COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2022 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2022 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union
Date: 2022-07-13
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Hungary, coronavirus disease, corruption, democracy, epidemic, independence of the judiciary, infringement of EU law, pluralism in the media, political rights, rule of law

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Luxembourg, 13.7.2022  SWD(2022) 517 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2022 Rule of Law Report        Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2022 Rule of Law Report          The rule of law situation in the European Union {COM(2022) 500 final} - {SWD(2022) 501 final} - {SWD(2022) 502 final} - {SWD(2022) 503 final} - {SWD(2022) 504 final} - {SWD(2022) 505 final} - {SWD(2022) 506 final} - {SWD(2022) 507 final} - {SWD(2022) 508 final} - {SWD(2022) 509 final} - {SWD(2022) 510 final} - {SWD(2022) 511 final} - {SWD(2022) 512 final} - {SWD(2022) 513 final} - {SWD(2022) 514 final} - {SWD(2022) 515 final} - {SWD(2022) 516 final} - {SWD(2022) 518 final} - {SWD(2022) 519 final} - {SWD(2022) 520 final} - {SWD(2022) 521 final} - {SWD(2022) 522 final} - {SWD(2022) 523 final} - {SWD(2022) 524 final} - {SWD(2022) 525 final} - {SWD(2022) 526 final} - {SWD(2022) 527 final}  
 
 
ABSTRACT 

As regards judicial independence, concerns expressed in the context of the Article 7(1) TEU 
procedure initiated by the European Parliament, as well as in previous Rule of Law Reports, 
remain  unaddressed.  This  is  also  the  case  for  the  relevant  recommendation  made  under  the 
European  Semester.  These  concerns  relate  in  particular  to  the  challenges  faced  by  the 
independent National Judicial Council in counter-balancing the powers of the President of the 
National  Office for the Judiciary, the rules on  electing the President of the Supreme Court, 
and  the  possibility  of  discretionary  decisions  as  regards  judicial  appointments  and 
promotions, case allocation as well as bonuses to judges and court executives. Following the 
Supreme  Court  decision  declaring  unlawful  a  request  for  preliminary  ruling,  the  European 
Court  of  Justice  ruled  that  such  decision  is  contrary  to  EU  law.  As  regards  efficiency  and 
quality,  the  justice  system  performs  well  in  terms  of  the  length  of  proceedings  and  has  an 
overall high level of digitalisation. The gradual increase of salaries of judges and prosecutors 
continues. 

The  implementation  of  most  measures  under  the  2020-2022  anti-corruption  strategy  was 
postponed  and  no  new  strategy  has  been  announced.  Shortcomings  persist  as  regards 
lobbying,  revolving  doors  as  well  as  political  party  and  campaign  financing.  Independent 
control mechanisms remain insufficient to detect corruption. Concerns remain regarding the 
lack of systematic checks and insufficient oversight of asset declarations as well as the lack 
of conflict of interest rules for the public interest trusts. The lack of a robust track record of 
investigations  of  corruption  allegations  concerning  high-level  officials  and  their  immediate 
circle remains  a serious  concern, although some new high-level  corruption cases  have been 
opened. The lack of judicial review of decisions not to investigate and prosecute corruption 
remains  a  cause  of  concern,  in  particular  in  an  environment  where  risks  of  clientelism, 
favouritism  and  nepotism  in  high-level  public  administration  remain  unaddressed.  The 
Commission sent Hungary a written notification under the Regulation on a general regime of 
conditionality to protect the EU budget in case of breaches of the principles of the rule of law. 

The functional independence of the Media Authority needs to be strengthened. The continued 
channelling  of  significant  amounts  of  state  advertising  to  pro-government  media  creates  an 
unlevel  playing  field  in  the  media  landscape.  Public  service  media  operates  in  a  complex 
institutional  system,  amid  concerns  over  its  editorial  and  financial  independence.  Media 
professionals  continue  to  face  challenges  in  exercising  their  activities,  including  with  the 
surveillance  of  investigative  journalists.  Access  to  public  information  continued  to  be 
hindered under the state of danger. 

As regards the system of checks and balances, the transparency and quality of the legislative 
process remain a source of concern. The Government has been using its emergency powers 
extensively,  also  in  areas  not  related  to  the  COVID-19  pandemic  as  initially  invoked.  The 
Commissioner  for  Fundamental  Rights  has  gained  more  competences,  but  his  accreditation 
was  downgraded  following  concerns  regarding  his 
ineffective 
implementation by state organs of judgments of European and national courts is a source of 
concern.  Pressure  continues  on  civil  society  organisations,  whilst  the  public-interest  trusts 
receiving significant public funding and managed by board members close to the Government 
have become operational. 

independence.  The 

1 

 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 

In  addition  to  recalling  the  obligation  to  comply  with  the  rule  of  law-related  rulings  of  the 
ECJ and the rule of law related infringement procedures referred to in the country chapter, the 
concerns raised under the conditionality regulation, the relevant concerns raised in the Article 
7  TEU  procedure  initiated  by  the  European  Parliament,  and  recalling  the  relevant  country-
specific recommendations under the European Semester, it is recommended to Hungary to:  

  Strengthen the role of the National Judicial Council, while safeguarding its independence, 
to effectively counter-balance the powers of the President of the National Office for the 
Judiciary. 

  Adapt the rules related to the Kúria to remove judicial appointments outside the normal 
procedure,  to  strengthen  eligibility  criteria  for  the  Kúria  President,  and  to  strengthen 
control  by  judicial  bodies  over  the  Kúria  President,  taking  into  account  European 
standards,  and  to  remove  the  possibility  of  reviewing  the  necessity  of  preliminary 
references, in line with EU law requirements. 

  Adopt  comprehensive  reforms  on  lobbying  and  revolving  doors,  and  strengthen  the 

system of asset declarations, providing for effective oversight and enforcement.  

  Establish  a  robust  track  record  of  investigations,  prosecutions  and  final  judgments  for 

 

high-level corruption cases.  
Introduce  mechanisms  to  enhance  the  functional  independence  of  the  media  regulatory 
authority  taking  into  account  European  standards  on  the  independence  of  media 
regulators. 

  Strengthen  the  rules  and  mechanisms  to  enhance  the  independent  governance  and 
editorial independence of public service media taking into account European standards on 
public service media. 

  Adopt legislation to ensure fair and transparent distribution of advertising expenditure by 

the state and state-owned companies. 

  Remove obstacles affecting civil society organisations.   

2 

 
 
 
I. 

JUSTICE SYSTEM  

Hungary  has  a  four-tier  ordinary  court  system.  113  district  courts  operate  at  first  instance, 
while  20  regional  courts  hear  appeals  against  district  court  decisions  and  decide  on  certain 
cases at first instance. Five regional appeal courts decide on appeals against decisions of the 
regional  courts.  The  main  role  of  the  Supreme  Court  (Kúria)  is  to  guarantee  the  uniform 
application of the law. The Fundamental  Law tasks the President of the National Office for 
the Judiciary (NOJ), elected by Parliament, with the central administration of the courts. The 
National  Judicial  Council  is  an  independent  body,  which,  under  the  Fundamental  Law, 
supervises the NOJ President and participates in the administration of the courts. Judges are 
appointed by the President of the Republic following a recommendation of the NOJ President 
based  on  a  ranking  of  candidates  established  by  the  local  judicial  councils  (composed  of 
judges elected by their peers). The NOJ President cannot deviate from this ranking without 
the prior consent of the National Judicial Council. The Constitutional Court is not part of the 
ordinary  court  system  and  reviews  the  constitutionality  of  laws  and  judicial  decisions.  The 
prosecution  service  is  an  independent  institution  vested  with  powers  to  investigate  and 
prosecute  crime.  The  Hungarian  Bar  Association  and  the  regional  bar  associations  are 
autonomous self-governing public bodies. 

Independence  

Perceived judicial independence continues to be average among the general public and 
low among companies. The level of perceived judicial independence by the general public 
remains average, marking a slight increase from 40% in 2021 to 43% in 20221. According to 
data  in  the  2022  EU  Justice  Scoreboard,  perceived  judicial  independence  by  companies 
remains low, 34% of companies perceive judicial independence as ‘fairly or very good’, an 
increase compared to the 32% in 20212. As regards the general public, the five-year negative 
trend in  perceptions  turned in  2022;  as regards companies, after  a significant  drop in  2019, 
perceptions continue to improve. 

There  have  been  no  legislative  steps  to  address  concerns  related  to  the  lack  of  checks 
and  balances  in  the  administration  of  courts.  On  23  May  2022,  in  the  context  of  the 
European  Semester,  the  Commission  proposed3  to  the  Council  to  address  to  Hungary  a 
recommendation  to  strengthen  judicial  independence,  noting  that  the  National  Judicial 
Council continues to face difficulties in counter-balancing the powers of the NOJ President as 
regards  the  management  of  the  courts4.  Although  there  have  been  some  positive 
developments regarding the NOJ President’s cooperation with the National Judicial Council5, 
the  powers  of  the  National  Judicial  Council  have  not  been  extended  to  ensure  effective 

1   Figure  50,  2022  EU  Justice  Scoreboard.  The  level  of  perceived  judicial  independence  is  categorised  as 
follows: very low (below 30% of respondents perceive judicial independence as fairly good and very good); 
low (between 30-39%), average (between 40-59%), high (between 60-75%), very high (above 75%). 

2   Figure 52, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
3   Recital (27), Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on the 2022 National Reform Programme of 

Hungary and delivering a Council opinion on the 2022 Convergence Programme of Hungary. 

4   2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 2. 
5   Stakeholders report that since November 2021, the NOJ President has regularly attended the meetings of the 
National Judicial Council and has had an improved track record in reacting to the requests of the Council. 
Thus, on 1 December 2021 the NOJ President agreed that the Office would cover the costs of the Council’s 
website  (contribution  from  the  Hungarian  Association  of  Judges  for  the  2022  Rule  of  Law  Report,  p.  11; 
contribution from the European Association of Judges for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 6). 

3 

 
                                                 
oversight over the NOJ President6, and further guarantees against possible arbitrary decisions 
by  the  NOJ  President  are  necessary7.  In  its  Opinion8  of  16  October  2021,  the  Venice 
Commission recalled its previous consideration that the powers of the NOJ President remain 
very  extensive  when  wielded  by  a  single  person  and  their  effective  supervision  remains 
difficult.  

The  absence  of  effective  control  over  the  NOJ  President  increases  the  possibility  of 
arbitrary decisions as regards the career of judges. Judges’ first appointments are limited 
to  three  years,  at  the  end  of  which  the  court  president  assesses  their  suitability  for  judicial 
tenure  and  may,  if  they  are  found  suitable,  request  the  NOJ  President  to  recommend  the 
President of the Republic to appoint them for an unlimited period of time9. On 4 November 
2021, the second-instance service court  attached  to  the  Kúria ruled10 that judges  who, after 
their  initial  appointment,  are  found  unsuitable  for  tenure  by  the  court  president,  cannot 
challenge the assessment report itself, but only have a remedy when proceedings are brought 
against  them  by  the  court  president  with  a  view  to  establishing  their  professional 
incompetence11. There is no possibility to grant interim relief to prevent an interruption of the 
judicial  career  during  the  review  of  the  evaluation.  Stakeholders  have  underlined  that  this 
raises concerns as regards effective judicial protection of the judges concerned, affecting their 
independence12.  After  consulting  the  National  Judicial  Council,  the  NOJ  President  has 
prepared a draft legislative proposal to amend the rules, which was subsequently  agreed by 
the Council13. In another set of proceedings, on 2 June 2021, the Kúria ruled14 that there is no 

6   Contribution  from  the  European  Association  of  Judges  for  the  2022  Rule  of  Law  Report,  pp.  10-11.  The 
NOJ President has not acted on a call made on 2 February 2022 by the National Judicial Council to initiate 
disciplinary proceedings against a  Regional  Court President because  of  his  failure  to shield a senior judge 
from undue external pressure. To be noted that the National Judicial Council has no legal basis to oblige the 
NOJ President to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a court president. 

7   Joint  contribution  from  Amnesty  International  Hungary  and  eight  other  CSOs  for  the  2022  Rule  of  Law 
Report,  p.  5.  For  instance,  the  Integrity  Policy  issued  by  the  NOJ  President,  which  can  be  used  to  deter 
judges from discussing in public issues related to judicial independence, has not been amended (ibid., p. 9). 
Stakeholders argue that its provisions are unclear and leave room for arbitrary interpretation and may hinder 
judges’  involvement  in  public  discourse  (Amnesty  International  Hungary  (2021),  Status  of  the  Hungarian 
judiciary, p. 24). Article 26(1) of the Fundamental Law and 39(1) of Act CLXII of 2011 prevent judges from 
engaging in political activities. 

8   CDL-AD(2021)036, para. 66, point a). 
9   2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 7. The court president 
evaluates  the  overall  performance  of  the  judge  based  on  the  examination  material  and  the  documents  and 
assessments obtained. 

10   Decision  SzfÉ.9/2021/14.  In  the  case  at  hand,  the  former  judge  challenged  this  decision  before  the 
Constitutional  Court;  the  case  is  pending  (IV/00390/2022).  Stakeholders  relate  the  finding  of  unsuitability 
for that judge to the fact that, on 7 September 2018, she had made a request for a preliminary ruling in an 
asylum case (Judgment of the CJEU of 19 March 2020, Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal (Tompa), C-
564/18,  ECLI:EU:C:2020:218):  joint  contribution  from  Amnesty  International  Hungary  and  eight  other 
CSOs for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 4. 

11   Section  81  of  Act  CLXII  of  2011  provides  that  if  a  judge  is  found  unfit,  the  court  president  –  when 
communicating  the  evaluation  results  –  calls  on  the  judge  to  resign  from  office  within  thirty  days.  If  the 
judge fails to comply, the court president notifies the first-instance service court which opens incompetency 
proceedings following the rules of disciplinary proceedings. 

12   Joint  contribution  from  Amnesty  International  Hungary  and  eight  other  CSOs  for  the  2022  Rule  of  Law 

Report, p. 4. 

13  Meeting of the National Judicial Council of 13 June 2022. 
14   Judgment  Mfv.X.10.049/2021/16.  The  plaintiff,  a  District  Court  judge,  ranked  first  in  two  subsequent 
application procedures for posts at a Regional Appeal Court. The NOJ President annulled both procedures 
without  any  meaningful  explanation,  thereby  preventing  the  plaintiff’s  promotion.  The  judge  concerned 
challenged the Kúria judgment before the Constitutional Court; the case is pending (IV/03595/2021). 

4 

 
                                                 
judicial  remedy  available  against  decisions  of  the  NOJ  President  annulling  a  call  for 
applications.  Stakeholders  report  that  the  NOJ  President  does  not  publish  calls  for 
applications for all vacated judicial posts15. Although there is an appointment and promotion 
procedure in place, the NOJ President has extensively used the exceptions allowed by the law 
to fill a vacancy without a call for applications. In 2021, the reassignment of judges after the 
end  of  their  secondment  to  other  state  bodies  outside  the  judiciary  was  added  to  the  list  of 
exceptions16. As observed by  the Venice Commission  in  its Opinion17  of 16 October 2021, 
this system should not be used to institute a practice of bypassing the ordinary processes of 
promoting judges, noting that there are no criteria established for the NOJ President to assign 
a judge to a higher position.  

The  courts  hearing  administrative  cases  have  been  reorganised  and  the  possibility  of 
discretionary termination of judges’ assignment raises concerns. As of 1 March 2022, an 
‘omnibus’ law18 reorganised the judicial review of administrative decisions19. The Budapest 
Regional  Appeal  Court  now  hears  appeals  against  first-instance  decisions  of  the  eight 
regional courts with an administrative department. The Kúria hears petitions for review and 
uniformity  complaints  limited  to  points  of  law.  Exceptionally,  in  cases  related  to  elections, 
referenda and freedom of assembly20 the Kúria proceeds as a first and last instance court21. 
The Kúria reviews the legality of municipal decrees. Since there is no separate administrative 
courts  system,  judges  are  specifically  assigned,  with  their  consent,  to  hear  administrative 
cases.  In  the  Kúria,  judges  dealing  with  administrative  cases  are  assigned  by  the  Kúria 
President; in other courts, they are assigned by the NOJ President upon proposal of the court 
president22. Neither the criteria nor the terms of an assignment or the termination thereof are 
set  out  by  law.  In  the  absence  of  such  criteria,  such  assignments  can  be  terminated  on  a 
discretionary basis, without the consent  of the judge  concerned. Judicial  review is  available 
against  these  decisions23.  In  the  absence  of  criteria  for  the  termination  of  the  assignment, 
there  are  doubts  as  regards  the  effectiveness  of  such  judicial  review.  This  possibility  of  a 
discretionary removal from the pool of judges hearing administrative cases raises concerns as 
regards  judicial  independence,  given  that  it  could  exert  undue  pressure  on  the  judges 
concerned.  According  to  European  standards,  individual  judges  must  be  free  not  only  from 

15   Contribution from the European Association of Judges for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 5. Under Section 
9(3) of Act CLXII of 2011, vacated judicial posts are not necessarily published, as the NOJ President may 
decide to transfer the post to another court, or to fill the vacancy without publishing a call for applications. 

16   Sections 8(f), 27/A, 58 and 62/C of Act CLXII of 2011. 
17   Venice Commission (CDL-AD(2021)036), para. 59. 
18   Act  CXXXIV  of  2021  was  adopted  by  Parliament  on  14  December  2021,  without  public  consultation, 

following the request of the Kúria President. 

19   Another  ‘omnibus’  legislation  introduced  structural  changes  to  the  existing  court  system  seeking  to  make 
administrative justice work faster and more predictably (2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the 
rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 6). 

20  Except for the dissolution of an assembly by the police. 
21   Section 229 of Act XXXVI of 2013. 
22   Section 30(1) and (3) of Act CLXII of 2011 and Sections 76(5)(e) and 77(1) of Act CLXI of 2011.  
23   Sections 76(5)(e) and 77/A(2) of Act CLXI of 2011 and Section 145(1) of Act CLXII of 2011). In 2021, the 
NOJ  President,  following  a  proposal  from  the  respective  court  presidents,  unilaterally  terminated  the 
assignment of  several judges  (including presiding judges)  without any  meaningful justification,  with a 2-3 
days’  notice  (Decisions  102.E/2021  (IV.  26.)  OBHE,  104.E/2021  (IV.  27.)  OBHE,  122.E/2021  (V.  17.) 
OBHE, 137.E/2021 (VI. 9.) OBHE, 166.E/2021 (VI. 28.) OBHE, 167.E/2021 (VII. 2.) OBHE, 176.E/2021 
(VII. 22.) OBHE, 312.E/2021 (XI. 23.) OBHE). In their joint contribution for the 2022 Rule of Law Report 
(pp. 4-5), Amnesty International Hungary and eight other CSOs also refer to such situation.  

