COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Roadmap on critical technologies for security and defence
Date: 2022-02-15
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: EU financing, European defence policy, European security, common security and defence policy, critical infrastructure security, research and development, security of supply, technical cooperation

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Strasbourg, 15.2.2022  COM(2022) 61 final  COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Roadmap on critical technologies for security and defence   
 
 
1. 

Introduction 

Remaining  at  the  cutting  edge  of  technological  development  is  critical  for  ensuring  Europe's 
prosperity, security and way of life. New technologies are transforming the security and defence 
sectors at a faster pace than ever before and blurring the dividing line between the civilian and 
military  domain.  Digital  technologies  in  particular  are  affecting  established  balances  of  power 
within  the  global  security  landscape.  It  is  thus  essential  to  ensure  that  Europe’s  security  and 
defence sectors remain technologically fit for purpose. 

Many critical technologies for security and defence increasingly originate in the civilian domain 
and use critical  components of  a  dual-use nature. To accelerate innovation  across domains  and 
foster  technological  sovereignty  in  the  security  and  defence  sectors,  better  exchange  between 
civilian and defence research and innovation communities is needed. In light of its longstanding 
expertise  in  civilian  technological  development  and  its  new  defence  cooperation  instruments1, 
the  EU  is  well  placed  to  take  a  lead  role.  However,  this  will  require  a  more  efficient  use  of 
resources  and  a  readiness  to  explore  the  opportunities  of  dual  use,  while  upholding  the  EU’s 
fundamental  values.  It  also  means  reducing  strategic  dependencies  and  vulnerabilities  of  the 
value and supply chains associated with these technologies. 

The  fragmentation  of  Europe’s  security  and  defence  capabilities  has  led  to  economic 
inefficiencies,  reduced  operational  capacity  and  increased  strategic  dependencies.  The  ongoing 
revolution in security and defence technologies and the new EU defence cooperation instruments 
give the EU an opportunity to avoid the mistakes of the past, to build on its existing capacities 
and preserve its economic prosperity and security. The future European security and defence 
technological  and  innovation  landscape  should  be  developed  under  EU  cooperative 
frameworks from the outset. 

In her 2021 State of the Union address2, President von der Leyen recognised that while work on 
developing a European defence ecosystem had started, a European Defence Union was needed. 
The  EU  Strategic  Compass  for  security  and  defence  (‘Strategic  Compass’),  to  be  adopted  by 
Member States  in  March 2022, will set  out  a common strategic vision  for the next  decade and 
outline how the EU will enhance its capacity to act and respond to various crises and challenges; 
secure its interests and protect its citizens; invest and innovate to jointly develop the necessary 
capabilities and technologies; and deepen partnerships based on EU values and interests.  

This  roadmap  on  critical  technologies  for  security  and  defence  responds  to  a  request  from  the 
European Council of 25-26 February 20213 to  outline a path  for boosting  research, technology 
development and innovation (RTD&I) and reducing the EU’s strategic dependencies in  critical 
technologies  and  value  chains  for  security  and  defence.  The  roadmap  will  be  presented  to  the 
informal summit  in  Paris on 10-11 March 2022  and  will  feed into  the Strategic Compass.  The 

1   The  European Defence  Fund  (EDF), the  Coordinated  Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the Permanent 

Structured Cooperation on Defence (PESCO) 

2   2021 State of the Union address of Commission President von der Leyen 
3   Statement of the members of the European Council of 26 February 2021  

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Roadmap  proposes  a  way  forward  for  the  EU  and  Member  States  to  jointly  reach  the  above-
mentioned goal, notably by: 

 

identifying  technologies  critical  for  EU  security  and  defence,  boosting  them  through 
European (RTD&I) programmes; 

  ensuring  that  defence  considerations  are  better  taken  into  account  in  civilian  European 
RTD&I programmes and industrial and trade policies, as appropriate, while possible civilian 
uses of technologies are also better considered in defence RTD&I programmes;  

  promoting  from  the  outset  an  EU-wide  strategic  and  coordinated  approach  for  critical 
technologies  for  security  and  defence,  to  make  the  best  use  of  EU  and  Member  States’ 
RTD&I programmes,  achieve synergies between civilian and defence RTD&I  communities 
and mitigate strategic dependencies from external sources; and 

  coordinating as much as possible with other like-minded partners, such as the United States 
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), under mutually beneficial conditions. 

2.  Critical technologies and strategic dependencies for security and defence 

The update of the ‘2020 New Industrial Strategy: Building a stronger Single Market for Europe’s 
recovery’  (‘updated  industrial  strategy’)4  of  May  2021  confirms  that  technological  leadership 
remains  an  essential  driver  of  the  EU’s  competitiveness  and  innovation,  in  particular  for  so-
called  ‘critical  technologies’5.  It  also  underlines  the  importance  of  identifying  and  mitigating 
strategic dependencies in ‘sensitive ecosystems’, including those of ‘proximity, social economy 
and civil security’ and ‘aerospace and defence’, to ensure the EU’s resilience. 

The  Commission  action  plan  on  synergies  between  civil,  defence  and  space  industries 
(‘synergies action plan’)6 of February 2021 recognises the growing importance of disruptive and 
enabling technologies originating in the civilian domain for Europe’s future security and defence 
and  the  need  to  promote  cross-fertilisation  and  synergies  between  civilian  and  defence 
technologies.  It  sets  out  several  key  actions  to  encourage  the  exchange  of  information  and 
cooperation  between  civilian  and  defence  communities  using  EU  RTD&I  programmes  and 
instruments as a starting point. 

