Evaluation of EU state building contracts (2012-2018) : final report. Volume 1, Main report.
Date: 2022-03-21
Institutions: Directorate-General for International Partnerships
Subjects: civil society, contract, economic and social cohesion, economic growth, economic stabilisation, financial instrument, financial transparency, governance, intervention policy, macroeconomics, national budget, peace, performance measurement, political reform, poverty, public finance, public service, report, simplification of formalities, social policy

Evaluation of EU 
State Building Contracts 
(2012-2018) 

Final Report   

Volume 1: Main Report 

December 2020 

___________ 
Evaluation carried out on behalf of  
the European Commission 

INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT 

 
 
       
 
 
 
This report was drafted by 

Contract No. COM 2015/Lot 1 Evaluation 
N° 2018/402701 

This evaluation was commissioned by  

The Evaluation and Results Unit of the  

Directorate General for International Co-operation and 

Development (European Commission) 

The report presents the views of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of the 
European Commission or the authorities of the countries concerned. 

ADE SA 

Rue de Clairvaux 40, Bte 101 

1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium) 

+32 10 45 45 10 

ade@ade.eu 

www.ade.eu 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LEGAL NOTICE 

This document has been prepared for the European Commission however, it reflects the views only of the authors, and the 
European Commission is not liable for any consequence stemming from the reuse of this publication. More information on the 
European Union is available on the Internet (http://www.europa.eu). 

PDF  

ISBN 978-92-76-50041-4 

ISSN 2529-3338 

doi: 10.2841/468686 

MN-07-22-174-EN-N 

Manuscript completed in December 2020 
The European Commission is not liable for any consequence stemming from the reuse of this publication.  
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2022 

© European Union, 2022 

The reuse policy of European Commission documents is implemented by the Commission Decision 2011/833/EU of 12 
December 2011 on the reuse of Commission documents (OJ L 330, 14.12.2011, p. 39). Except otherwise noted, the reuse of 
this document is authorised under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC-BY 4.0) licence 
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). This means that reuse is allowed provided appropriate credit is given and any 
changes are indicated. 
For any use or reproduction of elements that are not owned by the European Union, permission may need to be sought directly 
from the respective rightholders. 

CONTACT INFORMATION 

European Commission 
Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) 
Directorate D - Sustainable Development Policy and Coordination 
Unit D.4 - Performance, Results and Evaluation; Internal Communication, Knowledge Management and 
Collaborative Methods 
Email: INTPA-EVALUATIONS@ec.europa.eu  
B-1049 Brussels, Belgium 

EU International Partnerships: 
https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/our-impact/monitoring-and-evaluation_en 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

Table of Contents 

ABBREVIATIONS 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

1. 

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1 

1.1  GENERAL APPROACH, EVALUATION FRAMEWORK AND EVALUATION QUESTIONS .............. 1 

1.2  EVALUATION TOOLS .................................................................................................... 4 

1.3  CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES .................................................................................... 5 

2. 

THE SBC, AN INSTRUMENT TO ENGAGE IN SITUATIONS OF FRAGILITY ............................ 6 

2.1.  THE SBC WITHIN THE EU STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR INTERVENTION IN SITUATIONS OF 
FRAGILITY .................................................................................................................. 6 

2.2  SBC SPECIFICITIES .................................................................................................... 8 

2.3  VARIED INTERVENTION CONTEXTS CHARACTERISED BY MULTIPLE FRAGILITY AND 

VULNERABILITY FACTORS .......................................................................................... 10 

2.4  SBCS MAPPING ....................................................................................................... 11 

3. 

LITTLE CHANGE IN THE FRAGILITY SITUATION OF RECIPIENT COUNTRIES ...................... 15 

3.1.  PRECARIOUS GROWTH DYNAMICS IN A STABILISED BUT VULNERABLE MACROECONOMIC 

FRAMEWORK ............................................................................................................ 16 

3.2.  LITTLE IMPROVEMENT IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL COHESION AND IN STATE LEGITIMACY .. 19 

3.3. 

INSUFFICIENT SOCIAL PROGRESS TO INITIATE A REAL REDUCTION IN POVERTY .............. 21 

4. 

SBCS DESIGN ......................................................................................................... 23 

4.1.  PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION OF FRAGILITY ............................................ 23 

4.2.  RISK ANALYSIS GUIDING THE DESIGN ......................................................................... 24 

4.3  OBJECTIVES TARGETED AND BROADENING THE RESPONSE TO THE SITUATION OF 

FRAGILITY ................................................................................................................ 25 

4.4  PROGRAMMES DESIGN AND DEGREE OF CONSISTENCY WITH THE GUIDELINES .............. 27 

4.5  STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES IN SBC DESIGN ......................................................... 30 

5. 

SBCS IMPLEMENTATION ........................................................................................... 31 

5.1  SPEED OF INTERVENTION AND ADAPTABILITY .............................................................. 31 

5.2  A KEY PLATFORM FOR TECHNICAL DIALOGUE .............................................................. 32 

5.3  SOUND AND NECESSARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS ................................................. 34 

5.4 

INSUFFICIENT HUMAN RESOURCES IN EUDS ............................................................... 35 

5.5  TOO LITTLE COMPLEMENTARITY BETWEEN SBCS AND OTHER EU INTERVENTIONS ........ 37 

Final Report 

Table of Contents 

 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

5.6  LIMITATIONS TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF JOINT RESPONSES BETWEEN TECHNICAL AND 

FINANCIAL PARTNERS ................................................................................................ 38 

5.7  CONSTRAINTS RELATED TO THE CONTEXT OF FRAGILITY ............................................. 40 

6 

SBCS EFFECTIVENESS ............................................................................................. 41 

6.1  CONTRIBUTION OF SBCS TO FISCAL SPACE INCREASE, MACROECONOMIC STABILISATION, 
STRENGTHENING OF PUBLIC FINANCE MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMIC RESILIENCE .......... 43 

6.2  CONTRIBUTION OF SBCS TO THE DELIVERY OF BASIC SOCIAL SERVICES ...................... 57 

6.3  CONTRIBUTION OF SBCS TO PEACEBUILDING AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE............. 66 

7 

CONCLUSIONS ......................................................................................................... 71 

7.1  SBCS CAPACITY TO RESPOND TO THE NEEDS OF COUNTRIES IN SITUATIONS OF FRAGILITY 
AND/OR TRANSITION ................................................................................................. 73 

7.2  SBCS DESIGN .......................................................................................................... 75 

7.3  SBCS IMPLEMENTATION ........................................................................................... 77 

7.4  SBCS EFFECTIVENESS ............................................................................................. 81 

8 

RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................. 84 

8.1  POSITION THE SBC AS A STABILISATION INSTRUMENT, RESPONDING TO THE NEEDS OF 
SOCIAL COHESION AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN FRAGILE CONTEXTS AND 
STRENGTHENING THE CORE OF THE GOVERNMENT SYSTEM ......................................... 85 

8.2 

IMPROVE THE DESIGN OF SBCS ................................................................................ 86 

8.3  RISE THE EU PROFILE IN POLITICAL DIALOGUE BY FOSTERING THE LEVERAGE EFFECT OF 

THE GENERAL CONDITIONS AND ITS CONVENING ROLE WITH DONORS ........................... 87 

8.4 

INTEGRATE THE SBC INTO A COMPREHENSIVE EU RESPONSE TO FRAGILITY ................ 89 

8.5  STRENGTHEN THE ROLE OF NATIONAL ACTORS AND ACCOUNTABILITY: ENSURE 

OWNERSHIP OF THE INSTRUMENT BY PARTNERS AND SYSTEMATICALLY INVOLVE CIVIL 
SOCIETY .................................................................................................................. 89 

LIST OF TABLES 

Table 1: Themes addressed by the set of evaluation questions ............................................. 3 

Table 2: Tools for data collection and analysis ...................................................................... 5 

Table 3: Key factors guiding the design and implementation of SBCs ................................... 9 

Table 4: Economic performance ...........................................................................................16 

Table 5: Governance, cohesion and social stability ..............................................................19 

Table 6: Evolution of social indicators ...................................................................................21 

Table 7: Success and limiting factors in programme design .................................................30 

Table 8: Factors facilitating and limiting coordination ............................................................39 

Final Report 

Table of Contents 

 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

LIST OF FIGURES 

ADE 

Figure 1: Comprehensive evaluation framework of the SBC .................................................. 2 

Figure 2: Combination of tools for data collection and analysis.............................................. 4 

Figure 3: Main strategic orientation documents for intervening  in situations of fragility ......... 6 

Figure 4: Specific objectives targeted by SBCs ..................................................................... 8 

Figure 5: Design and implementation modalities of SBCs ..................................................... 9 

Figure 6: Main fragility and vulnerability factors ....................................................................11 

Figure 7: Mapping of all SBCs (2012-2018) ..........................................................................11 

Figure 8: Evolution of SBC amounts committed and disbursed, 2012-2018  

(millions of euros) .................................................................................................12 

Figure 9: Average overall risk of SBC beneficiary countries (2013-2018) .............................13 

Figure 10: Sectors covered by variable tranche indicators (by financial weight of the 

indicators) .............................................................................................................14 

Figure 11: Evolution of the composition of SBC commitments, 2012-2018 ...........................14 

Figure 12: Variable tranche and disbursement rates by sector and by type of indicators ......15 

Figure 13: CPIA Economic Management Rating  for 12/15 countries analysed (Max: 6) ......17 

Figure 14: Evolution of the level of macroeconomic risk (macroeconomic policies) ..............17 

Figure 15: Infant mortality in children under five years of age  (/1,000 live births) .................22 

Figure 16: Objectives pursued by SBCs, per order of importance, according to survey 

respondents .........................................................................................................26 

Figure 17: Contribution and conditions for implementing the dialogue ..................................33 

Figure 18: Factors facilitating/constraining the implementation of SBCs ...............................36 

Figure 19: Complementarity with other EU interventions: actual degree of synergy between 

SBCs and other EU interventions in the country (by type of respondents) ............37 

Figure 20: Contribution of SBCs to state consolidation .........................................................42 

Figure 21: Period of disbursement of the fixed and variable tranches per quarter (for the 15 

countries studied) .................................................................................................45 

Figure 22: Short-term restoration of macroeconomic stability: importance of the objective and 
extent to which the outcomes were achieved .......................................................46 

Figure 23: Medium-term sustainability of  fiscal policy: importance of the objective  and 

degree of achievement of outcomes .....................................................................50 

Figure 24: Mobilisation of domestic revenue: importance of the objective and degree of 

achievement of the outcomes ...............................................................................51 

Figure 25: Government revenue as a percentage of GDP for the 15 countries reviewed ......52 

Figure 26: Frequency of variable tranche indicators per area of PFM ...................................53 

Figure 27: Degree of achievement of objectives in the PFM areas covered by SBCs 

according to context (between 0 and 5) ................................................................55 

Final Report 

Table of Contents 

EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

Figure 28: Allocations in priority areas as a percentage of total expenditure and change in 

expenditure in FCFA billions (right axis) ...............................................................59 

Figure 29: Variable tranche indicators in the social sectors   Breakdown by type .................64 

Figure 30: Variable tranche indicators in the social sectors   Achievement rate ....................64 

Figure 31: Summary of conclusions......................................................................................71 

Figure 32: Contribution of budget support to i) public policies and ii) outcomes and impacts 72 

Figure 33: Summary of the effectiveness of SBCs ................................................................81 

Figure 34: Recommendations: level of importance and ease of implementation ...................91 

Figure 35: Summary of conclusions and recommendations ..................................................92 

LIST OF ANNEXES IN VOLUME II 

ANNEX 1 – TERMS OF REFERENCE 

ANNEX 2 – METHODOLOGY 

ANNEX 3 – INVENTORY OF STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS 

ANNEX 4 – SURVEY RESULTS 

ANNEX 5 – QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 

ANNEX 6 – RISK MAPPING 

ANNEX 7 – ANSWERS TO EVALUATION QUESTIONS 

ANNEX 8 – LIST OF PEOPLE MET 

ANNEX 9 – BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Final Report 

Table of Contents 

 
 
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

Abbreviations 

ADE 

BS 
ACP 
AD 
AfDB 
BSSC 
CAR 
CSDP 
DAC 
DDR 
EUD  
DRM  
EC 
ECF 
ECHO 

EDF 
EEAS  
ENP 
ENP-E 
ENP-S 
EQ 
EU 
FA 
FDI 
FSI 
FT 
GAVI 
GDP 
PFM 
GGDC 
HIPC 
IcSP 
IMF 
JC 
LA  
MEDA 
NIP 
ODA 
OECD 
PEFA 
RCF 
RFI 

Budget Support 
Africa, Caribbean and Pacific 
Action Document 
African Development Bank 
Budget Support Steering Committee 
Central African Republic 
Common Security and Defence Policy  
Development Assistance Committee  
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
European Union Delegation 
Domestic Revenue Mobilisation 
European Commission 
Extended Credit Facility 
European Commission's Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and 
Civil Protection 
European Development Fund 
European External Action Service  
European Neighbourhood Policy 
European Neighbourhood Policy East 
European Neighbourhood Policy South 
Evaluation Questions 
European Union 
Financing Agreement 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Fragile States Index 
Fixed Tranche 
Global Alliance Vaccine Initiative 
Gross Domestic Product 
Public finance management 
Good Governance and Development Contract 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace  
International Monetary Fund  
Judgement Criteria 
Latin America 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership  
National Indicative Programme 
Official Development Assistance 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability 
Rapid Credit Facility of the IMF  
Rapid Financing Instrument of the IMF 

Final Report 

Abbreviations 

EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

RIC 
RMF  
SBC 
SBRC 
SRC 
SSR 
TA  
TAP  
TFP  
ToR 
UN 
VAT 
VT 
VTI 
WB 
WCA 

Republic of Ivory Coast 
Risk Management Framework 
State Building Contract 
State Building and Resilience Contract 
Sector Reform Contract 
Security Sector Reform 
Technical Assistance 
Technical and Administrative Provisions 
Technical and Financial Partners  
Terms of Reference  
United Nations 
Value Added Tax 
Variable Tranche 
Variable Tranche Indicators 
World Bank 
West and Central Africa 

Final Report 

Abbreviations 

EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

Executive Summary  

The State Building Contract (SBC), a budget support mobilised in 23 
countries to address systemic shocks in contexts of fragility and risk 

In order to reinforce the effectiveness of its budget support and make it better adapted to the 
different contexts of intervention, the European Commission created in 2012 a general budget 
support specifically dedicated to fragile and transitional situations: the State Building Contract 
(SBC). This instrument was very rapidly mobilised on a large scale: twenty-three countries on 
four continents benefited from it between 2012 and 2018, most often in situations marked by 
major  structural  weaknesses,  exacerbated  by  health,  climate  and/or  security  crises  (e.g. 
Burundi,  Haiti,  Mali,  Sierra  Leone,  Somalia  and  Chad).  SBCs  have  also  been  allocated  to 
countries that are not fragile but suffering from unexpected shocks with potentially devastating 
effects (e.g. natural disasters (e.g. Dominica, Nepal and Fiji), political transition (e.g. Tunisia)). 
In total, about €3.9 billion have been committed through 42 SBC programmes, the majority of 
which in West and Central Africa. 

Designed to support States made vulnerable by uncertain environments and a limited capacity 
to  respond  to  shocks,  SBCs  have  primarily  supported  the  recovery  or  maintenance  of 
Governments’ capacities in three major areas: i) macroeconomic and budgetary stabilisation 
and  public  finance  management  (PFM);  ii)  the  provision  of  basic  social  services  and  iii) 
democratic governance and the rule of law. The EU SBC is differentiated from budget support 
provided  by  other  donors  through  its  emphasis  on  1)  maintaining/restoring  basic  social 
services  (such  as  education  and  health);  2)  strengthening  state  institutions  in  the  area  of 
peacebuilding,  security  and  justice  (including  the  fight  against  corruption)  and  democratic 
governance reforms; and 3) budgetary transparency.  

Final Report 

Executive Summary / Page i 

 
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

A flexible instrument, tailored to needs but with an unclear strategic 
vision  

The SBC has been a unique and necessary instrument to address the specific urgent needs 
of situations of fragility, transition, and reconstruction. It has allowed, within a short period of 
time, financing the current expenditures of the Government through a grant. Based on a good 
understanding  of  the  challenges  and  risks,  the  programmes  prioritised  the  objectives  of 
stabilisation  and  rapid  recovery,  and  generally  provided  an  appropriate  response  to  the 
identified fragility factors.  

The modalities were adapted to the context and its evolution. The specific characteristics of 
beneficiary  countries  were  taken  into  account  to  analyse  the  eligibility  criteria  and  choose 
variable tranche indicators. The balance between fixed and variable tranches was generally 
appropriate  and  made  it  possible  to  strike  a  balance  between  the  immediate  needs  for 
stabilisation and the willingness to initiate longer term reforms. The variable tranche indicators, 
although  too  numerous  and/or  ambitious  and/or  disparate,  were  in  fact  the  main  levers 
incentivising these reforms: with nearly 30% of the amounts not disbursed, the sanction/bonus 
mechanism worked well although it did have disruptive effects on the predictability of funds. 
While over half of the disbursements were made within the timeframes agreed, they were most 
often made at the end of the fiscal year, whereas EU Budget Support Guidelines recommend 
disbursements at the start of the budgetary year wherever possible.  

The medium-term strategic approach underpinning the programmes was not made sufficiently 
explicit. This implied difficulties for the SBCs to lead ultimately to structural reforms benefiting 
people. Indeed, intervention logics reflected only partially the intervention strategies, tended to 
be  too  general  and  took  little  account  of  the  volatility  of  the  contexts.  The  preliminary 
assessments were not always sufficiently thorough to deal with sharper sectoral dimensions. 
Institutional or sub-state level fragilities, as well as the fragility factors most directly affecting 
people’s lives, were only partly taken into account. Synergies were limited because technical 
support was often disconnected from the other components of the support.   

Final Report 

Executive Summary / Page ii 

 
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

Valuable close technical dialogue but timid political steering  

SBCs  have  been  a  unique  forum  for  dialogue  on  budgetary,  fiscal  and  operational  issues 
related to the functioning of the public financial management system, as well as on respect for 
fundamental  values.  The  rapid  mobilisation  of  funding  has  also  enabled  the  EU  to  play  a 
leading role in dialogue in emergency situations and to seize a window of opportunity to support 
political transition at a key moment (Ivory Coast, Gambia) or in response to a natural disaster 
(Nepal).  

The political steering, which guarantees a commitment from the State at the highest level on 
the reforms that the SBC intends to support, was more timid. It was often undermined by the 
urgent  need  for  macro-economic  stabilisation  and  the  insufficient  commitment  by  national 
authorities to substantive reforms. The general conditions did not allow a real leverage effect 
to be exerted; it was more through the non-disbursement of amounts linked to unmet variable 
tranche indicators that the EU was able to exert some "pressure", but without any real effect 
on high-level policy dialogue.  

Above  all  a  stabilising  instrument,  placing  the  Government  at  the 
centre of the crisis response, but less effective to foster structural 
reforms for economic resilience 

A good stabilising instrument 

It is above all in stabilisation that SBCs proved to be most effective; their contribution to state-
building and societal resilience having been more mixed. SBCs have essentially contributed 
to stabilising or even restoring vital state functions after the shocks/crises encountered, thus 
avoiding a process of State de-structuring and the deterioration of people's living conditions.   

Final Report 

Executive Summary / Page iii 

 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

Contributed to restore the macro-fiscal framework 

ADE 

SBCs placed the Government at the heart of the response to fragility/transition/reconstruction. 
They first and foremost contributed to restoring the stability of the macro-fiscal framework 
(e.g.  Central  African  Republic,  The  Gambia  and  Chad)  by  mobilising  significant  financial 
resources in agreement with other technical and financial partners (primarily multilateral). It is 
essentially by contributing to the increase of fiscal space that they were able to cushion the 
shocks  on  government  current  expenditure,  but  without  avoiding  adjustments  on  capital 
expenditure  and  without  having  an  impact  on  stabilisation  policies  carried  out  under  IMF 
programmes.  

SBCs have helped to somewhat consolidate the fiscal bases for government action: through 
their  emphasis  on  reforms  to  increase  domestic  resources  mobilisation  (especially  by 
improving  the  collection  of  what  is  owed  (e.g.  Mali  and  Niger),  SBCs  helped  to sustain the 
stabilising effects and strengthen the capacity of these countries to respond to shocks. On the 
other  hand,  the  strengthening  of  Public  Financial  Management  systems  fell  short  of 
expectations,  despite  progress  in  budget  programming,  cash-flow  management  and  public 
procurement management, against a backdrop of increased budget transparency (e.g. Central 
African Republic, Haiti, Nepal and Niger), albeit still weak. The Public Finance Management 
Systems remained weak overall. 

Contributed to maintain the provision of basic services 

The increase of fiscal space, partly achieved through the SBCs and the dialogue conducted in 
the  framework  of  the  variable  tranche  indicators,  contributed  to  maintaining  current  public 
expenditure in the social sectors, in particular to maintaining the provision of basic services 
in  education  (e.g.  Mali  and  Niger)  and  health  (e.g.  Burundi  and  Ivory  Coast),  especially  for 
women  and  girls.  On the  other  hand,  they  were  not  able  to  contribute  to  strengthening  the 
quality of social services in the longer term, or to structuring sectoral policies or improving the 
steering of these sectors.  

Mixed effects on peacebuilding and democratic governance processes 

In the field of democratic governance, SBCs succeeded in effectively supporting - through 
support for institutional development and the initiation of reform processes - the establishment 
of conditions to support transition towards democratic governance. In contexts where there is 
a stated determination for democratisation and openness (e.g. Ivory Coast, The Gambia and 
Tunisia), SBCs have been able to contribute to improving public governance. By contrast, they 
had limited effects on peacebuilding processes (e.g. Afghanistan and Mali) and on rebuilding 
the social contract (e.g. Mali and Madagascar).  

Little progress on economic resilience in fragile states 

Little progress is generally observed in terms of the implementation of structural reforms that 
would  strengthen  economic  resilience,  except  in  non-fragile  states  where  SBCs  have 
contributed to a reduction in certain factors of economic fragility. The macroeconomic risks are 
still present, even higher in a significant number of countries, and the economic vulnerability 
of  beneficiary  states  has  not  been  reduced.  Overall,  the  situation  of  fragility  in  beneficiary 
countries  has  changed  little:  the  resilience  capacities  of  these  countries  have  not  been 
strengthened;  economic  structures  remain  uncompetitive  and  undiversified;  governance 
capacities  and  the  functioning  of  institutions  have  not  made  any  major  progress;  and  the 
situation of vulnerable populations has not improved. 

Final Report 

Executive Summary / Page iv 

 
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

Key explanatory factors 

ADE 

The  limits  observed  in  the  effects  of  SBCs  are  partly  inherent  to  the  context  of  persistent 
fragility in some of the beneficiary countries and depend on the willingness/capacity of these 
countries to carry out structural reforms. They also stem from weaknesses encountered at the 
level  of  programme  implementation,  in  particular  the  lack  of  leverage  effect  of  the  general 
conditions and of the political dialogue, the difficulty of ensuring continuity in the monitoring of 
reforms, the lack of resources within the EU Delegations to carry out monitoring and conduct 
dialogue, and the generally insufficient involvement of local actors (e.g. civil society). 

An instrument which places the EU in a crucial role, but which is still 
unrecognised and poorly understood   

Through SBCs, the EU has played an increasingly crucial role in supporting state-building in 
high-risk  contexts,  alongside  other  recognised  donors.  Thanks  to  a  much-appreciated 
technical dialogue of proximity, the EU has imparted credibility to its action. Its political weight, 
however, has not been proportionate to the financial amounts involved. This is partly due to 
the limitations observed in implementation, but also to the challenge in following and putting 
into operation an integrated approach that maximises complementarities with all the EU means 
of action. 

The instrument is not yet sufficiently well understood or known by most of the stakeholders 
involved. The weakness of the beneficiaries' capacities partly explains this lack of knowledge. 
The efforts made so far to allow for wider ownership have been insufficient. Furthermore, the 
outcomes achieved have been undervalued and under-communicated to the final beneficiaries 
and the wider audience. This may lead to mistrust of an instrument which is still unknown by 
the citizen. 

 Main recommendations 

Position  SBCs  as  a  stabilising  instrument,  making  sure  they 
1. 
also tackle the needs for social cohesion and democratic governance 
in fragile contexts and strengthen the core of the government system 

Related recommendations: 

 

 

 

Increase the visibility of EU support for social cohesion and democratic governance policies 
in stabilisation (R1). 

In structurally fragile countries, emphasise the role of the SBC as a means of strengthening 
the  government’s  capacity  to  manage  its  public  finances  and  the  steering  of  its  public 
policies, which are necessary conditions for supporting consolidation policies (R2). 

In  countries  affected  by  natural  disasters,  use  SBCs  to  strengthen  crisis  management 
factors  (including 
systems  and 
environmental e.g. climate change) and social factors (R3). 

to  address  relevant  context-related  vulnerability 

Final Report 

Executive Summary / Page v 

 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

2. 

Improve SBCs design 

Related recommendations: 

ADE 

  Further develop the intervention logics at regular intervals in accordance with the changes 
in context in order to better take into account the urgency and complexity of needs and 
ensure the adaptability of the response provided (R4). 

  Ensure  that  the  programmes  take  territorial  and  environmental  questions  better  into 

account, as well as the plight of the more vulnerable populations (R5). 

  Ensure continuity in the support for reforms initiated by SBCs to ensure the sustainability 

of the achievements over time (R6). 

  Carry out joint analysis of the institutional strengthening needs (R7). 

Raise the EU profile in the political dialogue: foster the leverage 

3. 
effect of the general conditions and its convening role with donors 

Related recommendations: 
  Continue structuring the close technical dialogue and strengthen the political dialogue (R8). 

  Strengthen the leverage effect of the general and specific conditions by better framing the 

general conditions and improving the choice of variable tranche indicators (R9). 

  Strengthen  human  resources  and  their  qualifications  within  EU  Delegations  for  the 

formulation, monitoring and implementation of SBCs (R10). 

4. 

Integrate SBCs into a comprehensive EU response to fragility 

Related recommendations: 
 

Integrate the SBC into a comprehensive EU response to fragility/consolidation and further 
seize  opportunities for mobilisation and  synergies  within  the  EU  portfolio  and  with  other 
Technical and Financial Partners (R11). 

5. 
Strengthen  national  ownership  and  accountability:  ensure 
ownership of the instrument by partners and systematically involve 
civil society 

Related recommendations: 
  Ensure greater ownership of the instrument by partners (including civil society) and further 
alignment  of  specific  conditions  and  disbursement  periods  with  their  capacities/needs 
(R12). 

  Strengthen the role of civil society in the implementation of SBCs (R13). 

 

Increase the visibility of SBCs and accountability among different publics (R14).

Final Report 

Executive Summary / Page vi 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

1. Introduction  

The  European  Commission's  Directorate-General 
International  Cooperation  and 
Development (DG DEVCO) commissioned ADE to carry out the Evaluation of the European 
Union  ‘State  Building  Contracts’  (SBC)1  deployed  during  the  period  2012-2018.  A  State 
Building  Contract  is  a  type  of  Budget  Support  (BS)  introduced  in  2012,  to  provide  budget 
support in situations of fragility and transition.  

for 

This  evaluation  seeks  (1)  to  provide  an  independent  review  of  all  SBCs  as  an  aid 
instrument,  and  in  particular  to  assess  the  extent  to  which  SBCs  have  contributed  in  a 
sustainable  way  to  consolidating  the  core  government  functions  after  shocks  and/or  in 
situations  of  fragility  or  extreme  fragility;  and  (2)  to  learn  from  experience  and  propose 
recommendations  in  order  to  improve  the  design  and  implementation  of  future  SBC 
programmes and optimise their expected effects.1 

1.1   General approach, evaluation framework and 

evaluation questions  

The  methodological  approach  adopted  for  this  evaluation  is  based  on  the  methodological 
approach for evaluating budget support (OECD/DAC)2 which provides for a three-step process 
based  on  the five levels  of  analysis  of the  intervention  logic  of  BS (see Annex  2).  Figure  1 
below  details  these five levels  for  SBCs, from  inputs  to  direct  and  induced outputs, then  to 
outcomes and overall objectives. This intervention logic does not differ fundamentally from one 
context of fragility to another. The objectives sought in terms of stabilising and consolidating 
government functions revolve around the following three main axes, which aim to address the 
main fragility factors encountered: 

  Macroeconomic stabilisation and public finance management; 

  Access to basic social services, in particular, education and health; 

  The establishment of a rule of law based on democratic principles and capable of putting 

public policies into effect in the priority sectors.  

The intervention logic also distinguishes between the themes and specific objectives sought 
by  SBCs  associated  with democratic transition and/or  characterised  by a context  of  conflict 
and/or violence (in blue), and those sought by SBCs deployed in a context of vulnerability to 
external shocks (in green). 

1   The  acronym  SBC  (State  Building  Contract)  will be used  throughout  the  report  to  refer  to  the instrument.  In 
2017,  the  acronym  changed  (`State  and  Resilience  Building  Contract’ (SBRC)).  As  most  of  the  operations 
covered in the context of this evaluation are SBC, the term SBC has been used (see Terms of Reference). 

2   OECD/DAC, Methodological approach for evaluating budget support, 2012. 

Final Report 

 Page 1 

                                                
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

Figure 1: Comprehensive evaluation framework of the SBC  

Final Report 

 Page 2 

External factors, context featuresand feedback processesImpacts•Long-term economic growth•Reduction of monetary and non-monetary poverty•Autonomy and social inclusion of vulnerable groups (including gender equality)•Safeguarding state apparatus then consolidation of the rule of law and good democratic governanceOutcomes•Restoration then consolidation of safety, justice and peace•Reform of the social contract / mutual trust maintained and/or increased between the state and citizens (including gender equality)•Maintenance and reinforcement of resilience for the most vulnerable populations (including gender equality)•Maintenance of access to / increased use of basic public services (including gender equality)•Strengthening of economic activity and diversification of the economyInduced outputsMacroeconomic and budgetary stabilisationthrough:•In the short term: stabilisation of the exchange rate, foreign reserves, limitation of the current account deficit, reduction of arrears, financing of basic state functions and stabilisation / reconstructionexpenditure•In the medium term: domestic resources mobilisation, budget reflecting national strategy, efficient public expenditurePFM: essential functions ensured and strengthened in the medium term (credibility of the budget, cash management, public procurement, budget execution in key sectors / Investments, internal and external control, transparency and fight against corruption)Maintenance/strengthening of the supply of basic public services to the population (education, health, food security, security)Good governance: civil rehabilitation, economic and social programmes and reforms of the institutional framework and policies, in particular in the following areas:•Rule of law and security•Democracy and human rights•Reconciliation •Regulatory framework of the private sector and diversification policies and systems to reduce economic vulnerability•Education and health (including gender)Improvement of relations between foreign aid and budgetary processes and national policies:•Increased volume and share of foreign aid in the national budget•Expanded fiscal space: Reduction of the budget deficit / Volume and share of the budget assignable to discretionary expenses necessary for stabilisation / reconstructionincreased•Coordination strengthened between donors and between different aid modalities•Better predictability of disbursements of external aid and resources allocated to the budget •External aid harmonised and aligned on government policies and systems•External aid transaction costs reducedEffects produced by government activities:•National budget financed from domestic tax revenues•National policy inputsSimilar and/or complementary or even conflicting effects produced by other external aid activitiesGovernmental resources & activities (2012-2018)•Combined state budgets for 2012-2018•Strategic vision, policies, strategies and plans of action•Functioning of the state apparatus: legal, regulatory, institutional framework, etc.•Political and administrative organisationOther resources and activitiesfinanced by vEU: Other programmes, SRC, ECHO, other support for peace and security (IcSP, CSDP missions)vExternal assistance, including IMF, WB, AfDB, funds released by HIPC (incl. MDRI), etc.Expected SBC inputs (2012-2018):vPreliminary diagnosis of the situation of fragility and risk analysisvTransfer of funds: €3.882 MvPerformance framework and different levels of dialogue(political, of policies and on follow-up of the performance) covering:•Government commitment vis-à-vis consolidation of the State and fight against poverty•PFM (i.e. DRM, external control, transparency, fight against corruption)•Statistics •Sectoral policies (education/health, food security, migration, etc.)•Good conduct of the electoral process•Independence of the judiciary•Security sector reform•Economic governance (natural resources, public sector)•Diversification of the economy, youth employment, business environment•GendervMonitoring of fundamental valuesvTechnical assistance and other technical support (PFM, statistics, reconstruction, key sectors)vWillingness to coordinate and harmoniseDirect outputsInputs•Low capacity and level of institutional development •Extent of political commitment to reform processes•Commitment of other donors•Weak public sector capacity•Nature of demand for public services•Extent of national accountability•Regional instability•Global economic development•Responses to changes in incentives•‘Entry conditions’ analysed with a dynamic approach•Comprehensive aid framework•Existing learning tools and processesCONTEXT OF INTERVENTION AND EXTERNAL FACTORSKey: Specific characteristics of SBCs related to vulnerability to external shocks for countries in situations of structural fragility; Specific characteristics of SBCs related to democratic transition for countries in situations of structural fragility, conflict, and/or violence 
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

The  comprehensive  evaluation  framework  built  on  the  three-step  approach  has  been 
broken down into a set of eleven evaluation questions set out in Table 1.  