5 

 
                                                 
undue  influences  outside  the  judiciary,  but  also  from  within,  such  as  from  those  who  have 
administrative responsibilities in the court24. 

Appointments  to  and  the  case  allocation  in  the  Kúria  have  raised  concerns.  As  of  1 
March 2022, as a rule, administrative cases are heard in the Kúria by panels of five judges25; 
in  cases  related  to  elections  and  referenda,  the  bench  is  composed  of  three  judges26.  The 
Kúria’s  case  allocation  scheme  assigns  judges  to  chambers  organised  in  civil,  criminal  and 
administrative departments. The scheme for the allocation of cases between chambers27 does 
not determine the composition of the judicial panel28. The key elements of the case allocation 
scheme  are  regulated  by  law29.  The  case  allocation  scheme  is  established  by  the  Kúria 
President;  the  Kúria’s  judicial  council  and  the  competent  department  give  a  non-binding 
opinion30  and  have  limited  powers31.  Litigants  can  consult  the  case  allocation  scheme  and 
obtain  information  about  the  number  of  chambers  and  their  composition  on  the  Kúria’s 
website.  The  Venice  Commission  Opinion  of  16  October  2021  analysed  the  Kúria’s  case 
allocation scheme and made proposals to the authorities32. Stakeholders complained that the 
Kúria’s  case  allocation  scheme  does  not  allow  the  parties  to  verify  on  the  basis  of  which 
criteria  the  composition  of  the  bench  has  been  determined33.  European  standards34  require 
that the allocation of cases within a court follow objective, pre-established criteria in order to 
safeguard the right to an independent and impartial judge. As regards the appointments to the 
Kúria, the concerns on the rules on electing its President, expressed in the 2021 Rule of Law 
Report,  have  not  been  addressed35.  The  number  of  judicial  posts  in  the  Kúria  is  not  set  by 
statute but by a decision of the NOJ President36. New judicial posts have been opened in the 

24   See  judgment  of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  of  22  December  2009,  Parlov-Tkalčić  v.  Croatia, 

24810/06, para. 86. 

25   Section 8(6) of Act I of 2017. Before this amendment, all cases were heard by three judges of the  Kúria. In 
civil  and  criminal  cases,  the  Kúria  President  may  set  up  five-judge  panels  for  certain  groups  of  cases, 
following a non-binding opinion of the department concerned and of the judicial council of the Kúria (2021 
Rule  of  Law  Report,  Country  Chapter  on  the  rule  of  law  situation  in  Hungary,  p.  3).  The  Venice 
Commission has recommended to determine in the law itself the criteria for setting-up a five-judge panel for 
certain types of cases (CDL-AD(2021)036), para. 66, point b). 

26   Section 229(2) of Act XXXVI of 2013. 
27   Section 10(1) of Act CLXI of 2011. 
28   Chambers in the Kúria include two to four presiding judges and three to five other judges. The panel hearing 

a case is composed of judges belonging to the same chamber. 

29  Section 10(1) of the Act CLXI of 2011. 
30   Sections 9(1), 151(1)(d) and 155(c) of Act CLXI of 2011. 
31   2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, pp. 3-5. 
32   The Venice Commission recommended that the opinion of the judicial bodies be made public and binding in 
order to ensure the transparency of the process and increase the trust of the citizens in the good and impartial 
functioning of the judiciary (CDL-AD(2021)036), para. 66, point b). 

33   Joint  contribution  from  Amnesty  International  Hungary  and  eight  other  CSOs  for  the  2022  Rule  of  Law 
Report, p. 7. According to stakeholders, in 2021, in at least one politically sensitive case the composition of 
the  adjudicating  panel  was  not  in  line  with  the  case  allocation  scheme.  Upon  the  freedom  of  information 
request lodged by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, the Kúria responded (2021.El.IV.H.35/2) that it does 
not keep record of derogations from the case allocation scheme and that it has no obligation by law to inform 
parties on any such derogation. 

34   Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, para. 24. See 
also judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 2 May 2019, Pasquini v. San Marino, 50956/16, 
paras. 100, 101 and 110. 

35   2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, pp. 5-6. 
36   2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 5. 

6 

 
                                                 
Kúria,  mainly  in  the  administrative  department37.  According  to  stakeholders,  due  to  the 
points  system38  applied  for  the  assessment  of  applications,  candidates  with  little  judicial 
experience  or  coming  from  a  political  career  without  judicial  experience  have  also  been 
appointed39. Stakeholders report that the practice of secondment extends far beyond its legal 
objectives and may be used to circumvent the guarantees of judicial appointments in regular 
application procedures40.  

The Court of Justice issued a ruling precluding the Kúria from declaring a request for 
preliminary  ruling  unlawful.  Following  a  decision  of  10  September  2019  in  which  the 
Kúria  had  considered  a  preliminary  reference  by  a  Hungarian  court  to  the  Court  of  Justice 
unlawful, the Court of Justice ruled on 23 November 202141 that EU law precludes a national 
supreme  court,  following  an  appeal  in  the  interests  of  the  law  brought  by  the  Prosecutor 
General,  from  declaring  a  request  for  a  preliminary  ruling  submitted  by  a  lower  court 
unlawful  on  the  ground  that  the  questions  referred  are  not  relevant  and  necessary  for  the 
resolution  of  the  dispute  in  the  main  proceedings.  The  Court  of  Justice  also  found  that  EU 
law  precludes  disciplinary  proceedings  from  being  brought  against  a  national  judge  on  the 
ground that the judge has made a preliminary reference42. On the same day, the Kúria issued 

37   Contribution from the European Association of Judges for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 5. In 2021, 14 
judicial and 10 senior (executive) positions were opened at the Kúria, significantly changing its composition. 
The Government notes that due to legislative changes that entered into force on 1 April 2020, the number of 
administrative  cases  brought  before  the  Kúria  has  almost  doubled.  This  required  the  setting-up  of  new 
chambers  within  the  Kúria’s  administrative  department  and  an  increase  in  the  number  of  Kúria  judges 
dealing  with  administrative  cases.  As  soon  as  the  obstacles  caused  by  the  COVID-19  pandemic  were 
removed in 2021, 10 vacancies in the Kúria could be filled through calls for applications. Further vacancies 
were also filled through calls for applications.  

38   See  2020  Rule  of  Law  Report,  Country  Chapter  on  the  rule  of  law  situation  in  Hungary,  p.  2.  Judicial 
applications  are  assessed  on  the  basis  of  a  points  system  established  by  Decree  7/2011  of  4  March  2011, 
issued  by  the  Minister  of  Justice  and  based  on  Act  CLXII  of  2011,  which  contains  an  exhaustive  list  of 
criteria to be taken into consideration in determining the ranking of applicants. The Minister of Justice can 
define the number of points to be awarded for these criteria. The assessment system awards points based on 
an  interview  and  certain  elements  of  the  application  file  (e.g.  length  of  service  as  a  senior  civil  servant, 
experience  with  the  assessment  and  preparation  of  draft  legislation).  According  to  the  Government,  the 
points system ensures that both candidates with a previous judicial experience and candidates coming from 
outside  the  court  system  may  be  appointed  a judge  under  the  same  conditions.  It  determines  the  objective 
criteria for awarding points to candidates.  

39   For example, a candidate  who had been a  State Secretary.  Contribution  from  the European  Association of 

Judges for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, pp. 5-6. 

40   Joint  contribution  from  Amnesty  International  Hungary  and  eight  other  CSOs  for  the  2022  Rule  of  Law 
Report, p. 7. In 2020, 43 judges were seconded to the Kúria (NOJ President (2021), 2020 Annual Report, p. 
17). Some judges spend years at the Kúria without a call for applications. Judges can be seconded to another 
court  to  support  their  professional  development  or  to  guarantee  the  even  distribution  of  the  workload 
between courts (Section 31(2) of Act CLXII of 2011). The Government notes that by summer 2022, long-
term  secondments  to  the  Kúria  have  been  completely  abolished.  As  of  1  March  2022,  the  number  of 
administrative cases brought to the Kúria has been decreasing which also contributes to a significant change 
in the practice of secondments. 

41   Judgment of the CJEU of 23 November 2021, IS, C-564/19, ECLI:EU:C:2021:949. 
42   On  10  September  2019,  the  Kúria  held  a  preliminary  reference  by  a  District  Court  judge  to  the  Court  of 
Justice to be unlawful, considering the questions irrelevant for the case at hand. The Kúria decision was of a 
declaratory nature and did not annul the decision to refer the case to the Court of Justice. Nevertheless, in 
October 2019, the ad interim president of the Budapest Regional Court, referring explicitly to the decision of 
the  Kúria,  initiated  disciplinary  proceedings  against  the  judge  who  issued  the  preliminary  reference.  In 
November 2019, the court president withdrew his motion for the opening of disciplinary proceedings. 

7 

 
                                                 
a  statement43  confirming  that  until  it  decides  otherwise,  its  decision44  is  final  and  its 
interpretation  of  the  law  binding.  The  procedural  rules45  allowing  to  challenge  before  the 
Kúria the necessity of a preliminary reference have not been amended. The Court of Justice 
has made clear that a decision by the Kúria considering a preliminary reference unlawful is 
liable to weaken both the authority of the answers that the Court is to provide to the referring 
judge and the decision that the latter will give in the light of those answers46.  

The rules on the uniformity procedure have been amended. In response to the 16 October 
2021 Opinion of the Venice Commission47, as of 1 January 2022, Parliament amended48 the 
rules  of  the  uniformity  procedure49  conducted  by  the  Kúria.  The  legislative  amendment 
assimilated  the  rules  of  the  uniformity  procedure  to  those  of  the  uniformity  complaint 
procedure which may be initiated by parties to proceedings50.  

Judicial  salaries  continued  to  increase,  while  the  discretionary  award  of  bonuses  by 
court  managers  continues  to  raise  concerns.  Judicial  salaries  have  been  increased  over  a 
period  of  three  years51.  In  the  third  phase,  as  of  2022,  the  salary  base  for  judges  and 
prosecutors  was  further  increased  by  13%.  As  regards  bonuses,  there  is  no  statutory  list  or 
definition of the types and forms of bonuses that the NOJ President and court presidents can 
distribute  among  judges,  nor  are  there  clear  criteria  as  to  what  serves  as  the  basis  of  such 

43   Kúria  (2021),  Statement  regarding  the  judgment  delivered  by  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  EU  in  case  C-
564/19.  In  an  earlier  statement  dated  16  April  2021,  the  Kúria  reaffirmed  that  its  decision  was  limited  to 
declaring a violation of criminal procedure rules. 

44   Bt.III.838/2019/11. 
45   Sections 667 and 490(1) of Act XC of 2017. 
46   Judgment  of  the  CJEU,  of  23  November  2021,  IS,  C-564/19,  ECLI:EU:C:2021:949,  paras.  74-75.  In  its 
contribution to the 2022 Rule of Law Report (pp. 20 and 22), the European Association of Judges considered 
that this could dissuade Hungarian courts from referring questions for a preliminary ruling to the Court of 
Justice. 

47   CDL-AD(2021)036. 
48   Section 71 of Act CXXXIV of 2021 amending Act CLXI of 2011. 
49   The  Kúria’s  uniformity  decisions  are  binding  on  courts  (Article  25(3)  of  the  Fundamental  Law).  As 
explained in the 2021 Rule of Law Report, the uniformity procedure – now renamed ‘preliminary reference 
procedure in the interest of uniformity of law’ – can be applied in two scenarios. In the first scenario, when a 
Kúria  chamber  wishes  to  deviate  from  the  Kúria’s  published  case  law,  it  must  stay  the  proceedings  and 
request  a  uniformity  decision.  In  the  second  scenario,  the  Kúria  (vice)  President,  the  heads  of  Kúria 
departments  and  the  Prosecutor  General  may  request  a  uniformity  decision  if  it  is  necessary  to  ensure  the 
uniform  interpretation  of  the  law,  or  to  alter  or  annul  a  previous  uniformity  decision  (2021  Rule  of  Law 
Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 4). Section 27(2) of Act CLXI of 2011 
provides  that  the  regional  (appeal)  court  presidents  may  propose  that  the  head  of  the  competent  Kúria 
department make a preliminary reference in the interest of uniformity of law.  

50   The amendment did not abolish the possibility to adopt the binding uniformity decisions as proposed by the 
Venice  Commission  (CDL-AD(2021)036),  para.  66,  point  c).  Parties  to  the  proceedings  may  lodge  a 
uniformity complaint against a final decision of the Kúria if it deviates from the Kúria’s published case law 
(2021  Rule  of  Law  Report,  Country  Chapter  on  the  rule  of  law  situation  in  Hungary,  p.  4).  After  the 
amendment,  the  preliminary  reference  in  the  interest  of  uniformity  of  law  is  decided  by  the  uniformity 
complaint  panel  (Section  34  of  Act  CLXI  of  2011).  Although  the  legal  rules  on  the  composition  of  the 
uniformity complaint panel have not been changed (it is chaired by the Kúria President or Vice President; its 
other  members  are  selected  by  the  chair),  as  of  1  January  2022,  the  Kúria  President  amended  the  case 
allocation  scheme  to  set  up  two  uniformity  complaint  panels,  each  composed  of  the  Kúria  President  and 
Vice President and 19 senior Kúria judges. 

51   2020  Rule  of  Law  Report,  Country  Chapter  on  the  rule  of  law  situation  in  Hungary,  p.  6.  As  of  January 

2020, salaries were increased on average by 32%, and as of January 2021, by 12%. 

8 

 
                                                 
decisions52.  According  to  stakeholders,  this  wide  discretion  can  lead  to  self-censorship  by 
judges53.  The  NOJ  President’s  refusal54  to  provide  the  National  Judicial  Council  with 
anonymised  data  regarding  the  award  of  bonuses  further  adds  to  a  lack  of  transparency. 
According  to  the  interpretation  of  the  NOJ  President,  this  issue  is  not  covered  by  the 
supervisory powers of the National Judicial Council. According to the Council of Europe, the 
principal rules of the system of remuneration for professional judges should be laid down by 
law  and  systems  making  judges’  core  remuneration  dependent  on  performance  should  be 
avoided as they could create difficulties for the independence of judges55.  

The rules on the removal of the Prosecutor General have been amended, while GRECO 
recommendations remain to be  fully addressed. Certain elements of the legal framework 
led GRECO to issue recommendations to review the rules for appointment of the Prosecutor 
General in order to safeguard the office from political influence56. As of 18 November 2021, 
an  amendment  to  a  cardinal  law57  introduced  the  requirement  of  two-thirds  majority  of  all 
members of Parliament  when voting on the removal of the Prosecutor General  from office. 
This  rule applies  to  the incumbent  Prosecutor General,  elected in  2019 for a period of nine 
years58. The recommendation of GRECO to remove the possibility to maintain the Prosecutor 
General  in  office  after  the  expiry  of  his/her  mandate  remains  unaddressed59.  Stakeholders 
have  expressed  concerns  as  regards  the  discretionary  powers  of  the  prosecution  service  to 
decide  on  the  investigation  and  prosecution  of  cases,  which  are  further  amplified  by  the 
strictly  hierarchical  architecture  of  the  prosecution  service  enabling  the  Prosecutor  General 
and  other  senior  prosecutors  to  instruct  subordinate  prosecutors  and  to  reallocate  cases 
assigned to them60.  

52   2021  Rule  of  Law  Report,  Country  Chapter  on  the  rule  of  law  situation  in  Hungary,  p.  8.  There  are 
normative bonuses based on objective criteria (e.g. years of service) or measurable surplus activity. For the 
latter, detailed guidelines have been issued by the NOJ President (Directive 5/2013 (VI. 25.) OBH). 

53   Joint  contribution  from  Amnesty  International  Hungary  and  eight  other  CSOs  for  the  2022  Rule  of  Law 
Report,  p.  10.  In  addition  to  deciding  directly  on  end-of-the-year  bonuses,  it  is  often  the  discretionary 
decision of the employer whether to allow the judge to participate in the activities that serve as the basis of 
granting  the  bonus.  E.g.  a  court  president  can  prevent  a  judge  from  participating  in  projects,  acting  as  an 
instructor for younger judges or being a member in judicial working groups, which automatically deprives 
them from the possibility of receiving such bonuses. 

54   Letter  (2021.OBH.III.D.1/34)  of  the  NOJ  President  to  the  President  of  the  National  Judicial  Council.  The 
NOJ President is of the view that this issue is not covered by the supervisory power of the National Judicial 
Council. 

55   Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, paras. 53 and 
55.  According  to  the  Venice  Commission,  bonuses  which  include  an  element  of  discretion  should  be 
excluded (CDL-AD(2010)004, para. 51).  

56   2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 8. See GRECO Fourth 

Evaluation Round – Second Interim Compliance Report. 

57   Section 85 of Act CXXII of 2021 amending Section 61/A(1)(i) of Act XXXVI of 2021. 
58   The Prosecutor General is nominated by the President of the Republic from among prosecutors and elected 
by  Parliament  with  a  two-thirds  majority  (Article  29(4)  of  the  Fundamental  Law).  This  rule  has  been 
unchanged since 1 January 2012. 

59   2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 8. 
60   Joint  contribution  from  Amnesty  International  Hungary  and  eight  other  CSOs  for  the  2022  Rule  of  Law 

Report, p. 12. 

9 

 
                                                 
Quality  

The digitalisation of the justice system continues to be overall high61. Hungary ranks very 
high when it comes to digital solutions to conduct and follow court proceedings in criminal 
cases and online access  to  published judgments  by the  general  public.  It also  ranks high as 
regards the use of digital technology by courts and prosecution services, and the existence of 
digital  solutions  to  initiate  and  follow  proceedings  in  civil/commercial  and  administrative 
cases62. Moreover, Hungary has very good results as regards the promotion of and incentives 
for using alternative dispute resolution methods63. 

Efficiency 

The  efficiency  in  civil  and  administrative  cases  remains  high64.  Hungary  performs  very 
well as regards the estimated time needed to resolve litigious civil and commercial cases at 
all court instances, to resolve administrative cases at first instance and at all court instances; 
the  number  of  pending  civil,  commercial  and  administrative  and  other  cases,  and  pending 
administrative cases65. In January 2022, a new law66 on pecuniary compensation for delay in 
civil  proceedings  entered  into  force.  This  law  provides  for  compensation  in  the  form  of 
pecuniary satisfaction in case of violation of the fundamental right to have civil proceedings 
completed within a reasonable time. Administrative and criminal proceedings are not affected 
by this law67. 

II. 

ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK  

The  Ministry  of  Interior  is  responsible  for  the  overall  coordination  of  the  anti-corruption 
policy and oversight over the National Protection Service. As a law enforcement agency, the 
National Protection Service is in charge of crime detection within the police, law enforcement 
and  other  government  agencies,  including  lifestyle  monitoring  and  integrity  tests  of  public 
officials.  A  smaller  division  in  the  National  Protection  Service  is  also  entrusted  with 
corruption prevention tasks, including intra-governmental cooperation and evaluation of the 
anti-corruption strategy and action plans. The police can investigate private sector corruption 
and  corruption-related  economic  crimes.  However,  the  investigation  and  prosecution  of 
corruption  in  the  public  sector  fall  under  the  exclusive  competence  of  the  Investigation 
Division of the Central Chief Prosecution Office of Investigation and its five regional offices. 
The prosecution service is supported by the investigative forces of the police and the National 
Protection  Service;  it  oversees  investigations  carried  out  by  other  investigative  entities, 
including the National Tax and Customs Administration. The State Audit Office contributes 
to corruption prevention with its competences for the control of the financial management of 
public  funds,  the  monitoring  of  state-owned  companies’  compliance  with  statutory  public 
disclosure obligations, as well as political party finance and campaign finance audits. 

61   2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 9. 
62   See Figures 47, 48, 43 and 46, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard.  
63  Figure 29, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
64   See 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 9. 
65   See Figures 8, 9, 10, 14 and 16, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
66   Act XCIV of 2021. 
67   Contribution  from  Liberties  for  the  2022  Rule  of  Law  Report,  pp.  9-10.  Joint  contribution  from  Amnesty 

International Hungary and eight other CSOs for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, pp. 16-17. 

10 

 
                                                 
The perception of public sector corruption among experts and the business executives is 
that  the  level  of  corruption  in  the  public  sector  remains  high.  In  the  2021  Corruption 
Perceptions  Index  by  Transparency  International,  Hungary  scores  43/100  and  ranks  26th  in 
the European Union and 73rd globally68. This perception is relatively stable over the past five 
years69.  The  2022  Special  Eurobarometer  on  Corruption  shows  that  91%  of  respondents 
consider corruption widespread in their country (EU average 68%) and 27% of respondents 
feel  personally  affected  by  corruption  in  their  daily  lives  (EU  average  24%)70.  As  regards 
businesses, 75% of companies consider that corruption is widespread (EU average 63%) and 
45%  consider  that  that  corruption  is  a  problem  when  doing  business  (EU  average  34%)71. 
Furthermore, 37% of respondents find that there are enough successful prosecutions to deter 
people  from  corrupt  practices  (EU  average  34%)72,  while  17%  of  companies  believe  that 
people  and  businesses  caught  for  bribing  a  senior  official  are  appropriately  punished  (EU 
average 29%)73. 

The  implementation  period  of  the  2020-2022  Anti-Corruption  Strategy74  and  of  the 
related Action  Plan has  been  extended.  In December 2021, the Government Resolution75 
adopting  the  mid-term  strategy  and  action  plan  was  amended  to  postpone  the  deadlines  for 
the majority of the measures until the end of 202276 or the first semester of 2023. Most of the 
strategy tasks are delegated to the Ministry of Interior, while the National Protection Service 
is  tasked  with  the  overall  coordination  of  the  implementation  of  the  strategy.  Little 
information  is,  however,  publicly  available  on  their  activities  to  implement  the  strategy, 
which  reduces  possibilities  for  public  monitoring  and  oversight77.  Among  the  non-

68   Transparency International (2022), Corruption Perceptions Index 2021. The level of perceived corruption is 
categorised  as  follows:  low  (the  perception  among  experts  and  business  executives  of  public  sector 
corruption scores above 79); relatively low (scores between 79-60), relatively high (scores between 59-50), 
high (scores below 50). 

69   In 2017 the score was 45, while, in 2021, the score is 43. The score significantly increases/decreases when it 
changes  more than  five points; improves/deteriorates (changes between 4-5 points) and is relatively stable 
(changes from 1-3 points) in the last five years. 

70   Special  Eurobarometer  523  on  Corruption  (2022).  The  Eurobarometer  data  on  citizens’  corruption 
perception and experience is updated every second year. The previous data set is the Special Eurobarometer 
502 (2020). 

71   Flash Eurobarometer 507 on Businesses’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU (2022). The Eurobarometer 
data on business attitudes towards corruption as is updated every second year. The previous data set is the 
Flash Eurobarometer 482 (2019). 

72   Special Eurobarometer 523 on Corruption (2022).  
73   Flash Eurobarometer 507 on Businesses’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU (2022).  
74   Medium-term National Anti-Corruption Strategy for the period of 2020-2022. 
75   The  Action  Plan  was  adopted  by  the  Government  Decision  1328/2020  of  19  June  2020  on  the  Mid-term 

National Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2020-2022 and the accompanying action plan. 

76   Measures  affected  by  the  postponement  until  31  December  2022  comprise,  for  instance,  trainings  for 
prosecutors  on  the  use  of  surveillance  tools  in  investigations;  a  corruption  prevention  pilot  project  for  the 
border control police; development of a Good Governance indicator system; dissemination of foreign bribery 
information; trainings of integrity officers. 

77   In 2021, three articles were made publicly available on trainings for officials in foreign services conducted 
by  the  National  Protection  Service,  on  the  OECD  Public  Integrity  Toolkit,  and  a  consultation  of  health 
worker representatives. Apart from this, the website of the Ministry of Interior provides only information on 
the  main  office  holders  in  the  ministry  and  news  as  part  of  the  centralised  Government  communication, 
https://kormany.hu/belugyminiszterium, while the website of the National Protection Service’s website only 
links back to the official, dedicated anti-corruption website without any relevant content on activities either, 
https://nvsz.hu/tevekenyseg/korrupcioellenes-tevekenyseggel-osszefuggo-kormanyzati-feladatokban-valo-
kozremukodes-0  and  https://nvsz.hu/szervezet/nemzeti-vedelmi-szolgalat/korrupciomegelozesi-foosztaly. 

11 

 
                                                 
 
implemented measures are those with the potential to contribute to a more effective detection 
and prosecution of corruption in public institutions and state-owned enterprises78 as well as 
the  strategy  implementation  report79.  More  generally  and  as  previously  noted,  the  scope  of 
the  anti-corruption  strategy  is  limited  to  fostering  integrity  in  the  public  administration80. 
Strategic  policy  coordination  in  relevant  anti-corruption  areas,  such  as  lobbying,  ‘revolving 
doors’, asset disclosure and political party financing, does not take place under the strategy, 
as they remain outside its scope81. Although an evaluation of the past ten years of Hungary’s 
fight against corruption was reported to have taken place, there is no public information about 
the preparation of a new strategic anti-corruption framework and action plan beyond 202282.  

Despite  amendments to the Criminal  Code to  address  foreign bribery, there is  still an 
absence  of  enforcement.  The  relevant  anti-corruption  offences  are  criminalised,  including 
bribery  and  foreign  bribery83.  As  reported  last  year,  an  amendment  to  the  Criminal  Code, 
which  entered  into  force  on  1  January  2021,  modified  the  definition  of  ‘foreign  public 
official’  by  clarifying  that  it  includes  officials  of  foreign  public  enterprises,  and  introduced 
stricter  sanction  levels  for  facilitation  payments84.  There  are  concerns  about  the  continued 
absence  of  enforcement  efforts  as  no  new  investigations  into  foreign  bribery  have  started 
despite  OECD-recorded  allegations  and  the  presence  of  significant  foreign  bribery  risk 
factors, notably related to multinational enterprises exporting from  Hungary in a number of 
high-risk sectors85. Regarding detection of foreign  bribery, Hungary has  yet  to  develop  and 

This would need to be seen in the context of the freedom of information law requiring proactive publishing 
of data (see pillar III). 

78   See  European  Semester  country  report  on  Hungary  (2022).  Information  received  from  Transparency 

International/K-Monitor/Corruption Research Centre in the context of the country visit to Hungary. 

79   Measures  affected  by  the  postponement  to  2023  relate,  for  instance,  to  the  development  of  an  automated 
decision-support system to improve the transparency and accountability of the decision-making process (31 
January  2023);  a  casebook  on  tackling  corruption  for  practitioners  (30  June  2023); data  entries  in  the  risk 
assessment  system  of  the  National  Protection  Service  (30  June  2023);  a  legal  framework  on  corruption  in 
major infrastructure investments (30 June 2023); surveys on integrity management models for state entities 
and state-owned enterprises (30 June 2023); and Implementation report of the tasks set out in the Strategy 
2020-2022 by the Minister of Interior (31 May 2023 for the  report of the Ministers; 30  June 2023 for the 
summary report of the Minister of Interior). 

80   The strategy includes primarily actions relating to the culture of integrity and e-administration, such as the 
introduction  and  development  of  electronic  solutions  to  increase  transparency  (e.g.  automated  decision-
making),  monitoring  integrity  risks,  integrity  trainings  for  civil  servants,  and  specialised  anti-corruption 
training for law enforcement, judges and prosecutors, cf. 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the 
rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 11. 

81  2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 11, and 2020 Rule of 

Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 11. 

82   Hungarian  Competition  Authority  (2021),  Press  release,  ‘A  decade  for  integrity  committed  to  eliminating 

corruption’. 

83   Hungary’s criminal code includes the relevant definitions of corruption and corruption-related offences and 
criminalises,  among  others,  active  bribery  (Sections  290,  293,  295  of  Act  C  of  2012)  and  passive  bribery 
(Sections 291, 294, 296), and trading in influence, embezzlement, misappropriation of public funds, abuse of 
office (Chapter XXVII), and failure to report a crime of corruption.  

84   2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 11. 
85   OECD, Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, Phase 4 Two-Year Follow-Up Report: Hungary 
(2021), p.  3,  para.  3  and  p. 6  on  recommendation  4.a.,  reporting  that  only  one  small-scale  foreign  bribery 
case has been concluded, resulting in the conviction of 26 natural persons between 2008 and 2011, since the 
entry into force of the Convention in Hungary. In turn, Croatia’s Supreme Court upheld in October 2021 its 
verdict against the ex-prime minister of Croatia and the CEO of the Hungarian oil and gas company MOL, 
for  active  and  passive  bribery  in  connection  with  MOL’s  acquisition  of  stakes  in  INA,  Croatia’s  oil 
company.  Reportedly,  the  MOL’s  CEO  was  tried  in  absentia,  and  sentenced  to  two  years  in  prison. 
Hungarian Spectrum (2021), ‘MOL’s CEO Zsolt Hernádi won’t be  gallivanting around the globe any time 

12 

 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
implement  a  dedicated  strategy86.  Notably,  criminal  sanctions  can  be  reduced  or  even  be 
dispensed  by  judges  if  the  suspect  confesses  corruption,  surrenders  the  illegally  obtained 
advantage, and discloses the circumstances of the criminal act to the authorities before they 
become aware of the commission of the offence87. 

Integrity tests and ‘lifestyle monitoring’ continue to be the main tool to deter and detect 
corruption in the public sector, while oversight could benefit from more independence. 
The  prosecution  service  considers  the  National  Protection  Service  to  be  the  main  and 
indispensable  source  for  evidence-gathering  to  initiate  corruption  investigations  and 
prosecutions88, in particular of petty corruption, such as gratuity payments in the healthcare 
sector. The possibility of conducting covert surveillance of public officials through ‘integrity 
tests’  to  establish  whether  they  commit  corruption  has  to  be  approved  by  the  public 
prosecutor and, in case a suspected crime is detected, reported to the competent agency89. The 
‘lifestyle  monitoring’  is  conducted  at  the  request  of  the  responsible  head  of  the  public 
institution  and  related  findings  can  be  a  ground  for  dismissal  of  the  public  official90.  Other 
detection tools, including asset declarations, whistleblower disclosures and registries, play a 
relatively  minor  role  in  corruption  investigations91.  State  bodies  with  supervisory  functions 
have  seen  political  appointments  raising  questions  as  to  their  impartiality  in  detecting 

soon’.  See  also  Hungary  Today  (2021),  ‘Croatia  Top  Court  Affirms  Prison  Sentence  for  MOL  Chief 
Hernadi’.  In  general,  Hungary’s  exposure  to  export-related  foreign  bribery  risks  largely  stems  from  the 
activities  of  multinational  enterprises  whose  activities  are  expanding  into  new  technology-based  industrial 
production, including in the transportation, healthcare and pharmaceutical industries – all sectors at high risk 
of  corruption,  see  OECD  (2019),  Implementing  the  OECD  Anti-Bribery  Convention,  Phase  4  Report  - 
Hungary, p. 10. With regard to state-owned enterprises, the electricity and gas, transport and finance sectors 
are at risk due to challenges in the implementation of effective governance arrangements, ibid, p. 8. 

86   OECD  (2021),  Implementing  the  OECD  Anti-Bribery  Convention,  Phase  4  Two-Year  Follow-Up  Report: 

Hungary, following up on the OECD recommendation of the Phase 4 Report – Hungary (2019), p. 54. 

87   Sections  290  to299  Act  C  of  2012  on  the  Criminal  Code.  According  to  the  Government,  the  underlying 
rationale  for  the  reduction  of  dispensing  of  sanctions  is  to  encourage  the  reporting  and  thus  detection  of 
corruption  crimes,  while  criminal  liability  would  be  established  nevertheless.  Under  the  UN  Convention 
Against  Corruption  State  Parties  can,  but  are  not  obliged  to,  allow  for  mitigating  punishment  to  special 
witnesses that assist the investigation of other, sophisticated offenders. 

88   Information received from the Prosecutor General’s Office in the context of the country visit to Hungary. 

See  also  Prosecutor  General  (2021),  Parliamentary  report  on  the  activities  of  the  Prosecution  Service  in 
2020, p. 25. As reported last year, criminal proceedings for corruption offenses are mainly initiated on the 
basis of the criminal investigation activities of the investigating authorities. The majority of the investigated 
cases are detected by the National Protective Service, see 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the 
rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 12. 

89   The range of public officials who may be subject to the integrity test is defined in Act XXXIV of 1994 on 
the  Police.  For  more  details,  see  National  Protection  Service  website  on  integrity  testing.  As  reported  last 
year, the amendment of 1 January 2021, broadened the scope of staff that may be subjected to integrity tests 
to all members of the Government and the public administration, including medical staff and social workers, 
see 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 12. The individual 
concerned  by  the  surveillance  shall  only  be  informed  once  evidence  of  corruption  is  detected  and  this 
resulted in criminal proceedings. Input from Hungary for the 2020 Rule of Law Report. 

90   The  lifestyle  monitoring  takes  into  account  whether  or  not  the  public  official’s  way  of  living  is  beyond 
his/her  salary.  In  order  to  conduct  the  lifestyle  monitoring,  the  curriculum  vita  and  a  completed  consent 
declarations  have  to  be  submitted  by  the  concerned  person  and  those  living  in  the  same  household,  see 
National Protection Service website on lifestyle monitoring. 

91   Information received from the Prosecution Service in the context of the country visit to Hungary. See also 
contribution  from  K-Monitor  for  the  2022  Rule  of  Law  Report,  p.  18,  and  2021  Rule  of  Law  Report, 
Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 12. 

13 

 
                                                                                                                                                        
corruption92.  Deficient  independent  oversight  mechanisms  and  close  interconnections 
between politics and certain national businesses are conducive to corruption93.  

Some  measures  to  improve  corruption  investigations  involving  EU  funds  have  been 
taken.  Concerns  exist  regarding  the  frequent  practice  of  the  Hungarian  authorities  to 
withdraw EU-funded projects in case of financial recommendations issued by the EU Anti-
Fraud  Office  (OLAF)  or  the  opening  of  OLAF  investigations,  while  amounts  due  are  not 
systematically  recovered  from  the  economic  operator  who  committed  the  irregularity  or 
fraud94. Similarly, the refusal of economic operators to cooperate during on-the-spot checks 
conducted  by  OLAF  have  been  in  focus95.  In  order  to  better  protect  the  EU  funds  from 
potential  fraud  and  corruption,  the  Prosecutor  General’s  Office  and  OLAF  have  signed  a 
cooperation agreement in February 2022, which commits both parties to closer cooperation. 
However, as it was recently signed, the effectiveness of the cooperation agreement will still 
have to be seen in practice. The recent allegations regarding the existence of a corruption ring 
in  management authorities linked to  national  and EU funds raise concerns as to  the lack of 
systemic oversight96.  

Despite good inter-institutional cooperation and adequate levels of resources, challenges 
remain  in  establishing  a  track-record  of  investigations,  prosecutions  and  final 
judgments in high-level corruption cases.  The prosecution service reports adequate levels 
of human and financial resources, and of specialisation to carry out their tasks97, and the legal 
framework provides the conditions for effective investigation and prosecution of corruption. 
Cooperation between the relevant anti-corruption entities, including the prosecution service, 
police, tax and custom authorities, and the National Protection Service, is considered good98. 
To facilitate more effective investigations, including in corruption cases, new IT systems for 
the prosecution service are under development99. The planned IT cooperation system for the 
handling and sharing of sensitive data among investigative authorities aims at addressing by 1 
December  2024  the  persisting  challenges  in  evidence-gathering,  particularly  with  regard  to 

92   Appointments have recently also been sought for unusually long periods for a mandate, such as in the newly 
created Supervisory Authority of Regulated Activities overseeing concessions, for which the President was 
appointed in October 2021 for a period of nine years, while grounds for the termination of the mandate are 
limited,  or  the  appointment  of  the  vice-president  of  the  State  Audit  Office  for  the  next  twelve  years.  See 
State Audit Office (2021), The President of the SAO has asked Dr. Mónika Karas to be Vice-President. See 
also  Freedom  House  (2022),  Freedom  in  the  World  –  Hungary  Country  Report,  emphasising  the 
government’s  broad  control  over  auditing  and  investigative  bodies;  and  the  2021  Rule  of  Law  Report, 
Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 12. 

93   As  recognised  also  by  the  OECD  (2021),  Economic  Survey  Hungary,  p.  57;  and  also  2021  Rule  of  Law 

Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 12. 

94   See 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 15. See also the 
OLAF (2021), 2021 Annual Report, for the latest data on irregularities, as well as OLAF’s contribution to 
the 2022 Rule of Law Report.  

95   Cf. 2021 Rule of Law report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 15. 
96   See Central Investigation Prosecutor’s Office (2022), Press Statement ‘Grants obtained through corruption’; 
Telex  (2022),  ‘18  people  questioned  over  bribery  in  Finance  Ministry  case’;  Telex  (2022),  ‘Five  arrested, 
one placed under criminal supervision in corruption case involving Finance Ministry’.  

97   Information  received  from  the  Prosecutor  General’s  Office  in  the  context  of  the  country  visit  to  Hungary. 

See also 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 11. 

98   Information received from the Prosecutor General’s Office in the context of the country visit to Hungary. 
99   The  reform  includes  two  IT  components  to  handle  sensitive  information  and  to  manage  case  files. 
Information received from the Prosecutor General’s Office in the context of the country visit to Hungary.  

