COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2022 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2022 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union
Date: 2022-07-13
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Poland, coronavirus disease, corruption, democracy, epidemic, independence of the judiciary, infringement of EU law, pluralism in the media, political rights, rule of law

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Luxembourg, 13.7.2022  SWD(2022) 521 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2022 Rule of Law Report         Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2022 Rule of Law Report           The rule of law situation in the European Union {COM(2022) 500 final} - {SWD(2022) 501 final} - {SWD(2022) 502 final} - {SWD(2022) 503 final} - {SWD(2022) 504 final} - {SWD(2022) 505 final} - {SWD(2022) 506 final} - {SWD(2022) 507 final} - {SWD(2022) 508 final} - {SWD(2022) 509 final} - {SWD(2022) 510 final} - {SWD(2022) 511 final} - {SWD(2022) 512 final} - {SWD(2022) 513 final} - {SWD(2022) 514 final} - {SWD(2022) 515 final} - {SWD(2022) 516 final} - {SWD(2022) 517 final} - {SWD(2022) 518 final} - {SWD(2022) 519 final} - {SWD(2022) 520 final} - {SWD(2022) 522 final} - {SWD(2022) 523 final} - {SWD(2022) 524 final} - {SWD(2022) 525 final} - {SWD(2022) 526 final} - {SWD(2022) 527 final}  
 
 
ABSTRACT 

Serious concerns persist related to the independence of the Polish judiciary. Since July 2021, 
the  Court  of  Justice  and  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  have  delivered  rulings, 
confirming a series of concerns identified by the Commission in the context of the procedure 
under Article 7(1) TEU and previous Rule of Law reports. Under the European Semester the 
Council, on a proposal of the Commission, recommended to Poland to enhance the investment 
climate, in particular by safeguarding judicial independence. In its Recovery and Resilience 
Plan  (RRP),  Poland  committed  to  undertake  reforms  of  the  disciplinary  regime  regarding 
judges,  to  dismantle  the  Disciplinary  Chamber  of  the  Supreme  Court,  and  to  create  review 
proceedings for judges affected by decisions of that Chamber aimed at strengthening certain 
aspects of the independence of the judiciary. Serious concerns related to the independence of 
the  National  Council  for  the  Judiciary  remain  to  be  addressed.  The  Constitutional  Tribunal 
issued further rulings directly  challenging the primacy of EU law, the provisions of the EU 
Treaties and the European Convention on Human Rights. In December 2021, the Commission 
opened  an  infringement  procedure  regarding  the  Constitutional  Tribunal  and  its  case  law. 
Concerns regarding the functioning of the prosecution service persist.  

The  government  finished  implementing  the  anti-corruption  programme  2018-2020  even 
though  not  all  of  the  actions  envisaged  therein  had  been  completed  and  no  subsequent 
programme  was  announced.  Key  legislative  tasks  of  the  programme,  such  as  on  asset 
declarations and lobbying, have not been completed. Concerns exist over the broad scope of 
immunities for top executives who are also members of Parliament, and impunity clauses for 
public  officials  who  commit  the  crime  of  abuse  of  office.  Risks  remain  as  regards  the 
effectiveness  of  the  fight  against  high-level  corruption,  including  the  threat  of  selective 
application of the law and impunity caused by a disparity in the treatment of corruption cases 
for political purposes. The independence of main anti-corruption institutions remains an issue, 
considering  in  particular  the  subordination  of  the  Central  Anti-Corruption  Bureau  to  the 
executive and the Minister of Justice also being the Prosecutor-General. 

The  independence  of  the  media  regulator  is  statutorily  guaranteed  and  the  legislation 
transposing  the  Audiovisual  Media  Services  Directive  provided  further  independency 
safeguards.  Operating  licensing  practices  show  risks  to  media  pluralism.  Further  measures 
concerning media ownership transparency were introduced, including an obligation to provide 
additional information on beneficial owners. Concerns over the independence of public service 
media remain, including over safeguards for appointments to executive positions. The general 
environment  for  journalists  continues  to  deteriorate.  Several  reported  lawsuits  against 
journalists  have  an  intimidating  effect  and  journalists  continue  to  be  a  target  of  abuse. 
Restrictions to the right of access to public information have been introduced under the state 
of emergency. 

Legislation carrying out significant reforms continues to be frequently adopted while bypassing 
procedures that provide for adequate consultations, something which Poland has committed to 
address  through  the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Plan.  Recently  proposed  initiatives  could 
adversely affect the civic space and there are concerns about measures limiting activities of 
civil  society.  The  Supreme  Audit  Office  operates  under  adverse  conditions.  The  newly 
appointed Ombudsman continues to play a key role as a rule of law safeguard, despite limited 
resources. Civil society organisations play a crucial role in providing help to refugees arriving 
in very high numbers from Ukraine to Poland. 

1 

 
RECOMMENDATIONS 

In  addition  to  recalling  the  need  to  address  the  serious  concerns  relating  to  judicial 
independence,  in  particular  those  set  out  in  the  Article  7  TEU  procedure  initiated  by  the 
Commission, as well as the obligation to comply with the rule of law related rulings of the ECJ 
and  the  rule  of  law  related  infringement  procedures  referred  to  in  the  country  chapter,  the 
commitments made under the National Recovery and Resilience Plan relating to certain aspects 
of the justice system and the checks and balances, and recalling the relevant country-specific 
recommendations under the European Semester, it is recommended to Poland to: 

  Separate the function of the Minister of Justice from that of the Prosecutor-General and 

ensure functional independence of the prosecution service from the Government.  

  Strengthen  the  existing  integrity  rules  by  introducing  lobbying  rules  and  a  standardised 

online system for asset declarations of public officials and Members of Parliament. 

  Ensure independent and effective investigations and prosecutions, address the broad scope 
of  immunities  for  top  executives  and  abstain  from  introducing  impunity  clauses  in 
legislation in order to enable a robust track record of high-level corruption cases.  

  Ensure  that  fair,  transparent  and  non-discriminatory  procedures  are  adhered  to  for  the 

granting of operating licences to media outlets. 

  Strengthen the rules and mechanisms to enhance the independent governance and editorial 
independence of public service media taking into account European standards on public 
service media. 

  Ensure a more systematic follow-up to findings by the Supreme Audit Office and ensure a 

 

swift appointment of the College Members of the Supreme Audit Office. 
Improve the framework in which civil society and the Ombudsperson operate, taking into 
account European standards on civil society and Ombudsinstitutions. 

2 

 
 
I. 

JUSTICE SYSTEM  

The  Polish  justice  system  is  separated  in  two  main  branches,  administrative  and  ordinary 
judiciary.  The  Supreme  Administrative  Court  and  16  administrative  courts  exercise  control 
over public administration, including the lawfulness of measures of local government bodies 
and of territorial organs of government administration. The ordinary judiciary, supervised by 
the  Supreme  Court1,  consists  of  three  levels:  11 appeal  courts,  47  regional  courts  and  318 
district  courts.  Judges  are  appointed  by  the  President  of  the  Republic  at  the  request  of  the 
National Council for the Judiciary. The Constitutional Tribunal, which adjudicates notably on 
the  constitutionality  of  legislation,  is  composed  of  15  judges  chosen  by  the  Sejm  (lower 
chamber  of  the  Parliament)  for  a  term  of  office  of  9  years.  The  National  Council  for  the 
Judiciary  is  tasked  by  the  Constitution  to  safeguard  judicial  independence.  A  particular 
characteristic of the prosecution system, which is not part of the independent judiciary, is that 
the  Prosecutor  General  and  the  Minister  of  Justice  are  the  same  person.  The  Constitution 
provides that advocates and legal counsellors can self-regulate their practice.  

Independence  

The level of perceived judicial independence in Poland is now very low among the general 
public  and  continues  to  be  very  low  among  companies.  Overall,  24%  of  the  general 
population and 19% of companies perceive the level of independence of courts and judges to 
be ‘fairly or very good’ in 20222. According to data in the 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard, the 
perceived judicial independence among both the general public and companies has consistently 
decreased  since  2016  (45%  for  the  general  public  and  35%  for  companies).  The  perceived 
judicial independence among the general public has decreased in comparison with 2021 (30%), 
and has slightly increased or remained stable for companies (18%). The main reason cited3 by 
the general public and companies for the perceived lack of independence of courts and judges 
is the perception of interference or pressure from the Government and politicians.  

Serious concerns related to the independence of the National Council for the Judiciary 
have not been addressed. The European Court of Justice confirmed4 that there are legitimate 
doubts as to the independence of the NCJ5. The Court of Justice further held that, whereas the 
fact that a body, such as a national council of the judiciary, which is involved in the procedure 
for  the  appointment  of  judges  is,  for  the  most  part,  made  up  of  members  chosen  by  the 
legislature  cannot,  in  itself,  give  rise  to  any  doubt  as  to  the  independence  of  the  judges 
appointed at the end of that procedure, the situation may be different where that fact, combined 
with other relevant factors and the conditions under which those choices were made, leads to 

1   The Supreme Court also supervises military courts. 
2   Figures 50 and 52, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard. The level of perceived judicial independence is categorised 
as follows: very low (below 30% of respondents perceive judicial independence as fairly good and very good); 
low (between 30-39%), average (between 40-59%), high (between 60-75%), very high (above 75%). 

3   Figures 51 and 53, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
4   Judgment of the Court of Justice of 15 July 2021, Commission v Poland, C-791/19, paragraph 108. Judgment 

of the Court of Justice of 6 October 2021, W.Ż., C-487/19, paragraph 150. 

5   The  method  of  appointment  of  judges-members  of  the  NCJ  as  well  as  the  premature  termination  of  the 
mandates  of  its  previous  judges-members  in  2018  is  one  of  the  concerns  raised  by  the  Commission  in  its 
reasoned proposal adopted under Article 7(1) TEU procedure (paragraphs 137-145). On 15 March 2022, the 
ECtHR found a violation of Article 6(1) ECHR owing to the absence of judicial remedies on the premature 
termination of the judge-membership of the NCJ: judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 15 
March 2022, Grzęda v. Poland, 43572/18. 

3 

 
                                                 
such  doubts  being  raised.6  In  a  number  of  rulings,  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights 
(ECtHR)  considered  the  process  of  judicial  appointments  to  a  bench  of  the  Chamber  of 
Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court composed of three judges7 and 
a three member bench of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court8 inherently defective on 
account of the involvement of the NCJ lacking independence from the legislature and executive 
and  the  appointment  upon  the  NCJ  resolution  in  a  procedure  lacking  effective  judicial 
protection and despite the stay of the implementation of that resolution. So far, no steps have 
been taken to address the concerns identified by the ECtHR9, even though it has called for a 
rapid  remedial  action  on  the  part  of  Poland10.  Also,  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court 
established in a significant number of rulings the lack of independence of the NCJ11. On 28 
October 2021, the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary decided to expel the NCJ 
from their organisation,12 essentially for its lack of independence and failure to defend judicial 
independence  against  attacks.  As  regards  the  exercise  of  its  duty  to  safeguard  judicial 
independence - except for a resolution issued in support of a Disciplinary Chamber judge - the 
NCJ has so far not adopted resolution in support to any judge in Poland13. Instead, the NCJ has 
called on the Prosecutor-General to take action against judges based on the content of their 
rulings14. In view of the expiry of the joint term of office of the NCJ judges-members, on 12 
May  2022,  the  Polish  Sejm  appointed  new  judges-members  of  the  NCJ15.  The  process  was 
boycotted by the largest associations of judges and organisations of other legal professions, 
including the National Bar Council and the National Council of Legal Councillors, who called 
on judges not to apply for election16. Former members of the NCJ, appointed thereto in the 

6   Judgment of the Court of Justice of 22 February 2022, X and Y, C-562/21 PPU and C-563/21 PPU, paragraphs 
75-76;  see  also  the  judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  15  July  2021,  Commission  v  Poland,  C-791/19, 
paragraph 103; and of 9 July 2020, Land Hessen, C‑272/19, paragraphs 55 and 56.  

7   Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 8 November 2021, Dolińska-Ficek and Ozimek v Poland, 

49868/19 and 57511/19. 

8   Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 3 February 2022, Advance Pharma sp. z o.o v. Poland, 

1469/20. 

9   The ECtHR remains seized in a number of other cases concerning various aspects of the reorganisation of the 
Polish  judicial  system  initiated  in  2017.  These  cases  concern  notably  procedures  for  appointments  and 
promotions of ordinary court judges involving the NCJ following its reform of 2017, and the lack of judicial 
review of decisions of the President of the Republic concerning such appointments and promotions; see the 
press release ECHR 039(2021) of 3 February 2022. As regards the 2017 justice reforms in Poland, the ECtHR 
held that these successive judicial reforms had been aimed at weakening judicial independence, starting with 
the grave irregularities in the  election of judges of the  Constitutional Tribunal in December 2015, then, in 
particular, the remodeling of the NCJ and the setting up of new Supreme Court chambers, while extending the 
Minister  of  Justice’s  control  over  the  courts  and  increasing  his  role  in  disciplinary  regime  for  judges;  cf. 
judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 15 March 2022, Grzęda v. Poland, 43572/18, paragraph 
348. 

10   See the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights of 3 February 2022, Advance Pharma sp. z o.o v. 
Poland, 1469/20, paragraph 364; of 8 November 2021, Dolińska-Ficek and Ozimek v Poland, 49868/19 and 
57511/19, paragraph 368. 

11   Press release of the Supreme Administrative Court of 11 October 2021.  
12   The decision was taken by 86 out of 92 votes, see ENCJ press communique of 28 October 2021. 
13   See the 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 8. Notwithstanding 
the lack of formal resolutions, it should be noted that the NCJ lodged in November 2021 an appeal against a 
disciplinary court ruling, requesting that a more lenient sanction be imposed (case ASD 4/2018) and negatively 
assessed a proposal of the Deputy Minister of Justice to dismiss a court vice-president; see written contribution 
from the NCJ in the context of the country visit to Poland.  

14   Statement of the NCJ of 14 April 2022 (WO 41.4.2022).  
15   Resolution of the Sejm of 12 May 2022. 
16   Statement of ‘Iustitia’ association of Polish judges of 7 December 2021; a petition of 13 March 2022 signed 
by a number of legal professions’ organisations and largest associations of judges and prosecutors; statement 

4 

 
                                                 
period of 1989-2018, supported that call17. Out of 15 judges-members appointed18, all were 
proposed by the current governing majority in the absence of any proposals from opposition 
parties, amongst which 11 reappointed members. 

New  reforms  of  the  justice  system,  including  a  change  of  the  judicial  map,  have  been 
announced,  with  several  of  these  already  being  put  forward  in  draft  legislation.  Draft 
laws19  were  proposed  that  would  introduce  the  institution  of  courts  of  peace,  composed  of 
judges of peace20 selected by the general population in open elections and appointed to a non-
renewable six-year term of office by the President of the Republic acting upon recommendation 
of the NCJ. Whilst initiatives aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the justice system21 are 
to  be  welcomed,  the  proposed  selection  method  of  the  judges  of  peace  would  give  rise  to 
concerns in the light of European standards on selection of judges. In addition, the Government 
prepared22 a comprehensive reform of the ordinary courts, including23 a change of the judicial 
map aiming at increasing the efficiency of the judiciary24. The reform would entail a forced 
transfer or retirement of ordinary court judges25 as well as changes in the system of judicial 
promotions.  The  Ombudsperson  expressed  serious  concerns  on  this  draft  law,  noting  in 
particular  that  it  does  not  address  the  lack  of  independence  of  the  National  Council  for  the 
Judiciary and allows the Minister of Justice to decide on judicial promotions within the new 
structure  of  ordinary  courts26.  Whereas  the  organisation  of  the  judicial  system  may  require 
certain  transfers  of  judges,  it  is  important  that  any  interferences  with  the  principle  of 
irremovability of judges are justified and proportionate, in line with the case-law of the Court 
of Justice27.  

of the National Bar Council of 13 March 2022, and a statement of the Committee of Human Rights at the 
National Council of Legal Councillors of 15 March 2022. 

17   An open letter by these former members of 18 January 2022 was published by major media outlets.  
18   Sejm Printout No. 2161. As regards the selection process of judges-members of the NCJ, out of over 10.000 

judges in Poland, 19 judges submitted their candidatures. 

19   The draft laws No. 1760 and 1761 proposed on 4 November 2021 by the President of the Republic. 
20   These judges would be competent to examine minor civil and criminal cases. 
21   Cf. Part II of the explanatory memorandum accompanying draft laws No. 1760 and 1761. 
22   Draft law No. UD322, containing the draft law on the Ordinary Courts Organisation and draft law No. UD 
323,  containing  a  draft  law  implementing  the  former  law;  both  published  by  the  Government  Legislation 
Centre on 26 and 27 April 2022 respectively.  

23   The  reform  would  furthermore  provide  for  i.a.  a  uniform  status  of  judge,  an  e-serving  system  in  judicial 
proceedings and an extension of access to courts as well as changes of the powers of the Ministry of Justice 
as regards ordinary court judges, in particular as regards the system of judicial secondments.  

24   The draft law would i.a. seek to decrease the workload incumbent on district court judges (who receive 93,8% 
of the overall number of cases lodged with courts in Poland). See the statement of reasons accompanying the 
law draft law No. UD 323.  

25   In accordance with Article 180(5) of the Polish constitution, ‘[w]here there has been a reorganisation of the 
court system or changes to the boundaries of court districts, a judge may be allocated to another court or retired 
with maintenance of his full remuneration’.  

26   The draft law would abolish the current three-level structure of ordinary courts (district, regional and appeal) 
and substitute it with a two-level structure (regional and provincial). It would empower the Minister of Justice 
to promote and transfer judges from regional to provincial courts, without the need to base such decision on 
criteria referring to a judge’s qualifications and professional experience. Also, the Minister of Justice would 
be empowered to designate disciplinary courts of first instance in cases concerning i.a. judges. See the opinion 
of 16 May 2022 of the Ombudsperson.  

27   See  in particular the judgments of the Court of Justice of  24 June 2019,  Commission v Poland, C-619/18, 
paragraph 115 ff.; of 5 November 2018, Commission v Poland, C-192/18, paragraphs 113 ff.; of 16 November 
2021, Criminal proceedings against W.B. and Others, joined cases C-748/19 through C-754/19, paragraphs 
115 ff. 

5 

 
                                                 
Serious concerns have emerged as regards the implementation of certain European Court 
of  Justice  rulings  on  the  Polish  judiciary.  On  14  July  2021,  the  Vice-President  of  the 
European  Court  of  Justice  granted  interim  measures28  requested  by  the  Commission  in  the 
context of the case C-204/21 R. In that infringement case, the Commission had referred Poland 
to the Court of Justice in view of concerns related to the law on the judiciary of December 2019 
and  the  continued  activities  of  the  Disciplinary  Chamber  as  regards  judges29.  In  view  of 
developments on the ground, the Commission considered that Poland had failed to take the 
necessary measures to fully comply with that order for interim measures. Consequently, on 7 
September 2021, the Commission requested the Court of Justice to impose a daily financial 
penalty30.  On  27  October  2021,  the  Vice-President  of  the  Court  of  Justice  imposed  EUR  1 
million as a daily penalty payment on Poland for as long as the interim measures order of 14 
July 2021 has not been fully complied with. So far, Poland has not complied with the interim 
measures order. On 7 September 2021 the Commission decided to send a letter of formal notice 
to Poland31 considering that Poland had failed to take the necessary measures to fully comply 
with the judgment of the Court of Justice in the case C-791/19, concerning the disciplinary 
regime for judges in Poland. 

