REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Long-term forecast of future inflows and outflows of the EU budget (2023-2027)
Date: 2022-06-30
Institutions: Directorate-General for Budget, European Commission
Subjects: EU budget, EU expenditure, Member States' contribution, budget policy, budgetary resources, long-term forecast, multiannual financial framework, own resources

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 30.6.2022  COM(2022) 315 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Long-term forecast of future inflows and outflows of the EU budget (2023-2027) {SWD(2022) 175 final}  
 
 
Table of Contents 

TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................................................................................... 1 

1. 

2. 

Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3 

Forecast of outflows of the EU budget 2023-2027............................................................................................................ 3 

2.1.  Payments in relation to the commitments of the 2021-2027 MFF .......................................................................... 5 

2.2.  Payments for the completion of pre-2021 commitments............................................................................................... 7 

2.3.  De-commitments ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 8 

2.4.  NextGenerationEU ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 8 

2.5.  Evolution of the level of outstanding commitments ........................................................................................................... 9 

3. 

4. 

Forecast of inflows of the EU budget 2023-2027 ............................................................................................................ 10 

Conclusions ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 12 

Annex I – Results of the forecast* .............................................................................................................................................................. 14 

Table 1.1 – Long-term forecast of future outflows over 2023-2027 for the MFF .......................................................................... 14 

Table 1.2 – Payments in relation to the commitments of the 2021-2027 MFF............................................................................... 15 

Table 1.3 – Payments for the completion of pre-2021 commitments ............................................................................... 16 

Table 2 – Forecast de-commitments ........................................................................................................................................................ 17 

Table 3 – Long-term forecast of outflows for NextGenerationEU ......................................................................................... 18 

Table 4 – Change in the total outstanding commitments from 2023 to 2027 ............................................................ 18 

Table 5 – Long-term forecast of future inflows of the EU budget over 2023-2027 ................................................ 19 

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1.  Introduction 

This report provides projections for the inflows and outflows of the EU budget over the period 2023-2027i. It is the 
second  edition  of  the  long-term  forecast  for  revenue  and  expenditure  stemming  of  the  Multiannual  Financial 
Framework (MFF) 2021-2027ii and NextGenerationEUiii, updating the estimates presented in the June 2021 reportiv. 

The forecast covers the next five years, in accordance with Article 247(1)(c) of the Financial Regulationv. The period 
largely overlaps with last year’s report, which exceptionally spanned over seven years from 2021 to 2027 to provide 
a comprehensive overview of the expected revenue inflows and the expenditure outflows under the ceilings of the 
then newly adopted MFF.  

Along  with  the  MFF  estimates,  this  forecast  updates  the  projections  of  payments  on  all  programmes  under 
NextGenerationEU.  This  expenditure,  additional  to  the  spending  under  the  MFF,  is  financed  exclusively  by  revenue 
proceeds from borrowing operations on the capital markets. 

Payments from the EU budget follow commitments. The estimates in this report are based on the commitments of 
the financial programming accompanying the Draft Budget 2023vi. These include the adjustmentvii of the MFF for the 
late  adoption  of  rules  and  programmes  under  shared  management  under  Article  7  of  the  MFF  Regulation,  the 
programme-specific  adjustments  under  Article  5  of  the  MFF  Regulationviii  as  well  as  re-use  of  de-commitments 
under Article 15(3)ix of the Financial Regulation. As regards revenue, the forecast is based on the revenue system of 
the Own Resources Decisionx. The revenue projections also consider the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United 
Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Northern  Ireland  from  the  European  Union  and  the  European  Atomic  Energy 
Communityxi (the ‘Withdrawal Agreement’). 

2.   Forecast of outflows of the EU budget 

2023-2027 

The payments over the next five years of the MFF are expected to reach EUR 1 156 billion, including EUR 873 billion 
under the MFF payment ceiling and EUR 278 billion for NextGenerationEU non-repayable support.  

The forecast includes estimates for the future programme-specific adjustments stemming from Article 5 of the MFF 
Regulation  and  for  the  re-use  of  de-commitments  under  Article  15(3)  of  the  Financial  Regulation,  which  will  be 
allocated  in  the  years  2024-2027.  The  programme-specific  adjustments  are  expected  to  result  in  an  automatic 
upward  adjustment  of  the  MFF  ceilings  for  commitments  and  payments  of  EUR 9.4  billion  in  addition  to  the 
adjustments for 2022 and 2023 totalling EUR 3.3 billionxii. The exact annual adjustment will depend on the revenue 
from competition fines in the previous year for an overall amount of EUR 11 billion (in 2018 prices) by 2027. 

2 

 
 
 
Chart 1 - Payments forecast by category (in EUR billion) 

264 

232 

225 

240 

Annual average: 231 

NextGenerationEU 

194 

MFF 2021-2027 

Completion 

The forecast payments from the EU budget are not evenly distributed across the reference period. They depend on 
the expected evolution of: 1) the phasing-in of payments for the new MFF programmes (66% of the total payments), 
2)  the  pace  of  disbursements  under  NextGenerationEU  (24%  of  the  payments),  and  3)  the  completion  of 
commitments from the 2014-2020 period and earlier (10% of the payments). The estimated annual average of the 
outflows  is  EUR 231 billion,  with  EUR  56  billion  to  be  financed  by  borrowing  on  the  capital  markets  for 
NextGenerationEU programmes. 

Payments  over  the  period  are  expected  to  steadily  decline  after  a  peak  in  2023,  which  is  largely  driven  by  the 
frontloading of NextGenerationEU. A temporary  rebound in outflows is expected in 2026, when all final payments 
under NextGenerationEU will have to be completed. As of 2027 the forecast almost exclusively comprises payments 
under the 2021-2027 MFF programmes. 

