Measuring the quality of government at the sub-national level and comparing results with previous studies : final technical report & select case studies in Spain and Poland.
Date: 2022-03-24
Institutions: Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy
Subjects: EU regional policy, Poland, Spain, case study, coronavirus disease, governance, government, local government, quality standard, research method, research report, sample survey

Measuring the Quality of 
Government at the Sub-National 
Level and Comparing Results with 
Previous Studies: 

Final Technical Report & Select Case Studies in Spain and 
Poland 

[Nicholas Charron, Monika Bauhr & Victor Lapuente, Quality of Government Institute & Department of Political 
Science, University of Gothenburg 
Pablo Fernández-Vázquez, Carlos III University, Madrid 
Paweł Chmieliński & Barbara Wieliczko Institute of Agricultural and Food Economics, National 
Research Institute, Poland]  
March – 2022 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                  
 
 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy 
Unit B1 — Policy Development and Economic Analysis  
B-1049 Brussels 

Contact: Paola Annoni 

E-mail: regio-B1-head-of-unit@ec.europa.eu 

European Commission 
B-1049 Brussels 

 
 
 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Measuring the Quality of 
Government at the Sub-National 
Level and Comparing Results with 
Previous Studies: 

Final Technical Report & Select Case Studies in Spain and 
Poland 

2022 

EN 

Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy 

 
Manuscript completed in March 2022 

1st  edition 

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ISBN 978-92-76-49864-3  doi: 10.2776/87917 

KN-01-22-207-EN-N 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous Studies 

Table of Contents 

1. 

Introduction: Part I ................................................................................... 7 

2.  Background, Methodology and Sample ................................................. 8 

3. 

2021 Survey Items .................................................................................. 14 

4.  Construction of the 2021 EQI ................................................................ 17 

5.  Margins of Error for the 2021 EQI ......................................................... 23 

6. 

Testing the Uncertainty of the 2021 Estimates .................................... 25 

6.1.  Corruption Pillar ................................................................................... 25 

6.2. 

Impartiality Pillar .................................................................................. 27 

6.3.  Quality Pillar ........................................................................................ 28 

7. 

Final Index: Regional Variation of EQI & External Validity Checks. .. 30 

8.  Overall and Recent Time Trends in the EQI......................................... 35 

9.  Conclusions: Part I ................................................................................ 39 

10.  Appendix: Part I ..................................................................................... 41 

10.1.  The effect of Covid-19 perceptions QoG perceptions from the  pilot ... 41 

10.2.  The relationship between Covid-19 and EQI core questions ............... 41 

10.3.  Comparing changes in mean responses to QoG questions over time . 47 

10.4.  Conclusions from the  pilot .................................................................. 53 

10.5.  Comparing the Irish regions over time ................................................. 54 

10.6.  Full list of 2021 Estimates .................................................................... 57 

11. 

Introduction: Part II - Why Spain and Poland?  ................................... 62 

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Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous Studies 

12.  Sub-National QoG in Two Spanish Regions: Catalonia & Basque 

Country ................................................................................................... 66 

12.1.  Executive Summary ............................................................................. 66 

12.2.  Introduction .......................................................................................... 67 

12.3.  Case selection & methodology ............................................................ 68 

12.4.  Description of the history & structural features of both regions ............ 70 

12.5.  Comparative analysis .......................................................................... 74 

12.5.1. Institutions: Politics & Political Parties ..................................................... 74 
12.5.1. Institutions: Regional Funding ................................................................. 76 
12.5.1. Institutions: Public Administration............................................................ 76 
12.5.1. Institutions: The Judiciary & Corruption ................................................... 79 
12.5.1. Institutions: The Media ............................................................................ 80 
12.5.1. Institutions: Civil Society & Culture .......................................................... 80 

12.6.  Conclusions ......................................................................................... 81 

12.7.  Appendix of Spanish Study .................................................................. 84 

13.  Sub-National QoG in Two Polish Regions: Lubelskie & Opolskie ..... 85 

13.1.  Executive Summary ............................................................................. 85 

13.2.  Introduction .......................................................................................... 87 

13.2.1. Regional Performance in the Country ..................................................... 87 
13.2.2. The Research Method ............................................................................ 88 
13.2.3. Position of Lubelskie & Opolskie within Poland ....................................... 90 
13.2.4. Roadmap of the Polish Report ................................................................ 94 

13.3.  Description of Lubelskie ....................................................................... 96 

13.3.1. Historical background ............................................................................. 96 
13.3.2. Structural Conditions............................................................................... 96 
13.3.3. Regional autonomy & funding ................................................................. 97 

13.4.  Description of Opolskie ........................................................................ 99 

13.4.1. Historical background ............................................................................. 99 
13.4.2. Structural Conditions............................................................................. 100 
13.4.3. Regional autonomy & funding ............................................................... 102 

13.4.  Comparative analysis ........................................................................ 103 

13.5.  Conclusions ....................................................................................... 121 

14.  References………………………………………………………………………123 

6 

 
 
 
 
Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

1

Introduction: Part I

This document presents the latest of four rounds of the EQI data on regional governance in EU

countries (Charron, Dijkstra, and Lapuente, 2014; Charron, Dijkstra, and Lapuente, 2015; Char-

ron, Lapuente, and Rothstein, 2013; Charron, Lapuente, and Annoni, 2019. While this round of

data largely builds on the work of previous rounds, there are several alterations based on sugges-

tions from a Rasch analysis of the 2010, and 2013 rounds of the EQI data (Annoni and Charron,

2019), as well as an expanded number of regions and several small adjustments based on the

Covid-19 situation. In this document, we highlight the sample, summary statistics and question

items that are included in the 2020 round of the EQI. Together with national estimates from the

World Bank Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2009), we report data on

Quality of Government (‘QoG’) for all EU 27 countries and for NUTS 2 regions for all available EU

countries (save Germany and Belgium at NUTS 1), totaling 209 regions. The QoG questions are

aimed at capturing average citizens’ perceptions and experiences with corruption, and the extent

to which they rate their public services as impartial and of good quality.

In addition, we highlight broad patterns as we see them in the data and, more specifically, analyse

trends in the EQI over time within regions. Using several statistical and observational techniques,

we elucidate a list of potentially interesting case studies that can be undertaken to better draw

out ‘best practices’ to improve governance at the sub-national level in other EU regions.

7

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

2 Background, Methodology and Sample

Initially, our fieldwork was scheduled for March/April of 2020. However, the Covid-19 pandemic

that struck all of the Eurozone at this time, causing much disruption and uncertainty, led to a

delay.

In lieu of the full sample, we fielded a pilot survey in June of 2020. Our main inquiry

was whether the pandemic had a noticeable effect on responses compared with previous years. In

addition, 2020 is the first year in which the survey includes online administration for some (50%)

of the respondents. We thus sought to better understand the differences between the traditional

telephone replies and the online responses. We provide an analysis of the pilot here in this report

(see Appendix ).

The field work for the full sample began during the month of October, 2020 and concluded in

the first week of February 2021. Interviews were conducted in the local majority language in each

country/region. The results were returned to the Quality of Government Institute in February,

2021.

The E.U. regional survey was undertaken by Efficience 3 (E3), a French market-research, sur-

vey company specialising in public opinion throughout Europe for researchers, politicians and

advertising firms. E3 has also conducted the 2010, 2013 and 2017 rounds of the EQI and were thus

familiar with the question format and goals of the survey. E3 conducted the interviews themselves

in several countries and used sub-contracting partners in others. The respondents, from 18 years

of age or older, were contacted randomly via telephone in the local language. Computer Assisted

Telephone interviews (CATI) were conducted via both landlines and mobile phones, with both

methods being used in most countries. Decisions about whether to contact residents more often

via land or mobile lines were based on the local expertise of market research firms in each country.

Online interviews were also included this year as a compliment to the traditional CATI interviews,

thus increasing access to certain demographic groups (namely younger people) and increasing the

sample size significantly compared to previous years. Moreover, for the first time, all EU countries,

including even the smaller member states, are included in the survey. For purposes of regional

placement, respondents were asked the post code of their address to verify the area/ region of

residence if mobile phones were used, or if they were an online respondent.

Ideally, a survey would be a mirror image of actual societal demographics – gender, income, educa-

tion, rural-urban, ethnicity, etc. However, we are not privy to exact demographic distributions; in

particular at the regional level in most cases, thus imposing artificial demographic lines might lead

to even more problems than benefits. For our CATI sample, we thus sought the next best solution.

To achieve a random, representative sample, based on their expert advice we used what is known

in survey-research as the ‘next birthday method’. The next birthday method is an alternative to

the so-called quotas method. When using the quota method for instance, one obtains a (near)

8

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

perfectly representative sample – e.g. a near exact proportion of the amount of men, women,

certain minority groups, people of a certain age, income, etc. However, as one searches for certain

demographics within the population, one might end up with only ‘available’ respondents, or those

that are more ‘eager’ to respond to surveys, which can lead to less variation in the responses, or

even bias in the results. The ‘next-birthday’ method, which simply requires the interviewer to ask

the person who answers the phone who in their household will have the next birthday, still obtains

a reasonably representative sample of the population. The interviewer must take the person who

has the next coming birthday in the household (if this person is not available, the interviewer

makes an appointment), thus not relying on whomever might simply be available to respond in the

household. So, where the quota method is stronger in terms of a more even demographic spread

in the sample, the next-birthday method is stronger at ensuring a better range of opinion. The

next-birthday method was thus chosen because we felt that what we might have lost in demo-

graphic representation in the sample would be made up for by a better distribution of opinion.

With respect to the online sample, for reasons of access, a random sample is not possible, thus the

standard quota method was employed, based on gender, age and education demographics at the

NUTS 2 regional level.

Along with the CATI sample, we add online respondents to the 2020 EQI survey.

In addition

to the added value of lower costs and reaching a wider group of younger respondents that would

not otherwise answer their mobile phones, the online administration is of particular interest for

a topic such as the EQI, where sensitive questions about perceptions and experiences with cor-

ruption, for example, could be affected by social desirability biases from interviewer-administered

surveys, such as face-to-face or over a telephone. In other words, respondents are more likely to

answer truthfully about such sensitive topics when taking self-administered surveys, thus provid-

ing more accurate data (Kreuter, Presser, and Tourangeau, 2008; Heerwegh, 2009). In contrast to

the telephone interviews where respondents are randomly contacted, these respondents participate

voluntarily. To increase the online sample, E3 worked with local partners to create a multi-channel

communication of online and off-line networks to recruit potential respondents. These channels in-

clude using banners on various portals and websites, email recruitment via panel owner’s databases,

newsletters, brand communications, loyalty website and social media platforms. The firm also ac-

tively recruited via telephone and face-to-face interactions. All survey email invitations included

a general description of the survey, confidentiality and anonymity statements, for panel members,

the opportunity to unsubscribe or opt-out of future research; and an appropriate privacy policy

or statement. As randomization via this administration was not possible as with CATI, the quota

system was employed, based on age, gender and education characteristics of each region.

In addition, to compensate for some key demographic over/under-representation upon receiving the

final sample, E3 provides weights based on age, gender and education for each region, comparing

the sample drawn to actual demographic statistics from the latest figures provided by Eurostat.

9

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

This is done for both the CATI and online sample, which we could use to calculate an individual

weight for each individual in the sample. By the end of the study, we found variation in the

response and refusal rates by country, that could be the result of with many factors including the

sensitivity of one of the primary the topics at hand – corruption. A breakdown of the sample is

listed in Table 1 below by country.

Two issues in the preparation of this study are worthy of mention here. First, in some areas,

such as immigration, customs, defence or the judicial arena, we do not expect much variation from

region to region within countries at all. Thus to maximize regional variation on the QoG-oriented

question in the survey, we elected to limit the questions in the survey to only those policy areas

that are most often either governed or administered by sub-national bodies.

In the end, three

policy areas were selected – health care, education and law enforcement. In addition to these three

policy areas, we also inquire about the integrity of regional elections.

The second issue to deal with is the fact that in some countries – such as Germany, Belgium,

Italy or Spain – the regions that we are targeting in the questions are both politically and admin-

istratively meaningful. That is to say that these regional governments are elected by their local

constituents, and have their own autonomous revenues (either from directly taxing citizens, or

central government transfers or both) and have a degree of autonomy with which to redistribute

resources in the form of public services. Other countries might have some regions that are po-

litically meaningful - for example, in Finland (Åland), Portugal (Azores and Madeira), or Czech

Republic (Prague, Moravskoslezsko and Střední Čechy) - yet others sampled in these countries are

not at the most politically relevant level. In a third group of countries, e.g. more politically cen-

tralised countries, such as Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia or Sweden, this issue becomes even more

challenging. The regions that we are targeting (NUTS 1 or NUTS 2), while meaningful in the

sense that EU development funds are targeted directly to them and that Eurostat reports annual

data on them, they have in some cases been mainly an invention for EU statistical purposes, and

none are politically meaningful. Therefore, in some cases, asking a respondent in some cases ‘how

would you rate the quality of “ ‘X” ’ service in your region of “ ‘Y” ’ might be very confusing, since

respondents from countries like Hungary or Romania might not recognise that they are even living

in region ‘Y’. It can therefore be argued that the administrative and political responsibility of

the regions in these three public services selected varies in different countries and thus this may

be problematic for this data gathering. However this study argues otherwise, in that we attempt

to capture all regional variation within a country and, as several other scholars have noted (e.g.

Tabellini, 2010; Charron and Lapuente, 2013), there are numerous empirical indications and some

anecdotal evidence pointing to the fact that the provision and quality of public services, even if

controlled by a powerful central government can nonetheless largely vary across different regions.

To synthesise the survey and make the results as comparable between and within countries as

possible, we asked respondents about their public services ’in their area.’

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Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

Table 1: Sample by Country

Country

Germany1

Romania

Italy

Austria

Poland2

Spain

Sweden3

Finland

Denmark

Ireland

Belgium4

Netherlands

Hungary5

Slovakia

Croatia

Bulgaria

France6

Czech Republic

Portugal

Greece7

Luxembourg

Estonia

Latvia

Lithuania8

Slovenia

Malta9

Cyprus10

NUTS regions

targeted n per NUT total respondents % sample

38 (16)

8

21

9

17

17

8

5

5

3

11 (3)

12

8

4

2

6

27

8

7

13

1

1

1

2

2

1

1

500

500

600

500

600

600

500

500

500

500

500

500

500

500

500

500

500

500

500

500

500

1000

1000

1000

500

500

500

19,293

4,168

12,907

4,516

10,559

10,409

4,077

2,496

2,555

1,507

5,713

6,163

4,083

2,081

1,039

3,082

14.84

3.21

9.93

3.47

8.12

8.01

3.14

1.92

1.97

1.16

4.39

4.74

3.14

1.60

0.80

2.37

13,292

10.23

4,948

3,575

6,842

520

1,066

1,038

2,039

1,016

505

502

3.81

2.75

5.26

0.40

0.82

0.80

1.57

0.78

0.39

0.39

1Sampled at NUTS 2 level, but for purposes of continuity with past years, the EQI data is reported at NUTS 1
2NUTS 2 increased from 16 to 17
3Sampled at NUTS 2 from NUTS 1 previously
4Sampled at NUTS 2 level, but for purposes of continuity with past years, the EQI data is reported at NUTS 1
5NUTS 2 increased from 7 to 8
6For overseas regions, online unavailable, CATI sample only
7Sampled at NUTS 2 from NUTS 1 previously
8Sampled at NUTS 2 from NUTS 1 previously
9Online unavailable, CATI sample only
10Online unavailable, CATI sample only

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Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

Table 2 reports the basic demographic distributions of the total sample and by survey adminis-

tration. On the whole, we see little difference by survey administration with respect to gender

or employment status. Yet we observe a clear trade-off in age, education and population of resi-

dence, in which the CATI respondents are older, more rural and lower educated than the online

respondents, which is quite consistent with previous research on hybrid studies11.

. As noted,

post-stratification weights will be included to comport the sample distribution with the population

distributions on gender, age and education.

Table 2: Sample Demographics: Total and by Survey Administration

Variable

CATI

Online

Total

Female

Male

Age: 18-29

Age: 30-49

Age: 50-64

Age: 65+

Education: < secondary

Education: secondary

Education: tertiary or >

Population: <10k

Population: 10k - 100k

Population: 100k - 1m

Population: >1m

Employment: Public sec.

Employment: Private sec.

Employment: Not working

51.5

48.5

16.8

34.9

25.6

22.5

27.6

38.4

33.9

34.1

37.1

18.8

5.2

19.2

40.9

38.7

51.7

48.3

20.5

38.5

25.2

15.6

11.8

39.0

49.2

28.1

38.4

23.2

6.9

19.0

42.8

33.0

51.6

48.4

18.6

36.7

25.4

19.1

19.8

38.7

41.4

31.1

37.8

21.0

6.1

19.1

41.8

35.9

11see for example: https://www.pewresearch.org/methods/2015/05/13/from-telephone-to-the-web-the-challenge-

of-mode-of-interview-effects-in-public-opinion-polls/

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Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

Finally, new to this year, we offered a wider scope of language choice to respondents living in areas

with significant and sizeable language diversity.. The regions and languages are as follows:

• Belgium (all regions, BE): French and Dutch

• Pais Vasco (ES21): Basque and Spanish

• Cataluña (ES51): Catalan and Spanish

• Valle d’Aosta (ITC2): French and Italian

• Bolzano/Bozen (ITH1): German and Italian

• Nord Vest, Centru (RO11 and RO12): Hungarian and Romanian

• Estonia (EE): Estonian and Russian

• Latvia (LV): Latvian and Russian

Figure 1: Areas in which Multiple Languages are Offered

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Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

3

2020 Survey Question Items

Several empirical (based on Annoni and Charron, 2019) and conceptual improvements were made

to the question items in the EQI index in 2017 that are continued here. In sum, two key changes

were been made. First, the question scale has been changed. In previous years we used an odd-

numbered 11 point scale. However, we found that the ‘5’ response (mid-point) was overused and

might lead to misleading results. An even ’10 point’ scale was subsequently employed to maintain

the variation of a larger scale but to eliminate the middle category which may at times have been

representing ‘don’t know’. We continue this in 2020. Second, two questions from the 2013 round

were removed due to poor performance, and three others were added, for a total of 17 question

items (compared with 16 in the first two rounds). In this year’s set of questions, we adjusted the

question on corruption in elections on the basis of the poor performance of the previous wording

elucidated from a Rasch analysis of the 2017 data.

We begin however by highlighting the ‘core’ questions that have remained in the three rounds

of the survey over time. First, in question 4-6 in the current survey, respondents rate the quality of

their three public services in question on a scale of ‘1’ (extremely poor quality) to ‘10’ (extremely

high quality):

Q4. How would you rate the quality of public education in your area?

Q5. How would you rate the quality of the public health care system in your area?

Q6. How would you rate the quality of the police force in your area?

The next six questions try to capture the extent to which public services are delivered impar-

tially in the regions of Europe.

‘Impartiality’ is admittedly a more complicated concept to put

forth to respondents than ‘quality’, so we framed this question in two ways – with a more neg-

ative tone and a more positive tone. In the first three questions (7-9), we asked citizens to rate

from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree) whether they agreed that ‘certain people’ get

special advantages when dealing with the public service in question. The second set of questions

(10-12), asks respondents on a four point scale (1. Agree, 2. Rather Agree, 3. Rather Disagree

or 4. Disagree) whether all people in their region are ‘treated equally’ by the service in question.

We used all six questions in the final index to allow for as much variation as possible while not

letting either the ‘positively’ or ‘negatively’ framed question alone determine the impartiality data.

Q7. “Certain people are given special advantages in the public education system in my

area.”

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Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

Q8. “Certain people are given special advantages in the public health care system in my

area.”

Q9. “The police force gives special advantages to certain people in my area.”

Please respond to the following 4 questions with ‘Agree, rather agree, rather disagree or Disagree’

Q10. “All citizens are treated equally in the public education system in my area.”

Q11. “All citizens are treated equally in the public health care system in my area.”

Q12. “All citizens are treated equally by the police force in my area.”

The next question, on elections, has been re-phrased as follows:

Q13. "In the area where I live, elections are conducted freely and fairly."

The next three questions deal with respondents’ perception of the extent to which corruption

is present in their public services, along with two general questions about how often they believe

that ‘others in their area’ use corruption to obtain public services. Again, perceptions may not

capture the full story, but, as Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009) argue, ‘perceptions matter

because agents base their actions on their perceptions, impression, and views’, thus, if citizens

believe their public services to be inefficient or corrupt, they are less likely to use these services.

Likewise with foreign firms and investment in countries perceived to be plagued with problems of

rent-seeking and public sector mismanagement. However, we complemented these questions with

additional questions about respondents’ actual experience with bribery later on. The perceptions

questions are scaled as 1-10, with ‘1’ being ‘strongly disagree’ and ‘10’ being ‘strongly agree’. In

addition, we defined the concept of corruption for the respondents to provide a baseline of common

understanding, which we expected to give additional comparative validity to these items. The re-

spondents thus heard/saw the following:

In this survey, we define corruption to mean ‘the abuse of entrusted public power for private gain’.

This ‘abuse’ could be by any public employee or politician and the ‘private gain’ might include

money, gifts or other benefits.

Q14. “Corruption is prevalent in my area’s local public school system.”

Q15. “Corruption is prevalent in the public health care system in my area.”

Q16. “Corruption is prevalent in the police force in my area.”

The following two questions were added in 2017. Here, instead of asking citizens about either

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Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

‘how often others engage in bribery to obtain public services’ (2010), or asking respondents about

corruption for ‘special advantages’ (2013), we split these ideas of so called ‘need’ and ‘greed’ cor-

ruption (see Bauhr, 2017) into the following two questions (1-10, with ‘1’ being “strongly disagree”

and ‘10’ being “strongly agree”):

Q17a. "People in my area must use some form of corruption to just to get some basic

public services."

Q17b. "Corruption in my area is used to get access to special unfair privileges and wealth."

In addition to the corruption perception questions, we asked about citizens’ direct experience with

corruption. In contrast to 2010 and 2013, where we only inquired about whether a respondent

paid a bribe for one of the public services in question, we followed the 2017 survey and inquired

whether the respondent was asked to pay a bribe by a public sector employee in one of the services

in question, as well as whether they paid, so as to attempt to capture the direction of who is the

‘initiator’. For the final index, we coded a respondent as ‘1’ for Q17 or 18 if they answered ‘yes’

to any of the four sub-questions.

Q18. In the last 12 months, have you or anyone in your family been asked by a public official

to give an informal gift or bribe in (1=yes, 2=No, 99=DK/refuse):

(a) Schools or other education services?

(b) Health or medical services?

(c) Police authorities?

(d) Any other government-run agency?

Q19. In the last 12 months, have you or anyone in your family given an informal gift or

paid a bribe to (1=yes, 2=No, 99=DK/refuse):

(a) Schools or other education services?

(b) Health or medical services?

(c) Police authorities?

(d) Any other government-run agency?

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Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

4 Construction of the 2021 EQI

As with the three previous rounds, we began by taking the country average from the World Bank’s

‘World Governance Indicators’ (WGI) data for four indicators:

‘control of corruption’, ‘govern-

ment effectiveness’, ‘rule of law’ and ‘voice and accountability’, which served as national estimates

around which the regional estimates were placed . The data was taken for the most recent year

of publication (in this case 2019). We began by standardising each WGI measure for the EU 27

sample. This figure was used as a country’s mean score in the EQI for all the countries in the

sample so as to combine those countries outside the survey with those in it, as well as to ‘anchor’

the regional QoG estimates in a national context that is not captured by the regionally-based

survey questions.

Table 3 shows the results of the latest national level WGI scores by country and indicator. The

countries are in rank order and grouped together based on the result of a cluster analysis of the

grouped together countries that were most similar on the four individual WGI indicators.12. The

scores were then added together (equal weighting) and then standardised within the sample of 30

European countries. As a point of reference, we also provided the rank-change from the 2017 EQI

(which used 2015 WGI data)

We see five cluster groups in the data. Again, we observe a ‘top’ cluster of northern/Western

EU member states, followed by a second group of mainly older member states. The one exception

is Estonia, which is the only new member state in the top two groups. The most difficult distinc-

tions were Greece and Hungary, which, depending on cut-off levels, could have belonged to either

group 4 or 5. We can observe that the rank order of countries has not changed significantly for

most of the states in the sample, as most changes are only 1-2 places. Notable exceptions are Malta

and Cyprus, which fell six and three places, respectively, and Slovenia, Spain and Lithuania, which

climbed three, three and four places in the EU27 rankings, respectively.

In addition, Hungary

and Croatia have now entered the bottom group, which Romania and Bulgaria had consistently

occupied among the EU27 countries in the first three rounds.

12Wards linkage and squared Euclidean distancing

17

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

Table 3: Country Level Governance Indicators and Rankings

Country CC

RL

GE

VA

AVE.

2017 rank Diff.

Group

FI

DK

SE

NL

LU

DE

AT

IE

BE

FR

EE

PT

SI

LT

ES

LT

CY

CZ

MT

SK

PL

IT

EL

HR

HU

BG

RO

2.15

2.11

2.12

2.00

2.11

1.90

1.55

1.46

1.55

1.30

1.54

0.76

0.91

0.68

0.65

0.48

0.60

0.51

0.24

0.33

0.60

0.24

-0.01

0.13

-0.01

-0.16

-0.13

2.02

1.9

1.91

1.81

1.79

1.62

1.88

1.39

1.36

1.41

1.28

1.14

1.12

1.02

0.98

1.01

0.76

1.05

0.95

0.56

0.45

0.28

0.20

0.37

0.49

0.04

0.36

1.93

1.94

1.83

1.80

1.73

1.59

1.49

1.28

1.03

1.38

1.17

1.15

1.08

1.04

1.00

1.11

0.99

0.89

0.86

0.67

0.6

0.47

0.41

0.41

0.50

0.34

-0.28

1.59

1.58

1.59

1.56

1.52

1.34

1.33

1.34

1.37

1.14

1.21

1.24

1.01

1.02

1.09

0.88

1.08

0.94

1.11

0.91

0.70

0.98

0.94

0.53

0.22

0.38

0.49

1.92

1.88

1.86

1.79

1.79

1.61

1.56

1.37

1.33

1.31

1.30

1.07

1.03

0.94

0.93

0.87

0.86

0.85

0.79

0.62

0.59

0.49

0.39

0.36

0.30

0.15

0.11

1

3

2

4

5

6

8

7

9

10

11

12

16

15

18

20

14

17

13

21

19

22

25

24

23

27

26

0

1

-1

0

0

0

1

-1

0

0

0

0

3

1

3

4

-3

-1

-6

1

-2

0

2

0

-2

1

-1

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

2

2

2

2

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

4

4

4

4

5

5

5

5

18

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

Table 4: Summary of Regional EQI Indicators

Pillar

Variable description

Name

Corruption

i. perceptions

ii. experiences

Impartiality

Quality

corruption in education

corruption in health care

corruption in law enforcement

need corruption

greed corruption

elections are fair and clean

stEdCorr

stHelCorr

stLawCorr

stNeedCorr

stGreedCorr

stElecCorr

asked to pay a bribe for public service

paid a bribe for public service

stnoAskBany1

stnopayBany1

some get special advantages in education

some get special advantages in health care

stEdImpart1

stHelImpart1

some get special advantages in law enforcement

stLawImpart1

all treated equally in education

all treated equally in health care

all treated equally in law enforcement

quality of education

quality of health care

quality of law enforcement

stEdImpart2

stHelImpart2

stLawImpart2

stEdQual

stHelQual

stLawQual

In the first two rounds, we then took the standardised sample mean for combined WGI data and

set each country’s national average as such. A key difference made in the 2017 round (and ret-

rospectively in all subsequent rounds) was that we aggregated to the WGI at the pillar levels of

corruption, impartiality and quality in order to better make use of these three distinct concepts

empirically. This also allows for the added advantage of a more valid comparison of unit changes

in each pillar over time. We followed this practice again in the 2021 round.

The regional data itself combines 17 survey questions about QoG in the region, which are shown

in Table 4. As noted, the questions are centred on three QoG concepts:

‘quality’, ‘impartiality’

and ‘corruption’. In building the regional index, we re-score each variable so that higher numbers

equate to higher QoG and then the 18 questions/indicators to three pillars based on factor analy-

19

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

sis13; We then averaged these three pillars together to form the final index figure for each region.

After each stage of aggregation, the data was standardised. For the countries without multiple

NUTS 2 regions, there is nothing to add to the WGI Country score, thus the WGI data is used as

the QoG estimate alone, as regional variation is unobserved. With respect to the countries with

regional data, we set the national average as the WGI for each of the three pillars and explained

the within country variance using the regional level data. The ‘roadmap’, so to speak, of the

aggregation process can be seen in Figure 2.

Figure 2: EQI 2021 Roadmap

Note: Aggregation from survey questions to regional level includes regional post-stratification weights, based on age,

gender and education. * denotes the stage in which the regional estimates are centred on the WGI data.

To begin, we aggregated the individual scores (‘survey question’) to the corresponding regional

level, so that each of the 17 questions in the index is now a regional ‘indicator’. Estimates are

13For corruption pillar, the regional estimates are centered round the ’control of corruption WGI score. For

impartiality, the estimates are set around the ‘government effectiveness’ WGI score. The regional impartiality

indicators are centered on the ‘rule of law’ and the regional ‘quality’ indicators are centered on the ‘voice and

accountability’ and ‘government effectiveness’ WGI national scores.

