Rules of engagement for handling disinformation : 2022 edition.
Date: 2022-02-08
Institutions: Eurostat
Subjects: EU statistics, data collection, data recording, disinformation, social media, user guide

Rules of engagement for 
handling disinformation 2022 edition

M A N U A L S  
A N D   G U I D E L I N E S

MANUALS AND GUIDELINESStatistical requirements compendium2018 editionRules of engagement for 
 handling disinformation 

2022 edition 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manuscript completed in February 2022 

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For any use or reproduction of elements that are not owned by the European Union, permission may 
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Copyright for the photographs: Cover © Shyntartanya/Shutterstock 

Theme: General and regional statistics 
Collection: Manuals and guidelines 

PDF: 

ISBN 978-92-76-47145-5 

ISSN 2315-0815 

doi: 10.2785/18378 

KS-GQ-22-003-EN-N 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contents 

Background ......................................................................................................................... 4 

1.  Introduction .................................................................................................................... 5 

1.1.  Disinformation and the role of National Statistical Institutes (NSIs) ....................................... 5 

1.2.  Position of the Task Force on ESS strategic communication .................................................. 6 

2.  What is disinformation? ................................................................................................. 6 

2.1.  Definition with respect to the statistical domain ....................................................................... 6 

2.2.  Two types of disinformation ........................................................................................................ 7 

3.  How to identify, monitor and verify disinformation ..................................................... 7 

3.1.  Online tools for tracking disinformation ..................................................................................... 8 

3.2.  Social media monitoring tools ..................................................................................................... 8 

4.  Incidents: what is actually happening in the ESS ........................................................ 9 

5.  Tried and tested response practices ............................................................................. 9 

5.1.  Lessons from NSIs’ incidents .................................................................................................... 10 

What did not work ......................................................................................................................... 10 
What worked ................................................................................................................................. 10 

5.2.  Lessons from the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Communication ........ 11 

6.  Rules of engagement for the ESS ............................................................................... 12 

6.1.  Do research ................................................................................................................................. 13 

6.2.  Response ..................................................................................................................................... 13 

General recommendations ............................................................................................................ 13 
Simple disinformation .................................................................................................................... 14 
Sophisticated disinformation ......................................................................................................... 14 

6.3.  Recommendations from ‘The Debunking Handbook’ ............................................................. 15 

6.4.  Latest experiences ...................................................................................................................... 16 

7.  Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 16 

Annex: Online tools for identifying, monitoring and verifying disinformation ............. 18 

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Background 

In  2020,  the  Task  Force  on  ESS  strategic  communication  was  launched,  following  the 
endorsement of its mandate at the meeting of the European Statistical System Committee in 
February  2020.  The  members  of  the  Task  Force  are  representatives  of  17  National 
Statistical  Institutes  (NSIs)1  and  Eurostat.  The  aim  of  the  Task  Force  has  been  to  identify 
common challenges within the ESS and, where appropriate, to develop coordinated strategic 
communication approaches. The mandate of the Task Force expires in March 2022. 

One  of  the  three  subgroups  of  the  Task  Force  is  the  subgroup  on  handling  disinformation, 
chaired  by  Statistics  Netherlands.  Its  members  are representatives from six  NSIs  (Belgium, 
Greece, Spain, France, Italy and the Netherlands) and Eurostat. The subgroup has prepared 
a  set  of  ‘rules  of  engagement’,  containing  recommended  practices  on  how  to  handle 
disinformation  and  a  list  of  online  tools  that  NSIs  can  use  to  detect,  monitor  and  verify 
disinformation. 

Eurostat, January 2022 

1 Statistics Belgium, Destatis, Statistics Denmark, the Hellenic Statistical Authority, INE Spain, INSEE, Croatian 
Bureau of Statistics, Hungarian Central Statistical Office, the Central Statistics Office Ireland, ISTAT, Statistics 
Lithuania, Statistics Netherlands, Statistics Poland, INE Portugal, the Statistical Office of the Republic of 
Slovenia, the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovakia, Statistics Finland Statistics. Austria was also a 
member of the Task Force from March 2020 until June 2021. 

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1.  Introduction 

1.1. Disinformation and the role of National Statistical Institutes 

(NSIs) 

The  digital  revolution  has  brought  us  many  good  things.  However,  certain  related 

phenomena, such as the rise of social media and changing information consumption habits, 

have together created an environment that enables the rapid proliferation of disinformation. 

This  has  rocked  the  foundations  of  many  institutions  underpinning  democratic  values  and 

order in society. The European Commission (EC) initiated several activities in order to tackle 

disinformation. In 2018, the report ‘A multi-dimensional approach to disinformation’, prepared 

by the independent High-level Expert Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation, was 

released.  The  report  includes  a  number  of  recommendations  aiming  to  provide  short-term 

responses  to  the  most  pressing  problems,  longer-term  responses  to  increase  societal 

resilience  to  disinformation,  and  a  framework  for  ensuring  that  the  effectiveness  of  these 

responses  is  continuously  evaluated.  As  EC  Commissioner  Mariya  Gabriel  wrote  in  her 

foreword,  “there  is  no  single  lever  to  achieve  these  ambitions  and  eradicate  disinformation 

from the media ecosystem.” This is especially true for official statistics producers. 

