Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 : evaluation report. February 2022.
Date: 2022-07-25
Institutions: Directorate-General for International Partnerships
Subjects: Angola, aid evaluation, capacity building, cooperation policy, development policy, farming sector, report, technical cooperation

STRATEGIC EVALUATION 

EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S 
COOPERATION WITH ANGOLA 2008-2020 

Evaluation report 

February 2022 

International 
Partnerships 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Prepared by: 

The project is implemented by GDSI Limited,  
Block 15, Galway Technology Park, Parkmore, Galway, H91 AY0Y, Republic of Ireland 
Contact Person: Pauric Brophy 
Email:  consulting@gdsi.ie 

Framework Contract: EuropeAid/137211/DH/SER/Multi (COM 2015) 

Contract No. 2020/415932 

Contract title: Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 

2008-2020 

Evaluation report 

Authors 

Dr Arne DISCH, Team Leader 

Mr. Nevanda JOSÉ, National Expert 

Dr Vegard BYE, Senior Evaluator 

Ms Syra KHAN, Research Assistant 

Dr Torun REITE, Senior Evaluator 

Mr José Maria ALVAREZ VEGA, Quality Expert

Ms. Gabriela COHEN, National Expert 

Contact information: 

European Commission 
Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) 
Directorate D - Sustainable Development Policy and Coordination 
Unit D.4 - Performance, Results and Evaluation; Internal Communication, Knowledge Management and 
Collaborative Methods 
Email: INTPA-EVALUATIONS@ec.europa.eu  
B-1049 Brussels, Belgium 

EU International Partnerships: 
https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/our-impact/monitoring-and-evaluation_en 

 
 
 
      
             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LEGAL NOTICE 

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MN-08-22-132-EN-N 

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International 

Report cover page: photo, source: shutterstock.com, Ref. No.1530996167 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 
Evaluation Report 

i 

CONTENTS 

1    Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... 1 

2    Background and Introduction .................................................................................................. 9 

2.1 

2.2 

2.3 

The EU Programme in Angola .............................................................................................. 9 

The Changing Framework Conditions ................................................................................ 10 

The Structure of the Report ................................................................................................. 11 

3.  Methodological Approach ....................................................................................................... 12 

3.1 

3.2 

The Evaluative Study .......................................................................................................... 12 

Looking Ahead and Recommendations .............................................................................. 14 

4.  Main Findings from Evaluative Phase ................................................................................... 15 

4.1  Relevance, Efficiency and Effectiveness ............................................................................ 15 

4.2 

Impact, Sustainability, Value Added, Coherence, Complementarity.................................. 22 

4.3  Capacity Development and Policy Dialogue....................................................................... 29 

4.4  Main Findings and Lessons Learned ................................................................................... 35 

5.  Looking Ahead and Recommendations ................................................................................. 37 

5.1  Angola and EU Priorities .................................................................................................... 37 

5.2 

Economic Diversification and Agricultural-Led Development .......................................... 45 

5.3  Capacity Development, Policy Dialogue and Quality Assurance ....................................... 53 

List of Tables 
Table 1: NIP decisions funded under (EDF-9), EDF-10 and EDF-11 ............................................... 10 
Table 2: Capacity Development Matrix ............................................................................................. 54 

List of textboxes 
Textbox 1: Priority Areas for Policy Dialogue .................................................................................. 34 
Textbox 2: Progress attributed to the Policy Dialogue. ..................................................................... 34 
Textbox 3: The World Bank’s Systematic Country Diagnostic ........................................................ 40 
Textbox 4: First Findings from the PEFA Exercise ........................................................................... 43 
Textbox 5: The Value Chain for Coffee: Main Findings from Sector Study .................................... 47 
Textbox 6: Other Value Chain Studies on the Primary Sector .......................................................... 47 
Textbox 7: Organisations versus Institutions ..................................................................................... 54 
Textbox 8: Why a large Investment Project Failed ............................................................................ 59 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii  Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 

Evaluation Report 

List of abbreviations 

AAAA 

AfDB 
CD 
EARM 
EC 
ECCAS 
EDF 
EEAS 
EFSD 
EIDHR 
EPA 
EU 
EUD 
HDI 
HLM 
ICGLR 
INE 
INTPA 
IP 
JAES 
JWF 
MFF 
MIP 
MS 
NAO 
NDICI 
NIP 
PALOP 
PND 
RIP 
ROM 
SADC 
SOM 
TA 
TAIEX 
TEI 
ToR 

Addis Ababa Action Agenda 

African Development Bank 
Capacity Development 
External Assistance Management Reports 
European Commission  
Economic Community of Central African States 
European Development Fund 
European External Action Service 
European Fund for Sustainable Development 
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights  
Economic Partnership Agreement 
European Union 
Delegation of the European Union  
Human Development Index 
High-Level Meeting 
International Conference of the Great Lakes Region 
Instituto Nacional de Estatistica, National Statistics Institute 
Directorate-General for International Partnerships (formerly DEVCO) 
Implementing Partner 
Joint Africa-EU Strategy 
Joint Way Forward 
Multi-annual Financial Framework 
Multi-annual Indicative Programme 
Member State (of the EU) 
National Authorising Officer 
Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument 
National Indicative Programme 
Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa, African Lusophone Countries 
Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento, National Development Plan 
Regional Indicative Programme 
Results-Oriented Monitoring 
Southern Africa Development Community 
Senior Officials Meeting 
Technical Assistance 
Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument (EU) 
Team Europe Initiative 
Terms of Reference 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 
Evaluation Report 

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1   

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  

EU’s programme of cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 happened largely during the Presidency 
of Eduardo dos Santos. The coming to power of President João Lourenço in 2017 was seen to change 
the conditions for future collaboration. The team was therefore asked to provide recommendations in 
light of this, leading the team to focus more on the forward-looking part of the exercise.  
The  evaluation  report  consists  of  three  volumes1.  This  first  provides  findings,  conclusions  and 
recommendations  of  the  team;  the  second  provides  the  annexes;  the  third  contains  the  project 
reviews2. 

Background and Methodological Approach  

This evaluation reviewed the interventions funded under the National Indicative Programme (NIP) 
2008-2013  with  €214  million  and  the  NIP  2014-2020  with  €157  million,  where  non-state  actors 
received an additional €40 million. The evaluation reviewed 16 of the 20 interventions financed and 
the  programmatic  results  from  the  100  projects  implemented  by  non-state  actors.  The  main 
information sources were documents available, stakeholders interviewed, and an online survey 

The forward-looking exercise took the lessons from the evaluation as well as a critical review of the 
political-economic conditions likely to prevail into the future as the starting point for identifying areas 
that may provide the best options for EU-Angola collaboration in the coming 2021-2027 period. The 
team  then  carried  out  a  series  of  interviews  with  a  wide  range  of  stakeholders:  Parliamentarians, 
Government officials, the academic community; representatives of the private sector, both national 
and international; civil society organisations (CSOs) at both national and local levels; international 
development partners as well as EU staff in Luanda and Brussels.  

Findings: Relevance, Efficiency and Effectiveness  

RELEVANCE  

The two NIPs were Highly Relevant but not realistic given the scale of EU funding. There has been 
a  dispersion  across  too  many  objectives  and  sectors  with  limited  own  capacities  to  manage  and 
support such complex programmes. The risk analyses did not provide realistic options given that the 
Government was not truly committed to stated objectives and reforms. 

All projects are Highly Relevant in terms of alignment to the NIPs, national priorities and stakeholder 
needs. Ties to SDGs in recent decisions exist but without links to SDG targets. 

Intervention  priorities  have  been  Relevant  to  the  Angolan  context  but  often  not  realistic  in  their 
expectations.  With  increasing  use  of  Angolan  expertise  in  project  design,  these  weaknesses  are 
reduced, though the largest and recent project in the 2014-2020 NIP, the resilience, food security and 
nutrition project (FRESAN) in three drought-prone provinces of Southern Angola, is seen as poorly 
designed, lacking in GoA involvement, and with resultant poor performance.  

The projects supporting civil society, receiving just over 10% of total EU aid to Angola, are seen as 
Highly Relevant by the CSOs, where the EU has been the single largest source of support to civil 
society. This support furthermore reaches well beyond Luanda, so these projects have been important 
for supporting CSOs’ role and voice in local level discussions and decision-making. 

1 Volume 1 (main evaluation report) is  published at https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/strategic-evaluation-reports_en  . 
Volume II and Volume III are available upon request sent to INTPA-EVALUATIONS@ec.europa.eu 
2Idem. 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
2  Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 

Evaluation Report 

EFFICIENCY  

Most  projects  have  experienced  serious  delays,  particularly  in  start-up  but  also  during 
implementation.  Time  Efficiency  has  therefore  overall  been  Poor  though  for  most  interventions 
improving towards the end of the period, with the FRESAN project as a clear exception.  

Delivery of Outputs has  often been delayed but largely on budget. Results frameworks have been 
adjusted to take into account such delays. Consequently, despite unrealistic expectations in the design 
stage,  corrective  measures  introduced  over  time  improved  Output  Efficiency  to  the  level  of 
Acceptable.  

Physical  infrastructure  deliverables  have  performed  better,  capacity  development  outputs  worse. 
Delivery outside Luanda has generally been poorer than deliverables within Luanda. Delivery in the 
non-state sector has generally been better than in the public sector. 

In-country management, with authority to reach agreements with the Angolan partners, performed 
best. IPs that maintained decision making at their head office abroad were often seen by the Angolans 
of taking decisions based on incomplete information. Complex projects such as the regional PALOP 
projects or those with several components implemented by different partners, have experienced high 
coordination  costs.  Public  sector  staff  rotations  caused  disruptions  that  led  to  lowered  project 
efficiency, though often only temporarily. 

Relations  between  foreign  experts  and  Angolan  partners  were  generally  considered  good,  though 
better between partners in the non-public sector. 

There  were  external  barriers  to  efficiency  of  projects:  (i)  Angola  is  an  expensive  country  which 
discouraged foreign experts to apply for jobs, (ii) living in Angola is difficult due to lack of public 
services, (iii) it is difficult for spouses to find work, so two-income couples would not apply, (iv) 
language was generally not an issue when projects reached the implementation phase. But this was 
largely so because non-Portuguese speaking experts may not have applied or been accepted on expert 
rosters, limiting the available pool of experts. But a number of barriers are becoming less onerous, 
facilitating improved project efficiency in the future.     

EFFECTIVENESS  

The projects are overall well-designed in the sense that Outputs are strategic for the achievement of 
defined Outcomes. The Achilles heel has been to deliver on the foreseen Outputs. This has been true 
for project designed Outputs but there are also cases where necessary complementary inputs from 
Government have not been forthcoming, preventing Outcome attainment. Overall  Effectiveness is 
therefore only Acceptable.  

Findings: Impact, Sustainability, Value Added, Coherence and Complementarity  

IMPACT  

Impact on Angolan institutions varies considerably. There are cases of clear improvements of more 
technical bodies, but also with regards to policy instruments such as planning and management tools. 
There are some success stories when it comes to national policy (children/youth rights) and national 
services (cash transfer programme). 

Staff  coverage,  comprehensiveness  and  relevance  of  skills  upgrading  has  varied  considerably. 
Attempts at capacity development outside Luanda has faced challenges in terms of contents, duration 
of  training,  and  staff  rotations.  Staff  rotation  in  particular  is  pointed  to  as  a  key  reason  that  new 
knowledge/skills tend to be lost over time.   

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 
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Changes in political leadership is a problem that seriously affects the ability of public bodies to stick 
to  a  longer-term  development  path.  This  consistency  is  crucial  for  improvements  to  become 
embedded so that real impact is achieved.  

Regarding direct service delivery, results are scattered and thus less likely to be permanent. Results 
outside Luanda have tended to be fragmented, small-scale, not replicated and as much dependent on 
the particular local circumstances as on structural issues. While feedback from CSOs is more positive, 
results are small-scale and dispersed, making it difficult to see any kind of societal impact, though 
information is scarce on this point.  

Projects  with  complex  management  or  coordination  structures  have  generally  experienced  a 
deterioration in performance, despite being set up to be strategic in their thinking and functioning. 

The real constraining factor during the first ten years of the evaluation period was a government that 
was not very committed to the EU programme or even constrained activities it did not approve of.  

SUSTAINABILITY  

In the public sector, sustainability of new skills is most likely in stable organisations at central level. 
The greatest threat is high staff rotation, particularly at provincial and municipal levels. 

When the framework for applying the new skills is in place, for example when changes in rules or 
legislation have been consolidated, this helps sustain new skills and behaviour. 

Sustainability of benefits to final beneficiaries of improved public sector services depends largely on 
whether local public financing is available to maintain the service stream. With the country’s fiscal 
crisis, several project reviews were rather pessimistic while survey results were more positive. 

CSO  respondents  are  positive  regarding  sustainability  of  new  knowledge,  largely  because  their 
projects are based on own core mandates so there is strong commitment to maintain and apply new 
skills.  But  the  learning  and  experience  sharing  platforms  called  for  in  some  of  the  projects  are 
evidently not functioning, raising questions regarding long-term sustainability. 

Organisational change to public institutions can be sustained provided such change is supported by 
revised rules or laws. If not, such changes are susceptible to politics, where incoming ministers have 
in some instances changed priorities so that foreseen project results wither away. 

VALUE ADDED, COHERENCE AND COMPLEMENTARITY  

The EU is seen as constructive in trying to provide value added to activities of member states (MS). 
In practice this is limited, since only a few MS have substantial aid activities in Angola. 

The EU programme is coherent in terms of being aligned to Angola’s National Development Plan 
and to the EU’s own NIPs. There are few direct links across EU projects, however, and no visible 
overarching programme thinking, such as a clear capacity development approach. 

The complementarity of the EU projects with those other actors in Angola is seen as good. There is 
collaboration with a number of UN agencies, the World Bank and African Development  Bank on 
several projects though it is noted that the biggest project on the ground, FRESAN, has not reached 
out to other activities in those provinces.  

Once implementation starts, however, project management becomes very focused on implementing 
the project as per agreement and not so much on possible synergies underway. This issue, however, 
is first and foremost for the Angolan project owners to handle.  

 
 
 
 
 
4  Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 

Evaluation Report 

Findings: Capacity Development and Policy Dialogue 

CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT  

Most  EU-funded  interventions  have  Capacity  Development  (CD)  components.  The  EU  further 
provides support to formal training centres and more recently also to tertiary education, yet there is 
no comprehensive CD strategy, meaning structure and approach varies across projects.  

While many projects experienced serious delays in the start-up of activities, particularly in the early 
projects, the provision of TA is seen as being largely provided in a timely manner. This somewhat 
contradictory finding is in part explained by the fact that many of the delays had to do with formal 
aspects of project start-up. Once this was in place, much of the TA was provided more or less on 
schedule. 

Cost effectiveness was questioned in some cases. It was argued that projects could have used more 
Angolan skills and companies. While this evaluation has not been in a position to validate this claim, 
it is obviously an important question that should be pursued.  

Concerning appropriateness of the TA provided, long-term TA was seen as positive since it allowed 
expert/s to understand issues more carefully. Hence, they could provide mentoring and oversight as 
well as more formal skills development. 

While the training centres supported were to address important needs, the actual experience has been 
mixed: one centre never opened, a second was located in a difficult-to-access city, and the third one 
just recently started up so there are no results yet. That such critical infrastructure for the country’s 
long-term skills development performs so poorly is unfortunate. 

The results reporting on CD activities is poor. Baselines are missing and there is a lack of indicators 
for tracing development from activities to Outputs to likely or desired Outcomes. 

The  challenge  for  the  individual  project  is  that  neither  the  country  nor  the  EU  appear  to  have  an 
overarching framework for identifying needs and tracking performance. The costs of doing this for 
each project is prohibitive, so a more comprehensive approach would be helpful to the individual 
intervention. 

CD is complicated and adjustments are often required, yet project agreements lock the parties to an 
approach that may turn out not to be optimal. While addenda are possible, they can be cumbersome 
and often happen fairly late while early piloting on complex projects can test assumptions and allow 
for adjustments before large-scale implementation is initiated. The EU is well equipped for such an 
approach since the ROM review tool is well suited for summarising lessons from a pilot.  

The  EU  in  Angola  has  not  applied  an  overarching  framework  for  designing  and  tracking  CD 
performance, despite the EU having a structured approach. Applying such a framework would ensure 
greater coherence across projects and could also support GoA overall efforts. 

POLICY DIALOGUE  

The high-level policy dialogue, based on the Joint Way Forward partnership, has evolved in scope, 
depth and regularity with the Lourenço presidency. The dialogue has focused on overarching policy 
issues, including beyond Angola’s borders, encouraging better understanding on both sides. It has till 
now  not  addressed  many  project  issues  but  may  provide  foundations  for  more  comprehensive 
development cooperation going forward, including beyond the public sector. 

Conclusions  

While grant aid represents only a small fraction of the public budget, GoA seems to appreciate the 
catalytic and strategic contribution external financial assistance can provide. This may allow for more 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 
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innovative approaches to collaboration, with more long-term thinking around thematics and sectors 
to support, ensuring synergies across interventions to achieve overarching objectives. 

A better understanding of the political and administrative structures, organisation and power relations 
will be necessary to identify where external support can have the greatest impact, including support 
to local level administration and development. 

The  private  sector  needs  to  play  a  central  role  if  economic  diversification  is  to  happen,  where 
Angola’s adherence to the SADC Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and new instruments like 
the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+) and Team Europe Initiatives (TEIs) 
open the door to much broader and innovative relations. 

Support for non-state actors (NSAs) should be increased, more strategic and long-term, assisting the 
establishment  of  shared  arenas  for  experience  sharing,  collaboration,  advocacy,  and  links  to  local 
administrations. This requires a commitment by GoA to allow more political space for NSAs.  

Capacity  development  should  be  a  central  pillar  of  the  EU  assistance.  There  is  a  need  for  a 
comprehensive and strategic approach based on careful analysis and systematic learning and testing. 
Given GoA’s diversification ambition, this strategy should have a labour-market perspective and clear 
links  to  the  education  sector,  providing  individual  projects  with  a  framework  to  ensure 
complementarity and attention to “building capacity to produce capacity”. 

While the Team Europe approach of mobilising the broader EU community is highly appropriate, the 
problems encountered by FRESAN as the largest, most strategic and complex project in Angola point 
to issues to bear in mind when designing comprehensive interventions such as TEIs: 

  Sustainable capacity development should be a key objective with a realistic intervention logic 
and timeline provided. The actual commitment and capacities of the public sector in national, 
provincial  and  municipal  administrations  that  are  to  contribute  to  and  benefit  from  the 
intervention should be clearly described, where in particular the interest in and capacity to work 
across administrative boundaries in the public sector should be understood and addressed. 

  Likely gaps in the supply of skills necessary to implement the project should be analysed in the 
context of the labour market and how the education universe can address supply constraints 
over time. The time horizon for addressing these issues is typically well beyond those of the 
project. So, project design should be realistic in terms of expected capacity development results.  

  Decision  making  and  administrative  structures  need  to  address  two  slightly  competing 
concerns: making decision making and implementation authority as close to impact levels as 
possible while ensuring full information sharing and consultative processes among key actors. 
Of particular importance is that national stakeholders feel fully involved and consulted on key 
issues, realising that different stakeholders have differing and in areas competing agendas. 

  Where  possible,  institutional  twinning  may  provide  long-term  partnerships  and  the  EU’s 
shorter-term Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument (TAIEX) may provide 
support for strengthening key public sector capacities. But for such partnerships to work, careful 
planning and management commitment on both sides should be in place.  

  Given the generally weak capacities, organisational fragilities and heavy transaction costs in 
implementation, flexibility in design and implementation arrangements with piloting and other 
slower start-up steps should be used; active monitoring for close risk-management; proactive 
experience  sharing  for  learning  across  actors;  a  “strategic  reserve”  in  the  budgets  to  exploit 
windows of opportunity. While a good intervention logic with key assumptions is important for 
successful implementation, experience is  that once  activities start  up, a series of unforeseen 
problems and opportunities will emerge, and addressing these early are key to success.  

 
 
 
6  Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 

Evaluation Report 

Looking Ahead: Angola and EU Priorities 

ANGOLAN DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES  

Angola has produced its National Development Plan 2018-2022 with six priority areas: (i) human 
development,  (ii)  sustainable  and  inclusive  economic  development,  (iii)  key  infrastructure,  (iv) 
consolidation  of  peace,  strengthening  democratic  state  and  rule  of  law,  good  governance,  state 
reforms and decentralisation, (v) balanced territorial development, and (vi) guarantee the stability and 
integrity of Angola. The operationalisation of sustainable and inclusive economic development, a key 
objective, was subsequently provided in the programme of support to production, diversification of 
exports  and  import  substitution,  PRODESI  with  a  number  of  value  chain  studies  detailing 
development and investment needs. 

EU’S MIP AND TEAM EUROPE INITIATIVE  

The EU prepared its Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) 2021-2027 with three Priority Areas: 
(i) sustainable economic diversification, (ii) transparent, accountable and effective governance (iii) 
human development, while the TEI is to contribute to transformative processes of diversification of 
the national economy for sustainable and inclusive economic growth and job creation. 

THE ANGOLAN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT  

While the Lourenço presidency came into office promising political and economic reforms, results 
remain limited, partly due to the fiscal crisis brought on by the collapse of the petroleum sector and 
accentuated  by  the  pandemic.  But  the  political  commitment  to  the  original  reform  agenda  is  now 
unclear, meaning the conditions for future programme implementation remain uncertain. 

CONCLUSIONS 

The political system is structured to ensure central control. Reforms from the top are therefore likely 
to be slow, and always with an eye to maintaining centralised control. 

The economic system remains largely rent-seeking, where a political-economic elite and its foreign 
partners control key areas of the economy and can use instruments of the state to protect their interests. 
The space for other economic actors has historically been limited but is now opening up. This is likely 
to continue with further macro-economic reforms and Angola’s expected adherence to the EU-SADC 
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). 

The Government is, however, very aware of and concerned about the serious economic and thus also 
political challenges the country faces and is therefore open to steps that will address these – with the 
proviso that they do not seriously challenge central control.  

There  is  clearly  considerable  overlap  between  GoA  and  EU  priorities,  providing  important 
opportunities for long-term collaboration. Yet while reforms are moving ahead, especially in the field 
of macro-economic management and in the justice sector, there are questions regarding the future 
reforms in terms of speed, depth and the space that actually will be accorded new actors and activities. 
There are therefore key reform areas that the EU should monitor: (i) political democratisation; (ii) 
macro-economic  stability,  predictability;  (iii)  transparent  and  competitive  markets;  (iv)  improved 
administrative procedures and processes.  

Looking Ahead: Economic Diversification and Agricultural-led Development 

While Angola’s National Development Plan, PRODESI and MIP all consider a range of economic 
sectors for Angola’s diversification, the team would suggest that the EU pay particular attention to 
the agricultural sector. This allows for sustainable and equitable economic development; it can create 
growth across the country; it can make important contributions to poverty reduction, gender equity 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 
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7 

and employment with  particular focus on  youth  unemployment;  it will improve food security  and 
nutritional  status;  strengthen  climate  resilient  primary  sector  production;  can  support  local 
entrepreneurial  initiatives  and  opens  up  for  strengthening  local  participatory  governance  with  an 
overarching goal of contributing to the SDGs. 

At the same time, agriculture-led development requires long-term commitment and investments, and 
is high risk. The EU, with its long-term planning horizon and the single largest grants budget and 
with access to complementary financial resources has the organisational and financial means of being 
the partner that Angola needs for this transformative challenge. 

It should be stressed that the team does not suggest that the EU focus exclusively on agricultural-led 
development, but,  if there is Government support for it, that the EU commit to a large enough and 
broad-based enough programme that it can really have a transformative impact on the sector. 

Activities  under  MIP  Priority  Areas  2  and  3  can  improve  area-based  local  development  through 
complementary  processes.  With  regards  to  issues  of  transparent,  accountable  and  effective 
governance, this should focus on enabling local producers and entrepreneurs  to enter markets and 
access  inputs  and services on competitive terms. Human development  should  pay  attention to  the 
needs of the smallholder sector.  

Looking Ahead: Capacity Development, Policy Dialogue and Quality Assurance 

A key challenge for an agricultural-led area-based development process is how to ensure the critical 
institutional, organisational and individual skills, knowledge and capacities are made available, are 
relevant to the challenges being faced, and are sustainable over time. For Angola, this means to build 
some of these capacities almost from scratch and will thus require both time and financing to become 
reality. Other capacities can either be developed locally over time (educational development) or can 
be found in the labour market and contracted from there.  

A medium- to longer-term capacity development strategy thus needs to address the relevant parts of 
the  educational  sector,  an  analysis  of  the  labour  market,  and  what  the  programme  itself  needs  to 
provide, in order to ensure a sustainable “production of capacity to produce capacities” critical to the 
sector. 

A key instrument for such a comprehensive capacity programme could be twinning with homologous 
institutions in countries that cover some of the same agro-climatic zones and preferably with cultural 
and technological proximity for easier knowledge sharing/peer learning.  

In this connection, the EU-Angola policy dialogue provides unique opportunities for high-level policy 
discussions  to  the  benefit  of  both  parties.  There  has  been  a  willingness  on  the  side  of  Angola  to 
address also politically more sensitive issues, which justifies a continued investment in this process. 
The upcoming high-level meeting should include a willingness on the side of EU to provide election 
observers for the upcoming national elections in August 2022; issues important for attracting foreign 
investments  such  as  for  “green  energy”  in  line  with  Angola’s  commitments  at  COP26;  and 
improvements to the operational environment for project implementation.  

An  important  consideration  for  the  coming  MIP  is  strengthening  the  Angolan  participation  in 
monitoring, evaluation, learning and the building of institutional memory regarding the EU-supported 
activities in the country, both as a means of making the EU+MS programme better known/visible but 
also as a contribution to the national debate on the country’s development experiences.  