2.1.  The specific features of the security and defence sectors 

The EU defence industry has a diverse structure, with large multinationals and small to medium-
sized players. Demand comes almost exclusively from national governments, which also control 
all  acquisition  of  defence-related  products  and  technologies,  as  well  as  their  export.  Different 
national requirements and national public spending and investment continue to fragment the EU 
defence  market,  at  times  risking  to  impede  interoperability  between  Member  States’  national 
armed forces. The defence sector therefore does not follow the conventional rules and business 
models  that  govern  more  traditional  markets,  and  has  thus  limited  room  to  influence  related 

4   COM(2021) 350 final 
5   The  Commission  in  the  context  of  its  work  on  the  Observatory  of  critical  technologies  is  in  the  process  of 

defining ‘criticality’ for the purposes of space, defence and related civil sectors (including security). 

6   COM(2021) 70 final 

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investments and market choices. This makes it difficult for industry to undertake substantial self-
funded defence RTD&I projects.  

The  EU  security  industry  faces  similar  challenges,  as  markets  are  also  predominantly  national 
but  even  more  fragmented.  Its  customers  are  diverse  (e.g.  police  forces,  internal  security 
agencies, custom agencies, border authorities, private security services), activities  take place at 
different  levels  (local,  regional,  national),  and  organisation  varies  from  one  Member  State  to 
another. The Commission will present a study on the EU security market in 2022 providing 
further insights into this complex sector. In addition, Commission services in the first half of 
2022 will summarise the proposals for fostering the adoption of capability-driven approaches to 
be applied across security sectors. These proposals will strengthen the early and forward-looking 
identification of needs and solutions for security and law enforcement.  

The  space  and  cyber  are  strategic  ‘enablers’  for  the  security  and  defence  sectors.  The  space 
sector shares many of their specific features, with its small market volumes and limited leverage 
on the private market for components. The resilience of the space programmes and of the space 
value  chains  are  critical  for  the  EU  security  and  defence  objectives.  Cyber  also  plays  an 
increasingly important role across defence capabilities, requiring attention and investment. With 
fast-increasing  cyber-attacks  targeting  both  civilian  and  defence  assets  and  networks,  and  the 
growing role of the civilian sector in cyber innovation and standardisation, closer links between 
cybersecurity and cyber defence are needed. The Commission contribution to European defence 
in the context of the Strategic Compass (‘defence communication’), which is part of this defence 
package, outlines further measures for these two sectors. 

2.2.  Mapping critical technologies and strategic dependencies for security and defence  

The  updated  industrial  strategy  provides  a  broad-based  mapping  and  analysis  of  the  EU’s 
strategic  dependencies  and  capacities,  based  on  a  first  round  of  in-depth  reviews  of  sensitive 
ecosystems7.  While  this  work  has  provided  a  basis  for  policy  action  in  support  of  better  EU 
resilience, it also acknowledges that more work is needed to enhance further our understanding 
of the EU’s strategic dependencies, and how they may develop and lead to further vulnerabilities. 
This work includes a second round of in-depth reviews of sensitive ecosystems and a monitoring 
system through the Observatory of critical technologies (‘Observatory’), see Section 2.3.  

Commission  services  have  started  working  on  in-depth  reviews  of  defence  and  security 
technology  areas,  including  in  the  area  of  cybersecurity,  to  support  the  updated  industrial 
strategy  and  the  development  of  the  Observatory.  Two  preliminary  case  studies  have  been 
carried out so far on the defence technology areas of autonomous systems and semiconductors, 
which were considered to be representative samples, because of their cross-cutting relevance for 
military capabilities in different domains, see Box 1. The aim was to identify common patterns 
between these defence technology areas, in particular as regards the causes of dependencies and 
associated risks, as well as initial avenues to mitigate them.  

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The case studies confirm that the defence sector broadly shares the same strategic dependencies 
and vulnerabilities  as other sensitive ecosystems, notably  as regards technology  gaps, (critical) 
raw  materials,  skills,  low  RTD&I  investment,  and  extra-territorial  regulations  by  non-EU 
countries.  They  also  indicate  that  the  sector’s  vulnerabilities  are  generally  exacerbated  by  the 
strategic and sensitive nature of its activities (e.g. higher standards of security of information and 
security of supply) and its comparatively marginal market size.  

The case studies further show that some of the EU’s global competitors take more offensive and 
defensive  actions  to  promote  critical  technologies  and  address  strategic  dependencies  than  the 
EU  has  done  up  to  now.  For  example,  they  tie  national  defence  considerations  more 
systematically  into  civilian  technological  development,  invest  heavily  in  their  indigenous 
RTD&I and industrial capacity, attract outside investors and at times deploy aggressive takeover 
strategies  in  third  countries.  They  also  protect  their  own  industrial  expertise  and  influence  by 
leveraging  interdependencies  or  using  tight  extra-territorial  regulations  to  limit  third  country 
access to technologies. 

While  the  EU  has  tools  of  its  own  to  strengthen  its  industrial  capacity  in  compliance  with  EU 
rules, it is hampered by the still largely fragmented EU defence market demand, its historically 
strict separation of civilian and defence RTD&I at EU level, and comparative underinvestment 
by Member States in the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). Indeed, 
the  collective  spending  on  defence  innovation  by  Member  States  (EUR  2.5  billion  or  1.2%  of 
defence expenditure) continues to lag behind a 15-year old EDA target of 2%. 

