COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Commission contribution to European defence
Date: 2022-02-15
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: European defence policy, European security, common security and defence policy, computer crime, industry-research relations, information security, public procurement, research and development, space policy, strategic defence

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Strasbourg, 15.2.2022  COM(2022) 60 final  COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Commission contribution to European defence  
 
 
1.  Introduction 

In  today’s  world,  the  European  Union  faces  increased  global  instability  and  geopolitical 
friction,  as  acknowledged  by  the  first-ever  comprehensive  EU  Threat  Analysis,  conducted  in 
November 2020 in preparation of the upcoming EU Strategic Compass.  Conflicts and crises in 
our neighbourhood and beyond have a direct impact on our own security, while our societies and 
economies  are 
including  cyber-attacks  and 
disinformation campaigns which originate abroad. Meanwhile the climate crisis and biodiversity 
loss  are  creating  challenges  for  global  security  in  general  and  for  civil-military  operations  in 
particular.  

targeted  by  sophisticated  hybrid 

threats, 

What  is  and  has  been  occurring  on  and  around  our  borders  on  land,  air  and  at  sea,  as  well  in 
cyber space, along important maritime routes and in outer space, all underline the need for us to 
become better prepared, more capable and more resilient. Against the backdrop of an accelerated 
technological race between the United States and China, the European Union must further build 
and  secure  its  technological  edge.  As  geopolitical  relations  evolve  and  our  environment  is 
changing, the Union must evolve similarly, and intensify and accelerate its collective capacities 
to  defend  and  secure  its  fundamental  values  and  its  citizens.  A  quantum  leap  in  European 
defence is an integral and indispensable part of securing the Union  and its citizens in the 
years and decades to come.  

Current  and  past  events  serve  as  wake-up  calls  that  Europeans  need  to  work  more  closely 
together  on  defence  to  ensure  their  own  security  and  become  a  stronger  security  provider  for 
others,  using  the  Union’s  uniquely  broad  toolbox.  The  EU  is  already  engaged  to  address  the 
multiple  open  and  frozen  conflicts  in  our  Eastern  and  Southern  neighbourhoods,  as  well  as  in 
different  regions  across  Africa  as  our  neighbouring  continent.  The  recent  Russian  military 
build-up  along  the  eastern  border  of  Ukraine,  in  Belarus,  and  in  the  Black  Sea  region, 
together  with  Moscow’s  attempts  to  disrupt,  divide,  and  redefine  the  security  architecture  in 
Europe, challenge the international rules-based order. It also reminds us that we need to deliver 
on a stronger European defence, in close partnership with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO).  The  abrupt  end  of  the  international  military  mission  in  Afghanistan  in  August  2021 
taught  us  that  Europe  needs  to  be  better  prepared  to  deal  with  complex  stabilisation  tasks  and 
sudden emergencies by itself. We have seen how instability can become a breeding ground for 
terrorism and uproot people, and how global and regional powers can use such situations to gain 
influence  and  access  to  resources.  Adding  to  the  complexity  is  the  multiplier  effect  of  climate 
change on the potential for conflicts within and between states.  

At  the  same  time,  the  EU  needs  to  step  up  its  own  preparedness,  capability  and  resilience  to 
better protect its citizens. Threats to the EU’s security are increasingly not only of a military 
nature.  We  are  facing  more  damaging  cyber-attacks  targeting  our  critical  entities,  paralysing 
industrial  plants,  energy  supply  facilities,  city  administrations,  and  hospitals,  while  foreign 
information manipulation and interference also goes to the heart of our democracies. The state-
sponsored  hybrid  attack  by  the  Lukashenko  regime,  instrumentalising  migrants  for  political 
purposes,  is  a  clear  example  of  the  evolving  nature  of  hybrid  campaigns  that  aim  to  subvert, 
coerce and manipulate us below the threshold of armed aggression. The EU has responded to this 

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situation  with  humanitarian  support,  diplomatic  outreach  to  third  countries,  support  to  our 
Member  States  and  sanctions  against  those  responsible.    The  COVID-19  pandemic  meanwhile 
underlined the need for enhanced resilience as well, with the armed forces providing logistical, 
security and medical assistance to civilian authorities in the early stages in 2020. In this rapidly 
changing  environment,  the  European  Union  needs  to  further  strengthen  its  preparedness, 
capabilities  and  resilience,  notably  by  enhancing  shock  absorption  mechanisms  and 
building its toolbox across all relevant sectors.  

Member States  are working to  tackle  all  threats  and challenges more robustly through the new 
EU  Strategic  Compass  for  security  and  defence  (‘Strategic  Compass’),  to  be  adopted  by 
Member States in March 2022. It will set out a common strategic vision for the next decade and 
outline how the EU will enhance its capacity to act and respond to various crises and challenges; 
secure its interests and protect its citizens; invest and innovate to jointly develop the necessary 
capabilities  and  technologies;  and  deepen  partnerships  based  on  EU  values  and  interests.  With 
this communication, the European Commission is further contributing to this work. 

The European Union needs to act now to advance its defence capabilities in the present context 
and also equip the EU to face the future battlefields, encompassing a new generation of state-of-
the-art  technologies  capable  of  addressing  threats  deriving  from  cyber,  hybrid,  space 
collaborative and autonomous systems based on connectivity and Artificial Intelligence (AI). At 
the same time, the industrial ecosystem that defence forms together with the aerospace and the 
security sector constitutes a high-tech industrial ecosystem that is not only an essential driver 
for Europe’s open strategic autonomy and technological sovereignty, but also a major contributor 
to growth and innovation. On top of contributing to the security of the European Union’s citizen, 
the European defence sector can contribute to the sustainable economic recovery following the 
pandemic  and  the  overall  innovative  nature  of  an  ecosystem  that  has  the  potential  of  greatly 
contributing to the green transition and resulting in positive spill-overs for civilian use. 

Achieving  our  goals  is  only  possible  by  developing,  procuring,  and  operating  military 
equipment  together.  The  EU  has  put  in  place  new  tools  and  instruments1  to  reverse  the  long 
standing fragmentations that hamper the efficiency of Europe’s defence sector and diminish the 
ability of the EU and its Member States to build the next generation of defence capabilities that 
will  be  critical  for  Europe’s  future  security  and  its  ability  to  provide  security  in  its 
neighbourhood and beyond.  

In particular, the European Defence Fund (EDF)2, with a budget close to EUR 8 billion for 2021-
27,  is  already  a  game-changer  for  establishing  a  European  defence  ecosystem  capable  of 
delivering state of the art interoperable defence technologies and equipment that will enhance the 
Union’s freedom of action and its technological sovereignty and competitiveness. 

Against this challenging background, the European Commission will keep working closely with 
the High Representative and the Member States to:  

1  Including  the  European  Defence  Fund,  the  Permanent  Structured  Cooperation  (PESCO)  and  the  Coordinated 

Annual Review on Defence (CARD). 