In  an  age  of  social  media  and  ‘filter  bubbles’,  polarisation  in  the  social  debate,  conspiracy 

theories  and  deliberate  spreading  of  disinformation,  an  awareness  of  the  benefits  of  the 

proper  use  of  robust  data  in  society  is  more  important  than  ever.  The  Covid-19  crisis  has 

made this all too clear.  

We are seeing a disturbingly rapid increase in the amount of disinformation being promoted 

in  the  public  sphere.  The  motivations  of  those  behind  this  disinformation  are  not  always 

clear.    Since  the  role  of  official  statistics  is  also  to  lay  the  foundation  for  a  healthy  public 

debate,  National  Statistical  Institutes  (NSIs)  are  affected  by  this  increase  in  disinformation. 

Even  worse,  NSIs,  as  purveyors  of  objective  facts,  are  targeted  and  affected  by  the 

dissemination  of  disinformation  in  public  debate  on  an  unprecedented  scale.  If  not 

addressed,  disinformation  targeting  NSIs  can  have  a  negative  effect  on  their  reputation, 

eroding  trust  and  endangering  their  ability  to  fulfil  their  mission  in  society:  providing 

organisations and individuals with high-quality statistics to support their decision-making. 

This  raises  new  questions  for  NSIs.  What  position  should  they  assume?  How  can  they 

handle  this  new  phenomenon? What  is  considered  to  be  disinformation  (and  what  is  not)? 

When  does  it  become  an  issue  for  official  statistics  producers?  What  works  in  handling 

disinformation and what does not?  

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These  questions  were  taken  on  by  the  subgroup  of  the  Task  Force  on  ESS  strategic 

communication  on  handling  disinformation  (TF  STRATCOM  subgroup  on  handling 

disinformation), resulting in the answers outlined in this document. 

1.2. Position of the Task Force on ESS strategic 

communication 

Laying  a  foundation  for  public  debate  does  not  mean  that  NSIs  should  take  an  active  and 

prominent  part  in  that  debate.  The  Task  Force  members  agreed  that  NSIs  should  refrain 

from  activities  that  can  make  them  vulnerable  to  attacks  and  distract  them  from  their  core 

activity:  producing  and  disseminating  objective  statistics  in  an  independent  way.  The 

members of the Task Force agreed that the term ‘fake news’ could be provocative. As has 

been stated in the EC report ‘A multi-dimensional approach to disinformation’, the term ‘fake 

news’ has been appropriated and used misleadingly by powerful actors to dismiss coverage 

that they simply find disagreeable. The subgroup decided that its name should not reflect a 

provocative  attitude  and  therefore  ‘fake  news’  and  ‘fighting’  should  be  avoided.  The  group 

agreed on the proposed name ‘Subgroup on handling disinformation’ and on using the term 

‘disinformation’ in all work and communication. 

2. What is disinformation? 

2.1. Definition with respect to the statistical domain 

Disinformation is a phenomenon that goes well beyond the term ‘fake news’. On a general 

level,  disinformation  can  touch  every  part  of  society,  from  politics,  education,  business, 

media to public debate, and can occur in many different formats. A shared definition for the 

purposes of the Task Force was necessary to take this work forward.  

Disinformation  as  defined  in  the  EC  report  mentioned  above  includes  all  forms  of  false, 

inaccurate,  or  misleading  information  designed,  presented  and  promoted  to  intentionally 

cause public harm or for profit. This definition was deemed too broad for NSIs, whose core 

activity  is  dissemination  of  objective  facts  and  data.  So  the  Task  Force  agreed  that  a 

common, more specific definition is important and is a meaningful starting point for its work, 

as a guideline for useful analysis and recommendations that can be applied in the world of 

official statistics.  

In their first meeting, the members of the subgroup on handling disinformation discussed and 

agreed upon the following definition of disinformation: 

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‘Disinformation 

is  non-factual  or  demonstrably  untrue  or  wrong 

information that is spread in public debate. This information has the intent 

to mislead or is being presented as a “truth untold by mainstream media”. 

The presented information can be contradicted with official statistics and 

facts provided by the statistical office.’ 

2.2. Two types of disinformation 

In order to get a good grasp of the amount and types of disinformation that NSIs encounter, 

the members of the Task Force shared and analysed recent disinformation incidents which 

their  organisations  have  faced.  In  the  analyses  of  disinformation  incidents  collected  by  the 

members  of  the  wider  Task  Force  on  ESS  strategic  communication,  two  main  types  of 

disinformation emerged: the first defined as ‘simple disinformation incidents’ and the second, 

‘sophisticated  disinformation  incidents’,  more  threatening  and  more  difficult  to  tackle. 

Simple  incidents  of  disinformation  are  wrong/invented  figures  with  the  clear  intention  to 

mislead. As such, they are easy to counter, by simply stating the correct figure and providing 

referrals to the correct official data and documents. 

