REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Report on Competition Policy 2021
Date: 2022-07-14
Institutions: Directorate-General for Competition, European Commission
Subjects: EU competition policy, State aid, anti-trust legislation, competitiveness, control of State aid, control of restrictive practices, merger control, restriction on competition, single market

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 14.7.2022  COM(2022) 337 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Report on Competition Policy 2021 {SWD(2022) 188 final}  
 
 
REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE 
COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE 
COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 

Report on Competition Policy 2021 

Contents 

1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 2 

2. Ensuring that Competition Rules Remain Fit for the Future – Progress on the Extensive 
Policy Agenda ............................................................................................................................ 4 

2.1. New legislative initiatives to strengthen the competition policy toolbox .................... 4 

2.2. Updating antitrust and merger rules and guidance to make them fit for new 
challenges ............................................................................................................................ 4 

2.3. Updating State aid rules and guidance to make them fit for new challenges .............. 7 

2.4. Adjusting DG Competition to current and future enforcement needs ....................... 12 

3. Competition Policy Enforcement Contributed to the Digital Transition and a Strong and 
Resilient Single Market ............................................................................................................ 14 

3.1. Enforcement in antitrust contributed to the digital transition and a strong and resilient 
Single Market  ................................................................................................................... 14 

3.2. Merger control contributed to the digital transition and a strong and resilient Single 
Market ............................................................................................................................... 18 

3.3. State aid control contributed to the digital transition and the resilience of the Single 
Market ............................................................................................................................... 19 

4. Competition policy enforcement contributed to the green transition ................................... 20 

4.1. State aid control contributed to the Green transition ................................................. 20 

4.2 Antitrust enforcement and merger control contributed to the green transition ........... 21 

5. Competition Policy Contributed to An Economy that Works for people ............................ 23 

5.1. Resilient European financial services ........................................................................ 23 

5.2. Fiscal State aid and selective tax advantages ............................................................. 24 

5.3. Competition policy continued to mitigate the economic and social fall-out from the 
COVID-19 pandemic ........................................................................................................ 25 

6. Joining Forces Shaping a European and Global Competition Culture ................................. 28 

6.1. Policy Cohesion through the European Competition Network .................................. 28 

6.2. Competition policy cooperation across the world...................................................... 29 

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1. Introduction 

The  Annual  Competition  Report  of  2021,  addressed  by  the  Commission  to  the  European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the  Regions,  elaborates  on  the  most  important  developments  in  EU  competition  policy  and 
enforcement in 2021.  

Competition policy is one of the cornerstones of the EU Single Market. Vigorous competition 
policy  enforcement  provides  European  businesses  and  consumers  with  choice,  innovation, 
quality  and  competitive  prices.  In  line  with  the  Commission’s  priorities,  competition  policy 
enforcement also fosters competition towards a post-pandemic recovery and a greener, more 
digital, more resilient and more inclusive economy in the EU.  

A  strong  and  resilient  Single  Market  supports  entrepreneurship  at  all  stages,  enables 
businesses of all sizes to get the most out of the Single Market’s scale and to use that scale as 
a  competitive  advantage  to  compete  better  in  a  globalised  economy.  EU  competition  policy 
must not only be effectively and consistently enforced but also sufficiently agile to deal with 
current and future challenges. 

In 2021, under Executive Vice-President Vestager’s leadership, competition policy continued 
to play an important role in the EU’s response to the crisis, demonstrating its in-built ability to 
react  swiftly  to  sudden  changes  in  the  economy.  The  Temporary  Framework  for  State  aid 
measures  to  support the economy in  the current  COVID-19 outbreak enabled necessary and 
proportionate  support  by  Member  States  to  otherwise  viable  businesses  that  ended  up  in 
jeopardy  because  of  the  pandemic.  The  Commission  also  laid  out  a  path  for  a  progressive 
phase-out of pandemic-related crisis measures under the Temporary Framework for State aid 
measures, accompanied by measures to kick start and crowd in private investment. To reduce 
the negative social and economic impact on the EU caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, 
the  Commission  will  again  use  the  flexibility  of  the  State-aid  policy  toolbox.  It  will  allow 
Member  States  to  minimise  the  negative  economic  effects  without  distorting  competition  in 
the EU more than strictly necessary.  

The Commission continued its work to make markets work better for citizens and businesses 
of all sizes by enforcing the EU competition rules in the areas of antitrust, merger control and 
State aid control – in the digital and other sectors – while considering the specificities of each 
market. The Commission did this while working hand in hand with Member States’ national 
competition authorities (NCAs) and under the scrutiny of EU courts. 

As  set  out  in  the  Commission  Communication  on  a  Competition  Policy  fit  for  new 
challenges1,  the  Commission  is  carrying  out  an  unprecedented  review  of  EU  competition 
policy,  covering  more  than  20  sets  of  rules  with  the  objective  of  making  sure  that  EU 
competition  policy  instruments  remain  future-proof  and  support  the  EU’s  green  and  digital 

1  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council, the  European  Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  the 
Committee of the Regions - A competition policy fit for new challenges, COM(2021)713, 18.11.2021. 

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transitions,  the  recovery  process,  the  response  to  economic  developments  and  fostering  the 
resilience of the Single Market.  

The Commission is also in the process of complementing the competition policy toolbox with 
new  instruments  designed  to  tackle  foreign  subsidies  and  digital  gatekeepers.  In  May  2021, 
the Commission tabled a Proposal for a Regulation on foreign subsidies distorting the internal 
market2. In 2021, significant progress was made by co-legislators as regards the Commission 
proposal for a Digital Markets Act.  

In 2021, the Commission continued to increase the efficiency of its operations in competition 
policy  enforcement.  DG  Competition  continued  its  efforts  to  digitise  its  case  handling 
processes.  The  year  also  brought  major  changes  in  deploying  financial  resources  directly  to 
competition  policy  enforcement  by  means  of  a  dedicated  operational  budget.  The  Single 
Market Programme (SMP)3 and its component for competition policy, with a budget of EUR 
20.4  million  for  2021,  provides  stable  financing  of  measures  enhancing  the  Commission’s 
enforcement  capacity,  policy  initiatives,  international  cooperation  as  well  as  competition 
policy  advocacy.  DG  Competition's  Communications  Strategy  supports  the  Executive  Vice 
President's ambition to pro-actively communicate the benefits of competition policy in a clear, 
consistent and continuous manner. 

2 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market, COM(2021) 223 
final, 5.5.2021. 
3  Regulation  (EU)  2021/690  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  28  April  2021  establishing  a  programme  for  the  internal 
market,  competitiveness  of  enterprises,  including  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises,  the  area  of  plants,  animals,  food  and  feed,  and 
European statistics (Single Market Programme) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 99/2013, (EU) No 1287/2013, (EU) No 254/2014 and 
(EU) No 652/2014 (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 153, 3.5.2021, p. 1–47. The Regulation applies retroactively, from 1 January 2021. 

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2.  Ensuring  that  Competition  Rules  Remain  Fit  for  the  Future  –  Progress  on  the  Extensive 
Policy Agenda  

2.1. New legislative initiatives to strengthen the competition policy toolbox 

Forming  part  of  the  EU  Digital  Strategy4  to  tackle  systemic  digital  challenges  such  as  the 
spread  of  cyber  threats,  hate  speech,  disinformation,  limited  competition  and  fairness  in 
digital  markets,  the  Commission  presented  two  legislative  proposals  in  December  2020, 
namely  the  Digital  Services  Act  (DSA)5  and  the  Digital  Markets  Act  (DMA)6.  The  DMA 
proposes a series of directly applicable obligations for firms acting as important gatekeepers 
for  businesses  and  consumers  in  the  Single  Market.  The  DMA  remained  a  top  legislative 
priority in 2021 as demonstrated by the adoption of the co-legislators’ respective mandates in 
November and December 20217.  

In  May  2021,  the  Commission  tabled  a  proposal  for  a  Regulation  on  foreign  subsidies 
distorting the internal market8. While aid granted by EU Member States is closely scrutinised, 
subsidies  granted  by  countries  outside  the  EU  to  companies  active  in  the  EU  go  largely 
unchecked. The new rules would tackle foreign subsidies that distort competition in the Single 
Market.  Under  the  proposed  Regulation,  the  Commission  would  be  able  to  investigate 
subsidies granted by foreign States to firms active in the EU and redress – when appropriate – 
the distortive effects caused by such State support9.  

2.2.  Updating  antitrust  and  merger  rules  and  guidance  to  make  them  fit  for  new 
challenges 

The purpose of the on-going review of key antitrust and merger rules is to evaluate the rules 
in  force  and  to  adjust  them  where  needed,  keeping  up  with  market  developments  that  have 
transformed  the  way  businesses  operate,  including  the  growth  of  e-commerce  and  online 
platforms. The Commission is also assessing whether further guidance to market participants 
is called for. 

4 Shaping Europe’s Digital Future, Commission publication of 19.2.2020, ISBN 978-92-76-16362-6. 
5 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Single Market For Digital Services (Digital Services Act) 
and amending Directive 2000/31/EC, COM(2020) 825 final, 15.12.2020. 
6  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  contestable  and  fair  markets  in  the  digital  sector  (Digital 
Markets Act), COM(2020) 842 final, 15.12.2020.  
7  Press  release,  “Regulating  ‘big  tech’:  Council  agrees  on  enhancing  competition  in  the  digital  sphere”,  25  November  2021,  available  at 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/11/25/regulating-big-tech-council-agrees-on-enhancing-competition-in-the-
digital-sphere/; and press release, “Digital Markets Act: Parliament ready to start negotiations with Council”, 15 December 2021, available at 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20211210IPR19211/digital-markets-act-parliament-ready-to-start-negotiations-with-
council. 
8 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market,  COM(2021) 
223 final, 5.5.2021. 
9 The proposal includes three tools: (i.) proposed concentrations where the target company has an EU turnover of at least EUR 500 million 
and  the  foreign  financial  contribution  exceeds  EUR  50  million,  would  have  to  be  notified  to  the  Commission;  (ii.)  bids  in  EU  public 
procurement procedures involving foreign financial contributions where the value of the procurement is at least EUR 250 million would have 
to be notified to the Commission; and (iii.) the Commission would be empowered to investigate ex-officio other market situations, including 
smaller  concentrations  and  smaller  public  procurement  procedures.  The  Commission  would  have  exclusive  competence  to  enforce  the 
Regulation. When the negative effects of the foreign subsidy outweigh its positive effects, the Commission will have the power to impose 
redress  measures  or  accept  commitments  to  remedy  the  distortion.  Such  measures  and  commitments  include  a  range  of  structural  or 
behavioural remedies, such as the divestment of certain assets or the prohibition of a certain market behaviour. The Commission will also 
have the power to prohibit a subsidised concentration or the award of a public procurement contract to a subsidised bidder. 

4 

 
                                                 
Review of rules on vertical supply and horizontal cooperation continued 

Vertical  agreements,  such  as  those  between  suppliers  of  goods  or  services  and  their 
distributors, are common across all sectors of the EU economy. In July 2021, the Commission 
launched  a  public  consultation  on  the  draft  revised  Vertical  Block  Exemption  Regulation 
(VBER) and Vertical Guidelines10. The aim of the ongoing revision is to clarify and simplify 
certain provisions and fill in perceived regulatory gaps where the current rules may no longer 
be  fit  for  purpose  due  to  market  developments  such  as  the  growth  of  online  sales  and  the 
emergence of new types of platform undertakings. The Commission aims at having new rules 
in place when the current rules expire on 31 May 2022. 

As regards the review of the EU competition rules on horizontal cooperation, the purpose of 
these  rules  is  to  make  it  easier  for  undertakings  to  cooperate  in  ways  that  are  economically 
desirable  and  without  adverse  effect  from  the  point  of  view  of  competition  policy.  In  May 
2021, the Commission published the findings of the evaluation11 of the two horizontal block 
exemption regulations on Research & Development and specialisation agreements (abreviated 
R&D  BER  and  Specialisation  BER  respectively,  together  HBERs),  together  with  the 
Horizontal  Guidelines.  In July 2021, the Commission  launched  a public  consultation  on the 
policy  options  for  the  revision  of  the  rules12.  Since  both  regulations  will  expire  on  31 
December 2022. The Commission aims to have the new rules in place by this date.  