Recommendations 

1.  The  EU  should  track  performance  in  the  four  key  areas  of  (i)  political  democratisation;  (ii) 
macro-economic  stability  and  predictability;  (iii)  transparent  and  competitive  markets;  (iv) 
improved administrative procedures and processes, to monitor to what extent the Government is 
improving the environment for long-term, predictable and broad-based collaboration. 

 
 
8  Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 

Evaluation Report 

2.  The EU should focus on agricultural-led development as a core concern under MIP Priority Area 

1 and expand this engagement with the Member States with the Team Europe Initiative. 

3.  While the natural resources base is considered very good, the institutional, legal, infrastructure, 
skills and basic social services foundations are generally poor, which is what the EU should focus 
on.  

4.  Working with the appropriate stakeholder groups, the EU should support the development of a 
politically owned, technically solid and financially viable sector strategy as the foundation for 
its support to an agriculture-led development programme [the corollary is that if it turns out that 
there is little interest in committing to such a sector approach, the Delegation should reassess its 
willingness to allocate significant resources to this sector]. 

5.  Based on an agricultural sector development strategy, the EU should support the identification 
of a “minimum needs” public sector capacity with a 5–10-year master plan for improving the 
situation. 

6.  The EU might offer to finance a comprehensive land review with the objective of updating land 
laws;  establish  principles  of  land  titling,  usufruct  rights,  land  as  collateral;  support  the 
development  of  a  land  cadastre  with  a  focus  on  high-productive  areas  but  that  includes  the 
various land holding schemes under which current users are exploiting agricultural land. 

7.  The EU can assist local actors develop more integrated territorial /area-based approaches to rural 
development  including  public  investment  “packages”  that  will  allow  the  rural  population  to 
remain in rural areas and attract youth to invest in agricultural production.  

8.  The EU may assist the development of a long-term viable rural credit system through support to 

risk-sharing, insurance, first-loss and innovative approaches to rural lending. 

9.  The EU should use this agricultural-led approach as the foundation for its support to the Team 
Europe  Initiative,  providing  opportunities  for  Member  States  and  other  actors  to  develop 
complementary actions such as value-chain development through private investments. 

10.  The EU should ensure that a significant part of the PASCAL project is allocated to municipalities 
that are identified as important for agricultural-led development. The PASCAL project in these 
areas should include assistance to strengthening an enabling environment for local business and 
agricultural production and help combat all forms of barriers to competitive local markets.  
11.  The EU should help strengthen local planning and in particular local public investment processes 

to ensure rural areas and agricultural-based activities are fully taken into consideration. 

12.  The EU should extend its on-going support to TVET and tertiary education to include primary 
sector  relevant  training,  education  and  research,  with  particular  attention  to  the  needs  of  the 
smallholder sector.  

13.  The EU should support Angolan authorities develop a capacity building programme for creating 
“minimum  needs” organisations and skills  for agricultural-led  growth  and development  to  be 
viable. 

14.  The EU should explore options for collaborative arrangements to build sustainable capacities in 
the agricultural sector, with particular focus on possible Latin America/Brazilian partners. 
15.  The EU should continue the high-level policy dialogue with Angola but should address more 
issues related to the bilateral cooperation, and in particular seek to find solutions to political and 
administrative bottlenecks for implementation of interventions. 

16.  The EU should make it clear that it is willing to accommodate any request for election observers 
and sees this as important for documenting improvements in the field of democratisation. 
17.  The  EU  should  establish  a  facility  for  financing  Angolan  contributions  to  quality  assurance 
activities  along  the  entire  intervention  delivery  chain;  support  experience  sharing  and  open 
learning  arenas;  and  help  build  local  institutional  memory  regarding  achievements  and 
challenges identified in EU-funded activities for better decision-making and implementation. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 
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9 

2    BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION  

The purpose of this evaluation is to review the results of the EU-Angola collaboration 2008-2020 and 
present recommendations for the coming period as per the Terms of Reference: 

  Assess the performance of EU support – policy dialogue and financial assistance – to Angola. 
  Take  stock  of  the  results  achieved  by  the  EU’s  support  and  identify  the  contributing  and 

constraining factors. 

  Identify areas of improvement and good practices to develop orientations and guidelines for the 

implementation of current programme (EDF-11) and future financial assistance. 

  Support  the  preparation  of  the  new  country  programme  2021-2027  in  the  context  of  the 

Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI). 

  Inform future joint programming initiatives should the opportunity present itself. 

2.1  THE EU PROGRAMME IN ANGOLA 

The EU’s National Indicative Programmes (NIP) for Angola 2008-2013, signed in November 2008, 
presented the strategic framework for cooperation between the EU and Angola funded under the 10th 
European  Development  Fund  (EDF-10).  With  a  budget  of  €214  million,  the  programme  financed 
interventions3  to  support  governance,  economic  and  institutional  reforms,  human  and  social 
development,  rural  development, food security, and demining.  The  NIP 2014-2020  (EDF-11) had 
budgets totalling €210 million and focused on (i) technical and vocational education and training, and 
higher education; (ii) sustainable agriculture; and (iii)  water and sanitation.  Following a  mid-term 
review  in  2017,  the  budget  was  reduced  to  €132  million  and  a  new  focal  sector,  (iv)  economic 
governance  and  private  sector,  was  introduced,  replacing  water  and  sanitation.  However,  the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) awarded a €100 million loan to support the implementation of water 
related projects. In 2020, budget support of €20 million was added to support the Ministry of Health’s 
work to address the Covid-19 pandemic and assist the country’s efforts to address the economic and 
social consequences of the pandemic. A further €5 million grant, combined with a €50 million loan 
by the EIB, was provided to the Ministry of Health. EDF-11 thus ended up totalling €157 million.  

19 Decisions were funded over EDF-10 and EDF-11, where the evaluation was also to include the 
health intervention from EDF-9 (Table 1). A demining project and one supporting management of a 
national forest were not reviewed (highlighted in yellow)4, and two projects providing support to the 
National Authorising Officer (NAO) were also not included (light blue) due to lack of documentation 
though the contents are to a large extent included in D-40914 Angola Dialogue Facility.  

Three non-NIP interventions were to be considered for inclusion in the analysis:  

  Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs).  
  The Technical Cooperation Facility (TCF). 
  The Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities (CSO-LA) and the European Instrument 

for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) programmes. 

Regarding RIP projects, the three for Portuguese-speaking (PALOP) countries had EDF funding and 
therefore are included in table 1: D-20847 Human resources for health in PALOPs; D-21808 Support 
to Rule of Law in PALOPs; and D-24373 Training institute for financial and economic management 
in PALOPs. No other regional projects were of significance and thus not included in the analysis. 

3 Funding is allocated according to formal Decisions (shown with the “D-x” numbering). There  can be several projects under one 
decision so activities under a given decision may, for sake of simplicity, be referred to as “interventions”. 
4 The demining action (D-21028) was a direct service delivery project addressing  a particular issue while the national biodiversity 
project (D-22929) focused on a particular national park rather than a systemic environmental concern, but also because it did not link 
up with other interventions and was not addressing an issue that the Delegation had indicated it tended to focus on going forward. 

 
 
                                                 
 
10  Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 

Evaluation Report 

Table 1: NIP decisions funded under (EDF-9), EDF-10 and EDF-11  

EDF # 

Decision 
# 

Decision name  

Budget at 
signing, € 

Date signed 

9 

10 

10 

10 

10 

10 

10 

10 

10 

10 

10 

10 

10 

10 

10 

11 

11 

11 

11 

11 

20847 

Development of Human Resources for Health in PALOP  

10,000,000 

01-01-08 

21027 

Institutional Support to Water Supply and Sanitation Sectors 

17,000,000 

01-04-09 

21028 

Demining Action  

20,000,000 

01-04-09 

21418 

Programme of Support to the Health Sector II (PASS II)  

25,000,000 

01-11-12 

21626  Modernisation of Institutional Capacities for Public Planning  

13,500,000 

01-01-10 

21647 

Local Development Programme (LDP) Social Action Fund (FAS IV) 

30,000,000 

01-04-13 

21808 

Support to Rule of Law in PALOPs 

21954 

Support to Non-State Actors (PAANE) 

22495 

Technical Cooperation Facility (TCF) III  

8,400,000 

01-01-13 

3,000,000 

01-03-11 

3,000,000 

01-03-11 

22953 

Effective Policy for Social Protection and Solidarity (APROSOC) 

32,300,000 

01-04-14 

22929 

National Biodiversity Project: Conservation of Iona National Park 

10,000,000 

01-02-13 

22990 

Trade Support Programme (ACOM)  

23004 

Identity and Justice for Children 

12,000,000 

01-12-14 

17,000,000 

01-01-14 

23005 

Establishment of Vocational Training Centre for Water Sector  

11,800,000 

01-04-14 

24373 

Training Institute, Financial and Economic Management in PALOPs 

5,400,000 

01-12-13 

37953 

Strengthening Resilience, Food Security and Nutrition (FRESAN) 

70,080,000 

01-08-17 

38134 

Technical and Vocational Education and Training (RETFOP) 

22,000,000 

01-12-16 

38769 

TCF and Support to the National Authorising Officer 

5,000,000 

01-08-16 

40911 

Public Finance Management (PFM) and Financial Sector Reform  

5,000,000 

01-01-19 

40914 

EU Angola Dialogue Facility  

4,000,000 

01-01-19 

The  TCF  was  used  for  project  preparation  purposes  and  thus  did  not  produce  independent 
deliverables.  The  EU  financing  for  non-state  actors  was  important,  however,  with  a  total  of  100 
projects funded by EIDHR (€9.8 million) and CSO-LA (€30 million) over the two EDF periods, so a 
review of this funding was included5). 

Finally, the ToR asks that the evaluation review the policy dialogue under the Joint Way Forward 
(JWF) process, which was entered into in July 2012. This is addressed in a separate section.  

2.2 

 THE CHANGING FRAMEWORK CONDITIONS   

H.E., Mr. João Lourenço was elected President of Angola in September 2017, running on a platform 
that included combatting corruption, opening up the political dialogue, diversifying the economy and 
implementing  decentralisation.  He  assumed  the  Presidency  at  a  difficult  time  with  the  petroleum 
market collapse in 2014 which reduced export earnings and government revenues. The pandemic has 
obviously exacerbated this difficult situation, increasing the pressures on public sector finances. 

At the same time, the situation for Angolan citizens and business is difficult. Angola scores poorly 
on most indicators of social development and equity. Basic health and education levels remained low 
for a long period of time though are beginning to improve: The Human Development Index (HDI) 

5  See 
EVALUATIONS@ec.europa.eu. 

reviews  of 

the 

the  various 

interventions 

funded 

in  Volume  3,  available  upon 

request 

from 

INTPA-

 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 
Evaluation Report 

11 

score was only 0.394 in 2010 but rose to 0.574 in 20186. Despite this, Angola still ranked as number 
149 out of 190 countries on the HDI – considerably lower than one would expect given its GNI/capita. 
While life expectancy is increasing, school enrolment rates have grown significantly, various health 
indicators are moving in the right direction7 the pandemic will likely reverse some of these gains. 
And while Angola has been rated as among the more corrupt countries in the world, there are signs 
of  improvement:  while  it  ranked  146  out  of  180  on  Transparency  International’s  Corruption 
Perceptions Index in 2019, its score had shot up from 19 out of 100 in 2018 to 26 in 2019, moving it 
up 19 places in the country rankings8. Whether this is the beginning of a longer-term trend or just 
opportunistic changes by a new regime remains to be seen9, but the economy may be opening up: the 
time taken to start a business fell from 66 working days in 2010 to only 36 days in 201810 though in 
the World Bank’s Doing Business 2020, Angola still ranks as number 177 of 190 countries rated11. 

2.3  THE STRUCTURE OF THE EVALUATION REPORT   
The  evaluation report is divided into three volumes12: 

Volume 1 (main evaluation report) presents:  
  The methodological approach. 
  Main  findings  and  conclusions  by  the  EU  evaluation  criteria  of  Relevance,  Efficiency, 

Effectiveness, Impact, Sustainability, Value Added, Coherence and Complementarity. 

  The  evaluation  then  looked  at  the  Policy  Dialogue  and  Capacity  Development  &  Technical 

Assistance, as areas the Delegation had wanted the team to look more carefully at. 

  The  Recommendations  section  looks  first  at  Angola  and  EU  priorities  going  forward  and  the 

likely operational environment for EU support. 

  The  second  part  looks  at  how  the  EU’s  and  Angola’s  overriding  concern  of  economic 
diversification  and  inclusive  growth  can  best  be  supported,  given  the  three  main  areas  of  EU 
support presented in its draft Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP), 
In light of the above, the final Recommendations section then looks at how public sector capacity 
building can best be addressed, before looking at how the overarching policy dialogue and more 
local engagement in monitoring, evaluation and learning of the EU support can contribute to more 
sustainable results. 

 

Volume 2 includes the annexes for this exercise: 
  Annex A: The Terms of Reference (ToR). 
  Annex B: Bibliography. 
  Annex C: Persons interviewed. 
  Annex D: Methodology applied. 
  Annex  E:  Overall  Evaluation  Matrix,  compiling  the  evaluation  matrices  from  the  intervention 

assessments carried out (see Volume 3). 

  Annex F: Survey results. 
  Annex G: Conversation Guides. 

6 See http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2019.pdf .  
7 While life expectancy at birth in 2010 was 55 years, it had risen to 61 years in 2018; mortality rate of under-5 per 1,000 live births 
fell from 121 to 77; secondary school gross enrolment rates went from 26 to 51 over the same period (World Bank’s country profile).  
8  See https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2019/results  
9 During early 2021 a series of webinars on “The State of Transformations in Angola” by national and international researchers largely 
concluded that the change processes initiated after the 2017 elections were slowing down. The Luanda Leaks that produced 715,000 
documents on Isabel dos Santos’ business and corruption, published in January 2020, were said to be based on a successful hack, but 
more likely this damning material came to light as part of the power struggle between the outgoing regime and the new national elite.  
10 See World Bank country profile. 
11 
Regulation-in-190-Economies.pdf, page 4. Mozambique is in 138th place with a score of 55.0.  
12 Volume 1 (main evaluation report) is published at https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/strategic-evaluation-reports_en  . 
Volume II and Volume III are available upon request sent to INTPA-EVALUATIONS@ec.europa.eu  

http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/688761571934946384/pdf/Doing-Business-2020-Comparing-Business-

See 

 
 
                                                 
 
12  Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 

Evaluation Report 

  Annex H: Survey questionnaire.   

Volume 3 provides the assessments of the 16 interventions looked at and the assessment of the CSO-
LA and EIDHR programmes. This volume is available internally to EU staff.  

3.  METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH  

The situation in Angola is complex and has changed considerably over the evaluation period 2008-
2020, and it continues to evolve, opening up new possibilities for EU-Angola collaboration. Based 
on the Delegation’s request to make the evaluation as useful for the forward planning as possible, 
there was an agreement to carry out the evaluation in steps, to allow for adjustments to the process 
and instruments accordingly. The process has therefore resulted in more deliverables than usual: 

  A methodology note and document inventory were produced, leading to an improved evaluation 

matrix and agreement to revise the methodology for the forward-looking phase.  

  Using the document inventory, a Resource and Results Mapping provided documented results, 
identifying information gaps and shortcomings to be addressed by the evaluation exercise. 

  The formal Inception Report was prepared, presenting methodology, sources of information in 

more detail, a revised Evaluation Matrix, and the project reviews in the Mapping study. 

  The Evaluative Study then carried out the review of the National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) 
and their interventions, presenting the findings in three volumes13: (i) Main Evaluation Report, 
(ii)  Annexes,  (iii)  Project  Assessments  and  a  summary  review  of  the  EIDHR  and  CSO-LA 
programmes.  

  The Forward-looking Study then took the lessons and conclusions from the Evaluative Study 
and  carried  out  an  intensive  interview-programme  covering  a  wide  range  of  national 
stakeholders and EU staff both in Luanda and Brussels, to identify Recommendations based on 
(i) the rapidly changing environment, (ii) new needs and new possibilities, (iii) the constraints 
of a realistic political-economic assessment, and (iv) the comparative advantages that an EU 
with a Team Europe approach can provide. 

3.1  THE EVALUATIVE STUDY   

For the document review, the team checked whether the intervention had a clear results framework 
and results reporting that would allow verification of reported results against expectations. 

All interventions had programme documents or financial agreements that provided the background 
for  the  intervention  and  presented  expected  results.  The  team  looked  in  particular  for  third-party 
assessments  in  the  form  of  mid-term  or  final  evaluations  or  Results-Oriented  Monitoring  (ROM) 
reports. 9 mid-term evaluations and 9 final evaluations for 11 interventions were identified, 18 ROM 
reports across 10 interventions, and a total of 34 project progress reports14. The remaining projects 
began implementation recently and had not yet been subject to external performance assessments.  

Most  interventions  have  a  Results  Framework/Logframe  with  an  Overall  Objective,  2-3  Specific 
Objectives and 2-5 Results (in a classic results framework these would be Outcomes and Outputs). 
The quality and comprehensiveness of the frameworks vary a lot, something also noted by a number 
of  ROM  reports.  The  status  of  so-called  “results”  is  sometimes  unclear.  In  most  cases  they  are 
presented as classic outputs – direct deliverables for which the project could be made accountable 

13 Volume 1 (main evaluation report) is published at https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/strategic-evaluation-reports_en . 
Volume II and Volume III are available upon request sent to INTPA-EVALUATIONS@ec.europa.eu  
14 13 of this were, however, engineering reports on an infrastructure investment component of a project. 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 
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13 

for.  But  in  other  cases,  they  are  formulated  as  downstream  results  of  the  direct  Outputs.  Another 
problem was the lack of specificity of what was to be achieved, where the formulation of many results 
is in process terms (“to contribute to strengthening …”). While one could monitor and report on many 
of these, the actual target value was not specified, so simply training one staff member for a week 
could be chalked up to “strengthening of human resources”. Many of the projects in Angola contain 
various aspects of capacity building – human resources upgrading, organisational development – and 
this field is notoriously difficult to specify and even more challenging to track and report. Given the 
fragility of the information base available for a number of these projects, this lack of specificity in 
the Logframes is understandable but made it difficult for the team when trying to assess achievements. 
In some cases, there were indicators that allowed for monitoring, and often detailed activity lists that 
showed what was to be done. But for many projects, baseline data were not available or not detailed, 
often because such data simply were not available. This was a particular problem where projects were 
contributing  to  strengthening  administrative  systems  and  activities  at  provincial  and/or  municipal 
levels. 

Final evaluations were only available for half of the projects, so in a number of cases the team only 
had the intermediate results provided in mid-term reviews and what was recorded in ROM reports. 
The ability to assess actual achievements hence is variable, as seen in the project reviews in Volume 
315. At the same time, in a number of cases there is additional information available. Where that was 
the case, this has been used16. 

Some  interventions  changed  their  Logframe  during  implementation.  Some  ROM  reports  provide 
results against a different results framework, where the team did not know when the Logframe was 
changed,  for  what  reasons,  and  for  how  long  project  management  has  been  reporting  against  the 
revised framework. Another problem is that the team does not know which interventions have in fact 
changed their frameworks and which ones have not. For this reason, the team has relied on the original 
Logframes, but which provides another set of biases when recording and analysing achievements17. 

The policy dialogue has been based on the Joint Way Forward (JWF) initiative, which has been broad 
ranging in issues covered. In addition, the EU has provided technical assistance and other forms of 
support to build the capacity of Angola to contribute actively both to the dialogue itself but also to 
take  on  a  stronger  role  in  the  implementation  and  monitoring  of  interventions  under  the  National 
Authorising Officer (NAO) system that has been in place during this period.  

Regarding the interviews, it was easier to identify those involved in the more recent projects.  This 
means  that  the  informational  basis  for  the  project  assessments  has  moved  from  being  heavily 
document based for the earlier projects to more interview-dependent for the more recent ones.  

A  web-based  survey  was  distributed  to  180  persons,  of  which  61  answered,  giving  an  acceptable 
response rate of 34%. The 35 rating questions were distributed across the 8 substance areas of this 
evaluation,  where  for  each  area  respondents  could  also  provide  further  comments.  The  complete 

15 Idem. 
16  ROM reports as of 2015 include Results Reporting, so as of then there has been more data which is reflected in reporting from the 
Delegation: D-23004 has as its first Specific Objective “The system for birth registration is strengthened, leading to an increase in the 
rate of birth registrations”. The programme document did not contain a baseline nor any target values, but the Delegation’s Results 
Reporting 2019 provides a baseline value of 342,479 registered births in 2015 with a target value of 600,000 for 2019, with the number 
achieved being 524,479. For health posts with birth certification systems in place, the report provides a baseline value of zero, a 2019 
target of 60 while actual achievement was 70. The 2019 Report analysed 12 interventions, but only five were NIP interventions, but 
with no data on the two most recent ones, so in practice only three were discussed. Of the other seven, five were funded over the CSO-
LA programme and the last two were technical assistance projects supporting the Ministry of Trade under the TAF/TCF facility. 
17 Normally the team would go back and retrace these changes. Due to the particularities of the Angola country programme – the basic 
shift in development parameters with the collapse of the petroleum sector and the election of President Lourenco in 2017 who has a 
very  different  development  agenda  –  it  was  agreed  that  the  evaluation  would  pay  as  much  attention  to  the  forward-looking 
recommendations work, and thus would not be able to carry out as detailed an assessment of past achievements as otherwise would 
have been done.  

 
 
                                                 
 
14  Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 

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answers with percentage distributions are presented in Volume 318, Annex F, the survey questionnaire 
in Annex H19. 

Classic triangulation has been challenging. There is limited information from end beneficiaries. There 
were  few  face-to-face  interviews  with  stakeholders.  There  was  more  documentation  on  older 
interventions but with few real baselines and with results reporting not always complete or detailed, 
changes  to  results  frameworks  not  well  documented,  data  from  activities  outside  Luanda  less 
complete made assessing data veracity and completeness difficult across interventions.  

However, with the combination document review, interviews and the survey data, the team considers 
the overall Findings reliable and valid (the Methodology is presented in Volume 220, Annex D ).   

3.2  LOOKING AHEAD AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

During the preparatory work for this evaluation during the second half of 2020, the Delegation asked 
that  the  Recommendations  part  be  paid  particular  attention  and  contribute  to  the  Multiannual 
Indicative Programme (MIP) 2021-2027. During the spring of 2021, this was modified to include, 
where relevant, the new EU instrument Team Europe Initiatives (TEI).  

It was therefore agreed that the forward-looking and recommendations work would require a separate 
methodology and a larger share of available resources since the collaboration in the coming period 
will take place under different framework conditions than those of 2008-2020.  

The team therefore used the Main Findings and Conclusions from the evaluation phase as the bases 
for discussions with a wider universe of stakeholders to hear their views regarding Angola’s future 
options  and  where  EU  support  can  be  of  greatest  value.  This  included  key  political  parties  in 
Parliament;  Government  officials;  the  academic  community;  representatives  of  the  private  sector, 
both national and international; civil society organisations (CSOs) at both national and local levels; 
and international development partners. In addition, the team has spoken with EU staff, both at the 
Delegation and across various units in the Commission, including staff who worked in the Delegation 
during earlier periods but are now serving elsewhere. In all about 110 persons have been spoken with, 
based on a conversation guide that was tailored to the various stakeholder groups (the list of persons 
spoken with is provided in Volume 221, Annex G). 

As per the above understanding, particular attention has been paid to the challenges of longer-term 
capacity development, with a focus on the public sector, and additional documentation on issue like 
the EU’s own Territorial  approach to  programming was  reviewed for lessons  to  be applied to  the 
proposals made by the team going forward. 

The  pandemic  had  made  it  impossible  for  the  international  members  of  the  team  to  carry  out  the 
foreseen fieldwork in the spring of 2021. Since the entire evaluation process was delayed, however, 
it became possible for the full team to visit Angola in October 2021. During the weeks the team was 
in the field, a large number of conversations – several of them group discussions to brainstorm around 
alternative scenarios for the future – were held to hear honest opinions by a range of stakeholders.  

While there is general agreement regarding the rather dire situation the country is currently facing, 
there is also a lot of hope regarding future possibilities. The macro-economic situation and hence the 
limits on the state budget means that the Government will not be able to carry out all the investments 
it wants in order to realise its ambitions regarding a diversification of the economy.  

18 Idem. 
19 The questionnaire asked which stakeholder group the respondent belonged to, but as explained in Annex F the categories were not 
mutually exclusive. A number crossed off for two categories, making it impossible to analyse responses by stakeholder group. This is 
unfortunate as for some issues it would have been interesting to see if there are systematic differences of perception across groups.  
20 Volume II is available upon request sent to INTPA-EVALUATIONS@ec.europa.eu  
21 Idem. 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 
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15 

Nevertheless, it is the political rather than the economic barriers that most observers held up as most 
likely constraints to future developments. This is hence the area where stakeholders believe the EU 
needs to monitor closely for signals regarding where future collaboration is most likely to produce 
the best, most equitable and sustainable results.  

4.  MAIN FINDINGS FROM EVALUATIVE PHASE 

The Main Findings are divided into three sections. The first one presents the findings and conclusions 
according to three standard EU evaluation criteria, namely Relevance, Efficiency and Effectiveness. 
The second section looks at Impact, Sustainability, Value Added, Coherence and Complementarity. 
The third addresses the  Policy Dialogue, and Capacity Development and Technical Assistance,  as 
these are areas that the Delegation asked that the team look at more carefully. 

4.1  RELEVANCE, EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS 

The three performance dimensions of Relevance, Efficiency and Effectiveness were looked at both 
from the perspective of the overarching programmes – the National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) 
for the two periods 2008-2013 and 2014-2020 – and with regards to individual projects. 

4.1.1  Relevance  

This  section  first  looks  at  programme  relevance  before  addressing  project  relevance:  (i)  Was  the 
project relevant with respect to Angola’s priorities, and – for the more recent ones – the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs)? (ii) Was the design of the project such that it was relevant given the 
Angolan developmental context? (iii) Was the project relevant for Angolan societal actors – public 
administration at national and local levels, the business community, civil society?  

