COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Implementation of Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing a Community framework for the safety of nuclear installations amended by Directive 2014/87/Euratom Accompanying the document Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the progress made with the implementation of Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing a Community framework for the safety of nuclear installations amended by Directive 2014/87/Euratom
Date: 2022-04-21
Institutions: Directorate-General for Energy, European Commission
Subjects: access to information, application of EU law, exchange of information, nuclear law, nuclear policy, nuclear power station, nuclear safety, professional qualifications

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 21.4.2022  SWD(2022) 107 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Implementation of Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing a Community framework for the safety of nuclear installations amended by Directive 2014/87/Euratom Accompanying the document Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament  on the progress made with the implementation of Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing a Community framework for the safety of nuclear installations amended by Directive 2014/87/Euratom {COM(2022) 173 final}  
 
 
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I. 

INTRODUCTION  

1.1.   Objective and structure of the Staff Working Document 

This Staff Working Document accompanies and supports the Commission’s second report to 
the  Council  and  the  European  Parliament  on  progress  made  with  the  implementation  of 
Directive 2009/71/Euratom amended by Directive 2014/87/Euratom (Directive) and provides 
a more detailed, article-by-article analysis of the Member States’ implementation approaches, 
relying primarily on the reports submitted by the Member States to the European Commission 
in 20201. 

This  document  is  structured  in  two  sections  -  the  section  on  ‘Nuclear  Safety  Governance’ 
covers  Articles  4  (‘Legislative,  regulatory  and  organisational  framework’),  5  (‘Competent 
regulatory  authority’),  7  (‘Expertise  and  skills  in  nuclear  safety’)  and  8  (‘Transparency’)  of 
the  Directive,  and  the  section  on  the  ‘Safety  of  Nuclear  Installations’  covers  Articles  6 
(‘Licence holders’), 8a (‘Nuclear safety objective’), 8b (‘Implementation of the nuclear safety 
objective’),  8c  (‘Initial  assessments  and  periodic  safety  reviews’),  8d  (‘On-site  emergency 
preparedness and response’), and 8e (‘Peer-reviews’) of the Directive.  

It  should  be  noted  that  the  Member  States  with  nuclear  installations  have  the  obligation  of 
transposing  and  implementing  all  Articles  of  the  Directive,  with  due  account  of  a  graded 
approach.  In  line  with  this  graded  approach,  the  implementation  of  the  provisions  of  the 
Directive  depends  on  the  potential  magnitude  and  nature  of  risks  posed  by  the  nuclear 
installations that the States plan or operate. In addition, taking into account that the provisions 
of  the  Directive  linked  with  the  existence  of  nuclear  installations  do  not  apply  to  those 
Member  States  without  nuclear  installations,  those  Member  States  are  exempted  from  the 
obligation of transposing and implementing Articles 6 (‘Licence holders’), 8a (‘Nuclear safety 
objective’), 8b (‘Implementation of the nuclear safety objective’), 8c (‘Initial assessment and 
periodic  safety  reviews’)  and  8d  (‘On-site  emergency  preparedness  and  response’)  of  the 
Directive.2  

 1.2.  Overview of the nuclear installations in the EU 

Article 3 of the Directive specifies the types of nuclear installations coming within its scope, 
i.e.  nuclear  power  plants  (NPPs),  enrichment  plants,  nuclear  fuel  fabrication  plants, 
reprocessing plants, research reactor facilities, spent fuel storage facilities, as well as storage 
facilities  for  radioactive  waste  that  are  on  the  same  site  and  are  directly  related  to  the 
aforementioned  nuclear  installations.  Furthermore  the  Directive  covers  all  stages  of  the 
lifecycle  of  nuclear  installations  (siting,  design,  construction,  commissioning,  operation, 
decommissioning). 

The  present-day  situation  in  the  Member  States  is  diverse,  from  those  with  one  or  more  of 
each type of these installations, to those without any installations. According to their national 

1 

2  

Concerning  the  United  Kingdom,  considering  that  the  obligation  of  applying  the  Euratom  legislation 
applied until 31 December 2020, and the national report was submitted in 2020, the information presented 
was considered in the Commission’s review. 

The quantitative references to the number of Member States e.g. majority, in this Staff Working Document, 
were made with due consideration of this differentiated application. 

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energy policies, some Member States have plans to pursue nuclear energy generation through 
continued  operation  of  existing  NPPs  or  to  construct  new  NPPs.  Others  have  decided  to 
discontinue operations after a certain date, or have prohibited the construction of new plants. 
The  majority  of  NPPs  are  sited  in  those  countries  that  took  a  prominent  role  in  the 
development  of nuclear  technology  in  Europe  in  the  1950’s  -  1960’s,  and,  consequently,  these 
countries account for the majority of installations under shutdown or decommissioning. 

Annex 1 provides a summary of information on nuclear installations by country and by type, 
as reported. 

II. 

NUCLEAR SAFETY GOVERNANCE (Articles 4, 5, 7 and 8 of the Directive) 

2.1.  

LEGISLATIVE,  REGULATORY  AND  ORGANISATIONAL  FRAMEWORK 
(Article 4) 

2.1.1.  National framework (Article 4, paragraph 1, first sentence) 

According  to  Article  4,  paragraph  1  of  the  Directive,  Member  States  should  establish  and 
maintain a national legislative, regulatory and organisational framework for the nuclear safety 
of nuclear installations (‘national framework’). 

All  Member  States  report  that  they  have  a  national  framework  in  place  to  carry  out  the 
activities  covered  by  the  Directive.  However,  the  scope  and  the  level  of  detail  varies 
significantly  between  the  Member  States.  The  national  frameworks  have  been  developed  in 
different  ways,  depending  on  the  countries’  nuclear  profiles  and  national  administrative 
systems. Generally, the national frameworks of Member States with nuclear installations tend 
to be more complex and include more levels of legislation and implementing regulations, as 
well  as  administrative  documents  and  practices.  The  Member  States  without  nuclear 
installations  address  nuclear  safety-related  issues  mainly  through  legislation  on  radiation 
protection, supplemented by provisions in the areas of health, environment or civil protection.  

2.1.2.  Allocation  of  responsibilities  and  coordination  (Article  4,  paragraph  1, 

letter (a)) 

Article 4, paragraph 1, letter (a) of the Directive requires that the national framework provides 
for the allocation of responsibilities and coordination between relevant State bodies.  

The  Member  States  report  on  their  administrative  and  organisational  structure,  where  the 
competent  regulatory  authority  (referred  to,  throughout  the  Staff  Working  Document,  as 
‘regulatory  authority’  or  ‘regulator’)  plays  a  key  role  in  regulating  nuclear  safety  matters. 
While, as a rule, a single regulatory authority concentrates the  core regulatory competences, 
such competences are shared in some Member States by more than one entity. In this respect, 
the Directive leaves the precise organisation of the regulators to the decision of the Member 
States (‘an authority or a system of authorities’).  

Several  Member  States  indicate  situations  where  interfaces  exist  between  the  regulatory 
authorities,  other  bodies  and  various  ministries  (such  as  the  ministries  having  energy, 
environment, health or interior affairs in their portfolio) which also play a role in the overall 
institutional framework aimed at ensuring nuclear safety. To illustrate this aspect, the area of 
emergency preparedness and response (EP&R) is one where, typically, there are strong links 

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between  various  national  bodies,  such  as  between  regulators  and  civil  protection  services, 
national defence bodies, state inspection services, relevant ministries etc. In this context, some 
Member States also mention cooperation with regions and local authorities or with specialised 
advisory  bodies  and  experts.  For  Member  States  without  nuclear  installations,  cooperation 
between  counterpart  regulators  of  other  Member  States  is  particularly  important  for 
responding  to  potential  radiological  or  nuclear  emergencies  originating  outside  of  their 
borders.  Generally,  Member  States  define  the  individual  responsibilities  of  the  relevant 
institutions involved in the area of nuclear safety in legal provisions. In some reported cases, 
the interfaces between these bodies are described in inter-institutional agreements/memoranda 
of  understanding3  which  constitute  the  basis  for  such  cooperation  and  coordination 
arrangements.  

2.1.3.  Nuclear safety requirements (Article 4, paragraph 1, letter (b)) 

Article 4, paragraph 1, letter (b) of the Directive requires that the national framework provides 
for  national  nuclear  safety  requirements,  covering  all  stages  of  the  lifecycle  of  nuclear 
installations. 

Member States indicate the main legal texts laying down national nuclear safety requirements, 
which  are  generally  made  publicly  available.  While  in  most  cases  these  requirements  are 
incorporated into legally binding provisions (e.g. laws, decrees or regulations), some Member 
States opted to define more detailed non-binding regulatory guidance (e.g. recommendations, 
guidelines)  which  aim  to  assist  stakeholders  to  put  the  high-level  legal  requirements  into 
practice.  In some cases,  nuclear safety requirements  can also  be incorporated into particular 
licences or made applicable through supervisory measures on an individual basis.  

Depending on the countries’ nuclear energy profiles, these requirements are either focused on 
nuclear safety, or cover both nuclear safety and radiation protection aspects.  

While, in general, the requirements address all stages of the lifecycle of nuclear installations, 
in  a  few  cases,  the  reports  have  not  explicitly  referred  to  the  existence  of  separate  specific 
requirements  relative  to  the  decommissioning  stage.  Concerning  their  scope,  they  cover  – 
besides NPPs  –  other  types of nuclear installations, such as research  reactors, depending on 
the national nuclear programme.  

2.1.4.  Licensing system (Article 4, paragraph 1, letter (c)) 

Article 4, paragraph 1, letter (c) of the Directive requires that the national framework provides 
for a system of licensing and prohibits the operation of nuclear installations without a licence. 

The  Member  States  have  consistently  reported  that  the  operation  of  nuclear  installations 
without a licence is prohibited under their legal frameworks. The national reports also provide 
descriptions of the licencing systems, giving various levels of detail. The general conclusion 

3  

For instance, Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Spain 
General  Note:  All  National  Reports  are  publicly  available  on  the  Europa  website  at  the  address 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/topics/nuclear-energy/nuclear-safety_en. This Staff Working Document focuses 
on  identifying  trends  across  the  Member  States’  approaches  in  the  Directive’s  implementation,  whilst 
giving examples of good national solutions for implementation of specific requirements of the Directive. 

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drawn  from  the  reports  is  that  there  is  a  significant  variety  of  licencing  approaches  and 
systems within the EU, and different types of licences and authorisations are issued at various 
stages. 

The  licensing  process  for  a  nuclear  installation  normally  includes  the  following  steps, 
depending  on  national 
legislation:  siting  and  site  evaluation,  design,  construction, 
commissioning,  operation,  decommissioning.  Member  States  choose  either  to  issue  licences 
corresponding to each step of the licensing process or to divide these steps into several sub-
steps  or  merge  several  steps  (e.g.  combined  licences  for  construction  and  operation). 
Conditions may be attached to the licences granted, requiring that the licensee obtains further, 
more specific, authorisations or approvals before carrying out particular activities. 

Concerning  the  authority  granting  the  licences,  the  regulatory  authority  is  generally 
empowered  to  make  regulatory  decisions  and  to  grant,  amend,  suspend  or  revoke  licences, 
conditions  or  authorisations,  as  appropriate.  In  a  few  cases,  the  licences  are  granted  by  the 
Government, based on a prior safety assessment performed by the regulator. 

2.1.5.  Regulatory control (Article 4, paragraph 1, letter (d)) 

Article 4(1) letter (d) requires that the national framework provides for a system of regulatory 
control of nuclear safety performed by the regulatory authority. 

Member States present their systems of review and assessment that take place before issuing a 
licence  (documentation  reviews),  once  the  licence  is  issued  and  then  throughout  operations 
(document-based reviews and on-site planned and unannounced inspections). Some Member 
States also refer to Periodic Safety Reviews (PSRs) in this context.  

In this respect,  the Member States  have put  in  place  various  mechanisms, for instance  legal 
requirements to carry out reviews/inspections at a specified frequency; formal procedures for 
carrying  out  inspections,  including  relevant  handbooks  and  guidelines;  a  medium-term 
strategy (for a few years) and a short-term inspection plan (for example annual), which should 
be regularly revised to take into account feedback from previous periods; systematic follow-
up  of  the  recommendations’  implementation;  focus  on  particularly  pertinent  topics,  such  as 
ageing management; cooperation with Technical Support Organisations (TSOs) and relevant 
expert organisations. 

2.1.6.  Regulatory enforcement (Article 4, paragraph 1, letter (e)) 

Article 4, paragraph 1, letter (e) of the Directive requires that the national framework provides 
for effective and proportionate enforcement actions, including, where appropriate, corrective 
action or suspension of operation and modification or revocation of a licence. 

The  Member  States  have  consistently  enacted  enforcement  provisions,  including  sanctions, 
into their legal frameworks. Such requirements are included in specific legislative acts, such 
as those governing inspection activities, in general administrative acts, criminal codes or other 
legislation  relative  to  criminal  offences  and,  in  some  cases,  in  the  regulatory  authorities’ 
management  systems  or  guidelines.  In  most  scenarios,  the  regulatory  authority  is  the  focal 
point  of  such  actions;  however,  interfaces  exist  between  the  regulator  and  other  law 

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enforcement  entities  within  the  overall  legal  system,  such  as  courts,  prosecution  agencies, 
other administrative and government bodies.  

Member States inform that enforcement actions can be taken both preventively or in response 
to  an  identified  breach.  In  the  event  of  an  emergency,  actions  can  be  taken  directly  by  the 
regulatory authority or its inspectors.  

Effective  enforcement  requires  an  adequate  system  of  sanctions  with  sufficient  deterrence 
potential.  As  far  as  sanctions  are  concerned,  most  Member  States  report  that  they  follow  a 
graded approach, depending on the severity of the breach. The possible sanctions range from 
issuing  a  warning,  to  requesting  modification,  suspension  or  revocation  of  a  licence,  and 
culminating to criminal sanctions in severe cases. In most cases, the national systems include 
a range of fines, which may be imposed either directly by the regulator, or by other relevant 
law  enforcement  bodies.  A  few  Member  States  provide  examples  of  enforcement  actions 
carried out, to demonstrate the effectiveness of the system in practice. 

2.1.7.  National framework improvement (Article 4, paragraph 2) 

Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Directive requires Member States to maintain and improve the 
national  framework,  taking  into  account  operating  experience,  insights  gained  from  safety 
analyses for operating nuclear installations,  development of technology and results of safety 
research. 

Most Member States  have affirmed their commitment  to  ensure continuous updates of their 
national nuclear safety-related framework and shared their experiences and approaches in this 
respect.  These  updates are typically  related to  changes  in  the EU/Euratom-level  framework; 
European  activities,  such  as  those  at  the  level  of  the  European  Nuclear  Safety  Regulators 
Group  (ENSREG)  or  the  Western  European  Nuclear  Regulators  Association  (WENRA); 
developments in international standards, particularly those issued by the International Atomic 
Energy  Agency  (IAEA);  results  of  international  reviews;  feedback  from  experience 
(inspections,  incidents,  accidents).  Reorganisations  of  the  national  administration  or 
exchanges with other national authorities could also determine modifications of the national 
framework. Some Member States report that they are assessing the needs for amendments on 
a  regular  (e.g.  annual)  basis  or  that  such  assessments  are  part  of  the  core  processes 
incorporated in the regulatory authority’s management systems. In some cases4, the need for 
such regular review is laid down in relevant legislation or is included in policy and planning 
documents. 

2.2. 

COMPETENT REGULATORY AUTHORITY (Article 5 of the Directive)  

2.2.1.  Regulatory independence 

2.2.1.1.  Functional  separation  and  absence  of  instructions  in  the  performance  of  the 

regulatory tasks (Article 5, paragraph 2, letter (a)) 

Article  5,  paragraph  2,  letter  (a)  of  the  Directive  requires  that  the  regulatory  authorities  are 
functionally  separate  from  any  other  body  or  organisation  concerned  with  the  promotion  or 

4  

For instance, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia. 

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utilisation of nuclear energy. They should not seek or take instructions from any such body or 
organisation  when  carrying  out  the  regulatory  tasks.  This  requirement  constitutes  a 
fundamental  condition  for  independent  regulatory  decision-making  that  is  free  from  undue 
influence.  

According to the national reports, all Member States have established a regulatory authority in 
the  field  of  nuclear  safety.  Typically,  Member  States  chose  to  establish  a  single  regulatory 
authority. However, in some Member States, there is not a single regulator at national level, 
but  a  system  of  authorities  sharing  the  key  regulatory  functions  (rulemaking,  licensing, 
assessment, inspection and enforcement), according to established internal arrangements. For 
instance, in some of these cases, the inspection-related tasks have been dissociated from the 
remaining responsibilities of the regulator and have been assigned to a separate authority. In 
the  case  of  federal  Member  States,  it  has  been  reported  that  functional  separation  is 
guaranteed  both  at  central  and  federal  state/provincial  level  by  means  of  legislation  and 
organisational measures. 

The legal  status  and structure of the  regulatory authorities  differ from one Member State to 
the other. Three main organisational schemes5 can be distinguished6 as described below:  

i.  Many  Member  States  have  established  regulatory  authorities  as  independent 
administrative authorities, completely separated in all aspects of their operation from 
any  other  government  body  or  organisation,  either  concerned  with  the  promotion  or 
utilisation  of  nuclear  energy  or  not.  These  regulatory  authorities  usually  have  their 
own legal personality, a certain  (usually high) degree of administrative and financial 
autonomy, and report and are accountable directly to the Member State’s Government, 
to the Prime Minister or both to the President and Government, without supervision by 
a  Minister.  Although  the  Directive  requires  that  the  regulatory  authorities  should  be 
functionally separate from bodies or organisations concerned with the promotion and 
utilisation  of  nuclear  energy  and  not  from  any  other  bodies  in  general,  the  Member 
States7  following  the  first  organisational  model  saw  the  added  value  of  having  an 
independent regulator, not only functionally but also legally distinct from other public 
or private entities. 