14 

 
                                                 
obtaining  relevant  financial  data  from  the  currently  numerous  separate  state  registries100. 
Moreover,  a  new  case  management  system  is  planned  to  take  up  operations  in  support  of 
prosecutorial  investigations  by  1  July  2026.  The  number  of  registered  criminal  procedures 
initiated for corruption crimes increased in 2021101. The overall increase is reportedly due to 
the increase in the number of criminal proceedings opened for private sector corruption cases, 
including  primarily  petty  corruption102.  Furthermore,  the  increase  in  the  number  of 
proceedings  for  public  sector  corruption  significantly  fluctuated  over  the  years103.  The 
indictment rates for corruption are reported to be overall high104. Some new high-level cases 
involving  politicians  were  investigated  in  2021105.  However,  serious  concerns  remain 
regarding  the  absence  of  a  robust  track  record  of  investigations  of  corruption  allegations 
concerning  high-level  officials  and  their  immediate  circle106.  This  poses  a  risk  of  low 

100  The IT database would offer the possibilities to all prosecutors to interconnect and thus investigate criminal 
cases,  including  through  artificial  intelligence  and  an  open-source  element,  according  to  information 
received by the Prosecutor General’s Office in the context of the country visit to Hungary. 

101  See  written  contribution  from  the  Prosecution  Service  in  the  context  of  the  country  visit,  p.  6,  stating  an 

increase from 872 (in 2020) to 1306 (2021). 

102  With  185  private  sector  corruption  cases  initiated  in  2020  compared  to  317 proceedings  initiated  in  2021. 
According to the prosecution service, the increase is  due to the amendments to the Criminal Code in force 
since 1 January 2021 and the criminalisation of informal facilitation payments (‘gratitude payments’) in the 
health care sector, thus relating to petty corruption, see written contribution from the Prosecution Service in 
the context of the country visit, p. 7. 

103  Public  sector  corruption  proceedings  initiated  varied  over time:  853  (in  2019);  508  (in 2020);  and  729  (in 
2021).  See  in  this  context  also  the  Prosecutor  General’s  released  video  message  on  the  activities  of  the 
Prosecution  Service  in  2020  (6  October  2021)  on  the  annual  report  to  Parliament  on  the  activities  of  the 
prosecution service, indicating that the trend of previous years of a  growing number of registered criminal 
procedures initiated for public sector corruption crimes was reversed and even dropped in 2020. See also the 
Prosecutor General (2021), Extract of the Parliamentary report on the activities of the Prosecution Service in 
2020. 

104  Written  contribution  from  the  Prosecution  Service  in  the  context  of  the  country  visit,  p.  8.  See  also  2021 
Rule  of  Law  report,  Country  Chapter  on  the  rule  of  law  situation  in  Hungary,  p.  12.  See  also  the  OLAF 
(2021),  2021  Annual  Report,  for  the  latest  data  on  irregularities,  indicating  an  indictment  rate  of  67%  in 
Hungary. 

105  List of cases in the written contribution from the Prosecution Service in the context of the country visit, pp. 
12 et seq. and Press release (2021), The Central Chief Prosecution Office of Investigation has interrogated 
MP  Dr  Pál  Völner  concerning  allegations  of  accepting  bribes  from  the  chief  bailiff.  The  crime  was 
reportedly detected through phone tapping by the National Protective Service. The Member of Parliament’s 
immunity was lifted on 14 December 2021, after he had formally become a suspect. While he resigned from 
his position at the Ministry on the day the scandal broke out on 7 December 2021, he continued to serve as a 
Member of Parliament, along with fellow MPs György Simonka and István Boldog, whose cases are heard 
in court. None of the suspects were detained in pre-trial detention but remained with their seat in Parliament. 
106  2020 and 2021 Rule of Law  reports, Country Chapter on the rule of law  situation in Hungary, pp. 10 (for 
2020) and 12 (for 2021). See Átlátszó (2021), ‘Botched investigations: 20 important cases that got stuck with 
prosecutors’,  outlining  that  investigations  have  either  stalled  for  a  long  time  or,  on  the  contrary,  the 
proceedings  were  quickly  closed  ‘in  the  absence  of  crime’,  or  no  investigations  were  launched.  Notably, 
even where cases are dismissed at an early stage in the detection phase on lower levels of the police or the 
National  Tax  Authority,  the  prosecution  service  has  the  right  to  take  on  the  investigation  and  instruct  the 
police  forces  to  act  accordingly.  In  general,  the  Prosecutor  General’s  Office  does  not  collect  separate 
statistics on ‘high-level corruption’ cases as this is not a category defined in criminal law but made reference 
to  corruption  cases  that  concerned  top  executives  performing  public  functions.  See  also  Civitas 
Institute/Transparency  International  (2021),  Black  Book  II  –  Corruption  and  State  Capture  in  Hungary. 
Contribution from K-Monitor for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 22; contribution from IDEA Institute for 
the  2022  Rule  of  Law  Report,  pp.  11-12  with  regard  to  EU  funds-related  cases.  See  also  Bertelsmann 
Stiftung  (2022),  Transformation  Index:  Hungary  Country  Report,  highlighting  that  the  prosecution  of 
corruption is limited to those cases, which can be considered political petty corruption, happening outside of 
the negotiated rules of the power pyramid. 

15 

 
                                                 
accountability,  in  view  of  the  lack  of  judicial  review  for  prosecutorial  decisions  not  to 
investigate  and  prosecute  corruption  allegations107.  Risks  of  clientelism,  favouritism  and 
nepotism in high-level public administration remain unaddressed108. The full implementation 
of  the  GRECO  recommendations  as  regards  the  effective  functioning  of  the  prosecution 
would further strengthen the anti-corruption framework109. 

Hungary’s  integrity  rules  on  asset  declaration  and  conflicts  of  interest  require  more 
effective oversight and enforcement. Hungary  has an extensive asset disclosure system in 
place,  that  requires  members  of  Parliament,  Government  officials  and  public  officials  to 
declare  their  assets  and  interests110.  Concerns  have  been  raised  in  particular  regarding  the 
asset  declarations’  content  of  members  of  Parliament  last  submitted  in  February  2021111. 
Asset declarations are verified only upon notification of suspicions, and potential follow-up is 
left to the discretion of the public official’s employer or, in case of members of Parliament 
and  other  high-ranking  officials,  to  the  Parliamentary  Committee  on  Immunity112.  Any 
incompatibility  of  conflicts  of  interest  of  members  of  Parliament  must  be  declared  to  the 
Speaker113, following which, they are subject to certain restrictions pending the resolution of 
the situation114. However, neither declarations of interests nor information about any follow-
up are publicly available. Despite long-standing calls, no reform efforts have been initiated to 
make the supervision, verification and enforcement of rules of conduct, conflicts of interest 
and asset declarations for members of Parliament more effective115. The government proposal 
introducing  amendments  to  the  asset  declarations  rules  for  members  of  Parliament  with  an 
indicative  timeline  for  adoption  on  27  July  2022  does  not  aim  to  address  these  calls  to 
strengthen the data verification, oversight or sanctions in case of failure to comply with the 

107  2022  EU  Justice  Scoreboard,  pp. 70-71,  noting  that  victims  of  other  crimes  have  the  remedy  of  a  judicial 
review  by  means  of  ‘substitute  private  prosecution’.  Notably,  the  Prosecutor  General  is  accountable  to 
Parliament  and  members  of  Parliament  can  pose  questions.  However,  they  have  no  right  to  reply,  and 
Parliament  cannot  decide  on  whether  the  response  was  sufficient  with  the  consequence  in  practice  that 
questions concerning  the justification on the closure of high-level corruption cases can  be refused and left 
unanswered. 

108  E.g. Bertelsmann Stiftung (2022), Transformation Index: Hungary Country Report, stressing that the highly 
centralised  political  corruption  became  the  main  modus  operandi  of  Hungarian  politics,  with  political 
corruption  and  informal  power  networks  as  key  pillars  of  party-state  capture.  For  an  overview  of  alleged 
corruption cases, Civitas Institute/Transparency International (2021), Black Book II  – Corruption and State 
Capture  in  Hungary.  In  addition,  Corruption  Research  Center  Budapest  (2022),  Corruption  Risks  and  the 
Crony System in Hungary: a brief analysis of EU funded contracts in Hungarian public procurement 2005-
2021;  Corruption  Research  Center  Budapest  (2021),  Political  Favoritism  in  Public  Tenders  in  Hungary: 
Analysis of the odds of winning, investigating the system in Hungary based on data of more than 227 000 
public tenders.  

109  GRECO Fourth Evaluation Round – Second Interim Compliance Report, recommendation xiv, paras. 37 and 
42. See also pillar I and 2021 Rule of Law report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, 
pp. 8-9. 

110  Cf. also 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 12. 
111  GRECO Fourth Evaluation Round – Second Interim Compliance Report, p. 11, para. 56. See also Hungary 
Today  (2022),  ‘Asset  Declaration:  Hungary’s  Politicians  Hardly  Have  Any  Savings’,  Hungary  Today 
(2021), ‘MP’s Asset Declarations Yet Again Raise Concerns, Causing Calls for Stricter Rules’. 

112  The Committee rejected almost all notifications as unsubstantiated in the years between 2017-2021 (15 out 
of 16), while in the remaining case the procedure  was not initiated due to the subsequent correction of the 
declarations, see 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 13. 

113  The Speaker is the President of Parliament. 
114  Act XXXVI of 2012, amended in December 2019. 
115  GRECO Fourth Evaluation Round – Second Interim Compliance Report, p. 5. 

16 

 
                                                 
rules116. In addition, the Government plans to introduce new rules on conflicts of interest, on 
gifts and similar benefits for parliamentarians117. Until then, conflicts of interest rules are not 
applicable  to  members  of  Parliament,  state  secretaries  and  other  public  officials  of  the 
government who serve, at the same time, as board members of ‘public interest trusts’, despite 
the  fact  that  these  trusts  receive  significant  public  funding,  entailing  increased  risks  of 
corruption118.  Since  such  trusts  may  receive  funding  not  only  from  the  Hungarian  state  but 
also  from  the  private  sector  and  foreign  states,  the  trustees  may  engage  in  fundraising  and 
lobbying  activities.  The  legal  framework  has  been  challenged  before  the  Constitutional 
Court119  due  to  concerns  regarding  the  separation  of  powers,  as  trustees  are  not  prevented 
from holding high ranking positions, such as Minister and member of Parliament, at the same 
time.  The  absence  of  codes  of  ethics  for  members  of  the  Government,  state  secretaries,  or 
members  of  Parliament  represents  another  integrity  gap.  Verification  procedures  by  the 
National  Tax  and  Customs  Authority  upon  suspicions  of  unjustified  wealth  can  only  be 
initiated  if  investigative  authorities  have  also  opened  criminal  inquiries,  thus  significantly 
limiting the possibility for such verifications120.  

Lobbying  rules  remain  incomplete  with  no  systematic  follow  up  in  case  of  non-
compliance.  Hungary  has  no  comprehensive  lobby  regulation,  transparency  register  or 
legislative footprint in place to disclose contacts with interest representatives121. According to 
a  2013  Government  Decree,  employees  of  state  administration  bodies  need  to  document 
meetings and may only meet interest representatives in relation to their work after informing 
their superiors, who may prohibit the meeting122. However, there is no obligation to make the 
encounters or the content public, nor are there any sanctions provided in the Decree in case of 
failure  to  comply.  No  steps  have  been  taken  to  establish  a  clear  set  of  rules  for  contacts 
between  members  of  Parliament  and  lobbyists  to  address  concerns  regarding  the  level  of 
transparency in  the decision-making process123. Comprehensive lobbying  rules would be of 
particular importance with regard to the increasing number of ‘investments of major national 
economic  interests’124,  as  they  are  exempted  from  regular  requirements  and  safeguards  in 
order to simplify and accelerate investment procedures. This exemption applies regardless of 
whether such investments are of private or public nature.  

Post-employment  rules  and  cooling-off  periods  are  fragmented  and  apply  only  to  a 
small group of public officials.  Overall ‘revolving doors’ are scarcely regulated with rules 
existing only for a few institutions, such as the State Audit Office and the National Media and 
Infocommunications  Authority,  while  confidentiality  clauses  are  contained  in  Hungary’s 
labour  code125  as  well  as  in  some  specific  legislation  applicable  to  public  officials126.  In 

116  The  proposal  for  the  amendment  of  the  Act  XXXVI  of  2021  was  submitted  on  21  June  2022 

https://www.parlament.hu/irom42/00369/00369.pdf  

117  Information received from the Government in the context of the draft report consultation. 
118  The regulation on public interest was codified in April 2021, see Act IX of 2021. 
119  Constitutional Court Case No. II/02280/2021. 
120  2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 13. 
121  See also 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 13. 
122  Government Decree 50/2013 of 25 February 2013. 
123  See GRECO Fourth Evaluation Round – Second Interim Compliance Report, paras. 8-9. 
124  While the concept of ‘investments of major national economic interest’ was introduced by Act LIII of 2006, 
there has been a significant growth in the number of public and private investments declared subject to the 
law  with  67  investments  being  declared  of  major  national  interest  only  in  the  course  of  2021.  See 
Government Decree 83/2021 of 23 February 2021. 

125  Section 8(4) of Act I of 2012. 

17 

 
                                                 
practice,  however,  these  rules  are  not  effectively  enforced,  as  the  Government  is  still  to 
specify  the  sectors  and  public  officials’  positions  to  which  cooling-off  time  restriction  will 
apply with regard to business careers of public officials in the area, in which they were active 
beforehand127.  A  code  of  conduct  for  members  of  Parliament  that  would  include  post-
employment guidelines is neither in place nor planned128. 

The  regulatory  framework  on  whistleblowers  requires  further  steps  to  enhance  their 
protection  in  practice.  Amendments  to  the  current  law  have  not  yet  been  proposed  to 
transpose  the  EU  Directive129.  Various  state  agencies  operate  online  reporting  channels, 
including  the  Commissioner  for  Fundamental  Rights130,  the  Hungarian  Competition 
Authority131, the Public Procurement Authority132 and the Prime Minister’s Office. The latter 
can receive disclosures related to the misuse of EU funds133. No steps have been taken yet to 
address the major operational deficiencies in the whistleblower regime, including the limited 
protection against retaliation and the risks of disclosure of the whistleblowers’ identity134. 

Challenges  remain  with  regard  to  political  party  and  campaign  financing135.  The  State 
Audit Office is responsible to oversee the use of public funds and to  control the legality of 
political  parties’  financial  management.  However,  political  advertising  on  the  social  media 
platform Facebook, including by financed third parties136, is not considered to fall within the 
legal  definition of political  advertising  under the Electoral  Procedure Act  and has  therefore 
not been audited so far by the State Audit Office137, even if recent elections have shown that 

126  Section  93(1)(g)  of  Act  CXXV  of  2018,  stipulating  that  a  Government  official  shall  retain  classified 
information and, in addition,  not disclose  to any unauthorised person or  entity any  fact  which came to  his 
knowledge  in  the  course  of  his  activities  and  the  disclosure  of  which  would  have  adverse  or  beneficial 
consequences for the State, a governmental authority, an employee or a citizen. 

127  The  term  of  the  restriction  specified  by  law  is  the  equivalent  of  the  time  spent  on  the  job  subject  to  the 
restriction, with a maximum of two years (Section 117(2) of Act CXXV of 2018). Section 117(1) provides 
that  the  Government  must  determine  the  sectors  and  positions  where  a  government  official  may  not  be 
employed after the termination of his/her public service. That provision remains to be implemented. 

128  GRECO has repeatedly called for the introduction of a code of ethics/ conduct for members of Parliament to 
be  adopted,  covering,  among  others,  post-employment  rules,  and  complementary,  practical  measures  for 
their implementation, see GRECO Fourth Evaluation Round – Second Interim Compliance Report, pp. 3-4, 
with reference to the Fourth Evaluation Report, p. 17. 

129  Directive  (EU)  2019/1937  on  the  protection  of  persons  who  report  breaches  of  Union  law.  The  OECD 
recognised  the  positive  aspects  of  the  existing  regulatory  framework,  but  raised  concerns  as  regards  the 
effectiveness of the protection of whistleblowers, see OECD (2021), Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention, Phase 4 Two-Year Follow-Up Report: Hungary.  

130  The Commissioner acts as a  reporting channel and operates the electronic platform but  has limited formal 
competence  as  regards  whistleblower  complaints,  including  the  forwarding  of  reports  to  competent 
authorities. See 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 14. 

131  Hungarian  Competition  Authority,  General 

information 

about 

how  Cartel 

chat  works, 

https://www.gvh.hu/kartellchat/kcfaq/faqentry_568311.html. 

132  Public  Procurement  Authority,  Public  Procurement  Anonymous  Chat 

(KAC) 

launched, 

https://www.kozbeszerzes.hu/hirek/elindult-kozbeszerzesi-anonim-chat-kac/. 
133  See the Magyarorszag.hu portal, Public interest announcements, www.anti-lop.hu. 
134  Including the limited protection against retaliation and the risks of disclosure of the whistleblowers’ identity. 
See  OECD  (2021),  Implementing  the  OECD  Anti-Bribery  Convention,  Phase  4  Two-Year  Follow-Up 
Report: Hungary, p. 3. 

135  2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 12. 
136  This  can  include  proxies,  such  as  the  so-called  GONGOs,  companies,  informal  grouping  of  people  or 
individuals  that  are  involved  in  campaigning  activities  as  special  purpose  vehicles  to  promote  political 
parties or candidates, the related spending of which would not appear in party accounts. 

137  Information received by Transparency International and the State Audit Office in the context of the country 
visit to Hungary.  Act XXXVI of 2013 on electoral procedure covers  media content or audiovisual content 

18 

 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
most of the political party campaigning is taking place on this communication tool138. While 
some  measures  have  been  taken  to  ensure  that  political  party  financial  registries  are 
transparent and up-to-date to clarify party income sources and campaign periods as well as to 
ensure  a  more  in-depth  monitoring,  overall  concerns  remain  as  regards  the  transparency  of 
party financing139. 

The  trend  of  heightened  COVID-19  related  corruption  risks  in  public  procurement 
persists140,  including  for  public  interest  trusts.  There  is  some  transparency  in  public 
procurement  and  monitoring  by  the  Public  Procurement  Authority  reportedly  increased  in 
2021141.  Yet  specific  data  on  beneficiaries  and  overall  amounts  on  exempted,  pandemic-
related procurements is not publicly available despite hightened risks of corruption142. At the 
same time, the share of contracts awarded with a single-bidder, and thus without competition, 
increased from 2020 to 2021143. A Government Decree144 introduced measures to reduce this 
high share of single bids targeting, however, only public procurements above the EU public 
procurement  thresholds,  thus  relating  only  to  a  limited  number  of  procurements,  while  no 
concrete  timeline  is  in  place145.  According  to  the  Public  Procurement  Authority,  fewer  but 
much  larger  investments  have  been  procured146.  Furthermore,  as  reported  previously147, the 

published in a press product promoting or encouraging a candidate organisation or an independent candidate, 
while  political  advertising  content  on  the  social  media  platform  Facebook  is  considered  not  to  be  from  a 
media  promotion  provider.  Thus,  its  social  media  content  does  not  qualify  as  press  product  within  the 
meaning  of  Section  146(b)  of  the  Media  Act.  In  this  context,  see  also  the  Handbook  of  the  State  Audit 
Office, Elections: Handbook prepared to support election regularity (23 December 2021). 

