REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the application of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations and Article 66a thereof
Date: 2022-04-26
Institutions: Directorate-General for Human Resources and Security, European Commission
Subjects: European official, cost of living, pay freeze, pension scheme, posted worker, purchasing power, remuneration of work, servant (EU), staff regulations (EU), wage determination

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 26.4.2022  COM(2022) 180 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the application of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations and Article 66a thereof  
 
 
REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
THE COUNCIL 

on the application of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations and Article 66a thereof 

1. 

INTRODUCTION 

Article 15(2) of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations  (SR) as last amended in 20131 provides 
that, before 31 March 2022, the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament 
and  the  Council  having  regard  to  the  survey  conducted  under  Article  2  of  the  same  Annex 
and  assessing  whether  the  evolution  of  purchasing  power  of  remuneration  and  pensions  of 
Union  officials  is  in  accordance  with  the  changes  in  the  purchasing  power  of  salaries  in 
national civil services in central governments. On the basis of this report, if appropriate, the 
Commission shall submit a proposal to amend Annex XI as well as Article 66a of the SR, on 
the basis of Article 336 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 

This  report  implements  the  aforementioned  provision  by  assessing  the  fulfilment  of  EU 
institutions’ recruitment needs, describing the process and outcome of the implementation of 
the rules for updating remuneration and pensions under Annex XI to the SR (hereinafter the 
"Method") as well as the solidarity levy under Article 66a for the period 2014-2021. 

2. 

EU INSTITUTIONS RECRUITMENT NEEDS 

2.1. 

Statutory requirement to survey recruitment needs 

Article  2  of  Annex  XI  of  the  SR  provides  that  the  Commission  shall  regularly  survey  the 
recruitment needs of the institutions.  

While from  an  operational  point of view recruitment  aims at  filling vacant  positions within 
EU institutions, Article 27 of the SR and Articles 12 and 82 of the Conditions of Employment 
of  Other  Servants  require,  on  the  one  hand,  that  officials  and  agents  meet  the  highest 
standards of ability, efficiency and integrity, and, on the other hand, that they are recruited on 
the broadest possible geographical basis from among nationals of Member States of the EU. 

2.2. 

Observations on recruitment needs 

The  European  Personnel  Selection  Office  (EPSO)  is  in  charge  of  selecting  officials,  who 
represent  the  largest  share  of  EU  staff.  EU  institutions  regularly  communicate  their 
recruitment needs to EPSO, which establishes a yearly plan to run competitions and defines 
selection  methods  and  procedures,  including  marking  rules  for  each  competition.  Together 
with the checks carried out upon recruitment, this guarantees that all recruits meet the highest 
standard of ability, efficiency and integrity, in line with Article 27 of the SR. 

1   Regulation  (EU,  Euratom)  No  1023/2013  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  22  October 

2013. 

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2.2.1.  Decrease of applications to EU competitions 

By comparing EU institutions’ recruitment needs for non-linguistic administrators (expressed 
in number of laureates sought) with competitions’ actual outcome, Annex 1 shows that, as a 
general rule, EPSO managed to select the requested number of laureates. 

This  being  said,  the  numbers  of  applicants  to  AD  generalist  competitions  declined  for  all 
clusters  of  Member  States  (Annex  2).  For  pre-2004  Member  States,  such  a  decline  started 
after the 2004 reform of the SR, while for post-2004 Member States, the decline started after 
the 2014 reform of the SR (Annex 3)2. This affected the EU institutions’ ability to fulfil their 
recruitment needs, as well as to ensure a geographically balanced recruitment. 

2.2.2.  Pragmatic  solution  implemented  by  the  Commission  to  fulfill  specific 

recruitment needs  

To address its recruitment needs, the Commission increasingly recruited temporary agents on 
permanent  posts  which  are  normally  occupied  by  permanent  officials.  In  the  Commission, 
their  total  number  outside  linguistic  services  grew  from  461  in  2013  (of  which  118  at 
administrator level) to 1672 in 2020 (of which 825 at administrator level).  

2.2.3.  A geographically imbalanced recruitment 

The  Commission  has  encountered  difficulties  to  recruit  staff  on  the  broadest  possible 
geographical  basis.  In  its  2018  report  adopted  pursuant  to  Article  27  of  the  SR3,  the 
Commission  notably  identified  the  issue  of  attractiveness,  translating  in  low  levels  of 
participation  in  EU  competitions  when  compared  to  the  size  of  the  relevant  population  of 
some Member States. As a result, some nationalities are not sufficiently represented on EPSO 
lists  of  laureates.  Annex  4  illustrates  how,  since  2018,  applications  to  EU  competitions 
remained  unbalanced4,  thereby  resulting  in  geographically  unbalanced  recruitments.  In 
particular,  the  number  of  significantly  under-represented  nationalities  among  junior 
administrators has risen to 13: Austrian, Czech, Estonian, German, Danish, Finnish, Cypriot, 
Luxembourgish, Maltese, Dutch, Polish, Slovak and Swedish5.  

2.3.  Correlation  between  EU 

institutions’  attractiveness  and  different 

macroeconomic and socioeconomic factors, including remuneration 

The  table  hereinafter  provides  information  regarding  the  level  of  participation  in  EU 
competitions  for  each  Member  State  over  the  period  2013-2019.  All  Member  States  were 
included in the analysis except Belgium, the smallest Member States in terms of population 

2   Only applications of Greek and Cypriot nationals increased or remained stable. 

3   Commission report to the European Parliament and the Council of 15 June 2018, as corrected on 24 August 

2018 by COM(2018)377 final/2. 

4  

In the  framework of the present report, the  level of participation for each Member State is defined by the 
ratio between the share of candidates and the share of EU population over the period 2013-2019. A 7-year 
period is  used to smoothen data, as EU competitions are held irregularly. Moreover, due  to the pandemic 
and  its  consequences  on  the  organisation  of  these  competitions,  2020  and  2021  are  considered  atypical 
years and are therefore excluded from the analysis. 

5   Situation at 31 December 2021. 

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and those whose level of participation is  within the 80-120% bracket, i.e. close to the ideal 
“target” participation6. More precisely, excluded Member States are: 

-  Belgium  because  the  overrepresentation  of  Belgian  citizens  among  EPSO 
candidates is linked to the status of Brussels as the seat of several EU institutions7, 
-  Cyprus,  Luxembourg  and  Malta,  as,  in  light  of  their  small  population  size,  the 
analysis of the share of  candidates  in EU competitions  compared to  the  national 
population is not statistically sound, and  

-  Hungary, Slovakia and Finland, as their level of participation (comparing level of 
participation  with  percentage  of  EU  population)  is  between  80%  and  120% 
measured over seven years and therefore close to the target. 

In order to  assess factors  influencing the level  of participation  in EU  competitions  for each 
Member State, it is necessary to examine EU institutions’ attractiveness across the EU. As the 
choice to apply to an EU competition remains ultimately a personal one that can be based on 
various factors, the Commission assessed the existence of possible correlations between a set 
of  macroeconomic  and  socioeconomic  factors  and  observed  trends  in  the  level  of 
participation observed across Member States (Annex 5 to 5.7). In particular, the Commission 
assessed  relative  net  earnings  in  Members  States  (Annexes  5.1  and  5.2),  unemployment 
levels  (Annex  5.3),  the  national  employment  situation  (Annex  5.4),  the  image  of  the  EU 

6   As the “target” (level of participation of 100%) can never be reached for statistical reasons, the choice was 
made to analyse only Member States where there is a clear imbalance. The cut-off level was set at +/- 20% 
compared to a 100% participation level. This is in line with the approach taken in the Commission report 
adopted pursuant to Article 27 of the Staff Regulations of Officials and to Article 12 of the Conditions of 
Employment of Other Servants of the European Union (Geographical balance) – COM(2018) 377 final. 

7   The  same  phenomenon  is  observed  in  the  headquarters  of  other  international  organisations.  For  example, 

German staff are overrepresented at the European Central Bank. 

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(Annex  5.5),  personal  financial  prospects  (Annex  5.6),  and  the  OECD  better  life  index 
(Annex 5.7).  

On  the  basis  of  these  data,  the  Commission  assessed  possible  correlations  between  low 
participation in EU  competitions and these socioeconomic and macroeconomic  factors. The 
following conclusions could be drawn:  

-  participation  of  EU  nationals  in  EU  competitions  is  fairly  correlated  with  net 
earnings  in  Member  States  and  the  perception  of  employment  prospects  at 
national level, 

- 

- 

- 

if  the  analysis  is  restricted  to  the  Member  States  with  the  highest  and  lowest 
wages, the level of participation to EU competitions and the level of net earnings 
are almost perfectly correlated8. This is particularly true for the Germany, France, 
the  Netherlands,  Austria,  Denmark,  Ireland,  Sweden,  Portugal,  Slovenia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Croatia, Latvia and Bulgaria. For mid-wage Member States, 
results  are  however  more  nuanced  and  require 
taking  on  board  other 
socioeconomic factors, 

the level of participation in EU competitions is highly correlated with the OECD 
better life index,  

the  level  of  participation  is  weakly  or  not  correlated  with  the  national 
unemployment  level,  the  image  of  the  EU  among  citizens  and  the  perception  of 
improvement of one’s financial situation in the coming year.  

3. 

IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 65 OF THE STAFF REGULATIONS 

3.1. 