Table 1: Themes addressed by the set of evaluation questions 

Criteria 

Relevance 

Effectiveness  

(direct outputs) 

Effectiveness and 
Sustainability 

Effectiveness/Impact 
& Sustainability 

#Q 

Q1 

Q2 

Q3 

Q4 

Q5 

Q6 

Q7 

Q8 

Q9 

Theme 

  Taking into account the situation of fragility in the 

beneficiary countries 

  Response appropriate and consistent with international 

principles of intervention in these contexts 

  Fiscal space generated by SBCs and discretionary 

budgetary resources to strengthen measures designed 
to stabilise and foster core government functions 

  Predictability of funds 

  Short term restoration of macroeconomic stability 
  Adoption of medium term stabilisation policies 
 

Improvements in the transparency, management and 
control of beneficiary countries’ public finances 

  Development of the capacity of the institutions in charge 

of maintaining justice, security and peace 

  Maintenance/strengthening of health and food security, 
education and health services, and access by the most 
vulnerable groups. 

  Stabilisation of the economy and long-term recovery of 

economic growth 

  Strengthening of long-term resilience to economic 

shocks 

  Main determining factors of these changes 
  Return and consolidation of peace and transition 

towards democratic governance 

  Main determining factors of these changes 
  Preservation and strengthening of access to health and 

education services, water and food security 
  Main determining factors of these changes  

Efficiency 

Coordination, 
complementarity 

Q10   

Q11   

Institutional framework, human resources and technical 
means deployed by the EU to support SBCs  
Interaction with the other technical and financial 
partners, and with other EU instruments  

  Added value of SBCs  

Final Report 

 Page 3 

 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

1.2  Evaluation tools  

ADE 

The evaluation is based on a three-level analysis: 

The general level: bringing together overarching themes related to the deployment of 
the instrument, such as the strategic guidance of the international community to engage 
in fragile countries, the evolution of the level of risk in the 23 SBC beneficiary countries, the 
evolution of variables of interest (e.g. GDP growth rates) in SBC beneficiary countries and in 
other fragile and non-fragile countries, and EU staff perceptions of the instrument; 

The country level: thorough analysis of 15 country case studies where SBCs have been 
deployed:  

o  Eight  countries  (Burundi,  Ivory  Coast,  Haiti,  Madagascar,  Mali,  Nepal,  Central 
African  Republic  (CAR),  and  Sierra  Leone)  were  the  subject  of  documentary 
analysis, statistical analysis (budget and fiscal data; outcome indicators) and field 
missions to meet the main stakeholders (EU staff involved in the design and follow-
up of SBCs, national authorities, other Technical and Financial Partners (TFP), civil 
society, etc.); 

o  Seven other countries (Afghanistan, The Gambia, Guinea, Niger, Somalia, Chad 

and Tunisia) were the subject of documentary and statistical analysis; 

The programme level: with both an inventory of all 42 programmes deployed and an in-
depth study of 32 SBCs in the context of country case studies.  

Figure 2: Combination of tools for data collection and analysis  

Data was collected and analysed using a mixed-methods approach based on qualitative and 
quantitative data (see Table  2). The  combination  of these approaches  enabled  the  team to 
gather the necessary information at the level of indicators and to triangulate information from 
a number of sources in order to validate (or invalidate) the judgement criteria, while ensuring 
the solidity of the findings.  

Final Report 

 Page 4 

Country levelGeneral levelProgrammelevel15 country case studies,incl.8 field visits•Document analysis•EU interviews•On-line survey•Risk mapping•Econometric analysis•Inventory of the 42 SBCs•In-depthanalysis of 32SBCs  
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

Table 2: Tools for data collection and analysis 

Tools 

General/strategic level literature review of the guidelines behind the instrument and, more 
generally, guidance by donors for intervention in fragile countries, etc. (see Annex 7). 

Interviews with EU staff at headquarters to collate their views on the instrument, the means 
made available and the decision-making process, etc. (see Annex 7). 

Online  survey  to  systematically  gather  the  views  of  EU  staff  at  headquarters  and  in 
European Union Delegations (EUD) (see Annex 4). 

Inventory & typology of SBCs to obtain a mapping of the 42 SBCs deployed (amounts 
involved, modalities used, areas covered by variable tranche indicators, etc.) (see Annex 3). 

Mapping  of  the  evolution  of  risks  perceived  by  the  EU  on  the  basis  of  the  Risk 
Management Framework for the 23 beneficiary countries (see Annex 6). 

Country case studies: in-depth analysis of 32 SBCs in 15 countries (eight countries visited 
and seven analysed on the basis of documentation - list of countries included above). 

Variance analysis (ANOVA) (see Annex 5) to study the behaviour of variables of interest 
(indicators  of  outputs/outcomes  covering  the  three  fields  of  analysis  -  macroeconomics, 
social and governance/rule of law -) in the 23 SBC beneficiary countries and in 29 other SBC 
non-beneficiary (fragile and non-fragile) countries during the 2003-2018 period.  

Econometric regression of a standard model for estimating growth which supplemented 
the ANOVA in providing quantitative elements on the nature of the effects of the SBC on 
public expenditure and its main components, and on economic growth (see Annex 5). 

1.3  Challenges and responses  

This  evaluation  presented  several  challenges  for  which  methodological  responses  were 
brought. Firstly, the OECD DAC’s methodological approach, designed to evaluate joint budget 
support  operations  deployed  in  the  same  country,  was  applied  in  identifying  as  closely  as 
possible  the  contribution  of  budget  support  to  induced  outputs  in  the  countries  where  a 
thorough  analysis  was  undertaken,  whilst  undertaking  simultaneously  quantitative  analyses 
exploring the relations between the implementation  of SBCs and the outcomes observed in 
the 23 beneficiary countries.     

The  wide  scope  of  the  evaluation  (42  programmes  implemented  in  23  countries  on  five 
continents, on very varied areas) justified the decision to carry out an in-depth analysis of a 
high number of countries (15 out of 23 countries) as well as the use of a combination of data 
collection tools and, in particular, of a survey covering all beneficiary countries.  

Final Report 

 Page 5 

EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

Finally,  the  limitations  imposed  by  the  fragile  situation  of  most  of  the  beneficiary  countries, 
whether in terms of access to data or field trips, did not constitute a major constraint during the 
evaluation.  Field  missions  were  conducted  in  at-risk  countries  (such  as  the  Central  African 
Republic  or  Mali)  and  access  to  data  produced  by  international  institutions  and  cross-
referenced with national sources provided a sufficiently wide-ranging database of information 
and indicators.    

2. The SBC, an instrument to 

engage in situations of 
fragility  

2.1. The  SBC  within  the  EU  strategic  framework  for 

intervention in situations of fragility 

As  part  of  an  overhaul  of  its  approach  to  budget  support,  the  Communication  from  the 
Commission entitled “The Future Approach to EU Budget Support to Third Countries” (2011) 
and  corresponding  Council  conclusions  (2012)  propose  greater  differentiation  of  budget 
support operations to enable the EU to better adapt to the context of the partner country. SBCs 
were introduced for intervention in countries in situations of fragility (see Section 2.3). Their 
mobilisation is part of the strategic framework established by the international community for 
intervening in fragile situations, which has been progressively clarified in the documents shown 
in Figure 3.  

Figure 3: Main strategic orientation documents for intervening  
in situations of fragility3 

3   Only the main documents used in the Commission Budget Support Guidelines are included here. 

Final Report 

 Page 6 

20072011201320152016International dialogueNew Deal for Engagement in FragileStatesCommissionTowards an EU response to situations of fragilityEU CouncilAn EU response to situations of fragilityOECDPrinciples for Good International Engagement in Fragilestates and SituationsCommissionThe future approach to EU budget support to third countries2017OECDStatesof Fragility:Understanding ViolenceUnited NationsTransforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for SustainableDevelopmentCommission / HR/VPThe EU’s comprehensiveapproach to externalconflictand crisesEUShared vision, common action: a strongerEurope:a global strategy for the European Union’s foreign and security policyInternational dialogueDeclaration of Stockholm on AddressingFragilityand Building Peace in a Changing WorldCommission / HR/VPA strategic approach to resilience in the EU’s externalactionEUNew European consensus for development  
 
                                                
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

The Commission Budget Support Guidelines (2012 and 2017) form part of the continuity of 
commitments  made  by  the  EU  for  its  interventions  in  situations  of  fragility,  established,  in 
particular, in the Communication of the Commission “Towards an EU response to situations of 
fragility” (2007) and the corresponding Council Conclusions. The concept of fragility on which 
the budget support guidelines are based on is the one given in the 2007 Communication.  

“Fragility refers to weak or failing structures and to situations where the social contract is 
broken due to the state's incapacity or unwillingness to deal with its basic functions, meet its 
obligations and responsibilities regarding service delivery, management of resources, rule of 
law,  equal  access  to  power,  security  and  safety  of  the  population  and  the  protection  and 
promotion of citizens’ rights and freedoms.”  

Source: EC, Towards an EU response to situations of fragility, COM(2007) 643 final. 

The principles of engagement defined in this framework are also important principles in the 
definition of EU’s actions in the form of budget support in situations of fragility4.  

Principles for EU engagement in situations of fragility: 

  Taking deliberately calculated risks that must be weighed against the risks inherent 

to non-action; 

  More  systematically  addressing  the  root  causes  of  conflict,  manifestations  of 

violence, insecurity and risk of vulnerability; 

  Proposing  a  differentiated,  coordinated  and  comprehensive  response,  combining 
diplomatic  action,  humanitarian  aid,  development  cooperation  and  security,  and 
adopting 'whole-of-government' approaches. 

  Supporting democratic governance, state building and reconciliation processes and 

human rights protection; and 

  Promoting  political  will  for  reform  through  dialogue  and  incentives,  rather  than 

through conditionality and sanctions. 

Source: EC, Towards an EU response to situations of fragility, COM(2007) 643 final. 

The guidelines are also in line with the EU strategic framework for external assistance "The 
EU's Comprehensive Approach to External Conflict and Crises" (2013) and the "Shared Vision, 
Common  Action:  A  Stronger  Europe"  (2016)  which  place  the  implementation  of  a 
comprehensive  approach  at  the  heart  of  their  principles  as  well  as  the  "New  European 
Consensus for Development" (2017). 

In 2017, following  the  joint  Communication “A  Strategic  Approach to Resilience  in  the  EU's 
external  action”  (2017)  examining  different  aspects  of  state  and  societal  resilience,  the 
objective of resilience was explicitly added to the objectives pursued by budget support. The 
“State Building Contract” has become the “State and Resilience Building Contract”. 

4   Also supplemented by those approved in the context of the OECD (“Principles for international engagement in 

fragile states and situations”). 

Final Report 

 Page 7 

                                                
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

2.2  SBC Specificities 

2.2.1  SBC Specific Objectives  

ADE 

The guidelines (2012) indicate that the SBC should be mobilised in a situation of fragility or 
when  a  country  is  going  through  a  period  of  political  transition  towards  democracy  and  the 
establishment  of  the  rule  of  law.  It  seeks  to  “help  partner  countries  to  ensure  vital  state 
functions  and  to  deliver  basic  services  to  the  populations”.  During  this  post-crisis  period,  it 
seeks to “getting the state functioning again, (...) consolidating a weak state apparatus, (...) 
and building trust (…) to prevent a country from slipping back into crisis”. During the transition 
period, it seeks to “contribute directly to macroeconomic stabilisation (...) in order to meet, in 
particular, social needs (wages, health, education) or other peace and state building goals”. 
With  the  revision  of  the  guidelines,  the  approach  was  refined  and  the  potential  scope  of 
intervention of SBCs broadened to include resilience. The guidelines (2017) note that the SBC 
seeks to strengthen the capacity of a state “to build, maintain or restore its core functions, and 
basic social and political cohesion, in a manner that ensures respect for democracy, the rule 
of law, human and fundamental rights and fosters inclusive long-term security and progress”.  

Figure 4: Specific objectives targeted by SBCs 

Final Report 

 Page 8 

Specific objectives of the SBC1. To improve the financial capabilityof the governmentto re-establish peace and macroeconomic stability and to reach short-term policyobjectives2. To support the efforts of the government to guarantee vital state functions (provision of peace and security, payment of civil servicesalaries, provision of core administrative functions and minimum basic services to the population, etc.).3. Foster a process of transition towards development and democratic governance4. Consolidate the resilience of the state and society2017update 
  
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

2.2.2  SBC Design and Implementation Modalities  

ADE 

The SBC adopts the same modus operandi as all other EU budget support: full fungibility of 
funds  to the  treasury;  use of  national  public finance systems; fulfilment  of  the four  eligibility 
criteria  at  the  time  of  decision  and for  each  disbursement;  a "package"  combining  financial 
transfers,  policy  dialogue  and  capacity  building.  Its  design  and  implementation  modalities 
described in Figure 5 are, however, specific in order to be tailored to the situations of fragility 
in the beneficiary countries.  

Figure 5: Design and implementation modalities of SBCs 

Source: Based on the EU guidelines on budget support  

The  guidelines  highlight  several  key  elements  that  must  be  ensured  for  the  design  and 
implementation of an SBC in view of the specific nature of the context (see Table 3). 

Table 3: Key factors guiding the design and implementation of SBCs  

Favour a rapid and adaptable response and maintaining a long-term commitment 

The guidelines recognise that “support for countries in fragile situations means engaging at 
an early stage and being prepared to stay engaged over the long haul”, especially as post-
crisis recovery is a process that can be "long and non-linear". The approach initially chosen, 
based on a short programme (1 to 2 years) renewable once, was revised in 2017, to extend 
the duration of SBCs to three years, particularly for situations of structural fragility, and to 
allow for their renewal "as long as the fragility persists".”5 

5   European Commission, ‘Budget Support Guidelines’, 2017. 

Final Report 

 Page 9 

•Amounts: to be discussed with the IMF•Profile of disbursement in line with treasury needs•Predictability of aid fundsFinancial transfers•Duration: One to three years, renewable•Disbursement, if possible, during the first part of the budget year•One FT during Year 1 and thereafter no further VTPolicydialogueStrengthening of capacities•Stabilisationstrategies and national responses to fragilityfactors•Macroeconomic governance•Institutional capacity•Ongoing process in an integrated approach•Coordinated with MSand TFP•Based on BS monitoring and the evolution of the situation•PFM•Formulation and implementation of public policies•Public administration reform•Anti-corruption measures•Varied support: TA, twinning and expertise, IT, equipment, IMF expertise•Coordinated with MSand TFP•Based on BS monitoring and the evolution of the situation•Based on needs and other support   
 
                                                
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

Pay special attention to the coordination and predictability of funds  

The  guidelines  (2012  and  2017)  insist  on  the  importance  of  coordination  between 
international partners at headquarters and at country level, particularly to ensure a response 
that best reflects the government's cash-flow needs.   

Ensure strengthened political and policy dialogue 

Political  and  policy  dialogue  associated  with  budget  support  form  an  integral  part  of  BS 
programmes. For SBCs, this means “paying special attention to its capacity and declared 
commitment  to  state  building  objectives/goals  (...)  and  good  governance  principles” 
(guidelines 2017).  

At  the  same  time,  address  systemic  institutional  weaknesses  in  countries  in 
situations of fragility  

Additional  technical  support  should  accompany  SBCs  for  key  policy  functions,  including 
Public Finance Management (PFM), policy design and implementation, public administration 
reform, and anti-corruption measures. 

2.3  Varied  intervention  contexts  characterised  by 

multiple fragility and vulnerability factors 

SBC  beneficiary  countries  in  situations  of  fragility  cover  a  wide  range  of  situations  and 
contexts  of  vulnerability:  emergence  from  crisis  or  armed  conflict,  rebuilding  phase, 
humanitarian  crises  or  natural  disasters,  situations  of  extreme  poverty.  Most  of  them  have 
experienced  cycles  of  instability  and  conflict,  including  violence.  The  fragility  and 
vulnerability factors affecting low- or middle-income countries are generally similar from 
one country to another. It is the way in which they manifest and are embedded in a particular 
context that varies from country to country. These factors can, depending on the context, cause 
or sustain periods of conflict and/or low levels of public governance.  

The figure below presents the factors of fragility most often cited in recent literature6 through 
the prism of the OECD's multi-dimensional fragility framework, which identifies five dimensions 
of fragility: political, security, economic, societal, and environmental. 

6   This includes: OECD, States of Fragility, 2018; ECORYS for DANIDA, Evaluation of the Africa Programme for 
Peace, 2018; OECD, States of Fragility Report, Understanding Violence, 2016; AFD-BM, Relever les défis de 
la stabilité et de la sécurité en Afrique de l’Ouest, 2015; Mcloughlin, C (2012) Topic Guide on Fragile States. 
Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, University of Birmingham. 

Final Report 

 Page 10 

 
 
                                                
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

Figure 6: Main fragility and vulnerability factors 

2.4  SBCs Mapping 

SBCs mobilised in 23 countries  on  five  continents  but  above all in West  and Central 
Africa  

The EU deployed 42 SBC programmes in 23 countries with total commitments of €3.882bn 
over the period 2012-2018 (see Annex 6). Most of the beneficiary countries are sub-Saharan 
African countries (16 countries notably in Western and Central Africa), as well as Afghanistan, 
Dominica, Fiji, Haiti, Nepal, Tunisia and Ukraine.  

Figure 7: Mapping of all SBCs (2012-2018) 

Final Report 

 Page 11 

Social and political tensions, risk to growth and developmentRegional conflictsPoliticalEconomicSocietalLack of state legitimacyAbsence of long-term drivers of growthExtreme poverty / Youth underemploymentPartner breakdown, sanctionsTerritorial and social inequalities (incl.gender inequality)Weakness of civil societyLimited state resourcesLimited public servicesRefugees/displaced peopleDeterioration of the environment and climate conditions, pressure on resourcesLand management difficultiesIdentity fragmentation / ethnic marginalisationEnvironmentalViolent political mobilisation and impunityWeakness/failure of state institutions, political instabilityWeakness of economic institutionsUncontrolled and predatory security, police and justice servicesSecurityDemography (i.e. population growth, urbanisation)MigrationFood and nutrition insecurityMaritime piracyGeopolitical agendasElectoral violenceEconomic marginalisation of certain groups / Concentration of wealthFight for exploitation of natural resourcesWeakness and under-equipping of security, police and justice servicesCriminal activity (trafficking in arms and drugs, etc.)Epidemics (i.e.Ebola)Natural disasters, contamination etc.Excessive dependence on importsHumanitarian crisisRegional and/or international economicTerrorism and risk of radicalisationTransparency, corruption and capacity of the society to adapt to change and avoid oppressionHigh level of resources and dependence on aidInconsistent enforcement of the lawElite capture of the statePolitical inequalities between “included” and “excluded” groupsPrevalence of infectious diseasesLevel of human rights protectionLack of state control over the territoryPresence of armed conflictLow levels of responsibility and rule of law 
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

West  and  Central  Africa  is  the  main  region  of  intervention,  comprising  14  intervention 
countries and 26 SBC programmes (Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ivory Coast, The Gambia, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, Chad 
and Togo). The top five beneficiary countries for SBC commitments over this period are Mali 
(€615m; 3 SBCs), Afghanistan (€515m; 2 SBCs), Tunisia (€448m; 5 SBCs), Ukraine (€355m; 
1 SBC) and Haiti (€236m; 2 SBCs). 

The  amounts  committed  increased  significantly  between  2012  and  2014,  from  €162m  to 
€705m,  particularly  due  to  an  increase  of  commitments  in the Western  and  Central  African 
region, and the commitment of the first tranche of the SBC in Ukraine (see figure below). The 
annual amounts committed then stabilised around €500m for the period 2015-2017. In 2018 
there was a slight drop, with commitments lower than €400 million, mainly due to the reduction 
in commitments in West and Central Africa and Asia. 

Figure 8: Evolution of SBC amounts committed and disbursed, 2012-2018 
(millions of euros) 

Source: ADE, based on data from the SBC database; The amounts of the SBC Somalia and SBC II Afghanistan 
will effectively be committed as of 2019, and are therefore not shown in these graphs. 

Beneficiary countries with higher vulnerability  

The  countries  in which  the  EU intervened through  SBCs  exhibited social  and macro-
economic fragilities. The variance analysis (ANOVA) (Annex 5) shows that the EU deployed 
SBCs in countries with higher social vulnerability7 and macroeconomic fragilities, particularly 
in terms of growth rates, current account, debt and poverty levels.  

The countries in which the EU intervened through SBCs had a substantial level of risk. 
The risk mapping, reconstituted on the basis of the EU Risk Management Framework (Annex 
6), shows that the majority of the SBC beneficiary countries (65% or 15 countries out of 23) 
had a ‘substantial’ average overall level of risk with a score of between 2.5 and 3.5 (out of the 
maximum five) and that no SBC beneficiary country had a low overall average score for this 
period (i.e. a score below 1.5) (see figure below). It also shows that the level of risk increased 
after 2013, for each of the five risk dimensions.  

7    Numerous social indicators are significantly different between SBC beneficiary and non-beneficiary countries, 
and SBC beneficiary countries show higher indices of the Fragile States Index (FSI) “Policy - Public Services” 
indicator and the FSI “Social” indicator covering demographic pressure, the presence of refugees and external 
intervention. 

Final Report 

 Page 12 

1622844313764283240100200300400500600700800201220132014201520162017201816229244949738801002003004005006007008002012201320142015201620172018UkraineCommitmentsTotal(cid:9)withoutUkraineDisbursementsUkraineTotal(cid:9)withoutUkraine603431705525 
 
 
                                                
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

Figure 9: Average overall risk of SBC beneficiary countries (2013-2018) 

Source: ADE, Risk mapping based on EU data (Annex 6) 

Broad thematic coverage, partly through increasing variable tranches 

In accordance with the objectives set, SBCs covered four areas,8 namely:  
  Macroeconomic and fiscal stabilisation; 
  Public finance management; 

  Maintenance/strengthening of basic public services, including education, health and food 

security; 

  Good governance, including support for: 

o  The rule of law and security;  
o  Democracy and human rights;  
o  Economic governance, the business environment and economic diversification. 

The  indicators  used  in  the  variable  tranches  of  the  SBC  mainly  focused  on  good 
economic  and  financial  governance,  with  54%  of  the  financial  weight  of  the  indicators 
covering this domain (see figure below). SBCs also primarily targeted good governance and 
the rule of law, as well as social sectors (education and health). 

8    The sectors/areas targeted by SBCs are stated in the general and/or specific objectives of SBCs, and also in 

the indicators included in the performance framework. 

Final Report 

 Page 13 

 
 
 
                                                
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

Figure 10: Sectors covered by variable tranche indicators (by financial weight 
of the indicators) 

Source: ADE, based on data from the SBC database 

The  proportion  of  fixed  tranches  foreseen  in  the  total  of  programmes  gradually 
decreased over the evaluation period, from 100% of the amounts committed in 2012 to 62% 
in 2018. 

Figure 11: Evolution of the composition of SBC commitments, 2012-2018 

Source: ADE, based on data from the SBC database  

The variable tranches show an overall disbursement rate of 71%. More detailed analysis 
of the type of indicators used in these variable tranches showed that process indicators show 
the highest overall disbursement rate (78%), followed by outcome (71%), output (64%) and 
input  (59%)  indicators.  Disparities  are  also  visible  by  area:  the  indicators  for  the  sectors  of 
disaster  prevention/preparedness  and  good  governance/rule  of 
the  best 
performance (overall  disbursement  rates  of  80%  and  79%);  those relating to  economic  and 

law  show 

Final Report 

 Page 14 

 
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

financial  governance,  which  account  for  more  than  half  of  the  amounts  committed  in  the 
variable tranches, show an execution rate of 70%, those relating to health a rate of 68% and 
those relating to education a rate of 65%.   

Figure 12: Variable tranche and disbursement rates by sector and by type of 
indicators9  

Source: ADE, based on data from the SBC database 

3. Little change in the fragility 

situation of recipient 
countries   

The  contexts  in  which  SBCs  have  been  implemented  are  complex  and  marked  by  weak 
capacities  to  respond  to  shocks,  weak  institutional  environments  and  significant  risks  of 
destructuring. The greater the degree of fragility, the more the context appears volatile and 
uncertain, being greatly exposed to internal and external shocks with potentially devastating 
effects  on  economic  structures,  social  cohesion  and,  ultimately,  on  populations.  The  SBC 
beneficiary  countries  share  common  characteristics  that  are  salient  to  a  greater  or  lesser 
extent: economic structures with little diversification, an unstable political environment, weaker 
institutions and capacities for governance, a lack of state legitimacy and more volatile aid flows. 
In addition to this, there is also more corruption, as indicated by the IMF in the evaluation of its 
interventions in fragile states.10 The dynamics of fragility are, however, specific to each country 

9   Others: agriculture, energy, water, mining sector and tourism. 

10   Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF, The IMF and Fragile States, Evaluation Report, 2018. 

Final Report 

 Page 15 

 
 
                                                
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

depending on its economic, social and institutional structures, as well as its geographic and 
environmental characteristics. 

3.1. Precarious  growth  dynamics  in  a  stabilised  but 

vulnerable macroeconomic framework 

Table 4: Economic performance 

Growth rate 
GDP/head 

Inflation rate (GDP 
deflator) 

Current account 
balance (as a 
percentage of 
GDP) 

Public debt  
(Percentage of 
GDP) 

2008-
11 

2012-18 

2008-11 

2012-18 

2008-11 

2012-18 

2008-11 

2012-18 

SBC countries 

1.3 

1.9 

7.3 

5.1 

-9.7 

-9.0 

40.0 

53.8 

Of  which  fragile 
countries 

Non SBC 
countries11 

1.5 

2.0 

7.7 

4.3 

-10.9 

-10.3 

33.3 

21.0 

2.8 

2.1 

10.7 

5.2 

-1.0 

-3.5 

31.4 

27.3 

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators database (WDI) 

Macroeconomic stability has been achieved, but vulnerability remains high. Overall, the 
beneficiary countries have maintained the stabilisation of the macroeconomic framework, in 
terms of inflation and public debt indicators. On average, inflation was lower in all countries 
during the period 2012-18 and particularly in fragile SBC beneficiary countries. The level of 
public debt increased on average for SBC beneficiary countries but not in the fragile states. 
However, these positive indicators hide the persistence of significant vulnerabilities: external 
deficits  remain  considerable  and  the  amount  of  public  debt  after  debt  cancellation  for  the 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) is again increasing significantly in  various 
countries.  

11   The  sample  of  non-SBC  countries  was  designed  to  be  counterfactual  for  the  quantitative  analysis  (see  the 

detailed list in Annex 5). 

Final Report 

 Page 16 

 
 
 
 
                                                
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

Figure 13: CPIA Economic Management Rating  
for 12/15 countries analysed12 (Max: 6)  

ADE 

and 

Policy 

 The sustainability of the macroeconomic 
framework  as  measured  through  the 
Country 
Institutional 
Assessment  (CPIA)  index,  “economic 
management”  cluster13  for  the  15  SBC 
beneficiary countries analysed in greater 
depth, shows, at best, a status quo and 
a 
fragile 
countries. The only exception is Tunisia, 
which improved.   

in  structurally 

reduction 

Source: World Bank 

This persistent fragility of the macroeconomic framework is directly reflected in the perception 
of risks as measured by the Risk Management Framework (RMF).  

Figure 14: Evolution of the level of 
macroeconomic risk (macroeconomic 
policies) 

in 

reaching  a 

In fragile SBC beneficiary countries, the 
risk of macroeconomic policies leading to 
instability 
the  macroeconomic 
framework  has  increased  steadily  since 
2013, 
level  considered 
substantial  (>2.5)  in  2018.  In  fragile 
countries  facing  security  threats,  the 
significant  increase  in  debt  and  the 
accompanying  risk  of  unsustainability  is 
an aggravating factor (the level of risk of 
this dimension has increased each year 
since 2013, from 2 to 3.3 in 2018).   

Source: ADE, based on the EU Risk Management Framework 
database. 

12   SBC beneficiary countries have been grouped into three categories in order to better capture the differences in 
context: 1) CAT 1: non-fragile countries (Dominica, Fiji, Tunisia, Ukraine); 2) CAT 2: countries in a context of 
deep structural fragilities that have been subjected to political / economic shocks (Burundi, Burkina Faso, The 
Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritania, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Togo, a group to 
which we associate the Ivory Coast, a case of complex interpretation); 3) CAT 3: countries in fragile situations 
having faced a high security risk between 2012 and 2018 (Afghanistan, Somalia, Mali, Niger, CAR, Chad). 

13   This cluster includes “debt policy”, “budget policy” defined as the short and medium term sustainability of budget 
policy with regard to monetary policy and the exchange rate, the sustainability of the debt and its impact on 
growth, and “macroeconomic management” defined as the framework of monetary policies, the exchange rate 
and the overall demand. 

Final Report 

 Page 17 

3,353,333,353,383,323,323,313,373,333,273,373,273,233,333,403,373,403,373,333,373,202012201320142015201620172018AverageFragile(cid:9)countries(cid:9)with(cid:9)security(cid:9)riskFragile(cid:9)countries00,511,522,53Non-fragile(cid:9)countriesFragile(cid:9)countriesFragile(cid:9)countries(cid:9)with(cid:9)security(cid:9)risk20132014201620172018 
 
 
 
 
                                                
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

No  return  to  a  sustainable  growth  path  despite  the  convergence  in  GDP  per  capita 
growth rates   
SBC countries continued to systematically perform less well than the others in terms of GDP 
per capita growth, but the difference with the non-beneficiary countries narrowed during the 
2012-2018 period, showing a catch-up in the performance of the fragile beneficiary countries 
towards a growth of 2% per year, which is almost identical to that of fragile non-beneficiary 
countries. 

With the exception of Ivory Coast, Guinea and to a lesser extent Mali, the countries analysed 
did not experience a structural transformation that would lead to sustainable growth. In Chad 
and  Burundi,  growth  has  become  negative.  In  Sierra  Leone  it  is  very  volatile.  The  other 
countries are barely keeping afloat around stagnation level. A small number of countries saw 
a short-term spike after a shock, notably the Central African Republic, Haiti and Sierra Leone, 
but with no real structural recovery. 

Insufficient  improvement  in  the  economic  environment  and  in  the  confidence  of 
economic agents 
Between 2012 and 2018, the ranking of SBC beneficiary countries in Doing Business saw little 
change: with the exception of Nepal, whose position was significantly better in 2012 and has 
remained so, the other beneficiary countries are lagging behind between the 150th and bottom 
position (188th), competing with each other to improve their position a few places. In this regard, 
Ivory Coast did best, moving up 22 places over the last three years, followed to a lesser extent 
by Guinea and Niger. 
The share of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the GDP fluctuates considerably from one year 
to another, which adds a further element of volatility to the macroeconomic framework. 

A still high economic vulnerability in the absence of diversification and mechanisms to 
respond to shocks  
Most of the beneficiary countries are highly exposed to economic shocks, and in particular to 
fluctuations  in  the  terms  of  trade,  which  are  mostly  linked  to  changes  in  the  prices  of  main 
export  products  and  rice  and  petrol  import  prices,  as  well  as  to  the  dependence  of  public 
investment on external aid. They are also dependent on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), on 
concessional  external  financing,  on  the  potential  loss  of  trade  preferences  and  on  possible 
exchange rate shocks. 

Few  countries  succeeded  in  putting  in  place  truly  effective  specific  national  mechanisms  to 
respond to crises and shocks, as the budgetary leeways of SBC beneficiary governments to 
respond to economic shocks have been reduced. 

Climate fragility factors and youth unemployment still equally important 
A large part of SBC beneficiary countries is among the poorest and least habitable countries 
on the planet, and climate change exposes them to increased risks that threaten key economic 
sectors, while exacerbating the possibility of greater environmental deterioration. 

The dependence of some of these countries on agriculture and exploitation of forest or mining 
resources, coupled with high levels of poverty and unemployment, leaves them vulnerable to 
increased extreme events. 

