Opinion of the European Central Bank of 25 August 2022 on the establishment and operation of a Central Credit Register (CON/2022/28)
Date: 2022-08-25
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: financial stability, legal basis

EN 

ECB-PUBLIC 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 25 August 2022  

on the establishment and operation of a Central Credit Register  

(CON/2022/28) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On 29 July 2022 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Greek Ministry of Finance 

for an opinion on a draft law on the establishment and operation of a central credit register (hereinafter the 

‘draft law’). 

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 

Functioning of the European Union and the third, fourth and sixth indents of Article 2(1) of Council Decision 

98/415/EC1, as the draft law relates to the Bank of Greece, the collection, compilation and distribution of 

monetary, financial, banking, payment systems and balance of payments statistics, and to rules applicable 

to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. 

In  accordance  with  the  first  sentence  of  Article 17.5  of  the  Rules  of  Procedure  of  the  European  Central 

Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion. 

1. 

Purpose of the draft law 

1.1  The draft law establishes a central credit register (hereinafter the ‘Register’) as a national personal 

data filing system as defined in Article 4, point (6), of Regulation (EU) 2016/6792 (hereinafter the ‘GDPR’). 

The Register will operate as an electronic database, be established, maintained and operated by the Bank 

of Greece, and record, at a granular level, inter alia, the payment history, type of collateral provided and 

any other information relating to any form of credit granted to natural and legal persons including guarantors 

(hereinafter ‘data subjects’) by credit and financial institutions that have their registered office in Greece 

and by branches of foreign credit and financial institutions operating in Greece. The exact scope of credit 

covered by the draft law, namely the relevant credit thresholds and the relevant creditors to be covered 3, 

will be specified in an act of the Governor of the Bank of Greece. 

1  

Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities 
regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 

2     Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119 4.5.2016, p. 1). 
The draft law defines ‘creditors’ as the legal persons to which data subjects owe credit that falls within the scope of the 
draft law but other than: entities listed as public sector agencies in article 51 of Law 1892/1990 (Government Gazette 
issue  Α  101/1990,  p.  101);  local  and  regional  municipal  authorities  and  their  enterprises/corporations;  and  utility 
undertakings to the extent that the Greek State holds, directly or indirectly, part of the share capital.  

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The Register will allow, among others: (a) the collection and extraction of (positive and negative) financial 

history data on natural and legal persons by creditors which hold and manage such data; (b) the production 

and provision of credit reports on data subjects; (c) the retention and processing of financial history data, 

in keeping with the applicable institutional framework for the protection of personal data and information 

security; (d) the provision of a single contact point from which data subjects can obtain credit reports; and 

(e) the provision of a single contact point to which data subjects can apply to have financial history data 

that is collected by third-party agencies updated or rectified, or generally to exercise their rights under the 

GDPR.  

1.2  Objectives of the draft law  

The primary aim of establishing and operating the Register is to enhance the financing of the real economy 

by  the  Greek  financial  system  and  to  safeguard  financial  stability  by  improving  the  quality  of  available 

information and thereby enabling a more rational assessment of the creditworthiness of potential borrowers 

and generally contributing to more informed decision-making in relation to credit granting4. According to the 

explanatory note 5 accompanying the proposal on the establishment of the Register submitted by Greece 

to the European Commission to obtain funding from the Recovery and Resilience Facility 6, the Register is 

also  expected  to  increase  available  information  regarding  the  credit  history  of  potential  debtors,  have  a 

positive impact on the quantity and quality of investment spending, encourage competition among financial 

institutions, result in a lower cost of capital for Greek borrowers, and greatly increase the ability of investors 

to price risk in the secondary market for non-performing loans (NPLs). This will increase NPL valuations, 

boost recovery rates and, thereby, help banks to resolve legacy NPL challenges faster and more efficiently 

in terms of use of capital. The explanatory note also states that the Register, since it is maintained and 

operated by the Bank of Greece, supports the Bank’s obligations and functions in supervising the financial 

sector and ensuring financial stability. 