A  reform  of  the  disciplinary  regime  has  been  adopted  by  the  Sejm  with  the  aim  of 
fulfilling the commitments made under the Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP). In the 
context  of  the  European  Semester,  on  23  May  2022,  prior  to  finalising  its  assessment  of 
Poland’s  RRP,  the  Council,  on  a  proposal  of  the  Commission,  issued  a  country  specific 
recommendation to Poland to  enhance the investment climate, in particular by  safeguarding 
judicial  independence32.  On  1  June  2022,  the  Commission  gave  a  positive  assessment  of 
Poland’s RRP. It contains several commitments from Poland to improve the investment climate 
including a comprehensive reform of the disciplinary regime applicable to Polish judges, aimed 
at strengthening certain aspects of the independence of the judiciary. First, the reform should 
ensure that all cases against judges, including disciplinary cases and decisions on the lifting of 
judicial immunity, will be adjudicated by a court that complies with the requirements under 
Article 19(1) TEU to be independent, impartial, and established by law. Second, judges cannot 
be subject to disciplinary liability for submitting a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court 
of Justice, for the content of their judicial decisions, or for verifying whether another court is 
independent,  impartial,  and  established  by  law.  Third,  procedural  rights  of  parties  in 
disciplinary  proceedings  are  to  be  strengthened.  Fourth,  a  review  procedure  must  be  set 
allowing  all  judges  affected  by  rulings  of  the  current  Disciplinary  Chamber  to  have  these 

28   The Vice-President of the Court of Justice ordered Poland in particular to immediately, and until the delivery 
of the final judgment, suspend the provisions by which the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court can 
decide on requests for the lifting of judicial immunity, as well as on matters of employment, social security 
and retirement of Supreme Court judges; suspend the effects of decisions already taken by the Disciplinary 
Chamber on the lifting of judicial immunity; and suspend the provisions preventing Polish judges from directly 
applying EU law protecting judicial independence, and from putting references for preliminary rulings on such 
questions to the Court of Justice. For the scope of the infringement case see the 2021 Rule of Law Report, 
Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland. pp. 4-5. 

29   2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 4. 
30   Commission press release of 7 September 2021 IP/21/4587. 
31   If the Commission considers that the Member State concerned has not taken the necessary measures to comply 
with the judgment of the Court of Justice, it may bring the case before the Court after giving that State the 
opportunity to submit its observations in reply to the letter of formal notice, under Article 260 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union. The Polish authorities submitted their reply on 8 November 2021. 
This reply is currently being analysed in view of deciding on next steps.  

32   Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on the 2022 National Reform Programme of Poland and 

delivering a Council opinion on the 2022 Convergence Programme of Poland (Recital (5)). 

6 

 
                                                 
rulings reviewed without delay by a court that complies with the requirements of Article 19(1) 
TEU.  The  Council  endorsed  the  Commission’s  positive  assessment  and  adopted  an 
Implementing Decision on the Polish RRP on 17 June. Poland will need to demonstrate that 
the corresponding milestones have been fulfilled before any disbursement under the RRF can 
be made. On 9 June 2022, the Sejm adopted a set of amendments to the disciplinary regime for 
judges. The President of the Republic signed the Law of 9 June 2022 amending the law on the 
Supreme Court and certain laws, which was published in the Journal of Laws on 14 June 2022 
and enters into force on 14 July 202233. This reform will be analysed by the Commission. 

Poland committed to dismantle the Disciplinary Chamber which, despite rulings of the 
Court of Justice, continued to decide on cases concerning judges, including by suspending 
them  in  office.  In  its  RPP,  Poland  committed  that  all  cases  against  judges,  including 
disciplinary cases and decisions on the lifting of judicial immunity, will be adjudicated by an 
independent  and  impartial  court  established  by  law,  different  from  the  current  Disciplinary 
Chamber.  It  also  committed  to  circumscribe  the  discretionary  power  to  designate  the 
disciplinary  court  with  jurisdiction  at  first  instance  in  cases  concerning  judges  of  ordinary 
courts. The  new law  provides for the establishment of a Chamber of Professional  Liability, 
which  will  be  analysed  by  the  Commission.  Despite  rulings  of  the  Court  of  Justice,  the 
Disciplinary Chamber decided in several cases to either suspend judges in office in the context 
of  disciplinary  proceedings34,  or  to  lift  their  immunity  for  the  purpose  of  criminal 
investigation35, including in view of the content of their judicial decisions (including Supreme 
Court  judges).  These  cases  were  initiated,  following  the  interim  measures  order  of  14  July 
2021,  by  the  Minister  of  Justice  or  court  presidents  appointed  by  him  against  judges  who 
questioned the status of other judges due to their appointment upon a proposal by the NCJ in 
its composition based on the rules introduced in 201736. Following the interim measures order 
of the Court of Justice, the Chamber of Labour Law and Social Security of the Supreme Court 
allowed one of its judges  –  suspended in  office  by the Disciplinary Chamber  – to  continue 
adjudicating cases37. On 23 May 2022, the Disciplinary Chamber reinstated one of the judges 
suspended  by  the  Disciplinary  Chamber  in  disciplinary  proceedings,  who  was  immediately 
obliged to take leave, until 19 July 2022, and transferred without his consent to another court 
division  by  the  president  of  the  district  court  where  he  adjudicates38.  Two  court  presidents 
appointed to the office by the Minister of Justice disregarded rulings of national courts obliging 
them  to  allow  judges,  subject  to  suspension  by  virtue  of  resolutions  of  the  Disciplinary 
Chamber, to continue adjudicating cases39. In its ruling of 22 July 2021, the European Court of 
Human  Rights  ruled  that  the  procedure  for  appointing  judges  to  the  Disciplinary  Chamber 

33    Journal Of Laws, item 1259. 
34   See notably a press communique of 17 December 2021 in the cases I DO 13/21, I DO 14/21, I DO 16/21. It is 
also noted that on 23 May 2022, the Disciplinary Chamber overturned one of its decisions whereby it had 
suspended an ordinary court judge on 4 February 2020. Disciplinary charges concerning among others the 
content of a judicial decision of the judge concerned remain pending (see press communique of the Supreme 
Court of 23 May 2022). 

35   See notably cases press communique of 23 September 2021 in the case I DI 20/21; of 4 August 2021 in the 

case I DO 8/21; and of 16 July 2021 in the case II DIZ 2/21. 

36   The decisions are taken on the basis of Article 130(1) of the Law on the Ordinary Courts Organisation. 
37   Following the interim  measures order of 14 July 2021 of the Court of Justice, the  Labour Law and Social 
Security Chamber of the Supreme Court reinstated one of its judges who had his immunity lifted and had been 
suspended  in  office  by  the  Disciplinary  Chamber  of  the  Supreme  Court.  Following  the  reinstatement,  a 
member of the Disciplinary Chamber requested the prosecution service to investigate this decision. 

38   The president of the court concerned, appointed to the office by the Minister of Justice, is a member of the 

National Council for the Judiciary (since 2018). 

39   This concerns rulings of civil courts issued in cases of two judges suspended in office.  

7 

 
                                                 
amounted  to  a  fundamental  irregularity  adversely  affecting  the  whole  process  and 
compromising its legitimacy, considering that the Disciplinary Chamber hearing the case was 
not a tribunal established by law40. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) issued a 
number  of  interim  measures  orders  to  protect  judges  from  having  their  disciplinary  cases 
examined  or  their  immunity  lifted  by  the  Disciplinary  Chamber.  Furthermore,  in  spite  of  a 
Court of Justice judgment, the President of the Disciplinary Chamber continued to designate41 
disciplinary courts of first instance42.  

The Constitutional Tribunal issued a further ruling that directly challenges the primacy 
of EU law and key provisions of the EU Treaties and continued challenging the ECHR, 
amidst  persisting  concerns  over  its  independence  and  legitimacy.  The  Constitutional 
Tribunal has continued43 to develop its case-law questioning the compatibility with the Polish 
Constitution  of  provisions  of  the  EU  Treaties  and  the  ECHR.  On  7  October  2021,  the 
Constitutional Tribunal ruled i.a. that Article 19(1) TEU is unconstitutional in so far as, ensure 
effective legal  protection in  the  fields  covered by EU law, it confers on national  courts the 
power to bypass, in the course of adjudication, provisions of the Polish Constitution, and to 
rule on the basis of provisions which are not binding, repealed or declared unconstitutional44. 
Moreover, in the same ruling the Constitutional Tribunal declared the unconstitutionality of 
Article 19(1), second subparagraph, and Article 2 TEU, in so far as – to ensure effective legal 
protection  in  the  fields  covered  by  EU  law  and  to  ensure  judicial  independence  –  these 
provisions empower national courts to rule on issues regarding the judiciary45. On 22 December 
2021, in view of this case law as well as of the concerns related to the Constitutional Tribunal 
no  longer  meeting  the  requirements  of  an  independent  and  impartial  tribunal  previously 
established  by  law  as  required  by  Article  19(1)  TEU,  the  Commission  launched  an 
infringement procedure, which is still ongoing46. In addition, the Constitutional Tribunal held 
in rulings of 24 November 2021 and 10 March 202247 that Article 6 ECHR is unconstitutional 
to the extent that it applies to the Constitutional Tribunal and empowers the ECtHR to assess 

40   Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 22 July 2021, Reczkowicz v. Poland, 43447/19, see point 

2 of the operative part of the judgment.  

41   See e.g. the order issued in the case DO 28/21 of 6 August 2021 and the designation of disciplinary courts in 
of  Łódź  (ASD  1/22;  ASD  2/22),  and of  Białystok  (ASD  1/22);  see  also  a  report  of  Association  of  Judges 
‘Iustitia’ of 17 August 2021. 

42   On 30 March 2022, the President of the Disciplinary Chamber issued an ordinance No 8/22 setting out rules 
governing  the  designation  of  the  disciplinary  court  competent  to  hear  disciplinary  cases  of  judges  in  first 
instance by ballot , seeking to address one of the EU law violations identified by the Court of Justice. 

43   See the ruling of 14 July 2021 in case P 7/20, where the Constitutional Tribunal considered that Article 4(3) 
second subparagraph TEU read in connection with Article 279 TFEU are unconstitutional to the extent that 
they  oblige  Poland  to  abide  by  interim  measures  orders  issued  by  the  Court  of  Justice  that  affect  the 
organisation and functioning of Polish courts and the procedure before such courts (2021 Rule of Law Report, 
Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 7). 

44   Case K 3/21. 
45   Notably  to  review  the  legality  of  the  procedure  for  appointing  a  judge,  including  the  examination  of  the 
lawfulness  of  the  act  of  appointment  of  a  judge  by  the  President  of  the  Republic;  review  the  legality  of  a 
resolution of the NCJ containing a request to the President for the appointment of a judge; or ascertain that the 
process of appointing a judge has been defective and, as a result, to refuse to recognise as a judge a person 
appointed to judicial office in accordance with the Polish Constitution. 

46   See Commission press release of 22 December 2021 IP/21/7070. 
47   Cases K 6/21 and K 7/21. On 4 July 2022, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs transmitted to the media a 
statement according to  which, following the  Constitutional Tribunal’s rulings on  the  unconstitutionality of 
Article  6(1)  ECHR,  it  would  not  comply  with  a  recent  ruling  of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights 
concerning the Polish judiciary and refused to pay damages to certain applicant-judges in cases decided by the 
ECtHR. See: TOKFM.pl of 4 July 2022 where the statement is reproduced. 

8 

 
                                                 
the legality of the appointment of Constitutional Tribunal judges and to the extent that, among 
others, it empowers national courts and the ECtHR to carry out a specific assessment in the 
context  of  determining  the  compliance  of  other  courts  with  the  requirement  of  a  ‘court 
established by law’48. In addition, the Constitutional Tribunal remains seized in a number of 
other  cases  contesting  the  constitutionality  of  provisions  of  EU  law,  notably  Article  322 
TFEU49, and the power of the Court of Justice to impose daily financial penalties on Poland50. 
In view of the rulings on the unconstitutionality of the ECHR, the Secretary General of the 
Council of Europe formally requested Poland, under Article 52 ECHR, to explain the manner 
in which its national law ensures the effective implementation of the Convention51.  

The  Supreme  Court  has  been  subject  to  rulings  of  the  European  Courts  and  has 
undergone  further  changes  in  its  management.  On  6  October  2021,  the  Court  of  Justice 
clarified  in  specific  circumstances  the  impact  of  irregularities  in  a  judicial  appointment 
procedure  of  a  Supreme  Court  judge  on  the  fulfilment  by  that  judge  of  the  requirements 
stemming from Article 19(1) TEU52. The impact of irregularities in judicial appointments to 
the Supreme Court was also addressed in rulings of the European Court of Human Rights53. 
On 30 September 2021, the President of the Republic appointed54 a new President of the Civil 
Chamber55 following a contested procedure56. It is noted that this new President of the Civil 
Chamber changed the composition of the referring court responsible for the implementation of 
a preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice relating to irregularities in the appointment of a 
Supreme  Court  judge57.The  First  President  of  the  Supreme  Court  publicly  stated  that  the 
implementation  of  Court  of  Justice  rulings  concerning  the  judiciary  constitutes  a  breach  of 
Polish  law,  calling  on  the  political  authorities  to  address  the  situation  through  a  legislative 

48   These rulings were issued following motions of the Prime Minister (as regards the case K 3/21 in which the 
Constitutional Tribunal ruled on 7 October 2021) and the Prosecutor-General (as regards cases K 6/21 and K 
7/21) who is at the same time the Minister of Justice.  

49   Which  is  the  legal  basis  for  Regulation  2020/2092  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  16 
December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget. Case K 1/22. 
50   Case K 8/21. A similar motion was also submitted by a group of Members of Parliament of the governing 

majority (case K 5/21). 

51   Article 52 of the Convention stipulates that ‘on receipt of a request from the Secretary General of the Council 
of Europe any High Contracting Party shall furnish an explanation of the manner in which its internal law 
ensures the effective implementation of any of the provisions of the Convention’. See press communique of 
the Council of Europe Secretary General of 7 December 2021.  

52   Judgment of the Court of Justice of 6 October 2021, W.Ż., C-487/19, where the Court of Justice held that the 
order by which a court, ruling at last instance and sitting as a single judge, dismissed the action of a judge 
transferred against his will, must be declared null and void if the appointment of that single judge took place 
in clear breach of fundamental rules which form an integral part of the establishment and functioning of the 
judicial system concerned and the  integrity of the outcome of that procedure is undermined, giving rise  to 
reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals as to the independence and impartiality of the judge concerned. 

53   See the paragraph on the National Council for the Judiciary and the Disciplinary Chamber (above).  
54   On  2  September  2021,  10  and  24  February  2022,  the  President  of  the  Republic  appointed,  respectively,  a 
President  of  the  Labour  Law  and  Social  Security  Chamber,  a  President  of  the  Chamber  of  Extraordinary 
Control and Public Affairs and a President of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court.  

55   The judge holding the office  of the Civil Chamber President has been appointed to the judicial office  in a 

procedure that was found irregular by the ECtHR in Advance Pharma (see above). 

56   On 27 September 2021, an official statement was published by the Supreme Court referring to the position of 
a majority (14) judges of the Civil Chamber who contested the selection procedure (see press communique of 
the Supreme Court). 

57   This concerns the implementation of the judgment of the Court of Justice issued on 6 October 2021 in the case 
C-487/19 W.Ż. See in particular an order of the judge rapporteur of 30 December 2021 in the case  III CZP 
25/19; an order of the President of the Civil Chamber of 5 January 2022; and a written statement of 1 February 
2022 of the judge removed from the bench.  

9 

 
                                                 
proposal. The First President also publicly criticised58 decisions of other Supreme Court judges 
whereby they annulled rulings of lower instance courts or decided on the recusal of judges in 
defiance of the case law of the Constitutional Tribunal59. The First President also requested, 
that a disciplinary investigation be opened against Supreme Court judges in view of the content 
of  a  judicial  decision  they  took,  of  the  composition  of  the  bench,  and  of  doubts  as  to  their 
impartiality60. 

Concerns  regarding  the  functioning  of  the  prosecution  service  persist.  The  offices  of 
Minister of Justice and Prosecutor-General continue to be occupied by the same person61. The 
practice  of  seconding62  prosecutors,  already  considered  by  Polish  courts  to  be  a  form  of 
demotion  and  discrimination63,  continues  to  be  used  by  superior  prosecutors64.  Instructions 
binding  on  prosecutors  reportedly  continue  to  be  issued  in  concrete  cases65.  The 
instrumentalisation  of  the  prosecution  service  is  further  exemplified  in  cases  in  which  a 
preliminary ruling request was made66 and by the opening of a criminal investigation in a case 
concerning  judges  of  the  Court  of  Justice67.  Furthermore,  the  National  Prosecutor’s  Office 

58   Statement of the First President of the Supreme Court of 22 October 2021.  
59   The rulings were issued following the interim measures order of the Court of Justice 14 July 2021 in the case 

C-204/21 R. See notably cases I KZ 29/21, V KZ 47/21. 

60   The President of the Criminal Chamber indicated that the First President’s decision appears to be aimed at 
exerting influence on the judges adjudicating in a concrete case. See press communique of the Supreme Court 
of 29 March 2022. A judge of the Supreme Court decided to recuse himself from cases in view of the ECtHR 
the ruling Dolińska-Ficek and Ozimek v Poland. See a communique issued on 29 November 2021 in the case 
I CSKP 524/21. 

61   Following the merging in the context of the reforms in 2016 of the positions of Prosecutor General and Minister 
of  Justice,  the  Minister  of  Justice  directly  wields  the  powers  vested  in  the  highest  prosecutorial  office, 
including the authority to issue instructions to prosecutors in specific cases and to transfer prosecutors. His 
power  has  been  subject  to  criticism  including  by  the  Venice  Commission  and  by  the  Commission  in  its 
Reasoned Proposal adopted under the Article 7(1) TEU procedure on the rule of law in Poland. See the 2021 
Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 12. 

62   The  National  Prosecutor  sued  the  President  of  the  association  of  prosecutors  ‘Lex  Super  Omnia’  for  her 
allegations  related  to  harassment  of  prosecutors  through  secondments  without  their  consent.  See  press 
communique of the National Prosecutor’s Office of 24 February 2021. 

63   E.g.  rulings  of  28  February  2022,  the  Regional  Court  in  Warsaw  which  ruled  that  the  secondment  of  a 
prosecutor constituted unequal treatment and could be perceived as a discriminatory act. On 16 June 2021, the 
Supreme Court ruled that a prosecutor seconded to another unit for indefinite time cannot be revoked from the 
secondment without prior notification (case No. III PSKP 23/21). 