2 PE/11/2021/INIT 

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o  Ensure effective and focused implementation of the innovative instruments and initiatives 
that  we  have  put  in  place,  such  as  the  EDF  and  the  Action  plan  on  Military  Mobility, 
including through a number of additional measures put forward in this Communication; 

o  Support  closer  defence  cooperation  between  Member  States  and  between  industries, 
underpinned  by  the  necessary  financial  resources  and  enhanced  collaborative  spending  in 
line  with  existing  commitments,  to  enhance  cost-effectiveness,  strengthen  interoperability, 
foster innovation and improve industrial competitiveness and resilience;  

o  Strengthen our ability  to respond in the face of acute crises, including  cyber-attacks and 
hybrid  campaigns,  as  well  as  longer-term  challenges  and  geopolitical  contestations  in 
strategic domains, based on a whole-of-government approach and reinforcing dual-use and 
civil  -  military  synergies  across  a  wide  variety  of  Commission-led  policies,  tools  and 
instruments; 

o  Maintain  and  enhance  close  interaction  with  NATO,  in  line  with  the  commitments 
undertaken  and  the  agreed  principles  guiding  EU-NATO  cooperation  under  the  Joint 
Declarations,  as  well  as  with  other  key  international  partners  such  as  the  United  Nations 
(UN)  and  like-minded  bilateral  partners  including  the  United  States  of  America,  Norway3  
and Canada. 

In  this  ever-evolving  geopolitical  and  technological  context,  and  in  view  of  the  upcoming 
informal Summit in Paris on 10 and 11 March 2022, this Communication outlines concrete, new 
measures  and  initiatives  in  a  number  of  critical  areas  and  identifies  key  success  factors 
towards a more competitive and harmonised European defence market, including by:  

-  Stepping  up  investments  for  defence  research  and  capabilities  developed  in  EU 

cooperative frameworks;  

-  Facilitating  synergies  between  civilian  and  defence  research  and  innovation  and 

- 

reducing strategic dependencies; 
Incentivising the joint procurement of defence capabilities developed in a collaborative 
way within the EU; 

-  Calling  upon  Member  States  to  continue  moving  towards  streamlined  and  more 
convergent export control practices, in particular for defence capabilities developed in 
an EU framework; 

-  Strengthening the security and defence dimension of space at EU level; 
-  Enhancing European resilience inter alia by stepping up cybersecurity and countering 
cyber  and  any  other  hybrid  threats,  enhancing  military  mobility  and  addressing 
climate change challenges for defence. 

Through  these  building  blocks,  and  drawing  on  the  synergies  between  internal  and  external 
policies including those fostered under the 2020 Security Union Strategy, the Commission will 
continue  to  actively  contribute  in  the  years  to  come  to  the  process  of  building  a  European 

3 As a member of the European Economic Area. 

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Defence  Union  with  targeted  initiatives  and  projects,  using  the  full  spectrum  of  tools  at  its 
disposal to further counter the fast-changing multi-layered threats we face.  

2.  Stepping  up  investments  for  defence  research  and  capabilities  developed  in  EU 

cooperative frameworks 

The  EDF  is  an  ambitious,  balanced  and  inclusive  programme  that  ensures  Member  States’ 
strong involvement so that funded projects meet armed forces’ operational needs, paving the way 
to production and procurement. Its eligibility criteria keep the market open while strengthening 
the  competitiveness  of  the  European  defence  industry  and  protecting  the  EU’s  security  and 
strategic interests.  

By  the  end  of  2022,  the  European  Commission  will  have  invested  EUR  1.9  billion  in  defence 
research and capability development projects answering Member States’ capability needs. It will 
thus  kick-start  key  large-scale  collaborative  capability  development  projects  addressing 
critical shortfalls while also stimulating defence innovation, including in particular niche areas. 
It includes smaller projects and open calls that widen the cross-border participation of start-ups 
and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs), with up to 8% of its 2021 budget devoted to 
funding  disruptive  technologies  for  defence  and  around  6%  dedicated  to  open  calls  for  SMEs. 
They  represent  48%  of  the  1100  entities  that  have  submitted  proposals  and  20%  of  the  total 
funding  demand4  for  EDF  2021  calls5.  The  Commission  will  continue  to  promote  the 
participation  of  SMEs  across  the  EU,  including  by  encouraging  the  integration  of  the  most 
innovative and competitive ones within supply chains. 

The  first  calls  for  proposals  published  in  2021  already  plan  to  allocate  around  EUR  700 
million to projects addressing large-scale and complex defence platforms and systems such 
as next generation fighter systems, ground vehicles fleet, multirole and modular offshore patrol 
vessels, and ballistic missile defence. 

Also  through  its  development  precursor  programme6,  two  major  capability  development 
projects  of  high  strategic  importance  received  a  total  grant  of  around  EUR  140  million. 
MALE  RPAS  supports  the  development  of  a  medium-altitude  and  long-endurance  drone.  It 
contributes  to  building  technological  sovereignty  in  drones,  a  critical  asset  for  Member  States’ 
armed forces. The European Secure Software-defined Radio (ESSOR) will boost interoperability 
by  creating  a  European  standardisation  for  defence  secure  communication  technologies.  Other 
meaningful  funded  projects  focus,  inter  alia,  on  command  and  control,  AI  enabled  decision-
making, collaborative combat, cyber defence or space-based observation. 

Developing defence capabilities is a long-term process,  which requires coordinated and upfront 
planning.  Strategic  orientation  for  the  EDF  is  provided  through  the  defence  capability 

4 Subcontractors included. 
5 Under the precursor programme, the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP), in 2020, for 
which outcomes are available, SMEs represented 35% of the entities and benefited from 30% of the total funding of 
the 26 projects, before taking into account the participation of sub-contractors that are often SMEs. 
6 The European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) 

4 

 
                                                           
priorities  commonly  agreed  by  Member  States  within  the  framework  of  the  Common 
Security  and  Defence  Policy  (CSDP),  and  in  particular  in  the  context  of  the  Capability 
Development Plan (CDP) and in coherence with other EU defence related initiatives such as the 
Coordinated  Annual  Review  on  Defence  (CARD)  and  the  Permanent  Structured  Cooperation 
(PESCO).  

In  addition,  to  provide  transparency  and  predictability  especially  in  view  of  the  planning  of 
national defence budgets, the Commission has prepared an indicative and flexible multiannual 
perspective  for  the  four  years  ahead,  to  be  reviewed  each  year  in  light  of  developments. It 
ensures  consistency  of  collaborative  defence  capability  projects  and  coherence  of  work 
programmes  along  the  duration  of  the  EDF  while  also  providing  both  transparency  and 
predictability.  In  this  context,  the  Commission  and  Member  States  will  keep  strengthening  the 
multiannual  annual  perspective  taking  into  account  key  capabilities  and  strategic  enablers 
identified as priorities by Member States following the adoption of the Strategic Compass. 

Thanks  to  its  catalyst  effect,  the  EDF  will  thus  continue  to  pave  the  way  for  targeted  defence 
investments in support of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) and 
matching  priorities  commonly  agreed  by  Member  states  within  the  EU.  To  better  support  the 
development  of  large-scale  defence  capability  projects,  the  possibility  for  multi-annual  work 
programmes  should  be  assessed  in  the  context  of  the  EDF’s  mid-term  review.  It  is  equally 
important  to  ensure  that  other  horizontal  policies,  such  as  initiatives  on  sustainable  finance, 
remain  consistent  with  the  European  Union  efforts  to  facilitate  the  European  defence 
industry’s sufficient access to finance and investment.  

In order to further enhance both cooperation in the framework of the EDF and the integration of 
the internal defence market, the Commission will also continue to work with Member States to 
exploit the possibilities offered by the Directive 2009/43/EC7 on the intra-EU transfer of defence 
related  products  with  a  view  to  facilitate  transfers  related  to  EU-funded  collaborative  projects. 
By  advising  on  the  rules  and  procedures  under  Directive  2009/43/EC,  and  working  to  build 
consensus  amongst  Member  States,  the  Commission  will  aim  at  simplifying  the  transfer  of 
defence-related products within the internal market, and notably in the framework of EU-funded 
collaborative projects, and facilitating exchanges of best practices. 