20

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

aggregated using post-stratification weighting, based on gender, age and education. All population

figures by region were taken from the latest Eurostat year (2019). The post-stratification weights

have the following property:

(cid:88)

iϵs

wixi
iϵs wi

(cid:80)

= ¯x

(1)

Where ‘s’ is the net sample, ‘wi’ is the post-stratification weight and ‘xi’ is the observation of
adjustment variable ‘x’, e.g. age, gender, or education, of the i-th element in ‘s’. Finally , ¯x the

population mean of x. The weights are then divided by their arithmetic mean to have a mean of ‘1’.

We tested the overall consistency of the 17 indicators with Cronbach’s Alpha, which was 0.971,

showing high levels of association.

In addition, of all the possible pairwise correlations, all are

positive when items are re-scaled so that higher scores equal higher QoG. Moreover, significance

tests showed that all pairwise correlations are significant (p<0.01). Next, factor analysis then

grouped the 17 indicators into more similar groupings, of which we find three with an Eigenvalue

above ‘1’. After normalising each of the 17 indicators (through z-score standardisation) so that

they share a common range, the 17 indicators were aggregated into the three groupings’ ‘pillars’.

The one exception is the corruption pillar, which had one additional step containing two sub-pillars

called ‘experience’ and ‘perceptions’, which represent question items reflecting personal experience

with petty corruption versus perception of corruption in various other areas. These two sub-pillars

were aggregated using equal weighting. The pillars were then aggregated into the regional index14.

After each step of aggregation, the data was standardised, such that the EU27 mean is ‘0’ with a

standard deviation of ‘1’.

A region’s score relative to its country mean is calculated via weighting each region’s score by

their share of the national population. This figure is thus used to explain regional variation only

within each country included (e.g. not absolute levels of QoG). We then subtract this mean score

from each region’s individual pillar score from the regional study, which shows if the region is

above or below its national average and by how much. This figure is then added to the national

level, WGI data, so each region has an adjusted score for each of the three pillars, centered on the

respective WGI indicators. It is worth mentioning that none of the regional variation from the

regional index is lost during this merging process; the country mean of all regional scores is simply

adjusted. The formula employed is the following:

EQIpillarxy = W GIy + (R.QoGx − CR.QoGy)

(2)

14Commission et al. (2008) point out that when combining multiple indicators into a single index, the underlying

data should be significantly correlated.

21

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

Where ‘EQI’ is the final score from region ’x’ (or country) in each pillar –corruption, impar-

tiality and quality - of the EQI within country ’y’ (where applicable). ‘WGI’ is the World Bank’s

national average for each country for each pillar, while ‘R.QoG’ is each region’s score from the re-

gional survey and ‘CR.QoG’ is the country average (weighted by regional population) of all regions

within the country from the regional survey for each pillar. The EQI pillars were standardised so

that the mean is ‘0’ with a standard deviation of ‘1’. The three pillar scores were then aggregated

using equal weighting.

A full list of the EQI for 2021 for all countries and regions is located on the homepage of the

Quality of Government Institute15. As per the results for 2010, 2013 and 2017, we found that

in several cases the data showed significant and wide variations in QoG within countries (Italy,

Belgium, Spain and France for example), while others showed little variation in regional QoG

(Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands, Slovakia).

15The regional and microdata for all rounds are freely available for download here: https://www.gu.se/en/quality-

government/qog-data/data-downloads/european-quality-of-government-index

22

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

5 Margins of Error for the 2021 EQI

As reported in the three previous rounds, we constructed margins of error for the regional es-

timates, similar to the authors of the WGI report ‘margins of error’, around each of the QoG

variables that are published annually. The idea is to construct a range around the regional esti-

mates so that we can say with some degree of certainty that region ‘x’s higher QoG score is in fact

‘significantly’ higher than region ‘y’s score. Although, in theory, any number can be chosen, we

selected a margin of error at the 95% confidence level. After obtaining the margin of error based

on our sample size, we then can calculated the distance around the estimates of QoG for each region.

To be precise, there are two ways to go about calculating the margin of error for survey data

– an ‘exact’ confidence interval and an ‘approximate’ confidence interval. The former takes into

account both sampling and non-sampling errors, while the latter only considers random sampling

errors. While the ‘exact’ interval may be more precise, we find the advantages of the ‘approximate’

confi- dence interval to far outweigh the drawbacks, in particular with respect to the efficiency and

time saved in the calculation. Moreover, we have no reason to suspect that there is any bias in

certain groups being excluded or not being forthright in their responses, so compensating for such

error is simply beyond our reach. Thus, we report an ‘approximate’ confidence interval for each

region’s EQI estimate.

We began by assuming a normal distribution of the sample so that we may use the Central Limit

Theorem. We know from basic statistical probability that in a sample ‘x’, 95% of the area of a

basic normal Bell curve is between our estimates (µ) 1.96+/- the standard error around µ. We

calculate the standard error as: S.E. = σ/

√

based around the QoG estimate: 1.96 +/- σ/

n. The margin of error for each individual region is
√

n, where n=17 for the 17 regional indicators used

to construct the EQI.

Figure 3 shows the results of the calculations. We can see that each region has its own indi-

vidual margin of error based on the consistency of the estimates for each of the 17 aggregated

questions in the survey. Regions in which aggregate responses to the QoG questions are inconsis-

tent (e.g. citizens feel that that the services are impartial, but lack good quality) will have higher

margins of error than those regions in which citizens rated the quality, impartiality and corruption

at a consistently high (or moderate or low) level.

The mean margin of error by region is 0.295 with a standard deviation of 0.081. The three regions

with the greatest level of consistency are Steiermark (AT22), Midtjylland (DK04) and Friuli-

Venezia Giulia (ITH4), with 0.11, 0.12 and 0.12 respectively. The three regions with the greatest

uncertainty around their estimates are the Budapest and Pest (HU11 and HU12) and Calabria

23

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

Figure 3: EQI in Rank order with Regional Margins of Error

Note: Estimates shown with 95% margins of error. Horizontal ’0’ line represents the EU27 mean.

(IT06) regions with 0.46, 0.47 and 0.50 respectively. Figure 3 shows the full range of countries and

regions, with confidence intervals around the estimates of the 2020 EQI. The highest ranked region

is the small, Swedish speaking, Finish island region of Åland (FI20), which shows as a positive

outlier for the third straight EQI round; while the region of Bucharest (RO32) is ranked lowest.

24

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

6 Testing the Uncertainty of the 2021 Estimates

In this section, we summarise a number of alternative simulations that were done in order to test

how sensitive the results are to our model assumptions and specifications. Specifically, we exam-

ined the effects of alternative weighting schemes, aggregation methods, and the standardisation

and exclusion of individual indicators in the index, to test how closely the results resemble those

finally reported.

In the 2021 version of the EQI, we continue the practice from 2017 (which was also retrospec-

tively applied to previous years). The method is now to centre the regional indicators around

national estimates for each of the three pillars – corruption, impartiality and quality – and thus,

in order to elucidate the results as clear as possible, we undertook sensitivity analyses for each of

the three pillars. In sum, the following adjustments were considered – testing the sensitivity with

all possible combinations:

Table 5: Alternative Construction Scenarios to Test Uncertainty

Model

Weighting Aggregation Excl. item Standardisation Micro to macro

original EQI

equal

arithmetic

none

z-score

standard

alternatives

factor

geometric

one at a

min-max

none

time

demographic

weighting

only online

only CATI

6.1 Corruption Pillar

Table 6 shows the top 10 most divergent scenarios from the 2021 EQI, un-centred corruption pillar

estimates. The table shows the various ways in which the original EQI roadmap has been altered,

along with the median shift in regional rank and the region with the greatest shift in rank due

to the alteration, as well as the direction of that shift. We used the Spearman Rank coefficient

as a metric to test the overall divergence from the original EQI. In general, we observed that the

corruption pillar is quite stable and robust to alterations. However, there is some evidence that

the online sample produced some divergent results, as the Spearman rank coefficient is 0.844 with

the final corruption sample. The CATI-alone sample also has a lower Spearman Rank. This could

25

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

be due to survey administration differences and their effect on issues such as social desirability

bias in answering sensitive questions about corruption, or the difference could be due to the fact

that when aggregating with the CATI or online samples alone, the observations per region were

reduced by 50%, which leads to more volatile estimates. In terms of individual regions, we noticed

that regions such as EL61 in Greece were reported as highly favourable among online respondents,

as their relative rank in the raw corruption scores increased by 134, while NL32 (Noord-Holland)

decreased by 96 spots when using only CATI respondents, as compared with the original (raw,

un-centred) rank order.

When looking at the other types of alterations – weighting, excluded indicators, aggregation and

standardisation, we can see that these alterations do not lead to significant differences in the over-

all ranking, as the Spearman coefficient does not drop below 0.95 for any of them. Yet, among

these, we observe that alterations that include factor weighting increase the uncertainty of the esti-

mates. The median shift in rank ranges between 11 and 12 for the 5 most deviant scenarios in

Table 5, which is relatively small given that there are 208 regions in the sample and these rankings

are un-centred by country.

Table 6: Top 5 Most Divergent Scenarios: Corruption Pillar

Aggregation Weights Excl. item Micro adj. Standard. Med. (max) Max reg. Spearman

arithmetic

none

none

arithmetic

none

none

arithmetic

arithmetic

arithmetic

Factor

Factor

Factor

Greedcorr
Bribepay
Needcorr

online

only

CATI

only

none

none

none

z-score

12(134)

EL61

0.844

z-score

12(96)

NL32

0.928

z-score

z-score

z-score

11.5(49)

11 (48)

11.5(56)

NL32

ITF6

NL11

0.953

0.956

0.957

Note: total of 208 regions, with 1st scenario representing the final index. These are the 5 scenarios

LEAST like the aggregated regional Corruption index used to build the EQI. Median shift is abso-

lute median shift. A total of 39 simulations were run.

There are a few outlying regions that are highly affected by alterations to the EQI index as-

sumptions however. Namely, the Greek regions of EL54 and EL61 ares highly sensitive to several

of the alterations, particularly the type of survey administration, moving at times over 100 places

in the rankings. Other regions that make substantial shifts in ranks (between 48 and 96 places)

in certain alternative simulations are Noord-Holland (NL32), Calabria (ITF6), Groningen (NL11),

and Zeeland (NL34).

26

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

6.2

Impartiality Pillar

Table 7: Top 5 Most Divergent Scenarios: Impartiality Pillar

Aggregation Weights Excl. item Micro adj. Standard. Med. (max) Max reg. Spearman

arithmetic

none

none

arithmetic

none

none

online

only

CATI

only

z-score

17(114)

BE3

0.76

z-score

11(58)

ES62

0.945

arithmetic

noe

none

unweighted

z-score

arithmetic

geometric

Factor

Factor

edimpart1
edimpart1

none

none

z-score

min-max

5 (51)

4 (25)

4 (26)

AT33

HU11

HU11

0.985

0.993

0.993

Note: total of 208 regions, with 1st scenario representing the final index. These are the 5 scenarios

LEAST like the aggregated regional Corruption index used to build the EQI. Median shift is abso-

lute median shift. A total of 34 simulations were run.

In the case of impartiality, we can observe that the divergence from the main (raw, un-centred)

corruption ranks are most deviant when aggregating only the online sample from the micro-level to

the regional level, with a Spearman rank of 0.76. Again, we can also observe that the CATI-alone

aggregated estimates are the second most deviant, yet the Spearman rank is considerably higher, at

0.945. The median shifts for these two most divergent scenarios are 17 and 11, respectively. How-

ever, we can see that all other types of adjustments led to very little divergence from the original

raw rankings. When aggregating without post-stratification demographic weights, the Spearman

is 0.985, and setting aside the first impartiality question on education, using factor weighting and

either arithmetic or geometric aggregation are the fourth and fifth most divergent scenarios. How-

ever, the Spearman rank is above 0.99 in both cases and the median shift is just 4 ranks.

In terms of the individual regions most affected by the various decisions made to build the impar-

tiality index, Wallonie (BE3) is most sensitive to survey administration (online only), followed by

Murcia (ES62) in Spain (CATI only). The Austrian province of Tyrol (AT33) is the most affected

when using unweighted micro data, while in scenarios 4 and 5 in Table 6 the capital region of

Budapest (HU11) drops 25 and 26 places, respectively.

27

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

6.3 Quality Pillar

Table 8: Top 5 Most Divergent Scenarios: Quality Pillar

Aggregation Weights Excl. item Micro adj. Standard. Med. (max) Max reg. Spearman

arithmetic

none

none

online

z-score

15(121)

EL61

0.830

geometric

geometric

arithmetic

none

factor

none

edqual
edqual
none

arithmetic

none

none

only

none

none

CATI

only

none

min-max

14 (99)

min-max

14(100)

z-score

12 (61)

IE05

IE05

RO11

0.908

0.909

0.944

min-max

9 (59)

ES42

0.960

Note: total of 208 regions, with 1st scenario representing the final index. These are the 5 scenarios

LEAST like the aggregated regional Corruption index used to build the EQI. Median shift is abso-

lute median shift. A total of 22 simulations were run.

In the case of the quality pillar items, we can again observe that the most deviant case is when

we aggregate the online respondents only from the microdata. The Spearman Rank in this case

is 0.83, with a median shift of 15. Next, we can see that geometric aggregation together with

min-max standardisation and excluding the item on education quality leads to the next two most

deviant scenarios, with Spearman ranks of 0.908 and 0.909, respectively. Both have median shifts

of 14 places in the un-centred regional rankings. The CATI only aggregated data is the fourth

most deviant case, with a Spearman rank of 0.944, while the unweighted microdata ranks fifth,

with a Spearman rank of 0.96.

With respect to the individual regions most affected by the adjustments in the quality data, we

found again that the Greek region of EL61 is the most sensitive to the online only aggregation

sample, while the Irish region of IE05 (Southern) is the most sensitive to the exclusion of the

education item. The Romanian region of Nord Vest (RO11) moves 61 places from its original rank

when aggregating with only CATI respondents, while Castile-La Mancha (ES42) moves 59 places

when aggregating microdata without weighting.

Overall, the uncertainty tests tell a fairly clear story. First, the EQI rankings are most sensi-

tive to changes made during the micro-level aggregation, not to decisions made after the regional

data has been aggregated. Second, the online-only estimates are most deviant from the original,

un-centred rankings for each pillar. We therefore re-built the final EQI index using samples of the

exclusive CATI and online groups and compared the two to elucidate, after post-country centring,

which regions are most sensitive to survey administration and in what direction. We calculated

margins of error for each estimate and tested whether CATI and online EQI estimates differ sig-

28

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

nificantly.

Figure 4: Significant Differences in Online versus CATI Aggregation

Note: estimates produced using separate samples and margins of error calculated via method shown in section 5.

non-significant differences are not shown. Y-axis is overall EQI score, and x-axis is the region’s rank on the original

EQI index.

We found that in 91% of the regions there is no significant difference between the online and

CATI estimates for the full index. Yet in 9% of the regions (19) we found that the margins of error

do not overlap, and they are shown above in Figure 4. For regions in which the orange full circle

is above the hollow blue circle, such as ITH1 (Bolzano), these are ‘favoured’ by the online sample,

while the regions in which the blue hollow circle is above the orange circle are ‘favoured’ by the

CATI respondents.

29

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

7 Final Index: Regional Variation of EQI and External Va-

lidity Checks

In the interest of space, all EQI, pillar and margin of error estimates are listed in the appendix

of this document. Figure 4 summarises the final index; showing the countries in rank order from

top to bottom on the y-axis and regional variation on the x-axis. As with the 2013 and 2017 EQI

index, the Swedish speaking, Finish island region of Åland is an outlier at the top of the index

ranking.

Figure 5: Countries in Rank Order and Regional Variation of 2021 EQI

Note: highest regional score in each country with regional data labeled via NUTS code.

The following figures show the results of the EQI index for the four years of data. The previous

three years have been re-calculated with the current methodology and a sample of the 2017 EQI

for a more direct comparison over time. A major change from previous years is the absence of the

UK, which left the EU prior to the 2021 data. As the UK was not included in the current round,

we re-calculated past years for the EU27 sample only to make them comparable with 2021.

Based on the two figures above, we can observe several interesting features of the 2021 data. One,

30

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

Figure 6: 2021 EQI

as with previous years, there is significant regional variation in some countries, while there is very

little in others. Italy, Spain, France (in particular when considering the overseas regions), Belgium

and Romania have quite considerable regional spans in the data. In addition, the range in Poland,

Germany and Greece has increased since the previous round. Slovenia is also a noteworthy case,

with the eastern region (SI03) being roughly 0.6 standard deviations above the western region of

SI04. Moreover, the former is above the EU27 mean (one of only three such new member state

regions), while the latter is under it. We also found, for the first time, significant variation between

two Irish regions, as the Dublin region (IE06) is significantly lower than the Southern region (IE05)

according to the margins of error. In other cases, the within country regional variation is modest or

very low, as in Sweden, Denmark, Austria, or Slovakia, where no pairwise differences are significant.

Table 9 shows the pairwise correlations among the current 2020 pillars and main index, along

with how they relate to previous years of the EQI. We found that each of the three 2021 pillars

is correlated at 0.947 or higher with the main index. As expected, the pillars are also strongly

correlated with one another, yet slightly less so, indicating that they do indeed represent distinct

concepts. For instance, the weakest correlation is between corruption and quality (0.866), while

the strongest is between corruption and impartiality (0.916). We also observed that the 2021 index

and its pillars are strongly related to previous years. We adjusted the 2010, 2013 and 2017 versions

31

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

to the EU 27 sample, thus increasing the validity of the pairwise comparisons. We can see that

2021 has the highest pairwise correlation with the most recent year (2017), yet still has pairwise

correlations over 092 with the years 2010 and 2013, supporting previous years’ findings that the

data is indeed ‘sticky’ over time, even despite the Covid-19 pandemic.

Table 9: Pairwise correlations among 2021 EQI pillars and past years

Variable

EQI2021 Corr.2021

Imp. 2021 Qual.2021 EQI2017 EQI2013

Corrup. 2021

0.962

1

Impart. 2021

0.965

0.916

1

Quality 2021

0.947

0.866

0.876

1

EQI 2017 (adj)

0.952

0.936

0.921

0.898

1

EQI 2013 (adj)

0.923

0.933

0.881

0.869

0.957

1

EQI 2010 (adj)

0.931

0.905

0.898

0.892

0.930

0.941

1

Note: Pairwise Pearson correlation statistics reported, n=208. 2010-2017 EQI are adjusted to the

EU27 sample for comparability. All coefficients are statistically significant (p<0.001)

In Table 10 below, we expand the simple pairwise correlation analysis to check for external validity

of the measure by making two sets of comparisons. First, to establish a type of external validity

called ‘convergent validation’, in which we expect relatively high correlation with alternative mea-

sures of the concept (Adcock and Collier, 2001), we compared the 2021 EQI with other possible

alternative measures of QoG at the regional level for as many EU NUTS regions as possible. As

there are not many to choose from at this time, we limit this to three alternatives - the aggregated

corruption perceptions from a recent OECD study in 2016 (OECD, 2016), a measure of corruption

risk in procurement (% ’single bidding’ by region from 2017, (Fazekas and Kocsis, 2020), and a

measure of perceived meritocracy in the public sector from Charron, Dahlström, and Lapuente

(2016), which is measured in 2013. Next, to test for so called ’construct validity’, we checked the

degree of correlation with factors we expect to be correlated with QoG based on a priori theory

and findings from the literature. In this case, we expected that indicators of socio-economic de-

velopment, such as the human development index (HDI)16, per capita wealth, poverty rates and

16data on the HDI was collected from https://globaldatalab.org . All other measures of economic development

are from Eurostat.

32

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

average life expectancy to be significantly correlated with the EQI. We also added an indicator of

regional development (or lack there of) in that we show correlations with the % of the population

who have never used the internet. Based on numerous findings in the literature, we also anticipate

that social trust (from Charron and Rothstein (2018)) and political gender equality (from Sund-

ström and Wängnerud (2016)) are positively related to the EQI. Finally, we included the size of a

region in terms of area, which serves as a sort of placebo – we thus did not expect any relationship

between regional size and the EQI.

Table 10: Pairwise correlations among Regional QoG Alternatives & Covariates

Variable

EQI2021 Qual.2021

Imp. 2021 Corr.2021

Alternative measures of QoG

corruption perceptions (OECD)

% single bids

meritocracy in public sector

Other Covariates

HDI (2018)

PPP per capita (logged, 2018)

Ave. Life exp. (2018)

% poverty rate (2018)

% Never used internet (2018)

% women in local parl. (2015)

Social trust (2017)

Area (sq. Km)

0.79

-0.53

0.72

0.64

0.61

0.45

-0.63

-0.83

0.53

0.55

0.04

0.70

-0.50

0.69

0.63

0.61

0.55

-0.59

-0.74

0.51

0.56

0.002

0.74

-0.53

0.71

0.6

0.58

0.37

-0.6

-0.82

0.55

0.49

0.06

0.83

-0.51

0.69

0.62

0.76

0.38

-0.55

-0.79

0.5

0.55

0.01

Overall, based on the table above, we found strong evidence of both types of external validity. We

can see that perceptions of corruption from an alternative source data (and from over five years

earlier) correlate with the EQI at nearly 0.8 and with the corruption pillar at 0.83. Meritocracy in

the public sector, which can be considered a narrow form of QoG or a direct cause of it, correlates

with the EQI at 0.72 and with our measure of impartiality at 0.71. Single bidding in procurement,

which represents a high level of grand corruption/ elite collusion, is also significantly correlated in

the expected direction, at -0.53.

Regarding the covariates, we found that both the measure of GDP per capita, as well as the

broader HDI measure (see Figure 6) and poverty rates, correlate at 0.61, 0.64 and -0.63, respec-

tively, meaning that QoG and development are strongly related but yet theoretically and empiri-

33

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

cally separate. Life expectancy is also significantly correlated (0.45) and in the expected direction,

with the quality of services pillar yielding the highest correlation with this measure (0.55). The

measure of (lack of) internet use is also highly correlated with regional QoG, at -0.83, meaning

areas in the EU27 with the least internet use are also those with the lowest QoG. In addition,

we found that the indicators % of women in parliament and social trust both correlate signifi-

cantly, at roughly 0.5 or greater, with the EQI and all pillars. Lastly, the variable for which we

did not anticipate a correlation with the EQI (area) does, indeed, not yield a significant correlation.

Figure 7: 2021 EQI and the HDI

note: line represents bivariate, least squares regression fit. EQI 2021 shown on Y-axis

34

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

8 Overall and Recent Time Trends in the EQI

In this section, we seek to identify if any of our regions have shown a significant trend in a positive

or negative direction in the data over time. We test both over the entire time period as well as

from the past year (2017). This is useful to identify potentially interesting case studies and to

investigate policy ideas from recent success cases. We organised the adjusted EU27 EQI data

into a panel dataset for all regions covered with the four years. While it is of course difficult to

identify a clear trend from four years in a panel data set per observation, even based on these

limited observations we can conduct simple tests that can help us reveal and possible time trends

in the data. We began with an analysis of variance (ANOVA) test below to determine whether

significant changes have occurred within groups over time. For this, we ran an ANOVA test with

an interaction term between the year and a dummy variable for each region (along with the two

constituent terms) to determine if any trends within the regions are significant.

Table 11: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) Test

Source

Model

Partial of SS df

795.8

417

MS

1.91

F-stat

prob>F

26.1

0.000

Year

Reg. dummy

Interaction

0.0003

55.1

28.8

1

209

207

0.0003

0.01

0.32

0.10

4.4

1.5

0.94

0.000

0.002

Residual

9.7

416

0.07

Total

826.2

833

0.99

The results in the above table show that there is at least some significant variance within the

regions over time during the four years, as the interaction term between the regional dummy vari-

ables and time is significant (p=0.002). We then proceeded to time series data regression in order

to elucidate which regions in fact have made such significant changes and in which direction the

change was made.

The regression model is specified as follows:

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Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

EQIrt = δrNr + θt + βr(Nr ∗ θt) + ϵrt

(3)

Where EQI is the index used to capture institutional quality in region (or country) r in the year t (r

= 1, 2,. . . . r, and t = 0, 1, 2, and 3 which equate to 2010, 2013, 2017 and 2021), and where Nr = 1
for region ’r’ and 0 if otherwise, and ϵrt the error term. The constant term is omitted17. This model
can be estimated with simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, where δr elucidates fixed
spatial differences in levels of the EQI and θt captures the fixed time effects (e.g. a year count).
βr is the interaction term, which captures temporal trends in the EQI for each region. As regards
time trends within regions over time, the null hypothesis states that there are no significant time

trends (e.g. βr is insignificant). Where we observe significant trends (positive or negative) from
the baseline year, such regions can be considered to have made a significant change in governance.

The interpretation of βr is thus the average marginal change in the EQI for each region over the
three years since the baseline year of 2010.

Table 12: Top 10 Regions with Greatest Average Positive Change in EQI since 2010

Region

NUTS code Ave. change P-value (2-tailed)

Severen tsentralen

Vest

Praha

Severozapaden

Lithuania

Gelderland

Bucuresti - Ilfov

Jadranska Hrvatska

Friesland

Puglia

BG32

RO42

CZ01

BG31

LT

NL22

RO32

HR03

NL12

ITF4

0.298

0.284

0.254

0.250

0.245

0.225

0.213

0.181

0.175

0.171

0.002

0.002

0.005

0.006

0.007

0.011

0.016

0.033

0.037

0.044

Table 12 shows the top 10 regions with the greatest average marginal change over the four years

of the EQI. All average marginal changes are statistically significant in Table 12 (p<0.05). The

17Several of our 2021 regions have changed since 2017, and thus we make several adjustments to compare these

over time for the purpose of this analysis. First, Ireland’s 3 NUTS regions are not comparable with the previous

two, NUTS 2 regions, and thus we employ the country level (WGI) estimates to compare Ireland over time here. We

do the same for Lithuania, which has recently split into two NUTS 2 regions to unify the comparisons. Hungary and

Poland, which have both added a specific capital region. For the time comparisons in this section, we use the older

regions (PL12 and HU10) as our units, whereby we take the population weighted average of the two new regions for

2021 to construct the estimates for this year. More on regional changes and EQI variation in Ireland can be found

in the appendix, section 10.5

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Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

top region in this respect is the Bulgarian region, Severen tsentralen (BG32), which has had an

average change of nearly 0.30 standard deviations from the baseline 2010 year18. Regions 2-5 are

all regions from Eastern and Central Europe, with the capital region of Prague (CZ01) yielding

the third greatest average change since 2010. However, not all are newer member regions, as three

of the regions at the bottom of this table are from older member states, namely two Dutch regions

– Gelderland (NL22), and Friesland (NL12) – which have improved at a rate of roughly 0.23 and

0.18 standard deviations per year, respectively, since 2010.

Table 13: List of Regions with Greatest Positive Change in EQI since 2017

Region

Guyane

Abruzzo

Umbria

Yugoiztochen

Comunitat Valenciana

Illes Balears

Severozapaden

Piemonte

Marche

Liguria

La Rioja

Zahodna Slovenija

NUTS code EQI 2017 EQI 2020 Change from ’17

FRY3

ITF1

ITI2

BG34

ES52

ES53

BG31

ITC1

ITI3

ITC3

ES23

SI04

-1.454

-1.85

-1.407

-2.064

-0.358

-0.455

-2.158

-1.091

-1.268

-1.147

0.335

-0.216

-0.66

-1.111

-0.734

-1.403

0.283

0.178

-1.581

-0.517

-0.746

-0.63

0.845

0.283

0.79

0.74

0.67

0.66

0.64

0.63

0.58

0.57

0.52

0.52

0.51

0.50

Table 13 shows the regions with the greatest positive changes in the overall EQI since 2017. All

regions have a 0.5 standard deviation increase or greater. The top region is the French overseas

region of Guyane (from -1.45 to -0.66), followed by the two Italian regions of Abruzzo and Umbria.

Two additional Italian regions, Piemonte and Marche also yielded noteworthy positive changes

since 2017. We see two Bulgarian regions (BG34 and BG31) that have made significant increases,

yet from very low scores of under -2.0 in 2017. Three Spanish regions have also made a significant

climb in the data since 2017, Illes Balers and Valencia, which moved from below the overall EQI

mean of ‘0’ to above it in 2020, and La Rioja, which climbed to a score of 0.845, ranking it near

the top 25% of all EU 27 regions. Finally, the capital region of Slovenia (SI04) made a sizeable

climb of roughly 0.5 since the previous EQI round.

Figure 7 illustrates significant positive and negative change in the EQI since 2017. We observe in

this figure that the most significant recent over time change has been in southern Europe and East-

18The actual change has gone from -2.11 to -1.23 in 2021.

37

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

ern/Central Europe, as only one region in Northwest EU countries (Bremen) has made a change

of at least 0.5 standard deviations or more. Along with the net positive changers since 2017 we

observed in Table 10, the data show five Polish regions dropping significant since 2017, along with

Észak-Magyarország (HU31) in Hungary, the German region of Bremen, the overseas French region

of Mayotte (FRY5) and the Romanian capital region of Bucures,ti-Ilfov (RO32). The change made
by the Bucharest region now renders it the lowest ranked in the 2021 EQI data.

Figure 8: Significant regional changes since 2017

Note: Blue (red) indicates significant positive (negative) changes of at least 0.5 standard deviations since 2017.

38

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

9 Conclusions: Part I

The 2021 round of the EQI is the largest survey ever undertaken to measure the perceptions of

quality of government. It collects the opinions of over 129,000 respondents in a total of 208 NUTS

1 and NUTS 2 regions in all EU 27 member state countries, using both CATI and online survey

administration. Since this survey builds on previous rounds of the survey (2010, 2013 and 2017)

it also allows for systematic analysis of shifts over time and how both changes and inertia can be

explained. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it also seeks to gauge the opinions of Europeans

in a particularly dramatic point in time, in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic. This allows for

several new and important insights into the link between institutional performance and quality

of government. In particular it allows for important insights into the quality of public services in

three of the public service sectors perhaps most closely involved in managing the consequences and

responses to the crises; health care, education and law enforcement.