While  market  forces  have  led  to  a  situation  where  no  single  country  can  achieve  full 
technological  sovereignty  in  a  technology  domain,  there  is  a  global  race  for  technological 
leadership and the associated economic and military advantages. This could exacerbate the EU’s 
existing  strategic  dependencies  and  generate  new  ones,  if  it  does  not  take  action.  A  structured 
approach is needed for the EU to stay at the forefront of critical technologies and to identify and 
mitigate  strategic  dependencies  in  the  domain  of  security  and  defence.  This  roadmap  aims  to 
provide such an approach, to be integrated in the EU Strategic Compass. 

Box 1: Case studies – Autonomous  systems and semiconductors for defence  

The Commission’s analytical work on autonomous systems for defence, with specific attention 
to artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning, identified relevant critical technologies and 
four main areas  where the EU is  lagging behind, namely: skills,  data, hardware, and testing. 
Possible measures to address them would build on the existing EU AI strategy8 and associated 
policy  initiatives,  as  well  as  Member  States’  national  AI  strategies.  They  include  RTD&I 
activities  (e.g.  increased  availability  of  data  and  AI  training,  link  to  the  European  Processor 
Initiative), infrastructure (e.g. cloud computing capacity for defence purposes, domestic testing 
facilities)  and  the  protection  of  existing  critical  assets  (e.g.  foreign  direct  investment 
screening). 

The  analytical  work  on  semiconductors  for  defence  underlined  the  ubiquitous  presence  of 
semiconductors  in  defence  equipment,  and  existing  and  future  dependencies  caused  in 

8   COM(2018) 237 final 

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particular  by  the  lack  of  indigenous  EU  capacities  (foundries)  for  the  most  advanced  nodes. 
The Commission has included mitigating measures in the proposal for a European Chips Act 
adopted on 8 February 20229, which aims to create a state-of-the-art European chip ecosystem 
to improve EU capabilities in this area, thereby also addressing defence needs.  

2.3.  The Observatory of critical technologies 

Lack  of  foresight  on  the  future  importance  of  technologies  is  in  part  to  blame  for  some  of  the 
EU’s  existing  strategic  dependencies  on  third  countries  (e.g.  remotely  piloted  systems, 
semiconductors).  The  EU  needs  more  structured  foresight  and  strategic  reflection  on  critical 
technologies  for  security  and  defence  in  order  to  identify  priority  areas  to  boost  research  and 
innovation, reduce existing strategic dependencies and avoid the emergence of new ones.  

The Observatory of critical technologies, currently being set up by the Commission in line with 
the synergies action plan (action 4), will contribute to this reflection.  Its working methods will 
take into account other similar initiatives10 to avoid duplication. This will enable the fine-tuning 
of  the  list  of  critical  technologies  from  the  synergies  action  plan  to  reflect  the  evolving 
technology landscape and capability needs. 

The Observatory will identify, monitor and assess critical technologies for the space, defence and 
related civil sectors, their potential application and related value and supply chains. It will also 
identify, monitor and analyse existing and predictable technology gaps, root causes of strategic 
dependencies and vulnerabilities.  

It will be essential to agree with Member States on a meaningful level of detail to discuss these 
issues  at  EU  level  and  on  the  need  to  share  relevant  data  among  Member  States  and  with  the 
Commission.  A  mechanism  will  be  established  within  the  Observatory,  in  the  form  of  a 
dedicated expert group, for exchanging and discussing in a classified environment with Member 
States.  This  will  include  discussions  on  the  emergence  of  new  and  disruptive  technologies  to 
avoid new dependencies for the security, defence and space industries. The High Representative 
and his services will be associated with this process. 

The Commission, based on data of the Observatory, will present to Member States a classified 
report on critical technologies and risks associated with strategic dependencies affecting security, 
space and defence by end of 2022 and every two years thereafter. The Commission will prepare 
technology  roadmaps  based  on  these  reports,  which  will  include  mitigating  measures  to  boost 
RTD&I and reduce strategic dependencies affecting security and defence. 

Once the Observatory’s operations are well-established, the scope of its work could be extended 
to other industries, as indicated in the updated industrial strategy. 

9   COM(2022) 45 final 
10   For  example,  the  Advanced  Technologies  for  Industry  (ATI)  support  and  tools,  the  monitoring  of  critical 
technologies  for  space,  the  Overarching  Strategic  Research  Agenda  (OSRA),  the  Technology  Building  Blocks 
(TBB) and Key Strategic Activities (KSA) of the European Defence Agency (EDA).  

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Way forward: 

  In 2022, the Commission will establish an expert group to facilitate exchanges with Member 
States on critical technologies, value and supply chains. It will be part of the Observatory of 
critical technologies for defence, space and related civil industries. The aim would be to: 
  conduct  a  regular  consultation  with  Member  State  authorities  to  prepare  the  classified 

report; 

  ensure  appropriate  handling  of  sensitive  and  classified  information  that  may  be 
exchanged in the context of the Observatory of critical technologies, related reports and 
roadmaps.  

  By  mid-2022  the  Commission  will  present  a  study  on  the  EU  security  market,  which  will 
serve  to  better  understand  the  specific  features  of  the  civil  security  market,  to  support  the 
identification  of  critical  technologies  and  strategic  dependencies,  and  to  underpin  the  new 
capability driven approach for security and other RTD&I activities. 

  By  mid-2022,  Commission  services  will  produce  a  paper  summarising  the  proposals  for 
fostering the adoption of capability-driven approaches to be applied across security sectors. 

3. 

