The European Council in 2019 : overview of dynamics, discussions and decisions.
Date: 2021-12-18
Institutions: Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services
Subjects: China, European Council, European Parliament, European Union, Russia, Türkiye, United Kingdom, climate change policy, decision (EU), democracy, economic policy, enlargement of the Union, foreign policy, monetary policy, multiannual financial framework, operation of the Institutions, single market, withdrawal from the EU

The European 
Council in 
2019 
Overview of 
dynamics, 
discussions and 
decisions 

STUDY 

EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

Author: Desmond Dinan 
European Council Oversight Unit 
PE 694.236 – November 2021 

EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The European 
Council in 2019 

Overview of dynamics, discussions and decisions 

The year 2019 provided a respite for the European Council from crisis 
management, but was not without major challenges. Three stood out: 
the  Spitzenkandidaten  process  for  selecting  the  next  President  of  the 
European  Commission;  Brexit,  which  unexpectedly  remained  on  the 
agenda  of  the  European  Council  throughout  the  year;  and  policy 
towards climate change.  

The European Council had mixed feelings about the Spitzenkandidaten 
process,  with  one  of  its  leading  members  being  adamantly  opposed. 
That  set  the  stage  for  a  bruising  battle,  which  culminated  in  an  epic 
special summit, lasting from 30 June to 2 July. None of the transnational 
parties’  lead  candidates  received  the  European  Council’s  nomination. 
Instead, the European Council nominated a relative outsider, Ursula von 
der Leyen, as part of a package of appointments to leading EU positions, 
the  cleverness  of  which  managed  to  overcome  differences  among 
national leaders.  

Meanwhile,  the  inability  of  the  UK  government  to  win  parliamentary 
support  for  the  Withdrawal  Agreement  obliged  the  UK  to  request 
extensions of the deadline. Much to its surprise, the European Council 
met in the Article 50 format on four occasions in 2019, the last one being 
on 13 December, to discuss preparations for the negotiations on future 
EU-UK relations after the UK’s eventual departure, which happened on 
31 January 2020.  

Climate was another issue to the fore in 2019, as the European Council 
sought to reach unanimity on a commitment by the EU to cut net carbon 
emissions  to  zero  by  2050.  Failure  to  reach  unanimity,  during  difficult 
negotiations at the December summit, was seen as a setback for the new 
President of the European Council, Charles Michel, who was attending 
his first meeting of the institution in that capacity. 

EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

 
 
 
 
AUTHOR(S) 

This study has been written by Desmond Dinan, Professor of Public Policy, George Mason University, Virginia. 
Professor Dinan wrote the study at the request of the European Council Oversight Unit, of the Directorate for 
Impact Assessment and European Added Value, within the Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research 
Services (EPRS) of the Secretariat of the European Parliament. 

ADMINISTRATOR RESPONSIBLE 

Astrid Worum, European Council Oversight Unit, EPRS 

To contact the publisher, please e-mail EPRS-EuropeanCouncilOversight@ep.europa.eu   

LINGUISTIC VERSIONS 

Original: EN 

Manuscript completed in November 2021.  

DISCLAIMER AND COPYRIGHT 

This  document  is  prepared  for,  and  addressed  to,  the  Members  and  staff  of  the  European  Parliament  as 
background  material  to  assist  them  in  their  parliamentary  work.  The  content  of  the  document  is  the  sole 
responsibility of its author(s) and any opinions expressed herein should not be taken to represent an official 
position of the Parliament. 

Reproduction  and  translation  for  non-commercial  purposes  are  authorised,  provided  the  source  is 
acknowledged and the European Parliament is given prior notice and sent a copy. 

Brussels © European Union, 2021. 

PE: 694.236 
ISBN: 978-92-846-8586-8 
DOI: 10.2861/395171 
CAT: QA-01-21-279-EN-N 

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http://www.eprs.ep.parl.union.eu (intranet) 
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The European Council in 2019 

Executive summary 

At the beginning of 2019, members of the European Council knew that the year ahead would be 
challenging. Apart from anything else, the European Parliament (EP) elections in May would see the 
beginning  of  a  new  institutional  cycle,  covering  the  period  2019-2024.  The  European  Council’s 
involvement  in  launching  the  new  institutional  cycle  was  primarily  twofold.  One  was  to  make 
nominations  and  appointments  for  the  EU’s  top  leadership  positions;  the  other  was  to  set  the 
orientations for the EU by adopting a new Strategic Agenda. 

In both cases, the European Council saw itself as carrying out an essential Treaty-based requirement: 
setting  the  EU’s  overall  direction.  Whereas  adopting  the  Strategic  Agenda  proved  relatively 
uncomplicated, agreeing on a package of top-level positions was anything but. 

In particular, leaders had to juggle the Spitzenkandidaten process, first used in 2014 to nominate (by 
the European Council) and then to elect (by the European Parliament) the President of the European 
Commission. The European Council had mixed feelings about the Spitzenkandidaten process, with 
one of its leading members, French President Emmanuel Macron, being adamantly opposed. This 
set the stage for a bruising battle in the European Council.  

Leaders first addressed the issue of assigning top jobs at the informal Sibiu summit on 9 May, held 
a more intensive discussion at a special dinner on 28 May, following the EP elections, and concluded 
a package deal at an epic special summit, which lasted from 30 June 30 to 2 July. In what turned out 
to be a process of mutually-assured exclusion, none of the lead candidates received the European 
Council’s nomination. Instead, the European Council nominated a relative outsider, Ursula von der 
Leyen, before electing Charles Michel, the outgoing Prime Minister of Belgium, as its President.  

The European Council had asserted its position and defied the EP by not nominating one of the lead 
candidates as Commission President. Yet opinion within the European Council was divided on the 
issue,  as  it  was  in  the  EP.  Only  a  minority  of  European  Council  members  had  either  steadfastly 
supported  a  lead  candidate  or  staunchly  rejected  the  Spitzenkandidaten  process.  Many  others 
seemed  ambivalent,  wanting  above  all  to  select  a  slate  of  sound  candidates  for  the  various 
leadership  positions  and  avoid  inter-institutional  conflict.  The  cleverness  of  the  final  package 
managed to overcome differences among national leaders. 

Brexit took up much more of the European Council’s time in 2019 than leaders had expected at the 
beginning  of  the  year.  The  inability  of  the  UK  government  to  win  parliamentary  support  for  the 
Withdrawal Agreement obliged Prime Minister May to request an extension of the deadline, on two 
occasions. This required the European Council to meet in the Article 50 format on 21 March and on 
10 April. Leaders met again in the Article 50 format on 17 October and endorsed a revision of the 
EU-UK  Withdrawal  Agreement,  which  eventually  won  parliamentary  support  in  the  UK.  The 
European Council convened its final Article 50 meeting on 13 December to discuss preparations for 
the negotiations on future EU-UK relations after Brexit, which happened on 31 January 2020. 

Leaders  of  the  EU-27  remained  united  in  their  approach  to  Brexit,  but  discussions  within  the 
European  Council  about  the  purpose  and  length  of  the  proposed  extensions  were  nonetheless 
protracted and tense. Positions ranged from extreme frustration with the UK to advocacy of a more 
nuanced and patient approach. By the end of the year, the European Council was more than ready 
to bid the UK goodbye and turn to a new phase of UK-EU relations. 

Climate change and climate action was another issue to the fore in the European Council in 2019. 
The EU prided itself on being a global leader in climate policy, notwithstanding deep differences 
among Member States. Such was the case at the regular June summit, when four leaders held out 
against a commitment for the EU to become the first climate-neutral major economy in the world 
by 2050.  

I 

 
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

Leaders returned to the issue at their regular December summit. By that time, climate had become 
an  even  more  prominent  issue  for  the  EU,  not  least  because  of  Commission  President  von  der 
Leyen’s  promise  to  launch  a  ‘Green  New  Deal’.  Poland  was  the  sole  remaining  holdout  to  an 
agreement among leaders to cut net carbon emissions to zero by 2050; failure to reach consensus 
on  climate  policy  was  deeply  disappointing  for  Charles  Michel,  who  was  presiding  over  his  first 
European Council meeting.  

The  European  Council  addressed  economic  affairs,  including  the  single  market,  industrial  policy, 
digital policy and research and innovation, at its regular spring meeting in March. Discussions about 
trade and investment focused largely on China, in preparation for the EU-China summit on 9 April. 
Leaders also discussed economic and monetary union during 2019, notably in meetings of the Euro 
Summit on 21 June and 13 December, in both cases in an extended (EU-27) format. They grappled 
with efforts to strengthen the banking union and reform the European Stability Mechanism, and 
with other highly technical but also highly political issues, without reaching a definitive agreement. 

Relations with China dominated the European Council’s discussion of external affairs, at least in the 
first half of the year; the troublesome behaviour of Russia and Turkey also attracted the European 
Council’s attention. A discussion at the October European Council about whether to open accession 
negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia proved surprisingly divisive, with President Macron 
leading the charge against and also calling for a reconsideration of EU enlargement policy. This drew 
attention  to  the  challenge  for  the  EU  of  dealing  with  the  western  Balkans  and  of  managing  the 
accession of new Member States.  

II 

 
 
 
 
 
The European Council in 2019 

Table of contents 

1. Introduction  ________________________________________________________________ 1 

2. Meetings, members, and other attendees _______________________________________ 4 

2.1. Introduction _______________________________________________________________ 4 

2.2. Meetings  _________________________________________________________________  4 

2.3. Members  _________________________________________________________________  6 

2.4. Other attendees ____________________________________________________________ 8 

3. Domestic politics, personal interaction, and combinations within the European Council9 

3.1. Introduction _______________________________________________________________ 9 

3.2. The link between domestic politics and European Council dynamics  _________________  9 

3.3. Inter-personal relations _____________________________________________________ 11 

3.4. Combinations within the European Council  ____________________________________ 13 

4. Institutional actors __________________________________________________________ 17 

4.1. Introduction ______________________________________________________________ 17 

4.2. The Council Presidency _____________________________________________________ 17 

4.3. The Commission President __________________________________________________ 19 

4.3.1. President Juncker _______________________________________________________ 19 

4.3.2. President von der Leyen __________________________________________________ 20 

4.4. The European Council President ______________________________________________ 21 

4.4.1. President Tusk __________________________________________________________ 21 

4.4.2. President Michel ________________________________________________________ 24 

5. The 2019-2024 Strategic Agenda  _____________________________________________ 26 

6. Institutional appointments and nominations ___________________________________ 30 

III 

 
 
 
 
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

6.1. Introduction ______________________________________________________________ 30 

6.2. The Spitzenkandidaten process _______________________________________________ 30 

6.2.1. Nominating the President of the European Commission ________________________ 30 

6.2.2. After the European Parliament elections _____________________________________ 33 

6.2.3. An epic summit _________________________________________________________ 36 

6.2.4. Significance of the Spitzenkandidaten process in 2019 __________________________ 40 

7. Brexit  _____________________________________________________________________ 42 

7.1. Introduction ______________________________________________________________ 42 

7.2. The 29 March deadline  _____________________________________________________ 42 

7.3. Extending the deadline _____________________________________________________ 44 

7.4. The revised agreement _____________________________________________________ 47 

8. Economic affairs ____________________________________________________________ 50 

8.1. Introduction ______________________________________________________________ 50 

8.2. The single market and related policies _________________________________________ 50 

8.3. Trade and investment ______________________________________________________ 54 

8.4. Economic and monetary union _______________________________________________ 56 

9. Climate policy ______________________________________________________________ 60 

9.1. Introduction ______________________________________________________________ 60 

9.2. The 2050 target ___________________________________________________________ 60 

9.3. The December summit  _____________________________________________________ 62 

10. The multiannual financial framework _________________________________________ 65 

11. Protecting democracy ______________________________________________________ 68 

12. External relations __________________________________________________________ 70 

12.1. Introduction _____________________________________________________________ 70 

12.2. The western Balkans and enlargement policy __________________________________ 70 

IV 

 
 
 
The European Council in 2019 

12.3. China  __________________________________________________________________ 72 

12.4. Russia __________________________________________________________________ 76 

12.5. Turkey __________________________________________________________________ 77 

12.6. The United States  ________________________________________________________ 79 

12.7. Other countries and regions ________________________________________________ 80 

13. The Conference on the Future of Europe ______________________________________ 82 

14. Relations with the European Parliament  ______________________________________ 84 

14.1. Introduction _____________________________________________________________ 84 

14.2. Presidential styles  ________________________________________________________ 84 

14.3. Brexit  __________________________________________________________________ 86 

14.4. The Spitzenkandidaten process ______________________________________________ 87 

14.5. The multiannual financial framework _________________________________________ 89 

14.6. The Conference on the Future of Europe ______________________________________ 90 

15. Conclusions _______________________________________________________________ 91 

V 

 
 
 
 
The European Council in 2019 

1. Introduction 

Does  the  European  Council  have  a  strong  institutional  identity?  It  is  the  newest  of  the  EU’s 
institutions, having been formally established only in 2009, when the Lisbon Treaty came into effect. 
It is the smallest EU institution, whose staff consists almost entirely of the President and his cabinet 
(the  European  Council  depends  on  the  Council  Secretariat  for  essential  support).  It  meets  only 
occasionally,  no  more  than  every  6  weeks  or  so,  usually  for  an  afternoon  and  evening,  and  the 
following morning. Yet it is the most powerful political body in the EU. 

By all accounts, its members like attending meetings of the European Council. National leaders are 
among their peers: holders of the highest political positions in the Member States. Apart from the 
importance of its meetings, the European Council has a political and social significance beyond its 
stated purpose. Its members benefit from the numerous corridor conversations, chats over coffee 
and lunch, and formal bilateral and plurilateral meetings that take place in and around a plenary 
session of the European Council. The opportunity cost of not attending a meeting of the European 
Council is high. It includes missing out on summits, and missing a chance to shine – or at least appear 
in  a  favourable  light  –  on  the  European  stage.  Attending  a  European  Council  can  give  leaders  a 
respite from acrimonious domestic politics and a platform on which to burnish their international 
credentials. 

The existence of a standing President has helped instil in the European Council a stronger sense of 
institutional identity and importance. So has the prevalence of major crises in recent years, which 
only  the  European  Council  has  had  the  political  capacity  to  manage.  Apart  from  crises,  certain 
responsibilities  have  the  potential  to  bind  the  European  Council  institutionally.  These  include 
making key appointments and adopting the quinquennial Strategic Agenda. Both occurred in 2019, 
at the beginning of the new institutional cycle triggered by the European Parliament elections, in 
May. Making new appointments and adopting the Strategic Agenda for 2019-2024 helped set the 
EU’s overall direction and had the potential to boost the European Council’s institutional identity. 

Whereas adopting the Strategic Agenda proved uncontroversial, agreeing on a package of top-level 
positions was anything but. In the case of the Strategic Agenda, leaders were able to draw on various 
milestones in the Future of Europe Debate, such as the Bratislava Declaration (September 2016), the 
Rome  Declaration  (March  2017),  the  Sibiu  Declaration  (May  2019),  and  the  many  speeches  by 
national leaders in the EP (2018-2019). In addition, the Leaders’ Agenda, which the European Council 
endorsed in October 2017, provided a framework for leaders to try to resolve contentious issues but 
also hold discussions that would help them to craft the Strategic Agenda. Accordingly, the European 
Council adopted the new Strategic Agenda in June 2019, without difficulty. 

By contrast, there was no easy way to approach the conundrum of top-level positions. Leaders knew 
that they would need to strive for balance: gender, geographical, party political, and national. But 
there was an additional complication: the Spitzenkandidaten process. This was first used in 2014, 
when  the  main  transnational  parties  chose  ‘lead  candidates’  at  the  beginning  of  the  EP  election 
campaign.  The  idea  was  that  the  European  Council,  with  responsibility  for  nominating  the 
Commission President, taking into account the outcome of the EP elections, would choose the lead 
candidate deemed by the EP as the most likely to secure a majority when the EP would formally 
elect the Commission President. Needless to say, the EP was fully behind the new process.  

The European Council had mixed feelings about this innovation in 2014. Some members thought 
that it encroached on their right to nominate a candidate for Commission President without outside 
interference. Others, especially those who were leading members of the main transnational political 
parties, were willing to go along with it. It helped in 2014 that the two biggest political groups in the 
EP  after  the  elections  rallied  behind  Jean-Claude  Juncker,  the  lead  candidate  of  the  European 

1 

 
 
 
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

People’s Party (EPP), who was also a long-standing member of the European Council. The European 
Council duly nominated Jean-Claude Juncker, the leading lead candidate, and the EP duly elected 
him Commission President. 

Things were different in 2019. One reason was that neither of the lead candidates of the two largest 
political parties had been a national chief executive, which was seen as an informal prerequisite for 
Commission President. Another was that, partly at President Tusk’s urging, the European Council 
was more aware of its institutional identity and prerogatives, and had already declared, in February 
2018, that there would be no ‘automaticity’ between the EP’s advocacy and the European Council’s 
nomination of a candidate for Commission President. Yet another reason why 2019 was different 
was that French President Emmanuel Macron adamantly opposed the Spitzenkandidaten process. 
This was partly because he wanted to protect what he saw as a core European Council responsibility, 
partly also because the European Parliament had rejected his idea of transnational lists, but perhaps 
more so because he did not belong to either of the two largest European political parties.  

This set the stage for a bruising battle in the European Council over the allocation of the top EU jobs, 
the centrepiece of which was the Commission President. Prominent members of the EPP stuck by 
their lead candidate, prominent members of the Party of European Socialists (PES) stuck by their 
lead candidate, and leaders belonging to the Alliance for Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) 
called for the nomination of an ALDE lead candidate (there were several).  

The European Council first addressed the jobs issue at the informal Sibiu summit on 9 May, held a 
more intensive discussion at a special dinner on 28 May, following the EP elections, and concluded 
a package deal at another special summit, which lasted from 30 June 30 to 2 July. In what turned 
out  to  be  a  process  of  mutually-assured  exclusion,  none  of  the  lead  candidates  received  the 
European Council’s nomination. Instead, the European Council nominated Ursula von der Leyen to 
be Commission President. Belonging to the EPP, being German (like the EPP lead candidate) and a 
woman,  Ursula  von  der  Leyen  seemed  an  inspired  choice.  The  European  Council  then  elected 
Charles Michel, the outgoing  liberal Prime Minister of Belgium,  as its President, and selected the 
Spanish  socialist  Josep  Borrell  as  High  Representative  and  Christine  Lagarde  of  France  as  ECB 
President (subject to various consultations and approvals).  

The  European  Council  had  asserted  its  position  and  defied  the  EP  by  not  nominating  a  lead 
candidate. But had this helped to boost the European Council’s institutional identity? Probably not, 
as  opinion  within  the  European  Council  was  divided  on  the  merits  and  practicability  of  the 
Spitzenkandidaten  process.  It  seemed  that  only  a  minority  of  members  had  either  steadfastly 
supported  a  lead  candidate  or  adamantly  rejected  the  Spitzenkandidaten  process.  Many  others 
seemed ambivalent, wanting above all to select a slate of sound candidates for the various positions 
and  avoid  inter-institutional  conflict.  The  cleverness  of  the  final  package  helped  to  overcome 
differences within the European Council. 

Brexit was an issue that could easily have divided the European Council (strictly speaking, the EU-27 
in the Article 50 format). The United Kingdom was due to leave the EU on 29 March 2019, but failure 
to win parliamentary support for the Withdrawal Agreement obliged Prime Minister May to request 
an extension of the deadline, on two occasions. This, in turn, obliged EU leaders to meet in the Article 
50 format  on 21 March, the first day  of their regular spring  summit, and on 10 April, in a special 
session, to consider the UK’s requests. Leaders also discussed Brexit briefly at the end of their regular 
June summit, without formally convening an Article 50 meeting, but they met again in the Article 
50  format  on  17  October  and  endorsed  a  revision  of  the  EU-UK  Withdrawal  Agreement,  which 
eventually won parliamentary support in the UK. In addition to holding its regular end-of-semester 
summit on 12 December, the European Council convened an Article 50 meeting on 13 December to 
discuss preparations for the negotiations on future EU-UK relations after Brexit, which happened on 
31 January 2020. 

2 

 
 
 
The European Council in 2019 

Clearly, Brexit took much more of the European Council’s time in 2019 than leaders had expected at 
the  beginning  of  the  year.  Leaders  remained  united  on  the  issue,  but  discussions  within  the 
European  Council  about  the  purpose  and  length  of  the  proposed  extensions  were  nonetheless 
protracted and tense. Positions ranged from extreme frustration with the UK to advocacy of a more 
nuanced and patient approach. By the end of the year, the European Council was more than ready 
to bid the UK goodbye and turn to a new phase of UK-EU relations. 

The  European  Council  addressed  economic  affairs,  including  the  single  market,  industrial  policy, 
digital policy, and research and innovation, at its regular spring meeting, on 21-22 March. Leaders 
also  discussed  economic  and  monetary  union  (EMU)  in  2019  during  two  meetings  of  the  Euro 
Summit,  on  21  June  and  13  December,  both  in  an  extended  format.  At  both  meetings,  leaders 
grappled  with  efforts  to  strengthen  the  banking  union  and  reform  the  European  Stability 
Mechanism,  and  with  other  highly  technical  but  also  highly  political  issues,  without  reaching  a 
definitive agreement. 

Climate  was  another  issue  to  the  fore  in  the  European  Council  in  2019.  The  EU’s  apparently 
progressive position on climate policy disguised deep differences among Member States. Such was 
the case at the regular June summit and again at the regular December summit. By that time, climate 
had become a pressing issue for the EU, especially because of the newly-appointed Commission 
President’s promise to launch a ‘Green New Deal’.  

Poland was the sole remaining holdout at the end of the year; failure to reach consensus on climate 
policy  was  deeply  disappointing  for  Charles  Michel,  who  was  presiding  over  his  first  European 
Council meeting. The issue would need to be addressed again in 2020, not least in the context of 
the multiannual financial framework, an issue that leaders discussed occasionally in 2019 but put off 
for serious negotiation until the new year. 

Relations with China dominated the European Council’s discussion of external affairs, at least in the 
first semester of the year, in preparation for the EU-China summit on 9 April. The European Council 
did  not  explicitly  address  EU-US  relations,  but  touched  on  them  in  the  context  of  trade  and 
investment policy. The troublesome behaviour of Russia and Turkey also attracted the European 
Council’s attention. A discussion at the October European Council about whether to open accession 
negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia proved surprisingly divisive. This drew attention to 
the challenge for the EU in the past few years of dealing with the western Balkans, and to the limits 
of EU enlargement policy. 

This  report  assesses  the  work  of  the  European  Council  in  2019,  examines  its  membership  and 
political dynamics, and discusses its agenda and key decisions. It was a year without the unrelenting 
pressure  of  persistent  crises:  EMU  reform  was  desirable  but  no  longer  pressing;  migration  was 
absent  from  the  European  Council’s  agenda;  Brexit  continued  to  trouble  EU  leaders,  but  for 
procedural  rather  than  substantive  reasons.  Making  key  appointments,  especially  that  of  the 
Commission President, could have bound the European Council more closely together, but deep 
differences among national leaders over the Spitzenkandidaten process risked pulling its members 
apart. Adopting the Strategic Agenda for 2019-2024 was important for the European Council, and 
blissfully uncontroversial. In retrospect, it is easy to see 2019 as the quiet before the storm of the 
coronavirus  pandemic. But at the time, at the end of a busy  year, leaders could look back on  12 
months of serious challenges and some real accomplishments.  

3 

 
 
 
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

2. Meetings, members, and other attendees 

2.1. Introduction 

This section describes the meetings of the European Council in 2019, in its various formats. It also 
explains the changing composition of the European Council, not only because of the turnover in the 
presidencies of the Commission and the European Council, but also because of changes at the top 
in national leadership. The section lists as well the guests who attended European Council meetings 
in 2019. 

2.2. Meetings 

The Treaty on European Union (TEU) stipulates that ‘The European Council shall meet twice every 
six months’ (Article 15.3 TEU). In 2019, as in previous years, the European Council’s regular, four-
times-a-year meetings took place on 21-22 March and 20-21 June, in the first half year, and 17-18 
October and 12-13 December, in the second half of the year.  

The Treaty goes on to say that ‘When the situation so requires, the President shall convene a special 
meeting  of  the  European  Council’  (Article  15.3  TEU).  Following  the  outcome  of  the  2016  UK 
referendum on whether to leave or remain in the EU, the European Council decided to organise its 
Brexit-related  discussions  in  the  form  of  special  Article  50  meetings,  named  after  the  TEU  article 
dealing with the withdrawal of a Member State. Article 50 meetings brought together 27 of the 28 
national leaders, the UK Prime Minister being the exception. (The need for Article 50 meetings ended 
with the UK’s departure from the EU in January 2020.) There were four Article 50 meetings in 2019: 
on  21  March;  10  April;  17  October;  and  13  December.  Apart  from  the  10  April  meeting,  these 
coincided with regular European Council meetings. 

A close relation of the European Council, arguably constituting a special European Council format, 
emerged  during  the  euro  crisis.  This  was  the  Euro  Summit,  which  brings  together  the  leaders  of 
the euro-area  countries,  the Euro  Summit President,  who  is  also  the  president  of  the  European 
Council,  and  the  President  of  the European Commission,  in  order  to  provide  strategic  guidelines 
on economic policy in the euro area. There were two meetings of the Euro Summit in 2019, on 21 
June and 13 December, both of which coincided with regular European Council meetings. 

Since the launch by EU leaders of the Lisbon Strategy for economic modernisation, in March 2000, 
the  regular  March  meeting  of  the  European  Council  has  focused  on  jobs,  growth,  and 
competitiveness. The agenda for the 21-22 March 2019 summit duly emphasised this policy field, 
but  leaders  spent  the  evening  of  21  March  meeting  in  the  Article  50  format  to  discuss  the 
increasingly complex Brexit situation, in the run-up to the 29 March departure date, and to consider 
a UK request for an extension of the deadline. The longer-than-expected Article 50 meeting gave 
leaders relatively little time on the second day of the summit for other business, notably the main 
agenda item (economic reform), climate change, fighting disinformation, and the upcoming summit 
with China. Leaders issued separate conclusions on Article 50 and for the regular European Council, 
which took place only on 22 March. 

Leaders held an Article 50 summit on 10 April to consider a request from the UK government for a 
second  Brexit  extension,  which,  after  difficult  discussions,  they  granted.  After  the  meeting,  the 
European Council (Article 50) issued conclusions. 

At the regular June meeting, leaders had an unusually full programme. On 20 June, they adopted 
the EU’s  Strategic  Agenda  for  2019-2024  and  discussed  climate,  disinformation,  the  multiannual 
financial framework (MFF) and external relations, including Russia and Turkey. They also continued 
the  highly-fraught  process  of  making  nominations  and  appointments  for  the  EU’s  top  jobs 

4 

 
 
 
The European Council in 2019 

(President  of  the  European  Council,  President  of  the  European  Commission,  President  of  the 
European  Central  Bank  and  the  High  Representative  for  Foreign  and  Security  Policy),  before 
deciding to continue their deliberations on this sensitive matter at a special meeting, at the end of 
the month.  

On 21 June 2019, leaders participated in the Euro Summit, in an extended format – including all 
national leaders, not just the leaders of euro area countries – to review the work done by finance 
minister in the Eurogroup on deepening economic and monetary union. At the end of the summit, 
the EU-27 briefly discussed Brexit, without formally convening an Article 50 meeting. The European 
Council  issued  conclusions  for  its  regular  20  June  meeting  and  a  statement  for  its  21  June  Euro 
Summit. 

The European Council met on 17 and 18 October 2019 to discuss a number of issues including the 
MFF, EU enlargement, Turkey, climate, and priorities for the next 5 years. On 17 October, leaders met 
in the Article 50 format and endorsed the deal reached by the EU negotiator and the UK government 
to revise the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement, which would take some time, beyond the previously-
agreed 31 October deadline, to enter into force. The European Council issued conclusions for its 
meetings in both the regular and Article 50 formats.  

In addition to holding its regular end of semester summit on 12 December, the European Council 
convened a Euro Summit and an Article 50 meeting on 13 December. The Article 50 meeting was 
relatively brief, as leaders discussed preparations for the negotiations on future EU-UK relations after 
Brexit, which happened on 31 January 2020. Meeting in their regular format, EU leaders dealt almost 
exclusively with climate change, a subject of lengthy and difficult discussions, and touched also on 
the MFF and external relations, among other issues. The European Council issued conclusions for its 
regular meeting and Article 50 meeting, and a statement for the Euro Summit. 

As well as holding meetings in the (extended) Euro Summit and the Article 50 format, leaders held 
three irregular meetings in 2019. The first of these took place in Sibiu, Romania, on 9 May (Romania 
held the Council presidency at the time). This informal meeting was foreseen in the Leaders’ Agenda, 
a work programme, drawn up by the President and approved by the European Council in October 
2017, intended to guide EU action up until the 2019 European Parliament elections. EU leaders not 
only  celebrated  Europe  Day,  but  also  issued  a  largely  hortatory  Sibiu  Declaration  and  discussed 
plans for the coming years with a view to formulating the 2019-2024 Strategic Agenda, which they 
duly adopted at the European Council in June 2019. Apart from the Declaration, leaders did not issue 
conclusions or a statement after the Sibiu meeting. The Sibiu summit stands out for its relatively 
relaxed proceedings, the lack of contestation among leaders, the evident enthusiasm with which 
the  Romanian  President  hosted  the  event  in  his  native  city,  and  Sibiu’s  warm  welcome  for  the 
participants.  

In Sibiu, leaders agreed to hold an informal meeting on 28 May to continue their discussions about 
nominations and appointments, especially concerning the European Commission President, in light 
of the outcome of the EP elections. At an informal dinner on 28 May, leaders took stock of the results 
of the elections and began the nomination process for the new heads of EU institutions. As with the 
Sibiu meeting, leaders did not issue conclusions or a statement after the 28 May meeting.  

Having  begun  in  earnest  their  discussion  of  nominations  during  their  regular  June  European 
Council,  leaders  decided  to  continue  talks  at  a  special  meeting,  beginning  on  30  June.  During  a 
series of plenary sessions and bilateral and plurilateral meetings spanning an unusually long time 
(the summit continued until 2 July), leaders discussed and eventually agreed on the nominations 
for the four top-level positions, and issued conclusions. 

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2.3. Members 

The TEU states that: ‘The European Council shall consist of the Heads of State or Government of the 
Member  States,  together  with  its  President  and  the  President  of  the  Commission.’  Whether  a 
Member State is represented in the European Council by a head of state or government depends on 
constitutional arrangements or political convention in each country. Four of the 28 Member States 
in 2019 were represented by heads of state: France, Lithuania, Romania and Cyprus, whose leader is 
also head of the government. 

Of the EU’s political institutions (European Council, Council of the EU, European Commission and 
European  Parliament),  the  European  Council  experiences  by  far  the  most  turnover  or  ‘churn’. 
Whereas  European  Commissioners  and  Members  of  the  European  Parliament  (MEPs)  have  fixed, 
five-year terms, national leaders may lose office at any time, for a variety of reasons, even if they 
supposedly  have  fixed  terms  (much  depends  on  national  constitutions  and  political  practice). 
Moreover, national elections that result in a change of leader take place at different times in different 
Member States. In any given year, in an EU of 27 Member States, there is likely to be a number of 
elections,  some  of  which  will  probably  produce  a  change  of  leadership.  (The  Council  of  the  EU 
experiences similar churn, but government ministers have relatively more security of tenure than 
national leaders.) 

In 2019, there were 10 changes of national leader in the European Council, involving eight Member 
States: 

  Following  tortuous  negotiations  in  the  wake  of  the  October  2018  general  election, 
Krišjānis Kariņš, leader of the small New Unity party, formed a new coalition government 
in  Latvia  in  January  2019.  Prime  Minister  Kariņš  attended  every  European  Council 
meeting in 2019. 

  On 27 May, Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz lost a no-confidence vote in the national 
parliament and left office the following day. The next evening, the European Council 
held an informal dinner to discuss the outcome of the European Parliament elections. 
Finance Minister Hartwig Löger represented Austria at the meeting, as Chancellor pro 
tempore.  In  early  June,  Brigitte  Bierlein  took  office  at  the  head  of  a  technocratic 
government,  pending  the  outcome  of  the  September  2019  national  elections,  and 
represented Austria at the June European Council. As it took several months to form a 
new government after the elections, Chancellor Bierlin continued to represent Austria 
in the European Council during the rest of the year. 

  Belgium held national, regional and European elections on the same day in May 2019. 
The  results  of  the  national  elections  were  inconclusive,  with  the  liberal  party  of 
incumbent Prime Minister Charles Michel doing poorly. Prime Minister Michel remained 
in office pending the formation of a new government, which he was not expected to 
lead. Indeed, he was replaced on 28 October as acting Prime Minister by Sophie Wilmès, 
from  his  liberal  party.  Prime  Minister  Wilmès  represented  Belgium  in  the  December 
European Council, which Michel also attended as the new European Council President. 
In Denmark, Prime Minister Lars Rasmussen was unable to form a government after the 
5 June election. The Social Democrats’ leader, Mette Frederiksen, managed to form a 
government at the end of the month, just in time to attend the 30 June-2 July special 
European Council as Prime Minister (she had attended the 20-21 June European Council 
as Prime Minister pro tempore). She remained in office throughout the rest of the year. 
  Like  Austria,  Finland  had  two  changes  of  representation  in  the  European  Council  in 
2019. Prime Minister Sipilä, in office since 2015, announced his intention to resign in 
early March and stayed on in a caretaker capacity until a new government coalition took 
over in early June, based on the results of the April general election. Antti Rinne, leader 

6 

 
 
 
 
The European Council in 2019 

of the Social Democratic Party, became the Prime Minister. Only 6 months later, Prime 
Minister Rinne resigned over a dispute in the ruling coalition. Sanna Marin, the newly 
elected leader of the Social Democrats, then became Prime Minister, in time to attend 
the  December  European  Council.  This  change  of  leadership  took  place  during  the 
country’s Council presidency. 
In Greece, New Democracy leaders Kyriakos Mitsotakis became Prime Minister in early 
July  after  a  decisive  general  election  win.  He  replaced  Alexis  Tsipras,  who  had  been 
Prime Minister since 2015 and who had called the 2019 election after his party fared 
badly in the European Parliament elections. 

  Gitanas  Nauseda  won  the  second  round  of  the  presidential  election  in  Lithuania  on 
26 May and was officially inaugurated on 12 July. He replaced Dalia Grybauskaite, who, 
as  President  of  Lithuania  for  10  years  (the  constitutional  term  limit),  was  a  veteran 
member  of  the  European  Council.  President  Nauseda  attended  his  first  European 
Council in October. 
In the UK, Boris Johnson became Prime Minister in July, replacing Theresa May. Prime 
Minister Johnson attended the October European Council but chose not to attend the 
next (December) European Council. 

The two members of the European Council who are not national leaders – the European Council 
President and the President of the Commission – enjoy fixed terms that are not subject to political 
churn.  In  the  case  of  the President  of  the  Commission,  this  is  a five-year  term;  in  the  case  of  the 
European Council President, it is a two-and-a-half-year term, renewable once. The five-year term of 
Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker expired in 2019 (he did not seek reappointment), as did 
the second term of European Council President Donald Tusk. The two new presidents – Ursula von 
der Leyen of the Commission and Charles Michel of the European Council – made their debuts at 
the  December  European  Council,  although  Ursula  von  der  Leyen  was  a  guest  at  the  October 
European Council, as Commission President-elect. 

One of the most striking aspects of the European Council is the high attendance rate. Heads of State 
or Government are extremely busy people. Their time is scheduled, indeed rationed, to the minute. 
Yet throughout the history of the European Council – and 2019 was no exception – it has been rare 
for a national leader to miss a meeting. The reason for this may seem obvious: the importance of 
European Council meetings (what political scientists would call their high political salience). But that 
is not always or not solely the reason why attendance at European Council meetings is so high. Many 
meetings of the European Council have been less than momentous, and not all of its members play 
a starring role.  

Apart from the significance of the meeting, leaders take the time and trouble to attend because the 
European Council has a political and social significance beyond its stated purpose. The European 
Council is an exclusive club whose price of entry is national leadership. Its members enjoy being 
among their peers, and benefit from the numerous corridor conversations, chats over coffee and 
lunch, and formal bilateral and plurilateral meetings that take place in and around a meeting of the 
European Council. To put it another way, the opportunity cost of not attending a meeting of the 
European Council is high. It includes missing a chance to shine – or at least appear in a favourable 
light  –  on  the  European  stage.  Attending  a  European  Council  can  give  leaders  a  respite  from 
acrimonious domestic politics and a platform on which to burnish their international credentials. 

In 2019, the leaders of only one Member State did not attend meetings of the European Council. Not 
surprisingly, that Member State was the UK. Prime Minister May skipped the special summit in Sibiu 
because  the  agenda  was  mostly  about  the  future  of  the  EU,  to  which  she  felt  she  had  little  to 
contribute. Her successor, Boris Johnson, skipped the December 2019 European Council because 
the UK was on the verge of leaving. 

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The European Council President and the President of the Commission attended all European Council 
meetings in 2019. 

2.4. Other attendees 

According to the Treaty, ‘The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
shall take part in [the European Council’s] work.’ Following the major turnover of top EU jobs in 2019, 
Josep Borrell replaced Federica Mogherini as High Representative and attended his first European 
Council  meeting  in  that  role  in  December.  Federica  Mogherini  attended  all  meetings  of  the 
European Council in 2019 before leaving office, apart from the informal dinner on 28 May. 

The  official  list  of  participants  for  each  meeting  of  the  European  Council  includes  the  ‘General 
Secretariat  of  the  Council’.  In  2019,  Jeppe  Tranholm-Mikkelsen,  the  Council  Secretary-General, 
attended every European Council meeting.  

The list of participants also includes guests. Foremost among these is the President of the European 
Parliament, who over time has become a permanent guest of the European Council, although the 
President’s  attendance  is  limited  to  the  opening  session.  Antonio  Tajani  was  President  of  the 
European Parliament until early July 2019; he was succeeded by David Sassoli.  

The other guests in 2019 were: 

  Mario Draghi, the President of the European Central Bank (ECB), who attended the June 
Euro Summit, and his successor, Christine Lagarde, who attended the December Euro 
Summit. 

  Michel  Barnier,  the  Commission’s  Brexit  negotiator,  who  attended  the  Article  50 

meetings. 

  Portuguese Finance Minister Mário Centeno, President of the Eurogroup, who attended 

the June and December Euro Summits. 

  Commission-President  elect  von  der  Leyen,  who  attended  the  regular  October 
European  Council.  (She  attended  her  first  meeting  of  the  European  Council  as 
Commission President in December.) 

  UK Prime Minister Theresa May, who was a guest at the start of the Article 50 European 

Council on 10 April. 

  The  prime  ministers  of  Iceland,  Liechtenstein  and  Norway,  who  briefly  attended  the 
March European Council to mark the 25th anniversary of the European Economic Area. 

8 

 
 
 
The European Council in 2019 

3. Domestic politics, personal interaction, and combinations 
within the European Council 

3.1. Introduction 

Even  in  countries  where  elections  do  not  take  place,  domestic  politics  can  change  a  leader’s 
fortunes.  Leaders’  domestic  standing  can  affect  their  international  standing,  including  their 
influence in the European Council, real or perceived. The year 2019 saw a high degree of volatility in 
European politics, across almost all Member States 

3.2. The  link  between  domestic  politics  and  European  Council 
dynamics 

As noted in the previous section, there were 10 changes of national leader in the European Council 
in  2019.  Many  of  the  other  national  leaders  in  office  throughout  2019  faced  serious,  sometimes 
debilitating, political challenges at home. All competed, albeit indirectly, in the May 2019 European 
Parliament  elections.  Long  described  as  second-order  national  elections,  European  Parliament 
elections do not necessarily decide the fate of national governments but can strengthen or weaken 
the positions of national governments and their leaders. A number of national leaders, apart from 
some  of  those  who  lost  office  in  2019,  also  faced  general  elections.  Regardless  of  the  electoral 
contests that they faced in 2019, most national leaders endured a high degree of domestic political 
difficulty during the year.  

When sitting around the European Council table or otherwise interacting with each other, leaders 
are well aware of the strength or weakness of their interlocutors’ political situations. Power is the 
currency of politics, national and international. The power of a national leader depends, to a degree, 
on perception. How is a leader’s country regarded? Is a leader seen to be secure in office? How well 
is a leader handling domestic political, and other, challenges? 

The European Council is a cosy and, for the most part, a convivial club. Rivalries undoubtedly exist 
among  national  leaders,  and  deep  personal  animosities  are  not  unknown  within  the  European 
Council.  Nevertheless,  given  the  generally  consensual  nature  of  the  European  Council,  it  seems 
unlikely  that  a  national  leader  would  attempt  to  exploit  another  member’s  political  weakness  in 
order to gain an advantage. More likely, because all national leaders operate in contested political 
arenas, the prevailing sentiment is empathetic. At the same time, leaders who dislike each other may 
well indulge in schadenfreude. Leaders under political pressure at home may enjoy a respite at the 
European Council, but may also feel constrained in making a contribution there. 

In view of the emphasis that he put on the inter-relationship between French and EU politics and 
policies, Emmanuel Macron stands out as a national leader most likely to be affected by adverse 
domestic developments. From the outset of his presidential election campaign, in 2017, Emmanuel 
Macron  made  clear  his  ambition  to  transform  France  politically  and  modernise  the  country 
economically  while  shaping  the  development  of  the  EU.  For  President  Macron,  the  goals  of  a 
resurgent France and a revitalised EU have always been closely interwoven. This was as apparent in 
his  famous  Sorbonne  speech,  before  winning  election  in  2017,  in  which  he  laid  out  a  vision  for 
France  and  the  EU,  as  it  was  in  the  editorial  that  he  published  in  several  leading  European 
newspapers on 5 March 2019, at the outset of the EP elections campaign, in which he wrote: ‘The 

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deep  transformation  of  France  that  I  am  undertaking  doesn’t  work  without  a  new  stage  of  the 
European project. That’s why the French elected me.’1 

The persistent gilets jaunes movement, coming second to the eurosceptic Rassemblement National 
in the EP elections (albeit by a smaller margin than predicted), and the large protests in December 
2019  against  pension  reforms  therefore  represented  a  setback  for  President  Macron  both 
domestically and on the European stage. But did it affect his performance or his persuasiveness in 
the European Council? Because we know little about what happens inside the European Council, it 
is  difficult  to  answer  that  question.  We  know  from  statements  and  tweets  by  European  Council 
members,  and  from  investigations  by  well-informed  journalists  and  think-tank  analysts,  that 
President Macron has been the most prominent national leader in the European Council in terms of 
trying to set the agenda, reach key decisions, and shape the direction of the EU. He has taken forceful 
and highly visible positions, inside and outside the European Council, on issues such as Brexit, the 
Spitzenkandidaten process, a possible eurozone budget, and the future of NATO. President Macron’s 
domestic difficulties seem not to have hindered his outspokenness on the European stage, whether 
or not they undermined his effectiveness.  