64   E.g.  as  reported  by  the  association  of  prosecutors  ‘Lex  Super  Omnia’,  prosecutors  from  Świnoujście  city 
complained  about  their  workload  and  the  lack  of  support  to  that  end  by  their  hierarchy.  A  supervising 
prosecutor  decided  on  31  March  2022  to  immediately  second  these  prosecutors  to  prosecutorial  units  in 
different towns. See Prawo.pl of 5 April 2022, ‘Prosecutors complained about work overload and… ended up 
on  punitive  secondments’.  For  multiple  other  examples  see  a  report  by  the  Committee  for  the  Defence  of 
Justice, of 18 November 2021; a report of the association of prosecutors ‘Lex Super Omnia’ of 27 June 2021. 
65   This was confirmed in an interview by the President of the Association of Prosecutors ‘Lex Super Omnia’, 
who stated that in politically sensitive cases, instructions are not given in a written form and often superior 
prosecutors  use  other  means  to  ensure  lower  prosecutors’  compliance.  The  interview  is  found  in  Gazeta 
Wyborcza  of  6  February  2022,  ‘Prosecutors  in  Poland  are  defenceless  in  the  face  of  repression  by  their 
management’.  

66   See  case  C-269/21,  where,  following  the  referral  of  a  set  of  questions  to  the  Court  of  Justice,  the  public 
prosecutor’s office joined the case as a party and, on 28 September 2021, requested the recusal of the judge 
making the referral, submitting to that end that the referring judge is not impartial. The motion for recusal was 
rejected. See a report of 25 January 2022 of the association of judges ‘Themis’.  

67   As confirmed by the spokesperson of the Regional Prosecutor’s Office in Warsaw. The investigation concerns 
allegations of the abuse of competences and failure to carry out duties by members of the European Court of 
Auditors and judges of the Court of Justice. TVP.info of 25 January 2021 where a statement of the public 

10 

 
                                                 
issued  instructions  binding  on  all  prosecutors  recalling  the  allegedly  non-binding  force  of 
judgments  of  the  European  Court  of  Justice  and  of  the  ECtHR68  as  well  as  requesting 
prosecutors to report to the National Prosecutor’s office and to the Disciplinary Officer cases 
in which judges question the status of other judges69. Prosecution services are also seized in 
the context of actions undertaken by judges70. Whilst the European Public Prosecutor’s Office 
(EPPO)  currently  has  23  ongoing  investigations  involving  Poland,  the  Polish  prosecution 
services refuse to cooperate with the EPPO71. Furthermore, as regards the environment for legal 
professions, no measures were taken to remove the power of prosecutors to suspend a lawyer’s 
licence without prior consent of the court72. Also, disciplinary actions were undertaken against 
a legal councillor who submitted requests for recusal of judges on account of their possible 
irregular appointment73.  

Quality  

Poland is progressing well as regards digitalisation of the justice system, while room for 
improvement remains.  Administrative cases benefit from  a comprehensive set of IT tools. 
Such tools could be further improved, notably as regards civil cases74. This could ensure that 
distance communication technology can be used to contact relevant parties to proceedings in 
all types of civil cases, to provide for a possibility of filing a claim online and to ensure that 
access to the electronic file of ongoing cases exists in all types of civil and commercial cases75. 
The current rules, measures and technological tools allow for a remote hearing; in addition, 
business  and  debt  registers  are  kept  in  full  electronic  form  and  traders  are  handled 
electronically;  also,  since  July  2021,  the  service  of  judicial  documents  via  the  Information 
Portal of the Common Courts has been operational; moreover, legislative work is underway at 
the Ministry of Justice with a view to using information technology enabling, inter alia, parties’ 
access  to  procedural  documents  and  with  a  view  to  shortening  court  proceedings76.  Further 
improvement would be needed to introduce electronic case files both in ordinary courts and in 

prosecutor’s office is reproduced. See also a decision of 15 December 2021 No. 3041-1.Ds.90.2021 of the 
Regional Prosecutor’s Office in Warsaw (I Criminal Division). 

68   Instruction No. 1001-4.430.1.2021 of 13 December 2021. The instruction considers rulings of the Court of 
Justice and of the ECtHR to be of declaratory nature and cannot become a basis of rulings delivered by Polish 
courts.  

69   Instruction No. 1001-4.433.2.2021 of 22 December 2021. The instruction applies retroactively to ‘cases, in 

which the present obligation has so far not been abided by’.  

70   On  1  October  2021,  a  member  of  the  Disciplinary  Chamber  of  the  Supreme  Court  informed  prosecution 
services about a possible commitment of a criminal offence by four Supreme Court judges. The information 
concerns a judge who had been suspended in office by the Disciplinary Chamber who continued to adjudicate 
cases (following the interim measures order of the Court of Justice of 14 July 2021 in case C-204/21 R) and 
three other judges who made this possible. Also, the Internal Affairs Department of the National Prosecutor’s 
Office  opened  criminal  investigation  against  two  judges  who  gave  an  interview  to  the  Polish  media, 
underlining the importance of ensuring a full implementation of the rulings of the Court of Justice and of the 
ECtHR. See TVP.Info of 1 October 2021, ‘Scandal at the top levels of the EU. The Polish prosecutor’s office 
has opened an investigation’; also: See a report of 25 January 2022 of the association of judges ‘Themis’. 
71   On 16 February 2022, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) sent a letter to the Commission on the 
lack of cooperation by Poland. Given that whenever the EPPO is carrying out a criminal investigation of a 
cross-border nature, it is unable to obtain evidence located in Poland, the EPPO’s ability to counter criminality 
affecting the Union budget is systematically hindered.  

72   See also the 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 12. 
73   Decision of 28 October 2021 of the Deputy Disciplinary Officer for Ordinary Court Judges; see a report of 25 

January 2022 of the association of judges ‘Themis’. 

74   Figures 42, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
75   Figures 46, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
76   Written comments from the Polish authorities. 

11 

 
                                                 
the Supreme Court, thus facilitating the circulation of files between courts77.Work is ongoing 
to introduce a uniform IT system for all courts in Poland78. At the same time, no steps have 
been taken to revise the system of case allocation that was found to be prone to abuse, in spite 
of concerns expressed to that end by the Supreme Audit Office79.  

Efficiency 

The overall performance of ordinary and administrative courts remains stable. As regards 
ordinary courts, their overall performance remains average. In 2020, there was a decrease in 
the estimated time needed to resolve litigious civil and commercial cases at all three instances, 
and  the  rate  of  resolving  such  cases  at  first  instance  improved80.  Poland  remains  under 
enhanced supervision of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe for the length of 
civil and criminal proceedings81. As regards administrative courts, their performance remains 
above average82.  

II. 

ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK  

Several  authorities  are  responsible  for  anti-corruption  in  Poland,  including  the  Prosecutor-
General,  who  is  also  the  Minister  of  Justice,  and  the  Minister  of  Internal  Affairs  and 
Administration who is in charge of prevention aspects, such as the lobby register for public 
officials.  The  Central  Anti-Corruption  Bureau  is  the  specialised  law  enforcement  body 
combating  corruption  in  the  public  and  the  private  sector  alongside  the  Central  Police 
Investigation Bureau and the regular police, the Internal Security Agency and the Prosecution 
Service83. The Central Anti-Corruption Bureau combines intelligence and police functions, and 
can trigger both administrative and criminal proceedings. It has also been tasked with policy 
coordination84  and  corruption  prevention,  including  educational  awareness-raising  activities 
against  corruption  and  an  e-learning  platform85.  The  Supreme  Audit  Office  (NIK)  has  a 
preventive  role  monitoring  the  public  spending  of  the  government  administration  bodies, 
including the National Bank of Poland and state legal persons86. 

77   Written contribution from the Supreme Court for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 
78   Press release of the Ministry of Justice of 12 October 2021. 
79   See the 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p 13 footnote 94. 
Cf. press release of the Ministry of Justice of 16 September 2021, in which the concerns of the Supreme Audit 
Office were not referred to.  

80   No data available as regards the remaining two instances. Whereas in 2019 the rate amounted to approximately 

98%, in 2020 it passed the threshold of 100%; figure 12, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard. 

81   Council  of  Europe  CM/Del/Dec(2018)1331/H46-19:  H46-19  Bąk  (Application  No.  7870/04),  Majewski 
(Application No. 52690/99), Rutkowski and Others (Application No. 72287/10) and Jan Załuska, Marianna 
Rogalska and 398 other applications (Application No. 53491/10) v. Poland. 

82   Figures 5, 9, 13, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
83   Cf. Law of 9 June 2006 on the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau. The Law of 24 May 2002 on the Internal 
Security Agency and Foreign Intelligence Agency. The Law of 28 January 2016 on the Prosecution Service. 
Law of 6 April 1990 on the police. Within the police, the Police Internal Affairs Bureau is appointed to combat 
and reduce corruption  within  the police itself.  According to the Bureau’s 2019 report,  25% of accusations 
against police officers concern corruption crimes (see statistical data provided by the Internal Affairs Bureau 
of the Police). 

84   The  Central  Anti-Corruption  Bureau  replaced  the  Minister  of  Interior  and  Administration  in  the  overall 

coordination of the Governmental Anti-Corruption Programme. 

85   Educational website of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, and its e-learning platform.  
86   Law of 23 December 1994 on the Supreme Audit Office.  

12 

 
                                                 
The perception among experts and business executives is that the level of corruption in 
the  public  sector  remains  relatively  high.  In  the  2021  Corruption  Perceptions  Index  by 
Transparency International, Poland scores 56/100 and ranks 13th in the European Union and 
42nd globally87. This perception has deteriorated over the past five years88. The 2022 Special 
Eurobarometer on Corruption shows that 55% of respondents consider corruption widespread 
in  their  country  (EU  average  68%)  and  39%  of  respondents  feel  personally  affected  by 
corruption in their daily lives (EU average 24%)89. As regards businesses, 44% of companies 
consider that corruption is widespread (EU average 63%) and 19% consider that corruption is 
a problem when doing business (EU average 34%)90. Furthermore, 47% of respondents find 
that  there  are  enough  successful  prosecutions  to  deter  people  from  corrupt  practices  (EU 
average 34%)91, while 19% of companies believe that people and businesses caught for bribing 
a senior official are appropriately punished (EU average 29%)92. 

The audit93 of the Government Anti-Corruption Programme 2018-2020 found that the 
programme was partly implemented94. The government has finalised the implementation of 
the programme95 and reported that more than 57.5% of the planned actions were implemented 
in  adverse  circumstances.  The  programme  aimed  to  raise  awareness  about  and  reduce 
corruption with the specific goals of (i) strengthening preventive and educational activities, (ii) 
improving the monitoring of corruption risks and anti-corruption regulation, and (iii) enhancing 
the  cooperation  and  coordination  between  law  enforcement  authorities  at  national  and 
international  level.  The  implementation  was  coordinated  by  the  Intersectoral  Group  of  the 
Central  Anti-Corruption  Bureau96  and  was  audited  by  the  Supreme  Audit  Office97  with  the 
focus on the extent of the implementation, the conditions for the implementation, including the 

87   Transparency International (2022), Corruption Perceptions Index 2021. The level of perceived corruption is 
categorised  as  follows:  low  (the  perception  among  experts  and  business  executives  of  public  sector 
corruption scores above 79); relatively low (scores between 79-60), relatively high (scores between 59-50), 
high (scores below 50). 

88   In 2017 the score was 60, while in 2021 the score is 56. The score significantly increases/decreases  when it 
changes more than five points; improves/deteriorates (changes between 4-5 points), and is relatively stable 
(changes from 1-3 points) in the last five years. 

89   Special Eurobarometer 523 on Corruption (2022). The Eurobarometer data on citizens’ corruption perception 
and experience is updated every second year. The previous data set is the Special Eurobarometer 502 (2020). 
90   Flash Eurobarometer 507 on Businesses’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU (2022). The Eurobarometer 
data on business attitudes towards corruption as is updated every second year. The previous data set is the 
Flash Eurobarometer 482 (2019). 

91   Special Eurobarometer 523 on Corruption (2022).  
92   Flash Eurobarometer 507 on Businesses’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU (2022).  
93   The audit was planned for the first quarter of 2022, see Supreme Audit Office (2020), Workplan for 2021, p. 
9. Supreme Audit Office (2022), Post-audit presentation of the audit Implementation of the Government Anti-
Corruption Programme for 2018-2020. The Supreme Audit Office positively assesses the implementation of 
the  programme  with  regard  to  the  measures  for  the  Ministry  of  Development  and  Technology,  while 
referencing also the lack of implementation of actions. 

94   See in this context also the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (2021), Final report on the implementation of the 

'Government Anti-Corruption Programme 2018-2020. Written comments from Polish authorities. 

95   The  programme  is  based  on  resolution  No.  207  of  19  December  2017  of  the  Council  of  Minister  –  the 
Governmental Anti-Corruption Programme for years 2018-2020, (M.P. z 2018 r. poz. 12). The Programme 
was accompanied by an Action Plan, Governmental Anti-Corruption Programme for years 2018-2020. 

96   The Intersectoral Group is led by the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, according to information received from 

the Government for the 2022 Rule of Law report. 

97   Notably,  in  support  of  the  prevention  of  corruption  and  other  irregularities,  the  Supreme  Audit  Office  has 
created  a  special  department  for  ad  hoc  inspections,  which  is  designed  to  respond  quickly  to  signals  of 
irregularities from citizens, journalists and members of the parliament. Information received by the Supreme 
Audit Office in the context of the country visit to Poland. 

13 

 
                                                 
pandemic, as well as the results and impact of the Programme98. While most of the objectives 
to provide educational material and trainings have been met, the implementation of important 
legislative initiatives specified in the programme has not been completed. These include, in 
particular, the bill on Liability of Collective Entities, the reform of the asset declaration system, 
and  the  revision  of  the  lobbying  legislation99.  No  public  announcement  was  made  for  the 
adoption of a new anti-corruption strategy beyond 2020100. 

The legal framework to fight corruption has been reinforced, yet gaps remain. The Polish 
Criminal Code broadly criminalises corruption101. Amendments of the Criminal Code to fight 
corruption in public life102 entered into force on 1 January 2022 to counter corruption practices 
and increase transparency of public life by introducing new tools to address conflicts of interest 
of public office holders103  and stricter criminal  sanctions for  corruption104. Among the new 
tools are the registers to enhance transparency in political party finance105 and a ban for public 
officials,  including  local  government  representatives,  to  take  up  positions  in  state-owned 
enterprises106. However, the ban on secondary activities does not extend to current deputies 

98   Implementation of the Government Anti-corruption Programme for 2018-2020. The Supreme Audit Office 
has  presented  four  general  observations  on  the  measurement,  monitoring  and  reporting  of  the  level  of 
implementation of the Programme, according to information received by the Government for the 2022 Rule 
of Law report. 

99   Central  Anti-Corruption  Bureau  (2020),  Implementation  report  of  the  Governmental  Anti-Corruption 
Programme for 2018-2020 in 2019; p. 2, on the suspension of work regarding asset declarations). According 
to information received from the Batory Foundation/ Helsinki Foundation in the context of the country visit 
to Poland, the Ministry of Justice discontinued the  work on the bill on  Liability of Collective Entities,  for 
which  a  draft,  currently  still  internal  bill  was  prepared,  while  the  Ministry  of  Internal  Affairs  and 
Administration  does  not  currently  pursue  the  work  on  lobbying.  For  more  information  on  these  specific 
aspects, see also further below the section on lobbying. 

100  According to the government, preparatory work for a new national strategy to prevent and combat corruption 
was already underway in the first half of 2021, which should take into account the recommendations of the 
EU, the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), the OECD, and the UN. See 2021 Rule of Law Report, 
Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 16. 

101  GRECO confirms that the legislation in place broadly complies with the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law 
Convention  on  Corruption  (ETS  173)  and  its  Additional  Protocol  (ETS  191),  GRECO  -  Third  Round 
Evaluation Report. The key offence penalised by the Criminal Code is bribery of public officials in its passive 
(accepting a bribe) and active (offering a bribe) forms. The term ‘person holding a public position’ as defined 
by  law  has  a  broad  scope,  including  among  others  the  President  of  the  Republic  of  Poland,  members  of 
Parliament, judges, notaries, officers of a public authority, members of local authorities, etc. 

102  Law amending the Criminal Code and certain other acts (14 October 2021). 
103  The Law amends the 1997 Law on Restriction on Conduct of Business Activities by Persons Performing Public 

Functions and the 1996 Law on the Exercise of the Mandate of a Deputy and Senator. 

104  The  Law  introduces  three  significant  changes  in  this  regard,  including  new  criminal  sanctions  that  can  be 
imposed between 1 and 15 years, or for life in case of (apart from the already existing prohibition to hold a 
public function after a corruption conviction) with the underlying objective to counter corrupt practices and to 
increase openness and transparency in public life. 

105  For more details, see section below on political party finance. 
106  The amendment stipulates that during the exercise of their mandate deputies, senators and mayors may not be 
employed or engaged in any other occupation in commercial companies, in which the State Treasury or a local 
government hold, directly or indirectly through other entities, at least 10% of shares. In general, Poland has 
broadly criminalised corruption in line with the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption 
(ETS 173) and its Additional Protocol (ETS 191), as confirmed by the Group of States against Corruption; 
See  GRECO  Third Evaluation Round  – Evaluation  Report.  The key offence penalised is bribery of public 
officials in its passive and active  forms (accepting or offering a bribe). The term ‘person holding a public 
position’ as defined by law has a broad scope, including among others the President of the Republic of Poland, 
members of Parliament, judges, notaries, officers of a public authority, members of local authorities, etc.  

14 

 
                                                 
and senators or municipality-owned enterprises107. Apart from the prohibition to hold public 
functions  following  corruption  convictions,  the  reform  introduces  criminal  sanctions  for 
corruption  ranging  from  one  to  15  years,  including  a  life  sentence  for  repeat  corruption 
offences108,  which  raises  questions  concerning  its  proportionality109.  The  fight  against 
corruption, including in key areas of public administration, has been included as a priority for 
the  police  for  2021-2023110.  Priority  areas  include  the  enhancement  of  police  operations  in 
combating key types of crime, including corruption crimes. 

Concerns  regarding  the  effectiveness  in  fighting  foreign  bribery  still  need  to  be 
addressed111.  As  regards  foreign  bribery,  the  OECD  had  called  on  Poland  to  remove  the 
Criminal Code provision that allows the perpetrators of bribery to avoid legal sanctions if they 
notify  the  responsible  authorities  about  the  crime  and  disclose  all  circumstances  before  the 
authorities learn about it, as it leads to impunity112. Deficiencies have also been highlighted 
with regard to the effective enforcement to tackle foreign bribery113 since a private company 
can only be held criminally liable for foreign bribery after the individual who committed the 
bribe was convicted in final instance. The level of sanctions in this regard with too low fines 
for companies are not considered effective, proportionate or dissuasive114. A draft law is being 
discussed in the Parliament that would amend provisions defining passive and active bribery, 
including foreign bribery115. 

Obstacles  to  the  effective  repression  of  corruption,  including  high-level  corruption, 
remain. Corruption investigations and prosecutions tend to be lengthy, partly due to the need 

107  Ibid, as also confirmed by information received from the Batory Foundation in the context of the country visit 

to Poland. 

108  Article 43 of the Criminal Code. The criminal sanctions will be mandatory for public officials committing the 
corruption crimes specified in the criminal code  and possible for any other individual committing specific 
corruption crimes. See also Article 41(1)(b) of the Criminal Code. 

109  Information received from the Association of judges and prosecutors, and the Batory Foundation/ Helsinki 
Foundation in the context of the country visit to Poland. See in this context also the opinion of the Supreme 
Court on the draft Law of 29 July 2021. 

