COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Screening of FDI into the Union and its Member States Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Second Annual Report on the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union
Date: 2022-09-01
Institutions: Directorate-General for Trade and Economic Security, European Commission
Subjects: EU Member State, activity report, direct investment, financial control, foreign capital, foreign investment, investment policy, third country

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 1.9.2022  SWD(2022) 219 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Screening of FDI into the Union and its Member States       Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Second Annual Report on the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union                 {COM(2022) 433 final}  
 
 
Contents 

1. 

Foreign Direct Investments into the EU – 2021 overview .................................................................... 3 

A)  Main findings ........................................................................................................................................ 3 

B)  A rebound of global FDI but weak flows in the EU ............................................................................... 3 

C)  Clear rebound in dealmaking with +32% new acquisitions and +12% new greenfield investments ... 5 

D)  The US and UK dominated foreign transactions in acquisitions equity stakes and greenfield projects

10 

E)  Public shareholding in foreign investors, 2021 ................................................................................... 14 

F)  Russian shareholding in Europe (EU27) .............................................................................................. 16 

2.  Methodology and sources .................................................................................................................. 18 

3. 

EU Member States – legislative developments .................................................................................. 20 

Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 20 

Austria ..................................................................................................................................................... 21 

Belgium ................................................................................................................................................... 21 

Bulgaria ................................................................................................................................................... 22 

Croatia ..................................................................................................................................................... 22 

Cyprus ..................................................................................................................................................... 23 

Czechia .................................................................................................................................................... 23 

Denmark .................................................................................................................................................. 24 

Estonia ..................................................................................................................................................... 25 

Finland ..................................................................................................................................................... 25 

France...................................................................................................................................................... 26 

Germany .................................................................................................................................................. 27 

Greece ..................................................................................................................................................... 28 

Hungary ................................................................................................................................................... 29 

Ireland ..................................................................................................................................................... 30 

Italy ......................................................................................................................................................... 30 

Latvia ....................................................................................................................................................... 31 

Lithuania ................................................................................................................................................. 32 

Luxembourg ............................................................................................................................................ 33 

Malta ....................................................................................................................................................... 33 

Netherlands............................................................................................................................................. 34 

1 

 
 
 
 
Poland ..................................................................................................................................................... 35 

Portugal ................................................................................................................................................... 35 

Romania .................................................................................................................................................. 36 

Slovakia ................................................................................................................................................... 36 

Slovenia ................................................................................................................................................... 37 

Spain ........................................................................................................................................................ 38 

Sweden .................................................................................................................................................... 39 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
1. Foreign Direct Investments into the EU – 2021 overview 

A)  Main findings 

  Global  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  inflows  reached  EUR  1.5  trillion  in  2021, 
outperforming by 52% the values observed in 2020. The EU contributed with EUR 117 
billion to the world value, with a 31% decrease in inflows compared to 2020. 

  In 2021 we observed over 4 000 transactions done by foreign investors in the EU, 20.5% 
more than in 2020. The rebound was skewed towards the acquisition of equity stakes in 
existing companies, which was 32% higher compared to 2020. 

  The US and the UK dominated foreign transactions with 58% of the acquisitions and 

60% of the greenfield investments. 

  In 26% of the cases, foreign investors used their existing EU subsidiaries to invest in the 

EU1. 

  Information and Communications Technology (ICT) was the top sector by number of 
foreign  acquisition  (30%)  and  the  second  by  foreign  greenfield  investments,  after 
wholesale and retail. Manufacturing came next with 26% of all foreign acquisitions and 
12% of the greenfield investments. 

  In  2021,  53%  of  all  foreign  acquisitions  in  manufacturing  targeted  high-tech  firms 

(compared to 45% in 2020). 

B)  A rebound of global FDI but weak flows in the EU 

Global foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows recovered in 2021, reaching EUR 1.5 trillion, and 
outperforming by 52% the values observed in 2020 and remaining 11% above the pre-pandemic 
level2. The availability of vaccination against COVID-19 and the gradual re-opening of the largest 
economies fuelled the momentum for FDI. International investors (particularly the US) rebalanced 
their portfolios exploiting a buoyant stock market offering new market opportunities.  

OECD projections covering the whole 2021 suggest that, while at the world level FDI increased 
by 27% compared to the previous year, the EU27 experienced a decrease by 31% compared to 
2020  and  still  lagged  behind  pre-COVID-19  levels  by  68%.3  When  looking  at  the  number  of 
foreign led transactions4, acquisitions of equity stakes are instead in  a  recovery path; however, 
greenfield projects still lag behind. 

1 By using an established EU company – which carries out an economic activity in a Member State – to invest into 
another  EU  company,  the  investment  becomes  an  “intra-EU”  one  and  hence  falls  outside  the  scope  of  the  FDI 
Screening Regulation. To note that in 2021 only 8% of the investments (greenfield investments and equities) were 
originated by EU subsidiaries of Russian global ultimate owners. 
2 Source OECD. Data extracted on 29/04/2022. 
3  2021  performance  is  mostly  due  to  a  the  last  quester  of  the  year  that  was  characterised  by  negative  inflows 
(disinvestments) for EUR 11.8 billion. Source OECD. 
4 GLOSSARY: We use the term foreign investor to identify non-EU entities (companies or persons) acquiring equity 
stakes or initiating greenfield investment projects in the EU (in short ‘greenfields’ or ‘greenfield investments’). The 
terms  foreign  and  non-EU  are  used  interchangeably.  Throughout  the  text  the  term  acquisitions  will  identify  the 
acquisitions of equity stakes in EU companies, be it M&A or stakes below 50% but above 10% of the capital, and the 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
“Increased expenditures on both fixed assets and intangibles will not translate directly into a rapid 
FDI rebound, as confirmed by the sharp contrast between rosy forecasts for capital expenditures5 
and still-depressed greenfield project announcements”6. 

The breakdown of FDI inflows by instrument7 (Figure 1) suggests that in 2021, the negative level 
of intercompany debt almost halved compared to 2020, and reinvestment of earnings (EUR 204 
billion) rose again in 2021, surpassing the pre-COVID-19 year (EUR 160 billion in 2019). This is 
a signal of rising profits of multinational enterprises in 2021 (which were down 36% on average 
in 20208 compared to 2019) and hence of the likely rebound in mergers & acquisitions (in short: 
M&A)  activity.  Despite  the  increased  number  of  M&A  transactions  in  2021,  FDI  from  equity 
investments still fails to recover9, suggesting that the positive outlook has not fully materialised.  

Investments from cross-border M&A and greenfield activities have increased in the first quarter 
of 2022, thanks to few large transactions, although the number of deals decreased slightly10. The 
prospects for 2022 remain uncertain and heavily dependant on the behaviour of the pandemic and 
on the war Russia is conducting in Ukraine.  

term transactions will be referred to the sum of acquisitions and greenfield investments. Portfolio investments are 
excluded. For additional information see the section on methodology and sources. 
5 Capital expenditures (CapEx) are funds used by a company to acquire, upgrade, and maintain physical assets such 
as property, plants, buildings, technology, or equipment. CapEx is often used to undertake new projects or investments 
by a company (Investopedia, last access April 2022). 
6  James  Zhan,  Director  of  investment  and  enterprise,  UNCTAD.  World  Investment  Report  2021  -  Investing  in 
Sustainable Recovery | Publications | UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub. 
7  Financial  flows  consist  of  three  main  components:  equity  capital,  reinvestment  of  earnings  of  foreign  parents’ 
affiliates, and intracompany debt. 
8 Unctad, 2022, World Investment Report 2021: INVESTING IN SUSTAINABLE RECOVERY (unctad.org). 
9 In 2021, net equity capital FDI inflows reached €-4bn in the EU22 (data  are not available for Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Malta, and Romania). The drop is mainly driven by the Netherlands, that records €-110bn disinvestments. 
Positive net equity FDI inflows are observed, among others, in Germany with €32bn in 2021 (+42% compared with 
2020) and in France with €27bn (+26%). 
10 JRC FDI Bulletin, 2022Q1, JRC129302. 

4 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 1: FDI inflow in EU27 with breakdown by instrument (billion EUR) 

Equity Flows

Reinvestment earnings

Debt Flows

Rest

R
U
E
N
O
I
L
L
I
B

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

-100

-200

-300

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

Source: OECD data, extracted on 30/04/2022. Data refers to inward FDI flows. The 
details by instrument does not include inflows into Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Malta, 
and Romania whose value is grouped under Rest. FDI values exclude investments 
from resident special purpose entities. “Debt flows” stands for “Intercompany debt 
flows”.  

C)  Clear rebound in dealmaking with +32% new acquisitions and +12% new greenfield 

investments 

In 2021 we observed over 4 000 transactions done by foreign investors in the EU27, 20.5% more 
than  in  2020.  The  rebound  was  skewed  towards  the  acquisition  of  equity  stakes  in  existing 
companies,  with  a  32%  increase  compared  to  2020,  setting  M&A  and  minority  investments11 
almost back to 2019 levels. Greenfield projects modestly increased by 12% in 2021 compared to 
2020, yet remaining 38% below pre-COVID-19 levels12. 

In 2021, the US was the main foreign investor in the EU with 32.3% of all foreign acquisitions 
and 39.4% of all foreign greenfield investments. In spite of the acceleration in dealmaking, US 
greenfield  investments  are  36%  below  the  level  observed  in  2019  (Table  1).  The  only  two 
greenfield investors bouncing back to pre-COVID-19 levels in 2021 were the group of offshores 
countries and Russia. Russia, with 71 transactions (of which 45 are greenfield investments) was 
the 11th foreign investor in the EU in 2021 with 1.3% of all foreign acquisitions and 2.1% of foreign 
greenfield investments. 

11 We define minority investment as the acquisition of equity stakes for more than 10% (but less than 50%) of the 
capital of the target company.  
12 See figures in the Annual Report 2022. 

5 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
 
Table 1. Number of foreign acquisitions and greenfield investments: share over total for 2021 
and percentage change on 2020 and 2019. Detail by jurisdiction of the ultimate investor. 