1.3 

Information to be recorded with the Register  

The  Bank  of  Greece  may  hold  the  following  in  the  Register:  (a)  identification  information  and  general 

information  on  the  data  subject;  (b)  financial  history  data  relating  to  any  credit  application  or  credit 

agreement entered into by the data subject (including in its capacity as guarantor); (c) information linking 

data subjects that are parties to the same credit agreement or have provided a guarantee in connection 

The draft law contains a non-exhaustive/indicative list of creditors, that includes: i) credit institutions within the meaning 
of Article 3(1)(1) of Law 4261/2014 and Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 established in Greece; ii) branches 
in Greece of credit institutions established abroad; iii) credit institutions established in the EEA which trade in Greece 
pursuant to Article 39 of Law 4261/2014; iv) corporate credit providers within the meaning of Article 153(4) of Law 
4261/2014;  v)  factoring  companies  within  the  meaning  of  Article  4(2)  of  Law  1905/1990  (Government  Gazette 
A147/1990); vi) leasing companies within the meaning of Article 2(1)(a) of Law 1665/1986 (Government Gazette A 
194/1986); vii) branches in Greece of financial institutions within the meaning of Article 3(1)(22) of Law 4261/2014 
established abroad; viii) loan and credit debt management companies within the meaning of Article 1(1)(a)(aa) of Law 
4354/2015 and branches within the meaning of Article 1(1)(a)(bb) of Law 4354/2015; ix) credit agencies within the 
meaning  of  Article  3(2)  of  Law  4438/2016;  x)  microfinance  institutions  within  the  meaning  of  Article  2(b)  of  Law 
4701/2020; xi) payment institutions within the meaning of Article 4(4)(f) of Law 4537/2018, inasmuch as they provide 
credit; xii) e-money institutions within the meaning of Article 10(3) of Law 4021/2011, inasmuch as they provide credit; 
xiii) card issuing and management companies; and xiv) other financial institutions within the meaning of Article 4(1)(26) 
of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. 
See Article 1(3) of the draft law. 
Available here: https://greece20.gov.gr/en/the-complete-plan/. 
The Recovery and Resilience Facility was established by Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 12 February 2021 (OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17–75).  

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with the same credit agreement; and (d) any credit commentary or other analysis produced by the Bank of 

Greece in connection with a data subject. The credit information that the Bank of Greece may hold in the 

Register may be used for the production of general reports, analyses and statistics produced by the Bank 

of Greece and held in a form that prevents identification of the data subject. 

1.4  Credit report 

Based on the aforementioned information and data recorded therewith, the Register will also produce, upon 

application, a credit report for all credit receivers. The exact contents of the report will be determined by an 

act of the Governor of the Bank of Greece and will vary depending on the recipient of the report and the 

purpose  for  which  the  report  was  requested.  These  purposes  are  listed  in  the  draft  law:  (a)  to  verify 

information provided by the data subject in connection with a credit application to a creditor; (b) to assess 

the  risks  incurred  by  the  creditor  in  granting  credit  to  the  data  subject  or  accepting  the  data  subject’s 

guarantee for the credit agreement; (c) to assess the risks attached to credit granted to the data subject or 

a change to the nature or term of the respective credit agreement or guarantee; (d) to monitor and assess 

failure to comply with the terms of a credit agreement relating to credit granted by the creditor to a data 

subject or to a guarantee provided by that data subject; (e) to evaluate a data subject’s application to a 

creditor  for  a  debt  payment  plan;  and  (f)  to  analyse  portfolios  of  credit  agreements  held  by  financial 

institutions. The report may not, however, assign a credit rating or a creditworthiness score for the credit 

receiver.  

1.5  Role of the Bank of Greece 

The draft law requires the Bank of Greece to establish, maintain and operate the Register. The Bank of 

Greece is also responsible for its technical design and the implementation of its filing system, collecting 

and  organising  personal  and  other  data  from  all  sources,  keeping  them  in  a  way  that  safeguards  data 

integrity, confidentiality and availability, complying with data protection legislation and, in general, ensuring 

the seamless operation of the Register. The Bank of Greece is also appointed as the ‘controller’ within the 

meaning of the GDPR and Law No 4613/2019 7, both of which apply to the processing of data by the Bank 

of Greece and third parties that receive the credit report produced by the Register. The Bank of Greece 

must also inform data subjects that their data have been shared with the Register, as required by the GDPR. 

1.6 

Information and data provided to the Register  

Where the relevant credit falls within the scope of the draft law, creditors must provide financial history data 

to the Register by giving the Register access to, and allow the electronic transmission from, their electronic 

systems covering a period of at least the past 12 months. The draft law requires creditors to transmit data 

(and  update  already  provided  data)  on  a  monthly  basis  and  to  connect  online  to  the  Register  within  12 

months of the adoption of the act of the Governor of the Bank of Greece (see paragraph 1.9 below). The 

Bank of Greece may request creditors to provide additional data that may be used for financial analyses 

and the compilation of statistics produced by the Bank. 

The draft law defines ‘financial history data’ as all information on debts (whether due, repaid or outstanding) 

of natural and legal persons, including in particular: data identifying the debt; the type of debt and its basic 

terms; the real and contractual collateral for the debt; the payments made, the time of payment and the 

outstanding balance of the debt; debt payment plans; changes to the identity of the debtor; information on 

7     Government Gazette A 78/2019. 

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any litigation between the debtor and creditors, on any administrative or enforcement measures taken, on 

any criminal proceedings for default where default is a criminal offence, as further specified in the draft law; 

and whether the data subject is unemployed or bankrupt or has been discharged and the debt has been 

written off. 

