REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Review of the scope of the Regulation No 654/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014
Date: 2022-03-01
Institutions: Directorate-General for Trade and Economic Security, European Commission
Subjects: World Trade Organisation, common commercial policy, infringement of EU law, international agreement, international trade, settlement of disputes, third country, trade agreement (EU), trade dispute

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 1.3.2022  COM(2022) 74 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Review of the scope of the Regulation No 654/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014  
 
 
REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
AND THE COUNCIL 

Review of the scope of the Regulation No 654/2014 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 15 May 2014 

1. 

INTRODUCTION 

Regulation (EU) No 654/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 
2014 (hereafter the “Enforcement Regulation”) provides the rules and procedures for an 
effective and timely exercise of the Union’s rights under international trade agreements, 
with the objective of safeguarding the Union’s economic interests.1 In 2021, the scope of 
the Enforcement Regulation was updated to provide for further possibilities for a Union 
action  to  face  existing  challenges,  and  to  enhance  the  Regulation’s  effectiveness  and 
consistency.2 

Currently,  the  Enforcement  Regulation  enables  the  Union  to  suspend  or  withdraw 
concessions or other obligations under the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement 
and other international trade agreements of the EU in the following situations: 

- 

- 

to enforce the Union’s rights under a trade agreement when the latter is breached 
by a third country either following a favourable outcome for the Union in a trade 
dispute  or  where  the  Union’s  attempt  to  obtain  binding  resolution  of  a  trade 
dispute is unsuccessful for reasons outside the Union’s responsibility; and 

to  rebalance  the  Union’s  obligations  under  and  in  line  with  a  trade  agreement, 
when  third  countries  introduce  a safeguard  measure  or unilaterally modify  tariff 
concessions or services commitments from which the Union benefits. 

The Enforcement Regulation empowers the Commission to adopt, modify, suspend and 
repeal commercial policy measures in those circumstances. Before the recent amendment 
of the Enforcement Regulation, the commercial policy measures that could be adopted by 
means of implementing acts consisted solely of measures concerning trade in goods and 
access to public procurement. The 2021 amendment extended these possibilities so as to 
include  measures  concerning  trade  in  services  and  certain  trade-related  aspects  of 
intellectual property rights. The Commission enacts implementing regulations following 
the examination procedure and, where applicable, an information gathering exercise with 
relevant stakeholders. 

1   Regulation  (EU)  No  654/2014  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  15  May  2014 
concerning the exercise of the Union's rights for the application and enforcement of international trade 
rules (OJ L 189, 27.6.2014, p. 50). 

2   Regulation  (EU)  2021/167  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  10  February  2021 
amending  Regulation  (EU)  No  654/2014  concerning  the  exercise  of  the  Union’s  rights  for  the 
application and enforcement of international trade rules (OJ L 49, 12.2.2021, p. 1). 

1 

 
 
                                                 
2.  REVIEW REQUIREMENT 

Article 10 of the Enforcement Regulation provides that the Commission shall review the 
scope of the Regulation taking into account in particular the commercial policy measures 
that  may  be  adopted,  as  well  as  its  implementation.  The  review  should  also  focus  on 
additional  commercial  policy  measures  suspending  concessions  or  other  obligations  in 
the field of trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights. 

The review is to be conducted no later than a year following 13 February 2021 and the 
Commission is to report its findings to the European Parliament and the Council. 

The previous reviews of the Regulation took place in 2017 and 2019.3 

The  period  subject  to  the  present  review  encompasses  the  period  following  the  latest 
review  (2019),  namely  December  2019  to  date.  As  regards  the  2021  amendment,  the 
review  period  runs  respectively  from  13  February  2021  (date  of  entry  into  force  of  the 
amendment) to date. 

3.  REVIEW  OF  THE  SCOPE,  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  MEASURES  AND  IMPLEMENTATION 

OF THE ENFORCEMENT REGULATION 

3.1.  Scope of the Regulation 

Article  3  of  the  Enforcement  Regulation  sets  out  the  specific  situations  in  which  the 
Enforcement  Regulation  applies  and  where  the  Union  may  respond  via  commercial 
policy measures. The 2021 amendment supplemented the original scope with additional 
situations, as presented below. 

