COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS on the 8th Cohesion Report: Cohesion in Europe towards 2050
Date: 2022-02-04
Institutions: Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy, European Commission
Subjects: EU employment policy, EU regional policy, coronavirus disease, economic and social cohesion, economic convergence, economic development, epidemic, investment policy, regional development, sustainable development

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 4.2.2022  COM(2022) 34 final  COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS on the 8th Cohesion Report: Cohesion in Europe towards 2050 {SWD(2022) 24 final}  
 
 
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 

on the 8th Cohesion Report: Cohesion in Europe towards 2050 

1. 

INTRODUCTION 

Based on the analysis in the 8th Cohesion Report, this Communication presents the main 
changes  in  territorial  disparities  over  the  past  decade  and  how  policies  have  affected 
these  disparities.  It  highlights  the  potential  of  the  green  and  digital  transitions  as  new 
drivers of EU growth,  but  argues  that without appropriate policy action new economic, 
social  and  territorial  disparities  may  appear.  Finally,  it  launches  a  reflection  on  how 
cohesion  policy  should  evolve  to  respond  to  these  challenges  and  in  particular  how  to 
ensure  that  place-based,  multilevel  and  partnership  led  approaches  continue  to  improve 
cohesion, while building on synergies and mainstreaming cohesion objectives into other 
policies and instruments.  

2.  COHESION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION HAS IMPROVED, BUT GAPS REMAIN 

The  Cohesion  Report  assesses  the  long-term  evolution  of  regional  disparities,  but  also 
briefly  addresses  the  dramatic  short-term  effects  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic.  This  has 
had  an  asymmetric  impact  on  EU  regions,  reflecting  different  regional  healthcare 
capacities,  restrictions  and  economic  structures.  COVID-19  has  already  increased  EU 
mortality by 13% (Chapter 11), but the impact so far is higher in less developed regions 
where mortality increased by 17%2. The pandemic led to the largest recession since 1945, 
affecting  especially  sectors  that  depend  on  personal  interaction,  such  as  tourism,  and 
drastically altered our jobs, schools and social interactions, while travel restrictions had a 
disproportionate impact on border areas. 

Convergence has been driven by high growth in less developed regions,  but their low 
cost-advantages and returns on infrastructure investment may shrink over time. 

Since 2001, less developed eastern EU regions have been catching up with the rest of 
the EU, leading to a substantial reduction of the GDP per capita gap (Map 1). Their high 
growth  rates  have  been  fuelled  by  structural  transformation,  notably  a  shift  of 
employment  out  of  agriculture  and  into  higher  value  added  sectors.  Some  of  these 

1  The  chapters  referred  to  in  this  Communication  are  those  of  the  accompanying  Staff  Working 

Document. 

2  Less  developed  regions  have  a  GDP  level  at  less  than  75%  of  the  EU  average,  transition  regions 

between 75% and 100%, and more developed regions more than 100%. 

1 

 
 
 
                                                 
regions  have  relied  on  infrastructure  investment  and  low  costs  to  promote  growth. 
However, the returns on infrastructure investment will decline and low cost advantages 
will shrink if real wages grow faster than productivity, especially in the tradeable sectors. 
To  avoid  a  development  trap  in  the  future,  less  developed  regions  will  need  to  boost 
education and training, increase investments in research and innovation, and improve the 
quality of their institutions.  

Several  middle-income  and  less  developed  regions,  especially  in  the  southern  EU, 
have suffered from economic stagnation or decline (Map 1), suggesting they are in a 
development trap3 (Map 2).  Many were hit by the economic and financial crisis in 2008 
and have struggled to recover since. Long-term growth will require reforms of the public 
sector, an upskilled labour force and a stronger capacity to innovate.  

3  A  region  is  considered  trapped  if  its  growth  has  slowed  down  and  is  lower  than  EU  and/or  national 
growth. Map 2 shows the regions  which  were  mostly or frequently trapped between 2000 and 2019. 
Regions in grey were mostly not trapped.  