1.7  Persons entitled to access the data held in the Register, and related purposes 

Under the draft law, the data held in the Register will only be accessible upon request to: the data subject, 

whose access will be restricted exclusively to data relating to them personally; any creditor to which credit 

is owed or to which an application for credit has been submitted and which has connected to the Register; 

the  Personal  Data  Protection  Authority  for  the  purposes  of  verifying  compliance  with  data  protection 

legislation; and judicial and prosecutorial authorities for the purposes of dispensing justice and, in particular, 

preventing and combating money laundering and terrorism financing.  

Creditors may only use data to which the Register provides access for the sole purpose of managing credit 

risk and improving the quality of the credit information at their disposal on data subjects. Creditors which 

further process data received from the Register must be acting as ‘controllers’ within the meaning of the 

GDPR;  and,  for  the  purposes  of  the  transmission  of  data  to  the  Register,  they  must  be  regarded  as 

processors  and  must  conclude  a  contract  for  that  purpose  with  the  Bank  of  Greece  in  accordance  with 

Article  28  of  the  GDPR.  A  similar  contract  must  also  be  concluded  between  the  Bank  of  Greece  and 

Teiresias  S.A.,  a  privately  owned  and  operated  credit  bureau  that  also  processes  and  stores  financial 

history data. 

Data subjects whose data are filed with the Register, have the rights provided for in the GDPR and may 

also challenge said data and the credit report produced by the Register on the basis of the said data, and 

request the Bank of Greece to correct inaccurate data.  

1.8 

Interoperability of the Register with other databases 

The draft law provides that the Register must complement and be fully harmonised and interoperable with 

the Public Debt Office, the Independent Credit Rating Authority, the Private Debt Monitoring Register (all 

of which will be established under separate legislation) and the existing system of Teiresias S.A.. For the 

purpose  of  cross-checking  and  corroborating  identification  information  and  general  information  held 

therein8, the Register may have recourse to the IT systems of the Independent Authority for Public Revenue 

and of the General Commercial Registry, ERGANI and of any other public sector entity.  

In addition, the Register must also interoperate with GR-AnaCredit, the analytical credit dataset operated 

by  the  Bank  of  Greece  in  accordance  with  Regulation  (EU)  2016/867  of  the  European  Central  Bank 

(ECB/2016/13) 9 and Act 2677/19.05.2017 of the Governor of the Bank of Greece, which is used to collect 

information on loans granted by credit institutions to legal persons. In order to achieve its purposes, the 

Register may collaborate with similar central credit registries abroad. 

Furthermore, in order to be able to provide information in the context of producing financial analyses or 

statistical reports based on the data it holds, the Register must also interoperate and exchange information 

8   ‘Identification information’ and ‘general information’ are defined in Article 2 of the draft law.  
9   Regulation (EU) 2016/867 of the European Central Bank of 18 May 2016 on the collection of granular credit and credit risk 

data (ECB/2016/13) (OJ L 144, 1.6.2016, p. 44). 

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(while preventing the identification of the data subject) with the databases and electronic systems of the 

public or the private sector or of credit rating agencies. 

1.9  Secondary legislation to be adopted by the Bank of Greece 

The draft law authorises the Bank of Greece to adopt secondary legislation, in the form of an act of the 

Governor of the Bank of Greece, determining several aspects of the draft law, including the following: (a) 

credit thresholds falling within the scope of the draft law; (b) when and how often the Register accesses 

and extracts financial history data held by creditors; (c) the technical details and operating specifications of 

the Register and the method used to interconnect it with the agencies referred to in the draft law; (d) what 

an  application  for  credit  reports  should  contain,  how  it  will  be  submitted  to  the  Register  and  how  data 

subjects may exercise their rights; (e) how the Register will process data; (f) for how long the Register is 

required to retain data, depending on the category of data  and on whether or not the relevant debt has 

been repaid; (g) what credit reports will contain, depending on their recipient; (h) any other details conducive 

to or necessary for the operation of the Register.  

Moreover, the draft law authorises the Bank of Greece to adopt an operations regulation for the Register, 

detailing how creditors and data subjects interconnect and communicate with the Register, how information 

and data will be recorded to ensure that they are mapped and transmitted in an appropriate manner, the 

format in which information and details must be provided, and any other matter relating to the operational 

management of the Register. 

2. 

