Initial training of justice professionals serving the rule of law : report.
Date: 2022-09-27
Institutions: Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers
Subjects: EU Member State, EU law - national law, EU legal system, Western Balkans, conference proceedings, judicial cooperation, judicial reform, lawyer, legal profession, rule of law, vocational training

Initial training of justice 
professionals serving 
the rule of law

REPORT 

FEBRUARY  22>23  ❘  2022
BORDEAUX 

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Executive Summary

This two-day conference in the French city of Bordeaux discussed the initial training of justice professionals, 
in particular magistrates and lawyers, the respect for the rule of law in the EU, and their links. Jointly hosted 
by the French Presidency of the Council of the EU, the École Nationale de la Magistrature (ENM) and the 
European Commission, the conference brought together over 150 national and European level training 
providers and associations in charge of post-university training for judges, prosecutors and lawyers, from 
all 27 EU Member States and the Western Balkans, alongside trainees from those professions and an 
online audience. As such it aimed to support and to contribute to the priorities of the European judicial 
training strategy for 2021-2024. 

There was no doubt that this was a conference about the spirit of the EU itself and the rule of law. 
“Judicial training is so central to the idea of creating Europe,” said Nathalie Roret, Director of the 
École Nationale de la Magistrature (ENM), in a speech to open the two-day conference. Europe is “a 
community of law,” said Peter Csonka, Deputy Director for Criminal Justice, Directorate General 
for Justice and Consumers, at the European Commission, speaking after Ms Roret. Speakers 
and onsite participants over the course of three plenary sessions and nine parallel workshops looked for 
ways of enhancing the European dimension of initial training. The European judicial training strategy calls 
for newly appointed justice professionals to be “well prepared to play a role as European professionals, 
and contribute significantly to upholding the rule of law,” said Didier Reynders, Commissioner for 
Justice at the European Commission. Éric Dupond-Moretti, Garde des Sceaux, Minister of 
Justice for France, was hopeful. In 1990, most legal professionals in Europe had never participated 
in any form of EU legal training but now he said “more than half” have. Marküs Brückner, Judge and 
Secretary General of the European Judicial Training Network (EJTN), added that, while the 
rule of law is a shared EU value, the initial training of justice professionals differs widely between EU 
countries. James MacGuill, President of the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe 
(CCBE), called for more resources to be invested in the training of justice professionals all around Europe. 

Lauren Blatiere, Professor at the Angers University in France, then kicked off the second plenary 
session with an explanation of how the rule of law came to be a vital part of the EU, and the place 
of the rule of law in the EU treaties. José de Sousa Lameira, Judge and Vice-President of the 
Superior Council of the Magistracy, Portugal, set out why the recruitment and training of judges 
is so central to the rule of law in the EU. Aileen Donnelly, Judge at the Court of Appeals and 
Chairperson of the Judicial Studies Board in Ireland, said it was important to remember the role 
played by judges in modern Europe. Judges, she explained, hold governments to account. Even if they at 
times have to make unpopular decisions, judges and judicial training exist to protect fundamental rights.

The plenary sessions of the first day also covered topics ranging from early access to EU law courses, 
cross-border exchange programmes, digitalisation, the role of the European courts in upholding national 
justice, and the diversity of national training programmes.

The conference then moved to an afternoon of five parallel workshops on topics relating to the initial 
training of justice professionals in Europe. The content of each workshop was very rich, bringing together 
around 30 representatives of the legal professions for lively discussions. Highlights included: the importance 
of fostering bravery, as well as expertise and personal qualities, through initial training (session: “Judicial 
independence and impartiality, guarantees of the rule of law”); the possible need for harmonised 
courses on EU law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union across different countries 
(session: “Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union”); gaps in 

4

training and in understanding between different generations of judges, and how to address this through 
their education (session: “What judicial control of the law within the rule of law?”); problems of 
understanding and personnel, when national legal officials try to speak with their EU counterparts (session: 
“The judicial dialogue between national courts and European courts”); and how to reconcile 
a judge’s private life with their public role – including when it comes to managing stress (session: “The 
rule of law training versus training on ethics, mismatch of the concepts”).

On day 2, the conference reconvened for four additional parallel workshops in the morning using the 
“Snowball methodology”. These workshops touched for example upon: the value of using mock trials in 
initial training for candidate judges and prosecutors (session: “Judicial initial training”); the importance 
of offering theoretical EU law courses very early on in initial training courses, to counter a general lack of 
interest among young trainees (session: “Initial training for lawyers”); drawing on lessons learned 
during the Coronavirus pandemic to use digitalisation as a way of improving cooperation between 
professions and countries (session: “Cross professional initial training sessions”); and the need for 
a new code of conduct as legal training moves online (session: “Digitalisation in initial training”).

This shift online, with an increased expectation that digitalisation will transform many aspects of initial 
training, was the big change from previous debates on European judicial training, reflected at the 
conference conclusion. “I call on the Commission to drive this impetus at an EU level,” said Benoît 
Chamouard, Magistrate, and Deputy Director of Human Rights at the Ministry of Europe 
and Foreign Affairs in France, wrapping up the snowball workshops of day 2. 

As another important part of day 2, three national representatives shared with the audience a sample of 
best practices to reflect on. In Finland, Minna Koskinen, Judge at the Finnish Court of Appeal, said 
a three-year training programme for junior judges makes it possible to serve as a judge on a lower court 
at the same time as carrying out initial training. In Bulgaria meanwhile, said Nina Yaneva, Prosecutor 
at  the  National  Institute  of  Justice  (NIJ)  in  Bulgaria, a nine-month interactive course gives 
trainees extensive training in EU law and the rule of law. Alenka Košorok Humar, Director of the 
Slovenian Bar Academy, said training in EU law remained voluntary for trainees, but she hoped that 
there would eventually be a recognised EU initial training programme for justice professionals.

The final word, appropriately enough, was about storytelling. Tamara Ćapeta, Advocate General 
at the Court of Justice of the European Union, said the rule of law was the story chosen to unite 
the EU. Including the rule of law in initial training around Europe is “a guarantee that the story chosen 
by the EU will live, and that the rule of law will once again tomorrow become the most important story 
to know and to tell.” 

Closing the conference,  Wojciech  Postulski,  Policy  officer  at  the  Directorate-General  for 
Justice and Consumers of the European Commission, and Elie Renard, Deputy Director at 
the École Nationale de la Magistrature (ENM), both said that building on the key learnings of the 
two-day conference would help the EU to foster initial training, with the rule of law as its heart.

5

Contents

Executive Summary 

DAY ONE 

First Plenary: A European Reflex for Judicial Training 

Second Plenary: Talking About the Rule of Law 

Day One Workshops  

4

7

7

9

11

Judicial Independence and Impartiality, Guarantees of the Rule of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union . . . . . . . . . . .12
What Judicial Control of The Law Within the Rule of Law? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
The Judicial Dialogue Between National Courts and European Courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
The Rule of Law Training Versus Training on Ethics, Mismatch of the Concepts  . . . . . .17

DAY TWO 

Day Two Workshops  

18

18

Judicial Initial Training  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
Initial training for lawyers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
Cross Professional Initial Training Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
Digitalisation in Initial Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

Closing Session (Plenary):  
Stories of National Success and the EU’s Favourite Tale 

23

Snowballing: Presentations of the Conclusions of the Workshops. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
Best Practices Presentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24
Closing Keynote Speech: The EU Story . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24
Closing of the Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

ANNEX I: List of Speakers and Workshop Leaders  

ANNEX II: Action Points for Training Providers to Consider  

ANNEX III: Speeches  

26

28

32

Peter CSONKA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32
Nathalie RORET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34
Tamara ĆAPETA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37
Lauren BLATIERE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42
Aileen DONNELLY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48
José de SOUSA LAMEIRA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63

6

First Plenary: A European Reflex for Judicial Training

DAY ONE
Plenary I: A European Reflex for Judicial Training 

“Compliance with the rule of law is an important part of EU integration,” said Nathalie Roret, Director 
of the École Nationale de la Magistrature (ENM)1. Opening the two-day conference in Bordeaux, 
Ms Roret was in no doubt that a focus on the rule of law and the training of EU justice professionals 
was needed more than ever. 

“Judicial training is so central to the idea of creating Europe,” said the director. But many legal professionals 
are not even aware of EU law, she said, adding that the ENM has an essential role to play here.

Some weeks ago, said Ms Roret, the ENM launched a new cycle of “European judicial studies.” This 
was the first of 12 events expected to be organised by the School under the French EU Presidency. 
The studies are part of ENM work to train judges, prosecutors and lawyers around Europe, “to create a 
genuine European reflex.”

The “diversity in the backgrounds” of justice professionals across 27 EU Member States can be “a great 
strength and asset” for Europe and the rule of law, she said. “We need to think of ways the European 
dimension can be enhanced” in legal training, she explained. An EU law “is not a law we can pick and 
choose. It is part of our common future.”

Peter  Csonka,  Deputy  Director  Criminal  Justice,  Directorate  General  for  Justice  and 
Consumers, at the European Commission, agreed that Europe is “a community of law.” But, citing 
recent events in Poland and Hungary, he added that the rule of law was now “being tested by some 
Member States,” making it more important than ever to protect and promote the European judicial 
training strategy.

The European judicial training strategy for 2021-242 urges each justice profession to use “all digital 
tools available,” said the deputy director. The Coronavirus pandemic gave reason to be optimistic about 
this shift to a digital system, he added. The pandemic had “a profound impact on training,” he explained, 
forcing most activities to move online. But training levels were at a record high during the pandemic. In 
total, said Mr Csonka, over 320,000 justice professionals around the EU received training in 2020 – a 
more than 319% increase over nine years.

Mr Csonka added that he saw the need to increase awareness of EU law – particularly among young 
professionals. This could mean asking training providers to offer more exchange opportunities, to help 
young professionals “understand EU law and start their careers with that understanding.”

Mr Csonka said a lot remained to be done to "modernise justice systems and digitalise them as much as 
possible." He presented to the audience as a very concrete outcome of the conference “the panorama on 
judicial initial training”3 – on the European e-Justice Portal4 of the European Commission. The panorama 
provides information on judicial initial training schemes for judges, prosecutors and lawyers in all Member 
States. "This should contribute to the successful implementation of the European judicial training strategy 
and help properly design EU support for those training objectives," Mr Csonka concluded.

He was supported by Didier Reynders, Commissioner for Justice at the European Commission, 
speaking to the conference in a video message. The European judicial training strategy should ensure 
that newly appointed justice professionals “are well prepared to play a role as European professionals, 

(1) https://www.enm.justice.fr/ 

(2) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0713 

(3) https://e-justice.europa.eu/123/EN/national_training_systems 

(4) https://e-justice.europa.eu/ 

7

and contribute significantly to upholding the rule of law,” he explained. He said he was convinced of the 
importance of providing some training in EU law as early as possible in a professional’s legal career.

Also speaking in a video message, Éric Dupond-Moretti, Garde des Sceaux, Minister of Justice 
for France, was the fourth speaker to agree both that the EU was built around the rule of law and 
that, for justice professionals, “training at EU level is absolutely essential.” He said there were signs the 
legal profession was moving in the right direction. In 1990, said the minister, most legal professionals in 
Europe had never participated in EU legal training. Now “more than half” have, he said.

Marküs Brückner, Judge and Secretary General of the European Judicial Training Network 
(EJTN)5, said that, while the rule of law is a shared EU value, the initial training of justice professionals 
differs widely between EU Member States. The number of variables to be considered, multiplied by 27 
Member States, runs into the hundreds, he said, giving a concise overview of some differences. In most 
Member States, initial training is mandatory before taking up a professional appointment. In several 
Member States a central school is responsible for legal training, while in some this is decentralised. 
Often there is an entry competition for taking up training, but not in all Member States. The length of 
training programmes ranges from one to four years, depending on the country. The methodology used 
is also “very diverse,” he added. “Everyone has a different system. Not all countries have a final exam, 
with some preferring to assess continuously. Everyone has a mix of training on the job and theoretical 
training,” he explained. But in the end, he said, “this is how it should be for training.” On the one hand 
trainees “get the knowledge”, on the other they have to “apply this in practice.”

James MacGuill, President of the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE)6, 
presenting the panorama of initial training for lawyers in the EU, said the CCBE was in favour of “the 
protection of standards” for training across different countries. In particular, he said the independence of 
the bar was a “vital” legal protection. “Outside the EU that’s not always the case.” He added that it was “a 
tragedy and a disgrace” that justice training was under-resourced in Europe. He warned that any attempt 
to simplify justice systems through the use of algorithms would be a problem for both judges and other 
justice practitioners. Experience in the US shows algorithms encourage decisions that are “very unjust, 
very racial,” he said. “It is a wise, well-trained judge that knows the rules and knows the exceptions.”

Closing the first plenary session of the first day, Mr MacGuill said “We believe in the rule of law. The rule 
of law can only be achieved though access to justice. And access to justice can only be achieved through 
well trained, strong justice professionals.” 

Key Messages:

 ⇢ The rule of law is an essential cornerstone of the EU and should be supported by training;

 ⇢ There is a need to enhance the EU dimension in initial training;

 ⇢ Early access to EU law courses is needed for trainee legal professionals;

 ⇢ Cross-border exchange programmes should be used to improve awareness of EU law and the 

European remit of justice professionals;

 ⇢ Digitalisation can foster good EU legal training;

 ⇢ Diverse national training programmes require targeted actions to achieve the common objectives 

of the European judicial training strategy for 2021-2024.

(5) https://www.ejtn.eu/ 

(6) https://www.ccbe.eu/ 

8

Second Plenary: Talking About the Rule of Law

Plenary II: Talking about the Rule of Law 

A second plenary session to prepare the ground for in-depth workshops saw three expert speakers setting 
out the different aspects of the much-debated concept of rule of law. 

Lauren Blatiere, Professor at the Angers University in France, gave a clear account of the rule 
of law itself, and how this came to be so central to the EU identity.

Back in 1951, when the Treaty of the European Coal and Steel Community was signed in Paris, the 
idea of the “rule of law” was not mentioned at all. The six founding countries, Belgium, France, Italy, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, at that stage imagined the rule of law 
would remain an exclusive national competence, Ms Blatiere said. There was “no unanimous consensus” 
on what the term meant or why it would be a shared priority, she explained.

The first mention of the rule of law at EU level came “quite late,” said the professor, in the 1992 Maastricht 
Treaty. This was a “quite limited” reference in the preamble to the treaty, saying that Member States 
would uphold principles including the rule of law. The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam then turned to defining 
the concept. At this stage, the rule of law was “no longer vague” but became an EU principle. Among the 
conditions of EU membership, the Treaty said, was the respect for the rule of law.

At this stage EU Member States were preparing for the membership of countries from eastern Europe. 
These new members had a very different political, historic and economic background than older EU 
Member States. Ahead of this “massive” enlargement there was therefore a need to agree on shared 
values to be respected by all members, and to clearly set these out in legislation.

The 2001 Nice Treaty made it possible to recommend sanctions on a Member State where there was 
a “clear risk” of a serious breach of the rule of law. The Lisbon Treaty in 2007 took this a step further. 
The rule of law was no longer a principle but became a “value… It was an essential aspect of the EU.” 

But countries are now finding it difficult to use the treaties to sanction Poland and Hungary for their 
apparent breach of the rule of law, she said. The judicial route offered by the Court of Justice of the EU 
then becomes “the only real possibility” for enforcing the rule of law, Ms Blatiere concluded.

José de Sousa Lameira, Judge and Vice-President of the Superior Council of the Magistracy, 
Portugal, looked further into the role played by courts – and in particular, by judges – in upholding this 
rule of law. “Nobody challenges the idea that the recruitment of judges is crucial to the rule of law,” he 
said. “The way a judge is appointed reflects their place in a sovereign body.”

In Portugal for instance, said Mr de Sousa Lameira, a judge is not a senior civil servant, as may be the 
case elsewhere, but a member of an autonomous civil body. But whatever training process is preferred by 
Member States, “it is not possible to imagine a free democratic society if we don’t have an independent 
judiciary.”

This means keeping the recruitment of judges independent of state and government, he said. “Not 
only recruitment but also promotion must escape government influence,” he explained. There are two 
recruitment systems used around the EU, said Mr de Sousa Lameira, which he termed “the bureaucratic 
and the professional.”

In Portugal, the bureaucratic system is preferred. This means “recruitment by an independent body, with 
the collaboration of a high council for the judiciary, through a series of tests. Despite some objections, 
this is in line with the concept of an independent judiciary. This does not mean it cannot be improved, 
but the basis of the structure should not be challenged.”

9

Like James MacGuill in the opening plenary, Mr de Sousa Lameira warned against relying on algorithms 
for justice. “It is essential to educate judges in the way algorithms are developed and the risks associated 
with their use,” he explained. “Justice can’t be handed down by machines. It must be made by humans.”

Concluding the first morning of speeches, Aileen Donnelly, Judge at the Court of Appeals and 
Chairperson of the Judicial Studies Board in Ireland, agreed with both earlier speakers on the 
importance of courts, when it comes to upholding the rule of law. “The right of access to the courts is an 
indispensable cornerstone of a state governed by rule of law,” she said.

But she said this depended equally on the independence of judges and on access to courts. “A system 
where a judge appears to be independent can mask problems with the rule of law,” Ms Donnelly said. 
The independence of judges is not for instance always appreciated by the public or the media, she said. 

As an example of the "extreme pressure" under with judges must at times operate to uphold their 
independence and the rule of law, she cited an instance in February 2022 when a judge dismissed a 
case against a man who was arrested at a traffic check point early in the Coronavirus pandemic. Laws 
restricting non-essential travel had not come into effect at the time of his arrest, although the risks 
to public health were widely accepted. Ms Donnelly quoted the judge saying “This Covid pandemic is 
exceptional but the rule of law is not."

She said that, although Ireland does well in terms of people’s perception of the independence of judge’s, 
a 2011 change to the rules which allowed judges’ pay to be reduced had been passed “without any real 
debate.” Ms Donnelly said “we need to remember that the public are looking at us. Every time we make 
a decision.”

“We need to step back and look at what judges do,” said Donnelly. “They hold governments to account. 
Sometimes they make decisions which are very unpopular. But they are protecting fundamental rights.”

Key messages: 

 ⇢ The rule of law has been an EU Treaty principle or value since 1992, but remains hard to enforce;
 ⇢ National breaches of the rule of law cannot be sanctioned without the Court of Justice of the 

European Union;

 ⇢ The recruitment and training of judges has to be independent of government influence;
 ⇢ The value of the independence of judges has to be more widely appreciated by the public.

10

Judicial Independence and Impartiality, Guarantees of the Rule of Law

Day One Workshops 

Workshop 1: 

Judicial Independence and Impartiality, Guarantees of the Rule of Law

Workshop leaders

Daniel Ludet, Honorary Counsellor at the Court of cassation, Former Director of the École nationale 
de la magistrature (ENM), President of the College of Conduct of Magistrates of the Judicial Order, 
France

Gerard Tangenberg, Judge, President of the Court of Appeal ‘s-Hertogenbosch, former director of 
the Training and Study Centre for the Judiciary (SSR), Netherlands

Summary of talks

Independence and impartiality safeguard the rule of law both for people and for judges, but they must not 
be taken for granted. Judges can for instance come under attack from the media, and also indirectly from 
public opinion. The initial training of judges includes an overview of information and techniques that will 
allow a judgment to be reached. The problem, found in all countries, is that a judge does not magically 
become independent and impartial the day he or she takes office. But the qualities of independence and 
impartiality are assumed to be present, as they allow judges to avoid external influence.

Examples given by participants at this workshop included countries where corruption is rife and the 
notion of bravery comes into play, and countries where political groups can appoint judges, which can 
be a barrier to independence. Participants agreed that judges must nonetheless apply “the rule of law” 
without fear of the consequences.7 “This is what we ask of them, but it is difficult. We cannot blame 
judges for backing down,” said one. In France, the status of a judge is protected and so it is not difficult 
to be brave. The situation is obviously very different in other countries.

There were several references to Article 6.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights: “Everyone is 
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law.” This means that people have a right to expect independence and impartiality, and 
judges have a duty to uphold this expectation, which must form part of initial training.

Action points

Training should be interactive, to include specific knowledge, exchanges and discussions between 
trainee judges, and feedback from trainers.

Court internships can help young judges to learn through observation and imitation, as seen already 
for instance in France.

Initial training must treat independence and impartiality as matters to be taught and learned, rather 
than as something natural and innate.

(7)  See discussed Justice Breyer remarks on ways to preserve the rule of law delivered at the mock trial of the Barons forcing Magna Carta from King 

JohnLackland in 1215, https://youtu.be/8MU7tK6HM3Q (1h.19’-1h.22’)

11

Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 

Union

Training programmes covering the independence of judges must include both theory and practice.

There is a need for a mechanisms to guarantee the independence of judicial professionals, especially 
judges. This means several issues regarding independence must be considered as part of initial training. 
These issues include looking at who decides on the appointment of judges, as well as who decides on 
promotions, salaries, and resources allocated to the courts. 

Training programmes should also discuss if and how security of tenure (inamovibilité) can be guaranteed. 

Exchanges between Member States and best practice sharing are important for training future judges 
about the purpose of their independence and impartiality.

Workshop 2: 

Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

Workshop leaders

Mikołaj Pietrzak, Dean of the Warsaw Bar Association, Poland

Gabriel Toggenburg, Policy Coordinator for the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights at the European 
Union Agency for Fundamentals Rights (FRA)

Summary of talks

Participants at this workshop considered how to improve initial training in and the understanding of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The Charter was noted to have made several legal 
advances possible, because it is supra-national and gives access to rights directly linked with European 
citizenship. The Charter also, the workshop heard, made it possible to enlarge the field of action of the 
European Court of Human Rights.

Although EU Institutions and Member States are legally obliged to promote the implementation and 
teaching of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, it is still at times unclear how to 
do this in practice. The application therefore often depends on individual understanding and on national 
constitutions. The question for the judge is then how to decide whether the Charter should apply to any 
given situation. In several cases Member States have refuted the application of EU law. 

Action points

There is an urgent need to consider education around EU Member States. Universities actually often 
offer too few courses in EU law, and these are in many cases optional.

The Charter of Fundamental Rights should then be made an self-standing and practical part of legal 
training, to avoid becoming lost in European law training courses.  

Courses should teach the practical application of the Charter, as well as theoretical cases, to end 
the current situation in which young graduates have no experience in this key area. 

Training courses on EU law and the Charter should also be harmonised across legal professions, 
rather than judges generally receiving more training than other professionals, as is often the case today.

Preliminary ruling questions and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights should be essential 
issues for initial training in EU Member States. 

12

What judicial control of the law within the rule of law?

Language  skills should also be considered. English has become the reference language to which 
everyone must relate in their learning of European law. A minimum level of English is therefore a 
prerequisite to be able to understand and execute the Charter correctly.

Harmonisation of the European university system, particularly of courses taught in the context 
of initial training for legal professionals, seems necessary. Today, all students are not equal, because of 
the diversity of teaching standards and courses. 

