EU initial response to the Covid-19 crisis in partner countries and regions. Volume I, Main report.
Date: 2022-06-13
Institutions: Directorate-General for International Partnerships
Subjects: Afghanistan, Caribbean Islands, Congo, EU financial instrument, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Honduras, Kenya, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar/Burma, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen, aid evaluation, aid to refugees, coronavirus disease, crisis management, data processing, emergency aid, employment service, foreign policy, health policy, humanitarian aid, impact study, macro-financial assistance, the EU's international role, water management

FAST-TRACK ASSESSMENT 

EU INITIAL RESPONSE TO THE COVID-19 
CRISIS IN PARTNER COUNTRIES AND REGIONS 

Volume I – Main report 

January 2022 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepared by: 

Consortium of ADE, PEMconsult A/S and IRAM  

Consortium leader: ADE s.a  

Rue de Clairvaux 40, Box 101 

1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium) 

+32 10 45 45 10 

ade@ade.eu  

www.ade.eu  

Framework Contract EuropeAid/140122/DH/SER/multi (EVA 2020) 

Contract No 2020/300010133 

Contract title: Fast-track assessment of the EU initial response to the COVID-19 crisis in partner countries 

and regions  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Contact information: 

European Commission 
Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) 
Directorate D - Sustainable Development Policy and Coordination 
Unit D.4 - Performance, Results and Evaluation; Internal Communication, Knowledge Management and Collaborative 
Methods 
Email: INTPA-EVALUATIONS@ec.europa.eu  
B-1049 Brussels, Belgium 

EU International Partnerships: 
https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/our-impact/monitoring-and-evaluation_en 

 
 
 
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FAST-TRACK ASSESSMENT OF THE EU’S INITIAL RESPONSE TO THE COVID-19 CRISIS IN PARTNER COUNTRIES AND REGIONS 

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Evaluation of EU initial response to the COVID-19 crisis in partner countries and regions  

CONTENTS 

Acronyms 

Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................................................................ i 

1.  Purpose and scope of the assessment ........................................................................................................................... 1 

2.  Methodology .................................................................................................................................................................................. 1 

2.1  Overall methodological approach ............................................................................................................................... 1 

2.2  Data collection and analysis tools .............................................................................................................................. 2 

2.3  Limitations ............................................................................................................................................................................... 4 

3.  Key contextual elements ........................................................................................................................................................ 6 

3.1 

Impact of COVID-19 in the 17 countries and regions ..................................................................................... 6 

3.2  The Global EU response to COVID-19 in partner countries and the Team Europe approach ... 8 

3.3 

Inventory of the European Commission’s response to COVID-19 in the 17 countries and 
regions ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 9 

4.  EQ 1 - A response relevant for the COVID-19 crisis ............................................................................................ 14 

5.  EQ 2 – Increased coordination and coherence during the EC initial COVID-19 response .............. 21 

6.  EQ 3 – Flexible adaptation to COVID-19 requirements ..................................................................................... 33 

7.  EQ4 – Mitigation of effects of the pandemic .......................................................................................................... 40 

8.  Conclusions, Lessons Learnt and Recommendations .......................................................................................... 51 

8.1  Overall assessment ......................................................................................................................................................... 51 

8.2  Conclusions ........................................................................................................................................................................... 52 

8.3  Lessons Learnt ................................................................................................................................................................... 57 

8.4  Recommendations ............................................................................................................................................................ 59 

Appendix - Country / regional notes 

Country note - Afghanistan 

Country note - Ecuador 

Country note - Ethiopia 

Country note - Montenegro 

Country note - Senegal 

Country note - Turkey 

Regional note - Caribbean 

Country note - Fiji-Pacific 

Country note - Kenya 

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Country note - Sierra Leone 

Country note - Ukraine 

Country note - Yemen 

Country note – Democratic Republic of Congo 

Country note - Honduras 

Country note - Morocco 

Country note - Myanmar 

Country note - South Africa 

List of Tables 

Table 1:  Overview of evaluation criteria and evaluation questions........................................................................ 2 

Table 2:  Differentiation of the intensity of data collection and analysis across countries. ...................... 2 

Table 3:  Limitations for the evaluation and mitigation measures taken. ........................................................... 4 

Table 4:  Stakeholder agreement on Team Europe contribution to effectiveness of EU COVID-19 

response ............................................................................................................................................................................. 28 

Table 5:  Accountability in the management of COVID-19 emergency fiscal policy packages............. 47 

List of Figures 

Figure 1:  EU paid amounts for the COVID-19 response in 2020 by case study country/region........... 10 

Figure 2:  EU paid amounts for the COVID-19 response by Team Europe priorities in the 17 case 

study countries and regions .................................................................................................................................... 11 

Figure 3:  Distribution of EU paid amounts for the COVID-19 response by aid modality in the 17 

case study countries and regions ......................................................................................................................... 12 

Figure 4:  EU paid amounts for the COVID-19 response by aid modality in the 17 countries and 

regions ................................................................................................................................................................................. 13 

Figure 5:  EU paid amounts for the COVID-19 response by implementing partner in the 17 case 

study countries and regions .................................................................................................................................... 13 

Figure 6:  Size of COVID-19 response as percentage of average annual national EU payments 

(country) for 2014 - 2019 ....................................................................................................................................... 19 

Figure 7:  Visibility of EU COVID-response in partner countries ............................................................................... 23 

Figure 8:  Team Europe contribution to visibility of EU COVID-19 response ..................................................... 24 

Figure 9:  Contribution of Team Europe to coordination and coherence of EU COVID-19 response ... 25 

Figure 10: Contribution of Team Europe on EU-COVID response effectiveness (perceptions) .............. 27 

Figure 11: Satisfaction with the results of the EU COVID-19 response (as of May - June 2021) ...... 41 

List of Boxes 

Box 1:   Overview of the EU macro-economic support and debt service relief as part of the COVID-

19 response .......................................................................................................................................................................... 16 

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Box 2:   South Africa - combining smaller EU aid contributions under the Team Europe brand to 

raise their visibility ........................................................................................................................................................... 24 

Box 3:   Senegal – Using the Team Europe approach to facilitate coordination and joint action 

around budget support .................................................................................................................................................. 26 

Box 4:   Multi-dimensional crises and policy agendas and their effect on the adoption of the Team 

Europe approach ................................................................................................................................................................ 30 

Box 5:   Existing coordination mechanisms and their effect on the early Team Europe approach...... 31 

List of annexes in volume II 

Annex 1: Terms of Reference 

Annex 2: EU response to COVID-19 

Annex 3: Methodology: Additional Information 

Annex 4: Survey Results 

Annex 5: List of People Interviewed 

Annex 6: Bibliography 

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ACRONYMS 

AAP 

ACP 

AFD 

AfDB 

ARTF 

BOAD 

BS 

BSSC 

CCRT 

Annual Action Programme 

African Caribbean Pacific 

French Agency for Development Cooperation 

African Development Bank 

Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund 

West African Development Bank 

Budget Support 

Budget Support Steering Committee 

Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust 

COVAX 

COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access 

CRIS 

CSO 

DCI 

DG ECHO 

DG INTPA 

DG NEAR 

DRC 

EBRD 

EC 

ECDC 

EIB 

EDF 

ENI 

EQ 

ESSN 

EU 

EU MS 

EUTF 

GDP 

HDP 

HI 

Cross-Regional Information System 

Civil Society Organisation 

Development Cooperation Instrument 

Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations 

Directorate-General for International Partnership 

Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations 

Democratic Republic of Congo 

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 

European Commission 

European Centre for Disease Control 

European Investment Bank 

European Development Fund 

European Neighbourhood Instrument 

Evaluation Question 

Emergency Social Safety Net 

European Union 

EU Member States 

EU Trust Fund 

Gross Domestic Product 

Humanitarian Development Peace 

High-Intensity 

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HIP 

HOPE 

HQ 

HTSP 

IBP 

IDB 

IFI 

IGAD 

IMF 

IHR 

IP 

IPA 

IPC 

ISG 

JC 

JICA 

JIMT 

LI 

LIC 

MDTF 

M&E 

MI 

MFA 

MFF 

NGO 

OECS 

PAHO 

PCR 

PFM 

PHC 

PIC 

PPE 

PRES 

Humanitarian Implementation Plan 

Humanitarian Operations 

Headquarter 

Healthy Timing and Spacing of Pregnancy 

International Budget Partnership 

Interamerican Development Bank 

International Financial Institution 

Intergovernmental Authority on Development 

International Monetary Fund 

International Health Regulation 

Implementing Partner 

Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance 

Infection, Prevention and Control 

Interservice Group 

Judgment Criterion 

Japan International Cooperation Agency 

Joint Incident Management Team 

Low-Intensity 

Low Income Country 

Multi-donor Trust Fund 

Monitoring and Evaluation 

Medium-Intensity 

Macro-Financial Assistance 

Multiannual Financial Framework 

Non-governmental Organisation 

Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States 

Pan American Health Organisation 

Polymerase Chain Reaction 

Public Financial Management 

Primary Health Care 

Pacific Island Country 

Personal Protective Equipment 

Programme de Résilience Économique et Sociale (of Senegal) 

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ACRONYMS 

 
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RCCE 

RHCN 

SDG 

SDR 

SME 

SPC 

SRBC 

SRPC 

TA 

TF 

TRY 

UN 

UNDP 

USD 

WASH 

WB 

WHO 

Risk Communication and Community Engagement 

Regional Health Communication Network 

Sustainable Development Goals 

Special Drawing Rights 

Small and Medium Enterprise 

Pacific Community 

State and Resilience Building Contract 

Sector Reform Performance Contract 

Technical Assistance 

Trust Fund 

Turkish Lira 

United Nations 

United Nations Development Programme 

US Dollar 

Water, Sanitation and Hygiene 

World Bank 

World Health Organisation 

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THE  EUROPEAN  UNION  SUPPORT  TO  PARTNER 
COUNTRIES AND REGIONS DURING THE FIRST YEAR OF 
THE  COVID-19 
FAST-TRACK 
ASSESSMENT  TO  TAKE  STOCK,  LEARN  AND  LOOK 
AHEAD. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

PANDEMIC 

–  A 

INTRODUCTION  

Early  in  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  the  EU  committed  to  help  its  partner  countries  deal  with  the 
immediate effects of the pandemic during 2020, the first year of the crisis. The EU and its Member 
States envisioned a cooperative, joint approach for this initiative, called “Team Europe”1. This fast-
track assessment is a stocktaking, lesson-learning and forward-looking exercise examining this initial 
EU response to the COVID-19 crisis (the “EU COVID-19 response”), and the added value of the Team 
Europe approach. It examines the support the EU provided to 15 countries and two regions in different 
parts  of the  world2.  These countries  and  regions  represent  a  varied  set  of  circumstances,  both in 
relation to their pre-COVID-19 socio-economic and political situation and with regard to their COVID-
19 related challenges and national responses.  

The assessment focuses on the EU assistance managed by the European Commission. To reflect the 
essence  of  the  Team  Europe  approach,  it  also  considers  its  coherence  and  complementarity  with 
other  Team  Europe  actors,  that  is,  the  EU  Member  States,  European  Investment  Bank,  and  the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The timeframe of the assessment runs from 
the outbreak of the COVID-19 crisis to the end of December 2020. However, the assessment also 
includes activities still ongoing in 2021 if these had started in 2020. 

THE EU COVID-19 RESPONSE AND THE TEAM EUROPE APPROACH  

In 2020, the total EU (Commission-managed) commitments to respond to the COVID-19 crisis in the 
15 countries and two regions amounted to EUR 3 662 million. This included EUR 1 260 million of 
exceptional  macro-financial  assistance  (MFA)  for  Montenegro  and  Ukraine.  The  total  contracted 
amount in 2020 was EUR 2 171 million.  

Team Europe COVID-19 response packages for partner countries and regions combined money from 
various  EU  external  funding  instruments  managed  by  different  EC  services.  The  Team  Europe 
approach  was  meant  to  facilitate  greater  coordination  and  scale-up  of  resources  across  the 
Commission  as  well  as  coherence  with  EU  Member  States  and  European  Development  Finance 
Institutions, building on the spirit of “Working Better Together”3. The Team Europe approach and the 
COVID-19  response  were  presented  and  endorsed  in  a  Joint  Communication  (April  2020)4  and  in 

1  

“Team  Europe”  consists  of the  EU  and  its  Member  States,  including  national  development  banks  and  implementing 
agencies, as well as the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
2   Afghanistan,  the  Caribbean  region,  the  Democratic  Republic  of  Congo  (DRC),  Ecuador,  Ethiopia,  Fiji  and  the  Pacific, 
Honduras, Kenya, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Turkey, Ukraine, and Yemen. 

3   https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/working-better-together. 
4   Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions – Communication on the Global EU Response to COVID-19; JOIN (2020) 11 final, Brussels, 
8.4.2020. 

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Council  Conclusions  (June  2020)5,  and  reaffirmed  in  a  further  set  of  Council  Conclusions  (April 
2021).6. 

The EU response focused on three main Team Europe priorities: (i) socio-economic support, receiving 
68 % of the paid amount; (ii) health, water, and sanitation with 20 %; and (iii) emergency assistance, 
representing  12%  of  the  overall  envelope.  Some  46%  of  the  support  was  paid  through  budget 
support, 29% through macro-financial assistance, and 14% through project modality. Humanitarian 
interventions represented 10% of total paid amount, while blending constituted only 1%. Resources 
were also channelled through specific financing mechanisms such as the EU Trust Fund for Africa or 
the Facility for Refugees in Turkey. 

METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS 

This  assessment  followed  the  methodological  guidelines  for  strategic  evaluations  of  DG  INTPA, 
centring on the intervention logic of the EU response and on a concise evaluation matrix structured 
around four evaluation questions. Data collection in the 17 countries and regions occurred remotely, 
at three different levels of intensity. Six in-depth case studies provided a contextualised picture of 
the COVID-19 response, based on document and data review, key informant interviews, and focus 
groups.  These  were  followed  by  11  more  narrow  case  studies  to  increase  the  robustness  of  the 
findings. A financial inventory of the COVID-19 response was carried out for all 17 case studies. Data 
collection also included a cross-cutting analysis of 30 budget support (BS) programmes. Finally, an 
online  survey  was  sent  to  key  stakeholders  in  all  17  countries  and  regions,  and  to  selected 
headquarters-level stakeholders in the European Commission and from EU Member States. 

The  assessment  was  carried  out  on  a  tight  timeline,  but  nonetheless  covered  a  diverse  set  of 
interventions  and  aid  modalities  which  necessitated  collecting  and  validating  information  at 
headquarters,  at  regional  level  and  in-country  from  different  EC  services,  EU  Member  States,  EU 
partner  governments,  a  wide  range  of  implementing  partners,  non-EU  donors,  and  civil  society 
organisations.  The  assessment  was  conducted  in  the  months  immediately  after  the  end  of  the 
evaluation period, making it unlikely that any long-term effects from the support could be observed, 
including results that would take more time to materialise. Limited standardisation of reporting on 
the  COVID-19  response  at  country  level,  resulting  challenges  with  data  quality  and  the 
discontinuation  of  INTPA’s  COVID-19  tracker  for the  COVID-19  response  meant  that the  financial 
inventory could be put together only for the group of 17 case study countries and regions, not for 
areas outside of the scope of this assessment. This limited the ability to gain a broader, more global 
view of the scale and scope of the EU pandemic response. Finally, the inability to travel during the 
pandemic added to the challenge of limited availability of secondary data on the COVID-19 response 
and its possible results. Findings of this assessment are therefore preliminary, as the situation related 
to the global pandemic continues to evolve. 

5   Council Conclusions on Team Europe Global Response to COVID-19, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 8.6.2020. 
6   Council Conclusions on Team Europe, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 23.4.2021. 

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MAIN CONCLUSIONS OF THE FAST-TRACK ASSESSMENT 

EU RESPONSE TO COVID-19 WAS FLEXIBLE, APPROPRIATE AND NEEDED IN PARTNER COUNTRIES 
AND REGIONS (C1) 

The EU put together COVID-19 support packages that responded to some of the most acute needs 
in partner countries in the first year of the COVID-19 crisis. Through considerable investment of time 
and  energy  by  EC  staff  (including  EU  Delegations),  the  EU  was  able  to  flexibly  adapt  existing 
interventions and create some new ones. It also managed to form several helpful partnerships and 
otherwise  coordinate  with,  among  others,  EU  Member  States,  the  World  Health  Organisation,  and 
other UN organisations, to deliver the assistance in ways that were relevant and timely. As foreseen, 
the  assistance  covered  emergency  assistance,  health,  water  and  sanitation,  and  socio-economic 
support - the three priority areas that the EU and its Member States had highlighted in their strategic 
documents.  By  and  large,  EC  services  in  charge  of  development  cooperation,  neighbourhood  and 
enlargement, and humanitarian assistance made appropriate and flexible use of the full range of aid 
modalities they had at their disposal to put together the support packages for partner countries. 

GOOD RESPONSE TO EU BUDGET PRESSURES, ALBEIT WITH CERTAIN DOWNSIDES (C2) 

The EU managed to provide this support even though it found itself in the last year of the EU multi-
annual budget, also called the 2014 – 2020 Multiannual Financial Framework, when the pandemic 
started. Most of this multi-year budget had already been committed at that time. Faced with this 
challenge, the EU successfully found ways for money previously allocated to projects or programmes 
in its partner countries, but not yet used, to be reallocated to the COVID-19 response. 

This otherwise flexible approach had one downside: it did not tie the size of the support packages to 
the scale of the needs in the different countries, or their absorption capacity in times of crisis. The 
resulting packages were in fact quite uneven in size when compared to the scale of EU support in the 
years  before  the  start  of  the  pandemic.  Concretely,  this  meant  that  several  of  the  low-income 
countries, including the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Yemen and Afghanistan, received far 
less funding in COVID-19 support in 2020 than they had received in general support in the years 
immediately before the pandemic. Several middle-income countries, on the other hand, received far 
more funding. This included among others Montenegro, Senegal, and Ukraine. 

RELEVANT LARGE-SCALE MOBILISATION OF BUDGET SUPPORT AND MACRO-FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 
(C3) 

The pandemic severely affected the economies of the 17 partner countries and regions included in 
this  assessment.  This  also  led  to  a  sudden  slump  of  revenues  for  their  governments,  while  their 
expenditures  for  responding  to  the  COVID-19  crisis  increased.  The  EU  therefore  appropriately 
mobilised  around  three  quarters  of  the  EUR  3  668  million  through  budget  support  and  macro-
financial assistance to support the pandemic response in 13 countries. The size of the budget support 
payments made to the treasury account of the partner countries ranged from modest to significant 
in  relation  to  total  public  revenues.  In  all  cases,  the  payments  provided  liquidity  to  partner 
governments and shored up macro-economic stability at a time when it was needed most to finance 
and implement national COVID-19 response packages and help the population deal with the social 
and economic effects of the crisis. In several countries, including Ethiopia, Montenegro, South Africa, 
Senegal and Ukraine, these government packages, supported by the EU, helped cushion the shock of 
the  pandemic  on  private  companies  and  the  population.  Budget  support  and  macro-financial 
assistance  also  provided  a  platform  for  policy  dialogue,  particularly  to  follow  progress  in  the 
execution of the government-led COVID-19 response plans. 

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Ensuring  proper  accountability  and  transparency  in  the  management  of  COVID-19  spending  by 
partner  governments  under  the  conditions  of  the  COVID-19  crisis  was  a  challenge  for  the  EU.  It 
followed-up on these issues more strongly in some countries than in others. 

EU-FINANCED  PROJECTS  PROVIDED  SUPPLIES,  EQUIPMENT  AND  SERVICES  FOR  HEALTH,  SOCIAL 
PROTECTION AND EMPLOYMENT FOR VULNERABLE GROUPS (C57) 

The EU committed about one quarter of its financial support to allow a diverse range of humanitarian 
and development cooperation programmes and projects to make available supplies, equipment and 
services that were much needed for the initial pandemic response in the 17 countries and regions. 
These included personal protective equipment (PPEs), ventilators, COVID-19 test kits and laboratory 
equipment,  water  and  sanitation  solutions,  and  other  products  and  services  required  for  proper 
medical care and hygiene. In many countries, support went to groups that were particularly vulnerable 
to the effects of the pandemic but were not eligible or otherwise could not receive social protection 
services. Those groups included, for example, Syrian refugees in Turkey and refugees and internally 
displaced  people  in  Afghanistan,  the  DRC  and  Yemen.  EU  projects  and  programmes  also  directly 
supported small and medium enterprises in their attempts to weather the economic effects of the 
global health crisis. 

EU RESPONSE AIMED AT IMMEDIATE COVID-19 CRISIS, LESS AT LONG-TERM CRISIS RESILIENCE 
OR THE NEXUS (C4, C6) 

Working to advance key structural reforms (such as in PFM, economic governance, social protection, 
labour market or the health sector) was a challenge when so many other acute and urgent needs 
needed to be addressed simultaneously. In practice, the EU emphasised supporting the response to 
the immediate COVID-19 crisis over the development of longer-term resilience to future crises.  

This pattern applied across sectors and aid modalities. In the health sector, the EU had planned to 
build up the capacities of national health systems, such as in Ukraine and Montenegro. Ultimately, 
however, these plans took a backseat to providing health systems with resources to deal with the 
more immediate pressure from high rates of COVID-19 infections in the second half of 2020. The 
strengthening of national systems for greater resilience to future crises is also at the heart of budget 
support and macro-financial assistance. However, for budget support, most payments were made in 
2020. This helped finance the immediate national COVID-19 responses but left open how countries 
would finance their response in the years to come. Additionally, to speed up the disbursements, the 
EU voided indicators for variable tranches of several budget support programmes. These indicators 
were intended to encourage governments to undertake longer-term reforms such as better managing 
their budget resources. In a de-facto trade-off between short- and longer-term priorities, this choice 
reduced the effects these programmes could have had on the follow-up of national reform agendas. 

POLITICAL  COMMITMENT  TO  TEAM  EUROPE  MOTIVATED  SEVERAL  JOINT  COVID-19  RESPONSES 
(C7) 

Amid a general sense of urgency to act, the EU and its Member States  committed themselves in 
Council Conclusions  of  June  2020 to  jointly  help  partner  countries  respond to  the  pandemic.  This 
high-level political commitment to Team Europe motivated EC services, EU Member States, and the 
EIB and EBRD in several countries to seek out opportunities to offer better-coordinated support to 
the challenges of the pandemic, often building on existing mechanisms for cooperation. In places like 
South Africa, Senegal or Ukraine, the EU and its Member States presented their support under the 
common banner of Team Europe and thereby increased EU visibility. In Senegal and several other 

7   Presented out of order in the interest of the flow of the text. 

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countries, interest in collaborating met with opportunities to work together. In Senegal, for example, 
this led to a joint support combining money from the EU, Germany, and several other multilateral 
and  bilateral  actors  which  helped  to  finance  Senegal’s  national  COVID  response  Programme  de 
Résilience  Economique  et  Sociale  (PRES).  In  this  and  several  other  cases,  closer  alignment  of 
objectives, efficient policy dialogue and pooling of resources may have led to greater effectiveness 
of EU support. The EU and its Member States reaffirmed their commitment to the Team Europe in 
April 2021 in a second set of Council Conclusions. 

EARLY “TEAM EUROPE” NOT YET SUITED FOR ALL CONTEXTS (C8) 

In its first application, the Team Europe approach was not yet equally suited for all  the different 
contexts the EU encountered in its pandemic response. In particular in countries where the EU faced 
more complex and multi-dimensional policy agendas or was responding to complex and protracted 
crises, EC staff and EU Member States did not see how the approach would help them to increase 
their cooperation beyond current levels. Cooperation mechanisms like the Multi-Donor Trust Funds in 
Afghanistan or the EU accession framework for Montenegro that had been created well before the 
onset of the COVID-19 crisis and had been well-established through years of cooperation did not 
offer much space either to further enhance collaboration between the EU and its Member States or 
to launch communication or messaging campaigns under the Team Europe banner. This was even 
more so the case when the existing structures included not only European donors, but also donors 
external to the EU.  

In addition, EC staff, EU Member States and other relevant stakeholders were not yet fully familiar 
with the Team Europe approach. Guidance that EU headquarters had sent out remained incomplete 
and did not offer concrete solutions to address more systemic, organisational bottlenecks that had 
impeded  cooperation  between  the  EU  and  its  Member  States  in  the  past,  such  as  incompatible 
procedures, incompatible financial cycles, or differing political interests. 

LESSONS FROM THE ASSESSMENT  

Lesson #1  

Budget support can be powerful to 
support partner governments facing 
a rapid onset crisis in quickly 
providing funds to frontline public 

services. 

It is always necessary to have 
appropriate mechanisms in place to 
ensure accountability and 
transparency of partner 
governments’ operations, even in 
crisis response situations 

Lesson #2 

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Lesson #3  

Procedures for blending and 
guarantees are too lengthy to 
provide a suitable aid modality for 
putting together and deploying a 
crisis response in a short timeframe.

Lesson #4 

The Commission lacked a fast and flexible 
way to mobilise funding for rapid, nexus-
type interventions in response to newly 
emerging crises and emergencies that 
could complement humanitarian operations 
and link them to new or existing 
development interventions 

Lesson #5  

The usefulness of the Team Europe 
approach for improving the geo-political 
standing of the EU hinges on rallying 
support for the approach in other thematic 
areas within development and international 
relations and maintaining it once the sense 
of crisis linked to COVID-19 has subsided.

Lesson #6 

Putting the Nexus into practice 
internally within the EC as part of 
crisis responses requires continued 
attention to the division of labour and 
coordination between the Commission 
development, foreign policy, and civil 
protection and humanitarian services.

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RECOMMENDATIONS 

Recommendation 1: Continue to support the COVID-19 response in partner countries throughout 
2021 and beyond as necessary, adjusting the scope to reflect the evolving situation in countries, 
taking  into  account  the  additional  resources  from  the  new  2021  –  2027  Multi-year  Financial 
Framework, and aligning the scale of support to the magnitude of needs in the different countries 
and regions. 

……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 

Recommendation  2:  Create  a  financial  reserve  or  contingency  fund  that  can  be  used  to 
complement the use of existing funds for crisis response, to narrow funding gaps, and to even out 
the  allocation  of  funds  across  countries,  making  it  more  commensurate  with  the  respective 
magnitude of needs. The introduction of the ‘emerging challenges and priorities cushion’ under 
NDICI-Global Europe (article 6.3) foresees such a reserve. 

……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 

Recommendation  3:  Develop  guidelines  on  using  the  modalities  available  under  the  NDICI, 
including in particular the Rapid Response Actions, to design and implement ad-hoc, timely and 
adaptable  crisis  response  interventions  for  the  continued  EU  support  to  the  global  COVID-19 
response,  also  in  view  of  their  potential  for  helping  to  link  relevant  EU  civil  protection  and 
humanitarian aid interventions, development and foreign policy actions. 

……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 

Recommendation 4: Continue providing macro-economic support as necessary, in light of the 
current fiscal strains faced by partner governments, after careful review of the general eligibility 
criteria  and  assessment  of  the  risks.  Favour  the  use  of  budget  support  and  macro-financial 
assistance especially when it is possible to generate significant fiscal space. Maximise the use of 
policy dialogue to inform and monitor the implementation of partner country crisis response plans. 

……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 

Recommendation 5: Pursue support to medium- to longer-term fiscal and public expenditure 
reforms aimed at increasing domestic revenue mobilisation and at promoting debt sustainability, 
both during crisis response and post-crisis. 

……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 

Recommendation 6: Build on the lessons from the EU response and the national responses to 
COVID-19 to help partner countries in developing their capacities for the vertical and horizontal 
expansion of social protection systems in EU partner countries to increase crisis preparedness and 
resilience and support vulnerable populations. 

……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 

Recommendation 7: Further cooperate with partner governments so they become more open 
and accountable in their present and future crisis policy response and crisis spending. 

……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 

Recommendation 8: Use experiences from the COVID-19 response and the initial experiences 
with  the  Team  Europe  Initiatives  to  sharpen  the  conceptual  framework  and  build  on 
comprehensive  Team  Europe  Intervention  Logic  to  design  and  implement  a  Team  Europe 
Approach.  This  should  also  include  an  analysis  of  the  political  economy  of  the  Team  Europe 
approach.  Based  on  this,  expand  on  the  operational  guidance  and  communication  materials 
promoting the approach internally and externally. 

……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 

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1.  PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE ASSESSMENT 

The  European  Commission’s  Directorate-General  for  International  Partnerships  (DG  INTPA) 
commissioned ADE to carry out a fast-track assessment of the EU’s initial response to the 
COVID-19 crisis in partner countries and regions. This assessment aimed at collecting early 
evidence and providing an independent assessment of the EU’s response to the COVID-19 crisis in 
support of partner countries and regions. It additionally sought, to the extent possible, to be a stock-
taking, lesson-learning and forward-looking exercise on the Team Europe approach in the medium 
and longer term beyond the immediate response to the COVID-19 pandemic. 

The assessment primarily focused on the assistance provided by the European Commission (EC). It 
also integrated the support provided by other European actors (EU Member States (EU MS), European 
Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)) where 
relevant. 

The geographical scope covered 15 partner countries (Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), Ecuador, Ethiopia, Honduras, Kenya, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
South Africa, Turkey, Ukraine, and Yemen) and two regions (Caribbean, Fiji-Pacific). 

The  temporal  scope  considered  all  EU  (Commission-managed)  commitments  and  disbursements 
undertaken from the outbreak of the COVID-19 crisis in early 2020 until the end of December 2020. 
The evaluation also considered as part of the COVID-19 response the commitments and payments 
which had been made before the outbreak of the  crisis, but which were re-directed to tackle  the 
pandemic.  In  order  to  collect  enough  evidence  in  particular  on  the  initial  effects  reached,  the 
assessment also included activities which had started in 2020 and were still under way in 2021.  

2.  METHODOLOGY 

2.1  Overall methodological approach 

The methodology for this assessment followed DG INTPA’s methodological guidelines and ADE’s 
good  practices  for  strategic  evaluations,  while  taking  account  of  the  fast-track  nature  of  this 
assessment. It built around two centrepieces:  

•  The intervention logic of the Team Europe approach to COVID-19, both globally and at 
country/regional  level  (Section  4.2,  Terms  of  Reference,  Appendix),8  which  provided  a 
reference against which the EU’s response was evaluated.  

•  A concise evaluation matrix, around which data collection and analysis were structured. It 
covered the relevance of the response to the pandemic (EQ1); the quality of coordination 
with other actors, as well as the  visibility and  added value of the  Team Europe approach 
(EQ2);  the  efficiency  of  the  response  (EQ3);  and  the  preliminary  effects  of  the  support 
delivered  (EQ4).  Table  1  provides  an  overview  of  the  evaluation  criteria  and  evaluation 
questions; the full version of the evaluation matrix is included in Annex 3.2.1. 

8   The country/regional specific intervention logics in Appendix have been validated by the corresponding EU Delegations. 

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Table 1: Overview of evaluation criteria and evaluation questions. 

Evaluation Questions (EQs) 

EQ1: To what extent did the EU response address the needs and priorities of partner countries and 
regions, in line with the three priorities of the Team Europe approach (in the short- and long-term)? 

EQ2: Did the Team Europe initial response add benefits to what would have resulted from actions taken 
by EU institutions and EU MS on their own? 

EQ3: To what extent were, and are, various tools, aid modalities and their combinations efficient, flexible, 
and appropriate in view of promoting effective interventions? 

EQ4: Was the EU response successful in progressing towards results? 

A multi-level, staggered approach for data collection and analysis was used centred on 17 
case studies (countries and regions) (Table 2). Three different levels of data collection intensity were 
distinguished  to  adequately  cover  the  wide  thematic  and  geographic  scope  despite  the  short 
timeframe.  Each  case  study  country  was  assigned an  intensity  level,  based  on  a  multiple-criteria 
decision-making approach (Annex 3.2.2). In addition, data collection at the three levels was staggered 
over time to enable the use of earlier insights to direct the analytical focus in later phases. Data were 
first  collected  for  high-intensity  (HI)  countries,  to  provide  an  in-depth,  contextualised  and 
evidence-based understanding, while simultaneously highlighting areas of interest for further inquiry. 
These  areas  were  subsequently  pursued  in  medium-intensity  (MI)  and  low-intensity  (LI) 
countries. This increased the robustness of evidence and emerging findings through triangulation. 

Table 2: Differentiation of the intensity of data collection and analysis across countries. 
Data collection tools (in consecutive order, from left to right) 

Intensity 
level of 
inquiry 

 Countries / Regions 

High 
intensity  

Afghanistan, Ecuador, 
Ethiopia, Montenegro, 
Senegal, Turkey 

Medium 
intensity 

Fiji (Pacific region), Kenya, 
Caribbean region, Sierra 
Leone, Ukraine, Yemen 

Low 
intensity 

DRC, Honduras, Morocco, 
Myanmar, South Africa 

Inventory 
compilation 

Document & 
Data review 

Number of 
individual 
interventions 
reviewed 

Number of 
interviews and 
focus group 
discussions 

Stakeholder 
survey 

✓ 

✓ 

✓ 

Extensive 

3-6 

7-14 

Moderate 

2-3 

Selective 

0 

5-8 

1-4 

✓ 

✓ 

✓ 

The  assessment  ran  from  December  2020  to  September  2021  and  followed  a  well-defined 
sequential approach across three phases (inception, interim, reporting). A detailed overview of the 
activities and deliverables by phase can be found in Annex 3.1. 

2.2  Data collection and analysis tools 

A  common  set  of  consecutive  data  collection  and  analysis  tools  was  used  across  the  case  study 
countries  and  regions.  A  concise  overview  is  provided  below,  while  additional  information  can  be 
found in Annex 3. 

Firstly, the team compiled an inventory of the Commission response deployed in the 17 case 
study  countries/regions  (Annex  2).  The  inventory  contained  an  exhaustive  list  of  COVID-19 
interventions for each country/region along with their key characteristics (managing DG, Team Europe 

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priority area, aid modality, financial volume, implementing partner and so on). It built initially on the 
COVID-19 tracker developed by DG INTPA and on the information provided by DG ECHO and FPI, as 
well  as  complementary  databases (CRIS,  HOPE).  It  was  subsequently  updated and  complemented 
with  information  from  the  country-level  Team  Europe  COVID-19  response  fiches,  including  for 
interventions managed by DG NEAR and DG ECFIN, as well as additional information from the EU 
Delegations. A detailed methodology of the inventory can be found in Annex 2.1. The inventory was 
instrumental  in  providing  an  overview  of  the  priority  areas  targeted  and  aid  modalities  used  at 
country/regional  level.  Findings  and  lessons  could  then  be  validated  within  and  across  similar  (or 
“comparable”) country packages. The inventory was also used to assign intensity levels for the review 
conducted for the case study countries (Annex 3.2.2).  

Next, documents and data were reviewed for all 17 case study countries/regions (Annex 3.2.3), 
albeit at different intensity levels (Table 2). This included a review of the in-country Team Europe 
response as a whole, and of a selection of individual interventions for HI and MI countries (Table 2). 
The  evaluation  team  selected  these  individual  interventions  jointly  with  Commission  staff  (i)  to 
capture core elements of the different response packages; (ii) to represent all three Team Europe 
priority areas as defined in the Joint Communication; and (iii) to arrive at a balanced selection of the 
different aid modalities and implementing partner types across all case studies. 

A cross-cutting analysis of the 30 budget support programmes mobilised for the COVID-19 
response was carried out (Annex 2.4). It focused on two levels: 

•  A review of the newly designed COVID-19 BS programmes and of the changes made 
to  ongoing  BS  programmes  (such  as  frontloading,  neutralisation  of  variable  tranche 
indicators,  etc.).  Planned  and  effective  disbursement  calendars  were  also  reviewed,  and 
specific  attention  was  put  on  accountability  and  transparency  issues.  In  addition,  five  BS 
programmes were selected for in-depth review in consultation with Commission staff.9 This 
included  a  review  of  the  documentation  of  each  BS  programme  (financing  agreements, 
COVID-19 addenda, and disbursement files) and of the macro-fiscal context, the statistical 
analysis of macro and budgetary data, and interviews with key stakeholders. 

•  At macro level, the effects of BS were assessed in terms of (i) enlarged fiscal space 
through the analysis of macro-budgetary data for the 13 BS beneficiary countries; (ii) design, 
implementation  and  monitoring  of  COVID-19  national  response  plans;  and  (iii)  Public 
Financial Management (PFM) strengthening and accountability in the management of COVID-
19 funds, notably through data from the International Budget Partnership (IBP). 

Stakeholder interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted remotely based 
on  interview  guides,  at  varying  intensities  across the  countries (Table  2;  Annex  5).  These  allowed 
broadening and deepening understanding  of the overall  COVID-19 response and  of the individual 
selected interventions. Stakeholders interviewed included staff from EU Delegations, EU services, EU 
MS,  EU  development  and  financial  institutions,  implementing  partners,  national  authorities,  other 
donors and institutions, and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). 

A  stakeholder survey  was  then  conducted in all 17 case studies to  broaden the  evidence base 
beyond interviews and FGDs (Annex 3.2.4). It was used to quantify perceptions and to triangulate 
data.  A  common  questionnaire  template  was  developed  and  subsequently  tailored  towards  five 

9   Senegal  (EU  Daan  Corona),  Montenegro  (SRBC),  Ethiopia  (SRPC  Health),  Ecuador  (Economic  reactivation  of  affected 

areas Manabí and Esmeraldas) and Fiji (SRPC Agriculture). 

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respondent groups.10 The survey was administered online for two weeks,11 with periodic respondent 
reminders. 

Finally, all evidence was systematically analysed and triangulated to provide robust answers to 
the evaluation questions, first at country/regional level in individual country/regional notes (Appendix) 
and subsequently at cross-country/regional level in the main report. The cross-cutting analysis was 
facilitated  by  a  series  of  team  workshops.  Findings  were  also  discussed  and  validated  through 
periodic meetings with the Interservice Group (ISG). 

The assessment was conducted in keeping with all applicable standards on the ethical conduct of 
evaluations relating to the treatment of gender, awareness of power dynamics among evaluation 
stakeholders,  safeguards to  ensure  confidentiality  and  anonymity  of  information  shared  with  the 
evaluators and other relevant issues. Moreover, the evaluation team confirmed that it was able to 
work  on  this  assessment  independently,  and  without  undue  influence  on  the  data  collection  and 
analytical processes. The evaluators were not aware of any conflicts of interests that would have 
impeded the impartiality of the team towards the evaluation subject or evaluation stakeholders. 

2.3  Limitations 

The recent nature of the COVID-19 pandemic along with the fast-track approach for this assessment 
presented a set of inherent challenges that were much more pronounced than in traditional strategic 
evaluations. Three prime examples were (i) a very tight timeline; (ii) limited data availability; and (iii) 
limited hindsight and temporal scope (nine months). Findings are therefore preliminary, emerging, 
and dynamic. In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic-imposed travel restrictions and hence the need for 
remote  data  collection.  These  limitations,  as  well  as  the  measures  applied  to  mitigate  them,  are 
discussed in Table 3. 

Table 3: Limitations for the evaluation and mitigation measures taken. 

Limitations 

Mitigation measures taken 

presented 

Tight  timeline:  the  fast-track  nature  of  this 
assessment12 
time 
constraints not generally found in more strategic 
evaluations of a similar thematic and geographic 
scope.  

substantial 

This was compounded by the large diversity in 
Team Europe responses to be evaluated (multi-
priority, multi-modality, multi-sector, multi-
of 
country) 
stakeholders  involved  (for  document  delivery, 
consultation, validation etc.). 

number 

large 

and 

the 

• 

• 

Focus on  the  essence,  with  a  swift  process  with 
swift decisions and flexibility, from both ISG and 
evaluation team. 
Evaluation  team  of  adequate  size,  combining 
experts  with  solid  evaluation  experience  across 
the thematic and geographic areas concerned, in 
order to work quickly, efficiently and in parallel. 
•  Multi-level  approach  to  data  collection  and 
analysis, differentiating intensity across countries 
common  evaluation 
while  maintaining  a 
framework. 

•  Allow 

limited  degree  of  overlap 

in  phases 
(inception, interim, final) and intensity levels (high, 
medium, low), as well as slight adjustments to the 
evaluation timeline, to accommodate unexpected 
events and delays (see Annex 3.1) 

Little  hindsight  and  short  temporal  scope: 
findings  are  preliminary,  emerging,  and 
dynamic, as the COVID-19 crisis and EU response 

•  Commitment  dates  were  used  to  determine 
whether  COVID-19  interventions  fell  within  the 
temporal  scope  of  the  assessment  or  not 

10   a) Commission services, EU Delegations and EDFIs, b) in-country implementing partners, c) national authorities, d) non-
implementing CSOs, e) global stakeholders. Survey questionnaires differed by respondent group, not by country. 

11   As an exception, the survey addressed to global stakeholders remained open for more than four weeks.  
12   About seven months from kick-off meeting to draft final report. 

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Limitations 

Mitigation measures taken 

are  ongoing  and  evolving.  It  proved  complex  to 
apply  the  evaluation’s  temporal  scope 
boundary of December  2020 as a hard  cut-off, 
as in reality the Team Europe response continues 
over from 2020 to 2021. 

• 

within 

interventions 

(whether  interventions  were  within/outside  the 
scope  if  committed  before/after  31  December 
2020).  
For 
scope, 
implementation was considered even if spanning 
to 2021. Since data collection largely took place 
from  March  to  May  2021,  many  useful  insights 
beyond  the  temporal  scope  were  gathered,  in 
particular for countries with a later/delayed Team 
Europe  response  and  for  the  assessment  of 
effectiveness. 

the 

restrictions  due 

Travel 
to  COVID-19: 
meetings, interviews and focus group discussions 
could not take place in-person. 

•  Use  of  remote  evaluation  techniques,  tools,  and 
technologies,  drawing  on  ADE’s  extensive 
experience  herewith 
recent 
assignments during the COVID-19 pandemic). 

(including  from 

Limited  data  availability:  given  the  recent 
nature of the COVID-19 pandemic13 and the fast 
response  set  up  by  Team  Europe,  limited  data 
were available, especially on results of the Team 
Europe response (cf. EQ 4). 

for 

the 

incomplete 

limitations 

Specific 
inventory 
compilation,  mainly  relating  to  poor  data 
quality: 
at 
information 
contract/agreement 
level;  discontinuation  of 
INTPA’s COVID-19 tracker and no standardisation 
limited 
of 
consideration 
contributing 
interventions. 

reporting  at  country 

level;  and 

indirectly 

of 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Systematic  assessment  of  secondary  data 
availability,  through  document  type  templates 
(see  Annex  3.2.3)  and  close  consultation  with 
Commission relevant services, the ISG and the 
EU Delegations. 
Emphasis  on  primary  data  collection,  through 
stakeholder interviews, focus group discussions 
and survey. 

The original information contained in the COVID-
19 tracker developed by DG INTPA; information 
from  CRIS;  information  provided  by  DG  ECHO 
(based on HOPE) and clarifications provided by 
FPI  were  updated  and  complemented  with 
the  country-level  Team 
information  from 
Europe  COVID-19  response  fiches,  as  well  as 
additional information from the EU Delegations, 
including information on interventions managed 
by DG ECFIN and DG NEAR. 
Regional and global initiatives were included if 
mentioned  in  the  country-level  Team  Europe 
COVID-19 Response fiches to identify indirectly 
contributing interventions. 
(missing 
To  deal  with  poor  data  quality 
information  or 
inconsistent  reporting),  the 
evaluation team triangulated information to the 
extent  possible.  However,  this  may  have 
affected the reliability of the figures presented. 

For additional details, see Annex 2.1. 

13   About eight months between the Joint Communication on the Global EU response to COVID-19 and the start of the 

evaluation. 

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3.  KEY CONTEXTUAL ELEMENTS 

3.1  Impact of COVID-19 in the 17 countries and regions 

During  the  rapid  global  spread  of  the  COVID-19  virus  from  March  2020  onwards,  the 
profound, diverse and sustained effects of the pandemic in EU partner countries quickly 
became  evident.  The  pandemic  put  immense  pressure  on  health  and  sanitary  systems,  thereby 
initiating or aggravating health and humanitarian crises. Simultaneously, it affected livelihoods and 
well-being  by  disrupting  markets,  value  chains  and  employment  in  manifold  sectors  –  in  turn 
constraining  public  and  private  finance  –  and  through  its  impacts  on  education,  quality  of  work, 
human rights, and so forth. The impact of the pandemic persisted at the end of 2020 in the 
17 countries/regions under review, although its severity, features and trajectory differed 
across  those  countries/regions.  Indeed,  the  impact  strongly  depended  on  country-specific 
circumstances, such as capacities, national response plans, partner presence and political stability. 
Detailed information on country/regional-specific responses and impacts can be found in Appendix.  

3.1.1  Health, sanitary and humanitarian impacts 

To  mitigate  the  first  wave  of  infections,  all  countries  adopted  strict  containment 
measures,  including  travel  bans,  closing  international  borders,  banning  public  gatherings,  school 
closures,  quarantine  requirements,  lockdowns,  and  the  establishment  of  a  curfew.  Although 
lockdowns were remarkably similar across countries, some countries took longer to respond, causing 
an outburst of contaminations (Afghanistan, Ecuador). Support was provided to the health system 
and urgent health needs were addressed, especially in terms of critical medical supplies and products. 

The first wave of infections was generally more severe in upper-middle-income countries 
(Ecuador,  Fiji,  South  Africa,  Turkey)  than  in  low-income  countries  (Afghanistan,  DRC,  Ethiopia, 
Sierra Leone, Yemen). One reason for the higher propagation rate in richer countries might have been 
the  higher  urbanisation,  urban  density,  and  mobility  within  the  country/region  and  overseas. 
Conversely, transmission may have been slower in countries where rural areas were disconnected 
from urban epicentres and with a higher share of rural population.14 Another explanation may be the 
preponderance  of  work-  or  market-place  transmission  in  middle-income  countries,  as  opposed  to 
community-related  transmission  in  low-income  countries.15  The  difference  could  also  be  partly 
explained by inaccuracies in data collection, whereby especially in low-income countries the actual 
number of cases may have significantly surpassed the estimated number. 

Despite  a  (presumably)  lower  prevalence  of  infections,  the  health  and  humanitarian 
impacts were typically higher in poorer countries due to internal fragilities. Low healthcare 
capacity meant that hospitals were quickly overwhelmed, inducing particularly acute health crises in 
countries  with  an  ongoing  humanitarian  crisis  (Ethiopia,  Myanmar,  Turkey,  Yemen),  health  crisis 
(Ethiopia, Honduras, South Africa), armed conflict (Afghanistan, Myanmar), or that faced some form 
of  natural  disaster  (Ethiopia,  Honduras,  Yemen).  In  these  countries,  the  pandemic  significantly 
aggravated  the  already  fragile  situation,  putting  further  pressure  on  an  already  under-resourced 
health system and infrastructure. Implementation of health measures was very difficult for countries 
such as Afghanistan and Yemen, where years of violent conflict have severely damaged health and 
general infrastructure. Similarly, while initial efforts were implemented to contain the virus, health 

14   “Schellekens,  Philip;  Sourrouille,  Diego.  2020. COVID-19  Mortality  in  Rich  and  Poor  Countries:  A  Tale  of  Two 
Pandemics? Policy  Research  Working  Paper;  No.  9260. World  Bank,  Washington,  DC.  ©  World  Bank. 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/33844 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.” 

15   The Covid-19 lockdown trade-off in low- and middle-income countries | VOX, CEPR Policy Portal (voxeu.org) 

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infrastructure and services were dismantled following the February coup in Myanmar. By comparison, 
countries with a strong history of health emergencies and disaster management (Sierra Leone, South 
Africa, Turkey) were more able to formulate adequate response plans, building on experience dealing 
with  past  health  crises  (Ebola,  malaria,  typhoid,  cholera).  By  adapting  already  existing  disaster 
management frameworks to the COVID-19 context, these countries focused on surveillance, isolation, 
quarantine,  testing,  clinical  care,  and  behavioural  change,  allowing  for  a  swift  and  appropriate 
response in the initial stages of the pandemic. 

3.1.2  Social and economic impacts 

All countries adopted socio-economic measures  in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Although these varied across countries, government responses were generally based on 
the  same pillars: supporting the health sector, strengthening social resilience of the population, 
supporting the private sector, and maintaining jobs. Social assistance, such as cash transfers and 
food  supplies,  targeted  the  most  disadvantaged  households.  Temporary  unemployment  benefits 
were granted to formal workers and cash transfers to informal workers. Support was provided to 
businesses in sectors hit hardest by the pandemic (debt payment deferrals, tax exemptions, social 
transfers to employees and deferred social contribution payments). The sectors concerned varied, 
but the agricultural sector was often prioritised. Tourism, a key driver of trade and foreign exchange 
inflows for many low- and middle-income countries, was also prioritised (Caribbean countries, Fiji, 
and Pacific Island Countries (PICs), Morocco, Senegal, South Africa). 

Different socio-economic response features and approaches can be observed across the 
case  study countries.  In general, middle-income countries responded  with more comprehensive 
economic  programmes  and  well-targeted  fiscal  responses.  Conversely,  in  several  countries  the 
response was severely constrained: Myanmar and Yemen, for instance, had to cope with a lack of 
budgetary space, weak institutional capacity and limited external assistance. For a few countries, the 
recovery  plan  was  transformed  into  a  national  development  strategy  to  reflect  lessons  from  the 
pandemic (Senegal, South Africa16). In Montenegro, Morocco and South Africa, the low infection rate, 
whether real or perceived depending on the scale of testing campaigns, prompted the reopening of 
borders and the alleviation of containment measures to stimulate the economy. 

Nevertheless, the socio-economic response plans were generally insufficient to offset the 
effects of the pandemic: 
•  The  COVID-19  pandemic  increased  overall  poverty.  In  January  2021,  the  World  Bank 
estimated  that  the  pandemic  had  pushed  between  119  and  124  million  people  into  extreme 
poverty around the globe in 2020, with no reversion of this trend likely in 2021.17 Decreasing 
living  standards  in  developing  countries  were  well  documented  as  a  partial  consequence  of 
lockdown policies.18 COVID-19 prevention measures, as well as supply delays and price increases 
of humanitarian, food and commercial goods, resulted in increases in food insecurity (among the 
case study countries, especially in Afghanistan and Ethiopia). 

•  An  increase  in  inequality  is  another  consequence  of  the  pandemic.  Inequality  strongly 
increased in countries with a high percentage of daily workers and where the informal economy 
represents  a  large  share  of  the  Gross  Domestic  Product  (GDP).  Female,  young,  old,  and  less-
educated workers, who were already likely to be disadvantaged before the shock, bore the brunt 
of the pandemic’s immediate impact on jobs. 

16   South Africa’s recovery plan included a longer-term strategy to foster an inclusive and sustainable recovery and to 

strengthen people’s resilience to future shocks. 

17   Updated  estimates  of  the  impact  of  COVID-19  on  global  poverty:  Looking  back  at  2020  and  the  outlook  for  2021 

(worldbank.org) 

18   Drèze and Somanchi 2021; Egger et al. 2021 

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•  The  economic  impact  of  COVID-19  was  substantial  and  broad-based,  and  while  all 
countries  suffered  from both  demand  and  supply  shocks,  the  shock  was  more  severe  for 
middle-income  countries  strongly  dependant  on  international  flows.  This  includes 
economies with little diversification, which rely strongly on tourism (Caribbean countries, Fiji, and 
other PICs), export revenues or remittances (Myanmar, Senegal, South Africa, Ukraine). 

3.2  The Global EU response to COVID-19 in partner countries 
and the Team Europe approach 

The Team Europe approach was born out of the extraordinary conditions created in 2020 
by  the  COVID-19  pandemic  and  the  desire  to  offer  a  united  European  response  to  the 
pandemic-related needs emerging in the partner countries. The EU concluded early on that 
the  COVID-19  pandemic  required  a  fast,  massive,  coordinated,  and  coherent  response  to  protect 
people, to save lives, and to minimise the economic fallout worldwide. In a joint communication of 
April 2020 to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions19, the European Commission signalled that international solidarity 
and leadership called for combating the virus and its effects not only in Europe, but also in the rest 
of the world. The EU strongly supported international cooperation and multilateral solutions as key 
pathways for this response, in line with both the EU’s own strategic interests and with core European 
values. EU Member States endorsed the Team Europe approach and the COVID-19 response in a set 
of  Council  Conclusions  in  June  2020  20,  and  reaffirmed  the  approach  in  a  further  set  of  Council 
Conclusions in April 2021 21. 

The Team Europe approach built on the commitment made by the EU and its Member States 
to work more closely and in a more coordinated way as laid out in the European Consensus 
on Development22 and the Global Strategy for the European Union’s foreign and security 
policy.  These principles  were  translated  into  the  “Working  better  together”  concept to  strengthen 
joint programming and joint implementation in the interest of increased effectiveness of EU actions 
in  particular  at  country  level,  including  also  in  broader  contexts  such  as  security,  environmental 
protection, migration, human rights, and international trade and investment.23 The COVID-19 crisis 
created momentum for the EU and its Member States to reaffirm and strengthen their commitment 
to cooperation with the political support to the Team Europe approach, and to call for the application 
of principles of “Working Better Together” and Joint Programming to the response to COVID-1924. 

The Team Europe approach was intended to encourage the EU and its Member States, their 
implementing agencies and European public development banks, and European Financial 
Institutions (EFIs), to combine resources and to improve overall coherence in the interest 
of raising the standing and visibility of the EU as a global leader and world-leading donor. 
Team  Europe  constitutes  a  joint  effort  by  the  European  Union  and  its  Member  States,  their 

19   JOINT  COMMUNICATION  TO  THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT,  THE  COUNCIL,  THE  EUROPEAN  ECONOMIC  AND  SOCIAL 
COMMITTEE  AND  THE  COMMITTEE  OF  THE  REGIONS,  Communication  on  the  Global  EU  response  to  COVID-19,  JOIN 
(2020) 11 final, Brussels, 8 April 2020. 

20   Council conclusions on Team Europe Global Response to COVID-19, 8 June 2020 
21   Council conclusions on Team Europe, 13 April 2021. 
22   See  European  Consensus  on  Development  at  https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/system/files/european-

consensus-on-development-final-20170626_en.pdf  

23   https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/wbt-policy-context  
24   For example, the Council Conclusion of June 8, 2020, on the Team Europe Global Response to COVID-19 “highlights the 
role of the EU Delegations” in coordinating Member States, European development agencies, the EIB and other European 
financial  institutions,  “in  line  with  the  Working  Better  Together  approach”.  The  Conclusions also  emphasise  that  the 
longer-term response to COVID-19 should be embedded in the “context of our commitments to joint programming”, 
and  that  “joint  needs  assessments”,  “joint  monitoring systems”  and  “joint  communication  campaigns”  are  all  in  the 
interest of a “joint, swift, visible, and transparent action of Team Europe”. 

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implementing  agencies  and  public  development  banks,  as  well  as  the  European  Investment  Bank 
(EIB)  and  the  European  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Development  (EBRD).25  Compared  to  earlier 
mechanisms that had focused on streamlining operational coordination and had remained confined 
to country-specific experiences, Team Europe is more political in nature with the aim of improving 
the positioning of the EU as an influential and visible geopolitical actor in the international arena. 
The approach is associated with three core objectives: (1) efficient coordination to achieve greater 
coherence  and  impact  of  EU  actions;  (2)  promoting  EU  interests  and  values  at  national  and 
international level; (3) strengthening EU visibility through joint communication under Team Europe.26  

The  scope  of  the  Team  Europe  approach  progressively  expanded,  from  reacting  to 
immediate  needs  in  response  to  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  to  responding  to  partner 
countries’  longer-term  socio-economic  needs  for  “Building  Back  Better  and  greener”27. 
Programming exercises ongoing when this assessment was under way were gathering Team Europe 
actors around a number of Team Europe Initiatives as flagships of the Team Europe approach. These 
are  intended  to  identify  and  jointly  address  critical  priority  bottlenecks  in  partner  countries  and 
promote  the  Team  Europe  approach28.  Team  Europe  Initiatives  are  voluntary  initiatives,  designed, 
financed, and implemented by all Team Europe actors, and spanning country, regional and thematic 
levels. They may further include involvement of like-minded non-EU donors interested in establishing 
closer working relationships and further strengthening coordination.29 

3.3  Inventory  of  the  European  Commission’s  response  to 
COVID-19 in the 17 countries and regions 

The Commission mobilised significant funding for the COVID-19 response (Annex 2). In 2020, 
total EU (Commission-managed) commitments to respond to the COVID-19 crisis in the 17 countries 
and regions under review amounted to EUR 3 662 million.30 The Multiannual Financial Framework of 
the EU (2014-2020) was in its last year of implementation when the pandemic hit. Most of the EU 
commitments mobilised for the response therefore included funds that had already been committed 
prior to COVID-19 for ongoing interventions, and that were then re-oriented to tackle the pandemic. 
They also included EUR 1 260 million of Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) in the form of loans to 
Montenegro and Ukraine for 2020 and 2021 in response to the pandemic. The Commission’s total 
paid amount in 2020 for the 17 countries and regions under review was EUR 2 171 million (Figure 
1).31 New interventions contracted in 2020 represented less than one third of the total portfolio.32 33 

25   The Council Conclusions of June 8, 2020, on Team Europe Global Response to COVID-19, p. 2. 
26   Interviews 
27   “The Council emphasises that Team Europe interventions aim at global sustainable recovery in the spirit of “building 
back better and greener”, the achievement of the 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the 
goals of the Paris Agreement.” (Council Conclusion of April 13, 2021, p.3)  

28   https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/wbt-team-europe  
29   https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/wbt-policy-context  
30   Total amounts include bilateral interventions, regional interventions and global initiatives specifically addressing the 
COVID-19 crisis in the 17 countries and regions under review. Regarding global initiatives, the global action “Coronavirus 
Facts” addressing the COVID-19 ‘disinfodemic’ targeted Ethiopia, Kenya, and Senegal. DG ECHO’s global contract for 
the  “EU  Global  Response  to  the  COVID-19”  specifically  covered  assistance  to  Kenya,  Ethiopia, Afghanistan,  and  the 
Caribbean, respectively implemented by WHO for the first three countries and by UNICEF for the Caribbean. Regional 
initiatives added up to bilateral support in Ukraine, South Africa, and Ecuador. Regional interventions were also included 
in the case of the Caribbean and Pacific case study. The bilateral cooperation programmes implemented in the countries 
of the Caribbean region and in the countries of the Pacific region except Fiji are however not part of the scope of the 
assessment and are therefore not covered under the findings at EQ level. 

31   See Annex 2.1 for more details on calculation of the figures for this section of the report and potential limitations due 

to poor data quality. 

32   This includes all new contracts signed in 2020, even those already envisaged for signature before the pandemic hit.  
33   I) The thematic classification of the response relied on DG INTPA’s COVID-19 tracker, as well as the country-level COVID-
19  response  fiches.  For  Yemen,  the  emergency  and  health  sectors  were  not  clearly  separated.  Hence,  further 

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Figure 1: EU paid amounts for the COVID-19 response in 2020 by case study 
country/region 

Source: Inventory compiled by ADE 

The  European  Commission  mobilised  across  the  board  to  design  and  implement  the 
response. Most of the countries and regions covered by this assessment fall under the responsibility 
of  DG  INTPA  while  four  of  them  fall  under  the  responsibility  of  the  Directorate-General  for 
Neighbourhood  and  Enlargement Negotiations  (DG  NEAR).34  The  Directorate-General  for  European 
Civil  Protection  and  Humanitarian  Aid  Operations  (DG  ECHO)  was  active  in  13  out  of  the  17 
countries/regions.35 FPI contributed to the COVID-19 response in eight of the 17 countries.36 DG ECFIN 
supported two countries through exceptional MFA.37 

The  Commission’s  response  focused  on  three  main  Team  Europe  priorities,  namely  (i) 
socio-economic support, (ii) health, water, and sanitation and (iii) emergency assistance 
(Figure 2). The bulk of the paid response went to socio-economic support (68%), followed by health, 
water, and sanitation (20%) and emergency assistance (12%). In 11 out of the 17 countries/regions, 
the response mostly consisted of socio-economic support. In DRC, Fiji and Morocco, the bulk of the 
paid  portfolio  addressed  health,  water,  and  sanitation.  In  Ethiopia,  Turkey  and  Yemen,  the  paid 
response consisted mostly of emergency assistance (Figure 1).   

classification was done by the evaluation team based on available information. II) For the Caribbean, the overall amount 
displayed includes both regional and bilateral funds for the sake of completeness; however, the case study only focused 
on regional interventions.  

34   Montenegro, Morocco, Turkey, Ukraine. 
35   Afghanistan, Caribbean, DRC, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Fiji-Pacific, Kenya, Myanmar, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Turkey, Ukraine, 

Yemen. 

36   Afghanistan, DRC, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Kenya, Myanmar, Senegal, Yemen. 
37   Ukraine and Montenegro. 

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Figure 2: EU paid amounts for the COVID-19 response by Team Europe priorities in the 17 
case study countries and regions 

Source: Inventory compiled by ADE 

The Commission used various aid modalities to deploy its assistance (Figure 3). It mobilised 
massive funding through budget support (BS): EUR 1 006 million disbursed or 46% of the paid 
amounts for in a number of countries among the 17 countries/regions under review through 30 BS 
programmes38, including four programmes specifically designed in 2020 to respond to the COVID-19 
crisis.39  40 It also deployed two exceptional MFA schemes for Montenegro and Ukraine for a total 
paid amount of EUR 630 million or 29% of the response. Technical assistance programmes and 
projects funded by DG INTPA, DG NEAR or FPI41 (EUR 308 million) represented 14% of total paid 
amounts.  43%  was directly  managed  by  the  Commission  via  grant  agreements  and  services  and 
57% was indirectly managed42 via contribution and delegation agreements signed with international 
organisations and EU MS agencies. Emergency interventions through DG ECHO (EUR 211 million) 
represented 10% of total paid amounts. This included funds that had been already foreseen under 
the Humanitarian  Implementation Plan (HIP) 2020. In one country (Afghanistan), additional  funds 
(EUR 15 million) were mobilised under the HIP. Additional DG ECHO support, minor in terms of funding, 
came via the Emergency Toolbox, specifically used to fund DG ECHO’s global response to COVID-19, 
the EU Humanitarian Air Bridge initiative, as well as the Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF). The 
use  of  blending  was  limited,  with  EUR  15  million  paid  in  2020  (1%  of  the  response)  for  four 
interventions in Ecuador, the Caribbean, Kenya, and Myanmar.  

Part of the support provided through BS, “classical” programmes and projects and DG ECHO was 
channelled through specific financing mechanisms including Trust Funds and Facilities.43 Multi-
donor or single donor trust funds were used in 13 countries. Most of the funding channelled through 
Trust Funds (TF) went to the EU Trust Fund (EUTF) for Africa. The latter was used in Morocco, Kenya, 

38   This excludes all the bilateral BS interventions deployed in the Caribbean countries since the Caribbean was assessed 

through a regional lens. 

39   These four BS programmes were deployed in Montenegro, Morocco, Kenya, and Senegal.  
40   Note  that  the  volume  of  reference  here  for  BS  programmes  has  been  drawn  from  the  inventory  compiled  by  the 
evaluation  team.  The  highest  identified  amount  is  reported  here  although  a  lower  amount  has  been  reported  and 
considered  in  the  in-depth  BS  analysis  carried  out  by  the  evaluation  team.  This  is  attributable to  different  ways  of 
reporting  across  country  case  studies.  The  in-depth  BS  analysis  relied  on  documentation  directly  collected  by  the 
evaluation team and is presented in Annex 2. 

41   Via the IcSP mechanism. 
42   Indirect management was used in all countries except for South Africa. 
43   The inventory does not provide a comprehensive picture of the funds mobilised through Trust Funds. 

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and Ethiopia for a total of EUR 48.32 million. More than half of the support in Turkey came from the 
Facility  for  Refugees  for  a  total  of  EUR  58  million  paid.  Finally,  candidate  countries  for  EU 
membership also participated in specific EU initiatives.44  

Figure 3: Distribution of EU paid amounts for the COVID-19 response by aid modality in 
the 17 case study countries and regions45 

Source: Inventory compiled by ADE 

Figure 4 presents a detailed breakdown of the use of different aid modalities in the 17 case 
studies  and  the  different  profiles  of  the  response  packages.  In  eight  out  of  the  14 
countries/regions where BS was used 46, most of the response was delivered through this aid modality. 
In  Senegal  and  Morocco,  BS  represented  99%  and  98%  of  the  response  respectively.  “Classical” 
programmes and projects constituted a large share of the support packages for DRC, Sierra Leone, 
and Fiji. Turkey and Yemen largely benefited from DG ECHO emergency assistance. In Montenegro 
and  Ukraine,  the  crisis  MFA  represented  49%  and  91%  of  the  country  package  respectively.  The 
portfolio  was  relatively  balanced  across  the  various  aid  modalities  in  Ecuador,  Afghanistan,  and 
Ukraine if the MFA is excluded. 

44   These initiatives are not reported in the inventory data made available to the evaluation team.  
45   Overall (i.e., beyond the scope of the study), over EUR 46 billion was committed to the EU response to COVID-19, with 

two-thirds of those commitments disbursed as of September 2021. 

46   “Regions” refers to the Caribbean region as budget support was delivered to seven Caribbean countries (Barbados, St 
Kitts and Nevis, Dominica, Haiti, Jamaica, Dominican Republic, Guyana). This is reflected in the inventory data following 
a demand from the EC. However, the regional Caribbean case study only covers regional interventions. All national level 
interventions, including budget support interventions, to the single Caribbean countries  have been excluded from the 
in-depth analysis and the cross-cutting budget support analysis presented in the following sections of the report.   

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Figure 4: EU paid amounts for the COVID-19 response by aid modality in the 17 countries 
and regions 

Source: Inventory compiled by ADE 

Governments  from  partner  countries  implemented  the  bulk  of  the  EU  (Commission-
managed) response. Governments were by far the largest recipient of EU response to COVID-19, 
with 76% of the paid amounts, consisting mostly of the large share of BS and the exceptional MFA. 
18% of the support was implemented through international organisations, in particular the  United 
Nations (UN) agencies (8%), international and national non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (7%) 
and the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) (2%), and other international 
organisations and bodies (1%). EU MS agencies implemented around 1% of the amounts. For Profit 
Organisations (FPO) managed 1% of the amounts ‘Figure 5).47 

Figure 5: EU paid amounts for the COVID-19 response by implementing partner in the 17 
case study countries and regions 

Source: Inventory compiled by ADE 

47   Shares consider funds allocated to implementing partners where available information did not allow for categorisation. 

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4.  EQ 1 - A RESPONSE RELEVANT FOR THE COVID-19 
CRISIS48 

EQ1:  To  what  extent  did  the  initial  EU  global  response  to  the  COVID-19  pandemic 
through the Team Europe country packages address the needs and priorities of partner 
countries and regions in each country context, in line with the three priorities of the 
Team Europe approach? 
Summary answer: The different COVID-19 response packages covered relevant combinations of 
the  thematic  priorities  emphasised  by  the  Joint  Communication  on  the  Global  EU  response  to 
COVID-19,  related  to  both  short-term  and  longer-term  needs  in  the  different  countries/regions. 
Differences in the thematic emphasis of the support packages were in part linked to differences of 
needs across the countries and to specific response priorities which the Commission and some 
partner  governments  had  agreed  on.  However,  with  “new”  money  scarce  at  the  end  of  the 
Multiannual  Financial  Framework  (MFF)  for  2014-2020,  EU  Delegations  emphasised  adapting 
existing  projects  to  the requirements and  needs  of  the COVID-19  crisis by re-allocating money 
within or between interventions. As a result, the priorities of the COVID-19 response packages often 
mirrored Commission priorities before the COVID-19 outbreak. In a few cases only, the Commission 
purposely tried to cover Team Europe priorities that had not been part of its pre-COVID-19 portfolio. 
When  it  did  so,  this  was  done  through  WHO,  other  UN  agencies,  EU  Member  States,  or  other 
development partners to access the required expertise. The packages in themselves were by and 
large  consistent  with  key  normative  principles  of  the  Joint  Communication  and  that  of  EU 
development  cooperation  overall,  such  as  focus  on  those  most  in  need,  respect  for  good 
governance and human rights, and gender equality and non-discrimination. However, the sizes of 
the  packages  relative  to  the  volume  of  pre-COVID-19  EU  cooperation  varied  greatly.  Budget 
support, macro-financial assistance, and contributions to the Catastrophe Containment and Relief 
Trust  (CCRT)  for  debt  service  to  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  offered  an  appropriate 
response  to  support  partner  governments  in  coping  with  macro-financial  pressures  and  in 
implementing  their  emergency  social  and  fiscal  policy  package.  Budget  support  and  other 
programme-based  approaches  also  potentially  presented  the  best  opportunities  for  linking  the 
immediate COVID-19 response to build greater crisis resilience, in line with longer-term efforts of 
some  partner  country  governments,  but  less  so  in  LDCs,  in  countries  in  crises  or  in  other  low-
capacity environments. Support to the development of vaccines production or distribution capacity 
in partner countries was not covered by COVID-19 response packages. 

COVERING EMERGENCY NEEDS AND LONGER-TERM PRIORITIES 

Mobilising  the  full  external  EU  crisis  response  toolkit  for  the  different  Team  Europe 
packages enabled the Commission to respond to the partner countries’ immediate, short- 
and  medium-term  priorities 
in  a  comprehensive  manner,  covering  reasonable 
combinations of the priority areas set out in the Joint Communication of April 202049. In 
most of the countries covered by this assessment, Team Europe packages mixed DG ECHO-funded interventions 
together with BS and bilateral and regional interventions. In Montenegro, for example, the Commission used a wide 
range of aid modalities and mechanisms (MFA and BS, bilateral and regional interventions, participation to EU 
initiatives associated with the status of the country as EU accession country). It allowed the Team 
Europe  country  package  to  cover  issues  spanning  from  the  emergency  purchase  of  medical 
equipment to the strengthening of the health system and the contribution to the financing of the 
country’s  packages  of  socio-economic  measures  linked  to  COVID-19.  For  instance,  the  MFA  and 

48   For details on the different country case studies, please see the Appendix of this report containing the individual reports 

from the 17 case studies. 

49   Communication on the Global EU Response to COVID-19, JOIN (2020) 11 final, Brussels, 8.4.2020. 

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COVID-Resilience  Contract  were  designed  and  implemented  to  ensure  synergies  in  terms  of  the 
objectives pursued by  their respective crisis financial  supports and the socio-economic and public 
financial governance reforms promoted by the country’s EU accession reform agenda. Overall, the 
EU response to COVID-19 covered the three priority areas emphasised by the Joint Communication 
and  related  Council  Conclusions.  However,  the  allocation  of  resources  to  the  three  priority  areas 
differed  significantly  among  countries.50  The  share  of  support  allocated  to  health,  research,  and 
water,  for  example,  varied  significantly  and  ranged  from  close  to  or  over  60%  of  the  support 
packages for countries such as DRC, Fiji (including regional aid) and Morocco, to under 10% in, for 
example,  Ethiopia,  Montenegro,  Myanmar,  and  Sierra  Leone.  Support  to  socio-economic  issues, 
representing the largest share of EU response to COVID-19 overall, constituted anywhere from 0% 
to 30% of the country packages on the low end (such as DRC, Morocco, Turkey, and Yemen) to close 
to or over 90% on the high end of the spectrum (such as in Montenegro, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and 
Ukraine).51  

Differences in the emphasis of the EU support packages vis-à-vis the three priority areas 
were in part linked to differences of needs across the countries and reflected agreements 
between the EU and partner governments on specific priorities for the COVID-19 response. 
Emergency  aid,  for  example,  constituted  upwards  of  25%  for  all  but  one  of  the  low-income 
countries,52 where the pressure to provide prompt support to basic needs of vulnerable groups was 
likely to be higher. By contrast, emergency support made up only around 5% or less for most lower-
middle  and  upper-middle  income  countries.  Overall,  the  needs  correspondence  of  these  diverse 
COVID-19  support  packages  met  or  exceeded  the  expectations  of  all  representatives  of  national 
authorities and EU institutions and bodies in all but one of the 11 countries that responded to this 
question in the stakeholder survey for this assessment.53 This was also supported by the findings 
from the key informant interviews. The exception here is Ecuador, where correspondence of the aid 
package and its size in relation to needs was worse than had been expected.54 In four out of the 17 
countries/regions,  the  EU  built  on  dialogue  with  governments  to  create  specific  BS  operations  to 
channel resources to nationally owned COVID-19 response strategies. In Senegal, over EUR 83 million 
were reallocated from two existing BS programmes to a single fixed tranche payment of EUR 111.7 
million  for  the  EU  Daan  Corona  programme  that  supported  Senegal’s  Programme  de  Résilience 
Economique  et  Sociale  (PRES).  This  amount  accounted  for  over  60%  of  the  total  EU  response  to 
COVID-19  to  Senegal,  and  largely  explains  why  overall more  than 90%  of  the  COVID-19  support 
package for Senegal was dedicated to addressing socio-economic issues. The EU also used dedicated 
BS programmes to support the COVID-19 response priorities of the national governments in Morocco 
(EUR 105 million),55 Montenegro (EUR 28 million),56 and Kenya (EUR 30 million).57  

Budget  support,  macro-financial  assistance,  and  contributions  to  the  Catastrophe 
Containment and Relief Trust for debt service falling due to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) also offered an appropriate response to support partner governments in coping 
with  macro-financial  pressures  and  in  implementing  their  emergency  social  and  fiscal 

50   Across all 17 country/regional packages, the bulk of the contracted response went to socio-economic support (54.4%), 

followed by health, water, and sanitation (28.3%), and emergency assistance (17.3%). 

51   In all of these countries, the bulk of the socio-economic support was delivered through MFA (Montenegro, Ukraine) or 

BS (Senegal, Sierra Leone). 

52   Such as Afghanistan (30%), Ethiopia (50%), Yemen (60%) and Turkey (86%). In the case of Turkey, this emergency aid 

was predominantly meant to cover support of the refugee population in the country. 

53   Only stakeholders from 11 out of the 17 countries/regions responded to this question in the survey. See Annex 4 for 

details. 

54   Confirmed in key informant interviews and the online stakeholder survey. 
55   Representing approximately 22% of the EU COVID-19 response package for Morocco. 
56   EUR 28 million was disbursed in 2020 out of a total of EUR 40.5 million committed. It constituted approximately a 

quarter (25%) of the EU COVID-19 response package for Montenegro. 
57   About one third (33%) of the EU COVID-19 response package for Kenya. 

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policy packages. However, the potential for linking the immediate response to COVID-19 
to build greater crisis resilience over the longer-term efforts through budget support was 
not fully exploited. All countries introduced emergency social and fiscal policy packages between 
March and June 2020 to minimise the socio-economic impact of the COVID-19 crisis. The make-up 
of these packages ranged from the introduction of a set of specific measures (e.g., in Afghanistan, 
Ecuador,  Honduras,  Ukraine)  and  sector  policies  (e.g.,  in  Kenya)  to  fully-fledged  multi-sectoral 
preparedness and response plans (e.g., in Ethiopia, Montenegro, Senegal). The Commission supported 
the implementation of these packages through BS programmes, MFA, and contribution to the CCRT 
for debt service relief.  

Box 1: Overview of the EU macro-economic support and debt service relief as part of the 
COVID-19 response 

Overview of the EU (Commission-managed) budget support, macro-financial assistance, 
and debt service relief for the COVID-19 response 

In the sample of the evaluation, the Commission mobilised 30 budget support programmes in 
13 countries for the response. Total disbursements amounted to EUR 872 million during 2020. 
In four of the sampled countries (Kenya, Montenegro, Morocco, Senegal), the Commission designed 
in 2020 newly dedicated COVID-19 BS programmes to support partner governments in coping 
with the challenges of the pandemic. Most of the already ongoing BS programmes mobilised 
for the response were not subject to significant content-related changes linked to the COVID-19 
crisis.  In  those  cases,  initial  BS  commitments  for  2020  and/or  subsequent  years  were  often 
frontloaded  (e.g.,  Afghanistan,  Ecuador,  Fiji,  Senegal,  South  Africa).  In  the  case  of  Morocco, the 
unspent amounts from previous years were often transformed into a fixed tranche instalment. 
Seven of the already existing BS programmes put significant emphases on COVID-19 in a rider 
signed in 2020: i) adaptation of the general conditions on public policy and transparency where 
publication  and  satisfactory  progress  in  the  execution  of  the  government-led  response 
programmes were requested; ii) top-ups on BS financial flows (e.g. Ethiopia, Honduras) or on BS 
complementary  measures  to  support  dedicated  COVID-19  actions  (e.g.  digitalisation  of  micro, 
small  and  medium  enterprises  (MSMEs)  in  Honduras  and  Technical  Assistance  (TA)  to  support 
national  capacities  in  designing  and  implementing  emergency  and  recovery  sector  policies  in 
strategic areas in South Africa); and iii) transformation of variable tranches into a fixed tranche 
(Honduras,  Morocco,  Sierra  Leone)  or  re-use  of  undisbursed  funds  from  previous  tranches 
(Myanmar).  

Two crisis macro-financial assistance programmes were also provided to Montenegro and 
Ukraine (EUR 630 million disbursed in 2020) to help limit the economic fallout of the pandemic. 
They were aimed at addressing situations of balance of payment crises in tandem with an IMF 
arrangement. 

In December 2020, the Commission adopted the financing of a special measure in favour of the 
poorest  and  most  vulnerable  African  Caribbean  Pacific  (ACP)  countries  hit  by  the  COVID-19 
pandemic  through  the  Catastrophe  Containment  Relief  Trust  (CCRT)  for  debt  service 
falling due to the IMF. With a contribution of EUR 183 million, the Commission became the most 
important contributor to the CCRT. This contribution was instrumental in unlocking the third tranche 
of debt service relief for all 29 CCRT-eligible countries. The purpose is to enable countries to meet 
exceptional balance of payment/fiscal needs created by the pandemic rather than having to assign 
these resources to debt service. 

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ADAPTING ONGOING EU SUPPORT TO ADDRESS THE COVID-19 CRISIS 

With available funds scarce at the end of the MFF for 2014-2020, EU Delegations were 
faced  with  a  limited  set  of  options  to put together  the  urgent COVID-19  response  and 
therefore chose to adapt existing projects and programmes to the requirements and needs 
of the COVID-19 crisis by re-allocating funds within or between interventions. The available 
data  did  not  allow  for  a  reliable  assessment  of  the  scale  of  additional  funds58  committed to  the 
COVID-19 response beyond the existing global, regional, and country-level cooperation envelopes. 
However,  the  key  informant  interviews  confirmed  that  the  allocation  of  “new”  money  to  specific 
countries  was  rare.  As  a  result,  the  EU  focused  on  adapting  existing  interventions  to  needs  and 
requirements of the COVID-19 crisis.59 

Partly as a result of the above, but also to build on prior experience when assembling a 
fast  response  to  the  COVID-19  crisis,  and  to  adhere  to  prior  political  agreements,  the 
priorities of the EU COVID-19 response packages often mirrored those of EU cooperation 
prior to COVID-19, albeit with several exceptions. COVID-19 response packages by and large 
stayed within the thematic scope of the pre-COVID-19 cooperation envelope and resisted moving 
into new areas where EU Delegations or their implementing partners did not have an established 
track-record and experience. In South Africa, for example, the EC did not have a strong presence in 
the health sector prior to COVID-19. The response package for South Africa therefore only contained 
a  small  health  component.  Pre-COVID-19  political  agreements  also  shaped  the  emphasis  of  the 
COVID-19  response.  The  COVID-19  response  package  for  Turkey,  for  example,  contained  a  large 
component of emergency support and other assistance targeting the population of refugees in the 
country, consistent with the political agreements between the EU and the Turkish government on the 
care for refugees residing in Turkey.  

The adaptation of existing projects and programmes for the COVID-19 response built on 
formal or informal needs assessments carried out mainly by the implementing partners. 
The  extent  of  the  changes  to  projects  varied  considerably  across  interventions  and 
support packages. In many cases, changes to programmes resulted from exchanges on prevalent 
needs  with  the  existing  implementing  partners,  in  particular  when  information  on  needs  from 
government  partners  was  limited.  Most  commonly,  changes  consisted  of  financially  topping-up 
ongoing activities, or adjusting the relative emphasis of programmes, but without changing the types 
of activities themselves. A good example of this practice was the use of the Emergency Social Safety 
Net (ESSN) programme directed at the refugee population in Turkey for the COVID-19 response. The 
ESSN itself remained mostly unchanged and was only mobilised as a conduit for distributing cash-
support.60  In  other  countries,  this  minimalist  approach  to  adaptation  meant  that  the  COVID-19 
response remained very closely aligned to the pre-COVID-19 priorities and activities of the EU in the 
given  country.  Adaptation  of  the  Northern  Border  Programme  in  Ecuador,  for  example,  was 
representative of this approach for much of the larger support package for the country. Continuation 
of programme activities was ensured by introducing protective equipment, safety measures, social 
distancing, and by replacing in-person interactions with remote activities, where possible. Priorities 
were somewhat refocused on WASH and food security/livelihood; however, within existing objectives 
and  budget  lines.  In  Yemen,  the  overall  socio-economic  response  of  the  EU  mainly  consisted  of 

58   I.e., additional to the money that had already been part of global, regional, and country-level cooperation envelopes 

prior to the COVID-19 crisis. 

59   Without considering the two commitments of MFA to Ukraine (EUR 1 200 million) and Montenegro (EUR 60 million), the 
share of COVID-19 support delivered through adapted existing interventions was approximately 67%, or EUR 1 624 
million.  

60   In Turkey, topping up of the ESSN made it possible to provide refugees additional payments of 1000 TRY (1000 Turkish 

Lira (TRY) are approximately EUR 100) over the course of June and July of 2020. 

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reinforcing ongoing activities, but without changing the types or targeting of the activities.61 The type 
of minimal adaptation of existing programmes was relatively common across the entire portfolio 
examined for this assessment,62 and overall was representative of a relatively pragmatic approach 
of the EU to the COVID-19 crisis response. 

In a small number of case studies, the EC covered Team Europe priorities which had not 
been  part  of  its  pre-COVID-19  portfolio,  typically  by  using  partners  to  access  the 
specialised  expertise  and  resources  required  for  this  effort.  In  Fiji  and  the  Pacific  region, 
where the EC had not previously supported the health sector, the EC re-allocated EUR 22 million from 
the  Investment  Facility  for  the  Pacific  (IFP)  to  help  fund  a  World  Health  Organisation  (WHO)-led 
multilateral effort to support the health sector of Fiji and other Pacific Island countries through a 
Joint Incident Management Team (JIMT) for COVID-19. In Myanmar, the EU Delegation reached out 
to EU MS to address COVID-19-related issues in the health sector. In Ecuador, the EU Delegation 
initially liaised with the government over the coverage of health in the country package, although it 
had not been active in the health sector in the five or six years prior to COVID-19.  

VARIATION IN THE RELATIVE SIZE OF COVID-19 RESPONSE PACKAGES 

Looking across countries, the size of the response packages relative to the volume of pre-
COVID-19  EU  financial  cooperation  (see  Figure  6  below)  varied  greatly,  disfavouring 
several low-income countries, but also some middle-income countries. The constraint of 
having to build the support package from funds from the multiannual financial framework 
for 2014 – 2020 which had not yet been used limited the financial space to adjust the 
scale or scope of the response to the magnitude of needs in the country. The scale of the 
COVID-19 support relative to the average annual bi-lateral commitments varied significantly across 
the 17 countries/regions covered by this assessment, from only 9 % for Turkey to close to or over 
200% for Montenegro, Ukraine, and Senegal. Several of the low-income countries (LICs) among the 
assessment sampled received less than 100% of their prior average annual cooperation envelopes 
for  the  2014-2019  period  (DRC  (12%),  Yemen  (47%),  and  Afghanistan  (68%)).  The  stakeholder 
survey found that opinions on the volume of COVID-19 support were more varied and in some cases 
much more  negative  among  national  authorities  and  EC  services than  for  other  attributes  of  the 
response.63 Across all countries, less than 30% of respondents from these groups64 found that the 
volume of support “exceeded their expectations”, while more than 60% held this opinion regarding 
the speed, flexibility, or needs correspondence of the support. While the corresponding questions only 
received a small number of responses per country,65 the feedback from the key informants selected 
for this survey showed comparatively low opinions on the scale of support in Afghanistan, a country 
that received less than 100% of its average pre-COVID-19 cooperation envelopes. The main factor 
behind  the  uneven  allocation  of  resources  to  countries  was  most  likely  the  need  to  compile  the 
COVID-19 response packages for all countries from the remaining resources from the last MFF that 

61   Such  as  the  Social  Protection  for  Community  Resilience  in  Yemen  (SPCRP)  (EUR  1.24  million),  Support  Resilient 
Livelihoods and Food Security in Yemen (ERRY II) (EUR 10 million), Strengthening Institutional and Economic Resilience 
in Yemen (SIERY) (EUR 20 million). 

62   It  was  not  possible  to  systematically  classify  all  of  the  interventions  in  the  17  countries/regions  covered  by  this 

assessment. 

63   That is, speed, flexibility, and needs correspondence.  
64   A combination of national authorities and in-country Commission services, EU Delegations and EDFIs. 
65   Responses per country range from 1 to 4 for this particular question. 

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had not yet been spent. This naturally limited the possible scale of the package, and the space for 
adjusting the response, either in scale or scope, to specific requirements or needs in the country.66 

Figure 6: Size of COVID-19 response as percentage of average annual national EU 
payments (country) for 2014 - 201967 

Source: Inventory compiled by ADE and EU Aid Explorer (European Commission payments and Trust Funds contribution 
over the period 2014-2019)  

66   One of the Ecuadorian key informants pointed out, for example, that humanitarian and socio-economic needs in the 
country during 2020 had been and still were great, and that, in relation to that, the volume of support had been very 
limited. See Appendix for details. 

67   The  figure  does  not  include  numbers  for  the  Caribbean  and  Fiji/Pacific,  as  comparing  the  figures  for  pre-COVID-19 
assistance  only  considered  national  commitments,  not  regionally  committed  amounts.  As  the  figures  for  COVID-19 
support also include regional commitments, the percentages are higher for countries that have received a large share 
of regional funds as part of the COVID-19 response. As this was the case for both the Caribbean and Fiji/Pacific, they 
were omitted from this analysis. 

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ALIGNMENT WITH HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION PRINCIPLES 

By  and  large,  the  packages  were  consistent  with  key  normative  principles  of  the  Joint 
Communication and of the EU development and humanitarian cooperation overall, such as 
focus on those most in need, respect for good governance and human rights, and gender 
equality  and  non-discrimination.68  For  low-income  countries,  emergency  support  consistently 
made up a higher share of their support packages than was the case for middle-income countries 
among the 17 case studies, reflecting the greater need for this type of aid in those countries. The 
average share of emergency support in the packages for low-income countries was close to 28% as 
opposed to 7% for medium-income countries. It ranged from 24% (Ethiopia) to 52% (Yemen), for 
four out of the five LICs in the sample.69 The one outlier was Sierra Leone, where COVID-19-related 
emergency support only constituted approximately 3% of the overall package.70 As a result, close to 
60% of the emergency COVID-19 support for the 17 countries/regions was committed to the five 
low-income  countries  across  the  17  cases.71  In  all  of  the  LICs,  the  COVID-19  support  packages 
targeted specific marginalised and vulnerable groups such as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and 
refugees, returnees, and also generally income-poor households, including workers in the informal 
sector  (Sierra  Leone)  with  specific  activities  to  help  meet  their  basic  socio-economic  needs  and 
livelihoods in the months following the start of the COVID-19 crisis. This included nutritional services 
and food aid (Afghanistan, Ethiopia), and livelihood support (Sierra Leone), also for communities with 
high shares of IDPs and returnees (Afghanistan, Ethiopia). It also included WASH support and support 
to health centres catering to these vulnerable populations (e.g., in Afghanistan, DRC, Ethiopia, Yemen). 
DG  ECHO,  responsible  for  managing  most  of  the  emergency  COVID-19  support,  realigned 
humanitarian interventions in several LICs and MICs to address the additional risks and needs faced 
by IDPs and refugees often living in densely populated camps or isolation centres.72 Packages also 
included gender-specific activities in the different Team Europe priorities. The EU provided specific 
socio-economic  support  to  women  and  girls  (e.g.,  Ethiopia,  Yemen).  In  Turkey,  a  middle-income 
country,  the  bulk  of  the  EU  response  to  COVID-19  targeted  the  population  of  refugees  from  the 
Middle East and North Africa. Several other packages for MICs included activities targeting vulnerable 
populations. 

One element not covered by COVID-19 initial response packages was the development of 
capacity for the production or distribution of vaccines. This cannot be seen as an oversight. In 
hindsight,  setting  money  aside  for  promoting  vaccines  production  and  rollout  of  vaccination 
campaigns  would  have  been  relevant.  However,  it  was  not  clear  during  2020  if  a  vaccine  would 
actually become available in the near future. That said, several of the 17 countries/regions received 
vaccines in early 2021 without being prepared for the new task of large-scale vaccine distribution73. 

68   The Joint Communication on the EU response to COVID-19 of April 2020 specified that Team Europe packages were 
expected to be “comprehensive, focused on supporting the most in need” and “support good governance, security and 
human rights, as a core part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, while respecting the Paris Agreement.”   

69   Afghanistan, DRC, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Yemen. 
70   The specific reasons for Sierra Leone receiving this small amount are not known. By comparison, support packages for 
middle-income  countries  in  the  sample  contained  on  average  7%  of  emergency  support,  with  a  range  from  zero 
(Honduras) to 15% (Ecuador). This figure excludes Turkey, where EU support to the population of refugees from the 
Middle East and North Africa meant that emergency support made up more than 50% of the COVID-19 support package 
(numbers  from  the  COVID-19  support  inventory  based  on  CRIS  and  individual  country-level  TE  COVID-19  response 
fiches). 

71   The overall share of COVID-19 funds only amounted to 20%. 
72   E.g., in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Yemen as LICs, but also in Turkey. 
73   The EU did support the COVAX facility and, towards the end of 2020, also began preparing the payment of grants to 
allow partner countries to purchase vaccines. A total of EUR 70 million in grants under one such effort, directed at 
countries in the Western Balkans, were signed and paid in full by May 2021, according to EU information. Also, according 

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5.  EQ  2  – 
COHERENCE  DURING  THE  EC 
RESPONSE 

INCREASED  COORDINATION  AND 
INITIAL  COVID-19 

EQ2: To what extent did the Team Europe initial response add benefits to what would 
have resulted from actions taken by the EU institutions and EU Member States on their 
own? 

Summary  answer: Coordination  among  EC  services,  and  coherence  with  EU  MS  and  EDFIs,  and 
coordination with non-EU partners did intensify in many countries during the initial response to the 
COVID-19  crisis,  both  at  national  and  regional  levels.  The  EU  COVID-19  response  in  partner 
countries also bolstered EU visibility at country-level, its credibility as a partner in the COVID-19 
response, and its ability to convene actors around a coordinated response to the pandemic. While 
not the only enabling factor, the Team Europe approach did contribute to these achievements in 
several cases. It increased the visibility of the COVID-19 response of the EU and its Member States. 
In  about  half  of  the  cases,  the  Team  Europe  approach  also  facilitated  steps  towards  a  more 
coherent EU COVID-19 response at country level. While the primary form of cooperation consisted 
of  sharing  information  and  analyses,  increased  political  commitment  tied  to  the  Team  Europe 
approach did help in several countries to push cooperation beyond the sharing of information. This 
may  have  facilitated  greater  effectiveness  of  the  EU-COVID  response  in  at  least  a  few  cases. 
However,  gaps  in  the  conceptual  guidance  on  the  early  Team  Europe  approach  limited  its 
contribution to a more coordinated and coherent pandemic response. Specifically, the emphasis on 
political commitment to cooperation of the approach was not enough to address and overcome 
more systemic bottlenecks for greater cooperation between the EU and its Member States.  This 
also explains why the Team Europe approach did not significantly help to improve coordination 
between  EC  services  in  charge  of  development  (DG INTPA  and  DG  NEAR)  and  EC  humanitarian 
services (DG ECHO) as key EU stakeholders of the humanitarian-development nexus. 