In this report, we highlight some of the most important changes to the data and key results

of the EQI 2021 survey. First, we see some improvements in citizens’ perceptions of the quality of

government between 2017 and 2021. Citizens rate the quality of public service delivery higher and

report lower level of bribing and other forms of corruption. Second, we see that citizens in regions

with higher quality of government are less worried about the economic and health consequences of

the pandemic, and are more likely to perceive that their authorities have handled the crises well.

In particular, past levels of corruption perceptions is strongly related to economic worries due to

Covid -19 (see Appendix for more on this point). Third, we find that the geography of regional QoG

is slowly shifting. While several Eastern European regions seem to be on a rise, several southern

European regions see a marked decline. Fourth, we see a remarkable convergence between regions

in some countries, while we see a divergence within others. Fifth, looking at just the capital region

score compared to their country mean, we also find a stark and noticeable variation in the scores of

EU’s capital regions, with some capital regions being way below their country mean, while others

are significantly higher. Finally, we see noticeable decline in the EQI inn most regions in Poland

and Hungary relative to the EU average. Thus, a key lesson from the EQI project overall is the

measuring of QoG over time and the importance of tracking such dynamic changes.

The survey also shows the critical link between countries and regions that recently experienced

substantial democratic backsliding and perceptions of quality of government. While quality of

government is clearly distinct from democratic performance, infringement on media rights and the

independence of the judicial system is clearly linked to reduced quality of government.

In the next part of the report (Part II), we further investigate regional variation of QoG within

two countries - Spain and Poland (see the Interim Report for more details of case selection). In

Spain, we highlight some of the reasons why regions are diverging with respect to QoG, namely the

39

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

divergence of Pais Vasco and Catalonia. In our other set of regional cases (Opolskie and Lubelskie),

we observe that while both Hungary and Poland experienced a decline in quality of government,

it seem important to understand why some regions, such as the Opolskie region in Poland and

the Pest region in Hungary seem to have evaded the general drop. A wealth of empirical evidence

suggest that while democracies may not always be as effective as theories predict to reduce cor-

ruption levels, examples of autocracies that manage to contain corruption are very rare. In most

international comparisons, liberal democracies fare the best in terms of containing corruption and

improving the quality of government (Bauhr and Grimes, 2021).

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Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

10 Appendix

10.1

: The effect of Covid-19 perceptions on attitudes to QoG from the

2020 EQI Pilot

As noted, the original survey was scheduled to go into the field in March/April of 2020. Yet due

to the many uncertainties created by the Covd-19 pandemic, we decided to delay going into thee

field en masse, and to instead assess the impact of Covid-19 on the overall response of the EQI

core questions. Instead, we invested a small portion of the budget to conduct a pilot survey in

three selected countries - Germany, Italy and Romania. The sample consists of 1000 respondents

(500 via CATI and 500 online) in each country, for a total of just over 3000. We present and

summarize our findings here in appendix section. Our main inquiry here is whether the pandemic

has a noticeable effect on responses. While we cannot prove causality, we do test for several empir-

ical implications. First, we look at the overall correlations between our three questions regarding

Covid19 attitudes and each individual EQI core question, controlling for a host of demographic

factors, survey administration and country fixed effects. Next, we compare mean scores across

all EQI core questions for each country with previous years to test whether there are significant

differences between the two years and if so, to what magnitude (in terms of standard deviation

changes). Third, we compare previous changes in the 2013 to 2017 round of the EQI data prior

to Covid19 for Germany, Italy and Romania to provide a context through which we can assess the

magnitude of any current changes.

10.2 The relationship between Covid-19 and EQI core questions

To gauge citizen attitudes of Covid-19, we inquired about three issues in the questions below:

1. How would you rate how the authorities are handling the Coronavirus in your area? (1=very

good, 2=somewhat good, 3=somewhat bad, 4= very bad, 99=DK/refuse)

2. Personally, how worried are you about the effect of the Coronavirus/COVID19 on the fol-

lowing?: (1=very worried, 2=somewhat worried, 3=not so worried, 4=not at all worried)

• your own or your family’s health?

• your own or your family’s economy?

The first question asks about one’s perception of the institutional response to Covid-19, while the

other two questions inquire about citizens’ personal worries. We begin in Figure 1 with the general

41

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

satisfaction of citizens regarding the authorities’ handling of Covid-19 where they live. The data

reveal that Germans show on average the highest level of satisfaction (1.86) and the mean differ-

ence between Germans and the other two countries is statistically significant (p<0.05, two-tailed

t-test). Yet the means between Romania and Italy are statistically indistinguishable (p=0.09).

However, overall, respondents in all three countries show striking high level of satisfaction.

Figure 1: Summary of Satisfaction with Handling of Covid19

Note: question ranked from 1-4, with lower scores equally higher perceived quality of handling Covid19.

Next, we examine the relationship between individual level responses on the three ques-

tions above with responses on the EQI core questions. The figures below show the marginal effects

from ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of a one-unit increase of each of these three questions

on levels of each of the EQI questions, controlling for age, gender, income, education, occupation,

population of residence, type of survey administration and country of residence, along with survey

weights. In the analyses below, we reverse the scale of the satisfaction question (1) to indicate

that higher scores equal more satisfaction, while increase in the other two questions indicate more

personal worry about the virus. All EQI questions below have been re-scaled so that higher values

equal higher ‘quality of government’ (‘QoG’, e.g. higher quality, greater impartiality and lower

corruption). In addition, all questions are standardized (z-score) so that we observe a standard

deviation change in the question as a results of a one unit increase of the Covid-19 questions.

The results are quite consistent across all EQI core questions, highlighted in Figures 2-8. We

find very unsurprisingly that positive perceptions of Covid-19 handling equate with better percep-

42

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

tions of QoG across the board. The effect is significant in all models and the magnitude of the

effect is between 0.18 and 0.35 standard deviations of the EQI core items, depending on the ques-

tion. Conversely, we find that personal worry about one’s own or family’s health due to Covid-19

has no significant association with any of the EQI perceptions questions of quality, impartiality or

corruption. The question regarding economic worry does have some statistically significant asso-

ciation with 11 of the 14 EQI questions, yet the magnitude is often quite small (<0.10 standard

deviations).

Figure 2: Covid-19 Attitudes and Perceptions of Service Quality

Note: estimates (dots) show the effect of a one unit increase in the Covid-19 variables on each EQI questions, which

are measured in terms of (z-score) standard deviations. Dots to the right side of the zero line have a positive effect,

while dots on the left side show a negative effect. 95% confidence intervals.

43

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

Figure 3: Covid-19 Attitudes and Perceptions of Service Impartiality:Education

Figure 4: Covid-19 Attitudes and Perceptions of Service Impartiality: Health

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Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

Figure 5: Covid-19 Attitudes and Perceptions of Service Impartiality: Law Enforce-

ment

Figure 6: Covid-19 Attitudes and Perceptions of Corruption

45

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

Figure 7: Covid-19 Attitudes and Perceptions of Corruption

Having looked at the questions on perceptions of services, we now turn to personal experiences,

using logistic regression (as all outcomes are now binary). We find that having contact with any of

our public services in question does not associate with any attitudes on Covid-19. However, we do

observe that the questions have a small, but significant effect on some aspects of petty corruption

experiences. First, people who rate the Covid-19 response by authorities more positively tend to

report few experiences with either being asked or having paid a bribe for any service in question,

which is in line with our expectations. Second, the more worried a respondent is about their own

or their family’s health, the more likely they are to report instances of being asked and having

paid a bribe. This could be due to services being limited during the pandemic, which offers more

opportunities for rent seekers combined with people’s willingness to pay an extra sum for a service

when they feel rather desperate. Economic worry is also associated with being asked to pay, yet

not having paid, all things being equal.

46

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

Figure 8: Covid-19 Attitudes and Experiences with Corruption

Note: change in logged odds shows, with 95% confidence intervals from logistic regression, controlling for age, gender,

income, education, occupation, population of residence, type of survey administration and country of residence, along

with survey weights.

10.3 Comparing changes in mean responses to QoG questions over time.

We now move to examine whether there are any changes in the core EQI questions from the pre-

vious round (2017), and if so which direction. Additionally, we examine the magnitude of the

change and the level of significance (based on two-sample t-tests). As there are clear country-level

contextual differences in the responses, we take each country one at a time, comparing the levels

using the 10-point scale respondents in 2020 with the similar scales in 2017 and 2013. As our pilot

sample consists of just 1000 respondents per country, we do not have the sample size in 2020 to

dis-aggregate to the regional level, but the country effects are elucidating nonetheless.

Table A1: Comparing Germany’s scores over past 3 EQI rounds on Core Questions

Indicator

2020

95% c.i.

2017

95% c.i.

diff.

s.d. diff.

2013-17

s.d. diff

qualEd10

qualHel10

qualLaw10

impEd10

impHel10

6.97

7.29

7.28

5.88

5.55

6.73,7.22

7.03,7.55

7.02,7.54

5.5,6.25

5.16,5.94

6.26

6.58

6.75

6.37

5.72

6.21,6.3

0.72*

6.53,6.62

0.71*

6.7,6.79

0.53*

0.38

0.37

0.27

6.31,6.44

-0.50*

-0.18

5.65,5.78

-0.17

-0.06

-0.07

-0.06

0.3

-0.69

-0.62

-0.04

-0.03

0.15

-0.25

-0.22

47

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

impLaw10

impEd2

impHel2

impLaw2

corrEd10

corrHel10

corrLaw10

need10

6.8

3.08

2.83

3.16

7.41

7.02

7.38

8.09

6.41,7.18

7.2

7.13,7.26

-0.4

-0.15

-0.49

-0.19

2.96,3.21

2.7,2.97

3.04,3.28

7.02,7.79

6.63,7.4

2.81

2.55

3.02

8.02

7.24

2.78,2.83

0.28*

2.52,2.57

0.28*

3.0,3.05

0.14

0.27

0.27

0.14

7.97,8.08

-0.62*

-0.26

7.18,7.3

-0.22

-0.09

6.99,7.76

7.9

7.84,7.95

-0.52*

-0.22

7.73,8.46

8.42

8.37,8.48

-0.33

-0.14

0.05

0.11

0.07

-0.05

-0.03

-0.12

0.04

0.1

0.07

-0.02

-0.01

-0.05

greed10

7.44

7.03,7.84

7.49

7.43,7.56

-0.06

-0.02

Note: weighted means reported. Number of observations for 2020 and 2017 is 240 and 6,799

respectively. Two-tailed t-test of independent samples is reported in ‘diff ’ columns (2020-2017),

*p<0.05. Red indicates that the standard deviation change was larger between 2017 and 2020 than

in the comparing set of years (2013 to 2017).

Beginning with Germany in Table A1, we show the weighted mean values for 2020 in relation

to the weighted mean values for 2017, along with the confidence intervals around each point es-

timate. In general, we observe that the average scores for EQI core questions in Germany have

made modest, yet significant changes for most questions comparing 2020 and 2017, where t-test

differences of means yields a significant change in 8 or 14 items (*p<0.05). Morover, in only three

of these cases (impartiality in education 1, corruption in education and law enforcement), the

scores imply higher QoG, not lower.

To put these findings into context we also compare similar changes from 2013 to 2017. We see that

from 2017 to 2020 that the changes were larger in terms of standard deviation increases from one

round to the next (marked in bold red), with the exception being the three questions on impar-

tiality, which were showed larger declines from 2013 to 2017 than from 2017 to 2020. Overall, the

changes are larger from 2017 to 2020, but the majority of these reflect positive and statistically

significant changes.

Table A2: Comparing Italy’s scores over past 3 EQI rounds on Core Questions

Indicator

2020

95% c.i.

2017

95% c.i.

diff.

s.d. diff.

2013-17

s.d. diff

qualEd10

qualHel10

qualLaw10

6.82

6.7

6.77

6.63,7.0

6.5,6.9

6.56,6.99

6.08

5.83

6.26

6.03,6.13

0.73*

5.78,5.88

0.87*

6.21,6.31

0.52*

0.34

0.37

0.24

-0.51

-0.46

-0.58

-0.24

-0.2

-0.26

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Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
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impEd10

impHel10

impLaw10

impEd2

impHel2

impLaw2

corrEd10

corrHel10

corrLaw10

need10

6.49

5.87

6.39

3.01

2.92

2.93

6.83

6.44

6.6

6.62

6.21,6.76

5.59,6.15

6.11,6.67

2.93,3.09

2.82,3.01

2.84,3.02

6.57,7.1

6.15,6.73

6.31,6.88

6.32,6.92

5.95

5.61

6.04

2.72

2.59

2.79

6.22

5.83

6.24

6.61

5.89,6.01

0.54*

0.2

5.55,5.67

0.26

5.98,6.1

0.35*

2.7,2.74

0.29

2.57,2.61

0.32*

2.76,2.81

0.14*

6.16,6.28

0.61*

5.7,5.89

6.18,6.3

0.61*

0.36*

0.09

0.13

0.27

0.31

0.14

0.22

0.22

0.13

6.55,6.67

0.01

0

-0.81

-0.26

-0.98

-0.18

-0.06

-0.21

-1.01

-0.25

-0.97

-0.3

-0.09

-0.37

-0.17

-0.06

-0.2

-0.37

-0.09

-0.36

greed10

6.3

6.01,6.6

6.18

6.11,6.24

0.13

0.05

Note: weighted means reported. Number of observations for 2020 and 2017 is 278 and 7,985

respectively. Two-tailed t-test of independent samples is reported in ‘diff ’ columns (2020-2017),

*p<0.05. Red indicates that the standard deviation change was larger between 2017 and 2020 than

in the comparing set of years (2013 to 2017).

Next, we look at the results from the Italian respondents during the sample time periods in Table

A2. The results are remarkably consistent – in all cases, Italians rate their services more favorably

in terms of QoG across the board. Moreover, in all cases save the ‘need’ and ‘greed’ corruption

questions, the positive differences in 2020 from 2017 are statistically significant. However, looking

at the context of the previous period, in which every indicator in 2017 dropped from 2013, the

magnitude of the changes are on average not as great as the decline from the previous period’s

change on average (2103 to 2017). In other words, for the comparable 12 questions, the magnitude

of the (negative) change from 2013 to 2017 was greater than the (positive) changes in 2017 to 2020.

Although causality is impossible to prove with this data, we can confirm that Covid-19 has not

negatively affected the attitude of institutional quality in Italy, if anything, it has helped recover

them closer to the 2013 levels.

Finally, we look at Romania during the same period.

In general, we see very little significant

movement in mean responses to comparable questions over time in Romania – attitudes appear

quite fixed, While 6 of 14 differences being positive and 8 of 14 negative compared with 2017, very

few are statistically significant. The exception in the 2017 to 2020 data are questions regarding

impartiality; in which 4 of the 6 impartiality questions have dropped significantly in 2020 from

2017, by a magnitude of roughly 0.20 to 0.25 standard deviations.

The comparison with 2013 to 2017 changes show also that Romanians tend to give fairly con-

49

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

sistent answers to the QoG questions in the aggregate, with comparatively high satisfaction in the

quality of services, moderate scores on impartiality and high perceptions of corruption across the

board. While the 2020 sample shows a drop in impartiality from 2017, the 2017 also showed a

significant drop in the three service corruption scores from 2013, all of which ticked up again in

2020. Thus, if there are effects of Covid-19 on Romanian respondents, they are in the perceptions

of how citizens are impartiality treated in getting public services, yet not in any other area.

Table A3: Comparing Romania’s scores over past 3 EQI rounds on Core Questions

Indicator

2020

95% c.i.

2017

95% c.i.

diff.

s.d. diff.

2013-17

s.d. diff

qualEd10

qualHel10

qualLaw10

impEd10

impHel10

impLaw10

impEd2

impHel2

impLaw2

corrEd10

corrHel10

corrLaw10

need10

6.91

6.52

6.71

5.35

4.64

5.04

2.67

2.48

2.5

5.34

4.59

4.84

5.05

6.6,7.22

6.17,6.87

6.36,7.06

4.93,5.76

4.24,5.03

4.6,5.48

2.53,2.81

2.34,2.61

2.36,2.64

6.71

6.21

6.83

6.06

5.39

5.79

2.84

2.48

2.71

4.18 4.99

4.41,5.26

4.64,5.46

4.38

4.79

5.16

6.65,6.77

0.2

6.13,6.29

0.31

0.1

0.13

-0.14

-0.03

6.76,6.89

-0.12

-0.06

0

5.9,6.16

-0.71*

-0.23

5.29,5.5

-0.75*

-0.24

5.69,5.9

-0.75*

-0.24

2.8,2.87

-0.16

-0.17

2.45,2.51

0

0

2.68,2.74

-0.21*

-0.22

0.09

0.08

0.02

4.3,4.47

4.7,4.88

0.2

0.05

5.06,5.25

-0.11

-0.04

-0.32

-0.34

-0.44

-0.01

-0.06

0.03

-1.1

-0.84

-0.95

4.92,5.76

5.1

5.01,5.19

0.24

-0.07

-0.01

0

-0.11

-0.11

-0.14

-0.01

-0.06

0.03

-0.4

-0.32

-0.34

greed10

4.7

4.28,5.13

5

4.9,5.09

-0.29

-0.1

Note: weighted means reported. Number of observations for 2020 and 2017 is 234 and 3,444 respec-

tively. First set of impartiality questions and corruption questions are reversed ordered. Two-tailed

t-test of independent samples is reported in ‘diff ’ columns (2020-2017), *p<0.05. Red indicates

that the standard deviation change was larger between 2017 and 2020 than in the comparing set of

years (2013 to 2017).

Finally, we look at changes in self-reported personal experiences with petty corruption in the

three countries. For proper comparison, we use only telephone (CATI) interviews from 2020, as

the possible social desirability bias from telephone interviews compared with the more anonymous

online administration is held constant over time.

50

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
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The three countries again tell somewhat divergent stories. In the case of Germany, we see small

and insignificant positive change in 2020 compared with 2017, yet all proportions are at 0.02 (2%)

or less in both years thus the self-reported personal experiences were low in 2017 and remain such

in 2020. We do however see a small and significant change in paying a bribe on whole from 0.6%

in 2017 to 2.7% in 2020, mainly driven by a small uptick in within the health care sector.

In the case of Italy, there again is no ambiguity of the results – self-reported bribery is signifi-

cantly down for every indicator save one - being asked by law enforcement, which also shows a

negative (yet insignificant) trend nonetheless. The results are strongest for the ‘having paid’ set

of indicators, with the self-reported bribe-paying for a service overall down from 17.4% in 2017 to

an estimated 5.5% in 2020. It is noteworthy that even the online estimate for total paid bribes

(0.10, with a 95% c.i. of 0.073, 0.126) shows a statistically significant drop compared with the all-

CATI respondents from 2017. Thus, like the perceptions of QoG questions showing near uniform

improvement in Italy between 2020 and 2017, we observe a considerable decrease in the rate of

corruption experiences.

Finally, our findings for Romania are less consistent than the largely insignificant change in Ger-

many and near uniform improvements in Italy. Here we observe that there is a significant increase

in direct experiences with corruption in education (both being asked, and paying), with both more

than doubling, along with a significant increase in self-reported paying in health care, from 11% to

18%. The rate of overall bribe-paying experience also ticked up significantly from roughly 14% in

2017 to just over 21% in 2020. Whether this increase is due to Covid-19 is uncertain – the coun-

try’s average bribe paying rate in 2013 was 27%, thus 2017 could have reflected an exceptional time.

Table A4: Changes in Experiences with Public Sector Petty Corruption Table

Indicator

2020

95% c.i.

2017

95% c.i.

diff.

Germany

0.013

0.012

0.012

0.007

edask1
helask1
lawask1
otherask1
edpay1
helpay1
lawpay1
otherpay1
askBribeTotal 0.021

0.003

0.018

0.007

0.008

0.002 0.024

0.004

0.002 0.005

0.002 0.022

0.01

0.008 0.012

-0.001 0.016

0.003

0.002 0.005

0.002 0.021

0 0.013

0.006 0.03

0.007

0.003

0.006

0.005 0.009

0.001 0.004

0.004 0.008

-0.003 0.009

0.002

0.001 0.002

0.001 0.016

0.008 0.034

0.003

0.017

0.008

0.001 0.004

0.014 0.02

0.009

0.002

0.004

0.005

0.004

0.012

0.001

0.006

0.004

payBribeTotal 0.027

0.012 0.042

0.006 0.01

0.020*

51

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
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Italy

0.012

0.051

0.025

0.013

edask1
helask1
lawask1
otherask1
edpay1
helpay1
lawpay1
otherpay1
askBribeTotal 0.086

0.043

0.014

0.002

0.002

0.002 0.021

0.05

0.045 0.055

-0.038*

0.032 0.071

0.011 0.039

0.003 0.022

0.082

0.043

0.034

0.076 0.088

-0.031*

0.039 0.048

-0.018

0.03 0.038

-0.022*

-0.002 0.006

0.095

0.089 0.102

-0.093*

0.025 0.062

0.004 0.025

0.114

0.066

0.107 0.12

0.06 0.071

-0.070*

-0.051*

-0.002 0.006

0.04

0.035 0.044

-0.037*

0.061 0.111

payBribeTotal 0.055

0.034 0.074

Romania

0.083

0.108

0.018

0.047

edask1
helask1
lawask1
otherask1
edpay1
helpay1
lawpay1
otherpay1
askBribeTotal 0.145

0.031

0.013

0.084

0.18

0.056 0.11

0.079 0.137

0.004 0.031

0.027 0.067

0.057 0.111

0.144 0.215

0.001 0.024

0.015 0.048

0.112 0.178

payBribeTotal 0.212

0.174 0.25

0.124

0.174

0.117 0.131

-0.038*

0.166 0.182

-0.121*

0.037

0.093

0.027

0.036

0.038

0.108

0.024

0.031

0.126

0.139

0.031 0.043

0.046*

0.083 0.102

0.022 0.033

0.03 0.042

0.015

-0.01

0.011

0.031 0.044

0.046*

0.098 0.118

0.072*

0.019 0.029

-0.012

0.025 0.037

0

0.115 0.137

0.019

0.128 0.15

0.073*

Note: weighted proportions reported with 95% confidence intervals around the point estimate. Two-

tailed t-test of independent samples is reported in ‘diff ’ column (2020-2017), *p<0.05.

52

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
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10.4 Conclusions from the pilot analysis

In sum, the analyses here have attempted to gauge the effect, if any, of Covid-19 on responses to

EQI core questions on perceptions and experiences with QoG. While the limited sample sizes of

the 2020 pilot do not warrant a detailed regional comparative analysis over time, we can compare

pooled effects as well as country means and proportions over time. The results of the above anal-

yses are the following:

• Overall, citizens show strikingly high satisfaction with the handling of Covid-19 by the au-

thorities in their area. Germany shows the highest rates of satisfaction, followed by Romania

and Italy, with at least 82% in all three countries reporting or more claiming the authorities

have been ‘very good’ or ‘somewhat good’.

• There is an association between attitudes on Covid-19 and QoG questions. In particular, and

not surprisingly, those that rate the responses to Covid-19 more positively also perceive and

experience better QoG across the board. In terms of personal worry, the effect of economic

worry tend to be associated with higher QoG in most cases, while personal health worries

are uncorrelated with questions of QoG, holding constant other factors.

• In comparing the mean response to the comparable EQI perception questions over time, we

found that there are indeed some changes, but they are quite country-specific. In Germany

and Italy, perceptions of QoG are on average significantly higher in 2020 compared with

2017, in particular in Italy. In Romania, we observe largely negligible change, yet there are

significant declines in the perceptions of most impartiality questions. However, for the most

part, the changes from 2017 to 2020 are comparable with the change from 2013 to 2017 in

terms of standard deviation increases/decreases of the item in question. The exception being

possibly Germany, whereby the positive changes from 2017 to 2020 appear slightly larger

than change from the previous period.

• In terms of changes in corruption experiences over time, again, we observe quite country-

specific effects.

In the case of Italy, we see a uniform and significant decline in rates of

corruption experiences in all sectors for both being asked to pay and paying a bribe for a

service. In Germany, the overall rate of self-reported bribe-paying ticked up (from 0.6% to

2.7%), yet all other indicators show negligible changes over time.

In Romania, we see a

53

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

significant increase in bribe experiences in education and health care from 2017 to 2020, as

well as the overall rate of bribe-paying up from 14% to 21% in 2020. Yet in this case, the

overall rate is still lower than the self-reported rate of 27% in 2013, thus it is difficult to

assess if Covid-19 is the cause of this uptick, or if 2017 was an exceptional year.

Overall, the analysis shows that on whole, the responses to the EQI core questions from the pilot

were not negatively affected by the Covid-19 crisis. In the case of Italy, and for the most part in

Germany, we might maintain the opposite – that perceptions of QoG have improved since 2017.

Whether this is due to Covid-19 is impossible to say, yet we can concluded that there is not a

negative effect of the crisis on our estimate for these two countries. For Romania, the results show

lower QoG in some areas (impartiality perceptions and direct experiences), but unchanged in most

other indicators. One conclusion we might draw is that since the overall perception of handling by

the authorities is quite positive, perceptions in state capacity by citizens has been enhanced.

10.5 Comparing Irish regions over time

For the previous three rounds of the EQI, the Irish NUTS 2 regions had been measured according

to the past boundaries which ceased to exist due to to Statutory instrument No. 573/201419,

passed by the Irish assembly and approved by the EU Commission. Previously, there were two

NUTS 2 regions (IE01 - Border, Midland and Western and IE02 - Southern and Eastern), which

are shown on the left side of the figure below. Currently, due to the reforms, there are three NUTS

2 regions - IE04 (Northern and Western), IE05 (Southern) and IE06 (Eastern and Midland). The

main issue with the Irish cases, is that there is a complete discontinuity from the previous scheme

to the current one, whereby none of the previous two regions exist as they were geographically.

For example, we see that while IE05 and IE06 are mostly a split from the previous IE02, IE06

actually does take several counties from previous IE01 as well, such as Laois, Longford, Offaly and

Wastmeath, which were previous part of the Border, Midland and Western region (IE01), yet are

are now all part of the greater Dublin region (IE06). Moreover, Louth county also went from IE01

to now IE06. These changes mean that there are no clean comparisons over time a the NUTS 2

level in Ireland from this EQI round with the previous ones as seen in Figure 9.

19see: http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2014/si/573/made/en/print

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Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
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Figure 9: Irish NUTS 2 Regions Pre/Post Reform

Note: Red lines show the previous and current NUTS 2 regions. Population (at the time of reform) is shown by

region.

The geographic changes therefore present us with a choice in terms of over time comparisons of

both the Irish regions, as well as for the EQI EU27 sample on whole, which requires a common

sample of regions for each year in the data for the most valid temporal comparisons. We essentially

have therefore two options for the Irish regions when comparison over time. First, we could simply

apply the country-level WGI averages to the three current Irish regions for the 2010-2017 years so

that we have the same number of Irish regions in all years of the data. This would essentially wipe

away any past variation observed in the previous data, yet be most valid for the current NUTS

scheme.

Second, as an alternative, we could re-aggregate the 2020 Irish data to the previous NUTS 2

scheme and use these figures for our over time comparisons, counting just the two Irish NUTS

2 regions for all four years of the EQI. As we have respondent’s post-codes in the 2020, this is

entirely possible to do and thus we can simply continue the previous NUTS scheme into 2020 with

the old regions prior to the reforms.

55

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

Figure 10: EQI Score Irish NUTS 2 Regions over time

Note: Blue dots show the current Irish NUTS scheme, while black dots show the previous ones. Margins of error

are provided around the estimates. The 2020 black dots have been re-calculated using respondent post-codes.

We present Figure 10 to help us assess which alternative is most optimal.

In essence, we are

looking to exploit the most regional variation possible. We compare the within-country variation

of the current NUTS 3 regions (blue dots) with that of the previous NUTS 2 regional scheme

for 2017 and 201320. The Figure reveals that while IE01 ranked higher than IE02, there was no

significant within-country variation between the previous NUTS 2 regions in either 2013 or 2017.

The re-calculated scores for 2020 show the exact same pattern, yet with even less regional difference

between former IE01 and IE02. However, when looking at the 2020 EQI within-country variation

for the newer, three Irish regions, we observe more interesting within-country variation that was

overlooked by the previous boundaries. For example, we now see that there is a rather considerable

gap between IE05 and IE06, the two regions than mainly composed IE02 previously. Thus, given

that the previous variation between IE01 and IE02 was negligible, we proceed with option 1 listed

above, and apply the WGI country-level values for the previous to the current three Irish NUTS

region for purposes of comparison over time and to maximize the most relevant variation in the

data, which we clearly see is in the current NUTS scheme.

20As Ireland was not included in the 2010 regional survey, the country level WGI scores were applied to the 2

Irish regions.

56

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
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10.6 Full List of 2021 Estimates

Name

Reg. Brussels

Flanders

Wallonie

Severozapaden

Severen tsentralen

Severoiztochen

Yugoiztochen

Yugozapaden

Yuzhen tsentralen

Cyprus

Praha

Strední Cechy

Jihozápad

Severozápad

Severovýchod

Jihovýchod

Strední Morava

Moravskoslezsko

Hovedstaden

Sjælland

Syddanmark

Midtjylland

Nordjylland

Baden-Württemberg

Bayern

Berlin

Brandenburg

Bremen

Hamburg

Hessen

Mecklenburg-

Vorpommern

Niedersachsen

Nordrhein-Westfalen

Rheinland-Pfalz

Saarland

Sachsen

Sachsen-Anhalt

Schleswig-Holstein

Thüringen

Estonia

Northern and Western

Southern

Eastern and Midland

Attiki

Voreio Aigaio

Nuts

Quality

Impart. Corrupt. EQI

low c.i.

high c.i.