EQUITY STAKES 

SHARE (%) 

YEAR-ON-YEAR 

GREENFILEDS 

SHARE (%) 

YEAR-ON-YEAR 

US 

UK 

OFFSHORES 

SWITZERLAND 

CANADA 

NORWAY 

CHINA 

JAPAN 

SINGAPORE 

AUSTRALIA 

RUSSIA 

ROW 

2021 

32.3 

25.6 

8.1 

7.0 

5.7 

5.2 

2.4 

2.3 

1.9 

1.5 

1.3 

6.8 

21/20 

21/19 

54% 

15% 

50% 

12% 

100% 

87% 

-8% 

-30% 

375% 

61% 

108% 

-9% 

3% 

-9% 

1% 

-16% 

15% 

28% 

-56% 

-59% 

153% 

-9% 

4% 

-37% 

US 

UK 

CHINA  

OFFSHORES 

SWITZERLAND 

JAPAN 

RUSSIA 

NORWAY 

CANADA 

SOUTH KOREA 

2021 

39.4 

20.9 

6.1 

6.0 

5.8 

3.7 

2.1 

1.9 

1.8 

1.6 

ROW 

10.8 

21/20 

21/19 

7% 

9% 

-4% 

32% 

2% 

-6% 

-36% 

-35% 

-49% 

25% 

-65% 

-53% 

254% 

130% 

5% 

0% 

94% 

39% 

-50% 

-66% 

-26% 

-34% 

Source: JRC elaboration based on Bureau van Dijk data, extracted on 22/02/2022. ROW: Rest of the World. 

Investors, especially large conglomerates with multiple activities, often use subsidiaries registered 
in  other  countries  (e.g.  the  group’s  financial  branch)  to  conduct  investments.  These  are  fully 
operating  companies,  not  special  financial  vehicles  set  in  place  for  the  purpose  of  a  specific 
investment. Data suggests that in 2021, foreign investors used their EU subsidiaries for 26% of 
their investment transactions, on average (Figure 2). Looking at the jurisdiction of the controlling 
parent,  this  percentage  dropped  to  14%  for  US  investors,  while  UK  investors  used  their  EU 
subsidiaries in one third of the cases, indicating tight economic links between  the UK and EU. 
Among the top foreign investors, the group of offshore countries invested in the EU via their EU 
subsidiaries in 43% of the cases. In many instances these are funds with offices in the EU that 
acquire minority stakes in EU companies. For China and Hong Kong the investments done via EU 
subsidiaries reached 38% in 2021.   

6 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Location of the direct investor. Detail by origin of the controlling parent and 
type of investment (acquisition of equity stakes and greenfield investments)  

Source: JRC elaboration based on Bureau van Dijk data, extracted on 22/02/2022. Offshores: Offshore financial Centre13. RoW: Rest of the World. 
China includes Hong Kong. Equity stake refers both to M&A and the acquisition of non-controlling stakes in EU companies. 

With nearly 600 acquisitions of equity stakes and 350 greenfield investments in 2021, Information 
and Communications Technology (ICT) was the top sector by number of foreign acquisition (30%) 
and the second by foreign greenfield investments (15.4%), after retail (Table 2). The 2021 two 
digits year-on-year growth in the acquisition of equity stakes (+34%), brought ICT 27% above its 
pre-COVID-19  levels,  while  the  rebound  is  yet  to  come  for  greenfield  investments  (which 
experienced a 46% decline in 2021 compared to 2019). The US and the UK grouped the biggest 
share  of  foreign  transactions  in  ICT,  with  64%  of  the  acquisitions  and  69%  of  the  greenfield 
investments. When looking at the size of the acquired EU companies in 2021, ICT acquisitions 
involved small companies in 43.3% of the cases (Table 3). 

Manufacturing ranked among the top three target sectors in 2021, with nearly 26% of all foreign 
acquisitions  and  12%  of  greenfield  investments  (Table  2).  In  spite  of  the  acceleration  in 
dealmaking in 2021 (+38% for acquisitions and +12% for greenfield investments), manufacturing 
was still below 2019 levels both in acquisitions and greenfield investments. As in the case of ICT, 
US and UK were the main foreign jurisdictions investing in manufacturing, with 56% of all foreign 
acquisitions and 44% of the greenfield investments respectively for each jurisdiction. Among the 
remaining foreign investors in 2021, China and Japan originated 10% of the greenfield projects 
each. 

Looking  at  the  other  sectors  severely  hit  during  the  pandemic,  accommodation  somewhat 
recovered in 2021. The number of acquisitions almost tripled in 2021, bringing this sector 18% 
away from 2019 levels (Table 2). For greenfield investments the performance was even better. 
Accounting for 10.2% of all foreign greenfield investments, in 2021 accommodation rose by 28% 
compared to 2020 and 6% compared to 2019.  

13 The main offshores by number of M&A or GFs are (in alphabetical order) Bermuda, British Virgins Islands, Cayman 
Islands, Mauritius and the United Kingdom Channel Islands. For the full list of Offshore Financial Centres, see e.g. 
Commission  Staff  Working  Document  -  Following  up  on  the  Commission  Communication  “Welcoming  Foreign 
Direct Investment while Protecting Essential Interests” – SWD(2019) 108 final – 13 March 2019. 

7 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
Table 2. Number of foreign acquisitions and greenfield investments: share over total for 2021 
and percentage change on 2020 and 2019. Detail by target sector (NACE-Rev.2). 

EQUITY STAKES 

ICT 

MANUFACTURING 

PST* 

RETAIL  

FINANCE.INSUR 

ELECTRICITY 

REAL.ESTATES 

CONSTRUCTION 

ACCOMMODATION 

HEALTH 

TRANSPORT 

ADMINISTRATIVE.SU
PPORT  
ARTS.ENTERT 

MINING 

EDUCATION 

AGRICULTURE 

REMAINING 
SECTIONS 

SHARE 
(%) 

2021 

30.0 

25.9 

8.0 

7.1 

6.0 

4.1 

2.9 

2.7 

2.4 

2.3 

2.2 

1.7 

1.2 

1.0 

0.9 

0.7 

1.0 

YEAR-ON-YEAR 

GREENFIELD 
INVESTMENTS 

SHAR
E (%) 

YEAR-ON-YEAR 

21/20 

34% 

38% 

39% 

30% 

2% 

7% 

60% 

152% 

188% 

-6% 

-2% 

-6% 

26% 

36% 

20% 

40% 

90% 

21/19 

27% 

-13% 

8% 

-30% 

-34% 

-20% 

-37% 

10% 

-18% 

-23% 

-49% 

-43% 

-43% 

27% 

29% 

56% 

-10% 

2021 

21/20 

RETAIL  

ICT 

MANUFACTURING 

TRANSPORT 

ACCOMMODATION 

FINANCE.INSUR 

PST* 

ADMINISTRATIVE.S
UPPORT  
ARTS.ENTERT 

WHOLESALE AND 
RETAIL  
ELECTRICITY 

CONSTRUCTION 

EDUCATION 

WATER SUPPLY 

OTHERSERVICE 

HEALTH 

REMAINING 
SECTIONS 

28.0 

15.4 

12.0 

10.3 

10.2 

8.4 

8.3 

2.1 

1.3 

1.2 

1.0 

0.5 

0.4 

0.3 

0.2 

0.2 

0.2 

6% 

15% 

12% 

32% 

28% 

9% 

-2% 

-10% 

133% 

13% 

109% 

-20% 

-31% 

17% 

-29% 

100% 

-55% 

21/19 

-26% 

-46% 

-55% 

-5% 

6% 

-50% 

-57% 

-57% 

33% 

-41% 

64% 

-63% 

-83% 

0% 

-17% 

0% 

-67% 

Source: JRC elaboration based on Bureau van Dijk data, extracted on 22/02/2022. / * PST = professional, scientific and technical services (section 
M of Nace rev.2) 

Table 3 – Size of acquired companies in EU (share over total by sector, 2021) and share of 
foreign acquisitions (share over total). Detail by Nace-Rev.2 sectors. 

SECTORS 

SHARE OVER TOTAL BY SECTOR, 2021 

ICT 

MANUFACTURING 

PST* 

RETAIL 

FINANCE 

CONSTRUCTION 

TRANSPORT 

ELECTRICITY 

HEALTH 

OTHER SECTORS 

AVERAGE ALL 
SECTORS 

Micro 

21.87 

14.04 

18.18 

23.08 

35.71 

13.89 

9.09 

32.26 

19.35 

25.95 

21.34 

Small 

43.31 

27.09 

38.64 

37.36 

48.21 

30.56 

15.15 

32.26 

22.58 

23.66 

31.88 

Medium 

24.20 

34.73 

26.52 

27.47 

8.93 

33.33 

48.48 

25.81 

29.03 

26.72 

28.52 

Large 

10.62 

24.14 

16.67 

12.09 

7.14 

22.22 

27.27 

9.68 

29.03 

23.66 

18.25 

Source: JRC calculations on Bureau van Dijk Orbis-Global data extracted on 22/02/2022. The first four columns are based on detailed balance 
sheet data, available only for 72% of the acquisitions of equity stakes observed. Each row sums to 100. Micro: enterprises with less than 10 persons 
employed; Small: enterprises with 10-49 persons employed; Medium: enterprises with 50-249 persons employed; Large: enterprises with 250 or 
more persons employed. / * PST = professional, scientific and technical services (section M of Nace rev.2) 

8 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Following  the  Eurostat  definition,  foreign  transactions  in  the  manufacturing  sector  were 
reclassified by technological  intensity in  two categories, high and low tech manufacturing14.  In 
2021 acquisitions in high tech manufacturing grouped 53% of the total number of foreign deals in 
manufacturing, and 64% of the greenfield investments (Table 4). The shares in 2020 were 45% 
and  62%,  respectively.  This  reclassified  data  shows  that  the  rebound  of foreign  investments  in 
manufacturing affected all types of investments, also those in low tech manufacturing. This is the 
case of both China and Japan, where 2019 investments were highly skewed towards high tech, 
while  in  2021  they  appear  more  balanced.  A  slightly  different  picture  holds  for  greenfield 
investments.  In this case, some jurisdictions show a clear preference  for high tech investments 
(US, Switzerland, Japan, Offshores), while there are also jurisdictions pursuing a more diversified 
portfolio in 2021.  

Table  4.  Technological  content  of  foreign  investments  in  manufacturing,  high  vs  low 
technology. 

Origin 

Year 

Acquisitions 

Greenfield investments 

US  2021 

2020 

2019 

UK  2021 

2020 

2019 

Switzerland  2021 

2020 

2019 

China  2021 

2020 

2019 

Japan  2021 

2020 

2019 

Offshores  2021 

2020 

2019 

RoW  2021 

2020 

2019 

High 
tech. (%) 
54.2 

Low 
tech. (%) 
45.8 

High 
tech. (%) 
63.0 

Low tech. 
(%) 
37.0 

56.6 

45.7 

39.6 

50.5 

39.4 

46.0 

45.5 

48.3 

52.2 

71.4 

64.6 

52.9 

80.0 

68.2 

46.3 

50.0 

32.0 

37.4 

53.1 

49.1 

43.4 

54.3 

60.4 

49.5 

60.6 

54.0 

54.5 

51.7 

47.8 

28.6 

35.4 

47.1 

20.0 

31.8 

53.7 

50.0 

68.0 

62.6 

46.9 

50.9 

59.1 

69.3 

50.0 

58.1 

47.9 

92.3 

82.6 

80.6 

42.9 

50.0 

70.0 

69.6 

56.0 

59.8 

75.0 

59.3 

83.3 

55.4 

64.7 

65.1 

40.9 

30.7 

50.0 

41.9 

52.1 

7.7 

17.4 

19.4 

57.1 

50.0 

30.0 

30.4 

44.0 

40.2 

25.0 

40.7 

16.7 

44.6 

35.3 

34.9 

Source: JRC calculations on Bureau van Dijk Orbis-Global data extracted on 22/02/2022. RoW: Rest of the world, Offshores: Offshore Financial 
Centres, China includes China and Hong Kong.  