The teaching and understanding of EU law are not governed by supranational standards, meaning 
that its application has to be based on the national context. This gap between national and supranational 
situations must be closed, to favour a consistent implementation of the Charter. 

Several initiatives are now emerging to centralise and communicate information about EU law in a uniform 
way across EU Member States. These initiatives aim to give meaning to European law for all professionals, in 
particular students and could serve as a reference to facilitate the use of the European Charter.

Workshop 3: 

What Judicial Control of The Law Within the Rule of Law?

Workshop leaders

Juan Martinez, Moya, Senior Judge, Member of the Spanish General Council of the Judiciary, Spain 

Céline Marilly, Advocate General Referee at the Court of Cassation, France

Summary of talks

Recent crises, both the Coronavirus pandemic and the threat of terrorism, have highlighted the role courts 
play in consolidating the rule of law, workshop participants said. This shows the need for awareness of 
and training in the tools likely to guarantee respect for fundamental rights and freedoms.

Constitutional review processes vary in each country, participants heard. In France, the role is devolved to 
the Constitutional Council. Since a reform in 2008, it is possible for a litigant to raise a “priority question 
of constitutionality”. The judge may consider these questions and say whether they are serious or not. 
For this, he or she must have a knowledge of constitutional law. The French judge has therefore become 
the assessor of international commitments. There are 2 types of review: abstract, regarding the law in 
general, or concrete, regarding the application of the law in a particular case. The judge must check that 
the infringements of rights and freedoms are not disproportionate.

Judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters is contributing to not only the monitoring and application 
of the rules, but through it, to a better understanding of legal instruments. In Spain, the international 
cooperation networks of the General Council of the Judiciary and its alerts on issues of European Union 
law to the judicial professionals are excellent examples.

Direct judicial communications between judges from different jurisdictions on a specific case to discuss 
issues such as lis pendens, jurisdiction, applicable law, etc., integrate a dialogue valuable not only for 
cooperation but also for the correct application of the law. As example will be the operability at EU level 
of the Article 86 of the Regulation 2019/1111 (applicable from 1 August 2022)8.

(8)   Council Regulation (EU) 2019/1111 of 25 June 2019 on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters 
of parental responsibility, and on international child abduction; Article 86 on Cooperation and communication between courts; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32019R1111 

13

The Judicial Dialogue Between National Courts and European Courts

Action points

Guidance on basic standards and principles should be developed to create a common judicial 
culture. This would give Member States a common knowledge base to use in initial training courses, to 
which they could add national particularities. 

Gaps  in  understanding  between  different  generations  of  judges  should  be  addressed  through 
continued education programmes.

Cultural  differences between Member States, regarding judges and the legal systems, could be 
addressed through European exchange programmes.

Sharing experience and learnings, in particular regarding proportionality, would help Member States 
to design and study programmes based on best practice. 

There should be greater awareness of different national approaches to reviewing the compatibility 
of constitutional law with the European Convention on Human Rights, or other international 
treaty, and the challenges this can pose for consistent EU legal training. In France, for instance, a review 
takes place once a case comes to court, making the French judge the assessor. In Belgium, as a differing 
example, compatibility with EU law is given precedence over the Belgian constitution.

The assessment of constitutional and international questions is often absent from initial training courses, 
or too short to be effective. This should be addressed for instance in consultation with Spain, which has 
experts in the area of constitutional review to help access this knowledge of European law in practice.

Workshop 4: 

The Judicial Dialogue Between National Courts and European Courts

Workshop leader

Benoît Chamouard, Magistrate, Deputy Director of Human Rights, Ministry of Europe and Foreign 
Affairs, France

Summary of talks 

Members of this workshop discussed how training could improve conversation with and understanding 
between national and European courts. On the national side, talks covered both national supreme 
courts and national lower courts. European courts included the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Participants separated into groups according to their profession 
within the judiciary, with lawyers and judges discussing training needs separately before all regrouping. 

The group of judges found that, amongst various future magistrates across Member States, most agreed 
training about the European courts was inadequate – and in some cases non-existent. In France, the 
training is limited. In Italy, it lasts just one week. In Bulgaria training is very limited and, in most cases, 
focused on the theory, rather than the application, of European law by the courts. A group of lawyers 
from Croatia, Italy, Estonia and France said that the main problem identified was a lack of information 
on how to communicate with European courts.

Overall, national courts were said to not have enough information, courage or personnel to deal with 
national problems in EU circles. Understanding of the European courts was found to be much greater 
in newer EU Member States, perhaps because these countries recently learnt all of EU law in one go, 
whilst information has worn out over time in older Member States. This led to questions of how better 
to promote a shared European culture.

14

Action points

There is a need for information  materials  on  how  to  communicate  with  European  courts, 
and what the rules are around this. This should include details of the correct people to contact and the 
format to use in communications.

Materials must be suitable for use by very small teams. For instance in Croatia, at the most 
junior level judiciary staff don’t know how to communicate with the European Commission or have the 
courage to attempt this. In another case only one woman in a law firm had any knowledge of European 
courts. 

National courts must be clearer about needs for training that could be resolved at an EU level.

Materials should also explain the interplay between European and national courts, and how these promote 
shared values. A French judge warned that some people in France felt they had lost their identity as 
French people, in the face of EU law and EU court rulings.

In Estonia, handbooks about the European courts and institutions have been successfully drafted for 
use at the municipal level and could be used as part of the guidance for this communication initiative.

Good quality information is needed to ensure the quality of work judges can do. This could begin with 
informal discussions with the EU institutions. Rather than trying to understand everything about EU 
law and the courts, a national judge could instead follow training to obtain an overarching understanding, 
so he or she could then better focus resources to deal with a problem.

Top-down training of magistrates, with oversight from the CJEU, would be a positive development.

Internships and trips to courts in other EU countries are also needed to foster understanding. 

Easy to use materials are needed for members of the judiciary, to help them learn quickly what the 
relevant case law is and where that information can be found.

These materials must be specific to different sets of case law and procedures, for instance in 
cases about money laundering or about violence towards women.

15

TRAINING 
NEEDS

Learn how to find 
information  
(legal information)

LEARNING 
OUTCOMES

Capacity to find the 
legal information

Learn how to find 
practical information

How to ask fruitfully 
the preliminary 
question to CJEU?

Capacity to find the 
contact points and 
referees in court and 
in one’s ministry of 
justice

Capacity to ask the 
preliminary ruling 

GOOD 
PRACTICES

Training by young 
trainers
Embedding European 
(EU + ECHR) training 
material in the 
national trainings 

SUBSTANCE

FORMAT

Webinar for the 
outlines
Workshops (case 
studies)
(short) Study visit 

Learn how to search 
on the institutional 
websites and 
legal data bases: 
Curia, Hudoc (Help 
platform) and on 
e-Justice
Commentaries (joint 
handbooks ECHR-
FRA)

Learn how to find 
the national or local 
contact points of the 
main networks 

Directories
Meetings with the 
contact points
Newsletters 

Identify the scope of 
the EU law
Train to use the tools 
in order to phrase 
the preliminary 
question and the 
form on Curia 

EU fundamentals 
EU law: scope and 
interpretation (Cilfit 
case)
Case studies  

To have a contact 
point in court or 
in one’s ministry 
of justice to check 
the phrasing of the 
preliminary ruling 

Capacity to master 
how does what and 
how

General knowledge 
on the European 
courts and role of 
national judges 

Capacity to approach 
without fear the 
European dimension 
of legal cases and 
situations

Pre-requisite: 
knowledge of 
the European 
institutional 
environment and 
of the European 
mechanisms

To have the 
European reflex

To dare asking the 
question to the CJEU

Study visits 
Short paper version 
outlines
Networking
Long term 
internships or 
secondments 

Superior Court 
Network 
Meetings with peers 
to exchange 
Encourage 
compulsory 
continuous training 

Creation of contact 
points at the CJEU
Study visits 

Embedding European 
(EU + ECHR) training 
material in the 
national trainings

16

The Rule of Law Training Versus Training on Ethics, Mismatch of the 

Concepts

Workshop 5: 

The Rule of Law Training Versus Training on Ethics, Mismatch of the Concepts

Workshop leaders

Filippo Donati, President of the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ), Professor of 
constitutional law, a lay member of the Consiglio Superiore  della Magistratura, Italy

Gianluca Grasso, Judge, Coordinator of the international sector, Superior School of  the Magistracy 
(SSM), Italy

Summary of talks

Ethical training for judges is difficult, because a judge’s ethics are not only based on merit and capabilities, 
but also on their personal skills and sensibilities.  Members of this workshop said judges must be made 
accountable to gain society’s trust and must fulfil their role in service and in private life. 

They must act lawfully, have a good attitude towards others, be respectful of lawyers and clerks, have 
no bias, and show an impartiality that can be seen by the public.  Every judge has a duty to make sure 
their life reflects the law.  He or she must also be able to cope with the stress of specific cases and 
workload. Participants in the workshop were reminded however that ethical standards are among the 
common attributes of judges and lawyers, established for decades.  

The  mission  of  the  European  Network  of  Councils  for  the  Judiciary  (ENCJ)  is  the  reinforcement  of 
independent, accountable judiciaries in the EU, to guarantee citizens’ access to fair, independent, and 
impartial courts.  Ethics and the Rule of Law go together, because ethics must reinforce the Rule of Law. 
The ENCJ acknowledges the importance of judicial ethics and has addressed the subject in the ENCJ 
Judicial Ethics Report 2009-2010 on the definition of principles of ethic applicable to the judiciary9.

Action points

Vocational training should be used as an opportunity to reflect on principles.  This means honouring 
and defending the profession and administration of justice, to the benefit of both the judicial profession 
and citizens.  

The independence  of  justice  professionals must be promoted through training, alongside the 
resolution of fair legal cases.  

Guidance is needed on judicial ethics and the use of social media, particularly regarding posting 
information online. This relatively new problem means training should help justice professionals understand 
the risk to ethics of posting something harmful online.

A better awareness of the delicate balance between rights, responsibilities and ethics is also needed 
when it comes to using new technology in a judicial context.

An awareness of differences between national rules on links  between  the  courts  and  political 
parties around Member States should also be fostered at EU level. A Spanish speaker commented that 
in Spain it is forbidden for judges to belong to a political party, while a Dutch participant said that in the 
Netherlands many judges are members of political parties.

(9)  https://www.encj.eu/images/stories/pdf/ethics/judicialethicsdeontologiefinal.pdf

17

Judicial Initial Training

DAY TWO

Day Two Workshops 

Workshop 1: 

Judicial Initial Training 

Workshop leader

Jos de Vos, Vice Director and senior advisor on judicial training, IGO, Belgium

Summary of talks

Participants at this workshop were asked to focus their discussions on judicial training courses already 
offered around the EU. Group members described training courses that are part of the initial curriculum 
for candidate prosecutors and for candidate judges, explaining why these should be recommended to 
trainers from other countries. The groups also looked at existing training on ethics, conflicts of interests 
and integrity, which they found was very important for the trainees’ development but inadequately 
discussed in many countries. 

A perfect knowledge of national law was said to be essential to making any decisions, but at the same 
time a national judge is also an EU judge and needs a certain level of EU knowledge. Judges therefore 
need to be aware that they are part of an international community.  Every national judge must know 
that they are checked on international commitments in front of EU courts.  

Action points

Mock trials are essential and should be part of training programmes for judges. They are an opportunity 
for the trainee judge to learn not only about his or her future role, but also temporarily to change roles 
and learn about the defendant and prosecutor’s position. 

Court  visits should help trainees learn through an active briefing before the court session and a 
discussion after, during which he or she can ask technical and procedural questions. This should be in 
addition to the “passive” experience of learning by observing the court as a spectator.

Prison visits can also be helpful, allowing trainee justice professionals to understand the impact legal 
decisions have on the private life of a person sent to prison.

More work must be done to encourage the use of a common EU language. This should include taking 
part in exchange programmes between Member States to create a genuine judicial community at EU level.

Legal research is an area where cooperation between trainees should be encouraged. Trainees can 
answer questions from other trainees and make an in-depth memorandum, to be used by courts in 
preparing decisions. This teaches trainees to work together and look at topics in-depth.  

18

Initial training for lawyers

Workshop 2: 

Initial training for lawyers

Workshop leader

Eva Indruchova, Head of the International Department of the Czech Bar Association, Czechia

Summary of talks

Workshop participants discussed how to boost the EU dimension of initial training for lawyers, across a 
broad range of EU countries. Young trainees simply do not see the importance of EU law, one speaker 
said. It is not compulsory on many legal courses, nor is it encouraged by national politicians. With a heavy 
workload and tight schedules, young lawyers are happy to drop the EU law option. 

It is very important to attract a more diverse range of students to legal training, participants said. Currently, 
EU courses tend to attract only students with an international background, most likely those who also 
followed an Erasmus university exchange programme. Making some EU courses mandatory could help 
to avoid this problem and attract “the average lawyer.” One speaker concluded talks by suggesting that 
while the European Parliament is empty for three weeks every month, it should be used to host meetings 
of young lawyers from around the EU.

Action points

Theoretical EU law should be taught very early on in training courses to raise awareness and interest. 

Mandatory EU law training could also be introduced, with supervision by national bar associations.

EU funding would certainly help to encourage training in EU law. In particular, it would ease cross-
border exchanges for trainees, as these are too expensive to be organised by a national bar. In addition, 
cross-border exchanges of trainers could be introduced as an effective tool to share best practices and 
exchange experience.

A common certificate in EU training would also help national bars and universities. Students often fear 
losing credits by following a cross-border training course which is then not recognised in other countries.

Minimum standards and definitions of EU initial training should be created. This would create a 
general understanding of what has been learned and promote international recognition of qualifications. 

The benefits of including an EU dimension in the initial training of justice professionals must be 
better explained at national, bar and university level, and not appear to be forced down from the EU level. 

Training opportunities abroad should certainly be EU funded even though the Coronavirus pandemic 
has shown that online courses can be an alternative to training abroad, when funds are not available.
The European Training Platform (ETP)10 on the European e-Justice Portal could be further developed 
as a source of EU training materials; it would be beneficial to set up a network of trainers and a list of 
contact points and institutions responsible for the initial training.

(10)  https://e-justice.europa.eu/european-training-platform/  

19

Cross Professional Initial Training Sessions

Workshop 3: 

Cross Professional Initial Training Sessions

Workshop leader

Petros Alikakos, Judge of the Court of First Instance, Greece

Summary of talks

This workshop discussed ways to improve training between different justice professions. For judges, 
prosecutors and lawyers alike, the practice of initial inter-professional training and the need for common 
ongoing training was found to be crucial. If the various actors in the administration of justice better 
understood one another, the justice system would function more accurately, more transparently, and more 
quickly, participants said. This common legal culture would make it possible in particular to overcome 
existing  inter-professional  suspicions,  as  well  as  to  engage  in  constructive  dialogue  and  effective 
collaboration for the good of justice and of society as a whole11.

A suggestion was made that the issue of joint training for judges and lawyers could take into consideration 
the Darrois Committee’s work in France. This committee was set up in March 2009 to propose reforms of 
the legal profession; it proposed the “school of legal professionals” (École des professionnels du droit). At 
such school, trainee judges, lawyers, notaries, and clerks would be enrolled. Exams would be nationwide. 
During the school’s annual curriculum, students would follow the direction they wish, based on specific 
selection criteria. Indeed, if the model of the “school of legal professionals” was adopted, the conduct of 
joint recruitment procedures for judges and lawyers couldn’t be precluded. Such a system partly exists 
already in Germany for instance.

The creation of a common code of ethics with written rules, in the form of the 2002 Bangalore Principles 
of Judicial Conduct, was welcomed. At an EU level, training courses were said to have for reference 
both common codes of soft law for the Council of Europe and the EU, and a code of ethics for judges 
and prosecutors of the EU. Many obstacles to initial interprofessional training were however identified. 
Speakers said care must be taken not to try and resolve matters behind closed doors, at the same time 
as understanding that professional secrecy has to be maintained. 

“The existence of common legal principles and ethical values for all professionals involved in the legal 
process is essential to the proper administration of justice. (…) Where necessary common training for 
judges, prosecutors and lawyers on issues of common interest, can contribute in achieving high quality 
justice. (…) This joint training can make it possible to create the basis for a common legal culture”12

Joint training among judges, prosecutors, and lawyers is recommended for better mutual understanding 
among these professionals13.

Action points

A common code of ethics could be developed, building on common ground between legal professions. 
Differences would however necessarily apply, depending on the profession. A lawyer cannot for instance 
be neutral because he or she has to consider the client’s interest.

(11)   See Petros Alikakos, Joint Initial and continuous training for judges and lawyers in the framework of the Council of Europe and according to the Greek 

legal order, Journal of the IOJT, 2015, p. 115.

(12)  The Statement of Bordeaux of 2009, being the common-ground of opinion No. 12 of the Consultative Council of European Judges and No. 4 of the 

Consultative Council of European Prosecutors; (https://rm.coe.int/1680747391).

(13)  Opinion No. 4 (par. 29) of the Consultative Council of European Judges; https://rm.coe.int/1680747d37.m/  

20

Digitalisation in Initial Training

Initial interprofessional training should be encouraged to improve understanding between the various 
protagonists of justice and create a common ground conducive to justice. This means for instance a lawyer 
would know how to write a court order, while a judge or a prosecutor would understand the conditions 
under which conclusions are drawn up. 

The notion of a fair trial is crucial to a state of law, which is why joint training with a mixed groups of 
trainers is useful for considering different opinions on the same subject.

Digitalisation is needed for more efficient training management, in areas including ethics, soft skills 
and communication, as well as for the study of practical cases and fictitious trials. 

Workshop 4: 

Digitalisation in Initial Training

Workshop leader

Simone Cuomo, Secretary General of the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE)

Summary of talks

The workshop looked at several aspects of digitalisation in initial training, including the integration of 
digital tools into initial training courses, and the digital transformation of the judiciary and legal practice 
as an important subject in initial training. Digital training tools are already used in most countries, but 
the level of preparedness and progress varies greatly. The main question for all is how to move from 
classical training methods to an increased use of digital training tools, participants heard. Many obstacles 
remain, however. Levels of digital literacy vary between individuals, institutions and countries. 

Training in the digitalisation of justice is now essential. It needs to be part of initial training for all justice 
professions. Essential topics to be addressed in this regard are for example, the use of new technologies 
in criminal investigations, analysis of digital evidence and digital forensics, authentication of files, risks 
and ethical aspects when using AI tools, legal issues that might arise (such as the admissibility of digital 
evidence when the authenticity cannot be ensured), electronic court proceedings (such as e-identification, 
e-filing, e-service of documents, and remote court hearings). Moreover, it needs to be understood that 
digitalisation is not the answer to everything. Some things cannot be digitalised and require human 
interaction. These include witness statements and body language. In a judiciary context, it is important 
to ensure that digitalisation treats all participants in a trial equally, avoiding creating a disadvantage 
for any side.

Action points

A code of conduct for online training could be developed by training schools to guarantee the quality 
of digital training tools. 

Streamlined, shared information for online training would help to make training more attractive, as well 
as making it easier to incorporate for instance videos, legal games and simulations. 

‘Train the trainer’ initiatives are needed for digital courses, because the online trainer also has to 
be an entertainer for the students.

Students should be encouraged to help resolve technical problems, leaving the trainer free to focus 
on content. 

21

Basic housekeeping rules, such as no background noise, are needed for online courses and conversation, 
as experienced during a switch to online communication in the Coronavirus pandemic.

Digitalisation  in  initial  training  also  requires  proper  funding,  meaning  a  long-term  commitment  of 
financial and human resources.  

Training also needs to address the use of e-justice tools and the importance of interoperability 
between the various systems across borders.

Digital  skills  of  trainers are essential, as well as the involvement of specific experts in certain 
topics, such as court staff dealing with e-justice procedures, digital forensic experts, and IT experts. When 
IT experts are involved, they need to be trained on how to teach about IT in a way persons without IT 
skills can follow.

22

Closing Session (Plenary):  
Stories of National Success and the EU’s 
Favourite Tale

Snowballing: Presentations of the Conclusions of the Workshops
The day two workshops were conducted using the “snowball” method14. Unlike the traditional speakers 
and interventions format used on day one, the snowball method allows smaller groups and ideas to 
converge over the course of a workshop. This means several small groups form for a first round of talks, 
merging into progressively fewer but larger groups to share ideas and find common point. 

Opening the closing plenary session of this second and final day, Benoît Chamouard, Magistrate, 
and Deputy Director of Human Rights at the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs in 
France, was pleased with the outcome of the snowball workshops. "We predicted it would be a bit 
chaotic, but it didn't look that way," he said. Instead, the format had clearly fostered a lot of interest, 
agreement and disagreement.

The four leaders of the four "snowball" workshops then recapped the conclusions of their sessions. 

Judicial Initial Training 

Jos de Vos, Vice Director and senior advisor on judicial training at IGO, Belgium, recalled 
a recurrent conference finding: that in many Member States there simply "isn't basic training in EU law." 
He stressed the conclusion, reported by members of his workshop, that both national and EU prosecutors 
need to know how national and EU laws fit in with their decision, and which is needed when. "They need 
to be familiar with the principle of proportionality," he explained.

Initial training for lawyers

Eva  Indruchova,  Head  of  the  International  Department  of  the  Czech  Bar  Association, 
Czechia, said her workshop had found it was "of course" important to study EU law, "but it is equally 
important to have EU law as part of all other aspects of the law, for instance criminal law”. Above all, 
she said the workshop found justice training "has to start with good quality training at university level. 
University level training is very important. We must not miss that."

Cross Professional Initial Training Sessions

Workshop leader Petros Alikakos, Judge of the Court of First Instance, Greece, reflected on 
his group’s findings regarding the ideal trainer for EU justice training. "It’s better to have a mixed group 
of trainers, to show different opinions on the same topic," he said. 

Digitalisation in Initial Training

Simone  Cuomo,  Secretary  General  of  the  Council  of  Bars  and  Law  Societies  of  Europe 
(CCBE) and leader of the last workshop at the conference, touched on the "digital transformation" facing 
judicial training today. "This needs to be part of initial training," he said, even though the use of digital 
tools is not the same for every legal profession.

Mr Chamouard concluded the snowball reporting session by saying that this digital transformation and the 
need for digital skills was the major change from previous conferences. The trainee judges, prosecutors, 
lawyers and other legal professionals of today are “people born into a digital world,” he explained. A shift 

(14)  See page 28 of the EJTN Handbook on Judicial Training Methodology in Europe; https://www.ejtn.eu/MRDDocuments/EJTN_JTM_Handbook_2016_EN.pdf. 

23

to online exchanges is “going to push judges, researchers and lawyers to boost their digital skills. The 
European Commission also needs to boost this, including with financial support.” “I call on the Commission 
to drive this impetus at an EU level,” concluded the magistrate.

Best Practices Presentation

Speakers from Finland, Bulgaria and Slovenia then gave a snapshot of initial training in their own countries, 
as examples for other training providers and Member States to consider.