5  

6  

7  

This  categorisation  is  mostly  relevant  for  the  regulatory  authorities  of  Member  States  with  nuclear 
installations on their territory or plans to use  nuclear energy in the future. As for the Member States that 
have  neither  nuclear  installations  nor  any  plans  to  include  nuclear  in  their  energy  mix,  the  functional 
separation of these regulatory authorities is de facto ensured by the absence of any entities that promote or 
utilise  nuclear  energy.  Their  respective  regulatory  authorities  are  mostly  concerned  with  radiation 
protection issues and EP&R arrangements to address the consequences of accidents and incidents occurring 
in nuclear installations in other Member States. 

In recent years, it is noteworthy that in some Member States, reorganisations of their regulatory authorities 
have taken place, with the aim, inter alia, to strengthen the regulatory role and independence or to respond 
to  recommendations  arising  from  IAEA  Integrated  Regulatory  Review  Service  (IRRS)  missions.  This 
occurred,  for  instance,  in  Hungary  (2022),  Austria  (2020),  Croatia  (2019),  Portugal  (2018),  Italy  (2018), 
Netherlands (2017 and 2020). 

For  instance,  Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Ireland,  France,  Lithuania,  Malta,  Romania,  Slovakia,  Spain, 
Sweden, United Kingdom. 

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ii.  Many other Member States have opted for the establishment of regulatory authorities 
as  independent  administrative  authorities,  which  are  not  organisationally  part  of  a 
specific Ministry, but fall under its supervision. These Ministries neither promote nor 
utilise  nuclear  energy  and  are  typically  dealing  with  environmental/climate  matters, 
home  affairs/interior,  social  affairs  and  health,  education/research  etc.  Under  this 
setup,  the  regulatory  authorities  are  subject  to  varying  degrees  of  supervision  and 
control  of  their  activities  by  the  Ministries  in  question,  with  the  supervision  scheme 
usually consisting of a legality check of certain decisions taken by the regulators or in 
a broader monitoring of their activities. However, with a few exceptions, the Member 
States did not report extensively on the exact scope and nature of this supervision.  

iii.  Moreover, 

a 

in 

the 

few  Member  States, 

are 
Directorates/Departments or Units/Services of Ministries that are not  concerned with 
the promotion or utilisation of nuclear energy. In these cases, national legal provisions 
define  the  mandate  and  set  out  the  allocation  of  responsibilities  between  those 
Ministries  and/or  other  state  bodies,  so  that  there  is  a  clear  division  of  the  role  and 
responsibilities  of  each  government  entity  when  carrying  out  nuclear  safety-related 
functions. 

authorities 

regulatory 

When  regulators  take  the  form  of  independent  administrative  authorities  (models  i  and  ii), 
they  are  usually  led  by  management  boards  or  equivalent  bodies  with  extended  decision-
making  powers.  They  are  also  supported  by  internal  committees/expert  groups  of 
advisory/consultative  function,  which  usually  hold  significant  technical  and  scientific 
expertise.  

The requirement of functional separation does not exclude the existence of appropriate, well-
defined cooperation arrangements. In this sense, it has been reported by a few Member States 
that, where coordination is needed between state bodies with a role to play in nuclear-safety 
related  matters,  their  high-level  national  provisions  defining  the  mandates  of  these  different 
state bodies are complemented by documented arrangements, setting out in detail the specific 
allocation of responsibilities between them. Such complementary arrangements are conducive 
to  removing  uncertainties  and  ambiguities  and  thus  preventing  both  potential  gaps  and 
overlaps in the implementation of the regulators’ duties. 

Furthermore,  regulatory  authorities  may  also  cooperate,  where  appropriate,  with  external 
TSOs and/or external technical experts/consultants on issues within their competence in order 
to support their regulatory functions. Member States report that in these cases, the regulators 
maintain at  all times their effective independence and ownership of the  decisions made  and 
the measures taken. 

Generally, Member States  adhere to  the principle of not  seeking or taking instructions from 
any  other  body  or  organisation  (promoting  or  utilising  nuclear  energy)  deriving  from  their 
overall  regulatory  architecture  which  empowers 
their 
responsibilities in an independent manner, and functional separation. However, a few Member 
States8 have in place provisions explicitly stipulating the obligation. 

the  regulators 

to  discharge 

8  

For instance, Cyprus. 

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2.2.1.2.  Regulatory decisions founded on robust and transparent nuclear safety-related 

requirements (Article 5, paragraph 2, letter (b)) 

Article 5, paragraph 2, letter (b) of the Directive requires that the regulatory decisions must be 
based on clearly defined and transparent nuclear safety-related requirements and procedures. 
The objective is to ensure consistency and predictability in regulatory decision-making and to 
avoid subjectivity or the risk of subordination to undue external influence.  

Most  Member  States  report  on  general  legal  provisions  requiring  that  all  decisions  of  state 
bodies be duly justified, that new pieces of legislation be accompanied by impact assessment 
reports identifying the social, environmental or economic impact of the legislation, that some 
or  all  decisions  of  the  regulatory  authorities  can  be  contested  pursuant  to  established 
administrative procedures etc. 

The vast majority of Member States report that the decision-making, regulatory oversight and 
inspection of their regulatory authorities is based on policies and processes formalised in their 
management  systems  or  in  supervision  manuals/handbooks/guidelines.  Several  mechanisms 
to ensure the objectivity of the decision-making are described. For instance, in Member States 
whose regulatory authorities are overseen by collegiate management bodies, the decisions are 
taken  by  the  plenary,  which  in  principle  minimises  subjectivity  in  decision-making.  Many 
Member  States9  explained  that  they  consult  external  qualified  technical  experts  or  TSOs, 
local/regional  committees,  or  internal  technical  bodies  with  scientific  expertise  during  the 
decision-making procedure. Such arrangements ensure that decisions take account of the state 
of  the  art  scientific  and  technical  knowledge  and  involve  all  actors  who  can  provide  a 
meaningful and technically sound contribution to the process. 

As regards the requirement to base the regulatory decisions on “robust” nuclear safety-related 
requirements,  all  the  Member  States  report  that  they  abide  by  international  principles  and 
standards  and  by  EU/Euratom  legislation.  The  nuclear  safety-related  requirements  are 
reflected  in  high-level  national  legislation,  in  underlying  implementing  provisions  (decrees, 
regulations, ordinances etc.) as well as in technical documents based on scientific knowledge 
and  lessons  learned  from  operating  experience  (recommendations,  guidelines,  manuals, 
practical  arrangements  etc.)  These  documents,  together  with  the  licencing  terms  and 
conditions,  are  intended  to  provide  a  robust  and  detailed  basis  for  taking  objective  and 
consistent decisions, without the danger of being influenced by other outside factors.  

As regards the requirement to base the regulatory decisions on “transparent” nuclear safety-
related requirements, the Member States report  that  their nuclear safety legal  framework, as 
well as their most important regulatory decisions (especially those pertaining to licencing) and 
policy documents, are published. Some Member States extend the public right to information 
by  allowing  interested  parties/stakeholders  to  have  access  to  the  applicants’  licencing  files, 
while  a  few  countries  have  legislation  in  place  stipulating  that  all  documents  of  all  public 
authorities,  including  of  the  regulatory  authorities,  can  be  freely  accessed  by  citizens  upon 
request. 

9  

For instance, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Netherlands, Slovenia. 

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Transparency  in  regulatory  decision-making  is  ensured  through  various  means,  such  as  the 
states’ participation in relevant international instruments10, as well as through publication of 
the  licensing-related  procedures  and  information  on  the  regulators’  websites11  or  dedicated 
social  media  accounts;  press  releases;  press  events;  newsletters  issued  by  the  regulators; 
public announcements on the results of supervision activities; public consultations associated 
to  the  licensing  process  or  relating  to  draft  nuclear  safety  legislation;  meetings  with 
regional/municipal institutions, or with the general public as well as with other persons in the 
vicinity of the nuclear installations; annual activity reports submitted to the Government or to 
the supervising Minister etc.  

2.2.1.3.  Dedicated  and  appropriate  budget  allocations  and  responsibility  for  the 
implementation of the allocated budget (Article 5, paragraph 2, letter (c)) 

Article 5, paragraph 2, letter (c) of the Directive requires that the regulatory authority should 
have sufficient financial resources for the proper discharge of its assigned responsibilities and 
the responsibility for the implementation of the allocated budget.  

In  terms  of  financing  models,  two  main  approaches  were  identified.  In  the  first  model,  the 
financing of the regulatory authorities is based on a combination of financial allocations from 
the State budget  and fees collected from  licence holders or other revenues from  charges for 
services  such  as  technical  support  or  training.  Under  this  first  model,  the  fees  are  either 
directly paid to the regulators’ budget or they become part of the State budget, from which the 
regulators  are  subsequently  financed.  In  the  second  model,  the  financing  of  the  regulatory 
authorities relies on State budget allocations. The distribution of Member States between the 
two models is almost equal.  

On  the  financing  from  the  State  budget,  several  Member  States  describe  in  more  detail  the 
different stages of the procedure of allocating funds to the regulatory authorities. Generally, 
regulators’  involvement  is  mainly  in  the  initial  planning  phase  when  they  estimate  the 
amounts necessary for fulfilling their regulatory duties, and in the final implementation phase 
when they use the allotted resources. In the planning phase, the plans are typically drawn up 
on  an  annual  basis;  nevertheless,  certain  Member  States  inform  of  the  elaboration  of 
multiannual  plans12,  usually  with  a  three-year  perspective.  In  the  implementation  phase, 
several  Member  States  confirm 
in 
implementing  their  own  budget;  the  internal  distribution  of  funds  to  concrete  activities  is 
done, for example, through annual plans drawn up by the regulators. 

the  regulatory  authorities  are  autonomous 

that 

On the financing from fees, the Member States’ reporting indicates the types of activities for 
which fees are collected and the relevant legal instruments setting out calculation methods or, 

10   For example, the UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making 
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (“Aarhus Convention”), the Convention on Environmental 
Impact  Assessment  in  a  Transboundary  Context  (“Espoo  Convention”  and  its  amendment)  and  its 
associated Protocol (UNECE Kiev Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment to the Convention on 
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context). 

11    For instance, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, 

Slovenia, Slovakia. 

12   For instance, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Lithuania. 

9 

 
 
                                                 
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in some cases, fixing the amounts of the fees. In some cases, financing from fees and other 
services represents the main share of the regulatory authorities’ budget. 

An  important  aspect  is  ensuring  that  the  budget  available  to  the  regulators  is  adequate.  The 
majority  of  Member  States  rely  on  the  general  budgetary  procedures.  Only  a  few  Member 
States13 have adopted specific legal requirements imposing that the financing of the regulatory 
authorities  should  be  adequate.  Some  Member  States14  also  have  supporting  internal 
regulatory procedures detailing the regulators’ budgetary process.  

Several Member States inform that they can request additional resources, in case new tasks or 
unforeseen  circumstances  arise.  In  this  respect,  a  number  of  countries15  refer  to  the 
submission of annual reports to the national Governments or Parliaments, where they inform 
on  the  budget  implementation  and  use  the  opportunity  to  highlight  future  –  at  times 
supplementary  -  financial  needs.  Besides  the  aforementioned  annual  reports  which  can 
contain financial projections, some Member States point out other methods, such as levying 
special  fees  from  the  licensees16,  setting  out  state mechanisms,  usually  in  the  framework  of 
the state budget procedure, to ensure a flexible response to such situations17, using the system 
of  multiannual  planning  or  rebalancing  funds  among  activities18,  appealing  to  the  state 
reserve19 or even allocating some non-limited credits for covering exceptional situations20. 

The  expenditure  of  the  budget  allocated  is,  as  some  Member  States  report,  monitored 
permanently  though  key  performance  indicators21,  annual  reports,  or  audits  conducted  by 
relevant  state  offices.  Transparency  is  ensured  through  the  publication  of  these  reports  or 
audit conclusions22.  

To  illustrate  their  national  approaches,  the  majority  of  Member  States  offer  precise  recent 
figures on the regulators’ budgets, sometimes split among the various regulatory activities; in 
several cases, these figures show an increase of the financial resources, throughout the period 
covering, usually, the preceding two to three years. 

In  a  number  of  instances,  Member  States  include  express  statements  concluding  that  the 
current financial resources are adequate to allow the performance of the regulatory duties. The 
Member  States  do  not  report  difficulties  with  respect  to  the  adequacy  of  the  regulatory 

13   For instance, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania. 

14   For instance, Germany, Netherlands. 

15   For instance, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Sweden. 

16   For instance, Belgium. 

17   For instance, Cyprus, Denmark, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia. 

18   For instance, Poland, Slovenia. 

19   For instance, Poland. 

20   For instance, Luxembourg. 

21   For instance, Cyprus. 

22   For instance, Spain. 

10 

 
 
                                                 
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budget.  Nevertheless,  several  IRRS  mission  results  or  information  contained  in  regulators’ 
annual  reports  highlight  that  additional  work  is  needed  to  ensure  adequate  financing  of 
regulatory activities. 

2.2.1.4.  Appropriate human resources in terms of numbers and qualifications (Article 5, 

paragraph 2, letter (d)) 

Article  5,  paragraph  2,  letter  (d)  of  the  Directive  requires  that  the  regulatory  authorities 
employ an appropriate number of staff with qualifications, experience and expertise necessary 
to  fulfil  their  obligations.  The  Directive  also  refers  to  the  possibility  of  using  external 
scientific and technical resources and expertise in support of the regulatory functions.  

The  Member  States  inform  of  the  regulatory  authorities’  human  resources,  in  line  with  two 
criteria - numbers and qualifications. 

Concerning  the  first  criterion  of  staff  numbers,  several  Member  States  refer  to  the 
applicability of the general public administration rules for civil servants setting out the overall 
national  staffing  policies;  in  some  cases,  the  general  framework  establishes  the  number  of 
civil servants posts.  

The  regulators  typically  play  a  key  role  in  evaluating  their  own  staffing  needs.  This 
systematic approach is  carried out through planning (which, usually, feeds into the financial 
needs’ planning), both  on an annual  basis  and on a multi-annual  basis (typically  covering a 
three-year  period),  complemented  by  other  operational  plans  or  by  ongoing  evaluations  of 
staffing levels. These planning strategies allow the authorities to estimate their needs, looking 
at possible changing workloads due to supplementary tasks and activities23.  

Concerning the second criterion of staff qualifications, the reports indicate, on the one hand, 
the situation at the time of recruitment, and, on the other hand, the post-recruitment situation, 
when  the  staff  benefits  from  training  both  at  the  entry  into  service,  and,  subsequently,  on  a 
continuous basis, throughout the entire professional activity.  

The majority of the Member States report that they have recruitment criteria for the staff to be 
employed  in  the  regulatory  authorities,  consisting  essentially  of  educational,  expertise  and 
professional  experience  criteria.  In  this  respect,  it  was  reported  that  expert  positions  in  the 
areas  of  nuclear  safety  and  radiological  protection  are  mainly  occupied  by  highly  qualified 
persons, with higher education degrees, and with significant specialisations and professional 
experience in the relevant domains.  

After  recruitment,  the  regulators’  new  staff  undergo  initial  induction  training  programmes. 
Furthermore, throughout their career, the staff  follow regular specialised  training,  as part of 
the  employer’s  in-house  programmes.  This  is  supplemented  by  participation  in  outside 
courses organised by national  universities or research institutes, by  international  institutions 
such as the  IAEA, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development /  Nuclear 
Energy Agency (OECD/NEA), EU and by taking part in practical exercises particularly in the 
area  of  EP&R  or  by  learning  from  operational  and  regulatory  experience  feedback;  several 

23   For instance, Germany. 

11 

 
 
                                                 
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Member  States24  informed  that  informatics  tools  and  e-learning  training  modules  are  also 
used. Cooperation arrangements  with  various institutions or counterparts are in  place. Some 
Member States offered more detailed information with respect to the specific training offered 
to the nuclear inspectors. 

Several  Member  States  indicate  that  the  regulatory  authorities  are  supported  by  external 
expertise or have the possibility of taking advantage of such advice, whenever needed. This 
advice  is  provided,  on  the  one  hand,  by  entities  such  as  scientific  councils,  committees, 
institutes  or  TSOs  that  are  specifically  established  with  the  aim  of  advising  the  regulators, 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  by  outside  experts  or  consultants  for  specific  projects.  Certain 
Member  States25  indicate  that  the  regulators  require  high  levels  of  technical  and  scientific 
qualifications  from  these  external  experts,  and  that,  in  some  cases,  they  define  in  their 
procedures  the  scope  and  functions  of  this  support.  On  occasion,  the  preservation  of 
regulatory independence and autonomous decision-making when using external expertise was 
expressly affirmed. 

In  terms  of  reflecting  the  requirement  of  having  adequate  human  resources,  the  situation  is 
similar to the one of the appropriate financial resources. The majority of Member States rely 
on  the  general  State  legislation  applicable  to  all  civil  servants,  while  only  a  few  Member 
States enacted dedicated legal requirements, specifying the need for adequate regulatory staff 
in terms of numbers and qualifications26. Some Member States complement these general or 
specific requirements with internal regulatory procedures27. 

The  majority  of  the  Member  States  offer  concrete  details  of  the  number  of  personnel 
employed, structured according to various criteria such as type of contracts, main regulatory 
duties or divisions of the organisational chart. Some Member States inform of increases in the 
number of employees or of the approval of new posts, which have been / are in the process of 
being  filled  through  recruitment  or  mobility  solutions.  However,  there  were  also  reports  on 
staff  reductions  due  to  the  national  policy  of  no  further  development  of  the  nuclear 
programme. 