Final Report 

 Page 18 

 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

3.2. Little 

improvement 

in  political  and  social 

cohesion and in state legitimacy    

Overall,  the  indices  of  political  fragility  and  measuring  social  cohesion  changed  little  on 
average  between  2008-2011  and  2012-2018.  They  remained  particularly  high  (above  8)  in 
fragile countries regardless of whether countries were SBC beneficiaries or not. Overall, state 
legitimacy  was  not  strengthened  in  SBC  countries  and  remains  significantly  weakened  in 
fragile  countries.  Between  these  two  periods,  the  situation,  in  fact,  deteriorated  in  fragile 
countries in terms of social fragility (determined on the basis of three indicators for “democratic 
pressure”, “refugees and displaced people”, and “external intervention”). 

Table 5: Governance, cohesion and social stability  

FSI - Political 

FSI-  Political 
State legitimacy  

– 

FSI - Cohesion 

FSI - Social 

2008-11 

2012-18 

2008-11 

2012-18 

2008-11 

2012-18 

2008-11 

2012-18 

SBC countries 

8.0 

8.1 

8.1 

8.1 

7.7 

7.7 

7.5 

7.8 

Of which fragile 
countries 

Non SBC 
countries14 

8.3 

8.3 

8.3 

8.3 

8.0 

8.0 

8.1 

8.5 

7.5 

7.2 

7.7 

7.6 

7.1 

7.1 

7.5 

7.3 

Sources: Fragile State Index (FSI), Transparency International 
Reading: the SFI indices are measured on a scale from 0 to 10, with 10 being the maximum level of fragility. 

The analysis of changes between 2012 and 2018 in SBC beneficiary countries confirms the 
persistence of a precarious situation, even if within the 15 countries analysed in depth, some 
saw their situation improve and others deteriorate. Only a minority of countries have reduced 
their  overall  level  of  fragility  under  the  Fragile  States  Index  (FSI)  score15  (10  out  of  23 
countries), while a majority of countries appeared more fragile at the end of the period. Fragility 
primarily  affects  the  African  continent,  marked  by  heterogeneous  trajectories  (Ivory  Coast 
progressed 10 points, whereas Mali fell 18 points). Nevertheless, there are positive changes 
in some countries (Ivory Coast, Haiti, Sierra Leone and Chad) or in some areas (reduction in 
collective grievances, respect for human rights).  

Most of the SBC beneficiary countries did not experience a reduction in violent political 
conflicts  over  the  2012-2018  period.  This  conflict  dynamic  has  undermined  national 
peacebuilding processes towards socio-political stability.  
According to the FSI, a small majority of countries saw deterioration in their security context 
(8/15  countries).  Civil  war  has  persisted  (Afghanistan),  while  the  Sahel  States  have  faced 
activism  by  armed  rebel  and/or  terrorist  groups  on  their  territory  (Mali,  Niger  and  Chad). 
Political alternation (The Gambia, Madagascar, Tunisia) has led to clashes, excessive use of 

14   The  sample  of  non-SBC  countries  was  designed  to  be  counterfactual  for  the  quantitative  analysis  (see  the 

detailed list in Annex 5). 

15   The Fund for Peace, Fragile State Index, 2019 annual report  

Final Report 

 Page 19 

 
 
                                                
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

force and a crisis in the state security apparatus. A democratisation process followed by an 
electoral crisis led to a hardening of the state apparatus and repression (Burundi). The SSR 
processes undertaken in most of the countries did not benefit from strong political commitment 
backed up by significant resources. In addition, DDR processes have struggled to produce the 
peace-making effects expected and provided for under peace agreements, whose expected 
dividends have failed to ensure socio-political stabilisation (Afghanistan, Mali, CAR).  

The  EU  risk  management  framework  also  revealed  deterioration  in  the  average  score  for 
“Insecurity and conflicts” for all 15 countries under review for the period under review (2.69 to 
2.89).  The  countries  with  the  largest  deterioration  in  their  score  were:  Central  Africa,  Haiti, 
Madagascar, Mali and Niger, and those with an improvement in their score were: Sierra Leone 
and Tunisia.  

The  sub-group of  the 15  countries  studied made  little progress during the  2012-2018 
period  in  terms  of  governance  to  ensure  the  conditions  for  a  political  transition  to  a 
system of democratic governance.  
A strengthening of elite fragmentation is observed in a slim majority of countries (8 out of 15), 
while  three  countries  have  seen  no  progress  (Burundi,  Madagascar,  Tunisia).  Political 
leadership crises (Burundi, The Gambia, Haiti, Madagascar, Mali, CAR, Somalia and Tunisia), 
whether  or  not  coupled  with  polarisation  fuelled  by  identity-related  tensions  on  the  political 
scene  (Guinea,  Mali,  Nepal,  Central  African  Republic,  Somalia),  contributed  to  significantly 
weaken the legitimacy of public institutions. In all countries, the distribution of resources and 
wealth  associated  with  unfair  institutional  treatment,  by  judicial  institutions  in  particular, 
contributed  to  increasing  social  and  political  inequalities,  and  a  marginalisation  of  already 
vulnerable social groups.  

A  majority  of  countries  (9  out  of  15)  have  nevertheless  recorded  a  reduction  in  collective 
grievances of an intra-community and political nature according to the FSI. The post-conflict 
response to a crisis phase brought about a reduction in the level of tensions between social 
groups (Burundi, Ivory Coast, The Gambia, Niger), accompanied by a fairer redistribution of 
resources  on  the  territorial  front  (Burundi,  Ivory  Coast,  Niger,  Chad)  and  socio-economic 
(Tunisia, Madagascar) front.  

In  addition,  the  FSI  “Public  Services”  sub-indicator  of  the  “Policy”  indicator  shows  that  the 
quality and/or access to public services did not deteriorate in a large majority of countries (11 
out of 15), with progress recorded in Nepal, Somalia, Tunisia and Burundi.  

The  EU  risk  management  framework  reveals  deterioration  in  the  average  score  in  
“Democracy”  for  all  15  countries  reviewed  for  the  period  (2.33  to  2.84),  with  two  major 
exceptions: The Gambia and Tunisia. 

The  entire  sub-group  of  the  15  countries  studied  introduced  reforms  that  produced 
institutional guarantees for citizens over the 2012-2018 period.  
A strengthening of state legitimacy was observed in nine of the 15 countries, despite having 
gone  through  post-conflict  or  political  transition  situations  in  a  fragile  context  (Ivory  Coast, 
Niger, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Chad and Tunisia) and/or external shocks (Haiti, Madagascar, 
Nepal,  Sierra  Leone  and  Chad).  For  three  countries  having  made  the  most  progress  (Ivory 
Coast,  Sierra  Leone  and  Tunisia),  successful  handovers  of  power  resulted  in  renewed 
confidence in public institutions. Reforms designed to strengthen representation, transparency 
and public accountability, even if partial, brought renewed confidence among citizens in the 
state and its institutions.  

Guarantees relating to respect for human rights and the rule of law  were strengthened in a 
large majority of countries (11 countries out of 15). The most significant progress during this 

Final Report 

 Page 20 

EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

period  was  made  in  Guinea,  Niger,  Tunisia  and  Sierra  Leone.  In  these  four  countries, 
changeovers  in  political  power  brought  in  governments  that  strengthened  the  legal 
mechanisms  protecting  civil  and  political  rights  ended  massive  human  rights  violations  and 
strengthened  legal  and  judicial  guarantees.  This  positive  change  was  not,  however, 
corroborated  by  the  EU  Risk  Management  Framework  scores,  all  of  which  were  down, 
particularly those relating to “human rights”. Some African countries, characterised by political 
regimes  with  authoritarian  tendencies  (Burundi)  or  the  persistence  of  armed  conflict  (Mali, 
CAR, Somalia), did not experience this positive trajectory.  

Finally, a majority of countries (9 out of the 15 studied and 12 out of the 23 SBC beneficiaries) 
saw an improvement in the perception of corruption index16. The reduction in the perception of 
this  phenomenon  is  particularly  visible  in  Afghanistan,  Ivory  Coast  and  Gambia.  Burundi, 
Madagascar  and  Sierra  Leone,  on  the  other  hand,  saw  this  index  fall,  while  high  levels 
persisted in CAR, Chad and Tunisia.  

3.3. Insufficient  social  progress  to  initiate  a  real 

reduction in poverty  

Table 6: Evolution of social indicators 

Net primary school 
enrolment rate 

Net secondary 
school enrolment 
rate 

Rate of severe 
malnutrition 

Percentage of 
assisted 
childbirths 

2008-11 

2012-18 

2008-11 

2012-18 

2008-11 

2012-18 

2008-11 

2012-18 

SBC countries 

74.2 

78.6 

39.5 

36.8 

19.6 

20.5 

65.0 

67.4 

Of which fragile 
countries 

Non SBC 
countries17 

67.8 

76.3 

24.8 

32.1 

24.3 

25.6 

41.6 

51.9 

81.4 

82 

51.9 

52.8 

19.0 

18.2 

70.1 

76.4 

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators database (WDI) 

Improvement in primary and, to a lesser extent, secondary school enrolment 
During the course of the 2012–2018 period, the rate of access to primary education in fragile 
SBC  beneficiary  countries  improved,  rising  above  levels  in  fragile  non-SBC  beneficiary 
countries (by 70% on average). Within the 15 SBC beneficiary countries analysed in greater 
depth, it is in Ivory Coast, The Gambia and Niger that primary school enrolment increased the 
most. However, in Mali (no change) and Chad (drop), there was no growth. The improvement 
in the enrolment in school of girls must also be highlighted and was observed, in particular, in 
countries  where  they  had  been  the  first  to  be  removed  from  school  (Mali,  Niger  and  Sierra 
Leone). 

16   Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index, 2019 Annual Report.  

17   The  sample  of  non-SBC  countries  was  designed  to  be  counterfactual  for  the  quantitative  analysis  (see  the 

detailed list in Annex 5). 

Final Report 

 Page 21 

 
 
                                                
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

Overall improvement in the health of children under five years of age and in the 
management of pregnancies  
In the health sector, the most notable result is the reduction in the infant mortality rate, which 
is marked in all SBC beneficiary countries, except for Dominica where the rate was already 
low. There has been significant progress in maternal health: the percentage of births attended 
by  qualified  staff  has  exceeded  the  50%  mark  in  fragile  SBC  beneficiary  countries.  The 
indicators for  monitored pregnancies  and contraceptive prevalence for  non-fragile  countries 
also improved in SBC beneficiary countries between 2008–11 and 2012–18, whereas there 
was no significant change in vaccination rates between the two periods.  

Figure 15: Infant mortality in children under five years of age  
(/1,000 live births) 

Source: UNDP database 

Deterioration in the undernourishment prevalence rates 
Besides Tunisia, where the prevalence of undernourishment remained stable overall for the 
period 2012–2016 (below the 5% threshold), most of the available information compiled on the 
subject  shows,  in  the  best  of  cases,  a  precarious  stabilisation  (as  in  Guinea,  thanks  to  an 
improvement in its harvests over recent years that is more circumstantial than structural, or in 
Mali, which reported a slight decline in the prevalence of undernourishment from 6.4% to 6% 
2013 and 2017), but most often a worsening of the situation. Severe malnutrition still affects 
one person in four on average in fragile SBC beneficiary countries. 

Final Report 

 Page 22 

020406080100120140160NepalMadagascarGambiaHaitiAfghanistanBurundiGuineaIvory(cid:9)CoastNigerMaliSierra(cid:9)LeoneCARChadSomalia20122016 
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

4. SBCs Design  

ADE 

This chapter presents the findings of the evaluation relating to the key elements of programme 
design:  understanding  of  the  challenges,  relevance  of  the  objectives,  consistency  of  the 
intervention logics and modalities chosen. These findings are based on the analysis of EQ 1 
(see Annex 7). 

4.1. Preliminary analysis of the situation of fragility 

the  various  aspects  of 

SBCs  have  generally  been  subject  of  relatively  succinct  fragility  and/or  context 
preliminary analyses that have adequately informed programme design, despite several 
limitations in these analyses.  
The identification of each SBC reviewed was based on a BS roadmap with relatively succinct 
analyses  (1  to  3  pages)  of  fragility.  The  analyses  proposed  within  this  roadmap  offered  an 
overview  of 
fragility  (i.e.,  political,  security/human  rights, 
macroeconomic,  social  and  environmental).  The  level  of  detail  of  the  analyses  undertaken 
varied  according  to  the  countries  and/or  programmes:  the  SBCs  designed  in  emergency 
situations were subject to more succinct analyses and the SBCs identified at the end of the 
period under review were subject to more detailed analyses than those identified at the start 
of the period. Overall, these analyses presented certain limitations: they did not provide an in-
depth  analysis  of  the  various  fragility  factors,  or  an  exhaustive  analysis  of  the  institutional 
weaknesses  that  SBCs  seek  to  address;  they  did  not  generally  identify  the  sources  of 
resilience,  as  the  objective  of  resilience  came  into  being  in  the  2017  guidelines;  and  they 
emphasised  the  factors  contributing  to  institutional  weakness,  without  adequately  covering 
infra-state  fragility  factors.  The  fragility  factors  identified  by  the  EU  generally  correspond  to 
those identified by other donors in the framework of their analyses, without the documented 
analyses carried out by the different partners being shared between them. 

The analyses of the situation of fragility conducted have generally enabled SBCs to respond 
adequately to the challenges presented by the situations of fragility. The respondents to the 
online  survey  (Annex  4)  indicate  that  the  initial  context  analyses  were  sufficiently  well 
substantiated to enable SBCs to respond to the challenges presented by the fragility of the 
countries (average score 3.95/5). However, in more than a third of the programmes analysed 
(12/32),  the  depth  and  frequency  of  analysis  of  the  situation  of  fragility  and  the  context 
(including at sector level) were not always sufficient to best identify the issues in order to inform 
the design of SBCs (Burundi, Guinea, Haiti (education), SBC 2 Madagascar (electricity), Mali 
and Sierra Leone).  

Final Report 

 Page 23 

 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

4.2. Risk analysis guiding the design 

risk 

little  used 

assessment 

systematically 

underpinned 
programme 
in  monitoring  programme 

Extensive 
identification/formulation  but  has  been 
implementation.  
Risks have been systematically analysed through the risk management framework, an internal 
EU  tool  providing  an  annually  updated  assessment  of  the  risks  by  type  (political, 
macroeconomic,  development,  PFM,  corruption/fraud).  The  analyses  carried  out  for  the 
programmes studied in detail covered all these risks through a set of questions but went into 
greater  depth for  macroeconomic,  public finance management  and  corruption risks  than  for 
risks associated with political and developmental issues. It is noteworthy that the assessment 
of developmental risks was enhanced during the review of the risk management framework in 
2019. 

Risk mitigation measures most often formulated in a general way were also identified for the 
15 case study countries18 as part of the identification/formulation of SBCs. Dialogue on policies 
is  often  presented  as  the  main  vector  of  risk  mitigation,  followed  by  support  in  the  form  of 
technical  assistance  and  coordination  between  donors.  Analyses  of  the  risk  management 
framework did not generally foster the monitoring of risks during implementation of SBCs (9/15 
countries - Burundi, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Mali, Madagascar, Nepal, Niger, Sierra Leone and 
The Gambia). The country case studies show that the EU was generally positioned behind the 
IMF as regards the monitoring of macroeconomic risk, as the IMF steers the monitoring of the 
macroeconomic framework of the countries as part of its missions. Similarly, the country case 
studies indicate that the monitoring of PFM/corruption risks has tended to be done on the basis 
of the implementation reports of the annual work plans of public finance reform programmes, 
most often with substantial support from the World Bank.  

Finally,  the  analysis  of  the  potential  cost  of  non-intervention  was  the  subject  of 
undocumented  qualitative  discussions.  The  potential  cost  of  non-intervention  was  taken 
into account qualitatively during discussions within the BS Steering Committee (BSSC)19 on 
the roadmaps during the identification/formulation/disbursement of SBCs. It is also supposed 
to be clarified in the risk management framework, but the information provided remain poorly 
developed. There is no analysis systematically guided by a clearly established methodology. 
Furthermore, the qualitative information was not taken into account in the documents used to 
inform the design of the programmes. In addition, these documents contained no reflections 
on possible alternative scenarios, including an analysis of the institutional, developmental and 
political effects that could lead to the decision not to allocate budget support and/or to mobilise 
other types of aid.  

18   An exception to this are the first SBCs deployed in Mali and Sierra Leone, where mitigation measures were 

never identified in funding agreements. 

19   This committee was established pursuant to the 2012 guidelines.  

Final Report 

 Page 24 

 
 
                                                
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

4.3  Objectives 

targeted  and  broadening 

the 

response to the situation of fragility 

4.3.1  Objectives focused on immediate macroeconomic stabilisation needs 

SBCs have sought to respond to the identified fragility factors by emphasizing above 
all  the  stabilisation  of  the  macroeconomic  framework  and  the  strengthening  of  public 
finance management, in alignment with the IMF. In support of macroeconomic stabilisation, 
the  SBC  also  sought  to  restore/improve  basic  social  services  and  support  the  transition  to 
democratic governance.  

The 15 country case studies indicate that SBCs aimed at i) restoring macroeconomic stability 
- placing major emphasis on the mobilisation of domestic revenue – by creating a fiscal space 
capable of coping with a political and/or security crisis (Afghanistan, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Mali, 
Madagascar and CRA), a natural disaster (earthquake in Nepal in 2015), a health crisis (e.g. 
Ebola) or an oil crisis (Chad); and ii) restoring and/or consolidating core government functions, 
by  supporting  the  strengthening  of  public  finance  management  and  basic  social  services 
delivery  (education,  health,  water/sanitation,  justice,  etc.).  The  online  survey  respondents 
confirm these priorities (see figure below): domestic revenue mobilisation appears as the main 
objective targeted by SBCs (with a score of 3.93/5), followed by the following four objectives: 
medium term sustainability of the fiscal policy, improvement of the budgetary process, short-
term restoration of macroeconomic stability and strengthening of other functions of the public 
finance  management  system  (with  a  score  of  between  3.3  and  3.5/5).  The  short-term 
maintenance or consolidation of basic social services in the social sectors of education and 
health (with a score of between 1.87 and 2.4 4/520), and the maintenance of peace, security 
and  the  rule  of  law  (with  a  score  of  between  1.12  and  2.33/521)  are  considered  secondary 
objectives of SBCs by the respondents.  

All programmes analysed in detail within the framework of the eight field missions show that 
health,  and/or  education  and/or,  more  generally,  the  supply  of  basic  social  services  were 
covered either by specific target objectives and/or political dialogue and/or technical assistance 
envisaged to support SBCs. 

20   The SBC objectives related to consolidation are ahead of those related to the short-term maintenance of social 

services according to survey respondents. 

21   The objectives related to support for the implementation of peace agreements, the strengthening of systems for 

the organisation of elections and the consolidation of defence have a score of <1.3. 

Final Report 

 Page 25 

 
 
 
                                                
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

Figure 16: Objectives pursued by SBCs, per order of importance, according to 
survey respondents 

Source: Survey conducted by ADE of EU staff involved in SBCs 

4.3.2  An instrument supporting the Government 

Above all, the instrument was aimed at strengthening the Government and, in fact, little 
oriented towards social vulnerability and civil participation. SBCs have aimed to reduce 
poverty  by  supporting  the  government  capacity  to  deliver  minimum  basic  services  to  the 
population, including vulnerable groups, during times of acute crisis. Their intervention logic 
was  little  oriented  towards  tackling  the  multidimensional  elements  underlying  people's 
vulnerability.  It  is  indeed  difficult to  address this multidimensional  theme with  an  instrument 
that  primarily  intervenes  on  the  operating  budget.  One  important  aspect  for  addressing  the 
vulnerability of the populations is food security. Problems relating to food insecurity and the 
consolidation and structuring of safety nets have only been a focus of SBCs to a very small 
extent.  When  this  has  been  the  case,  it  has  tended  to  be  more  through  Sector  Reform 
Contracts  (SRC)  (Mali  and  Niger).  Regarding  civil  participation,  SBCs  sought  to  primarily 
support formal national channels and did little to stimulate the engagement of civil society or 
the  private  sector.  SBCs  have  not  placed  much  emphasis  on  accompanying  instruments 
promoting local democracy or civil participation, except for some cases (Afghanistan, Haiti and 
Tunisia). They have also made little attempt to support territorial policies of deconcentration 
and decentralisation.  

Final Report 

 Page 26 

 
 
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

4.3.3  Broadening of the response to the situation of fragility 

For  successive  SBCs  over  time,  the  objectives  they  pursued  were  often  gradually 
broadened  to  include  several  sectors  and  structural  reforms,  particularly  on  the 
economic front. The capacity of the SBC to bring in a broad package of reforms, as well 
as long-term reforms in an uncertain environment, was overestimated. In over half of the 
beneficiary  countries,  successive  SBCs  deployed  (see  also  Section  5.1).  The  thematic 
coverage  of  these  programmes  has  gradually  increased  over  time  (e.g.  Niger,  Mali, 
Madagascar).  Furthermore,  in  various  cases  (e.g.  Niger  and  Sierra  Leone),  support  for 
structural  economic  reforms,  concerning  productive  sectors,  regulation  and  the  business 
climate, was gradually introduced after the first SBC. This development reflects the emphasis 
placed on resilience by the 2017 guidelines. These types of reforms were, furthermore, often 
supported by other TFPs and/or other EU programmes, including sectoral reform contracts. 
Support for structural policies requires a framework that allows for the adoption of a long-term 
vision. This is complicated in a fragile environment that is uncertain due to the high degree of 
inherent  risks  and  its  changing  nature.  As  a  result,  the  capacity  of  the  SBC  to  introduce 
structural reforms in this type of environment was limited. 

4.4  Programmes  design  and  degree  of  consistency 

with the guidelines 

4.4.1  Dynamic assessment of eligibility 

The evaluation of the eligibility criteria took into account the weak institutional capacity, 
as well  as  the  slow and differentiated  progress  over time  in implementing  reforms  in 
different countries. The analysis of the four eligibility criteria (public policies, stable macro-
economic framework, public finance management, transparency and oversight of the budget), 
which are the same for the different BS contracts, was carried out within the framework of the 
roadmap. A dynamic analysis of eligibility was undertaken, with emphasis placed on progress 
made in the implementation of reforms, while acknowledging that the initial point of departure 
differs  from  one  country  to  another  (see  box  below).  Accordingly,  it  took  into  account 
weaknesses  inherent  in  situations  of  fragility,  as  recommended  by  the  guidelines.  The 
downside of this approach is that the eligibility criteria were insufficiently restrictive to have a 
real incentive effect. 

In  the  SBC1  in  Mali,  eligibility  was  assessed  in  light  of  the  progress  made  in  the 
implementation of the roadmap for transition (2013) which served as a reference framework 
for  government  action  during  the  political  transition  period,  in  the  public  finance  reform 
programme  and  in  the  government  compliance  with  criteria  relating  to  the  programme 
supported IMF Rapid Credit Facility (RCF). 

4.4.2  Financial amounts  

The adequacy of the amounts involved to the needs is difficult to assess. The determination of 
the financial amounts took into account several factors, such as the available envelope in the 
National Indicative Programme (NIP), the allocation of the amounts available between BS and 
other instruments, the progress made by the countries, etc. It was generally not aligned with 

Final Report 

 Page 27 

 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

the quantification of the support needed to prepare and implement reforms. It did, however, 
reflect in a third of the country case studies the willingness to take into account the financing 
needs  of  the  countries,  as  calculated  by  the  IMF,  for  countries  that  had  negotiated  a 
programme with the Fund. In three of the eight country case studies, the determination of the 
funds allocated, however, raises questions (e.g. the amounts were not justified in Haiti or in 
Guinea;  in  Burundi,  the  financial  contribution  initially  foreseen  was  in  line  with  the  amounts 
projected  in  the  preceding  programme  but  was  disconnected  from  the  amounts  actually 
disbursed, leading to significant variability from one year to another). 

The distribution between fixed tranches and variable tranches was generally appropriate, with 
fixed tranches amounting to 69% of the amounts committed since 2012, and an increase in 
the proportion of variable tranches over time from 0% of the sums committed in 2012 to 38% 
in  2018,  remaining  below  the  40%  threshold.  In  several  of  case  studies,  however,  the 
interlocutors raised the issue of the risk of variable tranches becoming too large in relation to 
budgetary needs and predictability. 

4.4.3  Variable  tranche  indicators,  dialogue  and  complementary  technical 

assistance 

The selected variable tranche indicators and the dialogue envisaged in relation to them were 
generally relevant to the context and objectives of SBCs, despite a number of weaknesses. 
They  were  intended  to  relieve  the  constraints  identified  for  the  restoration  of  government 
functions, focusing mainly on economic and financial governance (53% of the financial weight 
of VT indicators) and to a lesser extent on social sectors and democratic governance.  

Overall, process (39%) and output (37%) indicators made up the vast majority of the indicators, 
with an emphasis on the implementation of measures/reforms rather than the monitoring of 
outcomes. In cases where several SBCs were implemented successively, some performance 
indicators were often gradually introduced, in quite a suitable manner in the macro-financial 
field, as well as in the social sectors.  

Weaknesses in the choice of indicators were observed in a third of the country case studies: 
a)  certain  indicators  and/or  targets  i)  were  too  ambitious  as  regards  the  capacities  of  the 
authorities or ii) were not correctly incorporated into the SBC intervention logic or iii) were not 
correctly  reflected  in  the  analyses  of  context/fragility;  b)  the  size  of  the  number  of  sectors 
covered by the indicators, particularly in Mali, Niger and in Guinea (up to seven sectors); c) the 
high number of indicators (more than eight) and the inclusion of sub-indicators in over a third 
of country case studies (Afghanistan, Haiti, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone and Chad); and d) poor 
use of the matrix in Madagascar, where SBCs were accompanied by a matrix of priority actions 
relating to public finance and the fight against corruption. These actions were interpreted and 
used in the dialogue by certain national partner interlocutors as conditions, and were perceived 
as disproportionate in relation to the expected funding. 

The  procedures  related  to  the  dialogue  envisaged  were  generally  not  well  documented, 
although there was greater detail in the SBCs formulated at the end of the evaluation period. 

Finally, regarding complementary technical assistance, 74% of the SBCs earmarked specific 
funds for this purpose, but without precisely defining the modalities related to this support. 

4.4.4  Exit strategy/sustainability of achievements 

SBCs have generally not explicitly planned for an “exit strategy/ strategy to sustain the 
gains made” based on the context at the time of designing or implementing the programmes. 
The  survey  respondents  gave  a score  of  2.7/5  to  the  planned  strategy  to sustain the gains 

Final Report 

 Page 28 

EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

made. All 15 country case studies show that exit strategies were not planned at the time of 
programme design. 

For structurally fragile countries, the “exit strategy/strategy to sustain the gains made” 
materialised by the renewal of an SBC or the introduction of another type of BS. The EU 
made a continuous commitment over a number of years in over half of the beneficiary countries 
(13/23) (generally two SBCs, sometimes three, and up to five in Tunisia). SBC renewal was 
decided at the end of the implementation of a programme in order to continue with initial efforts 
to  allow  for  increased  mobilisation  of  domestic  revenue,  and  to  strengthen  public  finance 
management,  as  well  as  to  deepen  dialogue  on  certain  sectoral  reforms  and/or  enter  into 
sectoral  dialogue.  In  a third  of  the  country  case  studies (5/15  countries),  the  efforts  initially 
made  in  the framework of  SBCs  were  pursued through the  evolution of  the  SBC towards a 
good governance and development contract and/or a sector reform contract (Ivory Coast, Haiti, 
Niger and CAR). 

Some  cases  (Burundi  and  Mali)  show  that  the  EU  has  not  made  sufficient  plans  for 
alternative  scenarios  to  address  a  marked  deterioration  in  the  country’s  situation.  In 
Burundi, no exit plan or plan to sustain the gains made was discussed to deal with the sharp 
deterioration  in  the  country's  political  conditions  in  May-June  2015.  However,  the  risk 
management framework showed a worsening of the average level of risk since 2012, political 
risks were considered 'high' and the macroeconomic framework had been deteriorating since 
2013. Mali has been in a permanent situation of exiting from crisis since 2012. However, the 
financing  agreements  of  the  successive  SBCs  do  not  explicitly  provide  for  an  exit  strategy 
and/or a strategy to sustain the gains if the crisis becomes acute.

Final Report 

 Page 29 

EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

4.5  Strengths and weaknesses in SBC design 

Table 7: Success and limiting factors in programme design 

Success factors  

•  Overall,  a  good  assessment  of  the  situation  of  fragility  and  of  risks  has  fed  into  the 

identification/design of programmes.  

•  The SBC objectives sought to address the identified factors of fragility. 

•  The SBCs were firmly rooted in sectoral and/or national strategies, and formulated jointly 
with the governments of the beneficiary countries, as well as in discussion with the main 
Technical and Financial Partners involved. 

•  The  intervention  logic  followed  in  the  context  of  successive  SBCs  was  generally 
consistent and made it possible to provide an appropriate response to the evolution of 
the situation in order to consolidate the core functions of the government. 

•  The  modalities  of  intervention  implemented  were  generally  appropriate  for  the  fragile 

situation the countries were in. 

Limiting factors 

•  No exhaustive documented analysis of the potential cost of non-intervention. 

•  SBC design weaknesses: very general objectives; confusion between the different levels 
of the intervention logic; phasing of induced outputs sought not clearly explained; some 
programmes  too  ambitious  in  view  of  the  context;  analyses  of  the  context  not  far-
reaching  or  frequent  enough  in  some  cases;  insufficient  analysis  of  institutional 
weaknesses. 

•  Weaknesses in the internal consistency of successive SBCs in some cases: tendency 
to  expand  the  number  of  sectors  covered  over  time;  or  major  change  in  the  sectors 
targeted  by  the  variable  tranche  indicators  over  the  course  of  time  not  guaranteeing 
continuity; or change of approach between SBCs without furtherance of the outcomes 
achieved under SBC1. 

•  Weaknesses  of  variable  tranche  indicators:  over-ambitious  indicators  and/or  targets; 

high number of indicators and sectors covered by the indicators. 

•  Lack of detail in the dialogue and complementary Technical Assistance envisaged at the 

time of identification/design of the programmes. 

• 

Insufficient reflection on the “exit strategy/strategy to sustain the gains made” according 
to the context, including an insufficient consideration of alternative scenarios to deal with 
a marked deterioration in the country situation. 

Final Report 

 Page 30 

 
 
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

5. SBCs Implementation  

This  chapter  presents the findings from  the  evaluation  of the  SBC  implementation  process: 
flexibility,  dialogue,  decision-making  process,  human  resources  deployed,  complementarity 
with  other  EU  interventions  and  coordination  between  technical  and  financial  partners  (see 
analysis of EQ10 and EQ11 in Annex 7).   

5.1  Speed of intervention and adaptability  

The SBC instrument has enabled the EU to provide a rapid response accompanied by 
often substantial financial resources to deal with a situation considered urgent in over 
half of the country case studies (8/15 countries (Ivory Coast, The Gambia, Mali, Niger, CAR, 
Somalia,  Chad  and  Tunisia)  –  see  box).  This  response  was  characterised  by  programmes 
prepared  in  short  periods  of  time,  often  comprising  a  significant  first  fixed  tranche  with  no 
variable  tranche,  and  including  variable  tranche  indicators  focusing  on  inputs  and/or  direct 
outputs for the following tranches. These rapid response cases often coincided with a window 
of opportunity during which the deployment of the (first) SBCs was intended to provide support 
for a process to strengthen state legitimacy (Afghanistan), or a political transition at a key time 
(Ivory Coast, Gambia, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, CAR, Sierra Leone), or a process leading 
to the clearance of arrears (Somalia), or a response following a natural disaster (Nepal), or a 
health crisis (Guinea) or an oil crisis (Chad). 

In Mali, SBC1, formulated rapidly in response to the emergency situation caused by the crisis 
of  2012,  enabled  a  significant  contribution  to  government  revenue (€120M)  in 2013  and  a 
rapid disbursement, during the same quarter in which the funding agreement was signed.  

In  CAR,  the  establishment  of  SBC1  in  2014  coincided  with  an  opportunity  created  by  the 
emergence of a political transition. The intervention was rapid and necessary to support the 
country emerging from the situation of financial collapse in which it found itself. 

In Tunisia, the SBC was put rapidly in place to support the authorities in defining the agenda 
for reforms (Special Report on EU Assistance to Tunisia, 2017). 

The programmes were generally capable of adapting to the context at the time of their 
design. This includes the interpretation of the eligibility conditions concerning the situation of 
fragility  (see  Section  4.4.1);  the  choice  of  indicators,  mainly  covering  inputs/outputs  (see 
Section  4.4.3);  the  introduction  of  specific  elements  at  the  time  of  programme  design 
(indicators  not  specified  in  the  funding  agreement,  multi-year  disbursements,  precautionary 
measures, etc.) 