110  See Priorities of the Commander-in-Chief of the Police for 2021-2023. Details on how these priorities will be 
implemented  and  on  the  concrete,  expected  results  are  not  published.  In  detail,  these  tasks  include  the 
strengthening of police activity in counteracting economic crime in the areas of tax crime, crimes against the 
fundamental  interests  of  the  European  Union  and  crimes  in  the  area  of  public  procurement;  as  well  as 
increasing police effectiveness in combating corruption in key areas of public administration activity. 

111  Cf. 2021 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 17. 
112  OECD (2015), Poland: Follow-Up to the Phase 3 Report & Recommendations , p. 4. Cf. also OECD (2018), 

Poland must make urgent legislative reforms to combat foreign bribery. 

113  In the period between 2016-2019, Poland opened at least three investigations into foreign bribery, initiated no 
prosecution and concluded no case with sanctions, according to Transparency International (2020), Exporting 
Corruption,  p.  96,  with  further  reference  to  cases.  See  also  OECD  (2021),  Poland’s  lack  of  progress  in 
implementing reforms to boost fight against foreign bribery remains a serious concern, indicating that Poland’s 
proposed, recent Action  Plan on the subject-matter could be seen as a step in the  right direction, although 
Poland  needs  to  still  add  concrete  activities,  specific  deadlines,  and  measurable  indicators  to  the  proposed 
measures  to  be  able  to  determine  their  effectiveness.  Furthermore,  OECD  (2020),  Poland  should  urgently 
implement reforms to boost the fight against foreign bribery and preserve independence of prosecutors and 
judges. More information can also be found in the OECD (2022), Poland: Phase 4 Evaluation (scheduled for 
June 2022). 

114  OECD  (2020),  Poland  should  urgently  implement  reforms  to  boost  the  fight  against  foreign  bribery  and 

preserve independence of prosecutors and judges.  

115  The  draft  law  amending  the  Criminal  Code  and  certain  other  laws  (draft  no.  2024)  of  22  February  2022, 

https://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm9.nsf/druk.xsp?nr=2024 . 

15 

 
                                                 
for  additional  human  and  technical  resources  to  the  prosecution  service116.  The  level  of 
specialisation and digitalisation of the services involved is not always sufficient to carry out 
their tasks to combat corruption effectively117. Regarding high-level corruption cases, concerns 
remain about institutionalised corruption118 and a risk of impunity caused by a disparity in the 
treatment of corruption cases for political purposes, which potentially breaches the principle of 
equality before the law119. These concerns are based on the increased influence of the executive 
branch of power over the judiciary, the prosecution and police with the entire chain of criminal 
proceedings being exposed to risks of political interference, undermining the effectiveness of 
anti-corruption efforts in respect of persons in top executive functions120. Concerns regarding 
the  broad  scope  of  immunities  of  persons  exercising  top  executive  functions  who  are  also 
members  of  Parliament  have  not  been  addressed,  preventing  criminal  accountability  for 
corruption crimes regardless of whether they are related to the members’ official duties121. The 
fact  that  the  Minister  of  Justice  continues  to  serve  also  as  Prosecutor-General  adds  to  the 
concerns  over  the  independence  of  the  Central  Anti-Corruption  Bureau  from  the  executive 
power122.  The  increased  supervisory  powers  of  the  Prosecutor-General,  who  can  issue 
instructions in individual cases, including not to prosecute, and take over corruption cases of 
his  subordinate  prosecutors,  provides  avenues  to  influence  anti-corruption  prosecutions 
politically, which has also been the case on several occasions123. In this context, concerns exist 
about  the  risks  of  politically  motivated  investigations  and  wiretapping  of  public  officials, 

116  Information received by the representatives of the National Council of the Bar and of the National Council of 

Legal Councillors in the context of the country visit to Poland. 

117  Cf. 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 18, with a reference 
to information received from the government. In this context, in particular the restrictions to access financial 
data can present an obstacle for the detection and prosecution of corruption. 

118  As a strategic and systemic, legal and or ethical influence undermining institutions’ effectiveness by diverting 
it from its purpose or weakening its ability to achieve its purpose, including the weakening of the public’s 
trust. See Helsinki Foundation (2022), A state of accusation: Polish prosecution service 2015-2022, and Batory 
Foundation (2020), Laying the groundwork for ‘grand corruption’: the Polish government’s (anti-corruption 
activities  in  2015-2019).  In  this  context,  see  also  Part  IV,  p.  27,  regarding  the  concerns  about  the  lack  of 
effective follow-up by the prosecution services to requests made in the aftermath of audits of the Supreme 
Audit Office, and also Part I, p. 9 and Part II, p. 17 (elections) and p. 18 (Covid section). 

119  Ibid. Information received from Batory Foundation/Helsinki Foundation in the context of the country visit to 
Poland; see also GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round – Evaluation Report, paragraph 91. See also 2021 Rule of 
Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 17. 

120  GRECO  Fifth  Evaluation  Round  –  Evaluation  Report,  paragraph  91.  See  also  2021  Rule  of  Law  Report, 

Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 17.  

121  GRECO  Fifth  Evaluation  Round  –  Compliance  Report,  paragraphs  54-63;  and  GRECO  Fifth  Evaluation 
Round  –  Evaluation  Report,  paragraphs  82-91,  reiterating  its  recommendation  that  in  respect  of  persons 
exercising top executive functions, an in-depth reform of the system of immunities be carried out with a view 
to facilitating the prosecution of corruption offences by excluding these from the scope of immunities and by 
ensuring that the procedure for the lifting of the immunity is transparent and based on objective and fair criteria 
used effectively in practice (see paragraph 87). See also 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the 
rule of law situation in Poland, p. 17. 

122  As  reported  in  the  2020  and  2021  Rule  of  Law  Reports,  Country  Chapters  on  the  rule  of  law  situation  in 
Poland,  p. 8  and  11  (for 2020)  and  18  (for 2021)  ;  GRECO  Fifth  Evaluation  Round  –  Evaluation  Report, 
paragraph 78. 

123  Helsinki Foundation  (2022), A  state of accusation: Polish  prosecution  service  2015-2022, and information 
received from the Batory Foundation in the context of the country visit to Poland and as reported, with more 
details, in the 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, pp. 8 and 11. 
In this context, see also the concerns raised by the Venice Commission (opinion CDL-AD(2017)028). 

16 

 
                                                 
prosecutors and defence lawyers by the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau’s Pegasus surveillance 
spyware124. 

The  Polish  Government  has  analysed  the  effectiveness  of  its  lobbying  rules  but  the 
findings  have  not  been  made  public.  A  legislative  amendment  to  the  current  lobbying 
regulation125 dating back to 2005 was one of the objectives set out in the Government’s Anti-
Corruption Programme for 2018-2020126. Yet, no legislative amendments have been proposed. 
The  applicable  law  defines  lobbying,  establishes  a  public  register  as  well  as  determines 
obligations  and  sanctions  for  unregistered  lobbyists.  In  this  context,  Poland  does  not  have 
lobbying  rules  obliging  persons  exercising  top  executive  functions  to transparently  disclose 
their  contacts  with  interest  representatives127.  In  practice,  however,  there  are  three  lobby 
registers in place, one for the Government (based on the lobbying regulation), one for the lower 
chamber of Parliament (Sejm), and one covering its higher chamber (Senate)128. For lobbying 
activities towards the government, the Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration is the 
supervisory body129. For members of Parliament, the two chambers have supervisory tasks over 
lobbying activities130. Concerns persist as to the effectiveness of these registers with low and 
declining registration rates.131 The oversight is not systematic and no information is available 
on  whether  sanctions  have  been  applied  to  unregistered  lobbyists132.  Post-employment 
(‘revolving  doors’)  rules  exist  for  top-level  officials  but  do  not  extend  to  members  of 
Parliament and are limited to entities that the respective public official dealt with professionally 
or issued specific decisions133. 

124  As also reported in Part IV below, p. 24. Contribution by the Supreme Audit Office for the 2022 Rule of Law 
Report, p. 1; contribution from the Marshal of the Senate of the Republic of Poland for the 2022 Rule of Law 
Report, p. 1. See in this context also Prosecutor Wrzosek under surveillance with Pegasus? The prosecutor's 
office refused to initiate proceedings (29 Dec. 2021). Reportedly, also opposition lawyer Roman Giertych was 
under surveillance by the Pegasus software, who used his phone also for professional conversations subject to 
the  attorney’s  secrecy,  see  Roman  Giertych  under  surveillance  with  Pegasus  (21  Dec.  2021).  The  same 
software was used in the case of Senator Krzysztof Brejza, see Brejza – another victim of Pegasus: The KO 
Chief of Staff was surveilled during the election campaign (23 December 2021). 

125  The Law of 7 July 2005 on Lobbying in the law-making process was one of Europe’s first lobbying regulations. 
126  The resolution No. 207 of 19 December 2017 of the Council of Ministers – the Governmental Anti-Corruption 
Programme for years 2018-2020, (M.P. z 2018 r. poz. 12). See also above in the section on the Anti-Corruption 
Programme, p. 12. 

127  GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round - Compliance Report, paragraphs 32-36. 
128  While the two separate parliamentary registers require lobbyists to provide information about the entities they 
represent as well as their specific interests, the information contained in the Government register is limited to 
personal data.  

129  Law of 7 June 2005 on lobbying activities in the law-making process.  
130  See above, Law of 7 June 2005 on lobbying activities in the law-making process.  
131  The number of lobbyists registered in the Sejm decreased between 2015-2018 from 31 to 20 lobbyists, see 
https://konkret24.tvn24.pl/polityka,112/kim-jest-lobbysta-sprawdzamy-przepisy,950341.html, and continued 
to  decline 
in  2019  and  2020,  see  https://klubjagiellonski.pl/publikacje/fikcja-jawnosci-dzialalnosc-
lobbingowa-w-sejmie-rp-w-latach-2006-2019/.  In  2021,  only  14  professional  lobbyists  (i.e.  2.82%)  were 
represented  in  the  Sejm  without  presenting  their  position,  according  to  information  by  the  Sejm, 
https://www.sejm.gov.pl/lobbing/informacja_roczna_2021.pdf.  Cf.  2021  Rule  of  Law  Report,  Country 
Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, pp.18-19. See also the still valid assessment conducted by Frank 
Boldt Foundation (2016), ‘Lobbying – a risk or an opportunity? – Lobbying regulation in the Polish, Slovak, 
and  Czech  perspective’.  On  the  need  to  enhance  transparency  in  the  interactions  by  parliamentarians  with 
lobbyists  and  other  third  parties  who  seek  to  influence  the  legislative  process  is  also  a  long-standing 
recommendation of GRECO that has so far not been met by Poland, see GRECO Fourth Evaluation Round - 
Interim Compliance Report, pp. 3-5. 

132  Ibidem, cf. also 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 19. 
133  GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round – Evaluation Report, recommendation viii and paragraph 65. 

17 

 
                                                 
There  are  various  systems  for  asset  declarations  and  controls  but  the  initiative  to 
standardise  them  is  not  being  pursued134.  The  creation  of  a  uniform  system  for  the 
submission and analysis of asset declarations for public officials was one of the measures of 
the  Government  Anti-Corruption  Programme  2018-2020135.  The  Central  Anti-Corruption 
Bureau prepared a draft regulation, however, it has not been made public136. The technical work 
towards  a  more  standardised,  electronic  system  was  suspended  until  appropriate  legislative 
steps are taken137. Until then, a centralised submission and monitoring system is lacking, while 
the  level  of  digitalisation  of  politicians’  asset  declaration  continues  to  be  low138.  Most 
declarations  are still filled out  by hand, with  various declaration forms  being in  use139. The 
scope of data to be disclosed is similar but not streamlined for every public official required to 
submit declarations. 

Whistleblowers  can  report  corruption  in  an  official  online  reporting  system,  while 
dedicated legislation for whistleblowers’ protection is in preparation. The Central Anti-
Corruption Bureau hosts a helpline system for anonymous disclosures by citizens140. There is 
no analytical data available on the use and effectiveness of this hotline in practice141. A new 
draft law on whistleblower protection is in preparation to transpose the relevant EU directive142. 
The  legislative  process  is  still  at  governmental  level  and  no  timeline  for  adoption  in 
available143.  Until  amendments  are  introduced  to  the  current  whistleblower  framework, 
whistleblowers’ protection is provided for in different legal provisions144. 

New  measures  aim  at  increasing  transparency  in  political  party  finance  rules,  while 
concerns have arisen regarding election campaigns. The law on the Political Parties was 
revised  by  criminal  code  amendments145  introducing  the  obligation  for  political  parties  to 

134  Cf. 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 19, when technical 

work towards a standardised system were already undertaken but then suspended. 

135  The resolution No. 207 of 19 December 2017 of the Council of Ministers – the Governmental Anti-Corruption 

Programme for years 2018-2020 (O.J. ‘M.P.’. of 2018 r. item. 12). 

136  Poland’s  new  anti-corruption  law  was  reportedly  accompanied  by  a  new  regulation  on  asset  declaration. 
Access to document requests by stakeholders regarding the regulation were declined, according to information 
received in the context of the country visit to Poland.  

137  Implementation of the Government Anti-corruption Programme for 2018-2020. 
138  GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round – Evaluation Report, recommendations x and xi, paragraphs 72 and 78.  
139  Ibid. Cf. 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 19, where it was 
reported  that,  at  least,  16  different  forms  are  in  use.  Provisions  on  asset  declarations  are  scattered  among 
several legislative acts.  

140  Input received from Poland for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in 

Poland, p. 24. No data was submitted regarding the effectiveness and use of the hotline.  

141  According  to  information  received  by  the  Government  for  the  2022  Rule  of  Law  report,  the  Central  Anti-
Corruption Bureau communicates its anti-corruption activities, including information on the effectiveness of 
all  reporting  channels  supported  by  the  Agency,  in  its  annual  report,  which  is  sent  to  the  Polish  supreme 
executive institutions and is publicly available. 

142  In October 2021 a governmental inter-service consultation was launched for the draft law. 
143  Draft Law on the protection of persons who report violations of the law. Poland has yet to transpose the EU 
Whistleblower Directive. The deadline for transposition by Member States lapsed on 17 December 2021. 
144  Poland reported that whistleblowers are subject to protection on the basis of general principles of labour law 
and provisions protecting employees-whistleblowers from retaliation, such as anti-discrimination provisions 
and  the  provisions  that  prohibit  mobbing  in  the  place  of  employment,  while  reviews  found  that  the 
effectiveness of the labour code provisions in practice is low and only covering part of the working population. 
See  UN Conference of the State  Parties to the  UN  Convention against Corruption (2015), Implementation 
Review  Group  –  Poland,  p.  5,  and  OECD  (2015),  Poland:  Follow  up  to  the  Phase  3  Report  and 
Recommendations (2015), pp. 5 and 29. 

145  Act amending the Criminal Code and certain other acts (14 October 2021). 

18 

 
                                                 
maintain up-to-date a register of donations146 and a register of contracts of political parties147. 
Overall, stakeholders assess the registers’ potential to increase transparency in political party 
finances as a step in the right direction148. Concerns have, however, been raised by the Personal 
Data Protection Office that the disclosure of the donors’ identity in the register of donations 
would allow the identification of the donors’ political affiliation149. Furthermore, the exclusion 
from the register of individual donations to the Electoral Fund have raised questions as to the 
new  rules’  impact  in  practice150,  as  the  Electoral  Fund  is  the  only  source  of  funds  used  to 
finance election campaigns. The revised law on the Political Parties entered into force on 1 July 
2022151. Furthermore, in September 2021, a court ruled that the prosecutor’s office is to resume 
the investigations into the so-called envelope elections of May 2020 that concern allegations 
of misuse of public funds152.  

‘Impunity clauses’ in public procurement rules, first introduced during the COVID-19 
pandemic,  continue  to  raise  concern  of  corruption  risks.  Several  temporary  exemptions 
from  criminal  and  disciplinary  responsibility  for  the  abuse  of  power  by  public  officials 
(‘impunity  clauses’)  who  manage  public  funds  or  purchase  equipment,  services,  and  other 
resources were introduced during the pandemic153. Following the failure to adopt extensions of 

146  New Article 25(6)-(13) of the Political Parties Act. The register of donations is in electronic form, searchable 
and made available in a public information bulletin operated by the political parties, including information 
only on those donations exceeding the amount of approximately EUR 2,500 (i.e. PLN 10,000) of a person in 
a  single  year,  excluding  membership  fees.  In  case  of  failure  of  compliance  with  the  new  obligation,  an 
administrative monetary sanction is applied (equal to 50% of the amount of payments made). 

147  New  Articles 27(a)-(c) of the Political Parties Act;  Article 4 of the  Law amending the  Criminal  Code and 
certain  other  acts  (14  October  2021). The  register  of  contracts  is  in  electronic  form  and  made  public.  The 
register includes information on the contract number, data and place of the contract signature, contract period, 
parties to the contract and their representatives, the subject, value and mode of the contract. In case of failure 
of compliance with the new obligation, the same administrative monetary sanctions apply as for the register 
of donations, see footnote above. 

148  The positive potential, particularly for the register of contracts, is seen for cases where access to document 
requests  would  not  lead  to  the  disclosure  of  public  information.  Information  received  from  the  Batory 
Foundation in the context of the country visit to Poland. See in this context also the related publication Batory 
Foundation (2017), ‘Finances of Polish parties’, p. 151. 

149  See letter of the President of the Personal Data Protection Office to the Chancellery of the Sejm  of 30 June 
2021. The register includes personal data, including the name and address of the donating individual, the date 
and the amount of the donation. 

150  While individual donations to parties have  rarely exceeded 10% of the annual revenue  of political parties, 
individual donations to the Electoral Fund have  played a  more important role in the  financing in the past, 
having accounted to approximately 40% of the Funds’ revenues in the years of 2011-2016, according to the 
Batory Foundation (2017), p. 146. 

151  Article 15 of the Law amending the Criminal Coe and certain other acts (14 October 2021). 
152  See the 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 26. This ruling 
of  29  September  2021  overturns  the  decision  of  the  District  Prosecutor’s  Office  in  Warsaw  not  to  initiate 
investigations  into  the  allegations  of  the  Prime  Minister  and  others  exceeding  their  powers  by  unlawfully 
ordering preparations for the presidential election and causing damage of great proportion and ballot rigging. 
See also the Supreme Audit Office (2021), Report, finding that the organisation and preparation of the elections 
had  no  sufficient  legal  basis.  The  Supreme  Audit  Chamber  sent  notification  to  the  prosecution  service 
regarding the suspicion of the commission of crimes in the organisation of the presidential elections involving 
individuals performing top executive functions. Several attempts to launch investigations were subsequently 
hindered, including also by the launch of disciplinary procedures against proactive prosecutors. The allegations 
concern the spending of public funds of approximately EUR 15 million (PLN 70 million). 