Zooming in on the expenditure under the current MFF and the completion of its predecessors, the forecast payments 
average EUR 175 billion, with 2023-2024 below average and 2026-2027 above. The difference between the peak 
year for payments (2027) and the trough  (2024) is roughly EUR 36 billion. This pattern has also been observed in 
prior MFFs due  to  the  progressive  phasing  out  of  closure  payments  of  the  previous  financial  frameworks  and the 
new spending programmes effectively reaching cruising speed in the second half of the respective MFF. 

The  forecast  margin  under  the  MFF  payment  ceiling  amounts  to  EUR  5.5  billion  and  EUR 11  billion  in  2023  and 
2024,  respectively.  For  the  period  2025-2027,  the  annual  margin  may  appear  negative  compared  to  the  current 
payment  ceilings,  with  the  forecast  exceeding  the  ceiling  by  EUR 24.6  billion  for  the  three  years  combined.  These 
deviations  across  the  years  are  simply  a  consequence  of  the  payment  ceiling  set  at  a  stable  level  in  real  terms, 
while  implementation  is expected  to  follow  a  variable  path.  Pursuant  to  the  automatic  adjustment  mechanism  of 
Article 11(1)(b) of the MFF Regulation, the amounts not spent in a given year will increase the ceilings for the future 
years.  Therefore,  the  expected  positive  margins  prior  to  2025  will  increase  the  ceilings  in  2025-2027  (within  the 
limits set by  Article 11(3) of the  MFF Regulation).  Considering this adjustment and the future  programme-specific 
adjustment  under  Article 5  of  the  MFF  Regulation  (which  will  increase  the  payment  ceilings  by  an  additional 
EUR 9.4 billion),  the  current  payment  forecast  for  the  last  three  years  of  the  MFF  is  compatible  with  the  overall 
2021-2027 MFF payment ceiling.  

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Chart 2 - Payments forecast vs MFF payment ceiling (in EUR billion) 

Maximum Payments Ceiling: 
2025-2027 incl. increase SMI 
Art. 11(3)) 

Forecast Payments (under the 
MFF ceiling) 

Payment Ceiling (Technical 
Adjustment 2023) 

2.1.  Payments in relation to the commitments of the 2021-2027 MFF 

Cohesion policy and the  Common  Agricultural Policy (CAP) account for more than half  of the estimated payments 
stemming  from  the  2021-2027  MFF.  The  long-term  forecast  is  therefore  largely  driven  by  the  forecast 
implementation of these two policies. 

Heading 2a - Cohesion policy 

The payments forecast over 2023-2027 for the new cohesion policy programming stands at EUR 177 billion, around 
EUR  8  billion  less  than  in  last  year’s  forecast.  The  more  pronounced  delaysxiii  in  the  launch  of  the  2021-2027 
programming period will shape the payments over the remainder of the MFF. No national programme was adopted 
in 2021, with all expected to be approved by the end of 2022. The COVID-19 pandemic and the need to integrate 
the recovery initiatives into the legislative package under negotiation in the course of 2020 led to a later adoption of 
the  relevant  legal  acts,  which  largely  explains  the  observed  delays.  Moreover,  national  authorities’  focus  on 
implementing NextGenerationEU may also have played a role. The technical assumption for this forecast is that as 
of 2024 Member States will start to partially recuperate the delays accumulated over 2021-2023 and will reach a 
speed of implementation comparable to the 2014-2020 period towards the last years of the MFF. This assumption 
is made in a context of heightened uncertainty due to the current geopolitical and economic instability, as well as 
the absence of a relevant historical benchmark to project implementation over the long-term. 

There  are  upside  and  downside  risks  to  this  forecast.  Member  States  may  put  extra  efforts  to  accelerate 
implementation as of 2023 and the speed of implementation of the previous programming period could be reached 
earlier.  Payments  may  also  accelerate  in  relation  to  the  REPowerEUxiv  initiative  under  which  the  Commission 
proposed  that  Member  States  have  the  possibility  to  transfer  up  to  12.5%  of  their  cohesion  allocations  to  the 
Recovery and Resilience Facility (which is not reflected in the forecast), building on the already available 5% transfer 
possibility and adding 7.5% transfer possibility for REPowerEU objectives only. By contrast, if Member States do not 
undertake additional efforts, a one-year delay will persist. Consequently, this would delay payments and potentially 
lead to unprecedentedly high level of de-commitments due to the N+3 de-commitment rules. 

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Chart 3 - Payments forecast for Heading 2a (2021-2027 MFF commitments), and upside and downside 
scenarios (in EUR billion) 

Upside scenario 

Forecast  
Payments 

Downside scenario 

Heading 3 - Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 

The payments forecast for Pillar I of the CAP – EUR 208 billion over 2023-2027 – reflect the most recent financial 
programming and Member States’ transfers between the two CAP Pillars. 

Contrary  to  cohesion  policy,  there  are  no  delays  expected  in  the  implementation  of  Pillar  II  –  the  European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) – owing to the two-year transitional provisions, which extended the 
2014-2020  programmes  until  2022.  Considering  that  all  Member  States  have  submitted  their  Strategic  Plans  for 
the new CAP, the effective implementation of the 2023-2027 programmes is expected to start already in 2023, one 
year earlier than assumed in the June 2021 forecast report. 