THE  TEAM  EUROPE  APPROACH  BROUGHT  POLITICAL  COMMITMENT  TO  COORDINATION  AND  COHERENCE  OF 
COVID-19 RESPONSE 

By endorsing the newly devised Team Europe approach, the EU, its Member States and the 
European  Financial  Institutions74  politically  committed  to  a  joint,  coordinated,  and 
coherent response to COVID-19 in partner countries. In its conclusions of June 8, 2020,75 the 
Council confirmed its full support of the Team Europe approach, and called for “joint, swift, visible, 
and transparent” response to the pandemic. EU MS specifically endorsed several concrete elements 
of  the  Team  Europe  approach.  This  included  the  drawing  of  contributions  from  all  Team  Europe 
members,76 information sharing and coordinated, coherent actions of Team Europe members, joint 
needs  assessments,  joint  monitoring,  consistency  between  the  humanitarian/emergency  response 
and  medium  to  longer-term  COVID-19  support,  and  joint  communication  efforts  using  the  Team 
Europe label.77 Representatives of EU MS and Commission services at the level of headquarters who 

to EU information, Commission services began to prepare grants for the World Bank and WHO for the development of 
vaccine capacities of recipient countries. These actions fell outside of the temporal scope of this assessment.  

74   The European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
75   Council conclusions on Team Europe Global Response to COVID-19, June 8, 2020. 
76   I.e.,  the  EU  and  its  MS,  implementing  agencies,  the  European  Investment  Bank  (EIB),  and  other  European  financial 

institutions, including the Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 

77   See text of the Council conclusions on Team Europe Global Response to COVID-19, June 8, 2020. 

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were surveyed78 for this assessment expected the Team Europe approach to yield future benefits in 
particular  in  relation  to  the  visibility  of  the  EU  (79%),  improved  coordination  (77%),  and  joint 
programming (70%). 

THE RESPONSE TO COVID-19 FACILITATED GREATER COHERENCE AND INCREASED VISIBILITY OF 
EU EXTERNAL ACTION 

Coordination  among  Commission  services,  and  with  EU  MS  and  EDFIs,  and  coordination 
with  non-EU  partners  did  intensify  in  about  half  the  case  study  countries  and  regions 
during  the  initial  response  to  the  COVID-19  crisis.  Over  50%  of  respondents  from  EU 
Delegations and country-office staff of the Commission’s humanitarian services reported observing 
closer coordination and coherence with EU MS. An even greater share of them thought that they had 
cooperated  more  closely  than  before  with  the  WHO.  50%  of  survey  respondents  among  national 
authorities  found  that  coordination  with  the  EU  had  improved.79  Overall,  close  to  60%  of  non-EU 
stakeholders80 felt that their coordination with their respective EU Delegations had intensified for the 
COVID-19  response.81  Coordination  activities  ranged  from  compilations  of  data  on  COVID-19 
support82 to pooling resources for needs assessments (Ecuador)  and technical  advice (DR Congo), 
flagship initiatives (the EU Humanitarian Air Bridge in Yemen), and joint results matrices and joint 
policy dialogue with national authorities (Senegal). Joint situation analyses were the most frequent 
form of collaboration. More intensive forms of collaboration, such as joint M&E that required more 
closely aligned programming, where comparatively less frequent.83  

In Montenegro, Fiji,  and Ukraine, coordination increased also at regional  level. In Montenegro, this 
included coordination on situation analyses, response planning, and prioritisation of the COVID-19 
response  initiated  at  headquarters  and  involving  the  EU  Delegation,  EEAS,  several  Commission 
services at HQ level (DG NEAR, DG SANTE, DG ECFIN), and the European Centre for Disease Control 
(ECDC). In Ukraine, coordination intensified in both the national and regional programmes under the 
Eastern  Partnership.  This  included  the  EU4Business  Initiative  in  support  of  Small  and  Medium 
Enterprises  affected  by  the  pandemic;  and  the  programme  “U-LEAD”,  bringing  together  the  EU, 
Germany, Poland, Sweden, Denmark, Estonia, and Slovenia. In Fiji, where among EU MS only France 
is  present,  the  EU  Delegation  stepped  up  its  coordination  with  non-EU  actors  (international 
organisations and non-governmental organisations present in multi-country programmes), notably 
with the WHO-led Pacific Joint Incident Management Team (JIMT) for COVID-19.  

The EU COVID-19 response in partner countries and regions also bolstered EU visibility at 
national/regional-level,  its  credibility  as  a  partner  in  the  COVID-19  response,  and  its 
ability to convene actors around a coordinated response to the crisis resulting from the 
pandemic. Survey results clearly suggest that the initial response to the pandemic made a positive 

78   Representatives  of  11  EU  Member  States  (HQ-level)  responded  to  the  survey  (response  rate  of  40%)  and  three 

representatives from Commission services (HQ-level) responded to the survey. 

79   Only 46% of respondents among National Authorities thought that cooperation and coordination between them and 
the EU Delegation had improved during the COVID-19 response in comparison to the pre-COVID-19 time. A slightly 
greater share (51%) found that it had stayed the same. 

80   This includes UN agencies and other international organisations, implementing partners, EU MS, and non-EU donors. 
81   Only 2.5% of respondents thought that their cooperation with their EU Delegations had worsened; online survey among 

key EU stakeholders for the COVID-19 response of May – June 2021. 
82   E.g. through the country-level Team Europe COVID-19 response fiches. 
83   According to the online survey, 80% of respondents from EC services, EU Delegations, and EDFIs found that coordination 
across Team Europe “frequently” or “very frequently” took the form of joint situation analyses. More intensive forms of 
cooperation, such as cooperation for joint M&E, which requires more closely aligned programming were less common. 
Only around 30% of respondents from EC services, EU Delegations, and EDFIs found that this occurred “frequently” or 
“very frequently”. 

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difference  to  the  EU’s  standing  in  partner  countries.84  Overall,85  about  three-quarters  of  all  173 
respondents to the surveys conducted  in the 17 partner countries and regions86 felt that the role 
played by the EU in responding to the COVID-19 crisis had increased its national or regional visibility. 
A slightly larger share (78% of respondents) felt that this role had made the EU a more credible 
partner in the pandemic response. Approximately 70% thought that this had increased the EU’s ability 
to convene other actors around a future, coordinated response. Even among non-EU stakeholders, 
leaving aside the opinions from EU staff in country representations and selected global partners, the 
opinions  of  the  role  played  by  the  EU  in  the  response  to  the  pandemic  were  just  as  positive. 
Approximately 75% of EU in-country partners87 and over 85% of national authorities felt that the 
pandemic response had increased EU visibility and that it had strengthened its credibility as an actor 
in the COVID-19 response.  Just over 60% of in-country partners and  73% of national  authorities 
thought that this had increased the EU’s in-country convening power. 

Figure 7: Visibility of EU COVID-response in partner countries 

"EU COVID-19 support has increased EU visibility?"

EU-MS, Commission services (HQ)

21%

71%

7%

Partners (UN, NGOs, bi-lateral agencies)

National authorities

45%

44%

42%

12%

41%

2%

12%

EUDs & humanit. country offices

28%

53%

9%

10%

Total

26%

50%

10%

14%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Strongly agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

Do not know

Source: Survey conducted by ADE 

THE  TEAM  EUROPE  APPROACH  MADE  THE  EU  RESPONSE  TO  COVID-19  MORE  COHERENT  AND 
VISIBLE THAN IT WOULD HAVE BEEN WITHOUT IT.  

The Team Europe approach increased the visibility of the response to COVID-19 by the EU 
and its Member States. Overall, 66% of survey respondents from EU Delegations, field offices of 
Commission humanitarian services and EDFIs felt that the Team Europe approach had increased the 
visibility of the EU and its Member States in relation to the response to COVID-19 in partner countries. 
19% of these respondents disagreed with this notion. Across all groups of respondents, 28% had not 

84   This is based on surveys conducted in 17 of the EU’s partner countries and regions. The data therefore strictly speaking 

cannot shed light on the perception of the EU in all partner countries. 

85   Including responses from various types of organisational partners of the EU at country level (both current implementing 
partners and organisations without such relationship with the EU at the time of the survey), national authorities, and 
other non-governmental umbrella organisations; but also representatives from EU Delegations, country offices of EC 
humanitarian services, and EDFIs. 

86   Overall, the survey had a response rate of 34%; i.e., with 173 responses to the 541 invitations to participate in the 

survey which had been sent out. For details, see Annex 4. 

87   Including UN organisations, bilateral development agencies (EU and non-EU), INGOs and NGOs; serving as implementing 

partners and those without such affiliation. 

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yet heard of the Team Europe approach (see Figure 8). Messaging on the EU COVID-19 response 
referred  to  the  Team  Europe  approach  in  about  three  quarters  of  the  cases,  albeit  with  some 
differences  in  consistency.  The  Team  Europe  approach  was  comparatively  well  promoted  in  the 
Caribbean, Ecuador, Fiji, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Ukraine.  

Figure 8: Team Europe contribution to visibility of EU COVID-19 response 

"Team Europe made EU COVID-19 response more visible"

EU-MS, Commission services (HQ)

7%

43%

14%

29%

7%

Partners (UN, NGOs, bi-lateral agencies)

13%

27%

8%

18%

National authorities

20%

26%

3%

17%

34%

31%

EUDs & humanit. country offices

40%

26%

19%

6%

8%

Total

20%

27%

12%

13%

28%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Strongly Agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

Do not know

Team Europe not known

Source: Survey conducted by ADE 

In  South  Africa,  the  Team  Europe  approach  proved  suitable  politically  to  communicate  on  a 
combined Team Europe package made of comparatively small individual contributions from the EU 
and its Member States (see Box 2). Joint, combined reporting and communication on the Team Europe 
COVID-19 response was also seen as an opportunity in several other case study countries or regions.88 
The development of the budget support programme “EU Daan Corona” in Senegal was one example 
of increased visibility associated with the Team Europe approach (see Box 3). 

Box 2: South Africa - combining smaller EU aid contributions under the Team Europe 
brand to raise their visibility  

In  South  Africa,  the  EU  and  its  Member  States  considered  the  Team  Europe  concept 
useful  for  combining  comparatively  small  individual  contributions  to  the  COVID-19 
response into a larger, more visible support package. The combined support was presented 
in a communication product as “Team Europe’s Response to COVID-19 in South Africa”, where 
the  “European  Union  and  its  Member  States,  acting together  as  ‘Team  Europe’”  were  working 
“alongside the South African government to help address this crisis”. When this assessment was 
being carried out, the EU Delegation and EU MS had just initiated meetings to develop a shared 
communication  strategy  on  Team  Europe  approach   and its  role  in  the COVID-19  response  in 
South Africa. 

In about half of the 17 case studies, the Team Europe approach also facilitated moving 
towards a more coherent EU COVID-19 response at national and regional levels. Among 
staff from EU Delegations, country offices of Commission humanitarian services and EDFIs, 76% of 

88   This included, among others, the Caribbean, Kenya, Senegal, and Sierra Leone: 

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survey respondents thought that the Team Europe approach was one element that had helped to 
increase coordination and coherence among the EU and its Member States and EDFIs89 (see Figure 
9). In those cases, in-country Commission staff felt political emphasis from HQ had created greater 
commitment  at  country-level  to  work  together  more  closely  on  the  pandemic  response.  Most 
commonly, this manifested itself in more frequent sharing of situation analysis and of other 
information, also aided by the country-level Team Europe COVD-19 response country fiches90.  

Figure 9: Contribution of Team Europe to coordination and coherence of EU COVID-19 
response 

"TE increased coordination and cooperation among EU and 
Member States"

EU-MS, Commission services (HQ)

14%

43%

14%

22%

7%

Partners (UN, NGOs, bi-lateral agencies)

8%

29%

6%

22%

34%

National authorities

20%

30%

7%

9%

31%

EUDs & humanit. country offices

31%

45%

8%

7%

8%

Total

17%

33%

7%

14%

28%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Strongly Agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

Do not know

Team Europe not known

Source: Survey conducted by ADE 

The “Team Europe political appeal” for cooperation helped to push cooperation beyond the 
sharing of information in several case study countries. Positive examples include the design 
of a budget COVID-19 support package for Senegal (see Box 3), the aligning of cooperation priorities 
and the creation of a new coordination mechanism (“Mesa COVID-19”) and programming mechanism 
for the COVID-19 response in Africa (see below), and joint negotiations on EU contributions to the UN 
emergency appeal for South Africa (see below). 

89   8% disagreed with this claim, another 15% either had no opinion or had not yet heard of Team Europe. 
90   Based on information from the case studies and open-ended questions in the stakeholder survey on the value-added 

and limitations of the Team Europe approach.  

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Box 3: Senegal – Using the Team Europe approach to facilitate coordination and joint 
action around budget support 

In Senegal, the bulk of the EU support package consisted of a new EUR 111.7 million budget 
support contract “EU Daan Corona”. While coordination, complementarity and coherence 
in  the  country  were  already  strong  pre-COVID-19,  the  Team  Europe  approach  was 
credited  with  improving  coordination  and  also  increasing  EU  convening  power  with 
non-EU donors/actors. The budget support matrix was a natural focal point for coordinating 
policy  messages  and  support  to  the  government.  The  EU  Delegation  became  chair  of  the 
development partners’ coordination group and jointly with Germany, the International Monetary 
Fund, and the World Bank, engaged in dialogue with the authorities, and led the preparation of 
the BS matrix. The matrix was signed by all BS providers in Senegal: the African Development 
Bank  (AfDB),  French  Development  Agency  (AFD),  Canada,  Spain,  and  Japan  International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA). The EC cooperated closely with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
on ensuring appropriate governance and transparency of the implementation of the government’s 
measures against COVID-19. KfW Development Bank disbursed its EUR 100 million in the form 
of grants on the basis of the EC disbursement file prepared for the budget support contract “EU 
Daan Corona”.  France, the World Bank and AfDB ultimately implemented their own public policy-
lending  programmes,  with  a  separate  set  of  disbursement  triggers.  The  EU  also  cooperated 
closely  with  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  on  ensuring  appropriate  governance  and 
transparency of the COVID-19 response. Four out of five key informants who responded to an 
online survey for this assessment, associated the Team Europe approach with the EU COVID-19 
response  in  the  country.  Government  representatives  among  the  respondents  welcomed  the 
“pooling of actions” and the “speaking with one voice” the Team Europe approach had facilitated 
in their view. EU MS and other non-EU partners credited the approach with helping to enhance 
efficiency of coordination with the government and other partners. All respondents thought the 
Team Europe approach had facilitated increased visibility of the EU and its Member States. 

In  Ecuador,  the  Team  Europe  approach  helped  to  align  priorities  and  to  bring  about  a 
coordination mechanism and dialogue process involving government partners, the EU and 
its Member States, UN agencies, and other actors. A “Mesa COVID-19” brought together seven 
ministries and 12+ EU actors and partners to agree on priorities and organise the recovery, including 
a joint monitoring framework to gauge progress.91 With reference to the Team Europe approach, the 
EU  Delegation  and  EU  MS  supported  a  UNDP-led  joint  COVID-19  Recovery  Needs  Assessment 
(thereafter complemented by further needs analysis under Mesa COVID-19) and a mapping of EU 
cooperation to guide post-COVID-19 recovery in July 2020, in consultation with national authorities, 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs), and the private sector.92 The Team Europe approach also 
inspired the EU and Member States in Ecuador to join efforts in programming for the next 
MFF,  beyond  immediate  COVID-19  needs  with  a  longer  term  perspective,  in  view  of 
“Building Back Better and greener” through the so called “Team Europe Initiatives”. Over 
the short-term, and against the backdrop of scarce financial resources at the end of the MFF 2014-
2020  and  corresponding  limited  programming  options  in  Ecuador  and  other  countries,  the  needs 
assessment did not influence the design of the COVID-19 response package for the country.93 

91   Country-level Team Europe COVID-19 response fiche Ecuador 15/07/20, Minutes Premesa 01/10/20, EcuTEI Sept. 2020, 

Interviews. 

92   Since April 2020, a similar COVID-19 recovery needs assessment was applied in four other countries (South Africa, 

Azerbaijan, El Salvador, Haiti). 

93   Supported by key informant interviews. 

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However, the added value of this coordination effort linked to the Team Europe approach 
should be assessed over a longer term. 

In South Africa, the EU and its Member States made use of the Team Europe approach to present 
their  COVID-19  response  to  the  public,  which  also  led  to  efforts  to  develop  a  more  coordinated 
communication campaign on the COVID-19 response and beyond (see Box 2). Beyond that, the EU 
and its Member States also referred to the Team Europe approach when they negotiated EU 
contributions  to  the  UN  emergency  appeal  on  COVID-19  for  South  Africa.  The  Team  Europe 
concept was also used to frame assistance opportunities beyond the initial COVID-19 response.  

TEAM  EUROPE  CONTRIBUTIONS  TO  EFFECTIVENESS  OF  THE  EU  RESPONSE  TO  THE  COVID-19 
CRISIS 

The Team Europe may have facilitated greater effectiveness of the EU COVID-19 response 
in a limited number of case study countries and regions by intensifying cooperation and 
coordination among and between the EU and its Member States. Information from the case 
studies  and  data from  the  online survey suggest  that in  a limited number of countries  the  Team 
Europe approach may have contributed to the effectiveness of the EU COVID-19 response.94 Overall, 
38% of survey respondents thought that the  Team Europe approach had made the EU pandemic 
response more effective or ‘impactful’.95 Support for this thesis was relatively constant. Across the 
different  stakeholder  groups  targeted  in  the  survey,  at  least  30%  thought  that  the  Team  Europe 
approach  had  made  a  positive  difference  in  this  regard.96  Views  were  more  positive  among 
Commission services and EU Member States (see Figure 10). 

Figure 10: Contribution of Team Europe on EU-COVID response effectiveness 
(perceptions) 

"Team Europe has made EU-COVID response more 
impactful"

EU-MS, Commission services (HQ)

14%

29%

7%

43%

7%

Partners (UN, NGOs, bi-lateral agencies)

15%

19%

5%

27%

National authorities

13%

29%

7%

17%

34%

31%

EUDs & humanit. country offices

14%

43%

22%

13%

8%

Total

13%

25%

9%

24%

28%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Strongly Agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

Do not know

Team Europe not known

Source: Survey conducted by ADE 

94   This comparison relies on information gathered in interviews and through the analysis of documents for case studies 
that was interpreted by the evaluators. It also draws on the perception of country stakeholders collected through the 
online stakeholder surveys.  

95   Phrasing used in the online questionnaire. 
96   These  were  representatives  at  headquarters  level  from  EU  Member  States  and  Commission  services;  in-country  or 
regional  EU  partners  (UN,  NGOs,  INGOs,  bi-lateral  development  agencies);  National  Authorities,  and  staff  from  EU 
Delegations, country offices of EC humanitarian services, and in-country or regional staff of EDFIs. 

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In  five  out  of  the  17  case  studies  (Honduras,  Senegal,  Sierra  Leone,  South  Africa,  and  Ukraine) 
respondents to the online survey among EU staff, national authorities, and other partners97 uniformly 
agreed that the Team Europe approach had added to the effectiveness of the EU pandemic response. 
(see Table 4). In another five case studies (Caribbean, DRC, Ecuador, Kenya, and Montenegro), Team 
Europe respondents from at least two of these three groups thought that the Team Europe approach 
had had a facilitating effect on the effectiveness of the EU response to the pandemic. 

Table 4: Stakeholder agreement on Team Europe contribution to effectiveness of EU 
COVID-19 response 

Positive  views  (ü)  on 
Team 
Europe 
effectiveness among… 

y
r
t
n
u
o
c
-
n

i

U
E
…

f
f
a
t
s

✓ 

✓ 

✓ 

Countries 

(Ecuador), 
Ukraine 

South Africa 

(Caribbean), 
(DRC), 
Honduras, 
(Kenya), 
(Montenegro) 

Senegal, 
Sierra Leone 

l

a
n
o
i
t
a
N
…

s
e
i
t
i
r
o
h
t
u
A
✓ 

,

s
O
G
N

I

S
M
-
U
E

,

N
U

.
.

,

s
O
G
N
✓ 

)
s
P

I

.
l
c
n
i
(

Comments / Explanations 

In  Ecuador,  two  survey  respondents  strongly  disagreed  with  a 
positive role of Team Europe approach for effectiveness; one stating 
that Team Europe members only met to talk about “what everyone 
had  always  been  doing”,  without  giving  space  to  rethinking  their 
actions or coordinating them. 

✓ 

N/A 

✓ 

In  Caribbean,  DRC,  Kenya,  and  Montenegro,  at  least  one  key 
respondent held negative  views on  the effect of the  Team Europe 
approach on the effectiveness of the EU pandemic response. In some 
cases (Kenya, Montenegro), these respondents acknowledged Team 
Europe  approach  effects  on  coordination  and  visibility  but  did  not 
think the approach had substantially improved results. 

✓ 

✓ 

N/A 

Country names without brackets: uniformly held positive views; Country names in brackets: some differences 
in opinion (see “comments/explanations”) 

Source: Survey conducted by ADE 

The resulting list contains some of the countries and regions that provided some particularly positive 
examples  of  Team  Europe  approach  contributions.  These  include  Senegal,  with  its  successful 
cooperative  development  of  a  joint  budget  support  operation  to  respond  to  COVID-19,  and 
Montenegro, with a strong Team Europe approach-inspired effort to coordinate at regional level. The 
picture is less clear-cut for other countries, including Ecuador, where the approach inspired a new 
coordination mechanism for COVID-19 support (“Mesa COVID-19”), but where the relevance of these 
coordination efforts for the delivery of the support packages is not yet well-established. The evidence 
at country level on this question is therefore not conclusive. However, the above picture can serve as 
a point of departure for further inquiry. 

97   Depending on the case study, partners who responded to the online survey included EU Member States, UN agencies, 

non-EU donors; some of whom also had acted as EU implementing partners during 2020. 

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ALTERNATIVE  FACTORS  AND  FACTORS  DETRACTING  FROM  THE  FACILITATING  ROLE  OF  THE  TEAM 
EUROPE APPROACH 

The  Team  Europe  approach  was  not  the  only  factor  that  contributed  to  increasing  the 
visibility of the EU in the global response to the COVID-19 crisis in partner countries and 
regions; and to increased coordination and cooperation among and between the EU, its 
Member States and EDFIs. This was supported by evidence from the case studies and from the 
online survey, where opinions on the EU role in the pandemic response were more positive than the 
opinions on the Team Europe approach. Across all groups, a majority of respondents thought that the 
EU pandemic response had increased EU visibility at country level; however, only less than half of 
respondents thought the Team Europe approach had played a role in making the EU more visible98. 
The difference in positive views on EU visibility and on the contribution of the Team Europe approach 
to this visibility was even larger among in-country EU partners (UN organisations, bi-lateral donors, 
NGOs and INGOs)99 and National Authorities.100  

In-country or regional staff of EU Delegations, EU humanitarian offices or offices of EDFIs mentioned 
several factors that in their view had limited the added value of the early Team Europe 
approach for the COVID-19 response. Most commonly, staff from EU Delegations, DG ECHO country 
offices and in-country staff from EDFIs referred to the newness of the approach, pointing out that 
it was “still to be implemented” in their country,101 or that they had not yet received sufficient 
information  on  the  concept  itself  and  its  implications  for  their  work  at  country  level.102  Others 
perceived  the  focus  of  the  Team  Europe  approach  to  be  on  “common  reporting  and  information 
sharing”, which in their view had kept it from addressing systemic, organisational bottlenecks 
for cooperation103, including “different internal  processes and procedures” and “differing financing 
timelines” of the EU and its Member States, with new “capacities and resources104.  

In other cases, limited in-country presence of EU Member States or EDFIs or low interest 
among  those  that  were  present  had  limited  opportunities  for  joint  initiatives105.  An 
inclination  among  EU  Member  States  to  highlight  their  own  contributions  had  impeded  the 
formulation of a joint approaches in two countries. In at least three countries, EU officials indicated 
that the COVID-19 pandemic was only one of several equally important issues or crises they had to 
address,  which  in  their view  had  reduced  the  incentives  among the  EU  and its  Member  States  to 
emphasise the Team Europe approach and the COVID-19 response (also see Box 4 for details). 

98   While 77% of respondents overall thought that the role played by the EU in the pandemic response had increased EU 
visibility,  only  47%  thought  that  the  Team  Europe  approach  had  contributed  to  EU  visibility,  a  difference  of  30 
percentage points. See Figure 7 and Figure 8 in comparison. 

99   Among UN organisations, NGOs, INGOs and bi-lateral donors in country, 87% of respondents felt that the EU response 
to COVID-19 had increased EU visibility, while only 40% thought that Team Europe had contributed; a difference of 47 
percentage points. 

100  Among National Authorities, 85% thought that the EU pandemic response had increased EU visibility, and only 46% 

thought the Team Europe approach had contributed to this regard, a difference of 39 percentage point. 

101  Feedback from at least two EU Delegations in case study countries/regions. 
102  Mentioned by five Delegations. 
103  EU Delegation officials in at least three countries. 
104  Interview with EU officials. 
105  This was the case, among other things, in Caribbean, Fiji and Sierra Leone. 

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Box 4: Multi-dimensional crises and policy agendas and their effect on the adoption of 
the Team Europe approach 

The prevalence of complex, multi-dimensional policy and social agendas, evolving around 
socio-economic issues or also tied to crisis conditions, may have made it more difficult for 
the Team Europe approach to take hold in certain countries. These circumstances made it 
more likely  that the EU  and its Member States were already members of several  other, well-
established platforms and mechanisms. This was the case in Afghanistan, for example, where 
cooperation and coordination centered primarily on the structures of MDTFs (also see below). The 
EU undertook significant communication efforts on the multilateral response to COVID-19 in the 
country,  but  did  so  without  strongly  referencing  the  Team  Europe  approach.  In  Afghanistan, 
Yemen, and in Myanmar, the opinion was also that COVID-19 was just one among many factors 
of the ongoing multidimensional crisis. In Yemen, one of the most visible achievements of the EU 
and  its  Member  States  was  the  strengthened  coordination  for  the  deployment  of  the  EU 
Humanitarian  Air  Bridge.  The  Commission  and  Sweden  had  launched  the  “air  bridge”  jointly; 
however,  without  associating  it  with  the  approach.  In  Montenegro,  communication  around  the 
COVID-19 response centred on the country’s EU accession status. The EU Delegation therefore 
favoured the use of the “EU for you” hashtag over Team Europe approach messaging. However, 
the Team Europe approach remained visible at regional level. 

Stakeholders of the EU COVID-19 response also pointed to a number of factors other than Team 
Europe that they felt had intensified cooperation and coordination of the EU response to the 
pandemic. Very commonly, this included a  sense of  urgency to respond to unprecedented crisis 
conditions.106  Stakeholders  also  pointed  out  that  incentives  and  opportunities  for  cooperation  and 
coordination  of  the  pandemic  response  had  also  been  linked  to  well-established  and  deeply 
institutionalised cooperation mechanisms that existed well before the breakout of the pandemic 
(see box below). In addition, countries saw the emergence of new non-EU coordination platforms 
for the COVID-19 response. In particular, the WHO facilitated coordinated actions with the EU, its 
Member  States,  and  with  non-EU  actors.107  Such  mechanisms  facilitated  coordination  but  did  not 
leave space for or require the additional impetus from a Team Europe approach.108  

106  Mentioned by at least five EU in-country officials. 
107  Mentioned in at least six of the country/regional cases or survey responses. 
108  Mentioned in at least four of the case studies and in two survey responses. 

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Box 5: Existing coordination mechanisms and their effect on the early Team Europe 
approach 

Well-established  coordination  mechanisms  and  structures  that  pre-dated  the  start  of  the 
COVID-19  crisis  generally  facilitated  a  speedy,  cooperative  roll-out  of  the  EU  COVID-19 
response. Faced with the urgency of the pandemic, the EU, its Member States and other partners primarily 
used existing mechanisms to exchange information, pool resources, and otherwise work together. From the 
perspective of Team Europe approach, however, such mechanisms enabled the adoption of the approach, 
but also hindered it. Their effect depended very much on the specific characteristics of each mechanism, 
the composition of the group of partners, and the policy context. In Senegal, for example, a well-established 
culture of cooperation linked to the “Groupe Europe” operating in Senegal since 2014 (bringing together 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Spain, the EU Delegation and the EIB) and 
prior experience with joint budget support facilitated the adoption of the Team Europe approach for the EU 
COVID response in the country. In countries such as Afghanistan (MDTFs) or Montenegro (the EU accession 
framework), the presence of strong, coordination platforms (in the case of Afghanistan also led by non-EU 
partners), paired with complex, multi-dimensional policy or crisis contexts (see Box 4), made it more difficult 
for  the  Team  Europe  approach  to  take  hold.  In  those  circumstances,  in-country  EU  staff  members  and 
implementing  partners  felt  that  they  did  “what  they  always  did”  in  terms  of  information  sharing, 
coordination and communication for the EU pandemic response 

LITTLE ATTEMPT TO BRIDGE THE HUMANITARIAN-DEVELOPMENT GAP  

In only a small number of case study countries and regions did the Commission try to use 
the  COVID-19  response  to  help  bridge  the  humanitarian-development  gap.  In  Yemen,  EU 
actors,  non-EU  international  partners,  and  national  stakeholders  undertook  analyses  and  policy 
dialogue on more effective coordination between humanitarian and development actors and issues 
for  the  years  2020  and  2021.  The  COVID-19  response  in  Yemen  was  articulated  along  a 
humanitarian-development continuum, using a combination of re-orientation of existing DG ECHO 
programmes, and of fund reallocations of DG INTPA assistance towards affected sectors and most 
vulnerable  populations.  In  Myanmar,  the  Nexus  Response  Mechanism  (NRM),  a  pilot  programme 
operating similarly to a facility with high degree of flexibility, helped to facilitate a more efficient 
response  to  COVID-19109.  Integrating  COVID-19  support  into  peace  processes  was  generally  not 
attempted; it is unclear what factors prevented this from happening.  

improve  coordination  between  Commission  services 

While the Team Europe approach and the EU COVID-19 response as a whole facilitated 
better  coordination  between  the  EU  and  its  Member  States,  the  response  did  not 
in  charge  of 
significantly 
development (DG INTPA and DG NEAR) and Commission humanitarian services (DG ECHO) 
as key EU stakeholders of the Humanitarian-Development nexus. The Joint Guidance on the 
COVID-19  response  and  Team  Europe  approach  gave  the  primary  responsibility  for  country-level 
coordination  to  the  EU  Delegations.110  However,  in  countries  with  large  emergency  response 
components,  EU  Delegations  and  country  offices  of  DG  ECHO  often  shared  the  lead  role.  In 
Afghanistan, for example, DG ECHO was the main interlocutor for the COVID-19 emergency response. 
DG ECHO built on their established presence in the country, their relationship with government and 
provincial  authorities, their  role  in  the  Humanitarian Donor  Group,  and  the  network  of  partners in 

109  It should be noted that outside the 17 case studies, there are cases where scenario-planning efforts aim to anticipate 
the impact of COVID-19 on security, peace, and politics (with best-case, medium, and worst-case scenarios and resulting 
recommendations for critical actions), such as in northeast Nigeria (information collected in interviews). 

110  See Section 3.2 and the beginning of this chapter. 

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Water,  Sanitation  and  Health  (WASH),  and  protection.  Both  services  played  critical  roles  in  EU 
advocacy  efforts  with  key  donors,  the  Afghan  government,  and  EU  Member  States.111  There  was 
undoubtedly  a  certain  measure  of  horizontal  coordination  between  the  two  services.  The  Team 
Europe  approach  response  fiche  also  facilitated  the  compilation  of  information  from  both  sides. 
However,  neither  the  COVID-19  response  as  such  nor  the  approach  fundamentally  changed  the 
coordination structures or dynamic between the two services.112  

Multiple funding streams added to the coordination challenge. In Turkey, for example, the COVID-19 
response drew on resources from the Facility, the EUTF, the HIP 2020, and the Instrument for Pre-
Accession Assistance (IPA), all of them outside of any cross-institutional oversight beyond the high-
level oversight by DG NEAR.  

The approach and timeline of this assessment did not allow for the in-depth assessment of factors 
that would have enabled or limited the strengthening of the nexus approach in connection with the 
EU pandemic response. However, it appears that the COVID-19 response did not offer opportunities 
for fundamental structural reforms that would have strengthened the nexus approach above and 
beyond its pre-pandemic status. This related to the general dynamic of the roll-out of the response, 
characterised by a sense of urgency to make support available quickly; to rely in many cases on the 
adaptation of existing programmes; and to seek coordination and cooperation with other partners 
while relying predominantly on existing structures and coordination mechanisms.  

111  DG ECHO notes 2021, Interviews May 2021; Team Europe Country Fiche, May 2020. Several of the case studies with a 
strong emergency response were in the middle of a protracted crisis rather than a singular humanitarian disaster (e.g., 
Afghanistan, DRC, Yemen). In these situations, DG ECHO interventions have also included a medium-term component 
(strengthening health systems for example). 

112  The additional EUR 50 million allocated to Afghanistan was divided between DG INTPA and DG ECHO. This money would 
have provided a good opportunity for an integrated humanitarian and development response. However, the two resulting 
programmes operated independently of each other. 

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6.  EQ  3  –  FLEXIBLE  ADAPTATION  TO  COVID-19 
REQUIREMENTS 

EQ3: To what extent were, and are, the individual aid modalities and other aid delivery 
mechanisms  and  their  combinations  efficient  and  flexible  enough  for  use  in  Team 
Europe’s COVID-19 response under the COVID-19 crisis conditions? 

Summary  answer:  Overall,  the  EU  succeeded  in  deploying  its  external  crisis  response  toolkit  in 
relatively  short  timeframes,  considering  the  normal  duration  of  Commission  procurement 
procedures. To respond as quickly as possible to the pandemic, the Commission used flexibility 
provisions and introduced new ones to speed up the response to COVID-19. This enabled the EU to 
adapt  its  wide  range  of  external  crisis  aid  modalities  and  mechanisms.  The  Commission  often 
continued working with the aid modalities and mechanisms already used to implement its portfolio 
of interventions prior to COVID-19. It rapidly mobilised considerable EU financial resources through 
30 BS programmes, most of them already ongoing prior to COVID-19. BS funds were transferred 
to the Treasury of partner countries, most often during the last quarter of the year, to preserve 
their macroeconomic stability and sustain their socio-economic activity. In humanitarian settings, 
the procedures in place were flexible but the response managed by the Commission humanitarian 
services still showed a mixed picture on the speed of disbursement. Adjusting existing cooperation 
programmes was often swift, especially when no rider was required to ongoing contracts, but could 
also be lengthy. When trust funds were used, whilst the response was generally quickly designed, 
the support was often delivered with delays to the final beneficiaries. Observed delays were mostly 
due to global market shortages on all medical equipment and material but also to tense political 
contexts.  Blending  and  guarantees  did  not  prove  fit  to  deliver  an  emergency  response.  The 
Commission  often  followed  the  response  provided  through  existing  monitoring  and  evaluation 
(M&E) mechanisms. It did not feel the need to set up a dedicated monitoring system to report on 
the  global  outputs  and  outcomes  reached  during  the  pandemic.  Through  BS,  the  Commission 
placed stronger emphasis on the accountability in the management of COVID-19 funds by partner 
countries in some countries. 

FLEXIBILITY PROVISIONS  USED TO MAXIMISE  THE TEAM EUROPE APPROACH  RESPONSIVENESS TO 
THE COVID-19 CRISIS 

The Commission made extensive use of existing flexibility provisions and introduced new 
ones to maximise the responsiveness of its aid modalities and mechanisms to the COVID-
19 crisis. Following the outbreak of COVID-19, DG ECHO, DG INTPA and DG NEAR issued guidelines 
and adapted their procedures. DG ECHO issued guidelines for IOs and NGOs to cope with these 
exceptional circumstances.113 These guidelines laid down provisions to derogate from procurement 
rules because of COVID-19 (by applying the derogation existing in the partner’s internal procedure) 
and to redirect funding within an ongoing action to the COVID-19 response. Changes in activities 
should be 100% flexible, unless they qualify as substantial changes to the action, hence triggering 
an amendment. For the response managed by DG INTPA and DG NEAR, all partner countries were 
considered  eligible  for  the  crisis  declaration  list.  This  enabled  the  use  of  more  flexible 
procedures, usually circumscribed to situations of conflict and fragility. These procedures were to 
hasten the procurement of essential goods and services. They enabled the award of grants without 
a call for proposals and the use of negotiated procedures for the procurement of services, supplies, 

113  DG ECHO, Response plan to the impact of COVID-19 on the implementation of humanitarian aid – FAQ addressed to 
IOs. DG ECHO, Response plan to the impact of COVID-19 on the implementation of humanitarian aid – FAQ addressed 
to NGOs. 

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and  works.  Moreover,  they  enabled  retroactivity  on  expenditure  incurred  before  the  date  of 
submission  of  an  application  for  EU  financing.  In  addition,  administrative  procedures  for  the 
identification/formulation phase for new interventions were eased-up through simplified templates 
(such as for Action Documents) for all interventions, including for BS. Inter-service consultations with 
other Commission services and consultations of other EU institutions (such as through the European 
Development Fund Committee with EU MS) were also fast-tracked, through a shortening of response 
times and the use of written procedures. 

Furthermore,  the  Commission  adjusted  its  BS  decision-making  processes  to  allow  for 
timely responses. Firstly, during the “Jumbo Budget Support Steering Committee” (BSSC) meeting 
held on 17 April 2020, DG INTPA/EEAS discussed the envisaged support to partner countries’ COVID-
19  response  through  BS,  in  particular  the  reorientation114  of  ongoing  BS  programmes  and  the 
identification  of  new  programmes.  Secondly,  not  all  BS  disbursements  made  during  2020  were 
discussed  at  BSSC.  Part  of  the  BS  disbursements  were  processed  through  written  procedures 
(including  e-mail  consultation  across  services)  and  recorded  for  approval  by  the  BSSC.  A  similar 
process was replicated in DG NEAR, through the FAST Committee. Moreover, the preparation of the 
BS disbursement dossiers respected the usual process in all cases. This process was eased in a few 
countries through light updates of the macroeconomic, PFM and transparency conditions based on 
the reports of 2019 (Honduras) or the re-use of the PFM and Transparency Report from November 
2019 instead of preparing an updated version in 2020 (Sierra Leone).  

In  the  exceptional  COVID-19  situation,  the  Commission  also  deployed  “crisis  Macro-
Financial  Assistance”  in  2020/2021  to  ten  enlargement  and  neighbourhood  partner 
countries.  These  MFA  programmes  consisted  of  loans  on  highly  favourable  conditions  to  help 
countries  cover urgent  financing  needs.  They  were shorter  in  duration  (12 months  instead  of  the 
usual 2.5 years) and with only two disbursements. The first disbursement was to be released as soon 
as possible after the signature of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the partner country. 
It was conditional upon the implementation of an IMF programme but not subject to the fulfilment 
of specific conditions. The second disbursement was to be released upon the fulfilment of conditions 
detailed in the MoU. Ukraine, the largest recipient, received its first instalment (EUR 600 million) in 
December 2020, following the signature of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and the renewed 
engagement  to  continue  cooperation  under  the  IMF  programme.  Montenegro  received  its  first 
instalment (EUR 30 million)  early  October 2020 upon entry into force of the MoU to address the 
negative economic and financial impacts of the COVID-19 crisis on the country’s balance of payments 
and State Budget. 

RESPONSE MANAGED BY THE COMMISSION HUMANITARIAN SERVICES: FLEXIBLE BUT MIXED SPEED 

Mechanisms managed by DG ECHO were generally deployed with flexibility to respond to 
COVID-19. The disbursement speed depended on humanitarian settings. Most humanitarian 
interventions reviewed under this assessment were part of the Humanitarian Implementation Plans 
(HIPs) deployed at country/regional levels. The HIPs were generally not modified during 2020. Almost 
all  humanitarian  interventions  analysed  were  already  ongoing  before  March  2020.  DG  ECHO 
generally  succeeded  in  quickly  adapting  them  by  including  additional  COVID-19  activities  for 
vulnerable populations. In most cases under review,115 addenda were signed between March and June 

114  For instance, an “instruction note on financing decisions related to COVID-19 - April 2020” sent by the Director-General 
on 6 April 2020 further reinforced and clarified the possibility of neutralising variable tranche indicators made irrelevant 
by the crisis and/or no longer monitorable. 

115  8/11 DG ECHO-funded interventions reviewed in depth. 

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2020. In three out of eleven interventions116, assistance was delivered to beneficiaries within three 
months. In Turkey, the ESSN intervention under the Facility was rapidly implemented, making use of 
the pre-established beneficiary registry and delivery system, as well as quickly disbursing funding 
from  savings  and  contingencies  in  June  2020  simultaneously  to  assistance  rolled  out  by  the 
government for Turkish citizens. However, in several of the countries, humanitarian assistance was 
delivered later than initially expected. Contracting procedures with partners meant that the projects 
only started in September 2020 in Afghanistan and Ecuador. Implementation delays were also due 
to global procurement difficulties surrounding protective equipment.  

Moreover, EU humanitarian air bridges organised by DG ECHO facilitated the swift delivery 
of essential supplies. They took place in four of the countries under review (Afghanistan, Ethiopia, 
Myanmar, and Yemen). In Afghanistan, supplies were delivered by June/July 2020, at the height of 
Afghanistan’s first wave of COVID-19 infections, despite closed borders and disrupted supply routes 
into  Afghanistan  as  a  landlocked  country.  In  Yemen,  the  humanitarian  air  bridge  enabled  the 
importation of PPE and medical supplies in July and August 2020. Finally, DG ECHO also used its 
Emergency Toolbox to provide humanitarian assistance to unforeseen and sudden crises. Two out 
of the four available tools were used for the COVID-19 response: the Small-Scale Tool in Colombia 
and South Africa and the Epidemics Tool for the global response.117 

MASSIVE AND FAST TEAM EUROPE RESPONSE TO COVID-19 THROUGH BUDGET SUPPORT 

Budget  Support  enabled  the  Commission  to  rapidly  mobilise  considerable  financial 
resources in support of the partner countries’ COVID-19 response. This would not have been 
possible  through  other  aid  modalities.  In  the  13  countries  that  benefited  from  BS,118  total  BS 
commitments  for  2020  were  significantly  increased  (+71%):  from  EUR  573  million  to  EUR  980 
million,  spread  across  30  BS  programmes.  67%  of  the  EUR  980  million  committed  represented 
dedicated  COVID-19  commitments  (including  both  redirected  funds  and  additional  funds119  to 
respond to the pandemic). The remaining commitments included initially planned BS amounts for 
2020 under the fixed and variable tranches. The Commission disbursed a total of EUR 872 million 
during 2020 through BS in these 13 countries. The discrepancy between total commitments and total 
disbursements mostly lies in the suspension of BS payments in 2020 on three ongoing programmes 
(EUR 87 million) in Ethiopia due to the crisis in Tigray. More widely, Commission services in charge of 
international  cooperation  (DG  INTPA  and  DG  NEAR)  paid  nearly  EUR  3  billion  in  2020  as  BS,  in 
comparison to EUR 1.6 billion in 2019.120 

Putting  the  specific  case  of  Ethiopia  aside,  the  predictability  of  BS  disbursements  was 
relatively  good.  Following  COVID-19  addenda,  68%  of  the  planned  commitments  under  the  30 
programmes were foreseen during the second semester of 2020, with the bulk (38%) for Q3. Several 
payments planned in Q3 actually took place in Q4, implying that the bulk of the disbursements (40%) 
were made in Q4. When disbursements were planned for the first semester (32%, of which 13% in 
Q1 and 19% in Q2), they often took place as foreseen. 

The BS aid modality proved flexible to adapt to the pandemic. The Commission approved new 
BS COVID-19 specific programmes in compressed times and adapted pre-existing programmes to 

116  The information reported in the Single Forms issued for each intervention generally does not detail when the assistance 

is delivered to beneficiaries. 

117  Source: DG ECHO, Emergency Toolbox factsheet, January 2021. 
118  Afghanistan,  Ecuador,  Ethiopia,  Fiji,  Honduras,  Kenya,  Montenegro,  Morocco,  Myanmar,  Senegal,  Sierra  Leone,  South 
Africa, Ukraine. We exclude the Caribbean countries since the Caribbean was assessed through a regional lens only. 

119  Total commitments of half of the already ongoing BS programmes (13/26) were increased. 
120  Source: EC, BSSC 2020 Activity Report, February 2021 & Budget Support – Trends & Results 2021 report. 

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COVID-19.  Four  new  BS  COVID-19  programmes  were  signed  between  June  and  October  2020  in 
Kenya, Montenegro, Morocco, and Senegal. Considering the time normally required to prepare a BS 
programme, this is considered fast. The disbursements under these programmes took place between 
October and December 2020, seven to nine months after COVID-19 was declared as a pandemic by 
the WHO. The programmes aimed to assist countries in facing the budgetary strains of coping with 
the COVID-19 crisis and to support them in implementing their COVID-19 national response plans. 
They  consisted  of  single-fixed  tranche  operations  for  Kenya  and  Senegal  and  of  two-tranches 
operations  over  2020  and  2021  for  Montenegro  and  Morocco,  with  a  first  large,  fixed  tranche  in 
2020. These four fixed tranches were disbursed in the last quarter of 2020. Total disbursements in 
2020 under these programmes amounted  to  approximately EUR 275 million (or 40% of total  BS 
2020 commitments); mostly in Senegal (approximately EUR 112 million) and in Morocco (EUR 105 
million),  but  also  in  Kenya  (EUR  30  million)  and  in  Montenegro  (EUR  28  million).  All  types  of  BS 
contracts  were  used: the SRBC  in  Montenegro  and Morocco,  the  Sustainable Development Goal-C 
(SDG-C) in Senegal and the Sector Reform Performance Contract (SRPC) in Kenya. 

In the 13 BS beneficiary countries under review, 26 pre-existing programmes were adapted for the 
COVID-19 response through addenda121 issued between April and December 2020 and the use of 
lighter procedures (such as written exchanges) for INTPA. Changes consisted of:  

•  Frontloading  BS  disbursements  planned  in  2020  or  in  subsequent  years  earlier  in  2020:  this 

concerned nine programmes for payments totalling EUR 216 million.122  

•  Disbursements of the amounts linked to unmet variable tranches indicators from previous years 
for a total of EUR 84 million for four SRPCs in Morocco, and one SRPC in both Honduras and 
Myanmar. 

•  Cancelation  or  neutralisation  of  performance  indicators  made  irrelevant  and/or  no  longer 
monitorable due to the crisis: this concerned two programmes (SRBC in Afghanistan and SRPC 
Social Security in Morocco) for a total of EUR 30 million. 

•  Approval of top-ups on three existing SRPCs for a total of EUR 17 million (Ethiopia and Honduras). 
•  BS disbursements under pre-existing programmes were often made quickly: they occurred two 
to three months after the crisis (mid-March 2020) in Ethiopia, Morocco, Senegal, and South Africa. 
In Myanmar, disbursements were made in March and July 2020.  

FLEXIBILITY  OF  THE  EU  RESPONSE  TO  COVID-19  THROUGH  OTHER  AID  MODALITIES  AND 
MECHANISMS  

Adjusting existing international cooperation  projects and programmes123 was flexible in 
some  case  study  countries,  especially  when  no  rider  was  required,  but  cumbersome  in 
others.  Launching  new  COVID-19  response  interventions  was  often  a  lengthy  process, 
generally  entailing  a  delayed  response.  Adaptations  were  made  in  due  time  to  ongoing 
procurement contracts and grants supporting the health sector in DRC, Turkey and Yemen and the 
socio-economic response in Kenya. In Turkey, the EUR 2.7 million Health Security project made funds 
available  immediately,  at  a  time  when  the  Ministry  of  Health  was  not  willing  to  invest  in  Rapid 
Diagnostic  Tests.  Procurements  of  PPE  and  testing  kits  faced  significant  delays  although  the 
procurement  still  remained  relevant,  for  use  in  subsequent  waves.  In  DRC,  medical  and  sanitary 

121  Addenda were issued for 19 BS programmes. 
122  It includes the frontloaded BS amounts in Fiji whose disbursement  - initially planned for the end of the 2019/2020 
Fijian fiscal year (June/July 2020) - was made at the beginning of the subsequent 2020/2021 fiscal year (August 2020), 
which was appreciated by national authorities. 

123  This  encompasses  interventions  funded  under  the  various  EU  financial  instruments  (e.g.,  Development  Cooperation 

Instrument (DCI), IPA, European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), IcSP, EIDHR).  

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equipment started to be delivered in April 2020, only one month after the declaration of the first 
COVID-19 case in the country. A retroaction clause was applied since the contract was signed in May 
2020.  In  Kenya,  a  new  operation  establishing  a  Safe  Trade  Emergency  Facility  over  a  six-month 
period to mitigate the impact of COVID-19 on trade was quickly designed. It was swiftly implemented 
by Trade Mark East Africa as of May 2020. Conversely, in Ukraine, a large portion of the response 
package  meant  to  support  private  sector  recovery,  civil  society  and  overall  social  resilience  and 
recovery  (i.e.,  programmes  associated  with  the  Annual  Action  Programme  (AAP)  II  2020)  was 
approved in November 2020. As a result, only 17% (EUR 30 million out of EUR 169 million) of that 
component directed at socio-economic issues had been spent by the end of March 2021.  

The flexibility of the response to COVID-19 channelled through Trust Funds was mixed: 
swift and handy in some cases but lengthy in others. In Senegal, several EUTF projects (e.g., 
PASPED) quickly reallocated some of their activities and provided a swift response that did not require 
an addendum. For PASPED, the EU Delegation quickly approved the changes to be brought using the 
PRAG emergency procedures. Grants were provided to 136 enterprises with the first instalment paid 
in August 2020. Similarly, additional EU financing (EUR 10 million) that had already been earmarked 
for the facility was quickly  delivered  (by  May 2020)  to the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance 
Facility (CCRIF) Multi-Donor Trust Fund. All 18 Caribbean governments active under CCRIF received 
early May 2020 a 26% discount on their insurance coverage ahead of the 2020 hurricane season. In 
Afghanistan, partners reached an agreement in June/July 2020 on the re-allocation of EUR 12.5 million 
of unspent EU funding from an ARTF governance project to the newly created ARTF-funded “Relief Effort for Afghan 
Communities and Households” (REACH) project. Finalising all administrative steps for the re-allocation 
took another four to six months. However, the services financed with these resources were distributed 
with delay, mostly due to national political roadblocks and capacity bottlenecks on the side of the 
Afghan government.  In Honduras, the ongoing UN Spotlight  Initiative focusing on gender violence 
was modified for the COVID-19 response. EU staff considered the adjustments made as slow and 
highly time consuming to manage. 

The response to COVID-19 channelled through regional initiatives and programmes was 
often designed quickly but the delivery of services was sometimes delayed, mostly due to 
global market shortages on all medical equipment and material. In Ukraine, the EU4Business 
Initiative was an efficient coordinating platform to mobilise EU programmes in support of immediate 
Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) needs linked to the pandemic. It was instrumental in providing 
timely information to SMEs about access to grants, loans, and business advice available under EU 
SME  programmes,  which  were  expanded  to  respond  to  the  pandemic.124  The  regional  EU/WHO 
"Solidarity for Health" Initiative (EUR 30 million) was designed and adopted quickly as well to meet 
emergency needs and support the health system. It delivered essential support and training to health 
workers  across  Ukraine,  but  at  a  slower  pace  than  initially  anticipated  due  to  market  shortages 
slowing down procurement and custom procedures. In the Caribbean, a programme for outbreak control 
operations  (EUR  8  million)  via  the  Caribbean  Public  Health  Agency  (CARPHA)  was  quickly  designed.  But 
implementation was  not  as straightforward:  procurement  of  PPE  and  equipment  encountered some 
issues because of delayed responses from Caribbean countries on specific needs and simultaneous 
increase in prices due to high demand. Similarly, vaccines delivery, delegated to the Pan American 
Health Organisation (PAHO), was not timely. 

Blending projects and guarantees did not prove to be appropriate for responding to urgent 
needs emerging from the COVID-19 crisis. Very few blending projects, in the form of technical 

124  A new EUR 120 million support programme was introduced to help SMEs, including the self-employed and others, to 
have easier access to credit and boost their businesses following the crisis. Over EUR 200 million of existing credit lines 
and grants are available for SMEs in local currency through the EU4Business Initiative. 

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assistance and interest rate subsidy, were deployed in 2020 in response to the pandemic.125 None of 
them started to be implemented in 2020. No loan guarantees were provided in the countries under 
review. The fact that blending projects and guarantees were not widely used is partly due to the fact 
that these operations go through a heavy design and approval process, which takes almost a year. 
In  Ecuador,  it  took  the  full  year  2020  to  have  the  contract  signed  by  all  parties  for  the  WASH 
Portoviejo intervention although negotiations had already started in 2018. Works were expected to 
start at the end of 2021. In Kenya, discussions started in May 2020 to provide an interest rate subsidy 
to an EIB loan under the Cotonou Investment Facility126 aiming to enhance the capacity of financial 
institutions  to  continue  accepting  the  risk  of  lending  to  private  enterprises,  especially  SMEs.  The 
contract between the Commission and the EIB was only signed in December 2020. The project was 
in its inception phase mid-May 2021. The credit lines were expected to be delivered in June 2021 at 
the earliest. In Senegal, discussions around an operation supporting a state mechanism guaranteeing 
bank loans to companies encountered little enthusiasm. Enterprises were reluctant to take out a loan 
in a crisis situation and banks considered the interest rate proposed insufficiently attractive. In Kenya, 
where the country debt ratio was already problematic, grants were favoured and guarantees to back 
loans or investments were not discussed as an option.  

The candidate countries for EU accession also received swift assistance thanks to their 
participation in EU initiatives. In Turkey, the EU Civil Protection Mechanism127 was activated 
at the end of May 2020 to support the country in the repatriation of Turkish citizens stranded in Peru 
and  Colombia.  Montenegro  also  benefited  from  this  mechanism,  which  facilitated  the  delivery  of 
hospital supplies and protective equipment. It also received material for COVID-19 testing provided 
by the Commission Joint Research Centre.  

MONITORING AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE MANAGEMENT OF THE COVID-19 RESPONSE 

The Commission did not feel the need to set up a dedicated monitoring system to report 
on the global outputs and outcomes reached during the pandemic. At country level, close 
monitoring  of  the  COVID-19  response  most  often  took  place  through  the  existing 
monitoring  systems  of  the  adapted  interventions.  Commission  staff  regularly  updated  the 
Team Europe approach COVID-19 response fiche giving a brief overview of the state of play of the 
response deployed at country/regional level. But there was no consolidated overview of the supplies 
and other outputs and outcomes achieved thanks to joint response in the countries reviewed. Since 
the  COVID-19  response  was  largely  embedded  within  on-going  interventions  at  country  level, 
monitoring of the COVID-19 response happened through the already established monitoring systems. 
Specific  COVID-19  response  related  indicators  were  rarely  incorporated.  An  exception  is  the 
monitoring system set up to measure the outputs of all the projects funded under the EUTF for Africa 
for which such indicators were added following the pandemic.  

The Commission often succeeded in adapting its  monitoring practices to the challenges 
brought by the pandemic. During 2020, site visits had to be temporarily suspended in all countries 
to comply with social distancing measures and travel restrictions. The Commission continued liaising 
remotely  with  authorities,  project  implementing  partners,  its  Member  States,  and  international 

125  Under the bilateral envelopes, amounts were contracted for only three blending interventions in 2020 in the form of 
technical assistance (Ecuador -LAIF- and Myanmar -AIF-) and an interest rate subsidy (Kenya -CIF-). The inventory does 
not include the EFSD guarantees, for which information was not available at country level. 

126  The Investment Facility receives its capital from the European Development Fund and is managed by the EIB. Funding 
provided from the Investment Facility can accept a higher risk level than loans from EIB’s own resources. Under the 
Cotonou Partnership Agreement, the EU MS provide a sovereign and political risk guarantee for all ACP operations. 
127  In addition to the EU MS, there are six Participating States to the Civil Protection Mechanism: Iceland, Norway, Serbia, 

North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Turkey. 

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donors. For BS programmes, EU staff made efforts to continue policy dialogue and regular monitoring 
of performance indicators despite the difficult context. In extremely tense environments (Myanmar, 
Yemen), considering the impossibility to access project sites, it was even more important to rely on 
international NGOs and local organisations with a proven track record. In Ecuador and Honduras, M&E 
did not take place apart from ongoing BS operations because most interventions had only recently 
started implementation. 

The Commission placed stronger emphasis on accountability in the management of COVID-
19 funds through Budget Support in some countries. All BS disbursements made to support 
partner countries in their COVID-19 response128 were subject to the four BS eligibility criteria. In half 
of the BS beneficiary countries (Honduras, Kenya, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone),  progress  on  the  public  availability  of  information  regarding  the  management  and  use  of 
COVID-19 funds and/or on the implementation of government response measures to COVID-19 was 
included in the general conditions, most often in the public policy eligibility condition. For half of the 
BS deployed for the response, the Commission requested reporting on the measures deployed within 
the  framework  of  the  "Special  Fund  for  the  Management  of  the  COVID-19  Pandemic”  prior  to 
disbursing when (re)/designing the operations or after having disbursed, in line with the conditions 
set  in the programmes.  For the other half of the budget  support deployed,  a cluster examination 
through  interviews  with  key  stakeholders  would  be  required  to  assess  to  what  extent  special 
measures  should  have  been  taken  to  mitigate  potential  fiduciary  risks.    In  most  BS  programmes 
(17/30), no further emphasis (such as in-depth analysis under the general conditions and/or in the 
disbursement  notes,  dedicated  variable  tranche  indicators,  etc.)  was  put  on  accountability  in  the 
management of COVID-19 funds by partner countries. The BS programmes deployed in Senegal and 
Montenegro  stand  out  as  two  exemplary  cases  where  the  Commission  strongly  promoted 
transparency and accountability.129 In Senegal, one of the three axes of the BS matrix dealt with good 
governance  and  transparency  of  the  implementation  of  the  government’s  measures  against  the 
crisis.  This  promoted  the publication  by  the  government  of  the  decree  establishing  the  COVID-19 
response fund and the budgetary execution reports detailing all COVID-19 expenses during 2020. In 
Honduras and Kenya, audits conducted in 2020 revealed a potential misuse of pandemic funds. BS 
disbursements, which took place in the last quarter of 2020, were made following a thorough review 
by the Commission of the issues encountered and the adoption of appropriate mitigating measures. 
In Honduras, the Commission obtained the commitment of the government to use BS funds through 
UN System procurement procedures to guarantee the adequate and transparent use of the funds. 
Beyond BS programmes, accountability in the management of COVID-19 funds was a matter covered 
through the M&E carried out for these interventions, often carried out by international partners and 
NGOs. This assessment did not cover this aspect in detail since, contrary to BS and MFA interventions, 
other interventions deployed for the COVID-19 crisis did not specifically aim to foster the countries’ 
PFM capacities.   

128  This assessment only considered the BS programmes mobilised for the COVID-19 response. More generally, the four 

eligibility criteria apply to all BS disbursements. 

129  This can be illustrated by the depth of the analyses made in the FA under the general conditions, a dedicated axis in 
the  matrix  (Senegal)  or  dedicated  variable  tranche  indicators  (Montenegro),  the  detailed  assessments  made  in  the 
disbursement files, and the attention given to those issues in the policy dialogue. 

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7.  EQ4 – MITIGATION OF EFFECTS OF THE PANDEMIC 

Note: Data collection for this fast-track assessment was carried out in the months immediately after the end of 
2020, the period covered in this evaluation. This timing, and the nature of this condensed fast track assessment 
itself carried out under conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic, made it unlikely that the evaluators would be able to 
see and collect evidence of concrete results of the initial EU COVID-19 response. The assessment of results therefore 
centred on feedback collected from key informants with knowledge of the response that was solicited through key 
informant interviews, selected documents, and a stakeholder survey.  

To what extent was the EU response successful in progressing towards the objectives 
associated with the COVID-19 response? 

Summary answer: Satisfaction with the emerging results of the initial EU response to the COVID-
19 crisis in partner countries and regions varied between the different priority areas. It was highest 
in  relation  to  macro-economic  stability,  and  comparatively  lowest  in  food  and  housing,  private 
sector development and access to health care services. In more than half of the 13 BS beneficiary 
countries,  BS  and  MFA  programmes  provided  modest  to  significant  fiscal  space  to  partner 
governments,  helping  to  maintain  short-term  stability  of  the macro-fiscal  framework.  This also 
proved  extremely  useful  to  finance  national  socio-economic  and  fiscal  stimulus  packages.  The 
implementation  of  these  packages  cushioned  the  shock  to  the  economies  and  people  through 
fiscal, economic, and social measures. In 2020, governments often boosted priority spending (in 
areas such as  health,  education, and  social  protection).  Direct  COVID-19  support  to  the  private 
sector was negligible, with only modest mitigation effects for businesses. Safety net programmes 
supported  in  some  countries  helped  to  meet  short-term  basic  needs  of  households.  In  health, 
COVID-19  support  packages  helped  to  meet  immediate  needs  for  preventive  and  curative 
measures,  with  basic  medical  supplies  and  PPE  as  the  main  deliverables.  Smaller  projects  to 
strengthen  the  diagnostic  capacity  helped  to  improve  laboratory  capacity  in  several  countries, 
supporting the diagnosis of COVID-19 cases for timely isolation or treatment of cases. Results for 
system  strengthening  were  more  variable.  During  the  crisis,  promotion  of  the  continuation  of 
already engaged longer-term reforms, including on PFM, was often challenging. Overall, beneficiary 
countries showed a rather significant accountability gap. Mixed effects were observed in terms of 
increased  resilience  of  the  core  capabilities  of  the  public  sector.  Broader  health  system 
strengthening  was  less  successful  in  the  short-term  than  more  targeted  interventions,  such  as 
building  diagnostic  capacity.  Increasing access  to basic  and  other health  services  also  received 
comparatively little attention in the EU response outside of BS.  

Satisfaction with the emerging results of the initial EU response to COVID-19 in partner 
countries varied significantly between the different priority areas the EU and its partners 
were targeting. It was highest for macro-economic stability and the creation of adequate 
fiscal space, and comparatively lowest in food and housing, private sector development 
and access to health care services. Across all countries and groups of survey respondents, close 
to  89%  of  respondents  among  EU  institutions  and  bodies,  EU  partners  (including  EU  Member 
States),130 national authorities and independent CSOs were satisfied or very satisfied with how the 
EU initial COVID-19 support had helped partner countries to ensure adequate fiscal space and macro-
economic stability throughout the first year of the COVID-19 crisis. As can be seen in Figure 11, this 
suggests that macro-economic support was by far the best performing results area of the COVID-19 
support packages. By comparison, opinions of key stakeholders on results in other key areas were 

130  In addition to EU MS, this includes UN organisations and other IGOs, CSOs and NGOs, bilateral and multi-lateral donors, 

both in an autonomous role or as implementers of EU response to COVID-19. 

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somewhat less positive. 56% of respondents in all countries were at least satisfied with results of 
EU support in helping to meet key basic needs for food and housing of the population affected by 
the COVID-19 crisis, about 42% thought the results of the EU response to COVID-19 in private sector 
development  were  satisfactory,  and  57%  were  satisfied  that  EU  support  had  helped  to  increase 
access to health services in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic. Satisfaction with the success of 
EU  support  to  help  increase  capacity  in  partner  countries  for  COVID-19-related  research  and 
diagnostic  capacity  as  another  health-related  results  area  was  similar;  here  54%  of  respondents 
found the results of EU support satisfactory.131 The following sections will look at the results in the 
different areas in more detail. 

Figure 11: Satisfaction with the results of the EU COVID-19 response (as of May - June 
2021) 

Source: Survey conducted by ADE 

MITIGATING THE IMMEDIATE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE COVID-19 CRISIS 

Supporting  governments  to  maintain  macro-economic  stability  and  to  implement  their 
COVID-19 policy response  

A closer examination of budget support and macro-financial assistance in the context of 
the  EU  initial  COVID-19  response  confirmed  that,  in  seven  of  the  13  BS  beneficiary 
countries in the case studies, BS and MFA provided modest to significant fiscal space to 
partner governments. This enabled them to limit the economic shock of the crisis and to 
maintain  the  stability  of  the  macro-fiscal  framework  in  the  short-term.  In  the  six 
remaining countries,  the  fiscal  space  effect  was  negligible. BS and ‘crisis MFA’132 provided 
clear fiscal space for five out of the thirteen countries reviewed.133 The disbursements in 2020 ranged 
from  2.4% to  5%  of total  public  revenues  of  that  year.  In  Senegal,  BS  provided  significant  fiscal 

131  For details, see detailed results of the online survey in Annex 4. 
132  Two ‘crisis MFA’ were provided in Montenegro and Ukraine. 
133  Afghanistan, Montenegro, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Ukraine. 

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space (+5%), albeit in the context of a widening current account deficit and rise of public debt and 
debt service. The fiscal space increase was amplified by loans, essentially in the form of BS, agreed 
by the IMF, WB, AfDB, IDB and the West African Development Bank (BOAD). Together, grants and 
loans partly compensated for the loss in total revenue linked to the decrease in economic activity. In 
Montenegro, BS and MFA payments contributed to maintain the country’s macroeconomic stability 
during a steep economic contraction, lower fiscal revenues, and significant debt service obligations. 
In Ukraine, the exceptional COVID-19 MFA together with the second instalment134 of the previous 
Commission MFA IV, the support of other partners (IMF and WB) and the country’s ability to mobilise 
additional financing on the domestic and international (Eurobond) financial markets contributed to 
close the financing gap135 of the country. MFA was all the more important as the cost of tapping the 
domestic  and  international  markets  had  considerably  increased  during  2020  for  the  national 
authorities. The highly concessional and substantial nature of the EU MFA financial support during 
2020 contributed to service the country’s external debt service estimated at USD 5 billion for the 
2020 fiscal year, including a maturing EU debt repayment from a previous MFA 5 years ago for a 
total amount of EUR 500 million. 

In two out of the 13 countries (Fiji, Morocco), BS disbursements totalled around 1% of total public 
revenues, hence providing less significant fiscal  space but much needed liquidity in tense macro-
fiscal environments. In Fiji, despite the modest magnitude of the amounts disbursed (EUR 8 million), 
the BS disbursement at the early stage of the 2020/2021 Fijian fiscal year (August 2020) contributed 
to  a  timely  increase  in  the  government’s  fiscal  capacities  to  finance  a  second  round  of  stimulus 
packages  dedicated  to  the  agricultural  response.  In  the  remaining  six  countries,136  with  BS 
disbursements totalling less than 0.5% of 2020 total public revenues, the fiscal space effect was 
negligible. BS disbursements still infused liquidity into the system during the crisis, which was useful 
to finance countercyclical fiscal  policy measures. In Ecuador, BS disbursements (EUR 9 million)  in 
2020  brought  only  limited  fiscal  space  to  the  government  and  could  therefore  not  prevent  a 
deterioration of the macro-fiscal framework, which was already at risk during recent years. 

The  EU  response  also  contributed  to  create  fiscal  space  in  CCRT-eligible  countries137  through  its 
contribution (EUR 183 million) to the relief of a third tranche of IMF debt service payment coming 
due for the period April 14 to October 13, 2021 and totalling about EUR 203 million. 

The increase in fiscal space  was particularly useful to finance the governments’ socio-
economic and fiscal stimulus packages, which included public health response. In Senegal, 
the increase in fiscal space helped to finance essential governmental expenditure to combat COVID-
19 as foreseen in the PRES, which totalled 29% of total public revenues. The rapid execution of the 
PRES and its close oversight by the government clearly helped to cushion the socio-economic effects 
of COVID-19. At the end of December 2020, the PRES had an execution rate of 99%, with a wide 
range of measures implemented, from emergency food aid for vulnerable households to clearing of 
the arrears of payment of the state in the sectors impacted by the crisis and fiscal measures for 
enterprises.  However,  banks  and  enterprises  showed  little  enthusiasm  to  provide  loans  to  SMEs 
impacted by the crisis. In Montenegro, increased fiscal capacity safeguarded the funding of the health 
system  and  of  key  fiscal  stimulus  packages  aimed  at  mitigating  the  immediate  negative  socio-
economic  impacts  of  COVID-19.  Specific  emphasis  was  put  on  supporting  vulnerable  populations 
(social assistance and protection), preserving existing and new employment (wage subsidies), and 
supporting micro and small enterprises (liquidity support). Regular reporting confirmed achievements 

134  The IMF initially estimated this gap at USD 12 billion for 2020. 
135  The IMF initially estimated this gap at USD 12 billion for 2020. 
136  Ecuador, Ethiopia, Honduras, Kenya, Myanmar, South Africa 
137  They include the following countries which are part of this review: Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, and Yemen. 

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in all these areas. In Ukraine, while neither targeted at specific COVID-19 related public expenditures 
nor  linked  to  policy  dialogue  on  the  national  crisis-response,  the  crisis-MFA  helped  to  increase 
national fiscal capacity to finance the COVID-19 Special Fund estimated at EUR 2.3 billion. At the end 
of 2020, 97% of the allocated funds had been spent on a series of fiscal (e.g., tax breaks), economic 
(e.g., job saving) and social measures (such as unemployment benefits and capacity strengthening 
of national hospitals to respond to outbreaks of infectious diseases). In Fiji, BS, representing almost 
30%  of  the  total  annual  2020/2021  budget  appropriation  for  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture,  was 
instrumental to secure budget execution of programmes undertaken by the Agricultural Extensions 
Services to reduce the socio-economic effects of the crisis in rural areas and to prevent food crises. 
This  helped  to  protect  rural  livelihoods  and  to  preserve  national  food  and  nutrition  security.  In 
Morocco, the EU  response package,  constituting  about  15% of the national COVID-19 Fund, gave 
Morocco fiscal space to implement its emergency response. The latter included a range of fiscal and 
monetary measures that benefited companies and employees such as deferral of tax payments and 
social contributions, refinancing measures for SMEs and self-employed people and liquidity support 
to foster access to finance for SMEs and micro-enterprises138. Support also extended to workers in 
the informal economy, who received special social transfers. In South Africa, while BS disbursements 
were  relatively  low  in  comparison  to  2020 total  public  revenues  (0.02%), their  earmarked  nature 
implied that they contributed financing to specific national sector programmes addressing COVID-19 
impacts.139  Technical  assistance  was  mobilised  through  the  BS 
negative  socio-economic 
complementary  measures  to  assist  the  national  authorities  in  designing  and  implementing  the 
emergency and recovery sector policies in the areas targeted by the programmes. Finally, the IMF 
reports that CCRT-eligible countries “boosted 2020 priority spending (health, education, and social 
protection)  relative  to  pre-COVID-19  projections  by  some  0.5  percentage  points  of  GDP,  despite 
significant  loss  of  budgetary  revenues  in  many  cases”.140  In  all  of  the  countries  (five)  for  which 
primary data was available, a significant increase (from + 50% to + 110%) in public health spending 
could be observed.141  

Providing direct support to enterprises and households   

Compared to the significant volume of macro-economic support (BS and MFA), direct EU support to 
the private sector  was negligible in  2020. Overall, the mitigation effects on businesses remained 
modest. This is consistent with the comparatively low levels of satisfaction of key stakeholders with 
the results of EU support in this area. In Senegal, several EUTF financed projects enabled the provision 
of  subsidies  to  around  730  enterprises  to  help  them  face  the  economic  difficulties  linked  to  the 
pandemic. In Ukraine, some existing programmes were redirected to help Ukrainian SMEs, with the 
EU4Business  Facility  playing  an  important  role  in  providing information  about  EU  SME  support 
implemented with partner organisations under the umbrella of  the EU4Business initiative.  In early 
2021, much of the support envisaged in this area was still to be implemented. Moreover, financial 
intermediation  loans  to  enterprises  facing  liquidity  problems  promoted  through  blending  proved 
difficult and lengthy to materialise. In Senegal, a guarantee/blending operation to support a credit 
guarantee scheme did not  materialise due to a lack of interest  from  both banks and enterprises. 

138  The Central Bank reduced the key interest rate from 2.25% to 1.5%, increased liquidity provision and relaxed prudential 

ratios to support the banking system. 

139  E.g.,  promotion  of  youth  employment,  support  to  small  enterprises  through  relief  finance  schemes  and  resilience 

facilities, access to digital technology and innovation for COVID-related research, etc. 

140  IMF, IMF Policy Paper, CCRT – Third tranche of debt relief in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, April 2021. 
141  Available budgetary data show an increase ranging from +50% to +110% between the budget allocated to the Ministry 
of Health  in  the  2020 revised  budget  in  comparison  to  the  2020  initial  budget  or  between  the 2020 actual  health 
expenditure  in  comparison  with  2019  actual  health  expenditure  in  Afghanistan,  Ethiopia,  Montenegro,  Senegal,  and 
South Africa. 

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Similarly, a guarantee/blending operation with the EIB in Kenya aiming to increase access to finance 
for MSMEs did not yet deliver results. It was in its inception phase mid-May 2021. 

Safety net programmes supported in some case study countries enabled the short-term 
basic needs of households to be met. Overall, 56% of survey respondents thought that support 
to meet the basic needs of the population for food and housing had been effective (see above). In a 
few countries (Kenya, Myanmar, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Turkey, Ukraine), households benefited from 
safety-net  interventions  that  minimised  the  effects  of  income  losses  on  livelihoods.  These 
programmes  were  able  to  cover  some  of  the  short-term  basic  needs  of the population, including 
vulnerable people who were not able to access unemployment benefits or short-term work schemes. 
In  Kenya,  emergency  economic  support  was  provided  to  urban  households.  The  duration  of  the 
support was short but enabled immediate short-term basic needs to be met. In Sierra Leone, a top-
up of a WB Social Safety Net programme delivered support in May 2021 to an additional 36 000 
households  that  would  otherwise  have  been  excluded  from  social  assistance.  In  Senegal,  cash 
transfers were provided to vulnerable people (such as migrants and families of migrants who stayed 
in the country) to help them meet electricity bill payments, medical expenses, restart a business and 
cover  basic  needs.  In  Myanmar,  socio-economic  measures  provided  livelihood  support  to  workers 
from the garment industry, mostly women and including returning migrant workers. In Turkey, topping 
up of the ESSN made it possible to provide refugees with additional payments of 1000 TRY142 over 
the course of June and July of 2020. Outside of the ESSN, targeting refugees not eligible for ESSN-
support, implementing partners (IPs) of DG ECHO143 also provided one-off payments of 1000 TRY, or 
cash for rent, either as a one-off payment of 800 TRY or as three-monthly transfers of 300 TRY 
each.144  In Ukraine, 190 grants were awarded to civil society/community action groups all over the 
country, which helped address COVID-19 societal needs, including the delivery of food and medicines 
to the most vulnerable people. 

SHORT-TERM RESPONSE IN HEALTH, WATER, AND SANITATION SECTORS 

In most case study countries and regions, the COVID-19 support packages were able to 
meet immediate needs for preventive and curative measures. Basic medical supplies and 
PPE were the main deliverables, as well as smaller amounts of rapid diagnostic antigen 
tests and other basic material. Deliveries took place as early as April 2020, but in some cases 
were  also  delayed  into  December  2020  and beyond.  Late  contracting  along  with  pressure  on  the 
global, regional, and national markets for these products hindered their timely provision. EU support 
in Montenegro, Afghanistan, Ukraine, Turkey, and Ethiopia allowed for the timely delivery of medical 
and 
(diagnostic  kits,  reagents,  consumables,  oxygen 
concentrators, etc.) and PPE (goggles, masks, gowns, and face shields) to hospitals and laboratories 
to protect front-line workers. In Morocco, EU BS helped the government to finance a wide range of 
short-term responses to the pandemic, including the large-scale purchase of testing kits, medical and 
sanitary equipment and medicines and their distribution to health care centres across the country.  

laboratory  supplies  and  equipment 

Bottlenecks  in  the  global  supply,  the  closing  of  borders  (e.g.,  in  Afghanistan)  and  other  trade 
interruptions, security challenges or regional approaches (Yemen, Tigray) led to delays for some of 

142  1000 Turkish Lira (TRY) are approximately EUR 100. 
143  UNHCR, Welthungerhilfe, Diakonie, Relief International. 
144  Monitoring  data  from  ESSN  implementing  partners  highlight  the  essential  contribution  that  the  emergency  top-up 
payments made to meeting household needs, where 78% reported that they had faced increased expenditure on food 
and hygiene items and 69% had a member of their household that had lost employment. However, all partners agreed 
that the socio-economic situation of households had not returned to pre-COVID-19 times when their cash assistance 
ended. 

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the medical/laboratory supplies and PPE (Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Yemen, Kenya refugee camps, IGAD). 
Provision of deliverables and  COVID-19 support through most  regional  projects was complex  and 
also  often  delayed.145  Implementation  of  the  Team  Europe  EU-support  to  the  IGAD  response 
programme,146 for example, was hindered by frequently changing country demands for equipment 
and supplies,147 challenging custom procedures, the political and security environment in the region, 
and the need to cover such a large region.148 This created huge challenges for the implementation 
considering the difficult political context.149 

While relatively limited in scope, projects to strengthen the diagnostic capacity in  case 
study  partner  countries  and  regions  helped  to  improve  laboratory  capacity  in  several 
partner countries. These enabled timely diagnostic of COVID-19 cases and initiation for 
isolation or treatment where needed. Training in handling the diagnostic measures  was 
important, as most countries had no experience, specifically where new laboratories were 
set-up. 54% of survey respondents across all countries were satisfied with the results of the initial 
EU support in this area as of mid-2021. EU support focused mainly on diagnostic support through 
establishment  or  support  of  laboratories  for  Polymerase  Chain  Reaction  (PCR)  testing  (Turkey, 
Ecuador, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Ukraine, Caribbean) or, to a lesser extent, on the provision of oxygen 
concentrators  and  ventilators  for  case  management  (Montenegro,  Afghanistan,  Ukraine,  Turkey, 
Ethiopia). In some countries, this was combined with capacity development in infection, prevention, 
and  control  (IPC)  as  well  as  case  management  (Ukraine,  Turkey,  Ethiopia).  In  Ethiopia,  DG  ECHO 
worked with WHO to support the set-up of seven new diagnostic facilities, the provision of PPE and 
supplies for health workers, and training in COVID-19 case management, including the detection of 
cases.150 The number of PCR151 diagnostic facilities in the country was increased from zero to 74.152 
Ethiopia became the only country among the 17 case study countries/regions conducting point of 
entry assessments at their borders, required by the International Health Regulation (IHR) of WHO. 
Turkey was the only country among the 17 that received support for genome sequencing capacity, 
an important aspect considering the development of variants. In Afghanistan, DG ECHO established 
diagnostic facilities in cooperation with WHO. Prior to this effort, the country had not had any such 
facilities.  

In  a  small  number  of  case  study  countries,  support  to  the  development  of  laboratory 
capacity was significantly delayed. In Montenegro, the proposed rehabilitation and enlargement 
of four hospitals and the building of a bio-safety lab were only in their inception phase in early 2021. 
While the latter had already been discussed between partners prior to COVID-19, disagreement about 
its relevance in the pre- and post-COVID-19 situation had delayed the start of implementation. In 
Ecuador,  the  relevant  programme  aimed  at  increasing  diagnostic/laboratory  capacity  was  much 
delayed and started only in 2021.  

145  That is, regional projects in Fiji/Pacific Community (SPC); Caribbean, IGAD. One exception was the regional health project 

that among other things supported Ukraine. 

146  With an overall budget of EUR 60 million, covering, among other things, Kenya, and Ethiopia. 
147  For example, recipient countries requested changes of distribution sites or delivery destinations; or refused acceptance 
of  support  altogether.  Distribution  of  PPE,  masks,  mobile  laboratories,  or  ambulances  through  the  programme  was 
therefore delayed. 

148  EU Delegation Djibouti, personal communication 20 April 2021 
149  EU Delegation Djibouti, personal communication 20 April 2021 
150  Programme Management; EU Delegation Ethiopia, personal communication, 16 April 2020. 
151  PCR is a highly sensitive laboratory (gold standard) test to detect the coronavirus even though very  few viruses are 

present. 

152  This helped to fill immediate gaps left by delayed BS tranches (see below) (interviews, Ethiopia). 

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In comparison to the large emphasis on laboratory capacity, the EU support paid relatively 
little attention to laboratory quality assurance, such as through trainings on sample collection, 
transportation and testing as well as verification of tested samples.153  

CONTRIBUTING TO BUILDING MORE RESILIENT GOVERNMENTS  

Pursuing the promotion of longer-term public financial management reforms during the 
crisis  was  often  difficult.  The  PFM  general  eligibility  condition  was  verified  prior  to  all  BS 
disbursements. The leverage effect of this general condition was however difficult to evaluate within 
the  remit  of  this  assessment.  Moreover, in  fewer  than  half  of  the  BS  interventions  reviewed, the 
Commission  also  supported  PFM  reforms  through  dedicated  indicators  on  overall  or  sector  PFM 
reforms154 for the 2020 variable tranche and the policy dialogue in relation to them. The necessity 
to  respond  immediately  to  the  crisis  set  in  the  background  the  longer-term  PFM  reform  agenda 
encompassing issues such as domestic revenue mobilisation and debt management. For instance, in 
Afghanistan,  Kenya,  and  Sierra  Leone,  some  or  all  of  the  PFM-related  indicators  were  not  met 
(Afghanistan) and/or were neutralised due to COVID-19. The amounts linked to these indicators were 
all transformed into a fixed instalment (to be) disbursed in 2020 (2021).155 In Afghanistan, one of 
the  unmet  indicators in  2020  covered  better  governance  of  the  civil  service. The  five  neutralised 
indicators linked to the 2021 variable tranche covered domestic revenue mobilisation and budgetary 
processes.  Whilst  efforts  were  made  to  maintain  policy  dialogue  on  these  issues,  the  leverage 
expected on progress on longer-term PFM reforms was de facto minimised.  

All  case  study  beneficiary  countries  showed  a  rather  significant  accountability  gap 
according to the IBP. The survey conducted by the IBP at the end of 2020 (Table 4) shows that BS 
beneficiary countries put in place limited transparency arrangements around the COVID-19 policy 
responses. Supplementary budgets were adopted in all BS beneficiary countries between March and 
July 2020. In July 2020, they were publicly available in eight countries (Ecuador, Kenya, Fiji, Sierra 
Leone, Montenegro, Morocco, Honduras, Senegal, South Africa). Execution reports were published in 
seven  countries  (Honduras,  Kenya,  Montenegro,  Morocco,  Senegal,  South  Africa,  Ukraine).  They 
include little to no detailed information on COVID-19 spending in all of them. BS beneficiary countries 
also score relatively low in terms of oversight according to the IBP. Audit reports on the financial 
management  of  government  COVID-19  responses  were  released  during  2020  in  Fiji,  Kenya,  and 
South Africa. Finally, BS beneficiary countries performed poorly regarding citizen participation in the 
formulation and execution of COVID-19 policy responses. Moreover, the accountability gap was larger 
in non-BS beneficiary countries (DRC, Turkey, Yemen), which score “minimal” on transparency and 
participation and low on oversight. 

153  Exceptions were observed in Ethiopia. 
154  Six out of the 15 BS interventions for which a variable tranche was foreseen in 2020 included dedicated indicators on 
overall PFM reforms (Afghanistan State and Resilience Building Contract (SRBC), Kenya PASEDE, Sierra Leone SBC3) or 
sector PFM reforms (Ethiopia SRPC Job Compact, Morocco SRPC Social Protection, Myanmar SRPC Education). 

155  Case of Afghanistan for the neutralised indicators linked to the 2021 variable tranche. 

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Table 5: Accountability in the management of COVID-19 emergency fiscal policy 
packages156 

beneficiary 

Transparency 

Oversight 

Participation 

BS 
countries 

Afghanistan 

Ecuador 

Ethiopia 

Fiji 

Honduras 

Kenya 

Morocco 

Myanmar 

Senegal 

Sierra Leone 

South Africa 

beneficiary 

Ukraine 

Non-BS 
countries 

DRC 

Turkey 

Yemen 

Limited 

Limited 

Minimal 

Some 

Limited 

Limited 

Limited 

Limited 

Limited 

Some 

Some 

Limited 

Minimal 

Minimal 

Minimal 

Limited 

Minimal 

Minimal 

Minimal 

Minimal 

Minimal 

Limited 

Minimal 

Limited 

Minimal 

Adequate 

Minimal 

Minimal 

Minimal 

Minimal 

Minimal 

Minimal 

Minimal 

Some 

Some 

Some 

Minimal 

Limited 

Minimal 

Limited 

Minimal 

Some 

Minimal 

Minimal 

Minimal 

Source: International Budget Partnership 

Budget  support  and  macro-financial  assistance  programmes  also  promoted  continuous 
key  structural  reforms,  with  mixed  results  in  terms  of  increased  resilience of  the  core 
capabilities  of  the  public  sector.  In  Montenegro,  key  structural  reforms  in  the  areas  of  PFM, 
economic governance, social protection, and labour market were promoted by an ongoing PAR BS, 
the  COVID-Resilience  Contract,  and  the  crisis  MFA.  The  more  recent  fiscal  stimulus  packages 
demonstrated that national authorities were committed to promoting the resilience of the national 
economy  with measures  to  preserve  and improve  competitiveness,  boost  financial  intermediation 
and increase access to liquidity or equity for MSMEs.157 In Ukraine, the EU MFA’s policy dialogue that 
was not specifically COVID-related aimed at promoting a continuation in the reform process in key 
areas: PFM, civil service and public administration system governance, rule of law and anti-corruption, 
business climate and corporate governance of state-owned-enterprises, as well as restructuring of 
the national gas market. However, the overall reform process slowed down in 2020 due to COVID-
19 and the political turmoil and institutional instability faced by the country the same year. Resources 
were  reallocated  to  short-term  needs  and  political  commitment  was  diverted  from  longer-term 

156  Montenegro was not part of the survey. 
157  In addition, the EU worked regionally with key IFIs active in the  Western Balkans to support infrastructure, the real 
economy (including SMEs) and the local banking sector to improve the borrowing performance of the private sector 
through  the  mobilisation  of  EU-funded  guarantee  schemes.  These  activities  will  materialise  progressively  over  the 
course of 2021. 

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governance  and  sector  reforms.  In  Fiji,  the  BS  intervention  paved  the  way  for  more  efficient 
management of public resources and better accountability and service delivery in the agriculture and 
food security sector. But the further deterioration of the health situation in the region during 2021 
entailed a protracted socio-economic and fiscal crisis. In Ecuador, the contribution of the ongoing BS 
intervention on the economic and productive reactivation of the Manabí and Esmeraldas provinces 
was mixed, mostly due to the slowdown of the economy at the national level and the social unrest 
that took place in October 2019. 

LONGER-TERM STRENGTHENING OF HEALTH SYSTEMS 

EU response to COVID-19 was successful in strengthening several specific health system 
capacities  that  had  immediate  relevance  for  the  pandemic  response  in  countries. 
Developing specific capacities for general and intensive health care services produced good results 
in several countries. In Ukraine, for example, EU support helped the country to improve the capacity 
for testing, surveillance and infection prevention and  control,  and helped to implement COVID-19 
case management protocols, all in line with the national emergency response plan. Although limited 
in  scale,  capacity  development  in  surveillance,  detection  and  tracing  and  case  management 
(Caribbean, Turkey, Ethiopia, Ukraine) were effective measures to address the nine pillars of WHO’s 
COVID-19 response and the IHR of WHO. Mental Health and psycho-social support for patients and 
frontline workers was limited to Ukraine and Turkey.  

Results  of  broader  interventions  aimed  at  health  system  strengthening158  were  by 
comparison not as consistent, partly because these concerns were trumped by the urgency 
of  responding  to  more  immediate  health-related  needs,  or  because  crisis  conditions 
hampered their implementation. In Ukraine, measures to strengthen the overall health system 
were foreseen, but the evolution of the pandemic kept the focus on ensuring that the national health 
system could withstand the acute pressure from high COVID-19 caseloads. In Ethiopia and Myanmar, 
instability and conflict limited the lasting positive effects of EU response to COVID-19 on the health 
systems. In Ethiopia, health system strengthening in relation to COVID-19 was addressed through a 
EUR 10 million COVID-19 top-up on the Health Sector Budget Support programme. The additional 
funding aimed to help the country to increase the number of diagnostic laboratories with COVID-19 
diagnostic equipment and test kits, and the number of treatment centres.159 In Myanmar, the coup 
d’état led to the interruption of most public services (health, education, finance) and wiped out the 
positive  effects  of  earlier  COVID-19  related  interventions.  BS  programmes  and  lending  to  the 
National Health Laboratory were suspended. It is not possible to say if any progress made before the 
coup  in  limiting  the  spread  of  the  virus,  reducing  humanitarian  suffering,  and  minimising  socio-
economic pressure could be sustained.  

158  Governance, financing, health services, human resources, medicine/technology, information. 
159  The  consolidated  pandemic  response  contributed  to  enhance  the  short-  and  medium-term  capacity  of  the  national 
health system by increasing the number of testing centres (from two to 40) and expanding treatment centres. WHO 
supported the distribution of supplies for sample collection, transportation, and testing; conducted laboratory quality 
assurance visits and facilitated the independent verification of tested samples; completed rehabilitation of lab facilities; 
trained lab staff and sample collectors; and supplied testing kits. The response also topped up the ongoing Health SRPC 
(2016-2022)  which  focuses  on  the  quality  and  access  to  health  service  delivery,  equity  in  health  service  delivery, 
allocation, and spending in the health sector and on public finance management (PFM) and oversight functions in the 
sector. The EU strongly encouraged the government to increase domestic allocations to the health sector, and the health 
ministry’s budget indeed increased in the fiscal year 2020/2021. Overall results were however mitigated as some key 
health indicators, notably on maternal and child health, performed well below Healthy Timing and Spacing of Pregnancy 
(HTSP) targets and showed a decline in 2020 compared to 2019 (Source: EU Delegation note to the Ministry of Finance 
from June 2020). 

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EU support helped to improve access to health care through project support in a small number of 
countries, but also supported the health care system through several BS operations.160 In Turkey, 
health system strengthening measures included mobile clinics in rural areas as well as remote tele-
health services. Both addressed mental health and other health issues and reduced the burden on 
other health facilities. In Yemen, a country with hardly any capacity in the health sector, EU response 
to COVID-19 allowed the rehabilitation of five health facilities and helped to equip them with PPE, 
infrared  thermometers,  and  hand  sanitiser,  thus  increasing  access  to  basic  health  care  services. 
Training on IPC, case management and the adequate use of PPE to 200 Red Crescent Volunteers and 
100 staff optimised health service delivery and ensured ‘duty of care’. Additionally, DG ECHO support 
for the UNICEF shielding programme is likely to have some longer-term effects on the knowledge 
and  capacity  of  Community  Health  Workers  (CHWs)  and  on  the  availability  of  improved  WASH 
facilities.  Comparatively  little  attention  was given to  ensuring  access to  health  services,  including 
primary health care (PHC) as the major entryway to health services. 

Addressing  general  health  determinants  such  as  water  supply  occurred  in  several 
countries, but often was limited in scale. One exception was support in this area for Sierra Leone. 
The  EU  supported  the  large-scale  instalment  of  water  supplies  for  hygiene  activities  in  informal 
settlements in Freetown. An outstanding intervention by the  Team Europe was the support of ten 
Caribbean member states for their down payments with EUR 2.06 million for their more than 1 million 
doses  of  vaccine  procured  through  the  COVID-19  Vaccines  Global  Access  (COVAX)  facility.  Other 
COVID-19 vaccination strategies were not supported in the timeframe covered by this assessment161. 

The EU supported Risk Communication and Community Engagement (RCCE) in several case 
study  countries  to  raise  awareness  on  health  risks  related  to  COVID-19  and  to  tackle 
rumours and misinformation. However, it was not possible to examine the effectiveness 
of  these  interventions.  Under  the  Prime  Minister’s  leadership,  Ethiopia  initiated  the  ComBat 
campaign combined with an intensive surveillance set-up and active engagement to promote COVID-
19 testing. A hotline was set up in the Public Health Institute to provide guidance on COVID-19 for 
the  population.  In  Sierra  Leone,  the  EU  supported  a  very  intensive  RCCE  campaign  in  informal 
settlements, enlisting religious and community leaders and using door to door sensitisation to target 
false information on the pandemic. In Afghanistan, with the support of DG ECHO, an RCCE working 
group was established by Norwegian Refugee Council, led by WHO. Health workers went to schools 
and mosques for contact tracing and awareness raising sessions. In each district, community health 
workers were trained and assigned to health posts.  