153  The Central Anti-Corruption Bureau is in charge of the anticorruption-related aspects of the Government Anti-
Crisis Shield providing financial support to micro, small and medium-size and large enterprises to combat the 
effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Exemptions from criminal responsibility were included, in particular: in 
Article 10(c) of the Law amending the Law of 31 March 2020 on Specific Measures to Prevent,  Counteract 
and Combat COVID-19 and Other Contagious Diseases and Associated Crisis Situations and Certain Other 

19 

 
                                                 
those temporary exemptions beyond the previously introduced limited scope of time, a case 
was  brought  before  the  Constitutional  Tribunal and  is  still  pending  to  examine  whether  the 
crime of abuse of power by public officials, as laid down in the Criminal Code, is constitutional 
in such circumstances154. A similar impunity clause was also proposed in the recent draft law 
on  aid  for  Ukrainian  refugees155,  excluding  criminal  liability  during  war  times,  which  was, 
however,  discarded  due  to  increased  public  and  media  attention156.  Such  exemptions  from 
criminal  responsibility  introduce  corruption  risks  and  may  foster  the  abuse  of  political  and 
administrative power due to the lack of deterrence and perception of impunity. 

III.  MEDIA FREEDOM AND MEDIA PLURALISM 

According to the Constitution, the public interest regarding radio broadcasting and television 
is safeguarded by the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT) whose members are appointed 
by  the  Sejm,  the  Senate  and  the  President  of  the  Republic.  Freedom  of  the  press  and  other 
means of social communication are constitutionally protected. The Law on Broadcasting and 
the Press Law provide, respectively, a legal framework for the media regulator - the KRRiT 
and  safeguards  for  journalistic  independence.  The  Law  on  Broadcasting  was  amended  to 
transpose the revised Audiovisual Media Services Directive157 and included further provisions 
relavant for the transaprency of media ownership158.  

Changes  in  the  legal  framework  contributed  to  the  strengthening  of  the  statutory 
safeguards for the independence of the media regulator. Legislation transposing the revised 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD) was adopted on 11 August 2021, through an 
amendment  of  the  Broadcasting  Act.  The  revision  included  provisions  pertinent  to  the 
independence of the media regulator, in particular by making the procedure for dismissing its 
members more rigid159. To this end, it introduced an obligation to require the President of the 
Republic to confirm the expiry of the KRRiT members’ term of office, following a negative 

Laws, adopted in March 2020 (in force for 180 days between 8 March 2020 and 4 September 2020); in Article 
76 of the Law on special support instruments in connection with the spread of SARS-COV-2 virus, adopted 
in April 2020; and in Article 10(d) of the Law amending the Law of 31 March 2020 on Specific Measures to 
Prevent, Counteract and Combat COVID-19 and Other Contagious Diseases and Associated Crisis Situations 
and Certain Other Laws, proposed in August 2020 (not adopted). 

154  The case was initiated by a group of members of Parliament regarding articles 231 and 296 of the Criminal 
Code, see for more information, the website of the Constitutional Tribunal. Should the provisions be found 
unconstitutional,  such  a  judgment  risks  to  have  far-reaching  consequences  for  anti-corruption  regulations, 
setting a significant precedent.  

155  Amendment to the law on assistance to Ukrainian citizens in connection with the armed conflict on the territory 
of the country (March 2022), entered into force on 26 March 2022 with retroactive effect from 24 February 
2022.  

156  Information received from Amnesty International, Forum Obywatelskiego Prawa i Społeczeństwa, Helsinki 
Foundation  for  Human  Rights,  Batory  Foundation,  Ombudsperson,  Bar  Association  in  the  context  of  the 
country visit to Poland. 

157  Complete  transposition  of  the  Audiovisual  Media  Services  Directive  was  notified  to  the  Commission  in 

November 2021. 

158  Poland ranks 66th in the 2022 Reporters without Borders World Press Freedom Index compared to 64th in the 

previous year. 

159  In accordance with the Law of 29 December 1992 on television and radio broadcasting, members of the KRRiT 
may be removed from office  by the respective appointing authority in case the member concerned resigns, 
suffers from an illness barring him or her from exercising the  office, is found guilty of a criminal offence 
prosecutable by a public indictment, submits a lustration declaration that has been found false by the court, is 
found by the Tribunal of State to have violated law.  

20 

 
 
                                                 
vote by the two Chambers of Parliament. Both the resolutions, as well as any confirmation by 
the President, need to be reasoned. Despite the legal safeguards being in  place, as noted by 
different stakeholders, challenges relate to close political ties of some members of the KRRiT 
to the governing party, which may undermine its independence160. This is also reflected by the 
2022 Media Pluralism Monitor, which states that the existing appointment procedures do not 
ensure effective limitation of political influence161. Also, the list of responsibilities of the media 
regulator has been widened to align it with the revised AVMSD, for instance when it comes to 
actions related to video sharing platforms. 

Recent  developments  concerning  operating  licensing  show  existing  risks  to  media 
pluralism. As noted in last year’s Rule of Law Report162, there are concerns related to reducing 
media  pluralism  through  modification  of  requirements  for  obtaining  a  licence.  Proposed 
legislative amendments163, allowing not to grant broadcasting concessions to operators directly 
or indirectly controlled by persons registered outside the EEA, were subject to a Presidential 
veto and, therefore, did not become part of the Polish legal order. Concerns were also raised 
regarding  the  lack  of  transparency  of  the  legislative  process  of  these  amendments164. 
Controversies around the extension of the broadcasting licences for both TVN24 and TVN7 
channels165 show risks in relation to the operation of independent media actors166. In the case 
of TVN24, KRRiT decided to extend its licence but only after 18 months and the TVN7 licence 
was extended after more than 12 months from the extension request being made. While both 
licences were ultimately extended for the period of 10 years, the administrative proceedings by 
the KRRiT were considered as particularly long, although the Broadcasting Law provides for 
a simplified examination procedure in the case of a request for license renewal167. Moreover, 
when extending the TVN24 license, KRRiT issued a resolution mirroring the rationale of the 
above-mentioned problematic legislative proposal168.  

Further obligations concerning media ownership transparency have been adopted. The 
2022  Media  Pluralism  Monitor  reports  medium  risk  in  relation  to  the  media  ownership 
transparency, noting that the public has less readily-available access to the relevant ownership 
or  financial  data  than  authorities.  The  2021  amendment  of  the  Broadcasting  Law,  which 
transposes the revised AVMSD, expanded the scope of the transparency obligations for media 
service providers169. The new rules include an obligation to provide information on beneficial 

160  Contribution from Liberties for the 2022 Rule of Law Report; Contribution from the European Federation of 
Journalists for the 2022 Rule of Law Report; Contribution from Civicus for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

161  2022 Media Pluralism Monitor, country report on Poland, p. 12. 
162  2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p 21. 
163  Draft law amending the law on the radio and television broadcasting, submitted to the Sejm on 7 July 2021. 
164  Contribution from Liberties for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 
165  Owned by TVN group, which is owned by U.S. company Discovery.  
166  Under the Broadcasting Law, the applicant has to submit a request no later than 12 months before expiry of 
the current licence. The Law does not specify a time limit for the media regulator to decide. One could expect 
the national media regulator to issue its decision regarding a new broadcasting licence before the expiry of the 
current license. There are also alternative interpretations concerning the procedures and deadlines envisaged 
for the  renewal of a broadcasting licence. See  International Press Institute of 4 March 2022,  How ‘licence 
wars’ curb Poland’s free media (Gazeta Wyborcza)’. 

167  Contribution from Liberties for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. See also Gazeta Prawna (2021), ‘Can we really 

afford further pricey violations of the law?’. 

168  Business  Insider  (2022),  ‘Polish  TVN24  licence  extended.  The  National  Broadcasting  Council  adopted  a 

resolution whose aim is the same as that of the lex TVN’.  

169  Written contribution from KRRiT received in the context of the country visit to Poland. 

21 

 
 
                                                 
owners and include it in the National Judicial Register and the Central Register of Beneficial 
Owners170.  

There are concerns regarding the independence of Polish public service media. Following 
the 2016 reform171, the competences related to public service media are distributed between 
the National Media Council (RMN)172 and National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT). Under the 
current  legal  framework,  the  RMN  is  competent  for  the  appointment  and  removal  of  the 
management and supervisory boards of the Polish Television (TVP), the Polish Radio and the 
Polish Press Agency173. The 2022 Media Pluralism Monitor reports high risks in relation to 
independence of public service media governance and funding, referring to the support of the 
public service media management towards growing political partisanship as well as points the 
issues  related  to  the  justification  and  opaqueness  of  the  public  service  media  funding. 
Concerning the media regulator, KRRiT has powers related to the charters of duties of public 
service media and their yearly programming as well as financial plans, and to the assessment 
of yearly reports regarding performance of their public service remit. However, as reported by 
stakeholders and the Media Pluralism Monitor, KRRiT appears to be unwilling to react against 
imbalanced reporting on public services media,  which stands out  in  comparison  to  cases of 
harsh reactions towards reporting disseminated by independent private media174. As pointed 
out by a stakeholder, the existing division of competences between KRRiT and RMN limits 
KRRiT’s capacity to carry out its constitutional mission of safeguarding the freedom of speech 
and  the  right  to  information  and  public  interest  in  radio  and  television  broadcasting175.  No 
legislative developments concerning the distribution of state advertisements were reported in 
2021, however as confirmed by the 2022 Media Pluralism report challenges persist over its fair 
and  transparent  distribution176.  These  concern,  in  particular,  channeling  state  advertising  to 
government-sympathetic media outlets177.  

Introduction  of  the  state  of  emergency  negatively  affected  the  right  of  access  to 
information, in particular by humanitarian organisations and journalists. Following the 
introduction on 2 September 2021 of a state of emergency in the area adjacent to the Polish-
Belarussian border, the area was excluded from any media scrutiny, and no provision was made 
for a system of accreditation allowing access for journalists. There were reports of journalists 
being apprehended178, and in several instances journalists were informed by the police that they 

170  Ibidem.  The  Register 

is  available  online  and  can  be  consulted  under 

the  following  address: 

https://www.gov.pl/web/mswia/dzialalnosc-lobbingowa.  

171  Sejm’s official communique of 7 July 2016. 
172  According to the law, the Council consists of five members, three of them appointed by the Sejm and two by 
the  President  of  the  Republic  for  term  of  six  years.  The  President  appoints  members  of  the  Council  from 
candidates nominated by the largest parliamentary opposition groups. 

173  In December 2016, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal considered the exclusion of KRRiT from the process of 
appointment  of  the  public  media’s  management  as  unconstitutional.  See  Judgment  of  the  Constitutional 
Tribunal of 13 December 2016 in case K 13/16. 

174  2022 Media Pluralism Monitor, country report on Poland, p.8; Contribution from Liberties for the 2022 Rule 
of Law Report; Contribution from the European Federation of Journalists for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 
80.  

175  See report of the Batory Foundation (2021), The politicisation of the National Polish Broadcasting Council. 
176  2021  Rule  of  Law  Report,  Country  Chapter  on  the  rule  of  law  situation  in  Poland;  2022  Media  Pluralism 
Monitor, country report for Poland, p. 17 and Contribution from Liberties for the 2022 Rule of Law Report 
2022. 

177  2022 Media Pluralism Monitor, country report on Poland, p. 17. 
178  Media and NGOs also reported on other instances of ‘brutal’ apprehension of journalists in the area that were 
videotaped.  See  in  particular  Onet.pl  of  21  November  2021,  ‘Recordings  of  the  journalists’  apprehension. 
<You will fu**ing not feel like snapping photos>’containing a video recording, and a statement of the Helsinki 

22 

 
                                                 
would face criminal charges for reporting from the emergency zone179, and some were fined 
for their activities180. The Supreme Court acquitted journalists found in breach of these rules, 
considering  the  prohibition  introduced  by  the  Government  as  disproportionate  and 
unconstitutional181.  Another  law  concerning  the  situation  at  the  Belarussian  border182, 
empowered the border guard to grant the access to the zone to selected media, whilst retaining 
full control over the movement of journalists in that zone183. Overall, these restrictions were 
considered to be a risk to press freedom by the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council 
of  Europe,  the  Ombudsperson184  as  well  as  by  the  representatives  of  media  and  journalists 
associations who issued an open statement to that end185.  

The  professional  environment  for  journalists  continues  to  deteriorate186.  The  Law  on 
Broadcasting and the Press Law187 provides for safeguards of journalistic independence. Self-
regulatory mechanisms are not developed within the journalistic community, which, as noted 
by stakeholders, does not improve the working environment for journalists188. While journalists 
remain  exposed  to  cases  of  physical  and  verbal  abuse,  including  when  covering  public 
protests189,  the  2022  World  Press  Freedom  Index  reports  that  the  level  of  violence  has 
decreased.  However,  it  considers  that  the  protection  of  journalists  and  their  rights  during 
protests  remains  insufficient190.  The  news  media  community  continues191  to  be  exposed  to 
threats stemming from strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs)192. Since July 
2021, 24 alerts have been published on the Mapping Media Freedom platform and 14 of them 

Foundation of Human Rights (2021), ‘Brutal detention of journalists by soldiers near Michałow. The HFHR 
writes to the Minister of National Defence.  

179  Specifically, for staying in the prohibited area and for allegedly filming the border infrastructure, European 
Federation  of  Journalists,  contribution  to  the  Rule  of  Law  Report,  2022, p.  83.  Reporters  without  Borders 
(2021), ‘Polish soldiers cannot treat journalists as if it were a military dictatorship’, See also Part IV below. 
180  On 27 September 2021, journalists were caught while following a Border Guard bus transporting migrants 
towards the border, presumably in order to bring the group back to the territory of Belarus; as reported i.a. by 
the European Federation of Journalists; See contribution from the European Federation of Journalists for the 
2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 83. 

181 Judgment of 18 January 2022 in the case I KK 171/21 (see also part IV below). The Supreme Court considered 
as too broad the measures detailed in a governmental decree, based on the ordinance of the President of the 
Republic on the state of emergency. 

182  Law of 14 October 2021 on Erecting Protective Measures on the State Border.  
183  Press release of the Border Control Guard of 1 December 2021. There are no clear criteria governing the final 

decision taken in that respect. 

184  Contribution from the Commissioner for Human Rights for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p.10; Open letter of 
the Ombudsperson of 6 September 2021 addressed to the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister; 
Reporters without Borders.  

185  Association  of  journalists  issued  an  open  statement  raising  concerns  on  this  issue;  see  e.g.  Tygodnik 

Powszechny of 14 September 2021, where the statement is reproduced. 

186  See the 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland pp. 23-24. 
187  In particular, Article 10(2) of the Press Law of 26 January 1984 stipulates that  ‘a journalist has the right to 
reject  an  instruction  from  his  or  her  superior  if  he  or  she  is  expected  to publish  a  text  that  contradicts  the 
principles of fairness, objectivity and professional accuracy’. 

188 2022  Media Pluralism Monitor, country report on Poland, p.17, and contribution from the European Federation 

of Journalists for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 84.  

189  Commissioner for Human Rights, Contribution from the Commissioner for Human Rights for the 2022 Rule 

of Law Report 2022, p 9; Contribution from Liberties for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 17. 

190  Reporters without Borders, Poland. 
191  See the 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 24. 
192  For instance, Gazeta Wyborcza’s journalists were targeted by 63 lawsuits issued by a person with close ties to 
the ruling party. Similarly, according to Onet.pl data, media outlets run by Ringier Axel Springer were sued 
79 times and were faced with 17 criminal cases launched by people or institutions with close ties to the ruling 
party since 2015. See contribution from Liberties for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

23 

 
                                                 
concerned legal incidents related to journalists. In this period, the Council of Europe’s Platform 
to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists published 17 alerts, 14 of them 
related to legal incidents and five to harassment and psychological abuse193. The 2022 Media 
Pluralism  Monitor  assesses  the  risks  related  to  the  journalistic  profession,  standards  and 
protection at medium level194. In addition, a recent legislative draft of the Ministry of Justice 
risks affecting the freedom of speech on the Internet, giving rise to editors’ concerns195. The 
law would inter alia establish a public authority which would act as an appeal body for content 
moderation decisions taken by online platforms196.  

IV.  OTHER INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO CHECKS AND BALANCES 

Poland is a representative democratic republic with a directly elected President, a bicameral 
Parliament (Sejm and Senate) and a Constitutional Tribunal in charge of constitutional review 
of laws. The Sejm has the final decision-making power when adopting laws. The President of 
the Republic, the Senate, a group of 15 deputies, the Council of Ministers and a group of at 
least  100  000  citizens  have  the  right  to  propose  new  legislation.  The  independent 
Ombudsperson  is  tasked  with  safeguarding  the  freedoms  and  rights  of  persons  and  citizens 
specified in the Constitution and other normative acts. The Supreme Audit Office is the chief 
organ  of  state  audit,  subordinate  to  the  Sejm,  acting  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of 
collegiality. 

Significant  reforms  continue  to  be  frequently  adopted  through  the  by-passing  of 
procedures  that  require  adequate  consultations.  Practice  shows  that  the  governmental 
legislative track, which  entails  the obligation of  public consultations, is often not  used, and 
laws are regularly tabled by groups of Members of Parliament197. Such an approach results in 
a  high  share  of  laws  not  being  subject  to  adequate  public  consultation198.  This  practice 
practically prevents stakeholders from submitting their opinions on the draft legislation, and 
often postpone taking a position until the law has been transmitted to the Senate199. Together, 
this increasingly affects the quality of the legislation. This issue was raised in the context of 

193  Link  and  data  will  be  updated  Mapping  Media  Freedom  -  European  Centre  for  Press  and  Media  Freedom 

(ecpmf.eu). 

194  2022 Media Pluralism Monitor, country report on Poland, p. 11. 
195  See an open statement of 12 human rights and business organisations calling on withholding works on the law 
governing the freedom of speech in social media. Prawo.pl of 24 January 2022,  Organisations don’t want a 
“free speech on the internet” law, reproducing statements of business representatives and NGOs on the above 
issue. 

196  E.g.  the  law  would  also  make  it  possible  to  force  online  platforms  to  remove,  at  the  request  of  the  State 
authorities,  specific  content  or  block  activities  of  social  media  users.  In  addition,  the  Public  Prosecution 
Service would be able to block the content that infringes the law in force. Concerns have been raised that the 
draft law, could introduce a form of censorship of the internet as well as with regards to its compatibility with 
the EU framework. See the press release of 7 January 2022 of the Ministry of Justice. The draft law is still 
subject to governmental approval (cf. draft law UD293). See also Rzeczpospolita of 24 January 2022; Prawo.pl 
of 24 January 2022, reproducing statements of business representatives and NGOs on the above issue.  

197  In 2021, 22% of the laws were passed using the MP-based legislative track, and 56% of the laws using the 
Government-based  track  were  not  consulted.  Cf.  Grant  Thornton,  ‘Law  barometer.  Analysis  of  the  legal 
environment’s  stability  in  the  Polish  economy’  2022  Edition  (the  report  analyses  the  stability  of  the  legal 
environment in the Polish economy). 

198  Grant Thornton, 2022 Edition. A prominent example is the recent tax reform where, as of February 2022, in 
the case of eight out of nine laws constituting the reform there is no evidence of public consultations. See: a 
statement of 12 October 2021 of Pracodawcy RP. 

199  This was confirmed by representatives of the Ombudsperson’s Office in the context of the virtual country visit 

to Poland, held on 14-16 March 2022. ENHRI contribution to the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 408.  

24 

 
                                                 
the 2019 and 2020 Country Specific Recommendations under the European Semester200. As 
part of its RRP, Poland made a commitment to adopt an amendment to the Rules of Procedure 
of the Sejm, the Senate and the Council of Ministers, which shall introduce a mandatory impact 
assessment and public consultation for draft laws proposed by deputies and senators and limit 
the use of fast-track procedures to well-specified and exceptional cases, with a view to a better 
and more stable regulatory framework. In this context, it is noted that the perceived level of 
effectiveness of investment protection by the law and courts is very low among companies201.  