3.1.1.  Articles  3(a)  and  (b):  Following  a  binding  adjudication  of  a  trade 

dispute in favour of the Union 

The Enforcement Regulation  applies where a dispute settlement  procedure in  the WTO 
(Article 3(a)) or in relation to other international trade agreements (Article 3(b)) resulted 
in a binding adjudication of the trade dispute, and gives rise to a right to enforcement by 
the  Union  because  of  non-implementation  by  the  defending  party.  The  Enforcement 
Regulation  is  thus  applicable  following  a  dispute’s  binding  resolution  in  favour  of  the 
Union. 

In the period subject to review, the Enforcement Regulation has been used once for such 
a  situation.  In  2020,  the  Union  introduced  commercial  policy  measures  on  imports  of 
certain products originating in the United States, as an enforcement action in relation to 
the  adjudicated  WTO  dispute  on  subsidies  to  the  aircraft  manufacturer  Boeing.4  The 

3   REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 
Review of the scope of the Regulation No 654/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
15  May  2014,  COM/2019/639  final;  REPORT  FROM  THE  COMMISSION  TO  THE  EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT  AND  THE  COUNCIL  Initial  Review  of  the  scope  of  the  Enforcement  Regulation, 
COM/2017/0373 final. 

4   Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  2020/1646  of  7  November  2020  on  commercial  policy 
measures concerning certain products from the United States of America following the adjudication of 
a  trade  dispute  under  the  Dispute  Settlement  Understanding  of  the  World Trade  Organization  (OJ  L 
373, 9.11.2020, p. 1);  United States  — Measures  Affecting Trade in Large  Civil Aircraft  — Second 
Complaint (DS353). 

2 

 
                                                 
measures were introduced following the adoption, in April 2019, of the Appellate Body 
report confirming the United States’ non-compliance in the WTO dispute and the WTO 
arbitration  on  the  level  of  countermeasures.  The  Appellate  Body  report  confirmed  that 
the United States’ subsidies to Boeing continued to cause significant harm to Airbus. 

For the purposes of introducing the countermeasures, the Commission carried out under 
the  Enforcement  Regulation  an  information  gathering  exercise  on  a  preliminary  list  of 
products from the United States on which the Union could take countermeasures.5 

In July 2021, the Union suspended the application of the imposed measures for a period 
of five years.6 The suspension is intended to allow the two sides to continue discussions 
to operationalise their intentions regarding financing, research and development funding 
as well as specific support to large civil aircraft.7 

The  use  of  the  Enforcement  Regulation  in  this  case  was  a  major  factor  behind  the 
positive  developments  in  the  case.  Only  after  the  imposition  of  the  EU  measures  on 
imports  from  the  United  States  –  which  had  already  implemented  far-reaching 
enforcement  measures  against  the  Union  based  on  the  Airbus  WTO  dispute  –  could 
sufficient  balance  and  reciprocity  be  re-established.  This  created  the  right  environment 
for subsequent constructive engagement and the solution that has by now been reached.   

The limited use of the Regulation on the grounds set out in Articles 3(a) and (b) during 
the review period is attributable to the procedural stages of pending trade disputes. The 
enforcement stage is a very advanced phase in a trade dispute, which only few cases ever 
reach  given  that  most  are  resolved  much  earlier.8  On  the  other  hand,  it  cannot  be 
excluded  that  the  mere  existence  of  the  instrument,  and  the  potential  to  exercise  the 
Union’s rights accordingly, has a deterrent effect on third countries, limiting their interest 
in non-compliance following successful litigation in the Union’s favour, or even on non-
observance of their commitments under a trade agreement in the first place. 

3.1.2.  Articles  3(aa)  and  (ba):  where  the  resolution  of  a  trade  dispute  is 

blocked   

These  grounds  were  introduced  by  the  2021  amendment.  They  are  similar  to  those  in 
point 3.1.1 as they relate to enforcement of the EU’s rights on the basis of trade disputes 
but concern specifically blockage of a dispute settlement procedure. 

The  Enforcement  Regulation  was  designed  originally  on  the  premise  that  a  fully 
functioning dispute settlement procedure is in place, which leads to a final and binding 
adjudication  of  a  dispute.  However,  in  situations  where  the  Union’s  counterpart  to  a 
dispute  would  not  cooperate  and  would  prevent  a  procedure  leading  to  a  binding  and 
enforceable  ruling,  the  objective  of  the  Regulation,  which  is  to  safeguard  the  Union’s 

5   WTO  Boeing  dispute:  EU  issues  preliminary  list  of  US  products  considered  for  countermeasures; 

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/fi/ip_19_2162  

6   Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1123 of 8 July 2021 suspending commercial policy 
measures  concerning  certain  products  from  the  United  States  of  America  imposed  by  Implementing 
Regulation (EU) 2020/1646 following the adjudication of a trade dispute under the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding of the World Trade Organization (OJ L 243, 9.7.2021, p. 43). 