In Afghanistan, since the political framework was not completely finalised before the funding 
agreement was signed, the variable tranche indicators were not specified in the agreement. 
The latter was amended 10 months after signature to include the indicators. 

In  Somalia,  the  SBC  took  the  changing  situation  in  the  country  into  account  via:  i)  two 
disbursements planned each year (instead of one) to enable regular analysis of the eligibility 
criteria  and  variable  tranche  indicators;  ii)  the  indicators  were  only  defined  for  2019  in  the 
agreement; the indicators for the following years are to be finalised during the third quarter of 

Final Report 

 Page 31 

EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

the preceding year. In addition, specific precautionary measures were put in place before the 
disbursements could be made to monitor and supervise the use of the funds at municipal and 
central level (reporting by the treasury management committee; approval of a PFM plan by 
the  Ministry  of  Finance;  reporting  by  a  financial  governance  committee  and  by  the  federal 
member states). 

The  SBC  generally  demonstrated  flexibility  in  its  implementation  to  respond  to 
changing  circumstances.  Most  of  the  programmes  were  thus  adapted  during  their 
implementation  to  changes  in  their  context  through  amendments:  increase  in  the  amounts 
committed on successive SBCs, extended duration, modification of variable tranche indicators, 
budget  reallocation  of  variable  tranches  not  fully  disbursed,  addition  of  special  tranches  to 
respond to specific external shocks (e.g. Ebola tranche), etc. 

5.2  A key platform for technical dialogue 

In all countries studied, dialogue has been a central element of the SBC programmes; SBCs 
have provided a unique forum for dialogue on fiscal and tax issues, and on the functioning of 
the public financial management system, as well as on respect for fundamental values. At the 
forefront,  technical  dialogue  has  been  intensified  and  gradually  developed  by  becoming 
increasingly structured (through monitoring platforms or the setting up of steering committees), 
with an emphasis on proximity that was welcomed by numerous interlocutors and considered 
a specific feature of the EU approach. The variable tranche indicators were one of the main 
vectors of this dialogue. 

In Mali, the implementation of the SBCs since the first one in 2013, has made it possible to 
open both a technical and strategic dialogue. Technical dialogue is conducted in a structured 
framework on a regular basis (monthly meetings since SBC2 on general conditions and VT 
indicators with a monitoring table shared by the technical services and the EUD, steered by 
the  National  Authorising  Officer  (NAO)  (CONFED).  This  monthly  follow-up  is  extended  by 
bilateral  meetings  with  the  departments  responsible  for  the  measures  covered  by  the 
indicators. This so-called proximity dialogue is very much appreciated by the Malian side. 

In Afghanistan, the SBC, being one of the Afghan government’s first experiences with the 
budget support instrument, introduced a process of close cooperation between the EUD and 
the government to put the dialogue into practice. An SBC Steering Group (SG) was created 
and entrusted with the supervision of the implementation of the action twice a year and with 
establishing  a  monthly  technical  political  dialogue.  In  practice,  the  steering  group  was 
established in November 2016, and met at high level twice a year. The technical meetings 
took place monthly. 

In  Haiti,  the  possibility  of  holding  both  political  (Head  of  Delegation)  and  policy  dialogue 
brought great credibility to the dialogue with the government. However, it did not lead to a 
resolution of the political obstacles that constituted a major impediment to the implementation 
of the reforms supported by the SBC. 

On the contrary, the suspension of programmes, as in Burundi, had a high cost and an impact 
on macroeconomic policies and financial governance. 

Final Report 

 Page 32 

EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

In  Burundi,  the  suspension  of  the  SBC,  followed  by  the  application  of  Article  96,  led  to  a 
complete cessation of dialogue. Since June 2015, there has been no further dialogue with the 
government on questions relating to governance/budget/macro/public finances and although 
dialogue was renewed in basic sectors (education and health in particular), the EUD is finding 
it difficult today to restart a dialogue on these questions, without having SBC-type instruments. 

In general,  the  EU  departments  consider  that  the  elements  for  conducting  quality  technical 
dialogue  are  in  place  (regularity,  existence  of  a  structured  framework,  mobilisation  of  the 
various thematic sections within the EUDs) and that it has contributed to major advances.  The 
opinion of the EUDs on this dialogue process is somewhat less positive than the departments 
at  the  headquarters  (see  survey  results),  particularly  as  regards  the  implementation  of  a 
structured framework and the leadership role of the national authorities, which is considered 
unsatisfactory.  

The implementation of the strategic dialogue seems more difficult and less easy to manage by 
the European stakeholders. In many countries, it has had its ups and downs depending on the 
government's  willingness  to  engage,  the  political  sensitivity  of  the  issues  deemed  to  be 
priorities,  and  the  capacity  of  national  actors  to  carry  out  reforms  and  master  SBC 
programmes.  Nevertheless,  it  has  played  a  generally  satisfactory  role  as  a  leverage  in  the 
political  dialogue  conducted  by  the  ambassador  and  in  removing  blockages  and  ensuring 
compliance  with  the  commitments  made  in  the  implementation  of  the  reforms  (see  graph 
below). In countries facing long-term structural fragility, strategic dialogue was considered less 
satisfactory, particularly regarding its capacity for leverage and removing obstacles.      

Figure 17: Contribution and conditions for implementing the dialogue 

Source: Survey conducted by ADE of EU staff involved in SBCs

Final Report 

 Page 33 

 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

The effectiveness of the forums for dialogue and for monitoring the implementation of budget 
support programmes established in the majority of the countries studied (11 countries out of 
15:  Afghanistan,  Burundi,  Central  Africa,  Guinea,  Haiti,  Madagascar,  Mali,  Nepal,  Niger, 
Somalia and Chad) was limited by a number of factors:  

  Poor institutional capacity of the administrations of most of the SBC beneficiary countries;  

  The  absence  of  political  support  that  could  annihilate  the  willingness  of  technical 
administrations (sometimes very competent despite the institutional weakness referred to 
above) and their genuine efforts to promote reforms; 

  The holding of a bilateral dialogue, favoured by a number of donors and partner countries, 

that takes precedence over multilateral dialogue; 

  A  source  of  ambiguity  and  lack  of  ownership  of  the  reforms  that  these  coordination 
mechanisms can create when the partner government sees them as a way of imposing 
conditions rather than a forum for working as equals; 

  The relative weight of the countries’ Ministries of Finance, which is frequently a cause of 

the disinterest by sectoral ministries in consultation mechanisms. 

5.3  Sound and necessary decision-making process 

The institutional framework, and in particular the decision-making process involving the EUDs 
and various departments of the headquarters is considered sound and necessary to enable 
appropriate and justified decisions to be made. The programming and monitoring documents 
(Roadmap  prior  to  formulation,  Risk  Management  Framework,  Action  Document,  letter 
authorising  disbursement),  in  fact,  provide  all  the  elements  necessary  for  justifying  the 
approach adopted. 

The  SBC  design,  approval  and  implementation  process  is  similar  to  that  of  other  budget 
support contracts but, given the context of fragility in which SBCs are implemented, it includes 
an  examination at  each stage  by  the  BS  steering  committee (BSSC/FAST)22. The  BSSC  is 
involved  from  the  outset  in  the  identification  of  planned  operations:  it  discusses  roadmaps, 
approves  the  awarding  of  new  contracts,  advises  on  disbursements  and  oversees  risk 
assessment through the RMF. The recommendations supplied by the BSSC are systematically 
incorporated into the meeting notes and are generally formally forwarded to the EUD with a 
letter  from  the  geographic  directorate  informing  the  EUD  of  the  amounts  approved  for  the 
disbursement of the tranches.    

The decision-making process at the disbursement stage involves different steps that take time, 
with processing times for disbursement files that may seem too long in some cases. While the 
circuit itself is not called into question, in particular because the decisions require an in-depth 
analysis  of  the  conditions  and  exchanges  between  headquarters  and  the  field,  a  lack  of 
planning of the work required to compile the files in the country and of the examination phase 
by  headquarters  has  been  identified.  The  Financing  Agreements  rarely  contain  realistic 
scheduling of the different stages necessary for disbursement.   

The  Budget  Support  Steering  Committee  is  an  important  body  that  ensures  the  changing 
context and specific situations relating to the implementation of the programmes are taken into 

22   The  BSSC  brings  together  the  management,  the  DEVCO  and  NEAR  units  in  charge of budget  support,  the 
geographic directorates, the thematic units concerned and the EEAS, which gives a political point of view. 

Final Report 

 Page 34 

                                                
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

account. It contributes to developing a common vision at the headquarters between the various 
departments  involved,  particularly  with  the  EEAS.  The  development  of  a  common  vision 
between the EUDs and headquarters on the strategy to be adopted in each country, including 
the  selection  of  variable  tranche  indicators,  is  less  evident  in  certain  cases  and  of  major 
concern, as shown by the field missions. It is important that decisions are not perceived as 
being "Brussels-driven", undermining the ownership of the programme by the national partner. 
It is also not clear either if the guidance and recommendations transmitted by the headquarters 
to the EU Delegations are systematically appropriate and integrated into the dialogue with the 
government.  

5.4  Insufficient human resources in EUDs 

EUDs  have  suffered  from  a  lack  of  means  to  effectively  implement  all  SBC  components, 
covering programme design; technical and strategic monitoring; the conduct of an ongoing, in-
depth dialogue in a number of areas; programming and monitoring of TA; analysis of general 
and  specific  conditions;  and  preparation  of  disbursement  files.  These  human  resource 
constraints  within  the  EUDs  have  explicitly  been  noted  in  six  of  the  15  countries  (Burundi, 
Madagascar, Nepal, Somalia, Guinea and Afghanistan). This concerns both a lack of human 
resources  to  cover  all  the  tasks  an  SBC  requires  and  the  fact  that  neither  expertise  in 
macroeconomic  policy  and  public  finance  management  nor  knowledge  of  the  specific 
characteristics  of  the  contexts  of  fragility  are  systematically  present.  This  observation  is 
particularly  marked  in  fragile  countries  dealing  with  security  threats.  The  exception  of  Mali, 
where two people plus a head of section have been involved on a daily basis in monitoring the 
SBC, shows the importance of having a large enough team. In all cases, it is very difficult, if 
not impossible, for a single person to manage all the components of an SBC programme alone. 

In Afghanistan, it is estimated that the limited allocation of human resources to the SBC, in 
addition to security measures, diminished the optimum use of the instrument in terms of in-
depth  dialogue.  Due  to  the  lack  of  internal  resources,  the  EUD  relied  heavily  on  the 
contributions of the World Bank for policy dialogue. 

This problem with resources is attributed to the absence of a human resources management 
policy capable of specifically taking into account the skill requirements in fragile countries in 
accordance with the portfolio implemented and the more difficult working conditions that are 
encountered in these countries.  

Overall, the survey (see Figure 18) shows that the EUD staff possesses good basic technical 
expertise  for  understanding  the  context  and  its  implications,  and  for  engaging  in  policy 
dialogue, and also that it is increasingly relying on technical competencies held within sectoral 
sections. In fact, they have much-appreciated guidance tools (the BS guidelines in particular), 
as well as technical support from the headquarters, which is also highly appreciated. However, 
some consider that these tools (particularly the BS guidelines and training) are not sufficiently 
focused on the specific features of SBCs and the difficulties inherent in fragile and sometimes 
unstable  settings.  The  need  for  training  specifically  focused  on  SBCs  and  on  contexts  of 
fragility are not sufficiently well covered. 

Final Report 

 Page 35 

 
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

Figure 18: Factors facilitating/constraining the implementation of SBCs 

Source: Survey conducted by ADE of EU staff involved in SBCs 

Given the lack of internal resources or resources necessary for detailed analysis, the EUDs 
turn to external expertise to take care of all or part of the context analysis, as well as some 
parts  of  programme  monitoring,  in  particular,  the  preparation  of  disbursement  files  and,  in 
some  cases,  of  dialogue.  The  employment  of  this  external  expertise  (including  TA)  is 
considered  sufficiently  satisfactory.  Entrusting  certain  tasks,  in  particular  those  involving  a 
positioning  of  the  EU  in  relation  to  the  partner  country  (roadmap,  action  document, 
disbursement  files,  positioning  within  the  technical  and  strategic  dialogue)  to  external 
consultants may, however, limit the capitalisation process and undermine the EU in its dialogue 
with the partner. 

Finally, the evaluation identifies two major weaknesses with medium-term implications: 

  The absence of a capitalisation process within the same country and the risk of losing all 

the gains made by the SBCs following a suspension or change of staff; 

  The lack of a communication strategy towards both the government and the general public, 
which accentuates the lack of ownership and prevents the benefits of the instrument from 
being highlighted in fragile situations where public opinion is unstable.  

Final Report 

 Page 36 

 
 
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

5.5  Too  little  complementarity  between  SBCs  and 

other EU interventions 

The  complementarity  between  SBCs  and  other  EU  interventions  was  very  variable  and 
significantly influenced by local situations. All SBC programming documents mention the links 
and potential complementary between the various EU interventions within the same country. 
In  practice,  the  situations  were  very  varied,  but  little  coordination  is  generally  observed 
between BS and the other instruments. 

The  most  favourable  cases  involved  an  integration  of  SBCs  in  the  context  of  other  EU 
interventions  under  the  Annual  Action  Programme  (The  Gambia)  or  the  National  Indicative 
Programme (Tunisia, CAR and Somalia). In Niger, a high degree of complementarity between 
EU interventions in the form of BS was favoured by the formulation of a single disbursement 
file for all programmes, which strengthened joint analyses. SBCs were a factor in integrating 
various actions when other ongoing projects were used to facilitate the achievement of their 
variable tranche indicators (RIC and Sierra Leone). This complementarity, although identified, 
was not always exploited (Burundi, where the sectoral VT indicators were defined without links 
with ongoing EU projects). The timing differences between BS programming and that of other 
interventions may have been an obstacle, as in Guinea, where frozen aid resumed at the same 
time  as  BS,  leading  to  the  concomitant  implementation  of  interventions  programmed  in 
different contexts.  

Figure 19: Complementarity with other EU interventions: actual degree of 
synergy between SBCs and other EU interventions in the country (by type of 
respondents) 

Source: Survey conducted by ADE of EU staff involved in SBCs 

Coordination  with  humanitarian  interventions  or  through  specific  budget  lines  requires  a 
transversal  approach  which  was  achieved  in  the  Republic  of  Ivory  Coast  between  sectoral 
programmes and the Instrument contributing to stability and peace (IcSP), or in CAR where a 
good  link  was  established  between  TA  programmes  and  the  multi-donor  BEKOU  fund.  In 

Final Report 

 Page 37 

 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

Nepal,  in  the  context  of  reconstruction  following  a  natural  disaster,  complementarities  were 
very  clearly  indicated  at  the  formulation  stage  but  were  difficult  to  materialise  during 
implementation. For example, the field experience of the European Commission's Directorate 
General  for  Humanitarian  Aid  and  Civil  Protection  (ECHO)  was  given  little  value  in  the 
implementation of the SBC or dialogue. 

The delegations, which are probably closer to the field reality, hold a far less favourable view 
(see Figure 19) of the synergies between EU interventions and SBCs (particularly as regards 
humanitarian aid (ECHO)) compared to DEVCO and above all the European External Action 
Service  (EEAS),  which  is  systematically  more  optimistic,  except  for  defence  and  security 
interventions.  More  surprisingly,  the  EUDs’  fairly  poor  assessment  of  the  level  of 
complementarity/synergy between SBCs and SRCs raises question (2.7 out of 5).  

5.6  Limitations 

to 

the 
responses  between 
partners 

implementation  of 
technical  and 

joint 
financial 

SBCs were generally designed in close collaboration with the Technical and Financial Partners 
delivering budget support and/or supporting reforms upheld by EU SBCs. The implementation 
of  budget  supports  from  different  TFPs  was  generally  done  bilaterally  with  the  partner 
countries. The approach often converged but was rarely joint. There have been few common 
actions, with the exception of those undertaken in emergencies (see the case of Ivory Coast, 
Chad and Somalia).  

Concerning the identification and formulation of the programmes, coordination with other TPFs 
consisted of an exchange of analyses on the extent and nature of fragility factors, but these 
analyses  were  generally  not  conducted  jointly.  However,  they  were  based  on  evaluations 
undertaken jointly on specific themes (Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA), 
Post Disaster Needs Assessment). These exchanges of information contributed to the decision 
to intervene by favouring the SBC modality, as well as to efforts to avoid duplication and to 
ensure better complementarity in the formulation of the programmes of the different TFPs.  

Both  during  design  and  implementation,  the  field  of  macro-financial  stabilisation  is  where 
coordination  i)  between  the  TFPs  supplying  BS  and  ii)  between  these  TFPs  and  the 
government was the most comprehensive, with major influence from the IMF. SBCs naturally 
gave higher priority to the reform of public finance and set out to ensure that their financial 
contributions and specific objectives enabled partner countries to bring about the conditions 
required to benefit from IMF facilities or the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) 
initiative.  

As regards implementation, this emphasis on stabilisation and macro-financial consolidation 
materialised  through  the  set-up  of  reform  monitoring  committees,  bringing  together  the 
government and the TFPs. The EUDs played a proactive role in these groups, which favoured 
a coherent view of the reforms and made a reduction possible in beneficiary transaction costs, 
particularly  in  countries  where  a  common  matrix  of  reforms  was  adopted.  However,  a 
harmonised approach characterised by a common matrix of reforms only rarely materialised. 
Real efforts to strengthen the institutional weaknesses of the beneficiary governments were 
made  by  TAs  deployed  by  the  various  TFPs,  but  coordination  of  these  technical  supports 
between donors remained limited.  

Final Report 

 Page 38 

EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

By way of example, technical support for the reform of public finances is frequently handled 
by  regional  centres  such  as  Afritac  and  Caritac.  These  structures,  developed  by  the  IMF, 
provide  technical  assistance,  the  usefulness  and  quality  of  which  are  acknowledged  and 
welcomed by the beneficiaries. However, although they are broadly funded by the EU, until 
recently, the EU only had access to very limited or no information and had little impact on the 
work carried out, even though it is of major importance for facilitating the reforms promoted 
by  SBCs.  In  the  West  African  region,  the  exchange  of  information  with  the  EU  has, 
nevertheless, intensified, as has the EU's involvement in the monitoring of the annual work 
plans.   

In general, the majority of the TFPs continued to give priority to bilateral dialogue, in part for 
administrative and procedural reasons. 

Ensuring effective coordination in other areas that are essential for state rebuilding seems to 
be a far greater challenge: identification of the causes of fragility is less coordinated and the 
elaboration of a common vision of the type of joint response to be made seems more difficult.  

Table 8: Factors facilitating and limiting coordination 

Factors facilitating coordination 

Factors limiting coordination 

n
o
i
t
a
l
u
m
r
o
F

/

n
o
i
t
a
c
i
f
i
t
n
e
d

I

g
n
i
r
o
t
i
n
o
m
d
n
a
n
o
i
t
a
t
n
e
m
e
l
p
m

I

  Determining  role  of  the  IMF  in 
identifying  the  sources  of  macro-
and 
financial 
the 
instability 
provision  of  a 
framework  of 
reforms.  

  Exchange  of  information  between 

TFPs on analyses of fragility. 

  Existence of joint specific analyses: 
Public  Expenditure  and  Financial 
Accountability 
(PEFA),  TADAT, 
PDNA  can  provide  a  basis  for 
to 
common  diagnosis 
identify fragility factors. 

in  order 

  Differences 

between 

the 
administrative roles of each donor 
concerning 
disbursement 
schedule  and 
formulation  of 
interventions. 

the 

  Insufficient  coordination  between 
the  various  departments  of  the 
Commission concerning diagnosis 
and the coordination of responses 
and 
be 
implemented. 

instruments 

to 

  Ownership of the reform monitoring 
framework by the authorities of the 
partner countries. 

  Persistence  of  the  pre-eminence 
of bilateral dialogue between each 
TFP and the partner government. 

  Involvement  and  motivation  of  EU 
the 

entrusted 

staff 
implementation of SBCs. 

with 

  Reinforcement  of  the  institutional 
institutions 
the  process  of 

capacity  of  national 
responsible 
reform and dialogue. 

for 

  Capacity to support policy dialogue 

through political dialogue. 

  Institutional  weakness  of  partner 

administrations. 

  Insufficient 

information  sharing 
and  coordination  between  TA 
programmes from TFPs and SBCs 
implementation. 

Final Report 

 Page 39 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

5.7  Constraints related to the context of fragility  

Constraints  inherent  to  the  context  of  fragility  in  which  SBCs  are  allocated  hindered  good 
programme implementation. These constraints, which were also identified by the respondents 
to  the  survey  (see  Figure  18),  are  mainly  characterised  by  a  lack  of  appropriation  of  the 
programmes and the instrument by all the stakeholders involved, a lack of management and 
monitoring  capacity  within  the  partner  administration  and  the  difficulty  of  having  reliable 
statistics  and  a  monitoring/evaluation  system  for  sectoral  policies,  and  even  difficulties  in 
travelling and visiting. 

In  a  number  of  beneficiary  countries,  the  lack  of  appropriation  by  stakeholders  was  noted, 
particularly  within  sectoral  ministries.  This  is  partly  due  to  a  limited  understanding  of  the 
instrument,  its  objectives  and  modus  operandi  (the  sectoral  ministries  in  particular  have 
difficulty  understanding  the  fund  allocation  circuit,  which  is  nevertheless  that  of  the  budget) 
and to the fact that staff are not always aware of the indicators for which they are responsible 
and the reasons for choosing them. Experience shows that a misunderstood indicator cannot 
provide an incentive for pushing ahead a reform.     

The  national  partner’s  capacity  for  programme  management  is  undermined  by  this  lack  of 
understanding and by the regular rotation in administrations, by the lack of capitalisation and, 
in some cases, by the insufficiency of resources within the technical services to provide the 
monitoring and technical dialogue relating to the variable tranche indicators.  

The weakness of the institutional capacities of the services concerned with the implementation 
of reforms is also a limiting factor, but one that is generally taken into account in the programme 
design and addressed through additional measures and, in particular, technical support. The 
range of these supports in relation to the SBC objectives was, however, regularly limited 1) by 
the  late  start  of  the  Technical  Assistance  in  relation  to  the  rest  of  the  programme,  which 
reduced  the  overall  coordination  (Nepal)  or  led  to  the  separate  implementation  of  the  two 
programmes, limiting the synergies and the materialisation of the reforms intended by the SBC 
(Madagascar); 2) by a lack of coordination with the support of other donors (IMF, WB); 3) by a 
prior and sometimes exclusive use of this support to ensure a VT indicator is met without real 
transfer of knowledge (Haiti), therefore entailing the risk of more limited appropriation by the 
national  partner  (Sierra  Leone);  4)  by  a  lack  of  monitoring  of  funded  activities,  whose 
accomplishments  have not been fully recognised (Burundi). 

Finally, the weakness of the statistical apparatus but also of the monitoring/evaluation systems 
within  the  ministries,  long  recognised  as  a major  constraint  to the  implementation  of  public 
policies, also affected the implementation of SBCs and their capacity to use the monitoring of 
the outcomes of these policies as an incentive for reform.   

Final Report 

 Page 40 

EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

6 SBCs Effectiveness  

The  mobilisation  of  SBCs  contributed  to  the  achievement  of  a  number,  but  not  all,  of  the 
objectives sought, as shown in Figure 20 below. This chapter discusses the direct and induced 
outputs of SBCs, as well as their contribution to development outcomes observed in the three 
main areas of intervention of the programmes, namely: i) macro-economic stabilisation, public 
finance  management  and  economic  resilience;  ii)  basic  social  services;  and  iii)  the 
consolidation of peace and democratic governance. These findings are based on the analysis 
of the evaluation questions covering the contribution of SBCs to the direct outputs (EQ2) and 
induced  outputs  (EQ3;  EQ4;  EQ5;  EQ6),  as  well  as  the  outcomes  (EQ7;  EQ8;  EQ9)  (see 
Annex 7).  

Final Report 

 Page 41 

 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

Figure 20: Contribution of SBCs to state consolidation 

Final Report 

 Page 42 

Stability of the macro-budgetary frameworkDomestic revenue mobilisationPrimary educationMaternal health MalnutritionInstitutional strengthening in terms of peace, justice and securityDemocratic governance reformsPeace buildingPolitical transitionSocial contract rebuildingState Building ContractsPeace & democratic governanceMacroeconomic stabilisation & resilience & public finance managementBasic social servicesBudget spending education/healthAccess to public services across the territoryStructural policies social servicesStructural policies to strengthen the economyPublic finance managementBudget transparencyEconomic resilienceAlignmentPredictabilityCoordinationFiscal spaceAppropriationAid integrationinto the budgetFight against corruptionSignificant positive effects of SBCsPositive effects of SBCsLimited effects of SBCsLittle or no effects of SBCsLegend 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

6.1  Contribution  of  SBCs  to  fiscal  space  increase, 
macroeconomic  stabilisation,  strengthening  of 
public 
finance  management  and  economic 
resilience 

By providing financial resources directly to the budget, SBCs contributed to enlarging the fiscal 
space,  while  ensuring  satisfactory  predictability  of  funds  (direct  output).  The  resources 
provided in the form of currency and transferred to the treasury account, in fact, contributed to 
the  stabilisation  of  the  macro-fiscal  framework  in  the  short  term  and  made  it  possible,  with 
complementary support and the leverage stemming from variable tranche indicators, to secure 
and even increase social expenditures (indirect outcome).  

At  the  same  time,  the  attention  given  to  Domestic  Revenue  Mobilisation  through  the 
complementary measures and the variable tranche indicators, contributed to stimulating the 
mobilisation of national revenue and, in this way, bolstering the government’s own resources 
in order to deploy its development strategy over the medium-term. The integration of SBCs 
into the government budget and the use of national systems is in itself, in a context of fragility, 
a decision legitimising public systems and enabling often weakened systems to work. SBCs 
made the strengthening of Public Finance Management a major objective, with progress that 
was gradual but often complicated by the political and institutional weakness  characterising 
the intervention context (see Figure 20).  

6.1.1 

Fiscal space increase clearly visible and satisfactory predictability  

SBCs were able to intervene rapidly with significant funds to contribute to the increase 
of fiscal space, which became essential in a number of countries to ensure their functioning 
as  they  emerged from crisis.  SBCs  enabled  significant fiscal  space  increase  in most  of the 
beneficiary countries and for a period of time usually longer than budget support from bilateral 
donors. In 8 of the 15 beneficiary countries analysed, the SBCs brought significant amounts 
into the government budget, amounting to over 5% of public revenue for a period of one or 
more  years,  with  a  massive  intervention  in  the  first  years  following  the  crisis.  The  share  of 
SBCs in total revenue peaked in some countries during their emergence from the crisis, as 
was the case in The Gambia and CAR, and was significant in terms of duration in countries 
such as Niger, Sierra Leone and, to certain extent, Mali.  

In CAR, the first SBC dates from 2014, while the wage bill in the public sector amounted to 
140% of tax revenue. The SBC provision amounted to 15% of total revenue in 2014, and over 
12%  in  2015.  Throughout  this  period,  the  SBC  contributions  remained  very  significant  in 
relation to the overall wage bill (still close to 20% in 2018) and total revenue (between 6 and 
8% from 2016 to 2018). In Gambia, SBC1, allocated in the form of a single fixed tranche in 
2017,  provided  an  essential  contribution  to  cover  the  government’s  urgent  needs,  with  a 
contribution equivalent to 13% of its revenue. In 2018, the first tranche of SBC2 amounted to 
10% of the government’s revenue. 

In Ivory Coast, Haiti, Chad and Guinea, the “government’s revenue increase” effect was less 
spectacular in proportion to the revenue. SBCs have, however, been an important component 
of  financial  support  to  the  public  sector  within  the  framework  of  a  joint  response  by  the 
Technical  and  Financial  Partners.  In  other  cases  (Afghanistan  and  Nepal  in  particular), 

Final Report 

 Page 43 

EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

although  the  amounts  allocated  via  SBCs  were  relatively  less  considerable,  they  clearly 
provided additional fiscal space, which financed new discretionary expenditure. 

SBCs  were  also,  in  specific  situations  of  political  crises  or  very  high  risk,  real  triggers  for 
mobilising contributions in the form of BS from other donors (as in The Gambia, Central Africa, 
Mali, Ivory Coast and to a lesser extent, Somalia). The EU, through the SBCs, was one of the 
major  players  in the mobilisation  of  BS  to  support fragile countries. This is  explained  by  its 
capacity  for  rapid  intervention  and  by  the  significant  amounts  allocated,  giving  the  EU 
substantial weight in all BS allocated to beneficiary countries. The fiscal space increase effect 
was broadly  amplified  by  the  actions agreed  by  the  donors,  essentially  multilateral  but  also 
bilateral (France or the United Kingdom, depending on the country). 

A massive revenue generation over time may lead, in certain cases, to a form of dependence 
of  governments  on  external  funding  allocated  in  the  form  of  SBCs.  When  it  comes  to 
withdrawing  or  reducing  funds,  this  dependency  may,  on  the  other  hand,  result  in  a 
contractionary  effect,  obliging  the  country  to  adjust  its  expenditure.  These  cases  are  few, 
thanks in part to the increase in national resources that followed most of the SBC programmes, 
which is reflected by a reduction in the share of SBCs in public revenue over the years. 

The predictability of flow disbursements was satisfactory overall, but more difficult to 
ensure for VTs.  The disbursement schedules were respected in half of the cases and fewer 
than 10% of the disbursements were carried over to the following fiscal year.  

  50%  of  the  fixed  tranche  disbursements  were  made  during  the  course  of  the  quarter 
provided for in the financing agreement and 30% in the following quarter. 80% of transfers 
were therefore made within a three-month period at most.   

  36.5% of the variable tranches were disbursed during the quarter planned in the financing 
agreement and 33% were three months late. 70% of transfers related to variable tranches 
were therefore made with a maximum three-month time lag. 

In most of the cases where disbursements concerned only one fixed tranche, the timeframe 
was  respected.  There  is  less  predictability  for  the  variable  tranches:  delays  were  often 
encountered in the submission of justificatory documentation required for the disbursement of 
the tranches; and there were also difficulties encountered by the beneficiaries in forecasting 
the amounts that would actually be disbursed in the context of the variable tranches. In the 15 
countries  reviewed,  the  amounts  disbursed  in  the context  of  variable tranches amounted to 
75% of the total amounts foreseen, equivalent to a non-disbursement of €145M out of the total 
€560M.  

Final Report 

 Page 44 

 
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

Figure 21: Period of disbursement of the fixed and variable tranches per 
quarter (for the 15 countries studied) 

Source: ADE, based on data from the SBC database 

The recommendation made in the guidelines to plan the disbursement, where possible, at the 
start of the fiscal year was often not followed. For the most part, the disbursements were made 
during the fourth quarter, particularly for variable tranches. No variable tranche disbursement 
was  able  to  be  made  during  the  first  six-month  period,  and  only  7.5%  of  fixed  tranche 
disbursements  were  made  during  the  first  half  of  the  year.  Efforts  were  made,  however,  to 
ensure  the  spread  of  disbursements  over  the  year  with,  notably,  two  disbursement  periods 
planned: one during the first half of the year for fixed tranches and the other at the end of the 
year for variable tranches (e.g. Niger).   

6.1.2 

Restoration  of  macroeconomic  stability  and  preservation  of  basic 
expenditure 

SBCs, mainly through financial transfers, have contributed to restore macroeconomic 
stability,  while  preserving  current  expenditure,  but  without  avoiding  adjustments  on 
capital expenditure.  
The analysis of the SBCs in the 15 countries under review consolidates EU staff views which 
consider  the  short-term  restoration  of  macroeconomic  stability  as  the  fourth  most  important 
objective pursued by SBCs and the first in terms of outcomes in all contexts in which SBCs 
were implemented. This outcome is generally deemed to have been achieved in non-fragile 
countries as well as in structurally fragile countries, with particularly significant effects in fragile 
countries facing security risks.  