BE1

BE2

BE3

BG31

BG32

BG33

BG34

BG41

BG42

CY

CZ01

CZ02

CZ03

CZ04

CZ05

CZ06

CZ07

CZ08

DK01

DK02

DK03

DK04

DK05

DE1

DE2

DE3

DE4

DE5

DE6

DE7

DE8

DE9

DEA

DEB

DEC

DED

DEE

DEF

DEG

EE

IE04

IE05

IE06

EL30

EL41

-0.191

-0.076

-0.081

-0.121

-0.422

0.559

0.052

-1.732

-1.349

-1.223

-1.046

-1.66

-1.216

-0.019

-0.096

-0.409

-0.307

-0.613

-0.118

-0.222

-0.159

-0.255

1.438

0.765

1.515

1.762

1.713

0.93

1.17

-0.083

0.401

-0.074

1.089

0.815

0.819

0.958

0.82

1.087

0.854

0.815

0.423

1.025

0.778

0.298

0.441

0.761

0.431

0.60

0.446

-1.89

-1.383

-1.829

-1.585

-1.528

-1.257

-0.44

0.451

0.149

-0.1

-0.403

0.197

-0.004

-0.169

-0.195

1.224

1.137

1.292

1.434

1.471

0.694

0.986

0.177

1.219

0.301

0.803

0.902

1.1

1.014

0.847

1.029

1.052

0.742

0.821

1.295

1.084

0.358

0.652

0.716

0.35

0.889

0.764

-0.946

-0.846

-1.557

-1.423

-2.042

-0.948

-0.452

-0.566

-0.592

-0.524

-0.754

-0.417

-0.401

-0.65

-0.797

1.006

1.651

1.606

1.719

1.568

1.007

1.198

0.795

1.255

1.105

0.902

1.265

1.325

1.318

1.108

1.541

1.082

1.323

1.237

1.305

1.233

0.729

0.444

1.029

0.424

0.709

0.436

-1.581

-1.238

-1.596

-1.403

-1.81

-1.184

-0.315

-0.073

-0.295

-0.322

-0.613

-0.117

-0.217

-0.339

-0.431

1.27

1.23

1.527

1.701

1.645

0.911

1.161

0.308

0.995

0.461

0.967

1.032

1.123

1.139

0.96

1.266

1.034

0.997

0.859

1.255

1.071

0.48

0.532

0.867

0.417

0.380

0.225

-1.905

-1.558

-1.847

-1.712

-2.165

-1.498

-0.802

-0.353

-0.513

-0.513

-0.793

-0.313

-0.409

-0.540

-0.640

1.066

0.966

1.361

1.583

1.491

0.719

0.995

0.004

0.721

0.067

0.803

0.856

0.936

0.945

0.763

1.045

0.840

0.788

0.588

1.059

0.897

0.216

0.288

0.621

0.216

0.180

1.040

0.647

-1.257

-0.918

-1.345

-1.094

-1.455

-0.870

0.172

0.207

-0.077

-0.131

-0.433

0.079

-0.025

-0.138

-0.222

1.474

1.494

1.693

1.819

1.799

1.103

1.327

0.612

1.269

0.855

1.131

1.208

1.310

1.333

1.157

1.487

1.228

1.206

1.130

1.451

1.245

0.744

0.776

1.113

0.618

-0.922

-0.349

-1.224

-1.262

-1.244

-1.674

-1.173

-1.137

-1.517

-1.530

-0.829

-0.744

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Notio Aigaio

Kriti

EL42

EL43

Anatoliki Makedonia,

EL51

Thraki

Kentriki Makedonia

Dytiki Makedonia

Ipeiros

Thessalia

Ionia Nisia

Dytiki Ellada

Sterea Ellada

Peloponnisos

Galicia

EL52

EL53

EL54

EL61

EL62

EL63

EL64

EL65

ES11

Principado de Asturias

ES12

Cantabria

País Vasco

Navarra

La Rioja

Aragón

Madrid

Castilla y León

Castilla-la Mancha

Extremadura

Cataluña

Valenciana

Illes Balears

Andalucía

Región de Murcia

Canarias

Île de France

Centre - Val de Loire

Bourgogne

Franche-Comté

Basse-Normandie

Haute-Normandie

Nord-Pas-de-Calais

Picardie

Alsace

Champagne-Ardenne

Lorraine

Pays-de-la-Loire

Bretagne

Aquitaine

Limousin

Poitou-Charentes

Languedoc-Roussillon

Midi-Pyrénées

Auvergne

Rhône-Alpes

ES13

ES21

ES22

ES23

ES24

ES30

ES41

ES42

ES43

ES51

ES52

ES53

ES61

ES62

ES70

FR10

FRB0

FRC1

FRC2

FRD1

FRD2

FRE1

FRE2

FRF1

FRF2

FRF3

FRG0

FRH0

FRI1

FRI2

FRI3

FRJ1

FRJ2

FRK1

FRK2

-0.564

-0.502

-0.063

-1.05

-0.752

0.299

-0.349

-1.191

-0.664

-1.147

-0.609

-0.097

0.554

0.114

1.042

1.032

1.374

0.009

0.328

-0.308

0.323

0.549

-1.213

-1.462

-1.345

-1.207

-1.321

-1.318

-1.453

-1.376

-1.706

-1.385

-1.095

-0.354

0.853

0.197

1.17

0.775

0.632

-0.254

-0.45

-0.08

0.344

0.5

-0.484

-0.526

0.274

0.039

-0.431

0.024

-0.226

-0.051

0.368

0.352

0.446

0.764

0.432

0.745

0.432

0.928

0.655

0.459

0.686

0.989

0.806

0.534

0.529

0.285

0.731

0.461

0.65

0.623

0.374

-0.565

0.351

-0.464

0.468

0.894

0.516

0.399

0.696

0.62

0.379

0.278

0.577

0.38

0.576

0.854

0.806

0.734

0.67

0.713

0.382

0.641

0.558

0.519

-1.869

-1.486

-0.817

-0.885

-0.809

-1.317

-1.214

-1.527

-1.853

-1.329

-1.058

-0.428

0.375

-0.003

0.586

0.251

0.435

-0.309

-0.533

-0.251

0.124

0.229

-1.011

-0.079

0.102

-0.555

-0.507

-0.797

-0.03

0.811

0.68

0.665

0.732

0.575

0.04

0.256

0.611

0.616

0.446

0.868

1.041

0.743

0.834

0.827

0.4

0.65

0.718

0.394

-1.262

-1.194

-0.771

-1.088

-0.998

-0.809

-1.044

-1.417

-1.462

-1.337

-0.956

-0.304

0.617

0.107

0.969

0.712

0.845

-0.192

-0.227

-0.221

0.274

0.442

-0.7

0.283

0.178

-0.537

-0.046

-0.515

0.134

0.718

0.536

0.523

0.759

0.563

0.403

0.335

0.733

0.572

0.513

0.833

0.981

0.791

0.705

0.716

0.369

0.7

0.601

0.541

-1.695

-1.534

-0.995

-1.463

-1.278

-1.144

-1.283

-1.842

-1.783

-1.672

-1.280

-0.551

0.478

-0.048

0.563

0.530

0.571

-0.430

-0.594

-0.450

0.103

0.265

-0.829

-0.854

-0.547

-0.713

-0.718

-0.474

-0.805

-0.992

-1.141

-1.002

-0.632

-0.057

0.756

0.262

1.375

0.894

1.119

0.046

0.140

0.008

0.445

0.619

-0.954

-0.446

0.095

0.004

-0.846

-0.176

-0.752

-0.127

0.526

0.309

0.258

0.512

0.314

0.139

0.104

0.442

0.298

0.323

0.628

0.721

0.552

0.461

0.492

0.127

0.438

0.367

0.288

0.471

0.352

-0.228

0.084

-0.278

0.395

0.910

0.763

0.788

1.006

0.812

0.667

0.566

1.024

0.847

0.703

1.038

1.241

1.030

0.949

0.940

0.611

0.962

0.835

0.794

58

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

Provence-Alpes-Côte

FRL0

0.417

0.581

0.28

0.442

0.227

0.657

d’Azur

Corse

Guadeloupe

Martinique

Guyane

La Réunion

Mayotte

Jadranska Hrvatska

Kontinentalna

Hrvatska

Piemonte

Valle d’Aosta

Liguria

Lombardia

Abruzzo

Molise

Campania

Puglia

Basilicata

Calabria

Sicilia

Sardegna

Bolzano/Bozen

Trento

Veneto

Friuli-Venezia Giulia

Emilia-Romagna

Toscana

Umbria

Marche

Lazio

Latvia

Sostines regionas

Vidurio ir vakaru

Luxembourg

Budapest

Pest

Közép-Dunántúl

Nyugat-Dunántúl

Dél-Dunántúl

Észak-Magyarország

Észak-Alföld

Dél-Alföld

Malta

Groningen

Friesland (NL)

Drenthe

Overijssel

FRM0

0.481

FRY1

FRY2

FRY3

FRY4

FRY5

HR03

HR04

ITC1

ITC2

ITC3

ITC4

ITF1

ITF2

ITF3

ITF4

ITF5

ITF6

ITG1

ITG2

ITH1

ITH2

ITH3

ITH4

ITH5

ITI1

ITI2

ITI3

ITI4

LV

LT01

LT02

LU

HU11

HU12

HU21

HU22

HU23

HU31

HU32

HU33

MT

NL11

NL12

NL13

NL21

-1.158

-1.031

-1.578

0.289

-2.275

-1.157

-1.184

-0.258

0.011

-0.497

-0.236

-1.013

-1.316

-2.114

-1.391

-1.317

-2.145

-1.095

-1.159

0.322

0.658

0.409

0.358

0.331

0.033

-0.331

-0.609

-1.087

-0.244

0.042

-0.058

1.121

-1.398

-1.271

-1.475

-1.283

-1.25

-1.907

-1.396

-1.175

-0.12

1.361

1.562

1.315

1.357

0.583

-0.265

-0.159

-0.379

0.282

-0.3

-0.736

-1.183

-0.831

-0.769

-0.831

-1.219

-1.254

-1.29

-1.567

-1.413

-1.638

-2.238

-1.509

-1.571

-0.732

-0.352

-0.648

-0.422

-0.909

-0.63

-1.131

-0.986

-1.241

-0.058

0.161

-0.121

1.135

-0.749

-0.425

-0.746

-0.905

-0.872

-1.078

-1.353

-0.662

-0.149

1.391

1.465

1.558

1.318

-0.135

-0.096

0.408

0.05

-0.046

-0.772

-0.472

-1.356

-0.404

-0.757

-0.493

-0.894

-0.944

-0.922

-1.896

-1.088

-1.198

-1.646

-1.335

-0.932

-0.316

-0.282

-0.193

-0.111

-0.535

-0.442

-0.658

-0.559

-1.158

-0.601

-0.132

-0.457

1.444

-1.658

-0.927

-0.876

-1.052

-0.83

-1.43

-1.534

-1.104

-0.909

1.137

1.743

1.575

1.603

0.322

-0.526

-0.271

-0.66

0.182

-1.159

-0.819

-1.289

-0.517

-0.524

-0.63

-0.813

-1.111

-1.221

-1.931

-1.347

-1.438

-2.087

-1.364

-1.268

-0.251

0.01

-0.15

-0.061

-0.385

-0.36

-0.734

-0.746

-1.207

-0.312

0.025

-0.22

1.281

-1.317

-0.908

-1.072

-1.122

-1.022

-1.528

-1.482

-1.018

-0.408

1.346

1.651

1.54

1.481

0.090

-0.917

-0.688

-1.069

-0.154

-1.515

-1.249

-1.708

-0.672

-0.737

-0.820

-0.999

-1.329

-1.559

-2.246

-1.658

-1.723

-2.557

-1.647

-1.507

-0.432

-0.154

-0.371

-0.182

-0.575

-0.484

-0.941

-0.941

-1.422

-0.495

-0.310

-0.610

1.104

-1.819

-1.364

-1.451

-1.519

-1.369

-1.958

-1.838

-1.424

-0.926

1.066

1.469

1.344

1.305

0.554

-0.135

0.146

-0.251

0.518

-0.803

-0.389

-0.870

-0.362

-0.311

-0.440

-0.627

-0.893

-0.883

-1.616

-1.036

-1.153

-1.617

-1.081

-1.029

-0.070

0.174

0.071

0.060

-0.195

-0.236

-0.527

-0.551

-0.992

-0.129

0.360

0.170

1.458

-0.815

-0.452

-0.693

-0.725

-0.675

-1.098

-1.126

-0.612

0.11

1.626

1.833

1.736

1.657

59

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

Gelderland

Flevoland

Utrecht

Noord-Holland

Zuid-Holland

Zeeland

Noord-Brabant

Limburg (NL)

Burgenland (AT)

Niederösterreich

Wien

Kärnten

Steiermark

Oberösterreich

Salzburg

Tirol

Vorarlberg

Malopolskie

Slaskie

Wielkopolskie

Zachodniopomorskie

Lubuskie

Dolnoslaskie

Opolskie

Kujawsko-Pomorskie

NL22

NL23

NL31

NL32

NL33

NL34

NL41

NL42

AT11

AT12

AT13

AT21

AT22

AT31

AT32

AT33

AT34

PL21

PL22

PL41

PL42

PL43

PL51

PL52

PL61

Warminsko-Mazurskie

PL62

Pomorskie

Lódzkie

Swietokrzyskie

Lubelskie

Podkarpackie

Podlaskie

Warszawski stoleczny

Mazowiecki reg.

Norte

Algarve

Centro (PT)

Lisboa

Alentejo

Açores (PT)

Madeira (PT)

Nord-Vest

Centru

Nord-Est

Sud-Est

Sud - Muntenia

Bucuresti - Ilfov

Sud-Vest Oltenia

Vest

PL63

PL71

PL72

PL81

PL82

PL84

PL91

PL92

PT11

PT15

PT16

PT17

PT18

PT20

PT30

RO11

RO12

RO21

RO22

RO31

RO32

RO41

RO42

1.477

1.028

1.141

1.249

1.228

1.056

1.363

1.269

0.842

0.865

0.503

0.677

0.742

0.61

0.922

1.037

1.159

-0.507

-0.6

-0.473

-1.126

-0.627

-0.697

-0.688

-0.74

-0.936

-0.755

-0.964

-0.824

-1.084

-0.837

-0.76

-1.558

-0.733

0.612

-0.125

0.411

-0.052

0.057

0.422

0.508

-1.514

-1.417

-1.936

-2.323

-1.924

-2.352

-2.119

-1.736

1.537

1.132

1.22

0.899

1.051

1.389

1.088

1.051

1.108

1.491

0.965

1.168

1.571

1.373

1.342

1.042

1.089

-0.924

-0.758

-0.888

-0.981

-0.772

-0.742

-0.348

-0.73

-0.914

-0.836

-0.801

-0.984

-1.465

-0.836

-1.105

-1.345

-0.921

0.083

0.153

0.132

0.307

0.05

-0.015

-0.393

-1.307

-0.45

-1.271

-0.897

-0.971

-1.698

-0.801

-0.829

1.62

1.368

0.981

0.794

1.363

1.139

1.38

1.489

0.763

0.889

0.6

0.733

0.697

0.766

0.659

0.778

0.819

-0.632

-0.252

-0.334

-0.457

-0.208

-0.785

0.055

-0.521

-0.49

0.177

-0.696

-0.455

-0.598

-0.379

-0.671

-0.647

-0.508

-0.624

-0.248

-0.078

0.156

-0.25

-0.442

-0.73

-1.279

-0.564

-1.871

-1.483

-1.19

-2.198

-1.27

-0.888

1.604

1.221

1.157

1.019

1.261

1.24

1.326

1.318

0.939

1.123

0.716

0.892

1.042

0.951

1.012

0.989

1.062

-0.714

-0.557

-0.587

-0.888

-0.557

-0.77

-0.34

-0.689

-0.81

-0.489

-0.852

-0.783

-1.089

-0.711

-0.878

-1.229

-0.748

0.025

-0.076

0.161

0.142

-0.05

-0.012

-0.213

-1.419

-0.842

-1.758

-1.628

-1.414

-2.163

-1.45

-1.195

1.414

1.046

0.884

0.751

1.047

0.966

1.128

1.156

0.769

0.977

0.518

0.722

0.937

0.794

0.857

0.801

0.811

-0.935

-0.801

-0.827

-1.154

-0.829

-0.994

-0.626

-0.899

-1.056

-0.829

-1.055

-1.023

-1.374

-0.952

-1.108

-1.632

-0.970

-0.393

-0.375

-0.170

-0.161

-0.349

-0.268

-0.573

-1.747

-1.104

-2.132

-1.957

-1.683

-2.529

-1.746

-1.464

1.794

1.396

1.430

1.287

1.475

1.514

1.524

1.480

1.109

1.269

0.914

1.062

1.147

1.108

1.167

1.177

1.313

-0.493

-0.313

-0.347

-0.622

-0.285

-0.546

-0.054

-0.479

-0.564

-0.149

-0.649

-0.543

-0.804

-0.470

-0.648

-0.826

-0.526

0.443

0.223

0.492

0.445

0.249

0.244

0.147

-1.091

-0.580

-1.384

-1.299

-1.145

-1.797

-1.154

-0.926

60

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

Vzhodna Slovenija

Zahodna Slovenija

Bratislavský kraj

Západné Slovensko

Stredné Slovensko

Východné Slovensko

Länsi-Suomi

Helsinki-Uusimaa

Etelä-Suomi

Pohjois- ja Itä-Suomi

Åland

Stockholm

Östra Mellansverige

Småland med öarna

Sydsverige

Västsverige

Norra Mellansverige

Mellersta Norrland

Övre Norrland

SI03

SI04

SK01

SK02

SK03

SK04

FI19

FI1B

FI1C

FI1D

FI20

SE11

SE12

SE21

SE22

SE23

SE31

SE32

SE33

-0.061

0.072

-1.092

-0.341

-0.484

-0.51

1.328

1.582

1.311

1.556

2.19

1.42

1.405

1.598

1.364

1.28

1.022

1.093

1.552

-0.319

0.596

-0.696

-0.714

-0.559

-0.938

1.456

1.505

1.405

1.561

2.403

1.327

1.172

1.559

1.295

1.309

1.282

1.429

1.412

-0.258

0.149

-0.847

-0.721

-0.616

-1.021

1.355

1.621

1.425

1.572

2.004

1.467

1.376

1.589

1.288

1.566

1.502

1.002

1.73

-0.221

-0.477

0.283

-0.912

-0.615

-0.574

-0.855

1.433

1.629

1.434

1.623

2.284

1.459

1.368

1.643

1.366

1.438

1.318

1.22

1.625

0.014

-1.187

-0.814

-0.799

-1.040

1.240

1.462

1.261

1.448

2.044

1.190

1.078

1.377

1.129

1.175

1.000

0.970

1.367

0.035

0.552

-0.637

-0.416

-0.349

-0.670

1.626

1.796

1.607

1.798

2.524

1.728

1.658

1.909

1.603

1.701

1.636

1.470

1.883

61

Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous
Studies

11

Introduction to Part II: Why Spain and Poland?

Spain and Poland are two relatively similar, medium-large EU member states that can be seen as representative of

the Old and New Europe, of Western and Eastern Europe. Spain is a relatively decentralised state and Poland is a

relatively unitary one. Overall, the average level of quality of government of Spanish regions is close to the median

level for the whole EU. It has been fairly stable since the first EQI round, although it has declined somewhat over

time, from being slightly above the median level in 2010 to being slightly below in 2021. Poland offers a different

evolution: on average the Polish regions have performed significantly better with each EQI round from 2010 up until

2017. Yet, in this latest round there has been a marked declined.

Within both countries there are regions with very diverse results, and very diverse trajectories, in the EQI. In

Spain we have selected two regions that have traditionally been seen as similar – both being highly socioeconom-

ically developed, early industrialisers, and having strong nationalist and separatist movements: Catalonia and the

Basque Country. Nevertheless, from the first EQI round up to the present, Catalonia and the Basque Country have

been at opposite extremes: while the Basque Country ranks the highest in Spain, Catalonia ranks the lowest. This

divergence, far from reducing, has been increasing over time. What explains these stark differences between two

otherwise historically similar regions?

In Poland we have selected two regions with important differences in EQI scores. Yet, in this case the paradox

regards their trajectories as much as their current positions. Opolskie was the the lowest ranked region in the first

round of the EQI (2010), but it has risen over time, and now ranks highest among Polish regions in 2021. This is a

remarkable shift in citizens ratings of their region. Moreover, it was the only region in Poland not to decline from

2017 to 2021. What explains this change in Opolskie? Furthermore, while Opolskie records the largest improvement

across time, Lubelskie presents the largest fall in EQI from the previous round (2017). What then explains these

movements in opposite directions of these two Polish regions?

A complete answer to these questions is beyond the scope of this report, but, as we have aimed for in previ-

ous reports, our goal is to explore some tentative answers, based on a qualitative methodology. Our experts – Pablo

Fernández-Vázquez, Paweł Chmieliński, and Barbara Wieliczko – have interviewed public officials, and representa-

tives of business, media and civil society in the regions, asking them what are, in their view, the reasons behind

the evolution of quality of government in their region. A note is in order here: as in the rest of the EQI study, in

this qualitative section we do not focus exclusively on the quality of the public services delivered by the regional

government but on those services delivered in the region, irrespective of whether they are provided by national,

regional or local authorities. Our concern is the quality, impartiality, and lack of corruption of the services provided

in the region, not whose responsibility they are.

In the first place, the report collects the views of experts regarding their own perceptions of the quality of govern-

ment in their region irrespective of EQI ranking. Generally speaking, there is a pattern, according to which those

respondents in the highest EQI regions (i.e. the Basque Country and Opolskie) tend to share a more homogeneous

(and positive) view of the actual quality of government in their region. They consider that a large proportion of

public officials devote significant attention to adequately providing public services to the population. Despite some

doubts in the Opolskie region regarding impartiality, all experts in the Basque Country agreed that the region’s

high EQI score reflects the regional reality. By contrast, in those regions with relatively lower scores (i.e. Catalonia

and Lubelskie) experts are more divided. Many of them think that the quality of their public institutions is neither

worse nor better than in other regions.

There are also similarities between the Spanish and Polish studies as to what explains such regional differences.

In the relatively high-performing regions (i.e. the Basque Country and Opolskie), intangible or ‘soft’ factors are

underlined by experts, although they are slightly different in each case. While in Opolskie the fact that it is a

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Figure 1: Select Case Study Regions

Figure 2: Evolution of the EQI in the selected regions

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multicultural region, and thus more open and tolerant, is regarded as important, in the case of the Basque Country

it is the fact that it is a relatively homogeneous region, and thus where social control and accountability are easier,

that matters. Yet, in both cases experts underline the work ethos among civil servants, and also in the population

at large, as a remarkable factor. That is, the idea that consistent work and progress, even if slow, should be better

socially rewarded than seeking to get rich very quickly, predominates. In the Basque Country, experts agree on

the utmost importance of the high level of social trust. Individuals from different class backgrounds are used to

interacting in all sorts of social encounters, from gastronomic societies to civil society organisations. Similarly,

historical participation in civic organisations, from fire brigades to socio-cultural association, is underlined by the

experts in Opolskie as fundamental for understanding its current situation, as this created a tradition of working

for the community. This idea is also echoed in the Basque Country.

Another important intangible is the high level of political, and even social, consensus in both Opolskie and in

the Basque Country. In Opolskie, experts noted the historical legacy of a political culture based on dialogue and

compromise. An example of this would be the peaceful coexistence between different cultures, from both Germany

and the East. And, this could be reflected in the higher degree of cooperation between political representatives of

different ideological opinions currently existing in the region. In the Basque Country, the main political dynamic,

according to all experts, is the existence of a wide consensus – which is particularly remarkable in a society char-

acterised by polarised politics between unionists and Basque nationalists and the disturbing decades-long presence

of terrorism. The dissolution of the terrorist group ETA 10 years ago is seen by many as a factor facilitating the

increasing levels of unity and consensus among the Basque political class. This translates into higher levels of policy

stability: government turnover as a result of changing political majorities does not imply disruption in policies, but

rather continuity. Likewise, opposition parties tend to support a large proportion of the governments’ legislative

initiatives in the regional parliament.

In contrast to the current Basque political pragmatism, Catalonia is seen as a highly polarised arena. The re-

gion is sharply divided into two political blocks: pro-independence and unionist. And the 2017 political push for

Catalan secession is, in the view of experts closer to the unionist side, a major reason for discrediting regional

institutions in the eyes of the population. Conversely, for those supporting the independence bid, governance in

Catalonia has suffered as a result of the ‘brutal’ response of the Spanish government that, in their view, slowed down

policymaking and increased red tape. Nevertheless, a feeling shared among many in Catalonia is that the regional

government had prioritised the attempt at secession over governance and management. Similarly, in Lubelskie the

opinions of experts are highly divided along political positions. For instance, while some argue forcefully that there

are no threats to freedom of the press in Lubelskie, others believe that there are pressures in this area from national

and local governments; and, all in all, most consider that information is not reliable and that media outlets have

incentives to conceal relevant news.

These intangible or ‘soft’ factors do seem to matter more than particular institutions for strengthening quality

of government. And yet one institutional factor seems key, at least for the Spanish regions: the level of politicisation

of managerial positions in the administration. There seems to be a higher proportion of politically appointed top

managers in the Catalan public sector than in the Basque equivalent. Likewise, in Lubelskie experts concur: political

and personal connections do seem to matter more than skills and professional experience when it comes to being

appointed to a top managerial position in public sector organisations. Other institutional factors, such as trans-

parency requirements, have also been noted as relevant by experts. The increasing availability of open administrative

data is seen, particularly in the case of both Spanish regions, as fundamental to providing high quality of government.

Having said this, the existence of certain institutions – from codes of good conduct and administrative procedures

to the existence of ad hoc anti-corruption bodies – is seen in Lubelskei and Catalonia as sometimes superfluous or,

in some cases, even detrimental to quality of government. In Lubelskei, specific institutions, such as the Supreme

Audit Office, the Internal Security Agency or the Central Bureau of Investigation, can be potentially helpful, but

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often times they are seen as manipulable by the authorities. In Catalonia, some experts noted the ‘dark side’ of

some regulatory changes designed to foster quality of government. The administrative procedures that theoretically

protect administrations from fraud and corruption can delay administrative activity and may actually increase red

tape. Fear of punishment leads many public officials to paralysis, which, in turn, hampers public sector innovation.

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12 Sub-national Quality of Government in the EU A qual-

itative study of two Spanish regions: Catalonia and the

Basque country

21

12.1 Executive Summary

• In terms of quality of government, Spain is a fairly stable, average case within the EU. However, this masks

significant within-country variation that is growing over time.

• This report focuses on the highest and lowest ranked regions, the Basque Country and Catalonia, respectively.

• Paradoxically, the Basque Country and Catalonia share several key similarities. Both regions were early

industrialisers, are richer than average, have important urban centres, have their own language in addition

to Spanish, and the regional governments are responsible for the three services that the EQI study focuses

on: education, health, and policing.

• The methodology used is that of in-depth interviews with stakeholders that have good knowledge of the

working of public administration in the regions. 27 interviews were conducted.

• There is wide agreement among experts in the Basque Country that the high EQI score reflects the realities

of the situation. In Catalonia, by contrast, experts are sharply divided.

• Many experts attribute the divergence in EQI scores to differences in the political dynamic of both regions:

consensus in the Basque Country and contentious polarisation in Catalonia. The difference in the funding

model for the Catalan and Basque governments is a centrepiece in most accounts given by Catalan partic-

ipants. They argue that the Basque institutions have many more fiscal resources to fund public services.

Basque participants, on the other hand, argue that the reason for their increased wealth is their management

culture.

• The political appointment of managerial level positions is also discussed as a reason for poorer government

outcomes, although there is no agreement among experts about this. The same applies to the abundance of

administrative positions filled with personnel with temporary contracts.

• Transparency in the public administrations of both regions has increased, but experts consider that this has

not improved the EQI scores and that the new rules impose cumbersome red tape that produces paralysis

and stifles innovation.

• In terms of corruption, most experts say that this has affected Catalonia more so than the Basque Country.

However, several Catalan participants argue that the perception of high corruption in Catalonia reflects the

lower tolerance of Catalans towards it compared to citizens in other Spanish regions.

• Culture plays a prominent role in accounts of the high/low EQI scores in both regions. Several Catalan

participants emphasised that the perception of poor quality of public services stems from the higher standards

that Catalans have. Culture, interviewees say, plays a different role in the Basque Country. They argue that

the small size of the region and its relative homogeneity favours social control and accountability. The strength

and density of civil society also contributes to high interpersonal trust levels and to higher responsiveness to

social interests.

21Author: Pablo Fernández-Vázquez, Carlos III University, Madrid. Lead coordinator from UGOT is Victor

Lapuente

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12.2

Introduction

Spain is a very intriguing case through which to study the determinants of regional quality of government. On the

one hand, the median EQI level for the 17 Spanish regions is -0.1, a value that is fairly close to the overall mean of

zero for all regions in the EU-27 countries. Over time, the median level of quality of government has not changed

substantially: it was 0.2 in 2010, 0.18 in 2013, -0.13 in 2017, and now -0.1. In other words, the median region in

Spain is located near the center of the overall distribution in every round of the EQI study.