General observations  

2.1  The  ECB  notes  that  several  important  aspects  of  the  Register  are  expected  to  be  determined  by 

means of secondary legislation to be adopted by the Bank of Greece. In that respect, the ECB should 

be consulted on such legislation before it is adopted.  

2.2  The  ECB  in  principle  welcomes  the  establishment  of  the  Register,  insofar  as  it  is  envisaged  to 

contribute to a comprehensive and efficient centralisation of granular credit data, which in turn should 

contribute  to  improving  existing  and  developing  new  ESCB  statistics  since  it  provides  important 

breakdowns and details not available from currently used data sources, such as information on the 

structure and risk patterns of credit granted by the financial sector. In addition, the Register should 

enable more informed assessments of credit risk by credit and financial institutions (both in terms of 

the initial decision to grant credit and in terms of ongoing assessments of existing exposures) and 

should therefore enhance the risk management capabilities of these institutions. In this sense, the 

data held in the Register are considered to constitute a useful tool for micro- and macroprudential 

supervision. The data to be held in on the Register, and access thereto, are also considered to be 

useful from a financial stability and macroprudential supervision perspective, as it would allow the 

monitoring and assessment of the build-up of and appetite for credit risk in the banking and financial 

system more generally, thereby helping to calibrate the use of macroprudential instruments.  

2.3  However, the draft law does not contain  any provision explicitly allowing the Bank of Greece, the 

ECB, or the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) to access data held in the Register.  

2.4  Regarding  microprudential  supervision,  the  ECB  understands  that,  subject  to  data  protection 

requirements, the ECB may, in the exercise of its supervisory duties that relate to credit institutions, 

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require the Bank of Greece, as ‘national competent authority’ within the meaning of Article 2(2) of 

Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/201310, to request and pass on information held in the Register 11. 

This point is also relevant in the context of the macroprudential tasks conferred on the ECB under 

Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 12, which requires the ECB to take into account the specific 

situation of the financial system, economic situation and the economic cycle in the individual Member 

States or parts thereof13. However, in view of the exhaustive list of persons granted access to the 

information held in the Register according to Article 6 of the draft law, any such access would be 

limited and granted on a case-by-case basis. Given the scope and the significance that the data to 

be held on the Register has for micro- and macroprudential supervision purposes and, therefore, for 

the  tasks  concerning  policies  relating  to  the  prudential  supervision  of  credit  institutions  and  other 

financial institutions with the exception of insurance undertakings conferred on the ECB pursuant to 

Article 127(6) of the Treaty, the ECB would welcome the explicit inclusion of these purposes in the 

aims of the draft law and a provision in the draft law explicitly giving the Bank of Greece and the ECB 

access to the Register.  

2.5  The consulting authority could also consider wider access rights to the Register, for example by other 

bodies  and  agencies  of  the  Union  that  play  a  role  in  banking  supervision,  such  as  the  European 

Systemic Risk Board, the European Banking Authority and other relevant bodies established at Union 

level, such as the European Stability Mechanism and the European Single Resolution Mechanism, 

as has been done by other Member States 14, and provided that the purposes for which the data can 

be shared with each specific body are clearly stipulated in the draft law and that the confidentiality of 

the said data is ensured. In that respect, the ECB notes that the draft law already provides that the 

Register may collaborate with similar central credit registries abroad in order to achieve its purposes. 

The ECB therefore notes that facilitating supervisory purposes could be usefully listed among the 

objectives of the Register, so that such wider access may be permitted. 

2.6  Regarding  the  access  of  the  ECB  and  the  Bank  of  Greece  to  the  data  held  in  the  Register  for 

statistical and monetary policy (as distinct from supervisory) purposes, without an explicit legal basis 

in the draft law, such access would either be limited or completely impossible. Although the draft law 

does not explicitly list among the objectives of the Register that it would contribute to the tasks of the 

ESCB as laid down in Article 127 of the Treaty, the ECB considers that accessing the Register would 

be beneficial for, and materially support, the exercise of these tasks. Consideration should therefore 

be given to adding the contribution to the tasks of the ESCB to the objectives that the Register is 

10  

11 

12  
13  
14  

Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank 
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63). 
This understanding is based on Article 6(2) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring 
specific  tasks  on  the  European  Central  Bank  concerning  policies  relating  to  the  prudential  supervision  of  credit 
institutions  (OJ  L  287,  29.10.2013,  p.  63)  and  Article  21  of  Regulation  (EU)  No  468/2014  of  16  April  2014  of  the 
European Central Bank establishing the framework for cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between 
the  European  Central  Bank  and  national  competent  authorities  and  with  national  designated  authorities  (SSM 
Framework Regulation) (ECB/2014/17) (OJ L 141, 14.05.2014, p. 1). 
This understanding is also based on Article 55C of the Statute of the Bank of Greece but in that case, the Bank of 
Greece would only be able to share the information it has received on an aggregated basis. Prudential supervision-
related information can also be shared with the ECB on the basis of Article 54 of Law No 4261/2014 (Government 
Gazette A 107/2014).  
Article 5 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. 
See paragraph 3.2 of Opinion CON/2015/20. 
See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2013/93. 