Final Report 

 Page 45 

00,10,20,30,40,50,60,7T4T3T2T1Fixed(cid:9)TrancheVariable(cid:9)Tranche 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

Figure 22: Short-term restoration of macroeconomic stability: importance of 
the objective and extent to which the outcomes were achieved 

Source: Survey conducted by ADE of EU staff involved in SBCs 

Urgent interventions to secure the treasury  

The objective “of helping partner countries to ensure vital state functions and delivering basic 
services to the populations” (2012 BS guidelines) assigned to the SBC implicitly includes the 
provision  of  urgent  resources  to  enable  the  government  to  continue  fulfilling  its  duties, 
especially when treasury tensions can lead to a significant accumulation of payment arrears 
on  core  expenditure  such  as  wages  or  the  supply  of  medicines  or  fuel.  With  the  partial 
exception of the SBCs implemented in medium-income countries such as Tunisia and Ukraine, 
the stated intention to secure the treasury existed in all SBCs, even for those that prioritised 
support for the recovery of a country after a natural disaster (as in Dominica, Nepal and Fiji) 
rather than support for macroeconomic governance. It is clear that, a priori, a greater reliance 
on budget support resources - typical of SBC recipient countries - makes them more important 
in government cash-flow programming. It remains difficult to demonstrate that the increase in 
fiscal space derived from SBCs has systematically enabled governments to sustain essential 
expenditure  given  the  weaknesses  encountered  in  cash  flow  planning  in  many  fragile 
countries,  which  remains  opportunistic,  insufficiently  rigorous  and  sometimes  lacking  in 
transparency.  The  “SBC effect”  on  the  treasury,  however,  seems  very  clear  in  the  Central 
African Republic, Chad and in The Gambia, countries that were facing major debt servicing 
and/or arrears obligations, having a crowding-out effect on the budget implementation of other 
priority/essential expenditure. In structurally fragile rather than post-crisis countries, the effect 
of the SBC on the treasury is harder to determine. There are, however, chronic emergency 
situations where the SBC continues to help some countries to keep their heads above water 
(Sierra Leone). In one-off emergency settings, even countries less dependent on BS benefited 
from  the  room  for  manoeuvre  offered  by  the  SBC  (Mali  and  Haiti),  but  the  TFPs  rarely 
succeeded in coordinating their disbursements to respond in real time to national cash-flow 
needs (as in Guinea). 

In  the  CAR,  the  programme  to  support  the  safeguarding  and  consolidation  of  the  Central 
African State disbursed in 2014-2015 made it possible to ensure 15% and 12%, respectively, 
of the total government revenue  and up to 36% of  civil  servants’  remuneration during  and 
immediately after the peak in intra-community violence and at a time when no other donor 
was providing budget support. The EU budget support was the only direct support for public 
expenditure in 2014 and 2015. As of 2016, balance of payments support and budget support 
were also provided by the IMF, the WB, the African Development Bank and France. With the 
election of President Touadera and the relative stabilisation in the political arena, the weight 

Final Report 

 Page 46 

00,511,522,533,544,5Non-fragile(cid:9)countriesFragile(cid:9)countriesFragile(cid:9)countries(cid:9)with(cid:9)security(cid:9)riskImportance(cid:9)in(cid:9)terms(cid:9)of(cid:9)objectivesDegree(cid:9)of(cid:9)achievement(cid:9)of(cid:9)outcomes 
 
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

of the SBC gradually declined to 6% in 2018, but cash-flow remained very tight over the entire 
period  under  review.  Budget  support  unquestionably  relieved  the  pressure  but  did  not 
eliminate it, the mobilisation of domestic revenue remained insufficient despite real progress 
(from 5% of the GDP in 2014 to 9% of the GDP in 2018). 

A stabilising/shock-absorbing effect on public current expenditure, allowing the payment of 
essential expenditure but not restarting capital expenditure 

The  financial  windfall  form  the  SBC  contributed  to  the  reduction  of  payment  arrears 
accumulated during the crisis period, particularly in Ivory Coast, Chad and Mali. 

One case where action on payments arrears is patent was Mali. In 2013 and 2014, SBC1 
accounted  for  50%  of  the  entire  BS  (grants  and  loans)  included  in  the  budget,  which  is 
approximately 8% of the government revenue. This injection of currency and revenue for the 
government contributed to redressing the crisis situation of 2012, which had led to a massive 
increase  in  arrears,  seriously  undermining  suppliers  and  the  banking  sector,  as  well  as 
causing  a  slump  in  public  investments  and  a  drop  in  foreign  reserves.  The  provision  of 
external assistance via the budget in 2013, and the maintenance of a prudent fiscal policy 
made it possible to revive expenditure, while avoiding recourse to unsustainable sources of 
funding. A large part of the arrears was reimbursed in 2014-2015, with Mali often being cited 
as an example of a successful arrears absorption policy. The direct effect of budget support, 
and of the SBC, diminished thereafter and was replaced for some time by an effective national 
stabilisation policy. 

The financial flows of the SBC have also contributed to maintaining or even increasing 
essential government spending (spending effect). The quantitative analysis and country 
case  studies  converge  to  show  the  positive  effect  of  SBCs  on  government  expenditure,  in 
particular  for  current  expenditure,  even  though  it  remained  under  pressure  throughout  the 
period.  

The quantitative analysis conducted for this study on the basis of the ANOVA methodology 
(Annex 5) indicates that during the 2012-2018 period, unlike the preceding period, the SBC 
beneficiary  countries  saw  a  rapid  increase  in  the  public  final  consumption  share  of  GDP 
compared with non-beneficiary countries. The difference between SBC beneficiary and non-
beneficiary  countries  therefore  diminishes  in  terms  of  the  level  of  current  expenditure  as  a 
percentage of GDP. This catch-up effect can be linked to the introduction of SBCs during the 
2012-2018  period.  It  is  supported  by  the  results  of  econometric  regressions  that  tested  the 
effect of the SBC on public expenditure and its main components. They show that the SBC 
has a fairly weak, yet not negligible positive effect, to explain the evolution of the public final 
consumption in GDP, which is essentially made up of the wages of civil servants. 

The effect of the SBC on investment expenditure is less visible, although both the ANOVA 
and  econometric  regressions  suggest  that  SBCs  have  played  a  role  in  the  more  positive 
evolution of public investment in GDP, which is increasing for SBC recipient countries while it 
is decreasing in non-beneficiary non-fragile countries23.  The indicators collected at the same 
time on the share of capital expenditure of GDP show, at best, a stabilisation of these expenses 
over the period studied in SBC beneficiary countries at levels below 10% and, in a number of 

23   This outcome should, however, be viewed with caution as, in numerous countries, particularly non-fragile SBC 
beneficiary countries, statistics relating to the gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) (expressed as a percentage 
of GDP) is not available in the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) database.  

Final Report 

 Page 47 

                                                
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

cases (Burundi, Haiti, CAR, Chad and Guinea), a downward trend towards levels close to  5%, 
that are far insufficient to set a development process in motion.  

These  results  are  confirmed  by  the  findings  from  country  field  visits.  In  general,  SBC 
beneficiary  countries  stabilised  and,  in  some  cases  (Niger  and  Haiti),  even  saw  a  slight 
increase in their current spending as a percentage of GDP. Investment expenditure was more 
directly  affected  by  shocks  or  crises  with  an  impact  on  macro-fiscal  frameworks.  They 
remained  at  low  levels,  as  a  percentage  of  GDP,  but  with  an  upwards  trend  during  the 
emergence from  the  crisis.  All  countries were  closely  monitored by  the  IMF  with the  aim  of 
pursuing budget adjustments in order to ensure the stability of the macro-financial framework. 
This pressure may explain this “spending control”, which is clearly visible in all fragile countries 
under review and also led to a more drastic adjustment in current spending in countries such 
as The Gambia, Guinea and Chad, where their level was near or beyond 18% of GDP before 
the crisis. In countries deemed less fragile in macro-fiscal terms (such as Nepal), the effect of 
SBCs can more immediately be seen in the increased spending.  

SBCs contributed to the spending effect in social sectors and made it possible to secure 
and even increase public spending in the essential education and health sectors. The 
results of the analysis of variance (ANOVA) show that the amount of spending on education 
was maintained as a percentage of GDP in SBC beneficiary countries, whereas it decreased 
in the others. Spending on health as a percentage of GDP is significantly higher in fragile SBC 
beneficiary  countries  than  in  non-fragile  beneficiary  countries  and tends  to  increase,  a  sign 
that health remains a priority and that, when available, additional resources are allocated to 
this sector.  

Stabilisation effects through facilitated access to currency and use of less expensive 
financing  

In principle, budget support, through the input of currency, also has an effect on the balance 
of payments and capacity of absorption by contributing to lightening constraints on access to 
foreign  currency  and  therefore  permits  the  regulation  of  imports,  debt  clearance  operations 
and even, in extreme cases, capital flights. 

For SBCs, in view of the ANOVA results, foreign currencies have mostly been used by 
SBC  beneficiary  countries  to  reduce  debt  servicing  and  make  essential  imports 
possible. The ANOVA analysis shows that there was no increase in foreign currency asset 
holding and therefore there was no long-term effect of SBCs on the amount of reserves, or an 
effect  on  the  debt  stock  and  therefore  on  macroeconomic  resilience.  On  the  other  hand,  a 
positive  effect  is  observed  in  terms  of  decrease  in  debt  servicing  in fragile SBC  beneficiary 
countries, which may also be derived from an improvement in the signature of some countries 
studied.  Their  capacity  to  obtain  more  favourable  interest  rates  on  the  market  -  mostly  the 
national  market  -  seems  to  have  recovered  over  the  years  in  which  SBCs  were  deployed, 
suggesting  that  the  SBC,  by  bringing  credibility  to  the  beneficiary  government,  was  able  to 
facilitate recourse to less expensive debt. 

Weak leverage on the short-term macroeconomic stance in the presence of the IMF, whose 
mandate is to do so 

Beyond  financial  contributions,  the  relevance  and  effectiveness  of  SBCs  must  also  be 
evaluated  in  light  of  their  leverage  effect  on  the  maintenance  of  a  macroeconomic  policy 
geared  to  stability,  including  the  implementation  of  specific  macroeconomic  stabilisation 
measures.  In  all  SBC  beneficiary  countries,  it  is  the  IMF,  partly  through  European  funding 
support  via  AFRITAC  or  CARITAC,  that  guides  most  of  the  short-term  macroeconomic 
management  policies  and  measures,  such  as the  management  of  the  interest  rate  and the 
exchange  rate, modelling for  budget  preparation,  national  accounts,  debt  management  and 

Final Report 

 Page 48 

EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

management  of  monetary  policy,  with  the  sole  exception  of  the  mobilisation  of  national 
resources.  

The  country  case  studies  do  not  demonstrate  that  the  general  macroeconomic  eligibility 
condition (criterion) had a real leverage effect on macroeconomic policy orientation. In fact, 
this eligibility is broadly aligned with the IMF position, which, unlike the European Commission, 
has a sufficiently strong mandate to defend any suspension of budget support on the sole basis 
of  failure  to  comply  with  the  macroeconomic  policy  criterion.  In  addition,  in  the  countries 
studied,  no  variable  tranche  macroeconomic  indicator  covered  these  areas,  except  for  a 
condition  relating  to the consistency  of  the  wage  bill  with the  programming  agreed with the 
IMF, enshrined in the Finances Law of 2016 in SBC 2 of the Central African Republic.  

The  country  case  studies  reveal  some  isolated  cases where technical  assistance  has  been 
able  to  play  a  somewhat  more  influential  role  in  macroeconomic  management.  The  few 
successful  cases  depend  more  on  the  skills  of  a  specific  technical  assistance  than  on  a 
consistent approach by the EU on matters of macroeconomic stabilisation. 

In  countries  where  fiscal  and  monetary  policy  remained  stability-oriented,  the  role  of  the 
general macroeconomic condition has been elusive as the EU, unlike the IMF, prefers to focus 
on reforms aimed at restoring sound budget management, primarily supporting public finance 
reform and domestic resources mobilisation, making it possible in the medium or long term to 
limit the fiscal deficit and improve financial and administrative governance. In this sense, even 
if a macroeconomic analysis is carried out to provide context elements and justify compliance 
with the macroeconomic general condition, the general condition on public finance reform is 
still more closely and concretely embedded in the design of a European SBC than the former. 

In the event that budgetary and monetary policies present instability risks, the choice between 
i) suspension when reforms do not follow or ii) maintenance of SBCs to avoid the costs of a 
suspension and a worsening of the risk of instability was not easy to make. The EU generally, 
but  not  systematically,  followed  in  the  IMF’s  footsteps.  Experience  shows  that  there  is  no 
obvious choice and that the (threat of) suspension can either provide the expected leverage 
or, on the contrary, plunge the country into chaos. The decision to make or not a disbursement 
in  an  unpromising  situation  as  regards  reforms  or  misuse  of  public  funds  is  fraught  with 
consequences and must be taken in conjunction with the other donors.  

In  Burundi  and  Sierra  Leone,  the  choice  was  to  continue  disbursements  in  a  borderline 
situation, on the assumption that significant measures to improve budgetary discipline would 
be taken sooner or later, which may have contributed to maintaining, or even masking for a 
time, fiscal policies deemed irresponsible. In Burundi, the worsening of the political situation 
finally led to the withdrawal of all budget support with disastrous effects on the stability of the 
macroeconomic  framework.  In  Sierra  Leone,  the  changes  began  after  the  IMF  2018 
programme,  when  the  newly  elected  government  committed  to  renewed  structural  efforts, 
finally giving reason to maintain disbursements.  

In Chad, on the other hand, the EU suspended the disbursement of the 2017 tranche because 
of  the  debt  problem  caused  by  the  takeover  of Glencore  which led  the IMF to interrupt  its 
programme. However, the African Development Bank and France paid to the treasury at the 
end of  2017  the  significant  amounts  planned for,  hereby  limiting  the  potential  destabilising 
effects. The EU was able to resume its dialogue and its disbursements after a solution was 
found.   

In Mali, in 2014, the SBC, through the strategic dialogue underway and the threat of a non-
disbursement, made it possible to contribute to the adoption by the government of various 
corrective measures in response to two scandals demonstrating mismanagement of public 
funds. 

Final Report 

 Page 49 

EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

Budget  support,  including  SBCs,  are  supposed  to  be  comprehensive  responses  by  the 
international community to situations of fragility. The fragmentation of the national counterparts 
responsible for monitoring and supervising the programmes  is characterised by the national 
counterparts  for  European  SBCs  being  generally  different  from  those  of  the  IMF  Extended 
Credit Facility (ECF). This is explained, in part, for institutional reasons, including the role of 
the National Authorising Officer in the management of EU aid which may pose a problem.  

6.1.3 

Consolidation of medium-term macro-budgetary  framework and PFM 
system underway 

The leverage effect of the SBC has been widely used to drive the adoption of reforms 
that contribute to the long-term consolidation of the macroeconomic framework. In this 
potentially  huge  area,  the  EU  most  often  considered  increased  domestic  revenue 
mobilisation (DRM) as a priority. Besides DRM, the vast majority of the reforms in this area 
supported  by  SBCs  related  to  public  finance  management,  and,  in  particular,  budgetary 
planning, treasury, controls, procurement and staff expenditure. These are structural reforms 
aimed at the sustainability of a country’s macroeconomic framework, which primarily benefitted 
those with the weakest initial capacity (CAR, Sierra Leone and Somalia, among others). 

Figure 23: Medium-term sustainability of  
fiscal policy: importance of the objective  
and degree of achievement of outcomes  

fiscal 

policy 

  The medium-term sustainability 
of 
is, 
furthermore,  considered  by 
EU  staff  who  participated  in 
the  on-line  survey  to  be  the 
important 
second  most 
objective 
the 
SBC  (scoring  3.5  out  of  5) 
and 
the  second  outcome 
achieved (scoring 3.38 out of 
5).  

targeted  by 

Source: Survey conducted by ADE of EU staff involved in SBCs 

According to the survey respondents, the objective of medium-term sustainability of the fiscal 
policy and the outcomes perceived in the field were all the more significant when the country 
is in a situation of structural fragility, particularly when it continues to cope with urgent security 
challenges. 

These  reforms  above  all  helped  beneficiaries  to  implement  and  protect  a  macroeconomic 
status quo that was just about sustainable but did not increase the room for manoeuvre for 
implementation of growth policy, hence the prevalence of the macroeconomic risk in 2019 as 
high  as  in  2012.  These  are  longer-term  reforms,  whose  achievements  can  be  more  easily 
reversed by the political context, as exemplified in Burundi or the obstructions by the Haitian 
legislator to taxation and customs reforms.  

Final Report 

 Page 50 

00,511,522,533,544,55Non-fragile(cid:9)countriesFragile(cid:9)countriesFragile(cid:9)countries(cid:9)with(cid:9)security(cid:9)riskImportance(cid:9)in(cid:9)terms(cid:9)of(cid:9)objectivesDegree(cid:9)of(cid:9)achievement(cid:9)of(cid:9)outcomes 
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

Increased domestic revenue mobilisation  

ADE 

The  contribution  of  SBCs  to  increased  domestic  revenue  mobilisation  has  been 
confronted with the limits of economic structures and the absence of a tax policy for 
inclusive growth.  

With  the  exception  of  Tunisia,  DRM  is  part  of  the  variable  tranches  indicators  of  all  SBCs 
implemented in the 15 countries studied in greater detail. Although this growing attention stems 
in part from political demands for accountability made by public opinion in donor countries, it 
cannot be denied24 that fragile countries - even more than others - must wean themselves off 
their dependence on a limited number of funding sources, particularly official development aid, 
with a view to reducing their vulnerability to the fluctuations of international financial flows.  

Figure 24: Mobilisation of domestic revenue: 
importance of the objective and degree of 
achievement of the outcomes  

 Domestic  Revenue  Mobilisation 
(DRM) is seen by EU staff as the major 
objective of SBCs (score 3.93 out of 5) 
and  one  where  the  most  significant 
outcomes were achieved (3.35 out of 5, 
the third most successful). This outcome 
is  considered  to  be  best  achieved  in 
fragile and security-risk prone countries.  

Source: Survey conducted by ADE of EU staff involved in SBCs 

In fact, the DRM agenda made undeniable progress in the macroeconomic choices of fragile 
countries  during  recent  years.  The  following  graph  illustrating  the  evolution  of  government 
revenue expressed as a percentage of GDP for the 15 countries studied in detail shows that 
the majority of the countries taken into consideration exceed the average of 14% which the 
OECD had identified in 201125.      

Aside from the spectacular dropout of Burundi and Haiti’s relative performance, most of the 
countries show an encouraging overall development, even though in some cases, such as The 
Gambia, Sierra Leone or Chad, the results remain volatile or slow (Madagascar). 

24   See inter alia: OECD, Fragile States 2014. Domestic Revenue Mobilisation in Fragile States. 

25   With an average ratio of taxes to GDP of 14% in 2011, the capacity of fragile countries to mobilise revenue was 
considerably less than the average of developing countries (17%) and very much less than  OECD countries 
(34%). 

Final Report 

 Page 51 

00,511,522,533,544,55Non-fragile(cid:9)countriesFragile(cid:9)countriesFragile(cid:9)countries(cid:9)with(cid:9)security(cid:9)riskImportance(cid:9)in(cid:9)terms(cid:9)of(cid:9)objectivesDegree(cid:9)of(cid:9)achievement(cid:9)of(cid:9)outcomes 
 
 
 
 
                                                
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

Figure 25: Government revenue as a percentage of GDP for the 15 countries 
reviewed 

Source: IMF 

In general, SBCs above all targeted, and often succeeded in, improving the collection of what 
is owed (identification of taxpayers, including legal entities, better determination of the tax base 
and - in the next logical step - exemptions and tax expenditure), but fell short of supporting a 
real structuring of the fiscal framework, whether for better redistribution or to serve a growth 
agenda.  SBCs  promoted  major  technical  reforms,  but  these  have  not  always  -  or  not  yet  - 
demonstrated their potential for transformation, or even for increasing revenues, which should 
result from a broadening of the tax base, itself dependent on economic diversification26.  

SBCs  responded  to  the  concerns  expressed  by  the  European  Court  of  Auditors27  by  more 
explicitly integrating the problem of tax exemptions (Guinea, Mali, Niger, CAR and Chad) as 
well as the extractive sector (Afghanistan, Mali and Sierra Leone).  

The case studies show that one SBC was not enough to carry forward an ambitious tax reform 
agenda  without  sustained  political  will,  but  prioritisation  of  the  issue  by  the  SBC  and  by  all 
TFPs  has  been  important  for  its  signalling  and  advocacy  effect  vis-à-vis  the  recipient 
government, although all progress cannot be systematically attributed to SBCs as the IMF is 
normally very active on this issue. However, the SBC has sometimes had to be satisfied with 

26   There is still no international consensus on “good” tax policy in developing countries, and even less so in fragile 
countries (OECD 2013 cit.). In the short term, too rapid a rise in taxes in weakened economies can have negative 
effects on the economic recovery in countries emerging from crisis. On the other hand, and again in the short 
term, the broadening of the tax base is often difficult to reconcile with the desire to quickly boost investment 
through an attractive business environment, or even through a certain degree of complacency for tax planning 
and optimisation techniques well known to multinationals (free zones, transfer pricing, “tolerant” auditing, etc.). 

27   The  Court  of  Auditors  noted  that  the  evaluations  conducted  by  the  Commission  on  Tax  Policy  and 
Administration,  prior  to  the  design  of  the  support,  did  not  address  issues  such  as  the  risks  related  to  tax 
exemptions,  and  the  collection  and  transfer  of  tax  and  non-tax  revenues  from  natural  resources.  Court  of 
Auditors, The use of budget support to improve domestic revenue mobilisation in sub-Saharan Africa, 2016. 

Final Report 

 Page 52 

0510152025303540201020122014201620182019 
 
                                                
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

prior measures, without always being able to accompany the reforms to the end. In fact, these 
are long reforms whose implementation and success may exceed the duration of an SBC. 

When it was set up, the quality of the technical assistance provided by the EU to strengthen 
DRM was welcomed (Haiti, Guinea and The Gambia), but, overall it suffered in many cases 
from a lack of overall steering focused on strategic priorities shared with the partner country 
and other donors. 

Finally,  it  is  worth  recalling  the  importance  for  tax  reforms  of  good  cooperation  with  the 
legislative power, which SBCs tend not to deal with directly, in order to avoid any "political" co-
opting of a tool that is above all intended to be technical. 

Development  of  the  Public  Finance  Management  systems:  support  for  reforms  aligned  with 
reform plans and agreed with other TFPs but not specifically geared towards "fragility" 

The strengthening of public finance management systems was one of the main objectives of 
SBCs.  All  programmes  addressed  this  objective  via  the  general  condition  relating  to  the 
implementation of a relevant and credible PFM programme, and in all programmes of the 15 
countries  reviewed  (except  Nepal)  through  the  addition  of  VT  indicators  around  which  a 
dialogue with the authorities was initiated. Over half of the variable tranche indicators of SBC 
programmes in the 15 countries (190 out of 357) focused on PFM aspects, including DRM and 
anti-corruption.  Furthermore,  the  programmes  were  systematically  supported  by  technical 
dialogue, coordination with the other TFPs and technical assistance.  

As  indicated  in  the  graph  below,  the  variable  tranche  indicators  first  targeted  DRM 
strengthening,  greater  transparency,  anti-corruption  measures,  improvement  of  public 
procurement systems and the budget programming process.  

Figure 26: Frequency of variable tranche indicators per area of PFM 

Source: ADE, based on data from the SBC database 

Variable  tranche  indicators  generally  responded  to  the  main  weaknesses  identified  in  the 
assessments  of  PFM  systems,  but  some  were  too  complex  or  overambitious  in  terms  of 
capacity to implement reforms (Madagascar, Sierra Leone and Chad). In general, they do not 
show  specific  characteristics  related  to  “fragility”.  In  the  SBCs  analysed,  the  “fragility” 
dimension is essentially observed in a “starting situation” that is weaker. The core functions of 
PFM systems - such as treasury management (through the single treasury account) or payroll 
management (which is an important issue given the burden of wages in current spending) – 
have been poorly addressed through the selected variable tranches indicators. These topics 
could be covered by complementary measures (as in Niger to support the implementation of 
the single Treasury account). 

Final Report 

 Page 53 

0,3110,0890,0840,07890,06840,06840,05790,05260,03680,03160,03160,02630,01580,01580,031600,050,10,150,20,250,30,35DRMExternal(cid:9)AuditTransparencyAnti-corruptionPublic(cid:9)procurementBudget(cid:9)PreparationPFM(cid:9)legislative(cid:9)frameworkInternal(cid:9)controlAccountingBudget(cid:9)execution(cid:9)rateDecentralisationPayroll(cid:9)managementPublic(cid:9)Investment(cid:9)ManagementCash(cid:9)flow(cid:9)management(cid:9)/(cid:9)Single(cid:9)Treasury(cid:9)AccountOther 
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

During  implementation,  coordination  and  dialogue  with  the  partner  government  was  mainly 
conducted at a technical level. High-level strategic dialogue was less frequent. The quality of 
the  dialogue  and  coordination  was  affected  by  capacity  constraints  within  national 
administrations and high staff turnover, which is generally more frequent in fragile countries.   

Coordination  with  other  TFPs  has  essentially  consisted  of  information-sharing  to  avoid 
duplication  and  to  seek  synergies.  In  only  four  out  of  15  countries  has  a  common  PFM 
performance matrix been established, with varying degrees of success (fairly effective in Haiti 
but unconvincing in Sierra Leone and unsustainable in Burundi).   

In  14  of  the  15  countries  studied,  the  partner  country  was  supported  by  PFM  technical 
assistance, that was deployed according to the needs of each country and took different forms: 
1) TA to monitor and facilitate dialogue (Afghanistan SBC2, Guinea); 2) TA targeting specific 
technical  issues  (CAR, Mali,  Haiti,  Gambia and Somalia;  3) TA  in  support  of  overall  reform 
(Sierra Leone, Burundi, Chad and Nepal); 4) on-going support not directly related to the SBC 
(Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone SBC1, Afghanistan). 

Little or no progress in the overall performance of PFM systems 

The various means deployed have contributed to progress in the reforms targeted, however, 
progress  has fallen  short  of  initial  expectations  and  the  effects  on the  performance  of  PFM 
systems have remained barely visible. 

Illustrating the difficulties encountered in the implementation of reforms, the performance of 
the beneficiary countries on the PFM indicators contained in the VT indicators was mixed, with 
55% of the indicators having been fully met and the others having been partially or not met. 
This  average  is  negatively  affected  by  countries  such  as  Burundi,  Sierra  Leone  and  Chad, 
where  most  of  the  indicators  were  not  met,  but  in  none  of  the  programmes  did  all  PFM 
indicators meet the target set at the outset.  

This  lack  of  progress  in  reform,  as  illustrated  by  the  case  studies,  is  well  perceived  by 
programme managers, who considered the degree of achievement of PFM targets to be rather 
mixed  in  several  of  the  areas  covered.  This  assessment  should  be  qualified:  in  fragile 
countries,  and  particularly 
those  under  strong  security  pressures,  SBCs  supported 
strengthened cash management and an improved budget programming process, whereas in 
non-fragile  countries,  better  outcomes  were  seen  in  higher-level  reforms  such  as  public 
procurement management and the strengthening of other functions of the PFM system.  

Final Report 

 Page 54 

 
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

Figure 27: Degree of achievement of objectives in the PFM areas covered by SBCs 
according to context (between 0 and 5) 

Source: Survey conducted by ADE of EU staff involved in SBCs 

The  analysis  of  the  performance  of  PFM  systems,  measured  by  Public  Expenditure  and 
Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessments and Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 
(CPIA) scores, shows that only two of the 15 reviewed (Ivory Coast and Madagascar) saw any 
real  improvement  in their  public  finance  management  since  2012.  By  contrast,  these  same 
indicators reveal that performance deteriorated in three countries (Burundi, Haiti and Niger).  

The  evaluation  points  to  various  factors  that  facilitated  the  ability  of  SBCs  to  effectively 
contribute to the advancement of PFM systems: 1) the initial commitment and ownership of 
reforms by the government, which cannot be “bought” by the general condition (most often not 
very restrictive and without demonstrated leverage) or the variable tranche indicators; 2) the 
implementation  of  complementary  measures  to  support  of  the  reforms  targeted  by  the 
programme, in line with the agreed agenda and in response to the needs expressed by the 
partner;  3)  the  realism  of  targets  and  objectives in  weak  capacity  settings;  4)  the  quality  of 
technical dialogue when it is conducted by people with the necessary skills and experience.  

Progress in the area of budget transparency, but no significant improvement in accountability    

Some  progress  was  made  in  the  area  of  budget  transparency  and  oversight,  particularly 
related to the availability of budgetary documents and the role of parliament and civil society 
in the budget programming process. On the other hand, transparency in budget execution and 
control by external audit institutions have either stagnated at low levels or diminished. 

The  main  progress  made  during  the  implementation  of  SBCs,  through  the  transparency 
eligibility  condition  and  in  certain  cases  through  variable  tranche  indicators  (Central  African 
Republic)  has  focused  on  the  provision  of  information  on  the  budget,  the  monitoring  of  its 
execution and the involvement of civil society (see table below). In a number of beneficiary 
countries  (see  EQ  4,  Annex  7),  the  review  of  the  Finance  Law  was  strengthened  by  its 
publication  and  accompanying  documents  (The  Gambia,  Haiti,  Nepal,  Niger  and  Chad), 
quarterly performance reports were published (Burundi before 2015, Gambia, Guinea, Haiti, 
Niger, CAR and Chad in 2015), management accounts were sent to the Court of Auditors and 
the Parliament (Niger and CAR), citizen budgets were produced and distributed (Afghanistan, 

Final Report 

 Page 55 

3,503,782,672,692,563,292,832,582,682,793,003,004,003,003,3300,511,522,533,544,5Improvement(cid:9)in(cid:9)the(cid:9)budgetary(cid:9)processStrengthening(cid:9)of(cid:9)cash-flow(cid:9)managementImprovement(cid:9)in(cid:9)public(cid:9)procurement(cid:9)management(cid:9)Strengthening(cid:9)of(cid:9)external(cid:9)auditStrengtening(cid:9)of(cid:9)other(cid:9)functions(cid:9)of(cid:9)the(cid:9)PFM(cid:9)systemNon-fragile(cid:9)countriesStructurally(cid:9)fragile(cid:9)countriesFragile(cid:9)countries(cid:9)with(cid:9)security(cid:9)risk 
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

Gambia,  Guinea,  Niger  and  Chad)  and  the  involvement  of  civil  society  was  strengthened 
(Burundi before 2015 and Niger).  

In this field, the general condition was able to have greater leverage than the other general 
conditions due to the fact that the documents to be disseminated are very clearly identified, 
the targets are precisely defined and these objectives are monitored by PEFA indicators. In 
certain cases, however, the general condition did not have the desired incentive effect (Ivory 
Coast, Madagascar and Chad until 2018).  

The  progress  made  in  the  availability  of  budgetary  information  and  reading  tools  (citizen 
budget)  did  not  lead  to  the  outcomes  expected  in  terms  of  budgetary  transparency  and 
decision-making, public participation and accountability mechanisms of the States concerned. 
There was no significant change in the level of budgetary transparency measured by the PEFA 
and the OBI (see EQ4 Annex 7). In 2017, the availability of information and participation of the 
public remained very low, particularly in fragile countries (Niger, Chad and Burundi). Several 
countries  in  which budgetary transparency questions  were  closely  monitored  through  SBCs 
(CAR, Gambia, Guinea and Haiti) still did not have an evaluation of the level of transparency 
by the OBI in 2017.     

6.1.4 

Limited attention until 2017 to the implementation of growth-oriented 
structural  policies  and  little  contribution  to  strengthening  economic 
activity and reducing the economic vulnerability of States 

While stability is obviously a precondition for pursuing a policy of growth and poverty reduction, 
the  choice  of  budgetary  rigour  also  has  a  cost  in  terms  of  expenditure  which,  without  a 
significant improvement in the quality of spending, may affect the deployment of growth factors 
through  the  implementation  of  structuring  investments.  Maintenance  of  a  fairly  “restrictive” 
fiscal policy as advocated by the IMF remained the line applied by default by the authorities 
and by the EU. Within this framework, in some cases, SBCs were able, often in the context of 
sectoral  dialogue,  to  facilitate  the  maintenance  of  a  degree  of  social  spending,  but  did  not 
generally  provide  a  particularly  innovative  approach  to  the  dilemmas  of  the  “Washington 
Consensus” or how to restore growth within a particularly narrow macro-fiscal framework.   

and 

Reconstructing  certain  basic  financial  management  functions  where  SBCs  are  most  often 
involved was a crucial prerequisite for establishing macroeconomic stability in flagrant cases 
of state failure before tackling long-term growth issues (the case of Central Africa in particular). 
Some  SBCs,  particularly  the  most  recent  ones  formulated  after  the  2017  revision  of  the 
guidelines  that  explicitly  introduced  the  resilience  objective,  adopted  other  variable  tranche 
indicators for structural economic policies besides public finance management, the domestic 
mobilisation revenue mobilisation and public sector reform (i.e. governance of the extractive 
sector (Afghanistan, Mali and Sierra Leone) or other productive sectors (Somalia, Chad, Sierra 
Leone and Tunisia), active labour market policies (Afghanistan), entrepreneurship (Gambia), 
of 
(Mali 
technical 
water/energy/telecommunications  utilities 
(Guinea,  Madagascar  and  Somalia),  and 
infrastructure  (Guinea,  Mali,  Nepal,  Sierra  Leone  and  Tunisia)).  Although  several  of  these 
indicators have been achieved, the added value of a generalist instrument such as the SBC is 
not apparent in cases that are often technically complex, where Ministries of Finance, the usual 
counterparts of the SBC, often have neither the capacity nor the will to federate the efforts of 
the competent sectoral administrations nor the latter to go through the filter of the Ministry of 
Finance. On another note, climatic resilience is very rarely taken into account in SBCs, even 
in Sahelian countries where it is  a top priority of European cooperation in the broad sense. 
Despite the importance of this issue, and its coverage by some of the prior fragility analyses 
undertaken  during  the  formulation  of  new  SBCs,  few  of  them  addressed  explicitly  climate 
change policies in the broad sense (with the recent exception of Haiti). 

and  Sierra 

vocational 

regulation 

Leone), 

training 

Final Report 

 Page 56 

EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

SBCs have helped to put in place some of the conditions necessary to enable the government 
to implement a consolidation policy and to initiate a process of sustainable growth. The SBCs 
contributed  to  the  restoration  of  viable  macroeconomic  balance  necessary  for  sustainable 
growth. The macroeconomic stabilisation reforms to which SBCs have helped beneficiaries to 
implement and protect a broadly sustainable macroeconomic status quo but did not increase 
the  room  for  manoeuvre,  particularly  in  terms  of  fiscal  policy,  to  pursue  a  growth  policy. 
Moreover,  few  countries  have  been  able  to  put  in  place  truly  effective  country-specific 
mechanisms  to  respond  to  crises  and  shocks,  as  the  fiscal  space  of  SBC  beneficiary 
governments to respond to economic shocks was limited and mainly used to maintain stability 
through current expenditure spending. 