RELEVANCE OF NATIONAL INDICATIVE PROGRAMMES  

The  2008-2013  NIP  has  as  strategic  objective  the  Cotonou  Agreement  of  addressing  poverty 
reduction consistent with sustainable development. The European Consensus prevailing at that time 
included human rights, good governance, social cohesion, employment, decent work and agriculture. 
Principles for the collaboration include aid effectiveness, policy coherence for development (PCD), 
concentration  –  where  the  NIP  lists  nine  areas  –  and  mainstreaming  EU  cross-cutting  concerns: 
democracy, human rights and good governance, gender equality, environmental sustainability, and 
the fight against HIV/Aids. The actual programme areas supported were:  

  Governance and Support for Economic and Institutional Reform: (i) institutional development 
in the context of the modernisation of public administration, (ii) support for decentralisation 
and  local  governance,  (iii)  support  for  the  justice  sector,  (iv)  strengthening  public  finance 
management, (v) enhancing accountability and transparency.  

  Human and Social  Development:  (i)  human resources  development,  (ii)  supporting different 
tiers  of  government  in  delivering  services,  (iii)  improving  the  links  between  providers  and 
communities/  users,  (iv)  strengthening  mechanisms  to  support  vulnerable  sections  of  the 
population, (v) improving the synergies between the health and educations sectors and water 
and sanitation provision, (vi) rehabilitation, construction and equipment. 

  Rural Development, Agriculture and Food Security: (i) Agricultural development, (ii) support 
for  the  economic  and  social  reintegration  of  vulnerable  groups,  (iii)  access  (demining),  (iv) 
improve access to rural water and sanitation services.  

The 2014-2020 NIP states that the EU wishes to support “Angolan efforts to strengthen a democratic 
political culture, to increase institutional capacities, to intensify the fight against poverty as well as 
the fight against corruption and to improve transparency and accountability. The establishment of a 
competitive and diversified economy as well as a more favourable trade and investment climate are 

 
 
 
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important  to  achieve  sustainable,  inclusive  growth,  create  decent  jobs  and  to  contribute  to  the 
progressive extension of the national social protection floor in line with international commitments. 
Moreover,  the  strengthening  of  civil  society  in  Angola  remains  an  important  element  in  the  EU 
strategy” (NIP 2014-2020, p. 7). It goes on to note that EDF-11 will “focus on supporting reforms, 
capacity building and improving management in the selected sectors with greater positive impact on 
the  diversification  of  the  economy,  poverty  reduction  and  food  security”  (ibid.).  It  identifies  three 
sectors  for  attention:  (1)  Technical  and  Vocational  Education  and  Training  (TVET)  and  Higher 
Education, (2) Sustainable Agriculture and (3) Water and Sanitation (WS).  

A Mid-Term Evaluation (MTE) of the NIP in 2017 led to a reduction in the EDF-11 financial frame 
from €210 million to €132 million and a reorientation of the programme: The Water and Sanitation 
sector  was  removed  and  replaced  by  Support  to  Economic  Governance  and  Private  Sector 
development. The basic argument for the reduction in the EDF frame was the lack of progress on 
implementing interventions and Government of Angola (GoA) not implementing its long-promised 
reforms. The timing turned out to be unfortunate, as the election of President João Lourenço towards 
the end of 2017 heralded a greater interest and willingness to move ahead on political change but the 
EU lacked the resources to support this change-agenda as much as it would have liked. 

However, NIP programmes are seen as Highly Relevant as against stated Angolan development 
priorities and actual country needs, as argued in the documents. The realism of the two programmes, 
and in particular the 2008-2013 one, can be questioned. They present politically extremely ambitious 
agendas while it was known that there was limited likelihood that GoA would implement its stated 
change  agenda.  At  the  same  time,  the  Delegation  realized  that  the  limited  resources  the  EU  was 
offering as compared with public budgets provided for limited leverage.  The Delegation was also 
badly understaffed, as consistently noted in the External Assistance Management Reports (EARM) 
to  EU  Headquarters.  The  ability  to  monitor  and  manage  such  complex  undertakings  and  ensure 
successful implementation was hence limited.  

RELEVANCE OF PROJECTS TO ANGOLA’S PRIORITIES AND THE SDGS  

All project reviews point to the projects being aligned to national development programs, whether 
general  national  priorities  or  sector  priorities.  Background  documentation  addresses  the  links  to 
Angolan  policies,  priorities  and  actual  needs  as  reflected  in  international  rankings,  situational 
descriptions and national statistics.  

All projects also have clear links to the respective NIPs, but there are not many cross-project linkages. 
There are several projects related to health and sanitation, and social protection and children’s rights 
during EDF-10 though apart from the water sector training institute (D-23005), there are few directly 
discernible synergies. There are also several projects related to public finance management (PFM), 
one addressing PFM and financial sector reform directly while two are PALOP projects22: one on 
Rule of Law that contains anticorruption and money laundering components, and a regional training 
institute on financial and economic management.  

More recent projects make reference to SDGs in the text, but none have indicators that are directly 
linked to the 169 SDG targets or 232 indicators, or how their results link to national targets set for 
achieving the SDGs. One cannot expect particular interventions to generate results of significance for 
national  SDG  targets,  and  the  most  recent  NIP  2014-2020  was  designed  before  the  SDGs  were 
approved, so it does also not provide any direct link upwards to the global SDGs. It would, however, 
have  been  interesting  to  see  to  what  extent  the  Relevance  of  an  intervention  could  be  better 
documented through clearer operational references to SDG targets or indicators. 

Overall, however, all projects are seen as Highly Relevant as stand-alone interventions.  

22 PALOP: Lusophone countries in Africa, Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
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PROJECTS’ RELEVANCE TO ANGOLAN DEVELOPMENTAL CONTEXT 

Most projects include capacity building: upgrading of staff skills and strengthening of organisations’ 
ability to perform their assigned functions (see later more on this). Some of these ambitions were hardly 
realistic, yet resources were set aside to reach them. One common observation on older projects was 
that important dimensions of the design work was given to European consultancies that did not have 
in-depth understanding of Angola – the society, the public sector and the political system. Unrealistic 
expectations were reflected in assumptions regarding the existing capacities and interest to implement 
and improve systems and processes and the political commitment to pursue difficult objectives even 
when political leadership of a ministry changed, etc. With respect to allocation of resources to the 
operational objectives that intervention was to provide, a number of ROM reports point to the non-
attainment of these, where some results frameworks therefore were adjusted. 

The three PALOP projects suffered from a basic assumption that because the countries participating 
all  had  a  Portuguese  colonial  past  and  therefore  had  inherited  a  common  language  and  legal, 
administrative, cultural traditions and institutional arrangements, this would provide economies of 
scale and a platform for mutual learning and experience exchanges. In practice the differences and 
distances between countries were such that most of the hoped-for synergies and positive externalities 
were  not  really  experienced  as  very  useful  to  Angola.  While  some  gains  were  achieved  through 
common publications and joint events with counterpart Portuguese institutions, in the end the trans-
border nature of the projects and in particular the peer learning expected by and large did not happen 
– Relevance was lower than hoped for.  

More  recent  projects  have  relied  more  on  Angolan  expertise  for  design.  This  has  meant  better 
adaptation to the socio-political and economic realities on the ground, improving the Relevance of 
the final design as far as the Angolan development context is concerned. 

An  important  exception  to  this  quite  positive  picture  is  the  €65  million  project  to  improve  food 
security and drought resilience in the three southern-most provinces, FRESAN. The recent mid-term 
evaluation (MTE) notes that while the overarching objectives clearly are relevant, the actual design 
prepared  by  the  lead  IP  transformed  it  “into  a  very  complex  and  bureaucratic  programme…. 
Moreover, the GoA vision and requirements were not adequately included …”. It goes on to note that 
the project design identifies the key issues (production, nutrition, water, etc.), but  doesn’t identify 
how to  address  them and instead resorts to  contracting  studies, assessments  and  ‘diagnostics.  The 
consequence  is  that  “FRESAN  lacks  an  agricultural  technical  package  on  how  to  improve 
productivity,  diversification  and  resilience”  –  that  is,  the  project  does  not  have  an  operational 
response to the situation on the ground, a rather startling finding23.  

Project priorities are in general seen as Relevant to the Angolan context while project design has 
been highly variable, on average Acceptable, with both dimensions generally improving over time. 

PROJECTS’ RELEVANCE TO ANGOLAN SOCIETAL ACTORS  

The  support  to  Angolan  authorities  and  in  particular  the  NAO  to  strengthen  Angola’s  ability  to 
manage  the  collaboration  with  the  EU  has  been  relevant  in  terms  of  objectives.  The  results  were 
disappointing, however, as assumptions regarding commitment turned out not to be true.  

This  was  a weakness  in  a number of project  designs,  where  the  challenge has  been to  gauge  real 
commitment  by  public  sector  actors.  In  most  projects,  the  EU  has  accepted  formal  statements  of 
commitment. This has on the one hand tried to make local partners take their own statements seriously 
by providing incentives for this. But the EU has also faced the political quandary of whether to tell a 

23 SOFRECO (2021), “Mid-Term Evaluation of the FRESAN Programme in Angola”, June – pp 9-10.  

 
 
 
                                                 
 
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national actor that its statements on commitment are not trusted. Another design challenge has been 
that  central  authorities  are  more  concerned  with  control  than  innovation  and  performance  so 
introducing and assuming performance-based development has generally not succeeded. 

Of the €371 million over EDF-10 and EDF-11 plus €10 million over EDF-9, only €3 million went to 
non-state  actors.  In  addition,  however,  come  the  €40  million  from  the  CSO-LA  and  EIDHR 
programmes., so a total of €43 million out of €421 million of total EU support to Angola 2008-2020 
– just over 10% – was for non-state actors. The feedback from these is that the EU support was Highly 
Relevant to them, in part because the EU is the single funding source for the CSO sector in Angola, 
where much of this has been for actors outside Luanda, which for the CSOs has been important. But 
results  have  overall  also  been  better  than  with  public  sector  actors.  One  thing  is  that  CSOs  are 
interested in identifying better ways to carry out their mission. But they also experience the EU as 
listening to their views and concerns, so that projects are addressing their priorities. This feature is 
strengthened by the fact that the CSOs have to compete for funding by submitting proposals which 
they themselves design. For this reason, it is not surprising that two-thirds of the CSOs answer in the 
affirmative when asked if the EU takes their views into account where relevant  

FINDINGS  

  The two NIPs were Highly Relevant but not realistic given the scale of EU funding. There has 
been a dispersion across too many objectives and sectors with limited own capacities to manage 
and support such complex programmes. The risk analyses did not provide realistic alternatives 
to a Government not committed to stated objectives and reforms. 

  All  projects  are  Highly  Relevant  in  terms  of  alignment  to  the  NIPs,  national  priorities  and 
stakeholder needs. Ties to SDGs in recent decisions exist but without links to SDG targets. 

  Intervention priorities have been Relevant to the Angolan context but often not realistic in their 
expectations. With increasing use of Angolan expertise in project design, these weaknesses are 
reduced,  though  the  largest  and  recent  project  in  the  2014-2020  NIP,  the  resilience,  food 
security and nutrition project (FRESAN) in three drought-prone provinces of Southern Angola, 
is seen as poorly designed, lacking in GoA involvement, and with resultant poor performance.  

  The projects supporting civil society, receiving just over 10% of total EU aid to Angola, are 
seen as Highly Relevant by the CSOs. The EU has been the single largest source of support to 
civil society  and reaching beyond Luanda these projects have been important for supporting 
CSOs’ role and voice in local level decision making.  

4.1.2  Efficiency  

Efficiency is looked at along four dimensions:  

1.  Information on costs of Outputs compared to budgets is uneven. What is often commented on 

is the time costs that were experienced. 

2.  Projects  were  largely  implemented  by  external  contractors,  such  as  UN  agencies  and 

consulting companies. Their efficiency in managing projects has been uneven. 

3.  The relations between the implementing partner (IP) and the Angolan authority responsible 

for the area of the intervention varied across projects.  

4.  Finally, features of the Angolan context constitute impediments to efficient implementation.  

DELIVERY OF EXPECTED OUTPUTS 

A large share of the projects experienced serious delays, some of them for over a year. Factors noted: 
  There were delays in signing project agreements. One reason was disagreements over project 

design if Angolan partners were not satisfied with aspects of the project proposal. 

 
 
 
 
 
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19 

  With a change of minister between project design till it was ready for signature, it would take 
time before the new minister had been fully briefed and was convinced regarding the project. 
  The bureaucratic procedures on the Angolan side could be cumbersome, where different line 

ministries were not equally expeditious in finalising and signing final agreements. 
  EU tendering for Implementing Partners (IPs) delayed some processes considerably. 
  IPs often had problems recruiting qualified staff, while some staff recruited were found wanting 

and replacements had to be found, which took time. 

  GoA did not always honour its financial commitments, delaying implementation. 

Delays  in  start-up  and  implementation  have  been  the  single  greatest  concern  when  it  comes  to 
delivering on the EU-Angola programme, with considerable frustration on all sides.  

The  EU  Delegation  has  been  concerned  with  the  slow  pace  with  which  project  proposals  were 
assessed and final agreements signed by GoA and the inability of contractors – UN agencies but in 
particular consulting companies – to get experts on the ground. GoA has been unimpressed with the 
bureaucracy required to get projects designed and implementing partners approved and contracted by 
the EU and the time it takes implementing partners to get experts in post. Consulting companies and 
UN agencies were frustrated with the delays in approval of experts, the issuance of visas and other 
formal  requirements  for  working  in  Angola  and  what  was  often  felt  as  lack  of  commitment  and 
support for the smooth implementation of activities including disinterest by national counterparts. 

These frustrations have abated with the new Government, where actors experience greater interest 
and commitment to implementing projects and where operations are now more efficient. 

With regards to delivering Outputs, these appear to have been delivered more or less on budget but 
usually with considerable delays. In some cases when it became obvious that the original plans were 
not realistic, the results frameworks were modified.  

Physical  infrastructure  Outputs  have  largely  been  delivered  but  capacity  development  has  been 
uneven where in particular changes in the public sector outside Luanda have on average been poor. 
Capacity building for non-state actors has been more successful, but also that has been uneven.  

EFFICIENCY OF PROJECT MANAGEMENT  

Because project designs have varied, the structure of project management has also differed. 

Several projects were organised in  components with different  IPs, which has caused problems for 
overall  implementation.  One  reason  was  that  each  IP  was  primarily  responsible  for  the  own 
component  and  therefore  focused  on  this.  Implementation  of  the  overall  project  depended  on  the 
various  components  complementing  each  other,  and  in  some  projects  this  coordination  was 
insufficient. Even when there was a clear lead  IP, complicated management arrangements  created 
bureaucracy and did not foster good communications across actors and activities. 

Another problem was having different kinds of IPs on the same project, especially combining a UN 
body and a consulting company. The UN agency has dual accountability lines: its activities must be 
in line with its own mandate and reporting to HQ should document that the project contributes to the 
agency’s  objectives,  but  as  IP  it  should  report  to  the  project  owner,  the  Angolan  partner,  and 
preferably align this with that of any other IPs. Consulting companies reported to the Angolan partner 
but harmonising this with how a UN agency reported was not always simple. 

For the three PALOP projects, coordination and management mechanisms were complicated. On two, 
project management was with the Portuguese partner in Lisbon while the third one was managed from 
Luanda but again with a complicated structure. Common to all three was that overall management 
was seen as inefficient, the coordination mechanisms deteriorated over time as commitment was seen 
to  be  uneven  across  partner  countries,  making  it  increasingly  challenging  for  the  coordinator  to 
maintain an active dialogue with all parties.  

 
 
20  Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 

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Some consulting companies never established decision-making authority in Angola but retained this 
in their head office in Europe. This became a source of frustration as some decisions were criticised 
for not being based on a sufficiently good knowledge of the situation on the ground.  

The projects that experienced the best management were either where team leaders on the ground 
have considerable decision-making authority, or where the contracting body has an office in-country 
that could communicate with and reach agreements directly with the authorities.  

The longevity in-post made a difference: staff rotations in Angolan public bodies, the EU Delegation 
and  at  the  project  level,  caused  disruptions  and  required  additional  time  for  adjusting  and 
accommodating the changes.  

RELATIONS PROJECT IMPLEMENTERS  ANGOLAN PARTNERS 

While  project  management  was  often  pointed  to  as  a  source  of  frustration,  the  relations  between 
project experts and their Angolan partners are most often described as quite good. While there were 
a couple of cases noted where team leaders had to be replaced, most experts who came to Angola 
seem to have established good working relationships with their local partners.  

Difficulties  occurred  when  personnel  changed,  as  this  almost  inevitably  meant  that  some  of  the 
capacity developed was lost – either the expertise was not continuous and able to build on what had 
already been done, or local staff trained was no longer in post and new staff had to be  updated on 
earlier training/skills upgrading work.  

The rules under which foreign experts had to work – local laws, regulations, public sector procedures 
but  perhaps  even  more  so  the  “unwritten  rules”  and  local  organisational  culture  –  were  often 
unfamiliar to arriving experts. Adjusting to and accepting these required some flexibility on the side 
of the foreign expertise, but again these issues appear to have resolved themselves over time – most 
reports are of positive relations. 

The  relations  are  overall  more  positive  when  it  comes  to  the  support  to  non-state  actors.  This  is 
presumably due to the fact that the IPs in this field were often Angolan CSOs or foreign NGOs that 
had  a  long  history  of  working  in  Angola  and  therefore  both  knew  the  country  but  also  the  local 
organisations they were worked with. 

BARRIERS TO EFFICIENCY 
Several  issues  were  mentioned  by  foreign  experts  with  experience  working  in  Angola  as  general 
barriers to taking up posts in Angola, whether on EU-funded projects or other activities: 

  Angola is expensive, housing in particular, which discouraged people from applying for jobs, 

though this has lessened over the last years due to the collapse of the petroleum sector. 

  Angola is not an easy place to live, especially for families: education and health services are 
generally  not  at  a level  that  foreign experts  are used to;  transportation is problematic where 
Luanda experiences constant traffic jams; maintenance and repair services may be difficult to 
get within a reasonable time and cost; etc. 

  It is not easy for spouses to find work, so two-income couples are hesitant to move to Angola. 
  Portuguese language has generally not been an issue: most experts speak Portuguese or Spanish. 
The flip side is that that this up-front language requirement meant that persons who do not speak 
Portuguese but might otherwise consider a posting in Angola, have not applied. This will have 
narrowed the field of expertise available. But in the short run this requirement is reasonable: 
the knowledge of other European languages among adult Angolans is limited so ensuring that 
parties can communicate by insisting on some Portuguese knowledge makes sense. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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FINDINGS  

  Most  projects  have  experienced  serious  delays,  particularly  in  start-up  but  also  during 
implementation. Time Efficiency has therefore overall been Poor though for most interventions 
improving towards the end of the period, with the FRESAN project as a clear exception.  

  Delivery of Outputs has often been delayed but largely on budget. Results frameworks have 
been adjusted to take into account such delays. Consequently, despite unrealistic expectations 
in the design stage, corrective measures introduced over time improved Output Efficiency to 
the level of Acceptable.  

  Physical  infrastructure  deliverables  have  performed  better,  capacity  development  outputs 
worse. Delivery outside  Luanda has  generally  been poorer than deliverables within  Luanda. 
Delivery in the non-state sector has generally been better than in the public sector. 

  In-country  management,  with  authority  to  reach  agreements  with  the  Angolan  partners, 
performed best. IPs that maintained decision making at their head office abroad were often seen 
by the Angolans of taking decisions based on incomplete information. Complex projects such 
as the PALOP projects or those with several components implemented by different partners, 
have experienced high coordination costs. Staff rotations caused disruptions that led to lowered 
project efficiency, though often only temporarily. 

  Relations  between  foreign  experts  and  Angolan  partners  were  generally  considered  good, 

though better between partners in the non-public sector. 

  There were external barriers to efficiency of projects: (i) Angola is an expensive country which 
discouraged foreign experts to apply for jobs, (ii) living in Angola is difficult due to lack of 
public services, (iii) it is difficult for spouses to find work, so two-income couples would not 
apply,  (iv)  language  was  generally  not  an  issue  when  projects  reached  the  implementation 
phase. But this was largely so because non-Portuguese speaking experts may not have applied 
or  been  accepted  on  expert  rosters,  limiting  the  available  pool  of  experts.  But  a  number  of 
barriers are becoming less onerous, facilitating improved project efficiency in the future.     

4.1.3   Effectiveness  

The basic Effectiveness question asked to what extent projects were focused on delivering Outputs 
that were strategic for attaining the planned Outcomes. 

DEGREE TO WHICH OUTPUTS ARE STRATEGIC FOR DESIRED OUTCOMES 

Most projects report that the focus has indeed been on those Outputs that are critical for longer-term 
results. This is particularly the case for capacity building tasks, where they are strategic for the public 
sector to be able to deliver on their promises. The capacities being developed can be for direct service 
delivery, such as the health sector and social protection and children’s rights projects, while others 
were to assist the capacity across a sector to plan, monitor and report better, at national but at times 
also at provincial and municipal levels.  

The capacity development objectives are the most complicated ones and where delivery of Outputs 
have been the weakest. When discussing the strengthening of local planning capacities, for example, 
it is noted that basic skills have been learned but few municipalities have been able to implement the 
full planning cycle. With high staff rotation, those trained have also often left their original positions 
so the benefit from training is thus largely lost since the Outcome of being able to carry out a complete 
planning cycle is not attained.  

However, in the case of the project to strengthen public planning, two of five project components 
concluded successfully and thus could deliver on the Outcome. For two of the other components a re-

 
 
 
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organisation  of  the  hosting  ministry  meant  that  the  Outputs  were  no  longer  seen  as  strategic  and 
therefore not pursued and obviously the original Outcomes were no longer valid. The final component 
had all the Outputs delivered according to the original concept but then the Outcome itself was no 
longer interesting, so the finalised Outputs were subsequently discarded. The two components that 
concluded successfully were fairly compact and technical, so the delivery chain was shorter and easier 
to manage, so “keeping it simple” is of important when implementing environments are complex.   

In perhaps the clearest case of physical Outputs as key to project success, the training institute for the 
water sector was in fact finished. Because GoA did not provide the complementary inputs foreseen – 
equipment, furniture etc. – the building therefore exists as an empty shell: while the training that it 
was to  provide is  still very much needed in  the  country, this will not  be attained unless and until 
Angola is able to provide the missing inputs. So, while one set of Outputs that were focused on a 
highly  valid  Outcome  was  delivered  as  per  the  EU  commitment,  the  Outcome  for  the  time  will 
unfortunately not be possible.  

A number of projects carried out adjustments during the period. One survey question was thus to what 
extent this had any real consequences. 72% claimed this was the case, where 30% “Strongly agree”. 
This is significant since many start-up problems had to do with lack of knowledge of local conditions, 
and this answer indicates that projects learn and adjust.  

FINDINGS  

  The  projects  are  overall  well-designed  in  the  sense  that  Outputs  are  strategic  for  the 
achievement  of  defined  Outcomes.  The  Achilles  heel  has  been  to  deliver  on  the  foreseen 
Outputs.  This  has  been  true  for  project  designed  Outputs  but  there  are  also  cases  where 
necessary  complementary  inputs  from  Government  have  not  been  forthcoming,  preventing 
Outcome attainment. Overall Effectiveness is therefore only Acceptable.  

4.2 

IMPACT, SUSTAINABILITY, VALUE ADDED, COHERENCE, COMPLEMENTARITY  

These five dimensions of the EU programme are looked at project level. 

4.2.1  Impact  

When looking at the impact of the EU funded interventions, several dimensions were considered:  

  What are likely long-term effects on Angolan institutions, a key concern for the EU? 
  Where end beneficiaries were not Angolan institutions, what are likely longer-term effects?  
  To what extent has strategic management contributed to more and better longer-term Impact, 

and in that case, what can be said about the EU Delegation’s contribution? 

  Have longer-term results outside Luanda been significant? 

LONGER-TERM EFFECTS ON ANGOLAN INSTITUTIONS 

The  project  addressing  the  rights  of  the  child  seems  to  have  succeeded  in  establishing  long-term 
change: the understanding of children’s rights and the concept of protection has been strengthened; 
collaboration between police and social services has been improved; alternatives to incarceration are 
looked into; there is sensitization of judges as to the particular situation of youth.  

In terms of improvements to specific public institutions, success stories include the National Institute 
of Statistics (INE) and the SADC Secretariat under the support to national planning project. But these 
were only two of the five components of the project, with just over 28% of project funding. Despite 
the limited finances involved, several factors seem to explain the success: 

  These are technical bodies with clear mandates that do not suffer much political interference in 

their operations or management. 

 
 
 
 
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  Since they are technical bodies both staff and management are fairly stable – specific skills are 

called for – so staff and organisational continuity are good. 

  The capacity building requested was well-defined and derived from their respective mandates 
and therefore understood, supported and wanted by both management and the staff involved – 
there was strong and continuous ownership to the process and the results. 

  While the project was not of very long duration, the kinds of additional capacity development 
these bodies requested was quite specific and successfully delivered during the project period 
– there do not seem to have been any pending matters or incomplete input deliveries. 

Other projects experienced what appears to be durable success in particular fields. The development 
of an information management system, SIGAS, for social action sector as well as the development 
and roll-out of the cash transfer programme were important achievements. The training provided for 
the  staff  dealing  with  international  trade  and  agreement  issues  also  appears  to  have  helped  the 
Ministry  of  Trade  improved  its  ability  to  negotiate  in  the  interests  of  Angola,  and  similar 
improvements have been reported in the water supply and sanitation sectors.  