Principle of parallelism 

The principle of parallel development of purchasing power means that the purchasing power 
of  EU  staff  members  follows,  both  upwards  and  downwards,  the  evolution  of  the  average 
purchasing  power  of  civil  servants  in  national  central  governments.  Assessing  the 
implementation of the principle of parallelism during the observed period may further clarify 
difficulties observed when it comes to EU institutions’ recruitment needs.  

Under Article 65(1) of the  SR, the update of remuneration and pensions reflects the annual 
evolution between 1 July of the previous year and 1 July of the current year9 of: 

- 

the  real  salaries  of  civil  servants  in  the  central  governments  in  a  sample  of  10 
Member States representing at least 75% of the EU Gross Domestic Product (EU 
GDP)  10. For each of these Member States, the  yearly change in real salaries is 

8   The  United  Nations  (UN)  deals  with  this  issue  by  applying  the  so  called  ‘Noblemaire  principle’,  i.e.  a 
formula which essentially sets the salary level of the UN by reference to the salary level paid by the civil 
service of the Member State which pays the highest (in recent years this has consistently been the United 
States). In consequence, the UN is able to guarantee interest from candidates of all Member States. 

9   The methodology is based on the comparison of a snapshot of a national remuneration system of a Member 
State in the month of July of the current year with the equivalent snapshot in the same Member State in the 
month of July of the previous year.  

10   Belgium,  Germany,  Spain,  France,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands,  Austria,  Poland  and  Sweden. 
Despite the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union, the sample of 10 Member States 

4 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
calculated  net  of  inflation  and  is  called  the  Specific  Indicator.  The  Global 
Specific Indicator (GSI) is the average of all specific indicators weighted by the 
respective GDP of each Member State.  

- 

the annual inflation in Brussels and Luxembourg (in the same proportion as the 
distribution  of  the  EU  staff  between  the  two  cities).  This  element  is  called  the 
Joint Index.  

The GSI and the Joint Index are multiplied to calculate the value of the update. The value of 
the  update  is  expressed  as  a  percentage  that  is  applied  across-the-board  to  the  net 
remuneration and pensions of all EU staff, with effect on 1 July11.  

In this context, it is important to point out that the Method does not allow ‘double counting’ 
of  inflation,  but  guarantees  the  parallel  evolution  of  salaries  of  EU  staff  and  national  civil 
servants, net of inflation. To this end, the GSI is first calculated net of inflation in the sample 
of 10 Member States, and only as a second step is it combined with the Joint Index. Detailed 
information on the evolution of the GSI and of the Joint Index are provided in part 3. 

3.2. 

Specific indicators 

This  chapter  explores  whether  the  sample  of  Member  States  currently  used  to  calculate  the 
GSI  translates  correctly  the  real  changes  of  purchasing  power  of  all  national  civil  servants 
and whether the general and specific derogations from the principle of parallelism inherent to 
the Method have led to a significant loss of purchasing power by EU civil servants. 

3.2.1.  Calculation of the Global Specific Indicator as defined in the 2013 Method 

Under the Method adopted in 2013, the GSI was computed as of 1 July 2015, using a sample 
of eleven reference Member States  (weighted by  GDP):  Belgium, Germany, Spain,  France, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom.  

As of 1 January 2021 the United Kingdom is no longer considered an EU Member State and 
therefore since that date it is not included in the sample for the calculation of the GSI. Annex 
6  shows  that  following  the  United  Kingdom’s  withdrawal  from  the  European  Union,  the 
sample still meets  the 75% threshold laid down  in  Article 1(4) of Annex XI to  the  SR  and 
thus  does  not  need  to  be  amended.  In  implementation  of  the  agreed  inter-institutional 
approach  concerning  references  to  the  United  Kingdom  in  the  EU  legislation,  for  the 
purposes  of  Article  1(4)  of  Annex  XI,  Eurostat  now  uses  a  sample  consisting  of  the  10 
remaining Member States aforementioned. 

Annual and cumulative data by Member State of the applicable sample 

Annex 7 shows the time series of the specific indicators for the applicable sample of eleven 
Member  States  since  1  July  2015,  together  with  a  simple  arithmetic  mean  value  for  the 
period. Annex 8 shows the same data, re-expressed as a cumulative index (2014=100). 

still represents more than 75% of the EU Gross Domestic Product as required under Article 1(4) of Annex 
XI to the SR. 

11   To account for substantial changes in the cost of living in Brussels and Luxembourg, an intermediate update 

may take place as of 1 January, in accordance with Articles 4 to 7 of Annex XI to the SR.  

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Global Specific Indicator for the applicable sample 

The  cumulative  impact  of  the  GSI  calculated  and  the  GSI  applied  since  I  July  2015  is 
illustrated in Annex 9. The calculated GSI corresponds to the evolution of purchasing power 
of civil servants in the sample of Member States over the period (weighted by GDP expressed 
in  Purchasing  Power  Standards).  In  accordance  with  the  principle  of  parallelism  (see  part 
3.1),  the  purchasing  power  of  EU  staff  followed  the  same  evolution  as  the  sample,  except 
since 1 July 2020, as a result of the implementation of the exception clause (see part 3.2.4). 

Annex 10 shows the time series of the GSI since 1 July 2015, together with the Joint Index 
and  the  consequent  annual  update  for  EU  staff.  The  GSI  applied,  computed  as  a  simple 
average for the seven year period is 100.6, the cumulative impact of the GSI applied to July 
2014 (2014=100) is 103.4.  

3.2.2.  The Global Specific Indicator as defined under previous Methods 

The current legislative solution to use a sample of 10 Member States to calculate the GSI has 
not always been the approach chosen by the legislator. Prior to 2004, the GSI was calculated 
by  reference  to  the  statistical  data  for  all  Member  States  (e.g.  15  Member  States  in  2003), 
whereas in the period 2004-2012 a sample of 8 reference Member States was used.  

The  legislator’s  decision  to  adopt  the  new  Method  was  motivated  by  a  retrospective  data 
analysis  suggesting  that  developments  in  that  sample  would  reflect  closely  the  average 
evolution in all Member States. However, it is to be noted that a subsequent analysis showed 
that  the  actual  evolution  of  purchasing  power  in  the  selected  sample  after  2004  was  lower 
than the average for all Member States. In 2013, the co-legislator maintained the principle of 
a sample of Member States, while increasing its size from 8 to 11. 

To fulfil the statutory requirement to analyse whether the evolution of purchasing power of 
Union  officials  has  been  in  accordance  with  the  changes  in  the  purchasing  power  of  civil 
servants in central governments from all Member States, this chapter provides simulations of 
the evolution of the GSI in case a sample of EU 8 or in case no sample would have been used 
in the period 2015 - 2021.  

With  the  sample  of  eight  Member  States12,  the  simple  average  of  the  yearly  GSI  for  the 
period  2015-2021  would  be  100.4  and  the  cumulative  impact  (2014=100)  would  be  102.5. 
With all Member States the simple average of the yearly GSI for the period 2015-2021 would 
be 101.1 and the cumulative impact (2014=100) would be 106.5.  

Annex  11  of  this  report  compares  the  evolution  of  the  GSI  calculated  on  the  basis  of  the 
above  mentioned  alternative  samples.  These  data  show  that  as  a  result  of  the  sample  of 
Member States defined in 2013 by the co-legislator, the purchasing power of EU staff only 
reached  half of the changes in  the purchasing power of salaries in  national  civil  services in 
central governements, which may have resulted in a reduction in perceived attractiveness of 
the EU as an employer. 

12   Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and United Kingdom. 

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3.2.3. 

Specific Indicator: trends for individual Member States 

Calculations and figures relating to specific indicators in the Member States are based on data 
supplied and validated by the responsible statistical authorities of the Member States. To this 
end, a yearly remuneration questionnaire has been developed and updated over time. A set of 
country-specific methodology manuals  and assessment reports is also  being made public to 
raise the level of transparency13. 

Annex  12  summarises  the  available  data  for  each  Member  State  for  the  period  2015-2021, 
together  with  a  simple  arithmetic  average  value  for  the  period.  Annex  13  shows  the  same 
data, re-expressed as a cumulative index (2014=100). Among Member States that are part of 
the  sample,  the  highest  net  increases  since  2015  are  observed  in  Poland  (121),  Germany 
(109.8),  Austria  (109.6)  and  the  Netherlands  (109).  The  lower  increases  are  observed  in 
Luxembourg (101.6) and Belgium (101.8) and, within the sample, only central civil servants 
in France experienced a decrease of their net purchasing power (97.9).  

Because  the  evolution  of  EU  staff  remuneration  is  calculated  on  the  basis  of  the  weighted 
average of a sample of Member States, and as detailed in part 3.2.1, over the same period, the 
remuneration of EU staff increased by 103.4.  

Among  Member  States  that  are  not  part  of  the  sample,  the  highest  net  increases  of 
remuneration  are  observed  in  Slovakia  (186.4),  Czechia  (167,1),  Bulgaria  (156.3)  and 
Romania (148.1). Annex 14 shows that the vast majority of Member States that are part of the 
sample and have low participation rates in EU competitions organised by EPSO – as shown 
in part 2 – had specific indicators largely superior to the GSI on the basis of which EU staff 
remuneration has  been updated.  In other words,  relative purchasing power  attractiveness  of 
the EU has declined for those countries. 