14 High tech includes high tech and medium-high tech firms, and low tech includes medium-low and low tech ones 
(NACE-Rev.2, 
classification: 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/Annexes/htec_esms_an3.pdf.  

Eurostat 

details, 

digits). 

further 

For 

see 

2 

9 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
D)  The  US  and  UK  dominated  foreign  transactions  in  acquisitions  equity  stakes  and 

greenfield projects 

The re-opening of EU economies after the pandemic, buoyant stock markets and cheap credit have 
increased the appetite for new foreign acquisitions and greenfield investments in the EU. In 2021, 
in line with previous years, the US was the main foreign investor in the EU, with over 600 deals 
and  700  greenfield  projects.  Germany,  Spain,  France  and  the  Netherlands  were  the  top  target 
countries, hosting nearly 60% of all US deals and 54% of all US greenfield investments in the EU 
(Table 5a, b). The increased presence of US investors in 2021 (compared to the previous year) 
affected all EU countries, especially Belgium and Denmark, where the US dealmaking reached 
again pre-COVID-19 levels. The US investors concentrated 2021 dealmaking mainly in ICT (38%) 
and in manufacturing (28%), both bouncing back and surpassing the pre-COVID-19 levels of 2019 
(Table 6a).   

In  contrast  with  dealmaking  in  equity  stakes,  in  2021  US-originated  greenfield  investments 
increased  by  a  modest  7%,  remaining  36%  behind  the  number  of  projects  in  2019,  mainly  in 
Germany and Sweden. US greenfield investments were mostly spread across few sectors with ICT 
accounting for 21.7% of all US  greenfield investments in  the EU, and  with  manufacturing and 
retail grouping 20.4% and 11.1%, respectively (Table 6b). 

The UK was the second foreign investor in the EU, with about 1 000 transactions in 2021, which 
were evenly split between greenfield investments and acquisitions of equity stakes. The year-on-
year increase of 14.5% in acquisition of equity stakes principally involved four EU countries, as 
over 48% of all UK deals in 2021 were located in Germany, Spain, France and Ireland (Table 5a). 
Year-on-year15 growth saw a redirection of dealmaking from Spain mainly towards Denmark and 
France. In 2021, 48.5% of the UK transactions were in ICT and manufacturing (Table 6a), with 
retail collecting 11% of UK acquisitions of equity stakes.  

UK  greenfield  investments  were  even  more  geographically  concentrated  than  acquisitions  of 
equity stakes (Table 5b). Nearly 59% of the UK greenfield investments went to four EU countries, 
Spain, the Netherlands, France, Germany, with the last two countries losing ground on a year on-
year basis. As much of 31.7% of UK greenfield investments were in ICT, while manufacturing 
and finance grouped 12.1% and 9.7%, respectively, of the UK greenfield investments in the EU 
(Table 6b). 

15 Percentage change of 2021 with respect to 2020. 

10 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Table 5 – Foreign investments (number of deals and projects) by origin of the investor and 
destination country (top investors and receivers), share 2021 and percentage  change with 
respect to 2020. 

ORIGIN 

Table 5a – Acquisitions of equity stakes (M&A and minority) 
YEAR 

DESTINATION 

US 

2021 

y/y 

UK 

2021 

y/y 

OFFSHORES 

2021 

y/y 

SWITZERLAND 

2021 

y/y 

CANADA 

2021 

y/y 

NORWAY 

2021 

DE 

18.2 

46% 

15.2 

1% 

13.8 

16% 

16.9 

-38% 

26.8 

275% 

10.9 

ES 

16.3 

72% 

12.4 

-11% 

15.7 

14% 

10.3 

56% 

8.9 

67% 

5.9 

y/y 

450% 

200% 

CHINA 

2021 

y/y 

ROW 

2021 

y/y 

23.9 

8% 

11.9 

-9% 

26.1 

-50% 

13.8 

-18% 

FR 

12.7 

86% 

11.0 

62% 

6.9 

120% 

10.3 

100% 

15.2 

42% 

1.0 

- 

8.7 

-100% 

10.0 

35% 

NL 

12.2 

64% 

8.4 

0% 

7.5 

33% 

10.3 

27% 

11.6 

86% 

12.9 

8% 

4.3 

0% 

11.9 

23% 

IT 

8.6 

29% 

6.6 

18% 

15.1 

IE 

6.7 

35% 

9.4 

-4% 

5.7 

100% 

125% 

19.1 

136% 

8.9 

1.5 

0% 

5.4 

5.9 

- 

6.5 

70% 

7.1 

46% 

1.0 

0% 

0.0 

- 

2.6 

0% 

150% 

200% 

100% 

ORIGIN 

YEAR 

Table 5b – Greenfield investments  
DESTINATION 

IE 

11.5 

46% 

8.2 

65% 

1.5 

 - 

2.3 

PL 

6.7 

119% 

9.1 

20% 

3.7 

0% 

1.5 

IT 

5.6 

-9% 

4.7 

-15% 

8.8 

20% 

7.5 

US 

2021 

y/y 

UK 

2021 

CHINA 

OFFSHORES 

SWITZERLAND 

y/y 

2021 

y/y 

2021 

y/y 

2021 

y/y 

JAPAN 

2021 

y/y 

RoW 

2021 

ES 

20.1 

29% 

28.7 

85% 

25.7 

46% 

28.6 

52% 

20.9 

4% 

13.4 

0% 

18.1 

DE 

11.6 

NL 

7.3 

-32% 

-19% 

8.6 

-24% 

-47% 

11.8 

8.8 

-41% 

-25% 

-22% 

9.5 

57% 

5.1 

10.5 

27% 

5.4 

FR 

15.4 

5% 

12.1 

9.8 

8% 

7.8 

-44% 

17.1 

27% 

9.4 

3.8 

-50% 

18.6 

4% 

20.7 

12.1 

-63% 

-33% 

900% 

-33% 

300% 

0.8 

-13% 

-50% 

15.9 

4.9 

3.1 

0% 

2.4 

6.2 

0% 

0.0 

5.4 

-  

2.4 

y/y 

217% 

27% 

-11% 

-11% 

117% 

33% 

-60% 

-100% 

-33% 

8.2 

50% 

4.0 

78% 

6.7 

59% 

2.5 

-33% 

5.9 

26% 

Source: JRC elaboration based on Bureau van Dijk data, extracted on 22/02/2022. BE: Belgium, DE: Germany, DK: Denmark, ES: Spain, FR: 
France, IE: Ireland, IT: Italy, NL: Netherlands, PL: Poland, SE: Sweden, RO: Romania, RoW: Rest of the world, Offshores  stands for Offshore 
Financial Centres, RoEU: Rest of EU. China includes deals/projects originated both in China and Hong Kong. y/y stands for year-on-year and is 
the percentage change between 2021 and 2020.  
In 2021 the number of Chinese acquisitions of equity stakes and greenfield projects were half of 
those seen in 2019, and remained nearly unchanged with respect to 2020. This trend mirrors the 
decreasing role of China in global cross-border M&A that was at a 10 year low in 202116. 

16 Rhodium, 2022. 

11 

DK 

3.6 

BE 

5.1 

229% 

100% 

SE 

3.2 

11% 

4.6 

-4% 

2.5 

- 

2.2 

50% 

0.9 

-67% 

20.8 

5.2 

44% 

1.3 

-50% 

4.4 

100% 

3.6 

33% 

4.0 

300% 

320% 

2.2 

0% 

3.7 

2.2 

67% 

2.6 

RoEU 

13.5 

29% 

19.8 

22% 

25.8 

58% 

21.3 

-19% 

15.2 

89% 

23.8 

71% 

23.9 

0% 

34.9 

7.2 

157% 

5.7 

80% 

3.7 

67% 

3.6 

13.9 

-18% 

2.2 

0% 

1.5 

-56% 

67% 

-30% 

-45% 

SE 

2.3 

RO 

3.1 

-33% 

238% 

2.2 

67% 

7.4 

1.1 

-50% 

3.7 

RoEU 

16.4 

3% 

15.9 

-3% 

23.5 

233% 

150% 

-30% 

3.0 

3.0 

30.1 

67% 

27.1 

0% 

22.0 

-25% 

28.5 

40% 

4.7 

100% 

1.2 

 - 

4.7 

46% 

 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
                                                           
Tight  controls  on  outbound  capital  flows,  prudent  approach  to  granting  credit  to  companies 
compared with few years back17, uncertainty surrounding developments related to geopolitical and 
commercial  tensions  have  shaped  the  Chinese  appetite  for  dealmaking  in  2021  (and  also  the 
appetite of companies to have a Chinese investor). These factors are likely to play a relevant role 
also in 2022.  In 2021 Chinese transactions were mainly concentrated in few EU countries. Half 
of the Chinese equity investments involved Germany and Spain (Table 5a), with the latter losing 
ground in 2021 (together with France). An increased interest of Chinese investors is observed in 
Italy  and  Sweden.  Chinese  transactions  in  2021  involved  predominantly  companies  in 
manufacturing (50%), followed by finance (10.9%, Table 6.a). 

The number of Chinese greenfield investments in the EU failed to recover in 2021, and decreased 
by an additional 4% on a year-on-year basis, bringing Chinese greenfield investments 56% below 
the  levels  recorded  in  2019.  The  fewer  Chinese  greenfield  investments  observed  in  2021  were 
mainly concentrated in Spain, France, Germany and Italy (with a combined 55%), while Romania 
and Sweden recorded the highest 2021 year-on-year growth (Table 5b). The zoom by sector of 
the investment (Table 6b) shows that 51.5% of the Chinese greenfield investments took place in 
ICT, while only 0.7% targeted manufacturing.  

Table 6 – Foreign investments (number of deals and projects) by origin of the investor and 
target sector (top investors and sectors), share 2021 and percentage change with respect to 
2020. 