On 1 January 2022, Poland had 38 leading judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights pending implementation202. At that time, Poland’s rate of leading judgments from 
the past 10 years that remained pending was at 48% and the average time that the judgments 
had been pending implementation was 5 years and 10 months203. The oldest leading judgment, 
pending  implementation  for  17  years,  concerns  the  excessive  length  of  proceedings  before 
administrative bodies and courts and absence of an effective remedy204. On 1 July 2022, the 
number of leading judgments pending implementation increased to 45205.  

The new Ombudsperson continues to play a key role as a  rule of law safeguard, while 
constrained by limited resources. On 8 and 21 July 2021 respectively, the Sejm appointed 
and the Senate approved the appointment of a new Ombudsperson with bi-partisan support206. 
As in previous years since 2016, the public authorities have not increased the budget allocated 
to the Ombudsperson’s office for the  year 2022, thereby limiting its capacity to exercise its 
role207, even though the Office is intensely involved in the humanitarian situation at the Polish-
Belarussian border and provides assistance to refugees from Ukraine208. The Ombudsperson’s 
cooperation with state authorities remains difficult, including due to the authorities’ refusal to 
react  to  the  Ombudsperson’s  statements  or  to  take  into  account  his  comments  and 
recommendations  as  regards  legislative  drafts209.  The  Ombudsperson  retains  ‘A’  status, 

200  This was confirmed by representatives of the Ombudsperson’s Office in the context of the virtual country visit 

to Poland. See also the ENHRI contribution to the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 408.  

201  Only 24% of companies are very or fairly confident in the effectiveness of investment protection in Poland, 
whereas 65% of companies are either fairly unconfident or very unconfident. The main reasons invoked by 
companies  in  that  respect  are  frequent  changes  in  legislation  or  concerns  about  quality  of  the  law-making 
process  as  well  as  unpredictable,  non-transparent  administrative  conduct  and  difficulty  to  challenge 
administrative decisions in courts; concerns about quality, efficiency or independence of justice also play a 
role in that respect, see figures 54 and 55, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard. 

202  The adoption of necessary execution  measures  for a  judgment by the European  Court of Human  Rights is 
supervised by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. It is the Committee’s practice to group 
cases against a State requiring similar execution measures, particularly general measures, and examine them 
jointly. The first case in the group is designated as the leading case as regards the supervision of the general 
measures and repetitive cases within the group can be closed when it is assessed that all possible individual 
measures needed to provide redress to the applicant have been taken. 

203  All figures are calculated by the European Implementation Network and are based on the number of cases that 
are considered pending at the annual cut-off date of 1 January 2022. See the Contribution from the European 
Implementation Network for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 61-62.  

204  Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 1 February 2005, Beller v. Poland, 51837/99. 
205 Data according to the online database of the Council of Europe (HUDOC). 
206  Press release of the Ombudsperson’s Office of 23 July 2021. 
207  Statement of the Ombudsperson’s Office submitted and included in the  contribution from ENNHRI for the 

2022 Rule of Law Report.  

208  Information  presented  in  the  context  of  the  virtual  country  visit  to  Poland  by  the  representatives  of  the 
Ombudsperson’s office. See also contribution from ENNHRI for the 2022 Rule of Law Report pp. 407-408. 

209  See contribution from ENNHRI for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

25 

 
                                                 
awarded in November 2017 by the UN Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions 
(GANHRI)210. 

Despite  allegations  related  to  the  use  of  Pegasus  and  equivalent  spyware  surveillance 
software, no investigation was launched by the prosecution service. On 21 December 2021, 
media  reported211  that  a  barrister  had  been  targeted  by  Pegasus  software212.  Using  such 
software  against  barristers  may  compromise  the  lawyer’s  secrecy.  Prosecution  services 
declined  to  conduct  an  investigation  into  these  matters213.  Stakeholders  expressed  serious 
concerns  in  that  respect,  pointing  at  the  likelihood  that  more  lawyers  were  targeted  in  this 
specific way214. Amongst the alleged targets there was reportedly also a prosecutor and two 
members  of  opposition  parties  and  a  business  representative215.  Reportedly,  the  Pegasus 
surveillance software216 was purchased for the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, which raises 
further  concerns  regarding  the  use  of  corruption  investigations  for  political  purposes.  The 
Minister of National Security and Defence Matters confirmed that the Pegasus software had 
been  acquired217.  Representatives  of  the  governing  coalition  submitted  that  no  surveillance 
method can be imposed without prior consent of the court218. The Ombudsperson submitted 
that  judicial  control  in  that  respect  is  insufficient  and  courts  do  not  know  what  type  of 

210  Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI), Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA), 

Accreditation Report of 27 April 2022.  

211  The initial statement on this development was published by the Associated Press (2021), AP Exclusive: Polish 

opposition due hacked with NSO spyware.  

212  The barrister concerned specialises in representing interests of politicians, including of a former President of 
the European Council, before Polish courts. See also the 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the 
rule of law situation in Poland, p. 12, footnote 90.  

213  On 29 December 2021, the public prosecutor’s office informed the prosecutor reportedly affected by Pegasus 
attacks  that  her  allegations  are  based  on  the  information  received  from  her  phone’s  manufacturer.  The 
prosecutor declined the request to submit her phone device for further examination by the prosecution services. 
See RadioZet of 29 December 2021 where a statement of the prosecutor concerned is reproduced together 
with press statement of the public prosecutor’s office. 

214  Including by pointing at the likelihood that more lawyers were targeted in this specific way. See Statement of 
1 February 2022 of the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe. See also the Council of Bars and Law 
Societies of Europe contribution submitted in the context of the Rule of Law Report preparation. 

215 The prosecutor concerned is a member of the association of prosecutors ‘Lex Super Omnia’ who initiated a 
criminal investigation in the case concerning the organization of the presidential elections in 2020 via post 
(see the 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 26, footnote 217). 
As  confirmed  in  the  Senate,  one  of  the  members  of  the  opposition  concerned,  at  the  time  of  the  alleged 
Pegasus-based surveillance, was the main person responsible for the parliamentary electoral campaign in 2019. 
The business representative allegedly targeted was the President of the association ‘Employers of the Republic 
of Poland’; see Onet.pl of 19 April 2022, Citizen Lab: another Pegasus victim in Poland. 

216  Amnesty International (2022), Poland: Use of Pegasus spyware to hack politicians highlights threat to civil 
society;  Amnesty  International  (2021),  Pegasus  Project:  massive  data  leak  reveals  Israeli  NSO  group’s 
spyware used to target activists, journalists, and political leaders globally. 

217  Wpolityce.pl of 7 January 2022, containing an interview in which the admission was made. On 14 January 
2022, the Supreme Audit Office disclosed to the media two invoices which were assigned to the Central Anti-
Corruption Bureau from the ‘Justice Fund’ – operated by the Ministry of Justice – to acquire ‘means of special 
technique’. On 7 February 2022, the Supreme Audit Office organized a press conference where it informed 
the public that over 7000 ‘possibly dangerous’ attacks had been conducted on electronic devices in possession 
of the Office’s staff, including the President of the Supreme Audit Office. The Office has not confirmed that 
any of these alleged attacks had been carried out by means of the Pegasus software. According to the Office, 
financial means from the ‘Justice Fund’ could not be used for any such purchase in accordance with law. See 
minutes of the Senate’s special Committee session of 18 January 2022. 

218  It is also noted that under the Polish law, surveillance techniques can be used against persons suspected of 
committing a criminal offence. However, the prosecutor allegedly targeted by the Pegasus software was not a 
suspect or subject to any criminal proceedings in the period concerned.  

26 

 
                                                 
surveillance  would  eventually  be  imposed  by  the  state  bodies219.  The  Senate  set  up  an 
extraordinary committee to conduct an inquiry into these developments220.  

Government action on the Polish-Belarussian border under a state of emergency sparked 
concerns of stakeholders as to constitutionality and restriction of fundamental rights and 
freedoms.  On  31  August  2021,  in  view  of  the  crisis  at  the  Polish-Belarussian  border,  the 
Government requested the President of the Republic to introduce a state of emergency on the 
territory  of  two  Polish  regions  adjacent  to  the  Belarussian  border,  limiting  a  number  of 
constitutional rights and freedoms221 (until 1 December 2021). Without questioning as such the 
state  of  emergency,  the  Ombudsperson  raised  concerns  related  to  the  disproportionate 
limitation  of  constitutional  freedoms  in  that  respect.  Meanwhile,  as  the  state  of  emergency 
could  not  be  constitutionally  prolonged  past  1  December  2021,  the  Sejm  adopted  on  17 
November 2021 a law empowering the Minister of Interior to impose a prohibition incumbent 
on  any  person  to  stay  or  move  within  the  border-adjacent  area222.  According  to  the 
Ombudsperson, another law concerning the situation at the Belarussian border raises severe 
constitutionality  concerns  notably  related  to  the  suspension  of  constitutional  rights  and 
freedoms223224.  

The Supreme Audit Office continues its operation under adverse conditions. As of 2021, 
the  Marshal  of  the  Sejm  has  been  refusing  to  appoint  Members  of  the  SAO  College,  thus 
hampering  the  effective  functioning  of  the  Office225.  The  Prosecutor-General  has  made  a 
request  to  deprive  the  President  of  the  SAO  of  his  immunity,  which  is  currently  under 
examination  of  the  Sejm226.  Representatives  of  the  SAO  raised  concerns  about  the  lack  of 
effective  follow-up  by  the  prosecution  services  to  its  requests  made  in  the  aftermath  of 

219  Press communique of the Ombudsman’s Office of 12 January 2022. The Ombudsperson considers that the use 
of any system of total invigilation, such as the one offered by the Pegasus software, would be incompatible 
with Polish law.  

220  This committee has no inquisitorial competences.  A motion to convene an inquisitorial committee remains 
pending before the Sejm. As regards the Senate, see the press release of 17 January 2022. As regards the Sejm, 
reference is made to draft motions lodged with the Sejm on, respectively, 11 January 2022 and  10 February 
2022.  

221  According to the Polish constitution, a state of emergency may be introduced for a definite period no longer 
than 90 days and be extended once only for a period no longer than 60 days; press release of the government 
of 31 August 2021. According to the ordinance of the President of the Republic, the state of emergency entailed 
i.a. the suspension of the right to organise and hold assemblies and cultural events, the prohibition of staying 
in designated places, objects and areas, and the limitation of the access to public information as regards actions 
conducted in the area covered by the state of emergency; press release of the President of the Republic of 1 
October 2021. 

222  Law of 17 November 2021 amending the Law on the Protection of  the State Border and certain other laws. 
The set of prohibitions introduced was lifted as of 1 July 2022. According to the  Polish government, these 
measures were introduced in order to ensure security or public order. 

223  Law  of  14  October  2021  on  Erecting  Protective  Measures  on  the  State  Border.  Press  release  of  the 

Ombudsperson of 21 October 2021.  

224  Press release of the Border Control Guard of 1 December 2021. There are no clear criteria governing the final 

decision taken in that respect.  

225  See  the  call  of  the  President  of  the  SAO  addressed  to  the  Marshal  of  the  Sejm,  reiterating  the  request  for 
appointment of a number of new SAO College members, dated 3 August 2021. See also the minutes of the 
sitting of the Sejm’s Committee for the State Audit of 8 March 2022 where the situation was discussed. For 
additional background, see also Tok.Fm of 23 September 2021. It is noted that in June 2022, the SAO College 
consisted of 9 members while 19 posts exist according to the law.  

226  Press  release  of  the  National  Prosecutor’s  Office  of  23  July  2021.  The  request  has  been  made  due  to  i.a. 
allegedly incorrect information provided in asset declarations by the President of the Supreme Audit Office. 

27 

 
                                                 
audits227. Furthermore, the chief office-holders in Poland refuse to cooperate with the SAO in 
the context of audit reports228. Since 2021, the Supreme Audit Office (‘SAO’) has produced a 
number  of  audit  reports  raising  concerns  regarding  possible  instances  of  public  funds’ 
embezzlement and mismanagement by public authorities, notably by the Ministry of Justice229 
and bodies responsible for implementing the state budget230. While the SAO raised concerns 
about developments adversely affecting its own independence at the forum of the European 
Organisation  of  Supreme  Audit  Institutions231,  no  steps  have  so  far  been  taken  by  the  state 
authorities to rectify the situation.  

Civil society plays a crucial role in providing help to refugees from Ukraine, following the 
Russian  war  of  aggression  against  Ukraine.  NGOs  have  been  very  active  in  providing 
psychological and medical support, interpretation services, and in supplying food and clothes 
to over three million refugees. In addition, the self-government of legal professions has been 
active  in  providing  refugees  with  legal  assistance  free  of  charge232.  The  Government  has 
facilitated the process  of financial donations to  selected NGOs in  this context  and assigned 
about EUR 10 million to the NGOs assisting with the situation on the ground233. A group of 40 
NGOs signed an open statement to the European Commission and the Council voicing concerns 
as regards the Polish Government’s initiatives to disburse additional EU funds aimed at helping 
the refugee crisis and the fact that funds do not reach local authorities and civil society234.  

The civic space has further deteriorated. Poland continues to have a broad and vibrant civil 
society,  consisting  of  more  than  120  000  different  NGOs.  However,  in  view  of  the  lack  of 
action to  address  a  continued deterioration in  civic freedoms, assessments now characterise 

227  Information presented by the Supreme Audit Office during the country visit to Poland held in the context of 
the 2022 Rule of Law Report preparation. See also the Audit report No. P/20/037 of 30 September 2021. 
228  The Marshal of the Sejm refused to appear before the SAO twice. See the statement of the Marshal of the Sejm 

of 16 February 2022. 

229  Audit  report  No.  P/20/037  of  30  September  2021  on  the  ‘Implementation  of  the  tasks  of  the  Victims’ 
Assistance and Post-penitentiary Assistance Fund – Justice Fund’. The report states that only 38% of resources 
under the Fund were used in a manner that is consistent with the Fund’s statutory aims, i.e. to provide help to 
victims of crimes. The remainder of resources allocated to the Fund was used to finance other activities giving 
rise to concerns of the SAO. Overall, subject to a possible embezzlement were PLN 280 million (ca. EUR 63 
million). According to the SAO, in spite of a request to follow up on the audit’s findings and the expiry of the 
statutory  deadlines,  neither  the  Prime  Minister  nor  the  Deputy  Prime  Minister  reacted  to  the  request  to 
undertake action. The Head of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau stated that it is not competent to act. A 
possible embezzlement related to the Justice Fund – under the sole remit of the Minister of Justice – would 
need to be followed up by the prosecution services, headed by the Minister of Justice in his capacity of the 
Prosecutor-General.  

230  The 2020 State Budget Discharge Report presented on 22 July 2021 before the Sejm. According to the SAO, 
this was the first time in the history of Poland that it was not possible to give a positive assessment of the 
budget’s implementation. Notably, according to the SAO findings, instances of absconding of large financial 
operations  outside  the  legal  framework  of  the  Budget  Law  were  detected.  These  operations  resulted  in  a 
significant financial imbalance of the State in 2020 and an increase of almost EUR 100 billion in public debt. 
Calculated according to the same methodology, the previous increase of the public debt by a similar value had 
taken almost 10 years. 

231 TVN 24 of 18 May 2021 presenting a letter of the SAO President. SAO press release of 8 June 2021 concerning 

a discussion held among Heads of European Supreme Audit Institutions. 

232  The National Bar Council and the National Council of Legal Councillors contributed to an internet platform 
containing relevant information related to the situation of refugees from Ukraine. See the press release of the 
National Bar Council of 14 April 2022.  

233  Press release of the Government of 28 February 2022, of 11 March 2022, and of 8 April 2022.  
234  Tok.fm of 14 March 2022, where the letter in question is reproduced.  

28 

 
                                                 
Poland’s civic space as  ‘obstructed’235.  LGBTIQ people and relevant  NGOs continue being 
targeted by draft legislative initiatives236. Furthermore, no measures have been undertaken to 
address the concerns raised by NGOs as regards their access to public funding237. A number of 
the  so-called  ‘LGBTIQ-ideology  free’  zones  have  been  annulled  by  courts238,  while  three 
regional and several local governments decided to repeal these declarations on their own239. 
On  30  March  2022,  a  draft  law  was  proposed240  aiming  at  ensuring  ‘transparency  of  non-
governmental organisations’241, giving rise to concerns of stakeholders; the draft law would 
create  a  national  registry  of  NGOs  “financed  from  abroad”  (with  an  exception  for  NGOs 
receiving  EU  funds),  which  would  also  in  specific  circumstances  be  under  an  obligation  to 
disclose the list of donors and indicate the origin of their funding on promotional materials242. 
Stakeholders have also expressed concerns on a draft law amending the regime governing the 
offence  of  religious  beliefs243.  Moreover,  a  law  was  introduced  to  the  Sejm  seeking  to 
substantially  increase  the  control  over  schools’  functioning  by  central  government’s 
representatives who would be in position to notably decide on admitting or refusing access of 
individual NGOs to extracurricular activities of schools244. 

235  CIVICUS update of 8 February 2022. Rating given by CIVICUS. Ratings are on a five-category scale defined 
as:  open,  narrowed,  obstructed,  repressed  and  closed.  In  2020  and  2021,  civic  space  was  considered  as 
‘narrowed’.  

236  E.g. draft law submitted on 9 August 2021 as citizens’ legislative initiative amending the Law on Assemblies 
and  certain  other  laws  (pending),  seeking  to  outlaw  the  promotion  of  civil  partnerships  and  same-sex 
marriages. On 13 January 2022, the Sejm adopted a Law amending the Law on Passport Documents which 
makes it substantially difficult or even blocks the possibility to receive a Polish passport by children born into 
same-sex  couples.  See  Contribution  from  ILGA  Europe  and  International  Planned  Parenthood  Federation 
European Network’s for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. Also, Poland has been ranked last in the EU as regards 
the treatment of LGBTIQ groups, see Kampania Przeciw Homofobii, statement of 12 May 2022, referring to 
ILGA-Europe 2022 Rainbow Europe Map (https://www.rainbow-europe.org/). 

237  Concerns refer to the functioning of the National Institute of Freedom – Centre for Civil Society Development 
responsible for the distribution of government funding, as well as nationally attributed EU funding, to NGOs. 
See the 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 27. 

238  Press release of the Ombudsperson’s office of 29 March 2022 and further references contained therein. 
239  Press release of the Ombudsperson’s office of 10 January 2022. 
240  A similar initiative was tabled on 7 August 2020.  
241  Submission No. EW-020-860/22 (not yet registered formally in the legislative procedure) of 30 March 2022. 
242  See statements of representatives of Helsinki Foundation of Human Rights, Batory Foundation, Klan/Jawor, 

Watchdog Polska in Prawo.pl of 1 April 2022.  

243  Statement of Instytut Spraw Społecznych of 12 April 2022. The draft tabled on 14 April 2022 would exacerbate 
possibilities to impose sanctions for the offence of religious beliefs and broaden the protection of professing 
such beliefs publically. It would i.a. extend the scope of criminal liability to any act of ‘publically offending 
the Church or other religious association’ and of ‘interfering with the public performance of a religious act’ 
(where, under the current regime, such acts must be made ‘maliciously’). See Polish Press Agency (2022), 
Solidarity Poland proposes to tighten the rules on offending religious feelings. The Ombudsperson considers 
that  criminal  provisions  on  the  offence  of  religious  beliefs  should  be  abolished;  cf.  press  release  of  the 
Ombudsperson of 15 April 2021. 