From this point of view, Spain would appear as an ’average’ case of quality of government in the European context.

However, the median Spanish regional EQI does hide a substantial level of cross-regional variation in quality of

government. This is shown in Figure 1, which presents the percentile of each Spanish region within the entire

sample of EU-27 regions. The within-country variation is remarkable. Some Spanish regions are among the best

performers in Europe. The Basque Country (ES21), the highest ranked region within Spain, is in the group of the

top 25% of regions. Indeed, its EQI level is comparable to most Austrian or German regions, and it is even above

länder like Hamburg (DE60) or Upper Austria (AT31). The same could be said of Spanish regions like La Rioja

(ES22) or Navarra (ES23).

In stark contrast, regions like the Canary Islands (ES70), Andalusia (ES61), or Catalonia (ES51) lie in the bottom

third of the EU-27 distribution of quality of government index. Catalonia, the lowest-ranked region in Spain, has

an EQI index value that is very close to those of several Polish and Italian regions such as Malopolskie (PL21) or

Umbria (ITI2). In sum, it is not appropriate to characterise Spain with a single indicator of quality of government.

Within its borders we can find regions ranked among the best in Europe and others that are among the worst ranked

according to the EQI index. Incidentally, this heterogeneity helps justify why a regional-level measure of quality of

government is necessary, since a national one may mask too much variation within it.

Cross-regional heterogeneity in quality of government estimates is not something new in the Spanish con-

text, although divergence between regions has been rising over time. Figure 2, which is borrowed from Charron,

Lapuente, and Bauhr, 2021, presents the regional EQI estimates for all 17 Spanish regions over the four rounds of the

regional Quality of Government study. As can be seen, within-country heterogeneity has been on the rise in Spain,

particularly from the second round onwards22. The better-performing regions such as the Basque Country, Asturias,

or Navarra have improved their EQI values over time. At the same time, the regions with poorer performance, such

as Andalusia and Catalonia, have dropped in the quality of government indicators.

Figure 3 summarises the descriptive analysis of the performance of the Spanish regions in the latest EQI study.

The figure presents the within-country distribution of regional EQI scores for all EU countries with more than one

region. It does so with a boxplot, wherein the horizontal line inside the ‘box’ reflects the median and the bottom and

top limits of the box indicate the 1st and 3rd quartiles. The vertical lines indicate the maximum and the minimum

of the distribution (unless there are outliers, in which case they are represented by dots). Countries in Figure 3 are

ordered according to the regional median EQI value, from lowest to highest. Spain’s data is highlighted in red.

This figure reflects how the median Spanish region is located close to the (standardised) European average of

zero. At the same time, the within-country variation in Spain is considerable: the spread of the ‘box’ and the

distance between the top and the bottom of the vertical line is higher than that of most other European countries,

with the exception of Italy. Indeed, the standard deviation of regional EQI scores in Spain (0.52) is the second

largest of all studies, only behind Italy (0.59).

22The standard deviation of regional quality of government in Spain has grown monotonically. It was 0.24 in

2010, 0.28 in 2013, 0.42 in 2017, and now it has reached 0.5.

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Figure 1: Regional EQI: Relative Position of Spanish Regions within the EU

Note:The position of Spanish regions within the overall distribution of regional EQI in the EU-27, 2021 round.

Dots represent the percentile of each region. Higher percentiles indicate that the region has a higher EQI value.

12.3 Case selection and Methodology

This report presents an in-depth study of the two Spanish regions with the highest and the lowest EQI score. These

regions are the Basque Country (ES21) and Catalonia (ES51), respectively. Focusing on the two extreme cases of

measured quality of government is particularly fitting given the high variation in regional EQI in Spain and how it

has grown steadily over time across the four rounds already completed.

The methodology employed is qualitative. The report relies on in-depth interviews with active politicians, pub-

lic administrators, and representatives of business, academia, and civil society from both regions.

In total, 27

interviews were conducted (see Appendix). Interviewees were first provided with information about the results of

the study in each of their regions. They were then prompted to provide their overall reaction to the score obtained

by the region, considering whether they largely agreed with it or not, and why this was the case. Lastly, participants

were asked to discuss in more detail the reasons that could explain the high (or low) performance of the adminis-

trations – local, regional, national – operating within their region.

The experts recruited expressed three types of reactions regarding the EQI scores obtained by the Basque Country

and Catalonia in the last round. The first type of reaction was that of surprise at the vast difference in perceived

quality of government between both regions. As one interviewee expressed it: ‘I am surprised because, on paper,

Catalonia and us [The Basque Country] are similar. We see each other as leaders within Spain and we tend to look

outside of Spain for models. I.e. our model is Norway rather than Andalusia.’ This reaction responds, at least

partially, to the fact that both regions were the early industrialisers in Spain, have been magnets for domestic labour

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Figure 2: Regional Variation in Spain Over Time

Note:The EQI index value for all 17 Spanish regions over the four rounds of the Study. The region-specific indicator

and the region’s name are in blue. Source: Charron, Lapuente, and Bauhr (2021).

migration for many decades, and even today rank high in terms of GDP per capita. Specifically, according to the

latest data – from 2019 – the Basque Country ranks 2nd and Catalonia ranks 4th in regional per capita GDP23. This

sense of surprise was not shared by all participants, however. Some expressed the belief that the difference between

Catalonia and the Basque Country was due in part to differences in population size. A participant indicated: ‘Size

matters for the quality of government. Smaller regions tend to be ranked better than larger ones. [On top of it] the

Basque Country is a very homogeneous society whereas Catalonia is much more diverse.’

The second type of reaction relates to the EQI score for the Basque Country. There was an almost unanimous

consensus among participants from the Basque Country that this region’s high EQI score reflected reality. As a

participant candidly stated:

‘In the Basque Country we have a good life.24’ Another person declared:

‘In the

Basque Country there is an outstanding quality of life.25’ A third interviewee, coming from the business world,

indicated: ‘I am not surprised; there is a general perception that public services here are very good. It’s a feeling

you encounter in the street.’ Along the same lines, another participant said:

‘The education, health, and police

services are truly good. It’s not just perceptions. It’s reality.’ One of the participants gave a very concrete example:

‘The average waiting time for a doctor in the Basque Country is much shorter than in other Spanish regions like

Andalusia or Murcia. The news was on the radio this morning.’ The third reaction concerns the score obtained

by Catalonia. In contrast to the opinions gathered in the Basque Country, participants in Catalonia were sharply

divided in their evaluation of their region’s EQI estimate. On the one hand, a group of interviewees argued that the

score did not reflect the reality of Catalonia. A top official in the regional government declared: ‘The score reflects

more perceptions than realities.’ A bureaucrat in a provincial administration agreed:

‘The quality of the public

services is not actually that much worse than that of the Basque country.’ Elite civil servants in a public agency

declared: ‘The measurement instrument is problematic, because it focuses on perceptions rather than on realities.’

23Source: https://es.statista.com/estadisticas/1087914/pib-per-capita-por-comunidades-autonomas/
24In Spanish: ‘En el País Vasco vivimos muy bien.’
25In Spanish: ‘En el País Vasco se vive de la repera.’

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Figure 3: Regional Variation in Spain: 2021

Note: Within-country variation in the EQI index, 2021 round, Boxplot. The horizontal line inside the ‘box’ indicates

the median in the distribution, the bottom and top borders of the box reflect the 1st and 3rd quartiles, respectively.

Sample: only regions with >1 region

On the other hand, another similarly sized group of Catalan participants expressed their agreement with the score

as well as their lack of surprise. ‘The map [with the regions in colours according to their score] did not surprise me at

all. I am very critical. Back in the day, Catalonia was a model for other regions, now it’s not’, said a top bureaucrat.

Another person declared: ‘I am not surprised. It’s the procés [the bid for independence by the regional government

backed by part of Catalan society] stupid. It has deeply divided society and made everyone frustrated.’ Lastly,

another one said: ‘I am not surprised. The regional administration was not built to promote good governance, but

to promote nation-building. And it shows.’

This divergence of point of view among participants in Catalonia is a theme that emerges repeatedly – almost

as a leit motiv – in the remainder of the report because opinions in this region are deeply divided.

The remainder of this report is structured as follows. The next section briefly describes the main structural char-

acteristics of the two regions that we study. This is followed by an in-depth analysis of the factors that could

contribute to the quality of government in each region. This analysis zeroes in on several dimensions that might

account for differences in the perceived quality of government: (1) contextual factors, (2) the political dynamic,

(3) the functioning of public administrations, (4) the role of the media and the judiciary, and (5) culture and civil

society. Lastly, the report concludes with a discussion of take-away lessons that can be drawn from the results of

the study.

12.4 Description of the history and structural characteristics of both

regions

Historical background

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Catalonia and the Basque Country are both northern regions in Spain. They distinguish themselves from other

regions in that they were two of the earlier industrialisers in the country, starting in the late 19th century (2003).

The Basque Country’s industry specialised in coal, steel production, and shipbuilding, whereas in Catalonia the

textile industry was prominent. Another key element that is distinctive is that both have regional languages, basque

and catalan. Specifically, part of the population in both regions (albeit less than half) has these regional languages

as their mother tongue. Speakers of these languages are largely bilingual in that they are also fluent in Spanish.

Catalans and Basques who have Spanish as their native language are less bilingual, although the levels of bilin-

gualism in these groups has been rising due to the education system in both regions, which strongly promotes the

learning of the regional language.

As a result of the combination of industrialisation and having their own language, regionalist and nationalist move-

ments arose in the late XIXth and early XXth centuries. Their influence led to the creation of regional governments

with devolved powers in the 1930s, during the democratic experience of the Spanish second Republic. In part due to

the presence of strong nationalist movements and the previous historical experience with regional decentralisation,

the Basque Country and Catalonia – in that order – were the first two regions to access regional autonomy following

the passing of the 1978 Spanish Constitution.

Structural conditions

Catalonia is significantly larger than the Basque Country, both in geographical area and in population. Catalonia

comprises over 32,000 square kilometers, which represents around 6% of Spanish territory. By contrast, the Basque

Country only occupies about 7,000 square kilometers, hence 1/5 of the size of Catalonia. In terms of population, the

difference is also notable. The population of the Basque Country hovers slightly above 2 million, whereas that of

Catalonia is close to 8 million. The population of the Basque Country is thus only 1/4 of that residing in Catalonia.

The difference in ratios indicates, at the same time, that population density is somewhat higher in the Basque case

than in the Catalan one.

Economically, both regions are richer than the Spanish average and have been so for many decades. Table 1

below presents the trend in the per capita GDP of both regions, using the Spanish average as a benchmark. As

can be seen, both regions have a higher GDP per capita than Spain as a whole, and this is fairly constant over the

2010-2019 period.

Table 2 deepens this analysis by looking at the weight of each regional economy in the Spanish total. Even though

the Basque Country is richer than Catalonia (in per capita terms), its weight in the Spanish economy is much

smaller than Catalonia’s, barely 1/3 of it. This is due to the fact that the Basque Country is significantly smaller

in population.

Table 19: Per Capita GDP in both Catalonia and the Basque Country, in euros. Spain’s

average is used as the benchmark, period 2010-2019.

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Table 2: Weight of regional economies in the Spanish total – 2010-2019

Region

Basque Country

Catalonia

2010

6%

18.8%

2013

6%

18.8%

2017

6%

19.1%

2019

6%

19%

The following two graphs (Figure 4 and Figure 5) present the composition of the Catalan and the Basque economies,

respectively. As can be seen, both are regions in which the primary sector has a tiny weight (1% or less), whereas

industry and the service sector are much more relevant. Manufacturing is particularly important for the Basque

country, whereas trade and transportation is crucial for the Catalan economy. The weight of the public admin-

istration – social security, health, education, social services – is somewhat higher in the Basque country than in

Catalonia.

Figure 4: Composition of the Catalan Economy, data for 2019. Source: National

Statistics Institute (INE)

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Figure 5: Composition of the Basque Economy, data for 2019. Source: National Statis-

tics Institute (INE)

Regional autonomy and funding

Catalonia and the Basque Country have similar levels of regional powers. This similarity is particularly relevant

when it comes to the three key services that the EQI focuses on: health provision, education, and public safety. In

this regard, the regional governments of Catalonia and the Basque Country have full control over the public health

service in the region. The only key aspect that is decided at the national level is the minimum list of services that

citizens have the right to without having to pay. Regions can, however, choose to top this up by adding services

that are not covered under public insurance in other parts of the country.

A similar logic applies to education. The central government sets basic standards regarding the regulation of

public and charter schools, and it sets mandatory basic guidelines for the curricula in primary and secondary edu-

cation. However, management of the education service, its human resources, pay levels, and (partly) the content of

the curriculum are fully in the hands of the Catalan and Basque governments.

In terms of public safety, Catalonia and the Basque Country are the only two regions with their own police force,

the Mossos d’Esquadra in the former region and the Ertzaintza in the latter. The Spanish national police and the

Guardia Civil are still present in both regions, although, for most intents and purposes, their presence is largely

residual in both cases. In that sense, day-to-day policing and responsibility for addressing most types of crime is in

the hands of the regional police forces26.

Where Catalonia and the Basque Country diverge most is in their regional funding model. The Basque Coun-

try has full fiscal autonomy. Through the policy of concierto foral, the three Basque provinces have their own tax

collection agency that is responsible for collecting all taxes. The Basque Country transfers a negotiated quantity to

the Spanish central government, the cupo, to fund the general services that the Spanish government provides in the

Basque Country. Crucially, nonetheless, the Basque Country’s fiscal revenue does not contribute to fund services in

any other region. In other words, there are no net fiscal transfers from the Basque Country to poorer regions within

Spain.

26The Spanish ‘Guardia Civil’ is equivalent to the French Gendarmerie or the Italian Carabinieri corps.

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Catalonia, by contrast, is part of the general regional funding system. In this region, taxes are collected by the

Spanish tax collection agency (the Agencia Tributaria). The regional government has some capacity to set income

tax rates, but only within some bounds. From the total tax revenue raised in Catalonia, part of it is transferred to

the Catalan regional government as well as to local governments located in this region. Another part of it is used to

fund the services provided by the Spanish government in Catalonia, such as social security administration. Lastly,

part of the revenue is transferred to help fund public services in poorer regions. Catalonia, in sum, is one of the few

regions that is a net contributor to the funding of public services in Spain.

12.5 Comparative Analysis

12.5.1

Institutions: Politics and Political Parties

Nearly every expert interviewed highlighted how the political system in the region was central to explaining the

score obtained in the study. The political dynamic depicted by experts was one of wide consensus in the Basque
Country and polarisation and entrenched division in Catalonia.

A key aspect that is emphasised by several Basque Country-based experts is that the politics of this region is

now dominated by consensus. The current regional government – as well as key provincial authorities and large

municipalities – are ruled by a coalition between the two main parties that represent two key constituencies of

Basque society, the nationalists and the unionists. These parties are the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) and the

Basque Socialist Party (PSE). According to a former top bureaucrat, this coalition ‘contributes to create a collab-

orative culture that focuses on the pragmatic management of the region, rather than on maximalist goals. There

is no ideology that is being imposed. This helps pacify the society and sends the signal that the relationship with

the central government will be fruitful. As a result, the demands that are placed on the central government are

reasonable, which lowers polarisation. This is something that the Basque society is rewarding after many years of

terrorism and more polarised politics’.

Along the same lines, another expert stated that the last 15 years have witnessed the end of polarized, block-

based politics in the Basque Country. The cleavage between nationalist vs unionist Basques is less salient now.

‘The time of radical and high-stakes politics is over in the Basque Country. The business world does not want it. It

wants stability.’

What has contributed to the de-polarisation of Basque politics? Here experts largely agree as well. The dis-

solution of the Basque terrorist group E.T.A. is the main factor. As a consulting expert declared:

‘There is a

widely-shared optimism in the Basque Country following the end of E.T.A. That optimism percolates perceptions

of the quality of government. It has also contributed to the end of polarised politics.’ As a socialist councillor also

stated: ‘After the end of terrorism, there is a strong desire in the Basque society to turn the page. We now demand

unity and consensus.’

Consensus politics, the experts say, goes beyond the coalition between the Basque Nationalist Party and the Social-

ists. Several experts pointed out that several parties have at different times in the last decade been in charge of the

main political institutions of the Basque Country – regional government, provincial governments, and large munici-

palities – and yet policies have remained largely stable27.As an expert said: ‘Regional ministries have changed hands

between parties, and so have municipalities and provinces, and yet everything has carried on working smoothly. Gov-

ernment turnover does not produce a public policy reset. Improvements are introduced gradually, unlike in Spain’s

27All major Basque parties have at some point managed either the regional government, a province, or a provincial

capital. This includes the Basque Nationalist Party, the Socialist Party, Bildu – a left nationalist party close to

E.T.A, and the Spanish Popular party.

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central government, where new major laws are introduced with every new cabinet.’

The complex institutional setup of the Basque Country is also mentioned as a factor that contributes to con-

sensus. The regional government is responsible for funding and managing the health, education, and police services,

among others. But resources come from the provinces, which manage the tax collection agencies – haciendas forales

– and then transfer the resources to the regional government and municipalities. These provinces are also in charge

of transport and infrastructure. As a top official indicated: “There is a need for collaborative governance, both be-

tween parties and between levels of government. The need to work together for the common good”. As an example

of collaboration and consensus, this expert indicated how 1/2 of all regional parliamentary initiatives had support

from parties that are not in the regional cabinet.”

The picture that emerges in Catalonia is drastically different.

It is one of entrenched political blocks, namely

the pro-independence camp and the unionist one. A political system, in sum, that is polarised. Several Catalan

experts, particularly those not sympathetic towards the pro-independence bid, argue that the polarised dynamic is

one of the main culprits for the low EQI scores obtained by Catalonia. They also tend to blame the pro-independence

camp for having fueled polarisation with its bid for independence.

Experts that are critical of the pro-independence movement suggest that the political push for secession – named El

procés – has negatively affected both perceptions about the quality of government and the underlying realities.
In terms of perceptions, a top bureaucrat in a Catalan administration declared that: ‘The procés has discredited

the regional institutions. On the one hand, the pro-independence camp sees that the autonomous institutions are

insufficient and problematic. On the other, the unionist side has come to see the institutions (which are controlled by

pro-independence parties) as sectarian.’ Using a similar argument, a second expert indicated that the independence

bid has “lowered trust in the regional government”. Even an expert that is closer to the pro-independence parties

stated that: “The pro-independence bid has created the sensation among the public that the regional government

has not focused on governance and management.” 28 Some opinions also point to the fact that the pro-independence

bid has negatively affected the quality of government. A top bureaucrat in an administration stated that: ‘With

the procés, the regional government has paid little attention to the actual management of day-to-day problems in

favour of the more epic goal of achieving independence.’ A retired local administrator highlighted that: ‘There has

been an absence of pragmatic politics. Much has been left undone for many years. For instance, the unified plan

for infrastructure and service provision, which is a responsibility of the regional government, has not been approved

for a long time. Regional public employees are still owed wages from 2014. . . .’ All this can be summarised in the

opinion shared by another expert. She declared:

‘We have gone through 10 years of a standstill that has deeply

affected public policies. The procés has concentrated all political energies and there has been no actual government.

This has even percolated all the way down to local governments. Even parts of the regional budget have been left

unspent because of the lack of diligence and attention of the government.’

Other experts, those more favourable towards independence, have a very different outlook on the repercussions

of the pro-independence movement. They do not tend to mention the polarisation of society or lack of attention

towards public policymaking.

Instead, the focus here has been on the harmful role of the central government’s

response to the independence referendum. As an expert declared:

‘The response of the Spanish government was

brutal. The activation of article 155 in the Constitution was traumatic for the regional administration, and particu-

larly for its employees. It also increased red tape and thus slowed down policymaking. It even affected contractors.’

28In Spanish: ‘Se ha generado la sensación de que no se gestiona.’

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12.5.2

Institutions: Regional Funding

The issue of regional funding emerged in almost all interviews with experts, particularly among those based in

Catalonia. At issue here is the role played by the different funding systems that Catalonia and the Basque Country

enjoy. As described above, whereas some of the fiscal revenue raised in Catalonia is used to fund public spending

in other regions in Spain, that is not the case for the Basque Country. For several experts in Catalonia this is a

key factor that explains the lower quality of public services relative to the Basque Country. A top official declared:

‘We receive insufficient funding from the central government. This is particularly acute in terms of gaps in the

execution of promised investments.’ This sense of poor and unfair treatment from the central government is shared

by many other experts.

‘We receive less than we produce. There is no ordinality in investments. And even the

limited investments that are promised are not completed, said another expert. This same idea was expressed by a

handful of other interviewees. The conclusion they reach is that ‘this poor regional funding system contributes to

the poor perception of the quality of public services’. A person who has worked in both the Basque Country and

Catalonia said: ‘The Basque funding makes a difference. Municipalities have a lot more money. Public employees

have higher salaries. The regional government has more financial room to fund generous public services.’29.

By contrast, the Basque Country is seen by many Catalan experts as privileged. One of the experts graphically

expressed this: ‘In the Basque Country they live off the fat of the land.30. Another said: ‘The Basque Country is

rich, and they manage all their fiscal resources.’

Several experts in the Basque Country rejected this idea of privilege. Two arguments were advanced. The first

one was historical. They argued that in the early period of devolution Catalonia was offered the same system but

rejected it. As one expert declared: ‘Jordi Pujol did not want the Basque model of regional funding because it is

one in which you are on your own. If revenues are low, the central government does come to the rescue.’ A key

argument raised by business people, bureaucrats, and third sector agents in the Basque Country is that their model

of regional funding is very risky. If revenues are high, the money may be kept. But if fiscal revenues go down, this

leads to much worse trouble than being part of the general system because there is no eligibility to receive solidarity

from other regions. This, the experts say, has important implications for the functioning of the Basque regional

government and local authorities: ‘The concierto – the Basque funding system – is risky. It relies on good public

management.’ Another person said: ‘Yes, the concierto is very important for us. But not so much because revenues

are higher, but because in the Basque Country we know that we must pull ourselves up by our bootstraps. We thus

need good public management. This generates a more entrepreneurial and pragmatic culture – our quality of life is

at stake. This creates incentives to have low levels of corruption and for tax evasion to be fought more decisively

by the authorities.’

12.5.3

Institutions: Public Administration

This is an area that many experts focused on in their diagnosis of the problems of quality of government. One of

the issues considered was the historical legacy of how regional administrations were built through decentralisation

after 1978. In the case of Catalonia, some experts were very critical. One of them stated:

‘During the first 23

years of regional autonomy (1980-2003), a new administration was built from scratch, but the philosophy that was

followed was not one of ensuring an effective administration, but that of “nation-building”. The shape the regional

administration took was one that mimicked the party that led the regional government during those two decades,

29This expert notes, however, that: ‘A funding system is not a sufficient condition for the high score of the Basque

Country. La Rioja participates in the same system as Catalonia and yet has very good scores.’

30In Spanish: ‘Los vascos nadan en la abundancia.’

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Convergència i Unió. Many within the first cohorts of top managers and administrators were selected from social

strata that were sympathetic to this party.’ According to another expert, something similar occurred in the Basque

Country during the 1980s, but this was somewhat corrected in the 1990s.

Another key dimension considered by experts is that of the selection of candidates for the top managerial posi-

tions in the administration. Regarding Catalonia, an expert indicated that: ‘The proportion of top managers that

are politically appointed is higher in Catalonia than in the Basque Country. In addition, there has been substantial

turnover in these positions since 2003.’ The problem of the politicisation of these top positions is also highlighted

by a participant who stated: “Lots of appointments at the top administrative level are discretionary, and in several

key agencies such as the Centre for Opinion Studies (CEO) or the School of Administration.

In many of these

cases, the appointees must be civil servants, but there is still quite a wide margin for political discretion. This has a

demoralising effect for many public employees. And it weakens the capacity of administrations to develop long-term

plans. In part, this stems from the fact that those appointed politically tend to have a conservative mindset: they

do not want to risk innovating so that they have better chances of progressing in their careers.’

Other interviewees were not that critical about the system for appointing top level managers. A participant said:

‘Yes, there is politically-induced turnover at the top. But that is normal. I do not think a fully autonomous man-

agerial echelon would be good. They would have a lot of power and they would have neither legitimacy nor be

subject to accountability.’ Others, while critical of the system, indicated that it could not explain why Catalonia

is the lowest ranked region: ‘Politicisation of the managerial level is not specific to Catalonia. True, that level is

colonised by parties, but the same happens in the rest of Spain.’ Thinking of the local level, an expert said: ‘The

managerial level is very much controlled by political parties in all Spanish municipalities. What counts is political

loyalty.’

Some participants in the Basque country indicated that politicisation was less of an issue in that region. An

academic said:

‘There are fewer positions appointed based on political loyalty.’ Yet another said that:

‘There is

a two-way street between public managerial positions and positions in the private sector (and even to the third

sector). There is thus less politicisation, and these people have a lot of social prestige.’

A problem shared by both regions according to most experts is the fact that a high proportion of public employees

are interinos, i.e. many positions are filled by personnel that have temporary appointments whereas the position

is meant to be filled by permanently appointed staff. As a participant highlighted: ‘In the Basque Country there

is a huge pool of people with temporary appointments. It’s more than 50% in the higher echelons of the adminis-

tration. At least the Basque Institute for Public Administration manages their selection with fairly impartial exams.’

A similar situation arises in Catalonia. As someone very familiar with this said:

‘40% of employees are tempo-

rary. This is a huge challenge, since European rules force us to take this down to no more than 8%. One of the

participants provided an explanation for what is behind this problem: ‘There have been very few calls for permanent

positions, and not with enough periodicity. There have been 10 years with calls for entry exams for the cuerpo

general. The lack of calls has been made up for with the opening of temporary positions.’

What are the consequences of this for the quality of government? Experts voice concerns, although they do not

think it is a key factor. One expert said: ‘The procedure to select interinos is not particularly opaque, but it recruits

from a lower quality pool because calls for temporary positions are not as widely known by potential candidates.’

A former elite bureaucrat in the Basque Country confirmed this:

‘The profiles of people recruited on temporary

contracts are not the best.’

It seems that the consequences might not be limited to the overall talent of public servants. Some experts fear

that it has increased the politicisation of the administration. According to a participant: ‘Temporary positions open

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the door to favouritism and nepotism in hiring practices.’ Another person was even more negative: ‘Many of those

selected for temporary positions in Catalonia have affinity with the parties that have been in power in the last ten

years.’

Finally, another issue that is mentioned is whether language requirements can be detrimental to the hiring of

talent for the regional and local administrations in these two regions. As mentioned above, both regions have their

own languages in addition to Spanish, and both Spanish and Basque/Catalan are official in the region. An expert

who is familiar with the situation in the Basque Country said that language requirements are a barrier to entry:

‘Talent is lost, particularly in public universities.’ Others were not critical: ‘We really care about effective bilingual-

ism in the Basque Country. It may deter some potential candidates, but it is still worth it. And knowledge of Basque

is only an entry-requirement for positions that involve dealing directly with citizens. On top of that, the Basque

regional government creates many opportunities for newcomers to learn Basque through institutions like Euskaltegi.’

In terms of transparency, experts in both regions highlighted the changes in the rules that administrations must

abide by. The increasing availability of open administrative data was also emphasised by other participants. A top

bureaucrat in Catalonia declared: ‘A lot of progress has been made in Catalonia since the regional law of 2014. It

was promoted by several parties in parliament. It is more ambitious and demanding than the national-level one.

There are clear punishments for lack of compliance.’ A counterpart in the Basque Country raised a similar point:

‘We have a very ambitious regional transparency law. Information on all contracts above 500 euros can be accessed

by the public, and this includes the identity of the person who signed the contract.’ Another Basque official proudly

said: ‘We are pushing for open government. We want data to be open and for paperwork to be done digitally so

it is more traceable and transparent. Our commitment shows in how the region has been selected to participate in

the Open Government Partnership, together with 19 other regions in the world.’

Among some Catalan interviewees, however, there is bewilderment that the improvements in transparency are

not reflected in the EQI score: ‘There is a high level of compliance with the Catalan transparency law. That’s why

I am surprised that it’s not improving the region’s score.’

The improvements in transparency, according to several experts, have a dark side. The new rules, they say, are

a source of red tape that slows everything down. A Catalan official said: ‘There was strong internal resistance to

the transparency law among civil servants. It increases their workload. This is a relevant issue since the increase

in transparency requirements may discourage potential candidates from entering an administrative career. It’s just

too much responsibility and too much red tape.’ A former municipal employee could not agree more:

‘In Spain,

we are latecomers to the question of administrative transparency. But now we may have gone overboard, with the

zeal of the newly-converted. Rules are too cumbersome, particularly for smaller municipalities. The staff needed to

comply with the rules is missing. Now there is paralysis among public employees. There is a fear of signing any

document.’

A Catalan expert in public administration declared:

‘Procedures are now a living hell. The fear of punishment

is leading us to paralysis. There is a fear of signing forms. And this is stifling innovation.’ Another participant

concurred and was deeply alarmed about this: ‘The regional transparency law, together with the new Spanish law

on procurement is producing a true standstill in the administration. It takes a year to do a contract! It’s an absolute

blockade. These laws are overly founded upon the complete mistrust of civil servants. The red tape is so bad that

I don’t think Catalonia will be able to spend the European NextGen resources.’

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12.5.4

Institutions: The Judiciary and Corruption

The role of the judiciary does not seem to play an important role for experts. Those that highlight it in their

interviews tend to think that the judicial authorities do a good job. As a Catalan expert indicated: ‘The judiciary

does its job of fighting corruption. It has uncovered major cases. But this has created social unrest and shock.’