3.2.4.  General  derogation  to  the  principle  of  parallelism:  application  of  the  moderation 

and exception clauses 

By  derogation  to  the  principle  of  parallelism  of  purchasing  power  evolution,  a  moderation 
clause  limits  high  increases  in  purchasing  power,  as  well  as  any  high  loss  in  purchasing 
power for a given year. If the calculated increase in purchasing power (GSI) exceeds 2% or if 
the purchasing power decreases by more than 2%, then the change in purchasing power for 
EU staff is limited to 2%. The part of the gain or loss in purchasing power exceeding 2% is 
applied nine months later, from 1 April of the following year. 

A  second  general  derogation  is  the  exception  clause,  which  limits  the  gain  in  purchasing 
power  of  EU  staff  when  there  is  a  downturn  in  the  EU  economy.  If  there  is  a  forecast 
decrease in the EU GDP in real terms and there is a gain in purchasing power measured by 
the GSI, then depending on the magnitude of the GDP  in  real  terms decrease, a part of the 
gain in purchasing power is postponed. If the EU GDP in real terms decreased by more than 
3%, then the gain in purchasing power due to the Method is granted when the EU economy 
recovers,  i.e.  when  the  EU  GDP  in  real  terms  reaches  the  pre-downturn  level  (recovery 
clause).  If  the  final  data  delivered  by  the  Commission  on  the  EU  GDP  in  real  terms  is 

13   The general methodology manual for calculating Specific Indicators is available on Eurostat’s website. In 
addition, 13 country-specific assessments have already published as of late 2018 and work is ongoing with 
other  national  authorities  to  increase  the  number  of  published  assessments  (see  the  following  link: 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/civil-servants-remuneration/specific-indicators/country-assessments).  

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different from the forecast, to the extent that it affects how the exception clause was applied, 
then the necessary corrections, including retroactive adjustments, either positive or negative, 
are made14. 

Moderation clause: between 2015 and 2021, Eurostat duly verified the figures of the updates 
against the criteria for the moderation and exception clauses, as set out in Articles 10 and 11 
of  Annex  XI  to  the  SR.  The  GSI  exceeded  the  statutory  limit  of  +2%  /  -2%  only  in  2020, 
when the GSI measured (+2.5%) was above the threshold required to trigger the moderation 
clause. Given the concurrent application of the exception clause in the same year (2020), and 
in line with Article 10 of Annex XI to the SR, the moderation clause did not apply. 

Exception  clause:  the  annual  EU  GDP  growth  forecast  available  at  the  time  of  each  yearly 
Eurostat report was positive, except in 2020, when, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
the forecasted evolution of the Union GDP in real terms was negative (-7.4 %)15 . Therefore, 
the exception clause under Article 11(1) of Annex XI to  the  SR applied in 2020.  Since the 
Union GDP decrease was greater than 3%, the GSI was not used to calculate the value of the 
update of remuneration and pensions. Hence, the whole GSI that would have been factored in 
the annual update for 2020 (+2.5%) will form the basis of the calculation of a future update 
once the cumulative increase of the Union GDP in real terms becomes positive, in accordance 
with Articles 10 and 11(4) of Annex XI to the SR.  

The implementation of statutory general derogations to the principle of parallelism and, more 
specifically, of the exception clause in 2020 has been implemented strictly, allowing to limit 
the  annual  update  resulting  from  the  Method  in  times  of  economic  downturns  and  thus 
providing net savings for the EU budget. On the other hand, this application of the exception 
clause impacted the parallel evolution of the purchaising power of EU civil servants, as for 
the same period civil servants in national governments from the sample effectively benefited 
from a higher purchasing power of 2.5% on average, thus resulting in a decline of attractivity 
for the EU since 2020. 

Likewise, the 2020 annual update demonstrated the effectiveness of the automatic moderation 
clause,  which  was  also  introduced  in  2014.  Should  the  exception  clause  not  have  been 
triggered  at  the  same  time,  the  moderation  clause  would  have  automatically  limited  the 
increase of the GSI until April 2021. 

Overall, it could be concluded that the automaticity of the Method, (i.e. remuneration updates 
based  on  statistical  data  which  produce  effects  on  the  basis  of  the  SR  and  without  the 
intervention of any other legal act) has worked well since 2014. The automatic Method was 
fit  for  purpose,  allowing  to  take  account  economic  circumstances  and  purchasing  power 
evolutions,  while  significantly  reducing  administrative  burden  compared  to  the  annual 
recourse to ordinary legislative procedure used before 2014. 

14   The  Working  Group  on  Articles  64  and  65  of  the  SR  decided  that  the  "final  data"  delivered  by  the 
Commission on the EU GDP for a given year would be interpreted as the data available by 30 September of 
the  following  year.  This  clarification  was  deemed  to  be  necessary  since  GDP  data  can  often  be  revised 
many years after the reference year. 

15   In  2021,  the  final  figure  measured  by  Eurostat  for  the  2020  decrease  of  the  EU  GDP  in  real  terms  was  -

5.9%.  

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3.2.5. 

Specific derogation from the general principle of parallelism 

To take account of the particularly difficult economic and social context in the Union at the 
time,  as  part  of  the  2014  reform  it  was  also  decided  that  the  update  of  remuneration  and 
pensions of all staff of the Union institutions, other bodies and agencies through the Method 
would  be  suspended  in  2013  and  2014,  and  that  the  potential  advantages  for  officials  and 
other servants of the European Union derived from the application of the Method would be 
balanced by the reintroduction as of 1 January 2014 of a solidarity levy  deducted from  EU 
staff salaries at an increased rate.  

3.2.5.1.  The suspension of salary updates for two years (2013-2014) 

As part of the reform of the SR in 2013, the European Council called for the adjustment of 
remuneration  and  pensions  of  all  staff  of  the  Union  institutions  through  the  Method  to  be 
suspended for two  years. Thus, no update of remuneration and pensions took place in 2013 
and  201416,  pursuant  to  the  clear  text  of  the  SR.  According  to  the  European  Court  of 
Auditors, this two-year freeze generated 1.5 billion savings over the 2014-2020 Multiannual 
Financial Framework17.   

While  the  suspension  of  the  update  discontinued  the  application  of  the  principle  of 
parallelism for the period 2013-2014, the correction coefficients continued to be updated to 
ensure equality of purchasing power between the different places of employment. 

3.2.5.2.  The impact of the EU solidarity levy 

The solidarity levy is a deduction from the remuneration of EU staff that was re-introduced at 
an increased rate as from 1 January 2014. The rate of the solidarity levy, which is applied to 
the base defined in Article 66a(3) of the SR, is 6%. It is increased to 7% for staff in grade AD 
15,  step  2,  and  above.  In  the  draft  2022  budget18,  revenues  from  the  solidarity  levy  are 
expected to reach EUR 106 million. Annex 15 shows the evolution of these revenues since 
2012. 

3.2.5.3.  Assessment of the specific derogations to the principle of paralelism 

As a result of these specific derogations, EU staff endured a significant loss in terms of real 
purchasing power. EU staff lost around 10.3% of their purchasing power, mainly due to the 
combined effect of the reforms of the SR in 2004 and in 2013, cuts in salary adjustments and 
the implementation of the exception clause in 2020. Over the same period, civil servants in 
central  governments of the Member States gained on average 0.9 % in terms of purchasing 
power19. 

16   Pursuant to Article 65(4) of the SR. 

17   European Court of  Auditors,  Special report 15/2019, Implementation of the 2014 staff reform package at 

the Commission - Big savings but not without consequences for staff. 

18   Draft General budget of the European Union for the financial year 2022, COM (2021) 300. 

19   Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  on  data  pertaining  to  the 
budgetary impact of the 2021 annual update of remuneration and pensions of the officials and other servants 
of the European Union and the correction coefficients applied thereto COM(2021) 729.  

9 

 
 
                                                 
3.3. 

The Joint Index 

The Joint Index measures changes in the cost of living in Belgium and Luxembourg for EU 
staff according to the distribution of staff serving in these two Member States, based on the 
Harmonised  Indices  of  Consumer  Prices  (HICP)  in  the  case  of  Belgium  and  the  Consumer 
Prices Index (CPI) in the case of Luxembourg, in accordance with Article 1 of Annex XI to 
the SR. Due to the specific consumption weights used for aggregating the Joint Index20, there 
may be differences between its evolution and the evolution pattern of the HICP for Belgium 
and the CPI for Luxembourg21 for a given year.  

Annex  16  shows  the  Joint  Index  time  series  (annual  increase  June-June  by  reference  to 
previous  year),  together  with  information  for  Belgian  HICP  and  Luxembourg  CPI.  The 
average Joint Index over the period from 2015 to 2021 is 101.4. The cumulative index for the 
whole  period  to  June  2021  (base  June  2014  =  100)  is  110.6.  By  comparison,  the  average 
HICP in  Belgium over the period  is  101.6 and the cumulative total  for the period  is 111.4. 
The average CPI in Luxembourg over the period was 101.2 and the cumulative total for the 
period is 108.8. 

As a result of the introduction of the Joint Index by the 2014 reform of the  SR, part of the 
update  corresponding  to  the  inflation  measured  in  Brussels  and  Luxembourg  allowed  to 
ensure consistency between adjustments paid to EU staff and inflations measured in Brussels 
and  Luxembourg.  Annex  17  shows  that  in  case  the  Brussels  International  Index  had 
continued  to  serve  as  a  basis  for  the  update  of  remuneration  as  was  the  case  under  the 
previous Method, the cumulative inflation measured during the reference period would have 
been almost the same as the one calculated on the basis of the Joint Index22. The cumulative 
total for the Joint Index is lower than the Belgian HICP and higher than Luxembourg’s CPI.   

4. 

IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 64 OF THE STAFF REGULATIONS 

4.1. 