What is unclear is the extent to which the skills upgrading is permanent and has led to improvements 
in service delivery. In several projects, it seems clear that results were not durable or well embedded 
in the organisation. One of the PALOP projects hoped to strengthen the human resources management 
and  training  capacities  in  the  health  sector.  The  first  issue  in  particular  requires  a  change  in 
organisational culture and perhaps structure – it is not a technical issue of getting management skills 
in place but requires thinking around career paths, promotions criteria etc. These are complicated and 
often politically contentious in big organisations like a ministry of health. The timeline was therefore 
too  short,  and  the  understanding  of  how  such  complex  organisational  changes  can  be  produced 
probably  incomplete.  Another  factor  was  that  there  were  changes  at  the  top,  and  one  incoming 
Minister made it quite clear that this issue was no longer seen as critical, so the political support for 
the change process was lost. In another health sector project, tools and training for provincial and 
municipal  level  staff  were  provided  but  the  longer-term  effects  are  called  into  question,  in  part 
because training was insufficient, and some training and tools were not fully appropriate to the local 
situation.  Similar  issues  were  raised  regarding  the  training  and  tools  provided  for  municipalities 
through the Social Action Fund.  

There are also cases of missed opportunities, where the FRESAN Midterm Evaluation (MTE) notes 
that the project has not involved provincial authorities and technical bodies in a manner that could 
have contributed to their longer-term capacities. While it is acknowledged that neither the project nor 
the MTE have assessed the political commitment to and technical capacity of these bodies to actively 
participate, it is unusual that a project addressing fundamental livelihoods problems does not involve 
those public bodies that are mandated to address these issues over time. 

On the other hand, there are examples of important longer-term effects that were not planned. While 
the PALOP project supporting the rule of law was seen as not very successful, one of the results of 
the  project  was  that  the  six  Angolan  institutions  involved  established  links  and  communications, 
which has been beneficial for the field since a number of these do not normally interact.   

In the survey, about half the respondents believe that Angolan institutions will continue to function 
better after the project ends, which is a very positive finding, though nearly 20% hold the opposite 
view.  Furthermore,  half  of  the  respondents  believe  that  the  projects  have  produced  unforeseen 
positive longer-term effects.  

LONGER-TERM EFFECTS ON ANGOLAN BENEFICIARY GROUPS  

The examples that are pointed to are again the ones noted above: the project on children’s rights is 
expected to make a difference in how youth who have committed crimes are seen and treated by both 
social services, the police and the courts. The extent to which this will happen across Angola is of 

 
 
24  Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 

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course open to question, but a new set of principles seem to have been established that presumably 
will impact actual practice over time.  

A similar effect can be seen with the social action project, where the improved planning instruments 
and  the  cash  distribution  programme  are  expected  to  improve  the  public  sector’s  service  delivery 
(though  the  cash  programme  may  be  superseded  by  the  much  larger  and  somewhat  different 
programme funded through a World Bank credit). The trade program has evidently also improved the 
relations between the public sector and the business community.  

Regarding direct service delivery, in a number of municipalities and provinces, improved tools and 
skills are evidently ensuring better access to and quality of services in fields like health including 
mother-child health care, water and sanitation.  It is unclear how widespread and sustainable these 
service improvements are, however. A main concern raised is high staff rotation, meaning that when 
trained staff are moved to a locality where management or fellow staff have not received this training, 
it becomes difficult for these civil servants to continue applying their acquired skills.  

While it is early days for ascertaining the effects of FRESAN on the intended beneficiaries, the MTE 
points to a number of inappropriate initiatives undertaken, all the more disturbing since the report 
points to a lack of adherence to existing EU standards and experiences for addressing the kinds of 
challenges being faced in southern Angola. Of equal importance is the observation that the kinds of 
transformation desired “is a process that takes many years of implementation to have results. This 
constraint  should  have  been  clearly  addressed  into  the  programme  formulation  document,  with 
realistic indicators set in the logframe” (ibid, p 36).  

The feedback from CSOs is more positive, where Impact supposedly is greater both in terms of their 
participation in municipal consultation forums but also in direct service delivery. Once again this is 
attributed  to  the  fact  that  the  implementing  partners  tend  to  be  peers  and  thus  are  close  to  the 
participating  CSOs  in  terms  of  experience  and  commitments,  but  also  have  a  genuine  own 
commitment to the issues addressed and communities served.  

Nearly half the survey respondents believe that the positive effects will continue after the respective 
project ends, which is more positive than the general assessments in evaluations and ROM reports.  

STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT  

Regarding strategic management of projects, most comments point to a series of weaknesses: 

  The  key  concern  is  that  projects  had  centralised  management,  some  based  outside  Angola, 
which  limited  flexibility  and  context-sensitivity.  For  regional  PALOP  projects  it  could  be 
expected that head offices were not in Angola, but for other projects this was a serious problem. 
  A number of projects were multi-actor or cutting across different administrative units within 
the same ministry. These projects required various forms of coordination mechanisms, some of 
which never really worked well, others that deteriorated over time, so that spill-over effects and 
hoped-for synergies did not appear. 

  Changes to political leadership was a problem, where ministers’ individual preferences rather 
than longer-term sector priorities determined whether a project was seen as useful or not. 
  The strategic role of a given project as compared to the priority sectors presented in the NIPs 
was not always obvious. Some projects were expected to contribute to developing new policies 
and standards, but this strategic focus was not consistent across the portfolio.  

  Some observers felt Delegation staff could have played a more active role in maintaining the 
strategic focus or the broader coordination mechanisms in place when these began weakening. 
But it is unclear how far Delegation staff can or should go in this regard, however, as there is a 
need for local ownership and leadership for projects to perform and provide longer-term results.  

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 
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25 

  A number of projects did, however, adjust to changing circumstances and new opportunities, 
and some  IPs changed team  staff that did  not  perform, including some team  leaders.  Under 
difficult implementation conditions and in a period when GoA officials were neither focused 
on EU-financed interventions nor happy with some of the objectives being pursued, the room 
for expansive initiatives were clearly constrained. The clearest example was the expulsion of 
the  team  leader  on  a  project  when  she  pursued  the  formal  objective  of  the  intervention  of 
strengthening the voice and role of non-state actors.  

While one might point to lost opportunities with regards to more strategic thinking, during the first 
ten years of this 13-year period actual options were largely defined/constrained by GoA.  

LONGER-TERM EFFECTS OUTSIDE LUANDA  

The impact of the EU collaboration outside Luanda has been difficult to gauge. One thing is that most 
projects that did have activities outside the capital tended to restrict these to a few provinces, and 
sometimes  to  specific  municipalities  within  those  provinces.  This  was  based  on  the  pragmatic 
realisation that transportation is both costly and difficult if one wants to reach the entire country. Most 
projects  therefore  had  a  tightly  defined  area  of  operations.  The  key  exception  is  the  cash  transfer 
programme,  which  was  to  operate  country-wide  after  the  pilot  phase  in  three  provinces,  and  the 
children’s rights intervention is in principle also to have pan-territorial reach.  

The  CSO  interventions  seem  to  have  more  sustainable  impact  where  they  are  active.  Each  one, 
however, tends to be rather small, so while the sustainability may be good the actual impact in terms 
of number of citizens reached and social services and societal dimensions influenced is very limited.  

The information on results and consequences of interventions outside Luanda is limited so difficult 
to assess what society-level impacts might be across the country, but indications are they are limited. 

FINDINGS  
 

Impact on Angolan institutions varies considerably. There are cases of clear improvements of 
more  technical  bodies,  but  also  with  regards  to  policy  instruments  such  as  planning  and 
management  tools.  There  are  some  success  stories  when  it  comes  to  national  policy 
(children/youth rights) and national services (cash transfer programme). 

  Staff coverage, comprehensiveness and relevance of skills upgrading has varied considerably. 
Attempts  at  capacity  development  outside  Luanda  has  faced  challenges  in  terms  of  contents, 
duration of training, and staff rotations. Staff rotation in particular is pointed to as a key reason 
that new knowledge/skills tend to be lost over time.   

  Changes in political leadership is a problem that seriously affects the ability of public bodies to 
stick to a longer-term development path. This consistency is crucial for improvements to become 
embedded so that impact is maintained.  

  Regarding direct service delivery, results are scattered and thus less likely to be permanent. While 
feedback from CSOs is more positive, results are small-scale and dispersed, making it difficult 
to see any kind of societal impact, though information is scarce on this point.  

  Projects  with  complex  management  or  coordination  structures  have  generally  experienced  a 
deterioration in management performance, despite being set up to be strategic in their thinking 
and functioning. 

  The real constraining factor during the first ten years of the evaluation period, however, was a 
government that was not very committed to the EU programme or even constrained activities it 
did not approve of.  

  Results outside Luanda have tended to be more fragmented, small-scale, not replicated and as 

much dependent on the particular local circumstances as on structural issues. 

 
 
 
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4.2.2  Sustainability  

Sustainability is looked at along two dimensions: permanence of the results achieved, and the capacity 
to continue delivering the services are sustainable. 

Regarding results, the team looked at two dimensions. The first is whether beneficiaries will continue 
to enjoy the improved situation caused by the project. The other asks if structural changes brought 
about  by  the  project  are  likely  to  remain  –  changes  to  legal  or  organisational  structures  that  are 
assumed to affect beneficiaries in a positive manner. 

The operational sustainability is divided into two dimensions. The first concerns the ability of the 
providers to maintain financial and economic viability of the  activity while the second asks if the 
technical skills necessary for continued service delivery are in place.  

SUSTAINABILITY OF RESULTS FOR TARGET GROUPS AND FINAL BENEFICIARIES 

Regarding sustainability, a distinction is made between the target group and the final beneficiaries. 
The former is directed at those who are directly engaged in and benefit from project activities, such 
as public officials being trained. The final beneficiaries are those who are meant to benefit from the 
increased capacities of the trained civil servants: the inhabitants of communities where the social cash 
distribution programme has been set up; the population that is to benefit from better health services 
due to better trained health personnel, etc.  

Regarding longer-term effects for target groups, projects where staff have technical tasks at central 
level seem to be the most successful in this regard: training for central planning systems like SIGAS 
in social assistance and the staff in INE and the SADC Secretariat are expected to retain their skills.  

For more generalised skills upgrading, and in particular for staff at provincial and municipal levels, 
reports point to two issues. The first is that the duration and intensity of training is often not sufficient 
for new skills to become fully embedded in the respective organisations. The other problem is the 
high staff turn-over/rotation in the public sector, since when staff leave the positions for which they 
had received training, their new skills are to a large extent become lost. This means sustainability of 
new capacities tend to be low in sectors and organisational levels where staff rotation is high.  

A  more  positive  picture  emerges  in  the  justice  for  children  project,  which  benefitted  two  factors. 
There are changes to the formal frameworks for the sector meaning rules for behaviour are changed. 
In addition, since there are several institutions engaged that have complementary roles, there is a joint 
interest  in  each  body  carrying  out  its  new  role  since  without  this,  the  performance  of  the  other 
organisations will suffer.  

When it comes to final beneficiaries, much less is known since neither this study nor the studies on 
individual projects have much information on these Outcome level results.  The improved skills of 
service providers in the health sector, for example, are considered vulnerable to factors that weaken 
sustainability, with the result that final beneficiaries may not experience sustainability in health care 
over  time.  In  other  projects,  the  picture  is  different:  the  changes  to  children’s  rights  are  probably 
sustainable; changes to the treatment of juvenile delinquents may improve – these issues require more 
careful tracking of results out along the delivery chain of each project.  

Despite  the  issues  raised  in  the  various  performance  reports,  over  47%  of  the  survey  respondents 
believe that beneficiaries will be able to maintain their improved situation after the project ends. But 
a significant 16% disagree, while about 35% do not have an opinion. But respondents’ opinions still 
come across as more positive than that gained from the written assessments, which may indicate that 
more recent experiences are seen as more positive than the historical ones. 

The results among CSOs are not uniform, but interviews point to more sustainability largely due to 
the self-interest and ownership among the organisations. Most of the CSOs are rather small and local 

 
 
 
 
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27 

so a decision to engage in capacity building is more likely to be grounded in a fairly coherent and 
comprehensive understanding across the entire organisation, a factor for ensuring sustainability. 

Regarding legal and organisational changes,  legal  changes  are something one would  expect  to  be 
fairly sustainable whereas organisational change may be susceptible to changing priorities at the top. 
When  it  comes  to  legal  and  institutional  changes,  these  are  largely  considered  sustainable.  The 
changes to the rights of the child, including birth registration, are now part of Angola’s legal code. 
Informants expect the improved status and treatment of youth who are brought before the courts to 
remain  in  place.  The  cash  transfer  programme  is  expected  to  remain  an  integral  part  of  Angola’s 
social protection system though the design and implementation may change.  

When  it  comes  to  organisational  change,  not  only  formal  structures  and  procedures  but  also 
behaviour, this is seen as dependent on political support being maintained and trained staff retained 
in post. The organisational improvements in the water and sanitation sectors as well as in health such 
as improved referral systems  are seen as positive but require continued support from the top.  The 
improvements to INE and the SADC Secretariat are seen as sustainable exactly because management 
and technical staff are supportive of the improvements. The introduction of the SIGAS system in the 
social affairs sector is considered positive and for the time being the necessary skills are in place to 
run and maintain it. The skills upgrading in the legal area to combat illicit financial flows etc is also 
seen as reasonably sustainable as again both management and staff are supportive. The studies that 
have been done under the auspices of ACOM remain available to the interested parties and constitute 
important  contributions  to  Angola’s  preparations  for  adherence  to  the  SADC  region’s  Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the EU. The networks created between public sector officials and 
business leaders in this connection are also likely to remain active, where the desire for successful 
EPA membership provides strong incentives for these gains to be maintained.  

The comment above regarding the CSO community seems to hold as far as any organisational changes 
are concerned. To the extent that CSOs have taken on board lessons regarding how better to organise 
their work and organisation, this is likely to remain in place for the reasons noted above: these are 
small organisations that are interested in learning and becoming better at what they do, so any desired 
improvements will be adapted, implemented and maintained, to the extent their resources permit. 

TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL/ECONOMIC SUSTAINABILITY 

When it comes to financial sustainability, Angola faces a difficult situation. The fiscal crisis means 
that financing for operations and maintenance of infrastructure and staff retention is reduced, so even 
if ownership and the desire to maintain improvements are strong, the ability to do so is reduced.  

Central  authorities  clearly  have  more  resources  than  lower-level  administrative  units:  as  noted, 
management systems, planning and decision-making tools and training centres such as for economic 
and financial management that are seen as useful are being maintained and used.   

The problems are much greater at provincial and district levels. At the same time, however, reports 
note that municipalities are trying to keep improved health facilities running since they provide key 
services  to  the  population,  new  planning  instruments  and  systems  when  they  have  the  skills,  are 
applied by some local administrations as they are helpful. 

The trend may therefore be somewhat contradictory regarding local level sustainability. On the one 
hand the financial situation has worsened considerably over the last years. At the same time, there 
appears to be more interest in providing better services, both through more collaboration with non-
state actors and applying new own capacities, infrastructure and instruments to the extent possible.  

Regarding skills/technical sustainability, this is in large part a function of human resources policies 
in  place:  stable  institutions  that  retain  staff  and  focus  on  delivering  technical  services  are  able  to 
absorb and apply new skills whereas entities with high staff turnover quickly lose new knowledge.   

 
 
 
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FINDINGS  

  In the public sector, sustainability of new skills is most likely in stable organisations at central 
level. The greatest threat is high staff rotation, particularly at provincial and municipal levels. 
  When the framework for applying the new skills is in place, for example when changes in rules 

or legislation have been consolidated, this helps sustain new skills and behaviour. 

  Sustainability  of  benefits  to  final  beneficiaries  of  improved  public  sector  services  depends 
largely on whether local public financing is available to maintain the service stream. With the 
country’s fiscal crisis, studies tend to be pessimistic while survey results are more positive. 
  CSO respondents are positive regarding sustainability of new knowledge, largely because their 
projects are based on own core mandates so there is strong commitment to maintain and apply 
new skills. But the more permanent learning and experience exchange platforms foreseen by 
the EU are evidently not functioning, raising questions regarding long-term sustainability. 
  Organisational change can be sustained provided such change is supported by revised rules or 
laws. If not, such changes are susceptible to politics, where incoming ministers have in some 
instances changed priorities so that foreseen project results wither away. 

4.2.3  Value Added, Coherence and Complementarity of the EU Programme  

The ToR asks that the evaluation looks at three dimensions beyond the five standard OECD criteria: 
  The value added that the EU programme provided to member state (MS) financed activities. 
  The  coherence  of  the  EU  programme  –  the  extent  to  which  projects  had  links  to  other  EU 
activities and were derived from overarching objectives of EU’s collaboration with Angola. 

  The complementarity of the EU projects with those of other actors in Angola.  

VALUE ADDED OF EU PROGRAMME 

The EU should not overlap or compete with or undermine activities of MS but should rather ensure 
that when it is engaged in a sector where a MS is active, that it supports and complements what the 
MS is doing, providing value added to the MS activity.   

While  Development  Partner  Group  meetings  take  place,  few  MS  have  active  development 
programmes, where most grant financing is for local or own-country NGOs active in Angola – focus 
is  rather  on  commercial  relations.  The  value-added  EU  can  offer  is  therefore  limited.  The  survey 
shows, however, that the Delegation is seen as constructive, and this is largely because there is a good 
dialogue within the EU community in Luanda, not least of all because it is fairly small. 

COHERENCE OF THE EU PROGRAMME  

The  external  coherence  – the extent to  which the  EU programme  is  aligned with  GoA’s  National 
Development Programme and other national priorities – the consensus is that this is the case, as was 
noted also when discussing the NIPs. 

Regarding internal coherence of the programme, all projects have clear links to the respective NIP. 
The extent to which the individual project is strategic for that sector or issue is less clear, though the 
background documents for the individual projects generally provide a good overview of the sector 
and the issues that need to be addressed, and thus a justification for the individual project. 

There are not many linkages across projects, however – clusters that might generate synergies across 
individual interventions. Exceptions include the support to the water and sanitation sectors and the 
water  sector  training  institute  but  where  the  hoped-for  synergy  never  happened  since  the  training 
centre has not become operational. Two health sector interventions were complementary but did not 
fulfil original expectations as a new minister showed less interest.  

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 
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29 

What is missing is more systematic thinking around how to address more deep-seated problems, and 
in particular the overarching concern regarding lack of capacity in the public sector.  

COMPLEMENTARITY OF EU PROGRAMME 

The  complementarity  issue  concerns  the  extent  to  which  EU  funded  activities  have  adjusted  their 
design and implementation to the interventions by other actors, such as UN agencies, international 
financial institutions (World Bank, African Development Bank, IMF) and bilateral donors. 

Background documentation for EU projects is generally comprehensive regarding related activities. 
The extent to which this information has led to adjustments in design is not known, but the opinion 
of the respondents to the survey indicates that the EU programme management listens: nearly 45% 
“Agree” and 25% “Strongly agree” that the EU takes these other activities into account in its own 
project designs .  

In  the  project  reporting,  several  such  links  are  noted,  in  particular  to  UN  agencies  like  UNICEF. 
While UNICEF is an implementing partner on some EU projects, it also has own funding for activities 
in the fields of health care, the situation of children, water and sanitation, with WHO also engaged 
on two projects. Several projects have links to activities funded by the World Bank (WB) and the 
African  Development  Bank  (AfDB).  Regarding  CSO  support,  a  number  of  bilateral  donors  and 
foreign NGOs are mentioned as actors the EU was aware of and to some extent collaborated with. 

The large-scale FRESAN project works with a number of local CSOs but is faulted for not taking 
advantage  of  related  activities,  where  the  midterm  evaluation  refers  to  activities  supported  by  the 
AfDB, the WB, UN agencies and governmental bodies that have not been reached out to.  

What is also seen, however, is that once projects start up, they may not be equally adept at adjusting 
to other activities taking place. One case pointed to is APROSOC, which did not seek to see how its 
cash distribution programme could contribute to but also adjust to the much larger programme being 
funded  through  a  WB  credit.  However,  once  a  project  has  been  signed,  management  focuses  on 
delivering against the agreed results framework. The other issue is that such adjustments are first and 
foremost an Angolan responsibility: If Angola has accepted a complementary activity, then it is for 
the authorities to ensure that linkages and collaboration are established and in the manner they want. 
This is not for an external actor to decide. 

FINDINGS  

  The EU is seen as constructive in trying to provide value added to activities of member states 
(MS). In practice this is limited, since only a few MS have substantial aid activities in Angola. 
  The EU programme is coherent in terms of being aligned to Angola’s National Development 
Plan and to the EU’s own NIPs. There are few direct links across EU projects, however, and 
no visible overarching programme thinking, such as a clear capacity development approach. 
  The complementarity of the EU projects with those of other actors in Angola is seen as good. 
There  is  collaboration  with  a  number  of  UN  agencies,  the  World  Bank  and  African 
Development  Bank  on  numerous  projects  though  it  is  noted  that  the  biggest  project  on  the 
ground has not reached out to other activities in those provinces.  

  Once  implementation  starts,  however,  project  management  becomes  very  focused  on 
implementing the project as per agreement and not so much on possible synergies underway. 
This issue is first and foremost for the Angolan project owners to handle.  

4.3  CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT AND POLICY DIALOGUE 

Capacity development (CD) is a key component of many interventions of the EU’s programme but 
where results have in general been disappointing. Understanding barriers to success is important for 
future programming, leading the Delegation to ask that this issue be paid particular attention.  

 
 
30  Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 

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Another key dimension is the comprehensive EU-Angola policy dialogue with the Joint Way Forward 
(JWF) process that was agreed in 2012, making Angola the only African country apart from South 
Africa where the EU has such a continuous high-level dialogue.  

4.3.1  Capacity Development and Technical Assistance 

The main modality of CD has been through the provision of technical assistance (TA). The evaluation 
looked at two issues: (i) the cost efficiency, timeliness, and appropriateness of CD and TA, and (ii) 
general issues regarding CD in Angola that may be useful for future CD planning. 

TIMELINESS AND COST EFFICIENCY 

Most projects, as noted earlier, experienced delays in the start-up of activities, where provision of the 
TA has been a constant preoccupation. This has evidently decreased over time, in part because the 
general  barriers  to  efficiency  (see  above)  have  diminished  over  time.  Some  of  the  same  IPs  are 
contracted over time, so  they have developed a history and  built infrastructure on the ground that 
make  it  easier  to  contract  the  right  experts  and  facilitate  their  arrival  and  insertion  in  the  local 
organisation.  But  there  are  examples  of  recent  projects  with  40  months  of  start-up  delays  or  the 
phasing-in of different components of the project CD was not optimal. And it remains difficult to 
recruit for posts outside Luanda. FRESAN, working in the three southern provinces, has experienced 
serious delays for a number of posts, including being able to fill the posts with the requisite skills.  

When  it  comes  to  cost-effectiveness,  documentation  and  interviews  claim  that  at  least  on  some 
projects Angolan milieus could have done the job at lower cost and would have been available from 
project signature to begin implementation, thus reducing or eliminating the delays. Furthermore, the 
high administrative costs of projects where management and parts of the administration were in the 
home country of the consulting company were difficult to justify.  

APPROPRIATENESS OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 

When it comes to the appropriateness of the TA provided, there were some contradictory views. On 
the one hand, most TA was seen as appropriate and useful, providing training and solving problems, 
and providers like UNICEF were praised for their knowledge of the situation and sector. Longer-term 
experts were preferred as they provided continuous and better-informed advice, and their mentoring 
function was praised.  

On the other hand, approaches such as “cascade training” where persons trained are expected to train 
others  –  often  at  lower  levels  of  the  public  administration  –  have  not  worked  well24.  These 
observations are fairly consistent across the assessments: while training is praised, the TA staff did 
not  really  understand  context  well;  the  approach  taken  was  too  general  and  not  tailored  to  the 
particular context of the Angolan organization; the training was not very useful outside Luanda; etc. 
Short-term  missions  were  also  generally  seen  as  less  useful:  they  were  too  technical,  focused  on 
solving specific problems rather than contributing to building more locally relevant capacity.  

The most important complaint was that there was little “building capacity to produce capacity”: when 
the external experts left there was not any capacity or system in place to ensure that these skills could 
continue  to  be  developed  locally  with  Angolan  capacities.  To  the  extent  that  there  would  be  a 
continuous need for that particular skill, the country would remain dependent on external assistance 

24 This should not be confused with “training of trainers”, since there is no presumption with the “cascade training” that the persons 
being trained in themselves are going to continue being trainers – it is rather that they will provide some skills orientation to colleagues 
so that they can carry out some of the same tasks. The big difference is that for “training of trainers”, the persons selected are chosen 
in part based on pedagogical skills and interest. With cascade training, one might easily end up with staff who are not very good at 
conveying new messages or have much interest in this.   

 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
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31 

to provide this. The exceptions were the training centres – for the water sector, the regional centre in 
economic and financial management, and the support for technical and vocational training, RETFOP.  

However, the first one was never made operational due to missing inputs from GoA . The regional 
training centre, while highly relevant for all the PALOP countries, is located in Lubango, a two-hour 
twice-a-week flight south of Luanda, so neither easy to attract long-term TA nor very attractive for 
PALOP  participants  to  travel  there  for  training.  Because  of  a  40-month  delay  in  start-up, 
results/achievements are not yet clear.   

On the other hand, TA staff experienced that their Angolan counterparts were not as well prepared as 
stated  in  the  documents,  so  the  skills  and  knowledge  the  TA  staff  were  offering  were  not  taken 
advantage of, meaning there was serious wastage in the use of highly skilled expertise.  

CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT  

When reviewing the general experience of CD in Angola, several issues became apparent. 

The first is the extent to which the political economy of the public sector and thus the role of public 
administration is understood. The MPLA has had a monopoly of political power and control since 
1975, so over this period has shaped the state to its concerns. The consequences for how ministries 
are organised, set priorities and pursue policies need to be understood in light of this.  