The effective work of judges, the expert continued, has contributed to a sense that there is a lot of corruption in

Catalonia. This positive view of the judiciary is not shared by a minority of experts. One participant in the Basque

Country was very critical: ‘Among judges located in the Basque Country, there is very little appetite to investigate

sensitive cases. The top regional court [Tribunal Superior de Justicia] had on its deck the case of a corrupt judge

and it chose to turn a blind eye.’

The question of corruption plays a prominent role for many experts in both Catalonia and the Basque Coun-

try. Corruption is blamed by many as one of the reasons why perceptions of quality of government are worse in

Catalonia and the Basque Country.

In Catalonia many experts agree that there have been major corruption scandals and that this may have con-

tributed to perceptions of corruption. Two experts on corruption in Catalonia indicated: ‘In the Basque Country

there have been fewer corruption scandals and these have affected central actors in the political system. In Cat-

alonia, on the other hand, corruption has affected the hegemonic party [Convergencia I Unió].’ A top official in

Catalonia agreed: ‘Corruption scandals have been very relevant, such as the Palau scandal and the Pujol one.’

There was some agreement that these well-publicised scandals may have damaged perceptions of impartiality and

corruption in Catalonia, but several experts doubted whether corruption in this region is actually higher than in

other places. A former manager of a Catalan institution indicated: ‘Corruption in Catalonia is remarkable, but it

is not higher than in regions like Valencia, Andalusia, or the Canary Islands.’ A top bureaucrat in the regional

government confirmed this view: ‘I am very surprised by the very negative view of corruption in Catalonia. There

has been more corruption in other regions such as Valencia or the Balearic Islands.’

Most Basque experts tend to say that corruption in this high score region is very much under control. A retired top

bureaucrat indicated: ‘There may be isolated cases of corruption in the Basque Country, but there is definitely no

sense that the main party – The Basque Nationalist Party – is corrupt at its core. That increases the credibility of

the institutions.’ Another retired official said: ‘There may be some corruption, but it is very limited. I have worked

for many institutions and agencies and I haven’t seen any impropriety. Even though there is frequent government

turnover and new parties have checked the files, nothing dirty has ever been found. There are no skeletons in

the closet.’ This same expert was proud of the ethics code created in 2014 that applies to top-level political ap-

pointees. Violations of this code “imply the termination of the job. This sends a signal to all top political appointees”.

This apparent consensus is broken by some (minority) participants. They say that corruption in the Basque Country

is not detected, but that it exists. A person interviewed said that there is “omertá among contractors with public

institutions due to lack of impartiality. They are scared that if they blow the whistle they’ll be cut from access to

future contracts’. A second expert went even further: ‘There is a lot more corruption than people think. It’s just

hidden, hidden now because the Basque Nationalist Party currently controls all the key political institutions in the

Basque Country. This leads to a “code of silence”. There is a lot of clientelism, many people’s livelihoods depend

on public administrations. Hence, they do not make complaints.’

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12.5.5 The Media

The role of the media does not appear prominently in interviews with participants. When it does, it plays a markedly

different role among Catalan and Basque experts.

In Catalonia, several participants made the case that the media has contributed to create pessimistic perceptions

about the quality of public services and the situation of Catalonia as a whole. As two participants indicated: ‘There

is a very diverse media landscape in Catalonia, and this has created a more critical and demanding citizenry. The

Catalan regional TV program, Polònia, is a good example of this. It mocks all politicians very harshly, regardless

of their party.’ In addition to this, the experts continued: ‘The central government has pushed an agenda in the

Spanish media that accuses Catalan politicians of wrongdoing but has done so with fabricated evidence.’ Along the

same lines, an expert declared: ‘The national TV stations have explicitly sought to artificially increase the salience

of corruption in Catalonia.’ This is related to the point raised above indicating that a proportion of experts in

Catalonia were uneasy about the low EQI score and attributed it to perceptions rather than realities.

Another group of Catalan experts emphasised a different aspect of the role of the media. According to them,

the media, and particularly the regional public TV station (TV3), have significantly contributed to polarisation.

One person openly said: ‘TV3 is unbearable now. It’s tremendously slanted.’ Another declared: ‘The media have

substantially contributed to polarisation. TV3 is now very sectarian, it’s helping create identity-based bubbles.’

The context behind these opinions is that the regional public TV – which broadcasts in Catalan – is now mostly

watched only by the pro-independence part of society.

Experts in the Basque Country seldom considered the role of the media as prominent. However, when they did,

there was disagreement. Top officials in the regional government considered that the media was not particularly

friendly: ‘The main media conglomerate in the region is not particularly friendly towards the government. It def-

initely is not pro-nationalism.’

In any case, these officials indicated that:

‘Official advertising was allocated to

media outlets strictly in proportion to their market share.’ A freelance journalist had a more cynical view of the

media landscape in the Basque Country:

‘There is a general crisis of the traditional business model. There are

fewer and fewer investigative journalists and those that uncover things are pressured.’ In terms of market structure,

this person indicated that, among printed newspapers, ‘one is controlled by the government party [Deia], another

one is strongly nationalistic [Gara], and the main one is basically controlled by the major business interests [Correo]’.

12.5.6 Civil Society and Culture

Culture is one of the topics that participants in both regions refer to the most when explaining the rank obtained

by their region.

In Catalonia, several participants made the case that the predominant culture in the region is a key factor be-

hind the low EQI score. Specifically, their argument is that Catalans tend to be more demanding and have higher

standards towards public services. This would explain why Catalans have negative perceptions of the quality of

public services. The underlying reality is not worse than that of most other regions, they say, but the interpretation

of it is more critical.

This quote from a participant is representative of this argument:

‘The Catalan population has very high stan-

dards [es muy exigente]. We have higher standards than in other regions in Spain. This stems from a historical

tradition of having a dense and well-organised civil society. The density of associations and non-profit foundations

is much higher than in the rest of the country. This stronger civil society produces a stronger demand for good

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outcomes and stronger demand for effective accountability.’ Along these lines a top bureaucrat interviewed declared:

‘We Catalans have historically had a liberal or even libertarian character and a strong civil society, and for this

reason we tend to see governments and public services with suspicion. We have very high standards.’

Culture is also wielded as an argument to explain why perceptions of corruption may be high in Catalonia. A

participant declared:

‘In Catalonia there is a strong critical sense towards corruption. The scandal that affected

Jordi Pujol [regional prime minister for >20 years] and his political party deeply affected and alarmed society.

This effect was cross-cutting, i.e.

it shocked both pro-independence and pro-union citizens. In other regions like

Andalusia or Valencia there has been a more tolerant approach on corruption.’ A similar opinion was raised by some

participants with good knowledge of corruption in the region: ‘Catalan society had a very strong reaction towards

corruption scandals. We are a very demanding society, more so than in other territories. Perhaps in Valencia or in

the Balearic Islands they have been more tolerant.’

These opinions are shared more frequently by interviewees who appear to be more sympathetic towards the pro-

independence bid. However, a pro-unionist participant also concurred that; ‘We Catalans are very self-critical’,

although his conclusion pointed in a different direction: ‘We have thought of ourselves as the trailblasers [punta de

lanza] in Spain, and now we see we are not at the top anymore. This is something that is creating a widely shared

sense of pessimism.’

Culture also plays an important role in the accounts provided by experts in the Basque Country, albeit a role

of a different kind. Culture in the context is wielded as an argument to explain why the quality of government is

high, regardless of perceptions. A key argument that was highlighted by a good number of Basque participants is

well represented by this quote from an interviewee: ‘The Basque Country is small. We know each other. I could

bump into the regional prime minister at the movie theater this evening. There is less social stratification.’ Along

these lines, another participant indicated how the close-knit character of society is a deterrent of corruption: ‘We

all know each other in the Basque Country. The social cost of being corrupt or of wasting public resources is very

high. Indeed, we have very high standards vis-à-vis fraud: there is no presumption of innocence here.’

Along similar lines, a business person speaking about the ethos of the corporate world declared:

‘Here we do

not like those who want to make a quick buck. Those are caught fast. We, instead, promote steady and reasonable

management. The Basque private sector is largely composed of industrialists, not entrepreneurs who want to make

easy money. We value stability and step-by-step progress.’ Similarly, an expert from the third sector indicated that:

‘Basque society favours pragmatism in management. There is an ethic of constant work and progress, even if it is

slow. Hence, if frowns upon those that get rich very fast.’

Two more aspects of culture are brought up in the interviews as factors that could contribute to the high per-

ceived quality of government in the Basque Country. The first is the level of inter-personal trust: ‘We are a small

society with a high degree of interpersonal and interclass trust: in the same txoko [closed gastronomic society] you

can find people from very different class backgrounds.’ The second one is the close-knit nature of Basque civil

society. It leads some participants to consider that this increases institutional responsiveness: ‘Civil society is very

well organised. There are plenty of organisations –many of them local – that lobby agencies and officials and often

get their demands met. This clearly increases satisfaction with the functioning of institutions.’

12.6 Conclusions

The gap in EQI scores between Catalonia (ES51) and the Basque Country (ES21) is rather striking. These are

two regions that share several key structural factors that could be associated with the quality of government: they

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have higher than average GDP per capita, were early industrialisers, have high levels of urbanisation, can count

on competitive public universities and wide access to public education, are multi-ethnic societies with their own

language in addition to Spanish, and have important regional powers. Yet their performance in the EQI survey

could not be more divergent: the score for Catalonia is -0.83 and that of the Basque Country 0.89. Given that these

scores are standardised, the difference in scores amounts to about 1.7 standard deviations!

This remarkable gap raises important questions for future research, particularly regarding the relative importance of

long-term factors versus short-term contextual changes on the score of a region. Several interviewees indicated that

there were indeed differences in the underlying performance of the Basque Country and Catalonia, but that these

real differences were magnified in citizens’ perceptions because of short-term factors, such as government stability

or political polarisation.

One of the key methodological challenges for future iterations of the EQI study may thus be to disentangle the

extent to which citizens’ perceptions reflect tangible and stable differences in government performance rather than

a response to conjunctural considerations. Indeed, many participants in the Basque Country, and (some of) those

located in Catalonia, were eager to indicate that recent political developments were a key factor behind the score

received by their respective region. Granted, the political context can have important consequences on the actual

levels of service quality, impartiality, and corruption, but it can also affect the public mood, and this can in turn

colour perceptions about the quality of government. Future work should try to parse out the relative importance

of short-term contextual factors versus underlying stable phenomena. This could be done, for example, with survey

experiments that employ priming manipulations.

A promising application of this inquiry would be to examine the impact of political polarisation. One of the

explanations offered to account for the mismatch between Catalonia and the Basque Country was that politics in

the Basque Country is dominated by consensus while that of Catalonia is frayed by deep divisions. A very rele-

vant question that ensues is to what extent political polarisation (or lack thereof) affects the measured quality of

government in a durable way or whether its impact lasts only so long as polarisation survives. If Catalonia were to

become less polarised now, would that be reflected immediately in the perceptions of citizens or would polarisation

leave a long-term legacy on the quality of government?

Another intriguing question regards the role of government stability and the domination of regional politics by

a single party. In both Catalonia and the Basque Country, regional politics have largely been dominated by a single

party. In Catalonia, it has been Convergence and Union and its heirs (PdCat and now Junts per Catalonia) that

have dominated. This party and its new incarnations have led the regional government for 33 years over the 40-year

period between 1980 and 2020. Likewise, the Basque Nationalist Party has been in office in the region for the entire

period since regional devolution, except for a three-year stint between 2009 and 2012. Despite this close similarity,

the performance of both regions in the EQI study is widely different. This raises the questions: what is the effect

of party hegemony on the quality of government services? Is the impact heterogeneous and conditional on third

variables?

The last point relates to the role of economic crises. The over-time evolution in the EQI scores for Catalonia

and the Basque Country show a steady increase for the Basque Country since 2013 and a saw-like shape for Cat-

alonia (Figure 2). A plausible explanation advanced by some participants is that the Basque Country has improved

its score (in part) because it navigated the Great Recession much better than Catalonia. Indeed, one of Catalonia’s

worst EQI performances occurred in the 2010 wave, in the middle of the recession, when unemployment was very

high and both the central and regional governments were starting to implement substantial budget cuts. Thus,

what is the effect of economic performance on the quality of government? Does it affect public services in the long

run through budget cuts and the loss of human capital or does the crisis simply affect the public’s mood in the

short-term? These are essential questions, the answers to which may serve two purposes: (1) to improve our under-

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standing of the determinants of the quality of government and (2) to enhance our interpretation of the underlying

phenomena that the EQI captures.

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12.7 Appendix for Spanish Study

Interview

Interview 1

Interview 2

Interview 3

Interview 4

Interview 5

Interview 6

Interview 7

Position

Region

public sector consultant

Catalonia & Basque Country

Top bureaucrat regional government

Catalonia

Top bureaucrat provincial administra-

Catalonia

tion

Top bureaucrat regional government

Catalonia

Elite civil servant Barcelona munici-

Catalonia

pality

Public Administration scholar

Catalonia

Former municipal civil servant (not

Catalonia

Barcelona)

Interview 8

Former administrator or major Cul-

Catalonia

Interview 9

Interview 10

Interview 11

Interview 12

Interview 13

Interview 14

Interview 15

Interview 16

Interview 17

Interview 18

Interview 19

Interview 20

Interview 21

Interview 22

Interview 23

Interview 24

Interview 25

Interview 26

Interview 27

tural Centre

Director of public agency

Catalan anti-corruption agency

Catalan anti-corruption agency

Catalonia

Catalonia

Catalonia

Top bureaucrat provincial administra-

Catalonia

tion

Top bureaucrat regional government

Catalonia

Top bureaucrat regional government

Basque Country

Political scientist

Basque Country

Member of municipal council

Basque Country

Top bureaucrat regional government

Basque Country

Top bureaucrat regional government

Basque Country

Top bureaucrat regional government

Basque Country

Freelance journalist

Former civil servant

Basque Country

Basque Country

Former civil servant provincial (foral)

Basque Country

administration

Top Bureaucrat regional government

Basque Country

Researcher and civil servant in the field

Basque Country

of education

Business federation

Third sector organisation

Business association

Basque Country

Basque Country

Catalonia

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13 Sub-national Quality of Government in the EU in the time

of Covid-19 Polish case studies

31

13.1 Executive Summary

• The QoG performance of the Polish regions has been consistently between the high results of the northern

and western EU member states and that of the southern and eastern states.

• This report presents the result of an in-depth analysis aimed at determining the factors that have shaped

differences in perceptions of the quality of governance in two Polish regions that differ significantly in levels

of 2021 EQI.

• In-depth interviews were conducted with representatives of different stakeholders and age groups. There were

27 respondents in Lubelskie and 24 in Opolskie, representing different areas of socio-economic life, as well as

different professions and sectors.

• Introductory desk research showed the different history of the regions studied, differences in the structure

of the economy and in the level of socio-economic development. The historical background and spheres of

influence of different organisational cultures, traditions of international cooperation and labour migration are

significantly different in the regions analysed, which translates into differences in organisation and regulation

in public institutions.

• There are no differences in regional autonomy and funding as Poland is a unitary state.

• There are meaningful differences in the size and population of the regions – Opolskie being the smallest Polish

region with the lowest number of citizens but a strong network of towns and cities; Lubelskie is bigger but

significantly centralised, with a large centre of power and a network of rather small towns.

• The respondents confirmed the results of the EQI. As many as 75% of respondents in Opolskie and 26% of

respondents in Lubelskie, noted that their institutions are better than elsewhere in Poland.

• From the institutions surveyed, nterviewees in Lubelskie expressed the highest confidence in the army. In

Opolskie respondents highlighted relatively higher trust in administrative units but also in public services and

entrepreneurs. Political parties and the media remain the institutions eliciting limited trust in both regions.

• In Lubelskie, public institutions are more focused on following rules and procedures, while in Opolskie they

are focused on delivering concrete results. This is also connected to the predominant strategy for ensuring

compliance with the rules by public services employees, which differs between the regions. In Lubelskie this

is largely punitive, while in Opolskie the strategy is based on positive reinforcement.

• Respondents in both regions indicated an improvement in the quality of public institutions following Poland’s

accession to the EU, with the greatest positive changes recorded in the case of educational units, universities

and schools. The violation of impartiality due to political and/or personal connections is much more visible in

Lubelskie than in Opolskie. This was mainly manifested by differences in access to public positions through

political or personal connections. In Lubelskie voivodship, 30% of respondents indicated a very high or high

degree of partiality in the case of political connections and 37% in the case of personal connections.

In

Opolskie it was 12.5% and 8.3%, respectively.

• The competence of leaders and willingness to cooperate with other stakeholders presented by local and regional

authorities are also important factors shaping the perception of the quality of governance. The organisational

31Authors are Paweł Chmieliński and Barbara Wieliczko from the Institute of Rural and Agricultural Development,

Polish Academy of Sciences, Warszawa, Poland. Lead coordinator from UGOT is Monika Bauhr.

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culture in Opolskie, based on the principles of public consultation and participation, supported transparency

and allowed for more autonomous actions by public institution employees.

• Inhabitants of both regions, but especially Opolskie, emphasised the importance of good structures, efficient

organisation of work in offices, work ethos and competences of officials, as well as multiculturalism and

contacts with other countries, as some of the basic factors for the quality of governance index. These features

are linked to the historical development of the region, which in turn has had an impact on the infrastructure

network, links between centres and their independence from the regional capital.

• Membership of the EU has introduced new institutional principles, based on participation and cooperation

with NGOs and citizens, for planning and implementing regional policy.

In general opinion, despite the

bureaucracy (usually pointed to when criticising the use of Structural Funds), the legitimacy of planning,

the high impact (through the size of the budget), and equal rules for access to support for beneficiaries are

usually highlighted. This translates into a better perception of public institutions, the competence of their

staff and the quality of regional policy.

• On the other hand, the survey shows that both the quality of planning and the way (and legitimacy) of

spending EU funds, and thus their real effect in a given region, depended on the quality of the institutions,

and the work ethos, openness and certain general values represented by a region’s community. This was also

demonstrated by the COVID-19 pandemic, during which the regional authorities performed relatively better

in organising assistance to inhabitants and managing the crisis than those at the national level. On a regional

level, however, it can be seen that Opolskie’s institutions were rated higher, in this context, than thosein

Lubelskie’.

• The results of the study confirm that historically shaped regional differences still have a significant influence

on socio-economic development and quality of governance. The diverse historical pathways of the Polish

regions had a strong impact on the level of social capital and these differences persist. This is related to

the influence of eastern and western culture (including organisations) on each of the regions, but was also

due to the degree of homogeneity of the region in terms of ethnicity and location-related contacts with other

countries through family and work ties.

• Strengthening power in local centres, further decentralisation of funding opportunities (incl. EU cohesion

policy), as well as the greater involvement of citizens in decision-making on development of the regions, can

provide significant support to improving the quality of regional governance in Poland.

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13.2

Introduction

13.2.1 Regional QoG performance in the country

The Polish regions’ QoG performance has been consistently located between the high results of the northern and

western EU member states and that of those in the south and east. Regional QoG in Poland improved according

to each of the EQI surveys from 2010 to 2017. The results of the 2021 EQI survey show a deterioration from the

previous results. The EQI results for the Polish regions are now slightly better overall than in 2010 (Tab. 1.1).

Table 1.1: List of Regions with Greatest Positive Change in EQI since 2017

Region

2010

2013

2017

2021

Dolnośląskie

Kujawsko-Pomorskie

Łódzkie

Lubelskie

Lubuskie

Małopolskie

Mazowiecki regionalny

Opolskie

Podkarpackie

Podlaskie

Pomorskie

Śląskie

Świętokrzyskie

Warminsko-Mazurskie

Warszawski stołeczny

Wielkopolskie

Zachodniopomorskie

Poland

-0.868

-0.594

-0.803

-0.759

-0.845

-0.827

-0.924

-1.028

-0.8

-0.889

-0.643

-1.026

-0.795

-0.883

-0.924

-0.928

-0.818

-0.844

-0.852

-0.235

-0.704

-0.611

-0.373

-0.496

-0.748

-0.199

-0.722

-0.339

-0.364

-0.848

-0.655

-0.437

-0.748

-0.592

-0.478

-0.553

-0.342

-0.224

-0.059

-0.447

-0.568

-0.335

-0.457

-0.413

-0.56

-0.392

-0.272

-0.415

-0.594

-0.265

-0.457

-0.402

-0.303

-0.383

-0.77

-0.689

-0.852

-1.089

-0.557

-0.714

-0.748

-0.340

-0.711

-0.878

-0.489

-0.557

-0.783

-0.810

-1.229

-0.587

-0.888

-0.746

Note: source: Charron, Lapuente, and Bauhr (2021)

Polish regions, with their current borders and powers, were established in 1999 after the administrative reform

that significantly changed the responsibilities and powers of the non-central authorities.

In the period between

1975-1998 there were 49 regions (voivodships) in Poland. Since 1999 there have been only 16. For purposes of

cohesion policy, due to diversity in socio-economic development, the biggest region – Mazowieckie was divided into

two regions – Mazowieckie region and Mazowieckie capital city.

For in-depth analysis, two Polish regions have been chosen – Lubelskie (PL81) and Opolskie (PL52). The ra-

tionale for choosing Lubelskie region is because of its generally lower EQI than the Polish average, as well as a much

larger fall in the value of this index between 2017 and 2021, while in the case of Opolskie, it is the fact that in the

2021 survey its EQI was the highest among the Polish regions.

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13.2.2 The Research Method

The study was based on interviews with citizens in the case study regions – Lubelskie and Opolskie – representing

different social groups. The interviews were based on a questionnaire that included open and closed questions.

Figure 1: Sectoral and age structure of the participants of the Lubelskie case study

The interviewees were chosen to represent different stakeholder groups, but the sample is not representative of the

whole population. Moreover, the choice of respondents was aimed at interviewing people who could respond to the

diverse issues mentioned in the interview. Therefore, the shares of the respondents presenting different opinions are

not representative of the whole population of the studied regions but of the groups interviewed. The premise of

the study was to interview representatives of different sectors, primarily people representing professions that deal

directly with institutions, as employees but also as users. Therefore, the study included representatives of local

government, entrepreneurs, NGOs (including local action groups operating in rural areas), academics and teachers,

students and residents.

The Lubelskie case study was based on individual interviews with 27 persons representing the private, public

and social sectors and different age groups. The majority of participants were women – 55.6%. In Opolskie, 24

people were surveyed, of which 58.3% were women.

In both regions, a diverse representation of different sectors and fields of socio-economic life was ensured in or-

der to provide adequate survey saturation. At the same time, selection was based on people who have regular

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Figure 2: Sectoral and age structure of the participants of the Opolskie case study

contact with the public administration by virtue of their profession or activity. Thus, interviewees were able to

make a relatively objective assessment of the region’s functioning in the context of the subject of the study (Fig. 1,

2).

The introductory part of the study report – description of the regions – is based on a literature review and statis-

tical data from Statistics Poland. The sections following compile the respective answers to the questions asked in

a methodologically convergent manner in both regions. The sampling and uniform research approach allow for a

comparative study.

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13.2.3 Position of Lubelskie and Opolskie regions in the socio-economic landscape

of Poland

The high degree of regional inequalities in Poland has historical roots dating back to the 19th century. Poland

was divided between Prussia, Austro-Hungary and Russia32. The distinctive development conditions of these three

territories have left deep traces that have manifested themselves in the level of economic growth, infrastructure

networks (roads, railways), the level of urbanisation, the legal system, the level of education, the behaviour of the

population and the cultural landscape (Chmieliński, 2006). These differences were not offset by the Second Polish

Republic, especially as the modernisation efforts undertaken in the east were interrupted by the Second World War.

The nature of regional diversity is also rooted in the reforms that took place over almost 200 years of the tur-

bulent history of Poland. Reforms giving peasants ownership of land were the beginning of the process of the

transformation of agriculture from the feudal era and the emergence of a capitalist economy that led to changing

the agrarian structure. These reforms took place during a more than 100-year period of partitions, during which

individual parts of the country were incorporated into various state organisms. The effect was that these reforms

were not only carried out in three different periods of the nineteenth century (appropriation took place over 50

years), but they also incorporated differences in the law of the three invader countries. The conditions for running

a farm in various parts of Poland were thus under the agricultural laws of Prussia, Austria and Russia.

Also, the development and character of agriculture in the areas of a particular annexation was conditioned by

the culture and model of agriculture prevailing in a given country. In the Prussian area, the appropriation was

associated with agricultural concentration, and thus with the creation of a smaller number of farms operating on

large areas of land (over 67% of agricultural land was concentrated in farms with an area of over 20 ha). In the

other regions, the appropriation of land to peasants did not bring any changes in the agrarian structure, which was

characterised by agrarian fragmentation and overpopulation (Chmieliński, 2006). In the Austrian part of Poland,

the land use status was characterised by a mosaic of small plots of land; while in the Russian part a polar structure

began to form: on the one hand, small farms of appropriated peasants, and on the other, arable farms owned by the

gentry. The policy of the invaders in the Polish lands and the manner and different dates of the enfranchisement

reform carried out also affected agricultural culture and production efficiency in particular areas. In the Prussian

partition, where the reform took place earliest, patterns of capitalism and an agricultural culture characteristic of

Western Europe were disseminated, while in the Russian partition, where the reform was carried out latest, the

authorities sought to minimise land ownership by the privileged gentry (Wawrzyniak, 2004).

Differences in the way the land reform was carried out in individual parts of Poland permanently set the limits

for the post-partition diversification of agriculture in Poland. The effects of it are visible not only in the modern

agrarian structure, but also in regional differences in the socio-economic level of development (E. Gorzelak, 2003). A

significant impact on the scale of diversification in the socio-economic structure of rural areas in Poland was caused

by the border changes resulting from the Potsdam Conference of 1945. From the point of view of agricultural de-

velopment, it should be emphasised that the amount of land used for agriculture in Poland decreased by 15.5% (up

to 21,656 thousand ha), with up to a third of all agricultural land now located in the newly annexed western and

northern territories of Poland. With these changes, the post-war map of Europe involved a massive resettlement of

about 3 million Germans and about 1.5 million Poles from the territories of the then USSR (Fig. 3).

After the Second World War, state policy aimed at creating a centrally controlled economy resulted in the creation

and promotion of the development of state-owned farms and agricultural production cooperatives. This is a subject

that goes beyond the scope of this study; nevertheless it goes to show the source of the spatial diversity of agriculture

32Opolskie region is situated within the (19th century) Prussian partition, Lubelskie within the Russian partition

(Figure 3).

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Figure 3: Historical and administrative regions of Poland

in the country, undoubtedly affecting the development of rural areas.33

Such differences as described above also influence the level of family incomes, with Lubelskie being in 2015 among

those regions with the lowest incomes (Czapiński and Panek, 2015: 39) and thus also among those with the largest

share of families struggling to make ends meet (Czapiński and Panek, 2015: 43). In 2015, Opolskie was among the

voivodships with the highest living conditions, while Lubelskie was among those with the lowest living conditions

(Czapiński and Panek, 2015: 127).

The long-studied differences in the development of the Polish regions identified four sets of factors shaping socio-

economic (and cultural) differences in Poland (G. Gorzelak et al., 2021):

1. Historically developed differences, especially the period of Poland’s partition lasting 123 years until the end

of the First World War.

2. Cultural factors shaping religiosity and attachment to tradition.

3. Pace of post-socialist transformation.

4. Efficiency of local government.

A synthetic picture of the differences between the Polish regions is shown along two axes (G. Gorzelak et al., 2021,

Chmieliński, 2006): southwest (higher developed, better in going through the transformation) – northeast (lower

values), and northwest (more modernising attitudes, higher efficiency of local governments) – southeast (more tra-

ditional attitudes).

The two regions under consideration differ significantly in their historic pathways as well as structure and socio-

33In 2018, the sub-regional study of the quality of governance in Poland included the Lubelskie (low EQI) and

Pomorskie (highest EQI in Poland, 2017) regions. The analysis of respondents’ statements and the literature study

already indicated at that time that historical divisions at the regional level and spheres of influence of the different

powers (empires) were associated with the quality of infrastructure, institutions and organisation of socio-economic

life in different regions of Poland. Thus, they differentiate the level of quality of governance (see Chmieliński and

Wieliczko 2018). It is worth noting that Pomorskie and Opolskie regions lie within the same borders of the 19th

century Prussian partition and Lubelskie within the Russian partition (see Figure 3). The partition borders largely

differentiate the level of development of regions in Poland, which is a border country at the meeting point of eastern

and western cultures (Cf. Bański, 2022; Chmieliński, 2006).

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economic situation. This diversity is well presented by Biedka et al. (2021), who proposed a classification of the

Polish regions based on size of the largest city, level of unemployment and share of those employed in the agricultural

sector in the total employed population. This resulted in putting Lubelskie into the category ‘rural’, while Opolskie

went to the ‘structurally burdened urban ‘category (Fig. 4).

Figure 4: Typology of Polish region by Biedka et al. (2021)

Such differences as described above also influence the level of family incomes, with Lubelskie being in 2015 among

those regions with the lowest incomes (Czapiński and Panek, 2015: 39) and thus also among those with the largest

share of families struggling to make ends meet (Czapiński and Panek, 2015: 43). In 2015, Opolskie was among the

voivodships with the highest living conditions, while Lubelskie was among those with the lowest living conditions

(Czapiński and Panek, 2015: 127).

