COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2022 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2022 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union
Date: 2022-07-13
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Bulgaria, coronavirus disease, corruption, democracy, epidemic, independence of the judiciary, infringement of EU law, pluralism in the media, political rights, rule of law

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Luxembourg, 13.7.2022  SWD(2022) 502 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2022 Rule of Law Report        Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2022 Rule of Law Report          The rule of law situation in the European Union {COM(2022) 500 final} - {SWD(2022) 501 final} - {SWD(2022) 503 final} - {SWD(2022) 504 final} - {SWD(2022) 505 final} - {SWD(2022) 506 final} - {SWD(2022) 507 final} - {SWD(2022) 508 final} - {SWD(2022) 509 final} - {SWD(2022) 510 final} - {SWD(2022) 511 final} - {SWD(2022) 512 final} - {SWD(2022) 513 final} - {SWD(2022) 514 final} - {SWD(2022) 515 final} - {SWD(2022) 516 final} - {SWD(2022) 517 final} - {SWD(2022) 518 final} - {SWD(2022) 519 final} - {SWD(2022) 520 final} - {SWD(2022) 521 final} - {SWD(2022) 522 final} - {SWD(2022) 523 final} - {SWD(2022) 524 final} - {SWD(2022) 525 final} - {SWD(2022) 526 final} - {SWD(2022) 527 final}  
 
 
ABSTRACT 

Reforms  in  Bulgaria  in  the  area  of  justice  and  anti-corruption  were  first  followed  by  the 
Commission  under  the  Cooperation  and  Verification  Mechanism  (CVM)  and  are  currently 
monitored under the Rule of Law Mechanism.  

The  Government  has  committed,  in  the  context  of  the  Bulgarian  Recovery  and  Resilience 
Plan, to establish an effective mechanism for the accountability and criminal liability of the 
Prosecutor  General  and  his/her  deputies,  as  well  as  a  judicial  review  of  prosecutorial 
decisions not to open an investigation. This would address longstanding concerns referred in 
the  previous  editions  of  the  Rule  of  Law  Report  and  in  the  CVM.  There  are  increasing 
concerns related to the functioning of the Supreme Judicial Council and the need to address 
its composition is all the more important. Concerns related to the Inspectorate to the Supreme 
Judicial  Council  remain.  The  absence  of  regular  competition  for  the  promotion  of 
magistrates, combined with an extensive use of secondments, risks to affect the independence 
of  magistrates.  A  legislative  reform  has  abolished  the  specialised  judicial  authorities,  while 
providing for the reappointment of the relevant magistrates to ordinary courts and prosecution 
offices,  with  safeguards  to  protect  judicial  independence  and  procedural  rights.  Challenges 
remain in the area of digitalisation of justice. Administrative justice continues to perform well 
in terms of efficiency.  

The  Anti-Corruption  Commission  has  continued  to  perform  its  activities,  with  envisaged 
reforms aiming at restructuring it to improve its capacity towards investigation of corruption 
cases.  A  solid  track-record  of  final  convictions  in  high-level  cases  of  corruption  is  still 
lacking.  The  National  Strategy  for  Prevention  and  Countering  Corruption,  as  well  as  the 
general provisions for the integrity of the public administration continue to be implemented, 
including provisions for specific sectors and a mechanism for the declaration and verification 
of assets. Lobbying and protection of whistleblowers are still not properly regulated, although 
there are plans to address that. Sector-specific corruption risks such as management of budget 
funds  and  control  activities,  including  procurement  were  identified  during  the  COVID-19 
pandemic. 

As  regards  media  freedom  and  pluralism,  the  legal  framework,  based  on  a  set  of 
constitutional  safeguards  and  legislative  measures,  guarantees  freedom  of  expression  and 
editorial  independence.  The  lack  of  a  clear  regulatory  framework  to  ensure  transparency  in 
the  allocation  of  state  advertising  remains  a  concern,  despite  some  measures  having  been 
taken  to  improve  transparency.  As  regards  media  ownership  transparency,  reflections  are 
ongoing  about  a  more  effective  enforcement  of  media  ownership  obligations.  Legal 
safeguards  exist  regarding  the  independence  of  public  service  media,  but  appear  to  be 
insufficient; a revision of the law is being considered in order to strengthen the independence 
of  public  service  media  and  define  in  more  detail  the  public  service  remit  and  the  related 
financing.  The  professional  environment  of  journalists  has  slightly  improved  since  the  last 
year  but  issues  such  as  access  to  public  information,  working  conditions  and  strategic 
lawsuits, remain. 

The  establishment  of  a  Post-monitoring  Mechanism  to  accompany  future  CVM  related 
reform is progressing well after a decision of the Supreme Administrative Court. New rules 
have  been  adopted  by  the  Parliament  to  improve  the  law-making  process.  The  emergency 
regime  related  to  the  COVID-19  pandemic  has  ended.  A  Council  for  Civil  Society 
Development has been set up with the objective of assisting civil society, which will include 
drafting and implementation of policies covering Civil Society Organisations themselves. 

1 

  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 

In addition  to  recalling  the commitments made under the national  Recovery and Resilience 
Plan relating to certain  aspects of the justice system and the anti-corruption framework and 
the  remaining  commitments  under  the  Cooperation  and  Verification  Mechanism,  it  is 
recommended to Bulgaria to:  

  Ensure  timely  ordinary  competitions  for  promotion  to  avoid  long-term  secondment  of 
judges to fill in vacant positions, taking into account European standards on secondment 
of judges. 

  Advance  with  the  legislative  amendments  aiming  at  improving  the  functioning  of  the 
Inspectorate to the Supreme Judicial Council and avoiding the risk of political influence, 
in particular by involving judicial bodies in the selection of its members. 

  Take steps to adapt the composition of the Supreme Judicial Council, taking into account 

European standards on Councils for the Judiciary. 

  Continue the implementation of measures to improve the integrity of the specific sectors 
of the public administration, including measures tailored to the police and the judiciary. 
  Ensure  that  the  institutional  reforms  of  the  Anti-Corruption  Commission  and  the 
specialised judicial authorities lead to  an improved effectiveness  of investigations and a 
robust track-record of prosecution and final judgments in high-level corruption cases. 
Improve  transparency  in  the  allocation  of  state  advertising,  in  particular  with  regard  to 
state advertising contracted through intermediaries, such as media agencies. 

 

2 

  
 
 
The Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) was established at the accession to the 
European Union in 2007 as a transitional measure to facilitate Bulgaria’s continued efforts to 
reform its judiciary and step up the fight against corruption and organised crime1. In line with 
the decision setting up the mechanism and as underlined by the Council, the CVM ends when 
all  the  benchmarks  applying  to  Bulgaria  are  satisfactorily  met2.  The  Commission’s  latest 
CVM report, adopted in October 2019, recorded that Bulgaria had made a number of further 
commitments  and concluded that the progress  made under the CVM was sufficient  to  meet 
Bulgaria’s commitments made at the time of its accession to the EU. As the Commission also 
underlined,  Bulgaria  will  need  to  continue  working  consistently  on  translating  the 
commitments  specified 
legislation  and  on  continued 
implementation. Said implementation continues to be monitored in the context of the Rule of 
Law Mechanism, and more concretely, in the Commission’s annual Rule of Law Report. 

into  concrete 

the  report 

in 

I. 

JUSTICE SYSTEM  

The judicial system of the Republic of Bulgaria3 includes a total number of 182 courts which 
are  ordinary  and  specialised.  As  a  general  rule,  the  ordinary  courts  hear  cases  in  three 
instances, with the system of these courts comprising 113 district courts, 28 regional courts 
and 5 courts of appeal. The specialised courts include military and administrative courts. The 
Supreme  Court  of  Cassation  is  the  court  of  last  instance  in  cases  heard  by  ordinary  and 
military courts, while for administrative cases, the Supreme Administrative Court is the court 
of last instance. The judiciary also includes the Prosecutor’s Office. The Constitutional Court 
of  Bulgaria  reviews  constitutionality  of  laws  and  gives  interpretative  decisions4.  The 
Prosecutor’s Office has a unified structure and is headed by the Prosecutor General5. Bulgaria 
participates in the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. The Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) 
is  the  highest  administrative  authority  in  the  Bulgarian  judiciary.  It  is  responsible  for 
managing the judiciary and ensuring its independence. Judges, prosecutors and investigators6 
are appointed, promoted, transferred and dismissed by their respective chamber (Judges’ or 
Prosecutors’) of the SJC7. In addition to the SJC, activities of magistrates are supervised by 

1   Following  the  Council  conclusions  of  17  October  2006  (13339/06),  the  Mechanism  was  established  by 

Commission Decision of 13 December 2006, OJ L 354, 14.12.2006, p. 58. 

2   Council Conclusions on the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, 12 December 2017. 
3   For  a  description  of  the  judicial  structure  see  e.g.  CEPEJ  (2021),  Study  on  the  functioning  of  the  judicial 

systems in the EU Member States. 

4   See 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, p. 2.  
5   Art. 126 to 128 from the Constitution. 
6   Venice Commission opinion (CDL-AD(2019)031), para. 13-14: The majority of the investigators are police 
officers,  procedurally  supervised  by  the  prosecutors;  a  smaller  number  of  investigators  have  the  status  of 
magistrates  and  work  in  the  National  Investigative  Service  or  in  investigative  units  which  are  part  of 
prosecutors’  offices  at  regional  level.  Procedurally,  they  are  all  under  the  supervision  of  prosecutors. 
Procedural  supervision  means  that  all  decision  by  an  investigator  can  be  overturned  by  a  supervising 
prosecutor.  The  supervising  prosecutor  is,  in  turn,  subject  to  a  supervision  by  a  hierarchically  superior 
prosecutor, up to the level of the Prosecutor General. 

7   The Plenary of the Supreme Judicial Council has 25 members. The Supreme Judicial Council is composed 
by  a  Judicial  Chamber  and  a  Prosecutorial  Chamber.  The  Judicial  Chamber  is  composed  of  six  judges 
elected by judges, six members elected by Parliament and the presidents of the two highest courts, who are 
ex  officio  members.  The  Prosecutorial  Chamber  is  composed  of  four  prosecutors  and  one  investigating 
magistrate elected by their peers, five members elected by Parliament, and the Prosecutor General, who is an 
ex officio member. 

3 

  
                                                 
the  Inspectorate.  The  Supreme  Bar  Council  is  an  independent  and  self-governing  body 
established by law8. 

Independence  

The level of perceived judicial independence in Bulgaria continues to be low among the 
general  public  and  is  now  very  low  among  companies.  Overall,  31%  of  the  general 
population and 28% of companies perceive the level of independence of courts and judges to 
be ‘fairly or very good’ in 20229. According to data in the 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard, the 
perceived  judicial  independence  among  both  the  general  public  and  companies  has 
consistently decreased in the last years, although it remains higher than in 2016 (23% for the 
general public and 21% for companies). Both figures have decreased in comparison to 2021 
(32% for the general public and 43% for companies). 

Provisions  for  an  effective  accountability  and  criminal  liability  mechanism  for  the 
Prosecutor  General  and  his/her  deputies  are  planned  within  the  framework  of  the 
Recovery  and  Resilience  Plan  (RRP)  related  reforms10.  The  lack  of  a  possibility  for  an 
effective  criminal  investigation  of  the  Prosecutor  General  and  his/her  deputies  has  been  a 
long-standing issue, which was raised not only by the European Commission11 but also by the 
European Court of Human Rights12 and the Council of Europe13. As pointed out in previous 
reports14, the combination of the powers held by the Prosecutor General15 and his/her position 
in the Supreme Judicial  Council16 result in a considerable influence within the Prosecutor’s 

8   See 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, p. 3.  
9   Figures 50 and 52, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard. The level of perceived judicial independence is categorised 
as  follows:  very  low  (below  30%  of  respondents  perceive  judicial  independence  as  fairly  good  and  very 
good); low (between 30-39%), average (between 40-59%), high (between 60-75%), very high (above 75%). 

10   They will take place by Q2 2023. 
11   See 2020 and 2021 Rule of Law Reports, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, pp. 3-5; 

Progress report Bulgaria 2019, COM(2019)498, p. 6. 

and  CM/Notes/1398/H46-6 

12   ECtHR, judgment of 5 November 2009, Kolevi v. Bulgaria, paras. 121-127, 129, 135 and 136. 
13   Council  of  Europe,  Supervision  of  the  execution  of  the  European  Court’s  judgments,  Committee  of 
Ministers Decision CM/Del/Dec(2022)1436/H46-6 of 10 June 2022 and CM/Notes/1436/H46-6 of 8-10 June 
2022,  Committee  of  Ministers  Decision  CM/Del/Dec(2021)1419/H46-8  of  2  December  2021  and 
CM/Notes/1419/H46-8  of  30  November-  2  December  2021,  CM/Del/Dec(2021)1398/H46-6  of  11  March 
of  Ministers  Decision 
2021 
CM/Del/Dec(2020)1377bis/H46-9  of  1-3  September  2020  and  CM/Notes/1377bis/H46-9  of  3  September 
2020. See also Committee of Ministers (Interim Resolution CM/ResDH(2019)367 of 5 December 2019 and 
CM/Notes/1362/H46-6 of 3-5 December 2019; Venice Commission Opinion (CDL-AD(2019)031). 
14   See 2020 and 2021 Rule of Law Reports, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, p. 3-5. 
15   The  Prosecutor  General  may  annul  or  amend  any  decision  taken  by  any  prosecutor  which  has  not  been 
reviewed  by  a  judge.  Furthermore,  he  may  second  prosecutors  without  their  consent,  for  a  period  of  3 
months within a calendar year, and issue written instructions to prosecutors, concerning only the application 
of  the  law,  including  in  individual  cases.  The  Prosecutor  General  also  has  significant  powers  over  the 
prosecutors who are the heads of offices at district and provincial level.  