Enhancing  the  coordination,  focus  and  level  of  collaborative  defence  investments  is  critical  to 
improve the overall efficiency of defence expenditures within the EU, while taking into account 
as  well  existing  commitments  such  as  those  undertaken  in  the  PESCO  context  to  regularly 
increase  defence  budgets.  The  collective  delivery  of  strategic  defence  capabilities  can  only  be 
achieved through coordinated planning as well as EU and national public investments targeting 
common defence research and development priorities.  

Against  this  background,  the  Commission  will  also  develop  further  incentives  to  stimulate 
Member  States’  collaborative  investments  in  defence  strategic  capabilities,  notably where 
they are developed and/or procured within European Union cooperative frameworks. The 

7  Directive  2009/43/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  6  May  2009  simplifying  terms  and 

conditions of transfers of defence related products within the Community. 

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Commission  will  include  a  chapter  with  observations  on  developments,  barriers  and 
opportunities  relative  to  multinational  defence  capabilities  projects  in  the  Annual  Single 
Market Report, which is usually published in conjunction with the European Semester Autumn 
Package. In this context, the Commission could also consider how to scale up collective efforts 
to  secure  and  coordinate  the  co-funding  of  Member  States  channeled  through  the  EDF  with  a 
view to securing greater value for money. 

Way forward 

  With  the  EDF,  the  Commission  will  continue  to  actively  encourage  Member  States  to 
further define strategic defence capabilities priorities and enablers following the adoption 
of  the  Strategic  Compass  through  the  revised  CDP  and  the  CARD  outcomes.  It  will 
contribute 
their 
development. 

to  align  defence  planning  and  collective  spending 

to  support 

  The Commission will develop further additional  incentives to stimulate Member States’ 
collaborative  investments  in  strategic  defence  capabilities,  notably  those  that  are  to  be 
developed and/or  jointly  procured in  European  Union  cooperative  frameworks, and will 
report  on  the  developments,  barriers  and  opportunities  related  to  multinational  defence 
capability projects in the Annual Single Market report. 

  In 2022, the Commission will continue to work with Member States to further facilitate 
the  transfer  of  EU-funded  defence  products  within  the  internal  market,  in  particular  by 
supporting the full exploitation of possibilities offered by the Directive 2009/43/EC. 

3.  Facilitating  synergies  between  civilian  and  defence  research  and  innovation  and 

reducing strategic dependencies 

The Commission outlines, in its Roadmap on critical technologies for security and defence that is 
adopted  alongside  the  present  Communication8,  a  path  for  boosting  research,  technology 
development  and  innovation  and  reducing  the  EU’s  strategic  dependencies  in  critical 
technologies and value chains for security and defence.  

Building on the update of the ‘2020 New Industrial Strategy: Building a stronger Single Market 
for  Europe’s  recovery’9  and  the  Action  Plan  on  synergies  between  civil,  defence  and  space 
industries10, it proposes a way forward for the EU and Member States to:   

 

identify technologies being critical for EU security and defence;   

  promote  from  the  outset  an  EU-wide  strategic  and  coordinated  approach  for  those  critical 
technologies by leveraging  research, technology development and innovation programmes;  

 

reduce strategic dependencies.  

8  COM (2022) 61 final 
9  COM (2021) 350 final 
10 COM (2021) 70 final 

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This requires greater awareness of the criticality of certain technologies, such as semiconductors, 
for the security and defence sectors, a better identification of related strategic dependencies, and 
possible mitigating measures, taking into account the diversity of sources and the prospect that 
operational use of the technology might be compromised or denied11. The Observatory of critical 
technologies12  (‘Observatory’)  will  establish  a  dedicated  mechanism 
identify  such 
assessments, based on inputs of Member States and the industry. The findings of the Observatory 
will  be  instrumental  to  boost  EU  research,  technology  development  and  innovation  on  those 
technologies,  in  an  EU-wide  coordinated  approach.  This  work  complements  broader  efforts  to 
address security of supply of critical civilian goods, in fields such as health and energy13. 

to 

The  Commission  will  also  prepare  an  approach  to  encourage  dual  use  for  research  and 
innovation  at  EU  level,  and  deploy  a  Defence  Innovation  Scheme  to  support  innovation  and 
entrepreneurship on critical technologies in close coordination with the Defence Innovation Hub 
to be established by the European Defence Agency (EDA).  

Finally,  in  order  to  reduce  strategic  dependencies,  the  Commission  will  continue  to 
systematically  assess  security  and  defence  considerations  when  implementing  and  reviewing 
existing - or designing new - EU instruments.  

4.  Incentivising  the  joint  procurement  of  capabilities  developed  in  a  collaborative  way 

within the EU 

Member  States’  joint  procurement  of  European  defence  capabilities  substantially  increases 
the inter-operability of European national armed forces  and  supports the competitiveness of 
the EDTIB, notably through greater economies of scale. 

However, Member States have yet to meet the long-standing European collaborative equipment 
procurement  collective  benchmark14  –  35%  of  defence  equipment  spending,  which  they  have 
confirmed  within  the  PESCO  framework15.  According  to  the  EDA,  in  2020  Member  States16 
have  spent  around  EUR  37  billion  in  defence  equipment  procurement  expenditure  (i.e. 
procurement  of  new  defence  equipment).  Of  this  amount  about  only  11%  (around  EUR  4.1 
billion)17,  was  spent  on  European  Collaborative  Defence  Equipment  Procurement  Expenditure 
(i.e.  procurement  of  new  defence  equipment  in  collaboration  with  other  Member  States).  This 
means  that  the  bulk  of  Member  States'  defence  equipment  procurement  expenditure  (around 
89%) was made on a national basis and/or in cooperation with third countries. 

11  As  regards  semiconductors,  see  the  accompanying  Roadmap  on  critical  technologies  for  security  and  defence, 
section 2.2, and the Commission Communication, A Chips Act for Europe, COM(2022) 45 final. 
12 In association with relevant Commission services and with the European Defence Agency. 
13 In line with Commission proposals COM (2021) 577 of 16.9.2021 on a framework of measures for ensuring the 
supply  of  crisis-relevant  medical  countermeasures  in  support  of  a  public  health  emergency,  COM(2021)  660  of 
13.10.2021 on tacking rising energy prices, and COM (2021) 350 on updating the new industrial strategy. 
14  In  November  2007,  the  EDA  Ministerial  Steering  Board  approved  four  collective  benchmarks  for  investment 

including the 35 % of total equipment spending for European collaborative equipment procurement.  

15 EUR-Lex - 32021H1117(01) - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu) 
16 Except DK 
17 Based on data provided by eleven Member States 

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The  year  2020  is  not  an  exception  and  can  even  be  considered  as  part  of  a  trend  that  has 
worsened  in  recent  years.  Indeed,  the  percentage  in  European  collaborative  defence  equipment 
procurement has been constantly decreasing since 2016, and the 2020 figure is the lowest since 
such data is being collected (2005). 

Two EU instruments already pave the way to joint procurement. As a condition for financial 
support  for  development  actions,  the  EDF  Regulation  requires  that  Member  States  intend  to 
procure  the  final  product  or  use  the  technology  in  a  coordinated  manner.  The  Defence  Public 
Procurement  Directive  2009/81/EC  provides  for  a  dedicated  exclusion  from  the  public 
procurement rules for cooperative projects based on  Research and Development (R&D)18. This 
exclusion applies also to the phases of the life cycle after R&D if the procurement contracts are 
awarded in the framework of the same cooperative project. In 2019, the Commission published a 
Notice19 providing guidance on various possibilities  for cooperative procurement offered under 
the  Directive.  Further  support  to  Member  States  will  be  available,  in  particular  through  the 
Expert Group on Defence and Security Procurement. 