The  second  type  of  disinformation  is  the  type  with  which  we  struggle  most.  More  complex 

disinformation  includes,  for  example,  data  visualisations  that  do  not  use  the  right  scale, 

visualisations that compare different time periods, incorrect calculations based on official NSI 

figures (with a clear mention of a statistical offices as a source, to give the data credibility). 

In  this  document,  we  will  try  to  distinguish  between  these  two  types  of  disinformation  and 

propose appropriate response measures and recommendations. 

‘Misinformation’ differs from disinformation since it is not spread with the intention to deceive 

or mislead – though in the end it might be doing just that. In general, misinformation is easier 

to counter by just correcting and giving accurate information. 

3. How to identify, monitor and verify 

disinformation 

The  spread  of  disinformation  has  led  to  the  development  of  a  number  of  tools  that  aim  to 

support  individuals  and  organisations  in  monitoring  and  verifying  disinformation  spread 

online. A wide array of online platforms that cover disinformation and offer tools is available 

globally. In this document, we focus on platforms and tools that NSIs use or should consider 

using, given the experience others already have.  

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Two  main  groups  of  tools  were  identified  by  the  Task  Force  as  useful  for  NSIs  when 

handling  disinformation:  online  tools  for  tracking  and  monitoring  disinformation  and  social 

media monitoring tools.  

The tools in both groups can be adapted to the specific needs and area of work of the user, 

for example, an NSI in a given country, with specific topics that are vulnerable to the spread 

of disinformation. 

Nevertheless, the Task Force noted that creating a monitoring system with a 100% coverage 

of all the arenas where disinformation might occur is unattainable. Human intervention and 

consideration,  for  instance,  by  NSI  communications  experts,  is  always  needed  to  focus 

attention, evaluate and take the right course of action. 

Monitoring official and ‘mainstream’ media, which are themselves targeted by disinformation 

attacks  and  are  thus  particularly  alert,  is  another  way  to  detect  disinformation.  During  the 

Covid-19  crisis,  many  NSIs  (also  members  of  the  Task  Force)  were  prompted  to  consider 

action against disinformation in the field of statistics. 

3.1. Online tools for tracking disinformation 

There  are  different  types  of  online  tools  for  tracking  disinformation:  some  of  them  analyse 

and  visualise  the  spread  of  disinformation  and  allow  for  fact-checking  (e.g.  Hoaxy),  others 

allow users to browse and search for fact-checks in relation to, for example, a specific topic 

or a politician's statement (e.g. Google Fact Check Explorer). 

A full list of tools identified by TF STRATCOM subgroup on handling disinformation for the 

monitoring and verification of disinformation is available in the Annex. 

3.2. Social media monitoring tools  

While social media monitoring tools have a broader application in the management of social 

media  and  online  communities,  they  can  also  be  valuable  for  the  timely  detection  of 

disinformation.  Social  media  monitoring  tools  allow  organisations  such  as  NSIs  to  track 

mentions of any given term or topic (name of the organisation, statistical release, etc.) based 

on  predefined  keywords  and  algorithms  on  online  platforms  such  as  media  outlets,  social 

media  and  blogs.  By  tracking  online  mentions  of  specific  terms  in  relation  to  their 

organisations,  NSIs  can  monitor  conversations  that  develop  online  around  their  content, 

identify  misinformation  and  disinformation  and  react,  when  necessary,  in  a  timely  manner. 

These  tools  can  also  help  NSIs  identify  supporters  who  have  influence  in  their  online 

communities and with whom they could engage to seek support.  

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A full list of social media monitoring tools identified by TF STRATCOM subgroup on handling 

disinformation for the monitoring and verification of disinformation is available in the Annex. 

The choice and use of social media monitoring tools should be decided in collaboration with 

local data protection officers. Some social media monitoring tools may be evaluated as not 

being  in  line  with  the  General  Data  Protection  Regulation  2016/679  (GDPR)  due  to  the 

amount or type of the personal data they collect or the location of their servers (US).  

4. Incidents: what is actually happening in the 

ESS 

In  most  Member  States,  NSIs  have  recently  been  confronted  with  disinformation  incidents 

that  affected  their  communication  or  reputation.  Members  of  the  Task  Force  shared  these 

incidents with each other, to learn from them and develop effective measures. The incidents 

are saved in an online repository that is regularly updated and available. 

The  repository  includes  information  on  the  topic  of  the  incident,  description,  date, 

source/media concerned, and, if applicable, engagement actions and results. 

Incidents  in  the  recent  past  were  often  linked  to  the  Covid-19  crisis,  like  disinformation 

spread  on  the  severity  of  the  crisis  and  persons  challenging  official  mortality  statistics 

published by NSIs. Among Task Force members, this type of disinformation was detected by 

NSIs in Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium and Ireland. Labour and unemployment data 

in  Greece  and  Poland  were  challenged  in  disinformation  claims.  In  Spain,  Ireland  and  the 

Netherlands  disinformation  was  spread  about  NSI  research  regarding  the  use  of  mobile 

network operators’ data, claiming that citizens were illegally tracked. 