9-11  March;  Committee 

of 

16   In the Prosecutorial Chamber, where the five members elected by Parliament are currently also  prosecutors 
or investigating magistrates, all members are subordinates to the Prosecutor General, the  ex officio member 
and  chairman,  who  plays  a  decisive  role  in  relation  to  their  career  and  disciplinary  proceedings.  In  the 
Plenary,  the  prosecutorial  members  have  been  noted  to  usually  vote  as  a  block  supporting  the  Prosecutor 
General’s  proposals  or  position.  See  also  Art.  16  (3)  and  (4)  of  the  JSA  -  The  Prosecutors’  chamber  (11 
members)  is  presided  by  the  ex  officio  member  the  Prosecutor  General  and  it  consists  of  five  members 
elected by the Parliament, four by prosecutors and one by investigators elected by their respective peers; Art. 
30(1)  and  32  of  the  JSA  -  The  Plenary  of  the  SJC  (25  members)  is  comprised  of  the  members  of  both 
aforementioned chambers and is presided by the Minister of Justice, who does not have the right to a vote. 
The plenary of the SJC decides upon the draft budget, disciplinary removal from office and proposals for the 

4 

  
                                                 
 
Office  as  well  as  potentially  within  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council  (both in  its  Prosecutorial 
Chamber  and  its  Plenary)  and  within  the  magistracy17.  On  14  October  2021,  Bulgaria 
submitted  its  RRP  to  the  Commission18.  The  European  Commission  adopted  a  positive 
assessment  of  Bulgaria’s  RRP  on  7  April  2022.  On  3  May  2022,  the  Council  adopted  the 
implementing decisions on the approval of the plan. As part of the rule of law-related reforms 
in  the  plan,  the  authorities  committed  to  introduce  an  effective  mechanism  for  the 
accountability  and  criminal  liability  of  the  Prosecutor  General  and  his/her  deputies.  The 
mechanism  would  include  guarantees  for  the  independent  character  of  the  investigation, 
including by introducing measures that would allow the suspension of the Prosecutor General 
and his/her deputies in the event of criminal proceedings against them, as well as including 
the  selection  by  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council  of  a  judge19  appointed  to  the  position  of 
prosecutor  acting  as  an  investigating  magistrate.  The  envisaged  reform  would  also  include 
safeguards to ensure the career stability and independence of that judge20 in accordance with 
the decisions of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe21 and the opinions of 
the  Venice  Commission22.  Furthermore,  the  Bulgarian  Government  committed  to  cooperate 
with  the  Human  Rights  Directorate  of  the  Council  of  Europe  and  to  consult  the  Venice 
Commission of the Council of Europe on the draft amendments prior to their submission to 
the  National  Assembly.  In  addition,  in  view  of  limiting  the  potential  influence  of  the 
Prosecutor General within the Supreme Judicial Council, the Government has also committed 
to  exclude  the  representatives  of  the  prosecution  and  and  investigation  services  from  being 
nominated  as  members  elected  by  the  Parliament  to  the  Council23.  Finally,  as  regards  the 
increased  accountability  of  the  Prosecutor  General,  the  Government  has  committed  in  the 
RRP to set up procedures for hearings of the Prosecutor General, as well as annual reporting 
obligations on corruption related matters. 

appointment of the Presidents of the Supreme Court of Cassation, the Supreme Administrative Court and the 
Prosecutor  General  (Art.  30(2)  of  the  JSA). The  two  chambers  take  decisions  on  appointment,  promotion, 
relocation  and  release  from  office,  matters  related  to  acquisition  and  restoration  of  tenure  and  decide  on 
disciplinary  sanctions  (Art.  30(5)  of  the  JSA);  voting  majority  for  decisions  of  the  Judges’  chamber  are 
described in Art. 33 para 4 of the JSA. 
17   Council  of  Europe,  Supervision  of 

judgments, 
CM/Del/Dec(2021)1419/H46-8  of  2  December  2021  and  CM/Notes/1419/H46-8  of  30  November-  2 
December 2021, CM/Del/Dec(2021)1398/H46-6 of 9-11 March 2021. See also the 2021 and 2020 Rule of 
Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria.  

the  European  Court’s 

execution  of 

the 

18   One component of the plan  is devoted to addressing challenges to the  ‘business environment’ and aims to 
increase  the  overall  resilience  of  the  Bulgarian  economy  by  addressing  the  concerns  with  the  rule  of  law, 
corruption, money laundering and effectiveness of the public administration. Once approved by the Council 
of the European Union by means of an implementing decision, the reforms and investments under the RRP 
as set out in the annex to the implementing decision become legally binding. 

19   According  to  the  milestone  set  in  the  RRP  as  regards  the  Prosecutor  General,  that  judge  should  have  a 
minimum  professional  qualification  and  experience  in  criminal  justice,  and  would  be  selected  using  an 
independent random selection mechanism.  

20   Written contribution from the Minister of Justice in the context of the country visit: the “judge  will not be 
able to be removed by the SJC, the Prosecutor General will not be able to intervene and instruct him on the 
investigation, and  while it is  under  way, the Prosecutor General  will be suspended  from office  The  career 
development of the investigating judge will be protected, regardless of the outcome of the investigation. The 
investigation will be able to cover both actions and inactions of the Prosecutor General”.  

21   Committee  of  Ministers  Decision  CM/Del/Dec(2022)1436/H46-6  of  10  June  2022,  CM/Notes/1436/H46-6 
of 8-10 June 2022 and Analysis of the general measures in the Kolevi case, H/Exec(2022)8 of 24 May 2022 

22   See footnotes 14 and 15. 
23   Written  contribution  from  the  Ministry  of  Justice  in  the  context  of  the  country  visit,  p.5.  See  also  Venice 
Commission Opinion (CDL-AD(2019)031), para 27; CM/Notes/1419/H46-8 of 30 November- 2 December 
2021; and CM/Del/Dec(2020)1377bis/H46-9 of 9-11 March 2021, para. 9. 

5 

  
                                                                                                                                                        
The Constitutional Court confirmed the right of the Minister of Justice to request to the 
Supreme  Judicial  Council  the  early  termination  of  the  mandate  of  the  Prosecutor 
General. On 8 February 2022, the Constitutional Court declared constitutional the possibility 
for the Minister of Justice to ask for the early termination of the mandate24 of the Prosecutor 
General  (and  also  of  the  Presidents  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Cassation  and  the  Supreme 
Administrative Court). On 22 July 2021, the interim Minister of Justice filed a request to the 
Supreme Judicial  Council for the dismissal  of the Prosecutor General25. The Plenary  of the 
Supreme Judicial  Council voted the request  of the Minister as inadmissable and considered 
that the Minister did not have the power to file such a request26. Following this, the Minister 
of  Justice  challenged  the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council  before  the  Supreme 
Administrative  Court  and  requested  clarifications  from  the  Constitutional  Court  on  the 
powers of the Minister of Justice to request the early dismissal of the Prosecutor General27. 
The Constitutional Court confirmed that the Minister of Justice has such power to request the 
early  dismissal  of  the  Prosecutor  General28.  On  2  March  2022,  the  new  Minister  of  Justice 
filed a new request for the dismissal of the Prosecutor General29. 

The  introduction  of  judicial  review  against  decisions  of  prosecutors  not  to  open  an 
investigation is envisaged. In the adopted RRP, the Government has committed to introduce 
a mechanism for judicial review of any decisions of prosecutors not to open an investigation. 
As noted in the 2021 Rule of Law Report30, this is a long-standing concern and the envisaged 
measures would address the recommendations from the Council of Europe31. On 2 December 
2021, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe reiterated the recommendation32 
but  also  welcomed that the authorities committed under the RRP to  work together with  the 
Council  of  Europe  in  order  to  develop  the  legislation  for  this  mechanism33.  In  addition, 
arrangements  would  be  made  to  avoid  an  excessive  additional  workload  for  courts  and 
prosecutors34. The reform is expected to be adopted by mid-2023.  

Concerns  over  the  functioning  and  composition  of  the Supreme  Judicial  Council have 
increased, also in the context of disciplinary proceedings. The situation mentioned in the 
202035 and 202136 Rule of Law Reports, with the judges elected by their peers37 not forming 

24   Pursuant to Art. 176.5 in conjunction of Art. 173.3 of the JSA, for the circumstances outlined in Art. 129.3 

point 5 of the Constitution. 

25   The power would stem from Art. 130c of the Constitution  – “The Minister of Justice shall be able to make 
proposals for appointment, promotion, demotion, transfer and release from office of judges, prosecutors and 
investigating magistrates.” See also Plenary of the SJC, Protocol No.14 of 2021. 

26   See Plenary of the SJC, Protocol No.14 of 2021. 
27   Art.  130c  of  the  Constitution.  This  article  also  includes  the  power  to  request  the  early  dismissal  of  the 

Presidents of the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court. 

28   Constitutional Court Decision No. 1 of 2022/Case No. 17 from 2021: “… it should be assumed that although 
the Minister of Justice does not have the right to vote in the Supreme Judicial Council, this does not deprive 
him  of  the  opportunity  to  propose  issues  within  the  competence  of  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council  and 
therefore does not preclude proposals for engagement of responsibility or ascertainment of other facts under 
art. 129, para 3 of the Constitution and in respect of the three senior magistrates…”. 

29   See Plenary of the SJC, Agenda No.8 of 2022. 
30   See 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, p. 5. 
31   European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 3 March 2015, S.Z. v. Bulgaria, 29263/12. 
32   See 

CM/Del/Dec(2021)1419/H46-8, 

CM/Del/Dec(2021)1398/H46-6, 

para. 

10, 

para. 

3; 

CM/Del/Dec(2020)1377bis/H46-9, para. 4; CM/Del/Dec(2019)1362/H46-6. 

33   See CM/Del/Dec(2021)1419/H46-8, para. 4. 
34   In the context of the RRP, the authorities committed to adopt arrangements to avoid an excessive additional 
workload for courts and prosecutors, which will be clarified in consultation with the Council of Europe.  

35   See 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, p. 3-5.  

6 

  
                                                 
a majority in the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), remains unchanged38. Since 1 July 202139, 
the concerns have increased as the SJC functions with only four peer-elected judges40 due to 
the resignation of two peer-elected members41. The same voting practice of the Plenary of the 
Supreme  Judicial  Council  presented  in  the  previous  report42  continues43  to  underline  the 
decisive  role44  of  the  Prosecutor  General  in  the  SJC45.  The  concerns  regarding  the 
composition  and  functioning  of  the  SJC  have  been  reiterated  by  the  European  Parliament’s 
ad-hoc  delegation  to  Bulgaria46,  the  Council  of  Europe47,  the  UN  Universal  Periodic 
Review48 and various stakeholders49. In addition, similar concerns over the functioning of the 
SJC  have  arisen  in  the  context  of  disciplinary  proceedings.  On  19  October  2021,  the 
European  Court  of  Human  Rigths50  issued  a  decision  regarding  disciplinary  proceedings 
against  a  judge  before  the  SJC. While  the  Court  confirms  that  the  disciplinary  proceedings 
before  the  SJC  comprised  a  number  of  procedural  guarantees51,  it  considered  that  the 

36   See 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, p. 5-7. 
37   The  ex  officio  judges  do  not  count  as  peer  elected  judges.  -  Venice  Commission  opinion  (CDL-

AD(2020)035), para. 44.  

38   Recommendation  CM/Rec(2010)12  of  the  Committee  of  Ministers  of  the  Council  of  Europe,  para  27; 
Venice  Commission  opinion  (CDL-AD(2020)035),  para.  44;  JSA,  Art.  16(3)  and  (4)  – Since  the  Judicial 
Chamber (14 members) is presided by either one of the  ex  officio  members (the President of the Supreme 
Court of Cassation or the President of the Supreme Administrative Court) a majority can be reached, both in 
the Plenary of the SJC and the Judicial Chamber, without the votes of the judges elected by their peers. 

39   See Plenary of the SJC, Protocol No. 12 of 2021. 
40   The  total  number  of  members  at  the  SJC  is  currently  22  (Judicial  Chamber  is  with  12  members; 
Prosecutorial Chamber is with 10 members) – there is one vacancy for a Parliament elected member of the 
Prosecutorial  Chamber  since  January  2020  and  two  vacancies  for  peer  elected  members  of  the  Judicial 
Chamber since July 2021.  

41   After  a  call  to  all  members  of  the  SJC  to  follow  the  two-peer  elected  members  and  resign,  which  did  not 
have  any  effect,  in  October  2021,  a  majority  of  judges  decided  not  to  participate  in  two  attempts  for  the 
election of new peer-elected members, which resulted in unsuccessful elections (Statement of the Bulgarian 
Judges Association of 23 June 2021). About only 20% of all judges in the country took part in the elections. 
No  new  elections  were  scheduled  because  the  mandate  of  the  current  SJC  ends  in  October  2022  and  the 
procedures for election of the new members have started in early 2022. See also Art. 29k, para. 2 and 3 of 
the JSA.  

42   See 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, p.6: for important 
decisions,  members  from  the  Prosecutors’  chamber  seem  to  vote  in  block,  together  with  the  Parliament 
elected  members  of  the  Judges’  chamber.  See  Committee  of  Minister  of  the  Council  of  Europe 
(CM/Del/Dec(2021)1398/H46-6).  See  also  from  the  meetings  of  the  Plenary  of  the  Supreme  Judicial 
Council: Protocol No. 14 of 2021 on the vote for the dismissal of the Prosecutor General; Protocol No. 16 of 
2021 on renovating the summer resorts of the Prosecutor’s Office. 

43   See  2020  Rule  of  Law  Report,  Country  Chapter  on  the  rule  of  law  situation  in  Bulgaria,  p.  5-6.  See  also 

2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, p. 3-4. 

44   Due to the position of the Prosecutor General within the Prosecutor’s Office and his role as a chairman of the 
Prosecutors’ Chamber, he has a decisive role in the Prosecutors’ Chamber and an important influence in the 
Plenary of the Supreme Judicial Council. 

45   Art.  16  (3)  and  (4)  of  the  JSA  -  The  Prosecutors’  Chamber  (11  members)  is  presided  by  the  ex  officio 
member  the  Prosecutor  General  and  it  consists  of  five  members  elected  by  the  Parliament,  four  by 
prosecutors and one by investigators elected by their respective peers. 

46   Mission  Report  following  the  ad-hoc  delegation  to  Slovakia  and  Bulgaria  –  21-24  September  2021 

Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, p. 15. 