The  EU  supported  the  Caribbean  Public  Health  Agency  (CARPHA)  Communication  in  developing  a 
regional  risk  communication  strategy  and  a  communication  media  plan  for  COVID-19.  Both  were 
shared with the Regional Health Communication Network (RHCN) to assist CARPHA member states 
to develop and implement a risk communication strategy in support of a more coordinated regional 
response to COVID-19. In December 2020 CARPHA hosted a virtual meeting with RHCN to improve 
regional communication focal points’ listening skills, monitoring, analysing, and responding to social 
media to address the ‘infodemic’. Misinformation on COVID-19 was addressed through partnerships 
with the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and Facebook to position CARPHA as the 
default research result when people from Caribbean states searched for ‘Coronavirus’ or ‘COVID-19’. 

160  E.g., Ethiopia, Morocco. 
161  As of September 2021, over EUR 3 billion have been provided to COVAX through Team Europe and 500 million doses 

are meant to be shared through Team Europe by mid-2022 (based on information from Commission staff). 

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CARPHA also collaborated with the Deaf Pioneers and produced a COVID-19 information video for 
the deaf.162  

EU support of risk communication on  COVID-19 in northern Yemen encountered strong opposition 
and denial by the government and the population. Several RCCE measures therefore focused only on 
southern Yemen. Similarly, in the DRC, COVID-19 vaccination campaigns encountered distrust among 
the population and with medical staff, making the implementation of RCCE campaigns challenging. 

162  11th EDF regional Health Security project – Implementation Update on 31st March 2021   

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8.  CONCLUSIONS, 
RECOMMENDATIONS 

LESSONS 

LEARNT 

AND 

This section presents a brief overall assessment for this evaluation, followed by specific conclusions. 
It  further  presents  for  each  conclusion  the  underlying  findings  across  the  evaluation  questions 
provided in chapters 4 to 7 above.  

8.1  Overall assessment 

Overall, the EU response to the COVID-19 pandemic (in the context of the Team Europe approach) 
was relevant and timely, allowing the  EU to support partner countries and regions in  a context of 
profound  crisis.  Faced  with  this  challenge  at  the  end  of the  EU  2014-2020 Multiannual  Financial 
Framework, the Commission appropriately concentrated mostly on re-allocating already committed 
funds  and  re-purposing  ongoing  interventions.  Budget  support  and  macro-financial  assistance 
constituted,  in  terms  of  funding,  about  three  quarters  of  the  EU  response  in  the  17  case  study 
countries  and  regions.  In  a  context  of  revenue  shortfall  and  rising  expenditure  and  debt,  these 
provided timely liquidity to partner governments of all countries examined. In several of them, the 
modest  to  significant  fiscal  space  increase  generated  contributed  to  maintain  macroeconomic 
stability. It also helped partner governments to finance their emergency fiscal and socio-economic 
packages.  The  implementation  of  these  packages  cushioned  the  shock  on  enterprises  and  the 
population.  Through  budget  support,  the  Commission  promoted  better  accountability  and 
transparency in partner countries in the management of funds dedicated to the response to COVID-
19, more strongly in some countries than in others. Moreover, numerous humanitarian/emergency 
and development cooperation programmes and projects, which represented about a quarter of the 
overall financial envelope of the COVID-19 response in case study countries and regions, produced 
some tangible deliverables in health, private sector development, and water, sanitation, and hygiene. 
Attempts at systems strengthening were often crowded out by responses to more immediate needs. 
Budget support provided necessary and continued support to governments during the crisis to secure 
key public expenditure. However, opportunities for building greater crisis resilience through budget 
support were not fully exploited. Beyond the focus on the immediate crisis response, they hinged on 
the level of institutional capacity and the degree of reform-minded leadership. Nexus efforts pursued 
through other aid modalities were also rare. While not the only enabling factor, the Team Europe 
approach  did  increase  the  visibility  of  the  EU  response  to  COVID-19  and  also  facilitated  greater 
coordination in about half of the examined cases. Beyond the sharing of information and analysis, 
increased  political  commitment  tied  to  the  Team  Europe  approach  may  have  facilitated  greater 
effectiveness of the EU response to COVID-19 in at least a few cases. However, the Team Europe 
approach’s  emphasis  on  political  commitment  to  cooperation  could  not  help  to  overcome  more 
systemic bottlenecks for greater coordination between the EU and its Member States. 

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8.2  Conclusions 

C1.  The  Commission  put  together  an  EU  response  to  COVID-19  that  was  relevant  and 
appropriate for supporting the response to the COVID-19 crisis in partner countries and 
regions.  Intensified  EU-internal  and  external  coordination  and  cooperation  through  pre-
existing  mechanisms,  the  flexible  use  of  aid  modalities  and  considerable  investment  of 
staff time allowed for the timely delivery of these packages, in keeping with Commission 
normative principles and priorities. 

Based on EQ1, EQ2, EQ3, EQ4 

•  By  and  large,  the  COVID-19  response  was  consistent  with  the  three  priority  areas  and  key 
strategic and operational principles put forward in the Joint Communication on the Global EU 
response to COVID-19 of April 2020163, making appropriate use of the range of aid modalities at 
its disposal to compile COVID response packages for its initial COVID response.  

•  Both DG ECHO and DG INTPA and DG NEAR made appropriate changes to their procedures to 
speed  up support in  these  exceptional  circumstances,  granting  implementing partners  greater 
leeway for procurement, enabling the award of grants without calls for proposals and introducing 
simplified action document templates for all aid modalities to alleviate the workload associated 
with programme formulation and adaptation, among other things. 

•  Coordination, cooperation and partnerships with EU MS, UN organisations, non-EU  donors and 
other partners helped the Commission to bring into the COVID-19 response the required expertise 
that  had  not  been  part  of  the  pre-COVID-19  cooperation  envelope  for  certain  countries  (e.g., 
health in Fiji). 

•  Overall, this allowed the Commission to help partner countries in the roll-out of their own national 
COVID-19 responses, made it possible for the Commission to deliver much needed supplies and 
equipment for the health sector, and - to some extent - to support and provide social protection 
services to vulnerable populations and support SMEs and other private sector actors during the 
first year of this crisis. 
The  roll-out  of  large-scale  vaccination  campaigns  in  partner  countries  was missing  from  the  EU  COVID-19 
response packages. 

• 

C2. Faced with the COVID-19 crisis at the end of the EU Multiannual Financial Framework, 
the  Commission  dealt  appropriately  and  efficiently  with  the  constraint  of  having  little 
additional money to allocate to the response in partner countries by re-allocating and re-
purposing already committed money where possible. This approach translated into uneven 
sizes  of  response  packages  relative  to  the  pre-COVID-19  cooperation  envelopes  and  in 
relation to the tremendous needs that remain in many countries. 

•  The Commission had a limited set of options to put together the COVID-19 response at the end 
of  the  Multiannual  Financial  Framework  2014-2020,  as  “new”  money  was  in  most  cases  not 
available. In line with HQ guidance, EU Delegations and headquarters therefore chose to adapt 

Based on EQ1, EQ3 

163  Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions – Communication on the Global EU response to COVID-19; Brussels, 8.4.2020, JOIN (2020) 
11 final. 

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existing  interventions  to  the  requirements  and  needs  of  the  COVID-19  crisis  by  re-allocating 
money within or between interventions. 

•  The adaptation of existing cooperation and humanitarian interventions was flexible and efficient, 
overall, in particular when the Commission and partners worked to avoid the need for substantial 
amendments of existing financing agreements. Flexibility and efficiency varied by aid modality, 
however. In comparison to working with existing projects, the launching of new EU interventions 
for the COVID-19 response was often lengthier and more time consuming, entailing a delay in 
the arrival of support. 

•  However,  the  reliance  on  re-allocating  and  re-committing  remaining  funds  meant  that 
opportunities for intentional planning and allocation of money from one country to another were 
limited. This applied to DG NEAR, DG INTPA, and also DG ECHO, as it also worked within the limits 
of the original HIPs, with the exception of Afghanistan. 

•  This translated into an uneven distribution of money across the different countries, as the sizes 
of  the  eventual  response  packages  depended  on  the  status  of  financial  commitments  and 
contracts.  Sizes  of  the  COVID-19  response  packages  relative  to  their  pre-COVID-19  average 
annual payments from 2014-2019 therefore varied from 9% (Turkey) to over 249% (Morocco), 
in ways that were not linked to the relative prevalence of needs in the different countries and 
that were not necessarily commensurate with the tremendous needs that existed and continue 
to exist in particular in resource-poorer countries in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic. 

C3. Massively mobilising budget support and  macro-financial  assistance for the support 
packages was a relevant approach to support governments’ fiscal capacity for initial crisis 
response  linked  to  COVID-19.  In  several  cases,  this  helped  countries  to  stabilise  their 
macro-fiscal  framework  and  to  execute  supplementary  budgets  placing  COVID-19 
measures  at  their  core.  It  also  offered  a  policy  dialogue  platform  to  monitor  the 
implementation  of  the  response.  Sound  budget  execution  and  proper  transparency  and 
oversight of COVID-19 expenses were promoted more strongly in some countries than in 
others. 

Based on EQ1, EQ2, EQ3, EQ4 

•  Partner countries introduced emergency fiscal and socio-economic policy packages in response 
to  the  COVID-19  pandemic.  These  were  reflected  in  supplementary  budgets  voted  during  Q2 
2020 that needed to be financed amid severe contraction of economies and domestic revenues.  
•  Constituting three quarters of the overall financial response envelope of the countries/regions 
covered by this assessment, BS and MFA164 helped to distribute large amounts of aid in a short 
timeframe. All BS and MFA disbursements planned for 2020 were made during the fiscal year 
2020  or  early  in  the  fiscal  year  2021165.  In  five  out  of  the  13  countries,  BS  and  MFA 
disbursements, which made up between 2.4 to 5% of public revenues of 2020, allowed for a 
significant increase in fiscal space. This contributed to ease the countries’ economic and financing 
constraints brought by the COVID-19 crisis. This was also useful for governments to be able to 
execute their supplementary budgets designed to respond to COVID-19 during the calendar year 
the pandemic hit. COVID-19 measures that were financed consisted of recurrent expenditures, 
mainly subsidies provided to a wide array of sectors (emergency, health, social protection, private 
sector  development,  food  security  and  agriculture,  etc.),  and  compensation  for  loss  of  tax 
revenue. In the remaining countries (eight out of 13 countries), the fiscal space generated through 

164  They  consisted  of  four  new  BS  programmes,  the  adaptation  of  26  already  ongoing  BS  programmes,  and  two  new 

exceptional MFA programmes. 

165  This concerns Ethiopia, Kenya, Fiji, and South Africa which all have a fiscal year distinct from the calendar year.  

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BS and MFA financial flows was negligible to modest. Nevertheless, it infused timely liquidity into 
government systems during the crisis, which was useful to finance countercyclical fiscal policy 
measures. 

•  BS  and  MFA  programmes  also  provided  a  platform  for  policy  dialogue,  particularly  to  follow 
progress in the execution of the government-led COVID-19 response plans. In some countries 
(such  as  Senegal),  regular  technical  discussions  took  place  between  BS  providers  and  the 
government during the crisis around a joint policy matrix. This matrix formed the basis to report 
on progress in the implementation of the COVID-19 response166.  

•  The Commission duly verified compliance with each of the four BS eligibility criteria for all BS 
disbursements. In addition, the Commission added specific COVID-19 requirements to promote 
accountability (e.g., reporting on special funds created to respond to the pandemic) for half of 
the BS deployed for the response that fit into the sample. Two cases (Senegal and Montenegro) 
stand  out  as  exemplary  cases  where  the  Commission  strongly  promoted  transparency  and 
accountability  in  the  management  of  COVID-19  funds  by  partner  countries.  Moreover,  the 
Commission seriously dealt with cases of potential misuse of funds revealed through audits in 
Honduras and Kenya. 

C4. The COVID-19 response through budget support and macro-financial assistance  was 
meant  to  respond  to  immediate  crisis  needs  rather  than  to  address  resilience  and  the 
continuation of already ongoing longer-term reforms. Mixed effects were observed in terms 
of increased resilience of the core capabilities of the public sector. 

Based on EQ1, EQ2, EQ3, EQ4 

•  BS and MFA programmes intrinsically supported efforts to strengthen national systems in pursuit 
of  greater  crisis  resilience  in  the  immediate  and  medium-term  future.  In  practice,  however, 
effects of these programmes on reforms in PFM, economic governance, social protection, labour 
market, etc. were impeded by two factors: 
➢  Firstly, the bulk of the budget support financial flows were provided during 2020. For the 
“crisis  MFA”,  the  disbursement  of  the  first  instalment  in  2020  was  not  subject  to  the 
fulfilment  of  specific  conditions  in  order  to  speed  the  response.  The  quality  of  the  policy 
dialogue will be all the more important for the release of the second instalment for which 
policy conditions linked to structural reforms have to be met.  

➢  Secondly, the leverage associated with the policy dialogue linked to general conditions, policy 
matrixes and performance indicators was minimised. Policy dialogue could not be as strong 
as in a “non-crisis” situation due to movement restrictions following COVID-19, albeit efforts 
were made to pursue dialogue. Variable tranche indicators that focused on longer-term PFM 
reforms were neutralised for several BS programmes.  

166  In Senegal, the matrix covered governance and transparency in the implementation of the COVID-19 response and the 

socio-economic response. 

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C5.  The  numerous  humanitarian/emergency  or  development  projects  that  made  up  the 
remaining quarter of the overall financial COVID-19 response envelope in the 17 countries 
and  regions167  produced  some  tangible  deliverables  in  areas  like  health,  private  sector 
development, water, sanitation, and hygiene. EU-financed projects also directed assistance 
to vulnerable groups not eligible for government-managed social protection programmes, 
albeit only for short time periods. 

Based on EQ1, EQ3, EQ4 

•  Humanitarian  and  development  cooperation  projects  that  were  part  of  the  COVID-19  support 
packages helped to meet several prevalent needs in partner countries and regions. In health, this 
included needs for basic medical supplies and PPE, and improved laboratory capacity to facilitate 
diagnoses of COVID-19 cases. EU Delegations used a variety of implementation arrangements 
and  partners  for  this  purpose,  often  building  on  cooperation  with  UN  organisations,  and  in 
particular  WHO.  This  allowed  the  Commission  to  provide  health-related  support  where  EU 
Delegations of several countries did not have pre-COVID-19 experience in this sector (e.g., in Fiji 
and Ukraine). 

•  The  EU  also  used project-type  aid to  channel  resources  for  basic  income,  food,  or  housing  to 
certain vulnerable populations whose livelihoods had been severely affected by the pandemic, 
but who were not eligible for services from national social protection programs. This included, for 
example, refugees, marginally employed workers or workers in the informal sector. While this 
support was highly relevant, it could often not offset the economic losses those groups were 
experiencing, and in many cases ran out before socio-economic conditions had stabilized. 

•  Overall, satisfaction with results of the COVID-19 response associated with projects was lower 
than the satisfaction with the role of the EU in stabilising the macro-economic framework of 
partner  countries  through  BS  and  MFA168.  This  includes  results  in  areas  relevant  for  social 
protection such as food and housing, and access to health care services. It also applied to support 
to the private sector through modalities other than BS. 

C6. Beyond this, humanitarian-development nexus efforts associated with the COVID-19 
response existed but were rare. Where they existed, efforts to tie the COVID-19 response 
into broader efforts at systems strengthening (e.g., in health) were often trumped by the 
need to respond to more immediate needs.  

Based on EQ1, EQ2, EQ4 

•  The  examination  of  the  COVID-19  response  in  17  countries  and  regions  identified  very  few 
attempts at operationalising the nexus, one being in Yemen, where the COVID-19 response was 
planned along a humanitarian – development continuation. 

•  Examples of institutional arrangements that would help to put the nexus concept into practice 
were rare or, where existing, were ultimately not linked to the initial COVID-19 response for the 
17  partner  countries/regions.  In  Myanmar,  the  Nexus  Response  Mechanism  (NRM),  a  pilot 
programme  operating  similarly  to  a  facility  with  high  degree  of  flexibility,  facilitated  a  more 
efficient response to COVID-19. 

•  Multiple funding streams involved in the COVID-19 response presented an additional challenge, 
as happened in Turkey where the response drew on different instruments (Facility, EUTF, HUMA169, 

167  Apart from approximately 1% of resources used for blending operations (see Section 2.3 of this report). 
168  According to results of the online survey. 
169  The humanitarian aid programme of the Commission, administered by DG ECHO. 

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IPA) that did not have a shared higher-level oversight function. Similar constellations were found 
in other countries. 

•  The EU record in system strengthening as part of the initial COVID-19 response, such as in health, 
was  mixed,  with  less  success  in  broader  efforts  at  strengthening  national  systems,  where 
priorities  for  longer-term system  strengthening  took  a  backseat  to  more immediate  concerns 
directly relevant for dealing with the challenges at hand. More focused interventions targeting 
system elements with high immediate relevance for the pandemic response (such as laboratory 
capacity strengthening) were more successful. 

C7.  Amidst  a  general  sense  of  urgency  to  support  partner  countries  in  dealing  with  the 
pandemic, the early Team Europe approach added value to the response of the EU to COVID-
19 in many of the case study countries and regions. Where the political appeal of the new 
approach  met  with  suitable  opportunities  for  cooperation,  the  Team  Europe  approach 
improved the visibility and standing of Europe as a whole as a key partner at country level. 
In some cases, it also helped to improve the effectiveness of the response.  

Based on EQ1, EQ2 

•  Coordination and cooperation among Commission services, with EU MS and EDFIs, and with non-
EU partners intensified in most of the case study countries and regions during the initial response 
to the COVID-19 crisis, both at national and regional levels. This increase was driven in part by a 
general sense of urgency stemming from the COVID-19 crisis to offer the appropriate support to 
partner  countries.  It  also  showed  the  influence  of  long-standing,  pre-COVID  cooperative 
arrangements and mechanisms that carried their momentum forward into the first year of the 
initial EU COVID-19 response. 

•  However, the strong political commitment to a joint EU response to COVID-19 that both EU and 
its Member States expressed through Council Conclusions created additional incentives at country 
level for the EU and its Member States and EDFIs to seek and make full use of opportunities for 
closer collaboration.  

•  At  a  minimum, the  approach  and  its  appeal  for  information  sharing  and  joint  communication 
offered  a  useful  point  of  convergence  for  the  individual  activities  of  the  EU  and  its  Member 
States. Some of the increased visibility of “Team Europe COVID-19 responses” are tied to this 
aspect  of  the  approach.  The  Team  Europe  approach  was  particularly  well  promoted  in  the 
Caribbean and in six country cases (Ecuador, Fiji, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Ukraine).  

•  Where  interest  in  more  intensive  cooperation  met  with  available  opportunities  to  collaborate 
(such  as  joint  budget  support  in  Senegal),  the  Team  Europe  approach  achieved  substantive 
changes  in  the  way  COVID-19  support  was  provided:  closer  alignment  of  objectives,  efficient 
policy  dialogue,  and  pooling  of  resources  may  have  increased  the  effectiveness  of  the  EU 
response.  However,  the  results  of  the  initial  EU  pandemic  response  need  to  be  verified  by 
additional evaluations. 

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C8. The early Team Europe approach was not equally suited to operate in all the different 
contexts  the  EU  encountered  while  designing  its  pandemic  response.  Knowledge  of  the 
Team  Europe  approach  was  also  not  yet  widespread.  Multi-dimensional  policy  agendas 
paired with well-established and pre-existing coordination mechanisms did not offer much 
space  to  further  enhance  collaboration  between  the  EU  and  its  Member  States,  nor  to 
launch communication or messaging campaigns under the Team Europe banner. This was 
even  more  so  when  the  existing  structures  included  not  only  European  donors,  but  also 
donors external to the EU. 

Based on EQ1, EQ2 

•  Some of the factors that impeded the adaptation and use of the Team Europe approach for the 
initial EU COVID-19 response were: a) lagging familiarity with and knowledge of the Team Europe 
approach  as  such;  b)  insufficient  clarity  on  the  intended  value-added  of  the  Team  Europe 
approach in different types of circumstances; c) the desire of the EU and EU MS to remain visible 
in their own right. These factors came to bear in particular in countries where the EU and its MS 
were already firmly integrated in pre-existing cooperation platforms that did not always leave 
much room or a clear need for another approach or framework for cooperation170. 
In  several  countries,  COVID-19  was  either  seen  as  one  of  many  factors  in  ongoing,  multi-
dimensional  crises (e.g.,  Afghanistan,  Yemen, Myanmar);  or  EU  presence  and cooperation  was 
already  strongly  associated  with  other,  dominant  mechanisms  or  processes,  such  as  the 
accession process in Montenegro, or the MDTF mechanism in Afghanistan. This meant that the 
Team  Europe  approach  was  either  not  adopted  for  communications  related  to  the  COVID-19 
response or was not adopted systematically. 

• 

•  Lastly, the Team Europe approach in its early form did not offer solutions for addressing more 
systemic or organisational bottlenecks for cooperation between the EU and its Member States. 
Where  these  existed,  such  as  in  the  form  of  incompatible  procedures  or  differing  financing 
timelines, the Team Europe approach did not show a way forward. 

8.3  Lessons Learnt 

The following paragraphs present a number of lessons that emerged from the analysis conducted 
for this assessment and whose relevance go beyond the immediate scope of this evaluation. 

Lesson #1: Budget support can be powerful to support partner governments facing a rapid 
onset crisis in quickly providing funds to frontline public services.  

•  The pandemic imposed a heavy fiscal and growth toll on partner countries. In 2020, government 
budgets  faced  rising  expenditures  and  lower  tax  and  revenue  collections.  They  therefore  had 
limited fiscal space to finance their COVID-19 response. 

•  Through budget support, the Commission could quickly channel funds into government budgets 
as initial response to COVID-19. In some countries, these funds represented a significant share 

170  This often applied to countries caught in complex, multi-dimensional and protracted crises, such as those in Afghanistan 
or Yemen, where the COVID-19 pandemic is just one among many issues that the international community and their 
government partners are seeking to address, and where established coordination mechanisms and partnerships offered 
opportunities for coordination and cooperation (e.g., the multi-donor trust funds in Afghanistan). However, the same 
dynamic also applies in a stable context. One example here is Montenegro, where the EU pre-accession framework 
offered structures and language that could be applied to the EU response to COVID-19, which thus left less immediately 
accessible room for establishing the early Team Europe approach in connection with the response.  

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of total government revenues. This was most useful to support governments in meeting their 
immediate expenditure needs. 

Lesson #2:  It is  always  necessary  to  ensure that appropriate mechanisms  securing the 
accountability and transparency of government operations are applied, even in situations 
of response to a crisis. 

• 

In  its  support  to  partner  countries’  COVID-19  response,  the  Commission  aligned  with  partner 
country national plans and used their budgetary/public finance systems (notably through budget 
support), including those provided for crisis spending. The pandemic confirmed the importance 
of public financial management as part of managing the fiscal response. Most partner countries 
made  use  of  existing  budget  flexibility  and  emergency  provisions  and/or  created  new  special 
funds or entities in response to COVID-19. Securing accountability requires ex ante or ex post 
controls on frontline spending, together with appropriate tracking systems. 

Lesson #3: Blending and guarantees were not a suitable aid modality for putting together 
and deploying crisis responses in a short timeframe. 

•  None of the blending projects – in the form of technical assistance or interest rate subsidies - 
deployed for the initial COVID-19 response in the 17 countries started implementation in 2020, 
in large part due to the heavy design and approval process associated with this modality.  
•  Additionally,  the  few  EFSD-backed  financial  guarantees  envisaged  to  remove  credit  supply 
constraints  in  support  of  private  enterprises  in  coping  with  COVID-19  challenges  did  not 
materialise. Several reasons explain it:  less room for manoeuvre for governments to increase 
borrowing since they  had passed large fiscal  packages in response to COVID-19 and were, in 
many cases, already highly indebted; lagging interest among banks who feared an increase of 
non-performing loans in crisis times and among enterprises who were not willing to subscribe to 
additional credits during the crisis; little in-country experience with the instrument both within 
governments and EU Delegations; and the long time necessary to set up such operations due to 
heavy design and approval processes. Another concern often raised in the literature lies around 
the  targeting  difficulties  met  with  lines  of  credit  through  the  banking  system,  i.e.,  financial 
intermediary loans having often failed to reach the worst affected by crises. 

Lesson #4: The Commission lacked a fast and flexible way to mobilise funding for rapid, 
nexus-type interventions in response to newly emerging crises and emergencies that could 
complement  humanitarian  operations  and  link  them  to  new  or  existing  development 
interventions. 

•  No suitable EU aid modality/mechanism existed that could be used to provide quick support with 
development money through new interventions. While the adaptation of existing development 
projects  for  the  COVID-19  response  was  a  relatively  efficient  way  to  make  support  available 
quickly, the development of new projects generally took longer, resulting in delays in the provision 
of assistance. 

•  Moreover, putting together new development interventions required large investments of time 
and energy by EU staff. While this worked for the COVID-19 response, this should not be counted 
on as the basis for a fast response by the EU for future crises. 

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Lesson #5: The usefulness of the Team Europe approach for improving the geo-political 
standing of the EU hinges on rallying support for the approach in other  thematic areas 
within development and international relations and maintaining it once the sense of crisis 
linked to COVID-19 has subsided. 

•  The COVID-19 pandemic created a global sense of urgency to respond to the medical and socio-
economic challenges related to this unprecedented crisis. Team Europe approach translated this 
sense  into  commitments  to  pursue  a  cooperative  approach  to  respond  to  the  challenges  the 
pandemic created. 

•  Whether the commitment for cooperation can translate from the COVID-19 crisis to other policy 
arenas, and whether the Team Europe approach can help to enhance the standing of the EU as 
a  whole  as  partner  of  reference,  remains  an  open  question  from  the  perspective  of  this 
assessment. Changes in the global geopolitical landscape may help to sustain interest among 
Member States in a Europe with a well-established culture and processes for coordinated action 
if the approach proves itself in the early years of its existence.  

Lesson  #6:  Putting  the  Nexus  into  practice  internally  within  the  EC  as  part  of  crisis 
responses requires continued attention to the division of labour and coordination between 
the  Commission  development,  foreign  policy,  and  civil  protection  and  humanitarian 
services. 

•  The  COVID-19  response  by  and  large  did  not  change  the  working  dynamic  and  coordination 
between within Commission services (DG INTPA, DG NEAR, FPI and DG ECHO), with DG ECHO often 
playing a co-equal role in countries with strong emergency response. Humanitarian, development 
and foreign policy interventions with nexus potential were not necessarily coordinated beyond 
the sharing of information. 

•  The assessment identified few examples of institutional arrangements to support a more closely 
coordinated approach to planning and delivery of a joint crisis response by DG ECHO, DG INTPA, 
FPI, and DG NEAR. 

8.4  Recommendations 

This chapter presents the recommendations of the evaluation. They derive from the conclusions and 
findings of this report and aim to provide some guidance on the future of the EU response to the 
COVID-19 crisis (and response to future crises) and the development of the Team Europe approach. 

Recommendations identify the groups they are targeting (EU Delegation, DG ECHO field, DG ECHO, 
DG  NEAR,  DG  INTPA,  etc.).  A  summary  table  on  linkages  between  findings,  conclusions  and 
recommendations is provided at the end of the chapter171.  

R1. Continue to support the COVID-19 response in partner countries and regions throughout 
2021  and  beyond  as  necessary,  adjusting  the  scope  to  reflect  the  evolving  situation  in 
countries,  taking  into  account  the  additional  resources  from  the  new  2021  –  2027 
Multiannual Financial Framework and aligning the scale of support to the magnitude of 
needs in each country. 

Directed at HQ, incl. DG INTPA, DG NEAR, DG ECHO, DG ECFIN 

Based on C1, C2, C4 

171  NOTE: This table will be added in the final version of the report, after the meeting with the ISG on the report. 

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•  With the pandemic continuing across the globe, and with the supply of vaccines to Africa and 
other  regions  of  the  world  very  limited,  most  EU  partner  countries  will  continue  to  suffer 
significantly from the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. While the initial response of the EU 
channelled much needed resources to governments and the population in 2020, many countries 
are facing and will continue to face challenges in 2021 and beyond. 

•  At the same time, the challenges and resource gaps in countries have changed significantly since 
the start of the pandemic. Globally, one of the biggest gaps in supplies necessary to curb the 
spread of the virus is in relation to access to COVID-19 vaccines, which remains unequal. The EU 
has already started to address this issue by supporting the construction of production facilities 
in  Africa  and  other  places  and  by  large-scale  vaccine  sharing  of  the Member States  with  the 
COVAX Facility and also bilaterally with third countries. This support needs to continue and will 
need to be complemented by efforts to build up the logistical capacity for large-scale vaccine 
campaigns in partner countries. 

•  The scale of future COVID-19 support for specific countries should also be determined by the 
magnitude  of  their  prevalent  needs,  their  absorption  capacity,  and  the  existing  accountability 
mechanisms. It should depend less on the amount of resources that can be re-allocated from 
the existing cooperation envelope in a particular country (see R2). 

•  Reporting on future COVID-19 support also should be streamlined and improved, building on the 
country-level  Team  Europe  COVID-19  response  fiches,  while  linking  the  reporting  better  to 
existing  data  management  platforms  in  the  different  DGs  (i.e.,  CRIS/OPSYS,  etc.)  and  other 
standard reporting formats. 

R2. Create a financial reserve or contingency fund that can be used to complement the use 
of existing funds for crisis responses to close funding gaps, and to even out the allocation 
of funds across countries, making it more commensurate with the respective magnitude of 
needs.  

Directed at HQ, with involvement of DG INTPA, DG NEAR, DG ECHO, European Parliament, European 
Based on C2 
Council 

•  While  the  crisis  response  primarily  based  on  the  re-purposing  of  existing  interventions  was 
appropriate for the COVID-19 response, it did leave the Commission services and EU Delegations 
with little space for intentional programming and for increasing the  allocation of resources to 
certain countries in response to the magnitude of COVID-19-related needs. The financial reserve 
or contingency fund is therefore meant to complement resources from existing interventions in 
any future crisis responses. The introduction of the ‘emerging challenges and priorities cushion’ 
of EUR 9,534 billion under NDICI-Global Europe (article 6.3) foresees such a reserve, to “respond 
to unforeseen needs”. Its concrete operationalisation should be fleshed out. 

•  Money from the fund or reserve ideally should not be tied to a particular region or Commission 
service172. Instead, it should in principle be available to any relevant Commission service to top-
up its resources for a specific emergency response.  

•  The Commission should consider the possibility of resourcing the reserve funds counter-cyclically, 
in  order  to  provide  a  financial  buffer  during  times  when  most  money  from  the  Multiannual 
Financial Framework is already committed or spent. Unused funds should be rolled over into the 
next financing period. 

172  Feasibility to be determined. 

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R3.  Develop  guidelines  on  using  the  modalities  available  under  the  NDICI,  including  the 
Rapid  Response  Actions,  to  design  and  implement  ad-hoc,  timely  and  adaptable  crisis 
response interventions for the continued EU support to the global COVID-19 response, also 
in view of their potential for helping to link relevant EU civil protection and humanitarian 
aid interventions, development and foreign policy actions. 

Directed at HQ, with involvement of DG INTPA, DG NEAR, DG ECHO, FPI  
Lesson #4 

Based on C2, C4, C6, C8, 

•  Launching new projects with development money for the EU support to the global response to 
COVID-19 was one of the most time-consuming operational aspects of the initial response, and 
often led to delays in the start of services. The newly created “Rapid Response Actions” (article 
4) under the NIDCI-Global Europe has the potential to address this issue for DG INTPA and DG 
NEAR who had been missing this type of response mechanism173. 

•  To make best use of the Rapid Response Actions, the EC services should provide guidance that 
expands on their intended role and significance for the continued support of the global response 
to  COVID-19.  As  rapid  response  actions  are  also  meant  to  help  DG  INTPA  and  DG  NEAR  to 
complement EU humanitarian and civil protection assistance, they are  also a relevant tool for 
strengthening the HDP Nexus in the context of the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Guidance 
should  therefore  explain,  among  other  things,  the  types  of  circumstances  under  which  Rapid 
Response Actions should become part of EU support to responses to COVID-19, minimum criteria 
for the involvement of Nexus stakeholders in the formulation of actions, and requirements for 
the linking of actions from different services, where applicable. 

•  Providing guidance on the use of Rapid Response Actions for the response to COVID-19 should 
happen in parallel to the clarification of the division of labour between DG INTPA and DG NEAR 
on the one hand, and DG ECHO on the other, to avoid duplication of uncoordinated emergency 
response efforts. 

R4. Continue providing macro-economic support in light of the current fiscal strains faced 
by  partner  governments.  Favour  use  of  Budget  Support  and  Macro-Financial  Assistance 
especially  when  it  is  possible  to  generate  significant  fiscal  space.  Maximise  the  use  of 
policy  dialogue  as  a  leverage  to  inform  and  monitor  the  implementation  of  the  crisis 
response plans of partner countries. 

Directed at budget support teams in DG INTPA, DG NEAR, EU Delegations 

Based on C3, C4 

•  The bulk of the EU’s initial financial response to COVID-19 in partner countries and regions was 
provided  in  2020.  While  economic  recoveries  diverge  across  countries  and  sectors,  partner 
countries and regions remain severely affected by the pandemic in 2021. With economic activity 
still  being  disrupted  and  uncertainty  weighing  on  growth,  most  governments  continue  facing 
strong fiscal pressures and struggle to meet their immediate spending needs. They will require 
additional medium-term budgetary support. 
In this context, continued support to partner governments through budget support and macro-
financial  assistance  programmes,  after  careful  review  of  the  general  eligibility  criteria  and 
assessment of the risks, therefore remains highly relevant. The provision of budgetary support 

• 

173 These actions, with a financial envelope of EUR 3,182 billion, are meant to enable early actions in situations of urgency. 
They  should  cover  three  main  areas  of  intervention:  peace,  stability  and  conflict  prevention  ;  resilience  and  increased 
linkages  between  humanitarian  aid  and  development  actions;  and  Union  foreign  policy  across  political,  economic  and 
security issues. They shall not be programmed. The Commission may adopt exceptional assistance measures. 

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should  be  all the more  considered  when  disbursements  can  generate  significant  fiscal  space. 
Indeed, it is in those cases that their contribution to ease partner countries’ financing constraints 
can be made visible. 

•  Make sure that all opportunities are seized to adequately inform the design and to take stock of 
the implementation of COVID-19/future crisis response plans. Draw on existing policy dialogue 
platforms and/or national/sector coordination frameworks to discuss the main orientations of the 
partner countries’ response plans to crises and to closely monitor their implementation. Provide, 
where necessary, relevant capacity building/technical assistance, in particular to support national 
capacities  to  design  and  implement  emergency  and  recovery  sector  policies  (e.g.,  social 
protection, access to finance, employment, agriculture, etc.), or to strengthen transparency and 
accountability. 

R5. Pursue support to medium- to longer-term fiscal and public expenditure reforms aimed 
at  increasing  domestic  revenue  mobilisation  and  at  promoting  debt  sustainability  both 
during crisis and post-crisis responses. 

Directed at DG INTPA, DG NEAR, EU Delegations 

Based on C4 

•  The management of the fiscal response by partner governments often brought to light structural 
vulnerabilities, notably in the broad PFM architecture, including debt management together with 
accountability and transparency. Addressing underlying structural PFM vulnerabilities of country 
systems  is  essential  for  both  immediate  and  long-term  recovery.  Strong  public  financial 
management systems with sound budget planning, execution and control enable countries to be 
more  effective  in  targeting  resources,  re-orienting  expenditures  and  ensuring  greater 
accountability in the use of resources. 

•  While  PFM  reform  programmes  are  multi-year  and  multi-component  programmes  aiming  at 
medium- to long-term structural reforms, they should be incorporated into crisis interventions as 
well as in post-crisis response interventions. 

•  Most partner countries are likely to face tight fiscal conditions due to large fiscal deficits and 
high levels of public debt. Beyond protecting key public expenditures in the short-term, following 
up on the reform agenda is necessary to boost government revenues and ensure proper public 
debt management in the medium- to long-term: 
➢  Support  government  measures  aiming  to  strengthen  domestic  revenue  mobilisation.  The 
implementation of tax policy and revenue administration reforms will enable to significantly 
increase tax collection over a medium-term horizon (including progress toward international 
tax governance standards).  

➢  Support  government measures (such as  fiscal rules) that would maintain spending in line 

with revenue mobilisation capacity and keep the public debt at sustainable levels. 

➢  Support  countries  vulnerable  to  shocks  from  changes  in  commodity  prices  and  natural 
disasters to work towards building fiscal buffers to enhance resilience to shocks and achieve 
debt sustainability. 

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R6. Build on the lessons from the EU response to COVID-19 and the national responses to the pandemic 
to support partner countries in developing their capacities for the vertical and horizontal expansion of 
social  protection  systems  in  EU  partner  countries  to  increase  crisis  preparedness  and  resilience  and 
support vulnerable populations. 

Directed at DG INTPA, DG NEAR, EU Delegations  

Based on C4, C5, C6 

• 

•  Build on experiences from the EU response to COVID-19 to identify recurring gaps in national 
social  protection  systems  (e.g.,  ineligibility  of  workers  in  the  informal  sector  (Senegal174), 
refugees, migrants, or internally displaced people) and other key weaknesses (e.g., financing gaps 
for  social  protection,  inability  of  existing  systems  to  provide  appropriate  social  protection 
floors175). 
Integrate these insights and other lessons from the global COVID-19 response into the ongoing 
work  of  the  EU  on  promoting  social  protection  through  international  cooperation  and 
partnerships176. The aim should be to identify models for ensuring more comprehensive social 
protection177  during  crises  and  emergencies,  either  through  more  coherent  and  universal 
permanent social protection systems, or through models for the temporary horizontal expansion 
of existing systems to vulnerable groups or their vertical expansion to new services or levels of 
support. 

•  Pilot those models for the fast vertical and horizontal donor-driven expansion of social protection 
systems to make them more “shock-responsive”, while aligning them as closely as possible to 
the existing, government-driven structures and procedures for social protection. 

•  Harmonize  the  work  on  social  protection  with  that  on  domestic  revenue  mobilisation  and  at 
promoting debt sustainability both during crisis and post-crisis responses (see R5) and with the 
ongoing work on strengthening the humanitarian-development nexus. 

R7. Further cooperate with partner governments to be more open and accountable in their 
present and future crisis policy response and crisis spending.  

Directed at DG INTPA, DG NEAR, EU Delegations 

Based on C3 

Increased efforts should be made in coordination with IFIs or Member States to strengthen capacities 
and accountability mechanisms in partner countries to be better prepared for the ongoing COVID-19 
response and future crises. This would involve continuing to: 

•  Promote adequate ex ante or ex post controls on public expenditure through appropriate tracking 
systems. This is key to ensure checks and balances in situations presenting increased fiduciary 
risks.  This  includes  the  adoption  of  an  integrated  financial  management  information  system 
(IFMIS) to improve budget and cash management in general and, more specifically, to secure an 
integrated  expenditure  reporting  for  COVID-19/future  crises.  This  also  implies  ensuring  that 

174  E.g., workers in the informal sector were not covered by the national COVID-19 response program PRES. 
175  The  ILO  defines  social  protection  floors  as nationally  defined  sets  of  basic  social security  guarantees which  secure 
protection aimed at preventing or alleviating poverty, vulnerability, and social exclusion. These guarantees should ensure 
at a minimum that, over the life cycle, all in need have access to essential health care and basic income security (see: 
https://www.ilo.org/secsoc/areas-of-work/policy-development-and-applied-research/social-protection-floor/lang--
en/index.htm). 

176  E.g.,  this  includes  the  work  linked  to  SOCIEUX+  (http://socieux.eu/),  its  partnership  with  the  International  Labour 
Organization  (ILO),  UNICEF  and  the  Global  Coalition  for  Social  Protection  Floors  (https://socialprotection-pfm.org/), 
among other things. 

177  For example, see “What’s next for social protection in light of COVID-19: country responses”; The International Policy 

Centre for Inclusive Growth; Policy in Focus, Volume 19, Issue No.1, March 2021. 

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countries  operate  under  a  treasury  single  account  to  consolidate  and  optimise  the  use  of 
government resources. 

•  Promote the establishment of internal audit units in ministries to strengthen PFM. 
•  Support the empowerment of State Audit Institutions.  
•  Support legislatures, including on approving expenditures, monitoring of policy implementation 

and following-up on audit findings. 

•  Promote increased citizen participation in the formulation, approval, and execution of additional 

emergency fiscal policy packages to allow citizens to exercise accountability.  

•  Promote openness of data in requesting the publication of the initial and supplementary finance 
acts;  the  publication  of  monthly  progress  reports  on  policy  response  implementation;  the 
disclosure  of  all  details  related  to  procurement  contracts  linked  to  emergency  spending;  the 
publication of budget execution reports, which should include details on emergency spending; 
and the publication of audit reports on the financial management of the emergency response. 
This is  of paramount  importance  to  reveal  potential  irregularities  related to procurement  and 
misuse of funds. 

R8.  Use  experiences from  the COVID-19 response  and the  initial  experiences with  Team 
Europe Initiatives to sharpen the conceptual framework and build a comprehensive Team 
Europe joint Intervention Logic to design and implement the Team Europe approach. This 
should  also  include  an  analysis  of  the  political  economy  of  the  Team  Europe  approach. 
Based  on  this,  expand  on  the  operational  guidance  and  communication  materials  to 
promote the approach internally and externally. 

Directed at DG INTPA 

Based on C1, C6, C7, C8, L5 

•  The  Team  Europe  approach  showed  strengths  and  limitations  in  different  contexts  and 
circumstances  (see  C7  and  C8).  It  is  therefore  important  for  the  Team  Europe  approach  and 
initiatives supported by Team Europe to be well contextualised. 

•  The  Team  Europe  approach  created  political  momentum  around  the  COVID-19  response. 
Expansion on  this early approach needs to be  supported  by the development of a conceptual 
framework, and of guidance and tools to facilitate cooperation, even in the presence of systemic 
and organisational bottlenecks. 

•  The  EU  and  its  Member  States  should  also  use  political  economy  analyses  to  identify  policy 
arenas that could benefit from the  Team Europe approach, and that could be targeted in the 
coming years, to further establish the approach.

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APPENDIX - COUNTRY / REGIONAL NOTES

 
 
Country note - Afghanistan

 
 
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Contents 

1.  Background..................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 

1.1. 

Country COVID-19 context and government response .............................................................................. 1 

1.2. 

EU response ........................................................................................................................................................................ 2 

2.  Answers to Evaluation Questions (EQs) ......................................................................................................................... 3 

2.1. 

EQ 1 – Relevance ............................................................................................................................................................. 3 

2.2. 

EQ 2 – Value added ........................................................................................................................................................ 5 

2.3. 

EQ 3 – Efficiency .............................................................................................................................................................. 7 

2.4. 

EQ 4 – Effectiveness ................................................................................................................................................... 10 

3.  Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch .................................................................................................................................... 13 

THE PURPOSE OF THIS COUNTRY NOTE IS TO INFORM THE FAST-TRACK ASSESSMENT OF THE EU INITIAL RESPONSE AS A 
WHOLE. IT IS NOT DESIGNED TO BE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RESPONSE IN THE COUNTRY. 

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Acronyms 
AKF 
ARTF 
BS 
CDC 
DCI 
DG ECHO 

ADE 

Aga Khan Foundation 
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund 
Budget Support 
Community Development Councils 
Development Cooperation Instrument 
European Commission’s  Directorate-General  for European Civil  Protection and 
Humanitarian Aid Operations 
Early Warning, Early Finance, and Early Action Project 
European Union Member States 
Evaluation Question 
European Union 
Delegation of the European Union 
Gozar Assemblies 
Gender-based violence 
German Corporation for International Cooperation GmbH 
Government of Afghanistan 
Humanitarian Implementation Plan 
Human resource management 
International Committee of the Red Cross 
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace 
Internally displaced person 
International Monetary Fund 
International non-governmental organisation 
European Commission’s Directorate-General for International Partnerships 
International Organization for Migration 
International Rescue Committee 
Least developed country 
Law-and-Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan 
Multi-Donor Trust Funds 
Municipal Governance & Support Programme 
Ministry of Finance 
Ministry of Health 
Ministry of Public Health 
Medecins sans frontières 
Non-governmental organisation 
Norwegian Refugee Council 
Personal protective equipment 
Risk Communication and Community Engagement 
Research and Development 
Relief Effort for Afghan Communities and Households 
State and Resilience Building Contracts 
Save the Children 
Tackling Afghanistan's Government HRM and Institutional Reforms 
Team Europe 
United Nations 
United Nations Development Programme 
United Nation Humanitarian Air Service  
United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund 
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene 
World Bank 
World Food Programme 
World Health Organization 

ENETAWF 
EUMS 
EQ 
EU 
EUD 
GA 
GBV 
GIZ 
GoA 
HIP 
HRM 
ICRC 
IcSP 
IDP 
IMF 
INGO 
INTPA 
IOM 
IRC 
LDC 
LOFTA 
MDTF 
MGSP 
MoF 
MoH 
MoPH 
MSF 
NGO 
NRC 
PPE 
RCCE 
R&D 
REACH 
SRBC 
STC 
TAGHIR 
TE 
UN 
UNDP 
UNHAS 
UNICEF 
WASH 
WB 
WFP 
WHO 

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1. Background 

1.1.  Country COVID-19 context and government response1 

The  number  of  COVID-19  cases  started  to  soar  in  April  2020,  peaking  in  early  June  2020,  and 
gradually declined to relatively low levels around August/September 2020. A second wave started in 
October 2020. In December 2020, Afghanistan had a total of 46 717 confirmed cases of COVID-19 
and 1 797 deaths, although a study issued by the World Health Organization (WHO)2 suggested that 
by June 2020 more than 30% of the population had been infected by the virus. Afghanistan is highly 
vulnerable to the pandemic due to the overall fragile situation brought about by the armed conflict, 
a weak health system, widespread poverty, constrained access to water and sanitation, high-density 
settlements, and low levels of education. The pandemic has hit food security and nutrition, with more 
than 2 million women and children needing nutrition treatment and 4.2 million individuals in severe 
food shortage.3 

Daily new confirmed COVID-19 cases in Afghanistan 

Source: Johns Hopkins University CSSE COVID-19 Data 

The crisis has also had severe economic repercussions, hitting services and industry, with a more 
moderate  impact  on  agriculture.  Sharp  demand  shock  for  goods,  services  and  labour  caused 
widespread income loss, aggravated by high job insecurity, with most jobs belonging to the informal 
sector, and the lack of a social safety net. This has resulted in increasing food insecurity and poverty, 
which  has  reached  61%-72%  according  to  the  World  Bank  (WB).4  Overall,  the  Ministry  of  Health 
(MoH)’s response included increasing spending on health and social needs up to 1.3% of the national 
gross domestic product (GDP) in June 2020, widening the budget-deficit. A EUR 313 million Extended 
Credit Facility Arrangement was also agreed between the Government and the International Monetary 

1 Note that the evaluation period spans from the incipit of the crisis to the end of December 2020. 
2 https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-humanitarian-response-plan-2018-2021-2020-year-end-monitoring-report 
3 Team Europe COVID-19 Response Tracker, December 2020 
4 The World Bank COVID-19 Relief Effort for Afghan Communities and Households (REACH) (P174119), p. 5. 

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Fund  (IMF)  to  preserve  macroeconomic  stability,  reverse  the  fiscal  deterioration  caused  by  the 
pandemic and protect development and social spending.5 

1.2.  EU response 

The EU and Germany  were  among the main contributors to the  Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust 
Fund  (ARTF)  and  the  Law-and-Order  Trust  Fund  for  Afghanistan  (LOTFA,  managed  by  the  United 
Nations Development Programme [UNDP]).  Within the EU, Germany was the only Member State to 
allocate funds specifically to Afghanistan, with EUR 78.3 million committed by the end of 2020.6 By 
December  2020,  the  EU  had  allocated  around  EUR  275  million  to  the  COVID-19  response  in 
Afghanistan. The assistance package for Afghanistan encompasses all three priorities identified in 
the Joint Communication, including emergency response (EUR 79 million); support to health, Water, 
Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH), and Research and Development (R&D) – EUR 72 million; economic 
and social measures (EUR 125 million).7  

The EU (Commission-managed) emergency response was provided mainly through United Nations 
(UN)  agencies  (including  WHO  global  contract  on  COVID-19)  and  focused  on  the  provision  of 
humanitarian assistance to address the needs arising from the concurrent conflict and health crises. 
Interventions included the mobilisation of the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and 
Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) Humanitarian Air Bridge for the delivery of humanitarian 
goods.8  

An important share of the budget allocated to the support to health systems was commitment to the 
support to health and nutrition services to the local population provided through the United Nations 
International  Children's  Emergency  Fund  (UNICEF),  WHO  and  Aga  Khan  Foundation  (AKF).  The  EU  
response in this domain further included technical assistance to the Afghan Ministry of Health for 
the  improvement  of  Afghan  Health  System,  directly  managed  by  the  German  Corporation  for 
International Cooperation GmbH (GIZ), and the reallocation of funds for local governance support and 
police sector support, through UN-Habitat and the LOTFA respectively.9  

EU  interventions  to  mitigate  the  socio-economic  impact  of  the  crisis  included  budget  support 
disbursements in the framework of the existing Resilience and State Building contract (EUR 12 million 
out  of  a  total  budget  of  EUR  100  million),  as  well  as  funds  channelled  through  the  World  Bank, 
including the expansion of existing projects (World Bank Incentive package)  or the reallocation of 
unspent resources under pre-COVID-19 commitments to address COVID-19 - related needs (Relief 
Efforts for Afghan Communities and Households, EUR 12.5 million)10 (see Annex: Intervention Logic 
Sketch). 

Several interventions were selected for an in-depth review, and have therefore been given greater 
attention in this note, especially in EQ4. Below is the list of the selected interventions in Afghanistan: 

•  Emergency response 

o  1. Direct medical assistance and nutritional assistance (Commission humanitarian 
services implemented with funding managed by the European Commission's 

5 https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/11/06/pr20334-afghanistan-imf-executive-board-approves-a-us-370m-ecf-arrangement-to-

support 

6 Team Europe COVID-19 Response Tracker, December 2020, March 2021 
7 Inventory compiled by the evaluation team 
8 Team Europe COVID-19 Response Tracker, December 2020, March 2021 
9 Ibidem 
10 Ibidem 

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Directorate-General for International Partnerships) - UN agencies, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
(EUR 15 million) 

•  Health 

o  2. Local governance (reorientation to COVID-19 response) – UN Habitat (EUR 4.15 

million) 

o  3. Support to health and nutrition services (new project to be mobilised) – WHO 

(EUR 15 million)/UNICEF (EUR 10 million)/ AKF/Coraid (EUR 10 million) (total EUR 35 
million) 

•  Socio-economic:  

o  4. Reintegration of returnees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) – International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) - support livelihood, cash-for work (EUR 2 million) 

2. Answers to Evaluation Questions (EQs) 

2.1.  EQ 1 – Relevance 

EQ1:  To  what  extent  did  the  initial  EU  global  response  to  the  COVID-19  pandemic 
through the Team Europe country packages address the needs and priorities of partner 
countries  and  regions in  each  country  context  in  line with  the  three priorities  of  the 
Team Europe approach? 

Summary: The COVID-19 response package for Afghanistan was in line with the key principles of 
the joint EU Communication on the COVID-19 response, covering all three TE priorities emphasised 
by the communication. Partnerships with established international, inter-governmental actors and 
non-governmental actors were intended to provide capacities on the ground to address emergency 
needs and to help bolster the capacity of Afghan hospitals and health facilities to diagnose and 
treat COVID-19 cases. Several interventions under different modalities aimed at addressing short-
to medium-term socio-economic needs of the Afghan population, including those of returnees and 
IDPs. Government ownership and connectedness to longer-term resilience was linked to the use of 
the budget support and the channelling of funds to programmes and projects financed through 
Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) with established mechanisms for policy dialogue  and ongoing 
projects with longer-term time horizons. However, the single largest component of the EU response 
was designed to operate outside of these mechanisms. 

The design of the COVID-19 response package for Afghanistan was in line with the key principles of 
the joint EU Communication on the COVID-19 response. The package covered all three Team Europe 
(TE) priorities emphasised by the joint communication.11 It foresaw the use of new12 and existing funds 
for  immediate  targeted  support  to  address  the  humanitarian  consequences  of  the  pandemic  in 
Afghanistan  and  to  help  address  shortages  in  personal  protective  equipment  (PPEs),  as  well  as  to 
ensure the continuation of the provision of social services, in particular to help meet the needs of the 
most vulnerable. With Afghanistan’s borders with surrounding countries closed immediately after the 
onset of the pandemic, humanitarian air bridges were intended to ensure a minimum provision of 

11 Emergency response to the immediate health crisis and resulting humanitarian needs; strengthen health, water and sanitation systems, as 
well  as  partners’  research  capacities  to  deal  with  the  pandemic  and  their  preparedness;  address  the  immediate  social  and  economic 
consequences (EU Joint communication_2020_11) 

12 The EU package for Afghanistan included “fresh” or “new” money to fund COVID-19 response priorities in the country. The EU Delegation 
as  recipient  of  the  funds  divided  the  money  between  Commission  humanitarian  services  (receiving  EUR  15  million)  and  Commission 
development services/ Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) (receiving EUR 35 million). 

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essential  medical  supplies,  in  line  with  the  stipulation  of  the  EU  joint  communication  to  take  “all 
necessary  measures”13  to  ensure  that  this  was  the  case.  The  COVID-19  response  package  for 
Afghanistan was designed to address short-term, emergency needs (see above) through partnerships 
with established international and inter-governmental actors and non-governmental actors, including 
WHO  and  other  UN  agencies,  ICRC,  the  International  Rescue  Committee  (IRC),  the  Aga  Khan 
Foundation, and others. The humanitarian and emergency response component used funds managed 
by  the  Commission  humanitarian  services14  and  resources  from  the  Instrument  contributing  to 
Stability  and  Peace  (IcSP).15  It  covered  the  provision  of  personal  protective  equipment  (PPE)  and 
COVID-19 testing supplies and infrastructure, as well as other medical and nutritional assistance. By 
expanding existing programmes, Commission humanitarian services also targeted certain secondary 
effects of the COVID-19 crisis, such as the economic impact, increase in malnutrition, gender-based 
violence (GBV), and food insecurity.16 

Short- to medium-term needs for bolstering the capacity of Afghan hospitals and health 
facilities to diagnose and treat COVID-19 cases were covered by a new EUR 35 million EU 
programme financed from the allocation of additional funds to support the Afghan COVID-
19 response (see above). The programme17 was designed to help strengthen the COVID-19 testing 
and treatment capacity of hospitals, support infection prevention in health facilities18 and help reduce 
nutritional risks of COVID-19 infections.19 As well as providing funds to strengthen the health system 
and build capacity of health workers, funds were also provided for community-based activities to 
strengthen available nutrition services, WASH services, and change behaviours.  

Implementation was  foreseen to occur through indirect management by WHO and UNICEF, and a 
grant  agreement  with  the  Aga  Khan  Foundation  (AKF).  In  addition,  the  EU  also  supported  the 
strengthening of the capacity of police hospitals to identify and treat COVID-19 cases, and to increase 
the  access  of  members  of  the  police  force  to  PPE  through  the  United  Nations  Development 
Programme (UNDP)-administered Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA). 

The  COVID-19  response  package  also  appropriately  foresaw  several  interventions 
implemented  through  a  range  of  modalities  to  help  addressing  short-to  medium-term 
socio-economic  needs  of  the  Afghan  population  during  the  COVID-19  crisis  and  its 
aftermath,  including  poor  households  in  the general  population  and specific  vulnerable 
groups, such as returnees and IDPs.20 This also included the payment of an additional EUR 12 
million under an existing budget support agreement (SRBC)21 as part of a disbursement of EUR 100 
million under that contract in 2020 to create fiscal space for “the mobilisation of domestic revenue 
and increased spending to contain the disease”.22 In addition, the EU agreed with the World Bank as 
administrator  of  the  Afghanistan  Reconstruction  Trust  Fund  to  re-allocate  EUR  12.5  million  of 
unspent  funding  from  an  ARTF  governance  project  to  help  finance  the  ARTF-portion  of  a  newly 

13 EU Joint Communication_2020-11. 
14 EUR 40.85 million. 
15 EUR 5 million. 
16 Through the allocation of EUR 24 million associated with the expansion of existing programmes. 
17 “Support to the Government of Afghanistan in response to the COVID-19 Emergency”. 
18 Through improved infection prevention policies, more reliable water supply and waste management. 
19 Through the provision of nutritional services along with COVID-19 treatments. 
20 Among other things, through World Bank administered programmes intended to provide livelihood support to communities with high shares 

of IDPs and returnees. 

21 In the case of Afghanistan, this EUR 12 million was associated with three targets in the SRBC 2019 which had not been met, or had been 

met with significant delay.  

22 Disbursement request sent by the Ministry of Finance, 29 March 2020. 

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created,  and  World  Bank  administered,  “Relief  Effort  for  Afghan  Communities  and  Households” 
(REACH). With a slightly more medium-term perspective, the EU also agreed with the World Bank on 
the reallocation of EU ARTF contributions to a four-year, World Bank administered “Early Warning, 
Early  Finance,  and  Early  Action  Project”  (ENETAWF  in  Farsi)  that  aimed  at  increasing  the  crisis 
resilience of food insecure households by providing regular and predictable cash support during non-
drought years to food insecure households that could be scaled-up during drought years.  

Opportunities for government ownership and connectedness to longer-term resilience and 
development efforts were linked to the use of the budget support and the channelling of 
COVID-19 response funds to programmes and projects financed at least in part through 
one of the Multi-Donor Trust Funds established in Afghanistan. Budget support through the 
SRBC and the reallocation of funds under the ARTF and LOTFA relied on established mechanisms for 
coordination and policy dialogue with government partners, and with other partner donors. This made 
it possible in principle to link funding to new or existing government-driven initiatives, such as the 
use of combined funding from REACH and the existing Citizens’ Charter programme to provide up to 
90%  of  the  funding  of  the  “National  Dinner  Table”  programme  of  the  Afghan  government 
(“Dastarkhwan-e-Meli” in Farsi) meant to cover an estimated 4.1 million households with incomes of 
USD  223  a  day  or  less  in  2020.  EU-funded  programmes  also  made  use  of  existing  bodies  at 
community level (including the Community Development Councils (CDC) and Gozar Assemblies (GA)) 
to allocate COVID-19 resources to specific communities, families and priorities at local level;24 and 
maintain their relevance for longer-term development projects. Support channelled through the “Early 
Warning, Early Finance, and Early Action Project” (see above) was meant to help establish a national 
drought response system that included forecasting of droughts and mechanisms for both recurrent 
transfers  and  emergency assistance.  By  contrast,  the  EUR  35  million  programme  “Support to  the 
Government of Afghanistan in response to the COVID-19 Emergency” as the single largest component 
of the EU response to Afghanistan was designed to operate outside of these established mechanisms, 
which limits its connectedness to longer-term resilience strengthening and development efforts.  

2.2.  EQ 2 – Value added 

EQ2: To what extent did the Team Europe initial response provide additional benefits 
beyond what would have resulted from actions taken by the EU institutions and EU MS 
on their own? 

Summary 

The EU institutions’ strong presence in Afghanistan paved the way for rapid and overall coherent 
response to the COVID-19 emergency in the country. This efficient EU coordination, both internal 
and with EU Member States (EUMS), was not attributable to a specific Team Europe (TE) approach 
as defined by headquarters, but rather a proactive use of specific multi-donor mechanisms in place 
and the EU’s pre-existing convening power. The TE approach was used mainly to advance economic 
recovery initiatives albeit in a limited manner. The Cooperation Section of the EU Delegation and 
EU humanitarian services were the main EU actors of the COVID-19 emergency response, building 
on their established presence in Afghanistan, their relationship with the Government of Afghanistan 
(GoA), the Commission humanitarian services’ coordinating role of the Humanitarian Donor Group, 
and the EU Delegation’s network of development partners, including the World Bank. There were 

23 Approximatively EUR 1,70. 
24 Pre-COVID-19, both CDCs and Gas had been supported by the Citizens’ Charter programme. 

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significant communication efforts around EU support to the multilateral response to COVID-19 in 
Afghanistan, but not under the Team Europe (TE) label. 

Despite evidence of efficient EU coordination in the response to COVID-19 in Afghanistan, 
there are no signs of a specific, tangible Team Europe (TE) approach. Coordination was shaped 
more by the COVID-19 emergency than by headquarters promoting a TE approach. EU institutions 
were already strongly present in Afghanistan (second largest donor after the US and before the WB), 
channelling much of its support through multi-donor funds, and global contracts coordinated by UN 
agencies  and/or  multilateral  agencies, 
the  World  Bank-managed  Afghanistan 
including 
Reconstruction  Trust  Fund  and  the  UN-managed  Law  and  Order  Trust  Fund  for  Afghanistan.  EU 
Institutions and Germany were already amongst top donors to ARTF and LOTFA. The EU response to 
COVID-19  thus  built  on  pre-existing  mechanisms  to  enhance  its  capacity  to  respond  in  a  timely 
manner while avoiding duplication. Contracting for the COVID-19 response was concluded in 2020, 
in part using accelerated procedures.25 

As  underlined  in  interviews,  Team  Europe  (TE)  came  more  “as  a  guideline,  a  suggestion  to  apply 
wherever  possible  around  the  COVID-19  response  but  could  not  be  directly  linked  to  the  country 
level”.26 As such, the Team Europe (TE) response to COVID-19 consisted of additional commitments 
made  to  international  organisations  (i)  at  the  country  and  (ii)  regional  levels  (Humanitarian 
Implementation Plan (HIP) Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, April 2020).27 

The Cooperation Section of the EU Delegation and the EC humanitarian services were the 
main EU actors of the COVID-19 emergency response. Both built on their established presence 
in Afghanistan, their relationship with GoA, their coordinating roles, and their network of partners. 
Both the EU Delegation’s Cooperation section and Commission humanitarian services played a critical 
role  in  joint  advocacy  efforts  (with  key  donors).  The  EUD  maintained  close  communication  and 
dialogue  with  the  WB  as  ARTF  manager,  the  GoA,  other  donors  and  EU  MS  to  ensure  relevance, 
coordination,  and  follow-up.28  Audits  continued  to  be  planned,  contracted  and  implemented  as 
foreseen, although audit reporting has slowed down due to the pandemic. 

Germany  earmarked  funding  for  COVID-19-related  health  support  in  Afghanistan,  but 
other  EU  MS  channeled  their  funds  through  multi-donor  trust  funds  and  continued  to 
coordinate their response through the ARTF (not through a TE mechanism). Therefore, the Team 
Europe (TE) approach did not particularly serve to advance complementarity with EU MS in the COVID-
19  response,  but it did  help  define  the  Team  Europe  Initiative (TEI)  “Sustainable  Jobs  for  Peace”, 
which seeks to build synergies with existing environmental and economic initiatives developed by the 
EU and its Member States around green economic development  – a notion not yet at the core of 
national strategic documents.29  

Instead of creating new, TE-specific processes, the EU made use of its existing channels 
of cooperation to continue coordination with non-EU partners, which worked well overall. 
The EU expert and technical teams already in country allowed a swift coordination early in the process 
to determine and agree on the reprioritisation and repurposing of funds of both EU-specific envelopes 

25 TE Country fiche Dec 2020; Commission Implementing Decision June 2020; Interviews, May 2021. 
26 Interview 
27 Country fiche Dec 2020, Infographic May 2020. 
28 Commission humanitarian services notes 2021, Interviews May 2021; TE Country fiche May 2020 
29 TEI Jobs May 2020; Interviews May 2020; TE Covid fiche May 2020. 

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and multi-lateral ones. In order to facilitate the repurposing of EU funds that had been allocated to 
the  ARTF,  the  EU  Delegation  closely  worked  with  the  ARTF  focal  point  and  World  Bank  teams  to 
support a flexible response while making sure that EU legal requirements were equally met30. In the 
case of the procurement of medical equipment, ECHO facilitated cooperation between Médecins Sans 
Frontières  (MSF),  WHO,  UNICEF  and  the  Chinese  Embassy  to  establish  a  sustainable  and  reliable 
supply chain.31  

In health, the EUD technical  teams had initially approach their counterparts in the World Bank to 
discuss opportunities for channeling the additional EUR 30 million through a World Bank administered 
emergency health project. Ultimately, the sides did not find a workable solution to put the envisioned 
cooperation into practice and needed to abandon the effort. The EU ultimately decided to channel 
the  new  EU  resources  for  health  into  a  new  intervention  with  WHO,  UNICEF  and  AFK/Cordaid,  to 
complement Sehatmandi and the WB’s COVID-19 response. 

Despite significant communication efforts around EU support to the multilateral response to COVID-
19  in  Afghanistan  through  social  media  and  the  institution  websites,  there  was  no  visibility 
campaign organised in the Team Europe (TE) framework specifically. Besides, as noted by 
several interviewees and corroborated by programming documents and Team Europe (TE) country 
fiches, while the issue of COVID-19 was important on the political agenda, it also appeared to delay 
projects responding to other pre-existing priorities, aggravated meanwhile by the pandemic (notably 
peace and security issues and the border areas). 

2.3.  EQ 3 – Efficiency 

EQ3: To what extent were, and are, the individual aid modalities and other aid delivery 
mechanisms  and  their  combinations  efficient  and  flexible  enough  for  use  in  Team 
Europe’s COVID-19 response In COVID-19 conditions? 

Summary: Combining different aid modalities allowed the EU to provide support along different 
timelines. Money allocated from the Commission development services to the EC’s humanitarian 
services financed emergency support in the months immediately following the COVID-19 outbreak. 
Unspent EU contributions to Multi-Donor Trust Funds were reallocated to help address medium- to 
long-term priorities, also linking this support to policy dialogue and coordination occurring in these 
platforms. While this allowed for a relatively fast allocation of money overall, the services financed 
with these resources were often distributed only with delay, due to national political roadblocks, 
capacity bottlenecks on the side of the Afghan government and other factors beyond EU control. 
Indirect management of EU funds by UN organisations or contracting with INGOs allowed the EU 
to  make  use  of  partners  with  established  COVID-19  response  activities,  clear  organisational 
mandates  and  established  operations  and  offices  on  the  ground,  which  also  ensured  relatively 
good access to areas around the country. However, the lengthy procedures for a new EUR 35 million 
project organised by the EU in partnership with UNICEF, WHO and AKF were only completed in time 
for  a  project  start  in  January  2021.  Bottlenecks  and  disruptions  of  supply  chains  due  to  close 
border caused delays in the procurement of supplies and protective equipment.  

The combination of different aid modalities in the COVID-19 response package provided 
the  EU  with  flexibility  to  provide  support  along  different  timelines,  using  both 

30 Based on interviews with EU Delegation and World Bank. 
31 TE Country fiche May 2020; Interviews May 2021. 

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governmental  and  non-governmental  dissemination  channels.32  Commission  development 
and  humanitarian  services  intentionally  built  on  the  complementary  modalities  available  by 
allocating a EUR 15 million share of the additional EUR 50 million ECHO for short-term, emergency 
support  and  retaining  EUR  35  million  for  a  COVID-19  response  programme  with  a  medium-term 
perspective.33 This and other ECHO funding allowed the EU to provide relatively fast support in the 
months after the start of the pandemic in the form of medical supplies, protective equipment and 
other assistance. A humanitarian air bridge organised by ECHO and an additional air bridge run by 
UN partners made it possible for the EU to provide some of these supplies by June/July 2020 at the 
height  of  Afghanistan’s  first  wave  of  COVID-19  infections,  despite  closed  borders  and  disrupted 
supply routes into Afghanistan as a landlocked country. Contracting procedures with NGO partners 
did  mean  that  some  other  ECHO  projects  only  started  in  September  2020.34  In  many  cases, 
bottlenecks on global markets and in supply chains were the main factor associated with delays in 
the start-up of the ECHO-financed COVID-19 response, rather than delay in funding.35 This underlines 
the relevance of the humanitarian aid bridges. 

Reallocating  unspent  EU  contributions  to  Multi-Donor  Trust  Funds  (ARTF  and  LOTFA) 
allowed the EU to co-finance COVID-19-related programmes and to help address medium- 
to  long-term  priorities,  also  linking  this  support  to  policy  dialogue  and  coordination 
occurring in these platforms. In May 2020, the EU started to cooperate with the World Bank as 
manager of the ARTF to determine which re-allocations could be made in line with both WB and EU 
administrative procedures and legal requirements. Within two months, the EU informally agreed with 
the WB to re-allocate EUR 12.5 million of unspent EU funding from an ARTF governance project36 to 
the  newly  created  ARTF-funded  “Relief  Effort  for  Afghan  Communities  and  Households”  (REACH) 
project. Finalising all administrative steps for the re-allocation took another four to six months.37 The 
EU also worked with UNDP as the administrator of the Law-and-Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan to 
re-allocate resources the EU had already paid into the trust fund to provide the police with PPE and 
hospital equipment.  

Relationships established through policy dialogue with government partners in relation to 
budget  support  may  have  helped  to  facilitate the  re-allocation  of  resources  of  for the 
COVID-19 response even for other aid modalities. Limited, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
the  experience  of  past  exchanges  with  the  Afghan  Ministry  of  Finance  (MoF)  in  relation  to  policy 
dialogue for Afghanistan’s SRBC made it more straightforward and faster to amend the financing 
decisions  of  ongoing  projects  for  the  COVID-19  response.  Agreements  on  expanding  dates  for 
implementation  in  relation  to  the  COVID-19  response  that  required  the  approval  by  the  MoF,  for 
example, benefited from established relations between the Delegation of the European Union (EUD) 
and its counterparts in the Ministry of Finance.38 

Budget  support  (BS)  disbursements  under  the  already  ongoing  SRBC  took  place  in  July 
2020, as initially planned in the financing agreement (signed before the COVID-19 crisis). 
A total of EUR 100 million was disbursed. For the variable tranche, three indicators were not met in 

32 Also supported by feedback from key informants in Afghanistan: “In the end, it is the portfolio approach that counts”, Interview. 
33 In May 2020, when WHO declared the COVID-19 crisis to be a pandemic, Commission humanitarian services in Afghanistan reached out to 
headquarters about funding mobilisation. The allocation of EUR 15 million of the new funds from  Commission development services to 
humanitarian services was a result of this initiative (Interview). 

34 interview. 
35 Interview. 
36 Tackling Afghanistan’s Government human resource management (HRM) and Institutional Reforms (TAGHIR). 
37 Key Informant Interview. Also, the financing agreement for this re-allocation was signed on November 3, 2021. 
38 Key Informant Interview. 

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2020. They were neutralised due to the COVID-19 crisis to enable a full disbursement of the variable 
tranche (EUR 50 million). 

While the MDTFs and budget support allowed a relatively fast allocation of money, the 
services  financed  with  these  resources  were  often  distributed  only  with  delay,  due  to 
national political roadblocks, capacity bottlenecks on the side of the Afghan government 
and other factors beyond EU control. Political disputes over parliamentary budget oversight of 
the  “National  Dining  Table”  (“Dastarkhwan-e-Meli”)  programme  to  which  REACH  /  ARTF  resources 
contributed, and corresponding claims of insufficient transparency and the possibility of corruption 
delayed the start of the programme and therefore the arrival of support at community level.39 Overall, 
the Afghan government was challenged in the first month of the pandemic to manage the sudden 
higher influx of aid resources and to distribute support, pointing to limitations of using budget support 
or programme-based approaches to respond to national crises in least developed countries (LDCs). 

The  alternative  modalities  of  indirect  management  of  EU  funds  by  established  UN 
organisations and agencies or direct management with INGOs as implementers allowed 
the  EU  to  make  use  of  partners  with  established  COVID-19  response  activities,  clear 
organisational mandates and established operations and offices on the ground, which also 
ensured  relatively  good  access  to  areas  around  the  country.40  For  existing  projects,  this 
modality  allowed  for  the  relatively  speedy  re-orientation  of  resources  and  activities.  A  local 
governance project implemented by UN-Habitat received approval of the project amendments in June 
2020,  two  months  after  negotiations  had  started.  The  project  was  eventually  able  to  start 
implementing its COVID-19 activities in August 2020, as project activities were halted for about two 
months at the request of the Government. For the newly developed COVID-19 response project41, the 
corresponding administrative procedures and contract negotiations with UN and international non-
governmental organisation (INGOs) partners took longer. The EU Delegation first received notice that 
additional money for the COVID-19 response would be allocated to Afghanistan in March/April 2020. 
A meeting to discuss the possibility of channelling the funds through the ARTF funded Sehatmandi 
project    took  place  but  it  was  not  possible  for  technical  reasons  (  distortion  of  the  “Pay-for 
performance”  contracts  to  NGOs  implementing  Sehatmandi).  Subsequent  negotiations  and 
contracting procedures with WHO, UNICEF, and AKF for the project “Support to the Government of 
Afghanistan in response to the COVID-19 Emergency” were completed in December 2020. Project 
implementation therefore only started in January 2021. It should be noted that  Development co-
operation  administrative  procedures  are  by  nature  longer  than  ECHO  procedures;  and  that  the 
development of new project also is known to take longer than the adaptation of existing interventions. 

Delays in the COVID-19 response were not always linked to availability of funding, but 
also to bottlenecks and disruptions of supply chains. Closed borders contributed greatly 
to  availability  of  funding  itself.42  Even  partnerships  with  globally  and  nationally  established 
Intergovernmental  Organisations  (IGOs)  (such  as  WHO)  could  not  always  prevent  bottlenecks  in 
provision of essential equipment, leading to delays. For example, while provision of many supplies 
(including PPEs) was timely, providing and setting up of PCR and other lab facility equipment by WHO 

39 The disputes were still ongoing in February 2021, although the government had started disbursing resources for the programme and had 

spent USD 160 million at that time, according to news reports (https://tolonews.com/afghanistan/budget-169954). 

40 Interview. 
41 Financed with EUR 35 million of new resources. 
42 Interview 

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was many months delayed.43 As of May 2021, the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) was still waiting 
for diagnostic material,44 which consequently affected the health services and the relationship with 
MoPH. 

2.4.  EQ 4 – Effectiveness 

To what extent was the EU response successful in progressing towards the objectives 
associated with the COVID-19 response? 

Summary 

The  EU  supported  with  EUR  50  million  the  response  in  AFG  through  emergency  projects 
implemented  by  partners  (managed  by  Commission  humanitarian  services)  and  through  the 
structure  of  the  Ministry  of  Public  Health.  Contracting  partners  was  six  months  later  at  the  EU 
Delegation compared to Commission humanitarian services which disbursed funding fast because 
emergency  instruments  are  designed  for  rapid  response  whereas  Commission  development 
services’ instruments are not designed for an emergency situation but for longer term development 
cooperation . Personal protective measures and diagnostics were major investments. Other support 
included in the sectors of education, protection, WASH and nutrition, implemented by INGO’s, UN 
and the Aga Khan Foundation. Addressing the pandemic and keeping the normal health services 
up, has been a challenge in a country, which had very little diagnostic and protection measures in 
place at the onset of the pandemic. Impact on the response has been difficult to estimate while 
the humanitarian needs remain exceedingly large. 

EU  focused  on  development,  supporting  government  structures  and  health  service 
packages and Commission humanitarian services focused on emergency response, including 
in  Taliban  led  areas.45  Commission  humanitarian  services  coordinated  the  Humanitarian  Donor 
Group and facilitated the definition of joint advocacy efforts with other key donors. However, the 
government  played  a  crucial  role  to  implement  the  donor  funding  and  in  the  coordination  of  the 
response. Commission humanitarian and development services maintained regular meetings with the 
Ministry  of  Public  Health  and  ensured  advocacy  messages  gathered  by  partners  were  properly 
delivered. Commission humanitarian and development services closely coordinated with the WB to 
ensure  the  provision  of  personal  protection  equipment,  and  infection-control  training  to  health 
providers. The global amount of funds going to the country specifically for the humanitarian response 
to the COVID-19 pandemic was estimated to be around EUR 58.2 million. The procurement of medical 
equipment and consumables remained a major gap. 

Both funding managed by Commission humanitarian and development services was effective 
in establishing testing laboratories through their support to WHO. These were not available 
in country at the onset of the pandemic. Furthermore, their support also improved the outreach and 
coverage of health and nutrition support of World Food Programme (WFP), Save the Children (STC), 
WHO,  UNICEF  and  the  ICRC.  Educational  and  safe  learning  support  was  increased  through  the 
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), UNICEF, and STC. Protection support was augmented through NRC 
and IOM, and additional WASH support was provided through NRC and UNICEF. Overall, the response 
had a positive effect. 

43 Planned end March 2020 for 17 provinces; delivered December/January/ March 2021 for ten provinces, the rest in June 2021 for  seen 

provinces.  

44 The causes of the delays were not clear. 
45 Interview with partner 

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PPE  and  diagnostic  equipment  and  material  were  procured  without  the  direct  involvement  of  the 
Ministry of Health. WHO used its own airbridge between Kabul and Doha. Despite a huge response, 
the gap in essential health services remained while the trauma and mental health-related caseload 
increased. Addressing a pandemic and maintaining essential health services in parallel has proved 
challenging.  A  reduction  in  mortality  was  observed  and  the  increased  testing  capacity  and  case 
management in hospitals had a positive impact. The testing capacity, laboratories, capacity building 
and improved case management has a lasting impact for the country.46 

WFP  contribution,  managed  by  Commission  humanitarian  services,  specifically  for  the 
food/nutrition response allowed expansion of nutrition activities for a larger geographical hard-
to-reach area, but also included urban areas due to the economic hardship arising from the COVID-
19  pandemic.  WFP  used  the  Commission  humanitarian  services  airbridge  during  the  peak  of  the 
pandemic but also the United Nation Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) operations.47 It is unclear to 
what extent the response had an impact on improving the nutrition status. Food prices went up and 
food shortages became a secondary crisis.48  

Support of diagnostic capacity was supposed to increase capacity for surveillance, rapid 
response and case investigation as well as case management, infection, prevention, and 
control related to COVID-19. Nutritional support was provided to patients and in communities.49 
Clearly, the response by development donors was very slow compared to that of the humanitarian 
donors.50 Provision of diagnostic equipment for 17 provinces through WHO was planned for March 
2020 but arrived for ten provinces in December 2020 and January -March 2021, while the remaining 
was scheduled for June 2021. The delay created an initial challenge for the MoPH,51 but was very 
helpful for the 3rd wave of COVID-19 infections, which was more severe than the 2nd wave. 

Channelling  the  EUR  35  million  outside  the  ARTF  allowed  the  EU  to  make  use  of  the 
established presence of WHO, UNICEF, and the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF). The World Bank 
was fast with their USD 300 million commitment and the MoPH saw the need for ‘flexible funds’, not 
being  ‘wasted’  in  the  ARTF  structure,  as  there  was  an  urgent  need  for  oxygen  concentrators  and 
laboratory facilities and related equipment.52 Before the pandemic, Afghanistan had one single PCR 
facility, by the end of June 2020 the country had PCR testing facilities in each of the 28 provinces, 
while oxygen plants are available in all provincial facilities; about 5 000 health staff were trained in 
case management and intensive care.53 

UN  Habitat  repurposed  a  budget  of  EUR  1.7  million  under  the  project  ‘Municipal 
Governance & Support Programme (MGSP) COVID-19 Quick response Project’, in 11 MGSP 
cities and Kabul, from April 2020 to October 2020. Key outputs were an improved database and 
vulnerability assessments; community awareness raising and community and municipality prevention 
measures  related  to  COVID-19.54  Some  of  the  activities  were  already  implemented  before  the 
pandemic and it is not entirely clear what was specifically allocated to the repurposed budget. 

46 Interview with partner 
47 Ibidem 
48 Interview with National Authorities 
49 EU development assistance Afghanistan – health and nutrition (March 2021) 
50 Interview with partner 
51 Ibidem 
52 Interview with National Authorities 
53 Interview with National Authorities 
54 200430 MGSP COVID 19 v2. UN HABITAT; PMR MGSP March 2021 UN HABITAT progress report 

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The establishment of the Risk Communication and Community Engagement (RCCE) working group by 
Norwegian  Refugee  Council  and  led  by  WHO  was  covered  with  funding  managed  by  Commission 
humanitarian  services.55  Health  workers  went  to  schools  and  mosques  for  contact  tracing  and 
community awareness sessions. In each district community health workers were trained and engaged 
in  20  health  posts  to  identify  suspected  cases  and  refer  those  for  treatment.56  Minimal  testing 
capacity paired with rumours and stigma created reluctance to be tested. 

However,  the  humanitarian  needs  are  immense  and  could  not  all  be  addressed  by  the 
international community. Insecurity and fear of escalated fighting as well as the withdrawal of 
the international troops adds to the overall situation. Going forward, there are gaps in the provision 
of support to trauma and mental health cases, as well as GBV and protection concerns with regards 
to negative coping strategies such as child labour and early marriages. It has also proved very difficult 
to maintain the health services in place while adding the extra burden of COVID-19. 

55 Interview with NGO 
56 Interview with National Authorities 

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3. Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch 

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Source: Evaluation Team 

 
Country note - Ecuador

 
 
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Contents 

1.  Background..................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 

1.1. 

1.2. 

Country COVID-19 context and government response .............................................................................. 1 

European Union (EU) response ................................................................................................................................. 2 

2.  Answers to Evaluation Questions ...................................................................................................................................... 3 

2.1. 

2.2. 

2.3. 

EQ 1 – Relevance ............................................................................................................................................................. 3 

EQ 2 – Value added ........................................................................................................................................................ 6 

EQ 3 – Efficiency .............................................................................................................................................................. 8 

2.4. 

EQ 4 – Effectiveness ................................................................................................................................................... 10 

3.  Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch .................................................................................................................................... 13 

THE  PURPOSE  OF  THIS  COUNTRY  NOTE  IS  TO  INFORM  THE  FAST-TRACK  ASSESSMENT  OF  THE  EU  INITIAL 
RESPONSE AS A WHOLE. IT IS NOT DESIGNED TO BE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RESPONSE IN THE COUNTRY. 

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Acronyms 

AECID 

Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation 

BS 

CBI 

DFI 

DG DEVCO 

DG ECHO 

Budget Support 

Cash-Based Intervention 

Development Financial Institution 

Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development  

Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid 
Operations  

DG INTPA 

Directorate-General for International Partnerships 

DP 

EIB 

EU 

EUD 

Disaster Preparedness  

European Investment Bank 

European Union 

Delegation of the European Union  

FONPRODE 

Development Promotion Fund  

FPI 

GDP 

GIZ 

GoE 

IcSP 

IDB 

IFRC 

INGO 

IOM 

LAIF 

M&E 

MoH 

MS 

NGO 

OECD 

PPE 

RC 

Foreign Policy Instrument 

Gross Domestic Product 

German Corporation for International Cooperation 

Government of Ecuador 

Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace 

Inter-American Development Bank 

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies  

International Non-Governmental Organisations 

International Organization for Migration 

Latin America Investment Facility 

Monitoring and Evaluation 

Ministry of Health 

Member states 

Non-governmental organisation 

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  

Personal protective equipment 

Red Cross 

STRRP 

Technical Secretary for Reconstruction and Productive Reactivation 

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TE 

UN 

Team Europe 

United Nations 

UN HABITAT 

United Nations Human Settlements Programme 

UNHCR 

UNICEF 

WASH 

WB 

United Nations Refugee Agency 

United Nations Children's Fund 

Water, hygiene and sanitation 

World Bank  

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1. Background 

1.1  Country COVID-19 context and government response 

As of 31 December 2020, Ecuador had reported a total of 212 512 cases and 14 034 deaths1 caused 
by COVID-19.2 The virus spread exponentially between March and May, due to a delayed response by 
the  Government  which  only  introduced  lockdown  measures  three  weeks  after  the  first  case  was 
reported, and which started to ease the measures in early May despite a surge in COVID-19 cases.3 
The health system was quickly overwhelmed, with unequal and insufficient access to basic services 
and distribution of hospital beds, and an overall low per capita health expenditure. 

Daily new confirmed COVID-19 cases in Ecuador 

Source: Johns Hopkins University CSSE COVID-19 Data. 

Prior  to  the  pandemic, the  country  was  already experiencing  a public debt  crisis,  with  public debt 
rising from 30.9% to 68.9% of gross domestic product (GDP) between 2015 and 2020.4 The health 
crisis has amplified this crisis as well as the macroeconomic imbalances that the country had been 
working on since the end of the oil price boom, revealed structural weaknesses such as the high level 
of informality (60% of employment is informal) or insufficient access to public services, and caused 
a deep recession that has led to a rebound in poverty. Beyond the consequences for economic activity 
in general, lockdown measures have had a dramatic impact on women, as 45%t have lost their jobs5 
and  gender-based  violence  has  increased  sharply,  as  well  as  on  education,  as  only  37.2%  of 
households have access to the internet. 

1 https://ourworldindata.org/covid-deaths#what-is-the-cumulative-number-of-confirmed-deaths 
2 The official figure is likely to underestimate the true toll of the pandemic in the country. A comparison of mortality rates 

between 2019 and 2020 shows an excess of deaths of 38 788 during the pandemic.  
Source: https://www.eurodad.org/ecuador_covid19_and_debt 

3 Ibidem.  
4 As a result, the country allocated 29% of government revenues to meet creditor claims in 2019 (around 2.3 times the 

public health budget of Ecuador). Source: https://www.eurodad.org/arrested_development 

5  https://www.vistazo.com/actualidad/nacional/el-de-las-mujeres-en-ecuador-ha-perdido-su-trabajo-durante-la-

BXVI191536 

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The Government has put in place measures to support the economy, including the distribution of a 
EUR 506 family protection voucher for two months to selected targets,7 the regulation of fuel prices, 
the protection of workers and the extension of social security coverage for the unemployed, as well 
as the renegotiation of external debt and the creation of a EUR 931 million8 financing programme to 
boost production. 

1.2  European Union (EU) response 

A EUR 43 million envelope from the Commission to assist Ecuador in coping with the COVID-19 crisis 
was announced in April 2020, contextually to the Joint Communication on Team Europe (TE) response. 
The Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA), Commission’s Service for Foreign 
Policy Instruments (FPI) and the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian 
Aid  Operations  (DG  ECHO)  delivered  assistance  to  the  country  covering  all  three  priority  areas 
identified in the joint communication. Several EU MS (Germany, Spain, France and Italy) that finance 
development cooperation in Ecuador were active in the COVID-19 response. The EU further joined 
forces with the Government of Ecuador and other multilateral donors (the United Nations (UN) and 
World Bank [WB])  to  develop  a post-disaster needs assessment  to inform a coordinated  recovery 
strategy, and was involved in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
Development Center Multisectoral study covering the social and macroeconomic impacts of COVID-
19  in  the  country  and  estimating  Ecuador’s  financial  needs  and  available  funding  to  finance  a 
response strategy. To date, EU funds committed to tackle the COVID-19 crisis in Ecuador amount to 
EUR 45.2 million including both bilateral and regional support. 

Emergency response measures accounted for around 5% of EU assistance for the country. DG ECHO 
provided  most  of  the  resources  for  humanitarian  response  through  country-level  and  regional 
projects delivered through international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), the United Nations 
and  the  International  Federation  of  Red  Cross  and  Red  Crescent  Societies  (IFRC).  Ecuador  was 
additionally one of the four beneficiary countries of FPI regional funds allocated to the COVID-19 
emergency response in South America through the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace 
(IcSP). The EU intervention in support to the Water, hygiene and sanitation (WASH) sector consisted 
of  a  EUR  10  million  EU  contribution  to  a  European  Investment  Bank  (EIB)  loan  –  blending  (Latin 
America Investment Facility (LAIF) - Portoviejo WASH) – covering the development of infrastructure, 
WASH initiatives and information campaigns. Socio-economic support accounted for more than 50% 
of EU response budget and was largely provided by DG INTPA. Support to address the socio-economic 
consequences  of  the  crisis  was  channelled  predominantly  through  budget  support  disbursements 
(EUR 13 million mobilised to date) aimed at strengthening macroeconomic stability and allowing the 
Government to implement its COVID-19 response plan. DG INTPA contribution was complemented by 
resources committed by FPI both at regional and country level, including the financing of research, 
workshops and dissemination of information concerning government measures to  fight COVID-19 
and impacts in the areas of trade, investments, and the business environment.  

6 USD 60. 
7 People in the informal sector, poor households, small retailers and producers with incomes below USD 400 per month 

(the target was 950,000 households). 

8 USD 1.1 billion. 

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Several  interventions  were  selected  for  an  in-depth  review,  and  have  thus  been  given  greater 
attention  in  this  note,  especially  in  Evaluation  Question  4.  Below  is  the  list  of  the  selected 
interventions in Ecuador: 

•  ECHO, emergency response:  Disaster Preparedness (DP) Project - IFRC (implemented by the 

Ecuadorian Red Cross) (EUR 460 000) 

•  Directorate-General  for  International  Cooperation  and  Development  (DG  DEVCO),  health 
research  and  water:  Blending  operation  LAIF  -  Portoviejo  WASH  -  EIB,  Inter-American 
Development  Bank  (IDB),  the  Spanish  Agency  for  International  Development  Cooperation 
(AECID), the Development Promotion Fund (FONPRODE) (EUR 10.4 million) 

•  DEVCO, economic-social: Budget support (BS) programme - Economic reactivation of affected 

areas Manabi and Esmeraldas (EUR 17 million) 

•  DEVCO, economic-social: Northern Border programme – AECID, the German Corporation for 

International Cooperation (GIZ) – EUR 12.9 million  

•  DEVCO,  economic  -social:  Proyecto  Ciudades  incluyentes,  comunidades  solidarias  - 
OnuHabitat, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) – EUR 3.7 million. 

2. Answers to Evaluation Questions  

2.1  EQ 1 – Relevance 

EQ1:  To  what  extent  did  the  initial  EU  global  response  to  the  COVID-19  pandemic 
through the Team Europe (TE) country assistance address the needs and priorities of 
partner countries and regions in each country context in line with the three priorities of 
the Team Europe approach? 

Summary 

The Commission COVID-19 response was rather ad hoc, mainly consisting of adaptations needed 
to  continue  to  pursue  ongoing  interventions  in  the  new  context  and  making  some  adjustments 
where  feasible  to  address  the  needs  arising  from  COVID-19.  It  was  embedded  in  the  existing 
framework of EU development activities in Ecuador with clear links to the EU Multiannual Indicative 
Programme for 2014-2020 and the advancement of  the broader EU agenda.  Existing activities 
were appropriately adapted, and, within their scope, funds reoriented to address COVID-19-related 
needs in the three thematic areas identified in the EU Joint Communication. New activities (beyond 
the reorientation of existing projects and budget lines) was extremely limited. 

The emergency response was limited in scope but relevant to cover immediate necessities. The 
health response was suited to build long-term institutional capacities in line with the principles of 
the humanitarian-development nexus, yet it appeared less relevant to facilitate short-term service 
delivery.  The  socio-economic  response,  constituting  the  bulk  of  the  assistance,  was  relevant.  It 
combined  operational  adaptation  responding  to  immediate  needs,  and  support  to  the  national 
budget providing some liquidity and increasing government ownership.  

Overall, the EU COVID-19 response was rather ad hoc, mainly consisting in adaptations needed 
to continue to  pursue ongoing  interventions in the new  context and in making  some  adjustments 
where  feasible  to  address  the  needs  arising  from  COVID-19.  The  response  provided  by  the 
Government was quite slow. There was therefore no window of opportunity for the Commission to 

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anchor  its  COVID-19  response  strategy  into  the  government  response.  Nonetheless,  consultations 
with national authorities - Presidencia, Planifica Ecuador and Cancilleria – within the response served 
the  objective  of  strengthening  strategic  dialogue,  especially  for  long-term  planning.9  Overall  EU 
funding  to  respond  to  the  crisis  was  deemed  insufficient  by  the  Government  of  Ecuador  (GoE) 
counterparts.10  

Support  to  refugees  and  other  vulnerable  groups  was  included  in  the  assistance,  in 
accordance  with  the  European  Consensus  on  Development11  and  the  EU  Gender  Action 
Plan.12 For instance, the EUR 3.7 million programme “Proyecto Ciudades incluyentes, comunidades 
solidarias” introduced a cash-based intervention (CBI) benefitting 18 500 people in extreme poverty 
and increasing attention to the gender dimension.13 This and other CBIs (implemented through other 
projects,  including  the  IFRC  one,  in  a  coordinated  and  non-overlapping  fashion)  were  especially 
relevant  to  tackle  difficulties  in  access  to  basic  rights,  particularly  food  security,  lodging  and 
education  confirmed  by  partners  on  the  ground;  and  adapted  to  new  modalities  (using  tellers  or 
sending money by phone).14 Other examples include the IcSP-financed projects, providing food-kits 
and  biosecurity  kits  to  vulnerable  populations;  the  additional  EIDHR  emergency  fund  to  support 
defenders  of  indigenous  people’s  rights;15  and  the  regional  programme  EUROSOCIAL+  sustaining 
women victims of domestic violence.  