138  BIRN  (2022),  Hungary  Election:  Virtual  Smear  Tactics  Alive  and  Well  on  Facebook.  According  to 
information received by the CSOs K-Monitor, Transparency International and  Corruption Research Center 
Budapest  in  the  context  of  the  country  visit  to  Hungary,  the  amounts  spent  on  Facebook  being  by  far  the 
largest. See also Hungary Today (2022), Political Parties Spent HUF 3 Billion during Campaign Period on 
Facebook  Alone;  BIRN  (2022),  Hungary  Election:  Virtual  Smear  Tactics  Alive  and  Well  on  Facebook; 
Euractiv (2022), Orban’s influencers shower cash, become largest social media spenders. 

139  In  practice,  the  State  Audit  Office  (SAO)  has  limited  competence  to  control  the  expenditure  of  political 
parties,  and  only  parties  that  have  gained  at  least  one  percent  on  the  ballot  from  the  party  list  can  be 
monitored. Corruption risks therefore exist for public funds, for example, if parties below this threshold are 
founded  to  obtain  access  to  state  subsidies,  terminating  their  operations  after  the  elections.  Furthermore, 
findings  of  the  SAO  that  can  result  in  serious  sanctions,  such  as  the  withdrawal  of  state  funds,  cannot  be 
challenged before an administrative court. See also GRECO Third Evaluation Round - Second Addendum to 
the Second Compliance Report, para. 24. 

140  2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 15. 
141  Hungarian  Government  (2021),  Press  Statement,  A  decade  for  integrity,  committed  to  eliminating 

corruption.  

142  In this context, see Átlátszó (2020), ‘The Government has abused the pandemic multiple times according to 

K-Monitor and HCLU’. 

143  Corruption Research Center Budapest (2021), Two tendencies in the Hungarian public procurement, pp. 3-4, 
including  an  analysis  of  more  than  250 000  public  contracts  awarded  between  2005  and  2021  in  general, 
stating  that  the  contracts  awarded  to  single-bidders  in  2021  rose  to 34.6%  in  2021  (from  32.1%  in  2020). 
According  to  the  single  bid  indicator  of  the  Single  Market  Scoreboard,  until  2020,  the  proportion  of 
contracts awarded in procedures where there was just one bidder had stagnated around 40% between 2018-
2020, which was among the highest in the EU. 

144  Government Decree 63/2022 of 28 February 2022, which entered into force on 15 March 2022. 
145  The government target is to reduce the share of single bids for all public procurements below 15%, although 
without  a  concrete  timeline.  Hungary  also  committed  to  developing  a  comprehensive  performance 
measurement  methodology  and  to  exploring  measures  to  address  some  of  the  problems  in  the  public 
procurement sector. Government Decree 63/2022 of 28 February 2022. 

146  Public  Procurement  Authority  (2021),  Flash  Report:  Hungarian  Public  Procurement  in  Numbers,  p.  3, 
reporting a 23% increase of the total value compared to 2020 and considerably above the level of the total 
value calculated in the years prior to the coronavirus pandemic. 

19 

 
                                                                                                                                                        
2021  law148  repealed  a  specific  requirement  of  the  public  procurement  law149  taking  trusts 
established  by  the  state  as  well  as  legal  persons  managed  by  them,  out  of  the  scope  of 
application  of  procurement  rules  in  respect  of  procurements  financed  by  European  Union 
funds150. This carries the potential to increase corruption risks in a procurement market that is 
already vulnerable to corruption151. 

On  27  April  2022,  the  Commission  sent  a  written  notification  to  Hungary  under  the 
budget conditionality Regulation152. The Commission has serious concerns about the use of 
the EU budget in Hungary. The concerns relate to breaches of the principles of the rule of law 
in  relation  to  the  use  of  public  procurement  and  the  functioning  of  the  authorities 
implementing  the  budget,  financial  control,  audit,  monitoring,  accountability  process, 
transparency, prevention of fraud, corruption and other breaches of EU law, and the constant 
failure to implement the recommendations addressed to the authorities for several years. This 
is  demonstrated  by  an  exceptionally  high  level  of  financial  corrections  over  the  years, 
documented  by  audit  work  and  contradictory  procedures.  In  the  written  notification,  the 
Commission also referred to possible breaches in connection to public procurement, such as 
the  limits  to  investigation  and  independent  prosecution,  as  well  as  the  lack  of  an  effective 
anti-corruption framework. Hungary replied to the written notification on 27 June 2022 and 
the Commission is assessing the information and observations provided in the reply. 

III.  MEDIA PLURALISM AND MEDIA FREEDOM 

Hungary’s  Fundamental  Law  and  sectoral  legislation  provide  the  legal  framework  for  the 
protection  of  media  freedom  and  pluralism  and  for  the  right  to  access  information  held  by 
public  authorities153.  The  Media  Act  provides  the  legislative  framework  for  both  the 
Hungarian  media  regulator  as  well  as  for  the  regulation  of  public  service  media.  Hungary 
transposed the AVMS Directive in 2019154. 

147  See 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 14. 
148  Act VIII of 2021. 
149  Section  5(3)  of  Act  CXLIII  of  2015,  defining  the  entities  required  to  apply  public  procurement  rules:  ‘In 
respect  of  procurements  financed  by  European  Union  funds  trusts  established  by  the  State  shall  apply  the 
provisions of this Act, as well as legal persons maintained by such trusts […]’. 

150  In 2021, several public-interest trusts were set up by the government performing public duties and donations 
of  public  assets  were  made  amounting  to  more  than  2%  of  GDP.  Public-interest  trusts  performing  public 
duties  and  legal  persons  maintained  by  them  are  not  expressly  covered  by  Section  5(1)  of  Act  CXLIII  of 
2015. They may fall under Section 5(2) but in respect of procurements financed by European Union funds 
that provision does  not cover all situations that  were covered by the former Section 5(3), repealed by  Act 
VIII  of  2021. The  same  law  also  removed  rules  aimed  at  preventing  conflict  of  interest,  thereby  allowing 
holders  of  public  office  to  sit  on  the  board  of  trustees  of  such  trusts,  see  further  above.  Cf.  also  OECD, 
Economic Survey Hungary (2021), p. 58, recommending that all public procurements should be subject to 
competitive  tendering to  secure transparent procedures and to improve cost efficiency,  while  full  financial 
scrutiny should apply, including to public-interest trusts. 

151  Cf. European Semester (2022), p. 11.  
152  Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 
on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget, OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1. 
153  Hungary ranks 85th in the 2022 Reporters without Borders World Press Freedom Index compared to 92th in 

the previous year.  

154  Directive  (EU)  2018/1808  amending  Directive  2010/13/EU  on  the  coordination  of  certain  provisions  laid 
down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual 
media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) in view of changing market realities. 

20 

 
                                                                                                                                                        
independence  of  the  Hungarian  media  regulator  needs  to  be 
The  functional 
strengthened155.  While  the  Media  Act  provides  for  a  detailed  legal  framework  for  the 
establishment and operation of the Media Authority and while the authority is endowed with 
sufficient funding for the accomplishment of its tasks, concerns persist over the Authority’s 
functional independence. The decision-making body of the Authority  - the Media Council - 
remains  composed  of  members  all  nominated  by  the  ruling  party156.  The  Media  Council’s 
refusal to renew the broadcasting license of independent radio station Klubrádió, based on the 
station’s failure to comply with certain administrative obligations, and which resulted in the 
radio  being  taken  off  air,  remains  the  subject  of  an  ongoing  Commission  infringement 
procedure  against  Hungary157.  On  14  April  2022,  the  Media  Council  refused  to  renew  the 
licence of another independent radio station, Tilos Rádió, based on the radio’s media service 
provider having violated legal requirements on the use of inappropriate language four times 
during  a  seven-year  period158.  The  2022  Media  Pluralism  Monitor  confirms  its  previous 
assessment  that  while  the  rules  governing  eligibility  and  incompatibility  of  the  Media 
Authority’s board members are specified in the Media Act, they do not ensure objective and 
transparent procedures in practice. It therefore, once more registers medium risk for Hungary 
in terms of the independence and effectiveness of the Media Authority159.  

The  channelling  of  significant  state  resources  to  pro-government  media  continues  to 
create  an  unlevel  playing  field  in  the  Hungarian  media  landscape160.  The  majority  of 
CSOs and media experts concur that there has been an increase in the number of government-
critical  outlets  over  the  past  decade  but  point  out  that  the  manner  in  which  the  significant 
volumes of state resources are channelled to pro-government media outlets and other relevant 
structures  continues  to  create  an  unlevel  playing  field.  Furthermore,  there  appears  to  be  no 
transparency  in  the  distribution  of  these  resources161.  An  analysis  of  the  impact  of  the 
establishment  of  the  ‘KESMA’162  media  conglomerate  in  November  2018  found  that  the 
latter has had a significant negative impact on the market for daily regional newspapers and 
on  the  distribution  and  printing  market  and  an  impact  on  radio,  with  far  less  or  negligible 
impact  on  the  television  and  national  newspaper  markets163.  The  2022  Media  Pluralism 
Monitor explains that in the sectors identified as having witnessed a significant impact, one 
can observe ‘political’ or ‘ideological’ concentration in which outlets ‘on paper independent 

155  2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 16. 
156  2021  Rule  of  Law  Report,  Country  Chapter  on  the  rule  of  law  situation  in  Hungary,  p.  16.  The  former 

President of the Council and Authority resigned one year prior to the end of her mandate.  

157  The  Commission  considers  that  the  Media  Council’s  decisions  to  reject  Klubrádió’s  application  were 
disproportionate and non-transparent and that Hungarian media law has been applied in a discriminatory way 
in breach of EU telecoms rules, set  out in Directive (EU)  2018/1972 establishing the European Electronic 
Communications Code (Recast). On 17 June 2021, the Kúria upheld the Media Council’s decision. 

158  International Press Institute (2022), ‘Hungary: Fidesz Media Council  moves to silence independent station 

Tilos Rádió’. 

159  Media Pluralism Monitor 2022, country report on Hungary, p. 14. 
160  2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, pp. 17-18. 
161  Joint  contribution  from  Amnesty  International  Hungary  and  eight  other  CSOs  for  the  2022  Rule  of  Law 

Report, pp. 38-39. 

162  Central  European  Press  and  Media  Foundation.  An  ad-hoc  report  by  the  Centre  for  Media  Pluralism  and 
Media Freedom concluded in 2019 that the establishment of KESMA would exacerbate the overall risks to 
media  pluralism  in  Hungary  (2020  Rule  of  Law  Report,  Country  Chapter  on  the  rule  of  law  situation  in 
Hungary, p. 14).  

163  Contribution from the National Media and Infocommunications  Authority, pp. 3-4 largely corroborated by 

stakeholder meeting with the Hungarian Editors-in-Chief Forum and Mertek Media Monitor.  

21 

 
                                                 
from  each  other,  follow  the  same  political  interests  and  share  the  same  narratives’164.  For 
these  reasons,  the  2022  Media  Pluralism  Monitor  confirms  the  previous  year’s  high  risk 
scores  with  regard  to  both  news  media  concentration  and  state  advertising  in  the  country 
respectively165.  

There  are  no  plans  to  introduce  legislation  to  enhance  transparency  of  media 
ownership166.  The  2022  Media  Pluralism  Monitor  continues  to  rate  transparency  of  media 
ownership  at  high  risk,  finding  that  ‘the  legal  provisions  and  the  Media  Council  itself  fall 
short in guaranteeing effective transparency for all media, as well as effective and easy access 
to  the  relevant  information  by  the  public,  particularly  for  the  disclosure  of  ultimate  and 
beneficial owners of media outlets’167. Nonetheless, stakeholders do not consider this to be a 
major  concern  given  that  most  data  can  be  found  in  the  generic  company  register  and  that 
offshore incorporation and registration in this field is rare168.  

Public service media operates within a complex institutional system amid concerns over 
its financial and editorial independence. The Media Act provides the legal framework for 
public  service  media  via  the  establishment  of  a  Public  Service  Foundation169  and  a  Public 
Service  Board,  both  of  which  exercise  supervision  over  the  Duna  Media  Service  Nonprofit 
Private Limited Company, the public service media provider with editorial responsibility for 
the  broadcast  content170.  The  Media  Act  provides  for  societal  control  over  public  service 
media via the Public Service Board, composed of representatives of fifteen public bodies and 
organisations171. Under the Media Act, another entity, the Media Service Support and Asset 
Management  Fund  (MTVA)172  is  responsible  for  content  acquisition  and  show  production 
and  is,  in  effect,  the  employer  of  public  service  media  journalists.  The  Fund’s  substantial 
annual budget is subject to parliamentary approval173, but concerns exist as to the absence of 
effective oversight over its spending174. The 2022 Media Monitor considers this to be a high 
risk  area  given  that  there  is  ‘a  lack  of  transparency,  civil  control  and  oversight  over  the 
budget of the Fund’ and that supervision is carried out by MTVA, which is, in turn, managed 

164  2022 Media Pluralism Monitor, country report on Hungary, p.17. 
165  2022 Media Pluralism Monitor, country report on Hungary, p. 17 and 24, respectively. 
166  2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 17.  
167  Media Pluralism Monitor 2022, country report on Hungary, p. 17.  
168  Joint  contribution  from  Amnesty  International  Hungary  and  eight  other  CSOs  for  the  2022  Rule  of  Law 

Report, p. 41.  

169  Parliament elects the members of the Board of Trustees of the Public Service Foundation for a period of nine 
years. Half of them are nominated by the governing faction and the other half by the opposition, while the 
seventh  member is nominated by the President of the Media Council.  The Board of Trustees  appoints and 
terminates the employment of Duna’s executive director while Section 91 of the Media Act expressly lays 
down that the Board of Trustees shall have no control over the content of public service media programmes.  

170  Duna’s budget for 2022 is HUF 1.8 billion (approximately EUR 5 million).  
171  Churches, public bodies, local government bodies, bodies of national and ethnic minorities, and other non-
governmental  organisations  nominate  members  to  the  Public  Service  Board.  Its  main  function  is  the 
supervision of the implementation of the Public Service Media Code. 

172  The  chairperson  of  the  Media  Council  appoints,  establishes  the  salary  of  and  exercises  employers’  rights 
over  MTVA’s  Director-General,  deputy  directors,  as  well  as  the  chairperson  and  all  four  members  of  its 
Supervisory  Board.  The  Media  Council  is  responsible  for  approving  MTVA’s  annual  plan  and  financial 
policy and for determining the rules governing use and management of MTVA’s assets.  

173  MTVA’s budget for 2022 is HUF 130 billion (approximately EUR 361 million).  
174  Joint  contribution  from  Amnesty  International  Hungary  and  eight  other  CSOs  for  the  2022  Rule  of  Law 

Report, p. 41.  

22 

 
                                                 
by the Media Council175. Concerns persist as to public service media’s editorial independence 
and stakeholders have pointed out its role in amplifying disinformation by third actors176. 

Journalists  and  media  outlets  continued  to  face  diverse  challenges  in  Hungary.  Some 
journalists  have  continued  to  face  difficulties  when  attempting  to  access  members  of  the 
Government and are barred from attending certain events, while court proceedings targetting 
certain  journalistic  investigations  have  been  launched  on  data  protection  grounds177.  The 
uncovered  secret  surveillance  of  journalists178  and  the  Tilos  Rádió  case  constitute  the  two 
new  alerts  registered  on  the  Council  of  Europe’s  Platform  to  promote  the  protection  of 
journalism and the safety of journalists concerning Hungary since July 2021. 

Access to public information continues to be hindered. Access to public information has 
been  hindered  under  the  ‘state  of  danger’:  deadlines  for  public  authorities  to  process  such 
requests were extended from 15 to 45 days  (renewable once), also allowing them to charge 
fees  where  the  fulfilment  of  the  access  to  public  information  request  would  endanger  or 
hinder  the  public  authority  in  carrying  out  its  task  related  to  fighting  the  pandemic179. 
Stakeholders report that transparency of public-interest funds is inadequate, in particular due 
to the limited scope of the disclosure obligations180, and the lack of effective enforcement of 
judicial decisions ordering the disclosure of data concerning public funds181.  

IV.  OTHER INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO CHECKS AND BALANCES 

Hungary  is  a  parliamentary  republic  with  a  unicameral  Parliament  (National  Assembly). 
Parliament  that,  among  other  functions,  adopts  and  amends182  the  Fundamental  Law  of 
Hungary,  legislates,  including  cardinal  laws183,  elects  the  Prime  Minister,  and  elects  –  by  a 

175  2022 Media Pluralism Monitor, country report on Hungary, p. 24. 
176  Joint  contribution  from  Amnesty  International  Hungary  and  eight  other  CSOs  for  the  2022  Rule  of  Law 
Report, p. 47; Political Capital: Russian Disinformation in Hungarian Public Broadcast Media: Complaint to 
the European Commission, 2022; Contribution from International Press Institute for the 2022 Rule of Law 
Report, p. 15. 

177  Joint  contribution  from  Amnesty  International  Hungary  and  eight  other  CSOs  for  the  2022  Rule  of  Law 

Report, pp. 46-47. 

178  See pillar IV. 
179  2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 18. 
180  Parliament has failed to implement Decision 7/2020 (V. 13.) AB of the Constitutional Court finding that the 
right to freedom of information extends to all public data and that judicial remedies must exist to fulfil this 
fundamental  right  vis-a-vis  all  persons  handling  public  data.  In  Decision  15/2021  (V.  13)  AB,  the 
Constitutional  Court  held  that  the  derogations  introduced  during  the  ‘state  of  danger’  are  in  line  with  the 
Fundamental  Law.  The  Constitutional  Court  –  as  a  constitutional  requirement  –  also  laid  down  that  if  an 
access request is fulfilled within the deadline of 45 or 90 days, the data controller must record the reasons 
justifying the endangerment of the performances of the public tasks of the controller in relation to the state of 
danger, and it shall also inform the requesting party of these reasons. The Constitutional Court also pointed 
out that the extension can only apply to public tasks that are related to the fight against the pandemic, thus 
other types of – unrelated – public tasks are not included in the derogation. 

181  Joint  contribution  from  Amnesty  International  Hungary  and  eight  other  CSOs  for  the  2022  Rule  of  Law 

Report, p. 46. 

182  A two-thirds majority of all the members is required to adopt or amend the Fundamental Law. 
183  The  Fundamental  Law  provides  for  the  adoption  of  33  cardinal  laws  implementing  its  provisions  and 
containing  detailed  rules  on  the  functioning  of  key  institutions  or  on  the  exercise  of  certain  fundamental 
rights. They may be adopted or amended by a two-thirds majority of the members of Parliament present. The 
Venice Commission criticised Hungary for using cardinal acts beyond what is strictly necessary, and even in 
respect of detailed legislation, which has been considered questionable from a democratic perspective as it 
makes it difficult to introduce reforms in the future (CDL-AD(2012)009, para. 47). 