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intended to serve and to further amending the draft law to explicitly include these purposes in the 

aims of the draft law and to ensure a clear legal basis establishing the said access rights, as has 

been done in other Member States 15, and taking into account the provisions of Council Regulation 

(EC) No 2533/98 16. The ECB understands that such an explicit authorisation is necessary from a 

national law perspective to ensure that the Bank of Greece has a robust legal basis for disclosing 

data held in the Register to the ECB for the purposes of discharging its obligations under Regulation 

(EU) 2016/867 (ECB/2016/13)17. Such a legal basis is required because the draft law prohibits the 

disclosure of information held in the Register unless such disclosure is explicitly provided for. This 

provision  is  without  prejudice  to  the  requirements  of  Article  10  of  Regulation  (EU)  2016/867 

(ECB/2016/13), which regulates the use of credit data reported under that Regulation by the ECB 

and national central banks (NCBs).  

2.7 

In considering whether to grant access to the ECB and the Bank of Greece, as noted in paragraph 

2.6 above, regard should be had to reducing and simplifying the reporting obligations of credit and 

financial institutions and avoiding the duplication of reporting requirements for credit-related data in 

line with the recitals of Regulation (EU) 2016/867 (ECB/2016/13), the recitals of which note that, with 

a  view  to  ensuring  efficient  reporting  and  adequate  interoperability  with  other  existing  or  new 

reporting  frameworks,  NCBs  should  be  allowed  to  collect  the  information  to  be  transmitted  to  the 

ECB as a part of a broader national reporting framework and to extend the reporting of credit data 

beyond  the  scope  outlined  in  Regulation  (EU)  2016/867  (ECB/2016/13),  for  their  own  statutory 

purposes,  in  line  with  relevant  national  law

18

.  It  is  all  the  more  important  to  avoid  reporting 

redundancies given that the Register will, according to the draft law, ‘interoperate’ or ‘cooperate’, or 

‘have recourse to’, several other public and private sector databases, some of which have not yet 

been established.  

2.8 

In considering whether to grant access to the ECB and the Bank of Greece as noted in paragraph 

2.6 above, regard should be had to full compliance of the national framework with the objectives and 

requirements  of  Regulation  (EU)  2016/867  (ECB/2016/13),  including  with  legal  requirements 

concerning feedback loops since further provisions on the scope and implementation of feedback 

loops by the NCBs may be laid down in separate legal acts to be adopted by the ECB, and NCBs 

may enter into Memoranda of Understanding regarding their respective cooperation in the feedback 

loops based on the applicable legal frameworks 19. 

2.9  The  recitals  of  Regulation  (EU)  2016/867  (ECB/2016/13)  also  note  that  the  framework  for  the 

collection of credit data under that Regulation should be set up with a view to ensuring interoperability 

15 

16  

17  
18 
19  

See, e.g., paragraph 1.3 of Opinion CON/2021/24; paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2013/93; paragraph 2.2 of Opinion 
CON/2014/57. 
Council Regulation No (EC) 2533/98 of 23 November 1998 concerning the collection of statistical information by the 
European Central Bank (OJ L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 8).  
For  example,  article  8(1)  Article  8(1)  of  Regulation  (EC)  No  2533/98  allows  for  the  use  of  confidential  statistical 
information  by  the  ESCB  “exclusively  for  the  exercise  of  the  tasks  of  the  ESCB”,  except  in  a  number  of  defined 
circumstances.  Moreover, paragraphs  4, 4a  and  5  of  Article 8 of the same regulation allow for  the transmission of 
confidential statistical information within and outside the ESCB, subject to the fulfilment of a number of requirements 
and conditions. These latter provisions are particularly important when it comes to information collected by other NCBs 
in accordance with the AnaCredit Regulation (EU) 2016/867 to which the Bank of Greece may have access. 
See also paragraph 2.3 of Opinion CON/2017/13. 
See recital 15 of Regulation (EU) 2016/867 and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2017/33. 
See recital 17 of Regulation (EU) 2016/867 (ECB/2016/13).  

