COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT Accompanying the document Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders
Date: 2021-12-14
Institutions: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: EU migration policy, Schengen Agreement, border control, external border of the EU, foreign national, illegal migration, internal border of the EU, migrant, residence permit, travel

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   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Strasbourg, 14.12.2021  SWD(2021) 462 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT  Accompanying the document Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL  amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders        {COM(2021) 891 final} - {SEC(2021) 440 final} - {SWD(2021) 463 final}  
 
 
Table of contents 

1. 

2. 

INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT ............................................................... 4 

PROBLEM DEFINITION ..................................................................................................................... 6 

2.1.  What is/are the problems? ................................................................................. 6 
2.1.2.  Discrepancies in the application of travel restrictions at the external borders 
undermining the trust and impacting the credibility vis-a-vis third countries .......... 19 

2.2.  What are the problem drivers? ........................................................................ 27 
2.3.  How likely is the problem to persist? .............................................................. 30 

3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? ......................................................................................................... 32 

3.1.  Legal basis ....................................................................................................... 32 
3.2.  Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action............................................................... 32 
3.3.  Subsidiarity: Added value of EU action .......................................................... 33 

4.  OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? ................................................................................ 33 

4.1.  General objectives ........................................................................................... 33 
4.2.  Specific objectives ........................................................................................... 34 

5.  WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? ..................................................................... 36 

5.1.  What is the baseline from which options are assessed? .................................. 36 
5.2.  Description of the policy options .................................................................... 37 
5.3.  Options discarded at an early stage ................................................................. 47 

6.  WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS?............................................................ 48 

Impacts on fundamental rights ........................................................................ 50 
6.2. 
6.3.  Other impacts .................................................................................................. 51 

7.  HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? ............................................................................................ 52 

8. 

PREFERRED OPTION ....................................................................................................................... 56 

8.1.  Option 2 ........................................................................................................... 56 
8.2.  REFIT (simplification and improved efficiency) ............................................ 56 

9.  HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? .................................. 57 

ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ............................................................................................ 59 

1. 

LEAD DG, DECIDE PLANNING/CWP REFERENCES .................................................................. 59 

2.  ORGANISATION AND TIMING ...................................................................................................... 59 

3. 

4. 

CONSULTATION OF THE RSB ....................................................................................................... 59 

EVIDENCE, SOURCES AND QUALITY ......................................................................................... 62 

5.  ANALYTICAL METHODS ............................................................................................................... 63 

ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION ....................................................................................... 64 

1.  

SCHENGEN FORUM ......................................................................................................................... 64 

2.   MINUTES:  EXPERT  MEETINGS  ON  MEASURES  ALLOWING  FOR  A  MORE 
EFFECTIVE  COOPERATION  WITHIN  THE  SCHENGEN  AREA,  14  AND 
22 JANUARY 2021 ............................................................................................................................ 64 

3.  

PUBLIC CONSULTATION ............................................................................................................... 69 

ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW? ........................................................................................... 77 

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1.  

2.  

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE INITIATIVE ..................................................................... 77 

SUMMARY OF COSTS AND BENEFITS ........................................................................................ 77 

ANNEX 4: RELEVANT INPUTS AND STUDIES ..................................................................................... 80 

ANNEX 5: CONCLUSIONS OF THE CHAIR – SCHENGEN FORUM 30 NOVEMBER 2020 .............. 88 

ANNEX 6: LIST OF REINTRODUCED BORDER CHECKS AT INTERNAL BORDERS ..................... 90 

ANNEX 7: FACTS ON THE EVOLUTION OF THREATS ..................................................................... 111 

ANNEX  8:  MEASURES  BY  THE  SCHENGEN  MEMBER  STATES  AT  THEIR  INTERNAL 
AND  EXTERNAL  BORDERS  IN  RESPONSE  TO  THE  FIRST  WAVE  OF  COVID-19 
(UNTIL 19 MARCH 2020) ............................................................................................................... 114 

ANNEX 9: EXAMPLES OF GOOD PRACTICES DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC .................. 124 

ANNEX  10:  USE  OF  POLICE  CHECKS  AND  NEW  TECHNOLOGIES  WITHIN  THE  LAST 

FIVE YEARS .................................................................................................................................... 126 

ANNEX 11: DUTCH @MIGO-BORAS SYSTEM ................................................................................... 131 

ANNEX  12:  REPORTS  RECEIVED  BY  MEMBER  STATES  WITH  INTERNAL  BORDER 
CONTROL IN PLACE BETWEEN MARCH AND JUNE 2020 IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
ARTICLE 33 SBC ............................................................................................................................. 140 

ANNEX 13: API AND PNR ....................................................................................................................... 142 

ANNEX 14: NEW IT ARCHITECTURE AT THE EXTERNAL BORDERS .......................................... 143 

ANNEX 15: BORDER AREAS ................................................................................................................. 144 

ANNEX  16:  LIST  OF  LEGAL  ACTS  AND  PROPOSALS  MENTIONED  IN  THE  IMPACT 

ASSESSMENT ................................................................................................................................. 146 

ANNEX  17:  2017  PROPOSAL  OF  THE  AMENDMENT  OF  THE  SCHENGEN  BORDERS 

CODE ................................................................................................................................................ 150 

1. 

2. 

3. 

CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL .................................................................................................... 152 

LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY ..................................................... 156 

RESULTS  OF  EX-POST  EVALUATIONS,  STAKEHOLDER  CONSULTATIONS  AND 
IMPACT ASSESSMENTS ............................................................................................................... 158 

4. 

BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS ..................................................................................................... 158 

5.  OTHER ELEMENTS ........................................................................................................................ 158 

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Glossary 

Term or acronym 

Meaning or definition 

API 

ECDC 

ECRIS-TCN 

EES 

ETIAS 

eu-LISA 

Advanced Passenger Information 

European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 

The  European  Criminal  Records  Information  System  – 
Third Country Nationals 

Entry/Exit System 

European Travel Information and Authorisation System 

EU  Agency  for  the  Operational  Management  of  Large-
Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice 

EURODAC 

European Asylum Dactyloscopy Database 

Europol 

FRA 

Frontex 

PNR 

SAC 

SBC 

European  Union  Agency 
Cooperation 

for  Law  Enforcement 

Fundamental Rights Agency 

European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG) 

Passenger Name Record 

Schengen  Associated  Countries:  Iceland,  Liechtenstein, 
Norway and Switzerland 

Schengen Borders Code 

Schengen Handbook 

Practical Handbook for Border Guards - ANNEX 

to the Commission Recommendation C(2019)7131 

SIS 

Schengen Information System 

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TFEU 

VIS 

WHO 

YEA 

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 

Visa Information System 

World Health Organisation 

Your Advice Europe 

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1. 

INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT 

The Schengen area without controls at internal borders (the “Schengen Area”) is one of the 
most significant achievements of European integration. It comprises an area where European 
Union (EU) citizens and non-EU citizens legally staying in the territory as well as goods and 
services  can  circulate  freely.  Schengen  is  a  key  element  for  the  functioning  of  the  Single 
Market  and  its  creation  has  brought  significant  social  and  economic  benefits  to  European 
societies. 

As  illustrated  by  a  2018  EUROBAROMETER  survey1,  Europeans  value  Schengen  very 
much,  in  particular  the  easier  trade  and  travel,  and  the  absence  of  passport  control.  This  is 
confirmed  by  the  high  number  of  complaints  and  queries  following  the  introduction  of 
measures at internal borders in response to COVID-19 (see section 2.1.1).  

1.1.  Brief overview of the Schengen area  

The  Schengen  area  stems  from  the  1985  Schengen  Agreement  and  the  1990  Schengen 
Convention2.  Originally  conceived  as  intergovernmental  cooperation,  it  became  a  fully-
fledged  Community  policy  thanks  to  the  Treaty  of  Amsterdam  and  Treaty  of  Lisbon.  At 
present, the Schengen acquis relating to the area without controls at internal borders applies 
to all Member States except Ireland3 and to four Schengen Associated Countries (SAC).  

The  Schengen  area  is  supported  by  a  significant  body  of  measures  to  compensate  for  the 
absence  of  controls  at  internal  borders  and  ensure  a  high  level  of  security.  The 
Schengen acquis  has  developed  over  years  and  has  been  recently  further  reinforced  in  the 
areas  of  external  borders  (external  border  management,  common  visa  policy),  and 
compensatory  measures  (police  cooperation,  return  policies  and  the  Schengen  Information 
System  (SIS)).  A  robust  monitoring  mechanism4  ensures  the  proper  implementation  of 
measures, both at the external borders and within the Schengen area.  

At  the  core  of  the  Schengen  project  is  the  abolition  of  checks  at  internal  borders  which, 
according  to  the  Schengen  Borders  Code5  (SBC),  can  be  crossed  at  any  point  and  time.  To 
that  end,  Member  States  must  remove  obstacles  to  a  fluid  traffic  flow  at  land  borders,  in 
particular speed limits not based on road-safety considerations.  

The  abolition  of  checks  at  internal  borders  implies  that  measures  having  an  effect 
equivalent to border checks  are  also  prohibited (Article 23(1) SBC).  While no criteria are 
laid down in the law as to when measures have such equivalent effect, Article 23(1) SBC (and 
the  relevant  case-law6)  provides  a  non-exhaustive  list  of  checks  within  the  territory  that  are 
considered  admissible,  suggesting  that  in  particular  measures  exclusively  linked  to  the  fact 

1  https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/what-do-europeans-think-schengen-area-results-special-eurobarometer-
schengen_en 
2 OJ L 239, 22.9.2000, p. 13 and OJ L 239, 22.9.2000, p. 19 respectively. 
3 Ireland and the United Kingdom until Brexit opted in to participate only in police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters (thus not on external border control or rules concerning the internal borders). 
4 Council Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013 (OJ L 295, 6.11.2013). For full reference, see Annex 16. 
5 Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (OJ L 77, 23.3.2016, p. 1–52). For full reference, see Annex 16. 
6 See in particular Judgment of the Court of Justice of 22 June 2010, Melki and Abdeli, joined cases C-188/10 
the  Court  of  Justice  of  19  July  2012,  Adil, 
and  C189/10,  ECLI:EU:C:2010:363, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:508, C-278/12 PPU. 

judgment  of 

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that a person is crossing the border are proscribed. However, the Member States continue to 
be able to carry out any other measures related to the exercise of police powers under national 
law.  

Moreover,  Member  States  may  temporarily  reintroduce  border  checks  at  their  internal 
borders  as  a  last  resort  measure,  for  a  limited  period  of  time,  and  in  response  to  a  serious 
threat  to  internal  security  or  public  policy,  on  the  basis  of  the  rules  set  out  in  Chapter II  of 
Title III of the Schengen Borders Code. This possibility has been used extensively in the last 
six years (i.e. since the migratory crisis of 2015 and increased terrorist threats), impacting the 
exercise of the freedoms guaranteed by the Treaties.  

1.2.  A New Strategy for Schengen 

In her State of the Union 2020 address, President von der Leyen announced a new strategy 
for the future of Schengen with a view to restoring the four freedoms “in full and as fast as 
possible”7.  The  idea  of  a  new  approach  to  Schengen  replied  to  the  challenges  that  the 
Schengen  area  has  been  confronted  with  in  the  past  years:  an  extraordinary  high  level  of 
migration in 2015, an increased threat from terrorism and COVID-19. This idea echoed in the 
Joint Declaration of  the EU  Home  Affairs Ministers of 12 November 20208.  In the  Pact on 
Migration  and  Asylum9,  the  Commission  announced  the  establishment  of  a  dedicated 
Schengen  Forum  in  order  to  stimulate  more  concrete  cooperation  and  to  re-build  trust 
between  all  relevant  stakeholders  of  the  Schengen  area.  The  Forum,  organised  for  the  first 
time  on  30 November  2020,  gathered  representatives  of  the  Member  States  and  of  the 
European Parliament who agreed that Schengen needs to be made stronger and more resilient. 
The  situation  at  the  internal  borders  was  also  recalled  in  the  European  Parliament’s 
Resolution of 20 January  2021 on monitoring the application of Union law 2017, 2018 and 
201910. This Strategy should build on the efforts of the Commission to restore Schengen and 
to make it stronger, and is part of the wider exercise of making Europe more resilient, in the 
aftermath of the pandemic. 

The upcoming Schengen Strategy will steer the process of reinforcing Schengen governance. 
It is to be accompanied by two initiatives: one to review the Schengen Borders Code, with 
conclusions  to  be  drawn  from  the  negotiations  on  the  Commission’s  proposal  of  2017 
(hereafter  the  “2017  proposal”)11,  and  a  proposal  to  reform  the  Schengen  evaluation 
mechanism12  in  order  to  make  it  a  fully  effective  tool  for  evaluating  the  functioning  of 
Schengen and implementation of the follow-up recommendations. The Strategy will also take 
stock of the initiatives and measures that are currently being implemented in the management 
of  the  external  borders.  This  concerns  in  particular  the  measures  related  to  the  new  IT 
architecture  at  the  external  borders  (Entry  Exit  System  (EES)  European  Travel  Information 

7  State  of  the  Union  Address  by  President  von  der  Leyen  at  the  European  Parliament  Plenary,  16 September 
2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_20_1655. 
8 Joint statement by the EU home affairs ministers on the recent terrorist attacks in Europe, 13 November 2020, 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/11/13/joint-statement-by-the-eu-home-affairs-
ministers-on-the-recent-terrorist-attacks-in-europe/. 
9 COM/2020/609 final. For full reference see Annex 16. 
10  Report  on  monitoring  the  application  of  Union  law  2017,  2018  and  2019,  17  December  2020, 
(2019/2132(INI)), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2020-0270_EN.html. 
11 COM(2017)571 final. For full reference see Annex 16. 
12 PLAN/2020/8679. 

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and  Authorisation  System  (ETIAS)  and  Interoperability)13.  Finally,  it  will  announce 
additional initiatives to reinforce security in the EU (e.g. on cross-border police cooperation), 
to  complement  the  Commission’s  continued  efforts  to  make  full  use  of  the  Schengen 
Information System and to increase the capacities of Europol14. 

The  revision  of  the  Schengen  Borders  Code  will  particularly  take  into  account  the  lessons 
learnt from  the lack  of sufficient support  among  Member States  for the  2017 proposal. The 
2017  proposal  aimed  at  extending  the  time-limits  applicable  for  reintroduction  of  internal 
border controls in exchange for stronger procedural safeguards. It provided for an increase of 
the time-limit for the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders in case of 
foreseeable threats to up to one year with prolongation periods of up to 6 months. In contrast, 
a  new  consultation  procedure  was  foreseen,  in  which  the  Commission  would  have  had  the 
power to take a stance on the necessity and proportionality of the checks15. 

This  Impact  Assessment  assesses  the  options  for  making  Schengen  stronger  and  more 
resilient,  including  a  fresh  way  forward  on  the  Schengen  Borders  Code  (the  reform  of  the 
Schengen Evaluation Monitoring Mechanism is subject to a separate report). It is based on a 
consultation  process  launched  at  the  Schengen  Forum  in  November  2020  and  continued 
through  technical  workshops  in  January  and  February  2021  with  Member  States, 
representatives of the European Parliament and stakeholders, as well as a public consultation 
carried out between 19 January and 16 March 202116.  

2. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION 

2.1.  What is/are the problems? 

Over  the  last  six  years,  Schengen  has  been  exposed  to  a  number  of  challenges:  an 
extraordinary migratory pressure in 2015 which exposed the deficiencies in the management 
of  some  external  borders,  terrorist  attacks  and,  most  recently,  COVID-19.  According  to 
Eurostat17, in 2015, 1,255,600 first time asylum seekers applied for international protection in 
the  Member  States  of  the  European  Union  (EU),  a  number  more  than  double  that  of  the 
previous  year.  To  compare,  in  2018  there  were  699,000  applications  lodged  in  the  EU, 
including  631,000  first  time  applications18.  The  terrorist  threat,  while  always  present,  has 
become very prominent in Europe since the attack on Charlie Hebdo six years ago, in January 
2015,  and  the  growth  of  the  so-called  Islamic  State  in  Syria  (yet,  this  development  can  be 
linked with Schengen only in a limited manner - see Annex 7). Finally, the fast spread of the 

13  EES  Regulation  (EU)  2017/2226  (OJ  L  327,  9.12.2017),  ETIAS  Regulation  (EU)  2018/1240,  OJ  L  236, 
19.9.2018), Interoperability Regulation (EU) 2019/817 (OJ L 135, 22.5.2019, p. 27).  
14 (SIS) COM(2020)791final and Europol COM(2020)796final respectively. 
15 See Annex 17. 
16  Public  consultation  “Temporary  checks  at  internal  borders  –  amending  the  Schengen  Borders  Code”: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12827-Amendment-of-the-Schengen-
Borders-Code/public-consultation. 
17 Eurostat Newsrelease “Asylum in the EU Member States Record number of over 1.2 million first time asylum 
seekers  registered  in  2015”,  4  March  2016:  https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7203832/3-
04032016-AP-EN.pdf/790eba01-381c-4163-bcd2-a54959b99ed6. 
18 European Commission “Statistics on  migration to Europe”:  https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-
2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/statistics-migration-europe_en#developmentsin20192018. 

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COVID-19  pandemic  caused  between  March  and  October  2020  an  excess  of  deaths 
amounting to almost 300,000 in the EU, compared with the same period in 2016 – 201919.  

In response to these developments, some Member States decided to reintroduce border checks 
at  some  or  all  of  their  internal  borders  (see  Table  1  below).  While  at  first  such  decisions 
responded  to  clearly  identifiable  events,  in  particular  major  sports  events,  and  for  a  certain 
period of time have been even recommended by the Council20 (see Annex 7), now they often 
appear to be permanent precautionary measures. At the same time, measures agreed to protect 
the  external  borders  in  relation  to  COVID-19  are  applied  in  an  incoherent  manner  by  a 
number  of  Member  States,  thus  increasing  the  problems  for  the  Schengen  area  as  a  whole. 
Although  reintroducing  border  checks  is  a  legitimate  measure  to  address  serious  threats  to 
internal  security  and  public  policy  and  may  help  the  implementation  of  other  legitimate 
measures (for instance travel restrictions), the geographical scope and duration of these border 
checks have had a heavy impact on the free movement of persons and the free circulation of 
goods,  two  fundamental  freedoms  guaranteed  by  the  Treaties.  The  scale  of  this  impact  is 
outlined  in  section  2.1.3.  The  impact  has  been  particularly  visible  at  the  land  borders, 
affecting  in  particular  the  multiple  economic  and  social  ties  in  cross-border  regions  and  the 
150 million persons living in these regions.  

Despite  a  number  of  initiatives  taken  by  the  European  Commission  (in  particular  the 
Recommendation  of  12  May  2017  on  proportionate  use  of  police  checks  and  police 
cooperation  in  the  Schengen  area21  and  the  Recommendation  of  3  October  2017  on  the 
implementation  of  the  provisions  of  the  Schengen  Borders  Code  on  a  temporary 
reintroduction of border control at internal borders in the Schengen area22, the proposal for an 
amendment to the Schengen Borders Code tabled in 2017 and high level discussions, as at the 
Schengen  Forum  on  30 November  2020)  and  a  number  of  resolutions  of  the  European 
Parliament23, these border checks have not yet been lifted. 

Table 1 - Overview of border checks at internal borders September 2015  - May 2021*, 
based on notifications received from Member States 

COVID-19 related (state of play April 
2021) 

Migration and terrorism (long-lasting 
border checks in place since 2015/2016) 

19  Eurostat  “Excess  mortality  in  2020:  especially  high  in  spring  and  autumn”,  20  January  2021, 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/ddn-20210120-1. 
20  Serious  deficiencies  identified  at  the  Greek  external  border  in  2016  led  to  the  adoption  of  four  Council 
Recommendations that, based on Article 29, called on five Member States (Austria Germany, Sweden, Denmark 
and  Norway)  to  temporarily  reintroduce  border  checks  at  their  internal  borders  between  May  2016  and 
November 2017 
21 C(2017)3349. For full reference see Annex 16. 
22 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/1804 For full reference see Annex 16. 
23 E.g. European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2020 on the Schengen system and measures taken during 
the COVID-19 crisis (2020/2801(RSP)), European Parliament resolution of 19 June 2020 on the situation in the 
Schengen  area  following  the  COVID‑19  outbreak  (2020/2640(RSP)),  European  Parliament  resolution  of  17 
September  2020  on  COVID-19:  EU  coordination  of  health  assessments  and  risk  classification,  and  the 
consequences for Schengen and the single market (2020/2780(RSP)), European Parliament resolution of 30 May 
2018 on the annual report on the functioning of the Schengen area (2017/2256(INI)). 

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Austria (9 January 2021 - 28 April 2021)  Austria  16  September  2015  –  11  November 

2021 

Belgium  (27  January  2021  –  18  April 
2021) 

Denmark (13 March 2020 – 11 November 
2021) 

Denmark  4  January  2016  –  11  November 
2021  

Finland (19 March 2020 – 30 April 2021)  

France (1 May 2021– 31 October 2021) 

Hungary  (1  September  2020  –  22  May 
2021)  

Iceland (18 March 2021 – 16 April 2021) 

France  13  November  2015  –  31  October 
2021 

Germany 13 September 2015 – 11 November 
2021 

Norway (16 March 2020 – 10 May 2021)  Norway 26 November 2015 – 11 May 2021 

Portugal  (31  January  2021  –  30  April 
2021)  

Spain (31 January 2021– 1 May 2021) 

Sweden 12 November 2015 – 11 May 2021 

*  This  table  does  not  take  into  account  the  border  checks  that  were  reintroduced  but  had 
again been lifted by April 2021. 

For more information concerning the reintroductions of border checks at internal borders, see 
Annex 6. 

Based on the experience of the last six years in the Schengen area, including the recent crisis 
situation related to COVID-19, two problems can be identified:  

-  Problem  1:  Border  checks  at  internal  borders  which  are  long-lasting  and  applied 
against  an  abstract  threat  or  used  as  a  first  aid  measure  (and  as  such  are  often 
disproportionate  and  inadequate  to  address  the  threats  they  are  supposed  to  tackle) 
become an unjustified hurdle to exercising the freedom of movement for persons and 
goods; 

-  Problem 2: Discrepancies in the application of the measures at the external borders, 
such as travel restrictions for non-essential travel to the EU by third country nationals, 
undermining the trust between Member States and increasing the incentives for some 
to reintroduce internal border checks, thus putting the overall functioning of Schengen 
at risk. 

The existence of these problems is linked with the following specific issues: 

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Specific issues of effectiveness concerning Problem 1:  

-  Use  of  border  checks  at  internal  borders  as  a  first  aid  measure  without  sufficient 

mitigating measures; 

-  Persistence  of  border  checks  at  internal  borders,  while  compensatory  measures  that 
would interfere less with the movement of goods and persons across borders are not or 
under-used.  
Specific issues of relevance concerning Problem 2: 

-  Travel  restrictions for non-essential travel  to  the EU at  the external  borders are only 

set out in a Council Recommendation which is legally not binding. 

Box 1 – Problem definition 

PROBLEM 1 (Section 2.1.1) Border checks at internal borders which are long-lasting 
and applied against abstract  threats  or are used as a first  aid  measure (and as such are 
often disproportionate and inadequate to address the threats they are supposed to tackle) 
become an unjustified hurdle to persons and goods moving in the Schengen area.  

a)  Use  of  border  checks  at  internal  borders  by  Member  States  as  a  ‘first  aid 
measure’;  

  Examples  of  difficulties  (at  the  outset  and  in  relation  to  evolving 

circumstances) 

  Perspective of the cross-border regions 
  Effectiveness  and  efficiency  of  border  checks  in  addressing  threats  to 

public health 

  Response  time  to  mitigate  impacts  –  unavailability  of  mitigating 

measures from the outset 

b) Long-term hurdles for persons and goods to move freely in the Schengen area 

  Underuse of compensatory measures 

PROBLEM  2  (Section  2.1.2)  Discrepancies  in  the  application  of  travel  restrictions  at 
the  external  borders  undermining  the  trust  and  impacting  the  credibility  vis-a-vis  third 
countries. 

IMPACTS OF THE PROBLEMS (Section 2.1.3) 

2.1.3.1 Impacts of the long- lasting border controls 
  Specific impacts on the air travel industry 
 
Impacts on the cross-border regions  
 
Impacts on the administration 
 
Impacts on border management capacity 

2.1.3.2 Impacts related to COVID-19 

1.2.1.  Border  checks  at  internal  borders  which  are  long-lasting  and  applied 
against  abstract  threat  or  used  as  a  first  aid  measure  (and  as  such  are 
often  disproportionate  and  inadequate  to  address  the  threats  they  are 

EN 

9 

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supposed  to  tackle)  become  an  unjustified  hurdle  to  persons  and  goods 
moving in the Schengen area 

This problem refers to a number of situations over the last 6 years where Member States have 
decided  to  temporarily  reintroduce  border  checks  at  their  internal  borders,  for  different 
reasons. Since September 2015, border checks at the internal borders have been reintroduced 
more than 250 times. Even if, per se, border checks are without prejudice to the right of free 
movement, in practice they do have an impact on the way EU citizens can exercise this right. 
In  some  cases,  they  can  also  serve  to  implement  other  measures  affecting  the  freedom  of 
movement, in particular travel restrictions.  

Box 2 – Absence of checks at internal borders and freedom of movement 
Pursuant to Article 3(2) of the Treaty on European Union, “[t]he Union shall offer its citizens an 
area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of 
persons  is  ensured  in  conjunction  with  appropriate  measures  with  respect  to  external  border 
controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime.” 

While the Schengen Borders Code abolishes border checks at internal borders (Article 22) and 
requires  Member  States  to  remove  any  obstacles  to  traffic  at  land  borders  (Article  24),  the 
conditions for the exercise of the right of free movement and residence24 (both temporary and 
permanent)  in  the  EU  for  EU  citizens  and  their  family  members  are  set  out  in  Directive 
2004/38/EC25.  

The  freedom  of  movement  of  EU  citizens  in  the  internal  market  is  the  basis  for  allowing  the 
absence of internal border controls on persons in the Schengen area, but these two concepts are 
not  equivalent  in  scope.  Free  movement  of  persons  is  also  granted  to  EU  citizens  living  in  a 
Member State which does not (yet) participate in the area without internal border control. Within 
the  Schengen  area,  the  benefits  of  not  being  submitted  to  border  checks  are  also  available  to 
third country nationals legally staying or residing in the Schengen area, but the right to travel of 
those third country nationals does not go that far as the right of free movement of EU citizens. In 
any case, the temporary reintroduction of border checks at internal borders does not affect rules 
governing the right of free movement as set out in Directive 2004/38/EC. 

In 2020, the numerous reintroductions of border checks at internal borders intended to contain 
(or to help contain) the spread of COVID-19 revealed a number of specific problems which 
will  be  analysed  in  point  a)  below.  Similarly,  the  years  preceding  the  pandemic,  where  a 
number of Member States carried out persistent border checks at their internal borders or on 
some sections of these borders, provide evidence on how ineffective these checks often are. 
This will be analysed in point b) below. 

24 This right stems from Article 21(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which 
provides that every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the measures adopted 
to give effect to them. Article 45 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union also provides for 
freedom of movement and residence. 
25 Directive 2004/38/EC (OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, p. 77.) For full reference see Annex 16 

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a)  Internal border checks as a measure of first aid  

In  the  period  March  –  June  2020,  border  checks  at  internal  borders  have  often  been 
applied  a  first  aid  measure  and  17  Member  States  reintroduced  border  checks  in  an 
(unsuccessful) attempt to contain a further spreading of COVID-19. Some of them maintained 
or re-reintroduced them again even during periods where the epidemiological situation across 
the EU was comparable between the Member States. The identification of new variants of the 
virus  at  the  end  of  2020  led  again  to  another  wave  of  reintroductions  of  border  checks  at 
internal borders.  
Until  the  adoption  of  sectorial  guidelines  by  the  EU  with  the  aim  to  mitigate  the  unwanted 
effects  of  internal  border  controls  (disruption  of  supply  chains,  disproportionate  hurdles  to 
free  movement  of  persons,  goods  and  services),  Member  States  and  EU  citizens  have  been 
exposed to unprecedented disruptions. 