23 

 
                                                 
two-thirds  majority  –  the  top  rank  public  officials  of  the  country.  The  President  of  the 
Republic  is  elected  by  Parliament.  There  are  a  number  of  institutions  tasked  with  counter-
balancing the powers of the legislature and the executive and entrusted with guaranteeing the 
respect of the constitutional order, including the Constitutional Court, the State Audit Office 
and  the  Ombudsperson  (‘Commissioner  for  Fundamental  Rights’).  In  addition  to  the 
Government, the President of the Republic and every parliamentary committee, any member 
of Parliament may table a bill. 

The  lack  of  public  consultation  coupled  with  an  accelerated  legislative  process  has 
further  weakened  the  quality  of  the  regulatory  environment184.  Whilst  the  Government 
has  organised  ‘national  consultations’  on  certain  topics185,  the  absence  of  effective  public 
consultation  on  draft  laws  raises  questions  as  regards  legal  certainty  and  the  quality  of 
legislation186.  CSOs  report  that  decisions  are  made  without  the  genuine  involvement  of 
relevant  stakeholders187.  The  Government  has  been  almost  systematically  failing  to  comply 
with  its  legal  obligation  of  publishing  online  draft  laws  for  public  consultations188. 
Government  policies  often  circumvent  existing  consultation  mechanisms  by  submitting 
significant  bills  through  individual  members  of  Parliament  or  by  using  extraordinary  or 
urgent  procedure189.  For  business  stakeholders,  the  quality  of  law-making  is  an  important 
factor  for  investor  confidence  and  a  reason  for  concern  about  effectiveness  of  investment 
protection for nearly a quarter of companies in Hungary190. 

184  For example, a non-COVID-19 related legislative change  to several  parts of the  Criminal Procedure  Code 
was  adopted  one  day  and  entered  into  force  on  the  following  day.  Another  example  is  the  proposed 
amendment to the law initiated by the Minister of Justice, which has brought about substantial changes in the 
practice  of  child  custody.  As  there  was  insufficient  consultation  with  the  CSOs  concerned,  family  rights 
CSOs  sent  written  comments  to  the  Ministry  expressing  their  concerns  about  several  elements  of  the  new 
legislation (contribution from Hungarian Association of Judges for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 14). 
185  The Government notes that a total of five national consultations were held during the ‘state of danger’. The 
consultations are conducted on the basis of direct inquiries from citizens. The Government considers that the 
national consultation is a well-proven tool by which the opinion of the Hungarian people is regularly sought.  

186  2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 21.  
187  Contributions  from  Civil  Society  Europe  for  the  2022  Rule  of  Law  Report,  p.  8;  European  Transport 

Workers’ Federation for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 18. 

188  According to the government website, out of the 145  government draft laws in 2021, only three laws were 
published for public consultations. From these three, only one can be deemed as having been genuinely open 
for consultation; the other two drafts were published three weeks after the bills had already been submitted 
to Parliament. Moreover, no amendments could have been submitted by the time the texts were published for 
‘consultation’  (joint  contribution  from  Amnesty  International  Hungary  and  eight  other  CSOs  for  the  2022 
Rule of Law Report, p. 49). The absence of clear minimum deadlines for consultation resulted in a deadline 
for comments expiring the same day as the draft bill was published (in 2018 this was the case for 9 out of the 
18 draft laws published for consultation). 

189  This happened for example in the case of Act LXXIX of 2021. To the original proposal to tighten penalties 
for  paedophile  offences,  the  Legislative  Committee  tabled  an  amendment  seeking  to  shield  minors  from 
content  referring  to  homosexuality,  sex-change  and  divergence  from  self-identity  corresponding  to  sex  at 
birth.  The  individual  motion  allowed  Parliament  to  decide  on  the  amendment  without  a  public  debate  and 
consultation (contribution from Hungarian Association of Judges for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 14). 
According  to  information  available  on  the  Parliament’s  website,  in  2021,  11  bills  tabled  by  members  of 
Parliament (nine by the majority, one by the opposition, one by a non-allied member) were passed into law. 
190  Figure  55, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard indicates that  ‘[F]requent changes  in legislation  or concerns about 
quality of the law-making process’ is the most stated reason for concern about effectiveness of investment 
protection for companies in Hungary. Eurobarometer survey FL504; replies to the question: ‘What are your 
main reasons for concern about the effectiveness of investment protection?’ if the response to Q3 was ‘fairly 
unconfident’ or ‘very unconfident’. 

24 

 
                                                 
The  Government  has  used  its  emergency  powers  extensively.  As  of  1  June  2022,  the 
Government  terminated191  the  second  ‘state  of  danger’  it  declared192  in  January  2021  in 
response to  the COVID-19 pandemic.  During the reporting period, Parliament authorised193 
the Government to further extend the applicability of the Government’s emergency measures 
until  the  end  of  the  pandemic-related  ‘state  of  danger’.  The  Government  went  beyond  the 
Parliament’s  authorisation  when  it  issued  emergency  measures194  to  regulate  matters 
unrelated to the COVID-19 pandemic. It also used its emergency powers to overrule judicial 
decisions,  thereby  limiting  the  right  to  strike195  and  media  freedom196.  Several  emergency 
measures have been challenged before the Constitutional Court, but  most applications were 
found inadmissible, or proceedings were discontinued on the ground that the challenged rules 
were  no  longer  in  force.  When  deciding  cases  on  the  merits,  the  Constitutional  Court 
confirmed  the  ban  on  assemblies197,  the  extension  of  the  statutory  deadline  for  addressing 
access to documents requests198, the rules related to COVID-19 immunity certificates199 and 
the cancellation of a semester in  higher education200. On 24 May 2022, Parliament adopted 
the Tenth Amendment, allowing the Government to declare a ‘state of danger’ in case of an 
armed  conflict,  war  or  a  humanitarian  catastrophe  in  a  neighbouring  country.  On  25  May 
2022, the Government declared201 another ‘state of danger’ under the amended Article 53(1) 
of  the  Fundamental  Law,  in  view  of  the  armed  conflict  and  humanitarian  catastrophe  in 
Ukraine  and with  a view to  averting their impact  on Hungary.  On 8 June 2022, Parliament 
adopted Act VI of 2022, authorising the Government to extend the applicability of emergency 
measures until 1 November 2022. 

191  Government Decree 181/2022 of 24 May 2022. 
192  Government Decree 27/2021 of 29 January 2021. 
193  Section 1 of Act CII of 2021 extended the authorisation until 1 January 2022; Section 84 of Act CXXX of 

2021 further extended the authorisation until 1 June 2022. 

194  E.g.  the  Government  overruled  Acts  of  Parliament  to  regulate  the  retail  of  fuel  (Government  Decrees 
84/2022  of  5  March  2022  and  94/2022  of  10  March  2022)  and  the  access  to  SIM  cards  by  Ukrainian 
refugees (Government Decree 88/2022 of 7 March 2022) before the adoption of the Tenth Amendment (see 
below). 

195  The court allowed the industrial action of the air traffic controllers of the Hungarian Air Navigation Service 
Provider  while  determining  the  minimum  service  for  air  traffic  control  (Budapest  Regional  Appeal  Court, 
order of 20 July 2021, 2.Mpkf.35.080/2021/5). Yet, Government Decree 446/2021 of  26 July 2021 banned 
any  strike  by  air  traffic  controllers  during  the  state  of  danger.  (Contribution  from  Österreichischer 
Gewerkschaftsbund  for  the  2022  Rule  of  Law  Report,  p.  17).  Subsequently,  the  Constitutional  Court 
confirmed the constitutionality of this emergency measure (Decision 3065/2022 (II. 25.) AB). 

196  Shortly after a court ruling (Budapest Regional Court, judgment of 27 January 2022, 109.K.705.866/2021/5) 
quashing the  ministerial decision limiting  media access to hospitals, the Government issued an emergency 
measure  (Government  Decree  33/2022  of  4  February  2022)  allowing  the  administrative  authorities  to 
regulate contacts between hospitals and the media. 

197  Decision  23/2021  (VII.  13.) AB.  The  Constitutional  Court  established  as  a  constitutional  requirement  that 
the  lawmaker  may  only  suspend  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  assembly  in  times  of  a  state  of  danger  for  a 
period of time and within the scope of what is indispensably necessary, and only in such a way that it must 
examine  at  reasonable  intervals  whether  the  circumstances  giving  rise  to  the  restriction  still  justify  the 
suspension of the fundamental right. 

198  The  Constitutional  Court  ruled  that  extending  the  15-day  deadline  for  fulfilling  freedom  of  information 
requests  to  45  and,  in  some  cases  90  days  during  the  ‘state  of  danger’  is  constitutional  as  long  as  data 
managers indicate the reasons that predict a likelihood that the fulfilment of the request within the 15-days 
deadline may endanger the performance of their public service tasks in the state of danger. 

199  Decision 27/2021 (XI. 5.) AB.  
200  Decision 28/2021 (XI. 5.) AB.  
201  Government Decree 180/2022 of 24 May 2022.  

25 

 
                                                 
Investigations have been initiated following allegations related to the use of Pegasus and 
equivalent  spyware  surveillance  software  against  lawyers  and  journalists,  while  there 
are  concerns  due  to  the  absence  of  effective  judicial  supervision  as  regards  the  use  of 
secret  surveillance  measures  outside  criminal  proceedings.  The  national  data  protection 
authority  carried  out  an  investigation  following  allegations202  that  at  least  ten  Hungarian 
lawyers,  including  the  President  of  the  Hungarian  Bar  Association,  and  at  least  five 
Hungarian journalists203, had been targeted by the Pegasus spyware204. The report by the data 
protection  authority205  published  on  31  January  2022  confirmed  that  the  Hungarian 
authorities206  had  used  the  Pegasus  spyware  for  covert  surveillance  of  information  systems 
and premises, and that information gathering subject to authorisation207 was carried out with 
respect to several persons identified in the press. The report concluded that the spyware had 
been used in accordance with the relevant legal regulations. On 15 June 2022, the prosecution 
service closed its investigation finding that there had been no unauthorised covert information 
gathering  or  illegal  use  of  covert  means.  Stakeholders  also  report  that  the  rules  of  secret 
information  gathering  are  so  loose  in  Hungary  that  lawyers,  like  any  citizen,  may  legally 
become surveillance targets208 and that the Minister of Justice has discretion in allowing the 
secret  surveillance  for  reasons  of  national  security  without  any  meaningful  oversight  and 
control over the decision taken209. Already in its judgment Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary210, the 
European  Court  of  Human  Rights  found  that  authorisation  and  application  of  secret 
surveillance  measures  lacked  judicial  supervision211.  The  execution  of  the  judgment  is  still 
ongoing, and Hungary remains under enhanced supervision of the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe. The absence of guarantees,  including effective judicial oversight,  in 
case of secret surveillance of lawyers on grounds of national security, raises serious concerns 

202  Direct36 (2021), ‘President of the Hungarian Bar Association and several other lawyers have been targeted 
by Pegasus’. On 31 March 2022, Direkt36 also reported that a lawyer who acted as a defense counsel in a 
high-profile murder case was also targeted by Pegasus. 

203  Including investigative reporters, a newspaper editor, a photojournalist working on high-level corruption and 

a media owner.  

204  Contribution from  Liberties for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 7. Contribution from the Council of Bars 
and  Law  Societies  of  Europe  for  the  2022  Rule  of  Law  Report,  p.  32.  Joint  contribution  from  Amnesty 
International Hungary and eight other CSOs for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, pp. 12-13. 

205  Findings  of  the  investigation  of  the  Hungarian  National  Authority  for  Data  Protection  and  Freedom  of 
Information launched ex officio concerning the application of the ‘Pegasus’ spyware in Hungary, p. 50. 
206  The Specialised National Security Service provides covert information and data gathering services to other 

national security agencies and law enforcement agencies. 

207  Section  56(1)  of  Act  CXXV  of  1995  on  national  security  services  provides  that  the  services  may,  with 
external authorisation, a) search residences in secret and record their observations with technical devices; b) 
observe and record what is happening on the residence with the help of technical devices; c) open letters and 
other  postal  items,  inspect  their  contents  and  record  them  with  technical  devices;  d)  learn  communication 
through a  public telephone line or some other telecommunication service  transmitting said communication 
and  record  the  relevant  observations  by  technical  devices.  In  accordance  with  Section  58(2),  intelligence 
information  gathering  activities  listed  in  Section  56(1),  carried  out  during  the  performance  of  national 
security tasks – with some exceptions – are authorised by the Minister of Justice. 

208  Contribution  from  Liberties  for  the  2022  Rule  of  Law  Report,  p.  8.  Joint  contribution  from  Amnesty 

International Hungary and eight other CSOs for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 12. 

209  Joint  contribution  from  Amnesty  International  Hungary  and  eight  other  CSOs  for  the  2022  Rule  of  Law 

Report, p. 12.  

210  Judgment  of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  of  12  January  2016,  Szabó  and  Vissy  v.  Hungary, 

37138/14.  

211  The Government notes that the use of surveillance devices is subject to strict conditions and judicial or other 
external  authorization  under  Hungarian  law.  Regardless  of  professional  orders,  professions,  occupations, 
jobs, anyone can be subject to covert surveillance provided that the legal conditions are met. 

26 

 
                                                 
because  it  weakens  their  independence,  undermining  the  confidentiality  of  client-lawyer 
communication212.  

Concerns  as  regards  the  independence  of  the  Commissioner  for  Fundamental  Rights 
have  been  aggravated  by  the  takeover  of  the  responsibilities  of  the  Equal  Treatment 
Authority by the Commissioner. In March 2022, the UN Sub-Committee on Accreditation 
(SCA) of the Global Alliance of NHRIs (GANHRI) confirmed its earlier recommendation213 
that  the  Hungarian  national  human  rights  institution  be  downgraded  to  B-status.  The  SCA 
found that the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights ‘has not effectively engaged on […] all 
human  rights  issues,  including  in  relation  to  vulnerable  groups  such  as  ethnic  minorities, 
LGBTI,  refugees  and  migrants  as  well  as  constitutional  court  cases  deemed  political  and 
institutional, media pluralism, civic space and judicial independence’214. As of January 2021, 
through  new  legislation,  the  Commissioner  for  Fundamental  Rights  took  over  all  the 
responsibilities  and  functions  of  the  Equal  Treatment  Authority.  In  its  18  October  2021 
Opinion215, the Venice Commission  criticised that the law was ‘adopted during the state of 
emergency, in a rushed manner, apparently without consultation with civil society and other 
stakeholders’.  The  Venice  Commission  concluded  that  as  a  result  of  the  merger,  ‘the  new 
system  of  protection  against  discrimination  is  overall  more  complicated  and  thus  has  the 
potential to be less effective than the previous one’ and that this is a risk ‘that may undermine 
the  effectiveness  of  the  work  in  the  field  of  promoting  equality  and  combating 
discrimination’.  According  to  stakeholders,  the  number  of  discrimination  complaints  has 
significantly dropped after the merger216. 

The  Constitutional  Court  continues  to  review  final  judicial  decisions,  including  upon 
request of public authorities217. The new possibility to review final judicial decisions upon 
request  of  public  authorities  raises  questions  in  particular  as  regards  legal  certainty218. 
Although it is not part of the court system, the Constitutional Court adjudicating on the merits 

212  According to the Government, secret surveillance for national security purposes does not target  the  client-

lawyer relationship. 

213  Global  Alliance  of  National  Human  Rights  Institutions  (GANHRI):  Report  and  Recommendations  of  the 

Virtual Session of the Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA), 14-24 June 2021, pp. 12-13.  

214  Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI) (2022): Report and Recommendations of 

the Virtual Session of the Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA), 14-25 March 2022, pp. 43-47.  

215  CDL-AD(2021)034,  para.  57.  The  Venice  Commission  noted  with  regret  ‘that  no  Director  General  for 
Equality  Treatment  [within  the  Commissioner’s  Office]  has  been  appointed’  (para.  58)  and  that  the 
Commissioner could not confirm either the date for filling this vacancy or elaborate on the selection criteria, 
although  without  a  Director  General  for  Equality  Treatment,  ‘it  is  hard  to  imagine  the  promotion  and 
visibility of equality mandate as required by ECRI General Policy Recommendation No 2’ (para. 44). The 
Venice Commission expressed concerns (para. 42) that the Equal Treatment Directorate (ETD) ‘is currently 
understaffed, which affects the overall quality of its performance’.  

216  According to stakeholders, in 2019, the Equal Treatment Authority received 868 cases throughout the year, 
whereas ‘in the first 6 months of 2021, the ETD received only 156 complaints, proportionate to the time only 
one  third  of  the  2019  number  of  complaints’  (Joint  contribution  from  Amnesty  International  Hungary  and 
eight other CSOs for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 52). 

217  In 2021, the Constitutional Court quashed 23 final judicial decisions following constitutional complaints by 
the  parties,  two  of  them  being  upon  request  of  public  authorities  (the  Northern  Transdanubian  Water 
Management Directorate (Decision 16/2021. (V. 13.) AB) and the Government (Decision 33/2021. (XII. 22.) 
AB)). 

218  2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 24. According to the 
Government,  the  availability  of  a  constitutional  complaint  against  a  final  and  binding  court  decision 
guarantees the general principles of legal certainty and constitutionality. 

27 

 
                                                 
of  the  case  has  been  characterised  as  ‘a  court  of  fourth  instance’219.  According  to 
stakeholders,  in  2021,  the  Constitutional  Court  continued  to  overrule  Kúria  decisions  in 
politically  sensitive  cases220.  This  role  of  the  Constitutional  Court,  composed  of  members 
elected by Parliament without the involvement of the judiciary, in reviewing judgments of the 
ordinary courts, has also been raised by the Commission in the context of the 2022 European 
Semester221.  As  regards  the  constitutional  control  of  the  legislative  and  the  executive,  in 
2021, the Constitutional Court annulled six legal acts and in 11 cases it did not annul the acts 
but formulated requirements for their application.  

The  Government’s  stance  conditioning  compliance  with  a  judgment  of  the  Court  of 
Justice  of  the  European  Union  upon  a  ruling  of  the  Constitutional  Court  raises 
concerns. On 17 December 2020, the Court of Justice222 ruled that Hungary failed to fulfil its 
obligations under EU law in the area of procedures for granting international protection and 
returning  illegally  staying  third-country  nationals.  On  26  February  2021,  the  Government 
submitted a petition to the Constitutional Court seeking an interpretation of the Fundamental 
Law, arguing that the implementation of this judgment raised a constitutional problem. In its 
reply,  on  7  December  2021,  the  Constitutional  Court223  ruled  that  as  long  as  the  EU 
institutions  do  not  take  the  measures  necessary  to  ensure  the  effectiveness  of  the  joint 
exercise of competences, Hungary is  entitled to  exercise the relevant  non-exclusive field  of 
competence of the EU224. On 12 November 2021, the Commission decided to refer Hungary 
to the Court of Justice225 over its failure to comply with this judgment of the Court of Justice. 