2 

 
 
                                                 
Map 1 

3 

 
 
 
Map 2 

Capital metropolitan regions perform better than other regions.  Between 2001 and 
2019,  real  GDP  per  head  in  metropolitan  (metro)  regions  grew  faster  than  in  other  EU 
regions  (Chapter  2).  In  the  southern  and  the  eastern  EU,  both  capital  and  other  metro 
regions  had  higher  GDP  and  employment  growth  per  capita,  leading  to  a  growing 
concentration  of  economic  activity  and  employment  in  these  regions.  In  the  north-

4 

 
 
 
western EU, however, metro regions and other regions grew at similar speeds, while only 
the capital regions grew slightly faster.  

Significant  progress  has  been  made  in  improving  employment  and  social  inclusion4, 
but important structural challenges remain. 

Employment has been growing, but regional disparities remain larger than before 
2008  (Chapter  5).  The  economic  crisis  in  2008  led  to  a  significant  spike  in  regional 
disparities  in  both  employment  and  unemployment  rates.  At  the  EU  level,  the 
employment rate has fully recovered from the crisis and reached its highest value in 2019 
at  73%  of  those  aged  20-64.  Regional  disparities  have  fallen  since  2008,  but  remain 
wider  than  before  the  economic  crisis.  Employment  rates  in  less  developed  regions 
remain far below those in more developed regions (Map 3).  

Map 3 

4   See the regional dimension of the social scoreboard https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/european-pillar-

of-social-rights/indicators/data-by-region  

5 

 
 
 
                                                 
Reducing regional employment disparities requires more employment growth and a 
reduction of the gender gap. In less developed regions, the gender employment gap is 
almost twice that in more developed regions (17 vs 9 percentage points). Overall, women 
in  less  developed  regions  are  more  likely  to  be  disadvantaged  compared  to  men  in  the 
same region and less likely to have a high level of achievement compared to women in 
other regions.  

The number of people at risk of poverty and social exclusion has fallen by 17 million 
between  2012  and  2019,  mostly  due  to  the  decline  of  the  number  of  people  in  severe 
material deprivation in eastern Member States. Reaching the EU 2030 target of reducing 
the number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion by at least 15 million requires 
maintaining  the  current  rate  of  poverty  reduction  over  the  next  decade.  The  pandemic, 
however,  increased  the  number  of  people  at  risk  of  poverty  and  social  exclusion  by  5 
million in 2020.  

Health  disparities  have  been  shrinking.  Life  expectancy  has  increased  faster  in  less 
developed regions over the past decade than other regions. Nevertheless, life expectancy 
is still low compared to the EU average in many eastern regions (Map 4). The pandemic 
reduced  life  expectancy  in  2020  in  almost  all  Member  States,  but  this  is  likely  to  be 
temporary  (Chapter  1).  The  pandemic  also  highlighted  the  regional  differences  in 
healthcare capacity.  

6 

 
 
 
Map 4 

7 

 
 
 
 
 
Cohesion policy has helped to reduce disparities. 

Economic  modelling  indicates  that  in  2023,  GDP  per  head  will  be  2.6%  higher  in 
less developed regions due to support from cohesion policy in 2014-2020. This model 
also  shows that the  gap  between  GDP per head in  regions  representing  top and bottom 
deciles will fall by 3.5% (Chapter 9).  

Following  the  contraction  of  national  public  investments  due  to  the  economic  and 
financial  crisis,  cohesion  policy  became  a  more  important  source  of  investment 
(Chapter 8). In cohesion countries, cohesion funding grew from the equivalent of 34% to 
52%  of  total  public  investment  from  the  2007-2013  programming  period  to  the  2014-
2020  programming  period  (Figure  1).  Without  cohesion  policy,  the  reduction  in  public 
investment would have been even bigger in these countries.  

Figure 1: Cohesion policy allocations relative to public investment, 2007-2013 and 2014-2020  

Cohesion  policy  responded  quickly  to  the  COVID-19  crisis  by  mobilising  additional 
funding,  making  spending  on  the  crisis  response  eligible  and  allowing  higher  co-
financing rates. This helped Member States and regions respond to the crisis. However, 
cohesion policy should now return to its core mission of reducing regional disparities and 
promoting long-term regional development.  