Chancellor  Merkel’s  domestic  difficulties  were  far  less  serious  that  President  Macron’s.  Her 
unassuming leadership style is also vastly different from the French President’s assertiveness. Even 
after the announcement that she would not contest the next federal election, and notwithstanding 
the stresses within her coalition government, Chancellor Merkel remained a formidable presence in 
the European Council. It has always been a rule of thumb for observers of the European Council that 
when the German Chancellor speaks, everyone around the table listens. In breakout meetings, other 
European Council members almost always seek the German Chancellor’s participation. There was 
no  suggestion  in  2019,  a  year  of  domestic  difficulties  for  Angela  Merkel,  that  the  Chancellor’s 
privileged position in the European Council had waned. 

Dutch  Prime  Minister  Mark  Rutte  was  another  leading  member  of  the  European  Council  whose 
domestic political position in 2019 seemed tenuous. Moreover, Prime Minister Rutte’s influence in 
the EU was potentially weakened by Brexit, because of the impending departure of a large Member 
State with which the Netherlands has traditionally been close on a range of institutional and policy 
issues. Far from retreating in the face of these developments, Prime Minister Rutte seemed to move 
closer  to  the  centre  stage  of  EU  affairs  in  2019.  He  used  the  opportunity  of  giving  the  keynote 
’Churchill’ speech in Zurich in early February to assert himself and his country as leading players 
within the EU. By all accounts, Prime Minister Rutte was especially outspoken within the European 
Council  on  important  issues  such  as  Brexit,  EU  external  relations  and  the  next  MFF.  He  was 
particularly  critical  of  countries  that  were  not  meeting  the  deficit  and  debt  rules  for  eurozone 
membership, for which he was criticised in the Netherlands for what some saw as an obsession with 
Italy’s precarious fiscal position.2 

Prime Minister Sánchez was another national leader whose fragile domestic situation in 2019 did 
not seem to affect his performance on the EU stage. The influential Financial Times observed on 3 
July 2019 that ‘Spain is re-emerging as a power in the EU’, with Prime Minister Sánchez being one of 
a handful of leaders who helped broker a deal over the EU’s top jobs and who contributed actively 
in discussions about a possible Eurozone budget. For Prime Minister Sánchez, as for other leaders in 
similar situations, stepping up in the European Council may have been a way to dispel domestic 
gloom and even strengthen his standing at home by being seen to be a major European player. 

1   Vernay, S., ‘ENTRETIEN: Emmanuel Macron s’engage pour peser dans la bataille des européennes’, Ouest-France, 2019.  
2   Danning,  J.,  ‘Dutch  Courage:  Is  the  Netherlands  overconfident  in  its  EU  influence?’,  European  Council  on  Foreign 

Relations, 2019. 

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The European Council in 2019 

Apart from domestic politics, national constitutional arrangements affect leaders’ performance in 
the European Council. In President Macron’s case, this could be liberating; in Prime Minister Rutte’s 
case, it could be constraining. As the French Head of State, President Macron has a fixed five-year 
term  and  does  not  have  to  explain  himself  to  the  national  parliament  (he  is  constitutionally-
prohibited from speaking before the parliament). Being free of national parliamentary constraints 
gave President Macron considerable room to manoeuvre in the European Council. By contrast, the 
Netherlands’  system  of  parliamentary  democracy  means  that  Members  of  Parliament  have  the 
opportunity  –  indeed,  the  responsibility  –  of  carefully  examining  European  Council  conclusions, 
thereby tying the Prime Minister’s hands to a certain extent.  

In a revealing interview with Süddeutsche Zeitung in May 2019, Chancellor Merkel made a similar 
point about a basic difference between her constitutional position and that of President Macron: ‘I 
am the Chancellor of a coalition government and much more tied to parliament than the French 
President, who is not allowed to enter the National Assembly at all.’3 In the case of the Netherlands, 
the Prime Minister tends to be more constrained on issues concerning economic policy and the MFF, 
in which Dutch parliamentarians take an avid interest. Of course, the Dutch Prime Minister can use 
this apparent constraint to advantage by claiming  to his fellow national leaders that a particular 
proposal would never get through the national parliament. 

3.3. Inter-personal relations 

A scene from a documentary on the European Council produced by La Chaîne parlementaire, the 
television channel of the French national assembly, included a revealing exchange at the opening 
of  the  December  2019  summit.  Charles  Michel,  the  new  President,  began  the  meeting,  as  is 
customary, by welcoming new members and congratulating those who were recently re-elected. 
He included Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki. Perhaps not having heard President Michel 
clearly,  Hungarian  Prime  Minister  Orbán,  a  close  ally  of  Prime  Minister  Morawiecki,  interjected 
immediately  to  say  that  the  European  Council  President  should  have  congratulated  his  Polish 
colleague for his recent election victory. Before a startled President Michel could explain himself, 
Prime  Minister  Bettel  of  Luxembourg  jumped  in  to  correct  Prime  Minister  Orbán.  The  scene 
suggested passive-aggressiveness on the part of Prime Minister Orbán and testiness towards the 
Hungarian Prime Minister on the part of Prime Minister Bettel, who is personally and politically poles 
apart  from  his  Hungarian  counterpart.  A  commentator  on  the  exchange,  speaking  in  the 
documentary, described it as an example of the ‘diplomacy and virility’ 4 that is sometimes apparent 
in the European Council. 

As  mentioned  earlier,  the  culture  of  the  European  Council  is  nonetheless  cosy  and  consensual, 
although inevitably its members have their differences. Sometimes leaders simply rub each other 
up  the  wrong  way.  At  other  times,  or  additionally,  they  may  have  profound  political  and  policy 
disagreements that spill over into apparent antipathy. Reflecting in early 2019 on his experience in 
the  European  Council  since  2013,  Malta’s  Prime  Minister  Joseph  Muscat  remarked:  ‘There  is  a 
common-sense approach … I’ve seen a lot of collegiality.’ That said, ‘Some of the debates might end 
up  being  quite  inflamed  …  I’ve  seen  …  people  almost  coming  to  blows  with  each  other  on  a 
particular subject. It’s quite entertaining.’5 

3  
4  

5  

Fried, N. and Kornelius, S., ‘Gewissheiten gelten nicht mehr’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2019. 

Bureau, A. and Noghès, Y.-A., ‘Sommets: dans les secrets des négociations européennes: Le climat’, La Chaîne parlementaire, 
2021. 

Eder, F., ‘POLITICO Brussels Playbook, presented by Naftogaz of Ukraine: Who’s on the Commission’s naughty list? — 
Peek behind Council’s veil — Brexit gymnastics’, Politico, 2019. 

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EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

Perhaps  because  of  his  pre-eminence  and  precocity,  President  Macron  occasionally  incurred  the 
wrath, or at least the exasperation, of other European Council members. Charles Grant, a long-time 
and well-respected commentator on the EU, noted in a blog post on 14 May the irritation on the 
part  of  other  national  leaders  over  the  French  President’s  behaviour  at  summits,  especially  ‘his 
strident and uncompromising performance at the April European Council [on Brexit]’. According to 
Charles Grant: ‘Macron’s mercurial style sometimes grates. French officials have on occasion said 
that he would take a certain line, only to show up [in the European Council] and take a different 
stance.’6 Media reports suggested that President Macron’s assertiveness in the negotiations over 
top-level appointments, at the 30 June-2 July European Council, and strident objection to opening 
accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia, at the October European Council, caused 
considerable annoyance among other national leaders. 

President  Macron  was  notably  forthright  in  his  criticism  of  leaders  having  a  questionable 
commitment  to  democracy,  notably  Prime  Minister  Orbán.  ‘I  have  to  fight  against  him’,  the 
Hungarian Prime Minister was quoted as saying about President Macron. ‘It’s nothing personal, but 
it’s about the future of our country.’7 Going beyond his spat with President Macron, Prime Minister 
Orbán seemed intent in early 2019 on alienating many colleagues in the European Council, where 
he was already unpopular because of his professed illiberalism. Few mainstream EU leaders would 
have disagreed, in private at least, with the assessment of Timothy Garton Ash that Prime Minister 
Orbán ‘has demolished liberal democracy in his country over the last decade. Adding insult to injury, 
he  has  used  taxpayers’  money  to  consolidate  his  illiberal  regime.’8  Prime  Minister  Orbán’s  well-
publicised  comments  in  support  of  Italy’s  anti-immigration  interior  minister,  Matteo  Salvini,  and 
against Commission President Juncker and the EPP’s candidate for Commission President, Manfred 
Weber, in the run-up to the EP elections, also ruffled feathers in the European Council. 

Chancellor  Merkel  is  widely  respected  in  the  European  Council  for  being  its  longest-serving 
member,  for  being  head  of  the  EU’s  most  influential  Member  State,  for  being  composed  and 
unflappable,  and  for  being  well-prepared  and  knowledgeable  about  the  topic  at  hand.  Prime 
Minister  Rutte,  another  European  Council  old-timer,  has  had  well-publicised  run-ins  with  other 
leaders, notably Prime Minister Orbán and Prime Minister Morawiecki, over the issue of democratic 
norms  and  values.  Apart  from  his  government’s  alleged  illiberalism,  Prime  Minister  Morawiecki 
caused growing irritation in the European Council in late 2019 because of his refusal to sign up to 
the  goal  of  EU  climate  neutrality  by  2050.  Prime  Minister  Morawiecki’s  recalcitrance  on  climate 
change may have grated on others, but members of the European Council generally understand 
that domestic economic, political, and social circumstances determine a leader’s position. Members 
of  the  European  Council  may  disagree  with  a  particular  national  preference,  but  they  generally 
appreciate why it is strongly held.  

The leaders of small Member States are not necessarily shy about making their voices heard in the 
European Council. Nonetheless, small Member States are at an inherent disadvantage, regardless of 
the European Council’s egalitarian ethos. The EU may be a unique political entity, but the laws of 
international relations still apply to its members. While complaining about the direction of the EU, 
Czech  Prime  Minister  Andrej  Babis  made  this  point  at  his  party’s  congress  in  Prague  in  February 
2019: ‘We want small Member States to have significant influence on Europe’s development, so that 
Europe is not governed just by bigger states…’9  

6   Grant, C., ‘The Brussels view of Brexit’, Centre for European Reform, 2019. 
7  

Eder,  F.,  ‘POLITICO  Brussels  Playbook,  presented  by  Google:  Weber  tests  the  waters  —  Franco-German  love-fest 
preview — Tusk charms Romania’, Politico, 2019.  

8   Garton Ash, T., ‘Europe must stop this disgrace’, Guardian, 2019. 
9  

Ponikelska, L., ‘EU’s smaller members should have bigger say’, Bloomberg, 2019. 

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The European Council in 2019 

The leader of one small Member State enjoyed disproportionate attention, if not influence, in the 
European Council in 2019. Because of the likely detrimental impact of Brexit on the island of Ireland, 
leaders paid close attention to the views of Prime Minister Varadkar during their discussions about 
the  UK’s  withdrawal.  In  a  sign  of  Ireland’s  sudden  prominence,  Prime  Minister  Varadkar  visited 
President Macron in Paris on 2 April and hosted Chancellor Merkel at a meeting in Dublin later in the 
same  week,  in  the  run-up  to  the  crucial  10  April  European  Council  (Article  50).  Prime  Minister 
Varadkar,  who  had  made  an  impassioned  pro-EU  speech  to  the  European  Parliament  in  January 
2018, sought to use his new-found prominence to position himself as an influential voice on other 
issues on the agenda of the European Council. As his office pointed out before his meeting with 
President Macron: ‘Other matters to be discussed include the future of Europe agenda in advance 
of the forthcoming summit in Sibiu and the appointment of a new European Commission, Council 
president and high representative in June.’10 

3.4. Combinations within the European Council 

Research  suggests  that  there  are  no  permanent  alliances,  groups,  or  combinations  of  countries 
within the European Council. Instead, national leaders caucus and act together on an ad hoc basis, 
depending  on  the  issue  under  discussion.  Nevertheless,  certain  countries  have  a  close  historical 
affinity and may share a set of economic and other policy preferences. The leaders of those countries 
may often be on the same side of an argument in the European Council, but not sufficiently often 
to  identify  them  as  belonging  to  informal  groups,  let  alone  formal  alliances.  The  same  is  true  of 
leaders who are members of the same European political party. 

The  most  obvious  combination  of  countries  that  comes  to  mind  when  discussing  inter-state 
dynamics in the EU, and inter-personal dynamics in the European Council, is France and Germany. 
Political  pundits  were  quick  to  point  out  the  limits  of  Franco-German  relations  in  2019.  Mark 
Leonard, of the European Council on Foreign Relations, predicted the end of the road for Franco-
German influence in the EU, in an article in Project Syndicate, in December 2018.11 Dominique Moisi, 
a  leading  French  commentator  on  international  relations,  argued  in  March  2019,  also  in  Project 
Syndicate,  that:  ‘Whatever  marriage  of  reason  might  have  existed  between  France  and  Germany 
previously, it has given way to estrangement. This is a clash not just of personalities or even political 
imperatives,  but  of  nostalgias:  France  craves  the  grandeur  of  the  Charles  de  Gaulle  era,  while 
Germany recalls fondly the comfortable stability of the Bonn Republic.’12 

The  clash  –  or  at  least  differences  –  of  personalities  between  President  Macron  and  Chancellor 
Merkel was certainly apparent in the European Council throughout the year. As Chancellor Merkel 
pointed out in her interview with Süddeutsche Zeitung, in May 2019: ’We wrestle with each other, 
there are differences in mentality between us and differences in understanding roles.’ Predictably, 
however, Chancellor Merkel insisted that France and Germany remained on the same ‘wavelength’ 
when it came to core EU issues and rejected the idea that she was always  opposed to  President 
Macron’s ambitious objectives.13  

Regardless of personalities, France and Germany have a highly-institutionalised relationship, based 
on the 1963 Élysée Treaty. On the anniversary of the signing of the original Treaty, President Macron 
and Chancellor Merkel signed an updated version in Aachen on 21 January 2019. The new treaty 
reiterated the two countries’ commitment to peace, friendship and close international cooperation 

10   Eder, F., ‘POLITICO Brussels Playbook: Plane trouble — Brussels vs. rule of law breakers — Sorry, not sorry’, Politico, 

2019. 

11   Leonard, M., ‘The coming Franco-German bust-up’, Project Syndicate, 2018. 
12   Moisi, D., ‘The ambition Europe needs’, Project Syndicate, 2019. 
13   Fried, N. and Kornelius, S., ‘Gewissheiten gelten nicht mehr‘, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2019. 

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on a range of issues, from cultural affairs to security and defence. Even on such a solemn occasion 
and  on  such  hallowed  ground  –  Aachen  was  the  capital  of  Charlemagne,  the  first  Holy  Roman 
Emperor, in whose name the EU awards an annual prize – President Macron could not escape gilets 
jaunes  protesters.  Nor  was  the  new  treaty  uncontroversial  in  France,  where  the  Rassemblement 
National criticised the President for supposedly surrendering French sovereignty and caving in to 
Germany. 

President Macron and Chancellor Merkel had similar motives for signing the new treaty. President 
Macron  sought  to  reboot  Franco-German  relations  and  reverse  the  growing  discord  since  the 
beginning of his presidency. He also sought to use a revitalised Franco-German relationship as a 
means of advancing some of his major European objectives. For her part, Chancellor Merkel sought 
to reassure President Macron of Germany’s reliability as a privileged partner in EU affairs. The largely 
symbolic Aachen Treaty was a low-cost way of doing so. 

As in France, the Aachen Treaty was controversial in Germany, albeit much less so and not because 
of concerns about sovereignty. Instead, German critics of the Treaty fretted that it would alienate 
other Member States by implying Franco-German exclusivity in the EU. One of the most prominent 
critics was Sigmar Gabriel, former leader of the Social Democratic Party, former Foreign Minister, and 
former Vice-Chancellor, who wrote that, insofar as the Treaty excluded all other Member States, it 
risked deepening Europe's divisions even further.14  

Other  Member  States  are  indeed  highly  sensitive  to  what  many  of  them  perceive  as  a  Franco-
German duopoly within the EU, a sensitivity that became more perceptible in the shadow of Brexit. 
In an effort partly to counter the impression of Franco-German exclusiveness, President Macron and 
Chancellor Merkel invited the European Council President and the European Commission President 
to  attend  the  Aachen  event.  Speaking  at  the  ceremony,  President  Tusk  cautioned  France  and 
Germany not to overlook the other Member States, especially those to the east: ‘I will put it bluntly 
– today Europe needs a clear signal from Paris and from Berlin that strengthened cooperation in 
small formats is not an alternative to the cooperation of all of Europe. That it is for integration, and 
not instead of integration.’ To reinforce his point, President Tusk spoke in Polish. 

Despite  prevailing  concern  about  a  Franco-German  hegemony,  especially  in  light  of  the  Aachen 
Treaty, President Macron and Chancellor Merkel differed on most substantive issues discussed in 
the  European  Council  in  2019.  On  Brexit,  President  Macron  chafed  at  granting  the  UK  long 
extensions to the departure deadline, whereas Chancellor Merkel urged patience and latitude on 
the part of the EU. On enlargement, President Macron blocked opening accession negotiations with 
Albania and North Macedonia, whereas Chancellor Merkel sided with the large majority of national 
leaders  in  arguing  otherwise.  On  the  nomination  of  the  next  Commission  President,  President 
Macron adamantly opposed selecting Manfred Weber, the lead candidate of the European People’s 
Party,  whereas  Chancellor  Merkel  strongly  backed  Manfred  Weber  until  a  late  stage  in  the 
negotiations,  when  a  belated  Franco-German  agreement  on  a  slate  of  nominations  and 
appointments may indeed have proved decisive in resolving the issue.  

Outside  the  European  Council  but  no  less  important  for  EU  policymaking,  France  and  Germany 
disagreed  over  the  Commission’s  proposal  for  a  copyright  directive,  and  Chancellor  Merkel  took 
exception to President Macron’s outspoken criticism of NATO. Nevertheless, France and Germany 
were capable of acting together, such as when they issued a joint paper on industrial policy, shortly 
before  the  March  summit,  due  in  part  to  their  opposition  to  the  Commission’s  decision  in  early 
February  to  block  the  creation  of  a  railway  equivalent  of  Airbus  through  the  merger  of  Siemens 
(German) and Alstom (French). In a show of accord towards the end of a year replete with Franco-
German tension, President Macron and Chancellor Merkel toured an Airbus manufacturing plant in 

14   Gabriel, S., ‘Franco-German friendship is not enough,’ Project Syndicate, 2019.  

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Toulouse in mid-October, where they were photographed having lunch in the fuselage of a plane 
under construction.15 

Throughout  the  history  of  the  EU,  the  close  collaboration  between  France  and  Germany  never 
broadened  into  a  trilateral  relationship  involving  another  Member  State.  In  terms  of  size  and 
potential influence within the EU, the UK would have been an obvious candidate. For a variety of 
reasons, this never happened, and certainly would not happen once Brexit was in train. Poland was 
another possible member of a leadership trio in the EU, but such an outcome also faced formidable 
historical and political obstacles. In 2019, there was talk of the Netherlands stepping up with France 
and  Germany  to  provide  overall  direction  in  the  EU.  The  Financial  Times  quoted  a  senior  Dutch 
official saying, in February 2019: ‘We talk about the three M’s: Merkel, Macron and Mark [Rutte].’16  

Within  the  European  Council,  Prime  Minister  Rutte  may  well  have  been  vocal  and  sometimes 
persuasive. He certainly sought to mediate between Prime Minister May and other leaders at crucial 
times  in  the  Brexit  process,  and  played  an  important  part  in  the  negotiations  over  top-level 
nominations and appointments. He shared the same space on the political spectrum with President 
Macron and  had a good relationship  with Chancellor Merkel, based in part on traditional Dutch-
German co-operation. But Prime Minister Rutte also had serious differences with both leaders over 
various issues, not least his opposition to the Franco-German paper on industrial policy, and was 
never seen by others as being equal to the French President and German Chancellor in the unspoken 
hierarchy of European Council members. Despite his prominence in the European Council in 2019, 
there was never a real prospect that a Dutch-French-German triumvirate would emerge in the EU. A 
report  from  the  Clingendael  think-tank  in  April  2019  suggested  that  the  Dutch  government  and 
Dutch citizens consistently overestimated their influence in the EU.17  

One of the many differences between President Macron and Chancellor Merkel is that they do not 
belong to the same European political party or family. Chancellor Merkel is a stalwart member of the 
European People’s Party; President Macron resolutely refused to join any of the existing European 
parties,  although  he  caucused  with  leaders  belonging  to  the  smaller  Alliance  of  Liberals  and 
Democrats for Europe Party (ALDE). After the 2019 EP elections, the ALDE group in the EP joined 
forces  with  President  Macron’s  En  Marche  to  form  the  Renew  Europe  group.  Observers  of  the 
institution frequently debate the extent to which European political party membership matters in 
the European Council. According to Prime Minister Muscat of Malta, discussions among leaders are 
‘never a matter of left vs. right … there are no parties when leaders convene’.18 This may well be true 
in  general,  but  Prime  Minister  Muscat  spoke  before  the  European  Council  deliberated  on  the 
Spitzenkandidaten process, which, by its nature, divided most leaders along party political lines in 
2019. 

The  leaders  of  other  historic  groupings  of  Member  States,  such  as  the  Benelux  (Belgium, 
Netherlands, Luxembourg) meet occasionally to discuss issues of common interest but rarely, if ever, 
identify as a group in the European Council. Leaders of the Visegrad Four, or V4 (Czechia, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia), usually meet before the start of regular summits, but do not necessarily caucus in 
the summit itself. As a gesture of goodwill, the V4 leaders invited Chancellor Merkel to join them at 
a meeting in February 2019 in Bratislava, after which the five leaders issued a joint statement calling 
for unity among Member States: ‘There is no place for East-West, North-South, Old-New divides in 

15   Donahue, P., ‘Merkel, Macron make a show of unity’, Bloomberg, 2019.  
16   Brunsden, J and Khan, M., ‘France proposed EU revolution on picking winners’, Financial Times, 2019. 
17   Dekker, B., Korteweg, R., Sie Dhian Ho, M., and Zweers, W., ‘Perceptions of Dutch interest promotion inside the EU’, 

Clingendael, 2019. 

18   Eder, F., ‘POLITICO Brussels Playbook, presented by Naftogaz of Ukraine: Who’s on the Commission’s naughty list? — 

Peek behind Council’s veil — Brexit gymnastics’, Politico, 2019. 

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the current European Union. The way forward is through an open and sincere dialogue on the basis 
of mutual trust and respect among all of its Member States.’19 

Ad  hoc  groups  of  Member  States  occasionally  emerge  on  particular  issues.  The  most  striking 
example  in  2019  was  two  groups  of  countries  that  coalesced  around  opposite  positions  in  the 
negotiations  for  the  2021-2027  MFF.  On  one  side,  the  ‘Frugal  Four’  –  Austria,  Denmark,  the 
Netherlands and Sweden – insisted on limiting expenditure to 1 per cent of gross national income, 
and also wanted to retain budget rebates, thereby reducing their net contributions. On the other 
side, the ‘Friends of Cohesion’ – Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Malta, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain – fought for higher 
spending and, especially, to maintain generous funding for regional development. Net beneficiaries 
from  the  EU  budget,  the  Friends  of  Cohesion  were  influential  in  the  previous  round  of  MFF 
negotiations in 2012 and 2013. In November 2019, the Friends of Cohesion held a summit in Prague 
to coordinate their position on the new MFF. 

Examples  of  other,  more  transient  groups  include  the  eight  Member  States  (Belgium,  Denmark, 
France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden) that issued a ‘non-paper‘ on 
climate  policy  before  the  Sibiu  summit  in  May  2019,  urging  a  target  date  of  2050  for  the  EU  to 
achieve  net-zero  greenhouse  gas  emissions.  Another  ‘non-paper’,  this  time  calling  for  a  more 
effective EU foreign and security policy, written before a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council in 
June 2019, was more typical in that it included both France and Germany. The other signatories were 
Czechia, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Romania. However, the countries 
involved in this initiative did not identify themselves as a group within the European Council.20 

Apart from the V4, regional groups of national leaders rarely emerge in the European  Council. A 
group of seven countries, variously called the EU Med, the EuroMed 7, and the MED7 (Cyprus, France, 
Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain) meets occasionally, mostly at ministerial level, to discuss 
issues of particular interest to the Mediterranean Member States. There was no evidence in 2019 
that the leaders of those countries caucused in the European Council. 

19   Eder,  F.,  ‘POLITICO  Brussels  Playbook,  presented  by  Google:  Meet  Germany’s  new  boss  —  Italy  vs.  France  — 

Competition heats up’, Politico, 2019. 

20   Peel, M and Khan, M., ‘Europe’s Global Act’, Financial Times, 2019. 

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4. Institutional actors 

4.1. Introduction 

The European Council President and the European Commission President are institutional actors in 
the  European  Council.  Both  positions  changed  hands  in  2019.  The  leader  of  the  country  in  the 
Council Presidency is an institutional actor as well as being a Head of State or Government. Often, 
countries  in  the  Council  Presidency  will  subordinate  narrow  national  interests  to  broader  EU 
interests. Two countries with markedly different cultures, histories and economic profiles held the 
Council Presidency in 2019: Romania in the first semester and Finland in the second semester. 

4.2. The Council Presidency 

Since implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the country in the rotating Council presidency no longer 
chairs  meetings  of  the  European  Council.  Nevertheless,  the  leader  of  the  country  in  the  Council 
presidency  has  a  privileged  position  in  the  European  Council  during  the  presidency  semester. 
Symbolically,  that  leader’s  name  appears  first  in  the  list  of  national  leaders  participating  in  a 
European Council meeting (the name of the European Council President appears separately, at the 
top of the page). The names of the other national leaders come after that of the EU Council President, 
in the alphabetical order of the country that they represent. Also, together with the President of the 
European Council and the President of the European Commission, the EU Council President gives a 
prominent  press  conference  after  each  regular  summit,  which  is  distinct  from  the  usual  press 
conferences given by other national leaders. 

Substantively, the Council President delivers a report at regular summits on the implementation, 
since the last meeting, of European Council conclusions. In addition, the Council President may have 
special responsibilities for items on the agenda of the European Council. For instance, in March 2019 
the European Council agreed that it would come back to the issue of protecting democracy in June, 
on the basis of a report prepared by the Romanian Presidency in cooperation with the Commission 
and the High Representative. The report of the Romanian Presidency ‘on countering disinformation 
and the lessons learnt from the European elections’, became a preparatory document for the June 
summit. 

Also in June 2019, the European Council welcomed the work done under the Romanian Presidency 
on the MFF. The European Council called on the succeeding Finnish Presidency to continue the work 
and to develop a so-called ‘negotiating box’ for the next stage of the process. At its next regular 
meeting  in  October,  further  to  a  presentation  by  the  Finnish  Presidency,  the  European  Council 
exchanged views on key issues of the MFF and called on the Presidency to submit a negotiating box 
with figures ahead of the next European Council. Following the presentation of the negotiating box 
by the Finnish Presidency, the European Council briefly discussed the main aspects of the MFF at its 
December meeting. 

At the same meeting, the European Council considered the idea of a Conference on the Future of 
Europe, which at the time was expected to start in 2020 and end in 2022. The European Council then 
asked  ‘the  Croatian  Council  Presidency  [January-June  2020]  to  work  towards  defining  a  Council 
position on the content, scope, composition and functioning of such a conference and to engage, 
on this basis, with the European Parliament and the Commission’. 

Behind  the  scenes  of  the  European  Council,  there was  considerable  concern  at  the  start  of  2019 
about the ability of the Romanian Presidency to carry out its various responsibilities. As mentioned 
previously, the political situation in Romania was highly volatile. Nevertheless, President Iohannis, 
who represented Romania in the European Council, plausibly presented himself as being above the 

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domestic  political  fray,  as  he  was  head  of  state  and  not  of  government.  Romania  was  a  relative 
newcomer to the EU, having joined in 2007, and had not previously held the Council Presidency. Nor 
did the Presidency Trio of which Romania was a part – Romania (January-June 2019), Finland (July-
December  2019)  and  Croatia (January-June 2020)  –  contain  a  large,  experienced  Member  State, 
although Finland had held the presidency twice before.  

A  glittering  ceremony  held  to  launch  the  Romanian  Presidency  in  Bucharest  in  January  2019 
attracted anti-government protesters. President Tusk struck a slightly jarring note when he warned, 
with respect to Romania’s questionable record on combating corruption and defending democracy, 
against ‘those in the European Union who might think that playing outside the agreed rules and 
cutting corners means strength’. The following month, in a tweet following a meeting with Prime 
Minister  Dăncilă,  President  Tusk  criticised  the  Romanian  government  for  actions  that  could 
undermine  the  rule  of  law:  ‘Maybe  I’m  old  fashioned,  but  I  still  believe  that  it’s  for  judges,  not 
politicians, to decide who’s guilty and who’s innocent.’ 

Yet  President  Tusk  was  lavish  in  his  praise  for  President  Iohannis’s  contribution  to  the  Council 
Presidency  and  to  the  work  of  the  European  Council.  In  a  statement  at  the  end  of  the  informal 
summit in Sibiu in May 2019, President Tusk enthused: ‘I would like to thank President Iohannis for 
organising  and  hosting  the  Sibiu  Summit.  When  we  met  in  January,  at  the  beginning  of  your 
Presidency – when I spoke with such conviction, and so emotionally about Romania – I was speaking 
with confidence, because I know that you are truly remarkable. You have organised an exceptional 
summit and you can be proud of your work, just as Europe is proud of you. I have fallen in love with 
Sibiu, the whole of Europe has fallen in love with you.’ 

It is customary for the European Council President to congratulate the outgoing Council President 
at the end of each semester. Speaking after the June European Council, President Tusk said: ‘Last 
but  not  least,  I  would  like  to  thank  President  Iohannis  and  his  entire  team  for  an  energetic  and 
successful  presidency.  You  managed  to  have  ninety  pieces  of  legislation  agreed  in  the  last  one 
hundred  days  before  the  European  elections,  including  on  border  protection,  reducing  CO2 
emissions  and  building  a  digital  Europe.  That  is  impressive.  You  made  good  progress  on  the 
Multiannual Financial Framework package. And, of course, you hosted last month’s EU summit in 
beautiful Sibiu, a Europe Day that we will always remember.’ 

It is rare for a country to have a change of government or leader during its Council presidency – 
indeed, some countries informally put domestic politics on hold during their presidential semester 
–  but  Finland  acquired  a  new  Prime  Minister  in  December  2019,  when  Sanna  Marin,  the  newly-
elected  leader  of  the  Social  Democrats,  replaced  Antti  Rinne  following  a  dispute  in  the  ruling 
coalition. Having an ambitious national climate target (full carbon neutrality by 2035) and having 
several Green party politicians in its coalition government, Finland put a premium during its Council 
presidency on climate policy, which was a key issue for the European Council in the second half of 
2019. The new Finnish Prime Minister worked closely with the new European Council President at 
the December European Council to win a commitment by most national leaders to making the EU 
climate-neutral  by  2050.  Despite  their  efforts,  Poland  would  not  commit  to  implementing  this 
objective, thereby obliging the European Council to come back to the topic in June 2020. 

Inevitably, the difficult discussions over climate became bound up in the negotiations on the MFF. 
Finnish hopes of bringing the MFF negotiations to a conclusion by the end of 2019 were unrealistic. 
Moreover, Finland’s draft plan to limit the new MFF to 1.07 per cent of GNI was deeply unpopular 
with the ‘Friends of Cohesion’, a collection of countries, many in central and eastern Europe, that are 
net beneficiaries of the EU budget. Nor did the Finnish draft win friends in the European Commission 
or  the  European  Parliament.  At  the  December  summit,  leaders  called  on  the  European  Council 
President, Charles Michel, to take the negotiations forward in 2020 with the aim of reaching a final 
agreement.  Nevertheless,  they  underlined  that  the  next  MFF  would  significantly  contribute  to 

18 

 
 
 
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climate action, with tailored support for regions and sectors most affected by the transition being 
made available from the Just Transition Mechanism, proposed by the Commission. At the beginning 
and at the end of his remarks following the December summit, Charles Michel congratulated and 
thanked the Finnish Presidency. 

4.3. The Commission President 

The Commission supports the work of the European Council in various ways, including contributing 
background  papers,  undertaking  work  suggested  or  requested  by  the  European  Council,  and 
otherwise following up on summit conclusions. The Commission is also deeply involved in issues 
that  come  before  the  European  Council,  such  as  the  MFF,  negotiations  for  which  begin  with  a 
Commission proposal. The Commission President participates fully in discussions among national 
leaders despite not being a principal member of the institution (the Commission President cannot 
vote),  and  has  a  strong  institutional  foundation  from  which  to  project  influence  and  authority. 
Within  the  European  Council,  the  Commission  President’s  influence  depends  as  well  on  inter-
personal relations, especially on the closeness or otherwise of relations with key national leaders, 
notably the French President and the German Chancellor. 

4.3.1. President Juncker 
When he took office in 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker, Commission President until his retirement on 30 
November 2019, promised to lead a ‘political’ Commission. As he explained in October 2020, almost 
a year after leaving office: ‘By this I meant that I was neither the secretary of the European Council 
nor the slave of the European Parliament, to make it clear that the Commission was independent … 
“Political” also means that the Commission must have its own ideas, that it must not give up and 
relinquish  at  the  first  hurdle  and,  therefore,  that  it  must  be  able  to  say  “no”  to  the  European 
Council.’21 This statement hints at a peculiarity in the Commission President’s position within the 
European  Council:  the  Commission  President  is  a  member  of  an  institution  with  which  another 
institution, which they head, is sometimes in conflict.  

President Juncker had immense experience as a member of the European Council. Before becoming 
Commission President, he had been the Prime Minister of Luxembourg for 18 years. He had also 
chaired the Eurogroup for almost a decade, thereby gaining unrivalled familiarity with the intricacies 
of EMU. Jean-Claude Juncker’s long experience as a national leader stood him in great stead in the 
European Council during his tenure as Commission President. So did his long acquaintance with 
Chancellor Merkel and their roles as leading members of the European People’s Party.  

Like  other  members  of  the  European  Council,  Jean-Claude  Juncker  had  got  to  know  Emmanuel 
Macron  only  after  the  new  French  President  attended  his  first  summit  in  June  2017.  Emmanuel 
Macron and Jean-Claude Juncker may not have been particularly close, but they developed a good 
working  relationship.  President  Juncker  appreciated  President  Macron’s  passionate  advocacy  of 
deeper European integration and defence of EU democratic norms and values, but disagreed deeply 
with  President  Macron’s  rejection  of  the  Spitzenkandidaten  process.  Having  been  nominated  as 
Commission President in 2014 following the inaugural application of the process, and being a strong 
supporter of Manfred Weber, the lead candidate whose party – Juncker’s own EPP – had won the 
2019 EP elections, President Juncker clashed openly and repeatedly with President Macron on this 
issue.  

The  disappointing  outcome  of  the  Spitzenkandidaten  process  in  2019  demonstrated,  to  some 
extent, President Juncker’s limited influence on that issue in the European Council, not only by virtue 

21   Marchais, I. and Levy, H., ‘Exclusive interview with Jean-Claude Juncker: ‘Europe is a world power and unaware of it’, 

Foundation Robert Schuman, 2020. 

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of  being  Commission  President  rather  than  a  national  leader,  but  also  because  his  tenure  was 
coming to an end. President Juncker was centrally involved in the European Council’s dealings with 
Brexit in 2019, not least because the Commission was responsible for interacting with the UK on 
behalf of the EU-27. On some other key issues in 2019, President Junker was less directly involved or 
less influential than he would have wished, because of his waning time in office. This was true of 
climate, a policy field in which the Commission plays a central role (President Juncker was out office 
by  the  time  of  the  crucial  negotiations  at  the  December  summit).  It  was  also  true  of  the  MFF 
negotiations, which did not begin in earnest until 2020. 

Institutionally,  a  Commission  President  has  a  singular  relationship  with  the  European  Council 
President. The latter has well-defined responsibilities within the European Council that set the office 
holder apart from the Commission President. Nevertheless, both Presidents symbolise the EU and 
represent it internationally. President Juncker and President Tusk had worked out their respective 
representational roles well before 2019. By that time, President Juncker had softened his suggestion, 
made  in  the  2017  State  of  the  Union  address,  to  combine  both  offices.  As  a  result,  despite  well-
known differences between them in political experience, style and temperament, President Juncker 
and President Tusk enjoyed a comfortable modus vivendi by 2019, as both approached the end of 
their terms in office.  

Employing  his  characteristic  effusiveness  and  playfulness,  President  Juncker  spoke  warmly  of 
President Tusk in a speech to the European Parliament shortly before leaving office: ‘… I would like 
to thank President Tusk. We have been twin brothers. Even twin brothers can disagree sometimes. 
But we had the intelligence to hide our disagreements. So, for you, it probably comes as a surprise 
that  we  did  have  disagreements.  But  I  want  to  thank  Donald  for  his  unfailing  cooperation,  for  a 
friendship that will last and that I am proud of. Friendships – a word used indiscriminately – are rare 
in politics. They are rarer still within the same political family, but without Donald I couldn’t have 
done what I’ve done.’ 

President Juncker’s mention of political families may have been an oblique reference to the deep 
disagreement  between  himself  and  President  Tusk,  both  members  of  the  EPP,  on  the 
Spitzenkandidaten  process,  a  disagreement  that  was  far  from  hidden  in  2019.  On  other  issues, 
President Juncker and President Tusk occasionally worked well together. An example, which Jean-
Claude Juncker cited in an interview after he left office, was defence policy, an area in which both 
leaders wanted to see greater EU involvement: ‘In order to get this idea of European defence across, 
we have to explain constantly that it is not a counter-project to NATO, but that it is complementary. 
This has gone unnoticed, but [President] Tusk and I developed joint actions, signed a number of 
documents with the NATO Secretary General. Between NATO and the European Union, things are 
[now] developing in rather a good way.’22 

4.3.2. President von der Leyen 
Ursula von der Leyen, who became Commission President on 1 December 2019, is different from 
Jean-Claude Juncker in many notable respects. Both are members of the EPP, but there the political 
similarity ends. Whereas President Juncker was a national leader for many years, President von der 
Leyen had been a government minister for many years, but never a prime minister. Accordingly, 
whereas  President  Juncker  had  vast  experience  of  the  European  Council  before  becoming 
Commission  President,  President  von  der  Leyen  had  never  attended  a  meeting  of  the  European 
Council  until  she  became  Commission  President-elect.  Their  political  styles  were  also  different: 

22   Marchais, I. and Levy, H., ‘Exclusive interview with Jean-Claude Juncker: ‘Europe is a world power and unaware of it’, 

Foundation Robert Schuman, 2020. 

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President Juncker being highly extroverted, demonstrative, and affable; President von der Leyen 
being reserved, tightly-wound, and cautious.  

President-elect von der Leyen was a guest of the European Council at its meeting in October 2019. 
This  allowed  her  to  become  acquainted  with  the  institution  before  becoming  a  member  of  it  in 
December, and also to discuss her strategic agenda with EU leaders. President von der Leyen was in 
an awkward position with those national leaders, such as President Macron, whose nominees to the 
Commission  had  failed  to  win  EP  approval.  However,  President  von  der  Leyen  owed  her  own 
nomination in large part to President Macron, and enjoyed a cordial relationship with Chancellor 
Merkel, in whose governments she had served since 2005. 

Just as President Juncker worked out his relationship with President Tusk after they assumed their 
respective presidencies in 2014, President von der Leyen and Charles Michel began to work on their 
relations  as  Commission  President  and  European  Council  President  after  each  assumed  office  in 
December 2019. Whereas President Juncker and President Tusk had already known each other as 
national leaders in the European Council, and as members of the EPP, President von der Leyen and 
President  Michel  were  not  members  of  the  same  European  political  party  and  barely  knew  each 
other before being nominated to head their respective EU institutions. However, there was nothing 
to suggest, in late 2019, that the relationship would be anything but positive and productive.  

4.4. The European Council President 

4.4.1. President Tusk 
In 2019, President Tusk was in his final year in office, having been re-elected in 2017 to a second, 
two-and-a-half-year term. As he left office, at the end of  November, President Tusk was only the 
second incumbent to hold the position of standing European Council President since it came into 
existence  in  2009,  following  the  implementation  of  the  Lisbon  Treaty.  The  contrast  between 
President Tusk and his predecessor, Herman Van Rompuy, who also served a full 5 years, is striking. 
Although both had previously been national leaders – Herman Van Rompuy in Belgium and Donald 
Tusk  in  Poland  –  each  came  from  countries  with  vastly  different  political  histories,  practices  and 
cultures. Belgian politics are notoriously fractious because of linguistic and regional differences that 
superimpose  upon  the  usual  ideological  divides.  More  so  than  elsewhere,  successful  national 
politicians in Belgium must be consensus-builders. By contrast, politics in Poland are deeply divided 
along  conservative-progressive,  nationalist-internationalist,  and  anti-EU  and  pro-EU 
lines. 
Successful national politicians tend to be tribal rather than inclusive in their leadership styles.  

Before  becoming  European  Council  President,  Donald  Tusk  was  the  leader  of  Civic  Platform,  a 
centre-right  party  on  the  progressive/internationalist/pro-EU  side  of  Polish  politics.  As  European 
Council  President,  he  sought  to  transcend  and  overcome  divisions  among  national  leaders  on  a 
range of issues and for a variety of reasons, but his style was noticeably direct, even abrupt, perhaps 
reflecting his political background. He was frequently scathing in his criticism of the conservative 
Polish  government,  led  since  December  2017  by  Mateusz  Morawiecki,  for  taking  measures  that 
weakened the rule of law and other democratic safeguards, just as he was of the governments of 
Hungary  and  Romania  for  similar  behaviour.  This  did  not  cost  him  the  support,  in  the  European 
Council, of President Iohannis, who was head of Romania but not of the Romanian government. But 
it ensured him the enmity of Prime Minister Morawiecki and Prime Minister Orbán of Hungary. 