Principle  of  equality  of  purchasing  power  among  EU  staff  –  correction 
coefficients 

The correction coefficient puts into practice the general principle of equal treatment, which in 
this particular case corresponds to the equality of purchasing power between all staff of the 
EU  institutions,  bodies  and  agencies  regardless  of  their  place  of  employment.  Whereas  the 
same  salary  grids  and  basic  amounts  apply  to  all  EU  staff,  correction  coefficients  apply  to 
staff serving in posts outside Brussels and Luxembourg, who should neither suffer financially 
from higher living costs in their duty stations nor benefit from lower living costs23. 

Hence  the  correction  coefficient  operates  as  a  percentage  adjustment  to  the  salary  to 
compensate  the  difference  (either  positive  or  negative)  in  the  cost  of  living  in  each  duty 
station. The correction coefficient is applied according to the following formula: 

20   As compared with the regular weights used for price statistics, the main difference for aggregating the Joint 
Index is the use of weights for rents that include owner-occupiers (instead of considering only tenants).  

21   Values shown are for the overall aggregate index; actual calculations are done from detailed level. 

22   Note that during the reference  period, inflation rates  were  historically low  for all component  sub-indices. 
Note  also  that  the  calculation  is  using  a  consumption  pattern  for  Belgium  alone  and  might  give  slightly 
different results if combined with a specific consumption pattern for Luxembourg. 

23   For staff members assigned in delegations, under Article 11 of Annex X, staff members have the possibility 

to request the payment of their remuneration in euros with the weighting applicable in Brussels.  

10 

 
 
                                                 
Salary in 
Brussels  
(in euros) 

Correction 
coefficient 

X 

(= Economic parity 
/ Exchange rate) 

X 

Exchange rate  
(=1 for euro-countries) 

Salary in duty 
station  
(in euros for euro-
countries) 

= 

Correction coefficients are updated at least once a year with effect on 1 July24. 

The methodology for calculating correction coefficients is defined and regularly improved by 
Eurostat  in  cooperation  with  the  national  statistical  institutes.  For  the  period  under 
consideration, it is worth mentioning the following developments: 

- 

implementation of a more developed methodology for comparing healthcare and 
education costs, including fee-paying schools across Member States, 

-  data collection work has been adapted in the context of Brexit and of the Covid 

19 pandemic’s consequences, 

- 

an  increasing  number  of  organisations  are  willing  to  cooperate  with  Eurostat25 
and to use the data issued by Eurostat for different purposes. 

Annex 18 shows correction coefficient values for individual duty stations in the EU26 for the 
period 2013-2021. From this table it is apparent that the correction coefficients for different 
locations have followed different trends over time. In 15 locations they have decreased over 
the period, whilst they increased in 16 locations. 

Since the entry into force of the amended Annex XI to the SR, a new procedure for creating 
or  withdrawing  correction  coefficients  outside  of  the  capital  city  is  in  force,  in  accordance 
with  Article  9  thereof27.  Following  the  United  Kingdom’s  withdrawal  from  the  European 

24   An intermediate update may take place with effect on 1 January in the event of a substantial change in the 

cost of living between June and December. 

25   For  instance,  the  “family  budget  surveys”  conducted  to  define  consumption  weights  have  been  fully 
harmonised  with  the  Coordinated  Organisations  (e.g.  OECD,  Council  of  Europe)  and  the  United  Nations 
decided in 2015 to use Eurostat source data on correction coefficients as input to adjust the salaries of their 
staff working in the EU (like Eurostat uses UN data for many locations outside the EU).. 

26   In accordance with Articles 12 and 13 of Annex X to the SR, specific weightings (correction coefficients) 
may also apply to the remuneration of staff posted outside the EU. The updated value of these weightings is 
annexed to the yearly reports adopted by the Commission on data pertaining to the budgetary impact of the 
updates. Eurostat has developed a specific methodology in cooperation with national statistical authorities. 

27   This  procedure  involves  notably  the  adoption  by  the  Commission  of  a  delegated  act  following  a  formal 
request submitted by the appropriate authorities of the Member States concerned, the administration of an 
institution of the Union or the representatives of officials of the Union in a given place of employment. For 
staff assigned in Bonn, the German national statistical office stopped providing data for the calculation of 
this  correction  coefficient  in  Bonn  in  2021.  In  the  absence  of  data  provided  by  the  relevant  national 
statistical office, and with regards to the very limited number of staff concerned, the correction coefficient 
applicable in Bonn has been suspended and replaced since 2021 by the correction coefficient applicable in 
Germany. 

11 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Union, the correction coefficient  applicable in the United Kindom is calculated in line with 
the methodology applicable to third countries, since 1 February 202028. 

4.2. 

Issues faced by the Commission with the system of correction coefficients 

4.2.1.  Perception of correction coefficients as impacting negatively purchasing power and 

attractiveness of the EU public service 

As  identified  in  2018  in  the  Commission’s  interim  report  on  the  implementation  of  Annex 
XI29, correction coefficients  are often mistakenly  perceived as the driver  of the decrease of 
purchasing  power  of  EU  staff.  The  Commission  services  are  often  asked  by  stakeholders, 
including  staff,  staff  representatives,  host  State  representatives  about  the  role  of  correction 
coefficients and the methodology used for computing them. This issue arises in particular in 
cases involving staff whose place of employment is subject to a correction coefficient below 
100, particularly when this specific coefficient is subject to downward updates30.  

Correction  coefficients  aim  only  at  maintaining  over  time  the  equivalence  of  purchasing 
power between staff posted in different Member States and staff members posted in Brussels. 
Conversely, the correction coefficients do not aim at maintaining purchasing power at a given 
level. Hence, as the purchasing power of staff in Brussels decreased since 2004 (part 3.2.5), 
the purchasing power of staff in all places of employment decreased in the same proportion. 
Thus, the correction coefficients represent only the vehicle through which the adjustment is 
implemented in places outside Brussels and Luxembourg. 

At the same time, the above perception of correction coefficients remains an issue related to 
attractiveness of the EU civil service in some Member States. In that regard, a number of EU 
agencies located in Member States where a correction coefficient below 100 applies reported 
to  the  Commission  a  visible  negative  impact  on  their  capacity  to  recruit  and  retain  highly-
qualified and geographically balanced staff. In the same manner, agencies located in Member 
States  with  high  correction  coefficients  also  reported  similar  difficulties,  highlighting  the 
decrease of EU staff net purchasing power observed in many duty stations, regardless of the 
applicable correction coefficient. 

In  this  context,  the  Commission  ensures,  at  the  occasion  of  each  update  of  correction 
coefficients, comprehensive information is given to other institutions about the context of the 
update  and  provides  detailed  explanations  on  the  fluctuation  of  different  correction 
coefficients and the evolution of purchasing power of staff. 

4.2.2.  Lack of consideration for expenses made outside the place of employment 

Under the SR, Eurostat and national statistical institutes are responsible for determining the 
statistical  methodology  applied  to  the  calculation  of  correction  coefficients  and  its 
implementation.  The  existing  methodology  developed  by  Eurostat  in  cooperation  with 

28   OJ C 211/8 of 25 June 2020 and OJ C 501, 13 December 2021. 

29   Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of Annex XI to 

the Staff Regulations and Article 66a thereof, COM (2018) 830.  

30   A  regular  question  received  concern  the  local  scope  on  the  basis  of  which  correction  coefficients  are 
calculated. The correction coefficients are calculated on the basis of a comparison of the cost of living in 
capital cities of Member States except in cases where local correction coefficients are calculated for some 
Member States in which case, local costs are reflected (see in that sense case T-618/20, FZ v. Commission). 

12 

 
 
                                                 
national  statistical  institutes  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  staff  member's  expenditure  is 
entirely incurred in the place of employment. This approach is being analysed, as the overall 
consumption  patterns  of  staff  members  also  comprises  expenditures  outside  the  place  of 
employment (‘out of area expenditures’).  

In this regard, Eurostat and national statistical institutes agreed on the need to update family 
budget surveys in order to quantify the impact of ‘out of area expenditure’ on expatriate EU 
staff consumption. On that basis, experimental results were discussed among statisticians of 
the  Commission  and  the  Member  States.  In  particular,  Eurostat  has  started  to  explore  the 
possibility  to  better  reflect  staff  expenditure  patterns  by  including  expenses  taking  place 
outside  the  place  of  employment.  Annex  19  illustrates  results  of  this  preliminary  work  and 
notably the flattening effect resulting from the inclusion of ‘out of area expenditures’ in EU 
staff consumption patterns.  

When  it  comes  to  EU  staff  consumption  patterns,  the  system  of  correction  coefficients  is 
focusing  on  bilateral  comparisons  between  Brussels  and  the  duty  station,  but  it  could  be 
envisaged  that  it  also  takes  into  account  ‘out  of  area’  expenditure.  It  is  expected  that 
Eurostat’s  current  experimental  work  on  ‘out  of  area  expenditure’  would  be  mature  in  the 
coming  years  as  a  statistical  measure  and  could  result  in  an  evolution  of  the  statistical 
methodology  applied,  pending  agreement  among  statisticians  in  the  Working  Group  on 
Articles 64 and 65 of the SR. Some of these changes could, however, be implemented under 
the current statutory framework.  