Table 6a – Acquisitions of equity stakes (M&A and minority) 

ORIGIN 

YEAR 

NACE SECTOR 

US 

UK 

OFFSHORES 

SWITZERLAND 

CANADA 

NORWAY 

CHINA 

ROW 

2021 

y/y 

2021 

y/y 

2021 

y/y 

2021 

y/y 

2021 

y/y 

2021 

y/y 

2021 

y/y 

2021 

y/y 

ICT 

38.2 

55.5% 

27.3 

0.7% 

27.0 

59.3% 

20.6 

-6.7% 

33.9 

90.0% 

51.5 

79.3% 

4.3 

-33.3% 

17.1 

21.1% 

17 Also fueled by large defaults 

Manufacturing 

28.1 

78.8% 

21.2 

5.0% 

25.8 

PST 

7.6 

11.6% 

9.0 

4.6 

0.0% 

11.0 

32.4% 

89.7% 

6.9 

3.8 

105.0% 

120.0% 

100.0% 

Retail 

Finance 

Others 

4.8 

16.8 

15.4% 

86.0% 

6.2 

6.9% 

13.2 

0.0% 

3.7 

25.3 

17.8% 

23.3 

23.3% 

22.8 

3.3% 

27.7 

6.6 

0.0% 

14.3 

9.6 

30.0% 

-44.4% 

5.4 

3.6 

700.0% 

100.0% 

33.3% 

72.2% 

11.9 

5.9 

1100.0% 

100.0% 

6.5 

0.0 

3.0 

0.0% 

10.9 

14.9 

25.0% 

28.3 

50.0% 

-100.0% 

66.7% 

18.2% 

4.8 

8.6 

6.7 

33.8 

-23.5% 

-11.5% 

-14.3% 

18.2% 

36.8 

51.5% 

15.2 

70.0% 

12.9 

116.7% 

50.0 

-17.9% 

29.0 

14.7% 

12 

 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
                                                           
ORIGIN 

YEAR 

NACE SECTOR 

Table 6b – Greenfield investments  

US 

UK 

CHINA 

OFFSHORES 

SWITZERLAND 

JAPAN 

ROW 

ICT 

21.7 

-6.9% 

31.7 

4.3% 

51.5 

9.4% 

51.9 

27.8% 

30.2 

-2.5% 

19.5 

-23.8% 

23.0 

40.9% 

2021 

y/y 

2021 

y/y 

2021 

y/y 

2021 

y/y 

2021 

y/y 

2021 

y/y 

2021 

y/y 

Manufacturing 

20.4 

19.3% 

12.1 

5.7% 

0.7 

PST 

10.5 

Retail 

Finance 

Others 

11.1 

8.9 

27.5 

-1.1% 

15.5% 

-1.3% 

13.7% 

5.6 

7.1 

9.7 

33.8 

-16.1% 

13.8% 

-4.3% 

26.6% 

19.1 

6.6 

2.2 

19.9 

-50.0% 

13.0% 

50.0% 

-75.0% 

-22.9% 

9.0 

33.3% 

18.6 

71.4% 

12.2 

100.0% 

14.9 

-6.3% 

5.3 

5.3 

3.8 

24.8 

16.7% 

-46.2% 

400.0% 

83.3% 

17.8 

7.8 

9.3 

-8.0% 

-23.1% 

-7.7% 

34.1 

3.7% 

16.1 

4.9 

0.0% 

6.7 

12.2 

-23.1% 

-17.6% 

7.7 

31.7 

91.2% 

17.4% 

34.8% 

70.7% 

16.3 

-4.5% 

17.1 

Source: JRC elaboration based on Bureau van Dijk data, extracted on 22/02/2022. RoW: Rest of the world, Offshores Offshore Financial Centres. 
PST stands for professional, scientific and technical activities (Nace–Rev.2, section M), it contains among other things R&D facilities. ICT stands 
for Information and communication (Nace-Rev.2, section J). “Others” category aggregates the remaining NACE sections.  

13 

 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
E)  Public shareholding in foreign investors, 2021 

This  Box  analyses  public  shareholding  in  EU  foreign  investment  transactions  in  2021, 
considering  both  acquisitions  of  equity  stakes  and  greenfield  projects.  Public  shareholding 
occurs whenever a state-controlled body or company holds stakes (either control or minority) in 
a foreign investor. We investigate public shareholding coming from the main foreign investors 
into the EU, namely Switzerland, China, Japan, South Korea, Russia, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. 

In  2021,  14%  of  the  foreign  acquisitions  (16  %  in  2020)  recorded  presence  of  public 
shareholding from the selected jurisdictions. Slightly lower the case of greenfield investments, 
where 13% of cases (12% in 2020) presented public holdings. 

In the large majority of cases, public shareholding is expressed through minority stakes, with an 
overall  average  of  3%,  more  specifically  3.4%  for  acquisitions  and  2.4%  for  greenfield 
investments. This implies that looking merely at control stakes would give a very limited picture 
of public holdings (Figure B1).  

Figure B.1. Foreign acquisitions and greenfield investments with public participation: share by 
amount of participation and country. 

Source: JRC calculations on Bureau van Dijk data extracted in March 2022. 

The pattern of public shareholding varied widely across the selected foreign jurisdictions, with 
the largest proportion of cases (47%) being from the United States. This country conveys public 
shareholding mainly through federal and local funds controlled by  public bodies, which hold 
usually small stakes (on average below 1%) in US and foreign entities investing in the EU. The 
second largest group of cases comes from South Korea (25%), with average stakes still below 
1%. Similarly, all other countries present very small average public shares, except China with 
about 19% and Russia with a very significant 44%18. 

Public  shareholding  tends  to  be  more  substantial  in  foreign  investors  active  in  specific 
industries. The manufacturing sector alone accounted for 48% of the cases, although the amount 
of public stakes is rather limited in this group (on average 1.5%). The second-largest industry 
affected by public shareholding is the ICT sector (14% of cases), with an average stake of 1%. 
Other  industries  had  smaller  presence  of  public  shareholding,  but  with  higher  stakes.  For 
example, 10% of cases were in the Financial sector, with a mean public stake of 11%. Wholesale 
and retail trade followed with 9% of cases and on average a 2% stake, while the highest public 
average share was recorded in Professional Activities (13%). 

14 

 
 
 
 
Although overall about half of the analysed transactions entail domestic  public shareholding, 
i.e. public owners holding stakes in an investor registered in their same country, the selected 
jurisdictions  show  rather  different  preferences.  For  example,  China  and  Japan  reported  no 
domestic cases, as their public stakes were detected only in investors registered outside Japan 
or China. On the opposite side, the UK and Russia held public shares almost exclusively (90% 
of  cases)  in,  respectively,  British  and  Russian  companies  investing  in  the  EU,  with  majority 
shares only for the latter. The United States and Switzerland, instead, showed over three-quarters 
of domestic cases of public shareholding.  

18 The data on State influence depends on the reconstruction of ownership links among subsidiaries, sometimes very 
difficult for Chinese companies. Those companies often use offshore subsidiaries to enter the EU, with little or no 
information on the links with mainland China, or have complex nested structures not fully captured by Bureau van 
Dijk raw data. 

15 

 
 
 
                                                           
F)  Russian shareholding in Europe (EU27) 

This box reports Russian investments in EU firms as of 202019 (investment stock). We detail 
both  controlling  and  non-controlling  (influence)  stakes  held  by  investors  from  Russia  (RU). 
Companies with multiple Russian shareholders, each holding a stake below 50%, but all of them 
summing  up  to  more  than  50%  of  the  capital  of  the  EU  business,  are  considered  as  cases  of 
potential control(*). 

Figure  1.  Number  of  EU27  companies  under 
Russian control or influence, by Member States 
(top 7) 

in  other  7 

Russia  exerts  influence  or  control  in  over 
30 thousand companies in the EU (0.12% of 
the  EU  companies20).  It  controls  about  17 
thousand  EU  companies,  has  potentially 
controlling  stakes 
thousand 
companies and minority stakes in 4 thousand 
companies.  We  observe  an  additional  2 
thousand  companies  with  a  reported  non-
controlling  Russian  shareholder,  for  which 
the  amount  of  stake  is  not  known.  The 
breakdown for top member states is reported 
in Fig 1. 

The  top  EU  countries  by  number  of 
the 
Russian-controlled  companies  are 
Czech  Republic  (with  24.7%  of  the  total 
number of EU companies controlled by RU), 
Latvia (18%), Germany  (12.3%), Cyprus (10.3%) and  Bulgaria (8.3%).  Czech 
Republic,  Latvia,  and  Germany  are  also  the  top  countries  by  number  of 
companies with Russian influence (respectively 32.6%, 12% and 13.1% respectively), followed 
by Italy (7.8%) and Bulgaria (5.5%). Latvia and Cyprus have the highest percentage of controlled 
companies  with  respect  to  their  size  (measured  by  number  of 
companies). 

Table 1. Assets 
controlled by the 
Russian government 

In 57.7% of the EU companies under Russian control or influence, 
assets are held by a natural  person, in  9.7% by  a company  and in 
1.1%  by  a  public  authority/state.  The  Russian  government  controls 
assets mainly in Cyprus (34.2% of the cases), Ireland (16.5%) and the 
Netherlands (7.9%) (See Table 1). These assets are in companies for 
79.9% of the cases, and in banks or other financial institutions for the 
remaining cases. 

The  sectors  with  the  largest  presence  of  Russian  investors  are 
Wholesale (with 4530 and 3607 companies under control and influence, 
respectively), Real Estate (2714 and 2470), Professional Scientific and 
Technical  activities  (1721  and  1272).  Russia  also  controls  1199 
companies  in  Finance  and  Insurance,  and  exerts  influence  on  883 

Manufacturing firms. 

16 

 
 
 
 
 
Russia directly controls 36 EU companies in the Oil & Gas sector and 33 in Electricity. Ten 
of the controlled Oil & Gas firms are in Germany, while minority stakes are found in six Oil & 
Gas  companies  mainly  in  Eastern  and  Nordic  Europe.  As  for  Electricity,  seven  controlled 
companies are in Germany and five in Latvia, while large minority stakes are present in another 
36 EU firms mainly in Latvia, Croatia and Hungary.  

Source: JRC calculations on Bureau van Dijk data extracted in March 2022. (*) Potential control refers to direct shareholding only. 

19 It covers the stock of companies as of 2020 as it is based on balance sheet information, which is available only up 
to 2020. 2021 balance sheets are still incomplete at the time of drafting this document. 
20 EU companies are approximately 23 million (latest available year 2018, Eurostat business demography) 

17 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
2. Methodology and sources 

Raw data on acquisitions of equity stakes and greenfield projects is from Bureau van Dijk datasets 
(Orbis-Global, Zephyr and Orbis-CrossBorder). Data has been retrieved in February 2022 and then 
further elaborated by the Joint Research Centre (JRC).  