The  priorities  of  the  immediate  assistance  were  appropriately  informed  by  needs 
assessments from implementing partners on the ground16 as well as consultation with Presidencia. 
Yet  the  scope  of  the  emergency  assistance  was  limited,  constituting  around  5%  of  the 
response,  with  an  additional  small  amount  of  EUR  5  million  regional  funds  allocated.  Among  the 
emergency actions, the IFRC/Ecuador Red Cross (RC) project was relevant to strengthen prevention 
and management of the epidemic with activities including dissemination of COVID-19 best practices 
information,  distribution  of  hygiene  kits,  psychosocial  support  to  affected  people,  as  well  as 
establishment of triage centres and management of deceased people. The intervention also allowed 
a  relevant  response  to  immediate  livelihood  needs  through  the  provision  of  food/cash  support, 
especially  targeting  remote  and  uncovered  areas;  its  appropriateness  was,  however,  somewhat 
reduced by the scope of the benefit, as only 50 families were selected, while 500 were estimated to 
be in need. 

Health interventions were designed to respond to the needs of the national health system, 
although involvement of the Ministry of Health (MoH) in planning was discontinuous as there was 
limited  cooperation  in  the  health  domain  in  the  five  to  six  years  before  COVID-19.  Dialogue  was 
partially resumed with the crisis, the main necessities of the Government being acquiring supplies 
and rehiring doctors. However, technical assistance was not requested and the EU offer of a blending 
initiative in the health sector eventually did not materialise.17  The Laboratory Project with the 

9 Under the MESA Covid framework 37 proposals focusing on long term economic reactivation are now  being discussed 

with the EU. 

10 Interview. As a middle-income country, Ecuador receives less funding than poorer countries.  
11 https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/european-consensus-development_en 
12 EU Gender Action Plan 2016-2020 
13 INTERIM PROGRESS REPORT1“INCLUSIVE CITIES, COMMUNITIES OF SOLIDARITY” Fostering local communities of solidarity 

for migrants and refugees from Venezuela MIGR/2019/407-734 

14 Interview 
15 EuropeAid/159690/DD/ACT/EC 
16 Interview 
17  Interview.  Initially  there  was  interest  from  the  Government  but  then  dialogue  stopped  for  weeks  and  the  offer  was 

eventually cancelled in February, as it was too close to elections.  

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AECID,  partially  reorienting  the  existing  action  “Talento  Humano,  Innovación  y  Tranferencia  de 
Tecnología”, was relevant to compensate for the insufficient national diagnostic capacity18 
of the three centralised laboratories in Quito, Guayaquil and Cuenca, although EU contribution to the 
action was limited to EUR 200 000, with the bulk of the funds coming from EU MS.19 This project was 
coordinated  with  other  EU  MS  actions  on  the  same  topic  adding  coherence  to  the  response.  The 
project was planned with the Delegation of the European Union (EUD) as early as April and included 
the  provision  of  diagnostic  kits,  epidemiologic  training,  converting  four  pre-existing  decentralised 
university laboratories for testing, and setting up a mobile laboratory to reach rural areas. However, 
the long amendment administrative procedure taking approximatively one year was not appropriate 
to cover emergency needs.20  The newly signed EUR 10.4 million blending operation, aiming to 
improve the health conditions of the rural population of Portoviejo through stable access to clean 
water and sanitation to a population that only had scarce access before, was relevant both for 
COVID-19-related challenges and for long-term resilience. However, its appropriateness for 
the needs of the pandemic was coincidental, since negotiations had already started in 2018,21 with 
2020  designated  as  the  year  for  parties to  sign  the  contribution  agreement.22  The  design  of  this 
infrastructure operation is highly unlikely to change due to COVID-19. The use of blending (through 
LAIF)  enabled  the  poverty  focus  of  the  project  to  increase  in  extending  population  coverage.  The 
Commission contribution will also  finance the  technical  assistance envisaged  to support  the  local 
Project  Implementation  Unit.  This  was  viewed  as  particularly  useful  since  the  local  implementing 
party had no previous experience of working with international financiers.23 However, it must be taken 
into account that donors were not active in the health sector prior to COVID-19 and cooperation with 
the MoH was difficult.  

Ecuador’s  EU  cooperation programme initially  included  an  important  socio-economic  component24 
intended to support the country’s development efforts, notably by reviving production and promoting 
exports. As for the socio-economic response, the adaptation to the Northern Border Programme 
was relevant to address the immediate COVID-19-related challenges ensuring continuation 
of  activities  with  the  introduction  of  protective  equipment,  safety  measures  for  face-to-face 
activities, and converting activities to remote modalities25 where possible. The refocus on WASH and 
food security/livelihood, within existing objectives and budget lines, was relevant to offset some of 
the household and community level social impact of the pandemic, as well as being conducive to 
long-term  sustainability.  The  programme  foresaw  action  to  improve  access  to  clean  water  and 
hygiene  awareness,  reinforce  the  capacity  of  local  authorities,  increase  work  opportunities  via 
strengthening  local  markets  and  the  agricultural  value  chain,  and  sustain  food  security  through 
distribution  of  food  parcels.  Yet,  the  long-term  programme  was  not  fundamentally  reoriented, 
potentially neglecting evolving socio-economic needs. The front-loading of two tranches (a total 
of  EUR  7  million  initially  foreseen  for  2020  and  2021)  of  the  ongoing  budget  support 
aimed  to  contribute  to  providing  liquidity  to  government  finances  to  implement  the 
national  response  plan  for  COVID-19,26  although  the  amount  of  the  support  remained 

18 The Ministry of Health estimated the need to increase PCR processing by 92%. 
19 ANEXO 1. ACUERDO DE DELEGACIÓN DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA.  SUPPORT MEASURES EN ECUADOR. TALENTO HUMANO, 

INNOVACIÓN Y TRANSFERENCIA DE TECNOLOGIA, April 2017 

20 Interview 
21 Interview 
22 UNIÓN EUROPEA CONVENIO DE CONTRIBUCIÓN Cooperación Española LA/2020/417-023  signed in November 2020 
23 Interview 
24 Sector 1 “Support to sustainable and inclusive growth at the local level” (2014-2020 MIP) 
25 For instance, switching to remote teaching/training; introduction of digital marketing etc. 
26 A USD 6.4 billion loss for the economy in Ecuador estimated in the national Post Disaster Need Assessment (PDNA) 

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limited  compared  to  the  country  budget.27  The  budget  support  focus  on  reactivation  of 
production  in  the  areas  most  affected  by  the  2016  earthquake28  was  in  line  with  the  long-term 
objective to support sustainable and inclusive growth at local level set out in the 2014-2020 MIP, 
while  resting  on  the  national  development  plan  2017-2021  “Toda  una  vida”.29  The  EUR  1  million 
technical assistance was also considered relevant by government stakeholders to ensure alignment 
with commitments undertaken with other donors.30 

2.2  EQ 2 – Value added 

EQ2:  To  what  extent  did  the  Team  Europe  (TE)  initial  response  provide  additional 
benefits beyond  what would have resulted from actions taken by the EU institutions 
and EU MS on their own? 

Summary 

The  Team  Europe  approach  in  Ecuador  built  on  and  complemented  pre-existing  coordination 
mechanisms. By providing a platform to identify and discuss emergency needs, and by creating a 
dedicated  mechanism  involving  the  Government  (Mesa  COVID-19)  and  the  joint  needs 
assessments, it positively influenced coordination among EU institutions and EU MS, and to some 
extent non-EU partners, even beyond the initial COVID-19 response. The TE approach also helped 
the  EU  joint  programming  in  Ecuador  –  a  first  for  the  country.  The  TE  communication  strategy 
strengthened the EU brand and visibility, but not necessarily at all levels.  

The Team Europe approach introduced in response to COVID-19 positively complemented 
pre-existing EU coordination mechanisms, and led to more coordinated programmes and 
interaction with the Government of Ecuador, even beyond the initial COVID-19 response 
design.  It first provided a platform to navigate COVID-19 emergency needs and consequences, and 
increased dialogue among EU institutions and EU MS, limiting duplication of efforts. The TE approach 
was  particularly  instrumental  in  aligning  priorities  and  bringing  about  a  coordination  mechanism 
across highly centralised EU institutions such as EIB, which operates remotely and works based on 
co-financing mechanisms.31 

There  were  dedicated processes  and  staff  for  a  joint  COVID-19  Recovery Needs  Assessment  and 
mapping of EU cooperation to guide post-COVID-19 recovery.32 

Technical resources were mobilised by EU actors to re-programme a total EUR 39 million33 (including 
a health response of EUR 8.48 million34 and a socio-economic recovery support of EUR 27 million)35, 

27 Interview 
28 Action Document Ecuador -Sector Reform Performance Contract 
29 The indicators of the BS address objective 5 and 6 of the National Development Plan: access to irrigation, rural poverty, 
accomplishment  of  results  in  local  authorities,  credit  to  microcredit  segment  in  Public  Bank  affected  areas,  fishery, 
production of cocoa and coffee, formulation of central and local government strategy. 

30 Interview 
31 COVID-19 response tracker 15/07/20, Minutes Premesa 01/10/20, EcuTEI Sept. 2020, Interviews. 
32 Análisis y mapeo de la respuesta UE a la COVID-19 en Ecuador 31/08/20, Informe tematico derechos humanos 2021, 

TDR Mesas 14/09/20 

33 USD 46 million.  
34 USD 10 million. 
35 USD 32 million. 

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and an additional EUR 20 million36 was mobilised from the EU (DEVCO, ECHO), EU MS (Spain, France, 
Italy, Germany, Hungary) and loans from the EIB. 

Despite delays in the reprogramming and disbursement processes, the TE approach also 
supported  political  and  policy  dialogue  between  the  EU  and  the  country  national 
counterparts  well  beyond  the  COVID-19  response.  Capitalising  on  existing  dialogue  and 
thematic mechanisms such as the “Mesa Pais”, the EU-Ecuador High Level Political Dialogue, and the 
regional coordination platforms EUROsocial+, EL PACTO and EUROCLIMA+, a virtual thematic multi-
stakeholder high-level dialogue process was created -- Mesa COVID-19 – to match priority needs 
with financial and technical resources. Mesa COVID-19 brought together seven ministries and more 
than 12 EU actors and partners to agree priorities and organise recovery. Information sharing was 
consolidated,  allowing  a  clearer  division  of  labour,  with  each  EU  MS  driving  specific  sets  of 
interventions. Mesa COVID-19 also came with a joint monitoring framework to gauge progress. It 
further leveraged individual EU MS resources and added value, notably in the framework of the Mesa 
COVID-19 (for example, in the framework of the second meeting of Mesa COVID-19 in December 
2020,  there  were  15  requests  by  different  ministries  to  specific  EU  actors  and  MS).  The  mesa 
facilitated the dialogue and dispatch of demands (see Powerpoint Secunda Mesa 09/12/20). However, 
some evidence suggests that the mechanism became an internal mechanism and was not inclusive 
enough in the long term.37 

Key priorities were defined following the joint needs assessments with EU MS and consultations with 
national authorities, DFIs and the private sector.  This approach paved the way, for instance, for the 
Team Europe Initiative (TEI) concentrating on promoting Sustainable Growth and Jobs and the Green 
Deal, as part of its effort to help consolidate Ecuador’s status as an upper-middle income economy.38 

Furthermore, the TE approach consolidated the EU joint programming approach in the preparation 
and negotiations of “Programación Conjunta 2021-2023" and “Visión Conjunta 2021-2027” – a first 
for the country. 

The Team Europe (TE) perspective also helped the EU Delegation and EU MS coordinate 
with non-EU and UN partners.  This started at the analytical level with the COVID-19 Recovery 
Needs Assessment process. At the operational level, examples of improved coordination included the 
Frontera Norte region, where the EU, GIZ, AECID and the UN are coordinating and sometimes built 
synergies across their respective mandates. Examples include two of the seven areas of EU support 
to  respond  to  COVID-19,  whichforesaw  synergies  with  UN  agencies:  regional  cooperation 
(approximately  EUR  500  000)  for  El  PACTO,  EUROsociAL+,  Programa  regional  Migración  IcSP-GIZ, 
Programa Regional Migración United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN HABITAT); and a 
contribution to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) for the Northern border region (approx. 
EUR 240 000).39 

More broadly, the TE approach served as a tool to reinforce political dialogue and alignment of EU 
interventions  with  the  2030  Agenda  and  the  implementation  of  the  Ecuador  Multiparty  Trade 
Agreement between the EU, Colombia, Peru and Ecuador. For example,  the TE initiative foresaw a 

36 USD 24 million. 
37 Minutas y PPT Primera Mesa 01/10/20, PPt Secunda Mesa 09/12/20, TDR Mesas, Infographics,  Recursos reorientation 

25/09/20, Interviews. 

38 Ecuador Team Europe Initiative - version 29/09/2020. 
39 Mapeo de la respuesta EU 31/08/20. 

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series of measures to (i) strengthen the implementation of the trade agreement; (ii) facilitate private 
and public investments; and (iii) stimulate innovation and productivity. These measures  applied to 
the broader EU engagement with the private sectors, international development banks and non-EU 
countries.40 

The  TE  communication  strategy  strengthened  the  EU  brand  and  visibility,  but  not 
necessarily  at  all  levels.  In  the  “Month  of  Europe”,  the  official  launch  of  the  "Team  Europe" 
assistance  was  organised  through  a  two-week  media  tour,  the  production  of  infographics,  and  a 
number of digital activities such as the online forum "Facts 19  - Disinfodemics in Latin America". 
There is limited evidence of the campaign’s impact so far: for example, as of May 2021, the Youtube 
videos produced had less than 20 views. The TE brand is still perceived to be an internal label, with 
little  conceptual  clarity  outside  the  EU  and  to  some  extent  among  EU  MS  and  EU  international 
partners (interviews). The Joint Programme (2021-23) and Joint Vision (2021-27) for Ecuador use 
the label “#TeamEurope” and promote the EU acting as a team to position itself at the same level of 
other big players in the country, notably the United States and China. 

2.3  EQ 3 – Efficiency 

EQ3: To what extent were, and are, the individual aid modalities and other aid delivery 
mechanisms  and  their  combinations  efficient  and  flexible  enough  for  use  in  Team 
Europe’s COVID-19 response in COVID-19 crisis conditions? 

Summary 

Overall, the EU response was not mobilised as quickly as initially anticipated, though support was 
delivered during 2020. Several adjustments were made to the ongoing BS operation to respond to 
the pandemic and to adapt to wider implementation difficulties, hence showing adaptability. BS 
funds were released during the second semester of 2020, in August and December. ECHO response 
was not delivered as quickly as initially anticipated: funds for the IFRC project were released in 
September 2020 instead of May 2020. 

Implementing  partners  generally  stressed  the  strong  flexibility  and  involvement  of  the  EU 
Delegation  staff  to  adapt  to  an  evolving  situation,  which  contributed  to  making  changes  at 
intervention level happen quickly when a rider was not required. 

Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) of the COVID-19 TE response was significantly challenged by the 
implementation difficulties brought by the pandemic. It varied between interventions, with no M&E 
for interventions having started in 2020 and follow-up of the ongoing BS operation, though the 
quality of reporting by the national authorities tended to diminish in recent years. 

Several adjustments were made to the ongoing BS operation to respond to the pandemic 
and to adapt to wider implementation difficulties, but the response was not delivered as 
quickly as initially anticipated.  
Whilst it was intended that part of BS financial flows (22%) would reach the country’s treasury in 
the first semester of 2020,41 BS disbursements were made during the second semester, in August 
and December 2020. The first amendment to the financing agreement, signed in June 2020, allowed 
for the front-loading of  the  payment of the  fixed tranches planned for 2020 (EUR 4 million) and 

40 EC TEI 29/09/21. 
41 Source: TE COVID-19 Fiche 

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2021 (EUR 3 million). The Government also later received EUR 2 million, corresponding to 40% of the 
first variable tranche scheduled for 2020, as only two indicators out of six achieved the 2019 targets. 

Two amendments were signed to extend the duration of the operation to adapt to the difficulties 
faced during implementation, notably due to the economic downturn and the social unrest of October 
2019. In November 2020, a second amendment to the financing agreement was signed. It enabled 
an increase of EUR 1 million of the complementary support by reducing by the same amount the BS 
financial flows and an extension of the technical assistance until June 2022 with a view to facilitate 
dialogue  on  the  implementation  of  the  National  Development  Plan.  Finally,  considering  the  poor 
performance of the first variable tranche, the EU proposed, in December 2020, a third amendment 
to  the  financing  agreement  to  extend  the  review  period  of  the  budget  support  indicators  from 
December 2020 to December 2021, thereby postponing the payment of the second variable tranche 
from October 2021 to July 2022. 

The LAIF instrument (blending) did not  contribute to respond to urgent needs emerging 
from COVID-19. Blending operations are not initially meant to respond quickly to crises. Blending 
procedures  are  usually  lengthy.  For  the  Portoviejo  WASH  infrastructure  operation  under  review, 
negotiations  started  in  2018.  It then  took  almost  the  full  year  2020  to  go  through  the  signature 
process  of  the  contribution  agreement  between  the  Commission  and  the  EIB.  In  early  2021,  the 
Project Implementation Unit was established. The first EIB disbursement is expected for September 
2021, as soon as the pre-conditions are met. Works will only start towards end of the year 2021. 
Moreover,  infrastructure  operations  –  the  design  of  which  rests  on  feasibility  studies  delineating 
technical and financial aspects - do not offer much opportunity in terms of quick reorientation of 
activities. 

Response through ECHO was not mobilised as quickly as expected for the IFRC project (EUR 
456 000). The delivery of the  response was initially envisaged in May  2020 for this intervention. 
Whilst the response was drafted in a couple of weeks and the proposal submitted and approved in 
April 2020, the Memorandum of Understanding with ECHO was signed in July 2020, and the funds 
were  only  released  in  September  2020.  Implementation  delays  were  also  due  to  procurement 
difficulties  surrounding  protective  equipment,  understandable  at  a  time  when  demand  was  far 
outstripping supplies. 

Implementing partners mobilised for  the  TE  response  (including  IOM, UNHCR,  IFRC,  GiZ) 
generally stressed the strong flexibility and involvement of the  EU Delegation  staff to 
adapt to an evolving situation, which contributed to making changes at intervention level 
happen quickly when a rider was not required. Interviewees often noted the excellent disposition 
of EU Delegation staff to discuss changes - even substantial - to be applied to interventions. They 
underlined  that  EU  Delegation  staff  supported  all  possible  reorientation,  provided  it  was  well 
justified.  For  the  Northern  Border  Initiative,  no  formal  resubmission  of  documents  or  request  for 
budget changes was necessary. When project documentation had to be changed, it was more time 
consuming for administrative reasons (for instance, the launch of the Cash Bonus Intervention for 
the “Ciudades Incluyentes” project took place in September 2020 whilst discussions had started in 
February/March 2020). 

The depth of the M&E of the COVID-19 TE response varied between interventions; it was 
significantly challenged by the implementation difficulties  created by the pandemic. For 
the ongoing BS operation, the Technical Secretary of Planning (Planifica Ecuador) carried out the M&E 
of  the  National  Development  Plan  2017-2021  and  interacted  with  the  EU  Delegation  in  2020 
through policy dialogue. The Commission BS disbursement file  (2020) reported  a decrease in the 
quality of reporting of Planifica Ecuador over the last years and the dissatisfaction of the citizens of 

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Manabí and Esmeraldas with the reconstruction process and the level of transparency given by the 
Technical  Secretary  for  Reconstruction  and  Productive  Reactivation  (STRRP)  on  project's  selection 
criteria, funding and implementation. For other operations, no M&E was conducted. Some operations 
only started implementation in 2020 (such as the Northern Border Initiative), and evaluation activities 
have  only recently  started to be  implemented. For all  four ongoing  LAIF operations (not linked to 
COVID-19), the EIB could not perform M&E on site due to travel restrictions. It increased the frequency 
of its online monitoring missions, but this does not give the full picture. 

2.4  EQ 4 – Effectiveness 

To what extent was the EU response successful in progressing towards the objectives 
associated with the COVID-19 response? 

Summary 

Through ad hoc emergency and health support, the TE COVID-19 response supported the health 
system, provided PPE and contributed to enhancing diagnostic capacity in laboratories. The limited 
scale  of  the  activities  undertaken  implies  that  the  impact  will  remain  limited.  On  the  socio-
economic front, the Commission front-loaded the disbursements envisaged  for 2020 and 2021 
under its ongoing BS focused on the economic recovery of earthquake-affected areas. The small 
amounts disbursed (EUR 9 million) brought limited fiscal space to the Government and could not 
meaningfully contribute to prevent a deterioration of the macro-fiscal framework. The contribution 
of the BS programme in terms of sustainable development, including in terms of enhanced socio-
economic resilience, was mixed, mostly due to the slowdown of the economy at the national level 
as well the social unrest in October 2019. Moreover, most of the other interventions deployed for 
the socio-economic response were in early implementation in 2020, with few results to report on. 

Emergency support was provided through small scale interventions, with limited impact. 
The effectiveness of the IFRC/Ecuador RC intervention (EUR 456 000) is difficult to assess without 
talking to beneficiaries and having access to programmatic progress reports. However, the scale of 
activities  undertaken,  although  clearly  relevant,  is  not  expected  to  have  had  a  large  impact.  The 
intervention supported the Ecuador health system in numerous ways, providing a triage service in 
places, consultations with patients, psychosocial support, and cash and hygiene supplies. In addition, 
through the EUR 3 million regional IcSP contract, which includes Ecuador, approximately 4 000 food 
kits for people in vulnerable situations (refugees and Ecuadorians) were distributed in different cities 
in the country. The project delivered more than 130 000 biosecurity kits, including masks, gloves and 
protective suits for personnel fighting the pandemic, and hired health officials to reinforce different 
state institutions. 

The  laboratory  project  funded  by  AECID,  GIZ  and  the  EU  contributed  to  scaling  up 
diagnostic  capacity,  especially  in  the  research  laboratories  in  universities  as  well  through 
implementation of a mobile laboratory for remote areas42 43 and laboratory equipment in Frontera 
Norte.44 The EU Delegation and AECID contributions funded equipment whilst universities provided 
premises and human resources. A local non-governmental organisation (NGO) was engaged which 
had experience in procurement, which both empowered the local  civil society and was considered 

42 MS Spain, Germany, Italy; personal communication 
43 AECID Ecuador, personal communication 
44 GIZ, personal communication 

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more effective than the public sector.45 In addition, PPE was delivered through the Northern 
Border  Initiative,  which  was  not  initially  intended  to  provide  health  support  for  the 
community. Personal protective equipment (PPE) was provided in terms of “biosafety supplies such 
as surgical masks, N95-type retractable masks, nitrile gloves, panoramic face shields, alcohol, gel, 
atomisers, eco-friendly paper towels, and metal shoe disinfectant trays” (July 2020 report) to its field 
teams, and established COVID-19 friendly operational protocols for staff to observe during field trips 
protecting both the teams and community members. Since testing for COVID-19 was very scarce in 
Ecuador,  the  project  contributed  to  improving  this  capacity  and  strengthened  the  health  system. 
However, other measures have been limited and effectiveness is not clearly observed. 

BS disbursements (EUR 9 million) in 2020 brought limited fiscal space to the Government 
and could not prevent a deterioration of the macro-fiscal framework. They represented 0.04 
%  of  total  public  revenues46  in  2020.  In  response  to  the  COVID-19  crisis,  the  Commission  front-
loaded the disbursement of the fixed tranches to be paid in 2020 (EUR 4 million) and 2021 (EUR 3 
million) of the ongoing BS (EUR 26 million) targeting earthquake-affected regions.47 In addition, EUR 
2 million of the first variable tranche (40%) scheduled for 2020 was paid, with only two indicators 
(cacao and coffee productivity) out of six achieved. The other four indicators, on capacity of local 
authorities, employment, use of artisanal fishery facilities and microcredit, did not meet the targets. 
Macro-economic stability, which was at risk in recent years, worsened with the COVID-19 crisis in 
2020: GDP growth fell, and the country’s fiscal deficit and external debt increased. The plummeting 
oil price and the social unrest of October 2019 also negatively impacted the economy. Structural 
issues  (an  economic  model  based  on  the  exploitation  of  natural  resources  and  a  lack  of 
competitiveness  of  the  economy)  also  explain  the  difficult  fiscal  and  economic  situation  of  the 
country. 

The contribution of the BS programme in terms of sustainable development, including in 
terms of enhanced socio-economic resilience, was mixed. The results reached on objectives 5 
and 6 of the National Development Plan, which are sustained by the BS programme, were mixed, 
mostly due to the slowdown of the economy at the national level as well the social unrest in October 
2019. The Government conducted pro-private sector policies promoting attraction of investment and 
industrial territorial development. The productivity of agriculture and agricultural exports have also 
improved. But, the situation is more challenging regarding employment. Whilst efforts were made to 
reduce  the  incidence  of  rural  poverty,  indicators  measuring  rural  income  and  multidimensional 
poverty  did not show improvements. “Regarding the progress of the policy for reconstruction and 
productive reactivation in Manabí and Esmeraldas provinces, and the implementation of its economic 
and productive reactivation, with only 1.2% of economic growth in Manabí and Esmeraldas in 2019 
the target of at least 2% was not met. The same poor performance is registered for employment. 
(…) Some good results are observed in the agriculture sector where indicators of cocoa and coffee 
yield have been fully met.” (BS disbursement note, July 2020). 

Most of the other interventions deployed for the socio-economic response were in early 
implementation in 2020, with few results to report on. The Northern border programme (EUR 
18.9 million), in its first year of implementation in 2020, progressed at a slower pace because of 

45 MS Spain, Germany, Italy; personal communication 
46 As per executed budget in 2020. 
47 The objective of the programme is to help the Government reach objectives 5 and 6 of its national development plan 
2017-2021 “Toda una vida” with a special focus on reactivating production in areas of Manabi and Esmeraldas affected 
by the 2016 earthquake. The programme started in March 2019 with the first fixed tranche of EUR 8 million disbursed 
in December 2019.   

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COVID-19 and the 2019 unrest.48 Activities to promote agro-ecological production among targeted 
households were re-launched in August 2020 using new sanitary protocols, but none of the outcome 
indicators have yet been achieved.49 Moreover, a “health” component was included in an early alert 
system meant to diagnose and monitor cases of lack of access/violation of basic human rights within 
population  living  along  the  border.  No  M&E  framework  was  yet  in  place  in  early  2021  to  assess 
results. Work under the LAIF WASH intervention are expected to start at the end of 2021. No M&E 
was in place to report on the outputs and results of the “Proyecto Ciudades incluyentes, comunidades 
solidarias” (EUR 3.7 million). 

Public  Finance  Management  and  budget transparency were  not  specifically  targeted  by 
the  COVID-19  response  through  the  ongoing  BS  beyond  the  assessment  of  the  general 
eligibility criteria. No specific provisions or changes (including in the general conditions, variable 
tranches indicators, sources of verification, etc.) were brought to the BS programme in the addendum 
prepared in May 2020 in response to the COVID-19 crisis.

48 No field work took place between March and June 2020 because of the state of emergency and lockdown measures 

introduced by the Government. 

49 Targets for new production and new value chains were being defined. 

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3. Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch 

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Source: Evaluation Team 

 
Country note - Ethiopia

 
 
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Contents 

Acronyms 

1.  Background..................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 

1.1 

1.2 

Country COVID-19 context and government response .............................................................................. 1 

European Union (EU) response ................................................................................................................................. 2 

2.  Answers to Evaluation Questions ...................................................................................................................................... 3 

2.1 

2.2 

2.3 

2.4 

EQ 1 – Relevance ............................................................................................................................................................. 3 

EQ 2 – Value added ........................................................................................................................................................ 4 

EQ 3 – Efficiency .............................................................................................................................................................. 6 

EQ 4 – Effectiveness ...................................................................................................................................................... 7 

3.  Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch .................................................................................................................................... 10 

THE  PURPOSE  OF  THIS  COUNTRY  NOTE  IS  TO  INFORM  THE  FAST-TRACK  ASSESSMENT  OF  THE  EU  INITIAL 
RESPONSE AS A WHOLE. IT IS NOT DESIGNED TO BE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RESPONSE IN THE COUNTRY. 

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Acronyms 

ACF 

BS 

DAC 

DG ECHO 

Action Against Hunger 

Budget Support 

Development Assistance Committee 

European  Commission’s Directorate-General  for European Civil  Protection and 
Humanitarian Aid Operations 

DG INTPA 

European Commission’s Directorate-General for International Partnerships 

EQ 

EU 

EUD 

HBIC 

HIP 

IDP 

IGAD 

INGO 

IOM 

IRC 

MoF 

MoH 

MS 

MSME 

MSPRP 

NGO 

PHEM 

PPE 

SRPC 

TE 

UN 

UNHCR 

UNICEF 

UNOPS 

WASH 

Evaluation Question 

European Union 

Delegation of the European Union 

Home-Based Isolation and Care initiative 

Humanitarian Implementation Plan 

Internally Displaced Person 

Regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development 

International non-governmental organisations 

International Organization for Migration 

International Rescue Committee 

Ministry of Finance  

Ministry of Health 

European Union Member State 

Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise 

Multi-Sectorial Preparedness and Response Plan 

Non-Governmental Organisation 

Public Health Emergency Management 

Personal Protective Equipment 

Sector Reform and Performance Contract 

Team Europe 

United Nations 

United Nations Refugee Agency 

United Nations Children's Fund 

United Nations Office for Project Services 

Water, sanitation and hygiene 

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WB 

WFP 

WHO 

World Bank 

World Food Programme 

World Health Organization 

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Fast-track assessment of the EU initial response to the COVID-19 crisis in partner countries and regions  ADE 

1. Background 

1.1  Country COVID-19 context and government response 

The first case of COVID-19 in Ethiopia was confirmed in March 2020. The pandemic is happening in 
a context of 7 million vulnerable people remaining in need of humanitarian assistance (including over 
700  000  residing  in  the  country),  notably  due  to  recurrent  climatic  disasters.1  The  crisis  has 
significantly aggravated the fragile situation, putting pressure on the under-resourced health system 
already facing other epidemics such as cholera. It is exacerbated by poor living conditions, poor health 
and hygiene practices, and inadequate Water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) facilities and services, 
with an aggravated food security scenario already impacted by a locust outbreak.2  

Daily new confirmed COVID-19 cases in Ethiopia 

Source: Johns Hopkins University CSSE COVID-19 Data 

After introducing restrictive measures mid-March 2020, the Council allocated ETB 5 billion3 to the 
Ministry of Health (MoH) to scale up interventions aimed at containing the spread of the virus, such 
as the purchase of medical supplies, raising public awareness and outreach.4 The Government also 
issued  a  Health  Preparedness  and  Response  Plan  to  COVID-19  and  a  COVID-19  Multi-Sectorial 
Preparedness  and  Response  Plan  (MSPRP)  in  April  2020.  Four  levels  of  coordination  were  set  up: 
National Disaster Risk Management Council led by the deputy prime minister’s office; Public Health 
Emergency  Management  (PHEM)  Task  Force  (multi-sectoral)  led  by  the  Ministry  of  Health;  PHEM 
Technical  Task  Force  led  by  the  Director  General  of  Ethiopian  Public  Health  Institute;  and  PHEM 
Technical  Working Group  led  by  the  national  incident  manager.5  The  MSPRP  identified  COVID-19-

1   https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/humanitarian-

bulletin_23_march_-05_april._2020_final.pdf 

2   https://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/africa/ethiopia_en 

3   The equivalent of around EUR 95 million. 

4   https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/humanitarian-

bulletin_23_march_-05_april._2020_final.pdf 

5   http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/110671585329237527/pdf/Project-Information-Document-Ethiopia-

COVID-19-Emergency-Response-P173750.pdf  

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Fast-track assessment of the EU initial response to the COVID-19 crisis in partner countries and regions  ADE 

related needs for three months in different sectors such as agriculture, education, health, nutrition, 
refugees, and water and sanitation. The total cost of the plan amounted to USD 1 billion.67 

1.2  European Union (EU) response 

With a population of over 100 million and as one of the fastest-growing economies in sub-Saharan 
Africa, Ethiopia is a key partner for the EU. The country is beneficiary to ambitious Team Europe (TE) 
Initiatives (such as the digitalisation initiative), which have gathered the interest of EU MS and their 
financial institutions/development agencies. In June 2020, Team Europe (TE) presented its COVID-19 
response to the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and proposed an initial support package amounting to EUR 
487 million, of which EUR 232 million was committed in 2020. 

The emergency response included a top-up (EUR 10 million) and front-load of 2022 payment (EUR 
17.5 million) of the health budget support (BS) programme for Ethiopia launched in 2016 (total EUR 
175 million programme). The additional support to COVID-19 response (EUR 10 million) envisaged 
to  increase  the  number  of  laboratories  equipped  for  COVID-19  diagnostics  and  the  capacity  of 
treatment centres. Ethiopia has also benefited from the EU response to Health and Socio-Economic 
Impact  of  COVID-19  in  the  IGAD  region  (EUR  60  million).  The  programme  is  to  support  the  IGAD 
efforts to mitigate the COVID-19 pandemic, and promotes regional cooperation and a collaborative 
response to shared concerns caused by the pandemic, especially to the most vulnerable populations 
in cross-border areas. The response was further delivered through United Nations (UN) agencies and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) by adapting ongoing humanitarian interventions as well the 
existing  integration  programme  for  returnees.  These  adaptations  aimed  to  mitigate  COVID-19-
related food insecurity affecting the most vulnerable and to support information campaigns. Ethiopia 
also  benefited  from  the  EU  Global  response  to  COVID-19  channelled  through  the  World  Health 
Organization (WHO). Throughout the crisis, the EU remained committed to respond to the country’s 
multiple  vulnerabilities  (including  internal  displacement,  locust  infestation,  cholera  outbreaks  and 
natural  disasters).  A  budget  of  EUR  42.85  million  was  committed  by  the  European  Commission’s 
Directorate-General  for  European  Civil  Protection  and  Humanitarian  Aid  Operations  (DG  ECHO)  in 
2020 to respond to the country’s humanitarian needs, including COVID-19.  

The socio-economic response consisted largely of budget support payments aiming to strengthen 
the  country’s macroeconomic  stability  and  to  support  the  MSPRP implementation.  Direct  financial 
support  was  channelled  through  several  existing  budget  support  programmes  (such  as  the  Job 
Compact  Sector  Reform  and  Performance  contract,  and  the  Connectivity  and  Competitiveness 
Contract),  for  a  total  amount  of  EUR  142.5  million  disbursed  in  2020.  In  December  2020,  the 
disbursement of EUR 88.5 million in budget support payments across three different programmes 
was  postponed  by  the  EU  in  the  context  of  the  crisis  in  Tigray.  The  EU  also  postponed  signing  a 
financing  agreement  for  the  “EU  budget  support  for  economic  recovery  in  response  to  COVID-19 
crisis in Ethiopia” (See Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch). 

Several interventions were selected for an in-depth review, and have therefore been given greater 
attention  in  this  note,  especially  in  Evaluation  Question  (EQ)  4.  Below  is  the  list  of  the  selected 
interventions in Ethiopia: 

6   Around EUR 0,8 billion. 

7   https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/humanitarian-

bulletin_23_march_-05_april._2020_final.pd  

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•  ECHO, emergency response 

o  1. Heath Budget Support – 2nd phase (EUR 50 million + 10 million COVID 19 response) 
o  2. EU Global response to COVID-19 - WHO (EUR 2.7 million) 
o  3. Adaptation of ongoing humanitarian interventions - UN agencies and international 

non-governmental organisations (INGOs) – EUR 2.4 million 

•  European  Commission’s  Directorate-General  for  International  Partnerships  (DG  INTPA), 

economic-social:  

o  4.  Regional  Intergovernmental  Authority  on  Development  (IGAD)  programme  – 
International  Organization  for  Migration  (IOM),  United  Nations  Children's  Fund 
(UNICEF), United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) – delivery of medical 
equipment, border security and safe trade, digital innovation – (EUR 53 million for 
the whole region) 

2. Answers to Evaluation Questions 

2.1  EQ 1 – Relevance 

EQ1:  To  what  extent  did  the  initial  EU  global  response  to  the  COVID-19  pandemic 
through  the  Team  Europe  (TE)  country  packages  address  the  needs  and  priorities  of 
partner countries and regions in each country context in line with the three priorities of 
the Team Europe approach? 
Summary:  
The  EU  package  in  Ethiopia  was  designed  as  a  mixture  of  budget  support  programmes  and 
realignment of humanitarian actions to the COVID-19 specific context. Emergency needs and the 
socio-economic  recovery were both addressed in a timely fashion. The  instruments  used in the 
package aimed at responding to short-term priorities but also tried to build longer-term COVID-19 
resilience.  Particular  attention  was  given  to  ensure  national  ownership  and  alignment  with 
Ethiopian’s response strategy. Nevertheless, the Tigray crisis has disrupted the payment of budget 
support tranches.  

The Team Europe (TE) response in Ethiopia is in line with the priorities set out in the Joint 
Communication and with Ethiopia’s specific context. Protection of vulnerable populations 
was also taken into consideration. The Team Europe (TE) response mainly consisted of a mix 
between  budget  support  programmes  and  reallocation  of  humanitarian  actions.  ECHO  addressed 
humanitarian needs in the health and WASH sectors by providing assistance to internally displaced 
persons, refugees and victims of natural disasters. Team Europe (TE) mobilised, through the ongoing 
health budget support,8 a EUR 10 million COVID-19-specific top up to support the national response 
plan and disbursed EUR 15 million planned BS payment for 2020 to strengthen the health sector. 
Another  budget  support  programme  was  designed  to  support  the  Government  towards  economic 
recovery after the crisis, by improving job protection through improved governance and Micro, Small 
and  Medium  Enterprise  (MSME)  support.9  This  programme  also  aimed  to  facilitate  women’s 
participation  and  shifting  towards  empowerment  in  agreement  with  the  principles  of  the  Gender 
Action Plan.10 Two additional budget support programmes were included in the package, but they are 
not directly related to COVID-19: their scopes covers digitalisation and job creation concerns. 

8   https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/stories/budget-support-ethiopia-improving-health-facilities-times-

covid-19_en  

9   The contract was not signed as of March 2021 

10   https://www.gtai.de/resource/blob/645086/2321debedebc6d0981cba14c4f748113/PRO20210429645078.pdf  

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EU  assistance  in  Ethiopia  was  addressed  in  a  timely  fashion  and  was  consistent  with 
immediate needs related to COVID-19, including those of vulnerable populations. The EU 
health  budget  support  aimed  at  increasing  test  capacities  and  setting  up  treatment  centres  and 
personal  protective  equipment  (PPE)  provision.  According  to  the  United  Nations  Refugee  Agency 
(UNHCR), there are 700 000 refugees and 2.4 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Ethiopia. 
These populations were (and are) particularly vulnerable to COVID-19. Therefore, DG ECHO responded 
by realigning ongoing humanitarian interventions to cope with the additional risks associated with 
COVID-19 for IDPs and refugees living in densely populated camps or isolation centres. Some projects 
focused on providing WASH facilities in the camps as well as supporting health centres and providing 
food assistance.11 

The measures for the COVID-19 response included a longer-term perspective and fostered 
national  ownership  and  shared  responsibilities  of  the  projects.  They  additionally  gave 
more attention to the health sector. The support included instruments to build for a longer-term 
perspective. This is in line with the future ten year perspective development plan (2021-2030) and 
will  provide  support in  digitalisation  and  job  creation,  through  two  budget  support  programmes.12 
These  programmes  should  improve  national  capacities  in  the  long-term.  For  instance,  improving 
connectivity will contribute to develop e-health services useful to track and trace information. The 
Job Compact budget support should provide support to MSMEs enterprises and to informal workers, 
both men and women. Nevertheless, the relevance of the response provided through BS decreased 
due the conflict situation in Tigray which emerged in December 2020, and which led the Commission 
to postpone several BS payments foreseen in 2020 to 2021. 

2.2  EQ 2 – Value added 

EQ2:  To  what  extent  did  the  Team  Europe  (TE)  initial  response  provide  additional 
benefits beyond what would have resulted from actions taken by the EU institutions 
and EU MS on their own? 
Summary:  
EU institutions and MS built on pre-existing coordination mechanisms for the COVID-19 response 
and demonstrated flexibility in reprogramming and front-loading payments. At operational level, 
the Team Europe (TE) approach emphasised coordinated data collection, but there  was no joint 
monitoring, and interviews highlighted important differences in approaches by ECHO and INTPA in 
their engagement on health. There is little evidence of increased coordination with and influence 
on non-EU donors – beyond the already central role the EU plays in the health sector, and as an 
important donor more generally. Communication on the Team Europe (TE) approach was mainly 
directed at the Government, with limited public communication efforts in-country; the Team Europe 
(TE) approach at the regional and global levels was more visible. 

EU institutions and EU MS built on pre-existing coordination mechanisms for the COVID-
19 response in Ethiopia and the IGAD region. The EU had already developed a joint cooperation 
strategy for 2017-2020, with a set of common mechanisms used for coordinated programming in 
the country (including the development of two TE initiatives), which continued working after the Team 
Europe  (TE)  approach  was  launched.  They  were  supplemented  by  COVID-19  taskforce  meetings 

11   Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Horn of Africa, 2020  

12   The  “Ethiopia  Regional  Connectivity  and  Competitiveness”  and  the  “Job  Compact  Sector  Reform  and  Performance 
Contract”. The former is not directly related to COVID-19, while the latter has a specific COVID-19 focus through its 
addendum. Note that a share of payment of the former has been postponed due to the Tigray crisis.   

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taking  place  every  15  days  to  share  data  on  progress,  needs  and  remaining  challenges.13  The 
development of a Team Europe (TE) approach to COVID-19 was not perceived to have an impact, 
either positive or negative, on these mechanisms. COVID-19-related matters were discussed as part 
of regular Head of Cooperation meetings. 

Documents  stress  flexibility  in  fund  re-orientation,  reprogramming  and  front-loading 
payments. The bulk of the emergency health response was channelled through the ongoing Ethiopia 
Health Sector budget support programme. The EU’s rapid reactivity was also observed at the regional 
level  with  the  “EU-IGAD  COVID-19  Response  programme”  designed  as  a  joint  response.14  These 
mechanisms  also  helped  making  subsequent  joint,  high-level  decisions,  such  as  postponing  the 
budget support payment disbursements (EUR 88.5 million) in the context of the Tigray crisis. 

However, beyond re-prioritisation, interviews indicate mixed results at operational level. 
On the one hand, the Team Europe (TE) approach put great emphasis on strengthening mechanisms 
for coordinated data collection and research. Specific interventions were to support the Government 
and its partners to track and monitor the health response to COVID-19, such as regional surveillance 
and  monitoring  systems  (EU-IGAD  COVID-19  Response  Project),  and  fast  dissemination  of 
#CoronavirusFacts  at  country  level.  However,  interviews  highlighted  important  differences  in 
approaches by  ECHO and INTPA in their engagement with  the  Ministry  of Health on public health 
matters, resulting from the different focus on the shorter term (ECHO one-year plans) and longer 
term (INTPA seven-year plans). Going forward with the COVID-19 second wave, efforts were made 
to bridge the emergency and development gap. Moreover, although regular reporting existed through 
the COVID-19 tracker and key programme action reports, there was no joint monitoring such as using 
a common result matrix. 

There is little evidence that the Team Europe (TE) response to COVID-19 was particularly 
coordinated with the main non-EU donors to Ethiopia, namely the World Bank (WB), the United 
Kingdom  and  the  United  States.  Interviews  with  non-EU  donor  representatives  note  only  isolated 
examples of regular meetings with the EU on COVID-19 specifically, although coordination on health 
matters was already fluid. The EU-IGAD COVID-19 Response programme, under Team Europe (TE) 
but at a regional level, offered a tangible example of Team Europe (TE) added value. As part of the 
programme, a Communications Working Group was established with focal points from each partner 
organisation (UNOPS, UNICEF, IOM and TradeMark East Africa) and each country to  ensure a “one 
programme, one team” approach as well as harmonised messages and visibility. 

13   Interviews, April 2021. 

14   EU-IGAD Final progress report, Dec. 2020. 

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Documentation  shows  that  communication  on  the  Team  Europe  (TE)  approach  to  fight 
COVID-19  was  mainly  directed  at  the  Government,  while  public  communication  efforts 
were  limited.  A  letter to  the  Ministry  of  Finance  explaining  the  Team  Europe  (TE)  approach  and 
announcing its EUR 487 million contribution was relayed by a number of local newspapers (such as 
the Daily Monitor/Fanabc). It was also broadcast on almost all local TV channels and through the EU 
Delegation  Facebook  profile,  whilst  the  EU  Delegation  used  the  #TeamEurope  hashtag  in  its 
communication. However, there was no massive public communication campaign on the Team Europe 
(TE) response to COVID-19. Interviews suggest that the communication campaign was insufficient to 
match the visibility and influence efforts of partners such as China or the United States,  and also 
highlighted that budget support was not always good to raise visibility as compared to projects. EU 
MS both deplored this, yet also prioritised their own visibility over that of TE. The “Team Europe” label 
for a joined-up COVID-19 response was more visible at regional and global level, such as through 
the EU Global response to COVID-19 channelled through WHO. 

As to whether the Team Europe (TE) approach led to increased EU convening power with 
non-EU actors, or potential for influence, there is no evidence at this stage beyond the central 
role the EU has played in the health sector, both prior to COVID-19 and in response to it, and more 
generally  as  an  important  donor  (EU  and  EU  MS  together  represent  the  country’s  second  donor 
reporting to the Development Assistance Committee [DAC]). 

2.3  EQ 3 – Efficiency 

EQ3: To what extent were, and are, the individual aid modalities and other aid delivery 
mechanisms  and  their  combinations  efficient  and  flexible  enough  for  use  in  Team 
Europe’s COVID-19 response in COVID-19 crisis conditions? 
Summary 
DG ECHO humanitarian support was quickly released and ongoing activities adapted to meet the 
needs generated by the pandemic. EUR 35 million was disbursed as BS during the first semester 
of 2020, but only part of BS disbursements was made in 2020 due to the crisis in Tigray. Support 
was  provided  nationwide,  where  aid  modality  combinations  worked  well  in  matching  needs. 
Humanitarian activities were monitored through established procedures such as post-distribution 
monitoring exercises. Monitoring of the BS Health Sector Reform and Performance Contract (SRPC) 
took place within joint health policy dialogue platforms. 

DG ECHO humanitarian support was quickly released  and  ongoing  activities  adapted  to 
meet the needs generated by the pandemic. This can be seen in the top-ups provided by ECHO 
to  its  implementing  partners15  whereby  ongoing  interventions,  predominantly  in  displaced 
communities,  were  adapted.  For  example,  Action  contre  la  Faim  (ACF)16  reported  that  they  were 
supporting and strengthening health systems in  six primary hospitals, 92 health centres and 429 
health posts, across Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz, Oromia and Amhara. Funding was also provided 
to UNICEF, who was able to quickly purchase personal protective equipment (PPE) equipment.  

BS funds were provided relatively quickly in 2020, but only a minor part of the planned 
disbursements  was  effectuated  due  to  the  crisis  in  Tigray.  The  Commission  disbursed 
(following HQ’s approval end April 2020) the initially planned disbursements (EUR 35 million) under 

15   Approximately 10 agencies including Dutch  Red Cross, Goal, IOM, International Rescue Committee (IRC), World Food 
Programme (WFP), COOP Italia, Danish Red Cross, Norwegian Refugee Council, People In Need-Czech Republic, ACF.  

16   “Action Against Hunger”. 

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two ongoing BS programmes (SPRC Health – FT disbursed in Q2 2020 – and SRPC Job Compact – FT 
& VT disbursed in Q1 2020-) and disbursed end of June 2020 an EUR 10 million COVID-19 top-up 
under the Health SRPC. However, due to the crisis in Tigray, the Commission postponed the initially 
planned  disbursements  of  EUR  78.5 million  under  its  three  ongoing  BS  operations  as  well  as the 
signature of an ‘EU budget support for economic recovery in response to COVID-19 crisis in Ethiopia 
in December 2020.  

Support was provided nationwide, as can be seen in terms of the humanitarian support coverage 
and through the redirection of 70% of the Ministry of Health support budget to the regional health 
bureaus. Support was also provided to WHO which has offices in ten regions of the country as well 
as  in  Addis.  The  ongoing  conflict  in  Tigray,  however,  complicated  the  provision  of  support  in  that 
region. Regional activities were implemented through IGAD. 

The combination of aid modalities worked well in terms of matching needs. Within the health 
system,  equipment  and  testing  capacity  were  provided  through  both  emergency  and  longer-term 
support, awareness was raised at a community level, displaced communities were supported, and 
training and orientation were provided to health workers to build capacity. This combined response 
may  have  increased  the  overall  capacity  of  the  health  system  and  may  also  have  a  long-term 
beneficial effect on the level of funding provided to the Ministry of Health. Although different support 
mechanisms complemented each other, it is difficult to attribute this to a “Team Europe” approach; 
it is more perhaps the result of established mandates in action. 

Monitoring  activities  were  undertaken  for  both  humanitarian  and  BS  interventions. 
Humanitarian  programmes  had  established  procedures  such  as  post-distribution  monitoring 
exercises undertaken on a regular basis. The reporting period for such activities was relatively short, 
which  enabled  operational  modifications  to  be  identified  and  operational  adjustment  made 
comparatively quickly  as projects  were  being implemented.  Monitoring  of the  BS  health  response 
took place within existing joint policy dialogue platforms. Policy dialogue between the Government 
and partners took place within the health sector Annual Review Meeting. The main health dialogue 
platform was the Joint Consultative Forum. The health sector has been jointly supported for years by 
several donors through a pooled funding mechanism. The Commission did not increase this basket 
fund; it delivered its support to the Treasury through a Health SRPC. Monitoring of the performance 
of the Health Sector Transformation Plan (HTSP) and  of the COVID-19 response plan – supported 
through the health SRPC – took place within these platforms. 

2.4  EQ 4 – Effectiveness 

EQ4:  To  what  extent  was  the  EU  response  successful  in  progressing  towards  the 
objectives associated with the COVID-19 response? 
Summary: 
The impact of the pandemic to date was substantially less than expected or planned for, which is 
to  some  extent  due  to  the  support  provided  by  the  EU  and  other  donors.  As  a  result  of  the 
consolidated  pandemic  response,  the  Ministry  of  Health  was  able  to  increase  the  short-  and 
medium-term capacity of the national health system by increasing the number of testing centres 
and  expanding  treatment  centres.  The  response  also  strengthened  support  to  regional  health 
authorities and provided diagnostic and medical equipment, PPE equipment, supplies for health 
workers,  and  improved  case  management,  accompanied  by  training  in  surveillance  and  the 
detection of cases. Ongoing and upcoming BS interventions supporting employment initiatives and 
economic recovery may ease the socio-economic effects of the pandemic. 

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The sanitary impact of the pandemic to date  was substantially lower than expected or 
planned for. According to available statistics, Ethiopia has only seen moderate reported levels of 
COVID-19  cases,  peaking  at  approximately  1  500  new  cases  and  20  deaths  per  day  around 
September 2020, reducing towards the year end.  However, due to the lack of testing and limited 
access to some regions, there is a strong likelihood that the real number of cases is much higher. 

The consolidated pandemic response contributed to enhance the short- and medium-term 
capacity of the national health system by: 

- 

- 

increasing the number of COVID-19 diagnostic laboratories (from two to more than 40)17 and 
expanding  treatment  centres.  WHO  supported  the  distribution  of  supplies  for  sample 
collection,  transportation  and  testing;  conducted  laboratory  quality  assurance  visits  and 
facilitated  the  independent  verification  of tested  samples;  completed  rehabilitation  of  lab 
facilities; trained lab staff and sample collectors; and supplied testing kits.18   
topping up the ongoing Health SRPC (2016-2022) which focuses on the quality and access 
to health service delivery, equity in health service delivery, allocation and spending in the 
health sector and on public finance management (PFM) and oversight functions in the sector. 
The EU strongly encouraged the Government to increase domestic allocations to the health 
sector,  and the health ministry’s budget increased  in the fiscal year 2020/2021.19 Overall 
results were however mitigated as some key health indicators, notably on maternal and child 
health, performed well below HTSP targets and showed a decline in 2020 compared to 2019 
(Source: EUD note to the Ministry of Finance from June 2020). 

BS disbursements (EUR 45 million) provided limited fiscal space and represented 0.5% of 
2020 total public revenue. The bulk of the BS disbursements planned for 2020 were postponed 
because of the Tigray crisis. However, the disbursements made did provide much needed liquidity 
into the Treasury in a tense macro-fiscal environment.  

The  Team  Europe  (TE)  response  also  provided  PPE  and  other  much  needed  medical 
equipment,  while  strengthening  support  to  the  regional  health  authorities.  DG  ECHO 
provided  support  to  humanitarian  partners  in  terms  of  PPE,  sanitiser,  soap,  washstands,  hygiene 
practices and so on, which will have a beneficial effect in communities. ACF, for example, reported 
the  renovation  of  24  community  water  schemes.  DG  ECHO  also  provided  EUR  3.9  million  for  the 
procurement  of  diagnostic  equipment  and  medical  supplies  to  the  WHO,20  who  co-led  the  public 
health emergency centres and strengthened the overall support operation of the Ministry of Health. 
WHO  support  provided  PPE  and  medical  supplies  for  health  workers,  plus  case  management, 
accompanied  by  training  in  surveillance  and  case  detection.  This  training  support  will  generate 
positive  impact  in  the  medium-  to  long-term,  as  will  the  provision  of  diagnostic  and  ventilation 
equipment. The hotline set up in the Public Health Institute to provide guidance on COVID-19 for the 
population  could  be  used  for  other  similar  epidemics  within  the  country.  WHO  also  provided 
continuous  onsite  mentorship  for  treatment,  isolation  and  quarantine  centres  on  IPC  and  case 
management, facility infrastructure and patient flow, and minimum patient care standards. They also 

17   According to a key informant response. WHO quoted a figure of 74 testing centres.  

18   WHO progress report (no date available). 

19   The budget allocation to the health sector increased from ETB 12.64 billion in 2019/2020 to 18.7 billion in 2020/2021. 

Source: Cepheus Growth Capital, Ethiopia’s 2020-21 Budget, 31 July 2020. 

20   Ethiopia is one of the priority countries which has benefited from the EU Global response to COVID-19, covering ten 
countries  in  Asia  and  Africa  with  EUR  37.5  million  channelled  through  WHO  between  30  January  2020  –and  29 
January2021). 

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supported the establishment of the home-based isolation and care initiative (HBIC) for COVID-19 and 
provided technical guidance on the integration of COVID-19 into the national health system. 

Internal government mechanisms further helped to address the pandemic. Despite severe 
supply restrictions from Europe, the PPE supply chain was effective due to the government’s close 
relationship with China, which provided a significant amount of PPE for African nations. Additional 
PPE  was  produced  in-country  to  cover  domestic  needs,  through  government  support  at  specific 
industrial  parks.  Furthermore,  the  ComBAT  campaign,  led  by  the  Prime  Minister  of  Ethiopia  and 
supported by WHO, was started at the onset of the pandemic with an intensive surveillance set-up 
and  active  engagement  with  communities  to  promote  COVID-19  testing.  Through  training  and 
deploying  322  Rapid  Response  Teams  across  all  12  regions,  the  number  of  COVID-19  tests  was 
successfully increased, 95% of which were investigated within 48 hours. 

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3. Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch 

Source: Evaluation Team 

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Country note - Montenegro

 
 
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Contents 

1.  Background..................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 

1.1. 

Country COVID-19 context and government response .............................................................................. 1 

1.2. 

EU response ........................................................................................................................................................................ 2 

2.  Answers to Evaluation Questions (EQs) ......................................................................................................................... 3 

2.1. 

EQ 1 – Relevance ............................................................................................................................................................. 3 

2.2. 

EQ 2 – Value added ........................................................................................................................................................ 4 

2.3. 

EQ 3 – Efficiency .............................................................................................................................................................. 5 

2.4. 

EQ 4 – Effectiveness ...................................................................................................................................................... 6 

3.  Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch ....................................................................................................................................... 8 

THE  PURPOSE  OF  THIS  COUNTRY  NOTE  IS  TO  INFORM  THE  FAST-TRACK  ASSESSMENT  OF  THE  EU  INITIAL 
RESPONSE AS A WHOLE. IT IS NOT DESIGNED TO BE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RESPONSE IN THE COUNTRY. 

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Acronyms 

COVAX 
ECFIN 
NEAR 
EBRD 
ECDC 
DG ECHO 

DG SANTE 
EEAS 
EIB 
EP 
EQ 
EU 
EUD 
EU MS 
IFI 
IMF 
IPA 
JC 
MFA 
MSME 
MSE 
PFM 
PHC 
SAA 
SME 
SRBC 
TE 
UN 
UNDP 
US 
WHO 

COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access 
EU Economic and Financial Affairs 
EU Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid 
Operations 
Direction générale de la santé et de la sécurité alimentaire 
European External Action Service 
European Investment Bank 
European Parliament 
Evaluation Question 
European Union 
Delegation of the European Union 
EU Member States 
International Financial Institution 
International Monetary Fund 
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance 
Judgment Criteria 
Macro Financial Assistance 
Micro, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
Micro and Small Enterprises 
Public Financial Management 
Primary Health Care 
Stability and Association Agreement 
Small and medium enterprises 
State and Resilience-Building Contract 
Team Europe 
United Nations 
United Nations Development Programme 
United States 
World Health Organization 

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1. Background 

1.2  Country COVID-19 context and government response 

Montenegro was one of the last countries to be affected by the COVID-19 pandemic in Europe but was 
then heavily impacted. A first wave between March and May 2020 with only 324 confirmed cases was 
almost imperceptible.1 A stronger wave arrived in the country in the second half of June 2020, intensified 
around September to October, and peaked between November and December 2020.2 Before any cases 
were detected, the Government had issued a EUR 59 million “Country Preparedness and Response Plan" 
in collaboration with the WHO to cover immediate health priorities and offset the social implications of 
the crisis.3 

Daily new confirmed COVID-19 cases in Montenegro 

The country experienced a 12-14% fall in gross domestic product (GDP) in 2020, largely due to losses 
in the tourism sector, the informal sector and remittances from EU countries, on which the economy is 
heavily dependent.4 To mitigate the impact of the crisis, in April 2020 the Government adopted two fiscal 
stimulus packages of around EUR 75 million to boost growth and employment. This was followed by new 
measures  totaling  EUR  1.22  billion  in  June  2020  for  investment  and  financial  support  to  the  real 
economy.5 A wage subsidy programme was introduced in a third stimulus package in July 2020, then 

1 OECD (2020), THE COVID-19 CRISIS IN MONTENEGRO. 
2 OECD (2021), THE COVID-19 CRISIS IN MONTENEGRO. 
3  WHO  (2020),  COVID-19  Country  Preparedness  and  Response  Plan:  Montenegro,  World  Health  Organization 

Regional Office for Europe, Podgorica. 

4 OECD (2021), THE COVID-19 CRISIS IN MONTENEGRO. 
5  https://www.gov.me/en/News/229705/PM-Markovic-presents-third-package-of-Government-measures-to-

support-citizens-and-economy-After-280-million-in-first-and-40-mill.html 

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extended to allow the initial economic support measures to continue into November and December 2020, 
when the second wave peaked in Montenegro.6 

1.2  EU response 

The EU COVID-19 response in Montenegro overall amounted to EUR 53 million. More in details, the EU 
provided support to the COVID-19 crisis in Montenegro by reallocating EUR 3 million under the existing 
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) for the immediate response to the health crisis; supporting 
the strengthening of the health system with EUR 9.5 million by reallocating funds from the agriculture 
to the health sector under the IPA framework; and by addressing the economic and social consequences 
of the crisis through a new Budget Support Intervention (SRBC)7 of EUR 40.5 million. The EU also provided 
EUR 60 million in targeted Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA).8 

As an EU candidate country, Montenegro benefited from support beyond specific assistance for COVID-
19. The country signed the Joint Procurement Agreement, and has access to the Solidarity Fund, the EU 
Civil Protection Mechanism and the Early Warning and Response System. It received regional assistance 
for the health sector and vulnerable groups, assistance from the European Centre for Disease Prevention 
and Control (ECDC), and assistance from the EU’s Joint Research Centre. Montenegro also has observer 
status in the EU Health Security Committee and participated in the Committee meeting on 15 April 2020.9 
(See Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch) 

Several  interventions  were  selected  for  an  in-depth  review  and  have  therefore  been  given  greater 
attention in this note, in particular in Evaluation Question 4. The selected interventions in Montenegro 
are listed below: 

•  Emergency 

o  ECHO: Purchase of medical equipment and supplies – UNDP (EUR 3 million) 

•  Socio-economic 

o  NEAR: Resilience Contract budget support (EUR 40.5 million) 
o  ECFIN: Macro Financial Assistance (EUR 60 million) 

6 OECD (2021), THE COVID-19 CRISIS IN MONTENEGRO. 
7 State- and Resilience-Building Contract 
8 TE COVID-19 Country Fiche Dec. 2020 
9 Ibidem 

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2. Answers to Evaluation Questions (EQs) 

2.1  EQ 1 – Relevance 

EQ1:  To  what  extent  did  the  initial  EU  global  response  to  the  COVID-19  pandemic 
through  the  Team  Europe  (TE)  country  packages  address  the  needs  and  priorities  of 
partner countries and regions in each country context in line with the three priorities of 
the Team Europe approach? 

Summary: The scope and emphasis of the EU package in Montenegro were in line with the priorities 
of  the  EU  joint  communication  on  the  Global  COVID-19  response  and  other  strategies  for 
development cooperation and enlargement. The package was appropriately designed  to address 
short-term,  COVID-19-related  needs  related  to  the  immediate  emergency;  health,  water  and 
sanitation; and socio-economic support. The emphasis on socio-economic assistance building on 
pre-existing efforts and national  priorities, as well as on strengthening the  government-centred 
health  system,  linked  the  response  to  short-term  needs  to  the  development  of  longer-term 
resilience. 

The design and priorities of the EU package in Montenegro were in line with priorities of 
the  EU  joint  communication  on  the  Global  COVID-19  response  and  other  strategies 
relevant to Montenegro, as well as the overall EU agenda and principles. Assistance included 
taking  actions  to  involve  Montenegro  in  EU  joint  initiatives  and  platforms  open  to  pre-accession 
countries, namely the Joint Procurement Agreement, the Western Balkans framework contract for 
procurement  and  the  COVID-19  Vaccines  Global  Access  (COVAX)  initiative,  in  line  with  the  Joint 
Communication approach and the enlargement strategy. The Resilience Contract budget support was 
aligned with the overall accession and development strategy for the country, as well as the EU 2030 
Agenda.  Its  indicators  focused  on  advancing  PFM  reforms  and  budget  transparency  as  well  as 
improving MSMEs resilience, all with a gender dimension. EUR 15 million IPA funds were redirected 
to  support  Roma  communities,  vulnerable  women  and  children,  elderly  and  disabled  persons, 
migrants, and vulnerable returnees during the crisis, consistent with the principles expressed in the 
European Consensus on Development.  

The support package in Montenegro was relevant for addressing immediate and evolving 
COVID-19-related  needs  in  the  three  Team  Europe  priorities  of  the  COVID-19  response 
(emergency  response;  health,  water  and  sanitation;  socio-economic  support).  The  EUR  3 
million  IPA  emergency  reallocation  through  the  EU  Integration  Facility,  implemented  by  UNDP, 
foresaw support to help meet emergency needs for medical equipment (such as ventilators and X-
rays machines)  and supplies to protect against  COVID-19  infections.10 The EUR 9.5 million health 
package was aimed at strengthening the health infrastructure and increasing laboratory capacities, 
also in view of future epidemics. Budget support of EUR 40.5 million to the Montenegrin authorities11 
was intended to provide the fiscal space necessary to respond to the economic crisis. Similarly, EUR 
60  million  MFA  was  aimed  at  sustaining  the  balance  of  payments  within  a  climate  of  general 
instability several months into the crisis.12  

10 The EUR 3 million reallocation under IPA was designed and agreed late in March. The agreement was signed 

with UNDP on 2 April and the first batches delivered mid to late April.  

11 Extensive discussions with authorities and internal work in DG NEAR (plus wider Commission) carried out in 

April on the first steps on design of the planned Budget Support Resilience Contract. 

12 Macro Financial Assistance (loans) package agreed on the 22nd of April. 

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The Commission’s support aimed at long-term resilience against the crisis, whilst ensuring 
national  ownership  and  alignment  with  country-level  efforts.  Budget  support  allowed  the 
Government  to  manage  the  response  according  to  nationally  defined  needs,  priorities,  and 
mechanisms. The performance indicators were realistic and in line with the Government’s COVID-19 
policy response. The MFA was aligned with ongoing PFM reforms. The priorities of the EUR 9.5 million 
health support were informed by Montenegrin Government preferences,13 but raised doubts on the 
EU side as to their appropriateness for meeting medium-term COVID-19-related needs. 

2.2  EQ 2 – Value added 

EQ2:  To  what  extent  did  the  Team  Europe  (TE)  initial  response  provide  additional 
benefits beyond  what would have resulted from actions taken by the EU institutions 
and EU MS on their own? 

Summary:  EU  institutions  coordinated  analysis  and  planning  for  the  COVID-19  response  for 
Montenegro and the Western Balkans from the start. Coordination with international organisations, 
good prior to COVID-19, was further stepped up through joint analysis and coordinated operations. 
Pre-COVID-19, coordination with EU MS was already strong around the accession reform agenda 
and did not intensify during the crisis response. Overall, the COVID-19 response increased visibility 
of the EU in Montenegro, but this response was not associated with the Team Europe (TE) approach, 
at least not at national level. The TE concept  was much more visible at regional level (Western 
Balkans), where EIB and EBRD made consistent use of the brand in their communication. 

EU  institutions  coordinated  analysis  and  planning  of  the  COVID-19  response  for 
Montenegro and the Western Balkans from the start, especially at headquarters, between EEAS 
and  NEAR,  with  DG  SANTE  and  ECDC  on  health;  and  with  ECFIN  on  MFA  and  BSRC.  Inter-service 
consultation on budget support led to reprogramming funds from three annual programmes for a 
EUR 40.5 million budget support. In Montenegro itself, the EU Delegation liaised with EIB and EBRD 
more closely than pre-COVID-19. Overall, however, the COVID-19 portfolio was primarily a collection 
of COVID-19-related projects and was not backed by a COVID-19 strategy. The COVID-19 response 
does not seem to have impacted coordination with EU MS, either positively or negatively. Pre-COVID-
19, there was already close coordination with EU MS on the accession reform agenda. There is no 
evidence of increased EU convening power.  

The “Team Europe” label for increased coordination and cooperation around the COVID 
response was much more visible at regional level (Western Balkans). Here, DG NEAR held 
regular consultations with the EU Delegation, the EIB, EBRD and EU MS agencies and institutions such 
as KfW to identify needs (such as for SME support), to identify financial intermediaries, and to reorient 
activities to respond to COVID-19. In the case of regional support to businesses through local banks 
(European  Investment  Fund  and  European  Fund  for  Southeast  Europe),  the  EU  Delegations  often 
provided  complementary  grant  elements.  It  is  not  clear  if  the  COVID-19  response  reinforced 
coordinated implementation and oversight. The most visible sign of coordinated reporting was the 
bi-weekly update of the TE response fiche between March and December 2020.  

EU coordination with international organisations (chiefly the UN) was good prior to COVID-
19  and  was  further  stepped  up,  intensifying  joint  analysis  and  coherent  but  not  joint 
operations.  UNDP  played  a  strong  role  in  co-designing  and  implementing  the  EUR  3  million 
emergency response.14 The EU also liaised with the IMF on the European Parliament-Council decision 

13 The bulk of the assistance (EUR 3.89 million and EUR 4.39 million) were top-ups for the rehabilitation and 

enlargement of hospitals and the construction of a bio-safety laboratory. 

14 April 2020 agreement 

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to provide macro-financial assistance supported both by the World Bank Group and the IMF. While 
there  is  no  joint  matrix  of  reforms  with  these  two  actors,  interviews  did  not  indicate  any 
inconsistencies  between  their  respective  interventions.  There  is  no  evidence,  however,  that  this 
coordination  extended  to  non-EU,  bilateral  partners,  such  as  Turkey,  or  the  USA.  The  COVID-19 
response package did not contain projects that were co-financed by EU MS or non-EU donors. 

The  COVID-19  response  increased  visibility  of  the  EU  in  Montenegro,  aided  by  the  rapid 
announcement of the EUR 3.3 billion package for the Western Balkans15 which “goes far beyond what 
any other partner has provided to the region”.16 With the exception of EIB and EBRD, which made 
consistent  use  of  the  TE  brand,  neither  the  country  nor  regional  communication  used  the  visual 
identity promoted EU-wide, relying rather on the “EU for you” branding, which makes sense in a pre-
accession context. 

2.3  EQ 3 – Efficiency 

EQ3: To what extent were, and are, the individual aid modalities and other aid delivery 
mechanisms  and  their  combinations  efficient  and  flexible  enough  for  use  in  Team 
Europe’s COVID-19 response in COVID-19 crisis conditions? 

The EU rapidly and flexibly reprogrammed and reallocated existing resources to make bilateral IPA 
II assistance COVID-19-orientated and available to the country in response to short- and medium-
term needs. A mix of complementary aid modalities facilitated effective interventions in the three 
COVID-19 response areas and allowed the EU to support Montenegro’s national fiscal capacities. 
An exceptional MFA package provided additional macro-financial support. This was completed by 
the  adjustment  of  the  EU  regional  cooperation  to  ensure  direct  financial  support  to  the  real 
economy (especially SMEs and local financial intermediaries). As an accession country, Montenegro 
was also included in a wide range of instruments and actions that are not available to the rest of 
the world. 

In the absence of additional available funds, the EU used all the flexibility of its financial 
procedures and aid modalities to quickly review the bilateral envelope for Montenegro in 
March 2020. EU institutions used a fast-track approach to reprogramme and reorient funds which 
had already been committed to  design an emergency and medium-term COVID-19 response.  The 
resulting  COVID-19  response  package  allowed  the  EU  to  address  and  contribute  to  the  country’s 
immediate- short- and medium-term priorities in a comprehensive manner.  

A  complementary  set  of  aid  modalities  and  delivery  mechanisms  allowed  the  EU  to 
respond to needs in all three of the Team Europe priorities of the COVID-19 response. This 
included a EUR 3 million (reallocation from the IPA European Integration Facility) immediate response 
to purchase medical protective equipment which was delivered with the support of UNDP at the onset 
of the second and stronger COVID-19 wave in the country. Timely support under the Budget Support 
Resilience Contract (BSRC) of EUR 40.5 million with a frontloaded first disbursement of EUR 28 million 
provided fiscal space to the national authorities to finance fiscal stimulus packages to mitigate social 
and economic impacts of the crisis. Finally, a EUR 9.5 million project was aimed at strengthening the 
national health system.17 

The EU also quickly mobilised additional funds by adopting a flexible approach to its MFA 
instrument and by adapting  this to the specific case of Montenegro. The EU changed the 
eligibility criteria for MFA and shortened the payment period to two years from three, with only two 

15 Combining resources from the EU institutions, EU MS, EIB and EBRD. 
16 Communication 
17 Progress of this project has been slow (see EQ4). 

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instalments. This allowed the EU to complement its COVID-19 response toolkit with an extraordinary 
financial assistance of EUR 60 million of which EUR 30 million was disbursed in early October 2020 
to  address  the  negative  economic  and  financial  impacts  of  the  COVID-19  crisis  on  the  country’s 
balance  of  payments  and  State  Budget.  MFA  and  BSRC  were  designed  to  ensure  synergies  and 
complementarity not only in terms of the objectives of their respective crisis financial supports but 
also in terms of their supported socio-economic and public financial governance reforms aligned with 
the  country’s  EU  accession  reform  agenda.  Policy  dialogue  and  monitoring  of  these  operations 
remained embedded in the existing, comprehensive, and well-articulated monitoring framework of 
the Stability and Association Agreement (SAA) and for the accession negotiations.  

The  EU  also  complemented  its  bilateral  support  with  a  response  at  regional  (Western 
Balkans) level especially through the redirection of its IPA-Multi-Country Programme and 
a strong focus on the short and medium-term needs of the regional real economy. This 
additional layer focused on providing direct support to the economic and banking/financial sector, 
with  the  mobilisation  of  several  EU-funded  guarantee  schemes  to  inject  liquidity  into  the  local 
banking sector and to improve the borrowing performance of the private sector, especially SMEs. This 
was  done  in  close  coordination  with  keys  IFIs  in  the  region,  including  the  EIB,  the  EBRD,  and  the 
relevant financing institutions from EU MS.  

2.4  EQ 4 – Effectiveness 

To what extent was the EU response successful in progressing towards the objectives 
associated with the COVID-19 response? 

Summary: 

The EU provided personal protective and medical equipment ahead of a severe second COVID-19 
wave. BS and MFA were instrumental in providing fiscal space for national fiscal stimulus packages 
which mitigated the economic and social impacts of the pandemic, with a specific focus on the 
most vulnerable and micro- and small enterprises. This highly EU concessional financial support 
also contributed to macroeconomic stability and supported the implementation of structural key 
socio-economic  and  governance  reforms.  The  regional  response  is  expected  to  increase  the 
resilience of the private sector and the banking sector to the effects of the crisis. 

Personal protective equipment (PPE), ventilators and x-ray machines protected medical 
staff and supported the diagnostic capacity of the health sector. The support also eased 
financial pressures on the public health system caused by the economic downturn. The EU 
managed to procure these items in adequate quality and quantities despite the highly competitive 
market  for  PPE  and  medical  equipment  during  the  first  months  of  the  pandemic  caused  by  high 
demand  and  the  export  ban  of  some  key  suppliers.18  The  rehabilitation  and  enlargement  of  four 
hospitals and the construction of biosafety laboratories has not yet progressed.  

EU  budget  support  and  the  exceptional  provision  MFA  represented  3.2  %  of  public 
revenues for 2020 (excluding grants), and 5.14 % of sole tax revenues for that year. The 
payments  helped maintain  national  macroeconomic stability  during  a  steep  economic  contraction 
with lower fiscal revenues and important debt service obligations. They also increased the national 
fiscal capacity to ensure the funding of the health system and of key fiscal stimulus packages aimed 
at mitigating the immediate negative socio-economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.  

18 Data on the delivery and use of the equipment and supplies is limited as UNDP did not carry out monitoring 
and follow-up after delivering the materials to the Montenegrin authorities, as (according to information from 
UNDP) access to health facilities had been restricted. 

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Support  channelled  through  BS  and  MFA  ensured  a  proper  alignment  with  the  national 
priorities  related  to  the  country’s  COVID-19  own  national  response  policy.  It  reinforced 
mutual EU policy dialogue, under the existing umbrella of the EU accession reform agenda, putting 
specific  emphasis  on  the  effectiveness  of  the  country’s  COVID-19  response  towards  the  more 
vulnerable  populations  (social  assistance  and  protection),  the  preservation  of  existing  and  new 
employment  (wage  subsidies),  and  support  for  micro-  and  small  enterprises  (liquidity  support). 
Regular  reporting  on  the  implementation  of  the  government’s  fiscal  package  confirmed  several 
effective achievements in all these areas.  

The response struck an effective balance between predictability of disbursement of funds 
in  the  2020  budget  and  maintaining  leverage  for  consolidating  and  accelerating  key 
structural reforms (PFM, economic governance, social protection, and labour market). This 
was  conducive  to  improving  the  overall  efficiency,  transparency  and  accountability  of  the 
government’s  ongoing  COVID-19  fiscal  stimulus  packages  while  increasing  the  post-COVID-19 
resilience  of  the  national  economy.  The  more  recent  fiscal  stimulus  packages  demonstrated  that 
national  authorities  are  committed  to  promoting  the  resilience  of  the  national  economy  with 
measures  to  preserve  and  improve  competitiveness,  boost  financial  intermediation  and  increase 
access to liquidity or equity for MSMEs.19  

The  EU  did  not  support  any  specific  awareness  campaigns  about  the  health  risks 
associated  with  COVID-19  and  the  corresponding  government  response.  However,  EU 
communication promoted the visibility of the EU, through press releases, press conference on the EU 
COVID-19  responses,  videos,  infographics,  and  success  stories.  Communication  focused  on  the 
distribution of medical protective equipment and the BSRC’s and MFA first disbursements, where the 
link was made between the EU COVID-19 financial contribution to the State Budget and the country’s 
fiscal stimulus packages to mitigate the socio-economic impacts of the pandemic. Communication 
campaigns associated the support with the “EU” and not specifically with “Team Europe”. 

19 In addition, EU regional cooperation with key IFIs active in the Western Balkans to support infrastructure, the 
real economy (including SME) and the local banking sector can help to improve borrowing performance of the 
private sector through the mobilisation of EU-funded guarantee schemes. These activities will materialise 
progressively over the course of 2021. 

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3. Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch 

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Source: ADE Evaluation Team 

 
 
 
 
 
Country note - Senegal

 
 
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Contents 

1.  Background..................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 

1.1. 

1.2. 

Country COVID-19 context and government response ............................................................................ 1 

European Union response.......................................................................................................................................... 2 

2.  Answers to Evaluation Questions (EQ) ........................................................................................................................... 3 

2.1. 

2.2. 

2.3. 

2.4. 

EQ 1 – Relevance ........................................................................................................................................................... 3 

EQ 2 – Value added ...................................................................................................................................................... 5 

EQ 3 – Efficiency ............................................................................................................................................................ 6 

EQ 4 – Effectiveness .................................................................................................................................................... 8 

3.  Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch .................................................................................................................................... 10 

THE  PURPOSE  OF  THIS  COUNTRY  NOTE  IS  TO  INFORM  THE  FAST-TRACK  ASSESSMENT  OF  THE  EU  INITIAL 
RESPONSE AS A WHOLE. IT IS NOT DESIGNED TO BE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RESPONSE IN THE COUNTRY. 

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Acronyms 

ACP 

AFD 

AfDB 

BOAD 

BS 

CB/TA 

EBRD 

EC 

ECHO 

EIB 

EQ 

EU 

EUD 

EUTF 

FA 

GDP 

GMD 

HQ 

IcSP 

IDB 

IMF 

JICA 

KfW 

M&E 

EUMS 

MSME 

NDICI 

PNBSF 

POC 

PRES 

ROM 

African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States 

French Development Agency 

African Development Bank 

West African Development Bank 

Budget Support 

Capacity Building / Technical Assistance 

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 

European Commission 

European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations 

European Investment Bank 

Evaluation Question 

European Union 

Delegation of the European Union 

EU Trust Fund 

Financial Agreement 

Gross Domestic Product 

Governance, Migration and Development 

Headquarter 

Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace 

Inter- American Development Bank 

International Monetary Fund 

Japan International Cooperation Agency 

Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau Development Bank 

Monitoring and Evaluation 

EU Member States 

Micro, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 

Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument 

National Family Security Grant Programme 

Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint 

Economic and Social Resilience Programme 

Results-Oriented Monitoring 

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SDG 

SME 

SRPC 

TE 

WB 

XOF 

Sustainable Development Goals 

Small and medium enterprises 

Sector Reform Performance Contract 

Team Europe 

World Bank 

West Africa CFA Franc 

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1. Background 

1.1  Country COVID-19 context and government response 

The pandemic hit Senegal on the 2 March 2020 and, as of 31 December 2020, 19 140 cases and 410 
deaths were registered.1 The measures adopted by the Government to contain the spread of the virus, 
namely  lockdown  and  border  closures,  had  a  strong  impact  on  the  country's  trade  and  financial 
exchanges and caused a contraction in economic activity. Some sectors were more affected than others 
by the pandemic, such as hotels and restaurants (-60.7% growth), transport, fisheries and construction, 
all of which are important in the country's economy. This led to an increase in unemployment and poverty 
rates especially as the income of 90% of Senegalese families depends mainly on the informal sector, 
which accounts for about half of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).2 Overall, the country recorded its 
first negative growth rate since the devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994 (-0.7% in 2020).3 

Daily new confirmed COVID-19 cases in Senegal 

To mitigate the effects of the shock, in April 2020 the Government adopted the Economic and Social 
Resilience Programme (PRES), endowed with XOF 1 billion. The PRES contains health and socio-economic 
mitigation  measures  and  is  organised  into  four  pillars:  supporting  the  health  sector  through 
strengthening prevention, detection and response by improving availability of medical equipment and 
laboratory  capacity;  strengthening  the  social  resilience  of  the  population,  in  particular  by  granting 
emergency  food  aid  to  the  tune  of  XOF  69  million  to  the  1  million  most  vulnerable  households; 
macroeconomic  and  financial  stability  to  support the  private  sector  and maintain  jobs,  thanks to  the 

1 International Labour Organization, Etude de l’impact de la COVID-19 sur les entreprises et travailleurs de l’économie informelle 
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---africa/---ro-abidjan/---sro-

Sénégal, 

from 
September 
au 
dakar/documents/publication/wcms_763402.pdf. 

2020, 

2 Ibidem 
3 https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/SEN 

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provision of a XOF 200 billion facility; regular supply of hydrocarbons, medical products, pharmaceuticals 
and basic necessities to the country.4 

1.2  European Union response 

Team  Europe  (TE)  mobilised  a  total  of  EUR  448.75  million5  in  grants  and  loans  to  contribute  to  the 
response. EU MS including Germany, France, Spain, Italy, and Belgium made additional contributions of 
up  to  around  EUR  200  million.  60  %  of  EU  support  was  provided  in the  form  of  budget  support.  No 
emergency humanitarian response in the country was provided by the EU, as no critical humanitarian 
needs were reported. However, the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) 
maintained a food security and nutrition watch function. 

The  EU's  COVID-19  response  in  the  country mostly  focused  on  strengthening  the  health  system  and 
promoting  socio-economic  recovery.  For  the  health  response,  the  EU  financed  the  “LABPLUS  AFRICA” 
project (EUR 10 million) under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) to reinforce the 
country’s6 preparedness and response to COVID-19, as well as to implement innovative approaches. The 
EU also contributed via the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) Investment Facility to 
the  European  Investment  Bank  (EIB)  loan  “Diagnostic  Device  Technology  transfer  with  the  Pasteur 
Institute”  (EUR  20  million)7,  and  adapted  its  ongoing  programmes  to  support  awareness-raising 
campaigns on basic sanitary measures and kit distribution. 

The  support  to  socio-economic  recovery  mostly  aimed  to  strengthen  macro-economic  stability  and 
resilience  through  budget  support.  The  purpose  was  to  increase  the  necessary  fiscal  space  for  the 
Government  to  be  able  to  implement  the  PRES.  The  EU  support  through  budget  support  consisted  in 
frontloading BS payments of ongoing programmes8 at the onset of the crisis (EUR 12.3 million) and in 
designing a new BS operation “UE Daan Corona” with a single fixed tranche of EUR 111.7 million. The 
remaining  BS  funds  for  the  three  ongoing  BS  operations  in  the  country9  were  decommitted  and 
recommitted in this new operation. The Commission also re-oriented several projects financed under the 
EU  Trust  Fund  for  Africa  (EUTF)  to  support  socio-economic  recovery.  (See  Annex:  Intervention  Logic 
Sketch)  

Several  interventions  were  selected  for  an  in-depth  review,  and  have  therefore  been  given  greater 
attention in this note, especially in EQ4. Below is the list of the selected interventions in Senegal: 

•  1. Budget Support “EU Daan Corona” (EUR 111.7 million) 
•  2. “Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour et la réintégration 

durable au Sénégal” – AECID 

•  3. “Programme de lutte contre la migration irrégulière à travers l’appui au Secteur Privé et à la 

création d’emplois au Sénégal” (PASPED) – AICS (EUR 14.3 million) 

4 “Programme de Résilience Economique et Sociale”, Ministère de l’Economie, du Plan et de la Coopération, Dakar, April 21st, 

2020. 

5 Data as of December 2020. 
6 Through the Institut Pasteur de Dakar and Praesens Belgium. 
7 Approved by the EIB board in December 2020. 
8 SDG-C and Water Sector Reform Performance Contract (SRPC). 
9 SDG-C, Water SRPC and Social Protection SRPC. 

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2. Answers to Evaluation Questions (EQ) 

2.1  EQ 1 – Relevance 

EQ1: To what extent did the initial EU global response to the COVID-19 pandemic through 
the  Team  Europe  (TE)  country  packages  address  the  needs  and  priorities  of  partner 
countries and regions in each country context in line with the three priorities of the Team 
Europe approach? 

Summary:  The  design  and  priorities  of  the  EU  package  in  Senegal  were  in  line  with  development 
strategies relevant to Senegal, mostly reflecting the overall EU agenda and principles. The EU package 
in Senegal addressed the immediate and evolving COVID-19-related needs in a timely manner mainly 
in two Team Europe (TE) priorities of the TE COVID-19 response (health, water and sanitation; and 
socio-economic support). The scope and emphasis of the TE package in Senegal attempted to build 
medium- to long-term resilience, while ensuring national ownership, as well as alignment with country-
level efforts and operational principles defined in the Joint Communication. 

The  design  and  priorities  of  the  EU  package  in  Senegal  were  in  line  with  development 
strategies relevant to Senegal, mostly reflecting the overall EU agenda and principles.  The 
bulk of the package consisted of a new budget support contract “EU Daan Corona”10 aimed at supporting 
the socio-economic mitigation measures of the Economic and Social Resilience Programme11 adopted by 
the  Government  of  Senegal  in  April  2020  as  well  as  the  strengthening  of  governance  and  budget 
transparency. This operation reflects well the key objectives identified in the Joint European Strategy for 
Senegal  2018-2023  such  as  private  sector  development  and  employment  promotion,  food  security, 
better economic governance  and  better public  finance  management.12  Explicitly  built  on  the  National 
Response  to  COVID-19,  the  new  budget  support  programme  was  consistent  with  the  principle  of 
ownership  of  development  priorities  by  recipient  countries,  in  line  with  the  European  consensus  on 
Development.13 Similarly, the reorientation of  some activities of several EUTF-funded projects echoed 
the goal of reaching the most vulnerable. Several projects financed under the EU response to COVID-19 
included actions addressing gender-specific needs and ensuring support to Senegalese women affected 
by  the  pandemic, thus  reflecting  the  EU  Gender  Action Plan.  One of  the  14  indicators  of  the  BS Daan 
Corona matrix also focused on the enhancement of productive social safety nets, notably for women.14  

The priorities of the EU package in Senegal addressed the immediate and evolving COVID-19-
related needs in a timely manner. They focused on two Team Europe (TE) priorities of the TE 
COVID-19 response (health, water and sanitation; and socio-economic support). Although no 
specific emergency response was planned under the EU package, the new BS operation addressed the 
need by the Government to finance its national response plan to COVID-19. The PRES foresaw, amongst 
others,  the  coverage  of  health  expenditure  linked  to  COVID-19  (health  system  facilities  and  care  of 

10  Vaincre le Corona 
11 “Programme de Résilience Economique et Sociale”, Ministère de l’Economie, du Plan et de la Coopération, Dakar, April 21st, 

2020. 

12 Document de Stratégie Conjointe Européenne pour le Sénégal 2018-2023. 
13https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/system/files/european-consensus-on-development-final-20170626_en.pdf. 
14 Gender Action Plan 2016-2020 for Senegal. 

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patients), emergency food aid for the population and support to the diaspora. Food aid was delivered in-
kind, though all development partners strongly advocated for cash-based transfers to ease logistics and 
foster transparency. Pillar 1 of the PRES  aimed  at responding to the immediate health needs arising 
from  the  crisis,  namely  strengthening  prevention,  detection,  awareness  raising  and  health 
infrastructures,15 as well as ensuring procurements of medicines and necessity goods through pillar 4. 
To address the need of limiting the spread of the pandemic, the EU adapted several ongoing programmes 
to  support  awareness-raising  campaign  on  basic  sanitary  measures  and  kit  distribution,  including 
“Développer l’emploi au Sénégal”, PASPED programme, and “Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint (POC)”.16 
Similarly,  the  reorientation  of  some  EUTF-funded  projects  aimed  to  respond  to  socio-economic 
challenges linked to the pandemic in specific regions or for specific vulnerable populations, often filling 
gaps  in  the  government’s  response.  Specifically,  the  PASPED  programme  was  quickly  reoriented  to 
transform its EUR 3 million Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) investment facility (project component 
1) into an emergency grant mechanism to maintain jobs, sustain activity and meet the livelihood needs 
of vulnerable populations.17 Funding within the Governance, Migration and Development (GMD) project 
was  appropriately  reallocated  to  provide  cash  transfers  to  returning migrants.  However,  delays  in  its 
approval hampered the original plan.  

The  scope  and  emphasis  of  the  Commission’s  assistance  in  Senegal  attempted  to  build 
medium to long-term resilience, while ensuring national ownership, as well as alignment with 
country-level efforts and operational principles defined in the Joint Communication.  The BS 
aid modality fully respected the principles of alignment and ownership. The BS Daan Corona financial 
flows were directed through national budgeting and execution systems; they were being audited by the 
national court of auditors in March 2021. The matrix of the BS “EU Daan Corona” was designed around 
the pillars 2 (strengthening of the social resilience of the population) and 3 (macroeconomic and financial 
stability to support the private sector and jobs) of the PRES. Development partners also included a third 
pillar in the joint matrix, focused on governance and transparency of public finances. This is key in terms 
of  government’s  long-term  capacity  to  deliver  public  services  to  its  population  in  an  effective  and 
transparent  way.  Furthermore,  the  preparation  of  the  BS  matrix,  jointly  led  by  the  Commission  with 
Germany, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and its signature by all BS providers in 
Senegal (African Development Bank (AfDB), French Development Agency (AFD), Canada, Spain and  Japan 
International  Cooperation Agency  (JICA)  in  addition) appropriately  resonated  with the  commitment to 
improve collaboration as expressed in the Joint Communication. Though the matrix did not cover pillar 1 
of the PRES (health system strengthening), the contribution of the BS Daan Corona to the financing of 
the PRES indirectly tackled the strengthening of the health preparedness and response to COVID-19. The 
Commission also had three ongoing BS operations when the crisis hit, which aimed to strengthen socio-
economic resilience.18 The Commission’s response also aimed to enhance diagnostic capacity respectively 
via two interventions: the “LABPLUS AFRICA” project funded under the IcSP and the contribution via the 
ACP Investment Facility to the EIB investment loan supporting diagnostic devices technology transfer. 
The  relevance  of  the  response  through  these  two  interventions  in  addressing  evolving/medium  term 

15 Finalisation of health infrastructures has been committed by the Government, namely for Mathlaboul Fawzaini and Asfadar 

hospitals. 

16 TE COVID-19 response tracker and Excel Reorientation of activities provided by the European Delegation (EUD). 
17 The changes were quickly made using the emergency procedure.   
18 The assessment of these operations was not part of the scope of this fast-track assessment. Additionally, the remaining 

financial flows under these three operations were decommitted and recommitted to the new BS Daan Corona. 

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needs is questionable as implementation was in inception or had not yet started in March 2021. A health 
capacity  building  strategy  including  strengthening  treatment  and  infrastructures,  and  supporting  a 
vaccination campaign, is missing, leaving questions around the capacity of the country to deal with the 
third wave of COVID-19, as well as future pandemics.   

2.2  EQ 2 – Value added 

EQ2: To what extent did the Team Europe (TE) initial response provide additional benefits 
beyond what would have resulted from actions taken by the EU institutions and EU MS on 
their own? 

Summary: The EU COVID-19 response helped to promote the EU brand and identity by announcing 
EUR 450 million support. Gains in improved division of labour and synergies were limited compared to 
pre-COVID-19. Coordination across EU institutions and between EU institutions and EU MS was already 
a  reality  pre-COVID-19.  COVID-19  appeared  to  have  made  the  ability  of  the  Commission  and  its 
partners to engage in joint analysis, resource mobilisation, and planning more tangible. EU coordination 
with non-EU donors and international organisations was important and was further stepped up. 

The  EU  COVID-19  response  helped  to  promote  the  EU  brand  and  identity by  announcing  the 
important EUR 450 million support from EU Institutions including the EIB and EU MS. This sent a strong 
message of European solidarity to Senegal.  