The forecast of payments deriving from the 2021-2027 MFF also includes payments linked to the last two tranches 
(2021 and 2022) of the previous programming exercise. They are expected to be covered by payments until 2026 
(see Point 2.2. Payments on pre-2021 commitments). 

With  the  2014-2022  EAFRD  programmes  running  on  track  and  the  new  CAP  plans  under  approval,  the 
implementation of the EAFRD is expected to run steadily. However, some annual deviations are expected over 2024-
2027,  with  a  particular  concentration  of  payments  in  2026  due  to  the  overlap  between  the  completion  of  the 
previous programmes (under N+3 de-commitment rule) and the quicker phasing in of the new ones (under N+2 de-
commitment  rule).  Furthermore,  EAFRD  payments  may  be  accelerated  in  relation  to  the  REPowerEU  initiative, 
similarly to the cohesion policy funds (see point above). 

Other programmes and headings 

There is an increase in the payments forecast over the five-year period across all other headings resulting from a 
combination of several factors: 

-  New  initiatives  such  as  the  Union  Secure  Connectivityxv  and  the  European  Chips  Actxvi  will  frontload 

payments, mostly under Heading 1. 

5 

 
 
- 

- 

The  latest  geopolitical  challenges  presuppose  an  acceleration  of  payments  of  the  programmes  under 
Heading  4  -  Migration  and  Border  Management,  Heading  5  -  Security  and  Defence,  and  Heading  6  - 
Neighbourhood and the World. 

The delayed start of some programmes in 2021 will lead to a redistribution of payments in later years. The 
more  substantial  change  with  respect  to  last  year’s  forecast  concerns  the  Brexit  Adjustment  Reserve  for 
which the adopted legal actxviiprovides for a more even distribution of payments across the years compared 
to the Commission proposal for a large pre-financing instalment, which underpinned last year’s forecast. 

2.2.  Payments for the completion of pre-2021 commitments 

The forecast for payments for the completion of pre-2021 commitments (RAL for reste à liquider) is updated to take 
into account payments made in 2021 and planned in the 2022 budget. The forecast of EUR 110 billion for the next 
five years is largely in line with last year’s forecast with certain annual differences. 

Heading 2a - Cohesion policy 

Most payments on pre-2021 commitments (58%) relate to the previous programming period of the cohesion policy 
funds,  which  is  running  at  full  speed.  The  payment  projections  are  based  on  the  latest  Member  States’  forecast 
(January  2022)  and  recent  information  for  the  implementation  on  the  ground.  With  the  Cohesion’s  Action  for 
Refugees in Europe (CARE), proposed by the Commission on 8 March 2022xviii, Member States will be able to speed 
up the deployment of all non-programmed funding under the 2014-2020 period, frontloading payment to 2022 and 
2023. Compared to last year’s report, this translates into a reduction of the payments’ forecast in 2024. 

The  last  accounting  year  for  the  European  Structural  and  Investment  (ESI)  funds  ends  in  June  2024,  but  most 
payments  are  projected  by  end-2023.  For  the  closure,  considering  the  retention  rate  and  pre-financing  clearance, 
payments are expected to be limited after 2024. 

Heading 3 - Common Agricultural Policy  

The expected completion of the 2014-2022 operational programmes is broadly in line with last year’s forecast. It 
includes, however, a novel element, which is the impact of the recently proposed xix lump-sum payments to farmers 
and  SMEs  in  the  food-processing  sector.  Consequently,  this  frontloads  payments  by  EUR  450  million  from  2024-
2025 to 2023. 

Other programmes and headings 

The  vast  majority  (84%)  of  outstanding  payments  for  the  remaining  parts  of  the  budget  is  almost  evenly  spread 
between Headings 1 - Single Market, Innovation and Digital and Heading 6  - Neighbourhood and the World. While 
completion activities under Heading 1 are now expected earlier than previous estimations, the updated expectations 
for projects under Heading 6 are more backloaded towards 2025-2026. 

2.3.  De-commitments 

The  overall  de-commitments’  forecast  over  2023-2027  stands  at  EUR  7.6  billion,  which  is  a  slight  reduction 
compared to last year’s forecast of EUR 8.4 billion. However, there are some notable changes. 

6 

 
Heading 2a - Cohesion policy 

There  is  a  considerable  reduction  in  the  de-commitments  concerning  the  completion  of  the  previous  programmes 
under the ESI funds from EUR 3.7 billion down to EUR 0.4 billion. This is due to the 100% co-financing rate for the 
2021-2022 accounting year under the CARE initiative, which will facilitate full  absorption and minimise the risk of 
de-commitments during the closure process of the programmes. 

There  is  some  limited  de-commitments’  risk  in  the  new  cohesion  programmes  from  2026  following  the  same 
technical assumptions used for the payment estimations.  In the fifth year of the new programming period, the de-
commitment targets for the commitments of 2022 and 2023 apply, yet the rate of submission of payment claims 
would still lag the historical pace due to the delays at the start of the programmes. The de-commitment risk could 
recede  with  sufficient  acceleration  in  implementation  in  2024.  However,  if  no  acceleration  materialises,  and  the 
implementation speed remains close to the historical 2014-2020 rates (including the one-year delay), the risk of de-
commitment would increase  exponentially. In this  extreme scenario, which excludes any significant catching up of 
the delay in the programming start, a large part of the re-programmed 2021 tranche could be effectively lost.  