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with central credit registers and other relevant credit data sets established by public sector entities, 

including databases on securities statistics as well as the ESCB Register of Institutions and Affiliates 

Dataset20.  The  ECB  understands  that  the  Register  will  interoperate  with  GR-AnaCredit.  In  that 

respect  and  for  reasons  of  legal  certainty,  it  is  suggested  that  the  draft  law  or  the  secondary 

legislation  to  be  adopted  thereunder  could  more  clearly  incorporate  the  reporting  obligations  that 

have  direct  effect  by  reason  of  Regulation  (EU)  2016/867  (ECB/2016/13)  with  the  additional 

obligations imposed by the draft law on reporting agents that are covered by both frameworks. This 

would  ensure  full  compliance  of  the  draft  law  with  the  provisions  of  Regulation  (EU)  2016/867 

(ECB/2016/13).  

2.10  The draft law does not contain any explicit provisions regarding sanctions to be imposed in cases of 

non-compliance of reporting agents with reporting obligations established in the draft law. The ECB 

understands that this may be one of the points regarding the Register that will be addressed in the 

secondary  legislation  that  the  Bank  of  Greece  is  authorised  to  adopt  under  the  draft  law.  In  that 

respect, the ECB wishes to draw the attention of the consulting authority to the sanctioning regime 

that applies in respect of a failure by reporting agents to comply with the ECB’s statistical reporting 

requirements, and which is referred to in Regulation (EU) 2016/867 (ECB/2016/13)21, and to note 

that: (a) the sanctioning regime to be established for the Bank of Greece under national law should 

operate  without  prejudice  to  the  ECB’s  sanctioning  regime  under  Union  law;  and  (b)  national  law 

should ensure the compliance of  both the ECB  and the  Bank of Greece  with the non bis in idem 

principle, which is reflected in Article 2(1) of Regulation (EC) No 2157/1999 of the European Central 

Bank (ECB/1999/4) 22 and whereby no legal action may be instituted twice in respect of the same 

cause of action. National law should therefore facilitate the provision of information and consultations 

between the ECB and the Bank of Greece before any decision to initiate an infringement procedure 

is taken by either 23. 

2.11  Lastly, the ECB notes that the draft law does not explicitly state that the Register will be owned by 

the Bank of Greece. However, the ECB understands that the Bank of Greece will be the exclusive 

owner of the Register and would therefore welcome, for the sake of legal clarity, the inclusion of a 

provision in the draft law explicitly stating that the Bank of Greece is not only the sole operator but 

also the exclusive owner of the Register.  

3. 

Conferral of a new task on the Bank of Greece 

3.1  The  draft  law  confers  on  the  Bank  of  Greece  the  new  task  of  establishing  and  operating  a  credit 

register as a centralised collection of granular credit and credit risk data. 

3.2  The ECB underlines that a proposed conferral of new tasks on a national central bank (NCB) in the 

ESCB must be assessed against the prohibition on monetary financing laid down in Article 123(1) of the 

20  
21  
22  

23  

See recital 16 of Regulation (EU) 2016/867 (ECB/2016/13). 
Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2016/867. 
Regulation  (EC)  No  2157/1999  of  23  September  1999  on  the  powers  of  the  European  Central  Bank  to  impose 
sanctions (ECB/1999/4) (OJ L 264, 12.10.1999, p. 21). 
See paragraph 3.5 of Opinion CON/2021/24. 

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Treaty.  For  the  purposes  of  that  prohibition,  Article  1(1)(b)(ii)  of  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No 3603/9324 

defines ‘other type of credit facility’, inter alia, as ‘any financing of the public sector’s obligations vis-à-vis 

third parties’. 

3.3  Ensuring that Member States implement a sound budgetary policy is one of the key objectives of the 

monetary  financing  prohibition,  which  may  not  be  circumvented25.  Therefore,  the  task  of  financing 

measures, which are normally the responsibility of the Member States, and which are financed from their 

budgetary sources rather than by the NCBs, must not be entrusted to NCBs. To decide what constitutes 

financing of the public sector’s obligations vis-à-vis third parties, which can be translated as the provision 

of central bank financing outside the scope of central bank tasks, it is necessary to carry out, on a case-by-

case basis, an assessment of whether the task to be undertaken by an NCB is a central bank task or a 

government task, i.e. a task within the responsibilities of the Member States.  

3.4  As part of its discretion in the exercise of its duty, on the basis of Article 271(d) of the Treaty and 

Article 35.6 of the Statute of the ESCB and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the 

ESCB’), to ensure that NCBs honour the obligations laid down by the Treaty, the Governing Council has 

endorsed criteria for determining what may be seen as falling within the scope of a public sector obligation 

within the meaning of Article 1(1)(b)(ii) of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 or, in other words, what constitutes 

a government task as follows: 

First, central bank tasks are in particular those tasks that are related to the tasks that have been conferred 

on the ECB and the NCBs by the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. These tasks are mainly defined in 

Article  127(2),  (5)  and  (6)  and  Article  128(1)  of  the  Treaty,  as  well  as  Article 22  and  Article  25.1  of  the 

Statute of the ESCB. 