Key findings from the evaluation of the rules on horizontal agreements 
The  evaluation  showed  that  the  rules  on  horizontal  agreements  remain  useful  tools  for  businesses. 
However,  the  evaluation  identified  several  areas  where  the  rules  are  not  sufficiently  adapted  to 
digitisation and the pursuit of sustainability goals. Some of the provisions in the HBERs are viewed as 
rigid and complex, while others are considered unclear and difficult to interpret by companies. More 
specifically, the conditions for exemption in the R&D BER  may no longer  be optimal for  capturing 
pro-competitive R&D agreements and the scope of the Specialisation BER may be too narrow. Some 
provisions  in  the  HBERs  and  Horizontal  Guidelines  are  also  considered  unclear  or  overly  strict. 
Finally,  the  Horizontal  Guidelines  offer  little  guidance  on  recent  market  developments  such  as 
digitisation,  resilience  and sustainability  objectives13  in  horizontal  agreements (for  example, they  do 
not  provide  sufficient  legal  certainty  for  the  self-assessment  of  agreements  pursuing  sustainability 
objectives and data sharing/data pooling agreements. 

In  May  2021,  the  Commission  also  published  the  findings  of  the  evaluation14  on  the 
functioning of the Motor Vehicle Block Exemption Regulation (MVBER)15. The Commission 

10 Public consultation on the draft revised Regulation on vertical agreements and vertical guidelines, from 09.07.2021 to 17.09.2021. See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition-policy/public-consultations/2021-vber_en 
11 Commission Staff Working Document - Evaluation of the Horizontal Block Exemption Regulation, SWD (2021) 103, 6.5.2021.  
12  Public  consultation  -  Horizontal  agreements  between  companies,  13.7.2021  to  5.10.2021.  See:  https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-
regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13058-Horizontal-agreements-between-companies-revision-of-EU-competition-rules/public-
consultation_en 
13 The 2030 UN Agenda for Sustainable Development identifies 17 Sustainable Development Goals (such as climate action, affordable and 
clean  energy  or  industry,  innovation and  infrastructure  and 169 targets  (including but not  limited  to  strengthening  resilience  and  adaptive 
capacity  to  climate-related  disasters,  ending  deforestation  and  restoring  degraded  forests  or  developing  sustainable,  resilient  and inclusive 
infrastructures). 
14  An  Evaluation  Report  and  a  Staff  Working  Document  (SWD)  summarise  the  conclusions.  Report  from  the  Commission,  Commission 
Evaluation  Report  on  the  operation  of  the  Motor  Vehicle  Block  Exemption  Regulation  (EU)  No  461/2010,  COM(2021)264,  28.05.2021. 
Commission  Staff  Working  Document  of  the  Motor  Vehicle  Block  Exemption  Regulation  accompanying  the  document  Report  from  the 
Commission,  Commission  Evaluation  Report  on  the  operation  of  the  Motor  Vehicle  Block  Exemption  Regulation  (EU)  No  461/2010, 
SWD(2021)112, 28.05.2021. 
15 Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, OJ L 102, 23.4.2010, pp. 1–7. 

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concluded  that  while  the  principles  of  the  MVBER  remain  valid,  the  emergence  of  new 
technologies  and  the  increasing  role  of  data  in  this  industry  ought  to  be  reflected  in  the 
Commission’s guidance accompanying the MVBER. The current MVBER will expire on 31 
May 2023. The Commission is currently reflecting on the follow-up to these findings, while 
also taking into account the ongoing review of the VBER. 

Results of the evaluation of the Market Definition Notice published 

The Market Definition Notice16 provides important guidance on how the Commission applies 
the concepts of relevant product and geographic markets in competition enforcement. In July 
2021,  the  Commission  published  the  results  of  the  evaluation  of  the  Market  Definition 
Notice17. On the basis of the findings, the Commission has decided to review the Notice and 
will consult stakeholders on the draft of the revised Market Definition Notice in 2022. 

Key findings from the evaluation of the Market Definition Notice 
The Commission concluded that the principles of the Market Definition Notice, based on the case law 
of the EU courts, remain sound. However, they may not fully reflect recent  developments in market 
definition  practice,  such  as  those  related  to  digitisation.  Areas  where  the  Market  Definition  Notice 
might  not  be fully  up-to-date include:  (i.) the  use  and  purpose  of the  SSNIP  (small  significant  non-
transitory  increase  in  price)  test in  defining  relevant markets;  (ii.)  digital  markets, in  particular  with 
respect  to  products  or  services  marketed  at  zero  monetary  price  and  to  digital  ecosystems;  (iii.) 
assessment  of  geographic  markets  in  conditions  of  globalisation  and  import  competition;  (iv.) 
quantitative  techniques  for  market  definition;  (v.)  calculation  of  market  shares;  and  (vi.)  non-price 
competition (including innovation). 

Draft Guidelines published on the application of competition law to collective agreements 
for self-employed persons 

Some self-employed persons have little influence over their payment and working conditions. 
Collective bargaining can be an important tool to achieve better terms but some self-employed 
individuals  can  be  considered  “undertakings”  and  collective  agreements  may  therefore  be 
captured  by  the  EU  competition  rules.  To  address  this  issue,  the  Commission  consulted  all 
stakeholders  on  different  policy  options  in  January  2021,  first  with  an  inception  impact 
assessment, and then with a detailed questionnaire in March 202118. On 9 December 2021, the 
Commission published for consultation draft Guidelines on the application of EU competition 
law  to  collective  agreements  regarding  the  working  conditions  of  self-employed  persons19. 
The  Commission  will  assess  the  input  from  stakeholders  with  the  aim  to  publish  a  final 
version of the Guidelines in 2022.  

16 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, OJ C 372, 9.12.1997, pp. 5–13. 
17  Commission  Staff  Working  Document,  Evaluation  of  the  Commission  Notice  on  the  definition  of  relevant  market  for  the  purposes  of 
law  of  9  December  1997,  SWD(2021)  199,  12.7.2021.  See:  https://ec.europa.eu/competition-
Community  competition 
policy/system/files/2021-07/evaluation_market-definition-notice_en.pdf 
18  Collective  bargaining  agreements  for  self-employed  –  scope  of  application  EU  competition  rules,  consultation  period  5.3.2021  – 
31.5.2021.  See:  https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12483-Collective-bargaining-agreements-for-self-
employed-scope-of-application-EU-competition-rules/public-consultation_en 
19  Communication  from  the  Commission  Guidelines  on  the  application  of  EU  competition  law  to  collective  agreements  regarding  the 
working  conditions  of  solo  self-employed  persons,  9.12.2021  C(2021) 8838  final  ANNEX.  The  draft  Guidelines  are  part  of  a  package  of 
initiatives  by  the  Commission  also  including  a  proposal  for  a  Directive  on  improving  working  conditions  in  platform  work  and  a 
Communication on harnessing the full benefits of digitisation for the future of work. 

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Results of the evaluation of the procedural and jurisdictional aspects of EU merger control 
and further guidance on Article 22 published 

The  objective  of  the  evaluation  of  the  procedural  and  jurisdictional  aspects  of  EU  merger 
control  was  to  analyse  how  certain  merger  rules  have  worked  under  evolving  market 
conditions.  The  evaluation  focused  on  two  topics  in  particular:  (i.)  the  effectiveness  of  the 
turnover-based  jurisdictional  thresholds  in  capturing  concentrations  that  may  have  a 
significant  impact  on  competition  in  the  Single  Market;  and  (ii.)  the  effectiveness  of  the 
simplified  notification  procedure  introduced  in  2013.  In  March  2021,  the  Commission 
published the findings of the evaluation20. 

Key findings from the evaluation of the procedural and jurisdictional aspect of EU merger 
control  
The  Commission  concluded  that  the  turnover-based  jurisdictional  thresholds  combined  with  the 
referral mechanism had generally proved to be effective in capturing relevant transactions in the EU 
Single  Market.  However,  recent  market  developments  have  resulted  in  a  gradual  increase  in 
acquisitions  of  firms  that  play  or  may  develop  into  playing  a  decisive  competitive  role,  despite 
generating  little  or  no  turnover  at  the  time  of  the  merger.  The  evaluation  concluded  that,  in  certain 
cases,  transactions  with  a  potential  negative  impact  on  competition  were  reviewed  neither  by  the 
Commission,  nor  by  any  Member  State.  This  included  in  particular  acquisitions  targeting  nascent 
firms  with  competitive  potential  and  innovative  firms  including  in  -  but  not  limited  to  -  the  digital, 
pharmaceutical, biotechnology and certain other industrial sectors. The value of the target firm was not 
always sufficiently correlated to the transaction's potential anti-competitive effects. 

The  Commission  adopted  in  March  2021  a  communication  providing  guidance  on  how  to 
apply  the  referral  mechanism  between  Member  States  and  the  Commission  as  set  out  in 
Article 22 of the Merger Regulation21 in the specific circumstances where the turnover-based 
thresholds do not  reflect the competitive potential  of the target  and where the transaction is 
not notifiable to any Member State under national law. The Commission intends to encourage 
and accept more referrals under Article 22 of the Merger Regulation22.  

2.3. Updating State aid rules and guidance to make them fit for new challenges 

In 2021, the Commission continued the evaluation and revision of existing State aid rules and 
guidance to further facilitate the green and digital transitions and foster the resilience of the 
Single Market when recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic. The Commission continued to 
follow market developments and stands ready to further adjust its policy tools so that the EU 
can respond swiftly to emerging crises.  

20  Commission  Staff  Working  Document, Evaluation  of procedural and jurisdictional  aspects  of  EU  merger  control,  SWD(2021)  66  final, 
26.3.2021. 
21  Communication  from  the  Commission:  Guidance  on  the  application  of  the  referral  mechanism  set  out  in  Article  22  of  the  Merger 
Regulation to certain categories of cases, OJ C 113, 31.3.2021, pp. 1–6. 
22 Article 22 of the Merger Regulation allows Member States to ask the Commission to examine any concentration that does not have an EU 
dimension, but which affects cross-border trade and threatens to significantly affect competition within the territory of the Member State(s) 
making  the  request,  irrespective  of  whether  such  transaction  is notifiable  under  the national  merger  control  rules  of  the  referring  Member 
State(s). 

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Adjustments of the State aid Temporary Framework  

Most  recently,  the  Commission  consulted  Member  States  on  a  proposal  to  prolong  until  30 
June 2022 the Temporary Framework for State aid measures, while setting out the path for the 
progressive phase-out of pandemic-related crisis support. The Commission adopted the sixth 
amendment of the Temporary Framework in November 202123. The prolongation of existing 
measures  under  the  Temporary  Framework  for  State  aid  measures  until  30  June  2022  will 
avoid  cliff-edge  effects  by  preventing  that  businesses  are  suddenly  cut  off  from  targeted 
public support at a time when serious disturbances affecting Member States’ economies have 
not  yet  ended.  The  Commission  continues  to  pay  due  regard  to  developments  potentially 
affecting  the  EU,  including  the  social  and  economic  impact  on  the  EU  caused  by  Russia's 
invasion  of  Ukraine,  in  order  to  act  swiftly  and  adjust  its  policy  tools  where  necessary. 
Moreover,  the  Commission  introduced  two  new  tools  to  kick  start  and  crowd  in  private 
investment  for  a  faster,  greener  and  more  digital  recovery  from  the  pandemic.  The 
Commission introduced investment support towards a sustainable recovery until 31 December 
2022  and  solvency  support  until  31  December  2023,  allowing  Member  States  to  leverage 
private funds and make them available for investments in SMEs, including start-ups and small 
mid-caps. 

Guidelines on State aid for climate, environmental protection and energy adopted 

The Commission carried on with its review of the State aid rules to make them fit for purpose 
and  aligned  with  the  climate  goals  of  the  EU.  In  June  2021,  the  European  Commission 
launched  a  public  consultation24  inviting  all  interested  parties  to  comment  on  the  proposed 
revision  of  the  Energy  and  Environmental  State  aid  Guidelines.  In  December  2021,  the 
Commission  endorsed  the  new  Climate,  Energy  and  Environmental  State  aid  Guidelines 
(CEEAG)25.  The  revision  widens  the  scope  of  the  Guidelines  to  cover  new  economic  areas 
such  as  clean  mobility  and  the  decarbonisation  of  industry.  It  will  also  provide  a  flexible 
framework by allowing support to all technologies that can deliver the European Green Deal. 
The wider scope of the Guidelines is accompanied by safeguards which ensure that the State 
aid  is  efficiently  directed  to  where  it  is  needed  and  require  Member  States  to  consult 
stakeholders when  designing  large  State  aid  measures.  The CEEAG will support EU  efforts 
towards  decarbonisation,  a  circular  economy,  biodiversity,  clean  or  zero-emission  mobility 
and  buildings’  energy  efficiency  and  performance,  with  a  view  to  meet  the  EU  climate  and 
energy  targets  for  2030  and  2050.  The  CEEAG  entered  into  force  in  January  202226. 
According to revised rules, more State aid will be considered compatible than before. 