Overall,  a  number  of  Member  States  report  that  the  current  numbers  of  personnel  are 
sufficient  to  carry  out  the  regulatory  duties.  However,  several  Member  States  consider  that 
maintaining  appropriate  staffing  is  a  permanent  challenge  and  underline  difficulties  in 
attracting and keeping sufficient and/or qualified staff; in some cases, this shortage is covered 
by resorting to external expertise. Similar challenges are confirmed by IRRS reports or annual 
reports produced by the regulators. 

24   For instance, Slovakia. 

25   For instance, Belgium, Bulgaria. 

26   For instance, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania. 

27    For instance, Germany, Netherlands. 

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2.2.1.5.  Provision  for  the  prevention  and  resolution  of  conflicts  of  interest  (Article  5, 

paragraph 2, letter (e)) 

Article 5, paragraph 2, letter (e) of the Directive requires that the regulatory authorities should 
establish  procedures  for  the  prevention  and  resolution  of  any  conflicts  of  interest.  The 
Directive’s preamble identifies two cases where special attention should be given, namely the 
rotation of staff with executive responsibility between the nuclear industry and the regulators, 
and the situation of organisations that provide the competent regulatory authority with advice 
or services. 

The  Member  States  inform  of  their  national  frameworks  governing  the  topic  of  conflicts  of 
interest,  typically  structured  as  a  ‘pyramid’  with  two  interconnected  levels.  The  first  level 
comprises  general  legally  binding  legislation,  applicable  to  all  civil  servants,  including 
therefore the majority of the regulatory authorities’ staff. Such framework provisions are laid 
down in legal instruments setting out overall rules on the conduct of civil servants and in legal 
instruments drawing up national anti-corruption rules. The second level supplements the first 
with  specific  requirements,  tailored  to  the  regulators’  concrete  responsibilities,  tasks, 
activities and relations  with  other actors from the nuclear sector. Such  rules are included in 
sector-specific legally binding nuclear energy-related legislation28 and/or in codes of ethics or 
internal procedures adopted by the regulatory authorities and binding on their own personnel29 
or in contractual relations binding on the parties. 

Based  on  the  aforementioned  national  frameworks,  the  Member  States  describe  various 
mechanisms  to  prevent  conflicts  of  interest  of  the  regulatory  authorities’  staff,  covering 
various employment stages. Such mechanisms include submitting declarations of income and 
interests  upon  recruitment  and  periodically  thereafter30;  adhering  to  the  internal  codes  of 
ethics  and procedures  established by the  regulators; prohibiting participation in  decisions or 
activities  where  the  staff  member  or  a  related  party  has  a  private  interest;  prohibiting 
exploitation  of  the  regulatory  position  for  private  interests;  prohibiting  receipt  of  unlawful 
profits or benefits from the performance of the regulatory activities; prohibiting holding office 
in  political  entities;  prohibiting  membership  of  the  management  or  supervisory  bodies  of 
commercial entities, including licensees (n.b. in some case, exceptions are possible when the 
person  is  nominated  by  the  appointing  authority  and  is  representing  the  State,  potentially 
creating  ambiguity  with  regard  to  regulatory  independence);  restricting  performing  other 
gainful activities, subject to conditions and exceptions, for example, for research or teaching 
activities;  verifying  continuously  the  conflicts  of  interest  situations,  for  instance,  through 
annual  interviews  or  justifications  of  the  performed  services;  imposing  confidentiality 
obligations; ensuring that decision-making undergoes several approval stages. Some Member 
States  also  inform  on  the  existence  of  independent  State  entities  dealing  with  conflicts  of 
interests of civil servants. Transparency measures are also reported by several Member States, 
such as publishing the declarations of interests. 

28   For instance, Belgium, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Spain. 

29   For instance, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Netherlands, 

Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden. 

30   For instance, Bulgaria, Greece, Ireland, Lithuania, Romania. 

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As regards the resolution of conflicts of interest, several Member States require the concerned 
employees  to  abstain  from  the  participation  in  the  related  regulatory  decision  or  procedure; 
other Member States require the staff member who is aware of a potential conflict or even in 
doubt, to immediately notify the employer  - usually, these notifications are addressed to the 
line managers or other hierarchical superiors; some Member States inform of the possibility to 
exclude  the  concerned  individual  from  the  relevant  procedures  and  ensure  adequate 
substitution.  

Several  Member  States31  mention  that  the  regulators  provide  training  of  personnel  on  the 
applicable conflict of interest prevention and resolution rules.  

In terms of follow-up, a range of Member States inform of disciplinary measures applicable in 
case  the  rules  relating  to  conflicts  of  interest  are  not  respected,  culminating  with  dismissal, 
and of the possibility to appeal against the decisions of the regulatory authorities. 

To prevent the rotation of staff with executive responsibility between the nuclear industry and 
the  regulators  (both  directions),  several  Member  States  inform  of  “cooling-off”  periods, 
limiting  employability  applicable  either  at  the  entry  into  service  (if  the  person  seeking 
employment  with  the  regulator  had  previously  worked  in  an  entity  supervised  by  the 
regulator)  or  upon  leaving  employment  (if  the  former  employee  of  the  regulator  intends  to 
subsequently work in an entity supervised by the regulator). In some cases, such restrictions 
apply  to  all  civil  servants  of  the  regulatory  authority32,  while,  in  other  cases,  they  refer 
expressly  to  the  persons  exercising  positions  with  executive  responsibility33.  In  all 
circumstances, precise time periods are defined. In addition, during the performance of their 
duties,  the  persons  with  executive  responsibility  are  subject  to  general  rules  relating  to 
conflict  of  interest.  Some  Member  States  have  specific  provisions  in  place,  for  example 
prohibitions of ‘outside’ employment, participation in decision-making or use of information, 
which  are  adapted  to  the  characteristics  of  these  types  of  functions.  A  few  Member  States 
clearly  define  the  procedures34  for  appointment,  suspension  and  dismissal  of  the  regulatory 
personnel  with  executive  responsibilities,  which  has  the  advantage  of  strengthening  legal 
certainty, predictability and protecting against discretionary staff changes.  

As  a  particular  case,  several  Member  States  report  also  on  the  measures  taken  for  nuclear 
safety  inspectors.  Examples  include  prohibiting  an  inspector  to  inspect  the  same  licence 
holder  more  than  twice  in  a  row;  defining  dedicated  ethics  rules;  imposing  stricter 
requirements concerning the declarations of interests; ensuring the rotation of the responsible 
coordinating inspector.   

To prevent potential conflicts of interest for organisations providing the regulatory authorities 
with  advice  or  services,  a  number  of  Member  States  present  their  measures,  which  include 
prohibiting  the  appointment  of  representatives  of  licence  holders  as  members  of  advisory 

31   For instance, Bulgaria, Estonia, France. 

32   For instance, Finland, Hungary, Lithuania. 

33   For instance, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania. 

34   For instance, Spain, Netherlands. 

14 

 
 
                                                 
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bodies35;  adopting  regulatory  guidance  detailing  the  rules  applicable  in  case  of  recourse  to 
external  expertise36;  defining  clear  selection  requirements;  requiring  declaration  of  interests 
both  before  and  after  the  start  of  the  assignment37;  imposing  adherence  to  the  applicable 
impartiality  and  ethics  rules,  in  some  cases  through  contractual  stipulations38;  applying 
general  procurement  rules  and  developing  implementing  guidelines  at  the  regulator’s  level; 
prohibiting  experts  who  had  already  participated  in  preparing  documentation  for  a  licence 
holder to take part in reviewing or evaluating the same issue39. The ultimate responsibility of 
the regulatory authority for the decisions taken was affirmed on several occasions. 

2.2.1.6.  Provision  of  nuclear  safety-related  information  without  clearance  (Article  5, 

paragraph 2, letter (f)) 

Article 5, paragraph 2, letter (f) of the Directive requires the regulatory authorities to provide 
safety-related information to the public, media or other governmental bodies, without review 
or  clearance  from  any  other  body  or  organisation  (including  other  public  authorities).  This 
provision is intrinsically linked to Article 8 on transparency as regards the information to be 
provided by the regulatory authorities on nuclear installations' normal operating conditions as 
well as in the case of incidents and accidents. 

All  Member  States  report  that  they  have  put  in  place  mechanisms  for  the  dissemination  of 
nuclear safety-related information by their regulatory authorities, including the publication of 
safety-relevant  documents  on  the  website  of  the  regulators;  press  releases  and  conferences; 
media events; newsletters; news flashes; reports; information about the PSRs; public on-site 
meetings; campaigns; surveys; arrangements for answering citizens’ enquiries etc. 

According to Member States’ reports, the absence of ‘clearance’ from any other State bodies 
when  disseminating  such  information  is  in  most  cases  not  expressly  stipulated  in  national 
legislation, but it can be inferred from the institutional setup and the specific tasks assigned to 
the  regulatory  authorities,  which  include  communication  activities  in  their  areas  of 
competence.  

2.2.2.   Regulatory  powers  and  tasks  (Article  5,  paragraph  3  –  in  connection  with 

Article 4, paragraph 1) 

Article  5,  paragraph  3  of  the  Directive  requires  that  the  regulatory  authorities  should  be 
entrusted  with  the  necessary  legal  powers  for  the  proper  discharge  of  their  assigned 
responsibilities. It also defines the main regulatory tasks - proposing, defining or participating 
in  the  definition  of  national  nuclear  safety  requirements;  ensuring  the  licence  holder’s 
compliance  with  these  requirements  and  the  terms  of  the  relevant  licence;  verify  such 
compliance through regulatory assessments and inspections; proposing or carry out effective 
and proportionate enforcement actions. 

35   For instance, Bulgaria. 

36   For instance, France. 

37   For instance, Finland, Lithuania, Sweden. 

38   For instance, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Spain. 

39   For instance, Lithuania. 

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As  regards  Article  5,  paragraph  3,  letter  (a)  of  the  Directive,  the  Member  States’  reports 
illustrate that regulators are closely involved in the definition of nuclear safety requirements 
and  are  responsible  for  laying  down  licencing  conditions.  Member  States  are  free  to  decide 
how  these  requirements  are  adopted  and  applied,  in  line  with  Article  4,  paragraph  1,  last 
sentence of the Directive.  

More  specifically,  the  reports  indicate  that  the  regulatory  authorities  are  competent  for  the 
preparation  of  nuclear  safety  requirements  that  take  into  account  operating  experience, 
insights  gained  from  safety  analyses  of  operating  nuclear  installations,  development  of 
technology  and  results  of  safety  research.  These  requirements  may  take  different  forms 
depending  on  the  institutional  arrangements  in  each  Member  State,  the  regulators’  status 
within  this  setup  and  the  respective  law-making  procedure.  In  principle,  primary  legislation 
(laws) is drafted by the regulatory authority itself and then adopted by the Parliament, with or 
without the intermediate approval/control by the supervising government entity (in case there 
is  one).  Alternatively,  the  regulatory  authority  may  be  consulted  during  the  legal  drafting 
procedure, which is initiated and carried out by the relevant Ministry.  

As  far  as  the  establishment  of  secondary  nuclear  safety-related  legislation  is  concerned 
(decrees,  regulations,  ordinances,  decisions  etc.),  this  is  usually  drafted  by  the  regulatory 
authorities  and  approved  by  the  corresponding  supervising  government  entities  or,  less 
frequently, it can be drafted and adopted by the regulators themselves.   

Where regulatory authorities play a major role is in the adoption of documents of a technical 
nature  interpreting  and  implementing  the  existing  nuclear  safety  higher  level  requirements 
(such  as 
recommendations, 
instructions,  circulars,  technical  standards  etc.)  and  pertaining  to  the  different  operational 
aspects of the regulatory process.  

regulatory  decisions,  guidelines,  manuals,  handbooks, 

At  the  same  time,  regulators  are  frequently  consulted  during  the  drafting  of  legislation 
touching  upon  nuclear  safety-related  issues,  for  which  other  State  bodies  are  primarily 
responsible and hold the right of legislative initiative. An example would be the establishment 
of  radiation  protection-related  provisions  on  EP&R  arrangements  by  civil  protection 
authorities. 

As regards Article 5, paragraph 3, letter (b) of the Directive, the regulator has to require that 
the licence holder complies with the safety requirements and demonstrates such compliance. 
All  Member  States  report  that,  based  on  their  national  legal  framework,  licence  holders  are 
bound by the nuclear safety legislation in force and by the terms/conditions of their licences. 
Compliance  with  the  safety  requirements  is  demonstrated  through  the  assessment  of 
documentation  that  is  required  to  be  attached  to  a  licence  application,  through  safety 
assessments  and  safety  reports.  The  Member  States’  legislation  refers  to  safety  analysis 
reports  corresponding  to  the  different  stages  of  the  lifecycle  of  a  nuclear  installation  and  to 
PSRs,  during  which  the  licence  holders,  under  the  supervision  of  the  regulatory  authorities, 
systematically and periodically reassess the nuclear safety of the nuclear installation, at least 
once every ten years. 

As regards Article 5, paragraph 3, letter (c) of the Directive, which is intrinsically linked to 
letter  (b)  thereof,  supervision  by  the  regulatory  authorities  is  essentially  carried  out  on  the 
basis of the analysis and evaluation of documents submitted by the licence holders and of the 
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information collected during inspections. Regulatory review is ensured by means of planned, 
unannounced,  and  special/reactive  inspections,  which  could  be  triggered  by  incidents, 
exceptional  situations  of  intervention  in  the  event  of  radiological  emergencies,  safety 
concerns etc. 

In many Member States, these inspections are carried out in line with established inspection 
plans, inspection manuals, or concrete rules included in the  regulators’ management system, 
usually following relevant ISO standards. The regulatory authorities usually follow a graded 
approach  as  regards  the  frequency  of  supervision  and  inspections,  which  is  based  on  the 
safety  significance  or  hazard  potential  of  the  nuclear  installation  in  question.  Regulatory 
authorities also opt for resident inspectors on site in specific nuclear installations for the daily 
monitoring of activities and of compliance with the established requirements. Inspections are 
concluded with a final report summarising the relevant findings.  

As  regards  Article  5,  paragraph  3,  letter  (d)  of  the  Directive,  Member  States  report  that  the 
regulatory  enforcement  decisions  are  made  by  inspectors,  based  on  their  professional 
experience and judgment and, in some occasions, taking account of the advice received from 
external  experts  participating  in  the  inspection,  such  as  TSOs  or  independent  technical 
experts. 

There is  a large variety of enforcement actions, which are  consistently used by the Member 
States;  these  consist  of  issuing  official  warnings,  ordering  provisional  measures,  imposing 
corrective technical or administrative modifications to the installation, ordering the cessation 
of its operation, the amendment or revocation of a licence, imposing administrative fines or 
even penal sanctions etc. It has been reported in a few Member States that there is an appeal 
procedure against enforcement actions. 

In  light  of  the  Directive’s  stipulation  that  the  enforcement  actions  must  be  "effective  and 
proportionate",  many  Member  States  report  to  be  applying  a  “graded”  approach  in  their 
enforcement policy, implying the application of enforcement actions that are commensurate to 
the nature, duration, severity of the detected infringement. 

2.3. 

EXPERTISE AND SKILLS IN NUCLEAR SAFETY (Article 7 of the Directive) 

Article  7  of  the  Directive  requires  all  parties  to  make  arrangements  for  the  education  and 
training  for  their  staff  having  responsibilities  related  to  the  nuclear  safety  of  nuclear 
installations  so  as  to  obtain,  maintain  and  to  further  develop  expertise  and  skills  in  nuclear 
safety and on-site emergency preparedness. 

Typically, the Member States inform of their requirements, both of a legally binding nature, 
and non-legally binding guidance containing more detailed provisions. 

The  education  and  training  programmes  are  generally  implemented  through  annual  training 
plans,  medium  and  long-term  strategies  and  the  identification  of  needs.  They  include  both 
theoretical and practical exercises. 

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The regulatory authorities and the licence holders ensure that all personnel performing safety-
related duties, including contractors40, are adequately trained and qualified. The qualifications 
are  regularly  reviewed,  in  some  Member  States  every  two  to  five  years.  Performance 
interviews during the year support the identification of the development needs.  

Some  regulators  implement  a  policy  of  skills  and  knowledge  transfer  by  more  experienced 
workers to newer employees to ensure continuity at the level of the organisation and preserve 
experience and established good practice. The recruitment of young professionals joining the 
regulatory authority is based on education requirements being met; this includes in particular 
nuclear safety officers and inspectors, and radiation protection experts. 

An important issue highlighted by Member States is the ageing of the nuclear workforce and 
the  need  to  retain  knowledge  and  expertise,  including  in  the  field  of  decommissioning. 
Solutions  imply,  for  instance,  the  establishment  of  a  ‘national  nuclear  knowledge 
management  programme’  in  co-operation  with  relevant  stakeholders41,  the  development  of 
dedicated university courses42, the preparation of ‘needs assessments’ involving the relevant 
actors43.  In  addition,  there  are  a  number  of  relevant  initiatives  at  EU  level,  such  as  the 
European Human Resources Observatory for the Nuclear Sector (EHRO-N). 

2.4.  

TRANSPARENCY (Article 8 of the Directive)  

2.4.1.   Provision of nuclear safety-related information (Article 8, paragraphs 1 and 2) 

Article  8  of  the  Directive  lays  down  the  obligation  of  providing  information  in  relation  to 
normal operating conditions of nuclear installations, as well as providing prompt information 
in case of incidents and accidents. In the first case, information is to be provided to workers 
and  the  general  public,  with  specific  consideration  to  local  authorities,  population  and 
stakeholders in  the vicinity of a nuclear installation;  in  the latter case, competent  regulatory 
authorities  of  other  Member  States  in  the  vicinity  of  a  nuclear  installation  are  also  to  be 
informed. The obligation to provide information rests on both the regulatory authority and on 
the licence holder. 