3.  DRIVERS OF REGIONAL GROWTH TEND TO BOOST COHESION 

Investments in infrastructure, skills, innovation and governance have continued to drive 
convergence  in  recent  years.  Nonetheless,  gaps  remain  and  many  drivers  of  growth 
remain concentrated in more developed regions and urban areas. Recent research shows 
that  the  effectiveness  of  these  investments  depend  on  an  appropriate  region-specific 
investment mix and a good institutional and macro-economic framework.  

8 

 
 
 
In  the  2014-2020  programming  period,  almost  half  of  cohesion  policy  investment 
supported  infrastructure,  largely  due  to  needs  in  the  eastern  EU.  This  has  helped  to 
reduce  the  road  transport  performance  gap  in  the  eastern  EU  and  to  close  it  in  the 
southern  EU  (Chapter  4).  This  investment  has  also  improved  rail  performance  in  the 
southern and the eastern EU. Nevertheless, more investment is still needed in the eastern 
EU, in particular to support the shift to a carbon neutral economy.  

Basic  broadband  access  is  almost  universal  in  the  EU,  but  very-high-speed 
connections are only available to two out of three city residents and one out of six rural 
residents  (Chapter  4).  Transport  and  IT  infrastructure  investments  alone  do  not 
automatically lead to higher growth rates. They need to be accompanied by policies that 
create a favourable environment for companies to grow and help workers to access new 
employment opportunities in all regions.  

Sufficient  investment  in  environmental  protection,  clean  energy  and  the  provision  of 
associated  services  is  essential  to  ensure  long-term  sustainability,  competitiveness  and 
quality of life. Air and water pollution have been reduced, but still remain too high 
in many less developed regions.  The air pollution caused by  fine particulate matter is 
high in many eastern regions. Within the EU it leads to an estimated 400,000 premature 
deaths  a  year.  Ozone  concentrations  remain  too  high  in  many  southern  regions.  Waste 
water treatment has improved throughout the EU, but more investments are still needed 
in  many  less  developed  and  transition  regions  to  protect  and  improve  water  quality 
(Chapter 3).  

Skills  endowments  are  unevenly  distributed  and  concentrated  in  more  developed 
regions and especially capital regions. Less developed regions lag  far behind transition 
and more developed regions in terms of tertiary education, life-long learning and digital 
skills. Despite improvements at the EU level, gaps between regions have remained wide. 
When many workers lack a secondary  education, closing the productivity gap becomes 
harder.  Educational  attainment  and  skills  also  display  a  large  urban-rural  divide.  City 
residents are more likely to have a university degree, to participate in training and to have 
good digital skills than rural residents. 

Entrepreneurship  is  critical  for  growth,  but  tends  to  be  concentrated  in  larger  cities. 
New firms are particularly important to diversify economic activities and create  jobs in 
low growth regions. The Recommendation on Effective Active Support to Employment 
(EASE)5  following  the  COVID-19  crisis  highlights  how  upskilling,  reskilling  and 
entrepreneurial  support  can  promote  inclusive  job-to-job  transitions  taking  into  account 
the regional context.  

Innovation  is  the  key  determinant  of  long-term  regional  economic  growth,  but  the 
regional  innovation  divide  in  Europe  has  grown.  While  certain  Member  States  have 
made  significant  progress  in  catching  up,  many  regions,  including  in  more  developed 

5  Commission Recommendation on an effective active support to employment following the COVID-19 

crisis (EASE) – C(2021) 1372, 4.3.2021. 

9 

 
 
                                                 
Member  States,  lag  behind  (Figure  2).  This  is  due  not  only  to  a  lack  of  investment  in 
R&D,  but  also  weaknesses  in  regional  innovation  ecosystems.  Better  innovation 
diffusion at national and regional level can help less developed and transition regions to 
catch  up.  Smart  specialisation  strategies,  which  were  introduced  in  cohesion  policy  for 
2014-2020,  can  help  to  address  this  divide,  but  will  need  to  focus  more  on  regional 
potential. 

Figure 2: The regional innovation divide in Europe 2021 

This innovation divide is exacerbated by weak innovation and limited human capital 
spill-overs from international trade linkages and value chains in many less developed 
and  transition  regions.  In  spite  of  often  significant  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  and 
exports, many regions fail to capture the benefits for local firms and workers. Poor take-
up of digital technologies, managerial practices and industry 4.0 technologies in business 
and the public sector means that many regions are unprepared to take advantage of new 
opportunities and are vulnerable to potential reshoring as value chains evolve. 