7   EU and US take decisive step to end aircraft dispute. 

8   See  an  overview  of  EU’s  active  dispute  settlement  cases  of  10  December  2021,  available  at  DG 

TRADE website. 

3 

 
                                                 
interests  by  equiping  the  Union  with  the  instruments  necessary  to  react  effectively  and 
swiftly  to  illegal  measures  of  third  countries,  could  not  be  achieved.  To  tackle  these 
challenges, the Commission proposed an update of the Enforcement Regulation, and the 
Regulation was amended in 2021.  

The specific circumstances of application are as follows: 

i.  As  regards  WTO  trade  disputes,  the  Enforcement  Regulation  applies  following 
the circulation of a WTO panel report upholding, in whole or in part, the claims 
brought  by  the  Union,  if  an  appeal  under  Article  17  of  the  WTO  Dispute 
Settlement  Understanding  was  filed,  but  cannot  be  completed  because  the 
Appellate Body is not operational and the third country does not agree to interim 
appeal  arbitration  under  Article  25  of 
the  WTO  Dispute  Settlement 
Understanding. 

This  amendment  was  triggered by the  situation  of the currently non-functioning 
WTO Appellate Body. As well known, the WTO Appellate Body is currently not 
operational due to the United States blocking the appointment of new Appellate 
Body  members.  The  WTO  Appellate  Body  cannot  work  on  appeals  filed  as  of 
11 December 2019,  nor  is  it  working  any  more  on  appeals  filed  beforehand  but 
not completed by early 2020.  Therefore, the situation exists, allowing the Union 
to take enforcement action in WTO disputes that are blocked on appeal, except if 
appellate  review  is  agreed  under  Article  25  of  the  WTO  Dispute  Settlement 
Understanding.  

The  amendment  provides  a  safeguard  in  addition  to  the  ongoing  efforts  of  the 
Union  to  resolve  the  crisis.  The  Union  developed  the  Multi-party  Interim 
Arrangement, which aims at replicating  as much as possible the WTO appellate 
mechanism  through  arbitration  proceedings  provided  under  Article  25  of  the 
WTO  Dispute  Settlement  Understanding.9  The  arrangement  notably  maintains  a 
binding  two-tier  WTO  dispute  settlement  mechanism,  among  other  features.  A 
number of other WTO members joined the arrangement, which remains open to 
the rest of the membership on a voluntary basis, and also ad hoc for the purposes 
of specific disputes. 

ii.  As regards trade disputes under other EU trade agreements, including regional or 
bilateral  agreements,  the  Enforcement  Regulation  applies  if  adjudication  is  not 
possible because the third country is not taking the steps that are necessary for a 
dispute  settlement  procedure  to  function,  including  unduly  delaying  the 
proceedings amounting to non-cooperation in the process. 

Such  risks  of  blockages  were  identified  in  the  2019  review  of  the  Enforcement 
Regulation. For instance, when the other party does not appoint an arbitrator and 
no fall-back mechanism  remedies that situation, the Union would not be able to 
obtain a binding ruling that can be enforced. 

Over the (relatively short) review period no such situation has arisen fully, leading to the 
use of the Enforcement Regulation as amended. The use of the amended instrument has, 
however,  been  contemplated  in  some  instances,  and  the  mere  possibility  to  use  it  may 

9  

Interim appeal arrangement for WTO disputes becomes effective. 

4 

 
                                                 
have produced the necessary encouragement for the responding third country in question 
to allow a binding resolution of the WTO dispute.  

For ongoing disputes, the absence of practice is thus in part due to the fact that the Multi-
party  Interim Arrangement is available and operative and that in other cases the parties 
are able to agree, ad hoc, on appeal arbitration. Moreover, the absence of active practice 
is  again  linked  to  the  procedural  stage  of  pending  disputes  as  a  dispute  must  reach  a 
certain stage for the Enforcement Regulation to become potentially applicable. 