23 Communication from the Commission Sixth Amendment to the Temporary Framework for State aid measures to support the economy in 
the  current  COVID-19  outbreak and amendment  to the  Annex  to  the  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Member  States  on  the 
application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty  on the Functioning of the European Union to short-term export-credit insurance 2021/C 
473/01, C/2021/8442, OJ C 473, 24.11.2021, pp. 1–15. 
24 Public consultations from 7.6.2021 to 2.8.2021. See: https://ec.europa.eu/competition-policy/public-consultations/2021-ceeag_en 
25 Communication from the Commission: Guidelines on State aid for climate, environmental protection and energy, 27.1.2022, C(2022) 481 
final. 
26 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_22_566 

8 

 
                                                 
Revised IPCEI Communication adopted 

to  sustainable  economic  growth, 

Important  Projects  of  Common  European  Interest  (IPCEI)  bring  together  knowledge, 
expertise,  financial  resources  and  economic  actors  throughout  the  EU  with  a  view  to 
overcome important market failures, systemic failures and societal challenges which could not 
otherwise  be  addressed.  They  contribute 
jobs, 
competitiveness  and  strengthen  the  open  strategic  autonomy  of  the  EU.  To  avoid  that  they 
distort  competition  in  the  Single  Market,  IPCEIs  require  the  approval  of  the  Commission 
under  the  State  aid  rules.  IPCEIs  enable  breakthrough  innovations  up  to  the  first  industrial 
deployment  and  infrastructure  investments  of  great  importance  where  public  intervention  is 
necessary.27  IPCEIs  boost  entrepreneurship  in  the  EU,  facilitate  the  green  and  digital 
transitions and increase the resilience of the Single Market. Following an evaluation and after 
an extensive consultation28  of all interested parties on the proposed  revised  communication, 
the Commission adopted a revised Communication on State aid rules for Important Projects of 
Common European Interest (IPCEI Communication)29 in November 2021. The revised IPCEI 
Communication applies as of 1 January 2022.  

Communication on State aid rules for Important Projects of Common European Interest  
The updated Communication widens the EU scope and transparent character of IPCEIs by stipulating 
that IPCEIs must normally involve at least four Member States. Moreover, IPCEIs must be designed 
in  a  transparent  and  inclusive  manner.  The  revised  Communication  facilitates  the  participation  of 
SMEs  in  IPCEIs  and  enhances  the  benefits  of  their  involvement.  The  2021  IPCEI  Communication 
aligns its objectives with current EU priorities. To support the environmental strategies of the EU and 
to  accelerate  the  green  transition,  the  revised  IPCEI  Communication  requires  Member  States  to 
provide evidence of compliance of the notified projects with the ‘do no significant harm' principle. In 
addition, the Communication clarifies the criteria to be used when combining EU and national funds. 

Public consultation on the State aid Framework for research, development and innovation 

The State  aid  Framework for  research, development and innovation  (the RDI  Framework)30 
incentivises  risky  research,  development  and  innovation  (RDI)  activities,  which  would  not 
occur  in  the  absence  of  public  support.  The  Commission  launched  a  public  consultation  in 
April  2021  with  a  view  to  simplify  the  existing  State  aid  Framework31.  The  objective  is  to 
make it easier for Member States to support research, development and innovation, including 
for  SMEs  and  innovation  clusters,  while  ensuring  that  possible  competition  distortions  are 
kept to the minimum as well as providing the right incentives to enable the green and digital 
transition  of  the  EU.  Following  the  public  consultation  and  the  contributions  received,  the 
Commission continues its reflections on how to modernise the RDI Framework and make it 
future proof. Given the importance of the green and digital transitions and the resilience of the 
Single Market, these reflections on RDI Framework modernisation include for example areas 
such  as  testing  and  experimenting  infrastructure  as  well  as  developing  and  delivering 

27 In the past, funding under the IPCEI Communication has been approved to projects related to batteries, microprocessors and certain 
infrastructures. 
28 Public consultations form 23.2.2021 to 20.4.2021. See: https://ec.europa.eu/competition-policy/public-consultations/2021-ipcei_en 
29 Communication from the Commission: Criteria for the analysis of the compatibility with the internal market of State aid to promote the 
execution of important projects of common European interest, C(2021) 8481 final. 
30 Framework for State aid for research and development and innovation, OJ C 198, 27.6.2014, p. 1. 
31 Public consultations from 8.4.2021 to 3.6.2021. See: https://ec.europa.eu/competition-policy/public-consultations/2021-rdi_en  

9 

 
                                                 
breakthrough  technologies.  The  Commission  expects  the  revised  RDI  Framework  to  be 
adopted in 2022. 

Public consultation on the State aid Broadband Guidelines 

The  State  aid  rules  for  the  deployment  of  broadband  networks  (Broadband  Guidelines)32 
facilitate  the  deployment  and  take-up  of  broadband  networks  in  areas  with  insufficient 
connectivity, such as remote and sparsely populated regions. The Guidelines enable Member 
States to support modern infrastructure providing end-users with high-quality and affordable 
broadband services in areas where commercial operators have limited incentives to invest.  

In  July  2021,  the  Commission  published  its  findings  of  the  evaluation  of  the  Broadband 
Guidelines  33.  It concluded  that, overall, the existing rules  work well and are fit for purpose 
but  that  some  adjustments  would  be  necessary  to  adapt  the  current  rules  to  recent 
technological  progress.  Adequate  investements  are  needed  to  meet  the  current  EU  policy 
objectives,  in  particular  the  EU  2025  Gigabit  Society34  and  the  2030  Digital  Compass35.  In 
November  2021,  the  Commission  submitted  for  public  consultation  the  proposed  revised 
Broadband Guidelines36. The public consultation remained open until 11 February 2022. The 
draft Guidelines aim to make it easier for Member States to stimulate the deployment of high-
performing  broadband  networks,  including  Gigabit  and  5G  networks,  while  limiting 
competition distortions. 

Scope of the General Block Exemption Regulation extended to facilitate EU programmes 

With  the  aim  of  improving  the  interplay  between  EU  funding  rules  and  EU  State  aid  rules 
under  the  new  Multiannual  Financial  Framework37,  the  Commission  adopted  in  July  2021 
amendments  to  the  General  Block  Exemption  Regulation  (GBER)38.  These  amendments 
extend  the  scope  of  the  regulation  and  streamline  the  State  aid  rules  applicable  to  national 
funding falling within the scope of certain recently adopted EU programmes39. 

32  Communication  from  the  Commission:  EU  Guidelines  for  the  application  of  State  aid  rules  in  relation  to  the  rapid  deployment  of 
broadband networks, OJ C 25, 26.1.2013, pp. 1-26. 
33 Commission Staff Working Document – Evaluation of the State Aid rules for broadband infrastructure deployment, SWD(2021) 194 final, 
7.7.2021.  
34 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions: Connectivity for a Competitive Digital Single Market – Towards a European Gigabit Society, COM (2016) 0587 
final.  
35  Communication  from the Commission to  the  European  Parliament,  the Council,  the  European Economic  and  Social Committee  and the 
Committee of the Regions, Digital Compass: the European way for the Digital Decade, COM (2021) 118 final, 9.3.2021.  
36 Draft Communication from the Commission Guidelines on State aid for broadband networks, of 19.11.2021,  
37 See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/eu-budget/long-term-eu-budget/2021-2027_en 
38  Commission  Regulation  (EU)  2021/1237  of  23  July  2021  amending  Regulation  (EU)  No  651/2014  declaring  certain  categories  of  aid 
compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 270, 29.7.2021, 
p.39.  Public  funding  that  fulfils  the  conditions  of  State  aid  as  defined  in  Article  107(1)  of  the  TFEU  must  normally  be  notified  to  the 
Commission and approved before it is put into effect, in order to ensure that public spending does not cause unfair competition for companies 
operating  within  the  EU's  internal  market.  However,  Member  States  are  not  obliged  to  notify  State  aid  to  the  Commission,  if  the  aid  in 
question meets all the relevant criteria set out in the GBER. 
39  The  concerned  national  funds  are  those  relating  to:  Financing  and  investment  operations  supported  by  the  InvestEU  Fund;  Research, 
Development and Innovation (RDI) projects having received a “Seal of Excellence” under Horizon 2020 or Horizon Europe, as well as co-
funded  research  and  development  projects  or  Teaming  actions  under  Horizon  2020  or  Horizon  Europe;  certain  trans-European  digital 
connectivity  infrastructure  projects  funded  or  having  received  a  “Seal  of  Excellence”  under  the  Connecting  Europe  Facility;  European 
Territorial Cooperation (ETC) projects, also known as Interreg. 

10 

 
                                                 
With  the  amendment  of  the  GBER,  State  aid  granted  by  national  authorities  for  projects 
funded  by  programmes  managed  at  EU  level  can  be  directly  implemented  by  the  Member 
States without prior notification to the Commission. However, Member States have to inform 
the Commission about the aid measures after they have been adopted. In addition, the updated 
GBER  allows  Member  States  to  provide  State  aid  for  the  digital  and  green  transitions.  It 
allows a degree of flexibility to rapidly support companies needing assistance due to negative 
economic effects caused by unexpected external shocks. Exempting broad categories of State 
aid from prior notification is a major simplification and facilitates swift implementation by the 
Member States.  

Green Deal GBER revision  

The GBER is currently undergoing a targeted revision that has the objective to allow Member 
States  to  mobilise  quickly  more  aid  for  green  projects,  without  the  need  for  prior  approval 
from  the  Commission.  The  revision  aims  to  widen  the  scope  of  the  GBER  to  cover  aid  for 
investments  in  new  technologies  such  as  hydrogen  and  carbon  capture,  storage  or  usage, 
which  are  essential  to  address  strategic  dependencies.  The  scope  of  the  GBER  will  be 
extended  to  areas  that  are  key  to  achieve  the  objectives  of  the  European  Green  Deal,  for 
example resource efficiency and biodiversity. Moreover, the GBER revision aims to refine the 
provisions  on  aid  for  investments  in  key  policy  areas  such  as  the  energy  performance  of 
buildings  and  the  recharging  and  refuelling  of  infrastructure  for  clean  mobility.  Finally,  the 
rules for defining eligible costs and eligible aid intensities will be made more flexible.  

Revision of the Risk Finance Guidelines adopted 

In December 2021, the Commission adopted revised Guidelines on State aid promoting risk 
finance investments40. The revised Guidelines provide a number of improvements which will 
ease  the  application  of  the  Guidelines,  consolidate  existing  requirements  for  ex-ante 
assessment  and  limit  the  requirement  to  provide  a  funding  gap  analysis  to  the  largest  risk 
finance  schemes.  Moreover,  the  revised  Guidelines  introduce  simplified  conditions  for  the 
assessment of schemes aimed exclusively at start-ups and SMEs that have not yet made their 
first  commercial sales. To ensure  consistency, certain  definitions included in  the Guidelines 
are aligned with those in the GBER41. The revised Guidelines apply from 1 January 2022. 

Revised Communication on the Short-term export credit insurance adopted  

In December 2021, the Commission adopted a revised Communication on short-term export 
credit insurance (STEC Communication)42. The Communication includes a limited number of 
amendments.  For  example,  the  Communication  modifies  the  eligibility  criteria  for  SMEs, 
which  under  certain  circumstances  may  benefit  from  State  insurance.  Under  the  previous 
rules, the threshold for SMEs was an annual export turnover of maximum EUR 2 million. The 

40 Communication from the Commission: Guidelines on State aid to promote risk finance investments, OJ C 508, 16.12.2021, pp. 1–36.  
41  Commission  Regulation  (EU)  No  651/2014  of  17  June  2014  declaring  certain  categories  of  aid  compatible  with  the  internal  market  in 
application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 187, 26.6.2014, pp. 1-78. 
42 Communication from the Commission to the Member States on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union to short-term export credit insurance, OJ C 497, 10.12.2021, pp.5-13.  

11 

 
                                                 
revised STEC Communication increases this threshold to EUR 2.5 million. The revised STEC 
Communication entered into force on 1 January 2022. 

Revised Regional Aid Guidelines adopted  

The Regional Aid Guidelines allow Member States to support least favoured regions as well 
as regions facing transitional or structural challenges. The Guidelines also ensure the integrity 
of  the  Single  Market  while  taking  into  account  the  EU  cohesion  objectives.  Following  the 
evaluation of the current rules in 201943 and an extensive consultation of stakeholders on the 
draft text, the Commission adopted the revised Regional Aid Guidelines in April 202144. The 
revised guidelines include a number of targeted adjustments reflecting the experience gained 
from the application of the previous rules. They also  take into account new policy priorities 
related  to  the  European  Green  Deal  and  the  European  Industrial  and  Digital  Strategies.  The 
revised Regional Aid Guidelines entered into force on 1 January 2022. 