Boosting RTD&I on critical technologies for security and defence  

The technology roadmaps that the Commission will prepare, based on the assessments from the 
Observatory, will underpin activities ranging from programming RTD&I on critical technologies 
to  developing  larger  flagship  initiatives  that  will  contribute  to  strengthening  the  EU’s 
competitiveness  and  resilience  in  the  security  and  defence  sectors.  In  order  to  deliver  on  these 
objectives,  a  more  efficient  use  will  need  to  be  made  of  available  financial  resources  through 
better coordination of existing EU and national RTD&I programmes and instruments. 

3.1.  Overcoming the separation between EU civilian and defence RTD&I  

The  Commission  under  its  synergies  action  plan  (action  2)  committed  to  enhancing  by  2022 
internal coordination between EU programmes and instruments, see Box 2, in order to unlock the 
huge benefits arising from synergies between civilian and defence RTD&I for economic growth, 
the single market and the security of European citizens.  

While  the  implementation  of  this  objective  can  be  taken  further  also  in  2023  (e.g.  through 
improved  planning  and  synchronisation,  guidance  to  managing  authorities  in  Member  States, 
etc.),  some  obstacles  will  be  harder  to  tackle  in  the  short-  and  medium  term  and  may  require 
involving other stakeholders. This is notably the case where legal provisions in the basic acts of 
EU programmes and instruments set practical constraints. For example, while dual use activities 
can be funded under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) and European Structural Investment 
Funds (ESIF), activities carried out under Horizon Europe11 focus on civilian applications; there 
is  no  framework  for  direct  support  for  such  activities  under  RTD&I  programmes  and 

11   The term ‘Horizon Europe’ in this document refers to the specific programme implementing Horizon Europe and 
the European Institute of Innovation and Technology, activities carried out under these have an exclusive focus 
on civilian applications. 

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instruments. Similarly, the European  Investment Bank’s lending policy still has restrictions for 
the defence sector. 

In order to facilitate exchanges between civilian and defence communities, especially in the area 
of critical technologies, the Commission will prepare in 2023 an approach for encouraging dual-
use  RTD&I  at  EU  level  to  be  fully  implemented  in  the  medium  to  long  term  across  EU 
programmes and instruments. This work will also feed into the mid-term evaluation of relevant 
sectoral  programmes,  such  as  the  funds  under  the  Common  Provisions  Regulation,  including 
funds for health emergency preparedness.  

Box  2:  EU  programmes  and  instruments  supporting  RTD&I  on  critical  technologies 
relevant  to  security  and  defence  and  their  infrastructure  deployment  under  the 
Multiannual Financial Programme (2021-2027) 

-  EDF  dedicates  EUR  8  billion  to  defence  research  and  development.  4-8%  of  the  EDF 
research and development budget will be allocated to disruptive technologies, i.e. up to EUR 
100 million per year.  

-  Horizon Europe under pillar II 'Global Challenges and European Industrial Competitiveness' 
allocates EUR 1.6 billion to civilian security research and innovation under the cluster ‘Civil 
security  for  society’,  whereas  critical  technologies  are  supported  under  clusters  ‘Digital, 
Industry  and  Space’,  ‘Climate,  Energy  and  Mobility’  and  'Food,  Bioeconomy,  Natural 
Resources, Agriculture and Environment'. Complementary activities are funded under pillar I 
‘Excellent  Science’,  the  European  Innovation  Council  (EIC)  and  European  Institute  of 
Innovation  and  Technology  (EIT)  in  pillar  III  'Innovative  Europe',  as  well  as  European 
partnerships, which pool and mobilise resources to ensure the EU’s technological leadership 
and open strategic autonomy in critical areas; 
the  Digital  Europe  Programme  (DEP)  will  foster  deployment  activities  relevant  to  critical 
technologies in the priority areas of cybersecurity, AI and supercomputing; 
the Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research Competence Centre and Network of 
Coordination Centres in 2022 will adopt a strategic agenda on cyber investments feeding into 
Horizon Europe and DEP. Synergies between civilian and defence technologies and dual use 
applications may be explored through links to EDF in line with applicable rules. 

- 

- 

-  ESIF  (in  particular  for  European  Regional  Development  Fund  and  the  European  Social 

Fund+) can be used in support of EDTIB;  

-  other relevant EU programmes, funds and instruments include the Space Programme, CEF, 
InvestEU  Programme,  the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  (RRF),  LIFE  Programme, 
public-private partnerships, blending facilities. 

3.2.  Linking  EU  and  national  programmes  and  instruments  supporting  RTD&I  on  critical 

technologies for security and defence 

While  EU  programmes  and  instruments  provide  significant  funding  to  RTD&I  activities  for 
security and defence in the EU, the majority of funding for such activities still lies with Member 
States, and the fragmentation of security and defence markets remains a serious problem. As a 
consequence,  achieving  technological  sovereignty  in  some  critical  technology  areas  and 
mitigating strategic dependencies in others will require EU-wide coordination.  

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Member States are invited to commit in the Strategic Compass to developing together with 
the  Commission  an  EU-wide  strategic  coordinated  approach  for  critical  technologies 
relevant for security and defence from the outset, in full respect of the variety and complexity 
of the  governance of EU and national  programmes and instruments.  This  approach would  also 
take into account other coordinating structures, such as the new EU Innovation Hub for Internal 
Security  chaired  by  the  Standing  Committee  on  Operational  Cooperation  on  Internal  Security 
(COSI), and the new EU Innovation Hub for Defence to be set up by the EDA. 