The importance and capacities of public bodies vary. Ministries of finance tend to be better funded 
with  qualified staff that allow for key issues to  be addressed. Other ministries face tighter budget 
ceilings  with  consequences  for  staffing  levels  and  staff  qualifications.  The  preconditions  for  CD 
therefore vary systematically: some ministries are understaffed with employees who may not have a 
strong technical background for the issues they are to handle, often do not have a very conducive 
working  environment,  poor  pay,  and  few  incentives  to  perform  since  management  may  be  more 
concerned with control than quality of delivery. Recruitment and promotion are not necessarily based 
on transparent and meritocratic criteria, staff feel overwhelmed by the range of tasks they are to cover, 
bureaucracy  is  rampant  and  render  processes  dysfunctional;  staff  do  not  feel  motivated  by 
management  to  take  risks  and  look  for  new  ways  of  delivering;  and  colleagues  voice  similar 
frustrations.  More  important,  perhaps,  is  a  long  tradition  of  the  public  sector  being  subject  to  the 
control of the party, and that what is rewarded is loyalty to the political leadership.  

Under these circumstances, expecting staff to take on new tasks, upgrade their skills and work across 
institutional boundary lines when that is not going to be rewarded by own management is a big ask.  

This organisational culture is a determining factor for what can be expected and how to insert new 
tasks and ways of doing business in a given organisation.  

But while organisational culture is fairly stable in terms of how organisation works, political volatility 
can be high: ministers have changed quite often in several ministries, and new ministers have shifted 
priorities  without  the  reasons  being  clear  to  staff.  There  is  therefore  little  incentive  for  pushing 
innovative changes: there is no telling how a new minister may react to such initiatives.  

Designing  CD  interventions  under  such  circumstances  thus  requires  in-depth  knowledge  and 
understanding of the general dynamics of the public sector; the culture of the particular public body 
that  is  to  host  the  CD  project;  identify  what  are  actual  capacities  in  place  that  can  be  built  on; 
understand the incentives environment  for the staff  expected to  be on the project  and what  might 
motivate them and management to commit to medium-term results; establish realistic improvements 
to  skills,  organisational  culture,  structure  and  performance  and  how  this  is  to  translate  into 
monitorable performance improvements. 

This is a tall order and requires a more long-term and comprehensive approach to CD. The problem 
is that without a more structured framework for the individual CD intervention, results are likely to 

 
 
32  Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 

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fall short of what is being desired. The Government clearly must play the key role, and other actors 
supporting CD should be invited to join this more comprehensive approach to CD25.  

Exactly what such a framework would consist of and how various actors can contribute would need 
to be discussed with the national authorities. Given the considerable resources that annually are spent 
on various forms of capacity  development, in  the public, business  and  civic sectors, it may make 
sense  to  rethink  the  fundamental  approach  to  CD,  and  in  particular  the  concern  of  how  to  build 
“capacity  to  produce  capacity”:  what  are  the  links  to  the  formal  education  sector,  what  are  the 
demands of the labour market over the medium term, and thus how can the international community 
best help Angola balance out its labour supply and demand requirements in the best way?  

FINDINGS  

  Most EU-funded interventions have Capacity Development (CD) components. The EU further 
provides  support to formal  training  centres and  more  recently  also  to  tertiary  education,  yet 
there is no comprehensive CD approach, meaning structure and approach vary across projects.  
  While many projects experienced serious delays in the start-up of activities, particularly in the 
early projects, the TA is seen as  largely  being provided in a timely manner. This somewhat 
contradictory finding is in part explained by the fact that many of the delays had to do with 
formal aspects of project start-up. Once this was in place, much of the TA was provided more 
or less on schedule. 

  Cost effectiveness was questioned in some cases. It was argued that projects could have used 
more Angolan skills and companies. While this evaluation has not been in a position to validate 
this claim, it is obviously an important issue that should be pursued.  

  Concerning appropriateness of the TA provided, long-term TA was seen as positive since it 
allowed expert/s to understand issues more carefully. Hence, they could provide mentoring and 
oversight as well as more formal skills development. 

  While the training centres supported were to address important needs, the actual experience has 
been mixed: one centre never opened, a second was located in a difficult-to-access city, and the 
third one just recently started up so there are no results yet. That such critical infrastructure for 
the country’s long-term skills development performs so poorly is unfortunate. 

  The  results  reporting  on  CD  activities  is  poor.  Baselines  are  missing  and  there  is  a  lack  of 
indicators for tracing development from activities to Outputs to likely or desired Outcomes. 
  The challenge for the individual project is that neither the country nor the EU appear to have 
an overarching framework for identifying needs and tracking performance. The costs of doing 
this for each project is prohibitive, so a more comprehensive approach would be helpful to the 
individual intervention. 

  CD is complicated and adjustments are often required, yet project agreements lock the parties 
to an approach that may turn out not to be optimal. While addenda are possible, they can be 
cumbersome  and  often  happen  fairly  late  while  early  piloting  on  complex  projects  can  test 

25 Some fields, while strategic, may have less of a need and have less to contribute to such a CD strategy because what is needed in 
their fields and the tools for assessing situations exist. The World Bank and the IMF have long experience in analysing and supporting 
ministries of finance and central banks and can use Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability for overarching analyses and more 
specialised  tools  like  the  Tax  Administration  Diagnostic  Assessment  Tool  (TADAT)  for  boring  down  into  specific  units.  The 
International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) is in a similar situation since the mandate/role of SAIs are similar 
across the globe, permitting INTOSAI to use its own performance assessment framework to guide possible TA/ CD support to national 
supreme audit institutions.  

 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 
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33 

assumptions and allow for adjustments before large-scale implementation is initiated26. The EU 
is well equipped for such an approach since the ROM review tool is well suited for summarising 
lessons from a pilot.  

  The EU in Angola has not applied an overarching framework for designing and tracking CD 
performance, despite the EU having a structured approach27. Applying such a framework would 
ensure greater coherence across projects and could also support GoA overall efforts. 

4.3.2  Policy Dialogue and Framework for EU Collaboration  

The 2012 agreement expresses a shared willingness “to address jointly a number of global issues of 
common interest and thus transcend relations merely based on Aid and Development”. The stated 
intention between the two parties was “to reinforce the political dialogue and engage in more active 
political cooperation”, founded on the Cotonou Agreement. The purpose of the dialogue was to take 
the relations “to a higher level”, guided by principles of democracy and rule-of-law, sovereignty and 
respect for territorial integrity, human rights, and good governance – key EU principles – and “the 
interdependence  between  Africa  and  Europe  in  a  globalised  world”.  Commitment  to  regional 
cooperation and institutions was identified as a key element of JWF along with conflict prevention 
and a common interest to address migration and displacement of populations affected by unrest and 
political crisis. In the JWF, Angola and the EU also commit themselves to the promotion of good 
governance, human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as the fight against corruption. 

The  JWF  consists  of  High-Level  Ministerial  meetings  and  Senior  Officials  meetings.  During  the 
fourth  2016  JWF  discussions  four  priorities  were  agreed  to:  (i)  peace  and  security,  (ii)  good 
governance and human resources, (iii) economic cooperation and trade, and (iv) energy. The fifth 
meeting in 2020 addressed more political matters: regional political and security priorities; security 
and defence; trade; Covid-1928. 

In the context of the 2030 Agenda and in line with the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES, 2007), the 
dialogue within this Action was to enhance the political cooperation in priority areas of relevance for 
the implementation of the NIP 2014-2020. The dialogue is now continuing beyond that period. 

While the original agreement was a fairly general one, the following High-level Meeting (HLM) only 
took place four years after the agreement was signed. The process has accelerated lately, addressing 
a wider range of issue while at the same time becoming more specific and operational, as a reflection 
of the new government’s interest in strengthening its ties with the EU and benefitting from the greater 
range of possibilities available.  

A project has been established to promote technical follow-up initiatives from the JWF process. This 
is to support the exchange of policies, the sharing of best practices and testing of these with minor 
interventions. A number of these areas are politically sensitive for Angola (Textbox 1).  

The policy dialogue is highly appreciated: over 67% of those surveyed agree that this has been and is 
important for the relations between the parties. What is perhaps more important is the extent to which 
parties believe the dialogue has led to practical improvements. The EU has seen a significant increase 
in  GoA  interest  in  this  dialogue  after  the  election  of  President  Lourenço.  It  is  believed  that 

26 A risk-reward analytical framework now in use in countries like Norway has found that risk-studies prepared before implementation 
will miss out on a few actual risks and challenges simply because only during implementation will actual barriers be identified. Another 
element was that once a project had spent 10% of its budget, one would be able to identify 90% of total risks the project would likely 
face, meaning that doing a risk analysis towards the end of a pilot phase is often the most cost-effective quality assurance step in a 
project cycle.  
27  See  EuropeAid  (2005),  “Institutional  Assessment  and  Capacity  Development:  Why,  what  and how”.  Tools  and  methods  Series, 
Reference  Document  No 
https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/public-cd-tc/documents/institutional-assessment-and-capacity-
1, 
development-why-what-and-how-0   
28 See https://europa.eu/newsroom/content/5th-angola-eu-ministerial-meeting-joint-way-forward_en  

 
 
                                                 
 
34  Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 

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anticorruption measures taken in previous years, such as the conveniently timed “Luanda Leaks” (see 
footnote 9), were intended to legitimize Angola in the view of Western, not least EU, partners.  

Angola  has  previously  given  the  highest  priority  to  bilateral  rather  than  multilateral  relations, 
somewhat in contrast to the expressed priority of the JWF framework. This is particularly the case in 
relations of relevance to the country’s most sensitive security interests, such as with the two Congos. 
as  national  security  concerns  are  important  when  it  comes  to  Angola’s  relations  to  other  African 
countries. Angola is, however, showing an increasing interest in working with the African Union and 
the three subregional instruments to which it belongs: the Southern Africa Development Community 
(SADC),  the  Economic  Community  of  Central  African  States  (ECCAS)  and  the  International 
Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), now even holding the presidency of the latter two. 
The renewed interest in joining the EU-SADC Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) is seen to be 
as much driven by politics as the economic aspects.  

Textbox 1: Priority Areas for Policy Dialogue 

Several priority areas have been identified for the policy dialogue: 

  Peace  and  security,  recognizing  the  unquestionable  legitimacy  of  the  UN  on  international  peace  and 

security matters. 

  Migration and mobility. 

  Good governance, human rights and fundamental freedom, fight against corruption. 

  Economic growth  and sustainable  development based on  a strong  and diversified  economy,  where it is 
stated in the agreement that a strong economy in Angola rests on its functional and structural diversification 
and on improved economic governance. 

  Environmental  sustainability  and  climate  change,  where  the  two  parties  consider  environmental 
degradation  and  climate  change  to  undermine  sustainable  development.  The  supply  of  sustainable  and 
environmentally friendly energy, not least in rural areas, is considered to be a precondition for the promotion 
of sustainable socio-economic growth in line with the Paris agreement. 

  Science and technology are recognized as important for growth and global competitiveness. Angola and 

the EU will therefore intensify cooperation in ICT.  

  Training and education: improved knowledge and human resource skills are also seen as fundamental for 
economic growth. Highly developed capacity at tertiary level through networking, mobility of students and 
researchers, institutional support and innovation will therefore be emphasized. The participation of a greater 
number of Angolan students and scholars in the “EU Erasmus Mundus” programme and access to other 
EU educational instruments will therefore be facilitated. 

The policy dialogue is also seen to have made the EU adjust its interventions to be more aligned to 
GoA priorities and concerns, but the opposite is also seen as true: Angola listens more to the EU and 
engages positively due to this. When it comes to the impact on projects, however, the picture – while 
still quite positive – is not quite as rosy. In the survey, 57% believe the policy dialogue has made 
positive contributions, and almost nobody believes it has contributed negatively. When it comes to 
concrete project impacts, however, these are more difficult to identify since few projects have been 
developed and signed after the election of President Lourenço. 

Textbox 2: Progress attributed to the Policy Dialogue. 

Green deal: 

The Fifth JWF HLM identified the EU policy priority of the Green Deal and the transition to a low carbon society 
in the aftermath of the pandemic and climate change resilience as a key area for joint action.  

One  successful  outcome  of  the  2020  policy  dialogue  was  to  have  encouraged  the  GoA  to  ratify  the  Paris 
Agreement. Based on this important policy decision, the Green Deal transition may be given an even more 
prominent role in the political dialogue in the time to come.  

Most academic observers in Angola claim that there is not  yet any sign of an active political interest in the 
transition to green energy on the part of GoA, despite a general agreement that the country has no time to lose 
to prepare for a post-petroleum economy. Companies originating in EU countries (France, Italy) are now those 
most actively pursuing new hydrocarbon concessions in Angola. In its 2020  External Assistance Monitoring 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 
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35 

Report, the Delegation highlights that it has managed to establish a Climate Round Table between GoA and 
multilateral agencies, development banks and diplomatic missions, which is an encouraging step. 

Human rights: 

The JWF has created a specific EU-Angola Working Group as an arena for the political dialogue on human 
rights, where views were exchanged on “different topics of mutual interest”. The human rights impact of Covid-
19,  and  some  episodes  of  reported  excessive  use  of  police  force,  were  among  topics  discussed  last  year. 
Independently of JWF, there is also an ongoing policy dialogue in the framework of the Cotonou Agreement, 
with an annual meeting  with the participation of EU member states and the Ministry of Justice and Human 
Rights. The issue of disproportionate use of force by police against demonstrators was again discussed at this 
meeting. 

Trade and investment: 

Angola submitted a formal request to accede to the EU-SADC Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) in 
2020. Angola had participated in the original EPA negotiations but did not sign the Agreement that was signed 
in 2015 by the six other SADC countries. However, the future accession of Angola was already foreseen at 
that time and the EPA therefore contains a specific provision on this (Article 119 (3)). Negotiations can start 
once  the  Joint  Council,  which  includes  the  SADC  EPA  States  at  ministerial  level,  has  adopted  a  decision 
responding positively to Angola’s request. The adoption of this decision is still pending (as of late early May 
2021). The parties would officially launch negotiations immediately following this decision, and these should 
under normal circumstances be concluded in approximately one year.  

The 5th HLM also agreed to start exploratory talks on negotiations of an EU-Angola investment agreement, 
with focus on investment facilitation. Angola would be the first African country with such agreement. The aim 
is  to  contribute  to  the  diversification  of  Angola’s  economy,  another  important  EU  concern  where  most 
independent observers in Angola see little practical action from the Government’s side so far.  

FINDINGS  

  The high-level policy dialogue, based on the Joint Way Forward partnership, has evolved in 
scope, depth and regularity with the Lourenço regime. The dialogue has focused on overarching 
policy issues, including beyond Angola’s borders, encouraging better understanding on both 
sides. It has till now not addressed many project issues but may provide foundations for more 
comprehensive development cooperation going forward, including beyond the public sector. 

4.4  MAIN FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNED 

Based on the above, the findings and lessons that the team believes are the most relevant for the next 
step of identifying options and providing recommendations going forward are provided below. 

4.4.1  Main Findings  

The  NIPs  were  Highly  Relevant  but  Unrealistic  with  a  broad  dispersion  of  objectives,  with  risk 
analyses that did not address reasonable concerns regarding GoA commitments. The projects were 
also Highly Relevant, and in particular the support to non-state actors has been important, with the 
EU the single largest source of funding for this sector. 

Most projects have experienced serious delays, meaning time efficiency has been poor, though most 
have in the end delivered planned or amended level of Outputs. Delivery outside Luanda has generally 
been poorer than within Luanda, and better in the non-public sectors.  

Project management based in-country has delivered better results, while complex projects – PALOP, 
multi-component – have exhibited management inefficiencies. Output to Outcome Effectiveness has 
been acceptable, despite Angola presenting a difficult implementing environment: living costs are 
high,  social  services  lacking,  language  has  limited  the  recruitment  universe,  and  where  a  major 
challenge has been high staff turn-over in the public sector as well as changes in political leadership 
in some ministries which has led to sudden changes in priorities. Sustainability of skills upgrading is 
therefore generally poor except in national bodies with technical objectives. This is problematic since 

 
 
36  Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 

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capacity development (CD) is an overarching objective for EU support yet there is a lack of analysis 
of and reporting on CD results. 

The framework conditions for Angola-EU cooperation have changed considerably. The collapse of 
the petroleum market in 2014 followed by the pandemic in 2020 has reduced GoA’s fiscal space and 
ability to fulfil some of its project obligations. While the President elected at the end of 2017 came 
to power on a programme of combatting corruption, decentralising public administration, diversifying 
the economy and opening up political space, achievements to date are limited. On the other hand, the 
policy dialogue between Angola and the EU has become more open. Issues previously considered 
sensitive are now being discussed, which points to new areas for possible EU-Angola cooperation in 
the period to come.  

4.4.2  Conclusions  

While grant aid represents only a small fraction of the public budget, the current Government seems 
to appreciate the catalytic and strategic contribution external financial assistance can provide. This 
may allow for more innovative approaches to the collaboration, with more long-term thinking around 
thematics and sectors to support, ensuring more synergies between separate interventions in order to 
achieve more overarching objectives. 

A better understanding of the political and administrative structures, organisation and power relations 
will be necessary to identify where external support can have the greatest impact, including support 
to local level administration and development. 

The  private  sector  needs  to  play  a  central  role  if  economic  diversification  is  to  happen,  where 
Angola’s  adherence  to  the  Economic  Partnership  Agreement  (EPA)  and  new  instruments  like  the 
European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+) and Team Europe Initiatives (TEIs) open 
the door to much broader and innovative relations. 

Support  for  non-state  actors  should  be  increased,  more  strategic  and  long-term,  assisting  the 
establishment  of  shared  arenas  for  experience  sharing,  collaboration,  advocacy,  and  links  to  local 
administrations. This requires a commitment by GoA to allow more space for non-state actors.  

Capacity  development  should  be  the  central  pillar  of  EU  assistance.  There  is  a  need  for  a 
comprehensive and strategic approach based on careful analysis and systematic learning and testing. 
Given GoA’s diversification ambition, this strategy should have a labour-market perspective and clear 
links  to  the  education  sector,  providing  individual  projects  with  a  framework  to  ensure 
complementarity and attention to “building capacity to produce capacity”. 

While the Team Europe approach of mobilising the broader EU community is thus highly appropriate, 
the problems encountered by FRESAN as the largest, most strategic and complex project in Angola 
point to issues to bear in mind when designing comprehensive interventions such as TEIs:  

  Sustainable capacity development should be a key objective with a realistic intervention logic 
and timeline provided. The actual commitment and capacities of the public sector in national, 
provincial  and  municipal  administrations  that  are  to  contribute  to  and  benefit  from  the 
intervention should be well understood. A particular aspect is the interest in and capacity to 
work across administrative boundaries in the public sector. 

  Likely gaps in the supply of skills necessary to implement the project should be analysed in the 
context of the labour market and how the education  universe can address supply constraints 
over time. The time horizon for addressing these issues is typically well beyond those of the 
project so project design should be realistic in terms of expected capacity development results.   

  Decision  making  and  administrative  structures  need  to  straddle  two  competing  concerns: 
making  decision  making  and  implementation  authority  as  close  to  impact  levels  as  possible 
while  ensuring  full  information  sharing  and  consultative  processes  among  key  actors.  Of 

 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 
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37 

particular  importance  is  that  national  stakeholders  feel  fully  involved  and  consulted  on  key 
issues, realising that different stakeholders have differing and in areas competing agendas. 
  Where possible, institutional twinning may provide long-term partnerships and TAIEX short-
term support for strengthening key public sector capacities. But for such partnerships to work, 
careful planning and management commitment on both sides should be in place.  

  Given the generally weak capacities, organisational fragilities and heavy transaction costs in 
implementation, flexibility in design and implementation arrangements with piloting and other 
slower start-up steps should be used; active monitoring for close risk-management; proactive 
experience  sharing  for  learning  across  actors;  a  “strategic  reserve”  in  the  budgets  to  exploit 
windows of opportunity. While a good intervention logic with key assumptions is important for 
successful implementation, experience is  that once  activities start  up, a series of unforeseen 
problems and opportunities will emerge, and addressing these early are key to success.  

5.  LOOKING AHEAD AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

The preparation of the MIP and the introduction of TEIs provide the EU with a unique opportunity 
to discuss its future collaboration with Angola. There is a different situation and interest on the side 
of Angola to strengthen the cooperation while the EU has a richer set of instruments it can mobilise 
for future programmes.  

This section thus looks at the foundations for the collaboration and in particular GoA’ ambition of a 
diversification of its economy with inclusive growth, an approach the EU supports, and then looks at 
the challenge of making this feasible given the current structural challenges Angola faces. 

5.1  ANGOLA AND EU PRIORITIES 

Angola’s Ministry of Economy and Planning released Angola’s National Development Plan 2018-
2022  (PDN,  Plano  de  Desenvolvimento  Nacional)29  in  April  2018,  and  subsequently  provided  its 
more  operational  programme  of  support  to  production,  diversification  of  exports  and  import 
substitution,  PRODESI  (Programa  de  Apoio  à  Produção,  Diversificação  das  Exportações  e 
Substituição das Importações)30. 
The Delegation just saw its MIP 2021-2027 approved31, and the TEI that has been agreed for Angola 
is  being  used  to  mobilise  MS  interest  and  commitment  in  order  to  better  respond  to  Angola’s 
priorities. 

5.1.1  Angola’s Development Priorities  

The PDN presents the six priority areas for national development: (i) human development and well-
being, (ii) sustainable and inclusive economic development, (iii) key infrastructure, (iv) consolidation 
of  peace,  strengthening  democratic  state  and  rule  of  law,  good  governance,  state  reforms  and 
decentralisation, (v) balanced territorial development, and (vi) guarantee the stability and integrity of 
Angola and strengthening of its role in  the regional  and international  context.  These six areas are 
operationalised in 25 strategic policies.  

The PDN recognizes the challenges that the country faces: the fiscal crisis of the state; the poor human 
investment performance as shown in the annual Human Development  Index32 and similar when it 

29 See https://www.ucm.minfin.gov.ao/cs/groups/public/documents/document/zmlu/njax/~edisp/minfin601408.pdf  
30 See https://prodesi.ao/  
31  Angola’s  MIP  was  just  approved  in  December  2021  –  see  https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/global-europe-
programming_en.mip-2021-c2021-9359-angola-annex_en.pdf (europa.eu) 
32 See http://hdr.undp.org/en/2020-report  

 
 
 
                                                 
 
38  Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 

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comes to the business environment as shown in the Doing Business index33. The country is hampered 
by a public sector that requires modernisation and persistent corruption.  

The PDN, in its table 3.1, presents what were at the time the ideas for addressing these issues and 
provided  a  proposal  for  how  the  state  budget  should  be  restructured  in  order  to  implement  these 
objectives . This shows that defence and security was to see allocations fall from 21.4% to 13% while 
health was to grow from 8.5% to 15%, education from 12.4% to 20% and what is termed “economic 
affairs” from 16.4% to 22%34. This is a very ambitious restructuring of the state’s finances but shows 
a political commitment to pursue important changes.  

PRODESI AND VALUE CHAIN STUDIES  

PRODESI  is  the  programme  that  is  to  help  implement  strategic  area  2  of  PDN,  diversified  and 
sustainable economic development. There are a range of sectors that are meant to be covered by it: 
primary sector production (crops, livestock, fisheries, forestry) and agro-industry; mineral resources; 
petroleum  and  natural  gas;  textiles,  clothing  and  footwear;  public  infrastructure  and  construction; 
technology  and  telecommunications;  tourism;  and  private  sector  engagement  in  health,  education, 
training and research. Focus is to be on the non-hydrocarbon sectors, with a focus on those areas that 
can produce surplus for export and/or substitute imports – i.e., reduce the current import-intensity of 
the national economy – while paying attention to the potential for cross-sector spill-over effects from 
investments in a given sector. A key step is to improve the business environment for national and 
foreign entrepreneurs/investors, ensuring that markets are open and competitive, incentives for export 
are in place, credit is made available for investments, fundamental infrastructure for production and 
transport/trading is improved, thereby increasing employment opportunities, especially for youth.  

Implementing the PDN and PRODESI will require, according to the President’s introduction to the 
PRODESI  document,  both  legal  reforms  but  also  a  close  monitoring  and  rigorous  evaluation  of 
efforts. But the first objective should be to produce sufficient basic food stuffs for the local market 
that the country no longer needs to import these. For this to happen, the private sector will be key. 

To support this process,  the private investment and export promotion agency  AIPEX (Agência de 
Investimento Privado e Promoção das Exportações de Angola) was established in March 2018, with 
some  financing  being  made  available.  The  country  was  furthermore  divided  into  four  investment 
zones with differentiated fiscal incentives to investors/producers. In order to document the investment 
opportunities available, a series of value chain studies have been produced, most of them under the 
PRODESI programme35. But the financing available under PRODESI is difficult to access and thus 
not  going  to  the  small-scale  national  entrepreneurs,  which  was  the  stated  intention,  but  rather  to 
established businesspeople 

Most observers do not see that either the PDN or PRODESI have so far been able to deliver on their 
ambitious  agendas.  The  one  exception  seems  to  be  the  privatisation  process  managed  by  IGAPE 
(Instituto de Gestão de Activos e Participações do Estado), a body under the Ministry of Finance, 
which has been handling the privatisation process in a transparent and professional manner36. 

33 See https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/doingbusiness  
34 World Bank data show that while defence expenditures in 2015 were 11.5% of the budget, in 2020 this had fallen to 7.8%  - see 
https://data.worldbank.org/country/angola?view=chart.  The  Public  Expenditure  and  Financial  Accountability  (PEFA)  exercise 
currently underway will presumably provide a completer and more updated picture. 
35 The African Development Bank has so far financed six such studies, including for mining, fisheries, textiles, and tourism; the EU 
has funded one for coffee and another for fisheries (done before the AfDB study); the Netherlands looked at the recovery and expansion 
of agricultural crop potential in the Lobito corridor. The studies are fairly generic descriptions of the state of the various sectors and 
their potential for investments at the various points in the value chains.  
36 There were some observers contesting this, saying that at least some of the processes they felt had led to some assets being awarded 
to members of the national elite, but the team is in no position to verify either point of view.  