47   Committee  of  Ministers  decision  CM/Del/Dec(2021)1398/H46-6.  See  also  Venice  Commission  opinion 

(CDL-AD(2020)035), para. 40. 

48   Contributions from UN OHCHR Regional Office for Europe for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 1. 
49   Contributions  from  Austrian  Federal  Economic  Chamber,  European  Association  of  Judges,  and  Bulgarian 

Institute for Legal Initiatives Foundation for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

50   ECtHR, judgment of 19 October 2021, Todorova v. Bulgaria, 40072/13. 
51   ECtHR, judgment of 19 October 2021, Todorova v. Bulgaria, 40072/13, para. 109.  

7 

  
                                                                                                                                                        
disciplinary proceedings conducted by the SJC and the sanctions imposed had amounted to 
an interference with the exercise of the magistrate’s right to freedom of expression which had 
not been “necessary in a democratic society” for pursuing legitimate aims set out in Article 
10  of  the  Convention52.  In  addition,  in  2021,  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court  annulled 
several  decisions  of  the  SJC  imposing  disciplinary  sanctions  on  judges  or  prosecutors  for 
insufficient  reasoning  or  procedural  irregularities53.  Addressing  the  issue  of  the  SJC’s 
composition54 by aligning it to European standards, is all the more important in view of  the 
forthcoming end of the current mandates of SJC members55.  

Concerns remain regarding political influence and the functioning of the Inspectorate to 
the  Supreme  Judicial  Council  (ISJC).  As  mentioned  in  previous  Rule  of  Law  Reports56, 
currently  the  Inspectorate  oversees  the  activity  of  the  judiciary,  assesses  the  integrity  and 
potential conflicts of interest of magistrates, and is responsible for proposing any opening of 
disciplinary proceedings regarding magistrates to the SJC. The ISJC consists of an Inspector 
General  and  ten  inspectors,  who  are  independent  and  elected  by  the  National  Assembly57. 
The working group that was set up in December 2020 and tasked with addressing concerns 
regarding  the  risk  of  political  influence  on  the  Inspectorate58  has  finalised  its  work59, 
identifying two  groups of proposals  for legislative amendments.  One, needing  further work 
within  the  framework  of  the  current  working  group60.  The  other,  would  require  a  longer 
period  for  implementation,  which  is  why,  no  amendement  has  been  tabled  in  Parliament 
alleviating these concerns. These concerns are aggravated by the fact that the Inspectorate is 
still working on the basis of an expired mandate61. In February 2022, the Ministry of Justice 
asked  representatives  of  the  judiciary,  professional  legal  organisations,  as  well  as  the 

52   ECtHR, judgment of 19 October 2021, Todorova v. Bulgaria, 40072/13, paras. 164 and 173. 
53   Contribution from the European Association of Judges for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 12. 
54   See Art. 130 and Art. 130a paras. 3 and 4 of the Constitution. 
55   The term of the current SJC runs until October 2022 and the procedures for election of new members have 

already begun. 

56   See also 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, p.8; 2020 Rule 

of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, p.8. 

57   Art. 132a of the Constitution. 
58   See 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, p. 3: as part of the 
previously  mentioned  Government’s  Action  Plan,  in  December  2020,  the  Minister  of  Justice  established  a 
working  group  tasked  with  drafting  legislative  amendments  to  address  the  Inspectorate  related  issues 
identified as a concern by the 2020 Rule of Law report. See also Venice Commission (CDL-AD(2017)018), 
para. 58. 

59   Written contribution from the Ministry of Justice in the context of the country visit to Bulgaria, pp. 5 and 6. 
60   Formed Order No. LS-13-88/21.12.2020 of the Minister of Justice with the task of drafting a comprehensive 

draft amendments to the Judiciary Act. 

61   The procedure for election of a new Inspectors and Inspector General was supposed to start no later than 9 
February  2020  for  the  Inspector  General  and  no  later  than  14  January  2020  for  the  Inspectors  (JSA,  Art. 
44(1)). Such procedure has still not been initiated to this date. A similar situation occurred also during the 
mandate of the previous Chief Inspector who operated under a de facto 2 year extension of the mandate. To 
be  noted  that  other  institutions  which  are  also  in  similar  situation:  five  other  independent  and  supervisory 
authorities  also  operate  on  the  basis  of  an  expired  mandate:  Commission  for  protection  of  personal  data, 
mandate  expired  since  16  April  2019;  Commission  for  consumer  protection,  mandate  expired  since  27 
March  2020;  Bulgarian  National  Bank,  mandate  expired  since  July  2021;  Fiscal  Council  expired  since 
November 2021; National Social Security Institute Committee for disclosing the documents and announcing 
affiliation  of  Bulgarian  citizens  to  the  State  Security  and  intelligence  services  of  the  Bulgarian  National 
Army,  mandate  expired  since  July  2017  (Written  contribution  from  the  Bulgarian  Institute  for  Legal 
Initiatives in the context of the country visit). 

8 

  
                                                 
academic  legal  community  to  submit  proposals  regarding  the  optimisation62  of  the 
organisation and activities of the SJC and the ISJC in the context of the established European 
and international standards63 for the activities of these types of bodies64. The Plenary of the 
Supreme  Administrative  Court65  made  a  request  to  the  Constitutional  Court  concerning  the 
interpretation of the constitutional provisions regarding the ISJC66. That request was declared 
admissible on 17 May 2022 and is now pending.  

The  absence  of  regular  competitions  for  the  promotion  of  magistrates,  combined  with 
an extensive use of secondments, continue to raise serious concerns. As underlined in the 
2021 Rule of Law Report67, while magistrates may be promoted only through a competition, 
in practice only one competition for the promotion of judges has been completed in the last 
four  years68.  The  absence  of  regular  competitions  has  resulted  in  an  extensive  use  of 
secondments69. European standards highlight that promotions should be based on merit70 and 
secondments should happen with consent and on a temporary basis71, and only in exceptional 
circumstances72.  A  widespread  use  of  secondments  may  negatively  impact  on  seconded 
magistrates, if they are faced with the risk of a termination of their secondment against their 
will; this increases the power of the administrative heads if they are competent to decide on 
secondments and their termination73, which may create situations of dependence74. The lack 
of regular merit-based promotions combined with an extensive use of secondments therefore 

62   Improving  the  procedures  for  competitions,  selection  of  administrative  heads  and  attestation  in  order  to 
speed them up and ensure objective results; refining the procedures for disciplinary proceedings in the light 
of  practical  experience;  increasing  the  effectiveness  of  the  training  activities  of  the  National  Institute  of 
Justice. 

63   Opinion  of  the  Venice  Commission  on  the  Judiciary  Law  from  2017  (CDL-AD(2017)018;  Opinion  of  the 
Venice Commission on the draft amendments to the Constitution from 2015 (CDL-AD(2015)022); Opinions 
of the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE). 

64   Written contribution from the Ministry of Justice in the context of the country visit to Bulgaria, p. 8. 
65   Constitutional Court Case No. 7 of 29 April 2022 
66   In particular, the request touches upon the question whether the Inspector General and the Inspectors should 
continue work after the end of their mandate  until new holders of office are appointed by the Parliament at 
these positions. 

67   2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, pp. 6 and 7, footnote 74. 
See  also  website  of  the  SJC,  register  for  seconded  magistrates  which  for  2022  recorded  a  number  of  217 
seconded judges (97 of them are seconded for more than 24 months). 

68   Written contribution from the Supreme Court of Cassation; Contribution from Bulgarian Institute for Legal 

Initiatives in the context of the country visit to Bulgaria. 

69   The  lack  of  competitions  has  been  reported  by  civil,  criminal  and  administrative  judges  –  Information 
received  from  Bulgarian  Judges  Association,  President  of  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court;  President  of 
the  Supreme  Court  of  Cassation;  Specialised  Prosecutor’s  Office  in  the  context  of  the  country  visit  to 
Bulgaria. See also 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria p. 9 on 
the  number  of  seconded  judges  which  kept  increasing  and  on  the  number  of  long  secondments  (with 
consent)  to  fill  in  higher-ranking  positions.  See  also  written  contribution  from  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Cassation  in  the  context  of  the  country  visit  to  Bulgaria,  topic  3,  p.1,  stating  that  “In  the  past  period  no 
development has been achieved in the staffing of the Supreme Court of Cassation, but on the contrary – there 
is a clear trend of regression, as the number of seconded persons is gradually increasing”. 

70   Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, para 44. 
71   As  regards  EU  law  requirements,  see  CJEU,  Judgment  of  16  November  2021, Prokuratura  Rejonowa  w 

Minsku Mazowieckim, Joined Cases C-748/19 to C-754/19, EU:C:2021:931, point 72. 

72   Venice Commission (CDL-AD(2017)018), paras. 86 and 87. 
73   The  Judicial  Chamber  can  also  terminate  prematurely  secondments  when  during  the  secondment  there  are 
violations of the terms and conditions provided in the JSA, or in case of necessity for staffing the body of the 
judiciary from which the judge is seconded. See Art. 30(5), point 18 of the JSA. 

74   Written contribution from the Supreme Court of Cassation in the context of the country visit to Bulgaria, p.4 

of topic 3. 

9 

  
                                                 
risks  to  affect  judicial  independence.  Some  practices  have  been  developed  within  the 
judiciary  to  circumscribe  the  powers  of  the  administrative  heads  in  this  respect75,  but  only 
regular and timely competitions based on merit would effectively avert the abovementioned 
risk76.  

Legislative  amendments  have  been  introduced  to  put  an  end  to  the  special  promotion 
regime  for  magistrates  in  the  Inspectorate  to  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council  and  the 
Supreme  Judical  Council.  As  to  the  automatic  promotion  of  magistrates  described  in  the 
2020  Rule  of  Law  Report77,  on  14  April  2022  the  same  law  adopted  for  the  closure  of  the 
specialised judicial authorities78 amending the Judicial System Act also removed the specific 
promotion  mechanism  for  SJC  and  ISJC  members79  by  ending  the  possibility  for  these 
members  to  be  reinstated  at  the  end  of  their  term  of  office  in  a  higher  position  as  judge, 
prosecutor or investigator than that held before the election80. Furthermore, concerns related 
to  the  automatic  promotion  of  judges  within  the  envisaged  judicial  map  reform  did  not 
materialise in a draft law81. 

The Supreme Judicial Council adopted criteria for deciding on additional remuneration 
of magistrates, aiming at limiting the discretionary powers of court presidents.  In order 
to address the Council of Europe’s concerns regarding the broad discretionary powers of the 
Court Presidents  for allocating  additional remuneration of magistrates82, in November 2021 
the SJC set out criteria for additional remunerations for judges and prosecutors (except for the 
specialised  judicial  authorities83)  linked  to  the  degree  of  workload  of  courts,  prosecutor’s 
offices, and district investigation departments84.  

75   Written contribution from the Supreme Court of Cassation in the context of the country visit to Bulgaria: the 
selection of judges to be seconded is increasingly carried out by the plenaries of the court’s colleges, which 
propose to the administrative head of office the judge for secondment. In addition, courts are drafting rules 
for objective criteria for secondment. 

76   The power of court presidents, to impose a disciplinary measure (under Art. 327 of the JSA, court presidents 
may draw the attention of judges, prosecutors and investigators to the violations committed by them in the 
formation and movement of cases or in the organisation of their work) was further increased with respect to 
single judges due to the practice of the ISJC to recommend the issuing of less severe disciplinary sanctions 
(e.g. reprimand). In addition, they can also decide to refer the matter to the SJC, asking the latter to open a 
disciplinary proceeding aiming at imposing a more relevant sanction (Written contribution from the ISJC in 
the context of the country visit to Bulgaria). 

77   See 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, p.8-9. 
78   Adopted on 14 April 2022, and promulgated on 26 April 2022. 
79   See 2021 Rule of Law Report p. 10 
80   Written contribution from the ISJC in the context of the country visit to Bulgaria, p.1.  
81   The  proposal  issued  by  the  SJC  was  strongly  criticised  by  stakeholders  (Contribution  from  the  European 

Association of Judges for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 24). 

82   According  to  GRECO,  the  system  of  applying  supplementary  remuneration  appears  still  to  be  subject  to 
broad discretionary decisions and risks of undue influence. GRECO Fourth Evaluation Round  – Evaluation 
report,  recommendation  x,  para.  26;  See  also  Venice  Commission  (CDL-AD(2010)004),  para.  46  and  51; 
Recommendation  CM/Rec(2010)12  of  the  Committee  of  Ministers  of  the  Council  of  Europe,  para.  55: 
“Systems  making  judges’  core  remuneration  dependent  on  performance  should  be  avoided  as  they  could 
create difficulties for the independence of judges”. 

83   The specialised judicial authorities include the Specialised Criminal Court and the Specialised Prosecutor’s 

Office. 

84   Decision under Protocol No. 42 of 23 November 2021 of the Judicial Chamber of SJC and decision of the 
Plenary of the SJC under Protocol No. 23 of 25 November 2021; Decisions of the Prosecutorial Chamber of 
SJC  Protocol  No.  40  of  23  November  2021.  See  the  categorisation  made  pursuant  to  Art.  233,  para.  6, 
sentence  1  of  the  JSA,  the  SJC  proposed  categorisation  of  the  abovementioned  offices  under  extremely 

10 

  
                                                 
 
A new draft law was  adopted to close the specialised  judicial  authorities and provides 
for a mechanism for the reappointment of magistrates. On 14 April 2022, the Parliament 
adopted  a  law  for  the  closure  of  the  specialised  judicial  authorities  because  of  several 
concerns  also  mentioned  in  previous  Rule  of  Law  Reports85  and  raised  by  various 
stakeholders86.  Regarding  the  reappointment87  of  the  magistrates  who  worked  in  the 
specialised judicial authorities, the respective chamber of the SJC88 would have the obligation 
to  open  positions  at  district  and  appellate  level  based  on  the  workload  of  each  court, 
prosecutor’s  office,  and  investigative  service89.  The  decisions  of  the  SJC  on  reappointment 
would  be  subject  to  judicial  review  before  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court90.  This 
reappointment procedure appears to present sufficient safeguards for the protection of judicial 
independence.  However,  on  4  May  2022, 
the 
constitutionality  of  the  reform  before  the  Constitutional  Court.  The  Court  considered  the 
challenge admissible on 17 May 2022. The procedures for reappointment of these magistrates 
are suspended pending the ruling of the Constitutional Court91. 

the  Prosecutor  General  challenged 

Quality  

Improvements on legal aid, court fees and alternative dispute resolution are envisaged. 
As  noted  in  the  previous  two  Rule  of  Law  Reports,  accessibility  of  courts  remains  a 
concern92.  In  the  adopted  RRP,  the  Government  has  committed  to  improve  the  system  of 
legal aid by extending it to additional types of cases and by including additional grounds for 
requesting  the  aid.  In  addition,  amendments  would  provide  for  exemptions  from  court  fees 

heavy  (2.7  basic  monthly  remunerate  for  magistrates),  high  (2.3  basic  monthly  remuneration  for 
magistrates), medium (1.5 basic monthly remuneration for magistrates) and low workload. 