Governance  in  the  EU  is  mostly  improving,  but  gaps  remain  between  and  within 
Member  States  (Map  56)  (Chapter  7).  Improving  institutions  can  contribute  to  more 
effective investment, higher levels of innovation and entrepreneurship, which are critical 
for  long-term  economic  growth.  All  Member  States  have  improved  their  business 
environment,  but  significant  variations  remain.  The  effectiveness  of  the  justice  system 
also  differs  between  Member  States  and  in  a  few  Member  States  the  rule  of  law  has 
deteriorated over time.  

6  The index is based on a regional survey that measures the quality of local police, education and health 

care and corruption, nepotism and discrimination in the provision of these services. 

10 

 
 
 
                                                 
Map 5 

The  role  and  capacity  of  sub-national  governments  in  economic  development 
remains uneven, although they carry out most public investment, notably in relation 
to  the  energy  transition  and  adaptation  to  climate  change  (Chapter  8).  Place-based 
policies  are  particularly  important  in  countries  with  significant  internal  economic 
disparities. Local and regional autonomy has grown slowly in cohesion countries during 
the past decades, but remains lower than in the rest of the EU. Since managing cohesion 
policy programmes is challenging for regions with little autonomy and less experience in 
carrying  out  public  investments,  cohesion  policy  has  helped  strengthen  administrative 
capacity  and  the  implementation  of  regional  development  strategies,  notably  through 
territorial instruments and cooperation within functional areas.  

11 

 
 
 
 
 
4.  NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR GROWTH, BUT RISKS OF NEW DISPARITIES 

In the next 30 years, the EU’s growth will be driven by the green and digital transitions. 
These will bring new opportunities, but will require significant structural changes that are 
likely  to  create  new  regional  disparities.  If  ignored,  the  demographic  transition  may 
undermine  both  cohesion  and  growth.  The  way  these  transitions  are  managed  will 
determine  whether  all  regions  and  citizens,  wherever  they  live,  will  be  able  to  benefit 
from  these  transitions.  Without  a  clear  territorial  vision  of  how  these  processes  will  be 
managed  and  an  ambitious  implementation  of  the  European  Pillar  of  Social  Rights,  a 
growing  number  of  people  may  feel  that  their  voices  are  not  heard  and  the  impact  on 
their  communities  are  not  considered,  which  may  fuel  discontent  with  democracy.  To 
prepare  Europe  to  deal  with  these  challenges,  it  is  essential  to  promote  job-to-job 
transitions to green and digital sectors and bridging related skills shortages, as proposed 
in the EASE Recommendation. 

The  green  transition  and  especially  the  goals  of  a  carbon  neutral  and  circular 
economy  will  transform  our  economies.  It  will  boost  employment  in  sectors  such  as 
renewable  energy,  recycling,  design,  renovation  and  ecosystem  services,  but  may 
adversely affect sectors that need to reduce their emissions and the regions in which they 
are located (Maps 6 and 7). Natural capital in rural regions may boost jobs in managing 
ecosystem  services  and  renewable  energy.  The  social  impact  of  the  EU  goal  of  being 
climate-neutral by 2050 will thus differ from one region to another and may be higher in 
those with high poverty rates. This will require the support of policy instruments such as 
the Just Transition Fund.  

12 

 
 
Map 6 

13 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 7 

14 

 
 
 
 
 
The  digital  transition  is  moving  forward  at  different  speeds  across  Europe.  Its 
completion will require expanding very-high-speed internet access, boosting digital skills 
and  investing  in  IT  equipment.  This  will  benefit  rural  areas  because  their  internet 
connections tend to be slow and their digital skills below average. Faster internet access 
will allow more people to work from home, improve access to online services, including 
training, health and e-commerce, and may encourage more services to move out of major 
urban  centres.  Less  developed  Member  States  will  benefit  more  from  this  transition  as 
their  firms  lag  behind  in  their  use  of  digital  technologies,  e-commerce  and  e-business 
practices.  