 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
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39 

5.1.2  The Multiannual Indicative Programme and Team Europe Initiative  

The  EU  Parliament  merged  a  number  of  EU  grants  facilities  under  a  unified  Neighbourhood, 
Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) for the Multi-annual Finance Frame 
period  2021-2027.  EU  Delegations  therefore  have  this  more  flexible  instrument  as  the  basis  for 
programming the 2021-2027 country MIP.  

With the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, the EU and the MS agreed in early 2020 to form Team 
Europe  to  provide  comprehensive  and  coordinated  assistance  to  partner  countries  to  combat  the 
consequences of the pandemic. Based on this experience, the EU and MS agreed to extend the Team 
Europe concept to more general and broad-based Team Europe Initiatives (TEIs). These are to be so-
called transformative programmes within one or more of the five policy priorities defined by the EU 
that can potentially apply a wide range of financial and non-financial instruments, from the EU and 
its  MS:  credits,  loans  and  blended  financing;  private  sector  investment  guarantees;  TA  including 
twinning; trade promotion instruments.  

MIP PRIORITY AREA 1: SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION  

This  priority  area  is  to  support  transformative  processes  towards  a  green  and  resilient  economic 
recovery in line with the 2030 Agenda. This is to be achieved through strengthening sustainable value 
chains,  among  other  things  through  climate-smart  agriculture.  This  is  to  contribute  to  increased 
agricultural productivity, food security and nutritional outcomes, and is to lead to greater exports and 
create work opportunities and decent jobs with a special focus on women and youth.    

In order to achieve this, the programme will engage with the private sector to promote foreign direct 
investment, resilient business opportunities, access to new markets and tapping into new financing 
schemes such as green financing and instruments such as blending and guarantees. In addition, the 
EU will support investments in renewable energy production, power grids and distribution networks.  

These priorities are in line with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and Angola’s PND.  

Under  this  Priority  Area,  the  MIP  has  identified  three  Specific  Objectives  (SOs)  with  a  series  of 
Results specified under each with indicators and target values. 

MIP PRIORITY AREA 2: TRANSPARENT, ACCOUNTABLE AND EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE  

This  area  is  to  address  more  inclusive  governance  and  continued  support  to  judicial  and  public 
administration reforms, including public finance management (PFM). The EU also intends to expand 
social protection in line with the principle of “Leave No One Behind”.  

The governance initiatives are meant to assist GoA’s policy of economic diversification, trade and 
the attraction of Foreign Direct Investment, which all call for a transparent and rules-based business 
environment. This Priority Area thus is strongly interlinked with and supports Priority Area 1. 

MIP PRIORITY AREA 3: HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 

To help the workforce adapt and be relevant to the new market dynamics envisioned with economic 
diversification, there is a need to upgrade skills and market-relevant knowledge. This priority area 
thus focuses on education, particularly technical and vocational education and training (TVET) and 
higher education, largely university education. This is essential for the younger generations to access 
jobs and the labour market, which is expected to evolve with the growth of a more diversified and 
green economy. Reaching women and assisting them attain more equitable educational opportunities 
also requires a more modern educational system that is conducive to more gender-balanced goals. 
This is hence also important for the attainment of the objectives of priority areas 1 and 2. 

TEI: ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION 

 
 
40  Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 

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The  Delegation  has  prepared  a  TEI  focusing  on  economic  diversification  (“Support  to  the 
transformative  processes  of  diversification  of  the  national  economy  for  sustainable  and  inclusive 
economic growth and job creation”). It essentially builds on and develops further the interventions 
identified in  Priority Area 1 of the draft MIP.  It  is  to  strengthen the private sector, agro-logistics, 
supporting export promotion and investments focusing on EU-Angola trade, as well as strengthen the 
enabling environment, including skills development and economic governance. 

The TEI will receive financing over Priority Area 1 of the MIP but with some further actions under 
Priority Areas 2 and 3, specifically on PFM and TVET. The EU will contribute funding from the MIP 
allocations  while  support  is  also  expected  from  France  (AFD  and  Expertise  France),  Portugal 
(Instituto Camões), the Netherlands, and the European Investment Bank. 

The TEI will include a range of financing instruments, with several areas for joint financing identified 
as well as assistance to policy development and the regulatory environment through TA. The TEI is 
to take a multi-stakeholder partnership approach to achieving its desired transformative impact by 
inviting in key partners from the private sector, civil society and academia. 

5.1.3  Angolan Operational Environment  

Angola faces a range of challenges. In addition to the petroleum shock, the Covid-19 pandemic hit 
the economy hard, not  least  of all the more  marginalised  groups that were already struggling:  the 
country is experience levels of poverty it has not known since independence. The fact that it may 
have its status changed from a Least Developed Country (LDC) to a Low-Middle Income Country 
(LMIC)37 will, among other things, affect its market access abroad, including to the EU. 

Reforms in the justice sector have allowed for more open public debate, freedom of expression, more 
critical media and youth movements, and steps have been taken to combat the endemic corruption in 
the country, though this dynamic has abated over time. The big shift has been with the stated need 
for economic diversification, in part to overcome the dependence on the petroleum sector, but also to 
address the serious unemployment situation, especially among the rapidly growing population where 
better educated cohorts of youth cannot find gainful employment. 

Linked to this is the need for better local administration. In a country twice as big in area as France 
but with less than half the population, exploiting the resources across this vast country in a way that 
generates jobs will require considerable ability to take decisions locally. While legislation has been 
prepared to increase decision making authority for local authorities, little has so far happened. Yet 
economic diversification based on an enabling business environment, including locally, is seen as 
fundamental to the country being able to address the challenges it faces.  

Yet the starting point for change is a country with serious inequalities regarding income and wealth, 
political power, gender rights, regional differences, and across social and cultural groups (Textbox 
3).  

Textbox 3: The World Bank’s Systematic Country Diagnostic 

This 2018 study by the World  Bank presents the challenges that the  economy faces, where the  below  are 
headlines from the study’s summary: 

  Angola's private sector is defined by weaknesses concerning available inputs, factors of production, and the 

role of institutions 

  The political system has historically been characterized by discretionary decisions, rampant corruption, and 

crony capitalism, constraining private sector growth and contributing to the exclusion of the poor 

37 Country status is decided by the UN based on a set of verifiable criteria such as income per capita. Since the UN decision, however, 
Angola’s economy has fallen dramatically so by this criterion Angola might again regain its LDC status.  

 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 
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41 

  Government influence in the productive economy is still pervasive, crowding out the growth of the private 

sector 

  Competitiveness is hindered by an unfavourable regulatory environment and high barriers to entry 

  Failing and inadequate infrastructure is an impediment to economic growth 

  Agriculture  is  a  major  sector  of  the  Angolan  economy,  although  productivity  is  low,  and  the  country's 

abundant resources remain underutilized 

  The rural and slum populations have been particularly excluded from economic growth 

  Institutional centralization undermines effective service delivery 

  Gender gaps in Angola are large and the challenges are significant  
See https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/31443  

ANGOLAN REFORM PROCESSES 2017-2021  

When  João  Lourenço  took  over  as  President,  it  was  a  significant  event  in  the  country’s  history. 
President  José  Eduardo  dos  Santos  had  been  in  power  with  a  highly  personalistic  and  family-
dominated presidency for 38 years. He and his family were quickly obliged to give up control over 
party, state and parts of their economic interests. President Lourenço made a public commitment to 
root  out  corruption  and  set  the  country  on  a  course  of  broad-based  development.  International 
partners, including the EU, saw a government more willing to have a real political dialogue.  

The early reforms in the Lourenço presidency were promising. Measures were taken against high-
level corruption; a regulatory authority was established to oversee the all-dominant state oil company 
Sonangol; a credit from the IMF obliged the state to provide transparency in its public finances; steps 
were taken to permit more media openness and civic mobilisation. The commitment to PFM reform 
as part of a broader public administration reform agenda included a broad review and update of the 
legal framework and numerous new Laws and Decrees underpinning key PFM systems, processes, 
and institutions (decentralization, public investment, assets and debt management, etc.). At present, 
numerous processes have been established in principle but have yet to begin implementation, and the 
checks and balances and effective control systems needed to attain the deeper effect of the reforms 
are yet to be seen. Capacity development will be central to achieve the effect of these reforms.  

Yet while certain changes took place during the first years, signs are of a faltering reform process. 
One indicator is the consistent postponement of long-promised local elections and the establishment 
of directly elected local authorities (autarquias). As Angola prepares for national elections in August 
2022, it seems clear that the ruling party wants to maintain power. The Constitutional Court, with a 
recently  appointed  new  Chief  Justice  from  the  ruling  party,  just  declared  a  popular  opposition 
politician ineligible to run in the presidential elections. 

There is therefore considerable “unfinished business” when it comes to the objectives presented in 
the PDN and PRODESI. The EU must therefore be realistic regarding the realism of the support being 
requested. The EU therefore should probably monitor the performance of GoA with respect to (at 
least)  four  dimensions  it  has  said  it  intends  to  improve:  (i)  political  democratisation;  (ii)  macro-
economic stability and predictability;  (iii) transparent and competitive markets; and  (iv) improved 
administrative procedures and processes. 

POLITICAL DEMOCRATISATION  

Angola has enjoyed an exceptional political stability since the end of the civil war in 2002, at the cost 
of pluralism, transparency, democratic governance and human rights. As noted above, early steps by 
the Lourenço presidency provided some change, but that dynamic appears to have stopped up. 

A  key  factor  in  the  stability  has  been  the  absolute  control  which  the  MPLA  has  had  over  the 
administration. The “deep state” that has been constructed over the last 40 years is built on strong 
control from above and loyalty by management and staff from below. And behind the civil service 
has  been  a  very  strong  security  apparatus  that  is  directly  answerable  to  the  presidency.  This 

 
 
42  Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 

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sophisticated and well-resourced apparatus is in turn itself dependent on the continued rule by MPLA 
and is likely to resist any real transfer of power38. 

Yet president Lourenço is under considerable pressure. The combination of the macroeconomic crisis, 
Covid-19 pandemic and lack of effective poverty-oriented measures is depriving the government of 
the  support  it  enjoyed  after  the  2017  elections.  Public  frustration,  particularly  among  the 
demographically  dominant  youth  population,  has  led  to  an  increased  level  of  protest.  Several 
opposition  parties  are  now  rallying  behind  a  joint  presidential  candidate  and  coordinating  their 
electoral campaigns with  the aim of winning more Parliamentary seats,  to at  least  ensure that the 
MPLA will not retain its controlling two thirds majority. A more effective parliamentary opposition 
may therefore emerge after the August 2022 national elections, though there are questions regarding 
whether the elections will be free and fair39. 

Issues/ markers regarding political stability and democratisation might be: 

  The degree  to  which national elections in  2022  are considered free  and fair, and opposition 

political voices are given free access to the population. 

  The degree to which media are increasingly free and encourage public debate on political issues, 

that civic organisations experience increasing political space for their engagement. 

  The  degree  to  which  opposition  parties  in  Parliament  are  allowed  to  –  and  capable  of  – 

presenting credible alternatives for public policies 

  The degree to which local level bodies can exercise authority and support local development 

by providing a more enabling environment for local producers and businesses. 

MACRO-ECONOMIC STABILITY AND PREDICTABILITY 

The PFM reforms that have taken place and the institutions that manage the economy – the Central 
Bank, the Ministry of Finance and to some extent the Ministry of Economy and Planning – are clearly 
paying off. They are seen as being more professional, well managed, more transparent, and with the 
support and oversight by the IMF these organisational improvements are expected to continue40.  

The macro-economy is being stabilised. The budget is being balanced and may show a slight surplus. 
Inflation rates have been brought down, though not quite as far as the authorities had predicted. The 
exchange  rate  has  stabilised  and  the  spread  between  the  official  and  parallel  market  is  now  quite 
narrow. The Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) exercise that is currently taking 
place will provide a thorough analysis of the budget situation in terms of quality of the budget process, 
comprehensiveness/coverage,  trends,  overall  PFM  transparency  and  accountability,  the  extent  to 
which Parliament and the auditor-general’s office execute their constitutional roles.   

The key challenge is how public finances are going to develop as the country adjusts to lower and 
more volatile revenues from the petroleum sector. The economic diversification strategy is therefore 
central for addressing this predicament. 

Issues/ markers regarding macro-economic stability and predictability might be: 

38 The recently published book by Paula Cristina Roque, “Governing in the Shadows: Angola’s Securitised State”, presents a carefully 
researched history and analysis of this very powerful and influential part of government – and why it is not likely to let another political 
force take over the levers of political power.  
39 During the spring of 2021 a series of webinars between Angolan and international social scientists were organised on the topic of 
future scenarios for Angola, resulting in the paper “Angola after dos Santos: Change and continuity” by Vegard Bye, Paulo Inglés and 
Aslak Orre, Chr. Michelsen Institute Working Paper 8, November 2021. 
40  While  the  MEP  is  credited  with  managing  the  production  of  both  the  PDN  and  PRODESI  programmes,  the  implementation  of 
PRODESI has been disappointing to many, and the sudden change of the Minister this year without any explanation or forewarning 
has troubled members of the international community, who had expected more continuity and transparency regarding the management 
of this central ministry.  

 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 
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43 

  The degree to which GoA can point to real achievements for their economic diversification and 
development programme, in part using the targets set in the PDN and PRODESI as benchmarks. 
  The degree to which PFM reforms and performance continue to improve, using the forthcoming 
PEFA report as a baseline and monitor reporting by the Central Bank, the Ministry of Finance, 
the IMF and World Bank regarding key parameters of the economy and the budget.   

  The  degree  to  which  the  internal  control  and  oversight  mechanisms  of  the  state  –  auditor 
general’s  office;  prosecutor-general’s  office;  Parliamentary  oversight  committees;  other 
regulatory and oversight bodies – are allowed to and in fact exercise their formal authority in a 
transparent and credible manner.  

Textbox 4: First Findings from the PEFA Exercise 

Preliminary findings from the first phase of the PEFA attest to the following: 

  The core PFM functions in the Ministry of Finance are well established,  demonstrating strong capacity in 

core central functions that all in all underpin the effectiveness of the PFM cycle 

  Budget processes  are solid and based  on a clear formulation process, Treasury cash management  and 
payments  are  well  functioning  even  though  reconciliation  processes  need  to  be  strengthened  (bank, 
accounts).  

  The annual financial statements are consolidated and produced in a systematic manner, but timeliness can 

be improved (9 months). 

  Procurement reforms are lagging and have not demonstrated a turn towards more competitive bidding and 

preliminary findings, with continued reliance on direct purchase.  

  Fiscal restraint and implementation of tax reforms have taken place. Tax management systems have been 
developed but there is a lack of a structured risk management approach that addresses taxpayer compliance 
risks.  

  The impact of the tax reform has not yet delivered with respect to domestic revenue mobilization. The non-
oil tax revenues, as a share of total revenue, have increased since the reform was initiated, largely due to 
the fall in oil revenues since 2014. However, the share of non-oil taxes to GDP remains mostly the same 
today as at the beginning of the oil boom. Developing the non-oil tax system remains an urgent task as it 
remains largely the same as it was when the tax reform started. 

  Transparency in the budget information publicly available has increased by publishing the In-Year reports 
online, but budget transparency still needs to be improved by publishing the Audit Report online in a timely 
manner, expand the budget disclosure on government assets and liabilities and on new policy proposals in 
the  budget.  There  should  also  be  additional  information  in  the  Year-End  Report,  for  example  on  debt 
composition, on the accuracy of original macroeconomic projections, and on performance information. 

  Scrutiny  and  oversight  are  still  weak,  and  the  roles  of  the  office  of  the  external  auditor/Auditor-General 
(Tribunal das Contas) and Parliament (Assembleia Nacional) in the overall system of checks and balances 
need to be strengthened. 

TRANSPARENT AND COMPETITIVE MARKETS 

The government has stated that private sector engagement is fundamental for Angola to diversify its 
economy  away  from  its  petroleum  dependence.  While  legislation  is  now  more  liberal  regarding 
ownership  and  other  formal  requirements,  in  practice  much  of  the  local  economy  is  owned  or 
controlled by those who were able to amass fortunes under the previous regime, leaving limited space 
for newcomers. This is also seen in Angola’s ratings in the World Bank’s annual  Doing Business 
report, which still has Angola close to the bottom of the rankings. The country therefore has a long 
way to go before it can be considered an attractive place to invest.  

At the same time, there are forces within both government and the private sector that are pushing for 
and achieving change. This is seen in the positive experiences of members of the business community 
regarding the privatisation process under IGAPE noted above but also in a more general opinion that 
there are more possibilities for independent businesspeople to invest and succeed. This is also due to 

 
 
44  Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 

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the national market becoming more interesting since a more realistic exchange rate has reduced the 
country’s ability to import its consumer goods, opening up for national production to fill the gap.  
The 2019 AfroBarometer report for Angola, based on a representative sample of 2,400 individuals41, 
noted that about 61% of the population believed that the country was moving in the wrong direction 
and only one-third in a good direction (op.cit., p 12). This was before the pandemic hit and about two 
years after the presidential election in 2017. When asked what they saw as the greatest problems, in 
descending  order  they  were  health  (17.5%  of  respondents),  education  (13.3%),  unemployment 
(9.9%), lack of electricity (7.6%) and water (7.6%), followed by hunger (6.5%) and the management 
of  the  economy  (4.3%).  Overall,  the  urban  population  was  more  concerned  about  the  economic 
dimensions and the rural population on the lack of public services and infrastructure (op.cit., p. 13). 
When describing the economic situation of the country overall, nearly 36% said it was very bad and 
26.2% that it was bad, 20% neither good nor bad, leaving a paltry 15% that saw the economy as good 
or very good. At the same time, over half said they thought the economy would improve over the 
coming year (op.cit., pp.14-15) – but then Covid-19 hit the economy. 

More troubling are  recent  reports by the public  procurement  service, SNCP (Serviço Nacional de 
Contratação Pública). The 2020 report notes that in 2019, 85% of the value of public procurements 
were  awarded  through  direct  contracting,  in  violation  of  national  law,  though  this  was  an 
improvement over 2017, when over 97% of public procurement was awarded directly42.The issue is 
that  in  Angola,  the  public  sector  is  the  dominant  economic  actor,  and  its  purchases  of  goods  and 
services represents a significant share of the total national market. To the extent that these contracts 
are largely awarded to members of the national elite, this represents a significant barrier to private 
sector growth. 

The legal frameworks for aspects of market competition may be good, but adherence is overall poor. 
There is little oversight and control and limited if any consequences when rules are broken.  

Issues/ markers regarding transparent and competitive markets might be: 

  The  extent  to  which  formal  laws  and  rules  enable  increased  transparency  and  free  and  fair 

competition in various national markets43.  

  The  degree  to  which  ratings  schemes  (Doing  Business;  Transparency  International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index; local surveys) report perceived improvements regarding open 
and competitive national markets. 

  Reports by national bodies that are mandated to track and report on aspects of market behaviour, 

such as SNCP, provide information that issues are improving. 

  The extent to which potential foreign investors perceive a conducive business environment to 

emerge in Angola. 

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES FOR EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION 

While free and competitive markets are important for private business, the administrative rules and 
procedures for carrying out activities on the ground, whether by the private sector, civil society or 
projects financed by international donors and financing bodies, have historically constituted major 
costs.  This  can  cover  activities  such  as  getting  import  licences  for  necessary  inputs  to  projects/ 
investments, visas for foreign workers, rules and procedures on the local labour market etc. Part of 
this is due to a public sector that is not always performance and service oriented; suffers from lack of 
capacity and good management; can be the result of a deliberate decision to increase the costs to one 

41 See https://afrobarometer.org/fr/publications/  
42 Referenced in Expansao on 26 June 2020 
43 The energy market may for example have more or less hidden barriers to entry, for example with a monopsonist purchaser in the 
form of a publicly owned transmission grid and whose purchase price from suppliers is set by an external body like a regulator. 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
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45 

actor in favour of another; or simply slow down an activity that is not viewed favourably by an actor 
who has the authority to do so. With limited accountability for performance in the public sector, these 
transaction costs contribute to Angola being considered a high-cost and difficult and unpredictable 
environment to work in. For the EU, which intends to increase its funding to Angola, these transaction 
costs may constitute a major source of frustration and inefficiency.  

Issues/ markers regarding improved administrative procedures and practices: 

  Reporting on the extent to which “red tape” and other administrative costs of doing business, 

whether in the private or public sectors, are being brought down. 

  Reporting on time reductions in typical key steps in project implementation, such as approval 
of  project  agreements,  active  participation  in  annual  meetings  and  reviews,  cut  in  delays  in 
issuing visas and other permits necessary for implementing tasks. 

CONCLUSIONS  

The political system is structured to ensure central control. Reforms from the top are therefore likely 
to be slow, and always with an eye to maintaining centralised control. 

The economic system remains largely rent-seeking, where a political-economic elite and its foreign 
partners control key areas of the economy and can use instruments of the state to protect their interests. 
The space for other economic actors has historically been limited but is now opening up. This is likely 
to continue with further macro-economic reforms and Angola’s expected adherence to the EU-SADC 
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). 

The  Government  is,  however,  aware  of  and  concerned  about  the  serious  economic  and  thus  also 
political challenges the country faces and is therefore open to steps that will address these – with the 
proviso  that  they  do  not  seriously  challenge  central  control.  It  therefore  prepared  its  National 
Development  Plan  and  programme  of  support  to  production,  exports  and  import  substitution, 
PRODESI, which were followed by value-chain studies to identify where to diversify and invite in 
private actors for economic growth and employment creation, its main concerns.  

The EU has prepared its MIP 2021-2027 as well as its TEI with its MS partners. The MIP is organised 
around three Priority Areas: (i) sustainable economic diversification, which is also the focus of the 
TEI, (ii) transparent, accountable and effective governance, and (iii) human development.  

GoA and EU priorities thus overlap, providing important opportunities for long-term collaboration. 
However,  while  the  Lourenço  Presidency  began  important  reforms  with  a  number  of  steps  taken, 
results to date have been disappointing. Some reforms are moving ahead, especially in the field of 
macro-economic management and in the justice sector. While there are a number of reasons why the 
reform process has stalled, it remains unclear if there is a will to push ahead with major reforms or if 
the political system is more concerned with maintaining control. There are therefore key reform areas 
that the EU should monitor: (i) political democratisation; (ii) macro-economic stability, predictability; 
(iii) transparent and competitive markets; (iv) improved administrative procedures and processes.  

RECOMMENDATION(S) 

R1:  The  EU  should  track  performance  in  the  four  key  areas  of  (i)  political  democratisation;  (ii) 
macro-economic stability and predictability; (iii) transparent and competitive markets; (iv) improved 
administrative procedures and processes, to monitor to what extent the Government is improving the 
environment for long-term, predictable and broad-based collaboration. 

5.2  ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION AND AGRICULTURAL-LED DEVELOPMENT 

The PDN and PRODESI list sectors that the authorities identified as important for increased economic 
activity, and which all presumably need to develop in order for a diversified and labour-intensive 
economy to grow. Some of these are typically of interest to private investors: tourism, energy, mining. 
For the EU, the question is therefore where its comparative advantage lies. It is the largest  grants 

 
 
46  Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Angola 2008-2020 

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donor; can mobilise loans and credits and private investment guarantees from a variety of sources; it 
is the biggest source of technical assistance; and is the world’s largest market. 

A  key  challenge  is  identifying  the  foundations  for  sustainable,  widespread,  employment-creating 
growth that may also address regional and gender inequities, and what appears to be an unsustainable 
rural-to-urban migration that is overwhelming urban infrastructure and services.  

The  one  sector  that  all  seem  to  agree  should  be  a  major  contributor  to  achieving  the  country’s 
ambitious goals, is agriculture. Statistics vary, but Angola today utilizes 10-15% of its agricultural 
land. Family farms constitute 92% of total cultivated area. 72% of Angola’s land is worked manually, 
25% uses animal traction and only 3% is mechanised. Only a third of smallholder farms receive any 
form of TA, a scant 4% benefit from technological packages, and almost all land is rainfed44. The one 
agricultural  value  chain  study,  on  coffee,  basically  concludes  that  the  entire  chain  is  broken  (see 
footnote 5).  

The overall picture is one of a large and spread-out sector that was badly affected by the war that 
ended in 2002, has been neglected since then and therefore has not seen any significant investments 
for decades. At the same time, the country is considered to be potentially one of the richest agricultural 
regions in Africa – a resource that is likely to only increase in importance as global climate change 
makes the demand for food and other agricultural products increase over time. 

5.2.1  Agricultural-led Development  

Agricultural development is long-term and risky: there is a need to invest in research and development 
and extension services that are to service a wide variety of needs, by agro-climatic zone, by crop, 
sometimes by variety, by producer group (smallholder versus modern capital-intensive producers), 
and for national or the more demanding international markets. It requires an education system from 
basic  training  through  to  university  faculties  with  qualified  teaching  staff  that  can  offer  academic 
degrees at least to MSc-level and over time PhDs.  

The  sector  itself  needs  to  be  defined  –  whether  it  is  a  broad-based  primary  sector  that  includes 
livestock, forestry and fisheries, or at least to begin with is to have a narrower focus.  

Around primary sector production there are a host  of other services  that need to  come into place. 
Necessary inputs need to be available in quantities and with quality desired at the time required and 
at  affordable  prices;  a  commercialisation  system  that  ensures  procurement,  storage,  transport  and 
orderly settlement of invoicing; credit and risk management schemes to allow for investments and 
management of the risks that primary sector production always entails; a business environment that 
is stable and supportive of longer-term primary sector production; and institutions – public and private 
– that have the capacities and mandates to support and enforce legislation and regulations in line with 
the intentions of laws and procedures.  

The studies seen seem by and large to confirm the general impression found in the coffee sector value 
chain study: there is little in terms of structured development of the sector, so while one third of the 
population lives in rural areas, half the labour force is engaged in agricultural production45. Yet public 
investments are not benefiting the primary sector, as reflected in other relevant studies. 