EU institutions were quite joined up pre-COVID-19, and this is likely to continue. In 2020, the 
year that COVID-19 hit Senegal, the EU engaged in a programming exercise that is now part of the new 
2021-2027  financial  Neighbourhood,  Development  and  International  Cooperation  Instrument  (NDICI) 
framework, implying closer coordination with the other General Directorates outside of Development. 
During  2020,  several  pre-programming  documents,  such  as  the  Team  Europe  Initiatives  (TEIs),  were 
drawn up. The COVID-19 tracker helps gather information on the different instruments used to adapt 
ongoing and planned projects to the pandemic. 

Coordination between EU institutions and EU MS was already a reality pre-COVID-19, to the 
extent that Senegal had Joint EU-EU MS programming as of November 2018, and a donor coordination 
group  called  “Groupe  Europe”  has  existed  since  at  least  2014,  bringing  together  Belgium,  France, 
Germany,  Italy,  Luxemburg,  the  Netherlands,  Spain,  the  EU  Delegation  and  the  EIB.  The  response  to 
COVID-19 further intensified joint analysis, resource mobilisation, and planning. The EU and its Member 
States (Germany, France, Spain, Italy and Belgium) mobilised nearly EUR 450 million in support of the 
Government  of  Senegal’s  COVID-19  response.  This  sent  a  strong  message  of  European  solidarity  to 
Senegal. Secondly, the partners engaged in policy and operational dialogue with the authorities on PRES 
thanks to the common matrix of indicators signed by all budget support providers. The collaboration was 
particularly strong between the Commission and Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW). KfW disbursed 
its  EUR  100 million in  the  form  of  grants  on  the  basis  of  the  EU  disbursement  file  prepared  for the 
Commission BS Daan Corona.  

In more operational terms, gains in improved division of labour and synergies were substantial compared 
to pre-COVID-19. The design of the BS Daan Corona programme promoted strong coordination 
between  EU  and  Germany  and  closer  coordination  with  other  BS  providers,  including  in 
particular multilateral actors (such as IMF, WB) and France (AfD). The bulk of EU-TE COVID-19 
support is budget support, with a common matrix and a common political dialogue. The EU main COVID-

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19  response  was  the  restructuring  of  the  three  existing  budget  support  programmes  (Sustainable 
Development  Goals (SDGs), water and sanitation, social protection)  into one, aligned to government’s 
PRES. Outside of budget support, the EU’s portfolio in response to COVID-19 included a series of COVID-
19-related projects that were complementary to this budget support. 

EU coordination with non-EU donors and international organisations was important and was 
further stepped up, especially when the crisis hit. The TE approach increased EU convening power 
with  non-EU  donors/actors,  insofar  as  the  EU  Delegation  became  chair  of  the  development partners’ 
coordination  group,  including  coordination  of  the  contributions  of  the  partners  to  the  government’s 
COVID-19  resilience  program.  The  budget  support  matrix  was  naturally  an  important  venue  for 
coordinating policy  messages  and  support to  government.  There  was,  for  example,  close  cooperation 
between the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on governance and transparency pre-COVID-
19  and  for  the  COVID-19 response.  Coordination  between  partners  was  particularly  strong  when  the 
crisis hit but diminished throughout 2020. Whilst all BS providers signed the joint BS matrix, the AfDB, 
World Bank (WB) and AFD responded to the crisis by reorienting their own policy lending programmes 
and using triggers that were not included in the joint matrix. There were joint ongoing discussions on a 
second matrix in March 2021 to follow on the work carried out in 2020 and emphasise transparency and 
accountability  on  COVID-19  expenditure.  Besides  budget  support,  co-funded  or  co-financed  projects 
provided signs of coordination between EU and non-EU donors (such asRosso bridge with EIB and AfDB; 
Senoba-Zinguinchor road with the AfDB).  

2.3  EQ 3 – Efficiency 

EQ3:  To  what  extent  were,  and  are,  the  individual  aid  modalities  and  other  aid  delivery 
mechanisms and their combinations efficient and flexible enough for use in Team Europe’s 
COVID-19 response in COVID-19 crisis conditions? 

Summary: The TE (Commission, Germany) COVID-19 response was mobilised quickly through budget 
support  and  for  ongoing  projects  that  were reallocated  to  COVID-19  when  they  did  not  require an 
addendum.  All  BS  payments  were  made  during  2020.  In  combining  various  aid  modalities  (BS, 
“classical” capacity building/technical assistance programmes, including the ones financed under the 
EUTF), the Commission was able to provide a comprehensive response to the crisis. Close Monitoring 
and Evaluation (M&E) of the COVID-19 response took place and was embedded in already existing 
M&E mechanisms.  

The  TE  (Commission,  Germany)  COVID-19  response  was  mobilised  quickly  through  budget 
support and for ongoing projects that were reallocated to COVID-19 when they did not require 
an addendum. All BS payments were made during 2020, in Q2 for the frontloaded disbursements (EUR 
12.3 million) and in Q4 for the single fixed tranche BS Daan Corona. This provided timely resources for 
the Government to finance its 2020 expenditures, notably those linked to the PRES. The design of the 
new  BS  Daan  Corona  operation  was  made  on  the  basis  of  existing  BS  funds  of  three  ongoing  BS 
operations in the country. This operation was designed and implemented relatively smoothly19 around a 
joint matrix. The German BS was disbursed in Q4 as well on the basis of the EU disbursement notes, 

19  Joint  BS  matrix  statement  signed  in  May  2020,  Financial  Agreement  (FA)  signed  end  August  2020,  EU  Delegation 

disbursement note sent early October 2020 to Headquarter (HQ) and payment made in November 2020 

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without including specific triggers for disbursement. Several EUTF projects (e.g. PASPED) could reallocate 
quickly some of their activities and provide a swift response when they did not require an addendum. 
For  PASPED,  the  EU  Delegation  approved  in  record  time  the  changes  to  be  brought  using  the  PRAG 
emergency procedures. Grants were financed to 136 enterprises with the first instalment paid in August 
2020. For others (e.g. Governance, Migration and Development project) which required an addendum, the 
response  was  not  delivered  as  swiftly:  cash  transfers  to  migrants  was  delivered  during  the  period 
December 2020 to March 2021 although it had initially been envisaged for July 2020. By coincidence, it 
enabled the Commission to provide timely support to the second wave of the pandemic, at a time when 
the Government was not providing further support.  

In combining various aid modalities (BS, “classical” CB/TA programmes, including the ones 
financed under the EUTF), the Commission was able to provide a comprehensive response to 
the crisis. Through BS, the Commission supported the Government in the implementation of its national 
COVID-19 response plan. The combination of i) financial flows and ii) close political and policy dialogue 
was useful to reinforce the effectiveness of the support offered. Several TA projects financed through 
the previously ongoing BS were also ongoing in areas covered by the BS Daan Corona, including. external 
control. Through other projects such as the ones financed under the EUTF, the EU  was able to target 
specific  vulnerable  populations  whose  needs  were  not  necessarily  well  covered  through  the  PRES, 
including Micro, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (MSMEs), the majority of which being informal. 

Close monitoring of the COVID-19 response took place, embedded in already existing M&E 
mechanisms.  A  TE  COVID-19  response  fiche  giving  a  brief  overview  of  the  state  of  play  of  the  TE 
response was updated every month by the Commission HQ. At the Commission level, coordination of the 
response  was  made  under  the  umbrella  of  the  EU  Head  of  Delegation,  in  close  interaction  with  the 
Commission HQ. Specific Excel tables were also created to follow the reallocation of the activities of 
ongoing operations (e.g. for EUTF financed projects). Close monitoring of the response took place within 
the framework of the implementation of each intervention deployed or reallocated for the crisis response. 
The Government coordinated and monitored the implementation of the PRES. This was closely followed 
by all BS providers within the framework of the joint BS matrix. The Commission led both the technical 
and political dialogue around the joint BS matrix with the authorities (Ministry of Finance and Budget 
and Ministry of Economy, Planning and Cooperation). Moreover, all EUTF financed projects across Africa 
are subject to a third-party monitoring by a consulting firm. A specific M&E system was set up together 
with the implementing partners by developing a set of 40 common indicators to measure the outputs of 
all EUTF projects on a bi-annual basis. Specific COVID-19-response related indicators were added with 
the  pandemic.  The  implementation  of  individual  EUTF  projects  (such  as  PASPED)  was  also  followed 
through external Results-Oriented Monitoring (ROM) missions. 

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2.4  EQ 4 – Effectiveness 

To  what  extent  was  the  EU  response  successful  in  progressing  towards  the  objectives 
associated with the COVID-19 response? 

Summary 

The  TE response  (Commission, Germany) brought significant amounts into the government budget, 
with BS disbursements in the form of grants amounting to 5% of total public revenue in 2020. The 
enlarged fiscal space enabled the Government to limit the economic shock of the crisis and to maintain 
the stability of the macro-fiscal framework in the short-term through current expenditure spending. 
The increase in fiscal space was particularly useful to finance essential governmental expenditure to 
combat  COVID-19  as  foreseen  in  the  PRES.  Through  the  BS  Daan  Corona,  the  EU  also  strongly 
supported the governance and transparency of public finances. Through the dialogue held within the 
framework of the joint matrix, the Commission also supported additional critical issues not included in 
the  PRES,  in  particular  social  protection.  Support  delivered  through  other  EU  instruments  also 
contributed to mitigating the socio-economic effects of the crisis.  

TE response (Commission, Germany) brought significant amounts into the government budget, 
with BS disbursements in the form of grants amounting to 5% of total public revenue in 2020. 
The total EU contribution through BS in the form of grants amounted to EUR 224 million. The fiscal space 
increase effect was broadly amplified by the loans in the form of BS agreed by the donors, essentially 
multilateral    (IMF,  WB,  AfDB,  Inter-  American  Development  Bank  [IDB])  donors  and  the  West  African 
Development Bank (BOAD) for a total of EUR 703 million. 

The enlarged fiscal space enabled the Government to limit the economic shock of the crisis 
and to maintain the stability of the macro-fiscal framework in the short-term through current 
expenditure spending. In 2020, the support provided by international partners partly compensated for 
the loss in total revenue linked to the decrease in economic activity. After this, expenditure - in particular 
recurrent  expenditure  –  was  higher than  initially expected.  This  resulted  in  a widening  of the  current 
account deficit (6.7% of GDP in 2020). Moreover, public debt and debt service have risen in recent years. 
In 2020, the mobilisation of funds in the form of loans, although concessional, to respond to the crisis is 
estimated to bring debt to 70% of GDP in 2020. 

The  increase  in  fiscal  space  was  particularly  useful  to  finance  essential  governmental 
expenditure to combat COVID-19 as foreseen in the PRES. The rapid execution of the PRES and 
its close piloting by the Government contributed to cushion the shock. The PRES showed an execution 
rate of 99% at end December 2020. Key measures of the PRES that were implemented and supported 
by the joint BS matrix included: 

- 

Pillar 2 : Social resilience :  

o  Emergency  food  aid  disbursed  in  kind  for  1  000  000  vulnerable  households  or  8  million 
people.  Though  governance  (public  procurement)  and  logistical  issues  were  encountered 
during aid delivery, the latter was completed by the end of July 2020. 

o  Takeover of electricity bills, completed by August 2020. 

- 

Pillar 3 : Macro-economic and financial stability : 

o  Clearing the arrears of payment of the State in the sectors impacted by the crisis (such as 

agriculture, transport, health, education and energy).  

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o  Direct  support  to  enterprises  (e.g.  subsidies)  in  the  sectors  impacted  by  the  crisis.  Large 

companies benefited from this measure.  

o  Little  enthusiasm  from  both  banks  and  enterprises  on  a  guarantee  mechanism  for  the 

financial system to provide loans to SMEs impacted by the crisis  
o  A package of fiscal measures with tax debt remissions for enterprises. 

PRES economic measures did not sufficiently reach MSMEs, the majority of which operate in the 
informal sector. Without legal recognition of their activity and employees, many MSMEs were 
barred from the advantages and mechanisms put in place by the PRES.  

Through  the  BS  Daan  Corona,  the  EU  also  strongly  supported  the  governance  and 
transparency of public finances, which was one of the three pillars of the joint matrix. For instance, 
international  partners  required  close  control  of  COVID-19  expenditures  by  the  court  of  auditors.  The 
funds for the COVID-19 response were fully integrated into and executed through the state budget. The 
Government used fast-track procedures due to the emergency context. A monitoring committee for the 
implementation  of  Force  COVID-19  operations  was  therefore  set  up  to  ensure  control.  The  2020 
budgetary  execution  report  detailing  all  COVID-19  expenses  during  2020  was  made  available  to  the 
public in March 2021.  

Through  the  dialogue  held  within  the  framework  of  the  joint  matrix,  the  Commission  also 
supported additional critical issues not included in the PRES, in particular social protection. 
The  partners  obtained  the  renewed  commitment  of  the  Government  to  support  the  National  Family 
Security Grant Programme (PNBSF) and to ensure timely quarterly cash transfers within this framework.  

Support  delivered  through  other  EU  instruments  also  contributed  to  mitigating  the  socio-
economic effects of the crisis. With the EUTF financed projects, subsidies were provided to around 
730 enterprises to help them face the economic difficulties linked to the pandemic. Cash transfers were 
also provided to vulnerable people (e.g. migrants and families of migrants who stayed in Senegal) to 
help them meet electricity bill payments, medical expenses, restart a business,  and meet other basic 
needs. With the EUTF GMD project, 15 000 people across the territory each benefited from XOF 50 000 
in three instalments during the period December 2020 to February 2021. 

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3. Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch 

Source: Evaluation Team 

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Country note - Turkey

 
 
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Contents 

Acronyms 

1.  Background..................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 

1.1. 

1.2. 

Country COVID-19 context and government response .............................................................................. 1 

EU response to COVID-19 ........................................................................................................................................... 2 

2.  Answers to Evaluation Questions (EQs) ......................................................................................................................... 3 

2.1 

2.2 

2.3 

2.4 

EQ 1 – Relevance ............................................................................................................................................................. 3 

EQ 2 – Value added ........................................................................................................................................................ 5 

EQ 3 – Efficiency .............................................................................................................................................................. 6 

EQ 4 – Effectiveness ...................................................................................................................................................... 8 

3.  Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch .................................................................................................................................... 11 

THE  PURPOSE  OF  THIS  COUNTRY  NOTE  IS  TO  INFORM  THE  FAST-TRACK  ASSESSMENT  OF  THE  EU  INITIAL 
RESPONSE AS A WHOLE. IT IS NOT DESIGNED TO BE OUT AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RESPONSE IN THE COUNTRY. 

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Acronyms 

CCTE 

CEB 

CFM 

CRIS 

DG ECHO 

DG NEAR 

EBRD 

EC 

EEAS 

EIB 

EQ 

ESSN 

EU 

EUD 

EUMS 

EUTF 

GAP 

GoT 

H2020 

HIP 

HOPE 

HQ 

IEC 

IFI 

IFRC 

INGO 

IO 

IPA 

IPC 

ISAA 

JRC 

M&E 

Conditional Cash Transfer for Education 

Council of Europe Development Bank 

Connectivity Fault Management 

Common External Relations Information System  

Directorate  General  for  European  Civil  Protection  and  Humanitarian  Aid 
Operations 

Directorate General for EU Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations 

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 

European Commission 

European External Action Service 

European Investment Bank 

Evaluation Question 

Emergency Social Safety Net 

European Union 

Delegation of the European Union 

EU Member States 

European Union Trust Fund for Syrian Refugees 

EU Gender Action plans 

Government of Turkey 

Horizon 2020 

Humanitarian Implementation Plans 

European Hospital and Healthcare Federation 

Headquarter 

Information, Education and Communication 

International Financial Institution 

International Federation of the Red Cross 

International Non-Governmental Organisation 

International Organisation 

Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance 

Infection Prevention and Control 

Integrated Situational Awareness and Analysis 

Joint Research Centre 

Monitoring and Evaluation 

MHPSS 

Mental Health & Psychosocial Support Network 

MoH 

ODA 

PDM 

Ministry of Health 

Official Development Assistance 

Post Distribution Monitoring 

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PPE 

RDT 

SME 

TE 

TOBB 

TRC 

UNFPA 

UNHCR 

WHL 

WHO 

Personal Protective Equipment 

Rapid Diagnostic Test 

Small and medium enterprises 

Team Europe 

Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey 

Turkish Red Crescent  

United Nations Population Fund 

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 

Welthungerhilfe 

World Health Organization 

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1. Background 

1.1. 

Country COVID-19 context and government response 

The  first  case  of  COVID-19  was  confirmed  on  the  11  March  2020  in  Turkey,  but  the  number  of 
infections exploded around the end of November 2020, peaking in early December 2020 with more 
than 30 000 cases per day. This resurgence of infections was mainly due to fact that the Turkish 
authorities  adjusted  their daily  count to include  asymptomatic cases. Despite this  surge in  cases, 
Turkey stands among the countries with overall lower mortality rates. This trend is correlated with 
the smaller proportion of elderly population in Turkey compared to countries with higher death rates. 
However, Turkey had remarkably low mortality rates for the elderly, which might be the result of 
early preventative measures and testing put in place to contain the spread of the virus, some of 
which  were  specifically  targeted  to  this  subgroup.1  The  country  also  managed  to  send  Personal 
Protective Equipment (PPE) and other vital supplies to countries in need, thanks to previous health 
system reforms and a strong culture of health emergencies and disaster management.2. 

Daily new confirmed COVID-19 cases in Turkey 

The crisis nonetheless exacerbated pre-existing problems in Turkey’s labour market, including issues 
regarding access to finance and low demand for workers, and impacted on the informal sector, which 
accounts for a third of employment.3 New restrictive measures were introduced on 30 November 
2020 in Turkey, resulting in the loss of 2.3 million jobs in December and bringing job losses in the 
hotel sector back to the levels of April and May 2020 (around -33-36%)4 The pandemic also had a 
severe  impact  on  the  4  million  refugees5  in  the  country,  affecting  incomes  and  living  conditions, 

1   World  Health  Organization  Regional  Office  for  Europe,  Turkey’s  Response  to  COVID-19:  First  Impressions  (Ankara, 
Turkey,  2020),  available  from  https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/335803/WHO-EURO-2020-1168-
40914-55408-eng.pdf.  
Ibidem. 

2  
3   World Bank Group, Jobs at Risk in Turkey: Identifying the Impact of COVID-19, Social Protection & Jobs Discussion Paper, 
N°2004, July 2020, available from https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/34360/Jobs-at-Risk-
in-Turkey-Identifying-the-Impact-of-COVID-19.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.  
International Labour Organization, Impact of the Second Wave COVID-19 Measures on Employment in Turkey, Research 
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---europe/---ro-geneva/---ilo-
Brief,  March  2021,  available 
ankara/documents/publication/wcms_775757.pdf.  

from 

4  

5   According to IOM, there are 3.6 million Syrian refugees in Turkey and around 360 000 refugees of differing nationalities 

(from https://turkey.iom.int/syria-response. Accessed on 24/09/2021). 

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further deteriorating the fragile situation.6 7 Among refugees benefiting from the Emergency Social 
Safety  Net  (ESSN),  an  EU  funded  programme  under  the  Facility  of  Refugees  in  Turkey,  69%  of 
households lost their previous sources of income and 82% went further into debt.8 

The  Government  of  Turkey  launched  a  national  recovery  plan  in  response  to  the  pandemic  –  the 
Turkey Relance – worth USD 15.4 billion. The stimulus package included the following measures: tax 
breaks, deferrals, additional credit guarantees and loan repayments delays, reduced interest rates, 
recruitment of additional health personnel, performance salaries for health personnel, lowest pension 
increase, cash salary support, minimum wage support, and company insurance coverage increases.9 

1.2. 

EU response to COVID-19 

The  EU  COVID-19  support  to  Turkey  was  largely  channelled  through  European  and  international 
financial institutions. The European Investment Bank (EIB) planned EUR 270 million for new hospitals 
and  small  and  medium  enterprises  (SMEs)  support  although  this  has  not  yet  manifest  as  of 
September 2021. The Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) provided a EUR 200 million loan to 
the Ministry of Health to fight the virus and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) Board approved a EUR 1 billion “Solidarity Package” for targeted investments. 

The EU provided a support package of a total of EUR 105 million.  The assistance was channelled 
through different financial instruments including IPA II both under the Facility for Refugees, and the 
IPA Multiannual Programme and Civil Society Fund,10 ECHO under the Facility and via the HIP 2020, 
and  the  EUTF/MADAD  both  under  and  outside  the  Facility.  Around  EUR  60  million  fell  under  the 
Emergency Response component, EUR 12.7 million under Strengthening the Health System and EUR 
32.8 million under the Socio-economic Response. Around EUR 63 million were mobilised under the 
Facility.  

ECHO provided a small-scale humanitarian response including supply of PPE, Hygiene items, food aid 
and cash /vouchers transfers); a EUR 40.4 million top  up to the ESSN, a CCTE top-up for children 
under the Facility for Refugees. ECHO also mobilised a EUR 8 billion cash intervention for non-ESSN-
beneficiaries outside of the Facility, through the HIP 2020.  

Under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), unused funds were used to provide health 
assistance, including a EUR 5.3 million project on strengthening Ministry of Health capacity. A number 
of  ongoing  projects  were  adapted  to  COVID-10  including  EUR  2.7  million  for  epidemiology  and 
surveillance capacity building (ongoing since 2018), as well as six projects on various socio-economic 
projects. A mobilisation of contingencies of EUR 4.7 million was also made under the EUR 300 million 
direct grant to the Ministry of Health (under the Facility) for PPEs and hygiene supplies for refugees, 
as well as training for health workers in migrant health centres under the Facility (SIHAAT project). 

Furthermore, assistance was provided via the EUTF-MADAD, including provision of emergency supply 
and PPEs under the Facility and support to distance learning, special needs-fund, social cohesion and 
psychosocial care, employment activities, and SME support under the Facility and IPA.  

6   Strategic  Mid-Term  Evaluation  of 

the  Facility 

for  Refugees 

in  Turkey  2016-2020.,  available  at 

https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/strategic-mid-term-evaluation-facility-refugees-turkey-main-
report_en  

7   https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Impact-of-COVID-19-on-Daily-Life-of-Refugees-in-Turkey_.pdf  
8  
9  

International Labour Organization, Ibid. 
“Turkey 
(KPGM), 
Government 
https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/insights/2020/04/turkey-government-and-institution-measures-in-response-to-COVID-
19.html.  

COVID-19”, 

Institution 

Measures 

Response 

and 

to 

in 

10   The  actions  under  the  Facility  are  based  on  the  commitment  of  EUR  6  billion  under  the  EU-TR  statement 
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/enlargement-policy/negotiations-status/turkey/eu-facility-refugees-
turkey_en. Accessed 24/09/2021. 

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In addition, there were in-kind donations of testing material by the JRC and assistance by the Civil 
Protection Mechanism in the repatriation of Turkish citizens.  

Several  interventions  were  selected  for  an  in-depth  review  and  have  thus  been  given  greater 
attention in this note, especially in EQ4. Below is the list of the selected interventions in Turkey: 

•  Emergency: 

o  1. DG ECHO under Facility for Refugees: PPE, hygiene items, small-scale food aid and 

cash/vouchers transfers – 11 partners (EUR 2.13 million) 

o  2. DG ECHO under the Facility for Refugees: ESSN top-up - IFRC (EUR 40.44 million) 
o  3. DG ECHO under the HIP 2020: Basic needs assistance for non-ESSN beneficiaries 

- UNHCR (EUR 8 million) 

•  Health:  

o  4. DG NEAR under IPA 2016: Strengthening Ministry of Health Capacity To Combat 

Covid-19 - WHO (EUR 5.3 million) 

•  Socio-economic: 

o  5.  DG  NEAR  under  MADAD  -  Facility  for  Refugees  and  IPA:  Living  and  Working 
Together: Integrating SuTPs to Turkish Economy  - TOBB (part of EUR 8.89 million) 

2. Answers to Evaluation Questions (EQs) 

2.1  EQ 1 – Relevance 

EQ1: To what extent did the initial European Union (EU) global response to the COVID-
19 pandemic through the Team Europe  (TE) country packages address the needs and 
priorities of partner countries and regions in each country context in line with the three 
priorities of the Team Europe approach? 

Summary: The Commission  COVID-19 package was embedded in the existing framework of  EU 
humanitarian and development activities in Turkey.  Notwithstanding contextual limitations, the 
assistance was appropriately designed and operationally adapted to address short-term, COVID-
19-related needs in the thematic areas identified in the EU Joint Communication11, with a particular 
focus on emergency. The health response was characterised by high national ownership and suited 
to  build  long-term  institutional/infrastructural  capacities  while  facilitating  short-term  service 
delivery. 

The EU COVID-19 package was embedded in the existing framework of EU humanitarian 
activities and  the pre-accession framework in Turkey. In line with government preferences, 
existing lines of financing were not redirected to support COVID-19. As funds were not diverted this 
decision  ensured  continuity  of  existing  EU  financial  assistance  covering  classical  domains  of  EU 
humanitarian activities and the pre-accession framework in the country. Resources were allocated to 
support refugees and other vulnerable groups, in accordance with EU objectives. However, funding 
for  gender-specific  needs  remained  limited  to  1.5  %  of  the  total  budget  committed,  limiting  the 
pursuit of objectives expressed in the Commission’s policy document on gender and the EU Gender 
Action plans (GAP II and GAP III).12 

11  JOINT  COMMUNICATION  TO  THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT,  THE  COUNCIL,  THE  EUROPEAN  ECONOMIC  AND  SOCIAL 
COMMITTEE  AND  THE  COMMITTEE  OF  THE  REGIONS  Communication  on  the  Global  EU  response  to  COVID-19. 
JOIN/2020/11 final.  

12  Funding  for  protection  and  advocacy  projects  specifically  benefiting  women  and  minority  groups  amounted  to  1%. 
Funding for additional gender-sensitive activities in the framework of existing projects accounted for about 0.5%. These 
included actions to contrast domestic violence and to support women shelters and psychosocial support services.  

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Notwithstanding contextual  limitations, the  assistance was appropriately designed and 
operationally  adapted  to  address  short-term,  COVID-19-related  needs  in  the  thematic 
areas identified in the EU Joint Communication, with a particular focus on emergency. As 
the national needs assessment lacked credibility due to the absence of official data and rigorous 
analysis,  the  priorities  of  the  humanitarian  interventions  were  appropriately  informed  by  needs 
assessments, surveys and analysis produced by implementing partners13 working across different 
thematic areas, as well as the protection working group’s interagency assessment. The adaptation of 
the  existing  EU-funded  ESSN14  directed  relevant  assistance  to  1.7  million  of  the  most  vulnerable 
refugees  who  had  been  heavily  impacted  by  the  pandemic,  as  they  were  mostly  working  in  the 
informal  sector.15  This  assistance  was  delivered  rapidly,  making  use  of  the  ESSN  pre-established 
beneficiary  registry  and  delivery  system,  as  well  as  quickly  disbursing  funding  from  savings  and 
contingencies. The assistance could have been delivered even earlier, namely in April 2020, but it 
was decided to wait until the assistance for Turkish citizens was rolled out by the Government of 
Turkey (June 2020) to avoid controversies. Through the post-Facility HIP, ECHO’s funded support to 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), distributed in May, enabled a further 88 
000  non-ESSN  beneficiary  households  to  receive  a  one-off  cash  assistance.  These  interventions 
aligned with and complemented the government’s pre-existing social assistance response to Turkish 
citizens, by including refugees and by setting transfer values mirroring the level of assistance that 
the Turkish government was providing to citizens.16  

Similarly, the mobilisation of EUR 4.7 million contingencies under the EUR 300 million direct grant to 
the Ministry of Health (SIHAAT project) aimed at providing PPEs and hygiene supplies for refugees, 
as well as training for health workers in migrant health centres under the Facility. International Non-
Governmental Organisations (INGOs) funded under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey also redirected 
budget or used contingencies to provide protective equipment, medical supplies and hygiene items, 
as well as food vouchers and food packages to vulnerable groups. This contributed to further address 
emergency needs. These interventions also accounted for the new operational challenges caused by 
lockdown and social distancing, with the introduction of measures such as digital payments, switching 
to remote monitoring and Connectivity Fault Management (CFM), as well as lifting conditionalities on 
school  attendance  (for  the  Conditional  Cash  Transfer  for  Education  [CCTE])  and  adapting  refugee 
registration and referral mechanisms to include information on COVID-19 (for UNHCR). Meanwhile, 
TOBB’s reorientation provided financial incentives to businesses to maintain employment for TOBB’s 
certified beneficiaries. It complemented the government’s COVID-19 subsidy programme, covering 
half the minimum wage for workers in the formal sector. However, the quota in favour of refugees 
(set under the Facility) limited further adaptation to include additional vulnerable Turkish citizens.17  

The  health  response  was  characterised  by  high  national  ownership  and  suited  to  build 
long-term  institutional/infrastructural  capacities  while  facilitating  short-term  service 
delivery. The health package emerged directly from the needs identified by the Ministry of Health 
with the Ministry of Health being involved at each stage of the process. The EUR 2.7 million project 
strengthening  epidemiology  and  surveillance  (ongoing  since  2018)  not  only  responded  to  the 

13   International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), Concern, Diakonie, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), Turkish 

Red Crescent (TRC), Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB). 

14   ECHO/TUR/BUD/2019/91011 
15   According to a survey carried out by IFRC and TRCS with 468 Emergency Social Safety Net beneficiary households, 78% 
reported  facing  an  increase  in  expenses  to  cover  additional  costs  like  food  and  hygiene  items  and  79%  had  lost 
employment. Other households that are ineligible for the ESSN, the majority of which were still highly vulnerable prior 
to COVID-19, have also lost employment (See FRIT midterm evaluation - Annex on COVID-19). 

16   Same transfer value as was used in the government’s response (TL 1000). 
17   The quota is set at 65:35 in favour of refugees. The project aimed to support 3 000 beneficiaries – however while the 

Turkish quota was rapidly filled, only 282 refugees have been supported. 

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immediate need of the Government to gather COVID-19 data and strengthen epidemic intelligence, 
but also aimed at strengthening the emergency preparedness and response capacity in the long run. 
Similarly,  the  EUR  5.3  million  project  on  strengthening  Ministry  of  Health’s  testing  and  genome 
sequencing capacity not only served the short-term necessity of strengthening expertise in contact 
tracing  and  rapid  testing,  but  also  the  medium-term  challenge  of  detecting  COVID-19  variances, 
while producing long-lasting capacity to identify future pathogens through genome sequencing. The 
SIHAAT project also included some capacity building elements in the recruitment of health workers 
trained under another project funded by the EU and implemented by WHO. Simultaneously,  some 
epidemiology capacity building was included in the framework of assistance to SMEs in the health 
sector, where not only equipment was provided, but virology training was also included in the project. 

2.2  EQ 2 – Value added 

EQ2: To what extent did the Team Europe (TE) initial response provide benefits beyond 
what would have resulted from actions taken by the EU institutions and EU MS on their 
own? 

Summary: The Team Europe (TE) approach did not particularly increase visibility of the EU's role in 
the  fight  against  COVID-19.  There  is  no  evidence  that  the  Team  Europe  (TE)  approach  either 
reinforced  or  relaxed  coordinated  situation  analysis,  planning  or  implementation  across  EU 
institutions. Regarding EU-EU MS coordination, there were no significant gains in terms of improved 
division of labour and synergies compared to the joined-up approach that the Facility for Refugees 
in  Turkey  already  represented.  Regarding  non-EU  actors,  there  was  “nothing  more  than  usual”, 
besides ad hoc meetings with major International Organisations (IOs) and International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) regarding their COVID-19 response. 

There  is  no  evidence  that  the  Team  Europe  (TE)  approach  either  reinforced  or  relaxed 
coordinated situation analysis, response planning and prioritisation across EU institutions 
including EIB and EBRD. The EIB planned EUR 270 million in new operations, but this has not been 
formally  approved  “in view  of  the  overall  tense  EU-Turkey  relations”  (COVID-19  tracker dated  26 
February 2021), indicating close coordination with European External Action Service (EEAS, in charge 
of coordinating foreign policy including EU-Turkey relations). There is no data on how the EBRD EUR 
1 billion “Solidarity Package” (much of it in response to the COVID-19 crisis) and the Council of Europe 
Development Bank’s EUR 200 million loan to the Ministry of Health to fight COVID-19, on the one 
hand, were coordinated with, on the other hand, ongoing IPA and Facility for Refugees programmes 
and new projects funded by the EUR 105 million made available for the COVID-19 response from 
(among other sources) Facility savings. However, interviews underscored good coordination in country 
both  pre-COVID-19  and  in-COVID-19,  supported  by  prompt  (but  not  unilateral)  decisions  from 
Brussels. IFIs-Commission consultations were highlighted in particular. 

There  is  no  evidence  that  the  Team  Europe  (TE)  approach  reinforced  coordinated 
implementation  and  oversight  across  EU  institutions  either.  There  was  regular  reporting 
between the EU Delegation and Brussels, and in Brussels, alongside regular coordination between DG 
ECHO, EUTF and DG NEAR, and also with the DG RTD. But besides the NEAR Project Team on COVID-
19, which was set up, and a measure of “horizontal coordination” between services (interviews, March 
2021),  there  was  no  inter-service  task  team  to  go  beyond  information  sharing  and  help  ensure 
coherence  between  the  different  COVID-19-related  projects.  The  Team  Europe  (TE)  approach 
reinforced coordinated data collection, research, and monitoring to a basic (but important) degree, 
thanks to the COVID-19 tracker providing situation analysis and listing COVID-19-related projects 
across instruments and DGs, their commitments and disbursements.  

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Coordination between EU and EU MS under the Facility continued to be regular, as prior to 
the COVID-19 crisis. There was “regular information sharing” on the COVID-19 response among EU 
MS  Development  Counsellors/Heads  of  Mission,  with  a  focus  on  reallocation  or  earmarking  of 
available  funds,  and  some  joint  messages  for  dialogue  with  the  authorities.  In  more  operational 
terms,  there  were  no  significant  gains  in  terms  of  improved  division  of  labour  and  synergies 
compared to the joined-up approach that the Facility (a central instrument in the TE COVID response) 
already represented.  

The Team Europe (TE) approach to COVID-19 did not particularly increase EU convening 
power with non-EU actors, given its the EU’s already prominent role. The European Commission, 
EIB  and  EU  MS  (mainly  Germany  and  France)  together  represented  over  82%  of  all  Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) flows reported to the OECD DAC. Coordination with non-EU donors 
was nonetheless important to political and policy dialogue, and for policy coherence in addressing 
Turkey’s multidimensional fragilities, but it did not change in quality or intensity. Interviews indicated 
that there was “nothing more than usual”, besides ad hoc meetings with major IOs and IFIs regarding 
their response to the pandemic.  

The Team Europe (TE) approach did not particularly increase visibility of the EU's role in 
the fight against COVID-19. EU Delegation communicated on the EU response to the crisis, but 
the communication around the Team Europe (TE) response to COVID-19 was limited in the absence 
of a Government of Turkey  (GoT) request. But in terms of being clear about what Team Europe’s 
values and purpose is, and how it distinguishes itself from other actors, the Team Europe (TE) brand 
was quite clear given the Facility for Refugees and given the highly visible political dialogue with 
Turkey.  

2.3  EQ 3 – Efficiency 

EQ3: To what extent were, and are, the individual aid modalities and other aid delivery 
mechanisms  and  their  combinations,  efficient  and  flexible  enough  for  use  in  Team 
Europe’s COVID-19 response in COVID-19 crisis conditions? 

Summary: The Commission COVID-19 response was mostly mobilised quickly through reallocation 
of funding from savings and contingencies and project adaptation, although with variation in the 
flexibility of the different instruments. ECHO’s emergency assistance under the Facility and via the 
HIPs  was  swift.  Projects  under  the  IPA  framework  were  overall  slower  than  ECHO  but  not 
necessarily  less  flexible.  The  speed  of  adaptation  of  EUTF  projects  varied  across  projects.  The 
decision to not redirect funding under the current programming set some constraints in terms of 
flexibility of the aid modalities, yet synergies across classical projects under various instruments 
were exploited. Monitoring of the COVID-19 response took place, notwithstanding the absence of 
a common coherent reporting system. 

The EU COVID-19 response was mostly mobilised quickly through reallocation of funding 
from  savings  and  contingencies  and  project  adaptation,  although  with  variation  in  the 
flexibility of the different instruments. ECHO’s emergency assistance under the Facility 
and  via  the  HIPs  was  swift.  ECHO’s  support  modality  under  the  Facility  was  flexible,  allowing 
implementing partners to quickly adapt projects without the need for formal amendments, making 
possible delivery of assistance by as early as June 2020. The ESSN intervention under the Facility 
was rapidly implemented, making use of the pre-established beneficiary registry and delivery system, 
as well as quickly disbursing funding from savings and contingencies in June 2020 simultaneously 
to assistance rolled out by the Government for Turkish citizens. The UNHCR cash intervention was 
delivered as early as May 2020, utilising the long-used card system. The fast response was made 

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possible by upfront expenditures which were then retroactively reimbursed in September 2020 by 
the EU. Projects under the IPA framework were overall slower than ECHO but not necessarily 
less  flexible per  se.  The  EUR  2.7  million  “epidemiology  and  surveillance  capacity  building”  project 
made funds available immediately, at a time when the Ministry of Health was not willing to invest in 
Rapid Diagnostic Tests (RDTs). Procurements of personal protective equipment (PPE) and testing kits 
faced  significant  delays  although  the  procurement  still  remained  relevant,  for  use  in  subsequent 
waves. Similarly, the  EUR 5.3 million “Strengthening Ministry of Health (MoH) Capacity to Combat 
COVID-19”  was  only  signed  at  the  end  of  December  2020.  The  speed  of  adaptation  of  EUTF 
projects varied across projects. For instance, TOBB’s adaptation took less than two months as 
there was no need for an addendum. Yet the programme stopped for three months mainly to adjust 
face-to-face operations to remote modalities.  

The  decision  to  not  redirect  funding  under  the  current  programming,  informed  by 
government preferences, set some constraints in terms of flexibility of the aid modalities. 
The choice of modality was limited and primarily based on presence and availability of funding to be 
able  to  mobilise  under  a  relevant  instrument.  The  option  of  most  flexible  aid  modalities  such  as 
budget  support  and  macro-financial  assistance  was  not  available  in  Turkey,  given  specific 
conditionalities  attached  to  these  modalities.  However,  coordination  across  EU  and 
implementing  partners  ensured  efficient  allocation  of  resources  and  exploitation  of 
synergies  and  complementarities.  Classical  projects  under  various  instruments/channels18 
targeted  specific  vulnerable  populations  whose  needs  were  not  necessarily  well  covered  by  the 
government response, such as the ESSN and the UNHCR interventions. The different projects tried to 
complement each other, attempting to avoid duplication across ECHO, ESSN and UNHCR support via 
coordination and the deduplication matrix used by the Turkish Red Crescent, although lacking a single 
common data system. 

Monitoring  of  the  COVID-19  response  took  place,  notwithstanding  the  absence  of  a 
common  coherent  reporting  system.  A Team Europe  (TE) COVID-19 response tracker giving a 
brief overview of the state of play of the Team Europe (TE) response was updated (quarterly) by the 
Commission Headquarters (HQ). In the Integrated Situational Awareness and Analysis (ISAA) report, 
the EU provided on a weekly basis an overview of the COVID-19 situation in partner countries, while 
bi-monthly reports on lifting temporary restrictions of non-essential travel to the EU were produced. 
Close  M&E  of  the  response  took  place  within  the  framework  of  the  implementation  of  each 
intervention for crisis response. CCTE, UNHCR, ESSN, and TOBB interventions adapted monitoring and 
CFM to remote modality and included COVID-19 related indicators. While monitoring stopped for a 
few months at ECHOFIELD level, guidance on additional reporting was provided by the HQ to ECHO 
partners. There was an effort to convene different stakeholders in meetings, data sharing and cross-
checking  information.  The  COVID-19  response  could  have  further  benefited  from  an  overarching 
leader across EU divisions, which is currently missing. The disjointed reporting mechanisms, with all 
divisions reporting to different platforms,19 well reflects this horizontal structure and its challenges 
to efficiency.  

18   Assistance channels included 1) unused funds under IPA II, 2) the Facility for Refugees, ECHO under the Facility, the 
EUTF/MADAD  under  the  Facility  and  3)  ECHO  under  the  HIP  2020  4)  EUTF/MADAD  outside  the  Facility  5)  in-kind 
donations of testing material by the Joint Research Centre (JRC) and 6) Civil Protection Mechanism. 

19   CRIS, HOPE – and the EUTF not reporting at all. 

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2.4  EQ 4 – Effectiveness 

To what extent was the EU response successful in progressing towards the objectives 
associated with the COVID-19 response? 

Summary:  The  interventions  funded  by  the  Commission  were  effective  in  fostering  a  prompt 
emergency response in the health sector, including strengthening personal protection and access 
to  basic  services.  The  package  effectively  contributed  to  strengthening  national  surveillance 
capacity and is expected to improve the resilience of the health system. It contributed to preventing 
and easing the onset of the socio-economic crisis in a limited way, mainly ensuring continuation 
of activities and alleviating the impact of COVID-19 on refugees. Emergency economic support to 
refugee  households  provided  through  the  Team  Europe  (TE)  package  made  an  important 
contribution to meeting short term survival needs, but the amount and duration was insufficient to 
fill  the  full  needs  gap.  Lack  of  information  and  limited  strategic  risk  communication  activities 
limited the effectiveness of the support. Experiences of COVID-19 opened space for dialogue on 
strengthening resilience through increasing or providing more efficient social protection. 

The Commission interventions were effective in fostering a prompt emergency response 
in  the  health  sector  including  strengthening  personal  protection  and  access  to  basic 
services. The full amount of  EUR 57.5 million committed for the emergency response under the 
Facility and the ECHO HIP 2020 was paid in 2020, financing provision of PPEs, hygiene items and 
other basic needs assistance through mobilisation of savings and contingencies. These health-related 
interventions required only minimal adaptation, exploiting pre-existing services run by implementing 
partners such as mobile clinics, effective in strengthening health service provision in rural areas.20 
Surveys conducted by implementing partners further confirmed good satisfaction rates for remote 
tele-health services in remote areas and a 40% increase in beneficiaries with access to basic health 
services, including improved access for women.21  Mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) 
were addressed, including the setting up of an online support service for psychiatric consultations 
and helpline for women. However, the extent of the effect was not clear and language barriers made 
the service less effective.22 People needed prescriptions and medication support, which was not fully 
operationalised.23 Under the IPA framework, EUR 267 300 of the committed EUR 4.7 million was paid 
for  procurement  of  protective  equipment  and  hygiene  supplies,  as  well  as  awareness  campaign 
among refugees and training health workers in migrant health centres in the course of 2020.24 Local 
PPE  procurement,  coordinated  with  health  directorates,  contributed  to  an  efficient  and  fast 
distribution,25 as evidenced by specific monitoring missions. Three rounds were distributed over April 
to November 2020. The procurement of dignity kits, on the other hand, was delayed by two months 
due to the highly technical requirements of ECHO’s tender.26 

The  EU  health  response  effectively  contributed  to  strengthening  national  surveillance 
capacity and is expected to improve the resilience of the health system. Expected results of 
the “Strengthening MoH Capacity To Combat Covid-19” project suggest that this intervention will be 
effective, although it  was unclear how risk mitigation measures related to procurement risk  were 
addressed. The epidemiology and surveillance capacity building were effectively  rolled out by the 
World Health Organization (WHO) with training on Early Warning & Response Systems including 298 

20   Interview, implementing partner. 
21   Satisfaction survey of Tele Health Services, interview implementing partner. 
22   Interview, implementing partner. 
23   Interview implementing partner. 
24   Team Europe COVID-19 Response Tracker to the 26/02/21. 
25   Interview, implementing partner 
26   Interview 

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participants,  Field  Epidemiology  Training  involving  163  participants  and  Laboratory  including  61 
participants. This action was already under implementation since 2018. The effect was maximised 
by linking laboratory surveillance with Training of Trainers programmes across the country.  Team 
Europe supported a better coordination across stakeholders and brought specifically WHO and the 
Ministry of Health fostering a discussion on how to improve inaccurate reporting. It is worth noting 
that national authorities adjusted daily COVID-19 case count to international practices in November 
2020.27 

The EU response contributed to easing the onset of the socio-economic crisis in a limited 
way, mainly ensuring continuation of activities and alleviating the impact of COVID-19 on 
refugees.  The  total  committed  EUR  8.8  million  was  paid  in  2020  and  included  9  EUTF  projects 
focusing on support to distance learning, special needs-fund, social cohesion and psychosocial care, 
employment activities, and SME support for vulnerable refugee populations.28 Among those, the TOBB 
project  did  not  promote  further  employment  but  temporarily  helped  job  retention  for  1  800 
beneficiaries,  of  which  only  250  were  Syrian  refugees,29  while  ensuring  continuation  of  activities 
introducing health and safety measures. The project also contributed to a deeper understanding of 
the needs of refugees and local companies and identified best responses for post-pandemic recovery 
by financing research on the local labour markets.  

Emergency economic support to refugee households made an important contribution to 
meeting short term survival need, but the amount and duration was insufficient to fill the 
full  needs  gap.  The  ESSN  emergency  top-ups  delivered in  June-July  totalled  TRY  1000.  UNHCR, 
Welthungerhilfe  (WHL)  and  Diakonie  also  provided  a  one-off  payment  of  TRY  1000.  Relief 
International gave cash for food again totalling TRY 1000. Concern and UNFPA gave cash for rent, 
respectively as three monthly transfers (TRY 300 each) and a one-off payment (an average of TRY 
800). Monitoring data from ESSN implementing partners highlighted that payments contributed to 
meeting household needs, where 78% reported increased expenditure on food and hygiene items 
and 69% had a member of their household who had lost employment. IFRC’s monitoring of ESSN 
and non-ESSN beneficiaries’ welfare highlighted marked differences in indicators such as resort to 
negative coping strategies and taking on debt between these groups. However, ESSN beneficiaries 
still  faced  deterioration  in  their  situation,  although  less  pronounced,  and  reported  that  it  was 
insufficient to fill all needs. Similar findings were reported by UNHCR and International NGO partners 
(Concern,  Diakonie,  WHL,  UNFPA).  Their  Post  Distribution  Monitoring  (PDM)  showed  that  the  cash 
injections  effectively  supported  household  budgets  and  stopped  the  risk  of  eviction.  However,  all 
partners agreed that the socio-economic situation of households had not returned to pre-COVID-19 
levels.30  

Protection support included individual protection assistance and psychosocial support for 
grown-ups and children. The coverage of refugees with such assistance, however, was quite low, 
with for example 50 000 beneficiaries for Concern, and 30 000 for Diakonie.  

Certain factors undermined the effectiveness of programmes. For example, for UNHCR, lack 
of up-to-date contact information for non-ESSN refugees limited inclusion of vulnerable households 
in the cash assistance in practice. Whereas the original payroll included over 107 000 households, 
only 88 000 were eventually paid. Meanwhile, Diakonie faced some difficulties in ensuring the timely 
disbursement of the cash provided through bank transfers. In addition, the EU COVID-19 response 

27   Counting all detected cases, including asymptomatic ones. 
28   Team Europe COVID-19 Response Tracker to the 26/02/21 
29   Interview: the interest among Syrian refugees in participating was low, with the majority of them working in the informal 

sector and afraid of losing their right to the ESSN. 

30   Concern completed a second needs assessment in December 2020 which showed an improved situation in comparison 

to May 2020; the situation, however, was still difficult. 

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did not facilitate strategic risk communication activities for refugees in Turkey, and Team Europe (TE) 
support was not adequately communicated. This would have included a specific targeted approach 
in  engaging  refugee  communities  and  strategize  clear  risk  mitigation  and  prevention/behaviour 
measures against COVID-19. Refugees mainly received information from traditional media or social 
media, close contacts or friends, community groups and the Ministry of Health. Partners disseminated 
messages on the protection measures for COVID-19, and Information, Education and Communication 
(IEC) materials via SMS messages and Zoom sessions. Infection Prevention and Control (IPC) protocols 
were disseminated in health centres and prevention measures were discussed during psychosocial 
support sessions. Some partners only used online media in urban and rural areas for safety messages, 
while others disseminated them via mobile health promotion services. 

Experiences of COVID-19 appeared to be opening space for dialogue.  For example, on the 
ESSN,  ECHO  and  IFRC  negotiated  with  the  Government  concerning increasing the  routine  transfer 
value on the ESSN considering the increased cost of living. While the  Government was previously 
reluctant, there was acknowledgement of this issue since COVID-19, and in March 2021 agreement 
was reached on increasing this from TRY 120 to TRY 150. Under the HIP 2021-22, ECHO accepts 
proposals for additional rounds of one-off cash assistance to meet the economic needs of non-ESSN 
households. ECHO is also ready to negotiate with the Government of Turkey on the need for additional 
top ups to ESSN beneficiaries if the economic situation deteriorates further during an imminent ‘third 
wave’.  UNHCR also broached the idea of an additional round of temporary assistance to other non 
ESSN beneficiaries, noting that the  Government of Turkey also provides wage support for citizens 
which refugee populations do not benefit from. 

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3. Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch 

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Contents 

Acronyms 

1.  Background..................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 

1.1 

1.2 

Regional COVID-19 context and governments’ responses ....................................................................... 1 

European Union (EU) response ................................................................................................................................. 1 

2 

Answers to Evaluation Questions ...................................................................................................................................... 2 

2.1 

2.2 

2.3 

2.4 

EQ 1 – Relevance ............................................................................................................................................................. 2 

EQ 2 – Value added ........................................................................................................................................................ 6 

EQ 3 – Efficiency .............................................................................................................................................................. 7 

EQ 4 – Effectiveness ...................................................................................................................................................... 9 

3 

Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch .................................................................................................................................... 11 

THE  PURPOSE  OF  THIS  REGIONAL  NOTE  IS  TO  INFORM  THE  FAST-TRACK  ASSESSMENT  OF  THE  EU  INITIAL 
RESPONSE AS A WHOLE AND NOT TO CARRY OUT AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RESPONSE IN THE REGION. 

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Acronyms 

APS 

BS 

French Public Health Agency 

Budget Support 

CARICOM 

Caribbean Community 

CARPHA 

Caribbean Public Health Agency 

CB/TA 

CCRIF 

CDC 

CDEMA 

CEDA 

COVAX 

DG ECHO 

Capacity Building / Technical Assistance 

Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility 

United States Center for Disease Prevention and Control 

Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency 

Caribbean Export Development Agency 

COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access 

European  Commission’s  Directorate-General  for  European  Civil  Protection 
and Humanitarian Aid Operations 

DG INTPA 

European Commission’s Directorate-General for International Partnership 

EDF 

EIB 

EQ 

EU 

EUD 

FPI 

GDP 

European Development Fund 

European Investment Bank 

Evaluation Question 

European Union 

Delegation of the European Union 

Service for Foreign Policy Instruments 

Gross Domestic Product 

IMPACS 

Caribbean Community Implementation Agency for Crime and Security 

LAC 

M&E 

MS 

PAHO 

PHAC 

PHE 

PPE 

RIVM 

OECS 

Latin America and Caribbean 

Monitoring and Evaluation 

EU Member State 

Pan American Health Organization 

Public Health Agency Canada 

Public Health England 

Personal Protective Equipment 

Netherlands’ National Institute for Public Health and the Environment 

Organization of Eastern Caribbean States 

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OCT 

SME 

TE 

TEI 

THIS 

UNCTAD 

UNICEF 

WASH 

WB 

Overseas Countries and Territories 

Small and medium enterprises 

Team Europe 

Team Europe Initiatives  

Tourism and Health Information System 

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 

United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund 

Water, sanitation, and hygiene 

World Bank 

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1. Background 

1.1  Regional COVID-19 context and governments’ responses 

The Caribbean has been one of the most efficient regions in containing the COVID-19 from the outset. 
As the first cases of COVID-19 were declared in the region, governments decided to move towards 
complete  lockdown.  Despite  the  swift  response  from  governments,  due  to  the  structure  of  the 
economies heavily relying on tourism, remittances and export, these economies have been hard hit 
by the pandemic, notably in terms of employment, consumption, and poverty.  

The economic impact of the COVID-19 crisis has varied across countries in the region, but the most 
salient common issue faced by Caribbean countries is the income shock for the tourism sector. In the 
region, the share of tourism in gross domestic product (GDP) ranges between 30 and 90 % (direct 
and indirect contribution). Remittances also fell sharply as the origin countries of these flows (United 
States,  United  Kingdom  and  Canada…)  also  went  into  lockdown.  Furthermore,  tax  revenues  and 
foreign exchange earnings derived from exports of goods and services (notably linked to tourism) 
have come to an abrupt halt. 

In response, a common approach was decided upon by several countries of the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM)  leading  to  a  set  of  coherent  policies  on  health,  logistics  and  transport.  For  instance, 
Member  States  of  the  CARICOM  agreed  on  a  Common  Public  Health  policy  which  included  joint 
procurement  of  goods.  This  also  set  common  standards  for  the  intra-regional  transportation  of 
people and goods. As for the economic response, most countries implemented fiscal packages that 
included additional health spending, temporary cash transfers for displaced workers, credit support 
to small and medium-sized firms and affected sectors— such as tourism, transport, and agriculture, 
expansion  of  social  safety  net  programs  for  vulnerable  groups,  tax  and  custom  duty  waivers  on 
essential food and hygiene product imports. Several Central banks reduced policy rates and/or reserve 
requirements or provided liquidity assistance through other facilities to support economic activity.1 

1.2  European Union (EU) response 

The Team Europe (TE) Response in the Caribbean included emergency funding from the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) in support to governments’ expenditure in the health sector, as well as access 
to finance for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), public infrastructure, and financing for climate 
change related projects. EU MS mainly contributed to bilateral programmes in few countries in the 
Caribbean, including delivery of in-kind assistance to governments. 

The Commission committed a total of EUR 315 million, including EUR 30 million of funds channelled 
through  regional  initiatives.  Bilateral  emergency  response  led  by  the  Commission’s  Directorate 
General for Humanitarian aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO) included water, sanitation, and hygiene 
(WASH) and food distribution activities, as well as communication campaigns and personal protective 
equipment (PPE) distribution in different countries. The health response consisted of supply of health 
and medical equipment. The socio-economic response focused on restoring livelihoods and providing 
budget support (BS) to governments.  

1   United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), “COVID-19 in the Caribbean and the Central America 
region:  Identifying  blue  pathways  to  move  forward  in  a  COVID-19  context  and  beyond”,  July  2020.  Retrieved  from 
https://unctad.org/es/node/26953  

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As for the regional response, DG ECHO has reoriented EUR 0.6 million of ongoing initiatives. A global 
United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) contract included EUR 0.6 million 
support to Cuba. The health response comprised a EUR 8 million programme through the Caribbean 
Public Health Agency (CARPHA). This included the provision of personal protective equipment (PPE), 
test reagents, lab material, treatment/vaccines, as well as support to increase the agency and health 
workforce technical capacity and public awareness. In addition, technical assistance (TA) for a total 
of EUR 2.8 million could be requested by Caribbean countries. The socio-economic response primarily 
consisted  in  a  EUR  10  million  grant  to  the  Caribbean  Catastrophe  Risk  Insurance  Facility  (CCRIF), 
securing substantial discount to CCRIF member countries to pay for their 2020 disaster insurance. 
Simultaneously, a EUR 3.86 million top-up was made to a pre-existing programme with the Caribbean 
Export  Development  Agency  (CEDA)  for  financing  the  Direct  Assistance  Grant  Scheme  (DAGS) 
targeting the private sector.  

For  the  purpose  of  this  assessment  regional  initiatives  (EUR  30  million)  were  considered  in  the 
analysis,  although  few  additional  elements  of  bilateral  support  are  mentioned  in  the  note.  Two 
interventions were selected for an in-depth review, thus have been given greater attention in the 
note,  especially  in  evaluation  question  (EQ)  4.  Below  the  list  of  the  selected  interventions  in  the 
Caribbean: 

•  Health:  

o  The  Commission’s  Directorate-General  for  International  Partnerships  (DG  INTPA): 
Prevention and control of outbreaks of communicable diseases in the Caribbean - 
CARPHA (EUR 8 million) 

•  Socio-economic:  

o  DG INTPA: Disaster insurance premium discounts to Caribbean governments  – EU-

World bank (WB) Resilience Facility, CCRIF (EUR 10 million) 

2  Answers to Evaluation Questions 

2.1  EQ 1 – Relevance 

EQ1:  To  what  extent  did  the  initial  EU  global  response  to  the  COVID-19  pandemic 
through  the  Team  Europe  (TE)  country  packages  address  the  needs  and  priorities  of 
partner countries and regions in each country context; in line with the three priorities 
of the Team Europe (TE) approach? 

Summary 

The  priorities  of  the  Commission  assistance  in  the Caribbean  were in  line  with  the  three  Team 
Europe  (EU)  priorities  of  the  Joint  Communication,  with  a  focus  on  health  and  mostly  socio-
economic assistance, and aligned with development strategies relevant to the Caribbean, reflecting 
the overall EU agenda and principles. The Commission support addressed - mostly timely - the 
immediate  and  evolving  COVID-19  related  needs  especially  in  the  health  and  socio-economic 
sphere.  The  scope  and  the  emphasis  of  the  Commission  assistance  aligned  with  regional  and 
country-level efforts, ensuring national and regional ownership, while including capacity building 
elements for long term resilience.  

The priorities of the Commission assistance in the Caribbean were in line with the three 
Team Europe (TE) priorities of the Joint Communication, with a focus on health and mostly 
socio-economic assistance. They were also aligned with development strategies relevant 
to the Caribbean, reflecting the overall EU agenda and principles. 

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Thematic priorities of assistance corresponded with the  Team Europe (TE)  priorities  defined in the 
Joint Communication but with a specific focus on health (14 % of the DG INTPA total) and mostly on 
socioeconomic response (86 % of the DG INTPA total). This distribution accurately reflects the reality 
of the Caribbean, where COVID-19 has severely impacted economies, disrupting income streams and 
remittances  flows  and  causing  job  loss  and  reduced  income  in  the  tourism  sector,  the  main  GDP 
contributor of the region.2  

The  COVID-19  assistance  package  largely  consisted  in  reorientation  of  existing  cooperation 
programmes at bilateral as well as regional level, including remaining resources from the 2014-2020 
budgetary cycle. Although a limited pool of options, it ensured continuation of existing assistance 
and evident alignment with EU development agenda in the country. Namely, the CARPHA programme 
aligned with the Joint Caribbean-EU Partnership Strategy and the Strategic Plan for the Caribbean 
Community 2015-2019, while the CCRIF intervention reflected the objectives identified in the above-
mentioned strategies, as well as with the Comprehensive Disaster Management Strategy 2014-2024.  

Explicitly built on the needs of the governments, these two operations are also consistent with the 
principle  of  ownership  of  development  priorities  by  recipient  countries,  in  line  with  the  European 
consensus on Development.3 

DG  ECHO’s  humanitarian  assistance,  under  the  emergency  pillar,  aimed  at  reaching  the  most 
vulnerable, in line with core EU principles. Similarly, bilateral actions had the objective of supporting 
civil society and strengthening actions in protection of sexual and gender-based violence, in line with 
EU  principles  on  EU’s  Rights-based  approach,  gender  and  marginalized  groups,  and  particularly 
relevant in the Caribbean context where women and vulnerable groups have been disproportionately 
affected by the pandemic.4   

The Commission support addressed (mostly timely) the immediate and evolving COVID-19 
related needs especially in the health and socio-economic sphere.  

DG  ECHO’s  regional  emergency  assistance  (EUR  0.6  million  committed)  focused  appropriately  on 
supplying PPEs, hygiene kits, equipment, communication materials, food and cash assistance, as well 
as enhancing emergency response in health and WASH  (EUR 0.6 million committed). This support 
addressed  the  need  for  prevention  and  control  of  COVID-19,  as  well  as  meeting  basic  needs  of 
vulnerable groups in a region where pre-existing territorial disparities have been exacerbated.5 Yet 
the  volume  of  the  assistance  seems  quite  limited,  especially  compared  with  DG  ECHO’s  EUR  10 
million action targeted for Haiti, including health equipment, training, WASH and a humanitarian air 
bridge, which was overall not as impacted by the virus (despite still being very poor).6  

The  health  assistance  was  relevant,  while  speed  varied  across  interventions.  The  EUR  8  million 
programme for outbreak control operations via CARPHA was quickly designed7 The response was fast 
as  funds  had  previously  been  allocated  to  CARPHA  for  strengthening  the  health  system  in  the 

2    https://unctad.org/es/node/26953 
3   https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/system/files/european-consensus-on-development-final-

20170626_en.pdf 

4   https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/covid-19-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-regional-socio-

economic-implications-and-policy-priorities-93a64fde/ 

5   Measures as basic as washing hands or avoiding physical contact are difficult to follow for 21 % of the Latin America 
and  the  Caribbean  (LAC)  urban  population  living  in  slums,  informal  settlements  or  inadequate housing where  basic 
services are not affordable. See Oxfam (2020), El coronavirus no discrimina, las desigualdades sí [Coronavirus does not 
discriminate, inequalities do], London, https://www.oxfam.org/en/node/12128. 
Interview. Considering the population of the country the cases are overall lower than in other Caribbean countries. See 
https://covid19.who.int/region/amro/country/ht 
7   within weeks from the onset of the pandemic 

6  

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Caribbean. The signature of the contract for that purpose of strengthening the health system in the 
Caribbean,  was  originally  planned  for  2021  and  2022,  and  was  expedited  to  have  a  programme 
specifically targeted to COVID-19. The programme addressed the demand-driven need for prevention 
and the lack of testing and treatment capacity across the region by providing PPEs, testing equipment, 
treatment  and  vaccines,  support  to  increase  health  personnel  and  public  awareness  including 
developing guidelines and protocols particularly for construction and tourism.8 Similar actions have 
been financed on a bilateral level. A EUR 2.8 million demand driven TA under the Caribbean Regional 
Resilience  Facility  aimed  at  addressing  the  need  to  support  public  administrations  to  design  and 
implement COVID-19 response actions. The extent to which this was a priority for governments is 
questionable given that they were all informed about the possible use of the facility, but only Haiti 
has  requested  and  timely  received  TA  for  EUR  500  000.9  The  regional  EUR  1  million  internal 
reallocation  on  communication  surveillance  and  monitoring  mechanisms  for  COVID-19  response 
under  the  Pan  American  Health  Organization  (PAHO)’s  “one  health  programme”  aimed  at  looking 
more in depth at compounded vulnerability. Although the relevance of the action could be questioned 
as the addendum was only adopted in November 2020 and the financial agreement subsequentially 
signed,10 it might have accidentally proven timely for the second-third wave of the pandemic. 

Socioeconomic assistance provided via the EUR 10 million grant to the CCRIF was relevant to - at 
least partially11 - relieve CCRIF member states fiscal pressure. By securing a 26 % discount to pay 
for disaster insurance it aimed at freeing up resources to address COVID-19 related needs including 
health response and fiscal stimulus package set up by governments. This was highly relevant given 
the  already  limited  fiscal  space  characterized  by  high  level  of  indebtment  pre-crisis,  likely  to 
skyrocket in 2020, 12 and GDP estimated to fall by 7.9 % in 2020.13 Simultaneously, the action aimed 
at  covering  the  evolving  (and  longstanding)  needs  to  face  natural  disasters  during  the  hurricane 
season (one of the main concerns in the region)14 by ensuring that countries would still purchase the 
insurance  despite  limited  budget  availability.  The  design  of  the  discount  with  a  flat  rate  also 
appropriately aimed at providing fair and equal access to every country, considering that extremely 
poor countries as Haiti already benefitted from a 50 % discount paid by the Caribbean Development 
Bank.15 Similarly, acceleration and top-up of bilateral BS operations aimed at improving overall fiscal 
balance, with around EUR 126 million delivered in 2020 out of the EUR 150 million committed, with 
most yet not all disbursements made between July and December 2020.  

The  scope  and  the  emphasis  of  the  Commission  assistance  aligned  with  regional  and 
country-level efforts, ensuring national and regional ownership, while including capacity 
building elements for long term resilience.  

Priorities of the assistance were mostly informed by identified needs from national authorities. For 
the EUR 8 million health strengthening programme, CARPHA led extensive coordination with country 

8   Team Europe (TE) COVID-19 Response Tracker and Interviews  
9   Team Europe (TE) COVID-19 Response Tracker and DIR G Response Tracker, internal documents 
10   Team Europe (TE) COVID-19 Response Tracker and DIR G Response Tracker, internal documents 
11   The needs are very high. The IMF estimated that the region’s financing gap is around USD 4 billion, or 4.8 % of 2020 
regional  GDP 
See 
natural 
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2021/03/11/na031221-how-the-caribbean-can-avoid-becoming-a-covid-19-
long-hauler  

aggravate 

disasters 

further 

could 

that 

and 

risk 

the 

of 

it. 

12   average for the Caribbean was 68.5 % of the GDP in 2019. See https://unctad.org/es/node/26953 
13   Estimates as of December 2020 and excluding Guyana. See https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/covid-

19-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-regional-socio-economic-implications-and-policy-priorities-93a64fde/  

14   https://unctad.org/es/node/26953 
15   Interview 

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Ministries and various regional organizations,16 generating national and regional ownership of the 
assistance  and  linking  to  in  country  effort  to  better  respond  to  challenges  brought  by  the  crisis. 
Similarly,  The  CRIFF  discount  was  demand  driven  and  further  ensured  government  ultimate 
ownership by giving countries the possibility to choose between different possibilities on how to use 
the  discount  including  using  it  in  2020/2021,  apply  it  over  two  years  or  increasing  coverage  for 
2020/2021.17  

Some capacity building elements were present in the design of the CARPHA intervention as training 
was planned for health officials which could be beneficial for the long run.18 The programme also 
adapted to respond to the medium-long term need to support the vaccination campaign, sustaining 
resilience against COVID-19 in a context characterized by logistical challenges and lack of economy 
of scale.19 Namely, in October 2020 EUR 1.9 million of funding contributed to support ten countries 
to  purchase  vaccines,  making  down  payments  to  the  COVID-19  Vaccines  Global  Access  (COVAX) 
initiatives, while  six countries were already exempted from payments for vaccines.20 This effort was 
also in line with the indication of associating countries to the COVAX initiatives as expressed in the 
Joint Communication. The scope of the action however remained quite limited as 1.2 million doses, 
corresponding  to  around  20  %  of  the  population,  while  70  %  coverage  of  the  population  was 
required.21  

On the other hand, the CCRIF action rested on a long standing 10-years effort to strengthen countries 
capacity to address emergencies, making use of the lessons from the TA previously provided under 
this framework.22 Not only the action was relevant to respond to immediate and medium-term needs, 
but also potentially beneficial to further raise awareness on disaster risk financing, strengthening 
resilience in the long run.23 

16   The Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA), CARICOM, Organization of Eastern Caribbean States 
(OECS), Pan American Health Organization, the Caribbean Community Implementation Agency for Crime and Security 
(IMPACS), US Center for Disease Prevention and Control (CDC), Public Health England (PHE), Public Health Agency Canada 
(PHAC), the Netherlands’ National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) and the French public health 
agency (APS). 

17   Interview 
18   Interview 
19   https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2021/03/11/na031221-how-the-caribbean-can-avoid-becoming-a-covid-19-

long-hauler 

20   Given poor economic situation Haiti, St Lucia, St Vincente, Dominica, Guyana, Grenada were exempted from payments. 
The exemption is tied to their status with GAVI and not directly with funding from the EU. These countries were thus 
able to benefit from COVAX without needing to access funding from the CARPHA initiative. 

21   Interview  and  https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2021/03/11/na031221-how-the-caribbean-can-avoid-becoming-

a-covid-19-long-hauler 

22   Interview. Ministers of Finance had a better understanding of the process to deal with an emergency, the volume of 

finances required and the instruments available.  

23   Interview. 

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2.2  EQ 2 – Value added 

EQ2: To what extent has the Team Europe (TE) initial response added benefits to what 
would have resulted from actions taken by the EU institutions and EU MS on their own? 

Summary 
The EU rapid response to COVID-19 in the Caribbean appears to be due to its pre-existing presence 
and participation in regional coordination mechanisms rather than to the adoption of a specific 
Team  Europe  (TE)  approach.  The  response  appeared  well  coordinated  across  EU  institutions, 
whereas  only  few  EU  MS  are  engaged.  Close  cooperation  with  the  WB  allowed  the  creation  of 
beneficial fiscal space for Caribbean governments to guarantee vital coverage despite the COVID-
19  related  crisis  and  ahead  of  the  hurricane  season.  The  Team  Europe  (TE)  label  has  been 
proactively used to present the EU response to COVID-19 in regional media and on social media. 
There is limited evidence so far to gauge the impact of these efforts on EU visibility and influence 
in the region or in the donor community.   

Despite limited use of the Team Europe (TE) concept in programme/project documents, the 
EU response to COVID-19 in the Caribbean has been fast and well-coordinated, building 
on pre-existing coordination mechanisms and programmes. Most of the response consisted of 
a reorientation of existing cooperation programmes at both country and regional levels. This decision 
was  taken  by  the  seven  EU  Delegations  in  the  Caribbean  region  at  the  invitation  of  the  EU 
headquarters to take timely decisions to contain the crisis.24 

Priorities  alignment  was  conducted  in  close  coordination  between  DG  INTPA,  DG  ECHO  and  the 
Commission’s  Service  for  Foreign  Policy  Instruments  (FPI)  to  ensure  complementarity  of  the 
interventions, with response coordination managed by DG INTPA. Locally, coordination was ensured 
through Head of Missions meetings in Barbados, and amounted to EUR 367 million, targeting the 
health sector (14 % of the total) and socioeconomic recovery (86 %). Of these, EUR 313 million have 
been  identified  for  country/regional  COVID-19  response  out  of  the  pre-existing  envelopes  for 
Caribbean countries, EUR 28 million under the funding to Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) 
of the EU, and EUR 25 million through the Caribbean Investment Facility.25 And In response to COVID-
19, the EIB has offered emergency funding to the governments in the region to support health sector 
expenses.  

The EU contribution to health emergency and socio-economic recovery has been fast and 
well prioritised. On the health front, while DG ECHO has led the emergency support with regional 
actions and projects in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, DG INTPA also shouldered an important 
share of the effort, directing its support through CARPHA, as well as through health-related bilateral 
and  global  allocations.  CARPHA  leadership  ensured  smooth  coordination  and  relevant  focus  of 
support.26 

On the socio-economic front, through close cooperation with the WB, and through a EUR 10 million 
grant  to  the  decade-old  CCRIF,  the  EU  supported  the  creation  of  fiscal  space  for  Caribbean 
governments to guarantee vital coverage ahead of the 2020 hurricane season. The WB had set up a 
EUR 10 million trust fund to subsidise premiums to allow governments with sufficient liquidity to 

24   Interviews May 2021, Team Europe (TE) COVID-19 Response Tracker August 2020. 
25   Team Europe (TE) COVID-19 Response Tracker August 2020, informal email notes May 2021. 
26   Team Europe (TE) COVID-19 Response Tracker August 2020; CARPHA Factsheet; interview May 2021. 

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manage the ongoing crisis and minimize its potential impact.27 In parallel, a Team Europe Initiative 
(TEI) on Increased Access to Finance and Improved Climate for the Private Sector, and a Team Europe 
Initiative (TEI)  on Green  Climate Financing,  with  a  specific  focus  on  renewable energy,  have  been 
proposed in September 2020, complementing ongoing programmes to support the private sector, 
including through the Caribbean Export Development Agency (CEDA).   

There  is  limited  evidence  on  how  the  Team  Europe  (TE)  approach  enabled  better 
coordination  with  EU  MS.  Considering  the  selective  presence  of  EU  MS  in  the  region,  and  the 
reactivity of DG INTPA, EU MS involvement was minimal, consisting mainly in information sharing on 
both the situation and EU action across diplomatic representations.28 

The EU’s rapid response to COVID-19 in the Caribbean appears to be largely due to its pre-
existing  presence  and  involvement  with  regional  coordination  mechanisms  and  non-EU 
donors  rather  than  to  the  adoption  of  a  Team  Europe  (TE)  approach.  As  interviews  with 
CARPHA and EU Delegation suggest, the EU was already involved with the CARICOM and CARPHA, 
which  facilitated  dialogue  and  adaptation  of  priorities  and  programming  when  COVID-19  hit.  On 
socio-economic  recovery,  the  established  presence  of  the  EU  team  in  the  region  and  the  “strong 
relationship with EU Delegation in Barbados” developed by key donors, notably the WB, facilitated 
mutual understanding and joined-up approach to mitigating the impact of the crisis and supporting 
CCRIF and the insurance sector.29 

The  Team  Europe  (TE)  label  has  been  proactively  used  to  present  the  EU  response  to 
COVID-19 in regional media and on social media, notably around the dedicated responses through 
CARPHA  and  CCRIF.30  There  is  limited  evidence  available  so  far  to  gauge  the  impact  of  these 
communication efforts on EU visibility and influence in the region or in the donor community.   

2.3  EQ 3 – Efficiency 

EQ3:  To  what  extent  have  the  individual  aid  modalities  and  other  aid  delivery 
mechanisms and their combinations been, and currently are being, efficient and flexible 
enough for use in Team Europe’s (TE) COVID-19 response under conditions of the COVID-
19 crisis? 

Summary 

The  Commission  COVID-19  response  was  mostly  mobilised  quickly  through  a  contribution  to 
CARPHA,  covering  CRIFF  insurance  costs,  as  well  as  reorientation  of  programmes.  Although 
modality choice was limited by contextual factors, the Commission could provide a comprehensive 
response to the crisis combining various aid modalities (contribution to regional partners, insurance 
discount, BS and “classical” CB/TA programmes). Regular monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of the 
COVID-19 response took place. It has rather rested on pre-existing M&E mechanisms, although 
additional monitoring came from participation in visibility-related events.   

The speed of the Commission COVID-19 response varied depending on the aid modality 
and  the  extent  to  which  programme  were  new  or  modified.  The  response  was  mostly 

27   Interviews, May 2021. 
28   Interview May 2021. 
29   Interview May 2021. 
30   Team Europe (TE) COVID-19 Response Tracker August 2020. 

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mobilised quickly through a contribution to CARPHA and covering CRIFF insurance costs. 
Programmes were not quickly reoriented when they required an addendum, which was the 
case for most of the actions.   

The action with CARPHA was set up as early as April 2020 and EUR 5 million were quickly disbursed 
right  after.31  The  response  was  fast  as  funds  had  previously  been  allocated  to  CARPHA  for 
strengthening the health system in the Caribbean. The signature of the contract, originally planned 
for 2021 and 2022, was anticipated, and the programme specifically targeted to COVID-19.32 The 
implementation of the action was not as straightforward as its design. For instance, procurement of 
PPEs  and  equipment  encountered  some  issues  because  of  delayed  responses  from  Caribbean 
countries  on  specific  needs  and  simultaneous  increase  in  prices  due  to  high  demand.  Similarly, 
vaccines delivery, arranged with PAHO as the designated COVAX procurement agent, has not been 
timely.33 A EUR 10 million CCRIF-executed grant was quickly processed as additional financing to the 
CCRIF Multi-Donor Trust Fund to expand financial protection against disasters ahead of the 2020 
hurricane season. Discussions started towards the end of April 2020 to adapt the intervention and 
the discount was made available in early May 2020.34 All 18 active Caribbean governments active 
under CCRIF received a 26 % discount immediately, although the actual process of transferring the 
money to CCRIF is still ongoing. The action was timely and came when some of the governments had 
already reallocated part of their budget for the COVID-19 response while others were struggling or 
having  difficulties  to  access  resources  from  other  donors.35  A  fast  action  was  possible  thanks  to 
strong  pre-existing  relationship  with  the  relevant  stakeholders  and  especially  as  funds  had  been 
already earmarked for CCRIF (with the agreement signed in 2018) and there was no need for an 
amendment as the discount operation was eligible under this framework.36 Alternatives to this type 
of financing, including pulling resources from a multi-donor trust fund, would have not been as fast 
and  the  volume  not  as  big  as  reported  by  interviewees.  Both  regional  and  bilateral  programmes 
(including  classical  CB/TA  and  BS)  were  redirected  with  speed  of  the  response  varying  across 
programs. Reorientation was generally slower when an addendum was required, which was the case 
for most programmes. For instance, 15 programmes have been adjusted in the socio-economic area.  

The Commission could provide a comprehensive response to the crisis combining various 
aid modalities (contribution to regional initiatives, trust funds, BS and “classical” CB/TA 
programmes).  

Being at the end of the programming cycle most of the programmes had already been formulated 
and  approved  so  there  were  limited  possibilities  of  redirection  and  choice  of  aid  modality. 
Nonetheless, the Commission used existing opportunities/spaces to provide a response specifically 
targeted  to  COVID-19  for  both  CARPHA  and  CCRIF  action.  For  instance,  through  the  regional 
contribution to CARPHA the Commission used CARPHA’s greater expertise in the health sector, as well 
as the wide pre-existing network ensuring a coherent health response across countries. By covering 
CRIFF insurance costs, the Commission supported the member countries in flexibly using budget as 
they saw best fit, while ensuring coverage for potential future crisis. The combination of financial 
flows and TA under the EU-WB Caribbean Regional Resilience Facility has been useful to reinforce 
the scope of the support brought. Flexibility and effectiveness were also enhanced as the design of 

31   Specific documentation on CARPHA action and Directorate-General Response Tracker, internal documents 
32   Interview 
33   Interview 
34   Interview and Directorate-General Response Tracker, internal document 
35   Interview 
36   Interview 

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the discount gave countries the possibility to choose between different options, including using the 
discount in 2020/2021, applying it over two years or increasing the coverage of the insurance for 
2020/2021.37  Finally,  through  programmes  reorientation  and  adaptation,  the  Commission  could 
ensure continuity of existing assistance while integrating the COVID-19 dimension.  

Regular M&E of the COVID-19 response took place. It has rather rested on pre-existing 
M&E  mechanisms,  although  additional  monitoring  came  from  participation  in  visibility-
related events.  

M&E of the response took place within the framework of the implementation of each intervention 
deployed/reallocated  for  the  crisis  response.  Partners  monitored  projects 
implementation. 
Specifically, CARPHA closely monitored PPEs delivery, which was followed by press releases. Direct 
monitoring from the Commission took place through participation in visibility events, including PPEs 
handover ceremonies done jointly with partners. The status of COVID-19-related activities has been 
tracked at EU Delegation and headquarters level via a shared COVID-19 Tracker and Excel sheets 
detailing advancement of interventions. However, it is not clear from available information if specific 
COVID-19-response related indicators have been added with the pandemic.  

2.4  EQ 4 – Effectiveness 

To  what  extent  has  the  EU  response  been  successful  in  progressing  towards  the 
objectives associated with the COVID-19 response? 

Summary 

Through  the  CARPHA  initiative  the  Commission  fostered  a  prompt  health  emergency  response 
including  strengthening  prevention,  diagnosis  and  surveillance  and  contributed  to  strengthen 
national health systems capacity and vaccine accessibility in the region. The action is also expected 
to have contributed to greater public awareness about the pandemic. 

The  Commission  response  was  effective  in  fostering  PPEs’  procurement  as  part  of  the 
health emergency response. PPEs were provided although procurement encountered delays. The 
EUR  0.8  million  contract  for  procurement38  to  twelve  CARPHA  member  countries  was  awarded  in 
December 2020 and the first batch was only delivered in March 2021, while a second shipment is 
expected in June/July 2021.39  

The  response  via  the  contribution  to  CARPHA  contributed  to  strengthening  prevention, 
diagnosis and surveillance, as well as reinforcing national health systems’ capacity and 
vaccine  accessibility  in  the  region.  Testing  capacity  was  enhanced  in  the  region.  Three 
additional laboratory technologists were recruited in August 2020 in the CARPHA regional laboratory, 
and 27 491 PCR tests were conducted between August and December 2020 for seventeen CARPHA 
countries. PAHO provided capacity building to eight countries and CARPHA developed guidelines and 
a tool for rapid antigen testing kits.40 Strengthening of surveillance system was supported in 
five countries. An online surveillance assessment tool was developed towards the end of 2020 and 
is scheduled for roll out in 2021. Since April 2020, nine training webinars were conducted on the 
Tourism and Health Information System (THiS) and COVID-19 health measures for the hospitality 

37   Interview. Note that different countries have in fact chosen different options, with the majority of countries choosing 

the first option.  

38   within the framework of the EUR 8 million CARPHA initiative 
39   11th European Development Fund (EDF) regional Health Security project – Implementation Update at 31st March 2021 
40   11th EDF regional Health Security project – Implementation Update at 31st March 2021 

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sector in all CARPHA member states. Additionally, six specific COVID-19 guidelines for the hospitality 
sector were developed.41  

Financial  barriers  to  vaccine  access  were  at  least  partially  removed  and  vaccine 
availability/delivery  was  fostered.  Vaccine  procurement  has  materialized  although  quantities 
were  limited to the allocation provided under the COVAX mechanism. Procurement procedures were 
adjusted,  and  vaccines  sponsored  with  funds  from  the  EUR  8  million  allocation  to  CARPHA.  Ten 
CARPHA member states were provided with support for down payments for more than one million 
doses of vaccine procurement through COVAX facility. A total of 408.000 doses have been delivered 
in  different  tranches,  with  a  first  batch  having  been  delivered  in  late  March  2021.  These  COVAX 
deliveries  were  funded  via  CARPHA  and  procured  through  PAHO.  42  A  greater  budget  would  have 
allowed more vaccine procurement.43 

CARPHA initiative is expected to have contributed to greater public awareness about the 
pandemic. CARPHA Communication unit developed a regional  risk communication strategy and a 
communication media plan to assist CARPHA countries in the development and implementation of 
national  risk  communication  strategies.  The  action  also  promoted  a  more  coordinated  regional 
response  to  COVID-19.  In  December  2020  CARPHA  hosted  a  virtual  meeting  to  improve  regional 
communication focal points listening skills, monitoring, analysing and responding to social media to 
address  the  ‘disinfodemic’.  Additionally,  COVID-19  related  health  promotion  campaigns  were 
facilitated.  Misinformation  on  COVID-19  was  addressed  through  partnerships  with  OECS  and 
Facebook.  The  initiative  set  CARPHA’s  website  as  the  default  result  for  COVID-19  related  online 
research  in  CARPHA  countries.  Key  health  messages  were  also  promoted  through  Facebook  and 
Instagram.  Finally,  CARPHA  collaborated  with  the  Deaf  Pioneers  and  produced  a  COVID-19 
information video for the deaf which is expected to be completed in May 2021.44  

41   11th EDF regional Health Security project – Implementation Update at 31st March 2021 
42   Interview 
43   11th EDF regional Health Security project – Implementation Update at 31st March 2021 
44   11th EDF regional Health Security project – Implementation Update at 31st March 2021 

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3  Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch 

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Contents 

1.  Background..................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 

1.1. 

Country COVID-19 context and government response .............................................................................. 1 

1.2. 

European Union (EU) response ................................................................................................................................. 2 

2.  Answers to Evaluation Questions (EQs) ......................................................................................................................... 2 

2.1. 

EQ 1 – Relevance ............................................................................................................................................................. 2 

2.2. 

EQ 2 – Value added ........................................................................................................................................................ 4 

2.3. 

EQ 3 – Efficiency .............................................................................................................................................................. 6 

2.4. 

EQ 4 – Effectiveness ...................................................................................................................................................... 8 

3.  Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch .................................................................................................................................... 11 

THE PURPOSE OF THIS COUNTRY NOTE IS TO INFORM THE FAST-TRACK ASSESSMENT OF THE EU INITIAL RESPONSE AS A 
WHOLE. IT IS NOT DESIGNED TO BE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RESPONSE IN THE COUNTRY. 

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Acronyms 

AAP 
ACP 
ADB 
COVAX 
DFAT 
ECHO 
EDF 
EQ 
EU 
EUD 
FAO 
GDP 
HQ 
JIMT 
IFRC 
INTPA 
IOM 
MS 
MFAT 
PFM 
PFTAC 
PICs 
PPE 
SDP 
SPC 
SRPC 
SSRL 
TE 
TEI 
UN 
UNDP 
UNFPA 
UNICEF 
USAID 
WASH 
WB 
WFP 
WHO 

Annual Action Plan 
African, Caribbean and Pacific  
Asian Development Bank 
COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access 
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations 
European Development Fund 
Evaluation question 
European Union  
Delegation of the European Union 
Food and Agriculture Organization 
Gross domestic product 
Headquarter 
Joint Incident Management Team 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
International Partnerships 
International Organization for Migration 
Member State 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Public Financial Management 
Pacific Financial Technical Assistance Center 
Pacific Island countries 
Personal Protective Equipment 
Strategic Development Plan 
Pacific Community 
Sector Reform Performance Contract 
Support to Sustainable Rural Livelihoods 
Team Europe 
Team Europe Initiatives 
United Nations 
United Nations Development Programme 
United Nations Population Fund 
United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund 
United States Agency for International Development 
Water Sanitation Health 
World Bank 
World Food Programme 
World Health Organisation 

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1. Background 

1.1. 

Country COVID-19 context and government response 

The Pacific Island countries (PICs) such as Fiji initially succeeded in keeping Covid-19 under control 
and recorded a small number of cases. Governments quickly implemented strict containment and 
health  measures  such  as  lockdowns,  curfews  and  physical  distancing,  travel  restrictions  and 
international border closures to prevent imported cases of the virus.1 However, the Fijian government 
ruled out any possibility of a nationwide lockdown. As of 15 July 2021, Fiji had registered 13 886 
cases and 74 deaths, most of them since April 2021. Due to imported cases and alleged breaches in 
quarantine, the country is now struggling to contain an outbreak of the highly transmissible Delta 
variant. In addition to the pandemic, the region was hit by five tropical cyclones over the past year. 

This  had  immense  social  and  economic  impacts.  Tourism  essentially  collapsed  due  to  travel 
restrictions and fear, and the economy is estimated to have contracted by 19%.2 Given the region’s 
strong dependency on tourism revenues, the international border closures have had knock-on effects 
for overall economic activity  (especially on retail, manufacturing, and trade sectors), supply chain 
disruptions,  and  job  losses.  Unemployment  has  increased  by  27%,  in  2020,  the  most  severe 
contraction  in  Fiji’s  history.  This  is  especially  worrying  for  the  most  vulnerable  and  marginalised 
groups, including  women, children,  older people,  young  people,  persons  with  disabilities, LGBTQI+, 
single and women-headed households, and poor households. Overall, the social and economic crises 
brought  about  by  these  external  shocks  have  undermined  the  country's  ability  to  achieve  the 
Sustainable  Development  Goals.  The  economic  contraction  was  also  particularly  severe  and 
persistent for other small island economies, with output in 2020 remaining more than 10% below 
pre-pandemic levels in Palau and Vanuatu. 

In order to support the economic activity, the Fijian government adopted a series of relief measures. 
A stimulus package of FJD 1 billion was announced on 27 March 2020 together with the Fiji National 
Provident Fund. This included cash transfers through the FNPF for Fijians in the formal sector who 
had lost their jobs or seen their working hours reduced.3 With limited room for countering the negative 
impact of the pandemic on economic growth and household incomes, Fiji has had to rely heavily on 
support from international Donors such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, JICA, and AIIB 
among others. Overall, PICs have limited fiscal space and have struggled to provide the support that 
their people and economies need.4 

1  UN Pacific - Socio-economic impact assessment of Covid-19 in Fiji, Consolidated Report, July 2020 
2  World Bank. 2021. World Bank East Asia and Pacific Economic Update, April 2021 :Uneven Recovery. Washington, DC: 

World Bank. © World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/35272 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO. 

3  World Bank - PRESS RELEASE NO: 2021/097/EAP 

4 World Bank. 2021. World Bank East Asia and Pacific Economic Update, April 2021  Uneven Recovery. Washington, DC: 
World Bank. © World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/35272 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO. 

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1.2. 

European Union (EU) response 

EU budget allocated to COVID-19 response in the Fiji amounted to EUR 8.31 million by December 
2020. The largest share of bilateral support was provided in the form of budget support to increase 
the country’s fiscal space and allow for the implementation of the national COVID-19 response plan. 
Budget  support  was  complemented  with  humanitarian  assistance  delivered  by  the  Directorate-
General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) through the Disaster 
Relief Emergency Found administered by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies (IFRC), to address the humanitarian emergency triggered by Tropical Cyclone Harold in April 
2020. Regional support of EUR 34 million was also committed by the Commission for the COVID-19 
response, including EUR 22 million allocated through regional African, Caribbean and Pacific Group 
of States (ACP) programmes for prevention, detection and diagnostics.5 (See Annex: Intervention Logic 
Sketch) 

Two  interventions  were  selected  for  an  in-depth  review,  and  have  therefore  been  given  greater 
attention in this note, especially in EQ4. Below is the list of the selected interventions in Fiji-Pacific: 

•  Health: 

o  Regional Health Support – World Health Organization (WHO), World Food Programme 
(WFP),  Pacific  Community  (SPC)  (EUR  22  million):  composed  of  EUR  2  million  for 
Timor Leste (WHO) and EUR 20 million for other Pacific countries. (WHO, WFP, SPC) 

•  Socio-economic support:  

o  Budget Support Agriculture (EUR 8 million) 

2. Answers to Evaluation Questions (EQs) 

2.1. 

EQ 1 – Relevance 

EQ1:  To  what  extent  did  the  initial  EU  global  response  to  the  COVID-19  pandemic 
through  the  Team  Europe  (TE)  country  packages  address  the  needs  and  priorities  of 
partner countries and regions in each country context in line with the three priorities of 
the Team Europe approach? 
Summary: In keeping with the Joint Communication, the EU COVID-19 response for Fiji sought to 
address needs related to health and socio-economic recovery while also taking into account the 
effects of Tropical Cyclone Harold in April 2020, which exacerbated the COVID-19 crisis conditions. 
The EU used a combination of regional and national channels to  provide support to Fiji and the 
other Pacific Island Countries (PICs), tying in particular its health response closely to multi-lateral 
response  efforts  in  the  region,  in  line  with  the  Joint  Communication.  The  response  sought  to 
address socio-economic needs primarily by advancing the final EUR 4 million payment tranche of 
a recently agreed budget support programme for agriculture by adding it to the EUR 4 million first 
payment tranche under the programme. 

In keeping with the Joint Communication,6 the EU COVID-19 response for Fiji and other 
Pacific Island Countries sought to address needs across different sectors, emphasising in 
particular health and support for socio-economic recovery, but also taking into account 

5  Country Team Europe Response to COVID-19 Tracker 
6  Communication on the Global EU response to COVID-19 (JOIN (2020) 11 final); Brussels, 8.4.2020. 

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needs  arising  from  Tropical  Cyclone  Harold  in  April  2020,  which  exacerbated  the  crisis 
conditions  linked  to  the  COVID-19  crisis.  EU  support  was  meant  to  help  address  short-  and 
longer-term challenges of the health sector related to COVID-19, principally to provide resources and 
supplies for the immediate crisis in 2020, and to extend support into the medium- to -long-term to 
help increase the crisis resilience of the health system. Socio-economic needs were targeted through 
the budget support to the agricultural sector and various other, smaller scale interventions to ensure 
food and nutrition security and to safeguard trade and the private sector which had been affected 
by  the  closing  of  borders  to  goods  and  visitors.  Through  ECHO,  the  EU  package  also  provided 
immediate support to communities affected by Tropical Cyclone Harold, which caused widespread 
destruction in Fiji and other PICs in April 2020 and exacerbated the difficult situation caused by the 
COVID-19 crisis. 

The EU Delegation in Suva used a combination of regional and national channels to provide 
support to Fiji and the other Pacific Island Countries with their COVID-19 responses, tying 
some of its support closely to multi-lateral response efforts in the region, as requested 
in the Joint Communication on the COVID-19 response. In health, the EU re-allocated EUR 22 
million  from  the  Investment  Facility  for  the  Pacific  to  help  fund  a  WHO-led  multi-country,  multi-
lateral effort to support the health sector of Fiji and other PICs through a Joint Incident Management 
Team (JIMT) for COVID-19. The JIMT was established in January 2020, bringing together different 
UN organisations7 and donors8 to fund and implement a “Phase 1” regional action plan to provide 
initial support to PICs in the first few months of the pandemic. At national level, the EU used the 
front-loading of tranche payments of a budget support programme for the agricultural sector to help 
the Fijian government secure highly needed fiscal space and address socio-economic needs related 
to  the  pandemic.  Beyond  the  front-loading,  the  budget  support  programme  was  not  otherwise 
adapted to respond to any specific aspects of the COVID-19 crisis. 