In  most  cases,  legal  provisions  defining  the  tasks  of  the  regulatory  authority  include  the 
obligation  to  disseminate  information  on  the  nuclear  safety  of  nuclear  installations  and  its 
regulation. The regulators are also bound by general legislation on the right to free access to 
information and legislation on access to information on environmental aspects.  

As  regards  the  regulatory  authorities,  the  communication  practices  identified  include 
establishing  a  communication  policy  document  for  the  regulatory  authority44;  publishing 
annual reports and results of regular inspection reports on the website45; making information 

40   For instance, Italy, Slovakia. 

41   For instance, the Netherlands. 

42   For instance, Finland. 

43   For instance, Germany. 

44   For instance, Hungary. 

45   For instance, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic. 

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on  the  website  available  in  more  than  one  language46;  integrating  social  media  into  the 
communication channels;  maintaining contacts  with the press and  organising workshops for 
journalists;  establishing  special  websites  following  major  events,  such  as  the  Fukushima 
accident47; offering opportunities to provide feedback and ask questions; establishing bodies 
for information, consultation and debate on the risk associated with nuclear activities48. 

As regards the licence holders, in some cases the Member States’ reports provide examples of 
interactions with the public similar to those of the regulators, such as opening and maintaining 
visitor  centres49;  distributing  printed  information  magazines  and  brochures;  setting  up 
consultative  bodies  to  reinforce  the  relations  with  local  residents50;  organising  meetings  at 
schools and universities; organising site visits, thematic events and open days.  

Concerning  communication  in  case  of  incidents  or  accidents,  the  reports  present  various 
solutions,  usually  integrated  within  the  EP&R  framework,  and  in  many  cases  involving 
different  national  entities  responsible  for  civil  protection  and  crisis  management  activities. 
Some Member States provide examples of initiatives, such as an educational film intended for 
the population of the municipality with the aim of raising awareness of the procedures in the 
event of a nuclear accident at the plant or implementing a system for informing the public via 
SMS51. 

As far as international cooperation is concerned, Member States frequently make reference to 
the  Convention  on  Early  Notification  of  a  Nuclear  Accident  and  the  Convention  on 
Assistance  in  the  Case  of  a  Nuclear  Accident  or  Radiological  Emergency  (as  well  as  the 
IAEA USIE52 and RANET53 systems), as well as to the EU systems (ECURIE, EURDEP)54. 
Regional  initiatives  are  also  mentioned;  for  instance,  the  shared  joint  agreement  between 
Nordic  Competent  Authorities,  referred  to  as  ‘Nordic  Manual’,  which  is  an  implementation 
agreement  of  a  commonly  agreed  protection  strategy  (‘Nordic  Flagbook’).  Bilateral 
agreements are also commonly in place between neighbouring countries. 

Some  Member  States  refer  to  their  legislation  introducing  the  principle  of  public  access  to 
official  documents  and  some  provide  examples  of  grounds  for  refusal  or  restriction  of 
provision of information to the public. Such grounds include, for instance, physical protection 
of radioactive materials, industrial ownership or classified information. 

46   For instance, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France. 

47   For instance, Czech Republic. 

48   For instance, France. 

49   For instance, Netherlands, Slovenia, Slovakia. 

50   For instance, Slovakia. 

51   For instance, Czech Republic. 

52  

53  

IAEA Unified System for Information Exchange in Incidents and Emergencies (USIE). 

IAEA Response and Assistance Network. 

54   European Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange (ECURIE), European Radiological Data 

Exchange Platform (EURDEP). 

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2.4.2.  Cooperation  between  regulatory  authorities  (Article  8,  paragraph  3  –  in 

connection with Article 5, paragraph 2) 

Article  8,  paragraph  3  of  the  Directive  introduces  the  requirement  that  the  regulatory 
authorities engage in cooperation activities on the nuclear safety of nuclear installations with 
counterparts of other Member States in the vicinity of a nuclear installation, inter alia, via the 
exchange and/or sharing of information.  

Most Member States report having in place provisions in their legal framework laying down 
the general cooperation obligation of their regulator with similar authorities of neighbouring 
(or  other)  Member  States.  They  complement  this  information  with  a  detailed  list  of  the 
specific  bilateral  and  multilateral  agreements  that  they  have  entered  into  and  specify  the 
modalities of how this cooperation is implemented in practice.  

According  to  the  national  reports,  Member  States  are  signatories  to  international  nuclear 
safety  treaties  (such  as  the  Convention  on  Nuclear  Safety,  the  Convention  on  Early 
Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear 
Accident  or  Radiological  Emergency)  and  have  participated  in  the  ConvEx  exercises  under 
the IAEA auspices. At the same time, they are members, where relevant, of the various EU 
(e.g. ECURIE, EURDEP) and international accident management and reporting systems (e.g. 
USIE, RANET,  IRS, EPRIMS)55. They also  regularly take part in various fora and working 
platforms  of  the  EU,  IAEA,  OECD,  Heads  of  the  European  Radiological  Protection 
Competent Authorities (HERCA) and WENRA, where national experts meet their peers and 
share information and expertise.  

Member States’ regulatory authorities also take part in bilateral and multilateral meetings with 
neighbouring  countries  based  on  bilateral  agreements,  to  share  information  and  experience. 
Among some Member States with common borders, there is continuous exchange of technical 
data,  with  the  aim  of  informing  and  answering  the  questions  of  residents  and/or  local  and 
national  representatives56.  In  some  cases  there  is  also  exchange  of  information  on  the 
licensing processes of nuclear installations (or on modifications thereof) that are in progress 
and are of interest to neighbouring Member States57.  
There  are  also  some  cases  of  Member  States58  that  have  adopted  arrangements  with  both 
neighbouring  and  non-neighbouring  countries,  located  within  and  outside  EU,  using  similar 
NPP technology. 

Other  collaborative  activities  between  regulators,  which  go  beyond  the  pure  exchange  of 
information,  include  joint  inspections59,  mutual  training,  exchange  of  personnel,  cross-

55  

IAEA  Unified  System  for  Information  Exchange  in  Incidents  and  Emergencies  (USIE),  IAEA  Response 
and Assistance Network (RANET), IAEA Incident Reporting System (IRS), Emergency Preparedness and 
Response Information Management System (EPRIMS). 

56   For instance, between Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. 

57   For instance, between Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway. 

58   For  instance,  countries  operating  or  intending  to  operate  “Water-Water  Energetic  Reactors”  (‘VVER’), 
such  as  Finland  and  Hungary;  countries  intending  to  operate  “European  Pressurized  Water  Reactors” 
(“EPR), such as France and Finland; and countries operating CANDU reactors (Romania). 

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participation  of  experts  in  national  emergency  plan  exercises,  joint  commissions  and  expert 
groups with neighbouring Member States. 

2.4.3. Public participation in the decision-making on the licensing of nuclear installations 

(Article 8, paragraph 4) 

Article  8,  paragraph  4  of  the  Directive  reflects  the  need  to  ensure  that  the  general  public  is 
given  the  appropriate  opportunity  to  participate  effectively  in  the  decision-making  process 
related to the licensing of nuclear installations. 

All Member States with nuclear installations have procedures in place to consult the public on 
the  main  phases  of  the  licensing  of  a  nuclear  installation  (siting,  construction  and 
decommissioning).  However,  differences  exist  in  cases  where  additional  consultations  can 
also relevantly be organised. Hence, some Member States report on consultations conducted 
when  important  changes  in  the  operation  of  the  nuclear  installations  are  envisaged  (e.g. 
service life extension of the reactor, steam generator replacement and power uprates). 

To  implement  the  Directive’s  obligation,  most  Member  States  couple,  to  a  varying  degree, 
their consultation processes with the information and consultation obligations laid down in the 
international  environmental  legislation  such  as  the  Espoo60  or  Aarhus61  Conventions  or  the 
EU environmental acquis, such as the Environment Impact Assessment Directive62. Pursuant 
to  this  framework,  Member  States  have  the  obligation  to  consult  their  population  and  other 
States  potentially  affected,  on  any  project  that  may  have  significant  adverse  effects  on  the 
environment;  this  includes,  as  appropriate,  projects  to  construct  nuclear  installations  or 
associated  major  changes  or  extensions  to  them.  Although  the  environmental  consultations 
may include relevant information available and obtained through risk assessments pursuant to 
the  nuclear  safety  legislation,  such  as  measures  envisaged  to  prevent  or  mitigate  the 
significant adverse effects of major accidents / disasters on the environment and details of the 
preparedness for and proposed response to such emergencies, there is a lack of clarity whether 
such  consultation  mechanism  address  all  relevant  nuclear  safety-significant  factors.  Only  a 
few Member States report having in place specific nuclear safety consultation processes63.  

Several  consultation  practices  were  identified,  including  early  announcements  of  the 
consultation process in the press and dedicated websites; detailing the consultation modalities 
e.g.  scope  of  the  decision  at  stake,  availability  of  documents,  deadlines;  making  available 
non-technical summaries to facilitate a good understanding by the public at large; organising 
public  hearings;  involving  independent  expert  panels  which  participate  to  the  public 
debates64;  consulting  and  exchanging  information  through  the  local  information  committees 

59   For instance, between Belgium and the Netherlands. 

60   Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context. 

61   Convention  on  Access  to  Information,  Public  Participation  in  Decision-making  and  Access  to  Justice  in 

Environmental Matters. 

62   Directive  2011/92/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  13  December  2011  on  the 

assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, as amended. 

63   For instance, France, Hungary. 

64   For instance, Denmark. 

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established by the licensees in accordance with the legal requirements65; giving opportunities 
for appeals on the decision taken. 

III. 

SAFETY  OF  NUCLEAR  INSTALLATIONS  (Articles  6,  8a  –  8d  of  the 
Directive) 

3.1. 

LICENCE HOLDERS (Article 6 of the Directive)  

3.1.1.  Licence holder’s prime responsibility for nuclear safety (Article 6, letter (a)) 

Article 6, letter (a) of the Directive assigns the licence holders the prime responsibility for the 
nuclear  safety  of  a  nuclear  installation,  which  cannot  be  delegated.  This  includes 
responsibility  for  the  activities  of  contractors  and  sub-contractors  whose  activities  might 
affect the nuclear safety of a nuclear installation. 

In  general,  the  Member  States  with  nuclear  installations  lay  down  legal  provisions 
acknowledging  the  prime  responsibility  of  the  licence  holder  for  nuclear  safety;  in  some 
cases,  this  is  complemented  by  an  express  prohibition  of  the  delegation  of  responsibility. 
However, with  some exceptions66, Member States provided less detailed information  on the 
implementation of the licensees’ responsibility as regards the activity of contractors and sub-
contractors. Furthermore, in some cases, reference was made to the connected area of liability 
for damage caused by nuclear installation (nuclear liability). 

3.1.2.   Licence  holders’  safety  assessments  (demonstrations  of  safety  in  support  of  a 
licence application and regular safety assessments) (Article 6, letters (b) and (c)) 

When applying for  a licence, the  applicant  is  required to  submit a demonstration of  nuclear 
safety  whose  scope  and  detail  is  appropriate  to  the  potential  magnitude  and  nature  of  the 
hazard  of  the  nuclear  installation  and  the  site.  Furthermore,  licence  holders  are  required  to 
regularly  assess,  verify,  and  continuously  improve,  as  far  as  reasonably  practicable,  the 
nuclear  safety  of  their  nuclear  installations  in  a  systematic  and  verifiable  manner.  This 
includes  measures  for  the  prevention  of  accidents  and  mitigation  of  the  consequences  of 
accidents, including verification of the defence-in-depth provisions. 

The Member States report that the licensing steps for a nuclear installation typically involve 
site  evaluation,  design,  construction,  commissioning,  operation,  and 
siting  and 
decommissioning. Each of these steps requires the submission of a suitable site evaluation or 
safety  report,  detailing  the  site  characteristics,  and  design  and  safety  features  for  regulatory 
evaluation.  Those  countries  with  NPPs  in  operation  or  under  decommissioning  describe  in 
detail  the  processes  and  requirements  for  licensing  to  ensure  adequate  safety  demonstration 
throughout the life of the installation. Most countries specify legally binding requirements in 
regulations,  but  others  have  a  non-prescriptive  system  based  on  guidelines  setting  out  the 
regulatory expectations. 

The  national  requirements,  regulations  and  guidelines  generally  define  the  type  of  safety 
demonstration  in  terms  of  the  credible  faults,  hazards,  design  safety  criteria,  applicable 

65   For instance, France. 

66   For instance, Spain, Slovakia. 

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standards,  risk  limitation  to  workers  and  the  public,  and  plant  conditions  to  keep  within  an 
acceptable operating envelope for relevant processes, activities, and modifications. For NPPs, 
these are typically based on the IAEA safety standards and WENRA safety reference levels. 

The  safety  demonstration  is  intended  to  show  how  the  defence-in-depth  principle  has  been 
applied, and that operational limits for normal operation, abnormal operation and design basis 
accidents would not be exceeded. Deterministic and probabilistic safety assessments methods 
are  typically  used  to  analyse  internal  and  external  hazards  and  initiating  events  that  could 
trigger  accident  sequences,  and  to  demonstrate  the  capability  of  safety  systems,  and  the 
measures  available  to  mitigate  accident  consequences.  The  safety  demonstration  for  NPPs 
aims to show that the design has sufficient robustness to allow shutdown and cooling of the 
reactor from any operating state, and that the safety functions in related facilities such as the 
spent fuel storage facility would be maintained. Safety demonstrations are generally updated 
in line with operating experience, new safety analysis, research findings, plant ageing and the 
outcome of PSRs. 

Analyses  are  also  undertaken  for  more  severe  faults  outside  of  the  design  basis,  including 
severe  accidents  which  could  lead  to  large  releases  of  radioactivity.  The  safety  analyses 
include potential failures of the physical barriers to the release of radioactivity, the magnitude 
and  characteristics  of  the  releases,  the  determination  of  accident  management  strategies  to 
reduce  the  risk,  as  well  as  the  necessary  instrumentation,  equipment,  and  accident 
management  guidelines  needed  to  cope  with  such  accidents.  In  some  Member  States, 
numerical targets of the deterministic and probabilistic criteria are applied to demonstrate that 
radiological hazards are being adequately controlled and risks reduced to as low as reasonably 
practicable.  In many  countries, in line with  current  IAEA standards and  WENRA  guidance, 
the  severe  accident  analyses  aim  to  show  that  potential  severe  accident  states  have  been 
‘practically eliminated’, i.e. it is physically impossible for the accident state to occur or that it 
can be considered to be extremely unlikely with a high degree of confidence.  

Member States describe various activities conducted by licensees and regulators to verify that 
measures  are  in  place  for  the  prevention  and  mitigation  of  accidents,  and  the  application  of 
defence-in-depth  measures,  including  reviews,  inspections  and  control  activities.  Regulators 
may engage independent external experts for specialist analysis and reviews. Some countries 
report  that  the  results  of  reviews  and  inspections  carried  out  by  the  regulatory  authority  are 
documented  and  made  available  to  the  public  (e.g.  information  on  the  PSRs  or  the  actions 
envisaged  by  the  licensees67).  Safety  indicators  and  event  analysis  are  used  to  assess 
operational safety. Operating experience from events reported at European and international 
level (IAEA, OECD/NEA) is also taken into account.  

The  reports  describe  that  structures,  systems  and  components  of  relevance  to  nuclear  safety 
are required to be designed, manufactured, assembled, and tested so as to ensure their reliable 
functioning.  Licensees  are  required  to  ensure  that  the  manufacturers  and  suppliers  of  safety 
classified equipment, materials and accessories provide quality documentation  on the results 
of quality checks and tests of properties of components, equipment, and materials.  

67   For instance, Belgium. 

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3.1.3.  Licence holders’ financial and human resources (Article 6, letter (f))  

All Member States have requirements in place to ensure the availability of adequate financial 
resources  for  the  licence  holders,  with  several  countries  reporting  that  the  requirement  to 
demonstrate  this  aspect  is  already  part  of  the  initial  licence  application.  The  regulator  may 
assess  the  financial  resources  of  the  licence  holder  during  the  licence  application,  or 
assistance  is  sought  from  the  appropriate  ministry  (concerning  financial  resources  when 
issuing a licence for the first time).  

Several States report that they require that the financial resources of the licensee should cover 
all stages of the lifecycle of a nuclear installation68, including final costs of decommissioning 
and remediation and should also enable it to cope with a wide range of reasonably foreseeable 
economic risks69.  

While, generally, the Member States have requirements in place, albeit diverse in nature, their 
level  of  detail  of  reporting  on  implementation  varies.  Various  solutions  exist  to  assess  the 
level  of  the  licensees’  financial  resources.  These  include  annual  and  longer-term  business 
/investment plans70; the review of the licensee’s investment projects  related to safety by the 
regulator71; requirements for regulatory authorisation in case of changes that may impact the 
licensee’s financial resources, such as changes of ownership or corporate structure72; use of a 
risk-based  approach  to  examine  the  level  of  liquidity  and  solvency  of  the  licence  holder  to 
operate the installation safely73; regulatory inspections covering the financial situation etc. In 
some Member States, there may not be an explicit review of on-going availability of financial 
resources by the regulator, but rather the review is carried out indirectly through supervision 
of  how  the  licence  holders  fulfil  their  safety  obligations74.  Ultimately,  there  may  be  the 
possibility to revoke a licence if the financial security is deemed inadequate75. 

As  with  financial  resources,  Member  States  have  requirements  in  place  to  ensure  the 
provision  of  adequate  human  resources,  which  may  also  be  addressed  as  part  to  the  initial 
licencing  process.  The  licence  holder  is  normally  required  to  have  an  adequate  number  of 
qualified  personnel  suitable  for  their  tasks,  under  different  operating  conditions.  Significant 
functions  with  respect  to  safety  within  NPPs  are  designated,  and  the  competences  of  the 
persons working in such positions are verified.  