SBCs have, however, been effective in terms of lending credibility to the beneficiary countries, 
and fragile countries in particular, through EU involvement - and often that of other TFPs. The 
results of the ANOVA variance analysis suggest that SBCs sent a positive signal to creditors 
and investors, which led to a reduction in the cost of debt and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
inflows. The ANOVA analysis, in fact, reveals the noteworthy and unexpected outcome that 
fragile SBC countries receive more FDI than all others, although overall, the groups identified 
for analysis saw their FDI decline in value.  

These  advances  were, however,  insufficient  to  set  in motion  a  process of  economic growth 
and diversification to reduce the level of macroeconomic risk, which is currently as high as it 
was in 2012.  

6.2  Contribution  of  SBCs  to  the  delivery  of  basic 

social services  

All countries studied benefited from at least one SBC that explicitly aimed to maintain access 
to  social  services  or  to  services  in  a  particular  sector  (education,  health  or  food  security). 
Depending on the context, SBCs sought to contribute 1) to the implementation of emergency 
measures  to  maintain  basic  services  and  care  for  the  most  vulnerable  populations;  2)  to 
stabilising  the  government’s  capacity  to  restore/maintain  the  provision  of  social  services 
(including food security) in a difficult budgetary/institutional security context (Afghanistan, Ivory 
Coast, Mali, Niger, Chad and Sierra Leone); 3) to structure and consolidate the provision of 
education (Burundi, Haiti and Madagascar) and health (Burundi and Madagascar) services, in 
particular by capacity building for policy design, implementation and monitoring, and even the 
establishment of long-term safety nets. In the first two cases, SBCs were put in place while, at 
the  same  time,  aid  flows  from  ECHO  increased  significantly  to  protect  the  most  vulnerable 
populations.   

The objectives of maintaining and structuring services in these sectors are not, however, seen 
as  SBC  priorities.  According  to  the  survey  to  EU  services,  these  objectives  were  generally 
considered to be of little importance (scoring between 1.9 and 2.4 out of a maximum 5). The 
assessment  of  the  degree  of  achievement  of  outcomes,  however,  is  higher,  particularly 
concerning the short-term maintenance of education (2.9 out of 5) and health services (3.2 out 
of 5), which suggests that it is where the effects of SBCs were the greatest. This observation 
is largely confirmed by the field missions and the country analyses conducted on documentary 
basis. 

Of the 13 SBC beneficiary countries with one or more variable tranche indicators related to 
social  sectors  or  the  issue  of  vulnerability,  nine  underwent  several  successive programmes 
without  always  explicitly  addressing  the  issue  of  moving  from  the  stabilisation  phase  to  the 
consolidation  phase.  In  most  cases,  the  link  in  the  SBC  chain  between  stabilisation  and 
consolidation was not explicitly established. However, it was clear in the countries where SRCs 

Final Report 

 Page 57 

EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

took over, as in the education sector (Niger and Tunisia) or the food security sector (Mali and 
Niger). 

6.2.1 

Maintenance/strengthening  of  education  and  health  services,  but  no 
real contribution to the quality of services 

Maintenance/increase in budgets for the education and health sectors 

The most visible effect of SBCs in the social sectors is an “expenditure effect” through 
which the financial transfers and agreed upon spending priorities made it possible to 
maintain the level of spending in education as a percentage of GDP in SBC beneficiary 
countries (whereas it fell in non-beneficiary countries) and to significantly increase the 
level of spending in the health sector in fragile SBC beneficiary countries (see ANOVA 
results).  

These expenditure effects contributed both to restoring social services in emergency situations 
(Nepal,  CAR,  Haiti,  Guinea  and  Sierra  Leone)  and  to  maintaining  their  provision  that  could 
potentially be affected by major pressure on government sources. 

Recovery in an emergency   

In countries directly hit by a shock, the response consisted of ad hoc support aimed at keeping 
infrastructure open and caring for vulnerable populations: post-disaster reconstruction (Haiti 
and Nepal), epidemics - Ebola - (Guinea and Sierra Leone) or cushioning of a political shock 
(Madagascar28,  CAR).  SBCs  were  able  to  mobilise  more  or  less  significant  resources  fairly 
quickly: either with the implementation of a specific programme to provide a response to the 
emergency situation encountered, such as the one mobilised in Nepal, CAR or Guinea, or by 
additional tranches mobilised from an SBC already under way, as in Haiti and Sierra Leone.  

In  Nepal,  the  SBC  support  for  the  implementation  of  the  Post  Disaster  Reconstruction 
Framework  (PDRF)  in  2016  and  2017,  particularly  on  the  “housing  grant”  component, 
included  provision  of  funds  as  well  as  selected  variable  tranche  indicators  and  technical 
assistance  provided  through  the  Nepal-EU  Action  for  Recovery  and  Reconstruction 
(NEARR).  

In countries the Ebola-affected countries (Sierra Leone and Guinea), SBCs made it possible 
to increase spending in the health sector in the midst of the crisis (2014-2016).  

An aid spending effect at the sectoral level was observed in Guinea, among other countries, 
where  the  specific  conditions  relating  to  budget  allocation  and  execution  had  a  mixed 
performance29. A recent evaluation still demonstrates that it is thanks to the conditions of the 
SBC  that  the  Guinean  side  has,  to  some  extent,  stayed  on  track  with  its  international 
commitments to maintain social spending above predetermined levels in several key sectors, 
including health, which was also in line with IMF requests. 

In Sierra Leone, the share of health sector expenditure as a percentage of GDP increased 
from 13.3% in 2011 to 19.7% in 2014, 20% in 2015 and 16.5% in 2016.  During these years, 

28   In Madagascar, the political shock was prior to the mobilisation of SBCs, but caused an economic and budgetary 

shock that lasted throughout the so-called transition period.  

29   Pohl Consulting & Associates, Mid-term Evaluation of Public Finance Support Programmes, Republic of Guinea, 

2019. 

Final Report 

 Page 58 

                                                
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

the SBC, supplemented by an additional “Ebola” fixed tranche, accounted for a substantial 
share of government revenue, allowing for this increase. 

Maintaining/restoring services in situations of budgetary stress  

As  suggested  by  the  results  of  the  variance  analysis  (ANOVA),  the  resources  provided  by 
SBCs were accompanied by a maintenance or increase in current expenditure in the health 
and education sectors. These striking results of the ANOVA confirm the observations made on 
the basis of the documentary analyses and field missions. The budgets allocated to health and 
education were generally maintained as a percentage of expenditure, and even increased in 
some years in SBC beneficiary countries, except in Chad, The Gambia, Niger and the CAR for 
health.  

In Mali, the education sector remained the largest budget item (between 19 and 20% of total 
expenditure between 2013 and 2018), recently overtaken by defence/security, which in five 
years increased from 9% to 19.6% of total expenditure. The health budget increased between 
2013 and 2017 but decreased in 2018.  

Figure 28: Allocations in priority areas as a percentage of total expenditure 
and change in expenditure in FCFA billions (right axis) 

Source: ADE, on the basis of data provided by the Malian Ministry of Finance 

SBCs contributed to strengthening the delivery of education services, mostly outside of areas 
where the security situation is difficult. The policy dialogue accompanying the monitoring of 
indicators has helped build the capacity of the Ministry of National Education to monitor its 
policies and to relaunch the process of recruiting new teachers and assigning them according 
to needs.  

The share of the budget devoted to education in Central Africa (VTI 2018) seems to have 
increased significantly (16% in 2017 compared to 6.5% in 2010) and the target set for the 
indicator on the allocation and execution of the budget for the education sector for 2018 has 
been met. This leads one to conclude that the quality of the partners’ political and technical 
dialogue on the education sector may have influenced the government’s priorities and the 
trade-offs of the Ministry of Finance and Budget in favour of the sector. 

In countries subject to structural fragility, SBCs have, in some cases, enabled the catch-up of 
expenditure  dedicated  to  social  sectors  and  the  securing  of  budgetary  allocations 
(Madagascar). 

Final Report 

 Page 59 

050010001500200000,050,10,150,20,25201320142015201620172018Defense/(cid:9)SecurityEducationHealthAllocations(cid:9)to(cid:9)regionsGeneral(cid:9)budget(cid:9)expenditure  
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

In Madagascar, the Basic Social Sector Support Programme (PASSOBA), launched in 2013 
and  implemented  in  nine  out  of  the  22  poorest  regions  of  the  country,  contributed  to 
maintaining  basic  education  and  health  services  and  to  caring  the  most  vulnerable 
populations.  SBCs  above  all  contributed,  through  dialogue  and  the  variable  tranche 
indicators,  to  remove  the  bottlenecks  identified  such  as  the  management  of  healthcare 
personnel recruited through PASSOBA, the reduction of delays in the payment of subsidies 
to FRAM teachers and the resumption of transfers to municipalities, as well as the onset of 
the clearance of arrears due to drug dispensers and guards of basic health centres. 

The  enlarged  fiscal  space  provided  by  SBCs  is  an  initial  factor  that  has  allowed  these 
expenditures to be maintained, but alone, it has little chance of having the intended effect. The 
evaluation  shows  that  without  being  accompanied  by  specific  conditions  and/or  dialogue 
specifically  focused  on  preserving  budgetary  allocations  and  the  effective  execution  of 
expenditure,  the  expenditure  effect  has  little  chance  of  materialising.  The  persistence  of 
tensions  in  the  allocation  of  available  resources  in  the  face  of  urgent  and  multiple  needs, 
particularly security needs in countries where the risks of conflict are high (see, for example, 
Mali, Niger and CAR), makes it necessary to accompany transfers with a sustained dialogue 
on the budget instrument. In the 15 country case studies, one (or more) indicators was (were) 
specifically  formulated  to  secure  budget  allocations  in  the  social  sectors:  in  Guinea 
(Healthcare),  in  Madagascar  (Education  and  Healthcare),  in  Nepal  (Education  and 
Healthcare),  in  Central  Africa  (Education)  in  Ivory  Coast  (Healthcare)  and  in  Sierra  Leone 
(Education and Healthcare). In the field of healthcare in particular, indicators relating to sector 
allocations  (or  expenditure)  were  monitored  over  several  years:  Guinea  (three  tranches), 
Madagascar  (two  tranches),  Sierra  Leone  (three  tranches).  In  Nepal,  one  indicator  (2017 
tranche) targeted spending by the authorities in charge of reconstruction, and more specifically 
for school and health infrastructures.   

The effects of the dialogue on the budgets allocated to social sectors  have, however, been 
uneven and most of the budget envelopes obtained remain modest in relation to their share in 
the budget. The argument, rightly raised by the Ministries of Finance, is generally that of cross-
sectoral  fairness,  with  the  social  sectors  already  benefitting  from  significant  support  from 
foreign partners.  

Limited effect on the structuring of services delivery  

Contribution  of  SBCs  to  a  better  distribution  of  resources  on  the  territory  (staff, 
operating means)  

The  implementation  of  decentralisation  policies  is  an  important  aspect  of  education  policy 
through the effective strengthening of the decentralised management of peripheral services 
(i.e.  remote  from  large  urban  centres)  and  particularly  through  the  improvement  of  the 
functionality of peripheral educational establishments.  This matter was addressed via variable 
tranche indicators in three of the 15 countries, in Madagascar (Tranche 2018), Mali (Tranche 
2016 and 2017) and in the CAR (Tranche 2018). The targets were not all reached, but progress 
was  made  (reduction  of  transfer  payment  times  at  a  deconcentrated  level  in  Madagascar, 
improvement of the teacher/pupil ratios in deficit areas in Mali).  

The support for structuring of the supply of healthcare services was produced above all through 
the support for the strengthening of deconcentrated structures. The implementation of policies 
to  decentralise  and  structure  the  supply  of  peripheral  health  services  was  covered  by  six 
indicators  relating  to  three  countries:  Guinea  (Tranches  2016,  2018,  2019),  Madagascar 
(Tranche 2015) and Ivory Coast (2013). A number of these variable tranche indicators were 

Final Report 

 Page 60 

EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

not achieved, but they gave rise to a dialogue that provided an opportunity to emphasize the 
issues, as in Madagascar. 

In  Ivory  Coast,  the  SBC  clearly  contributed  to  strengthening  the  deconcentration  of  the 
healthcare  system  in  terms  of  human  and  financial  resources,  making  the  Departmental 
Health Authorities (DHAs) operational and thus facilitating the formulation of district health 
development  plans  incorporating  priority  health  programmes.  The  DHAs,  as  peripheral 
deconcentrated  bodies,  play  a  crucial  role  in  the  organisation  and  management  of  the 
production  of  healthcare  services.  In  particular,  they  have  the  role  of  organising  and 
monitoring  work,  allocating  tasks,  deploying  personnel,  evaluating  and  guiding  personnel, 
establishing and maintaining discipline for the production of quality healthcare services. In 
this  sense,  improving the  effectiveness of the  DHAs  has  led to  an  increase  in  the  level  of 
performance of health facilities. 

In Madagascar, the selected indicator aimed to ensure that the healthcare staff, assigned to 
health  centres  located  in  remote  areas  with  funding  of  an  on-going  European  project  is 
included in the financing of the government budget (target partially met). As a corollary, the 
indicators for the following tranches paid close attention to the transfers made by the Ministry 
of the Interior and Decentralisation to clear part of the subsidy arrears owed to social sectors 
via the municipalities (target not met) and to the transfers specifically intended for contract 
staff responsible for drug management in health facilities. These criteria were not met, but 
they  led  to  a  dialogue  that  was  necessary  to  address  these  bottlenecks,  which  had  been 
paralysing the health sector for nearly ten years. 

Contribution  of  SBCs  to  specific  functions  of  government  responsibility  (drug 
management) 

SBCs  have  not  systematically  aimed  to  address  specific  aspects  of  education  and  health 
services. In the education sector, no indicator directly targets quality issues, except for those 
relating to basic teacher training as in Haiti, Sierra Leone or more recently Somalia with varying 
degrees of success (in Haiti, the indicator relating to a teacher training policy was dropped, but 
the indicator relating to the need for a provisional teaching licence for 60% of teachers was 
met). In the area of health, medicine management was addressed in two countries (Mali and 
Chad)  where  the  situation  had  become  extremely  precarious. Output  indicators  were 
formulated  to  resolve  the  bottleneck  of  drug  availability,  which  is  essential  to  sustain  the 
activities of healthcare facilities. In both countries, these were achieved.     

Limited contribution of SBCs to strengthening sectoral policies and better steering of 
both sectors 

In countries with institutional fragilities, SBCs contributed to strengthening the role of sectoral 
ministries in exercising sector leadership and managing these massive external funds that are 
unevenly aligned with national systems. However, it must be acknowledged that the SBC alone 
had little leverage in strengthening the management capacities of the  concerned ministries. 
The effect is most visible when the SBC is used in conjunction with other instruments such as 
the  Education  SRCs  (Niger)  or  other  structuring  projects  (Madagascar)  and  with  the 
interventions of other donors, in particular through basket funds (Burundi and Niger).  

In several countries (Haiti, CAR and Somalia), SBCs provided more or less explicit support to 
national education strategies, either existing or to be developed, and some offered to support 
the steering process of the sector. The effects remained modest, consisting mainly in published 
statistical yearbooks and marginally revised strategies. For the health sector, greater emphasis 
was placed by SBCs on monitoring an existing policy, or specific sections of it, than on the 
design  or  strengthening  of  an  overall  sector  policy.  Some  SBCs  were  able  to  align  with 

Final Report 

 Page 61 

EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

strategies already in place and to monitor output (Afghanistan (ANPDF/ NPPs)) or outcome 
(Niger) indicators. In other countries, such as Chad, SBCs sought to monitor a particular aspect 
of this strategy such as the integration of nutrition into the minimum package of health sector 
activities. 

Contribution to gender mainstreaming 

SBCs paid particular attention to the girls’ schooling (Mali, Niger, Central African Republic 
and Sierra Leone) through variable tranche indicators focusing on awareness-raising (Mali), 
on  monitoring  over  several  years  of  the  performance  of  girls’  enrolment  in  basic  education 
(Mali,  Niger  and  Central  Africa)  and  on  monitoring  the  performance  of  girls’  schooling  in 
secondary school (Sierra Leone). 

In the area of health, the issue of maternal health was addressed in several of the 15 countries 
studied  (Burundi,  Ivory  Coast,  Guinea,  Niger  and  Sierra  Leone)  through  variable  tranche 
indicators aimed at improving the performance of the health system in terms of assisted birth 
rates (Burundi, Guinea, Niger and Sierra Leone) and contraceptive prevalence rates (Burundi, 
Niger).  The  targets  set  for  the  proportion  of  assisted  deliveries  were  achieved  in  all  four 
countries,  as  were  the  targets  set  for  the  percentage  of  women  using  modern  methods  of 
contraception.  

Overall, there is no evidence that these efforts have led to a real qualitative leap in the provision 
of basic social services, even if, in the health sector, the timid jump in attendance at health 
facilities, established by the increase in births attended by skilled staff in the three countries 
where a VT monitored this theme, may give an indication of the improvement in the confidence 
of women giving birth (Burundi, Guinea and Niger). 

6.2.2 

Weak contribution to policies directly targeting vulnerable populations 

While  all  SBCs  had  the  objective  to  reduce  poverty,  few  of  them  explicitly  deployed  an 
intervention logic focusing around the theme of vulnerability: a trend confirmed by the results 
of the on-line survey according to which the problems of food security and of the consolidation 
and  structuring  of  safety  nets  were  only  marginally  targeted  by  SBCs  and  did  not  produce 
visible outcomes. 

In  contrast  to  sectoral  themes  such  as  health  and  education,  a  real  support  or  dialogue 
mechanism is indeed difficult to put in place to address this intrinsically multidimensional and 
above all  multi-sectoral problem,  which simultaneously  concerns  rural,  water  and  sanitation 
development policies, crisis management systems and social welfare mechanisms through, in 
most cases, free social services, or mechanisms to prevent the exclusion of certain categories 
of  the  population  (schooling  for  girls,  for  example).  SBCs  did,  however,  address  the  issue 
through  technical  dialogue  led  by  the  choice  of  variable  tranche  indicators  around  sectoral 
entry points (agriculture, water/sanitation, social sectors), or by more specifically targeting the 
strengthening of food security or some safety nets. The progress made by SBCs in this area 
seems very limited in view of the high stakes, the multiple causes of fragility and the elements 
needed to strengthen resilience. 

SBCs attempted to establish a dialogue in four countries on sectors identified as being at the 
forefront  of  strengthening  food  security  by  targeting  circumscribed  and  well-identified 
problems from the beginning in the field of agriculture, water and sanitation or food security 
mechanisms. The definition of a consistent set of indicators to support the same measure over 
several tranches has strengthened the dialogue with the partner and has made it possible to 
obtain results even though these were deferred with respect to the date of measurement of the 
target  achievement  (water  supply  in  Afghanistan,  strengthening  food  crisis  management 

Final Report 

 Page 62 

EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

systems in Mali). On another note, the example of Chad highlighted the difficulty of achieving 
the desired progress over time. 

In  both  cases  (Mali  and  Haiti),  the  issue  of  school  canteens  was  taken  into  account  as  a 
vector for improving children’s food security, with a positive effect in Mali, where the selected 
indicator made it possible to initiate a dialogue between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry 
of  Education  on  the  number  and  location  of  canteens  to  be  financed.  In  Haiti,  the  indicator 
“securing expenditure on the school canteen programme” was not achieved, and the dialogue 
was redirected to the issue of steering the sector.  

In the area of health, SBCs contributed to improving the financial accessibility of healthcare 
for populations identified as the most vulnerable, by allowing and encouraging the government 
to take  charge  of the  associated  exemptions (Niger,  Gambia  and Madagascar),  but  without 
ensuring the sustainability of the system.  

The goal of strengthening the safety nets was pursued through SBCs in three countries: in 
each case, an approach to establish continuous dialogue was evident: in Haiti, to implement 
the  national  risk  and  disaster  management  system;  in  Nepal,  for  effective  support  for  the 
disaster-affected populations; and in Niger, for effective management of healthcare provided 
free of charge to targeted groups (indicators achieved but which had been formulated within 
the framework of the GGDC).  

6.2.3 

Positive  contribution  to  progress 
healthcare, but no effect on the prevalence of malnutrition 

in  access  to  education  and 

The  quantitative  and  functional  improvement  in  supply  made  possible  by  maintaining  or 
increasing spending in the beneficiary sector produced positive outcomes in terms of use of 
social services and in terms of improvement in certain health indicators (see Section 3.3).  

The choice of variable tranche indicators was crucial to achieve a real leverage effect. In the 
health and education sectors, the variable tranche indicators favoured outcome indicators with 
a  high  achievement  rate,  particularly  in  education.  SBCs  used  relatively  fewer  process 
indicators and the rate of achievement of output and process indicators was lower overall than 
in all sectors. The variable tranche indicators therefore focused more on the achievement of 
outcomes than on addressing specific issues of health and education policies. When this has 
been the case, the results have so far not been very clear, showing the difficulty of addressing 
specific  sectoral  policy  issues  through  a  more  generalist  instrument.  However,  focusing  on 
priority outcomes can contribute to strengthening the government’s commitment to achieving 
them (rate of assisted childbirths, education of girls). 

Final Report 

 Page 63 

 
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

Figure 29: Variable tranche indicators in the social sectors   
Breakdown by type 

Source: ADE, based on data from the SBC database 

Figure 30: Variable tranche indicators in the social sectors   
Achievement rate 

Source: ADE, based on data from the SBC database 

Contribution of SBCs to improving primary school enrolment, including girls 

The  improvement  of  primary  school  enrolment  (see  Section  3.3)  was  achieved  through  a 
conjunction  of  factors,  one  of  the  main  ones  being  the  substantial  support  provided  to  the 
sector  by  the  TFPs  and  the  Global  Partnership  for  Education  (GPE).  Through  financial 
transfers and dialogue on the budget, SBCs contributed to this outcome by securing current 
public expenditure, essentially used to cover the wages of teaching staff. This is particularly 
the case in fragile countries with major financial constraints. In cases of reconstruction after a 
natural disaster, SBCs contributed more directly to the investment programme (Nepal) and to 
the redeployment of infrastructure to maintain services. 

The  increase  in  primary  school  enrolment  rates  was  coupled  with  improved  geographic 
accessibility  in  several  countries  (Nepal,  Ivory  Coast,  Madagascar  and  Sierra  Leone).  by 

Final Report 

 Page 64 

 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

ensuring a better distribution of resources over the territory, SBCs were able to contribute to 
this important outcome (Ivory Coast and Madagascar).  

SBCs mainstreamed gender in several countries where girls were the first to be expelled from 
school  (Central  Africa,  Mali,  Niger  and  Sierra  Leone).  In  three  of  these  countries,  an 
improvement in their school enrolment rate was observed during the period under study. The 
attention paid to this dimension through the variable tranche indicators has helped to maintain 
the course towards this goal. 

Contribution  of  SBCs  to  the  reduction  in  child  mortality  and  the  improvement  of 
maternal health (monitored pregnancies and assisted birth rates) 

The marked drop in child mortality in all SBC beneficiary countries (except for Dominica) can 
be explained by a combination of efforts made in the framework of the Millennium Development 
Goals. The countries have benefited from numerous, continuous, consistent and coordinated 
technical and financial supports, and of the mobilisation of significant funding in the context of 
international  initiatives  such  as  the  International  Health  Partnership,  the  Global  Alliance 
Vaccine Initiative (GAVI) or the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), 
in addition to the support traditionally provided by the TFPs.  

In this context, as in the education sector, SBCs contributed to this result, through financial 
transfers  and  dialogue  on  the  budget,  making  it  possible  to  preserve  and  even  increase 
expenditure in the sector and maintain a health supply network that is better distributed over 
the territory (Ivory Coast and Madagascar).   

By  contrast,  there  is  no  demonstrated  effect  on  immunisation  rates  (see  ANOVA  variance 
analysis), which can be partly explained by the fact that immunisation strategies are most often 
financed  by  external  funding  (such  as  the  United  Nations  (UNICEF,  WHO)  specialised 
programmes).  

The attention paid by SBC on maternal health in four of the 15 countries studied is reflected in 
the improvement among all SBC beneficiaries in indicators for the percentage of assisted births 
as well as those for attended pregnancies and contraceptive prevalence. The ANOVA results 
suggest a positive contribution of SBCs to the percentage of attended pregnancies for fragile 
SBC  beneficiary  countries  and  to  contraceptive  prevalence  for  non-fragile  SBC  beneficiary 
countries, but not for assisted births, suggesting that it is essentially through the expenditure 
effect (and not the variable tranche indicators) that SBCs contributed to these outcomes.   

Deterioration in undernourishment prevalence rates 

Food insecurity remained a major concern in most SBC beneficiary countries due to continued 
high vulnerability to shocks (increased climatic risks (drought (Mali, Niger and Chad), cyclones 
(Haiti and Dominica), flooding (Burundi)), recurring natural disasters (Nepal),  and persistent 
security  problems  with  their  effect  on  economic  dynamics  (Central  African  Republic,  Niger, 
Mali,  Chad  and  Afghanistan),  deterioration  in  the  political  situation  (Burundi),  endemic 
institutional weakness (Guinea, Haiti, Madagascar), falling prices in export products (Chad), 
absence  of  a  return  to  sustainable  growth  dynamics,  and  difficulties  in  implementing  and 
financing intrinsically multidimensional and multi-sector food security policies whose efficiency 
depends  on  the  effective  mobilisation  of  weak  national  structures.  In  this  context,  the 
contribution of SBCs could only be limited, although some small progress was made in areas 
of  policies  aimed  at  reducing  food  insecurity  and  strengthening  the  authorities’  response  to 
crises. The ANOVA analysis confirms that the effects of SBCs are not significant on indicators 
of severe malnutrition.  

Final Report 

 Page 65 

 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

6.3  Contribution  of  SBCs  to  peacebuilding  and 

democratic governance 

Numerous SBC programmes sought to strengthen democratic governance and to consolidate 
peace and the social contract. This section successively presents the contribution of SBCs to 
the strengthening of institutions that are responsible for security, justice and the maintenance 
of  peace,  as  well  as  their  contribution  to  the  reforms  necessary  to  strengthen  democratic 
governance,  before  analysing  the  extent  to  which  these  contributions  promoted  the 
achievement of expected outcomes (socio-political stabilisation, improved public governance 
and the rebuilding of the social contract).  

6.3.1 

Overall positive effects on the institutions responsible for ensuring the 
preservation of peace, security and justice  

Support for the creation and/or functioning of institutions in the area of peace, security 
and justice was a secondary theme of SBCs, but nonetheless integrated in nearly one 
third of the programmes (13/42 programmes) and affected just over half of the countries 
that were part of a case study (8 out of 15). Most of the time, SBCs focused their attention on 
these  themes  through  variable  tranche  indicators  and  sectoral  dialogue  envisaged  in  the 
context of the selected indicators, relating to one of these themes: i) creation of institutions in 
the  areas  of  peacekeeping,  security  and  justice,  and  the  fight  against  corruption,  ii) 
increase/maintenance of budget allocations for institutions in charge of justice, maintenance 
of  law  and  order,  security  and  the  fight  against  corruption;  and/or  iii)  the  strengthening  of 
systems, procedures and capacities of actors in the areas of justice or internal security.  

In the countries concerned, SBCs sought to support the restoration and/or consolidation of the 
functioning and/or creation of public institutions in the fields of justice (Burundi, Ivory Coast, 
Madagascar, Mali, Niger and Tunisia), transitional justice (Gambia and Ivory Coast), internal 
security  (Ivory  Coast,  Madagascar,  Mali  and  Somalia),  concerning  deconcentration  (Ivory 
Coast), the fight against corruption (Ivory Coast, Madagascar and Niger) and social dialogue 
to strengthen  labour  governance  (Tunisia).  In  some  cases,  these  themes  were  covered  via 
eligibility criteria (as in Mali where the designation of the structure responsible for monitoring 
and  implementing  the  roadmap  for  transition  was  an  eligibility  criterion  for  the  first  fixed 
tranche)  or  the  EU  matrix  of  priority  actions  (as  in  Madagascar  with  the  matrix  on  public 
finances and the fight against corruption).  

Overall, little complementary support through technical assistance covering these themes has 
been mobilised in SBCs. 

SBCs  have  contributed  to  strengthening  these  institutions  in  these  countries, 
particularly in the area of justice. Overall, progress remains slow and these institutions 
continue to be characterised by major institutional and financial weaknesses. According 
to  the  survey  respondents,  the  contribution  of  SBCs  was  of  “average”  importance  to  the 
recovery/consolidation of public institutions responsible for justice (score of 2.72/5) and internal 
security  (score  of  2.59/5),  and  of  “little”  importance  to  the  recovery/consolidation  of  public 
institutions responsible for defence (score: 1.42/5). In five of the eight countries in which SBCs 
covered this problem30, positive effects are visible with the creation of institutions in the field of 
justice (Niger and Tunisia), transitional justice (Gambia), and the fight against corruption (Ivory 
Coast),  and  with  an  improvement  in  the  functioning  of  the  institutions  and  capacities  of 

30   Information on the effects of the SBC in Somalia is not provided as the programme agreement was signed at 

the end of 2018, and it is too early to determine its effects. 

Final Report 

 Page 66 

                                                
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

stakeholders  in  the  area  of  justice  and  security  (e.g.  processes,  appointment  and  staff 
recruitment,  securing/increasing  budget  allocations,  strengthening  the  ethics  and  rules  of 
professional conduct of police officers). 

In Ivory Coast, the SBC supported i) an increased judicial networking and the functionality 
of the courts of first instance through the regular holding of civil and criminal hearings on the 
national  territory;  ii)  the  initiation  of  a  political  dialogue  on  the  independent  and  impartial 
process of criminal justice through the holding of fair criminal trials for the most serious crimes 
committed  during  the  post-electoral  crisis  (although the relevant  variable  tranche  indicator 
was  not  achieved);  and  iii)  the  strengthening  of  the  capacity  of  the  Ministry  of  Justice  to 
conduct a quality dialogue with the government and, in particular, to mobilise funds from the 
Ministry of Finance. 

In Gambia, the SBC supported the creation of transitional justice institutions (e.g.: the Truth 
and Reconciliation Committee) and human rights (e.g.: the Commission on Human Rights). 
These institutions showed slow progress in terms of capacity strengthening. 

6.3.2 

An overall positive effect on democratic governance reform processes  

SBCs have often aimed to support public policies and reforms that ensure the transition 
towards  democratic  governance  systems,  particularly  in  the  justice  sector,  including 
the  fight  against  corruption  and  to  a  lesser  extent  in  support  of  electoral  processes. 
Over  40%  of  the  SBCs  (18/42  programmes)  included  variable  tranche  indicators  for  one  of 
these themes: definition of policies and/or implementation of reforms in the justice or police 
sectors;  financing  and  support  for  electoral  processes;  support  for  the  decentralisation 
process; anti-corruption legislation; or an eligibility criterion on monitoring the implementation 
of peace agreements (sole case of Mali). In most of the country case studies (10/15 countries; 
14 SBCs), SBCs sought to support States in their process of transition towards a democratic 
governance  system,  in  particular  in  the  area  of:  justice  sector  reform  (Burundi,  Ivory  Coast, 
The Gambia and Niger), police reform (Somalia), strengthening citizen participation in public 
life  (Afghanistan),  promoting  merit  and  performance  in  the  administration  (Haiti),  anti-
corruption legislation (Haiti, Madagascar, Niger, Mali), decentralisation as an essential element 
of the peace agreement (Mali), support for electoral processes (Niger and Tunisia). It should 
be  noted  that  the  emphasis  placed  by  SBCs  on  local  democracy  and  citizen  participation 
remained generally modest. Finally, little additional support in the form of technical assistance 
covering these themes was mobilised within SBCs. 