The  approach  would  use  the  classified  reports  on  critical  technologies  and  the  technology 
roadmaps  prepared  by  the  Commission  as  a  starting  point  for  discussions  between  Member 
States  authorities  and  the  Commission.  The  objective  would  be  to  identify  on  the  basis  of  the 
technology  roadmaps  those  areas  requiring  the  most  urgent  action  and  to  mobilise  EU  and 
Member States’ programmes, instruments and policies to address them in a coordinated manner, 
in compliance with EU State aid rules. This would ensure that investments are focused on those 
areas that matter the most to the security of EU citizens. Priorities would be regularly updated to 
ensure that they remain relevant and that spending is efficient.  

The Commission will work with Member States to identify the best mechanism for facilitating 
this coordination work (e.g. expert group of the Observatory). 

3.3.  Supporting  security  and  defence  innovation  and  entrepreneurship  –  Creating  an  EU 

Defence Innovation Scheme  

The EU needs to make better use of the full potential of its innovation community in support of 
security and defence. This will require assisting non-traditional players and existing innovative 
start-ups  and  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  (SMEs)  in  the  two  sectors  with  overcoming 
their high technological, administrative, regulatory and market-entry hurdles, complying with the 
high security standards, and accessing financing. The defence market is often structured around a 
few large players supported by a set of specialised SMEs that have limited direct access to this 
market. As a result, it can be difficult for innovative defence SMEs to access finance, which can 
make them more likely to turn to or be targeted by foreign investors. The situation is similar for 
innovative security SMEs, which face similar challenges in approaching potential customers or 
accessing tailored finance12. 

The  Commission  has  been  supporting  innovative  security  start-ups  and  SMEs  under  Horizon 
2020, where the allocated funding and overall success rates under the societal challenge 7 ‘Civil 
security  for  society’  have  been  above  average  for  small  innovators.  While  this  support  will 
continue  under  Horizon  Europe,  security  start-ups  and  SMEs  will  still  need  additional  tailored 
support to accelerate their road to the market. Exploring new instruments for dual-use innovation 
could boost their production capacity, competitiveness and sustainability. 

12  Challenges  and  opportunities  for  SMEs  and  start-ups  in  EU  security  R&I,  CERIS  SSRI  virtual  event,  30  April 

2021 

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The  Commission  has  started  setting  up  similar  activities  under  EDF  to  develop  a  toolbox  on 
defence  and  dual-use  innovation  covering  technology  readiness  levels  (TRLs)13  1-9.  Work  is 
ongoing on the following tools covering defence, new technologies and dual use: 

a)  Defence  innovation  through  EDF  –  Specific  actions  are  being  explored  to  better  support 
projects  on  disruptive  technologies,  and  innovative  and  future-oriented  defence  solutions, 
encouraging in  particular the participation  of innovative  SMEs, innovative laboratories  and 
research and technology organisations  (RTOs).  These actions may take  different  forms,  for 
example  business  coaching  (WP2021);  technology  challenges  (WP2022),  hackathons  or 
prizes (WP2023 or later). They will also draw on relevant experience from the EIC and may 
link to the new CASSINI for defence. 

b)  A defence investment blending facility under InvestEU – The creation of such a facility would 
allow the Commission to guarantee investments made by financial intermediaries across the 
EU  in  innovative  or  strategic  defence  SMEs.  This  would  ease  problems  linked  with  the 
limited access to finance for SMEs developing promising technologies for European defence, 
while providing trusted capital and avoiding hostile takeovers from  third countries’ entities. 
Enabling a better access to equity funding for innovative defence SMEs and mid-caps would 
support  their  growth  and  finally  benefit  to  the  innovativeness  of  the  EDTIB.  The 
Commission  will  also  explore  the  need  for  further  instruments  in  support  of  key  market 
actors in the value chain. 

c)  CASSINI for defence – This initiative would be inspired by the existing CASSINI initiative to 
support  the  SMEs  and  start-ups  in  the  space  industry.  It  would  provide  them  with  services 
like:  business  development  and  networks  (e.g.  matchmaking,  business  accelerator),  and 
prizes and competitions (including hackathons, mentoring, etc.), complementing the defence 
investment blending facility above. 

d)  Innovation  incubator  –  The  Commission  will  set  up  in  2022  an  innovation  incubator  to 
support the development of new technologies and shape dual-use innovation in line with the 
synergies  action  plan  (action  6),  which  could  play  an  important  role  in  bridging  the  gap 
between civilian- and defence-focused RTD&I programmes. Following a systematic analysis 
of  results  of  early  stage  technology  development,  the  incubator  would  flag  projects  and/or 
technologies that would exhibit potential security, space or defence applications to relevant 
services in the Commission and Member States for potential uptake. The Commission would 
assess  how  these  flagged  projects  could  be  directed  to  further  funding  opportunities,  as 
appropriate, such as the Transition funding scheme of the EIC or the EDF.  

e)  Support to innovation networks – Cross-border defence innovation networks could play  the 
role  of  innovation  brokers  and  encourage  collaborative  projects  to  incorporate  innovative 

13   The EU has widely adopted the use of a Technology Readiness Level (TRL) scale under its RTD&I programmes 
and  instruments  since  2014.  The  scale  distinguishes  nine  levels  of  technological  maturity,  ranging  from 
fundamental  research  under  TRL  1  to  a  final  product  ready  for  entry  into  the  market  under  TRL  9.  Since  the 
application and thus dual use potential of a technology is typically revealed at TRLs 5-6, it can be considered 
that a technology is ‘neutral’ at TRLs 1-4. 