On  1  January  2022,  Hungary  had  47  leading  judgments  of  the  European  Court  of 
Human  Rights  pending  implementation.  Hungary’s  rate  of  leading  judgments  from  the 
past  10  years that remain pending is  at  71%,  and the average time that the judgments have 
been  pending  implementation  is  over  6  years  and  three  months226.  The  oldest  leading 

219  Contribution from the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 23; 
Contribution  from  the  Kúria  President  for  the  2021  Rule  of  Law  Report,  p.  2,  considering  that  the 
Constitutional Court acting in the same manner as ordinary appellate courts. 

220  Joint  contribution  from  Amnesty  International  Hungary  and  eight  other  CSOs  for  the  2022  Rule  of  Law 
Report, p. 51. For example, on 14 December 2021,  the Constitutional Court (case IV/03991/2021) quashed 
the  Kúria order (Knk.II.40.646/2021/9) not allowing that a referendum to be held about the availability of 
gender reassignment treatment for children. Also, on 18 May 2022, the Constitutional Court (IV/234/2022) 
quashed the Kúria order (Knk.I.40.792/2021/10) allowing a referendum to be held on establishment of the 
Chinese Fudan University in Budapest. 

221  Recital (27), Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on the 2022 National Reform Programme of 

Hungary and delivering a Council opinion on the 2022 Convergence Programme of Hungary. 

222  Judgment of the CJEU of 17 December 2020, Commission v Hungary, C-808/18, ECLI:EU:C:2020:1029. 
223  Decision 32/2021. The Constitutional Court did not assess whether the incomplete effectiveness of the joint 
exercise of competences was realised in the specific case. It also emphasised that the abstract interpretation 
of the Fundamental Law cannot  include a review of the Court of Justice judgment, nor does the procedure 
allow  it  to  rule  on  the  matter  of  the  primacy  of  EU  law  (contribution  from  the  Conference  of  European 
Constitutional Courts for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, pp. 15-16).  

224  The Constitutional Court did not assess in the specific case whether the effectiveness of the joint exercise of 
competences was incomplete. It emphasised that the abstract interpretation of the Fundamental Law cannot 
extend  to  a  review  of  the  Court  of  Justice  judgment  or  to  the  examination  of  the  primacy  of  EU  law 
(contribution from the Conference of European Constitutional Courts for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, pp. 
15-16). 

225  Case C-123/22. 
226 All figures are calculated by the  European Implementation Network and are based on the number of cases 
that  are  considered  pending  at  the  annual  cut-off  date  of  1  January  2022.  See  the  Contribution  from  the 
European Implementation Network for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 48. 

28 

 
                                                 
judgment,  pending  implementation  for  13  years,  concerns  the  violation  of  the  right  to 
freedom  of  assembly227.  On  1  July  2022,  the  number  of  leading  judgments  pending 
implementation has decreased to 45228. There are cases where state bodies refuse to execute 
decisions of the domestic courts; several of these concern access to documents229. 

in  Hungary  continues 

international  standards231,  civic  space 

Independent  civil  society  remains  under  pressure.  Although  legislation230  governing  the 
registration  and  operation  of  CSOs  remained  essentially  unchanged  in  2021,  and  conforms 
to  be  rated  as 
with 
‘obstructed’232.  On  16  November  2021,  the  Court  of  Justice  held  that  Hungary  breached 
Union  law  by  criminalising233  the  organisation  of  activities  carried  out  with  a  view  to 
assisting  the  initiation  of  applications  for  international  protection  that  do  not  fulfil  the 
national criteria for granting that protection234. Hungary’s failure to implement this judgment 
maintains  the  pressure  on  CSOs  active  in  the  field  of  asylum.  The  implementation  of  new 
rules235  giving  the  State  Audit  Office  the  power  of  carrying  out  legality  checks  on  the 
accounts  of  CSOs  with  an  annual  balance  sheet  total  exceeding  a  certain  amount  has  been 
scheduled  for  the  first  semester  of  2022.  Independent  CSOs  are  often  being  labelled  as 

227  Judgment  of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  of  7  October  2008,  Patyi  and  Others  v.  Hungary, 

5529/05, pending implementation since 2009. 

228  Data according to the online database of the Council of Europe (HUDOC). 
229  Joint  contribution  from  Amnesty  International  Hungary  and  eight  other  CSOs  for  the  2022  Rule  of  Law 
Report,  p.  53.  E.g.,  in  August  2021,  the  Ministry  of  Finance  was  fined  for  the  non-implementation  of  an 
October  2019  judgment  obliging  the  Ministry  to  disclose  documents  related  to  the  loan  agreement  signed 
with the Russian Federation with a view to finance the  construction of the Paks II nuclear power plant.  In 
May  2021,  the  text  was  tabled  in  Parliament  as  a  draft  law  and  published.  In  another  case,  the  Budapest 
Regional  Court  (judgment  22.P.21.144/2021/6),  confirmed  by  the  Budapest  Regional  Appeal  Court  on  14 
October 2021 (judgment 2.Pf.20.641/2021/4/II), ordered a government agency to provide a CSO with certain 
data related to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic from November 2020. The government agency failed 
to execute the binding judicial decision until April 2022. According to the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 
one of the systemic problems contributing to this phenomenon of non-implementation is the lack of effective 
and genuinely coercive enforcement tools (Hungarian Helsinki Committee: Non-Execution of Domestic and 
International Court Judgments in Hungary, 2021, p. 10).  

230  Act  V  of  2013  (Civil  Code)  regulates  the  legal  forms  of  organisations:  associations  and  foundations.  Act 
CLXXV  of  2011  provides  for  rules  of  operation.  Stakeholder  report  that  under  these  laws,  anyone  can 
register a CSO at the courts. With the introduction of an electronic system some years ago, this process has 
become easier, though geographic differences among courts still prevail. The organisations can by and large 
freely operate  (Joint  contribution from  Amnesty International Hungary and eight other CSOs  for the 2022 
Rule of Law Report, pp. 55-56). 

231  Joint  contribution  from  Amnesty  International  Hungary  and  eight  other  CSOs  for  the  2022  Rule  of  Law 

Report, p. 54. 

232  Rating by CIVICUS; ratings are on a five-category scale defined as: open, narrowed, obstructed, repressed 

and closed. 

233  Section 353/A of Act C of 2012, introduced by Section 11(1) of Act VI of 2018 (part of the so-called ‘Stop 

Soros’ legislative package). 

234 Judgment of the CJEU of 16 November 2021, Commission v Hungary, C-821/19, ECLI:EU:C:2021:930. 
235  Under Act XLIX of 2021, the State Audit Office (SAO) annually prepares a report on civil organisations and 
foundations with an annual financial balance over HUF 20 million. According to the Government, the ability 
of CSOs to influence public life may be related to the means at their disposal; requiring transparency in the 
operation  and  funding  of  CSOs  is  an  overriding  reason  in  the  public  interest.  Stakeholders  argue  such  an 
audit  may  impose  an  unnecessary  administrative  burden  on  human  rights  defenders  critical  of  the 
government and could be misused to make their work as difficult as possible. According to stakeholders, the 
law  also  discriminates  against  specific  CSOs,  as  religious,  sport  and  national  minority  organisations  are 
exempted  from auditing. CSOs state that  while the law is disguised as a legal  measure intended to ensure 
transparency, its purpose is to ‘stigmatise Hungarian civil society’, since transparency over the finances of 
CSOs  is  already  ensured  under  current  legislation  (contribution  from  CIVICUS  for  the  2022  Rule  of  Law 
Report, p. 14; contribution from Philea for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 4).  

29 

 
                                                 
‘political’,  thus  not  truly  civic,  and  as  ‘agents’  not  serving  the  ‘national  interest’236. 
Organisations  representing  the  LGBTIQ  community  complain  of  being  targeted  by 
Government’s  smear  campaigns237.  After  the  referendum238  related  to  the  ‘Child-protection 
Law’239, the National Election Commission fined the CSOs that had called for invalid votes 
be  cast240.  The  Kúria  overturned  most  of  these  administrative  decisions241.  CSOs  have  also 
reported  difficulties  as  regards  access  to  justice,  in  particular  growing  obstacles  in 
challenging environmental permitting processes242.  

The State’s role in financing civil society raises questions. According to stakeholders, the 
Government  has  centralised  the  distribution  of  funding  through  the  National  Cooperation 
Fund  and  favours  the  financing  of  so-called  GONGOs243.  Almost  40%  of  civil  society’s 
resources come from public funding244; stakeholders report that such funding is uneven, lacks 
transparency and is politically biased against independent organisations245. In July 2021, the 

236  Contribution from Ökotárs for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 19. 
237  A  key  message  of  the  Government  is  that  the  sexual  education  of  children  should  not  be  left  to  LGBTIQ 
activists (contribution from Ökotárs for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 19). Pro-government media present 
LGBTIQ  issues  as  an  ideology,  and  accuse  CSOs  seeking  to  recruit  more  children  to  become  LGBTIQ, 
conflating sexual orientation and gender identity with paedophilia (contribution from ILGA-Europe for the 
2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 15). According to the Government, the purpose of communication on the child 
protection  law  is  about  the  parents’  right  to  upbring  their  children  and  the  protection  of  minors.  The 
Hungarian Fundamental Law strictly prohibits, and laws severely punish the exclusion and discrimination of 
sexual minorities. 

238  The  3  April  2022  referendum  called  by  the  Government  failed  because  less  than  half  of  the  voters  cast  a 

valid vote. 

239  Act  LXXIX  of  2021,  adopted  on  15  June  2021,  lays  down  a  number  of  restrictive  and  discriminatory 
measures;  in  particular,  it  prohibits  or  limits  access  to  content  that  propagates  or  portrays  the  so-called 
‘divergence  from  self-identity  corresponding  to  sex  at  birth,  sex  change  or  homosexuality’  for  individuals 
under 18. The Commission has launched infringement proceedings, because it considers that the law violates 
a  number  of  EU  rules.  In  its  Opinion  of  13  December  2021,  the  Venice  Commission  assessed  that  the 
amendments concerning ‘propaganda of homosexuality’ can hardly be seen as compatible with the European 
Convention on Human Rights and international human rights standards (CDL-AD(2021)050, para. 95). 

Election 

240  Decisions 324/2022, 325/2022, 327/2022, 328/2022 and 329/2022. 
241  Two  administrative  chambers  of  the  Kúria  overturned  Decisions  325/2022,  327/2022  and  329/2022  of  the 
National 
and 
Kvk.VI.39.423/2022/6, respectively). As regards Decisions 324/2022 and 328/2022, a third chamber rejected 
on  formal  grounds  the  application  of  CSOs  (Orders  Kvk.IV.39.419/2022/4  and  Kvk.IV.39.420/2022/4, 
respectively, confirmed by the Constitutional Court in Orders 3216/2022. (V. 11.) AB and 3217/2022. (V. 
11.) AB, respectively). 

(Orders  Kvk.V.39.421/2022/5,  Kvk.V.39.422/2022/3 

Commission 

242  Contribution from Ökotárs for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, pp. 18-19. Contribution from Liberties for the 
2022  Rule  of  Law  Report,  p.  8,  Joint  contribution  from  Amnesty  International  Hungary  and  eight  other 
CSOs for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, pp. 14-15. 

243  Contribution  from  Civil  Society  Europe  for  the  2022  Rule  of  Law  Report,  pp.  14-15.  GONGOs  are 

government-organised non-governmental organisations. 

244  The total income of associations and foundations is approximately HUF 900 billion. Of this, somewhat less 
than  40%  comes  from  public  funding,  around  20%  from  private  sources,  with  the  rest  originating  from 
generated  own  income  and  a  variety  of  other  sources  (joint  contribution  from  Amnesty  International 
Hungary  and  eight  other  CSOs  for  the  2022  Rule  of  Law  Report,  p.  54).  The  budget  of  the  National 
Cooperation Fund (NCF) was increased from HUF 3.4 billion to HUF 10.9 billion between 2012 and 2022. 
In recent  years, two  new  forms of support available to associations and foundations registered in Hungary 
have been introduced: the Village Civil Fund and the Urban Civil Fund with a budget of HUF 5-5 billion for 
each fund. 85% of NCF grants (HUF 9.7 billion in 2022) will be distributed through tenders. In the NCF, 
five committees with 9 members each decide on the allocation of resources, and they partly carry out their 
activities with representatives elected by CSOs (3 civil delegates). 

245  Contribution from Ökotárs for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, pp. 18-19. In 2021, an Urban Civic Fund was 
launched to replace the EEA/Norway Grants, but as Átlátszó revealed, about half of its biggest beneficiaries 

30 

 
                                                 
 
failure  to  agree  on  an  independent  grant  operator  in  charge  of  distributing  funds  to  civil 
society, led to Hungary losing funds from the European Economic Area and Norway Grants 
Scheme, of which approximately  EUR 9.6 million  were  earmarked for civil society246. The 
number  of  public-interest  trusts247  has  increased  to  35.  Twenty-one  trusts  are  in  charge  of 
operating  formerly  state-run  higher  education  institutions248  that  cover  two-thirds  of  the 
students in Hungarian higher education. 

are  organisations  directly  controlled  by  local  politicians  from  the  governing  party  or  their  affiliates 
(contribution from CIVICUS for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 14). While independent CSOs – e.g. those 
engaged in human rights or LGBTIQ  issues – are not formally excluded from applying for public funding, 
they rarely have a chance to secure a grant. 

246  While the donors and the Hungarian Government signed a Memorandum of Understanding in late 2020, and 
the  call  for  applications  to  find  a  fund  operator  managing  the  Active  Citizens  Fund  was  published 
(contribution  from  Liberties  for  the  2022  Rule  of  Law  Report,  p.  8;  joint  contribution  from  Amnesty 
International  Hungary  and  eight  other  CSOs  for  the  2022  Rule  of  Law  Report,  pp.  14-15).  Many  arts 
organisations struggle to continue their operations, also due to the loss of EEA/Norway grants (contribution 
from Artistic Freedom Initiative for the 2022 Rule of Law Report). 

247  Public-interest trusts are private law entities managed by a board of trustees of at least five natural persons, 
appointed for an unlimited period of time. After the transfer of the rights of the founder from the Minister to 
the  board  of  trustees,  only  the  board  will  be  able  to  remove  and  appoint  board  members.  The  legislation 
allows  the  founder  to  give  up  any  form  of  control  over  the  board  of  trustees,  making  its  members 
autonomous and irremovable. 

248  Among the 106 board members, it is estimated that less than 25% have academic background and only three 
persons have had a relevant international professional career. Over 70% of the board members have links to 
the  current  Government  or  personally  to  the  Prime  Minister,  including  current  and  former  ministers  and 
State  secretaries,  government  commissioners,  managers  of  the  central  bank,  members  of  Parliament, 
(deputy)  mayors,  vocal  members  of  pro-government  groups,  relatives.  Out  of  21  universities  that  have 
undergone the ‘model change’, 19 have boards with a majority of members thus linked to the Government. 

31 

 
                                                                                                                                                        
Annex I: List of sources in alphabetical order* 

* The list of contributions received in the context of the consultation for the 2022 Rule of Law report 
can  be  found  at  https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/2022-rule-law-report-targeted-stakeholder-
consultation_en.  

Amnesty 
(2021), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/EUR2736232021ENGLISH.pdf.  

International  Hungary 

the  Hungarian 

Status 

of 

judiciary 

Amnesty International Hungary, Eötvös Károly Policy  Institute (EKINT), Hungarian Civil Liberties 
Union  (TASZ),  Hungarian  Environmental  Partnership  Foundation  (Ökotárs),  Hungarian  Helsinki 
Committee, K-Monitor, Mertek Media Monitor, Political Capital, Transparency International Hungary 
(2022), Contribution for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

Artistic Freedom Initiative (2022), Contribution from the Artistic Freedom Initiative for the 2022 Rule 
of Law Report. 

Átlátszó (2020), ‘The Government has abused the pandemic multiple times according to K-Monitor 
and  HCLU’  (‘A  K-Monitor  és  a  TASZ  szerint  többszörösen  visszaélt  a  kormány  a  vírushelyzettel’) 
https://atlatszo.hu/kozugy/2020/10/28/a-k-monitor-es-a-tasz-szerint-tobbszorosen-visszaelt-a-
kormany-a-virushelyzettel/.  

Átlátszó  (2021),  ‘Botched  investigations:  20  important  cases  that  got  stuck  with  prosecutors’ 
ügyészségen’) 
(‘Elszabotált 
https://atlatszo.hu/kozpenz/2021/09/16/elszabotalt-nyomozasok-20-fontos-ugy-ami-megakadt-az-
ugyeszsegen/.  

nyomozások: 

megakadt 

fontos 

ügy, 

ami 

20 

az 

Bertelsmann  Stiftung  (2022),  Transformation  Index:  Hungary  Country  Report  https://bti-
project.org/en/reports/country-report/HUN. 

(2022),  Hungary  election:  virtual  smear 

BIRN 
https://balkaninsight.com/2022/03/30/hungary-election-virtual-smear-tactics-alive-and-well-on-
facebook/.  

tactics  alive  and  well  on  Facebook 

Centre  for  Media  Pluralism  and  Media  Freedom  (2021),  Media  pluralism  monitor  2021  –  country 
report 
Hungary 
on 
https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/71949/hungary_results_mpm_2021_cmpf.pdf?sequence
=1&isAllowed=y.  

Centre  for  Media  Pluralism  and  Media  Freedom  (2022),  Media  pluralism  monitor  2022  –  country 
report on Hungary.  

CIVICUS, Monitor tracking civic space – Hungary https://monitor.civicus.org/country/hungary/.  

CIVICUS (2022), Contribution from CIVICUS for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

Civil Society Europe (2022) Contribution from Civil Society Europe for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

Civitas Institute/Transparency International (2022), Black Book II – Corruption and State Capture in 
Hungary https://en.civitasintezet.hu/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Black_Book_II.pdf.  

Conference of European Constitutional Courts (2022) Contribution from the Conference of European 
Constitutional Courts for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

Corruption Research Center Budapest (2021), Two tendencies in the Hungarian public procurement  

https://www.crcb.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/2022_research_notes_01_220209_01.pdf.  

Corruption  Research  Center  Budapest  (2021),  Political  Favoritism  in  Public  Tenders  in  Hungary: 
Analysis of the odds of winning https://www.crcb.eu/?p=2925.  

Corruption  Research  Center  Budapest  (2022),  Contribution  from  Corruption  Research  Center 
Budapest for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

32 

 
Corruption  Research  Center  Budapest  (2022),  Corruption  risk  and  the  crony  system  in  Hungary:  A 
brief  analysis  of  EU 
in  Hungarian  public  procurement  2005-2021 
https://www.crcb.eu/?p=3095.  

funded  contracts 

Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE) (2021), Contribution from the Council of Bars 
and Law Societies of Europe for the 2021 Rule of Law Report. 

Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE) (2022), Contribution from the Council of Bars 
and Law Societies of Europe for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

Council  of  Europe:  Committee  of  Ministers  (2010),  Recommendation  CM/Rec(2010)12  of  the 
Committee of Ministers to member states on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities. 

Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2010),  Report on the Independence of the Judicial System. 
Part I: The Independence of Judges (CDL-AD(2010)004). 

Council  of  Europe:  Venice  Commission  (2012),  Opinion  on  Act  CLI  of  2011  on  the  Constitutional 
Court of Hungary (CDL-AD(2012)009). 

Council  of  Europe:  Venice  Commission  (2021),  Opinion  on  the  amendments  to  the  Act  on  Equal 
Treatment  and  Promotion  of  Equal  Opportunities  and  to  the  Act  on  the  Commissioner  for 
Fundamental  Rights  as  adopted  by  the  Hungarian  parliament  in  December  2020  (CDL-
AD(2021)034). 

Council  of  Europe:  Venice  Commission  (2021),  Opinion  on  the  amendments  to  the  Act  on  the 
organisation  and  administration  of  the  Courts  and  the  Act  on  the  legal  status  and  remuneration  of 
judges adopted by the Hungarian parliament in December 2020 (CDL-AD(2021)036). 

Council  of  Europe:  Venice  Commission  (2021),  Opinion  on  the  compatibility  with  international 
human  rights  standards  of  Act  LXXIX  amending  certain  Acts  for  the  protection  of  children  (CDL-
AD(2021)050). 

Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 19 March 2020, Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi 
Hivatal (Tompa), C-564/18, ECLI:EU:C:2020:218. 

Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union,  judgment  of  14  May  2020,  FMS  and  Others  v  Országos 
Idegenrendészeti  Főigazgatóság  Dél-alföldi  Regionális  Igazgatóság  and  Országos  Idegenrendészeti 
Főigazgatóság, C-924/19 PPU and C-925/19 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2020:367. 

Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 17 December 2020, Commission v Hungary, C-
808/18, ECLI:EU:C:2020:1029. 

Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 16 November 2021, Commission v Hungary, C-
821/19, ECLI:EU:C:2021:930. 

Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union,  judgment  of  23  November  2021,  IS,  C-564/19, 
ECLI:EU:C:2021:949. 

Directorate-General  for  Communication  (2019),  Flash  Eurobarometer  482:  businesses’  attitudes 
towards corruption in the EU. 

Directorate-General for Communication (2020), Special Eurobarometer 502: corruption. 

Directorate-General  for  Communication  (2022),  Flash  Eurobarometer  507:  businesses’  attitudes 
towards corruption in the EU. 

Directorate-General for Communication (2022), Special Eurobarometer 523: corruption. 

Direkt36  (2021),  ‘President  of  the  Hungarian  Bar  Association  and  several  other  lawyers  have  been 
targeted  by  Pegasus’  https://www.direkt36.hu/en/banati-janos-az-ugyvedi-kamara-elnoke-es-tobb-
masik-ugyved-is-az-izraeli-kemszoftver-celpontja-lett/.  

Direkt36 (2022), ‘Pegasus's defense attorney becomes a target as he turns around in one of Hungary's 
most  notorious  murder  cases’  (‘Pegasus-célponttá  vált  a  védőügyvéd,  amikor  fordulat  állt  be 

33 

 
Magyarország egyik leghírhedtebb gyilkossági ügyében’) https://www.direkt36.hu/pegasus-celpontta-
valt-a-vedougyved-amikor-fordulat-allt-be-magyarorszag-egyik-leghirhedtebb-gyilkossagi-ugyeben/.  

Domány,  Andras  (2021),  ‘For  nine  years,  a  former  Fidesz  secretary  of  state  took  over  the  new 
concession authority’ (‘Kilenc évre egy fideszes exállamtitkár került az új koncessziós hatóság élére’) 
https://hvg.hu/itthon/20211001_biro_marcell_szabalyozott_tevekenysegek_felugyeleti_hatosaga.  

Euractiv  (2022),  ‘Orban’s  influencers  shower  cash,  become  largest  social  media  spenders’ 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/orbans-influencers-shower-cash-become-
largest-social-media-spenders/.  

European  Association  of  Judges  (2022),  Contribution  from  the  European  Association  of  Judges  for 
the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

European Commission (2020), 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation 
in Hungary. 

European Commission (2021), 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation 
in Hungary. 

European Commission (2022), EU Justice Scoreboard. 

European Commission (2022), Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on the 2022 National 
Reform  Programme  of  Hungary  and  delivering  a  Council  opinion  on  the  2022  Convergence 
Programme of Hungary (COM(2022) 614 final). 

European Commission (2022), 2022 European Semester, Country Report on Hungary. 

European  Court  of  Human  Rights,  judgment  of  7  October  2008,  Patyi  and  Others  v.  Hungary, 
5529/05. 

European  Court  of  Human  Rights,  judgment  of  22  December  2009,  Parlov-Tkalčić  v.  Croatia, 
24810/06. 

European  Court  of  Human  Rights,  judgment  of  12  January  2016,  Szabó  and  Vissy  v.  Hungary, 
37138/14. 

European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 2 May 2019, Pasquini v. San Marino, 50956/16. 

European Implementation Network (2022), Contribution from the European Implementation Network 
for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

European  Transport  Workers’  Federation  (2022),  Contribution  from  the  European  Transport 
Workers’ Federation for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

Freedom 
– 
https://freedomhouse.org/country/hungary/freedom-world/2022. 

the  World 

Freedom 

House, 

in 

Hungary 

Country 

Report 

Global  Alliance  of  National  Human  Rights  Institutions  (GANHRI)  (2021),  Report  and 
Recommendations  of the  Virtual  Session  of  the  Sub-Committee  on  Accreditation  (SCA),  14-24  June 
2021 https://ganhri.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/EN-SCA-Report-June-2021.pdf.  

Global  Alliance  of  National  Human  Rights  Institutions  (GANHRI)  (2022):  Report  and 
Recommendations of the Virtual Session of the Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA), 14-25 March 
2022 https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2022-04/SCA-Report-March-2022_E.pdf.  

GRECO (2015), Fourth Evaluation Round – Evaluation Report on Hungary on corruption prevention 
in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors. 

GRECO (2019), Third Evaluation Round – Second Addendum to the Second Compliance Report on 
Hungary on incriminations and transparency of party funding. 

GRECO  (2020),  Fourth  Evaluation  Round  –  Second  Interim  Compliance  Report  on  Hungary  on 
corruption prevention in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors. 

34 

 
Hungarian Association of Judges (MABIE) (2022), Contribution from the Hungarian Association of 
Judges for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

Hungarian  Bar  Association  (2022),  Contribution  from  the  Hungarian  Bar  Association  for  the  2022 
Rule of Law Report. 

Hungarian  Competition  Authority  (2021),  Press  release:  A  decade  for  integrity,  committed  to 
eliminating 
https://www.gvh.hu/en/press_room/press_releases/press-releases-2021/a-
decade-for-integrity-committed-to-eliminating-corruption.  

corruption 

Hungarian Government, Medium-term National Anti-Corruption Strategy for the period of 2020-2022 
https://korrupciomegelozes.kormany.hu/download/f/ff/92000/STRAT%C3%89GIA%20k%C3%B6zz
%C3%A9tett.pdf.  

Hungarian  Helsinki  Committee  (2021),  Non-Execution  of  Domestic  and  International  Court 
Judgments 
https://helsinki.hu/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2021/12/HHC_Non-
in  Hungary 
Execution_of_Court_Judgments_2021.pdf. 

Hungarian  National  Media  and  Infocommunications  Authority  (2022),  Contribution  from  the 
Hungarian National Media and Infocommunications Authority for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

Hungarian Parliament (2021), Parliamentary report of the Prosecutor General on the activities of the 
Prosecution 
http://ugyeszseg.hu/wp-
content/uploads/jaskupeter/2021/10/ogy_beszamolo_2020.pdf.  

Service 

2020 

in 

Hungarian Spectrum (2021), ‘Mol’s CEO Zsolt Hernádi won’t be gallivanting around the globe any 
time  soon’  https://hungarianspectrum.org/2021/10/25/mols-ceo-zsolt-hernadi-wont-be-gallivanting-
around-the-globe-any-time-soon/. 

Hungary  Today  (2021),  ‘MPs’  Asset  Declarations  Yet  Again  Raise  Concerns,  Causing  Calls  for 
Stricter 
https://hungarytoday.hu/mps-asset-declarations-concern-stricter-orban-rogan-
corruption/.  

Rules’ 

Hungary  Today  (2021),  ‘Croatia  Top  Court  Affirms  Prison  Sentence  for  MOL  Chief  Hernádi’ 
https://hungarytoday.hu/hernadi-croatia-sentence-court-mol-leader/. 

Hungary  Today  (2022),  ‘Asset  Declaration:  Hungary’s  Politicians  Hardly  Have  Any  Savings’ 
https://hungarytoday.hu/asset-declaration-hungarys-politicians-hardly-have-any-savings/.  

Hungary Today (2022), ‘Political Parties Spent HUF 3 Billion during Campaign Period on Facebook 
Alone’ 
https://hungarytoday.hu/political-parties-campaign-facebook-opposition-fidesz-dominance-
election/.  

ILGA-Europe (2022), Contribution from ILGA-Europe for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) (2022), Contribution from the 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

International Press Institute (2022),  Contribution from the International Press Institute for the 2022 
Rule of Law Report. 

International  Press  Institute  (2022),  ‘Hungary:  Fidesz  Media  Council  moves  to  silence  independent 
station  Tilos  Rádió’  https://ipi.media/hungary-fidesz-media-council-moves-to-silence-independent-
station-tilos-radio/.  

K-Monitor  (2021),  Court  of  Auditors  vs.  Reality  (Számvevőszék  vs.  Valóság  -  Reakciónk  az  ÁSZ 
Elnökére) https://k.blog.hu/2021/03/23/szamvevoszek_vs_valosag.  

K-Monitor  and  Transparency  International  Hungary  (2022),  Contribution  for  the  2022  Rule  of  Law 
Report. 

Kúria (2019), Statement: ‘Criminal proceedings may only be stayed with a view to delivering a lawful 
and  well-founded  decision  on  the  merits’  (‘A  büntetőeljárás  menetének  megakasztása  a jogszerű és 
történhet’)  https://kuria-
alapos  érdemi  döntés  meghozatalának  előmozdítása  érdekében 

35 

 
birosag.hu/hu/sajto/buntetoeljaras-menetenek-megakasztasa-jogszeru-es-alapos-erdemi-dontes-
meghozatalanak.  

Kúria (2021), Statement regarding the opinion of the Advocate General delivered in case C-564/19 of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (A Kúria közleménye az Európai Unió Bírósága C-564/19. 
https://kuria-birosag.hu/hu/sajto/kuria-
számú 
kozlemenye-az-europai-unio-birosaga-c-56419-szamu-ugyeben-kifejtett-fotanacsnoki.  

indítványról) 

főtanácsnoki 

ügyében 

kifejtett 

Kúria (2021), Contribution from the Kúria President for the 2021 Rule of Law Report. 

Kúria  (2021),  Statement  regarding  the  judgment  delivered  by  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European 
Union  in  case  C-564/19  (A  Kúria  közleménye  az  Európai  Unió  Bírósága  C-564/19.  számú  ügyben 
hozott  ítélete  vonatkozásában)  https://kuria-birosag.hu/hu/sajto/kuria-kozlemenye-az-europai-unio-
birosaga-c-56419-szamu-ugyben-hozott-itelete-vonatkozasaban.  

Liberties (2022), Contribution from Liberties for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

National  Authority  for  Data  Protection  and  Freedom  of  Information  (2022),  Findings  of  the 
investigation  of  the  Nemzeti  Adatvédelmi  és  Információszabadság  Hatóság  (Hungarian  National 
Authority  for  Data  Protection  and  Freedom  of  Information)  launched  ex  officio  concerning  the 
application  of  the  “Pegasus”  spyware  in  Hungary  https://naih.hu/data-protection/data-protection-
reports/file/492-findings-of-the-investigation-of-the-nemzeti-adatvedelmi-es-informacioszabadsag-
hatosag-hungarian-national-authority-for-data-protection-and-freedom-of-information-launched-ex-
officio-concerning-the-application-of-the-pegasus-spyware-in-hungary.  

National  Media  and  Infocommunications  Authority  (2022),  Contribution  from  the  National  Media 
and Infocomunications Authority for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

OECD (2021), Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, Phase 4 two-year follow-up report 
on Hungary. 

OECD  (2021),  Economic  Survey:  Hungary  https://www.oecd.org/economy/surveys/Hungary-2021-
OECD-economic-survey-overview.pdf. 

OLAF 
12/olaf_report_2020_en.pdf.  

(2021),  The  OLAF 

report  2020  https://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/system/files/2021-

OLAF  (2022),  The  OLAF  report  2021  https://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/system/files/2022-06/olaf-
report-2021_en_4.pdf.  

OLAF (2022), Contribution from OLAF for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

Ökotárs (2022) - Contribution from Ökotárs for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

Österreichischer  Gewerkschaftsbund 
Gewerkschaftsbund for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

(2022),  Contribution 

from 

the  Österreichischer 

Philea (2022), Contribution from Philea for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

Political Capital (2022), Russian Disinformation in Hungarian Public Broadcast Media: Complaint to 
the European Commission https://www.politicalcapital.hu/news.php?article_read=1&article_id=2982 

President  of  the  National Office for the Judiciary  (NOJ)  (2021),  2020  Annual Report  (Az  Országos 
Bírósági  Hivatal  Elnökének  2020.  évi  beszámolója)  https://birosag.hu/sites/default/files/2022-
01/obhe_2020_eves_beszamolo.pdf.  

Prosecutor  General’s  Office  (2021),  Prosecutor  General’s  Report  on  Activities  of  the  Prosecution 
Service 
http://ugyeszseg.hu/en/wp-
content/uploads/jaskupeter/2021/10/ogy_beszamolo_2020.pdf.  

2020 

Prosecutor  General’s  Office  (2021),  Press  release:  ‘The  Central  Chief  Prosecution  Office  of 
interrogated  MP  Dr.  Pál  Völner’  (‘A  Központi  Nyomozó  Főügyészség 
Investigation  has 
gyanúsítottként hallgatta ki dr. Völner Pál országgyűlési képviselőt’) http://ugyeszseg.hu/a-kozponti-
nyomozo-fougyeszseg-gyanusitottkent-hallgatta-ki-dr-volner-pal-orszaggyulesi-kepviselot/.  

36 

 
Prosecutor General’s Office (2022), Press release: ‘Grants obtained through corruption’  (‘Korrupció 
útján  szereztek  pályázati 
fotókkal  -  a  Központi  Nyomozó  Főügyészség 
sajtóközleménye’)  http://ugyeszseg.hu/korrupcio-utjan-szereztek-palyazati-tamogatasokat-fotokkal-a-
kozponti-nyomozo-fougyeszseg-sajtokozlemenye/. 

támogatásokat  - 

Public  Procurement  Authority  (2021),  Flash  report  –  Hungarian  public  procurements  in  numbers 
https://kozbeszerzes.hu/media/documents/FLASH_REPORT-2021.pdf.  

Reporters without Borders – Hungary https://rsf.org/en/country/hungary.  

State Audit Office (2021), Press release: The President of the SAO has asked Dr. Mónika Karas to be 
Vice-President 
Karas  Monikát) 
alelnöknek 
https://www.asz.hu/hu/sajtokozlemenyek/az-asz-elnoke-alelnoknek-kerte-fel-dr-karas-monikat-2021-
10-29-12-00-00.  

fel  Dr. 

elnöke 

kérte 

ÁSZ 

(Az 

State Audit Office (2021), Press release: Elections: Handbook prepared to support election regularity 
(Választások: Kézikönyv készült a választások szabályszerűségének támogatása érdekében)  

https://www.asz.hu/hu/sajtokozlemenyek/valasztasok-kezikonyv-keszult-a-valasztasok-
szabalyszerusegenek-tamogatasa-erdekeben.  

Telex  (2022),  ‘18  people  questioned  over  bribery  in  Finance  Ministry  case’  (‘Tizennyolc  embert 
hallgattak 
ügyben’) 
https://telex.hu/belfold/2022/04/21/tizennyolc-embert-hallgattak-ki-unios-palyazatokkal-kapcsolatos-
vesztegetes-miatt.  

Pénzügyminisztériumot 

vesztegetés 

érintő 

miatt 

ki 

a 

Telex  (2022),  ‘Five  arrested,  one  placed  under  criminal  supervision  in  corruption  case  involving 
felügyelet  alá  helyeztek  a 
Finance  Ministry’ 
Pénzügyminisztériumot  érintő  korrupciós  ügyben’)  https://telex.hu/belfold/2022/04/22/ot-embert-
letartoztattak-egyet-bunugyi-felugyelet-ala-helyeztek-a-penzugyminiszteriumot-erinto-korrupcios-
ugyben.  

letartóztattak,  egyet  bűnügyi 

(‘Öt  embert 

Transparency International (2022), Corruption Perceptions Index 2021. 

Transparency International Hungary (2022), Contribution from Transparency International Hungary 
for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

37 

 
Annex II: Country visit to Hungary249 

The Commission services held virtual meetings in February and March 2022 with: 

  Alapjogokért Központ 
  Amnesty International Hungary 
  Corruption Research Center Budapest 
  Editors-in-Chief’s Forum (Főszerkesztők Fóruma) 
  Eötvös Károly Policy Institute 
  Hungarian Association of Judges (MABIE) 
  Hungarian Bar Association 
  Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (TASZ) 
  Hungarian Helsinki Committee 
  K-Monitor 
  Kúria (the Supreme Court) 
  Mathias Corvinus Collegium 
  Mérték Media Monitor 
  National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information 
  National Judicial Council 
  National Media and Infocommunications Authority 
  National Office for the Judiciary 
  Nézőpont 
  Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights 
  Office of the Constitutional Court 
  Prosecution Service of Hungary 
  Res Iudicata Association 
  State Audit Office (Állami Számvevőszék) 
  Századvég 
  Transparency International Hungary 

* The Commission also met the following organisations in a number of horizontal meetings:  

  Amnesty International  
  Article 19  
  Civil Liberties Union for Europe 
  Civil Society Europe  
  European Centre for Press and Media Freedom  
  European Civic Forum 
  European Federation of Journalists  
  European Partnership for Democracy 
  European Youth Forum 
  Free Press Unlimited 
  Human Rights Watch  
 
 
 

ILGA Europe 
International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) 
International Press Institute 

249  The Hungarian government did not provide written input and decided not to participate in relevant meetings 

of the country visit. However, it commented on the draft country chapter. 

38 

 
 
                                                 
  Open Society European Policy Institute (OSEPI) 
  Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso Transeuropa  
  Philea 
  Reporters Without Borders 
  Transparency International Europe 

39