Minna Koskinen, Judge at the Finnish Court of Appeal, pointed to Finland’s “assessor’s training 
programme” for junior judges. Under this programme, trainees have a fixed three-year position as 
assessors. After two of these they may serve as a judge in a lower court. Trainees spend about 70% 
of their time training on the job, with the rest spent in a combination of assignments, self-assessment, 
and being tutored. At the end of the programme they have a portfolio to show the development of their 
skills and may use the title “judicially trained.”

Nina Yaneva, Prosecutor at the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) in Bulgaria, looked at the 
permanent training of candidates for junior prosecutor positions in Bulgaria. A nine-month programme 
aims to develop skills through interactive training, led by a justice professional, who may be a judge, 
prosecutor or investigating magistrate. Under this programme “EU law training is essential for the trainees’ 
understanding of both EU law and the rule of law,” she said. “A very serious part of the exams is based 
on EU law.” During the pandemic most training moved online, for instance using Zoom to carry out mock 
trials. “I do believe we have the right formula for our common future,” concluded Ms Yaneva.

Alenka Košorok Humar, Director of the Slovenian Bar Academy, said she hoped there would 
eventually be a recognised EU initial training programme for justice professionals. For now however 
European training for Slovenian Bar members was carried out on a voluntary basis. The training includes 
up to date monitoring of case law. “We are highly aware of the European dimension of initial legal training 
and the rule of law,” said Ms Humar. As of 2021, she said initial training of lawyers at the two main 
Slovenian universities organised with the bar academy had a “special focus on the EU law dimension.” 
She added that “In the future I strongly believe we will further strengthen our cooperation with Slovenian 
education. We are stronger together.”

Closing Keynote Speech: The EU Story

Tamara Ćapeta, Advocate General at the Court of Justice of the European Union, said the 
rule of law was the story chosen to unite the EU. “Humans were able to organise into societies because of 
the stories that tie them together,” she explained. “Rule of law was not chosen by chance. It is necessary 
for a society that treats all people as equals. That guarantees freedom, for as long as freedom does not 
infringe on the freedom of others.”

But “to keep a story alive, it is necessary to narrate it. The story of the rule of law was there in the EU 
project for a long time but has been dormant for a while. Now the story tellers have awoken because 
some people forgot the story or were unaware of it.”

In this sense, she said recent events in Poland and Hungary could almost be seen as “fortunate” because 
they remind us why the rule of law matters, by showing what happens in societies that neglect it. 

She said the rule of law was relevant in the courts of Member States across the EU. Judges “from Ireland 
to Malta entered into dialogue with the Court of Justice of the EU to clarify the value of the rule of law.”

Including the rule of law in the training of judges, said Ms Ćapeta, is “a guarantee that the story chosen 
by the EU will live, and that the rule of law will once again tomorrow become the most important story 
to know and to tell.”

24

Closing of the Conference

Wojciech Postulski, Policy officer at the Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers 
of  the  European  Commission, said the event, with all its speeches and workshops, would “help 
the European Commission to better direct the support to judicial training in the Member States.” Elie 
Renard, Deputy Director at the National School for the Judiciary (ENM), added "I believe this 
conference has helped us to understand that the rule of law is at the heart of the EU project. The onus 
is on us as legal professionals to make sure it stays alive."

25

ANNEX I: 
List of Speakers and Workshop Leaders 

Speakers

Nathalie Roret, Director of the French National School for the Judiciary (ENM)

Peter  Csonka,  Deputy Director Criminal Justice, Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, 
European Commission

Didier Reynders, Commissioner for Justice, European Commission

Eric Dupond-Moretti, Garde des Sceaux, France

Marküs Brückner, Judge, Secretary General of the European Judicial Training Network (EJTN)

James Macguill, President of the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE) 

Lauren Blatiere, Professor at the Angers University, France

Aileen Donnelly, Judge at the Court of Appeals, Chairperson of the Judicial Studies Board, Ireland

José de Sousa Lameira, Judge, Vice-President of the Superior Council of the Magistracy, Portugal

Benoît Chamouard, Magistrate, Deputy Director of Human Rights, Ministry of Europe and Foreign 
Affairs, France

Minna Koskinen, Judge of the Court of Appeal, Finland

Nina Yaneva, Prosecutor, National Institute of Justice (NIJ), Bulgaria

Alenka Košorok Humar, Director of the Slovenian Bar Academy, Slovenia 

Tamara Ćapeta, Advocate General at the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)

Workshop leaders

Daniel Ludet, Honorary Counsellor at the Court of cassation, Former Director of the French National 
School for the Judiciary, President of the College of Conduct of Magistrates of the Judicial Order, 
France 

Gerard Tangenberg, Judge, President of the Court of Appeal ‘s-Hertogenbosch, former director of 
the Training and Study Centre for the Judiciary (SSR), Netherlands 

Mikołaj Pietrzak, Dean of the Warsaw Bar Association, Poland 

Gabriel Toggenburg, Policy Coordinator for the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights at the European 
Union Agency for Fundamentals Rights (FRA)

Juan Martinez Moya, Judge, Member of the General Council of the Judiciary, Head of the General 
Inspectorate of Justice, Spain 

Céline Marilly, Advocate General Referee at the Court of Cassation, France

Benoît Chamouard, Magistrate, Deputy Director of Human Rights, Ministry of Europe and Foreign 
Affairs, France

26

Filippo Donati, President of the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ), Professor of 
constitutional law, a lay-member of the Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura, Italy

Gianluca Grasso, Judge, Coordinator of the international sector, Superior School of the Magistracy 
(SSM), Italy

Jos de Vos, Vice Director and senior advisor on judicial training, IGO, Belgium

Eva Indruchova, Head of the International Department of the Czech Bar Association, Czechia

Petros Alikakos, Judge of the Court of First Instance, Greece

Simone Cuomo, Secretary General of the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE)

27

ANNEX II: 
Action Points for Training Providers to Consider 

DAY ONE 

Workshop 1: Judicial Independence and Impartiality, Guarantees of the 
Rule of Law

 ⇢ Interactive training activities to include specific knowledge, exchanges and discussions between 

trainee judges and feedback from trainers.

 ⇢ Court internships to help young judges learn through observation and imitation.
 ⇢ Independence and impartiality to be taught and learned.
 ⇢ Teaching both theory and practice of judicial independence. 
 ⇢ Mechanisms to guarantee the independence of judicial professionals, especially judges, as part of 

initial training.

 ⇢ Consider how security of tenure (inamovibilité) can be guaranteed. 
 ⇢ Exchanges between Member States and best practice sharing to teach future judges about the 

purpose of their independence and impartiality.

Workshop 2: Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union

 ⇢ Be aware that universities often offer too few courses in EU law, and these are in many cases 

optional.

 ⇢ Harmonisation of the European university system for courses taught in the context of initial training 

for legal professionals.

 ⇢ The Charter of Fundamental Rights to be an integral and practical part of legal training.  
 ⇢ Teach the practical application of the Charter as well as theoretical cases.
 ⇢ Harmonise training courses in EU law and the Charter across legal professions.
 ⇢ Include preliminary ruling questions about the Charter in training programmes.
 ⇢ Promote a minimum level of English language skills as a prerequisite to understand and execute 

the Charter. 

 ⇢ Close gaps between national and supranational standards to favour a consistent implementation 

of the Charter.

 ⇢ Use emerging initiatives to centralise and communicate information about EU law in a uniform way 

across Member States to facilitate the use of the Charter.

28

Workshop 3: What Judicial Control of the Law Within the Rule of Law?

 ⇢ Guidance on basic standards and principles to create a common European judicial culture.
 ⇢ Continued education programmes to address gaps in understanding between different generations 

of judges.

 ⇢ European exchange programmes to address cultural differences between Member States regarding 

judges and the legal systems.

 ⇢ Shared experience and learnings, in particular regarding proportionality, to help Member States to 

design and study programmes based on best practice. 

 ⇢ Awareness of different national approaches to reviewing the compatibility of constitutional law with 
the European Convention on Human Rights, or other international treaty, and the challenges this 
can pose for consistent EU legal training.

 ⇢ Assessment of constitutional and international questions in initial training courses.

Workshop 4: The Judicial Dialogue Between National Courts and 
European Courts

 ⇢ Information materials on how to communicate with European courts, and what the rules are around 

this, including details of who to contact and the format to use in communications.

 ⇢ Materials to be suitable for use by very small teams.
 ⇢ National courts to be clearer about needs for training that could be resolved at an EU level.
 ⇢ Materials to explain the interplay between European and national courts, and how these promote 

shared values.

 ⇢ Handbooks about the European courts and institutions for use at the local level. 
 ⇢ Informal discussions with the EU institutions to ensure the quality of work judges can do.
 ⇢ Top-down training of magistrates with oversight from the CJEU.
 ⇢ Internships and trips to courts in other EU countries to foster understanding.
 ⇢ Easy to use materials for members of the judiciary to help them learn quickly what the relevant 

case law is and where that information can be found.

 ⇢ Materials specific to different sets of case law and procedure.

Workshop 5: The Rule of Law Training Versus Training on Ethics, 
Mismatch of the Concepts

 ⇢ Vocational training as an opportunity to reflect on principles.
 ⇢ The independence of justice professionals promoted through training.
 ⇢ Guidance on judicial ethics and the use of social media, particularly regarding posting information 

online.

 ⇢ Better awareness of the delicate balance between rights, responsibilities and ethics when it comes 

to using new technology in a judicial context.

 ⇢ Awareness of differences between national rules on links between the courts and political parties 

around Member States at EU level.

29

DAY TWO 

Workshop 1: Judicial Initial Training 

 ⇢ Mock trials as part of initial training programmes for judges.
 ⇢ Court visits to help trainees learn through active and passive sessions.
 ⇢ Prison visits to help trainees understand the impact legal decisions have on the private life of a 

person sent to prison.

 ⇢ A common EU language to create a genuine judicial community at EU level.
 ⇢ Legal research to encourage cooperation between trainees. 

Workshop 2: Initial training for lawyers

 ⇢ Theoretical EU law taught very early in training courses to raise awareness and interest.
 ⇢ Mandatory EU law training with supervision by national bar associations.
 ⇢ EU funding to encourage training in EU law and ease cross-border exchanges for trainees.
 ⇢ Cross-border exchanges of trainers could be introduced as an effective tool to share best practices 

and exchange experience.

 ⇢ Common certificate in EU training to help recognition of cross-border training.
 ⇢ Minimum standards and definitions of EU initial training.
 ⇢ Explain benefits of including an EU dimension in the initial training of justice professional.
 ⇢ Training opportunities abroad and online.
 ⇢ The European Training Platform (ETP)15 on the European e-Justice Portal to be a source of EU 
training materials and include a list of contact points and institutions responsible for the initial 
training.

Workshop 3: Cross Professional Initial Training Sessions

 ⇢ A common code of ethics, building on common ground between legal professions.
 ⇢ Initial interprofessional training to improve understanding between the various protagonists of 

justice and create a common ground conducive to justice.

 ⇢ Joint training with a mixed groups of trainers sharing different opinions on the same subject.
 ⇢ Digitalisation for more efficient training management.

(15)  https://e-justice.europa.eu/european-training-platform/  

30

Workshop 4: Digitalisation in Initial Training

 ⇢ Code of conduct for online training to guarantee the quality of digital training tools.
 ⇢ Streamlined, shared information for online training to make training more attractive, incorporating 

videos, legal games and simulations.

 ⇢ ‘Train the trainer’ initiatives for digital courses, with online trainer as entertainer for students.
 ⇢ Encourage students to help resolve technical problems, leaving the trainer free to focus on content.
 ⇢ Basic housekeeping rules for online courses and communication.
 ⇢ Long-term commitment of financial and human resources.
 ⇢ Training to address the use of e-justice tools and the importance of interoperability between the 

various systems across borders.

 ⇢ Digital skills of trainers are essential.
 ⇢ Need to involve specific experts in certain topics, such as court staff dealing with e-justice procedures, 
digital forensic experts, and IT experts, who are trained on how to teach about IT in a way persons 
without IT skills can follow.

31

Peter CSONKA

ANNEX III: 
Speeches 

Peter CSONKA,  
Deputy Director Criminal Justice, Directorate-General for Justice 
and Consumers, European Commission
European Judicial Training Strategic objectives on initial training and the rule of law

"Check against delivery"

Dear distinguish guests, der colleagues, it is my pleasure to present to you the objectives of the new 
European judicial training strategy on initial training and the rule of law as well as the newly launched 
panorama on initial training on the European e-Justice Portal. 

The European judicial training strategy 2021-2024 

However, before I go into details, I would like to use this opportunity firstly to remind you of the main 
aspects of the European judicial training strategy. The new European judicial training strategy for 2021-
2024 was adopted in December 2020 as a part of a package to modernise justice systems in the EU. 
The package confirmed that training of justice professionals on EU law is essential for modernising justice 
systems and remains a priority for the Commission. 

Training should help justice professionals, including judges, prosecutors and lawyers, to be fit for the 
digitalisation of justice and prepare them for the challenges they are facing today and will be facing in 
the future. After the successful implementation of the European training strategy for 2011-2020, the new 
strategy sets new ambitious quantitative and qualitative objectives to boost training of justice professionals on 
EU law. This includes new operational objectives tailored to the needs of each justice profession 
to be reached yearly by 2024. With the new quantitative and qualitative objectives, we aim at further 
increasing participation in training and to balance it more among the different Member States and justice 
professions. We also wish to encourage a broader use of modern training methodologies that promote effective 
training activities of high quality. This is especially needed in today’s online and hybrid context. We therefore 
urge training providers to put all the digital tools available to support virtual training to the full use.

The European judicial training report 2021 

These main ideas were just confirmed by the 2021 statistical report on European judicial training 
published by DG Justice last December. The report covers the year 2020 and measures the participation of 
the targeted justice professionals in judicial training on EU law. It also helps us to monitor the implementation 
of the new quantitative and qualitative objectives set by the European judicial training strategy. 

The report clearly shows that the COVID-19 pandemic has challenged the training institutions a lot. Training 
activities had to be cancelled, postponed or quickly transferred into quality online training activities. Nevertheless, 
the total number of justice professionals in EU law judicial training marks a new record – more than 
320 000 justice professionals received training on EU law in 2020. This is notably due to the increase 
in EU law training for lawyers and the shift of training activities of some Member States to online training 
schemes, such as the HELP Programme by the Council of Europe. Between the adoption of the first strategy 
in 2011 and 2020, the number of justice professionals taking part in training on EU law increased by 319 %. 
Meaning that over 1.5 million justice professionals took part in such training activities. 

32

However, a closer look at the statistics for 2020 reveals a substantial decrease in the number of justice 
professionals trained on EU law for most Member States and professions especially for judges, prosecutors 
and bailiffs’ training. This means that the level of participation in training still differs considerably across 
Member States and among justice professions. The latest statistics show on the one hand that more still 
needs to be done, that ambitious training initiatives are needed for most justice professions 
and that it is possible. On the other hand, it shows that those training providers who quickly reacted 
to the new circumstances could keep the level of justice professionals trained or even increase it; such 
as, for example, Italy for lawyers, and Estonia and the Netherlands for judges and prosecutors. Moreover, 
the report confirms that the new operational objectives are realistic and can be reached. 

For this, we need the commitment of everyone involved. This is why I am very pleased to welcome so 
many participants to this important conference. 

Initial training of justice professionals 

Besides the operational objectives, the strategy sets a special focus on the training of young professionals 
and on the training on the rule of law. Commissioner Reynders just reminded us of the importance of 
these two topics in his message. Indeed, we need to boost judicial training for young professionals. It 
is essential that the new practitioners understand their role as EU practitioners from the start of their 
career. That is why they should be given a grounding in the EU legal system and legal culture already in 
the course of their initial training. This should help them to have a clear understanding of the role of EU 
law in national legal systems, the rule of law acquis and their role as European justice practitioners. We 
therefore need to make sure that sufficient time is devoted to good-quality training in EU law, fundamental 
rights, the rule of law, ‘judgecraft’ and language skills in initial training.

The strategy therefore firstly calls on training providers to ensure that every initial training curriculum 
includes sufficient modules on EU law. These can be either embedded in national law training or standalone 
where relevant. 

Secondly, the training curricula should also focus on the EU acquis on the rule of law, on the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and also on ‘judgecraft’ as standard components of the initial training offer. 

Thirdly, young professionals should be encouraged to participate in cross-border exchanges.  Meetings 
and exchanges between young professionals from other European countries are an excellent way to 
promote mutual trust between each other, a corner stone of the cross-border judicial cooperation. 
Training providers should provide for every future or newly appointed judge and prosecutor to take part 
in a cross-border exchange in the course of their initial training. The EJTN’s AIAKOS exchanges should 
therefore be made a standard component of the initial training offer for young judges and prosecutors. 

Lastly, we also need legal language courses to be systematically part of the initial training for all professions. 

The rule of law 

As Commissioner Reynders so rightly pointed out, judicial training is essential to promote a common rule of 
law culture. To promote this common rule of law culture, we should already start with our young professionals 
to make them aware of the important role they play in this context. Initial training should help secure the 
effective judicial protection, the cornerstone of the rule of law. This is why this conference is so important. 

The objectives regarding initial training and the rule of law are ambitious. But we will reach them together. 
How we will do so is what we will be discussing today and tomorrow. 

33

Nathalie RORET

Nathalie RORET,  
Directrice de l’École nationale de la magistrature
European Judicial Training Conference

« INITIAL TRAINING OF JUSTICE, PROFESSIONALS SERVING THE RULE OF LAW »  
Bordeaux, 22-23 February 2022

« LA FORMATION INITIALE DES PROFESSIONNELS DE LA JUSTICE AU SERVICE DE 
L’ETAT DE DROIT »  
Bordeaux, 22-23 février 2022

Monsieur le directeur général adjoint de la justice pénale, [Peter Csonka]

Monsieur le secrétaire général du Réseau européen de formation judiciaire, [Markus Brückner], Monsieur 
le président du Conseil des barreaux européens, [James Macguill]

Madame la Bâtonnière, Mesdames et messieurs,

J’ai l’honneur et le plaisir d’ouvrir la conférence intitulée « Formation initiale des professionnels de la justice 
au service de l’État de droit » proposée dans le cadre de la Présidence française de l’Union européenne 
conjointement par la Commission européenne et l’École nationale de la magistrature.

L’État de droit : voilà un sujet qui résonne avec l’histoire de la ville de Bordeaux qui nous accueille 
aujourd’hui dans l’un de ses amphithéâtres ; c’est en effet, Montesquieu, magistrat au parlement de 
Bordeaux et philosophe, qui énonça dans son ouvrage L’esprit des lois les principes de la séparation des 
pouvoirs qui garantissent le bon fonctionnement de nos démocraties et d’un État dans lequel le droit 
s’impose à tous, y compris à l’Etat lui-même, dans lequel il existe une hiérarchie des normes et une 
justice indépendante.

En Europe, c’est plutôt récemment que l’État de droit est devenu une priorité, même si le droit occupe 
une place importante dans la construction européenne depuis son origine : l’Union européenne a en effet 
développé, depuis une dizaine d’années environ, une action de développement et de renforcement de 
l’État droit ; cette action est basée sur

les institutions de l’Union, les outils de suivi et de sanctions, la jurisprudence du droit de l’Union, et la 
coopération étroite avec le Conseil de l’Europe.

Désormais, le respect de l’État de droit fait partie de l’intégration européenne.

Cette conférence est un évènement important d’abord en terme d’agenda.

C’est la première fois que la France préside le Conseil de l’Union européenne depuis l’adoption du traité 
de Lisbonne.

À l’époque, l’Europe sortait par le haut d’une crise sans précédent avec l’échec des referendums organisés 
en France et aux Pays Bas. Elle a pourtant réussi à avancer en intégrant notamment la Charte des droits 
fondamentaux dans le droit obligatoire de l’Union. Et rappelons-le, c’est aussi à l’occasion de ce traité 
que la primauté du droit européen a été rappelée.

À l’heure où ce principe est remis en cause par certains de nos voisins européens, à l’heure où l’Europe 
apparaît fragile, comme l’a constaté le Président de la république, Emmanuel Macron dans son discours 
devant le Parlement européen le 19 janvier dernier,

34

Nous ne devons pas oublier l’histoire et tout le chemin parcouru par ce beau projet européen, notre projet 
européen, celui que nous avons voulu réaliser « à petits pas » après une période de guerre tragique.

Nous avons suivi ensemble ce chemin traversé de doutes et d’évidences.

Rappelons-nous que nous étions 6 à y croire au début. Nous sommes 27 aujourd’hui à partager une 
histoire et un engagement communs.

« L’Europe se fera dans les crises et elle sera la somme des solutions apportées à ces crises » prédisait 
Jean Monnet. Et c’est plus que jamais ensemble que nous devons surmonter ces crises.

L’École nationale de la magistrature est résolument engagée au soutien de la construction européenne 
depuis sa création. Contribuer à la création d’un espace judiciaire commun en Europe, c’est l’un des 
objectifs de la stratégie internationale dont s’est dotée l’École en 2018. L’investissement prioritaire en 
Europe y est clairement affirmé.

L’ENM a, en effet, un rôle essentiel à jouer tant la formation judiciaire est au cœur du défi européen.

Car les juristes européens ne sont pas encore, pas assez vite, pas suffisamment sensibilisés au droit de 
l’Union européenne. Ils ignorent parfois jusqu’à l’existence des outils mis à leur disposition par l’Union. 
Ces lacunes fragilisent la construction européenne.

La formation judiciaire a, au contraire, vocation à renforcer les acteurs de la justice, à les rendre plus 
forts, plus compétents, à leur permettre de maitriser le droit de l’Union européenne qui n’est pas un droit 
facultatif dont nous pourrions nous exonérer. Il s’impose au titre de la hiérarchie des normes, et nous 
avons tous la responsabilité et le devoir de l’appliquer, il fait partie de notre culture juridique commune.

C’est dans cet esprit que, malgré la crise sanitaire, nous avons poursuivi notre action au sein du Réseau 
européen de formation judiciaire, dont l’ENM est un membre fondateur. Les auditeurs de justice et les 
magistrats français peuvent ainsi continuer à bénéficier des échanges et des formations sur le droit de 
l’Union européenne organisés par le Réseau, outre les sessions proposées classiquement par l’École sur 
le droit et la jurisprudence européenne. Je salue les membres de ce réseau qui sont présents aujourd’hui, 
nos amis, nos partenaires, avec lesquels nous travaillons quasi- quotidiennement au service d’une Europe 
de la Justice.

C’est aussi avec le concours de ce Réseau aujourd’hui incontournable sur la scène européenne que nous 
accueillons régulièrement des magistrats européens dans nos formations en présence ou à distance, 
dans une proportion qui a même augmenté en 2021.

Nous avons d’ailleurs lancé il y a quelques semaines notre nouveau cycle d’études judiciaires européennes, 
le premier des 12 évènements labellisés par la Présidence française de l’Union européenne et qui seront 
portés par notre Ecole d’ici au 30 juin 2022.

Avec ce cycle, nous avons l’ambition de former ensemble des magistrats et des avocats de toute l’Europe, 
et de créer un véritable réflexe européen au sein de la communauté judiciaire.