3.1.3.  Article 3(c): Rebalancing measures in response  to a third country’s 

safeguard 

The  other  situation  in  which  the  Enforcement  Regulation  applies  covers  rebalancing 
measures when a third country imposes a safeguard measure and the WTO Agreement on 
Safeguards (Article 8) or rules on safeguards in other Union agreements give the Union a 
right to rebalance.  

The Enforcement Regulation has been used in total twice for this purpose, including once 
during the review period. The first instance concerns the Union’s response to the import 
duties  on  steel  and  aluminium  imposed  by  the  United  States  in  2018.10  The  second 
instance  concerns  a  similar  Union’s  response  to  related  import  duties  on  steel  and 
aluminium derivative products introduced by the United States in 2020.11 In both cases, 
the Union introduced rebalancing measures in the form of additional import tariffs on a 
number  of  products  originating  in  the  United  States.  Procedurally,  the  adoption  of  the 
implementing  acts  imposing  rebalancing  measures  took  around  two  months  in  the  first 
instance,  and  a  month  in  the  second  instance,  in  compliance  with  the  deadlines  of  the 
WTO Agreement. 

During the review period, the Enforcement Regulation was later on also applied in order 
to  suspend  these  rebalancing  measures  on  two  occasions  in  2021.12  The  suspension 
provided the necessary  conditions for the Union and the United States to  advance their 
ongoing  cooperation,  including  with  a  view  to  eliminate  the  respective  tariffs.13 
Currently, the rebalancing measures are not applied. 

The Enforcement Regulation  ensured that  the Union was able to  respond  swiftly  to  the 
United States’ safeguard measures and to defend the Union’s economic interests on two 
important occasions. Additionally, the availability of the Union’s response played a role 

10   Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/724 of 16 May 2018 on certain commercial policy 
measures  concerning  certain  products  originating  in  the  United  States  of  America  (OJ  L  122, 
17.5.2018,  p.  14)  and  Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  2018/886  of  20  June  2018  on 
certain  commercial  policy  measures  concerning  certain  products  originating  in  the  United  States  of 
America and amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/724 (OJ L 158, 21.6.2018, p. 5). 

11   Commission Implementing Regulation  (EU) 2020/502 of 6 April 2020 on certain commercial policy 
measures concerning certain products originating in the United States of America (OJ L 109, 7.4.2020, 
p. 10). 

12   Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/866 of 28 May 2021 suspending commercial policy 
measures  concerning  certain  products  originating  in  the  United  States  of  America  imposed  by 
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/886 (OJ L 190, 31.5.2021, p. 94–95); Commission Implementing 
Regulation  (EU)  2021/2083  of  26 November  2021  suspending  commercial  policy  measures 
concerning  certain  products  originating  in  the  United  States  of  America  imposed  by  Implementing 
Regulations (EU) 2018/886 and (EU) 2020/502 (OJ L 426, 29.11.2021, p. 41). 

13   EU-US Joint statement of 31 October 2021; European Union statement of 31 October 2021; 

5 

 
                                                 
in  the  continued  efforts  to  resolve  the  underlying  matter.  The  suspension  of  the  active 
rebalancing  measures  was  instrumental  in  the  pursuit  of  elimination  of  United  States’ 
tariffs. Therefore, it can be concluded that the Enforcement Regulation proved to be of 
essential use and was a significant tool for the Union to address successfully the United 
States’ steel and aluminium tariffs.  

3.1.4.  Article 3(d): Modification of concessions or commitments 

The  last  situation  in  which  the  the  Enforcement  Regulation  may  be  used  is  in  cases  of 
unilateral  modification  by  a WTO member  of concessions  under Article XXVIII of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994) or of commitments  under 
Article  XXI  of  the  General  Agreement  on  Trade  in  Services  (GATS),  where  no 
compensatory  adjustments  have  been  agreed  as  regards  goods,  and,  compensatory 
adjustments are not  made in  conformity with  the findings of the arbitration pursuant  to 
Article XXI of the GATS, as regards services. 

Originally,  the  Enforcement  Regulation  was  applicable  only  in  situations  concerning 
Article  XXVIII  of  the  GATT  1994.  The  2021  amendment  supplemented  the  provision 
with situations concerning Article XXI of the GATS. The addition is logical and justified 
given the similarities between the two types of situations. 

In the review period, no such cases occurred. Neither there have been indications that a 
particular WTO member was intending to modify concessions or commitments without 
engaging  in  negotiations  on  compensatory  adjustments.  The  Regulation  may  have 
produced  a  deterrent  effect  because  its  mere  existence  demonstrates  that  the  Union  is 
willing  and  well  equiped  to  avail  itself  effectively  of  its  rebalancing  rights  under  those 
provisions. 