Annex 8 shows the state of play as of mid-March 2020 as regards the measures taken by the 
Member  States  to  respond  to  COVID-19.  Table  2  below  illustrates  problems  identified 
around the same time, which have been considered as hindering, in  a disproportionate way, 
professional travel and/or the smooth transport of goods and services, as well as other rights 
of  EU  citizens.  The  more  specific  impacts  of  these  measures  on  the  freedoms  are  further 
explained in sections 2.1.3.1 and 2.1.3.2 below. 

Table 2 – Examples of problems at internal borders in 2020 
MS/SAC 

Problem description 

PL-DE: 

SI-IT: 

The unilateral decision of Poland to reintroduce border checks led to severe 
congestion in the border areas, in particular in spring 2020, as many Polish 
citizens  wanted  to  return  to  Poland.  Long  queues  built  up  at  border 
crossings and continued throughout the border closure. All this also heavily 
impacted on the freight traffic and therefore the delivery of essential goods. 

The decision banning inter-regional movement in Italy was not shared with 
Slovenia.  Unaware  of  the  fact  that  Italians  were  not  allowed  to  move 
anyway,  Slovenian  authorities  closed  overnight  the  secondary  crossing 
points (sometimes by installing large rocks in the middle of the street) and 
leaving only two international crossings open (with controls). As Slovenia 
is a transit country between Eastern and Western Europe, many trucks got 
stuck  at  the  border.  Some  farmers  even  found  their  fields  split  in  two, 
without  the  possibility  to  use  their  usual  country  roads.  Furthermore,  the 
fact  that  one  of  the  crossing  points  was  on  a  highway  meant  that 
pedestrians and cyclists were not allowed to use it.  

BE-NL 

The  border  was  closed  with  containers,  blocks  and  fences  –  only  a  few 
crossing  points  were  left  open  for  frontier  workers,  with  the  police 
controlling  people  travelling  into  and  out  of  Belgium  (only  Belgium 
reintroduced border controls). There were limited justifications for crossing 
the border (accepted reasons were work-related or essential health of family 
reasons). 

Based on the DG REGIO Report The effects of COVID-19 induced border closures on cross-
border regions - An empirical report covering the period March to June 2020’ 

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11 

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The situation has evolved since Spring 2020, and the border measures have often been lifted 
and introduced again. This means that people, in addition, also had to keep pace with frequent 
changes in the applicable rules. The public consultations provided some insights to illustrate 
this challenge. According to Eurostar ‘The clarity and reciprocity of border restrictions, and 
their joint implementation, is essential [...]’26. ‘[B]order restriction rules have been changing 
and  updating  on  a  virtually  daily  basis.  The  result  has  been  confusion  for  passengers,  staff 
and  within  governments.  Frequently  governments’  own  information  (e.g.  embassy  websites) 
has failed to keep up and had been partial, inaccurate or missing entirely. The overwhelming 
majority of passengers are trying to be responsible but if the rules are not clear and simple, 
they struggle to  comply. Eurostar staff  and border forces are put  in  the  difficult position to 
have to interpret rules and regularly fail to provide answers with confidence’27.  

  Perspective of the cross-border regions 

The uncoordinated response has affected in particular cross-border regions where the socio-
economic ties between EU citizens and companies based in different Member States are very 
strong.  The  sudden  reintroduction  of  border  controls  also  affected  the  local  capacities  to 
ensure  essential  services  on  both  sides  of  the  border.  These  problems  illustrate  the  fact  that 
borders should be understood in the first place not as lines separating national sovereignties, 
but as areas where people live together. 

As reported by DG REGIO28, around 150 million Europeans live in border regions amounting 
to  30%  of  the  EU  population.  The  cross-border  regions  cover  40%  of  the  EU  territory  and 
produce 30% of the EU's GDP. Therefore, any changes as regards the possibility to cross the 
borders  without  controls  are  socially  and  economically  significant.  The  specific  impacts  of 
measures  at  the  internal  borders  on  the  cross-border  regions  are  described  in  section  below 
2.1.3. 

According to the study by DG REGIO ‘The effects of COVID-19 induced border closures on 
cross-border regions - An empirical report covering the period March to June 2020’29 and the 
‘20  case  studies  covering  the  period  March  to  June  2020’30  accompanying  it,  the  measures 
taken  by  the  Member  States  have  had  a  significant  impact  on  different  elements  of  cross-
border  ties.  The  most  relevant  for  this  Impact  Assessment  relate  to  the  area  without  border 
checks at internal borders, and concern primarily cross-border workers.  

26 Written contribution submitted to the Commission following the workshop of 14 January 2021. 
27 Written contribution submitted to the Commission following the workshop of 14 January 2021. 
28 COM(2017) 534 final Boosting growth and cohesion in EU border regions. 
29  European  Commission,  Directorate-General  for  Regional  and  Urban  Policy,  “The  effects  of  COVID-19 
induced border closures on cross-border regions – An empirical report covering the period March to June 2020”, 
https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/46250564-669a-11eb-aeb5-
February 
01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-search. 
30  European  Commission,  Directorate-General  for  Regional  and  Urban  Policy,  “The  effects  of  COVID-19 
induced  border  closures  on  cross-border  regions  –  20  case  studies  covering  the  period  March  to  June  2020”, 
https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/bf14de68-6698-11eb-aeb5-
February 
01aa75ed71a1/language-en. 

2021: 

2020, 

EN 

12 

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Map 1 - twin cities in the EU 

The  reintroduction  of 
different  measures  at 
internal  borders  have 
been 
particularly 
visible in the so called 
where 
‘twin-cities’, 
the  reintroduction  of 
checks 
internal 
at 
borders  affected  all 
such 
aspects 
entities.  There  are  37 
entities  of  this  kind 
(i.e.  cities  that  extend 
over  the  territories  of 
two Member States) in 
the EU. 

of 

The adopted measures triggered a lot of discussion and local initiatives. For instance, in the 
High Rhine Region, the citizens’ dialogues carried out in Summer 2020 led to the conclusion 
that the decision-making process in the situation of crisis should include: i) close coordination 
with  neighbouring  countries,  ii)  maintaining  local  border  traffic,  and  iii)  uniform  rules  to 
minimise the number of regimes applicable in the cross-border regions31.  

The  cross-border  regions  also  experienced  many  difficulties  related  to  constant  changes.  In 
2020,  the  Euregio  Meuse-Rhine  region  alone  received  416,000  questions  from  citizens  and 
businesses. This aspect also demonstrates the need for closer cooperation. In this context, the 
Euregio Meuse-Rhine called for even more cross-border cooperation in the situation of crisis 
in  order  to  do  justice  to  the  shared  responsibility  for  the  labour  market.  Furthermore,  in  a 
position paper of 21 September 2021 the Heads of State and Government of the Benelux and 
Baltic countries call for a closer monitoring of the Union’s border regions as a lesson learnt 
from  the  experience  with  the  pandemic  and  the  inclusion  of  a  cross-border  test  into  the 
policymaking process at Member State and Union level32. 

  Effectiveness  and  efficiency  of  border  checks  in  addressing  threats  to 

public health  

The objective of border checks reintroduced during the pandemic at internal borders has been 
to enforce travel bans for non-essential travel. However, the effectiveness of travel bans in the 
context of an epidemiological threat is not evident. The WHO expressly holds that “[t]ravel 
bans to affected areas or denial of entry to passengers coming from affected areas are usually 
not effective in preventing the importation of cases but may have a significant economic and 

31  See  letter  from  Marion  Dammann,  President  of  the  High  Rhine  Commission,  Head  of  Lörrach  District 
Authority (D), and Stephan Attiger, Vice-President of the High Rhine Commission, Administrator of the Canton 
of Aargau (CH) ARES(2020)4394367. 
32 Joint Benelux-Baltic position paper regarding the importance of impact assessments of EU-policies on border 
regions, 21 September 2021, 12663/21. 

EN 

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social  impact.”33  Several  media  outlets  cite  WHO  officials  calling  on  States  to  keep  their 
borders  open.  Considering  the  side-effects  of  border  closures,  Michael  Ryan,  the  WHO 
emergencies  director,  held  that  “[c]ontinuing  to  keep  international  borders  sealed  is  not 
necessarily  a  sustainable  strategy  for  the  world’s  economy,  for  the  world’s  poor,  or  for 
anybody else”34. 

Therefore,  the  WHO  continuously  advised  against  travel  and  trade  restrictions  to  countries 
experiencing  COVID-19  outbreaks35.  However,  it  recognised  that  “[t]ravel  measures  that 
significantly  interfere  with  international  traffic  may  […]  be  justified  at  the  beginning  of  an 
outbreak [of a pandemic], as they may allow countries to gain time, even if only a few days, to 
rapidly implement effective preparedness measures”, but also underlined that these “must be 
based  on  a  careful  risk  assessment,  be  proportionate  to  the  public  health  risk,  be  short  in 
duration,  and  be  reconsidered  regularly  as  the  situation  evolves.”36  The  available  studies 
concerning  the  effect  of  travel  restrictions  on  the  spreading  of  COVID-19  seem  to  confirm 
this assessment. Accordingly, following the appearance of new variants of the COVID-virus, 
the Council has only recommended to discourage non-essential travel but not to issue travel 
bans37. 

  Response time to mitigate impacts – unavailability of mitigating measures 

from the outset 

From the start  of the pandemic, the Commission worked closely with  the Member States to 
ensure a coordinated approach to border-related issues and a gradual return to free movement. 
It  organised  regular  videoconferences,  both  at  the  ministerial  level  and  technical  level, 
bringing  together  experts  from  Member  States,  different  Commission  services  and  relevant 

in 

to 

cf. 

relation 

33  WHO,  “Updated  WHO  recommendations  for  international  traffic  in  relation  to  COVID-19  outbreak”,  29 
February 2020: https://www.who.int/news-room/articles-detail/updated-who-recommendations-for-international-
traffic-in-relation-to-covid-19-outbreak;  cf.  WHO  “Key  considerations  for  repatriation  and  quarantine  of 
travellers 
the  outbreak  of  novel  coronavirus  2019-nCoV”,  11  February  2020: 
https://www.who.int/news-room/articles-detail/key-considerations-for-repatriation-and-quarantine-of-travellers-
in-relation-to-the-outbreak-of-novel-coronavirus-2019-ncov. 
34 
https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/692882-border-closures-not-a-sustainable-strategy-who; 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/world-health-organization-borders-shut-covid-19-not-sustainable-coronavirus/; 
https://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/World/2020/Jan-31/500308-who-says-keep-borders-open-despite-
coronavirus.ashx. 
35  WHO,  “Updated  WHO  recommendations  for  international  traffic  in  relation  to  COVID-19  outbreak”,  29 
February 2020: https://www.who.int/news-room/articles-detail/updated-who-recommendations-for-international-
traffic-in-relation-to-covid-19-outbreak; cf. WHO “WHO advice for international travel and trade in relation to 
the outbreak of pneumonia caused by a new coronavirus in China”, 10 January 2020: https://www.who.int/news-
room/articles-detail/who-advice-for-international-travel-and-trade-in-relation-to-the-outbreak-of-pneumonia-
caused-by-a-new-coronavirus-in-china;  WHO  “Updated  WHO  advice  for  international  traffic  in  relation  to  the 
outbreak  of  the  novel  coronavirus  2019-nCoV”,  24  and  27  January  2020:  https://www.who.int/news-
room/articles-detail/updated-who-advice-for-international-traffic-in-relation-to-the-outbreak-of-the-novel-
https://www.who.int/news-room/articles-detail/updated-who-advice-for-
coronavirus-2019-ncov-24-jan 
international-traffic-in-relation-to-the-outbreak-of-the-novel-coronavirus-2019-ncov; 
“Key 
considerations for repatriation and quarantine of travellers in relation to the outbreak of novel coronavirus 2019-
nCoV”,  11  February  2020:  https://www.who.int/news-room/articles-detail/key-considerations-for-repatriation-
and-quarantine-of-travellers-in-relation-to-the-outbreak-of-novel-coronavirus-2019-ncov. 
36  WHO,  “Updated  WHO  recommendations  for  international  traffic  in  relation  to  COVID-19  outbreak”,  29 
February 2020: https://www.who.int/news-room/articles-detail/updated-who-recommendations-for-international-
traffic-in-relation-to-covid-19-outbreak. 
37 Council Recommendation (EU) 2021/119 of 1 February 2021 amending Recommendation (EU) 2020/1475 on 
a coordinated approach to the restriction of free movement in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. 

cf.  WHO 

; 

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14 

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EU agencies such as European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control ECDC and Frontex. 
All these efforts have been made despite the lack of relevant tools. These meetings, organised 
on an ad-hoc basis, remained thus voluntary, without any basis in the applicable law. 

the  necessary 

Furthermore, 
and 
recommendations that resulted from these discussions were adopted on an ad hoc basis, which 
can  be  considered  a  good  basis  for  ‘mitigating  measures’  to  be  applied  whenever  several 
Member States reintroduce border checks at their internal borders. 

as  guidelines 

coordination 

instruments, 

such 

Table 3 – Measures adopted by the Commission in 2020* 

Date of a 
measure 

Measure adopted by the Commission in 2020 

16 March 2020  Guidelines  for  border  management  measures  to  protect  health  and  ensure 

availability of goods and essential services (COM(2020 1753 final). 

16 March 2020 

Communication: COVID-19: Temporary restriction on non-essential travel 
to the EU (COM(2020) 115); and successive extensions. 

23 March 2020 

Communication  on  the  implementation  of  the  Green  Lanes  under  the 
Guidelines  for  border  management  measures  to  protect  health  and  ensure 
the availability of goods and essential service (C(2020) 1897 final). 

30 March 2020  Guidance  on  the  implementation  of  the  temporary  restriction  on  non-
essential travel to the EU, on the facilitation of transit arrangements for the 
repatriation of EU citizens, and on the effects on visa policy (COM(2020) 
2050 final). 

30 March 2020  Guidelines concerning the exercise of the free movement of workers during 
COVID-19 outbreak (C(2020) 2051 final), especially regarding  workers in 
the health care and food sectors . 

3 April 2020 

Guidelines  on  EU  Emergency  Assistance  in  Cross-Border  Cooperation  in 
Healthcare related to the COVID-19 crisis (C(2020) 2153 final). 

8 April 2020  

Guidance  on  health,  repatriation  and  travel  arrangements  for  seafarers, 
passengers and other persons on board ships (C(2020) 3100 final). 

13 May 2020 

Guidance on safely resuming travel and rebooting Europe's tourism in 2020 
and  beyond:  Communication:  COVID-19  Towards  a  phased  and 
coordinated  approach  for  restoring  freedom  of  movement  and  lifting 
internal border controls (C(2020) 3250 final), 

11 June 2020 

Communication:  Tourism  and  transport  in  2020  and  beyond  (COM(2020) 
550 final). 

Commission Communication recommending a partial and gradual lifting of 
travel restrictions to the EU after 30 June, based on a common coordinated 
approach  (COM(2020)  399  final).  This  was  followed  by  a  Commission 
Proposal  for  a  Council  Recommendation  on  25  June  (COM(2020)  287 
final),  adopted  by  the  Council  on  30  June  (Council  Recommendation 
2020/912). 

4 

September  Commission  proposal  for  a  Council  Recommendation  to  ensure  that  any 
measures  taken  by  Member  States  that  restrict  free  movement  due  to  the 

EN 

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2020 

pandemic  are  coordinated  and  clearly  communicated  at  the  EU  level 
(COM(2020)  499  final),  adopted  by  the  Council  on  13 October  (Council 
Recommendation 2020/1785) . 

28 October 2020  Guidance  on  travellers  to  be  exempted  from  the  temporary  travel 

restrictions to the EU (including family members) (COM(2020) 686 final). 

22  December 
2020 

Commission  Recommendation  on  a  coordinated  approach  to  travel  and 
transport  in  response  to  the  SARS-COV-2  variant  observed  in  the  United 
Kingdom (C(2020) 9607 final). 

* Further measures have been and are still being adopted in 2021 

In  the  public  consultation,  Member  States,  the  European  Parliament  and  the  private  sector 
have  welcomed  the  coordination  role  assumed  by  the  Commission  in  the  fight  against 
COVID-1938.  Some  stakeholders  (primarily  carriers  associations)  regretted  the  absence  of 
contingency  rules  from  the  outset,  as  this,  in  their  view,  could  have  prevented  patchwork 
solutions and different interpretations by Member States.  

The absence of a mechanism at the EU level to deal with such emergency situations caused 
delays  which  impacted  both  the  border  regions  and  the  entire  Schengen  area  and  should  be 
considered as a significant part of the costs outlined below in Section 2.1.3. Moreover, also 
the  implementation  time  on  the  ground,  in  the  follow-up  to  the  adoption  of  the  different 
guidelines,  had  an  impact.  Still  in  April  2020,  weeks  after  the  European  Commission  had 
adopted  its  Communication  on  the  implementation  of  the  Green  Lanes  under  its  Guidelines 
for border management measures to protect health and ensure the availability of goods and 
essential  services,  stakeholders  (the  International  Road  Transport  Union)  voiced  concerns 
related to “several hours of waiting time at some newly created intra-EU borders”39. 

b)  Long-term hurdles for persons and goods to move freely in the Schengen area 

Apart  from  the  difficulties  due  to  COVID-19,  Schengen  has  been  exposed  to  many  other 
challenges over the last few years. In particular, the last six years have seen persistent border 
checks  at  internal  borders  in  six  Member  States  (France,  Austria,  Germany,  Sweden, 
Denmark and Norway), that repeatedly prolonged these border checks due to different threats 
(migration, terrorism, shortcomings at the external borders). These border checks have been 
repeatedly  prolonged  despite  the  evolution  of  the  situation:  relevant  circumstances  have 
changed  (change  of  migratory  patterns  removing  the  pressure  from  some  border  sections, 
evolution of terrorist threats towards ‘single wolf’ type), the intensity of specific threats has 
decreased considerably (with the number of irregular migrants currently at a level comparable 
to the period preceding 2015/2016 which, together with other measures taken in related areas, 
should  reduce  the  problem  of  secondary  movements),  and  counter-measures  have  been 
adopted at EU and national level to reinforce the external borders.  

38 Workshops organised by DG HOME on 14 and 22 January 2020. 
39 IRU, Open letter “Call to support the Community of supply chains and mobility networks in post COVID-19 
de-confinement 
2020: 
https://www.iru.org/system/files/Call%20for%20the%20continuity%20and%20survival%20of%20commercial%
20road%20transport%20post%20C....pdf. 

period”, 

April 

23 

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16 

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Since  the  very  beginning  of  Schengen40,  Member  States  have  always  had  the  possibility  to 
reintroduce temporary checks at internal borders. In the Schengen Borders Code, adopted for 
the first time in 2006, a specific procedure and time-limits depending on the character of the 
event posing a threat (foreseeable/non-foreseeable) were set up41.  

At first, Member States used the possibility of temporary reintroduction of border checks at 
internal borders quite rarely – between 2006 and 2015, border checks were reintroduced by 16 
Member States in only 36 situations in total, mostly in relation to international sport or other 
events taking place in the Member State concerned. In the vast majority of cases, the checks 
only lasted for a couple of days.  

The  situation  changed  in  2015,  with  the  mass-influx  of  third-country  nationals  and  the 
terrorist  attacks  in  Paris.  Since  then,  until  March  2020  (i.e.  the  beginning  of  COVID-19 
related reintroductions of border checks) there have been more than 250 cases of temporary 
reintroduction  of  border  checks.  Six  of  the  Member  States  (Austria,  Germany,  Denmark, 
Sweden, Norway and France) have kept border checks continuously in place during this entire 
period.  

The grounds and duration of all the instances of temporary reintroduction of border checks is 
available  on  the  website  of  DG  HOME42  (see  also  Annex  6).  Five  Member  States  (Austria, 
Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway) referred to the extraordinary migratory pressure to 
justify the reintroductions between September 2015 and May 2016. Between May 2016 and 
November 2017, the prolongations followed the Recommendation of the Council43 adopted in 
the special procedure of Article 29 of the Schengen Borders Code, in view of the persistent 
serious deficiencies identified at one of the external borders. However, as of November 2017 
these five Member States have continued border checks based on unilateral decisions, giving 
secondary movements of migrants, terrorist threats and/or alleged deficiencies at the external 
borders  as  a  justification.  This  was  the  case  even  where  the  data  available  to  the  national 
authorities  indicated  that  the  number  of  apprehensions  of  irregular  migrants  continuously 
reduced since 2015 and when the number was even lower than in the period before 201544.  

France is  the only Member State which has been continuously carrying  out  checks at  all its 
internal borders in view of terrorist threats or international events (e.g. Tour de France). Only 
recently, in the last few prolongations France has also referred to the migratory situation (and 
COVID-19). 

40  Article  2  of  the  Convention  Implementing  the  Schengen  Agreement:  “1.Internal  borders  may  be  crossed  at 
any point without any checks on persons being carried out. 2. However, where public policy or national security 
so  require  a  Contracting  Party  may,  after  consulting  the  other  Contracting  Parties,  decide  that  for  a  limited 
period  national  border  checks  appropriate  to  the  situation  shall  be  carried  out  at  internal  borders.  If  public 
policy or national security require immediate action, the Contracting Party concerned shall take the necessary 
measures and at the earliest opportunity shall inform the other Contracting Parties thereof”. 
41 In 2013, in one of the subsequent modifications of the Schengen Borders Code, a special procedure was added 
for persistent serious deficiencies at the external borders putting the overall functioning of the Schengen area at 
risk (Article 29). 
42  
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-
visas/schengen/reintroduction-border-control/docs/ms_notifications_-_reintroduction_of_border_control.pdf. 
43 Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/894 of 12 May 2016 setting out a recommendation for temporary 
internal border control in exceptional circumstances putting the overall functioning of the Schengen area at risk, 
and subsequent. 
44  Cf.  Situation  Report 
https://bundeskriminalamt.at/304/files/Jahresbericht_Schlepperei_undMenschenhandel_2019.pdf, p. 10.  

on  Human  Trafficking 

2019,  Ministry 

of  Austria, 

Interior 

of 

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Border checks  at internal borders are  not sufficient to address the underlying threats. At the 
same time, they are the most onerous measure to address threats to internal security or public 
policy.  In  the  public  consultation  carried  out  by  the  Commission,  all  but  one  responding 
business associations and company/business organisations indicated they have suffered either 
from  delays  when  transporting  goods  across  the  borders  (60%)  and/or  from  other  problems 
(60%),  due  to  reintroduced  border  controls.  These  checks  create  significant  costs  for  the 
private  sector  but  also  for  the  national  administration,  which  has  to  engage  resources  on  a 
quasi-permanent basis on often large areas of internal borders (for details see Section 2.1.3). 
Accordingly,  63  %  of  EU  citizens  and  all  business  associations  and  companies  indicated  in 
the  public  consultation  that  actions  for  the  removal  of  difficulties  to  cross  internal  borders 
should be reinforced within the Schengen framework. 52 % of the EU citizens and 70 % of 
the business organisations additionally agreed that control and monitoring of Schengen States’ 
compliance with the applicable rules should be improved45. 

To be noted that the above general limitations of internal border controls cannot be considered 
as  an  argument  against  reintroductions  of  internal  border  controls  as  such.  In  some 
circumstances (e.g. beginning of COVID-19, i.e. in the circumstances different from the ones 
of 2015/2016) border controls at internal borders may indeed have added value. However, in 
all  instances  of  the  internal  border  controls  requiring  prolongation,  the  same  challenge  of 
phasing out from internal border controls and substituting them by other measures, remain a 
main challenge. 

 

Insufficient  use  of  compensatory  measures  for  the  absence  of  border 
controls at internal borders 

In  particular  thanks  to  progress  on  the  technological  side,  a  number  of  measures  other  than 
border  checks  are  available  to  the  Member  States  to  address  threats  to  internal  security  or 
public policy. The use of new technologies, police checks and cross-border police cooperation 
or  Advanced  Passenger  Information  (API)  in  the  future  (see  section  2.2.3)  are  often  able  to 
achieve the same objectives as the border checks put in place by Member States, while being 
more effective in this respect. At the same time, both the impact on the circulation of persons 
and goods as well as the direct  costs of these measures are lower when compared to border 
checks.  

Based on the feedback received from the Member States in the consultation process46, most of 
the  Member  States  have  access  to  such  measures  have  the  possibility  to  deploy  new 
technologies  in  the  border  areas  or  carry  out  police  checks  there.  Annex  10  provides  an 
overview of the information that has been collected, while Annex 11 provides a description of 
the Dutch flagship measure, the @MIGO-BORAS system. This system allows for electronic 
license  plate  recognition,  verification  of  relevant  databases  and  dispatching  patrols  of  the 
Royal Marechaussee47 to carry out spot checks.  

The  possibility  of  using  such  compensatory  measures  is  reflected  both  in  the  Schengen 
Borders Code (Article 23) and in the 2017 Recommendation on proportionate police checks 

45 Annex 2, p. 13-14. 
46 Written contributions following the Workshop of 14 January 2021. 
47 The Royal Netherlands Marechaussee is deployed from royal palaces to the external borders of Europe, and 
the  world.  See: 
from  airports 
https://english.defensie.nl/organisation/marechaussee. 

theatres  of  war  and  crisis  areas  all  over 

the  Netherlands 

to 

in 

EN 

18 

  EN 

 
                                                 
and  police  cooperation  in  the  Schengen  area.  While  the  Recommendation  concerned  in 
particular  police  checks  and  cross-border  police  cooperation,  it  also  recognised  the  role  of 
new technologies and called for privileging these measures over internal border checks. 

In  the  consultation  process,  some  Member  States  disagreed  with  the  view  promoted  by  the 
Commission that police checks are a valid alternative to border checks at internal borders, in 
particular as they do not allow for immediate refusal of entry. However, it seems telling that, 
for  instance,  the  Netherlands  have  not  reintroduced  any  border  checks  at  internal  borders 
since  2015,  relying  entirely  on  the  Royal  Netherlands  Marechaussee  forces  and  @MIGO-
BORAS48.  

On  the  other  hand,  during  the  Expert  meetings  on  measures  allowing  for  a  more  effective 
cooperation  within  the  Schengen  Area,  on  14  and  22  January  2021,  one  representative 
underlined the industry’s openness for new technologies, but emphasized that these should be 
in  line  with  international  standards,  e.g.  the  IATA.  At  the  same  meeting,  one  carrier’s 
representative  acknowledged  that  the  use  of  technology  could  facilitate  the  work  of  border 
services, holding that new technology solutions must be coordinated by clear rules and may 
not  lead  to  delays  or  increased  waiting  time.  The  results  of  the  public  consultation  show  a 
high approval rate of companies for the use of compensatory measures. 80% of the business 
representatives  agreed  that  border  controls  should  be  substituted  by  alternative  measures 
where  possible.  What  is  more,  all  participating  business  representatives  expressed  their 
support for reasonable automated control measures49. 

1.2.2.  Discrepancies  in  the  application  of  travel  restrictions  at  the  external 
borders undermining the trust and impacting the credibility vis-a-vis third 
countries 

Following  the  outbreak  of  the  COVID-19  and  in  the  absence  of  adequate  rules  in  the 
Schengen Borders Code, the Member States took an uncoordinated approach in particular as 
regards  their  external  borders:  some  banned  all  travels  from  third  countries  while  others 
adopted  a  more  lenient  approach.  In  response  to  such  disarray  amongst  Member  States,  in 
March  2020,  the  Commission  called  for  a  coordinated  decision  on  applying  travel 
restrictions  on  non-essential  travel  from  third  countries  into  the  Schengen  area.  The 
purpose of this call was to avoid some Member States letting in travellers from countries with 
a  highly  problematic  epidemiological  situation  which  could  have  increased  the  risk  for  the 
entire  Schengen  zone  and  created  additional  incentives  for  other  Member  States  to  set  up 
internal border controls in the Schengen area, in order to prevent these persons from crossing 
into their territories. This call was followed by all EU Member States (with the exception of 
Ireland)  and  all  Schengen  Associated  Countries  and  was  later  included  in  the  2020/912 
Council Recommendation50.  