Car au-delà des formations sur le droit de l’Union européenne qui irriguent la scolarité des auditeurs de 
justice ou la formation continue des magistrats français, la formation judiciaire doit également nous 
permettre de consolider une base commune fondée sur l’État de droit et l’indépendance de la Justice. 
C’est le fondement même de l’engagement européen. Créer cette dimension, cette communauté qui 
transcende les frontières nationales et qui a besoin de matérialiser un lien entre ses membres.

35

Et ce lien doit pouvoir se tisser entre les acteurs de la justice le plus tôt possible, dès le début de leur 
carrière.

Tel est le sens de cet événement, l’un des 12 labellisés « Présidence française du Conseil de l’Union 
européenne » portés par l’Ecole nationale de la magistrature, sur les 18 événements organisés par le 
ministère de la Justice français : réfléchir ensemble aux moyens, aux méthodes permettant d’intégrer 
davantage encore les réflexes de défense de l’État de droit.

Elle va nous réunir pendant une journée et demi : magistrats, élèves magistrats, avocats et élèves-avocats, 
notaires, huissiers, d’une trentaine de nationalités différentes. Cette diversité des origines professionnelles 
et géographiques des intervenants et des participants est une richesse et un atout incontestables pour 
nourrir notre réflexion.

Le programme qui vous est proposé combinera des temps pléniers et des ateliers en sous-groupes au 
sein desquels vous pourrez activement prendre part à la réflexion et mêmes à des propositions sur les 
objectifs, les acquis de la formation, son contenu et son format.

Il est également prévu de réfléchir aux moyens par lesquels la dimension européenne de la formation 
initiale des magistrats et des avocats peut être renforcée.

Cette conférence a été élaborée grâce à une étroite collaboration entre la Commission européenne, et 
l’École nationale de la magistrature : les équipes de la Commission et de l’ENM ont travaillé ensemble 
de bout en bout pour construire cet événement et je les en remercie sincèrement.

Ils ont sollicité des intervenants de haut niveau, français et européens, universitaires, magistrats et 
avocats pour animer et nous accompagner dans une réflexion qui se veut tourner, in fine, vers la pratique, 
et que je remercie très chaleureusement.

Je tiens à remercier, enfin, les participants, parmi lesquels nos partenaires - le Réseau européen de 
formation judiciaire, la délégation des barreaux européens… - d’être venus nombreux à Bordeaux.

En 2022, plus que jamais, l’École nationale de la magistrature place ainsi son action sous le sceau de la 
coopération et des échanges européens, avec l’exigence de chaque instant de faire sienne la déclaration 
historique de Louise WEISS, lors de la toute première session du Parlement européen le 17 juillet 1979 
à Strasbourg « l’Europe ne retrouvera son rayonnement qu’en rallumant les phares de la conscience, de 
la vie et du droit ».

Je cède la parole à Monsieur le directeur adjoint de la justice pénale à la Commission européenne.

Seul le prononcé fait foi. 

36

Tamara ĆAPETA

Tamara ĆAPETA16,  
Advocate General at the Court of Justice of the European Union
The Rule of Law in the EU of Tomorrow

Speech for the Conference organised by the Ecole nationale de la magistrature 
(ENM), the European Commission and the French Presidency

‘Initial Training of Justice Professionals Serving the Rule of Law’  
Bordeaux, 22-23 February 2022

I. Introduction

In his seminal work, ‘Sapiens – A brief history of humankind’, the historian Yuval Noah Harari explained 
that humans were able to organise into societies because of the stories that tied them together and 
organised their mutual relations. The story that Europeans chose with a view to organise their commonly 
built society in the framework of the European Union is the one in which a society is founded on the rule 
of law. The rule of law was not chosen as the organisational principle of the European Union by chance, 
but on purpose. It was seen as a necessary condition for a society which treats all its participants as 
equal, respecting their dignity and allowing their personal freedom, as long as it does not endanger the 
equally valuable freedom of others.

The story involving the rule of law as its core value was not the only possible story. However, that is the 
one that the founders of the European Union have chosen. Being part of the European Union, therefore, 
entails the acceptance of that story. Given that the rule of law, as envisaged in the Treaties (Article 2 
TEU) is closely linked to other values and serves their achievement in practice (the other values being 
human dignity, freedom, protection of fundamental human and minority rights and equality), it is obvious 
that the rule of law is not a value neutral principle. In the EU framework, it enables integration based 
on liberal democracy.

To keep a story alive, it is necessary to narrate it, again and again, and to discuss its meaning. The 
story was always there in the EU project, but it lay dormant for some time. That is not so any more. 
The storytellers have awoken because some participants of the society have forgotten the story, or 
misunderstood its meaning and value.

In a way, the unwanted developments taking place in certain Member States, such as Hungary and 
Poland, could be seen as fortunate, as they forced us into discussing the more concrete contours of the 
rule of law. That will, hopefully, keep the story alive. Optimists always manage to find something good 
in otherwise bad developments.

Discussions about the rule of law are necessary in all parts of our societies – in schools, newspapers, 
cultural events and also, importantly, among judges and other legal professionals. That is why this event 
was indeed important. The lessons learnt at the sessions of this conference will be transformed into 
useful guidelines for the education of future judges and lawyers. That will, even more importantly, create 
a forum for constant discussion of the rule of law. It is important to seize this moment to establish the 
European judicial community, as we have heard yesterday at the dinner cocktail speech by Mr Renard.

(16)  All opinions expressed are personal to the author.

37

II. The rule of law as a judicially applicable value

Judges are at the same time subject to the rule of law and the guarantors of this value. As we have 
heard from several speakers in the opening session yesterday, access to justice and effective judicial 
protection are cornerstones of the rule of law. For judges to provide and defend the rule of law, this 
principle has to be judicially applicable.

I am, therefore, going to ask the question: Is the rule of law a judicially applicable value?

The President of the Court of Justice has, in one of his speeches last year,17 explained the rule of law by 
comparison to an electricity distribution system. At first, electricity is created as high voltage. This is the 
concept of the rule of law as a broadly understood value. Transformers then distribute the electricity to 
different branches. This is comparable to the principles that are based on the value of the rule of law. 
They include the principles requiring a transparent, accountable, democratic and pluralistic law-making 
process, the principle of legal certainty, the prohibition of arbitrary executive powers, and effective judicial 
protection, including access to justice, by independent and impartial courts. Those principles were to a 
larger or lesser extent interpreted in the case-law of the Court. The electricity is, in the end, streamlined into 
cities or private households, and to the particular users there: laundry machines, toasters, or streetlights. 
Similarly, the principles based on the rule of law turn, on a more concrete level, into legal rules: rules 
about legislative and administrative processes, rules about the jurisdiction of different branches of power, 
rules guiding the adoption of the normative texts, rules shielding judges from political influence or rules 
about conditions to access the courts, to name just a few.

It was disputed that the rule of law, especially at its value level and the level of its principles, is to be 
applied by judges, as it is too vague. This, however, showed not to be true. At all its levels, including at 
the more abstract level of a value, the rule of law is a judicially cognisable and applicable principle. 
That was clearly confirmed by the Court of Justice, sitting as the Full Court, in judgments delivered last 
week,18 which upheld the validity of the Conditionality Regulation (as it is colloquially called). To quote 
the Court, it held that:

‘Article 2 TEU is not merely a statement of policy guidelines or intentions, but contains values which, (…), 
are an integral part of the very identity of the European Union as a common legal order, values which are 
given concrete expression in principles containing legally binding obligations for the Member States.’19

On that basis, the Court rejected Hungary’s and Poland’s arguments that the Conditionality Regulation 
does not live up to the standard of legal certainty, itself being one facet of the rule of law value.

The Court also rejected the argument that the rule of law can only be defended through the political 
mechanism of Article 7 TEU (of which we have heard more in the lecture of Professor Blatiere yesterday). 
Quite to the contrary, its respect may be, and has to be, subject to judicial proceedings. In fact, as most 
of you are familiar with, the rule of law has already been the subject of infringement proceedings as well 
as of preliminary rulings. In a number of recent judgments initiated by the Commission, not only against 
Poland, the Court had the opportunity to clarify certain aspects of the rule of law relating to effective 
judicial protection and particularly the requirement of judicial the independence. 

The other important procedural route, which demonstrates that the rule of law is judicially relevant also 
in front of the Member States’ courts, is the preliminary reference procedure. Judges across the EU, 

(17)  Concluding remarks by Mr Koen Lenaerts, President of the Court of Justice of the European Union at the Conference “EUnited in diversity: between 

common constitutional traditions and national identities” Riga, 2-3 September 2021.

(18)  Case C-156/21 Hungary v Parliament and Council, EU:C:2022:97; Case C-157/21 Poland v Parliament and Council, EU:C:2022:98.

(19)  Case C-156/21 Hungary v Parliament and Council, EU:C:2022:97, paragraph 232.

38

from Ireland (in cases such as LM,20 as we have heard yesterday from Aileen Donelly) to Malta (in the 
case Repubblika21) entered into dialogue with the Court of Justice in order to clarify the meaning of the 
value of the rule of law and its component principles and rules. Most importantly, judges in Poland or 
Romania, turned to the Court of Justice, aware that the backsliding in the rule of law in their respective 
countries might prevent them from properly performing their duties as judges, in conformity with EU law. 
I am referring to cases such as A.K.22 and A.B.23 referred by Polish judges, and the cases Euro Box24 
and RS,25 decided by the Court only yesterday, which were initiated by Romanian judges. Those cases 
are signals that the rule of law is understood by national judges as a value applicable to disputes they 
are invited to resolve.

There is no doubt, therefore, that the rule of law and its components are judicially cognisable concepts. 
That requires all European judges to educate themselves and form their own opinion on this concept. 
When I use the term European judges, I do not only have in mind my colleagues from the Luxembourg 
Court. As was clear since as far back as 1963 and the judgment in Van Gend en Loos,26 and as was 
powerfully confirmed a few years ago in the Portuguese judges case,27 all national judges share with the 
Court of Justice the task to ensure that the Law (with a capital L) is respected within the EU legal order.

That task is performed in the mutual cooperation of all European judges. Cooperation can take the form 
of informal discussions as was the case at this Conference or as happens within many other activities 
supported by the European Judicial Network. It may also happen through more formalised mechanisms, 
especially through the preliminary ruling procedure.  

III. The interpretation of EU law

This dialogue of judges, to which one of the workshops at this Conference was devoted (and skilfully 
managed by Mr Chamouard, and at which I had the pleasure of participating), is an important tool for 
an inclusive and informed interpretation of EU law.

I would like to pause for a moment at the question of interpretation of EU law.

The preliminary ruling procedure is often described as a mechanism that enables the Court of Justice to 
interpret EU law and national judges to apply it. This description is, to my mind, misleading. The preliminary 
ruling procedure, as envisaged under the Treaties, indeed gives the last word about the meaning of EU 
law to the Court of Justice. However, that meaning is not formed by the Court of Justice alone, but in a 
dialogue with many other stakeholders in the EU legal order – such as national governments, companies 
and individuals, parties to proceedings at national courts and their lawyers, and other EU institutions. 
Through the mechanism of preliminary rulings, all national courts share with the Court of Justice the 
task of interpreting EU law. They are, at the same time, the sole guarantors that EU law will be applied 
in practice.

The discussions about this jurisdictional delimitation based on the difference between interpretation 
and application was reopened by several opinions28 of one of my colleagues whose mandate at the 

(20)  Case C-216/18 Minister for Justice and Equality (Failures of the judicial system), EU:C:2018:586.

(21)  Case C-896/19 Repubblika, EU:C:2021:311.

(22)  Case C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18 AK and Others (Independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court), ECLI:EU:C:2019:982.

(23)  Case C-824/18 A.B. and Others (Appointment of judges to the Supreme Court – Appeals), EU:C:2021:153.

(24)  Joined Cases C-357/19, C-379/19, C-547/19, C-811/19 and C-840/19 Euro Box Promotion and Others (EU:C:2021:1034).

(25)  Case C-430/21 RS (Effect of the decisions of a constitutional court) (ECLI:EU:C:2022:99).

(26)  Case C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos (EU:C:1963:1.)

(27)  Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses (EU:C:2018:117).

(28)  Opinions of A.G. Bobek in Case C-923/19, Van Ameyde España, EU:C:2021:125 ; and in Case C-561/19, Consorzio Italian Management et Catania 

Multiservizi, EU:C:2021:291.

39

Court has in the meantime came to an end, AG Michal Bobek. The judgment in the case Conzortio Italian 
Managment,29 sometimes referred to as CILFIT 2, even if interpreted by many as confirmation of the 
obligations of last instance courts to refer, introduced a novelty – an obligation for national judges to 
provide reasons for their decision not to refer, if they have so decided. That requirement demonstrates 
that national judges are invited and expected to interpret EU law, and only if they have doubts that their 
colleagues in other courts, in the same or other Member States, could come to different conclusions 
about the meaning of EU law, should they turn to the Court of Justice.

IV. Uniformity, diversity and the rule of law

Preliminary rulings coupled with the primacy of EU law serves the purpose that EU law remains ‘common 
law’ throughout the EU, across all the Member States and in front of all national courts. Primacy ensures 
such uniformity by insisting on the application of EU law even when a contrary national rule exists in a 
particular domestic system. At the same time, primacy also ensures equality among Member States. That 
was clearly recalled by the Court of Justice in yesterday’s RS judgment.30 The RS case came to the Court 
as a reference for a preliminary ruling submitted by a Romanian court. That court wanted, in a case in 
which it was deciding, to leave disapplied a Romanian law, which it considered to be contrary to EU law. 
However, the judge was prevented from doing so on the basis of the earlier constitutional court decision 
according to which judges had to apply domestic laws which that Court found to be constitutional. That 
was mandated with the threat of disciplinary procedure and sanctions. The Court of Justice, sitting as 
the Grand Chamber, found the rule established by the Romanian Constitutional Court inconsistent with 
the principle of primacy. It found at the same time that the threat of sanctions for applying EU law and 
for communicating for that purpose with the Court of Justice in the preliminary ruling procedure, runs 
counter to the essence of the rule of law. It deprives subjects of law of the effective judicial protection 
of their EU-based rights and endangers the independence of judges.

Whereas the rule of law, which for the sake of uniformity and equality among the Member States requires 
the primacy of EU law, has to be respected, it does not, however, require total uniformity. Divergences 
that would accommodate differences of participating states and their legal cultures are tolerated and 
possible. I will give you as an example the discussion which we had yesterday at lunchtime. I have learned  
that in some legal systems, in France and in the Netherlands, for instance, judges can be members of 
political parties. Other systems, such as Greece or Croatia, prohibit this. Can we find a uniform solution, 
without prohibiting judges’ membership in political parties at the EU level? Probably not. However, is 
that at all necessary? If, within their own legal cultures, judges cannot and do not come under influence 
and pressure of their party colleagues, if they do not implement party programs in their decisions and if 
their party membership does not create the appearance in the eyes of public that these judges are not 
independent, the rule of law, as understood by the EU legal system, is safeguarded. Core elements of 
the principle of judicial independence, as interpreted by the Court of Justice, are respected.

However, none of the participating legal orders can claim that their national identity does not require the 
respect of the rule of law. As the Court explained in its judgments of last week relating to validity of the 
Conditionality Regulation, which I have already mentioned, the rule of law is not only a mere condition 
for acquiring membership in the European Union. It is its organisational principle, to be respected at all 
times and by all branches of government.

(29)  Judgment in Case C-561/19 Consorzio Italian Management et Catania Multiservizi, EU:C:2021:799.

(30)  Case C-430/21 RS (Effect of the decisions of a constitutional court), ECLI:EU:C:2022:99, paragraph 55.

40

Courts, for their part, need to pay respect to the rule of law in all their activities - when they interpret legal 
rules in order to solve disputes and when they control other branches of government through different 
mechanisms of judicial review. One important aspect of the concept of the rule of law is that the rules of 
the system also bind a democratically elected majority. Controlling whether parliaments and executives 
abide by the rules, especially those that are considered fundamental, is the task of the courts. That task 
can be performed only if judges are independent from the bodies which they are invited to control. Three 
workshops of the conference discussed those important issues embodied in the concept of the rule of 
law – judicial independence, mechanisms and methods of judicial review and the relatively complex grid 
of fundamental rights guaranteed within the EU legal order.

I was unfortunately not able to follow all of the workshops, as they took place at the same time. From 
the program and the description of the topics, I could read that the workshops did not shy away from 
discussing controversial issues relating to these principles. Such open discussion is indeed the only way 
to clarify and resolve contradictions, which sometimes occur between different principles involved in the 
concept of the rule of law. However, openly recognising practical problems and conflicts in principles does 
not in itself cast doubt about the judicial applicability of the rule of law. On the contrary, it enhances 
its importance. Disagreements about the meaning] are inherent part of free and pluralistic societies. 
Once judges internalise the rule of law as a value inherent in the system, once it become a part of their 
professional ethics (another interesting topic discussed at this conference), the conflicts will be resolved 
in a way that fits the story, or to use Dworkin’s words, in a way that fits the political morality of the 
system. All such mismatches could be put together in one puzzle by rule of law-conform interpretation. 
An interpretation of which the artificial intelligence mentioned yesterday by Mr. MacGuill is not (or not 
yet, in any case) capable. Only human judges can undertake such a task. Such judges are, to answer the 
question posed by Mr de Sousa Lameira yesterday, judges of the future that we need.

Values, even if not easily explained or prone to simple definitions, could and should be internalised by 
judges. What I have in mind is similar to what Lord Goff, a member of what was then the UK House of 
Lords, expressed when talking about the boundary between the interpretation of law and the intrusion of 
judges into a legislative role: “… although I am well aware of the existence of the boundary, I am never 
quite sure where to find it. Its position seems to vary from case to case”. In the same way, judges need 
to be aware of the value of the rule of law. Even if individual judges might give different interpretations 
to principles and rules resulting from the rule of law, that does not affect the value itself. 

IV. Conclusion

To finish, without even purporting to be able to put in numbers the information per capita that I tried to 
communicate, as was admirably done yesterday by Mr Bruckner, I will conclude with the following thoughts. 
Inclusion of the rule of law in the education of judges and other legal professionals is a guarantee that 
the story chosen by the Europeans to guide and organise their common project will live. The rule of law 
in the EU of tomorrow will, therefore, become once again the most important story to know and to tell.

41

Lauren BLATIERE

Lauren BLATIERE,  
Professeure de droit public, CJB - UPRES EA n°4337, Université d’Angers
L’État de droit en Europe : histoire et perspectives

Retranscription de l’intervention prononcée le 22 février 2022.

Je tiens d’abord à exprimer mes sincères remerciements aux organisatrices et aux organisateurs de cette 
journée et tout le plaisir qui est le mien d’y participer. 

Pour entrer dans le vif du sujet, évoquer l’État de droit en droit de l’Union européenne peut peut-être 
sembler naturel aujourd’hui, mais tel n’est pas le cas. A tout le moins, tel n’a pas toujours été le cas. 

D’une part, si à l’origine de la construction communautaire l’objectif politique est de pacifier le continent 
européen après deux guerres mondiales, les Communautés européennes se traduisent concrètement, 
dans un premier temps, par une coopération sur des questions économiques et techniques. A ce stade 
de l’histoire, le droit communautaire ne se prononce pas sur la question de l’État de droit. 

D’autre part, au même moment, est créé le Conseil de l’Europe, organisation européenne expressément 
tournée vers la protection des droits fondamentaux, de la démocratie et de l’État de droit. On a alors 
pu imaginer que ces questions demeureraient dans le champ du Conseil de l’Europe et qu’elles seraient 
exclues du champ du droit communautaire. 

L’avenir a incontestablement démenti cette impression. Cela étant, avant d’approfondir l’étude de l’État 
de droit en droit de l’Union européenne, il est nécessaire d’essayer de définir ce qu’est l’État de droit. 
La difficulté est sérieuse car il n’y a pas de définition unanime. Selon les systèmes juridiques que vous 
étudiez, les sources juridiques ou doctrinales que vous consultez, l’approche retenue de l’État de droit ne 
sera pas toujours la même. Qui plus est, il s’agit d’une terminologie française, résultat d’une traduction 
de termes étrangers : le Rechsstaat Allemand et la Rule of Law anglo-saxonne. Or, ces trois concepts ne 
sont pas parfaitement identiques. 

Malgré ce, deux aspects de l’État de droit ressortent bien souvent et semblent faire l’objet d’un consensus. 
Tout d’abord, un aspect formel, qui est présent dès l’origine dans les trois concepts. Un État de droit est 
alors entendu comme un État qui se soumet au droit, sous contrôle de juridictions indépendantes et 
impartiales. Un aspect matériel, ensuite, qui est présent dès l’origine dans le concept de Rule of Law 
mais qui n’apparaîtra dans celui d’État de droit et de Rechsstaat qu’après la seconde guerre mondiale : 
un État de droit est un État qui ne se soumet pas à n’importe quel droit, mais à un droit respectueux 
des droits fondamentaux. 

De ces quelques propos, ressort également que l’État de droit est véritablement le fruit de l’histoire 
des États d’Europe de l’Ouest. Tel n’est pas le cas des États d’Europe de l’Est, ce qui explique en partie 
les difficultés que l’on rencontre aujourd’hui, à savoir les violations systémiques de l’État de droit par, 
notamment, la Hongrie et la Pologne, et qui, j’en suis certaine, seront évoquées dans les conférences 
ultérieures.

Quoi qu’il en soit, l’État de droit a bien fait l’objet d’une consécration progressive en droit de l’Union 
européenne. De surcroît, de cette consécration résulte une jurisprudence protectrice de la Cour de justice 
de l’Union européenne. Autrement dit, l’État de droit a donné lieu à des développements importants en 
droit de l’Union européenne, tant dans les textes que dans la jurisprudence. 

42

I. La consécration de l’État de droit en droit de l’Union européenne

Cette consécration est double, en ce qu’à la consécration de l’État de droit en droit primaire, en tant que 
principe puis valeur, a été associé un mécanisme permettant de sanctionner un État membre violant 
ladite valeur.  

A. L’apparition de l’État de droit dans le droit primaire

L’apparition de l’État de droit en droit primaire est tardive, puisqu’il n’est pas mentionné dans les traités 
fondateurs au cours des premières décennies de fonctionnement des Communautés européennes. Ce 
silence s’explique peut-être par le fait que les Communautés étaient alors tournées vers une coopération 
technique, de telle sorte qu’une référence à l’État de droit a pu sembler non pertinente aux rédacteurs 
des traités. Non sans lien, les États fondateurs n’étaient peut-être pas prêts à se lier sur une question si 
sensible que celle de l’État de droit dès le commencement de la construction communautaire. Le temps 
n’était-il peut-être pas encore venu. 