Evaluation of the Agricultural Block Exemption Regulation and Guidelines published 

In May 2021, the Commission published an evaluation of the Agricultural Block Exemption 
Regulation and the Guidelines for State aid in the agricultural and forestry sectors and in rural 
areas45.  The  evaluation  concluded  that  overall  these  rules  are  fit  for  purpose  and  meet  the 
needs of the sectors concerned46. However, certain targeted revisions, including clarifications 
of  some  concepts,  further  streamlining  and  simplification,  aligment  to  the  reform  of  the 
Common  Agricultural  Policy47as  well  as  adjustments  to  reflect  the  current  priorities  of  the 
EU, in particular the European Green Deal48. The next step is making an impact assessment, 
which looks into the issues identified during the evaluation. The Commission expects to have 
the revised rules adopted by 31 December 2022 when the current ones will expire. 

2.4. Adjusting DG Competition to current and future enforcement needs 

Digital transformation 

The  Commission  recognises  the  digital  transformation  as  a  major  political  priority  for  its 
current mandate (Europe Fit for the Digital Age), not only for driving change in markets but 
also  for  enabling  public  sector  modernisation.  In  2021,  DG  Competition  elaborated  on  and 
endorsed  a  comprehensive  internal  Digital  Strategy,  which  will  make  DG  Competition’s 
investigatory processes and other activities more efficient. Moreover, the Digital Strategy will 
strengthen  EU competition  law enforcement by investing in  state-of-the-art digital  solutions 
and  by  modernising  DG  Competition’s  case  management  systems,  notably  by  launching 

43 Guidelines on regional State aid for 2014-2020, OJ C 209, 23.7.2013, p. 1. 
44 Communication from the Commission: Guidelines on regional State aid, OJ C 153, 29.4.2021, pp. 1–46. 
45  The  validity  of  these  rules  was  previously  extended  until  31  December  2022.  See:  Commission  Notice  amending  the  European  Union 
Guidelines  for  State  aid in  the  agricultural and  forestry  sectors  and  in  rural  areas  2014  to 2020 as  regards  their  period  of  application and 
making temporary adaptations to take into account the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic (Text with EEA relevance), OJ 424, 8.12.2020, 
pp. 30-31.  
46 The evaluation assessed how the current rules and have performed, in light of their main objectives: minimising distortions of competition 
and trade in the agricultural and forestry sector; ensuring the consistency of the agricultural State aid rules with the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP), in particular rural development objectives under the CAP; and simplifying procedures and reducing administrative costs. See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/2089-Agricultural-State-aid-guidelines-review_en 
47 See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/food-farming-fisheries/key-policies/common-agricultural-policy/new-cap-2023-27_en 
48 See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en 

12 

 
                                                 
CASE@EC for State Aid and document management. The Digital Strategy is firmly anchored 
in  the  European  Commission’s  overall  Digital  Strategy  which  transforms  the  Commission 
into a digitally-enabled, user-focused and data-driven organisation.  

DG  Competition  is  developing  and  improving  digital  solutions  supporting  the  interaction 
between  external  stakeholders  such  as  NCAs,  companies  active  in  the  Single  Market,  law 
firms and private citizens. In this context, DG Competition launched in 2021 three new digital 
solutions;  State  Aid  Reporting  Interactive  (SARI2),  eConfidentiality  and  eRFI.  DG 
Competition  also  initiated  a  project  to  revamp  case-related  information  published  on  the 
EUROPA website, with the aim to better access, search and export public data on competition 
policy  (including  State  Aid,  Antitrust  and  Merger  cases  and  decisions).  Given  the  sensitive 
and confidential nature of the information DG Competition handles, IT security plans for new 
as well  as  existing digital  solutions  have been drafted or updated. The necessary safety  and 
monitoring measures are being implemented to enhance cyber security and cyber resilience. 

In  2021,  DG  Competition  continued  investing  in  corporate  intelligence,  advanced  data  and 
machine learning services and solutions to support investigations. A dedicated unit conducts 
intelligence  and  investigative  analyses  and  provides  forensic  IT  support.  Moreover,  the  unit 
collects and analyses information from publicly available sources and gathers information of 
potential investigative interest for the detection of new cases. 

Resources and organisation 

To  better  cope  with  evolving  policy  developments,  in  November  2021  DG  Competition 
carried out a re-organisation within the existing organisational structure. The number of units 
dealing  with  Important  Projects  of  Common  European  Interest  (IPCEI)  was  increased  from 
one to  two. Moreover, a Task  Force for the Digital Markets  Act  was formed to  support the 
adoption and implementation of the Digital Markets Act. In addition, DG Competition created 
a  reinforced  unit  to  implement  a  more  coordinated  approach  to  the  State  aid  policy 
ramifications of tax legislation and aggressive tax planning. 

The Single Market Programme 

The Single Market  Programme (SMP) was adopted in  April 202149. With a budget  of EUR 
4.2 billion over the period 2021-2027, the SMP provides financial support to strengthen the 
governance and the functioning of the Single Market and includes a competition component, 
that is to say a dedicated budget for competition policy. With a budget of EUR 20.4 million 
for  2021,  the  SMP  supported  an  effective  and  up-to-date  enforcement  of  EU  competition 
policy. Funds were also used for cooperation and partnerships with public administrations in 
the EU and worldwide as well as competition advocacy measures.  

49  Regulation  (EU)  2021/690  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  28  April  2021  establishing  a  programme  for  the  internal 
market,  competitiveness  of  enterprises,  including  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises,  the  area  of  plants,  animals,  food  and  feed,  and 
European statistics (Single Market Programme) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 99/2013, (EU) No 1287/2013, (EU) No 254/2014  and 
(EU) No 652/2014 (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 153, 3.5.2021, pp. 1–47. The Regulation applies retroactively, from 1 January 2021. 

13 

 
                                                 
Competition advocacy 

In  2021,  the  Commission  engaged  in  competition  policy  advocacy  and  outreach  at  multiple 
levels  to  support  the  effectiveness  of  EU  competition  policy,  most  prominently  with 
Executive  Vice-President  Vestager  participating  in  events  and  at  press  conferences.  Press 
releases, newsletters and social media were used to communicate the benefits of competition 
policy.  Dedicated  events  at  international  level  or  together  with  Member  States  were  also 
organised.  Due  to  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  most  events  were  held  in  virtual  and/or  hybrid 
formats in 2021.  

3.  Competition  Policy  Enforcement  Contributed  to  the  Digital  Transition  and  a  Strong  and 
Resilient Single Market  

Through  the  headline  ambition  “A  Europe  fit  for  the  digital  age”,  President  von  der  Leyen 
defined  the  digital  area  as  one  of  her  top  priorities  for  this  Commission  mandate.  In 
competitive markets firms must innovate and become more efficient to prosper50. This applies 
both to innovation-driven and fast-moving digital markets as well as to  markets that are not 
yet digital. Effective enforcement of the EU competition rules and regulatory reforms are of 
vital importance for the digital transformation of the EU economy, for the recovery from the 
COVID-19 pandemic and for strengthening the resilience of the Single Market.  

3.1. Enforcement in antitrust contributed to the digital transition and a strong and 
resilient Single Market  

In  2021,  the  Commission  continued  to  vigorously  enforce  the  competition  rules  to  address 
competition restrictions in the Single Market. 

In the markets for PC video gaming the Commission fined Valve, the owner of the online PC 
gaming  platform  Steam  and  five  publishers  –  Bandai  Namco,  Capcom,  Focus  Home,  Koch 
Media and ZeniMax – a total of EUR 7.8 million for restricting cross-border sales of PC video 
games  on  the  basis  of  customers’  geographical  location  within  the  EEA  (“geo-blocking”)51. 
The  fines  for  the  publishers,  totalling  over  EUR  6  million,  were  reduced  because  the 
companies cooperated with the Commission. Valve chose not to cooperate and was fined over 
EUR 1.6 million. 

50  The  importance  of  competition  and  innovation  is  also  highlighted  in  the  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European 
Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European  Economic  and  Social  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions  “An  SME  Strategy  for  a  sustainable  and 
digital Europe” - 10.3.2020 COM(2020) 103 final and in the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the  European  Economic  and  Social  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions  “Updating  the  2020  New  Industrial  Strategy:  Building  a  stronger 
Single Market for Europe’s recovery” – 25.5.2021 COM(2021) 350 final. 
51 Cases AT.40413, Focus Home; AT.40414, Koch Media; AT.40420, ZeniMax; AT.40422, Bandai Namco and AT.40424, Capcom. See 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/es/ip_21_170. 

14 

 
 
                                                 
In  April  2021,  the  Commission  issued  a  Statement  of  Objections  to  Apple  provisionally 
finding  that  Apple  distorted  competition  in  the  music  streaming  market  as  it  abused  its 
dominant position for the distribution of music streaming apps through its App Store52. The 
Commission takes issue with the mandatory use of Apple's own in-app purchase mechanism 
imposed  on  music  streaming  app  developers  to  distribute  their  apps  via  Apple's  App  Store. 
The Commission is also concerned that Apple applies certain restrictions on app developers 
preventing  them  from  informing  iPhone  and  iPad  users  of  alternative,  cheaper  purchasing 
possibilities.  

The  Commission  also  continued  its  investigations  into  potentially  anti-competitive  practices 
by Amazon53. The Commission has concerns that Amazon distorts competition in online retail 
markets by systematically relying on non-public business data of independent sellers who sell 
on  Amazon’s  marketplace.  This  practice  benefits  Amazon's  own  retail  business,  which 
directly  competes  with  those  third  party  sellers.  In  a  separate  case,  the  Commission 
investigates the possibility that Amazon gives preferential treatment to its own retail offers to 
the  detriment  of  Amazon  marketplace  sellers  that  use  Amazon's  logistics  and  delivery 
services. 

In  June  2021,  the  Commission  opened  a  formal  antitrust  investigation  to  assess  whether 
Facebook  violated  EU  competition  rules  by  using  advertising  data  gathered  from,  in 
particular,  advertisers  to  compete  with  them  in  markets  where  Facebook  is  also  active,  for 
example  classified  ads54.  The  Commission  has  concerns  that  Facebook  uses  data  from 
competing  providers  when  advertising  on  Facebook's  social  network  to  give  Facebook 

52 Case AT.40437, Apple - App Store Practices (music streaming). See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_21_2093 
53 Case AT.40462, Amazon Marketplace and Case AT.40703 - Amazon - Buy Box. See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2077. 
54 Case AT.40684, Facebook leveraging. See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result&policy_area_id=1,2,3 

15 

 
 
                                                 
Marketplace  a  competitive  advantage.  The  formal  antitrust  investigation  will  also  assess 
whether  or  not  Facebook  ties  Facebook  Marketplace,  the  company’s  online  classified  ads 
service,  to  its  own  social  network.  The  Commission  will  examine  if  the  way  Facebook 
Marketplace is embedded in the social network is a form of anti-competitive tying that gives 
the  company  an  advantage  when  reaching  customers  and  forecloses  competing  online 
classified ads services. 

In  June  2021,  the  Commission  opened  a  formal  antitrust  investigation  into  the  online 
advertising sector. The Commission is investigating whether Google favoured its own online 
display advertising technology in the ad-tech supply chain for the benefit of YouTube and to 
the  detriment  of  competing  providers  of  advertising  technology  services,  advertisers  and 
online  publishers55.  Moreover,  the  formal  investigation  will  examine  whether  Google  is 
distorting  competition  by  restricting  access  by  third  parties  to  user  data  for  advertising 
purposes on websites and apps, while reserving such data for its own use. The Commission's 
investigation  focuses  on  display  advertising  where  Google  offers  a  number  of  services  to 
advertisers as well as to publishers.  

In November 2021, the General Court largely upheld56 the Commission’s earlier decision in 
the Google shopping case. 

The Google Search (Shopping) case 
In June 2017, the Commission fined Google EUR 2.42 billion for abuse of its market dominance as a 
search  engine  by  giving  an  illegal  advantage  to  another  Google  product,  its  comparison  shopping 
service57.  Google’s  comparison-shopping  function  for  Europe  is  a  product  that  allows  consumers  to 
compare  products  and  prices  online  and  find  deals  from  online  retailers,  including  online  shops  of 
manufacturers, platforms (such as Amazon and eBay), and other re-sellers. In 2008, Google adopted a 
strategy to push its own comparison shopping service. Because of Google's illegal practices, traffic to 
Google's comparison shopping service increased substantially, while competing comparison shopping 
services  suffered  substantial  traffic  losses  on  a  lasting  basis.  Following  the  Commission’s  decision, 
Google  amended  the  so-called  shopping  box  to  allow  third-party  comparison-shopping  services  to 
feature in the box. In November 2021, the General Court largely upheld the Commission’s decision58.  