President Tusk’s combativeness towards the leaders of Hungary and Poland grew more marked in 
2019, perhaps because he would soon be leaving office. President Tusk was similarly outspoken on 
a range of other issues. For instance, he was as critical of Prime Minister May’s handling of Brexit in 
the UK and of her dealings with the EU-27 as he was of EU leaders, such as President Macron, who 
seemed unwilling to extend the Brexit deadline by a significant amount of time, if at all. He was also 

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highly  critical  of  President  Macron,  without  naming  him  publicly,  for  blocking  the  opening  of 
accession negotiation with Albania and North Macedonia at the October 2019 European Council. 
Speaking after the summit, President Tusk asserted that: ‘both countries have the right to start EU 
negotiations as of today. They are ready. Unfortunately, a few Member States are not ready yet. This 
is why we didn’t manage to reach a positive decision. Personally, I think it was a mistake, but I will 
not comment on it further.’ Reporting to the EP after the same summit, he reiterated that ‘this was 
a mistake’, and added: ‘which I have said to the leaders (and I was a bit more direct then).’  

On another external relations issue, President Tusk took aim at President Macron and Prime Minister 
Orbán  while  criticising  Russia,  toward  which  President  Tusk  had  taken  a  particularly  hard  line 
throughout his presidency. In a speech at the College of Europe in Bruges shortly before leaving 
office, President Tusk observed: ‘President Macron says that he shares the same views on this subject 
[a rapprochement with Russia] as Viktor Orbán, and that he hopes that Mr Orbán will help convince 
Poles to change their position on Russia. Maybe, but not me, Emmanuel.’ President Tusk added that, 
during his time in office: ‘I had to publicly remind others, almost every week, that Russia is not our 
“strategic partner”, but our “strategic problem”.’  

In the same speech, President Tusk said: ‘I want to tell you something I wouldn’t have dared to say 
a few months ago, as I could be fired for being too frank.’ His revelation, about Brexit, was neither 
new nor shocking. Nor was it novel for President Tusk to be frank in public, let alone, presumably, in 
the privacy of the European Council. Examples of President Tusk’s forthrightness, perhaps verging 
on abrasiveness, abounded in 2019, especially in his tweets and Instagram posts. One of the most 
infamous of these was a tweet on February 6: ‘I’ve been wondering what that special place in hell 
looks like, for those who promoted #Brexit, without even a sketch of a plan how to carry it out safely.’ 
The reaction in the UK, especially in pro-Brexit circles, was predictable. 

President  Tusk  was  far  from  reluctant  to  reveal  his  own  positions  when  making  his  post-summit 
statements and reporting to the European Parliament on a summit outcome. In his statement after 
the March Article 50 summit, he noted that: ‘The UK Government will still have a choice of a deal, 
no-deal, a long extension or revoking Article 50’, which was clearly his preference. In his remarks 
after the regular March summit, President Tusk added: ‘The fate of Brexit is in the hands of our British 
friends. We are, as the EU, prepared for the worst, but hope for the best. As you know, hope dies last.’ 
Reporting to the EP on the difficult Brexit summit of 10 April, at which leaders finally agreed to grant 
a flexible extension of the Article 50 period until 31 October 2019, President Tusk revealed that ‘I 
proposed such a change, as in my view it has a few advantages’. 

President Tusk made no secret of his belief that Brexit was an epic mistake and of his optimism that 
somehow the decision might be reversed. As he commented at the end of the October summit, at 
which EU leaders had endorsed the revised Withdrawal Agreement: ‘On a more personal note, what 
I feel today is sadness. Because in my heart, I will always be a Remainer. And I hope that if our British 
friends decide to return one day, our door will always be open.’ For someone so steeped in the harsh 
lessons of Polish politics, President Tusk seemed inclined to let hope triumph over realism in the 
case of Brexit. As he told the EP after the 10 April Brexit summit: ‘During the European Council one 
of  the  leaders  warned  us  not  to  be  dreamers,  and  that  we  shouldn’t  think  that  Brexit  could  be 
reversed. I didn’t respond at the time, but today, in front of you, I would like to say: at this rather 
difficult moment in our history, we need dreamers and dreams. We cannot give in to fatalism. At 
least I will not stop dreaming about a better and united Europe.’  

On  the  vexed  question  of  appointments  and  nominations  for  top-level  jobs,  especially  the 
Spitzenkandidaten process, President Tusk was eager to expedite decision-making in the European 
Council.  He  was  less  involved  in  making  the  decisions  themselves  than  in  ensuring  a  quick  and 
orderly  procedure.  Speaking  after  the  Sibiu  summit,  he  explained  that:  ‘I  intend  to  maintain  this 
[positive] spirit of the discussion during … the process of nominating the new EU leadership’, and 

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The European Council in 2019 

announced  that  he  would  convene  a  special  meeting  ‘of  all  28  EU  leaders,  in  order  to  start  the 
nomination process’, soon after the EP elections, on 28 May. He went on: ‘My intention is to carry 
out the election of heads of EU institutions in a swift, smooth and effective manner. Naturally, this 
process will follow the rules set down in the Treaties. It should reflect geographical balance as well 
as demography, so that both large and smaller countries are represented in the highest positions in 
the EU. To me, the spirit of the Treaty is also important when it comes to gender as well as political 
balance. Of course, it would be best if we managed to reach consensus on all these decisions. But 
we have to be realistic. I will not shy away from putting these decisions to the vote, if consensus 
proves difficult to achieve. The aim is simple: we need effective institutions, and so we need swift 
decisions. My intention is for the European Council to nominate the new EU leadership in June. I call 
on everyone to live up to their responsibility to make this possible.’ 

Most of the day-to-day work of the European Council President involves preparing summits and 
following  up  on  their  conclusions.  This  requires  considerable  travel  to  Member  State  capitals  for 
discussions with national leaders and many discussions with visiting national leaders in Brussels. The 
President  also  oversees  contacts  between  members  of  his  cabinet  and  national  ‘sherpas’  (senior 
officials  charged  with  coordinating  the  leaders’  participation  in  the  European  Council).  The 
President  sends  out  a  letter  of  invitation  shortly  before  the  beginning  of  each  summit,  which 
summarises the purpose of the meeting and often includes the President’s own preferences for the 
summit’s outcome. Unusually, President Tusk did not send a letter of invitation before the October 
2019 summit. 

President Tusk was assiduous in carrying out his responsibilities, although his interactions with the 
Polish  and  Hungarian  Prime  Ministers  were  inevitably  strained.  Despite  his  preparatory  work, 
meetings did not always go well or according to plan. The European Council (Article 50) on 10 April 
was uncommonly disputatious, as leaders discussed the merits and practicability of extending the 
Brexit deadline. According to media accounts, Chancellor Merkel ‘rebuked Tusk over the chaotic and 
divisive debate, which the Chancellor apparently felt showed a lack of preparedness by European 
Council officials’.23  

President Tusk had introduced the Leaders’ Agenda in October 2017, in an effort to improve the 
working methods and substantive output of the European Council. The Leaders’ Agenda set out a 
schedule of meetings until mid-2019, culminating in the Sibiu summit on 9 May. Some of the special 
Leaders’ Meetings would consist of informal discussions of contentious issues, based not on draft 
conclusions but on a short note prepared by the European Council President. Rather than seeking 
firm conclusions, the Leaders’ Meetings would prepare the ground for a more formal discussion of 
the agenda item at a later meeting of the European Council, where decisions might then be taken. 
The European Council was due to take stock of the Leaders’ Agenda at the Sibiu summit. 

By 2019, however, the Leaders’ Agenda appeared to have run out of steam. Although the Leaders’ 
Agenda called for a Leaders’ Meeting to discuss ‘EMU (state of play and any further decisions)’ at the 
March  European  Council,  no  such  meeting  or  discussion  took  place.  Nor  did  leaders  discuss 
‘Implementation  of  the  Leaders’  Agenda’  at  the  Sibiu  summit.  They  nonetheless  discussed 
‘Preparation of the Strategic Agenda 2019-2024’ in Sibiu, on the basis of a Leaders’ Note, as called 
for in the Leaders’ Agenda. This paved the way for the adoption of the Strategic Agenda at the June 
European Council.  

In what amounted to his valedictory address, at the College of Europe, President Tusk did not refer 
to processes or procedures during his work as European Council President, apart from claiming that 
he  ‘always  underlined  the  role  of  compromise  in  European  politics.  Compromise,  negotiations, 
consensus,  the  key  words,  without  which  we  cannot  understand  the  EU.’  Instead,  he  focused  on 

23   Herszenhorn, D., Barigazzi, J., and De La Baume, M., ‘EU delays Brexit, gives UK new deadlines’, Politico, 2019. 

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what he saw as the main dangers to EU unity – the leitmotif of his presidency – that he faced during 
the previous 5 years. These were Russia, the euro crisis, the migration crisis and Brexit: issues that 
risked widening already apparent divisions between northern and southern, eastern and western 
Europe, and between countries inclined to forge ahead with deeper integration and those unable 
or unwilling to join them. He also mentioned an additional concern: ‘the protection of the smallest 
Member States’. 

Of the various issues that he mentioned in his speech, Brexit was the most acute in 2019. President 
Tusk could not have imagined, at the beginning of the year, that the UK would still be a Member 
State at the end of November, when he left office. As President Tusk explained: ‘I did everything in 
my power to avoid the confrontational no-deal scenario and extend the time for reflection and a 
possible British change of heart. I have been called a romantic and an anglophile, both terms, in my 
opinion, quite suitable and merited. Most importantly, however, Brexit hasn’t divided us. The EU-27 
have maintained extraordinary self-discipline and loyalty among themselves.’ 

President Tusk briefly mentioned in his speech one of most challenging and divisive issues for the 
EU  in  2019:  growing  illiberalism  in  certain  Member  States.  While  emphasising  the  importance  of 
conciliation  and  consensus,  President  Tusk  remarked  that  ‘there  are  …  things  and  issues,  which 
cannot  be  the  subject  of  compromise  and  negotiations.  And  I’m  talking  about  our  fundamental 
values:  freedom,  the  rule  of  law,  the  dignity  of  individuals.’  Although  not  averse  to  criticising 
Hungary, Poland and Romania for democratic backsliding, President Tusk refrained from doing so 
in his informal farewell address. Perhaps he appreciated that, of all the potentially divisive issues 
that the EU faced in 2019, this was the most intractable and subversive. 

4.4.2. President Michel 
Like Herman Van Rompuy, the first elected President of the European Council, Charles Michel is a 
former Prime Minister of Belgium. President Tusk joked about this in his remarks at the handover 
ceremony  for  the  new  incumbent  on  29  November:  ‘As  you  may  have  noticed,  the  question  of 
leading the [European] Council is an internal Belgian-Polish matter. I don’t see a reason to change 
it.’ Interviewed soon after Charles  Michel’s selection as European Council President, Herman  Van 
Rompuy expressed satisfaction that Mr Michel would be taking on the job, and confidence that he 
would  succeed.  Perhaps  reflecting  sensitivity  to  a  criticism  of  his  own  term  as  European  Council 
President,  Herman  Van  Rompuy  rejected  the  idea  ‘that  Belgian  European  Council  presidents  are 
Franco-German puppets’.24 Charles Michel certainly has close political ties to President Macron  –
both  leaders’  parties  belonged  to  the  same  political  group  (Renew  Europe)  in  the  European 
Parliament – and is on good terms, without appearing to be particularly close, to Chancellor Merkel. 
Yet there was no suggestion at the time of his election as European Council President that he would 
be unduly deferential to the French and German leaders. 

In his remarks at the handover ceremony, President Michel teased President Tusk by saying that he 
would ‘perhaps [be] more cautious with my tweets, at least at the beginning’. Otherwise, President 
Michel  promised  to  ‘take  a  common-sense  approach  to  problem-solving  with  innovation  and 
efficiency. I will have my own style. Open for dialogue and committed to building bridges … But I 
will certainly speak out when needed.’ He also pledged to ‘use all my energy to reduce bureaucracy’. 
Charles Michel made a similar promise in a speech that he gave shortly before becoming President: 
‘I won’t hide behind bureaucratic jargon … or mountains of red tape. I want a frank and honest 
conversation that leads to decisions and actions.’ 

Elaborating on the working methods of the European Council, President Michel said that he wanted 
to ‘try to improve the preparation of our meetings’, so that leaders could ‘focus on strategic debates 

24   Khan, M., ‘Getting Ursula over the Leyen’, Financial Times, 2019.  

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rather  than  drafting  sessions  of  summit  conclusions’.  He  would  also  aim  to  promote  ‘better 
communication’  of  the  institution’s  work.25  Speaking  after  his  first  summit  as  President,  Charles 
Michel remarked that ‘I also had the occasion to explain to my colleagues what would be the way of 
working … and I have also given some information about an indicative political agenda for next 
year’.  

President Tusk had made similar points when he introduced the Leaders’ Agenda in October 2017. 
The fact that President Michel felt it necessary to reiterate them might suggest that, in his view, the 
Leaders’ Agenda had not been particularly successful. Alternatively or additionally, he may not have 
wanted  to  perpetuate  an  innovation  associated  with  his  predecessor.  Having  attended  many 
summits  as  a  national  leader,  President  Michel  may  have  appreciated  that,  despite  their  oft-
proclaimed interest in having ‘strategic debates’, members of the European Council habitually find 
themselves engrossed in the details of agenda items, arguing over the precise wording of the final 
conclusions. Such is the nature of the institution. 

President Michel stressed another procedural point both before taking office and in his first month 
in the job: the importance of close inter-institutional cooperation. He was especially laudatory in his 
remarks about the European Parliament, and devoted considerable time to briefing the EP on the 
outcome of the first summit over which he presided, in December 2019. Calls from new leaders for 
inter-institutional cooperation are not unusual, but Charles Michel’s emphasis on close European 
Council-European  Parliament  relations  may  have  reflected  a  perception  that  President  Tusk  had 
displayed a degree of impatience with the Parliament, especially as his mandate wore on. 

As for the substance of his work, the contents of President Michel’s in-tray were well known. Perhaps 
the most pressing item was climate change, which was foremost on the agenda of the December 
European  Council.  In  one  of  his  first  speeches  as  European  Council  President,  at  the  UN  Climate 
Conference  COP25  on  2  December,  President  Michel  declared  that  ‘I  have  a  clear  goal:  to  make 
Europe the first climate-neutral continent on the planet by 2050’. At the December summit, held 
only 10 days later, President Michel struggled to win the commitment of all Member States to the 
2050 target date, with Poland refusing to go along. The lack of consensus on climate policy at the 
December  meeting  was  a  disappointment  –  if  not  a  setback  –  for  President  Michel,  who  was 
criticised after the summit not for its conduct or outcome, but for minimising in his post-summit 
remarks the fact that the EU had not managed to reach consensus.26 

25   Brunsden, J., ‘Eastern EU governments demand price for climate neutrality’, Financial Times, 2019. 
26   Bureau,  A.,  and  Yann-Anthony,  N.,  ‘Sommets:  dans  les  secrets  des  négociations  européennes:  Le  climat’,  La  Chaîne 

parlementaire, 2019. 

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5. The 2019-2024 Strategic Agenda 

The European Council is responsible for defining ‘the general political directions and priorities’ of 
the EU (Article 15.1 TEU). Since 2014, it has done so, in part, by adopting a Strategic Agenda which 
sets  out  overarching  priorities  guiding  the  work  of  the  EU  for  a  period  of  5  years.  The  Strategic 
Agenda  emerged  at  a  time  when  the  European  Parliament  was  launching  the  Spitzenkandidaten 
process, which thrust the Parliament, the lead candidates and the Commission into a lively debate 
about the EU’s overall direction. This, in turn, prompted the European Council to assert its role as 
the EU’s primary agenda setter in the framework of the five-year institutional cycle. The lead-up to 
and launch of the 2014-2019 Strategic Agenda, regardless of its effectiveness and impact, helped to 
build  the  institutional  identity  of  the  European  Council  in  the  face  of  an  increasingly  assertive 
Parliament and a self-proclaimed ‘political’ Commission. 

The Leaders’ Agenda, an initiative launched by President Tusk in October 2017 partly to ensure that 
the European Council had a chance, occasionally, to think strategically rather than having to deal 
always  with  immediate  issues,  concluded  with  an  informal  meeting  in  Sibiu  on  9  May  2019.  The 
purpose  of  the  meeting  was  for  leaders  to  consider  the  state  of  the  EU  after  Brexit  (the  UK  was 
expected to have left by 29 March 2019) and to have a free-flowing discussion, unconstrained by 
draft  conclusions,  about  the  content  of  the  next  Strategic  Agenda,  which  the  European  Council 
planned to adopt in June, just ahead of the new institutional cycle. 

For the meeting, President Tusk prepared a Leaders’ Note outlining what the next Strategic Agenda 
might  look  like.  The  note  consisted  of  four  overriding  objectives,  in  the  form  of  major  headings, 
under each  of which was a short  blurb, four sub-headings,  and, under the sub-headings,  several 
bullet points. The four overriding objectives were:  

  Protecting citizens and freedoms 
  Developing our economic base: the European model for the future  
  Building a greener, fairer and more inclusive future 
  Promoting Europe’s interests and values in the world  

The Sibiu summit was a relatively relaxed affair. The UK had not yet left the EU, but Brexit, which had 
preoccupied  leaders  earlier  in  the  year,  had  receded  from  the  headlines,  albeit  temporarily. 
Institutional appointments, the next issue to preoccupy leaders, would come to the fore after the 
European Parliament elections, later in May. In Sibiu, therefore, leaders had a rare opportunity to 
catch  their  breaths  and  to  think  more  broadly  about  the  future  of  the  EU.  By  all  accounts,  the 
discussion  about  EU  priorities  was  lively  but  not  contentious.  There  was  no  fundamental 
disagreement about the content of the Leaders’ Note, although the leaders themselves may have 
had different views about how best to organise and prioritise the EU’s many objectives.  

After  the  meeting,  President  Tusk  issued  the  following  statement:  ‘Two  weeks  ahead  of  the 
European  Parliament  elections,  the  leaders  have  met  in  Sibiu  to  begin  a  discussion  on  the  EU’s 
priorities  for  the  coming  years  …  The  result  of  this  discussion  will  come  in  June,  when  –  as  the 
European  Council  –  we  will  adopt  the  EU’s  priorities  for  the  next  five  years,  also  known  as  the 
Strategic Agenda. Without prejudging the outcome of this debate – as it will also be influenced by 
the European Parliament elections – I can state one thing with complete certainty. The leaders have 
categorically  demonstrated  that  they  want  to  take  full  political  responsibility  not  only  for  single 
events or challenges, but for the European Union as a whole. Put simply, the Member States and 
their democratically elected leaders want to actively shape the way the EU functions and develops.’ 

There  are  two  important  points  about  this  statement.  First,  what  Present  Tusk  described  as  the 
beginning of a discussion about the EU’s priorities for the coming years could also be described as 
the  end  of  a  discussion  about  the  future  of  Europe,  which  leaders  had  launched  in  June  2016, 

26 

 
 
 
The European Council in 2019 

immediately  after  the  UK  referendum  on  Brexit.  The  highlights  of  this  debate  were  a  series  of 
statements and declarations about the nature of the EU, its purpose and potential, its usefulness 
and its value. These included a short statement by leaders of the EU-27 in June 2016, the Bratislava 
Declaration and Roadmap of September 2016, the Rome Declaration of March 2017 and the Sibiu 
Declaration of May 2019. The Sibiu Declaration was more florid and inspirational than the Leaders’ 
Note  on  the  future  Strategic  Agenda,  but  the  content  was  similar.  In  addition  to  these  joint 
statements and declarations, most EU leaders had given speeches on the future of the EU in the 
European Parliament, beginning in January 2018 and ending in April 2019. 

The  second  point  about  President  Tusk’s  Sibiu  post-summit  statement  is  his  emphasis  on  the 
‘political  responsibility’  not  only  for  crisis  response  (‘single  events  or 
European  Council’s 
challenges’), but also ‘for the European Union as a whole’. Here, President Tusk was asserting the 
European  Council’s  primacy  as  the  EU’s  strategic  leader,  ahead  of  the  Commission  and  the 
Parliament. As President of the European Commission and as a member of the European Council, 
Jean-Claude  Juncker  was  an  EU  leader,  but  he  also  wanted  his  ‘political’  Commission  to  be  an 
institutional leader, perhaps the institutional leader, of the EU. He had made that clear in successive 
State of the Union speeches. Moreover, on 30 April 2019, the European Commission set out policy 
recommendations  for  the  Strategic  Agenda  for  2019-2024  for  leaders  to  consider  at  the  Sibiu 
summit.  The  Commission  document  pointed  out  that  President  Juncker  had  proposed  the  Sibiu 
summit in his 2017 State of the Union address,  ‘when he unveiled a roadmap for a more united, 
stronger and more democratic Union’. The document did not mention that President Juncker had 
proposed  that  the  Sibiu  summit  take  place  on  30  March  2019,  the  day  after  the  UK’s  expected 
departure from the EU, but that President Tusk had changed the date to 9 May and incorporated 
the summit into the Leaders’ Agenda. 

At  the  same time,  the  European  Parliament  was  conscious  of  its  role  as  an  EU  leader.  As  already 
noted, since early 2018 the European Parliament had been organising plenary debates on the Future 
of Europe, inviting national leaders to share their visions of the future of the EU and engage in an 
exchange with MEPs in an open and constructive way. Moreover, in a resolution of 13 February 2019 
on the state of the debate on the future of Europe, the EP underlined that ‘the Union must tackle 
the challenges of its future with greater and better political integration, with full respect for and 
promotion of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the democratic principles and by working 
together’. In addition, the EP saw the Spitzenkandidaten process in part as an opportunity to shape 
the EU’s future. By contrast, the European Council saw the process not only as a challenge to its right 
to nominate the next Commission President without interference from another institution, but also 
a development that could affect its ability to set the political direction of the EU. 

Leaders came back to the Strategic Agenda at their regular, end-of-semester summit, in June 2019. 
It was one of a number of items discussed on the first day of the summit (the others were top-level 
appointments,  climate,  disinformation,  the  MFF  and  external  relations).  The  second  day  of  the 
summit was given over to economic and monetary union. The limited amount of time available for 
leaders to discuss the Strategic Agenda suggests that the preparatory work was well done, and that 
the  draft  Strategic  Agenda  –  contained  in  the  draft  conclusions  –  was  generally  acceptable  to 
everyone. Indeed, the four main headings of the agreed-upon Strategic Agenda, which constituted 
an annex of the summit conclusions, were almost identical to the four main headings in the Leaders’ 
Note discussed at the 9 May summit. The only difference was that ‘Building a greener, fairer and 
more  inclusive  future’  became  ‘Building  a  climate-neutral,  green,  fair  and  social  Europe’.  The 
addition of ‘climate-neutral’ and ‘social Europe’, two politically-loaded terms, was not insignificant.  

Rather than having a short blurb, several sub-headings, and bullet points under each heading, as 
was  the  case  with  the  Leaders’  Note,  the  Strategic  Agenda  consisted  of  a  number  of  short 
paragraphs under each heading, some of which differed in emphasis from the corresponding sub-
headings  and  bullet  point  in  the  Leaders’  Note.  For  instance,  whereas  the  Leaders’  Note  merely 

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mentioned ‘uphold the rule of law’ under the sub-heading ‘Safeguarding our democracies’, under 
the main heading ‘Protecting citizens and freedoms’, the Strategic Agenda contained the following 
paragraph:  ‘The  common  values  underpinning  our  democratic  and  societal  models  are  the 
foundation of European freedom, security and prosperity. The rule of law, with its crucial role in all 
our democracies, is a key guarantor that these values are well protected; it must be fully respected 
by all Member States and the EU.’ As well as being more explanatory, this was also more pointed. 
The  fact  that  all  Member  States  went  along  with  it,  notably  the  two  Member  States  being 
investigated  by  the  Commission  for  alleged  rule-of-law  violations,  suggests  that  the  Strategic 
Agenda was largely aspirational and declaratory. Like the statements and declarations issued during 
the future of Europe debate, the Strategic Agenda contained an important set of guiding principles 
for the EU, but it was a political rather than a legal text. 

Unlike  the  Leaders’  Note,  the  Strategic  Agenda  contained  a  section  called  ‘Delivering  on  our 
priorities’. The inclusion and the content of this section reflected the European Council’s awareness 
of the importance of policy delivery and implementation, and of the need for the EU to try to match 
rhetoric and reality. Accordingly, ‘Our Institutions must focus on what really matters … the EU must 
be big on big and small on small. It must leave economic and social actors the space to breathe, to 
create and to innovate … Our Institutions will … respect the principles of democracy, rule of law, 
transparency and equality between citizens and between Member States. Good governance also 
depends on the rigorous implementation and enforcement of agreed policies and rules, which must 
be  closely  monitored  …  The  EU  must  give  itself  the  means  to  match  its  ambitions,  attain  its 
objectives and carry through its policies.’ 

Finally, the Strategic Agenda reasserted the European Council’s responsibility for setting the EU’s 
general political directions and priorities: ‘This Strategic Agenda is the first step in a process that will 
be taken forward by the Institutions and the Member States. The European Council will follow the 
implementation  of  these  priorities  closely  and  will  define  further  general  political  directions  and 
priorities as necessary.’ 

President Juncker was quoted as saying after the Sibiu summit in May that the discussion of the 
Strategic  Agenda  ‘was  …  a  trial  run  for  the  June  European  Council’.27  After  the  June  European 
Council, President Iohannis, who had hosted the May summit, observed that the discussion in Sibiu 
ultimately fed into the Strategic Agenda, the final version of which ‘reflects entirely the 10 points 
under the Sibiu Declaration, the “Spirit of Sibiu” as I call it’.28  

According  to  the  European  Commission,  the  Strategic  Agenda  ‘serves  as  inspiration  for  the 
European Commission’s political priorities drawn up before formally taking office for a 5-year term’. 
Bearing  in  mind  the  recently-adopted  Strategic  Agenda,  and  following  consultations  with  the 
political group leaders in the European Parliament, Commission President-elect von der Leyen drew 
up the new Commission’s Political Guidelines, which she presented to the European Parliament at 
the beginning of its new mandate. The priorities set out in the Political Guidelines broadly identified 
the main policies and steps that the Commission intended to follow to ensure that its objectives 
would be achieved during the next institutional cycle. 

At its October 2019 meeting, the European Council exchanged views with President-elect von der 
Leyen on the Commission’s contribution to the implementation of the EU’s priorities, as set out in 
the Strategic Agenda. At the same meeting, the Finnish Prime Minister reported on the follow-up to 
the Strategic Agenda undertaken so far in the Council (Finland was then in the Council Presidency). 
As President Tusk remarked after the meeting: ‘Today leaders also discussed the priorities of the new 

27   Morgan, S., ‘Strategic success from the Sibiu summit’, Euractiv, 2019.  
28   Morgan, S., ‘Strategic success from the Sibiu summit’, Euractiv, 2019. 

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Commission with President-elect von der Leyen … It was an important discussion that will continue 
in the following months.’ 

In his remarks at the end of the December summit – his first as President of the European Council – 
Charles  Michel  mentioned  the  significance  of  the  Strategic  Agenda  for  the  European  Council.  In 
particular,  he  stressed  the  importance  ‘for  us  …  (of  being)  very  concentrated  …  (on)  the 
implementation of our strategic agenda’. This was a fitting finale in 2019 to the adoption of the new 
Strategic Agenda, the second in the history of the EU. 

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6. Institutional appointments and nominations 

6.1. Introduction 

The EU has a five-year institutional cycle. The year 2019 was the end of one cycle and the beginning 
of another, centred on the European Parliament elections in May. Taking into account the outcome 
of the elections, the European Council is responsible for electing, if necessary by a qualified majority 
vote, a candidate to become the next Commission President: ‘This candidate shall [then] be elected 
by the European Parliament by a majority of its component members.’ (Article 17.7 TEU). At the same 
time,  the  European  Council  elects  its  President  (Article  15.5  TEU)  and  proposes  the  next  High 
Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, subject to the agreement of the President-elect of 
the Commission (Article 18.1 TEU). As it happened, the Presidency of the European Central Bank 
(ECB), a position with an eight-year tenure, became vacant at the end of 2019, which required the 
European  Council  to  fill  that  opening  as  well,  subject  to  receiving  the  relevant  recommendation 
from  the  Council  and  opinions  from  the  European  Parliament  and  the  ECB’s  Governing  Council 
(Article 283, Treaty on the Functioning of the EU).  

The European Council’s first institutional appointment in 2019, which was not part of the regular, 
five-year cycle, also involved the ECB. In an entirely uncontroversial decision, at its meeting on 22 
March the European Council appointed Philip Lane, Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland, to the 
Executive Board of the ECB for a non-renewable term of 8 years (the appointment entered into effect 
on 1 June 2019). The European Council acted on the recommendation of the Economic and Financial 
Affairs  Council,  after  the  Eurogroup  gave  its  support  to  Philip  Lane’s  candidacy.  The  European 
Parliament had delivered its positive recommendation on the appointment on 14 March 2019 and 
the Governing Council of the ECB on 6 March 2019. 

By  contrast,  the  European  Council’s  selection  of  the  next  ECB  President  was  bound  to  be 
contentious, if previous selection processes for the position were anything to go by. Inevitably, the 
European  Council’s  involvement  in  filling  the  four  top-level  positions  in  2019  –  Commission 
President, European Council President, High Representative, and ECB President – became part of a 
single, informal and protracted procedure. The goal of the European Council was to make a set of 
decisions that put highly competent people into these positions while reflecting the diversity of the 
EU with respect to geography, the size of countries, gender, and political affiliation. Throughout EU 
history, Member States have fought tenaciously to promote their own nationals to the highest levels 
within the institutions. It was no surprise that this would be the case in 2019.  

6.2. The Spitzenkandidaten process 

6.2.1. Nominating the President of the European Commission 
Of the top-level positions that needed to be filled, that of Commission President stood apart. The 
European  Council  would  be  making  a  nomination,  not  a  definitive  appointment.  The  European 
Parliament would then elect – or not – the European Council’s nominee. Declaration 11 to the TEU 
notes  that  ‘the  European  Parliament  and  the  European  Council  are  jointly  responsible  for  the 
smooth running of the process leading to the election of the President of the European Commission. 
Prior to the decision of the European Council, representatives of the European Parliament and of the 
European Council will thus conduct the necessary consultations in the framework deemed the most 
appropriate.’  In  2014,  however,  the  European  Council  had  tussled  with  the  European  Parliament 
over the eligibility of candidates for the Commission Presidency, a tussle that seemed set to recur in 
2019. At issue was the European Parliament’s insistence, based on its interpretation of Article 17.7 
TEU, that ‘taking into account’ the outcome of the EP elections meant that the European Council 

30 

 
 
 
The European Council in 2019 

would have to nominate one of the so-called Spitzenkandidaten (lead candidates) put forward in the 
recent elections by the European political parties. 

Launched in 2014, the aim of the Spitzenkandidaten process was: 

to try to increase public interest, and consequently voter turnout, by putting forward 
contenders  for  the  Commission  Presidency,  thereby  further  personalising  and 
popularising the elections; 
to boost the profile and the influence of the European political parties; 
to strengthen the political legitimacy of the Commission President and, by association, 
the Commission as a whole;  
to bolster the EP’s institutional standing vis-à-vis the European Council; and 
to shift the constitutional nature of the EU in a more parliamentary direction by firmly 
tying the outcome of the elections to the selection of the head of the EU executive. 

The EP deemed the process a success in 2014. The two foremost lead candidates – Jean-Claude-
Juncker of the European People’s Party and Martin Schulz of the Party of European Socialists  – had 
campaigned  energetically  throughout  the  EU  (apart  from  the  UK,  where  the  government 
discouraged  them  from  doing  so).  Their  electioneering  helped  to  focus  public  attention  on 
important EU rather than simply national issues. Despite their best efforts, voter turnout declined 
slightly in 2014. Nevertheless, Jean-Claude Juncker, whose party won the most seats in the election, 
was duly nominated by the European Council and elected by the European Parliament to become 
Commission President. Whether the new Commission President and the new Commission enjoyed 
greater political legitimacy as a result is uncertain. The extent to which the EU system became more 
parliamentary is also debatable.29 

In  2014,  the  European  Council  was  divided  on  the  merits  and  appropriateness  of  the 
Spitzenkandidaten process, with some leaders resenting what they saw as the European Parliament’s 
efforts to tie the European Council’s hands when it came to nominating the Commission President. 
In the end, the European Council went along with it, perhaps because Jean-Claude Juncker was one 
of  its  own.  Having  been  Prime  Minister  of  Luxembourg  for  18  years,  he  was  a  long-standing 
European  Council  member.  Although  the  European  Council  prefers  to  decide  by  consensus, 
President Van Rompuy nonetheless called a vote on Jean-Claude Juncker’s nomination, in the face 
of entrenched opposition from UK Prime Minister Cameron, largely for domestic political reasons. 
Neither  Prime  Minister  Cameron  nor  Prime  Minister  Orbán,  who  also  voted  against  Jean-Claude 
Juncker, were enamoured of the Spitzenkandidaten process, but this was not their main reason for 
insisting on a vote on that occasion. 

There  were  a  number  of  differences  between  2014  and  2019  that  made  the  nomination  by  the 
European Council of a lead candidate unlikely this time around. One was that President Tusk was 
openly  sceptical  of  the  process.  The  European  Council  had  discussed  the  issue  of  high-level 
appointments at its informal meeting on 23 February 2018. In advance of the meeting, President 
Tusk noted that the European Council ‘cannot deprive itself’ of its prerogatives without a change in 
the  Treaty,  and  posed  to  national  leaders  the  question  of  whether  the  European  Council  should 
‘automatically  accept  the  outcome  of  a  Spitzenkandidaten  process’  or  whether  it  should 
‘autonomously decide how to take account of the elections, having held appropriate consultations’ 
with the EP. After the meeting, President Tusk reported firmly that: ‘There is no automaticity in this 
process. The Treaty is very clear that it is the autonomous competence of the European Council to 
nominate  the  candidate,  while  taking  into  account  the  European  elections,  and  having  held 
appropriate  consultations.’  During  his  term  in  office,  President  Tusk  was  keen  to  instil  in  the 

29   Hobolt, S., ‘A vote for the President? The role of Spitzenkandidaten in the 2014 European Parliament elections’, Journal 

of European Public Policy, 2019.  

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European  Council a greater sense  of institutional identity. A European Council more aware of its 
character and prerogatives would be more likely to defend its right to nominate the Commission 
President without direction from the European Parliament, while nonetheless taking into account 
the outcome of the EP elections, as required by the Treaty. 

Another difference in 2019 was that neither of the two foremost lead-candidates – Manfred Weber 
of  the  EPP  and  Frans  Timmermans  of  the  PES  –  was  a  serving  or  former  national  leader.  This 
represented  a  break  in  the  profile  of  Commission  Presidents  since  the  early  1990s.  (Ironically, 
Jacques Delors, who is routinely referred to as the most successful President in the Commission’s 
history, was not a national leader.) Despite never having led a national government, Manfred Weber 
and Frans Timmermans had considerable managerial experience: Manfred  Weber as head  of the 
largest  political  group  in  the  EP  and  Frans  Timmermans  as  a  Vice-President  of  the  European 
Commission. 

A  third,  perhaps  fundamental,  difference  in  2019  was  that  a  leading  member  of  the  European 
Council,  arguably  the  most  influential  member  at  the  time,  was  implacably  opposed  to  the 
Spitzenkandidaten  process.  That  was  President  Macron,  who  cloaked  his  opposition  in  a  spirited 
defence of the European Council’s rights and responsibilities but who was motivated as well by a 
powerful impulse to break what he saw as the stranglehold that the two largest political parties, the 
EPP and the PES, had on the organisation and functioning of the European Parliament. He set his 
sights especially on the EPP. Having disrupted the traditional left-right alignment of French politics 
with the success of En Marche, his new political party, President Macron made no secret of his desire 
to do the same at the EU level by forming an equally effective centrist political movement. President 
Macron’s obvious ally in the EP was Guy Verhofstadt, leader of the liberal Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats  for  Europe  (ALDE)  group,  a  former  Prime  Minister  of  Belgium,  and  one  of  the  most 
prominent MEPs. 

In view of President Macron’s overtures and Guy Verhofstadt’s lack of enthusiasm for the process, 
ALDE had not nominated a single lead candidate before the EP elections. Instead, it protested the 
process, while keeping its options open, by putting forward a slate of candidates that included Guy 
Verhofstadt and Margrethe Vestager, the European Commissioner for competition policy, who was 
widely  seen  as  being  highly  successful  and  having  strong  political  appeal.  Finnish  Prime 
Minister Juha Sipilä justified ALDE’s position by explaining that, in the past, the EPP ‘took everything, 
all the positions. I think that this is not good … And this is why ALDE [has] decided that we will have 
a team of politicians which shows that in the liberal party there is a different kind of thinking, and 
we are from north and south and west and east. And it’s a kind of window [into] the candidates we 
have in the ALDE party.’30 

Most  of  the  lead  candidates  campaigned  actively  in  the  spring of  2019,  but  Manfred  Weber  and 
Frans Timmermans were particularly prominent, participating in a host of debates, interviews and 
other media events throughout the EU, especially in Germany, the most populous Member State 
and a country that had shown an appetite for the Spitzenkandidaten process in 2014. Yet national 
leaders seemed unsure about how to proceed. Some had spoken highly of the Spitzenkandidaten 
process  in  speeches  to  the  European  Parliament,  given  as  part  of  the  ‘Future  of  Europe’  debate 
spanning 2018-2019. By contrast, in his speech to the EP in April 2018 President Macron was highly 
critical of the process in the absence of transnational party lists in the European elections, an idea 
that the Parliament had rejected in February 2018.  

Even among the EPP members of the European Council, there was ambivalence about the process 
and about the viability of Manfred Weber’s candidacy. One of the then EPP members, Prime Minister 

30   Eder, F., ‘POLITICO Brussels Playbook, presented by Google: EU’s Venezuela farce — Leave Bucharest alone! — Best 

laid plans’, Politico, 2019.  

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The European Council in 2019 

Orbán of Hungary, was openly hostile to Manfred Weber. Prime Minister Joseph Muscat of Malta, a 
member of PES, supported Frans Timmermans, but admitted that ‘In the European Council there 
isn’t  too  much  appetite  for  it  [the  Spitzenkandidaten process]  … I  think  most  in  [the  European] 
Council are irritated with the idea that [nominating the Commission President] is being changed to 
a situation where Parliament proposes, [the European] Council rubber stamps and Parliament then 
has the final say … that’s the feeling around the table, irrespective of political allegiances.’31  

The Commission unequivocally supported the process. In a communication of 13 February 2018, the 
Commission argued that the lead candidate system had ‘overall … a positive impact’ on the work 
of the EU institutions, and ‘should continue and be improved’. President Juncker, the beneficiary of 
the  process  in  2014,  had  reiterated  his  support  for  it  in  his  2018  State  of  the  Union  speech  and 
expressed the hope that, by 2024, the process could be combined with transnational lists, which the 
EP had earlier rejected. President Juncker used his membership of the European Council to urge 
national leaders to perpetuate the process in 2019. 

The  European  Parliament  also  stood  by  the  Spitzenkandidaten  process.  In  a  report  adopted  on  7 
February 2018, it affirmed its support for the procedure and warned that, if it rejected the process, 
the European Council would ‘risk submitting for Parliament’s approval a candidate for President of 
the Commission who will not have a sufficient parliamentary majority’. The Parliament also made 
clear that it stood ‘ready to reject any candidate … who was not appointed as a Spitzenkandidat’. 

During the 2019 election campaign, national leaders pronounced themselves occasionally on the 
merits of the Spitzenkandidaten process. Nonetheless, they waited until the informal Sibiu summit 
on 9 May to have a preliminary discussion about filling all of the top-level positions, especially that 
of  Commission  President.  Leaders  such  as  President  Macron  and  Prime  Minister  Bettel  of 
Luxembourg,  an  ALDE  member,  were  vocal  in  their  criticism  of  the  Spitzenkandidaten  process. 
Otherwise, nobody wanted to spoil the positive ‘spirit of Sibiu’ by pressing the issue.32  

At the end of the Sibiu summit, President Tusk announced that he would call a special meeting of 
all 28 EU leaders ‘just after the European Parliament elections, on 28th May … in order to start the 
nomination process’. President Tusk made clear his intention ‘to carry out the election of heads of 
EU institutions in a swift, smooth and effective manner’. For that reason, he stressed his willingness, 
if necessary, to call a vote in the European Council: ‘Of course it would be best if we managed to 
reach consensus on all these decisions. But we have to be realistic. I will not shy away from putting 
these  decisions  to  the  vote,  if  consensus  proves  difficult  to  achieve.  The  aim  is  simple:  we  need 
effective institutions, and so we need swift decisions. My intention is for the European Council to 
nominate the new EU leadership in June. I call on everyone to live up to their responsibility to make 
this possible.’ 

6.2.2. After the European Parliament elections 
By  convening  the  special  summit  immediately  after  the  results  of  the  elections  became  known, 
President Tusk was hoping that the European Council would be able to seize the initiative before 
the Parliament’s political leaders could coalesce around one of the lead candidates for Commission 
President.  In  2014,  the  leaders  of  the  EPP  group  and  the  Progressive  Alliance  of  Socialists  and 
Democrats (S&D) – the PES group in the EP – had agreed almost immediately after the election that 
Jean-Claude Juncker would be the lead candidate. Their decisiveness had the effect of limiting the 
European Council’s options and helping to ensure Jean-Claude Juncker’s nomination. Drawing on 
that experience, EP Secretary-General Klaus Welle, one of the architects of the Spitzenkandidaten 

31   Eder, F., ‘POLITICO Brussels Playbook, presented by Naftogaz of Ukraine: Who’s on the Commission’s naughty list? — 

Peek behind Council’s veil — Brexit gymnastics’, Politico, 2019. 
32   Morgan, S., ‘Strategic success from the Sibiu summit’, Euractiv, 2019. 