4.2.3.  Cost of living in Luxembourg 

On the occasion of the last SR reform in 2014, the co-legislators maintained the established 
legislative  solution  that  no  correction  coefficient  shall  be  applicable  to  the  remuneration  of 
staff in Brussels and Luxembourg, having regard to the special referential role of those places 
of employment as principal and original seats of most of the institutions. At the same time, 
the  co-legislators  decided  to  take  due  account  of  inflation  in  Luxembourg  by  creating  the 
Joint Index. 

The absence of a correction coefficient in Luxembourg under the SR is being questioned by 
stakeholders  and  certain  staff  representatives.  In  this  regard,  following  the  Commission 
interim report on Annex XI31, this institution commissioned a study on the cost of living in 
Luxembourg to assess whether the legislative solution laid down in the SR remained fit for 
purpose. The Commission contracted AIRINC to carry out the study. 

According to AIRINC, the accommodation in Luxembourg city in 2019 cost some 53% more 
than in Brussels. Rent has been the main driver for the deteriorating purchasing power of staff 
members working and residing in Luxembourg as compared with staff members working and 
residing in Brussels.  

However, AIRNC concluded that Luxembourg is in a unique situation in that it has thousands 
of  European  institutions’  staff  members  residing  in  bordering  regions,  where  the  cost  of 
living is significantly lower than in Brussels. These staff members nonetheless still reside at 
no  greater  distance  from  what  would  be  compatible  with  the  proper  performance  of  their 
duties32. As a result of this  geographical  particularity of  Luxembourg,  the introduction of a 

31   COM(2018) 830.  

32   This requirement is laid down by Article 20 of the SR.  

13 

 
 
                                                 
correction coefficient calculated on the basis of the costs observed in  Luxembourg may not 
fully grasp the particularities of Luxembourg as an EU place of employment33.  

In addition, among 80 headings used by Eurostat to compare the differences between places 
of  employment,  housing  is  the  main  heading  where  the  cost  of  living  in  Luxembourg  is 
manifestly higher than that of Brussels34. 

Moreover, some staff members may have acquired their dwellings at a time when the housing 
costs  were  lower  or  similar  in  Luxembourg  compared  to  Brussels  and  have  potentially 
experienced an asset price movement which sets them apart from new arrivals/existing staff 
who did not previously own property35.  

Thus,  it  is  considered  that  introducing  a  correction  coefficient  at  this  stage  might  not 
contribute to ensure equality of purchasing power among EU staff. In addition, introducing a 
correction  coefficient  solely  on  the  basis  of  a  divergent  price  level/trend  for  a  single 
component  may  introduce  an  element  of  instability,  if  the  price  level/trend  of  that  single 
component ceases to diverge in future. 

In  this  regard,  together  with  other  institutions  concerned,  the  Commission  is  f  assessing 
measures  allowing  to  effectively  address  high  housing  costs,  to  which  some  of  the  staff 
residing  in  Luxembourg  is  exposed.  Such  measures  would  allow  to  address  Luxembourg’s 
specifics  and  notably  the  situation  of  EU  staff  assigned  in  Luxembourg  but  residing  in 
neighbouring countries.  

A working group of representatives of the administrations of the EU Institutions with staff in 
Luxembourg is currently discussing the possibilities to address the challenges faced by most 
vulnerable staff members who are assigned to and reside in Luxembourg36. 

In  parallel,  the  Commission  is  looking  into  methodological  developments  on  ‘out  of  area 
expenditure’, which could serve as an additional element in the reflection on the introduction 
of a correction coefficient for Luxembourg.  

An  assessment  of  the  effects  of  the  targeted  social  measure  on  the  attractiveness  of 
Luxembourg as a place of employment, together with the ‘out of area expenditure’ statistical 
work, should form part of the reflection on the opportunity to envisage any evolution in the 
current  legal  framework  with  a  view  of  strengthening  equality  of  purchasing  power  among 
EU staff.  

33 

https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/study_on_the_cost_of_living_for_eu_staff_posted_in_luxembou
rg_-_final_report_v26-09-2019_0_0.pdf  

34   As the EU begins to exit a long period of historically low inflation, and the economies of Luxembourg and 
Belgium continue to evolve, differences seem starting to appear for certain other goods and services such as 
healthcare, education, furnishings, alcoholic beverages and tobacco.   

35   Arguably this may be true in other duty stations but to a much more limited extent as a result of recruitment 

turnover. 

36   A social measure could be adopted pursuant to Article 1(e) of the SR and would be limited to lowest grades 

staff while taking due account of their individual situation. 

14 

 
 
                                                 
5. 

CONCLUSIONS 

Article 15(3) of Annex XI to the SR provides for the continued application of the Method and 
Article 66a of the SR beyond 2023, as long as the European Parliament and the Council have 
not adopted a regulation on the basis of a Commission proposal.  

Since  2014,  the  Commission  observed  unequal  attractiveness  among  applicants  to  EPSO 
generalist competitions resulting in geographical imbalances among Commission staff. Over 
the  same  period,  the  evolution  of  EU  staff  remuneration  (+3.4)  only  reached  half  of  the 
change in the purchasing power of salaries in national civil services in central governments (+ 
6.5).  

At the same time, the automatic Method provided under Annex XI to the SR:  

-  put aside inter-institutional tensions and court cases known from the past, while 
remaining  under  the  constant  scrutiny  of  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Council via the annual reports delivered by the Commission. 

-  proved its efficiency, including in 2020, when the automatic implementation of 
the exception clause limited salary increases in a time of economic downturn and 
generated net savings for the EU budget, 

- 

- 

- 

resulted in moderated salary increases and prevented – as from 2015 – EU staff 
from  further  losing  purchasing  power,  by  ensuring  a  cumulative  annual  update 
(114.3) close to the cumulative annual inflation measured by the Joint Index in 
Brussels and Luxembourg (110.6), 

resulted in a decrease of the purchasing power of EU staff by 0.2% in 2021, 

ensured EU staff’s continued contribution to the consolidation of public finances 
in the Union by re-introducing a solidarity levy at an increased rate, 

-  withstood legal scrutiny before the European Courts in the few individual cases 
brought against it and avoided social tensions, as no major strikes took place in 
the Institutions during that period. 

Therefore,  at  this  stage,  the  Commission  considers  it  necessary  to  further  evaluate  possible 
methodological improvements to the system of correction coefficients, as well as to assess the 
opportunity of broadening the sample of Member States used for the calculation of the GSI, 
before submitting a proposal to amend Annex XI to the SR.  

Consequently, in line with Article 15(3) of Annex XI to the SR, the Commission will rely on 
the provisional application of the current Method beyond 2023, whilst ensuring the continued 
annual  reporting  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  on  data  pertaining  to  the 
budgetary impact of remuneration and pensions.  

15 

 
 
 
 
ANNEXES  

Annex 1: EPSO non-linguistic AD competitions (all profiles) by publication year  

AD' 

2013 
2014 
2015 
2016 
2017 
2018 
2019 

laureates sought 
474 
340 
375 
351 
290 
423 
585 

laureates delivered 
457 
359 
383 
361 
313 
435 
591 

Fulfilment of needs 
96% 
106% 
102% 
103% 
108% 
103% 
101% 

Annex 2: Number of Participants to AD level Generalists open competitions (Source: EPSO) 

1998 

September 
2005 

March 
2010 

March 
2014 

March 
2015 

March 
2017 

March 
2018 

March 
2019 

Avg 
2017-19 
vs Avg 
1998-05 
-58% 
-54% 
-81% 
-57% 
-61% 
-54% 
124% 
-49% 
-38% 
-40% 
-12% 
-54% 
-18% 
-81% 
-41% 

Avg 
2014-15 
vs Avg 
1998-05 
-56% 
-38% 
-70% 
-61% 
-50% 
-37% 
103% 
-50% 
-28% 
-43% 
-21% 
-22% 
-4% 
-78% 
-30% 

755 
2735 
531 
795 
3647 
2836 
1075 
425 
8918 
106 
662 
1098 
4335 
1314 
29232 

1162 
3905 
1179 
538 
4745 
3573 
873 
279 
7212 
92 
750 
1746 
3397 
943 
30394 
189 
420 
105 
667 
145 
342 
174 
1097 
378 
201 
3718 

AT 
BE 
DK 
FI 
FR 
DE 
EL 
IE 
IT 
LU 
NL 
PT 
ES 
SE 
EUR 14 
CY 
CZ 
EE 
HU 
LV 
LT 
MT 
PL 
SK 
SI 
EUR 10 
BG 
RO 
EUR 2 
HR 
Competition  of  March  2010  was  affected  by  special  circumstances  and  took  place  only  in 
2013. It is therefore not considered for comparison purposes 

373 
1423 
169 
330 
1623 
1464 
1844 
191 
5331 
67 
622 
595 
3356 
211 
17599 
143 
404 
91 
380 
118 
267 
74 
778 
274 
162 
2691 
656 
1490 
2146 
372 

453 
2111 
233 
265 
2176 
2115 
2146 
172 
6982 
70 
530 
1133 
3818 
253 
22457 
157 
348 
279 
673 
197 
468 
100 
1300 
391 
318 
4231 
1142 
2278 
3420 
713 

376 
1635 
153 
304 
1668 
1473 
2533 
167 
5071 
56 
602 
736 
3108 
221 
18103 
123 
214 
111 
459 
128 
290 
70 
855 
259 
201 
2710 
773 
1558 
2331 
435 

471 
1537 
161 
223 
1643 
1521 
2164 
176 
4712 
54 
642 
629 
3050 
208 
17191 
143 
235 
92 
442 
146 
302 
78 
838 
243 
196 
2715 
734 
1530 
2264 
393 