Demographic change, notably ageing, will affect all regions, but rural regions first. 
Over the next decade, population aged 65 and above is projected to grow by more than 
25%  in  one  out  of  five  regions.  The  working  age  population  is  projected  to  shrink  by 
more than 10% in one out of four regions. The population below 20 is projected to shrink 
by more than 10% in one out of three regions. Overall, the share of population living in a 
shrinking  region  is  projected  to  increase  from  34%  to  51%  between  2020  and  2040 
(Chapter  6).  Rural  regions  are  especially  affected  as  they  are  already  shrinking  (Figure 
3). These trends may affect growth potential, skills development and access to services. 

Figure  3:  Natural  population  change,  net  migration  and  total  population  change  by 
urban-rural regional typology and by type of metro region during the years 2010-2019 

In  recent  years,  some  places  in  Europe  experienced  sluggish  or  declining  economic 
opportunities,  social  mobility  and  quality  of  life.  Such  long-term  economic  decline  has 
fed  a  growing  discontent  among  citizens.  Eurobarometers  show  that  rural  residents  are 
more  likely  to  think  that  their  voice  does  not  count  and  to  distrust  the  EU.  However, 
citizens have more confidence in regional and local governments than in national or EU-
level  authorities.  To  address  these  concerns,  the  green  and  digital  transitions  should  be 
fair  and  just,  managed  in  an  inclusive  manner  and  developed  in  partnerships  with 
regional and local governments.  

15 

Average annual change per 1000 residentsNatural population changeNet migrationTotal population changeAverage annual change per 1000 residentsNatural population changeNet migrationTotal population changeUrban2.54.16.6capital metro5.13.38.4Intermediate0.13.83.9other metro0.54.55.0Rural-1.32.51.2non-metro-0.82.71.8Urban0.02.52.6capital metro1.02.73.7Intermediate-1.71.90.2other metro-0.52.52.0Rural-4.71.0-3.7non-metro-2.51.5-1.0Urban-0.52.72.2capital metro-0.34.74.5Intermediate-1.9-0.4-2.3other metro-1.00.2-0.7Rural-1.9-2.3-4.2non-metro-2.4-2.3-4.7Urban1.23.34.5capital metro2.73.56.2Intermediate-0.92.11.2other metro0.03.23.2Rural-2.00.4-1.6non-metro-1.80.8-1.0North-WesternSouthernEasternEUNorth-WesternSouthernEasternEU 
 
 
5.  CHALLENGES FOR COHESION POLICY 

The  Strategic  Foresight  Report7  highlights  climate  and  other  environmental  challenges, 
digital  hyperconnectivity  and  technological  transformations,  pressure  on  democracy, 
shifts  in  the  global  order  and  demography  as  major  trends.  Over  the  past  two  decades, 
cohesion  policy  has  reduced  economic,  social  and  territorial  disparities.  Yet  the  major 
green, digital and demographic transitions may create new disparities, increase demands 
on  national  and  local  authorities,  feed  popular  discontent  and  put  pressure  on  our 
democracies.  These  challenges  will  also  affect  other  developed  countries.  Policy 
exchanges with other interested countries could further enrich our policy debate.  

How can cohesion policy, together with other EU policies, address these new challenges? 
Europe’s citizens need to have confidence in their future, wherever they live.  Cohesion 
policy can reassure Europeans in three ways: first, by offering them a positive economic 
perspective  for their region;  second, by addressing their concerns about  their  quality of 
life, employment opportunities and social inclusion, and third, by ensuring that the costs 
and benefits of meeting new challenges are shared fairly. This can be done by identifying 
the  best  responses  to  these  new  drivers  of  disparities,  strengthening  the  role  of  regions 
and  factoring  in  territorial  impact  of  horizontal  EU  policies.  In  line  with  the  goal  of 
upward social convergence of the European Pillar of Social Rights, a broad policy debate 
under these headings, should be launched to feed into the development of the policy post 
2027. 