Heading 3 - Common Agricultural Policy 

Nearly two thirds of the de-commitments forecast under MFF Heading 3 relate to the EAFRD. The forecast for the 
closure  of  the  2014-2022  EAFRD  programmes  continues  to  be  built  on  the  assumption  that  there  will  be 
improvement compared to the 2007-2013 period. The overall result is lower than the 2021 forecast considering the 
impact  from the  novel  lump-sum payments  for  farmers and SMEs  in  the  food-processing  sector.  The  2014-2022 
EAFRD  de-commitments  are  forecast  to  materialise  towards  2026  during  the  closure  process.  De-commitments 
against the 2023-2027 CAP Strategic Plans are not expected before their closure (i.e. towards 2029-2030), and are 
not covered by this report.  

Other programmes and headings 

For the programmes centrally managed by the Commission, the forecast of de-commitments is based on the most 
recent  project-level  information.  As  a  novel  element,  a  forecast  for  de-commitments  against  the  new  MFF 
programmes,  using  as  a  basis  the  historical  de-commitment  rates  of  the  relevant  predecessor  programmes,  is 
considered.  The  de-commitments  are  forecast  for  the  entire  period  covered  by  the  report.  The  exact  year  of  de-
commitment  would  depend  on  the  closure  process of  individual  projects  and  actions  and  cannot  be  forecast  with 
precision. 

2.4.    NextGenerationEU 

NextGenerationEU is a temporary emergency instrument for crisis response, recovery, and resilience measures. The 
non-repayable  part  of  NextGenerationEU  constitutes  external  assigned  revenue  and  is  used  to  speedily  support 
reform  priorities  and  to  reinforce  a  number  of  key  programmes  for  the  recovery.  To  present  the  impact  of 
NextGenerationEU in a transparent manner, the estimates of the expected implementation of the external assigned 
revenue are drawn separately for each programme (see Table 3). The forecast is established based on the annual 
commitment instalments provided in the financial programming accompanying the Draft Budget 2023. 

The centrepiece of NextGenerationEU is the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), which accounts for 80% of 
the  non-repayable  allocationsxx.  NextGenerationEU  outflows  are  therefore  largely  determined  by  the  pace  of 
disbursements for the RRF. The Facility has entered the implementation phase, progressing quickly according to the 
timeline of reforms and investments set by the Member States. By the end of May, 2022, 26 Member States had 

7 

 
formally submitted their recovery and resilience plansxxi. The Commission proceeded with a pre-financing payment 
of up to 13% of the financial contribution to 21 Member States that had requested it. In accordance with the RRF 
Regulation,  no  further  pre-financing  payment  can  be  made  for  any  Member  State  (after  31  December  2021). 
Disbursements  follow  the  positive  assessment  of  payment  requests  that  under  the  RRF  may  be  submitted  up  to 
twice  a  year  upon  achievement  of  the  milestones  and  targets  established  in  the  Council  Implementing  Decisions 
adopted pursuant to the RRF Regulation. The forecast of payments over 2023-2027 is based on the adopted plans, 
as assessed by the Commission, on the data reported by Member States as part of their reporting obligations, and 
on developments in the implementation of the Facility until mid-May 2022. 

REACT-EU is the second largest instrument of NextGenerationEU, representing 12% of the non-repayable support. 
It  provides  a  bridge  between  the  2014-2020  and  the  2021-2027  programming  periods  for  cohesion  policy, 
distributing additional resources in 2021 and 2022 through some of the existing cohesion policy funds. REACT-EU 
commitments  take  place  over  two  years  (2021-2022).  Interim  and  final  payments  are  concentrated  over  2022-
2024,  in  line  with  REACT-EU  objectives  to  speed  up  the  delivery  by  using  existing  programmes  and  providing  full 
flexibility  of  the  implementation  rules.  Compared  to  last  year’s  forecast,  payments  are  even  more  frontloaded  as 
Member States may  use  funding  under REACT-EU to address recent flows of  people fleeing  Ukraine following the 
Russian invasion. To enable the acceleration of the disbursement of remaining funds, the legislation was amended 
to allow forxxii an increase of the pre-financing payments and simplified cost options. Some limited closure payments 
are expected by the end of 2025. 

The other five programmesxxiii supported through NextGenerationEU take up the remaining 8% of the non-repayable 
support  allocation.  The  forecast  of  payments  considers  the  experience  with  predecessor  programmes,  taking  into 
account the shorter cycle of commitments and the focus on immediate recovery needs. The Just Transition Fund, 
which is completely new, is affected by the delays in the adoption of the MFF and programme-specific legislation. 
The  adoption  of  most  of  the  Member  States’  programmes  is  expected  towards  the  end  of  2022,  and  almost  all 
disbursements  are  projected  to  be  spread  over  2023-2026.  For  InvestEU,  the  forecast  reflects  the  expected 
provisioning schedule of the  budgetary guarantee as well as the payment forecast  for the InvestEU  Advisory  Hub 
and the InvestEU Portal. 

The forecast assumes that all NextGenerationEU resources for operational activities will be committed by the end of 
2023  and  covered  by  payments  until  the  end  of  2026,  which  are  the  time  limits  established  by  the  applicable 
legislation. Therefore, no de-commitments are estimated. 

2.5.    Evolution of the level of outstanding commitments 

The 2021-2027 period would see a historical peak of the RAL at the end of 2023, when it may exceed the level of 
EUR 458 billion.  This  is a  temporary  effect  due  to  the  implementation  of  NextGenerationEU.  Starting  in  2024,  the 
RAL  associated  to  NextGenerationEU  will  be  progressively  settled  until  the  end  of  2026  when  the  payments  on 
NextGenerationEU commitments will have to be completed. 