85   See 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, p.12, and 2021 Rule 
of  Law  Report,  Country  Chapter  on  the  rule  of  law  situation  in  Bulgaria,  p.13-14.  In  its  judgment  of  11 
January  2022  (Ekimdzhiev  v.  Bulgaria,  paras  356,  311,  312),  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights 
underlined  the  lack  of  proper  judicial  oversight  over  decisions  to  issue  warrants  for  secret  surveillance  as 
since  2018  the  Specialised  Criminal  Court  has  been  issuing  roughly  half  of  all  surveillance  warrants  in 
Bulgaria  and  as  regards  the  judgments  of  the  Specialised  Criminal  Court  examined  in  that  ruling,  the 
majority of the warrants issued had completely blanket contents and were general enough to be capable  -of 
relating  to  any  possible  surveillance  application.  On  14  September  2021,  the  report  of  the  Temporary 
Committee of the 46th National Assembly for investigating the facts and events around the protest of 2020 
confirmed these concerns. In  their  written contribution, the European Association of Judges  has expressed 
concerns  on  the  additional  remunerations  for  the  specialised  magistrates  and  referred  to  the  fact  that  the 
public does not perceive the specialised criminal court as independent. 

86   See  Mission  Report  following  the  ad-hoc  delegation  to  Slovakia  and  Bulgaria  –  21-24  September  2021 
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, p.14; Information received from Bulgarian Institute 
for Legal Initiatives and Justice for Everyone Initiative in the context of the country visit to Bulgaria. 

87   The  reappointment  will  be  done  based  on  Art.  194,  para  1  of  the  JSC  –  “In  cases  of  closure  of  courts, 
prosecutor's  offices  and  investigative  bodies  or  reduction  of  the  number  of  positions  held  in  them,  the 
relevant chamber of the SJC opens the respective positions in another equal body of the judiciary in the same 
appellate district and reassigns the magistrates without competition.” - §41(1) and §42(1) and (4) of the Law 
amending and supplementing the Judicial System Act.  

88   The magistrates inform the respective chamber of the SJC about their preferred place for reappointment. In 
cases of several magistrates applying for the same position, the respective chamber of the SJC would decide 
on the reappointment based on pre-established criteria (§41 and §42 of the law). 

89   §41(2) and §42(2) and (5) of the Law amending and supplementing the Judicial System Act. 
90   Written contribution from the Ministry of Justice in the context of the country visit, p. 2. 
91   Constitutional Court Case No. 9 of 4 May 2022. 
92   See 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, p.8; and 2021 Rule 
of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, p.10. See also contribution from the 
European Judges Association for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p.23. 

11 

  
                                                                                                                                                        
for beneficiaries of legal aid93. Furthermore, a second commitment relates to the introduction 
of  a  mandatory  alternative  dispute  resolution  for  certain  cases,  such  as  divorce  by  petition, 
disputes  concerning  parental  rights  and  obligations.  While  this  is  a  welcome  reform,  when 
drafting the amendments account will have to be taken of the case law of the Court of Justice 
of  the  EU,  which  outlines  the  conditions  under  which  a  mandatory  alternative  dispute 
resolution  is  acceptable  under EU law94. The entry  into force of these reforms is  envisaged 
for the last quarter of 2022.  

Challenges remain for the Unified Information System for Courts. As of 1 June 2021, all 
courts  in  Bulgaria  should  have  started  working  with  the  Unified  Information  System  for 
Courts (UISC). However, as mentioned in the 2021 Rule of Law Report95, judges and court 
staff continue to claim that the system does not improve their work, but actually creates more 
obstacles. This was exemplified on 28 July 2021, when the plenary of the Supreme Court of 
Cassation requested from its President to order the discontinuation of the use of the USIC96 
because  the  system  appeared  to  be  complex,  cumbersome,  and  time-consuming  for  both 
judges and court staff97. On 10 August 2021, the President of the Supreme Court of Cassation 
ordered  the  system’s  discontinuation  on  the  grounds  that  it  does  not  have  the  capacity  to 
provide citizens and legal entities with due access to fast and equal justice98. On 28 January 
2022,  the  Sofia  City  Administrative  Court  decided  that  the  order  of  the  President  of  the 
Supreme Court of Cassation was null and void99. However, the new President of the Supreme 
Court  of  Cassation  confirmed  that  the  concerns  regarding  the  USIC  persist100,  and  has 
challenged  the  ruling  of  the  Sofia  City  Administrative  Court,  which  is  currently  pending 
before the Supreme Administrative Court. 

There  is  still  room  for  improvement  in  the  area  of  electronic  communications.  In 
particular,  it  is  not  possible  for  all  court  staff  and  judges  to  work  remotely  in  a  secure 
manner101.  Secure  electronic  communication 
for 
communication  between  courts,  while  not  being  available  for  other  legal  professionals103. 
Access  to  electronic  tools  remains  limited104.  There  are  several  projects  under  Bulgaria’s 
RRP that aim to improve the digitalisation of justice. Namely,  the foreseen reforms include 

to  some  extent102 

is  available, 

93   See RRP milestone on Accessible, effective and predictable justice. 
94   See Judgment of the Court of Justice of 17 June 2017,  Menini  & Rampanelli v Banco Popolare  – Società 
Cooperativa,  C-75/16,  ECLI:EU:C:2017:457, paras.  58-71;  Judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  18  March 
2010, Alassini and Others, Case 317/08 to C-320/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:146, paras. 62-67. 
95   See 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, p.11. 
96   Statement of 27 July 2021, signed by 69 judges from the Supreme Court of Cassation, named “Why is the 

USIC dangerous” and sent to the interim Minister of Justice and the Supreme Judicial Council. 

97   Contribution from the European Association of Judges, p.30. Information also confirmed by the Bulgarian 
Judges  Association; President of the  Supreme  Court of Cassation during the country  visit. In addition, the 
system might risk to breach procedural rules.  

98   Order No. 893 by the President of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 10 August 2021. 
99   Decision No. 500 of 28 January 2021, Sofia City Administrative Court. 
100  Written contribution from the Supreme Court of Cassation in the context of the country visit “Information on 

Topic 4”, p.2. 

101  Figure 44 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
102  There is no full electronic connectivity, allowing for a case to be accepted by another court electronically.  - 
Written contribution from the Supreme Court of Cassation in the context of the country visit, “Information 
on Topic 4”, p.2. 

103  Figure 45 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
104  Figures 46 and 47 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard. Currently, it is only possible to consult electronic files and 
to receive information online about court fees. However it is still not possible to initiate proceedings online, 
to file an application for legal aid online and the official court documents cannot be served electronically. 

12 

  
                                                 
annual analyses of the implementation of the legislative arrangements regarding digitalisation 
of  justice  to  allow,  among  others,  for  secure  electronic  communication105.  These 
arrangements  include,  among  others,  the  rules  on  service  of  notices  and  summons  to  an 
electronic  address,  the  possibility  of  payment  of  fees  and  other  obligations  to  the  court  by 
electronic  means,  and  drafting  of  judicial  acts  as  electronic  documents.  However,  their 
finalisation is foreseen by late 2023 and late 2024. 

Efficiency 

Administrative justice continues to perform efficiently. As last year, the disposition time 
for  administrative  courts  is  among  the  most  efficient  in  the  EU  at  first  instance  courts106. 
However, stakeholders report delays, which tend to occurr when the Supreme Administrative 
Court reviews decisions of the Supreme Judicial Council107. As for litigious and non-litigious 
civil  and  commercial  cases,  the  persistent  lack  of  disaggregated  data  does  not  allow  for  a 
proper  evaluation  of  the  overall  efficiency  of  the  judicial  system108.  As  a  result,  specific 
inefficiency problems could remain unnoticed109.  

II. 

ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK  

The  Commission  for  Counteracting  Corruption  and  Illegal  Assets  Forfeiture  (the  Anti-
Corruption Commission) remains responsible for both preventive and sanctioning actions for 
high-profile  corruption,  the  implementation  of  rules  on  asset  declarations  and  conflict  of 
interests,  the  confiscation  of  illegally  acquired  assets,  as  well  as  the  monitoring  of  the 
implementation of institutional integrity action plans. Created in the context of the post-2018 
reform110,  the  Anti-Corruption  Commission  has  progressed  in  its  reorganisation.  Special 
criminal  offences  (including  high-level  corruption)  remain  under  the  competence  of  the 
specialised  judicial  authorities  until  July  2022.  Afterwards,  the  competence  will  be 
transferred to the regional and appellate judicial authorities around the country.  

The  perception  of  public  sector  corruption  among  experts  and  business  executives  is 
that  the  level  of  corruption  in  the  public  sector  remains  high.  In  the  2021  Corruption 

105  The arrangements are laid down in the Civil Procedure Code and the Criminal Procedure Code. 
106  Figures 9 and 10, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard. It is to be noted that this result is based on the methodology 

used by CEPEJ. 

107  Information  received  from  Bulgarian  Judges  Association;  Specialised  Criminal  Court;  Specialised 
Prosecutor’s Office  in the context of the country  visit.  For example, in 2019, according to Figure  9 of the 
2022  EU  Justice  Scoreboard,  the  average  length  for  all  administrative  cases  was  107  days,  according  to 
statistics provided by the Supreme Administrative Court, the average length for SJC appeals was 442 days; 
in 2020, according to Figure 9 of the 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard, the average length for all administrative 
cases  was  124  days,  according  to  statistics  provided  by  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court,  the  average 
length  for  SJC  appeals  was  217  days.  Moreover,  some  delays  have  occurred  due  to  a  preliminary  ruling 
request  before  the  CJEU  and  a  constitutional  case,  which  suspended  a  number  of  ongoing  administrative 
cases. 

108  Figures 7 and 8, 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
109  Contribution from the President of the Court of Cassation “Delays in commercial dispute proceedings are a 
very serious problem. It entails not only adverse consequences, but also significant material damage to the 
parties”. In particular, the adverse consequences caused by the delayed handling of cases cannot be remedied 
by  organisational  measures  alone  as  the  main  reason  lies  in  the  lack  of  resources  in  the  Commercial 
Chamber.  

110  Following  the  comprehensive  reform  of  2017  and  2018,  Bulgaria  established  the  Commission  for 
Counteracting Corruption and Illegal Assets Forfeiture (hereinafter the Anti-corruption Commission). 2021 
Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, p.12. 

13 

  
                                                 
Perceptions Index by Transparency International, Bulgaria scores 42/100 and ranks 27th in the 
European Union and 78th globally111. This perception has been relatively stable over the past 
five years112. The 2022 Special Eurobarometer on Corruption shows that 88% of respondents 
consider corruption widespread in their country (EU average 68%) and 30% of respondents 
feel  personally  affected  by  corruption  in  their  daily  lives  (EU  average  24%)113.  As  regards 
businesses, 87% of companies consider that corruption is widespread (EU average 63%) and 
61%  consider  that  corruption  is  a  problem  when  doing  business  (EU  average  34%)114. 
Furthermore, 15% of respondents find that there are enough successful prosecutions to deter 
people  from  corrupt  practices  (EU  average  34%)115,  while  10%  of  companies  believe  that 
people  and  businesses  caught  for  bribing  a  senior  official  are  appropriately  punished  (EU 
average 29%)116. 

The  reorganisation  of  the  Anti-Corruption  Commission  has  progressed,  and  a  new 
reform of the Commission is envisaged. A reform of the Commission117 is foreseen under 
Bulgaria’s RRP118, and aims at modifying the investigative powers and further reorganising 
the  structure  of  the  Commission  by  splitting  it  in  two  separate  bodies119.  The  objectives  of 
these changes are to streamline the operations of the Commission and achieve better results 
on  both  anti-corruption120  and  asset  recovery  actions.  The  impact  of  the  reform  on  the 
effectiveness of the investigative operations of the Commission remains to be assessed, as the 
relevant draft-law remains to be approved, and it was made public оn 9 June 2022121. In the 
meantime,  the  reorganisation  of  the  Commission  is  ongoing  in  line  with  the  2018  reform 
plan. In 2021, eight territorial offices were closed, bringing the territorial structure to 20 units 
in total122. The Commission has also recruited 20% additional personnel (bringing the staff up 

111  Transparency  International  (2022),  Corruption  Perceptions  Index  2021,  pp.  2-3.  The  level  of  perceived 
corruption  is  categorised  as  follows:  low  (the  perception  among  experts  and  business  executives  of  public 
sector  corruption scores  above  79);  relatively  low  (scores  between  79-60),  relatively  high  (scores  between 
59-50), high (scores below 50). 

112  In 2017 the score was 43, while in 2021 the score was 42. The score significantly increases/decreases when 
it  changes  more  than  five  points;  improves/deteriorates  (changes  between  4-5  points);  is  relatively  stable 
(changes from 1-3 points) in the last five years. 

113 Special Eurobarometer 523 on Corruption (2022). The Eurobarometer data on citizens’ corruption perception 
and experience is updated every second year. The previous data set is the Special Eurobarometer 502 (2020). 
114 Flash Eurobarometer 507 on Businesses’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU (2022). The Eurobarometer 
data on business attitudes towards corruption as is updated every second year. The previous data set is the 
Flash Eurobarometer 482 (2019). 

