COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EVALUATION of Decisions (EU) 2016/1112 and (EU) 2016/2371 of the European Parliament and of the Council providing Macro-Financial Assistance to Jordan and Tunisia (2016-2019)
Date: 2022-09-27
Institutions: Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: European neighbourhood policy, Jordan, Tunisia, democratisation, economic development, economic reform, economic stabilisation, financial aid, macroeconomics, structural adjustment

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 27.9.2022  SWD(2022) 300 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  EVALUATION  of Decisions (EU) 2016/1112 and (EU) 2016/2371 of the European Parliament and of the Council providing Macro-Financial Assistance to Jordan and Tunisia (2016-2019)  {SWD(2022) 301 final}  
 
 
Table of contents 

1. 

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 3 

1.1. 

Purpose and scope of the evaluation ............................................................................... 3 

2.  WHAT WAS THE EXPECTED OUTCOME OF THE INTERVENTION? ................................ 5 

2.1. 

2.2. 

Description of the intervention and its objectives ........................................................... 5 

Point(s) of comparison ................................................................................................... 10 

3.  HOW HAS THE SITUATION EVOLVED OVER THE EVALUATION PERIOD? ................ 10 

4. 

EVALUATION FINDINGS (ANALYTICAL PART) – JORDAN............................................... 14 

4.1. 

4.2. 

4.3. 

To what extent was the intervention successful and why? ............................................. 14 

How did the EU intervention make a difference? .......................................................... 15 

Is the intervention still relevant? .................................................................................... 16 

5. 

EVALUATION FINDINGS (ANALYTICAL PART) – TUNISIA ............................................... 17 

5.1. 

5.2. 

5.3. 

6. 

To what extent was the intervention successful and why? ............................................. 17 

How did the EU intervention make a difference? .......................................................... 19 

Is the intervention still relevant? .................................................................................... 19 

POTENTIAL  RELEVANT  IMPACT  OF  THE  OPERATIONS  IN  THE  REGION  – 
CURRENT 
INTERVENTIONS 
APPROPRIATE? .............................................................................................................................. 20 

FRAMEWORK 

EVALUATING 

FOR 

7.  WHAT ARE THE CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED? ............................................ 21 

7.1. 

7.2. 

Conclusions .................................................................................................................... 21 

Lessons learned .............................................................................................................. 22 

ANNEX I:   PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ....................................................................................... 24 

ANNEX II. METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL MODELS USED .............................................. 26 

ANNEX  III.  EVALUATION  MATRIX  AND,  WHERE  RELEVANT,  DETAILS  ON 

ANSWERS TO THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS (BY CRITERION) .................................... 30 

ANNEX  IV.  OVERVIEW  OF  BENEFITS  AND  COSTS  AND,  WHERE  RELEVANT, 

TABLE ON SIMPLIFICATION AND BURDEN REDUCTION................................................. 35 

ANNEX V. STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION – SYNOPSIS REPORT ......................................... 36 

REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................................... 38 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Glossary 

Term or acronym 

Meaning or definition 

BRG 

DG ECFIN 

Better Regulation guidelines 

Directorate-General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs 

DSA 

EFF 

EP 

EU 

EUR 

GDP 

IMF 

LFS 

MFA 

MoU 

OLP 

PFM 

SBA 

SWD 

TFEU 

ToR 

USD 

Debt sustainability analysis 

Extended fund facility  

European Parliament 

European Union 

Euro 

Gross domestic product 

International Monetary Fund 

Labour Force Survey 

Macro-financial assistance 

Memorandum of understanding 

Ordinary legislative procedure 

Public finance management 

Stand-by arrangement 

Staff working document 

Treaty on the functioning of the European Union 

Terms of Reference 

United States dollar 

2 

 
 
 
1. 

Introduction 

1.1.  Purpose and scope of the evaluation 

Macro-financial  assistance  (MFA)  is  a  form  of  European  Union  (EU)  financial  aid  for 
partner  countries  experiencing  a  balance-of-payments  crisis,  helping  to  restore  their 
external  stability  and  to  bring  their  economies  back  to  a  sustainable  path.  It  takes  the 
form of medium-/long-term loans or grants (or an appropriate combination thereof) and 
complements  financing  provided  by  the  international  community  in  the  context  of  a 
financing arrangement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Disbursements are 
conditional  on  the  implementation  of  policy  reforms  agreed  between  the  Commission, 
on  behalf  of  the  EU,  and  the  beneficiary  country  and  laid  down  in  a  memorandum  of 
understanding (MoU). 

Since  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Treaty  on  the  European  Union  and  the  Treaty  on  the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on 1 December 2009, MFA is governed by 
Article 212 TFEU (and Article 209 TFEU for developing countries). In turn, each MFA 
operation is authorised by the Council and the European Parliament based on a dedicated 
Commission  proposal,  in  accordance  with  the  ordinary  legislative  procedure  (OLP,  in 
line with Article 294 TFEU). In urgent cases, MFA operations can be authorised by the 
Council alone pursuant to Article 213 TFEU. 

In accordance with Article 212 TFEU, in 2016, Parliament and the Council approved a 
EUR  500  million  MFA  to  Tunisia1  and  a  EUR  200  million  MFA  to  Jordan2  (both 
abridged as ‘MFA-II’ hereinafter). These operations followed a first EU macro-financial 
assistance  intervention  in  the  respective  countries3,  as  both  countries  continued  to  deal 
with  serious  balance-of-payments  difficulties,  albeit  driven  by  different  factors.  While 
MFA-II  to  Tunisia  was  mostly  triggered  by  domestic  security  threats  and  the 
repercussions  of  the  crisis  in  Libya,  both  of  which  heavily  impacted  the  Tunisian 
economy, MFA-II to Jordan was  approved in the context of regional insecurity and the 
Syrian refugee influx, which continued to pose a major challenge to an already struggling 
economy.  

The second MFA to Tunisia was implemented between October 2017 and October 20194. 
It was linked to the fulfilment of 15 specific policy conditions5, covering 7 reform areas: 
public finance management (PFM) and civil  service reform; taxation; social protection; 
the labour market; the financial sector; the investment climate; and tourism. The second 
MFA to Jordan was implemented between October 2017 and July 2019, and contained 11 
structural conditions6 across 5 areas: PFM; taxation; social safety  nets; employment and 
trade; and water.  

1 Decision (EU) 2016/1112   
2 Decision (EU) 2016/2371  
3  MFA-I  to  Tunisia  was  adopted  in  2014  and  fully  disbursed  by  2017.  MFA-I  to  Jordan was  adopted  in 
2013 and fully disbursed by 2015. 
4 The final tranche was approved on 30 October and disbursed in early November 2019. 
5  The  policy  conditions  are  detailed  in  the  related  Memorandum  of  Understanding  between  the  EU  and 
Tunisia.  
6  The  policy  conditions  are  detailed  in  the  related  Memorandum  of  Understanding  between  the  EU  and 
Jordan. 

3 

 
 
                                                           
In  line with  the requirements set  out  in  the  Better Regulation  guidelines  (BRG)7, MFA 
operations  are  subject  to  an  ex  post  evaluation.  To  this  end,  and  in  the  context  of  the 
above-mentioned MFA-II operations to  Tunisia and Jordan,  the Directorate-General  for 
Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) engaged an external contractor to complete 
a  single  independent  assessment8  for  the  two  interventions  combined.  The  evaluation, 
which informs this staff working document (SWD), was undertaken by ICF NEXT S.A. 
in  December  2020,  in  collaboration  with  Cambridge  Econometrics,  and  concluded  in 
September 20219. The exercise  assessed the respective MFA-II operations’ contribution 
to the macroeconomic and structural adjustment of Tunisia and Jordan.  

Innovating from previous evaluations, which covered one MFA operation at a time, this 
joint  evaluation  analysed  key  similarities,  differences  and  patterns  across  the  two 
interventions.  The  MFA  operations  in  Jordan  and  Tunisia  seemed  suitable  for  a  joint 
evaluation,  based  on  regional  similarities,  partly  comparable  conditionality  and 
overlapping time frames of implementation. Therefore, the joint evaluation also assessed 
the  regional  impact  of  MFA  in  the  EU’s  Southern  Neighbourhood.  By  analysing  the 
relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, EU value added and coherence of the two operations, 
the evaluation examined:  

1.  whether  the  ex  ante  considerations  determining  the  design  and  terms  of  the 
operations  were  appropriate,  taking  due  account  of  the  economic,  political  and 
institutional context; and 

2.  whether the outcome of the operations met their intended objectives. 

In terms of its methodological approach, the evaluation rests on three pillars:  

1.  A theory-based approach, which involved making explicit the underlying theory 
of  change  for  the  MFA  operations  in  Tunisia  and  Jordan,  i.e.  how  the  MFA 
interventions and conditions were expected to contribute to MFA objectives, and 
then  testing  that  theory  to  draw  conclusions  about  whether  and  how  the  MFA 
contributed to the observed results. The theory of change was developed based on 
desk research and validated through key informant interviews; 

2. 

3. 

The  use  of  mixed  methods  (a  combination  of  both  quantitative  and  qualitative 
research methods) to facilitate deeper understanding of the evaluation issues and 
to build a rich and comprehensive evidence base for the evaluation; and 

Triangulation,  i.e.  the  information  and  data  collected  from  a  range  of  different 
sources collectively provide answers to DG ECFIN’s evaluation questions, as set 
out in the Terms of Reference (ToR). 

While a number of limitations were experienced during the preparation and completion 
of the study, such restrictions did not affect the robustness or reliability of the evaluation 
conclusions,  which  serve  as  a  useful  basis  for  this  document  and  provide  further 
reflections on the assistance. The limitations and mitigating factors are further detailed 
in Annex II (‘Methodology and Analytical models’).  

7 European Commission SWD(2021) 305  
8 Ex post evaluation of the macro-financial assistance operations to Jordan and Tunisia (2016-2019) 
9 Annex I to this SWD provides a detailed timeline of the evaluation. 

4 

 
 
 
                                                           
2.  What was the expected outcome of the intervention? 

2.1.  Description of the intervention and its objectives 

As of 201310, the Joint Declaration adopted by Parliament and the Council provides the 
guiding  principles  for  MFA  decisions,  detailing  the  general  eligibility  criteria  and 
principles relating to the instrument’s conditionality. Principle 1 of the Joint Declaration 
states  that  MFA  is  an  exceptional  financing  instrument  of  untied  and  undesignated 
balance-of-payments  support  to  eligible  non-EU  countries  and  territories.  Its  objectives 
are:  

a)  to  restore  a  sustainable  external  finance  situation  for  eligible  countries  and 

territories facing external financing difficulties;  

b)  to  underpin  the  implementation  of  a  policy  programme  that  contains  strong 
adjustment  and  structural  reform  measures  designed  to  improve  the  balance-of-
payments position, in particular over the programme period; and  

c)  to reinforce the implementation of relevant agreements and programmes with the 

EU.  

As reported in the ex ante assessment11 accompanying the Commission’s proposal for the 
second  MFA  operation,  at  the  end  of  the  first  half  of  2015  the  Tunisian  economy  had 
experienced a sharp downturn in its growth projections compared to the beginning of that 
year,  in  the  context  of  a  difficult  domestic  situation  and  the  civil  war  in  neighbouring 
Libya. This downward revision was largely driven by the negative effect of the terrorist 
attacks on tourism (which contributed about 7% of GDP and accounted for about 15% of 
employment),  on  transport  (about  7%  of  GDP),  and  on  foreign  investor  sentiment. 
Despite  lower  oil  prices,  weaker  domestic  economic  activity  and  improved  export 
performance, the negative impact of the terrorist attack in Sousse on tourism put further 
pressure on the current account, pushing the external deficit towards 8.9% of GDP by the 
end  of  2015.  Official  foreign  exchange  reserves  ended  2014  at  USD  7.7  billion,  or  the 
equivalent  of  just  3  months  of  imports.  Despite  the  issuance  of  a  USD 1 billion 
international  bond  in  January  2015,  which  temporarily  raised  the  level  of  reserves, 
reserves had fallen again to about USD 6.5 billion at the end of October 2015, just under 
4 months of imports, due to the falling tourism income. 

As regards reforms, Tunisia continued to suffer from a number of structural deficiencies. 
While  the  country  had  adopted  a  number  of  encouraging  reform  measures  in  the 
preceding  years,  notably  in  the  context  of  the  programme  agreed  with  the  IMF  and 
supported  by  the  then  ongoing  MFA-I12,  implementation  had  often  been  slower  than 
planned,  partly  reflecting  the  complex  political  transition  and  security  problems  the 
country  was  going  through.  As  was  the  case  in  2014,  structural  reform  progress  was 
mixed  in  2015.  Delays  in  the  formation  of  the  new  government  and,  subsequently,  the 
challenging  political  context  created  by  the  domestic  security  threats  led  to  the 

10 An initial framework for MFA operations was provided by the  ‘Genval criteria’, set by the Council in 
1993. Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the  ‘Genval criteria’ were replaced by 
the 2013 Joint Declaration of Parliament and the Council, which represents an understanding shared by the 
co-legislators. 
11 Commission SWD/2016/030  
12 Major progress was observed in relation to banking sector reform, tax reform and reform of the statistical 
system. 