244  The law of 13 January 2022 amending the Law on Education and certain other laws. This law was vetoed by 
the President of the Republic on 2 March 2022. On 3 June 2022, the Minister of Education stated that the same 
law was proposed anew and is now consulted with the Chancellery of the President of the Republic in view of 
its entry into force by September 2022. See press release of the President of the Republic of 2 March 2022 and 
the  statement  of  the  Minister  of  Education  (in  Edukacja.dziennik.pl  of  3  June  2022).  One  of  such 
representatives  already  used  the  so-called  ‘black  list’  of  NGOs  to  block  their  access  to  schools.  The  list, 
including prominent NGOs functioning also on global scale, was created with the intention to identify entities 
that spread ‘harmful content’ and views allegedly inconsistent  with the school curricula. See WP.pl, of 24 
January 2022; Głos Nauczycielski of 8 February 2022. 

29 

 
                                                 
Annex I: List of sources in alphabetical order* 

* The list of contributions received in the context of the consultation for the 2022 Rule of Law report 
can  be  found  at  https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/2022-rule-law-report-targeted-stakeholder-
consultation_en.  

Amnesty International (2021) Pegasus Project: Massive data leak reveals Israeli NSO Group’s spyware 
used 
globally 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/07/the-pegasus-project/.  

journalists, 

activists, 

political 

leaders 

target 

and 

to 

Amnesty International (2022), Poland: Use of Pegasus spyware to hack politicians highlights threat to 
civil 
society  https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/01/poland-use-of-pegasus-spyware-to-
hack-politicians-highlights-threat-to-civil-
society/#:~:text=Confirming%20that%20Amnesty%20International%20has%20independently%20co
nfirmed%20that,said%3A%20%E2%80%9CThese%20findings%20are%20shocking%20but%20not
%20surprising. 

Amnesty  International,  Forum  Obywatelskiego  Prawa  i  Spolłeczeństwa,  Helsinki  Foundation  for 
Human Rights, Batory Foundation, Ombudsperson, Bar Association (2022), Contribution for the 2022 
Rule of Law Report. 

Associated  Press  (2021),  ‘AP  Exclusive:  Polish  opposition  duo  hacked  with  NSO  spyware’ 
https://apnews.com/article/technology-business-poland-hacking-warsaw-
8b52e16d1af60f9c324cf9f5099b687e. 

Association  of  Judges  ‘Themis’  (2022),  Report  of  25  January  2022  -  Challenging  the  principles  of 
primacy and direct applicability of EU law by the Polish authorities, 6 months after the CJEU’s rulings 
of  July  2021  http://themis-sedziowie.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Challenging-the-principles-of-
primacy-and-direct-applicability_extended_wer.pdf. 

Association of Prosecutors ‘Lex Super Omnia’ (2021), Report of 27 June 2021 – NEW LSO REPORT: 
"THE STICK METHOD. A ‘good change’ system of harassment of independent prosecutors" (NOWY 
RAPORT  LSO:  „METODA  KIJA.  Dobrozmianowy  system  nękania  niezależnych  prokuratorów”) 
https://lexso.org.pl/2021/06/27/nowy-raport-metoda-kija-dobrozmianowy-system-nekania-
niezaleznych-prokuratorow/. 

Batory  Foundation 
https://www.batory.org.pl/publikacja/finanse-polskich-partii/. 

‘Finances  of  Polish  parties’ 

(2019), 

(‘Finanse  polskich  partii’) 

Batory  Foundation  (2021),  The  politicization  of  the  National  Polish  Broadcasting  Council 
https://www.batory.org.pl/en/2021/07/29/the-politicisation-of-the-national-polish-broadcasting-
council/. 

Batory Foundation (2022), Contribution from the Batory Foundation for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

Border  Control  Guard  (2021),  Press  release  of  1  December  2021  https://strazgraniczna.pl/pl/dla-
mediow/zasady-obecnosci-mediow/9596,Zasady-obecnosci-mediow-w-pasie-przygranicznym-z-
Bialorusia.html. 

Business Insider (2022), Polska koncesja TVN24 przedłużona. KRRiT przyjęła uchwałę, która ma cel 
taki jak lex TVN https://businessinsider.com.pl/biznes/media/polska-koncesja-tvn24-przedluzona-krrit-
przyjela-dodatkowa-uchwale/6qgc37d. 

Campaign  Against  Homophobia  (2022),  Poland  is  an  EU  homophobe  –  we  know  the  results  of  the 
ILGA-Europe ranking https://kph.org.pl/ilgaeurope2022/. 

Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (2022), Media pluralism monitor 2022 – country report 
on Poland. 

Civicus, Monitor tracking civic space – Poland https://monitor.civicus.org/country/poland/. 

CIVICUS (2022), Contribution from CIVICUS for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

30 

 
Commissioner for Human Rights (2022), Contribution from the Commissioner for Human Rights for 
the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

Committee 
https://komitetobronysprawiedliwosci.pl/raport-kos-2021/. 

the  Defence  of  Justice  (KOS) 

for 

(2021),  Report  of  18  November  2021 

Committee for the Defence of Justice (KOS) (2022), Petition of 13 March 2022 signed by a number of 
legal  professions’  organisations  and 
judges  and  prosecutors 
https://www.iustitia.pl/images/1/petycja_PL.pdf#xd_co_f=NzQyNTdjYjYtNjUzZC00YjUwLWE3M
GUtMjZjMjg3MmY2ZjQ1~. 

largest  associations  of 

Constitutional  Monitor 
https://monitorkonstytucyjny.eu/archiwa/20910. 

(2022),  Written 

statement 

of 

1 

February 

2022 

Constitutional Tribunal, judgment of 13 December 2016, K 13/16. 

Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE) (2022), Contribution from the Council of Bars 
and Law Societies of Europe for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

Council of Europe, Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists – Poland 
https://fom.coe.int/en/alerte?years=2022&typeData=1&time=1653914309287. 

Poland 

Council of Europe, Secretary General,  Press communique of 7 December 2021 – Secretary General 
asks 
ECHR 
ensure 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/secretary-general-asks-poland-how-it-intends-to-ensure-effective-
implementation-of-echr. 

implementation 

effective 

intends 

how 

to 

of 

it 

Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2017), Poland – Opinion of the Venice Commission on the 
Act on the Public Prosecutor’s Office as amended (CDL-AD(2017)028). 

Court  of Justice  of  the  European  Union, judgment  of  5  November  2018,  Commission  v  Poland,  C-
192/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:924. 

Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 24 June 2019, Commission v Poland, C‑619/18, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:531. 

Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union,  judgment  of  9  July  2020,  VQ  v  Land  Hessen,  C-272/19, 
ECLI:EU:C:2020:535. 

Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union,  judgment  of  2  March  2021,  A.B.,  C‑824/18, 
ECLI:EU:C:2021:153. 

Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 15 July 2021, Commission v Poland, C-791/19, 
ECLI:EU:C:2021:596. 

Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union,  judgment  of  6  October  2021,  W.Ż.,  C-487/19, 
ECLI:EU:C:2021:798. 

Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 16 November 2021, Criminal proceedings against 
WB and Others, Joined Cases C-748/19 to C-754/19, ECLI:EU:C:2021:931. 

Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 22 February 2022, PPU, Joined Cases C‑562/21 
and C‑563/21, ECLI:EU:C:2022:100. 

Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union,  judgment  of  22  March  2022,  M.F.,  C‑508/19, 
ECLI:EU:C:2022:201. 

Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 29 March 2022,  BN and Others v Getin Noble 
Bank S.A., C-132/20, ECLI:EU:C:2022:235. 

Directorate-General  for  Communication  (2019),  Flash  Eurobarometer  482:  businesses’  attitudes 
towards corruption in the EU. 

Directorate-General for Communication (2020), Special Eurobarometer 502: corruption. 

31 

 
Directorate-General  for  Communication  (2022),  Flash  Eurobarometer  507:  businesses’  attitudes 
towards corruption in the EU. 

Directorate-General for Communication (2022), Special Eurobarometer 523: corruption. 

Dziennik.pl (2022), „Lex Czarnek 2.0”. The Minister of Education reveals when the new law will come 
into  force  ("Lex  Czarnek  2.0".  Minister  edukacji  zdradza,  kiedy  ustawa  zacznie  obowiązywać) 
https://edukacja.dziennik.pl/aktualnosci/artykuly/8435117,lex-czarnek-20-minister-edukacji-
przemyslaw-czarnek.html. 

European Commission (20 December 2017), Press release - Rule of Law: European Commission acts 
to 
Poland 
independence 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_17_5367. 

judicial 

defend 

in 

European Commission (2020), Council Recommendation on the 2020 National Reform Programme of 
Poland and delivering a Council opinion on the 2020 Convergence Programme of Poland (COM(2020) 
521 final). 

European Commission (2020), Country Report Poland (SWD(2020) 520 final). 

European Commission (2020), 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation 
in Poland. 

European Commission (2021), 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation 
in Poland. 

European  Commission  (7  September  2021),  Press  release  -  Independence  of  Polish  judges: 
Commission asks European Court of Justice for financial penalties against Poland on the activity of 
the Disciplinary Chamber https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_4587.  

European  Commission  (22  December  2021),  Press  release  -  Rule  of  Law:  Commission  launches 
infringement  procedure  against  Poland  for  violations  of  EU  law  by  its  Constitutional  Tribunal 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_7070.  

European Commission (2022), EU Justice Scoreboard. 

European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 1 February 2005, Beller v. Poland, 51837/99. 

European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 10 October 2005, Majewski v. Poland, 52690/99. 

European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 16 January 2007, ma v. Poland, 7870/04. 

European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 7 July 2015, Rutkowski and Others v. Poland, 72287/10, 
13927/11 and 46187/11. 

European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 20 June 2017, Załuska, Rogalska and Others v. Poland, 
53491/10. 

European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 22 July 2021, Reczkowicz v. Poland, 43447/19.  

European  Court  of  Human  Rights, judgment  of 8  November  2021,  Dolińska  - Ficek  and  Ozimek  v. 
Poland, 49868/19. 

European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 15 March 2022, Grzęda v. Poland, 43572/18. 

European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 3 February 2022, Advance Pharma Sp. Z O.O v. Poland, 
1469/20. 

European Court of Human Rights (3 February 2022),  Systemic dysfunction in judicial appointments 
procedure in Poland, ECHR 039 (2021). 

European Court of Human Rights (14 April 2022), Press release – Interim measures in another case of 
Polish Supreme Court judge’s immunity, ECHR 131 (2022). 

European Federation of Journalists (2022), Contribution from the European Federation of Journalists 
for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

32 

 
European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (2021), Press communique of 28 October 2021 - ENCJ 
votes to expel Polish Council for the Judiciary (KRS) https://www.encj.eu/node/605. 

European Network on National Human Rights Institutions (ENNHRI) (2022),  Contribution from the 
European Network on National Human Rights Institutions for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

European Implementation Network (2022), Contribution from the European Implementation Network 
for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

Gazeta Prawna (2021), Lex TVN. Can we really afford further pricey violations of the law? (Lex TVN. 
prawa?) 
Czy 
https://serwisy.gazetaprawna.pl/media/artykuly/8219976,lex-tvn-przedluzenie-koncesji-krrit-
odpowiedzialnosc.html. 

naruszenia 

kosztowne 

naprawdę 

kolejne 

stać 

nas 

na 

Gazeta  Wyborcza  (2022),  Prosecutors  in  Poland  are  defenseless  in  the  face  of  repression  by  the 
management 
represji  kierownictwa) 
https://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,28079182,prokuratorzy-w-polsce-sa-bezbronni-w-obliczu-represji-
kierownictwa.html#S.tylko_na_wyborcza.pl-K.C-B.3-L.1.maly:undefined. 

są  bezbronni  w  obliczu 

(Prokuratorzy  w  Polsce 

Głos  Nauczycielski  (2022),  Lex  Czarnek.  The  association  referred  to  by  curator  Nowak  dissociates 
itself from the so-called black list of organizations in schools (Lex Czarnek. Stowarzyszenie, na które 
powoływała  się  kurator  Nowak  odcina  się  od  tzw.  czarnej  listy  organizacji  w  szkołach) 
https://glos.pl/lex-czarnek-jedno-ze-stowarzyszen-na-ktore-powolywala-sie-kurator-nowak-
oswiadczylo-ze-nie-przygotowywalo-zadnej-listy-organizacji. 

Grant Thornton (2022), Law barometer. Analysis of the stability of the legal environment in the Polish 
economy  (Barometr  prawa.  Analiza  stabilności  otoczenia  prawnego  w  polskiej  gospodarce) 
https://barometrprawa.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Barometr-prawa-2022-RAPORT-Grant-
Thornton-16-03-2022.pdf. 

GRECO (2008), Third Evaluation Round – Evaluation Report on Poland on incriminations. 

GRECO  (2008),  Third  Evaluation  Round  –  Evaluation  Report  on  Poland  on  transparency  of  party 
funding. 

GRECO (2019), Fifth Evaluation Round – Evaluation Report on Poland on preventing corruption and 
promoting integrity in central governments (top executive functions) and law enforcement agencies. 

GRECO (2021), Fifth Evaluation Round – Compliance Report on Poland on preventing corruption and 
promoting integrity in central governments (top executive functions) and law enforcement agencies. 

Helsinki  Foundation  of  Human  Rights  (2021),  Brutal  detention  of  journalists  by  soldiers  near 
Michałów. The HFHR writes to the Minister of National Defence (Brutalne zatrzymanie dziennikarzy 
przez  żołnierzy  pod  Michałowem.  HFPC  występuje  z  pismem  do  Ministra  Obrony  Narodowej) 
https://www.hfhr.pl/brutalne-zatrzymanie-dziennikarzy-przez-zolnierzy-pod-michalowem-hfpc-
wystepuje-z-pismem-do-ministra-obrony-narodowej/. 

Institute  of  Social  Affairs  (2022),  Statement  -  The  position  of  the  Institute  of  Social  Affairs  on  the 
announcement of a change in the provision on offending religious feelings (Stanowisko Instytutu Spraw 
Społecznych 
religijnych) 
https://publicystyka.ngo.pl/stanowisko-instytutu-spraw-spolecznych-ws-zapowiedzi-zmiany-przepisu-
o-obrazie-uczuc-religijnych. 

zapowiedzi 

przepisu 

obrazie 

zmiany 

uczuć 

ws. 

o 

International Press Institute (2022), How ‘licence wars’ curb Poland’s free media (Gazeta Wyborcza) 
https://ipi.media/how-licence-wars-curb-polands-free-media-gazeta-wyborcza/. 

Iustitia (2021),  Statement of Iustitia Association of Polish judges of 2021 https://www.iustitia.pl/83-
komunikaty-i-oswiadczenia/4336-iustitia-nie-bedziemy-startowac-w-wyborach-do-politycznej-krs-
przez-ta-krs-placimy-miliony-euro-kary. 

Iustitia (2021), Report of 17 August 2021 - Report on the activities of Polish authorities after the rulings 
of the Court of Justice of the EU of July 14, 2021 in case C-204/21 and of July 15, 2021 in case C-
791/19 with attachments https://www.iustitia.pl/en/activity/informations/4214-report-on-the-activities-

33 

 
of-polish-authorities-after-the-rulings-of-the-court-of-justice-of-the-eu-of-july-14-2021-in-case-c-
204-21-and-of-july-15-2021-in-case-c-791-19-with-attachments. 

KRRiT (2022), Contribution from KRRiT for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

Liberties (2022), Contribution from Liberties for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

Marshal  of  the  Senate  of  the  Republic  of  Poland  (2022),  Statement  of  16  February  2022 
https://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm9.nsf/komunikat.xsp?documentId=4B1C6374486C9C3DC12587EA005
E78F0. 

Marshal of the Senate of the Republic of Poland (2022), Contribution from the Marshal of the Senate 
of the Republic of Poland for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

Ministry  of  Justice  (2021),  Press  release  of  16  September  2021  –  Random  case  allocation  system 
eliminated pathologies in the judiciary (System Losowego Przydziału Spraw wyeliminował patologie w 
sądownictwie) 
https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/system-losowego-przydzialu-spraw-
wyeliminowal-patologie-w-sadownictwie. 

Ministry of Justice (2021), Press release of 12 October 2021 – Deputy Minister Sebastian Kaleta at the 
EU Forum on the Digitalisation of Justice (Wiceminister Sebastian Kaleta na unijnym forum cyfryzacji 
wymiaru  sprawiedliwości)  https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/wiceminister-sebastian-kaleta-na-
unijnym-forum-cyfryzacji-wymiaru-sprawiedliwosci. 

Ministry of Justice (2021), Press release of 11 November 2021 - The Ministry of Justice opposes the 
application  of  double  standards to  Poland  (Ministerstwo  Sprawiedliwości  sprzeciwia  się  stosowaniu 
podwójnych 
standardów  wobec  Polski)  https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/ministerstwo-
sprawiedliwosci-sprzeciwia-sie-stosowaniu-podwojnych-standardow-wobec-polski. 

National  Bar  Council  (2022),  Statement  of  13  March  2022  https://www.prawo.pl/prawnicy-
sady/wybor-sedziowczlonkow-krs,513997.html. 

National Bar Council (2022), Press release of 14 April 2022 – New knowledge platform on refugee and 
migration  law  HELP  of  the  Council  of  Europe  (Nowa  platforma  wiedzy  nt.  prawa  uchodźczego  i 
migracyjnego  HELP  Rady  Europy)  https://www.adwokatura.pl/ogolnoprawne/nowa-platforma-
wiedzy-nt-prawa-uchodzczego-i-migracyjnego-help-rady-europy/. 

National Council of Legal Councillors (2022), Statement 15 March 2022 of the Committee of Human 
Rights  https://kirp.pl/stanowisko-komisji-praw-czlowieka-przy-krajowej-radzie-radcow-prawnych-z-
dnia-16-marca-2022-r-w-sprawie-wyroku-wielkiej-izby-europejskiego-trybunalu-praw-czlowieka-z-
dnia-15-marca-2022-r-w-sprawie/. 

National Council for the Judiciary (2022), Statement of 14 April 2022 (WO 41.4.2022). 

Prosecutor’s  Office 

National 
https://pk.gov.pl/aktualnosci/aktualnosci-prokuratury-krajowej/prokuratura-krajowa-wystapila-na-
droge-sadowa-w-zwiazku-ze-szkalujacymi-wypowiedziami-jednego-z-prokuratorow/. 

February 

(2021), 

release 

Press 

24 

of 

2021 

Prosecutor’s 

National 
https://pk.gov.pl/aktualnosci/aktualnosci-prokuratury-krajowej/wniosek-o-uchylenie-immunitetu-
prezesowi-nik/. 