Une première étape est franchie avec le traité de Maastricht, signé en 1992. Cette étape est cependant 
d’une importance relative. En effet, l’État de droit est alors inscrit dans le préambule du traité sur l’Union 
européenne, les États membres y rappelant simplement leur attachement. L’État de droit est également 
inscrit au titre des objectifs de deux politiques extérieures de l’Union : la politique de développement (article 
130 U, paragraphe 2, TCE) et la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune (article J.1, paragraphe 2, 
TUE). A ce stade, l’État de droit occupe donc une place bien mesurée. Il s’agit soit d’un simple engagement 
pris par les États membres dans le préambule du traité, sans davantage de précisions, soit d’un simple 
objectif de deux politiques extérieures de l’Union (objectif dont on connaît les résultats limités, encore 
aujourd’hui). 

La véritable évolution ne viendra que plus tard, avec traité d’Amsterdam, signé en 1997 et entré en 
vigueur en 1999. A compter de cette date, l’article 6 du traité sur l’Union européenne affirme pour la 
toute première fois que « L’Union est fondée sur les principes de la liberté, de la démocratie, du respect 
des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales, ainsi que de l’État de droit, principes qui sont 
communs aux États membres ». Il s’agit donc d’une étape importante. L’État de droit quitte la catégorie 
des engagements politiques flous ou des simples objectifs pour devenir un véritable principe, reconnu 
juridiquement et s’imposant aux États membres, comme à l’Union elle-même. Par ailleurs, avec le traité 
d’Amsterdam, est également modifié l’article 49 TUE, soit l’article qui organise l’adhésion de nouveaux 
États membres.  Avec cette modification, le droit primaire indique expressément que le respect de l’État 
de droit est une condition à l’adhésion de nouveaux États membres. 

Pourquoi une telle montée en puissance de l’État de droit à cette date, en tant que principe de l’Union 
et en tant que critère d’adhésion de nouveaux États membres ? Les raisons sont multiples, mais deux 
peuvent être citées. La première renvoie à ce que j’évoquais il y a quelques instants : à la date de 
l’élaboration du traité d’Amsterdam, les États membres sont finalement prêts à approfondir davantage 
la construction communautaire, en se liant toujours plus sur des questions plus sensibles, plus politiques 
que techniques. D’où, notamment, la consécration de l’État de droit en tant que principe de l’Union. La 
deuxième raison réside sans doute dans le fait qu’à la date de l’élaboration du traité d’Amsterdam, l’Union 
préparait l’adhésion massive des États d’Europe de l’Est, anciens satellites de l’URSS. Or, on mesurait 
l’écart existant entre les États membres de l’Union et ces États candidats à l’adhésion. Il est donc apparu 
essentiel de consacrer pour la première fois le socle de l’Union européenne, cette base essentielle qui 
doit être partagée par tous pour permettre à l’Union européenne de fonctionner et d’avancer.

43

Finalement, le traité de Lisbonne, signé en 2007 et entré en vigueur en 2009, a opéré une évolution 
sémantique, en s’inspirant ici du traité établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe, signé en 2004 mais 
finalement jamais entré en vigueur. Depuis le traité de Lisbonne, l’État de droit n’est plus un principe 
sur lequel l’Union est fondée, mais une valeur. Le passage de principe à valeur continue d’interroger 
juridiquement (d’autant plus que, à la lecture du préambule de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de 
l’Union européenne, entrée en vigueur avec le traité de Lisbonne, l’État de droit n’est pas une valeur mais... 
un principe !). Quoi qu’il en soit, politiquement, la référence aux valeurs de l’Union marque sans doute 
la volonté de définir le socle philosophique de l’Union, ce qui est au cœur de son identité. L’inclusion de 
l’État de droit au titre des valeurs de l’Union, à l’article 2 TUE, démontre donc l’importance de ce dernier. 

Par ailleurs, loin de se contenter de consacrer l’État de droit en tant que valeur, le droit de l’Union a 
également prévu un mécanisme permettant de sanctionner un État membre qui le violerait.  

B. Les sanctions pour violation de l’État de droit par un État membre

C’est le traité d’Amsterdam, à nouveau, qui a pris soin de doter l’Union d’une base légale lui permettant 
de sanctionner politiquement un État membre violant l’État de droit. Cette base légale se trouve à 
l’article 7 TUE. 

Si l’on s’intéresse uniquement aux aspects les plus importants (autrement dit, je ne peux réaliser ici une 
étude exhaustive), plusieurs questions surgissent. Tout d’abord, en quoi consiste la sanction prévue à 
l’article 7 TUE ? Principalement en une privation du droit de vote de l’État concerné au Conseil de l’Union 
européenne. L’État se trouve alors dans l’impossibilité de participer pleinement à une institution centrale 
de l’Union, institution qui joue notamment un rôle très important dans l’adoption du droit dérivé. La 
sanction n’est donc pas symbolique et elle a pu être qualifiée d’arme nucléaire. 

Ensuite, comment parvenir à une telle sanction ? Malheureusement, après une procédure lourde et vouée 
à l’échec. En effet, si le vote de la sanction en tant que tel est fait le Conseil de l’Union à la majorité 
qualifiée, il suppose qu’en amont, le Conseil européen, qui réunit les chefs d’État ou de gouvernements 
des États membres, ait constaté à l’unanimité « l’existence d’une violation grave et persistante de [l’État 
de droit] par un État membre ». Or, l’unanimité ici recherchée ne sera probablement jamais atteinte, même 
si elle exclut bien logiquement la participation de l’État concerné. Il y aura toujours des considérations 
politiques pour empêcher au moins un autre État membre de voter en faveur de ce constat. 

Le traité de Nice, signé en 2001, est venu porter l’Union sur le chemin de la prévention des atteintes à 
l’État de droit dans les États membres. Modifiant l’article 7 TUE, ce traité a permis au Conseil de l’Union 
de constater « qu’il existe un risque clair de violation grave [de l’État de droit] par un État membre ». Ce 
constat doit être fait à la majorité des 4/5ème et il permet au Conseil de formuler des recommandations 
à l’État concerné.  

Cette évolution n’a cependant porté aucun fruit puisque les atteintes à l’État de droit dans les États 
membres se sont multipliées et ont pris des proportions particulièrement inquiétantes dans au moins 
deux États membres. En Hongrie, tout d’abord, le Premier ministre Viktor ORBAN mène depuis 2010 une 
politique qui menace, et je reprends ici les propos du Parlement européen, « notamment [,] la liberté 
d’expression, la liberté académique, les droits fondamentaux des migrants (...à, la liberté de réunion et 
d’association, les activités des organisations de la société civile, (…), les droits des personnes appartenant 
aux minorités(…), les droits sociaux, le fonctionnement du système constitutionnel, l’indépendance 
du pouvoir judiciaire et d’autres institutions, sans oublier les nombreuses allégations inquiétantes de 
corruption et de conflits d’intérêts » (point 2 de la Résolution du Parlement européen du 17 mai 2017 

44

sur la situation en Hongrie).. La Pologne, quant à elle, inquiète depuis les élections présidentielles et 
législatives de 2015 qui ont conduit à l’arrivée au pouvoir du parti conservateur Droit et justice. La 
Pologne a notamment adopté, depuis cette date, une série de lois portant atteinte à l’indépendance des 
juridictions ordinaires et constitutionnelles.

Dans ce contexte, particulièrement grave, l’Union a continué, dans un premier temps, à essayer de solutionner 
la crise par une réponse politique. C’est ainsi qu’a notamment été élaboré par la Commission européenne 
un nouveau cadre de l’Union européenne pour renforcer l’état de droit en 2014 (COM/2014/0158 final). Là 
encore, l’idée pour moi n’est pas de rentrer dans les détails, mais de souligner que toute la logique de ce 
nouveau cadre repose sur l’instauration d’un dialogue, d’abord confidentiel, puis public, avec l’État membre 
où existe « une situation de menace systémique envers l’état de droit ». L’espoir est que ce dialogue permette 
d’aboutir à un rétablissement de la situation, avant même que l’article 7 TUE ne soit activé. 

Néanmoins, la mise en œuvre de ce nouveau cadre à l’encontre de la Pologne a prouvé sa totale 
inefficacité, la situation s’y étant dégradée. Finalement, l’article 7 TUE a enfin été activé, sur demande 
de la Commission, mais cette activation a eu lieu fin 2017 et le Conseil de l’Union ne s’est toujours pas 
prononcé sur la question. De la même façon, l’article 7 TUE a été activé à l’encontre de la Hongrie en 
septembre 2018, sur demande du Parlement européen cette fois-ci, et le Conseil ne s’est également 
toujours pas prononcé. Partant, si l’État de droit est bien une valeur de l’Union, il ne faut, je crois, atteindre 
aucun secours d’éventuelles sanctions politiques qui pourraient être infligées à un État membre le violant 
de façon systémique.

L’Union européenne a dernièrement pensé une nouvelle stratégie consistant à protéger l’État de droit 
en conditionnant le versement des aides de l’Union au respect de l’État de droit. L’idée est que tout État 
membre violant l’État de droit pourra se voir priver des aides financières de l’Union. C’était, du moins, 
l’idée initialement défendue par le Parlement européen. Finalement, après des débats très compliqués, 
la solution obtenue se révèle limitée (Règlement 2020/2092 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 16 
décembre 2020 relatif à un régime général de conditionnalité pour la protection du budget de l’Union). En 
schématisant, le versement des aides de l’Union n’aura pas lieu s’il s’avère qu’un État viole l’État de droit 
de telle sorte que cela porte atteinte aux budget de l’Union. Il y aurait bien plus à dire sur ce règlement, 
mais l’on peut souligner qu’il a immédiatement fait l’objet de deux recours en annulation introduits par 
la Hongrie et la Pologne devant la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, recours qui ont été rejetés par 
l’assemblée plénière de la Cour le 16 février 2022 (aff. C-156/21 et aff. C-157/21). 

Face à un tel constat, il ne nous reste qu’à espérer que la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice est parvenue 
à de meilleurs résultats. 

II. La protection accordée par la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne

Si la jurisprudence la plus récente est particulièrement intéressante, la jurisprudence initiale de la Cour 
de justice n’est pas dénuée de tout intérêt. 

A. la jurisprudence initiale

Alors que l’État de droit est invoqué par les parties depuis les années 1960, la Cour de justice ne l’a 
intégré à ses motifs qu’à la fin des années 1990 (CJCE, 4 février 1999, Köllensperger et Atzwanger, aff. 
C-103/97). A cette date, les formules employées révèlent que la Cour présume le respect de l’État de 
droit par un État membre ou, pour le dire autrement, qu’elle n’a aucun soupçon de violation de l’État de 
droit. Ce dernier est alors rapidement mentionné, au détour d’une phrase, comme accessoire très relatif 
du raisonnement de la Cour.  

45

Est-ce  à  dire  que  la  jurisprudence  de  la  Cour  de  justice  était  alors  totalement  déconnectée  des 
considérations liées à l’État de droit ? Une réponse négative s’impose. Tout d’abord, à cette époque, 
l’État de droit est déjà une source d’inspiration pour la Cour de justice qui affirme que la Communauté 
européenne est... une « Communauté de droit ». Elle le fait pour la première fois dans le célèbre arrêt 
Les Verts / Parlement de 1986 (aff. C-294/83). De cet arrêt, et de la jurisprudence ultérieure, il ressort 
que la Communauté de droit est une Communauté soumise au droit, sous contrôle de juridictions 
indépendantes et impartiales, dans le respect des droits fondamentaux. En somme, la Cour de justice a 
consacré l’existence d’une Communauté de droit qui est clairement influencée par le concept d’État de 
droit. Logiquement, depuis l’arrêt E et F de 2010 (aff. C-550/09), la Cour se réfère à l’« Union de droit », 
la Communauté ayant disparu. 

Par ailleurs, sans se référer expressément à l’État de droit, la Cour de justice œuvrait déjà, par le biais 
d’une jurisprudence très audacieuse, en faveur de la protection de ce dernier, puisqu’elle œuvrait en 
faveur du respect des droits fondamentaux, par les États membres et par la Communauté européenne. 
Autrement dit, elle protégeait très activement, sans le dire, le volet matériel de l’État de droit. Je fais ici 
écho à toute la saga jurisprudentielle ayant permis à la Cour de protéger les droits fondamentaux en tant 
que principe généraux du droit (pour la jurisprudence de principe : CJCE, 12 novembre 1969, Stauder, aff. 
C-29/69 ; CJCE, 17 décembre 1970, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, aff. C-11/70 et CJCE, 14 mai 
1974, Nold, aff. C-4/73). Ce faisant, la Cour œuvrait déjà en faveur de la protection de l’État de droit. 

Ce premier temps de la jurisprudence est donc loin d’être dénué de tout intérêt pour la question qui nous 
intéresse. La Cour est cependant allée plus loin au cours des dernières années. 

B. Une protection considérablement enrichie

En février 2018, la Cour de justice a, pour la première fois, développé une argumentation ferme et 
pédagogique quant aux exigences inhérentes à l’État de droit, dans une affaire portugaise où le respect 
de l’État de droit ne faisait aucun doute. Dans un contexte marqué par des violations graves de l’État 
de droit par certains États membres et par le constat de l’inefficacité absolue des sanctions politiques, 
la Cour a donc saisi la première affaire qui s’y prêtait pour énoncer clairement ce qui doit être fait par 
un État membre pour que ce dernier ce conforme à l’État de droit, valeur de l’Union européenne. Cette 
affaire est l’affaire dite «  des juges portugais  », tranchée par la Grande chambre le 27 février 2018 
(aff. C-64/16). Cet arrêt a été le point de départ d’une jurisprudence particulière riche, qui a par la suite 
été composées d’affaires portant directement sur la situation polonaise, soit à l’occasion de recours en 
manquement introduit par la Commission européenne contre la Pologne, soit à l’occasion de renvois 
préjudiciels transmis en masse (près de 40 !) par les juridictions polonaises. 

Il m’est ici impossible d’évoquer toutes les affaires concernées, mais il est indispensable de s’arrêter sur 
leurs principaux apports. En ce que ces affaires concernent la Pologne, vous verrez qu’elles se concentrent 
surtout sur le volet formel de l’État de droit, à savoir le droit à un tribunal indépendant et impartial. 

Au-delà de formulations de principes, particulièrement fortes, la Cour a consacré des solutions importantes. 
La Cour a ainsi affirmé, pour la première fois, que la valeur de l’État de droit est « concrétisée » par l’article 
19, §1, al. 2 TUE, selon lequel « Les États membres établissent les voies de recours nécessaires pour 
assurer une protection juridictionnelle effective dans les domaines couverts par le droit de l’Union ». Cette 
affirmation emporte des conséquences importantes pour plusieurs raisons. D’abord, il ressort des arrêts 
de la Cour que l’article 19 TUE est potentiellement applicable à toute juridiction susceptible de connaître 
de questions relatives au droit de l’Union, sans que l’on ne porte d’intérêt à l’applicabilité du droit de 
l’Union dans le litige en cause. Cela revient à étendre la protection de l’article 19 TUE a, potentiellement, 

46

la totalité des juridictions des États membres, ce qui confère à cet article un champ d’application sans 
doute plus étendu que celui de l’article 47 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux (Droit à un recours 
effectif et à accéder à un tribunal impartial). Ensuite, l’article 19 TUE a été reconnu comme étant d’effet 
direct, et peut donc être directement invoqué par ceux qui subissent une atteinte à leur droit à un tribunal 
indépendant et impartial, y compris les juges eux-mêmes. Autrement dit, l’article 19 TUE est devenu une 
arme juridique importante pour lutter contre les dérives de l’État de droit portant atteinte à l’indépendance 
et à l’impartialité des juridictions. Cela ressort notamment de l’affaire des juges portugais précédemment 
évoquée, ainsi que de l’affaire AB tranchée par la Cour le 12 mars 2021 (C-824/18).

Non sans lien avec ce qui vient d’être dit, la Cour a également affirmé qu’un État membre doit disposer 
et maintenir une législation garantissant l’indépendance et l’impartialité de ses juridictions. Partant, une 
réforme judiciaire nationale peut faire l’objet d’un examen à la lumière du droit de l’Union européenne, 
notamment des articles 2 et 19 du TUE ou de l’article 47 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux. Là 
encore, cette solution a été consacrée dans l’affaire des juges portugais, ainsi que, notamment, dans 
deux arrêts Commission contre Pologne rendus par la Cour le 5 novembre 2019 (C-192/18) et le 24 
juin 2019 (C-619/18). La Cour a ainsi pu affirmer qu’une législation qui impose le départ à la retraite 
de juges ordinaires ou constitutionnels, de façon discriminatoire et pour des finalités douteuses est 
contraire à l’État de droit. Il en va de même d’une législation qui organise le régime disciplinaire des 
juges par un organe non impartial et indépendant, sans possibilité de recours devant une juridiction 
indépendante et impartiale, et qui expose les juges à des sanctions au titre du contenu de leurs décisions, 
potentiellement uniquement pour avoir appliqué le droit de l’Union ou opéré un renvoi préjudiciel (voir 
en ce sens, notamment, une nouvelle affaire Commission / Pologne, du 15 juillet 2021, aff. C-791/19).

Néanmoins, les violations systémiques de l’État de droit n’entraînent pas automatiquement la suspension 
de la coopération judiciaire dans le cadre du mandat d’arrêt européen. Seule une mise en œuvre aboutie 
de l’article 7 TUE pourrait entraîner le refus automatique des mandats d’arrêts européen émis par les 
juridictions de cet État. En l’état, un juge ne peut donner une réponse négative à un mandat d’arrêt 
européen émis par une telle juridiction que s’il établit, après un examen minutieux et exigeant, incluant 
notamment une étude de la situation spécifique de la personne concernée par le mandat, de l’infraction 
pour laquelle elle est poursuivie et du contexte factuel, qu’il y a un «  risque réel de violation (…) du 
contenu essentiel du droit fondamental à un procès équitable » (solution consacrée dans l’affaire LM 
du 25 juillet 2018, aff. C-216/18 PPU)31. 

Si cette jurisprudence revêt une importance cardinale, elle présente une faiblesse, de taille : dans bien 
des affaires, la Pologne a ignoré les arrêts de la Cour ou les mesures provisoires ordonnées, ce qui a 
notamment amené la Cour a prononcé une astreinte d’un million d’euros par jour de retard dans l’exécution 
d’une ordonnance précédemment rendue (astreinte prononcée dans l’ordonnance du 27 octobre 2021, 
aff. C-204/21). Là encore, l’efficacité d’une telle astreinte reste malheureusement discutable... 

Je vous remercie.

(31)  Le jour même où cette intervention était prononcée dans le cadre de la formation initiale, la Cour a également consacré la possibilité de s’opposer à 

un mandat d’arrêt européen lorsque, « dans le cadre d’un mandat d’arrêt européen émis aux fins de l’exécution d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté 
privatives de liberté, (…) si [l’autorité judiciaire d’exécution] constate qu’il existe, dans les circonstances particulières de l’affaire, des motifs sérieux et 
avérés de croire que, compte tenu notamment des éléments fournis par ladite personne et relatifs à la composition de la formation de jugement ayant 
connu de son affaire pénale ou à toute autre circonstance pertinente pour l’appréciation de l’indépendance et de l’impartialité de cette formation, le droit 
fondamental de la même personne à un procès équitable devant un tribunal indépendant et impartial, établi préalablement par la loi, consacré à l’article 
47, deuxième alinéa, de la charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne, a été violé » (CJUE, Gde ch., 22 février 2022, Openbaar Ministerie 
(Tribunal établi par la loi dans l’État membre d’émission), aff. jointes C-562/21 PPU et C-563/21 PPU).

47

Aileen DONNELLY

Aileen DONNELLY,  
Court of Appeal Ireland, Chairperson of the Judicial Studies Committee, Ireland
The rule of law, a concept in crisis?

The Four Courts Bombardment (1922) ©RTE Stills Library

“The right of access to the courts is an indispensable  
cornerstone of a State governed by the rule of law”

Mr. Justice Fennelly, formerly an Advocate General at the Court of Justice, giving the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Ireland in the case of Mallak v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform.32
1.  What use however, is access to the courts if the courts themselves no longer appear to be subject to, 

or a cornerstone of, the rule of law?

Where does that leave a litigant, who willingly or unwillingly, finds themselves before such a court?

Is that the crisis that the title of this lecture speaks of?

Is it not so much a crisis in the concept of the rule of law but in the foundational stone of the edifice 
that is the rule of law?

2. 

I will approach this talk on the basis that the courts are an integral part of the rule of law and when there 
is a crisis in the courts, the rule of law itself is at risk. I will be focusing on some current challenges faced 
by justice professionals in their daily work both from a substantive perspective of the rule of law as well 
as the legal and institutional framework in which they operate. I will do this from a triple perspective:

(1)  the application of national law and national constitution, (2) the use of the cross border judicial cooperation 
instruments, and, (3) the direct application of EU law including the dialog between the national and European 
courts. I have chosen to address the role of an individual judge as an important actor in upholding the rule 
of law in all judicial systems rather than focusing on whether judicial systems are compliant.

3. 

I will address those topics as follows:

(32)  [2012] IESC 59, [2012] 3 IR 297.

48

Introductory comments on the phrase “Rule of Law”

Application of National Law and National Constitution

(i)  General remarks

(ii) 

Ireland and the rule of law

(iii)  The importance of the judge as an independent actor in the rule of law

(iv)  An early Irish example of extreme pressure on a judge

(v)  The pressure of decision making in extreme circumstances

Cross-border judicial co-operation

(i)  General remarks

(ii)  Specific example of the European arrest warrant procedure

Direct Application of EU law and dialog between national and European courts

(i)  EAW rulings and difficulties at the level of implementation

(ii)  Primacy of EU Law

Conclusion

Introductory comments on the phrase “Rule of Law”

4.  The origins, development and meaning of the rule of law have been the subject of much commentary 
in recent decades by the legal and socio-political academy as well as by judges speaking ex cathedra in 
addition to their judicial decisions. It is not the purpose of this lecture to add further to the understanding 
of the concept. It is necessary to say that I will approach rule of law as incorporating more than the 
view that a person may not be punished unless in accordance with law, that society is to be ruled by 
law and that governments are subject to law. As we will all agree it includes broader concepts such 
as accessible, intelligible and predictable laws, an absence of arbitrariness, equal application of law, 
adequate protection of human rights and accessible courts for the resolution of disputes.33 Central 
to all of this is an independent judiciary; access to the courts is only meaningful if those are courts 
comprised of an independent judiciary.

5.  Looking at it from a pan European perspective, we see the phrase “rule of law” find its way into the 
Statute of the Council of Europe adopted in 1949 by ten states of which Ireland was one. The phrase 
is also to be found in the preamble to the European Convention on Human Rights. In the body of the 
Convention, the phrases “in accordance with the law” or “prescribed by law” appear in many of the 
Articles dealing with substantive rights. As we all are aware the European Union is “…is founded on 
the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for 
human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the 
Member States in a society in which pluralism, non- discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and 
equality between women and men prevail” (Article 2 Treaty on European Union (“TEU”)).

(33)  In the common law world, these broader concepts are among what are often described as The Bingham Principles. (See Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law 
(Penguin, 2010)). In constitutional democracies, like Ireland, an independent judiciary, constitutionally mandated protection of fundamental rights in 
accordance with law and judicial review of legislation, institutionalise the concept of the rule of law.