The  Commission  aims  at  further  incentivising  Member  States’  joint  procurement  of 
European defence capabilities, including in relation to operations and maintenance. However, 
there are a number of practical financial and fiscal hurdles that need to be tackled to this end. 

The Commission will explore enabling a possible Value Added Tax (VAT) waiver to support 
the joint procurement and joint  ownership of defence capabilities that are developed in  a 
collaborative way within the EU. These capabilities will be available for use by Member States 
for missions and operations in the framework of CSDP20 or within the context of UN, NATO and 
national  activities.  Such  a  measure  could  especially  benefit  capabilities  developed  within 
cooperative EU frameworks (EDF and/or PESCO and/or within the EDA). The establishment of 
a  legal  framework  inspired  by  the  European  Research  Infrastructure  Consortium21  that  would 
benefit  from  a  VAT  waiver  on  equipment  that  Member  States  consortia  would  buy  and  own, 
could be considered in this context. 

Similarly, based on the lessons learned from the interim evaluation of the EDF, the Commission 
will consider reinforcing the current system of EDF bonuses, in order to provide a financial 
incentive  on  the  condition  that  Member  States  commit  to  jointly  acquire  and/or  own  the 
defence  capabilities  under  development22.  This  would  provide  stronger  incentives  to  ensure 
that the collaboration continues beyond the R&D phases, to  acquisitions, as well as operations 
and maintenance. 

Furthermore, building on the work of the Expert Group on the Financial Toolbox, new financing 
solutions  could  lead  to  greater  use  by  Member  States  of  already  existing  joint  procurement 

18 Article 13 of Directive 2009/81/EC 
19 2019/C 157/01 
20 In line with the multinational forces foreseen by Art 42.3 of the Treaty on European Union 
21 The European Research Infrastructure Consortium (ERIC) is a specific legal form that facilitates the establishment 

and operation of Research Infrastructures with European interest. 

22 Beyond the eligibility requirement specified under Article 21(3) (a) of EDF Regulation that requires an intention 

to procure the final product or use the technology in a coordinated manner. 

8 

 
                                                           
entities  such  as  the  EDA  or  the  Organisation  for  Joint  Armament  Cooperation  (OCCAR  - 
Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'Armement). In particular, the Commission 
will  assess  whether  the  EDF  regulation  provisions,  such  as  those  related  to  pre-commercial 
procurement23 may provide for financial support to contracting authorities and joint procurement 
entities 
including  by  covering 
administrative/transaction  costs  related 
joint  procurement  of  defence  research  and 
development services. 

their  procurement  procedures, 

further  coordinate 

to 

to 

Way forward 

  By early 2023, the Commission will make a proposal that would enable a VAT waiver to 
support  the  joint  procurement  and  ownership  of  defence  capabilities  developed  in  a 
collaborative  way  within  the  EU,  while  ensuring  compliance  with  World  Trade 
Organisation rules. 

  By  mid-2023,  the  Commission  will  build  on  the  work  of  the  Expert  Group  of  the 
Financial Toolbox with a view to propose new financing solutions to facilitate Member 
States’ joint procurement of EU strategic defence capabilities relying on already available 
expertise.  

  Following  the  interim  evaluation  of  the  EDF24,  the  Commission  will  explore  a  possible 
amendment to article 13 of Regulation 2021/697 establishing the European Defence Fund 
to  reinforce  the  EDF  bonus  system  when  Member  States  commit  to  jointly  acquire 
and/or own the defence capabilities under development. 

5.  Calling  upon  Member  States  to  continue  moving  towards  streamlined  and  more 

convergent export control practices 

While Member States are in charge of issuing export licences for military equipment, they assess 
their decisions on the basis of the Council Common Position25 that defines common criteria for 
controlling  the  export  of  military  technology  and  equipment.  It  also  sets  up  denial  notification 
and  consultation  mechanisms  with  a  view  to  increase  convergence  in  the  application  of  their 
export policies for defence-related products. 

However, as  joint  defence capabilities development  will progressively  become the norm in  the 
EU  rather  than  the  exception,  Member  States  will  benefit  from  increased  sharing  of  best 
practices and gradually leading to  a more  convergent approach to arms  exports controls. 
Building  upon work that has already been achieved,  and acknowledging that  exports are a key 
success  factor  for  the  business  model  of  the  European  defence  industry,  the  Commission  is 
supportive  of  Member  States  moving  towards  gradual  enhanced  streamlining  and  further 

23 Article 17 of the EDF regulation 
24 The  interim  evaluation  is  to be  carried out  no  later  than  four  years  (2025)  after  the  start  of  the  implementation 

period of the Fund according to article 29 of the Regulation establishing the EDF. 

25 Common Position 2008/944/CFSP. 

9 

 
 
                                                           
convergence of arms export control practices, especially for those defence capabilities that they 
develop together, in particular under the EDF.  

In  this  context,  the  Commission  welcomes  the  reflection  that  has  been  initiated  in  the 
Council26  on  exportation  of  capabilities  that  have  been  developed  in  an  EU  framework  and 
encourages Member States to pursue these discussions to facilitate exports control procedures for 
such  products.  This  process  could  also  draw  on  the  experience  of  bilateral  and  multilateral 
accords between Member States for jointly developed capabilities. 

In order not to hamper cooperation, this work should facilitate the definition of clear and easy-to-
implement  procedures.  Efficient  export  control  measures  should  be  defined  to  provide  EDF-
funded products with adequate and competitive access to international markets while preserving 
Member States’ sovereign decisions, in full respect of their relevant legal obligations and taking 
into  account  their  national  security  interests.  To  preserve  the  attractiveness  of  joint  defence 
capability projects, the Commission invites Member States to seek an approach according to 
which,  in  principle,  they  would  respectively  not  restrain  each  other  from  exporting  to  a 
third country any military equipment and technology developed in cooperation. This could 
apply  to  intended  exports  of  equipment  or  technology  incorporating  components  from  another 
Member State exceeding a certain de minimis threshold. 

Way forward 

  The  Commission  invites  Member  States  to  explore  ways  towards  the  streamlining  and 
gradual  further  convergence  of  their  arms  export  control  practices,  especially  for  those 
defence  capabilities  that  are  jointly  developed,  in  particular  in  an  EU  framework,  thus 
ensuring  EDF-funded  products  will  profit  from  adequate  and  competitive  access  to 
international markets without prejudice to Member States’ sovereign decisions. 

6.  Strengthening the defence dimension of space at EU level 

Space  is  a  strategic  area  for  EU’s  freedom  of  action  and  security.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  an 
increasingly congested and contested area, marked by a growing power competition.  

There  is  an  urgent  need  to  tackle  these  challenges.  A  new  EU  space  strategy  for  security  and 
defence,  currently  under  consideration  by  Member  States  in  the  context  of  the  Strategic 
Compass,  should  help  building  a  common  understanding  of  space-related  risks  and  threats, 
develop  appropriate  responses  to  react  better  and  faster  to  crises,  strengthen  our  resilience  and 
make full use of the benefits and opportunities linked to the space domain. Without prejudice to 
the content of the future joint strategy, the following actions will be considered: 

26 Within the Conventional Arms exports subgroup (COARM) of the Non-Proliferation and Arms Exports Working 

Party  

10 

 
 
                                                           
First, EU space assets27 should be further protected to enhance resilience of the EU in and 
from space.  