The term “foreign investor” is used whenever the investor is ultimately controlled by a non-EU 
entity (either a company or an individual). When the ultimate owner cannot be established, the 
location  of  the  investor  applies.  This  definition  differs  from  the  one  of  the  FDI  Screening 
Regulation21. Throughout the text the term acquisition will identify the acquisition of equity stakes 
in EU companies, be it M&A or stakes below 50% but above 10% of the capital, and the term 
transactions  will  be  referred  to  the  sum  of  acquisitions  and  greenfield  investments.  Raw  data 
(including old deals and projects) are regularly updated by the data provider, but data extraction 
for the same time window, done at different points in time, could lead to different figures due to 
update lags.  

The section only reports the deals’ number of transactions. Values are only available for a fraction 
of the  acquisitions due to  the fact that companies are not  obliged to  report the deal’s financial 
details. For greenfield investment projects, the expected investment and the job creation is always 
available but not reported in the text for consistency reasons. National account data at the start of 
the section, although based on the first counterpart location principle, should help in tracking FDI 
trends.  

All types of greenfield projects are accounted for in this document, including the construction of 
new sites, the relocation of a foreign presence, and the expansion of existing sites. All tables and 
figures are based on announced and completed transactions, but report them with their announced 
date. Rumours and postponed deals/projects are excluded. A multi-deal, i.e. a deal where there are 
multiple targets and/or multiple investors is considered a sum of multiple deals. For example, if a 
foreign investor acquires two companies, this is recorded as two deals. Conversely, if a foreign 
investor acquires a company with multiple subsidiaries (in different countries), the deal remains 
unique and is attributed to the parent company’s country. Deals with multiple targets and multiple 
investors (a negligible amount) are disregarded, as it is very difficult to devise a general rule to 
attribute the transaction. This classification rule is also applied to greenfield investments in case 
of multi-purpose projects in which several sites are built and/or the projects with multiple investors 
is announced.  

In the analysis of public shareholding, for each investor, the ownership information available at 
the time of the deal/project is used. Where not available for 2021, the ownership information used 
is that of 2020, the latest information available. Data on the size of EU target companies acquired 
by a foreign investor is based on raw data from Bureau van Dijk Orbis-Global. Where not available 
for 2021, the information on balance sheet used is that of 2020. 

21 See Article 2(2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/452 (the FDI Regulation). 

18 

 
 
                                                           
Note  that  very  small  firms  (and  to  some  extent  small  companies)  are  poorly  covered  in  this 
database (see OECD, 202022 for additional insights). 

Finally,  the  classification  of  companies  working  in  high  tech  manufacturing  can  be  found  in 
Eurostat webpage. Under high-tech we grouped companies falling under Eurostat sections high 
tech and medium-high tech firms. All the remaining companies are grouped under low-tech. 

22 See: https://www.oecd.org/economy/coverage-and-representativeness-of-orbis-data-c7bdaa03-en.htm. 

19 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
3. EU Member States – legislative developments  

Introduction 

This part of the Staff Working Document reflects the information provided by the EU Member 
States pursuant to their annual reporting obligation set out in Article 5 of the EU FDI Screening 
Regulation. 

The section for each Member State reflects: 

-  whether the relevant Member State has, as of 30 December 2021, a national investment 

- 

- 

screening mechanism in place; 
legislative developments in the field of investment screening during the reporting period 
(Q1 2021 – Q4 2021); 
any  ongoing  initiatives  that  may  be  expected  to  result  in  the  introduction  of  a  national 
screening mechanism or amendments to an existing mechanism. 

20 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Austria 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes  

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2021):  

None.  In  2021,  Austria  did  not  have  any  legislative  developments.  Austria’s  last  legislative 
development took place on 25 July 2020, when the new Austrian Investment Control Act 2011 
entered into force.  

ANY ONGOING INITIATIVES THAT MAY RESULT IN THE INTRODUCTION OF A 
NATIONAL  SCREENING  MECHANISM  OR  AMENDMENTS  TO  AN  EXISTING 
MECHANISM? 

Austria currently does not have any ongoing initiatives which can be expected to lead to updates 
to its existing screening mechanism and related legislation. 

REPORT: The Austrian government publishes an annual report in German. The latest version can 
be found under:  

https://www.bmdw.gv.at/Themen/Investitionskontrolle/T%C3%A4tigkeitsberichte-der-
Investitionskontrollbeh%C3%B6rde.html 

Belgium 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: No 

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2021):  

None. In 2021, Belgium did not have any legislative developments.  

ANY ONGOING INITIATIVES THAT MAY RESULT IN THE INTRODUCTION OF A 
NATIONAL  SCREENING  MECHANISM  OR  AMENDMENTS  TO  AN  EXISTING 
MECHANISM? 

As of 31 December 2021, Belgium had not established an investment screening mechanism. After 
a broad consultation with relevant stakeholders, a preliminary draft law was adopted by the federal 
Council of Ministers in July 2020. Following the opinion of the Council of State in September 
2020, it was decided in 2021 to draft a so-called ‘cooperation agreement’ between all governments 
involved, with the aim of setting up a national screening mechanism. On 31 December 2021, the 
discussions at the political level were ongoing with a view to finalise a draft text.  

The Federal Public Service Economy operates as the national contact point for the implementation 
of the Regulation (EU) 2019/452 and for the participation in the EU cooperation mechanism. 

Since January 2019 legislation (“Bestuursdecreet” of 7 December 2018) on the safeguarding of 
the strategic interests of the Flemish Community and Flemish Region became effective. 

21 

 
 
  
  
It allows the Government of Flanders to annul or declare inapplicable any legal action by a Flemish 
or local government body or bodies derived from these through which a foreign natural or legal 
person gains power of control or decision-making power in that government body, provided that 
the strategic interests of the Flemish Community or the Flemish Region are threatened – namely 
if the continuity of vital processes is jeopardised, if certain strategic or sensitive knowledge could 
fall into foreign hands, or if the strategic independence of the Flemish Community or the Flemish 
Region would be compromised – and provided that the Government of Flanders can demonstrate 
that  it  has  attempted  to  achieve  the  safeguarding  of  strategic  interests  with  the  consent  of  the 
government body concerned. 

Bulgaria 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: No 

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2021):  

None. In 2021, Bulgaria did not have any legislative developments. 

ANY ONGOING INITIATIVES THAT MAY RESULT IN THE INTRODUCTION OF A 
NATIONAL  SCREENING  MECHANISM  OR  AMENDMENTS  TO  AN  EXISTING 
MECHANISM? 

As of 31 December 2021, the Bulgarian authorities had not yet established a national screening 
mechanism. Nevertheless, in 2021, Bulgaria participated in the EU cooperation mechanism under 
Regulation (EU) 2019/452 and notifications  from other Member States were reviewed. Despite 
this, Bulgaria has not started any initiatives to establish a domestic screening mechanism.  

Nevertheless,  in  2022,  Bulgaria  is  planning  to  set  up  a  working  group  with  the  purpose  of 
establishing a national screening mechanism.  

Croatia 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: No 

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2021):  

None. In 2021, Croatia did not have any legislative developments.  

ANY ONGOING INITIATIVES THAT MAY RESULT IN THE INTRODUCTION OF A 
NATIONAL  SCREENING  MECHANISM  OR  AMENDMENTS  TO  AN  EXISTING 
MECHANISM? 

As of 31 December 2021, the Croatian  authorities had not  yet  established a national  screening 
mechanism. Nevertheless, Croatia has established a National Contact Point (NCT), consisting of 
the  Secretariat  and  the  Interdepartmental  Commission  for  the  screening  of  Foreign  Direct 
Investments. The NCT has the authority to request further information from foreign investors. In 
addition, it is responsible for reviewing, developing, and updating FDI screening regulations.  

22 

 
 
  
  
In 2021, the NCT has entered into bilateral exchanges with Member States to develop relevant 
screening regulations in Croatia. 

Cyprus 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: No 

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2021):  

None. In 2021, Cyprus did not have any legislative developments. 

ANY ONGOING INITIATIVES THAT MAY RESULT IN THE INTRODUCTION OF A 
NATIONAL  SCREENING  MECHANISM  OR  AMENDMENTS  TO  AN  EXISTING 
MECHANISM? 

On 20 September 2021, the Ministry of Energy, Commerce and Industry (the national contact point 
for FDI Screening) decided that the task of amending the existing legislation or creating a new 
legislative framework should be outsourced to the private sector. 

In addition, in 2021, the National Contact Point has engaged into bilateral exchanges with Member 
States  to  examine  their  best  practices  with  regards  to  the  establishment  of  national  screening 
mechanisms and legislation. 

Czechia 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes 

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2021):  

On 3 February 2021, the Czech Republic established a national screening mechanism under “The 
Foreign Investments Screening Act”. The Act came into force on 1 May 2022.  It establishes rights 
and  duties  on  foreign  investors  to  target  persons  or  owners  of  target  companies  in  the  Czech 
Republic.  

In  line  with  the  EU  FDI  Screening  Regulation,  this  Act  enables  national  authorities  to  screen 
transactions  on  their  potential  impact  on  national  security,  as  well  as  internal  or  public  order. 
Examples of this include, but are not limited to, a potential impact on critical infrastructures, key 
is  consistent  with 
technologies,  and  defence-related  sectors.  In 
recommendations of the National Security Audit, Security Strategy of the Czech Republic, and 
National Strategy for Countering Hybrid Interference. More specifically, the law includes among 
others: 

this  regard, 

law 

the 

1.  The  establishment  of  the  Ministry  of  Industry  and  Trade  of  the  Czech  Republic  as  a 

statutory body of the government, which conducts the screening 

23 

 
 
  
  
  
  
2.  A definition of foreign investor (ultimate beneficial owner of investing entity originates 

from a non-EU country) 

3.  A definition of foreign investment (Foreign investor acquires at least 10% of voting rights 

in and/or substantial control over a Czech target) 

4.  A definition of effective degree of control over the target object and person 
5.  A definition of the target object and the target person 
6.  A description of the screening procedure 
7.  A description of the consultation procedure 
8.  Definitions of administrative periods 

In  addition,  the  Act  introduces  two  screening  regimes.  The  first  regime  concerns  a  narrow 
group  of  the  most  sensitive  areas,  where  the  investor  will  need  approval  from  national 
authorities before carrying out the transaction. 

The second regime concerns all other national-security relevant investments and allows for the 
screening of past FDI for up to five years after completion of the transaction. To gain legal 
certainty  that  the  investment  will  not  be  contested  retrospectively,  the  foreign  investor  can 
voluntarily ask for confirmation that his or her investment will be subjected to screening or not 
(consultation). 

More information can be found under: https://mpo.cz/en/foreign-trade/investment-screening/ 

ANY ONGOING INITIATIVES THAT MAY RESULT IN THE INTRODUCTION OF A 
NATIONAL  SCREENING  MECHANISM  OR  AMENDMENTS  TO  AN  EXISTING 
MECHANISM? 

The  Czech  Republic  currently  does  not  have  any  other  ongoing  initiatives  that  may  result  in 
amendments to its newly established screening mechanism. 