49

Application of National Law and National Constitutions

General Comments
6.  We are all from different countries; we have different constitutions, different legal systems and systems 
of government, legislative and judicial organisation. Our understanding as lawyers and judges as to 
how the rule of law is interpreted and applied may differ.34 At present however, we, as judges in an EU 
Member State, operate within a judicial system that provides remedies sufficient to ensure effective 
legal protection in the fields covered by Union Law.35 Accordingly, as the Court of Justice said in 
Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugeuses v. Tribunal de Contas,36 Article 19 “gives concrete expression 
to the value of the rule of law stated in Article 2 TEU” and therefore, “entrusts the responsibility for 
ensuring judicial review in the EU legal order not only to the Court of Justice but also to national courts 
and tribunals”.37 The Court of Justice went on to say: “The very existence of effective judicial review 
designed to ensure compliance with EU law is of the essence of the rule of law.”38

7.  One of our functions as judges is to ensure effective judicial review. This is part of the essence of 
the rule of law. To be effective at judicial review, there must be a separation of judicial power from 
the other branches of government and in that context the judiciary must be both functionally and 
institutionally independent. That is a basic norm and is the platform on which the individual judge 
must operate. This talk is not about whether a given system is or is not functionally and institutionally 
independent but more about the process of the judge, seeking at the level of the individual, to abide 
by independence and impartiality.

8.  Sometimes the appearance of functional and institutional independence of the judiciary can mask 
real problems for the rule of law. By appearance, I mean a constitutional bedrock respecting the 
independence of the judiciary and without overt attacks on the rule of law by methods such as 
changing legislation or packing courts with clearly political appointments. Rule of law requires inter 
alia, accessible courts for the resolution of disputes as well as law that adequately protects human 
rights. Problems with the accessibility of courts can impinge on the rule of law therefore.

9.  Those problems can arise because of a lack of concrete supports for the judiciary. There can be 
inadequate resources because there are inadequate numbers of judges, inadequate court support staff, 
inadequate physical infrastructure of buildings and inadequate IT and other technical support. There 
can be inadequate training and supports to deal with increasingly complex cases and legal issues. 
All those factors contribute to less than perfect justice which can affect the rule of law in a myriad of 
ways. Delays in dealing with cases can result in inadequate protection of fundamental rights, increasing 
pressures in terms of workload may lead to errors by even the most conscientious of judges and the 
more the justice system is not seen to be working the more public confidence is undermined in the 
rule of law itself. Even when broadly supported by functional and institutional independence, judges 
can have pressures placed upon them by the extreme nature of the case at hand, by the expectations 
of colleagues and, increasingly, by public criticism in both mainstream media 39 or on social media.40

(34)  For an interesting discussion on how the concept of “Rechtsstaat” in the German language version of the Treaty may not have been a synonym of “rule 
of law” as understood in the United Kingdom, see Van Gevern “Scandals, Political Accountability and the Rule of Law, Counting Heads?” in Mads Adendas 
and Duncan Fairgrieve, (eds), Tom Bingham and the Transformation of the Law, A Liber Amicorum (Oxford University Press, 2009).

(35)  Article 19 TEU.

(36)  (Case C-64/16), EU:C:2018:117.

(37)  ibid at para. 32.

(38)  ibid at para. 36.

(39)  An example is the “Enemies of the People” headline in the UK Daily Mail, showing the pictures of the three “out of touch judges who defied 17.4m Brexit 
voters and could trigger constitutional crisis”. The wider effect on the rule of law at a functional level was highlighted by the initial inaction of the UK 
Lord Chancellor (the political Minister responsible for the judiciary) to respond to these headlines.

(40)  Of course, criticism of judgments is an entirely legitimate exercise of free speech. It is where that crosses into highly dangerous rhetoric aimed 

personally at a judge instead of at the reasoning of the judge, that a risk to the rule of law emerges. This is particularly so where public representatives 
endorse or amplify those damaging personal criticisms.

50

Ireland and the Rule of Law
10. It is not possible for me to address how in each country the application of national law and the national 
constitution may be affected by a crisis in the application of the rule of law. Each of our countries has 
its own tale to tell and indeed each country can point to stages in its history where the rule of law has 
not been observed; flagrantly, egregiously and infamously broken in certain cases.

11. Coming from a country with reasonably good scores on perception of independence in the 2021 EU Justice 
Scoreboard 41 and on the ENCJ Report on Independence, Accountability and Quality of the Judiciary, I can 
only report that at a level of institutional independence, the Irish judiciary, does reasonably well. We have 
constitutional protections which secure our independence at a functional level and also that leaves to the 
judiciary the decision as to whether laws that have been passed are in compliance with the Constitution. 
An excellent judicial summary is contained in the decision of State (Burke) v Lennon and Attorney General 
42 where Gavan Duffy J. in the High Court gave a wonderful exposition of what we would now term the 
rule of law when he described the 1937 Constitution. Paraphrasing him does not do justice to the lucid 
manner in which he set out how the architects of the Constitutions had sought to protect fundamental 
rights.43 These included characterising the State as democratic, enshrining a tri-partite separation of 
powers, prohibiting laws from being enacted which were repugnant to the Constitution and conferring 
jurisdiction to the High Court (and on appeal the Supreme Court) to declare such law invalid, to provide 
for justice to be administered in public courts established by law, to provide for trial in due course of law 
and only permit deprivation of liberty in accordance with law. He also mentioned how the legislature or 
the executive branch of government could not disregard the Constitution save in any emergency short 
of war or armed rebellion (but even then there were rules as to when and how that could be invoked. 
Specifically dealing with the issue before him he said that there was no express provision permitting the 
Government to intern people without trial.

12. All is not entirely rosy in the Irish rule of law garden however. A constitutional amendment, voted in by a 
large majority of the voters in 2011, removes the prohibition against reduction of judicial remuneration. 
This was passed at a time of huge austerity in Ireland. The Constitution now provides that judges’ 
remuneration can be reduced where reductions are made to the remuneration of “persons belonging 
to the classes of persons whose remuneration is paid out of public money and such law states that 
those reductions are in the public interest.” 4413 There is no independent mechanism for fixing judicial 
pay. Mr. Paul Gallagher, Senior Counsel (and the present Attorney General) critiqued this amendment 
in an excellent article in 2018.45 He discusses how the previous provision of the Constitution was 
widely regarded as conferring a benefit on the judiciary when it was for the purpose of reinforcing 
independence for the benefit of the public. He records how there was a lack of meaningful discussion 
in the public discourse about independence of the judiciary and the rule of law. In his view there was 
no serious attempt by government or political actors or the media to explain to the public the purpose 
of the long-standing constitutional protection; the protection itself was usually dismissed with a simple 
assertion that judges are independent. This led to a diminution in the status of the judiciary not least 
because an important constitutional protection could simply be set aside. He considered it could also 
have other unintended consequences such as reducing the attractiveness of the judiciary to highly 
qualified candidates at a time when law was becoming more and more complex. Mr. Gallagher said 
the fact that such an important constitutional protection could be swept aside because of perceived 
public demand without considerable and considered justification also affected the rule of law because 
it made other constitutional protections vulnerable to populist demands.

(41)  On other areas such as efficiency of justice and case loads, Ireland does less well or simply does not have the data for proper analysis.

(42)  [1940] IR 136.

(43)  ibid, page 144 et seq.

(44)  Article 35.3.3°.

(45)  Paul Gallagher, “Challenges to the Rule of Law in 21st Century Ireland” [2018] 41(1) Dublin University Law Journal 1-31. Mr. Gallagher also addressed 

the risk to the rule of law where the role of the judiciary in the area of judicial appointments was at risk of being diminished. The proposed amendments 
to the appointments process have now been significantly amended but no legislation has been finalised.

51

13. In my view, this example of a constitutional referendum demonstrates that it is extremely difficult to 
connect with the public about how the rule of law is important to each member of society. How do you 
communicate that what appears a privilege for a small group is actually of fundamental importance 
to individual rights? I think that is a challenge that must be addressed. Independence of the judiciary 
is of systemic importance in any democracy and the judiciary must work at communicating that its 
importance is external to the interests of any individual judge. We can reiterate it when appropriate 
in our judgments, but it may be also necessary for senior judicial figures to communicate directly with 
government or occasionally with the public.

14. This brings me to another challenge in Ireland to the rule of law. We simply do not have enough judges. 
We have, it is fair to say, increased the number of judges over the last decade or so. In 2013 we had 
another constitutional referendum to establish the Court of Appeal as our Supreme Court was simply 
swamped with appeals. The Court was established in October 2014 with 10 judges in total and that 
was increased to 16 judges in 2019.46 There have been increases in the number of judges in the High 
Court, but the President of that Court has said publicly the numbers are inadequate.47 So too have other 
Court Presidents. The District Court judges have communicated their message by cooperating with a 
journalist writing an article in The Irish Times newspaper entitled “Inside Ireland’s District Courts”.48 The 
journalist recorded interviews with a number of judges of the District Court about all aspects of work 
including the number of cases dealt with and the pressures of trying to hear and decide so many cases. 
The District Court deal with the vast majority of cases which come to the Irish Courts and therefore 
for public this is the court they are most likely to encounter.

The importance of the Judge as an independent actor
15. Many of us operate in jurisdictions where the judiciary have the requisite functional or institutional 
independence. Notwithstanding that, I think it is important to recognise that each individual judge 
plays a vital role in the rule of law. Every day we make decisions in which we are being asked to rule on 
compliance with the law by State actors, be they the government, ministers, lower tribunals or courts, 
police officers and officials of all types. Sometimes we will hold against the State and sometimes with 
the State. We resolve disputes between neighbours, between employers and employees and between 
private citizens whose interactions have somehow lead them into confrontation. We decide on and 
vindicate rights by our presence on the bench.

16. That we are seen to be upholding the rule of law may not be self-executing. What we perceive as 
self-evident may not always be so to the public whose interests we serve. It is important that in 
our judgments, and indeed our wider actions, to understand that what we do and say may lead to 
perceptions that the judiciary are not independent. We are bound by our own versions of the Bangalore 
Principles of Judicial Conduct to behave with integrity and propriety both in carrying out our duties 
and in our personal lives. The Preamble to those Principles recite that they are complementary to the 
UN Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary. Many of the principles reflect the importance of 
judicial independence and its close relative which is public confidence in the judiciary. Therefore, the 
language we use in judgments and how we conduct ourselves both on and off the bench, can affect 
how the public view our independence which in turn can have a destabilising effect on the rule of law. 
We willingly take on those duties when we become judges and we must promote the independence of 
the judiciary as individuals. I am mindful here that individual responsibility has its limits; for example, 
it cannot be the fault of an individual judge if pressure of work prohibits the performance of judicial 

(46)  There is an extra ordinary judge at present because of the part secondment of one judge to The Law Reform Commission.

(47)  For example, Dublin Solicitors Bar Association, The Parchment “The Pandemic President” [2021] (88), President Mary Irvine is recorded as saying she was 

speechless when she heard that 5 new judges were to be appointed because “to make a real difference we need 17.”

(48)  22nd January 2022. Unfortunately, this article is only available behind a paywall.

52

duties with the speed which the public may like. Communicating the reason for any delay may be an 
important part of ensuring that appropriate attention is directed towards the root cause of problems 
in the courts.

17.  Particular difficulties may arise where emergency powers are being challenged before courts. These 
can be difficult factually and legally because of the safety or security risks involved and also because 
of derogation provisions which provide for certain exemptions from “ordinary laws”. Great care and 
scrutiny are necessary to ensure that the rule of law is upheld.

An early Irish example of extreme pressure on a judge
18. The photograph I am using was taken in 1922 and I have chosen it to demonstrate an example of 
extreme pressure on a judge where the life of a party to proceedings was at stake. We can all hope 
that we never find ourselves in these circumstances, but I think there are still some lessons to be 
learned.

19. The year 1922, exactly one hundred years ago, in Ireland was a particularly difficult and dangerous 
time. A War of Independence against the United Kingdom had been fought and at the end of 1921 an 
Irish delegation had entered into a Treaty with the UK Government which was to formalise the partition 
of the island of Ireland. Division over the Treaty started immediately, but the Dáil, the Irish parliament, 
voted in favour of ratification in January 1922. That was the start of the Civil War, which by its very 
nature was bitter. The early headquarters of the Anti-Treatyites was the Four Courts building, the centre 
of the administration of judicial power in Ireland. I will not go into the details save to say that much of 
the complex of buildings lay in ruins and the courts had to move elsewhere.49 

20. In November of that year Erskine Childers, a noted author, a veteran of the struggle for independence 
and a member of the Irish Treaty delegation to London in 1921, was arrested for being in possession, 
without authority, of an automatic pistol.50 He was sentenced to death for this offence by a military 
tribunal of the Irish Provisional Government. His application for release under habeas corpus was 
made on the basis that there was no “law” giving a legal basis for the Military Tribunal as it had only 
been passed by a Resolution of the Dáil; this did not amount to legislation as it was not an Act of 
Parliament. The application was made to a judge, Sir Charles O’Connor MR. This judge had previously 
granted habeas corpus to a man arrested by British forces on the same type of charge as Childers 
where arguments of a similar nature were made.51 The judge in the earlier case rejected the British 
forces argument that the law that had been passed by the Westminster parliament in 1920 called 
the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act, to “quell” the war of independence meant that in a state of 
war there was no limitation of the prerogative of the Crown to set up military tribunals as it saw fit 
and without being subject to other legal requirements.

21. O’Connor MR gave his judgment after hearing 4 days of argument in a building which was surrounded 
by troops of the Irish Provisional Government to protect against an attack by Anti-Treatyites, something 
to which he alluded in the judgment. He gave his judgment ex tempore, meaning he did not reserve it 
for later consideration. His deep personal distress at what was happening in the country was evident 
in his judgment. A flavour of his judgment is apparent in the following excerpts:

“I am sitting here in this temporary makeshift for a Court of Justice. Why? Because one of the noblest 
buildings in this country, which was erected for the accommodation of the King's Courts and was 
the home of justice for more than a hundred years, is now a mass of crumbling ruins, the work of 
revolutionaries, who proclaim themselves the soldiers of an Irish Republic”

(49)  What constituted the courts was disputed in that era. Republican courts (Dáil Courts) had been set up and operated during the War of Independence but 
the Provisional Government chose to continue with the existing court structures. See Bláthna Ruane , “The Challenges of Creating a New Judiciary 1922-
1924” in Eoin Carolan (ed), Judicial Power in Ireland (Institute of Public Administration, 2018).

(50)  An irony of the tragedy that unfolded was that the pistol had been given to him by his former comrade Michael Collins, who was now one of the leaders 

of the Free State Army.

(51)  Egan v. Macready and Ors. [1921] 1 IR 265.

53

“This is the condition of affairs which confronts me when I come to deal with this case, and I have 
first to ask myself is this state of things to be allowed to continue, and on whom devolves the duty of 
re-establishing peace and order, and saving the country from utter destruction? Plainly this duty falls 
upon the Government—whatever that Government may be—whether it be merely provisional or finally 
constituted. Whatever character it bears, the salvation of the country depends upon it.”

22. There was only one way the case was going:

“For the purpose of suppressing this rebellion and restoring order, the Provisional Government has 
been obliged to employ its army. Force must be met by force, and violence by violence; and once an 
army is set in motion—once a state of war has been established—the rough and ready methods of 
warfare must be adopted, and take the place of the precise and orderly methods of civil government. 
The ordinary law is silenced by the sound of the pistol-shot and the bomb. Inter arma silent leges is a 
maxim two thousand years old, and has come down to us from the Romans. Suprema lex, salus populi 
must be the guiding principle when the civil law has failed. Force then becomes the only remedy, and 
those to whom the task is committed must be the sole judges how it should be exercised.”

23. These are fairly shocking conclusions to modern eyes as they strike at the very heart of the rule of law. 
O’Connor MR also refused a stay pending appeal even in circumstances where the very issue was to be 
heard the following week in respect of other applications. Erskine Childers was executed the following 
day before an appeal could be heard. His son later became President of Ireland.

24. What I find interesting about the case is that what appears to be driving him does not seem to have 
been the fear of retaliation on him personally. Instead, he was heavily influenced, it would appear, by 
the extent of the destruction and devastation that the civil war had brought to Ireland. An interesting 
take on his dilemma comes from my judicial colleague Mr. Justice Gerard Hogan of the Irish Supreme 
Court (formerly Advocate General of the European Court of Justice). Judge Hogan notes that O’Connor’s 
sudden resignation from the Irish Supreme Court in 1925 was brought about by some sort of mental 
breakdown on his part and that of his wife “as a result of what he had come to believe was his failure 
of nerve in the Childers case.”52 In the article, Judge Hogan poses the question that perhaps O’Connor 
was haunted by his pragmatic response. He posits that if the point raised by Childers was correct, a 
key part of the Provisional Government’s armoury in the course of the civil war would have been lost, 
leading potentially to the use of extrajudicial methods by Government forces to counter the Anti-Treaty 
forces’ lack of compunction in these matters and this could have led to the strangling of democratic 
institutions at birth.

The pressure of decision making in extreme circumstances
25. Plainly that was a huge dilemma but surely trampling on the rule of law in the cause of the rule of law 
ought not to be countenanced by a judge, no matter how tempting it may be in the moment? We are 
all aware of the difference in protection of rights some of which are absolute and some of which, in 
certain well defined circumstances, may be interfered with. The Latin maxim “Fiat Justitia, ruat caelum” 
would appear apt53 but even that phrase may be reductive of the complexities that judges may face 
in answering the questions posed to them. On one level the “ticking time bomb” and use of torture has 
a very simple answer; torture is prohibited. As the case of Gäfgen v. Germany54 demonstrates even 
when it is accepted that torture is absolutely prohibited, how that prohibition may affect issues at a 
trial may not be quite as straightforward. Are there differences between threat of torture (amounting 
to inhuman and degrading treatment) and torture itself? Is a court process to be viewed as a whole 
and thus tainted as being the “fruit of” the prohibited conduct?

(52)  Gerard Hogan, 'Should judges be neutral?' [2021] 72(1) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 63-90.

(53)  Let justice be done though the heavens may fall.

(54)  App. No. 22978/05, Grand Chamber, 1 June 2010. See also A & Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (No. 2) [2005] 3 WLR 1249, 

[2006] AC 221 on dealing with a risk that evidence might have been obtained through torture.

54

26. On the other hand, I think the Childers judgement is not so much an example of a judge teasing out the 
answer to a difficult question but instead gives an example of a judge losing perspective in that moment. 
It appears he was an otherwise fair and apparently good judge. The language he uses in his judgment 
demonstrates how those external pressures of the destruction of the country and even the building he had 
worked from were dominating his approach. It was not his personal security or safety that was at issue. 
I think it demonstrates how external societal pressures impact on the decisions of an individual judge’s 
decision even where no direct repercussions are anticipated by that judge. In other words, our commitment 
to the rule of law, which is a given, may find itself under pressure from our own view of what the best 
outcome is for society as a whole. At some stage, though not in as extreme a situation as O’Connor MR, 
we may all find ourselves struggling with making the correct decision according to the rule of law.

27.  I came across an interesting article in The Irish Times newspaper last month reporting on a judge 
dismissing criminal public order charges which had their origin in a traffic checkpoint set up by the Irish 
police, An Garda Síochána.55 

A case against a man who was stopped at a Garda (police) public health checkpoint had his case 
dismissed as there was no legislation in place at the time permitting such “public health checkpoints”.

28. The article records the solicitor for the defendant saying publicly afterwards: “This Covid pandemic is 

exceptional but the rule of law is not. Gardaí must adhere to the law.”

29. Whether the decision of the District Court judge was right or wrong is not what I am concerned with here. 
What the case demonstrates is that even in emergency situations the rule of law must be taken seriously 
by the legal profession and the judiciary. The fact that this is a “rule of law” situation will be reflected in 
public discourse and it is important that judges are attuned to that. This is not a statement that judges 
must rule in a particular way; regardless of how they rule in a given case, it is the reason for the ruling 
and the language through which that ruling is communicated which is of the utmost importance.

30. No matter what circumstances we operate in therefore, judicial independence and adherence to the 

rule of law must be at the forefront of our approach to our daily tasks.

(55)  Conor Gallagher, “Judge dismisses case against man stopped at Covid checkpoint at start of pandemic” (The Irish Times, 20 January 2022) https://www.

irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/judge-dismisses-case-against- man-stopped-at-covid-checkpoint-at-start-of-pandemic-1.4781691.

55

Use of Cross-Border Judicial Co-operation Instruments.

General comments
31. Under Article 67 (1) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”): “The Union shall 
constitute an area of freedom, security and justice with respect for fundamental rights and the different 
legal systems and traditions of the Member States”. Article 67(4) states “The Union shall facilitate 
access to justice, in particular through the principle of mutual recognition of judicial and extrajudicial 
decisions in civil matters”. This Article can now be viewed as the foundation for the regulatory regimes 
which include cross-border judicial co-operation in criminal and civil matters.

32. The issues covered by these matters can often be politically sensitive, (e.g. immigration and crime) and 
the legal provisions are particularly complex.56 A judge must have a knowledge and understanding of 
the principles underlying judicial co-operation as well as a more detailed knowledge of the particular 
legal provisions under which she is being asked to act.

The specific example of the European arrest warrant procedure
33. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty the area of freedom, security and justice had been an integral part of the 
three pillar Treaty architecture. It was under the TEU that the Framework Decision on the European 
arrest warrant and surrender procedures between Member States was agreed. I will concentrate on this 
aspect of judicial co-operation as it has produced many judicial decisions calling into question how a 
crisis in the rule of law in one Member State can affect cross-border judicial co-operation.

34. That Framework Decision was “the first concrete measure in the field of criminal law implementing the 
principle of mutual recognition which the European Council referred to as the “cornerstone” of judicial 
cooperation.”57 There was to be a system of free movement of judicial decisions in criminal matters.
35. Cross-border judicial cooperation measures raise all sorts of issues in respect of the rule of law. Some 
issues arise because of national law and some because of a situation in another Member State.

36. Framework Decisions, of course, require to be implemented by national law. That of course can raise 
particularly difficult issues of rule of law, on the one hand there is an obligation to apply the principle 
of conforming interpretation to national law but a judge cannot go beyond an interpretation that 
the national law will actually bear because to do so would be to act contra legem, literally “against 
law.”58 Directives must also be implemented by national law (or can be given direct effect in limited 
circumstances). An assessment of the extent to which national law permits the actions apparently 
required by EU law is of particular importance in these areas of judicial cooperation because they 
involve, usually, aspects of fundamental rights. Each judge must ask the fundamental question, is 
what I am doing permitted by law in the jurisdiction of which I am a judge?

37.  All EU judicial cooperation is based upon the principle of mutual trust between Member States that the 
common values on which the European Union is founded (as stated in Article 2 TEU), will be recognised 
and therefore that the EU law that implements them will be respected.59 We must presume, save in 
exceptional circumstances, that all other Member States will comply with their obligations.

(56)  Occasionally the complexity of a particular case can be increased by unusual or inadequate translations of the documents underpinning the particular 

cross-border request. Often those translation are outside the direct control of the judiciary.