9 

 
                                                           
solutions.  Technology  scouting  would  detect  and  identify  new  innovative  solutions  and 
technologies with potential benefits for defence applications. Research centres and technical 
test  facilities  would  then  test  relevance  of  such  technologies  from  the  civil  domain  and 
exchange  best  practices.  EDA  would  be  a  core  partner  of  the  Commission  for  the 
implementation of another part of action 6 under the synergies action plan.  

The Commission  will identify  how  to  link the toolbox  to  instruments  supporting innovation in 
the  domains  of  security  (e.g.  Horizon  Europe)  or  cybersecurity  (e.g.  the  network  of  National 
Cybersecurity Coordination Centres in cooperation with European Digital Innovation Hubs). 

The complementary strengths of the Commission and the EDA should be brought together under 
an  ‘EU  Defence  Innovation  Scheme’.  Under  the  scheme,  the  Commission,  based  on  its 
experience in implementing the EU budget in support of defence, civil and dual-use RTD&I, will 
play  a  central  role  in  stimulating  innovation  for  the  EDTIB.  Given  its  defence  expertise, 
including  in  bringing  together  emerging  and  disruptive  technologies  and  military  capability 
requirements, EDA will further connect and support Member States efforts through its Defence 
Innovation  Hub.  By  cooperating  closely,  the  Commission  and  the  EDA  will  in  synergy 
accelerate security and defence innovation for the EU and its Member States.  

3.4.  Skills 

Lack  of  skills  and  work-force  shortages,  especially  of  skilled  employees  with  a  background  in 
science,  technology,  engineering  and  mathematics,  are  major  challenges  for  the  defence  and 
security  industry,  which  rely  heavily  on  them  like  many  other  high-tech  industries.  As 
technologies  and  the  threat  landscape  are  rapidly  evolving,  it  is  important  that  the  industry 
reaches out more to new and young researchers and entrepreneurs, including women, taking an 
inclusive and accessible approach of all talents, skills and available work force.  

In  November  2020,  the  Commission  launched  the  Pact  for  Skills  with  a  first  wave  of  skills 
partnerships  in  the  three  key  industrial  ecosystems  of  microelectronics,  automotive  and  the 
aerospace & defence industries. Pact members (industry, universities and training organisations, 
social  partners)  committed  to  ensuring  a  continuous  and  sustainable  supply  of  skills  in  most 
needed areas by upskilling 200 000 employees and reskilling 300 000 people, with a public and 
private investment of EUR 1 billion by 2030. 

Way forward: 

  The Commission invites Member States to  commit in the Strategic Compass to  developing 
an EU-wide strategic coordinated approach for critical technologies relevant for security and 
defence from the outset. 

  In  2023  the  Commission  will  review  existing  EU  instruments  and  propose  further  ways  to 

encourage dual-use RTD&I at EU level. 

  The  Commission  will  support  innovation  and  entrepreneurship  on  critical  technologies  for 
security  and  defence  based  on  the  following  tools:  a)  dedicated  EDF  actions;  b)  a  new 
defence  investment  blending  facility  under  InvestEU;  c)  a  new  CASSINI  for  defence;  d)  a 
new  innovation  incubator  on  new  technologies  and  dual-use  innovation  in  2022;  and  e) 
increased support to innovation networks. 

10 

 
  The Commission together with the EDA and its Defence Innovation Hub will set up an EU 
Defence Innovation Scheme to accelerate security and defence innovation for the EU and its 
Member States. 

4.  Reducing strategic dependencies in critical technologies and value chains for security 

and defence 

The  EU  has  several  policy  tools  beyond  its  RTD&I  programmes  and  instruments  that  can 
contribute to reducing its strategic dependencies in critical technologies and value chains in the 
security  and  defence  sectors.  These  contribute  to  strengthening  the  EU’s  industrial  capacity, 
competitiveness,  technological  sovereignty  and  resilience,  but  also  to  protecting  current  and 
future technological developments and capabilities.  

The  Commission,  based  on  the  work  of  the  Observatory  of  critical  technologies  and  under  the 
updated  industrial  strategy,  will  systematically  assess  security  and  defence  considerations,  as 
appropriate,  when  implementing  and  reviewing  existing,  or  designing  new,  EU  industrial  and 
trade instruments to ensure that they are fit for purpose. 

 

 

Industrial  alliances  –  Industrial  alliances  engage  a  wide  range  of  partners  (e.g.  public  and 
private  players,  civil  society)  in  joint  action  on  key  EU  policy  objectives  in  specific 
industries  or  value  chains.  They  are  based  on  the  principles  of  openness,  transparency, 
diversity and inclusiveness, and operate in full compliance with competition rules. Industrial 
alliances  can  include,  where  appropriate,  specific  work  strands  to  reduce  strategic 
dependencies for the security and defence sectors. This is being considered in the European 
Alliance for Industrial Data, Edge and Cloud and in the Industrial Alliance on Processors and 
Semiconductor Technologies.  

Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEI) – IPCEIs are initiated by Member 
States  and  subject  to  EU  State  aid  rules.  They  are  designed  to  bring  together  knowledge, 
expertise,  financial  resources  and  economic  players  throughout  the  EU  with  the  aim  of 
overcoming market or systemic failures and societal challenges that could not be addressed 
by  private  actors  alone,  in  particular  in  the  area  of  breakthrough  innovation  and  key 
infrastructure. IPCEIs can take into account security and defence aspects. This could be the 
case in the upcoming second IPCEI on microelectronics announced in the Chips Act.  