Detailed guidance exists in some Member States for qualifications and proficiency (tests) of 
staff,  including  for  specific  shift  operator  functions  in  NPPs;  these  can  be  laid  down  in 

68   For instance, France, Slovenia. 

69   For instance, France. 

70   For instance, Bulgaria, Slovenia. 

71   For instance, Bulgaria. 

72   For instance, Germany. 

73   For instance, Netherlands. 

74   For instance, Sweden, United Kingdom. 

75   For instance, Germany. 

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separate  procedures,  but  also  in  the  Safety  Assessment  Report  (SAR)  or  PSRs  for  the 
installation76  or other documents  required  for licencing77. The regulator reviews compliance 
with the guidance. The licence holder must demonstrate the provision of a sufficient number 
of  qualified  personnel  for  the  operation  of  its  nuclear  installation  on  a  permanent  basis. 
Organisational and substantial changes in the organisation need to be also evaluated78. 

As  for  financial  resources,  human  resources  are  reviewed  by  the  regulators,  for  instance 
though  annual  meetings  of  the  regulator  with  senior  management  of  the  licence  holder  or 
through the regulator’s inspection programmes. 

Licence  holders  generally  have  the  obligation  to  set  out  the  requirements  on  financial  and 
human  resources,  placed  on  contractors.  These  may  be  part  of  the  licensee’s  management 
system79. Contractors are often required to have a certified quality management programme. 
The  requirements  on  contractors  may  be  extended  to  suppliers  and  both  contractors  and 
suppliers may be subject to oversight by the regulator80. 

3.2. 

NUCLEAR SAFETY  OBJECTIVE FOR NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS  AND 
THE  IMPLEMENTATION  OF  THE  OBJECTIVE  (Article  8a  and  8b  of  the 
Directive) 

Article  8a  of  the  Directive  requires  that  that  nuclear  installations  be  designed,  sited, 
constructed,  commissioned,  operated  and  decommissioned  with  the  objective  of  preventing 
accidents  and,  should  an  accident  occur,  mitigating  its  consequences  and  avoiding  early 
radioactive releases and large radioactive releases. Whilst the objective applies fully to ‘new’ 
installations (those receiving a construction licence for the first time after 14 August 2014), it 
is  also  to  be  used  as  a  reference  for  existing  installations  for  the  timely  implementation  of 
reasonably  practicable  safety  improvements81.  The  requirements  of  Article  8a  represent  an 
essential  first  step  to  reflect  the  important  lessons  of  the  Fukushima  nuclear  accident  on 
accident  prevention,  mitigation,  protection  of  the  containment  boundary  and  minimising 
effects on the population and surroundings. 

3.2.1  Overview of the implementation of the nuclear safety objective at national level 

The  majority  of  Member  States  opted  to  reflect  the  nuclear  safety  objective  by  using,  in 
legally  binding  instruments,  similar  wording  to  the  Directive.  In  addition,  some  Member 
States  supported  these  high-level  requirements  by  implementing  regulations  and  regulatory 
guidance, interpreting or quantifying the terms, or laying down regulatory criteria or licence 
conditions for the demonstration of the requirements82. For example, in one Member State83, 

76   For instance, Belgium. 

77   For instance, Spain. 

78   For instance, Finland, Romania. 

79   For instance, Bulgaria. 

80   For instance, Hungary, Romania. 

81   A  similar  objective  for  new  NPPs  is  formulated  in  the  principles  of  the  Vienna  Declaration  for  Nuclear 

Safety 

82   For instance, Belgium, Finland, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Slovakia 

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the  regulator  has  issued  more  detailed  recommendations  on  demonstrating  the  practical 
achievement  of  the  objective;  this  is  realised  through  quantitative  criteria  in  terms  of  the 
magnitude and probability of an early or large release that would require off-site emergency 
measures  without  sufficient  time  to  implement  them,  or  which  would  require  protective 
measures  that  cannot  be  limited  in  space  or  time.  Probabilistic  dose  targets  for  accident 
sequences are further specified.  

Several  Member  States  indicate  that  they  have  incorporated  in  their  regulations  or  guides 
safety objectives for new NPPs, similar to those established by WENRA, which explicitly call 
for the practical elimination of “accidents with core melt which would lead to early or large 
releases”84. The practical elimination objectives, which are also expressed in the latest IAEA 
safety standards85, apply to new NPPs, whereas for deferred and existing plants they should 
be used as a reference for identifying reasonably practicable safety improvements. Use of the 
practical elimination concept is particularly evident in those Member States that are pursuing 
the construction of new NPPs.  

3.2.2. 

Interpretation of the different terms and concepts of the nuclear safety objective 

Following  adoption  of  the  Directive,  the  European  Commission  facilitated  exchanges 
amongst national authorities with a view to promoting an ambitious interpretation of the high-
level  requirements  in  Article  8a.  The  outcomes  of  this  work  show  that  the  underlying 
concepts  are  still  evolving.  Several  terms,  such  as  ‘early  radioactive  releases’  and  ‘large 
radioactive  releases’  do  not  have  precise  definitions  in  existing  European  and  international 
standards.  Based  on  qualitative  supporting  guidance,  there  is  scope  to  develop  the 
implementation  approaches  in  a  more  quantitative  way.  Even  though  some  countries  have 
defined  quantitative  radiological  acceptance  criteria  corresponding  to  large  releases86,  and 
others addressed both large and early releases87, there is not a consistent approach regarding 
quantification of this concept.  

Besides the above views on quantification of the terms ‘early’ and ‘large’ radioactive releases, 
there  are  other  differences  in  the  Member  States’  approaches.  For  instance,  some  Member 
States  rely  on  much  earlier  versions  of  the  concept,  which  primarily  addressed  early  large 
releases. Some consider that accident sequences (or events, or accidents) that lead to early or 
large  releases  should  be  avoided  or  practically  eliminated,  whilst  others  apply  this  notion 
directly to early and large releases. 

83   Romania. 

84   For instance, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Slovenia, United Kingdom 

85  

IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR-2/1 (Rev. 1), Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design Specific 
Safety Requirements, 2016. 

86   For instance, Finland, Sweden. 

87   For instance, Hungary. 

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3.2.3.  Application of the nuclear safety objective to new nuclear installations 

In  those  countries  pursuing  the  construction  of  new  NPPs,  according  to  the  Member  States 
concerned, the designs of new reactors have robust design features to protect against extreme 
hazards in order to prevent severe accidents and mitigate their consequences. 

3.2.4.  Application of the nuclear safety objective to existing nuclear installations 

In  relation  to  operating  NPPs,  Member  States  indicate  that  practical  safety  improvements 
have  been  identified  and  implemented.  The  safety  upgrades  to  existing  installations  refer  to 
increased protection and mitigation measures against severe accidents, and typically include:  

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

Passive autocatalytic hydrogen recombiners;  

Water make-up to ensure in-vessel core cooling; 

Filtered containment venting systems to preserve containment function; 

Mobile diesel generators to ensure the power supply in case of station blackout; 

Improved  instrumentation  for  monitoring  safety  parameters  in  severe  accident 
situations. 

Many Member States indicate that safety upgrades are systematically identified in the scope 
of  the  ten-year  PSR,  and  that,  in  addition,  the  post-Fukushima  EU  Stress  Tests  yielded 
additional  insights  that  led  to  implementation  of  improvements  in  the  resistance  to  external 
hazards  (seismic  hazards,  flooding,  severe  weather),  loss  of  safety  systems,  and  severe 
accident  management88.  Another  Member  State  developed  guidance  for  the  design  of  new 
pressurised water reactors, in line with the provisions of the Directive, whilst indicating that 
its recommendations may also be used as a reference to seek safety improvements to reactors 
in operation, for example during periodic safety reviews89. 

3.2.5.  Development of the ‘reasonably practicable’ concept 

On  the  implementation  of  the  ‘reasonably  practicable’  safety  improvements  to  existing 
nuclear  installations,  none  of  the  reporting  countries  provide  further  information  on  their 
rationale  and  regulatory  expectations  related  to  such  improvements.  Some  countries  explain 
that  it  is  not  possible  to  formulate  comprehensive  and  unambiguous  criteria,  and  these 
improvements and their timeliness have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.  

However,  the  lack  of  clearly  defined  criteria  or  regulatory  expectations  risks  to  result  in 
diverse  implementation  approaches  for  similar  safety  challenges.  Experience  from  the  EU 
Stress Tests showed that even for similar reactor technologies, some licensees of NPPs have 
only recently adopted specific safety improvements associated with containment integrity or 
the avoidance of large releases through the implementation of passive autocatalytic combiners 

88   For  instance,  Belgium,  Czech  Republic,  Germany,  Hungary,  Netherlands,  Slovenia,  Slovakia,  Spain, 

Sweden, United Kingdom. 

89   France, ‘Design of pressurized water reactors - Guide Nr 22’, 18/07/2017 (INIS-FR--17-0820). 

27 

 
 
                                                 
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or  filtered  containment  venting,  whereas  other  countries  already  had  installed  them  several 
decades ago in response to accidents and operating experience90.  

Several ways of tackling the implementation of these issues are reported. As an example, the 
regulatory framework of a Member State91 requires taking into account the state of the art in 
science and technology in implementing the safety objective for existing installations. This is 
a  challenging  requirement  but  could  be  considered  as  the  basis  of  a  methodology  of 
technical  advances  and  risk 
determining  reasonable  practicality, 
acceptability  factors.  Some  regulators92  report  that  they  follow  closely  the  events  and  the 
international  operational  experience  feedback,  as  well  as  the  scientific  and  technological 
development  through  international  contacts  and  research  programmes  to  be  able  to  evaluate 
the aspects of reasonable practicability and timeliness of the improvements.  

taking  account  of 

3.2.6. 

Implementation  of  the  nuclear  safety  objective  through  defence-in-depth 
measures 

Article 8b, paragraph 1 requires that the principle of defence-in-depth, which consists of the 
implementation  of  successive  and  sufficiently  independent  levels  of  defence,  is  applied. 
Defence-in-depth is applied to minimise the impact of extreme external and unintended man-
made hazards; prevent abnormal operation and failures; control abnormal operation and detect 
failures;  control  accidents  within  the  design-basis;  control  severe  conditions,  including 
prevention  of  accident  progression  and  mitigation  of  the  consequences  of  severe  accidents; 
and establish on-site emergency response organisational structures. 

According  to  Member  States’  reports,  defence-in-depth  remains  a  fundamental  and  well-
established  concept  both  in  the  regulations  and  in  actual  practices,  applied  equally  to  both 
new  and  existing  installations.  These  are  implemented  to  prevent  and  detect  incidents; 
implement measures to prevent incidents leading to accidents; control accidents that could not 
be  avoided  or,  failing  that,  limit  their  worsening;  and  manage  accident  situations  that  could 
not  be  contained  so  as  to  limit  the  consequences.  According  to  these  reports,  many  safety 
improvements had already been performed prior to the formal reinforcement of  the defence-
in-depth concept in the Directive93. 

Member States report that the implementation of this principle is based, in particular, on the 
choice  of  a  suitable  site,  taking  into  account,  in  particular,  the  risks  of  natural  or  industrial 
origin  affecting  the  installation;  a  prudent  design  approach,  involving  adequate  safety 
margins; and using adequate physical redundancy, diversification and physical separation of 
the  important  elements  for  protection  that  perform  the  safety  functions  necessary  for  the 
demonstration of nuclear safety. In order to  achieve a high level of reliability and to ensure 
the necessary functions, measures are applied to ensure the quality of the design, construction, 

90   For instance, Sweden. 

91   For instance, Germany. 

92   For instance, Finland. 

93   For  instance,  Belgium,  Czech  Republic,  Germany,  Hungary,  Netherlands,  Slovenia,  Slovakia,  Spain, 

Sweden, United Kingdom. 

28 

 
 
                                                 
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operation,  shutdown,  decommissioning,  maintenance  and  monitoring  of  the  installations,  as 
well  as  the  management  of  possible  incident  and  accident  situations.  Furthermore,  the 
function  of  containment  of  radioactive  substances  is  ensured  by  the  use  of  one  or  more 
sufficiently independent successive barriers between those substances and the population and 
the  environment  and,  if  necessary,  by  a  dynamic  containment  system.  The  number  and 
effectiveness  of  such  arrangements  are  proportionate  to  the  scale  and  impact  of  potential 
radioactive releases, including in the event of an incident or accident.  

Within  the defence-in-depth  principle, the concept  of “design extension  conditions” (DECs) 
has  been  developed  to  reflect  more  challenging  events  than  those  considered  in  the  design 
basis  as  an  integral  part  of  the  safety  approach.  The  DEC  concept  has  as  its  goal  a 
comprehensive consideration of events associated with safety objectives whose achievement 
is expected to be demonstrated. Member States have progressively incorporated the concept 
into their national requirements, but provided less detail on its demonstration in practice.  

3.2.7. 

Implementation of the nuclear safety objective through safety culture  

Together  with  defence-in-depth,  an  effective  nuclear  safety  culture  is  regarded  as  a 
fundamental  factor  in  achieving  a  high  level  of  nuclear  safety  and  its  continuous 
improvement.  The  Directive  provides,  pursuant  to  Article  8b,  paragraph  2,  that  Member 
States should ensure that the national framework requires that the regulatory authority and the 
licence  holder  “take  measures  to  promote  and  enhance  an  effective  nuclear  safety  culture”. 
Important  elements  which  help  to  achieve  a  strong  nuclear  safety  culture  include,  in 
particular,  effective  management  systems,  appropriate  education  and 
training  and 
arrangements  by  the  licence  holder  to  register,  evaluate  and  document  internal  and  external 
safety significant operating experience and effective resolution of issues that have been raised. 

The  Member  States  concerned  by  reporting,  structured  their  explanations,  in  principle,  in 
accordance with the four safety culture elements laid down in the Directive.  

3.2.7.1.  Management systems 

The Member States indicate, generally, two types of instruments laying down safety culture 
rules. The first level consists of nuclear safety legislation setting the framework by clarifying 
the entities concerned by the requirement to develop management systems or by defining key 
principles,  requisites  and  features  of  a  safety  culture  architecture.  The  second  level  is  more 
detailed and is composed of a comprehensive suite of internal policy statements, procedures, 
guidelines,  action  plans,  roadmaps,  supplemented  by  other  tools  like  record-keeping  and 
reporting databases, training, publications or reports. Generally, safety culture is documented, 
as presented above. However, particularly in respect  to the regulators, a few Member States 
express the view that management systems do not need to be formalised, as they result from 
practical application or from international reviews. 

The  information  on  management  systems  refers,  in  the  majority  of  cases,  to  both  licence 
holders  and  regulatory  authorities,  while,  in  some  cases,  the  information  focusses  on  the 
measures taken at the licensee level (on which regulators have a supervisory role).  

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Overall,  priority  to  nuclear  safety  appears  to  be  an  underlying  principle,  which  is  either 
expressly  affirmed  in  the  various  documents  or  it  results  from  the  entire  safety  culture 
philosophy. 

The  management  systems  comprise,  usually,  two  main  categories  of  measures.  The  first 
category  addresses  aspects  related  to  shared  attitudes,  norms,  beliefs  and  values  of  all 
employees fostering a strong safety culture. Such measures include clear reporting lines and 
communication  channels;  adherence  to  agreed  rules  and  procedure;  personal  accountability 
for nuclear safety; contribution to the continuous improvement of safety; systematic decision-
making  feedback  on  the  work  results;  incentives  for  performance;  continuous  learning. 
Certain Member States emphasise the role of managers as leaders and models demonstrating 
commitment  to  safety  in  their  decisions  and  behaviours94.  In  this  framework,  there  are  also 
elements supporting a “questioning attitude” of the staff members, such as freely expressing 
opinions  and  positions;  identifying  non-compliance  issues;  reporting  them  to  the  line 
managers  or  other  levels  of  the  hierarchy  without  restrictions;  proposing  correcting  actions. 
The  second  category  comprises  procedural  requirements  defining  the  workflows  of  the 
licensee’s activities and their regulatory review95.  

Safety  culture is  usually subject  to  monitoring and evaluation.  Several  tools  were indicated, 
combining regular internal and external scrutiny. The internal level comprises, typically, self-
assessments,  surveys,  questionnaires,  internal  audits  or  management  reviews;  in  the  case  of 
licensees, a number of Member States confirm that contractors and suppliers are required to 
abide by the same rules, and are thus also covered by such assessments96. Under the external 
level,  generally,  regulatory  authorities  evaluate  the  licensees’  safety  culture  measures  by 
collecting  and  analysing  observations  from  inspections,  documentation,  events  and  other 
interactions or using indicators to assess trends; this is followed by feed-back and discussions 
with the licensees. Additionally, several Member States inform of assessments conducted by 
outside assessors or by international bodies as part of a peer review, such as the IAEA IRRS 
or OSART missions or during events discussing country-specific traits.  

Several Member States emphasise the role of international guidance, such as from WENRA, 
IAEA,  OECD/NEA  or  US  NRC,  in  supporting  them  to  develop  the  safety  culture 
requirements,  particularly  the  management  systems.  A  range  of  Member  States  refer  to 
training on safety culture matters offered to the employees97. 

3.2.7.2.  Arrangements on significant operating experience  

Overall,  Member  States  report  that  licence  holders  have  in  place  operational  feedback 
programmes and processes covering several elements, namely the collection, record keeping, 
analysis  and  documentation  of  operating  experience  (both  internal  and  external),  the 
detection,  notification  and  distribution  of  relevant  information,  and  the  continuous 

94   For instance, Lithuania. 

95   For instance, Austria, Denmark. 

96   For instance, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary. 

97   For instance, Czech Republic, Finland, Lithuania. 

30 

 
 
                                                 
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improvement of the mechanism. Several Member States set out processes of verification and 
use  of  the  records,  typically  by  the  regulatory  authorities,  at  the  time  of  inspection  or 
reporting.  International  cooperation  is  a  major  component,  with  several  arrangements  of 
experience sharing and exchange being quoted, such as the IRS (Incident Reporting System), 
WANO networks or the JRC Clearinghouse. 