Denmark 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes  

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2021):  

Before  adopting  a  general  investment  screening  regulation  in  2021,  Denmark  had  two  sector- 
specific FDI screening regulations: 1) the Act on War Material and 2) the Act on the Continental 
Shelf  and  Certain  Pipelines  Installations  on  Territorial  Waters,  providing  certain  authorisation 
requirements for foreign investors. 

On 1 July 2021, the new Danish FDI screening legislation, “The Investment Screening Act” and 
related  executive  orders  entered  into  force,  whereby  the  law  does  not  apply  to  foreign  direct 
investments and special financial agreements implemented before 1 September 2021.  

24 

 
 
  
  
 
The Investment Screening Act establishes two screening regimes. On the one hand, it entails a 
compulsory scheme for authorisation of FDI and special financial agreements within particularly 
sensitive sectors and activities (defense, dual-use, IT security, critical infrastructure, and critical 
technology). On the other hand, it entails an optional scheme for the notification of FDI and special 
financial agreements within other sectors. 

In addition, the Investment Screening Act is supplemented by three executive orders issued by the 
Ministry  of  Industry,  Business  and  Financial  Affairs.  These  orders  provide  clarification  on  the 
scope  of  the  legislation  and  further  definitions  on  particularly  sensitive  sectors  and  activities, 
procedures and on confidentiality. 

More information can be found under: 
https://businessindenmark.virk.dk/topics/Economy/Investments/ 

ANY ONGOING INITIATIVES THAT MAY RESULT IN THE INTRODUCTION OF A 
NATIONAL  SCREENING  MECHANISM  OR  AMENDMENTS  TO  AN  EXISTING 
MECHANISM? 

Denmark currently does not have any other ongoing initiatives that may result in amendments of 
its existing mechanism. 

Estonia 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: No 

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2021):  

None. In 2021, Estonia did not have any legislative developments.  

ANY ONGOING INITIATIVES THAT MAY RESULT IN THE INTRODUCTION OF A 
NATIONAL  SCREENING  MECHANISM  OR  AMENDMENTS  TO  AN  EXISTING 
MECHANISM? 

Estonia currently does not have a national screening mechanism in place. However, at the end of 
year  2021  and  the  beginning  of  the  year  2022,  Estonia  launched  a  public  consultation  and 
coordination with other ministries on draft legislation. A draft law is planned to be submitted to 
the Parliament for adoption in the second half of 2022.    

Finland 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes  

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2021):  

None. Finland did not have any legislative developments in 2021.  

25 

 
 
 
 
  
  
  
ANY ONGOING INITIATIVES THAT MAY RESULT IN THE INTRODUCTION OF A 
NATIONAL  SCREENING  MECHANISM  OR  AMENDMENTS  TO  AN  EXISTING 
MECHANISM? 

Finland  has  no  ongoing  initiatives  that  may  lead  to  amendments  to  its  existing  screening 
mechanism. 

France 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes  

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2021):  

In 2021, France introduced two major legislative changes to its existing FDI screening legislation. 

First, with its “Arrêté du 10 September 2021”, in amending the “Arrêté du 31 décembre 2019”, the 
French government revised the types of documents that must be submitted by investors. That is, 
foreign investors wanting to acquire voting rights or a stake in a French target company must now 
submit the EU Notification Form B23 in addition to other relevant documents.  

Second, on 22 December 2021, France has prolonged the obligation for foreign investors to notify 
investments when acquiring at least 10% of the voting rights (Décret n° 2021-1758). In July 2020 
the French government first lowered the threshold from 25% to 10% of voting rights. However, in 
light of the current health crisis and economic developments, the French Minister of the Economy, 
Finance and Recovery, and the Minister Delegate to the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs 
have requested to prolong this measure.  

More information on the above legislative developments can be found under: 

  https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Articles/2021/11/30/bruno-le-maire-et-franck-

riester-annoncent-la-prolongation-d-un-an-de-l-abaissement-exceptionnel-du-seuil-de-
controle-des-investissements-etrangers-en-france-de-25-a-10 
  https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000044553697 
  https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000044082732 

ANY ONGOING INITIATIVES THAT MAY RESULT IN THE INTRODUCTION OF A 
NATIONAL  SCREENING  MECHANISM  OR  AMENDMENTS  TO  AN  EXISTING 
MECHANISM? 

France has no ongoing initiatives that may result in amendments to its existing mechanism.  

REPORT:  France  annually  publishes  an  overview  of  its  activities.  It  can  be  found  under: 
https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Articles/9aa76183-24a8-49ba-9466-
179c5b29f99c/files/47b9b032-3d2b-4779-8327-15d3400045ab 

23 This voluntary notification form was put forward by the Commission to serve as a suggestion for Member States 
on how transactions could be notified to the EU cooperation mechanism. 

26 

 
 
  
                                                           
Germany 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes 

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2021):  

On  1  May  2021,  an  amendment  to  the  Foreign  Trade  and  Payments  Ordinance  (so-called  “17. 
AWV-Novelle”) entered into force. The amendment entailed procedural and substantive aspects to 
safeguard essential security interests.  

On  substantive  changes,  the  German  government  introduced  16  new  case  groups,  relating  to 
emerging  /  sensitive  technologies,  in  the  cross-sectoral  screening  procedure  in  Section  55a 
subsection 1 of the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance. In addition, it revised the case groups 
of  the  sector-specific  screening  procedure  (Section  60  subsection  1  of  the  Foreign  Trade  and 
Payments  Ordinance).  The  sector-specific  screening  applies  to  domestic  companies  in  sectors 
related to goods on the German export control list or other defence technology, IT security products 
to process classified state material, and facilities that are vital for defence.  

Regarding  the  procedural  changes,  the  German  government  adjusted  the  thresholds  for  the 
acquisition of voting rights that require an investor to notify the acquisition, and that trigger an 
investment screening. According to Section 56 of the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance, a 
notification by the investor is now mandatory, and an investment screening is triggered under the 
cross-sectoral  screening  procedure,  upon  reaching  a  10  %  or  20  %  threshold,  depending  on  to 
which case group the domestic German company belongs. If the company does not belong to any 
of  the  case  groups,  a  notification  is  not  mandatory,  but  a  screening  procedure  is  nevertheless 
triggered once the acquired voting rights reach 25 %.  

Moreover, Germany also introduced additional acquisition thresholds for transactions where an 
investor is already holding 10 % / 20 % / 25 % of the voting rights (depending on which case group 
the  German  target  company  belongs  to,  if  any)  and  now  acquires  further  voting  rights.  If  the 
aggregated  voting  rights  reach  certain  further  thresholds,  a  new  notification  by  the  investor  is 
mandatory  (where  the  German  target  company  belongs  to  one  of  the  case  groups),  and  a  new 
screening procedure is triggered.  

The German FDI screening mechanism was also supplemented to account for constellations with 
so-called atypical acquisitions of control in a domestic company. An atypical acquisition of control 
occurs where an investor acquires voting rights below the relevant thresholds, but at the same time 
acquires additional rights which – together with the voting rights – grant a level of control over 
the domestic company which corresponds to the control conveyed by the applicable voting right 
thresholds. Such additional rights can consist of additional seats or majorities in supervisory bodies 
or in the management of the company, veto rights in strategic business or personnel decisions, or 
the granting of rights to certain sensitive business information.  

27 

 
 
  
 
The  sector-specific  screening  criteria  of  Section  60  subsection  1  of  the  Foreign  Trade  and 
Payments  Ordinance  were  adjusted  to  better  protect  German  interests.  Where  the  screening 
procedure previously needed to determine if an FDI will "endanger" the essential security interests 
of  Germany, the question now is if an investment is "likely to affect" these interests. 

Finally,  the  Federal  Ministry  for  Economic  Affairs  and  Climate  Action  enacted  a  general 
administrative act setting out in detail the information to be submitted by investors when notifying 
an FDI. 

More information can be found under:  

https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Externe-Links/A/allgemeinverf%C3%BCgung-
au%C3%9Fenwirtschaftsgesetz-englisch-270521.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4 

ANY ONGOING INITIATIVES THAT MAY RESULT IN THE INTRODUCTION OF A 
NATIONAL  SCREENING  MECHANISM  OR  AMENDMENTS  TO  AN  EXISTING 
MECHANISM? 

Germany has no ongoing initiatives that may result in amendments to its existing mechanism.  

REPORT: Germany has not published a report on its activities in 2021, but key facts and figures 
on investment screening in Germany are available in German and English under: 

 https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Artikel/Foreign-Trade/investment-screening.html 

Greece 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: No 

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2021):  

During  the  reporting  period,  one  major  legislative  development  took  place  in  Greece:  the 
legislation on the Organisation of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) – the national 
competent  Authority  for  FDI  Screening  –  entered  into  force  on  28  February  2021.  This  law 
designates the MFA Department that is responsible for 1) the EU cooperation mechanism on FDI 
Screening  and  2)  the  operation  of  the  planned  national  FDI  Screening  mechanism,  which  is 
currently being drafted. 

This law further provides that the designated Department:  

  operates as a contact point for cooperation with other EU Member States and the European 

Commission in the context of the EU cooperation mechanism for FDI Screening  

  cooperates with the competent Greek Authorities and coordinates with them on the process 

of FDI Screening  

  is responsible for drafting and submitting to the European Commission the annual report 

on FDI Screening as provided by Regulation (EU) 2019/452  

28 

 
 
 
  
More information can be found under:  

https://www.mfa.gr/images/docs/eukairies_stadiodromias/organismos-ypex.pdf 

ANY ONGOING INITIATIVES THAT MAY RESULT IN THE INTRODUCTION OF A 
NATIONAL  SCREENING  MECHANISM  OR  AMENDMENTS  TO  AN  EXISTING 
MECHANISM? 

Greece is currently working on the draft legislation for the national FDI screening mechanism on 
the grounds of security and public order. After an initial consultation with Commission experts, 
the Greek government is currently revising its drafted legislation. In addition, Greece is actively 
seeking conversations with other EU Member States to exchange information on best practices.  

Hungary 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes  

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2021):  

In  the  reporting  period,  there  have  been  three  major  developments  in  Hungary’s  screening 
legislation.  

First, on 1 December 2021, Hungary added a new point j) to Section 2 (4) of “Act XCIX of 2021” 
on transitional rules  related to  emergencies. This  addition  allows the Hungarian government  to 
require investors to report certain types of activities in the insurance and re-insurance space. This 
amendment did not, therefore, in itself result in a change to the Hungarian legislation previously 
in force, but empowered the Government to declare new activities subject to notification. 