5. Tried and tested response practices 

In  addition  to  sharing  and  analysing  disinformation  incidents,  members  of  the  Task  Force 

also  gathered  information  on  their  response  practices  and  their  impact.  Many  NSIs  took 

specific  actions:  some  worked  well,  some  were  less  effective  or  not  at  all  effective,  and 

others even backfired. The following sections provide a summary of responses that did not 

work or were counterproductive, followed by a more extensive list of responses that worked 

and were effective.  

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5.1. Lessons from NSIs’ incidents 

WHAT DID NOT WORK 

  Engaging directly with the spreaders of disinformation, e.g. on social media in not-

owned communities. 

This exposes the NSI as ‘the voice of the establishment’, member of conspiracy; 

makes it vulnerable to counterattacks like accusations of ‘fake news’ and provokes 

even more attacks. 

 

In a message shared by the NSI (e.g. a tweet) directed toward the propagator of 

disinformation, repeating the disinformation content (‘the myth’) and naming it as 

such, before providing the right information and correct data. 

This might be deliberately misused as a confirmation of the disinformation provided, 

reduce the power of objective facts and the effectiveness of argumentation and 

positions the NSI as the voice of ‘the establishment’. 

WHAT WORKED 

  Use of disinformation detection tools (e.g. social media monitoring tools) 

  Having an analysis and response plan/strategy in place 

  Responding immediately (though not in direct debate/contact with the spreaders), 

preferably on your own channels and with neutral messages, focusing on the 

accurate information and data. 

  Responding via partners/ambassadors in your network as authoritative voices that 

articulate the position of official statistics, preferably in their independent channels 

(so called ‘earned’ channels or media). 

  Use of alert verification / fact-checking platforms 

  Dissemination of results of investigations on disinformation by media/fact-checkers 

on NSI website 

  Proactive communication of the values and the principles of the European Statistics 

Code of Practice that characterise the work of ESS partners (our values and the 

principles of the Code of Practice determine how we work and differentiate us from 

other entities that disseminate data)  

  Foster two-way communication on websites and social media: NSIs and Eurostat 

could benefit from two-way communication on social media and other digital 

platforms. Encouraging people to ask questions or express their concerns makes it 

Rules of engagement for handling disinformation 

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easier to provide valid responses, avoid the spread of disinformation, and gain and 

maintain trust.  

  Empower employees to act as ambassadors: Choose spokespersons or experts who 

can speak on behalf of the NSI for different areas of statistics (e.g. one for health 

statistics, one for population and housing census). These spokespersons should be 

experienced, long-time employees who are well aware of the methodology and 

objectives of the surveys and are monitoring all relevant public discussions 

concerning their field. 

  Build partnerships to handle disinformation: Partnering with (trusted) organisations, 

personalities, experts or social media influencers for information-sharing (when 

similar information is sent from multiple sources, this information has higher chances 

of being seen and trusted). Engage with influencers on social media, especially to 

reach young people (see the learning corner on how to spot and fight disinformation 

prepared by the Directorate-General for Communication of the European 

Commission, especially the guidelines for teachers) 

  Build partnerships to educate the public: Promote statistics as well as media and 

information literacy (of users and journalists) to fight disinformation and help users by 

providing valid official statistics while navigating the digital media environment. 

  Educate people on critical assessment of data they see online, ensuring 

that people know as much as possible about existing disinformation 

before it appears on their social media feeds. 

  Train local professional news outlets in best practices for searching for official 

statistics. 

  Encourage journalists to build trust by providing readers with background information 

to their stories. This can include information on why they are writing the story, how 

the story was reported, which steps were taken to be fair with the reporting and how 

they found the reported data. 

5.2. Lessons from the European Commission’s Directorate-

General for Communication 

The  Task  Force  members  also  consulted  specialists  from  the  Directorate-General  for 

Communication  of  the  European  Commission  who  are  involved  with  the  European 

Commission  programme  on 

tackling  disinformation.  They  presented  a  number  of 

recommendations and showed the results of specific actions they carried out. 

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Some of their recommendations include: 

  Improve detection, analysis and exposure of disinformation 

Invest in digital tools, data analysis skills and specialised staff within the EU institutions 

and in Member States; assess reach and impact of disinformation. 

  Create stronger cooperation and joint responses to disinformation among 

Member States and with organisations 

  Raise awareness and improve societal resilience. 

The European Commission put in place the following mechanisms: 

  The Rapid Alert System provides alerts on disinformation campaigns in real time 

to national contact points for disinformation designated by Member States and allows for 

an exchange of identified disinformation incidents before they appear elsewhere. 

  Implementation of EU-wide Code of Practice on Disinformation: Major online companies 

such as Google, Facebook, Twitter and Mozilla have signed up; regular reporting as of 

January 2019 and possible regulatory action in case of unsatisfactory results. 

  Targeted campaigns in Europe and beyond: Active participation of civil society in 

identifying and exposing disinformation; supporting independent media and fact-

checkers. 