In the Joint Communication on Space Traffic Management (STM)28, the Commission and the 
High Representative provide concrete orientations on how to increase the protection of EU space 
assets and promote a more sustainable use of space. In particular, the Commission will reinforce 
its  space  surveillance  assets  through  enhanced  services  in  Space  Surveillance  and Tracking 
(SST)  and  the  development  of  related  technologies,  such  as  automatic  collision  avoidance  or 
artificial intelligence.  

The  Commission  will  also  further  support  the  development  of  projects  related  to  Space 
Situational Awareness (SSA) and early warning capabilities for defence. Such projects will 
contribute  to  advanced  space  command  and  control  (SC2)  capabilities,  enhanced  SSA  sensors, 
and early warning system against ballistic missile threats and novel hypersonic threats29. 

Second,  the  Commission  will  enhance  the  security  and  defence  dimension  in  existing  and 
upcoming EU space infrastructures, in cooperation with the High Representative. 

The  Galileo  public  regulated  service  (PRS)30  offers  a  navigation  service  restricted  to 
government-authorised  users  for  sensitive  applications.  These  requires  a  high  level  of  service 
continuity, using strong, encrypted signals notably in the area of security and defence. The PRS 
is  designed  to  offer  unlimited  and  uninterrupted  service  worldwide.  It  is  a  clear  demonstration 
that a common infrastructure under civilian control can meet defence and security needs.  

The  proposal  for  a  regulation  establishing  the  Union  Secure  Connectivity  Programme  for 
2022-202731, which is being adopted alongside the present Communication as part of the space 
package,  will  enhance  the  resilience  of  the  EU  in  connectivity  through  secure  governmental 
communication.  It  will include defence requirements in terms of resilience from the outset and 
the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) constellation will provide an opportunity to take on-board pay-loads 
contributing  to  other  EU  space  programme  components.  The  system  will  build  upon 
GOVSATCOM and synergies with the European Defence Fund.  

The  evolution  of  Copernicus  should  also  take  into  account  defence  requirements  to  the 
extent possible, with a special attention given to the required levels of security and performance, 
and underpinned by the right governance based on trust.  

To  support  the  development  of  the  defence  dimension  of  existing  and  upcoming  EU  space 
infrastructures,  the  Commission  will  support  the  development  of  space  defence  capabilities 

27  The  EU  Space  Programme  has  four  components:  Galileo/EGNOS  for  positioning,  navigation  and  timing,   
Copernicus for Earth observation, GOVSATCOM for secure governmental satellite communications, and SSA for 
space situational awareness. 

28  JOIN (2022) 4 final 
29 Those projects are supported by the EDF and its precursor programmes. 
30 Decision No 1104/2011/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on the rules for 
access  to  the  public  regulated  service  provided  by  the  global  navigation  satellite  system  established  under  the 
Galileo programme, OJ L 287, 4.11.2011. 

31 COM (2022) 57 final  

11 

 
                                                           
through EDF. To date, about EUR 130 million have been allocated to fund space-related actions 
under the EDF and its precursor programmes.  

As  the  Commission  supports  the  development  of  collaborative  platforms  for  future  defence 
challenges,  it  also  seeks  to  improve  their  performance  by  making  the  best  use  of  existing  and 
future European space assets. For example, the Galileo for EU Defence (GEODE) project is co-
funded with EUR 44 million32 and aims at developing European standardised military navigation 
receivers  that  are  compatible  with  the  Galileo  PRS.  More  than  EUR  22  million  will  also  be 
invested  to  enhance  sensors  and  Command  and  Control  (C2)  for  an  EU  military  space 
surveillance awareness and develop a space-based early warning capability.  

Under  the  2021  EDF  work  programme,  the  EDF  will  be  dedicating  EUR  50  million  to  both 
space  and  ground-based  navigation  warfare  (NAVWAR)  surveillance  and  European 
technologies for resilient satellite communications against jamming. 

Third,  the  Commission  will  work  to  reduce  related  EU  strategic  dependencies  on  critical 
technologies, e.g. in the field of chips, quantum and  AI. To achieve this, the Commission will 
maximise  synergies  with  space-related  initiatives  implemented  under  existing  Commission-led 
instruments  (including  EDF,  Horizon  Europe33,  Space  Programme,  European  Innovation 
Council, and InvestEU) and will take advantage of the Observatory of critical technologies. The 
Commission  will  also  strengthen  the  resilience  of  related  European  supply  chains  to  ensure 
the integrity, the security and the operations of space infrastructures. 

Fourth,  the  Commission,  in  cooperation  with  the  High  Representative,  in  line  with  their 
respective mandates, will implement the enlargement of the current Galileo threat response 
mechanism34  to  the  systems  and  services  under  the  other  components  of  the  EU  Space 
Programme. This will further enhance the security governance of EU space infrastructures 
to better reply to threats and will promote adequate governance to be put in place by relevant 
actors. They will also improve situational awareness at EU level through better use of space data, 
in  close  cooperation  with  Member  States  and  systematic  cooperation  between  relevant 
agencies/bodies operating EU infrastructures.  

The Commission and the High Representative will also contribute to Member States’ efforts to 
further increase mutual  assistance  and crisis response mechanisms,  including through exercises 
and  by  boosting  readiness  against  threats,  fostering  interoperability  and  supporting  a  common 
strategic culture. 

32 Under the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) 
33 The term ‘Horizon Europe’ in this document refers to the Specific programme implementing Horizon Europe and 
the European Institute of Innovation and Technology; activities carried out under them have an exclusive focus on 
civil applications. 

34 As provided in the EU Space Programme Regulation 2021/696 and by Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/698 of 30 
April  2021  on  the  security  of  systems  and  services  deployed,  operated  and  used  under  the  Union  Space 
Programme which may affect the security of the Union. 

12 

 
 
 
                                                           
Way forward 

  Following  the  adoption  of  the  Strategic  Compass,  the  Commission  and  the  High 

Representative will propose a Joint EU Space strategy for security and defence. 

  By the end of 2022, the Commission will explore how to further enhance the protection 
of EU space assets, notably through additional SST services, improved performance of 
EU SST and by making full use of the potential of the EU industry. 

  As of 2022, the Commission will promote a ‘dual use by design’ approach for EU space 
infrastructures, with  a view to  offering new resilient services that  address governmental 
needs. In this context, the Commission encourages the co legislators to swiftly adopt the 
proposal  for  a  regulation  establishing  the  Union  Secure  Connectivity  Programme  for 
2022-2027. 

  The  Commission  will 

intensify  work 

technological 
dependencies and enhancing the resilience of  space  infrastructure related  supply  chains, 
notably  through  EU  funding  instruments  as  well  as  the  Observatory  of  critical 
technologies.  

towards  reducing  strategic 

  The Commission will set-up adequate governance for EU space infrastructures, in close 
cooperation with Member States, building on the model of the Galileo PRS. It will assess 
the feasibility to develop and deploy a more resilient and secured Copernicus service for 
governmental purposes,35 taking into account defence requirements to the extent possible. 

  By  the  end  of  2022,  the  Commission  and  the  High  Representative  will  explore  the 
possibility of activation of solidarity, mutual assistance and crisis response mechanisms in 
case of attacks originating from space or threats to space-based assets.  