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process, explained that: ‘After the [2019] election results are out, parties will very quickly need to 
come  back  together  to  make  decisions  …  in  24  to  48  hours’,  otherwise  delay  could  ‘derail  the 
process’ and opponents of the process within European Council would seize the opportunity.33  

The elections produced a Parliament with a much smaller gap in the allocation of seats between the 
two big political groups, the EPP and the S&D, and the others. Once again, the EPP won the largest 
number of seats (182), but substantially fewer than in the outgoing Parliament (216). The S&D (154) 
also lost a large number of seats (down from 185). The new liberal group, Renew Europe (108), made 
up of ALDE and En Marche, was substantially larger than the liberal group in the outgoing Parliament 
(69). The Greens did well in 2019, increasing their representation from 52 to 74. Lacking the clout 
that they had after the 2014 elections, the EPP and S&D could not impose one of their own lead 
candidates – presumably it would have been Manfred Weber – on the other groups, even if they had 
wanted to. The Greens, who supported the Spitzenkandidaten process, were unwilling to commit to 
either the EPP or the S&D lead candidate without a thorough discussion of that candidate’s policy 
programme. Renew Europe would have liked to have one of the ALDE candidates selected as the 
EP’s  lead  candidate,  but  would  not  support  one  of  the  other  group’s  candidates.  As  Secretary-
General Welle feared, political group leaders were unable to muster a stable majority behind a lead 
candidate with a broad policy programme when they met immediately after the elections, or at any 
time thereafter.  

This strengthened the hand of the European Council, but did not mean that, from the point of view 
of the EP, the Spitzenkandidaten process was doomed. Manfred Weber and Frans Timmermans were 
still viable candidates. Many of the national leaders, who belonged to either the EPP or the S&D, 
continued to support the process, rhetorically at least. Given the extent of doubts in the European 
Council about the process, however, President Tusk reportedly requested national leaders to give 
him  the  names  of  plausible  alternative  candidates  ahead  of  the  28  May  meeting.  He  sought  to 
ensure  that  the  European  Council  was  not  left  with  a  list  of  contenders  made  up  entirely  of 
Spitzenkandidaten, thereby swinging momentum back to the European Parliament. 

At the 28 May special summit, held over dinner, EU leaders took stock of the results of the European 
elections  and  formally  began  the nomination  process for  the  new  heads  of  the  institutions. 
President Macron was especially vocal, once again justifying his opposition to the Spitzenkandidaten 
process  in  terms  of  defending  the  prerogatives  of  the  European  Council  against  a  European 
Parliament  intent  on  upsetting  the  EU’s  institutional  balance.  In  President  Macron’s  view,  the 
European Council’s right to nominate the Commission President, without outside interference, was 
an important part of its overall responsibility for setting the direction of the EU. 

President Macron also complained about the two leading candidates’ qualifications, notably their 
lack  of  experience  of  running  a  national  government.  Chancellor  Merkel,  who  had  been  in  the 
European Council in 2014 when the process was first used, and had been torn at the time between 
institutional  loyalty  to  the  European  Council  and  political  loyalty  to  the  EPP,  of  which  she  was  a 
leading member, was torn along the same lines in 2019. In 2014, she had taken the political party 
route and supported Jean-Claude Juncker for Commission President. In 2019, the political party ties 
were  even  tighter  for  Chancellor  Merkel,  given  that  the  EPP  candidate,  Manfred  Weber,  was  a 
member of the Chancellor’s sister Christian Democratic party, the Bavarian Christian Social Union.  

Nor  was  Chancellor  Merkel  put  off  by  Manfred  Weber’s  lack  of  national  executive  experience, 
recalling  that  detractors  had  criticised  her  own  relative  lack  of  experience  at  the  start  of  her 
chancellorship 14 years earlier, and pointing out that Martin Schulz’s lack of executive experience 
did  not  seem  to  bother  the  PES  when  they  picked  him  as  their  lead  candidate  for  Commission 
President  in  2014.  Like  most  other  members  of  the  EPP  or  the  PES  in  the  European  Council, 

33   Brzozowski, A., ‘The Brief, powered by EUROBAT – Dead on arrival’, Euractiv, 2019. 

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The European Council in 2019 

Chancellor Merkel chafed at President Macron’s dismissal of a system that had worked well in 2014 
and had produced two credible candidates (in her view) in 2019. 

In his remarks after the 28 May dinner, President Tusk noted ‘first and foremost’ that the European 
Council was ‘very happy about the turnout [in the elections], which was the highest in 25 years’, a 
turnout that might have been attributable – although he did not say so – to the Spitzenkandidaten 
process itself (the evidence was inconclusive). He reiterated the agreement reached by the leaders 
in  February  2018  that  the  European  Council  would  nominate  the  Commission  President  in 
accordance with the Treaties, meaning that it would not be tied to a list of candidates proposed by 
the  EP:  ‘The  Treaty  is  clear:  the  European  Council  should  propose,  and  the  European  Parliament 
should elect.’ At the same time, ‘being a lead candidate is not a disqualification’. What mattered was 
that ‘the future President of the Commission must have the support of both a qualified majority in 
the European Council and a majority of the Members of the European Parliament’. President Tusk 
concluded: ‘I would just like to say that we did not discuss names tonight, just the process, so please 
don’t ask me about names.’ Yet it seemed unlikely that the leaders had not discussed names, and 
equally unlikely that the journalists would refrain from asking about specific contenders (they did 
not). 

The discussion over dinner had exposed the well-known differences within the European Council 
on the Spitzenkandidaten process and on the merits of the leading candidates. President Tusk hoped 
to resolve those differences early in the summer, rather than letting them fester into the autumn. 
Based  on  a  mandate  from  the  European  Council,  President  Tusk  intensified  his  discussions  with 
national leaders and started consultations with the European Parliament. These were intended to 
‘prepare the ground for decisions at the next EU summit on 20-21 June’. 

In a sign of the significance of political party positions within the European Council, despite many 
members’ lukewarm support for, or outright opposition to, the Spitzenkandidaten process, each of 
the  three  largest  families  appointed  two  national  leaders  to  act  as  informal  ‘coordinators’  in 
discussions about the top-level jobs. Dutch Prime Minister Rutte and Belgian Prime Minister Michel 
represented  the  liberals,  Spanish  Prime  Minister  Sánchez  and  Portuguese  Prime  Minister  Costa 
represented the Socialists, and Latvian Prime Minister Kariņš and Croatian Prime Minister Plenkovic, 
both former MEPs, represented the EPP.34 There were no Greens in the European Council. Within the 
EP, the political group leaders were engaged in a parallel process of cross-party discussions.  

Through the month of June, Manfred Weber struggled to put together a parliamentary majority as 
it became increasingly clear that the S&D and Renew Europe were unlikely to back him.35 Lack of 
adequate parliamentary support weakened Manfred Weber’s prospects in the European  Council, 
although Chancellor Merkel appeared unwavering in her support for him. Nevertheless, the names 
of other possible EPP candidates, such as Michel Barnier, the Brexit negotiator, Leo Varadkar, the 
Irish  leader,  and  Alexander  Stubb,  a  former  Prime  Minister  of  Finland,  were  being  mentioned 
increasingly often. 

Socialist leaders, especially Prime Ministers Costa and Sánchez, rallied behind Frans Timmermans, 
their Spitzenkandidat, who had made a strong impression during the election campaign and who 
might have been able to win the support of President Macron, whose opposition to Manfred Werner 
seemed implacable. Commissioner Timmermans’ big weakness within the European Council was 
the opposition of many leaders from Central and Eastern Europe, who resented the way in which he 
led the Commission’s investigation into allegations of rule-of-law violations in Hungary and Poland. 

34   De La Baume, M. and Herszenhorn, D., ‘EU 6’ to discuss Commission president choice’, Politico, 2019.  
35   Brunsden, J., Khan, M., and Barker, A., ‘Manfred Weber clings to bid for power in Brussels as support ebbs’, Financial 

Times, 2019.  

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In  his  letter  of  invitation  to  the  busy,  end-of-semester  (June)  meeting  of  the  European  Council, 
President Tusk was upbeat: ‘Over the past 3 weeks I have been consulting closely and regularly with 
you as well as with the European Parliament and its political group leaders. These consultations have 
shown  that  there  are  different  views,  different  interests,  but  also  a  common  will  to  finalise  this 
process  before  the  first  session  of  the  European  Parliament  …  I  remain  cautiously  optimistic,  as 
those  I  have  spoken  to  have  expressed  determination  to  decide  swiftly.  I  hope  we  can  make  [a 
decision] on Thursday.’ 

President  Tusk’s  hopes  were  dashed.  In  their  discussion  of  the  Commission  Presidency,  which 
included the broader jobs package, leaders spent several hours on the evening of 20 June reprising 
arguments  for  and  against  the  Spitzenkandidaten  process  and  for  and  against  the  leading 
candidates. President Macron and like-minded leaders criticised both the process and the suitability 
of  Manfred  Weber,  the  leading  candidate.  Chancellor  Merkel  and  other  EPP  leaders  refused  to 
abandon  Manfred  Weber  and  accept  instead  one  of  the  other  lead  candidates,  notably  Frans 
Timmermans of the PES or Margrethe Vestager of Renew Europe. This suggested that the dismissal, 
within the European Council, of one political group’s lead candidate would ensure the dismissal of 
the other lead candidates, a form of mutually assured rejection of the Spitzenkandidaten. Early in the 
morning  of  21  June,  after  a  trying,  four-hour  session,  President  Tusk  brought  the  inconclusive 
discussion to an end. By that time, leaders had agreed only to hold a special summit, finally to settle 
the issue, before the end of the month.  

President Tusk’s statement immediately after the summit was short and to the point: ‘The European 
Council had a full discussion of nominations taking into account my consultations and statements 
made within the European Parliament. There was no majority on any candidate. … We will meet 
again  on  30th  June.  In  the  meantime,  I  will  continue  consultations  including  with  the  European 
Parliament.’ The European Council conclusions made no mention of the leaders’ discussion of the 
top-level jobs. 

6.2.3. An epic summit 
Before  the  decisive  30  June  summit,  a  number  of  leaders  –  those  of  France,  Germany,  the 
Netherlands and Spain, as well as the Presidents of the Commission and the European Council –  had 
discussed the Commission Presidency on 28 June at the G20 summit in Osaka. This was an example 
of an opportunity that EU leaders whose countries are members of the G7 or G20 have to caucus 
informally, in this case on a pressing issue of interest to the EU as a whole (the UK Prime Minister was 
also  present,  but  reportedly  did  not  participate  in  the  discussions  with  other  EU  leaders).  Media 
reports predictably called the outcome of their deliberations the ‘Osaka Pact’.36 Less predictable was 
that the so-called pact involved nominating Frans Timmermans as Commission President, with the 
High  Representative  for  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  going  to  the  EPP,  and  possibly  also  the 
Presidency of the European Parliament, although this was not in the gift of the European Council. 
One of the many surprising things about this arrangement was that Chancellor Merkel apparently 
went  along  with  it.  Why  would  the  EPP  give  up  the  Commission  Presidency,  arguably  the  most 
important appointment, having won the most seats in the recent EP elections? 

Other EPP leaders responded harshly to news of the Osaka Pact. At an EPP summit preceding the 
special  30  June  European  Council,  they  took  Chancellor  Merkel  to  task.  Prime  Minister  Varadkar, 
whose name frequently appeared as a contender for a top position, was quoted as saying that the 
‘vast majority  of  EPP  prime  ministers  don’t  believe  we  should  give  up  the  presidency  of  the 
Commission so easily without a fight’.37 Regardless of the veracity of the Osaka Pact, the reports that 

36   Herszenhorn, D., Hanke Vela, J., and De La Baume, M., ‘Merkel backs ‘real’ lead candidates, tipping Timmermans and 

Weber for top EU jobs’, Politico, 2019. 

37   Barker, A., Brunsden, J., Peel, M., and Hall, B., ‘EU summit ends in deadlock over filling top jobs’, Financial Times, 2019.  

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Chancellor  Merkel  was  willing  to  abandon  Manfred  Weber  further  weakened  the  EPP  lead 
candidate’s chances, just as the backlash against it also weakened the PES lead candidate’s chances. 
This had the effect of throwing wide open the discussions at the special summit that began on 30 
June. 

The indicative programme for the special summit anticipated that the event would begin at 18.00 
with  the  usual  exchange  of  views  with  the  President  of  the  European  Parliament,  continue  over 
dinner,  beginning  at  18.30,  and  end  later  that  evening  or  early  the  following  morning,  followed 
immediately by a press conference given by the President of the European Council – ’time TBC (to 
be  confirmed).’  Meetings  of  the  European  Council  often  run  late.  This  particular  meeting  ran 
unusually late, not simply into the following morning but into the morning of 2 July, more than one 
day later.  

During  that  time,  leaders  met  in  plenary  sessions  interspersed  with  numerous  side  meetings 
involving various combinations of participants. Most leaders, with the understandable exception of 
Prime  Minister  May,  were  actively  involved  in  the  discussions,  although  President  Macron, 
Chancellor Merkel, Prime Minister Sánchez and a handful of others were the key players. Leaders 
needed  to agree on a nominee for Commission President as part of a package of other nominations 
and  appointments  that  would  strike  a  reasonable  balance  based  on  the  candidates’  political 
affiliation, country of origin, and gender. The ebbing support for the EPP’s lead candidate, within 
both the European Council and the European Parliament, and the unwillingness of most EPP leaders 
in the European Council  simply to accept one of the other lead candidates instead, complicated 
matters.  

It took time at the special summit for EPP leaders to back away from their lead candidate and for PES 
and Renew Europe leaders to back away, in turn, from their lead candidates. Once it became clear 
that none of the lead candidates was any longer a contender for the Commission Presidency, the 
leaders were open to new ideas about a slate of appointees and nominees for the four positions, as 
well  as  possible  compensation  for  each  of  the  three  main  political  parties’  unsuccessful  lead 
candidates  (Manfred  Weber/EPP,  Frans  Timmermans/PES,  Margrethe  Vestager/Renew  Europe). 
Behind the scenes, the national sherpas and senior officials from the Council Secretariat worked day 
and night to help the leaders reach an acceptable solution. The eventual outcome was politically 
astute. 

The nomination on which the other decisions hinged was that of Ursula von der Leyen, a German 
government minister, for Commission President. Minister von der Leyen’s name had not surfaced in 
previous discussions about the job, but the appeal of her candidacy soon became apparent. Her 
profile was similar, in important respects, to that of Manfred Weber, the foremost of the formal lead 
candidates. Neither of them had led a national government (a shared disadvantage), both were EPP, 
and both were German. Minister von der Leyen had the additional benefit of being female (a woman 
had not previously been Commission President and gender was a key consideration for the new set 
of EU leaders). Her main drawback may have been that she had never worked intensively on  EU 
affairs, whereas Manfred Weber had been a Brussels insider for his entire career. The suggestion of 
Minister von der Leyen, which reportedly came from President Macron’s team – even though she 
had  never  been  a  national  leader  –  assuaged  Chancellor  Merkel’s  misgivings  about  abandoning 
Manfred Weber, although it engendered fierce criticism from the Social Democratic Party (SPD), who 
were  partners  in  Chancellor  Merkel’s  coalition  government  (the  SPD  continued  to  support  the 
principle of the Spitzenkandidaten process and the candidacy of Frans Timmermans). In view of this 
domestic political difficulty, Chancellor Merkel formally abstained from supporting Minister von der 
Leyen, but seemed personally pleased with the outcome. 

The easiest of the remaining positions to be filled was that of European Council President. Several 
names  had  been  floating  for  some  time,  including  some  names  that  were  also  floated  for 

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Commission  President,  but  the  name  of  Charles  Michel  stood  out.  Already  a  member  of  the 
European Council, Charles Michel’s time as Belgian Prime Minister appeared to be coming to an end, 
as  he  faced  considerable  difficulty  forming  a  new  coalition  after  the  May  2019  general  election. 
Prime Minister Michel was a member of ALDE, which was not expected to (and ultimately did not) 
win the Commission Presidency nomination. As an ALDE leader, Prime Minister Michel was a close 
ally  of  President  Macron,  whose  support  he  enjoyed  for  the  European  Council  Presidency.  Apart 
from these political considerations, Prime Minister Michel had a personality and demeanour that 
differentiated him from President Tusk, whose abrasiveness often grated on other members of the 
European Council.  

With the EPP and ALDE/Renew Europe having secured the two top presidencies, the PES could fairly 
lay  claim  to  the  position  of  High  Representative  for  Foreign  and  Security  Policy.  Prime  Minister 
Sánchez, a leading PES member of the European Council, successfully advocated for Josep Borrell, a 
prominent  PES  politician,  a  former  President  of  the  European  Parliament,  and  a  former  Foreign 
Minister of Spain. For the remaining vacancy – President of the European Central Bank – political 
affiliation  was  supposedly  unimportant,  but  nationality  certainly  mattered.  As  President  Macron 
could  plausibly  claim  that  one  of  the  top  EU  appointments  should  go  to  a  French  national,  he 
proposed Christine Lagarde for the ECB job. Already well-known internationally as a former senior 
government minister and, since 2011, head of the International Monetary Fund, Christine Lagarde 
was a shoe-in. Her only drawback was a lack of national or European central bank experience. 

The conclusions recorded the formal outcome of the marathon meeting of 30 June–2 July 2019:  

‘(1) The European Council elected Charles Michel as President of the European Council for the period 
from 1 December 2019 to 31 May 2022 … (2) The European Council welcomed the decision of the 
[leaders of the countries] whose currency is the euro to appoint Charles Michel as President of the 
Euro Summit for the [same] period … (3) The European Council adopted the decision proposing 
Ursula  von  der  Leyen  to  the  European  Parliament  as  candidate  for  President  of  the  European 
Commission.  (4)  The  European  Council  considers  Josep  Borrell  Fontelles  to  be  the  appropriate 
candidate for High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, subject to the 
agreement of the President-elect of the Commission. (5) The European Council considers Christine 
Lagarde  to  be  the  appropriate  candidate  for  President  of  the  European  Central  Bank,  subject  to 
receiving the relevant recommendation and opinions in accordance with the Treaties.’ 

Unstated in the conclusions was that the leaders had already prevailed upon Ursula von der Leyen 
to  nominate  Frans  Timmermans  and  Margrethe  Vestager,  the  unsuccessful  PES  and  ALDE  lead 
candidates,  as  the  highest-ranking  Vice-Presidents  of  the  Commission,  although  President  Tusk 
referred  to  it  in  his  closing  statement.  (Indeed,  Frans  Timmermans  became  an  Executive  Vice-
President  in  the  new  Commission  with  responsibility  primarily  for  climate  policy,  and  Margrethe 
Vestager became an Executive Vice-President with responsibility primarily for digital policy). Neither 
the conclusions nor the President’s closing remarks referred to Manfred Weber, the thwarted EPP 
lead  candidate.  Given  that  he  would  remain  head  of  the  EPP  group,  there  was  a  widespread 
presumption  that  he  would  at  some  point  become  President  of  the  European  Parliament.  Also 
unstated was that leaders hoped to see the election of a European Parliament President from the 
S&D group, with the successful candidate coming from central and eastern Europe. In the event, the 
EP did indeed elect a President from the S&D group, but from Italy.  

The European Council had reached agreement on a candidate for Commission President without 
the need for a qualified majority vote. As President Tusk later told the European Parliament: ‘At our 
last summit, we were also able to build consensus. It took us three days, because I wanted to be sure 
that every Member State, big or small, from every corner of Europe, was on board when it came to 
the  future  leadership  of  the  Union.’  Although  reaching  agreement  ‘has  taken  us  longer  than 
planned’,  President  Tusk  remarked  immediately  after  the  summit,  ‘we  are  still  on  time.  We  have 

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agreed the whole package before the first session of the European Parliament. Five years ago, we 
needed three months to decide, and still some leaders were against. This year it was three days and 
nobody was against.’ President Tusk acknowledged that ‘Germany abstained on the Commission 
President due to some issues in the government coalition’, but reassured listeners that ‘personally, 
Chancellor Merkel supported the whole package’. President Tusk noted the ‘perfect gender balance’ 
of the package, the European Council having ‘chosen two women and two men for the four key 
positions’.  Nonetheless,  he  referred  to  a  lack  of  representation  from  Central  and  Eastern  Europe, 
noting  that  the  European  Council  ‘expect  Ursula  von  der  Leyen  to  ensure  an  appropriate 
geographical  balance  in  the  team  of  Vice-Presidents’.  As  President  Tusk  later  told  the  European 
Parliament: ‘of course, there is still room for improvement as regards representatives from the East, 
in the overall architecture of European positions’. 

President Tusk did not refer to political party balance in his remarks immediately after the summit, 
but  he  did  so  when  he  reported  on  the  summit  to  the  European  Parliament.  In  particular,  he 
addressed  the  concerns  of  the  Greens,  the  fourth-largest  group  in  the  Parliament:  ‘During  the 
process  of  nominations  I  was  in  close  contact  with  the  leadership  of  the  Greens  …  I  am  fully 
confident that cooperation with the Greens and their presence in the EU decision-making bodies 
will benefit not only the governing coalition, but Europe as a whole … even though there is still no 
European Council leader from this party. I hope that the newly-nominated Ursula von der Leyen will 
listen to my appeal [for Green representation in the Commission], in fact, I will pass her this message 
directly later today.’ 

President  Tusk  had  indicated  after  the  summit  that  the  leaders  hoped  to  see  the  election  of  a 
European  Parliament  President  from  the  S&D  group,  with  the  successful  candidate  coming  from 
central and eastern Europe. They had in mind Sergei Stanishev, a former Bulgarian Prime Minister. 
As is often the case in the Parliament, a President from the S&D group might then be followed, in 
the second half of the legislative term, by someone from the EPP group. However, on 3 July the 
European  Parliament  elected  David  Sassoli,  an  Italian  member  of  the  S&D  group,  as  its  new 
President.  According  to  an  academic  observer:  ‘The  fact  that  MEPs  elected  Sassoli  instead  of  the 
[European]  Council’s  own  candidate,  former  Bulgarian  Prime  Minister  Sergei  Stanishev,  suggests 
that  the  European  Parliament election in  May  has  led  to  a  renewed  desire  for  institutional  self-
assertion.’38 Especially in light of the European Council’s response to the Spitzenkandidaten process, 
it seems probable that a majority of MEPs resented the European Council’s effort to influence the 
election of the European Parliament’s President. 

The  most  spectacular  way  for  the  European  Parliament  to  signal  its  resentment  of  the European 
Council would have been for it to vote against Ursula van der Leyen for the Commission Presidency. 
Indeed, several MEPs cited this as a reason for their opposition to her in the election that took place 
at the European Parliament plenary session in Strasbourg on 16 July. The manner of Ursula von der 
Leyen’s  nomination,  her  perceived  closeness  to  Chancellor  Merkel  and  presumed  gratitude  to 
President Macron may well have counted against her. All the more reason for Ursula von der Leyen 
to campaign vigorously for MEPs’ support in the run-up to the election. Despite President Tusk’s 
entreaties  and  Ursula  von  der  Leyen’s  best  efforts,  the  Commission  President  nominee  failed  to 
bring the Greens on board. In the end, she was elected Commission President with 383 votes, fewer 
than 10 votes more than the 374 needed (half of the total number of MEPs). For some MEPs, the 
narrowness of President-elect von der Leyen’s win was a fitting rebuke to the European Council and 
a  sign  that  the  unsatisfactory  outcome  of  the  Spitzenkandidaten  process  had  weakened  the 
legitimacy of the incoming Commission President.  

38   Schwarzer, D., ‘The Lessons of the EU Leadership Fight’, Project Syndicate, 2019.  

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The European Council still had to tie up a few loose ends in the appointment process for the new 
institutional cycle. After Commission President-elect von der Leyen agreed, on 26 July, to appoint 
Josep  Borrell  as  the  High  Representative  (the  High  Representative  is  also  a  Commission  Vice-
President),  on  6  August  the  European  Council  formally  appointed  him  to  the  position. Having 
received  the  necessary  Council  recommendation,  and  positive  opinions  from  the  European 
Parliament  and  the  ECB's  Governing  Council,  on  18  October  the  European  Council  appointed 
Christine Lagarde to be the President of the ECB for a non-renewable term of 8 years (she took office 
on 1 November 2019). 

The European Council invited the Commission President-elect to attend its meeting in October, as 
an  opportunity  for  her  to  become  familiar  with  the  institution  and  to  brief  leaders  on  her  policy 
objectives. Before the summit, the Commission President-elect had a working breakfast with a small 
number  of  national  leaders,  including  three  representatives  of  the  main  political  groups  in  the 
European Council: Prime Minister Costa (Portugal/PES); President Macron (France/Renew Europe); 
and  Chancellor  Merkel  (Germany/EPP).  Even  more  than  her  presence  at  the  ensuing  European 
Council, the Commission President-elect’s attendance at the breakfast allowed her and the other 
participants to clear the air after the difficult nomination process. President Macron and Chancellor 
Merkel, in particular, were keen to overcome the differences between them over the validity of the 
Spitzenkandidaten process and the merits of the EPP lead candidate. Finally, in the last step of the 
appointment process, on 28 November the European Council appointed by written procedure the 
new  Commission for  the  period  from  1  December  2019  to  31  October  2024,  one  day  after  the 
European Parliament voted to approve the von der Leyen Commission as a body. 

6.2.4. Significance of the Spitzenkandidaten process in 2019 
As the centrepiece of the appointments package, the nomination of the Commission President had 
been politically fraught for the European Council. Yet it is misleading to claim that the European 
Council, as an institution, rejected the Spitzenkandidaten process outright. Some members of the 
European  Council  were  open  to  nominating  a  Spitzenkandidat,  including  President  Macron,  who 
reportedly  expressed  a  willingness  to  nominate  either  the  PES  candidate  or  one  of  the  ALDE 
candidates. But President Macron took a position on the merits of the candidates, not on the fact 
that they were Spitzenkandidaten. Indeed, he explicitly opposed the idea of restricting the universe 
of  candidates  to  those  who  were  Spitzenkandidaten.  In  his  view,  and  the  view  of  several  other 
leaders, the EP and the transnational political parties did not have the right to present the European 
Council with a list of acceptable candidates. The relative weakness of the EPP Spitzenkandidat, and 
the distribution of seats among the main political groups after the May 2019 elections, strengthened 
President Macron’s hand. So did the cleverness of his team in coming up with Ursula von der Leyen 
as  an  alternative  candidate  to  a  Spitzenkandidat,  someone  with  a  profile  similar  in  important 
respects to the EPP Spitzenkandidat and who was acceptable to the European Council.  

As stated at the outset of this section, the Spitzenkandidaten process aimed to meet a number of 
objectives having to do with voter turnout, interest in the EP elections, the personalisation of the 
election campaign, the profile of the transnational political parties, the ‘parliamentarisation’ of the 
EU, and the rebalancing of European Council-European Parliament relations. As in 2014, it is difficult 
to  evaluate  the  overall  impact  of  the  Spitzenkandidaten  process  in  2019.  Did  it  contribute  to  the 
higher  voter  turnout?  Is  President  von  der  Leyen’s  legitimacy  weaker  because  she  was  not  a 
Spitzenkandidat and because she had such a narrow margin of victory in her election, if that is even 
attributable  to  her  status  as  a  non-Spitzenkandidat?  One  thing  is  certain:  the  Spitzenkandidaten 
process  resulted  in  a  number  of  spirited  debates  among  the  candidates  during  the  EP  election 
campaign  which  received  considerable  media  coverage.  The  Spitzenkandidaten  may  not  have 
become  household  names  throughout  the  EU,  but  that  was  hardly  the  point.  The  fact  that  they 
generated more interest in the elections than might otherwise have been the case is significant. 

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For the European Parliament and most of the transnational political parties, the nomination by the 
European Council of someone who was not a Spitzenkandidat was a bitter disappointment. Some 
members  of  the  European  Council  shared  that  disappointment.  Institutionally,  the  European 
Council  fulfilled  its  responsibility  of  nominating  a  candidate  for  Commission  President,  having 
considered the Spitzenkandidaten in their deliberations. A different EPP Spitzenkandidat might have 
commanded  the  support  of  a  majority  of  MEPs  immediately  after  the  election  and  secured  the 
nomination in the European Council. The EPP, and the other political parties, may learn from that 
experience. 

The fact that the Spitzenkandidaten process did not work out in 2019 as its proponents had hoped 
did not mean that it was a complete failure, or that it might not work out differently in 2024. By any 
measure, it was good in  2019 to have identifiable  lead candidates for the Commission President 
stand in the EP elections, to have them debate substantive EU issues during the election campaign, 
and to have their names put forward for consideration by the European Council. The success of one 
or other of those candidates depended in 2019, as it had in 2014 and will again in 2024, not only on 
the  strengths  and  weakness  of  the  candidates  themselves,  but  also  on  the  configuration  of  the 
European Council and on the make-up of the newly-elected European Parliament. By adopting a 
flexible approach, both the European Council and the European Parliament can continue to avail of 
an institutional innovation that benefits the political system of the EU. 

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7. Brexit 

7.1. Introduction 

Few leaders would have predicted, at the beginning of 2019, that Brexit would have preoccupied 
the European Council for much of the year. Nevertheless, there were signs at the end of 2018 that 
Brexit  was  far  from  settled.  On  13  December,  leaders  of  the  EU-27  held  a  special  meeting  of  the 
European  Council,  in  Article  50  format,  and  reconfirmed  the  conclusions  of  their  25  November 
Article 50 meeting, in which they endorsed the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement and approved the 
political  declaration.  The  significance  of  the  December  meeting  was  not  only  that  leaders  felt  it 
necessary to reconfirm the results of their previous meeting, but also – even more so – that they 
underlined in the new set of conclusions that the backstop (the Protocol on Ireland and Northern 
Ireland) was intended as an insurance policy to prevent a hard border on the island of Ireland and 
ensure the integrity of the single market: ‘If the backstop were nevertheless to be triggered, it would 
apply temporarily, unless and until it is superseded by a subsequent agreement that ensures that a 
hard border is avoided.’ 

The leaders’ reassurances about the backstop came in response to the difficulty that Prime Minister 
May  was  having  with  the  ratification  of  the  Withdrawal  Agreement  in  the  UK  parliament.  Many 
parliamentary members of the Prime Minister’s Conservative Party, as well Members of Parliament 
from the Democratic Unionist Party of Northern Ireland, on whom the Prime Minister depended for 
the survival of her government, fiercely opposed the backstop. They worried that activation of the 
backstop would mean differences in regulation between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK, 
which they saw as a threat to Northern Ireland’s place in the Union. They and other critics of the 
Withdrawal Agreement also disliked the fact that it would require the UK, post-Brexit, to remain in a 
customs arrangement with the EU. 

7.2. The 29 March deadline 

The interaction between Prime Minister May and the leaders of the EU-27 at the end of 2018 set a 
precedent for their dealings for the first 3 months of 2019. None of the EU-27 wanted the UK to leave. 
Some may have held out hope, like President Tusk, that the UK might not leave after all. But given 
that  the  UK  seemed  determined  to  leave,  and  that  both  sides  had  concluded  a  Withdrawal 
Agreement after arduous negotiations, by early 2019 the EU leaders, including Prime Minister May, 
wanted to facilitate an orderly departure of the UK by the treaty-mandated date of 29 March (2 years 
after  the  UK  had  triggered  Article  50).  Hence  the  EU-27’s  willingness  to  clarify  aspects  of  the 
Withdrawal Agreement in order to help Prime Minister May with the approval procedure in the UK. 
Beyond that, the EU-27 would not budge. As leaders emphasised in the December 2018 conclusions: 
‘The Union stands by this agreement and intends to proceed with its ratification. It is not open for 
renegotiation.’ In order to focus UK parliamentarians’ attention on the looming 29 March deadline, 
leaders also let it be known that they discussed at the December 2018 summit ‘their preparedness 
for a no-deal scenario’.  

An exchange of letters between Prime Minister May, on one side, and Commission President Juncker 
and European Council President Tusk, on the other, had the same purpose of seeking and providing 
reassurances in order to assuage critics in the UK parliament of the Withdrawal Agreement. In a long 
letter of 14 January, Prime Minister May outlined the concerns of many UK parliamentarians with 
the Withdrawal Agreement, especially the backstop, and sought a sympathetic EU interpretation, if 
not alteration, of its terms. The fact that President Juncker and President Tusk responded the same 
day indicates the close choreography of the EU-UK interaction on the issue. Both leaders reiterated 
that  ‘we  are  not  in  a  position  to  agree  to  anything  that  changes  or  is  inconsistent  with  the 

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Withdrawal Agreement, but against this background, and in order to facilitate the next steps of the 
process,  we  are  happy  to  confirm,  on  behalf  of  the  two  EU  Institutions  we  represent,  our 
understanding of the following points within our respective fields of responsibility’.  

Moreover, Presidents Juncker and Tusk gave a quasi-legal assurance about the clarification already 
provided by the European Council in December 2018. This may have been more significant for what 
it said about the status of European Council conclusions than for its contribution to the ratification 
drama in the UK: ‘it can be stated that European Council conclusions have a legal value in the Union 
commensurate to the authority of the European Council under the Treaties to define directions and 
priorities for the European Union at the highest level and … They may commit the European Union 
in the most solemn manner. European Council conclusions therefore constitute part of the context 
in which an international agreement, such as the Withdrawal Agreement, will be interpreted. As for 
the link between the Withdrawal Agreement and the Political Declaration …  the two texts … while 
being  of  a  different  nature  …  can  be  published  side  by  side  in  the  Official  Journal  in  a  manner 
reflecting the link between the two as provided for in Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU).’ 

As expected, the government lost the ratification vote in the House of Commons the following day. 
What was not expected was the margin of defeat: 432 votes to 202. There was no uncertainty now 
about the unpopularity in the UK parliament of the Withdrawal Agreement or of the poor prospects 
for its ratification. Short of a complete renegotiation, which none of the EU-27 wanted, there was 
little that the EU-27 could do apart from trying to bolster Prime Minister May’s position by tinkering 
around the edges of the agreement. EU leaders were increasingly frustrated with the situation in 
London and with Prime Minister May’s inability to suggest a way forward. On 6 February, President 
Tusk posted his infamous tweet wondering about a ‘special place in hell’ for those who promoted 
Brexit. The following day, after what can only have been an awkward meeting with Prime Minister 
May  in  Brussels  to  discuss  overcoming  the  impasse  on  Brexit,  President  Tusk  issued  a  more 
restrained tweet: ’Still no breakthrough in sight. Talks will continue.’ 

Talks between UK and EU-27 negotiators may well have continued, but they remained inconclusive. 
With another vote looming in the House of Commons, Prime Minister May was desperate to come 
up with something from the EU-27 that might help to win ratification of the Withdrawal Agreement. 
Accordingly, she flew to Strasbourg on 11 March to meet Commission President Juncker, who was 
there for a plenary session of the European Parliament. This resulted in the ‘Strasbourg Agreement‘ 
between  the  European  Commission  and  the  UK.  Previously  agreed  at  negotiators’  level,  the 
agreement consisted of two documents: 1) an instrument relating to the Withdrawal Agreement, 
providing clarifications and legal guarantees on the nature of the backstop; and 2) a joint statement 
supplementing the political declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship. 

In a letter to President Tusk on 11 March, President Juncker described the Strasbourg Agreement as 
‘one  last  push  to  get  the  Withdrawal  Agreement  over  the  finishing  line  [in  London]’.  President 
Juncker  called  on  the  European  Council  to  endorse  the  accord  with  Prime  Minister  May  at  its 
meeting later in the month. Reflecting the frustration among the EU-27 with the festering Brexit 
situation, President Juncker expressed his belief ‘that it is now high time to complete the withdrawal 
process  …  and  to  move  on,  as  swiftly  as  possible,  to  the  negotiation  of  our  [EU-UK]  future 
partnership’. Reflecting also a growing awareness that Brexit might not happen on 29 March, and 
that  the  UK  might  therefore  request  an  extension,  President  Juncker  stressed  that  ‘the  United 
Kingdom’s  withdrawal  should  be  complete  before  the  European  elections  that  will  take  place 
between 23-26 May this year. If the United Kingdom has not left the European Union by then, it will 
be  legally  required  to  hold  these  elections,  in  line  with  the  rights  and  obligations  of  all  Member 
States as set out in the Treaties.’ 

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No doubt President Juncker’s point about UK participation in the EP elections was intended, in part, 
to focus the minds of UK parliamentarians on the need to ratify the Withdrawal Agreement as soon 
as possible. Otherwise, not only would the UK have to participate in the EP elections, which Brexiters 
did not want to happen, but the UK might find itself unable to leave the EU except by crashing out. 
Speaking after his meeting in Strasbourg with Prime Minister May, President Juncker said this was 
the  last  chance  for  MPs  to  support  the  Brexit  deal:  ‘There  will  be  no  further  interpretations  of 
interpretations or reassurances on reassurances … It’s this deal or Brexit may not happen at all.’39  

Just  as  the  exchange  of  letters  between  Prime  Minister  May  and  Presidents  Juncker  and  Tusk  in 
January 2019 had no perceptible impact on the first ratification vote in the House of Commons, the 
Strasbourg Agreement appeared to have little impact on the second ratification vote, which took 
place on 12 March, the day after Prime Minister May met President Juncker in Strasbourg. This time 
the margin of defeat – 391 votes to 242 – was smaller than in January, but the result was still crushing 
for  the  UK  government.  Rather  than  leave  on  29  March  without  the  benefit  of  a  withdrawal 
agreement, and in keeping with a vote in the UK Parliament ruling out a no-deal scenario, Prime 
Minister May sent a letter to President Tusk on 20 March asking for an extension of the Article 50 
period until 30 June 2019. 

7.3. Extending the deadline 

Prime  Minister  May’s  request  for  an  extension  opened  a  new  chapter  of  the  Brexit  saga  for  the 
European Council. According to Article 50, the European Council, in agreement with the Member 
State concerned, could decide unanimously to extend the deadline beyond the stipulated 2 years 
after  submission  of  a  Member  State’s  intention  to  leave.  Hitherto,  leaders  had  speculated  on 
whether the UK would request an extension and, if it did, what their reactions might be. Now leaders 
had to consider the question in earnest. They had an opportunity to do so at the next meeting of 
the European Council, due to begin the day after Prime Minister May’s extension request arrived in 
Brussels. The schedule for the two-day European Council already included a meeting in Article 50 
format, in the first (afternoon) session on 21 March. The working dinner of the European Council, 
scheduled  to  start  at  19.30  that  evening,  was  to  have  been  devoted  to  a  discussion  of  EU-China 
relations. In the event, leaders spent the entire first day of the summit discussing Brexit.  

In his letter of invitation, sent only the day before the summit began, President Tusk recommended 
that  the  European  Council  ‘consider  a  short  extension  conditional  on  a  positive  vote  on  the 
Withdrawal Agreement in the House of Commons’. A possible extension until 20 June, as requested 
by Prime Minister May, ‘has its merits … [but] creates a series of questions of a legal and political 
nature’, which the European Council would have to discuss in detail. President Tusk urged ‘patience 
and goodwill’ in the European Council’s deliberations: ‘Even if the hope for a final success may seem 
frail, even illusory, and although Brexit fatigue is increasingly visible and justified, we cannot give up 
seeking  –  until  the  very  last  moment  –  a  positive  solution,  of  course  without  opening  up  the 
Withdrawal Agreement.’ 

Whatever  goodwill  there  was,  patience  was  conspicuously  lacking  in  the  European  Council’s 
discussion  of  Brexit.  Before  they  met  in  Article  50  format,  Prime  Minister  May  briefed  her  fellow 
leaders on the state of play in the UK. By all accounts, the Prime Minister had nothing new to say and 
was  unable  to  explain  how  a  delay  would  significantly  improve  prospects  for  ratifying  the 
Withdrawal Agreement. Following an uncomfortable exchange with the Prime Minister, the EU-27 
convened in Article 50 format for what turned out to be an unusually testy meeting. 

39   Parker, G., Payne, S., Hughes, L., Barker, A., Khan, M., ‘May agrees revised Brexit deal with Juncker’, Financial Times, 

2019.  

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Leaders  had  been  expressing  their  views  on  a  possible  extension  since  at  least  early  February.  It 
seems unlikely, therefore, that anyone at the 21 March summit said anything original on the subject. 
But this was the leaders’ first opportunity to discuss the issue together and their only chance to grant 
an extension before the expiry of the 29 March deadline, short of convening a special summit in the 
coming  days.  All  were  cognisant  of  the  complication  posed  by  the  imminent  EP  elections.  In 
particular, the UK would have to participate in the elections if it was still a Member State at that time, 
even  if  it  were  to  leave  soon  afterwards.  The  possibility  of  having  a  large  contingent  of  UK 
eurosceptics in the new EP – a likely outcome of the elections – perhaps disrupting proceedings and 
affecting  the  outcome  of  key  votes  at  the  beginning  of  the  new  parliamentary  mandate,  was 
uncongenial to EU leaders. 

No leader wanted to reject the extension request outright. A no-deal Brexit would have been bad 
materially  and  reputationally  for  the  EU,  and  would  likely  sour  post-Brexit  EU-UK  relations.  Even 
though an extension would not necessarily mean that the UK would leave under the terms of the 
Withdrawal Agreement, there seemed to be a consensus among leaders that they should consent 
to the extension request. The key question, therefore, was the length of the extension. This was the 
dividing line between President Macron, who advocated a short extension, and most other leaders, 
who preferred a longer extension, possibly up to, or even exceeding, the Prime Minister’s requested 
date of 30 June. 

President Macron’s main concern was the corrosive effect that Brexit appeared to be having on the 
EU and the opportunity cost for the EU of having to deal with it at the expense of other important 
issues. Chancellor Merkel, who emerged as the champion of a longer extension, was not unaware of 
the insidious impact of a drawn-out Brexit, but thought it more advantageous for the EU not to rush 
an  already  politically-fraught  process.  Most  other  leaders  sided  with  Chancellor  Merkel,  as  did 
President  Tusk.  All  paid  close  attention  to  Prime  Minister  Varadkar,  in  view  of  Ireland’s  special 
position in the Brexit debate. Predictably, Prime Minister Varadkar urged restraint on the part of the 
EU-27. 

After  a  long  meeting  that  included  break-out  sessions  among  leaders  with  particularly  strong 
opinions on the subject – notably President Macron, Chancellor Merkel, Prime Minister Michel, Prime 
Minister Rutte, Prime Minister Varadkar, President Tusk and President Juncker – at which various 
dates were bandied about, the EU-27 leaders agreed to offer an extension until 22 May 2019, the 
day  before  voting  in  the  European  elections  would  begin,  on  condition  that  the  UK  Parliament 
approved the Withdrawal Agreement within the week after the summit, that is, before the original 
Brexit deadline. Accordingly, the UK would have until 22 May to pass the necessary legislation to 
complete the ratification process. Otherwise, EU leaders agreed to delay Brexit only until 12 April 
2019, expecting the UK to ‘indicate a way forward before this date’, although the UK had not been 
able  so  far  to  do  so  (12  April  was  the  final  date  by  which  the  UK  could  give  legal  notice  to  hold 
European Parliament elections). 

leaders  approved  the instrument  relating  to  the  Withdrawal 
At  the  same  time,  EU-27 
Agreement and the joint statement supplementing the political declaration reached between the 
European Commission and the UK government in Strasbourg. On 22 March, the second day of the 
regular summit, the EU-27 leaders adopted a decision formalising the political agreement reached 
the  previous  day on  extending  the  period  under  Article  50  (the  formal  decision  was  taken  in 
agreement with the UK, given that Prime Minister May needed to sign up to it). 