(57)  2002/584/JHA: Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States - 

Statements made by certain Member States on the adoption of the Framework Decision, at (6).

(58)  Pupino (Case C-105/03), EU:C:2005:386.

(59)  See para. 35 of LM (Case C-216/18 PPU), EU:C:2018:586).

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38. There is by this stage a well-worn path to the door of the CJEU raising issues which in one way or 
another question if Member States have complied with fundamental obligations under the Treaty. 
No one can be surrendered to face inhuman and degrading treatment in another Member State and 
the CJEU has laid down, starting with the decision in Aranyosi and Căldăraru60 the procedures to be 
followed prior to a judge refusing surrender on such a ground. Moving closer to the heart of the rule 
of law, the CJEU has over a series of cases, asserted with increasing vigour, the requirement that “a 
judicial authority” must be independent of the executive in order to be considered a judicial authority 
for the purpose of the Framework Decision.61 These cases concerned police and prosecutors as judicial 
authorities, the former being held absolutely not to be a judicial authority, whereas the latter may 
be dependent on their particular institutional and functional independence.

39. 39.  Then at the very centre of the rule of law are those cases where the independence of the judiciary 
was challenged by a party to the case. It is not necessary to recite in any detail the finding in those 
cases but, as is well known, the CJEU set out in Minister for Justice and Equality v LM,62 which 
concerned the evolving situation in Poland, that:

“where the executing judicial authority, called upon to decide whether a person in respect of whom 
a European arrest warrant has been issued for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution 
is to be surrendered, has material, such as that set out in a reasoned proposal of the European 
Commission adopted pursuant to Article 7(1) TEU, indicating that there is a real risk of breach of the 
fundamental right to a fair trial guaranteed by the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, on account of systemic or generalised deficiencies 
so far as concerns the independence of the issuing Member State’s judiciary, that authority must 
determine, specifically and precisely, whether, having regard to his personal situation, as well as to 
the nature of the offence for which he is being prosecuted and the factual context that form the basis 
of the European arrest warrant, and in the light of the information provided by the issuing Member 
State pursuant to Article 15(2) of Framework Decision 2002/584, as amended, there are substantial 
grounds for believing that that person will run such a risk if he is surrendered to that State.”

The direct application of EU law including the dialog between the national and 
European courts.

EAW rulings and difficulties at the level of implementation
40. I think it is a fair comment to say that national judges have not always found the distinctions between 
the two-step analysis required of them by the CJEU to be simple in concept or in practice. In the 
Supreme Court in Minister for Justice and Equality v. Celmer,63 O’Donnell J. stated:

“It should be said that the test posited in the judgment of the C.J.E.U. is not one that is easy to apply. 
Normally, it might be said that where systemic deficiencies of any kind are identified, it becomes 
unnecessary to identify the possibility of those deficiencies taking effect in an individual case. This 
is particularly so where the value concerns one that is essential to the functioning of the system of 
mutual trust. Indeed, it was this difficulty that led the trial judge to make the reference to the C.J.E.U. 
in the first place. It may also be questioned, at least in the abstract, whether once such systemic 
deficiencies have been found there is then room or need for further inquiry. It is not, however, for 
the national court to interrogate the logic of the reasoning of the C.J.E.U..”

(60)  Case C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:198.

(61)  See Aileen Donnelly and Mary Hastings, 'Mutual Recognition of Public Prosecutors’ Decisions: A Critical Analysis in Light of the European Arrest Warrant' 
in Gavin Barrett, Jean-Philippe Rageade, Diana Wallis and Heinz Weil (eds), The Future of Legal Europe: Will We Trust in It? (Springer, 2021) for case 
law concerning this topic, see J.R. and Y.C. (Joined Cases C-566/19 PPU and C-626/19 PPU), EU:C:2019:1077; LM (Case C- 216/18), EU:C:2018:117; 
Poltorak (Case C-452/16 PPU), EU:C:2016:858; Kovalkovas (Case C-477/16 PPU), EU:C:2016:861; Minister for Justice and Equality v. P.F. (Case C-509/18) 
EU:C:2019:457; Minister for Justice and Equality v. O.G. and P.I. (Joined Cases C-508/18 and C-82/19 PPU); N.J. (Case C-489/19 PPU), EU:C:2019:849.

(62)  LM (Case C-216/18 PPU), EU:C:2018:586; L and P (Joined Cases C-354/20 PPU and C-412/20 PPU), EU:C:2020:1033.

(63)  [2019] IESC 80; [2020] ILRM 121. This was the appeal from the High Court decision to extradite the person whose extradition was at issue in the 

Minister for Justice and Equality v LM reference.

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41. Different legal ways of challenging surrender to Poland based upon the ongoing crisis have brought 
further referrals asking the CJEU to look at matters from different angles. The CJEU held, in two 
referrals from the Netherlands judiciary,64 that where there is evidence of generalised or systemic 
deficiencies concerning the independence of the judiciary in the issuing State, the executing authority 
cannot deny the status of “issuing judicial authority” to the court in the issuing State and the executing 
judicial authority cannot presume that there are substantial grounds for believing that the person will, 
if surrendered, run a real risk of a breach of their fundamental right to a fair trial, without carrying out 
a specific and precise verification which takes account of, inter alia, their personal situation, the nature 
of the offence and the factual context in which the warrant was issued. The CJEU specifically said 
that the existence of the deficiencies does not necessarily affect every decision that the courts of that 
Member State may be led to adopt in each particular case.

42. Notwithstanding that decision of the CJEU, the Supreme Court of Ireland has again referred questions 
to the Court of Justice arising out of the changing situation in Poland.65 What is in issue in that case is 
the right to an effective remedy as required by Article 47 of the Charter on Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (“the Charter”) and Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(“the ECHR”). Reliance was placed by the appellants on the decision of the European Court of Human 
Rights (“ECtHR”) in the case of Ástráðsson v. Iceland;66 that decision had been delivered days before 
the decision in L and P and obviously therefore not considered by the CJEU.

43. The Irish Supreme Court was concerned that in the case of Poland, based upon the way in which judges 
were allocated, the appellants could not say which judges would hear their cases. They could only rely 
on the systemic issues as to appointment of judges in Poland and not on a specific complaint as to 
the validity of the appointment of the specific judges likely to hear their cases. The Supreme Court 
was clear that the situation in Poland was even more troubling than it had been at the time of The 
Minister for Justice and Equality v. LM decision and in particular there were significant problems with 
the appointment of judges.

44. The Supreme Court referred the following questions to the Court of Justice:

“(1) Is it appropriate to apply the test set out in LM and affirmed in L and P where there is a real risk 
that the appellants will stand trial before courts which are not established by law?

(2)  Is it appropriate to apply the test set out in LM and affirmed in L and P where a person seeking to 
challenge a request under an EAW cannot by reason of the fact that it is not possible at that point in 
time to establish the composition of the courts before which they will be tried by reason of the manner 
in which cases are randomly allocated?

(3)  Does the absence of an effective remedy to challenge the validity of the appointment of judges in Poland, 
in circumstances where it is apparent that the appellants cannot at this point in time establish that the courts 
before which they will be tried will be composed of judges not validly appointed, amount to a breach of the 
essence of the right to a fair trial requiring the executing state to refuse the surrender of the appellants?”

(64)  L and P (Joined Cases C-354/20 PPU and C-412/20 PPU), EU:C:2020:1033.

(65)  Orlowski v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2021] IESC 46. Judgment delivered on 23rd July 2021.

(66)  (App. No. 26374/18) judgment of 1 December, 2020.

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45. There have been cases being taken against Poland to the ECtHR which concerned aspects of the 
reorganisation of the Polish judicial system.67 Earlier this month the ECtHR gave a judgment in the 
case of Advance Pharma sp. z o.o v. Poland68 in which the judges held unanimously that there had 
been a violation of Article 6.1 ECHR because the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court, which had 
decided on its case had not been a “tribunal established by law”. This is a very detailed judgment 
and it recites in detail the history of the changes made since 2017. It referred to materials and 
assessments from international organisations and tribunals including the judgments of the Court of 
Justice. The Court applied the tests it had set down in the Ástráðsson v. Iceland case. In particular, 
the Court held that there was a very close interrelationship been the right to a Tribunal established by 
law and the guarantees of independence and impartiality. The Court held that there was a manifest 
violation of domestic law. It used very strong words in that case to condemn in particular, the executive 
and legislative interference in judicial proceedings, stating that those institutions had demonstrated 
“an attitude which can only be described as one of utter disregard for the authority, independence 
and role of the judiciary.”69 In other words, mere constitutional safeguards as to the independence 
and impartiality of the judiciary do not suffice; “[t]hey must be effectively incorporated into everyday 
administration attitudes and practices”.70

46. Undoubtedly these are questions which raise grave issues concerning the rule of law; what is the place 
of fundamental rights such as the right to an effective remedy within a system that has systemic 
deficiencies? No expedited hearing was granted in that case. In the meantime, questions raising similar 
issues were again raised by the Dutch Court. The case of X & Y v. Openbaar Ministerie71 was heard 
on the 16 November 2021 and Advocate General Rantos gave his opinion on the 16 December 2021. 
The decision of the Constitutional Court in Poland came out on the 7 October 2021 after the reference. 
That decision calls into question the application of fundamental EU principles regarding primacy of EU 
law and the role of the CJEU in the process of interpretation and application of the Treaty provisions. 
Advocate General Rantos said that the Constitutional Court judgment was a matter that had to be 
taken into account by an executing court.

47.  At para. 69 of his opinion AG Rantos raises the spectre of “impunity for many criminal offences” thereby 
infringing the rights of victims and disavowing the professional practice of the judges in Poland who 
endeavor to utilize the mechanism of judicial cooperation provided for by EU law. This, he posits, would be 
the end result of a blanket refusal to surrender requested persons to Poland. In my view this is highlighting 
two aspects of the rule of law crisis in Poland that, to different degrees and extents, are implicit and 
occasionally explicit throughout the rule of law case law regarding the EAW system. These aspects are:

1)  The vista of impunity from criminal prosecution by those sought for trial in Poland with all the 
attendant risks to the rights of others and to public confidence in the rule of law in Europe.

2)  How to respect the role of individual judges within the Polish system who strive to implement EU 
law despite the chaos around them.

(67)  Reczkowicz v. Poland (App. No. 43447/19), judgment of 22nd July 2021 and Dolińska-Ficek and Ozimek v. Poland (App. No’s. 49868/19 and 57511/19) 

judgment of 8th November 2021.

(68)  (App. No. 1469/20) judgment of 3 February, 2022.

(69)  n.37) at para. 333.

(70)  n.37) at para. 332.

(71)  Joined Cases C-562/21 PPU and C-563/21.

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48. On one level the possibility of impunity from criminal offences may seem to be an external factor 
putting pressure on judges not to stop surrenders. If so, how does that square with the duty to apply 
the rule of law? On the other hand, however, the recitals to the Framework Decision can be said to 
“baked in” to the entre mechanism of EAW. Those Recitals refer to an aim of the Framework Decision 
as being to remove the complexity and potential for delay inherent in extradition matters and to replace 
it by a free movement of judicial decisions in criminal matters. Of course, what is also clear is that the 
Framework Decision is expressly stated to respect fundamental rights.

49. In relation to the second aspect, there may clearly come a time when even individual judges cannot be 
said to rescue a situation where independence has been upended and the position of individual judges 
on tribunals can no longer be challenged. I would comment, however, that the Minister for Justice & 
Equality v. LM line of case law does recognise the individual judge as an important actor even where 
there are systemic deficiencies concerning the independence of the judiciary.

50. Advocate General Rantos went on to express the view, (para. 72) that the Constitutional Court ruling 
could play a role, not in the absolute but in the analysis by the requested court of the concrete risks 
for a requested person, once surrendered of a breach of a right to a fair trial and the absence of a 
remedy by which to challenge the irregular appointment of judges. At para. 73 he does not rule out that 
executing courts may be required to refuse to execute EAWs in spite of the regrettable consequences of 
the suspension for the objective, specific to the EAW of combating the impunity of a requested person 
in one Member State for offences allegedly committed in another. The decision must be made in light 
of the criteria and “having regard to the developments in the situation relating to the judicial system of 
the issuing member state” as to whether the individual will run the risk of executive interference and 
an inability to have an effective judicial remedy. I think that last matter stresses how this is a dynamic 
situation and that there is a need to keep up to date on developments.

51. Obviously, as judges of Member States of the EU, we await the judgment of the Court with a great 
deal of interest. Even if the views of the Advocate General are followed, the implication of this ruling 
on cross-border co-operation across the wide spectrum remains to be seen.

52. Is it a risk to the uniform application of the rule of law throughout Member States to ask individual 
courts to rule on the concrete risk of an unfair trial to an individual based upon what appear to be 
issues that, at first glance, apply across the judicial spectrum in Poland? Is this one of those cases 
where the Court of Justice must give full guidance on the interpretation of European law that will 
leave no doubt as to how these measures, although general in nature, affect the concrete risk to the 
rights of all individuals requested by Poland? Apart from the possibility of inconsistent application of 
European law, there is also another risk to the rule of law if there is any lack of clarity in the answer. 
Individual judges may struggle to see how the rule of law is complied with if they are being asked 
to apply mutual trust to a situation where the systemic and generalised defects run to the very core 
of issues such as whether a tribunal had been established by law, where judicial independence is 
at stake and where the obligations of EU law including the writ of the CJEU have been ruled not to 
have primacy in Poland. It raises questions as to how it can be compatible with the rule of law to 
return a person to a system in which their liberty may be decided by a body which itself may not be 
in accordance with the rule of law particularly because there is no way to challenge the composition 
of that tribunal. Any decision that places a duty on judges to continue to execute judicial decisions 
on the basis that the principles of mutual trust and recognition in the light of all these other judicial 
findings will have to explain carefully and cogently the rationale behind that duty.

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Primacy of EU law
53. Ireland has not been beset by a conflict over supremacy between EU law and the Constitution. 
This is because of the way in which our entry into the EU was facilitated by an amendment to our 
Constitution.72 That is not to say that the legal relationship between the two has been easy to decipher 
and apply. For example, it has necessitated a Constitutional referendum when amendments to the 
Treaties are proposed. This is necessary if acts done in furtherance of the amended Treaties are to be 
accorded the same protection from invalidation under the Constitution.

54. As we know, courts in some Member States have questioned whether EU law has supremacy over 
national constitutions. Naturally, weighty legal issues arise for determination where on its face there 
appears to be a fundamental conflict between a national Constitution and EU law. How those are 
worked out at a judicial level in Member States is not for me to comment upon. What I can comment 
on is that a collision between two legal systems with each claiming supremacy does not in an objective 
sense paint an ideal picture of the rule of law. The answer to resolving the dilemma, if there is a true 
dilemma to resolve, may lie outside the courts, but in the meantime, every member of the judiciary 
will have to tread cautiously in trying to resolve each individual issue as it arises before them in an 
individual case.

55. Similar issues arise in terms of the dialogue between the CJEU73 and national courts. I think that there 
is a common theme in the references made to the CJEU after the Minister for Justice and Equality v. 
LM decision which is that national courts are seeking to understand how the rule of law crisis in Poland 
is to be assessed at an operational level in cross-border judicial co-operation. Perhaps the X and Y v. 
Openbaar Ministerie judgment will put to rest any of these questions.

56. Judges will be well aware that a decision which has the effect of calling a halt to extradition to Poland 
from other Member States (and possibly from Poland to other Member States) will be momentous. It 
will draw a huge reaction from all sections of society across the Union with undoubtedly many media 
and other sources decrying that there is now “impunity for criminals”. Individual judges called on to 
implement the rule of law in individual cases may face external pressures.

Conclusion

57.  The courts are rightly said to be a cornerstone of the rule of law. On a daily basis, thousands of 
individual judges across Europe make decisions that reflect the operation of the rule of law in their 
jurisdiction. Each judge has a duty, no matter the jurisdiction in which they operate or the level of court 
in which they appear, to ensure that their decisions respect and reflect the independence that is given to 
the judiciary as an integral part of the rule of law. Within a judicial system stresses on the independence 
of the judiciary can arise from lack of resources, both in terms of personnel and infrastructure and from 
a diminution of their status. These factors can in turn contribute to the denial of access to the courts.

58. Judges are important individual actors in the rule of law. Not merely because of the decisions they 
take but how they take those decisions and how they explain them. Even conduct off the bench may 
have important consequences for the perception of judicial independence which itself undermines 
confidence in the rule of law. Judges may come under pressure from external events or even from 
colleagues. Judges cannot lose perspective because external events or consequences may be extreme.

(72)  As the High Court (Carroll J) said in Tate v. Minister for Social Welfare [1995] 1 IR 418: “This section [s. 2 of the European Communities Act, 1972] is the 
conduit pipe through which community law became part of domestic law. The Constitution was amended to enable accession to the Community, the 
European Communities Act, 1972, was passed and the Treaty of Accession was agreed, and thereby the whole body of Community law, past, present 
and future was incorporated into domestic law. But community law did not thereby become constitutional law or statute law. It is still community law 
governed by community law but with domestic effect. And it is in that form that it is part of domestic law.”

(73)  And of course between the European Court of Human Rights and courts of the State parties to the Convention.

61

59. The changes to the system of the administration of justice in Poland has precipitated a crisis in the 
courts of that country. That crisis has resulted in a huge amount of litigation before the Courts in 
Luxembourg and Strasbourg in which the meaning of European values of democracy and the rule of 
law have been dissected, analysed and applied. Each ruling appears to build on the earlier rulings. 
Those rulings raise implicitly or explicitly the spectre of impunity from criminal offences and that affect 
on the rule of law as well as the vital role in upholding the rule of law that individual judges may play 
even in a system which may have systemic deficiencies in the independence of the judiciary.

60. The ruling now awaited from the Court of Justice (X and Y v. Openbaar Ministerie) could have a very real 
effect on how the rule of law is to be operated at the coal face of cross-border judicial co-operation. 
Whatever the decision of the Court of Justice will be, judges across Europe will hope that it gives a clear 
indication of just how their own commitment to the rule of law as a value is to be respected when they 
are called upon to uphold both mutual trust and fundamental rights when the rule of law in another 
Member State is in such a crisis that the independence of its judiciary has called into question whether 
the courts can be said to be tribunals established by law.

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José de SOUSA LAMEIRA

José de SOUSA LAMEIRA,   
Judge and Vice-President of the Superior Council of the Magistracy, Portugal

Bordeaux, 22 février 2022

1. Chers Collègues 

Mesdames et Messieurs

C’est avec un grand honneur et un grand plaisir que je participe à cette importante réunion organizée 
par la Commission Européenne, dans le cadre du thème de la Formation Initiale des Professionnels de 
la Justice.

La justice se retrouve depuis quelques années au centre d’un débat intense et, étant un visage très visible 
et symbolique de l’État, ses problèmes affectent et intéressent l’ensemble de la société.

Le recrutement et la formation initiale des futurs juges est un sujet de discussion pertinent non seulement 
au sein de la magistrature et des universitaires, mais egálement au sein de la communauté au sens large.

Je pense que personne ne le remet en cause, mais au contraire reconnaît, que le recrutement et la 
formation des juges sont des questions essentielles pour garantir l’état de droit dans une société 
démocratique.

2. Recrutement, Formation et Indépendance

Discuter de la formation initiale des juges implique de lancer un débat: quel type de juge souhaite-t-on 
dans l’État démocratique actuel où le Pouvoir Judiciaire représenté par les juges, et par eux seuls, doit 
être indépendant par rapport aux autres.

Le mode de désignation des juges reflète dans une certaine mesure la conception du juge en tant que 
titulaire d’un organisme souverain.

Au Portugal, les juges ne sont pas de hauts fonctionnaires de l’administration, comme dans certains pays, 
mais les titulaires d’un organisme souverain.

La défense de l’indépendance des tribunaux, et par conséquent des juges eux-mêmes, commence par 
leur recrutement et leur formation.

Comme le mentionnait le Rapport 2020 sur l’État de Droit - Situation dans l’Union Européenne74 - 
“La méthode de nomination des juges est l’un des éléments susceptibles d’avoir une incidence sur 
l’indépendance de la justice et la perception de l’indépendance par le public».

L’indépendance des tribunaux et des juges constitue l’un des piliers de l’État de Droit.

L’indépendance des tribunaux et des juges si elle n’est pas un privilège, est, en effet, une exigence de 
l’État de Droit. Car c’est un moyen par les citoyens d’avoir la garantie que leurs droits sont exprimés de 
manière indépendante, équitable et impartiale par des juges qui le sont également.

Personne ne remet en cause le fait que l’indépendance des juges est le garant d’un processus impartial 
et qu’il n’est pas possible de concevoir une société libre et démocratique, dans laquelle les droits des 
citoyens seraient respectés, sans une justice indépendante.

(74)  Communication de la Commission au Parlement Européen, au Conseil, au Comité Économique et Social Européen et au Comité des Régions – 

COM(2020)580 final; Rapport 2020 sur l’état de droit - La situation de l’état de droit dans l’Union européenne.

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L’État de Droit sortira renforcé d’autant plus qu’il disposera d’un système judiciaire indépendant auquel 
les citoyens accordent de la valeur. Cela s’accomplit avec une justice rapide et efficace, en mesure de dire 
le droit et de l’appliquer en temps réel, administrée par des juges socialement reconnus et indépendants.

Ce besoin d’indépendance du Pouvoir Judiciaire et des Juges est ressenti par tous comme urgent et est 
commun à toutes les organisations internationals, cela se reflète par exemple dans plusieurs documents 
du Conseil Consultatif des Juges Européens75.

Pour atteindre cette indépendance, il est fondamental d’avoir une sélection et une formation de qualité, 
car personne ne remet en cause le fait que plus la formation et la préparation sont bonnes, plus la 
qualité du travail est élevée76.

Il est également important, pour obtenir l’indépendance souhaitée, de déterminer l’entité ou l’organisme 
qui doit procéder à la sélection et au recrutement des juges. 

En ce qui concerne la responsabilité de la sélection et du recrutement, la préférence pour une autorité 
indépendante du gouvernement et de l’administration, qui serait chargée de contrôler et de superviser 
les systèmes d’accès et de sélection pour les carrières judiciaires, accepté par tous77. 

Il convient de noter que non seulement le recrutement mais aussi la promotion dans la carrière doivent 
échapper au dictats du gouvernement et de l’administration, et suivre des critères objectifs.

Cela a été une exigence des organisations représentatives des juges.