However, although Member States have agreed among themselves on a list of third countries 
for which alone the restriction on non-essential travel could be lifted, they have applied the 
Recommendation  referred  to  above  in  very  different  ways.  Only  some  apply  the  list  of 
countries in full, while others decided to lift the restrictions only to some or even none of the 

48 https://www.marechausseecontact.nl/pdf/factsheet-migo-boras.pdf and Annex 11. 
49 Annex 2, p. 14. 
50 Council Recommendation (EU) 2020/912 on the temporary restriction on non-essential travel into the EU and 
the possible lifting of such restriction. 

EN 

19 

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countries on the list. Other Member States lifted the restrictions to third countries that were 
not on the list at all, thus putting at risk the overall functioning of the Schengen area.  

The divergences in implementation are shown by state of play of 16 April 2021: 14 Member 
States  (Croatia,  Cyprus,  Estonia,  Finland,  Greece,  Iceland,  Latvia,  Liechtenstein,  Lithuania, 
Luxembourg,  Portugal,  Slovenia,  Spain  and  Switzerland)  were  open  to  non-essential  travel 
from  the  listed  third  countries,  6  Member  States  (Belgium,  Denmark,  France,  Hungary, 
Norway  and  Slovakia)  were  closed  to  any  third  country,  while  the  remaining  10  Member 
States used the list with a considerable degree of flexibility. Furthermore, 13 Member States 
were  open  for  non-essential  travel  from  a  wide  group  of  third  countries  not  listed  in  the 
relevant  Annex  to  the  Council  Recommendation.  This  concerned  in  particular  Bulgaria  (18 
non-listed third countries), Cyprus (16), Greece (4), Italy (5), Lichtenstein (5), Malta (6), the 
Netherlands (5) and Poland (6). 

Furthermore, by the end of March 2021, a number of Member States were already using or 
planning to use proofs of vaccination or recovery as a tool to lift Covid-19 related restrictions 
while  Council  Recommendation  2020/912  still  does  not  provide  for  that  possibility.  On  17 
March  2021,  the  Commission  made  a  proposal  for  a  Regulation  on  an  interoperable  health 
certificate51,  the  so-called  Digital  Green  Certificate,  to  facilitate  free  movement  during  the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Following the approach that restrictions to free movement “of persons 
who do not pose a risk to public health, for example because they are immune to and cannot 
transmit SARS-CoV-2, should not be restricted, as such restrictions would not be necessary to 
achieve the objective pursued”52, this certificate shall certify vaccination against COVID-19, 
negative  test  results  and  recovery  from  COVID-19  and  be  valid  throughout  the  Union.  The 
European  Parliament  approved  the  parliamentary  scrutiny  of  the  proposal  under  the  urgent 
procedure53.  However,  this  proposal  and  a  second  one  extending  the  provisions  to  third 
country  nationals  legally  staying  or  residing  in  the  European  Union54  only  regulate 
movements within the Schengen area, and not travel to the EU.  

For instance, one Member State announced mid-March that as of 26 March, any third country 
national carrying a proof of vaccination or recovery from Covid-19 would be able to enter the 
country, irrespective of the reason of travel.  Two other Member States have both concluded 
agreements with Israel to exempt vaccinated travellers from testing and quarantine.  

As  to  the  application  of  the  exemptions  from  the  travel  restrictions  provided  for  in  the 
Council Recommendation (in particular travel of family members of EU citizens and residents 
and  travel  for  an  essential  function  or  need),  as  reported  by  Fragomen  Europe  Immigration 
Taskforce,  the  application  of  these  exemptions  is  often  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  border 
guards who are sometimes not sufficiently aware of the changing rules and the documents that 
can be supplied as evidence. For instance, certain Member States require an “essential travel 
certificate”, to be issued by the national authorities, for entry of persons exempted from the 

51  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  a  framework  for  the  issuance, 
verification  and  acceptance  of  interoperable  certificates  on  vaccination,  testing  and  recovery  to  facilitate  free 
movement during the COVID-19 pandemic (Digital Green Certificate), COM/2021/130 final. 
52 COM/2021/130 final, recital 7. 
53 Cf. Rule 163, Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament. 
54  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  a  framework  for  the  issuance, 
verification  and  acceptance  of  interoperable  certificates  on  vaccination,  testing  and  recovery  to  third-country 
nationals legally staying or legally residing in the territories of Member States during the COVID-19 pandemic 
(Digital Green Certificate), COM(2021) 140 final. 

EN 

20 

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travel  restriction.  While  such  certificate  allows  travellers  to  face  less  issues  at  the  border, 
difficulties are experienced when applying for the certificate at the consulate, as the latter has 
full discretion in determining whether the trip is considered as essential travel.  

On  this  point,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  83%  of  the  EU  citizens  who  replied  to  the 
stakeholders’  consultation  would  like  coordination  in  crisis  situations  to  be  reinforced. 
Similarly,  being  asked  if  a  coordination  at  EU-level  of  measures  applicable  at  the  external 
borders of the EU in response to common threats such as a pandemic is beneficial, 90.91% of 
the EU citizens agreed and only 5.05% disagreed. Likewise, 90% of the business associations 
and  company/business  organisations  considered  the  coordination  at  EU-level  of  measures 
applicable  at  the  external  borders  of  the  EU  in  response  to  common  threats  such  as  a 
pandemic as beneficial. 55 

1.2.3.  Impacts of the identified problems 

The two identified problems  are:  i) border checks  at  internal  borders which are long-lasting 
and applied against abstract threats or are used as a first aid measure and as such become an 
unjustified  hurdles  to  persons  and  goods  moving  in  the  Schengen  area  (2.1.1),  and  ii) 
discrepancies in the application of travel restrictions at the external borders undermining the 
trust  and  impacting  the  credibility  vis-a-vis  third  countries  (2.1.2).  While  the  size  of  the 
recovery plan for rebuilding post-COVID-19 Europe amounting to EUR 1.8 trillion may give 
an indication when assessing the overall damage caused by the pandemic to the EU, there is 
no data available at this stage on how much of that damage has been caused by border checks. 
In general, data both on the intended positive effects of reintroduced border controls as well 
as  the  negative  effects  (also  of  the  long-lasting  abstract  border  checks  in  place  for  several 
years) are difficult to come by. One of the reasons for this lack of data is that Member States 
are  obliged  to  report  on  the  effects  and  side-effects  of  their  border  controls  only  once  the 
checks  have  been  lifted  again  (Article  33  SBC).  Therefore,  the  six  Member  States  which 
continuously prolonged the checks over the past five years have not yet had to report on the 
impact of the border controls. 

As regards the internal border checks that were reintroduced during the COVID-19 crisis, the 
situation  is  slightly  different.  Member  States  that  reintroduced  border  checks  in  response  to 
the first wave of COVID-19 and lifted them by the end of June 2020 submitted their reports 
but,  unfortunately,  with  great  variations  as  concerns  the  quantity  and  the  quality  of  their 
contents. For more information see Annex 12. 

Given  this  lack  of  specific  data,  the  efforts  of  calculating  the  cost  of  non-Schengen  by  the 
Commission  in  2016  and  by  the  European  Parliament  in  2017  remain  the  main  point  of 
reference  to  demonstrate  the  impacts  of  border  checks  if  maintained  for  a  longer  period  of 
time, irrespective of their ground. Therefore, this section uses them as a basis for assessing the 
impacts  of  the  problems  identified  in  sections  2.1.1  and  2.1.2,  but  also  builds  on  the  inputs 
received from stakeholders during the public consultation. 

55 See Annex 2, p. 13. 

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1.2.3.1. Impacts of the long-lasting border checks at the internal borders 

As  outlined  in  the  Communication  ‘Back  to  Schengen  –  a  Roadmap’56,  the  Commission 
estimated in 2016 that a full reestablishment of border controls to monitor the movement of 
people within the Schengen area would generate immediate direct costs for the EU economy 
in a range between EUR 5 and EUR 18 billion annually57. These costs would be concentrated 
on certain actors and regions but would inevitably impact the EU economy as a whole. While 
the free exchange of goods within the EU amounts to more than EUR 2,800 billion in value 
and  1,700  million  tonnes  in  volume,  the  highest  and  most  immediate  impact  of  border 
controls  would  be  felt  by  the  road  haulage  sector,  with  EUR  1.7  to  EUR  7.5  billion  of 
additional direct costs each year.  

A study of 2016 commissioned by the European Parliament (see Annex 4)58 on the same 
topic even suggests annual costs of between EUR 6.5 billion and EUR 13 billion for the road 
freight sector if internal border controls were reintroduced at all internal borders. In the case 
of  limited  reintroductions  by  the  Member  States  having  internal  border  controls  in  place  in 
April  2016,59  the  annual  costs  for  the  road  freight  sector  are  estimated  to  reach  EUR  0.7 
billion to EUR 1.3 billion annually60. Data on the specific situation of France indicated that 
internal  border  controls  leading  to  an  assumed  waiting  time  of  30  minutes  would  cause  a 
direct economic loss of EUR 62 million for both, import and export61.  

According to the Roadmap, these additional costs would have a particularly harmful impact 
on  sectors  that  operate  on  small  margins  and/or  where  transport  presents  a  high 
percentage  of  the  costs.  Sectors  indicated  as  potentially  particularly  affected  were 
agricultural  and  chemical  sectors  as  well  as  the  transport  of  raw  materials.  In  the  medium 
term, costs of transport that are unduly increased by delays in border controls could hurt the 
efficient  development  of  EU  value  chains  and  the  competitiveness  of  the  EU  economy  as  a 
whole.  

Moreover,  the  estimates  of  the  Commission  of  2016  demonstrated  that  with  1.7  million 
workers in the EU crossing a border every day to go to their jobs, the reintroduction of border 
checks at all internal borders would cost commuters and other travellers between EUR 1.3 
and  EUR  5.2  billion  in  terms  of  time  lost62.  More  importantly,  long  waits  at  the  border 
would  discourage  people  from  looking  for  cross-border  opportunities  in  the  labour  market, 
reducing the pool of potential workers. This would in the medium term reduce the economic 
efficiency of some regions. In the case of France, the increased costs for cross-border workers 
would lead to a decrease in the number of workers willing to cross the border to reach their 

56 COM(2016)120, for full reference see Annex 16. 
57  Estimated  for  road  freight  transport,  cross  border  passenger  mobility,  tourism  and  corresponding 
administrative costs at the border. 
58  “Cost  of  non-Schengen:  the  impact  of  border  controls  within  Schengen  on  the  Single  Market”, 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/578974/IPOL_STU(2016)578974_EN.pdf. 
59  Austria,  Slovenia,  Hungary,  Sweden,  Norway,  Denmark,  plus  Greece,  for  which,  at  that  time,  the 
reintroduction  of  temporary  internal  border  control  due  to  persistent  serious  deficiencies  relating  to  external 
border control under Article 29 Schengen Borders Code was discussed. 
60 “Cost of non-Schengen: the impact of border controls within Schengen on the Single Market”, p. 29, 37. 
61 France Strategie “The Economic Cost of Rolling Back Schengen”, La Note d’Analyse No. 39, February 2016, 
pp. 6f. 
62 Slightly higher numbers “Cost of non-Schengen: the impact of border controls within Schengen on the Single 
Market”, p. 37: The total costs for commuters for reintroducing border controls at all internal borders range from 
1.7 billion EUR to 6.1 billion EUR per year. 

EN 

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work  place  by  more  than  5,000  workers  if  the  waiting  time  increased  by  10  minutes,  or  by 
more than 10,000 workers if the waiting time increased by 20 minutes, which would equal an 
economic  loss  of  EUR  150  million  or  EUR  300  million  respectively  (without  accounting 
potential unemployment-related costs)63. 

As  a  long-term  consequence  of  systematic  permanent  border  controls  in  the  Schengen  area, 
the  trade  between  Member  States  would  decrease  between  10  and  20%  within  the  10  year 
period from 2016 to 202564. This would lead to a decrease of the Schengen area’s GDP by 
0.8%, equivalent to more than EUR 100 billion65. For France alone, the loss would amount to 
0.5% of the GDP, equalling EUR 10 billion66.  

According to another study67, the reintroduced internal border controls in the Schengen area 
notified to the European Commission from summer 2015 until April 201668 have reduced the 
trade  in  goods  and  services  by  1.3%  compared  to  2011,  which  corresponds  to  an  annual 
decline in trade volume of EUR 70.19 billion and a decrease of the aggregate EU real GDP by 
approximately EUR 12.5 billion, which equals 0.10% of the GDP. In general, the data of this 
study suggests, that smaller and peripheral  States would be much stronger affected than the 
larger and/or central ones.  

According to another study specifically with regard to Germany, developing the hypothesis of 
permanent  border  checks  in  the  aftermath  of  the  migratory  crisis,  the  reintroduction  of 
permanent  border  checks at  internal  borders would  lead to  a  growth  loss of EUR 77 billion 
between 2016 and 2025 for Germany, and EUR 470 billion in total for the EU69.  

Specific data on the costs of border controls for different sectors is difficult to collect as the 
facilitation of border  crossing along the internal  borders of the EU must  be carried out  in  a 
non-discriminatory  manner.  For  instance,  the  Green  Lanes  system  that  was  established  in 
March 2020 in response to COVID-19 does not distinguish between different types of goods 
or  origins  and  destinations  of  the  vehicles70.  Moreover,  such  a  distinction  would  add  an 
additional layer of difficulty and further delays at the border. 

  Specific impacts on the air travel industry 

A  study  by  the  association  “Airlines  for  Europe”  identifies  the  “reintroduction  of  border 
controls within the Schengen area” as one of the gaps in the full implementation of Europe’s 

63 France Strategie “The Economic Cost of Rolling Back Schengen”, La Note d’Analyse No. 39, February 2016, 
p. 5. 
64 “The Economic Cost of Rolling Back Schengen”, La Note d’Analyse No. 39, February 2016, p. 1. 
65 “The Economic Cost of Rolling Back Schengen”, La Note d’Analyse No. 39, February 2016, pp. 9f. 
66 “The Economic Cost of Rolling Back Schengen”, La Note d’Analyse No. 39, February 2016, p. 11. 
67  Gabriel  Felbermayr,  Jasmin  Gröschl,  Thomas  Steinwachs  “Trade  costs  of  border  controls  in  the  Schengen 
area”, 27 April 2016: https://voxeu.org/article/trade-costs-border-controls-schengen-area. 
68 While the study does not list the States concerned, according to the European Commission’s list of temporarily 
reintroduced border controls, from summer 2015 to April 2016, internal border controls during that period were 
reintroduced by AT, BE, DE, DK, FR, HU, MT, NO, SE and SI.  
69  Bertelsmannstiftung,  GED  Study  „Departure  from  the  Schengen  Agreement  Macroeconomic  impacts  on 
Germany 
https://www.bertelsmann-
stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/BSt/Publikationen/GrauePublikationen/NW_Departure_from_Schengen.pdf. 
70  Communication  from  the  Commission  on  the  implementation  of  the  Green  Lanes  under  the  Guidelines  for 
border management measures to protect health and ensure the availability of goods and essential services 2020/C 
96 I/01, C/2020/1897. 

European  Union“, 

countries 

2016: 

and 

the 

the 

of 

EN 

23 

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Single Aviation Market71. The study estimates that in the period from 2016-2019, on average 
145,394 air passengers  were affected by internal  border controls,  with  the total  costs for air 
passengers caused by reintroduced internal border controls ranging between EUR 291 million 
(calculating with additional cost of EUR 2 per border crossing) and EUR 872 million (EUR 6 
per border crossing) per year”72. 

The  persistence  of  border  checks  creates  significant  challenges  for  the  airport  operators.  As 
highlighted  by  ACI  (Airport  Council  International)  “the  reintroduction  of  border  control  at 
internal  borders  leads  to  the  physical  separation  of  an  additional  passenger  category 
(passengers  on  Schengen  internal  flights  subject  to  border  control).  This  new  passenger 
category  is  currently  separated  from  passengers  on  domestic  flights  with  no  border  control 
and from those on international flights subject to border control. ACI EUROPE believes that 
airports have not been designed to comply with such a requirement on a permanent basis”73. 

 

Impacts on the cross-border regions  

While  not  all  regions  have  been  affected  equally74,  it  is  clear  that  the  economic  and  social 
impacts  of  persisting  border  checks  are  the  most  visible  on  a  local  scale.  For  instance,  the 
Øresund Strait between Sweden and Denmark is crossed by 95,900 persons on a daily basis 
(both  directions,  with  42,900  persons  traveling  by  car,  32,100  by  train  across  the  Øresund 
Bridge and the rest by ferries)75. According to the Oresundsinstituttet76, the measures adopted 
by Sweden and Denmark in 2016 at this internal border including border checks amounted to 
SEK 152 million, for the first half a year since the introduction of ID and border checks, or 
6,600 extra hours on the train daily for those travelling over the bridge, and 332,000 fewer job 
opportunities  in  Zealand  accessible  at  that  time  within  a  one-hour  commute  from  Malmo 
Central as compared to the period before the reintroduction measures at this internal border.  

The survey carried out for the County Administrative Board77 demonstrated that 39% of the 
nearly 400 interviewed considered changing the job and seeking employment in their country 
of residence, while 26% considered moving to their country of employment, with only 18% 
not planning to stop commuting. Another study referred to by the Oresundsinstituttet indicates 
that 64% experienced an increase in stress, and 70% were strongly affected by not knowing 
when they would arrive78.  

71  Airlines  For  Europe,  Jennifer  Janzen,  “Study:  Fully  Implementing  Europe’s  Single  Aviation  Market  Could 
Save  the  EU  Economy  €37  Bn  Per  Year”,  April  2020:  https://a4e.eu/publications/study-fully-implementing-
europes-single-aviation-market-could-save-the-eu-economy-e37-bn-per-year/. 
72 
ICCSAI  –  University  of  Bergamo,  “Cost  Of  Non-Europe 
file:///C:/Users/bacheli/AppData/Local/Packages/Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe/TempState/Downl
oads/a4e-study-iccsai-the-cost-of-non-europe-in-aviation-conea-2020-02-full-study.pdf, p. 84. 
73 ACI input of 15 March 2021 in the public consultations. 
74 See the territorial economic impact of COVID-19 in the EU. A RHOMOLO Analysis:  
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/jrcsh/files/jrc121261.pdf. 
75 
zealand/. 
76 https://www.oresundsinstituttet.org/. 
77  Skåne’s  report  Utvärdering  av  effekter  av  tillämpningen  av  förordning  om  vissa  identitetskontroller 
(’Evaluation of the Effects of the Adoption of the Regulation of Certain Identity Checks’). 
78 The study by a researcher from the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm, with responses from 900 train 
commuters, and the report (in Swedish) was published by Øresundsinstituttet in June. 

https://www.oresundsinstituttet.org/fact-sheet-the-effects-of-the-id-and-border-checks-between-scania-and-

in  Aviation”,  February  2020: 

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24 

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A Commission case study of 2017 on this specific border region confirms these effects79: the 
border controls introduced in 2016 have added to the already existing cross border difficulties 
at  this  specific  border  section.  A  report  commissioned  by  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  and 
Industry  of  Southern  Sweden  mentioned  in  the  study  estimates  that  the  border  controls 
between  Sweden  and  Denmark  have  led  to  societal  costs  of  SEK  1.5  billion  (or  EUR  150 
million).  Two  thirds  of  these  costs  related  to  delays  in  cross-border  traffic,  while  the 
remaining  share  relates  to  the  shrinking  market  potential  (e.g.  reduced  number  of  potential 
jobs for employees; smaller pool of workers available to employers)80.  

In  the  case  of  the  limited  reintroduction  of  internal  border  controls  in  the  Member  States 
having internal  border controls  in  place in April 2016, the total  annual  costs for commuters 
would amount to between EUR 168 million and EUR 606 million81. As a concrete example 
for the impact on one Member State serves the data available for the commuters residing in 
France, the country of origin of most commuters in the EU82. 350,000 French residents cross 
the  borders  on  a  daily  basis  to  work  in  Belgium,  Germany,  Luxembourg,  Switzerland  or 
Spain.  Based  on  a  value  of  time  of  EUR  10  per  hour,  the  costs  of  an  assumed  delay  of  10 
minutes  due  to  the  reintroduced  border  controls  would  amount  to  EUR  1.7  per  border 
crossing,  accumulating  to  EUR  723  a  year,  calculating  with  217  working  days.  For  a  20 
minutes delay, these cost would double, amounting yearly to over EUR 1,400 per commuting 
worker. The total social-economic costs for French commuting workers for an additional 10 
minutes spend at border controls are estimated to amount to EUR 250 million per year, for an 
additional 20 minutes, it would amount to EUR 500 million83. 

 

Impacts on the administration 

Finally,  the  estimates  of  the  costs  of  non-Schengen  referred  to  above  indicate  that  between 
EUR 0.6 and EUR 5.8 billion of administrative costs would have to be paid by governments 
due  to  the  need  for  increased  staff  for  border  controls.  The  costs  related  to  the  physical 
establishment of border controls are estimated at EUR 7.1 billion for the whole Schengen area 
(EUR 0.7 billion for the above mentioned seven Member States)84. Notably, the costs for the 
physical  establishment  of  border  controls  have  a  higher  impact  on  the  total  costs  when  the 
period  of  the  reintroductions  is  shorter85.  As  the  study  assesses  a  scenario  of  a  two-year 
reintroduction and an indefinite reintroduction, the situation experienced during the COVID-
19 pandemic of Member States reintroducing border controls  repetitively  over short periods 
of  time,  sometimes  not  continuously,  might  be  different.  As  these  costs  fall  under  the 

- 

av 

ekonomiska 

konsekvenser 

79 Easing legal and administrative obstacles in EU border regions, Case Study No. 2 Labour mobility Obstacles 
for cross-border commuters (Denmark – Sweden). 
80  3  Handelskammaren  -  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  and  Industry  of  Southern  Sweden  (2016),  Kontrollernas 
Öresundsregionen, 
kostnad 
http://www.handelskammaren.com/press/nyheter/nyhet/artikel/kontrollernas-kostnad-ekonomiskakonsekvenser-
av-id-kontrollerna-i-oeresundsregionen. 
81 Cost of non-Schengen: the impact of border controls within Schengen on the Single Market, 2016, p. 29. 
82  Cf.  study  by  MKW  Wirtschaftsforschung  GmbH,  commissioned  by  the  European  Commission  “Scientific 
Report  on  the  Mobility  of  Cross-Border  Workers  within  the  EU-27/EEA/EFTA  Countries”,  p.  XI: 
https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/system/files/ged/mkw_workers_mobility.pdf. 
83 France Strategie “The Economic Cost of Rolling Back Schengen”, La Note d’Analyse No. 39, February 2016, 
p. 5. 
84 Cost of non-Schengen: the impact of border controls within Schengen on the Single Market, 2016, p. 9. 
85 Cost of non-Schengen: the impact of border controls within Schengen on the Single Market, 2016 p. 26. 

ID-kontrollerna 

i 

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exclusive  responsibility  of  the  national  administrations,  they  are  not  reported  to  the 
Commission. 

 

Impacts on border management capacity 

The reintroduction of border checks at internal borders requires significant resources. In times 
of  limited  public  resources,  the  necessary  staff  is  normally  made  available  by  temporary 
reassignment from  other services, leading to  shortages in  staff in  the services of origin.  For 
instance,  an  unannounced  Schengen  Evaluation  visit  to  the  Nice  and  Orly  airports  in  2019 
revealed  that  these  two  airports  lack  trained  border  guards  to  control  travel  from  third 
countries,  while  France  has  been  carrying  out  border  checks  at  the  border  with  Italy  since 
2015.  

1.2.3.2. Impact of reintroduced checks at internal borders due to COVID-crisis 

While the border checks due to the COVID-crisis cannot compare in terms of duration with 
the long-lasting border checks introduced by the six Member States referred to above, these 
border checks have been introduced temporarily by a much higher number of Member States 
(17).  They  aggravated  the  trend  that  the  Single  Market  was  hit  disproportionately  by  the 
COVID-related restrictions in comparison to national GDPs. These restrictions caused major 
disruptions to the free flow of goods, services and people, resulting in a fall of intra-EU trade 
by  24%  in  Q2  and  Q3  2020,  while  GDP  fell  by  7%86.  Furthermore,  due  to  the  lack  of 
coordination and the rapidly changing measures the costs for citizens and businesses to adapt 
to these changes can be estimated to be much higher than those of long-lasting border controls 
(see above). The lack of uniform application of measures at external borders has also led to a 
lack of clarity among travellers coming from third countries, leading to numerous queries via 
EU  Delegations,  overall  impacting  on  the  predictability  of  travel  and  credibility  of  the 
measures taken. 

In some “twin cities” (see Map 1) measures taken at the beginning of the COVID-19-crisis 
prevented  school  children  from  going  to  school  and  elderly  people  from  going  to  the 
supermarket  closest  to  their  homes  as  these  schools  and  supermarkets  were  located  on  the 
other side of a hard border. The decision of Spain and Portugal in response to the first wave of 
COVID-19  to  close  the  border,  leaving  open  only  eight  border  crossings87  on  one  of  the 
longest internal borders of the EU, led to the following comments: “On a map, this seems fair, 
but  this  section of the border is  the busiest  of  all  the Spanish-Portuguese border, and there 
are  three  EGTCs  and  four  Eurocities,  which  gives  an  idea  of  the  importance,  permeability 
and  interrelationship  of  these  territories.  These  Eurocities  were  cut  off,  in  many  cases  they 
are  simply  separated  by  a  bridge  and  they  were  completely  divided.  ”88  Moreover,  on  the 
Galicia-Norte border, there are more than 12,000 cross-border workers who cross every day 
and had to make journeys of at least 50 km and, in some cases, 100 km or even more due to 
the border closure. 

Finally,  the  border  regions  expect  that,  if  no  solution  is  found  to  this  problem,  the 
attractiveness of cross-border employment is going to be affected considerably. In particular, 
cross-border  workers  have  come  to  realise  during  the  pandemic  that  they  are  particularly 

86 Annual Single Market Report 2021, SWD(2021) 351 final, p. 9. 
87 Only after a while a ninth crossing was reopened. 
88 Xosé Lago, Euroregion Galicia-Norte de Portugal. 

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vulnerable due to their status. Not being able to perform work cross-border raised the issue of 
the  State  competent  for  taxation  purposes89.  To  address  this  issue,  some  Member  States 
adopted  temporary  arrangements:  for  instance,  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands  adopted  an 
agreement valid from 11 March 2020 until 31 May 2020. However, the approach to this issue 
may differ from one cross-border region to another. 

2.2.  What are the problem drivers? 

The identified problems are driven by the drivers set out in sections 2.2.1- 2.2.6 below. 

Figure 1 - Problems, Problem drivers and Objectives 

1.2.4.  Disproportionate and inadequate use of border checks at internal borders 

Article 72 of the  Treaty  on the  Functioning  of the European  Union clearly  states that  “This 
Title  [Title  V,  Area  of  Freedom,  Security  and  Justice]  shall  not  affect  the  exercise  of  the 
responsibilities  incumbent  upon  Member  States  with  regard  to  the  maintenance  of  law  and 
order and the safeguarding of internal security”. Accordingly, Member States remain in the 
best  position  to  assess  if  there  is  a  threat  and  how  to  address  it.  In  view  of  that,  they  may 
adopt unilateral measures, without engaging in a discussion on their effects on the rest of the 
EU.  

This approach has been particularly visible during the COVID-19 crisis where internal border 
checks  have  been  reintroduced  repeatedly  despite  their  impact  on  the  economy  and  the  fact 
that the added value of that measure in containing the spread of the virus is not proven and 

89 The main rule is that the right to levy tax on the employment income is attributable to the home country. In 
case  an employee normally  works in another country than  the home country, the right to levy tax is primarily 
allocated to the country in which the work is performed. When the employee work from home the right to levy 
tax is no longer allocated to the country in which the work would normally be performed. 

EN 

27 

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even  largely  contradicted  by  the  European  Centre  for  Disease  Prevention  and  Control 
(ECDC)90. 