  Mobilisation of the private sector to tackle disinformation; partnering with social media 

providers (Facebook, Twitter) to implement fact-checking on their platforms. 

6. Rules of engagement for the ESS 

NSIs  are  advised  to  develop  and  maintain  a  prudent  and  consistent  approach  to  handling 

disinformation  incidents.  Consistently  adhering  to  a  set  of  predesigned  rules  in  an 

engagement strategy protects against careless actions that may backfire. NSIs are advised 

to  refrain  from  getting  involved  directly  in  public  debate  and  from  direct  confrontation  with 

propagators  of  disinformation  in  public  (online)  spaces  or  media  where  disinformation  is 

being  spread.  This  makes  an  NSI  vulnerable  to  allegations  such  as  bias  and  partisanship, 

lack of objectivity and independence. Getting involved in the debate always means that, one 

way or another (left or right), the public institution will be accused of taking a side. But that 

does not mean doing nothing is the only alternative.  

The  following  sections  present  the  ‘rules  of  engagement’  for  NSIs,  developed  by  the 

subgroup as a guideline for actions to take when confronted with disinformation. A distinction 

is  made  between  actions  useful  for  tackling  simple,  and  sophisticated,  disinformation 

incidents. 

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6.1. Do research 

  Ensure you fully understand the topic of disinformation. 

 

Identify and check the original source of disinformation. 

  Check  the  authenticity  of the  social media account  of the  propagator  -  engage  only 

on ‘safe platforms’ with verified accounts and trusted accounts. 

6.2. Response 

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS 

  After  your  initial  research,  decide  whether  to  respond  or  not.  Not  every  incident 

needs  to  be  addressed  actively.  Some  are  too  small,  insignificant,  or  appear  in 

obscure  channels  with  low  exposure  and  can  be  ignored.  Sometimes  incidents  ‘die 

out’.  But  do  not  ignore  disinformation  incidents  that  have  clear  potential  to  become 

more  substantial:  if  the  disinformation  starts  spreading  fast,  has  the  potential  to 

damage your organisation’s reputation or can have a significant negative impact on 

society. 

  Refrain  as  much  as  possible  from  direct  engagement  with  propagators  of 

disinformation  (identified  as  such).  In  general,  do  not  engage  directly  in  discussion 

with (anonymous or fake) accounts that spread disinformation.  

 

In the event of a barrage of negative attacks, it is wise to wait and pick your battles. 

Do  not  distance  yourself  openly  from  the  narrative  framework  of  the  accuser  but 

carefully  plan  the  next  steps  (e.g.  after  an  initial  response)  by  designing  credible, 

well-documented responses. 

  Keep  disseminating  the  right  data,  indicators,  explanations  and  comments  within 

trusted  channels  and  owned  media.  Make  sure  your  audience  is  not  surprised  by 

sudden  new  channels,  platforms  or  content  used  by  the  NSI  (thus  raising  new 

questions). 

  Turn the  argument  around  by making  strong points  based  on  statistical data, giving 

extra information, metadata, etc.  

  Keep  it  simple  and  use plain  language,  keeping  in  mind  that  among  your  audience 

there  might  be  people  who  do  not  have  a  high  degree  of  statistical  literacy  or  who 

might not spend too much time reading your message. 

If you decide it is necessary to respond to a disinformation incident, as a first step, we advise 

determining whether you are dealing with simple or sophisticated disinformation, as defined 

in section 2.2 of this document. Once you have done that, you can choose the right course 

of action as recommended below. 

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SIMPLE DISINFORMATION 

  When  disinformation  is  explicitly  wrong,  for  example,  a  wrong  figure  that  is  plainly 

contrary  to  official  statistics/indicators:  check  with  the  relevant  statisticians  in  your 

organisation  and  release  a  statement  on  your  preferred  channel  containing  the 

correct  data/indicator.  Do  not  mention  directly  the  disinformation  message/name  of 

the spreader when it is not necessary. 

  Respond  by  sharing  a  link  to  the  relevant  official  figures,  for  example,  the  open 

database or a graph or visualisation. 

SOPHISTICATED DISINFORMATION 

  Ask  your  strategic  partners  with  authoritative  voices/experts  to  respond  with  the 

correct  message/data,  referring  to  your  own  message,  if  any.  Identify  and  engage 

with  partners  at  a  national  level  using  the  repository  maintained  by  the  European 

Digital Media Observatory: https://edmo.eu/fact-checking-activities/. 

  Use proactive, positive communication. When drafting a response, be straightforward 

and  succinct.  Avoid  emphasising  disinformation  when  countering  false  claims 

(explaining why disinformation is incorrect is more effective than simply labelling it as 

false).  

  When choosing to respond, it is important to determine at the same time 

the  extent  to  which  you  will  continue  to  respond  to  someone's  false  or 

misleading  argument.  It  is  crucial  to  ‘pick  your  battles’  and  set  a  cut-off 

point for making further counter claims. A lot of news is likely to die out in 

the news cycle and there is no need to take more actions to counter it. 