  EU funding programmes – The EU has always had an open research and innovation policy. It 
is  guided by the  principle of open strategic  autonomy  and  aims at  ensuring a level  playing 
field  and  reciprocity.  The  EU’s  global  approach  on  research  and  innovation  encourages 
strategic  partnerships  with  like-minded  partners  in  line  with  the  EU’s  international 
obligations (e.g. NATO, United States, Canada Japan, South Korea, etc.)14. 
At  the  same  time,  it  is  necessary  for  Europe  to  make  sure  that  its  strategic  interest  are 
preserved.  For  2021-2027  the  Commission  has  clarified  and  harmonised  the  rules  of 
participation  for  non-EU  countries,  and  eligibility  of  entities,  across  EU  programmes  and 

14   It  must  be  noted,  however,  that  the  defence-related  research  and  development  programmes  of  most  of  our 

partners are not open to EU companies. 

11 

 
 
                                                           
instruments.  Specific  eligibility  conditions  for  security  sensitive  activities  have  been 
established  for  certain  programmes  (Horizon  Europe,  DEP,  EDF,  Space  Programme,  CEF) 
and  further  refined  in  the  relevant  work  programmes  to  protect  the  EU’s  essential  security 
interests.  The  ongoing  review  of  the  Commission  Financial  Regulation  will  also  provide 
more  clarity  on  how  to  maintain  the  EU’s  open  strategic  autonomy  approach,  i.e.  fully 
preserving the EU’s essential security interests while respecting its international obligations.  

  Standards – Under the synergies action plan the Commission is promoting the use of existing 
hybrid civil/defence standards and the development of new ones by the end of 2022 (action 
5) and the consideration of defence in the Commission’s standardisation policy and actions. 
While the EU strategy on standardisation15 aims to ensure EU leadership in setting civilian 
standards,  it  will  be  highly  relevant  for  the  defence  sector,  since  almost  80%  of  standards 
used  in  defence  come  from  civilian  sectors.  The  Commission,  together  with  stakeholders 
(e.g.  EDA),  will  explore  the  possibility  of  including  defence  requirements  in  the  future 
standardisation efforts it supports to enhance their compatibility with defence needs. 

  Foreign Direct Investment screening – The EU is one of the world's most open environments 
for foreign investment and one of the main destinations for foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
the  world.  However,  specific  investments  can  also  undermine  the  EU’s  essential  security 
interests. To prevent such risks, the EU has put in place a framework for FDI screening that 
has been operational since October 2020. The first annual report on FDI screening confirms 
the importance of effective FDI screening at Member State level and close cooperation at EU 
level, focusing on potential risks for security or public order. Member States are encouraged 
to set up national FDI screening mechanisms; 18 Member States already have one in place 
with another six in the pipeline. The Commission will evaluate the Regulation and present a 
report to the European Parliament and to the Council by October 2023.  

  Critical  infrastructures  –  The  increasingly  rapid  emergence  of  new  and  disruptive 
technologies has had a significant impact on security of equipment, infrastructure,  services, 
value and supply chains of strategic sectors, including those of security and defence. The EU 
and Member States need to factor in  more comprehensively such vulnerabilities in relevant 
risk  assessments  and  monitoring,  and  implementation  of  resilience-enhancing  measures 
against security threats, e.g. of a hybrid or cyber nature. EU coordination will be needed to 
ensure that Member States maintain a future-proof level of resilience and consistent security 
standards at EU level in order to avoid vulnerabilities.  

  Smart and circular use of materials –The new Circular Economy Action Plan of March 2020 
is  one  of  the  main  building  blocks  of  the  European  Green  Deal,  Europe’s  new  agenda  for 
sustainable  growth.  Innovation  and  new  business  models  based  on  increased  resource 
efficiency,  development  of  new  materials,  promotion  of  secondary  raw  materials  and  more 
sustainable  public  procurement,  will  not  only  preserve  the  environment  but  also  secure 
access  to  materials  for the industry. Additive manufacturing techniques,  green procurement 

15   COM(2022) 31 final 

12 

 
                                                           
and  the  recycling  of  materials,  if  well  implemented,  could  also  contribute  to  strengthening 
the competitiveness of the EU’s security and defence industries, and the EU’s resilience. 

  Data security – The European strategy for data sets out measures to ensure that individuals 
and companies can stay in control of their data. This will be addressed in the Data Act that 
the Commission will adopt in early 2022.  
As part of the  multi-country  project  on  common data infrastructures  and services  (bringing 
together  the  European  cloud  federation  and  common  European  Data  Spaces),  the 
Commission is facilitating investments (e.g. DEP, CEF, Next Generation EU fund) in cloud-
to-edge capacities that are secure, resilient, energy efficient and accessible in real time, and 
that provide quality of service throughout Europe. Ensuring technology transfer in cloud and 
edge  technologies  between  the  civil  (notably  security),  defence  and  space  industries  would 
enhance  technological  sovereignty.  The  European  Alliance  for  Industrial  Data,  Edge  and 
Cloud provides a possible platform to foster such synergies. 