(75)  Carlos Gómez Ligüerre, in «Juízes na Europa, formação, seleção, promoção e avaliação», ed. Fundation Francisco Manuel dos Santos, p. 25, affirme:  

«Les efforts des Nations Unies sur la garantie de l›indépendance de la justice ont conduit à l›approbation des «Principes de Bangalore sur la déontologie 
judiciaire», un ensemble de valeurs auxquelles les juges doivent adhérer et dont la réalisation doit être encouragée par les organes nationaux chargés de 
sélectionner et de diriger le pouvoir judiciaire. Le lien entre l›indépendance et la formation est souligné dans le principe numéro 6», en indiquant que «6.3 
- Le juge prendra des mesures raisonnables pour maintenir et améliorer ses connaissances, ses compétences et ses qualités personnelles nécessaires à 
une performance adéquate des fonctions judiciaires, en profitant à cette fin de la formation et des autres facilités qui seront mises à la disposition des 
juges, sous contrôle judiciaire.»  
Également, dans le rapport no. 4 (2003) du Conseil Consultatif des Juges Européens (CCJE), cité dans l›ouvrage mentionné:  
«3. Une formation élaborée, approfondie et diversifiée des juges sélectionnés à l’issue des études juridiques complètes, est indispensable pour que ceux-
ci exercent leur métier de manière compétente. 
4. Elle est aussi une garantie de leur indépendance et de leur impartialité, conformément aux exigences de la Convention de sauvegarde des Droits de 
l’Homme et des Libertés fondamentales.  
5. Elle est enfin une condition nécessaire pour que la justice soit respectée et respectable. La confiance des citoyens en la justice sera renforcée si les 
juges ont des connaissances approfondies et diversifiées qui s’étendent au-delà des domaines de la technique juridique à des domaines de grand intérêt 
social, s’ils présentent des qualités professionnelles et personnelles et s’ils font preuve de compréhension leur permettant de traiter des affaires et d’être 
en contact avec toutes les personnes concernées de manière appropriée et ouverte. Une formation est donc indispensable pour que les juges exercent 
leurs fonctions judiciaires de manière objective, impartiale et avec professionnalisme, puis pour les protéger contre les influences indues».  
De même, la “Magna Carta des Juges Européens”, du 17/11/2010, du Conseil Consultatif des Juges Européens met en évidence les garanties de 
l’indépendance judiciaire, le système de sélection et de nomination des juges, en soulignant que:  
«(…) Les décisions sur la sélection, la nomination et la carrière doivent être fondées sur des critères objectifs et prises par l’instance chargée de garantir 
l’indépendance.»

(76)  Cela est souligné par le Comité des Ministres du Conseil de l’Europe [Recommandation (94) 12 du Comité des Ministres Aux États Membres sur 

l’indépendance, l’efficacité et le rôle des juges] dans laquelle la sélection et la carrière des juges doivent être fondées sur le mérite, en tenant compte 
des qualifications, de l’intégrité, de la compétence et de l’efficacité. 
Dans son Rapport n.° 4 de 2003 (page 42 de la op. cit.) le Conseil Consultatif des Juges Européens a formulé plusieurs recommandations pour la 
formation initiale des juges, soulignant son importance, à savoir: 
«i. Que tous les candidats retenus aux fonctions judiciaires bénéficient ou acquièrent avant d’entrer en fonction des connaissances juridiques étendues 
dans les domaines du droit substantiel national et international ainsi que de la procédure. 
ii. Que les programmes de formation plus spécifiques à l’exercice de la profession de juge soient déterminés par l’établissement en charge de la 
formation, les formateurs et les juges eux-mêmes. 
iii. Que ces programmes théoriques et pratiques ne soient pas limités aux techniques du domaine purement juridique mais comportent également 
une formation à l’éthique ainsi qu’une ouverture sur d’autres domaines pertinents pour les activités judiciaires, par exemple la gestion des affaires et 
l’administration des tribunaux, les technologies de l’information, les langues étrangères, les sciences sociales et les modes alternatifs de solution des 
litiges. 
iv. Que la formation soit pluraliste afin de garantir et renforcer l’ouverture d’esprit du juge. 
. Qu’en fonction de l’existence et de la durée d’une expérience professionnelle antérieure, la formation ait une durée significative afin d’éviter son 
caractère purement formel».

(77)  La Commission de Venise, dans son rapport de 16/03/2010, comme le souligne Carlos Gómez Ligüerre (op. cit. pag. 44) :  

«(...) développe la préférence de la Recommandation R(94)12 pour un conseil judiciaire indépendant chargé, entre autres, de contrôler et de superviser les 
systèmes d›accès, de sélection et de promotion dans la carrière judiciaire. (…) L›autorité compétente en matière de sélection et de carrière des juges doit 
être indépendante du gouvernement et de l›administration. (...) La sélection et la promotion selon des méthodes objectives ont fait l›objet d›une pétition 
de la part des magistrats dans des textes élaborés par des organes représentatifs des juges».

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3. Recrutement et Formation en Europe

Comme mentionné ci-dessus, le recrutement et la formation des juges est l’une des questions qui a 
suscité le plus de débats.

En Europe, on suit deux modèles de recrutement et de formation, appelés modèles bureaucratique et 
professionnel78.

Nous ne nous attarderons pas sur leurs différences et spécificités. 

Le Portugal suit le dénommé “modèle bureaucratique”, autant avec adaptations, qui est également 
adopté dans les pays qui lui sont culturellement proches, les pays du sud de l’Europe.

Comme les autres pays qui lui sont proches, au Portugal, le recrutement et la formation sont effectués par 
un organisme autonome — le Centre d’Études Judiciaires — avec la collaboration du Conseil Supérieur 
de la Magistrature, l’organisme de gestion et de discipline des juges.

Le recrutement se fait par le biais d’un système de tests.

Malgré certaines voix discordantes, le mode de désignation des juges actuellement en vigueur au Portugal 
correspond, à mon avis, à la conception que l’on se fait du juge et de ce que l’on attend de lui.

Cela ne signifie pas que le modèle actuel ne peut pas être amélioré et ne doit pas être ajusté. Toutefois le 
fondement de la structure de ce dernier est établi dans la loi et ses principes ne sont pas remise en cause.

Cependant, il est toujours possible d’améliorer le recrutement et la sélection des futurs juges, notamment 
en garantissant une évaluation équitable de la qualité des connaissances juridiques et culturelles du 
candidat, de sa capacité critique, d’argumentation, d’exposition et de sa capacité à appliquer le droit au 
cas d’espèce.

C’est dans le recrutement et la formation des magistrats que commence la défense de l’indépendance 
des tribunaux et, par conséquent, des juges eux-mêmes.

Cette indépendance découle d’un mode de nomination capable d’empêcher le fait que les juges (maximum, 
ceux des Hautes Cours) ne soient nommés conformément aux intérêts des autres pouvoirs de l’État.

La formation initiale des futurs juges devrait toujours tenir compte du fait que seule une solide formation 
juridique, éthique et conforme aux valeurs démocratiques, peut garantir la protection effective des droits 
de tous ceux qui recourent à la justice, ce qui constitue la véritable pierre angulaire de l’État de Droit.

Nous ne pouvons pas oublier que la manière dont les juges exercent leur fonction est fondamentale pour 
leur légitimation et donc pour la crédibilité et le prestige des tribunaux.

Ce rayonnement est essentiel pour que les citoyens se reconnaissent eux-mêmes dans les décisions que 
les juges sont appelés à rendre pour résoudre les conflits qui leur sont soumis.

(78)  Carlos Gomes Liguerre; op. cit., p. 47: 

«Le premier, le modèle bureaucratique, est propre des pays de droit civil et la caractéristique la plus marquante est l’accès au pouvoir judiciaire, qui 
n’est rien de plus qu’un autre système d’accès à la fonction publique. (…) “Les juges sont recrutés après des épreuves écrites et orales, destinées à tester 
les connaissances institutionnelles des principales questions juridiques et s’adressant à des jeunes qui viennent de terminer leurs études universitaires. 
L’expérience professionnelle antérieure n’a que peu ou pas d’importance. La socialisation professionnelle se fait donc généralement au sein de 
l’organisation judiciaire. En d’autres termes, c’est là que les juges apprennent leur metier» 
«Le second, le modèle professionnel, est caractéristique des pays appartenant à la tradition de common law, “dans lesquels l’accès à la magistrature se 
fait par différentes voies, certaines sont même uniquement démocratiques, par élection populaire, et dans lesquels une approbation préalable dans les 
études de droit n’est pas requise, du moins pas pour occuper beaucoup des postes qui composent la magistrature commune»

65

4.  Évolution du Système de Recrutement et de Formation des Magistrats du Statut 

Judiciaire à nos jours

Avant 1975 (peu après la révolution des œillets du 25 avril 1974), le recrutement des juges se faisait 
par concours public au moyen d’épreuves écrites et orales.

Le Statut Judiciaire (Décret-loi n.° 44/278 du 14 avril 1962) définit les conditions générales d›admission 
et prévoit deux types de candidats au concours de recrutement des juges: les candidats obligatoires et les 
candidats volontaires. Les premiers étaient les Délégués du Procureur de la République, ils devaient figurer 
dans la moitié supérieure de la liste d’ancienneté de la 1ère classe avec une mention d’au moins “Bon”.

En plus de ceux-ci, les diplômés en droit ayant obtenu un diplôme universitaire avec la mention “Bon avec 
distinction” et ayant un minimum de 7 ans d’expérience en tant que Délégué du Procureur, Inspecteur de 
la Police Judiciaire, Avocat et Juge Municipal, pouvaient postuler.

Les candidats admis devaient passer des épreuves écrites et orales.

Le système de recrutement était caractérisé par l’absence de formation initiale orientée spécifiquement 
vers les fonctions à exercer.

De 1975 à 1979, la continuité est restée la même en ce qui concerne l’obligation de passer par la 
magistrature debout avant de pouvoir accéder à la magistrature assise, mais le système de stages a 
été introduit en tant que système de recrutement dans la magistrature assise.

La loi définissait, comme condition d’admission au stage de juge, d’être “Déléguée du Procureur de la 
République” avec une qualification de service d’au moins «bon» ou d’avoir plus de 10 ans de service 
continu en tant qu’avocat. Plus tard, les conservateurs et les notaires avec un minimum de 10 ans de 
service sont devenus éligibles à la magistrature assise (Décret-loi n.° 714/75 du 20 décembre).

Le recrutement a commencé à se faire par un stage professionnel, condition indispensable à l’entrée en 
fonctions de juge ou de procureur.

Le  stage  se  déroule  en  deux  phases:  une  phase  de  formation  initiale  et  une  phase  de  formation 
complémentaire.

À la fin de la phase de stage, les stagiaires sont déclarés aptes ou inaptes par un jury.

Depuis 1979, la magistrature debout a cessé de constituer une étape préalable pour la magistrature 
assise.

L’autonomie du Parquet a été consacrée par des statuts, et des diplômés en droit qui stipule q’un stage 
dans l’une des juridictions étaient soumis aux mêmes conditions d’accès.

Le recrutement direct pour exercer la fonction de magistrat a été abandonné et un centre de formation 
exclusivement destiné aux magistrats - le Centre d’Études Judiciaires - a été créé.

Avec la création du Centre d’Études Judiciaires, en 1979, un nouveau modèle a été introduit dans le 
recrutement, la sélection et la formation des magistrats judiciaires, en institutionnalisant la formation 
des magistrats par le biais d’un corps de formateurs spécialisés.

Le modèle de formation initiale prévu par la loi qui a créé le Centre d’Études Judiciaires comprenait trois 
phases: une période d’activités théoriques et pratiques, un stage d’initiation et un stage de pré-affectation.

La formation initiale est devenue une condition d’entrée dans la magistrature, et les caractéristiques 
essentielles de ce nouveau modèle, bien qu’ayant subit des altérations au niveau, 1) des conditions 
d’admission; 2) de la définition du moment du choix d’une magistrature ou d’une autre; 3) de la limite 
d’âge minimale ou maximale pour l’admission; 4) de la durée de la phase théorique-pratique ou du stage; 
5) du régime des tests d’aptitude, se sont maintenues au fil des ans. 

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Actuellement, l’admission à la formation initiale des magistrats s’effectue dans le cadre d’une procédure 
d’appel d’offre public79.

Le concours peut avoir pour but de pourvoir des postes vacants dans les magistratures debout et assise 
ou de pourvoir des postes de juges dans les tribunaux administratifs et fiscaux.

Pour être admisssibles au concours, les candidats doivent: 

Être citoyen portugais ou citoyen d›un État lusophone, avec une résidence permanente au Portugal, et 
auquel il est reconnu le droit d›exercer les fonctions de magistrat, dans les termes de la loi et dans des 
conditions de réciprocité.

Être titulaire d›un diplôme universitaire en droit ou d›un équivalent juridique. 

Avoir les autres conditions générales requises pour être nommé à une fonction publique.

Il existe deux voies distinctes pour l’admission au concours et pour l’entrée au formation initiale, la “voie 
de la qualification académique” et la “voie de l’expérience professionnelle”.

Pour pouvoir postuler par la “voie de la qualification académique”, le candidat doit toujours être titulaire 
d’un master ou d’un doctorat, ou de son équivalent juridique. Toutefois, cette exigence est levée si le 
demandeur est titulaire d’un diplome légale dans le cadre d’une organization d’études antérieur à celui 
établi par le décret-loi no 74/2006 du 24 mars 2006 (cours antérieurs à la Déclaration de Bologne) ou 
équivalent juridique.

Pour pouvoir postuler à la «voie d’expérience professionnelle», le candidat doit également posséder une 
expérience professionnelle dans le domaine judiciaire ou dans d’autres domaines liés à l’exercice des 
fonctions de magistrat, et d’une durée effective d’au moins cinq ans. 

Dans le cadre du processus de remplir des postes vacants au sein des magistratures debout et assise, 
un quota d’entrée de 25 % pour chaque voies d’admission est réservé à chacunes d’entre elles.

Les méthodes utilisées pour sélectionner les candidats sont les suivantes:

Des tests de connaissances, comprenant une étape écrite et, ensuite, mais uniquement pour les candidats 
de la voie “qualification académique”, une étape orale, toutes deux éliminatoires;

Évaluation des programmes d’études, uniquement pour les candidats admis par la voie de “l’expérience 
professionnelle”, également éliminatoire, qui comprend une discussion sur le programme d’études et 
l’expérience professionnelle du candidat; une discussion sur des questions de droit, basée sur l’expérience 
du candidat.

Examen psychologique de sélection.

Les candidats ayant obtenu la mention «favorable» à l’examen de sélection psychologique sont retenus. 

Les lauréats, selon l’ordre d’obtention de leur diplôme, ont le droit de suivre le cours théorique et pratique 
jusqu’à ce que le nombre total de postes vacants soit comblé.. 

Le classement se fait par ordre décroissant de la classification finale respective. 

Les candidats aptes qui n’ont pas été qualifiés pour participer au cours théorique-pratique immédiatement, 
à défaut de postes vacants, sont dispensés de subir les épreuves du concours suivant, et sont ordonnés 
avec les candidats qui l’ont réussi.

La formation initiale des magistrats des tribunaux judiciaires comprend une formation théorique et 
pratique, organisée en deux cycles successifs, et un stage d’entrée.

(79)  Article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Loi n° 2/2008, du 14 janvier 2008 .

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Le premier cycle de la formation théorique et pratique se déroule au Centre d’Études Judiciaires, tout 
temps pouvaint faire des stages intermédiaires de courte durée dans les tribunaux. 

Il débute le 15 septembre suivant le concours d’entrée et se termine le 15 juillet de l’année suivante. 

Le 2ème cycle de la formation théorique-pratique et le stage d’entrée se déroulent dans les tribunaux, 
dans le cadre de la magistrature choisi. 

Elle débute le 1er septembre suivant la fin du premier cycle et se termine le 15 juillet de l’année suivante. 

Les objectifs fondamentaux du cours de formation théorique et pratique sont d’apporter aux futurs juges 
le développement des qualités et l’acquisition de compétences techniques pour l’exercice de leur futures 
fonctions de juge dans les tribunaux judiciaires. 

5. Formation – Indépendance – État de Droit

La relation entre la formation initiale et l’indépendance du pouvoir judiciaire, dans l’affirmation de l’État 
de droit, est claire et est un sujet de la plus haute importance.

La définition de la carrière de juge est un aspect crucial qui n’est pas souvent abordé, mais qui est 
d’une importance fondamentale pour garantir l’indépendance des tribunaux, notamment le processus 
de sélection des candidats aux futurs magistrats et le respect de critères de sélection rigoureux. 

En Europe, en ce qui concerne le processus de sélection (comme c’est le cas pour le processus de 
promotion), il existe deux systèmes principaux: celui dans lesquel la sélection est basée uniquement sur 
le mérite (note d’examen) et celui qui privilégie l’expérience professionnelle (évaluée par le curriculum). 

Au Portugal, comme on l’a dit, il existe un système mixte avec deux voies d’admission distinctes: la «voie 
académique» et la «voie d’expérience professionnelle». 

De cette façon, nous essayons de concilier les avantages et d’estomper les inconvénients signalés dans 
les deux systèmes.

Cette préoccupation consistant à concilier un processus de sélection endogène, en tant que processus 
exogène qui garantirait l’indépendance judiciaire et la reconnaissance externe des compétences des 
candidats, donne une plus grande ouverture à la société et donc une plus grande crédibilité au processus 
de sélection, qui se reflete, également, dans la composition du jury des examens constitués et qui 
peut être différencié en fonction de la voie d’admission, de la méthode de sélection à appliquer et des 
différentes étapes. 

Le jury pour la phase écrite des épreuves de connaissances (voie academic) est composé d’au moins 
trois membres, (a) un juge ou, dans le cadre de concours pour pourvoir les postes vacants de juges dans 
les juridictions administratives et fiscales, un juge de cette juridiction; un Procureur de la République; C) 
Un juriste reconnu ou une personnalité reconnu dans d’autres domaines de la science et de la culture. 

Le jury de la phase orale des épreuves de contrôle des connaissances et le jury qui évalue les curriculum 
vitae sont composés de cinq membres, dans le respect de la proportion suivante: 

a) deux magistrats, l’un étant un juge ou, dans les concours de pourvoi des postes vacants de juges 
des tribunaux administratifs et fiscaux, un juge de cette juridiction, et l’autre un magistrat du parquet; 

b) trois personnalités, à savoir des avocats, des personnes dont le mérite est reconnu dans le domaine 
juridique ou dans d’autres domaines de la science et de la culture, ou des représentants d’autres secteurs 
de la société civile. 

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Les juges qui composent le jury sont nommés par le Conseil Superieur, les membres restants étant 
nommés par le Ministre de la Justice, sur proposition du Barreau, ou par le Directeur du Centre d’Études 
Judiciares. 

Il existe également deux domaines particulièrement importants dans le contexte de la formation initiale 
des magistrats et dans leur rapport avec le principe d’indépendance du pouvoir judiciaire. Il s’agit de 
l’organisation judiciaire et des technologies de l’information et de la communication, ces dernières étant 
l’aspect de la justice prédictive.

Au Portugal, avec la réforme de la carte judiciaire entrée en vigueur en 2014, et parallèlement à la forte 
réduction du nombre de districts judiciaires, une organisation à compétences administratives partagées 
a également été mise en place au niveau de chaque district, entre le juge-président, l’administrateur du 
district, le conseil de gestion et le conseil consultatif, dans le cadre d’une gestion par objectifs.

Compte tenu de cette nouvelle organisation judiciaire qui a modifié profondément le paradigme de 
l’administration des tribunaux au Portugal, il est clair que seule une formation solide et actualisée sur 
les compétences et le mode de fonctionnement de cette structure permettra aux auditeurs de justice, 
futurs juges, dans l’administration de la justice au nom du peuple, de comprendre les limites des fonctions 
administratives de gestion conférées aux organismes du district et la relation entre ces fonctions et 
l’exercice de la fonction souveraine de juger. 

Dans le cadre de la formation en organisation judiciaire et en organisation de méthodes et gestion 
des processus, le rôle du Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature et ses compétences pour suivre les 
performances des tribunaux judiciaires, avec l’adoption des mesures de gestion qu’il considère appropriées, 
est également mis en évidence.

La compréhension de la dialectique permanente parmi les «gestionnaires» actuels du Pouvoir Judiciaire 
s’avère fondamentale pour le maintien de l’indépendance du pouvoir judiciaire et, par conséquent, pour 
le renforcement de l’État de Droit Démocratique. 

Cette compréhension dépend nécessairement de la teneur et du contenu de la formation sur l’organisation 
judiciaire et sur les méthodes d’organisation et de gestion du processus ainsi que des formateurs qui 
délivrent ce contenu, ce qui fait appel aux critères de sélection des ces derniers. 

En ce qui concerne les technologies de l’information et de la communication, dans le domaine de la justice 
prédictive, il est essentiel d’éduquer les juges sur la manière dont les algorithmes sont développés et les 
risques associés à leur utilisation, ainsi que sur l’importance de structurer et de développer les bases de 
données des décisions jurisprudentielles. 

Il est noté avec une préoccupation particulière la nécessité de maintenir l’analyse humaine du juge, 
critique et rigoureuse, des suggestions jurisprudentielles mises à disposition par des outils équipés 
d’intelligence artificielle80.  

Une véritable société démocratique ne peut être atteinte que si nous disposons d’un système judiciaire 
indépendant sur le plan interne et externe.

En tant que Vice-Président du Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature, je ne peux que réfléchir à la phase 
théorique et pratique des auditeurs ainsi qu’a celle des juges stagiaires, ces derniers étant déjà attachés 
au Conseil.

(80)  Comme le remarque Conceição Gomes (in “Revue Critique des Sciences Sociales”, no. spécial/2018): «La formation des acteurs judiciaires devrait être 
guidée par l’objectif stratégique consistant à créer une culture juridique fortement attachée à la qualité, à l’efficacité et à la transparence de la justice, 
ainsi qu’à son activisme démocratique, que ce soit dans la promotion des droits de l’homme et des droits fondamentaux, ou dans la lutte contre les 
formes graves de criminalité, en particulier la corruption. La question centrale est de savoir si les modèles de formation du droit et de la formation 
professionnelle sont susceptibles de répondre à cet objectif stratégique. La conclusion de la prédominance de la formation technocratique, formaliste et 
fermée à l’interdisciplinarité et aux innovations susceptibles de créer une telle culture judiciaire exige que la politique de formation soit placée au cœur 
des agendas stratégiques de la réforme de la justice.»

69

Or, tant les auditeurs dans les phases théorique et pratique que les juges stagiaires ont besoin des juges 
expérimentés et compétents pour leur fournir la formation nécessaire.

Qui est le mieux placé pour le faire, notamment pour nommer les juges formateurs? C’est, sans aucun 
doute, le Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature, car il a la connaissance de la performance des juges et 
la compétence pour procéder à leur évaluation. 

Sans sous estimer l’importance de la doctrine et du droit substantiel, l’application de la loi est l’essence 
même du pouvoir judiciaire.

D’autre part, et surtout, l’application de la loi exige une position indépendante des ceux qui “rendent la 
justice”.

Il n’y a personne de mieux placé qu’un juge pour transmettre la culture de l’indépendance comme garantie 
d’une solution équitable.

De cette manière, il est également garanti que le Conseil susmentionné participe activement à la formation 
et au recrutement des juges.

Chèrs Collègues

Il ne fait aucun doute que l’indépendance des tribunaux et des juges commence clairement par le 
recrutement et la formation, cela étant essentiel à l’existence même de l’État de Droit Démocratique, ami 
des droits, des libertés et des garanties des citoyens, la présence de juges véritablement indépendants.

Merci de votre attention et de votre patience.

70

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