5 

 
                                                           
postponement  of  certain  reforms13.  In  a  complex  domestic  and  regional  environment, 
further  progress  was  needed  to  support  growth  and  fiscal  consolidation,  even  if  the 
reform agenda gathered some momentum in the last quarter of 2015. 

Similarly, since the beginning of 2011, Jordan’s economy had been significantly affected 
by  the  ongoing  regional  unrest,  notably  in  neighbouring  Iraq  and  Syria.  The  Syrian 
conflict  had  impacted  Jordan  not  only  by  disrupting  trade  with  and  through  Syria,  but 
also by causing an influx of more than 670 000 Syrian refugees into the country, which 
increased pressure on Jordan’s fiscal position, public services and infrastructure. Despite 
the difficult regional situation, the country’s economic growth remained stable at around 
2.7%  between  2011  and  2014.  However,  in  2015  Jordan’s  economic  growth  slowed 
significantly,  with  the  intensification  of  the  crisis  and  through  its  impact  on  trade, 
tourism  and  investor  confidence,  as  well  as  the  slowdown  in  the  Gulf  Cooperation 
Council (GCC) economies. In that year, exports declined by 6.6%, while tourism income 
fell by 7.1%. Although low oil prices and an 11.5% reduction in total imports led to an 
improvement  in  the  current  account  (excluding  grants)  compared  to  the  previous  year, 
Jordan  still  ended  2015  with  a  current  account  deficit  of  8.9%  of  GDP.  Despite  net 
international reserves at the comfortable level of USD 13.4 billion, equivalent to about 7 
months of imports, in the first quarter of 2016 Jordan’s external position was still under 
considerable pressure14. 

In  the  context  of  adjustment  and  reform  programmes  supported  by  the  assistance  from 
the  IMF,  the  World  Bank  and  the  EU’s  first  MFA  operation,  the  Jordanian  authorities 
made  significant  progress  in  a  number  of  key  structural  reform  areas  (notably  fiscal 
policy  and  administration,  PFM  and  the  energy  sector).  However,  while  progress  in 
reforms  was  substantial,  additional  structural  reform  efforts  still  needed  to  be  pursued 
and intensified at the end of 2015, to enable Jordan to achieve the double goals of fiscal 
consolidation and strengthening growth in a challenging regional environment. 

In light of the above, the Tunisian and Jordanian authorities formalised their requests for 
new  MFA  operations  (the  MFA-II  operations)  in  August  2015  and  March  2016 
respectively.  

Tunisia had already agreed on a two-year stand-by arrangement (SBA) with the IMF in 
June 2013, for an amount of USD 1.75 billion (400% of the Tunisian quota), which was 
then extended until December 2015. When the second MFA was requested, the SBA was 
on  track,  with  discussions  with  the  IMF  for  a  4-year  extended  fund  facility  (EFF) 
beginning 4 months later. With the EFF in place by spring 2016, the decision to provide a 
EUR  500  million  MFA  to  Tunisia  was  adopted  by  Parliament  and  the  Council  in  July 
2016. The  assistance was  provided in  the form of concessional  long-term loans, whose 
funding the Commission borrowed on capital markets on behalf of the EU. The choice to 
provide  the  full  amount  of  the  assistance  in  the  form  of  loans  was  consistent  with  the 
methodology for determining the use of grants and loans in the EU MFA, as endorsed by 
the  Economic  and  Financial  Committee  in  January  201115,  considering  the  economic 

13 Namely on the creation of an asset management company, on social safety nets, on the business climate 

and PFM. 

14 Com SWD/2016/0213 
15 The 2011 note to the Economic and Financial Committee states on the use of loans and grants in MFA 
operations that the criteria to be  considered when choosing the form of assistance should be: (a) the 
level  of  wealth  of  the  beneficiary  country  (as  measured  by  GNI  per  capita  and  poverty  rate);  (b) 
sustainability of public debt; and (c) eligibility for  the concessional arms of the IMF or World Bank. 

6 

 
                                                           
situation  in  the  country.  The  MFA-II  loans  were  provided  in  three  tranches: 
EUR 200 million in October 2017, EUR 150 million in June 2019 and EUR 150 million 
in October 201916.  

Figure 1. Theory of change for MFA-II to Tunisia, 2016-2019 

Source: ICF 

The  MFA-II  operation  aimed  at  covering,  in  conjunction  with  funding  provided  by  the 
IMF  and  other  international  donors,  at  least  62%  of  Tunisia’s  estimated  external 
financing gap for the period 2016-201717. The MFA-II was intended to be disbursed over 
2016-2017 and represented 14.3% and 6.8% of the overall residual financing gap (after 
deducting net IMF financing and the expected disbursement of World Bank policy-based 
loans)  in  the  respective  years.  By  coupling  the  disbursement  of  the  second  and  third 

Tunisia is a middle-income country with a relatively high level of income per capita. While its public 
debt  ratios  have  increased  significantly  in  recent  years,  the  country’s  public  debt  dynamics  are 
considered sustainable and  it  does not benefit  from  International Development  Association (IDA) or 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) financing. 
16 Overview: EU macro-financial assistance operations to Tunisia. 
17 The total external financing gap estimated by the IMF stood at USD 5.1 billion in 2015 (USD 2.7 billion 

in 2016; USD 2.4 billion in 2017). 

7 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
tranches  to  the  realisation  of  15  conditions  covering  7  reform  areas,  the  operation  also 
aimed  to  support  Tunisia’s  fiscal  consolidation  efforts  and  external  stabilisation  in  the 
context of the IMF programme, while backing the country’s structural reform efforts to 
pursue sustainable growth. 

The  theory  of  change  (Figure  1)  illustrates  how  the  MFA  financial  assistance  and 
conditions  were  expected  to  contribute  to  these  objectives.  Further  details  on  the 
implementation process and timeline are provided in the evaluation findings (Chapter 5).  

When the Jordanian authorities requested a second MFA in March 2016, the country had 
just  completed  the  USD  2  billion  (800%  of  quota)  three-year  SBA  programme  agreed 
with the IMF in 2012. Negotiations for a successor arrangement were already under way, 
and the three-year EFF  with  the  IMF  officially  entered into force in  the second half of 
2016.  Parliament  and  Council  adopted  the  Decision  to  provide  the  EUR 200 million 
MFA to Jordan in December 2016.  

The assistance was provided in the form of concessional long-term loans, in accordance 
with the above-mentioned methodology for determining the use of grants and loans in the 
EU  MFA18.  MFA-II  loans  were  provided  in  two  tranches:  EUR 100  million  in 
October 2017 and the remaining EUR 100 million in June 2019.  

MFA-II was intended to be disbursed over 2016-2017 and represented 5.5% and 9.6% of 
the overall residual financing gap in the respective years, estimated by the IMF at USD 3 
billion  for  the  period  2016-2017  (roughly  USD  1.7  billion  in  2016  and  1.3  billion  in 
2017).  The  financing  gap  was  broadly  attributed  to  three  factors:  a  persistently  large 
current account deficit, large debt amortisation requirements, especially for 2016, and the 
need  to  maintain  a  prudent  foreign  exchange  reserve  level.  Other  donors  (including 
France,  Japan,  the  US,  the  Gulf  Cooperation  Council  countries  and  the  Arab  Monetary 
Fund,  as  well  as  the  EU  through  its  grant-based  budgetary  support  financed  by  the 
European Neighbourhood Instrument) contributed additional funds over the same period, 
ensuring reasonable burden sharing in the donors’ support effort. 

The  objective  of  MFA-II  was  threefold:  (i)  contribute  to  covering  Jordan’s  external 
financing needs in the context of a sizeable external financing gap; (ii) support the fiscal 
consolidation effort and external stabilisation, in the context of the IMF programme; and 
(iii)  support  structural  reform  efforts  aimed  at  improving  the  overall  macroeconomic 
management.  The  diagram  below  provides  a  complete  view  of  the  theory  of  change 
(Figure 2). 

The MFA operations in both Jordan and Tunisia were part of respective broader financial 
assistance  frameworks  in  which  the  European  Union  participated  together  with  other 
international  actors  through  a  variety  of  financial  instruments.  Although  different,  the 
programmes  shared  many  objectives,  jointly  contributing  to  the  economic  development 
of the beneficiary countries.  

18 Jordan is an upper  middle-income country  with a relatively  high per capita income level.  Jordan’s per 
capita  gross  national  income  (GNI),  which  amounted  to  USD  5 160  in  2014,  is  the  fifth  highest  per 
capita  income  in  the  Southern  Neighbourhood.  While  the  country  public  debt  ratio  had  significantly 
increased in recent years, reaching 93% of GDP in 2015, the public debt dynamics were judged to be 
sustainable and the economy did not benefit from IDA or PRGT financing. 

8 

 
 
                                                           
Focusing  on  the  alignment  between  MFA-II  and  support  provided  through  other 
instruments by actors other than the EU, the objectives and conditions of both operations 
were  consistent  with  the  financial  assistance  programmes  offered  by  the  IMF.  Since 
MFA  operations  are  conditional  on  a  continuously  satisfactory  track  record  in  the 
implementation  of  the  IMF-supported  policy  programme,  fund  conditions  (unless 
waived)  are  de  facto  incorporated  into  the  MFA  requirements,  as  the  satisfactory 
implementation  of  the  country-specific  IMF  programme  is  a  pre-condition  for  the 
approval and disbursement of MFA assistance.  

Figure 2. Theory of change for MFA-II to Jordan 2016-2019 

Source: ICF 

Similarly,  the  respective  MFA-II  operations  intervened  in  tandem  with  other  EU 
instruments, including the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), to support partner 
countries in  the Neighbourhood, and also  worked in  tandem  with  humanitarian aid  and 
other thematic instruments19.  

The key value added of the MFA in comparison to other EU instruments is to alleviate 
the external financial constraints and to help create a stable macroeconomic framework, 
including  by  promoting  a  sustainable  balance  of  payments  and  budgetary  situation,  as 
well  as  an  appropriate  framework  for  structural  reforms.  By  helping  to  put  in  place  an 
appropriate overall policy framework, MFA can increase the effectiveness of the actions 
financed under other, more narrowly focused, EU financial instruments. 

19  The  overall  EU  cooperation  with  Tunisia  (2011-2019)  was  also  examined  through  an  independent 
assessment finalised in April 2022 (FWC COM 2019/410446/1). That evaluation confirms the overall 
contribution of EU-Tunisia cooperation to the democratic transition and macroeconomic stabilisation 
of the country during the period under review. 

9 

 
 
 
                                                           
2.2.  Point(s) of comparison 

As  specified  in  the  Terms  of  Reference,  Decision  (EU)  2016/1112  and  Decision  (EU) 
2016/2371  (Article  8(2))  state  that:  ‘No  later  than  two  years  after  the  expiry  of  the 
availability  period  referred  to  in  Article  1(4),  the  Commission  shall  submit  to  the 
European Parliament and to the Council an ex post evaluation report.’  

In line with Article 8(2) of the legislative Decisions, an external evaluation assessed the 
results and the efficiency of the operations, by focusing on: (i) the impact of MFA on the 
economy  of  the  beneficiary  countries  and,  in  particular,  on  the  sustainability  of  their 
external position and (ii) the added value of the EU interventions.  

By doing so, the evaluation verified:  

– Whether the ex ante considerations determining the design and terms of each operation 
were appropriate, taking due account of the economic, political and institutional context; 
and 
–whether the programmes’ outcome met the objectives set in the legislative Decisions.  

In  line  with  the  BRG,  the  assessment  focused  on  five  evaluation  criteria:  relevance  of 
MFA-II  interventions;  coherence  with  international  and  other  EU  financial  assistance 
instruments;  effectiveness;  efficiency  and  EU  value  added.  The  points  of  comparison, 
against which the MFA operations of 2016-2019 were assessed, refer to the situation in 
Jordan  and  Tunisia  prior  to  the  intervention,  on  the  one  hand,  and  during  and 
immediately after the implementation of the operations, on the other. As per the focus of 
the  MFA  instrument,  particular  attention  was  paid  to  the  external  sector  and  the  fiscal 
situation of the two economies. 

In  addition  to  the  above-mentioned  evaluation  questions,  the  ex  post  evaluation 
separately addressed the following issues:  

– an analysis of social impact of the MFA operations (more specifically in relation to the 
policy measures included in the MoU relating to the social sector, and by including social 
variables in the analysis), including in combination with IMF programme measures; 
–  an  analysis  of  the  impact  of  the  MFA  operations  (also  in  combination  with  the  IMF 
programme)  on  the  country’s  debt  sustainability,  by  drawing  on  the  IMF’s  debt 
sustainability analysis (DSA).  

Finally,  the  ex  post  evaluation  of  MFA  operations  to  the  Southern  Neighbourhood 
countries of Tunisia and Jordan also drew out noteworthy comparisons between the two 
interventions. This was achieved by using the results of the assessment of the evaluation 
criteria,  highlighting  corresponding  strengths  and  weaknesses,  while  assessing  the 
general impact of MFA on the Southern Neighbourhood region. 