Considering only the RAL stemming from the MFF 2021-2027 and its predecessors, cumulatively a nominal increase 
of around EUR 55 billion (+21%) may be expected at the end of 2027 compared to the start of the reference period. 
This change in the RAL is comparable to the size of an annual commitment tranche in cohesion policy. As cohesion 
accounts for the biggest share in the stock of RAL, it is of particular relevance for its evolution. The agreement to 
maintain  an  N+3  de-commitment  rule,  in  combination  with  the  delays  in  the  new  programming  process  backload 
payments  towards  the  end  of  the  MFF  and  to  the  years  beyond  (see  point  2.1).  This  also  results  in  some 
overestimation of the RAL increase because it captures the change between a year with low RAL (at the end of 2022 
large parts of the completion acitivities will be paid but most new commitments for  cohesion policy are yet to be 
made) and a year with peak RAL (at the end of 2027 all the commitments for cohesion policy will be made but more 
than half of the payments will follow in the years to come). 

8 

 
When measured against the size of the EU economy, the RAL is actually decreasing. From the start of 2023 to the 
end of  2027,  the  RAL  (excluding  NextGenerationEU)  is  projected  to  decrease  from a  level  of  1.7%  to  1.6%  of  EU 
Gross National Income. This shows that the nominal growth of the RAL is largely outweighted by the nominal growth 
of the EU economy. 

Chart  4  –  Evolution  of  the  level  of  outstanding  commitments  (RAL)  over  2023-2027,  measured  in 
percentage of the Union’s Gross National Income 

NextGenerationEU 

MFF 

3.  Forecast of inflows of the EU budget 2023-

2027 

The  EU  budget  is  financed  by  own  resources  and  other  revenue.  In  addition,  the  Union  has  been  empowered  to 
borrow  funds  to  finance  NextGenerationEU.  The  Commission  is  mobilising  the  funds  through  operations  on 
international  capital  markets,  in  line  with  the  financing  needs  of  NextGenerationEU’s  spending  programmes  (see 
point  2.4).  To  this  end,  the  Commission  follows  a  diversified  funding  strategyxxiv  and,  as  part  of  this  strategy, 
publishes annual borrowing decisions and six-monthly funding plans. The present forecast focuses on the revenue 
necessary to finance the budget expenditure within the MFF. 

The overall amount of own resources needed to finance the budget is determined by the total expenditure less other 
revenue.  Accordingly,  the  forecast  of  the  EU  budget  revenue  for  2023-2027  is  based  on  the  principle  that 
expenditure must be matched by revenue; therefore total revenue equals total expenditure. 

Since 2021, in line with the Withdrawal Agreement (part V), the United Kingdom has contributed to the EU budget in 
relation to outstanding commitments of previous multiannual financial frameworks. This includes the RAL at the end 
of  2020,  as  well  as  pensions  and  other  liabilities  laid  down  in  the  financial  settlement.  The  United  Kingdom’s 

9 

 
 
contribution  constitutes  ‘other  revenue’  of  the  EU  budget  and  is  not  part  of  the  Union’s  own  resources.  It  will 
progressively phase-out as the outstanding commitments will be settled. 

Other  miscellaneous  elements  not  forming  part  of  the  Union’s  own  resources  are  assumed  to  remain  nominally 
constant at the level of the 2023 Draft Budget. 

The remaining financing – national contributions and customs duties – accounts for most of the revenue needed to 
balance the budget expenditure.  The revenue forecast is based on the  parameters of  the Own Resources Decision 
2020, which introduced a new own resource based on non-recycled plastic packaging waste. The projections further 
include the refined own resource based on the Value Added Tax as well as Member States’ increased retention rate 
of  customs  duties  to  cover  their  collection  costs.  They  do  not  consider  the  Commission’s  proposals  on  new  own 
resources  of  22  December  2021xxv.  This  also  applies  to  future  proposals  that  the  Commission  has  committed  to 
present in accordance with the interinstitutional agreement (IIA)xxvi. 

On average for the period 2023-2027, national contributions are projected  at EUR 146 billion per year or 0.8% of 
the EU’s Gross National Income. The spending cycle and the phasing out of the United Kingdom contribution mainly 
determine  the  development  of  national  contributions  over  the  forecast  period.  From  2025  onwards,  increasing 
expenditure resulting from the new programmes entering cruising speed and the United Kingdom contribution to the 
RAL phasing out will keep national contributions increasing steadily through 2027. 

Chart 5 - Revenue forecast for financing the MFF 2023-2027 (in EUR billion) 

Own Resources ceiling 2.00% GNI 

Own Resources ceiling 1.40% GNI 

National contributions 

Traditional own resources (net) 

Other revenue 

In any given year, the total own resources collected by the Union may not exceed the  own resources ceiling set in 
the  Own  Resources  Decisionxxvii  of  1.40%  of  Gross  National  Income  of  the  EU  Member  States,  with  an  additional 
temporary  increase  of  0.6%  of  EU  GNI  for  covering  all  liabilities  of  the  Union  from  the  borrowing  on  the  capital 
markets  to  fund  NextGenerationEU.  While  own  resources  are  projected  to  grow  steadily  until  2027,  the  available 
margin under the Own Resources celling (so called “headroom”) is expected to remain largely stable as the Union’s 
Gross  National  Income  is  expected  to  increase  gradually  over  the  reference  periodxxviii.  The  headroom  stands  on 
average at EUR 187 billion over the period, of which EUR 104 billion for the increase of NextGenerationEU.  