The  private  sector  has  prepared  a  set  of  proposals  for  rejuvenating  key  sectors  of  the  economy 
including  the  primary  sectors46  with  a  breakdown  between  fisheries;  aquaculture;  salt;  aviculture; 

44 See draft mid-term review report of the FRESAN project, p. 2 
45 While the rural population according to World Bank data in 2000 was 50% of the population, by 2015 this had shrunk to 36.6% and 
in 2020 estimated at only 33.2%. Employment in agriculture showed an opposite trend, however: 37.5% of the national labour force 
was engaged in agriculture in 2000 but this had grown to 50.7% in 2019. See https://data.worldbank.org/country/angola?view=chart  
46 Grupo Técnico Empresarial July 2021 that covers the primary sector; industry, natural resources and technology; civil construction 
and public works; transport and logistics; tourism and environment; and commerce, distribution and services. 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
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livestock;  drought-prone  areas;  perennials;  and  forestry.  It  contains  a  ten-page  section  on  how  to 
address the drought issue – the only analytical part of the report. While large parts of the document 
are proposals for what the public sector is requested to do and deliver rather than a strategy that shows 
the contributions of different societal actors, the proposals are operational and to the point.  

Textbox 5: The Value Chain for Coffee: Main Findings from Sector Study 

A study produced for the EU provides a rather depressing summary of the situation in the sector. While almost 
25,000  growers  were  identified,  less  than  1,500  were  considered  commercial.  There  are  only  15  simple 
processing factories across the country; ten companies that do roasting and grinding; three companies that 
are involved in more sophisticated processing, of which one is state owned.  

The conclusions are that plants are old; most production is manual; there is no financial assistance; prices are 
low; infrastructure and services poor; buyers are not organised; cooperatives and associations are not working; 
basic  tools  are  lacking;  most  growers  are  old;  there  is  no  real  registry  of  growers  and  a  lack  of know-how 
among them. Regarding coffee processing, the raw material is of poor quality; low volume; obsolete machinery; 
infrastructure  and  services  are  missing;  real  processing  is  only  available  in  Luanda.  When  it  comes  to 
distribution and commercialisation, the situation is one of low  volume and poor quality; there is no national 
brand;  exports  face  bureaucratic  hurdles;  export  price  is  not  competitive;  only  a  few  producers  can  be 
considered relevant.  

It notes that while institutions are fundamental for the development and sustainability of the value chain, the 
team was not able to identify any kind of organisation that could be said to be in a functional state.  

Source: AgriNatura, Cadeia de valor do café em Angola. Report to the EU. March 2020 

The MEP, as part of the development of PRODESI into operational proposals, contracted a detailed 
feasibility study of two so-called agro clusters, in Cacuzo in Malanje and Quibala in Kwanza Sul, 
respectively. While extremely detailed, it is unclear how realistic the proposals are, and in particular 
to what extent they can serve as more general models for Angola’s primary sector development47.  

A recent study by the World Bank has looked at Angola’s agricultural policies in terms of their costs 
and  distributional  effects48.  The  study  notes  that  60%  of  funds  go  as  inputs  subsidies  –  land 
preparation,  seeds  programmes,  machinery  subsidies  –  that  mostly  favour  large  commercial 
producers. There are subsidies on certain crops to consumers, but these are financed by the protective 
tariffs on imports, meaning consumers pay an 8% implicit tax on their food consumption that is used 
to subsidize specific commodities. But the real problem is the dramatic under-investment in public 
goods: “Angola should seek to shift its agriculture sector support towards investments in public goods 
… given the overwhelming and long-standing evidence that public sector investments and support to 
agriculture public goods and services deliver higher economic returns than public sector investments 
in private goods” (op.cit., pp. 12-13).  

Angola has a vast and untapped agricultural potential; more than 50% of its food is currently imported 
so there is a vast import-substitution potential; while only about a third of the population lives in rural 
areas, rural poverty is acute, and there is a large population in “rural-urban” centres – cities and towns 
surrounded by rural areas. The effects of successful agricultural development can thus be profound 
on  the  economy,  the  country  and  the  population.  The  challenge  is  to  identify  a  viable  strategy  to 
successfully address this complex, strategically important yet long-neglected sector, and mobilise the 
actors that can support and implement it.  

Textbox 6: Other Value Chain Studies on the Primary Sector  

The 2017 study on the fisheries sector looks at supply and demand conditions, global and national dimensions, 
the regulatory regime, the segments of the sector (artisanal, industrial and semi-industrial, foreign fleets), and 
while  it recommends stronger public  oversight and control of a sector  where overfishing  and infractions by 

47  Desenvolvimento  sustentável  da  agricultura,  pecuaária,  setores  afins  e  agro-silvicultura.  Relatório  de  viabilidade.  Mahindra 
Consulting Engineers, September 2019, 356 pages.  
48 
Realigning-Agriculture-Support-Policies-and-Programs.pdf , Washington DC, 20 June 2021. 

https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/719131625036855154/pdf/Angola-Agriculture-Support-Policy-Review-

See 

 
 
                                                 
 
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foreign-owned fleets are well-known, it is otherwise fairly silent on what can or should be done in the sector. 

The second fisheries study from 2020 includes aquaculture and salt production as well as fresh-water fisheries 
(the main author of both studies is the same), noting that 2018 data show over 270 companies and around 
250,000  jobs  in  the  fisheries  sector  while  aquaculture  of  tilapia  involved  66  firms  and  1,000  jobs  and  salt 
production 19 firms with 1,500 workers. The volumes caught of commercially interesting species is already 
above sustainable catch levels, so the growth potential is seen in freshwater fisheries including aquaculture. 
When  it  comes  to  recommendations,  they  are  centred  on  legislative  and  regulatory  updates;  training  and 
improved entrepreneurship; technical assistance and financing; and institutional strengthening. 

The forestry study points to a small and fairly stagnant sector, where exploitation has grown in response to the 
need to earn foreign exchange by largely exporting unprocessed lumber. While the legal framework is seen 
as  updated,  the  management  of  the  sector  is  poor,  with  private  firms  seeking  short-term  gains  rather  than 
basing  their  business  model  on  a  longer-term  production  perspective.  The  sector  will  require  considerable 
investments for it to become an interesting sector commercially. 

Sources: (i) “Estudo de Mercado sobre o Sector dos Produtos da Pesca na República de Angola”, consultancy financed by the EU for 
APIEX through the ACOM project (Assistência Técnica de Apoio Institucional ao Ministério do Comércio), 236 pages, 2017, (ii) “Estudo 
da Cadeia de Valor do Sector das Pescas em Angola”, 3rd value chain study financed by the African Development Bank for PRODESI, 
98  pages,  July  2020,  (iii)  “Estudo  de  Mercado sobre  o sector  da Madeira  na  República  de  Angola e  o seu Potencial Exportador”, 
consultancy financed by the EU for APIEX through the ACOM project, 186 pages, undated – 2017 (?). 

SECTOR STRATEGY  

Agricultural development is to address a number of issues: provide sustainable livelihoods for the 
rural population49; produce marketable surplus for the national market, exports and agro-processing 
industry;  support  food  self-sufficiency  and  security  and  better  nutritional  status  for  households  in 
drought-prone  and  climate  sensitive  regions;  promote  sustainable  natural  resource  management; 
provide opportunities for entrepreneurial development servicing the agricultural sector; allow for a 
diversified  producer  universe  to  evolve  where  capital-intensive  modern  agriculture,  medium-scale 
modern family-farm production and traditional smallholder agriculture all can grow and prosper. This 
constitutes a set  of potentially non-aligned objectives  which will require a clear sector strategy in 
order to ensure appropriate reforms and investments.  

The work that has been done on value chains shows that there are huge unmet needs at every step of 
these chains, but where the sector strategy should necessarily focus on primary sector production. 

But the sector strategy will also need to identify the complementary investments that need to be made 
in order for agricultural production to be viable and attractive, especially for the young. The agro-
cluster idea reviewed by 2019 MEP-study was presumably meant to address this (see footnote 41), 
but it is a highly capital- and skills-intensive model that is neither feasible nor appropriate for the 
technically quite basic and geographically very dispersed agricultural sector in Angola.  

But a sector strategy should identify what are “minimum needs” investment packages that should be 
put in place regarding educational and health facilities; energy, water and sewerage infrastructure; 
transport  and  commercialisation  facilities;  skills  and  support  service  provision;  and  a  public 
administration working to strengthen an enabling environment for agricultural production and all the 
ancillary service sectors that it depends on. While the capacity of the public sector to finance and 
manage/service such complex packages are limited, the strategy would have to lay out a stepwise 
programme that gives local communities a credible and predictable plan for improvements over time 
– enough to make households willing to invest own time and resources on the land in the expectation 
that further production will be rewarded, and that the public sector will continue its investments.  

While such a programme needs to be developed and owned by the key national bodies, it is at least 
as important that it has solid support by the actors on the ground: the agricultural producers, the local 

49 The importance of the primary sector is under discussion. While the rural population according to World Bank data in 2000 was 50% 
of the population, by 2015 this had sunk to 36.6% and in 2020 estimated at only 33.2%. Employment in agriculture showed an opposite 
trend, with 37.5% of the national labour force engaged in agriculture in 2000 which had grown to 50.7% in 2019. See , .   

 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
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authorities; the private sector that is expected to service and benefit from a growth in the agricultural 
sector; civil society organisations that work with producers and society at large. In order for this to 
happen, they obviously need to be involved in the programming process early enough that their views 
are heard, considered and taken on board where appropriate. 

Another implication is that the development strategy is areas-based and not value-chain based: as far 
as agricultural production is concerned issues like access to markets, water management/irrigation 
systems, practical problems like soil acidity etc are not crop specific but area and context dependent, 
and therefore are better addressed as local challenges. 

The TEI may take a somewhat different approach since it involves loans/credits and other private 
sector-relevant instruments. One study on the Lobito corridor regarding the export potential for six 
particular crops is based on the current infrastructure and existing network of commercial growers in 
addition to the smallholders, presenting a strategy for this particular area50. 

5.2.2  Sector Institutions, Land and Credit  

Long-term comprehensive agricultural development requires constant research and development on 
crops,  use  of  fertilizers  and  control  agents,  modes  of  planting,  harvesting,  storage  etc;  extension 
agents that can provide new insights in a cost-efficient manner across relevant community groups; 
good and timely market information, forecasts, advice; training of key agricultural staff, officials.  

As noted in the value chain study of the coffee sector, most of this is missing: the crop institutes that 
the country had are largely integrated into the Ministry of Agriculture and thus have a very different 
function today; the country has only one significant faculty of agriculture at the Universidade José 
Eduardo dos Santos (UJES) in Huambo; there are a limited number of full-time agricultural training 
centres  though  the  number  is  growing,  in  part  with  support  from  NGOs  and  donors,  as  well  as  a 
growing  number  of  farmers’  centres,  though  the  needs  are  clearly  great:  according  to  one  report 
Angola has almost 3,000 cooperatives and 8,300 farmers’ associations across the country51, though it 
is not clear how many of this are truly operational. 

The  legal  and  regulatory  frameworks  should  be  updated  where  needed.  The  report  by  the  Grupo 
Técnico Empresarial (see footnote 40) contains a number of proposals, and the World Bank study 
(footnote 39) notes a number of others that are required for the incentive structure to be corrected, etc.  

Angola in a number of fields has appropriate frameworks in place but implementation is lacking  – 
for capacity or political or other reasons. This lack of capacity and political will to oversee and support 
implementation needs to be attended to. 

Angola today faces shortcomings in virtually all critical areas for agricultural development. At the 
same time, it takes considerable time to build these kinds of capacities. The sector strategy therefore 
needs to include an assessment of current capacities, what likely needs will be over the next 10-15 
years, and thereby identify key gaps that will require attention under the strategy52.  

The  time  costs  of  building  such  institutional  capacities  can  be  daunting,  so  accelerating  capacity 
building through smart organisational twinning/ partnerships may be helpful (see below).  

50 See Joep van den Broek; Katrien van Krieken; Ambrosio Fernandes; Armindo Fernandes; Nelson Marula; Osvaldo Panzo and Isáu 
Quissindo, Corredor do Lobito: Mapeamento do sector frutícola. For the Netherlands Enterprise Agency, November 2019. 60 pages 
and Ana Maria Simões and Ramalho Duarte,  Kilometres, Kwanzas, Ndukunena, Ndukutwala. (2016?), a short note on the existing 
infrastructure as a backbone for increased economic activity – but with a potential to both address poverty but also to favor the already-
better-off, so a political economy analysis is proposed to capture the distributional effects of alternative development models.   
51 See https://www.angop.ao/noticias/agricultura/luanda-tera-escolas-de-formacao-agricola/ - 11 December 2020. 
52 A useful tool is the recent publication by the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC), “Effectiveness 
to Impact Initiatives: Sector Needs Assessment”, August 2021. It looks at how overarching objectives of a sector like agriculture can 
be decomposed along the delivery chain, thus constituting an organising principle for this aspect of an agricultural sector strategy. 

 
 
                                                 
 
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But  the  key  issue  is  having  a  medium-  to  long-term  vision  of  how  Angola  can  (re-)build  its  core 
capacities for agricultural sector growth and development. 

THE LAND QUESTION 

Given  the  low  share  of  agricultural  land  that  is  in  fact  under  the  plough  today,  it  might  seem 
unnecessary to worry about issues like land titling, land purchases and land reallocations. However, 
Angola  should  probably  put  in  place  a  more  comprehensive  land  policy,  not  least  of  all  to  avoid 
serious land conflicts in the future. A first step might be to review existing land legislation but also 
to document usufruct rights and land (re-)allocation practices across the country, since these may vary 
by region, ethnic group/ tradition. Bringing the various formal and informal laws and rules into one 
searchable database could be of great help. 

While Angola apparently does not have a land shortage, large tracts of good land have already been 
allocated to individuals in a manner that is likely to lead to disagreements over actual ownership or 
usufruct rights. The authority of sobas to allocate or sell land to individuals seems to be another area 
of possible future clashes. At the same time, secure rights to land are important if Angola expects 
growers – smallholders, modern family farmers, commercial agricultural growers – to invest time and 
money in land improvements, perennial crops, etc. A land cadastre that reflects the various titling 
traditions is presumably key to any longer-term land improvement strategy, though this is a long-term 
process so one might start with the more important agricultural areas.  

Credit  to  the  sector  is  closely  linked  with  clear  titles  to  land.  Turning  land  into  an  asset  that  can 
potentially be seized if a borrower who used land as collateral defaults, is an issue that has created 
serious  disputes.  Without  access  to  credit,  however,  agricultural  producers  will  not  be  able  to 
modernise and improve their production, thus undermining any agricultural growth strategy.  

A land tax is another issue that should be addressed. Normally this would be a progressive tax by 
agro-climatic zone, based on the assessed productive potential, essentially taxing the “natural rent” 
that land can provide. But this is also used as a tool to ensure that large tracts of productive land are 
not left fallow but used for agricultural purposes. Politically this may often be a difficult issue because 
such un- or under-utilised land is often held by politically influential persons who hold the land for 
purposes other than production and profit.  

Land tends to be a highly emotive and thus politically sensitive matter. Finding acceptable solutions 
to the dilemmas that various dimensions of the land question pose will typically require considerable 
time  and  negotiations  before  acceptable  solutions  are  found.  Yet  the  land  questions  need  to  be 
addressed so that longer-term development becomes possible. 

PUBLIC INVESTMENTS 

To attract the local population and in particular youth to stay and invest in agriculture, there is a need 
for appropriately scaled investment packages that provide core public services to the rural population. 
This is a major challenge with regards to prioritization and spatial allocations. 

This  requires  a  locally  driven  programming  process  that  involves  local  authorities,  private  sector, 
civic actors and the agricultural producers. Such planning processes could build on the considerable 
experiences  across  Angola  of  popular  participation  in  public  budget  discussions;  participatory 
processes for settling priorities in local development; gender aware public budgeting; etc. What is 
different is that the discussions would have as a key concern the development of the rural economy. 
Identifying what “an enabling environment” means for this sector rather than urban-based businesses 
will thus require some different  approaches and ability to consider new options. But this is also a 
planning approach that can benefit from the lessons learned by the territorial approach championed 

 
 
 
 
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by the EU53. This approach is also in line with the basic message of the 2018 World Bank diagnostic 
Creating Assets for the Poor (see textbox 3): There is a need to address rural poverty through increased 
investments  in  human  capital,  tighter  integration  to  the  larger  economy  through  various  forms  of 
capital  formation  that  benefits  this  segment  of  the  population.  In  terms  of  effects  on  poverty, 
investments in agriculture have for a long time been considered as a particularly effective avenue54.  

RURAL CREDIT 

Agricultural  credit  is  high  risk:  agricultural  production  is  sensitive  to  environmental  risks,  where 
climate change has systematically increased this; the most common form of collateral is land which 
is a difficult asset to seize and dispose of in cases of default; the territorial dispersion of agricultural 
activities makes it costly for lender to monitor performance; crop prices are volatile making profit 
projections highly uncertain; in the Angolan context many of the inputs are imported providing an 
additional  exchange  rate  risk;  the  agricultural  markets  in  Angola  have  historically  been  highly 
distorted, making production for the national market unattractive and exports very costly.  

Yet without rural credit both for investment and operating expenditures agricultural development is 
not realistic. But there is today almost no rural credit available through commercial banks except for 
commercial crop producers. What rural credit there is seems to be largely through NGOs and projects.  

With the EU and MS’ range of financial instruments and ability to create innovative blended finance, 
first-loss instruments, risk-sharing and insurance schemes, the EU might  be able to assist national 
actors grow a rural credit market where some of the early risks are absorbed by the EU as part of a 
larger agricultural development programme.  

CONCLUSIONS  

While  the  PDN,  PRODESI  and  MIP  all  consider  a  range  of  economic  sectors  for  Angola’s 
diversification, the team would suggest that the EU focus on the agricultural sector. This allows for 
sustainable and equitable economic development; it can create growth across the country; it can make 
important contributions to poverty reduction, gender equity and employment with particular focus on 
youth unemployment; it will improve food security and nutritional status; strengthen climate resilient 
primary sector production; can support local entrepreneurial initiatives and opens up for strengthening 
local participatory governance with an overarching goal of contributing to the SDGs. 

At the same time, agriculture-led development requires long-term commitment and investments, and 
is high risk. The EU, with its long-term planning horizon and the single largest grants budget and 
with access to complementary financial resources has the organisational and financial means of being 
the partner that Angola needs for this transformative challenge. 

It should be stressed that the team does not suggest that the EU focus exclusively on agricultural-led 
development, but that if there is Government support for it, that the EU commit to a large enough and 
broad-based enough programme that it can really have a transformative impact on the sector. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

R2: The EU should focus on agricultural-led development as a core concern under MIP Priority Area 
1 and expand this engagement with the Member States with the Team Europe Initiative. 

R3: While the natural resources base is considered very good, the institutional, legal, infrastructure, 
skills and basic social services foundations are generally poor, which is what the EU should focus 
on.  

53 See Supporting decentralisation, local governance and local development through a territorial approach,  EC Tools and Methods 
Series, Reference Document no 23, November 2016, 166 pages. 
54  Perhaps  the  most  influential  study  was  the  World  Bank’s  2008  World  Development  Report:  Agriculture  for  Development.  See 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/5990  

 
 
                                                 
 
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R4: Working with the appropriate stakeholder groups, the EU should support the development of a 
politically owned, technically solid and financially viable sector strategy as the foundation for its 
support to an agriculture-led development programme [the corollary is that if it turns out that there 
is  little  interest  in  committing  to  such  a  sector  approach,  the  Delegation  should  reassess  its 
willingness to allocate significant resources to this sector]. 

R5: Based on an agricultural sector development strategy, the EU should support the identification 
of  a  “minimum  needs”  public  sector  capacity  with  a  5–10-year  master  plan  for  improving  the 
situation. 

R6: The EU might offer to finance a comprehensive land review with the objective of updating land 
laws; establish principles of land titling, usufruct rights, land as collateral; support the development 
of a land cadastre with a focus on high-productive areas but that includes the various land holding 
schemes under which current users are exploiting agricultural land. 

R7: The EU can assist local actors develop more integrated territorial /area-based approaches to 
rural development including public investment “packages” that will allow the rural population to 
remain in rural areas and attract youth to invest in agricultural production.  

R8: The EU may assist the development of a long-term viable rural credit system through support to 
risk-sharing, insurance, first-loss and innovative approaches to rural lending. 

R9: The EU should use this agricultural-led approach as the foundation for its support to the Team 
Europe  Initiative,  providing  opportunities  for  Member  States  and  other  actors  to  develop 
complementary actions such as value-chain development through private investments. 

5.2.3  Good Governance  

Activities under MIP Priority Area 2 may provide critical support to an agricultural-led process.  

GOOD LOCAL GOVERNANCE  

Two of the specific results under the first Strategic Objective of Enhance Rule of Law and digital 
governance  are  Corruption  and  bribery  in  all  its  forms  reduced  and  Capacity  of  judicial  and 
anticorruption institutions at (sub-)national levels is enhanced. 

Under this Strategic Objective, EU can support local authorities address these issues as they pertain 
to agricultural-led development, building inclusive, transparent and accountable local governance. A 
key instrument in addressing this could be the recently approved Support to Civil Society in Local 
Governance in Angola, PASCAL. This project could strengthen partnerships in municipalities that 
are  important  for  agricultural-led  development  with  the  objective  of  strengthening  local  enabling 
environments for agricultural producers and local entrepreneurs 

ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE  

The  second  Strategic  Objective  is  Improve  economic  governance  [and  strengthen  the  social 
protection system]. The first part can provide a further argument for the proposal that local public 
goods investment packages as incentives for agricultural sector investment and development should 
involve better and more local participatory planning as a means of ensuring better local PFM. 

5.2.4  Human Development  

The only Strategic Objective under the Priority Area 3 is Improve access, quality and relevance of 
TVET  and  Higher  Education,  with  the  intended  results  being  Improved  school  network  and 
regulations related to TVET included identifying labour needs for VET focused on promoting skills 
and employability and Improved network capacities relating to higher education identifying labour 

 
 
 
 
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needs for economic diversification and including education degrees that strengthens both primary 
and secondary students’ foundational and soft skills 

Both of these are highly relevant for strengthening agricultural-led development. As pointed to above, 
there are limited technical and vocational training facilities in Angola compared with the needs of an 
agriculturally rich country, and university level education and research also remains limited. The EU 
is already supporting the development of both TVET and tertiary education sectors in Angola with a 
focus on technical and technological fields, so one option is that the EU might extend these activities 
to also include agricultural sector-relevant fields.  

CONCLUSIONS  

Activities  under  MIP  Priority  Areas  2  and  3  can  improve  area-based  local  development  through 
complementary  processes.  With  regards  to  issues  of  transparent,  accountable  and  effective 
governance, this should focus on enabling local producers and entrepreneurs to enter markets and 
access  inputs  and services  on competitive terms. Human development  should  pay  attention to  the 
needs of the smallholder sector.  

RECOMMENDATIONS  

R10:  The  EU  should  ensure  that  a  significant  part  of  the  PASCAL  project  is  allocated  to 
municipalities that are identified as important for agricultural-led development. The PASCAL project 
in these areas should include assistance to strengthening an enabling environment for local business 
and agricultural production and help combat all forms of barriers to competitive local markets.  

R11:  The  EU  should  help  strengthen  local  planning  and  in  particular  local  public  investment 
processes to ensure rural areas and agricultural-based activities are fully taken into consideration. 

R12: The EU should extend its on-going support to TVET and tertiary education to include primary 
sector  relevant  training,  education  and  research,  with  particular  attention  to  the  needs  of  the 
smallholder sector.  

5.3  CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT, POLICY DIALOGUE AND QUALITY ASSURANCE 

Capacity development is central to any economic transformation in Angola. Assistance should build 
on what has been learned about public sector capacity development, since much of the efforts have 
been and will continue to be directed towards improving public sector performance.  

One  starting  point  could  be  the  three-part  approach  noted  previously:  what  the  education  system 
should  provide;  what  is  available  in  the  labour  market;  and  what  therefore  needs  to  be  provided 
through the EU supported programme.  

A sustainable capacity development programme must have as its key concern “capacity to produce 
capacity”, as referred to above. Such a capacity development programme therefore should have a 10–
15-year perspective, focusing on how it is to contribute to agricultural-led development.  

5.3.1  Public Sector Capacity Needs  

The starting point for such a programme should be to map out what is meant by capacity in the public 
sector, since this covers a few dimensions:  

  Institutional capacity: legal, regulatory frameworks set by and for the sector; roles and relations 
to other actors in the sector including lower levels in the administration and to actors outside 
the sector; recognised formal and informal rules and norms for behaviour in that sector. 

  Organizational capacity: the structure and boundaries of formal actors in the sector (ministry, 
directorate,  regulatory  agency  etc);  management  rules,  career  paths,  performance  criteria/ 
incentives,  organizational  culture  that  guide  behaviour/performance  of  the  actors  in  the 
organisation; numbers of staff in various formally defined roles. 

 
 
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  Individual capacities: individual skills/qualifications, job descriptions. 

To  ensure  conceptual  clarity,  the  following  definition  of  ‘Capacity  development’  reflects  ‘good 
practice’  uses  in  key  international  bodies  while  providing  an  operational  and  thus  potentially 
monitorable usage: “The ability of individuals, organisations and institutions to address assigned 
tasks,  solve  problems,  and  set  and  achieve  new  objectives,  in  a  sustainable  manner”55.  This 
definition lays out the societal levels of capacity concerns as being institutional, organisational and 
individual skills. 

This definition can be operationalized in the matrix below. This matrix can be used both to better 
understand what kinds of capacity building has taken place  – often a source of some difficulty in 
studies  –  but  also  to  provide  greater  consistency  regarding  how  one  might  track  performance  of 
capacity  development  activities  by  specifying  which  forms  of  capacity  are  in  fact  expected  to  be 
addressed, and what performance criteria might be for each of the relevant cells.   