3.2.7.3.  Reporting of safety significant events 

Generally, Member States mention that licence holders put in place procedures defining and 
documenting the detection, reporting and follow-up of events. Some of the measures include 
definition of criteria for reportable events; guidance for using the INES scale; event detection 
and  description;  methods  to  analyse  events;  rules  on  use,  storage  and  dissemination  of 
information;  procedures  and  clear  deadlines  for  reporting  to  the  regulatory  authorities  (and 
other relevant authorities, if necessary); guides on the types of remedial measures; monitoring 
the implementation of measures; evaluation of operational events feedback effectiveness and 
trends;  sharing  information  between  each  other.  The  regulators  have  an  oversight  role,  by 
inspecting  the  progress  of  the  events  management  and  the  sufficiency  of  the  remedial 
measures  taken,  keeping  their  own  records  of  events  or  looking  for  possible  associated 
generic issues98. Certain Member States inform of transparency measures, where information 
on events is included in annual reports or published on their websites. 

3.2.7.4.  Education and training 

The relevant information is  included in the Member States’ reporting under Article 7 of the 
Directive.  

Progress with the post-Fukushima EU Stress Tests implementation 

Following the EU Stress Tests after the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant accident on 
11  March  2011,  each  participating  country  prepared  its  National  Action  Plan  (NAcP).  In 
addition to the European Union Member States, Switzerland and Ukraine participated in this 
activity. 

Most significant safety improvements include e.g.: 

•            Installing  means  for  managing  severe  accidents  (including  containment  pressure 
control and hydrogen management), 

•            Installing additional means for heat removal functions, 

•            Installing additional means for ensuring emergency power. 

Two workshops were held in 2013 and 2015 to review progress on the National Action Plans, 
and the requirement to update the action plans was agreed by ENSREG and was subsequently 
included in the ENSREG work programme. Participating Member States committed to update 
their NAcPs in 2017 to publish updates every 2 years, starting from 2017, until completion of 
their  respective  NAcPs.  Those  Member  States  that  had  not  yet  reported  completion  of  their 
National  Action  Plans,  submitted  either  their  latest  update  at  the  end  of  2021.  ENSREG 
should adopt its “Post-Fukushima NAcP – Status Report” in 2022. 

98   For instance, Finland. 

31 

 
 
                                                 
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In  general,  countries  have  shown  that  most  of  their  actions  have  been  implemented  as 
planned.  However,  several  countries  reported  delays  compared  to  the  original  plans,  and  in 
the 2021 update a few actions may not be completed before the end of 2022. Several Member 
States  have  not  yet  reported  the  completion  of  their  post-Fukushima  National  Action  Plans. 
Some  of  the  open  actions  concern  significant  safety  improvements,  e.g.  emergency  control 
centre,  additional  cooling  measures,  maintaining  containment  integrity,  emergency  power 
supply, seismic reinforcement, or spent fuel storage facility. 

3.3.  

INITIAL  ASSESSMENT AND  PERIODIC SAFETY REVIEWS (Article 8c of 
the Directive) 

Article 8c of the Directive requires that any issue of a licence to construct or operate a nuclear 
installation, is based upon an appropriate site and installation-specific assessment, comprising 
a nuclear safety demonstration with respect to the national nuclear safety requirements based 
on the nuclear safety objective. Furthermore, the licence holder, under the regulatory control 
of  the  regulatory  authority,  is  required  to  re-assesses  systematically  and  regularly,  at  least 
every  10  years,  the  safety  of  the  nuclear  installation  to  ensure  compliance  with  the  current 
design basis and to identify further safety improvements by taking into account ageing issues, 
operational  experience,  most  recent  research  results  and  developments  in  international 
standards, using as a reference the nuclear safety objective. 

3.3.1. 

Initial assessment 

Member  States  have  in  place  detailed  licensing  procedures  for  nuclear  installations  that 
typically  require  the  applicant  to  provide  an  initial  safety  analysis  report  or  safety 
demonstration for the siting and design, a preliminary analysis report for the construction, and 
an operational safety analysis report for commissioning and operation.  

The national  regulations typically specify the nature of  the supporting documents  needed to 
justify  the  safety  features  related  to  the  project,  especially  in  respect  of  external  natural  or 
industrial hazards. The installation-specific assessment aims to confirm that the impacts and 
the  loads  on  structures,  systems  and  components  resulting  from  external  events,  internal 
events and realistic combinations of events are taken into account in the design basis and that 
defence-in-depth  is  implemented.  In  addition  to  deterministic  event  analysis  to  demonstrate 
that the most frequently expected events lead to minimal consequences, probabilistic analysis 
is also required to verify the effectiveness of the design against infrequent hazards and their 
combinations.  

3.3.2.  Periodic Safety Reviews 

PSRs  are  of  fundamental  importance  to  nuclear  safety,  and  applicable  to  all  nuclear 
installations.  These  reviews  contribute  to  achieving  the  nuclear  safety  objective  in  existing 
installations and often have an important role in the decision-making process for Long Term 
Operation (LTO)99.  

99   For instance, Bulgaria. 

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All  Member  States  with  nuclear  installations  require  PSRs  every  10  years  to  continuously 
improve the nuclear safety for all operating  and  decommissioning nuclear installations. The 
aim  is  to  update  the  assessment  of  the  risks,  taking  into  account  the  current  conditions, 
operational  experience  from  within  the  country  and  abroad,  research  results,  and  the 
developments in international nuclear safety standards. The review includes a verification of 
the  compliance  of  the  installation  with  the  design  basis  including  an  assessment  of  ageing 
issues, and potential further safety improvements in line with current regulations. The licensee 
reports the review findings with the measures it intends to take to remedy any deficiencies or 
improvement actions to the regulatory authority, who may impose additional requirements. 

To  illustrate  the  actions  carried  out  as  part  of  the  reviews,  some  Member  States  provide 
examples,  such  as  the  seismic  upgrade  of  the  reactor  building  to  take  account  of  the  latest 
seismic  standards100,  renovation  of  the  instruments  and  control  systems,  the  provision  of 
additional  cooling  means,  and  improvements  in  fire  protection101.  Measures  to  increase  the 
robustness  of  NPPs  following  the  EU  Stress  Tests  are  also  cited.  Challenges  are  also 
mentioned  including  the  management  of  ageing  of  materials  and  equipment  reaching  their 
design  life,  the  reassessment  of  safety  taking  into  account  the  enhanced  requirements 
applicable to new reactors. 

A few Member States quote requirements or guidelines requiring licensees to perform  PSRs 
following  a  methodology  based  on  the  14  safety  factors  described  in  the  IAEA  Safety 
Guides102  and  the  WENRA  reference  levels.  Despite  its  importance  for  safety  reassessment 
and  improvement,  overall,  Member  States  provide  few  details  on  the  PSR’s  scope, 
methodologies,  and  effectiveness,  as  well  as  on  how  the  nuclear  safety  objective  is 
systematically used in the PSRs as a reference to identify safety improvements, including in 
the  context  of  LTO.  Few  States  report  on  measures  taken  at  other  installations,  such  as 
research reactors. 

3.4. 

ON-SITE  EMERGENCY  PREPAREDNESS  AND  RESPONSE  (Article  6(e) 
and 8d of the Directive) 

Article 6(e) required licence holders to provide for appropriate on-site emergency procedures 
and  arrangements,  including  severe  accident  management  guidelines,  for  responding 
effectively to  accidents  in  order to  prevent  or mitigate their consequences.  Article 8d of the 
Directive  requires  that  an  organisational  structure  for  on-site  EP&R  should  be  established 
with  a  clear  allocation  of  responsibilities  and  coordination  between  the  licence  holders,  and 
competent authorities and organisations, taking into account all phases of an emergency; there 
should be consistency and continuity between the on-site and the off-site components of the 
EP&R arrangements.  

3.4.1.  Licence holders’ on-site emergency procedures and arrangements 

All Members States with nuclear installations confirm that licence holders comply with their 
obligation  to  put  in  place  on-site  EP&R  procedures  and  arrangements  by  referring  to  legal 

100   For instance, France. 

101   For instance, France. 

102   NS-G-2.10 superseded by SSG-25. 

33 

 
 
                                                 
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requirements  supported  by  regulatory  guidelines.  No  references  to  international  peer-review 
missions addressing this topic, such as the IAEA Emergency Preparedness Review (EPREV) 
or IRRS missions were mentioned in the reports.  

When  establishing  and  further  improving  their  EP&R  arrangements,  States  report  that  the 
licensees’  on-site  procedures  are  developed  under  the  supervision  of  the  regulatory 
authorities, based on international relevant standards (IAEA, WENRA) and regular exercises. 
Member  States  report  that  these  procedures  cover  all  operating  modes  and  severe  accidents 
occurrences.  

Even though this was a major finding from the Fukushima nuclear accident, not all Member 
States  with  nuclear  installations  reported  that  they  addressed  explicitly  situations  affecting 
several  units  simultaneously.  As  an  exception,  one  Member  State103  explicitly  refers  to 
licensee’s capability of dealing with simultaneous emergencies at all reactor units on a single 
site  over  a  minimum  period  of  one  week.  Other  Member  States  report  on  specific 
arrangements such as additional capacities and equipment to cope with extreme natural events 
leading to station blackout and/or loss of cooling. Those capacities are present on site and/or 
are part of mobile external intervention resources104 that can reach quickly the affected units. 

The testing of the EP&R arrangements takes an important place in the reporting. Usually, they 
are  reviewed  and  tested  on  a  yearly  basis  by  the  licensee,  under  the  supervision  of  the 
regulatory  authorities.  Larger exercises  combining on-site and off-site  aspects,  performed  at 
national  level,  sometimes  involving  neighbouring  countries,  are  carried  out  typically  once 
every three years. This allows the participation of all actors, at local and national level, and to 
test  the  consistency  of  procedures.  Based  on  the  lessons  learned,  improvements  are 
implemented, including training of staff using severe accident simulation or the development 
of specific protocols  for assistance between units on the same site to  take full  advantage of 
available support and qualifications105. 

Some  Member  States  report  on  specific  features  that  improve  EP&R,  for  example  ensuring 
quick  access  of  the  emergency  teams  and  efficient  intervention  on  the  relevant  parts  of  the 
installation  or  getting  support  from  the  ‘Utilities  Group’  that  gather  deep  knowledge  of  the 
design together with extended experience feed-back of each type of reactor. 

Some Member States report that they integrate maximum radiation dose objectives for each 
phase of an emergency. Those objectives give clear targets consistent with mitigation actions 
and to help defining anticipative protection measures notably of intervention teams and of the 
population. 

In  some  Member  States106,  licensees  include  both  operational  procedures  and  emergency 
procedures in their management system, thus improving consistency. 

103   Sweden. 

104   For instance, France, Sweden. 

105   For instance, Czech Republic. 

106   For instance, Hungary. 

34 

 
 
                                                 
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3.4.2.  Consistency between on-site and off-site arrangements 

In  case  of  incidents  or  accidents,  the  licensees  are  responsible  for  their  detection,  to  report 
immediately  to  the  regulatory  authorities  and,  when  necessary,  to  the  other  national 
authorities  involved.  Licensees  must  also  trigger  action  on-site  to  mitigate  the  incident  or 
accident to protect workers and the population during all phases of the emergency.  

The regulatory authorities, supported as appropriate by TSOs, have central roles in the EP&R 
arrangements, as well as in the coordination between on-site and off-site measures. Usually, 
as  early  as  the  site  licensing  stage,  they  approve  the  licensee’s  on-site  emergency  plan. 
Furthermore,  they  check  the  reviews  and  testing  of  these  plans  by  the  licence  holder  or 
perform  technical  simulation  of  crises,  based  on  qualified  models,  to  estimate  the  potential 
development  of  an  emergency.  In  case  an  emergency  occurs,  regulators  advise  national 
emergency  authorities,  which  include  the  health  authorities.  In  parallel,  they  can  carry  out 
field measurements to complement the analysis.  

In  addition,  Member  States  report  that  they  have  clear  chains  of  command  ensuring 
consistency and continuity between on-site and off-site EP&R. Less information is provided 
on the situations when conflicts could arise regarding decisions that could permanently affect 
the sites and the nuclear installations. 

Communication remains central in all EP&R arrangements, including the national emergency 
plans.  Several  communication  channels  are  used,  such  as  regular  telephone  lines,  mobile 
networks,  dedicated  secured  lines  or  dedicated  satellite  channels  or  radio  frequencies. 
Generally, there is  also  clear definition of ‘who’ informs ‘who’ between  the relevant  actors 
but also to the public; the latter includes redundancy between local and national information 
levels.  In  addition  to  providing  appropriate  information,  some  communication  mechanisms 
aim  at  ensuring  consistency  between  all  the  different  levels  and  bodies  delivering 
information107. 

Several Member States – both with and without nuclear installations - reviewed, and, where 
necessary, amended their national framework and EP&R arrangements to ensure consistency 
between the requirements of this Directive (covering only on-site arrangements) and those of 
the Basic Safety Standards Directive (covering both on-site and off-site arrangements). As a 
particular case, those Member States without nuclear installations or with installations at the 
decommissioning  stage  (with  the  spent  fuel  sent  back  to  the  country  of  origin)  rely  on  the 
requirements  of  the  Basic  Safety  Directive,  corroborated  with  those  of  the  Nuclear  Safety 
Directive, but only to the practicable extent, commensurate with the [remaining] radiological 
risks.  

3.5. 

PEER-REVIEWS (Article 8e of the Directive) 

3.5.1. 

International peer reviews on the national framework and competent regulatory 
authorities (Article 8e, paragraph 1) 

107   For instance, Czech Republic, France, Romania. 

35 

 
 
                                                 
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Self-assessments  and  accompanying  peer  reviews  of  the  legislative,  regulatory  and 
organisational  infrastructure  should  be  aimed  at  strengthening  and  enhancing  the  national 
framework of Member States. Article 8e, paragraph 1 requires Member States to perform self-
assessments  of  their  national  framework  and  competent  regulatory  authorities  and  invite  an 
international  peer  review  of  relevant  segments  thereof.  This  provision  existed  in  the  initial 
2009 Directive and was not changed by the 2014 amendment. In this respect, the preamble of 
the  2009  Directive  recognised  the  role  of  the  existing  peer  review  mechanisms  already  in 
place at IAEA, in particular the IAEA’s Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS), which 
several Member States had already made use of.  

Consequently, the Member States’ regulatory authorities in the framework of ENSREG made 
the  unanimous  recommendation,  noted  in  the  Memorandum  of  Understanding108  between 
ENSREG and IAEA, that “in order to comply with Article 9(3) of the Directive, the best way 
forward  is  by  cooperation  between  the  EU  Member  States  and  the  IRRS  programme”.  The 
Memorandum  sets  out  the  responsibilities  of  ENSREG  and  IAEA  in  the  delivery  of  IRRS 
missions  to  EU  Members  States  and  describes  the  three  components  of  the  EU  IRRS 
programme,  namely  self-assessments,  review  missions  and  follow-up  missions.  The 
coordination  of  the  IAEA  IRRS  programme  related  to  the  Directive’s  implementation  is 
carried  out  by  ENSREG  and  the  IAEA.  The  Commission  follows  the  programme’s 
implementation, participates in some cases as observer to the missions, and provides financial 
support to the IAEA enabling performance of the EU missions. 

The Directive’s ten-year requirement came into force starting with the transposition deadline 
of  22  July  2011.  In  the  ten-year  period  to  22  July  2021,  all  Member  States  should,  as  a 
minimum, have performed an initial IRRS mission. By March 2022, all Member States have 
performed an initial IRRS mission. Two Member States had originally planned missions for 
2020,  but  had  to  postpone  due  to  the  Covid-19  pandemic.  The  rescheduled  missions  took 
place in 2021 and 2022 respectively. 

As  mentioned  above,  the  programme  includes  IRRS  follow-up  missions,  which  should  take 
place no later than four years after the initial mission to review progress in implementing its 
suggestions  and  recommendations.  In  general,  Member  States  have  followed  this  four-year 
periodicity, with the exception to date of three Member States. The current status of the IAEA 
IRRS programme for the Directive’s implementation is presented in the table below. 

IAEA IRRS missions carried out since 2011 (related to the Directive’s implementation) 

Member State 

Initial IRRS mission 

Follow-up IRRS mission 

Austria 

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

2018 

2013 

2013 

2017 

2016 

108 

"Memorandum of Understanding between ENSREG and the IAEA for International Peer Review Missions 
to the EU Member States" 
http://ensreg.eu/sites/default/files/MoU%20ENSREG%20IAEA%20European%20programme%20IRRS%2
0missions%20-%20signed.pdf. 

36 

 
 
 
                                                 
 
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2015 

2017 

2013 

2021 

2016 

2012 

2014 

2019 

2012 

2015 

2015 

2016 

2019 

2016 

2018 

2015 

2014 

2013 

2022  

2011 

2012 

2011 

2018 

2012 

2019 

2019 

2017 

2019 

2015 

2017 

2017 

2018 

2020 

2020 

2018 

2017 

2017 

2015 

2014 

2016 

N/A 

Croatia 

Cyprus  

Czechia 

Denmark 

Estonia 

Finland 

France 

Germany 

Greece 

Hungary 

Ireland 

Italy 

Latvia  

Lithuania 

Luxembourg  

Malta 

Netherlands 

Poland 

Portugal 

Romania 

Slovakia 

Slovenia 

Spain 

Sweden 

U.K.109 

All IRRS mission reports are published on the IAEA website110, however not all EU Member 
States communicate their reports to the Commission, as required by the Directive. 