3.  How has the situation evolved over the evaluation period? 

As described in detail in the external evaluation report (Chapter 2), both countries faced 
external  and  domestic  shocks  that  aggravated  existing  economic  imbalances  and 

10 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
precipitated  the  need  for  international  financial  support.  To  achieve  the  objectives 
detailed in Section 2.1, and as per the usual MFA procedure, disbursements under these 
operations  were  tied  to  the  fulfilment  of  the  political  pre-conditions,  as  well  as  good 
progress  on  implementing  the  IMF  programme.  The  disbursement  of  the  following 
tranches  was  also  subject  to  fulfilment  of  a  set  of  country-specific  policy  conditions, 
specified in the MoU and related to key structural reform areas. 

In  the  case  of  Jordan,  the  release  of  the  first  tranche  took  place  on  25 October  2017, 
after  the  MoU20  came  into  force  in  September  2017.  The  second  and  final  tranche  was 
released on 24 June 2019. The delay with the second disbursement reflected the slower-
than-expected  reform  progress  in  some  policy  areas,  more  specifically  the  law  on  the 
Audit  Bureau,  the  law  on  income  tax  and  public  procurement.  By  the  time  the 
compliance statement was submitted in May 2019, the Jordanian authorities had achieved 
a high degree of compliance, fulfilling all 11 policy conditions across 5 structural reform 
areas.  

The MFA operation has had a positive contribution to the stabilisation of the Jordanian 
economy  and  helped  reduce  its  macroeconomic  imbalances  and  increase  resilience  to 
shocks  in  a  challenging  economic  environment.  The  first  tranche  was  disbursed  in  a 
particularly  challenging  context,  against  a  backdrop  of  rising  oil  prices  and  subsequent 
adjustment  in  electricity  tariffs,  as  well  as  issues  of  low  growth  and  low  investment. 
Without  the  first  tranche,  obtaining  alternative  financing  from  bilateral  donors  would 
have been complicated and highly uncertain, while drawing on reserves would have been 
severely constrained by looming repayment obligations. Similar challenges continued, in 
particular  low  growth,  weak  investment  and  shortfalls  in  expected  tax  revenue;  these 
remained relevant when the second tranche was transferred.  

Persistent  regional  instability  has  continued  to  weigh  considerably  on  the  Jordanian 
economy.  Over  the  years,  real  GDP  growth  slowed  from  3.1%  of  GDP  in  2014  to  an 
average  1.9%  during  2016-2019,  the  years  of  the  MFA-II  implementation.  With  the 
outbreak of the coronavirus crisis  in  2020  growth  slumped to  -1.6%, before recovering 
again.  Lower  growth  figures  are  partly  due  to  a  contraction  in  private  demand,  which 
resulted  from  an  increase  in  indirect  taxation.  Investment  and  public  demand  remained 
moderate.  

Against this background, unemployment rose continuously from 11.9% (2014) to 19.1% 
(2019), which then soared to 25% during the coronavirus pandemic in 2021 as a result of 
business bankruptcies and layoffs. Unemployment is particularly high among women and 
young people.  

Jordan had made remarkable progress with fiscal consolidation prior to the coronavirus 
pandemic.  The  government’s  budget  deficit  narrowed  from  10.3%  of  GDP  (2014)  to 
2.4% of GDP (2018), despite the previous interruption of gas supplies from Egypt, which 
drove the Jordanian government to replace gas with more expensive oil imports. With the 
onset of the coronavirus pandemic, the government adopted several support measures for 
the  national  economy  and  health  sector,  which  weighed  heavily  on  the  budget.  Yet 
Jordan was able to contain its budget deficit at 7% of GDP in 2021, also due to increases 
in tax revenue. Jordan’s debt has continued to pile up over the years, from 89% of GDP 
in 2014 to 108.6% of GDP in 2021. The amounts include the debt holding by the Social 

20 Memorandum of Understanding between EU and Jordan - MFA-II. 

11 

 
                                                           
Security  Investment  Fund,  which  represented  22%  of  GDP  in  2021.  The  debt  has 
continuously been assessed by the IMF as sustainable, most recently in December 2021.  

With respect  to  the  external  sector, the current account  balance has remained in  deficit 
and fluctuated strongly throughout the past decade, with extreme values of -2.1% of GDP 
in 2019 and -15% of GDP in 2021. Before the coronavirus pandemic, fluctuations were 
driven by developments in energy prices and imports, changes in remittances and tourism 
receipts. With the pandemic, the current account deficit widened even further, as Jordan’s 
tourism  imports  were  halted  due  to  travel  restrictions.  In  addition,  imports  recovered 
more quickly than exports, widening the deficit further.  

Foreign direct investment (FDI) plummeted to 1.1% of GDP in 2021, down from 5.4% of 
GDP in 2014. This downward trend is consistent with the long-term weakening of FDI 
(as a share of GDP) since the Syrian conflict, from an average of 12.7% in 2005-2010 to 
4.8%  in  2011-2017.  The  decline  in  FDI  created  further  pressures  on  the  capital  and 
financial account.  

The Central Bank of Jordan’s gross foreign reserves have remained strong over the years, 
gradually increasing from USD 15.5 billion in 2016 to USD 18 billion at the end of 2021, 
which included the IMF’s special drawing rights (SDR) allocation of SDR 328.8 million 
of August 2021. At the end of 2021, foreign reserves covered an estimated 8.2 months of 
Jordan’s imports of goods and services. 

2018 
2017 
41 457  42 947 
4 341 
4 274 
1.9 
2.0 
3.7 
3.2 
4.5 
3.3 
5.75 
5.0 
18.6 
18.3 
-2.4 
-2.5 
28.1 
27.8 

Jordan 
Nominal GDP, USD millions 
Nominal GDP per capita, USD 
Real GDP, % change 
Consumer price inflation, %, end of period 
Consumer price inflation, %, average 
Key monetary policy rate, %, end of period 
Unemployment rate, LFS, % 
General government balance, % of GDP 
Public expenditure, % of GDP 
Gross public debt (including debt holding 
by Social Security Fund), % of GDP 
Current account balance, % of GDP 
International reserves, USD billion 
International reserves, months of imports 
Gross external debt, % of GDP 
Net foreign direct investment, % of GDP 
Source: National authorities, Commission staff calculations. *estimates 2021. 

92.8 
-10.6 
15.0 
7.8 
71.1 
4.9 

92.9 
-6.9 
12.9 
6.8 
72.9 
2.2 

2021 
2020 
2019 
44 573  43 755  45 307 
4 399 
4 259 
2.2 
-1.6 
2.4 
0.1 
1.4 
0.5 
2.75 
2.5 
23.2 
22.7 
-5.1 
-7.0 
30.6* 
29.7 

4 426 
2.0 
0.6 
0.6 
4.0 
19.1 
-3.3 
27.9 

95.2 
-2.1 
13.9 
9.8 
72.1 
1.5 

106.5 
-8.0 
15.6 
11.0 
82.1 
1.6 

110.3 
-12.1 
18.0 
9.5 
85.5* 
0.9* 

In the case of Tunisia, MFA-II consisted of up to EUR 500 million in the form of long-
term  loans. MFA-II  was approved by the European Parliament and the  Council in  July 
2016, shortly after the Commission’s proposal.  

12 

 
 
 
The Tunisian MFA-II was disbursed in full. The first disbursement of EUR 200 million 
was made in October 2017, soon after the Tunisian Parliament’s ratification of the MoU21 
and the disbursement of the final tranche of MFA-I. The disbursements of the second and 
third  tranches  were  linked  to  15  specific  policy  conditions  in  seven  reform  areas:  (i) 
public  finance  management  (PFM)  and  civil  service  reform;  (ii)  taxation;  (iii)  social 
protection;  (iv)  the  labour  market;  (v)  the  financial  sector;  (vi)  the  investment  climate; 
and (vii) tourism. The disbursements of the second and third tranches (EUR 150 million 
each) were approved in June and October 2019 respectively, after a long time lag linked 
to  a  complicated  political  situation  and  slow  progress  in  fulfilling  some  of  the  policy 
conditions. 

During the evaluation period, Tunisia was facing a complicated economic and financial 
situation.  The  Tunisian  authorities  had  requested  the  new  MFA  operation  in  August 
2015, as the country was struck by three major terrorist attacks and an attempted invasion 
by  Daesh  in  March  2016  that  heavily  impacted  tourism,  transport,  investment  and 
ultimately the entire Tunisian economy. As in the case of Jordan, the MFA operation also 
provided  a  positive  contribution  to  the  stabilisation  of  the  Tunisian  economy  in  a 
challenging economic environment, helping reduce major imbalances. 

Tunisia 
Nominal GDP, millions USD 
Nominal GDP per capita, USD 
Real GDP, % change 
Consumer price inflation, %, end of period 
Consumer price inflation, %, average 
Key monetary policy rate, %, end of period 
Unemployment rate, LFS, % 
General government balance, % of GDP 
Gross public debt, % of GDP 
Current account balance, % of GDP 
International reserves, USD billion 
International reserves, months of imports 
Gross external debt, % of GDP 
Net foreign direct investment, % of GDP 

2017 
2019 
2018 
39 989  39 932  39 319 
3 324 
3 443 
3 436 
1.3 
2.6 
1.9 
6.0 
7.5 
6.2 
6.7 
7.3 
5.3 
7.8 
6.8 
5.0 
14.9 
15.5 
15.5 
-3.3 
-4.8 
-6.2 
67.9 
77.9 
70.4 
-8.4 
-11.2 
-10.3 
7.5 
5.3 
5.6 
4.5 
2.5 
2.7 
97.3 
99.7 
86.2 
2.1 
2.5 
2.0 

2020 
39 333 
3 295 
-8.7 
4.9 
5.6 
6.3 
17.4 
-9.7 
77.8 
-6.5 
9.2 
5.4 
100.9 
1.5 

2021 
43 568 
3 721 
3.1 
6.6 
5.7 
6.3 
18.4 
-8.3 
85.6 
-6.3 
8.0 
4.4 
96.3 
1.2 

Source: National authorities; Commission staff calculations; IMF 

The  Tunisian  economy  only  saw  a  moderate  expansion  in  2017,  one  that  continued  in 
2018, driven by the performance of the agriculture sector, greater exports and a recovery 
in tourism. During this period, the government made some progress on selected structural 
reforms  and managed to introduce some measures aimed at balancing the fiscal deficit, 
which included higher taxes. These measures helped reduce the deficit from 6% of GDP 
in  2017  to  3.9%  of  GDP  in  2019.  Debt  remained  elevated  (78%  of  GDP  in  2018), 
however,  limiting  the  authorities’  fiscal  headroom.  Inflation,  averaging  4.6%  between 
2010 and 2017, rose to 7% in 2018, while unemployment remained at around 15%.  

21 Memorandum of Understanding between EU and Tunisia - MFA-II. 

13 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Driven by a slowdown in agriculture and a contraction in industry, GDP growth fell to 
1.3%  in  2019.  High  unemployment  rates  persisted,  while  the  current  account  deficit 
remained under pressure on the back of higher oil prices. There were some slippages in 
fiscal  stabilisation,  through  civil  service  wage  hikes  and  a  pause  in  energy  price  hikes 
(partly  due  to  pressures  stemming  from  elections  in  2019).  More  generally,  the 
complicated political and economic situation stability weighed on reforms throughout the 
programme.  

At  the  beginning  of  the  MFA,  the  continuity  of  EU  support  in  Tunisia  was  valuable, 
given the deteriorating fiscal stance (public deficit stood at 6.5% in 2017). In 2019, the 
second and third disbursements also  came at  a time when growth  was decelerating and 
considerable debt repayment obligations were due (EUR 2 billion). In 2018, the absence 
of  an  MFA  disbursement  was  accommodated  by  budgetary  support  from  other 
international financial institutions (IFIs) and donors, as well as through financing raised 
from  the  domestic  banks  (in  foreign  currency).  Overall,  during  the  intervention  period 
prior to the coronavirus pandemic, the implementation of reforms linked to the IMF and 
the  MFA  programmes  accompanied  improvements  in  macroeconomic  data.  These 
included  lower  fiscal  deficits  and  public  debt,  a  lower  current  account  deficit  and  the 
improvement in international reserves in 2019. 

4.  Evaluation findings (analytical part) – Jordan 

4.1.  To what extent was the intervention successful and why?  

The  financial  support  provided  under  MFA-II  has  contributed  to  the  stabilisation  of 
Jordan’s economic performance over the years. The majority of the experts interviewed 
in the evaluation study believe that the macroeconomic outcomes would have been less 
favourable  in  the  absence  of  MFA-II.  In  particular,  the  highly  favourable  terms  of  the 
loan allowed for a reduction in the cost of public debt, as compared to alternative sources 
of  financing  (see  Chapter  6.5  of  the  independent  evaluation).  The  magnitude  of  the 
intervention  allowed  the  Jordanian  government  to  pursue  fiscal  savings  without 
burdensome public spending cuts, creating room for much-needed structural reforms. In 
addition, MFA conditionality helped in identifying priority reform areas. 