The same approach has also manifested itself during the last six years, when some Member 
States  prolonged  border  checks  at  their  internal  borders  over  many  years  despite  changing 
circumstances  and  refused  entry  to  thousands  of  third  country  nationals  on  the  grounds  of 
insufficient documents. Such unilateral decisions had an impact on the neighbouring Member 
State that remained confronted with the problem91. For more information on the evolution of 
these threats from the perspective of the Commission see Annex 7. The effectiveness of such 
controls is difficult to quantify, as Member States only have limited reporting obligations and 
in many cases prefer not to share comprehensive data on national security operations. 

The  disproportionality  furthermore  results  from  the  fact  that  the  reintroduction  of  internal 
border controls generates in the long term high costs (see 2.1.3.1), while there is an indication 
that alternative measures such as police checks or bilateral agreements and arrangements for 
the readmission of irregular migrants generate lower costs, but assuring the same results. The 
Dutch  @MIGO-BORAS  system,  for  example,  can  be  used  to  check  passing  vehicles  and 
select  those to  be stopped and examined without the need  for  a continuous physical  control 
procedure  at  the  border92.  Any  difficulties  reported  by  some  Member  States  as  regards  the 
application  of  the  readmission  agreements  should  not  justify  the  reintroduction  of  internal 
border controls, but rather modifications in the legal framework for such agreements. 

1.2.5.  Lack  of  sufficient  coordination  in  the  EU  (absence  of  a  platform  at  EU 
level to discuss measures affecting Schengen in a crisis situation)  

Under the Schengen rules (Article 27(5) SBC), Member States are obliged to consult with the 
other Member States and the Commission if they are considering reintroducing border checks 
unilaterally  at  internal  borders.  These  consultations  have  to  take  place  at  least  10  days 
before the planned date of reintroduction. The purpose is to organise, where appropriate, a 
mutual cooperation between the Member States for the duration of the border checks and to 
examine  the  proportionality  of  the  measures  as  compared  to  the  underlying  events,  i.e.  the 
threat to public policy or internal security.  

This process is clearly not suitable for emergency situations such as the outbreak of a highly 
contagious  disease.  Indeed,  the  COVID-19  experience  showed  that  Member  States  act  on 
their  own  without  consulting  or  even  in  some  cases  informing  other  Member  States  even 

https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/Considerations-related-to-measures-for-travellers-

90 
reduce-spread-COVID-19-in-EUEEA.pdf. 
“Border  closures  refer  to  closing  of  international  borders  and  aim  to  reduce  the  risk  of  importation  from 
countries  with  high  transmission  by  implementing  travel  restrictions  to  or  from  an  affected  area.  Based  on 
evidence  from  modelling  studies  mainly  related  to  influenza  pandemics,  border  closures  can  delay  the 
introduction of the virus into a country but only if they are almost complete and are rapidly implemented during 
the  early  phases  of  an  epidemic,  which  is  only  feasible  in  specific  contexts  (e.g.  for  small,  isolated,  island 
nations).  Available  evidence  therefore  does  not  support  recommending  border  closures,  which  will  cause 
significant secondary effects and societal and economic disruption in the EU.”, with reference to World Health 
Organization (WHO). Non-pharmaceutical public health measures for mitigating the risk and impact of epidemic 
and 
2020: 
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/329438/9789241516839-eng.pdf?ua=1. 
91  For  instance,  in  2017,  at  one  temporary  authorised  border  crossing  point  at  the  French/Italian  land  border 
(Menton) alone, 43,994 persons have been refused entry mostly for not having the necessary travel documents. 
92 See Annex 11. 

influenza, 

pandemic 

May 

12 

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28 

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when  confronted  with  the  same  threat.  In  addition,  as  the  experience  of  the  last  year 
demonstrates, it is also not suitable for events affecting more than two Member States. As a 
result, until the ad hoc initiative of DG HOME to organise conferences twice a week and the 
activation of the Integrated Policy Crisis Response (IPCR)93 at the level of the Council there 
was no EU structure to discuss and co-ordinate the measures adopted in line with the evolving 
circumstances. In particular, the diversity of the aspects at stake made the discussions on the 
border measures taken in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in the Council very difficult as 
none of the existing Council formations had a sufficiently broad scope.  IPCR focused at the 
start  of  its  activation  under  the  Croatian  Presidency  on  the  health  aspects,  and  only  later 
started  to  take  into  account  the  effects  of  COVID-19  on  other  policy  areas,  such  as  border 
management. Therefore, the issue lies not on the efficiency of the IPCR which proved to be a 
useful  tool  but  on  the  lack  of  a  pre-agreed  and  formalised  institutional  answer  to  a  health 
crisis.  

1.2.6.  Insufficient use of measures other than border checks at internal borders 

Member  States  have  at  their  disposal  a  number  of  measures  that  can  achieve  the  same 
objectives as border checks at internal borders. 

Although the 2017 Recommendation on proportionate police checks and police cooperation in 
the Schengen area has been positively received by the Member States, it has not triggered any 
substantial  changes.  Based  on  the  feedback  from  the  Member  States  in  the  workshops 
organised in 2017 in follow-up to the Recommendation94 and the recent workshop organised 
as  a  part  of  the  public  consultation  process  for  the  Schengen  Strategy95,  it  appears  that  the 
Recommendation  has  not  led  to  any  legislative  or  operational  changes,  with  only  France 
stating that they have modified the rules applicable to border checks in the border areas and 
beyond.  Even  if  many  Member  States  claim  that  the  police  checks  carried  out  on  their 
territory  comply  with  the  Recommendation  and  that  the  rules  described  therein  provide  for 
sufficient flexibility96, in the absence of quantitative data from the Member States, it remains 
to  be  noted  that  none  of  the  Member  States  carrying  out  border  checks  at  internal  borders 
since 2015 has  actually lifted these checks and reinforced police  checks instead (see  Annex 
10). 

Moreover,  during  the  public  consultations,  some  Member  States  signalled  the  problem  that 
the conditions  of use of  compensatory measures  considered  as alternatives to  border checks 
(use  of  new  technologies  such  as  video  surveillance,  number  plate  recognition  systems  or 
drones)  are  not  clearly  specified  or  defined.  For  some,  these  measures  should  not  be  used 
instead  of  border  checks  at  internal  borders,  but  in  addition  to  them.  One  Member  State 
considered  that  maintaining  police  measures  for  an  unlimited  period  of  time  at  internal 
borders would be unacceptable97. Similarly,  72.66% of EU and non-EU citizens  agreed that 
border  controls  at  internal  borders  should  be  substituted,  whenever  possible,  by  non-
systematic alternative measures, such as police checks and modern technologies98. 

93 See https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/publications/ipcr/. 
94  On  10  July  2017  DG  HOME  organised  a  workshop  on  the  implementation  of  the  Commission 
Recommendation on proportionate police Checks. The workshop was attended by AT, DE, DK, FR, HU, IT, NL, 
NO, SE, SI 
95 Workshops organised on 14 and 22 January. For more details see Annex 2. 
96 In particular AT, CZ, DE, FI, HU. 
97 See HU written contribution. 
98 Annex 2, p. 13. 

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Furthermore,  any  future  developments  concerning  the  collection  of  Advanced  Passenger 
Information  (API)  data  on  intra-Schengen  air  connections  could  be  challenged  under  the 
current  wording  of  Article  23  of  the  Schengen  Borders  Code  referring  to  compensatory 
measures  as  leading  to  prohibited  measures  having  effect  equivalent  to  border  controls.  To 
recall,  for  a  number  of  Member  States,  API  (notably  in  combination  with  Passenger  Name 
Records (PNR)) data have a huge potential in terms of enhanced security at a relatively small 
expense and without interference with travel flows99. For more information on API and PNR 
see Annex 13. 

1.2.7.  Absence of rules concerning the application of extraordinary measures at 
the  external  borders  during  crisis  situations  affecting  several  Member 
States 

The  Schengen  rules  provide  for  common  standards  concerning  border  checks  on  persons  at 
border crossing points and border surveillance at the external borders. These checks are based 
on the verification of the entry conditions for third country nationals. The idea behind these 
rules is that, if a borderless Schengen area is supposed to function, there must be agreement 
between all countries concerned and a common practice on who can enter this area. 

One of the entry conditions is that the third country national should not be considered to be a 
threat to public health, which has to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. In March 2020, the 
Commission called upon the Member States to apply a temporary travel restriction to all non-
essential  travel  from  third  countries  in  order  to  coordinate  practices  in  this  regard  and 
provided a list of derogations per category of persons that should be exempted from the travel 
restrictions100.  Council  Recommendation  of  30  June  2020101  also  provided  a  list  of  third 
countries whose residents should be exempted from such general travel restriction. As set out 
above, some Member States went beyond the scope of that annex, authorising residents from 
other third countries to access the European Union. For this reason, on 22 February 2021102, 
Commissioners  Johansson  and  Reynders  sent  a  joint  letter  to  the  Member  States  reminding 
them of the rules agreed in the Recommendation. Nevertheless, and as indicated above, with 
state of play 16 April 2021, 13 Member States were open for non-essential travel from a wide 
group of third countries not listed in the annex.  

2.3. 

How likely is the problem to persist? 

While  there  are  good  chances  to  address  the  current  COVID-19  pandemic  with  the  world-
wide vaccination programme, similar problems may occur at any moment in the future. This 
means  that  the  absence  of  ‘ready  to  use’  contingency  procedures  and  safeguards  can  again 
become a problem any time.  

99  Finland  believes  that  a  lot  can  be  done  with  pre-entry  passenger  data,  such  as  PNR  or  API,  also  inside  the 
Schengen area. Collecting and analyzing this information would have very little impact to free movement, but it 
would  give  a  possibility  to  do  targeted  checks  and  improve  situational  awareness.  Also  Norway  sees  an 
opportunity  in  the  upcoming  revision  of  the  API-Directive.  Already  now  Norwegian  authorities  receives  in 
essence API-information from ferries bound for Norway from Denmark, Sweden and Germany. The pre-arrival 
screening  of  this  information  is  in  its  experience  an  efficient  way  of  controlling  large  passenger  flows  while 
minimizing the need for physical controls.  
100 Communication of 16 March 2020, COM(2020) 115 final. 
101 Council Recommendation of 30 June, 2020/912 on the temporary restriction on non-essential travel into the 
EU and the possible lifting of such restriction. 
102 ARES(2021)1401158. 

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As  regards  the  persistent  border  checks  and  the  insufficient  use  of  compensatory  measures, 
the key to the evolution of the problem is the approach of Member States, which, on the one 
hand will not be sufficiently accountable for the choice of border checks at internal borders to 
address  the  identified  threat  and  on  the  other  hand  may  be  sometimes  concerned  that  the 
available compensatory measures could be considered as border checks in disguise.  

Despite the efforts of the Commission over the last few years (see Box 3 below), hardly any 
progress has been achieved in the past. In particular, despite the efforts of the Commission to 
convince  Member  States  to  go  back  to  a  real  Schengen  area,  the  only  (limited)  step  in  this 
direction  has  been  made  by  Germany  that  has  reduced  the  scope  of  the  long-lasting  border 
checks  at  its  internal  borders,  by  lifting  in  spring  2018  such  checks  with  regard  to  the  air 
connections from Greece (that had been in place since November 2017). 

Box 3– Actions of the Commission since 2015 
2015 – Opinion on necessity and proportionality of border checks at internal borders in Austria 
and in Germany C(2015)7100 

2016 – Back to Schengen – a Roadmap COM(2016)120 

2017 – Commission Recommendation on proportionate police checks and police cooperation in 
the Schengen area C(2017)3349 

2017 – Proposal on the amendment of the Schengen Borders Code COM(2017)571 

2018 – High Level meeting with the Ambassadors of the Member States having border checks at 
internal borders in place at that time and the Member States the most affected by such checks 

2017-2019  –  Requests  from  DG  HOME  for  additional  information  following  the  received 
notifications 

2020 – First Schengen Forum 

The Commission retains the right to issue an opinion on the necessity and proportionality of 
any  upcoming  prolongations  of  border  checks  at  internal  borders,  or  even  to  launch 
infringement  procedures.  However,  such  a  step  does  not  guarantee  that  the  core  of  the 
problem would be permanently addressed – i.e. the use of border checks rather as a first aid 
and  not  a  last  resort  measure.  Thus,  without  any  intervention  the  situation  at  the  internal 
borders  will  continue  to  be  exposed  to  the  changing  national  political  climate,  while  a 
European  approach  which  could  take  into  account  the  overall  interest  of  the  Schengen  area 
will continue to lack. 

The ongoing efforts to improve the management of the external borders (operationalisation of 
EBCG,  implementation  of  the  new  IT  architecture  with  new  systems  ETIAS,  EES,  ECRIS-
TCN and interoperability103 of information systems reinforcing the relation between pertinent 
databases), as mentioned above and further explained in Annex 14, are expected to improve 
the controls at external borders and as such should help in rebuilding trust among the Member 

103 Regulation (EU) 2018/1240, OJ L 236, 19.9.2018, p. 1; Regulation (EU) 2017/2226, OJ L 327, 9.12.2017, 
p. 20 ;  Regulation  (EU)  2019/816,  OJ  L  135,  22.5.2019,  p.1-26 ;  Regulation  (EU)  2019/817,  OJ  L  135, 
22.5.2019, p. 27 

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States.  However,  even  a  timely  implementation  of  these  new  rules  will  not  address  the 
concerns of Member States linked to a perceived unsatisfactory level of security due to cross-
border crime and terrorism. Moreover, based on the five years report on the functioning of the 
Schengen  Evaluation  Mechanism104  it  is  confirmed  that  already  now  there  are  no  major 
deficiencies in the management of the external borders. 

Once  the  proposals  accompanying  the  Pact  on  Migration  and  Asylum  are  adopted105, 
secondary movements of irregular migrants as well as ‘asylum’ shopping by asylum seekers 
should  be  better  controllable  than  currently.  Similarly,  the  terrorist  threat  should  be  better 
manageable thanks to the measures and steps identified in the EU Security Union Strategy as 
adopted  in  July  2020.  However,  it  is  not  likely  that  secondary  movements  or  terrorism  will 
ever  be  entirely  eradicated.  Therefore,  some  Member  States  might  continue  to  consider 
themselves as being more exposed to these challenges than other Member States, and hence, 
entitled to continue border checks at internal borders.  

The  planned  modification  of  the  API  Directive  and  adoption  of  a  code  for  police 
cooperation which are currently being explored and might lead to legislative proposals later 
this  year106,  would  help  to  expand  the  available  tools  for  compensatory  measures  to  border 
checks  at  internal  borders.  These  initiatives  will  be  an  important  step  to  boost  the  use  of 
alternatives to checks at internal borders. However, their adoption will provide only a partial 
solution  as  it  will  not  tackle  the  differences  between  authorised  measures  related  to  the 
exercise  of  police  powers  and  the  use  of  new  technologies  and  measures  having  effect 
equivalent to border checks at internal borders.  

3. 

WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? 

3.1. 

Legal basis 

This impact assessment concerns the measures adopted by the EU with regard to the absence 
of  any  controls  on  persons,  whatever  their  nationality,  when  crossing  internal  borders,  and 
also  the  measures  concerning  the  checks  to  which  persons  crossing  external  borders  are 
subject. This means that any legislative proposal following this impact assessment would be 
based on Article 77 (2)(b) and (e) TFEU. 

3.2. 

Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action 

Action in the area of freedom, security and justice falls within an area of competence shared 
between the EU and the Member States in accordance with Article 4(2) TFEU. Therefore, the 
subsidiarity  principle  is  applicable  by  virtue  of  Article  5(3)  TEU,  according  to  which  the 
Union  shall  act  only  if  and  in  so  far  as  the  objectives  of  the  proposed  action  cannot  be 
sufficiently  achieved  by  the  Member  States,  either  at  central  level  or  at  regional  and  local 
level,  but  can  rather,  by  reason  of  the  scale  or  effects  of  the  proposed  action,  be  better 
achieved at Union level. 

The  conditions  under  which  internal  border  checks  can  be  reintroduced  are  regulated  in  the 
Schengen  Borders  Code.  Any  modification  of  these  rules  would  require  EU  legislation. 

104 See footnote 34 above. 
105 
documents-adopted-23-september-2020_en. 
106 COM(2020)605 final. 

https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/migration-and-asylum-package-new-pact-migration-and-asylum-

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Furthermore, even where legislative action would not be considered appropriate, the integrity 
of the Schengen area and the fundamental right to free movement of all EU citizens require a 
coherent approach across the entire Schengen area, including on restrictions for non-essential 
travel to the EU at the external borders.  

In  particular,  the  objective  of  establishing  a  contingency  planning  for  Schengen  -  including 
specific measures at internal and external borders - as well as limiting the number of cases of 
temporary reintroduction of border checks at internal borders as a truly last resort measure to 
the real minimum, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States acting alone, and can 
be  better  achieved  at  the  level  of  the  Union.  The  Union  may  therefore  consider  taking 
measures to address the problems identified in this impact assessment, in accordance with the 
principle of subsidiarity. 

3.3. 

Subsidiarity: Added value of EU action 

EU  action  in  response  to  the  identified  problems  is  expected  to  bring  added  value  for  the 
entire Schengen area, and therefore to its citizens, by reinforcing the overall security and trust 
among the Member States as the prerequisites of the area without controls at internal borders, 
as well as the ability of persons and goods to move freely across borders.  

Such action is also expected to have tangible effects on cross-border regions which are much 
more advanced in terms of integration and rely on checks at internal borders being absent. As 
mentioned  above,  with  150  million  persons  living  in  cross-border  regions,  the  measures 
adopted on the basis of this impact assessment are likely to have an added value in particular 
for  this  population,  by  protecting  them  from  arbitrary  reintroductions  of  border  checks  at 
internal borders as a first aid measure. 

Thus, even under the assumption that the Member States are in the best position to determine 
the  most  appropriate  measures  to  address  an  identified  threat  to  internal  security  or  public 
policy,  the  interests  of  these  regions  require  a  guarantee  that  the  measures  that  have  the 
strongest impact on their daily operation truly are a last resort measure. 

4. 

OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? 

4.1. 

General objectives 

The  general  objective  of  any  intervention  is  to  ensure  that  persons  and  goods  can  move 
freely  without  unjustified  or  disproportionate  hurdles  within  the  Schengen  area.  To  this 
end, identified problems, i.e. border  checks  at  internal  borders which become an unjustified 
hurdle  to  these  movements  (2.1.1)  and  non-uniform  application  of  travel  restrictions  at  the 
external borders undermining the trust and impacting the credibility vis-a-vis third countries 
(2.1.2),  need  to  be  addressed  [Figure  2  presents  the  logic  of  intervention  to  attain  this 
objective]. 

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Figure 2 - Intervention logic 

4.2. 

Specific objectives 

The identified problems  concerning i) the border checks at  internal  borders which are long-
lasting  and  applied  against  abstract  threats  or  used  as  a  ‘first  aid  measure’  (2.1.1),  and  ii) 
discrepancies  in  the  application  of  travel  restrictions  at  the  external  borders  (2.1.2)  call  for 
solutions that would have the following specific objectives: 

1.2.8.  Creation of a contingency planning for Schengen 

The  objective  is  to  create  a  procedure  to  be  applied  specifically  in  response  to  a  crisis 
situation  affecting  all  or  several  Member  States  at  the  same  time.  Such  a  procedure  should 
allow  for  discussing  the  identified  threat(s)  at  EU  level  and,  in  consultation  with  the  other 
Member  States,  selecting  the  most  appropriate  measures  to  address  them.  The  contingency 
planning  should  fully  recognise  the  role  of  compensatory  measures  which  should  be 
encouraged as much as possible and privileged over border checks at internal borders.  

A contingency planning for Schengen should first and foremost ensure a better coordination 
among Member States in a situation of a common threat to streamline the measures taken and 
provide an approach as uniform as possible, in order to increase the predictability for citizens. 

It  should  also  reflect  that  “[t]ravel  measures  that  significantly  interfere  with  international 
traffic  may  […]  be  justified  at  the  beginning  of  an  outbreak  [of  a  pandemic],  as  they  may 
allow  countries  to  gain  time,  even  if  only  a  few  days,  to  rapidly  implement  effective 
preparedness measures”, but “must be based on a careful risk assessment, be proportionate 

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to the public health risk, be short in duration, and be reconsidered regularly as the situation 
evolves.”107 

1.2.9.  Application  of  mitigating  measures  and  specific  safeguards  for  cross-

border regions 

This objective refers to the need for a quasi-automated application of safeguards, should the 
temporary  reintroduction  of  border  checks  at  internal  borders  be  inevitable.  It  complements 
the  objective  concerning  the  creation  of  the  contingency  planning  for  Schengen.  It  should 
ensure  that  the  impacts  of  border  checks  reintroduced  at  several  border  sections  on  the 
functioning  of  cross-border  regions  and,  thus,  on  the  Internal  Market  are  limited.  The 
mitigating  measures  refer  in  particular  to  the  guidelines  and  recommendations  developed  in 
2020 in relation to the COVID-19 crisis.  

More  concretely,  once  this  objective  is  achieved,  the  good  practices  identified  in  the  DG 
REGIO study referred to above for cross-border entities such as twin cities and cross-border 
workers should be used more widely (for examples see Annex 9).  

1.2.10. Uniform application of measures at the external borders in particular in 

case of a threat to public health  

This  objective  refers  to  the  need  for  a  uniform  application  of  extraordinary  measures  at  the 
external borders where such measures are adopted in response to a threat to public health. To 
recall, in line with Recital 6 of the Schengen Borders Code, ‘Border control is in the interest 
not  only of  the Member  State at  whose external borders  it is  carried out but  of  all Member 
States  which  have  abolished  internal  border  control.  Border  control  should  help  to  combat 
illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings and to prevent any threat to the Member 
States’ internal security, public policy, public health and international relations.’ Therefore, 
any differences in the application of such measures at the external borders may jeopardise the 
trust on which the Schengen area relies. It also includes the need to ensure credibility vis-à-vis 
third countries and predictability of such measures for travel. 

1.2.11. Increased use of compensatory measures to address the identified threats 

The fourth specific objective is to ensure a high level of security within the Schengen area in a 
proportionate  manner.  To  this  end,  less  invasive  measures  than  border  checks  at  internal 
borders, such as police checks and the use of new technologies, should be privileged. Police 
checks  in  the  border  areas  can  be  carried  out  also  randomly  as  long  as  they  do  not  become 
border checks in disguise.  

1.2.12. Lifting the long-lasting border checks at internal borders 

The  fifth  specific  objective  of  any  intervention  would  be  to  make  the  Member  States 
concerned (see Table 1 above) lift border checks at their internal borders as soon as possible. 

107  WHO,  “Updated  WHO  recommendations  for  international  traffic  in  relation  to  COVID-19  outbreak”,  29 
February 2020: https://www.who.int/news-room/articles-detail/updated-who-recommendations-for-international-
traffic-in-relation-to-covid-19-outbreak. 

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The  costs  of  non-Schengen  as  well  as  the  case  studies  mentioned  earlier  concerning  the 
impact  of  border  checks  on  cross-border  regions  demonstrate  that  the  objective  of  restoring 
Schengen as the area without checks at internal borders remains valid and important for many 
EU citizens and residents.  

5. 

WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? 

This  Impact  Assessment  analyses  the  key  policy  options,  including  a  baseline  scenario,  to 
address the problems identified in section 2 and match the objectives set out in section 4.  

The  policy  options  have  been  developed  taking  into  account  requests  and  recommendations 
from  stakeholders,  the  experience  with  the  negotiations  of  the  2017  proposal  to  amend  the 
Schengen Borders Code (see Annex 2 and Annex 5), the new experiences from the COVID-
19  crisis  and  the  evidence  available  concerning  the  impacts  on  the  cross-border  regions. 
According to the DG REGIO Eurobarometer 2020108, 58% of Europeans think more influence 
of  regional  and  local  authorities  will  have  a  positive  impact  on  the  EU’s  ability  to  solve 
problems. The policy options have also been elaborated while bearing in mind the difficulty to 
quantify the impact of internal border controls as explained in Section 2.1.3.  

The negotiations of the 2017 proposal have shown that Member States are unlikely to accept 
modifications  of  the  existing  time-limits  for  unilaterally  reintroduced  border  controls  but 
rather  view  the  reintroduction  of  such  controls  as  their  sovereign  right.  Additionally,  the 
COVID-19  crisis  has  demonstrated  that  threats  to  public  health  can  require  uniform  rules 
concerning travel restrictions for non-essential travel to the European Union by third country 
nationals and that non-binding ad hoc measures cannot assure such a result. 

As  an  alternative  to  the  baseline  scenario  three  comprehensive  approaches  addressing  all 
identified problems can be envisaged:  

Option 1 proposes to adopt only soft law measures, together with the Schengen Strategy (soft 
law measures).  

Option 2 consists in a targeted amendment of the  Schengen Borders Code, accompanied by 
some  soft  law  measures  (mixed  option  based  on  the  targeted  amendment  of  the  Schengen 
Borders Code and soft law measures).  

Option 3 is more ambitious in terms of amending the existing rules. It presupposes that the 
decision on any measures necessary to address the identified threats would be taken at the EU 
level,  either  by  requiring  a  prior  decision  of  one  of  the  EU  institutions  approving  the 
reintroduction  of  border  checks  at  internal  borders  or  by  simply  removing  the  possibility  to 
reintroduce  border  checks  at  internal  borders109  from  the  legislation,  and  thus  imposing  the 
use of compensatory measures (mixed option 2 based on a more fundamental amendment of 
the Schengen Borders Code).  

5.1.  What is the baseline from which options are assessed? 

The  baseline  is  a  ‘no  policy  change’  scenario.  The  response  to  crisis  situations  such  as  a 
pandemic would depend on Member States and their willingness to cooperate with each other, 
based on the current  rules  in  the Schengen  Borders Code and other  relevant  EU legislation. 

108 https://cor.europa.eu/en/our-work/Pages/EURegionalBarometer-2020.aspx. 
109  See  Article  2(2)  of  the  Convention  Implementing  Schengen  Agreement  of  14  June  1985  between  the 
Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the  Federal Republic of Germany and the  French 
Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, Official Journal L 239, 22/09/2000. 

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This means that the know-how developed over the last year thanks to COVID-19 could be lost 
and that the EU would be exposed to a comparable lack of coordination in case of any future 
pandemic or any other Schengen-wide threat. 

Without any action, the long-lasting border checks at some internal borders are very likely to 
continue,  as  experience  shows  that  Member  States  are  not  considering  lifting  them.  In 
particular, neither the action plan to lift these controls, contained in the 2016 Communication 
‘Back to Schengen – a Roadmap’110, nor the 2017 legislative proposal to amend the Schengen 
Borders  Code111  or  the  Recommendations  of  the  Commission  relevant  for  this  topic 
succeeded in this respect. 

As mentioned in the previous sections, the data concerning migration and terrorist attacks as 
well as the role of border checks in containing COVID-19 demonstrate that border checks are 
either not justified anymore (in view of the situation at the external borders as concerns the 
migratory pressure) or are not the most efficient in addressing the identified threats (terrorism, 
pandemic).  

While the Commission has the possibility to issue an opinion on the necessity/proportionality 
of border checks at internal borders and to launch infringement proceedings, the problem that 
border  checks  are  being  used  as  a  universal  remedy  for  any  security  or  other  type  of  threat 
would  remain.  Moreover,  given  the  number  of  Member  States  concerned  and  the  complex 
implications  involved, launching  infringement procedures without any  accompanying action 
needs  to  be  measured  against  the  results  expected  and  the  complex  implications  involved, 
including in terms of the necessity to continue building trust between Member States and with 
the European Commission.  

5.2. 

Description of the policy options 

The identified problems  concerning i) the border checks at  internal  borders which are long-
lasting and applied against abstract threats or used as a ‘first aid’ measure (2.1.1), and ii) the 
non-uniform application of travel restrictions at the external borders (2.1.2) can be addressed 
through three lines of action.  