The degree of rurality provides a good indicator of the diversity in a region’s development as it is linked to the

degree of development of local infrastructure and also determines the importance of urban centres in the region

(rural regions are usually less economically advanced). However, when looking at economic development measured

by GDP, it can be seen that both regions are not at the top of the ranking of regions in Poland, both in terms of

GDP and its growth over time (Fig. 5).

One element that strongly differentiates the regions is their relationship with other countries. Although both

are border regions, Opole is characterised by strong external relations based on ethnic minority activity, but above

all on its tradition of work-related migration.

In the Polish censuses of 2002 and 2011, Opolskie was the region with the largest number of emigrants per 1000

inhabitants (Fig. 6), showing that there is a tradition of emigration, especially to Germany. Lubelskie region is

among the regions with a comparatively low scale of emigration. In Opolskie, due to the relatively short distance

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Figure 5: GDP growth in 1995-2018 (at constant prices) vs. GDP per capita of NUTS2

regions 1995

LBL – Lubelskie; OPO - Opolskie.

between the region and southern Germany, migrants often visit their families in Opolskie. Consequently, their

relationship with the region is closer than in regions with more distant emigration destinations. Opolskie was, in

the census of 2011, also the region with the highest percentage of households with emigrants staying abroad more

than 3 months 17.8%, while the Polish average was 9.6%. In Lubelskie the percentage was slightly higher than

the national average – 9.9%. An important difference is the structure of emigration in both regions. In Opolskie

the majority of emigrants – 52.6% came from rural areas, while in Lubelskie the majority – 59.5% – left the cities

(Statystyczny, 2013).

One element illustrating the diverse basis of regional development in Poland is the territorial diversification of voter

preferences, especially relating to parliamentary elections. The quality of civil society can be assessed by analysing

the electoral turnout in Poland. Usually, only about 50% of those eligible to vote participate. By contrast, in 2019

a turbulent election campaign (often referencing the fundamental values represented by the supporters of different

political options) contributed to increased participation in the parliamentary elections. According to the State Elec-

toral Commission, 61.74% of eligible voters participated in 2019 (vs: 2015 – 50.92%; 2011 – 48.92%; 2007 – 53.88%;

2005 – 40.57%; 2001 – 46.29%). In 2019 the right-wing, national-conservative Law and Justice party (PiS) won in

almost all of Poland except for the big cities, the suburban areas and a few areas in the north and west of Poland.

The Law and Justice party gained significant support in rural areas and, generally speaking, in the eastern part

of the country. The Civic Coalition (KO), the main component of which is the Civic Platform party (the second

biggest in Poland, representing liberal conservatism), achieved the second best result in the elections to the Polish

Sejm (Parliament). It gained the most support in the big cities of the northern part of Poland (Szczecin, Tricity)

and in the Poznań and Warsaw metropolitan areas. A sizable percentage of the population also voted for KO in

the south-west part of the country, the Silesia area and the Sudety mountains (Wilczyński et al., 2019), i.e. in the

areas that are part of the Opolskie region (Fig. 7).

It should be stressed that in recent decades the distribution of voter preferences on the regional map of Poland

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Figure 6: Number of emigrants staying abroad more than 3 months per 1000 inhabi-

tants

Source: Statystyczny, 2013, Map 3.

has followed an historical division, traditionally representing the different influences of the divisions of Poland from

the 18th and 19th centuries, PiS won in 2019 in regions whose borders generally coincide with the former Austro-

Hungarian and Russian partitions (Fig. 7).

13.2.4

4. Roadmap for the rest of the report

The respondents in Lubelskie region had mixed feelings about the response of public institutions to the pandemic.

They thought that the beginning of the pandemic made public institutions work harder but that later they returned

to their old routine (Fig. 20).

The next two chapters describe in more detail the socio-economic and historical background to the

development of the two case study regions, Lubelskie (Chapter 2) and Opolskie (Chapter 3). The analysis of the

survey results for each region is presented in Chapter 4, where the EQI results are complemented by opinions voiced

on the quality of the functioning of individual institutions, based on the following dimensions:

• Institutions: Politics and political parties

• Institutions: Public Administration

• Institutions: Judiciary

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Figure 7: 2019 Polish parliamentary election in poviats (NUTS 3) by percentage of

support

PIS

-

Law and

Justice;

KO – Civic Coalition.

Source:

Waclaw Jan Kroczek,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019P olishparliamentaryelection(Access : 20.12.2022).

• Media

• Civil society

• Impact of the EU

• Impact of COVID-19.

Drawing on the section describing the results of the historical analyses and the data from the various sources of

official statistics, and in conjunction with the results of the interviews, the substantive conclusions of the study are

highlighted in Chapter 5

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13.3

2. Description of Lubelskie

13.3.1 Historical background

The history of the region, as a part of Poland, started in the Middle Ages. Lublin, the region’s capital, was founded

in 1317. It remained part of Poland until the third partition of Poland in 1795, when it became part of the Austrian-

Hungarian Empire. The organisation of the Lublin region is influenced by the historically formed size structure of the

cities. As it was already mentioned, Lubelskie is dominated by small centres, with a visible prevalence of towns with

up to 5,000 inhabitants (one third). Small towns serve as local development centres in urban-rural and rural gminas,

while the city of Lublin, as the largest city in the region, is a clear administrative and economic centre. Moreover,

due to the lack of other large centres, Lubelskie remains under the strong influence of the Warsaw agglomeration,

mainly for (higher) education, and the labour market.

13.3.2 Structural Conditions

Lubelskie is located in the eastern part of Poland, and its eastern border is the Polish-Ukrainian border. Lubelskie

is the third voivodeship in Poland when it comes to area, while it is ninth in terms of population size (Statistics

Poland, 2020, p. 42). 2,108,300 people lived in Lubelskie (end of 2019), which amounts to 5.5% of the total Polish

population. Population density is much lower than the Polish average – 84 and 123 people per 1 km2 – in Lubelskie

and Poland, respectively. In the period between 2010 and 2019 the number of people living in Lubelskie decreased

by 2.8% and its natural increase is negative. The age structure of the region is similar to the Polish average (Tab. 2.1).

Table 2.1: Age structure of the population in Lubelskie

Age

Below 25

Over 65

Lubelskie

Poland

25.4

18.6

25.3

18.1

source: Own elaboration based on Statistics Poland (2020).

Lubelskie is significantly less urbanised than the Polish average, with only 46.5% of the population living in urban

areas (Polish average, 60%). Thus, the majority of the citizens in this region, 53.5%, live in rural areas. The region

is among the three most rural, and it shares borders with the other two. The average wage in Lubelskie is lower

than the Polish average – amounting to 90.6% and 88.5% in 2010 and 2018, respectively (Statistics Poland, 2020,

p. 45). This is also reflected in the higher than Polish average share of people suffering poverty, irrespective of its

definition. In the period from 2008 to2018, Lubelskie had the lowest or almost the lowest GDP per capita among

the Polish regions (there are 16 regions) and this indicator fluctuated around 70% of the Polish average (Tab. 2.2).

Table 2.2: GDP per capita in Lubelskie in 2008-2018

Year

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

% of the Polish average

Rank in Poland

69.4

67.2

67.6

67.9

70.3

70.7

71.6

15

16

15

15

15

16

16

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2015

2016

2017

2018

68.5

68.9

69.0

67.8

16

16

16

16

source: Own elaboration based on Statistics Poland (2010-2020).

Figure 8: Structure of GVA by kind of activity (current prices) in Lubelskie (in %)

*repair of motor vehicles; transportation and storage; accommodation and catering; **information and communi-

cation. Source: Statistics Poland (2020a) and GUS (2015).

The largest share in the structure of gross value added (GVA) comes under the category ‘trade, repair of motor

vehicles; transportation and storage; accommodation and catering’ (Fig. 8). Agriculture has a significant share of

the structure of the region’s economy compared with the Polish average and industry much lower, which is directly

related to the scale of the GDP per capita generated in Lubelskie. The region’s unemployment rate used to be

lower than the Polish average, but in the period from 2009 to 2019 the situation changed significantly, and now the

unemployment rate is much higher than the Polish average (Tab.2.3).

Table 2.3: GDP per capita in Lubelskie in 2008-2018

Year

2005

2009

2013

2017

2019

Lubelskie

Poland

17.0

12.9

14.4

6.3

5.5

17.6

12.1

13.4

3.8

3.3

source: Own elaboration based on Statistics Poland (2010-2020).

13.3.3 Regional autonomy and funding

Poland is a unitary state. There are no regions with special autonomy rights. The current Polish administrative

division into regions entered into force in 1999. Poland has 16 regions, called voivodships. The regions have their

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own regional authorities and administration. The authorities of the voivodship self-government operate on the basis

of, and within the limits set, by Polish law. Voivodship self-governments carry out public tasks not reserved by

law to governmental administration bodies at the level of the voivodship. The scope of activities of the voivod-

ship self-government does not violate the autonomy of the poviat and the municipality (smaller administrative units

within the Polish administrative system), and the voivodship self-government bodies do not act as supervisors of the

poviat and the municipality and have no authority over these units. The head of a voivodship self-government is the

Marshal, who in turn is the chairman of the voivodship board – the executive organ of the voivodship self-government.

The Marshal, who acts as the head of the Marshal’s Office and the head of its staff, organises the work of the

voivodship board. The Marshal’s Office manages the affairs of the voivodship and represents them externally. The

Marshal is also the head of the provincial self-government organisational units and has the power to issue decisions

in individual cases in the field of public administration.

The Marshal’s Office performs the tasks belonging to the competence of the Marshal and the voivodship board,

which include:

• public education, including higher education

• promotion and protection of health

• culture and the protection and care of heritage monuments

• social assistance

• pro-family policy

• modernisation of rural areas

• spatial development

• environmental protection

• water management, including flood protection, and in particular the equipment and maintenance of flood

control depots

• public transport and public roads

• physical activities and tourism

• protection of consumer rights

• defence

• public safety

• counteracting unemployment and activating the local labour market

• telecommunications business.

It should be pointed out that the responsibilities of this institution overlap in many respects with the EQI’s con-

stituent subjects, such as public education, including higher education, and promotion and protection of health or

public safety. The structure and scale of spending by the regional and local authorities in Lubelskie region is sim-

ilar to the Polish average (Tab. 2.4). More – both as a share of total spending and per capita – is spent on transport.

Table 2.4: GDP per capita in Lubelskie in 2008-2018

Category

Agriculture and hunting

Transport and communication

1a. Lub.

1a. Pol.

2a. Lub.

2b. Pol.

2.0

10.1

1.6

8.8

27.2

134.9

21.5

117.9

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Dwelling economy

Public administration

Education

Health care

Social assistance

Other tasks in sphere of social policy

Family

1.1

6.5

33.8

2.1

6.5

1.4

23.1

Municipal economy and environmental

8.1

protection

Culture and protection of national her-

3.7

itage

1.4

6.0

34.5

2.1

6.8

1.3

22.8

8.9

4.4

14.4

87.6

453.3

28.1

87.7

18.5

309.7

109.2

19.4

80.9

464.3

27.6

90.7

18.0

305.9

119.4

49.9

59.0

source: Own elaboration based on Statistics Poland (2010-2020). Category ’1a and 1b’ refer to Structure (in %),

while ’2a and 2b’ refer to Euros per capita.

EU funds are a vital source of funding in Lubelskie region. The total value of projects co-financed from EU

2014-2020 spending in this region reached almost EUR 4 billion, over 11% more than the Polish average of the per

capita value of such projects (Tab. 2.5). The regions’ share of EU co-financed projects is very high, 6.2% of the

Polish total, and is much higher than its share of Polish GDP, which is 3.7%.

Table 2.5: Registered unemployment rate in Lubelskie in %

item

Total in EUR (million)

as a share of the Polish total

per capita in EUR

per capita Poland = 100

Lubelskie

3,948.2

6.2

1,850.7

111.4

Poland

63,876.5

100

1,662.1

100

source: Own elaboration based on Statistics Poland (2010-2020).

The system of towns in Lubelskie region has a hierarchical structure with the clear domination of one big city

that plays the role of a centre for the whole region. Poor urbanisation of the region and the predominance of

small towns and traditional agriculture mean that those factors that disintegrate the classical hierarchical systems

of towns, such as competition, technological progress and increasing accessibility, do not play a significant role in

Lubelskie. The small towns and development centres have a relatively lower capacity to absorb EU funds (which re-

quire ‘own contributions’) than in other regions (Wich et al., 2015). Consequently, the impact of modernisation from

EU funds, although significant in the development of the region, has had a smaller impact on overall development

than in other regions.

13.4 Description of Opolskie

13.4.1 Historical background

Opolskie region was not part of Poland for centuries. It belonged to Poland only during the years 990 to 1335 and

became part of Poland again in 1922. Historically it has been part of Czechia, Austria and Germany. It is the only

Polish region in which a national minority representative – a representative of the German minority – is elected to

the Polish parliament.

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After the socio-economic transition from socialism started in Poland in 1989, the German minority in the re-

gion developed strong organisation (KUCZAłA et al., 2014), as before the national minorities were not allowed

to associate.

‘The German minority is active in politics at both a local and national level. It took part in local

government elections on 27th May 1990 for the first time. Since then, it has remained firmly established in the

region and has formed governing coalitions with other political groupings’ (Piruta et al., 2020).

Due to these historical conditions (six centuries of separation from the Polish state) and its border location, Opolskie

has acquired many features that distinguish it from other Polish regions. It has its own history, culture and tradi-

tion, and since the end of the Second World War a new population structure, which consists of the Polish majority

(immigrants from the eastern and central areas of pre-war Poland), the native population – the German minority,

and the national-ethnic Silesian minority. Harmonious coexistence of these population groups, based on mutual

respect and tolerance and openness to other cultures, also testifies to the regional distinctiveness of the area, which

forms today’s Opolskie region (Kisielewicz, 2015). In Opolskie, apart from the capital city Opole, there are also

other important cities that play an active role in the socio-economic development of the region – Kędzierzyn-Koźle,

Nysa and Brzeg.

13.4.2 Structural conditions

Opolskie region is located in the south of Poland, and its southern border is part of the Polish border with the

Czech Republic. It is the smallest of the Polish regions and has the lowest population size. 982,600 people live in

Opolskie (end of 2019), which amounts to 2.6% of the total Polish population. The region is less densely populated

than the Polish average, with 103 people per 1km2, while the Polish average is 123. Between 2010 and 2019, the

number of people living in Opolskie decreased by 3.5%. The age structure of the region is slightly worse than the

Polish average, with a lower share of the population below 25 and a larger share over 65 (Tab. 3.1).

Table 3.1: Age structure of the population in Opolskie

Age

Below 25

Over 65

Opolskie

Poland

22.9

18.8

25.3

18.1

source: Own elaboration based on Statistics Poland (2010-2020).

Opolskie is less urbanised than the Polish average, with 53.2% of the population living in urban areas (Polish

average 60%) and 46.5% of the citizens in this region live in rural areas (Polish average 40%).

Table 3.2: GDP per capita in Opolskie in 2008-2018

Year

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

% of the Polish average

Rank in Poland

84.8

81.7

79.5

80.1

80.8

80.5

95.5

80.8

15

16

15

15

15

16

16

16

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2016

2017

2018

79.6

79.3

79.4

16

16

16

source: Own elaboration based on Statistics Poland (2010-2020).

The average wage/alary was lower than the Polish average, both in 2010 and 2018, and amounted, respectively, to

91.4% and 90.6% of the Polish average. Yet, the share of households suffering from poverty – irrespective of its

definition – was much lower than the Polish average. This can be related to the fact that there is a tradition of

working – permanently or seasonally – in Germany and supporting families remaining in Opolskie.

Almost all through the period from 2008 to 2018, Opolskie remained in 11th place among the 16 Polish regions when

it came to GDP per capita. However, its GDP per capita compared to the Polish average decreased from 85% in

2008 to 80% in 2018 (Tab. 3.2). This shows that the regions’ development potential is deteriorating as compared to

the Polish average. The most important part of the region’s gross value added is generated in its industrial sector,

and the share of this sector slightly increased between 2010 and 2017 (Fig. 9). The share of other traditional sectors

of the economy decreased insignificantly.

Figure 9: Structure of GVA by kind of activity (current prices) in Opolskie (in %)

*repair of motor vehicles; transportation and storage; accommodation and catering; **information and communi-

cation. Source: Statistics Poland (2020a) and GUS (2015).

Table 3.3: Registered unemployment rate in %

Year

2005

2009

2013

2017

2019

Lubelskie

Poland

18.7

12.9

14.2

3.1

3.2

17.6

12.1

13.4

3.8

3.3

source: Own elaboration based on Statistics Poland (2010-2020).

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13.4.3 Regional autonomy and funding

There are no regions with special autonomy rights in Poland. The powers of the regional authorities are presented

in Chapter 2 Description of Lubelskie. Similarly, as in Lubelskie, the structure and per capita scale of expenditure

of the authorities operating in the region (regional and local) resembles the Polish average and, as in the case of

Lubelskie, spending on transport is higher than the average for the Polish regions (due to its remoteness). The

spending on public administration is also significantly higher than the Polish average – by over 25% in per capita

spending (Tab. 3.4).

Table 3.4. Structure and scale of expenditure per capita in Opolskie in 2019

1a. Lub.

1a. Pol.

2a. Lub.

2b. Pol.

Category

Agriculture and hunting

Transport and communication

Dwelling economy

Public administration

Education

Health care

Social assistance

Other tasks in sphere of social policy

Family

1.2

10.6

2.0

7.8

33.5

1.3

7.4

1.5

19.7

Municipal economy and environmental

8.8

protection

Culture and protection of national her-

4.2

itage

Physical education

Total

2.1

100.0

1.6

8.8

1.4

6.0

34.5

2.1

6.8

1.3

22.8

8.9

4.4

1.5

100.0

16.1

141.4

26.9

104.4

448.2

17.3

99.0

19.7

264.1

117.1

21.5

117.9

19.4

80.9

464.3

27.6

90.7

18.0

305.9

119.4

56.3

59.0

27.4

1337.9

19.5

1343.9

source: Own elaboration based on Statistics Poland (2010-2020). Category ’1a and 1b’ refer to Structure (in %),

while ’2a and 2b’ refer to Euros per capita.

The share of Opolskie in the total value of EU co-financed projects in the programming period 2014-2020 is 2.2%,

which is similar to its share of Polish GDP – 2% (Tab. 3.5).

Table 3.5: GDP per capita in Opolskie in 2008-2018

Year

% of the Polish average

Rank in Poland

Total in EUR (million)

1,373.9

as a share of the Polish

2.2

total

per capita in EUR

1,383.6

per capita Poland =

83.2

100

63,876.5

100

1,662.1

100

source: Own elaboration based on Statistics Poland (2010-2020).

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13.5 Comparative Analysis

The first block of questions in the survey concerned perceptions of the quality of institutions in both regions. Re-

spondents in Lubelskie had mixed opinions concerning the public institutions in their region. The most positive

opinion was expressed when it came to corruption levels, with as many as 26% of respondents had a positive opinion

about public institutions. The level of impartiality was also generally positively assessed (Fig. 10). The worst

assessed was the level of efficiency in delivering public services.

Figure 10: General image of public institutions in A. Lubelskie and B. Opolskie

In Opolskie respondents were more critical. The question asked about the evaluation of institutions regardless of

whether they are the responsibility of local, regional or national authorities. The mean response for each category

indicates that in general there is a more critical attitude to institutions inPoland as a whole. Respondents justified

this by citing the progressive influence of central government on the functioning of institutions in the region. This

assessment was more favourable in Lubelskie, with lower expectations for the efficiency of the functioning of regional

institutions.

The situation was different when asked about the efficiency of institutions in the region compared to other re-

gions in the country. In the Opolskie voivodship, as many as 75% of respondents rated public institutions better

than in other regions of Poland. Respondents generally gave better marks to the public institutions operating in the

voivodship, although they were least positive about impartiality, more positive about corruption, and most positive

about the quality and effectiveness of public services.

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In Lubelskie the comparison with other regions showed a more mixed picture. The majority, 52.2% , stated that

public institutions in Lubelskie are neither better nor worse than in other region, while 43.5% said that they are

worse and only 4.3% thought that they are better than in other Polish regions.

The majority of respondents observed differences in the quality of functioning of different institutions. One of

the Lubelskie interviewees stated: ‘public services provided by the national administration have the lowest level of

quality. There are also differences between the quality of public services provided in different sectors’. Another

person said: ‘I have a very unfavourable opinion of the judiciary, education and legislation on business activity.

The interpretation of regulations is discretionary. Moreover, the citizens have no support at all from state bodies

and they are left on their own.’

When asked about examples of better functioning institutions in Lubelskie, the majority of study participants

named institutions managed by local self-government rather than the institutions managed by national government.

The interviewees agreed that the level of EQI in Lubelskie well matches the actual quality of governance in the

region as compared with other Polish regions. Some of the further comments were:

‘Most of the authorities in our voivodship, whether at municipality, district or voivodship level, are party-affiliated

and act to benefit themselves rather than the citizens. The authorities do not aim to develop our region in the same

way as other regions of the country. The emphasis is only on the development of road infrastructure.’

‘I agree. The huge negative influence of politics on public institutions, the employment of people without the

appropriate competences in specialist and managerial positions have very negative effects...’

Among the reasons for the low level of the EQI in Lubelskie, respondents mainly named economic factors and

the ruling political party’s policy. This is reflected in the comments of the interviewees:

‘It is likely that the low assessment of the quality of governance is due to both limited economic resources, the

politics of the groupings leading the provincial assembly and the weak position of NGOs.’

Respondents also indicated the level of trust and the ability to work together, generally summarised by one re-

spondent who indicated that: ‘it is a matter of social capital.’ The situation of the region was also connected with
a general ‘lack of democratic standards for civil society across the country’.

In the Opolskie region, the independence of the regional administration from national politics is more pronounced.

This is reflected in the perception of the impartiality of institutions but also in the quality of public services. The

organisation of power around civil society is conducive to good governance in the region.

As already pointed out, the quality of governance is linked more to the work culture, that is the approach to

responsibility, than to economic factors, both in terms of regional wealth and the salaries of employees in public

institutions. The respondent from Opolskie stressed that: ‘ I see a lot of attention put to adequately high quality of

public service delivery in government offices at different levels. Officials are being trained and they are improving

their competences. It seems, however, that the prestige of the profession of civil servant is fading. The salaries, too

(we’re not talking about the central level, but the local and regional ones) are hardly encouraging. I personally know

officials who, after several years of working in a given office, left for so-called business, often as the lowest-qualified

and paid employees, but with a salary similar to those in offices and less responsibility in the workplace. Taking

into account salaries in the public sector, the relatively poor opportunities for promotion and the fading prestige of

the profession, I believe that civil servants in the Opolskie Voivodeship provide a good work taking into account the

high quality of service.’

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Another respondent from Opolskie emphasised that:

‘In terms of impartiality, I think that currently bias char-

acterises the Voivodship Office as a body subordinate to the government. I expect that communes associated with

the governing formation can count on more favourable approach/decisions, and this bias was also visible in the

allocation of funds from the Government Fund for Local Investment, which was defended by the Opole Voivode

(governor), although national data clearly showed favouritism to local government units associated with the gov-

erning formation. In the second tranche, for example, the city of Opole was deprived of these funds (as were the

majority of municipalities associated with the German minority). (. . . ) We are witnessing changes when it comes

to regional media (these are now public institutions since they were bought by a national company) - both TVP

Opole and, more recently, NTO (Newspaper Trybuna Opolska) are becoming platforms for communicating national

government policy and promoting the government, at the expense of various local government perspectives...’

Other opinions from Opolskie emphasise the growing links between regional institutions and central government

– a process stimulated by the current authorities in the country:

‘In recent years, it is hard not to notice that worldview and political issues are an important criterion in deci-

sions, especially at the level of government administration.’

‘The level of corruption varies from institution to institution depending on who oversees them. In my opinion, the

level of corruption at the national level is higher than in local governments.’

‘In the case of institutions subordinate to government administration, the link between some of their areas of ac-

tivity and the political option currently pursued is noticeable (e.g. in the area of culture).’

When asked if there are any public institutions in their voivodship that stand out in a positive way, the respondents

indicated mainly the voivodship offices:

‘I think the Marshal’s Office is such a place. As one of few in Poland, it implements the European Civic Budget

and receives support from the European Commission in this respect. Opolskie voivodship also, to a large extent

thanks to the Marshal’s Office (especially the Department of Operational Programmes Coordination), occupied high

positions in terms of the efficiency of implementation of European funds.’

‘If one refers to general public opinion polls, the local government is well or very well perceived.’

The EQI index for Opolskie voivodship was -0.457 (on a scale of -3 to +3). This is the highest score in Poland. The

respondents strongly agree with the data placing Opolskie voivodship first in the EQI ranking nationwide:

‘I agree with the assessment expressed in this study. The social perception of the region’s management is certainly

influenced by the very efficient use of European funds, the perceived good cooperation between local governments,

extensive cooperation and support for NGOs.’

‘I agree with this assessment. It may be influenced by the size (compactness) of the region, rather than the unani-

mous cooperation of representatives of different political options.’ ‘(...) from the perspective of the institutions with

which I cooperate (. . . ) it seems to me that the place is deserved. However, I do not have a comparison with other

institutions of this type in other regions; hence the assessment may not be entirely objective.’

In the opinion of another respondent:

‘the quality of the institutions that were surveyed (i.e. education, health

care, justice) may be better than in other regions (especially the neighbouring Silesia region), but whether it is the

best on the scale of 16 voivodeships - this is a phenomenon that is actually worth investigating. (. . . )’

‘(. . . ) I

appreciate the possibilities that have been implemented during the pandemic, i.e. electronic handling of some mat-

ters (e.g. receiving certificates), electronic system organising appointments/visits to offices (you know what time

to come, no queues, less stress for both parties). Personally, I have not experienced bad service in any office, be it

at local or regional level. The service is efficient, factual and helpful.’

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The main reasons for the positive assessment of the quality of governance in the Opolskie voivodship in comparison

to other voivodships in Poland stressed by respondents are the following:

• the region’s work ethos and work appreciation, i.e. ‘officials value their jobs and try to do them well.’

• it’s a multicultural region, which means more openness and more tolerance.

• no cult of the civil servant, as mentioned by a respondent: ‘the civil servants are not an oracle, but do their

job and they are helpful to citizens.’

• policy (management) and organisation of individual offices: ‘the free elections of the authorities influence the

fact that the managers of the offices care about the good opinion of the residents, which translates into an

appropriate policy for serving the public.

The lack of a direct link between residents’ income, municipal income and the quality of institutions is indicated

quite clearly. The Opolskie region is also quite strongly internally economically diverse, which has to do with the

different traditions of earning abroad in its different districts. Earnings abroad affect the income of local government

units (due to lost taxes), although there is no apparent negative impact on the assessment of the functioning of pub-

lic institutions from this. More significant for local infrastructure is permanent migration, which follows temporary

migration (Cf. Jończy and Łukaniszyn-Domaszewska, 2014).

In addition, it should be remembered that the region itself is internally diverse, creating a cultural mosaic, which has

an impact on the perception of the functioning of institutions in different parts of the region. Residents of Opolskie

were relatively more sensitive to dissimilarities and multiculturalism: (. . . ) a fairly good economic situation of the

inhabitants, especially in the municipalities in the south and east of the voivodship due to a long-lasting inflow of

income capital to these municipalities by a large group of emigrants (both permanent and circular migration) con-

nected to the German and Silesian minorities. Even before 2004, the local population had the opportunity to earn

money in Germany and bring large earnings to the Opole region - this had quite a significant impact on neutralising

the negative consequences of the political transformation and generated demand for local goods and services. Even

today, differences between rural areas in the western and south-eastern parts of the voivodship are visible. However,

it should also be mentioned that this had a negative impact on the level of local government income (lack of income

tax revenues) and on the local institutional infrastructure due to the fact that some people did not return from

migration (e.g. liquidation of schools, schools, transport links)’

At the same time, the results on the quality of governance were linked by the respondents to the level of gen-

eral satisfaction (satisfaction) with life, in this case Opolskie ranks quite high when it comes to representative

surveys presented in ‘Social Diagnosis’, one of the leading surveys on the quality of life in Poland (Czapiński, Panek,

2015; Batorski, et. al, 2015). The multicultural background of the region and historical changes were also underlined

by another respondent: ‘Perhaps it is worth mentioning a certain autostereotype, which, however, concerned the

period of the struggle for the Opolskie Voivodship in 1998, so the question arises about the validity of these per-

ceptions. Research carried out by sociologists from Opole shows that when there was a fight to maintain a separate

voivodships, both the elites and ordinary residents created an image of the Opole Voivodship in opposition to the

Katowice Voivodship, of which the Opole region was to become a part as part of the administrative division of the

country into 12 voivodships. According to the autostereotype constructed at that time, the Opolskie Voivodeship ap-

peared to be a well-mannered, law-abiding region with better quality roads, good organisation of work, nicer-looking

towns, and a political culture characterised by dialogue and readiness to compromise. The crowning example of the

latter being the peaceful coexistence of representatives of different cultures - not only German, but also borderland’

A researcher stressed that: ‘recent studies by Opioła and Czepil (2020) show that municipalities with a German and

Silesian minority are characterised by a higher level of participation than other municipalities in the voivodship.

These are communities where the local circles of the Socio-Cultural Association of Germans in Opole Silesia play an

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important role, the fire brigades have long traditions going back to pre-war times and many inhabitants are willing

to act for the benefit of their rural communities. It should be remembered that the Socio-Cultural Association of

Germans in Opole Silesia, which is the foundation of the political activity of the German minority on the scale

of the voivodship, is one of the strongest non-governmental organisations in the region, so the local circles in the

municipalities are part of a larger, well-organised and well-funded structure.’