The amount of the MFA-II (EUR 200 million) corresponded to 0.6% of Jordan’s GDP in 
2017, or 0.3% of GDP for each disbursement  in 2017 and 2019. Even though the final 
MFA amount was lower than originally requested by the Jordanian authorities (EUR 350 
million),  this  was  justified  based  on  an  updated  assessment  of  the  country’s  external 
financing  needs.  In  addition,  the  prospect  of  an  additional  follow-up  MFA  was 
incorporated  in  a  joint  declaration  by  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council  and  the 
Commission,  which  was  attached  to  the  MFA  decision.  This  follow-up  MFA  was 
eventually  agreed  in  2019,  after  the  successful  implementation  of  MFA-II.  The  size  of 
MFA-II  also  corresponded  to  the  amount  pledged  by  the  Commission  at  the  London 
Donor Conference ‘Supporting Syria and the Region’ in February 2016.  

Initially,  the  MFA-II  was  intended  to  be  fully  disbursed  over  2016-2017,  which  would 
then have represented 5.5% and 9.6% of the overall financing gap in the respective years 
(evaluation Chapter 6.1 provides additional details). Other donors were identified ex ante 
to fill the remaining financing gap, including the IMF and WB commitments. 

14 

 
 
During the implementation of MFA-II, cooperation between the different donors and the 
Jordanian authorities continued to be strong, which was also confirmed in the context of 
the London conference in 2019, which had produced a 5-year reform matrix for Jordan. 
This cooperation not only made the MFA-II intervention more coherent and aligned with 
the work of other donors,  but  also  reinforced the Jordanian government’s  ownership  of 
the reform areas (Chapter 6.2). 

The Jordanian government believed in the reforms, for which MFA-II provided impetus. 
The  observable  medium-term  impacts,  for  instance  higher  tax  revenue  following  the 
broadening of the tax base, have contributed to the government’s sense of ownership of 
the reform. Despite this, interviewees stated public ownership of the policy reforms may 
have been held back by  limited communication by the government on their importance. 
An  example  would  be  the  law  on  income  tax,  for  which  the  government  did  not  run  a 
campaign  to  inform  the  public  about  the  reform’s  long-term  benefits.  In  addition,  the 
high  turnover  of  government  officials,  together  with  unpredictable  legislative  and 
oversight  processes,  may  in  some  instances  have  led  to  varying  levels  of  reforms 
ownership. 

By  the  time  the  compliance  statement  was  submitted  in  May  2019,  the  Jordanian 
authorities had achieved a high degree of compliance, fulfilling all 11 conditions across 5 
structural  reform  areas  (see  evaluation  Chapter  6.1.2  for  a  detailed  analysis).  More 
specifically,  policy  conditions  were  either  fully  met  (as  in  most  cases,  including  on 
public  debt,  the  Audit  Bureau,  tax  reform,  the  household  survey,  the  social  safety  net, 
vocational training and the water sector) or broadly met (public procurement). 

Bureaucratic  procedures  negatively  affected  the  implementation  of  MFA-II.  Responses 
by  the  Jordanian  authorities  took  a  long  time  according  to  interviewees,  partly  due  to 
bureaucracy and associated indecisiveness, but also due to high staff turnover, excessive 
red  tape,  lack  of  adequate  resources,  burdensome  administrative  practices  and 
hierarchical complexity. 

The  monitoring  and  liaison  processes  went  smoothly.  The  Commission  cooperated 
closely  with  the  European  External  Action  Service  headquarters  and  in  Amman.  The 
very  good  coordination  with  the  IMF  simplified  the  monitoring  process  in  terms  of 
negotiations  and  sharing  information.  The  EU  delegation  in  Amman  effectively 
coordinated  meetings  with  the  Jordanian  Ministry  of  Planning  and  International 
Cooperation  (MoPIC)  and  engaged  with  the  authorities  on  the  ground,  by  regularly 
monitoring the implementation of reforms. Interviewees suggested improving the policy 
dialogue with actors in Jordan, especially at the design and implementation stages, so as 
to ensure effective coordination and monitoring.  

All in all, the MFA-II contribution was deemed appropriate and proportional in terms of 
burden sharing with other donors and achieving macroeconomic stability in Jordan. 

4.2.  How did the EU intervention make a difference? 

The EU added value from MFA-II had a financial and non-financial aspect. MFA-II was 
an  indispensable  part  of  an  overall  external  financial  assistance  package  prepared  by 
international donors in 2016. In that context, the financial contribution was important to 
cover  part  of  Jordan’s  financing  gap.  With  the  highly  concessional  terms  of  the  loans, 
which included a relatively low interest rate, long maturity and a long grace period, the 
MFA  also  translated  into  fiscal  savings  for  the  government.  In  addition,  individual  EU 

15 

 
Member States  alone  would  likely not  have  provided aid  of that size in  addition  to  the 
support they were already providing. 

Beyond  the  financial  contribution,  the  EU  contributed  to  significant  progress  in  key 
reform  areas.  MFA  conditionality  provided  a  politically  reinforcing  effect  that 
contributed  to  the  authorities’  sustained  mobilisation  around  crucial  (and  often  new) 
reform areas. There was considerable cross-conditionality with other donors (IMF, World 
Bank) in areas related to the tax regime, debt sustainability and water. 

The  MFA  had  an  important  signalling  effect  to  the  Jordanian  public,  the  private  sector 
and  to  international  donors,  as  it  showed  the  EU’s  commitment  to  supporting  Jordan 
during a difficult time. Despite this, interviewees noted that the visibility of the MFA was 
limited,  as  the  instrument  is  not  necessarily  known  beyond  limited  circles  of  informed 
stakeholders (see Annex 7.2 to the evaluation for additional details).  

The  MFA  also  contributed  to  restoring  confidence  in  the  economy,  as  the  reforms  are 
designed  to  foster  economic  stability.  The  continuous  MFA  support,  together  with  the 
support  of  international  donors,  tends  to  be  perceived  positively  also  by  credit  rating 
agencies.  Interviewees  indicated  that  donors’  assistance  may  not  be  sufficient  to  avoid 
downgrades in case of severe deterioration, yet the assistance is a stabilising factor also 
in that context.  

The  consultants  conducted  an  analysis  and  consulted  local  experts  to  enquire  about 
counterfactual  alternatives,  i.e.  what  might  have  happened  in  the  absence  of  MFA 
(Annex 11 to the evaluation).  

Under the first counterfactual scenario, it was  assumed that the first MFA-II tranche of 
EUR 100  million  in  2017  was  not  disbursed,  and  that  there  were  no  plausible 
alternatives.  

Under counterfactual scenario 2, the second MFA-II tranche of EUR 100 million in 2019 
was not disbursed, and again there were no plausible alternatives.  

Under  counterfactual  scenario  3,  the  assumption  was  that  neither  MFA-II  nor  the  IMF 
extended  fund  facility  were  disbursed.  According  to  the  survey  results,  respondents 
mostly  considered  increased  tax  collection,  raising  funds  from  domestic  markets  or 
reduced  capital  expenditure  as  the  most  plausible  alternatives  to  external  financing  for 
scenarios  1  and  2.  Respondents  expected  Jordan  to  have  experienced  a  significant 
financing  gap  under  scenario  3,  with  hypothetic  consequences  ranging  from  further 
tightening  of  the  government’s  fiscal  stance  to  sovereign  default.  The  exercise  on 
counterfactual  alternatives  showed  that  MFA  delivered  an  essential  contribution  to 
bridging the financing gap the government was facing in 2017-2019. 

4.3. 

Is the intervention still relevant? 

The MFA-II conditions were in line with Jordan’s reform priorities and also responded to 
the  country’s  needs.  The  MFA-II  conditions  built  upon  previous  reform  efforts  of  the 
first  MFA,  in  particular  in  the  areas  of  public  finance  management  (PFM),  the  social 
safety net, the labour market and utilities. All these areas were very relevant at that time 
and the reforms have been bearing fruits ever since. MFA-III in turn continued to build 
on previous reform achievements, in particular for PFM, taxation, the social safety net, 
the labour market and utilities.  

16 

 
All in all, MFA-II was highly relevant through its support of Jordan at a time of financial 
needs, helping it address its balance-of-payment problems and implement key structural 
reforms to stabilise the economy and increase the sustainability of its external position. 

5.  Evaluation findings (analytical part) – Tunisia 

5.1. 

 To what extent was the intervention successful and why?  

The MFA-II operation to Tunisia also contributed to macroeconomic stabilisation in the 
country,  in  a  persistently  challenging  economic  context  with  high  external  financing 
needs. The independent evaluation shows that the assistance was effective in helping to 
improve  Tunisia’s  balance-of-payment  situation,  as  well  as  in  supporting  fiscal 
consolidation  through  highly  concessional  financial  terms  and  policy  conditions.  As  in 
the case of Jordan, this  made it possible to create additional fiscal space and facilitated 
the implementation of structural reforms. 

The operation covered around 9% of the financing gap for the period 2017-2019 through 
EUR 500 million in loans on highly concessional terms and increased confidence in the 
Tunisian economy (see evaluation Chapter 5.1). The evaluation for Tunisia offered some 
quantitative  estimates  of  counterfactual  scenarios,  beyond  the  expert  survey  (Chapter 
5.3). According to the evaluation22, aside from the higher cost of servicing debt, the main 
downsides of the absence of MFA would have been a GDP decline as a result of cuts to 
public  expenditure  (real  GDP  0.44-1.1%  lower  by  2025  compared  to  the  baseline)  and 
inflationary  pressures  (inflation  rate  0.2-0.3  percentage  points  higher)  from  increased 
domestic financing.  

Overall,  the  favourable  loan  terms  allowed  for  an  improvement  in  debt  sustainability23 
and  a  reduction  in  the  cost  of  public  debt,  as  compared  to  alternative  sources  of 
financing. In the case of Tunisia, survey respondents (Annex 6 to the evaluation) felt that 
while  domestic  financing  could  have  been  a  plausible  alternative  to  MFA,  there  were 
important concerns regarding higher interest rates and ‘crowding out’ effects (i.e. rising 
public  sector  borrowing  could  have  driven  up  interest  rates  and  driven  down  private 
sector  investment).  With  greater  reliance  on  non-concessional  (financial)  support, 
Tunisia’s ability to service its debt would have been affected. Additionally, many survey 
respondents  also  indicated  that  MFA-II  helped  to  restore  confidence  in  the  economy 
(evaluation Chapter 5.7).  

In addition, MFA was instrumental in identifying priority reform areas and implementing 
corresponding key reforms during the period. The operation was fully disbursed, with all 
but  one  condition  met24.  The  evaluation  found  that  in  assessing  the  fulfilment  of  the 
conditions, the right balance was struck between flexibility (e.g. VAT) and steadfastness 
where necessary to foster reform (e.g. the Law on the Court of Auditors).  

22 The detailed counterfactual analysis can be found in Annex 12.2 to the evaluation. 
23 The absence of individual tranches of MFA-II would have increased Tunisia’s debt accumulation only 
slightly, although the undiscounted impacts on the cost of Tunisia’s borrowing would have been substantial 
in the absence of MFA (approximately EUR 235.9 million).   
24 As indicated in the evaluation, a duly justified waiver was granted for some of the conditions linked to 
the planned suppression of the VAT middle rate, due to relevant policy changes during the implementation 
period.  

17 

 
 
                                                           
Tunisia made substantial reform progress in certain areas, notably on the legislative front, 
with the parliamentary adoption of key laws (external audit, social safety net), and on the 
technical front, with the creation of a scoring model to underpin the targeting of support 
to  vulnerable  households  (social  safety  net).  In  other  areas  (tax  reform,  investment 
climate),  progress  was  more  fragmented.  However,  even  in  areas  where  there  was 
significant progress, the evaluation indicated that there was little recognition in Tunisia 
beyond  government  circles  and  international  experts.  As  expected,  the  visibility  of  the 
MFA  instrument  among  the  general  public  was  very  limited,  with  no  associated  public 
acceptance issues. By contrast, the IMF programme faced more criticism. 

Beyond  reforms,  the  counterfactual  analysis  conducted  during  the  evaluation  (Chapter 
6.4) also suggested that  in the absence of MFA-II the social situation would have been 
moderately  negatively  affected.  The  independent  evaluation  also  shows  that  the  MFA 
was  designed  and  implemented  efficiently  and  that  it  was  consistent  with  the  broad 
policy  framework  guiding  EU-Tunisia  relations  and  with  interventions  from  other 
international  donors.  However,  given  its  relatively  limited  size,  it  is  unlikely  that  the 
absence of MFA would have significantly affected the sustainability of Tunisian public 
debt. 

The relevance of the MFA financial envelope remained high throughout the operation. In 
2017, the continuity of EU support in Tunisia was valuable given the deteriorating fiscal 
stance.  In  2019,  the  second  and  third  disbursements  came  at  a  time  when  growth  was 
decelerating  (dropping  to  1%)  and  considerable  debt  repayment  obligations  were  due 
(EUR 2 billion). In 2018, the absence of  an MFA disbursement was accommodated by 
budgetary  support  from  other  IFIs  and  donors,  as  well  as  by  financing  raised  from  the 
domestic banks (in foreign currency).  