Option 1: Soft law 
This  option  proposes  soft  law  measures  drawing  on  the  lessons  learnt  from  the 
COVID-19  crisis.  It  also  further  develops  the  soft  law  tools  to  encourage  the  use  of 
compensatory measures instead of border checks at internal borders. As such it follows 
the earlier approach of the Commission in the 2016 Communication ‘Back to Schengen 
–  a  Roadmap’112  and  the  Recommendation  on  proportionate  police  checks  and  police 
cooperation in the Schengen area. This option also entails soft law measures on a better 
coordination  of  measures  at  the  external  borders  in  the  situation  of  crisis.  As  such,  it 
aspires to achieving all the identified objectives (see Table 4 below).  

The specific objectives would be achieved through the upcoming Communication on the 
future  of  Schengen  (the  so-called  Schengen  Strategy)  and,  possibly,  updates  of  the 
relevant Recommendations (in particular of the 2017 Recommendation on proportionate 
police checks).  

110 COM(2016)120, for full reference see Annex 16. 
111 COM(2017)571, for the text of the proposal see Annex 17.  
112 COM(2016)120, for full reference see Annex 16. 

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Under this option the ‘contingency planning for Schengen’ (ref. objective 4.2.1) would build 
on the existing legal framework and the know-how developed in 2020 and 2021 with regard 
to  COVID-19.  In  order  to  give  more  predictability  to  stakeholders,  the  Schengen  Strategy 
would  recall  the  rules  and  principles  that  should  apply  in  crisis  situations  in  the  Schengen 
area:  the  reintroduction  of  border  checks  only  as  a  last  resort  measures,  the  possibilities 
concerning the use and intensification of use of compensatory measures within the territory, 
the obligation to consult other Member States as regards the reintroduction of border checks 
at  internal  borders  and  of  loyal  cooperation  between  the  Member  States  as  regards  border 
checks in general. It would also provide an overview of the guidelines and recommendations 
adopted  in  response  to  COVID-19  as  a  baseline  for  the  mitigating  measures  that  should 
apply  when  reintroducing  border  checks,  until  they  are  updated  or  new  guidelines  and 
recommendations  are  adopted  on  an  ad  hoc  basis  (ref.  objective  4.2.2).  This  element  is 
particularly  relevant  for  bringing  more  predictability  to  the  industry  particularly  affected  by 
the  application  of  new  measures  at  or  in  the  area  of  the  internal  borders.  In  addition,  the 
Strategy would recommend specific minimum measures to  the benefit of the border regions 
where Member States reintroduce border controls at the internal borders. 

As regards a better coordination of measures at the external borders (ref. objective 4.2.3) 
in crisis situations, the Strategy could identify, based on the experience related to COVID-19, 
the  type  of  measures  that  can  be  taken  with  a  view  to  the  external  borders,  define  the 
categories of essential travel to the EU and stress the importance of a uniform application of 
any  such measures  in  order to  protect the integrity of the Schengen area.  It  could also  look 
into  the  guidelines  for  the  type  of  evidence  to  be  presented  during  border  checks  to 
demonstrate the essential character of the travel and deal with questions related to the transit 
of passengers.  In this respect, the role of the IPCR  could be enshrined. The IPCR would be 
consulted by the Commission. In case of new a pandemic, the IPCR could serve as a forum 
for Member States to coordinate the measures at the EU external borders. 

Finally, as regards the objective of lifting the long-lasting border checks and better use of 
the  compensatory  measures  (objectives  4.2.4  and  4.2.5)  in  the  future,  the  Schengen 
Strategy could, on the one hand, take a stance on the necessity and proportionality of checks 
at  internal  borders  by  those  Member  States  that  have  been  prolonging  border  checks  at 
internal  borders  on  the  same  grounds  for  a  certain  period  (e.g.  at  least  1]year),  and  on  the 
other hand, could complement the 2017 Recommendation on proportionate police checks and 
police cooperation in the Schengen area, by addressing some frequently asked questions from 
the  Member  States  as  regards  the  use  of  police  checks  and  new  technologies  in  the  border 
areas.  

Table 4 – Mapping of objectives and measures under Option 1 
Measures 

Objectives 

4.2.1  Creation  of  a 
contingency planning 
for Schengen 

The  Schengen  Strategy  recalls  the  existing  rules 
concerning the reintroduction of border checks and 
calls for the use of compensatory measures instead 
of  border  checks  at  internal  borders  as  well  as  for 
minimum mitigating measures, in particular for the 
border regions. 

Persons 

and 

4.2.2  Application  of 
mitigating  measures 

The  Schengen  Strategy  provides  an  overview  of 
relevant  guidelines/recommendations  adopted  in 

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goods  can  move 
[without 
freely 
unjustified 
or 
disproportionate 
limitations] 
within 
Schengen area  

the 

and 
specific 
safeguards for  cross-
border regions 

response  to  COVID-19.  It  also  recalls  the  need  of 
taking  due  account  of  the  interests  of  cross-border 
regions when deciding on the application of specific 
measures. 

4.2.3 
application 
measures 
external borders 

Uniform 
of 
the 

at 

The  Schengen  Strategy  identifies  the  criteria  to  be 
taken  into  account  by  the  EU  and  Member  States 
when  deciding  on  travel  restrictions  for  non-
essential  travel  of  third  country  nationals  and 
derogations therefrom.  

It provides also guidelines for the type of evidence 
that  could  be  presented  during  border  checks  to 
demonstrate the essential character of the travel. 

The  IPCR  is  consulted  and  involved  all  along  the 
implementation of the Strategy.  

4.2.4  Increased  use 
of  the  compensatory 
measures  to  address 
the identified threats 

The 2017 Recommendation on proportionate police 
checks and police cooperation in the Schengen area, 
is  further  developed  in  the  Schengen  Strategy  to 
address  some  frequently  asked  questions  from  the 
Member States as regards the use of police checks 
and new technologies in the border areas. 

4.2.5  Lifting 
the 
long-lasting  border 
checks  at 
internal 
borders 

The  Schengen  Strategy  takes  a  stance  on  the 
necessity  and  proportionality  of  checks  at  internal 
borders exceeding a certain period (e.g. > 1 year).  

Overall, this option would be a continuation of the current policy which is based on ad hoc 
reactions  to  crisis  situations,  while  it  would  ensure  that  the  know-how  developed  during 
COVID-19  is  preserved  and  used,  where  appropriate,  in  the  future.  In  this  sense,  it  would 
respond to the calls from the stakeholders to ensure more predictability, but only partially. At 
the same time, as regards checks at internal borders this option would give another chance to 
make use of the existing tools, while further developing the existing compensatory measures 
in the form of the soft law. As such, it would respond to the call of some Member States to 
use  the  available  tools  to  the  fullest  potential,  before  creating  new  tools113.  However,  this 
option is not likely to satisfy the other Member States which are directly affected by the long-
lasting  border  checks  at  internal  borders.  Taking  a  clear  position  on  the  necessity  and 
proportionality  of  the  persisting  border  checks  at  internal  borders  in  the  Schengen  Strategy 
would  be  also  welcomed  by  the  European  Parliament  that  has  been  encouraging  the 
Commission to take steps against the Member States abusing the current  rules, although the 
Parliament  is  likely  to  expect  more  far-reaching  action.  Being  addressed  to  the  Member 
States, the proposed measures would not create any obligations for the industry or citizens, 

113 [FI input: before creating new tools, we should ensure that we use the current, available tools, to their fullest 
potential.] 

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but  could  generate  some  benefits  for  them  if  Member  States  decided  to  adhere  to  the 
guidance.  

Option 2: Mixed option (targeted amendment of the Schengen Borders Code combined 
with soft law) 
This option addresses the identified shortcomings as regards the reintroduction of border 
checks  at  internal  borders  as  well  as  the  lack  of  a  uniform  application  of  special 
measures at the external borders, such as travel restrictions for non-essential travel to the 
EU by third country nationals. As such it addresses the criticism concerning the current 
situation  from  the  citizens,  the  European  Parliament,  as  well  as  Member  States 
complaining about the long-lasting checks at internal borders. It would also respond to 
the call from academia114. This option is expected to allow for ensuring that persons can 
move freely in the Schengen area without unnecessary hurdles, thanks to the limitation 
of  the  instances  where  border  checks  at  internal  borders  are  reintroduced.  A  targeted 
amendment of the Schengen Borders Code would concern:  

i)  a  new  procedure  of  ‘contingency  planning  for  Schengen’,  applicable  in  case  of  any 
serious threat to several or all Member States; 

ii) creating the possibility of adopting restrictions on non-essential travel into the EU for 
third country nationals in a situation of a serious threat, in particular to the public health, 
at the external borders;  

iii)  developing  the  concept  of  ‘last  resort  measure’  in  the  context  of  a  temporary 
reintroduction  of  border  checks  at  internal  borders  more  in  detail,  compared  to  the 
current  rules,  including  by  clarifying  better  what  measures  are  considered  as  not 
equivalent to border checks and therefore admissible below the threshold of Articles 25 
to 29 Schengen Borders Code, and the conditions of use of new technologies at internal 
borders and their vicinity; 

iv) limiting the side effects of any border checks by providing for mitigating measures to 
be applied where appropriate as part of the obligation to ensure proportionality, and in 
particular as concerns border regions; 

v) introducing an obligation to prepare a risk assessment in the case of border checks at 
internal borders are reintroduced, and 

vi)  providing  the  Commission  with  better  tools  to  keep  an  overview  of  the  decision-
making process in the Member States and the actual use of reintroduced border checks 
(modified rules on notifications and reports on the reintroduction of border checks). 

Soft  law  measures  within  the  framework  of  the  Schengen  Strategy  could  complement 
these new, more specific requirements concerning the proportionality of border checks 
by establishing a proper catalogue of mitigating measures to be applied in the situation 
of systematic checks reintroduced at internal borders by several Member States. Specific 
measures should be recommended in order to limit the impacts on twin cities and border 
regions  (e.g.  to  set  up  border  control  not  within  the  cities  but  on  their  margins  and  to 

114  Recommendations  of  the  Meijers  Committee  (standing  committee  of  experts  on  international  immigration, 
refugee and criminal law) shared with the Commission and attached in Annex 4. 

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ensure that cross-border workers can continue to commute to their place of employment 
without excessive administrative burden). 

This  option implies legislative changes in  the Schengen Borders Code to make contingency 
planning  for  Schengen  more  predictable  and  stable.  The  contingency  planning  (ref. 
objective  4.2.1)  would  consist  of  a  new  procedure  allowing  for  a  reintroduction  of  border 
checks at internal borders in response to any serious threat to internal security or public policy 
(including  public  health  as  in  2020)  affecting  several  or  all  Member  States  at  the  same 
time  (unlike  the  2017  proposal  when  the  Commission  proposed  the  possibility  to  prolong 
border checks to 1 year by an unilateral decision of a Member State or 2 years by a decision 
of  the  Council,  under  the  condition  that  the  Member  State  concerned  is  confronted  with  a 
persisting  threat  and  has  adopted  relevant  commensurate  measures  to  address  this  threat). 
While  Member  States  would  keep  the  right  to  reintroduce  border  checks  at  their  internal 
borders, under this option any prolongation of such checks would require a decision by one of 
the  EU  institutions  in  order  to  ensure  a  coordinated  approach  once  the  immediate  need  has 
been taken care of. The overall duration of such border checks should, however, be limited in 
time. 

The  new  procedure  would  be  supported  by  additional  safeguards  concerning  the  use  of 
mitigating measures (ref. objective 4.2.2), whenever the border checks are reintroduced by 
several  Member  States  at  the  same  time.  For  the  sake  of  transparency,  the  guidelines  and 
recommendations adopted in the course of 2020 in relation to COVID-19 could be gathered in 
the Practical Handbook for Border Guards115, in order to become a natural point of reference 
for  border  guards  in  a  crisis  situation.  At  the  same  time,  the  Schengen  Borders  Code  could 
point  (in  the  criteria  for  reintroduction  of  border  checks)  to  the  specific  need  to  protect  the 
border regions. These regions could e.g. be defined based on the approach adopted in the local 
border traffic Regulation 1931/2006 (for more information see Annex 15). 

Finally, contingency planning would be complemented by a new provision in the case where 
the European Centre  for Disease Prevention and Control (“ECDC”) detects  the  existence in 
one or more third countries of an [infectious] disease with epidemic potential. The provision 
would  allow  explicitly  the  Council  to  adopt  a  regulation,  based  on  a  proposal  by  the 
Commission,  which  would  provide  for  a  temporary  travel  restriction  on  non-essential 
travel  into  the  EU  for  third  country  nationals  residing  in  one  or  more  third  countries  and 
exemptions  from  such  restrictions.  (ref.  objective  4.2.3).  The  provision  would  define  the 
categories  of  essential  functions  pursuant  to  which  travellers  who  fulfil  them  would  be 
allowed to get into the EU. In addition, the provision would specify that the Regulation would 
(i)  identify  the  geographical  areas  or  third  countries  from  which  travel  would  be  subject  to 
restrictions  or  exemptions  of  restrictions,  (ii)  lay  down  the  specificities  of  the  travel 
restrictions  and  possible  exemptions,  (iii)  possibly  define  other  categories  of  essential 
functions, and (iv) conditions applicable to travels into the EU, like e.g. testing or quarantine.  

The  Schengen  Borders  Code  would  also  be  amended  in  view  of  the  objectives  4.2.4  and 
4.2.5.  This  amendment  would  have  as  an  objective  to  provide  the  Commission  with  better 
tools to assess the decisions of Member States to reintroduce border checks. It is in line with 
the  finding  of  the  public  consultation,  where  the  great  majority  of  participants  agreed  or 

115 Annex to the Commission Recommendation C(2019)7131. 

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tended  to  agree  on  the  importance  of  regular  and  comprehensive  monitoring  for  the 
implementation of common rules and standards across the Schengen area116. To that end, the 
provisions on the notifications and reporting obligation would also be modified, to ensure that 
the  Commission  and  other  Member  States  affected  by  the  measures  have  sufficient 
information on the situation at the internal borders (not only post factum, once border checks 
are lifted, as it is the case at present). The Roadmap accompanying the Schengen Strategy and 
indicating  the  steps  to  be  taken  in  order  to  achieve  the  objective  of  the  Strategy  of  making 
Schengen  stronger  and  more  resilient,  could  include  the  milestones  for  lifting  the  current 
border checks at internal borders.  

The Code would also  be amended with  a view to establishing a balance  between the use of 
border  checks  and  that  of  compensatory  measures  at  internal  borders.  To  that  end,  the 
amendment  should  bring  more  clarity  to  the  concept  that  border  control  at  internal  borders 
shall only be reintroduced as a  ‘last resort measure’. In this context, the intensification of 
police checks supported by new technologies would be explicitly mentioned as a necessary 
element  of  the  risk  assessment  to  demonstrate  that  border  checks  are  indeed  the  last  resort 
measure. Moreover, the catalogue of measures that can be used in the areas of internal borders 
without being considered as equivalent to border checks would be reviewed, to address some 
recurring  questions  concerning  police  checks  and  to  reflect  the  upcoming  developments,  in 
particular as regards the use of advanced passenger information (API). 

This proposal would replace the one tabled by the Commission in 2017, which did not receive 
sufficient  support  in  particular  in  the  Council.  That  proposal,  in  particular  provided  for  a 
specific  procedure  (decision  by  the  Council)  where  border  checks  exceeded  a  duration  of  1 
year. 
Taking into account the discussions in 2017 on that proposal, the new proposal would move 
away from a general reform of the rules governing the reintroduction of border checks at the 
internal  borders  to  a  more  targeted  approach.  Thus,  the  contingency  planning  will  address 
specifically  the  situation  of  a  threat  affecting  several  Member  States  or  even  the  entire 
Schengen area. For all other cases of reintroduction of border checks, the new proposal will 
limit  itself  to  providing  more  clarity  as  to  compensatory  measures  and  taking  into  account 
new  developments  in  this  area,  in  particular  the  2017  Commission  Recommendation  on 
proportionate  police  checks  and  police  cooperation  and  newly  developed  technologies.  A 
more  detailed  description  of  the  changes  that  were  proposed  in  2017  is  contained  in  Annex 
17. 

Table 5 – Mapping of objectives and measures under Option 2 

Objectives 

Measures 

4.2.1  Creation 
contingency 
of 
planning 
for 
Schengen  

The  SBC  is  amended  by  adding  a  new  procedure  of 
‘contingency  planning  for  Schengen’  which  applies 
when  several  or  all  Member  States  are  confronted  with 
the  same  kind  of  threat.  The  Member  States  may 
reintroduce border checks unilaterally but must seek the 
agreement of one of the EU institutions for prolongation. 

116 Annex 2, p. 13. 

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4.2.2 
Application 
mitigating 
measures 
specific 
safeguards 
cross-border 
regions 

and 

for 

Persons 
and 
goods  can  move 
[without 
freely 
or 
unjustified 
disproportionate 
limitations] 
within 
Schengen area  

the 

The  concept  of  proportionality  of  border  checks  in  the 
SBC explicitly refers to the mitigating measures; 

of 

The  Schengen  Handbook  contains  a  catalogue  of 
mitigating measures. 

The  specific  interests  of  cross-border  regions  are 
explicitly  mentioned  among 
the 
temporary  reintroduction  of  border  control  at  internal 
borders (Article 26). 

the  criteria 

for 

4.2.3  Response 
serious 
to 
in 
threats, 
particular  to  a 
pandemic 
includes 
uniform 
application 
of 
measures  at  the 
external borders 

also 

4.2.4.  Increased 
use 
the 
of 
compensatory 
measures 
address 
identified 
threats 

to 
the 

4.2.5  Lifting  the 
long-lasting 
border checks at 
internal borders 

The  SBC  is  amended  to  provide  for  a  possibility  of  a 
Regulation  by  the  Council  upon  a  proposal  by  the 
Commission  on  restrictions  on  non-essential  travel  into 
the EU in particular in the situation of a serious threat to 
the public health at the external borders. 

The following amendments in the SBC are proposed: 

The  concept  of  ‘last  resort  measure’  is  developed  [to 
reinforce  the  need  to  use  less  invasive  measures  before 
reintroducing border checks at internal borders]; 

All  border  checks  at 
internal  borders  must  be 
accompanied  by  a  risk  assessment;  The  non-exhaustive 
list  of  authorised  measures  not  equivalent  to  border 
checks is reviewed; 

The  conditions  for  the  use  of  new  technologies  at 
internal borders  and  in  the  areas  of  internal  borders are 
better explained. 

A  Roadmap  accompanying  the  Schengen  Strategy 
includes milestones for lifting the long-lasting checks at 
internal borders; 

The  SBC  is  amended  to  provide  to  the  Commission 
better  tools  to  obtain  an  overview  over  the  decision-
making process in the Member States and the actual use 
of  reintroduced  border  checks  to  assess  their  necessity 
and proportionality.  

Overall,  this  option  would  make  an  important  step  towards  a  contingency  planning  for 
Schengen  by  creating  a  new  procedure  for  the  reintroduction  of  border  checks  in  crisis 
situations and providing a stronger legal  basis for the use of mitigating measures and travel 
restrictions at  the  external  borders.  In this sense, this option provides for more stability  and 
predictability to citizens and industry with the new built-in safeguards that the impact on the 
functioning  of  Schengen  of  any  measures  adopted  to  address  the  crisis  situation  will  be 
limited. Furthermore, those citizens and regions that have been most affected because of their 

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location will benefit from  guarantees that their specific needs will be protected in  case of a 
future reintroduction of internal border checks.  

The expected better use of compensatory measures should assure more flexibility and better 
taking  into  account  the  local  circumstances,  thus  limiting  the  impact  on  citizens.  This 
development  would  be  welcomed  by  those  Member  States  which  are  exposed  to  the  long-
lasting border checks at the internal borders as well as by the European Parliament, if paired 
with increased monitoring that these measures are not discriminatory and respect fundamental 
rights. The Roadmap accompanying the Schengen Strategy would also be an important tool to 
restore the stability in the Schengen area. However, some Member States, in particular those 
carrying  out  border  checks  at  their  internal  borders  for  years,  can  be  expected  to  be  critical 
about the proposed measures. This option would also respond to the call for changes coming 
from academia (see in this respect the Recommendations of the Meijers Committee - standing 
committee of experts on international immigration, refugee and criminal law - shared with the 
Commission and attached in Annex 4). 

The  proposed  modifications  would  primarily  address  the  Member  States,  including  border 
guard authorities. The obligations for the industry will depend on the outcome of the ongoing 
discussion on the future of the API Directive which is outside the scope of this initiative.  

Option 3: Mixed option 2 (more fundamental change of the SBC, combined with soft law 
elements) 
This  option  sees  the  borderless  Schengen  area  as  one  integral  space  that  must  not  be 
fragmented  by  decisions  of  individual  Member  States  and  in  view  of  that  proposes  a 
strictly  EU  level  approach  where  any  decision  on  reintroduction  of  border  checks  at 
internal borders requires the prior approval of one of the EU institutions or removes the 
possibility of a reintroduction of border checks at internal borders altogether. 

Under  this  option,  the  contingency  planning  for  Schengen  would  go  much  beyond 
the  framework  currently  imposed  by  the  Schengen  Borders  Code  with  the  rules 
applicable  at  the internal/external  borders.  The discussion and decision at EU level  on 
the most appropriate measures (whatever their nature) to address any identified threats 
affecting  some  or  all  EU  Member  States  would  remove  the  current  discretion  of  the 
Member  States  as  regards  the  unilateral  reintroduction  of  border  checks  at  internal 
borders.  As  a  result,  a  new  approach  to  compensatory  measures  would  need  to  be 
developed to ensure that their application does not lead to border checks in disguise. 

As regards the  application of measures at  the  external  borders in  case of public health 
threats, the proposed remedies would not differ from option 2 (new restrictions on non-
essential travel into the EU applicable in the situation of threat to public health). 

The  current  paradigm  of  measures  at  internal/external  borders  taken  in  response  to  crisis 
situations  would  need  to  change  if  a  reintroduction  of  border  checks  was  not  an  option 
anymore. This option is based on the assumption that the relations developed in the EU based 
on  the  freedom  of  movement  and  the  Internal  Market  are  so  complex  that  reintroducing 
border  checks  at  internal  borders  does  not  make  sense  anymore  given  that,  after  all,  it  can 
only help pushing the identified problem to the neighbouring Member States (and in principle 
only for a limited period of time). Moreover, reintroducing border checks - as checks in fixed 
locations - does not seem sufficiently flexible and efficient.  

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Establishing a strictly European approach to response to threats to internal security or public 
policy, by bringing any decision on reintroducing border checks at internal borders to the EU 
level or simply removing the possibility to temporarily reintroduce border checks at internal 
borders from the Schengen Borders Code, would require taking a new approach to Schengen 
contingency including the mitigating measures (ref. objectives 4.2.1 and 4.2.2). Under this 
option, the contingency planning for Schengen would aim at identifying the best approach in 
each  crisis  situation,  irrespectively  of  whether  it  affects  one  or  more  Member  States.  The 
decision-making  process  would  be  time-framed.  In  the  absence  of  the  possibility  to 
(unilaterally) reintroduce border checks at internal borders, the Member States would need to 
choose  from  different  measures  related  to  different  policy  areas  (travel  restrictions, 
quarantine, intensified police checks, etc.). If provided at all, the reintroduction of controls at 
internal  borders  would  be  subject  to  a  truly  European  procedure.  As  a  general  rule,  such 
reintroductions would be based on a decision proposed and adopted by the Commission as an 
implementing act following the request by a Member State. 

The above modifications would be accompanied by a new Schengen tool allowing to restrict 
non-essential travel into the EU in case of a serious threat to public health, applicable in an 
uniform manner at all external borders, as presented in option 2 (ref. objective 4.2.3). 

The prohibition of border checks at internal borders, even in a situation of a serious threat to 
internal  security  or  public  policy  as  allowed  under  current  rules,  would  automatically  allow 
for achieving the objectives 4.2.4 and 4.2.5. 

Table 6 – Mapping of objectives and measures under Option 3 
Measures 

Objectives 

4.2.1  Creation  of 
contingency planning 
for Schengen  

The  SBC  is  amended  to  ensure  that  remedies  to 
threats affecting some or all EU Member States are 
discussed at the EU level and a decision is taken on 
the  most  appropriate  measures  (whatever  their 
nature) to address the identified threats. 

Persons 
and 
goods  can  move 
[without 
freely 
unjustified 
or 
disproportionate 
limitations] 
within 
Schengen area 

the 

4.2.2  Application  of 
mitigating  measures 
specific 
and 
safeguards for cross-
border regions 

The  Schengen  Strategy  encourages  Member  States 
to  set  up  an  exchange  platform  to  ensure  that  the 
compensatory  measures  adopted  by  the  Member 
States do not become equivalent to border checks at 
internal borders. 

4.2.3 Response to the 
includes 
pandemics 
uniform 
also 
of 
application 
the 
measures 
external borders 

at 

The SBC is amended to provide for a possibility of 
a  Council  Regulation  upon  a  proposal  by  the 
Commission  on  restrictions  on  non-essential  travel 
into the EU in the situation of a serious threat to the 
public  health  at  the  external  borders  (as  under 
option 2). 

4.2.4  Increased  use 
compensatory 
of 
measures  to  address 
the identified threats 

Following the amendment of the SBC prohibiting a 
(unilateral)  reintroduction  of  border  checks  or 
requiring approval of one of the EU institutions for 
any  reintroduction  of  border  checks  at  internal 
borders,  compensatory  measures  become  the  only 
the 
possibility  at 
institution.  

the  decision  of 

least  until 

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4.2.5  Lifting 
the 
long-  lasting  border 
checks  at 
internal 
borders 

The  SBC  is  amended  to  prohibit  border  checks  at 
internal borders or to make these checks subject to a 
prior decision of one of the EU institutions. 

Overall, this option is the most ambitious and the one that reflects best the idea of Schengen. 
However, the persistent use of border checks and the failure of the negotiations on the 2017 
proposal  of  the  amendment  clearly  demonstrate  that  the  EU  is  not  ready  for  such  a  radical 
step. In this sense this option risks leading to firm opposition from many Member States as it 
disregards  the  direct  link  between  the  possibility  to  reintroduce  border  checks  at  internal 
borders and national sovereignty. 

This  option  also  suffers  from  the  limitations  resulting  from  the  legal  basis  of  the  Schengen 
Borders  Code,  which  concerns  measures  at  the  borders  and  only  refers  to  other  measures 
applicable in border areas to ensure that these are not equivalent to border checks. This means 
that the application of other measures than border checks cannot be directly regulated in the 
Schengen Borders Code. The same applies to additional safeguards to avoid that the absolute 
ban on border checks at internal borders is circumvented by Member States by a discretionary 
use  of  compensatory  measures,  which  would  lead  to  border  checks  in  disguise.  Also  the 
exchange  of  information  on  the  actual  use  of  compensatory  measures  would  depend  on  the 
good will of the Member States. 

In this sense, the solutions proposed under this option seem to be premature and the identified 
objectives may have better chances to be achieved by means of developing the alternatives to 
border checks as such, instead of prohibiting border checks.  

This option also does not necessarily remove the unpredictability for  citizens, related to the 
use of measures in relation to the crossing of the border, as the full overview of the measures 
other than border checks cannot be guaranteed under the Schengen Borders Code.  

This  option  could  satisfy  part  of  the  industry  (airports),  while  the  carriers  (e.g.  Flexibus) 
might be still dissatisfied by the time losses generated by unpredictable and possibly intensive 
checks.  