After  the  regular  European  Council,  President  Tusk  expressed  satisfaction  with  the  outcome  on 
Brexit: ‘Personally, I am really happy about this development … it means that until 12 April, anything 
is possible: a deal, a long extension – if the UK decided to re-think its strategy – revoking Article 50, 
which is a prerogative of the UK Government. The fate of Brexit is in the hands of our British friends. 

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We are, as EU, prepared for the worst, but hope for the best. As you know, hope dies last.’ As he told 
the EP later in the month: ‘12 April is the new cliff-edge date.’ 

On 29 March, the date of the original Brexit deadline, the UK government was defeated for a third 
time in the House of Commons in a meaningful vote on the Withdrawal Agreement. The margin of 
defeat  was  smaller  than  on  the  previous  occasions  –  344  votes  to  286  –  but  the  rejection  was 
nonetheless resounding. Failure to ratify the agreement by 29 March meant that the new deadline 
for Britain’s departure was 22 May. However, on 5 April Prime Minister May requested for a second 
time that the EU extend the Article 50 period, until 30 June 2019. The EU-27 had already decided, 
following the third rejection of the Withdrawal Agreement in the UK parliament on 29 March, to 
hold a special meeting of the European Council (Article 50) on 10 April to discuss the implications of 
the  UK’s  looming  departure.  The  10  April  summit  would  now  be  devoted  to  discussing  Prime 
Minister May’s second extension request. The European Council seemed to be going back to the 
future. 

President Tusk’s letter of invitation, sent on 9 April, set the scene for the meeting. He dismissed the 
idea of not granting an extension, which would risk a no-deal Brexit. The question, therefore, was 
the length of the extension to grant. Although Prime Minister May had again requested a delay until 
30 June, ‘our experience so far, as well as the deep divisions within the House of Commons, give us 
little reason to believe that the ratification process can be completed by the end of June. In reality, 
granting  such  an  extension  would  increase  the  risk  of  a  rolling  series  of  short  extensions  and 
emergency summits, creating new cliff-edge dates. This, in turn, would almost certainly overshadow 
the business of the EU-27 in the months ahead.’ For those reasons, President Tusk recommended 
that leaders discuss ‘an alternative, longer extension … [of] no longer than one year, as beyond that 
date we will need to decide unanimously on some key European projects’. Such an extension could 
end automatically as soon as both sides ratified the Withdrawal Agreement. It would ‘provide more 
certainty and predictability by removing the threat of constantly shifting cliff-edge dates’, and allow 
the EU-27 to ‘avoid repeated Brexit summits’. The possibility that a long extension might also ‘allow 
the UK to rethink its Brexit strategy’, which President Tusk could not resist including in his letter, 
seemed fanciful, however. 

To a great extent, the exchanges among EU leaders at the 10 April Brexit summit were a reprise of 
their exchanges at the 21 March Brexit summit, but with even more testiness due to rising frustrating 
with the entire situation and irritation on the part of many other leaders with President Macron’s 
stridency. Just as she had had tried to explain her situation before the start of the 21 March meeting, 
Prime Minister May did the same at the beginning of the 10 April summit, this time as a guest of the 
EU-27. In both cases, the Prime Minister failed to allay the other leaders’ concerns. In the discussion 
that followed Prime Minister May’s  departure, the familiar fault lines emerged. President Macron 
seemed  more  passionate  than  before  in  his  denunciation  of  a  long  extension,  because  of  the 
damage that the protracted Brexit process appeared to be causing the EU. Chancellor Merkel was as 
restrained as ever, arguing that the risk of not granting an extension, or of granting only a short 
extension – notably that the UK might leave without an agreement – was too great for the EU to 
take.  This  was  the  position  also  of  Prime  Minister  Varadkar,  who  had  outsized  influence  in  the 
meeting. 

There was intense media interest in the 10 April summit. One account of the summit, written by Alex 
Barker,  a  long-time  EU  correspondent  for  the  Financial  Times,  is  worth  reproducing:  ‘…  [Prime 
Minister] May had spectacularly failed to win House of Commons support for the draft withdrawal 
agreement  …  Macron  was  staunchly  against  [granting  another  extension].  He  believed  time 
pressure  would  force  Britain  to  decide:  leave  in  an  orderly  fashion,  revoke  Article  50  or  face  the 
disruption of no deal. The summit splintered into small group discussions. Macron was in a minority 
but took on all-comers. At the other extreme was Tusk, advocating an extension of up to a year to 
spare leaders coming back to Brexit every few weeks. It was a tense, scratchy evening. There was an 

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unusual degree of bad feeling … Facing the thick fog of Brexit, Merkel was resorting to her favoured 
crisis-handling technique: “auf Sicht fahren”, or to drive by sight, creeping forward only as far as you 
can see. She thought more time was the safest option; the differences with Macron were surprisingly 
public … The extension was granted to 31 October.’40 The chosen date was a halfway point between 
an  end-of-year  deadline,  supported  by  Chancellor  Merkel  and  others,  and  Prime  Minister  May’s 
request for 30 June, beyond which Macron had preferred not to go. 

Although the conduct of the 21 March and 10 April Brexit summits was similar, and in each case the 
European  Council  granted  an  extension  of  the  Brexit  deadline,  there  was  at  least  one  marked 
difference in outcome: on 21 March the EU-27 leaders granted an extension that was shorter than 
what Prime Minister May had requested; on 10 April they granted an extension that was longer than 
what she had requested. In his report to the European Parliament on the 10 April summit, President 
Tusk explained why ‘the European Council changed the logic of granting a much shorter extension 
than requested by the UK, to giving an extension that is much longer’, for which he took credit: ‘I 
proposed such a change, as in my view it has a few advantages.’ 

There advantages were: ‘First and foremost, only a long extension ensures that all options remain 
on the table, such as ratification of the current Withdrawal Agreement, or extra time to rethink Brexit 
… Second, this extension allows the EU to focus on other priorities … Third, this flexible extension 
delays the possibility of a no-deal Brexit by over 6 months. Thanks to this, millions of people and 
businesses have gained at least some certainty in these unstable times.’ 

The  UK  duly  participated  in  the  European  Parliament  elections,  on  23  May.  The  result  was  an 
embarrassment for Prime Minister May, whose Conservative Party fell to 8.8 per cent of the vote, the 
biggest-ever loss for a governing party in a UK-wide election. Following her repeated failure to get 
the Withdrawal Agreement through the House of Commons and several votes of no-confidence, 
Prime Minister May announced, the following day, that she was throwing in the towel. She would 
resign  as  Conservative  Party  leader  on  7  June  and  be  a  caretaker  Prime  Minister  pending  the 
outcome of the Conservative leadership contest. 

Prime Minister May  attended her last  regular meeting of the European  Council on 19-20  June. It 
must have been a relief for all concerned that Brexit was not formally on the agenda. Nevertheless, 
at  the  end  of  the  meeting,  the  EU-27  leaders  briefly  discussed  Brexit,  with  Presidents  Tusk  and 
Juncker  updating  the  others  on  the  state  of  play.  Leaders  reiterated  that  they  ‘want  to  avoid  a 
disorderly Brexit and establish as close a future relationship as possible with the UK; are open to talks 
when it comes to the Declaration on future UK-EU relations if the position of the United Kingdom 
were  to  evolve,  but  the  withdrawal  agreement  is  not  open  for  renegotiation;  [and]  have  been 
informed of the state of play of planning for a no-deal scenario’. They added, as they had to, that 
they ‘look forward to working together with the next UK Prime Minister’. Given that the next Prime 
Minister was likely to the fiercely pro-Brexit and opportunistically anti-EU Boris Johnson, the EU-27 
leaders must have been viewing their future relations with the UK with some foreboding. Indeed, 
on  24  July  Boris  Johnson  became  Prime  Minister  –  the  third  UK  Prime  Minister  since  the  Brexit 
referendum. 

7.4. The revised agreement 

What  followed  was  predictably  chaotic.  Prime  Minister  Johnson  made  clear  his  determination  to 
scrap  the  backstop,  but  did  not  indicate  clearly  how  this  might  happen  without  there  being  an 
alternative  arrangement  in  the  Withdrawal  Agreement  that  would  prevent  the  need  for  border 
checks  on  the  island  of  Ireland.  Despite  their  long-stated  refusal  to  reopen  the  Withdrawal 

40   Barker, A., ‘Goodbye Brussels: what I learnt in eight years covering the EU’, Financial Times, 2019.  

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Agreement, the EU-27 clearly were willing to negotiate new provisions for Northern Ireland, as long 
as those provisions did not risk the reimposition of a border between the two jurisdictions in Ireland. 
The UK government floated various ideas, not all well thought-through or feasible. Once again, EU-
27  leaders  marvelled  at  the  impact  of  Brexit  on  the  UK  body  politic  and  the  inability  of  the  UK 
government  to  make  credible,  compelling  proposals.  The  comments,  in  mid-September,  of  the 
Prime Minister of Finland, whose country held the rotating Council Presidency, were not atypical: ‘It 
seems to me that there is no leadership … We need a written proposal not just soft talk … I know 
there were some non-papers from the UK side but they are not yet a [realistic] solution.’41  

One month later, in the run-up to the regular October European Council, due to take place only 2 
weeks  before  the  31  October  departure  date,  the  two  sides  were  much  closer  to  an  agreement. 
Perhaps most pressing for Prime Minister Johnson was the so-called ‘Benn Act’, passed in the House 
of Commons in September, that required the UK government to ask the EU-27 for an extension of 
the  Article  50  deadline  if  the  government  did  not  secure  parliament’s  approval  for  a  withdrawal 
agreement or a no-deal departure by 19 October. 

It became clear that the only way for Prime Minister Johnson to keep Northern Ireland within the UK 
customs  area  while  at  the  same  time  being  in  the  EU’s  customs  union,  without  having  customs 
checks  in  Ireland,  was  to  have  those  checks  between  the  mainland  UK  and  Northern  Ireland. 
Allowing a regulatory border in the Irish Sea was a huge concession for Prime Minister Johnson to 
make,  especially  in  the  face  of  fierce  opposition  from  the  Democratic  Unionist  Party  and  deep 
misgivings from hard-line Brexiters in the Conservative Party. Negotiations between representatives 
of  the  UK  government  and  the  Commission  Task  Force  on  the  precise  details  of  the  new 
arrangement continued up to the beginning of the 17 October summit. On the day that the summit 
began, the European Commission recommended that the European Council (Article 50) endorse the 
revised  Withdrawal  Agreement,  including  a  revised  protocol  on  Ireland/Northern  Ireland,  and 
approve a revised political declaration on the framework of the future EU-UK relationship.  

The European Council (Article 50) did so with surprising ease. In his statement to the EP following 
the summit, President Tusk explained why: ‘firstly, it had the support of Ireland; secondly, it had the 
support of the European Commission, ensuring that all our negotiating objectives were met; and 
thirdly, because it avoids a chaotic no-deal Brexit’ (he made the same points, less succinctly, in his 
public statement immediately after the summit). 

There was a palpable sense of relief among EU leaders, including Prime Minister Johnson. The Brexit 
drama was not yet over, however. Prime Minister Johnson was unable to complete the ratification 
procedure for the revised Withdrawal Agreement before having to comply with the requirements 
of the Benn Act. Reluctantly, on 19 October he requested of the EU-27 an extension of the departure 
deadline until 31 January 2020. As this was not unexpected, the EU-27 had already been considering 
their response. President Tusk sounded out the national leaders, most of whom, like the President, 
were willing to grant what seemed like a short, technical extension, without having to convene a 
summit  to  do  so.  President  Macron  was  reportedly  most  concerned  about  the  potentially 
destabilising consequences of yet another extension, and suggested that another summit might be 
warranted. In the event, the European Council took the decision to grant the extension by written 
procedure, with the agreement of the UK, on 29 October.  

Leaders had scheduled an Article 50 meeting for the second day of the regular European Council, 
on 12-13 December. As it happened, the UK general election took place during the first day of the 
European Council. As they convened on the morning after the UK election, leaders congratulated 
Prime Minister Johnson on his resounding victory. Although the Withdrawal Agreement had not yet 
been ratified in the UK, the extent of Prime Minister Johnson’s win suggested that the outcome of 

41   Fleming, S. and Peel, M., ‘UK lacks leadership to sort Brexit, says Finnish PM’, Financial Times, 2019.  

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the  ratification  procedure  was  not  in  any  doubt.  Accordingly,  the  Article  50  meeting  was  a 
straightforward affair, lacking the excitement and purposefulness of the other Article 50 meetings 
held in 2019. Looking to the future, leaders discussed preparations for the negotiations on EU-UK 
relations after the withdrawal and reconfirmed their aim of establishing a relationship as close as 
possible with the UK as a non-Member State.  

Donald  Tusk  was  no  longer  President  of  the  European  Council  in  December  2019.  Having  been 
President at the time of the UK referendum in June 2016 and throughout the ensuing Brexit saga, 
his  absence  from  the  final  Article  50  meeting  in  the  history  of  the  UK’s  departure  seemed  odd. 
Instead,  Charles  Michel  had  the  distinction  of  presiding  over  the  last  Brexit  summit,  although  as 
Prime Minister of Belgium he had participated in previous Article 50 meetings and had been actively 
involved  in  Brexit  discussions  among  EU  leaders.  Speaking  in  his  new  role  after  the  Article  50 
meeting, President Michel remarked that the EU was ‘ready to start the next phase. We are ready 
also to defend and promote our European interests. The level playing field is a very important goal 
for us … we hope that it will be possible to keep in the future a very strong strategic relationship 
with the UK.’ It was a quiet end to the noisy business of Brexit in 2019. 

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8. Economic affairs 

8.1. Introduction 

Traditionally,  leaders  devote  their  regular  spring  summit  to  discussing  economic  affairs.  This  is  a 
legacy of the launch of the Lisbon Strategy for economic modernisation by the European Council in 
March  2000.  Other  issues  are  discussed  at  the  March  summit  as  well,  thereby  cutting  into  the 
amount of time available for economic affairs. Such was the case in March 2019, when the European 
Council  had  an  especially  crowded  agenda.  Leaders  spent  most  of  the  first  day  of  the  summit 
discussing Brexit, following the second negative vote in the House of Commons on the Withdrawal 
Agreement  and  in  anticipation  of  a  request  by  the  UK  to  extend  the  deadline  for  the  country’s 
departure from the EU. The European Council’s annual discussion of economic affairs was squeezed 
into the second day of the summit, along with a related discussion about China and discussions 
about other aspects of external relations, climate change, the fight against disinformation, and a 
brief celebration of the 25th anniversary of the European Economic Area. 

In  recent  years,  the  European  Council  has  discussed  economic  affairs  under  the  heading:  ‘Jobs, 
Growth and Competitiveness’. This encapsulates the objectives of EU economic policy: to increase 
employment,  stimulate  growth,  and  boost  competitiveness.  A  fundamental  requirement  for 
achieving  these  objectives  is  ‘strengthening  the  economic  base  of  the  EU’,  which  was  another 
heading  used  by  EU  leaders  to  describe  their  discussion  of  economic  affairs  in  March  2019.  The 
policies encompassed by these headings include the single market, industrial policy, digital policy, 
research and innovation, and trade and investment policy. Competition policy is an ancillary policy 
field,  as  it  serves  to  police  the  single  market.  Economic  and  monetary  union  is  clearly  related  to 
broader economic policy, but is usually discussed separately by the European Council, in the Euro 
Summit format. 

8.2. The single market and related policies 

As the Commission declared in the opening sentence of its landmark communication in November 
2018: ‘The Single Market is one of the greatest achievements of the European project.’ The single 
market programme of the late 1980s is legendary in the history of the European Community and 
became  a  building  block  of  the  new  European  Union.  Even  though  the  target  date  of  1992  for 
completion  of  the  single  market  became  etched  in  the  EU’s  historical  memory,  it  was  well 
understood at the time, by policymakers and economic actors alike, that the single market could 
never  be  truly  complete.  Because  of  the  complexity  of  the  undertaking,  as  well  as  incessant 
technological  and  commercial  innovation  and  the  relentless  process  of  globalisation,  the  single 
market would always be a work in progress.  

The European Council played a decisive role in launching the single market programme and has 
since prided itself on its commitment to keeping the single market firmly on track. This has often 
resulted in ritualistic pronouncements about the importance of the single market for the European 
economy, notably the need to keep abreast of technological and other developments, to enact the 
required legislation, and to ensure implementation of single market measures at the European and 
national levels. Over time, the single market has become an all-encompassing term that covers the 
single market strategy, the capital markets union and the digital single market strategy. Also over 
time,  EU  enlargement  has  increased  economic  diversity  and  accentuated  economic  differences 
among Member States, thereby increasing the heterogeneity of a vast marketplace spanning the 
continent of Europe.  

In March 2018, the European Council asked the Commission to assess the state of play of the single 
market regarding the implementation, application and enforcement of existing legislation, and to 

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identify the remaining barriers and opportunities for a fully functioning single market. This resulted 
in  a  communication  from  the  Commission,  in  November  2018,  entitled:  ‘The  Single  Market  in  a 
changing world’. The subtitle of the communication, ‘A unique asset in need of renewed political 
commitment’, was revealing. It hinted at the Commission’s impatience with the European Council’s 
ritualistic  statements  in  support  of  the  single  market  and  preference  for  a  political  push  by  the 
European Council that would carry the various single market strategies forward.  

Indeed,  the  communication  was  unusually  hard-hitting:  ‘We  are  too  often  confronted  with  a 
situation where the consensus which appears to exist at the highest level on the need to deepen 
the Single Market is not matched by a political willingness to adopt the concrete measures that the 
Commission proposes and that would make a difference, or to transpose and implement measures 
which have already been agreed. Even when they express support for further market integration or 
for further harmonisation, Member States often promote only their domestic approaches as a basis 
for European rules, which can lead to political tensions. This in turn leads to repeated calls on the 
Commission  to  come  forward  with  new  ideas  but  the  willingness  to  follow  through  is  not 
guaranteed. We therefore need an open debate about these issues, and a renewed commitment by 
Leaders to all the dimensions of the Single Market.’ 

The Commission was concerned about possible backsliding in existing areas of market integration 
and failure to integrate in new and rapidly-changing economic sectors: ‘ … in order to avoid barriers 
re-emerging in the traditional markets and new ones appearing in strategic sectors for the future 
such as digital, artificial intelligence or the circular and the low carbon economy. More than ever, we 
need to match rhetoric with delivery and to have an open debate at the highest level leading to a 
renewed commitment by Leaders to the Single Market in all its dimensions.’  

The Commission turned the tables on the European Council by issuing a set of conclusions, in its 
communication, that were reminiscent of the conclusions of a meeting of the European Council, 
which often ‘call on’ and ‘invite’ the other institutions to act. In this case, it was the Commission that: 

‘calls  on  the  European  Council  to  ensure  that  the  Council  works  swiftly  with  the 
European Parliament to adopt by the end of March 2019 the legislative initiatives under 
the Single Market Strategy, the Digital Single Market and the Capital Markets Union and 
Banking  Union  …  as  well  as  other  initiatives  mentioned  in  this  Communication, 
including the social dimension, consumer protection and energy and transport; 

  calls on the European Council to ensure that administrations, at national, regional and 
local level, with the support of the Commission, step up efforts to transpose, apply and 
enforce all Single Market legislation, while avoiding ‘gold-plating’; 

  calls on the European Council to renew their engagement with citizens and businesses 
to promote continued political and public support for the Single Market, notably in the 
context of the European Parliament elections; 
invites the European Council, building on this Communication, to dedicate an in-depth 
discussion at Leaders’ level to the Single Market in all its dimensions to identify common 
priorities  for  action  and  appropriate  mechanisms  to  match  the  much-needed  new 
political  commitment  to  the  Single  Market  with  concrete  delivery  at  all  levels  of 
governance.’ 

The Commission’s communication touched a nerve in the European Council. In the run-up to the 
March 2019 summit, national leaders were becoming increasingly vocal about growing stresses and 
strains  within  the  EU  on  the  single  market  and  related  issues.  Leaders  of  the  new  (post-2004) 
Member States had long felt that the single market was skewed in favour of the economically and 
technologically  more  advanced  countries  of  north-western  Europe,  whose  commitment  to 
liberalisation did not entirely embrace the free movement of workers from poorer countries to the 
east. Economic nationalism and protectionism, developments that were antithetical to European 

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integration, appeared to be increasing within the EU. A number of Member States seemed to be 
adopting slogans and incentives that encouraged their citizens to buy products and services that 
were of national origin.  

Chafing  at  the  Commission’s  rejection  of  a  proposed  merger  between  two  leading  French  and 
German companies, Alstom and Siemens, the governments of both countries pressed to rewrite EU 
competition  rules  that  aimed  to  protect  the  single  market  from  the  emergence  of  government-
backed national – or bi-national – champions. Following a meeting in Berlin on 19 February between 
the German and French economy ministers, the two countries issued ‘A Franco-German Manifesto 
for a European industrial policy fit for the 21st Century’. According to the joint paper: ‘The choice is 
simple when it comes to industrial policy: unite our forces or allow our industrial base and capacity 
to gradually disappear. A strong industry is at the heart of sustainable and inclusive growth. And 
above all, it’s what will give Europe its economic sovereignty and independence.’ The meaning was 
clear: ‘Competition rules … need to be revised to be able to adequately take into account industrial 
policy considerations in order to enable European companies to successfully compete on the world 
stage. Today, amongst the top 40 biggest companies in the world, only 5 are European … we need 
to ensure our companies can actually grow and compete. This entails changes to existing European 
competition rules.’ The proposed changes included: ‘Taking into greater consideration the state-
control of and subsidies for undertakings within the framework of merger control, updating current 
merger  guidelines  to  take  greater  account  of  competition  at  the  global  level’,  and  considering 
‘whether  a  right  of  appeal  of  the  Council  which  could  ultimately  override  Commission  decisions 
could be appropriate in well-defined cases, subject to strict conditions’. 

This  was  the  context  in  which  the  leaders  of  17  Member  States  sent  a  letter,  on  26  February,  to 
President Tusk, insisting that ‘The Single Market … remain a source of growth and opportunities for 
citizens and businesses, by strengthening the four freedoms, embracing new developments and 
challenges and fostering innovation, including a social dimension. Policy-making needs to focus on 
the  facts  and  needs  and  better  enforcement  so  that  the  Single  Market  delivers  for  businesses, 
consumers, workers and citizens.’ The 17 leaders sought to ensure that ‘the Single Market provides 
a solid underpinning for an outward-looking, confident and more autonomous European Union in 
a challenging global environment’. 

It  is  not  unusual  for  groups  of  national  leaders  to  take  an  initiative  of  this  kind,  with  the  aim  of 
drawing attention to a particular opportunity or concern. What was striking about the letter of 26 
February 2019 was the large number of signatories and the absence of France and Germany from 
the list. The letter reportedly originated with Juha Sipilä, the Prime Minister of Finland, a country 
with a strong attachment to free trade and fair competition. In many respects, the contents of the 
letter did not differ greatly from the conclusions of many European Council discussions on the single 
market.  Thus,  it  referred  to  the  single  market  as 
‘the  key  driver  of  the  Union’s  global 
competitiveness’, which would continue to be a ‘source of growth and opportunities for citizens and 
businesses’. Reading  between  the  lines,  however,  it  was  possible  to  discern  criticism  of  incipient 
protectionism (although the word was never used) and a defence of existing competition policy in 
the  face  of  calls  for  change  from  certain  Member  States  (who  were  not  named).  On  services,  for 
instance, the letter stressed ‘that it is necessary to remove remaining cross-border obstacles as well 
as to prevent any new barriers and risk of fragmentation in this regard’, and that Member States 
‘should also commit to improving their performance in reducing service restrictiveness’. In order ‘to 
tackle the challenge of shortage of skilled workforce … remaining barriers [to] labour … mobility 
[should be] removed’. The letter also called for ‘an offensive industrial policy to innovate and remain 
globally  competitive  in  key  technologies  and  strategic  value  chains’.  Implicit  in  the  letter  was 
concern about developments having to do with countries and sectors such as services (Germany), 
posted workers (France), and food (Italy). No wonder that those countries either chose not to sign 
the letter or were not invited to do so. 

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The signatories of the letter were not only sounding the alarm about risks to the integrity of the 
single market, they were also trying to ensure that the EU would keep the single market and the 
existing  competition  policy  regime  front  and  centre  as  strategic  priorities  during  the  next 
institutional cycle. Indeed, their letter was entitled: ‘The future development of the Single Market 
and European digital policy in view of preparation for the next Strategic Agenda’.  

Although addressed to European Council President Tusk, the letter was copied to Antonio Tajani, 
President  of  the  European  Parliament,  and  Jean-Claude  Juncker,  President  of  the  European 
Commission.  Whoever  was  hoping  to  succeed  the  leaders  of  those  institutions  would  have  paid 
attention to the letter as well. 

In his letter of invitation to the summit, President Tusk wrote: ‘Beyond Brexit we will also address the 
longer-term issues facing us. In a more unstable world, shaken by new global, technological and 
environmental realities, there is no doubt that only together can we set our own course and defend 
the strategic interests of  the Union. This is true whether we are talking about strengthening our 
economic  base,  combating  unfair  practices  or  tackling  climate  change.  We  will  therefore  discuss 
how to use all the levers at our disposal to safeguard the interests of our citizens and companies.’ 

The  Franco-German  manifesto,  the  letter  of  the  17  leaders,  and  sometimes  sharp  criticism  by 
national leaders and ministers of other Member States’ positions on the single market suggested 
that the discussion of  economic affairs at the March 2019 summit would be contentious. In fact, 
leaders had little time or inclination at the summit to disagree over economic policy. They glossed 
over the differences between them on the single market and competition policy, exchanged views 
on the current economic situation, and heard from European Central Bank President Mario Draghi, 
who was a guest at the summit. In keeping with its formal role in the European Semester process – 
the EU’s annual cycle of economic and fiscal policy coordination – the European Council endorsed 
the policy priority areas of the annual growth survey and invited Member States to reflect them in 
their forthcoming national reform programmes and stability or convergence programmes, with the 
aim  of  fostering  growth  and  jobs  through  investment  and  reforms.  The  European  Council  also 
endorsed the draft Council recommendation on the economic policy of the euro area. 

Leaders quickly approved the draft conclusions on ‘Growth, Jobs and Competitiveness’. In language 
similar  to  that  found  in  previous  European  Council  conclusions,  leaders  agreed  ‘that  a  strong 
economic base is of key importance for Europe’s prosperity and competitiveness’, and declared that 
this objective should be achieved through ‘the single market, which should place emphasis on the 
service economy; the industrial policy, which should focus inter alia on artificial intelligence; (and) 
the digital policy, which should be fit for an age of digital transformation and data economy’. The 
European  Council  called  on  the  Commission  to  take  various  initiatives  to  help  achieve  these 
objectives, such as developing, by March 2020, a long-term action plan for better implementation 
of single market rules, and presenting, by the end of 2019, a long-term vision with concrete steps 
for the EU’s industrial future. On trade policy, leaders agreed on ‘Pushing for a free trade agenda, 
with  measures  such  as  concluding  new  free  trade  agreements,  making  full  use  of  trade 
defence instruments and resuming discussions on the EU's international procurement instrument. 
The  European  Council  also  called  for  the  necessary  steps  to  be  taken  toward  the  rapid 
implementation of the EU-US joint statement of 25 July 2018.’  

President  Tusk’s  statement  after  the  22  March  meeting  was  short  and  straightforward:  ‘Today 
leaders  discussed  how  to  best  prepare  the  EU  for  increasing  global  economic  competition.  This 
means strengthening the European single market and industrial base, which is key for job creation. 
We also agreed on the need for an open and assertive trade policy. In this context, the European 
Council called to resume the discussion on the public procurement instrument. We want to reinforce 
European capacity to deal with technology theft and cybersecurity threats, and we look forward to 
the  Commission’s  recommendation  on  the  security  of  5G  networks.’  Kicking  further  in-depth 

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deliberations on economic affairs a long way down the road, the European Council agreed that ‘In 
March 2020 [it] will hold an overall discussion on strengthening the economic base of the EU, on the 
basis  of  a  comprehensive  contribution  by  the  Commission’.  Nevertheless,  the  European  Council 
returned briefly to economic affairs at its informal meeting in Sibiu on 9 May, as part of its discussion 
about the future of Europe and the next Strategic Agenda, covering the period 2019-2024. 

The  section  on  economic  affairs  in  the  Leaders’  Note,  prepared  by  President  Tusk  for  the  Sibiu 
summit,  was  predictable.  Entitled  ‘Developing  our  economic  base:  the  European  model  for  the 
future’, it explained that ‘A strong economic base is of key importance for Europe’s prosperity and 
competitiveness, and for its role on the global stage. This should be achieved through an integrated 
approach  addressing  the  current  and  emerging  global,  technological,  security  and  sustainability 
challenges,  and  connecting  all  relevant  policies  and  dimensions.’  Accordingly,  the  Leaders’  Note 
called for ‘Mobilising all relevant policies’ (the single market, industrial policy, taxation policy, and 
EMU),  ‘Promoting  a  level-playing  field’  (through  fair  competition,  fighting  unfair  practices  and 
security risks, and securing strategic supply chains), ‘Investing in our future’ (skills and education, 
innovation and research, public and private investment, sustainable agriculture), and ‘Embracing 
the digital transition’ (by developing artificial intelligence, promoting access to and sharing the use 
of data, and ensuring connectivity). 

Leaders  agreed  on  the  final  version  of  the  Strategic  Agenda  at  their  regular  June  summit.  The 
heading of the section on economic affairs, ‘Developing our economic base: the European model 
for the future’, remained unchanged from the Leaders’ Note. The substance of the section was also 
largely unchanged, but the style differed (the Strategic Agenda was in narrative form, rather than 
consisting largely of bullet points). The opening paragraph of the economic section in the Strategic 
Agenda  elaborates  more  than  the  corresponding  wording  in  the  Leaders’  Agenda:  ‘A  strong 
economic base is of key importance for Europe’s competitiveness, prosperity and role on the global 
stage and for the creation of jobs. As technological, security and sustainability challenges reshape 
the global landscape, we need to renew the basis for long-term sustainable and inclusive growth 
and  strengthen  cohesion  in  the  EU.  This  requires  achieving  the  upward  convergence  of  our 
economies and addressing the demographic challenges.’ The key additions here were the calls for 
sustainable and inclusive growth, stronger cohesion in the EU, upward economic convergence, and 
addressing demographic challenges.  

Also at the June summit, as part of the European Semester, the European Council discussed the final 
country-specific  recommendations,  which  set  out  priorities  for  each  Member  State’s  economic 
policy  for  the  next  12-18  months.  Usually  the  European  Council  ‘endorses’  the  country-specific 
recommendations, but this is not a legal requirement. Indeed, June 2019 was the first time since the 
launch  of  the  process  in  2011  that  the  European  Council  did  not  endorse  the  country-specific 
recommendations, but only discussed them. 

8.3. Trade and investment 

Global trade and investment are key components of the panoply of EU economic policies. The EU’s 
goals are to buttress the rules-based international system, centred on the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), promote freer and fairer trade and investment flows, secure access to foreign markets for EU 
actors,  and  ensure  that  the  EU  is  equipped,  if  necessary,  to  defend  itself  against the  unfair  trade 
practices  of  others.  Pursuing  a  liberal  trade  and  investment  policy  has  become  more  difficult  in 
recent years as globalisation has stalled, populism has risen, and protectionism has soared. Three 
developments have been especially deleterious for the EU. The first is the unrelenting rise of China 
on  the  back  of  aggressive  government  intervention  that  impedes  the  free  flow  of  trade  and 
investment. The second is the damage done by the US administration of President Trump, which 
openly advocated and promoted protectionism, proclaimed the EU an economic foe, and crippled 

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the functioning of the WTO. The third, a result of China’s assertiveness and America’s defensiveness, 
is the outbreak of a US-China trade war, which risked causing collateral damage for the EU. 

Trade and investment are central to the external relations of the EU. The EU’s relations with China 
are mostly about economic affairs, and in recent years EU-China relations have become increasingly 
strained.  Similarly,  EU-US  relations  declined  precipitously  after  2017  in  light  of  the  Trump 
administration’s policies and pronouncements, and the imposition of tariffs on steel imports from 
Europe. The European Council remained keenly interested in 2019 in relations with China and the 
US,  topics  that  it  addressed  under  the  general  heading  of  economic  affairs  as  well  as  traditional 
external relations. However, the European Council was careful not to mention the US in its criticism 
of  certain trade practices, when  it clearly had that country in mind, lest it antagonise the Trump 
administration. By contrast, the European Council was willing to criticise China by name. 

At  the  March  summit,  leaders  included  trade  and  investment  policy  in  their  discussion  about 
strengthening  the  EU’s  economic  base.  As  noted  in  the  conclusions,  under  the  heading  ‘Jobs, 
Growth and Competitiveness’, this ‘should be achieved through an integrated approach addressing 
the  current  and  emerging  global,  technological,  security  and  sustainability  challenges,  and 
connecting all relevant policies and dimensions… (including) an ambitious and robust trade policy 
ensuring  fair  competition,  reciprocity  and  mutual  benefits’.  In  particular,  the  European  Council 
asserted  that  ‘the  EU  should  continue  to  push  for  an  ambitious  and  balanced  free  trade  agenda 
through the conclusion of new Free Trade Agreements, promoting EU values and standards, and 
ensuring  a  level  playing  field.  The  European  Council  reaffirms  its  commitment  to  an  open  rules-
based multilateral trading system with a modernised WTO at its core, and to resisting all forms of 
protectionism  and  distortions.’  In  addition,  the  European  Council  proclaimed  that  ‘the  EU  must 
safeguard  its  interests  in  the  light  of  unfair  practices  of  third  countries,  making  full  use  of  trade 
defence instruments and our public procurement rules, as well as ensuring effective reciprocity for 
public  procurement  with  third  countries’.  The  European  Council  also  called  for  ‘resuming 
discussions  on  the  EU’s  international  procurement  instrument’,  which  aimed  to  pry  open  public 
procurement markets abroad. In response to widespread concerns about the potentially negative 
implications  of  foreign  direct  investment  by  state-controlled  companies,  the  European  Council 
expressed confidence that ‘the new European foreign investment screening framework will enable 
Member States to address investments that threaten security or public order.’ 

Apart from the session at the spring summit devoted to ‘Jobs, Growth and Competitiveness’, the 
European Council intended to devote a session, over dinner on 21 March, to discussing relations 
with China, in preparation for the forthcoming EU-China summit on 9 April. Because of breaking 
developments,  this  session  instead  was  devoted  to  Brexit.  As  a  result,  leaders  included  the 
discussion of China in the session the following day on general economic affairs. The implications of 
China’s  rise  as  a  global  economic  power,  especially  in  sectors  such  as  automated  machines  and 
robots,  energy-saving  and  electric  vehicles,  aerospace  and  aeronautics,  and 
information 
technology,  was  of  particular  concern  to  the  European  Council  because  of  the  Chinese 
government’s intervention, ranging from direct State aid to tax incentives, licensing, and regulatory 
approvals.  So  was  China’s  Belt  and  Road  Initiative,  an  ambitious  plan  to  undertake  large-scale 
infrastructure development projects in Africa, Asia and Europe, which had already covered more 
than 120 countries since its launch in 2013. Most Member States shared a general wariness of China, 
but many – notably in southern and eastern Europe – were willing to participate in the Belt and Road 
Initiative and were enthusiastic about Chinese foreign direct investment. 

As a contribution to the European Council’s discussion, the Commission and High Representative 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy prepared a joint communication on EU-China relations. The 
communication was highly critical of China and proposed ten steps for the EU to take; these aimed, 
among other things, at improving market access for EU businesses in China and strengthening the 
EU’s ability to redress unfair trade practices. The Commission and the High Representative were duly 

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deferential  to  national  leaders:  ‘Finding  the  right  balance  of  policy  approaches  is  a  political 
judgement, requiring the attention of the European Council.’ 

In the event, the European Council did not endorse the joint communication but clearly drew from 
it in referring to trade and investment issues in the summit conclusions, under the heading ‘Jobs, 
Growth and Competitiveness’, without, however, mentioning China. The only reference to China in 
the  conclusions  was  the  simple  statement,  under  the  heading  ‘External  Relations’,  that  ‘The 
European Council prepared the EU-China summit to be held on 9 April 2019. It exchanged views on 
overall relations with China in the global context.’  

In his remarks after the summit, President Tusk could well have been thinking about China when he 
said that leaders ‘agreed  on the need for an open and assertive trade policy. In this context, the 
European  Council  called  to  resume  the  discussion  on  the  public  procurement  instrument.’  He 
referred specifically to China when he said that ‘We also discussed the priorities for next month’s 
summit  with  China.  Our  aim  is  to  focus  on  achieving  a  balanced  relation,  which  ensures  fair 
competition  and  equal  market  access.  In  this  context,  we  hope  to  persuade  China  to  include 
industrial subsidies as a crucial element of the WTO reform.’ 

President Tusk was more forthcoming in his report on the summit that he delivered to the European 
Parliament on 27 March: ‘Apart from next month’s EU-China summit, there are also other meetings 
and summits with the Chinese leaders. Therefore, it was crucially important to agree a coordinated, 
European approach. We worked out a positive stance that offers ambitious cooperation on bilateral 
and global issues, including trade. We both have a key economic interest in maintaining significant 
trade flows, which are possible thanks to the rules-based trading system. However, for this system 
to continue to operate, it needs to be quickly updated. For the EU, this means serious reform of the 
WTO that would cover industrial subsidies, as a priority. We want to persuade China to address this, 
and I am convinced we shouldn't give up. As regards bilateral issues, we would like to finalise talks 
on  the  investment  agreement  already  next  year.  We  will  discuss  all  of  this  with  China  at  the 
upcoming summit.’  

At  its  meeting  in  June  2019,  the  European  Council  adopted  the  new  Strategic  Agenda,  which 
included  language  on  trade  and  investment  that  clearly  had  China  in  mind:  ‘In  a  world  where 
common rules and standards are increasingly questioned, it will be vital to promote a level playing 
field, including in the area of trade. This means ensuring fair competition within the EU and on the 
global  stage,  promoting  market  access,  fighting  unfair  practices,  extraterritorial  measures  and 
security  risks  from  third  countries,  and  securing  our  strategic  supply  chains.  We  will  continue  to 
update  our  European  competition  framework  to  new  technological  and  global  market 
developments.’  

Trade  policy  came  up  briefly  at  the  December  meeting  of  the  European  Council  when  leaders 
expressed their concern at the paralysis of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism following the 
refusal of the United States to replace members of the Appellate Body. Accordingly, the European 
Council  reiterated  its  full  support  for  the  global  rules-based  international  order  and  noted  with 
concern  the  paralysis  of  the  WTO’s  mechanism  for  settling  disputes.  Leaders supported  the 
European Commission’s efforts to set up interim arrangements with third countries while actively 
pursuing a permanent solution, and called on the European Parliament and the Council to examine, 
‘as a matter of priority’, the Commission’s proposal to adapt the EU legislation referring to the EU’s 
rights under international trade agreements. 

8.4. Economic and monetary union 

Reform of the economic and monetary union – essentially, agreeing on a set of measures to improve 
the functioning of the euro area – has been high on the agenda of the European Council ever since 

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the onset of the euro crisis in 2010. The main elements of reform include strengthening the banking 
union,  the  EU-level  banking  supervision  and  resolution  system,  the  introduction  of  a  common 
backstop  for  the  Single  Resolution  Fund,  used  to  help  resolve  failing  banks,  and  reform  of  the 
European  Stability  Mechanism  (ESM),  the  bail-out  fund  for  euro  area  countries  experiencing  or 
threatened by severe financing difficulties.  

These are highly technical issues, the details of which are the province of the Eurogroup of finance 
ministers  of  euro  area  countries,  and  relevant  services  of  the  Commission.  They  are  also  highly 
political, hence the need for the European Council’s involvement, mostly in the form of the Euro 
Summit (meetings of the leaders of euro area countries). None of the EU-27 leaders disputed the 
need for EMU reform, but all had difficulty agreeing on the specifics. Moreover, the waning of the 
euro crisis eased the pressure for reform, and the emergence of other pressing issues, such as Brexit 
and the need to take decisions pertaining to the new institutional cycle, limited the time available 
to leaders for EMU-related discussions. 

In addition to the long-standing list of suggested reforms, President Macron had thrown another 
item  into  the  EMU  mix:  a  proposal  to  create  a  ‘eurozone  budget’  that  would  provide  automatic 
stabilisers to  help  boost  consumption  and  business  spending  over  the  business  cycle,  notably 
during an economic downturn. The absence of such a mechanism had arguably exacerbated the 
economic impact of the euro crisis. Originally, President Macron had envisioned a large stabilisation 
fund, worth several percentage points of eurozone GDP, separate from the EU budget and with its 
own revenue streams, such as pan-European taxes on big technology companies or the financial 
sector. But the idea was deeply unpopular with the northern European, creditor countries informally 
known  as  the  New  Hanseatic  League,  led  by  the  Netherlands.  Proud  of  their  fiscal  rectitude, 
members of the New Hanseatic League were loath to see the euro area become a ‘transfer union’ in 
which, as they saw it, funds would flow automatically from rich, responsible creditor countries to 
poor, irresponsible, peripheral Member States. 

At  the  Euro  Summit  in  December  2018,  leaders  issued  a  statement endorsing  a  report  of  the 
Eurogroup on EMU deepening, including steps for reform of the ESM, the terms of reference of the 
common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund, and a way forward on the banking union. Leaders 
also gave a mandate to the Eurogroup for further work on President Macron’s proposal, which by 
that time had been watered down to ‘a budgetary instrument for convergence and competitiveness 
for the euro area’. Far from being an independent financial instrument, EU-27 leaders agreed that ‘It 
will be part of the EU budget’. The word ‘stabilisation’ was nowhere to be found. President Tusk 
hailed the outcome of the December 2018 Euro Summit: ‘A year ago, we promised concrete steps 
to strengthen the Economic and Monetary Union. Today, leaders delivered on this promise.’ In fact, 
leaders were far from being in agreement on the entirety of EMU reform at the beginning of 2019. 