MFA-related  reforms  were  well  aligned  with  the  reform  programme,  to  which  the 
authorities were already  committed.  In general,  the evaluation  indicated that the liaison 
with  the  authorities  was  more  fluid  under  MFA-II  than  in  the  previous  operation. 
However,  other  factors  served  to  block  reforms,  such  as  political  instability  resulting 
from  frequent  changes  of  government,  and  the  severe  deterioration  of  socioeconomic 
conditions.  Additionally,  capacity  issues  caused  delays  in  implementing  reform  on  the 
Tunisian  side.  In  some  cases,  complementary  technical  assistance  programmes  run  by 
other  donors  were  instrumental  in  taking  forward  the  reforms  (e.g.  technical  assistance 
from the Word Bank for social safety net reforms). In other cases, the roots of the issue 
were  more  of  a  coordination  failure  on  the  authorities’  side;  these  were  to  be  partly 
addressed by the intensification of coordination work by key donors and IFIs from 2018. 

The  independent  evaluation  also  shows  that  the  MFA-II  was  aligned  with  the  broad 
policy  framework  guiding  EU-Tunisia  relations,  including  the  Association  Agreement 
and  the  European  Neighbourhood  policy.  It  was  also  an  integral  part  of  the  wider 
package  of  EU  support  to  post-revolution  Tunisia  and  adequately  supplemented  EU 
budget  support  programmes  in  several  domains.  The  EU  delegation  in  Tunis  also 
supported 
the 
implementation of reforms and the engagement with authorities on the ground. 

effectively  MFA 

implementation, 

to  monitoring 

contributed 

MFA-II  was  also  consistent  with  the  assistance  provided  by  other  international 
organisations, most notably the IMF and World Bank (including at conditionality level). 
Donor  coordination  efforts  intensified  in  Tunisia  over  the  course  of  MFA-II,  as 
illustrated by the organisation of joint high-level missions to support policy dialogue and 

18 

 
the adoption of joint policy matrices, including key socioeconomic reforms, agreed with 
the Tunisian government. 

5.2.  How did the EU intervention make a difference? 

The  EU  provided  significant  added  value  to  Tunisia  through  the  MFA-II,  both  in 
financial terms and through a push for key reforms. As in the case of Jordan, the financial 
contribution was relevant to cover part of the country’s financing gap and  provided EU 
added value in that individual Member States alone would likely not have provided aid of 
that  size  in  the  form  of  budget  support  in  addition  to  the  support  they  were  already 
providing. Also, the favourable conditions associated with the MFA loans, granted under 
very concessional terms (with low rates and long maturities averaging 15 years), created 
conditions for fiscal savings and a gradual adjustment of the primary public deficit.  

MFA-II  had  some  confidence-boosting  effects  and,  together  with  the  IMF,  prevented  a 
further drop in confidence in the Tunisian economy. As analysed in the evaluation report 
(Chapter  5.7),  MFA-II  also  sent  a  strong  signal  of  EU  support  to  Tunisia  at  a  time  of 
crisis, reinforcing the EU-Tunisia privileged partnership and Tunisia’s ongoing political 
transition.  It  was  received  positively  in  the  country,  despite  certain  public  scepticism 
about the effectiveness of international support and the donor agenda in general.  

The  MFA  also  had  a  reinforcing  effect  on  the  implementation  of  key  reforms  and  was 
instrumental in achieving the independence of the Court of Auditors25. The expert survey 
suggested that the EU could have used its leverage to promote deeper structural reforms, 
such as reform of state-owned enterprises or the public administration, which would have 
required  a  larger  support  package  to  overcome  resistance  to  change.  In  the  Tunisian 
MFA,  cross-conditionality  with  the  IMF  and  the  World  Bank  was  also  evident  in  civil 
service  reform,  VAT  reform,  the  financial  sector,  the  investment  climate,  social 
protection  and  public  procurement.  Finally,  the  evaluation  indicated  that  the  roles  with 
the IMF could have been better divided, with more efficient use of cross-conditionality 
and better targeted EU efforts. 

5.3. 

Is the intervention still relevant? 

The  evaluation  found  that  MFA-II  was  relevant  in  terms  of  its  design  and  objectives, 
financial envelope and structural conditions. The MFA-II package of EUR 500 million in 
loans  on  highly  concessional  terms,  was  large  in  both  absolute  and  relative  terms.  It 
represented a step change compared to MFA-I (EUR 300 million). Aside from Ukraine, 
the MFA-II operation to Tunisia was the largest MFA operation since 200026. The total 
MFA support volume  corresponded to  circa 0.6% and 0.9% of GDP  in  2017 and 2019 
respectively (the years when the different instalments were disbursed). This represented 
more than public expenditure on one of the main social assistance programmes in Tunisia 
(Programme  National  d’Aide  aux  Familles  Nécessiteuses,  PNAFN),  which  commonly 
absorbed around 0.5% of GDP per year. Thus, the size and form of the MFA financing 
were assessed as appropriate by the evaluation. 

25  The  independent  evaluation  contains  a  detailed  case  study  of  this  reform  in  the  area  of  external  audit 
(Annex 9) 

26  European  Union,  macro-financial  assistance  to  non-EU  partner  countries,  2019,  Available  at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/international-
economic-relations/macro-financial-assistance-mfa-non-eu-partner-countries_en#documents  

19 

 
                                                           
All thematic areas addressed by MFA-II conditionality corresponded to priority areas for 
reform. In several areas (external audit and social safety net), MFA-II conditions showed 
continuity with MFA-I, facilitating ongoing progress. Also, the lessons from MFA-I were 
incorporated  in  the  design  of  MFA-II  conditions:  the  level  of  ambition  of  the  social 
safety  net  conditions  was  better  calibrated  than  in  MFA-I,  and  measures  related  to 
preparation for a deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA) were not included.  

The conditions were strongly aligned with the country’s own reforms agenda, and there 
was an effort to balance and tailor different types of conditions to the Tunisian context. 
longer-term  reform,  with  MFA-II  containing  more 
The  focus  was  more  on 
legislative/institutional  change-related  conditions  that  the  previous  MFA.  The  Tunisian 
authorities found that the conditions were sufficiently specific to avoid misinterpretation, 
while also  providing for a degree of flexibility in  implementation (Chapter 7.1). At the 
same  time,  some  experts  in  the  evaluation  pointed  to  certain  conditions  that  appeared 
linked  to  EU  interests,  including  access  of  firms  (including  foreign  firms)  to  public 
procurement or the Euro-Aviation agreement. 

Overall,  the  EU  added  value  primarily  lay  in  the  financial  benefits  to  the  Tunisian 
economy,  with  the  highly  concessional  terms  of  the  MFA  loans  allowing  for  fiscal 
savings,  a  more  gradual  adjustment  of  the  primary  public  deficit  and  facilitating  the 
sustainability  of  Tunisia’s  public  debt.  The  EU’s  intervention  helped  Tunisia’s 
adjustment  path  by  creating  fiscal  space  for  other  reforms  and  for  sustaining  social 
spending.  Additional  key  added  value  resulted  from  the  MFA’s  support  for  reforms. 
Conditions  were  aligned  with  the  country’s  priorities  and  highly  relevant  in  advancing 
important  reforms  in  the  country  to  foster  growth  and  enhance  sustainability  of  its 
external position. 

6. 

 Potential relevant impact of the operations in the region – current 
framework for evaluating interventions appropriate? 

While  MFA  operations  pursue  objectives  at  national  level,  the  independent  evaluation 
also looked at their potential impact at regional level (Chapter 7). In principle, MFAs are 
of limited size compared to the economies they support. In a context where Tunisia and 
Jordan are not among the largest economies of the region and intraregional integration is 
low,  it  is  less  likely  that  MFA  operations  would  have  direct  macroeconomic  impacts 
beyond borders.  

However, MFA was part of a broader package and  the evaluation shows that shocks of 
large magnitude could have arisen  in the absence of such a broader package,  similar to 
the  scenario  assessed  where  no  MFA  and  no  IMF  programmes  would  have  been 
available  (Chapters  5.5  and  6.5).  This  would  have  rendered  negative  spillovers  more 
likely, especially for Jordan, where debt sustainability would have been severely affected 
already in the short term.  

At the same time, the MFA to Jordan was part of a broader package intended to help the 
country deal with the consequences of the Syrian refugee crisis, which was a crisis on a 
regional scale. The MFA complemented EU efforts through other instruments to address 
the  refugee  emergency  and  contained  specific  policy  conditionality  supporting  the 
scheme  agreed  in  the  EU-Jordan  Compact,  which  eased  the  EU’s  rules  of  origin  for 
Jordanian export companies employing a minimum share of Syrian refugees. By contrast, 

20 

 
 
while  the  crisis  in  Tunisia  partly  stemmed  from  other  regional  problems  (linked  to 
terrorism and the war in Libya), this broader element was less evident.  

Based on the experience from both Tunisia and Jordan (see Chapter 2 of the evaluation), 
crises  in  neighbouring  countries  can  have  tangible  impacts  on  other  countries  in  the 
region  through  channels  such  as  image  and  confidence.  Promoting  stability  in  a  single 
country  (or  two  individual  countries)  can  potentially  contribute  to  building  confidence 
and  attracting  tourism  and  investment  flows  into  the  Middle  East  and  North  Africa 
(MENA)  region.  In  both  cases,  EU  support  might  have  contributed,  indirectly,  to 
moderating  the  total  outflow  of  economic  migrants  in  the  area  by  helping  to  restore 
macroeconomic stability.  

Finally,  there  was  no  specific  evidence  that  the  MFA  support  prompted  change  at  a 
regional  level.  No  specific  example  could  be  pinpointed  in  the  evaluation,  but 
interviewees  generally  felt  that  it  could  in  theory  play  a  role.  There  was  certainly  an 
expectation from the EU that the MFA-II operation to Tunisia would be seen as a signal 
of support for democratic reform in the region.  

7.  What are the conclusions and lessons learned? 

7.1.  Conclusions 

The independent evaluation analysed the relevance,  coherence,  efficiency, effectiveness 
and EU value added of the MFA-II operations to Jordan and Tunisia implemented during 
2016-2019. It also explored the social impact of MFA, its effect on the countries’ public 
debt  sustainability  and  the  possible  regional  implications  of  the  operations.  The  study, 
conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic, encountered some data limitations and other 
shortcomings that were, however, duly mitigated.  

The  evaluation  finds  that  both  MFA-II  operations  were  relevant  in  terms  of  their 
objectives, form and timing. The overall design of the operations was also considered as 
appropriate.  The  size  of  the  respective  loans  was  deemed  meaningful,  but  not  critical, 
also  according  to  key  consulted  stakeholders.  Overall,  the  study  shows  that  the 
macroeconomic  situation  would  have  been  slightly  worse  in  the  absence  of  the  MFA 
financing, at least in Tunisia. In both countries, debt sustainability would have remained 
largely  similar  to  what  was  observed  (the  baseline)  in  the  case  of  no  MFA  funding. 
However, the combined counterfactual effect of no-MFA and no-IMF would have been 
very negative for the Jordanian economy. The evaluation report notably finds that, in this 
hypothetical  scenario,  the  country  would  have  most  likely  lost  access  to  international 
financial markets, further increasing the size of the financing gap. 

Similarly, in the absence of the respective MFA-II operations, the social situation would 
have been negatively affected through direct channels in both countries (slower or more 
superficial progress on key reforms such as social safety net reforms and labour market 
policy)  and  via  indirect  channels  in  Tunisia  (higher  costs  of  living  and  lost  income 
stemming from GDP impacts). Social impacts would have been even more severe in the 
absence of both the MFA and IMF funding. 

MFA policy conditionality covered the most relevant reform areas for both countries and 
supported  macroeconomic  stabilisation.  The  thematic  areas  addressed  by  the  MFA 
conditionality  were  relevant  and  aligned  with  the  countries’  own  reform  agendas,  and 
both  countries  made  tangible  reform  progress.  Conditions  in  the  respective  MFA-II 

21 

 
operations  showed  continuity  with  previous  MFA  operations  and  built  on  previous 
lessons  learned,  focusing  on  similar  reform  areas  or  better  adjusting  the  reforms.  This 
was  the  case  in  Tunisia,  with  the  parliamentary  adoption  of  key  laws  (on  external 
auditing  and  the  social  safety  net),  and  on  the  technical  front,  with  the  creation  of  a 
scoring  model  to  target  vulnerable  households.  In  Jordan,  key  actions  were  taken  with 
respect to social safety nets and public financial management. While all conditions were 
fulfilled  in  Jordan,  a  waiver  in  relation  to  one  condition  was  granted  to  Tunisia.  In  the 
case of Jordan, all conditions were fulfilled, although there were moderate to substantial 
delays in  implementation of some  of them  (tax reforms,  the  Law on the  Audit  Bureau, 
public  procurement).  The  Tunisian  authorities  fulfilled  all  but  one  condition,  with  the 
waiver in relation to the suppression of the VAT middle rate considered justified.  