3.2.  Commercial policy measures 

Article 5 of the Enforcement Regulation lists the potential commercial policy measures, 
which  the  Union  may  use  in  the  situations  identified  in  point  3.1.  Originally,  the  list 
provides for the following: 

(a)  Article 5(1)(a): the suspension of tariff concessions and the imposition of new or 

increased customs duties; 

(b) Article  5(1)(b):  the  introduction  or  increase  of  quantitative  restrictions  on 

imports or exports of goods; and 

(c)  Article 5(1)(c): the suspension of concessions in the area of public procurement. 

The 2021 amendment expanded the list to the following: 

(a)  Article 5(1)(ba): the suspension of obligations regarding trade in services and the 
imposition  of  restrictions  on  trade  in  services;  this  is  subject  to  a  mandatory 
prioritisation/hierarchy of steps. The Commission would need to go through each 
category and conclude that measures are not possible before moving to the next 
category.  The  first  category  is  those  services  where  there  is  an  authorisation  at 
Union level. The second is where there is extensive Union legislation. The third is 
where  the  information  gathering  exercise  has  shown  the  least  interference  with 
national legislation. 

6 

 
(b) Article  5(1)(bb):  the  suspension  of  obligations  with  respect  to  trade-related 
aspects  of  intellectual  property  rights  granted  by  a  Union  institution  or  agency 
and  valid  throughout  the  Union,  and  the  imposition  of  restrictions  on  the 
protection of such intellectual property rights or their commercial exploitation, in 
relation to right-holders who are nationals of the third country concerned. This 
range of possibilities corresponds largely to the first hierachical step applicable to 
services. 

The availability of measures in relation to services and intellectual property rights 
since February 2021 has been a significant improvement of the instrument and it 
adds heft to the Union’s ability to enforce its  rights under trade agreements in a 
number of respects:  

 

 

 

 

 

it  renders  the  enforcement  instrument  more  effective,  including  by 
producing an important deterrent effect on third countries’s illegal actions; 

it corresponds to the needs of modern and knowledge-based economies; 

it  matches  the  prominence  of  services  and  intellectual  property  rights  in 
international trade; 

it makes the Union credible when it seeks to negotiate protection for right-
holders abroad; 

it demonstrates that the Union is determined to exercise to a full extent the 
rights  that  it  has  under  trade  agreements,  including  by  enhancing  the 
efficacy of enforcement of obligations through cross-retaliation. 

All  three  instances  of  application  of  the  Enforcement  Regulation  in  total,  including 
within the review period, involved commercial policy measures in the form of additional 
customs duties on imports of goods into the Union. The measures were proportionate and 
commensurate to the harm inflicted by the third country’ corresponding measures (in this 
case, the United States). The use of import duties  proved to be  effective  in  imposing a 
price on the economy of the United States and was a factor in inducing it, over time, to 
change  its  measures.  As  a  result,  all  measures  under  the  Enforcement  Regulation  are 
currently suspended as the United States’ measures are not applied as before. 

None  of  the  other  possibilities  under  Article  5  was  deployed  during  the  review  period. 
This  is  partly  due  to  the  relatively  short  period  of  time  following  the  2021  amendment 
that introduced the additional possibilities. Furthermore, as mentioned, the use of import 
duties on goods has been effective. At the same time, the question of cross-retaliation did 
not  arise14  during  the  review  period,  which  might  have  seen  consideration  of 
countermeasures beyond goods, such as  in  the  fields  of trade in  services  or intellectual 
property rights. In the Boeing case, the United States’ measures that triggered the Union 
countermeasures  concerned  goods  under  the  WTO  Agreement  and  the  Union  could 
respond effectively via goods measures. In the WTO safeguards cases, it would not have 
been allowed to respond through measures other than those taken on goods further to a 
suspension  of  obligations  under  the  WTO  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade. 
Therefore, the remaining possibilities under Article 5 of the Enforcement Regulation are 
still untested but are available for future use. 