Second, based on the above authorisation, also with effect from 1 December 2021, a new Chapter 
10 has been added to Annex 1 of the Implementing Regulation, as a result of which: 

  insurance  activities  statutory  insurance  and  reinsurance  activities  according  to  Act 

LXXXVIII of 2014 and 

  activities  directly  related  to  insurance  Pursuant  to  Section  40  (3)  (a)  and  (e)  of  the  Act 
LXXXVIII of 2014 on insurance activities, are also considered as activities to be notified. 

Third, on 5 January 2022 the amendment of Government Decree 246/2018 on the implementation 
of Act LVII of 2018 on the Control of Foreign Investments Affecting Hungary's Security Interests 
entered  into  force,  by  the  Government  Decree  802/2021  (XII.  28.).  The  sole  purpose  of  the 
legislation was to harmonise national screening laws with the EU Screening Regulation. Thus, the 
implementation of the EU Regulation in Hungary is now fully ensured.  

29 

 
 
  
  
 
 
ANY ONGOING INITIATIVES THAT MAY RESULT IN THE INTRODUCTION OF A 
NATIONAL  SCREENING  MECHANISM  OR  AMENDMENTS  TO  AN  EXISTING 
MECHANISM? 

Hungary has no ongoing initiatives, which can be expected to lead to amendments to its existing 
mechanism. 

Ireland 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: No 

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2021):  

None. In 2021, Ireland did not have any legislative developments. 

ANY ONGOING INITIATIVES THAT MAY RESULT IN THE INTRODUCTION OF A 
NATIONAL  SCREENING  MECHANISM  OR  AMENDMENTS  TO  AN  EXISTING 
MECHANISM? 

Ireland  is  currently  in  the  process  of  finalising  the  required  primary  legislation  in  order  to 
implement a screening mechanism in Ireland. This new law will define the nature, scale and type 
of investments that should undergo investment screening. It will also set out the relevant points of 
considerations throughout the Screening process. It will ultimately empower the Minister to assess, 
investigate, authorise, condition, or prohibit foreign investments based on a range of security and 
public order criteria. Finally, it will also establish a screening mechanism in line with the EU FDI 
Screening Regulation.  

Italy 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes  

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2021):  

Throughout 2021, there have been two major legislative developments in Italy. 

First,  on  30  April  2021,  the  Italian  government  prolonged  the  applicability  of  its  temporary 
screening regime (as introduced by Decree-Law No. 23 of 8 April 2020) until 31 December 2021. 
Under this law, the national screening mechanism applies to acquisitions of at least 10% of shares 
or voting rights of an Italian target, as well as any subsequent acquisition exceeding 15%, 20%, 
25% and 50% thresholds. The necessary pre-condition for this is that investments must exceed 
EUR 1 million. Finally, the law also applies to investors from EU Member States as long as the 
transaction results in a majority control of the Italian target.  

Second, on 30 December 2021, the applicability of this temporary screening mechanism was once 
again prolonged until 31 December 2022 through Article 17 of Decree-Law 228 of 30 December 
2021 “Urgent provisions regarding legislative deadlines”.  

30 

 
 
  
  
More information on the above developments can be found under: 

  First legislative development:  

https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2021/04/30/21G00066/sg 

  Second legislative development: 

https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2021/12/30/21G00255/sg 

ANY ONGOING INITIATIVES THAT MAY RESULT IN THE INTRODUCTION OF A 
NATIONAL  SCREENING  MECHANISM  OR  AMENDMENTS  TO  AN  EXISTING 
MECHANISM? 

On  21  March  2022,  the  Italian  government  adopted  Articles  24-28  of  Decree-Law  21.  These 
articles amended the Law Decree no. 21 of 2012, by introducing urgent measures to react to the 
economic  and  humanitarian  effects  of  the  Ukrainian  crisis  ("Emergency  Measures  Decree"). 
Besides  these  developments,  Italy  did  not  have  any  ongoing  initiatives  that  may  result  in 
amendments to Italy’s screening mechanism.  

More information can be found under: 
https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2022/03/21/22G00032/SG 

Latvia 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes  

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2021):  

In  2021,  Latvia  had  three  major  legislative  developments.  First,  on  4  February  2021,  Latvia 
amended  Regulation  No.  606  “Regulations  Regarding  the  Information  to  be  Submitted  to  the 
Authority Determined in the National Security Law and the Handling of Information on Foreign 
Direct Investments”. In this amendment, the government clarified a reference to the law based on 
which the regulations have been issued. 

Second, on 20 May 2021, the Latvian government amended Chapter VI of the National Screening 
law.  In  this  amendment,  it  included  additional  criteria  to  qualify  companies  as  “Commercial 
Company of Significance to National Security”: 

  The owners of a forest land in the Republic of Latvia of at least 10 000 hectares; 
  The owners of an agricultural land in the Republic of Latvia of at least 4000 hectares; 
  has received the special permit (licence) for commercial activities with goods of strategic 
significance or a military manufacturer certificate issued by the Ministry of Defence, and 
it has a valid strategic partnership contract with the Ministry of Defence. 

Moreover, it granted national authorities with additional rights to decide which information they 
request from investors.  

31 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
Third, on 8 December 2021, the Latvian government once again amended the National Screening 
law by clarifying references to definitions of terms used in the law. 

More information can be found under:  

  First legislative development:  

  Link to amendment (in Latvian):  

https://likumi.lv/ta/id/320818-grozijums-ministru-kabineta-2017-gada-3-
oktobra-noteikumos-nr-606-noteikumi-par-nacionalas-drosibas-likuma-
noteiktajai-instituc... 

  Link to consolidated version of legislative act (in English): 

https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/294210-regulations-regarding-the-
information-to-be-submitted-to-the-authority-determined-in-the-national-
security-law-and-the-handling-of-information-on-foreign-direct-
investments 
  Second legislative development:  

  Link to amendments (in Latvian): 

 

https://likumi.lv/ta/id/323576-grozijumi-nacionalas-drosibas-likuma 
 Link to consolidated version of legislative act (with amendments, which 
are in force since 15/06/2021; in English):  
https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/14011-national-security-law 

  Third legislative development: 

  Link to amendments (in Latvian): 

 

https://likumi.lv/ta/id/328592-grozijumi-nacionalas-drosibas-likuma 
 Link to consolidated version of legislative act (in Latvian): 
https://likumi.lv/ta/id/14011-nacionalas-drosibas-likums 

ANY ONGOING INITIATIVES THAT MAY RESULT IN THE INTRODUCTION OF A 
NATIONAL  SCREENING  MECHANISM  OR  AMENDMENTS  TO  AN  EXISTING 
MECHANISM? 

Latvia is  currently working on the amendments of the national FDI screening mechanism. It is 
planned  to  widen  the  scope  of  national  FDI  screening  mechanism  and  to  include  additional 
companies and transactions. 

Lithuania 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes 

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2021):  

Lithuania  has  had  a  national  screening  mechanism  since  2002.  The  scope  and  procedures 
governing the screening of foreign investors are established by the Law on Protection of Objects 
Important  to  Ensuring  National  Security.  Significant  amendments  to  the  Law  were  adopted  in 
2020, implementing the FDI Screening Regulation.  

32 

 
 
  
 
 
In the reporting period, only minor amendments to the Law have been adopted. The main changes 
were  related  to  procurement  provisions  and  radio  frequencies  (channels)  of  electronic 
communications  networks  and/or  electronic  communications  services  provisions,  not  to  the 
investment  screening  regulation.  Also,  minor  updates  were  made  to  the  list  of  enterprises  and 
strategic infrastructure important to national security. 

ANY ONGOING INITIATIVES THAT MAY RESULT IN THE INTRODUCTION OF A 
NATIONAL  SCREENING  MECHANISM  OR  AMENDMENTS  TO  AN  EXISTING 
MECHANISM?  

Lithuania  will  set  up  a  working  group  in  spring  2022.  Its  purpose  will  be  to  take  into  account 
previous  experience  from  the  application  of  the  Law  and  submit  proposals  to  ensure  the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the FDI screening procedure. 

Luxembourg 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: No 

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2021):  

None. In 2021, Luxembourg did not have any legislative developments. 

ANY ONGOING INITIATIVES THAT MAY RESULT IN THE INTRODUCTION OF A 
NATIONAL  SCREENING  MECHANISM  OR  AMENDMENTS  TO  AN  EXISTING 
MECHANISM? 

Luxembourg currently does not have a national FDI screening mechanism. However, on 16 July 
2021,  the  Government  Council  approved  a  government  initiative  to  introduce  a  national  FDI 
screening mechanism and to set up the rules for the intra-European cooperation mechanism. The 
draft  law  as  well  as  the  draft  Grand-Ducal  regulation  have  been  submitted  to  the  Luxembourg 
Parliament - and for opinion to the Council of State and the professional chambers on 15 September 
2021. Both texts follow the normal legislative procedure. 

Link to legislation: 
https://chd.lu/wps/portal/public/Accueil/TravailALaChambre/Recherche/RoleDesAffaires?action
=doDocpaDetails&id=7885 

Malta 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes 

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2021):  

None. In 2021, Malta did not have any legislative developments. For more information, see below. 

33 

 
 
 
 
 
 
ANY ONGOING INITIATIVES THAT MAY RESULT IN THE INTRODUCTION OF A 
NATIONAL  SCREENING  MECHANISM  OR  AMENDMENTS  TO  AN  EXISTING 
MECHANISM? 

The Malta FDI Screening Office was set up in 2020 to implement the provisions of EU Regulation 
2019/452, which were later transposed into a Maltese Legislation - Chapter 620 of the Laws of 
Malta. The Law came into force on 11 October 2020. Other than this, Malta does not have any 
ongoing initiatives that may result in the amendment of its existing screening mechanism. 

More information can be found under: https://www.nfdismalta.com/ 

REPORT: Malta is in the process of developing an Annual Report. The report will present some 
background information on the establishment of the Office, the adoption of the EU Regulation and 
transposition into a Maltese legislation. The report will also present some key abstracts adopted 
from the EC’s Annual Report on Investment Screening and some statistics and figures on Maltese 
notifications, and general trends with respect to foreign M&A and greenfield projects by origin of 
investor and target sector. Finally, some highlights will be presented along with some points of 
action intended by the Maltese authorities in relation to Investment Screening in Malta. Included 
in the report, there will also be an audit report for 2020 and 2021. It is hoped to publish the Annual 
Report around April 2022. 

Netherlands 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes 

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2021):  

Prior to 2021, the Dutch FDI Screening mechanism was limited to the “Telecommunications Act”, 
“Electricity,  Production,  Transport  and  Supply  Act”,  as  well  as  the  “Gas  Transportation  and 
Supply Act”. On 30 June 2021, the Investments, Mergers and Acquisitions Security Screening Act 
(VIFO; in Dutch: “Wet veiligheidstoets investeringen, fusies en overnames”) was sent to the Dutch 
Parliament. The bill passed the lower house on 19 April 2022 and the upper house on 17 May 
2022.  It  is  expected  to  enter  into  force  late  2022  or  early  2023,  after  the  corresponding  lower 
regulation has been drafted. This bill introduces a general FDI Screening mechanism and concerns 
acquisitions and investments in  sensitive technology and sectors that are considered critical for 
national security and public policy.  