  Trade policy –The complexity and vulnerability of global supply chains is  an issue not just 
for  the  EU.  Other  countries  depend  on  the  EU  (‘reverse  dependencies’),  and  trade  (‘inter-
dependence’) may contribute to the stability of global value chains. The EU is also ready to 
act assertively and defend itself against unfair trading practices, such as the use of distortive 
foreign  subsidies,  while  acting  in  accordance  with  its  international  commitments.  The  EU 
will  continue  to  make  the  most  of  its  toolbox  of  trade  and  competition  instruments,  while 
making  sure  that  the  EU  tools  are  efficient  and  up  to  date.  The  Commission  has  therefore 
proposed  new  instruments,  such  as  the  Foreign  Subsidies  Regulation16  that  addresses 
distortions on the internal market caused by foreign subsidies. 

Further  relevant  policy  measures  (e.g.  introducing  a  potential  value-added  tax  (VAT)  waiver, 
facilitating the transfer of EU funded defence products) are listed in the defence communication. 

Way forward: 

  The Commission is exploring the possibility of adding defence work strands in initiatives 
such  as  the  European  Alliance  for  Industrial  Data,  Edge  and  Cloud  and  the  Industrial 
Alliance on Processors and Semiconductor Technologies. 

  The Commission together with Member States will identify and report in 2023 on the need 
for  risk-assessing  supply  chains  of  critical  infrastructure,  in  particular  in  the  digital 
domain, to better protect the EU’s security and defence interests. 

  The  Commission  encourages  all  remaining  Member  States  to  set  up  a  national  FDI 

screening mechanism. 

5. 

External dimension  

Cooperating  with  like-minded  partners  around  the  world  is  essential  for  enhancing  the  EU’s 
resilience  and  security  of  supply,  while  reducing  strategic  dependencies  and  increasing  mutual 
benefits. The principle of reciprocity plays an important role in this context. The EU’s traditional 

16   COM(2021) 223 final 

13 

 
 
                                                           
partners in the areas of technology, security and defence  include the members of the European 
Economic Area (in particular Norway), candidate countries, neighbourhood countries, and other 
third  countries  (e.g.  United  States,  Canada,  Japan,  South  Korea),  as  well  as  international 
organisations (e.g. NATO). Recent exchanges include in particular: 

5.1.  EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council  

The EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council (TTC) had its first meeting on 29 September 2021. 
In the joint  statement the EU  and the  US  reaffirmed their commitment to ‘focus on advancing 
respective supply chain resilience and security of supply in key sectors for the green and digital 
transition and for securing the protection of our citizens’ and its aim to ‘increase transparency of 
supply  and  demand;  map  respective  existing  sectoral  capabilities;  exchange  information  on 
policy measures and research and development priorities; and cooperate on strategies to promote 
supply chain resilience and diversification’. Ongoing work in working groups on secure supply 
chains  (including  on  semiconductors  under  a  specialised  track),  information  communication 
technology security, export controls and investment screening are most relevant for the present 
roadmap. The recently launched EU-U.S dialogue on security and defence could also serve as a 
forum for discussions on these issues. 

5.2.  Partnership with NATO 

At  the  2021  Brussels  Summit,  NATO  leaders  set  out  an  ambitious  agenda  on  technologies,  in 
particular Emerging and Disruptive Technology (EDTs).17 This provided further guidance to the 
work  carried  out  in  accordance  with  NATO’s  implementation  strategy  on  EDTs,  endorsed  by 
NATO defence ministers in February 2021. 

The  Commission  and  the  High  Representative  will  monitor  the  progress  of  relevant  NATO 
initiatives  in  this  area  through  regular  contacts  with  NATO  at  working  level  with  a  view  to 
possible  mutually  agreeable  and  beneficial  interaction  with  relevant  EU  initiatives  in  full 
transparency  towards  Member  States,  while  avoiding  creating  new  or  increasing  existing 
technological or capability dependencies.  

Way forward: 

  The  Commission  and  the  High  Representative  will  explore  in  the  context  of  the  EU-U.S. 
TTC and the recently launched EU-U.S. dialogue on security and defence how to advance 
supply chain resilience and secure the protection of our citizens. 

  The Commission and the High Representative will explore with NATO, in the framework of 
the  Joint  Declarations  on  EU-NATO  cooperation  and  in  full  transparency  with  Member 
States,  how  to  promote  a  mutually  agreeable  and  beneficial  interactions  between  their 
respective relevant initiatives. 

17   This included the decision to launch the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) and a 

NATO Innovation Fund. 

14 

 
 
                                                           
6.  Conclusions 

As the global geopolitical situation remains complex and the race for new technologies that are 
relevant  for  security  and  defence  continues,  the  EU  and  its  Member  States  must  reinforce 
cooperation  on  technologies  that  are  critical  for  Europe’s  long-term  security  and  defence  and 
efforts to reduce related strategic dependencies. 

This roadmap proposes to work closely with Member States on identifying critical technologies 
and  value  chains  for  security  and  defence  –  as  well  as  the  root  causes  of  associated  strategic 
dependencies in the context of the Observatory of critical technologies – to underpin an EU-wide 
strategic coordinated approach for critical technologies relevant for security and defence that will 
make the most of EU and national RTD&I programmes and instruments. 

To enhance the competitiveness and resilience of the security and defence sectors, the findings 
from the Observatory and related work under the updated industrial strategy will also contribute 
to  ensuring  that  security  and  defence  considerations  are  better  taken  into  account  within  EU 
industrial and trade policies, as appropriate and in line with EU competition rules and the EU’s 
international obligations.  

The  proposals  contained  in  this  roadmap  aim  to  contribute  to  the  RTD&I  dimension  of  the 
upcoming  EU  Strategic  Compass,  through  which  Member  States  will  set  ambitious,  long-term 
goals to substantially enhance Europe’s security and defence. 

15