The  EU  budget  is  providing  for  the  payments  of  interests  on  the  funds  borrowed  and  allocated  to  non-repayable 
support  under  NextGenerationEU  since  borrowing  started  in  2021.  The  own  resources  necessary  to  finance  those 
costs are counted within the temporary increase of 0.6% of EU GNI of the Own Resources ceiling. Over 2021-2027, 

10 

 
  
a  total  of  EUR 14.7 billion  is  planned  to  finance  the  costs  of  NextGenerationEUxxix.  The  planned  costs  follow  a 
backloaded profile to reflect the progressive rollout of borrowing. At the same time, there are uncertainties related 
to the financing cost of NGEU in light of the rapid and substantial increase of interest rates on the financial markets 
since December 2021. 

4.  Conclusions 

The present forecast is  drawn  up in a context of  high uncertainty  resulting  from  the war in  Ukraine. 
The initiatives already put forward for supporting Member States and specific sectors facilitate full absorption and 
accelerated payments for ongoing programmes. External financing instruments are making more funding available 
for Ukraine and the neighbouring partner countries. Going forward, demands are expected to remain  high implying 
advanced disbursements from the relevant EU budget instruments, as reflected in the forecast.  

The MFF payment ceiling remains sufficient to cover the projected payments in each of the next five 
years thanks to the MFF mechanisms for automatic adjustment, notably the possibility to transfer  unused 
amounts towards the end of the period when needs will peak. However, the net margin over 2023-2027 is roughly 
EUR 1.3 billion. Its size will have to be closely monitored going forwards, especially to measure the potential effects 
of new policy initiatives or of further acceleration of payments for ongoing programmes. 

While  the  completion  of  ongoing  programmes  has  advanced,  the  late  adoption  of  the  legislative 
package of the 2021-2027 MFF triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic has given rise to more delays at 
the  start  of  the  MFF  and  higher  de-commitment  risks  than  previously  anticipated  for  the  majority  of  new 
programmes  in  shared  management.  This  backloads  payment  needs  to  the  remainder  of  the  MFF.  Another 
consequence  is  the  higher  risk  of  effective  loss  of  funds  in  the  later  years  of  the  programming  period  due  to 
automatic de-commitments if Member States do not deploy efforts to recuperate the initial delays, starting already 
from the first years of effective implementation. 

Thanks to NextGenerationEU’s support to investments and reforms, the EU budget will continue to be 
at  the  heart  of  the  European  post-COVID  economic  recovery  in  the  next  years,  when  the  previous  MFF 
programmes  come  to  an  end  and  before  the  new  programmes  reach  cruising  speed.  The  necessity  to  implement 
NextGenerationEU funds ahead of the deadline for disbursements by 2026 may affect Member States’ capacity to 
put additional efforts to accelerating the launch of the new programming period for funds in shared management 
under the MFF. 

NextGenerationEU will also have a temporary effect on the level of the EU outstanding commitments, 
which will peak at the end of  2023 and then gradually  will return to levels comparable with the  start of the  MFF 
period  by  the  end  of  2027.  While  the  RAL  nominally  increases  at  the  end  of  the  MFF  compared  to  2023,  when 
measured as a share of the EU Gross National Income the RAL is reduced, which shows that the nominal growth of 
the EU economy outweights the accumulation of outstanding commitments from the EU budget. 

The forecast revenue (mostly EU own resources) necessary to finance the budget will steadily grow in 
line  with  the  MFF  expenditure.  Yet,  the  size  of  the  available  margin  under  the  Own  Resources  ceiling  (the 
‘headroom’) will remain relatively stable as the increasing revenue needs match the projected nominal growth of the 
EU economy. 

11 

 
Annex I – Results of the forecast* 

*All  values  are  in  billions  of  EUR,  current  prices,  unless  otherwise  specified.  Some  totals  may  not  tally  due  to 
rounding. 

Table 1.1 – Long-term forecast of future outflows over 2023-2027 for the MFF 

Year 

2023 

2024 

2025 

2026 

2027 

Total 

Commitment Ceiling 

182.7 

184.3 

187.9 

179.7 

185.4 

919.9 

Payment Ceiling 

168.6 

168.9 

172.2 

175.7 

179.2 

864.5 

In addition, adjustment for Article 5 
MFFR (estimate for future years) 

0.0 

1.7 

1.7 

1.8 

4.2 

9.4 

Commitments (programmed)* 

185.7 

187.4 

192.2 

183.0 

191.0 

Forecast Payments* 

166.3 

158.0 

176.3 

182.8 

193.9 

Of which Special Instruments** 

3.2 

0.1 

1.2 

0.0 

0.0 

939.4 

877.3 

4.6 

12 

 
 
 
Table 1.2 – Payments in relation to the commitments of the 2021-2027 MFF 

MFF Heading 

2023 

2024 

2025 

2026 

2027 

Total 

1 Single Market, Innovation and 
Digital 

15.5 

18.2 

21.0 

22.2 

22.8 

99.8 

2 Cohesion, Resilience and Values 

11.8 

25.5 

53.3 

58.9 

76.1 

225.6 

2.1 Economic, Social and territorial 
cohesion 

5.4 

16.9 

44.0 

48.1 

63.0 

177.4 

2.2 Resilience and Values 

6.4 

8.5 

9.3 

10.8 

13.1 

48.2 

3 Natural Resources and 
Environment 

3.1 Market related expenditure and 
direct payments 

3.2 Other programmes of Natural 
Resources and Environment 

4 Migration and Border 
Management 

5 Security and Defence 

6 Neighbourhood and the World 

46.1 

56.1 

58.8 

61.0 

56.9 

278.9 

40.7 

41.6 

41.8 

41.9 

42.0 

208.1 

5.4 

14.5 

17.0 

19.1 

14.9 

70.8 

2.4 

3.8 

4.4 

4.7 

4.8 

20.1 

0.9 

9.5 

1.8 

1.9 

2.3 

2.3 

9.2 

13.0 

15.0 

15.7 

15.6 

69.0 

7 European Public Administration 

11.4 

11.8 

12.2 

12.6 

13.0 

61.0 

Special Instruments 

2.7 

1.1 

3.8 

Total 

100.3 

130.3 

167.8 

177.4 

191.6 

767.4 

13 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.3 – Payments for the completion of pre-2021 commitments 