109 Concerning the United Kingdom, considering that the obligation of applying the Euratom legislation applied 
until  31  December  2020,  and  the  national  report  was  submitted  in  2020,  the  information  presented  was 
considered in the Commission’s review. 

37 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
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Peer reviews of the Member States’ national framework and competent regulatory authorities 
through  IRRS  missions  are  referenced  against  the  relevant  IAEA  Safety  Standards, 
comprising 36 overarching requirements. The observations that may arise from a peer review 
are classed as;  

  Recommendations (R): which reflect non-compliance with a requirement from the 

IAEA Safety Standards  

  Suggestions (S): which identify opportunities for improvement  

  Good Practices (GP): which identify regulatory practices superior to those observed 

elsewhere 

Analysis of the 28 IRRS missions carried out from 2015-2019 in EU Member States showed 
686 Observations in 12 Subject Group Areas (405 Recommendations, 243 Suggestions and 38 
Good Practices).  

Subject Group Areas 

Responsibilities and Functions of the Government 
Global Nuclear Safety Regime 
Regulatory Body Responsibilities and Functions 
Regulatory Body Management System 
Authorization 
Review and Assessment 
Inspection 
Enforcement 
Regulations and Guides 
Emergency preparedness and Response  
Interface Nuclear Safety and Security 
Activities for Embarking on a Nuclear Power Programme  

Observations 

R 
81 
10 
44 
34 
41 
28 
22 
8 
98 
38 
1 
0 

S  GP  Total 
5 
39 
125 
2 
8 
20 
7 
27 
78 
6 
17 
57 
3 
29 
73 
4 
9 
41 
0 
21 
43 
0 
8 
16 
3 
44 
145 
7 
37 
82 
1 
0 
2 
0 
4 
4 
686 
38 
405  243 

The 12 Subject Group Areas can be sub-divided into 58 subject groups. Among these subject 
groups,  observations  were  most  frequently  made  concerning;  Framework  for  Safety, 
Coordination  and  Cooperation  among  Authorities,  Regulatory  Body  Staffing  and 
Competence,  Establishment  of  the  Regulatory  Body  Management  System,  Development  of 
Authorization Process, Implementation of Authorization process, Development of Inspection 
Programme,  Spent  Fuel  and  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Regulations  and  Guides, 
Radiation Safety Regulations and Guides and Emergency Planning.  

It  should  be  noted  that  those  IRRS  follow-up  missions  that  took  place  during  the  period 
analysed  showed  a  closure  rate  for  the  recommendations  and  suggestions  made  during  the 

110   https://www.iaea.org/services/review-

missions/calendar?type=3158&year%5Bvalue%5D%5Byear%5D=&location=All&status=All 

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initial missions of around 86%, showing the value of the peer review approach in increasing 
the overall level of nuclear safety. 

EU Member States and IAEA can use analysis of the mission findings to identify trends and 
issues affecting national frameworks and regulatory bodies. However, care needs to be taken 
when looking at the numbers of findings, not to lose focus on those that might be those most 
significant  for  the  overall  level  of  safety,  especially  at  the  level  of  individual  missions.  As 
IAEA notes on each IRRS mission report: “The number of recommendations, suggestions and 
good practices is in no way a measure of the status of the national infrastructure for nuclear 
and  radiation  safety.  Comparisons  of  such  numbers  between  IRRS  reports  from  different 
countries should not be attempted.” 

Alongside  the  IRRS  programme,  IAEA  also  developed  the  Integrated  Review  Service  for 
Radioactive  Waste  and  Spent  Fuel  Management,  Decommissioning  and  Remediation 
(ARTEMIS)  peer  review  programme,  which  enables  EU  Member  States  to  meet  their  peer 
review  obligations  under  Article  14,  paragraph  3  of  Directive  2011/70/Euratom111. 
Considering the existence of some overlaps between the IAEA IRRS and the ARTEMIS peer-
reviews,  a  review  process  is  ongoing  to  explore  synergies  and  the  potential  benefits  of 
combining  the  two  processes  in  a  single  IRRS-ARTEMIS  mission,  where  requested  by  a 
Member State. This follows a trial combined IRRS-ARTEMIS mission in 2018. The review is 
carried out jointly by the IAEA and ENSREG. 

3.5.2.  Topical Peer-Reviews (Article 8e, paragraphs 2 and 3) 

In accordance with Article 8e, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Directive, the Topical Peer Reviews 
(TPRs)  should  allow  a  regular  review,  coordinated  by  the  Member  States,  of  their  national 
assessments  “based  on  a  specific  topic  related  to  nuclear  safety  of  the  relevant  nuclear 
installations on their territory”. Further details on the organisation of the process is provided 
in the Directive’s preamble, recital (23), according to which the Member States should define 
the  methodology,  terms  of  reference  and  the  timeframe  of  the  peer-review.  Reports  on  the 
findings  of  the  TPRs  should  be  produced.  Furthermore,  Member  States  should  establish 
National Action Plans (NAcPs) for addressing any relevant findings, taking into account the 
results of the TPR reports.  

First Topical Peer Review  

The  first  TPR,  conducted  in  2017-2018,  covered  the  ‘ageing  management’  of  reactors.  The 
peer review focused on the overall ageing management programmes and to selected systems, 
structures  and  components  (reactor  pressure  vessels,  electrical  cables,  concealed  pipework 
and concrete containment structures). The scope of the review was NPPs and large research 
reactors (≥1 MWth). 

The TPR process and organisation was described in the Terms of Reference (ToR) prepared 
by  ENSREG,  and  its  technical  scope  in  the  Technical  Specifications  (TS)  developed  by 

111   Council  Directive  2011/70/EURATOM  of  19  July  2011  establishing  a  Community  framework  for  the 

responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste. 

39 

 
 
                                                 
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WENRA.  Altogether,  16  Member  States  with  NPPs  and/or  research  reactors  participated  in 
this TPR together with 3 non-EU countries (Norway, Switzerland, Ukraine).  

The 16 Member States performed self-assessments and published the results in their National 
Assessment  Reports,  which  were  subject  to  a  peer  review.  The  generic  findings  were 
categorised to  good practices and  expectations (“TPR expected level  of performance”). The 
review also highlighted challenges where further work at European level is necessary. 

Both the ToR and the TS were submitted to public consultation and two stakeholder meetings 
were  organised  by  ENSREG  in  2018.  Stakeholders  were  also  invited  to  submit  questions 
based on the national assessment reports.   

A  TPR  Report was  established  and  country  specific  findings  compiled  to  provide  input  for 
National Action Plans and ENSREG follow-up work.  

According  to  the  TPR  Report,  the  main  finding  was  that  Ageing  Management  Programmes 
exist  in  all  countries  for  NPPs  and  that  no  major  deficiencies  were  identified  in  European 
approaches  to  regulate  and  implement  such  programmes  at  NPPs.  However,  the  review 
identified  areas  where  further  work  would  enhance  ageing  management  at  the  NPPs  and  in 
research reactors.   

ENSREG drew up an Action Plan setting out the follow-up required, both at the EU level and 
by  individual  Member  States.  Accordingly,  Member  States  published  their  TPR  NAcP  by 
September  2019.  These  were  to  be  updated  by  May  2021.  All  Member  States  concerned 
provided either an update to their TPR NAcP, or a final closure report, allowing ENSREG to 
adopt and publish its First Topical Peer Review Status Report 112 in November 2021, setting 
out the progress made in implementing both the national and EU-level actions. The next TPR 
NAcP updates are due by the end of 2023, followed again by an ENSREG Summary Report 
by May 2024. 

Concerning  the  first  TPR,  as  already  noted,  all  Member  States  with  relevant  installations 
participated.  However,  the  Directive  is  clear  that  “all  other  Member  States,  and  the 
Commission  as  observer,  are  invited  to  peer  review  the  national  assessment”.  With  the 
exception of few Member States113 that had participated in the first TPR, the reporting of the 
remaining  Member  States  without  installations  relevant  to  the  first  TPR  was  mixed;  one 
Member State did not take part as the exercise was not compulsory for research reactors under 
1MWth;  several  others  stated  that  the  topic/obligation  was  not  relevant,  whilst  the  other 
Member States did not mention the TPR at all.  

Second Topical Peer Review  

ENSREG, in line with the requirement of the Directive has already started the process for the 
second  TPR  which  will  take  place  in  2023  (National  Assessment  Reports)  and  2024  (Peer 
Review  Workshop),  with  appropriate  follow-up  to  any  findings  to  take  place  in  subsequent 

112 ENSREG 1st Topical peer review status report, November 2021 
113 Ireland, Luxembourg. 

40 

 
 
                                                 
STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

years. A timetable of the fundamental stages of the second TPR can be found in the ENSREG 
Work Programme 2021-23114, which also gives the remaining steps of the follow-up from the 
first TPR. 

In  a  similar  process  to  that  for  the  first  TPR,  at  its  November  2020  plenary  ENSREG  has 
endorsed  WENRA’s  proposal  of  ‘fire  protection’  as  the  topic  for  review.  ENSREG  has 
approved  the  timetable  of  the  overall  TPR  process,  and  the  TPR  Terms  of  Reference  are 
currently  being  drafted,  drawing  on  the  lessons  learned  from  the  first  TPR,  with  a  view  to 
their adoption in the first half of 2022, along with the Technical Specification. One important 
lesson was earlier stakeholder involvement and the first stakeholder meeting was already held 
in June 2021. 

3.5.3.  Peer-Review in case of a serious accident (Article 8e, paragraph 4) 

Article 8e, paragraph 4 of the Directive also directs Member States to invite an international 
peer review “in case of an accident leading to situations that would require off-site emergency 
measures or protective measures for the general public”. No such peer review was required to 
date. 

114   HLG-p(2021-42)_169 ENSREG Work Programme 2021-2023 

41 

 
 
                                                 
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Annex 1 – Summary of information on nuclear installations in the EU  

The information on the nuclear installations included in the tables below relies primarily on 
the  national  reports  submitted  by  the  Member  States  in  2020  (as  at  reporting  date  of  July 
2020, unless otherwise stated). 

Table 1. Countries with nuclear power plants, and their status  

Country 

Site/reactor unit 

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Czech 
Republic 

Doel 1 
Doel 2 
Doel 3 
Doel 4 
Tihange 1 
Tihange 2 
Tihange 3 
Kozloduy unit 5 
Kozloduy unit 6 
Kozloduy unit 1 
Kozloduy unit 2 
Kozloduy unit 3 
Kozloduy unit 4 
Dukovany 1 

Dukovany 2 

Dukovany 3 

Dukovany 4 

Temelin 1 

Temelin 2 

Finland 

Loviisa 1 

Loviisa 2 

Olkiluoto 1 
Olkiluoto 2 
Olkiluoto 3 

Hanhikivi 1 

France 

Belleville 1 

Power 
reactor 
type 
PWR 
PWR 
PWR 
PWR 
PWR 
PWR 
PWR 
PWR 
PWR 
PWR 
PWR 
PWR 
PWR 
PWR 
(VVER 
440/213) 
PWR 
(VVER 
440/213) 
PWR 
(VVER 
440/213) 
PWR 
(VVER 
440/213) 
PWR 
(VVER 
1000/320) 
(PWR) 
VVER 
1000/320 
(PWR) 
VVER V-
213 
(PWR) 
VVER V-
213 
BWR 
BWR 
PWR/EPR 

PWR 
VVER-
1200 
PWR-1300 

Capacity 
MWe 

Status 

Associated on-
site facilities 

Spent fuel 
storage 

Spent fuel 
storage 

Spent fuel 
storage;  
radioactive waste 
storage facilities 

Spent fuel 
storage 
radioactive waste 
disposal facilities 

Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Decommissioning 
Decommissioning 
Decommissioning 
Decommissioning 
Operational 

3000 

3000 

1000 
1000 
440 
440 
440 
440 
468 

471 

Operational 

468 

Operational 

471 

Operational 

1027 

Operational 

Spent fuel 
storage 

1029 

Operational 

507 

Operational 

507 

Operational 

890 
890 
1600 

1200 

Operational 
Operational 
Commissioning 

Pre-licensing 

1300 

Operational 

Spent fuel 
storage; 
radioactive waste 
disposal facilities 

Spent fuel 
storage; 
radioactive waste 
disposal facilities 

Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 

Belleville 2 

PWR-1300 

1300 

Operational 

Blayais 1 

PWR-900 

900 

Operational 

42 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

Blayais 2 

PWR-900 

900 

Operational 

Blayais 3 

PWR-900 

900 

Operational 

Blayais 4 

PWR-900 

900 

Operational 

Bugey 2 

Bugey 3 

Bugey 4 

Bugey 5 

PWR-900 

900 

Operational 

PWR-900 

900 

Operational 

PWR-900 

900 

Operational 

PWR-900 

900 

Operational 

Cattenom 1 

PWR-1300 

1300 

Operational 

Cattenom 2 

PWR-1300 

1300 

Operational 

Cattenom 3 

PWR-1300 

1300 

Operational 

Cattenom 4 

PWR-1300 

1300 

Operational 

Chinon B1 

PWR-900 

900 

Operational 

Chinon B2 

PWR-900 

900 

Operational 

Chinon B3 

PWR-900 

900 

Operational 

Chinon B4 

PWR-900 

900 

Operational 

Chooz B1 

PWR-1500 

1450 

Operational 

Chooz B2 

PWR-1500 

1450 

Operational 

Civaux 1 

PWR-1500 

1450 

Operational 

Civaux 2 

PWR-1500 

1450 

Operational 

Cruas 1 

Cruas 2 

Cruas 3 

Cruas 4 

PWR-900 

900 

Operational 

PWR-900 

900 

Operational 

PWR-900 

900 

Operational 

PWR-900 

900 

Operational 

Dampierre 1 

PWR-900 

900 

Operational 

Dampierre 2 

PWR-900 

900 

Operational 

Dampierre 3 

PWR-900 

900 

Operational 

Dampierre 4 

PWR-900 

900 

Operational 

Flamanville 1 

PWR-1300 

1300 

Operational 

Flamanville 2 

PWR-1300 

1300 

Operational 

Flamanville 3 
Golfech 1 

PWR-EPR 
PWR-1300 

1600 
1300 

Construction 
Operational 

Golfech 2 

PWR-1300 

1300 

Operational 

43 

Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 

Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 

 
 
 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 

STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

Gravelines 1 

PWR-900 

900 

Operational 

Gravelines 2 

PWR-900 

900 

Operational 

Gravelines 3 

PWR-900 

900 

Operational 

Gravelines 4 

PWR-900 

900 

Operational 

Gravelines 5  

PWR-900 

900 

Operational 

Gravelines 6 

PWR-900 

900 

Operational 

Nogent 1 

PWR-1300 

1300 

Operational 

Nogent 2 

PWR-1300 

1300 

Operational 

Paluel 1 

Paluel 2 

Paluel 3 

Paluel 4 

Penly 1 

Penly 2 

PWR-1300 

1300 

Operational 

PWR-1300 

1300 

Operational 

PWR-1300 

1300 

Operational 

PWR-1300 

1300 

Operational 

PWR-1300 

1300 

Operational 

PWR-1300 

1300 

Operational 

St. Alban 1 

PWR-1300 

1300 

Operational 

St. Alban 2 

PWR-1300 

1300 

Operational 

St. Laurent B1 

PWR-900 

900 

Operational 

St. Laurent B2 

PWR-900 

900 

Operational 

Tricastin 1 

PWR-900 

900 

Operational 

Tricastin 2 

PWR-900 

900 

Operational 

Tricastin 3 

PWR-900 

900 

Operational 

Tricastin 4 

PWR-900 

900 

Operational 

Fessenheim 1 
Fessenheim 2 
Chooz A, INB 163 
Bugey 1, INB 45 
St Laurent A1, INB 
46 
St Laurent A2, INB 
46 
Chinon A1, INB 
133 
Chinon A2, INB 
153 
Chinon A3, 
INB161 
Brennilis EL4, INB 
162 
Superphénix, INB 

PWR 
PWR 
PWR 
UNGG 
UNGG 

UNGG 

880 
880 
305 
540 
390 

465 

Shutdown 
Shutdown 
Decommissioning 
Decommissioning 
Decommissioning 

Decommissioning 

UNGG 

70 

Decommissioning 

UNGG 

UNGG 

180 

360 

Decommissioning 

Decommissioning 

HWGCR 

70 

Decommissioning 

FBR 

1200 

Decommissioning 

44 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 

STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

Germany 

91 
Grohnde 

PWR 

1 430 

Operational 

Gundremmingen-C  BWR 

1 344 

Operational 

Brokdorf 

Isar-2 

Emsland 

PWR 

PWR 

PWR 

1 480 

Operational 

1 485 

1 406 

Operational 

Operational 

Neckarwestheim-2 

PWR 

1 400 

Operational 

Krümmel 

BWR 

1 402 

Shutdown 

Philippsburg-2 

PWR 

Gundremmingen-B  BWR 

1 468 

1 344 

Brunsbüttel 

BWR 

806 

Grafenrheinfeld 

PWR 

Lower Weser 

PWR 

1 345 

1 410 

Philippsburg-1 

BWR 

926 

Biblis-B 

Biblis-A 

PWR 

PWR 

Neckarwestheim-1 

PWR 

Isar-1 

Lingen 

BWR 

BWR 

Gundremmingen-A  BWR 

Multipurpose 
research reactor 

PWR 
(D2O) 