Positive effects on democratic governance reform processes were visible in over half 
of the countries where these reforms were supported through SBCs (6/10 countries). In 
relation to the objectives referred to above, particularly note-worthy is the contribution of SBCs 
to the definition and programming of sectoral reforms in the areas of: justice (Ivory Coast and 
Gambia) and internal security (Niger); the promotion of the idea of an administration based on 
merit and performance (Haiti); progress in anti-corruption legislation (Madagascar and Niger), 
the financing and organisation of elections so that they become free and transparent (Niger 
and  Tunisia);  the  introduction  of  a  citizen’s  charter  targeting  the  improvement  of  citizen 
participation  in  public  life  (Afghanistan);  and  the  increase  in  the  transfers  of  funds  from 
deconcentrated  services  to  decentralised  services  as  an  essential  element  of  the  peace 
agreement (Mali). 

Final Report 

 Page 67 

 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

Justice and security sectors effects 

In Burundi, the SBC initiated support to justice sector reforms focused on issues associated 
with the backlog of cases and incarceration. Measures were taken by the government in 2013 
and 2014, without leading to any of the intended effects. Monitoring of actions in this field 
was discontinued at the end of 2014. 

In Ivory Coast, the SBC supported the definition and programming of a justice sector reform 
policy  tackling  major  challenges  in  the  sector  (fair  access  to  justice,  the  fight  against 
corruption,  conditions  of  detention,  etc.)  and  a  costed  action  plan  (2013-2015).  It  also 
promoted  computerised processing  of  jurisdictional  and penitentiary  information,  making  it 
possible to ensure credible monitoring and steering of public policy. 

In Niger, the SBCs supported justice and internal security reforms. A national internal security 
strategy (and its plan of action) was designed and adopted by the government in 2017 with 
support from the EU, the UNDP and EUCAP Sahel. Its implementation is supported by SBC3 
(implementation under way in 2019). 

In Mali, progress was gradually made in reforming the security sector with a working group 
set up in 2014, and an action plan for security sector reform, which was in the process of 
finalisation  in  2019.  SBC3  (signed  in  2018)  supported  this  process,  with  little  conclusive 
effects in mid-2019. 

Anti-corruption effects 

In  Niger,  SBCs  contributed  to  the  adoption  of  a  new  anti-corruption  law  (2016)  and  the 
establishment of the national anti-corruption policy and the High Authority for Coordinating 
the Fight against Corruption (target not met under SBC1 but met under SBC2). 

In Madagascar, the SBC2 contributed to advances in anti-corruption legislation with the anti-
corruption law adopted in 2016 and the Decree on the recovery of illicit assets, adopted in 
2019. Other legislation such as the Law on the declaration of assets of constitutional subjects 
and the Law on the recovery of illicit assets remained pending since 2016. 

However, the beneficiary countries remained characterised by major structural fragilities in the 
political and/or security areas. 

6.3.3 

Positive  contribution  to  the  political  transition  towards  a  democratic 
governance system 

SBCs  have  accompanied,  with  positive  effects  overall,  the  formal  progress  made  by 
beneficiary countries related to justice and security sector reforms, state redeployment, 
the emergence of democratic checks and balances, and increased legitimacy. To date, 
these advances have not led to visible results in terms of improved public governance. 
For the majority of countries undergoing political transition, electoral cycles have been factors 
in  domestic  policy  renewal  (Ivory  Coast,  Gambia,  Haiti  and  Tunisia)  contributing  to  a 
willingness  of  democratisation  and  openness,  framed  by  more  active  and  demanding  civil 
societies  (Afghanistan,  Madagascar,  Niger,  Tunisia).  In  these  countries,  there  was  greater 
political will and commitment to introducing institutional and public policy reforms. However, 
the  case  of  Burundi  shows  a  notable  hardening  and  drifting  of  executive  power.  In  the  six 
countries studied that showed progress (and where SBCs targeted these issues), the SBCs, 
by  focusing  on  supporting  the  creation  and  consolidation  of  public  institutions  -  including 
through securing budgets - and the adoption of national policies and the initiation democratic 
governance reforms, have promoted the establishment of conditions for political transition and 

Final Report 

 Page 68 

EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

for  the  establishment  of  stable  and  inclusive  governance.  The  progress  made  has  yet  to 
produce effects on the quality of governance and on the level of state legitimacy. 

6.3.4 

Mixed contribution to peacebuilding processes creating conditions for 
socio-political stabilisation 

The effects of SBCs on peacebuilding processes that should create the conditions for 
socio-political stabilisation have generally been mixed. SBCs have had positive effects in 
accompanying these processes when they were anchored in a successful political transition. 
On  the  other  hand,  they  have  had  modest  effects  on  these  processes  in  contexts  of  weak 
public  governance  and  fragile  peace  agreements.  This  shows  the  importance  of  external 
factors in determining whether or not SBCs contributed to these processes. During periods of 
cessation of armed conflict following the conclusion of a peace process coupled with political 
transition leading to a new political leadership, SBCs effectively accompanied peacebuilding 
reforms (Ivory Coast and CAR). In this context, political transitions offered a favourable context 
for  intervention  by  the  SBCs,  which  provided  stabilisation  and  recovery  support.  The 
experience of the SBC in Ivory Coast is notable in this regard, with effective SBC support for 
the territorial redeployment of local services in the security and justice sectors. On the other 
hand, in contexts where there is weak public governance, persistent armed conflict and fragile 
peace  processes,  SBC  support  to  government  efforts  had  very  modest  effects  on 
peacebuilding and the transition to a sustainable exit from crisis (Afghanistan and Mali). The 
effects of national policies were also limited by the difficulty for States to regain territorial control 
(Afghanistan, Mali, Somalia and CAR, despite the success of the transition process nationally). 

6.3.5 

Mixed contribution to the process of rebuilding the social contract 

SBCs, on the whole, have had mixed effects on the rebuilding of the social contract and 
mutual trust between ordinary citizens and the State and have not managed to avoid a 
deterioration in state legitimacy.  

The reforms supported by SBCs have largely focused on the creation of institutions and the 
adoption of national policy which, while necessary for institutional reform, are not sufficient for 
a renewal of the social contract, which also requires favourable governance conditions.  

States  that  have  successfully  undergone  democratic transition  (Ivory  Coast  and  Tunisia)  or 
democratic political alternation (Niger) have seen a strengthening in the quality of their public 
governance,  accompanied  by  more  ambitious  institutional  reforms  that  SBCs  were  able  to 
support in the areas of justice, the fight against corruption or citizen participation in particular. 
By contrast, in states with weaker governance (Haiti, Mali and Madagascar), unstable electoral 
processes  (Afghanistan,  Haiti  and  Madagascar)  and  the  persistence  of  armed  conflicts 
(Afghanistan  and  Mali),  SBC  support for  institutional  reforms  failed to  produce the  intended 
effects.  

The targets  achieved for  the  variable  tranche  indicators related to  the  level  of  sector  policy 
budget  allocation  did  not  automatically  translate  into  levels  of  deployment  and  quality  of 
services  throughout  the  territory.  SBCs,  which  were  focused  primarily  on  consolidating  the 
government at the central level, have provided relatively little support to deconcentration and 
decentralisation, as well as for citizen participation and local democracy mechanisms, which 
are key to promoting peaceful democratic transitions. These are themes that the EU was able 
to support through other aid modalities. There are a few exceptions worth highlighting: effective 
support for the local justice and police policy in Ivory Coast; the strengthening of Haitian civil 
society and its capacity for control and democratic interpellation thanks to institutional support 
mobilised within the framework of SBCs; support for the creation of the National  Council for 
Social Dialogue in Tunisia; support for the introduction of the citizens’ charter in Afghanistan 

Final Report 

 Page 69 

EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

and  the  on-going  process  of  decentralisation  in  Mali,  which  has  not  yet  led  to  territorial 
democratisation, as transfers of competences are yet to be made operational by transfers of 
concomitant means. 

Furthermore,  the  variance  analysis  (ANOVA)  indicates  that  the  “Political”  component  of  the 
Fragile States Index is improving for non-SBC beneficiary countries, while it is stagnating for 
countries that have benefited from a SBC. By breaking down the analysis into sub-indicators, 
we find the same negative result for the “state legitimacy” component, no significant effects for 
the  “public  services”  component  and  a  positive  effect  for  SBC  beneficiary  countries  on  the 
“human  rights”  component.  The  SBC  does  not  succeed  in  preventing  deterioration  in  state 
legitimacy  in  the  countries  supported,  but  fragile  SBC  beneficiary  countries  tend  to  see  an 
improvement in their indicators for human rights, a possible effect - among other factors - of 
greater international attention to countries receiving this support.  

Final Report 

 Page 70 

EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

7 Conclusions  

ADE 

The conclusions are structured into four groups:  

  The  capacity  of  SBCs  to  respond  to  the  needs  of  countries  in  situations  of 

fragility/transition; 

  The design of SBCs and their means of intervention; 

  The implementation of SBCs; 

  The effectiveness of SBCs and their contribution to outcomes. 

Figure 31: Summary of conclusions  

The following figure illustrates the summary of the main direct and indirect effects of SBCs, as well as 
their relationship to the outcomes and impacts identified. They cover the analyses developed in Sections 
3 to 6. 

Final Report 

 Page 71 

Implementation of SBCs10. A lack of integrated vision withinthe EU,with other TFPs and civil society 11. Restoration of the stability of the macro-fiscalframework and progress in PFM below expectations 13. Positive effects on political transition, and mixed effects on peacebuilding and democratic consolidation processes  5. Modalities of intervention overall adapted to the context 6. Weaknesses in intervention logicsand exit strategies 7. Can bequicklymobilised, adaptable and seeking to fit in with budget cycles 8. Close technical dialogue but weak political steering 9. Lack of human resources and tools 1. A unique and necessary instrument to respondto systemicshocks2. A responsecontributing to laying the foundations for the implementation of structural reforms by partner states but without managing to initiate policies addressing the factors of fragility over the long term4. Good understanding of the challenges and risks Capacity of SBCs to respond to needsDesignof SBCsEffectiveness of SBCs and sustainability of outcomes 12. Maintenance of of social services delivery but no increase in quality 14. Little influence on structuring policies15. Persistence of fragility and no strengthening of resilienceIntervention logicEQ1FragilityEQ2Direct effectsEQ3Macroeconomic stabilityEQ4PFMEQ5Institutions & reforms justice, security, peace EQ7Economic resilienceEQ6Basic social servicesEQ8Democratic governanceEQ9EfficiencyEQ10Coord. Compl.3.A responsenot sufficiently focused on the fate of populations 
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

Figure 32: Contribution of budget support to i) public policies and ii) outcomes and impacts 

Final Report 

 Page 72 

ImpactsOutcomesInduced outputsFinancial transfer (€3.882 M)Direct outputs•Regional instability•Global economic development•Responses to changes in incentives•Low public sector capacity & level of institutional development •Extent of political commitment to reform processes•Commitment of other donorsTechnical support (PFM, DRM, social sectors, justice, security, etc.)Expanded fiscal spaceForeign currency contributionBetter coordination: a concerted response from partners Alleviating cash flow constraintsLower financing costsMaintenance of current expenditure in the social sectorsFormulation & implementation of policies on primary schooling, maternal and child healthFinancing of basic state functions and stabilisation expenditureDifficulty in initiating social structural policiesBetter PFM: budget programming, including transparencyBetter PFM: quality of expenditure (public procurement, payroll management, control of execution)Stability of the macroeconomic framework & maintenance of basic economic circuits(+)Publicand private investment dynamics(-)Improvement of primary schooling(+)Improvement in the business climate (+/-)Diversificationof productive sectors(-)Malnutrition (-)Sustainableeconomic growth(-)Reductionin poverty(-)Consolidationof the rule of law and good democratic governance(-)Economicvulnerability(-)Better public service provision in the territoryCapacity for resilience among vulnerable populations (-)Institutional strengthening in the fields of peace, justice and securityDemocratic governance reform processesConsolidation of peace, security and justice (-)Transition to a democratic system(-)Rebuildingof the social contract (+)Fight against corruptionBetter DRM: collection of what is due, control of the tax base, tax exemptionBetter DRM: fiscal framework for sustainable and inclusive growth Difficulty in initiating structural policies tostrengthen the economyBetter alignmentLimited appropriationMacro-economic stabilisation& resilience, and public finance managementBasic social servicesPeace and democratic governanceStrategic & technical dialogueincl. concerning VT indicatorsàmacro, PFM, DRM, social sectors, justice, security, etc.Improvement in child mortality and maternal health(+)Limiting factorsSocialinclusion of vulnerable groups(-)Improvedpredictability of external aidEssential effectMajor effectAverage effectLittle effect 
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

7.1  SBCs  capacity  to  respond  to  the  needs  of 
fragility  and/or 

in  situations  of 

countries 
transition 

C1. 

A unique and necessary instrument to respond to systemic shocks  

The  SBC  has  proven  to  be  a  unique  and  necessary  instrument  to  respond  to  the 
immediate urgent requirements of situations of fragility / transition / reconstruction 
and to avoid processes of State collapse. In several cases, the EU seized a window of 
opportunity to initiate dialogue and implement a programme. 

SBCs have been designed to intervene in complex and varied situations of fragility. They have 
been mobilised in situations of i) acute political crisis during the critical period when countries 
were being steered by a Staff Monitored Programme while waiting to be able to access a credit 
facility, ii) recovery and reconstruction following a natural disaster, iii) economic shocks in a 
fragile environment, or iv) structural fragility aggravated in some cases by high security risks. 
These contexts of intervention, each of which have their specific features, have generally been 
characterised by the urgency of the response to be provided, substantial cash requirements, 
weak  institutional  structures,  an  uncertain  and  changing  outlook,  high  risks  and  high 
vulnerability of the populations.  

The SBC is the only instrument that enables the EU, in a short period of time, to finance the 
government  current  expenditure  (for  the  most  part,  the  salary  of  beneficiary  countries’  civil 
servants)  with  a grant  and  ensure  the  survival  of  the  State  in  extreme  cases  (such  as  The 
Gambia, Chad and the Central African Republic). In a context of increasing other aid channels, 
in  particular  humanitarian  aid,  SBCs,  which  followed  a  systematic  approach  placing  the 
government at the heart of the response to fragility, also responded to the need to strengthen 
the capacity of vital state structures. By guiding the use of government resources towards basic 
services and contributing to consolidating national systems, SBCs enabled the government to 
continue to exercise its core functions and thus protect populations from the effects of shocks. 
Compared  to  the  other  instruments  at  the  EU’s  disposal  for  intervention  in  these  types  of 
situation, SBCs enabled the EU to go beyond a direct  and ad hoc response to crises. They 
have simultaneously addressed macroeconomic instability, weak public governance and basic 
social services delivery. They have paved the way for support over time, where necessary, for 
public policy reforms, particularly in contexts where there is a clear willingness to reform.  

In over half of the cases analysed (9/15), the deployment of the (first) SBCs coincided with a 
window of opportunity created by the circumstances, through which the EU was able to launch 
a long-term commitment and gradually broaden its scope of action.  

Final Report 

 Page 73 

 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

C2. 

A  stabilising  instrument  contributing  to  laying  the  foundations  for  the 
implementation  of  structural  reforms  by  partner  States,  but  without 
succeeding in initiating policies addressing fragility over the long term 

SBCs have above all provided a response to stabilisation needs. The magnitude of 
financial  resources,  the  duration  of  the  programmes  and  the  fragility  of  the 
intervention contexts limited their ability to respond to the need of consolidating the 
economies  and  societies  in  which  they  were  deployed.  However,  by  focusing  their 
action  on  strengthening  public  finance  management  and  domestic  revenue 
mobilisation,  they  contributed  to  laying  the  foundations  enabling  for  partner 
countries  to  implement  structural  reforms.  The  latter  could  be  supported  by  other 
instruments (Sector Reform Contract (SRC), institutional support, blending, projects, 
basket funds, etc.). 

The objectives of SBCs were ambitious: 

  Restoring macroeconomic and budgetary stability; 

  Consolidating state and societal resilience; 

  Supporting a process of transition towards development and democratic governance; 

  Promoting reforms intended to tackle the sources of vulnerability; 

  Ensuring vital state functions (notably the provision of peace and security, the payment of 
civil service salaries, the provision of core administrative functions and of minimum basic 
services). 

The SBC has proven to be a unique instrument for preventing the worsening of the vicious 
cycle  of  fragility  and  for  accompanying  the  exit  from  crises  by  mitigating  their  potentially 
disastrous  consequences.  Indeed,  SBCs  have  contributed  to  i)  a  return  to  macroeconomic 
stability; ii) the consolidation of the state and its legitimacy, iii) the maintenance of basic social 
services; and iv) the protection of the territory as a whole and of its inhabitants.  

By contrast, in view of the ambition of the objectives, the results achieved in terms of increasing 
resilience  and  reducing  the  vulnerability  factors  in  the  beneficiary  countries  seem  modest. 
However, the response delivered by the SBC made it possible to go beyond the simple rescue 
of States in crisis. By focusing on reforms of public finance management systems and domestic 
revenue  mobilisation  policies,  the  SBC  contributed  to  bolstering  national  systems  and 
establishing the conditions for the implementation of structural reforms to consolidate the State 
and  society.  These  reforms  can  then  be  supported  by  other  instruments  (Sector  Reform 
Contract,  institutional  support,  blending,  projects,  joint  funds,  etc.)  that  have  greater  added 
value to support consolidation. 

The  transition  towards  a  consolidation  phase  has  indeed  proved  more  complex  in 
environments  where  it  is  difficult  to  introduce  a  long-term  vision  and  carry  out  structural 
reforms. The stabilisation process led to policies for fiscal austerity that have left little room for 
more ambitious actions to diversify the economy, to combat youth unemployment or protect 
the environment. The inclusion of the objective of state and societal resilience at the heart of 
the  SBC  as  of  2017  has  not  yet  shown  its  added  value.  Although  several  of  the  indicators 
relating to structural economic policies such as technical and vocational training, the regulation 
of  public  services,  infrastructure  or  labour  market  policies  have  been  achieved,  the  added 
value of a comprehensive instrument such as the SBC has not been shown on issues that are 
often  technically  complex  and  require  specific  institutional  support.  More  generally,  in 
structurally  fragile  states  with  persistent  institutional  weaknesses,  the  conduct  of  structural 

Final Report 

 Page 74 

 
 
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

reforms designed to reduce economic, social and political fragilities is rendered more difficult 
and requires significant political commitment and major technical support that goes beyond the 
scope of one or more successive SBCs.  

C3. 

A response not sufficiently focused on the fate of populations  

Within the limitations of its scope of intervention, SBCs have not sufficiently focused 
on populations: the intervention logics were insufficiently geared towards the changes 
expected  at  their  level;  the  fragility  analyses  have  not  sufficiently  well  covered  the 
institutional and sectoral aspects directly affecting them.  

Beyond the unfavourable context, the difficulties encountered by SBCs in having an effect on 
resilience capacities and situation of the populations are partly due to the complex nature of 
the situations themselves and the difficulty of addressing through this instrument the multiple 
fragility  factors  affecting  these  populations.  SBCs  have  not  sufficiently  taken  into  account 
several vulnerability factors affecting populations, such as: 1) obstacles to youth employment; 
2) issues of deconcentration and the reduction of territorial inequalities, that are a condition for 
a peaceful transition to democratic governance; 3) the weakness of local democracy and of 
civic engagement stakeholders; 4) climate fragility and the protection of natural resources; 5) 
the multidimensional factors of extreme poverty and malnutrition.  

7.2  SBCs Design  

C4. 

Programmes based on a good understanding of the challenges and risks  

In general, SBCs have delivered an appropriate response to fragility factors identified 
in the context of prior fragility and risk analyses, despite several limitations.  

All SBCs were subject to succinct fragility/context analyses and more in-depth risk analyses 
as part of their identification/formulation process. The fragility analyses provide an overview of 
fragility in its various dimensions but have several limitations: they do not thoroughly cover the 
different  fragility  factors;  they  do  not  cover  the  institutional  fragility  which  SBCs  seek  to 
address; or sub-state fragility factors; and they do not identify the sources of resilience. The 
risk  analyses  cover  the  risks  relating  to  macroeconomics,  public  finance  management  and 
corruption in greater depth than political and developmental risks.  

All these initial analyses together generally enabled SBCs to respond to the challenges the 
countries  are  facing  and  to  address  the  immediate  priorities  of  stabilisation,  as  well  as  the 
shortcomings observed in public finance management. However, in a third of the programmes 
analysed,  the  thoroughness  and  frequency  of  the  fragility  analysis  and  of  the  context 
assessment, particularly at sector level, were not always sufficient to deliver an appropriate 
response (often a formulation of variable tranche indicators not entirely focused on the issues 
at stake). 

Final Report 

 Page 75 

 
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

C5.   Modalities of intervention generally adapted to the context  

The  modalities  of  intervention  of  SBCs  have  generally  been  well-suited  to  the 
situation of fragility and have shown flexibility during implementation. This enabled 
the EU to strike the right balance between the need to provide financial support to a 
State  at  a  critical  moment  and  to  engage  in  reforms,  including  through  continued 
support over time. 

The  programmes  were  often  prepared  in  a  short  period  of  time  based  on  a  dynamic 
assessment of eligibility. They often comprised a significant initial fixed tranche with no variable 
tranche and included variable tranche indicators focused on inputs and/or direct outputs for 
the  following  tranches.  Specific  elements  were  also  introduced  during  programme  design 
(indicators not specified in the financing agreement, multi-year disbursements, precautionary 
measures, etc.). 

The evaluation of the eligibility criteria took into account the weak institutional capacity, as well 
as the slow and differentiated progress over time in implementing reforms in different countries. 
The objective was to avoid jeopardising stabilisation, particularly in the fiscal area. However, 
this  flexibly  led  implicitly  to  the  lifting  of  the  binding  nature  of  the  general  conditions  and, 
therefore, the desired incentive effect. That was particularly the case for the general condition 
relating to the relevance and credibility of the development policy and for the condition relating 
to the implementation of a relevant and credible public finance management reform plan, even 
though some progress was observed in this area thanks, above all, to the attention given to it 
in the specific conditions and the technical assistance targeting these reforms.  

The variable tranche indicators have in fact been the main lever for encouraging the initiation 
and/or implementation of reforms and for fuelling technical dialogue. With nearly 30% of targets 
not met and nearly 30% of the amounts not disbursed, the sanction/bonus mechanism was 
well applied, but with disruptive effects on the predictability of funds. The country case studies 
showed that the added value of an indicator was not limited to its performance. Difficulty in 
achieving them could also reflect the severity of bottlenecks and triggered useful dialogue.  

Overall, the indicators have been relevant to the context, having been designed to ease the 
constraints identified for the restoration of government functions. The findings of this evaluation 
show that the indicators were not, however, always able to have the expected incentive effect 
due to certain limitations, in particular: 

  Ownership by the partner (why, how, when): in several cases, national interlocutors 1) were 
not  familiar  with  the  indicators  selected  (particularly  at  the  sectoral  level);  or  2)  had  not 
properly  understood the reasons for the  choice of  these indicators  and their  articulation 
with their own public policy objectives;  

  Realism  of  the targets  set:  unrealistic goals  or, on  the  contrary, the  choice  of  indicators 
already achieved in order not to penalise the disbursement limit the incentive effect;  

  Relevance  to  the  objectives  sought:  the  indicators  were  not  always  appropriately 
formulated, particularly in cases where they were not sufficiently representative of national 
practices or did not reflect a real reform issue; 

  Continuity: indicators used for the disbursement of a single variable tranche had little effect 

if they were not monitored through dialogue or other accompanying measures. 

Final Report 

 Page 76 

 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

C6.  Weaknesses of intervention logics and exit strategies  

The intervention logics of SBCs have not been explained in detail, partly because of 
the complexity of the intervention contexts, and presented several weaknesses that 
could undermine the effectiveness of the programmes. The “exit strategy/strategy to 
sustain the gains made” has de facto led to the renewal of an SBC or the introduction 
of  another  type  of  budget  support,  without  sufficient  reflection  on  alternative 
scenarios or to ensure the sustainability of the outcomes. 

The programme intervention logics were not sufficiently clearly explained due to the complexity 
of  the  intervention  contexts,  characterised  by  major  uncertainty  and  the  presence  of  many 
uncontrollable  factors.  The  assumptions  underlying  the  successful  implementation  of  the 
programmes are numerous, hard to identify and change over time. Risk monitoring helped to 
identify them, but the analyses of the risk management framework  have generally not been 
used to update and adapt the intervention logics of the programmes being implemented. 

Other weaknesses were identified in the intervention logics, which are not all due to the fragile 
context: too general and often too ambitious formulation of programme objectives; a lack of 
phasing  for  the  achievement  of  induced  outputs  (improvement  in  public  policies,  public 
institutions,  public  spending  and  service  delivery);  confusion  between  direct  and  induced 
outputs/outcomes;  the  lack  of  elements  specifying  how  the  dialogue  and  above  all 
complementary  technical  support  will  contribute to  the  achievement  of  induced  outputs  and 
outcomes;  the  absence,  in  some  cases,  of  overall  performance  matrices  tracking  the 
achievement of elements of the intervention logic.   

The SBC exit strategy/strategy to sustain the gains made were not made explicit and implicitly 
relied,  particularly  for  structurally  fragile  countries,  on  the  transition  to  SRCs/GGDCs, 
depending on the context, as indicated in the guidelines, but with no establishment of clear 
conditions for transition from one type of contract to another and without sufficiently ensuring 
the sustainability of the outcomes achieved. The change of approach in 2017, no longer setting 
limits  to the  number  of  successive  SBCs  and  extending  its  duration  to three  years,  did  not 
clarify the exit strategy options. It also promoted the renewal of SBCs over time, particularly in 
countries that for political reasons are not eligible for C-MDG. These cases of successive SBCs 
(e.g. Mali, Niger and Haiti) show a gradual evolution towards multi-sector programmes with 
increasingly broad goals over time and that move away from the core of the instrument. 

7.3  SBCs Implementation 

C7. 

An instrument that can be quickly mobilised, adaptable and seeks to be 
articulated with budgetary cycles 

During  their  implementation,  SBCs  have  generally  been  able  to  ensure  rapid 
response, adapt to changing situations, take the budgetary cycle into account and, in 
general, ensure good predictability of funds, although efforts remain to be made in 
this regard. 

The financial transfer component of SBCs has often been implemented very quickly: in over 
half of the country case studies, SBCs enabled the EU to deliver a rapid response to deal with 

Final Report 

 Page 77 

 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

a situation considered urgent and in some cases acted as triggers for mobilising contributions 
in the form of budget support from other donors.  

The instrument has generally shown itself to be responsive to changing contexts and needs, 
and  underwent  numerous  adaptations  along  the  way  (revised  amounts,  extended  duration, 
modification  of  variable  tranche  indicators,  special  tranches  to  address  specific  shocks, 
reallocation of undisbursed amounts).   

The SBC has taken care to ensure that transfer periods are well coordinated and anticipated 
with the budget cycles in very tight budgetary situations, often encountered in fragile countries, 
where shifts - even by one quarter - can lead to cash flow difficulties. Overall, the findings of 
the  evaluation  show  that  the  predictability  of  disbursements  was  satisfactory.  The  fixed 
tranches, especially when they were disbursed alone or separately from the variable tranches, 
were predictable and more than 50% were disbursed within the foreseen timeframe. But the 
variable tranches were perceived by the beneficiaries as being largely unpredictable  due to 
the uncertainty about the amounts to be received, which were difficult to estimate at the time 
of  budget  programming.  Disbursements  were  also most  often made  at the  end  of the fiscal 
year, whereas the guidelines recommend, wherever possible, disbursements at the start of the 
fiscal year.  

C8. 

Close technical dialogue but weak political steering  

A  local  technical  dialogue  that  is  highly  valued  by  the  beneficiaries  was  generally 
established  through  the  implementation  of  SBCs.  Political  dialogue  under  the 
instrument was more timid and often undermined by the need to stabilise the situation 
in macroeconomic terms. 

In  the  15  countries  studied,  dialogue  has  been  a  central  element  of  SBCs,  as  these 
programmes have been a unique vehicle for dialogue on budgetary, fiscal and public financial 
management system-related issues, as well as on respect for fundamental values. Technical 
dialogue, based on variable tranche indicators, has been stepped up and has been gradually 
developed  and  structured  (through  monitoring  platforms  or  the  establishment  of  steering 
committees), in a logic of proximity that is welcomed by partner country representatives and 
considered a specific characteristic of the EU approach. 

The rapid mobilisation of funding enabled SBCs to take a leading role in the dialogue resulting 
from  the  emergency  situation  and  to  take  advantage  of  the  window  of  opportunity.  A 
resumption or revival of political dialogue with governments has thus been made possible in 
complex situations (Afghanistan, Gambia, Mali and Burundi prior to 2016).  

The political leverage of SBCs was recognised in over half of the country case studies, notably 
thanks to the inclusion of specific conditions for the disbursement of fixed tranches (Mali, Haiti 
and Tunisia). However, political steering, which ensures the government’s commitment at the 
highest  level  on  the  reforms  that  the  SBC  intends  to  support,  was  less  robust  and  often 
undermined  by  the  urgent  need  for  macroeconomic  stabilisation  and  the  disbursement  of 
funds.  This  steering  is,  however,  crucial  in  contexts  where  national  authorities’  political 
commitment to SBC objectives has not always been ensured. The SBC steering mechanism 
at the highest level in beneficiary countries has not been sufficiently systematized. It did not 
include  a  systematic  dialogue  during  the  preparation/approval  of  disbursement  files.  The 
the 
involvement  of 
identification/formulation phase.  

limited,  particularly  during 

remained  generally 

the  EEAS 

The  general  conditions  established  to  ensure  the  effectiveness  of  the  instrument  did  not 
generally provide a real leverage effect, although some progress was made. The main “means 

Final Report 

 Page 78 

 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

of exerting pressure” was the non-disbursement of amounts linked to unmet variable tranche 
indicators, but this has not allowed political dialogue on the country’s overall commitment to 
carrying  out  basic  reforms.  The  postponement  of  disbursement  when  the  macroeconomic 
condition was not met, was another tool for applying pressure, but mainly under the impetus 
of the IMF. 

C9. 

Lack of human resources and tools 

The human resources and tools mobilised at EU level and in partner countries have 
been insufficient to allow the full potential of the instrument to be deployed. 

The formulation and implementation of SBCs require major resources both at EU and partner 
country level. For both parties, this involves: i) conducting or coordinating fragility analyses, 
risk assessment, analyses of the evolution of the context; ii) negotiating programme content, 
iii) analysing the eligibility criteria; iv) monitoring the indicators selected for variable tranches; 
v) participating in and contributing to the technical and political dialogue on these issues; vi) 
planning  and  performing  monitoring  of  the  complementary  support;  vii)  coordinating  the 
disbursement files and justifying the achievement of criteria; and viii) performing continuous 
monitoring of the stakeholders present. Both the EU Delegations and the partners have not 
been able to deploy sufficient resources to ensure these tasks, both in number and sometimes 
also in terms of qualifications.  

The  tools  deployed  to  support  staff  were  welcomed  but  insufficiently  developed  and/or 
deployed,  especially  the  training  and  guidance  tools  specific  to  interventions  through  BS  in 
situations of fragility.  

The decision-making process involving the EU Delegations and various headquarters services 
has proven to be sound. The findings of the evaluation demonstrate that this long and multi-
phase process is justified given the importance of the decisions to be taken and the need for 
analysis underlying the programmes. The role of the Budget Support steering committee at the 
core  of  this  process  was  important  for  taking  into  consideration  changes  in  context  and 
developing  a  common  vision  at  headquarters.  Overall,  the  interactions  between  the 
headquarters and the EU Delegations were valued, particularly the technical support received 
by the headquarters throughout the phases of the programme cycle. By contrast, in  several 
cases, the EUDs did not feel sufficiently heard in the choice of orientations.  

C10.  A lack of comprehensive vision within the EU, with other TFPs and civil 

society  

SBCs have shown weaknesses in applying an EU integrated approach in response to 
the situation of fragility. In particular, these comprise poor complementarity between 
EU instruments and with other TPF and a low level of involvement of civil society. 