MFF Heading 

2023 

2024 

2025 

2026 

2027 

Total 

1 Single Market, Innovation and 
Digital 

5.4 

4.1 

3.1 

1.8 

1.3 

15.6 

2 Cohesion, Resilience and Values 

44.0 

18.0 

1.3 

1.2 

0.2 

64.6 

2.1 Economic, Social and territorial 
cohesion 

43.7 

17.7 

1.2 

1.1 

0.2 

63.9 

2.2 Resilience and Values 

0.3 

3 Natural Resources and Environment 

11.4 

 3.1 Market related expenditure and direct 
payments 

0.0 

0.3 

1.0 

0.1 

0.4 

0.1 

0.4 

0.0 

0.1 

0.7 

13.3 

0.0 

 3.2 Other programmes of Natural 
Resources and Environment 

4 Migration and Border Management 

5 Security and Defence 

6 Neighbourhood and the World 

11.4 

1.0 

0.4 

0.4 

0.1 

13.3 

0.7 

0.2 

4.2 

0.5 

0.2 

3.9 

0.1 

0.2 

3.5 

0.0 

0.1 

1.9 

0.0 

0.0 

0.7 

1.3 

0.7 

14.2 

Total 

65.9 

27.7 

8.5 

5.4 

2.4 

109.8 

* The total commitments and estimated payments include appropriations stemming from Article 5 of the MFF Regulation and 
Article 15(3) of the Financial Regulation. Unallocated margins are not included.  

** The amounts for special instruments cover the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve, the European Globalisation Adjustment 
Fund, the Brexit Adjustment Reserve and the Flexibility Instrument. In the subsequent tables, the payments related to the 
mobilisations of the Flexibility Instrument are included within the respective headings.  

14 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 – Forecast de-commitments 

MFF Heading 

Completion 

MFF 

Total 

1 Single Market, Innovation and Digital 

2 Cohesion, Resilience and Values 

2.1 Economic, Social and territorial cohesion 

2.2 Resilience and Values 

3 Natural Resources and Environment 

3.2 Other programmes of Natural Resources and 
Environment 

4 Migration and Border Management 

5 Security and Defence 

6 Neighbourhood and the World 

Total 

1.5 

0.7 

0.4 

0.3 

0.8 

0.8 

0.3 

0.1 

0.1 

3.4 

1.5 

1.0 

0.4 

0.7 

0.8 

0.8 

0.5 

0.1 

0.3 

4.1 

3.0 

1.7 

0.8 

0.9 

1.5 

1.5 

0.8 

0.1 

0.4 

7.6 

15 

 
 
 
Table 3 – Long-term forecast of outflows for NextGenerationEU 

Programme 

2023 

2024 

2025 

2026 

2027 

Total 

Horizon Europe 

InvestEU Fund 

1.8 

1.2 

1.3 

1.2 

0.4 

1.0 

0.1 

1.2 

0.0 

0.0 

3.5 

4.7 

European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF) 

10.0 

3.5 

1.1 

0.0 

0.0 

14.6 

European Social Fund (ESF) 

5.5 

6.2 

2.4 

0.0 

0.0 

14.1 

European Recovery and Resilience 
Facility 

Union Civil Protection Mechanism 
(RescEU) 

European Agricultural Fund for Rural 
Development (EAFRD) 

76.4 

56.9 

38.5 

50.6 

0.0 

222.4 

0.5 

0.8 

0.2 

0.2 

0.2 

1.9 

2.4 

2.1 

1.4 

0.7 

0.0 

6.6 

Just Transition Fund 

0.2 

2.4 

4.0 

4.1 

0.0 

10.7 

Total 

98.0 

74.5 

48.9 

56.8 

0.2 

278.4 

Table 4 – Change in the total outstanding commitments from 2023 to 
2027 

Source 

RAL start-
2023* 
(estimate) 

Commitments 
2023-2027 

Payments 
2023-2027 

Decommitments 
2023-2027 

RAL end-2027 

MFF  

NGEU  

Total 

259.8 

165.4 

939.4 

113.0 

877.3 

278.4 

7.6 

314.4 

0.0 

425.1 

1052.5 

1155.6 

7.6 

314.4 

* The RAL at the start of 2022 includes EUR 3.3 billion generated from third-country contributions to specific 
programmes of the 2014-2020 MFF, which is not included in the table. 