The EUR 22 million from the EU regional COVID-19 response package supported Phase 2 
of  the  JIMT  actions  to  address  the  “continued  vulnerability  of  Pacific  populations  and 
health  systems  to  COVID-19”9  in  view  of  their  limited  capacity  to  diagnose,  treat  and 
manage large numbers of COVID-19 cases while also ensuring the continuous delivery of 
essential services. Acknowledging the uncertainty over the course and duration of the COVID-19 
crisis, the Phase 2 action plan combined activities for tackling long-term health needs and resilience 
building  of  regional  health  systems  with  short-term  actions  to  make  available  life-saving 
interventions needed in the emergency phase of the response. Aligned to the WHO Global Response 
Strategy for COVID-19 and the WHO Western Pacific Regional Action Plan for Response to Large-
scale Community Outbreaks for COVID-19, the JIMT Phase 2 foresaw technical support to Fiji and 
other  PICs,  procurement,  and  transport  of  critical  medical  supplies,  including  personal  protective 
equipment  (PPEs),  enhancing  of  diagnostic  capabilities  and  also  the  strengthening  of  Water 
Sanitation  Hygiene  (WASH)  infrastructure  to  reduce  transmission  and  to  improve  care.  As  JIMT 
partners also included WFP, EU support also helped finance the transport of supplies and equipment 

7  International  Organization  for  Migration  (IOM),  United  Nations  Development  Programme  (UNDP),  United  Nations 

Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and WFP. 

8  The  Australian  Department  of Foreign  Affairs  and  Trade  (DFAT),  the  New  Zealand  Ministry  of Foreign  Affairs  (MFAT), 
United  States  Agency  for  International  Development  (USAID),  Asian  Development  Bank  (ADB),  and  World  Bank  (WB), 
among other things. 

9  Action Document for Health Support in response to COVID-19 in the Pacific; Annex III of the Commission Decision on the 

financing of the annual action programme in favour of the Pacific region for 2019. 

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by the WFP-managed Pacific Humanitarian Air Service10 as a relevant logistical element of the EU-
financed  response.  Additionally,  the  EU  also  foresaw  synergies  between  the  COVID-19-response 
project and several other regional programmes financed by the EU and other partners. This included 
the WHO-led “ACP programme to strengthen health systems for universal health coverage” whose 
budget the EU topped up with an additional EUR 2 million in response to the COVID-19 crisis.  

The EU response package sought to address socio-economic needs related to the COVID-
19 crisis primarily by advancing the final  EUR 4 million  payment  tranche of a  recently 
agreed budget support programme for agriculture and adding it to the first EUR 4 million 
payment tranche paid in August 2020. The increased tranche-payment of EUR 8 million, paid in 
August 2020 in line with the 2019 – 2020 Fijian fiscal year, was meant to help maintain the fiscal 
space of the Government to protect livelihoods and to enact fiscal and economic stimulus measures 
in line with its national COVID-19 response plan, while also allowing it to inject resources into the 
agricultural sector to mitigate the negative impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the economy and food 
security in the country, and to build the medium to long run resilience of the agricultural sector. The 
budget  support  payment  was  complemented  by  the  launch  and  adaptation  of  several  regional 
projects aimed at trade support and private sector development, natural resource management and 
food security, all of which would help the region with its socio-economic recovery from the effects 
of the pandemic. 

2.2. 

EQ 2 – Value added 

EQ2:  To  what  extent  did  the  Team  Europe  (TE)  initial  response  provide  additional 
benefits beyond  what would have resulted from actions taken by the EU institutions 
and EU MS on their own? 
Summary:  
The Team Europe (TE) approach was limited in Fiji, where very few MS are present and operate. 
The EU Delegation mainly ensured a quick and well-aligned response to the country and regional 
socio-economic  priorities  related  to  COVID-19.  Active  in  multi-country  programmes  and  multi-
donor  platforms  of  the  region,  the  EU  Delegation  optimised  its  coordination  with  international 
organisations and non-governmental organisations present in such mechanisms, notably with the 
WHO-led Pacific  Joint  Incident  Management  Team for  COVID-19.  Complementarity  with  EU  MS 
operating in the region was noted on specific actions. Despite a limited use of the “TE” branding, 
the organisation of the COVID-19 response was a good opportunity to enhance EU visibility as one 
of the key partners of the global response to COVID-19. 

Given that EU presence in the Pacific region, including MS, consists mainly of the EUD, the 
development of a Team Europe (TE) approach was somewhat limited. Nonetheless, the EU 
demonstrated  a  smooth  response  to  COVID-19,  ensuring  complementarity  and  coherence  of  its 
support to the EU overall strategy in the region, the region’s needs and existing donor coordination 
mechanisms.11 

10   The Commission authorised an exception to the “non-retroactivity of costs” to make all costs incurred from the start of 
the implementation of JIMT Phase 2 Plan on 1 June 2020 eligible for EU financing, independent of the actual signing 
of the financing and contribution agreements. The Financing Agreement of the project was signed in November 2020, 
five months after the start of the implementation of the Phase 2 plan. The duration of the implementation period was 
set to 22 months, with a subsequent closure period of 24 months to give room to address longer-term issues of the 
national health systems. 

11 Interview, June 2021. 

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First, the combined Team Europe (TE) response consisted of EUR 119 million of reoriented 
funding, demonstrating the EU’s capacity to reconcile emerging needs and the continuity 
of programmes (Interview June 2021; COVID-19 Tracker regional January 2021). The response was 
deployed mainly by EU Delegation for the Pacific and France. EU priorities in the region were impacted 
by COVID-19-related restrictions on tourism and the EU response took that into account in a timely 
fashion. By the end of January 2021, most of the Team Europe (TE) COVID-19 response actions were 
signed into contracts and all the accelerated budget support payments were disbursed. 

Second,  the  Team  Europe  (TE)  response  consisted  mainly  of  EUD  efforts  to  ensure 
complementarity  with  EU  MS  and  some  coordination  with  existing  regional multi-donor 
mechanisms. EU  aid originated mostly from  European Development Fund (EDF). The only EU MS 
providing more than EUR 1 million in 2019 was Germany, and aside from France and Spain, there is 
no MS presence in Fiji. While highlighted as a key challenge for EU coordination (Interview June 2021), 
efforts to enhance EU-EU MS collaboration bore fruit following Tropical Cyclone Harold through a 
joint EU-France partnership to deliver humanitarian aid.12 
At  the  country  level,  the  EU  Delegation  met  regularly  with  EU  Heads  of  Mission  in  Suva  and  EU 
embassies in the Pacific under the supervision of the EU Head of Cooperation to share information 
and coordinate emergency action.13 Country-level coordination also relied on missions from the EUD, 
as many partners were working off-island and national authorities in Fiji demonstrated little appetite 
for donor-led regional mechanisms. 
At the regional level, the EU channelled its support to the COVID-19 response through the WHO-led 
Pacific Joint Incident Management Team for COVID-19, which brought key organisations and donors 
together to support the emergency health response14, including the United Nations (UN)-led Pacific 
Humanitarian Group band a COVID-19-Pacific donor coordination group. 

In  the  COVID-19  response  context,  coordination  and  partnerships  with  international 
organisations and non-governmental organisations present in the region were optimised 
thanks to the EU Delegation for the Pacific participating in multi-country programmes and in all the 
coordination mechanisms listed above. Advancing complementarity and avoiding duplication through 
these groups is key considering that there is no joint budget support among donors, and poor appetite 
from national authorities to use regional coordination mechanisms.15 

There were clear efforts to brand and publicise the EU response to COVID-19 in the local 
media and social media. Despite a limited use of the “Team Europe” branding, the organisation of 
the COVID-19 response was a good opportunity to enhance visibility efforts.16 On 25 January 2021, 
a ceremony for the signature of the financing agreement of the COVID-19 Health Support to the 
Pacific  was  hosted  at  the  EU  Residence  in  Suva,  covered  by  the  local  press.  Most  press  releases 
referred to the “EU” or “the Head of Delegation”. Tagged as part of the quartet supporting the health 
sector in the face of COVID-19 across the Pacific, i.e., EU, the World Health Organization, the United 

12 COVID-19 tracker, Dec.2020. 
13 COVID-19 tracker country, Dec. 2020. 
14 AAP 2019 Amended; COVID-19 Tracker regional Jan.2021. 
15 COVID-19 Tracker, Jan. 2021. 
16 Interviews, June 2021. 

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Nations  World  Food  Programme  and  the  Pacific  Community,  the  EU  appeared  as  one  of  the  key 
partners among several actors in that global response.17 

2.3. 

EQ 3 – Efficiency 

EQ3: To what extent were, and are, the individual aid modalities and other aid delivery 
mechanisms  and  their  combinations  efficient  and  flexible  enough  for  use  in  Team 
Europe’s COVID-19 response in COVID-19 crisis conditions? 
Summary: The EU showed a strong reactivity and flexibility to reallocate available funds already 
committed in the framework of (1) its regional cooperation, by integrating the health dimension in 
view of the new needs of the PICs; and (2) its direct bilateral cooperation with Fiji, by amending 
the  new  budget  support  programme  in  the  agricultural  sector  to  double  and  advance  the  first 
payment by six months to mid-2021. This flexibility supported the national authorities in preserving 
fiscal resources at the beginning of the 2020/2021 fiscal year, at a time when they were facing 
severe declines in tax and foreign exchange inflows. It contributed to securing budget execution of 
an  agricultural  COVID-19  response  package  dedicated  to  protecting  rural  livelihoods  and 
preserving  national  food  and  nutrition  security.  The  monitoring  of  the  bilateral  EU  COVID-19 
response built on past experiences of budget support and capacity development projects in the 
agricultural  sector.  The  EU  intervention  also  supported  the  development  of  a  new  public  policy 
monitoring  and  evaluation  reform  process at  the  level  of  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture,  which  will 
contribute to improving the quality of the planning and monitoring of the national agriculture and 
food security policy. At regional level, the EU COVID-19 response in the health sector was aligned 
with the WHO’s monitoring system, but little information has been made available to date due to 
the recent contribution to JIMT phase 2. 

The  EU  demonstrated  strong  responsiveness,  at  the  onset  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic 
crisis, in repurposing its existing cooperation programmes at national and regional (multi-
country)  level.  This  strategy  consisted  essentially  of  redirecting  and  strengthening  the  regional 
cooperation focus on health sector resilience,18 as well as front-loading the financial resources still 
available in the bilateral cooperation envelopes and prioritising budget support in order to support 
the national government’s fiscal capacities to address the immediate socio-economic consequences 
of the crisis; implement their national COVID-19 response plan; and preserve their stability-orientated 
macroeconomic policies. Indeed, while Pacific countries were able to contain the health consequences 
of  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  notably  by  taking  early  travel  restrictions,  quarantine  and  lockdown 
measures, they were the worst hit developing countries in terms of economic and international trade 
disruption as well as in terms of deterioration of fiscal positions, aggravated by the strong reliance 
of Pacific economies on tourism, commodity exports and remittances.  

In the case of Fiji, as the national financial envelope was almost already fully committed 
in  2020,  the  bulk  of  the  bilateral  EU  COVID-19  response  consisted  of  amending  and 
advancing  in  a  timely  fashion  the  payment’s  schedule  of  a  new  sector  budget  support 
programme that was in its final formulation stage. Using sector budget support and adapting 
its disbursement architecture to advance and increase the payments to the 2020/2021 Fijian State 
Budget was considered by the national authorities as the most relevant and fastest way to respond 
to  their  immediate  fiscal  and  socio-economic  challenges.  A  swift  process  of  discussions  and 

17 Visibility report, Press releases Jan. 2021, Interview June 2021. 
18 Overall implementation of the EUR 22. million channelled through WHO, WFP and The Pacific Community “Health Support 

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agreements at the onset of the COVID-19 crisis, involving the EU Delegation, national authorities and 
the  endorsement  of  the  Directorate-General  for  International  Partnerships  (INTPA)  headquarters 
(Budget Support Steering Committee) in early 2020, allowed the EU budget support intervention to 
be quickly recalibrated in response to the new pandemic environment. The payment schedule of the 
EU budget support programme ‘Support to Sustainable Rural Livelihoods’ was modified to top-up the 
first payment of EUR 4 million with the same amount initially foreseen as a final payment in 2023. 
Initially planned for the end of the year 2020, the payment was advanced to August 2020. 

In Fiji, the monitoring of the EU COVID-19 response built on past experiences of budget 
support  operations  related  to  natural  disaster  recovery  interventions,  supports  to  the 
reform of the sugar sector and capacity development projects in the agricultural sector. 
The  EU  budget  support  also  contributed  to  support  the  national  development  of  a 
dedicated detailed monitoring and evaluation system in the agricultural sector, including 
an  updated  baseline  exercise  through  the  carrying  out  of  a  comprehensive  national 
agricultural census. The EU has been the leading donor in the agriculture sector since the onset of 
the preparation of the Ministry of Agriculture’s five-year Strategic Development Plan (SDP) 2019-
2023. Through the funding of an earlier Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)-managed capacity 
development  project,  it  provided  an  important  technical  support  which  led  to  progressive  and 
fundamental changes in the agricultural public policy approach. The authorities for the first time set 
up a forward-looking strategic planning for the agricultural sector and developed a specific costed 
operation plan, contributing to a better link with the national fiscal planning and the national and 
sector  budget  processes.  The  direct  contribution  of  the  EU  COVID-19  response  to  secure  budget 
allocation and execution of this national sector reform process and the planned EU budget support 
capacity development activities prepared the ground for a more efficient national monitoring and 
evaluation framework of the Fijian agricultural and food security development policy. EU capacity 
building under the budget support programme aimed also at strengthening the statistical governance 
and  project  assessment,  implementation  and  management  review  and  management  in  the 
agricultural sector. Where the COVID-19 national containment measures complicated the day-to-day 
technical and financial monitoring of the EU budget support programme, the EU Delegation adapted 
its monitoring system accordingly. Extension officers of the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) underwent 
training  on  data  collection  that  was  relevant  for  (i)  rapid  disaster  damage  assessments,  and  (ii) 
indicators of the MoA Strategic Development Plan. The above helped the MoA to obtain data and 
become more efficient in decision making related to the COVID-19 response. Monitoring also relied 
on an EU-supported national ongoing sector monitoring and evaluation reform process at the level 
of the Ministry of Agriculture. 

On macroeconomic and public financial management (PFM) issues, the EU integrated the 
existing  multi-donor  policy  dialogue  with  the  national  authorities  and  the  related 
coordination and monitoring mechanisms such as the World Bank coordinated “Friends of 
Budget  Support”.  The  EU  joined  the  existing  coordination  and  policy  dialogue  fora  on 
macroeconomic and public financial management issues led by key budget support donors such as 
the  ADB  and  the  World  Bank.  The  long-time  EU  contribution  to  the  Pacific  Financial  Technical 
Assistance Centre (PFTAC) was already conducive to a sound level of coordination, joint monitoring 
and policy dialogue with key PFM donors (including ADB, DFAT and New Zealand) and the national 
authorities. 

At  regional  level,  the  EU  COVID-19  response  in  the  health  sector  relied  on  the  WHO 
monitoring  system  in  the  context  of  the  Pacific  Action  Plan  for  Novel  COVID-19 

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Preparedness and Response Plan and the Joint Incident Management Team. Insufficient 
information on this is available for a full assessment. The related provisions of the contribution 
agreement planned the introduction of an electronic exchange system for the e-management of the 
agreement.  It  also  defined  the  first  reporting  period from  1  June  2020  to  31 May  2021  with  an 
expected monitoring report to be produced by the WHO.    

2.4. 

EQ 4 – Effectiveness 

To what extent was the EU response successful in progressing towards the objectives 
associated with the COVID-19 response? 
Summary  The  swift  increase and  front-loading  of  the  first  budget  support  disbursement  at  the 
beginning of the 2020/2021 fiscal year was effective in supporting the government’s Treasury to 
finance key and urgent economic, agricultural and food security stimuli and support packages, at 
the time of an extremely restrictive and constrained fiscal environment. The specific focus on food 
security and institutional and financial governance reform agenda in the agriculture sector played 
a critical role in mitigating the negative impacts of the economic contraction on vulnerable rural 
livelihoods and  the  risk  of  food  crisis,  while  paving the  way  for economic  and  social  resilience. 
Although  the  COVID-19  pandemic  did  not  immediately  lead  to  a  major  health  crisis,  the 
repurposing, mid-2020, of the EU regional cooperation to integrate health equipment and health 
system capacity building and resilience through support to  WHO’s phase  2 of its Joint Incident 
Management Team  should also prove effective in view of  the recent degradation of  the  health 
situation in the region. This includes EU funding for the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) 
initiative as rapid immunisation of the relatively small population of the PICs region is also vital 
for a regional social and economic recovery.    

Although the COVID-19 pandemic did not lead to an immediate health crisis due to  the 
highly  effective  reaction  of  the  Fijian  and  other  regional  authorities  in  controlling  the 
spread of COVID-19, the EU promoted a risk-mitigation approach by amending its regional 
cooperation accordingly to include health equipment and health system capacity building 
and resilience activities. The EU COVID-19 health-related response under its regional cooperation 
intended to  address the global  low diagnostic capacity  and critical  care infrastructure  situation in 
numerous  PICs  accentuated  by  the  fact  that  the  Pacific  region  is  prone  to  natural  disasters  and 
related possible outbreaks, as well as to high rates of non-communicable diseases, entailing several 
risks factors for severe COVID-19 crisis. 

The re-allocation of EUR 22 million from the Investment Facility for the Pacific to fund 
the second phase of a WHO-led multi-country, multi-lateral effort to support the health 
sector of Fiji and other PICs, aimed at reducing all these vulnerabilities by capitalising on 
the  Joint  Incident  Management  Team  set  up  by  WHO  in  January  2020.  This  intervention 
developed  a  specific  focus  on  enhancing  testing,  detection,  infection  prevention  and  monitoring 
capacities  as  well  as  on  patient  management  (through  Standard  Operation  Procedures), 
strengthening of surveillance and prevention of zoonotic diseases. All these actions were proposed 
in  order  to  promoting  the  International  Health  Regulation  in  the  region.  The  share  of  the  budget 
allocation  to  the  different  countries  is  not  known.  The  initial  implementation  was  planned  for  19 
months starting in June 2020, but the contract was finally signed only in December 2020 with the 
funding  disbursed  in  January  2021  with  a  retroactive  clause.  In  the  absence  of  monitoring 
information  at  the  time  of  the  present  report,  it  was  not  possible  to  make  an  effectiveness 
assessment of this regional EU COVID-19 response. The EU funding of the COVAX initiative, together 
with the other regional  donors’  vaccination distribution  campaigns, was also considered as highly 

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effective by the Fijian authorities in minimising the pandemic’s impact on the regional health systems 
and contributing to a rapid and sustainable economic recovery.   

In terms of addressing major socio-economic consequences of the pandemic, the doubling 
and advancing of the first payment under the EU budget support programme ‘Support to 
Sustainable Rural Livelihoods’ infused timely liquidity into the 2020/2021 State Budget. 
The  payment  at  the  early  stage  of  the  2020/2021  Fijian  fiscal  year  (August  2020) 
contributed to a timely increase in the government fiscal capacities to finance a second 
round of fiscal and economic stimulus packages, and more specifically, the dimension of 
its national agricultural response package, dedicated to protecting rural livelihoods and 
to  preserving  national  food  and  nutrition  security.  Despite  the  modest  magnitude  of  the 
amount disbursed (EUR 8 million representing approximately 1% of the planned annual fiscal deficit, 
though  the  magnitude  of  the  support  increases  when  considering  the  sole  annual  budget 
appropriation to the agricultural sector), it contributed to support the continuity and scaling up of the 
financing of countercyclical socio-economic and agricultural stimuli packages (more than EUR 800 
million for the 2020/2021 Fijian fiscal year compared to EUR 450 million in the 2019/2020 fiscal 
year), in an environment of extreme fiscal constraint and intensified socio-economic challenges which 
characterised the Fijian 2020/2021 fiscal year from the very beginning.  

The bulk of the EU COVID-19 response channelled through a swift and increased budget 
support disbursement in August 2020 contributed to preserving macroeconomic and fiscal 
stability by compensating for the drop in foreign exchange inflow. It was instrumental to 
secure  budget  execution  of  programmes  undertaken  by  the  Agricultural  Extensions 
Services to reduce socio-economic impact in rural areas and prevent food crisis. The EU 
scaling up and timing of the budget support disbursement was particularly predictable and timely for 
the  national  authorities  considering  the  early  2020/2021  State  Budget  cash management  needs. 
Indeed,  the  Government  faced  an  even  more  severe  public  financial  situation  from  mid-2020 
onwards. Strong contraction of the national gross domestic product (GDP) owing to the pandemic-
induced collapse of tourism and virus control measures (closing of the country’s international borders, 
quarantine measures and other domestic containment measures early in the pandemic) led to more 
pronounced adverse effects on the government’s overall fiscal position. This resulted in the dramatic 
decline of tax revenues and foreign exchange inflows, widening of the fiscal deficit and heavy reliance 
on debt financing. In this environment, the injection of EUR 8 million at the onset of the 2020/2021 
fiscal year provided the Government with valuable fiscal room for manoeuvre to scale up key public 
expenditure programmes related to the fiscal stimulus and food security packages. It also contributed 
to ensure funding, in an increasingly challenging fiscal environment, for the necessary economic and 
agricultural diversification reform agenda (such as non-sugar agriculture sub-sectors) of the country 
by  preserving  vital  state  budget  allocations  and  execution  for  related  key  public  expenditure 
programmes dedicated to the agriculture sector’s administrative, institutional and production reform 
policies.  

With an estimated contraction of more than 14% of GDP in 2020 in the aftermath of the 
April Tropical Cyclone Harold and the deep coronavirus-driven recession, characterised by 
a drop in tourist receipts due to travelling restrictions, the public finances further and 
sharply deteriorated after July 2020 compared to the 2019/2020 fiscal year. The planned 
fiscal deficit increased from 9% to close to an estimated 20% of GDP 2020/2021 (15% at the time 
of present reporting period). Fiscal revenues plunged by almost 35-40% during the second part of 
2000 while expenditures increased due to fiscal and economic stimulus initiatives through funding 

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to priority public expenditures programmes (Agricultural Response Package) in the agriculture and 
food and nutrition security sectors, whereas tax concessions were offered to the business community 
and socially vulnerable populations, in addition to the expansion of unemployment assistance and 
additional subsidies to cover the payment of minimum wages.  

The  EU  budget  support  payment  contributed  to  easing  the  continuum  in  the 
implementation of the national COVID-19 response. The latter entailed specific measures 
to  protect  livelihoods  in  order  to  reduce  the  negative  impact  of  the  pandemic  on  food 
systems and consolidate the resilience of the farmers’ community. The EU budget support 
notably included the scaling up of the existing Home Gardening Programme and a new Farm Support 
Package which aimed at boosting the production of short-term crops through distribution of seeds 
and materials. It preserved state budget financing for the agriculture sector strategy, including the 
specific national COVID-19 agricultural stimulus package, whereas several ministries saw a reduction 
in their budget appropriation between the 2019/2020 and 2020/2021 fiscal years in the wake of the 
subsequent recalibration and revision of State Budgets.        

As the EU disbursement represented almost 30% of the total annual 2020/2021 budget 
appropriation of the Ministry of Agriculture, the EU COVID-19 response also contributed 
to preserving from the pandemic and its related fiscal crisis institutional and financial 
governance reforms at national level, but especially at the agricultural sector level. The 
budget support intervention, together with the EU contribution to PFTAC and the EU regional technical 
assistance project on PFM, and with the influence of more sizeable budget support contributions from 
key donors in the region (World Bank and ADB as well as neighbouring countries such as Australia, 
New  Zealand  and  Japan),  further  strengthened  the  EU  policy  dialogue  on  PFM  reform  with  the 
national authorities. As one of the key players in the agriculture sector (since the progressive phasing 
out  of  other  donors  such  as  New  Zealand),  the  specific  focus  of  the  EU  COVID-19  intervention 
(dedicated  to  support  the  sustainable  rural  livelihood  intervention  of  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture; 
ongoing  comprehensive  institutional  and  financial  governance;  and  monitoring  and  evaluation 
reforms) paved the way for a more efficient management and reorientation of public resources as 
well as increased quality and accountability of public sector performance and service delivery in the 
agriculture  and  food  security  sector.  This,  consequently,  should  be  conducive to  stronger  national 
pandemic resilience in the near future. However, as the health situation deteriorated further in the 
region during 2021, entailing a protracted socio-economic and fiscal crisis, the Government of Fiji 
will  not  have  the  financial  capacity  to  offset  the  socio-economic  damages  alone  and  will  need 
additional budget support in the coming years. In that regard, a future EU post COVID-19 related 
response may have to consider stronger alignment with the most important budget support donor 
programmes (World Bank, ADB, DFAT and New Zealand) through, for example, a joint matrix of policy 
actions and/or performance indicators.   

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3. Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch 

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Source: Evaluation Team 

 
 
 
 
 
Country note - Kenya

 
 
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Contents 

Acronyms 

1.  Background............................................................................................................................................................................................. 1 

1.1 

1.2 

Country COVID-19 context and government response ...................................................................................... 1 

EU response ................................................................................................................................................................................ 2 

2.  Answers to Evaluation Questions .............................................................................................................................................. 3 

2.1 

2.2 

2.3 

2.4 

EQ 1 – RELEVANCE.................................................................................................................................................................. 3 

EQ 2 – VALUE ADDED ............................................................................................................................................................ 4 

EQ 3 – EFFICIENCY .................................................................................................................................................................. 5 

EQ 4 – EFFECTIVENESS ........................................................................................................................................................ 7 

3.  Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch ............................................................................................................................................... 8 

THE  PURPOSE  OF  THIS  COUNTRY  NOTE  IS  TO  INFORM  THE  FAST-TRACK  ASSESSMENT  OF  THE  EU  INITIAL 
RESPONSE AS A WHOLE AND NOT TO CARRY OUT AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RESPONSE IN THE COUNTRY. 

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Acronyms 

BS 

EIB 

EQ 

EU 

HQ 

INGO 

MIP 

MS 

MSME 

SME 

SRPC 

TE 

TEI(s) 

UN 

UNODC 

WB 

WHO 

Budget Support 

European Investment Bank 

Evaluation Question 

European Union 

Headquarter 

International Non-Governmental Organisation 

Multi Annual Indicative Programme 

Member State 

Micro, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 

Small and medium enterprise 

Sector Reform Performance Contract 

Team Europe 

Team Europe Initiatives 

United Nations 

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 

World Bank 

World Health Organisation 

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1. Background 

1.1  Country COVID-19 context and government response 

The first two cases of COVID-19 were confirmed on 13 March 2020, which prompted a rapid response 
from  the  Kenyan  Government  and  the  implementation  of  lockdown  measures  and  a  travel  ban. 
Despite the first peak of contaminations being reached in late July 2020, Kenyan authorities lifted 
restrictions on movement in and out of the country’s main cities and resumed international flights.1 
The  number  of  cases  subsequently  increased  in  October  and  November,  especially  in  the  capital, 
Nairobi, causing the World health Organisation (WHO) to worry about the potential spread to counties 
ill-equipped to handle an outbreak and to neighbouring  countries. In fact,  due to its geographical 
position, economic status and porous borders, Kenya has become a key transit country in the region.2  

Daily new confirmed COVID-19 cases in Kenya 

Measures to contain the spread of the virus have had  socio-economic repercussions in Kenya, as 
evidenced  by  the  economy  contracting  by  0.4  %  in  the  first  half  of  2020.3  Despite  a  slight 
improvement  in  the  second  half  of  the  year,  output  remained  below  2019  levels.  The  economic 
slowdown resulted in significant income losses, with many people falling below the poverty line of 
EUR 1.60 per day. The unemployment rate rose dramatically, essentially doubling by the end of 2020 
compared to the pre-COVID-19 level.4 The services, import and export sectors were strongly affected, 
with the tourism-related sectors being hit the hardest (83.3 % contraction in Q2). The pandemic also 
affected the agricultural sector, which employs 40 % of the population, leading to increased food 
insecurity. 

The  Government’s  response  consisted  of  several  economic  and  financial  measures  which  have 
contributed to a modest recovery in the second half of 2020. An immediate budgetary response 
of  EUR  53  million  was  provided  to  strengthen  the  health  system,  protect  the  most  vulnerable 

1 IOM - COVID-19 regional overview on mobility restrictions - 17 September 2020 
2 IOM - COVID-19 Strategic Response and Recovery Plan 2021 for East & Horn of Africa 
3 WB – Kenya economic update – November 2020 
4 WB – Kenya economic update – November 2020 

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households and support businesses. A fiscal stimulus package of EUR 422 million was adopted to 
cushion the economy from the depressive effects of the pandemic, targeting  among others youth 
worker  programmes,  education,  environment,  public  infrastructure,  agriculture  and  tourism.  Tax 
reliefs (income, corporate, turnover) and VAT rate reductions further complemented the response. 
The Central Bank of Kenya provided additional monetary stimulus and liquidity support, reduced 
its  key  policy  rate  from  8.25%  to  7.25  %,  and  granted  flexibility  to  banks  on  provisioning 
requirements  for  restructured  loans.  The  Kenyan  Government  developed  in  September  2020  a 
comprehensive response plan to the COVID-19 crisis around five pillars (private sector activity, policy, 
legal  and  institutional  reforms,  County  governments’  preparedness,  information  communication 
technology and human resource development). 

1.2  EU response 

The EU was among the first  to provide substantial  assistance in Kenya, as recognised by Kenyan 
leadership and the wider population. To date, Team Europe (TE) response in Kenya has totalled 
EUR 502 million, with EUR 134 million in grants from the EU and its Member States , and EUR 
368 million in loans from the EIB (European Investment Bank) and European Development Finance 
Institutions  (EDFIs).  The  EUR  90  million  Commission’s  support  to  Kenya  was  twofold.  Firstly,  an 
emergency and health response aimed to strengthen national and county capacity to manage, detect, 
and respond to COVID-19 while also supporting communities’ and vulnerable households. Through 
DG ECHO, the response also addressed health, water and sanitation issues in the refugee camps, in 
support of camp dwellers and host communities. Secondly, the socio-economic response included a 
new COVID-19 budget support (BS) programme (for which the EU disbursed EUR 30 million in 
November 2020) and  projects  on facilitating access to suitable  finance for private enterprises. In 
addition, it included projects aimed to ensure safe trade, to keep critical supply chains opened, and 
to guarantee food security and access to essential medicines. 

On the TE side, Germany and France donated equipment against COVID-19 to the Government in 
April 2020. France topped up its support to the Red Cross for cash transfer with EUR 0.5 million 
(around 8000 beneficiaries) and, in December 2020, provided EUR 30 million in concessional loans 
(via the World Bank Public Finance Reform programme).  Germany (EUR 1 million)  and Denmark 
(EUR  3  million)  contributed  to  the  Oxfam-led  consortium  supporting  direct  cash  transfers  in 
Mombasa. Finland (EUR 0.93 million), Poland (EUR 99,000), and Sweden (EUR 2.1 million) funded 
the World Food Programme to provide cash transfers and nutrition support to population in needs. 
The Netherlands contributed EUR 3 million to the Safe Trade Emergency Facility of Trademark East 
Africa, and was followed by Denmark which signed, in February 2021, a EUR 17 million contribution 
(for Kenya and the region). 

Three interventions were selected for an in-depth review, thus have been given greater attention in 
the note, especially in evaluation question (EQ) 4. Below the list of the selected interventions in Kenya: 

•  Health: 

o  1.  Health  and  social  safety  net  response  to  COVID-19  at  the  community  level  in 
Kenya - Kenya Red Cross (EUR 2.5 million), Amref (EUR 2.5 million), Oxfam (EUR 5 
million) 

•  Socio-econ support 

o  2. Safe Trade Emergency Facility’ to mitigate the impact on trade of the COVID-19 

crisis in Kenya - Trademark Africa (EUR 5 million) 

o  3. Kenya Micro, Small and Medium-sized enterprise Access Finance during the COVID-

19 emergency (blending) - EIB (EUR 20 million) 

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2. Answers to Evaluation Questions 

2.1  EQ 1 – RELEVANCE 

EQ1:  To  what  extent  did  the  initial  EU  global  response  to  the  COVID-19  pandemic 
through  the  Team  Europe  (TE)  country  packages  address  the  needs  and  priorities  of 
partner countries and regions in each country context; in line with the three priorities 
of the Team Europe approach? 

Summary 

The EU response in Kenya was relevant in terms of timing, partnerships, Team Europe (TE) thematic 
priorities  and  cross-cutting  issues.  It  was  acknowledged  by  the  various  stakeholders  that 
interventions  were  especially  rapidly  implemented  compared  to  previous  EU  interventions.  The 
response  contributed  to  answering  immediate  country  needs,  including  those  arising  from 
prevention and containment measures. However, the interventions are limited in their potential to 
strengthen local health systems and to enhance resilience to epidemic outbreaks. 

The  EU  response  to  COVID-19  in  Kenya  was  largely  timely,  in  line  with  EU  strategic 
documents and based on needs identified by knowledgeable local humanitarian partners. 
Indeed, the local partners and authorities have highly appreciated the speed with which funding has 
been committed, partners contracted and interventions implemented.5 It can also be noted that the 
potentially disproportionate burden of COVID-19 on women and girls was well identified and tackled 
in interventions, including through targeted cash transfers and initiatives to support women traders 
at the borders.6  

The  response,  while  addressing  all  three  Team  Europe  (TE)  priorities,  focused  on 
socioeconomic issues where the needs were relatively less met by other development partners and 
where most of the expertise of the EU Delegation lied.7 DG ECHO also brought specific attention to 
the continuation of services in refugee camps8 and has provided funding to the WHO at the global 
level, which in part benefitted to Kenya. 

Among  the  main  challenges  lied  the  facts  that  the  EU  had  little  to  no  experience  in  health 
programming  in  the  country  to  build  on  and  the  limited  funding  still  available  (non-
committed) from the ongoing EDF, as the epidemic outbreak happened at the end of a multi-
annual  financial  period.9  Those  challenges  were  met  by  engaging  in  new  partnerships  with  well-
established International NGOs, such as the Kenyan Red Cross and Oxfam, possessing the relevant 
knowledge and by redirecting funding from other projects, in agreement with Kenyan authorities.10 A 
main limitation for the social safety net response was the coverage and duration of the project in 
relation to needs. Oxfam estimated that almost 1.5 out of 2.6 million Kenyans in Nairobi’s informal 
settlements  could  be  currently  food  insecure.  Even  combined  with  the  range  of  other  safety  net 
initiatives implemented by Government and partners, complete coverage is unlikely. 

5 Interviews, May 2021 
6 Interviews, May 2021 
7 Interviews, May 2021; Team Europe Response to COVID-19 Tracker (July 2020 and March 2021); Strategic documents 
8 Interviews, May 2021 
9 Interviews, May 2021 
10 Interviews, May 2021; Team Europe Response to COVID-19 Tracker; Project level documentation 

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The  ownership  of  the  response  by  local  authorities  differed  among  interventions  and 
varied  over  time.  For  example,  the  cash  transfer  program  was  set  up  originally  with  the 
abovementioned  International  NGOs  with  a  plan  to  eventually  hand  it  over  to  the  Government. 
However,  despite  a  funding  possibility,  this  did  not  take  place  as  the  Government  had  other 
priorities.11 

The  interventions  can  only  be  expected  to  have  a  limited  impact  on  global  epidemic 
resilience and health system strengthening. Emergency and health interventions are not akin to 
generate greater resilience and capacity of the health sector. The speed and smoothness of the EU 
response did broker access for EU representatives to high-level national stakeholders and allowed to 
initiate dialogue in subjects where the EU was absent before. 

2.2  EQ 2 – VALUE ADDED 

EQ2: To what extent has the Team Europe (TE) initial response added benefits to what 
would have resulted from actions taken by the EU institutions and EU MS on their own? 

Summary 
Building on the Kenya  joint programming experience, the TE approach has positively influenced 
coordination and communication channels across EU institutions and MSs in the COVID response. 
With the EU Delegation playing a key role promoting collaborative mechanisms and ensuring the 
relevance of EU action to Government priorities, TE approach has the potential to give impetus for 
increased MS’s buy-in into new initiatives and EU partnerships with a broader set of stakeholders, 
including  International  NGOs  and  UN  agencies.  The  strong  TE  narrative  was  instrumental  in 
enhancing the political dialogue and increased EU visibility at the Government level and to some 
extent, in the donor community. 

The  TE  approach  has  positively  influenced  coordination  and  communication  channels 
across EU institutions in the COVID response. Available documentation shows the TE approach 
encouraged a fluid and cross-sectoral dialogue across EU institutions both in country and at HQs.12 
The  EU  Delegation  has  been  working  closely  with  EU  MS  embassies  and  the  EIB  to  provide  a 
comprehensive  COVID  response  package,  including  two  Team  Europe  Initiatives  (TEIs)  on 
Digitalisation and the Green Deal. The TE approach builds on several prior experiences of joint work 
including joint programming exercises: the TEIs built on the Kenya Joint Cooperation Strategy 2018-
2022 and informed the new Multi Annual Indicative Programme (MIP) 2021-2017.13 
The EU Delegation played a key role in advancing a TE perspective, notably enhancing the 
relevance  of  the  EU  response  to  Government  priorities  and  recovery  plans  and  pushing  for 
collaborative mechanisms (weekly meetings with EU operational team, political and policy dialogue 
with  key  stakeholders,  tracking  tools).  Most  interviewees  strongly  welcomed  such  active  role  and 
emphasized  how  the  TE  approach  facilitated  division  of  labour  in  some  cases  (such  as  DG  ECHO 
adapting its work on refugee issues to emerging COVID-19 related challenges) as well as a rapid 
reorientation and mobilisation of available resources.14 In areas where delays were experienced (such 
as  in  trade  or  access-to-finance  projects),  these  were  mainly  due  to  the  complexity  and  the 
specificities of chosen tools (such as blended finance procedures) rather than to poor coordination.15 
 TE  provided  a  framework  to  design  specific  joint  actions  with  MSs,  mobilising  their 
respective resources, networks and expertise (policy dialogue, technical assistance, finance…). 

11 Interviews, May 2021 
12 Interviews, May 2021; Team Europe Response to COVID-19 Tracker (March 2021) 
13 Interviews, May 2021 
14 Interviews, May 2021 
15 Commission-EIB Access finance key point, 2020; Interviews, May 2021 

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Documentation stresses the strong potential of complementarities built through the TEIs on Green 
Deal and Digitalisation. In addition to the possibilities for blending financing tools, TEIs opened new 
opportunities for MS’s buy-in. For example, the Green Deal initiative would allow Germany, France 
and  EIB  to  join  forces  on  clean  urban  transport  and  affordable  green  housing,  while  aligning  to 
Denmark’s  plans  to  upscale  its  Green  Growth  programme.16  While  it  is  too  early  to  gauge  actual 
impact,  it is understood  the  TEIs  have  the potential  of  being  “game  changers”  in the  way the  EU 
Delegation  coordinates  with  MSs  building  on  the  Joint  Cooperation  Strategy  and  “working  better 
together” approach. In contrast, some interviewees noted the tendency of some MSs to promote their 
own visibility rather than an “act as Europe” message, in a country that has a history of competition 
among powers for influence.17 
 As part of the TE approach, increased partnerships on specific areas of interventions were 
developed  with  non-EU  donors,  World  Bank  (WB),  UN  Agencies  (IFAD  (International  Fund  for 
Agricultural  Development),  United  Nations  Office  on  Drugs  and  Crime  (UNODC),  WHO)  and 
International NGOs (e.g., Oxfam, Red Cross and Care), to advance COVID-related support to the most 
vulnerable  populations,  in  sensitive  settings  and  at  community  level  (in  refugee  camps,  informal 
settlements  etc.).  In  this  regard,  an  interview  with  an  International  NGO  suggested  that  the  EU 
Delegation facilitation of dialogue, rapid reaction, and easing of certain technical and bureaucratic 
processes, constitute good practice.18 Documentation also suggests that TEIs have the potential to 
give impetus to EU cooperation with other donors, International NGOs, and research. For example, 
digitalisation has been identified as a key area of enhanced UN-EU partnership in Kenya at the Joint 
UN-EU retreat held in March 2020. 
 Despite limited documentation, interviews suggest that a strong TE narrative has been 
pushed  through  communication  outreach  and  policy  dialogue,  thereby  increasing  EU 
visibility. A series of stories from the field has been published on the EU Delegation website. Reports 
of press conferences, small videos and social media presence point to a potential positive effect on 
the EU’s clout, notably at the government level and in the donor community. However, it is difficult 
to gauge the extent to which EU communication gained traction at the population level. 

2.3  EQ 3 – EFFICIENCY 

EQ3:  To  what  extent  have  the  individual  aid  modalities  and  other  aid  delivery 
mechanisms and their combinations been, and currently are being, efficient and flexible 
enough for use in Team Europe’s COVID-19 response under conditions of the COVID-19 
crisis? 

Summary 

Flexibility,  implementation  speed  and  monitoring  varied  across  aid  modalities.  Humanitarian 
responses,  BS  as  well  as  the  Safe  Trade  Emergency  Facility  intervention  have  been  relatively 
amenable, fast and well-monitored.  Blending proved to be inappropriate as a rapid emergency 
response  modality.  The  handling  by  the  Kenyan  Government  of  suspicion  of  corruption  in  the 
management of COVID-19 funds has been duly considered by the Commission before disbursing 
the single fixed tranche of the COVID-19 BS.  

Humanitarian  responses  have  been  a  great  deal  more  amenable  and  therefore  more 
adaptable than other aid modalities in terms of absorbing reallocated funding to provide 
quick  support  in  addressing  immediate  health  and  social  needs.  DG  ECHO  has  allocated 
funding to the WHO (EUR 2.3 million) to enable them to provide support through governmental health 
channels, while at the same time funding International NGOs to provide support to refugees based 

16 Team Europe Response to COVID-19 Tracker (September 2020) 
17 Interviews, May 2021 
18 Interviews, May 2021 

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in the Dadaab and Kakuma camps in the north of the country. However, there was no modification 
in the regional Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) for COVID-19 which would have generated 
an increased funding base. The EU Delegation and MSs have also supported humanitarian agencies 
(Oxfam,  Kenyan  Red  Cross)  to  provide  cash  support  to  slum  areas  within  Nairobi,  with  the  first 
payment released in August 2020. Such relevant activities have happened quickly and efficiently, 
demonstrating good co-ordination between MSs and the EU Delegation. 

The EU response through BS has been swift with a total of EUR 37 million disbursed in 
July and November 2020 from two Sector Reform Performance Contracts (SRPCs). A newly 
dedicated e COVID-19 BS programme was signed very early on (June 23rd) prior to the first peak of 
contaminations  in  the  end  of  July.  The  single  fixed  tranche  (EUR  30  million)  was  disbursed  in 
November  2020.  Moreover,  the  fixed  tranche  instalment  (EUR  7  million)  initially  foreseen  under 
PASEDE was disbursed as initially planned in July 2020.  

”Classical” operations were also mobilised swiftly:  DG INTPA Safe Trade Emergency Facility 
intervention  (EUR  4  million)  implemented  through  TradeMark  East  Africa,  which  used  reallocated 
funds for the pandemic started in May 2020. 

The use of blending was not appropriate to provide a rapid emergency response. Indeed, 
blending operations usually go through a heavy design and approval process which takes almost a 
year. In Kenya, the EU reorientated funds originally attributed to the EIB for infrastructure operations 
to enhance the capacity of financial institutions to continue accepting the risk of lending to private 
enterprises, especially small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Discussions started in May 2020 but 
the  contract  between  the  Commission  and  the  EIB  could  only  be  signed  in  December  2020.  The 
project  was in its inception phase mid-May 2021. This substantially reduced the relevance  of the 
project as an immediate emergency response to COVID-19. 

The monitoring systems in place varied across these interventions. Monitoring processes are 
inherently built in for all humanitarian interventions to highlight where positive changes take place, 
as is the case for the Oxfam cash support, and where not. DG INTPA Safe Trade Facility intervention 
monitoring  system  was  well  established,  incorporating  a  national  oversight  committee  with 
government  representatives,  with  Trademark  producing  monthly  reporting.  For  the  blending 
operation, the  EIB manages and implements the intervention. Since it was starting only early/mid 
2021, no monitoring had yet taken place.   

The handling by the Government of Kenya of suspicion of corruption in the management 
of  COVID-19  funds  has  been  duly  considered  by  the  Commission  before  disbursing  the 
COVID-19  BS  single  fixed  tranche  (EUR  30  million).  In  July  2020,  media  and  CSOs  raised 
suspicions of corruption in the procurement of COVID-19 material  by the Kenya Medical  Supplies 
Authority (KEMSA). Following the scandal, the EU Delegation actively engaged with the anti-corruption 
bodies in Kenya, liaised with development partners to gain traction through a coordinated response, 
monitored the findings of the initial audit reports, and raised concerns and expectations during policy 
dialogue meetings. Furthermore, in order to enhance public scrutiny of the funds allocated towards 
addressing the Covid 19 crisis, the EU Del awarded a CSO grant of  EUR 919 354 whose  objective 
was to analyse and publicise, the allocation and use of Public Funds in relation to the COVID-19 Crisis 
for the Financial years 2019/2020 and 2020/2021 at National and County Government Levels in 
order to contribute to public feedback on resource allocation, utilisation and effectiveness  during the 
crisis. . Further government-led and donor-led investigations were envisaged. End October 2020, the 

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EU Delegation estimated that the Ministry of Health reacted swiftly following the audit report19 and 
that the government’s overall response to the suspicions had been credible thus far.20 

2.4  EQ 4 – EFFECTIVENESS 

To  what  extent  has  the  EU  response  been  successful  in  progressing  towards  the 
objectives associated with the COVID response? 

Summary  
The Commission agreed with the  Kenyan  Government to procure necessary  personal  protective 
equipment  (PPE)  kits  and  laboratory  diagnostic,  which  was  disseminated  rapidly  through  well-
established partners. Emergency support to urban households was adequate, but its duration too 
short. TE’s support to the Government’s socio-economic recovery efforts is only starting and results 
are limited. 

The EU provided  EUR 5 million  for  PPE, testing kits and ambulances. This was channelled 
through the Kenyan Red Cross and Amref over a timeframe of eight months. Large volumes of PPE 
could be procured and delivered due to reduced prices. 800,000 PPE kits were delivered by Amref 
alone, while 4,000 ambulance services were provided to pregnant women in rural areas. In addition, 
increased  testing  capacity  was  observed  by  partners,  albeit  low  in  the  refugee  camps.  Increased 
social stress and gender-based violence within the country and the refugee camps are most likely 
consequences of the pandemic. 

 Emergency  economic  support  to  urban  households  provided  through  the  Oxfam 
consortium’s  social  safety  net  made  an  important  contribution  to  meeting  short-term 
survival  needs.  The  amount  transferred  seemed  sufficient  to  cover  most  households  and  food 
needs,21 but the duration has been insufficient. There has not yet been adequate collective discussion 
between the actors on (harmonization of) transfer values, and on whether these safety nets should 
be designed with humanitarian objectives as paramount or with social protection system building 
and complementarity to government in mind. The intentions of Oxfam, the Kenyan Red Cross and 
Amref to influence the Government on the need for social  protection reforms  remain to be  seen, 
although all are well experienced in this competing area. 
 Not  enough  evidence  could  be  collected  on  the  effectiveness  of  Commission’s  socio-
economic  response.  The  revival  of  business  activity  will  strongly  depend  on  the 
Government’s  post-COVID-19  Economic  Recovery  Strategy  yet  to  be  implemented.    BS 
disbursements provided limited fiscal space: they represented 0.25 % of 2020 total public revenues. 
They allowed the injection of timely liquidities into the Government’s budget (e.g., EUR 7 million in 
July  i.e.,  at  the  peak  of  the  crisis  and  EUR  30  million  in  November).  This  was  crucial  in  a  tense 
macroeconomic environment where Kenya’s fiscal deficit was already high before the start of the 
crisis (i.e., 7.9 % of GDP during Fiscal Year 2018/2019) and debt servicing obligations took up 4 % 
of GDP the same year, around a quarter of the budget in May 2020.  Commission support focusing 
on Micro, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (MSMEs) through a blending operation with the EIB 
has not delivered results yet since the credit lines are supposed to be delivered in June 2021 at the 
earliest. 

19 The draft audit report – published in September 2020 – highlighted breaches of competition best-practices and estimated 
that overpricing by companies may have cost KEMSA approximately EUR 17 million. The Ministry of Health suspended three 
officers as well as the non-compliant firms mentioned in the report, called on the Anti-Corruption Commission to investigate 
KEMSA, and appointed a multi-sector team to review internal processes at KEMSA, issue recommendations and support its 
new management. 
20 Note on the BS Eligibility Assessment, 29/10/2020 & Note to the file, 19/11/2020 
21 The consortium provided a transfer value to ensure that households receive an income equivalent to 50% of the multi-
sector COVID-adjusted MEB as calculated by the Cash Working group. 

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3. Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch 

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Country note - Sierra Leone

 
 
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Contents 

1.  Background..................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 

1.1. 

1.2. 

Country COVID-19 context and government response ............................................................................ 1 

European Union (EU) response ............................................................................................................................... 2 

2.  Answers to Evaluation Questions (EQs) ......................................................................................................................... 3 

2.1. 

2.2. 

2.3. 

2.4. 

EQ 1 – Relevance ........................................................................................................................................................... 3 

EQ 2 – Value added ...................................................................................................................................................... 5 

EQ 3 – Efficiency ............................................................................................................................................................ 6 

EQ 4 – Effectiveness .................................................................................................................................................... 7 

3.  Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch .................................................................................................................................... 10 

THE  PURPOSE  OF  THIS  COUNTRY  NOTE  IS  TO  INFORM  THE  FAST-TRACK  ASSESSMENT  OF  THE  EU  INITIAL 
RESPONSE AS A WHOLE. IT IS NOT DESIGNED TO BE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RESPONSE IN THE COUNTRY. 

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Acronyms 

CBO 

CRS 

Community Based Organisation 

Christian Relief Services 

CODOHSAPA 

Centre of Dialogue on Human Settlements and Poverty Alleviation 

COVAX 

DFID 

DG 

ECHO 

COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access 

Department for International Development 

Directorate-General 

European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations 

ECOWAS 

Economic Community of West African States 

EIB 

EU 

EUD 

EQ 

FCC 

FDI 

European Investment Bank 

European Union 

Delegation of the European Union 

Evaluation Question 

Freetown City Council 

Foreign direct investment 

FEDURP 

Federation of Urban and Rural poor 

GIZ 

IGC 

ILO 

IMF 

INTPA 

M&E 

MS 

MOPED 

NaCSA 

NGO 

NPRP 

PHU 

PPE 

QAERP 

RCDSC 

Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 

International Growth Centre 

International Labour Organization 

International Monetary Fund 

International Partnerships 

Monitoring and Evaluation 

Member states 

Ministry of Planning and Economic Development 

National Commission for Social Action 

Non-governmental organisations  

National COVID-19 Preparedness and Response Plan 

Primary Health Care Units 

Personal protective equipment 

Quick Action Economic Response Plan 

Regional Centre for Disease Surveillance and Control 

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SSN 

TE 

TEI 

UNCDF 

WASH 

WB 

Social Safety Net programme 

Team Europe 

Team Europe initiative 

United Nations Capital Development Fund 

Water, hygiene and sanitation 

World Bank 

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1. Background 

1.1  Country COVID-19 context and government response 

As early as February 2020, the Government rolled out actions and measures to prevent the pandemic 
from entering the country, including increased surveillance in the Lungi international airports and at 
the major land border posts. Furthermore, a curfew was imposed, schools and markets were closed, 
and services of worship, bars and restaurant hours were limited. On 24 March 2020, President Julius 
Maada Bio declared a State of Public Emergency in the country for a period of 12 months. The first 
case  of  COVID-19  was  confirmed  on  31  March  2020.  The  country’s  Minister  of  Defence  was 
appointed  Interim Coordinator  of  the  Emergency  Operations Centre,  which  was  renamed  National 
COVID-19  Emergency  Response  Centre  (NACOVERC).  Similar  structures  were  also  established  at 
district level and District Coordinators for the 16 districts of the country appointed to coordinate the 
sub-national response. Measures put in place included a robust social mobilisation drive that includes, 
CSOs, journalist, artists, religious and community leaders; limiting meetings and public gathering to 
not more than 20 people; promotion of virtual meetings; imposition of inter-district and two-three 
day national lockdown; curfew; establishment of treatment centres for the management of positive 
patients and isolation centres for primary contacts of positive patient; promotion of hand washing in 
homes, communities, offices and other public places; mandatory wearing masks in public place. 

In March 2020, the Ministry of Health and Sanitation led the development of the nation’s COVID-19 
Response Plan. This plan was replaced by the May 2020 COVID-19 Preparedness and Response 
Plan  (NPRP). The key  objectives of the plan were to mitigate the spread of  COVID-19, minimise 
deaths, protect wider health services and mitigate the impact of COVID-19 on livelihoods. To achieve 
these objectives, the response plan adopted a strategic approach built on previous experience dealing 
with  health  threats  (Ebola,  malaria,  typhoid,  cholera)  and  focused  on  surveillance,  isolation, 
quarantine, testing, clinical care and behavioural change. Sierra Leone’s strategy to contain COVID-
19 built on the pre-existing Ebola response infrastructure and strong coordination between central 
and local authorities. 

Fearing the economic impact and social instability resulting from extended lockdown measures, and 
given  the  decrease  in  the  observed  number  of  new  cases,  the  Government  gradually  lifted 
restrictions.  Despite  the  rather  intangible  presence  of  the  virus  and  low  transmission  rates,  pre-
existing  vulnerabilities  and  increased  economic  hardship  have  worsened  the  conditions  of  the 
majority  of  the  population.  Socio-economic  consequences  of  the  containment  measures  include 
increased  food  insecurity,  (gender)  inequalities,  degradation  of  children’s  education,  higher 
unemployment  rates,  strong  decrease  in  economic  activity  (especially  in  the  trade  and  tourism 
sectors), and decline in foreign direct investment (FDI) flows and remittances.1 Since the pandemic 
affects  both  lives  and  livelihoods,  the  Government  of  Sierra  Leone  developed  a  Quick  Action 
Economic  Response  Plan  (QAERP).  The  primary  objective  of  the  QAERP  is  to  maintain 
macroeconomic and financial stability as well as mitigate the impact of the pandemic on households 
and businesses. The programme has the following objectives: 

-  Building and maintaining an adequate stock level of essential commodities at stable prices 

- 

Providing support to hardest-hit businesses to enable them to continue operations and avert 
layoffs of employees 

1 International Growth Centre (IGC) - United Nations COVID-19 socio-economic response plan for Sierra Leone, 23 Apr 2021 

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- 

Expanding safety nets to vulnerable groups 

-  Supporting labour-intensive public works 

- 

Providing assistance for the local production and processing of staple food items 

The total funds required for the implementation of the QAERP were estimated at EUR 129 million.2 
As  of  the  end  of  July  2020,  the  Government  had  committed  EUR  77  million3  while  multilateral 
partners had committed EUR 20 million.4 

1.2  European Union (EU) response 

The EU committed around EUR 142.5 million in response to the crisis in Sierra Leone:5  

- 

- 

The  health  response  mainly  consisted  of  repurposing  15  to  20  existing  interventions, 
including adapting operations and adhering to new COVID-19 protocols. Adaptations focused 
on disease management, health facilities, access to basic services including food provision, 
shelters, border management, setting up isolation centres and provision of structural support 
via  the  Civil  Service  and  Public  Administration.  The  EU  also  funded  several  awareness 
campaigns  to  contribute  to  better  prevention  and  fighting  misinformation.  Limited  fresh 
funds were committed for a COVID-19-specific EUR 2.2 million grant to a consortium made 
up of the Freetown City Council and various NGOs focusing on WASH, health and livelihoods. 
Similarly,  ongoing  support  to  decentralisation  focusing  on  WASH  and  agriculture  was 
repurposed to support COVID-19 preparedness, socio-economic response and recovery in the 
targeted districts with four additional grants signed and a top-up of around EUR 2 million 
invested in emergency activities.6 
The  socio-economic  response  included  a  EUR  25  million  budget  support  disbursement 
under the ongoing State Building Contract (frontloading and conversion of the 2020 variable 
tranche into a fixed tranche)7. A COVID-19-specific top-up of EUR 5.2 million was allocated 
to  the  World  Bank  social  safety  nets  project,  providing  households  with  income  support. 
Additional interventions contributed to the response despite not being specifically designed 
for  this  purpose.  These  included  two  major  programmes  focusing  on  food  security,  job 
creation and education (BASF; Jobs and Growth Programme).8  

-  No  emergency  response  was  specifically  targeted  to  COVID-19  given  the  absence  of 
critical humanitarian needs. However, DG ECHO contributed to the crisis response through a 
EUR  4  million  grant  to  WHO,  consisting  of  a  single  delivery  humanitarian  flight  providing 
Personal protection equipment (PPE).9 

EU MS presence is limited in Sierra Leone, with Germany now pulling out from the country and Ireland 
mostly working on gender and democracy. The TE approach materialised in the collaboration between 
the Commission and Ireland combining resources up to EUR 1.5 million. The joint response specifically 
focused on supporting local authorities in addressing the COVID-19 crisis. Similarly, a Team Europe 
Initiative “Green Alliance with Sierra Leone” was designed in cooperation with Germany (Energy and 

2 USD 151.95 million. 
3 USD 91.07 million. 
4 USD 23.354 million. 
5 Inventory compiled by the Evaluation Team 
6 Sierra Leone Team Europe COVID-19 response tracker, December 2020, March 2021 update and Interviews 
7 Rider n°4 to the Financing Agreement SL/FED/040- 115 signed on 25th June 2018 
8 Sierra Leone Team Europe COVID-19 response tracker, December 2020, March 2021 update and Interviews 
9  Sierra Leone Team Europe COVID-19 response tracker, December 2020, March 2021 update and Interviews 

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Agriculture) and Ireland (Nutrition and Gender), the European Investment Bank, the European Private 
Sector and European Civil Society Organisations.10 (See Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch) 

Two  interventions  were  selected  for  an  in-depth  review  and  have  therefore  been  given  greater 
attention  in  this  note,  especially  in  Evaluation  Question  (EQ)  4.  Below  is  the  list  of  selected 
interventions in Sierra Leone: 

•  Health 

o  1. DG INTPA: Freetown preparedness and response plan, Freetown City Council (FCC) 
- Christian Relief Services (CRS) and its co-applicants (Freetown City Council; Caritas 
Freetown;  Centre  of  Dialogue  on  Human  Settlements  and  Poverty  Alleviation 
(CODOHSAPA); Federation of Urban and Rural poor (FEDURP); Sierra Leone Red Cross 
Society) - (EUR 2.2 million) 

•  Socio-economic 

o  2. DG INTPA: Safety Net Project – World Bank (WB) (EUR 5.2 million) 

2. Answers to Evaluation Questions 

2.1  EQ 1 – Relevance 

EQ1:  To  what  extent  did  the  initial  EU  global  response  to  the  COVID-19  pandemic 
through  the  Team  Europe  (TE)  country  packages  address  the  needs  and  priorities  of 
partner countries and regions in each country context in line with the three priorities of 
the Team Europe approach? 

Summary 

The TE package in Sierra Leone adequately covered COVID-19 priority areas, through repurposing 
activities under on-going and upcoming contracts in line with the objectives of the NPRP and the 
QAERP. Coordination among Government, donors and implementation partners started early on, 
and  TE  appeared  to  respond  swiftly  to  the  COVID-19  crisis,  although  lack  of  funding  limited 
coverage. In general, TE also worked in close coordination with central and local authorities. The 
TE response package targeted medium-/long-term challenges through its strong linkages with on-
going country-level efforts, although little was done on capacity building 

The  TE  package  in  Sierra  Leone  adequately  covered  COVID-19  priority  areas,  through 
repurposing activities under on-going and upcoming contracts in line with the objectives 
of the NPRP and the QAERP: 11 

• 

In terms of funding, the emphasis lay heavily on the socio-economic response, through (i) 
frontloading  budget  support  payments  to  improve  the  government’s  fiscal  position;  (ii) 
providing  recovery  support  to  local  authorities;  and  (iii)  topping  up  the  Social  Safety  Net 
programme (SSN) to support informal workers in urban areas (an uncommon target group 
particularly  hit  by  the  pandemic).  These  were  further  complemented  by  targeted 
interventions within the framework of the on-going food security, job creation and education 
programmes (such as soap and food production).  

10 Sierra Leone Team Europe COVID-19 response tracker, December 2020, March 2021 update and Interviews 
11 Sierra Leone Team Europe COVID-19 response tracker, December 2020, March 2021 update and Interviews 

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•  A comprehensive health response was realised despite the health sector not being a priority 
for the EU in Sierra Leone. This happened largely through (i) repurposing grants to manifold 
NGOs and local authorities in order to strengthen preparedness and response capacities – in 
particular in Freetown as the epicentre of the epidemic – and (ii) prevention and awareness 
campaigns to combat fake news and the alarming refusal of the population to comply with 
safety protocols. 

•  An emergency response was not included, given the absence of critical humanitarian needs.  

Coordination among Government, donors and implementation partners started early on, 
and  TE  appeared  to  respond  swiftly  to  the  COVID-19  crisis,  despite  the  relatively  late  in-
country arrival of the pandemic, the limited number of cases and the partial evacuation of EU staff.12 
First,  repurposing  on-going  activities  allowed  for  quick  and  coordinated  action  through  existing 
operational modes. Two prime examples were the budget support payments which were frontloaded 
by  six  months  and  transformed  into  a  Fixed  Tranche,  and  the  actions  through  NGOs  and  local 
authorities with strong in-field work experience and networks. The top-up to the SSN for unconditional 
cash  transfers  exemplified  an  alternative  approach  for  quick  response,  where  TE  channelled 
resources through the existing  cash transfer delivery system of the World Bank and  the National 
Commission for Social Action (NaCSA). Second, EU administrative procedures were simplified to allow 
faster  mobilisation  and  implementation.  Finally,  Government,  donors,  implementing  partners  and 
citizens could build upon the experience and capacity gained during past crises (Ebola, landslide).  

Lack  of  funding  limited  coverage  and  could  have  impeded  appropriate  adaptation  of 
modalities to a deteriorating situation. The EUD expected in particular a deterioration with the 
rainy  season  and  associated  flooding,  in  which  case  additional  funding  could  have  increased 
coverage. Fortunately, a massive outbreak did not occur in Sierra Leone. 

TE worked in close coordination with central and local authorities.13 This was firstly achieved 
by explicitly tying action to the NPRP and QAERP, and by regular correspondence with the Government 
and development partners. It should be noted though that the latter applied less to the health sector 
response with its smaller projects, which ran directly through NGOs and local authorities, and hence 
implied  limited  government  ownership.  Secondly,  interventions  were  implemented  in  close 
coordination  with  local  authorities  (in  line  with  the  decentralisation  policy),  although  inadequate 
resources at district level remain a concern. The latter illustrates the strong polarisation between 
Government and opposition, which also complicates cooperation and crisis management. 

The TE response package also targeted medium-/long-term challenges through its strong 
linkages  with  on-going  country-level  efforts,  although  little  was  done  on  capacity 
building.14  TE  response  activities  existed  within  on-going  contracts,  several  of  which  particularly 
target structural change (e.g. the State Building Contract; the food security, job creation and education 
programmes). Moreover, the support to SSN through WB and NACSA is foreseen to be continued in 
the next programming cycle; conversely, this is not intended for the health response. The COVID-19 
response also did not compromise ongoing EU activities in support of the government’s Medium Term 
Development Plan (e.g. construction works). However, interviewees indicated that little attention was 
paid  in the TE response to capacity  building, and that structural, institutional and fiscal problems 
remain.  

12 Interviews 
13 Interviews 
14 Interviews 

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2.2  EQ 2 – Value added 

EQ2: To what extent did the Team Europe initial response provide additional benefits 
beyond what would have resulted from actions taken by the EU institutions and EU MS 
on their own? 

Summary 
Despite signs of coordinated efforts from EU institutions and EU MS, there is little evidence of a 
specific TE approach in this process. Considering the relatively low magnitude of COVID-19 so far, 
the  limited  number  of  EU  instruments  mobilised,  and  the  low  presence  of  MS  (only  two  have 
permanent representation), the TE approach was quite limited in Sierra Leone. Substantial support 
was, however, provided to local authorities and (EU) NGOs. EU visibility efforts were clear during 
COVID-19, and the TE approach contributed to enhancing the EU’s profile, but mainly among its 
immediate partners. 

There  is  little  evidence  of  the  extent  to  which  the  Team  Europe  approach  improved 
coordination among EU institutions in Sierra Leone. Available documents and interviews do not 
provide enough information of inter-services and agencies cooperation beyond regular information 
exchanges  and  joint  monitoring  meetings  with  national  stakeholders  and  MS  in  the  country. 
Considering the relatively low magnitude of COVID-19 spreading in a country that has faced Ebola, 
there  was  no  humanitarian  emergency  support  planned  for  COVID-19,  but  rather  a  contingency 
response. In that sense, ECHO focused on monitoring the situation in the region and in the country 
and  stood  ready  to  intervene,  should  the  humanitarian  situation  deteriorate  whatever  the  cause, 
including the recent Ebola outbreak in neighbouring Guinea. There was a sense of flexibility and pro-
active  dialogue  across  EU  institutions,  notably  between  the  EU  Delegation  and  the  European 
Investment Bank (EIB) should additional funds be needed to boost economic resilience and access to 
finance.15 

The TE approach entailed joint responses developed by the EU Delegation with Germany 
and Ireland – the two MS present in the country – to mainly help national authorities to address the 
health and socio-economic needs increasing with the COVID-19 crisis in line with the decentralisation 
policy in place in the country.16 A “Team Europe Initiative Supporting District Level Response to COVID-
19” was launched by the EU and Ireland, while a Team Europe Initiative “Green Alliance with Sierra 
Leone” was designed in cooperation with Germany (Energy and Agriculture) and Ireland (Nutrition 
and Gender), the European Investment Bank, the European Private Sector and European Civil Society 
Organisations, to open space for the participation of EU businesses and EU NGOs in the country.17  

There are signs of a comprehensive and coordinated effort from EU institutions  and EU 
MS to support local and national authorities, as well as European and local NGOs, in their 
response to COVID-19. For example, the EU doubled its support to the Regional Centre for Disease 
Surveillance  and  Control  (RCDSC)  in  the  Economic  Community  of  West  African  States  (ECOWAS) 
region, managed through the Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and co-funded 
with  the  German  Government,  from  EUR  5  million  to  EUR  11  million.  Interviewees  with  EU 

15Ministry of Planning and Economic Development (MOPED) Letter, April 2020. This had not materialised as of the end of 
June 2021, however. 
16 Interviews, June 2021. 
17 Interviews, June 2021; TEI Green Alliance. 

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stakeholders  welcomed  Irish  and  German  close  coordination  at  country  level  notably  on  medical 
supply actions where the EU is involved in a limited way.18 

Moreover, the EU and MS were active in supporting global mechanisms benefiting Sierra 
Leone, in particular on economic and social recovery solutions and through the COVID-19 
Vaccines  Global  Access  (COVAX)  facility,  but  not  necessarily  as  part  of  a  TE  approach. 
Regular meetings took place with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) who 
were strongly involved through budget support activities and a cash transfer programme. The EU 
topped up the WB Safety Net programme (EUR 5.2 million) and contributes to ongoing programmes 
in food security, job creation and education with various partners (the GIZ, World Bank, the United 
Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) and the International Labour Organization [ILO]) with a 
total of EUR 5.4 million disbursed in 2020, which can be construed as part of the COVID-19 response. 
It should be noted that this EU contribution to social protection has led to a longer-term commitment 
with WB and NACSA.19 

EU Team Europe initiative (TEI) fight against COVID-19 benefited from multiple launches 
mainly at the governmental official level (with official launch ceremony, regular correspondence with 
ministries, and so on) and in social media. While EU visibility efforts were pushed during COVID-19, 
the  EU  action  more  generally  was  publicised  more  through  various  hashtags  such  as 
#EUStandWithSalone than under a TE brand. There is therefore no evidence of enhanced visibility 
thanks to TE.20 However, the TE approach was quite instrumental in raising the profile of the EU’s 
role among international and local NGOS. For instance, the “Team Europe Initiative Supporting District 
Level  Response  to  COVID-19”  brought  together  six  European,  Irish  and  Sierra  Leonean  NGOs  to 
complement national COVID-19 response efforts. 

2.3  EQ 3 – Efficiency 

EQ3: To what extent were, and are, the individual aid modalities and other aid delivery 
mechanisms  and  their  combinations  efficient  and  flexible  enough  for  use  in  Team 
Europe’s COVID-19 response in COVID-19 crisis conditions? 

Summary 

TE  adapted  and  combined  various  existing  aid  modalities  to  deploy  a  relatively  rapid  and 
comprehensive response, although several modality-specific difficulties were encountered. As the 
TE response was largely embedded within ongoing contracts, follow-up typically happened through 
existing Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) mechanisms. 

TE adapted and combined various existing aid modalities to deploy a relatively rapid and 
comprehensive  response.21  The  fixed  tranche  budget  support  payments  (EUR  10  million)  were 
frontloaded from the end of the fiscal year to May 2020, and the variable tranche (EUR 15 million) 
was transformed into a fixed tranche paid in December 2020. Grants to NGOs and district councils 
were repurposed. Uncommitted and decommitted balances were used for new project grants (e.g. to 
the Freetown city council) or contributions through development partners (e.g. SSN). Certain delays – 

18 Interviews, June 2021 
19 Interviews, June 2021. 
20 Letters to MOPED April 2020, Visibility note, Interviews June 2021. 
21 Sierra Leone Team Europe COVID-19 response tracker, December 2020, March 2021 update and Interviews 

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especially  in terms  of  technical  assistance  and monitoring  – may have  been  created  through  the 
partial evacuation of EU staff. 

Several modality-specific difficulties were encountered.22 For the Freetown project, the large 
consortium set up with CRS as an International NGO and leading agency, combined with FCC as local 
government and five Community Based Organisations (CBOs), was very challenging in the particular 
political  context.  A  steering  management  committee  was  lacking,  there  was  insufficient 
understanding of EU operation among some partners, and the approach was neither cost-efficient 
nor  efficient  in  implementation.  Overlapping  sectoral  mandates  from  the  different  government 
agencies  e.g.  ministries  of  water  resources,  lands,  local  government  etc.  and  NaCOVERC;  agency 
responsible  for  national  corona  response  especially  constituted  an  obstacle.  For  the  SSN  project, 
transfers were only effectuated by May 2021, due to negotiation interference, the need for lessons 
learned from the first government-led phase, and the need to identify additional beneficiaries in an 
urban setting. 

As the TE response was largely embedded within ongoing contracts,  follow-up typically 
happened  through  existing  Monitoring  and  Evaluation  (M&E)  mechanisms.23  For  projects, 
meetings were held regularly and continuously with implementing partners, while field visits had to 
be temporarily suspended. For the budget support, although the Variable Tranche was turned into a 
Fixed  Tranche,  the  EUD  still  informally  followed  up  indicators.  Additional  fast-track  governmental 
audits of funds used for the QAERP were installed. For the new SSN project, third-party monitoring, 
WB  internal  monitoring  and  NACSA  audits  were  all  in  place,  and  complemented  by  supervision 
meetings. However, an overall monitoring mechanism for the TE response package as a whole was 
not put in place. 

2.4  EQ 4 – Effectiveness 

To what extent was the EU response successful in progressing towards the objectives 
associated with the COVID-19 response? 

Summary  

The impact of the TE package on health and the socio-economic situation appears to be generally 
positive. TE channelled EUR 2.2 million funding through a consortium-mix of a leading International 
NGO  with  co-implementing  partners  from  the  local  government  and  community-based 
organisations.  The  intervention  addressed  greater  public  awareness  and  health  determinants 
rather than direct health interventions; those were covered by DG ECHO. Cash transfers to 36 000 
additional households through the World Bank Social Safety Net programme also appeared to have 
been  well  received.  TE  installed  various  communication  activities  to  combat  widespread 
disinformation. 

Overall TE support had a positive impact  on health and the socio-economic situation in 
the informal settlements. It accelerated several activities enhancing the continuous support to 
communities  and  strengthened  the  use  of  stakeholder  networks  in  a  country  with  epidemics, 
pandemics, and natural disasters. Specifically, the TE contributed to health determinant aspects in 

22 Interviews 
23 Sierra Leone Team Europe COVID-19 response tracker, December 2020, March 2021 update and Interviews 

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informal  settlements  in  Freetown  with  provision  of  water  to  markets,  Primary  Health  Care  Units 
(PHUs) and vulnerable communities:24 

•  1 million masks 
•  Water supply to 90 PHUs (out of 450) and 92 markets (90 with kiosk) 
•  Street cleaners (80 groups, with 10 persons per group) received salaries of 339 EUR/month25, 
which was a United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID)/EU/FCC mix. 
This ensured that streets were cleaned and daily labour income continued. Flood mitigation 
measures were a main achievement due to timely EU funding support.6 

TE supported the Freetown preparedness and response plan with EUR 2.2 million funding 
from uncommitted balance, and channelled it through Christian Relief Services and  co-
implementers (mix of local government and Community Based Organisations).26 The support 
included  the  provision  of up  to  1  million masks  for  the  Primary  Health Units and  people  living  in 
informal settlements in Freetown, and improved hygiene and water supplies. A COVID-19 response 
plan was jointly developed by the Freetown Municipality and development partners, and put major 
attention  on  supporting  the  informal  settlements  where  about  350  000  people  live.  The  strategy 
addressed  behaviour  change  communication,  risk  communication,  community  engagement  and 
adequate quarantine measures. Those quarantine places were established in the next district with 
about 180 beds. The response ensured that the Government, communities and municipalities were 
represented, had voices and built upon synergies.27 

The  TE  top-up to  the World  Bank  Social  Safety  Net programme intended  to  support an 
additional  36 000  households  (up  to a  combined  total  of 88 000) that  would otherwise 
have  been  excluded  from  social  assistance.  A  single  transfer  of  a  EUR  135  e-voucher  per 
beneficiary was effectuated at the end of May 2021. Monitoring results and impact assessments 
were expected only from June 2021 onwards, although this project in particular was highlighted by 
multiple interviewees as a successful TE intervention.28  

The  city  of  Freetown  faced  a  great  deal  of  rumours  and  disinformation;  therefore, 
communication was a major activity to address inappropriate behaviour. TE contributed to 
the following prevention measures for reducing rumours and misinformation, which were prevalent 
across the country:29 

•  480  community  representatives  were  trained  to  conduct  door-to-door  sensitisation.  322 
zones  in  48  wards  were  engaged  during  the  door-to-door  sensitisation.  A  total  of  2  304 
communities  were  targeted  with  door-to-door  sensitisation  and  115  200  people  were 
reached over a period of two weeks.   

•  Additionally,  sensitisation  was  undertaken in  public spaces  to  promote  safe behaviours.  A 
total of 353 508 people were reached for both public space sensitisation and door-to-door 
sensitisation. 10 277 persons with disabilities and 46 034 market women were reached.   

24 CRS and Freetown Municipality, personal communication, 9th June 2021 
25 USD 400  
26 CSO-LA 415-636_CRS_Description 
27 CRS and Freetown Municipality, personal communication, 9th June 2021 
28 Interviews June 2021. 
29 Mid-Term Review, CRS, November, 2020 

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•  The outreach teams focused mainly on special groups, including the Inter religious council, 
Ebola  survivors  association,  persons  living  with  disability,  traders’  council,  slum  dwellers’ 
association, motor drivers’ union, Kekeh drivers’ union, and Okada drivers’ union.   

•  966 community stakeholders were engaged on outbreak prevention and best practices.   
•  48 megaphones and batteries were distributed to community representatives in all the wards 

to conduct community engagement sessions.   

- 

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3. Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch 

Source: Evaluation Team 

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Contents 

1.  Background..................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 

1.1. 

1.2. 

Country COVID-19 context and government response ............................................................................ 1 

European Union response.......................................................................................................................................... 2 

2.  Answers to Evaluation Questions (EQ) ........................................................................................................................... 3 

2.1. 

2.2. 

2.3. 

2.4. 

EQ 1 – Relevance ........................................................................................................................................................... 3 

EQ 2 – Value added ...................................................................................................................................................... 5 

EQ 3 – Efficiency ............................................................................................................................................................ 7 

EQ 4 – Effectiveness .................................................................................................................................................... 9 

3.  Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch .................................................................................................................................... 12 

THE  PURPOSE  OF  THIS  COUNTRY  NOTE  IS  TO  INFORM  THE  FAST-TRACK  ASSESSMENT  OF  THE  EU  INITIAL 
RESPONSE AS A WHOLE. IT IS NOT DESIGNED TO BE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RESPONSE IN THE COUNTRY. 

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Acronyms 

AAP 

AFETI 

CPM 

CSO 

DG 

EaP 

EBRD 

EC 

ECFIN 

ECHO 

EIB 

ENI 

EQ 

ERP 

EU 

EUD 

GDP 

GIZ 

HQ 

Annual Action Programme 

Expertise France 

EU Civil Protection Mechanism 

Civil Society Organisations 

Directorate-General 

Eastern Partnership 

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 

European Commission 

EU Economic and Financial Affairs 

European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations 

European Investment Bank 

European Neighbourhood Instrument 

Evaluation Question 

Emergency Response Plan 

European Union 

Delegation of the European Union 

Gross Domestic Product 

German Corporation for International Cooperation GmbH 

Headquarters 

ICMPD 

International Centre for Migration Policy Development 

ICU 

IMF 

IOM 

ITC 

KfW 

MFA 

MoU 

MS 

MSME 

NEAR 

NGO 

Intensive Care Unit 

International Monetary Fund 

International Organization for Migration 

International Trade Center 

Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau 

Macro Financial Assistance 

Memorandum of Understanding 

EU Member States 

Micro, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 

EU Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations 

Non-Governmental Organization 

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OECD 

PPE 

RRM 

SME 

TE 

UN 

UNDP 

UNOCHA 

UNOPS 

UNRPP 

UPHC 

USAID 

UWF 

WB 

WHO 

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 

Personal Protective Equipment 

Eastern Partnership Rapid Response Mechanism 

Small and medium enterprises 

Team Europe 

United Nations 

United Nations Development Programme 

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 

United Nations Office for Project Services 

UN Recovery and Peace Building Programme 

Ukrainian Public Health Centre 

United States Agency for International Development 

Ukrainian Women’s Fund 

World Bank 

World Health Organization 

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1  Background 

1.1  Country COVID-19 context and government response 

As  of  10  December  2020,  a  total  of  858  714  cases  of  COVID-19  and  14  470  deaths  had  been 
confirmed in Ukraine.1 At the start of the pandemic, the country had around 83 ventilators per million 
inhabitant and 1 716 intensive care units (ICU) beds, and immediately faced shortages in medical 
supplies,  such  as  masks  or  protective  suits  for  health  workers.  The  beginning  of  the  epidemic 
coincided with a government reshuffle in March 2020 and the pursuit of healthcare reforms, which 
delayed the initial response. Faced with the threat of 50 000 doctors being laid off and more than 
330 hospitals closing in the midst of a health crisis, the government amended a law in July 2020 to 
ensure that hospitals did not receive less funding than in previous years and to protect health care 
workers.2   

Daily new confirmed COVID-19 cases in Afghanistan 

Prior to the COVID-19 crisis, the economic outlook was stable, with steady growth, moderate public 
debt and relative price and currency stability. The unemployment rate, above 9% in 2019,  did not 
rise as dramatically as in many Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries in 2020.3 Nevertheless, the share of informal workers in the economy remains very high 
(up to 30%), the social safety net and savings are low, and the fiscal space is limited, which limits 
the  capacity  of  households  or  the  government  to  absorb  exogenous  shocks.4  An  assessment 
conducted by the UNDP in collaboration with UN Women and FAO found that since the beginning of 
the crisis, more than 84% households have lost income and 43% of them have at least a member 
who lost a job.5 

Several  measures  were  put  in  place  by  the  government  to  counter  the  economic  and  social 
consequences of the health crisis. On 27 May 2020, a programme for Stimulation of Economy was 

1   Note that the evaluation period spanned from the incipit of the COVID-19 crisis to the end of December 2020. 
2   OECD, The COVID-19 Crisis in Ukraine, Tackling Coronavirus (COVID-19) Contributing to a Global Effort, December 2020, 
from https://www.oecd.org/eurasia/competitiveness-programme/eastern-partners/COVID-19-CRISIS-IN-UKRAINE.pdf. 

3   The unemployment rate in Ukraine reached 9.9% in Q2 2020, before falling back to 9.4% in Q3. 
4   OECD, Ibidem. 
5   https://www.undp.org/press-releases/un-study-documents-devastating-impact-covid-19-ukraine 

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adopted by the government.6 It contained short-term initiatives in response to COVID-19,7 measures 
supporting  six  economic  sectors,8  and  the  implementation  of  general  functional  measures  to 
strengthen sectoral initiatives.9 Mid-September 2020, the draft state budget for 2021 was submitted. 
It included support for citizens and businesses, regional development, infrastructure renewal, and a 
total of USD 695.3 million for the fight against the COVID-19 infection.10 

1.2  European Union (EU) response 

The EU response in Ukraine was comprehensive providing considerable funding for macro-
economic  stabilisation  and  mobilising  EU  and  its  Member  States  instruments  and 
programmes  to  meet  health  and  humanitarian  needs  and  address  the  socio-economic 
consequences  of  the  pandemic.  Ukraine  is  the  biggest  recipient  of  Macro-Financial  Assistance 
(MFA) in the region, with an allocation of EUR 1.2 billion as part of a new COVID-19 programme to 
ten  enlargement  and  neighbourhood  countries.11  The  Commission  package  included  EUR  191.3 
million  to  deal  with  the  emergency  response,  address  medium-term  and  long-term  needs  of  the 
health system and mitigate the socio-economic consequences of the crisis. This included EUR 22.5 
million  for  the  health  response,  of  which  EUR  7.2  million  for  emergency  needs.  Central  to  this 
component was the EU/World Health Organization (WHO) Solidarity for Health Initiative,12 which the 
EU launched to help the six  Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries cope  with the pandemic  with the 
supply  of  medical  equipment  and  materials  and  the  provision  of  technical  training,  advice,  and 
management  support  to  help  contain  the  virus  (through  prevention,  detection,  and  control)  and 
improve patient care. Further EU support in addressing emergency  health needs was provided via 
different  additional  implementing  partners,  including  the  German  Corporation  for  International 
Cooperation  (GIZ),13  the  United  Nations  Development  Programme14  (UNDP),  Expertise  France 
(AFETI),15 the International Centre for Migration Policy Development16 (ICMPD) and the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), as well as other   17projects. Socio-economic support represented 
the bulk of the EU response package with EUR 168.7 million consisting of mostly new programmes 
which  were  re-profiled,  when  the  programming  cycle  allowed  it,  to  take  account  of  COVID-19 
priorities,  including  almost  the  entire  Annual  Action  Programme  (AAP)  2020  adopted  in  May  and 

6  

“Government  presents  the  Program  to  stimulate  the  economy  to  overcome  COVID-19  aftereffects”  (Ministry  of 
Economic  Development, 
from 
https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/uryad-predstaviv-programu-stimulyuvannya-ekonomiki-dlya-podolannya-naslidkiv-
covid-19. 

of  Ukraine, 

Agriculture 

27  May 

posted 

2020), 

Trade 

and 

7   Ensuring the  functioning of the  economy and  supporting branches  of economy  and  protection  of  goods,  works and 

8  

services from their import alternatives, considering the international agreements and obligations of Ukraine. 
Industry,  agriculture,  energy,  transport  and  infrastructure,  information  and  communication  technologies,  services 
domain (trade, hotels and restaurants, education, creative industries, personal services). 

9   Small  and  Medium  Enterprises  (SMEs)  support,  stimulation  of  international  trade,  investment  attraction,  innovation 

development, labour market development, reasonable regulation of economic activity. 

10   OECD, Ibidem. 
11   The EUR 3 billion MFA package to help these ten countries limit the economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic was 

adopted on 25 May 2020. 

12   The EUR 35 million package was part of a wider EUR 140 million which was reallocated to support the six countries 

following the outbreak of COVID-19.  

13   U-LEAD with Europe, the flagship EU programme supporting the decentralisation reform in Ukraine, was involved in 

delivering COVID-19 emergency medical kits and information to municipalities across Ukraine.  

14   The UNDP is one of the implementing partners of the UN Recovery and Peacebuilding Programme (UN RPP) supported 
by the EU and other donors, which has addressed priority needs in eastern Ukraine since 2014. The programme targeted 
the delivery of emergency equipment and supplies to Donetsk and Luhansk regions. 

15   Implementing the PRAVO programme 
16   Both  the  ICPDM  and  IOM  are  implementing  partners  of  EU-funded  programmes  supporting  Integrated  Border 

Management in Ukraine. 

17   Excluding MFA and ECHO’s humanitarian aid.  

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October  2020  and  partly  yet  to  be  implemented.  Additionally,  the  European  Civil  Protection  and 
Humanitarian  Aid  Operations  (ECHO)  provided  EUR  10.3  million  of  humanitarian  assistance  to 
address the needs of vulnerable populations in non-government-controlled areas and along the “line 
of contact” in eastern Ukraine. (See Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch) 

Four  interventions  were  selected  for  an  in-depth  review  and  have  therefore  been  given  greater 
attention in this note, especially in EQ4. Below is the list of the selected interventions in Ukraine: 

•  Emergency needs/Health 

o  1. NEAR/ENI: EU COVID-19 Solidarity Programme for the Eastern Partnership Health 

and Emergency– WHO 

•  Socio-economic:  

o  2. NEAR/ENI: U-LEAD with Europe Programme – GIZ, SIDA 
o  3. NEAR/ENI: EU4Business programme 
o  4. ECFIN: MFA (light review) 

2  Answers to Evaluation Questions (EQ) 

2.1  EQ 1 – Relevance 

EQ1:  To  what  extent  did  the  initial  EU  global  response  to  the  COVID-19  pandemic 
through  the  Team  Europe  (TE)  country  packages  address  the  needs  and  priorities  of 
partner countries and regions in each country context in line with the three priorities of 
the Team Europe approach? 

Summary 

The EU COVID-19 response was consistent with the priorities set out in the Joint Communication, 
with funds/actions (re)directed to emergency health and humanitarian needs, the strengthening of 
the health system, and the mitigation of the socio-economic effects of the pandemic. The extensive 
partnership  between  the  EU  and  Ukraine  provided  the  EU  with  a  wide  range  of  modalities  and 
actions  on  which  to  build  its  response  to  COVID-19.  The  focus  on  Ukraine's  short-term  health 
emergency  needs  was  well-justified  by  the  circumstances.  A  generous  MFA  programme  was 
deployed to cushion the worst of the pandemic’s economic impact. The EU4Business Initiative was 
mobilised to  provide immediate support to SMEs, with the rest of  the socio-economic response 
largely focused on medium-term needs through programmes which, for the most part, have yet to 
be implemented and, like other parts of the package, not solely dedicated to COVID-19. 

The EU response was in line with the Joint Communication. It was also consistent in its 
scope  and  volume  with  the  ambitious  partnership  established  with  Ukraine  since  the 
signing of the Association Agreement in 2014. The EU was able to draw on a wide range of 
programmes and instruments to shape its COVID-19 response. With the exception of the MFA and 
some  Eastern  Partnership  initiatives  launched  specifically  in  response  to  COVID-19,  most 
programmes  and  projects  in  the  package  contributed  to  this  response  only  through  part  of  their 
activities and resources with varying degrees of involvement and adaptation.  

Overall, the package was relevant to Ukraine health needs, with ongoing programmes and 
the  newly  launched  EU/WHO  Solidarity  for  Health  mobilised  to  address  the  need  for 
medical equipment  and  materials in  line with Ukraine’s COVID-19  Emergency  Response 

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Plan (ERP) adopted in March 2020.18 In accordance with the Joint Communication, the package 
also included actions to contribute to more resilient and responsive health systems in the long-term 
through the implementation of a country activity plan to be developed in consultation with national 
authorities  and  EU  Delegations.19  The  package  took  into  account  the  needs  of  vulnerable  people, 
including  through  DG  ECHO's  humanitarian  aid,  the  United  Nations  Recovery  and  Peace  Building 
Programme (UNRPP). Awareness-raising and information campaigns on safety standards and health 
measures also featured in the emergency package, responding to an urgent need to communicate 
information to the general public on the pandemic and how to combat it.  

The COVID-19 response provided considerable funding much needed to support Ukraine’s 
balance of payments and provide fiscal space for countering the economic fallout from 
the pandemic.  

The  substantial  MFA  programme  (EUR  1.2  billion)  addressed  Ukraine's  need  to  stabilise  the 
macroeconomic  environment  and  free  up  funds  for  managing  the  crisis.  With  a  fragile  macro-
economic environment, Ukraine was already a major recipient of MFA.20 The new programme covering 
ten partner countries21 was timely to help preserve the sustainability of public finances in a time of 
crisis and provide fiscal space for supporting the health system and the economy through the national 
COVID-19 Response Fund.22  

SME short-term needs were covered through the EU4Business Initiative, which coordinates 
EU support for SMEs in EaP countries, while the rest of the package was made up of AAP 
2020 actions to address the consequences of COVID-19 through support to sector reforms, 
including for the SME sector. 

The EU response package mobilised the EU4Business Initiative23 to address immediate SME needs, 
largely  liquidity  needs,  in  partnership  with  its  partner  financial  organisations.  These  included  the 
European  Investment  Bank  (EIB),  which  recently  launched  a  EUR  30  million  credit  line  to  support 
Ukrainian  private  sector  businesses,  with  a  focus  on  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  (SMEs) 
impacted  by  the  pandemic.24  It  should  be  noted  that  the  SMEs  programmes  which  EU4Business 

18   The  Ukrainian  Emergency  Response  Plan,  developed  in  cooperation  with  the  WHO,  was  presented  to  international 

partners on 6 March 2020 and was last updated in September 2020. 

19   The Component II of the EU/WHO Solidarity for Health is dedicated to long-term needs of the health system.  
20   The Commission had approved the disbursement of a EUR 500 million loan to Ukraine in May 2020, the last tranche of 
its fourth macro-financial assistance (MFA) programme. In total, the EU had provided Ukraine with EUR 3.8 billion in 
MFA loans between 2014 and the beginning of the pandemic. 

21   The EUR 3 billion emergency MFA package covers ten enlargement and neighbourhood partner countries, with Ukraine 

the largest recipient.  

22   The EUR 2.3 billion COVID-19 Acute Respiratory Disease Response Fund was established in 2020 to fund additional 

health, economic and social expenditures directly related to the COVID-19 epidemic. 

23   EU4Business  Initiative  coordinates  EU  SME  support  in  the  EaP  region,  which  is  delivered  with  partner  organisations 
(international organisations such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), EIB, Kreditanstalt 
für Wiederaufbau (KfW), OECD, World Bank (WB), International Trade Centre (ITC), and UNDP, as well as international 
consultancies, governments, government agencies, and non-governmental organisations [NGOs]).  

24   Ukraine: EIB and PRAVEX BANK join forces to enhance access to finance for SMEs affected by the economic impact of 

the coronavirus pandemic, EIB, March 2021.  

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coordinates were not included in the package,25 which was mostly made up of AAP 2020 actions26 
already programmed when the pandemic broke out and yet to be implemented.27.  

The  EU  response  drew  on  civil  society  development  initiatives  to  contribute  to  the 
emergency  response  and  the  post-pandemic  recovery,  with  particular attention  paid  to 
vulnerable people and women. 

The EU response package drew on the Eastern Partnership Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM)28 and 
the newly created Eastern Partnership COVID-19 Solidarity Programme29 to support the involvement 
of  civil  society  organisation  (CSOs)  projects  in  the  crisis  response,  in  addressing  the  needs  of 
vulnerable  populations,  conducting  awareness-raising  campaigns,  and  supporting  education  and 
cultural institutions. The RRM funded, for example, the project ‘Women's movement at the frontline 
of response to post-COVID-19 challenges in Ukraine’ implemented by the Ukrainian Women's Fund 
(UWF).30 The Civil Society Facility (EUR 10 million) under the AAP 2020 adopted in October 2020 was 
designed to help Ukraine tackle the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis and its medium- to long-term 
impact on civil society and local communities in Ukraine.  