Addressing new drivers of disparities by: 

  Ensuring  a  fair  transition.  Shifting  to  a  climate  neutral,  circular  economy, 
protecting  our  environment,  restoring  nature  and  reducing  pollution  will  generate 
many  benefits,  but  its  costs  should  be  distributed  fairly.  The  Just  Transition 
Mechanism  could  be  extended  to  address  the  social  costs  of  climate  change 
mitigation and adaptation and the other environmental challenges, including through 
better  anticipation  of  structural  change,  fighting  against  poverty,  investing  in  skills 
and  working  closely  with  social  partners  and  civil  society  actors  at  all  territorial 
levels. 

  Strengthening resilience and responsiveness to asymmetric shocks. The pandemic 
underscores the need for cohesion policy to be able to respond to unexpected shocks, 
notably linked to globalisation and technological change. Regions heavily dependent 
on  a  few  narrow  tradeable  manufacturing  or  service  sectors  are  particularly 
vulnerable.  Diversification  of  economic  activity,  notably  in  relation  to  the  digital 
transition  in  combination  with  place-based  policies,  such  as  smart  specialisation 
strategies, can help regions become more productive and less vulnerable to shocks. 

7 https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/strategic-planning/strategic-foresight/2021-strategic-foresight-report_en  

16 

 
 
                                                 
  Helping regions to respond to demographic change. Firms will have to adapt to a 
shrinking labour force by recruiting more from groups with lower employment rates 
such  as  youth,  women  and  non-EU  migrants,  and  by  investing  more  in  innovation, 
labour  saving  and  augmenting  technologies,  and  in  adult  learning,  in  particular  of 
older and low-skilled workers, which would help to reach the Porto Summit goals8. 
Primary  and  secondary  schools  will  have  to  adjust  to  the  lower  number  of  pupils, 
while  other  public  services  and  healthcare  will  need  to  serve  a  growing  number  of 
older residents.  

  Addressing  pressure  on  democracy  and  its  values.  Territorial  instruments  to 
engage  local  actors  in  cities,  towns,  rural  areas,  coastal  areas  and  islands  and  the 
partnership principle in cohesion policy can help address pressure on democracy by 
increasing  ownership  of  European  policies.  Territorial  cooperation  creates  new 
communities of common interest and supports the visible delivery of public goods at 
different territorial levels. 

Strengthening the role of regions in building Europe’s future by: 

  Creating new economic perspectives for less developed and peripheral  regions. 
Less  developed  regions  and  peripheral  regions  may  need  a  new  development 
paradigm. This should take account of emerging opportunities, international links, the 
territorial distribution of specific needs and endowments, and the provision of public 
goods such as strategic resources, biodiversity, renewables and amenities.  

  Embedding innovation in all regions. Addressing weaknesses in the diffusion and 
adoption of new ideas and technologies and encouraging broad-based innovation will 
ensure  that  all  regions  can  reap  the  benefit  of  an  increasingly  knowledge-intensive 
economy. 

  Strengthening  cross-border  and 

interregional  cooperation.  The  pandemic 
highlighted the difficulties of having to cross a national border for work, education, 
healthcare  and  other  services.  Road  and  rail  transport  performance  are  lower  in 
border  regions.  Addressing  these  issues  requires  better  governance  of  functional 
border areas, a stronger coordination of services, infrastructure and investments, and 
exchange of experience supported by pan-European research. 

  Strengthening  urban-rural  links  and  the  role  of  smaller  cities  and  towns  in 
supporting  rural  areas.  Large  cities  and  their  metropolitan  regions  often  drive 
economic development. Certain smaller cities, towns and villages provide access to a 
wide range of public and private services. Their role as regional centres means they 
provide  an  anchor  point  for  the  wider  region.  Strengthening  their  role  could  boost 
economic development and improve quality of life. While urban areas have distinct 

8 

each  year 
Including 
https://www.2021portugal.eu/media/icfksbgy/porto-social-commitment.pdf  

least  60%  of 

the  goal 

that 

at 

adults 

follow 

a 

training. 

17 

 
 
                                                 
challenges, further reinforcing links within functional areas could benefit both urban 
and  rural  residents.  The  long-term  vision  for  rural  areas9  provides  a  framework  to 
address the challenges facing rural areas.  