16 

 
 
 
 
Table 5 – Long-term forecast of future inflows of the EU budget over 
2023-2027 

INFLOWS 

Own Resources ceiling in % 
of EU Gross National Income 

      of which temporary increase 
for NGEU 

Own Resources ceiling 
expressed in EUR billion* 

     of which temporary increase 
for NGEU 

Net amount of traditional own 
resources** 

National contributions*** 

a 

a’ 

b 

c 

2023 

2024 

2025 

2026 

2027 

Total  

2,00% 

2,00% 

2,00% 

2,00% 

2,00% 

n/a 

0,60% 

0,60% 

0,60% 

0,60% 

0,60% 

n/a 

326,9 

342,0 

357,0 

371,8 

386,3 

n/a 

98,1 

102,6 

107,1 

111,5 

115,9 

n/a 

21,6 

22,6 

23,6 

24,6 

25,6 

118,0 

132,6 

127,7 

148,4 

155,1 

165,5 

729,4 

Total own resources 

d =b+c 

154,2 

150,4 

172,0 

179,7 

191,2 

847,4 

     of which own resources 
related to NGEU liabilities 

Other revenue (incl. provisional 
UK contribution) 

d’ 

e 

1,0 

2,1 

2,7 

3,7 

5,0 

14,5 

12,1 

7,6 

4,3 

3,1 

2,7 

29,8 

TOTAL REVENUE 

d+e 

166,3 

158,0 

176,3 

182,8 

193,9 

877,3 

Available margin under the 
Own Resources ceiling  

     of which margin under the 
temporary increase for NGEU 

a-d 

172,7 

191,6 

185,0 

192,1 

195,1 

n/a 

a’-d’ 

97,0 

100,5 

104,4 

107,8 

110,9 

n/a 

* Own Resources ceiling - calculated on the basis of the Spring 2022 economic forecast for the Gross National Income of the 
EU27 for 2023-2027 

** Traditional own resources are estimated on the basis of 25% retention rate for collection costs.  

*** National contributions include the Gross National Income-based own resource, the reformed Value Added Tax-based own 
resource and the new own resource based on non-recycled plastic packaging waste. 

17 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i Unless otherwise specified, all amounts in the report are expressed in current prices. 

ii Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 
to 2027, OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 11. 

iii Council Regulation (EU) 2020/2094 establishing a European Union Recovery Instrument to support the recovery in 
the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis, OJ L 433I , 22.12.2020, p. 23 (‘NextGenerationEU’). 

iv COM(2021)343, 30.6.2021. 

v  Regulation  (EU,  Euratom)  2018/1046  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  18  July  2018  on  the 
financial  rules  applicable  to  the  general  budget  of  the  Union,  amending  Regulations  (EU)  No  1296/2013,  (EU)  No 
1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, 
(EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012, OJ L 193, 
30.7.2018, p. 1. 

vi COM(2022) 400 - June 2022. 

vii COM(2022) 80 final, 28.1.2022. 

viii Article 5 of the MFF Regulation provides for the additional allocation in commitment and payment appropriations 
for a pre-defined list of programmes, for an amount equivalent to the revenue from competition fines, as entered in 
the budget of the year n-1 in accordance with Article 107 of the Financial Regulation. 

ix Article 15(3) of the Financial Regulation provides that commitment appropriations corresponding to the amount of 
de-commitments made in relation to research projects may be made available again to the benefit of the research 
programme the projects belong to or its successor in the context of the budgetary procedure. 

x Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14 December 2020 on the system of own resources of the European 
Union and repealing Decision 2014/335/EU, Euratom, OJ L 424, 15.12.2020, p. 1. 

xi OJ C66 I, 19.2.2019, p.1. 

xii COM(2021)365, 7.6.2021 and COM(2022)266, 7.6.2022. 

xiii For reference, the 2021 long-term forecast expected a delay comparable to the 2014-2020 period when around 
half of the amounts due in the first year of implementation had to be postponed. 

18 

 
 
                                                        
 
 
 
 
 
 
xiv COM(2022) 231 final, 18.5.2022 

xv COM(2022) 57 final, 15.2.2022. 

xvi COM(2022) 46, 8.2.2022. 

xvii Regulation (EU) 2021/1755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 2021 establishing the 
Brexit Adjustment Reserve, OJ L 357, 8.10.2021, p. 1–26 

xviii COM(2022) 109 final, 8.3.2022. 

xix COM(2022) 242 final, 20.5.2022. 

xx Given its demand-driven delivery mechanism, no forecast is available for the loan component of the Recovery and 
Resilience Facility (similarly to other loan-based instruments implemented outside the budget). 

xxi With one Member State discussions take place on the basis of a draft plan. 

xxii Regulation (EU) 2022/613 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 April 2022 amending Regulations 
(EU)  No 1303/2013  and  (EU)  No 223/2014  as  regards  increased  pre-financing  from  REACT-EU  resources  and  the 
establishment of a unit cost, OJ L 115, 13.4.2022, p. 38–41. 

xxiii Just Transition Fund, European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, Horizon Europe, InvestEU fund and the 
Union Civil Protection Mechanism (RescEU) 

xxiv COM(2021) 250 final, 14.4.2021. 

xxv COM(2021) 570 final, 22.12.2021. 

xxvi  Annex  II,  part  B  of  the  Interinstitutional  Agreement  between  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council  of  the 
European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on 
sound  financial  management, as  well  as  on  new  own  resources, including  a  roadmap  towards  the  introduction  of 
new  own  resources  Interinstitutional  Agreement  of  16  December  2020  between  the  European  Parliament,  the 
Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary 
matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the 
introduction of new own resources, OJ L 433I , 22.12.2020, p. 28–46. 

xxvii Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14 December 2020, OJ L 424/1, 15.12.2020 

19 

 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
 
 
 
 
 
xxviii  European  Commission,  European  Economic  Forecast  Spring  2022:  European  Economic  Forecast.  Spring  2022  | 
European  Commission 
(https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/european-economic-forecast-spring-
2022_en)  

(europa.eu), 

xxix  Without  prejudice  to  introducing  new  own  resources  with  a  view  to  covering  NextGenerationEU  repayment  and 
interest costs. 

20