(2021), 

release 

Office 

Press 

July 

23 

of 

2021 

OECD 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Poland-Phase-3-Written-Follow-Up-Report-ENG.pdf. 

the  Phase  3  Report  &  Recommendations  –  Poland 

(2015),  Follow-Up 

to 

OECD  (2018),  Poland  must  make  urgent 
https://www.oecd.org/corruption/poland-must-make-urgent-legislative-reforms-to-combat-foreign-
bribery.htm#:~:text=Poland%20must%20make%20urgent%20legislative%20reforms%20to%20comb
at,after%20its%20Phase%203%20evaluation%20in%20June%202013. 

legislative  reforms 

foreign  bribery 

to  combat 

OECD (2020), Poland should urgently implement reforms to boost fight against foreign bribery and 
preserve  independence  of  prosecutors  and  judges  https://www.oecd.org/poland/poland-should-

34 

 
urgently-implement-reforms-to-boost-fight-against-foreign-bribery-and-preserve-independence-of-
prosecutors-and-judges.htm. 

OECD (2021), Poland’s lack of progress in implementing reforms to boost fight against foreign bribery 
remains  a  serious  concern  https://www.oecd.org/poland/poland-s-lack-of-progress-in-implementing-
reforms-to-boost-fight-against-foreign-bribery-remains-a-serious-concern.htm. 

OKO  Press  (2020),  Woś  and  Ziobro  seek  a  register  of  NGOs  financed  from  foreign  funds.  "It's  an 
stigmatisation attempt" (Woś i Ziobro chcą rejestru NGO’s finansowanych ze środków z zagranicy. „To 
próba  stygmatyzacji”)  https://oko.press/wos-i-ziobro-chca-rejestru-ngos-finansowanych-ze-srodkow-
z-zagranicy-to-proba-stygmatyzacji/. 

OKO Press (2022), Lex Woś. Solidarna Polska seeks to "de-Putinize" non-governmental organizations 
with a law straight from Putin's Russia (Lex Woś. Solidarna Polska chce „deputinizować” organizacje 
pozarządowe ustawą rodem z Rosji Putina) https://oko.press/lex-wos-solidarna-polska-deputinizowac-
organizacje-porzarzadowe-przy-pomocy-ustawy-od-putina/. 

Ombudsperson’s Office (2021), Press release of 15 April 2021 – To repeal defamation laws – to modify 
the provision on the criminality of offending religious feelings. Adam Bodnar's opinion for the Sejm 
(Uchylić  przepisy  o  zniesławieniu  –  zmodyfikować  przepis  o  karalności  obrazy  uczuć  religijnych. 
Opinia  Adama  Bodnara  dla  Sejmu)  https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-zniesc-znieslawienie-
zmodyfikowac-obraze-uczuc-religijnych. 

Ombudsperson’s Office (2021), Press release of 23 July 2021  – Marcin Wiącek took the oath in the 
Sejm  as  the  new  COMMISSIONER  (Marcin  Wiącek  złożył  ślubowanie  w  Sejmie  jako  nowy  RPO) 
https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-marcin-wiacek-zlozyl-slubowanie-w-sejmie. 

Ombudsperson’s  Office  (2021),  Open  letter  of  6  September  2021  -  State  of  emergency.  The 
Ombudsperson  has  doubts  about  the  restrictions  on  the  work  of  journalists  and  access  to  public 
information (Stan wyjątkowy. RPO ma wątpliwości ws. ograniczeń pracy dziennikarzy oraz dostępu do 
informacji  publicznej)  https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/content/stan-wyjatkowy-rpo-ma-watpliwosci-ws-
ograniczen-pracy-dziennikarzy-oraz-dostepu-do. 

Ombudsperson’s Office (2022), Press release of 21 October 2021 – The law on the construction of a 
wall on the border is partially unconstitutional. Comments of the Ombudsperson for the Senate (Ustawa 
o  budowie  muru  na  granicy  częściowo  niekonstytucyjna.  Uwagi  RPO  dla  Senatu) 
https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-granica-budowa-muru-senat. 

Ombudsperson’s Office (2022), Press release of 23 November 2021 - The State Border Act needs to be 
amended.  Comments  of  the  Ombudsperson  for  the  Senate  (Ustawa  o  granicy  państwowej  wymaga 
poprawek.  Uwagi  RPO  dla  Senatu)  https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-senat-ustawa-granica-
panstwowa-uwagi. 

Ombudsperson’s  Office (2022),  Press  release  of  10 January  2022  -  Further  local  government  "anti-
LGBT" resolutions repealed by the court (Kolejne samorządowe uchwały „anty-LGBT” uchylone przez 
sąd) https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-wsa-krakow-uchwaly-anty-lgbt-uchylone. 

Ombudsperson’s Office (2022), Press release of 29 March 2022 – The court overturned another "anti-
LGBT" resolution – of the Niebylec Commune Council (Sąd uchylił kolejną uchwałę „anty-LGBT” – 
https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-uchwala-anty-lgbt-niebylec-sad-
Rady  Gminy  Niebylec) 
uchylenie. 

Ombudsperson’s  Office  (2022),  Opinion  of  16  May  2022  -  Ministerial  draft  amendments  to  the 
judiciary  –  significant  doubts  of  the  Ombudsman  (Ministerialne  projekty  zmian  w  sądownictwie  – 
istotne  wątpliwości  Rzecznika  Praw  Obywatelskich)  https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-ms-
sadownictwo-usp-projekty-zmian-opinia. 

Onet (2021), Video recordings of the apprehension of journalists: “You’ll f***ing cease taking pictures 
fotografowania") 
(Nagrania 
https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/bialystok/kryzys-na-granicy-zatrzymanie-dziennikarzy-sie-ka-odechce-
fotografowania/3gz20y9. 

dziennikarzy. 

zatrzymania 

odechce 

k***a, 

"Się, 

z 

35 

 
Onet (2022), ‘Citizen Lab: another Pegasus victim in Poland’ (‘Citizen Lab: kolejna ofiara Pegasusa w 
Polsce’) 
https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/tylko-w-onecie/citizen-lab-kolejna-ofiara-pegasusa-w-
polsce/dbtzhjt. 

Open statement of 12 human rights and business organisations calling on withholding works on the law 
governing the freedom of speech in social media https://api.ngo.pl/media/get/172893. 

Polish  Government  (2021),  Press  release  of  31  August  2021  https://www.gov.pl/web/sluzby-
specjalne/Stan-wyjatkowy-przy-granicy-z-bialorusia. 

Polish  Government  (2022),  Press  release  of  28  February  2022  https://www.gov.pl/web/usa-
en/standwithukraine--polish-ngos-and-how-to-help. 

Polish Government (2022), Press release of 11 March 2022 https://www.gov.pl/web/pozytek/10-mln-
zl-dla-ngo-pomagajacych-uchodzcom-i-uproszczenie-procedur-zlecania-zadan. 

Polish  Press  Agency  (2022),  Solidarity  Poland  proposes  to  tighten  the  rules  on  offending  religious 
feelings  (Solidarna  Polska  proponuje  zaostrzenie  przepisow  dotyczacych  obrazy  uczuc  religijnych) 
https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/news%2C1157233%2Csolidarna-polska-proponuje-zaostrzenie-
przepisow-dotyczacych-obrazy-uczuc. 

Prawo.pl (2022), Lex Czarnek 2.0 will go to the Sejm - now as a deputy's project (Lex Czarnek 2.0 trafi 
do Sejmu - teraz jako projekt poselski) https://www.prawo.pl/oswiata/weto-lex-czarnek,512667.html. 

Prawo.pl (2022), Organizations don't want a "free speech on the internet" law (Organizacje nie chcą 
ustawy  o  "wolności  słowa  w  internecie")  https://www.prawo.pl/prawo/sprzeciw-wobec-ustawy-o-
wolnosci-slowa-w-internecie,513032.html. 

Prawo.pl (2022), Politicians want to vet NGOs in order to catch agents of foreign influence (Politycy 
chcą 
zagranicy) 
wyłapać 
https://www.prawo.pl/samorzad/jawnosc-finansowania-organizacji-pozarzadowych-propozycje-
zmian,514383.html. 

lustrować 

agentów 

wpływu 

NGO, 

by 

z 

Prawo.pl  (2022),  Prosecutors  complained  about  the  work  overload  and...  ended  up  on  punitive 
secondments  (Prokuratorzy  poskarżyli  się  na  przeciążenie  pracą  i...  wylądowali  na  karnych 
delegacjach) https://www.prawo.pl/prawnicy-sady/delegacje-w-szczecinskiej-prokuraturze-problemy-
kadrowe,514437.html. 

of 

President 
http://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SitePages/Wydarzenia.aspx?ItemSID=824-0dc69815-3ade-42fa-bbb8-
549c3c6969c5&ListName=Wydarzenia. 

Disciplinary 

Ordinance 

Chamber 

(2022), 

No. 

the 

8/22 

of 

President 
(2021), 
https://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wydarzenia/prezydent-podpisal-rozporzadzenie-ws-
przedluzenia-stanu-wyjatkowego,35808. 

Republic 

release 

Press 

the 

of 

1 

October 

of 

President 
https://www.prezydent.pl/prawo/zawetowane/prezydent-wetuje-nowelizacje-prawa-
oswiatowego,49737. 

Republic 

(2022), 

release 

Press 

the 

of 

2  March 

2021 

2022 

Reporters without Borders – Poland https://rsf.org/en/country/poland. 

Reporters  without  Borders  (2021),  ‘Polish  soldiers  cannot  treat  journalists  as  if  it  were  a  military 
dictatorship’ https://rsf.org/en/polish-soldiers-cannot-treat-journalists-if-it-were-military-dictatorship. 

Rzeczpospolita,  Rząd  nie  zamierza  płacić  sędziom  pomimo  wyroku  Trybunału  w  Strasburgu, 
https://www.rp.pl/sady-i-trybunaly/art36639341-rzad-nie-zamierza-placic-sedziom-pomimo-wyroku-
trybunalu-w-strasburgu.  

Sejm (2022), A full transcript of the sitting of the Committee for the State Audit  (Pełny Zapis zapis 
państwowej) 
posiedzenia 
https://orka.sejm.gov.pl/zapisy9.nsf/0/2D415ED8D87E86A4C1258805003209C3/%24File/0235709.p
df.  

kontroli 

Komisji 

spraw 

do 

36 

 
Supreme  Administrative  Court  (2021),  Press  release  of  11  October  2021  -  Communication  on  the 
judgments of the Supreme Administrative Court concerning appeals against resolutions of the National 
Council  of  the Judiciary  on  the  presentation (failure to  present)  applications  for  appointment  to  the 
office  of  a judge  of  the  Supreme  Court  –  update  (Komunikat  w  sprawie  wyroków  NSA  dotyczących 
odwołań od uchwał KRS w przedmiocie przedstawienia (nieprzedstawienia) wniosków o powołanie do 
pełnienia 
aktualizacja) 
sędziego 
https://www.nsa.gov.pl/komunikaty/komunikat-w-sprawie-wyrokow-nsa-dotyczacych-odwolan-od-
uchwal-krs-w-przedmiocie-przedstawienia-nieprzedstawienia-wnioskow-o-powolanie-do-pelnienia-
urzedu-na-stanowisku-sedziego-sadu-najwyzszego,news,4,802.php?p=1.  

Najwyższego 

stanowisku 

urzędu 

Sądu 

na 

- 

Supreme 
https://www.nik.gov.pl/aktualnosci/prezes-nik-o-wykonaniu-budzetu-panstwa-w-2020.html. 

Discharge 

(2021), 

Budget 

Office 

Audit 

State 

2020 

Report 

Supreme  Audit  Office 
https://www.nik.gov.pl/aktualnosci/realizacja-zadan-funduszu-sprawiedliwosci.html. 

report  No.  P/20/037  of  30  September  2021 

(2021),  Audit 

Supreme 
support 
https://www.nik.gov.pl/en/news/strong-support-for-nik-president.html. 

(2021), 

Strong 

Office 

Audit 

Supreme  Audit  Office 
https://www.nik.gov.pl/plik/id,24448,vp,27194.pdf.  

(2021),  Letter  of 

the  President  of 

for 

NIK 

President 

the  Supreme  Audit  Office 

Supreme Audit Office (2022), Contribution from the Supreme Audit Office for the 2022 Rule of Law 
Report. 

Court 

Supreme 
http://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SitePages/Wydarzenia.aspx?ItemSID=812-0dc69815-3ade-42fa-bbb8-
549c3c6969c5&ListName=Wydarzenia&rok=2022. 

communique 

September 

(2021), 

Press 

of 

2 

2021 

Court 

Supreme 
http://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SitePages/Wydarzenia.aspx?ItemSID=784-0dc69815-3ade-42fa-bbb8-
549c3c6969c5&ListName=Wydarzenia&rok=2021. 

communique 

September 

(2021), 

Press 

27 

of 

2021 

Court 

Supreme 
http://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SitePages/Wydarzenia.aspx?ItemSID=815-0dc69815-3ade-42fa-bbb8-
549c3c6969c5&ListName=Wydarzenia&rok=2022. 

communique 

February 

(2022), 

Press 

10 

of 

2022 

Court 

Supreme 
http://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SitePages/Wydarzenia.aspx?ItemSID=823-0dc69815-3ade-42fa-bbb8-
549c3c6969c5&ListName=Wydarzenia. 

communique 

(2022), 

March 

Press 

29 

of 

2022 

Court 

Supreme 
http://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SitePages/Komunikaty_o_sprawach.aspx?ItemSID=502-b6b3e804-
2752-4c7d-bcb4-7586782a1315&ListName=Komunikaty_o_sprawach.  

communique 

(2022), 

Press 

May 

23 

of 

2022 

Supreme  Court  (2021),  Statement  of  the  First  President  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  22  October  2021 
http://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SitePages/Wydarzenia.aspx?ItemSID=793-0dc69815-3ade-42fa-bbb8-
549c3c6969c5&ListName=Wydarzenia&rok=2021. 

Supreme Court (2022), Contribution from the Supreme Court for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

The Guardian (2022), More Polish opposition figures found to have been targeted by Pegasus spyware 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/17/more-polish-opposition-figures-found-to-have-been-
targeted-by-pegasus-spyware. 

Tok fm (2021), PiS has found a new way for NIK and Marian Banaś?  Starring Elżbieta Witek (PiS 
znalazł  nowy  sposób  na  NIK 
i  Mariana  Banasia?  W  roli  głównej  Elżbieta  Witek) 
https://www.tokfm.pl/Tokfm/7,103087,27605017,pis-znalazl-nowy-sposob-na-nik-i-mariana-banasia-
w-roli-glownej.html. 

Tok  fm  (2022),  NGOs  write  to  the  European  Commission.  It's  about  money  to  help  refugees 
(Organizacje pozarządowe piszą do Komisji Europejskiej. Chodzi o pieniądze na pomoc uchodźcom) 

37 

 
https://www.tokfm.pl/Tokfm/7,103085,28219945,organizacje-pozarzadowe-pisza-do-komisji-
europejskiej-chodzi.html. 

Tok  fm  (2022),  A  judge  from  Lublin  was  supposed  to  receive  EUR  15  000  from  the  state.  The 
Government does not intend to pay. “We are getting closer to Russia”, (Lubelski sędzia miał otrzymać 
tysięcy  euro  od  państwa.  Rząd  płacić  nie  zamierza.  "Zbliżamy  się  do  Rosji”) 
15 
https://www.tokfm.pl/Tokfm/7,182251,28650980,sprawa-sedziego-z-lublina-ktory-wygral-przed-
etpcz-msz-juz.html.    

Transparency International (2022), Corruption Perceptions Index 2021. 

Tygodnik Powszechny (2021), Journalists at the border. Media Statement (Dziennikarze na granicy. 
Oświadczenie  mediów)  https://www.tygodnikpowszechny.pl/dziennikarze-na-granicy-oswiadczenie-
mediow-169036. 

TVN24  (2021),  Supreme  Audit  Office  chief  notifies  EUROSAI  about  government  pressure 
https://tvn24.pl/tvn24-news-in-english/polands-chief-auditor-complains-about-government-pressure-
on-his-institution-5097595. 

TVP info (2021), The judge of the Disciplinary Chamber notifies the prosecutor's office about four 
judges of the Supreme Court (Sędzia Izby Dyscyplinarnej zawiadamia prokuraturę ws. czterech sędziów 
SN) 
https://www.tvp.info/56151780/sedzia-izby-dyscyplinarnej-jan-majchrowski-zlozyl-
zawiadomienie-o-mozliwosci-popelnienia-przestepstwa-przez-czworo-tzw-starych-sedziow-sadu-
najwyzszego. 

TVP info (2022), Scandal at the top levels of the EU. The Polish prosecutor's office has opened an 
śledztwo) 
prokuratura  wszczęła 
investigation 
https://www.tvp.info/58132359/afera-korupcyjna-na-szczytach-ue-tsue-sledztwo-polskiej-
prokuratury. 

szczytach  UE. 

Polska 

(Afera 

na 

(2015), 

UNODC 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/WorkingGroups/ImplementationReviewGroup/E
xecutiveSummaries/V1406175e.pdf. 

Implementation  Review  Group,  Executive 

Summary 

–  Poland 

WP (2022), A bizarre list from Barbara Nowak. "This disqualifies her from holding any public office" 
(Kuriozalna  lista  od  Barbary  Nowak.  "To  ją  dyskwalifikuje  z  pełnienia  jakichkolwiek  funkcji 
publicznych") 
https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/kuriozalna-lista-barbary-nowak-to-ja-dyskwalifikuje-z-
pelnienia-jakichkolwiek-funkcji-publicznych-6729897877064352a. 

38 

 
Annex II: Country visit to Poland245 

The Commission services held virtual meetings in March 2022 with: 

  Amnesty International  
  Association of Judges ‘Iustitia’ and ‘Themis’ 
  Association of Judges ‘Themis’ 
  Association of Prosecutors ‘Lex Super Omnia’ 
  Fundacja Batorego 
  Forum Obywatelskiego Rozwoju 
  Free Courts – Wolne Sądy 
  Fundacja bona Notitia 
  Helsinska Fundacja Praw Człowieka 
 
Instytut Prawa i Społeczeństwa 
 
Instytut Sobieskiego 
 
Izba Wydawców Prasy 
  Klub Jagielloński 
  National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council 
  Logos  
  Fundacja Mamy i Taty 
  Ministry of Culture 
  National Council for the Judiciary 
  National Council of Legal Councillors  
  Ombudsman’s Office 
  Ordo Iuris 
  Rada Mediów Narodowych 
  Stowarzyszenie Polskie Telewizje Lokalne i Regionalne 
  Stowarzyszenie Polskich Mediów 
  Supreme Administrative Court 
  Supreme Audit Office 
  Supreme Bar Council 
  Supreme Court 
  Towarzystwo Dziennikarskie 
  Towarzystwo Dziennikarzy Polskich 
  Watchdog Polska 

* The Commission also met the following organisations in a number of horizontal meetings:  

  Amnesty International  
  Article 19  
  Civil Liberties Union for Europe 
  Civil Society Europe  
  European Centre for Press and Media Freedom  
  European Civic Forum 
  European Federation of Journalists  
  European Partnership for Democracy 
  European Youth Forum 

245  The Polish government did not provide written inputand decided not to participate in relevant meetings of the 

country visit. However, it commented on the draft country chapter. 

39 

 
 
                                                 
ILGA Europe 
International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) 
International Press Institute 

  Free Press Unlimited 
  Human Rights Watch  
 
 
 
  Open Society European Policy Institute ( OSEPI) 
  Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso Transeuropa  
  Philea 
  Reporters Without Borders 
  Transparency International Europe 

40