7.  Enhancing European resilience  

Europe  needs  to  enhance  its  resilience  to  prevent,  protect  and  withstand  future  shocks.  Due  to 
intrinsic  links  with  national  security  and  defence  policies,  responsibility  for  addressing  these 
threats lies primarily with Member States. In the meantime, some vulnerabilities are common to 
all Member States, and some threats extend across borders, such as the targeting of cross-border 
networks or infrastructures as well as climate change.  

The EU approach aims at integrating the external and internal dimension in a seamless flow. It 
brings  national  and  EU-wide  civilian  and  military  considerations  together  to  promote  concrete 
solutions, while facilitating increased resilience and continued operational efficiency. 

7.1. Countering hybrid threats 

35 Copernicus PRS-like service 

13 

 
 
                                                           
In 2020, the EU Security Union Strategy36 outlined hybrid threats as one of the priority areas to 
be  addressed  in  order  to  enhance  EU´s  security.  The  Strategy  sets  out  the  basis  for  a  renewed 
approach  to  these  ever-evolving  threats  covering  the  full  spectrum  of  action  –  from  early 
detection,  analysis,  awareness,  building  resilience  and  prevention  to  crisis  response  and 
consequence management. 

The  mapping of measures37  related to enhancing resilience and countering hybrid threats 
includes more than two hundred tools and measures at EU level, of which the vast majority 
of them are led or supported by the Commission. The Commission proposals in different areas, 
including the Digital Services Act38, the proposal for a Critical Entities resilience directive39 and 
the  revised  Union  Civil  Protection  Mechanism40,  will  further  contribute  to  this  increasing 
number of available EU tools to counter hybrid threats.  

Resilience  is  one  of  the  main  pillars  for  countering  hybrid  threats.  A  joint  staff  working 
document  of  January  202241  identified  53  resilience  baselines42  elements  at  EU  level.  This 
identification, announced in the Security Union Strategy, has been a crucial first step to track and 
objectively measure progress in this area. 

In  this  context,  Commission  services,    the  European  External  Action  Service  (EEAS)  and  the 
General  Secretariat  of  the  Council,  will  conduct  the  EU  Integrated  Resolve  PACE  exercise  in 
November  2022,  inter  alia,  to  address  hybrid  threats,  including  their  cyber  dimension.  This 
exercise will be conducted under the overall responsibility of the High Representative, with the 
participation  of  Member  States  and  EU  Agencies,  and  in  a  parallel  and  coordinated  (PACE) 
format with NATO. 

The Commission  has also  adapted to the  rapidly changing nature of threats.  Following the 
crisis at the EU border with Belarus, it proposed measures to tackle the instrumentalisation of 
migration,  including  blacklisting  transport  operators  involved  in  smuggling  or  trafficking  of 
people into the EU43. 

The  COVID-19  pandemic  has  revealed  the  need  to  enhance  coordinated  EU-level  action  to 
respond to health emergencies. At a time, where Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear 
threats  could  put  at  risk  public  health,  the  European  Health  Emergency  Preparedness  and 
Response  Authority  (HERA)  is  a  central  element  for  strengthening  EU  preparedness  and 
response  to  serious  cross-border  health  threats,  by  enabling  rapid  availability,  access  and 
distribution  of  needed  countermeasures.  Drawing  on  the  lessons  from  the  early  stages  of  the 
pandemic, work will continue to enhance military assistance to civilian authorities in this regard.  

36 COM (2020) 605 
37 SWD (2020) 152 final 
38 COM (2020) 825 final 
39 COM (2020) 829 final 
40 Regulation (EU) 2021/836 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 
41 SWD (2022) 21 final 
42  Benchmarks,  covering  situations  where  this  is  a  point  of  departure  as  well  as  an  envisaged  target  or  advice  on 

minimum level requirements 

43 COM (2021) 753 final 

14 

 
                                                           
Way forward 

  By 2023, the Commission, in cooperation with the High Representative and the Member 
States, will assess the sectoral resilience baselines to identify gaps and needs as well as 
steps to address them. 

  Following the adoption of the Strategic Compass, the Commission will contribute to the 
future  EU  hybrid  toolbox  by  ensuring  that  the  Member  States  have  a  full  overview  of 
existing internal instruments and measures to counter hybrid threats affecting the EU and 
its Member States. This will take into account the measures included in the 2020 mapping 
on  countering  hybrid  threats  and  recent  Commission’s  and  High  Representative’s 
proposals in areas such as critical infrastructure and disinformation. 

  Following  the  adoption  of  the  Strategic  Compass,  the  Commission  will  consider 
identifying  experts  in  relevant  policy  areas,  who  could  be  deployed  as  part  of  Hybrid 
Rapid  Response  Team  upon  request,  in  synergy  with  the  proposed  JCU  rapid  response 
teams. 

  In parallel Commission  services and the  EEAS  will  jointly  review the EU Playbook on 

countering hybrid threats. 

  By the end of 2022, the  Commission, in cooperation with the High Representative, will 
define a comprehensive vision regarding its rapid alert mechanisms and in particular the 
possibility  to  create  a  better  situational  awareness  picture,  in  coordination  and 
complementarity  with  other  EU  existing  mechanisms.  This  will  strengthen  the  Union’s 
capability  for  monitoring  and  early  detection,  prevention  and  preparedness,  including 
resilience, and response to hybrid threats. 

  Drawing on its expertise and instruments, the Commission will contribute to the EU effort 

to build resilience in partner countries. 

7.2. Enhancing cybersecurity and cyber-defence  

Countering  cybersecurity  threats  is  one  of  the  most  complex  security  and  defence  challenges 
today,  especially  considering  their  growing  number  and  impact,  and  while  state  actors  have 
developed specific sophisticated capabilities.  

The EU needs to protect critical network and information systems and to play a leading role in 
guaranteeing the security, stability and resilience  as well as freedom of the global internet. We 
need to  boost  cybersecurity and  cyber defence  in Europe  by  strengthening our cooperation, by 
investing more  effectively  into advanced  capabilities, and by setting  appropriate rules that will 
allow  for  a  better  linkage  of  all  the  dimensions  of  cyber.  These  efforts  should  focus  on 
protecting  citizens,  businesses  and  EU  interests,  detecting  and  deterring  malicious  cyber 
activities  and  defending  ourselves  against  cyber-attacks,  thereby  contributing  to  international 
security and stability and consolidating the EU’s cyber deterrence potential.  

15 

 
 
The  Commission  and  the  High  Representative  have  already  set  out  ambitious  actions 
contributing to these goals in the EU Cybersecurity Strategy of December 202044. A number of 
important instruments are in place to increase EU resilience, notably the Directive on measures 
for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union 
(NIS)45, the Cybersecurity Act46, the Directive on attacks against information systems47, and 
the  implementation  of  the  EU  toolbox  on  5G  Cybersecurity48,  Recommendation  on  a 
‘Blueprint’  for  a  coordinated  response  to  large-scale  cybersecurity  incidents  and  crises49 
and  the  EU  cyber  defence  policy  framework  [2018  updates]50.  The  Commission  has  also 
adopted a delegated act51 under the Radio Equipment Directive52 laying down legal requirements 
for cybersecurity safeguards, which manufacturers will have to  take into account  in  the design 
and  production  of  radio  equipment.  Finally,  it  released  a  recommendation  for  a  Joint  Cyber 
Unit (JCU)53 and presented a proposal to revise the NIS Directive in December 202054, which 
is  now  under  consideration  by  the  co-legislators.  In  line  with  this  level  of  ambition,  the 
Commission will shortly present proposals to enhance the cybersecurity and information security 
of the EU institutions, bodies and agencies. 