Table 2: Capacity Development Matrix  

Societal Level 

Perform Tasks: 

Solve Problems: 

Set and Achieve New Objectives: 

“What” and “how” 
known 

“What” is defined, “how” 
not known 

Neither the “what” nor the “how” are 
defined/ certain 

Task Complexity – the “What” and “How” 

Individual 

Organisational 

Institutional/Societal 

Building  institutional/societal  capacity  (“frameworks”)  typically  involves  changing  “rules  of  the 
game”, which is often a political act. Building the capacity of an organisation, which usually already 
has  a  mandate  and  a  set  of  rules  and  policies  it  is  expected  to  execute,  has  more  to  do  with 
organisational  structure,  purpose  and  the  skills  and  competencies  of  its  staff  (see  textbox  7).  At  the 
individual level, capacity development focuses on building the human resources that organisations 
need to carry out their functions, and the increased capacities should be embedded in the organisation 
in a sustainable way: if trained individuals leave, the organisation should have the capacity to replace 
this. Progress  at  each of these levels  thus  needs to  be monitored separately since the “units being 
capacity developed” are different and require quite different instruments to track and register.  

Textbox 7: Organisations versus Institutions  
The distinction between “organisations” and “institutions” is important in this context: 

  Organisations are groups of individuals bound by a common purpose to achieve objectives. They have a 
clear  boundary  that  separates  them  from  other  actors  and  the  external  environment.  They  control 
performance and, therefore, are accountable for results. This can be public sector agencies that have policy, 
oversight or implementation roles (ministries/ departments, institutes, directorates) or other actors such as 
NGOs, unions, faith-based organisations, private / public companies, etc.  

  Institutions are the structures and mechanisms of social order and cooperation that govern behaviour and 
decisions  by  individuals,  organisations  and  societies.  They  are  formal  rules  (laws  and  regulations, 
international conventions and compacts), informal constraints (conventions, norms of behaviour, codes of 
conduct), and the enforcement characteristics of both. 

55 This is an amalgamation of UNDP’s definition “The ability to perform functions, solve problems, and set and achieve objectives” 
(UNDP  2006,  “Capacity  Development  and  Aid  Effectiveness:  A  UNDP  Capacity  Development  Resource”),  and  that  of  the 
Governance Network (GOVNET) in  OECD/DAC  “The  ability of people, organisations and society as  a  whole to manage their 
affairs  successfully”  (OECD/DAC  2006,  “The  Challenge  of  Capacity  Development:  Working  towards  Good  Practice.”  OECD 
Papers 6(1): 58-94). 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
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Organisations can be institutions. Ministries are organisations that have objectives, operations and staff. They 
act as institutions when they set rules for others by passing laws or define objectives for a sector. In the words 
of  Douglass  North,  Nobel  prize  winner  for  his  work  on  institutional  economics,  “institutions  are  rules  of  the 
game, organisations are the actors playing the game” (North 1989, 1990).  

The  definition  further  identifies  the  complexity  of  tasks  to  be  completed,  which  is  important  for 
identifying useful instruments for assessing the results of capacity support provided:  
  Performing Functions assumes not only that the task is well defined, but also how it should be 
carried out; both the “what” to do and the “how” to do it are largely pre-determined. Traditional 
methods of training (at individual level) and organisational reforms (at organisational level) are 
typically seen as appropriate.  

  The second field of Solving Problems is more complex. The “what” to be achieved is often clear 
but the “how” depends on the context and often is not obvious to external actors. The key external 
skill may often be mentoring assisting national authorities to understand, select, apply and adapt 
experiences, their own experience and that of other countries, and to critically assess and modify 
results produced.  

  Set and Achieve New Objectives means that also the “what” is unknown. The external input that 
may assist is facilitation skills to support local discussions, analysis and decision-making processes 
and other support that allows actors to critically re-think what they are doing, how they are doing 
it, and why. What also needs to be noted is that once a reflection process has been concluded and 
new  objectives  defined,  they  often  can  be  addressed  through  known  means  –  the  capacity 
development that is required suddenly is back to “Perform tasks” since now it is clear what needs 
to be done and often how it can be addressed.  

Capacity development interventions often are organisation-specific short-term projects, focusing on 
technical skills. Because the situation in Angola is that a number of key agricultural institutions and 
organisations need fairly comprehensive capacity building, classic project-based projects with short-
term  consultants  may  not  be  sufficient.  The  proposal  here  is  that  capacity  efforts  for  local-level 
development should be based on a different set of assumptions:  
  Since much of the capacity development is for more general and broad-based skills development, 
the  starting  point  should  be  what  the  formal  education  system  can  provide,  where  additional 
resources from the EU are to ensure that the educational sector provides the broader skills base 
that the sector needs. 

  The second step would be to ascertain what the current labour market is able to provide, since lack 
of certain skills in a particular field or geographic location might very well be covered by available 
skills somewhere else, and that it is cheaper and more efficient to bring those skills to where they 
are  being  sought  rather  than  producing  site-specific  skills  through  a  project.  A  labour-market 
diagnostic may therefore be useful.  

  Once it is clear that neither the educational sector nor the labour market can provide critical skills 
within a reasonable time horizon or at acceptable cost, a project specific programme can be put in 
place.  Where  feasible,  the  key  objective  should  be  to  create  “capacity  to  produce  capacities”, 
though this may not always be feasible or rational. 

The  typical  weakness  of  project-based  technical  skills  development  is  one  often  seen  in  Angola: 
qualified skills are moved around or leave the public sector for better paying jobs in the private sector 
now that new and market-valuable skills have been acquired. This “producing for failure” is endemic 
in capacity development interventions and is a risk that needs to be addressed in project design.  

The high staff rotation that is seen throughout the Angolan public sector is a structural issue that the 
EU may wish to analyse and raise with Angolan authorities. It is important to find solutions to this 
problem since it systematically undermines capacity development efforts.  

 
 
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But when capacity development is on the agenda, the partners also need to be realistic about what the 
incentives  are  that  are  required  to  attract,  retain  and  further  develop  the  skills  and  organisational 
performance of the relevant staff. Too much effort often goes into defining training needs without 
looking  at  how  the  skills  are  going  to  be  retained  by  the  organisation  and  provide  the  continued 
services and knowledge that the organisation needs.  

Another  issue  is  identifying  what  are  the  minimum  capacities  actually  required  to  attain  realistic 
organisational targets. Here an assessment of what the organisation itself is capable of achieving is in 
order. Many of the public bodies in Angola are today understaffed or may have the number of staff 
but without the requisite skills; the overall organisational culture is not oriented towards improved 
performance  or  recognition  of  individual  efforts;  what  is  appreciated  may  be  loyalty  and  not 
innovation;  staff  do  not  experience  being  appreciated  or  rewarded  for  delivering  on  formal 
deliverables;  they  are  already  overworked  and  have  little  time  or  energy  for  taking  on  new 
responsibilities, learning new skills, or participating in cross-institutional tasks.  

5.3.2  Capacity Development and Twinning  

Given  the  range  of  institutions  that  typically  service  the  agricultural  sector,  Angola  is  facing  a 
daunting agenda. The major challenge may be creating performance-oriented agencies that see the 
agricultural producer as their main concern – “accountability downwards”, as it were – whereas many 
Angolan institutions have historically been more concerned about their “accountability upwards” to 
political authority. What is  hence the issue is not lack of technical skills but management and the 
overall organisational culture regarding what is encouraged and rewarded. One way of getting such 
key  dimensions  in  place  is  through  longer-term  institutional  twinning  –  if  the  partner  twinning 
institution itself reflects the kinds of characteristics and values that Angola would like. 

In a field such as agricultural research and development, the twinning partner should be able to help 
Angola address issues from basic knowledge and crop selection to sophisticated variety development, 
climate adaptation work  and tailored  extension services. Such institutions of course exist in  other 
parts of the world, where those in Latin America and Brazil in particular would seem to match the 
needs of Angola: they have fairly recently themselves been at technological levels where Angola is 
today; they cover the same agro-climatic zones and produce many of the same crops; they face some 
of the same phytosanitary and quality assurance issues that Angola must address if it wants to increase 
its exports; the technical staff in these institutions are more used to the challenging working conditions 
that Angola presents than for example European experts and are therefore more likely to be willing 
to spend actual time in the rural areas; the Brazilians of course have a linguistic and historical link to 
Angola; and Latin American expertise is on average more cost-efficient than European experts. 

The real arguments for organisational twinning rather than using expert consultants have to do with 
the more common incentive structures and the stronger local ownership this can engender, where the 
experiences with such twinning arrangements point to a number of lessons56:  

  A formal agreement between similar institutions means that the supplying institution takes a 
responsibility  for  the  technical  advice  being  offered  –  it  is  not  simply  an  individual  expert 
coming in and offering his/her services57. 

56 Scandinavian countries have for more than 40 years used public institutions for twinning with counterpart institutions in partner 
countries – with varying success in the early years but with lessons acquired over time that has allowed these partnerships to improve. 
57 This is one of the strengths of having technical assistance (TA) from institutions like the World Bank or the IMF: When an adviser 
from the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) arrives, it is with the IMF’s institutional memory, experience and imprimatur. The 
downside is of course that this might be too much “blueprint” advice, but usually the advice is based on fairly long relationships as the 
basis for the TA intervention and thus based on solid understanding of context and issues. Even experts from the UN system generally 
do not have this kind of institutional solidity when providing TA. 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
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  Having the partner country institution visit the supply institution to verify what is being offered, 
discuss  conditions,  and  overall  feel  comfortable  that  the  partnership  is  built  on  mutually 
acceptable conditions and interests is important for the longer-term relationship, the ownership 
to the arrangement by the partner institution, and to ensure that the twinning arrangement has 
the full support also by management at the supplying institution.  

  Since  the  partner  institutions  have  similar  mandates  in  their  respective  countries,  there  is  a 
greater understanding for the complex pressures and expectations that the partner institution is 
facing, making for more relevant experience exchanges that go beyond just technical matters. 
  Since  the  agreement  is  between  two  institutions,  a  “whole  of  organisation”  partnering  is 
possible: instead of just training technical expertise, which is often the focus of TA projects, 
the entire partner organisation can be included, such that support services – administration and 
finance,  logistics,  internal  technical  services  –  can  be  included  and  addressed,  including  in 
activities such as short visits, which can provide a more balanced organisational development. 
  Since twinning arrangements can be renewed, there is also a mutual approximation process that 
is important: as staff in the two organisations work together, relationships of trust and mutual 
understanding evolve that makes technical discussions and training much easier and effective. 
  Twinning  opens  up  for  addressing  management  issues,  which  is  often  a  major  problem  in 
partner  countries:  consultants  are  seldom  credible  dialogue  partners  for  senior  management 
unless they themselves have had senior policy and administrative responsibilities in the public 
sector, which is not often the case. Consultants are in any case often treated with some wariness 
which is normally not the case for a civil servant from a fellow institution.  

  The partner country institution will have a different ability to manage and take issue with the 
technical advice offered, as it can complain to the supplying institution’s management if a given 
expert is not performing as expected. Because the arrangement matters to both parties, the issue 
is more likely to be addressed. 

  The  individual  expert  will  often  have  an  own-professional  interest  in  the  project,  and  while 
providing experience s/he will also be learning and taking away new experiences, leading to 
longer-term commitment to the partner that often goes beyond what is strictly being financed – 
the cost-benefit ratio can be more positive than with consultancy contracts. 

While this list of benefits from twinning is impressive, there are also important shortcomings. The 
major one is usually that what the supplying institution can offer is not really what the partner country 
needs. While collaboration between  formal institutions like agricultural research and development 
institutes or faculties of agronomy can identify areas for collaboration, that might be more difficult 
for  areas  like  farmer  training  centres,  seed  replication  centres,  etc.  Within  a  large  capacity 
development  programme,  it  is  therefore  important  to  identify  where  institutional  twinning  is 
appropriate, and where it is not likely to be useful.  

Another problem is typically that the supplying institution does not really have that much capacity to 
allocate  to  other  organisations:  they  have  a  tight  budget  and  a  mandate  to  address  and  not  much 
leeway for other tasks. One solution to this has been that the supplying organisation gets funding that 
allows  it  to  finance  additional  positions  in  the  organisation  during  the  agreement  period58.  – 
Consultants identified and approved for given positions have normally already ensured that they are 
available for the tasks. 

Another issue has been that staff in the supplying institution may be good at their job in their home 
country but not necessarily the best as a trainer, mentor, facilitator in a very different context. Having 

58 Norway’s Oil for Development TA program involved five different Norwegian public institutions, where for example the Petroleum 
Directorate was for a certain period given funding equivalent to eight work-years – 96 work-months – which allowed the Directorate 
to fund perhaps 15 staff to work part-time in nearly a dozen different countries during a year.  

 
 
                                                 
 
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such  staff  go  through  familiarisation  training  before  being  sent  abroad  is  important,  but  in 
organisations  that  have  been  involved  in  twinning  for  a  long  time,  this  issue  is  normally  handled 
through internal on-the-job orientation and training. – Consultants, on the other hand, normally have 
considerable field experience, know how to interpret and respond to framework conditions and may 
be bringing a lot of comparative experiences from a number of different settings to the table and are 
not hostage to the experience of only one institution/country. 

Public institutions on the supply side may face several bureaucratic hurdles of their own: they may 
not have a mandate that allows for such international engagements; they are not set up to work under 
other legal  and institutional  arrangements and usually have limited experience in  how to  function 
efficiently abroad, handle international disputes, negotiate external financing arrangements, handle 
duty of care responsibilities abroad. Some public institutions that are interested in such tasks may not 
be allowed or do not have the experience to write tenders and successfully compete for contracts. 
Workarounds  for  public  institutions  to  participate  in  twinning  agreements  should  be  possible  to 
develop, but they need to be eligible as per the EU’s procurement rules and regulations. – Consulting 
companies obviously are set up exactly to compete for contracts and tend to be very good at it. One 
possible model is a consortium between a consulting company, which handles contracts, financial 
management  and  reporting,  logistics,  overall  task  management  and  performance  reporting,  with 
public institutions as consortium members that commit to specified activities and deliverables but 
with minimum administrative and organisational responsibilities in the host country.  

While  (re-)building  public  institutions  and  certain  core  capacities  may  benefit  from  institutional 
twinning, there are obviously a host of other skills areas that are better served by traditional training, 
mentoring and consultancy inputs. The capacity development strategy/ programme should therefore 
identify which capacity building instruments are best suited for which sustainable results. 

CONCLUSIONS  

A key challenge for an agricultural-led area-based development process is how to ensure the critical 
institutional, organisational and individual skills, knowledge and capacities are made available, are 
relevant to the challenges being faced, and are sustainable over time. For Angola, this means to build 
some of these capacities almost from scratch and will thus require both time and financing to become 
reality. Other capacities can either be developed locally over time (educational development) or can 
be found in the labour market and contracted from there.  

RECOMMENDATIONS 

R13: The EU should support Angolan authorities develop a capacity building programme for creating 
“minimum needs” organisations and skills for agricultural-led growth and development to be viable. 

R14: The EU should explore options for collaborative arrangements to build sustainable capacities 
in the agricultural sector, with particular focus on possible Latin America/Brazilian partners. 

5.3.3  Policy Dialogue and EU-Angola Collaboration  

The fact that Angola and the EU have agreed to hold high-level meetings (HLM), with the next one 
scheduled for early in 2022, provides the EU with a unique opportunity to put forward some of the 
ideas presented here, to gauge the possible high-level political commitment for going ahead. 

One concern raised by some is that the link between HLM discussions and the programme on the 
ground is sometimes missing. For the next HLM, some issues of relevance could be considered. One 
relates to EU’s concern with climate change. According to the Nationally Determined Contributions 
of Angola, submitted to UNFCCC in May 2021, the country plans to reduce GHG emissions up to 
14% by 2025 as compared to the base year 2015. President Lourenço, who went in person to deliver 

 
 
 
 
 
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Angola’s speech in Glasgow, made a commitment, explicitly inspired by the ratification of the Paris 
Agreement, to increase the already substantial renewable share of the country’s energy supply from 
62% to 70% by 2025, with a five-year plan to reach 78% of electricity production capacity. Angola’s 
National Strategy for Renewable Energies for diversifying Angola’s economy in a green direction. 
The potential for this, and the difficulties that have to be overcome through political dialogue, are 
illustrated by a vast hydropower plant that never got off the drawing board (Textbox 8). 

Textbox 8: Why a large Investment Project Failed  

In the period leading up to 2012, the Hydro group, one of the world’s leading aluminium producers, carried out 
a  detailed  feasibility  study  for  an  integrated  USD  5-7  billion  energy  and  aluminium  production  project  in 
southern  Angola  (Kwanza  Sul  and  Benguela  provinces).  It  was  to  include  a  2  GW  hydropower  plant,  a 
significant employment generation plant for the production of 450,000 tons of aluminium per year based on 
import of alumina from Hydro’s mining and alumina production in Brazil. Surplus energy would be available for 
the national grid including other industrial projects, and for export to the Southern Africa region. The project 
failed to materialize, despite high-level political engagement, due to a perceived lack of transparency on the 
Angolan side with regards to the guarantees proposed for the project.  

The project had been the subject of considerable interest and commitment by important groups on both sides, 
so it might be  interesting to look more carefully  how  such a  big and visible project could fall  afoul of more 
particularistic  agendas,  and  what  can  be  done  to  mitigate  such  risks  and  threats  to  viability  of  important 
initiatives in the future as new ideas are put forward as part of the economic diversification efforts. 

The larger issue is the framework conditions for the implementation of activities that require some 
form of public approval. Project managements typically face a host of transaction costs that would be 
very  useful  for  Angola  to  lower,  not  least  as  a  signal  to  foreign  investors  that  the  authorities  are 
systematically improving the working conditions for foreign partners, whether investors or projects. 

Another issue for the next HLM would be whether and under which conditions the EU could offer 
electoral observation for the August 2022 national elections. Opposition parties spoken with note a 
serious  concern  that  elections  will  not  be  free  and  fair,  and  that  an  observer  mission  by  the  EU 
throughout the election process – beginning perhaps at least six months before the actual elections – 
would be very welcome.  

CONCLUSIONS  
The EU-Angola policy dialogue provides unique opportunities for high-level policy discussions to 
the  benefit  of  both  parties.  There  has  been  a  willingness  on  the  side  of  Angola  to  address  also 
politically more sensitive issues, which justifies a continued investment in this process.  

RECOMMENDATIONS 

R15: The EU should continue the high-level policy dialogue with Angola but should address more 
issues related to the bilateral cooperation, and in particular seek to find solutions to political and 
administrative bottlenecks for implementation of interventions. 

R16: The EU should make it clear that it is willing to accommodate any request for election observers 
and sees this as important for documenting improvements in the field of democratisation. 

5.3.4  Building Angolan Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning Capacity 

An agricultural-led area-based development process is complex, dynamic and context sensitive. For 
a big programme like the EU’s MIP, combined with further support through the TEI, the EU and 
Angola should establish a quality assurance, monitoring, reporting and learning project. This is to 
ensure  quality  assurance  up  front  on  programming  and  intervention  preparation,  but  also  for 
continuous tracking of and reporting on performance.  

“Quality at entry” has been documented as key to successful project implementation: once a project 
begins running, it is costly to change direction. Yet at the same time, lessons from large programmes 
show that risk studies as part of feasibility studies cannot predict the practical problems once activities 

 
 
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start up. One rule-of-thumb from an early comprehensive review of large-scale public programmes 
was that once about 10% of programme investments are made, management should be able to uncover 
90% of the risks that will be encountered during the implementation period – but may also identify 
better ways of carrying out the project, hence should adopt a “risk and reward approach”59.  

When it comes to local development, there are a number of dimensions that are of interest: how does 
youth  respond  to  opportunities  in  the  agricultural  sector,  what  are  the  most  positive  and  negative 
factors and how can incentives be improved? How has the situation of women changed, and how can 
their role and situation be improved? Are local businesses able to enter the market and compete for 
services  to  agricultural  producers,  and  what  needs  to  be  done  to  further  this?  What  are  the  main 
transaction costs and how can they be reduced? These kinds of questions require separate and more 
in-depth  studies  not  easily  addressed  using  standard  monitoring  instruments  like Results-Oriented 
Monitoring (ROM) missions, while final evaluations may come too late for corrective decisions.  

Many of the monitoring and reporting documents are today owned and stored by the EU with limited 
use  and  access  by  Angolan  partners.  For  this  new  programme  period,  the  EU  might  discuss  with 
Angolan authorities how to involve Angolan skills more, how to build more local capacities for these 
kinds of quality assurance activities. Angola should furthermore be given the possibility of building 
its own institutional memory of what has been achieved and how, and have the knowledge generated 
from  this  vast  programme  become  available  to  national  actors  –  authorities,  private  sector,  civic 
actors,  academics  –  so  that  the  insights  contribute  to  public  debate,  transparency,  accountability, 
better decision making and documented effects of the assistance. Having an academic institution as 
responsible for such an institutional memory might be helpful, to ensure widespread access (rules 
concerning access to confidential/restricted information would obviously have to be agreed).  

This can be a separate project under the MIP with for example 2-3% of total MIP resources, or under 
a Technical Cooperation Facility. Due to the EU’s procurement rules, such a project may have to 
headed  and  administered  by  an  EU-based  and  eligible  body,  whether  public  or  private.  A  joint 
decision-making  body  could  decide  the  annual  work  programme  and  priorities,  and  allocate  the 
funding needed for the various kinds of activities that can be envisioned under such a facility. 

Such a facility will in no way substitute or replace standard ROM missions, mid-term reviews and 
final evaluations, but to the contrary can offer complementary Angolan resources. This will contribute 
to  the  ROM/review  reports,  but  also  provide  Angolan  consultants  and  resource  persons  with  the 
experience of working on such products and processes, participate in the discussions and analyses, 
share in the final products and be able to share findings and conclusions, where appropriate, with 
Angolan society at large. 

PROGRAMMING AND PLANNING 

Both the agricultural-led area-based planning under the MIP and the TEI will require a number of 
programming missions and consultation processes. This facility can both provide Angolan experts to 
contribute,  finance  preparatory  discussions  and  workshops,  organise  field  missions  and  internal 
reflection and learning events once draft or final documents are available.  

A particular service may be early-implementation visits. Experience is that management is extremely 
busy at the start-up of activities and does not have much time to verify assumptions and pursue early-

59 “Prosjektstyring 2000” was a  five-year research effort led by Norway’s University of Science  and Technology that has led to a 
continuous research and quality assurance programme under the Ministry of Finance for developing tools and instruments for better 
public planning and decision making; supports a rigorous national two-stage project approval process that has reduced cost overruns 
over the last ten years; and has been adopted by a number of OECD countries as a model for their own planning and cost management 
policies  and  procedures.  See  https://www.prosjektnorge.no/prosjekt-norge/kunnskapskilden/forskningsaktivitet-i-ps2000nsp-og-
prosjekt-norge/resultater-fra-prosjektstyring-ar-2000-ps2000/  

 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
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warning signals. An early quality verification mission can be of great help in assisting management 
identify early issues and find implementable corrective action. 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

Because of the scale and complexity of the proposed interventions, there should be a structured ROM 
programme with perhaps annual missions that cover thematic areas but also to ensure that problems 
and risks not foreseen can be identified early.  

As noted above, a number of more specific issues may require more in-depth and longer-term field 
work than ROM mission or mid-term reviews can provide. One option that could be considered is to 
finance field-research grants for MA/MSc students. The concept could be to have an arrangement 
with relevant academic institutions where students can submit proposals to carry out field work on 
EU-financed interventions, looking at the effects of particular interventions on women’s situation; 
success stories in making local governance more transparent etc. Such a field-intensive programme 
will provide a much richer picture of what is actually being achieved and provide insights in terms of 
how to support innovation and risk taking. 

The facility could host an annual event where the more interesting MA/MSc theses are presented, 
both to share interesting results and thus disseminate “good practices”, but also as a means of making 
the EU programme more visible and understandable to the population as well as to decision makers. 
Various prizes could be considered, such as to the municipalities that have taken innovative steps to 
improve  the  local  business  environment;  to  local  communities  for  designing  innovative  ways  of 
reducing their transaction costs; for agricultural innovations etc, building a culture of excellence and 
learning. The attendees would include government officials, national politicians, staff and students 
from universities, the media, local civic organisations, the international community, and others. 

INSTITUTIONAL LEARNING AND MEMORY 

With  a  more  intensive  programme  of  monitoring  and  reporting,  building  a  system  for  experience 
sharing and learning as well as a more formal institutional memory could also be supported by such 
a facility. Exactly what the contents of such a monitoring, reporting, learning and sharing programme 
would look like is obviously to be discussed, but the principle of building local knowledge, insight 
and institutional memory should be central. 

RECOMMENDATION(S) 

R17: The EU should  establish  a facility for  financing  Angolan contributions  to  quality assurance 
activities along the entire intervention delivery chain; support experience sharing and open learning 
arenas; and help build local institutional memory regarding achievements and challenges identified 
in EU-funded activities for better decision-making and implementation. 

 
 
GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU 
In person 
All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct information centres. You can find the address of the centre 
nearest you at: https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en 
On the phone or by email 
Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about the European Union. You can contact this service: 
- by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for these calls), 
- at the following standard number: +32 22999696, or 
- by electronic mail via: https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en 
FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU 
Online 
Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on the Europa website at: 
https://europa.eu/european-union/index_en 
EU publications 
You can download or order free and priced EU publications from EU Bookshop at: https://publications.europa.eu/en/publications. 
Multiple copies of free publications may be obtained by contacting Europe Direct or your local information centre (see 
https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en). 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The  European  Commission  Directorate 
General  for  International  Partnerships  - 
INTPA 

INTPA Mission 
Our  mission 
to  sustainable 
to  contribute 
is 
development, the eradication of poverty, peace and 
the protection of human rights, through international 
partnerships  that  uphold  and  promote  European 
values and interests. 

Follow us: 

: @EU_Partnerships 

: EUPartnerships 

: eu_partnerships 

: EUintheWorld