Table 7 – Policy options and key measures 
Problem 

Objective 

Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 3 

4.2.1  Creation  of 
contingency planning 
for Schengen 

Schengen 
Strategy 

Schengen 
Borders  Code 
amendment 

Schengen 
Borders 
Code 
amendment 

checks 

Border 
at 
internal 
borders 
long-
are 
which 
lasting  and  applied 
against 
abstract 
threats  or  used  as  a 

4.2.2  Application  of 
mitigating measures 

Schengen 
Strategy 

Schengen 
Borders  Code 
amendment;  

Schengen 
Borders 
Code 
amendment 

Schengen 
Handbook 

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4.2.4  Increased  use 
compensatory 
of 
measures  to  address 
the identified threats 

Recommendati
on 

Schengen 
Borders  Code 
amendment 

Schengen 
Borders 
Code 
amendment 

4.2.5  Lifting 
the 
long-lasting  border 
checks  at 
internal 
borders 

Schengen 
Strategy 

Schengen 
Borders  Code 
amendment 

Schengen 
Borders 
Code 
amendment 

Roadmap/ 

Schengen 
Strategy  

4.2.3  Response  to  a 
includes 
pandemic 
uniform 
also 
a 
of 
application 
measures 
the 
external borders 

at 

Schengen 
Strategy 

Schengen 
Borders  Code 
amendment 

Schengen 
Borders 
Code 
amendment 

‘first  aid  measure’ 
(and  as  such  are 
often 
disproportionate  and 
inadequate 
to 
threats 
the 
address 
they  are  supposed to 
tackle)  become  an 
unjustified hurdle for 
persons and goods to 
move 
the 
Schengen area  

in 

Non-uniform 
application  of  travel 
restrictions  at 
the 
borders, 
external 
necessary, 
where 
undermining 
the 
trust  and  putting  the 
functioning 
overall 
of Schengen at risk 

5.3. 

Options discarded at an early stage 

Following  the  consultation  of  stakeholders,  the  Commission  discarded  the  option  of 
expanding  carriers’  liability  with  regard  to  the  intra-Schengen  connections  as  a  measure 
alternative to border checks at internal borders. Carriers’ liability has been set out in Article 
26  of  the  Convention  Implementing  the  Schengen  Agreement117  (CISA)  and  further 
developed  in  Directive  2001/51/EC118.  It  imposes  on  carriers  certain  obligations  when 
transporting passengers from outside the EU into the Schengen area. In particular, it obliges 
them  to  ensure  that  all  persons  brought  to  the  EU  are  in  possession  of  relevant  documents 
allowing for entry. It also obliges Member States to impose penalties on carriers who do not 
comply with this obligation. In recent  years, some Member States imposed an obligation on 
carriers  in  national  law  to  verify  the  documents  of  all  passengers  (for  non-commercial 
reasons). These obligations have been part of the national measures aimed at addressing the 
threats to internal security or public policy, which at the same time justified the reintroduction 
of border checks at internal borders. 

117 OJ L 239, 22.9.2000, p.19. For full reference see Annex 16. 
118 Council Directive 2001/51/EC (OJ L 187, 10.7.2001). For full reference see Annex 16. 

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The  decision  not  to  look  at  expanding  the  liability  of  carriers  has  been  taken  in  view  of 
proportionality considerations: i) carriers’ liability is linked with the subsequent border checks 
by  the  border  guards.  Therefore,  the  verification  of  the  compliance  with  any  new  rules 
concerning carriers’ liability at internal borders would require developing a specific system of 
verification;  ii)  the  checks  of  documents  carried  out  by  carriers  would  be  very  limited 
(presence  of  documents/evident  signs  of  counterfeit  etc.)  but  would  still  require  significant 
investments from the carriers119. 

6. 

WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? 

1.3.  Economic and social impacts 

None  of  the  options  is  expected  to  generate  direct  costs  for  the  economy  or  the  citizens 
compared to the baseline scenario because all the options aim at restoring the Schengen area 
as the area without checks at internal borders.  
The  analysis  of  the  economic  benefits  of  the  proposed  options  may  only  rely  on  the 
assessment  of  the  direct  benefits  related  to  how  each  of  the  options  could  contribute  to 
bringing  back  the  normality  in  the  Schengen  area  by  lifting  the  current  border  checks  and 
preventing the reintroduction of border checks at internal borders in the future. 
As regards the economic impacts of the considered measures at the external borders, some 
Member  States  particularly  relying  on  foreign  tourists  may  perceive  them  as  potentially 
affecting their economy. However, given the overall positive impact of such measures on trust 
among the Member States, these potential costs would be counterbalanced by the benefits for 
the  Schengen  area  (as  other  Member  States  could  not  justify  the  reintroduction  of  border 
checks  at  internal  borders  and/or  travel  bans  within  the  Schengen  area  which  equally  affect 
the tourism industry of these Member States). In view of that, the assessment of the economic 
impact of the measures considered to address problem 2 (travel restrictions for non-essential 
travel to the EU) will depend on their effectiveness in preventing the reintroductions of border 
checks at internal borders due to a divergent application of the measures taken at the external 
borders.  
The soft law measures considered under Option 1 are not very likely to limit the duration of 
border checks and therefore the economic benefits of Option 1 would be rather limited. The 
measures  proposed  under  this  option  are  not  likely  to  impact  ‘the  national  approach’  of  the 
Member States  as  regards taking  the decision on  reintroduction of border  checks  at  internal 
borders  in  the  future  as  explained  in  section  2.2.4.  As  the  reintroduced  border  checks  in 
particular affects cross-border regions, the risk of using border checks as a first aid measure 
could  continue  affecting  the  economic  interests  of  these  regions.  Furthermore,  the  risk  of  a 
non-uniform  application  of  travel  restrictions  at  the  external  borders  justifying  possibly  the 
reintroduction  of  border  checks  at  internal  borders  could  not  be  sufficiently  prevented  only 
with soft law measures (such as criteria for travel restrictions and guidelines for evidence in 
the  Schengen  Strategy)  as  the  current  experience  with  the  implementation  of  Council 
Recommendation 2020/912 shows. 
Option 2, with the new mechanism of contingency planning, bringing the response to crisis 
situations  affecting  several  or  all  Member  States  to  the  EU  level  and  reinforcing  the  use  of 
compensatory measures, is likely to provide better and more reliable framework for exercising 
basic freedoms by preventing long-lasting border checks at internal borders in the future. As 

119 For instance, written contributions of Hungary and Eurostar. 

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such,  this  option  could  be  instrumental  in  limiting  the  negative  economic  impact  of  border 
checks at internal borders and thus the economic benefits of this option could be significant. 
Also  the  possibility  of  adopting  an  EU-wide  travel  restriction  for  non-essential  travel 
applicable at the external borders in the situation of a public health threat could contribute to 
this objective by eliminating a likely ground for the reintroduction of border checks at internal 
borders.  
Option 3, bringing any decision on reintroduction of border checks at internal borders to the 
EU  level  or  abolishing  border  checks  as  such,  may  appear  as  having  the  biggest  positive 
economic impact for the future, also relieving cross-border regions from carrying the bulk of a 
burden of measures that are meant to benefit the entire Member State. However, it also risks 
having the most unwanted side effects, as the non-transparent use of compensatory measures 
could lead to border checks in disguise. Nevertheless, the possibility to adopt EU–wide travel 
restrictions applicable at the external border in the event of a public health crisis could limit 
the need for compensatory measures and thus, also the risk of their discretionary use by the 
Member States. 
Also  as  regards  the  social  impacts,  this  analysis  is  focused  on  the  benefits  that  each  of  the 
options  can  bring  in  terms  of  lifting  border  checks  at  internal  borders  and  restoring  trust 
between the Member States. From this perspective, the situation in the cross-border regions is 
of  particular  relevance.  As  underlined  in  the  inception  impact  assessment  and  mentioned  in 
section  2.1.3,  there  are  1.7  million  workers  in  the  EU  crossing  a  border  every  day  to  go  to 
their  jobs  and  long  waiting  times  at  the  border  might  discourage  people  from  looking  for 
cross-border opportunities on the labour market, reducing the pool of potential workers. The 
social benefits from the proposed measures would extend to EU citizens and all other persons 
legally residing in the EU. Moreover, the impact of the proposed measures on the entire EU 
population  benefiting  from  the  area  without  checks  at  internal  borders  would  be  positive, 
given that they diminish the risk of reintroduction of border checks. 
the 
Option  1,  with  no 
guidelines/recommendations building solely on the mitigating measures adopted in relation to 
COVID-19, is not likely to reduce the risk of reintroductions of border checks and as such is 
not likely to have any significant positive social impact.  
Option 2, with the contingency planning for Schengen and the reinforced concepts of the ‘last 
resort measure’, should limit the use of border checks at internal borders. This option can be 
expected  to  yield  more  positive  social  impacts  also  due  to  the  further  development  of  the 
concept of ‘proportionality’ and a proper catalogue of mitigating measures to be included in 
the Schengen Handbook, which would guarantee certain  minimum  safeguards whenever the 
reintroduction of border checks is truly necessary and justified.  
Finally, bringing to the EU level any decision on the use of relevant measures, including any 
instance of use of border checks at internal borders, as provided for in Option 3, could make 
the  most  visible  difference,  in  particular  for  cross-border  regions,  provided  that  relevant 
safeguards  could  be  developed  to  ensure  that  compensatory  measures  which  the  Member 
States  would  have  to  rely  on  instead  do  not  become  equivalent  to  border  checks  at  internal 
borders.  At  the  same  time,  bringing  such  decisions  to  the  EU  level  or  even  abolishing  the 
possibility of border checks at internal borders could significantly increase the pressure on the 
EU. As certain phenomena (secondary movements, cross-border criminality or even terrorist 
threats)  cannot  be  eradicated  completely,  the  EU  might  become  an  easy  target  for  criticism 
driven by national debates.  

real  contingency  planning  and  a  simple  overview  of 

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6.2. 

Impacts on fundamental rights 

All  three  considered  options  attempt  to  address  problems  which  have  an  impact  on  the 
following rights: i) the right to family life of persons residing legally in the EU, ii) the right to 
work, to exercise the right of establishment and to provide services in any Member State, iii) 
the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, iv) the right to 
privacy and protection of personal data.  

All  three  options  considered  recognise  the  possibility  to  make  the  exercise  of  the  rights 
mentioned above more difficult, either by reintroducing border checks at  internal borders or 
by  using  compensatory  measures  such  as  police  checks  in  border  areas.  However,  these 
possibilities already exist and are recognised as justified despite their impact on fundamental 
rights.  

Thus, the impact of the specific options on fundamental rights may be measured according to 
the duration of limitations to the fundamental rights likely under each option. 

From this perspective, the positive impacts of Option 1 on the rights listed above under points 
i)  –  iii)  would  be  the  most  limited,  given  the  overall  limited  efficiency  of  this  Option  in 
achieving  the  identified  objectives.  Compared  to  this,  Options  2  and  3  would  have  both  a 
positive impact on fundamental rights by limiting or eliminating the use of border checks at 
internal borders.  

As compared to the status quo, in all options the overall impact on the fundamental rights of 
the  possible  increased  use  of  compensatory  measures  to  border  checks  at  internal  borders, 
such as police checks,  would  be positive, as it would  concern a smaller number of persons, 
compared to  border checks.  However, the increased use of the  compensatory  measures  also 
requires strong safeguards to protect against abuses, including where the promoted measures 
could become border checks in disguise. According to a study commissioned by the European 
Parliament, the discretionary power  conceded to police officers when conducting  checks on 
persons within the territory of a Member State in accordance with the current Article 23 of the 
Schengen Borders Code, has led to racial profiling and discriminatory selection of the persons 
being checked within the border areas.120 It can therefore not be excluded that Options 2 and 
3 which are based on an increased use of compensatory measures might increase this risk.  

Regarding  the  protection  of  fundamental  rights  in  case  Member  States  take  alternative 
measures,  none  of  the  options  provides  for  a  list  of  such  possible  measures  and  thereby 
provides  for  accompanying  safeguards  for  fundamental  rights.  Nevertheless,  whatever 
alternative measures they decide to take, Member States will have to ensure that these comply 
with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and all other relevant international law as laid down 
in article 4 of the Schengen Borders Code. In addition, the alternative measures may not harm 
the rights of persons enjoying the right of free movement under Union law (Article 3a) of the 
Schengen  Borders  Code),  and  the  controls  should  be  performed  in  full  respect  of  human 

120  Cf.  Sergio  Carrera,  Ngo  Chun  Luk  “In  the  Name  of  COVID-19:  An  Assessment  of  the  Schengen  Internal 
Border  Controls  and  Travel  Restrictions  in  the  EU”,  September  2020,  study  commissioned  by  the  European 
Parliament’s  Policy  Department  for  Citizens’  Rights  and  Constitutional  Affairs  at  the  request  of  the  LIBE 
Committee, PE 659.506, p.72f., citing e.g. K. Brouwer, M. van der Woude, J. van der Leun, “Op de grens van 
het vreemdelingentoezicht: discretionaire beslissingen binnen het Mobiel Toezicht Veiligheid”, Tijdschrift voor 
Veiligheid, Vol. 16, No. 2/3, 2017, p. 73; T.J.M. Dekkers, ‘Selecting in Border Areas: Profiling Immigrants or 
Crimmigrants?’, The Howard Journal of Crime and Justice, Vol. 58, No. 1, March 2019, pp. 25-44. 

EN 

50 

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dignity (article 7 of the Schengen Borders Code). Finally, supplementary  safeguards against 
increased risk of racial profiling or other phenomena in the process of targeting checks which 
could  impede  on  fundamental  rights,  would  stem  from  the  current  anti-discrimination 
obligations under EU and national law. Additionally, implementing options 2 or 3 should be 
accompanied by increased monitoring measures, e.g. in the context of Schengen Evaluations.  

As  regards  the  right  listed  under  point  iv)  above  –  the  right  to  privacy  and  protection  of 
personal data –, according to the public consultation, 25.25% of the responding EU citizens 
consider that any automated control would be an unacceptable intrusion in their private life. 
Moreover,  it  has  to  be  stressed  that  all  measures  of  considered  options  in  the  context  of 
surveillance and monitoring technologies shall be subject to the applicable EU data protection 
rules, irrespectively if they concern soft law measures or legislative proposals. In this sense, 
all options ensure an adequate level of protection to the citizens. 

6.3. 

Other impacts 

The  options  considered  do  not  have  any  measurable  impacts  on  the  environment.  The 
persistence of border checks may generate increased CO2 emissions caused by waiting cars at 
the borders, but no data are available in this regard. At the same time, the negative effects of 
long-lasting border checks on the cross-border mobility could compensate or counterbalance 
such effects by limiting the overall volume of emissions. For this reason, the impacts on the 
environment will not be taken into account in the overall assessment of the options. 

As  regards  the  impact  on  administration,  the  costs  of  alternative  measures  are  difficult  to 
calculate  given  that  they  concern  the  maintenance  of  law  and  order  which  are  under  the 
exclusive responsibility of the Member States. Therefore, the Commission does not have any 
data on this at its disposal.  

Option  1,  with  soft  law  measures,  does  not  create  any  new  obligations  for  national 
administrations. The call for better coordination based on the know-how developed in relation 
to COVID-19 could lead to additional tasks in a future crisis situation. However, the positive 
effects  of  additional  coordination  should  outweigh  the  burdens,  as  this  could  reduce  the 
number of measures in place or allow for sharing the responsibility for specific actions with 
the authorities of the neighbouring Member States. 

By maintaining the possibility to reintroduce temporarily border checks at internal borders but 
adding new obligations, such as a risk assessment, a standardised notification concerning the 
reintroduction  of  border  checks  at  internal  borders  and  an  obligation  to  report  regularly  on 
these, Option 2 could have the biggest direct impact on the administration. However, as the 
measures  proposed  in  this  option  should  achieve  an  overall  reduction  in  the  use  of  border 
checks, the additional administrative burden should be limited.  

As compared to Option 2, Option 3 - which does not require a risk assessment or reporting 
but  presupposes  that  the  administration  would  get  involved  in  the  coordination  and 
monitoring  of  the  compensatory  measures  -  would  have  a  moderate  impact  on  the 
administration.  

The measures concerning the external borders would have only a positive impact on national 
administrations which would follow a uniform approach, without having to negotiate bilateral 
arrangements with third countries.  

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51 

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Overall,  the  perception  of  the  administrative  impacts  may  vary  from  one  Member  State  to 
another.  In  the  Member  States  which  in  recent  years  have  not  resorted  to  border  checks  at 
internal borders to address crisis situations, a more European approach would not make any 
difference.  However,  for  the  Member  States  with  long-lasting  border  checks  at  internal 
borders and which are underusing compensatory measures, the options considered may appear 
to  increase  the  administrative  burden,  depending  on  the  combination  of  the  compensatory 
measures applied. 

From the EU side, the new procedure of contingency planning for Schengen as well as a more 
structured approach to notifications/reporting obligations, may require some small adjustment 
of resources. 

7. 

HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? 

Table 8 – Comparison of the three policy options 

Baseline  Option 1  Option 2  Option 3 

Effectiveness 

Efficiency 

Proportionality  

Coherence 

0 

0 

0 

0 

+ 

+ 

+ 

+++ 

+++ 

+++ 

+++ 

+++ 

++ 

++ 

+ 

+++ 

1.4.  Effectiveness 

All  three options are expected to  have an impact  in  terms  of managing the disproportionate 
limitations to persons and goods moving in the Schengen area, and thus are expected to help 
in  achieving  the  identified  general  and  specific  objectives.  However,  their  effectiveness  is 
strictly linked to the likely difference they would make compared to the baseline scenario.  
Measures  under  Option  1  are  expected  to  have  a  low-to-moderate  positive  impact.  This  is 
because  the  legislative  provisions  concerning  the  reintroduction  and  application  of  border 
checks  at  internal  borders  would  remain  unchanged.  This  means  that  the  risk  of 
undue/disproportionate  limitations  could  not  be  avoided  in  the  future  and  Member  States 
would continue having a lot of discretion both as regards the reintroduction of border checks 
at internal borders, and the application of mitigating measures. 

Option 2, with the legislative modifications to the Schengen Borders Code, includes a set of 
measures  that  could  have  a  highly  positive  impact.  This  concerns  in  particular  a  proper 
contingency planning for Schengen on the one hand and the development of concepts as ‘last 
resort’ and proportionality on the other, which are expected to influence the way the Member 
States  decide  on  reintroduction  and  application  of  border  checks  at  internal  borders.  Given 
that  the  possibility  to  reintroduce  border  checks  at  internal  borders  is  perceived  by  some 
Member States as an aspect of their sovereignty, this option offers the most realistic approach 
to  the problems  identified, and the most effective way of achieving the objectives that have 
been identified. 

Option 3 may also appear to have a positive impact by eliminating the possibility of unilateral 
decisions on reintroduction of border checks at  internal  borders. However, using this option 
would overhaul the current Schengen architecture where the Member States keep the right to 
decide  on  the  reintroduce  border  checks  as  a  last  resort  measure.  Thus  this  positive  result 
would lead at the same time to reluctance of the Member States to give up a power which is 
considered by many as an aspect of their sovereignty. Another drawback is related to the risk 

EN 

52 

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of insufficient transparency as to the measures applied by Member States to address identified 
threats,  instead  of  border  checks:  eliminating  the  possibility  to  reintroduce  border  checks  at 
internal  borders  unilaterally  would  be  accompanied  by  eliminating  the  notifications  to  the 
Commission  and  the  Council,  leaving  in  force  only  the  transparency  obligations  resulting 
from the ‘Strawberry Regulation’121 (i.e. to inform the Commission about any obstacle to the 
free  movement  among  the  Member  States).  In  this  sense,  Option  3  cannot  sufficiently 
guarantee  that  the  four  freedoms  guaranteed  by  the  Treaties  will  not  be  limited  in  a 
disproportionate manner.  

1.5.  Efficiency 

The analysis of the main impacts shows that  all three options are expected to bring benefits 
compared to the baseline scenario, without generating significant costs. The socio-economic 
impacts  are  decisive  in  this  assessment,  given  the  lack  of  measurable  impacts  on  the 
environment  or  on  administration.  The  impacts  on  fundamental  rights  are  comparable 
between  the  three  options,  although  Option  1  may  have  a  slightly  smaller  positive  effect  in 
attempting to end the long-lasting measures at the internal borders. 

Option 1 is expected to have the lowest efficiency in terms of socio-economic impacts. The 
proposed  soft  measures  are  not  likely  to  prevent  a  discretionary  use  of  border  checks  at 
internal  borders  in  the  future,  which  are  generating  significant  costs  for  the  economy  and 
communities, in particular at regional level. 

Option 2 is expected to be highly efficient because it creates new obligations for the Member 
States and stronger tools of control for the Commission (e.g. risk assessment, regular reports 
concerning  the  reintroduced  border  checks)  which  could  increase  the  pressures  on  Member 
States (by means of an opinion on necessity/proportionality).  

Option 3 is expected to have a moderate efficiency because of the unpredictable impact of the 
compensatory measures used by the Member States instead of border checks and the risk that 
they could become border checks in disguise.  

1.6. 

Proportionality 

According to the principle of proportionality laid down in Article 5(4) TEU, there is a need to 
match the nature and intensity of a given measure to the identified problem. 

Measures proposed under  Option 1  do not impose any  additional obligations  on the  actors. 
They  comply  with  the  boundary  test  as  the  continued  effectiveness  of  the  Schengen  area 
depends on the concerted action of all the Member States.  

However, the choice of the instrument (Communication of the Commission and other soft law 
measures  such  as  guidelines/recommendations)  does  not  give  a  sufficient  guarantee  that  the 
identified objectives would be achieved. For this reason this option may raise concerns as to 
its proportionality. 

Option 1, like Option 2, fully reflects the fact that a reintroduction of border checks at internal 
borders is widely considered as a legitimate measure of maintaining law and order.  

Option 2, despite certain new obligations on the Member States related to the new provisions 
on  contingency  planning,  risk  assessments  and  reporting  obligations,  appears  to  be  fully 
proportionate  as  the  benefits  resulting  from  better  control  over  the  use  of  border  checks  at 

121 Council Regulation (EC) No 2679/98 (OJ L 337, 12.12.1998, p. 8–9). For full reference see Annex 16. 

EN 

53 

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internal borders would outweigh these burdens. This option also complies with the boundary 
test as the continued  effectiveness  of the  Schengen area depends  on the  concerted action of 
the Member States. The increased use of compensatory measures such as  police checks and 
the use of  new technologies  furthermore decreases the  intensity of the invasion  on citizens’ 
freedoms. As these measures can be used in a targeted manner, based on risk assessment and 
are  subject  to  the  number  of  safeguards  under  national  law,  they  generally  have  a  lesser 
impact  on  the  freedom  of  movement  than  border  controls  which  can  concern  all  persons 
crossing the internal  border. The proportionality  of such measures is  further safeguarded by 
the fact that the CJEU has limited the discretionary powers of Member States in carrying out 
border controls and police checks on their territory122. 

Finally, the choice of the instrument fully corresponds to the identified objectives. Moreover, 
the proportionality of this option results also from the targeted character of the intervention in 
the Schengen Borders Code.  

Option 3, like Option 2 can also be assessed positively as regards the choice of instrument.  

However,  it  requires  a  much  more  significant  intervention  in  the  Schengen  Borders  Code 
compared  to  Option  2  and  would  eliminate  one  of  the  powers  of  the  Member  States  dating 
back  to  the  origins  of  Schengen  cooperation  (Convention  Implementing  Schengen 
Convention).  It  may  also  be  perceived  by  some  Member  States  as  not  compliant  with  the 
Treaties,  as  pursuant  to  Article  72  of  the  TFEU  the  Title  referring  to  the  area  of  freedom, 
security  and  justice  “shall  not  affect  the  exercise  of  the  responsibilities  incumbent  upon 
Member  States  with  regard  to  the  maintenance  of  law  and  order  and  the  safeguarding  of 
internal  security”.  In  this  sense,  it  may  appear  as  going  beyond  that  what  is  necessary  to 
address the identified problems. 

1.7.  Coherence 

The  three  options  include  measures  that  are  coherent  with  the  overall  objective  of  the 
upcoming  Schengen  Strategy  and  other  initiatives  in  this  area  intended  to  preserve  the 
Schengen area and to make it stronger for the future. They are complementary to the parallel 
initiative to reform the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism which aims, among other things, to 
restore trust  between the Member States and allow for a quick identification of deficiencies 
which may put the overall functioning of the Schengen area at risk.  

Furthermore,  all  three  options  take  due  account  of  the  possibilities  offered  by  new 
technologies  which  are  likely  to  revolutionise  border  management  once  the  new  IT 
architecture is deployed throughout the Schengen area. They also fully recognise and reflect 
the know-how developed during the COVID-19 pandemic making an effort to integrate it as 
much as possible in the process of managing crisis situations. 

In  broader  terms,  by  bringing  more  predictability  to  the  reintroduction  of  border  checks  at 
internal  borders,  the  initiative  may  reinforce  the  effectiveness  of  the  holistic  approach 
and  migration  management.
proposed 

the  Commission 

security 

by 

on 

122  Judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  22 June  2010,  Melki  and  Abdeli,  joined  cases  C-188/10  and  C189/10, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:363, judgment of the Court of Justice of 19 July 2012, Adil, ECLI:EU:C:2012:508, C-278/12 
PPU, judgment of the Court of Justice of 21 June 2017, A. (Europabrücke), case C- 9/16, ECLI:EU:C:2017:483. 

EN 

54 

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Table 9 – Impacts of the Options  

Impacts/Options  Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 3 

Soft law changes 

Mixed approach 

Mixed approach 2 

Effectiveness 

Efficiency 

EN 

but 

law 
Low  –  Soft 
measures  would  have 
only  a  limited  impact 
on 
the  effectiveness 
by  building  political 
not 
pressure 
guarantying 
that 
mistakes 
previous 
concerning  the  use  of 
border 
at 
internal borders would 
the 
be  avoided 
future.  
The  effectiveness  of 
law  measures 
soft 
depends  on  the  good 
will  of 
the  actors 
involved. 

checks 

in 

do 

change 

Low  –  The  soft  law 
measures 
not 
sufficiently  guarantee 
in 
a 
the 
approach 
internal 
to 
borders.  The  impacts 
this  option  are 
of 
terms  of 
limited 
assuring 
the 
that 
benefits  of  the  area 
at 
without 
internal borders would 
the 
be  restored  for 
the 
citizens 
industry. 

check 

and 

in 

for 

for 

the 

option 

High  –  The  mixed 
approach,  relying  on  a 
targeted  amendment  of 
the  Schengen  Borders 
Code and an operational 
tool 
the  border 
guards,  is  expected  to 
allow  for  attaining  the 
objectives. 
identified 
offers 
This 
solutions 
the 
Member States (the new 
procedure  to  be  applied 
in 
situation  of 
common  threat),  for  the 
Commission  (new  tools 
of  control)  and  for  EU 
citizens/industry  who 
seek  guarantees  that  the 
basic  freedoms  will  not 
be  limited  without  due 
cause, and predictability 
(mitigating  measures 
the 
linked 
with 
of 
proportionality 
new 
checks, 
border 
rules  on  restrictions  on 
non-essential  travel  into 
the  EU  at  the  external 
borders). 

is  high 

High  –  The  impact  of 
Option  2 
in 
terms  of  restoring  the 
benefits of the Schengen 
area.  This  is  thanks  to 
the  legislative  changes 
allowing to ensure more 
efficiently  the  seamless 
conditions 
for 
exercising 
the  basic 
freedoms  by  ensuring 
that  border  checks  are 
truly the measure of last 
for  a 
resort,  applied 
limited  period  of  time 
the 
that 
and 

55 

Moderate  to  High  –  The 
ambitious  legislative  proposal, 
despite  bringing  the  choice  of 
remedies  to  the  EU  level,  may 
to  protect  citizens  and 
fail 
industry  from  a  discretionary 
use,  by  Member  States,  of 
compensatory  measures  in  a 
manner  that  could  make  them 
border  checks  in  disguise.  The 
risk  related  to  that  undermines 
the  obvious  advantages  of 
lifting 
the  decision  on  any 
reintroduction of border checks 
at  internal  border  to  the  EU 
level or prohibiting them in the 
future as too old-fashioned and 
not  reflecting  sufficiently  the 
overall interest of Schengen. 

or 

checks 

Moderate  to  High  –  The 
impact of Option 3 can be high 
thanks  to  bringing  to  the  EU 
level the decision on the use of 
border 
simply 
prohibiting  border  checks  at 
internal  borders.  However,  the 
likely 
the 
Member  States  and  the  risk  of 
border  checks 
in  disguise 
undermine  the  efficiency  of 
this option. 

opposition 

of 

  EN 

 
 
compensatory  measures 
are  used  to  their  full 
potential. 

to 

High  -  All  measures 
under  option  2  are 
proportionate 
the 
identified  problems  and 
do  not  go  beyond  what 
is  necessary  to  achieve 
the specific objectives. 