1 300 

1 225 

840 

912 

268 

250 

57 

Mülheim-Kärlich 

PWR 

1 302 

THTR-3001 

AVR 

Greifswald-5 

Greifswald-2 

Greifswald-3 

Rheinsberg 

Greifswald-4 

Greifswald-1 

Compact sodium-
cooled nuclear 
installation 

HTR 

HTR 

WWER 

WWER 

WWER 

WWER 

WWER 

WWER 

SNR 

308 

15 

440 

440 

440 

70 

440 

440 

21 

Decommissioning 

Decommissioning 

Decommissioning 

Decommissioning 

Decommissioning 

Decommissioning 

Decommissioning 

Decommissioning 

Decommissioning 

Decommissioning 

Decommissioning 

Decommissioning 

Decommissioning 

Decommissioning 

Decommissioning 

Decommissioning 

Decommissioning 

Decommissioning 

Decommissioning 

Decommissioning 

Decommissioning 

Decommissioning 

Decommissioning 

Würgassen 

BWR 

670 

Decommissioning 

45 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

672 

357 

509 

Decommissioning 

Decommissioning 

Operational 

Spent fuel 
storage 

Hungary 

Stade 

Obrigheim 

Paks unit 1 

Paks unit 2 

Paks unit 3 

Paks unit 4 

Paks II (2 units) 

Italy 

Caorso  

PWR 

PWR 

PWR/ 
VVER-
440/V-213 
PWR/ 
VVER-
440/V-213 
PWR/ 
VVER-
440/V-213 
PWR/ 
VVER-
440/V-213 
PWR/ 
VVER-
1200 
BWR 

Garigliano 

BWR 

Latina 

Trino 

Gas 
Graphite 
PWR 

504 

Operational 

500 

Operational 

500 

Operational 

1200 

Prelicensing 

870 

160 

160 

272 

Decommissioning 

Decommissioning 

Decommissioning 

Decommissioning 

Lithuania 

Ignalina unit 1 
Ignalina unit 2 

LWGR 
LWGR 

1185 
1185 

Decommissioning 
Decommissioning 

Netherlands 

Romania 

Borssele 
Dodewaard 
Cernavoda 1 
Cernavoda 2 

PWR 
BWR 
PHWR 
PHWR 

485 
55 
707 
707 

Operational 
Shutdown 
Operational 
Operational 

505 

Operational 

505 

Operational 

470 

Operational 

470 

Operational 

440 

Construction 

440 

Construction 

Slovakia 

Bohunice 3 

Bohunice 4 

Mochovce 1 

Mochovce 2 

Mochovce 3 

Mochovce 4 

Bohunice V-1 

Bohunice A-1 
Krško 
Trillo 1 

Almaraz 1 
Almaraz 2 

Slovenia 
Spain 

PWR/ 
VVER-
440/V213 
PWR/ 
VVER-
440/V213 
PWR/ 
VVER-
440/V213 
PWR/ 
VVER-
440/V213 
PWR/ 
VVER-
440/V213 
PWR/ 
VVER-
440/V213 
VVER-
440/230 
HWGCR 
PWR 
PWR 

PWR 
PWR 

143 

560 
696 

46 

Decommissioning 

Decommissioning 
Operational 
Operational 

Operational 
Operational 

Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 

Radioactive 
waste storage  
Radioactive 
waste storage 
Radioactive 
waste storage 
Radioactive 
waste storage 
Spent fuel 
storage;  
radioactive waste 
storage facilities 

Spent fuel 
storage;  
radioactive waste 
storage facilities 
Spent fuel 
storage;  
radioactive waste 
storage facilities 

Radioactive 
waste storage 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sweden 

United 
Kingdom 

STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

Ascó 1 
Ascó 2 
Cofrentes 
Vandellos 2 
José Cabrera 

Vandellos 1 
Santa María de 
Garoña 
Forsmark 1 

Forsmark 2 
Forsmark 3 
Oskarshamn 3 
Ringhals 1 
Ringhals 3 
Ringhals 4 
Ågesta 
Barsebäck 1 
Barsebäck 2 
Oskarshamn 1 
Oskarshamn 2 
Ringhals 2 
Dungeness B 1 

PWR 
PWR 
BWR 
PWR 
PWR 

PWR 
BWR 

BWR 

BWR 
BWR 
BWR 
PWR 
PWR 
PWR 
PHWR 
BWR 
BWR 
BWR 
BWR 
PWR 
AGR 

Dungeness B 2 

AGR 

Hartlepool 1 

Hartlepool 2 

Heysham 1-1 

Heysham 1-2 

Heysham 2-1 

Heysham 2-2 

AGR 

AGR 

AGR 

AGR 

AGR 

AGR 

Hinkley Point B 1 

AGR 

Hinkley Point B 2 

AGR 

Hunterston B 1 

AGR 

Hunterston B 2 

AGR 

Torness 1 

Torness 2 

Sizewell B 

AGR 

AGR 

PWR 

Hinkley Point C 1 
Hinkley Point C 1 
Berkeley 1 
Berkeley 2 
Bradwell 1 
Bradwell 2 
Calder Hall 1 
Calder Hall 2 

PWR-EPR 
PWR-EPR 
Magnox 
Magnox 
Magnox 
Magnox 
Magnox 
Magnox 

7394 

141 

480 
446 

990 

1118 
1172 
1400 
750 
1072 
1117 
10 
600 
600 
473 
638 
852 
615 

615 

655 

655 

625 

625 

680 

680 

655 

655 

644 

644 

682 

682 

1250 

1630 
1630 
138 
138 
123 
123 
49 
49 

47 

Spent fuel 
storage 

Spent fuel 
storage 

Spent fuel 
storage 
Radioactive 
waste storage 

Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 
Spent fuel 
storage 

Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Decommissioning 

Decommissioning 
Shutdown 

Operational 

Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Shutdown (Dec2020) 
Operational 
Operational 
Decommissioning 
Decommissioning 
Decommissioning 
Decommissioning 
Decommissioning 
Decommissioning 
Operating 

Operating 

Operating 

Operating 

Operating 

Operating 

Operating 

Operating 

Operating 

Operating 

Operating 

Operating 

Operating 

Operating 

Operating 

Construction 
Construction 
Decommissioning 
Decommissioning 
Decommissioning 
Decommissioning 
Defuelled 
Defuelled 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

Magnox 
Calder Hall 3 
Magnox 
Calder Hall 4 
Magnox 
Chapelcross 1 
Magnox 
Chapelcross 2 
Magnox 
Dungeness A1 
Magnox 
Dungeness A2 
Hinkley Point A 1  Magnox 
Hinkley Point A 2  Magnox 
Magnox 
Hunterston A 1 
Magnox 
Hunterston A 2 
Magnox 
Oldbury 1 
Magnox 
Oldbury 2 
Magnox 
Sizewell A 1 
Magnox 
Sizewell A 2 
Magnox 
Trawsfynydd 1 
Magnox 
Trawsfynydd 2 
Magnox 
Wylfa 1 

49 
49 
48 
48 
225 
225 
235 
235 
150 
150 
217 
217 
210 
210 
195 
195 
490 

Wylfa 2 

Magnox 

490 

Dounreay 
Dounreay  

PFR 
DFR 

234 
11 

Defuelled 
Defuelled 
Decommissioning 
Decommissioning 
Decommissioning 
Decommissioning 
Decommissioning 
Decommissioning 
Decommissioning 
Decommissioning 
Defuelling 
Defuelling 
Defuelling 
Defuelling 
Decommissioning 
Decommissioning 
Permanently 
shutdown 
Permanently 
shutdown 
Decommissioning 
Decommissioning 

Table 2. Central spent fuel storage facilities 

Facility type 
Central waste storage/treatment115 

Name/site 
Belgoprocess site 

Country 
Belgium 

Czech 
Republic 
France 
Germany 

Hungary 

Italy 

Netherlands 
Slovakia 
Sweden 

Spent fuel storage/radioactive waste 
storage 
Spent fuel storage 
Ahaus interim fuel storage facility 
(BZA) 
Interim fuel storage facility Gorleben 
(BZG) 
Interim fuel storage facility North 
(ZLN) Rubenow 
Interim Spent Fuel Storage Facility 
(ISFS) 
Deposito Avogadro 
OPEC 1 
Fuel Pit Wells Storage Facility 
HABOG facility 
ISFS Jaslovské Bohunice 
CLAB interim storage spent nuclear 
fuel 

Table 3. Research Reactor facilities 

Country 
Austria 
Belgium 

Name/site 
Triga Mark II  
Venus/Guinevere 
BR1 

Řež site 

La Hague 

Paks 

Oskarshamn 

Power(th) 
250 kW 
500 kW 
2 MW 

Status  
Operational 

Operational 

Operational 
Operational 

Operational 

Operational 

Operational 

Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 

Status  
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 

115  Very limited quantities of spent nuclear fuel from two Belgian research reactors that have been dismantled 

(BR3 and Thetis) are stored here. 

48 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

Country 

Czech 
Republic 

Denmark 

Finland 
France 

Name/site 
BR2 
BR3 
LVR-15 
LR-0 
ČVUT, Praha 
Danish Reactor 2 
(DR 2) 
Danish Reactor 3 
(DR 3) 
Hot Cell facility 
FiR1, Triga Mark II 
CABRI Test reactor (Cadarache), 
INB 24 

Power(th) 
120 MW 

10 MW 
- 
1 kW 
5MW 

10MW 

250 kW 
25 MW 

Status  
Operational 
Decommissioning 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Decommissioned 

Decommissioning 

Decommissioning 
Decommissioning 
Operational 

High Flux Reactor (HFR), INB 67 

57 MW 

Operational 

100 MW 

Under construction 
Under construction 

Jules Horowitz (RJH), INB 172 
ITER International fusion reactor 
project, INB 174 
Phénix, INB 71, Marcoule (CEA) 
Rapsodie, INB 25, Cadarache (CEA) 
Masurca, INB 39, Cadarache (CEA) 
ÉOLE, INB 42, Cadarache (CEA) 
Phébus, INB 92, Cadarache (CEA) 
Minerve, INB 95, Cadarache (CEA) 
Ulysse, INB 18, Saclay (CEA) 
Osiris, INB 40, Saclay (CEA) 
Orphée, INB 101, Saclay (CEA) 

Germany 

SUR Stuttgart (SUR S) 

10-7  MW 

Research reactor Mainz (FRMZ) 

0.1 MW 

SUR Ulm (SUR U) 

SUR Furtwangen (SUR FW) 
Furtwangen (SUR FW) 

Training reactor (AKR-2) 

High flux neutron source 
Munich/Garching (FRM-II) 

Berliner Experimentier-Reaktor II 
(BER-II) 

Geesthacht 1  
(FRG-1) 

Geesthacht 2 
(FRG-2) 

SUR Aachen 
(SUR AA) 

10-7 MW 

10-7 MW 

2 x 10-6 MW 

20 MW 

10 MW 

5 MW 

15 MW 

10-7 MW 

Research Reactor Munich (FRM) 

4 MW 

Research Reactor 2 (FR-2) 

DIDO (FRJ-2) 

Research and Measuring Reactor 
Braunschweig (FRMB) 

44 MW 

23 MW 

1 MW 

Research Reactor Neuherberg (FRN) 

1 MW 

Greece 
Hungary 

GRR-1 
Budapest Research Reactor 

5 MW 
10MW 
49 

Shutdown/decommissioning 
Shutdown/decommissioning 
Shutdown/decommissioning 
Shutdown/decommissioning 
Shutdown/decommissioning 
Shutdown/decommissioning 
Shutdown/decommissioning 
Shutdown/decommissioning 
Shutdown/decommissioning 
Operational 

Operational 

Operational 

Operational 

Operational 

Operational 

Shutdown 

Shutdown 

Shutdown 

Shutdown 

Decommissioning 

Decommissioning 

Decommissioning 

Decommissioning 

Decommissioning 

Shutdown 
Operational 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

Power(th) 
100kW 

0.02 kW 
250 kW 
5 kW 
0 
1000 kW 
0.1 kW 
5000 kW 
25000 kW 
50 kW 
2 - 5 MW 
45 MW 
2 MW 
30 MW 
10 MW 
1 MW 
14 MW 
2 MW 
250 kW 
50MW 
1MW 

Country 

Italy 

Latvia 
Netherlands 

Poland 

Portugal 
Romania 

Slovenia 
Sweden 

United 
Kingdom 

Name/site 
Training reactor of the Budapest 
University of Technology and 
Economics 
AGN 201 Constanza 
Triga Mark II Lena Pavia 
RSV Tapiro 
SM-1 
Triga RC-1 
RB-3 
Ispra-1 
Essor 
L-54M Cesnef 
Salaspils 
HFR Petten 
Technical University Delft HOR 
Maria 
Eva 
RPI 
Triga 
VVR-S 
TRIGA Mark II 
R2 
R2-0 
BEPO Harwell 
PLUTO Harwell 
DIDO Harwell 
SGHWR Winfrith 
Dragon Winfrith 
Consort II Imperial College 
PFR, Dounreay 
DFR, Dounreay 

Status  
Operational 

Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Decommissioning 
Shutdown 
Shutdown 
Shutdown 
Decommissioning 
Operational 
Operational 
Operational 
Decommissioning 
Decommissioning 
Operational 
Decommissioning 
Operational 
Decommissioning 
Decommissioning 
Decommissioning 
Decommissioning 
Decommissioning 
Decommissioning 
Decommissioning 
Decommissioning 
Permanent shutdown 
Permanent shutdown  

Table 4. Fuel cycle installations (enrichment, fuel fabrication, reprocessing plants) and other 
facilities 

Country 
Belgium 

Denmark 

France 

Name/site 
Belgonucleaire - 
MOX 
manufacturing 
plant, Dessel 
FBFC UO2 
manufacturing, 
Dessel 
Fuel fabrication 
plant for DR2, DR3 
Georges Besse 2, 
Pierrelatte, INB 168 
TU5 installation, 
Pierrelatte, INB 155 
Fuel fabrication 
plant, Romans-sur-
Isère, INB 63 
Nuclear fuel 
fabrication unit, 
Romans-sur-Isère, 
INB 98 
Nuclear fuel 
fabrication plant, 
Melox, INB 151 
UP3 A, La Hague, 

Facility type 
Fuel fabrication 

Status  
Decommissioning 

Fuel fabrication 

Decommissioning 

Fuel fabrication 

Decommissioning 

Enrichment/processing of 
radioactive substances 
Radioactive substance processing  

Operational 

Operational 

Fuel 
Fabrication plant 

Fuel 
Fabrication plant 

Fuel 
Fabrication plant 

Operational  

Operational 

Operational 

Reprocessing plant 

Operational 

50 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country 

Germany 

STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

Name/site 
INB 116 
UP2 800, La Hague, 
INB 117 
STE3, La Hague, 
INB 118 
Tanks B1 and B2, 
Malvési, INB 175 
Installation for the 
Purification 
and Recovery of 
Uranium (IARU), 
Tricastin, INB 138 
AREVA Tricastin 
Analysis 
Laboratories 
(ATLAS), Tricastin, 
INB 176 
Tricastin Uranium 
Fleet, Tricastin, 
INB 178 
P35, Tricastin, INB 
179 

La Hague (Orano 
Cycle) 
INB 33, INB 38, 
INB 47, INB 80  
Fontenay-aux-Roses 
(CEA) 
INB 165, INB 166 
Saclay (CEA) 
INB 49 
Chinon (EDF) 
INB 94 
Cadarache (CEA) 
INB 32 - ATPu 
INB 37B - STE 
INB 52- ATUE 
INB 53- MCMF 
INB 54 – LCP 
INB 56 -  
Grenoble (CEA) 
INB 36 – STED 
INB 79 - Unité 
d’entreposage de 
déchets de haute 
activité 
Tricastin (Orano 
Cycle) 
INB 105 – 
Comurhex 
INB 93 – Usine 
Georges Besse 
URENCO uranium 
enrichment plant 
Gronau (UAG) 
ANF fuel element 
production Lingen 

WAK reprocessing 
plant Karlsruhe incl. 
VEK vitrification 

Facility type 

Status  

Reprocessing plant 

Operational 

Processing of radioactive materials  Operational 

Conversion/packing storage of 
radioactive materials 
Factory 

Operational 

Operational 

Laboratory for the use of 
radioactive materials 

Operational 

Storage of radioactive materials 

Operational 

Storage of radioactive materials 

Operational 

Spent fuel treatment/other 

Shutdown/decommissioning 

Laboratories/other 

Shutdown/decommissioning 

Laboratories/research facilities 

Shutdown/decommissioning 

Irradiated materials workshop 

Shutdown/decommissioning 

Shutdown/decommissioning 

Workshop; 
Effluent treatment station; 
Enriched uranium workshop; 
Radioactive substances depot; 
Laboratory; 
Storage of radioactive substances; 

Transformation of radioactive  
substances; 
Storage of radioactive substances 

Shutdown/decommissioning 

Shutdown/decommissioning 

Transformation of radioactive 
substances; 
Transformation of radioactive 
substances 

Uranium enrichment 

Production of LWR fuel with low-
enriched uranium dioxide 

Operational 

Operational 

Reprocessing plant 

Decommissioning 

51 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

Country 

Italy 

Netherlands 

Name/site 
facility 
FN Bosco Marengo 
Eurex 
Itrec 
Urenco, Almelo 

Facility type 

Status  

Fuel fabrication plant 
Reprocessing 
Reprocessing 
Enrichment plant 

Decommissioning 
Decommissioning 
Decommissioning 
Operational 

Romania 

Pitesti 

Spain 

Juzbado 

Sweden 

United 
Kingdom 

Westinghouse, 
Västerås 
Capenhurst 
Springfields 
Springfields 
Sellafield -Magnox 
fuel reprocessing 
plant 
Sellafield – Oxide 
fuel reprocessing 
plant 
Dounreay FCA 

Fuel fabrication plant, radioactive 
waste storage 
Fuel fabrication plant, radioactive 
waste storage 
Fuel fabrication plant 

Operational 

Operational 

Fuel enrichment plant 
Magnox fuel production plant 
Oxide fuel production plant 
Reprocessing 

Operational 
Decommissioning 
Operational 
Operational 

Reprocessing 

Operational 

Reprocessing 

Decommissioning 

52