  Tailor  information/response  to  the  users’  specific  needs  and  preferred  channels  of 

media  consumption  (as  media  consumption  habits  differ  significantly  across  the 

different  audiences).  Aim  to  use  a  variety  of media (video,  infographics,  etc.)  to get 

the  response  message  out  and  reach  all  users  (whose  age,  habits  and  knowledge 

differ). 

  Optional  (depending  on  the  NSI’s  general  strategy  for  senior  management  social 

media  engagement):  respond  using  the  account  of  a  high-ranking  officer  in  the 

organisation (director or director-general) to give your message an authoritative tone 

and a personal touch. 

Rules of engagement for handling disinformation 

14 

 
 
  
 
6.3. Recommendations from ‘The Debunking Handbook’ 

This widely cited handbook on disinformation and how to tackle it can be useful material for 

NSIs as well. The Debunking Handbook 20202 summarises the current state of the science 

of misinformation and its demystification. It was written by a team of 22 prominent scholars 

of  disinformation  and  represents  the  current  consensus  on  the  science  of  disinformation 

exposure for engaged citizens, policymakers, journalists, and other practitioners. A step-by-

step  guide  to  addressing  disinformation,  based  on  the  Debunking  Handbook,  is  provided 

below. 

1. FACTS: Tell the truth first 

Do  it  easily  and in  a few  words.  This  allows  to  configure the  message and direct 

the conversation by relying on your own points, not those of others. 

An alternative based on official statistics must be given to make it easier to ‘erase’ 

inaccurate information in the initial understanding of the person and replace it with 

the facts. 

2. MYTH: Point out disinformation 

Repeat  it  only  once  and  immediately  before  correcting  it.  Avoid  unnecessary 

repetitions that can give credibility to disinformation. 

3. FALLACY: Explain why disinformation is wrong 

Juxtapose the correction with the disinformation. Ensure the differences are clear 

even on a quick read.  

a)      Explain why the disinformation seemed correct in the first place 

b)      Why it is now clear that it is wrong  

c)      Why the alternative is correct  

4. FACTS: State the truth and facts again 

Make  sure  the  truth  is  the  last  thing  people  will  process.  Realise  the  effects  will 

fade over time, so be prepared to debunk it repeatedly. 

2 George Mason University Center for Climate Change Communication (2020). Debunking Handbook 2020. 
Fairfax: George Mason University.  

Rules of engagement for handling disinformation 

15 

 
 
  
                                                           
 
6.4. Latest experiences 

In  putting  the  recommendations  mentioned  above  into  practice,  some  NSIs  have  already 

learned some interesting lessons. 

According to Statistics Netherlands, at the time of writing, there was a notable decrease in 

the  spread  of  disinformation  on  Covid-19  related  topics,  such  as  doubts  around  the 

trustworthiness  of  official  statistics  on  excess  mortality.  Especially  in  mainstream  media, 

there  is  less debate on these figures.  Disinformation  incidents  seem to  be limited  to  small, 

isolated  communities,  mostly  active  on  social  media,  and  do  not  appear  as  much  in 

mainstream  media  and  at  the  heart  of  the  public  debate.  The  highest  number  of 

disinformation incidents appears in the debate on vaccination and its health implications – a 

topic not covered by official statistics. 

However, it is not possible to determine the exact cause of this development and to assign 

this  decrease  to  actions  carried  out  by  Statistics  Netherlands.  On  the  other  hand,  the 

situation is different when it comes to the climate change debate. 

ISTAT  observed  a  similar  development  and  noted  that  citizens  increasingly  recognise  and 

point out disinformation in the discussions on Covid-19. 

Statistics Belgium noticed a positive evolution in the use of its statistics since the start of the 

Covid-19  crisis.  Especially  on  Twitter,  users  react  to  disinformation  and  tag  Statistics 

Belgium  when  posting  the  correct  figures.  Users  even  use  Statistics  Belgium  figures  to 

correct news reports containing erratic data. 

Statistics Belgium underlined the importance of the recommendation to keep disseminating 

the  right  data,  indicators,  explanations  and  comments  within  trusted  channels  and  owned 

media. They have also found it beneficial to refrain from direct engagement with spreaders 

of  disinformation.  These  two  principles  will  be  incorporated  in  its  general  communication 

strategy. Besides this, Statistics Belgium is aiming for better collaboration with the academic 

and educational world in order to enhance the statistical literacy of specific user groups.  

7. Conclusion 
The growing number of disinformation incidents affecting official statistics has underlined the 

vulnerability of the role of NSIs in public debate. This became all the more evident during the 

Covid-19 crisis, when many NSIs faced disinformation incidents through which the accuracy, 

objectivity and independence of their statistics were questioned publicly. Therefore, NSIs are 

advised  to  develop  an  appropriate  response  plan,  taking  into  consideration  the  general 

recommendation of avoiding direct confrontation with the propagators of disinformation. 