The 2021-25 multiannual work programme of the Digital Europe and of the Connecting Europe 
Facility (CEF - Digital sector) will support the deployment of a secure quantum communication 
infrastructure (Euro QCI). The CEF will also support other critical communication infrastructure, 
including  certain  backbones between  Member  States  and  with  third  countries, with  the  highest 
security standards. 

To complement those instruments and further reduce the attack surface and exposure to risk, the 
security and standardisation of products and services related to information and communication 
technology  (ICT)  should  be  strengthened.  This  applies  in  particular  to  the  security  of  critical 
hardware  and  software  components.  The  Commission  is  therefore  preparing  new  proposals 
laying  down  horizontal  security  requirements,  that  will  form  the  centrepiece  of  the  Cyber 
Resilience  Act  announced  in  the  State  of  the  Union  address55.  A  defence  dimension  could  be 
considered  in  this  context,  in  particular  as  regards  the  potential  development  of  common  or 
hybrid cybersecurity standards. 

44 JOIN (2020) 18 final 
45 Directive (EU) 2016/1148 on security of Network and Information Systems (NIS) 
46  Regulation  (EU)  2019/881  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  17  April  2019  on  ENISA  (the 
European  Union  Agency  for  Cybersecurity)  and  on  information  and  communications  technology  cybersecurity 
certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 

47 Directive 2013/40/EU (12/08/2013) 
48 COM (2020) 50 final 
49  Commission  Recommendation  (EU)  2017/1584  of  13  September  2017  on  coordinated  response  to  large-scale 

cybersecurity incidents and crises, C/2017/6100 

50 14413/18 (19/11/2018) 
51 C (2021) 7672 
52 Directive 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on the harmonisation of 

the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of radio equipment 

53 C (2021) 4520 final 
54 COM(2020) 823 final  
55 State of the Union address 2021 - Strengthening the soul of our Union – 15 September 2021 

16 

 
                                                           
To further enhance the technological capabilities of the EU and its cyber defence actors (mainly 
Member States’ defence forces), more cooperation between relevant actors will be sought in the 
planning  of  civilian  and  defence  investments  for  the  development  of  relevant  technologies  as 
well  as  their  use.  The  Cybersecurity  Industrial,  Technology  and  Research  Competence 
Centre  and  Network  of  Coordination  Centres  (CCCN)56    will  adopt  in  2022  its  Strategic 
agenda  on  cyber  investments.  The  agenda  could  cover  possible  synergies  between  civil  and 
defence technologies and potential dual-use applications, thus seeking synergies with other EU 
programmes,  including  Horizon  Europe,  the  Digital  Europe  programme,  and  the  EDF,  in  a 
coordinated manner and while respecting relevant governance rules. 

The  Commission  has  already  dedicated  EUR  38.6  million57  to  six  cyber  defence  projects. 
Among  others,  this  budget  is  supporting  the  development  of  a  European  cyber  situational 
awareness  platform  and  a  project  on  technologies  for  secure  and  resilient  communication.  The 
EDF  will  continue  to  support  the  development  of  cyber  capabilities  for  defence.  In  2021,  two 
specific calls were launched under the EDF for a EUR 33.5 million financial envelope.  While all 
defence capability projects entail a cyber-dimension, cyber defence will remain a priority for the 
EDF in the upcoming years. 

To  better  prepare  for  potential  large-scale  incidents  and  crises  in  the  Union,  enhanced 
coordination  is  essential  to  ensure  situational  awareness,  rapidly  identify  potential  response 
needs  and  resources  and  to  align  effective  communication  amongst  relevant  actors  at  Member 
States’ and EU level, in order to mitigate potential impacts in the Union. 

To step up the detection of malicious cyber activities and enhance situational awareness, the 
Commission  is  working  with  Member  States  towards  the  establishment  of  cross-border 
platforms  to  share  cybersecurity  threat  intelligence  (EU  SOCs)  while  also  reinforcing 
capacities of Security Operation Centres (SOCs) at national level across the EU.The objective of 
those  cross-border  platforms  (‘EU  SOCs’)  is  to  enable  the  exchange  of  data  on  cybersecurity 
threats from various sources, as well as tools and capabilities, on a large-scale basis, in a trusted 
environment. They will be equipped with next-generation, ultra-secure tools and infrastructures. 
This should allow to improve collective detection capacities and timely warnings to authorities 
and  relevant  entities.  These  actions  will  benefit  from  financial  support  from  DEP,  notably 
through  a  joint  procurement  to  develop  and  operate  EU  SOCs,  including  advanced  tools  and 
infrastructures, as well as a call for grants to support SOCs capacities in the Member States.As a 
next  step,  promoting  civil  -  military  cooperation  at  national  level  in  this  area  could  be  also 
considered, together with Member States.  

The  degree  of  cybersecurity  cooperation  between  Member  States  when  it  comes  to  incident 
response  should  be  increased  including  through  possible  cooperation  among  civilian  and 
defence  response  teams.  The  Joint  Cyber  Unit  aims  at  bringing  together  all  relevant 
cybersecurity  communities  (i.e.  diplomatic,  civilian,  law  enforcement  and  defence) to  ensure 
to 
an EU  coordinated  response to 

incidents  and  crises,  as  well  as 

large-scale  cyber 

56 PE/28/2021/INIT 
57 Under the EDIDP 

17 

 
                                                           
offer assistance in  recovering  from  these  attacks. Therefore,  the  military  could  structurally 
cooperate and coordinate with other cybersecurity communities through the JCU. 

Developing cyber skills through joint training and exercise is also key for effective resilience to 
cyberattacks,  improving  cyber  capabilities,  developing  a  shared  understanding,  and  building  a 
common response capacity.  If Member States so decide, they could consider  enhanced civilian 
military cooperation in cyber training and joint exercises, building on the European Security and 
Defence College and EDA’s cyber education, training and exercises programmes.  

Way forward 

  By  the  third  quarter  of  2022,  the  Commission  will  propose  the  Cyber  Resilience  Act 
which  will  aim  to  increase  the  cybersecurity  of  products  and  associated  services  in  the 
internal market.  

  To set up the new ‘EU SOCs’ platforms for sharing of cyber threat intelligence and tools, 
by  the  second  quarter  of  2022,  the  Commission  will  publish  a  Call  for  expression  of 
interest to select hosting entities for EU SOCs accompanied by dedicated Roadmap. This 
should  pave  the  way  for  building  an  EU  strategic  capability  for  detecting  and  sharing 
information about cyber threats. 

  The  Commission  will  work  with  Member  States  on  stepping  up  preparedness  for  large 
scale  cyber-incidents  through  enhanced  coordination,  including  identifying  potential 
needs and resources to manage response. 

  In 2022, a Strategic agenda for the Cybersecurity Competence Centre will be proposed, 
including  on  dual  use  technology  and  civil-military  synergies  to  be  enshrined  in  a 
coordinated manner with relevant actors. 

  The  Commission,  together  with  the  High  Representative,  will  continue  supporting 
Member States in setting up the JCU, in particular its mutual assistance mechanism, and 
will  encourage  civilian  military  cooperation  to  facilitate  information  exchanges  and 
coordination  between  defence  experts  and  other  communities  (i.e.  civilian,  law 
enforcement and diplomacy). 

  The  Commission  will  request  the  European  Standardisation  Organisations  to  develop 
harmonised  standards  in  support  of  the  recently  adopted  delegated  act  of  the  Radio 
Equipment Directive as regards cybersecurity and privacy. 