Figure 11: Level of confidence in different institutions in A. Lubelskie and B. Opolskie

Further opinions point to the importance of the subjective intervention of the local authorities, the geographi-

cal accessibility of the region and the related possibility of the development of individual smaller centres:

“Perhaps Opole, which has been undergoing visible changes since the new president in 2014, and the municipality

itself, which occupies the highest positions in various types of local government rankings on a national scale, is also

working for a good overall assessment of the quality of institutions in the region; it is worth noting that Opole clearly

dominates on a provincial scale as the only, relatively large (130,000) urban centre and is additionally the centre of

the smallest province in Poland (demographically and territorially), to which it is relatively close to all 10 district

cities (50-60 km on average). Perhaps this size of the voivodeship and proximity to the regional capital (which is de-

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veloping quite dynamically, compared to the period before 2014) has influence on the evaluation of the institutions’.

The interviewees in Lubelskie expressed highest confidence in the army.

‘Extreme confidence’ was the answer

chosen by 22% of the persons interviewed. The army was also, ex aequo with the police, the institution with the

lowest share of the answer ‘almost none’, with 4% of respondents choosing this option. Political parties received

the lowest level of confidence with 44% of those questioned choosing the answer ‘almost none’. The second worst

was the media, with 22% of the respondents choosing the lowest available response. At the time of the COVID-19

pandemic it is worrying that the third worst rated institutions were hospitals, with 18.5% of the interviewees stating

that they had almost no confidence in this institution.

In Opolskie respondents highlighted relatively higher trust in administrative units but also in public services and

entrepreneurs. This indicates a better institutional basis, while the media remains the institution with limited trust.

Organisational culture

Public institutions in Lubelskie region are considered to operate on routine pathways, following rules and pro-

cedures. They tend to be homogeneous and to a lesser extent are willing to cooperate with other stakeholders. The

short-term/long-term perspective of public institutions also strongly differs between the two regions. On average, a

long-term perspective is pursued in Opolskie, while a short-term one operates in Lubelskie. In the case of the posi-

tion – following rules and procedures vs. presenting and delivering concrete results – the two regions vary strongly.

In Lubelskie public institutions are more concentrated on following rules and procedures, while in Opolskie they are

focused on delivering concrete results.

In both regions, the assessment of the level of organisational culture is very even in the opinion of respondents.

In Opolskie they tend to indicate that a stronger culture, in this respect, is represented by public administration

organisations and institutions. While in Lubelskie they indicate individual competences and activity, in Opolskie

they indicate features connected with the organisation and good management of the whole administrative system.

Employment in public institutions

In Lubelskie region, in the opinion of most of the interviewees, the people at the top of public sector organisa-

tions were appointed to these positions thanks to their personal or political connections rather than their skills

and professional experience. The most representative opinion for this question was: ‘Personal/political connections

matter most. Competence is of little importance.’ The majority of respondents think that this is not only typical

of their region but is a general practice in Poland.

Also, the same employment mechanism applies in the case of other positions in public institutions. However,

more interviewees also mentioned the importance of skills. The best summary of the opinions expressed by the

participants is the statement: ‘I think that to a large extent, connections and then competence.’ In the opinion of

the respondents this employment mechanism is similar to those applied in other Polish regions.

To have a successful career in the public sector in Lubelskie, according to the participants, one needs to have

good personal and/or political connections. This was assessed as being similar as in other regions. However, some

interviewees stated that this applied to an even larger extent in Lubelskie.

Judiciary

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Figure 12: Organisational culture of public institutions in A. Lubelskie and B. Opolskiee

Respondents in Lubelskie region are skeptical about the chances that public employees would turn to media or

corresponding authorities if they discovered something wrong in their organisation. Only 1/5 of the interviewees

said that in such a situation a public employee would inform the media, the judiciary or the authorities.

Figure 13 shows the responses in Lubelskie and Opolskie to the question:

‘Imagine that a public employee dis-

covers that something is wrong in her organization (e.g. that his/her superior or a politician has been engaging in

dubious deals with entrenched interests, or are planning to do so), what do you think he/she will do? Will he/she

report it to the media, to the relevant authority or to the judiciary?’

In Opolskie the situation is slightly more favorable, as more answers (nearly 30%) indicated the possibility of

pointing out irregularities and informing the appropriate institutions. It should be noted that due to the high level

of surveillance by government institutions in the socialist era, informing the authorities is still perceived rather

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Figure 13: Opinions on Reporting Wrong-doing in A. Lubelskie and B. Opolskiee

negatively in Poland and this increases with age (and the presence of memories from before 1989).

Almost half of the interviewed citizens of Lubelskie region are of the opinion that a whistleblower would fear

repercussions in relation to reporting irregularities in their institution (Fig. 14). Over 75% of the respondents chose

answers 1-3. This is well explained by the opinion shared by over 50% of the respondents that there is no adequate

protection for whistleblowers and that they can expect to suffer from different forms of repercussions. Such opinions

are best summarised by one of the respondents: ‘There is no such protection. The courts do not work properly,

the police do not deal with such cases, there are no resources and people who could provide protection in such a

case. And where will such a person later find a job?’ The other interviewee stated:

‘There is a complete lack

of protection. A citizen disclosing information must have tremendous civil courage and honour and expect to be

blacklisted in all the public institutions. Unless he is a well-known person and has support, it is always a risk,

especially with a dependent family.’

Figure 14: Will this public employee fear repercussions if she decides to “blow the

whistle”?

Most of Opolskie respondents noted that usually citizens are eager to express (especially on the Internet) their

dissatisfaction with various irregularities in the region. Irregularities are reported by the media, including social

media, but it is often information about the results of inspections carried out by various public institutions that

were established for this purpose. It is different in the case of whistleblowing at work; here, similarly to Lubelskie,

Opolskie residents indicated fear of repercussions for whistleblowers in the workplace. Such opinions were expressed

by about 60% of respondents, and a relative freedom in this respect was indicated by about 10%.

According to the respondents from Opolskie, citizens slightly more openly express their dissatisfaction when cases

of corrupt acts are made public / publicised. As one of them points out: ‘ (. . . ) citizens would rather express their

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dissatisfaction loudly. But here again it would all depend on the scale of the act and the situation of the person

who commits it. If it was a corrupt act to give a small gift (e.g. coffee or a box of chocolates), I think that looking

at the scale of corruption in central government, nobody would even react. If it was the acceptance of a bribe in

the form of cash, such an action would be condemned by society. The job of an official is one of high public trust,

with access to a lot of sensitive data, and there would be no understanding here for such abuse of one’s position.’

In the opinion of the respondents, in the public institutions of the Lubelskie region punishment is used predomi-

nantly rather than reward to enforce the compliance and good conduct of public service employees (Fig. 15). Here,

a rather significant difference in approach to motivating employees in public institutions emerges. In Opolskie, as

many as half of the respondents indicated that institutions employ a reward policy as a strategy for enforcing good

work, but more than one third had no experience or knowledge of this.

Figure 15: Responses of A. Lubelskie and B. Opolskie respondents to the question of

predominant strategy used in the region in order to enforce the compliance and good

conduct of the employees in the public service

Respondents in Lubelskie region generally stated that the existence of codes of conduct is irrelevant. As one of

the interviewees put it: ‘Codes exist, but the question is whether they are followed. After all, even at the national

level, there are no good examples in this area.’ In the opinion of the majority of the respondents from Lubelskie

region, citizens become ever more indifferent to corruption cases. As expressed by one of the interviewees: ‘Society

is becoming more and more indifferent. There are so many of these phenomena, and there are no or few conse-
quences.’ The agency most involved in revealing corruption in Lubelskie region is the media, as one person put it:
‘The quickest way is through the media.’

The respondents named a wide range of institutions responsible for prosecuting corruption. Among them there

were: the police, the Central Anticorruption Office, the judiciary, the Internal Security Agency, the Supreme Audit

Office, the Central Bureau of Investigation, and the prosecutor’s office. Yet, some of the interviewees also expressed

skepticism that these institutions are actively dealing with corruption cases: ‘Probably not anymore. Formally, yes,

the Supreme Audit Office, the Internal Security Agency, the police, the Central Bureau of Investigation, but... I

guess all structures have been manipulated enough to be just a tool in the hands of the government authorities...

especially the Ministry of "Justice". The network of political and business connections, protection of self and loved

ones, surveillance systems lead the country down the slope....’

In Opolskie respondents did not particularly comment on this phenomenon, usually referring to ‘a job well done’ as

the general rule of the institution’s activities (less connected with a system of penalties or rewards). At the same

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time, they expressed their skepticism about the effectiveness of public services in tracking down irregularities given

the increasing influence of central government on their independence.

Media

As already mentioned, the media is not much trusted in Lubelskie. According to respondents, the least reliable

source of news is the national state television, with over 60% expressing a total lack of confidence. Also, regional

public television and national public radio were among the least trustworthy news sources. The difference in level

of confidence is also related to media popularity and the type of issues they focus on. The national media are more

popular and visible, while regional media tend to concentrate on less political issues. The internet is better perceived

because respondents observe only the sources of their choice, while it is hard to escape the narratives presented by

national public television.

Figure 16: Level of confidence in the news in A. Lubelskie and B. Opolskie

In Opolskie, respondents generally stressed that private media are more credible because they are not directly

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subordinated to the local or governmental authorities, although the objectivity and independence of the private

media depends on its financial condition. Local or regional media are usually financially weaker, so they may even

indirectly try to not come into conflict with the authorities, as in their opinion this may negatively influence their

financial situation (e.g. by ordering or not ordering advertisements) – ‘the private media are also dependent (e.g. in

a financial sense). I would rather think of it in terms of the degree of autonomy, in terms of being able to do critical

interventionist or investigative journalism, or just publishing information that is unfavourable to any authority (in

this sense private media have more autonomy.)’

One can also note a generally higher trust in media representing more diverse opinions. Of note is the position

of the Internet as a medium of freedom when it comes to local space. This is mainly due to “the development of the

Internet and social media, which create new opportunities for journalistic work and for describing local reality. I

am referring here to local media, which are still weak and face the problems I have already mentioned, but this does
not mean that there are no examples of them fulfilling their control function’.

The question about the existence of obstacles to the freedom of the press in the region divided the interviewees in

Lubelskie into three almost equal groups. The first considered that there are no threats to the freedom of the press in

Lubelskie, the second considered the current Law and Justice national government and local politician of this party,

as well as the state company Orlen, which recently bought a network of regional newspapers in different regions

(Polska Press Group), to be a threat. Some people in this group also mentioned the state of emergency recently

introduced in some poviats (two in Lubelskie region – 68 towns and villages), which is related to the problem of the

Łukaszenka caused border migration (refugee) crises. This means that journalists cannot enter the poviats in which

this state of emergency has been introduced. The third group mentioned other factors threatening press freedom

in the region, such as corruption, conformism, capital concentration, and the low number of independent sales outlets.

Most respondents stated that it was impossible to know whether local media hide any news/events. Only some

respondents stated that public media exaggerate some events to show the ruling party in a better light: ‘Information

favourable to the political factions ruling the region is exaggerated and unfavourable events are concealed.’ The

refugee issue was mentioned as an example of the issues hidden/not fully described by media.

All respondents in Opolskie agreed that the news in the local media described rather well what is happening

in the region. However, taking into account the general situation in Poland, they indicated that the media in the

region are less and less independent:

‘The owner of the largest daily newspaper in the region (NTO - Nowa Trybuna Opolska) is now PKN Orlen.

Since the newspaper changed ownership, the narrative of the articles has also changed. Another newspaper, Gazeta

Wyborcza in Opole, is theoretically more independent, but the editorial staff has been reduced to a minimum. As

a result, journalists are not able to take up important, controversial topics because they do not have the time.

In the media, content has to be delivered on a daily basis, and tackling a difficult topic takes a journalist out of

newsgathering for a while. The factor which most affects the freedom to work is the ever-decreasing funding.’

The media’s freedom to report what is happening in Lubelskie depends on the issue. Over 1/5 of respondents

consider that media have no freedom to report about cases of corruption. In the case of politics, such an opinion

was expressed by 15% of respondents. It was believed that the most freedom applied to reporting about the economy.

In Opolskie, it was pointed out that the media are free to present what is going on in the region as far as the

economy, security or public health is concerned but more limited when it comes to politics or corruption. It can be

seen that in Opole general opinions about media freedom in reporting various incidents are slightly more positive

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Figure 17: Freedom to report what is happening in A. Lubelskie and B. Opolskie

(Fig. 17).

In Opolskie it was indicated that there is less freedom of the press today than twenty years ago. The respon-

dent underlines this: ‘Freedom of the press is now a slogan. If political power, central power, owns shares in the

press, it is difficult to expect the press to be independent and free.’

Another emphasises:

‘It is difficult not to see a clear worldview or political line in the coverage of the media,

including private media. Which in itself is not something special in the world, but I think it is becoming increas-

ingly difficult to see an attempt at a reasonably objective view of the events presented or their presentation from
different points of view.’ According to respondents, obstacles to press freedom in the province relate to problems
faced by local and regional media throughout the country:

• a general tendency towards centralisation of the media market

• dependence on local entrepreneurs and local government as important advertisers

• lack of general trust in the impartiality of opinions presented in the media

• problems with access to public information in journalistic work

• greater interest of the public in entertainment-oriented journalism instead of journalism focused on important

public issues

• proximity of journalistic and political/official circles that is typical for small communities.

The Reuters Institute (2021) at the University of Oxford, in its annual media report, notes the strong polarisation

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of the market and the low level of trust in the public media. Less than 50% of Poles declare that they trust the

media. Among all media, the most trusted is private radio – RMF FM, which is trusted by 68% of respondents,

followed by TVN and Polsat (private television channels) and regional newspapers (58%). The lowest media in the

trust ranking is public television, which is trusted by slightly more than one third of respondents. The report shows

that invariably, for several years, the most important source of information in Poland has been the internet. Over

the 2015-2020 period, the use of internet as a source of news was stable, at the level of 84%. Fewer and fewer people

get their information from television – a drop from 81% to 75% between 2015 and 2020. Radio came in third place

with a result of 66% (up 14 percentage points since 2015). Finally came the printed press – read by 24 per cent

of respondents (down 4 percentage points in this period). Local media are still a fairly important part of the news

market in Poland, but now their popularity is declining, in favour of the internet (and news platforms).

Violation of Impartiality

The issue of trust in public institutions is related to good governance, primarily in terms of an impartial sys-

tem for promoting and hiring public officials. First of all, it should be noted that in Lubelskie respondents indicated

that personal connections as well as political affiliations or wealth status have a very high impact on the oppor-

tunity to obtain preferential access to public services. Ethnic preferences were mentioned to a lesser extent (Fig. 18).

Most people questioned in Lubelskie do not recall a case in which a public institution had been accused of favouritism

or violating impartiality. However, they are sure that there are such cases and that they are likely to happen again

in the future.

In Opolskie, there is much less perception of the privileged use of public services according to social status, ethnicity

or wealth. In the interviews, access to services was assessed as fairly uniform for all residents of the region. To some

extent, they indicated that wealth helps with preferential access to public services.

Respondents in Opolskie more often emphasised that merit and competence are usually important for obtaining

managerial positions in public sector institutions, but this depends on the level of the position in the hierarchy: ‘The

higher the level of power, the more tempting it is, so these positions tend to be politically filled, especially if they

involve a correspondingly high salary. It is no secret that in politically connected institutions, artificial managerial

positions were and still are created or existing ones are filled by politically connected people.’

‘Competence may lie with lower-level employees or freely elected bodies (e.g. local authorities). This is where social

capital is important.’

‘At local government level competence, at national level connections.’

In general, it should be noted that the inhabitants of Lubelskie assess the lack of impartiality in access to public

services more critically than the inhabitants of Opolskie region. Both groups believe that the wealthy can count

on higher preferences. However, it is interesting that relatively more respondents in Lubelskie indicated ethnic

background as a factor relating topreference for access to public services, in relation to the other questions, but also

in relation to the inhabitants of Opolskie (mean score of 3.2 versus 2.6, on a scale of 1-7, where 7 means large extent).

Impact of EU

Respondents had mixed feeling when forecasting the quality of governance in Lubelskie in the next 5 years. Only

40% hoped for improvement, while the majority was pessimistic. Some of the respondents stated that the direction

of change depended on whether the ruling political party remained in power. If it remained so, further deterioration

or lack of any change in the quality of governance was expected

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Figure 18: Factors determining preferential access to public services in A. Lubelskie

and B. Opolskie

The respondents saw a significant improvement in the quality of services provided by public institutions after EU

accession. The largest improvement was seen in education – schools and universities, although it was much smaller

in the case of hospitals. The lowest rankings were for the courts and police, where 15% and 7% of respondents,

respectively, saw no improvement (Figure 19).

Respondents listed digitalisation of public administration, modernisation of buildings and improvements in the

quality of public services as positive changes observed during the last 10 years. SoDme pointed to improvements

in the treatment of citizens when dealing with public administration. Among the negative changes, they named

growing bureaucracy, corruption, and nepotism. The most negative feeling they had was about freezing the medical

care for patients with illnesses other than Covid, but for other aspects they generally stated that the response was

better than one could imagine, if one ever imagined such a situation.

Similarly to Lubelskie, respondents in Opolskie also saw the biggest positive changes in the development of an

educational infrastructure, i.e. the general situation of schools and universities, and to a lesser extent other institu-

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Figure 19: Level of improvement of the services provided by public institutions after

the EU accession in A. Lubelskie and B. Opolskie

tions. The level of improvement in the services provided by public institutions generally increased after accession,

but this was mainly in relation to the investment and the opportunities for the development of these institutions by

EU programmes and funds.

Problems with the functioning of public administration after accession to the EU usually focus on bureaucracy

and the excessive burdens associated with it, but on the other hand, in Opolskie, we observe improved transparency

of procedures and institutional efficiency. This influences greater public involvement and increased civic awareness,

which is related to problems associated with the availability of activities and resources that support such attitudes.

However, reduction in the decentralisation of power and the tendency to reduce expenditure on the maintenance

of public services (political expressions of austerity in the country) may negatively affect the quality of human

resources in public administration:

‘on the other hand, the difficult financial situation in the public sector may

reflect negatively on the work of public sector employees. Progressive partisanship of the state and appointments

according to clientelistic criteria may also lead to deterioration of the public administration.’

In the opinion of the majority of respondents from both regions, EU membership has introduced new institu-

tional principles for planning and implementing regional policy based on participation and cooperation with NGOs

and citizens, using more transparent rules for planning, implementing and evaluating support programmes. Thus, in

the general opinion, despite the bureaucracy (usually pointed to in criticism of Structural Funds), positives, such as

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the legitimacy of planning, the high impact (through the size of the funding budget) and clear rules for beneficiaries,

are usually pointed out. This has also benefited the perception of public institutions, their staff and the regional

policy pursued. On the other hand, the quality of the institutions is dependent on the quality of planning, the way

(and legitimacy) EU funds are spent and thus their real effects in the region.

As one respondent from Opolskie pointed out: ‘First and foremost, the influx of funds has allowed the implemen-

tation of various types of projects, both hard (e.g. infrastructural) and soft (competences, education). Additional

institutions for "business-related" support, but also for fighting social problems (e.g. social integration centres) were

created. With the inflow of funds a new layer of officials dealing with structural policy was created They participate

in numerous training programmes and also learn the principles of good governance, but it seems to me that this

applies to all Opolskie (I remind you that the entire Priority V under the Operational Programme Human Capital

2007-2013 concerned the implementation of the principles of good governance) (. . . ) This refers to strengthening

consultation mechanisms and cooperation with social partners and non-government organisations as regards mak-

ing and implementing public policies and legal regulations, and to implementation of public tasks, including also

measures related to social supervision over public institutions.’

In terms of changes in the quality of governance over the next five years, respondents in the Opolskie region

strongly indicated that they expect improvements, which is primarily related to the new financial perspective and

good EU policy programming, also at the regional level.

Impact of the COVID-19 pandemic

The respondents in Lubelskie region had mixed feelings about the response of public institutions to the pandemic.

They thought that the beginning of the pandemic made public institutions work harder but that later they returned

to their old routine (Fig. 20).

The pandemic produced mixed feelings about the future of the quality of public services in Lubelskie region. The

question posed by most of the respondents related to the length of the COVID-19 pandemic determining potential

changes in the functioning of public institutions. Generally, respondents stated that with the current political party

in power such changes could only be for the worse.

Figure 20: Answers to the question: Have you observed a negative/positive change in

the quality of public services since the start of the Covid-19 pandemic crisis?

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In terms of the approach to the pandemic (COVID 19) in the Opolskie region, it was felt that the institutions,

mainly using their own resources and planning, adapted to the COVID-19 pandemic requirements in the face of a

rather chaotic policy by the central authorities:

‘At national level, I do not know where to start: a lack of respirators? the lack of masks or disinfectant fluids?

My opinion is negative. At regional and local level, I even saw a “rush to action”. Institutions, mainly on their

own, were adapting to the requirements of the COVID-19 pandemic: the electronic petitioner service, disinfectants,

respecting the limits of access to facilities, inquiry boxes, separation plexiglass, personal protective equipment, the

tremendous determination of management and staff.’

In the face of the pandemic, the determination of the regional authorities and public institutions’ staff had the

greatest influence on the possibility of a relatively good organisation of assistance to inhabitants and their contin-

uing social life and organisation of the functioning of public administration. For example: ‘. . . the administration

head (starost) of Krapkowice municipality, with the deputy starost and a section of the office, personally directed the

"traffic" at the swabbing point on COVID. . . I believe they have done well in reducing the impact of the pandemic.’

Both regions emphasised the individual actions of administration staff, NGOs and public institutions in the re-

gion (with particular emphasis on the health services) in mitigating the effects of the pandemic and its impact on

the lives of residents. At the same time, in Opolskie these positive actions were relatively more often juxtaposed

to the low efficiency of public services at the national level. In Lubelskie, the actions of the regional and national

authorities were assessed moderately well:

‘Public institutions have taken extensive measures to limit the negative effects of the pandemic on society and the

economy. The regional government initiated, among other things, the campaign Opole supports itself, which not

only provided assistance from the local government, but also had a positive impact on the activation of other enti-

ties. It probably had a real impact on reducing these negative effects. This is confirmed by public statistic data, in

which entrepreneurs in Opolskie rated the negative impact of COVID-19 lower than the national average.’

The majority of respondents in Lubelskie region stated that the quality of services provided by public institu-

tions deteriorated after the COVID-19 pandemic. The worst deterioration was observed in the case of hospitals and

schools (Table 4.1).

Table 4.1. Average score for assessment of the change in the services provided by public institutions

after the COVID-19 crisis (1-7 scale, where 7 means very positive

Category

Schools

Universities

Hospitals

Judicial courts

Police

Lubelskie

Opolskie

2.7

3.3

2.0

2.7

3.9

3.9

4.3

3.9

4.1

4.6

In Opolskie, respondents generally gave better marks to individual institutions in terms of their actions in the face

of COVID-19, while pointing to the chaos in the organisation of in-patient and distance learning, which was rather

due to the decisions of Government Ministries and the lack of adequate resources for the proper implementation of

distance learning. The same was true of the health service, which, confused by the lack of transparency in its efforts

to organise treatment in the crisis, revealed its structural backwardness.

The actions of the police, active in the organisation of traffic, control of the public during quarantine, or assis-

tance to residents, were, relatively, best evaluated in both regions. The feedback from respondents in both regions

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suggested that, overall, services in the regions showed much better organisation than at the national level. The low

rating of health services indicates the relatively low efficiency of the system in the face of crises, which is revealed by

the relatively low indicators showing public expenditure and the number of doctors and nurses per capita in Poland.

Eurostat data shows that Poland allocated the least resources (4.8 per cent of GDP in 2020) to health care among

all EU countries. OECD data shows that Poland is at the bottom of the ranking of European countries in terms of

the availability of doctors and nurses per capita34.

34EUROSTAT: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Healthcareexpenditurestatistics(access :

29.12.2021).OECD : https : //www.oecd.org/coronavirus/en/data − insights/number − of − medical − doctors −

and − nurses?utmterm = P ACutmmedium = socialutmsource = twitterutmcontent = (acccess : 29.12.2021)

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13.6 Conclusions

It should be stressed that the economic situation has had only a limited influence on the quality of governance in

these cases. Instead, the evidence points in this respect to the traditions inherent in (or representing) a particular

value system and the corresponding culture of the organisation of social life. Macroeconomic indicators do not place

either region at the forefront of economic development among voivodeships in the country. The proximity of strong

agglomerations (for Lubeskie – Warsaw and for Opolskie – Wrocław, Katowice) was, and still often is, perceived as

a factor negatively influencing the pace of development, e.g. by drawing out human capital.

These relations are reinforced by the structure of the regions, more precisely by the number and density of the

regionally located economic and social centres. The higher the proportion of cities in a region, the better it is for

the importance, development and functional quality of institutions.

Size and structure (Opolskie – polycentric; Lubelskie – with one dominating centre) influence the perceived quality

of governance. Other studies also confirm the historically (and thus culturally and ethnically) shaped differences

that persist and determine the present work ethic and development trajectories.

Respondents in Lubelskie have mixed opinions concerning public institutions in their region. Only 26% of re-

spondents had a positive opinion about public institutions. The most positive opinion was expressed when it came

to the level of corruption While the level of impartiality was generally positively assessed, the worst assessed was

the level of efficiency in delivering public services.

In the Opolskie voivodship, as many as 75% of respondents

rated public institutions better than in other regions of Poland. Respondents generally gave better marks to the

public institutions operating in the voivodship, although they were least positive about impartiality. They were

more favourable about corruption and most favourable about the quality and effectiveness of public services.

Strong differences in EQI scores are related to the level of trust in individual institutions and the degree of their

politicisation, which can be seen when comparing the two regions. In Opolskie region the level of trust in institutions

is clearly higher. The social perception of the region’s management is certainly influenced by a very efficient use of

European funds, perceived good cooperation between local government units, and extensive cooperation with, and

support for, NGOs.

In both regions private media are perceived as more credible due to the fact that they are not directly subor-

dinated to local or governmental authorities. According to the respondents, the media should help to control the

correctness of the procedures applied by the institutions. Where central administrations execute strong control over

public media, they lack opportunity or motivation to reveal irregularities, and they rather become a tool for the

promulgation of policy information. In the case of private media this happens to a much lesser extent, although

it is important that public institutions still remain very significant advertisers at both regional and national lev-

els. The advertising budgets of administrations can significantly influence the economic condition of the media, as

well as their development and competitive position. This also may influence the independence of journalists and

their choice of topics. Information available on the Internet is gaining an increasing role, especially for young people.

It should be emphasised that the difficult financial situation in the public sector may have a negative impact

on the work of public sector employees. The increasing partisanship of the state and appointment to positions

according to clientelistic criteria may also lead to the deterioration of public administration.

Public opinion is increasingly critical about various irregularities, expressing a negative assessment rather than

noticing positives or successes. However, it seems that there is still a relatively high level of indifference, a kind

of latent consent to those irregularities that occur.It should be emphasised that the quality of governance in both

regions is fundamentally influenced by historical conditions, which in turn affect the quality of public institutions

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and degree of resistance to various contemporary influences. These include:

• the region’s work ethos and appreciation of work

• whether the region is multicultural, which means more openness and more tolerance – one of the regions

analysed has a certain historical/structural advantage in this respect, while the other is more homogeneous

• the lack of a cult of the civil servant – the work ethos of the civil servant is based on his/her servile attitude

towards citizens, which has its roots in historical circumstances and the extent to which civil servants have a

public service ethos’

• the policy and management of individual offices/administration units

• the free election of authorities influences the fact that office managers care about the good opinion of the

residents, which translates into an appropriate service provision policy.

The economic situation of residents is also of great importance, particularly due to the large number of emigrants

(with both permanent and circular migration apparent). This has an additional impact on general life satisfaction

and produces diversity in the structure of the parties present in local-government, with implications for the need

for dialogue. The research carried out in the Opolskie voivodship shows that municipalities with German and Sile-

sian minorities are characterised by a higher level of participation than other communes in the voivodeship. Here,

long-established structures, such as organisations representing various social groups, including ethnic minorities, are

of great importance, both for the tradition of membership of community associations and for the local authorities’

tradition of including various organisations in the policy decision-making processes.

The results of the study confirm that the historically shaped regional differences still have a significant influence

on socio-economic development and the quality of governance. The Polish regions’ diverse historical pathways have

had a strong impact on the level of social capital and these differences persist.

In both cases, it was noted that strengthening the independence of regional authorities, their election by universal

suffrage, and their high degree of financial autonomy, are all conducive to increasing the quality of governance.

This was confirmed by local government during the COVID-19 pandemic, in the face of which they put in place

self-imposed solutions that helped organise aid, daily-life and the maintenance of sanitary restrictions. It is im-

perative to point to the positive role of Poland’s membership of the EU as a source of laws and regulations that

organised streams of support for the regions and their inhabitants. Membership also introduced a specific culture

of the local organisation of policy, with transparency in terms of access to, and the spending of, public funds. This

is to the benefit of the whole country, as it enables improvements in the quality of institutions, governance and

social participation, especially in regions that have a greater tradition of multiculturalism and cooperation with

others, which is conducive to building a civil society. Membership also had a positive effect in other cases, but the

differences observed point to the importance of social capital (especially in bridging different social groups).

Further support for these processes, utilising cohesion policy programmes targeted directly at the regions and

also strengthening their autonomy, may have a positive impact on slowing down the current decline in the quality

of governance in the Polish regions but also on improving their socio-economic development.

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