Second, as Article 14.4 of the Statute of the ESCB allows NCBs to perform ‘other functions’, new tasks, i.e. 

tasks that are not related to tasks that have been conferred on the ECB and the NCBs, are not precluded 

per se. However, new tasks that are undertaken by an NCB and which are atypical of NCB tasks or which 

are clearly discharged on behalf of, and in the exclusive interest of the government or of other public sector 

entities should be considered government tasks. 

Third,  an  important  criterion  for  qualifying  a  new  task  as  atypical  of  an  NCB  task  or  as  being  clearly 

discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government or other public sector entities is the 

impact of the task on the institutional, financial and personal independence of that NCB. 

In particular, the following aspects should be taken into account: 

(a)  whether the performance of the new task creates conflicts of interest with existing central bank tasks, 

which  are not adequately  addressed,  and does not  necessarily complement those existing central bank 

tasks. If a conflict of interest arises between existing and new tasks, sufficient safeguards to mitigate that 

conflict should be in place. The complementarity between a new task and existing central bank tasks should 

not  be  interpreted  broadly,  so  as  to  lead  to  the  creation  of  an  indefinite  chain  of  ancillary  tasks.  Such 

complementarity should be examined in relation to the financing of those tasks; 

24  

25  

Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993 specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions 
referred to in Articles 104 and 104b(1) of the Treaty (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1). 
Article  123  of  the  Treaty  also  serves  the  objective  of  maintaining  price  stability  and  reinforces  central  bank 
independence. 

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(b)  whether without new financial resources the performance of the new task is disproportionate to the 

NCB’s financial or organisational capacity, and may  have a negative  impact on the capacity to properly 

perform the existing central bank tasks; 

(c)  whether the performance of the new task fits into the institutional set-up of the NCB in the light of 

central bank independence and accountability considerations; 

(d)  whether the performance of the new task harbours substantial financial risks; 

(e)  whether the performance of the new task exposes the members of the NCB decision-making bodies 

to political risks that are disproportionate and may also have an impact on their personal independence 

and, in particular, on the guarantee of term of office set out in Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. 

3.5  Based on the criteria set out above, the following paragraphs assess whether the new task proposed 

to  be  conferred  on  the  Bank  of  Greece  under  the  draft  law  is  in  line  with  the  prohibition  of  monetary 

financing. 

3.6  Tasks related to the tasks conferred on the ECB and the NCBs by the Treaty and the Statute of the 

ESCB  

Generally, it is noted that granular credit and credit risk data based on central credit registers are necessary 

for  the  development  and  production  of  new  ESCB  statistics,  as  well  as  to  improve  the  quality  of  ESCB 

statistics. These new or improved statistics are, in turn, necessary for the performance of ESCB tasks.  

To  assess  whether  the  establishment  and  operation  of  a  register  holding  such  credit  data  is  an  ESCB-

related task, it is necessary to examine whether the purpose of that register is ESCB-related, i.e. whether 

the credit data are collected and analysed in order to support the performance of an ESCB-related task.26 

Such an assessment needs to consider the legislator’s intention, as manifested in the provisions regarding 

the aims of the credit register as well as the access to and specific set-up of the register. 

While some provisions of the draft law seem to imply that the credit data held in the Register may be used 

by the Bank of Greece for statistical purposes 27, such purposes are not included in the wording of the draft 

law’s explicit provision on its primary aim and are not reflected in the rules governing access to the Register 

(see paragraphs 2.4 to 2.6 above). However, the draft law explicitly lists ‘safeguarding financial stability’ as 

one of  the primary aims of the Register 28. Bank of Greece’s new task of establishing and operating the 

Register can thus be considered a task related to the ESCB’s contribution to the stability of the financial 

system under Article 127(5) of the Treaty. 

3.7  Tasks which are atypical of central bank tasks  

Safeguarding financial stability is a task that is not atypical of a central bank. Moreover, the Bank of Greece 

already  has  a  financial  stability  mandate29.  Consequently,  the  task  of  establishing  and  operating  the 

26  For the relevance of the purpose in determining ESCB-related tasks, see paragraph 2.4.1 of CON/2021/29, paragraph 
3.3.4.1  of  CON/2016/54,  and  paragraph  3.2  of  CON/2016/45.  Regarding  the  purpose  of  a  specific  credit  register,  see 
CON/2013/29.  Also  compare  Article 5.1  Statute of the  ESCB:  ‘In  order to undertake the  tasks of  the  ESCB,  the  ECB, 
assisted by the national central banks, shall collect the necessary statistical information ...’ 