Rules of engagement for handling disinformation 

16 

 
 
  
There  are  many  tools  available,  mainly  online,  that  can  help  NSIs  to  identify  and  monitor 

disinformation spread on online platforms and the Task Force encourages  their use. At the 

same  time,  it  is  important  to  keep  in  mind  that  tools  are  not  enough  to  develop  and 

implement  the  right  response.  Since  NSIs  have  a  delicate  position  as  independent  public 

bodies  within  the  governmental  structure,  constant  evaluation  of  incidents  and  tailoring  of 

responses  is  needed.  NSIs  are  advised  to  ensure  that  staff  in  the  relevant  departments 

(most  often  communications  departments)  are  adequate  in  number  and  equipped  with  the 

right  skills  and  procedures  to  handle  and  respond  to  disinformation.  Supporting  such 

activities in NSIs  can  include  engaging  dedicated  staff;  systematising  internal  support from 

other departments, like statistical research and production; enhancing collaboration between 

statistical  and  communication  professionals  on  the  work  needed  to  handle  disinformation; 

and fostering  collaboration  and  exchange on  the  topic  in the  ESS  and with external  actors 

(other governmental bodies, fact-checking organisations and journalists). 

In  the  framework  of  the  discussion  on  the  continuation  of  the  work  on  strategic 

communication  in  the  ESS  after  the  expiration  of  the  Task  Force’s  mandate,  the  subgroup 

recommends to continue the work on disinformation in the form of exchange of experiences, 

updating the repository of disinformation incidents and further developing recommendations. 

At  the  European  level,  there  are  several  ongoing  initiatives  around  handling  and  fighting 

disinformation. The Directorate-General for Communication of the European Commission is 

running the Network against Disinformation as well as topical groups (data, climate change). 

In  this  context,  another  action  could  be  connecting  the  work  on  disinformation  in  the  ESS 

with the work of the European Commission. Since membership in these groups is not open 

to  organisations  outside  of  the  European  Commission,  a  link  could  be  established  through 

Eurostat. 

Rules of engagement for handling disinformation 

17 

Annex: Online tools for identifying, monitoring and verifying disinformation 

Annex 

Tracking and analysing disinformation online 

Name 

Owner 

Platforms 
checked 

URL 

Google 

All 

Linka 

Google Fact 
Check Explorer 

Global 
disinformation 
index 

Description 

Languages 

Aims to facilitate the work of fact-checkers, journalists and researchers. 
Allows you to easily browse and search for fact-checks. For example, you 
can search for a politician's statement, or for a topic. You can also restrict 
results to a specific publisher. Using the tool allows you to consult fact-
checkers around the world to see if they have written about a certain image, 
claim, or content. 

All languages 

Veracity.ai 

News outlets 

Linkb 

The Global Disinformation Index is a web-based tool that rates news outlets 
based on the "probability of disinformation on a specific media outlet." This 
rating system covers all types of media, and provides a real-time score. 

English 

Hoaxy 

Indiana 
University 
Bloomington 

Twitter, online 
articles 

Linkc 

BotSlayer 

Indiana 
University 
Bloomington 

Twitter 

Linkd 

Visualises the spread of claims; fact-checking; A platform for tracking online 
misinformation. It is an open platform for the automatic tracking of both online 
fake news and fact-checking on social media. The goal of the platform is to 
reconstruct the diffusion networks induced by hoaxes and their corrections as 
they are shared online and spread from person to person. Hoaxy allows 
researchers, journalists, and the general public to study the factors that affect 
the success and mitigation of massive digital misinformation.  

Arabic, Bengali, 
Bulgarian, Chinese, 
English, Farsi, 
French, German, 
Hindi, Italian, 
Japanese, Malay, 
Portuguese, Russian, 
Spanish, Turkish 

An application that helps track and detect potential manipulation of 
information spreading on Twitter; uses an anomaly detection algorithm to flag 
hashtags, links, accounts, and media that are trending and amplified in a 
coordinated fashion by likely bots. It lets users explore the tweets and 
accounts associated with suspicious campaigns via Twitter, visualise their 
spread via Hoaxy, and search related images and content on Google. 
BotSlayer can be used by journalists, corporations, and political candidates 
to discover in real time new coordinated campaigns in their domains of 
interest, without any prior knowledge of these campaigns. 

English 

Botometer 

Indiana 
University 
Bloomington 

Twitter 

Linke 

Botometer is a tool to detect and remove likely social bots from your list of 
Twitter followers or friends; checks the activity of a Twitter account and gives 
it a score. 

All languages 

Rules of engagement for handling disinformation 

18 

Annex 

Tracking and analysing disinformation online 

Twitter twXplorer 

Northwestern 
University 

Twitter 

Linkf 

Social media research tool; TwXplorer allows users to search for a word or 
phrase and automatically see the most commonly used words and hashtags 
and the mostly frequently shared links; designed as a tool for researchers 
and journalists. 

English 

Iffy Quotient 

Michigan 
University 

news and 
information sites 

Linkg 

The Iffy Quotient is a metric for how much content from sites that frequently 
publish misinformation ('iffy') has been amplified on Facebook and Twitter. 