Proportionality  Low  -  This  option 
does  not  generate  any 
automatic  obligation 
for 
actors. 
However, the soft law 
measures might be not 
proportionate  in  view 
of  the  scale  of  the 
problems  that  need  to 
be addressed.  

the 

Low  -  The  measure  consisting 
in depriving the Member States 
of the possibility to unilaterally 
reintroduce  border  checks  or 
banning  the  reintroduction  of 
internal 
border 
border  altogether  may  go 
beyond  that  what  is  necessary 
to 
identified 
problems.  

address 

checks 

the 

at 

Coherence 

High  -  This  option  is 
the 
coherent  with 
the 
development  of 
Schengen acquis. 

High  -  This  option  is 
the 
coherent 
with 
the 
of 
development 
Schengen acquis. 

High  -  This  option is  coherent 
with  the  development  of  the 
Schengen acquis. 

8. 

PREFERRED OPTION 

8.1. 

Option 2 

Option 2 (mixed approach) is considered to be the preferred option. This choice reflects the 
the  cumulative  score  of  this  option  as  regards  effectiveness,  efficiency  and 
best 
proportionality.  It  draws  the  lessons  from  the  past  and,  at  the  same  time,  is  sufficiently 
ambitious. It respects the views of the Member States concerning the role of border checks in 
addressing serious threats while at the same time respecting also the legitimate expectations of 
the  EU  citizens  and  other  persons  benefiting  from  the  absence  of  border  checks  at  internal 
borders  as  to  preserving  the  Schengen  area  as  one  of  the  main  enablers  of  the  freedom  of 
movement of persons and goods.  

8.2. 

REFIT (simplification and improved efficiency) 

According to the Commission’s Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme (REFIT), all 
initiatives  with  the  objective  to  change  existing  EU  legislation  should  aim  to  simplify  and 
deliver stated policy objectives more efficiently (i.e. reducing unnecessary regulatory costs).  

The  analysis  of  impacts  suggests  that  the  preferred  option  should  help  to  optimise  the 
allocation  of  resources  in  case  of  crisis  and  to  limit  the  costs  of  reintroduction  of  border 
checks at internal borders. However, it should be noted that the new obligation concerning the 
risk  assessment,  the  new  template  for  notifications  of  reintroductions  and  reporting 
obligations, as well as new tasks related to the use of compensatory measures, may lead to a 
situation where the overall burden on Member States will not be reduced, and in some cases 
even increased.  

Additional  obligations  would  arise  for  the  EU  institutions.  This  would  concern  creating  the 
capacity  to  take  substantiated  decision  at  the  EU  level  on  the  use  of  restrictions  on  non-
essential travel into the EU at external borders but also to apply the contingency planning in 
case of need. 

No impact on EU bodies and Agencies is expected. 

EN 

56 

  EN 

 
However,  these  additional  tasks  should  generate  limited  additional  costs  compared  to  the 
significant positive impact on managing the crisis situations putting the overall functioning of 
Schengen area at risk. 

Table 10 – Impacts on simplification and administrative burden 

Baseline 

Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 3 

On national 
administrations 
On EU institutions 
On EU bodies and 
agencies 

0 

0 
0 

+ 

- 
– 

+ 

+ 
- 

+ 

- 
– 

Preferred 
Option 

+ 

+ 
– 

+++ high, ++ medium, + low, 0 neutral and – negative. 
The  cost  variations  for  Commission  and  EU  bodies  and  agencies  would  be  limited  and 
partially offset by other measures. 

9. 

HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? 

The  evaluation  of  the  targeted  amendment  of  the  Schengen  Borders  Code  as  regards  the 
temporary reintroduction of border checks at internal borders will depend on the information 
to be received from the Member States. 

Table  11  includes  a  non-exhaustive  list  of  quantitative  indicators  proposed  to  monitor  the 
achievement  of  policy  objectives  identified  in  this  Impact  Assessment.  These  indicators 
reflect  and  define,  in  practice,  the  success  of  the  policy  options.  However,  as  the  proposed 
option concerns addressing exceptional situations, the regular measurement of the indicators 
is not possible.  

Moreover, this unpredictability prevents setting fixed quantitative targets. However, it may be 
assumed that [within a year] from the adoption of the new rules the long-lasting border checks 
at  internal  borders  should  be  lifted  and  the  only  border  checks  in  place  at  that  time  will  be 
carried  out  for  a  limited  period  of  time  under  the  current  rules,  or  based  on  the  new 
contingency  planning  procedure.  Also,  in  the  same  period  of  time,  the  Schengen  Handbook 
should  be  updated  to  provide  an  overview  of  relevant  guidelines/recommendations  to  be 
applicable in case of temporary reintroduction of border checks at internal borders in several 
Member States.  

The  Commission  website  https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-
visas/schengen/reintroduction-border-control_en  informing  the  public  on  the  current  border 
checks  at  internal  borders  in  place  will  remain  the  main  IT  tool  allowing  to  monitor  and 
evaluate  the  situation  at  the  internal  borders.  Given  the  limitations  of  the  legal  basis  to 
measures at the internal borders, the Commission cannot develop a separate tool on the use of 
compensatory measures such as police checks in the border areas. However, the conditions of 
use  of  the  compensatory  measures  at  the  internal  borders  (spot  police  checks/new 
technologies)  will  be  subject  to  monitoring  in  the  framework  of  the  Schengen  Evaluation 
Mechanism, including any possible on-spot visits at the internal borders.  

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Table 11 – Success indicators 

Specific Objectives 

Operational Objective 

Indicators 

4.2.1  Creation  of  a 
contingency 
planning 
Schengen 

for 

  Reintroduction of 

  Number of reintroduction 

of border checks at 
internal borders  

Target 

 ↓ 
decreasing 
trend 

border 
checks/prolongation 
of border checks in 
case of the same 
threat in several/all 
Member States is 
discussed/decide at 
the EU level 
respectively 

  Duration of reintroduced 
border checks at internal 
borders 

↓ 
decreasing 
trend 

4.2.2  Application  of 
mitigating  measures 
and 
specific 
safeguards  for  cross-
border regions 

  Default set of 
safeguards 
applicable in the 
situation of the same 
threat for several/all 
Member States  

  Number of incidents at 

internal borders where the 
reintroduced border 
checks affect the 
freedoms in a 
disproportionate manner  

at 

Uniform 
4.2.3 
of 
application 
measures 
the 
external  borders  in 
particular  in  case  of 
to  public 
a 
health 

threat 

  restrictions on non-
essential travel into 
the EU applicable at 
all external borders 

  Number of third country 
nationals detected in the 
EU (or upon exit) who 
should have been subject 
to the temporary 
restrictions on non-
essential travel into the 
EU 

4.2.4  Increased  use 
of 
compensatory 
measures  to  address 
the identified threats 

  Less new 

  Number of new 

reintroductions of 
border checks 

  More examples of 

use of compensatory 
measures 

notifications concerning 
the reintroduction of 
border checks at internal 
borders 

  Number of best practices 

4.2.5  Lifting 
long-lasting 
checks  at 
borders 

the 
border 
internal 

  Current border 
checks are not 
prolonged 

  Number of prolongation 

of border checks  

↓ 
decreasing 
trend 

n.a. 

↓ 
decreasing 
trend 

↑ 
increasing 
trend 

↓ 
decreasing 
trend 

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ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION 

1. 

LEAD DG, DECIDE PLANNING/CWP REFERENCES 

The lead DG is  the Directorate-General  for Migration and Home Affairs  (DG HOME). 
The agenda planning reference is PLAN/2020/8753. 

The Commission Work Programme for 2021123 provides, under the heading ‘Promoting 
our European way of life’ a legislative initiative to amend the Schengen Borders Code. 

2. 

ORGANISATION AND TIMING 

The Secretariat-General set up the Inter-service Steering Group to assist in preparing the 
initiative  on  10  December  2020.  The  following  Directorates  General  representatives 
participated in the ISSG work: SJ, DG GROW, DG MOVE, DG RTD, DG HOME, DG 
JUST, JRC, DG SANTE and EEAS. 

An  Inception  Impact  Assessment  was  published  on  8  January  2021  and  was  open  to 
feedback from all stakeholders for a period of 4 weeks, until 5 February 2021124.  

Within this framework, the impact assessment was subsequently prepared. 

3. 

CONSULTATION OF THE RSB 

On 19 April 2021, the Directorate-General for Home Affairs submitted the draft Impact 
Assessment  to  the  Regulatory  Scrutiny  Board,  in  view  of  a  hearing  that  took  place  on 
12 May 2021. 

The recommendations of the Board were incorporated in the Impact Assessment Report 
as follows: 

Recommendations of the RSB 

How the RSB recommendations reflect in the 
current Impact Assessment Report 

(1)  The  report  should  begin  by 
describing  the  main  elements  of 
the  2017  proposal. 
It  should 
explain the lessons learnt from the 
negotiations and how the COVID-
19  crisis  has  brought  in  new 
perspectives. 
also 
It 
indicate  the  room  for  manoeuvre 
that  the  negotiations  left  for  this 
initiative and how it is reflected in 

should 

existing 

the  overall 
The  Impact  Assessment  presents 
objective  of  the  2017  proposal  (p.  6),  the  reasons 
why Member States did not accept modifications of 
unilaterally 
the 
reintroduced 
the 
negotiations  of  the  2017  proposal  (p.35)  and  how 
the  COVID-19  crisis  have  shown  how  threats  to 
public  health  require  uniform  rules,  which  ad  hoc 
measures  taken  by  Member  States  cannot  ensure 

time-limits 

controls 

during 

border 

for 

123 COM(2020) 690 final of 19.10.2020. 
124 
internal-borders-amending-the-Schengen-Borders-Code 

https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12827-Temporary-checks-at-

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the policy options. 

(p.35).  

Reference to the lessons learnt from the discussion 
in 2017, can be found throughout the description of 
the three policy options (Sec. 5.2), 

In  Section  5,  the  room  for  manoeuvre  left  for  the 
new  proposal  of  the  amendment  of  the  Schengen 
Borders Code is further explained and addressed in 
the different policy options.  

Section  2.2.1  was  expanded  to  include  existing 
example  from  a  Member  State  of  a  system 
implemented  that  does  not  require  continuous 
physical control at the border.  

the 

learnt 

illustrate 

from  past 
lessons 
To 
introductions  of  internal  border  controls  and  why 
existing  coordination  mechanism  failed,  a  new 
annex  7  was  added.  It  highlights  three  identified 
threats to the Schengen Area (migration, terrorism 
and  management  of  the  external  borders),  which 
pushed Member States to reintroduce checks at the 
internal  borders.  Section  2.1.1.2.b)  was  also 
the 
deepened 
and 
improved 
recommendations of the RSB. 

address 

to 

limited 

the  CJEU 

On  the  judgement  of  joined  cases  C-188/10  and 
C189/10, 
the  discretionary 
powers  of  Member  States  in  carrying  out  border 
controls  and  police  checks  on  their  territory, 
safeguarding  the  proportionality  of  compensatory 
measures, as further developed in Section 7.3 

on 

evidence 

introductions  of 

(2)  The  report  should  provide 
more 
the 
effectiveness  of  internal  border 
controls  and  alternative  measures 
to such controls. It should explain 
what  lessons  can  be  drawn  from 
past 
internal 
border  controls 
(in  particular 
during  the  COVID-19  crisis)  and 
coordination 
why 
mechanisms  failed.  It  should  also 
clarify  how 
the 
proportionality  of  internal  border 
alternative 
controls 
measures. The report should better 
explain the observed coordination 
Integrated 
deficiencies  of 
Policy 
Response 
mechanism during the COVID-19 
pandemic. 

it  assesses 

vis-à-vis 

existing 

Crisis 

the 

Section  2.2.2  was  expanded  to  better  explain  the 
coordination deficiencies observed at the Integrated 
Policy  Crisis  Response  during 
the  Covid-19 
pandemic.  

Section 5.2 where policy options are presented was 
further  expanded  so  as  to  better  explain  the 
different  policy  options,  addressing  for  each  and 
every  one  of  them  how  effective  enforcement 
would be ensured.  

(3) The report should describe the 
content of the policy options more 
in  detail,  including  the  preferred 
policy  option.  It  should  describe 
how  the  policy  options  will  be 
implemented 
the 
different choices (sub-options) for 
In 
this 
particular,  it  should  set  out  how 
the  new  coordination  mechanism 
and  contingency  planning  would 

implementation 

and  what 

are. 

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60 

  EN 

 
 
work  and  how  the  institutional 
decision  process  and  its  temporal 
framework  would 
It 
should  be  clear  about  how 
effective  enforcement  will  be 
ensured. 

function. 

It 

(4) The report should go beyond a 
purely  qualitative  impact  analysis 
and  present  quantitative  data 
wherever  possible. 
should 
further  specify  the  benefits  of 
lifting  internal  border  controls, 
possibly  distinguishing  between 
sectors.  The  report  could  draw 
from past efforts of calculating the 
cost  of  non-Schengen.  It  could 
also refer to anecdotal evidence or 
clearly 
case 
marking 
for 
example  for  the  administrative 
costs.  The  report  should  also  be 
more  explicit  about  the  possible 
risks  of  alternative  measures  for 
fundamental  rights  and  explain 
how  such  risks  can  be  contained. 
For  the  comparison  of  the  policy 
options,  the  comparative  tables 
should  be 
the 
accompanying text. 

line  with 

them  as 

studies 

(while 

such), 

in 

(5) Stakeholders’ views should be 
reflected throughout the report. In 
should 
particular, 

report 

the 

To  address  the  lack  of  quantitative  data  identified 
in  the  previous  report,  the  Impact  Assessment 
report  incorporated  the  results  from  the  public 
consultation  carried  out  by 
the  Commission 
(Section  2.1.1.b),  p.  17)  and  added  data  on  the 
impact  on  intra-EU  trade  and  GDP  caused  by 
reintroduction  of  checks  at  internal  border  due  to 
the  COVID-19  crisis  (Section  2.1.3.2,  p.  26). 
Moreover,  the  policy  options  (Section  5.2.)  were 
developed  taking  into  account  data  concerning 
migration  and  terrorist  attacks,  which  demonstrate 
that border checks are either not justified anymore 
or  are  not  the  most  efficient  in  addressing  the 
identified threats. 

Specific  quantitative  data  was  also  included  to 
clarify  the  benefits  of  lifting  internal  border 
controls  on  different  sectors,  such  as  air  travel 
industry and cross-border regions (Section 2.1.3.1, 
p. 21-25). 

On  pages  25-26,  the  report  outlines  the  requested 
estimation  of  the  administrative  costs  of  non-
Schengen (between EUR 0.6 and EUR 5.8 billion) 
the  physical  establishment  of  border 
and  of 
controls 
at  EUR  7.1  billion), 
demonstrating  that  the  physical  establishment  of 
border  controls  have  a  higher  impact  on  the  total 
costs when the period of reintroduction is shorter.  

(estimated 

The  section  on  the  impact  on  fundamental  rights 
was  deepened,  to  include  the  analysis  on  the 
protection  of  fundamental  rights  in  case  Member 
States  take  alternative  measures.  (Section  6.2,  p. 
49-50).  

For  the  comparison  of  the  policy  options,  table  8 
was  updated  to  better  reflect  the  accompanying 
text. 

The current  version of the  Impact  Assessment  has 
expanded 
the 
stakeholders’  consultation  that took  place between 

in  Annex  2 

results  of 

the 

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report  diverging 
transparently 
address  potential 
and 
views 
concerns  on  the  policy  options, 
implementation 
and 
impacts. 

choices 

November 2020 and February 2021.  

Moreover, the views of stakeholders are also better 
reflected  throughout  the  document,  allowing  for  a 
more transparent report, as follows: 

-  Section  2.1.1.a)  p.  3  presents  the  results  of  the 
citizen’s  dialogues  that  took  place  in  the  High 
Rhine region in Summer 2020, where cross-border 
citizens  and  businesses  exposed  the  impact  of 
unilateral reintroduction of internal border controls 
and presented their conclusions on how to address 
situations of crisis. 

-  Section  2.1.1.b)  p.  19  presents  the  results  of  the 
Expert  meetings  on  measures  allowing  for  a  more 
effective cooperation within the Schengen Area in 
January  2021.  It  also  highlights  the  opinion  of 
industry  and  carrier  representatives  who  provided 
conditions that should be met for the effective use 
of new technology solutions in border services. 

-  Section  2.1.2,  p.  20,  21  shows  the  results  of  the 
stakeholders’ consultations, encompassing the view 
of  EU  citizens  and  business  associations  and 
company/business organisations. 

- Section 2.2.3, p. 29 presents the view of EU and 
non-EU citizens during the public consultations.  

-  Section  5.2  provides  how  stakeholders  will  be 
impacted by each of the three policy options raised 
in the report.  

4. 

EVIDENCE, SOURCES AND QUALITY 

The starting point for this Impact Assessment report was the DG REGIO ‘The effects of 
COVID-19  induced  border  closures  on  cross-border  regions  -  An  empirical  report 
covering the period March to June 2020’125 and the ‘20 case studies covering the period 
March to June 2020’126 

125 
01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-search 
126 
01aa75ed71a1/language-en 

https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/46250564-669a-11eb-aeb5-

https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/bf14de68-6698-11eb-aeb5-

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The  Commission  also  relied  on  the  studies  on  costs  of  non  Schengen  prepared  by  the 
European  Parliament127,  notifications  of  the  Member  States  concerning  the  temporary 
reintroduction  of  border  checks  at  internal  borders  and  the  reactions  from  the  public 
manifested in the correspondence sent to the Commission.  

To assess the impact of the different options, information on stakeholders’ views through 
the stakeholder consultation activities, as  per Table 1, Annex 2, were a  main source of 
information.  

The quality of the data on duration and grounds of decisions on temporary reintroduction 
of border checks  at  internal borders  is  problematic. Although it relies on direct  sources 
(Member  States  concerned),  the  level  of  detail  and  parameters  used  by  the  Member 
States to demonstrate the need of border checks varies a lot and is difficult to compare. 
Also the use of data concerning the impact of border checks at the cross-border regions 
was challenging because of the fact that very little hard data is available, as regards the 
actual  cost  of  border  checks  at  internal  borders  in  particular  during  COVID-19  crisis, 
despite  the  serious  effort  made  by  the  Commission  to  collect  such  data,  as  part  of  the 
preparation of this Impact Assessment.  

5. 

ANALYTICAL METHODS 

To the extent possible, the Impact Assessment relies on quantitative analysis of the data 
available. This concerns in particular the use of border checks at internal borders. In the 
absence  of  quantitative  data  on  the  actual  reintroduction  of  border  checks  at  internal 
borders, the Impact Assessment relies on estimates concerning the quantitative aspects of 
reintroduction  of  border  checks  at  internal  borders  in  the  scenario  of  a  permanent 
reintroduction of border checks at internal borders. As a large part of the issues at stake 
do  not  have  a  quantitative  but  rather  a  qualitative  profile,  the  qualitative  evidence  has 
been  used  to  a  much  larger  extent,  in  particular  to  identify  trends  and  the  correlation 
between different factors and measure the different options’ impact.  

127  Directorate-General  for  Internal  Policies  Policy  Department  A:  Economic  and  Scientific  Policy, 
European Parliamentary Research Service  European Added Value Unit, PE 578.974-May 2016: “Cost of 
non-Schengen:  the  impact  of  border  controls  within  Schengen  on  the  Single  Market”,  requested  by  the 
European 
Protection, 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/578974/IPOL_STU(2016)578974_EN.pdf. 

Internal  Market 

Parliament's 

Committee 

Consumer 

and 

on 

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ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION 

The  stakeholders’  consultation  took  place  between  November  2020  and  February  2021 
and  encompassed,  primarily,  targeted  stakeholders  by  way  of  the  Schengen  Forum  and 
thematic  workshops  divided  according  to  the  topic  and  stakeholders  involved.  It 
included  Member  States,  European  Parliament,  carriers  and  NGOs.  This  approach 
appeared preferable given the very different interests and issues at stake for the different 
stakeholders. The Commission prepared discussion papers to steer the discussion in the 
different meetings.  

1.   SCHENGEN FORUM 

Under  the  New  Pact  on  Migration  and  Asylum,  the  Commission  announced  the 
establishment of a dedicated Schengen Forum, involving the relevant national authorities 
such as Ministries of Interior and (border) police at national and regional level in order to 
stimulate more concrete cooperation and more trust among Member States to support the 
well-functioning of Schengen. 

The 1st Schengen Forum took place on 30 November 2020. At the forum, EU institutions 
and Member States provided political guidance on the future of Schengen, agreeing that 
there is a need of taking steps to preserve Schengen. The Conclusions of the Chair from 
the meeting are attached as Annex 5 

2.   MINUTES:  EXPERT  MEETINGS  ON  MEASURES  ALLOWING  FOR  A  MORE  EFFECTIVE 

COOPERATION WITHIN THE SCHENGEN AREA, 14 AND 22 JANUARY 2021 

Attendance:  The  meetings  were  attended  by  experts  from  a)  NGOs  and  airport  and 
airline representatives b) Members of the European Parliament and their representatives, 
c)  Schengen  Member  States  and  Schengen  Associated  Countries,  d)  carries’ 
representatives and Commission services (DG HOME). 

2.1. Explanation of the meeting’s objective (DG HOME) 

In  an initial  statement, the chair recalled the  objective of the meeting, the collection of 
views on the future cooperation within the Schengen Area in view of the adoption of the 
Schengen  Strategy  and  a  proposal  for  an  amendment  to  the  Schengen  Borders  Code 
(SBC). The focus lies on the main challenges facing Schengen, particularly, the current 
COVID-19  pandemic  and  the  reintroduction  of  internal  border  controls  by  Member 
States, in some cases exceeding the legal time limits.  

2.2. Introduction to the topics  

Schengen  governance:  Following  the  unsuccessful  2017  proposal  for  a  revision  of  the 
SBC, the COVID-19 pandemic made a new approach to Schengen governance necessary. 
The Commission’s inception impact assessment for the future of the SBC foresees four 
options:  1.  No  changes  to  the  SBC  and  the  2017  Recommendation  on  police 
a  new 
cooperation.  2.  Adoption  of  non-legislative  measures,  probably 
Recommendation  on  the  use  on  police  checks  and  the  use  of  new  technologies.  3. 
Legislative amendment of the SBC on alternatives to border control, particularly on 

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Article  23,  regarding  the  use  of  police  power.  4.  Legislative  abolition  of  internal 
border controls.  

COVID-19 response: The Schengen Strategy and the amendment to the SBC are also an 
opportunity to reflect on the COVID-19 response. Given that there is no legal basis for 
the Commission to act in this field, the Commission’s current reaction to the COVID-19 
pandemic  is  based  on  soft  law,  i.e.  recommendations  and  guidelines.  It  is  now  time  to 
reflect on a permanent framework for future comparable cases of a common threat 
for all Member States, e.g. pandemics. 

2.3. Exchange of views  

2.3.1. NGOs and airport and airline representatives (14.01.2020) 

A) Schengen governance  

Regarding  the  introduction  of  internal  border  controls,  one  NGO  called  for  more 
evidence,  particularly  on  the  risk  of  open  borders  compared  to  the  costs  and  the 
effectivity  of  internal  border  controls.  Another  NGO  underlined  the  importance  of 
alternatives  to  internal  border  controls,  holding  that  Member  States  sometimes  rely  on 
over-policing and securitization of borders. The Commission clarified in this regard that 
police checks, as alternative measures, may not have a similar effect as border controls. 

The  human  rights  NGOs  raised  concerns  about  fundamental  rights  violations, 
including  push-backs,  at  the  internal  and  external  borders.  Some  of  them  expressly 
called  for  a  holistic  approach  on  Schengen  and  the  Common  European  Asylum 
System  (CEAS).  One  NGO  raised  concerns  regarding  the  use  of  bilateral  readmission 
agreements to circumvent the applicable rules, stating that enhanced police checks could 
aggravate  the  issue.  The  Commission  clarified  that  readmission  agreements  with  other 
Member States are in line with the principle of non-refoulement and recalled the focus of 
the meeting on the internal dimension of Schengen. 

Some  NGOs  pointed  out  that  a  new  system  requires  safeguards  to  prevent  the 
undermining  of  human  rights  and  freedom  of  movement  in  the  name  of  security, 
including  a  solid  accountability  mechanism.  The  Schengen  evaluation  mechanism 
(SchEval) should be strengthened, particularly regarding fundamental rights. Also more 
involvement of the civil society in SchEval missions at internal borders was requested by 
one organisation. One NGO pointed out that police checks, as alternative measures, must 
include the necessary protection safeguards for persons who express the intention to 
seek  asylum.  Another  NGO  noted  that  the  interaction  between  the  SBC  and 
international  legal  frameworks,  e.g.  the  law  of  the  seas,  must  be  taken  into  account. 
Also  concerns  about  different  data  protection  standards  were  raised,  which  the 
Commission clarified referring to the GDPR and the complementarity of data protection 
and new technologies. 

The representatives of airlines and airports opposed the idea of introducing obligations 
on carriers to check identity documents. This would be a delegation of Member States’ 
responsibility on a third party, slow down the processes and incur costs. If any such rules 
should  apply,  all  types  of  carriers  should  be  subject  to  the  same  measures.  One 
industry’s  openness  for  new  technologies,  but 
representative  underlined 

the 

EN 

65 

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emphasized  that  these  should  be  in  line  with  international  standards,  e.g.  IATA. 
Possible new elements of the SBC should be integrated into the EES and ETIAS.  

B) COVID-19 response  

The  representatives  of  airlines  and  airports  favoured  more  coordination  under  the 
Commission  to  travel  restrictions  at  EU  level  (quarantine  and  testing),  a  common 
regime for vaccination and travel and coherence between intra-EU travel and travel into 
the EU. Given the high impact on airlines and airports, more information and dialogue 
with DG HOME, DG SANTE and DG MOVE would be appreciated. The industry fears 
that  the  worst  is  still  ahead  (cf.  new  virus  variants,  slow  vaccination  process)  and 
requested forecasts and scenarios for vaccination rates in order to prepare. Furthermore, 
the  elaboration  of  a  specific  plan  for  pandemics/crisis  of  this  magnitude  (cf.  Council 
request to DG MOVE for a pandemic plan for freight), and a greater focus on intelligent 
solutions  were  proposed.  The  Commission  clarified  that  the  SBC  and  any  possible 
amendment only applies to the possible reintroduction of checks at internal borders, not 
to restrictive measures such as quarantining and testing.  

The  Commission’s  guidance  on  the  implementation  of  asylum  in  the  context  of 
COVID-19 was welcomed by one NGO. Such guidance should also be a key element in 
future scenarios. 

2.3.2. Members of the European Parliament and their representatives (14 January 
2021) 

A. Schengen governance 

Half  of  those  who  took  the  floor  criticised  the  Commission  for  not  enforcing  the 
current rules on internal border controls properly and requested stricter enforcement 
in  the  future.  One  participant  explicitly  asked  about  the  Commission’s  handling  of 
Member  States  that  refuse  to  comply,  referring  to  a  monitoring  mechanism.  The 
Commission explained that the fact that a considerable number of Member States that 
previously  complied  with  the  rules  for  decennia  now  stopped  complying  suggests 
that  there  might  be  a  general  inadequacy  of  the  rules  for  current  challenges. 
Therefore,  initiating  infringement  procedures  might  not  be  the  solution,  and  the 
Commission needs to consider adapting the rules.  

One  participant  criticised  the  time  needed  to  process  Schengen  evaluations.  The 
Commission  pointed  out  that  the  SchEval  mechanism  is  currently  under  revision  and 
informed  about  the  possibility  to  comment  on  the  impact  assessment  until  1  February 
2021.  