27  Article  3(5)  of  the  draft  law  stipulates  that  credit  information  which  the  Bank  of  Greece  may  hold  in  the  Register  also 
encompasses analyses and statistics produced by the Bank; Article 4(3) of the draft law allows the Bank of Greece to 
request additional data from creditors so that they can be processed for the purpose of preparing financial analyses and 
statistical reports. 

28  See Article 1(3) of the draft law. 
29  Article 55A of the Statute of the Bank of Greece.  

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Register with the explicit primary aim of safeguarding financial stability is not an atypical task for the Bank 

of Greece. It is also noted that a number of Member States have established central credit registers and 

conferred  the  tasks  involved  in  operating  them  upon  NCBs,  albeit  for  different  purposes 30.  Also,  all 

Eurosystem  NCBs  are  required  to  operate  national  granular  credit  datasets  under  Regulation  (EU) 

2016/867 (ECB/2016/13).  

3.8  Tasks clearly discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government 

The  Bank  of  Greece  is  designated  by  the  draft  law  as  the  sole  operator  of  the  Register 31.  There  is  no 

indication  that,  in  carrying  out  its  task,  the  Bank  of  Greece  would  act  exclusively  in  the  interest  of  the 

government or another public entity. 

3.9  Extent to which performance of the new task creates conflicts of interest with existing central bank 

tasks 

The performance of the new task of establishing and operating the Register is unlikely to give rise to any 

conflicts of interest in connection with the Bank of Greece’s existing central bank tasks. 

3.10  Extent to which performance of the new  task is disproportionate to the financial or  organisational 

capacity of the Bank of Greece 

As previously noted by the ECB 32, Member States must not put their NCBs in a position where they have 

insufficient  resources  to  carry  out  both  their  ESCB-related  tasks  and  their  national  tasks,  from  an 

operational and financial perspective. In order to ensure that the Bank of Greece’s capacity to perform its 

ESCB-related  tasks  is  not  impaired,  the  Bank  of  Greece  must,  therefore,  be  able  to  avail  itself  of  the 

necessary resources to carry out its responsibilities under the draft law.  

The draft law does not cover the costs/funding of the Bank of Greece’s new task and currently provides 

that access to financial history data shall be granted free of charge 33. However, the ECB understands that 

on  condition  that  the  draft  provision  is  revised,  the  secondary  legislation  that  the  Bank  of  Greece  is 

authorised to adopt under the draft law may contain provisions regarding such funding, e.g. in the form of 

fees to be levied on the reporting agents under the draft law which the secondary legislation will ultimately 

determine. The ECB also understands that the Bank of Greece has already taken the necessary measures 

to ensure that sufficient resources are available for establishing and operating the Register.  

3.11  Extent to which performance of the new tasks fits into the institutional set-up of the Bank of Greece, 

in the light of central bank independence and accountability considerations 

Given the Bank of Greece’s existing financial stability mandate, the performance of the new tasks appears 

to fit into the Bank of Greece’s current institutional set-up.  

3.12  Extent to which the performance of tasks harbours substantial financial risks 

The draft law does not contain any specific provisions on liability for the operation of the Register. Under 

the draft law the Bank of Greece will assume liability for processing personal data, under both the GDPR 

and national law. The Bank of Greece may also incur potential contractual or non-contractual liability vis-à-

30  See, for example, Opinions CON/2016/57, CON/2021/2 and CON/2017/28 (Bulgaria); CON/2021/24 and CON/2011/20 
(Belgium);  CON/2019/2  and  CON/2015/20  (Malta);  CON/2017/33  (Austria);  CON/2016/42  (Slovenia);  CON/2014/57 
(Portugal); CON/2013/93 and CON/2017/13 (Latvia); CON/2012/111 and CON/2012/74 (Ireland). 

31  See also paragraph 2.11 above. 
32  See, for example, paragraph 4.6.1 of Opinion CON/2018/21. 
33  See Article 6(3) of the draft law. 

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vis the reporting agents or data subjects, stemming from the establishment of the Register, under national 

law. This potential liability does not appear to be disproportionate to the new tasks conferred on the Bank 

of Greece. 

3.13  Extent to which the performance of the new task exposes members of the decision-making bodies 

of the Bank of Greece to disproportionate political risks and impacts on their personal independence 

The performance of the new task conferred under the draft law does not appear to expose  the  Bank of 

Greece’s decision-making bodies to any disproportionate political risk or have an impact on their personal 

independence. 

3.14  Conclusion 

The ECB considers that the Bank of Greece’s new tasks relating to the Register qualify as central banking 

tasks and are therefore in line with the prohibition on monetary financing. 

This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex.  

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 25 August 2022. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Christine LAGARDE 

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