SBCs were mobilised without their specific role being sufficiently established in relation to that 
of  other  EU instruments. The  complementarity between  SBCs  and  other  EU  interventions 
seeking to reduce fragility was very variable and strongly influenced by the local context. This 
has mainly resulted in the use of complementary support (TA) to help beneficiaries meet the 
variable tranche indicators. Complementarity with ECHO's humanitarian aid, which accounted 
for a growing share of aid in these countries alongside SBCs, has not materialised to any great 
extent and this was also the case with the CSDP missions. Similarly, effective complementarity 
with the SRCs was rather weak in the field, even though SBCs and SRCs are budget support 
implemented by the same teams.  

Final Report 

 Page 79 

EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

SBCs  made  it  possible  to  stimulate  coordination  with  the  other  technical  and  financial 
partners providing BS, but within the limits of each one's respective strategies. The design 
of SBCs has fostered an in-depth dialogue with the technical and financial partners providing 
BS, as the programmes were generally designed in close collaboration with the other partners. 
Rather, they were implemented on a bilateral basis. The approach has often been convergent, 
but rarely joint, except in situations of extreme emergencies requiring a strong response (Ivory 
Coast, Chad and Somalia).  

Complementarity  between  the  (objectives  and  means  of)  SBCs  and the  IMF  was  crucial  to 
maximize the contribution of SBCs to macroeconomic stabilisation and public finance reform. 
It was insufficient in the area of complementary technical support (TA), as the EU generally 
had little information/influence on the work of AFRITAC, which, however, it largely finances. 
The  public  finance  management/domestic  resource  mobilisation  axis  is  the  one  where 
coordination  among  partners  has  been  the  most  developed  and  fruitful.  When  cooperation 
among all BS providers materialised, it considerably enhanced the credibility and effectiveness 
of SBCs through the unification of public policy dialogue and the reduction of transaction costs 
for the beneficiary. 

Ensuring effective coordination in other areas essential for state reconstruction has remained 
a challenge: fragility analyses are specific to each partner and not shared among them; and 
even if partners share a common vision of the main challenges of the situation, developing a 
common vision on the type of joint response to be provided is still far more difficult.  

Finally, the involvement of civil society in the design, implementation or evaluation of SBCs 
has generally been very limited. This is largely explained by the fact that the partner State is 
the main interlocutor involved in the negotiation and implementation of the SBC. It is very often 
the case that situations of fragility result from a lack of confidence of the populations in their 
public  authorities  over  which  they  have  little  influence.  The  strengthening  of  civil  society 
information  and  control  mechanisms,  which  in  some  countries  has  been  the  subject  of 
complementary  support  to  SBCs,  has  generally  been  insufficiently  linked  to  the  reforms 
supported by SBCs.                                                                                                                      

Final Report 

 Page 80 

 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

7.4  SBCs Effectiveness 

ADE 

SBCs have above all contributed to stabilizing the economic and social situation, and initiating 
early recovery after a crisis, thus avoiding a deterioration in conditions or even, in some cases, 
state  collapse.  It  is  in  this  role  that  they  have  proved  most  effective,  with  a  more  mixed 
contribution to consolidation and sustainable recovery phases.  

Figure 33: Summary of the effectiveness of SBCs 

C11.   Above all a stabilising instrument, first and foremost in terms of  fiscal 

and macroeconomic policy  

By mobilising substantial financial resources in consultation with other TFPs (mainly 
multilateral), SBCs have first and foremost contributed to restoring the stability of the 
macro-fiscal  framework.  The  effects  in  terms  of  strengthening  PFM  fell  short  of 
expectations despite progress in budget programming, cash management and public 
increased  but  still  weak 
procurement  management,  against  a  backdrop  of 
transparency. 

The  effect  of  SBCs  was  most  visible  in  the  provision  of  financial  resources  that  cushioned 
shocks  to  government  current  expenditure.  SBCs  did  not  prevent  adjustments  in  capital 
expenditure.  Neither  did  they  influence  the  macroeconomic  policy  stance  pursued  by  the 
countries in conducting fiscal and monetary adjustments, which remained the prerogative of 
the IMF. The gains in DRM, especially in improving collection of what is owed, have helped to 
sustain these stabilising effects and strengthen the capacity to respond to shocks.  

While  overall  progress  in  public  financial  management  fell  short  of  expectations,  SBCs,  by 
prioritising  the  deficiencies  observed  according  to  context,  contributed,  in  particular,  i)  in 
structurally fragile countries, to improving budget programming processes and strengthening 
cash  management,  and  ii)  in  non-fragile  countries,  to  improving  public  procurement 
management.   

The effects in terms of public financial management and DRM were mainly achieved through 
the  variable  tranche  indicators  and  the  technical  dialogue  surrounding  them.  The  leverage 
effect of the general condition relating to public financial management was not very effective 
as  it  was  particularly  limited  by  the  need  to  meet  immediate  stabilisation  needs.  The 

Final Report 

 Page 81 

State buildingHot conflictStabilisationPeacebuildingHuma-nitarianPeacemaking(1-2 years)Peacebuilding (5-10 years)Positive effects of SBCsLimited effects of SBCsLegend 
 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

assessment  of  this  general  condition  has  often  been  considered  favourable,  despite  the 
obvious slowness and bottlenecks in the implementation of the reforms initiated.   

Budget  transparency  has  been  improved  through  greater  availability  of  budget  documents, 
including during budget execution, and through a greater role for parliament and civil society 
(notably  through  citizen  budgeting)  in  the  budget  programming  process.  It  is  the  eligibility 
criterion on this  theme  that  mainly  drove these  advances.  These  have not  yet  led  to a real 
improvement  in  the  transparency  of  budget  choices,  public  participation  or  accountability 
mechanisms in the States concerned.  

C12.   Maintenance of social services delivery but no quality enhancement 

SBCs  have  contributed  to  maintain  basic  social  services  delivery  (education  and 
health),  notably  thanks  to  the  increase  of  the  fiscal  space  provided  by  these 
programmes and to the dialogue conducted on these issues. However, they have not 
been able to contribute to a strengthening of the quality of social services. 

Fiscal  and  monetary  adjustments  have  been  made  while  preserving  overall  spending  on 
education and health, and ensuring that basic services in these sectors is maintained. SBCs 
contributed  in part  to these  effects,  as shown  by  the  variance  analysis.  The  enlarged fiscal 
space provided by SBCs was a key element allowing for the maintenance/increase of these 
expenditures.  It  has  been  accompanied  by  specific  conditions  and/or  dialogue  specifically 
focused on preserving budget allocations and on the effective  execution of expenditures so 
that  the  expenditure  effect  materialises.  Accompanying  transfers  with  sustained  dialogue 
concerning the budget instrument  has been key, in tense environments, in the allocation of 
available resources to address  the  urgency  of  multiple  needs,  particularly  security  needs  in 
countries where the risk of conflict remained high (e.g. Mali and Niger).  

By  helping  to  maintain  expenditure  in  sectors  deemed  essential  for  the  protection  of 
populations (health, education, justice, security), SBCs have shown their specificity in relation 
to IMF interventions, which set the framework for macroeconomic policies over which other 
donors have no influence.  

On the other hand, the evaluation shows that SBCs were not able to initiate a consolidation of 
sectoral policies in these areas or contribute to increasing the quality of the services.   

C13.  A  more  appropriate  and  effective  instrument  to  support  political 

transition than peacebuilding or the refounding of the social contract 

The SBC has been an appropriate and effective instrument to respond to crises, 
particularly during the phases of political transition, which were the most favourable 
context for successful intervention. It was less appropriate and effective in 
supporting other cycles of conflict.  

SBCs have also contributed to mitigating the effects of crises on the conditions for democratic 
governance. In particular, they have contributed to (i) creating and/or strengthening institutions 
in the area of peace, security, justice and anti-corruption (e.g. through increased/maintained 
budget allocations and/or by strengthening stakeholders’ systems, procedures and capacities) 
and (ii) the adoption of national policies and the initiation of reform processes in democratic 
governance.  These  effects  have  been  achieved  through  the  inclusion  of  variable  tranche 
indicators  for  these  sectors,  as  well  as  the  attention  paid  to  fundamental  values  in  the 
framework  of  political  dialogue.  This  specificity  of  SBCs  compared  to  other  donors'  BS  is 
considered by the latter a strong point of the EU. However, overall progress has remained slow 

Final Report 

 Page 82 

EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

and the institutions supported have continued to be characterised by significant institutional 
and financial weaknesses. Moreover, progress has been slow to have an effect on the quality 
of governance and the states’ level of legitimacy.  

Overall, SBCs have produced (i) heterogeneous effects on the quality of public reforms during 
the peacebuilding phase, (ii) fairly positive effects on the phases of political transition towards 
a  democratic  governance  system,  and  (iii)  more  mixed  effects  on  the  phases  of  stable 
democratic consolidation. The phases of political transition are the most favourable context for 
successful  SBC  intervention,  with  the  most  substantial  effects  on  reforms  being  observed 
during periods of democratic opening and quality political and technical dialogue.  

The  expected  progress  in  countries  emerging  from  crisis,  from  a  stabilisation  phase  to  a 
political  transition  towards  public  democratisation,  does  not  appear  to  have  been  achieved 
within the group of SBC beneficiary countries. This overall unfavourable evolution illustrates 
the difficulty of public policies in fragile states to produce effects on the determinants of conflict 
and on democratic governance. 

C14.  Little influence on structuring policies that would consolidate the sectors 

targeted and reduce vulnerability 

SBCs have not been able to sustainably influence policies intended to build 
resilience and reduce vulnerabilities. 

In  none  of  the  three  targeted  areas  have  SBCs  led  to  a  sustainable  consolidation  of 
government policies. The macro-fiscal framework has been stabilised, but the conditions for 
consolidation  of  this  framework  in  the  medium  term  have  not  been  established.  The 
macroeconomic  risks  are  still  present,  or  even  higher,  and  the  economic  vulnerability  of 
beneficiary governments has not diminished. While SBCs have been able to contribute to the 
restoration of a sustainable macroeconomic balance, this balance was not sufficient to bring 
about sustainable growth and an exit from poverty.  

In  the  social  sectors,  SBCs  have  contributed  to  maintaining  and  strengthening  health  and 
education services but not to improving the quality of the services, structuring sectoral policies 
or better steering of the sectors. At the same time, SBCs have contributed to better care for 
certain vulnerable populations (particularly in terms of girls' schooling or the implementation of 
a policy of free healthcare for women/children and access to the school system) but in a limited 
way  and  without  ensuring  its  sustainability.  Overall,  SBCs  have  had  little  effect  on  the 
systems/policies for caring for food-insecure populations. 

Furthermore, through the general condition on public policy, SBCs have aimed to support a 
relevant  and credible public  policy,  intended  to  address the  vectors of fragility  faced  by  the 
country, and to ensure its implementation. However, this criterion has rarely been synonymous 
with leverage to encourage the government to take better account of fragility and resilience 
factors in its policy. 

C15.   Stabilised  situations  in  what  is  still  a  very  fragile  environment  without 
strengthening societies' resilience capacity  

The  SBC  has  so  far  not  played  a  leading  role  in  strengthening  the  capacity  for 
resilience  of  fragile  societies  in  complex  and  uncertain  contexts  marked  by  the 
persistence  of  internal  and  external  shocks.  However,  by  stabilising  government 
functions  and  ensuring  the  maintenance  of  basic  services,  it  has  been  able  to 
contribute to social progress without reducing poverty or vulnerability.  

Final Report 

 Page 83 

EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

The majority of the beneficiary countries in situations of structural fragility have experienced a 
virtual status quo in their situation, without strengthening their capacity for resilience or their 
medium-term growth process. The implementation period of SBCs, from 2012 to 2018, was 
generally marked by the persistence of situations of fragility in the beneficiary countries without 
any real improvement in the capacity for resilience of the countries concerned and without any 
real  strengthening  of  economic  structures,  governance  capacity  or  the  functioning  of 
institutions.  

In these countries, SBCs have, above all, contributed to maintaining the status quo, avoiding 
massive deterioration in their situation and enabling them to pursue the efforts undertaken in 
the  social  sectors  with  the  support  of  donors.  In  these  complex  contexts,  SBCs  have  thus 
contributed  to  the  progress  made  in  terms  of  schooling  and  health,  and  in  particular  the 
improvement of children's schooling at primary level, including girls, as well as the reduction 
of infant mortality and the improvement of maternal health. 

SBCs have not reduced the vulnerability of populations and this remains a major challenge. In 
this  respect,  the  deterioration  in  the  undernourishment  prevalence  rates  in  most  of  the 
countries  benefiting  from  SBCs  is  only  the  visible  tip  of  a  very  deep  iceberg,  in the  face  of 
which public policies in the contexts encountered remain powerless.   

8 Recommendations 

The specific  contexts  of fragility/transition/reconstruction targeted  by  SBCs  are  not going to 
disappear any time soon. The analyses point to the complexity of the issues at stake and the 
persistent nature of problems in the future. The World Bank estimates that by 2030, at least 
half of the populations living below the poverty line will live in countries prone to fragility, conflict 
and/or  violence31.  These  situations  have  an  impact  on  poverty  and  extreme  poverty  in 
particular due to violence but also due to the decline in basic services and the weakening of 
the State's sovereign functions. The humanitarian and development challenges are numerous 
and are likely to remain so for a long time to come.  

This evaluation has demonstrated the relevance of the SBC instrument in addressing critical 
needs in situations of fragility. While SBCs are far from having achieved all expected outcomes, 
this does not mean that they have been ineffective. Contexts of fragility are inherently difficult 
and high-risk, with rapidly changing situations. Furthermore, the evaluation shoed that SBCs 
were not able to solve everything, that it was necessary to take into account their specificity 
and to integrate them with other interventions in a comprehensive approach.  

The recommendations and their link to the conclusions are detailed in Figure 35; Figure 34 
presents their level of importance and ease of implementation. 

31   World bank Group, Strategy for fragility, Conflict and Violence 2020-2025, Concept Note 

Final Report 

 Page 84 

 
 
                                                
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

8.1  Position  the  SBC  as  a  stabilisation  instrument, 
responding to the needs of social cohesion and 
democratic  governance  in  fragile  contexts  and 
strengthening the core of the government system    

R1:  Give  greater  emphasis  to  EU  support  to  social  cohesion  and  democratic 
governance policies for stabilization.  

The EU should continue its commitment to support fragile states or states weakened by shocks 
with BS and strengthen its capacity to respond to immediate stabilisation needs. In this context, 
the  EU  should  display  more  its  priorities,  in  particular,  access  to  basic  services  for  all 
populations and democratic governance. In order to better meet these stabilisation needs and 
the provision of essential services for the benefit of populations in all contexts, the following is 
recommended: 

  Strengthen  the  analysis  of  immediate  needs  for  stabilization/strengthening  of  essential 
government  services  in  the  analysis  of  fragility,  in  an  approach  aimed  at  protecting 
populations;  

  Explain  more  clearly  in  the  design/formulation  documents  the  SBC  intervention  logic 

(including the sequencing of expected induced outputs);  

  Emphasise the objective of preserving budget allocations/execution of expenditures in the 
social/justice/security/defense sectors and the improvement of expenditure management 
in these sectors, including spending quality;  

 

Include in the general condition on PFM a specific section on expenditure management 
reforms in priority sectors where there is no Sector Reform Contract; 

  Clarify 

the 

transition 

from  SBCs 

complementarity 
allocation/expenditure management side); 

between 

the 

to  Sector  Reform  Contracts  and  strengthen 
budget 

(in  particular 

instruments 

the 

on 

  Further support local democracy and citizen participation, as well as the territorial policies 

of deconcentration and decentralisation. 

R2:  In  structurally  fragile  countries,  emphasise  the  role  of  the  SBC  as  a  lever  to 
strengthen the government's capacity to manage its public finances and the steering of 
its  public  policies,  which  are  necessary  conditions  for  supporting  consolidation 
policies. 

Consolidation in structurally fragile countries requires first of all strengthening the government's 
management capacities and its means of financing. In this context, in parallel with stabilisation, 
SBCs should continue to give priority to the consolidation of PFM and DRM. They should also 
give greater importance to the capacity of governments to formulate and steer a national policy 
that addresses fragility in its various dimensions and that draws on sources of resilience. It is 
recommended to: 

 

Identify key actors with the political and financial clout and the willingness and capacity to 
carry out sensitive reforms;  

  Clarify  within  PFM  systems  which  core 

functions  should  be  prioritised 

in 

fragile/reconstruction contexts; 

  Gradually  introduce  an  analysis  of  the  sources  of  resilience,  particularly  in  structurally 

fragile countries that do not face high risks of conflict/violence. 

Final Report 

 Page 85 

EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

R3:  In countries prone to natural disasters, use SBCs to strengthen crisis management 
systems  and  address  context-relevant  vulnerability  factors  (including  environmental, 
climate and social change).  

In countries facing natural disasters, it is recommended to:  

  Take better account of the vulnerability factors that leave countries exposed to the risks of 

natural disasters (analyse this exposure more systematically); 

  Provide guidance tools (including training) to take these dimensions into account;  

  Systematically integrate an analysis of the sources of resilience into the road map/Action 

Document. 

8.2  Improve the design of SBCs 

R4: Further develop the intervention logic at regular intervals as the context evolves to 
better  take  into  account  the  urgency  and  complexity  of  needs  and  ensure  the 
adaptability of the response provided.  

In situations of fragility, rapid intervention is a key factor for effectiveness, as is the ability to 
adjust to urgent needs. Overall, the EU was able to respond quickly and intervene in fragile, 
urgent and shifting contexts. Disbursements were made quickly, but efforts can still be made 
to better take into account cash-flow needs (especially in post-crisis situations). Moreover, the 
relatively  short  duration  of  the  programmes  at  the  outset  (one  year,  followed  by  two  years) 
made it possible to adapt them as the context changed rapidly. The introduction of three-year 
programmes  requires  the  implementation  of  mechanisms  for  monitoring  and  adapting  to 
changes in risks and the context. It is recommended to:  

 

Improve the predictability of amounts to be disbursed and their consideration in cash-flow 
management, particularly in post-crisis situations (strengthen the forecasting capacities of 
the  Ministry  of  Finance, set mutually  agreed  disbursement schedules to meet  cash-flow 
requirements); 

  Renew  the  intervention  logic  annually  on  the  basis  of  changes  in  risk  management 

frameworks and in light of changes in the context; 

  Monitor the outputs and outcomes as they are achieved by systematically reviewing the 

performance matrices attached to the intervention logics; 

 

Intervene  rapidly  in  case  of  additional  needs  through  a  special  "crisis"  tranche  with 
conditions specific to the situation rather than by “topping up” existing programmes. 

R5:  Ensure  that  programmes  take  better  account  of  the  quality  of  social  services, 
territorial and environmental issues, and the fate of the most vulnerable populations.  

Some  key  issues  have  not  always  received  sufficient  attention.  The  recommendation  is  to 
ensure that programmes fully integrate the following objectives: 

  The  geographical  coverage  of  public  services  throughout  the  territory,  which  are  a  key 

factor for social cohesion and for ensuring state legitimacy; 

  The management of public expenditure in priority sectors, including spending quality; 

  The consolidation of sectoral policies in priority sectors and the enhancement of the quality 

of social services, especially when successive SBCs are deployed over time; 

  The rapid improvement of the fate of the most vulnerable populations, who are often the 
first victims of shocks, in particular through the objectives of strengthening food security; 

Final Report 

 Page 86 

EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

  The needs arising from environmental fragility. 

ADE 

The role of SBCs in addressing these issues should be specified and clarified in the guidelines. 
Guidance  tools  (including  training)  for  taking  these  dimensions  into  account  could  be 
developed.  

R6: Ensure continuity to guarantee the sustainability of achievements. 

SBCs have often initiated a learning dynamic that takes time and requires dialogue and long-
term support that has not always been met. Moreover, the absence of exit scenarios envisaged 
from the outset made it impossible to consolidate progress in a clear sequence such as, for 
example, the transition to SRCs. It is recommended to: 

 

Identify more explicitly at the outset the upward (SRC/GGDC) and downward (in the event 
of  programme  suspension  for  non-compliance  with  the  general  conditions  or  observed 
deterioration in the monitoring of fundamental values) exit strategies and adapt them as 
programmes are implemented; 

 

In  the  choice  of  indicators,  ensure  continuity  in  support  for  reforms    and  dialogue 
throughout successive programmes; 

  Ensure  systematic  capitalisation  on  the  achievements  of  previous  SBCs  and  guarantee 

good internal coherence between programmes in the case of successive SBCs. 

R7: Jointly analyse institutional strengthening needs.  

Complementary  support  is  an  important  component  of  SBCs  but  is  not  sufficiently  valued, 
especially  as  it  is  often  isolated  from  the  rest  of  the  programme  and  with  a  delayed 
implementation schedule. It is recommended to: 

 

Integrate the role of TA and complementary support in the intervention logics and specify 
how they are intended to contribute to the achievement of the objectives; 

  Clarify  the mechanisms for  identifying  and  implementing  support  in partnership with the 

beneficiaries; 

  Strengthen coordination with technical support provided by other donors, and, in particular, 

with the IMF in the framework of AFRITAC, which is co-financed by the EU.  

8.3  Rise  the  EU  profile  in  political  dialogue  by 
fostering  the  leverage  effect  of  the  general 
conditions and its convening role with donors 

R8: Continue structuring close technical dialogue and strengthen political dialogue.  

The EU has shown that, through the SBC, it is able to conduct a close policy dialogue that is 
highly  appreciated  by  partners  but  that  needs  to be  structured:  conducting  regular  dialogue 
coordinated  by  the  NAO  services  or  another  department  of  the  Ministry  of  Planning  or  the 
Ministry of Finance should make it possible to regularly monitor the achievement of the variable 
tranche indicators, to identify obstacles and the need for complementary support. At the same 
time, the  analysis  has  shown  that  the  lack  of  political  commitment for carrying  out  reforms, 
particularly  in  the  area  of  financial  governance,  has  hindered  the  achievement  of  SBC 
objectives. A deeper and more systematic political dialogue should be developed, particularly 
when disbursement files are submitted. It is recommended to:  

Final Report 

 Page 87 

EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

  Make  the  role  and  content  of  the  technical  policy  dialogue  more  explicit  in  action 

documents/ financing agreements; 

  During the implementation phase, ensure that a continuous and structured dialogue is held, 
jointly involving the Ministry of Finance and the sectoral ministries (introduction of a variable 
tranche indicator dashboard enabling monthly monitoring of the degree of achievement of 
the indicators and the risk of blockages); 

  Reinforce dialogue at the highest level (EU ambassador and ministers in charge) on the 
achievement  of  general  conditions  when  formulating  programmes  and  during  their 
implementation, particularly when approving each disbursement;  

 

Involve  the  EEAS  services  more  in  the  conduct  of  dialogue  and  in  the  analysis  of 
disbursement conditions.   

R9: Strengthen the leverage effect of general and specific conditions by better framing 
general conditions and improving the choice of variable tranche indicators. 

In the situations encountered, the general conditions attached to the adoption of programmes 
and  the  disbursement  of  each  tranche  are  not  very  restrictive.  They  are  often  useful  for 
analysing the initial situation and stressing the importance of having a relevant and credible 
public  policy,  a  relevant  and  credible  PFM  reform  plan,  stability-oriented  macroeconomic 
policies and the availability of comprehensive and sound fiscal information. In practice, these 
conditions no longer provide the incentive initially sought. This role and the expected minimum 
requirements need to be redefined, in particular:  

  Clarify expectations regarding the relevance and credibility of targeted policies in different 

types of context; 

  Further frame the analyses required to examine the public policy and PFM eligibility criteria 

and expected progress (similar to what exists for the criterion on transparency). 

The variable tranche indicators are an important signal for prioritising and advocating to the 
government.  To  strengthen  the  effectiveness  of  the  variable  tranche  indicators  and  their 
incentive nature, it is recommended to:   

  Systematically involve stakeholders in the choice of indicators and the definition of targets, 

and rely as much as possible on indicators defined in national policies;  

  Limit the number of indicators (e.g. a maximum of five) and avoid the use of sub-indicators;  

  Maintain indicators for the same themes over time to gradually lead to progress in reforms; 

  Further  promote  complementarity  between  indicators  and  technical  support  in  order  to 

advance the most sensitive sectoral reforms (security and justice). 

R10: Strengthen human resources and their qualifications within EU Delegations for the 
design, monitoring and implementation of SBCs. 

The case studies have shown the importance of having a sufficiently large and qualified team 
on  site  that  is  able  to  carry  out  all  the  necessary  analytical  work  and  regularly  monitor  the 
context  and  risks,  and  that  participates  in  the  technical  dialogue,  taking  into  account  the 
constraints imposed by a fragile environment. It is recommended to: 

  Develop a human resources management and capacity-building policy on fragility (career 

management, financial incentives, training on SBCs and fragility analysis); 

  Strengthen technical support from headquarters on specific aspects of SBCs and fragility;  

Final Report 

 Page 88 

EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

  Develop  specific  guidance  tools  to  intervene  in  the  contexts  targeted  by  the  SBC 
(reconstruction,  transition,  fragility)  on  the  analysis  of  fragility  factors,  PFM  priorities, 
technical aspects of reconstruction phases, etc.); 

  Capitalise  on  the  achievements  of  implemented  SBCs.  This  could  be  done  through 
systematising the production of a final report and taking into account the lessons learned 
in subsequent programmes;  

  Clarify the role of external expertise and the channels for mobilisation; in particular, avoid 

that it substitutes the Commission services in the dialogue with the authorities.  

8.4  Integrate  the  SBC  into  a  comprehensive  EU 

response to fragility 

R11: Integrate the SBC into a comprehensive EU response to fragility/consolidation and 
further seize opportunities for mobilisation and synergies within the EU portfolio and 
with other technical and financial partners. 

The development of a long-term holistic approach for responding to situations of fragility and 
which integrates role of the SBC in its various components (financial, dialogue and institutional 
support)  within  a  multi-instrument  response  should  be  initiated  rapidly  to  enhance  the 
effectiveness of EU action. It is recommended to: 

  Formulate an integrated strategy for responding to fragility; 

  Reinforce  synergies  with  humanitarian  aid  to  support  a  territorial  approach  and  the 
transition  from  emergency  services  to  continuous  services  (interact  more  closely  with 
ECHO to strengthen synergies from the design of SBCs and during their implementation, 
ensure  regular  exchanges  in  the  field  with  humanitarian  actors  working  in  the  areas 
covered by the SBC); 

  When formulating SBCs, identify projects with which complementarity can be envisaged 

and ensure that synergies are maximised in the field and in the policy dialogue; 

 

Intensify coordination with the IMF and the search for complementarity with other donors 
providing budget support and technical assistance, in particular EU Member States. 

8.5  Strengthen  the  role  of  national  actors  and 
accountability:  ensure  ownership  of 
the 
instrument  by  partners  and  systematically 
involve civil society 

R12: Ensure greater ownership of the instrument by partners (including civil society) 
and  further  alignment  of  specific  conditions  and  disbursement  periods  with  their 
capacities/needs.  

Ownership  of  the  instrument  by  partners  is  an  essential  condition  for  its  effectiveness,  in 
particular to bring about the reforms covered by the general and specific conditions. In many 
cases,  the  instrument  and  the  content  of  the  programmes  are  not  well  understood  by  the 
partners, particularly within the sector ministries. Measures should be adopted to:   

Final Report 

 Page 89 

EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

  Strengthen the understanding of the instrument by informing the authorities of the partner 
for  national 

through  continuous  dialogue  and  by  organising 

training 

countries 
administrations and authorities; 

  Exchange  more  widely  with  beneficiaries  and  civil  society  actors  during  the  formulation 
phase on the selection of variable tranche indicators, sequencing and targets. This could 
be done through a several-day seminar bringing together all stakeholders to discuss and 
validate the choice of variable tranche indicators and agree on the monitoring process; 

  Take better account of the time needed for the preparation of disbursement requests, the 
analysis of the data provided and the preparation of disbursement files, as well as their 
review  by  headquarters  (e.g.  systematically  integrate  a  retro-planning  starting  from  the 
desired disbursement date); 

  Systematically communicate to partners on whether or not variable tranche indicators have 

been met at the time of disbursement. 

R13: Strengthen the role of civil society in the implementation of SBCs.  

In fragile  environments,  where  the  strengthening  of  state  institutional  capacity  is  often  slow 
and constrained by the lack of resources and the primacy of political concerns, civil society 
has a key role to play in discussing and making more transparent the choices made by the 
legislative  and  executive  powers.  In  particular,  civil  society  needs  to  be  more  involved  in 
monitoring budget choices and budget implementation. It is recommended that partnerships 
be  further  developed  and  strengthened  to  enable  partners  to  play  a  more  active  role.  This 
requires:  

 

Involving them from the formulation of programmes and throughout the policy dialogue; 

  Systematising the production of citizen budgets; 

  Putting  in  place  actions  to  strengthen  their  budget  analysis  capacity  and  their 
understanding of the role played by the SBC and other budget support in the management 
of the government budget; 

  Helping them set up communication and exchanges activities with citizens. 

R14: Increase the visibility of SBCs and the accountability to different audiences.  

SBCs  are  a  specific  and  complex  instrument  for  the  uninitiated  to  grasp.  They  often  raise 
questions  about  the  relevance  of  using  public  money  without  necessarily  achieving  visible 
outcomes. It is important that the instrument is well known to civil society and stakeholders in 
both the countries of intervention and in the donors’ countries. Communication is therefore an 
important issue that needs to be adapted to the different target audiences. It is recommended 
to: 

  Define and implement a communication strategy with an action plan, in particular to show 

the benefits brought by SBCs; 

  Prepare press releases (similar to those issued by the IMF) to provide information about 
important  decisions,  including  the  signing  of  the  financing  agreement,  disbursement 
decisions and the conclusions of headquarters missions. 

Final Report 

 Page 90 

EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

Figure 34: Recommendations: level of importance and ease of implementation  

Final Report 

 Page 91 

HighEase of implementationEasyImportanceLowDifficultR 4R 5R 1R 8R 7R 3R 2R 61. Position the SBC as a support to social cohesion and democratic governance policies2. Increasethe leverage effect on PFM and public policy steering  3. Strengthen support for crisis management mechanisms 4. Further substantiate intervention logics at regular intervals5. Takebetter account of the quality of social services and the plight of populations6. Ensurecontinuity for sustainability 7. Jointlyanalyse institutionalstrengthening needs 8. Strengthen political dialogue9. Strengthen the leverage effect of conditions  10. Strengthening human resources11. Integratethe SBC into a comprehensive response  12. Ensurebetter ownership13. Strengthen the role of civil society14. Strengthen visibility and accountability R 12R 11R 10R 14R 13R 9 
EVALUATION OF EU STATE BUILDING CONTRACTS   
2012-2018 

ADE 

Figure 35: Summary of conclusions and recommendations 

Final Report 

 Page 92 

2. A response contributing to laying the foundations for the implementation of structural reforms by partner states but without succeeding in initiating policies addressing fragility factors over the long termImplementation of SBCs10. A lack of integrated vision within the EU, with other TFPs and civil society 11. Restoration of the stability of the macro-fiscalframework and progress in PFM below expectations 13. Positive effects on political transition, and mixed effects on peacebuilding and democratic consolidation processes  5. Modalities of intervention overall adapted to the context 6. Weaknesses in intervention logicsand exit strategies 7. Can be quickly mobilised, adaptable and seeksto be articulated with budget cycles 8. Closetechnical dialogue but weak political steering 9. Lack of human resources and tools 1. A unique and necessary instrument to respond to systemic shocks4. Good understanding of the challenges and risks Capacity of SBCs to respond to the needsDesignof SBCsEffectiveness of SBCs and sustainability of outcomes 12. Maintenance of of social services deliverybut no increase in quality 14. Little influence on structuring policies15. Persistence of fragility and no strengthening of resilience3. A response not sufficiently focused on the fate of populations1. Position the SBC as a support to social cohesion and democratic governance policies4. Further substantiate intervention logics at regular intervalsPosition the SBC as a stabilisationinstrumentto strengthen the core of the government system5. Take better account of the quality of social services and the plight of populations6. Ensure continuity for sustainability 7. Jointlyanalyse institutional strengthening needs 8. Strengthen political dialogue11. Integrate the SBC into a comprehensive response  13. Strengthen the role of civil societyImprove the design of SBCsProvide a comprehensive response to fragility2. Increase the leverage effect on PFM and public policy steering  3. Strengthen support for crisis management mechanisms Rise the EU profile in the political dialogue 9. Strengthen the leverage effect of conditions  10. Strengthen human resources12. Ensure better ownershipStrengthen stakeholder involvement & accountability14. Strengthen visibility and accountability ConclusionsRecommendations 
115