The Leaders’ Agenda called for a discussion of EMU – ’state of play and any further decisions’ – at 
the European Council on 21-22 March 2019, but this did not happen. Leaders were too busy with 
other important issues, including a special Brexit (Article 50) meeting on the evening of 21 March, 
to turn their attention to EMU. Nor had the Eurogroup made sufficient progress on EMU reform to 
warrant a discussion, let alone a decision-making session, by leaders at the March summit. Instead, 
leaders discussed EMU for the first time in 2019 at their 20-21 June meeting, when they held a Euro 
Summit, in an extended (EU-27) format, on the second day. 

Finance ministers met in the Eurogroup each month before the June European Council, including a 
week  before  leaders  convened  for  the  Euro  Summit.  They  continued  to  discuss  EMU  reform, 
focusing especially on an overhaul of the ESM. This had already been under discussion for 3 years. It 
aimed to bring the ESM under Community law, thereby reducing the scope for potential vetoes by 
national  governments  and  increasing  the  accountability  of  its  decision-making  in  relation  to  the 
European Parliament, improve its functioning in various ways, and expand its scope so that it could 

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provide  a  backstop  to  the  Single  Resolution  Fund.  Finance  ministers  reached  a  preliminary 
agreement shortly before the Euro Summit.42  

The  discussions  among  finance  ministers  about  the  proposed  instrument  for  convergence  and 
competitiveness were more time-consuming and testing. In early 2019, they acted as proxies for 
their national leaders: the French and Dutch finance ministers were at loggerheads, with the German 
finance minister hovering between an intellectual attachment to the Dutch position and a political 
attachment  to  the  French  position.  France  continued  to  push  for  a  large  eurozone  budget,  if 
necessary,  on  the  basis  of  an  intergovernmental  agreement,  with  key  decisions  being  taken  by 
eurozone governments. The Netherlands insisted on strict conditions, including giving veto power 
to national governments on spending decisions. On the eve of the Euro Summit, it was clear that 
governments  could  not  agree  on  fundamental  aspects  of  the  instrument  for  convergence  and 
competitiveness, including its size and precise purpose. 

interest 

in  what  came  to  be  called  the  budgetary 

Under the circumstances, the Euro Summit of 21 June was bound to be disappointing. Having let 
their economy ministers fight it out in the media and at meetings of the Eurogroup, national leaders 
resigned themselves at the Euro Summit to platitudes about the importance of EMU reform, notably 
changes to the treaty establishing the ESM and strengthening the banking union, and expressions 
instrument  for  convergence  and 
of 
competitiveness (BICC).  Leaders  did  not  endorse  the  preliminary  agreement  reached  by  their 
finance  ministers  on  reform  of  the  ESM.  As  the  meeting  page  noted  dryly,  ‘The  Euro  Summit 
welcomed  the  progress  made  by  the  Eurogroup  and  invited  it  to  continue  working  on  all  the 
elements of the package’, a subject to which the European Council planned to return in December 
2019.  Other  than  that,  leaders  discussed  the economic  situation together  with  European  Central 
Bank President Mario Draghi.  

President  Tusk  put  a  positive  spin  on  the  meeting  in  his  post-summit  statement:  ‘The  leaders 
discussed  the  further  strengthening  of  the  Economic  and  Monetary  Union.  We  took  note  of  the 
broad agreement on a euro area budgetary instrument. The Eurogroup in an inclusive format will 
continue  its  work  on  this  instrument,  which  will  eventually  be  integrated  into  the  long-term  EU 
budget.  The  leaders  also  expect  work  on  the  European  Stability  Mechanism  (ESM)  Treaty  to  be 
finalised by the end of 2019.’ 

In the months following the June Euro Summit, finance ministers renewed their efforts to reach a 
draft agreement on the BICC, while continuing to grapple with far-reaching EMU reform. Given that 
the size of the BICC was becoming bound up in the negotiations for the next MFF, which would 
begin  in  earnest  only  in  2020,  there  was  little  prospect  of  reaching  a  definitive  agreement  on  it 
before the next Euro Summit, in December. Otherwise, the finance ministers had come much closer 
together  on  the  proposed  instrument’s  precise  purpose  and  management  arrangements.  At  the 
same time, the finance ministers were having difficult discussions about possible changes to the 
stability  and  growth  pact,  an  issue  that  was  bound  to  sour  relations  between  the  northern  and 
southern Member States.  

In  view  of  the  incomplete  negotiations  on  various  aspects  of  EMU  reform,  leaders  were  not  in  a 
position  to  take  major  decisions  at  the  December  Euro  Summit.  The  background  brief  for  the 
meeting stated simply that ‘there will be a Euro Summit in inclusive format where EU-27 leaders will 
take stock of the implementation of their June 2019 statement concerning the strengthening of the 
Economic and Monetary Union’. Leaders duly welcomed ‘the progress made in the Eurogroup in an 
inclusive format on the deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union’, and tasked the Eurogroup 
‘to continue to work on the ESM package of reforms … and to continue work on all elements of the 

42   Vallée,  S.,  Cohen-Setton,  J.,  De  Gruawe,  P.,  Dullien,  S.,  ‘Why  the  European  Stability  Mechanism  reform  should  be 

postponed’, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2019. 

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further strengthening of the banking union, on a consensual basis’. On the BICC, leaders invited the 
Eurogroup ‘to provide its contribution swiftly on the appropriate solutions for its financing … in the 
context  of  the  next  MFF’.  Leaders  also  discussed  a  cherished  EU  objective:  enhancing  ‘the 
international  role  of  the  euro,  which  should  be  commensurate  with  the  global  economic  and 
financial weight of the Union’. While desirable, EMU issues no longer seemed pressing for EU leaders, 
who were happy to ‘encourage work to be taken forward on all these issues and will come back to 
them at the latest in June 2020’. 

President Michel had little to add to the official statement of the Euro Summit in his remarks after 
the meeting. He put most emphasis on ‘the international role of the euro’, which he deemed ‘a very 
important  objective’.  President  Michel  added  that  ‘A  few  days  ago,  we  have  started  again  [the] 
process of regular inter-institutional meetings with the Commission, the President of the European 
Central Bank, and the President of the Eurogroup. It is our goal to try to develop a mid-term, a long-
term vision … with regards to the international role of the euro. We will have the occasion in the 
next months to speak again in the European Council and see how it is possible to try to take steps 
in the right direction with regard to this important point.’ As the Euro Summit statement stressed, 
however, the weight and influence of the euro internationally would depend to a large extent on 
the success of EMU reform, which remained incomplete in 2019. 

Especially when compared to the summit discussions of the previous evening on climate change, 
the Euro Summit was remarkably relaxed. Perhaps its real significance was that it provided leaders 
with  a  first  opportunity  to  meet  Christine  Lagarde  in  her  new  role  as  President  of  the  European 
Central Bank. 

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9. Climate policy 

9.1. Introduction 

The European Council addressed climate policy on a number of occasions in 2019, culminating in a 
contentious discussion at the December summit. At issue was the EU’s ambitious goal of becoming 
climate-neutral  –  cutting  net  carbon  emissions  to  zero  –  by  2050.  Setting  such  a  goal  would 
represent  a  major  achievement  for  the  EU  while  cementing  its  self-image  and  international 
reputation as the leading global player in the fight against climate change. Apart from a pressing 
need for action within the EU, as elsewhere, on climate policy, two big international events in 2019 
focused the EU’s attention on this vital matter: one was the special United Nations Climate Action 
Summit in New York, in September, the other was the UN Climate Change Conference COP25 in 
Chile, in December, the end of which coincided with the final European Council of the year. National 
leaders hoped to be able to bolster the bloc’s leadership and influence at these international events 
by agreeing on crucial, far-reaching steps within the EU to reduce global carbon emissions, in line 
with the celebrated Paris climate accord. 

9.2. The 2050 target 

In 2019, climate policy first came onto the agenda of the European Council at the March summit. 
Following up on a discussion on climate change at the December 2018 summit, and drawing on a 
Commission communication and a background note from the Romanian Presidency, leaders held ‘a 
policy  debate  on  the  EU’s  long-term  strategic  vision  for  a  prosperous,  modern,  competitive  and 
climate-neutral  economy’.  Despite  well-known  differences  among  Member  States  on  aspects  of 
climate policy, the discussion at the March summit was short and relatively uncontentious. Leaders 
had other, more pressing matters to address, and had not planned to discuss climate policy in detail.  

Accordingly, the conclusions merely reiterated the EU’s commitment to the Paris Agreement, called 
for renewed global efforts to tackle climate change, advocated the prompt completion of national 
strategies to address the issue (only four Member States – Czechia, France, Germany and the United 
Kingdom  –  had  so  far  done  so),  and  noted  that  implementation  of  the  Paris  Agreement  ‘offered 
significant  opportunities  and  potential  for  economic  growth,  new  jobs  and  technological 
development  and  for  strengthening  European  competitiveness,  which  must  be  reaped  while 
ensuring a just and socially balanced transition for all’. Hinting at difficulties to come, leaders also 
emphasised the importance for the EU, by 2020 at the latest, of launching an ambitious long-term 
strategy to achieve climate neutrality, in line with the Paris Agreement, ‘while taking into account 
Member  States’  specificities  and  the  competitiveness  of  European  industry’.  Divergent  national 
interests  would  indeed  plague  efforts  to  reach  unanimity,  by  the  end  of  the  year,  on  a  specific 
strategy and a target date for the sought-after goal of reducing net carbon emissions to zero. 

Climate policy gathered momentum for the European Council with the publication of a ‘non-paper‘ 
by eight Member States – France, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain 
and Sweden – in early May, in the run-up to the Sibiu informal summit. This was another example in 
2019 of a group of countries taking an initiative to highlight a point of particular concern to them. 
The countries in question were ahead of the others in their willingness to call unequivocally for the 
EU to ‘adopt an ambitious long-term strategy with the objective of reaching net-zero greenhouse 
gas emissions by 2050 at the latest’.43 

43   Simon, F., ‘Germany, Poland snub EU appeal for greater climate ambition’, Euractiv, 2019. 

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Notably absent from the group was Germany, a leader in climate policy, and the countries of central 
and eastern Europe, which tended to be laggards. Perhaps anticipating the battle on climate policy 
later in the year, Germany chose to keep its powder dry and not risk alienating Member States that 
would have difficulty endorsing the 2050 target date. 

Climate  was  not  discussed  in  any  depth  or  detail  in  Sibiu,  but  it  was  included  in  the  Declaration 
issued at the end of the summit. Rather than dealing with the substance of the policy field, however, 
leaders merely promised in the Declaration ‘to jointly tackle global issues such as preserving our 
environment and fighting climate change’, in the context of a commitment for the EU to become ‘a 
responsible  global  leader’.  The  Sibiu  Declaration  fed  into  the  Strategic  Agenda  for  2019-2024, 
adopted by leaders at their regular June summit. Indeed, ‘building a climate-neutral, green, fair and 
social Europe’ was one of the five, catch-all priorities of the new Strategic Agenda, a section of which 
was devoted to the topic. In it, leaders agreed that ‘As the effects of climate change become more 
visible and pervasive, we urgently need to step up our action to manage this existential threat. The 
EU can and must lead the way, by engaging in an in-depth transformation of its own economy and 
society to achieve climate neutrality. This will have to be conducted in a way that takes account of 
national circumstances and is socially just.’ 

Whereas deciding on the language on climate policy in the Strategic Agenda was easy, reaching 
agreement on a commitment to climate neutrality by 2050 proved impossible at the June summit. 
With the UN Summit looming, leaders focused on the need to step up EU climate action and ensure 
the  transition  to  net  carbon  emissions.  After  a  rancorous  discussion,  the  leaders  of  four  Member 
States – Estonia, Czechia, Hungary and Poland – held out against the target date of 2050. It was no 
surprise that Poland’s Prime Minister, Mateusz Morawiecki, was the most vocal of the hold-outs. As 
he had repeatedly explained inside and outside the European Council, Poland is heavily reliant on 
domestic coal for its electricity production and would incur heavier costs than other Member States 
in order to achieve ambitious emissions reductions. Like other leaders, Prime Minister Morawiecki 
was keenly attuned to national constituencies, in this case the highly influential coal industry. Given 
Poland’s history, national security was another key consideration for the Prime Minister. Severely 
curtailing  carbon  emissions,  while  environmentally  desirable,  could  be  strategically  risky  if  it 
increased  Poland’s  dependence  on  foreign  energy  sources.  The  other  three  leaders  seemed  less 
adamant  than  Prime  Minister  Morawiecki  on  the  question  of  climate  policy,  with  the  leaders  of 
Czechia  and  Hungary  supporting  Poland  in  part  out  of  solidarity  with  another  member  of  the 
Visegrad Four group of central and eastern European countries. 

The Czech and Hungarian leaders may also have wanted to show their support for Prime Minister 
Morawiecki  in  the  face  of  President  Macron’s  vocal  criticism  of  Poland’s  position.  The  French 
President had already clashed with the Polish Prime Minister, and with the leaders of Czechia and 
Hungary,  on  a  number  of  issues,  including  the  rule  of  law.  President  Macron’s  strong  rebuttal  of 
Prime Minister Morawiecki’s arguments against committing to the proposed climate strategy likely 
strengthened the recalcitrance of the three central and eastern European leaders. Being averse to 
disputes within the European Council, Chancellor Merkel was more understanding of the minority 
position while making clear her own preference for the target date of 2050. 

The  conclusions  of  the  June  summit  made  the  best  of  a  difficult  discussion.  They  included 
uncontroversial  language  about  the  importance  of  the  forthcoming  UN  Summit  and  the  active 
involvement of Member States and the Commission in preparations for it. The European Council 
duly invited the Council and the Commission ‘to advance work on the conditions, the incentives and 
the enabling framework to be put in place so as to ensure a transition to a climate-neutral EU in line 
with  the  Paris  Agreement  that  will  preserve  European  competitiveness,  be  just  and  socially 
balanced, take account of Member States’ national circumstances and respect their right to decide 
on their own energy mix, while building on the measures already agreed to achieve the [previously 
agreed-upon] 2030 reduction target’. However, the goal of transitioning to ‘a climate-neutral EU in 

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line  with  the  Paris  Agreement’  contained  a  revealing  footnote:  ‘For  a  large  majority  of  Member 
States, climate neutrality must be achieved by 2050.’ As is the case with official European Council 
documents, the names of the Member States in the majority and the minority were not included.  

At the June summit, Donald Tusk had not been in a good position to mediate the dispute involving 
Prime Minister Morawiecki, a bitter political rival in the European Council President’s native Poland. 
The  President’s  post-summit  comments  on  the  leaders’  climate  deliberations  were  somewhat 
pointed: ‘We also discussed how to ensure a climate-neutral EU in line with the Paris Agreement. A 
vast majority of Member States has committed to climate neutrality by 2050. But reaching unanimity 
was  not  possible  today.’  By  referring  to  a  ‘vast  majority’  rather  than  a  ‘large  majority’,  as  in  the 
conclusions, President Tusk subtly suggested the seemingly extreme position of the four hold-outs. 
The  President  added:  ‘we  have  good  reason  to  believe  that  this  [opposition]  may  change,  as  no 
country ruled out the possibility of a positive decision in the coming months’. 

Failure to reach unanimity on the target date of 2050 for climate neutrality slightly dimmed the EU’s 
lustre at the UN Climate Summit in September, but the EU still shone on the world stage as a global 
leader in this policy field. The advent of the Finnish Council Presidency, in July, helped to keep the 
spotlight within the EU on climate policy, a priority for the government in Helsinki, which included 
members  of  the  Green  Party.  Indeed,  Finland’s  national  climate  target  called  for  net  carbon 
emissions by 2035, although the government had not yet devised a detailed strategy for meeting 
such an ambitious goal. At the same time, Commission President-elect von der Leyen promised to 
put climate at the top of her agenda, calling for a ‘Green New Deal’ and a quick commitment to the 
2050 goal. These developments further burnished the EU’s credentials as a global leader in the fight 
against climate change while presaging additional battles within the European Council. 

The high cost of meeting EU carbon emissions targets meant that Poland would expect significant 
compensation  before  abandoning  its  opposition  to  the  2050  goal.  The  Commission  had  already 
been working on a ‘Just Transition Fund’ to help Poland and other heavily coal-dependent Member 
States  make  the  expensive  transition  to  climate  neutrality.  Financial  assistance  to  hard-pressed 
Member  States  was  bound  to  be  part  of  a  comprehensive  agreement  within  the  EU  on  climate 
policy.  It  would  nevertheless  be  controversial  and  would  likely  complicate  the  negotiations  that 
were  about  to  start  in  earnest  for  the  next  MFF.  Many  of  the  net  contributors  to  the  EU  budget, 
already  alarmed  by  calls  for  additional  EU  spending,  would  baulk  at  establishing  a  substantial 
Transition Fund. 

The regular October summit gave EU leaders an opportunity to take stock of the climate debate. By 
that time Estonia, which had not been as strongly opposed as the other three hold-outs to the 2050 
goal, but had a climate-sceptic party in the coalition government, had signalled its switch to the 
majority position. In the event, leaders did not spend much time on climate at their busy October 
meeting. The conclusions noted merely that the European Council welcomed the outcome of the 
UN  Climate  Summit,  and  that  it  was  ‘determined  that  the  EU  will  continue  to  lead  the  way  in  a 
socially fair and just green transition in the implementation of the Paris Agreement, in line with its 
June  2019  conclusions’.  As  for  the  contested  goal  of  climate  neutrality  by  2050,  ‘the  European 
Council recalls that it will finalise its guidance on the EU’s long-term strategy on climate change at 
its December meeting’. 

9.3. The December summit 

Coinciding with the end of the COP25, held under the Presidency of Chile with logistical support 
from Spain, the December summit was an opportunity for the European Council to emphasise its 
commitment to tackling climate change by declaring the Member States’ unanimous adoption of 
the 2050 target for achieving zero carbon emissions. This was the first European Council attended 
by Charles Michel and Ursula von der Leyen in their new presidential positions. Only the day before 

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the  opening  of  the  summit,  President  von  der  Leyen  proposed  the  European  Green  Deal  at  the 
European  Parliament.  This  included  possible  funding  of  up  to  €100bn  for  climate  transition  in 
eligible Member States, something that was clearly intended to change the minds of the three hold-
outs at the summit – the leaders of Czechia, Hungary and Poland. A successful summit outcome 
would bolster Ursula von der Leyen’s standing at the outset of her Presidency, especially after her 
rocky approval process in the EP.  

For  Charles  Michel,  the  stakes  at  the  summit  were  much  higher.  Climate  change  was  one  of  the 
issues that he had singled out for special attention as European Council President. As part of the 
usual round of meetings with national leaders before a major summit, President Michel travelled to 
Poland for extensive discussions with Prime Minister Morawiecki. The cordiality of their meetings, 
including over dinner in a Warsaw restaurant, was captured in the documentary about the European 
Council authorised by President Michel and broadcast in 2020. It is clear from the film that President 
Michel appreciated Prime Minister Morawiecki’s reluctance to commit to the 2050 target, but was 
optimistic about the chances of reaching an agreement at the summit.44 

In his letter of invitation, President Michel stated: ‘I want us to agree on the commitment for the EU 
to become climate-neutral by 2050. This would be a major signal from the European Council that 
the EU will take a global leadership role on this crucial issue. It is my conviction that the transition to 
climate neutrality will create new opportunities for economic growth and development. However, 
we must also recognise that it will require … [that we] put in place a framework and the necessary 
resources to chart a fair and balanced path towards our objective. This means taking into account 
the different national realities and starting points.’  

The summit did not work out as planned. In a dramatic touch, environmental activists scaled the 
Europa  building,  where  the  summit  was  taking  place,  setting  off  flares  and  unveiling  a  banner 
declaring  a  climate  emergency  in  Europe. Starting  a  little  later  than  planned,  the  first  day  of  the 
summit  opened,  as  usual,  with  an  exchange  of  views  with  the  EP  President.  Leaders  were  then 
scheduled  to  spend  the  bulk  of  the  afternoon  discussing  ‘the  vital  challenge  of  climate  change’ 
before turning, over dinner, to the MFF. The first day was to have concluded shortly after dinner with 
a debrief on the implementation of the Minsk Agreement, concerning the situation in Ukraine, along 
with the endorsement of short conclusions on the WTO, Africa and Turkey. Instead, leaders spent 
almost the whole first day of the summit on climate, touching only briefly on other issues before 
ending the session well after midnight. By that time,  Czechia and Hungary  had abandoned their 
opposition to the 2050 target, but Poland remained obdurate. 

During  the  protracted  discussions,  which  took  place  in  small  groups  as  well  as  in  plenaries,  the 
Finnish Prime Minister (in the Council Presidency), President von der Leyen and President Michel did 
their utmost to bring Poland on board. Tempers were often frayed, with President Macron and Prime 
Minister Morawiecki once more rubbing each other up the wrong way. All leaders have domestic 
constraints,  and  can  usually  empathise  with  each  other.  The  Polish  leader  faced  a  powerful  coal 
lobby and influential far-right politicians dismissive of climate science. To help him prevail at home, 
and also on the merits of the issue, Prime Minister Morawiecki needed credible commitments from 
the  European  Council  of  large-scale  financial  assistance  for  making  the  transition  to  climate 
neutrality,  but  not  at  the  expense  of  spending  on  cohesion  or  agriculture  in  the  next  MFF,  from 
which Poland expected to benefit. He also wanted to ensure that Poland had sufficient flexibility to 
devise its own strategy to reach the 2050 goal. 

Other leaders were wary of linking the proposed Just Transition Mechanism too closely to the MFF. 
Negotiations for the next MFF, on which leaders were supposed to touch, however briefly, at the 

44   Bureau, A. and Yann-Anthony, N., ‘Sommets: dans les secrets des négociations européennes: Le climat’, La Chaîne parlementaire, 

2021. 

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December  summit,  would  be  tricky  enough  without  the  addition  of  costly  climate  adaptation. 
Nevertheless, all agreed that there would need to be some kind of connection between the Just 
Transition  Mechanism  and  the  MFF.  As  the  talks  progressed,  leaders  seemed  poised  to  reach  a 
satisfactory  agreement.  In  the  end,  however,  Poland  was  not  yet  prepared  to  go  along  with  the 
others.  

Czechia and Hungary joined the majority not only because of financial incentives, but also because 
of an understanding among leaders that nuclear energy could be an option for meeting climate 
targets. This was a rare instance in 2019 of the leaders of France, Czechia and Hungary seeing eye-
to-eye. The conclusions were carefully drafted in order not to alienate countries, such as Austria and 
Luxembourg,  that  were  strongly  anti-nuclear:  ‘The  European  Council  acknowledges  the  need  to 
ensure energy security and to respect the right of the Member States to decide on their energy mix 
and to choose the most appropriate technologies. Some Member States have indicated that they 
use nuclear energy as part of their national energy mix.’  

On  the  crucial  question  of  the  target  date,  the  conclusions  declared  that  ‘the  European  Council 
endorses the objective of achieving a climate-neutral EU by 2050, in line with the objectives of the 
Paris Agreement. One Member State, at this stage, cannot commit to implement this objective as 
far as it is concerned, and the European Council will come back to this in June 2020.’ Indeed, the 
European Council promised to ‘keep progress towards the EU’s objective of climate neutrality by 
2050 under review and give strategic guidance, as appropriate’. Beyond that, leaders stressed that 
the  transition  to  climate  neutrality  would  bring significant  opportunities for  economic  growth, 
markets, jobs and technological development, took note of the Commission’s communication on 
the European Green Deal and asked the Council to work on it, and recognised the need to put in 
place  a  framework  to  ensure  a  cost-effective,  socially  balanced  and  fair  transition  to  climate 
neutrality, taking into account different national circumstances. They also acknowledged that the 
next  MFF would  significantly  contribute  to  climate  action,  with  tailored  support  for  regions  and 
sectors most affected by the transition being made available from the Just Transition Mechanism. 

The statement in the conclusions that ‘The European Council endorses the objective of achieving a 
climate-neutral EU by 2050’, seemed disingenuous, given the clarification in the next sentence that 
‘One  Member  State,  at  this  stage,  cannot  commit  to  implement  this  objective  as  far  as  it  is 
concerned’. Charles Michel sought to gloss over this anomaly in his post-summit press conference, 
his first as European Council President. In what the Financial Times described as a bout of Belgian 
surrealism,  President  Michel  gave  a  torturous  explanation  of  the  summit  discussions  and  their 
outcome.45 Pressed by puzzled journalists, Charles Michel understandably sought to portray the first 
summit of his Presidency as an undeniable success. The EU had certainly come a long way in 2019 
towards committing to the ambitious goal of climate neutrality by 2050, but Poland’s continuing 
resistance was a disappointment. The President and other leaders cannot have relished the prospect 
of returning to this issue in June 2020, as called for in the December 2019 conclusions. 

45   Khan, M., ‘Climate contortions at EU leaders’ summit', Financial Times, 2019.  

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10. The multiannual financial framework 

The multiannual financial framework was the dog that did not bark in the European Council in 2019. 
Leaders did, indeed, discuss the MFF on a number of occasions, notably in October and December. 
They also made clear, on numerous occasions in 2019, that negotiating the next MFF would be a 
fraught and arduous process. But the MFF did not preoccupy the European Council throughout the 
year in a way that leaders, in 2018, thought that it might.  

The current MFF was due to expire at the end of 2020. Working backwards, the new MFF would need 
to  be  agreed  in  plenty  of  time  to  allow  for  the  potentially  lengthy  approval  process.  Ideally, 
negotiations  would  therefore  be  finished  by  the  end  of  2019,  which  was  the  goal  of  the  Finnish 
Presidency  in  the  second  semester  of  the  year.  In  the  event,  negotiations  within  the  European 
Council  began  in  earnest  only  in  early  2020.  Given  other  developments  in  2019,  such  as  the 
uncertainty of Brexit, which had implications for the EU budget, and the change in EU institutional 
leadership,  the  European  Council  was  happy  to  hold  things  over  until  the  start  of  the  new  year. 
Undoubtedly, inertia played a part. Knowing how contentious the budget negotiations were bound 
to be, and already involved in difficult talks over climate policy and other issues, leaders in 2019 
understandably put the MFF on the long finger. 

Leaders  had  first  discussed  the  forthcoming  MFF  at  an  informal  summit  in  February  2018.  The 
purpose  of  the  meeting,  according  to  President  Tusk,  was  for  the  European  Council  to  give  the 
Commission  ‘political  guidance  …  before  coming  up  with  its  proposals’.  Leaders  discussed  the 
general priorities for the period of the next MFF, the overall level of expenditure, and the possible 
timetable for the negotiations. Without yet trying to reach agreement on the size of the budget, 
leaders acknowledged that the EU would need to ‘spend more on stemming illegal migration, on 
defence and security, as well as on the Erasmus+ programme’.  

Leaders  claimed  that  they  wanted  to  speed  up  the  MFF  negotiations,  in  comparison  with  the 
previous MFF, which took almost 2 years from the time the Commission submitted its proposal to 
the time that the European Council reached a political agreement. The Commission presented its 
proposal  for  the  2021-2027  MFF  on  2  May  2018,  thereby  formally  launching  the  negotiations. 
Thereafter,  the  General  Affairs  Council  regularly  discussed  the  MFF.  Leaders  had  their  first 
substantial  exchange  of  views  on  the MFF, on  the  basis  of  a  progress  report  by  the  Council 
Presidency, at their December 2018 summit. As well as calling on the incoming Council Presidency 
to continue work on the MFF, leaders declared their aim to reach an agreement in the European 
Council in the autumn of 2019.  

The  General  Affairs  Council  worked  in  the  first  semester  of  2019  to  provide  the  June  European 
Council with a negotiating box for its deliberations. Prepared by the Council Presidency, with the 
approval of the General Affairs Council, the negotiating box is a means of structuring negotiations 
among national leaders on the MFF, not least by highlighting issues that would most likely require 
political  guidance  from  the  European  Council.  At  the  summit,  leaders  briefly  discussed  the 
negotiating  box  prepared  by  the  Romanian  Presidency.  While  welcoming  the  work  done  by  the 
General Affairs Council and the Presidency, leaders agreed that the process was still at a rudimentary 
stage. Therefore, they called on the incoming Finnish Presidency to develop a new negotiating box 
as the basis for a more detailed discussion in the European Council in October. The June conclusions 
stated rather optimistically that the European Council was aiming for an agreement before the end 
of the year. 

Discussions within the General Affairs Council, and numerous statements by national leaders, had 
already exposed deep  differences among Member States on the MFF. The  most  obvious rift was 
between  the  richer  (net  contributor)  and  poorer  (net  beneficiary)  countries.  A  number  of  net 
contributors, dubbed the Frugal Four – the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden and Denmark – wanted to 

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cap the budget at 1 per cent of EU gross national income (GNI). Other Member States, notably the 
biggest  beneficiaries  of  cohesion  policy  –  the  so-called  Friends  of  Cohesion  –  were  hoping  for  a 
budget of 1.16 per cent. The Commission had proposed 1.11 per cent and the EP was asking for 1.3 
per cent. The future of rebates, or ‘compensatory mechanisms’, further divided the richer and poorer 
Member States. A legacy of the budget battles of the 1980s, rebates were used to cap the amount 
that  some  net  contributors  paid  into  the  budget.  Whereas  Germany  and  the  Frugals  were 
determined  to  keep  their  rebates,  other  Member  States  –  including  France  –  saw  rebates  as 
anachronistic  and  unfair,  and  wanted  them  abolished.  On  the  revenue  side  of  the  budget,  ‘own 
resources’  were  an  additional  source  of  discord.  Going  beyond  the  existing  own  resources,  the 
Commission  and  some  Member  States  favoured  new  sources  of  direct  contributions  to  the  EU 
budget, such as a tax on plastics, which would also serve an environmental purpose. Poorer Member 
States feared that such a tax would be disproportionately hard on them. 

Under  the  circumstances,  preparing  a  negotiating  box  was  a  poisoned  chalice  for  any  Council 
Presidency.  Nonetheless,  Finland  accepted  the  challenge  with  alacrity,  hoping  to  be  able  to 
conclude the MFF negotiations within the European Council, or at least move the negotiations along 
substantially, during its term in office. The complexity of the process grew when it became apparent, 
towards the end of 2019, that the cost of helping countries meet the EU’s climate target would have 
to be factored into the budget. Another complication, which became increasingly apparent as the 
year progressed, was the question of linking EU funding to compliance with the rule of law, a move 
that Finland strongly favoured. This raised the hackles of Hungary and Poland, two countries already 
under  investigation  by  the  Commission  for  alleged  rule-of-law  violations.  Finnish  Prime  Minister 
Antti Rinne had an awkward meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, in Budapest, on 
30 September, where they discussed rule-of-law conditionality. Whereas Prime Minister Rinne called 
for a ‘balanced and legally clear instrument’ to deal with this issue, Prime Minister Orbán explained 
that ‘The rule of law in Hungary is not a legal matter. It’s a matter of pride.’46  

Leaders duly discussed the MFF at their October summit, but were not yet ready to try to reach an 
agreement. According to the conclusions, following a presentation by the Finnish Presidency, ‘the 
European Council exchanged views on key issues of the next Multiannual Financial Framework such 
as  the  overall  level,  the  volumes  of  the  main  policy  areas,  the  financing,  including  revenues  and 
corrections, as well as the conditionalities and incentives. In the light of this discussion, it calls on 
the Presidency to submit a Negotiating Box with figures ahead of the European Council in December 
2019.’  Outgoing  European  Council  President  Tusk  was  doubtless  relieved  to  hand  this  difficult 
dossier  over  to  his  successor.  For  his  part,  outgoing  Commission  President  Juncker  expressed 
irritation with the European Council’s discussion of the MFF, calling it a ‘stock-taking meeting, where 
everyone was repeating positions which were known, [there were] no new elements, no guidance, 
nothing’.  As  well  as  the  previously-mentioned  uncertainty  about  the  budgetary  implications  of 
Brexit, one of the reasons why leaders may have been reticent to get into the weeds of the MFF was 
precisely  the  change  in  Commission  leadership.  As  President  Tusk  explained  in  his  post-summit 
remarks, leaders were able to hear directly from Commission President-elect von der Leyen, who 
was a guest at the meeting, on ‘the priorities of the new Commission … as well as the future EU 
budget’. 

In the run-up to the December European Council, the Finnish Presidency redoubled its efforts. On 5 
December, it produced what it hoped would be the final negotiating box. This came in for withering 
criticism at a meeting of the General Affairs Council, less than a week later. The Presidency’s proposal 
of  a  budget  representing  1.07  percent  of  GNI  satisfied  neither  the  net  contributors  nor  the  net 
beneficiaries.  The  ‘Friends  of  Cohesion’  were  especially  alarmed.  It  seemed  unlikely  that  leaders 

46   Khan, M., ‘Von der Leyen’s fall guys’, Financial Times, 2019. 

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would be able to reach agreement at their summit on 12 December, even if they were inclined to 
try to do so. 

Whereas leaders touched on the MFF at the summit, they were not yet ready to delve into detailed 
and  potentially  debilitating  negotiations.  As  it  was,  their  discussion  of  climate  policy,  including 
financial  support  for  countries  to  meet  the  target  date  of  2050  for  zero  carbon  emissions,  was 
lengthy and heated. In the conclusions, the European Council called on President Michel ‘to take the 
negotiations forward with the aim of reaching a final agreement’. This would be a major undertaking 
for the new European Council President, who, in his post-summit remarks, accepted that ‘it will be 
my responsibility, in close cooperation with the Commission, to try to converge, to try to develop all 
the possible efforts in order to reach an agreement in the next weeks or in the next months’. This 
would  require  ‘bilateral  meetings  at  the  technical  level,  and  also  at  the  political  level,  with  the 
Member States … It is very important because we know that we have to discuss many difficult and 
sensitive topics regarding the next budget. For example, the level of ambition … the rebates, the 
conditionalities, the balance between the classical policies, on the one hand, and the new policies, 
on the other hand. Climate change, for example, is a very important issue in this framework … [as 
are]  the  own  resources.’  President  Michel  mentioned  another  aspect  of  the  budget  process,  the 
need ‘to have a good cooperation with the European Parliament, because the European Parliament 
has also a role to play in order to be able to [reach an eventual] decision’. Clearly, the MFF would 
preoccupy the European Council in the year ahead. 

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11. Protecting democracy 

The European Council first addressed the need to protect democracy from external threats in 2018. 
In early 2019, in the run-up to the European Parliament elections, the European Council became 
increasingly concerned about the issue. In an influential article in the Financial Times on 25 February, 
Krisjanis  Karins,  the  new  Prime  Minister  of  Latvia,  sounded  the  alarm.  Despite  leaders’  public 
expressions of concern, Prime Minister Karins warned that ‘at European Union level there is not a 
uniform  understanding  that  [disinformation]  is  a  problem’.  It  was  not  surprising,  given  Latvia’s 
location and historical experience, that Prime Minister Karins had Russia firmly in mind. Russia, he 
declared emphatically, ‘has an overt programme to sow discord in the West, especially in the EU … 
In Latvia, we are on the front line, we see it on a daily basis … Our partners in the rest of the EU have 
various understandings of this because they don’t feel, shall we say, a military threat, therefore they 
don’t feel that it’s a problem.’ Prime Minister Karins called for a long-term, sustained effort going 
beyond the EU elections, which EU leaders should set out in their June summit: ‘Democracies are 
always vulnerable …we have to understand that our society is being attacked.’47  

On  his  own,  the  leader  of  a  small  Member  State  was  unlikely  to  galvanise  the  European  Council 
around a particular issue. But Prime Minister Karins had the support of President Macron and other 
leaders. In an editorial published on 5 March in several media outlets, President Macron issued a 
spirited defence of the EU and warned of the risks to democracy emanating from hostile, outside 
forces:  ‘The  European  model  is  based  on  the  freedom  of  man and  the  diversity  of  opinions  and 
creation.  Our  first  freedom  is  democratic  freedom:  the  freedom  to  choose  our  leaders  as  foreign 
powers seek to influence our vote at each election. I propose creating a European Agency for the 
Protection of Democracies, which will provide each Member State with European experts to protect 
their election process against cyber-attacks and manipulation. In this same spirit of independence, 
we  should  also ban  the  funding  of  European  political  parties  by  foreign  powers.  We  should 
have European rules banish all incitements to hate and violence from the Internet, since respect for 
the individual is the bedrock of our civilisation of dignity.’ 

President Tusk picked up on this immediately. In a digression during a speech welcoming the Prime 
Minister of Armenia to Brussels, President Tusk asked to ‘make one remark about today's editorial 
by President Macron’. It was this: ‘I fully support [President Macron’s] way of thinking … There are 
external anti-European forces, which are seeking, openly or secretly, to influence the democratic 
choices  of  Europeans,  as  was  the  case  with  Brexit  and  a  number  of  election  campaigns  across 
Europe. And it may again be the case with the European elections in May. This is why I am calling on 
all those who care about the EU, to cooperate closely during and after the European elections. Do 
not allow political parties that are funded by external forces, hostile to Europe, to decide on key 
priorities for the EU, and the new leadership of European institutions.’ 

These  interventions  set  the  scene  for  a  brief  discussion  of  disinformation  and  protection  of 
democracy at the March summit. Leaders, even those whose countries were accused of rule-of-law 
violations, were in broad agreement about the need for vigilance against external threats. Speaking 
at the start of the summit, European Parliament President Tajani struck a chord when he mentioned 
‘the absolute need to guarantee the freedom of choice of European voters’ in the run-up to the EP 
elections, and drew attention to a recent resolution in which the Parliament stressed the danger of 
disinformation  and  ‘condemned  the  increasingly  aggressive  actions  of  Russia,  China,  Iran,  North 
Korea and others’. 

Under  the  heading  ‘Securing  free  and  fair  elections  and  fighting  disinformation’,  the  summit 
conclusions welcomed ‘the important work accomplished in this respect in the past months [by the 

47   Brunsden, J., ‘Reality Check’, Financial Times, 2019.  

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Commission and the High Representative], and called ‘for further enhanced coordinated efforts to 
address the internal and external aspects of disinformation and protect the European and national 
elections across the EU. Information-sharing is key in that context and the recent establishment of 
the Rapid Alert System is an important step forward. The European Council urges private operators 
such as online platforms and social networks to fully implement the Code of Practice and ensure 
higher standards of responsibility and transparency. It calls for continued and coordinated efforts to 
safeguard  the  Union’s  democratic  systems  and  to  combat  the  immediate  and  long-term  threats 
posed  by  disinformation,  as  an  integral  part  of  strengthening  the  EU’s  resilience  against  hybrid 
threats.’ Leaders agreed that the European Council would come back to this issue in June, on the 
basis of a report prepared by the Romanian Presidency in cooperation with the Commission and the 
High Representative, ‘in order to inform our long-term response’. 

The report of the Romanian Presidency, ‘on countering disinformation and the lessons learnt from 
the European elections’, provided a comprehensive, albeit preliminary, evaluation ‘of the disruptive 
role of disinformation in the context and in the wake of the latest European elections reflect[ing] the 
continuous  evolution  of  disinformation  and  its  capacity  to  adapt  to  changing  technology’.  It 
underlined ‘the need for a permanent state of preparedness and a permanent process to tackle the 
problem, combining bottom-up and top-down approaches, and through pre-emptive engagement 
and close cooperation with the relevant stakeholders such as academia, media, civil society, fact 
checkers and social platforms’. The report reviewed existing efforts to counter disinformation and 
included a number of recommendations that could be taken at national and EU level. One of these 
was a proposal from the Trio Presidency of the Council – the current Romanian Presidency, together 
with  the  upcoming  Finnish  and  Croatian  presidencies  –  to  establish  ‘a  permanent  horizontal 
working party of the Council of the EU, which would have a coordinating role and would monitor 
possible threats to democratic processes in order to enhance resilience and counter hybrid threats’. 

Leaders did not have much time to mull over the report at their busy June summit. Perhaps relieved 
that the EP elections had gone so well, and preoccupied with several other pressing issues, they 
dealt with disinformation almost in passing. President Tusk did not mention the subject in his post-
summit  remarks.  Although  he  went  out  of  his  way  to  thank  the  Romanian  Presidency  for  its 
‘impressive’ legislative achievements, for making ‘good progress’ on the MFF, and for hosting the 
successful Sibiu summit, he did not refer to the Presidency’s report on countering disinformation. 

The summit conclusions nonetheless included a relatively lengthy section on ‘Disinformation and 
Hybrid Threats’. Citing the Presidency report and contributions from the Commission and the High 
Representative,  EU  leaders  called  for more  efforts to  raise  awareness,  increase  preparedness  and 
strengthen resilience to disinformation. They welcomed the Commission’s intention to assess the 
implementation of commitments undertaken by online platforms under the Code of Practice, and 
also welcomed the recent adoption of a new sanctions regime to deal with cyberattacks. Finally, 
they called for new measures to boost the EU’s resilience to cyber and hybrid threats from outside 
the  EU,  and  highlighted  the  importance  of  better  protecting  the  EU’s  information  and 
communication networks, and its decision-making processes, from malicious activities. 

The EU and its Member States would have to remain vigilant in order to protect democracy and fight 
disinformation.  As  Prime  Minister  Karins  and  others  continued  to  point  out,  external  threats  to 
democracy in the EU were pervasive and enduring. Yet the European Council did not return to the 
subject during the remainder of 2019. Leaders devoted their time during subsequent summits to 
many other equally or more important issues. The fact that they had twice touched on protecting 
democracy in 2019, however, was significant. It signalled awareness and concern at the highest level 
about the risks to core EU values posed by outside actors, at a time when democracy was in danger 
of being undermined internally in certain Member States. 

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12. External relations 

12.1. Introduction 

The European Council has always been keenly interested in external relations. Unexpected events 
outside the EU, long-term global trends, and relations with key third countries frequently require 
the leaders’ attention. In some cases, internal and external policies are inextricably linked, migration 
being a good example. Classic external relations include the EU’s dealings with Russia, Turkey, the 
United States and, increasingly, China. Bilateral EU-US relations troubled EU leaders in 2019, given 
the idiosyncrasies of the Trump administration, but leaders were averse to discussing the US as a 
separate agenda item in the European Council. To the extent that leaders touched on transatlantic 
relations, it was in the context of trade and investment policy. Russia remained high on the European 
Council’s  agenda  in  2019,  largely  because  of  the  ongoing  conflict  in  Ukraine  and  because  of 
concerns  about  possible  Russian  interference  in  the  European  Parliament  elections.  Turkey  also 
loomed large for the European Council in 2019, especially because of Turkey’s illegal drilling off the 
coast  of  Cyprus  and  military  action  in  north-east  Syria.  New  in  2019  was  the  European  Council’s 
extensive discussion of policy towards China, going beyond economic issues (China was last on the 
agenda  of  the  European  Council  in  March  2017,  as  part  of  a  debate  on  trade  policy).  Apart  from 
occasional  references  to  other  countries  and  regions,  the  European  Council  in  2019  had  difficult 
discussions about the western Balkans, notably about whether to open accession negotiations with 
Albania and North Macedonia. 