The programmes were also deemed consistent with the broad policy framework guiding 
the EU relations with the countries, as well as with the previous MFA operations, other 
EU  programmes  and  donors.  MFA  not  only  contributed  to  effective  ‘burden  sharing’ 
with the IMF and other donors in financial terms, but also reinforced reforms promoted 
by the government and the international partners.  

The  EU’s  added  value  primarily  concerned  the  financial  benefits  to  the  Jordanian  and 
Tunisian economies, with the highly concessional terms of the MFA loans allowing for 
fiscal savings and a gradual adjustment of the primary public deficit. The financial added 
value  of  MFA  operations  also  derived  from  the  fact  that  the  EU  could  mobilise  and 
coordinate a wider amount of resources than any other individual donor country. Beyond 
this, both MFAs had important confidence-boosting and signalling effects to the general 
population. 

7.2. 

 Lessons learned 

The  MFA  operations  in  Jordan  and  Tunisia  achieved  the  objectives  of  supporting 
macroeconomic  stabilisation  and  fostering  much-needed  reform  in  these  countries.  The 
EU played a key role that could have not been  achieved by Member States individually 
given the elevated amount of the loans and the increased economies of scale, compared 
to  what  other  (project-  or  sector-based)  approaches  could  have  achieved.  The  EU 
involvement also helped safeguard key EU interests by supporting key reform areas for 
growth and stability in these countries.  

The  evaluation  also  offers  a  number  of  lessons  on  the  design  of  MFA  operations, 
particularly  when  it  comes  to  fostering  reform.  The  choice  of  reform  areas  remains 
highly  relevant,  with  experience  suggesting  that  focusing  on  areas  where  the  EU  is 
heavily involved (through other programmes/instruments/past MFAs) has greater added 
value.  This  was  evident  in  Tunisia  in  the  fields  of  external  audit  and  social  safety  net 
reforms, and in Jordan in relation to PFM reform.  

While  the  countries  delivered  on  the  agreed  reform  conditions,  the  external  evaluation 
concluded  that  increased  capacity  from  the  country  institutions  would  have  facilitated 
better  progress  on  these  actions.  This  finding  reiterates  the  importance  of  designing 
reforms  in  a  way  that  secures  achievable  targets  and  allows  for  a  certain  degree  of 
flexibility, considering the difficult situation in these countries, which is typically linked 
to  limited  administrative  capacity  and  political  instability.  The  expert  survey  also 
suggested that the EU could have used its leverage to promote deeper structural reforms 
through a support package large enough to overcome resistance to change. Finally, roles 
with the IMF could have been better divided, with more efficient use of cross-conditions 

22 

 
and  EU  efforts  better  targeted  towards  areas  where  it  had  specific  expertise  and 
experience. 

In parallel, the evaluation shows that the added value of cross-conditionality depends on 
the reform area and the country specifics. As stated in the report, these is less of a need 
for cross-conditions where donors are very well coordinated, as in Tunisia, where donors 
could  refer  to  a  common  matrix  of  policy  conditions  negotiated  with  the  government. 
However, given the constraints of the MFA instrument, targeted use of cross-conditions 
seems most appropriate. It does not eliminate the risk of discrepancies between different 
donor programmes, despite perfect  alignment  at  the beginning of a programme. This  is 
because  other  donors  (e.g.  the  IMF)  typically  have  more  freedom  to  renegotiate 
conditions,  while the MFA instrument  does  not offer such flexibility (this was the case 
with  cross-conditions  in  relation  to  tax  reforms  in  both  countries).  In  general,  the 
evaluation suggests reducing the number of cross-conditions in relation to strategic issues 
linked to a strong domestic agenda, where there is a need to politically reinforce or signal 
support for a particular reform effort. 

Capacity issues were also one of the main factors causing delays in implementing reform. 
In Jordan, the authorities were very slow in their responses, partly owing to a high level 
of  bureaucracy  and  associated  indecisiveness  in  the  public  sector.  Other  constraints  on 
capacity included a lack of adequate resources, constant turnover of staff, excessive red 
tape, burdensome administrative practices and hierarchical complexity. Additional issues 
in Tunisia blocking reforms included political instability resulting from frequent changes 
of  government  and  political  fragmentation  in  Parliament,  combined  with  high 
socioeconomic  pressure  and  domestic  resistance  to  reform  plans.  Coordination  with 
technical  assistance  from  the  EU  and  other  donors  should  continue  to  address  and 
anticipate this challenge. 

The  study  identified  a  number  of  ways  in  which  donors  can  help  to  ensure  reform 
ownership. At design level, allowing beneficiary countries to propose a list of potential 
conditions along with the request for MFA support is one option. During the negotiation 
and  implementation  of  the  support,  there  is  a  need  to  ensure  buy-in  from  all 
ministries/departments  concerned,  beyond  the  coordinating  ministry.  The  experience  of 
Tunisia with the donor matrix (after MFA-II negotiation) may be helpful here.  

During the implementation phase, the government should ideally communicate with the 
public  on  the  importance  of  reforms,  or  indeed  donors  could  insist  on  such 
communication in their policy dialogues. The communication aspect was clearly lacking 
in both countries, resulting in the mobilisation of public opinion against certain reforms 
(the law on income tax in Jordan, civil service reform and VAT reform in Tunisia) and 
the low level of visibility in both countries. 

Finally,  this  MFA  evaluation  was  the  first  one  providing  a  joint  assessment  of  two 
different  country  operations.  This  provided  some  economies  of  scale  for  the  study 
through a joint evaluation team, as well as the opportunity for additional comparative and 
regional  assessments  as  referred  to  above.  It  will  be  examined  to  what  extent  this 
approach can be pursued further for future ex post evaluations.  

23 

 
 
 
 
 
Annex I:   Procedural information 

In  accordance  with  Decision  (EU)  2016/1112  and  Decision  (EU)  2016/2371  (Article  8 
(2)) of the Council and the European Parliament, and in line with the requirements set out 
in  the  Better  Regulation  guidelines27,  MFA-II  operations  to  Jordan  and  Tunisia  are 
subject to an ex post evaluation. The intent of the evaluation is to assess the results and 
the efficiency of the operations, by focusing on: (i) the impact of MFA on the economy 
of  the  beneficiary  countries  and  in  particular  on  the  sustainability  of  their  external 
position; and (ii) the added value of the EU interventions.  

By looking at the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and EU value added of 
the operations, the evaluation verifies:  

– whether the ex ante considerations determining the design and terms of each operation 
were appropriate, taking due account of the economic, political and institutional context; 
and 

– whether the outcome met the objectives set in the legislative Decisions.  

Apart  from  identifying  areas  of  improvement  for  similar  ongoing  or  future  possible 
interventions, the evaluation also aimed to ensure better transparency and accountability 
of the Commission’s activities. To ensure validity, the analysis and conclusions are based 
on  the  evidence  obtained  using  several  evaluation  methods  (documentary  review, 
macroeconomic  data  analysis,  targeted  stakeholder  interviews,  expert  survey,  case 
studies, focus groups, comparative assessment and regional analysis, a debt sustainability 
analysis  and  a  social  impact  analysis).  The  Decide  planning  entry  for  the  ex  post 
evaluation of MFA-II to Jordan and Tunisia is PLAN2021/10170. 

The lead DG to  carry out  and manage this evaluation has been the Directorate-General 
for  Economic  and  Financial  Affairs  (DG  ECFIN).  DG  ECFIN  chaired  the  Interservice 
Steering Group (ISG) that was set up to manage the external evaluation. Apart from DG 
ECFIN,  the  ISG  comprised  representatives  of  other  Commission  departments  (the 
Secretariat-General  and  the  Directorate-General  for  Neighbourhood  and  Enlargement 
Negotiations) and the EEAS.  

The ISG had the responsibility to:  

a.  establish the evaluation roadmap for the external evaluation;  
b.  establish the Terms of Reference (ToR);  
c.  facilitate the evaluator’s access to the information needed;  
d.  advise, monitor and comment on the work undertaken by the external contractor.  

Under  the  framework  contract  to  provide  evaluation  services  on  MFA  operations,  in 
March  2021  the  Commission  awarded  the  specific  contract  to  undertake  the  external 
evaluation to ICF NEXT SA.  

A kick-off meeting, where the ISG and the external contractor discussed the deliverables 
and the evaluation methods, took place already in March 2021. The evaluation roadmap 
ran from 20 May 2021 until 17 June 2021, to seek wider feedback. The publication of the 

27 European Commission SWD(2021) 305.  

24 

 
 
                                                           
roadmap was followed by meetings on the inception and interim reports in May 2021 and 
June  2021  respectively.  The  draft  final  report  was  submitted  in  August  2021,  with 
updates provided for a final version approved in September 2021.  

In  addition  to  meetings,  ISG  members  were  continuously  informed  and  consulted  (via 
email  and  by  phone)  during  the  evaluation.  The  work  of  the  external  contractor  was 
complemented by internal analysis from Commission departments. 

25 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex II. Methodology and analytical models used 

This annex presents the methodological approach to the joint evaluation study of MFA-II 
operations  to  Jordan  and  Tunisia.  It  describes  the  design  of  the  methodology,  the  tools 
used for data and information gathering, and the results obtained. It also provides insights 
on the limitations encountered during the study and the mitigation strategies adopted. 

Evaluation design 

The methodology of the evaluation study was designed to respond to: (i) the evaluation 
questions  detailed  in  the  Terms  of  Reference  (ToR)  for  the  evaluation28;  and  (ii)  the 
Better Regulation guidelines (BRG) evaluation criteria29. It rested on three pillars:  

1.  A theory-based approach, which involved making explicit the underlying theory 
of  change  for  the  MFA  operation  in  Tunisia  and  Jordan,  and  then  testing  that 
theory  to  draw  conclusions  about  whether  and  how  the  MFA  contributed  to 
observed results. The theory of change was developed based on desk research and 
validated through key informant interviews; 

2.  A mixture of qualitative and quantitative input, with qualitative input, to facilitate 
a  deeper  understanding  of  the  evaluation  issues  and  to  build  a  rich  and 
comprehensive evidence base for the evaluation; and  

3.  Triangulation,  i.e.  the  information  and  data  collected  from  a  range  of  different 
sources using a range of methods collectively, provides answers to DG ECFIN’s 
evaluation questions.  

Tools for information gathering and results obtained 

The  information  and  data  required  for  the  study  were  collected  using  the  following 
methodological tools: 

a.  Review  of  documents  and  data  related  to  the  two  macro-financial  assistance 
(MFA)  operations  under  study,  including:  the  MoUs  of  the  operations  under 
analysis; the relevant operational assessments and ex ante evaluation statements; 
the  Commission  proposals  and  mission  reports;  budget  support  publications; 
relevant IMF country reports; and the Commission’s Better Regulation guidelines 
and toolbox. 

b.  Macroeconomic  data  analysis  concerning  national  accounts,  the  balance  of 
payments, public finances and monetary developments. The evaluation relied on 
primary  data  from  the  ministries  of  finance  and  central  banks,  as  well  as  on 
statistics produced by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.  

c.  Internal  brainstorming  session  on  counterfactual  scenarios,  aimed  at 
identifying,  developing  and  testing  hypothetical  counterfactual  scenarios  that 
would  have  been:  (i)  most  likely  had  the  MFA  or  the  MFA/IMF  EFF  not  been 
made  available  to  Tunisia  and  Jordan;  and  (ii)  least  likely,  along  with  detailed 
reasons  for  rejecting  these  latter  scenarios.  This  exercise  provided  a  basis  for 
further discussions with key stakeholders. 