In a market for pharmaceutical products, the Commission in February 2021 accepted a set of 
commitments  offered  by  Aspen59,  following  an  investigation  into  Aspen’s  alleged  excessive 
pricing. Aspen agreed to reduce its prices by 73% on average across Europe (except Italy) for 
six medicines that are essential to treat serious forms of blood cancer, including myeloma and 
leukaemia.  These  price  reductions  will  save  substantial  amounts  for  EU  health  systems  and 
will ensure that these medicines remain available on the market.  

55 Case AT.40670, Google - Adtech and Data-related practices. See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result&policy_area_id=1,2,3  
56 Judgment of the General Court of 10.11.2021, Case T-612/17, Google LLC and Alphabet, Inc. v European Commission, EU:T:2021:763. 
57 Case AT.39740, Google Search (Shopping). See: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39740/39740_14996_3.pdf. 
58 Judgment of the General Court of 10.11.2021, Case T-612/17, Google LLC and Alphabet, Inc. v European Commission, EU:T:2021:763. 
59 Case AT.40394, Aspen, Commission Decision of 10.2.2021 relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU) and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement, C(2021) 724 final. 

16 

 
                                                 
In March 2021, the Commission opened a formal antitrust investigation to determine whether 
Teva  had  abusively  blocked  or  delayed  the  entry  of  new  firms  competing  with  Teva’s 
blockbuster drug Copaxone to the detriment of patients and health systems60. 

In March 2021, the European Court of Justice upheld the Commission’s earlier decision in the 
Lundbeck case concerning pay-for-delay agreements. 

The Court of Justice’s judgment in the Lundbeck case61 
In the Lundbeck case, the European Court of Justice fully confirmed the Commission’s approach62 to 
pay-for-delay  agreements  in  the  context  of  patent  disputes.  In  pay-for-delay  agreements,  a 
pharmaceutical company offers transfers of value to producers of generic medicines to induce them to 
abandon or delay their market entry. In 2002, Lundbeck had concluded a number of agreements with 
different  makers  of  generic  medicines  concerning  generic  versions  of  Lundbeck's  branded  drug 
citalopram, a “blockbuster” antidepressant. These firms agreed with Lundbeck not to enter the market 
in return for substantial cash payments and other inducements. These incentives amounted to tens of 
millions of euros.  Lundbeck internally spoke about a “club” being formed and “a pile of $$$” to be 
shared with the generics producers.  
The  Court  of  Justice  upheld  the  Commission’s  assessment  that  such  pay-for-delay  agreements 
constituted restrictions by object, because the value transfers could not have had any other explanation 
than the interest of the parties not to engage in competition on the merits. The Court also confirmed 
that, at the time of the agreements, Lundbeck and the  producers of generic medicines were potential 
competitors, because they had real and concrete  opportunities to  enter the market and compete with 
Lundbeck. Moreover, they did not face any insurmountable entry barriers. 

Following the launch of the antitrust inquiry into the sector of the consumer Internet of Things 
(IoT)  in  202063,  the  Commission  published  a  preliminary  report  for  consultation  in  June 
202164.  The  sector  inquiry  focussed  on  products  and  services  related  to  digital  voice 
assistants, smart home devices and wearable devices. The final report and its accompanying 
Staff Working Document were published in January 202265.  

Final report of the sector enquiry into the consumer “Internet of Things” 
In  January  2022,  the  Commission  published  the  findings  of  its  sector  inquiry  into  the  consumer 
Internet of Things (“IoT”)66. This sector is growing rapidly and there is increasing demand for voice 
assistants  as  user  interfaces  for  interacting  with  other  smart  devices  and  consumer  IoT  services.  A 
number  of  potential  competition  issues  were  identified,  such  as  exclusivity  and  tying  practices  for 
voice assistants, limiting the possibility to use different voice assistants on the same smart device, lack 
of interoperability and limiting functionalities on third-party smart devices and consumer IoT services. 
The complex standardisation landscape and complex proprietary technologies may adversely affect the 
growth  potential  of  consumer  IoT  products.  Limiting  out-of-the-box  features  available  to  users  was 
another  concern.  Other  potential  competition  restraints  were  pre-installations,  default-settings  and 
prominent placement of consumer IoT services on smart devices or in relation to voice assistants. The 

60 Case AT.40588, Teva Copaxone. See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result&policy_area_id=1,2,3 
61  Judgments  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  25.3.2021,  C-586/16  P,  Sun  Pharmaceutical  Industries  and  Ranbaxy  (UK)  v  Commission, 
EU:C:2021:241;  C-588/16  P,  Generics  (UK)  v  Commission,  EU:C:2021:242;  C-591/16  P,  Lundbeck  v  Commission,  EU:C:2021:243;  C-
601/16  P,  Arrow  Group  and  Arrow  Generics  v  Commission,  EU:C:2021:244;  C-611/16  P,  Xellia  Pharmaceuticals  and  Alpharma  v 
Commission, EU:C:2021:245; and C-614/16 P, Merck KGaA v Commission, EU:C:2021:246. 
62 Commission Decision C(2013) 3803 final of 19.6.2013 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA 
Agreement (Case AT.39226 – Lundbeck). 
63 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1326. 
64 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_2884.  
65 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_402.  
66 Commission Staff Working Document – Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Final report - Sector 
inquiry into consumer Internet of Things, SWD (2022) 10 final, 20.1.2022.  

17 

 
                                                 
information  collected  in  the  sector  inquiry  on  the  consumer  IoT  will  provide  guidance  for  the 
Commission's future enforcement and regulatory activities. It also contributes to the legislative debate 
on the Commission's proposal for the Digital Markets Act. 

3.2. Merger control contributed to the digital transition and a strong and resilient Single 
Market 
Merger  control  ensures  that  consolidation  takes  place  in  a  way  that  preserves  sufficient 
competitive  pressure  in  the  markets  affected  by  a  merger.  Merger  control  prevents  the 
creation  of  market  structures  where  businesses  and  consumers  have  too  little  choice,  face 
lower innovation, lesser quality or higher prices. Merger control requires an assessment of the 
positive and negative effects of consolidation.  

In  2021,  the  Commission’s  merger  activity  remained  at  a  very  high  level.  The  Commission 
adopted  396  merger  decisions  in  various  sectors  (in  2020  the  Commission  adopted  352 
merger  decisions)  of  which  309  were  approved  following  a  simplified  procedure.  The 
Commission intervened in 14 proposed acquisitions, of which 11 transactions were approved 
subject  to  conditions.  Three  notified  transactions  were  abandoned  by  the  parties  and 
withdrawn in Phase II. 

In March 2021, the Commission approved, following an in-depth investigation and subject to 
conditions,  the  acquisition  of  Eaton  Hydraulics  by  Danfoss67.  The  company  supplies 
hydraulic components used in machinery used in the agricultural, industrial and construction 
industries. The commitments addressed the Commission’s competition concerns and ensured 
that  downstream  machine  manufacturers  could  continue  to  benefit  from  competitive  prices 
and a wide choice of innovative components for their products.  

In March 2021, the Commission approved, following an in-depth investigation and subject to 
conditions, the acquisition of GrandVision by EssilorLuxottica68. The company is active in the 
markets  for  eyewear  products  (sunglasses,  lenses  and  frames)  and  retail  sales  of  such 
products.  By  intervening,  the  Commission  ensured  that  competition  at  retail  level  remains 
vibrant benefitting customers in Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands. 

In April 2021, Air Canada and Transat decided to terminate a proposed merger agreement69. 
This  followed  an  in-depth  investigation  by  the  Commission  into  the  proposed  acquisition 
notified in April 2020, concentrating on the parties’ overlapping operations in the passenger 
air transport services between the EEA and Canada. The Commission's preliminary findings 
were  that  the  proposed  transaction  would  raise  competition  concerns  on  a  large  number  of 
transatlantic routes  and,  based on the results of the market  test, the  remedies offered by the 
parties appeared insufficient.  

In  December  2021,  the  International  Consolidated  Airlines  Group  (IAG)  and  Air  Europa 
decided to withdraw its  proposed merger agreement70. The withdrawal followed an in-depth 

67 Case M.9820 - Danfoss / Eaton Hydraulics. 
68 Case M.9569 – EssilorLuxottica / Grandvision. 
69 Case M.9489 - Air Canada / Transat. 
70 Case M.9637 – IAG / Air Europa, OJ C 519, 22.12.2021, p. 2. 

18 

 
                                                 
investigation by the Commission into the proposed acquisition of Air Europa  by IAG which 
controls Iberia, British Airways, and several other airlines71. The Commission was concerned 
that  the  proposed  transaction  could  significantly  reduce  competition  on  70  origin  and 
destination city pairs within and to/from Spain, where both airlines offer direct services.  

In 2021, the Commission continued its in-depth investigation into the proposed acquisition of 
Daewoo  Shipbuilding  &  Marine  Engineering  by  Hyundai  Heavy  Industries  Holding.  In 
January  2022  the  Commission  prohibited  the  merger  because  it  would  have  created  a 
dominant position by the merged company and reduced competition in the worldwide market 
for  the  construction  of  large  liquefied  gas  carriers  (LLNGs).  Liquefied  natural  gas  (LNG) 
contributes to the diversification of the EU’s energy sources and improves energy security.  

3.3. State aid control contributed to the digital transition and the resilience of the Single 
Market 

Broadband  infrastructure  that  meets  the  needs  for  very  high  digital  speeds,  capacities,  and 
quality is key to meeting the EU 2025 connectivity objectives set out in the EU 2025 Gigabit 
Society72 and the Digital Strategy73 as well as the EU 2030 connectivity objectives set out in 
the  2030  Digital  Compass74.  State  aid  contributes  to  the  roll-out  of  high  performance 
broadband networks in the EU in addressing market failures, that is to say situations and areas 
where  there  is  no  incentive  for  commercial  operators  to  provide  sufficient  broadband 
coverage.  

In  2021,  in  addition  to  projects  supporting  the  roll-out  and  take-up  of  fixed  broadband 
services,  the  Commission  approved  several  projects  concerning  the  roll-out  of  mobile 
broadband services, including, in May 2021, a EUR 2.1 million German aid scheme75 and, in 
December 2021, a Spanish scheme to support the deployment of passive infrastructure for the 
provision of mobile communication services in areas without 4G mobile coverage76. 

In  June  2021,  the  Commission  found  that  the  aid  received  by  terrestrial  operators  for  the 
extension of the terrestrial television network to remote areas of Spain contravened EU State 
aid  rules.  Following  the  annulment  of  a  2013  Commission  decision  (concerning  all  regions 
but  Castilla-La  Mancha),  the  Commission  confirmed  that,  between  2005  and  2008,  the 
operators  of  terrestrial  platforms  received  an  incompatible  selective  advantage  over  their 
competitors. The Court of Justice confirmed the Commission’s decision concerning Castilla-
La  Mancha  in  September  201877.  Since  Spain  had  only  partially  recovered  the  aid,  the 

71 Case M.9637 - IAG / Air Europa. 
72 Commission Communication Connectivity for a Competitive Digital Single Market – Towards a European Gigabit Society, COM (2016) 
0587, 14.9.2016. 
73 Commission Communication Shaping Europe’s Digital Future, 19.2.2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/communication-shaping-europes-digital-future-feb2020_en_4.pdf.  
74 Commission Communication, Digital Compass: the European way for the Digital Decade, COM (2021) 118 final, 9.3.2021.  
75 Case SA.59574, Germany - Deployment of high-performance mobile infrastructure in Germany- DE, OJ C 410, 8.11.2021, p.1. 
76 Case SA.64394 RRF - Spain- National aid scheme for passive infrastructure for mobile networks. 
77 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 20.9.2018, C-114/17, Kingdom of Spain v European Commission, EU:C:2018:309. 

19 

 
                                                 
Commission initiated proceedings before the Court of Justice. In April 2021, the Court held 
that Spain has failed to recover the aid (C-704/19)78. The recovery of this aid is ongoing. 

4. Competition policy enforcement contributed to the green transition 

EU competition policy is well placed to contribute to the EU’s environmental objectives and 
climate  targets,  including  the  decarbonisation  of  the  economy  and  the  shift  in  the  transport 
sector  from  polluting  fossil  fuels  to  alternative  fuels  in  accordance  with  the  Commission's 
mobility  policy.  Competition  law  enforcement  contributes  to  the  European  Green  Deal79  by 
keeping markets efficient, fair and innovative. In this context, the effective enforcement under 
the State aid instrument is key to avoid distortions of competition in the Single Market.  