115  Special Eurobarometer 523 on Corruption (2022).  
116  Flash Eurobarometer 507 on Businesses’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU (2022).  
117  In March 2022, the president of the Anti-Corruption Commission resigned from his role - See press release 
of the Commission for Counteracting Corruption and Illegal Assets Forfeiture from 14 February 2022.  
118  Council  Implementing  Decision  on  the  approval  of  the  assessment  of  the  recovery  and  resilience  plan  for 

Bulgaria, SWD(2022) 106 final and COM(2022) 172 final. 

119  Input  from  Bulgaria  for  the  2022  Rule  of  Law  Report,  p.13,  in  addition  to  information  received  in  the 
context of the country visit from the Ministry of Justice. While the specific roadmap for the full adoption of 
such reforms remains unclear, the agreed deadline for its finalisation is the third quarter of 2022. Information 
received in the context of the country visit from the  Anti-Corruption Commission (for the period from the 
beginning of 2022 to the date of the visit). 

120  Two  specific  milestones  on  the  reform  of  the  Anti-Corruption  Commission  are  envisaged  under  the 
Bulgarian RRP, namely the milestones 218 (titled: Entry into force of the legislative amendments reforming 
the Anticorruption and the Illegal Assets Forfeiture Commission) and 220 (titled: Anti-Corruption body set 
up and operational). 

121  Draft law for countering corruption of 9 June 2022. 
122  Namely 5 directorates, 13 central offices and 2 remote bureaux.  Information received in the context of the 

country visit from the Anti-Corruption Commission. 

14 

  
                                                 
to 500 officers in total)123, acquired updated office equipment, signed cooperation agreements 
with  foreign  peer  agencies,  and  adopted  internal  rules  and  guidelines  for  external 
stakeholders124.  Furthermore,  the  Commission  received  255  reports  on  conflicts  of  interest; 
initiated  90  procedures  that  resulted  in  22  decisions  regarding  senior  public  officials. 
Additionally, the anti-corruption directorate of the Anti-Corruption Commission125  received 
877  alerts  in  2021,  performed  618  integrity  checks  (of  which  97  on  the  demand  of  the 
prosecution  offices),  responded  to  45  requests  for  support  in  corruption  crimes,  and 
forwarded 93 files to the Special Prosecutor’s office126.  

The  National  Strategy  for  Prevention  and  Countering  Corruption  continues  to  be 
implemented. In 2021, a working group was tasked by the Government to prepare an annual 
report  on  the  implementation  of  the  2021-2027  anti-corruption  strategy127.  To  facilitate  the 
implementation  of  the  anti-corruption  strategy,  the  Government  proposed  measures  in  its 
RRP128. More precisely, the  measures  foreseen in  the RRP  aim at  fighting  corruption at  all 
levels  of  public  administration  and  of  the  justice  systems.  They  intend  to  ensure  that  the 
members of the Civil  Council of the National  Council on Anti-Corruption Policies monitor 
the  implementation  of  the  National  Strategy  for  Prevention  and  Counteraction  against 
Corruption and its associated Roadmap129.  

Despite  the  work  of  the  specialised  judicial  authorities,  a  solid  track-record  of  final 
convictions  in  high-level  cases  of  corruption  remains  to  be  established.  In  2021,  the 
Prosecutor’s  office130  and  Specialised  Prosecutor’s  office131  presented  data  on  their  activity 
regarding corruption cases. The accuracy and reliability of these regular reports are envisaged 

123  Information)  received  in  the  context  of  the  country  visit  from  the  Anti-Corruption  Commission  (for  the 

period from the beginning of 2022 to the date of the visit. 
124  Input from Bulgaria for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p.14.  
125 The Anti-Corruption Commission is organised into two main directorates: an anti-corruption directorate, and 
an illegal assets forfeiture directorate. Information received in the context of the country visit from the Anti-
Corruption Commission. 

126  Information received in the context of the country visit from the Anti-Corruption Commission. 
127  Decree  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  n.235  of  19.03.2021.  Input  from  Bulgaria  for  the  2022  Rule  of  Law 

Report, p.15. 

128  Information received in the context of the country visit from the Ministry of Justice. To this end, a specific 
milestone  in  the  RRP  foresees  that  the  National  Council  on  Anti-Corruption  Policies  to  annually  adopt 
reports  (starting  from  2022)  analysing  and  evaluating  the  implementation  of  the  National  Strategy  for 
Preventing  and  Combatting  Corruption  (2021-2027),  as  well  as  an  annual  reporting  on  progress  of 
implementation of the European Rule of Law mechanism shall be ensured. 

129  In  addition  to  that,  reforms  intend  to:  set  up  an  electronic  platform  for  the  exchange  of  information  to 
facilitate the verification of declarations of assets and interests and the identification of conflicts of interest; 
improve  the  role  of  the  Inspectorate  of  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council  in  the  prevention  and  counteracting 
corruption  through  revised  ethical  guidelines  and  trainings;  enhance  the  integrity  of  civil  servants  by 
implementing  an  integrity  verification  mechanism  for  civil  servants  occupying  positions  that  have  a  high 
corruption risk; promote integrity in the State Owned Enterprises through the adoption of a Code of Ethics; 
introduce corruption risk management systems and measures to enhance transparency. 

130  It reported 215 individuals convicted for corruption (compared to 262 individuals convicted in 2020), seven 
individuals  imprisoned  (compared  to  16  for  2020),  while  imprisonment  was  suspended  in  148  cases 
(compared to 165 individuals for 2020). 

131  It supervised 292 pre-trial cases (compared to 274 in 2020), including 58 newly opened files, closed 82 pre-
trial  proceedings,  indicted  61  individuals,  and  proposed  a  plea  bargain  for  five  persons.  Moreover,  16 
convictions,  none  of  them  final,  were  issued  on  corruption  cases  against  officials  (including  a  Minister,  a 
mayor, a deputy mayor and a judge), in addition to eight plea bargains. 

15 

  
                                                 
to be improved through the reforms introduced in the RRP 132. As mentioned above, in April 
2022, the Parliament adopted a law  for the  closure of the specialised judicial  authorities133. 
The  law  presents  a  mechanism  for  redistribution  of  the  cases  currently  with  the  specialised 
judicial authorities134. Given the early stage of the reform, it is too early to assess the effects 
in practice. In 2021, 33 cases related to corruption offences were initiated before the Supreme 
Court  of  Cassation135,  with  19  decisions  issued  (including  eight  appeal  decisions  quashed, 
and  nine  convictions  with  up-to  seven-year  imprisonment)136.  In  March  2022,  former  top 
executive  officials  (notably  the  former  Prime  Minister,  Finance  Minister,  Chief  of  the 
parliamentary  budgetary  Commission,  as  well  as  a  media  adviser)  were  detained  under 
suspicions of corruption as part of a police operation137.  

The  introduction  of  a  verification  mechanism  for  enhancing  the  integrity  of  the  civil 
servants  is  envisaged  in  the  RRP.  An  effective  system  for  checking  and  improving  the 
integrity of civil  servants occupying positions with  high corruption risks is  foreseen among 
the RRP measures. Moreover, general provisions for the integrity of the public administration 
continue to be implemented, including through practical projects138. In 2021, 90 cases were 
registered in 2021 for new corruption offences committed in the public administration (16% 
less  than  2020).  The  Ministry  of  Interior  received  1  478  reports  of  misconduct  within  the 
public  administration139.  In  2021,  the  Ministry  of  Interior  launched  two  projects  on  public 

132  The reports are expected to include data on the number of the high-level corruption cases filed, the number 
of cases concluded, detailed descriptions of the grounds for conclusion (both in the investigative stage and 
trial  stage),  number  of  convictions  and  acquittals,  as  well  as  indicators  defining  the  cases  for  high-level 
corruption. Council Implementing Decision on the approval of the assessment of the recovery and resilience 
plan for Bulgaria, SWD(2022) 106 final. 

133  See above under section I.  
134  The preliminary inspections and pre-trial proceedings before the Specialised Prosecutor’s Office  would be 
sent to the future competent district Prosecutor’s Office (as per §43 of the Law amending and supplementing 
the  Judicial  System  Act),  whereas  cases  for  which  there  has  not  been  a  preliminary  hearing  yet  would  be 
redistributed  to  the  future  competent  district  courts  (as  per  §44  and  §46  of  the  Law  amending  and 
supplementing the Judicial System Act ), and all other ongoing cases would be sent to the Sofia City Court 
and the Sofia Appellate Court, where the same panels of judges would be temporarily reappointed and will 
conclude  the  proceedings  (as  per  §45  and  §47-§54  of  the  Law  amending  and  supplementing  the  Judicial 
System Act). This arrangement would allow to avoid restarting proceedings. The Sofia City Court would be 
the court of first instance for cases within the competence of the European Public Prosecutor's Office. 

135  It is to be noted that the data of the Supreme Court of Cassation does not differentiate high-level corruption 
cases from corruption cases. Input from Bulgaria for the 2022 Rule of Law Report (Annex 1 - list of initiated 
cases). 

136  Input from Bulgaria for the 2022 Rule of Law Report (Annex 2 - list of issued decisions). 
137  Among others  see press release from the  Ministry of Interior from 17 March 2022. See  also Press release 

from Reuters of 17 March 2022. 

138  One  project  is  titled  "Strengthening  the  capacity  and  improving  the  work  of  the  authorities  in  charge  of 
control  and  sanctioning  powers  in  the  administration",  carried  out  by  the  administration  of  the  Council  of 
Ministers.  The  second  project  is  titled  “Reforming  the  integrity  checks  of  employees  in  CACIAF”,  whose 
goal is to strengthen the integrity system in CACIAF by reforming the framework for checking the integrity 
of employees. Input from Bulgaria for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p.17. 

139  These cases concern the activity of competent public services related to corruption crimes in general, and are 
not  limited  to  acts  committed  by  officials  of  the  Ministry  of  Interior.  The  cases  involved  133  individuals, 
compared to 145 individuals in 2020. Moreover, 364 employees received disciplinary sanctions, and 13 were 
dismissed. Input from Bulgaria for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p.26. 

16 

  
                                                 
administration  integrity.  Training  on  public  ethics  and  anti-corruption  are  delivered  by  the 
Academy of the Ministry of Interior140.  

Measures  aimed  at  improving  the  integrity  of  specific  sectors  of  the  public 
administration, including the police and the judiciary, continue to be deployed. Several 
authorities have continued to implement sector-based measures to improve the integrity of the 
public  administration.  As  regards  police  measures,  the  rotation  of  public  officers  at  risk  of 
corruption  (such  as  border  or  traffic  control  staff,  and  staff  involved  in  residence  and/or 
citizenship  procedures)  has  been  in  place  since  2015  in  order  to  deter  corruption141and  is 
being implemented on a permanent basis. The establishment of the facility to host the Centre 
for Active Monitoring in the System of the Ministry of Interior was completed at the end of 
2021 to deter instances of corruption142. In order to reduce the potential for corruption within 
the  Ministry  of  Interior,  the  number  of  electronic  administrative  services  was  increased143. 
During 2021, there were 126 reports of misconduct of border police received, which resulted 
in opening pre-trial proceedings against nine officers, plus five disciplinary proceedings (for 
serious disciplinary breaches) , and disciplinary sanctions were issued in 12 cases (including 
the  dismissal  of  six  officers)144.  During  2021,  the  National  Revenue  Agency  (NRA) 
performed an assessment on conflicts of interests of its personnel; an online training on ethics 
was delivered to staff of both NRA and the National Customs Agency145. As to the judiciary, 
the Inspectorate to the Supreme Judicial Council publishes anonymised cases of violations of 
the  Judiciary  System  Act.  It  has  also  established  guidelines  for  the  reporting  of  cases  of 
misconduct146.  To  prevent  and  counteract  conflicts  of  interest  in  the  judiciary,  the 
Inspectorate is in the process of developing a programme consisting of  an electronic public 
register  of  electronic  declarations  of  circumstances  related 
the  prevention  and 
establishment of conflicts  of interest  and property  declarations. Moreover, in  the  context  of 
the  implementation  of  the  Bulgarian  RRP,  it  will,  among  other  things,  revise  the  ethical 
guidelines for the conduct of magistrates and deliver anti-corruption trainings. 

to 

The system of declaration of assets and conflict of interests for public officials continues 
to be regularly implemented. For 2021, there were 12 430 declarations of assets received by 
the  Anti-corruption  Commission  (compared  to  6  303  for  2020)147,  and  a  total  of  5  279 
verifications  of  asset  declarations,  with  679  decisions  (compared  to  483  for  2020) 

140  For  example,  in  2021,  33  training  sessions  covering  anti-corruption  were  delivered  to  871  police  officers. 
Information  received  in  the  context  of  the  country  visit  from  the  Directorate  for  Internal  Security  of  the 
Ministry of Interior. 

141  The use of body cameras for patrol officers is also foreseen to deter corruption.  2021 Rule of Law Report, 
Country  Chapter  on  the  rule  of  law  situation  in  Bulgaria,  p.14,  in  addition  to  Input  from  Bulgaria  for  the 
2022 Rule of Law Report, p.16.  

142  The Centre allows for monitoring the actions of the employees of the Ministry of Interior, including border 

police officers, in real time. Input from Bulgaria for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p.24.  

143  Input from Bulgaria for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p.16.  
144  Input from Bulgaria for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p.24. 
145  All employees of the National Revenue Agency have undergone mandatory electronic self-training in order 
to get acquainted with the updated Code of Ethics of the National Revenue Agency. All new employees in 
the specialized administration in the National Customs Agency in 2021 have been trained in prevention and 
counteraction  to  corruption,  conflict  of  interest  and  the  Code  of  Conduct  for  employees  in  the  state 
administration and the Code of Conduct for Customs officials. Input from Bulgaria for the 2022 Rule of Law 
Report, pp.19-20. 

146  Input from Bulgaria for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p.17. 
147  The Public Register Directorate processed information on a total of 883 Senior Public Office Holders who 
did not submit or submitted the relevant declaration outside the statutory deadline during the year. Activity 
Report for the Commission for Anti-Corruption and Illegal Assets Forfeiture of 2021.  