28 Evaluation questions detailed in Annex III. 
29 SWD(2021) 305 final. 

26 

 
                                                           
d.  Interviews  with  key  stakeholders  from  the  European  Union  institutions, 
national  authorities  of  the  beneficiary  countries,  think  thanks  and  organisations 
based in the MENA region, and international financial institutions (IFIs). A total 
of  50  detailed  interviews  were  carried  out.  Interviews  with  EU  representatives 
covered  all  key  themes  of  the  evaluation,  to  understand  the  design,  monitoring 
and coordination process of the operations. The same aspects were discussed with 
officials at selected local authorities, namely: the coordinating ministries (MDICI 
and  MoPIC),  ministries  of  finance  and  the  central  banks  of  Jordan  and Tunisia. 
Insights  were  gathered  in  respect  of:  the  negotiation  process  of  the  MFA 
operations;  their  impact  on  each  country’s  macroeconomic  situation  and  reform 
operations;  and  the  wider  visibility  of  MFA  compared  to  other  budget  support 
programmes and other forms of international aid. Stakeholders with specific local 
and regional knowledge were also probed on the extent of similarities, differences 
and patterns across the two MFA interventions.  

e.  Expert survey to gather informed views in relation to the macroeconomic impact 
of  MFA-II  on  the  Tunisian  and  Jordanian  economies.  The  expert  panel  was 
recruited with the support of the local research team. Participants were recruited 
on  the  basis  of  their  familiarity  with  MFA-II  and  their  knowledge  of  each 
country’s  general  context  and  macroeconomic  situation.  A  total  of  37  and  26 
respondents participated in the Tunisian and Jordanian survey respectively. 

f.  Two  in-depth  case  studies  on  MFA-promoted  reforms  in  the  area  of  external 
audit,  which  formed  part  of  both  operations.  The  case  studies  were  primarily 
based on desk research and stakeholder interviews, and took into account inputs 
from local economic experts. 

g.  Social impact analysis (SIA) and debt sustainability analysis (DSA). The aim 
of  the  SIA  and  DSA  was  to  assess  the  impact  of  the  MFA-II  operations  on  the 
social  situation  and  on  the  sustainability  of  public  debt  in  each  of  Tunisia  and 
Jordan.  The  SIA  analysed  direct  and  indirect  effects  of  the  operations,  to 
understand  the  extent  to  which  (as  a  result  of  policies  linked  to  MoU 
conditionality)  social  protection  was  bolstered,  the  tax  system  was  made  more 
progressive  and  labour  market  conditions  were  improved.  For  both  the  SIA  and 
DSA,  and  through  the  implementation  of  a  counterfactual  analysis,  the  study 
aimed to establish the likely social and economic situation in Tunisia and Jordan 
in the absence of the first tranche of the MFA (Alternative 1); in the absence of 
the  second  and  third  MFA  tranches  (Alternative  2);  and  in  the  absence  of  both 
MFA and IMF funding (Alternative 3). 

h.  An online focus group organised between the study team, the local expert team, 
the  business  community,  civil  society 
and  several  representatives  from 
organisations,  media  and  academics  in  each  country.  The  main  topics  covered 
were  the  added  value  of  MFA-II  for  each  country  in  comparison  to  other  EU 
instruments;  the  EU  and  MFA-II  operations’  contribution  to  each  country’s 
overall reform efforts; and in-depth discussions of specific reform areas targeted 
by MFA-II. 

i.  Comparative  assessment  and  regional  analysis  to  flesh  out  key  similarities, 
differences and patterns across the two MFA interventions, and assess the regional 

27 

 
 
impact of MFA in the Southern Neighbourhood. The assessment allowed for the 
respective  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  each  MFA  operation  to  be  thoroughly 
investigated in light of the specific national context.  

While  the  expert  survey,  the  case  studies  and  the  online  focus  group  enabled  the 
collection of information of a highly technical nature, the interviews extended the hearing 
to include less specialised interest groups.  

The  data  collection  tools  were  used  to  inform  the  work  of  the  external  evaluator.  DG 
ECFIN,  together  with  the  other  members  of  the  Interservice  Steering  Group,  closely 
monitored the contractor’s work throughout the study.  

During the execution of the study, DG ECFIN provided the evaluator with all necessary 
documentation  in  a  timely  manner.  On  completion  of  the  exercise,  the  ISG  concluded 
that  the  study  addressed  all  key  issues  as  requested  in  the  Terms  of  Reference.  The 
evaluator delivered all requested results in line with the work plan.  

Limitations encountered and mitigation strategies 

1.  Stakeholder interviews: visits to Tunisia/Jordan were replaced with conference 
calls with all stakeholders consulted. For some national authorities, especially in 
Jordan, it was more challenging to secure the participation of stakeholders in this 
format  and  required  close  follow-up.  Topic  guides  were  tailored  to  take  into 
account  several  factors,  notably:  the  degree  of  involvement  with  the  operation; 
the  degree  of  familiarity  with  key  aspects  of  the  design;  negotiations  and 
implementation  of  MFA-II;  the  period  during  which  the  interviewee  held  the 
Tunisian/Jordanian  file  and  time  elapsed  since  then;  and  the  risk  of  confusion 
about the ongoing MFA operation (or MFA-I, or other EU programmes). MoUs 
and key facts about MFA-II were included to limit possible confusion.  

2.  Expert  survey:  one  challenge  was  to  avoid  insufficient  familiarity  among 
participants  with  specific  aspects  of  MFA-II.  Liaising  with  local  experts, 
substantial efforts were made to select a sample of relevant experts with expertise 
in  macroeconomics  –  with  no  particular  emphasis  on  increasing  the  size  of  the 
sample.  

3.  Debt sustainability analysis: the design of DSA counterfactual scenarios relied 
on the insights collected through consultations and surveys. Given the uncertainty 
about  possible  outcomes,  the  counterfactual  scenario  assumptions  include  only 
the most tangible potential impacts that were assessed as relevant within the DSA 
framework. More uncertain implications of the counterfactual outcomes were not 
modelled, given the challenges of identifying what the impacts would have been 
and  their  magnitude.  Data  sources  used  in  DSA  analysis  drew  mainly  on  IMF 
data and data from  the official  releases by the  ministries of  finance, the Central 
Bank of Tunisia and Central Bank of Jordan. Some projections developed as part 
of the DSA related to the future (2020 onwards). These projections underpin both 
the  baseline  and  the  alternative  scenarios,  introducing  a  degree  of  uncertainty 
over  the  baseline  values  and 
impacts.  Some  simplifying 
assumptions  were  used  in  projecting  the  values  of  the  key  debt  sustainability 
indicators.  

the  estimated 

28 

 
 
 
 
 
4.  Social impact analysis: a key challenge of the SIA was to determine the extent to 
which the different  conditionality-specified policies would have occurred  across 
the counterfactual scenarios. Interviewees (and respondents to the expert survey) 
engaged  only  to  a  limited  extent  in  the  hypothetical  exercise,  where  questions 
relating  to  social  impact  were  asked.  This  made  it  challenging  to  quantify  the 
extent  to  which  the  specified  policies  would  have  occurred  without  MFA 
operations/conditionalities  and  hence  identify  the  contribution  which  the  MFA 
had  in  influencing  the  Tunisian/Jordanian  authorities.  Given  this  challenge,  the 
SIA  sought  first  to  identify,  as  precisely  as  possible,  the  outcomes  and  social 
impacts  of  policies  specified  in  MFA  conditionalities,  then  attributed  a  share  of 
these social impacts to the MFA in a descriptive/qualitative way.  

5.  Comparative  assessment:  the  comparative  assessment  essentially  draws  on  the 
individual country evaluations. The caveats and limitations which apply to these 
individual  country  evaluations  also  apply  to  the  comparative  assessment.  In  the 
present case, differences in context did not prevent meaningful comparisons from 
being made. Discussions with the ISG, our regional experts and interviewees with 
experience  across  the  region  helped  put  Tunisian  and  Jordanian  results  in 
perspective.  

29 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex III. Evaluation matrix and, where relevant, details on answers to 
the evaluation questions (by criterion) 

This  annex  provides  a  more  detailed  overview  of  the  evaluation  matrix  used  for  the 
evaluation  study.  It  was  developed  by  the  external  contractor,  as  a  framework  for  the 
independent  assessment.  The  matrix  assigns  each  evaluation  question  outlined  in  the 
Terms of Reference to  the relevant  evaluation  criteria and serves  as general  framework 
for the applied methodology. 

Evaluation  question  on  relevance:  To  what  extent  was  the  MFA  operation  design 
(including  adequateness  of  financing  envelope,  focus  of  conditionality)  appropriate  in 
relation to the outputs to be produced and objectives to be achieved? 

Judgment criteria 

  The size of the 

financial assistance 
was adequate in 
relation to the 
financing needs of the 
beneficiary country; 

  The form of support 

was appropriate given 
the beneficiary 
country debt position 
and income status;  

Quantitative 
analysis 

  Financing needs in 2016 
and 2018 and how these 
were met; 

  Analysis of financing 

needs in 2017-2019 (as 
done by the IMF) and 
the role of MFA in 
meeting these needs; 

  MFA conditions were 
consistent with and 
relevant to Tunisian 
needs and realistic 
given the nature of the 
instrument; 

  Comparison between 
projected and actual 
financing needs – 
reasons for deviations 
and relevance and 
appropriateness of MFA 
in light of any changes; 

  The MFA package 
was generally 
regarded as relevant to 
Tunisian needs by 
stakeholders, local 
economists, media etc.  

  Analysis of how Tunisia 
meets criteria defining 
eligibility to grants and 
of EU budgetary 
constraints;  

  Debt sustainability 

analysis. 

Qualitative analysis 

Source of 
information 

  Degree of consensus 

Documentary analysis:  

among key stakeholders/ 
key informants regarding 
the relevance and 
importance of the MFA 
(in absolute and relative 
terms);  

  Stakeholders’ and local 
economists’ assessment 
of the use of the loan 
(and absence of grant) 
and focus of the 
conditions; 

  Examination of whether 

the focus of MFA 
conditionality was 
relevant and the 
ambition level 
appropriate in the local 
context, bearing also in 
mind the characteristics 
of the MFA instrument.  

Ex ante evaluation of 
MFA-II to Tunisia and 
Jordan;  
Reports on memoranda of 
understanding (MoUs) and 
loan agreements; 
Supporting documentation 
submitted by the authorities 
to the European 
Commission on the 
fulfilment of the structural 
reform criteria;  
Commission’s assessment 
of compliance with 
conditionality requirements 
(e.g. after mission 
reviews);  
IMF mission reviews;  
WB summary reports;  
Other reports / needs 
assessments (2015 PEFA 
report for Tunisia covering 
years 2011-2013, 2016 
PEFA report for Jordan 
covering years 2013-2015);  
Various indices e.g. The 
Open Budget Index, WB 
Doing Business Ranking,  
World Economic Forum 
Competitiveness Index.  

Semi-structured 
interviews:  

EC officials: DG ECFIN, 
DG NEAR; EEAS  
Key representatives of 
Member States  
IMF/ WB officials;  
Authorities including 
ministries of finance, social 

30 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
affairs and central banks;  
EU Delegations in Tunis 
and Amman.  

Case studies  
Experts’ survey  
Focus group  

Evaluation question on coherence: Were the measures of the MFA operation in line with 
key principles, objectives and measures taken in other EU external actions towards 
Jordan and Tunisia? 

Judgment criteria 

Quantitative 
analysis 

Qualitative analysis 

  MFA-II was fully in 

Not applicable  

 

line with EU 
objectives and 
reinforced EU action 
deployed via other 
instruments; 

  MFA conditionalities 
were consistent with 
and relevant to the 
EU’s and other donors’ 
programmes.  

Source of 
information  

Document and data 
review: 

MFA-II documentation 
including ex ante 
evaluations of MFA to 
Jordan and Tunisia;  
Identification of relevant 
programmes/ actions and 
review of their 
documentation (e.g. IMF, 
WB). 

Semi-structured 
interviews: 

EC officials: DG ECFIN, 
DG NEAR,  
EEAS.  
EU Delegation in Jordan 
/Tunisia;  
Jordan authorities, 
including Ministry of 
Finance and Central Bank ;  
Tunisian and Jordanian 
authorities including, 
ministry of finance and 
central bank 
representatives;  
Key representatives of 
Member States  
IMF/WB officials;  
Other IFIs / other donors  

Focus group  

Stakeholders’ 
assessment of the 
coherence of the MFA-
II operation with other 
EU external actions; 

  Mapping of conditions, 
qualitative assessment 
of the adequacy of the 
conditionality, 
potential synergies/ 
overlaps with other EU 
instruments (i.e. 
deployed under ENI); 

  Analysis of synergies 

with the IMF 
SBA/EFF programmes 
/ WB programme(s).  

31 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Framework for answering evaluation question on effectiveness: To what extent have the 
objectives of the MFA operation been achieved? 

Judgment criteria 

Quantitative 
analysis 

Qualitative analysis 

Source of 
information  

  Macroeconomic impact  

  Analysis of trends in 

  Counterfactual analysis  

  Document and data 

  Stakeholders and local 
economists’ views on 
the specific contribution 
of MFA to short-term 
macroeconomic 
stabilisation of Tunisia 
and Jordan;  

  Stakeholders and local 
economists’ assessment 
of the contribution of 
MFA to progress with 
structural reform.  

  There has been an 

improvement in the 
macroeconomic 
situation of both 
countries including 
external financial 
sustainability  

  The role and 

contribution of MFA 
can be identified 

  MFA had a positive 
social impact  

  The evidence suggests 
that Tunisia would 
have been worse off in 
absence of the MFA  

  Structural reforms  

  There is evidence of 

progress with reforms  

  There is evidence to 
suggest that MFA 
accelerated, reinforced 
or promoted reform in 
certain areas 

key indicators (national 
accounts, balance-of-
payments statistics, 
government finance 
statistics, monetary 
statistics, external 
sustainability) before, 
during and after MFAs 
II; 

  Analysis of data on 
lending conditions 
available for both 
countries (focusing on 
financing available from 
bilateral / multilateral 
donors and to some 
extent from national and 
international capital 
markets); 

  Debt sustainability 

analysis;  

  Social impact analysis – 

evolution of key 
indicators relating to 
unemployment, poverty, 
etc. 

review:  

  Macroeconomic data 

sourced from IMF/WB 
and national sources (for 
Tunisia, Jordan and 
MENA in general);  

  MFA documentation; 

  IMF reviews and 
country reports;  

  Credit rating agency 

reports (e.g. Moody’s); 

  Academic and literature 

on Tunisian and 
Jordanian economy;  

  Data on public 
borrowing 
(scale/maturity/costs) 
and prevailing market 
conditions at the time of 
MFA/IMF programmes. 