In  February  2021,  DG  Competition  organised  a  stakeholder  conference  to  discuss  how 
antitrust policy, merger policy and State aid policy can best work together with environmental 
and  climate  policies.  As  a  follow-up,  DG  Competition  published,  in  September  2021,  a 
Competition  Policy  Brief  on  how  competition  policy  can  and  will  support  the  Green  Deal 
objectives80. 

4.1. State aid control contributed to the Green transition  

In  2021,  the  Commission  approved  a  number  of  State  aid  measures  intended  to  support  the 
green transition of the EU. In particular, 18 measures supporting renewable energy and 7 for 
supporting clean mobility were approved by the Commission. 

In January 2021, the Commission adopted a decision authorising the second Important Project 
of Common European Interest (IPCEI) on batteries81. The project, entitled European Battery 
Innovation,  will  support  research  and  innovation  in  the  battery  value  chain.  The  twelve 
Member States will provide up to EUR 2.9 billion in funding in the coming years. The public 
funding is expected to unlock an additional EUR 9 billion in private investments. The project 
complements  the  first  IPCEI  in  the  battery  value  chain  approved  in  December  201982.  The 
project  is  consistent  with  the  Commission’s  policies  to  shift  from  the  use  of  fossil  fuels  to 
alternative  fuel  technologies  and  green and digital  transitions  of the EU  economy under the 
European  Green  Deal  and  the  Digital  Strategy83  as  well  as  to  increase  the  resilience  of  the 
EU’s economy. 

78 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 29.4.2021, C-704/19, European Commission v Kingdom of Spain, EU:C:2021:342. 
79 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, the European Green Deal, COM(2019) 640 final. 
80 https://ec.europa.eu/competition-policy/index/news/competition-policy-brief-12021-policy-support-europes-green-ambition-2021-09-
10_en.  
81  State  aid:  Commission  approves  EUR  2.9  billion  public  support  by  twelve  Member  States  for  a  second  pan-European  research  and 
innovation 
See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_226. The non-confidential version of the decision will be made available under 
the  case  numbers  SA.55855  (Austria),  SA.55840  (Belgium),  SA.55844  (Croatia),  SA.55846  (Finland),  SA.55858  (France),  SA.55831 
(Germany), SA.56665 (Greece), SA.55813 (Italy), SA.55859 (Poland), SA.55819 (Slovakia), SA.55896 (Spain), and SA.55854 (Sweden) in 
the State aid Register on the competition website. See: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/register/. 
82 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_6705. 
83 Commission Communication Shaping Europe’s Digital Future, 19.2.2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/communication-shaping-europes-digital-future-feb2020_en_4.pdf.  

chain,  Commission 

26.1.2021. 

project 

release 

battery 

entire 

along 

value 

press 

the 

of 

20 

 
                                                 
In February 2021, the Commission  approved  Romanian plans to  support the upgrade of the 
district  heating  system  in  Bucharest84.  The  EUR  254  million  aid  measure  funded  by  EU 
structural funds will help Romania achieve its energy efficiency targets and will contribute to 
the reduction of greenhouse gases and other pollutants without unduly distorting competition. 

In  April  2021,  the  Commission  approved  the  prolongation  and  modification  of  a  German 
scheme to support the production of electricity from renewable energy sources and from mine 
gas, as well as reductions of charges to fund support for electricity from renewable sources. 
The  reduction  of  charges  will  be  available  to  energy-intensive  companies  and  shore-side 
electricity supply to ships while at berth in ports. 

In May 2021, the Commission approved a Danish aid scheme to support electricity production 
from renewable sources. The measure will help Denmark reach its renewable energy targets 
without  unduly  distorting  competition  and  will  contribute  to  the  European  objective  of 
achieving climate neutrality by 205085. 

In  June  2021,  the  Commission  approved  the  prolongation  and  modification  of  an  existing 
German  scheme  to  support  the  production  of  electricity  by  new,  modernised  and  retrofitted 
highly efficient cogeneration plants. The approved scheme will promote energy efficiency and 
contribute to further reductions in CO2 emissions86.  

In  July  2021,  the  Commission  approved  a  EUR  30.5  billion  French  scheme  to  support  to 
operators  of  onshore  solar,  onshore  wind  and  hydroelectric  installations.  The  measure  will 
help  France  achieve  its  renewable  energy  targets  without  unduly  distorting  competition  and 
will contribute to the European objective of achieving climate neutrality by 205087. 

In addition, in December 2021, the Commission approved a EUR 900 million German scheme 
to support investments in the production of renewable hydrogen in non-EU countries, which 
will be then imported and sold in the EU88. The scheme, called H2Global, aims at meeting the 
EU  demand  for  renewable  hydrogen  that  is  expected  to  increase  in  the  coming  years  by 
supporting the development of the unexploited renewable resource potential outside the EU. 
Moreover,  H2Global  will  support  projects  leading  to  substantial  reductions  in  greenhouse 
emissions,  in  line  with  the  environmental  and  climate  objectives  set  out  in  the  European 
Green Deal.  

4.2 Antitrust enforcement and merger control contributed to the green transition  

In  July  2021,  the  Commission  found  that  the  car  manufacturers  Daimler,  BMW  and 
Volkswagen group (Volkswagen, Audi and Porsche) breached EU antitrust rules by colluding 
on  technical  development  in  the  area  of  nitrogen  oxide  cleaning  for  diesel  cars89.  The 

84 Case SA.57425, Romania – Support measure for the upgrade of the Bucharest Municipality District heating network, OJ C 177, 7 May 
2021, p.1. 
85 Case SA.56831, Denmark – Multi-technology RES tenders 2021-2024, OJ C 214, 4.6.2021, p.1. 
86 Case SA.56826, Germany – 2020 reform of support for cogeneration, OJ C 306, 30.7.2021, p.1. 
87 Case SA.50272, France – Appels d’offres pour les renouvelables 2021-2026, OJ C 450, 5.11.2021, p.1. 
88 Case SA.62619, Germany – H2Global. The public version of this decision is not yet available. See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result&policy_area_id=1,2,3 
89 Case AT.40178, Car Emissions, See: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases1/202146/AT_40178_8022289_3048_5.pdf. 

21 

 
                                                 
Commission imposed fines of EUR 875.2 million after all parties had agreed to settle the case 
under the cartel settlement procedure. Daimler was not fined because it revealed the existence 
of  the  cartel  to  the  Commission.  The  car  manufactures  had  colluded  to  hold  back  the  full 
potential  of  a  jointly  developed  technology  to  limit  harmful  emissions  of  diesel  cars  by 
signalling  to  each  other  that  they  would  not  compete  on  over-fulfilling  EU  car  emission 
standards. 

In  April  2021,  the  Commission  fined  railway  companies  Österreichische  Bundesbahnen 
(ÖBB),  Deutsche  Bahn  (DB)  and  Société  Nationale  des  Chemins  de  fer  belges  /  Nationale 
Maatschappij  der  Belgische  Spoorwegen  (SNCB)  a  total  of  EUR  48  million  for  their 
participation  in  a  customer  allocation  cartel90.  The  infringement  concerned  cross-border  rail 
cargo transport services in the EU provided by ÖBB, DB and SNCB under the freight sharing 
model and carried out in so-called blocktrains91. The Commission's investigation revealed that 
the  three  railway  companies  coordinated  their  conduct  by  exchanging  collusive  information 
on  customer  requests  for  competitive  offers  and  providing  each  other  with  cover  quotes  to 
protect their respective business. 

In September 2021, the  Commission  made legally  binding measures proposed by Greece to 
allow the competitors of Public Power Corporation (PPC) to purchase more electricity on a 
longer-term  basis92.  Greece  submitted  these  measures  to  remove  the  distortion  created  by 
PPC's exclusive access to lignite-fired generation, which the Commission and the EU courts 
had found to  create an inequality of opportunity in  Greek  electricity markets.  The proposed 
remedies will lapse when existing lignite plants stop operating commercially or, at the latest, 
by 31 December 202493.  

In  December  2021,  the  Commission  fined  Abengoa  S.A.  and  its  subsidiary  Abengoa 
Bionenergía  S.A.94,  EUR  20  million  for  participation  in  a  cartel  concerning  the  wholesale 
price  formation  mechanism  in  the  European  ethanol  market.  Biofuels  can  contribute  to 
promote cleaner transport and reduce greenhouse gas emissions and therefore play a key role 
in the green transition. 

In  the  field  of  merger  control,  the  Commission  approved  with  conditions  the  acquisition  of 
Suez  by  Veolia95  in  December  2021.Veolia  and  Suez  are  active  in  the  water  treatment  and 
waste  management  sectors.  The  two  companies  offer  a  wide  range  of  services  to  municipal 
and industrial customers. The Commission’s investigation revealed that the transaction would 
lead  to  significant  horizontal  overlaps  in  several  markets  in  France  and  in  EEA.  These 
overlaps  would  risk  eliminating  the  competitive  pressure  exerted  by  Suez  on  Veolia. 

90 Case AT.40330, Rail cargo. See: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result&policy_area_id=1,2,3 
91 Under the freight sharing model, which is a contract model foreseen in international railway law, railway companies performing cross-
border rail services provide customers with a single overall price for the service required under a single multilateral contract. 
92 Case AT.38700, Greek lignite and electricity markets. See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result&policy_area_id=1,2,3 
93 The same commitments were made by Greece to the Eurogroup in 2018 as a condition for the release of additional financial relief under 
the European Stability Mechanism for financial assistance to Greece. 
94 Case AT.40054, Ethanol benchmarks. See: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40054  
95 Case M.9969, Veolia / Suez. See: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result&policy_area_id=1,2,3  

22 

 
                                                 
Customers would therefore have faced a reduced choice of service solutions, often limited to 
the merged entity, without having any real bargaining power.  

5. Competition Policy Contributed to An Economy that Works for people 

The  social  market  economy  is  one  of  the  foundations  that  the  EU  is  built  upon  and  EU 
competition  policy  underpins  it.  In  2021,  DG  Competition  supported  this  headline  ambition 
by  enforcing  the  competition  rules  and  protecting  competition  on  fair  and  equal  terms.  The 
digital dimension was taken into account for example when implementing the Recovery and 
Resilience  Facility,  the  Capital  Markets  Union,  the  Banking  Union,  and  ensuring  effective 
taxation96. 

5.1. Resilient European financial services 

Antitrust enforcement in financial services 

EU competition policy plays an important role in ensuring that competition takes place on fair 
and  equal  terms  throughout  the  financial  services  sector.  In  2021,  the  Commission  focused 
strongly on cartel enforcement in the financial services sector, imposing fines totalling EUR 
740 million on 16 different financial institutions.  

In April 202197, the Commission adopted a decision against Bank of America Merrill Lynch, 
Crédit Agricole, Credit Suisse and Deutsche Bank for taking part in a cartel related to Supra-
sovereign, Sovereign and Agency bonds denominated in US Dollars (USD SSA bonds). The 
four  investment  banks  cooperated  through  a  core  group  of  traders  that  exchanged 
commercially sensitive information. The cartel participants, communicated via multilateral or 
bilateral chatrooms using Bloomberg terminals. 

In  May  2021,  the  Commission  sanctioned  another  bond-trading  cartel,  imposing  fines 
totalling  EUR  371  million.  The  Commission  concluded  that  Bank  of  America,  Natixis, 
Nomura,  RBS  (now  NatWest),  UBS,  UniCredit  and  WestLB  (now  Portigon)  breached  EU 
antitrust rules. A group of traders employed by these companies participated in a cartel in the 
primary and secondary markets for European Government Bonds (EGB)98. 

In  December  2021,  the  Commission  sanctioned  a  third  cartel  in  the  Foreign  Exchange  spot 
trading  market99.  The  Commission  fined  Barclays,  RBS  HSBC  and  Credit  Suisse  a  total 
amount of EUR 344 million (adding to the EUR 1.7 billion that had already been imposed on 
these firms in the two earlier Forex cases). 

In  June  2021,  the  Commission  issued  a  Statement  of  Objections  to  Insurance  Ireland,  an 
association  of  Irish  insurers.  The  Commission  took  the  preliminary  view  that  Insurance 

96 Communication from the Commission: Action Plan to fight tax evasion and to make taxation simple and easy (Q2 2020) included in the 
Adjusted Commission Work Programme 2020 COM(2020) 440 final Annex 1 and 2, 27.5.2020.  
97 Case AT.40346, Sovereign and Agency bonds, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_2004 
98 Case AT.40324, European Government Bonds. See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases1/202142/AT_40324_7971056_3662_3.pdf 
99 Case AT.40135, FOREX https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_AT_40135 

23 

 
                                                 
Ireland  breached  EU  antitrust  rules  by  restricting  competition  in  the  Irish  motor  vehicle 
insurance market100.  