English 

CrowdTangle 

Facebook 

Facebook, 
Instagram and 
Reddit 

Linkh 

A tool that publishers use to track how content spreads around the web; 
allows users to follow, analyse, and report on what’s happening with public 
content on social media; allows users to follow public content across 
Facebook, Instagram and Reddit, to benchmark and compare performance 
of public accounts over time, and track referrals and find larger trends to 
understand how public content spreads on social media. 

All languages 

Factchecking and investigative journalism 

Name 

Owner 

Platforms 
checked 

Google Fact 
Check Explorer 

Google 

All 

Snopes 

Snopes Media 
Group 

N/A 

Efe Verifica 

Agencia EFE 

N/A 

Factuel 

Agence France-
Presse (AFP) 

N/A 

NewsGuard 

NewsGuard 
Technologies 

news and 
information 
websites 

URL 

Linki 

Linkj 

Linkk 

Linkl 

Linkm 

Description 

Languages 

Aims to facilitate the work of fact-checkers, journalists and researchers. 
Allows you to easily browse and search for fact-checks. For example, you 
can search for a politician's statement, or for a topic. You can also restrict 
results to a specific publisher. Using the tool allows you to consult fact-
checkers around the world to see if they have written about a certain image, 
claim, or content. 

All languages 

A fact-checking website; a source for validating and debunking urban 
legends. 

Information verification service that identifies, fact-checks and provides 
correct information and context in relation to the most pervasive (viral) 
disinformation narratives that polarise public opinion in Spain. 
Scrutinises and verifies disinformation in several languages for a number of 
key topics and in different areas of the world, benefitting from a global 
presence and the expertise of AFP's investigative journalists. 

English 

Spanish 

Several different 
languages 

A journalism and technology company that rates the credibility of news and 
information websites and tracks online misinformation; Gives detailed trust 
ratings for 6 000+ news websites that account for 95% of online engagement 
with news. 

English 

Rules of engagement for handling disinformation 

19 

Annex 

Social media monitoring 

Name 

Platforms checked 

URL 

Description 

Languages 

Talkwalker 

All social media channels 
and online media 

Linkn 

Provides real-time insights into what's happening on all social channels and online 
media, across 187 languages; enables users to quickly identify issues and 
complaints before a crisis hits. 

187 languages 

Hootsuite 

All social media channels 
and online media 

Linko 

Search streams in the Hootsuite dashboard let users monitor conversations 
relevant to their business, industry, and products; users can monitor what people 
are saying based on keywords, hashtags, locations, and even specific users. 

N/A 

Brandwatch 

All social media channels 
and online media 

Linkp 

Social listening and analytics tool that helps you dig out relevant data from blogs, 
forums, as well as social media and news or review sites; this tool tells you 
what/how your customers talk about your brand online. 

can collect data written in 
any language; can 
analyse data for 
sentiment and key topics 
in 44 languages 

a https://toolbox.google.com/factcheck/explorer 
b https://disinformationindex.org/ 
c https://hoaxy.osome.iu.edu/ 
d https://osome.iu.edu/tools/botslayer 
e https://botometer.osome.iu.edu/ 
f https://twxplorer.knightlab.com/ 
g https://csmr.umich.edu/projects/iffy-quotient/ 
h https://www.crowdtangle.com/ 
i https://toolbox.google.com/factcheck/explorer 
j https://www.snopes.com/ 
k https://www.efe.com/efe/espana/efeverifica/ 
l https://factuel.afp.com/ 
m https://www.newsguardtech.com/ 
n https://www.talkwalker.com/ 
o https://www.hootsuite.com/ 
p https://www.brandwatch.com/ 

Rules of engagement for handling disinformation 

20 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
 
GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU 

In person 
All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct information centres. You can find the 
address of the centre nearest you at: https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en 

On the phone or by email 
Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about the European Union. You can contact this 
service: 
– by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for these calls),
– at the following standard number: +32 22999696 or
– by email via: https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en

FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU 

Online 
Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on the Europa 
website at: https://europa.eu/european-union/index_en 

EU publications 
You can download or order free and priced EU publications at: https://op.europa.eu/en/publications. 
Multiple copies of free publications may be obtained by contacting Europe Direct or your local information 
centre (see https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en). 

EU law and related documents 
For access to legal information from the EU, including all EU law since 1952 in all the official language 
versions, go to EUR-Lex at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu 

Open data from the EU 
The EU Open Data Portal (http://data.europa.eu/euodp/en) provides access to datasets from the EU. 
Data can be downloaded and reused for free, for both commercial and non-commercial purposes. 

Rules of engagement for 
handling disinformation

The rise of social media and changing information consumption 
habits have together created an environment that enables the rapid 
proliferation of disinformation. To support National Statistical Institutes 
and Eurostat when handling disinformation, the European Statistical 
System Task Force on Strategic Communication has prepared a set of 
‘rules of engagement’ with recommended practices. The document 
includes a list of online tools that can be used to detect, monitor and 
verify disinformation. 

For more information
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/

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 ISBN  978-92-76-47145-5

Statistical requirements compendium2018 edition