397 
2036 
273 
258 
2015 
1947 
1812 
182 
4608 
42 
584 
1083 
3602 
248 
19087 
117 
283 
234 
747 
193 
377 
91 
1146 
370 
237 
3795 
1065 
2323 
3388 
725 

259 
1745 
130 
298 
1696 
1418 
1381 
153 
3676 
33 
252 
556 
1786 
276 
13659 
84 
319 
140 
572 
247 
447 
79 
1086 
454 
209 
3637 
1078 
2332 
3410 

29232 

Avg 
2017-19 
vs Avg 
2014-15 
-4% 
-26% 
-36% 
9% 
-22% 
-27% 
10% 
1% 
-13% 
5% 
12% 
-41% 
-15% 
-15% 
-15% 
0% 
-10% 
-62% 
-40% 
-33% 
-32% 
-23% 
-33% 
-32% 
-33% 
-33% 
-35% 
-34% 
-34% 
-44% 

16 

 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex  3:  Number  of  Participants  to  administrator  level  generalists  open  competitions  (by 
cluster) 

Pre-2004 Member States

33000

31000

29000

27000

25000

23000

21000

19000

17000

15000

4500

4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

750

700

650

600

550

500

450

400

350

300

1998

2005

2014

2015

2017

2018

2019

Post 2004 Member States

2005

2014

2015

EUR 10

Croatia

2018

2019

2017

EUR 2

2014

2015

2017

2018

2019

 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 4: Applications to EU competitions by nationality  

2013 to 2019 
Competitions 

Applications  
(number) 

Applications 
per M. 
habitants 

Applications  
(share) 

Population  
(share) 

Guiding 
Rate 

Applications  
vs 
Population 

EL 
CY 
BE 
MT 
BG 
LT 
HR 
EE 
RO 
SI 
LU 
LV 
PT 
IT 
ES 
SK 
HU 
FI 
AT 
IE 
FR 
DK 
NL 
CZ 
PL 
SE 
DE 

19847 
1278 
16314 
676 
8722 
3235 
4185 
1304 
18236 
1927 
524 
1577 
8397 
47460 
29352 
2963 
4862 
2402 
3296 
1656 
17009 
1459 
4338 
2539 
9025 
1880 
14057 

1851 
1459 
1423 
1370 
1246 
1158 
1027 
984 
940 
926 
856 
821 
817 
777 
625 
544 
498 
436 
373 
338 
254 
252 
249 
241 
238 
184 
169 

8,7% 
0,6% 
7,1% 
0,3% 
3,8% 
1,4% 
1,8% 
0,6% 
8,0% 
0,8% 
0,2% 
0,7% 
3,7% 
20,8% 
12,8% 
1,3% 
2,1% 
1,1% 
1,4% 
0,7% 
7,4% 
0,6% 
1,9% 
1,1% 
3,9% 
0,8% 
6,2% 

2,4% 
0,2% 
2,6% 
0,1% 
1,6% 
0,6% 
0,9% 
0,3% 
4,3% 
0,5% 
0,1% 
0,4% 
2,3% 
13,6% 
10,5% 
1,2% 
2,2% 
1,2% 
2,0% 
1,1% 
15,0% 
1,3% 
3,9% 
2,4% 
8,5% 
2,3% 
18,5% 

3,1% 
0,8% 
3,1% 
0,6% 
2,4% 
1,5% 
1,6% 
0,8% 
4,5% 
1,0% 
0,8% 
1,0% 
3,1% 
11,2% 
8,9% 
1,8% 
3,0% 
1,8% 
2,6% 
1,6% 
11,6% 
1,8% 
3,9% 
3,1% 
8,2% 
2,7% 
13,8% 

362% 
286% 
279% 
268% 
244% 
227% 
201% 
193% 
184% 
181% 
168% 
161% 
160% 
152% 
122% 
106% 
97% 
85% 
73% 
66% 
50% 
49% 
49% 
47% 
47% 
36% 
33% 

Applications  
vs  
Guiding 
Rate 
281% 
72% 
229% 
46% 
158% 
95% 
116% 
71% 
177% 
88% 
31% 
72% 
120% 
186% 
144% 
73% 
71% 
59% 
56% 
45% 
64% 
36% 
49% 
36% 
48% 
30% 
45% 

 
 
 
 
 
Annex 5: Correlation between EU institutions’ attractiveness and different macroeconomic and socioeconomic factors including remuneration 

The correlation coefficient is a measure of linear correlation between two sets of data. It is the ratio between the covariance of two variables and 
the  product  of  their standard  deviations;  thus,  it  is  essentially  a  normalized  measurement  of  the  covariance,  such  that  the  result  always  has  a 
value between -1 and 1. Any figure between -0.7 and -1 or between 0.7 and 1 is considered – in the framework of this report – as illustrating a 
strong correlation. 

Among  Member  States  included  in  the  analysis,  some  were  excluded,  as  their  inclusion  would  have  jeopardised  the  statistical  soundness  of 
correlations  for  the  following  reasons.  Belgium  was  excluded  because  the  overrepresentation  of  Belgian  citizens  among  EPSO  candidates  is 
linked to the status of Brussels as the seat of several EU institutions. Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta  were excluded since the analysis of the 
share  of  candidates  to  EU  competitions  compared  to  the  national  population  is  not  statistically  sound,  in  light  of  their  small  population  size. 
Hungary,  Slovakia  and  Finland  were  excluded  as  their  level  of  participation  (comparing  the  level  of  participation  with  percentage  of  EU 
population) is between 80% and 120%, measured over seven years and therefore close to the target. 

Annex 5.1: Correlation between net earnings and the level of participation to EU competitions – Eurostat data base 

Annual net earnings in MS, i.e. the “net pay taken home”, originate from the Eurostat database and stand for gross earnings from which income 
taxes  and  social  contributions  are  deducted  and  to  which  family  allowances  are  added.  The  analysis  looks  at  annual  net  earnings  in  2019  in 
Member  States.  Net  earnings  are  calculated  from  four  surveys  carried  out  both  in  the  private  and  public  sector.  To  remove  the  effect  of 
differences  in  price  levels  between  Member  States,  purchasing  power  parities  were  used  to  have  earnings  expressed  in  purchasing  power 
standards, in compliance with Eurostat standard methodology. Given that the European Institutions strive to attract both single candidates and 
candidates with families, two different datasets reflecting two different situations were considered. First, a single person with no children earning 
167% of an average worker and second, a two-earner couple with two children, both earning 100% of the average worker earnings. 

Member States  

BG 

CZ 

DK 

DE 

EE 

IE 

EL 

ES 

FR 

HR 

IT 

LV 

LT 

NL 

AT 

PL 

PT 

RO 

SI 

SE 

Share  of  candidates  vs  share  of 
population 

244% 

47% 

49% 

33% 

193% 

66% 

362% 

122% 

50% 

201% 

152% 

161% 

227% 

49% 

73% 

47% 

160% 

184% 

181% 

36% 

Under represented = -1 

1 

-1 

-1 

-1 

1 

-1 

1 

1 

-1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

-1 

-1 

-1 

1 

1 

1 

-1 

Over represented = 1 

 
 
Net  earnings  in  2019  for  a  single 
person  without  children  earning 
167%  of  the  average  earning  (in 
PPS). BG = 1  

Correlation 

Net  earnings  in  2019  for  a  couple 
with 
two  children,  both  earning 
100%  of  the  average  earning  (in 
PPS). BG = 1 

Correlation 

1 

1.33 

2.12 

2.40 

1.36 

2.03 

1.46 

1.81 

2.00 

1.09 

1.64 

1.02 

1.20 

2.49 

2.30 

1.48 

1.28 

1.15 

1.26 

1.98 

1 

1.48 

2.43 

2.80 

1.54 

2.44 

1.76 

1.99 

2.29 

1.29 

1.93 

1.12 

1.32 

2.99 

2.79 

1.69 

1.46 

1.18 

1.44 

2.41 

-0.76 

-0.76 

Annex  5.2:  Correlation  between  net  earnings  in  Member  States  with  the  highest  and  lowest  wages  and  the  level  of  participation  to  EU 
competitions – Eurostat data base 

When restricting the analysis to the Member States with the highest and lowest wages, the level of participation to EU competitions and the level 
of  net  earnings  are  almost  perfectly  correlated.  This  is  particularly  true  for  Germany,  France,  the  Netherlands,  Austria,  Denmark,  Ireland, 
Sweden, Portugal, Slovenia, Lithuania, Romania, Croatia, Latvia and Bulgaria. For mid-wage Member States, results are however more nuanced 
and require taking on board other socioeconomic factors. 

Member States  

BG 

DK 

DE 

IE 

FR 

HR 

LV 

LT 

NL 

AT 

PT 

RO 

SI 

SE 

Share  of  candidates  vs  share  of 
population 

244% 

49% 

33% 

66% 

50% 

201% 

161% 

227% 

49% 

73% 

160% 

184% 

181% 

36% 

Under represented = -1 

1 

-1 

-1 

-1 

-1 

1 

1 

1 

-1 

-1 

1 

1 

1 

-1 

Over represented = 1 

 
 
 
Net  earnings  in  2019  for  a  single 
person  without  children  earning 
167%  of  the  average  earning  (in 
PPS). BG = 1  

Correlation 

Net  earnings  in  2019  for  a  couple 
with 
two  children,  both  earning 
100%  of  the  average  earning  (in 
PPS). BG = 1 

Correlation 

1 

2.12 

2.40 

2.03 

2.00 

1.09 

1.02 

1.20 

2.49 

2.30 

1.28 

1.15 

1.26 

1.98 

1 

2.43 

2.80 

2.44 

2.29 

1.29 

1.12 

1.32 

2.99 

2.79 

1.46 

1.18 

1.44 

2.41 

-0.96 

-0.96 

Annex 5.3: Correlation between unemployment levels and the level of participation to EU competitions – Eurostat data base 

In this Annex, it is assessed whether the economic situation in Member States determines, to some extent, the willingness to work in a foreign 
country and for the European Institutions. A macroeconomic indicator that might influence this choice is the unemployment rate, also provided 
by Eurostat. In order to match the demographics of EPSO candidates, only unemployed persons aged between 25 and 49 in the second quarter of 
2019 were incorporated in the analysis. 