State aid enforcement in financial services 

The Commission authorised the prolongation of  several  existing State aid schemes allowing 
Member States to continue strengthening the resilience of the financial sector, without having 
to  grant  new  State  aid  to  individual  financial  institutions.  Moreover,  the  Commission 
authorised the prolongation of schemes for the restructuring or orderly market exit of banks in 
distress  located  in  Poland101,  Ireland102  and  Denmark103.  In  addition,  the  Commission 
addressed  potential  liquidity  shortages  of  banks  in  Greece104.  Finally,  the  Commission 
authorised the prolongation of market-consistent  guarantee schemes for the securitisation of 
non-performing loans in Greece (Hercules105) and Italy (GACS106). These guarantee schemes 
help  banks  to  clean  up  their  balance  sheets  without  granting  State  aid  or  distorting 
competition.  

For Cyprus107 and Greece108, the Commission authorised indirect State aid to several financial 
institutions.  The  State  aid  schemes  are  primarily  geared  at  providing  social  support  to 
vulnerable households at risk of losing their homes. In addition, the Commission authorised 
Member  States’  support  of  recently  founded  SMEs  and  start-ups  frequently  held  back  by 
limited  access  to  finance.  To  this  end,  the  Commission  approved  a  modification  of  the 
existing risk finance scheme in France109.  

5.2. Fiscal State aid and selective tax advantages 

The Commission approved in 2021  several State aid schemes deferring payment of taxes to 
mitigate the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. In January 2021, the Commission 
approved  under  the  Temporary  Framework  for  State  aid  measures  a  EUR  156  million 
Lithuanian aid scheme for companies negatively affected by the COVID-19 pandemic110. The 
public support includes tax deferrals and tax-related liquidity measures (for example payment 
in  instalments  of  tax  arrears,  interest  free  debt  periods  as  well  as  suspensions  of  tax  debt 
recovery).  

100 Case AT.40511, Insurance Ireland: Insurance claims database and conditions of access. See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result&policy_area_id=1,2,3 
101 Case SA.63002, Poland – Eleventh prolongation of the Credit Unions Orderly Liquidation Scheme, OJ C 285, 16.7.2021, p.1; Case 
SA.64522, Poland – Sixth prolongation of the resolution scheme for cooperative banks and small commercial banks, OJ C 487, 3.12.2021, 
p.1. 
102 Case SA.62303, Ireland – 13th Prolongation of the Credit Union restructuring and stabilisation scheme, OJ C 240, 18.6.2021, p.1; Case 
SA.100030, Ireland – 14th Prolongation of the Restructuring and Stabilisation Scheme for the Credit Union Sector, OJ C 487, 3.12.2021, 
p.1; and Case SA.62649, Ireland – 17th Prolongation of the Credit Union Resolution Scheme 2020-2021, OJ C 240, 18.6.2021, p.1. 
103 Case SA.58478, Denmark – Third prolongation of the winding-up scheme for small banks, OJ C 60, 19.2.2021, p.1. 
104 Case SA.59030, Greece – Prolongation of the Liquidity Guarantee Scheme for banks, OJ C 144, 23.4.2021, p.1. 
105 Case SA.62242, Greece – Prolongation of the Hercules scheme, OJ C 214, 4.6.2021, p.1. 
106 Case SA.62880, Italy – Fourth prolongation of the Italian guarantee scheme for the securitisation of non-performing loans, OJ C 295, 
23.7.2021, p.1. 
107 Case SA.63005, Cyprus – Scheme for the management of loans granted Cyprus under Government Housing Plans (OIKIA Scheme), OJ C 
366, 10.9.2021, p.1. 
108 Case SA.100197, Greece - Extension of SA.58555 "Temporary primary residence protection scheme". The official version of the decision 
is not yet published. The official version of the decision is not yet published. See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result&policy_area_id=1,2,3 
109 Case SA.59985, France - Modification de la décision Aide d’État SA. 55869 (2019/N) : Dispositif IR-PME pour les investissements dans 
les FCPI et FIP, OJ C 195, 21.5.2021, p.1. 
110 Case SA.60632, Lithuania - COVID-19 - Deferral of tax payments, OJ C 41, 5.2.2021, p.1. 

24 

 
                                                 
In  March  2021,  the  Commission  had  decided  to  refer  the  United  Kingdom  to  the  Court  of 
Justice for failing to fully recover illegal State aid of up to EUR 100 million. The illegal State 
aid had been granted as a tax exemption for passive interest and royalties in Gibraltar between 
2011  and  2013111.  The  Commission  had  declared  this  corporate  tax  exemption  regime 
unlawful  and  incompatible  with  State  aid  rules  in  2018  and  more  than  two  years  after  the 
Commission decision, the Gibraltar authorities had recovered less than 20% of the total illegal 
aid112. Because the pending aid amounts and due recovery interest were fully repaid in escrow 
accounts between May 2021 and July 2021, the Commission repealed its previous decision to 
initiate Article 108(2) TFEU proceedings against the United Kingdom. 

5.3. Competition policy continued to mitigate the economic and social fall-out from the 
COVID-19 pandemic  

The Commission used the full flexibility of the State aid rules for exceptional circumstances 
to  adapt  the  Temporary  Framework  for  State  aid  measures.  The  change  provided  Member 
States  with  a tailor-made toolbox supporting  the economy during the  COVID-19 pandemic. 
Since it was first adopted in March 2020, the Commission adapted the rules to the developing 
needs of Member States and businesses. Two additional amendments were adopted in January 
and November 2021113. The sixth amendment sets out a path towards a step-by-step phase-out 
of  the  crisis  measures  while  avoiding  cliff-edge  effects  and  limiting  the  risk  for  greater 
economic divergence between Member States. 

State aid decisions under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU and the Temporary Framework 

The  Commission  continued  to  assess  aid  measures  under  Article  107(3)(b)  TFEU,  Article 
107(3)(c)  TFEU  and  the  Temporary  Framework  for  State  aid  measures.  The  Temporary 
Framework for State aid measures, which was initially established with an expiry date of 31 
December  2020,  provides  for  a  number  of  aid  measures  that  the  Commission  considers 
compatible  under  Article  107(3)(b)  and  Article  107(3)(c)  TFEU,  such  as  limited  amount  of 
aid,  selective  tax  advantages  and  State  guarantees  for  loans.  By  the  end  of  2021,  the 
Commission had taken more than 1180 decisions in all Member States, including those under 
the Temporary Framework for State aid measures. 

In 2021, for example, the Commission approved under the Temporary Framework a EUR 800 
million  Greek  scheme  to  support  companies  active  in  tourism  affected  by  the  COVID-19 
pandemic114.  The  Commission  concluded  that  the  measure  was  necessary,  appropriate  and 
proportionate  to  remedy  a  serious  disturbance  in  the  Greek  economy.  As  regards  Italy,  in 

111 Commission Decision (EU) 2019/700 of 19 December 2018 on the State Aid SA.34914 (2013/C) implemented by the United Kingdom as 
regards the Gibraltar Corporate Income Tax Regime, C/2018/7848, OJ L 119, 7.5.2019, pp. 151–20. 
112 This case relates to facts that took place prior to the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union. 
113 Communication from the Commission: Temporary framework for State aid measures to support the economy in the current COVID-19 
outbreak (OJ C 91I, 20.3.2020, p. 1), as amended by Commission Communications C(2020) 2215 (OJ C 112I, 4.4.2020, p. 1), C(2020) 3156 
(OJ C 164, 13.5.2020, p. 3), C(2020) 4509 (OJ C 218, 2.7.2020, p. 3), C(2020) 7127 (OJ C 340I, 13.10.2020, p. 1), C(2021) 564 (OJ C 34, 
1.2.2021, p. 6) and C(2021) 8442 (OJ C 473, 24.11.2021, p. 1). 
114 Case SA.63123, Greece - COVID-19: Support to tourism sector, OJ C 223, 11.6. 2021, p.1. 

25 

 
                                                 
October  2021,  the  Commission  approved  under  the  Temporary  Framework  a  EUR  31.9 
billion Italian scheme to support companies affected by the COVID-19 pandemic115. 

A  number  of  these  measures  have  been  co-financed  by  cohesion  policy,  following  the  two 
packages  of  measures  launched  by  the  Commission:  the  Coronavirus  Response  Investment 
Initiative (CRII), the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative Plus (CRII+) and REACT-
EU package. 

In March 2021, the Commission approved a French State guarantee scheme of up to EUR 20 
billion  intended  to  support  the  economy  in  the  context  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic116.  The 
scheme provides long-term funding to companies and facilitates new investments supporting 
the recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic.  

COVID-19 related State aid decisions and policy initiatives 

In  August  2021,  the  Commission  approved  a  set  of  guarantees  on  synthetic  securitisation 
tranches  under  the  European  Guarantee  Fund  managed  by  the  European  Investment  Bank 
Group117.  The  initiative  supports  companies  affected  by  the  COVID-19  pandemic  in  22 
participating Member States118.  

State aid decisions under Article 107(2)(b) TFEU 

Article  107(2)(b)  TFEU  enables  the  Commission  to  approve  State  aid  measures  granted  by 
Member  States  to  compensate  undertakings  for  damage  directly  caused  by  exceptional 
occurrences  such  as  the  COVID-19  pandemic  (for  example  in  transport,  tourism,  culture, 
hospitality  and  retail  sales).  Member  States  may  notify  to  the  Commission  damage 
compensation measures under Article 107(2)(b) TFEU provided that the aid is proportionate 
and  there  is  a  direct  causal  link  between  the  exceptional  occurrence  (the  COVID-19 
pandemic) and the damage suffered by the beneficiaries119.  

For example, in January 2021 the Commission authorised a EUR 12 billion German umbrella 
scheme to compensate companies for damages suffered due to restrictive measures introduced 
to contain the COVID-19 pandemic120. Under this scheme, companies from all sectors will be 
entitled to compensation for damages suffered during the lockdown periods as a consequence 
of restrictions imposed by the German government in March/April and November/December 
2020.  

In April 2021 the Commission authorised under Article 107(2)(b) TFEU a Danish scheme of 
EUR  1.74  billion  to  compensate  mink  farmers  and  mink  farming-related  businesses  for 

115 Case SA.62668, Italy - COVID-19 - IT - Automatic tax measures and non-repayable grants. The decision was adopted under Articles 
106(2), 107(2)(a), 107(2)(b) and 107(2)(c) TFEU. See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result&policy_area_id=3 
116  Case  SA.58639,  France  -  COVID-19:  Dispositif  de  garantie  aux  fonds  de  prêts  participatifs  et  d'obligations  subordonnées,  OJ  C  84, 
12.3.2021, p.1. 
117 Consisting of the European Investment Bank, “EIB” and the European Investment Fund, “EIF”. 
118 See Commission press release of 16.8.2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_4204. 
119 For example, a damage caused by quarantine measures precluding the beneficiary from operating its economic activity. Other kinds of 
aid, addressing more generally the economic downturn from the coronavirus pandemic, is to be evaluated under the compatibility principles 
set out in Article 107(3)(b) TFEU and the Temporary Framework for State aid measures. 
120 Case SA.60045, Germany - November Assistance Extra under Article 107 (2)(b) TFEU-Covid, OJ C 41, 5.2.2021, p.1.  

26 

 
                                                 
measures taken in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic121. In May 2021, the Commission 
authorised  a  EUR  10  billion  German  scheme  to  compensate  companies  in  all  sectors  for 
damage  caused  by  the  emergency  measures  taken  to  limit  the  spread  of  the  COVID-19122. 
Moreover,  in  July  2021,  the  Commission  approved  a  EUR  800  million  Italian  scheme  to 
compensate airports and ground handling operators for the damage caused by the COVID-19 
pandemic, in particular, the travel restrictions imposed to limit the spread of the virus123. 

State aid to the aviation sector 

Throughout 2021, the aviation sector continued to be one of the most severely affected by the 
COVID-19 pandemic. During this year, the Commission adopted 35 decisions allowing State 
aid  to  undertakings  active  in  the  aviation  sector  to  fulfil  their  liquidity  and  capital  needs 
brought  about  by  the  COVID-19  pandemic.  These  State  aid  measures  were  most  frequently 
approved under the Temporary Framework for State aid measures or Article 107(2)(b) TFEU.  