14   Article 22 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding. 

7 

 
                                                 
Further  extention  of  measures  in  the  field  of  trade-related  aspects  of  intellectual 
property rights 

The 2021 extension of the scope of possible measures in the field of trade-related aspects 
of intellectual property rights can be considered significant as a matter of principle, but it 
is limited in extent. It provides for enforcement action in the form of restrictions on the 
protection or commercial exploitation of intellectual property rights that are granted by a 
Union  institution  or  agency  and  are  valid  throughout  the  Union,  in  relation  to  right-
holders who are nationals of the third country concerned. This scope corresponds largely 
to the first step of the hierarchy of steps applicable to the measures in trade in services. In 
practice, currently, it may apply to geographical indications, EU trademarks, EU designs 
and plant varieties. It does not provide for an enforcement action in the form of measures 
affecting patents and copyright, for instance. 

The Commission’s current assessment is that there are no legal or technical impediments 
to  a  further  extension,  and  that  an  extension  would  be  generally  beneficial.  It  would 
increase the effectiveness and credibility of the enforcement instrument because it would 
add to the situations where the Union would be able to enforce its rights effectively when 
a  third  country  violates  intellectual  property  protection  enshrined  in  an  EU  agreement 
and the possibility to take such action as a matter of international law is already provided 
for.  It  would  further  induce  the  third  country’s  compliance  in  the  event  that  that  third 
country violates the agreed protection. 

Moreover,  stakeholders  have  been  generally  positive  about  measures  going  beyond  the 
current  scope  of  the  Enforcement  Regulation.  In  the  context  of  the  public  consultation 
related to the Commission proposal for an anti-coercion instrument,15 stakeholders were 
asked  specifically  about  further  measures  in  the  field  of  trade-related  aspects  of 
intellectual property rights. While they pointed out sensitivities (concerns about collateral 
damage to EU business), they also recognised potential benefits (increased effectiveness 
and credibility). 

The Commission leaves open the posibility of presenting a legislative proposal to update 
the  Enforcement  Regulation  in  this  and  potentially  other  aspects  in  the  future.  At  this 
stage, a legislative proposal is not considered oportune given that the last amendment of 
the Regulation is still very recent. 

The recent proposal for an anti-coercion instrument as well as the specific legislative act 
that  the  Commission  has  committed  to  propose  to  the  Council  and  the  European 
Parliament for the enforcement of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement may be 
of relevance in considering a further future extension of the Enforcement Regulation. 

At  the  same  time,  the  Commission  considers  it  important  to  continue  monitoring  and 
reviewing  the  range  of  measures  available  and  their  utility.  Such  a  review  should  be 
based  on  EU  dispute  settlement  activity,  future  cases  of  application,  and  other 
developments  that  may  have  implications  on  the  effectiveness  of  the  Enforcement 
Regulation in the wider context. 

15   Detailed results of the public consultation; Towards an EU anti-coercion instrument; 

8 

 
                                                 
3.3.  Implementation 

The  Regulation  proved  to  be  a  suitable  and  sufficiently  flexible  instrument  in  terms  of 
process. It has allowed for a timely and appropriate response by the Union when it was 
used.  It  enabled  the  Union  to  react  within  the  tight  deadlines  for  establishing  and 
exercising  rebalanciong  rights  under  the  WTO  Agreement,  in  2018  and  2020.  It  also 
supported swift and efficient action where this was justified by the urgency of the matter 
in suspending ongoing commercial policy measures (twice in 2021). 

4.  CONCLUSION 

The  Enforcement  Regulation  has  only  been  used  on  a  few  occasions  so  far,  both  to 
introduce measures in response to safeguards and for enforcement, as well as to suspend 
such measures. It delivered on its objectives to safeguard the Union’s economic interests 
and  proved  to  be  an  essential  and  suitable  instrument  to  respond  to  third  countries’ 
actions  in  the  specific  circumstances.  Even  if  limited,  the  practice  has  shown  that  the 
Union is able to react swiftly, effectively and resolutely and bring about positive results. 
The Commission  considers that, beyond the  Regulation's  limited  application  in  specific 
case so far, the very existence of an enforcement instrument has a positive impact and a 
deterent effect. It sends a clear signal of the Union’s ability to effectively assert its rights 
under  trade  agreements  or  in  the  event  of  their  breach.  It  may  therefore  be  that  the 
instrument does not need to be used frequently to establish that it has an impact because 
the threat of using it has already produced results. 

The Commission will continue to monitor the overall use and utility of the Enforcement 
Regulation.  It  leaves  open  the  possibility  for  a  further  update  of  available  commercial 
policy measures or the situations that could trigger their application. 

9