17 

  
                                                 
establishing  an  administrative  violation  in  cases  of  both  failure  to  submit  and  wrongly 
submitted asset declarations148. A tender for designing an online platform to file and verify 
declarations  of  asset  and  conflict  of  interests  was  launched  in  December  2021149.  In 
December  2021,  the  Anti-corruption  Commission  adopted  guidelines  concerning  the 
procedure  to  file  declarations  of  property  and  interests150.  Since  July  2021,  officers  of  the 
National  Customs  Agency151  are  required  to  sign  declaration  of  assets,  including  bank 
accounts152.  

Lobbying  lacks  a  dedicated  regulation.  As  noted  in  the  2020  and  2021  Rule  of  Law 
Reports,  there  are  no  specific  obligations  for  the  registration  of  lobbyists  or  reporting  of 
contacts  between  public  officials  and  lobbyists153.  Milestones  have  been  included  in  the 
framework of the RRP to regulate lobbying activities. As a result, legislative measures need 
to be adopted by the end of 2023 to specifically regulate lobbying activities in the context of 
public decision-making154.  

Provisions  are  in  place  for  the  audits  on  political  party  financing.  The  National  Audit 
Office (NAO) is responsible for carrying out audits on the consistency of financial activities, 
revenue,  expenditure  and  management  of  assets  made  available  to  political  parties155.  On 8 
January 2022, the NAO adopted a report covering the period from January to December 2020 
and  auditing  the  financial  activities  and  real  estate  given  to  political  parties156.  Moreover, 
political parties submit an annual report to the National Audit Office, which is responsible for 
maintaining  the  Unified  Public  Register  during  elections.  The  Register  renders  public 
information about the participants in the elections, such as donors; type, purpose and amount 
of  donations  made;  the  funds  provided  by  the  candidates  and  the  members  of  the  initiative 
committees; the declarations of origin of the donated and provided funds; the reports of the 
parties,  initiative  committees  and  coalitions  on  revenues,  expenditures  and  payment 
commitments  in  connection  with  the  election  campaign157.  According  to  the  law158,  the 
Committee  for  Combating  Corruption,  Conflict  of  Interest  and  Parliamentary  Ethics  shall 
provide  explanations  to  the  Members  of  the  Parliament  on  the  application  of  the  ethical 
norms, and may establish a breach of ethics rules, issue decision and impose measures159. 

A  working  group  tasked  to  prepare  a  draft  regulation  on  the  protection  of 
whistleblowers  has  been  established.  The  Anti-Corruption  Commission  is  responsible  for 

148  Activity Report for the Commission for Anti-Corruption and Illegal Assets Forfeiture of 2021. 
149  Input from Bulgaria for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p.20.  
150  Input from Bulgaria for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p.22. 
151  Decree No. 227 of 13.07.2021 of the Council of Ministers, See also Input from Bulgaria for the 2021 Rule of 

Law Report, p.25. 

152  Input from Bulgaria for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p.25. 
153  See 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, p.14, 2021 Rule of 

Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, p.15. 

154  Notably, a concept  note shall be prepared on the  regulation of lobbying, and legislative  measures shall be 

adopted to regulate lobbying activities in the context of public decision-making. 

155  Art. 172 of the Election Code. 
156  National Audit Office, Audit Report No. 0600100321 of 8 January 2022. 
157  Art. 171 of the Election Code. 
158  Rules of Organisation and Procedure of the National Assembly, Issued by the National Assembly Prom. SG 

No. 35/2 MAY 2017; amend. SG No. 34/20 APR 2018. 

159  Such  as  reprimand,  censure  or  temporary  removal.  Rules  of  Organisation  and  Procedure  of  the  National 
Assembly,  Issued  by  the  National  Assembly  Prom.  SG  No.  35/2  MAY  2017;  amend.  SG  No.  34/20  APR 
2018. 

18 

  
                                                 
receiving  whistleblowing  complaints  in  cases  of  corruption  or  conflict  of  interest.  In 
September 2021, the Ministry of Justice established a working group tasked to prepare draft 
regulation  on  the  protection  of  whistleblowers160.  The  consultation  process  on  the  draft 
amendments for a regulation on the protection of whistleblowers ended on 23 May 2022161. 
At the time of publication of this report, the proposals for changes in the draft amendments 
received  during  the  public  consultation  were  being  processed.  .  Nevertheless,  as  part  of 
Bulgaria’s  engagements  resulting  from  the  adoption  of  the  RRP,  the  introduction  of 
legislative measures is planned for September 2022 to align with the requirements of the EU 
directive for the protection of whistleblowers162.  

Bulgaria  abolished  its  investor  citizenship  scheme.  The  European  Commission  has 
frequently  raised  its  serious  concerns  about  investor  citizenship  schemes  and  certain  risks, 
including corruption, that are inherent in such schemes.163 Оn 24 March 2022, the Parliament 
repealed  the  provisions  allowing  for  the  naturalisation  of  investors  based  on  an  investor 
citizenship scheme164. 

Specific corruption-risks such as management of budget funds and conducting control 
activities,  including  procurement  were  identified,  in  the  COVID-19  pandemic.  On  31 
January  2022,  the  Ministry  of  Health  performed  a  corruption-related  risk  assessment165 
during  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  which  underlined  specific  corruption  risks  in  the  area  of 
management  of  budget  funds  and  in  the  conducting  of  control  activities,  including 
procurement. The analysis prompted the adoption of an annual health sector anti-corruption 
plan,  including  mitigating  measures166.  In  January  2021,  the  Anti-corruption  Commission 

160  Input from Bulgaria for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p.21. 
161  See  Draft  Law  on  the  Protection  of  Persons  Reporting  or  Disclosure  of  Violations  on  the  website  of  the 

Council of Ministers for public consultations from 23 May 2022. 

162  Directive (EU) 2019/1937. 
163  As  mentioned  in  the  EU  Commission's  report  of January  2019,  those  risks  relate  in  particular  to  security, 
money  laundering,  tax  evasion  and  corruption  and  the  Commission  has  been  monitoring  wider  issues  of 
compliance with EU law raised by investor citizenship schemes.  

164  Pending applications under the repealed Art. 12a and 14a are terminated. See para. 7 of the adopted law. See 
also  State  Gazette  No  26  of  1  April  2022.  Following  Russia’s  invasion  of  Ukraine,  the  Commission  also 
called on Member States operating an investor citizenship scheme to repeal it immediately and to assess the 
possibility  to  revoke  such  naturalisations  previously  granted  to  certain  Russian  and  Belarusian  individuals 
(see Commission recommendation on immediate steps in the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 
relation to investor citizenship schemes and investor residence schemes (C(2022) 2028 final). Bulgaria did 
not  provide 
the  Commission 
Recommendation. 

information  on  any  specific  assessments  carried  out 

following 

165  Anti-corruption Plan of the Ministry of Heath for 2022. 
166 Such as the following: Involvement of a larger number of experts in the preparation of technical assignments 
and  technical  specifications  for  public  procurement  and  application  of  the  rotation  principle  for  the 
employees included in the commissions under the Public Procurement Act; Separation of procurement from 
control in public procurement; Prevention - analysis of the current rules, instructions and methodologies of 
administrative  structures  and  secondary  budget  managers  at  the  Minister  of  Health,  in  order  to  identify 
opportunities for establishing corrupt practices and on this basis to amend them to cross these opportunities; 
Introduction of the principle of re-inspections of sites by another team; Rotation of employees from the units 
with  control  functions;  Establishment  of  an  electronic  system  for  data  entry  and  circumstances  within  the 
statutory deadlines in the Executive  Agency Medical Supervision; Development of  unified for all regional 
health  inspections,  procedures  and  samples  of  documents  for  the  provision  of  administrative  services; 
Development of specific internal rules and procedures for declaring and establishing conflicts of interest of 
employees  evaluating  applications  for  authorization  of  trade  in  medicinal  products  and  evaluating  clinical 
trials in the Bulgarian Drug Agency; Conducting trainings on prevention and counteraction to corruption and 
conflict of interests in the structural units of the Ministry of Health and the secondary budget managers at the 
Ministry of Health. Input from Bulgaria for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p.22. 

19 

  
                                                 
published  a  report  on  the  sector-specific  risk  of  corruption167.  In  2021,  the  Public 
Procurement  Agency  issued  guidelines168,  including  standardised  model  contracts,  aimed  at 
clarifying  public  procurement  procedures169.  A  report  on  the  results  of  the  public 
procurement  monitoring  the  period  2018-2020,  including  corruption-risk,  was  adopted  in 
2021170. 

III.  MEDIA PLURALISM AND MEDIA FREEDOM 

The Bulgarian legal framework is based on a set of constitutional safeguards and legislative 
measures,  such  as  the  Radio  and  Television  Act171.  The  Access  to  Public  Information  Act 
regulates  access  to  public  information  and  the  re-use  of  public  sector  information.  The 
Compulsory  Deposit  of  Copies  of  Printed  and  Other  Works  Act  contains  requirements 
regarding media ownership transparency (“Law on Deposit of Copies”)172. The institutional 
framework consists of the media regulator, the Council for Electronic Media (CEM), and the 
National Council for Journalistic Ethics and its executive body – the Ethics Commission173. 

While  the  legal  framework  concerning  the  media  regulator  remains  unchanged, 
concerns have been flagged about the lack of sufficient safeguards to secure its complete 
independence in practice.  While certain legal safeguards are in place, the CEM has raised 
concerns  about  the  availability  of  adequate  and  stable  financial  resources  for  its  activities 
(resources  have  nonetheless  increased  in  2021)  which  might  have  an  effect  on  its  work 
independently  from  state  pressure174.  Moreover,  several  stakeholders  have  shared  doubts 
about the lack of complete political independence in the activities carried out by the regulator 
and  some  commentators  point  to  the  fact  that  the  very  constitution  of  CEM  inevitably 
exposes it to risks of political influence175. 

The media self-regulatory body is the National Council for Journalistic Ethics (NCJE), 
whose  decisions  are  not  always  implemented  in  practice  by  the  relevant  media176.  The 
decisions of the Ethics Commission (the executive body of the NCJE) are only binding on the 

167  The report is titled Analysis of anti-corruption plans for 2021 of primary and secondary budget authorising 
officer.  The  analysis  revealed  that  the  corruption  risks  are  divided  into  areas  as  follows:  96  risks  in 
management,  disposal or spending of budget  funds and assets, including procurement;  148 risks in control 
activities;  61  risks  in  provision  of  administrative  services,  concessions,  issuance  of  licenses  and  permits, 
registration regimes; 17 risks in competitive procedures/competitions for entering persons in registers or for 
performing  regulated  professions;  44  risks  in  gaps  in  laws  and  unclear  legislation,  presupposing 
contradictory  interpretation  and/or  application  of  regulations;  73  risks  in  other  measures  in  view  of  the 
specific risks in the respective departments; and 117 risks in publicity measures. Input from Bulgaria for the 
2022 Rule of Law Report, p.22. 

168  On the  website of the Bulgarian Public Procurement  Agency  from 14 June to 16 July 2021 a set of seven 

guidelines was published.  

169  Input from Bulgaria for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p.19. 
170  Input from Bulgaria for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p.19. 
171  Radio and Television Act.  
172  The enforcement of the Law on Deposit of Copies is carried out by the Ministry of Culture. 
173  Bulgaria ranks 91st in the 2022 Reporters without Borders World Press Freedom Index compared to 112th in 

the previous year. 

174  Information received from CEM during the country visit and confirmed by written input. See also 2021 Rule 

of Law Report, p.16. 

175  Contributions  from  Reporters  sans  frontières  and  International  Press  Institute  for  the  2022  Rule  of  Law 

Report. See also 2022 Media Pluralism Monitor, p.11. 

176  The  media  self-regulatory  body  acts  on  the  basis  of  the  Code  of  Ethics  adopted  in  2004  and  signed  by  a 
number of media outlets. For the exact list of signatories, see ‘List of media which have signed the Ethics 
Code’.  

20 

  
                                                 
signatories  of  the  Bulgarian  Media  Code  of  Ethics  and  voluntary  for  other  media  players. 
Some stakeholders have expressed concerns that the decisions against media acting in breach 
of  journalistic  ethics  have  not  always  been  implemented  in  practice  and  that  no  sanctions 
were imposed177.  

Some  issues  remain  as  regards  the  effective  transparency  of  media  ownership  and 
related enforcement of these obligations.  In addition to the CEM public register covering 
media ownership structures of radio and television operators178, the Ministry of Culture hosts 
a public register based on declarations made by any media outlet of its beneficial ownership, 
as  well  as  the  funding  received  from  public  funds,  political  parties,  etc.  Although  the  legal 
framework  is  in  place,  some  media  do  not  declare  their  ownership  structure  (in  particular 
online media)179 while others declare owners who are not the ones that effectively control the 
media outlet180. A revision of the 2018 Law on the Deposit of Copies is being considered by 
the  current  government  to  improve  the  effective  availability  of  media  ownership 
information181.  

While the lack of a clear regulatory framework regarding transparency in the allocation 
of  state  advertising  remains  unchanged,  some  measures  have  been  taken  to  improve 
transparency in practice. Notably, this takes the form of a list of contracts awarded for the 
purpose of state advertising, including recipient and amount received, which can be consulted 
on  a  publicly-available  website182.  Stakeholders  underlined  however  remaining  issues  in 
particular  when  it  comes  to  a  lack  of  transparency  when  media  outlets  receive  state 
advertising  through  intermediaries  (media  agencies)183.  The  2022  Media  Pluralism  Monitor 
also considered that state regulation of resources and support to the media sector, including 
state advertising resources, scored at high risk (97%) and that the lack of regulatory standards 
regarding the distribution of state advertising remains problematic184. 

Media in Bulgaria are subject to a set of rules regarding their operation on the market, 
but  there  are  no  specific  media  pluralism  laws  restricting  media  ownership  and 
therefore  potential  media  concentration.  Media  can  rely  on  the  principle  of  editorial 
independence from economic and political actors which is set out in the Radio and Television 
Law and features in the Code of ethics of Bulgarian media185. Apart from general competition 
rules  which  are  underpinned  by  economic  considerations,  no  specific  rules  exist  when  it 
comes to activities that may have an impact on media concentration186. As to the entry and 
operation of media service providers, the law provides for different regimes when it comes to 

177  Written  contribution  from  Reporters  sans  frontières  for  the  2022  Rule  of  Law  Report.  Information  also 

received from Association of European Journalists in Bulgaria in the context of the country visit.  