The  Commission  approved  State  aid  to  the  airlines  Air  France124,  TUI125,  Scandinavian 
Airlines Systems126, Finnair127 and others. Moreover, the Commission assessed several rescue 
or restructuring measures for airlines such as TAP128 and Condor129 and authorised State aid 
to ensure the long-term viability of those and other airlines. 

In  September  2021,  the  Commission  adopted  two  decisions  regarding  the  Italian  airline 
Alitalia. After in-depth investigations into two State loans amounting to EUR 900 million in 
total  granted  in  2017,  the  Commission  concluded  that  these  loans  constituted  unlawful  and 
incompatible State aid130. In a separate decision131, the Commission found that the new Italian 
airline ITA, that is set to take over a part of Alitalia’s assets, is not the economic successor of 
Alitalia  and  therefore  not  liable  to  repay  illegal  aid  received  by  Alitalia.  Moreover,  the 
Commission found that the EUR 1.35 billion capital injection into ITA was market conform. 
Consequently, the capital injections did not constitute State aid under EU rules. 

The Recovery and Resilience Facility became operational - Preparing the exit from the 
crisis 

The  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  (RRF)  entered  into  force  on  19  February  2021132.  It 
finances  reforms  and  investments  in  Member  States  from  the  start  of  the  pandemic  in 
February 2020 until 31 December 2026. The RRF is the centrepiece of NextGenerationEU, a 

121  Case  SA.61945,  Denmark  -  Aid  scheme  for  mink  farmers  and  related  businesses  affected  by  the  COVID-19  out-break,  OJ  C  195, 
21.5.2021, p.1. 
122 Case SA.62784, Germany - Covid-19 - Art. 107 2b Federal Umbrella Scheme, OJ C 223, 11.6.2021, p.1. 
123 Case SA.63074, Italy - Damage compensation scheme for airport infrastructure managers and ground handling operators in Italy, OJ C 
327, 13.8.2021, p.1. 
124 Case SA.59913, France – COVID-19 - Recapitalisation of Air France and the Air France – KLM Holding, OJ C 240, 18.6.2021, p. 1. 
125 Case SA.59812, Germany – COVID-19 - Recapitalisation of TUI. The public version of this decision is not yet available. See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result&policy_area_id=3 
126 Case SA. 63898, Sweden - COVID-19 - State loan to SAS Consortium, OJ C 33, 21.1.2022; and SA. 63250, Denmark – SA.63250 COVID-
19 – Subsidised loan to SAS, OJ C 33, 21.1.2022. 
127 Case SA.60113, Finland - Finnair – COVID-19 - hybrid loan 107.2.b, OJ C 240, 18.6.2021, p.1. 
128 Case SA.60165 – Portugal - Restructuring aid to TAP SGPS. 
129 Case SA.63203, Germany – Restructuring of Condor, OJ C 429, 15.4.2021. 
130 Case SA.48171 – Italy – Complaints against alleged State aid to Alitalia. 
131 Case SA.58173 – Italy – Newco ITA; See Commission Press Release of 10.9.2021, “Commission finds new air carrier ITA is not Alitalia's 
economic successor and Italy's capital injections into ITA are market conform”, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_4665  
132 Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience 
Facility, OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, pp. 17–75. 

27 

 
                                                 
temporary  recovery instrument that allows the Commission  to  raise funds to  help  repair the 
immediate economic and social damage brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic. 

The  aim  of  the  RRF133  is  to  mitigate  the  economic  and  social  impact  of  the  COVID-19 
pandemic and make the EU more sustainable, resilient and better prepared for the challenges 
and  opportunities  of  the  green  and  digital  transitions.  The  RRF  allows  the  Commission  to 
raise funds to help Member States implement reforms and investments that are in line with the 
EU’s priorities.  

To  benefit  from  RRF  support,  Member  States  must  submit  Recovery  and  Resilience  Plans 
(RRPs)  to  the  Commission.  These  plans  set  out  the  reforms  and  public  investment  projects 
that each Member State plans to implement with the support of the RRF. DG Competition has 
provided guidance134 to  accompany  and facilitate the implementation  of the RRPs to  ensure 
that  supported  investment  and  reform  projects  are  compatible  with  State  aid  rules.  DG 
Competition also provided practical guidance to Member States for a swift treatment of State 
aid notifications within the RRF framework135.  

6. Joining Forces Shaping a European and Global Competition Culture 

6.1. Policy Cohesion through the European Competition Network 

In 2021, the Commission continued to ensure the coherent application of Articles 101 and 102 
through  the  ECN136.  Two  of  the  key  cooperation  and  support  mechanisms  in  Regulation 
1/2003  are  first,  the  national  competition  authorities’  (NCAs)  obligation  to  inform  the 
Commission  about  new  investigations  already  at  the  stage  of  the  first  formal  investigative 
measure  and  second,  to  consult  the  Commission  on  envisaged  decisions.  In  2021,  145  new 
investigations were launched within the network and 84 planned decisions were submitted.  

In  addition  to  the  cooperation  mechanisms  set  out  in  Regulation  1/2003,  other  ECN 
cooperation  mechanisms  ensure  a  coherent  enforcement  of  the  EU  competition  rules  across 
jurisdictions.  ECN  members  meet  regularly  to  discuss  recently  opened  cases,  policy  issues 
and  matters  of  strategic  importance.  In  2021,  horizontal  working  groups  and  sector-specific 
sub-groups held 37 meetings where NCA officials exchanged views and experience. 

In 2021, the Commission monitored and assisted Member States in their efforts to incorporate 
the ECN+ Directive137 into national law. This had to be done by 4 February 2021. In March 
2021,  the  Commission  opened  infringement  procedures  against  22  Member  States  because 
they had failed to notifiy that they had implemented the ECN+ Directive before the deadline. 
Of the 22 Member States,  14 subsequently  notified  implementation  before the  end of  2021. 
Before  closing  the  infringement  proceedings,  the  Commission  will  verify  that  the  ECN+ 

133 See the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard, which gives an overview of how the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility 
(RRF) and the national recovery and resilience plans is progressing: https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/recovery-and-resilience-
scoreboard/index.html 
134 See: https://ec.europa.eu/competition-policy/state-aid/coronavirus/rrf-guiding-templates_en 
135 https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/what_is_new/practical_guidance_to_MS_for_notifications_under_RRF.pdf 
136 Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ C 101, 27.04.2004, pp. 43-53 and OJ C 374, 
13.10.2016, p. 10. See: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52004XC0427%2802%29.  
137 Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 to empower the competition authorities of the 
Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market, OJ L 11, 14.01.2019, pp. 3–33.  

28 

 
                                                 
Directive  has  been  correctly  implemented.  In  2021,  the  Commission  continued  to  assist  the 
remaining Member States when finalising the implementation of the Directive.  

6.2. Competition policy cooperation across the world 

Multilateral relations 

In 2021, the Commission continued its active engagement in competition-related international 
fora  such  as  the  OECD  Competition  Committee,  the  International  Competition  Network 
(ICN), and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 

At  the  OECD  Competition  Committee  meetings  of  2021,  the  Commission  contributed  to 
discussions on competition enforcement and regulatory alternatives, competition compliance 
programmes,  potential  competition,  methodologies 
to  measure  market  competition, 
environmental  considerations  in  competition  enforcement  and  the  promotion  of  competitive 
neutrality  by  competition  authorities.  As  co-chair  of  the  ICN  Unilateral  Conduct  Working 
Group,  the  Commission  continued  a  multi-annual  project  assessing  dominance  and  market 
power  in  digital  markets.  In  2021,  the  Commission  participated  in  the  19th  meeting  of  the 
UNCTAD Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy.  

The Commission continued its endeavours to improve international subsidy rules. Reforming 
the  subsidy  rules  is  one  of  the  EU’s  main  priorities  when  reviewing  the  World  Trade 
Organization trade rules, as confirmed in the joint statement of the EU, US and Japan138.  

Bilateral relations 

In December 2021, the Commission and the US competition authorities launched the EU-US 
Joint  Technology  Competition  Policy  Dialogue  to  develop  common  approaches  and 
strengthen the cooperation on competition policy and  competition policy enforcement in the 
technology sectors139. The Commission remained in close contact with the Korean Fair Trade 
Commission  and  the  Japanese  Fair  Trade  Commission  under  the  respective  cooperation 
agreements140.  In 2021, the Commission continued the negotiations with Japan on a  Second 
Generation Competition  Cooperation Agreement141. As regards the draft Second Generation 
Cooperation  Agreement  between  the  EU  and  Canada,  the  Commission  is  in  regular  contact 
with  the  Canadian  Competition  Bureau  to  find  a  solution  on  data  protection  standards  in 
Canada  that  are  consistent  with  the  standards  established  by  the  Opinion  of  the  Court  of 
Justice  on  the  2014  EU-Canada  Passenger  Name  Record  Agreement142.  Finally,  the 
Commission  continued  its  close  competition  policy  cooperation  with  China's  State 
Administration for Market Regulation under the 2019 cooperation agreements143. 

138 See: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2330 
139 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_6671 
140 See: https://ec.europa.eu/competition-policy/international/bilateral-relations/korea_en; https://ec.europa.eu/competition-
policy/international/bilateral-relations/japan_en. 
141 See: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:22003A0722(01) 
142 See: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?pro=AVIS&num=C-1/15. Currently, Canada is preparing an overhaul of its domestic privacy act. 
143 See: https://ec.europa.eu/competition-policy/international/bilateral-relations/china_en 

29 

 
                                                 
The  Commission  aims  at  including  provisions  on  competition  and  State  aid  control  when 
negotiating  Free  Trade  Agreements  (FTAs).  In  2021,  the  Commission  continued  FTA 
negotiations with Australia, Azerbaijan, Chile, Indonesia, New Zealand and Uzbekistan.  

For  the  candidate  countries  and  the  potential  candidates,  the  Commission's  main  policy 
objective is  to  assist  them  when adopting legal frameworks for  competition  policy,  creating 
well-functioning  operationally  independent  competition  authorities  and  building  up  solid 
enforcement records. In 2021, the Commission continued to monitor candidate countries’ and 
potential  candidates’  compliance  with  their  commitments  under  the  Stabilisation  and 
Association agreements.  

To  develop  cooperation  in  the  competition  field,  the  Commission  also  continued  to  engage 
with a number of national and regional authorities in Africa. In 2021, the Commission hosted 
joint  workshops  with  the  South  African  Competition  Commission  on  digital  aspects  of 
competition policy and on cooperation between competition authorities. 

A regular and constructive inter-institutional dialogue 

The European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
European  Committee  of  the  Regions  are  key  partners  to  the  Commission  in  the  continuing 
dialogues on competition policy. Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, the dialogues continued in 
2021 through in-person meetings and remote participation. 

In  the  European  Parliament,  Executive  Vice-President  Vestager  participated  in  2021  in  a 
number  of  exchanges  of  views,  including  dialogues  on  the  Digital  Markets  Act  in  the 
Committee  on  Economic  and  Monetary  Affairs,  the  Committee  on  the  Internal  Market  and 
Consumer  Protection,  the  Committee  on  Legal  Affairs  as  well  as  in  the  Committee  on 
Industry,  Research  and  Energy.  Moreover,  Executive  Vice-President  Vestager  exchanged 
views with the the Subcommittee on Tax Matters on digital taxation and State aid in the tax 
area.  In  addition,  Executive  Vice-President  Vestager  participated  in  plenary  debates  on 
competition  policy;  on  the  Climate,  Energy  and  Environmental  State  aid  guidelines,  on  the 
Digital  Markets  Act  and  on  the  EU-US  Trade  and  Technology  Council.  Finally,  Executive 
Vice-President  Vestager  particpated  in  several  structured  dialogues  with  committees  of  the 
European Parliament, for example in a structured dialogue with the Committee on Economic 
and Monetary Affairs.  

In its written response of September 2021 to the Parliament’s resolution on competition policy 
(rapporteur Van Overtveldt; ECR, BE), the Commission highlighted, among other things, the 
adoption  of  the  Temporary  Framework  for  State  aid  measures,  the  COVID-19  crisis, 
investigations  into  Member  States’  tax  ruling  practices  and  changes  in  tax  legislation. 
Moreover, the Commission higlighted the proposal for a Digital Markets Act and the ongoing 
revision of the State aid rules (most importantly the revision of EEAG which followed the so-
called fitness check). 

In  2021,  in  the  Council,  Executive  Vice-President  Vestager  participated  in  exchanges  of 
views  and  debates  on  competition  policy  matters,  including  several  meetings  of  the 
Competitiveness Council - Internal market and industry. 

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