  The Commission will work together with the High Representative to further develop the 

EU cyber defence policy to be presented to Member States by the end of 2022. 

  The  Commission  invites  Member  States  to  consider  joint  cyber  defence  trainings  and 
exercises,  in  cooperation  with  existing  civilian  and  defence  training  and  exercises 
frameworks. 

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7.3. Enhancing military mobility 

Through thet implementation of the Action Plan on Military Mobility, the EU is already taking 
significant  steps  to  enhance  the  mobility  of  military  personnel,  materiel  and  equipment  within 
and beyond the EU, thus enhancing our ability to respond swiftly to a crisis or in view of routine 
activities  like  exercises.  Military  mobility  is  also  a  flagship  project  within  EU-NATO 
cooperation. 

With a 2021- 2027 EU budget of EUR 1.69 billion to support dual-use transport infrastructure, 
military mobility is a key component of the new Connecting Europe Facility (CEF)58. The 2021-
2023 Work Programme entails a yearly dedicated budget of EUR 330 million, and the first calls 
for proposals were launched in September 2021.  

Military  mobility  is  also  a  topic  of  the  2021  EDF  Work  Programme.  The  development  of  a 
digital system for secure and quick exchange of information related to military mobility is one of 
the two topics under the call for proposals on soldier and logistic systems, with a EUR 50 million 
indicative budget for the whole call.  

On 14 December 2021, the Commission proposed revising the trans-European transport network 
(TEN-T)  Regulation.  Among  other  measures,  the  proposal  aims  to  strengthen  standards  for 
civilian and military mobility and to expand the TEN-T maps to include new routes important for 
military mobility.  

The Commission will continue its efforts to contribute to military mobility within and beyond the 
EU, including by considering it  in relevant legislative proposals  and initiatives, in particular in 
the area of transport and cross-border procedures.  

Way forward 

  By the end of 2022, the Commission, together with the High Representative, will propose 
an  update  of  the  joint  Action  Plan  on  Military  Mobility,  which  may  cover identifiable 
needs in relation to digitalisation in transport, cyber resilience of transport infrastructure 
and artificial intelligence. 

7.4. Addressing climate change challenges for defence 

Climate  change  and  biodiversity  loss  poses  new  threats  to  security.  While  maintaining 
operational  effectiveness  remains  a  priority,  the  defence  sector  needs  to  meet  the  challenge  of 
adapting  to  the  security  effects  of  climate  change  including  operation  under  more  extreme 
climatic conditions, as well as  contribute to mitigation under the EU’s climate change policies, 
in  particular  the  European  Green  deal.  Improving  energy  efficiency,  increasing  the  use  of 
renewable  energy  where  possible,  and  reducing  emissions  in  this  sector,  should  become  an 

58  Regulation  (EU)  2021/1153  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  7  July  2021  establishing  the 

Connecting Europe Facility and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1316/2013 and (EU) No 283/2014 

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integral part of our collective efforts towards climate neutrality by 2050 as well as the protection 
of biodiversity and a strengthened circular economy.  

Circular  systems  can  have  major  benefits  for  defence  industries  and  procurement,  increasing 
resource  efficiency,  increasing  open  strategic  autonomy  for  certain  critical  materials,  and 
prolonging  and  optimising  the  utility  of  defence  equipment59.  Opportunities  to  improve  design 
for  disassembly,  component  harvesting,  repair,  refurbishment  and  remanufacturing  of  defence 
equipment will be identified and supported. This also goes for opportunities to upgrade defence 
equipment so that it can continue to operate under increasingly harsh environmental conditions 
in operational theatres. 

In  this  context,  the  Commission  is  committed  to  the  implementation  of  the  2020  Joint  EU 
Climate  Change  and  Defence  Roadmap60  on  which  Commission  services  will  present  a  first 
annual progress report together with the EEAS and the EDA in the first half of 2022. The EDF61 
2021  Work  Programme  already  identifies  topics  related  to  energy  management  and  energy 
efficiency.  EUR  133  million  have  been  dedicated  to  a  specific  call  to  support  research  and 
development of defence technologies and products addressing these topics.  As similar work is 
being stepped up within NATO, the UN and by the United States and other partners, the EU will 
intensify its staff-to-staff dialogues on the climate-security-defence nexus. 

Way forward 

  In  the  first  half  of  2022,  Commission  services,  EEAS  and  EDA  will  present  the  first 
progress report on the implementation of the Climate Change and Defence Roadmap.  

  During 2022, the Commission will assess climate/defence related initiatives implemented 
under  existing  Commission-led  instruments  (including  EDF,  Horizon  Europe,  Horizon 
2020, CEF, and LIFE) in order to enhance potential synergies.  

  By  the  end  of  2022,  the  Commission  will  establish  a  policy  framework,  drawing  on 
climate/defence  aspects  of  Commission-led  instruments  to  contribute  to  reduced  energy 
demand and increasing energy resilience of critical technologies used by civilian security 
actors and armed forces, and develop concrete climate resilient solutions in this context. 

  During  2022,  the  Commission  will  explore  the  potential  of  enhancing  the  impact  of 
energy-related  directives  on  military  infrastructure  (such  as  offices,  headquarters, 
barracks, hospitals, academies), including the Green Public Procurement options, as part 
of  the  European  Green  Deal  (i.e.  the  new  energy  efficiency  action  “the  Renovation 
Wave”,  the  revision  of  the  Energy  Efficiency  Directive  and  the  Energy  Performance  of 
Buildings Directive. 

  During  2022,  the  Commission  and  the  High  Representative  will  increase  and  intensify 

59 IF CEED (europa.eu)Circular defence - News & insight - Cambridge Judge Business School 
60 12741/20 
61 The  EDF regulation states that the  “Fund contributes to the mainstreaming of climate actions in Union policies 
and  to  the  achievement  of  an  overall  target  of  30  %  of  the  Union  budget  expenditure  supporting  climate 
objectives”. 

20 

 
                                                           
staff-to-staff  work  on  the  climate-security-defence  nexus  with  NATO,  the  UN  and 
relevant bilateral partners such as the US and Canada. 

8.  Conclusions 

In a more complex, contested, competitive and connected world than ever before, the EU must 
further step up its efforts to defend its strategic interests and values. The upcoming EU Strategic 
Compass on Security and Defence will set out ambitious goals for Europe’s long-term security 
and defence, to which this Communication is actively contributing. 

To this end, the Commission has identified the following main new areas to further strengthen 
the competitiveness of the European defence market: 

- 

- 

- 

explore  how  to  further  stimulate  Member  States  investments  in  key  strategic 
capabilities  and  critical  enablers  that  are  developed  and/or  procured  in  European  Union 
cooperative frameworks; 

further  incentivise  the  joint  procurement  of  defence  capabilities  developed  in  a 
collaborative  way  within  the  EU,  including  through  a  VAT  waiver  and  a  possible 
reinforcement of EDF bonuses; 

call upon Member States to continue moving towards streamlined and more convergent 
arms  exports  control  practices,  in  particular  for  defence  capabilities  developed  in  an  EU 
cooperative framework. 

The Commission  will also implement  the initiatives already launched that  are key enablers for 
European defence, such as the EDF and military mobility, as well as those that are essential for 
strengthening  European  resilience,  in  particular  in  space,  to  counter  hybrid  threats,  strengthen 
cybersecurity, and address climate change challenges related to defence. 

The  Commission  remains  ready  to  consider  additional  steps  forward  in  the  light  of  progress 
made and the evolution of the threats and challenges the Union faces in the future.  

21