  Addressing the needs of  left behind places. Some regions are confronted with the 
legacy  of  structural  changes  that  have  shrunk  traditional  sources  of  employment 
leading  to  skills  mismatches  and  environmental  degradation,  creating  development 
traps.  Such  areas  are  often  located  in  middle-income  countries  or  regions.  They 
require targeted policies to integrate these communities into the broader regional and 
national economy, in line with the principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights.  

Developing the tools to deliver cohesion towards 2050 by: 

  Increasing  the  effectiveness  of  place-based  policies.  The  need  to  complement 
nation-wide  structural  policies  with  place-based  policies  is  increasingly  recognised. 
Smart specialisation shows how to build on local assets to strengthen competitiveness 
and the innovation ecosystem. Locally targeted Territorial Just Transition Plans direct 
European  support  to  the  firms,  workers  and  communities  most  affected  by  climate-
driven structural change. This approach should be strengthened for other key policy 
objectives  under  cohesion  policy,  notably  for  the  green  and  digital  transitions.  In 
addition,  the  integrated  territorial  development  approach  and  the  dedicated  policy 
objective ‘Europe closer to citizens’ should be fully utilised. 

  Further streamlining the delivery of cohesion policy for beneficiaries.  Based on 
simplifications  and  flexibility  already  introduced  in  the  2021-2027  programming 
period,  both  under  cohesion  policy  and  other  relevant  investment-related  funds, 
explore additional beneficiary-friendly improvements in the delivery of the policy. At 
the  same  time  the  key  tenets  of  a  place-based  and  participatory  delivery,  such  as 
multi-level governance and partnership principle, should be reinforced. 

  Strengthening  the  role  of  cohesion  policy  in  unlocking  public  and  private 
investment in the green, digital and demographic transitions. Cohesion policy can 
play  a  greater  role  in  encouraging  investment  at  regional,  city  and  local  levels, 
leveraging  private  sector  resources  and  supporting  the  necessary  institutional 
adaptations.  This  means  ensuring  that  public  and  private  actors  at  the  appropriate 
level  have  the  necessary  capacity  to  sustain  such  investment  through  tax  revenues, 
user charges, fees and other sources of income in the longer-term. Such efforts should 
be linked to support from the Commission to strengthen the framework conditions for 
sustainable finance. 

  Increasing 

life.  Making  Europe 
competitive  and  cohesive  in  the  future  will  require  investing  more  and  better  in 

in  people  throughout  their 

investments 

9  COM(2021) 345 final, 30.6.2021. 

18 

 
 
 
                                                 
people’s  education  and  training,  including  their  skills,  creativity  and  potential  to 
create  businesses  and  to  innovate.  This  will  be  essential  in  order  to  successfully 
navigate the technological, green and digital transitions ahead of us. To strengthen its 
social cohesion and address the needs of left-behind groups, Europe needs to invest in 
targeted activation and social inclusion measures while continuing to support policy 
reforms aimed at an inclusive development. 

  Enhancing  complementarities  within  other  EU  policies.  The  current  approach  to 
synergies  within  the  EU  budget,  which  concentrates  on  inputs  and  financial  flows, 
needs to be more focused on real policy complementarities. A specific regional focus 
needs  to  be  given  to  new  policy  areas  -  such  as  strategic  interdependencies,  social 
climate  policy,  European  Industrial  Alliances  -  where  cohesion  policy  could  be 
particularly  relevant.  Territorial  impact  assessments  and  rural  proofing  should  be 
strengthened, so that the needs and specificities of different EU territories are better 
taken  into  account.  The  principle  of  “do  no  harm  to  cohesion”,  meaning  no  action 
should hamper the convergence process  or  contribute to  regional  disparities, should 
be further developed and integrated in policy making. 

  The  EU’s  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  will  provide  up  to  €724  billion  to 
Member  States.  Of  this  funding,  37%  has  to  support  climate  action  and  20%  the 
digital  transition.  Ensuring  that  these  resources  contribute  to  cohesion  in  a 
coordinated way will be a key challenge. 

The 2022 Cohesion Forum will launch a debate among stakeholders on the lessons to be 
drawn  from  the  recent  crisis  and  a  reflection  on  future  challenges  for  cohesion  policy, 
ensuring that no territory is left behind. 

19