  Semi-structured 
interviews:  

  EC officials: DG 

ECFIN;  

  IMF/WB officials;  

  Tunisian / Jordanian 

authorities, in particular 
ministries of finance and 
central banks; 

  EU Delegations in Tunis 

and Amman;  

  Inputs from local 

experts; 

  Expert survey  

 Focus group  

32 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Framework for answering evaluation question on efficiency:  

Evaluation 
question 

Judgment 
criteria 

Quantitative 
analysis 

Qualitative 
analysis 

Source of 
information  

MFA disbursements 
were timely given 
Tunisia’s/Jordan’s 
financing needs  

MFA disbursements 
were consistent with 
the EU stance in 
Tunisia and Jordan  

Timing of 
disbursements in 
relation to key 
macroeconomic 
developments and 
financing needs in 
Tunisia and Jordan  

EQ1: Was the 
disbursement of 
the financial 
assistance 
appropriate in 
the context of the 
prevailing 
economic and 
financial 
conditions in the 
beneficiary 
country?  

EQ2: In what 
way has the 
design of the 
MFA 
assistance 
conditioned the 
performance of 
the operation 
in respect to its 
cost and its 
objectives?  

There were 
favourable entry 
conditions for the 
MFA operation e.g. 
political 
commitment; public 
buy-in, capacity to 
implement reform  

There was effective 
dialogue between 
the European 
Commission and 
national authorities  

The design of the 
MFA operation was 
flexible, and it 
adjusted to changes 
in context and/or 
feedback 
mechanisms  

There was effective 
monitoring of the 
MFA operation  

The MFA operation 
was well perceived 
in Tunisia/Jordan  

Not applicable  

33 

Document and data 
review:  

MFA documentation  

IMF/ WB 
documentation  

Semi-structured 
interviews  

EC officials: DG 
ECFIN, DG NEAR  

EEAS  

IMF/WB officials  

Tunisian/Jordanian 
authorities  

EU Delegations in 
Tunis/Amman  

Document and data 
review: 

Macroeconomic 
data sourced from 
IMF and national 
sources  

MFA 
documentation  

Semi-structured 
interviews:  

EC officials: DG 
ECFIN, DG NEAR  

EEAS  

IMF/WB officials  

Tunisian authorities  

EU Delegations in 
Tunis/Amman  

Expert survey  
Focus group  

Analysis of the timing 
of disbursements of 
both MFA and IMF 
and factors affecting 
disbursements  

Time taken between 
Tunisian authorities’ 
request for MFA 
assistance and 
approval/ 
disbursement of MFA  

Consistency of 
disbursement or non-
disbursement 
decisions with the EU 
stance in the country 

The extent of 
liaison between the 
European 
Commission and 
national authorities  

Whether there was 
effective 
monitoring of the 
MFA operation  

The communication 
channels used, and 
media treatment 
received  

Stakeholders’ 
feedback on what 
could have been 
done differently 
with the benefit of 
hindsight  

Identification of 
good practice / 
lessons learned 
from the design and 
implementation of 
MFA operation in 
Tunisia/Jordan, 
comparing the 

 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
experiences in both 
countries  

Framework for answering the evaluation question on added value: What was the 
rationale for an intervention at EU level and to what extent did the MFA operation add 
value compared to other interventions by other international donors? 

Judgment criteria 

Quantitative 
analysis 

Qualitative analysis 

Source of 
information  

There is clear financial 
added value of EU 
support – over 
intervention at MS level  

There is demonstrable 
evidence that the MFA 
operation had a 
signalling and 
confidence-building 
effect – building 
investor and private 
sector confidence  

EU had a discernible 
influence on the design 
and application of 
conditionalities  

Trends in confidence 
indicators and proxy 
indicators of confidence 
such as interest rates for 
T-bills and longer-term 
bonds denominated in 
local / foreign currency 
and key indicators of the 
foreign exchange 
market  

Qualitative assessment 
of links between wider 
fluctuations in 
confidence indicators 
and EU assistance 

Mapping of 
conditionalities (see also 
‘relevance’)  

Stakeholders’ views on 
the role and influence of 
EU in the design and 
application of support 
package  

Document and data 
review: 

Macroeconomic data 
sourced from IMF and 
national sources;  

MFA documentation;  

IMF reviews and 
country reports;  

Academic and grey 
literature;  

Credit rating agencies’ 
reports;  

Financial markets data;  

Any relevant press 
monitoring reports.  

Semi-structured 
interviews:  

EC officials: DG 
ECFIN, DG NEAR;  

IMF/WB officials; 

Other key bilateral/ 
multilateral donors; 

Tunisian/Jordanian 
authorities;  

EU Delegations in 
Tunisia/Jordan;  

Focus group;  

Expert survey;  

Insights from study 
experts.  

34 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
Annex IV. Overview of benefits and costs and, where relevant, table on 
simplification and burden reduction 

The  typology  of  costs  in  the  Better  Regulation  toolbox  (defined  as  compliance, 
enforcement  and  other  indirect  costs)  is  impossible  to  apply  in  the  context  of  MFA 
operations,  as  such  costs  are  not  incurred  here.  As  indicated  in  the  legislative  financial 
statement accompanying the Commission’s proposals for MFA, the budgetary impact at 
the level of the EU is limited to some administrative costs related to human resources and 
the outsourcing of operational assessments and ex post evaluations. 

The  typology  of  benefits  (improved  welfare,  market  efficiency  and  wider  economic 
effects)  can  seem  to  be  more  relevant.  However,  as  shown  in  past  country  ex  post 
evaluations,  which  tried  to  quantify  the  macroeconomic  effects  of  the  MFA  assistance, 
either  by  counterfactual  modelling  or  by  other  more  qualitative  methods,  it  is  almost 
impossible to disentangle the effects of MFA from IMF assistance (both disbursed at the 
same time) and from other macroeconomic events. 

The  guidelines  for  carrying  out  ex  post  evaluations  of  MFA  operations  of  June  2015, 
acknowledged the problem and stated that: 

[…]  EU  added  value  may  be  the  results  of  different  factors:  coordination  gains,  legal 
certainty,  greater  effectiveness  or  efficiency,  complementarities  etc.  In  all  cases, 
concluding  on  the  continued  need  for  the  intervention  at  EU  level  may  be  difficult  as 
measuring EU added value is challenging. 
The  analysis  of  EU  added  value  is  often  limited  to  the  qualitative,  given  the  stated 
difficulties to identify a counterfactual. 

More specifically in the field of ex post evaluation of MFA, challenges can arise which 
cannot be easily discarded and which should be taken into consideration:  

  The  nature  of  the  instrument:  MFA  is  not  earmarked  in  any  way.  It  is  an 
instrument  complementing  an  IMF  programme.  It  cannot  be  linked  directly  to 
identifiable outputs as in the case of programme- or project-linked aid.  

  Objectives  of MFA operations can be implicit for political  reasons – when they 
are explicitly presented in an MoU, they are sometimes not specific in nature.  
  The size of the assistance: MFA grants/loans are provided in addition to an IMF 
loan  and  may  represent  a  small  proportion  of  the  total  funds  accorded  to  the 
recipient  country.  Thus  the  financial  components  of  both  instruments  cannot 
usually be easily or indeed meaningfully disassociated. 

The consequence of these challenges is that: 

  A  classic  assessment  of  efficiency  (i.e.  cost-effectiveness)  is  not  feasible, 
although it is pertinent to examine the suitability of the blend of grants and loans 
making  up  the  assistance,  other  questions  about  its  design  and  implementation, 
and consequences for the achievement of objectives.   

  Effects  on  macroeconomic  variables  over  time  cannot  be  uniquely  attributed  to 
MFA,  meaning  that  analyses  have  to  take  into  account  the  global  package  of 
which the assistance is a part. 

Past  country  ex  post  evaluations  have  taken  this  guidance  into  account  and  have  come 
with an evaluation methodology suited for the MFA instrument. 

35 

 
 
 
Annex V. Stakeholder consultation – Synopsis report  

This annex provides a brief overview of all stakeholder consultation activities undertaken 
for the evaluation, already introduced in Annex II. A total of 50 interviews were carried 
out with key stakeholders as part of the evaluation, including various stakeholders from: 
(i) the EU; (ii) beneficiary countries; (iii) the donor community; and (iv) other relevant 
stakeholders at regional level.  

More  specifically,  the  evaluation  team  interviewed  European  Commission  officials  and 
representatives  of  the  EU  and  individual  Member  States,  as  well  as  Tunisian  and 
Jordanian  national  authorities.  Other 
the 
implementation  and/or  monitoring  of  MFA  were  also  included,  while  IFIs,  the  wider 
donor community, civil society organisations (CSOs) and business representatives were 
also  consulted.  Owing  to  the  ongoing  COVID-19  pandemic  and  associated  travel 
restrictions, 
the  phone  or  via 
videoconferencing30.  

interviews  were  generally  conducted  over 

stakeholders 

involved 

relevant 

in 

The  focus  of  the  interviews  varied,  depending  on  the  stakeholder  type.  Interviewees 
received a copy of semi-structured questionnaires beforehand that were used to steer the 
interviews.  

Additionally, a dedicated expert survey sought  to elicit additional views in relation to: 
(i) the macroeconomic impact of MFA-II on the Tunisian and Jordanian economies; (ii) 
the  impact  and  contribution  of  the  operations  to  the  structural  reform  process  in  each 
country;  and  (iii)  various  design  and  implementation  aspects.  Participants  were  also 
asked  to  comment  on  possible  scenarios  (i.e.  alternative  avenues  that  would  have  been 
considered by the authorities) had either MFA-II or the entire joint MFA/IMF assistance 
package not been made available. The survey also covered aspects pertaining to the role 
of  the  MFA  in  promoting  structural  reform  and  the  associated  economic  and  social 
impacts.  

An online focus group discussion was also organised between the study team, the local 
expert team, and several representatives from the business community, CSOs, media and 
academics in each country. The discussion comprised a series of short presentations and 
live polls intended to facilitate open discussion among participants. 

Finally, two in-depth case studies31 on MFA-promoted reforms were developed (one for 
each  country)  in  the  area  of  external  audit.  These  formed  part  of  both  operations, 
including  consultations  and  interviews  with  the  relevant  stakeholders.  The  case  studies 
addressed: (i) the rationale behind the selection of MFA conditions in the selected area, 
as well as the relevance and added value of MFA conditionality; (ii) the significance of 
MFA conditionality in the context of the overall need for reform in a particular thematic 
area/sector; (iii) how the MFA conditions were implemented and whether the authorities 
encountered  any  obstacles  in  implementing  those  conditions  (e.g.  lack  of  capacity, 
political or public resistance to change, etc.); (iv) the role and contribution of the MFA in 

30 Annex IV to the evaluation report provides all the detailed information. Its Table 11 lists the stakeholders 
consulted  during  the  evaluation,  while  Table  12  lists  survey  experts  (a  total  of  37  and  26  respondents 
participated in the Tunisian and Jordanian surveys respectively).  
31  In  addition,  the  evaluation  team  also  carried  out  a  social  impact  analysis  (using  evidence  from  social 
indicators and primary data to assess the impact of the MFA-II operations on the social situation in each of 
Tunisia and Jordan) and a debt sustainability analysis to evaluate the impact of MFA-II operations on the 
sustainability of Tunisia’s and Jordan’s public debt.  

36 

 
 
                                                           
promoting reform, including identification of key causal links; and (v) short-, mid- and 
long-term benefits of the MFA conditions. 

37 

 
References 

European Commission (2016), Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the 
Council providing further macro-financial assistance to the Republic of Tunisia, Staff working 
document (February 2016). 

European Commission (2016), Decision of the European Parliament and the Council of 6 July 
2016 providing further macro-financial assistance to Tunisia, Decision No 2016/1112. 

European Commission (2017), Memorandum of Understanding between the European Union as 
lender and the Republic of Tunisia as borrower.  

European Commission (2014), Memorandum of Understanding between the European Union as 
lender and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as borrower.  

European Commission (2016), Proposal for a Decision of The European Parliament and of the 
Council providing further macro-financial assistance to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Staff 
working document (June 2016). 

European Commission (2016), Decision of the European Parliament and the Council of 
14 December 2016 providing further macro-financial assistance to Jordan, Decision No 
2016/1112.   

European Commission (2017), Commission Implementing Decision of 27 July 2017 approving 
the Memorandum of Understanding between the European Union and Jordan related to macro-
financial assistance to Jordan, Decision No 2017/2707.   

European Commission (2017), Memorandum of Understanding between the European Union as 
lender and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as borrower, Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/mou_signed_MFA II_jordan.pdf  

European Commission (2020), Decision of the European Parliament and the Council of 25 May 
2020 on providing macro‐financial assistance to enlargement and neighbourhood partners in the 
context of the COVID‐19 pandemic.  

ICF  (2021),  Ex  post  evaluation  of  the  macro-financial  assistance  operations  in  Tunisia  and 
Jordan (2016 – 2019). 

38