Member States  

BG 

CZ 

DK 

DE 

EE 

IE 

EL 

ES 

FR 

HR 

IT 

LV 

LT 

NL 

AT 

PL 

PT 

RO 

SI 

SE 

Share  of  candidates  vs  share  of 
population 

244% 

47% 

49% 

33% 

193% 

66% 

362% 

122% 

50% 

201% 

152% 

161% 

227% 

49% 

73% 

47% 

160% 

184% 

181% 

36% 

Under represented = -1 

1 

-1 

-1 

-1 

1 

-1 

1 

1 

-1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

-1 

-1 

-1 

1 

1 

1 

-1 

Over represented = 1 

Unemployment level  

4.3% 

1.8% 

4.8% 

3.2% 

4.0% 

4.2% 

17.6
% 

12.7
% 

7.5% 

6.9% 

10.5
% 

6.1% 

6.0% 

2.5% 

4.5% 

2.9% 

5.3% 

3.2% 

3.9% 

5.3% 

 
 
 
Correlation 

0.43 

Annex  5.4:  Correlation  between  the  perception  of  national  employment  situation  and  the  level  of  participation  to  EU  competitions  – 
Eurobarometer 2019) 

Among  the  more  than  200  questions  in  the  Eurobarometer37,  one  relates  to  the  judgment  citizens  have  on  the  employment  situation  in  their 
country. 

Member States  

BG 

CZ 

DK 

DE 

EE 

IE 

EL 

ES 

FR 

HR 

IT 

LV 

LT 

NL 

AT 

PL 

PT 

RO 

SI 

SE 

Share  of  candidates  vs  share  of 
population 

244% 

47% 

49% 

33% 

193% 

66% 

362% 

122% 

50% 

201% 

152% 

161% 

227% 

49% 

73% 

47% 

160% 

184% 

181% 

36% 

Under represented = -1 

1 

-1 

-1 

-1 

1 

-1 

1 

1 

-1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

-1 

-1 

-1 

1 

1 

1 

-1 

Over represented = 1 

Percentage  of  the  population  who 
thinks  that  the  employment  situation 
in their country is good  

Correlation 

28% 

80% 

90% 

73% 

60% 

65% 

7% 

13% 

22% 

24% 

14% 

37% 

45% 

85% 

66% 

65% 

38% 

38% 

45% 

65% 

-0.73 

37   The Eurobarometer is a set of surveys that are used by the EU Institutions to monitor public opinion on various topics. In the context of this study, data come from the 

standard Eurobarometer 92 carried out in all EU Member States at the end of 2019. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Annex 5.5: Correlation between the perception of the EU and the level of participation to EU competitions – Eurobarometer 2019 

Many  questions  in  the  Eurobarometer  address  the  image  that  citizens  have  about  the  European  Union  as  a  whole  and  the  EU  Institutions  in 
particular. Even though EPSO candidates may not be necessarily representative of the EU citizens (in terms of age groups in particular), it may 
be posited that citizens in Member States that subscribe the most to the European project are those more likely to apply to the EU competitions. 

Member States  

BG 

CZ 

DK 

DE 

EE 

IE 

EL 

ES 

FR 

HR 

IT 

LV 

LT 

NL 

AT 

PL 

PT 

RO 

SI 

SE 

Share  of  candidates  vs  share  of 
population 

244% 

47% 

49% 

33% 

193% 

66% 

362% 

122% 

50% 

201% 

152% 

161% 

227% 

49% 

73% 

47% 

160% 

184% 

181% 

36% 

Under represented = -1 

1 

-1 

-1 

-1 

1 

-1 

1 

1 

-1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

-1 

-1 

-1 

1 

1 

1 

-1 

Over represented = 1 

Percentage  of  the  population  who 
have a positive image of the EU 

Correlation 

61% 

31% 

55% 

50% 

49% 

63% 

31% 

39% 

36% 

41% 

33% 

42% 

50% 

43% 

38% 

50% 

59% 

52% 

44% 

50% 

-0.04 

Annex 5.6: Correlation between personal financial prospects and the level of participation to EU competitions – Eurobarometer 2019 

In the Eurobarometer, citizens are asked to provide their expectations regarding the financial situation of their household in the following year. 
Expectations on the personal financial situation are dependent on global employment prospects, as well as on personal considerations regarding 
expected salary level, job stability, etc. 

Member States  

BG 

CZ 

DK 

DE 

EE 

IE 

EL 

ES 

FR 

HR 

IT 

LV 

LT 

NL 

AT 

PL 

PT 

RO 

SI 

SE 

Share  of  candidates  vs  share  of 
population 

244% 

47% 

49% 

33% 

193% 

66% 

362% 

122% 

50% 

201% 

152% 

161% 

227% 

49% 

73% 

47% 

160% 

184% 

181% 

36% 

 
 
 
Under represented = -1 

1 

-1 

-1 

-1 

1 

-1 

1 

1 

-1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

-1 

-1 

-1 

1 

1 

1 

-1 

Over represented = 1 

that 

Percentage  of  the  population  who 
financial 
think 
situation  will  improve  in  the  next  12 
months 

their  own 

26% 

24% 

21% 

17% 

31% 

18% 

23% 

20% 

24% 

29% 

23% 

31% 

25% 

15% 

16% 

23% 

27% 

31% 

20% 

27% 

Correlation 

-0.56 

Annex 5.7: Correlation between the OECD better life index and the level of participation to EU competitions – OECD  

The OECD’s ‘better life index’ is a set of statistics aiming at comparing well-being across countries. Well-being encompasses material living 
conditions, housing conditions, employment, education, etc. For comparability purposes, the indicator chosen in the context of the study is the 
overall life satisfaction.  

Member States  

BG 

CZ 

DK 

DE 

EE 

IE 

EL 

ES 

FR 

HR 

IT 

LV 

LT 

NL 

AT 

PL 

PT 

RO 

SI 

SE 

Share  of  candidates  vs  share  of 
population 

244% 

47% 

49% 

33% 

193% 

66% 

362% 

122% 

50% 

201% 

152% 

161% 

227% 

49% 

73% 

47% 

160% 

184% 

181% 

36% 

Under represented = -1 

1 

-1 

-1 

-1 

1 

-1 

1 

1 

-1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

-1 

-1 

-1 

1 

1 

1 

-1 

Over represented = 1 

OECD better life index 

6.7 

7.6 

7.0 

5.7 

7.0 

5.4 

6.3 

6.5 

6.0 

5.9 

5.9 

7.4 

7.1 

6.1 

5.4 

5.9 

7.3 

Correlation 

-0.84 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 6: Evolution of the sample of Member States and their respective weight (2014 = 100) 

BEDEESFRITLUNLATPLSEUK20142,619,68,214,111,80,34,52,25,02,413,884,520152,619,98,213,911,50,34,32,25,12,414,084,420162,619,78,213,811,30,34,32,25,22,414,084,020172,619,98,313,711,50,34,22,25,12,413,884,020182,619,98,313,511,40,34,32,25,22,413,783,820192,619,88,213,511,30,34,32,25,32,413,683,520202,619,48,213,811,10,34,32,25,42,413,583,220213,022,59,115,712,40,45,22,56,52,880,1EU 11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 7: Annual specific indicators of Member States from the sample (2014 = 100) 

Annex 8: Cumulative annual specific indicators of Member States from the sample (2014 = 100) 

[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11]BEDEESFRITLUNLATPLSEUK201599,6102,9101,2100,3100,4101,2100,7100,7101,7101,9100,52016101,2100,8105,9100,1100,299,2106,2104,3107,7102,9100,62017100,5102,299,3101,599,5102,397,599,1101,798,698,8201899,2100,796,897,6102,498,6101,399,699,2100,698,72019102,1101,3102,399,199,5101,5100,8100,998,5102,2100,62020101,6101,5102,5100,1104,3102,2102,3105,7107,2101,2103,2202197,7100,199,599,298,796,7100,299,1103,8100,0:simple average100,3101,4101,199,7100,7100,2101,3101,3102,8101,1100,4[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11]BEDEESFRITLUNLATPLSEUK201599,6102,9101,2100,3100,4101,2100,7100,7101,7101,9100,52016100,8103,7107,2100,4100,6100,4106,9105,0109,5104,9101,12017101,3106,0106,4101,9100,1102,7104,2104,1111,4103,499,92018100,5106,7103,099,5102,5101,3105,6103,7110,5104,098,62019102,6108,1105,498,6102,0102,8106,4104,6108,8106,399,22020104,2109,7108,098,7106,4105,1108,8110,6116,6107,6102,42021101,8109,8107,597,9105,0101,6109,0109,6121,0107,6: 
 
 
 