12.2. The western Balkans and enlargement policy 

The  EU  has  long  sought  to  promote  stability  and  prosperity  in  the  western  Balkans  by  means  of 
enlargement  policy.  By  offering  a  realistic  prospect  of  accession,  the  EU  has  attempted  over  the 
years to accelerate economic and political reforms in the region. By 2019, four of the western Balkan 
countries  –  Albania,  North  Macedonia,  Montenegro  and  Serbia  –  were  candidates  for  EU 
membership. Two of them – Montenegro and Serbia – had formally begun accession negotiations. 
The two remaining western Balkan countries – Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo – had barely set out 
on  their  EU  integration  path,  making  candidacy,  let  alone  membership,  highly  unlikely  in  the 
foreseeable future.  

Slow progress in the accession negotiations with Montenegro and Serbia and the delay in opening 
negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia were undermining EU credibility in the region and 
reducing the effectiveness of EU enlargement policy. Despite widespread concerns within the EU 
about crime, corruption and potential political instability in Albania and North Macedonia, many 
Member States believed that the EU needed to send a positive signal to the region by agreeing to 
open accession negotiations with the two countries. Moreover, North Macedonia had removed a 
large  obstacle on the road to eventual membership when it formally renamed itself, in February 
2019, after an agreement reached in June 2018 with Greece, which had insisted on the change as a 
condition for allowing accession negotiations to begin. 

Leaders were due to address enlargement at their regular June summit. What many of them hoped 
would be a short discussion, resulting in an agreement to open accession negotiations with Albania 
and North Macedonia, did not take place. By that time, it was abundantly clear not only that some 
Member States were deeply reluctant to give a green light to Albania, in particular, but also that one 
of them – France – had serious misgivings, more broadly, about enlargement policy in the region. 
The prospect of enlargement was not popular in most Member States, and was grist to the mill of 
eurosceptics and populist politicians. This was certainly the case in France, and may have influenced 

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President Macron’s thinking on the matter. Understandably, however, he did not refer to domestic 
politics when discussing enlargement policy. Instead, he emphasised strategic considerations.  

Largely at the suggestion of President Macron, the leaders of France, Germany and the six western 
Balkan countries held an informal summit in Berlin on 29 April. There, President Macron advocated 
‘a genuine strategy for the Western Balkans in order to further commit to the stabilisation of the six 
non-EU countries, to enhance their economic and social development and to strengthen the rule of 
law’.  Pending  the  development  of  such  a  strategy  by  France  and  the  EU,  President  Macron  was 
adamant that it was premature to open accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia. 

At the General Affairs Council on 18 June, held only days before the regular June summit, the French 
minister  effectively  blocked  the  question  of  accession  negotiations  with  Albania  and  North 
Macedonia from going forward for discussion at the European Council. Accordingly, under ‘Other 
Items’,  the  conclusions  of  the  June  summit  stated only  that  ‘The  European  Council  endorses  the 
conclusions on enlargement and [the] stabilisation and association process adopted by the Council 
on 18 June 2019.’ In its conclusions, the General Affairs Council took ‘good note of the Commission’s 
recommendation to open accession negotiations [with Albania and with North Macedonia] based 
on its positive evaluation of the progress made and of the fulfilment of the conditions identified by 
the Council. In light of the limited time available and the importance of the matter, the Council will 
revert to the issue with a view to reaching a clear and substantive decision as soon as possible and 
no later than October 2019.’ In other words, the European Council concurred that the discussion 
necessary  to  reach  ‘a  clear  and  substantive  decision’  concerning  Albania  and  North  Macedonia 
would take place at the October summit. 

Not surprisingly, the discussion of enlargement at the October summit turned into a contentious 
and  lengthy  affair.  What  was  planned  as  a  short  exchange  over  dinner  on  17  October  became  a 
prolonged  argument  among  leaders  that  continued  until  early  the  next  morning,  without  an 
agreement  being  reached  to  open  accession  negotiations  with  Albania  and  North  Macedonia. 
President Macron was the sole hold-out as far as both countries were concerned, and rejected a 
suggestion  by  the  Finnish  President  that  leaders  at  least  agree  to  open  negotiations  with  North 
Macedonia. Like President Macron, the leaders of Denmark and the Netherlands were unwilling to 
allow  negotiations  with  Albania  to  begin,  but  were  willing  to  agree  with  everyone  else  (except 
President Macron) that negotiations with North Macedonia should finally go ahead. The distinction 
that some leaders made between the two countries was based, in part, on a perception that Zoran 
Zaev,  North  Macedonia’s  reformist  Prime  Minister,  had  taken  the  politically  courageous  step  of 
changing  the  country’s  name  in  order  to  facilitate  EU  accession,  and  that  his  country  had 
consistently  helped  to  stem  the  flow  of  asylum  seekers  attempting  to  enter  the  EU  through  the 
western Balkans. 

These constructive factors were insufficient to change President Macron’s mind. As at the previous 
summit in June, President Macron argued that the issue went deeper than providing incentives and 
rewards for reforms in candidate countries. Fundamentally, it was about the enlargement process 
itself. After years of engaging, sometimes fitfully, with countries in the western Balkans, President 
Macron  advocated  a  reappraisal  of  EU  strategy  towards  the  region  in  the  form  of  a  revitalised 
enlargement policy.  

Regardless  of  the  merits  of  this  position,  other  leaders  had  little  patience  with  the  way  in  which 
President Macron made his case and with his apparent lack of empathy for Prime Minister Zaev, who 
was waiting outside the room and whose domestic political position would be seriously weakened 
by  a  negative  outcome  in  Brussels.  Here  was  another  example,  in  2019,  of  President  Macron’s 
apparent imperiousness in the European Council. Chancellor Merkel, who had shown support for 
President  Macron  by  hosting  the  Franco-German  summit  with  leaders  of  the  six  western  Balkan 
countries in April, was nonetheless willing, at the October European Council, to agree to opening 

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accession negotiations with both Albania and North Macedonia. Anticipating President Macron’s 
obduracy, leaders of the Visegrad Four countries had written to President Tusk before the summit, 
calling  for  a  ‘decisive  discussion’  to  overcome  French  resistance.48  Already  at  loggerheads  with 
President Macron over rule-of-law issues, the leaders of the two of the Visegrad Four countries – 
Prime Minister Orbán of Hungary and Prime Minister Morawiecki of Poland – relished being part of 
the large majority of leaders supporting a different view than that of the French President. 

On the question of opening negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia, President Tusk found 
himself in complete accord with the Polish Prime Minister, with whom he rarely agreed. President 
Tusk was extremely disappointed that, for the third time in less than 2 years, the European Council 
had failed to reach a breakthrough on enlargement with respect to the western Balkans. In another 
example of the discrepancy between the content of summit conclusions and the conduct of the 
summit  itself,  under  the  heading  of  ‘Enlargement’,  the  conclusions  contained  a  single,  short 
sentence:  ‘The  European  Council  will  revert  to  the  issue  of  enlargement  before  the  EU-Western 
Balkans summit in Zagreb in May 2020.’ 

President Tusk was happy to explain the context of this brief statement in his post-summit remarks. 
Without  naming  France  as  the  sole  hold-out  with  respect  to  both  countries,  President  Tusk 
explained that ‘The overwhelming majority wanted to open accession talks with North Macedonia 
and Albania. However, such a decision requires unanimity, and there was no unanimity yesterday.’ 
He continued in a remarkably forthright way: ‘Let me be very clear: North Macedonia and Albania 
are not to blame for this … both these countries did what they were asked to do. And the adoption 
of  the  Prespa  Agreement  [on  North  Macedonia’s  change  of  name]  was  a  truly  extraordinary 
achievement. So, both countries have the right to start EU negotiations as of today. They are ready. 
Unfortunately,  a  few  Member  States  are  not  ready  yet.  This  is  why  we  didn’t  manage  to  reach  a 
positive decision. Personally, I think it was a mistake, but I will not comment on it further.’ 

In fact, President Tusk did comment further on it, when he reported on the summit to the European 
Parliament.  As  he  told  MEPs  on  22  October,  ‘the  leaders  held  a  difficult  debate  on  enlargement. 
Following  the  clear  recommendation  by  the  Commission,  an  overwhelming  majority  of  Member 
States wanted to open accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania. Despite this, the required 
unanimity was not possible last week. In my opinion, this was a mistake, which I have said to the 
leaders  (and  I  was  a  bit  more  direct  then).  Now  I  can  only  hope  that  the  leaders  draw  the  right 
conclusions, when they [next] discuss the accession process …’ This was a disappointing note for 
Donald Tusk on which to end his European Council Presidency. 

France  began,  before  the  end  of  2019,  to  flesh  out  its  substantive  concerns  about  enlargement 
policy in the western Balkans. However, leaders did not address the issue at the December European 
Council.  An  item  relating  to  Albania  nevertheless  came  up  at  the  summit,  on  which  all  Member 
States  could  easily  agree:  ‘The  European  Council  expressed solidarity  with  Albania  in  light  of  the 
recent  earthquake.  EU 
leaders  welcomed  the  Commission’s  announcement  to  provide 
humanitarian assistance and to organise a donors’ conference.’ It was a point that Charles Michel 
stressed in his post-summit remarks, his first as European Council President. 

12.3. China 

China may be far from Europe, but its global political and economic reach loomed large for the EU 
in 2019. In recent years, the EU’s interest in China had focused almost exclusively on finding ways to 
strengthen commercial ties with the world’s largest rapidly-growing, emerging economy. The EU is 
China’s largest trading partner; China was then the EU’s second-largest, after the US. China is also a 

48   Brzozowski, A., ‘Visegrad 4, North Macedonia in last-ditch effort to change French enlargement veto’, Euractiv, 2019.  

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leading destination for European investors and a source of massive direct investment in the EU. As 
the economic relationship has broadened and deepened, European business and political leaders 
have  grown  increasingly  concerned  about  various  Chinese  policies  and  practices.  These  include 
Chinese subsidies for national champions and local companies (support that would not be tolerated 
under EU competition law), China’s lack of reciprocal access to public procurement and apparent 
discrimination  against  foreign  companies  operating  in  the  country,  and  China’s  insistence  on 
technology transfers as a condition of inward investment.  

In addition, concern has grown within the EU about the purpose, beyond making money, of Chinese 
foreign  investment,  especially  as  Chinese  companies  extended  their  reach  into  sensitive  and 
strategically important sectors of the EU economy. A prime example, on which the US constantly 
harped, was the potential security risk inherent in the use of equipment provided by the Chinese 
company  Huawei  in  5G  mobile  communication  networks  being  developed  across  the  EU. 
Cybersecurity,  an  issue  of  rising  importance  in  Europe  as  elsewhere,  had  a  distinct  Chinese 
dimension.  Beyond  that,  many  Europeans  disliked  the  way  that  China  was  extending  its  global 
influence, by commercial and other means. Last but not least, human rights were an increasingly 
salient  issue  with  respect  to  China,  particularly  as  more  became  known  about  the  treatment  of 
Uighur Muslims in China’s Xinjiang province. 

The need to agree on a common position before the China-EU summit, due to take place in Brussels 
on  9  April,  prompted  leaders  to  have  a  thorough  discussion  of  policy  toward  China.  The  March 
summit was an ideal opportunity to do so; not only was it well-timed in relation to the forthcoming 
China-EU  summit,  but  also  the  regular  March  summit  traditionally  deals  with  economic  affairs, 
including  external  trade  and  investment.  As  a  contribution  to  the  summit,  in  early  March  the 
Commission  and  the  European  External  Action  Service  released  a  surprisingly  hard-hitting 
communication: ‘EU-China: A strategic Outlook’. Characterising China as a ‘systemic rival’, the joint 
paper covered the spectrum of EU concerns, ranging from trade and investment, to climate change, 
to human rights, and set out ‘10 concrete actions’ for leaders to discuss and endorse at the European 
Council later in the month. These aimed to meet three broad objectives: (1) Based on clearly defined 
interests  and  principles,  the  EU  should  deepen  its  engagement  with  China to  promote  common 
interests at global level; (2) The EU should robustly seek more balanced and reciprocal conditions 
governing the economic relationship; (3) … in order to maintain its prosperity, values and social 
model over the long term, there are areas where the EU itself needs to adapt to changing economic 
realities and strengthen its own domestic policies and industrial base.  

Whereas criticism of China was widespread throughout the EU, there were marked differences over 
China policy  among and  even within the  Member States. Northern European countries were the 
most  vocal  in  advocating  a  harder  line  towards  China.  Given  the  extent  of  its  economic 
interdependence  with  China,  Germany  was  in  an  awkward  position.  For  leading  German 
manufacturers, China was a large and lucrative market. At the same time, German policy makers saw 
economic  rivalry  with  China  as  one  of  the  main  reasons  why  the  EU  needed  to  devise  a  new 
industrial strategy to support the emergence of European champions.  

Elsewhere  in  the  EU,  many  countries,  such  as  Greece,  Hungary  and  Portugal,  strongly  supported 
Chinese  investment  in  Europe,  and  advocated  closer  China-EU  relations.  No  fewer  than  eleven 
Member  States  –  mostly  from  central  and  eastern  Europe  –  had  signed  up  for  China’s  ‘16+1’ 
initiative, the other members of the 16 being in the western Balkans and the 1 being China. The 
purpose of the 16+1 format was to facilitate Chinese investment in participating countries, notably 
under  the  auspices  of  the  Belt  and  Road  Initiative,  a  major  global  programme  focusing  on 
infrastructure, from which most northern EU Member States had resolutely distanced themselves. 
Immediately after the China-EU summit, China’s Prime Minister was due to travel to Croatia to attend 
a summit of the 16+1. Northern Member States viewed the 16+1 with deep scepticism, seeing it as 

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likely  to  divide  the  EU  and  weaken  the  appeal  of  EU  membership  for  countries  in  the  western 
Balkans.49  

In early 2019, Italy was preparing to become the most prominent EU Member State and the first G7 
country to join the Belt and Road Initiative. This was highly controversial within the EU and within 
Italy’s  already  fractious  coalition  government.  A  signing  ceremony  for  the  memorandum  of 
understanding was scheduled in Rome for the day after the EU summit at which China policy would 
be thoroughly discussed. The EU summit would give Prime Minister Conte an opportunity to explain 
Italy’s position to sceptical, northern European leaders. 

Instead  of  discussing  China  over  dinner  on  the  first  day  of  the  March  summit,  leaders  remained 
preoccupied with Brexit. It was not until the morning of the second day, when they had scheduled 
their discussion of economic affairs, that leaders finally turned their attention to China. Given the 
predominance of economic issues in the China-EU relationship, this was not a serious setback, but 
it  meant  that  leaders  had  less  time  than  planned  to  cover  a  wide  range  of  pressing  economic 
problems.  In  his  letter  of  invitation,  President  Tusk  had  already  linked  the  general  discussion  of 
economic affairs and the particular discussion of China: ‘In a more unstable world, shaken by new 
global, technological and environmental realities, there is no doubt that only together can we set 
our own course and defend the strategic interests of the Union. This is true whether we are talking 
about strengthening our economic base, combating unfair practices or tackling climate change. We 
will  therefore  discuss  how  to  use  all  the  levers  at  our  disposal  to  safeguard  the  interests  of  our 
citizens and companies. China is a key global player in all these issues. We will [therefore] have an 
in-depth  exchange  of  views  on  the  direction  of  our  overall  relations  with  China,  ahead  of  the 
upcoming EU-China summit.’ 

At  the  summit,  leaders  did  not  endorse  the  Commission-European  External  Action  Service 
communication on China, but discussed several issues raised in it, notably industrial policy, trade 
policy and digital development. President Macron and Chancellor Merkel led the charge in calling 
for more effective EU efforts to level the playing field for European companies in China and protect 
against what they saw as the potentially insidious effects of Chinese investment in Europe. Despite 
the risk of Chinese retaliation against German companies, Chancellor Merkel argued that the EU was 
better  served  by  recognising  the  dangers  that  China  posed  to  the  EU  and  dealing  with  them  as 
expeditiously  as  possible.  As  Chancellor  Merkel  remarked:  ‘We  are  partners  on  one  hand  and 
competitors on the other, not only regarding the economy, but we also have very different political 
systems. We want relations on the basis of reciprocity. We also want good trade ties with China.’50  

At a time of strained relations with Washington, President Macron and Chancellor Merkel were well 
aware that the strategic dimension of EU-China relations was growing more sensitive and important. 
Washington  was  pressing  the  EU  to  taker  a  stronger  stand  on  China.  Partly  due  to  US  efforts  to 
highlight unfair Chinese trade and investment practices, the EU was becoming more aware of such 
practices and the need to try to counter them. But the EU did not want merely to follow – or to be 
seen to be following – the US line. Indeed, there were aspects of international trade and investment 
on  which  China  and  the  EU  were  closer  than  were  the  EU  and  the  US,  notably  on  the  role  of 
multilateral institutions. In particular, China and the EU agreed on the importance of the WTO, and 
on the need for WTO reform, although the EU was struggling to persuade China to include industrial 
subsidies as a crucial element of that reform. China also supported the Paris Agreement on climate 
change, a cherished EU arrangement that the US had recently rejected. 

49   Hillman, J. and  McCalpin, M., ‘Will China’s ‘16+1’ Format Divide Europe?’, Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, 2019. 

50  

‘EU summit: As it happened’, Politico, 2019. 

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Other leaders cautioned against taking a tougher line on China, especially at a time of heightened 
China-US  tensions.  Some,  such  as  Prime  Minister  António  Costa  of  Portugal,  praised  Chinese 
investment  in  Europe,  dismissing  claims  that  it  came  with  diplomatic  strings  and  security  risks. 
According to the Prime Minister, Portugal’s experience of Chinese investment was ‘very positive’, 
showing ‘complete respect for our legal framework and the rules of the market’. 

Prime  Minister  Conte  sought  to  reassure  Chancellor  Merkel  and  others  by  describing  the 
memorandum of understanding that Italy was about to sign with China on joining the Belt and Road 
Initiative. ‘For now I have nothing to criticise’, Chancellor Merkel reportedly replied, ‘but unified [EU] 
action is better’.51 

The summit conclusions  belied the extent of the discussion  on China, containing only two short 
sentences on the subject: ‘The European Council prepared the EU-China summit to be held on 9 
April 2019. It exchanged views on overall relations with China in the global context.’ However, under 
the heading ‘Jobs, Growth and Competitiveness’ – another major agenda item – the conclusions 
took indirect aim at China: ‘the EU must also safeguard its interests in the light of unfair practices of 
third countries, making full use of trade defence instruments and our public procurement rules, as 
well  as  ensuring  effective  reciprocity  for  public  procurement  with  third  countries.  The  European 
Council calls for resuming discussions on the EU’s international procurement instrument.’ Similarly, 
with  China  in  mind,  the  conclusions  declared  that  ‘the  EU  needs  to  go  further  in  developing  a 
competitive,  secure,  inclusive  and  ethical  digital  economy  with  world-class  connectivity.  Special 
emphasis should be placed on access to, sharing of and use of data, on data security and on Artificial 
Intelligence, in an environment of trust. The European Council looks forward to the Commission’s 
recommendation on a concerted approach to the security of 5G networks.’ 

President  Tusk  was  more  forthcoming  in  his  remarks  after  the  summit,  explaining  that  leaders 
‘discussed  the  priorities  for  next  month’s  summit  with  China.  Our  aim  is  to  focus  on  achieving  a 
balanced relation, which ensures fair competition and equal market access.’ In his statement on the 
summit to the European Parliament on 27 March, President Tusk went into more detail: ‘Apart from 
next  month’s  EU-China  summit,  there  are  also  other  meetings  and  summits  with  the  Chinese 
leaders.  Therefore,  it  was  crucially  important  [for  leaders]  to  agree  a  coordinated,  European 
approach. We worked out a positive stance that offers ambitious cooperation on bilateral and global 
issues, including trade. We both have a key economic interest in maintaining significant trade flows, 
which are possible thanks to the rules-based trading system. However, for this system to continue 
to operate, it needs to be quickly updated.’ 

More revealing, perhaps, was President Tusk’s reference to an issue that increasingly overshadowed 
relations with China, but that did not appear in the European Council’s conclusions: ‘And of course, 
I can’t imagine not having human rights on the agenda (of the EU-China summit). I may be old-
fashioned but I still think that human rights are at least as important as trade.’ Not that human rights 
were entirely absent from the EU’s deliberations about China. For instance, the Commission-EEAS 
joint communication on EU-China relations referred to human rights no fewer than eight times. 

As the European Council opened in Brussels, Chinese President Xi Jinping landed in Italy for the first 
leg of a short visit that would also include Monaco and France. On the day after the summit, Italy 
joined  the  Belt  and  Road  Initiative,  with  great  fanfare,  at  a  ceremony  in  Rome.52  Two  days  later, 
President  Macron  hosted  President  Xi  in  Paris.  In  order  to  emphasise  the  broader,  EU  context  of 
relations  between  China  and  France,  President  Macron  invited  Chancellor  Merkel  and  President 
Juncker to join the talks (President Tusk did not attend). 

51  
52  

‘EU summit: As it happened’, Politico, 2019. 

Johnson, M., ‘Italy endorses China’s Belt and Road Initiative’, Financial Times, 2019.  

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The flurry of China-related discussions and events in March took place with the looming China-EU 
summit very much in mind. Based on the leaders’ discussion at the March European Council, the 
Permanent Representatives and the Foreign Ministers worked on a draft joint statement for the EU-
China  summit.  One  of  the  EU’s  objectives  was  for  both  sides  to  agree  on  a  deadline  in  2020  to 
conclude  a  long-sought  investment  agreement.  Another  was  for  China  to  provide  more 
transparency in its Belt and Road Initiative.  

At the bilateral summit on 9 April, Prime Minister Li Keqiang represented China; President Juncker 
and President Tusk represented the EU. After a considerable back-and-forth between the two sides 
on the wording of the joint statement, the agreed text satisfied many EU concerns. Indeed, leaders 
soon regarded the bilateral summit as representing a major breakthrough for the EU in its dealings 
with China, and a highlight of the EU’s external relations in 2019.  

President Tusk was effusive in his post-summit remarks, declaring that the discussions, carried out 
‘in an open and honest spirit … have been difficult, but ultimately fruitful’. Focusing on trade and 
investment, President Tusk emphasised the EU’s interest in ‘serious reform of the WTO that would 
cover  industrial  subsidies,  as  a  priority.  Therefore,  I  am  pleased  that  today  we  agreed  with  our 
Chinese partners to address [this] issue … It is a breakthrough. For the first time, China has agreed 
to engage with Europe on this key priority.’ In a subtle jab at the US, President Tusk expressed his 
hope ‘that these [efforts at WTO reform] will progress speedily … so that we can defend the rules-
based international trading system’.  

As he had in his report to the EP after the March European Council, President Tusk explained in his 
post China-EU summit remarks that ‘during our talks, we did not forget about human rights. As I 
have  stressed  many  times  before,  human  rights  are  –  from  our,  European  point  of  view  –  as 
important as economic interests. This is why today, just like in our previous meetings, I underlined 
the  need  to  maintain  the  EU-China  Human  Rights  Dialogue.  I  expressed  again  the  EU's  serious 
concerns as regards human rights, and raised a number of individual cases.’ Knowing that Premier 
Li would not have been happy to hear this, President Tusk ended graciously by ‘thanking Premier Li 
for his personal engagement in our summit’. 

Having devoting considerable time to China early in the year, the European Council did not return 
to the subject in 2019. However, in his remarks following the December summit, which included a 
difficult discussion about climate change, newly-installed President Michel included a final point on 
climate: ‘next year we will also have two important summits with China, an institutional summit and 
a summit with all the Member States. It seems to me very important, it is a point of the conclusions, 
to  also  advance  this  climate  diplomacy  in  our  international  relations.  I  consider  that  this  is  an 
extremely important geopolitical issue.’ 

12.4. Russia 

The EU’s strained relations with Russia were on the agenda of the European Council on a number of 
occasions  in  2019.  Russia’s  meddling  in  Ukraine  remained  the  European  Council’s  most  pressing 
concern.  But  Russia  also  cast  a  shadow  over  two  other  issues  of  keen  interest  to  the  European 
Council in 2019 – policy towards the western Balkans and the defence of democracy within the EU, 
especially in the run-up to the European Parliament elections. Despite differences among leaders 
over the egregiousness of Russia’s behaviour and how best to deal with it, and despite President 
Putin’s transparent efforts to divide Member States on the issue, it is striking that leaders agreed 
unanimously in June and December 2019, without serious risk of dissention, to roll over the EU’s 
economic sanctions on Russia for another 6 months.  

The consistency of the European Council’s position had much to do with the influence of Chancellor 
Merkel  and  the  relentlessness  of  President  Tusk.  It  was  in  large  part  thanks  to  them  that  the 

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conclusions of the March summit included a robust reiteration of the EU’s position on the situation 
in Ukraine: ‘Five years after the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by Russia the EU remains 
resolute in its commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The EU reiterates that it 
does not recognise and continues to condemn this violation of international law which remains a 
direct  challenge  to  international  security.  The  EU  remains  committed  to  implementing  its  non-
recognition policy.’ 

At their June summit, leaders briefly discussed Ukraine, where there was an escalation of tension 
following  Russia’s  seizure  of  Ukrainian  vessels  and  personnel  in  the  Azov  Sea.  Leaders  called  on 
Russia to release the captured Ukrainian sailors, return the seized vessels and ensure free passage 
through  the  Kerch  Strait.  Leaders  also  called  on  Russia  to  cooperate  fully  with  the  ongoing 
investigation into the downing of the Malaysian airliner, flight MH17, in July 2014 by Russian-backed 
separatists in eastern Ukraine. The destruction of MH17 with the loss of all passengers and crew, 
including  many  EU  citizens,  was  a  pivotal  event  at  the  outset  of  the  Ukrainian  crisis  that  turned 
public  and  political  opinion  firmly  against  Russia.  Dutch-led  efforts  to  investigate  the  event  (the 
flight  originated  in  Amsterdam)  faced  Russian  opposition.  In  view  of  continuing  Russian  non-
cooperation,  at  their  October  summit  EU  leaders  again  expressed  ‘full  support  for  all  efforts  to 
establish truth, justice and accountability for the victims of the downing of MH17 and their next of 
kin and called on all states to cooperate fully with the ongoing investigation in accordance with 
UNSC Resolution 2166’.  

As part of an international effort to resolve the conflict in Ukraine, President Macron and Chancellor 
Merkel represented the EU in discussions with the Russian and Ukrainian leaders in the so-called 
‘Normandy format’, which aimed to implement the peace-making agreements negotiated in Minsk. 
At  the  June  summit,  President  Macron  and  Chancellor  Merkel  briefed  the  other  leaders  on  the 
sluggish  implementation  of  the  Minsk  agreements  and  expressed  their  concern  about  a  Russian 
presidential decree, in April, enabling the issuing of Russian passports in certain areas of Ukraine’s 
contested eastern regions. In response, the European Council declared its readiness to take further 
action,  including  the  non-recognition  of  passports  issued  in  contradiction  to  ‘the  spirit  and  the 
objectives of the Minsk agreements’. At the December summit, President Macron and Chancellor 
Merkel  again  informed  the  other  leaders  about  the  poor  state  of  implementation  of  the  Minsk 
agreements, this time following a meeting in the Normandy format, shortly before the summit, in 
Paris. 

Although  the  European  Council  touched  only  briefly  on  Russia  during  the  December  summit, 
President Michel included critical comments on Russia in his post-summit remarks. Newly installed 
as European Council President, Charles Michel may have wanted to show that his position on Russia 
would not differ markedly from that of his predecessor, Donald Tusk, who had been highly critical 
of President Putin. Noting that the European  Council had  discussed the situation in Ukraine and 
decided to extend sanctions against Russia, President Michel emphasised that this was an issue on 
which the European Council would remain highly vigilant.  

12.5. Turkey 

EU-Turkey relations deteriorated further in 2019. Two issues, in particular, required the European 
Council’s attention. One was Turkey’s illegal drilling activities within the exclusive economic zone of 
Cyprus.  The  other  was  Turkey’s  unilateral  military  action  against  Kurdish  positions  in  north-east 
Syria, which exacerbated an already tense situation. In responding to these developments, leaders 
were aware of the need to be firm without jeopardising Turkish cooperation in the all-important 
effort to stem irregular migration into the EU.  

The country most affected by Turkey’s illegal drilling was, of course, Cyprus. It was not surprising, 
therefore, that Cypriot President Anastasiades raised the matter with his fellow national leaders at 

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the  first  available  opportunity.  That  was  in  Sibiu,  in  May,  where  the  contretemps  with  Turkey 
intruded on an otherwise serene summit. Because of its informal nature, there were no conclusions 
after  the  Sibiu  meeting.  However,  President  Tusk,  who  had  facilitated  President  Anastasiades’ 
request to raise the matter, strongly supported Cyprus in his post-summit remarks: ‘The European 
Union stands united behind the Republic of Cyprus and expects Turkey to respect sovereign rights 
of the EU Member State. The European Council will continue to follow these developments closely.’  

Indeed,  after  its  June  meeting,  the  European  Council  issued  a  blistering  criticism  of  Turkey’s 
continuing illegal activities off the coast of Cyprus. Once again, President Anastasiades had briefed 
his  colleagues  on  the  situation,  and  received  a  sympathetic  response.  The  conclusions  were 
appropriately hard-hitting: ‘The European Council expresses serious concerns over Turkey’s current 
illegal  drilling  activities  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  and  deplores  that  Turkey  has  not  yet 
responded to the EU’s repeated calls to cease such activities. The European Council underlines the 
serious  immediate  negative  impact  that  such  illegal  actions  have  across  the  range  of  EU-Turkey 
relations. The European Council calls on Turkey to show restraint, respect the sovereign rights of 
Cyprus and refrain from any such actions … The EU will continue to closely monitor developments 
and stands ready to respond appropriately and in full solidarity with Cyprus.’ Hinting at possible 
sanctions against Turkey, the European Council endorsed ‘the invitation to the Commission and the 
EEAS to submit options for appropriate measures without delay, including targeted measures’. 

The European Council also declared in its June conclusions that it ‘will remain seized of the matter 
and will revert accordingly’. It did so at its next meeting, in October. Shortly before the summit, the 
Foreign  Affairs  Council  had  discussed  Turkey’s  continued  drilling  activities  in  Cyprusʼ  exclusive 
economic  zone  and  adopted  conclusions  agreeing  that  ‘a framework  regime  of  restrictive 
measures targeting  natural  and  legal  persons  responsible  for  or  involved  in  the  illegal  drilling 
activity of hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean be put in place’. The European Council duly 
endorsed  the  Council  conclusions  and  reaffirmed  its  solidarity  with  Cyprus,  while  once  again 
promising to ‘remain seized of this matter’.  

The European Council’s condemnation of Turkey, and the threat of sanctions, had so far failed to 
deter President Erdoğan. In what was beginning to look like a repetitious response, the European 
Council once again denounced Turkey in December 2019, ‘reconfirm[ing] its conclusions of 17-18 
October  concerning  Turkey’s  illegal  drilling  activities  in  Cyprus’  Exclusive  Economic  Zone’.  In 
addition,  the  European  Council  took  issue  with  a  related  initiative  by  Turkey:  the  signing  of  a 
memorandum  of  understanding  with  Libya  on  the  delimitation  of  maritime  jurisdictions  in  the 
Mediterranean Sea, which, according to the European Council, ‘infringes upon the sovereign rights 
of third States, does not comply with the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences 
for  third  States’.  In  its  final  set  of  conclusions  for  the  year,  the  European  Council  ‘unequivocally 
reaffirms its solidarity with Greece and Cyprus regarding these actions by Turkey’.  

By that time, leaders had also taken issue with Turkey’s military action in north-east Syria, which had 
begun in early October. On 14 October, at the same meeting in which it condemned Turkey’s illegal 
drilling  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean,  the  Foreign  Affairs  Council  condemned  ‘Turkey's  military 
action  in  north-east  Syria’,  and  recalled 
‘the  decision  taken  by  some  Member  States  to 
immediately halt arms exports licensing to Turkey … on the basis of the provisions of the Common 
Position  2008/944/CFSP  on arms  export  control’.  Meeting  a  week  later,  the  European  Council 
endorsed the Foreign Affairs Council conclusions and denounced Turkey’s ‘unilateral military action 
in  North  East  Syria  which  causes  unacceptable  human  suffering,  undermines  the  fight  against 
Daʼesh and threatens heavily European security.’  

Dealing with Turkey in 2019 had been challenging for the European Council. In his first post-summit 
remarks, following the December European Council, President Michel expressed the dilemma facing 
the EU: ‘We have had tonight the occasion to discuss different international topics, especially the 

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relationship  with  Turkey  …  We  consider  it  is  important  in  the  future  to  continue  to  develop  a 
dialogue with this important country. We know that with regard to migration, for example, it is very 
important to keep a close cooperation. But at the same time, we know that is important to try to 
have a strategic vision … [and to know] what we want with this important country for the future of 
Europe.’  

12.6. The United States 

President Donald Trump’s evident disdain for the EU and disruption of transatlantic trade greatly 
bothered Europeans in 2019. National  leaders spoke frequently about the erratic and potentially 
destabilising  behaviour  of  the  Trump  administration,  and  the  Presidents  of  the  European 
Commission and the European Council were often openly critical of the US President. Nevertheless, 
the European Council studiously refrained from discussing transatlantic relations as a stand-alone 
agenda item and, in its conclusions, rarely mentioned the United States. Whereas leaders may well 
have  used  meetings  of  the  European  Council  to  have  corridor  conversations  about  the  latest 
developments in Washington and the widening rift between Europe and the United States, they did 
not discuss the sorry state of EU-US relations in formal summit sessions. Perhaps they did not want 
to risk making a bad situation worse. 

On  two  occasions  in  2019,  leaders  included  veiled  criticism  of  the  US  in  the  European  Council 
conclusions.  Not  surprisingly,  both  pertained  to  discussions  about  international  trade  and 
investment. The first was when leaders addressed economic affairs at their regular March summit. 
According to the conclusions: ‘The European Council reaffirms its commitment to an open rules-
based multilateral trading system with a modernised WTO at its core, and to resisting all forms of 
protectionism  and  distortions.’  This  reflected  the 
increasing  frustration  with  US 
unilateralism  and  efforts  to  undermine  the  WTO  by  blocking  the  appointment  of  new  Appellate 
Body members. 

leaders’ 

In a rare, specific mention of the US, the March conclusions went on to call ‘for the necessary steps 
to be taken towards rapid implementation of all elements of the U.S.-EU Joint Statement of 25 July 
2018’.  This  was  a  reference  to  the  outcome  of  a  meeting  in  Washington  between  Commission 
President Juncker and US President Trump that aimed to ease transatlantic trade tension. According 
to the Joint Statement, the EU and the US would work together with a view to achieving ‘Zero tariffs, 
zero non-tariff barriers, and zero subsidies on non-auto industrial goods; Strengthening cooperation 
on  energy;  Launching  a  dialogue  on  standards;  (and)  Reforming  the  WTO  and  addressing  unfair 
trading  practices,  including  intellectual  property  theft,  forced  technology  transfer,  industrial 
subsidies, distortions created by state-owned enterprises, and overcapacity.’ The European Council 
was concerned because, although considerable progress had been made, tariffs on European steel 
and aluminium remained in force and were being extended to derivative products.  

The second occasion when leaders included an oblique reference to the US in summit conclusions 
was at their December meeting. As on the first occasion, at issue was the future of the WTO: ‘The 
European Council reiterates its full support for the global rules-based international order and notes 
with  concern  the  paralysis  of  the  WTO’s  mechanism  for  settling  disputes.  It  supports  the 
Commission’s efforts to set up interim arrangements with third countries while actively pursuing a 
permanent  solution.  The  European  Council  calls  on  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  to 
examine, as a matter of priority, the Commission’s proposal to adapt, in line with WTO rules, the 
current  EU  legislation  on  the  effective  exercise  of  the  EU’s  rights  under  international  trade 
agreements to this new situation.’ 

Despite the restraint that the European Council showed with respect to the United States, President 
Tusk was occasionally unrestrained in his comments about the policies of the Trump administration. 
For instance, speaking after the Euro Summit on 20 June, President Tusk could not resist taking a 

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swipe at the United States when he remarked that ECB President Draghi had ‘emphasised that the 
biggest risks to the global economic outlook are trade and geopolitical tensions. We will take this 
message to the G20 in Osaka, where we will try to persuade our partners to cooperate, rather than 
threaten one another.’ By implication, the partner in question was the United States. 

President Michel was more discreet than President Tusk in his public pronouncements. While also 
being  careful  not  to  mention  the  United  States,  President  Michel  nevertheless  made  clear  the 
intended target of his criticism in his post-summit remarks about the importance of multilateralism 
and  the  WTO.  Warning  against  a  slide  towards  protectionism  in  international  trade  relations, 
President Michel stressed the importance of being able ‘to defend the legitimate interests of the 
European Union in commercial and economic terms’. 

12.7. Other countries and regions 

As was the case with Albania in December, the European Council used its summit conclusions on 
other  occasions  in  2019  to  express  sympathy  and  solidarity  with  third  countries  hit  by  natural 
disasters. Thus, in its March conclusions: ‘The European Council deeply regrets the loss of lives and 
the  destruction  in  Mozambique,  Malawi  and  Zimbabwe,  caused  by  tropical  cyclone  Idai.  The 
European Council welcomed the emergency response already provided by the European Union and 
its Member States, and expressed its readiness to continue supporting the concerned countries in 
providing urgent humanitarian relief assistance to the affected populations.’  

The European Council sometimes used its conclusions to draw attention to particular international 
initiatives or  developments that had not necessarily been discussed at the  meeting, or that may 
have been mentioned only briefly. The June summit had an unusually crowded agenda, including 
relations with Russia and Turkey’s illegal drilling in the eastern Mediterranean. Not discussed at the 
summit, or possibly mentioned in passing but included in the conclusions, were: 

  A  reaffirmation  of  the  importance  of  the  Eastern  Partnership  (2019  was  its  10th 
invited  the  Commission  and  the  High 
anniversary).  The  European  Council 
Representative to present new long-term policy objectives by early 2020, ahead of the 
next Eastern Partnership summit. 

  A statement of support for the peaceful transfer of power in the Republic of Moldova. 
The European Council invited the Commission and the High Representative to work on 
a  set  of  concrete  measures  to  help  Moldova,  based  on  the  country’s  sustained 
implementation of reforms under the Association Agreement.  

  A  recognition  of  the  renewed  impetus  in  EU-Morocco  relations,  with  the  European 

Council looking forward to the upcoming EU-Morocco Association Council. 

  An acknowledgement that the stability, security and prosperity of the countries on the 
southern  shore  of  the  Mediterranean  are  of  crucial  importance  for  the  EU,  and  that 
peace  and  long-term  stability  in  Libya  are  a  common  priority:  ‘The  EU  reiterates  its 
support for the UN-led process for the cessation of hostilities and an inclusive political 
solution.’ 

The entire continent of Africa was mentioned in two short sentences in the summit conclusions of 
June  2019:  ‘The  European  Council  underlines  the  crucial  importance  of  the  EU’s  strategic 
partnership with Africa. We are committed to developing it further with a shared ambition to face 
together common and global challenges.’ Leaders returned to the subject of the EU’s relations with 
Africa at greater length in December. They did so, in part, because of newly-appointed European 
Council President Charles Michel’s avowed interest in promoting greater EU involvement in Africa, 
which  had  also  been  a  hallmark  of  his  Prime  Ministership  of  Belgium.  At  the  December  summit, 
leaders  reaffirmed  the  importance  of  the  EU-Africa  partnership,  stressed  the  need  for  a  strategic 
discussion on Africa relations, and called on the Commission and the High Representative to provide 

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it with the necessary basis for such a discussion at the June 2020 European Council, in preparation 
for the next European Union-African Union summit, scheduled for October 2020.  

Given his interest in Africa and eagerness to put a stamp on  his new position, European Council 
President Michel dwelt on EU-Africa relations in his post-summit remarks. Apart from reiterating that 
Africa ‘is a very important continent for us’, which is ‘why we think that the preparation of the next 
European summit with Africa … will be very important’, President Michel stressed the relevance of 
Africa ‘in the fight against terrorism’, a topic that leaders had touched on in the summit. On this 
occasion, the European Council President mentioned France by name, recognising its contribution 
‘at  the  forefront,  with  the  support  of  other  European  countries’,  combating  terrorism  in  the  vast 
Sahel region. Terrorism in parts of Africa, President Michel stressed, ‘is a threat to the countries, is a 
threat to the peoples concerned, [and] is also a threat to our own security, to our freedoms, to our 
values of the rule of law, to our values of democracy in the European Union’. 

There was one other item of external relations to which the European Council turned its attention, 
albeit very briefly, in 2019. This was largely ceremonial, uncontroversial, and even enjoyable for the 
EU leaders. On 22 March, on the 25th anniversary of the European Economic Area (EEA), the Prime 
Ministers of Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway – whose countries, along with the EU Member States, 
make up the EEA – were invited as guests to attend the European Council. The leaders of the EEA 
member  states  had  a  lively  exchange  of  views.  The  conclusions  of  the  March  meeting  did  not 
mention the get-together, but the Prime Ministers of Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway issued a 
joint  statement  that  was  fulsome  in  its  praise  for  the  EEA:  ‘We  reaffirm  our  shared  values  of 
democracy, individual freedom, the rule of law and human rights, and a common commitment to 
open  societies  and  open  economies  …  The  EEA  Agreement  provides  a  framework  for  extensive 
rules-based multilateral cooperation in Europe. It promotes prosperity, innovation, competitiveness 
and  general  welfare,  and  plays  a  key  role  in  fostering  high  social,  consumer  and  environmental 
standards … The EEA is a manifestation of solidarity among the countries of Europe in overcoming 
shared social and economic challenges … During the last 25 years, Europe has undergone profound 
changes. The positive spirit of cooperation [with the EU] has allowed for adaptations and pragmatic 
solutions to meet our common challenges.’ 