178  See 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, p.16. 
179  According  to  the  Bulgarian  authorities,  identifying  the  actual  owners  of  online  publications  is  often 

infeasible in practice.  

180  Information received from the Ministry of Culture and media stakeholders in the context of the country visit. 
See  also  written contributions from Reporters sans frontières and International Press Institute  for the 2022 
Rule of Law Report. 

181  Input from Bulgaria for the 2022 Rule of Law Report.  
182  Input from Bulgaria for the 2022 Rule of Law Report.  
183  Information  received  from  Association  of  European  Journalists  in  Bulgaria  in  the  context  of  the  country 

visit, see also written contribution from Reporters sans frontières for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

184  2022 Media Pluralism Monitor, p.15.  
185  Art. 5 of the Radio and Television Law; Section 3 of the Code of Ethics. 
186  Information received from the Ministry of Culture in the context of the country visit.  

21 

  
                                                 
linear  services  (licensing/registration  requirement)  and  non-linear  services  (notification 
requirement)187.  

Certain legal safeguards exist regarding the independence of public service  media  but 
they appear to be insufficient. The media regulator CEM appoints the Director Generals of 
the Bulgarian national radio (BNR) and television (BNT) following a public competition and 
after hearings of the relevant candidates. Director Generals submit reports on their activities 
to CEM at regular intervals (currently every six months).188 The management boards of the 
BNR  and  the  BNT  consist  of  five  members  each,  and  are  endorsed  by  the  media  regulator 
upon proposal by the Directors General189. The appointment procedure for management and 
board  functions,  taken  together  with  the  funding  of  public  service  media,  does  not  seem  to 
guarantee independence from the government or other political influence190. A revision of the 
law  is  in  preparation  in  order  to  strengthen  the  independence  of  public  service  media  and 
define in more detail the public service remit and the related financing191. 

The  professional  environment  for  journalists  appears  to  have  improved  slightly  since 
the  last  report.  Stakeholders  consider  that  the  press  has  been  able  to  express  itself  more 
freely in comparison to past years192. Nevertheless, issues remain, in particular when it comes 
to  access  to  public  information193,  working  conditions  and  pressure  on  journalists  at  local 
level  as  well  as  the  increase  of  strategic  lawsuits  against  public  participation,  so-called 
SLAPPs  cases194.  Three  new  alerts  regarding  attacks  and  harassment  of  journalists  were 
registered in 2022 on the Council of Europe Platform to promote the protection of journalism 
and safety of journalists. This includes physical threats against an investigative journalist and 
defamation  lawsuits,  including  heavy  fines  in  one  defamation  case.  Finally,  no  measures 
supporting directly the media sector and its journalists have been put in place in the context 
of the COVID-19 pandemic195. 

IV.  OTHER INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO CHECKS AND BALANCES 

Bulgaria  is  a  representative  democratic  republic  with  a  directly  elected  President,  a 
unicameral National Assembly and a Constitutional Court in charge of constitutional review 
of  laws  and  interpretative  decisions.  The  National  Assembly  has  a  final  decision-making 
power when adopting laws196. Bulgaria has two national human rights institutions. First, the 

187  Input from Bulgaria for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 
188  Input from Bulgaria for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 
189  Art. 58(1) Radio and Television Act. 
190  2022 Media Pluralism Monitor, p.15. In particular, the MPM 2022 implies that the selection procedure for 

PSM management does not safeguard against politically engaged nominees. 

191  Information received in the context of the country visit (e.g. Ministry of Culture and media stakeholders). 
192  Information received from Association of European Journalists and National Council for Journalistic Ethics 

in the context of the country visit. 

193  The  2022  Media  Pluralism  Monitor  notes  that  while  institutional  websites  provide  better  access  to 
information functions in 2021 compared to previous years, explicit or tacit refusals of governmental bodies 
to provide public information or provide information that cannot be read in practice continue to take place. 
194  2022  Media  Pluralism  Monitor.  See  also  written  contribution  from  Reporters  sans  frontières  for  the  2022 

Rule of Law Report. 

195  The 2022 Media Pluralism Monitor indicates that some media outlets have resorted to financial instruments 

which were not media-specific and meant to limit the impact of the pandemic on the economy. 

196  Art. 87 of the Constitution: any member of the National Assembly or the Council of Ministers has the right 
to introduce a draft law. It is adopted by the National Assembly in two readings. The adopted draft law is 
sent to the President of the Republic of Bulgaria, who signs a decree for its promulgation.  After more than 
one  year  of  various  court  proceedings,  at  the  end  of  2021  a  panel  of  three  judges  from  the  Supreme 

22 

  
                                                 
 
Ombudsperson is an independent constitutional body, elected by the National Assembly and 
tasked with the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms which 
has an A-status  accreditation from GANHRI197. Second, the Commission for the Protection 
against  Discrimination  is  a  body  that  implements  policies  in  the  spheres  of  gender  equality 
and non-discrimination which has a B-status accreditation from GANHRI.  

The  establishment  of  a  Post-monitoring  Mechanism  is  progressing.  As  indicated  in 
previous  reports198,  the  Government  committed  to  set  up  a  Coordination  and  Cooperation 
Council (‘post-monitoring council’) with the aim of assessing Bulgaria’s progress in judicial 
reform,  fight  against  corruption  and  organised  crime  in  an  independent,  transparent,  and 
objective  manner.  This  body,  which  would  become  operational  once  the  CVM  is  formally 
lifted, includes a Civic Council which provides for the representation of civil society in the 
mechanism.  A  positive  development  follows  from  the  recent  ruling  of  the  Supreme 
Administrative  Court199  as  regards  the  procedure  to  select  members  of  the Civil Council  in 
the  framework  of  the  post-monitoring  mechanism.  The  Court’s  decision  concerned  the 
successful appeal made by an NGO to take part in the Civil Council previously rejected by 
the former Minister of Justice200. It is positive that the role of civil society is acknowledged as 
an important and vital element of any national policy development and implementation. On 
23  June  2022,  the  Government  published  for  public  consultation  draft  amendments  to  the 
decision  for  the  establishment  of  the  Post-monitoring  Mechanism201.  The  new  amendments 
aim  at  extending  the  competences  of  the  Mechanism  to  cover  the  topics  included  in  the 
Commission’s  annual  Rule  of  Law  Reports.  Moreover,  the  draft  envisages  that  the 
Mechanism  would  start  functioning  immediately  after  its  adoption  by  the  Council  of 
Ministers independently from the CVM. 

New procedural  rules have been adopted to improve the law-making process.  In 2021, 
Bulgaria held three parliamentary elections202. All three of the Parliaments made amendments 
to  their  Rules  of  Procedure,  which  led  to  an  improvement  of  the  rules  for  the  law-making 
process. As a result, all draft legislation proposed by Members of Parliament should now be 

Administrative  Court  ruled  in  favour  of  Bulgarian  Institute  for  Legal  Initiatives  (the  decision  is  available 
here in BG only e State Gazette and enters into force three days after its publication, unless the act provides 
otherwise. See also the recent draft reform of the Constitution mentioned in footnote 40, which extended the 
right  of  legislative  initiative  also  to  the  Councils  for  the  judiciary.  However,  this  was  later  left  out  of  the 
draft. 

197  Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions. 
198  See 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, p.17. 
199  The decision of 12 December 2021 (Decision No. 12800 on Administrative case No. 7245/2020) which held 
the  Minister  of  Justice  responsible  of  violating  Art.  146,  points  3  and  4 of  Administrative  procedure  code 
(substantial  violation  of  administrative  procedure  rules  and  of  contradiction  with  substantive  legal 
provision). See also the Contribution from the Bulgarian Institute for Legal Initiatives for the 2022 Rule of 
Law  Report.  After  more  than  one  year  of  various  court  proceedings,  at  the  end  of  2021  the  Supreme 
Administrative Court ruled in favour of the Bulgarian Institute for Legal Initiatives. The foundation has sued 
the Minister of Justice for rejecting without a reason its selection to be part of the Civic Council established 
by Decree 240 of the Council of Ministers for the creation of an internal monitoring mechanism related  to 
the  fight  against  corruption  and  the  judicial  reform.  That  internal  mechanism  is  supposed  to  replace  the 
CVM at national level. 

200  Contribution from the Bulgarian Institute for Legal Initiatives for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 
201  See draft amendments of Decree No. 240 of the Council of Ministers of 2019 on the website of the Council 

of Ministers for public consultations from 23 June 2022. 

202  Regular  Parliamentary  elections  were  held  on  4  April  2021.  However,  due  to  political  fragmentation  in 
Parliament and the resulting impossibility to form a ruling coalition, two snap parliamentary elections were 
held on 11 July 2021 and on 14 November 2021.  

23 

  
                                                                                                                                                        
accompanied  by  a  reasoning  and  an  impact  assessment203.  Moreover,  a  summary  of 
stakeholders’ opinions204 is to be presented with the draft laws. In addition, the possibility of 
introducing  important  legislative  changes  through  amendments  to  other  legal  acts  between 
the  first  and  the  second  reading  is  now  limited  to  amendments  related  to  the  matter  of  the 
initially submitted act and subject to the approval by a two-thirds majority of the committee 
responsible205.  Currently,  there  is  no  data  yet  to  confirm  whether  the  practices  followed  by 
the  previous  Parliaments  continue  to  be  used  or  whether  the  new  rules  are  fully  respected. 
The  quality  of  law-making  is  an  important  factor  for  investor  confidence  and  a  reason  for 
concern  about  effectiveness  of  investment  protection  for  24%  of  companies  in  Bulgaria206. 
Stakeholder feedback suggests that quick adoption of laws before prior assessment results in 
costs and legal uncertainty for business207. 

The emergency situation regime related to the COVID-19 pandemic ended. As described 
in  the  2021  Rule  of  Law  Report208,  the  emergency  regime  (‘emergency  epidemic 
situation’)209 adopted on 12 May 2020, and declared on 13 May 2020 was last renewed until 
31  March  2022210.  Further  easing  of  measures  was  introduced  through  an  order  of  the 
Minister  of  Health  on  17  March  2022,  including  the  abolishment  of  the  requirement  for  a 
‘green certificate’ for all activities and events in the country211. 

On  1  January  2022,  Bulgaria  had  92  leading  judgments  of  the  European  Court  of 
Human  Rights  pending  implementation212.  At  that  time,  Bulgaria’s  rate  of  leading 
judgments  from  the  past  10  years  that  remained  pending  was  at  55%  and  the  average  time 
that the judgments had been pending implementation was 6 years and 4 months213. One of the 
oldest leading judgments pending implementation for 22 years concerns the excessive use of 
force  by  law  enforcement  agents214.  On  1  July  2022,  the  number  of  leading  judgments 
pending implementation has increased to 97215. 

203  Art. 70 of the Rules of Procedure. 
204  Art. 70, para. 2, pp. 2 of the Rules of Procedure. 
205  Art. 78, para. 3 of the Rules of Procedure. 
206  Figure  54,  2022  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  indicates  that  “Frequent  changes  in  legislation  or  concerns  about 

quality of the law-making process” are of concern to 24.5% of companies in Bulgaria.  

207  Figure 55, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
208  To be noted that the legislative process was the regular one except for the emergency measures themselves. 

See 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, p.19. 

209  Art.  63  Health  Act.  According  to  this  new  regime,  the  Council  of  Ministers  could  declare  an  emergency 
epidemic situation for a certain period of time at the suggestion of the Minister of Health. This would allow 
some  of  the  measures  taken  under  the  state  of  emergency  to  continue  to  apply  and  new  ones  to  be 
introduced, despite the end of the state of emergency. 

210  Decision of the Council of Ministers of 24 November 2021. 
211  Order No. RD-01-138/17.03.2022. 
212  The  adoption of necessary execution  measures  for a  judgment by the European  Court of Human  Rights is 
supervised by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. It is the Committee’s practice to group 
cases against a State requiring similar execution measures, particularly general measures, and examine them 
jointly. The first case in the group is designated as the leading case as regards the supervision of the general 
measures and repetitive cases within the group can be closed when it is assessed that all possible individual 
measures needed to provide redress to the applicant have been taken. 

213  All figures are calculated by the European Implementation Network and are based on the number of cases 
that  are  considered  pending  at  the  annual  cut-off  date  of  1  January  2022.  See  the  Contribution  from  the 
European Implementation Network for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 30.  

214  Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 18 May 2000, Velikova v. Bulgaria, 41488/98, pending 

implementation since 2000. 

215  Data according to the online database of the Council of Europe (HUDOC) 

24 

  
                                                 
A Council for Civil Society Development has been appointed. On 16 February 2022, the 
Government  appointed  the  members  of  the  Council  for  Civil  Society  Development.  The 
Council  was  established  through  legislative  amendments,  which  entered  into  force  on  1 
January  2018216,  while  the  rules  governing  the  operation  of  the  Council  were  adopted  in 
2019217. The election of the Council’s first members took place on 14 May 2020218. However, 
in May 2021, these first members published an open letter to the then interim Prime Minister 
claiming that they had not been able to perform any activity over the previous year and urged 
him  to  take  the  necessary  measures  that  would  allow  the  consultative  body  to  begin 
operating219.  The  main  purpose  of  the  Council  is  to  participate  in  the  drafting  and 
implementation of policies in support of civil society development. In addition, the Council is 
also  responsible  for  the  advancement  of  the  national  civil  society  strategy,  for  making 
available the information on funding for civil society organisations, and for the definition of 
priority  areas  for  development220.  At  present  however,  the  civil  space  is  still  considered 
narrowed221. 

216  Art. 4 of the Non-Profit Legal Entities Act. 
217  Council  of  Ministers  (2019),  Rules  on  the  organisation  and  activity  of  the  Council  for  Civil  Society 

Development, 10 September 2019. 

218  Franet (2022), Country research - Legal environment and space of civil society organisations in supporting 

fundamental rights - Bulgaria, p. 3. 

219  Franet (2022), Country research - Legal environment and space of civil society organisations in supporting 

fundamental rights - Bulgaria, p. 4. 