2.2  EQ 2 – Value added 

EQ2:  To  what  extent  did  the  Team  Europe  (TE)  initial  response  provide  additional 
benefits beyond what would have resulted from actions taken by the EU institutions 
and EU MS on their own? 

Summary 

Although the pandemic highlighted the need for greater cooperation, there is no evidence that the 
EU  response  significantly  transformed  the  way  the  EU  institutions  work  with  each  other  and 
cooperate with EU MS and other international organisations. Some of the interventions mobilised 
for the response, such as U-LEAD with Europe, were already building on strong cooperation and 
coordination  between  the  EU  and  its  Member  States.  The  response  reinforced  the  strong 
cooperation that already existed between the EU and Ukraine’s international partners. The "Team 
Europe"  concept  was  used  to  promote  the  EU  and  its  Member  States  as  one  whole,  but  the 
effectiveness of this campaign is not yet clear. Its strong presence in Ukraine meant that the EU 
already had the capacity to play a major role in the response to the COVID-19 crisis irrespective 
of the Team Europe Approach. 

The Team Europe (TE) response was made possible thanks to the already well-developed 
cooperation between the EU and other donors, including EU MS, enabling a concerted and 

25   However, the EIB website presents its new loan operation for Ukrainian SMEs as being part of the Team Europe Initiative 

(TEI).  

26   EUR 105 million of the EUR 191.3 million EU response package.  
27   1.  Civil  Society  Facility  (EUR  20 million)  to  build  the  capacity of local  NGOs,  also  in  tackling the COVID-19  crisis,  2. 
EU4ResilientRegions (EUR 30 million), seeking to enhance Ukraine's overall resilience, notably to hybrid threats through 
support to its regions, which will address destabilisation factors such as the COVID-19 pandemic, 3. Climate package 
for  a  sustainable  economy  (EUR  10  million),  which  will  contribute  to  post-COVID-19  recovery  through  a  cleaner 
environment, less conducive for transmittable diseases, 4. EU4Business Support to SMEs in Ukraine to strengthen the 
policy  framework  and  business  ecosystem  and  promote  competitiveness  and  internationalisation  of  SMEs  (EUR  20 
million), 5. EU support to agriculture and small farm development in Ukraine (EUR 25 million). 

28   Established under the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Facility 2017, the EUR 500 000 facility supports CSOs with low 
value grants to respond to unexpected changes in the political or policy environment in partner countries of the Eastern 
Neighbourhood.  

29   The project (EUR 4 million) launched in 2020 targets  the most affected parts of the populations, with sub-grants to 

smaller, local organisations. 

30   Direct award, EUR 60 000 five-month project to help mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on women in 

Ukraine, particularly from an economic point of view. 

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comprehensive  response  to  the  country’s  emergency  needs.  The  pandemic  rather  than  the 
Team Europe (TE) approach intensified contacts, but no new joint analysis, coordination or monitoring 
mechanisms was established. The Commission and other EU institutions relied on existing channels, 
tools, and mechanisms to plan and articulate their action. The EU4Business Initiative, established to 
coordinate  all  EU  support  to  SMEs  in  the  Eastern  Partnership  countries,  is  a  good  example  of  an 
existing platform mobilised  to inform stakeholders about the support available to  the SME sector 
during the pandemic, including SME lending facilities that the EIB and EBRD redirected towards the 
COVID-19 response.31  

Programmes  that  had  preceded  the  COVID-19  response  had  already  intensified  the 
coordination and cooperation between  the EU and  its MS. As a mechanism to enhance the 
impact of European assistance by pooling resources and integrating programmes, the Team Europe 
Approach had in fact already been applied in Ukraine before the concept was introduced: this was 
for example the case of the U-LEAD flagship programme,32  which combined the efforts of the EU 
and several EU MS to support Ukraine’s decentralisation reform. The EU Civil Protection Mechanism 
(UCPM)  managed  by  DG  ECHO  also  contributes  to  a  more  effective  European  response  to  crisis 
situations  by  ensuring  the  coordinated  deployment  of  contributions  from  the  EU  and  its  Member 
States. 

The  response  mobilised  programmes  based  on  strong  partnerships  with  international 
organisations active in Ukraine. The UN Recovery and Peacebuilding Programme supported by 
the EU was well-placed to coordinate the COVID-19 response in the east of Ukraine.33 The ongoing 
PRAVO  programme,  implemented  by  AFETI  and  the  United  Nations  Office  for  Project  Services 
(UNOPS),34  delivered  personal  protective  equipment  (PPE)  to  its  stakeholders.35  The  main  EU 
emergency response was channelled through the new EU/WHO Solidarity for Health Initiative, which 
contributed to the implementation of Ukraine’s COVID-19 Emergency Response Plan, with additional 
funding from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the World Bank. 

The  "Team  Europe"  brand  was  used  by  the  Commission  to  promote  as  a  whole  the 
assistance  from  EU  institutions,  EU  MS,  and  European  financial  institutions,  but  the 
effectiveness of this campaign remains to be demonstrated.  

The "Team Europe" brand was used to promote the overall support provided to Ukraine by the EU, its 
Member States, and the European financial institutions. Infographics, audio, and digital content were 
developed to inform the general public about the Team Europe (TE) response. Health messages and 
information  on  the  support  provided  and  the  results  achieved  were  disseminated  through 
communication campaigns "Moving Forward Together"36 and "BeatCovid-19". However, it is not yet 

31   A new EU4Business information portal was launched in March 2021 with dedicated country websites in local languages 
providing information about existing EU SME support programmes, and particularly EU and national COVID-19 measures 
in favour of the private sector.  

32   With funding from the European Union, Germany, Poland, Sweden, Denmark, Estonia, and Slovenia. 
33   Donetsk  and  Luhansk  oblasts  under  control  of  the  Ukrainian  Government  as  well  as  the  four  surrounding  oblasts 

(Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson) 

34   Support to Rule of Law Reforms in Ukraine (PRAVO) is a special measure adopted in 2016 (EUR 52.2 million), which 
supports  reforms  in  the  justice  sector  (component  1  implemented  by  AFETI)  and  in  the  sector  of  law  enforcement 
(component 2 implemented by UNOPS). 

35   Prison and probation staff, customs services, and district and city courts 
36   “Moving forward  together”  is  the  EU  umbrella  communication  campaign  to  promote  the  EU  and  its  programmes  in 

Ukraine.  

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clear whether the “Team Europe” brand was sufficiently understood by the target audiences37 as the 
concept was new and had never been used before.38 

EU-funded programmes contributed to the communication efforts, applying standard EU 
visibility and communication guidelines but with no reference to Team Europe (TE).  

The  programmes  contributed  to  the  communication  efforts  about  COVID-19  and  the  assistance 
provided  by  the  EU.  U-LEAD,  for  example,  implemented  its  own  information  and  communication 
campaigns  by  developing  publicity  materials  and  digital  content  on  social  networks,  not  only  to 
promote its activities related to COVID-19 but also to inform local actors about health measures and 
to  share  good  practices  in  pandemic  adaptation.  The  WHO  also  developed  publicity  materials  to 
promote  the  results  achieved  in  Ukraine  in  the  framework  of  the  EU/WHO  Solidarity  for  Health 
Initiative. It should be noted that communication at intervention level was carried out in line with the 
EU visibility and communication guidelines with no reference to Team Europe (TE).  

There is no evidence to suggest that the Team Europe Approach strengthened the EU’s 
convening power. The EU's strong presence in Ukraine already made it an indispensable partner in 
the country's response to COVID-19.  

2.3  EQ 3 – Efficiency 

EQ3: To what extent were, and are, the individual aid modalities and other aid delivery 
mechanisms  and  their  combinations  efficient  and  flexible  enough  for  use  in  Team 
Europe’s COVID-19 response in COVID-19 crisis conditions? 

Summary 

The EU showed great flexibility and reactivity in responding to emergency needs, assembling its 
package  39  thanks  to  intense  contacts  among  its  services  and  with  partners  and  fast-track 
formulation/programming  cycles  involving  limited  consultations  with  Ukrainian  authorities. 
Ongoing  programmes  enabled  the  EU  to  launch  its  emergency  response  within  days  of  the 
government  introduction  of  a  national  lockdown  on  12  March  2020,40  which,  albeit  limited  in 
scope41, was symbolically important to show European solidarity. The pandemic also highlighted 
the merits of EU flagship initiatives, such as the U-LEAD programme, which was already based on 
a wide partnership and was particularly well placed to respond to crises thanks to its network of 
twenty-four regional offices and close contacts with local authorities across the country. Regional 
initiatives under the Eastern Partnership also played a key role, such as the EU/WHO "Solidarity for 
Health"  Initiative,  designed  and  adopted  in  less  than  three  months,  which  delivered  essential 
support  and  training  to  health  workers  across  the  country.  The  exceptional  MFA  programme 
provided  extremely  swift  and  timely  support  thanks  to  the  effective  cooperation  among  EU 
institutions and the Ukrainian authorities. The ongoing Eastern Partnership EU4Business Initiative 
was mobilised to respond to immediate SMEs needs, with the remainder of the socio-economic 
response package yet to be implemented. There was little time to introduce new monitoring and 
learning mechanisms, which remain essentially the same as before, with no consolidated overview 
of results achieved and needs covered by Team Europe (TE).  

37   A project named “Team Europe” implemented in 2016 may have created confusion. 
38   Existing opinion surveys sound the perceptions of the public towards the EU alone. According to the most recent survey 
carried  out  in  February-March  2021  (EU  Neighbours  east),  the  EU  is  considered  the  most  trustworthy  international 
institution in Ukraine, with 57.2% of respondents aware that the EU is helping Ukraine in fighting COVID-19 but only 
26.6% considering this support effective. 

39   Announced in March 2020, the programme was adopted and signed by May 2020. 
40   For example, U-LEAD’s information campaign carried out in March 2020 provided information and advice to Ukrainian 
municipalities on how to prevent, mitigate and counteract the spread of the virus. The programme sent its first COVID-
19 protection kits to rural municipalities in May 2020. 

41   Ongoing programmes delivered basic protective equipment and materials to their target groups.  

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The  EU  response  mobilised  the  full  range  of  aid  modalities  available  under  the  EU-
Ukrainian partnership. While contacts were kept with the Government throughout the pandemic, 
the EU COVID-19 response was essentially devised by the EU in cooperation with its international 
development  partners,  the  need  to  act  quickly  in  the  face  of  the  crisis  allowing  only  minimal 
interaction  with  the  Government  in  contrast  to  normal  programming  cycles.  The  Government 
appeared to have shared this pragmatic approach, generally welcoming the proactive response of 
the donor community to the crisis. Ongoing programmes were rapidly redeployed to respond to the 
crisis and send an important signal of solidarity to Ukraine. Through its network of 24 regional offices 
and close contacts with local authorities across the country, U-LEAD with Europe, the EU's flagship 
decentralisation programme, was able to intervene swiftly when the rest of the response was still 
being developed, distributing 1 900 protection kits containing essential medical equipment for local 
health staff to over 900 municipalities, and addressing the shortage of face masks by supporting 
local producers. 

The  use  of  regional  initiatives  and  partnerships  with  international  institutions  with  a 
strong  presence  in  Ukraine  was  appropriate  to  the  circumstances  and  proved  to  be 
successful.  The  use  of  Eastern  Partnership  initiatives42  was  well  justified,  enabling  a  faster  and 
more  efficient  design  and  adoption  process,  although  such  programmes  are  usually  more 
cumbersome to manage given the geographical scope and the number of stakeholders involved. By 
choosing the WHO as a partner, which already coordinated the United Nations (UN) response, the EU 
was  able  deploy  emergency  assistance  in  the  six  Eastern  Partnership  countries  through  a  more 
coordinated and coherent approach, drawing on WHO's leading expertise in pandemic response and 
the organisation’s strong country presence. Likewise, the UN Recovery and Peacebuilding Programme 
operating in the east of Ukraine was well placed to deliver emergency supplies43 to hospitals and 
medical  facilities  in  conflict-afflicted  areas  as  well  as  providing  capacity  building  and  training  to 
healthcare professionals. The amount allocated to the emergency response was fully disbursed, while 
68% of the health package allocated to medium to long-term needs was spent.44  

EU  institutions  showed  great  responsiveness  in  mobilising  an  emergency  MFA,  an  aid 
modality  which  normally  involves  heavy  and  time-consuming  procedures.45  Ukraine,  the 
largest  recipient  (EUR  1.2  billion),  received  a  first  tranche  (EUR  600  million)  in  December  2020 
following  the  signature  of  a  Memorandum  of  Understanding  and  the  renewed  engagement  to 
continue cooperation under the  International Monetary Fund  (IMF) programme.46 The rapid design 
and adoption of this exceptional MFA COVID-19 programme was the achievement of a collegial and 
participatory  coordination and  monitoring process involving  the DG  of  EU  Economic  and  Financial 
Affairs  (ECFIN),  the  DG  of  EU  Neighbourhood  and  Enlargement  Negotiations  (NEAR),  the  EU 
Delegation  and the Ukrainian Government.  

The  EU4Business  Initiative  demonstrated  its  usefulness  as  a  coordinating  platform  to 
mobilise EU programmes in support of immediate SME needs, largely liquidity needs, linked 
to  the  pandemic.  The  remainder  of  the  socio-economic  package  consisting  of  recently 
adopted programmes will take longer to be implemented. The EU4Business Facility aggregated 

42   In addition to the EU/WHO Solidarity for Health Initiative, part of the support to SMEs and the civil society was channelled 
through Eastern Partnership initiatives: EU4Business, the Eastern Partnership Rapid Response Mechanism, the Eastern 
Partnership COVID-19 Solidarity Programme or the Civil Society Resilience and Sustainability. 

43   Face masks, PPE, antiseptic liquid, patient monitors, oxygen concentrators and ventilators.  
44   End of March 2021 
45   The EUR 3 billion emergency MFA package for ten Enlargement and Neighbouring countries was announced in March 

2020 and was adopted in May 2020. 

46   The disbursement of the second tranche will be conditional on fulfilling eight measures laid down in the MoU. These 
include  measures  in  the  areas  of  public  finance  management,  the  fight  against  corruption,  improving  the  business 
environment and the governance of state-owned enterprises. 

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data on all support measures available under EU SME programmes and was instrumental in providing 
timely information to SMEs via a new portal on business advice and access to grants and loans, which 
were expanded to respond to the pandemic.47 The remainder of the EU response package consisted 
of actions recently adopted which will require additional time to effectively contribute to the post-
COVID-19 recovery.48 As of the end of March 2021, only EUR 30 million (17% of the amount allocated 
for the socio-economic response)49 had been spent, including EUR 11 million of budget support to 
the public administration sector, which was already planned and was not connected to government 
measures  in  support  of  economic  recovery.50  However,  as  already  mentioned,  SME  support  was 
channelled through a variety of EU programmes51 that were not included in the EUR 191.3 million-
EU response package.  

There was no fundamental change to monitoring and learning mechanisms induced by the 
pandemic or the Team Europe Approach. The EU Delegation ensured overall coordination of the 
implementation of the EU response package, liaising with Ukrainian authorities, EU MS, international 
donors, and project implementing partners. This increased the workload of EU Delegation staff, with 
additional meetings and work to process administrative changes to ongoing programmes and the 
launch  of  new  initiatives.  In  this  context,  there  was  little  time  to  adapt  monitoring  and  learning 
mechanisms. There is no evidence that the introduction of the Team Europe Approach brought any 
change either. Implementing partners were simply asked to report periodically on COVID-19 related 
activities, with the EU Delegation compiling this information and forwarding it to the Headquarters, 
which is responsible for following regional programmes. This may explain why, although figures exist 
for  each  programme,  there  is  no  consolidated  overview  of  supplies  and  other  outputs/outcomes 
achieved  thanks  to  Team  Europe  (TE),  including  the  share  of  the  country’s  needs  which  the  EU 
response package managed to cover.  

2.3  EQ 4 – Effectiveness 

To what extent was the EU response successful in progressing towards the objectives 
associated with the COVID-19 response? 

Summary 

The  EU  package  was instrumental  in  responding  to short-term  health  needs,  strengthening  the 
capacity  of  the  health  system  to  cope  with  the  emergency,  with  essential  supplies  of  medical 
equipment  and  materials  and  much-needed  organisational  support  and  technical  advice  to 
Ukrainian authorities with the implementation of their Emergency Response Plan. In doing so, it 
contributed to better crisis management, helping to mitigate the effects of the pandemic despite 
the continued increase in infections since February 2020. There was little time to build resilience 
by addressing more systemic deficiencies, as originally planned.  The substantial macro-financial 
assistance (MFA) contributed to strengthening the country's macro-economic stability, giving the 
Government additional room to manoeuvre in fighting the pandemic, notably through its EUR 2.3 
billion  COVID-19  Response  Fund,  which  contributed  to  a  less  severe  economic  downturn  than 
expected. The EU response relied on the EU4Business Initiative to mobilise EU SME programmes in 
support of SMEs during the pandemic, with more assistance on its way under the recently adopted 

47   An additional EUR 120 million was channelled to help SMEs, including the self-employed and others, to have easier 
access to credit and boost their businesses following the crisis. Over EUR 200 million of existing credit lines and grants 
were available for SMEs in local currency through the EU4Business Initiative. 

48   Four out of five AAP 2020 programmes included in the socio-economic package were modified to include a COVID-19 
component: Socio-economic support through the Climate Package, EU4Resilient Regions and the Civil Society Facility; 
EU4Business Support to Small and Medium Enterprises in Ukraine.    

49   EUR 169 million 
50   Indicators of achievement are related to the public administration. 
51   Implemented with partner organisations under the umbrella of the EU4Business Initiative. 

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AAP 2020. DG ECHO’s humanitarian aid and ongoing EU civil society projects alleviated the needs 
of some of the vulnerable groups with, again, new programmes foreseen under the AAP 2020. The 
EU response also contributed to greater public awareness about the pandemic, with the EU/WHO 
Solidarity for Health Initiative and other ongoing EU programme, such as U-LEAD and EU4Business, 
supporting  the government’s  communication efforts on  the  pandemic and on health and  socio-
economic response measures. 

The EU response helped the health system withstand the pressure of the pandemic despite 
a growing number of infections throughout most of 2020. However, systemic weaknesses 
in the health system remain, which could not be addressed due to  the evolution of the 
pandemic.  The  EU  response  helped  Ukrainian  authorities  manage  the  pandemic  in  line  with  the 
national Emergency Response Plan. The capacity of laboratories for testing was scaled up52 and the 
country’s  surveillance  system  and  infection  prevention  and  control  were  enhanced.  The 
implementation of case management improved the quality of patient care across Ukrainian hospitals. 
Specific training and tools53 contributed to improve the mental health and psychosocial conditions of 
frontline healthcare workers in their daily fight against the pandemic. EU support helped Ukrainian 
authorities carry out effective information campaigns54 on health risks, recommended behaviours, 
and available support, which were essential to the country’s fight against the pandemic. However, 
the EU response had limited time to address more long-term needs in the health system as the latter 
continued to combat the pandemic, which reached a new peak in early April 2021.55  

The highly concessional and substantial MFA helped stabilise the economy and provided 
fiscal space for the government’s efforts to alleviate the consequences of the pandemic 
on the economy. 

While it was not targeted at specific COVID-19 related public expenditures, nor linked to a specific 
policy dialogue on national crisis response measures, the highly concessional and substantial MFA 
contributed  to  increasing  the  fiscal  space,56  allowing  the  Government  to  finance  a  COVID-19 
Response  Fund  (EUR  2.3  billion)57  as  well  as  to  service  the  country’s  external  debt  repayments, 
reducing the impact of the pandemic on the 2020 fiscal deficit and mitigating the economic recession 
experienced by the country.58  

Fiscal  and  regulatory  support  measures  included  temporary  tax  breaks  and  tax  audit  holidays, 
extension of payment deadlines and increase of the threshold to benefit from the simplified taxation 
regime.  Economic  measures  included  unemployment  schemes  to  support  small  businesses  by 

52   reaching more than 40,000 test a day in November 2020 and April 2021 
53   Mental Health and Psychosocial Support during COVID-19 Preparedness, Response and Recovery 
54   The WHO with the support of the EU/WHO Solidarity for Health conducted ten waves of national COVID-19 surveys to 
provide insights into public knowledge, risk perceptions, behaviours, and trust towards COVID-19 measures, including 
restrictions,  testing,  and  tracing and  confidence  in  response  measures and  the  institutions  implementing  them.  The 
results of these surveys were used to design communication actions in cooperation with the Ukrainian Public Health 
Centre  (UPHC).  The  U-LEAD  programme’s  immediate  response  included  a  country-wide  Information  Campaign 
implemented  in  cooperation  with  UPHC  carried  out  at  the  outset  of  the  pandemic  in  March  2020,  which  provided 
information and advice to Ukrainian municipalities on how to prevent, mitigate and counteract the spread of the COVID-
19 pandemic and its effects. 

55   16,156 new daily cases on 8 April 2021 (7-day average). Source: Our World in Data.  
56   MFA disbursements of EUR 1.1 billion have represented approximately 3.2 % of the total national tax revenues and 16% 

of the total fiscal deficit in 2020. 

57   The COVID-19 Acute Respiratory Disease Response Fund was established in 2020 to fund additional health and social 

expenditures directly related to the COVID-19 epidemic.  

58   The fiscal deficit was expected to reach 7.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2020 but ultimately amounted to 
approximately 6% due to smaller than expected economic decline (according to the WB, GDP declined by an estimated 
4.5 % in 2020 against a decline of 6.5% during the first six months of the year) and better than anticipated performance 
of fiscal revenues, while a small part of the COVID-19 related outlays was redirected to capital expenditures and support 
to public sector wage and pensions increase. 

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compensating part of the worker’s salary to save jobs.59 Overall, UAH 10.7 billion (approx. EUR 325 
million) was disbursed to fund unemployment and furlough benefits by the end of 2020.  

On the social side, the pension fund was increased by an additional USD 1.1 billion60 and the country’s 
Social Insurance Fund set up monthly insurance benefits for healthcare workers on the COVID-19 
frontline.  The  Government  introduced  a  one-off  pension  increase  to  low-income  pensioners  (UAH 
1,000) and a regular monthly (UAH  500) pension top-up for retirees aged 80 years or more. The 
authorities also softened access to several social support programmes, such as household utilities 
subsidies and aid to families with children. 

The EU4Business Facility played an important role in providing information about EU SME 
support  implemented  with  partner  organisations  under  the  umbrella  of  EU4Business 
initiative. The remainder of the package addressing longer-term reform priorities is still 
to be implemented. 

The  EU4Business  Initiative,  which  coordinates  EU  support  to  the private  sector  implemented  with 
partner organisations61 in the six EaP countries, redirected its EUR 200 million of existing credit lines 
and grants to help SMEs maintain business activities during the pandemic, including a EUR 10 million 
facility for local currency loans to Ukrainian SMEs, which was extended by 18 months.  

The  EU4Business:  SME  Competitiveness  and  Internationalisation  project  implemented  by  GIZ 
organised online business clinics to help Ukrainian SMEs during the pandemic through short individual 
and  group  consultancy,  webinars,  trainings  and  forums,  and  vouchers  for  in-depth  business 
consultancy. The UN Recovery and Peacebuilding Programme helped twenty local SMEs in eastern 
Ukraine to move from in-person to online sales and organised webinars and online consultations to 
help Micro, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (MSMEs) survive the pandemic.62  

In addition to the aid delivered to vulnerable people in conflict-affected areas through DG ECHO, the 
190 grants awarded to civil society/community action groups all over Ukraine helped address COVID-
19 societal needs, including the delivery of food and medicines to the most vulnerable  people.63 
Finally,  the  EU-funded  House  of  Europe  programme64  awarded  over  90  grants  to  cultural 
organisations and implemented digital labs for cultural managers.65 

59   No figures available. However, the Ministry of Economic Development indicated that more than 300 000 jobs were 

saved in 2020. 

60   Source OECD 
61   Like  the  EBRD,  EIB,  KfW,  OECD,  World  Bank,  ITC,  and  UNDP,  as  well  as  international  consultancies,  governments, 

government agencies, and NGOs 

62   In  partnership  with  the  Donetsk  Oblast  Chamber  of  Commerce  and  Industry  and  Zaporizhzhia  Oblast  Chamber  of 

Commerce and Industry 

63   Covering 500 vulnerable families in Rivne and Kharkiv and 4 000 elderly persons in Kyiv, Lviv and Dnipro. 17 civil society 
initiatives were also supported in conflict-affected regions to alleviate the impact of COVID-19 on the most vulnerable 
groups. 

64   The programme supports culture, people-to-people contacts and creativity in Ukraine 
65   The Civil Society Facility Ukraine adopted in October 2020 under the AAP 2020 (EUR 10 million) will help mobilise civil 
society to tackle the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis and its medium to long term impact on local communities in 
Ukraine. 

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3  Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch 

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Contents 

Acronyms 

1.  Background..................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 

1.1. 

1.2. 

Country COVID-19 context and government response .............................................................................. 1 

European Union (EU) response to COVID-19 ................................................................................................... 2 

2.  Answers to Evaluation Questions ...................................................................................................................................... 3 

2.1 

2.1 

2.3 

2.4 

EQ 1 – Relevance ............................................................................................................................................................. 3 

EQ 2 – Value added ........................................................................................................................................................ 5 

EQ 3 – Efficiency .............................................................................................................................................................. 6 

EQ 4 – Effectiveness ...................................................................................................................................................... 7 

3.  Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch ....................................................................................................................................... 9 

THE  PURPOSE  OF  THIS  COUNTRY  NOTE  IS  TO  INFORM  THE  FAST-TRACK  ASSESSMENT  OF  THE  EU  INITIAL 
RESPONSE AS A WHOLE. IT IS NOT DESIGNED TO BE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RESPONSE IN THE COUNTRY. 

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Acronyms 

CHW 
C-SHARE 
DG ECHO 

DG INTPA 
DRC 
EQ 
ERRY 
EU 
EUD 
FPI 
GAP 
GBV 
HIP 
ICRC 
IDA 
IDP 
IFRC 
IMF 
INGO 
IPC 
IRC 
IRG 
MS 
NGO 
PPE 
ROM 
SIERY 
SPCRP 
SRHR 
TE 
UN 
UNDP 
UNFPA 
UNICEF 
WASH 
WB 
WFP 
WHO 

Community Health Workers 
Community Services for Health and Actions for Resilience 
European  Commission’s  Directorate-General  for  European  Civil  Protection  and 
Humanitarian Aid Operations 
European Commission’s Directorate-General for International Partnerships 
Danish Red Cross 
Evaluation Question 
Support Resilient Livelihoods and Food Security in Yemen 
European Union 
Delegation of the European Union 
European Commission’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments 
EU Gender Action Plan 
Gender-Based Violence 
Humanitarian Implementation Plan 
International Committee of the Red Cross 
International Development Association 
Internally Displaced Person 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
International Monetary Fund 
International Non-Governmental Organization 
Infection, Prevention and Control 
International Rescue Committee 
Internationally Recognised Government 
European Union Member State 
Non-Governmental Organisation 
Personal Protective Equipment 
Results-Oriented Monitoring 
Strengthening Institutional and Economic Resilience in Yemen 
Social Protection for Community Resilience 
Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights 
Team Europe 
United Nations  
United Nations Development Programme 
United Nations Population Fund 
United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund 
Water Sanitation Hygiene 
World Bank 
World Food Programme 
World Health Organization 

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1. Background 

1.1.  Country COVID-19 context and government response 

As of December 2020, Yemen has reported 2 100 COVID-19 cases and 610 deaths in total, resulting 
in a mortality rate of 29%, which is statistically one of the highest in the world.1 However, these 
figures are highly uncertain as testing remains rare,2 few deaths are officially reported and the two 
reference laboratories in the country are already overburdened by recurrent epidemics.3 The actual 
number of both infections and deaths from COVID-19 is likely much higher, and the actual mortality 
rate remains unknown. 

Daily new confirmed COVID-19 cases in Yemen 

Source: Johns Hopkins University CSSE COVID-19 Data 

The pandemic comes against the backdrop of a very serious humanitarian crisis in Yemen, with more 
than 24 million people in need of emergency assistance and 3.6 million internally displaced persons 
(IDPs). 4 In addition to famine risks, the health system is vulnerable, having been rendered ineffective 
by six years of conflict (for instance, only 700 intensive care beds and 500 ventilators were available 
in March 2020 for 30 million inhabitants)5. Only half of the country's health facilities are still open 
but  lack  the  essential  elements  to  be  operational  in  their  response  to  COVID-19,  due  to  general 
personal  protective  equipment  (PPE)  funding  shortages  and  long  delays  in  importing  response 
supplies. The country's overall situation further deteriorated in 2020 due to low global oil prices, the 
economic fallout resulting from COVID-19, weak public infrastructure, and low resilience to extreme 
weather events and natural disasters.6 

To help address the impact of the pandemic, prevent the virus spread and mitigate associated risks, 
the  World  Bank  (WB)  provided  EUR  22.8  million7  of  International  Development  Association  (IDA) 
grants to the World Health Organization (WHO), together with the Islamic bank, the UK and the US. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved immediate debt relief on all obligations becoming 
due over the six months from 14 April 2020 (amounting to around EUR 17 million)8, provided that 

1   https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-covid-19-preparedness-and-response-monthly-report-december-2020-enar 
2   Due to the lack of testing facilities; testing is only done in the south of the country. 
3   https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/106571586194037855/pdf/Yemen-Emergency-COVID-19-Project.pdf  
4   https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2020/3/5e7dbca64/peace-needed-five-years-conflict-yemen-deepens-

suffering.html 

5   https://oxfam.qc.ca/yemen-6-ans-de-guerre/ 
6   https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/106571586194037855/pdf/Yemen-Emergency-COVID-19-Project.pdf 
7   USD 26.9 million. 
8   USD 20 million.  
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the  Internationally  Recognised  Government  of  Yemen  (IRG)9  commits  to  channelling  resources 
through priority spending and health workers salaries throughout the country.10 

1.2.  European Union (EU) response to COVID-19 

The EU mobilised around EUR 86 million for the COVID-19 response in Yemen. The package included 
interventions in two main areas: safeguarding public health services for the epidemic response, and 
socio-economic recovery and resilience. (See Error! Reference source not found.) 

Interventions for safeguarding public health services included: 

•  The  European  Commission’s  Directorate-General  for  European  Civil  Protection  and 
Humanitarian  Aid  Operations  (DG  ECHO)’s  EUR  19.45  million  adaptation  of  programmes 
supporting health, Water sanitation hygiene (WASH) and nutrition. 

•  The  reorientation  of  three  European  Commission’s  Directorate-General  for  International 
Partnerships  (DG  INTPA)  initiatives  focusing  respectively  on  inclusive  access  to  health 
services  (EUR  0.99  million),  community  health  services  (EUR  1.84  million)  and  resilience 
through the community health workers programme (EUR 6.40 million). 

•  A new action “Response to Covid-19 Crisis: Support the maternal health in Yemen” funded 

by INTPA (EUR 14.30 million).  

Interventions under the socio-economic recovery and resilience response included: 

•  DG  ECHO’s  community  shielding  programme  with  a focus  on  IDPs  and host  communities 

(EUR 6 million). 

•  Continuation  of  DG  INTPA’s  ongoing  programmes,  including  the  Social  Protection  for 
Community Resilience in Yemen (SPCRP) (EUR 1.24 million), Support Resilient Livelihoods and 
Food  Security  in  Yemen  (ERRY  II)  (EUR  10  million),  and  Strengthening  Institutional  and 
Economic Resilience in Yemen (SIERY) – EUR 20 million.  

•  The European Commission’s service for foreign policy instruments (FPI) also provided support 
for  a  conflict-sensitive  response  (EUR  0.9  million)  and  for  a  peace-making/humanitarian 
dialogue (EUR 200 000).  

Two  interventions  were  selected  for  an  in-depth  review  and  thus  take  greater space  in  this  note, 
especially for Evaluation Question (EQ) 4. The selected interventions in Yemen were the following: 

•  Health  and  Emergency:  DG  ECHO  –  (UNICEF  and  other  partners)  Community  Shielding 

Programme. (EUR 6.1 million total programme)  

•  Health and Emergency: DG INTPA – Danish Red Cross (DRC) Community Services for Health 

and Actions for Resilience (C-SHARE) (EUR 7 million total programme)  

9   As  a  result  of  the  civil  war  that  has  been  raging  in  Yemen  since  2014,  the  territory  is  controlled  in  part  by  an 
Internationally Recognised Government, led by Mansour Hadi and supported by Saudi Arabia, and in part by the Houthi 
rebels, an armed organisation supported by Iran that controls the northwest of the country, including the capital Sana'a. 

10   Team Europe (TE) FICHE. 
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2. Answers to Evaluation Questions 

2.1  EQ 1 – Relevance 

EQ1:  To  what  extent  did  the  initial  EU  global  response  to  the  COVID-19  pandemic 
through  the  Team  Europe  (TE)  country  packages  address  the  needs  and  priorities  of 
partner countries and regions in each country context in line with the three priorities of 
the Team Europe approach? 

Summary:  Notwithstanding  the  many  contextual  limitations,  the  design  of  the  Commission 
response was relevant and operationally appropriate to address immediate short-term, COVID-19-
related needs in the thematic areas identified in the EU Joint Communication and line with core EU 
principles,  with  a  particular  focus  on  emergency  health  action  (ECHO)  and  health  system 
strengthening (INTPA). DG ECHO and DG INTPA appropriately adapted their on-going humanitarian 
and health activities to respond to the needs brought by the pandemic. However, the scope of the 
assistance is still limited compared to the proportion of the needs. The socio-economic response 
considered  evolving  and  longstanding  needs  of  the  country.  COVID-19  response  has  been 
mainstreamed  in  the  ongoing  activities,  however,  no  long-term  planning  on  post-COVID-19 
recovery  has  been  envisaged  yet,  due  to  the  unstable  context.  Implementation  faced  several 
operational issues, in particular in North Yemen where  the existence of the pandemic is largely 
denied by the de facto authorities. 

Notwithstanding the many contextual challenges and limitations, the design of the Team 
Europe (TE) response was relevant and operationally adapted to address immediate short-
term, COVID-19-related needs. The response was in line with the thematic priority areas identified 
in the EU Joint Communication and core EU principles, with a particular focus on emergency health 
action  and  health  system  strengthening.  However,  the  scope  of  the  assistance  was  still  limited 
compared to the proportion of the needs, while timeliness was not as straightforward in all cases.  

The absence of a single national authority – different authorities in North and South with 
different layers - meant that the Team Europe (TE) immediate response could not build on 
the national response as in other countries. Although  restoring basic services, responding to 
humanitarian needs, and strengthening institutions and macroeconomic stability were identified as 
national priorities, the “Reconstruction and Economic Recovery Plan” by the IRG lacked credibility due 
to the absence of official data.11 Similarly, no EU programming document existed at the time of the 
COVID-19  outbreak  in  Yemen,  nor  was  there  a    joint  needs  assessment.12  To  respond  to  these 
programmatic  challenges,  the  EU  Delegation  to  Yemen  approved  a  COVID-19  fast-track  Special 
Measure  in  202013  and  priorities  of  the  interventions  were  appropriately  informed  by 
implementing partners on the ground.14  

DG ECHO mainly adapted existing humanitarian projects, thereby ensuring continuity of 
humanitarian support and basic services, in a country where 80% of the population needs such 
assistance.15  These  adaptations  were  well  aligned  with  the  immediate  recognised  needs  of  the 
country to contain the spread of the virus and strengthen treatment. Immediate needs of vulnerable 

11   Interview. 
12   Interview.  A  Yemen  Humanitarian  Needs  Overview  was  elaborated  the  next  year  in  February  2021.  See 

https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-needs-overview-2021-february-2021-enar 

13   MIDEAST/2020/042-406. 
14   Interview. 
15   https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/tipping-point-yemen-s-health-system-impact-covid-19-fragile-state 
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groups  disproportionately  affected  by  the  pandemic  16  were  duly  considered.  For  instance,  the 
community shielding programme targeted families most at risk as well as IDPs and was approved 
as early as May 2020.  

Ongoing  DG  INTPA  development  projects  in  the  health  sector  were  also  relevantly 
reoriented to better respond to additional needs brought by the pandemic. More specifically, 
these addressed the lack of necessary infrastructure for prevention and treatment, lack of medical 
equipment, and the need for increasing training and protection for health personnel.17 The health 
workers’  programme  was  particularly  relevant  considering  how  the  COVID-19  outbreak  has 
disproportionately  harmed  health  workers  in  Yemen,  further  exacerbating  the  lack  of  health 
personnel.18 This programme was also built with a long-term perspective in mind, as it mainly focused 
on  capacity  development  within  the  health  sector.  The  new  INTPA  programme  on  maternal 
health was relevant to strengthen core health services severely impacted by the pandemic 
in the short and long run. This project was especially relevant considering that Yemen is one of 
the countries in the Middle East and North Africa region with the highest maternal, new-born and 
child deaths, with the pandemic having further aggravated the situation.19 

The  Team  Europe  (TE)  socio-economic  response,  mainly  consisting  of  a  continuation  of 
ongoing activities, considered evolving and longstanding needs of the country. This was in 
line with core pillars of EU international cooperation in Yemen, including development cooperation 
and political engagement.20 The ongoing development assistance was relevant to address secondary 
socio-economic consequences of the pandemic at least partially, as well as supporting the long-term 
objectives  of  the  EU  including  strengthening  community-based  and  institutional  resilience  and 
strengthening Yemen’s economy. However, no new interventions or any long-term planning 
specifically on post-COVID-19 recovery were envisaged.21 This needs to be understood in a 
context where the conditions for a formal multi-annual programme are not present, as reported by 
country stakeholders.22 

Additional  support  for  peace  and  stability  included  in  the  COVID-19  related  assistance 
was in line with EU principles, and relevant to tackling Yemen’s unstable situation in the 
medium- and long term. This happened for instance through FPI’s activities on preserving social 
cohesion and strengthening the humanitarian dialogue, which were designed to complement the UN 
peace process, in coordination with the UN Special Envoy.23 

Implementation faced operational issues. In North Yemen, the Team Europe (TE) response was 
challenging as the Northern de facto authority denied the existence of the pandemic and refused any 
precautionary measures and international support in this regard, despite efforts by EU, DG ECHO, the 
International  Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and UN partners.  Political  engagement with the 
northern authorities by Team Europe (TE) is important as all stakeholders are facing problems (UN, 
international  non-governmental  organisations  (INGOs),  non-governmental  organisations  [NGOs]). 
Although resources would be available, agencies also require absorption capacity to deliver. South 

16   Among vulnerable households, nearly half of the surveyed households (42%) reported that their living situation has 
changed since the COVID-19 outbreak started in March 2020. 42% of households (162) consider themselves at risk of 
eviction,  more  frequently  within  IDP  communities.  https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/CCY_COVID-
19%20IMPACT%20ON%20VULNERABLE%20HOUSEHOLDS%20IN%20YEMEN.pdf. 

17   https://medglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/A-Tipping-Point-for-Yemen%E2%80%99s-Health-

System072020.pdf 

18   97 health workers - epidemiologists, medical directors, midwives and other critical medical professionals - have died in 
Yemen  reportedly  from  COVID-19.  https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/tipping-point-yemen-s-health-system-impact-
covid-19-fragile-state  

19   According to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), every two hours a woman dies in childbirth in Yemen. Source:  

https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/03/1088352 

20   YEMEN – EU Development Cooperation forward planning 2021-2024 – Internal Document. 
21   Interview. 
22   Interview. 
23   Yemen Country Team Meeting 17 December 2020 – Readout. 
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Yemen has its own complexities as well, as beyond the IRG there are many other actors in the field 
active in the ongoing hostilities. In addition, the capacity of the Yemen Red Crescent Society was low, 
hence requiring continuous capacity building measures during the pandemic.24  

2.1  EQ 2 – Value added 

EQ2:  To  what  extent  did  the  Team  Europe  (TE)  initial  response  provide  additional 
benefits beyond what would have resulted from actions taken by the EU institutions 
and EU MS on their own? 

Summary:  Given  the  complex  security  and  political  context,  the  operationalisation  of  the  Team 
Europe (TE) approach in Yemen was centred on EU institutions sharing information and readapting 
programming to COVID-19 emergency needs. The main achievement of EU-MS coordination was 
the deployment of the EU Humanitarian Air Bridge thanks to DG ECHO and Sweden mobilisation, 
among others. 2020-2021 saw encouraging analysis and policy dialogue across EU actors, non-
EU  international  partners  and  national  stakeholders  on  more  effective  coordination,  notably 
through attempts at a humanitarian-development nexus approach, but Team Europe (TE) served a 
secondary  priority  for  the  country.  It  had  little  impact  on  existing  coordination  patterns  and an 
already important EU influence. 

Given  the  complex  security  and  political  context,  and  the  multiple factors  constraining 
external support to the country, the Team Europe (TE) approach used in the framework of 
the  COVID-19  response  was  embraced  in  a  very  limited  way  in  Yemen.  According  to 
interviewees, teams coordinating EU interventions in Yemen were exempt from advancing a Team 
Europe  (TE)  approach  beyond  what  the  context  allowed.  Correspondingly,  there  was  no  clear 
translation or operationalisation of the Team Europe (TE) approach in the country beyond a more 
systematic  use  of  information  sharing  practices  (joint  analysis,  coordinated  programming  and 
communication)25  and  programming  adaptation  at  the  EU  institution  level.  Increased  information 
sharing was beneficial given the abundant misinformation about the scale of the pandemic in the 
country, and limited resources and political will to track the evolution of the pandemic. With respect 
to  programming  adaptation,  the  Team  Europe  (TE)  approach  did  serve  to  strengthen 
coordination  already  existing  between  DG  INTPA  and  DG  ECHO,  notably  to  deepen  the 
humanitarian-development-nexus  approach  (interestingly,  interviews  and  documents  did  not 
mention  the  humanitarian-development-peace-nexus).  It  is  worth  noting  that  there  were  no 
programming documents for the period 2021-27 for Yemen when the pandemic broke out. As the 
EU Delegation is preparing a forward-looking planning document for 2021-2024, it appears that the 
Team Europe (TE) approach was pragmatic, without the deployment of specific mechanisms.26 

Interviews stressed that the Team Europe (TE) approach was not fully developed with EU 
MS  either.  Despite  the  creation  of  a  steering  committee  early  in  the  pandemic  for  coordinated 
prioritisation, participation was limited to a few actors (DG ECHO, Germany and the United Kingdom), 
and with no clear follow-up mechanisms.27 Germany (EUR 73 million), Sweden (EUR 9 million) and 
the Netherlands (EUR 7 million) supported programmes to provide medical and psychological support 
to gender-based violence (GBV) victims, improve access to health facilities, and strengthen sexual 
and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) – yet with limited coordination.28 The main achievement 
of EU-MS coordination was the deployment of EU’s Humanitarian Air Bridge to Yemen (Aden and 
Sana’a) for the delivery of essential humanitarian aid (including COVID-19 supplies), thanks to DG 

24   Interview. 
25   Mainly in the framework of an EU-funded regional programme, although the COVID-19 tracker and EUD webpage do 

not indicate which. 

26   Draft forward planning document, 2021-2024. 
27   Interview. 
28   COVID-19 Tracker July 2020. 
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ECHO and Sweden mobilisation. 29 While this operation was not directly programmed as part of the 
Team Europe (TE) approach, it provides an example of positive coordination and good visibility. 

The Team Europe (TE) approach extended existing coordination and policy dialogue with 
non-EU  donors,  UN  agencies  and  other  international  partners  intervening  in  Yemen.  In 
addition to the EU contribution to the global WHO COVID-19 plan, the EU institutions utilised strong 
partnerships with UN agencies (UNICEF, UNFPA, WFP, WHO and IMF) to coordinate global support to 
the crisis, as well as with INGOs (notably CARE, Red Cross-Denmark, DRC and INTERSOS) to implement 
frontline COVID-19 emergency responses. The EU also responded positively to requests by partners 
such as DRC to support community resilience. However, as underlined in interviews,  the COVID-19 
response was one among several priorities, given the aggravated conflict situation and its security 
implications  on  aid  delivery,  combined  with  scarcity  of  supplies  and  the  restrictions  imposed  on 
humanitarian personnel and aid delivery.30 

It remains quite unlikely that the Team Europe (TE) approach will serve to increase the 
EU’s convening power in the country. The EU communication focused on raising awareness about 
the alarming situation of the country, rather than on promoting the EU response. In November 2020, 
a  communication  campaign  (“We  Need  to  Talk  About  Yemen”)  as  well  as  regional  EU  diplomatic 
efforts  were  launched  to  drive  interest  on  peace  efforts  in  Yemen.  The  campaign  hashtag 
#TalkAboutYemen is being reused by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and other 
partners,  demonstrating  EU  influence.  It  is,  however,  not  attributable  to  the  Team  Europe  (TE) 
approach. 

2.3  EQ 3 – Efficiency 

EQ3: To what extent were, and are, the individual aid modalities and other aid delivery 
mechanisms  and  their  combinations  efficient  and  flexible  enough  for  use  in  Team 
Europe’s COVID-19 response in COVID-19 crisis conditions? 

Summary:  Within  a  predominantly  humanitarian  crisis  situation,  DG  ECHO  quickly  planned  the 
response  to  the  COVID-19  pandemic  in  Yemen.  However,  the  humanitarian  assistance  was  in 
general not as timely in terms of implementation, due to delays mainly attributable to external 
factors. Although DG ECHO modalities are more suited to a crisis response, DG INTPA also managed 
to roll out support. The ongoing civil war in Yemen prevented Team Europe (TE) from deploying its 
full package of aid modalities. DG ECHO Humanitarian implementation plan (HIP) modalities were 
sufficiently flexible and efficient for the crisis at hand, while partner networks and synergies across 
different  projects  were  exploited  for  a  COVID-19  response.  Monitoring  was  challenging  due  to 
COVID-19-related  and  other  contextual  factors,  yet  the  EU  envisaged  strategies  to  cope  with 
difficulties, relying on partners and testing alternative modalities. 

Within  a  predominantly  humanitarian  crisis  situation,  DG  ECHO  quickly  planned  the 
response to the COVID-19 pandemic in Yemen. This was done through its global allocation of 
EUR 30 million to WHO; its local HIP modification of EUR 4 million to UNICEF in May 2020 for the 
community shielding programme; its adaptations to ongoing initiatives for incorporating COVID-19 
protocols and addressing additional challenges; and its facilitation of the Humanitarian Air Bridge in 
July and August 2020. The humanitarian assistance was in general not as timely in terms of 
implementation, yet delays were mainly linked to external factors out of EU reach.31 This 

29   https://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/coronavirus-global-response-eu-humanitarian-air-bridge-and-70-million-additional-

aid-yemen_en. 

30   Meeting notes October-December 2020; Interview. 
31   External limiting factors included need for constant negotiations with authorities especially in the north, limited access 
for personnel, hijacking of ambulances, delays in local procurement, Intensive Care Unit using funds as recovery costs, 

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also  needs  to  be  understood  in  Yemen’s  context,  where  reaching  even  the  minimum  of  planned 
activities can already be considered as a success according to in-country stakeholders.32  

While DG ECHO systems are more aligned to sudden onset response scenarios – the HIP process for 
instance enables a flexible response to changes in operational context, as DG ECHO has done with 
respect to other contextual variations in Yemen – DG INTPA also managed to roll out support, 
mainly  through  programme  continuation  and  adaptations.  The  SIERY  programme  started  notably 
slowly, however. 

The ongoing civil war prevented deploying the full package of EU aid modalities in Yemen. 
DG ECHO HIP modalities were sufficiently flexible and efficient to respond to the crisis. DG ECHO also 
exploited partner networks and synergies across different projects, including those financed by DG 
INTPA, to address the COVID-19 crisis. This approach by DG ECHO, the Directorate-General with a 
comparatively large operational footprint, was deemed to make sense. Furthermore, it was in line 
with the nexus perspective and ongoing linkages between the DG ECHO food security interventions 
and the DG INTPA ERRY programmes.  

Monitoring was challenging due to COVID-19-related and other contextual factors, yet the 
EU  envisaged  strategies  to  cope  with  difficulties,  relying  on  partners  and  testing 
alternative  modalities.  Team  Europe  (TE)  agencies  experienced  complications  in  monitoring 
programme implementation, outcomes and added value, as access to project intervention areas was 
often difficult.33 The communities most susceptible to covid are in urban areas, which are more easily 
accessible, whereas access is more difficult in remote rural areas. As a mitigation strategy, the EU 
worked  through  INGOs  and  local  organisations  with  a  proven  track  record  for  monitoring.34 
Furthermore, the EU Delegation currently has three service contracts for third-party monitoring and 
evaluation,  undertaken  by  local  monitors,  which  started  early  2020.  However,  because  of  travel 
restrictions they have relied on phone calls and emails with project managers and staff for their data. 
DG ECHO resumed direct monitoring from December 2020.  

2.4  EQ 4 – Effectiveness 

To what extent was the EU response successful in progressing towards the objectives 
associated with the COVID-19 response? 
Summary: Personal protective and medical equipment, diagnostics and capacity development were 
provided  through  the  Red  Cross  and  UN  agencies.  The  established  network  of  the  Yemen  Red 
Crescent was instrumental to support North and South Yemen. The Team Europe (TE) facilitated 
risk communication and community engagement, while supporting patient treatments and health 
service provider trainings. 

The  overall  capacity  of  the  health  system  is  extremely  low.  The  country  has  only  five 
laboratories  with  PCR  tests  costing  approximately  EUR  90,35  while  intensive  care  unit  services  – 
including  ventilators  and  oxygen  supplies  –  are  very  limited  in  availability.  Therefore,  as  an 
interviewee put it, “achieving something is already wonderful”.36 

Team Europe (TE) provided personal protective equipment (PPE) including gowns, aprons, 
oxygen,  masks, infrared  thermometers and  hand  sanitisers to five  primary  health  care 

disinformation, and cultural beliefs undermining the COVID-19 response. Furthermore, delays were also due to the total 
lockdown of Yemen for several months, with up to 70% of international staff evacuated. There was also an issue of 
the reduced capacity of partners due to the reduction of staff in offices and teams in order to reduce exposure. 

32   Interview. 
33   Especially in northern Yemen, where the Houthi de facto authority has been largely in denial of COVID-19, and elsewhere 

where conflict is ongoing. 

34   The World Food Programme (WFP), for example, has scaled up its number of monitors in recent years. 
35   USD 105. 
36   Interview. 
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facilities of the Yemen Red Crescent Society.37 International procurement by the Danish Red 
Cross was fast compared to other agencies, while dissemination was finalised in August 2020. The 
EU crisis declaration allowed local procurement for PPE kits, tents, beds and handwashing facilities, 
procured from a certified supplier.38 Other procurement was delayed due to the global demand39 and 
the challenges faced within Yemen with arrival of goods in the North, several customs checkpoints 
and negotiations with different authorities. Ordered ambulances were hijacked.40 UNICEF provided 
cash  support  for  families  that  had  to  remain  isolated  and  could  not  work.  The  cash  support 
(approximately EUR 4241 per month) focused on self-employed daily labourers. 

The Team Europe (TE) facilitated risk communication and community engagement through 
the DRC to reduce COVID-19 transmission risk within five governorates and reached 188 
691  people.  Secondary  school  students  were  specifically  targeted  with  key  messages.42  Radio 
messages,  posters  and  public  awareness  sessions  through  mobile  teams  enforced  the  activities. 
Challenges were faced specifically in North Yemen due to denial and politicisation of COVID-19 and 
vaccines  by  the  Government  and  communities.  However,  people  saw  the  impact  of  COVID-19  on 
health and started to acknowledge the pandemic. Initial vaccine supply for North Yemen by WHO was 
planned at 10 000 and later reduced to 1 000 doses (South Yemen received 360 000 doses).43  

The DG ECHO support to the UNICEF community shielding programme will have a lasting 
effect  in  terms  of  knowledge  and  capacity  building  of  the  community  health  workers 
(CHWs) involved as well as in terms of improved WASH facilities. UNICEF trained CHWs in both rural 
and urban areas at a cost of approximately USD 2 50044 per CHW for a three month training period. 

The Team Europe (TE) intervention implemented by the Danish Red Cross built upon the C-
SHARE programme financed with EUR 7 million by DG INTPA from 2017-2021.45 In five rehabilitated 
health facilities, 35 968 patients were treated between July and December 2020.46 During the same 
period, face-to-face trainings were conducted in small groups for 100 staff and 200 volunteers on 
case management, infection, prevention and control (IPC), and correct  PPE use to optimise health 
service delivery and ensure ‘duty of care’. The training also included psychological first aid and self-
care sessions.47 Mental health expertise is very limited and not well accepted as a health issue in 
Yemen, providing challenges for both those affected and health service providers. Mobile services 
were attached to the primary health care facilities and were able to provide community services, risk 
communication and psychosocial support. Team Europe (TE) also addressed capacity development 
aspects by developing an infectious disease manual which was rolled out in remote health facilities 
and addressed COVID-19-related intervention pillars such as IPC, hygiene and case management. 

37   C-SHARE COVID-19 related interventions: Community Services for Health and Actions for Resilience (C-SHARE). COVID-

19 Response Activities March 2020 to March 2021, DRC. 

38   Interview. 
39   Interview. 
40   Interview. 
41   USD 50. 
42   C-SHARE COVID-19 related interventions: Community Services for Health and Actions for Resilience (C-SHARE). COVID-

19 Response Activities March 2020 to March 2021, DRC. 

43   Interview. 
44   Approximatively EUR 2,119. 
45   Parts of the budget were re-channelled for the COVID-19 response through two amendments with a total amount of 
EUR 184 000 (April 2020) and EUR 62 000 (August 2020). The DRC additionally received DG ECHO emergency funding 
for 18 months. Source: International Rescue Committee (IRC) Modification Request. 

46   C-SHARE COVID-19 related interventions: Community Services for Health and Actions for Resilience (C-SHARE). COVID-

19 Response Activities March 2020 to March 2021, DRC. 

47   Interview. 
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3. Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch 

Source: Evaluation Team 

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Contents 

1.  Background..................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 

1.1. 

Country COVID-19 context and government response .............................................................................. 1 

1.2. 

European Union (EU) response ................................................................................................................................. 2 

2.  Answers to Evaluation Questions ...................................................................................................................................... 3 

2.1. 

EQ 1 – Relevance ............................................................................................................................................................. 3 

2.2. 

EQ 2 – Value added ........................................................................................................................................................ 4 

2.3. 

EQ 3 – EFFICIENCY .......................................................................................................................................................... 6 

2.4. 

EQ 4 – Effectiveness ...................................................................................................................................................... 7 

3.  Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch ....................................................................................................................................... 8 

THE  PURPOSE  OF  THIS  COUNTRY  NOTE  IS  TO  INFORM  THE  FAST-TRACK  ASSESSMENT  OF  THE  EU  INITIAL 
RESPONSE AS A WHOLE. IT IS NOT DESIGNED TO BE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RESPONSE IN THE COUNTRY. 

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Acronyms 

CFR 

COVAX 

DG DEVCO 

DG ECHO 

Case Fatality Rate 

COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access 

European Commission’s Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation  

European  Commission’s  Directorate-General  for  European  Civil  Protection  and 
Humanitarian Aid Operations 

DG INTPA 

European Commission’s Directorate-General for International Partnerships 

DRC 

EDF 

Democratic Republic of the Congo 

European Development Fund  

ENABEL 

Belgian Development Agency 

EQ 

EU 

EUD 

FPI 

IcSP 

MoH 

MS 

NAO 

TE 

UN 

UNICEF 

WASH 

WHO 

Evaluation question 

European Union 

Delegation of the European Union 

Service for Foreign Policy Instruments 

Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace 

Ministry of Health 

Member States 

National Authorising Officer  

Team Europe 

United Nations 

United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund 

Water, Sanitation and Hygiene 

World Health Organization 

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1. Background 

1.1  Country COVID-19 context and government response1 

The virus was confirmed to have reached the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) on 10 March 
2020. The first few confirmed cases were all outside arrivals. Various measures were taken by the 
Government as of 18 March 2020 to limit the spread of the virus, and a National Response Plan was 
elaborated in March 2020.2 

By early January 2021, 21 302 cases were confirmed, of which 604 were fatal. Kinshasa recorded 
79% (16 915) of all confirmed cases. Other affected provinces included Kongo central (1 308), North 
Kivu (1 266 cases) and Haut Katanga (600 cases). As of 8 June 2021, the DRC had recorded 33 955 
confirmed cases of the disease, of which 821 were fatal.3 The capital accounted for 24 020 of these 
cases, many of them concentrated in the wealthy district of Gombe (home to prosperous Congolese 
and travelling expatriates). Kinshasa has a population of about 15 million people, many of whom live 
in poor, crowded conditions. So far, the city – and DRC itself with its population of about 86.7 million 
people – have been relatively spared from the impact of COVID-19 compared to South Africa – the 
worst-hit country in Africa – and states in other continents.  

Daily new confirmed COVID-19 cases in the Democratic Republic of Congo 

Source: Johns Hopkins University CSSE COVID-19 Data 

The  DRC  received  the  first  deliveries  of  doses  of  the  vaccine  Vaxzevria  (Astra  Zeneca)  from  the 
Swedish-British laboratory via the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) Mechanism on 2 March 
2021 (1.7 million doses). The vaccination campaign has started on the 19 of April 2021 instead of 
the  12  of  March  as  originally  planned.  The  vaccination  strategy  initially  included  priority  groups 

1   https://www.unicef.org/drcongo/media/5461/file; 

https://www.stopcoronavirusrdc.info;  

https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=CD; 
https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-
congo/covid-19-rdc-08-juin-2021;  https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jun/03/exponential-rise-in-covid-cases-
in-drc-capital-reports-who; https://covid19.who.int/region/afro/country/cd  

2   « Plan de préparation et de riposte contre l’épidémie au COVID-19 en République démocratique du Congo » (Mars 2020) 
3   Thus a case fatality rate (CFR) of 2.5%. Source : https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/covid-19-rdc-08-

juin-2021 

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(including people aged over 55 and those with comorbidities, health staff, staff working at counters 
in airports, ports, banks or supermarkets). By the end of April it was extended to all people above 18 
years old who wanted to be vaccinated. As of 14 June 2021, only a total of 36 939 vaccine doses had 
been administered, including to several foreigners. Of the 1.7 million doses available, 1.3 million were 
quickly redistributed to some African countries such as Togo and Ghana. According to government 
sources,  there  were  only  about  400  000  doses  left  in  Congolese  stocks  to  be  used  before  the 
expiration date (June 2021). 

The DRC Ministry of Health (MoH) officially announced the onset of the third wave of the COVID-19 
pandemic in the country on 4 June 2021 (with Kinshasa as its epicentre), following the significant 
rise of the caseload (the daily national figures rose from several dozen cases in past weeks to 243 
in early June 2021).4  

1.2  European Union (EU) response 

The Commission committed a total amount of EUR 21.4 million for the COVID-19 response in DRC. 
The emergency response included COVID-19 specific support to the World Health Organization (WHO) 
–  EUR  5.6  million  –  and  to  support  emergency  health  response  in  prisons  (EUR  1.5  million). 
Simultaneously ongoing emergency assistance adapted to COVID-19 needs focused on provision of 
food and access to shelter, clean water, health services and education to the most vulnerable.  

Health  assistance  included  support  to  the  Saint  Joseph  hospital  for  COVID-19 case  management 
implemented by ENABEL (EUR 5 million), as well as provision of medicines and hygiene items (EUR 
1.2 million) and support to the Congolese National Police to adapt to the crisis (EUR 3 million). Support 
for water system and sanitation was also included in the response for a total of EUR 0.5 million. 
Finally, the Commission services mobilised a total of EUR 5.2 million for communication and the fight 
against disinformation around the pandemic. 

The Team Europe (TE) approach materialised in the joint EU-MS launch of an EU Humanitarian Air 
Bridge to DRC, with the participation of France and Belgium. Additionally, EU MS contributed to DRC’s 
COVID-19 National  Response  Plan.  Belgium  mobilised EUR 18.6  million to support  health  system, 
food  security,  and  vaccines,  whilst  France  committed  EUR  5  million  for  prevention,  food  security, 
Water,  Sanitation  and  Hygiene  (WASH),  and  health.  Sweden  contributed  to  the  United  Nations 
Children's Fund’s (UNICEF) health action (EUR 5.9 million), while the Netherlands contributed to United 
Nations (UN) funds addressing the socio-economic impact of the pandemic (EUR 10 million). Finally, 
Denmark contributed to the global WHO fund (EUR 55 million) and directly supported the health and 
water sector through UN-led actions (EUR 4 million). (See Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch) 

4 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jun/03/exponential-rise-in-covid-cases-in-drc-capital-reports-who 

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2. Answers to Evaluation Questions 

2.1  EQ 1 – Relevance 

EQ1:  To  what  extent  did  the  initial  EU  global  response  to  the  COVID-19  pandemic 
through  the  Team  Europe  (TE)  country  packages  address  the  needs  and  priorities  of 
partner countries and regions in each country context in line with the three priorities of 
the Team Europe (TE) approach? 

Summary 

The  Team  Europe  (TE)  (Commission)  country  package  was  consistent  with  EU  principles  and 
approaches. The EU was at the forefront in supporting the country to identify the needs and build 
up a relevant National Response Plan to face the crisis. The bulk of the interventions implemented 
aimed at supporting the country at the emergency level rather than building on long term resilience 
against  the  pandemic.  Nevertheless,  some  interventions  in  the  health  sector  have  long-term 
potential,  but  this  is  challenging  given  the  limited  resources  and  limited  ownership  from  the 
country.  

The  European  Commission’s  support  in  the  DRC  was  consistent  with  the  Joint 
Communication on the EU's global response to COVID-19, calling for a focus on the most 
vulnerable, as well as a broader EU strategy in the country. The main project of the Team 
Europe  (TE)  package  in DRC  (EUR  5.5 million)  aimed  at  improving  the quality  and  accessibility  of 
health care for all (including the most vulnerable). Moreover, the health sector is one of the priority 
sectors of the European cooperation in DRC, ensuring the alignment of the Team Europe (TE) package 
with the EU's intervention priorities in the country under the 11th European Development Fund (EDF).5 

The  European  Commission’s  assistance  was  consistent  with  country  needs  related  to 
COVID-19. The specific objectives of the National Response Plan were aimed notably at improving 
WASH,  addressing  health  determinants  in  all  health  facilities  and  strengthening  COVID-19  care 
structures. Among other things, the Team Europe (TE) (European Commission) package emphasised 
these objectives through three projects dedicated to the supply of antiseptic soaps, hand-sanitiser, 
and water- and waste management supplies (buckets, garbage bins, hand-washing stations and so 
on), for a total of almost EUR 1 million. In the area of health infrastructure and crisis management 
in Kinshasa (the epicentre of the pandemic), one project supported the COVID-19 reference hospital 
Saint  Joseph  in  partnership  with  the  Belgian  Development  Agency  (ENABEL)  –  the  EUR  5  million 
project  previously  mentioned.  The  project  is  planned  over  24  months  and  aims  at  improving  the 
provision of health service (including through health staff training to improve the quality of health 
care), and population accessibility.6 

The  EU  was  in  a  good  position  to  ensure  that  its  interventions  (emergency  and  health 
sector) were consistent with the needs at country level as the pandemic evolved in the 
country. The design of the National Response Plan was a participatory process in which the EU was 
active. The EU ensured notably that the COVID-19 plan was not a replica of Ebola plans, which would 
have  not  been  fit  to  respond  to  the  pandemic.  In  fact,  the  Congolese  authorities  were  originally 
preparing  to  mimic  the  Ebola  response  in  the  response  to  COVID-19:  hospital  preparation,  kit 
distribution for prevention and control and management of deceased people were planned  in the 

5 EU internal documents; EU response documents 
6 Interview with the EU Delegation (EUD) and DG ECHO officers; EU response documents  

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same way. Specifically, there was no clear understanding of the contagiousness of COVID-19 and 
social distancing was not envisioned as this was not applicable to Ebola.7 The EU helped to set up a 
more  COVID-19  specific  plan  and  contributed  with  its  expertise  in  assessing  the  country’s  health 
needs to cope with the pandemic. Intervention priorities were communicated to the authorities and 
to the EU MS through pre-existing discussion platforms (see EQ2).8 

Although  crisis  resilience  was  an  aspect  of  some  of  the  projects,  both  the  European 
Commission’s  Directorate-General  for  International  Partnerships  (DG  INTPA)  and  the 
European  Commission’s  Directorate-General  for  European  Civil  Protection  and 
Humanitarian  Aid  Operations  (DG  ECHO)  interventions  primarily  focused  on  emergency 
responses. The EU Delegation did not receive additional development funding to respond to COVID-
19-related needs. The resources used for the TE (European Commission) country package came from 
the  remaining  11th  EDF  funds  (including  EUR  10  million  from  the  B  envelope  that  had  been 
committed in 2020 to strengthen the EU Delegation's actions in health and food security). The scale 
of the EU response package was therefore relatively small compared to country needs (15.8% of the 
total resources required to fully implement the National Response Plan). A resilience dimension was 
present in the support to the Saint Joseph hospital, through the foreseen oxygen production activity 
which should be a source of income for the hospital. 9 

Some  interventions  of  the  COVID-19  response  were  appropriate  for  building  long-term 
resilience against the pandemic. This included for instance the improvement of the accessibility 
to quality and affordable health care through the support to Saint Joseph Hospital. Nevertheless, 
there  are  structural  difficulties  in  the  DRC  which  undermine  the  contribution of  this  project  to  its 
resilience objective. These difficulties include the lack of ownership of projects by beneficiaries and 
Congolese authorities, and capacity gaps in the Congolese administration.10  

22  EQ 2 – Value added 

EQ2:  To  what  extent  did  the  Team  Europe  (TE)  initial  response  provide  additional 
benefits beyond what would have resulted from actions taken by the EU institutions 
and EU Member States on their own? 

Summary 

Coordination between EU institutions, EU Member States and non-EU donors was already a well-
grounded reality in DRC, and was further stepped up when the crisis hit. In the crisis context, the 
Team Europe (TE) dynamic further increased coordination and complementarity of the response 
between the EU and its Member States.  The approach was however less successful in promoting 
joint Team Europe (TE) interventions. There was high credibility and visibility of the EU response in 
the country. However, it was not clear to what extent this was linked with the Team Europe (TE) 
approach, which was formalised. 

Coordination between EU institutions, EU Member States and non-EU donors was already 
a well-grounded reality in DRC, and was further stepped up when the crisis hit.  During the 
first two weeks of the crisis coordination was limited for DG INTPA as EU Delegation non-essential 
staff  were  evacuated.  However,  DG  ECHO  remained  active  in  the  field  and  heavily  involved  in 

7 Interview with EU Delegation (EUD) and DG ECHO officers 
8 Interview with EU Delegation (EUD) and DG ECHO officers 
9 Interview with EU Delegation (EUD) and DG ECHO officers; EU internal documents; EU response documents 
10 Interview with EU Delegation (EUD) and DG ECHO officers; EU response documents; EU ambassadors Meeting notes   

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coordination with Member States and other donors. The COVID-19 crisis was discussed at regular 
weekly meetings between the EU and its Member States at the level of ambassadors and the head 
of cooperation. Specifically, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Germany were involved 
in the joint COVID-19 response with different degrees of intensity in terms of coordination with the 
EU.  Other  European  states  active  in  health  and  crisis  response  in  the  country  were  Norway, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (very active in the sector).11 Very early on there were frequent 
contacts (several times a week) between the main donors in the DRC to take stock of the crisis and 
monitor funding. In the health sector, there was a regular (monthly) coordination forum with donors 
and the Government (various working committees at the Ministry of Health). 12 Additional meetings 
aside from regular contacts were organised between the EU and national authorities, including the 
Technical Secretariat. Communication and coordination of the response was also done at the level of 
provincial authorities resulting in greater integration and coherence as compared to the Ebola crisis.13  

In the crisis context, the  Team Europe  (TE) dynamic further  increased coordination and 
complementarity  of  the  response  between  the  EU  and  its  Member  States.    It  created 
momentum  to  identify  the  different  competences  available  to  implement  COVID-19  activities, 
particularly  during  the  weekly  meeting  between  ambassadors  and  heads  of  cooperation.  The 
intervention on treatment of moderate COVID-19 cases implemented by ENABEL was an example of 
this effort. The coherence of the  overall  response was boosted  as the EU and  its Member States 
relied  on  the  same  technical  advice  from  experts  (Belgian  and  French)  to  define  their  respective 
actions. Overall, there was low risk of duplication in terms of interventions, also given the vast needs 
of the country, as pointed out by interviewees. The approach was however less successful in 
promoting joint Team Europe (TE) interventions. The only COVID-19-related joint action under 
the Team Europe (TE) approach was the Humanitarian Air Bridge, launched by the EU, with the support 
of  Belgium  and  France.14  Three  flights  transported  80  humanitarian  workers  and  56  tons  of 
humanitarian cargo to Kinshasa and Goma. The first flight, in June 2020, provided the opportunity 
for a joint mission of the EU Commissioner with the respective EU MS foreign ministers and a meeting 
with the DRC President.15  

There was high credibility and visibility of the EU response in the country. However, it was 
not clear to what extent this was linked with the Team Europe (TE) approach, which was 
never formalised. The credibility of the EU COVID-19 response rested on the EU’s long-standing 
involvement in the country's health sector. Concurrently, the EU ambassador was especially active in 
communicating  on  the  EU  COVID-19  response  (via  the  EU  Delegation  website,  Twitter,  and  press 
releases, notably). There was also greater coherence in the overall external communication as the EU 
relayed issues raised by EU MS with the national authorities. However, this was not necessarily a 
joint EU-MS strategy and EU MS remained in control of their own communication on the COVID-19 
response. Although coherent EU-MS communication was present, the approach was never formally 
labelled as “Team Europe” in DRC. 

11   United Kingdom’s Department for International Development set up donors’ meetings every two weeks on top of other 

meetings 

12   Monthly  meetings  with  the  Groupe  Inter-bailleurs  de  la  santé  and  consultations  once  or  twice  a week  between  the 

Ministry and UN agencies (WHO, UNICEF and others) 

13   Interview 
14   Interview with EUD and DG ECHO officers; EU internal documents; EU Delegation, France and Belgium Embassies in DRC 

websites (consulted in June 2021) 

15   Interview with EUD and DG ECHO officers; EU response documents. We did not gain interviews with National Authorities 

and international organisations.  

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2.3  EQ 3 – EFFICIENCY 

EQ3: To what extent were, and are, the individual aid modalities and other aid delivery 
mechanisms  and  their  combinations  efficient  and  flexible  enough  for  use  in  Team 
Europe’s (TE) COVID-19 response in COVID-19 crisis conditions? 

Summary 

The aid modality used for the EU response in DRC was the programme/project approach. INTPA 
projects  in  the  health  sector  were  funded  with  the  EDF  11  available  funds.  The  modality  was 
flexible enough to allow adaptations in due time, such as budget rearrangements. The monitoring 
and  learning  mechanisms  had  to  be  adapted  in  the  case  of  DG  ECHO  interventions  due  to 
difficulties related to the pandemic such as social distancing restrictions.  

The  EU's  cooperation  was  based  solely  on  a  programme/project  approach  in  DRC.  The 
COVID-19 pandemic led to movement restrictions, supply difficulties, closure of organisations, and 
other difficulties. Nevertheless, according to EU internal documents, none of the EU response package 
interventions were problematic in 2020. 

There were no particular concerns or delays in the implementation of the  Team Europe 
(TE) package projects. Exchanges with the National Authorising Officer (NAO), in charge of EDF 
implementation, were fast and efficient. Only one month elapsed between the declaration of the first 
COVID-19 case in DRC (10 March 2020) and the start of the first project in the package (15 April 
2020), even though the contract was only signed in May 2020 (with a retroaction clause).16 

Monitoring of the COVID-19 response did not rely on specific indicators for COVID-19. For 
health projects, this was not considered relevant as the indicators already in place were seen to also 
apply to the management of COVID-19. For emergency projects under DG ECHO, regular monitoring 
was not possible due to social distancing measures. Instead, there was more communication with 
technical  departments  to  update  knowledge  and  adapt  programmes  as  needed,  according  to  the 
evolution of the sanitary situation in the field.17  

16   Interview with EUD and DG ECHO officers; EU internal documents; EU response documents 
17   Interview with EUD and DG ECHO officers 

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24  EQ 4 – Effectiveness 

To what extent was the EU response successful in progressing towards the objectives 
associated with the COVID-19 response? 

Summary 

The  distribution  of  items  such  as  antiseptic  soaps  and  hydroalcoholic  gels  to  health  structures 
contributed  to  providing  Kinshasa  with  an  emergency  response  capacity.  The  European 
Commission’s interventions in health have the potential to contribute to strengthening the national 
health  system.  Although  it  is  difficult  to  draw  conclusions  on  the  results  of  awareness  raising 
projects, preliminary insight from the vaccination campaign suggested that a generalised distrust 
of the population hampered the effectiveness of the interventions in this area. 

The EU response was effective in fostering a prompt emergency response in Kinshasa with 
the provision of antiseptic soaps,  hydroalcoholic gels and plastic supplies (buckets, garbage cans, 
hand-washing stations and so on) to health structures shortly after the crisis began in the country.18  

The Commission package also included interventions with the potential to strengthen the 
service delivery capacity of health facilities, in line with EU’s cooperation priorities in DRC. For 
instance, the support to Saint Joseph Hospital, one of the targeted hospitals in the National Response 
Plan,  aimed  at  improving  COVID-19  case  management.  Beyond  that,  the  project  also  aimed  at 
improving the financial accessibility and the quality of health services supplies.19 The project started 
on 15 April 2020 without delays and the planned activities have been carried out so far. It is too 
early to assess results at this point as the project is planned as a 24-month intervention. However, 
interviewees were quite confident that the programme would bring an effective rationalisation of 
health resources in the short run, even if this is unlikely to be sustained in the long term once the 
programme ends.20 

It is difficult to draw conclusions on the results of awareness raising projects. However, 
the  current  vaccination  campaign  provides  an  insight.  There  were  a  few  projects  aimed  at 
improving public awareness of the pandemic (such as Anti-Misinformation Projects, funded through 
the  Instrument  contributing  to  Stability  and  Peace  [IcSP]).  The  roll  out  of  a  vaccination  plan  was 
attempted  (2021)  but  the  vaccination  campaign  is  struggling  to  get  off  the  ground  due  to  a 
generalised distrust of the population - including medical staff - particularly in relation to the fake 
news spread on social networks. By May 2021, only 23,000 people had been vaccinated. The need 
to inform the target audience therefore remains high.21 

18   The contract with the supplier of hydroalcoholic gels was signed by the NAO in July 2020, for a delivery due by end of 

July 2020. 

19   We do not a have information on the Team Europe (TE) package interventions’ outputs. 
20   Interview 
21   Interview with EUD and DG ECHO officers; EU response documents; EU ambassadors Meeting notes   

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3. Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch 

Source: Evaluation Team 

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Contents 

Acronyms 

1.  Background..................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 

1.1 

1.2 

Country COVID-19 context and government response .............................................................................. 1 

EU response ........................................................................................................................................................................ 2 

2.  Answers to Evaluation Questions ...................................................................................................................................... 2 

2.1 

2.2 

2.3 

2.4 

EQ 1 – Relevance ............................................................................................................................................................. 2 

EQ 2 – Value added ........................................................................................................................................................ 4 

EQ 3 – Efficiency .............................................................................................................................................................. 5 

EQ 4 – Effectiveness ...................................................................................................................................................... 6 

3.  Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch ....................................................................................................................................... 8 

THE  PURPOSE  OF  THIS  COUNTRY  NOTE  IS  TO  INFORM  THE  FAST-TRACK  ASSESSMENT  OF  THE  EU  INITIAL 
RESPONSE AS A WHOLE. IT IS NOT DESIGNED TO BE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RESPONSE IN THE COUNTRY. 

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Acronyms 

AECID 

BS 

CABEI 

CSOs 

DG DEVCO 

DG ECHO 

Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation 

Budget Support 

Central American Bank for Economic Integration 

Civil society organisations 

Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation  

Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid 
Operations 

DG INTPA 

Directorate-General for International Partnerships 

EIDHR 

EU 

EUMS 

GDP 

IDB 

IMF 

MIP 

MS 

SMEs 

TE 

WB 

UN 

European Instruments for Democracy and Human Rights 

European Union 

EU Member States 

Gross Domestic Product 

Inter-American Development Bank 

International Monetary Fund 

Multi-annual indicative programme 

Member States 

Small and Medium Enterprises 

Team Europe 

Word Bank 

United Nations 

DG DEVCO 

DG ECHO 

Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation  

Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid 
Operations 

DG INTPA 

Directorate-General for International Partnerships 

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1. Background 

1.1  Country COVID-19 context and government response 

The first cases of COVID-19 in Honduras were confirmed on 11 March 2020. As of 31 May 2020, 5 
094  confirmed  cases  and  201  deaths  were  registered,  the  highest  figures  in  Northern  Central 
America.1  The  pandemic  arrived  as  the  country  was  already  struggling  with  a  historically  severe 
dengue  emergency  that  put  huge  pressure  on  the  weak  medical  care  networks.  As  a  result  of 
insufficient  human  resources,  a  deficient  and  inadequate  distribution  in  primary  care,  a  low 
percentage  of  drugs  and  supplies  in  health  care  facilities,  and  poor  availability  of  tools  and 
equipment, around 1.3 million people had humanitarian needs in March 2020. 

Daily new confirmed COVID-19 cases in Honduras 

Source: Johns Hopkins University CSSE COVID-19 Data 

While  the  country  was  dealing  with  the  pandemic,  two  storms  hit  its  shores  between  1  and  16 
November 2020: tropical depression Eta and hurricane Iota. This further increased the humanitarian 
needs of hundreds of communities in the most affected geographical areas. As communities with 
destroyed  homes  tried  to  flee  the  region,  they  faced  harsh  mobility  restrictions  both  within  the 
national territory and at the border due to COVID-19 prevention measures. The combination of these 
natural disasters and COVID-19 left vulnerable people most at risk. The lack of hygiene and health 
access especially affected women and adolescents – particularly expectant mothers – girls and boys, 
the elderly, people with disabilities, and LGBTIQ+ people. 

Shortly after the first case was confirmed, the Government implemented severe measures to reduce 
the circulation of the virus, including a travel ban, school closures, bans on large social events, and a 
mandatory curfew. In parallel to the containment measures, an economic response plan was set up 
to cushion the negative impact on aggregate macroeconomic performance, prioritise healthcare and 
humanitarian services, ensure basic needs by providing food to the most vulnerable families, and 
reduce corporate tax burdens to prevent mass layoffs for the duration of the pandemic.2 On 2 April 
2020, the Honduran Congress authorised the Government to issue debt worth up to EUR 2.1 billion. 

1   Humanitarian Needs Overview - El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, OCHA, May 2020. 
2   UNDP, Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, June 22, 2020 

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The Honduras Solidarity Programme was established to provide food to around 800 000 families at 
risk across the country. The most affected sectors (self-employed workers, agriculture and transport) 
were  primarily  targeted  through  support  programmes  and  bonds.  Several  tax  and  employment 
measures targeting small and medium taxpayers were implemented, including payment deferrals, 
rate reductions, state compensation schemes and training. Economic stimulus measures consisted 
of grace periods for borrowers and easing debt repayments. Nevertheless, GDP is expected to have 
contracted by 9% in 2020 due to the pandemic and natural disasters. 

1.2  EU response 

The overall Team Europe (TE) package for the COVID-19 crisis in Honduras amounted to EUR 79 
million and included both non-refundable transfers and loans (the latter accounting for 39% of the 
total budget committed). More than half of Team Europe (TE) budget (EUR 43 million) was provided 
by the Commission. 

The  Honduras  package  included  budget  support  allocations  of  EUR  24 million,  complementing 
substantial liquidity injections provided through international financial institution loans (WB, IMF, IAB, 
CABEI).  EU  interventions  also  consisted  of  funds  reallocated  from  existing  DG  INTPA 
programmes (such as the CSO-LA programme and EIDHR) to support employment, improve food 
security and facilitate recovery in rural areas, as well as to provide first line assistance to vulnerable 
populations  and  mitigate  the  risk  of  increased  domestic  violence  because  of  the  lockdown. 
Employment  support  also  included  technical  assistance  to  businesses  for  the  implementation  of 
biosecurity measures for a safer and quicker reactivation of activities, information campaigns for the 
adoption  of  such  measures,  and  sustainable  support  to  SMEs,  for  instance  in  the  domain  of 
digitalisation. Honduras also benefited from DG  ECHO  regional funds through the activation of 
crisis modifiers within existing interventions. Following the Eta and Iota disasters in November 2020, 
DG ECHO further committed EUR 1.5 million in short-term humanitarian assistance to support 
livelihood recovery. (see Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch). 

2. Answers to Evaluation Questions 

2.1  EQ 1 – Relevance 

EQ1:  To  what  extent  did  the  initial  EU  global  response  to  the  COVID-19  pandemic 
through  the  Team  Europe  (TE)  country  packages  address  the  needs  and  priorities  of 
partner countries and regions in each country context in line with the three priorities of 
the Team Europe approach? 
Summary: 
The Team Europe (TE) country package appeared in line with EU principles and approaches. Efforts 
were also made to implement the package rapidly and adapt it to the evolving conditions, although 
it should be noted that in-country coordination was strongly affected by the low response capacity 
of  the  Government  as  well  as  the  scarce  existing  infrastructure,  particularly  as  it  pertains  to 
connectivity. Some of the interventions implemented have the potential to contribute to building 
long-term resilience. However, interventions within the health sector appeared focused on enabling 
continued  support  on  an  emergency  level,  with  no  significant  structural  improvements  being 
expected. 

The interventions of the Team Europe (TE) country package appeared consistent with the 
Joint Communication insofar they were targeted primarily at vulnerable people, including 

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people living in poverty, communities affected by migration and female survivors of gender-based 
violence, which increased during the pandemic. Interventions also targeted supply chain issues, 
particularly those related to  food security  (which  is one of three priorities of EU  cooperation with 
Honduras) and health. Projects also supported security protocol development as well as the purchase 
of biosecurity and other health-related supplies, through budget support.3 

EU budget support operations were relevant to help the Honduran government sustain the 
most  critical  COVID-19  response  actions,  providing  the  necessary  liquidity  injections  to  keep 
them operating through time. Beyond COVID-19, interventions were also adjusted to consider 
needs emerging from the two tropical storms that battered the country in November 2020. 

The  design  and  implementation  of  Commission  interventions  during  COVID-19  was 
significantly more rapid than usual, especially considering that INTPA aid modalities are designed 
for development cooperation more than for emergency response.4 Some activities within existing 
projects were in fact immediately readjusted to provide immediate response to COVID-19 
in areas in which it was deemed as (and appears to have been) highly needed. In this respect, it is 
worth mentioning that DG ECHO did not intervene in  a country-specific response to the COVID-19 
crisis in Honduras.5 

Alignment  with  the  Government  of  Honduras  on  the  response  to  COVID-19  was  only 
possible to some extent as the government response was limited, being affected by low political 
recognition,  human  capacity  issues,  and  technical  problems  arising  from  limited  connectivity  and 
limited capacity to work remotely during COVID-19. Connectivity issues and other significant 
changes in work conditions also strongly affected the capacity to collaborate with other 
actors, namely other international donors as well as beneficiaries and implementing partners in the 
field.6 

Although some elements of long-term resilience were addressed, in key areas (specifically 
in the health sector) the response appeared more geared towards ensuring sustainability 
of  emergency  measures  over  time,  rather  than  building  long-term  resilience.  Among 
elements  of  long-term  resilience  addressed  in  projects  were  the  development  of  biosecurity 
protocols, along with related training, as well as capacity building related to local resilience, such as 
home  agriculture  and  civil  society  capacity  strengthening.7  However,  discussions  around  budget 
support and closely related initiatives – which jointly represented EUR 30.8 million, or the bulk of the 
response  –  highlighted  how  these  were  primarily  expected  to  sustain  the  viability  of  emergency 
interventions, such as temporary patches to the health system and provision of emergency food/other 
basic support to the most vulnerable. No significant structural improvements to the health system 
have been observed so far, nor are they credibly expected.8 

3   Sources: descriptions of operations as reported on http://equipoeuropahn.eu/ and in the August 2020 note describing 

the response of TE to the COVID-19 crisis in Honduras, also available on the website. 

4   Citation from an interview 
5  
6  

Interviews and EU response documents 
Interviews.  The  novelty  of  the  situation  along  with  the  relative  lack  of  resources  such  as  good  internet/  phone 
connections (especially in remote areas), computers at home and systems for remote working/ possibility to access 
systems  from  locations  other  than  the  workplace  affected  all  actors.  In  addition,  a  large  portion  of  international 
personnel was repatriated, causing significant disruptions.  

7   Project descriptions; Interviews 
8  

Interviews 

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2.2  EQ 2 – Value added 

EQ2:  To  what  extent  did  the  Team  Europe  (TE)  initial  response  provide  additional 
benefits beyond what would have resulted from actions taken by the EU institutions 
and EU MS on their own? 
Summary: 
The introduction of the TE approach does not appear to have had significant influence on the design 
and execution of the COVID-19 response. In fact, coordination among the EU delegation, MS and 
other donors was already active in Honduras and was rather comparatively reduced in 2020, due 
to difficulties posed by the new working conditions (high rotation in donor staff due to evacuations, 
difficulties working remotely in a country with limited connectivity infrastructure). It was also noted 
that each MS tends to focus on different issues, making direct collaboration difficult. Although not 
perceived to have had tangible impact on the cooperation side, the  TE branding may, however, 
have had a positive impact on the positioning of the EU and MS as leading cooperation actors in 
Honduras. 

Coordination among EU MS as well as among international donors active in the country 
was taking place in Honduras for many years before COVID-19. In particular, the G-16 (the 
group bringing together international donors accredited in the country and with an active relationship 
with the Government) was organised as of 2016 in several working groups, which were topic-based 
and  met  regularly.9  EU  actors  present  in  the  country  also  coordinated  regularly,  which  resulted 
(amongst  other  outcomes)  in  a  Joint  Programming  Document  for  the  2019-2022  period.10  This 
document is considered the basis of the EU involvement in the country and of the programming for 
2021-27. 

However, coordination among different actors was substantially reduced in 2020, mainly 
due  to  the  emergency  circumstances  and  associated  changes  in  working  conditions. 
Particular causes were the impossibility of meeting physically (and difficulties in connecting virtually 
due  to  infrastructural  shortcomings),  changes  in  donor  teams11  due  to  evacuations,  and  shifts  in 
priorities and workloads both at government and donor levels.12 

Interviews and document review showed no evidence of joint planning/ execution in the 
EU COVID-19 response. Team Europe (TE) joint actions seem to have been limited to mutual 
information  on  activities  to  be  undertaken  and  communication/  media.  Most  notably,  an 
online portal was created,13 offering information on support provided to Honduras in response to the 
COVID-19 crisis by all  Team Europe (TE) members – among others, with the purpose of ensuring 
transparency of the use of EU funds. Furthermore, an official launch event of the Team Europe (TE) 
initiative was organised in late 2020. Finally, the TE (Equipo Europa) brand was extensively used in 
media and communication.14 

The  Team  Europe  (TE)  initiative  may  have  had  some  positive  effects  in  terms  of  the 
perception of the EU (including MS) as a stronger and more coordinated actor both in the 

Interviews 

9  
10   Available on http://equipoeuropahn.eu/, the transparency portal of the EU response to COVID-19 in Honduras. 
11   The  EU  donors  present  in  the  country  are  the  EU  itself,  France,  Spain  and  Germany.  Ireland  also  has  some  limited 

presence. EIB and EBRD are not active in Honduras. Source: website and interviews. 

12   Interviews 
13   http://equipoeuropahn.eu/ 
14   Interviews. 

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response to COVID-19 and in general, largely because of branding actions and communication 
(website, media messages). 

2.3  EQ 3 – Efficiency 

EQ3: To what extent were, and are, the individual aid modalities and other aid delivery 
mechanisms  and  their  combinations  efficient  and  flexible  enough  for  use  in  Team 
Europe’s COVID-19 response in COVID-19 crisis conditions? 
Summary 
Ongoing projects managed directly by the EU were the most flexible and quick-to-adapt modalities. 
In  most  cases,  adaptation  was  done  immediately,  within  existing  budget  lines.  Several 
modifications were also brought to ongoing budget support programmes to adapt to the pandemic. 
The BS funds mobilised for the COVID-19 response were released in December 2020 in the form 
of fixed tranches. Both modalities were complementary in the response in Honduras. In contrast, 
projects implemented through delegated cooperation to other international donors appeared to be 
the lengthiest to approve (only one of the new ones had started at the time of this study – namely, 
a EUR 3.5 million agreement with the World Food Programme) and most complicated to manage. 
It is also worth mentioning that flexibility was granted in re-assigning non-committed MIP funds 
to different sectors in the context of the COVID-19 crisis. 
In terms of monitoring, the Commission strongly focused on transparency and accountability of 
emergency spending during the pandemic due to potential misuse of funds. 

The  three  ongoing  budget  support  programmes  were  adapted.  For  EUROSAN  Budget, 
undisbursed funds from previous variable tranches were in part transformed into a fixed  tranche 
(EUR  3.8  million)  and  disbursed  in  December  2020  following  an  addendum  signed  in  September 
2020; another part (EUR 3.5 million) was instead reassigned to a contribution agreement with the 
World Food Programme (WFP), aimed at fostering food security and resilience in rural areas, signed 
in September 2020. The two other ongoing BS programmes, which started in 2019, each benefited 
from a top-up of EUR 3.5 million released in December 2020 through addenda signed in the same 
month.  For  EUROEMPLEO,  the  variable  tranche (EUR 5  million)  was  also  transformed  into  a  fixed 
tranche  disbursed  in  December  2020.  For  EUROSAN  Decentralisation,  the  fixed  tranche  of  EUR  4 
million was disbursed in July 2020 as initially planned. 

In terms of flexibility, ongoing “classical” projects were the fastest to be adjusted, particularly 
in  cases  in  which  adaptations  could  be  made  within  existing  activities,  without  amendments 
necessary, as those already had an organisation in place and resources assigned. Hence, the use of 
both projects and budget support can be considered complementary: the former allowed to 
provide more immediate relief, while the latter brought a larger and more structured support in a 
subsequent step.15 Beyond initial COVID adaptations, further adjustments to projects were also made 
in some cases because of the tropical storms that hit Honduras in November 2020.16 

Cooperation delegated to other entities, in particular to international organisations but also to 
AECID, tended to be the least adaptable  modality in the Honduras setting. These projects 
were consistently characterised by lengthy times for approval. For instance, projects with the IDB and 
with AECID are yet to start while the Spotlight Initiative implemented by the UN, the single example 
of a project that was already ongoing and subsequently modified, was deemed largely ineffective 

15   Project documentation and interviews 
16   Project documentation and interviews 

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and  highly  time-consuming  management-wise  for  the  EU  Delegation.17  The  abovementioned 
contribution agreement with the World Food Programme (WFP) was a partial exception in this sense, 
having been signed in September 2020. 

Lastly,  flexibility  was  granted  to  mobilise  unused  budget  within  different  sectors.  In 
particular, a portion of unused Rule of Law budget was used within the Health and Food Security 
ongoing operations. 

The  Commission  monitored  emergency  spending  through  BS.  Otherwise,  little  or  no 
structured  monitoring  activities  were  carried  out  during  the  crisis,  and  no  specific 
mechanisms were developed in this sense. Most interventions were only recently implemented and 
reports are not yet due; additionally, field visits were impossible. Two special audits conducted by the 
Supreme Audit Institution in May and October 2020 and a social audit issued in June 2020 revealed 
potential  misuse  of  pandemic  funds.18  The  most  worrying  purchases  concerned  seven  mobile 
hospitals. The Commission obtained the commitment of the Honduras government to use BS funds 
through  UN  System  procurement  procedures  to  guarantee  adequate  and  transparent  use  of  the 
funds.19 In late September 2020, IADB and IMF carried out a mission to analyse fiscal transparency and 
control  of  expenses  in  the  framework  of  COVID-19.  Key  recommendations  formulated  included, 
among  others,  adopting  a  Unique  Purchasing  Guide  for  the  COVID-19  Emergency;  strengthening 
budget  management  and  internal  control  frameworks;  and  publishing  recommendations  of  the 
concurrent controls. In addition, the delegation is regularly monitoring government spending, thus 
maintaining  an  informed  opinion  on  the  overall  coherence  with  agreed-upon  budget  support 
priorities.20  The  Commission  also  closely  followed  the  work  of  the  Supreme  Audit  Institution.  The 
disbursement  notes  of  the  three  programmes  put  a  heavy  emphasis  on  transparency  and 
accountability of emergency spending during the pandemic, in order to duly justify BS disbursements 
following the uncovering of these fraud allegations. 