Annex 9: Calculated and applied Global Specific Indicator 

Annex 10: Global Specific Indicator, Joint Index and annual update (2014 = 100) 

GSI 

101,2 

101,9 

100,4 

99,6 

100,5 

102,5 

99,8 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

2019 

2020 

2021 

Cumulative  
2014 = 100 

Joint 
Index  

Cumulative  
2014 = 100 

Annual 
update 

Cumulative  
2014 =100 

101,2 

103,1 

103,5 

103,1 

103,6 

103,6 

103,4 

101,2 

101,4 

101,1 

102,1 

101,5 

100,7 

102,1 

101,2 

102,6 

103,7 

105,9 

107,5 

108,3 

110,6 

102,4 

103,3 

101,5 

101,7 

102,0 

100,7 

101,9 

102,4 

105,8 

107,4 

109,2 

111,4 

112,2 

114,3 

 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Annex 11: Comparison of alternative GSI calculated based on different samples 

Comparison of alternative GSI based on 
different samples

107
106
105
104
103
102
101
100

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

EU8

EU11

All MS

Annex 12: Annual specific indicators of all Member States (2014 = 100) 

[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28]BEBGCZDKDEEEIEELESFRHRITCYLVLTLUHUMTNLATPLPTROSISKFISEUK201599,6101,8101,299,7102,9105,4100,9101,1101,2100,399,9100,4102,1108,8102,4101,2100,6101,1100,7100,7101,796,7104,7100,8101,0100,0101,9100,52016101,2105,9134,9100,7100,8113,3103,6100,0105,9100,1102,3100,2102,0106,3102,799,2101,9101,8106,2104,3107,7101,9111,9101,9108,5100,3102,9100,62017100,5102,5106,9101,0102,298,7103,799,199,3101,5102,499,5100,395,099,3102,3109,1101,197,599,1101,7101,0111,0100,5109,299,198,698,8201899,2117,3110,7102,0100,7100,5102,798,996,897,6108,7102,4100,0103,7100,298,6100,5102,2101,399,699,299,2109,298,6113,599,9100,698,72019102,1104,397,9100,5101,3108,599,9100,1102,399,1102,599,5101,2100,7113,6101,597,4100,9100,8100,998,599,8108,3102,0112,3102,7102,2100,62020101,6104,799,5101,7101,5102,1102,2102,9102,5100,1104,7104,3103,2104,1107,3102,2102,1102,0102,3105,7107,2100,298,1105,4115,0101,1101,2103,2202197,7110,4106,299,6100,1112,5100,399,499,599,2102,398,799,3100,8100,796,7101,7105,0100,299,1103,8101,298,198,9106,2100,6100,0: 
 
 
 
Annex 13: Cumulative annual specific indicators of all Member States (2014 = 100) 

[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28]BEBGCZDKDEEEIEELESFRHRITCYLVLTLUHUMTNLATPLPTROSISKFISEUK201599,6101,8101,299,7102,9105,4100,9101,1101,2100,399,9100,4102,1108,8102,4101,2100,6101,1100,7100,7101,796,7104,7100,8101,0100,0101,9100,52016100,8107,8136,5100,4103,7119,4104,5101,1107,2100,4102,2100,6104,1115,7105,2100,4102,5102,9106,9105,0109,598,5117,2102,7109,6100,3104,9101,12017101,3110,5145,9101,4106,0117,8108,4100,2106,4101,9104,7100,1104,4109,9104,5102,7111,8104,0104,2104,1111,499,5130,1103,2119,799,4103,499,92018100,5129,6161,5103,4106,7118,4111,399,1103,099,5113,8102,5104,4114,0104,7101,3112,4106,3105,6103,7110,598,7142,1101,8135,999,3104,098,62019102,6135,2158,1103,9108,1128,5111,299,2105,498,6116,6102,0105,7114,8118,9102,8109,5107,3106,4104,6108,898,5153,9103,8152,6102,0106,399,22020104,2141,6157,3105,7109,7131,2113,6102,1108,098,7122,1106,4109,1119,5127,6105,1111,8109,4108,8110,6116,698,7151,0109,4175,5103,1107,6102,42021101,8156,3167,1105,3109,8147,6113,9101,5107,597,9124,9105,0108,3120,5128,5101,6113,7114,9109,0109,6121,099,9148,1108,2186,4103,7107,6: 
 
 
Annex 14: Cumulative specific indicators of Member States from the sample and whose 
participation to EU competition is low  

Cumulative GSI of under represented MS from 
the sample

125,0

120,0

115,0

110,0

105,0

100,0

95,0

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

DE

NL

AT

PL

SE

FR

EU

Annex 15: Proceeds from the solodarity levy between 2012 and 2022 

Proceeds from the solidarity levy between 2012 and 2022

€110.000.000,00 

€100.000.000,00 

€90.000.000,00 

€80.000.000,00 

€70.000.000,00 

€60.000.000,00 

€50.000.000,00 

€40.000.000,00 

€30.000.000,00 

€20.000.000,00 

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

Commission européenne/Europese Commissie, 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel, BELGIQUE/BELGIË - Tel. +32 22991111 
Office: L107 21/007 - Tel. direct line +32 229-90515 

Commission européenne, 2920 Luxembourg, LUXEMBOURG - Tel. +352 43011 

Gertrud.Ingestad@ec.europa.eu 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 16: Joint Belgium-Luxembourg index, Belgian HICP and Luxembourg CPI 

Annex 17: Evolution of the cost of living in Brussels (Brussel international index)  

31 

YearJune t-1 = 100Cumulative June 2014 = 1002015101,2101,22016101,4102,62017101,1103,72018102,1105,92019101,5107,52020100,7108,32021102,1110,5Measure for increase in  cost-of-living in Brussels*. June t 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 18 : Evolution of correction coefficients 

32 

GEO/TIME2012201320142015201620172018201920202021BE/LU100,0100,0100,0100,0100,0100,0100100,0100,0100,0BG58,457,555,152,151,153,455,257,559,161,7CZ80,680,075,073,473,278,38385,585,288,1DK135,3134,8133,0131,8133,1133,9131,9129,3131,3134,2DE95,896,897,296,696,197,599,399,4101,9101,4Karlsruhe93,892,895,093,893,094,696,796,598,096,9München106,4108,2107,7106,0105,5107,5110110,3113,9113,4Bonn94,194,994,693,492,693,995,695,195,8EE77,678,978,678,077,680,382,283,382,386,3IE110,6113,0115,9116,6118,3119,8117,7119,2129,0133,6EL90,591,286,879,979,379,981,881,881,485,2ES97,196,394,590,288,188,791,791,694,296,3FR117,7117,4116,8114,6113,8114,8116,7117,7120,5119,9HR:80,077,674,673,574,976,475,975,878,3IT104,2104,4100,499,497,997,396,595,295,095,2Varese93,492,893,192,290,490,990,990,090,791,2CY84,183,781,277,374,374,477,978,978,282,2LV77,676,176,574,273,074,977,678,677,580,0LT71,571,971,469,069,774,373,675,176,680,1HU78,376,171,469,070,074,571,975,371,976,1MT83,384,483,484,585,786,590,292,094,794,0NL105,3108,9107,8107,8108,0108,3109,9111,5113,9111,4AT106,4108,3107,2105,9104,7106,3106,3106,0107,9109,6PL74,273,074,171,866,770,668,671,170,970,6PT83,583,182,279,280,682,485,788,691,191,4RO68,869,869,564,863,863,96465,366,668,5SI85,385,484,781,280,781,584,684,686,184,9SK79,780,279,076,475,777,378,579,080,679,9FI122,1123,7123,0119,7118,6119,9118,5118,1118,4118,6SE131,9132,9127,5127,9127,4127,9122120,5124,3130,3UK147,8139,2150,7166,9141,8133,5134,7132,9Culham112,5107,6116,7127,7107,3100,5102,6102,0 
 
 
 
Annex 19: Effects of exploratory out of area work by ESTAT 

Current correction coefficients 
–  
July 2021 

Estimated correction coefficient  
including out of area 
expenditures 

Change 

100 

64.8 

89.4 

129.8 

100.9 

96.8 

111.6 

87.7 

128.7 

86.2 

96.4 

117.2 

80.3 

95.3 

91.8 

83.7 

82.1 

81.8 

78.6 

94.5 

109.6 

107.3 

73.7 

91.9 

71.2 

86.1 

81.6 

115.7 

126.4 

0.0% 

5.0% 

1.5% 

-3.3% 

-0.5% 

-0.1% 

-1.6% 

1.6% 

-3.7% 

1.2% 

0.1% 

-2.3% 

2.6% 

0.1% 

0.7% 

1.8% 

2.6% 

2.1% 

3.3% 

0.5% 

-1.6% 

-2.1% 

4.4% 

0.5% 

3.9% 

1.4% 

2.1% 

-2.4% 

-3.0% 

BE 

BG 

CZ 

DK 

DE 

DE Karlsruhe 

DE Munich 

EE 

IE  

EL 

ES 

FR  

HR 

IT 

IT Varese  

CY 

LV 

LT 

HU 

MT 

NL 

AT 

PL 

PT 

RO 

SI 

SK 

FI 

SE  

100 

61.7 

88.1 

134.2 

101.4 

96.9 

113.4 

86.3 

133.6 

85.2 

96.3 

119.9 

78.3 

95.2 

91.2 

82.2 

80.0 

80.1 

76.1 

94.0 

111.4 

109.6 

70.6 

91.4 

68.5 

84.9 

79.9 

118.6 

130.3 

33