220  Art. 4 of the Non-Profit Legal Entities Act. See  also Franet (2022), Country research  - Legal environment 

and space of civil society organisations in supporting fundamental rights - Bulgaria, p. 4. 

221  See  rating  given  by  CIVICUS,  Bulgaria.  Ratings  are  on  a  five-category  scale  defined  as:  open,  narrowed, 
obstructed,  repressed  and  closed.  See  also  contribution  from  European  Civic  Forum  for  the  2022  Rule  of 
Law Report, p. 9, public participation and civil society capacities remain low due to lack of public policies 
(or  lack  of  implementation  thereof)  aimed  at  developing  the  sector,  and  lack  of  appropriate  funding  for 
advocacy work, in the context of weak rule of law infrastructures. 

25 

  
                                                 
Annex I: List of sources in alphabetical order* 

* The list of contributions received in the context of the consultation for the 2022 Rule of Law report 
can  be  found  at  https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/2022-rule-law-report-targeted-stakeholder-
consultation_en. 

Association  of  Judges  (2022),  Contribution  from  the  European  Association  of  Judges  for  the  2022 
Rule of Law Report. 

Austrian  Federal  Economic  Chamber  (2022),  Contribution  from  the  Austrian  Federal  Economic 
Chamber for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

Bulgarian Council of Ministers (2019), Council of Ministers, Rules on the organisation and activity of 
the Council for Civil Society Development, 10 September 2019. 

Bulgarian Council of Ministers (2021), Decision of the Council of Ministers of 24 November 2021. 

Bulgarian  Council  of  Ministers  (2021),  Decree  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  n.235  of  19.03.2021 
https://strategy.bg/StrategicDocuments/View.aspx?lang=bg-BG&Id=1353. 

Bulgarian Government (2022), Input from Bulgaria for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

Bulgarian Institute for Legal Initiatives Foundation (2022), Contribution from the Bulgarian Institute 
for Legal Initiatives Foundation for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

Bulgarian Institute for Legal Initiatives Foundation (2022),  Written contribution from the Bulgarian 
Institute for Legal Initiatives Foundation in the context of the country visit. 

Bulgarian  National  Assembly  (2021),  Report  of  the  Temporary  Committee  of  the  46th  National 
Assembly for investigating the facts and events around the protest of 2020. 

Bulgarian National Assembly (2021), Rules of Organisation and Procedure of the National Assembly. 

Bulgarian Ministry of Health (2022), Anti-corruption Plan of the Ministry of Heath for 2022. 

Bulgarian Ministry of Justice (2022), Written contribution from the Ministry of Justice in the context 
of the country visit. 

Bulgarian 
https://www2.aop.bg/metodologiya/metodicheski-ukazaniya/. 

Procurement 

Agency 

Public 

(2021), 

Methodological 

guidelines 

Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (2022), Media pluralism monitor 2022 – Report on 
Bulgaria. 

CEPEJ (2021), Study on the functioning of the judicial systems in the EU Member States. 

Civicus, Monitor tracking civic space – Bulgaria https://monitor.civicus.org/country/bulgaria/. 

Commission for Counteracting Corruption and Illegal Assets Forfeiture (2022), Activity Report for the 
Commission for Anti-Corruption and Illegal Assets Forfeiture of 2021. 

Commission  for  Counteracting  Corruption  and  Illegal  Assets  Forfeiture  (2022),  Press  release  of  14 
February 2022. 

Constitutional Court Decision No. 1 of 2022 on Case No. 17 of 8 February 2021. 

Constitutional Court Case No. 9 of 4 May 2022 

Constitutional Court Case No. 7 of 29 April 2022. 

Council  of  Europe:  Committee  of  Ministers  (2010),  Recommendation  CM/Rec(2010)12  of  the 
Committee of Ministers to member states on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities. 

Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers (2019), Decision CM/Notes/1362/H46-6. 

Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers (2019), Interim Resolution, CM/ResDH(2019)367. 

26 

  
Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers (2020), Decision CM/Del/Dec(2020)1377bis/H46-9 of 1-
3 September 2020. 

Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers (2020), Notes CM/Notes/1377bis/H46-9 of 3 September 
2020. 

Council  of  Europe:  Committee  of  Ministers  (2021),  Decision  CM/Del/Dec(2021)1419/H46-8  of  2 
December 2021.  

Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers (2021), Notes CM/Notes/1419/H46-8 of 30 November- 2 
December 2021. 

Council  of  Europe:  Committee  of  Ministers  (2021),  Decision  CM/Del/Dec(2021)1398/H46-6  of  11 
March 2021. 

Council  of  Europe:  Committee  of  Ministers  (2021),  Notes  CM/Notes/1398/H46-6  of  9-11  March 
2021. 

Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2010),  Report on the Independence of the Judicial System 
Part I: The Independence of Judges (CDL-AD(2010)004). 

Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2017), Bulgaria - Opinion on the judicial system act (CDL-
AD(2017)018). 

Council  of  Europe:  Venice  Commission  (2019),  Bulgaria  -  Opinion  on  draft  amendments  to  the 
Criminal Procedure Code and the Judicial System Act, concerning criminal investigations against top 
magistrates (CDL-AD(2019)031). 

Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2020), Bulgaria - Urgent interim opinion on the draft new 
constitution opinion (CDL-AD(2020)035). 

Council  of  Ministers  (2022),  Draft  Law  on  the  Protection  of  Persons  Reporting  or  Disclosure  of 
Violations, https://www.strategy.bg/PublicConsultations/View.aspx?lang=bg-BG&Id=6784 

Council  of  Ministers  (2022),  draft  amendments  of  Decree  No.  240  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  of 
2019, https://www.strategy.bg/PublicConsultations/View.aspx?lang=bg-BG&Id=6920 

Council of the European Union (2006), Council conclusions of 17 October 2006, PRESS RELEASE, 
2755th  Council  Meeting,  General  Affairs  and  External  Relations  General  Affairs  13339/06  (Presse 
264), https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13339-2006-INIT/en/pdf.  

Council  of  the  European  Union  (2017),  Council  Conclusions  on  the  Cooperation  and  Verification 
9, 
Mechanism, 
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15587-2017-INIT/en/pdf. 

COVEME 

December 

15587/17 

2017, 

12 

Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 16 November 2021,  Prokuratura Rejonowa w 
Minsku Mazowieckim, Joined Cases C-748/19 to C-754/19, EU:C:2021:931.  

Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 17 June 2017,  Menini & Rampanelli v Banco 
Popolare – Società Cooperativa, C-75/16, ECLI:EU:C:2017:457. 

Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union,  judgment  of  18  March  2010,  Alassini  and  Others,  Case 
317/08 to C-320/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:146. 

Directorate-General  for  Communication  (2019),  Flash  Eurobarometer  482:  businesses'  attitudes 
towards corruption in the EU. 

Directorate-General for Communication (2020), Special Eurobarometer 502: corruption. 

Directorate-General  for  Communication  (2022),  Flash  Eurobarometer  507:  businesses’  attitudes 
towards corruption in the EU.  

Directorate-General for Communication (2022), Special Eurobarometer 523: corruption.  

European  Civic  Forum  (2022),  Contribution  from  the  European  Civic  Forum  for  the  2022  Rule  of 
Law Report. 

27 

  
European Commission (2006), Commission Decision of 13 December 2006 establishing a mechanism 
for cooperation and verification of progress in Romania to address specific benchmarks in the areas 
of judicial reform and the fight against corruption (C(2006) 6569), OJ L 354, 14.12.2006,  

European  Commission  (2019),  Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Council  on  Progress 
the  Cooperation  and  Verification  Mechanism, 
COM(2019)498. 

in  Bulgaria  under 

European Commission (2020), 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation 
in Bulgaria. 

European Commission (2021), 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation 
in Bulgaria. 

European Commission (2022), ANNEX to the Proposal for a Council Implementing Decision on the 
approval  of  the  assessment  of  the  recovery  and  resilience  plan  for  Bulgaria,  of  7  April  2022, 
COM(2022) 172 final. 

European Commission (2022), Council Implementing Decision on the approval of the assessment of 
the recovery and resilience plan for Bulgaria, of 7 April 2022, COM(2022) 172 final. 

European Commission (2022), EU Justice Scoreboard. 

European  Commission  (2022),  Recommendation  on  immediate  steps  in  the  context  of  the  Russian 
invasion  of  Ukraine  in  relation  to  investor  citizenship  schemes  and  investor  residence  schemes 
(C(2022) 2028 final). 

European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 18 May 2000, Velikova v. Bulgaria, 41488/98. 

European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 5 November 2009, Kolevi v. Bulgaria, 1108/02. 

European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 3 March 2015, S.Z. v. Bulgaria, 29263/12. 

European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 11 January 2022, Ekimdzhiev v. Bulgaria, 70078/12. 

European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 19 October 2021, Todorova v. Bulgaria, 40072/13. 

European Implementation Network (2022), Contribution from the European Implementation Network 
for the 2022 Rule of Law Report.  

European  Parliament  and  Council  of  the  European  Union  (2019),  Directive  (EU)  2019/1937  of  the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report 
breaches of Union law. 

European  Parliament,  Committee  on  Civil  Liberties,  Justice  and  Home  Affairs,  Mission  Report 
following  the  ad-hoc  delegation  to  Slovakia  and  Bulgaria  –  21-24  September  2021,  adopted  17 
November 
2021 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/plmrep/COMMITTEES/LIBE/DV/2021/11-
29/MissionreportSK_BG_1240476_EN.pdf.  

Franet, Center for the Study of Democracy (2022), Country research - Legal environment and space 
of  civil  society  organisations  in  supporting  fundamental  rights  –  Bulgaria,  Vienna,  EU  Agency  for 
https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2022/civic-space-2022-update#country-
Fundamental  Rights, 
related. 

respect 

GRECO (2015), Fourth Evaluation Round – Evaluation report on Bulgaria on corruption prevention 
prosecutors 
in 
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000
016806c983f. 

parliament, 

members 

judges 

and 

of 

of 

Inspectorate to the Supreme Judicial Council (2022), Written contribution from the Inspectorate to the 
Supreme Judicial Council in the context of the country visit. 

28 

  
International Press Institute (2022), Contributions from International Press Institute for the 2022 Rule 
of Law Report 

Judicial  Chamber  of  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council  (2021),  Decision  under  Protocol  No.  42  of  23 
November 2021 

Ministry of Health (2022), Order No. RD-01-138/17.03.2022 

National Audit Office (2022), Audit Report No. 0600100321 of 8 January 2022. 

Plenary  of  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council  (2021),  Decision  under  Protocol  No.13  of  25  November 
2021 

Plenary of the Supreme Judicial Council (2021), Protocol No.12 of 2021 

Plenary of the Supreme Judicial Council (2021), Protocol No.14 of 2021 

Plenary of the Supreme Judicial Council (2022), Agenda No.8 of 2022 

Prosecutorial Chamber of the Supreme Judicial Council (2021), Decisions under Protocol No.40 of 23 
November 2021. 

Reporters Sans Frontières (2022), Contribution from the Reporters Sans Frontières for the 2022 Rule 
of Law Report. 

Reporters without Borders (2022) – Bulgaria https://rsf.org/en/bulgaria.  

Reuters  (2022),  Press  release  https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/bulgarias-former-pm-detained-
interior-ministry-says-2022-03-17/. 

Sofia City Administrative Court (2021), Decision No. 500 of 28 January 2021 

Statement of the Bulgarian Judges Association of 23 June 2021 https://judgesbg.org/144-2/. 

Statement of 27 July 2021, signed by 69 judges from the Supreme Court of Cassation, named “Why is 
the USIC dangerous” http://vks.bg/novini/stanovishte-vks-eiss-27-07.html.  

Supreme Administrative Court (2020), Decision No. 12800 on Administrative case No. 7245/2020 

Supreme Cassation Court (2021), Order No. 893 by the President of the Supreme Court of Cassation 
of 10 August 2021 

Supreme  Cassation  Court  (2022),  Written  contribution  from  the  Supreme  Court  of  Cassation  in  the 
context of the country visit.  

Supreme  Judicial  Council  (2022),  website  of  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council  for  the  register  of 
seconded judges, http://www.vss.justice.bg/root/f/upload/34/REG_KOM_11_04_2022_S.pdf. 

Transparency International (2022), Corruption Perceptions Index 2021. 

UN OHCHR Regional Office for Europe (2022), Contribution from the UN OHCHR Regional Office 
for Europe for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

29 

  
Annex II: Country visit to Bulgaria 

The Commission services held virtual meetings in March 2022 with: 

  Anti-Corruption Council 
  Anti-corruption Fund Foundation  
  Association of Bulgarian Radio and TV Operators 
  Association of European Journalists – Bulgaria 
  Association of Prosecutors in Bulgaria 
  Audio-Visual regulator – Council for Electronic Media 
  Bulgarian center for not-for-profit law 
  Bulgarian Helsinki Committee 
  Bulgarian Institute for Legal Initiatives  
  Bulgarian Judges Association 
  Centre for the Study of Democracy  
  Commission for countering corruption and for forfeiture of illegally acquired assets 
  For the truth project 
  Group of academics 
 
 
  Ministry of Culture  
  Ministry of Interior 
  Ministry of Justice 
  National Council for Journalistic Ethics 
  Office of the Prosecutor General 
  Open Society Institute 
  Public service media – Bulgarian National Radio 
  Specialised Criminal Court 
  Specialised Prosecutor's Office 
  Supreme Administrative Court 
  Supreme Bar Council 
  Supreme Court of Cassation 
  Supreme Judicial Council 
  Union of Publishers in Bulgaria 

Initiative Justice for Everyone  
Inspectorate to the Supreme Judicial Council 

* The Commission also met the following organisations in a number of horizontal meetings:  

  Amnesty International  
  Article 19  
  Civil Liberties Union for Europe 
  Civil Society Europe  
  European Centre for Press and Media Freedom  
  European Civic Forum 
  European Federation of Journalists  
  European Partnership for Democracy 
  European Youth Forum 
  Free Press Unlimited 
  Human Rights Watch  
 
 

ILGA Europe 
International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) 

30 

  
International Press Institute 

 
  Open Society European Policy Institute (OSEPI) 
  Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso Transeuropa  
  Philea 
  Reporters Without Borders 
  Transparency International Europe 

31