In a short speech on the occasion of the EEA anniversary, President Tusk could not resist drawing an 
obvious comparison between the positive approach of Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway and the 
awkwardness of EU Member States that were questioning the rule of law or, in the case of the UK, 
were leaving the EU altogether. As President Tusk pointed out: ‘The EEA Agreement is not a short-
term transaction, but a long-term partnership, where everyone contributes, and everyone benefits. 
In a world of resurgent nationalism and authoritarianism, in which geopolitical tensions create real 
threats  to  our  citizens,  you  [Iceland,  Liechtenstein  and  Norway]  have  stood  firmly  on  the  side  of 
wisdom,  the  rule  of  law,  cooperation  and  deeper  integration  among  our  nations.  I  would  like  to 
thank you for this today.’ 

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13. The Conference on the Future of Europe 

Concerns about a deficit of democracy at the EU level have been pervasive for many years. Leaders 
have  sought  to  address  them  in  a  number  of  ways,  mostly  by  encouraging  a  bigger  turn-out  in 
elections to the European Parliament. More recently, leaders have thought also about ways in which 
citizens could express opinions and share ideas, in an organised and systematic way, on the future 
of the EU. Leaders had their own ideas about EU reform, which they had expressed in speeches and 
statements, notably in plenary sessions of the EP, in 2018-2019. Emmanuel Macron had put forward 
several suggestions before and after his election to the Presidency of the French Republic in 2017. 
President Macron was particularly keen to engage citizens in deliberations about EU reform and was 
instrumental in launching the European Citizens’ Consultations, which were held throughout the EU 
in 2018. Although the Consultations generated a wealth of information about citizens’ interests and 
concerns, they did not have an appreciable impact on leaders’ deliberations in 2019 on the future 
of the EU. 

In  an  op-ed  published  in  several  media  outlets  in  early  March,  with  an  eye  to  the  European 
Parliament elections, President Macron issued a spirited defence of the EU and called for ‘European 
renewal’. One of his suggestions was, by the end of the year, to ‘set up, with the representatives of 
the European institutions and the Member States, a Conference for Europe in order to propose all 
the changes our political  project needs, with an open mind, even to amending the treaties. This 
conference  will  need  to  engage  with citizens’  panels and  hear  academics,  business  and  labour 
representatives, and religious and spiritual leaders. It will define a roadmap for the European Union 
that translates these key priorities into concrete actions. There will be disagreement, but is it better 
to have a static Europe or a Europe that advances, sometimes at different paces, and that is open to 
all?’  

The  European  Parliament  has  long  been  a  leading  proponent  of  far-reaching  EU  reform  and  of 
greater citizen participation in EU governance. EP interest in both grew throughout 2019, especially 
before and immediately after the May elections. Ursula von der Leyen tapped into this sentiment in 
her speech to the EP, in Strasbourg on 16 July, when she asked MEPs to support her candidacy for 
President  of  the  Commission.  In  a  section  of  the  speech  entitled  ‘A  new  push  for  European 
democracy’,  she  assured  MEPs,  having  ‘heard  your  concerns,  your  hopes  and  your  expectations’, 
that she wanted ‘European citizens to play a leading and active part in building the future of our 
Union. I want them to have their say at a Conference on the Future of Europe, to start in 2020 and 
run for two years.’  

The possibility of a Conference on the Future of Europe, involving extensive citizen participation, 
percolated  throughout  the  EU  in  the  following  months  before  landing  on  the  agenda  of  the 
European Council in December. In anticipation of the leaders’ discussion, the French and German 
governments released a non-paper in late November on key questions and guidelines relating to 
the idea. Declaring that ‘a Conference on the Future of Europe is prompt and necessary’, the two 
governments suggested that ‘To ensure best possible ownership, the Conference needs to involve 
all three EU institutions on the basis of a common mandate … and allow for broad consultation and 
participation of experts/civil society (academia, think tanks, professional unions and organisations 
etc.)  and  citizens.’  Indeed,  the  non-paper  called  for  ‘a  bottom-up  process  …  [with]  EU-wide 
participation of our citizens on all issues discussed’. The Conference ‘could be chaired by a senior 
European personality … advised by a small Steering Group, consisting of representatives of the EU 
Institutions, Member States, experts/civil society’. As for substance, the non-paper recommended 
that the Conference focus on a wide range of policies rather than on institutional issues. As for the 
outcome,  France  and  Germany  were  careful  not  to  mention  possible  treaty  changes,  suggesting 
only that ‘The final document with recommendations should be presented to the EUCO for debate 
and implementation.’ 

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In  the  event,  leaders  did  not  devote  much  time  at  the  December  summit  to  discussing  the 
Conference. The Franco-German suggestion that the Conference be ‘chaired by a senior European 
personality’ was potentially divisive. President Macron was known to favour Guy Verhofstadt, a close 
political ally, a leading Euro-federalist, and a prominent MEP (he was also a former Prime Minister of 
Belgium). Perhaps wanting to avoid a difficult discussion about leadership and other aspects of the 
Conference, and preoccupied with weightier issues at the summit – notably climate policy – leaders 
kept their comments to a minimum.  

The conclusions stated simply that ‘The European Council considered the idea of a Conference on 
the Future of Europe starting in 2020 and ending in 2022. It asks the Croatian Council Presidency to 
work towards defining a Council position on the content, scope, composition and functioning of 
such a conference and to engage, on this basis, with the European Parliament and the Commission.’ 
Keen  to  affirm  its  institutional  prerogative,  however,  the  European  Council  also  stated  that  ‘The 
European Council recalls that priority should be given to implementing the Strategic Agenda agreed 
in June, and to delivering concrete results for the benefit of our citizens.’ In other words, regardless 
of  the  desirability  of  holding  a  Conference,  of  ensuring  extensive  citizen  participation,  and  of 
involving the Council, the Parliament and the Commission ‘in full respect of the interinstitutional 
balance and their respective roles as defined in the Treaties’, the European Council had a special 
responsibility for directing the EU by means of the recently-agreed Strategic Agenda for 2019-2024, 
which it was determined to assert. 

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14. Relations with the European Parliament 

14.1. Introduction 

The  European  Council  and  the  European  Parliament  have  a  quasi-adversarial  relationship.  The 
European Council is the embodiment of intergovernmentalism in the EU, whereas the EP symbolises 
supranationalism.  The  European  Council  considers  itself  beyond  the  reach  of  EP  oversight  or 
scrutiny, and the EP often seems frustrated by the increasing prominence and political importance 
of the European Council and by the European Council’s tendency to encroach on the EP’s rights and 
responsibilities.  

The two institutions cross paths in a number of ways and on a range of policy issues. Article 15(6)(d) 
TEU requires the European Council President to ‘present a report to the European Parliament after 
each of the meetings of the European Council’. These reports are usually followed by an exchange 
between the European Council President and the EP’s  political  group  leaders as well as  ordinary 
MEPs. Article 235(2) TFEU states that ‘the President of the European Parliament may be invited to be 
heard by the European Council’. Given that the EP President has spoken at the beginning of regular 
European Council meetings since the late 1980s, Article 4(2) of the European Council’s post-Lisbon 
rules of procedure accepted that ‘Such exchange of views shall be held at the start of the meeting 
of  the  European  Council,  unless  the  European  Council  unanimously  decides  otherwise.’  These 
interactions between the EP President and members of the European Council, on the one hand, and 
the European Council President and MEPs on the other hand, are the main point of contact between 
the two institutions. During the encounters, the EP side – either the President speaking at the start 
of a summit, or MEPs speaking during visits of the European Council President to their institution –
frequently raises concerns about European Council agenda items that may affect the activities and 
responsibilities of the EP. In 2019, these mainly had to do with Brexit, the Spitzenkandidaten process, 
the MFF and the Conference of the Future of Europe.  

Although not directly pertaining to European Council-European Parliament relations, the EP in early 
2019 continued the practice, begun in February 2018, of inviting national leaders to visit the EP and 
speak on the subject of the EU’s future, an issue then being discussed in the European Council. Most 
national leaders availed of the opportunity to speak at plenary sessions of the EP. Their speeches 
constituted  an  informal  link  between  the  EP  and  the  European  Council,  and  contributed  to  the 
deliberations among national leader that resulted in the Sibiu Declaration of May 2019.  

14.2. Presidential styles 

President Tusk often seemed impatient during his visits to the EP, giving the impression that he was 
delivering post-summit reports because he had to, not because he wanted to. He was not averse to 
asserting  the  European  Council’s  prerogatives  whenever  he  thought  that  the  EP  needed  to  be 
reminded of them. This was the case as the Spitzenkandidaten process played itself out. It was also 
the case when the European Council turned its attention to devising a new Strategic Agenda. Thus, 
in his report to the EP following the Sibiu summit, President Tusk explained that ‘The result of [the 
leaders’]  discussion  will  come  in  June,  when  –  as  the  European  Council  –  we  will  adopt  the  EU’s 
priorities  for  the  next  five  years,  also  known  as  the  Strategic  Agenda.  Without  prejudging  the 
outcome of this debate, as it will also be influenced by the European Parliament elections, I can state 
one thing with complete certainty. The leaders have categorically demonstrated that they want to 
take full political responsibility not only for single events or challenges, but for the European Union 
as a whole. Put simply, the Member States and their democratically elected leaders want to actively 
shape the way the EU functions and develops. I believe that such a way of thinking is important, and 
– above all – desirable, in order to ensure the effective functioning of our whole community.’  

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Another example of President Tusk’s didacticism was when he lectured the EP on the democratic 
foundations of the EU, during his visit to Strasbourg on 4 July: ‘To some, the Parliament represents 
genuine European democracy because of its directly elected Members, while to others, it is rather 
the  European  Council,  because  of  the  strong  democratic  legitimacy  of  the  leaders.  In  fact,  such 
disputes make little sense, as both institutions are democratic. In the end, we must respect each 
other and cooperate with each other, because only then can we build trust and change Europe for 
the better.’ 

At  the  same  time,  President  Tusk  could  be  gracious  in  his  exchanges  with  the  EP.  For  instance, 
President Tusk closed his speech to the EP on 16 April, a month before the elections, with these 
words: ‘Dear friends, this is our last meeting in your current term. I hope to have the opportunity to 
meet  most  of  you  after  the  elections.’  Opening  his  report  to  the  EP  following  the  two  recent 
meetings  of  the  European  Council  –  on  20-21  June  and  on  30  June-2  July  –  President  Tusk 
congratulated ‘Members of this House and the new President on your election. I offer you my best 
wishes and hope for good cooperation between our institutions.’ In his final report to the EP, after 
the October summit, President Tusk concluded by saying that he wanted ‘to thank the European 
Parliament for five years of good cooperation. It doesn’t mean that we have always agreed. Quite 
the contrary. But I have always respected you knowing that we share the same goal: to protect our 
Union and our people. Thank you.’ Having listened to the debate that followed his report, President 
Tusk made the following closing remarks: ‘Thank you for all your warm words about me. It was worth 
waiting 5 years for such a moment.’  

As President of the European Parliament until early July, Antonio Tajani was President Tusk’s primary 
EP  interlocutor  in  2019  (President  Tusk  left  office  at  the  end  of  November).  A  long-time  Brussels 
insider, having served as a Commissioner as well as an MEP, President Tajani was politically savvy 
but non-confrontational. In his opening speeches at summits, President Tajani dutifully delivered 
the EP’s perspective on a variety of agenda items. Nonetheless, he was not shy about standing up 
for the EP in its dealings with the European Council. Such was the case in his opening speech at the 
Sibiu summit, when he commented on the future of Europe debate. President Tajani stressed that, 
in order to meet pressing challenges, the EU needed institutional reforms to make ‘decision-making 
processes more democratic and transparent and the EU and its institutions more accountable, as 
well  as  enhancing  its  efficiency  and  effectiveness’.  President  Tajani  was  especially  critical  of  the 
European Council for going beyond its Treaty role by developing ‘its own rights of political initiative 
in response to recent crises, sometimes encroaching into the legislative field’. He reiterated the EP’s 
view  that  ‘the  Union  must  tackle  the  challenges  of  its  future  with  greater  and  better  political 
integration’, and called on ‘Heads of State or Government to pursue this path in a renewed spirit of 
solidarity and collaboration’.  

By  temperament  and  political  training,  European  Council  President  Michel  was  much  more 
deferential than President Tusk. The contrast in their dealings with the EP was striking. While Prime 
Minister of Belgium, President Michel had sat through many opening speeches by the EP President 
at European Council meetings. Hearing his first such speech in his new role as European Council 
President, at the December summit, President Michel was considerate and respectful. He went out 
of his way, in his post-summit remarks and in his report on the EP, to praise EP President Sassoli, who 
had succeeded President Tajani, and to defer to the EP’s role in the MFF process and in the proposed 
Conference on the Future of Europe, both of which had been discussed by the European Council. 
Although  the  relationship  between  the  European  Council  and  the  European  Parliament  would 
remain inherently edgy, there was no sign of personal friction in the interactions between President 
Michel and President Sassoli. 

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14.3. Brexit 

Brexit was a major concern for the European Council and the European Parliament in 2019, as the 
UK parliament was unable to approve the agreement and the UK government requested extensions 
to the deadline for departure. The EP’s concern was partly procedural. Specifically, the EP would 
have to give its consent before the Council (Article 50) could conclude the agreement on behalf of 
the EU. The delay in approving the agreement on the UK side meant a delay also on the EU side. EP 
leaders wanted as much notice as possible in order to organise the requisite vote in their institution. 

Granting an extension to the UK raised a particular, substantive concern for the EP: the possibility 
that  the  UK,  if  still  a  Member  State,  would  participate  in  the  May  2019  elections.  Apart  from  the 
implications of this for the campaign itself, the EP dreaded the prospect of a UK delegation, likely 
dominated by eurosceptics, entering the newly-elected Parliament. UK eurosceptics were already 
disproportionately vocal and disruptive in the EP. The thought of perpetuating their presence after 
the elections was distasteful to most MEPs.   

The European Council first addressed a possible UK extension in March 2019, following a request by 
Prime Minister May. At the start of the summit, President Tajani expressed the EP’s ‘disappointment 
that the UK Government has not yet succeeded in securing a majority for the proposed deal in the 
House  of  Commons’,  and  hoped  that  the  European  Council  would  keep  the  extension  period  as 
short as possible, while linking it to a successful vote in the House of Commons. As for securing the 
EP’s consent to the agreement, President Tajani noted that the Parliament’s last sitting before the 
European  elections  was  on  18  April,  and  indicated  that  he  would  be  willing  to  convene  an 
extraordinary part-session after that date, if necessary.  

In his report to the EP, on 27 March, President Tusk described 12 April, the new Brexit deadline, as 
the ‘cliff-edge date. Before that day, the UK still has a choice of a deal, no-deal, a long extension or 
revoking Article 50.’ The possibility of a long extension, and therefore of having the UK participate 
in the upcoming EP elections, discomfited many MEPs and led to a lively debate following President 
Tusk’s report. Anticipating MEPs’ complaints, President Tusk was characteristically combative in his 
opening speech: ‘And here, let me make one personal remark to the Members of this Parliament. 
Before the European Council, I said that we should be open to a long extension if the UK wishes to 
rethink  its  Brexit  strategy,  which  would  of  course  mean  the  UK's  participation  in  the  European 
Parliament elections. And then there were voices saying that this would be harmful or inconvenient 
to some of you. Let me be clear: such thinking is unacceptable. You cannot betray the six million 
people  who  signed  the  petition  to  revoke  Article  50,  the  one  million  people  who  marched  for  a 
People's Vote, or the increasing majority of people who want to remain in the European Union. They 
may feel that they are not sufficiently represented by the UK Parliament, but they must feel that they 
are represented by you in this chamber. Because they are Europeans.’ 

Two weeks later, on 10 April, leaders held a special Brexit (Article 50) summit to consider the UK 
Prime  Minister’s  latest  request  for  another  extension.  In  his  opening  speech,  President  Tajani 
stressed that the key question was not the length of the extension, but whether it served a clear 
purpose,  ‘to  resolve  the  issue  meaningfully’.  Not  surprisingly,  President  Tajani  underlined  the 
significance of a further extension for the EP, given that the UK might have to participate in the May 
elections, which are ‘the basis for the efficiency and integrity of the European Parliament and the 
EU’. President Tajani added: ‘The European elections are not a game, and they must not be made to 
look like one thanks to the casual attitude that some in the UK may choose to take towards them.’  

This time,  leaders agreed to delay Brexit until 31 October. They stressed that the UK would have 
to hold EP elections ‘if it is still a member of the EU between 23 and 26 May 2019. If the UK fails to 
hold the elections, it will leave the EU on 1 June 2019.’ The Prime Minister had already agreed, in her 

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letter requesting an extension, that if the UK were still a Member State on 23 May it would be under 
a legal obligation to hold elections to the EP.  

The near-certainty that the UK would participate in the May elections bothered many MEPs, who 
expressed frustration when President Tusk reported on the summit, on 16 April. As in his previous 
appearance before the EP, President Tusk was uncompromising when he addressed head-on the 
likelihood that the UK would hold European elections in May: ‘We should approach this seriously, as 
UK Members of the European Parliament will be there [in the EP] for several months, maybe longer. 
They will be full Members of the Parliament, with all their rights and obligations. I am speaking about 
this  today  because  I  have  strongly  opposed  the  idea  that,  during  this  further  extension,  the  UK 
should be treated as a second-category Member State. No, it cannot. Therefore, I also ask you to 
reject similar ideas, if they were to be voiced in this House. I know that, on both sides of the Channel, 
everyone, including myself, is exhausted with Brexit, which is completely understandable. However, 
this is not an excuse to say “let's get it over with”, just because we’re tired. We must continue to deal 
with Brexit with an open mind, and in a civilised manner.’ 

Many  MEPs  were  highly  critical  of  the  European  Council’s  decision  to  grant  an  extension.  Guy 
Verhofstadt,  leader  of  the  Liberal  group,  was  one  of  them.  Fearing  that  the  Brexit  process  was 
becoming  interminable,  to  the  detriment  of  other  EU  and  EP  business,  Guy  Verhofstadt  was 
especially critical of President Tusk’s approach to the issue. In his closing remarks, President Tusk 
took  issue  with  the  Liberal  leader,  who,  President  Tusk  noted,  ‘was  applauded,  heartily  and 
energetically, by Mr Farage [a leading Brexiter and UK MEP]. This is a good enough reason for you, 
Mr Verhofstadt, to reconsider and reformulate your argumentation.’ 

By the time that Brexit next came onto the agenda of the European Council, in October, the UK was 
still in the EU and MEPs from the UK, many of them as disruptive as ever before, were still in the EP. 
At  the  October  summit,  the  EU-27  endorsed  the  deal  for  a  revised  agreement  reached  by  the 
Commission  and  the  UK  government  of  Prime  Minister  Johnson.  President  Tusk  referred  to  this 
almost in passing in his post-summit report to the EP, pointing out that ‘On the Council side, we 
have just finalised the necessary steps for the EU’s approval, and the legal texts are now with you. 
The EP has a role to play, and it is an important one.’ Because the UK’s departure finally seemed 
imminent, there was little discussion of Brexit in the EP following President Tusk’s remarks.  

Brexit  arose  for  the  last  time  on  the  agenda  of  the  European  Council,  in  2019,  at  the  Article  50 
meeting on 13 December. EU-27 leaders called for a timely ratification and effective implementation 
of the Withdrawal Agreement. They also discussed preparations for the negotiations on future EU-
UK relations after the withdrawal. President Michel, in his first post-summit report to the European 
Parliament,  devoted  a  short  amount  of  time,  in  an  otherwise  long  statement,  to  Brexit.  He 
summarised the conclusions of the Article 50 meeting and reconfirmed the EU’s aim of establishing 
as close  a  future  relationship as  possible  with  the  UK.  The  debate  that  followed  included  many 
references to Brexit and became quite heated, especially because of provocative interventions by 
UK eurosceptics, who were still in the House. In his concluding remarks, President Michel rebutted 
the  statements  of  the  Brexiters  and  reiterated  the  EU’s  interest  in  establishing  a  harmonious 
relationship with the UK, which was soon to become a non-Member State.  

14.4. The Spitzenkandidaten process 

The Spitzenkandidaten process was a potentially divisive issue between the European Council and 
the  European  Parliament,  and  each  institution  had  staked  out  its  position  well  before  the  May 
elections. For the European Council, there would be no ‘automacity’ between the outcome of the 
elections and the nomination of a lead candidate for Commission President. For the EP, the lead 
candidate who could command a majority of support in the EP, after the elections, should receive 
the  European  Council’s  nomination  for  Commission  President.  But  opinions  differed  within  the 

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European Council and within the EP. For instance, President Macron did not support the procedure. 
Nor did Guy Verhofstadt, the leader of the Liberal group in the EP.  

In 2019, leaders first discussed the procedure, however briefly, at their informal Sibiu summit. They 
agreed to meet again in Brussels for a working dinner on 28 May, to assess the outcome of the EP 
elections and start the nomination process for the heads of the EU institutions, not only that of the 
European Commission. After the summit, President Tusk explained that he intended to try to reach 
agreement  in  a  ‘swift,  smooth  and  effective  way’,  if  possible,  by  means  of  consensus  within  the 
European Council, but that he ‘would not shy away from  putting [the nominations] to the vote’. 
President Tusk was signalling to national leaders, as well as to the EP, that he wanted to conclude 
the entire process by the June European Council. 

In remarks before the leaders met for their informal dinner on 28 May, President Tajani emphasised 
that a majority of groups in the EP supported the Spitzenkandidaten process, which he urged the 
leaders to follow in their nomination of the next Commission President.53 At the dinner, leaders took 
stock of the results of the elections and mandated President Tusk to conduct consultations with the 
EP  and  with  the  national  leaders  individually,  in  order  to  prepare  the  ground  for  the  European 
Council  to  decide  on  the  package  of  nominations  at  its  June  summit.  Speaking  after  the  dinner, 
President Tusk was characteristically forthright:  ‘The Treaty is clear: the European Council should 
propose,  and  the  European  Parliament  should  elect  [the  President  of  the  Commission]’,  who 
therefore must have ‘the support of both a qualified majority in the European Council and a majority 
of the Members of the European Parliament’. President Tusk explained that he would now engage 
in  consultations  with  the  EP,  as  foreseen  by  the  Treaty:  ‘To  kick-start  this  process,  I  have  already 
offered to meet the European Parliament's Conference of Presidents as soon as they are ready.’  

During  the  3  weeks  between  the  28  May  dinner  and  the  June  European  Council,  President  Tusk 
consulted closely and regularly with national leaders and with leading MEPs, including President 
Tajani, and, individually, the heads of the political groups. On 18 June, he met the EP’s Conference 
of  Presidents.  At  the  beginning  of  the  summit,  on  19  June,  President  Tajani  reiterated  the  EP’s 
position  on  the  Spitzenkandidaten  process  and  urged  leaders  to  nominate  one  of  the  lead 
candidates, ideally Manfred Weber, leader of the EPP group in the EP, to which President Tajani also 
belonged and whose party had won most seats in the elections.  

Despite being ‘cautiously optimistic’ before the June summit, President Tusk reported afterwards 
that leaders were unable to reach agreement on an appointments package ‘reflecting the diversity 
of  the  EU’.  The  time  available  to  them  to  discuss  the  top-level  appointments  was  limited. 
Accordingly, leaders agreed to convene a special summit, devoted exclusively to the issue, on 30 
June.  In  the  meantime,  President  Tusk  would  continue  his  consultations  with  national  and  EP 
leaders. 

Addressing the European Council at the start of its meeting on 30 June – the last summit that he 
would  attend  –  President  Tajani  once  again  stressed  the  EP’s  position  in  support  of  the 
Spitzenkandidaten process. At the end of the long meeting, a much-relieved President Tusk reported 
that the European Council’s nominee for Commission President was Ursula von der Leyen. Knowing 
that  many  MEPs  would  be  unhappy  with  the  nomination  of  someone  who  had  not  been  a  lead 
candidate,  President  Tusk  emphasised  an  important  selling  point  for  Ursula  von  der  Leyen:  ‘If 
elected, she will be the first woman to lead the European Commission.’ 

President Tusk was aware that the appointments package agreed to by the European Council lacked 
geographical  and  party-political  balance.  None  of  the  candidates  was  from  central  and  eastern 
Europe,  the  Party  of  European  Socialists  was  under-represented,  and  the  Greens  were  not 

53   Herszenhorn, D., and De La Baume, M., ‘Tajani says majority of Parliament backs ‘lead candidate’ system’, Politico, 2019.  

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represented at all. During the summit, EU leaders had reportedly sought to rectify some of these 
imbalances by suggesting the election of a European Parliament President from the Socialists and 
Democrats (the group of the Party of European Socialists in the EP) and from central and eastern 
Europe, who would be followed in the second half of the term by someone from the EPP group. The 
preferred candidate of the national leaders was reportedly Sergei Stanishev, a former Prime Minister 
of  Bulgaria,  now  a  leading  MEP.  Whatever  their  position  on  accepting  Ursula  von  der  Leyen  as 
Commission  President,  MEPs  were  not  likely  to  follow  the  lead  of  the  European  Council  when 
electing their own President. Indeed, only one day after the end of the special summit to agree on 
the  jobs  package,  the  EP  elected  David  Sassoli,  an  Italian  MEP  belonging  to  the  S&D,  as  its  new 
President.  

The vote for Commission President took place on 16 July, and the outcome was far from being a 
foregone  conclusion.  In  an  effort  to  appease  the  Greens,  who  opposed  Ursula  von  der  Leyen, 
President Tusk told the EP on 4 July that: ‘During the process of nominations, I was in close contact 
with  the  leadership  of  the  Greens,  especially  with  Ska  Keller  and  Philippe  Lamberts.  I  am  fully 
confident that cooperation with the Greens and their presence in the EU decision-making bodies 
will benefit not only the governing coalition, but Europe as a whole. Therefore, I will appeal to all my 
partners to involve the Greens in the nominations, even though there is still no European Council 
leader from this party. I hope that the newly-nominated Ursula von der Leyen will also listen to my 
appeal, in fact, I will pass her this message directly later today. As you know, in many countries green 
symbolises  hope  and  freedom.  I  have  much  faith  in  this  symbol.’  The  Greens  maintained  their 
opposition,  as  did  many  S&D  members.  In  the  end,  Ursula  von  der  Leyen  barely  exceeded  the 
absolute majority of 374 votes that she needed to be elected.  

The Spitzenkandidaten process had its denouement in 2019 when the EP rejected Sylvie Goulard, 
the French candidate for European Commissioner, on 10 October. Sylvie Goulard’s candidacy was 
problematic for a number of reasons, but many MEPs made it clear that they were eager to take 
revenge  on  President  Macron,  the  leading  opponent  of  the  Spitzenkandidaten  process  in  the 
European  Council.  By  rejecting  Sylvie  Goulard  and  forcing  President  Macron  to  propose  another 
candidate,  many  MEPs  sent  a  not-so-subtle  signal  of  their  dissatisfaction  with  how  the 
Spitzenkandidaten  process  had  played  out  in  the  European  Council.54  The  newspaper  Le  Figaro 
described the outcome as ‘a cold shower’ for President Macron and an act of revenge by a European 
Parliament thwarted in its own choice of candidates for the Commission Presidency.55  

The  last  word  on  the  impact  of  the  Spitzenkandidaten  process  on  European  Council-European 
Parliament relations in 2019 belong to David Sassoli. They were among his first words spoken at the 
beginning of a meeting of the European Council, in his capacity of European Parliament President. 
Addressing leaders on 17 October, President Sassoli underlined that their choice ‘not to take into 
account the Spitzenkandidaten, although legitimate according to the Treaties, represented for the 
European Parliament, a wound that will have to be healed’. 

14.5. The multiannual financial framework 

As noted earlier in this report, the MFF was the dog that did not bark in the European Council in 
2019. This was not due to lack of interest on the part of the European Parliament. On the contrary, 
the  EP  had  already  set  out  its  position  on  the  MFF  and  was  eager  to  start  negotiations  with  the 
Council as soon as possible. The EP knew, based on experience, that the key negotiation among 
Member States would take place in the European Council, not in the Council of the EU. When the 
MFF  finally  came  on  the  agenda  of  the  European  Council,  in  October,  President  Sassoli  took  the 

54   Khan, M., ‘How defiant MEPs humbled Emmanuel Macron’, Financial Times, 2019. 
55  

‘Commission européenne: la candidature de Sylvie Goulard compromise’, Le Figaro, 2019. 

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opportunity  in  his  opening  remarks  to  reiterate  the  EP’s  view  that  the  EU  ‘need[s]  an  ambitious 
budget,  equivalent  to  1.3  per  cent  of  gross  national  income’,  that  ‘the  decision  on  revenue  and 
expenditure should be a single package’, and that the whole system of rebates should be abolished. 
These points put the EP on a collision course with the European Council. Touching on an especially 
sensitive issue that was also bound to be controversial in the European Council, President Sassoli 
explained  that  the  EP  favoured  introducing  ‘a  new  budget  protection  mechanism  that  would 
penalise  those  who  disregard  the  rule  of  law’.  Finally,  a  somewhat  exasperated  President  Sassoli 
recalled that the EP had been ready to negotiate the next MFF since November 2018 and expressed 
hope that negotiations with the Council could be opened as soon as possible.  

President  Sassoli  repeated  these  points  at  the  opening  of  the  December  European  Council, 
highlighting  the  ‘need  to  find  an  agreement  as  quickly  as  possible  in  order  to  avoid  delays  in 
implementing the Union’s policies and programmes’. President Sassoli expressed disappointment 
with the latest proposal from the Finnish Presidency, which fell short of the expectations of all of the 
Parliament’s political groups. President Sassoli cautioned national leaders that ‘no one should make 
the mistake of taking Parliament’s consent for granted without having listened to what it has to say’. 

Perhaps bearing President Sassoli’s comments in mind, President Michel stressed in his post-summit 
remarks, with respect to the MFF, that the European Council ‘considers that it is important to have a 
good cooperation with the European Parliament, because the European Parliament has also a role 
to play in order to be able to take this decision’. Similarly, in his report to the EP on the summit, on 
18 December, after explaining how he intended to proceed with the MFF negotiations, President 
Michel went out of his way to express his intention of cultivating good relations with the EP. He 
suggested that he would engage in ‘preventive exchanges’ with the EP, such as his meetings the 
previous evening with several MEPs, ‘taking into consideration the institutional role of the EP [in the 
MFF process]’, and with a view to expressing ‘all my respect and desire to develop good cooperation 
with the European Parliament’. 

14.6. The Conference on the Future of Europe 

The  Conference  on  the  Future  of  Europe  came  onto  the  agenda  of  the  European  Council  in 
December. Speaking at the opening of the summit, President Sassoli welcomed the Commission’s 
proposal for the Conference and the Member States’ willingness, ‘for the first time in 10 years … to 
launch a wide-ranging debate on the future of Europe and reach agreement on a shared vision of 
how  we  can  improve  our  policymaking  in  order  to  achieve  practical  results  and  benefits  for  our 
citizens’. Not surprisingly, President Sassoli stressed that the EP ‘intend[s] to be a driving force in the 
organisation of the conference and in its proceedings … it is vital that the Presidents of the three 
institutions  [European  Council,  European  Commission  and  European  Parliament]  show  joint 
leadership by taking on a personal role in this process’.   

President  Michel  was  conciliatory  in  his  post-summit  remarks  concerning  the  Conference  on  the 
Future of Europe, referring to the exchange of views between members of the European Council 
and the EP President at the start of the summit. While acknowledging the seriousness with which 
the  EP  was  taking  the  Conference,  President  Michel  proclaimed  that  ‘We  are  ready  …  in  the 
European Council, to cooperate with the European Parliament [and] to try to have a strong and a 
good  dialogue  …’  At  the  same  time,  President  Michel  mentioned  the  European  Council’s 
responsibility to provide overall guidance to the EU, which it was doing by means of the Strategic 
Agenda. While the Conference on the Future of Europe would provide an important, inclusive forum 
for discussing the direction of the EU, it ‘is also important for us [the European Council] to be very 
concentrated … on the implementation of our Strategic Agenda’. President Michel repeated these 
points in his report to the EP on the summit. 

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15. Conclusions 

EU leaders, like other mortals, look backwards as well as forwards at the turn of the year. Looking 
backwards in late December 2019, national leaders would have noted that their recent summit had 
been long and acrimonious, and left unfinished business – the quest for unanimity on the goal of 
climate  neutrality  by  2050  –  for  the  year  ahead.  It  was  the  first  summit  under  the  presidency  of 
Charles Michel, who had succeeded Donald Tusk at the end of November. Charles Michel was no 
stranger to the European Council, having served for several years as Prime Minister of Belgium. But 
the transition to European Council President has been tough. Perhaps more to the point, the first 
major issue with which he had to deal as European Council President – climate policy – had been 
especially challenging. 

Commission  President  Ursula  von  der  Leyen  was  another  newcomer  to  the  European  Council  in 
December.  Her  nomination  by  the  European  Council  and  subsequent  election  by  the  European 
Parliament had been a surprise, given that she had not been a Spitzenkandidat, or lead candidate, of 
one of the transnational political parties. The decision by the European Council not to nominate a 
lead candidate was controversial within the European Council and caused a rift with the European 
Parliament.  

EU leaders knew well in advance that the Spitzenkandidaten process was potentially divisive. The 
qualifications of the two leading Spitzenkandidaten – Manfred Weber of the European People’s Party 
and Frans Timmermans of the Party of European Socialists, neither of whom had held the highest 
national political office – made it easier for those in the European Council who opposed the process. 
Still, the political party allegiances of several national leaders were sufficiently strong to keep alive 
the  hopes  of  Manfred  Weber,  whose  party  won  the  most  seats  in  the  elections,  and  Frans 
Timmermans.  The  inability  of  the  European  Parliament  to  quickly  rally  around  either  of  those 
candidates also suited opponents of the Spitzenkandidaten process in the European Council.  

In  the  end,  a  clever  compromise  on  the  top  institutional  appointments  (Commission  President, 
European Council President, High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, and President of 
the  European  Central  Bank)  saved  the  day.  Although  Ursula  von  der  Leyen  was  elected  in  the 
European Parliament by only a small number of votes, and the EP forced the recall of France’s initial 
candidate for Commissioner, partly as a rebuke to President Macron, the leading opponent of the 
Spitzenkandidaten process, the package deal was a satisfactory outcome for the European Council. 

Nominating  and  appointing  new  leaders  was  one  aspect  of  the  new  institutional  cycle  that 
preoccupied the European Council in 2019. The other – adopting the 2019-2024 Strategic Agenda 
– was much less fraught. Both were central to the European Council’s Treaty-based responsibility to 
provide overall direction for the EU, and new institutional leaders would guide the EU by the light 
of the Strategic Agenda. The European Council had spent a considerable amount of time since 2017 
debating the future of the EU, and had issued a series of declarations on the subject. The informal 
Sibiu summit in May 2019 provided an ideal opportunity to tie important pieces together. As a result, 
leaders had little difficulty adopting the Strategic Agenda, covering a range of internal and external 
issues, at their June summit. 

Looking back on 2019 from the vantage point of late December, leaders would have been struck by 
how much time they had spent on Brexit, given that the UK was slated to leave the EU at the end of 
March. As it happened, the domestic politics of Brexit contrived to keep the UK in the EU beyond 
the  end  of  the  year.  The  European  Council  thrice  granted  the  UK’s  request  for  extensions  to  the 
departure deadline, due to the inability of Prime Minister May’s government to win parliamentary 
approval of the Withdrawal Agreement and, subsequently, the need for additional time in the UK to 
win  parliamentary  approval  of  the  revised  Withdrawal  Agreement  negotiated  by  the  new 
government of Prime Minister Johnson.  

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Members  of  the  European  Council  were  divided  on  the  merits  and  the  length  of  the  proposed 
extensions, but ultimately decided that they had little choice than to be patient. Some leaders may 
have wished that the longer it took the UK to leave the EU, the more likely the UK was, perhaps, to 
remain in the EU. But few leaders, if any, can genuinely have hoped for such an outcome. At best, it 
was  up  to  the  European  Council  to  make  the  UK’s  departure  as  painless  as  possible  in  the  more 
realistic hope of cultivating good, post-departure EU-UK relations. 

The endpoint of Brexit would see the UK becoming a third country (a non-Member State). At the 
same  time  that  the  European  Council  was  dealing  with  the  messy  process  of  Brexit,  it  was  also 
dealing, as it had been for years, with the protracted process of enlargement. The UK may have been 
on the way out of the EU, but a number of countries, notably in the western Balkans, were eager to 
get in. By 2019, enlargement policy – the procedure of leveraging possible membership in order to 
accelerate  economic  and  political  reforms  in  candidate  countries  and  promoting  stability  in  the 
notoriously insecure region of the western Balkans – had lost its edge. Accession negotiations with 
Serbia and Montenegro appeared to be moribund, and the European Council had yet to agree to 
open negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia.  

Leaders  tackled  the  question  of  Albania  and  North  Macedonia  at  the  October  summit,  but 
entrenched  opposition  from  President  Macron  once  again  prevented  agreement  from  being 
reached.  Apart  from  particular  concerns  about  the  preparedness  of  both  countries  for  accession 
negotiations,  let  alone  eventual  membership,  President  Macron  had  misgivings  about  the 
fundamentals  of  EU  enlargement  policy.  By  the  end  of  the  October  summit,  leaders  knew  that 
enlargement in general, and Albania’s and North Macedonia’s accession in particular, would come 
before the European Council again in 2020. 

Apart from relations with aspiring Member States, external relations are invariably on the European 
Council’s agenda. Relations with China engaged the European Council in 2019, especially in the early 
part of the year, in the run-up to the EU-China summit in April. A combination of commercial and 
strategic concerns brought China to the forefront of EU affairs, although opinions about the best 
approach for the EU to take differed among national leaders. In the end, the European Council was 
able to agree on a set of objectives for EU-China relations, and the EU-China summit appeared to 
have been a success.  

Closer to home, relations with Russia and Turkey remained tense. The European Council continued 
to criticise Russia for its meddling in Ukraine and easily agreed to maintain sanctions for Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea. The European Council was equally critical of Turkey’s illegal drilling in the 
eastern  Mediterranean  and  military  adventurism  in  Syria.  Clearly,  the  challenge  of  coping  with  a 
resurgent  China,  and  strained  relations  with  Russia  and  Turkey,  would  require  the  European 
Council’s  attention  in  2020,  as  they  had  in  2019.  The  challenge  of  dealing  with  the  US  under 
President Trump was very different, but would also require the leaders’ attention in 2020. 

There was one item, above all, that leaders anticipated having to confront in 2020, but that few were 
looking forward to; that was the multiannual financial framework. Leaders had set out their positions 
on the big questions concerning the MFF – its overall size, the future of rebates, the possibility of 
new revenue sources – in 2019, but resolutely refrained from entering into substantive negotiations. 
Nevertheless,  the  battle  lines  were  drawn  between  ‘frugals’  and  the  net  beneficiaries  of  EU 
expenditure. Rather than begin intensive negotiations in 2019, all thought it better to wait for the 
new Commission President and the new European Council President to arrive, and to put off, during 
an otherwise busy year, negotiations that were bound to be acrimonious and drawn-out, but that 
should still be possible to conclude on time in 2020 to allow the new MFF to come into effect in 
January  2021.  Little  could  leaders  have  known  what  awaited them.  The  MFF  negotiations  would 
indeed be arduous, but for more than the usual reasons. The looming pandemic would complicate 

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everything and ensure that the forthcoming budget negotiations would be unlike any previously 
experienced in the European Council. 

In retrospect, because we know what was coming in 2020, it is tempting to see 2019 as the end of 
an  era  in  the  European  Council,  and  generally  in  the  EU.  If  so,  that  era  ended,  for  the  European 
Council,  not  in  December  2019  but  in  February  2020,  which  was  when  the  last  ‘normal’,  pre-
pandemic summit took place. Without knowing what was to come, leaders could look back on the 
previous year, from the perspective of December 2019 or February 2020, as a crisis-free time during 
which they faced serious challenges but, on the whole, succeeded in dealing with them. By 2019, 
the  European  Council  had  acquired  an  identity  and  a  working  method  that  carried  it  through  a 
myriad of trials and tribulations. Leaders could not have foreseen at the end of the year that the 
resilience of their institution would soon be put to an unprecedented test. 

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The year 2019 provided a respite for the European Council from 
crisis management, but was not without major challenges. Three 
stood  out:  the  Spitzenkandidaten  process  for  selecting  the  next 
the  European  Commission;  Brexit,  which 
President  of 
unexpectedly remained on the agenda of the European Council 
throughout the year; and policy towards climate change.  

feelings  about 

the 
The  European  Council  had  mixed 
Spitzenkandidaten  process,  with  one  of  its  leading  members 
being adamantly opposed. That set the stage for a bruising battle, 
which culminated in an epic special summit, lasting from 30 June 
to  2  July.  None  of  the  transnational  parties’  lead  candidates 
received  the  European  Council’s  nomination. 
Instead,  the 
European Council nominated a relative outsider, Ursula von der 
Leyen,  as  part  of  a  package  of  appointments  to  leading  EU 
positions,  the  cleverness  of  which  managed  to  overcome 
differences among national leaders.  

Meanwhile,  the 
inability  of  the  UK  government  to  win 
parliamentary support for the Withdrawal Agreement obliged the 
UK to request extensions of the deadline. Much to its surprise, the 
European Council met in the Article 50 format on four occasions in 
2019, the last one being on 13 December, to discuss preparations 
for  the  negotiations  on  future  EU-UK  relations  after  the  UK’s 
eventual departure, which happened on 31 January 2020.  

Climate was another issue to the fore in 2019, as the European 
Council sought to reach unanimity on a commitment by the EU 
to  cut  net  carbon  emissions  to  zero  by  2050.  Failure  to  reach 
unanimity, during difficult negotiations at the December summit, 
was  seen  as  a  setback  for  the  new  President  of  the  European 
Council, Charles Michel, who was attending his first meeting of 
the institution in that capacity. 

This is a publication of the European Council Oversight Unit 
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

This document is prepared for, and addressed to, the Members and staff of the European 
Parliament as background material to assist them in their parliamentary work. The content of 
the document is the sole responsibility of its author(s) and any opinions expressed herein should 
not be taken to represent an official position of the Parliament. 

ISBN: 978-92-846-8586-8 
DOI: 10.2861/395171 
CAT: QA-01-21-279-EN-N