2.4  EQ 4 – Effectiveness 

EQ4:  To  what  extent  was  the  EU  response  successful  in  progressing  towards  the 
objectives associated with the COVID-19 response? 
Summary: 
The EU response had some effect in progressing towards the objectives associated with the COVID-
19 response: in particular, it contributed towards biosecurity awareness (through the design and 
publication of protocols, training, and acquisition of equipment); and is helping to extend in time 
measures which provide relief both to the health sector and to the economic situation of the most 
vulnerable people. However, these last measures are mostly short term in nature and/or focus on 
subsistence/ basic resilience rather than economic activation. From the information reviewed, it is 
not apparent that Honduras’s health sector or economy will emerge strengthened or significantly 
more  prepared  for  future  pandemics  from  the  current  crisis,  except  perhaps  for  what  concerns 
home/ small ecosystems.   

The  Team  Europe  (TE)  response  contributed  to  sustaining  emergency  solutions  to 
temporarily strengthen the health system. For instance, while the disbursements made through 
three ongoing budget support operations did not create significant fiscal space, they injected liquidity 

17   Project documentation and interviews 
18   Such misuse concerned public funds only. (EU funds were not compromised.) 
19   Commission disbursement note for EUROSAN Budget, 2020. 
20   Interviews 

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useful  to  sustain  the  management  of  the  pandemic,  such  as  the  operation  of  temporary  pre-
diagnostic  centres,  the  temporary  withdrawal  of  which  was  immediately  associated  with  hospital 
overcrowding.  However,  so  far  the  response  has  not  included  action  targeted  towards 
significant structural, long-term improvements to the health system.21 In fact, only two out 
of  the  six mobile  hospitals  acquired  by the  Government  are currently  operational  and  capable  of 
taking care of COVID-19 patients. Interventions of an economic nature were similarly largely focused 
on  contributing  to  emergency  or  quasi-subsistence  services  such  as  food  distribution  and  home 
agriculture.  It  is  not  immediately  clear  how  or  whether  these  can  and  will  support  economic 
development in the long term.22  

In terms of awareness of the pandemic, the EU supported, through several projects, the design 
of biosecurity protocols for dealing with COVID-19, as well as training and acquisition of 
equipment.  Most  notably,  protocols  designed  through  the  technical  assistance  part  of  the 
EuroEmpleo program were published and made available through a dedicated portal on the Ministry 
of Employment website. 

21   Interviews. In fact, some action in this sense is included in EUROSAN DEL (addressing nutrition through primary health 
establishments in 39 targeted municipalities); however, it pre-dated COVID-19 and was not eventually modified. 

22   EU response documents 

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3. Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch 

Source: Evaluation Team 

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Country note - Morocco

 
 
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Contents 

1.1 
1.2 

Acronyms 
1.  Background..................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 
Country COVID-19 context and government response .............................................................................. 1 
European Union (EU) response ................................................................................................................................. 2 
2.  Answers to Evaluation Questions (EQ) ........................................................................................................................... 3 
EQ 1 – Relevance ............................................................................................................................................................. 3 
EQ 2 – Value added ........................................................................................................................................................ 4 
EQ 3 – Efficiency .............................................................................................................................................................. 6 
EQ 4 – Effectiveness ...................................................................................................................................................... 7 
3.  Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch .................................................................................................................................... 10 

2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 

THE PURPOSE OF THIS COUNTRY NOTE IS TO INFORM THE FAST-TRACK ASSESSMENT OF THE EU INITIAL 
RESPONSE AS A WHOLE. IT IS NOT DESIGNED TO BE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RESPONSE IN THE COUNTRY. 

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Acronyms 

AAP 

BS 

CGEM 

CHU 

EBRD 

EC 

EIB 

EQ 

EU 

EUD 

EUTF 

EWC 

GDP 

IFI 

IMF 

IOM 

MS 

PASS 

PACC 

PIAFE 

PLL 

PPE 

PFM 

SME 

SRBC 

TE 

Annual Action Plan 

Budget Support 

Confédération générale des entreprises du Maroc 

University Hospitals 

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 

European Commission 

European Investment Bank 

Evaluation Question 

European Union 

European Union Delegation in Morocco 

EU Trust Fund 

Economic Surveillance Committee 

Gross Domestic Product 

International Financial Institution 

International Monetary Fund 

International Organization for Migration 

Member States 

Programme d'Appui au Secteur de la Santé Marocain 

Programme d’Appui à la Compétitivité et Croissance Verte 

Programme Intégré d’Appui à la Formation et à l’Education 

Precautionary and Liquidity Line 

Personal Protective Equipment 

Public Finance Management 

Small and Medium Enterprise 

State and Resilience Building Contract 

Team Europe 

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1. Background 

1.1  Country COVID-19 context and government response 

Morocco  recorded  the  first  case  of  COVID-19  on  2  March  2020.  After  progressing  slowly,  the 
pandemic gathered speed in late July, reaching a peak of 5,205 new daily confirmed cases1 on 17 
November 2020. Since then, the number of daily infections has steadily fallen, reaching slightly less 
than 2,000 new daily confirmed cases on 31 December 2020. A total of 439,192 people infected, 
and 7,388 COVID-19-related deaths were registered since the beginning of the pandemic as of that 
date. 

Daily new confirmed COVID-19 cases in Morocco 

The main governance structures/response instruments for managing the health crisis and its social 
and  economic  consequences  were  put  in  place  within  weeks  of  the  first  cases  being  identified, 
namely: 

-  An Economic Surveillance Committee (EWC)2, to monitor the evolution of the socio-economic 
situation  and  to  formulate  measures  to  support  the  national  economy  and  the  actors 
impacted  by  the  crisis,  in  connection  with  the  implementation  of  the  health  national 
emergency response  

-  A Special Fund for the Management of the COVID-19 Pandemic (COVID-19 Fund) to mobilise 
and  channel  public  and  private  resources  (including  external  resources)  for  financing 
additional health expenditure and socio-economic measures recommended by the Economic 
Surveillance Committee (EWC)3  

-  A  state  of  health  emergency  was  declared  on  23  and  24  March  2020  with  a  number  of 

containment measures4 and health safety rules.5 

1   Rolling 7-day average. Source: Our world in data.  
2   The Committee, chaired by the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Administration Reform (MEFRA), is composed of 

several ministerial departments, the Central Bank and the private sector. 

3   «Fonds spécial pour la gestion de la pandémie du coronavirus », endowed with MAD 10 billion (EUR 934 million) from 
the state budget. The Fund's total revenue amounted to MAD 33.7 billion (EUR 3.1 billion) at the end of August 2020. 
Including quarantine, suspension of all international passenger flights, interdiction of all public gatherings, and closures 
of mosques, schools, universities, restaurants, cafes, and hammams. 

4  

5   The state of emergency is still ongoing as of September 2021 until 31 October 2021, although with fewer restrictions 

on travels for tourists and vaccinated persons. 

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The government’s preliminary estimates indicated that Morocco’s real gross domestic product (GDP) 
contracted  by  7%  in  2020,6  leading to  an  increase in  unemployment  from  9.2%  to  11.9%  and  a 
budget deficit of 7.4% of the GDP in 2020.7 In August 2020, the Government announced an ambitious 
recovery plan of some MAD 120 billion (EUR 11.2 billion) in the form of state-guaranteed credits to 
businesses and funding for a newly created strategic investment fund which will finance investment 
projects (including Public Private Partnerships).8 

1.2  European Union (EU) response 

The  EU  COVID-19  response  in  Morocco  consists  of  a  package  of  approximately  EUR  456  million, 
mostly made up of budget support funded from the bilateral cooperation and the North of Africa 
window  of  the  EU  Trust  Fund  (EUTF)  for  Africa.  Central  to  the  package  is  the  European  Support 
Programme  for  the  COVID-19  Response  in  Morocco  (EUR  111  million),  which  is  a  new  State  and 
Resilience Building Contract (SRBC)9 adopted in August 202010 and released11 in November 2020 to 
support the government’s COVID-19 response plan.12 Two recent large budget support programmes 
in  the  sectors  of  education  and  health  adopted  under  the  Action  Programme  2019-202013  were 
included in the package for a total amount of EUR 240 million, with the fixed tranches increased 
(50% of the total) and front-loaded, also in support of the government’s COVID-19 response plan. 
Additional funding for the government’s COVID-19 Fund was mobilised through special COVID-19 
fixed tranches under ongoing budget support programmes14 to implement COVID-19 measures linked 
to the sector covered by these programmes.15 In total, these special COVID-19 tranches amounted 
to  EUR  116.5  million.  The  package  also  included  the  last  tranches  of  ongoing  budget  support 
programmes,  which  were transferred  irrespective  of  the  pandemic.  In  addition,  a  EUR  30  million-
variable tranche was disbursed under the EUTF-funded budget support programme for migration.16 
The only assistance provided through a project approach in the package is the EUTF-funded project 
implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in four North African countries to 
respond  to  emergency  needs  of  the  most  vulnerable  with  the  involvement  of  civil  society.17  (See 
Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch) 

6   Comparing to a 2.5% growth registered in 2019.  
7   Haut Commissariat au Plan, Situation économique en 2020 et ses perspectives en 2021, January 2021  
8   Mohammed VI Fund for Investment, which became effective with the adoption of a dedicated law in December 2020 

and its decree in February 2021.  

9   SRBC supports societal and state resilience as defined in the European Commission joint Communication “A Strategic 

Approach to Resilience in the EU's external action” (2017).  

10   Signed on 5 October 2020. 
11   Through  a  fixed  tranche  representing  almost  the  entire  amount  of  the  programme  (EUR  105  million)  to  feed  the 
government’s COVID-19 Fund via a contribution to the treasury. The second tranche (EUR 6 million) was included to 
make it possible, if needed, for the programme to be increased through a top-up, and is to be paid in 2021.  

12   “To support the implementation of the government's strategy to respond to the COVID-19 crisis in terms of  health, 
protection  of  workers  and  vulnerable  populations,  and  support  for  economic  activity  in  the  short  and  medium  term 
medium term”, EC Implementing decision, C(2020) 5410 final. 

13   Programme d'Appui au Secteur de la Santé Marocain (PASS) III (EUR 100 million) and the Programme Intégré d’Appui à 

la Formation et à l’Education (PIAFE) (EUR 140 million). 

14   For example : Programme d’Appui à la Compétitivité et Croissance Verte (PACC) supporting growth and competitiveness 
reforms (EUR 10.7 million), PASS II supporting health reforms (EUR 27.6 million), Youth programme (EUR 20 million). 
Unspent amounts were used to that effect for the first two programmes. In the case of the Youth programme, the 
special COVID-19 tranche is made up of funds from the subsequent tranches, which have been reduced.  

15   For example, the special COVID-19 tranche of the Youth programme supports measures to alleviate the impact of the 

crisis on young people.  

16   Worth EUR 101 million, it was adopted in 2019 to help Morocco improve the management of its borders, combat people 

smuggling and trafficking and improve migrant protection.  

17   Regional  Response  to  COVID-19  in  North  African  Countries  (EUR  7.55  million)  covering Algeria, Egypt,  Morocco  and 
Tunisia and focusing on the needs of migrants and displaced persons, including returnees and asylum seekers, as well 
as their host communities. It seeks to ensure protection and assistance to vulnerable populations as well as to address 
their emergent socioeconomic needs. 

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2. Answers to Evaluation Questions (EQ) 

2.1  EQ 1 – Relevance 

EQ1:  To  what  extent  did  the  initial  EU  global  response  to  the  COVID-19  pandemic 
through  the  Team  Europe  (TE)  country  packages  address  the  needs  and  priorities  of 
partner countries and regions in each country context in line with the three priorities of 
the Team Europe approach? 
Summary:  The  EU  COVID-19  response  was  in  line  with  the  priorities  set  out  in  the  Joint 
Communication with a significant package (EUR 450 million), consisting mostly of budget support 
feeding into the Moroccan treasury to finance national measures under the COVID-19 Fund set up 
by the Government to address health emergency needs and tackle the immediate socio-economic 
consequences of the pandemic. The response focused therefore on short-term needs through front-
loading of budget support (BS) payments, while ensuring that dialogue would continue on long-
term reform goals within the framework of the EU budget support programmes. Longer-term needs 
and  the  strengthening  of  resilience  are  also  to  be  addressed  through  the  EU  support  to  the 
government’s recovery plan, which is currently under discussion.  

The  EU  COVID-19  response  package  was  geared  at  supporting  the  comprehensive  and 
well-designed national  COVID-19 emergency response, which Morocco swiftly deployed. 
Shortly  after  the  pandemic  was  announced,  the  Moroccan  authorities  designed  an  ambitious  and 
proactive plan to contain the pandemic, address emergency health needs, stabilise the economy and 
alleviate the immediate impact of the crisis for households and enterprises. Central to this response 
was the setting up of a special COVID-19 Fund to finance response measures drawing on public and 
private  funds,  including  external  aid.  Considering  that  the  country’s  response  strategy  was  highly 
relevant and credible, the Commission decided to support its implementation with the front-loading 
of budget support, which was the main aid modality used in Morocco. This approach was agreed with 
the  Moroccan  authorities,  which  sought  the  backing  of  the  donor  community  and  international 
organisations  to  fund  their  emergency  response.  The  national  measures  that  the  EU  COVID-19 
response package helped finance through the country’s COVID-19 Fund were in line with the priorities 
of the Joint Communication, with a focus on emergency health needs, macro-economic stabilisation 
and fiscal and financial help for households and enterprises. 

In  supporting  the  national  COVID-19  response  plan,  the  EU  response  helped  address 
emergency needs crucial to the management of the health crisis. The health system, with 
limited and unevenly distributed resources and weaknesses in terms of accessibility and governance, 
faced  considerable  pressure  in  coping  with  the  pandemic,  which  overstretched  health  services, 
especially outside the main urban centres (Casablanca, Rabat, Fez, and Tangier). The EU COVID-19 
response  provided  fiscal  space  for  the  Moroccan  government  to  manage  the  health  crisis,  by 
strengthening  the  capacity  for  infection  control  and  patient  care,  upgrading  facilities  for  treating 
severe  cases,  and  ensuring  the  country-wide  delivery  of  laboratory  testing  materials,  personal 
protective equipment (PPE), hospital materials and medicine.  

The  COVID-19  response  was  also  well  aligned  with  Morocco’s  priorities  for  economic 
stabilisation and support to households and businesses. The lockdown measures introduced 
by the Government between March and August 2020 and the impact of the pandemic on the global 
economy pushed the Moroccan economy into its first recession since 1995, with a major downturn 
in the tourism sector, a drop in foreign investment and disruptions to external and domestic demand, 

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compounded  by  the  fall  in  agricultural  production  due  to  a  severe  drought.18  Morocco’s  real  GDP 
contracted by 7% in 202019 while unemployment rose from 9.2% to 11.9%.20 In this context, the 
government's priority was to preserve macro-economic stability through a proactive monetary and 
macro-financial policy while cushioning the impact of the health crisis on economic actors through 
fiscal  measures  in  support  of  businesses  and  social  transfers  targeted  at  the  most  vulnerable 
households. 

The  response  package  focused  on  short-term  needs,  but  budget  support  programmes 
enabled  the  EU  to  maintain  its  dialogue  on  long-term  reform  goals,  including 
strengthening  resilience,  which  will  feature  high  on  the  new  EU-Morocco  cooperation 
agenda. 
The EU COVID-19 response focused on the country’s emergency response, providing fiscal space to 
the Government to implement emergency health and socio-economic measures. While the response 
was  not  intended  to  build  long-term  resilience,  the  policy  dialogue  held  in  the  framework  of  the 
budget support helped maintain the focus of Moroccan authorities on long-term reform goals despite 
difficulties linked to the pandemic, in particular regarding the health and social protection systems, 
which are receiving further assistance from the EU.21 Furthermore, the new cooperation framework 
2021-2027,  which  will  support  the  country’s  post-COVID-19  recovery  plan,  will  lay  emphasis  on 
addressing structural weaknesses in the economy and building resilience. 

The  EU  response  helped  draw  attention  to  the  needs  of  vulnerable  populations.  The 
response package included one regional  EUTF-funded project, “Regional  Response to COVID-19 in 
North African Countries”, implemented by the IOM to help countries of the region ensure protection 
and  assistance  to  the  migrant  population  whilst  also  addressing  their  socio-economic  needs  by 
providing them with livelihood and employment opportunities. The special COVID-19 tranche under 
the Justice budget support programme put emphasis on legal protection measures and financial aid 
in favour of vulnerable people in contact with the justice system during the pandemic, such as women 
and children, victims of family violence, juvenile offenders in placement and prison inmates. 

2.2  EQ 2 – Value added 

EQ2:  To  what  extent  did  the  Team  Europe  (TE)  initial  response  provide  additional 
benefits beyond what would have resulted from actions taken by the EU institutions 
and EU MS on their own? 
Summary:  Given  the  crisis  and  the  need  to  react  quickly,  the  EU  COVID-19  response  package 
concentrated  on  Commission  instruments,  primarily  budget  support.  While  other  EU  institutions 
and EU MS supported Morocco’s emergency response, their contributions were not pooled into nor 
branded as an EU response package. Therefore, the Team Europe (TE) approach as a promotion 
tool was not really put into practice. The EU, however, maintained coordination with its partners 
but  the  pandemic  did  not  alter  the  way  they  cooperated.  The  EU  response  package  was 
commensurate with the strategic partnership that exists between the EU and Morocco enabling the 
EU to influence emergency and recovery policies through the policy dialogue which accompanies 
budget support. 

18   Un an de gestion de la pandémie COVID-19, March 2021 
19   After shrinking by 15.1% in the second quarter of 2020, mainly due to the lockdown, but also due to falling exports 

and collapsing tourism receipts ; activity recovered in the second half of 2020.  

20   Haut-Commissariat au Plan, Situation économique en 2020 et ses perspectives en 2021, January 2021 
21   The objectives of the EU budget support programmes « Programme d’Appui à la Réforme du Secteur de la Santé III » 
(health) and « Protection Sociale » (social protection) are to build sustainable and inclusive health and social protection 
systems. Both programmes include substantial technical assistance components.  

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Given the crisis, the Commission gave priority to tailoring its own instruments, primarily 
budget  support,  to  build  the  response  package.  Apart  from  one  project  implemented  in 
partnership with the IOM, the EU COVID-19 response involved only the Commission. According to the 
EC, the crisis was not conducive to experimenting with closer cooperation with EU MS, as it requires 
considerable time to create common frameworks, starting with joint programming. The focus was 
then on Commission instruments, the adaptation of which was already complex and time-consuming. 

Coordination with other international partners was maintained during the pandemic with 
no significant change in the level of contacts. Contacts with the other international partners 
were maintained through online meetings to exchange information and coordinate activities and to 
organise joint events in some cases. For example, EU-EBRD web seminars for enterprises were held 
to  provide  Moroccan  companies  affected  by  the  crisis  with  concrete,  operational  and  directly 
applicable solutions.22 

The EU Delegation   initiated a dialogue with EU MS on promoting their response efforts 
under a common Team Europe (TE) brand, but the approach has not yet been applied in 
practice. The EU Delegation Communication Unit gathered EU MS to present the Team Europe (TE) 
approach and discuss how the response from the EU institutions and EU MS could be promoted jointly. 
The EIB referred to the Team Europe initiative (TEI) in promoting its package of measures in favour 
of Morocco, but the concept was explained only in a linked page,23 and no Team Europe (TE) visual 
identity  was  used.  Likewise,  the  EU-EBRD  “Back  to  business  Initiative”  publicised  on  the  EEAS 
website24 makes mention to Team Europe (TE), but without visual brand and with only a link at the 
bottom  of  the  page  providing  additional  information  about  the  concept.  Moreover,  and  more 
importantly, the important contribution made by the EIB was not branded as part of the EU response 
package.25 
With  its  COVID-19  response,  the  EU  positioned  itself  as  one  of  the  key  players  in 
supporting  Morocco’s  timely  and  effective  response  plan  to  which  it  also  contributed 
through political dialogue thanks to the budget support modality. The EU was able to show 
its  solidarity  with  the  Moroccan  people  through  significant  financial  transfers  to  help  Moroccan 
authorities  implement  their  national  response  plan.  This  support  was  publicised  through  a  joint 
announcement  between  the  Moroccan  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  the  EU  Commissioner  for 
Enlargement  and  Neighbourhood  (2.4)26  and  was  also  highlighted  in  the  promotional  materials 
recently  issued  by  the  EU  Delegation  about  EU-Morocco  relationships.  However,  other  EU 
contributions,  such  as  the  exceptional  financing  from  the  EIB  released  in  August  2020  was  not 
mentioned in these materials although there were publicised on the EIB website which made a link 
to the overall EU COVID-19 response package and Team Europe (TE).27 In addition, the EU continues 
to contribute to the country's COVID-19 and post-COVID-19 response by maintaining a close policy 
dialogue in the framework of the budget support modality.  

22   Back to Business Initiative 
23   Maroc : tous unis contre la Covid-19 - la continuité pédagogique assurée par l’Université Euromed de Fès avec le soutien 
de l’Union européenne. The page makes no mention of the fact that Team Europe (TE) represents the combined response 
from  the  EU,  its  Member  States  and  European  financial  institutions  to  help  partner  countries  tackle  the  COVID-19 
pandemic.  

24   Team Europe - Back to Business Initiative - Industrie du conseil au Maroc : challenges et opportunités post Covid 19 
25   “2020 saw an extraordinary level of European Investment Bank activity in Morocco, with EUR 617 million in signatures 
– double the 2019 figure. The Bank took wide-ranging action under the Team Europe initiative (TEI) to quickly provide 
urgent  support  to  the  Kingdom  of  Morocco  to  combat  the  COVID-19  pandemic”.  Unprecedented  EIB  mobilisation  in 
Morocco in 2020 to combat COVID-19 pandemic, March 2021. In particular, the EIB mobilised  emergency financing 
(EUR 200 million) to support the implementation of Morocco’s national response plan, of which EUR 100 million was 
released at the end of August 2020. 

26   Joint announcement, March 2021 
27   La BEI débloque en urgence 100 millions d’euros pour soutenir le Maroc face au Covid-19 

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2.3  EQ 3 – Efficiency 

EQ3: To what extent were, and are, the individual aid modalities and other aid delivery 
mechanisms  and  their  combinations  efficient  and  flexible  enough  for  use  in  Team 
Europe’s COVID-19 response in COVID-19 crisis conditions? 
Summary: Budget support is not an emergency instrument. Still, due to the crisis, exceptional lighter 
procedures were applied and budget support actually proved to be a very flexible modality that 
enabled the EU to provide significant, swift, and direct financial support to help Morocco respond 
to the crisis. The EU and the Moroccan authorities expanded much effort to adapt it to the crisis. 
Given  that  75%  of  the  cooperation  between  the  EU  and  Morocco  is  conducted  through  this 
modality,  the  possibility  of  combining  budget  support  with  other  instruments  was  limited.  The 
framework set in place for budget support enabled the Commission to monitor the progress of the 
COVID-19  plan,  with  Moroccan  authorities  providing  detailed 
the 
implementation of their plan. 

information  about 

The  budget  support  modality  provided  the  necessary  flexibility  to  rapidly  mobilise 
considerable  resources  in  support  of  Morocco’s  COVID-19  response,  which  would  have 
been  difficult  to  achieve  under  other  aid  modalities.  The  EU  COVID-19  response  consisted 
almost  entirely  of  budget  support  reflecting  the  shape  of  the  current  EU-Moroccan  cooperation, 
where budget support is the main aid modality, representing approximately 75% on average of the 
total  amount of EU commitments to the country in the last decade. In agreement with Moroccan 
authorities, the EU decided to launch a State Resilience and Building Contract for the first time in 
Morocco,  with  a  total  budget  of  EUR  111  million  reallocated  from  adopted  budget  support 
programmes but not  yet implemented.28 The Commission introduced a simplified template, which 
helped speed up the adoption of the new SRBC programme by October 2020.29 In addition, the EC 
front-loaded  fixed  tranches  of  new  programmes  and  disbursed  special  COVID-19  fixed  tranches 
using unspent amounts under ongoing programmes. The familiarity of the Moroccan administration 
and the EU with the budget support modality also played an important part in the swift mobilisation 
of  EU  budget  support  for  the  national  COVID-19  response,  with  EUR  456  million30  disbursed  by 
February 2021,31 representing about 15% of the national COVID-19 Fund set up by the Government 
to respond to the crisis. It would have been difficult to achieve the same level of support with other 
instruments  involving  more  time-consuming  and  less  flexible  procedures,  such  as  technical 
assistance  contracts  or  grant  schemes.  Therefore,  no  efforts  were  needed  to  repurpose  projects 
currently implemented in Morocco  to contribute to the crisis response although activities of some 
projects were mobilised to address specific needs when feasible. As a result, besides budget support, 
the response included only one EUTF-funded regional initiative implemented by the IOM to address 
the needs of migrants in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia. From this point of view, it seems there 
is a need for emergency instruments (rather than emergency procedures), which can be drawn upon 
in such crises. Even the budget support modality, which offers greater flexibility, is not an emergency 
instrument and its deployment in crisis mode required significant efforts from the Commission and 
the country authorities despite the lighter procedures introduced.32 Finally, it should be stressed that 

28   EUR 40 million from the Public Administration Reform Programme (Annual Action Plan (AAP) 2020) + EUR 50 million 
from the Financial Inclusion programme (AAP 2020) + EUR 21 million of unallocated top-up funding (AAP 2020). New 
funding for these programmes is committed under AAP 2021.  

29   The Financing Agreement was signed in October 2020 and EUR 105 million was disbursed in December 2020. A second 

payment of EUR 6 million is foreseen in 2021. 

30   Including EUR 113 million of variable tranches that were planned irrespective of the pandemic.  
31   The special COVID-19 tranche (EUR 21 million) was released in February 2021.  
32   Simplified template for the SBRC and lighter disbursement conditions (see next point) 

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the use of budget support was only made possible thanks to the great reactivity of the Moroccan 
authorities in adopting a comprehensive and credible response plan.  

Given  the  urgency,  only  the  fulfilment  of  the  general  conditions  applicable  to  BS  was 
required.  However,  regular  budget  support  dialogue,  and  the  application  of  “classical” 
reporting and monitoring requirements ensured a good follow-up of the implementation 
of  the  national  response  plan.  The  only  criteria  used  for  disbursing  the  SRBC  and  the  special 
COVID-19 tranches were  the general  conditions of budget  support: satisfactory  progress with the 
national COVID-19 strategy, a stable, credible, and relevant macroeconomic policy, transparency and 
budget  control  and  the  pursuit  of  Public  Finance  Management  (PFM)  reforms.  It  was  considered 
impractical and inappropriate to add other conditions given the urgency, not to mention the challenge 
of  designing  meaningful  performance  indicators  in  the  midst  of  an  evolving  crisis.  However,  the 
budget support framework ensured that the European Commission was kept well informed about the 
progress  of  the  government’s  COVID-19  response,  either  through  policy  dialogue,  disbursement 
requests  submitted  by  the  Government  or  day-to-day  contacts  between  the  EU  Delegation  and 
Moroccan authorities. The latter provided detailed information about the sanitary and socio-economic 
measures implemented under the national plan when submitting the disbursement requests to the 
EC33,  including  a  comprehensive  overview  report  submitted  at  the  end  of  2020.34  Finally,  the 
indicators  of the programmes with specific  COVID-19 or front-loaded tranches remained in place 
ensuring that the EU continues to monitor the progress of public policies it supports, including through 
the second SRBC payment in 2021, which will ensure a longer-term follow-up to the crisis and the 
government’s  post-crisis  strategy.  While  front-loading  may  reduce  the  leverage  effect  of  future 
payments, it should be noted that the budget of the programmes concerned35 remains significant 
even after deducting the frontloaded tranches. Moreover, the transfer of funds is not the primary 
motivation of line ministries to engage in a budget support programmes. The technical assistance 
component accompanying such programmes often plays a more important role for the participating 
ministries. 

2.4  EQ 4 – Effectiveness 

EQ4:  To  what  extent  was  the  EU  response  successful  in  progressing  towards  the 
objectives associated with the COVID-19 response? 
Summary: The EU response package, representing about 15% of the national COVID-19 Fund, gave 
Morocco fiscal space to implement its emergency response. The level of EU support for Morocco's 
national  plan  was  even  greater  when  considering  the  contributions  of  the  EU  MS  and  the  EU 
financial institutions. Together with funding from International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and other 
donors, the package enabled the mobilisation of important resources for the management of the 
crisis without destabilising public finances and adding excessively to the deficit and the public debt. 
The emergency plan supported by the Commission helped Morocco’s health system weather the 
worst of the pandemic while  stimulus measures in favour of households and the private sector 
limited the socio-economic consequences and prevented a more serious downturn. 

The EU COVID-19 response contributed to improving the management of the crisis, helping 
the  health  system  to  overcome  the  worst  of  the  pandemic  despite  weaknesses,  which 

33   For  example,  the  request  for  payment  of the  COVID-19  special tranche  under  the  Social  Protection  budget  support 
programme was accompanied by a report from the Government on the social assistance provided for each type of 
beneficiary. 

34   « Pandémie COVID-19 : Principales Mesures Prises par le Gouvernement du MAROC », October 2020 
35   Half of the total budget for both programmes : Programme d'Appui au Secteur de la Santé Marocain (PASS) III (EUR 

100 million) and the Programme Intégré d’Appui à la Formation et à l’Education (PIAFE) (EUR 140 million).  

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ongoing reforms seek to remedy with EU support. Together with other donors, the EU COVID-
19 response helped Morocco mobilise additional resources for the public health authorities to monitor 
and control the spread of the virus, and to expand and reorganise hospital capacity and patient care. 
The testing capacity was expanded thanks to massive purchase of testing kits and the involvement 
of  University  Hospitals  (CHU)  and  military  hospitals  across  the  country.36  Medical  and  sanitary 
equipment  and  medicine  were  quickly imported  and  distributed to  health  care  centres  across  the 
country. Military field hospitals were also set up in or around towns to reduce the pressure on the 
health  system.  Fast-track  procedures  were  used  to  mobilise  Moroccan  companies  specialised  in 
respirators and hospital equipment to increase production. Other local companies were supported in 
adapting  their  production  facilities  to  manufacture  respirators  and  masks.  The  pandemic  evolved 
slowly in Morocco thanks to the sanitary measures implemented early on. Infections began to rise 
when  travelling  restrictions  were  lifted  in  the  summer  of  2020,37  with  a  sharp  increase  between 
October and November38 when the capacity of the Moroccan health system was exceeded prompting 
the Government to set up field hospitals. The crisis highlighted well-known structural weaknesses,39 
which current reforms seek to remedy with the support of the EU.40 

The EU COVID-19 response helped Morocco contain the social and economic damage from 
the pandemic for households and enterprises while minimising macroeconomic and fiscal 
imbalances  induced  by  the  crisis.  The  EUR  456  million  response  package  consisting  almost 
entirely of budget support gave fiscal space to Moroccan authorities to implement comprehensive 
socio-economic  response  measures,  which  helped  mitigate  the  impact  of  the  pandemic41  on 
enterprises. Total BS disbursements (EUR 456 million) represented 1.4% of total public revenues in 
2020 (equalling EUR 3 billion).42 In these circumstances, the budget support together with the other 
private  and  public  voluntary  contributions  to  the  COVID-19  Fund  helped  minimise  the  impact  on 
Morocco’s fiscal position. The budgetary deficit increased from 3.6% in 2019 to 7.6% in 2021 mostly 
due  to  reduced  tax  revenues  while  lower  tourism  receipts  explained  the  growing  current  account 
deficit,43 which rose from 29.5% of GDP in 2019 to 34.9% in 2020.44 

Support measures for businesses and employees adopted by the EWC and funded by the COVID-19 
Fund included the deferral of tax payments and social contributions for companies and employees; 
compensation  schemes  for  the  temporary  unemployed;  loan  payment  deferrals  and  refinancing 
measures for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and self-employed people; liquidity support to 
foster  access  to  finance  for  SMEs  and  micro-enterprises,45  and  state-guaranteed  credit  schemes, 
amongst others. Support measures extended also to workers in the informal economy, who benefited 
from special social transfers. According to estimates, these fiscal and monetary measures, which are 

36   From 300 tests a day in March 2020 to more than 20 000 a day at the end of July 2020. Our world in data.  
37   International borders were reopened on July 1, 2020 for Moroccan nationals living abroad and foreigners established 

in Morocco. 

38   5 205 new daily confirmed cases on 17 November 2020 (rolling 7-day average). Our world in data.  
39   Shortage of human and material resources; low motivation of health care practitioners to work in the most remote 
areas; problems of geographical and financial accessibility of services; poor performance and quality of services; and 
shortcomings in the governance of the sector as a whole.  

40   The EU launched its third-generation budget support programme (EUR 100 million) in support of health reforms in 2020 
« Programme d’Appui au Secteur de la Santé III » (PASS III) whose objective is to provide citizens with  quality health 
services distributed equitably throughout the territory. The EU is also supporting the reform of the social protection 
system through a EUR 109 million budget support programme implemented since 2018.  

41   The economy was also hit by severe drought which affected agricultural production.  
42   Source: Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de la réforme de l’administration, Loi de Finances rectificative, 2020. 
43   Morocco drew about USD 3 billion under the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL) 

arrangement. 

44   Source: Loi de Finances rectificative, 2021 
45   The Central Bank reduced the key interest rate from 2.25% to 1.5%, increased liquidity provision and relaxed 

prudential ratios support to support the banking system. 

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still ongoing, helped reduce the scale of the economic downturn in 2020 by 4 GDP points and, by 
preventing bankruptcies and job losses, enabled the economy to rebound once lockdown restrictions 
were lifted in the third quarter of 2020.46  

The EU response package indirectly contributed to the authorities' generally successful 
communication on the pandemic and health and socio-economic response measures. The 
Ministry of Health led a proactive communication policy informing the public on the evolution of the 
pandemic  and  the  health  measures  taken  to  counter  it.  Communications  on  support  available  to 
households and enterprises was led by the EWC as the body in charge of formulating socio-economic 
response  measures.47  In  general,  the  Government  has  been  praised48  for  its  transparency  and 
communication on the pandemic to which the EU response may have contributed.49 

46   Source: European Commission disbursement note, 27 November 2020. 
47   Information about the support for households and enterprises was published on the websites of the Ministry of Economy 
and  Finance  and  the  Confédération  générale  des  entreprises  du  Maroc  (CGEM),  the  employers’  association,  both 
members of the EWC.  

48   With the exception of some criticism  in the media regarding the announcements on the lifting of restrictions, which 

were said to lack clarity. 

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3. Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch 

Source: Evaluation Team 

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Country note - Myanmar

 
 
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Contents 

1  Background ............................................................................................................................................................... 1 

1.1 

1.2 

Country COVID-19 context and government response .............................................................................. 1 

European Union (EU) response ................................................................................................................................. 2 

2  Answers to Evaluation Questions .................................................................................................................. 3 

2.1 

2.2 

2.3 

2.4 

EQ 1 – Relevance ............................................................................................................................................................. 3 

EQ 2 – Value added ........................................................................................................................................................ 5 

EQ 3 – Efficiency .............................................................................................................................................................. 6 

EQ 4 – Effectiveness ...................................................................................................................................................... 7 

3  Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch .................................................................................................................. 9 

THE  PURPOSE  OF  THIS  COUNTRY  NOTE  IS  TO  INFORM  THE  FAST-TRACK  ASSESSMENT  OF  THE  EU  INITIAL 
RESPONSE AS A WHOLE AND NOT TO CARRY OUT AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RESPONSE IN THE COUNTRY. 

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Acronyms 

AAP 
ASEAN 
BS 
CERP 
CSO 
DG ECHO 

DG INTPA 
DG SANTE 
EQ 
E-READI 
EU 
EUD 
ICT 
IDP 
IMF 
LIFT 
M&E 
MFF 
MS 
NGO 
NRM 
ODA 
PPE 
SRPC 
TE 
TEI 
UN 
UNFPA 
UNHAS 
UNHCR 
UNICEF 
UNOPS 
WB 
WFP 
WHO 

Annual Action Plan 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
Budget Support 
COVID-19 Economic Relief Plan 
Civil Society Organizations 
European  Commission’s  Directorate-General  for  European  Civil  Protection  and 
Humanitarian Aid Operations 
European Commission’s Directorate-General for International Partnership 
European Commission’s Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety 
Evaluation Question 
Enhanced Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument 
European Union 
Delegation of the European Union 
Information and Communications Technology 
Internally Displaced Person 
International Monetary Fund 
Livelihoods and Food Security Fund 
Monitoring and Evaluation 
Multiannual Financial Framework 
EU Member State 
Non-Governmental Organization 
Nexus Response Mechanism 
Official Development Assistance 
Personal Protective Equipment 
Sector Reform Performance Contract 
Team Europe 
Team Europe Initiatives  
United Nations 
United Nations Population Fund 
United Nations Humanitarian Air Service 
United Nations Refugee Agency 
United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund 
United Nations Office for Project Services 
World Bank 
World Food Programme 
World Health Organization 

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1  Background 

A coup d’Etat was committed in Myanmar on February 1st, 2021. While being outside the temporal 
scope for this fast-track assessment, this event obviously affected the implementation and results 
of all support programmes at the time. To avoid losing the focus of this assessment, this note will 
focus on actions taken as reaction to the pandemic while considering the Coup in the Results section 
(evaluation  question  [EQ  4]).  Any  mention  of  “(local/national)  government”  or  “(local/national) 
authorities” refers to authorities in place before the Coup. 

1.1  Country COVID-19 context and government response 

Myanmar was largely unaffected by the pandemic in early 2020, with only 316 confirmed cases as 
of 8 July 2020.1 An anti-COVID-19 committee was created and a COVID-19 Emergency Response 
Project2  implemented  in  early  2020.  Despite  the  early  reaction,  the  second  half  of  the  year  was 
marked  by  a  rapid  increase  in  locally  transmitted  COVID-19  cases  across  the  country  from  mid-
August. As of November, more than 80,000 cases and 1,750 fatalities were reported. November was 
also the month when elections were organized, complicating local government action in the period 
right before (campaign) as well as immediately afterwards. The long-running conflict between the 
military and ethnic armed groups as well as the health system weakness also increase the risk for 
the  population.  Approximately  130,000  internally  displaced  persons  (IDPs)  from  different 
communities are confined in camps (many in Rakhine State) and over 800,000 have fled the country 
and  are  currently  refugees  in  Bangladesh3  and  Thailand.  Given  the  situation,  Myanmar  was 
incorporated in the United Nations (UN) Global Humanitarian Response Plan. 

The  pandemic  and  the  associated  containment  measures  have  weakened  consumption  and 
investment while disrupting business’ operations. Myanmar’s economy is estimated to have grown 
by 1.7 % in the 2019/2020 fiscal year,4 falling from the 6.8 % growth of 2018/2019. Activity in the 
manufacturing, retail, travel, leisure and recreational sectors contracted, while the agriculture and 
information  and  communications  technology  (ICT)  sectors  were  less  affected.  The  garment 
manufacturing industries (which account for 40 % of total manufacturing exports) were particularly 
affected. Lower foreign direct investments also contributed to a further deterioration of the country’s 
external position. The important inflow of migrant workers returning to Myanmar (about 100,000 
from  Thailand  alone)5  contributed  to  reducing  remittances  and  added  pressure  on  households’ 
welfare. 

To cushion the financial, social and economic consequences of the pandemic, a EUR 2.11 billion (USD 
2.5  billion)  COVID-19  Economic  Relief  Plan  (CERP)  was  announced  in  April  2020.  A  set  of 
comprehensive fiscal  and social  measures  were adopted.  As of  July  2020, the country’s financial 
requirements  to  tackle  the  humanitarian  needs  related  to  Covid  (heath  and  non-health)  were 
estimated at around EUR 50 million (USD 58.8 millions).6 The government’s total financing needs 

1   GHRP-COVID19_July_update.pdf (unocha.org)  
2   https://documents.banquemondiale.org/fr/publication/documents-

reports/documentdetail/185931587609194332/myanmar-covid-19-emergency-response-project  

3   https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2020-07/SG-Policy-brief-COVID-on-South-East-Asia.pdf  
4   http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/906171608086222905/pdf/Myanmar-Economic-Monitor-Coping-with-

COVID-19.pdf  

5   http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/906171608086222905/pdf/Myanmar-Economic-Monitor-Coping-with-

COVID-19.pdf 

6   https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/GHRP-COVID19_July_update.pdf 

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was expected to increase from EUR 3,13 billion to 3,55 billion in 2020 and to 3,8 billion in 2021.7 
The Burmese government benefited from EUR 42 million in Fast-Track Financing8 from the World 
Bank (WB). On 13 January 2021, the  International  Monetary Fund (IMF) approved9 an emergency 
financial assistance of EUR 297 million to address Myanmar’s urgent balance-of-payments needs, 
after a first disbursement of EUR 302 million in June 2020. While the CERP was initially seen as very 
successful, many of the positive actions of the government have not reached the entire population,10 
with ethnic minorities being left behind. The situation has worsened since the February coup as the 
health infrastructure and services are being dismantled and are no longer functional in most areas. 
The combined effect of COVID-19 and the coup are likely to have a huge effect on poverty levels.  

1.2  European Union (EU) response 

In response to the COVID-19 outbreak in Myanmar, the EU and its Member States have provided both 
financial  and  non-financial  assistance.  Team  Europe  (TE)  aid  totalled  around  EUR  150  million,  of 
which  EUR  83  million  consisted  of  debt  suspension  for  Myanmar  to  focus  efforts  on  economic 
recovery. The EU and its Member States (Denmark, Finland, France, Germany and Luxembourg) have 
coordinated efforts in the education sector through support to the Ministry of Education. Overall, the 
Commission  has  committed  a  total  of  around  EUR  104  million  for  the  COVID-19  response  in 
Myanmar.  

The socioeconomic response included the accelerated the disbursement of EUR 37.6 million in budget 
support  (BS)  which  aimed  at  supporting  a  fast  and safe  reopening  of  schools.  The  EU  set  up  the 
emergency Myan Ku cash fund of EUR 10 million in support of the (predominantly female) laid off 
garment  workers  who  face  destitution.    Several  EU  projects  have  been  re-oriented.  This  included 
strategic support for Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) – EUR 3 million – and support to dislocated 
workers, pregnant women and older people through the Livelihoods and Food Security Fund (LIFT) – 
EUR 3.8 million. 

The emergency response included dedicated COVID-19 programs (such as humanitarian flights and 
contribution to the World Food Programme [WFP]) and re-organisation of ongoing programs while 
mainstreaming COVID-19 safety security protocols such as avoiding large gatherings and providing  
personal protective equipment (PPE) to staff distributing humanitarian assistance. For instance, EUR 
3 million were attributed to the COVID-19 response in Rakhine State. DG ECHO worked towards re-
focusing  EUR  2  million  from  ongoing  programmes  in  support  of  Internally  Displaced  Persons  in 
camps.  Additionally,  DG  ECHO  allocated  EUR  1  million  to  support  WFP’s  commons  services  and 
logistics sector. 

For the health response, the EU has provided hospitals with vital PPE, facemasks, gloves and hand 
sanitisers for police – although this project has been terminated after the coup –and other frontline 
responders.  An  ongoing  blending  programme  supporting  the  National  Health  Laboratory  had  also 
been redirected and upscaled to support testing capacities, yet it was put on hold after the coup. 
Altogether, the EU has supported Myanmar’s COVID-19 response needs in this strand through grants 
(EUR 5.2 million) and loans (EUR 22 million). 

7   https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-documents/54255/54255-001-rrp-en.pdf 
8   Myanmar: $50 Million in Fast-Track Financing for National COVID-19 Emergency Response (worldbank.org) 
9   https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2021/01/13/pr219-myanmar-imf-execboardapproves-sdr258-4m-disburse-

under-rcf-purchase-rfi-address-covid19  

10   https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/left-behind-ethnic-minorities-and-covid-19-response-rural-southeast-myanmar  

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2  Answers to Evaluation Questions 

2.1  EQ 1 – Relevance 

EQ1:  To  what  extent  did  the  initial  EU  global  response  to  the  COVID-19  pandemic 
through  the  Team  Europe  (TE)  country  packages  address  the  needs  and  priorities  of 
partner countries and regions in each country context; in line with the three priorities 
of the Team Europe approach? 
Summary 
The Commission response in Myanmar covered a large range of needs, including maintaining the 
ongoing  humanitarian  support  to  ethnic  minorities  and  IDPs  while avoiding  spreading  the  virus 
through the humanitarian assistance vector and cooperating with the local authorities on socio-
economic  response,  including  education.  Ownership  of  the  response  is  a  complex  issue.  The 
Commission’s  Directorate-general  for  International  Partnerships  (DG  INTPA)  worked  with  the 
government through grants, sector reform contracts and technical assistance. On the other hand, 
the Commission’s Directorate-General for Humanitarian aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO) aimed 
at ensuring that assistance reached ethnic minorities and IDPs that were completely left out of the 
national  response  plans.  The  nexus,  longer-term  capacity  building  and  resilience  perspectives 
varied depending on the interventions. 

This section focuses on how the package was able to address successive waves of COVID-19 in the 
country and does not aim at answering the questions of whether the package was resilient to the 
Coup. The latter will be addressed in Section 2.4. 

EU assistance to Myanmar covered the three thematic priorities of the Joint Communication. 
Vulnerabilities and needs of women, old and disabled people, and internally displaced people11 were 
identified and targeted through both dedicated programmes (directed at older people and IDPs) and 
through gender-disaggregated analysis (such as for women in the garment sector).12 

The response mechanisms differed across the three thematic priorities. EU response did not 
particularly  focus  on  health  as  this  thematic  area  was  mostly  covered  by  EU  MS  with  extensive 
expertise in the sector, unlike the Commission and health is not a priority sector under the current 
Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). 13 The direct action on health was limited to two additional 
grants to an ongoing CSO-LA funded project targeting older people.  In case of the socio-economic 
response,  the  EU  relied  on  adjusting  existing,  signed  and  funded  programmes  along  the  way  to 
“mainstream” the COVID-19 response, for example through admitting all expenses related to PPE 
within all ongoing projects. The socio-economic response was largely targeted at laid off garment 
workers,  in  line  with  both  needs  of  the  country  and  European  political  priorities.14  In  case  of  the 
emergency  response,  the  strategy  consisted  in  giving  the  lead  to  DG  ECHO,  who  ensured 
complementarity with the national Humanitarian Response Plan C19 Addendum providing additional 
support which the government is not able to offer. 

11   Source: Joint Communication, country TE note, interview, project documentation. 
12   Project documentation review. 
13   Interview; https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/where-we-work/myanmar_en 
14   Interview. 

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Overall,  there  was  global  coherence  and  complementarity  between  the  Right-Based 
Approach favoured by Development actors and the Need-Based Approach of Humanitarian 
actors. The humanitarian crisis preceding COVID-19 was indeed caused by a human rights crisis and 
denial  of  rights  to  large  parts  of  society.  The  difference  in  approach  between  humanitarian  and 
development actors can be noticed in the choice of targeted beneficiaries. For instance, the targeting 
of garment workers, while highly relevant, would not have fitted with humanitarian criteria. 

The  assistance  included  additional  actions  over  time,  in  line  with  the  dynamics  of  the 
pandemic in Myanmar. During the relatively “light” first wave of cases (despite being geographically 
close  to  large  pandemic  clusters  such  as  China),  the  country  especially  experienced  significant 
socioeconomic consequences from the collapse of trade and external demand, in particular in the 
garment sector. The corresponding socioeconomic response was timely, mostly building on existing 
programs.  In  the  meantime,  there  was  some  room  to  design  and  implement  COVID-19-specific 
interventions before the second wave hit, starting August 2020, during which the country was much 
more substantially affected in terms of health. For instance, the intervention targeted at older people 
for was designed to start early July 2020. 

Shared ownership  of the  package  was  supported  through different  means. First,  working 
largely through already ongoing programmes made use of existing relationship and trust. Second, 
technical assistance delivered to the government for drafting and estimating the cost of the national 
emergency  and  socioeconomic  response  plan  also  contributed  to  building  trust  with  national 
authorities, enhancing ownership of the assistance.15 However, humanitarian actors, including DG 
ECHO, went beyond government priorities mainly focusing on  national citizens’ needs.16 
Instead, DG ECHO response as well as some CSO-LA funded projects focused on the needs of IDPs 
and local population of ethnic origin, neglected by the national response (including for example being 
set  at  the  bottom  of  vaccination  lists).  In  particular,  the  humanitarian  health  response  was  very 
limited  as  the  local  authorities  did  not  let  external  actors  act  in  this  field.  In  an  escalation  of 
humanitarian  access  constraints,  using  COVID-19  as  pretext,    most  humanitarian  activities  were 
suspended in September17 with a progressive return to normal capacity over time, reaching around 
30 to 50 % as of May 2021.18 

The  longer-term  resilience  perspective  was  included  to  very  different  extents  for  the 
thematic priority areas. Humanitarian interventions and cash transfers for socio-economic relief 
did not fit into a Nexus perspective,19 even though some activities with higher degree of sustainability 
were included as part of the cash transfer programs, including informing laid off workers of their 
rights. The support to the national health laboratory and budget support programs on the other hand 
were relevant to strengthening resilience and fostering structural changes.  

15   Interview. 
16   Interview. 
17   OCHA – Covid-19 Situation Report no. 11 (23 October 2020). Suspension of support letters for humanitarian personnel 
entering  the  country,  new  procedures  for  relief  flight  implemented  with  major  inconsistencies,  very  limited  travel 
authorization. 

18   Interview 
19   For  Cash  Transfer 

for 

instance, 

this  would 

imply 

linkages  with  national  protection 

systems. 

https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/cash-transfers_en  

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2.2  EQ 2 – Value added 

EQ2: To what extent has the Team Europe (TE) initial response added benefits to what 
would have resulted from actions taken by the EU institutions and EU MS on their own? 
Summary 
The  COVID-19  crisis  along  with  the  February  2021  coup  gave  impetus  to  a  Team  Europe  (TE) 
approach,  building  on  existing  EU  and  MS  coordination  mechanisms.  It  facilitated  joint  priority 
setting  as  well  as  innovative  programming  at  the  regional  level.  There  are  signs  of  enhanced 
geographical  and  sectoral  complementarities  between  EU  and  MS  to  support  national  efforts 
against COVID-19. However, there was limited data to gauge TE’s impact on coordination with non-
EU donors as well as EU visibility. 

The  Team  Europe  (TE)  approach  in  Myanmar  built  on  existing  EU  and  MSs  coordination 
mechanisms. The COVID-19 crisis along with the February 2021 coup gave impetus to develop a 
Team  Europe  (TE)  approach  building  on  existing  EU  Flagship  initiatives.20  As  chair  of  the  EU 
Development Counsellor Meeting, the EU Delegation has provided weekly updates since the coup on 
the general situation and COVID-19. The Team Europe (TE) approach manifested in division of labour 
and cooperation between the EU and MSs and specifically, the redirection of ongoing programmes in 
three  sectors:  education,  health,  and  gender.  It  also  included  the  continuation  of  EU-  and  Swiss-
supported the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) flight services. DG ECHO continued 
to coordinate with humanitarian donors on joint approaches to COVID-19. However, given the context 
of limited leverage and space for dialogue with national authorities, a few interviewees doubted the 
possibility  of  developing  Team  Europe  (TE)  joint  programming,  which  went  beyond  internal 
organisation and thematic prioritisation.21  

The  Team  Europe  (TE)  approach  reinforced  complementarities  with  MSs,  including  with 
those who suspended bilateral support after the coup. Several MSs are operating both through 
EU channels and bilaterally.22 The Team Europe (TE) approach enhanced geographical and sectoral 
complementarities through the EUD, Finland, Italy, France, Germany and Sweden providing personal 
protective equipment to local hospitals, support to the National Health Laboratory and sharing vital 
COVID-19 information to the Myanmar Police Task Forces -- although this support was suspended 
after the February 2021 coup. The EU, Finland, Italy and Sweden have also worked together as Team 
Europe  (TE)  on  sexual  and  reproductive  health  and  on  psychological  support  during  COVID-19, 
primarily  through  the  Women  and  Girls  First  Programme  implemented  by  the  United  Nations 
Population Fund (UNFPA).23  

At regional level, the Team Europe (TE) approach has facilitated joint priority setting and 
programming. Two Team Europe Initiatives (TEI) are being discussed in 2021: (i) the Association of 
Southeast  Asian  Nations  (ASEAN)  Team  Europe  Connectivity  Programme  that  will  integrate  an 
adequate socio-economic response to COVID-19; and (ii) the ASEAN Team Europe Initiative on Green 

20   Interview June 2021, Informal exchanges. 
21   Interviews June 2021. 
22   Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Poland, Sweden, Netherlands. 
23   COVID-19 tracker July 2020. 

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Deal, seeking synergies between the European Green Deal and the ASEAN Community Vision 2025. 
The latter TEI is not directly related to COVID-19.24 

It is difficult to evaluate the extent to which Team Europe (TE) impacted coordination with 
non-EU  donors  considering  pre-existing  practices  and  regular  communication  channels 
notably with the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom (main donors to Myanmar), and 
with  UN  agencies  and  non-governmental  organizations  (NGOs).  From  documentation,  EU 
stakeholders  very  much  depended  on  local  CSOs  and  UN  agencies  for  need  assessments  and 
situation  analyses  related  to  COVID-19.  The  Team Europe  (TE)  approach  did not  itself  trigger  the 
agreement on  official development assistance (ODA) debt suspension by EU MS (EUR 83 million), 
which was launched in the framework of the G20/Paris Club.25  

There are, however, signs of positive influence of the Team Europe (TE) approach on policy 
dialogue at the regional level. In March 2020, the EU and ASEAN engaged in a policy dialogue on 
COVID-19 response and pandemic prevention together with  the World Health Organization (WHO) 
and the donor community to exchange information, strengthen cooperation and share best practices. 
This effort has been led by the Commission’s Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety (DG 
SANTE) and DG ECHO under the Enhanced Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument (E-READI) policy 
dialogue facility and was meant to lead to a first discussion on vaccine security in July 2021.26 

Besides  production  of  infographics  and  use  of  #StrongerTogether  and  #TeamEurope 
hashtags, there is no available evidence of TE-branded communication products and how 
they impacted EU visibility and influence.27 

2.3  EQ 3 – Efficiency 

EQ3:  To  what  extent  have  the  individual  aid  modalities  and  other  aid  delivery 
mechanisms and their combinations been, and currently are being, efficient and flexible 
enough for use in Team Europe’s COVID-19 response under conditions of the COVID-19 
crisis? 
Summary 
The combination of modalities, with funds allocated to various types of actors (government, CSOs, 
other international organisations such as the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) 
and other UN agencies), proved to be a key factor for a quick response and resilience in an unstable 
political  context.  In  particular  the  Nexus  Response  Mechanism,  a  pilot  programme  operating 
similarly to a facility with high degree of flexibility, allowed an efficient reaction. Monitoring and 
evaluation (M&E) were constrained by the very limited access to information. 

Funds under ongoing programmes28 using different aid modalities were reshuffled and BS 
disbursements  were  accelerated  to  deliver  a  rapid  response.  Three  modalities  were  used 
simultaneously. First, the ongoing budget support programme (Sector Reform Performance 

24   It  foresees  work  at  regional,  sub-regional  and  country  level  to  serve  as  a  steering  platform  for  the  EU  and  MS  to 
coordinate  efforts  towards  a  green  transition  in  the  region  and  to  strengthen  relevant  regional  and  bilateral  EU 
initiatives (TE initiatives Association of Southeast Asian Nations fiches, January 2021). 

25   COVID-19 Tracker July 2020; Interviews 2021 
26   ASEAN COVID-19 Tracker June 2020 
27   Factsheet Rapid response; Infographic. 
28   Hence also established and trusted partners. 

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Contract (SRPC) Education) allowed to make two quick payments in March and July 2020: 
EUR 35 million (from the fixed and the variable tranche in 2023) were frontloaded to a unique fixed 
tranche and EUR 2.65 million of undisbursed funds from the second tranche were transformed into 
a fixed tranche. Moreover, the variable tranche indicators were simplified. Second, funds were taken 
away from a non-performing blending programme in the country and redirected to an ongoing 
blending programme supporting the National Health Laboratory. This top-up was introduced 
by the partner to the EUD as a concept note on June 1st, 2020. Third, funds were reshuffled from 
one less flexible project (Lift) to a more flexible one (Nexus Response Mechanism [NRM]).  

The  use  of  the  Nexus  Response  Mechanism,  which  operates  similarly  to  a  facility, 
facilitated the speed of the interventions. 29 The programme, operated by UNOPS, was most 
useful to design a rapid, project-type response to COVID-19. Namely, once an amount of money is 
committed to the NRM as part of the Annual Action Plan (AAP), the  mechanism allows to  flexibly 
allocate funds to various projects falling under its (wide) scope through the decision of a steering 
committee.30  Furthermore,  this  mechanism  allowed  to  support  CSOs  even  after  the  Coup,  and 
therefore proved to be more resilient to political instability than BS. 

Monitoring  and  evaluation  were  constrained  by  the  very  limited  access  to  information, 
including  absence  of  any  comprehensive  or thematic  need  assessments.  Information  collection  is 
entirely depending  on  the  field  presence  of  local  staff  as  travel  within  Myanmar  is  restricted  for 
international staff. Access to IDP camps is denied to most international and even local staff (with the 
exception  of  prominent  United  Nations  Refugee  Agency  (UNHCR)  and  WHO  staff).  Humanitarian 
assistance to the camps was therefore mostly delivered through trained camp residents, which made 
supervision  and  monitoring  of  aid  delivery  challenging.  Local  authorities  had  wanted  to  transfer 
responsibility for aid delivery to camp managers, even though these are said to be corrupt and under 
the influence of the national government. The option was not accepted by international humanitarian 
partners. 

2.4  EQ 4 – Effectiveness 

To  what  extent  has  the  EU  response  been  successful  in  progressing  towards  the 
objectives associated with the COVID-19 response? 
Summary 
Most of the effects observed by the end of 2020, mostly at the level of inputs and outputs, were 
wiped  out  by  the  Coup  d’Etat  in  February  2021.  Humanitarian  assistance  continued  during  the 
pandemic surge until most of it was suspended by the local government in September 2020. BS 
disbursements,  which  represented  less  than  0,5  %  of  2020  total  public  revenues,  created  only 
minor fiscal space but injected useful liquidity for the Government to face the pandemic. The WB 
and the IMF contributed to significantly enlarge the fiscal space. Moreover, EU MS contributed to 
almost  a  fifth  of  the  Government’s  request  of  debt  payment  suspension  under  the  G20  debt 
suspension initiative. 

Most of the effects observed by the end of 2020 were wiped out by the Coup d’État in 
February 2021. Most public services (health, education, finance) were interrupted (or suffered major 
disruptions) following the Coup, offsetting any benefits from government assistance that had been 

29   Myanmar is a pilot country for the implementation of the Humanitarian-Development Nexus. 
30   This was an INTPA intervention but DG ECHO is also involved through a seat at the advisory board and observer status 

in the steering committee.  

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supported  by  the  EU.  Budget  support  programmes  and  lending  to  the National  Health  Laboratory 
were suspended. There is little confidence that progress made before the Coup  can be recovered, 
making  it  unlikely  that  humanitarian  needs  resulting  from  COVID-19  can  be  alleviated,  that  the 
spread of the virus can be limited, and that the socio-economic fallout from the pandemic can be 
minimized31.  The  emergency  response  may  have  contributed  to  the  continuation  of  humanitarian 
activities,  for  example  through  the  distribution  of  PPE  to  humanitarian  partners  and  re-design  of 
some interventions to avoid large gatherings, at least until most of those were suspended by the 
local government in September 2020. 

Results  achieved  before  the  Coup  consisted  largely  of  inputs  by  local  authorities  and 
direct  outputs.  These  include  planning,  mobilization  of  adequate  funding  from  various  sources, 
increase in testing capacity and securing vaccines supplies. 

The BS disbursements under the ongoing SRPC Education did not create significant fiscal 
space in Myanmar,32 but injected timely liquidity in the form of grants to the Treasury (two 
disbursements in March and July 2020 for a total of EUR 70 million). The bulk of the increase in 
fiscal space was provided by the World Bank and the IMF in the form of loans. As part of the Team 
Europe  (TE)  response,  EU  MS  contributed  EUR  83  million  to  the  G20/Paris  Club  debt  suspension 
initiative. It corresponds to almost a fifth of the  total debt payment suspension requested by the 
Government of Myanmar from May to December 2020 (around EUR 420 million)33. 

Socio-economic measures also provided livelihood support to workers from the garment 
industry, mostly women and including returning migrant workers. Specific action was also taken to 
reach old and disabled people without access to mobile money devices. This support was operated 
through CSO actors, increasing its resilience to the Coup, even though the provision of those services 
has also been greatly impacted. In the education sector, support through the ongoing Sectoral Reform 
Contract aimed at the re-opening of schools. Schools have, however, not been able to re-open after 
the second COVID-19 wave in August 2020 followed by the November elections and February Coup. 

31   Interview. 
32   BS disbursements (through the Education SRPC) corresponded to 0.43 % of 2020 total public revenues in Myanmar. 
33   USD 500 million. 

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3  Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch 

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Contents 

Acronyms 

1.  Background..................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 

1.1 

1.2 

Country COVID-19 context and government response .............................................................................. 1 

EU response ........................................................................................................................................................................ 2 

2.  Answers to Evaluation Questions (EQs) ......................................................................................................................... 2 

2.1 

2.2 

2.3 

2.4 

EQ 1 – Relevance ............................................................................................................................................................. 2 

EQ 2 – Value added ........................................................................................................................................................ 4 

EQ 3 – Efficiency .............................................................................................................................................................. 5 

EQ 4 – Effectiveness ...................................................................................................................................................... 7 

3.  Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch .................................................................................................................................... 10 

THE  PURPOSE  OF  THIS  COUNTRY  NOTE  IS  TO  INFORM  THE  FAST-TRACK  ASSESSMENT  OF  THE  EU  INITIAL 
RESPONSE AS A WHOLE. IT IS NOT DESIGNED TO BE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RESPONSE IN THE COUNTRY. 

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Acronyms 

AfDB 

BS 

BRIC 

CSOs 

DG DEVCO 

DG ECHO 

African Development Bank 

Budget Support 

Brazil, Russia, India, China 

Civil society organisations 

Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation  

Directorate-General 
Humanitarian Aid Operations 

for 

European  Civil  Protection 

and 

DG INTPA 

Directorate-General for International Partnerships 

EFSD 

EIP 

EU 

EUD 

EUMS 

FMO 

FPI 

GDP 

HIP 

HIV 

IBP 

IFIs 

IMF 

IOM 

JC 

MIP 

MS 

PPE 

PSET 

SA 

SEFA 

SMMs 

TE 

European Fund for Sustainable Development 

External Investment Plan 

European Union 

European Delegation 

EU Member States 

Dutch Entrepreneurial Development Bank 

Service for Foreign Policy Instruments 

Gross Domestic Product 

Humanitarian Implementation Plans 

Human Immunodeficiency Virus 

International Budget Partnership 

Independent Fiscal Institutions 

International Monetary Fund 

International Organization for Migration 

Judgment Criteria 

Multi-annual indicative programme 

Member States 

Personal Protective Equipment 

Post-Secondary Education System 

South Africa 

Small Enterprise Finance Agency 

Small, Medium and Micro-enterprises 

Team Europe 

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TVET 

UN 

UNOCHA 

UNICEF 

WASH 

Technical and vocational education and training 

United Nations 

United  Nations  Office  for  the  Coordination  of  Humanitarian 
Affairs 

United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund 

Water, Sanitation and Hygiene 

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1. Background 

1.1  Country COVID-19 context and government response 

South  Africa’s  first  COVID-19  case  was  reported  on  5  March  2020.  While  the  first  cases  were 
imported, local transmission led to a quick increase in the number of cases.1 On 15 March, President 
Cyril Ramaphosa declared a national state of disaster. On 23 March 2020, a three-week nationwide 
lockdown with severe restrictions on travel and movement was announced, and further extended on 
9 April.  

South Africa was particularly at risk due to colliding epidemics, namely HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. 
The total number of people living with HIV is estimated at approximately 7.52 million in 2018. An 
estimated 19.0% of the adult population aged between 15 and 49 is HIV positive.2 South Africa also 
has a high tuberculosis burden, with high rates of HIV and TB co-infection. The prevalence of both 
diseases  means  South  Africa’s  population  is  more  at  risk,  especially  the  vulnerable  and  poorer 
individuals. The country endured two waves of infection in 2020, and as of 1 December 2020, 790 
004 cases and 31 535 deaths had been confirmed. 

South  Africa’s  national  COVID-19  response  comprised  8  stages:  preparation;  primary  prevention; 
lockdown;  surveillance  and  active  case-finding;  hotspots;  medical  care;  bereavement  and  the 
aftermath;  and  ongoing  vigilance.  The  first  steps  consisted  of  lockdown,  strict  social  distancing 
measures and curtailing human interactions, while later steps focused more on surveillance, testing 
and monitoring. A National Command Council on COVID-19 was established3 to lead the nation’s plan 
to contain the spread and mitigate the negative impact of the coronavirus.  

While the country was widely lauded for its quick initial response to the virus, lockdown measures 
have  had  a  strong  negative  impact  on  the  country’s  economy.  The  outbreak  of  the  COVID-19 
pandemic  occurred  at  a  time  when  the  South  African  economy  was  already  vulnerable,  having 
experienced two consecutive quarters of recession.4 The ensuing health crisis and lockdown measures 
resulted in a deepening of the economic crisis. As of October 2020, the IMF forecast predicted an 8% 
contraction of the economy that year. Unemployment increased to over 30% according to StatsSA, 
especially in the manufacturing, utilities, transport, trade, accommodation and tourism sectors. The 
deeper consequence of this prolonged depression was the rise in poverty and inequality in what was 
already one of the most unequal countries in the world.5 In terms of trade, both exports and imports 
decreased in 2020 because of COVID-19. In absolute terms, exports from South Africa decreased by 
EUR 18.65 billion. 

On 21 April 2020, a ZAR 500 billion stimulus package was announced in response to the pandemic, 
which was financed partly through internal resources, and partly by IFIs. The IMF Executive Board 
approved EUR 3.61 billion in Emergency Support to South Africa in July 2020.6 On 15 October 2020, 

1   FAO, ILO, IOM, OHCHR, UN Women, UNDP, UNEP, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNODC, WFP, WHO - Emergency Appeal for 

the Impact of COVID-19 in South Africa, April 2020 

2   Republic of South Africa, Department of Statistics - Mid-year population estimates, 2019 
3   https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-meets-political-parties-combat-coronavirus-COVID-19-19-

18-mar-18-mar  

4   South African Government - South African Economic Reconstruction and Recovery Plan, 15 October 2020 
5   UNDP – Report - Socio-economic impacts of COVID--19 across diverse African contexts- March 2021 
6   https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/07/27/pr20271-south-africa-imf-executive-board-approves-us-billion-

emergency-support-COVID-19-19-pandemic  

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the South African Government unrolled an Economic Reconstruction and Recovery plan to mitigate 
the effects of the crisis. Its main goals are to create jobs, re-industrialise the economy, accelerate 
economic reforms, and fight crime and corruption while improving the capability of the state. The 
National Response Plan also aims at resetting the South African economy, and building a new, more 
sustainable, resilient and inclusive economy.  

1.2  EU response 

In South Africa, the response to COVID-19 was led by the EU delegation and focused primarily on 
socio-economic support measures. Besides coordinating work with some EU MS and their European 
Development Financial Institutions, the EU delegation worked in collaboration with other actors, such 
as the International Budget Partnership (IBP). By the end of 2020, the EU had committed to COVID-
19  response  totalling  EUR  25.2  million,  of  which  EUR  14  million  consisted  of  an  acceleration  of 
existing budget support programmes. The annual action plan for 2020 was modified to include top-
ups  in  the  budget  allocated  through  four  existing  programmes  within  the  three  priority  areas 
identified in the South Africa National Development Plan 2030: employment creation (EUR 4.2 million 
top-up on the “Promotion through SMMEs Support Programme for South Africa”, plus another EUR 1 
million  on  “Capacity  building  programme  for  employment  promotion”);  education,  training  and 
innovation (“Support Programme to the National System of Innovation” reinforced by EUR 1.5 million); 
and improved delivery of public services (EUR 1 million top-up on the Technical Cooperation Facility 
in 2020). The EU also contributed to the UN-led Emergency Appeal for the impact of COVID-19 in 
South  Africa,  by  redirecting  EUR  4  million  of  unspent  funds  allocated  to  support  civil  society 
organisations  through  CSO,  MIP  and  EIDHR  programmes.  Complementary  emergency  assistance 
consisted of DG ECHO funds allocated to UNOCHA from the Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean 
HIP (EUR 150 000), and humanitarian support to strained migrants through vouchers (EUR 200 000). 
(See Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch). 

2. Answers to Evaluation Questions (EQs) 

2.1  EQ 1 – Relevance 

EQ1:  To  what  extent  did  the  initial  EU  global  response  to  the  COVID-19  pandemic 
through  the  Team  Europe  (TE)  country  packages  address  the  needs  and  priorities  of 
partner countries and regions in each country context in line with the three priorities of 
the Team Europe approach? 

Summary: Assembly of the EU COVID-19 response package for South Africa was constrained by 
the limited resources which could be reallocated or otherwise made available for the COVID-19 
response. This notwithstanding, the package was designed in line with the principles and priorities 
of the Joint Communication on the EU’s global response to COVID-19, including the response to 
short-term  emergency  needs,  channelling  resources  into  the  UN-led  Emergency  Appeal  for  the 
impact of COVID-19 in South Africa. The EU prepared to address medium- and longer-term COVID-
19-related needs by mobilising additional funds to “reinforce” existing budget support programmes 
to support COVID-19-related research and private sector support, and by accelerating the payment 
of existing commitments with the aim of providing the Government with additional fiscal space to 
respond  to  the  pandemic.  Potential  for  building  longer-term  resilience  against  the  COVID-19 
pandemic and similar crises with the help of the initial EU COVID-19 response is linked in particular 
to the predominant use of budget support in the EU package. 

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Assembling  an  EU  COVID-19  response  package  for  South  Africa  occurred  within  the 
constraints  of  the  limited  resources  which  could  be  reallocated  or  otherwise  made 
available  for  the  COVID-19  response.  Identifying  funds  that  could  be made  available  for  the 
COVID-19 response was seen as challenging at the particular time in the funding and programming 
cycle for cooperation with South Africa. 

Under these constraints (see above), the EU COVID-19 response package was designed in 
line  with  the  principles  and  priorities  of  the  Joint  Communication  on  the  EU’s  global 
response  to  COVID-19,  including  the  response  to  short-term  emergency  needs.  In  the 
absence  of  ECHO  as  a  partner  in  South  Africa,7  the  EU  channelled  resources  into  the  UN-led 
Emergency  Appeal  for  the  impact  of  COVID-19  in  South  Africa.  The  appeal  complemented  the 
government’s  own  three-pronged  COVID-19  response  strategy,8  aiming  at  supporting  the  public 
health response to the COVID-19 crisis; providing life-saving assistance to mitigate negative socio-
economic impacts of COVID-19, in particular targeting vulnerable communities; and supporting the 
overall coordination of the response. All of these principles and objectives are in line with the EU Joint 
Communication. ECHO itself channelled a limited amount of resources (EUR 350 000) through UN 
partners (IMO, UNOCHA) to support coordination of the regional response, and to support food aid 
for migrants (JC 1.1, 1.2). 

The  EU  prepared  to  address  medium-  and  longer-term  COVID-19-related  needs  by 
mobilising additional funds to “reinforce” existing budget support programmes to support 
COVID-19-related research and private sector support, and by accelerating the payment 
of existing commitments with the aim of providing the Government with additional fiscal 
space to respond to the pandemic. In the absence of prior cooperation in the health sector, the 
EU  directed  additional  support  in  “health,  research  and  water”9  towards  South  Africa’s  “National 
System  of  Innovation”  to  help  finance  public  investments  in  COVID-19-related  research  and 
development  and  provided  grant-support  to  the  International  Budget  Partnership  (IBP)  to  support 
increased transparency, public participation and oversight of the use of public resources for key WASH 
services in informal settlements around the country. In order to help address socio-economic needs 
in the longer-term after the start of the COVID-19 crisis, the package foresaw increased financing 
for (budget support) programmes aiming at employment promotion through SMMEs (increased by 
EUR 4.2 million), and capacity building for employment promotion (increased by EUR 1 million). Both 
of these actions were in line with the EU’s pre-COVID-19 cooperation priorities in South Africa, as 
well as with the government’s own COVID-19 response priority of private sector support. In addition, 
an acceleration of EUR 14 million of tranche payments under existing budget support schemes was 
meant to provide the government with additional  fiscal  space to  finance its own response to the 
COVID-19 crisis (JC 1.2, 1.3). 

Potential for building longer-term resilience against the COVID-19 pandemic and similar 
crises  with  the  help  of  the  initial  EU  COVID-19  response  is  linked  in  particular  to  the 
predominant use of budget support in the EU package. Budget support constitutes the main 
aid modality for the EU COVID-19 response, aligning the use of the resources closely to the priorities 

7   ECHO was not present in South Africa at the time of the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. A regional office was opened 

in late 2020. 

8   Slowing down the rate of transmission and infection, cushioning the socio-economic impact of the crisis by increasing 
social safety nets and private sector support/workers protection, and effective coordination (South Africa Emergency 
Appeal 2020). 

9   Joint Communication on the COVID-19 response. 

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of  the  South  African  Government  and  tying  short-term  activities  to  medium-  and  longer-term 
initiatives in key sectors such as private sector support, employment support and innovation. Even 
beyond  the  budget  support  modality,  the  emergency  support  channelled  through  the  UN-led 
emergency appeal for the impact of COVID-19 in South Africa is also tied into short and longer-term 
plans of the Government, as the appeal was designed to complement the government’s own COVID-
19 response strategy (JC 1.3). 

Under employment, through CBPEP an additional EUR 1 million provided support to: 

•  The design and implementation of the Covid Emergency Cask transfers to support the informally 

unemployed 

•  The  roll-out  of  the  Covid-TERS  relief  programme  through  the  Unemployment  Insurance  Fund 
(UIF),  benefiting  over  13  million  employees  and  1,146,863  companies  (with  a  disbursement 
valued at R57,1 billion from April to October 2020). 

•  The design and implementation of the Employment Stimulus Package creating close to 700,000 

jobs from October 2020 to March 2021 

2.2  EQ 2 – Value added 

EQ2:  To  what  extent  did  the  Team  Europe  (TE)  initial  response  provide  additional 
benefits beyond what would have resulted from actions taken by the EU institutions 
and EU MS on their own? 

Summary: The need to help South Africa respond to the COVID-19 crisis encouraged the EU and 
EU  MS  to  increase  their  coordination  and  to  present  their  COVID-19  assistance  as  a  common 
response in the interest of greater visibility. The partners did make use of the Team Europe (TE) 
concept to present their COVID-19 response to the public, and to jointly engage with other external 
partners, including the UN, when negotiating contributions to the UN emergency appeal on COVID-
19 for South Africa. The TE concept was also used to frame assistance opportunities beyond the 
initial  COVID-19  response.  These  efforts  also  translated  into  attempts  to  develop  a  more 
coordinated communication campaign on the COVID-19 response and beyond. 

The need to help South Africa respond to the COVID-19 crisis encouraged the EU and its 
Member States to increase their coordination and to present their COVID-19 assistance 
as  a  common  response  in  the  interest  of  greater  visibility  and  coordination.  The  EU 
Delegation and representatives of EU MS agreed to log all their COVID-19-relevant interventions in 
a  shared  reference  document,  the  Snapshot  of  EU  COVID-19  Support.  Other  than  the  COVID-19 
response tracker, it contained entries from all EU MS active in providing COVID-19-support to South 
Africa, as well as selected private sector contributions. The snapshot table was updated continuously 
throughout  2020,  and  among  other  things  was  shared  during  the  monthly  meetings  of  the  EU 
Cooperation  Counsellors.10  The  table  provides  a  succinct  overview  of  the  different  interventions 
supported by the partners.  Its intended purpose was to  help avoid duplication and overlap of the 
individual responses. However, the available data did not allow an assessment of the actual strategic 
and operational coordination that the snapshot template facilitated. Also, the snapshot emphasised 
an overview of the division of labour between the EU and its Member States. Coordination among EU 

10   A monthly meeting of representatives from EU MS active in development cooperation in South Africa, and shared by 

the EU. 

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institutions was not captured, and also seems to have been less relevant, considering the make-up 
of the COVID-19 response package from the side of the EU (JC 2.1, 2.2, 2.4). 

he EU and its Member States did make use the Team Europe (TE) concept to present their 
COVID-19 response to the public, and to jointly engage with other external partners, such 
as the UN. The TE concept was also used to frame assistance opportunities beyond the 
initial COVID-19 response. The EU and EU MS considered the Team Europe (TE) concept as useful 
to combine comparatively small individual contributions to the COVID-19 response into a larger, more 
visible support package. The combined support was communicated to the public as “Team Europe’s 
Response to COVID-19 in South Africa”, where the “European Union and its Member States, acting 
together as ‘Team Europe’ were working “alongside the South African Government to help address 
this crisis”.11 The EU Delegation and EU MS also decided to approach negotiations of contributions to 
the UN appeal for a COVID-19 response in South Africa (see EQ1) as “Team Europe”, starting with a 
joint request for the UN needs assessment underlying the appeal. The partners used the TE concept 
also to frame future assistance opportunities for South Africa through a “Team Europe Compact” that 
proposed a package of sovereign loans, budget support and projects to aid South Africa in COVID-19 
recovery in 2021 and beyond (JC 2.2, 2.3). 

These efforts also translated into efforts to develop a more coordinated communication 
campaign  on  the  COVID-19  response  and  beyond.  The  EU  Delegation  and  EU  MS  initiated 
meetings to develop a shared communication strategy on Team Europe (TE) and its role in the COVID-
19 response in South Africa.  

2.3  EQ 3 – Efficiency 

EQ3: To what extent were, and are, the individual aid modalities and other aid delivery 
mechanisms  and  their  combinations  efficient  and  flexible  enough  for  use  in  Team 
Europe’s COVID-19 response in COVID-19 crisis conditions? 

Summary:   Despite small financial margins of manoeuvre, the EU used a range of aid modalities 
to  better  assist  the  country  in  addressing its  short  to  medium-term  needs  and  challenges.  The 
budget support appropriations and planning management by the South African authorities did not 
provide much leeway for amending schedules of disbursement and proposing rapid frontloading. 
Nevertheless,  the  EU  sequenced  an  acceleration  of  BS  payments  mid-2020  followed  by  a 
frontloading of BS payments for the 2021/2022 fiscal year. The EU also ensured greater flexibility 
in  the  management  of  its  capacity  building  activities.  This  included  both  increasing  the  budget 
available  and  aligning  these  activities  more  closely  with  the  institutional  support  and  capacity 
needs of the administrations concerned and their implementing partners to design and implement 
pandemic recovery and resilience national activities and policies. Under the TE response umbrella, 
the EU also proposed innovative solutions under a joint (EU, EIB and several European Development 
Finance Institutions) proposal for a sovereign loan of EUR 700 million, as well as a first intervention 
to  support  the  banking  and  private  sectors  through  the  COVID-19  facility  set  up  by  the  EFSD 
(financial arm of the External Investment Plan). The blending modality is considered to hold great 
potential, but could not be mobilised yet for medium-term recovery and resilience actions. The EU 
also adapted its policy dialogue and monitoring approach to a challenging environment through a 
virtual/online modus operandi which was difficult given the magnitude of the COVID-19 outbreaks 
in the country. Nevertheless, the EU also seized opportunities to promote national capacities and 

11   Communication material “A snapshot of Team Europe’s Response to COVID-19 in South Africa”. 

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policy  developments  for  innovative  reforms  related  to  digital  transition  in  the  areas  of  public 
services provision, monitoring and accountability.    

Although EU budget support operations (the bulk of EU financial cooperation with eight 
operations  at  different  stages  of  implementation  and  completion)  were  neither 
particularly  COVID-19  specific  nor  the  most  suitable  modalities  to  address  emergency 
response,  the  EU  succeeded  in  accelerating  the  disbursement  of  three  budget  support 
instalments mid-2020 (JC 3.1). The accelerated budget support disbursements planned for the 
FY 2020/2021 (under the sector reform contracts: Teaching and learning development Programme; 
Ecosystem  for  Small  Enterprise  Programme/SMME  support;  and  Socio-economic  Justice  for  All) 
provided a timely total of EUR 14 million into the State Budget between June and July 2020 in order 
to support the fiscal space of the Government to finance its national COVID-19 policy response.  

Given the impossibility of frontloading budget support payments during  the 2020/2021 
South  African  fiscal  year,  the  EU  was  reactive  in  redirecting  commitment appropriations 
from the MIP toward reinforcing the next fiscal year BS disbursements (JC 3.1 & JC 3.2) 
to address the country’s COVID-19 crisis coping and recovery strategy. Due to non-flexible 
national legal provisions on planning and budgeting of EU budget support grants, it was not possible 
to frontload immediately future EU budget support instalments into the 2020/2021 South African 
fiscal year. The EU, however, swiftly amended the multi-annual indicative programme (MIP) to adapt 
sector budget support financing agreements related to the sectors most affected by the COVID-19 
pandemic, with a focus on support to innovation and technology developments for public services 
provisions and COVID-19 research, as well as support to small businesses and employment. These 
were assessed as particularly relevant within the medium-term COVID-19 challenges for national 
policy response.  

The  EU  also  increased  the  amount  of  technical  assistance  budget  (under  the  capacity 
building components of the BS as well as under a new TA facility under the MIP and the EU 
Delegation’s  Technical  Cooperation  Facility)  to  support  national  capacities  in  designing 
and  implementing  emergency  and  recovery  sector  policies  in  strategic  areas  of 
employment  promotion,  including  support  to  small  enterprises,  digital  response  and 
innovation  for  COVID-19  related  research  as  well  as  sustainable  infrastructure 
development (JC 3.1). The EU increased the budget of related capacity development projects (an 
additional EUR 1 million under the complementary support of the Employment Promotion through 
SMMEs  Support  Sector  Reform  Contract  –  renamed  the  EDSE  Ecosystem  Development  for  Small 
Enterprises- and an additional EUR 1 million for the Technical Cooperation Facility) in order to provide 
support to the authorities in setting up an emergency recovery grant and an employment stimulus 
package with a particular focus on youth employment.   

Uncommitted CSO funds (including from MIP and EIDHR budgets) were quickly mobilised 
and  redirected  towards  specific  urgent  actions  that  were  in  line  with  and/or 
complementary to those identified by the UN-led emergency appeal on addressing COVID-
19 impact (JC 3.1 & JC 3.2). The EU swiftly redirected several non-committed CSO funds towards 
urgent  crisis  response  activities  identified  under  the  UN-led  Emergency  appeal  for  South  Africa 
related  to  short-term  COVID-19  interventions.  These  included  improving  access  to  water  and 
sanitation services in informal and rural settlements (WASH) as well as awareness campaigns and 
procurement of personal protection equipment (PPE) in the Post-Secondary Education System (PSET), 
in particular for disadvantaged communities. 

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The EU also optimised the use of flexible procedures under the crisis declaration (JC 3.1) 
to ease the pace of contracting procedures for existing or new projects with implementing partners, 
and assisted them in swiftly developing support activities and mitigating the pandemic’s economic 
and social impact.   

Under the Team Europe (TE) joined-up response to the pandemic, the EU also promoted 
the mobilisation of specific additional COVID-19-related financial interventions for the 
benefit of local banking and financial services groups under the EFSD (European Fund for 
Sustainable  Development)  of  the  EU  External  Investment  Plan  (EIP),  as  well  as  under  the 
preparation of a first-ever joint EU massive sovereign loan proposal to the country (JC 3.2).  

At the end of 2020, a seven-year USD 35 million facility  was allocated to the South Africa Bank 
SASFIN, through the  2020 COVID-19 emergency facility  set in place by the EU  financially-backed 
FMO’s NASIRA  guarantee  fund.  This  action  aimed  at  supporting  SASFIN’s  on-lending to  COVID-19 
affected  borrowers  in  South  Africa,  and  developing  and  originating  new  digital  lending  products, 
specifically targeting  youth,  female  and migrant  borrowers.  Team  Europe  (TE)  also  demonstrated 
high  responsiveness  in  engineering  and  negotiating  with  the  National  Treasury  an  EU  substantial 
financial support to the South African Authorities’ Recovery Plan, which did not, however, materialise. 
It  was  a  sovereign  loan  articulated  around  the  EIB  and  other  European  Development  Finance 
institutions’ contributions with an associated EUR 50 million EU budget support to increase the level 
of concessionality for a total amount estimated at EUR 700 million (JC 3.1 JC 3.3). This proposal was 
finally declined by the Government in view of an already launched package of multilateral funding 
totalling USD 7 billion (the IMF USD 4.2 billion via a Rapid Credit Facility, the BRIC New Development 
Bank and the AfDB) and a conservative approach with regard to medium-term debt sustainability 
(estimated to peak at 87%  debt to GDP by 2023-2024)  and fiscal  trajectory, further aggravated 
after  the  country's  downgrading  to  non-investment  grade  by  International  rating  agencies  during 
2020.  

2.4  EQ 4 – Effectiveness 

To what extent was the EU response successful in progressing towards the objectives 
associated with the COVID-19 response? 

Summary:  health was not a focal sector in EU cooperation with South Africa. In the context of a 
stretched national fiscus, the EU sector reform contracts provided rapid and timely, though modest, 
liquidity/cash  support  to  the  National  Treasury,  to  finance  programmes  closely  related  to  the 
country’s COVID-19 fiscal stimuli package. Increased EU planned annual BS disbursements for the 
following fiscal year (2021/2022) also provided further predictability to the State Budget in view 
of the government’s medium-term financial needs for their national COVID-19 policy response. In 
a complementary way, the EU also increased the delivery of fine-tuned capacity building supports 
which effectively assisted the national authorities in designing and implementing  some of their 
COVID-19-related emergency and recovery policies and actions, especially in key areas such as 
employment  promotion,  support  to  small  enterprises,  and  digital  transition  for  public  services 
delivery. This support, still on-going, is pivotal to address institutional needs for post-COVID-19 
resilience policy-making and implementation.  

The mobilisation of uncommitted CSO funds towards specific urgent crisis response activities 
can also be considered as effective in supporting the public health response to the COVID-19 
crisis  as  in  line  with  or  complementary  to  those  activities  identified  by  the  UN-led 
emergency appeal on addressing COVID-19's impacts (JC 4.1, JC 4.2). The funding activities 

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aimed  among  others  at  improving  access  to  water  and  sanitation  services  in  informal  and  rural 
settlements (WASH) as well as financing awareness campaigns (JC 4.4) and procurement of PPE in 
the  Post-Secondary  Education  System  (PSET)  especially  for  disadvantaged  communities.  These 
activities  can  be  assessed  as  effective  in  mitigating  the  negative  impacts  of  the  pandemic, 
strengthening resilience of the targeted population, improving the control of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
and contributing to maintaining continuity in key public services to vulnerable populations. However, 
so far, the lack of detailed information and results achieved does not allow a specific assessment of 
these activities.  

At  the  time  of  an  already  stretched  national  fiscus  (the  consolidated  budget  deficit 
widened from 5.7% in 2019/20 to an estimated 14% in 2020/21), the acceleration of the 
disbursement  of  EU  budget  support  instalments  mid-2020,  under  three  sector  reform 
contracts,  contributed  in  a  timely  manner  to  maintaining  macroeconomic  stability  and 
providing liquidities to the National Treasury  to finance specific programmes under the 
government  COVID-19  fiscal  stimulus  package  set  up  under  the  supplementary  budget 
adopted in July 2020 (JC 4.3). However, the total amount of these three disbursements (EUR 14 
million) remained modest compared to the estimated ZAR 500 billion (10% of GDP) government fiscal 
stimulus package to deal with the impact  of the pandemic crisis. The magnitude of these budget 
support funds was not able to make a large impact on the global fiscal space of the Government. 
Nevertheless,  the  fact  that  these  funds  were  earmarked  to  specific  national  sector  programmes 
addressing COVID-19 negative socio-economic impacts (including promotion of youth employment, 
support to small enterprises through relief finance schemes and resilience facilities, and access to 
digital  technology),  as  well  as  the  efforts  and  high  responsiveness  of  the  South  African  sector 
authorities to re-orientate and reprioritise these EU-funded programmes towards more COVID-19-
related  urgent  activities  to  counter  socio-economic  consequences  and  ensure  continuity  in  the 
delivery of key public services, supported the effectiveness of this EU financial response. 

The financial reinforcement of EU Sector Reform Contracts via the top-up of two budget 
support  disbursements  in  the  2021/2022  South  African  fiscal  year  will  be  effective  in 
maintaining higher level of payments while making them more predictable (as channelled 
through  additional  fixed  tranches  only)  (JC  4.3  JC  4.5).  This  EU  response  intended  to 
acknowledge  the  government’s  medium-term  financial  needs  to  support  the  implementation  of 
strategic COVID-19 mitigation efforts in economic and social recovery policies and the related fiscal 
and debt sustainability constraints. This increase materialised through a new fixed tranche of EUR 
3.15 million under the Employment Promotion through SMMEs Support Sector Reform Contract and 
a top-up of the existing 2021 fixed tranche from EUR 4 to 5.5 million of the Support National System 
of  Innovation  Sector  Reform  Contract.  The  impact  of  this  additional  funding  will  be  effective  in 
2021/2022 to support the Government in its response to the COVID-19 crisis. It will affect a wide 
array of sectors including safeguarding investments in science and innovation; the development of 
innovative decision-making tools in service delivery; ensuring continuity of education services and 
other public services; funding of COVID-19-related research; support to the government’s Emergency 
Recovery  Grants  and  Employment  Stimulus  Package;  capacity  development  support  to  the  Small 
Enterprise Finance Agency (SEFA)  and the  Small Enterprises Innovation Fund to de-risk enterprise 
development lending coupled with business development support to small enterprises; and capacity 
building measures for the Department of Small Business Development (DSBD). At the beginning of 
2021,  the  SEFA  had  already  provided  ZAR  233  million  in  support  to  26  small-scale  local 
manufacturers and non-financial support to 66 local enterprises. 

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The increase of ongoing capacity building components of Sector Reform Contracts was also 
effective in assisting the national authorities in designing and implementing emergency 
and recovery sector policies in  the strategic areas of employment promotion, providing 
support  to  small  enterprises,  digital  response  and  innovation  for  COVID-19-related 
research,  and  sustainable  infrastructure  development  (JC.  4.3,  JC  4.5).  These  technical 
supports  were  instrumental  in  accompanying  the  national  authorities  in  the  setting  up  of  an 
emergency  recovery  grant  and  an  employment  stimulus  package  with  a  particular  focus  on  job 
creation and active labour market policies especially for youth employment. The Capacity Building 
Programme  for  Employment  Promotion  provided valuable  technical  advice  to the  Government  on 
urgent COVID-19 related measures to provide financial support to the most vulnerable sectors while 
developing innovative approaches on partnering and social learning, especially in the Technical and 
vocational education and training (TVET) sector.  

The  mobilisation  of  specific  financial  interventions  to  the  benefit  of  local  banking  and  financial 
services groups under the EFSD (European Fund for Sustainable Development) of the EU External 
Investment Plan (EIP) with a 7-year USD 35 million facility can be preliminarily assessed as effective 
in addressing the socio-economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic while contributing to economic 
resilience in the medium term (JC. 4.5). The facility, allocated to the South Africa Bank SASFIN,  is 
managed  by  the  EU  financially-backed  FMO’s  NASIRA  guarantee  fund  and  aimed  at  supporting 
SASFIN’s on-lending to borrowers affected by COVID-19 in South Africa, as well as developing and 
originating new digital lending products, specifically targeting youth, female and migrant borrowers. 
However, for the time being, information is lacking to properly assess the preliminary results of this 
intervention.  

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3. Annex: Intervention Logic Sketch 

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Source: Evaluation Team 

 
 
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