More information can be found under:  

www.eerstekamer.nl/wetsvoorstel/35880_wet_veiligheidstoets 

https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/wetsvoorstellen/detail?cfg=wetsvoorsteldetails&qry
=wetsvoorstel%3A35880 

https://www.bureautoetsinginvesteringen.nl/ 

34 

 
 
 
ANY ONGOING INITIATIVES THAT MAY RESULT IN THE INTRODUCTION OF A 
NATIONAL  SCREENING  MECHANISM  OR  AMENDMENTS  TO  AN  EXISTING 
MECHANISM? 

On  19  April  2022,  the  Dutch  House  of  Representatives  adopted  the  VIFO,  thereby  paving  the 
ground  for  a  general  FDI  Screening  Mechanism.  In  addition,  the  Ministry  of  Defense  and  the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy are drafting a bill for an investment screening 
procedure for transactions relating to the defense industry. The aim is to publish a draft version of 
this bill in late 2022 / early 2023 for public scrutiny (the internet consultation process).  

Poland 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes 

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2021):  

None. In 2021, Poland did not have any legislative developments.  

ANY ONGOING INITIATIVES THAT MAY RESULT IN THE INTRODUCTION OF A 
NATIONAL  SCREENING  MECHANISM  OR  AMENDMENTS  TO  AN  EXISTING 
MECHANISM? 

Poland currently has no ongoing initiatives that may result in amendments to its existing screening 
mechanism. 

Portugal 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes 

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2021):  

None. In 2021, Portugal did not have any legislative developments. 

ANY ONGOING INITIATIVES THAT MAY RESULT IN THE INTRODUCTION OF A 
NATIONAL  SCREENING  MECHANISM  OR  AMENDMENTS  TO  AN  EXISTING 
MECHANISM? 

Portugal  currently  has  no  ongoing  initiatives  that  may  result  in  amendments  to  its  existing 
screening mechanism. 

35 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Romania 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: No  

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2021):  

In 2021, Romania prepared a national emergency bill on FDI screening. 

ANY ONGOING INITIATIVES THAT MAY RESULT IN THE INTRODUCTION OF A 
NATIONAL  SCREENING  MECHANISM  OR  AMENDMENTS  TO  AN  EXISTING 
MECHANISM? 

On 18 April 2022, Romania published the Emergency Ordinance of the Romanian Government 
(no. 46/2022, on FDI screening) in the Official Gazette of Romania (“Monitorul Oficial”). 

The  legal  act  provides  a  deadline  of  60  calendar  days  for  drafting  the  mandatory  secondary 
legislation for its application. In addition, it foresees that the Romanian government sets up an 
inter-agency  Screening  Commission  in  charge  of  decision-making,  led  by  an  appointee  of  the 
Prime Minister. The Romanian Competition Council (RCC) will deal with the secretarial affairs, 
including the coordination of the expert groups  responsible for doing the screening. Moreover, 
provided that the Screening Commission offers a positive avis, it will also be responsible for formal 
decisions  on  screening  cases  (even  with  mitigating  conditions).  Conversely,  for  cases  with  a 
negative avis, the Romanian Government will make the final decision.  

Finally, Romania is also currently in the process of drafting and approving secondary legislation, 
however, they will, in the meantime, start notifying cases to the EU FDI screening cooperation 
network. 

REPORT: Starting in 2022 (as timeframe of reference), the Romanian Competition Council will 
release  an  annual  report  on  the  application  of  the  FDI  screening  legislation  highlighting  and 
commenting on the key takeaways. 

Slovakia 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes 

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2021):  

Slovakia does not have a comprehensive legal framework for the screening of foreign investments 
for the protection of security and public order. However, a partial scheme covering the elements 
of critical infrastructure in the competence of the Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic has 
been incorporated into the Act. 45/2011 Coll. on critical infrastructure, as amended. 

36 

 
 
 
 
 
 
This legislation came into force on 1 March 2021 and covers all direct and indirect transfers and 
transitions  of  the  elements  within  critical  infrastructure  in  the  competence  of  the  Ministry  of 
Economy  of  the  Slovak  Republic.  Its  coverage  goes  beyond  FDIs.  It  covers  only  elements  of 
critical  infrastructure  within  the  sectors  of  energy  and  industry.  So  far,  Slovakia  has  not  yet 
screened any transfer or transaction that would meet the definition of FDI according to Article 2 
of the Regulation (EU) 2019/452.  

Link to legislation in Slovak language: 45/2011 Z.z. - Zákon o kritickej infraštruktúre - SLOV-
LEX  

ANY ONGOING INITIATIVES THAT MAY RESULT IN THE INTRODUCTION OF A 
NATIONAL  SCREENING  MECHANISM  OR  AMENDMENTS  TO  AN  EXISTING 
MECHANISM? 

The Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic continues with the preparatory work for the draft 
of  a  comprehensive  Act  on  the  screening  of  FDI.  This  act  has  already  underwent  a  public 
consultation and extra-ministerial scrutiny. 

In addition, the Slovakian government entered into bilateral consultations with other EU Member 
States that already have a screening mechanism to further improve the Act. Currently, Slovakia is 
finalising the documentation regarding the proposed legislation, which is expected to be submitted 
to  the  European  Central  Bank  in  2022.  Subsequently,  it  will  be  submitted  for  approval  by  the 
government of the Slovak Republic as well as the National Council of the Slovak Republic. The 
proposed mechanism is to come into force on 1st January 2023. 

REPORT:  A  report  on  national  FDI  screening  activities  will  be  included  in  the  new 
comprehensive Act on the screening of FDI. According to the proposed legislation, the Ministry 
of  Economy  of  the  Slovak  Republic  will  be  obliged  to  publish  a  summary  information  on  the 
application of the law during the previous calendar year. Such summary will be published on the 
website of the Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic. The summary information will not 
contain  any  specific  information  about  concrete  FDI,  as  well  as  foreign  investors  and  target 
entities.  There  will  be  exclusively  aggregated  data  for  a  given  year  in  the  form  of  anonymous 
statistical data. 

Slovenia 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes  

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2021): No 

Slovenia’s mechanism for the screening of FDI within the Intervention Measures to Mitigate and 
Eliminate the Consequences of the COVID-19 Epidemic Act (Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Slovenia, No. 80/20, hereinafter referred to as: ZIUOOPE) entered into force on 31 May 2020 and 
will be in force until 30 June 2023. This mechanism in the scope of the newly adopted legislation 
was reported by Slovenia pursuant to the FDI Screening Regulation and no new legislation has 
been either adopted or proposed with regards to the screening of FDI since then. 

37 

 
 
 
ANY ONGOING INITIATIVES THAT MAY RESULT IN THE INTRODUCTION OF A 
NATIONAL  SCREENING  MECHANISM  OR  AMENDMENTS  TO  AN  EXISTING 
MECHANISM? 

However, the mechanism will be permanently included in the Investment Promotion Act (Official 
Gazette  of  the  Republic  of  Slovenia,  No.  13/18,  hereinafter  referred  to  as:  ZSInv)  within  the 
framework  of  the  regular/shortened  legislative  procedure.  Slovenia  will  take  into  account  the 
experience  in  using  the  existing  mechanism,  concerns  and  suggestions  of  investors  and  their 
representatives, and will thus permanently regulate the mechanism in ZSInv. Slovenia will enter 
into the preparatory phase of amending ZSInv for the purpose of FDI screening in the second half 
of  2022  and  is  to  complete  the  legislative  procedure  by  30  June  2023.  Slovenia  will  report  on 
relevant  developments  in  this  process  to  the  European  Commission  and  consult  the  European 
Commission in case of any questions or requests for recommendations. 

Links:  ACT  DETERMINING  THE  INTERVENTION  MEASURES  TO  MITIGATE  AND 
REMEDY  THE  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  COVID-19  EPIDEMIC  (ZIUOOPE):  Unofficial 
English translation. 

More information on FDI screening in Slovenia can be found here (only available in Slovene as 
of now): 

https://www.gov.si/teme/tuje-neposredne-investicije/ 

Spain 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes  

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2021): Yes 

The Second Final Provision of Royal Decree-Law 12/2021, of 24 June 2021, amended the Sole 
Transitional Provision of Royal Decree-Law 34/2020. It extended the FDI authorisation regime 
for certain investments in specific sectors made by investors based in other EU Member States, or 
in EFTA countries, until 31st December 2021. Subsequently, Article 4 of the Royal Decree-Law 
27/2021 extended the regime until 31st December 2022. 

ANY ONGOING INITIATIVES THAT MAY RESULT IN THE INTRODUCTION OF A 
NATIONAL  SCREENING  MECHANISM  OR  AMENDMENTS  TO  AN  EXISTING 
MECHANISM? 

In parallel, a new FDI screening regulation is being prepared. It is expected to enter into force in 
the  course  of  2022.  The  main  objectives  of  this  legislative  development  are  to:  (i)  update  the 
specific administrative procedure for FDI screening, that dates form 1999 (RD 664/99), and (ii) 
give a more specific definition of what is meant by critical technologies, essential input, sensitive 
data, etc. 

Therefore, while Article 7 bis of Law 19/2003 will remain in force, this legislation will represent 
a significant development.  

38 

 
 
 
REPORT:  

An annual report on FDI screening activities in Spain has been published. The report identifies: 

  The total number of operations subjected to FDI screening 
  The total number of authorisations and conditional authorisations 
  The ultimate Investor´s country of origin 
  The reasons for subjecting the investment 

The report can be found under: 
https://comercio.gob.es/InversionesExteriores/Documents/2020%20EN%20CIFRAS.pdf 

Sweden 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: No  

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2021):  

None. In 2021, Sweden did not have any legislative developments. 

ANY ONGOING INITIATIVES THAT MAY RESULT IN THE INTRODUCTION OF A 
NATIONAL  SCREENING  MECHANISM  OR  AMENDMENTS  TO  AN  EXISTING 
MECHANISM? 

Preparatory work is ongoing to introduce a Swedish FDI Screening legislation. In August 2019 
the Swedish Government appointed an inquiry chair to propose a framework for the screening of 
FDI in Sweden. The inquiry chair’s conclusions were presented in a report in November 2021. The 
report was circulated to stakeholders for opinion and work is now going on within the Government 
to produce a legislative proposal to the Parliament. 

Link to the proposal: Granskning av utländska direktinvesteringar, SOU 2021:87 (regeringen.se) 
[there is a summary of the proposal in English on pages 41-57]. 

39