Some  participants  called  for  stricter  rules  on  reintroductions,  particularly  stronger 
justification  requirements,  a  quicker  involvement  of  the  Council  and  a  stronger  role  of 
the Commission. Another proposal was the introduction of new safeguards with each 
prolongation  of  internal  border  controls.  Furthermore,  the  lack  of  a  common 
understanding of border controls and the necessity of clearer rules leaving less room 
for interpretation were raised.  

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One participant addressed the need for enhanced police and judicial cooperation, while 
another  called  for  more  rules  on  police  checks  within  the  territory.  Some  participants 
asked  for  clarifications  regarding  the  difference  of  border  controls  and  police 
checks. The Commission pointed out that the idea was to offer Member States a stronger 
legislative  basis  for  the  use  of  police  checks  at  the  borders,  allowing  them  to  intensify 
police  power  instead  of  reintroducing  border  controls.  Police  checks  are  more  flexible 
and easier to apply while border controls are only related to the crossing of the border. 

One  participant  warned  about  the  risk  of  racial  profiling  in  the  context  of  the 
European databases.  

Fundamental rights violations and push-backs at the external and (despite the CEAS 
and the Dublin rules) internal borders were criticised by one participant, who called for a 
coherent system. The Commission underlined that the rules to comply with fundamental 
rights  when  applying the SBC are in  place (Article 4 SBC) and that the new screening 
proposal includes a monitoring mechanism (despite the current opposition of a number of 
MS). 

B) COVID-19 response 

One participant considered that the best interest of the whole Schengen area be given 
more weight than individual interests of Member States and called for a clarification of 
the  rules  and  criteria.  Another  participant  considered  that,  despite  some  leeway,  MS 
should bring evidence, as it is not clear how border controls and travel restrictions have 
affected or prevented the spread of the virus.  

2.3.3.  Schengen  Member  States  and  Schengen  Associated  Countries  (14  January 
2021) 

A) Schengen governance 

A  number  of  Member  States  expressed  their  preference  of  a  holistic  approach  to 
Schengen, including e.g. the external borders, migration and the CEAS. Some Member 
States  also  highlighted  the  dependency  of  the  absence  of  internal  border  controls  from 
effective controls at the external border. In this regard, the Commission clarified that the 
external dimension is subject to the Pact on Migration and Asylum, not to the Schengen 
Strategy. 

There was broad consensus among Member States against a general abolition of the 
possibility to reintroduce internal border controls, holding that police controls are no 
alternative.  Some  Member  States  also  underlined  the  need  of  independency  of  the 
decision to reintroduce internal border controls. Given the general rejection of a possible 
abolition of internal border controls, a considerable number of Member States expressly 
referred to “additional measures” instead of “alterative measures”, the term used by the 
Commission.  The  idea  to  establish  an  intermediate  level  between  internal  border 
controls and their absence, e.g. in the form of intelligence driven checks police checks 
at the borders, was in general supported. 

Some  Member  States  underlined  that  police  checks  and  border  controls  must  be 
differentiated clearly. In this regard, also the Commission’s guidance on police checks 

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was  mentioned.  Some  Member  States  referred  to  the  question  of  feasibility  of  police 
checks  under  their  national  law.  Also  the  need  for  clear  rules  was  addressed.  Few 
Member  States  suggested  focusing  on  cross-border  police  and  criminal  justice 
cooperation.  In  this  regard,  the  need  for  sufficient  flexibility  for  regional  and  bilateral 
police cooperation was underlined. 

A considerable number of Member States asked to consider the intra-Schengen use of 
technology  currently  employed  only  at  the  external  borders.  Some  Member  States 
proposed the use of API and PNR as well as checks against EU databases at internal 
borders.  Further  proposals  included  the  use  of  PNR  for  police  checks  and  intra-EU 
flights  and  a  feasibility  study  on  the  use  of  PNR  for  other  means  of  transport.  In  this 
context, the Member States underlined that the use of new or additional technologies at 
the internal borders would need to be in line with EU legislation, particularly the GDPR. 
Two  Member  States  also  proposed  to  intensify  the  exchange  of  information  at  the 
internal borders similar to the one in place at external borders. 

The Dutch AMIGO Boras System, a camera system that recognizes license plates and 
additional  risk  indicators  to  identify  travellers,  was  given  major  attention,  with  some 
Member States considering a possible expansion of the system within the Schengen area. 

Most of the Member States that addressed carriers’ liability in their interventions were 
generally  open  to  such  possibility,  considering  that  it  could  contribute  to  the 
effectiveness of border controls. Few Member States were more sceptical, arguing that it 
would pose a disproportional burden to carriers.  The necessity of an impact assessment 
was raised by two Member States. 

B) Covid-19 response 

The  Member  States  acknowledged  the  overall  good  cooperation  at  EU  level,  but 
recognized  that  it  started  too  late.  While  Member  States  agreed  that  the  cooperation 
should be further strengthened, they diverged on how it should look like. Both the ICPR 
Council and the Commission were considered as  suitable coordinating bodies.  The 
essentiality  of  common  epidemic  criteria  and  regularly  ECDC  updates  on  the  epidemic 
situation was also raised. 

Another question on which Member States diverged was whether the cooperation should 
be consolidated into secondary legislation. While some Member States favoured a soft 
law approach, considering the need for flexibility and the different situations of Member 
States, others would prefer common legislation.  

2.3.4. Carries’ representatives (22 January 2021) 

A) Schengen governance 

The  carriers’  organisations  welcomed  the  Commission’s  recommendations  and 
guidelines  related  to  internal  border  controls  during  the  COVID-19  pandemic, 
particularly  on  the  green  lane  policy  and  underlined  the  need  for  common  rules  and 
their  harmonised  application.  One  representative  noted  that  besides  the  transport  of 
cargo, carriers also faced problems regarding the repositioning of personnel. 

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One  carriers’  representative  acknowledged  that  the  use  of  technology  could  facilitate 
the  work  of  border  services,  holding  that  new  technology  solutions  must  be 
coordinated  by  clear  rules  and  may  not  lead  to  delays  or  increased  waiting  time.  A 
potential challenge would be the compliance with the GDPR, since not many companies 
are specialised in storing such data. The Commission pointed out that railway operators 
already  participate  in  the  PNR  system  of  information  sharing  in  some  Member  States. 
However,  this  information  could  also  support  police  checks,  which  are  currently 
considered as possible alternative to border controls.  

One  representative  asked  for  a  clarification  on  the  extent  of  such  liability.  The 
Commission explained that the concept of carriers’ liability regarding external borders is 
based on the Schengen Convention and obligates carriers to verify if passengers hold the 
necessary  documentation  (passport  and  visa).  If  carriers  fail  to  carry  out  such 
verifications, they can be subject to sanctions, and, if a passenger is refused entry into the 
Schengen  area,  need  to  ensure  the  return  transport.  A  possible  intra-Schengen 
implementation  of  carriers’  liability  would  include  basic  checks  of  passengers’  travel 
documents. It would not impose any obligations on freight transport operators. 

The  only  representative  of  passenger  transport  present  was  sceptical  about  the 
introduction  of  an  intra-Schengen  carriers’  liability  and  pointed  at  the  necessity  to 
distinguish  between  different  means  of  transport.  Rail  staff  has  neither  the  authority 
nor the equipment to carry out border checks. As negative example of a comparable 
obligation, the representative referred to the carriers’ obligation in one Member State to 
check  the  passengers’  compliance  with  the  requirement  to  have  a  negative  PCR  test 
without  the  rail  staff  having  the  necessary  competence  nor  the  means  to  enforce  such 
obligation.  The  Commission  reminded  about  the  special  position  of  railways  in  the 
context of carriers’ liability. 

B) COVID-19 response 

Carriers  saw  a  need  for  further  harmonisation  of  the  COVID-19  response  and  the 
rules  governing  border  controls,  particularly  on  the  interpretation  of  the  term  of 
“essential personnel”. The term should be interpreted broadly, in line with operational 
needs,  e.g.  covering  besides  pilots  also  on-board  engineers,  and  in  coordination  with 
border  and  migration  authorities  and  civil  aviation  organisations.  One  carriers’ 
representative underlined that such harmonisation should also cover the neighbouring 
countries.  Another  concern  was  the  timely  information,  particularly  on  upcoming 
measures by the MS, also in the view of liability and passenger rights.  

Various  carriers’  representatives  indicated  that  it  is  difficult  to  estimate  the  costs 
caused by the internal border controls at this point. The Commission underlined that 
also data from 2015 onwards, when internal border controls were introduced in response 
to  terror  threats  and  irregular  migration  would  be  useful  for  the  Commission’s  impact 
assessment. 

3.   PUBLIC CONSULTATION 

In addition, a public consultation was carried out. It was launched on 19 January 2021, 
with the deadline for contributions set at 16 March 2021.  

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The  Commission  published  the  Inception  Impact  Assessment  on  its  website128  for  four 
weeks, but only received limited feedback, with four comments only: one from France, 
one from Croatia, one from Ukraine and one anonymous. 

128 
Schengen-Borders-Code. 

https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12827-Amendment-of-the-

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Table 1 – Stakeholders’ consultation 

Method of 
consultation 

Stakeholder group 

Consultation 
period 

Objective of the 
consultation 

Schengen Strategy 

1st Schengen 
Forum 

European 
Parliament, 
Member States, European 
Commission 

30 Nov 2020 

To  obtain  support 
on 
strategy 
the 
main elements 

Roadmap 

Public 

Public 
Consultation 

Public 

14 Jan – 5 Feb 

19 Jan – 16 Mar 

collect 
feedback 
from  citizens,  civil 
society  and  other 
stakeholders 

Revision of the Schengen Borders Code 

Public 

8 Jan – 5 Feb 2021 

-  Member States 

14 Jan 2021 

- European Parliament 

14 Jan 2021 

-  Civil Society 

14 Jan 2021 

Collect  views  from 
different  categories 
of stakeholders 

-  Carriers 

14 Jan 2021, 22 Jan 
2021 

-  Member States 

25 February 2021 

Collect  view  and 
exchange 
best 
practices 

Inception 
Impact 
Assessment129 

Workshops  at 
technical level  

(measures 
allowing  for  a 
more  effective 
cooperation 
within 
Schengen 
area) 

the 

Workshop  on 
Integrated 
Border 
Management 

Public 

Wide public 

19 

January- 

16  Collect views 

https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12827-Temporary-checks-at-

129 
internal-borders-amending-the-Schengen-Borders-Code 

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Method of 
consultation 

consultations 

Stakeholder group 

Consultation 
period 

Objective of the 
consultation 

March 2021 

Analysis  of  the  public  consultation  “Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the 
European  Parliament  and  to  the  Council:  Towards  a  stronger  and  more  resilient 
Schengen Area”: 

The  public  consultation  “Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European 
Parliament and to the Council: Towards a stronger and more resilient Schengen Area” 
had the objective to  collect  feedback from citizens, civil  society  and other stakeholders 
with  view  on  the  adoption  of  a  Strategy  on  the  future  of  Schengen.  During  the 
publication period from 19 January 2021 to 16 March 2021, 157 replies were registered. 
99  participants  were  EU  citizens  (63.06%),  40  non-EU  citizens  (25.48%),  6  business 
from  Germany,  Belgium,  Luxembourg  and  Russia),  4 
associations 
company/business organisations (2.55%; from Germany, Slovakia, Sweden, Ukraine), 4 
public  authorities  (2.55%;  two  national  authorities/agencies  from  the  Netherlands,  two 
local authorities from Germany and Poland), 2 trade unions (1.27%; from Germany and 
Spain), 1 academic/research institution (0.64%; from Hungary) and 1 NGO (0.64%; from 
Belgium). 

(3.82%; 

The  public  consultation  was  based  on  a  questionnaire  with  10  multiple  choice 
questions on the frequency (Q1) of and reasons (Q2) for travel within the Schengen area 
(before the Covid-19 pandemic), the participants’ view on the Schengen Area being one 
of  the  EU’s  biggest  achievements,  being  beneficial  for  social  and/or  economic  reasons 
and  having  more  advantages  than  disadvantages  (Q3),  the  need  for  reinforcement  of 
certain elements of the Schengen framework (Q4), the contribution of these elements to 
the  security  of  the  external  Schengen  borders  (Q5),  the  EU  coordination  during  the 
Covid-19  pandemic  (Q6),  the  impact  of  reintroduced  internal  border  controls  on  the 
citizens’ lives (Q7), the substitution of border control through non-systematic alternative 
measures,  such  as  police  checks  (Q8),  the  intensified  use  of  modern  technologies  with 
view  on  their  impact  on  private  life  (Q9)  and  the  importance  of  monitoring  of  the 
common  Schengen  rules  (Q10).  The  questionnaire  did  not  include  free  text  fields  for 
additional comments. However, with direct reference to the public consultation, Airport 
Council  International  (ACI) Europe and  Fragomen Europe  Immigration  Taskforce send 
their written considerations by email. 

Results:  With  88.55%  (139  replies),  the  large  majority  of  all  replies  received,  was 
given by participants in their capacity as private persons, of which 71.22% were EU-
citizens  and  28.78%  non-EU  citizens.  Most  answers  were  received  from  German  (33, 
23.74%) and Ukrainian  (32, 23.02%)  citizens,  followed by Slovakians  (11, 7.91%) and 
Italians  (10,  6.47%).  The  reason  for  the  large  share  of  Ukrainian  participants  is  not 
apparent. 

Overall,  the  most  important  reason  for  travelling  of  private  persons  is  tourism 
(85,61%),  followed  by  family/relationship  reasons  (43.88%)  and  business  (other  than 
commuting) (35,25%). 14.39% of the responding EU and non-EU citizens are regularly 

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commuting  between  Schengen  States  for  study  or  professional  reasons.  In  general,  the 
reasons  for  travel  in  the  Schengen  Area  are  comparable  for  EU-citizens  and  non-EU 
citizens  with  the  only  exception  of  commuting  between  Schengen  States  for  study  or 
professional  reasons.  The  share  of  commuting  non-EU  citizens  (22.50%)  is  more  than 
twice as high as the one of commuting EU-citizens (11.11%).  

The  great  majority  of  EU  and  non-EU  citizens  sees  the  Schengen  Area  positive: 
82.01% of the EU and non-EU citizen agree that the Schengen Area is one of the biggest 
achievements of the EU (12.23% tend to agree), 85.61% consider the Schengen Area as 
good  for  economic/social  reasons  (7.92%  tend  to  agree)  and  79.14%  consider  that  the 
advantages  of  Schengen  outweigh  the  disadvantages  (12.23%  tend  to  agree).  All 
statements  were  seen  slightly  more  positive  by  non-EU  citizens,  who  did  not  at  all 
“disagree” or “tend to disagree” with the proposed positive statements. 

With regard to the development of the Schengen framework, particularly the elements 
the  participants  would  like  to  see  reinforced,  82.83%  of  the  EU  citizens  indicated  the 
coordination  in  crisis  situations,  including  common  threats  such  as  pandemics,  62.63% 
the  removal  of  obstacles  to  cross  the  internal  borders,  particularly  long-lasting 
reintroductions of internal border controls and 51.52% the control and compliance with 
the Schengen rules. The replies of the non-EU participants revealed the same pattern, but 
overall, less non-EU participants attributed importance to the reinforcement of the three 
proposed  elements.  62.59%  of  the  EU  and  non-EU  citizens  consider  that  the 
implementation  of  these  elements  will  increase  the  security  at  the  external  borders, 
finally  strengthening  the  Schengen  Area  (16.55%  disagree).  Being  asked  if  a 
coordination at EU-level of measures applicable at the external borders of the EU in 
response  to  common  threats  such  as  a  pandemic  is  beneficial,  90.91%  of  the  EU 
citizens  agreed and only 5.05% disagreed. With 72.50% the share of agreement among 
non-EU citizens is considerably lower (12.50% disagreement). 

41.01%  of  the  participating  EU  and  non-EU  citizens  affirmed  that  they  have  not  been 
affected by internal border controls, while 25.18% indicated that they had to wait and 
their  trip  was  delayed.  38.85%  hesitated  to  travel  or  decided  not  to  travel  due  to  the 
internal  border  controls.  The  share  of  Non-EU  citizens  being  unsure  about  required 
documents was with 42.50% almost twice as high as the share of EU-citizens (21.21%), 
which might also have translated into the higher share of Non-EU citizens being hesitant 
to travel or deciding not to travel (47.50% compared to 35.35%).  

72.66%  of  the  EU  and  non-EU  citizens  agreed  that  border  controls  at  internal  borders 
should  be  substituted,  whenever  possible,  by  non-systematic  alternative  measures, 
such  as  police  checks  and  modern  technologies  (14.39%  disagree).  The  share  of  EU 
citizens  agreeing  with  the  substitution  of  border  controls  by  alternative  measures 
(74.75%) was slightly higher than the share of non-EU citizens (67.50%). While a clear 
majority  (73.38%)  of  the  private  persons  did  not  see  problems  with  automated  control 
measures in the internal border areas, provided that they are reasonably regulated by law 
and  fully  respect  data  protection  rules,  more  than  one  fourths  of  EU  citizens  (25.25%) 
opposed such measures, considering them as “an unacceptable intrusion” in their private 
life. Still considerable 12.50% of non-EU citizens shared this view.  

Only  a slight  majority (52.52%) of EU  and non-EU citizens  fully agreed that a  regular 
and comprehensive monitoring of the respect of common rules and standards across the 

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Schengen  area,  with  the  involvement  of  EU  institutions  and  all  countries  concerned,  is 
important  to  ensure  and  foster  trust  in  the  implementation  of  those  rules.  Still,  35.97% 
tend to agree to this statement.  

6,37%  of  the  replies  (10  replies)  were  received  by  business  associations  and 
company/business  organisations.  Despite  the  considerable  small  number  of  replies, 
these reflect a quite uniform point of view. Business associations and company/business 
organisations see the Schengen Area very positive. All participants fully agreed that the 
Schengen Area is one of the EU’s greatest achievements and that the Schengen Area is 
good for economic/social reasons. Still 90% fully agree that the Schengen Area has more 
advantages  than  disadvantages  (the  remaining  10%  tend  to  agree).  While  all  business 
associations  and  company/business  organisations  travel  for  professional  reasons  within 
the  Schengen  Area,  the  share  of  commuters  for  business  or  study  reasons  is  with  40% 
more than twice as high as for persons responding in private capacity. 

All business associations and company/business organisations see a need for reinforced 
action  in  removing  difficulties  in  crossing  the  internal  borders  between  the 
Schengen States, in particular by lifting long lasting reintroductions of border controls at 
internal  borders,  80%  for  better  coordination  in  crisis  situations,  including  pandemics, 
and  70%  for  a  reinforced  monitoring  of  the  Schengen  rules.  Overall,  the  demand  for 
action lies clearly above the one from private persons. Furthermore, contrarily to private 
persons, the responding businesses attributed greater importance to the removal of long-
term difficulties in crossing internal borders as to the crisis coordination at EU level.  

The impact of the reintroduced border controls  hit businesses harder than citizens in 
their  private  capacity  with  almost  all  business  associations  and  company/business 
organisations  having  suffered  either  from  delays  when  transporting  goods  across 
the borders  (60%) or from other reasons (60%). 50% of the participants  had to  wait 
and were impacted by delayed trips. Moreover, the share of participants being hesitant to 
travel  or  deciding  not  to  travel,  was  with  80%  more  than  twice  as  high  for  business 
associations  and  company/business  organisations  as  for  private  persons.  Furthermore, 
70% of the participating business associations and company/business organisations were 
unsure  regarding  the  documents  needed  to  cross  the  border.  The  huge  impact  of  the 
border  controls  on  businesses 
the  business  associations’  and 
is  reflected  by 
company/business organisations’ view on alternative measures: 80% would favour non-
systematic alternatives to border checks and no business association or company/business 
organisation  would  oppose  automated  control  measures  in  the  internal  border  areas, 
provided they are reasonably regulated by law fully respecting data protection rules.. 

Furthermore,  90%  of  the  business  associations  and  company/business  organisations 
considered the coordination at EU-level of measures applicable at the external borders 
of the EU in response to common threats such as a pandemic as beneficial.  

While  only  40%  of  the  business  associations  and  company/business  organisations  fully 
agree on the importance of the monitoring of the respect of common rules and standards 
across the Schengen area for the trust in the implementation of these rules and standards, 
the remaining majority still tends to agree. 

The  data  received  by  the  public  authorities,  trade  unions,  the  academic/research 
institution and the NGO mirrored this positive image of Schengen. Due to the very low 

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number of participants (1 to 4, which equals between 0.66% and 2.55% of all replies) and 
the subsequent lack of comparable data, the data received is not analysed in detail.  

Overall, the public consultation shows: 

-  The Schengen Area is in general perceived very positively, as well by EU and 
non-EU citizens as by businesses and other stakeholders. Businesses tend to see 
the advantages as well as the remaining challenges of Schengen more clearly than 
private persons. 

-  Businesses  are  more  impacted  by  internal  border  controls  than  private 
persons  with  almost  all  responding  business  having  suffered  from  the 
consequences  of  internal  border  controls.  To  some  extent,  this  might  also  be 
linked to a greater share of businesses relying on cross-border commuting (40%).  
-  While  business  are  very  open  to  the  use  of  alternative  measures  to  border 
control,  such  as  the  use  of  new  technologies,  a  considerable  share  of  private 
persons  (21.58%  of  all participants  in  private capacity  and  even  25.25%  of 
EU  citizens)  is  concerned  about  the  impact  such  measures  would  have  on 
their privacy. 

-  Particularly  businesses  see  a  clear  need  for  development  of  the  Schengen 
framework.  All  consulted  businesses  hold  that  more  action  is  required 
regarding  the  lifting  of  long-lasting  border  controls  (vs.  62.63%  of  private 
persons). While private persons attributed more importance to the coordination of 
crisis  response,  e.g.  in  pandemics,  the  majority  (62.63%)  still  considered  that 
there is a need of reinforced action to remove barriers to border crossings at the 
internal borders. 

Outside  the  direct  scope  of  the  public  consultation,  but  in  response  to  it,  two 
contributions were received by email. 

Airport Council International (ACI) Europe considers that a revision of the Schengen 
Borders  should  give  the  Commission  the  necessary  tools  and  powers  to  ensure  that 
restrictions of the free movement of persons are only introduced as last resort measure, 
are  limited  in  time  and  proportionate.  More  specifically,  ACI  Europe  points  at  the 
additional  costs  of  conducting  separated  border  controls  for  passengers  on  Schengen-
internal  flights,  as  it is  currently  required, highlighting that airports  are not  designed to 
accommodate such a second category of border checks on a permanent basis. Therefore, 
ACI Europe suggests that a legislative amendment of the Schengen Borders Code should, 
in  the  case  of  reintroduced  internal  border  control,  allow  passengers  on  Schengen-
internal  flights  to  follow  a  common  flow  and  common  border  control  together  with 
passengers on international flights. 

The  Fragomen  Europe  Immigration  Taskforce  points  at  difficulties,  business 
travellers face when entering the Schengen Area and suggests the introduction of unified 
visa  application  procedures,  additional  guidance  by  the  EU  regarding  the  exemption  of 
business travellers from Covis-19 related travel restrictions, particularly the introduction 
of  a  uniform  confirmation  document  for  business  travel,  which  should  reduce  the 

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discretionary power by the Member States’ consulates and border guards to establish if a 
business trip is considered as essential travel, and the introduction of a simplified short-
term  visa  application  process  for  frequent  business  travellers  into  the  Schengen  Area. 
These suggestions concern the visa policy as well as the modalities regarding restrictions 
of the freedom  of movement under Union law,  which are not  subject  to  the considered 
options for the development of the Schengen Borders Code. 

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ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW? 

1.  

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE INITIATIVE 

The  initiative  concerns  managing  exceptional  and  crisis  situations.  Therefore,  the 
proposal has a capacity to affect the following stakeholders:  

– 
– 
– 

Member States (Public Authorities, Border Guards, Police); 
EU institutions (European Parliament, Council and Commission); 
EU citizens and other persons residing in the Schengen area, in particular in the 
cross-borders regions; 
Carriers 

– 
The immediate effect  of the proposal  could  be visible in  the cross-border areas, should 
the national authorities decide to lift current checks at internal borders. 

2.   SUMMARY OF COSTS AND BENEFITS 

I. Overview of Benefits (total for all provisions) – Preferred Option 

Description 

Amount 

Comments 

to 
Reducing  hurdles 
persons 
goods 
and 
moving in the Schengen 
area 

Direct benefits 

in 

Citizens and other authorised persons can 
move  freely 
the  Schengen  area 
without  unnecessary  hurdles  without 
being  subject  to  the  long-lasting  border 
checks  in  response  to  abstract  threat  or 
border  checks  reintroduced  as  a  first  aid 
measure 

Exact data not available –benefits largely 
correspond  to  savings  in  terms  of  time 
spent when crossing the internal borders 

Indirect benefits 

Reviving  cross-border 
labour market 

Exact data not available 

Reviving Single Market  Exact data not available 

This  will  allow  for  truly  achieving 
one  of  the  objectives  set  out  in  the 
Treaty on European Union: 

the 

Article 3(2) The Union shall offer its 
citizens an area of freedom, security 
and justice without internal frontiers, 
in  which 
free  movement  of 
persons  is  ensured  in  conjunction 
with  appropriate  measures  with 
respect  to  external  border  controls, 
the 
immigration 
asylum, 
prevention and combating of crime 

and 

Benefits  will  result  from  saving  of 
time  for  the  cross-border  workers, 
reduction of risk of absenteeism and 
avoiding that workers get reluctant to 
seek 
employment 
(business perspective)  

cross-border 

Undisturbed  supply  chains,  taking 
cross-border 
full 

potential 

of 

EN 

77 

  EN 

 
the 

Limiting 
costs 
related  to  the  lack  of 
the 
predictability 
crisis situation 

in 

Exact data not available 

exchange and consumption 

Business  and  self-employed  may 
expect  minimum 
standards  and 
common  rules  to  apply  also  in  the 
crisis situation.  

Carriers  may  expect  uniform  rules 
applicable  with  regard  to  carriers 
liability  at  the  external  borders  in 
relation  to  the  application  of  travel 
restriction  for  non-essential  travel  to 
the EU by the third country nationals 

II. Overview of costs – Preferred option 

Citizens/Consumers  

Businesses 

Administrations 

One-off  Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent  One-
off 

Recurrent 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

78 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

Limitation  of 
prospects  for 
tourist 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

Costs 
of 
preparation  of 
risk  assessment 
and 
regular 
reporting 

- 

- 

  EN 

Direct 
costs 

Indirect 
costs 

for 

the 
on 

Contingency 
planning 
Schengen 
(including 
rules 
mitigating 
measures) 

Reintroductions 
of border checks 
are 
last 
truly 
resort  measure; 
other 
compensatory 
measures 
privileged  

are 

Direct 
costs 

Indirect 
costs 

Uniform 
application 
travel 
restrictions 
the 

Direct 
costs 

of 

at 
external 

Indirect 
costs 

EN 

 
 
 
 
borders  

destinations 
on 
relying 
third  country 
nationals 

EN 

79 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 4: RELEVANT INPUTS AND STUDIES 

CM2011Meijers Committee Recommendations for a new Strategy on the Future 
of Schengen November 2020 

Ref. Ares(2020)720051 6 - 30/11/2020 

The  European  Commission  emphasizes  in  its  new  Pact  on  Migration  and  Asylum  that 
effective  management  of  EU  external  borders  is  a  key  element  of  a  Schengen  area 
without internal borders. To ensure a 'well-functioning Schengen area', the Commission 
announces, in section 4.4, the presentation of a new Strategy on the future of Schengen, 
including 'initiatives for a stronger and more complete Schengen'. In this contribution, the 
Meijers Committee focuses on four subjects which need further development in this new 
strategy: 

1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 

The temporary reintroduction of internal border controls. 
The Schengen evaluation mechanism. 
Controls in the territory. 
The enlargement of the Schengen area. 

Ref. 1. Temporary reintroduction of internal border controls 
In  response  to  refugee  and  migration  flows  in  2015  and  2016,  but  also  in  reaction  to 
terrorist attacks in several European cities, Members States have repeatedly reintroduced 
internal border controls, with reference to the provisions of the Schengen Borders Code 
(SBC). Since 2015, these controls have been extended several times. This has resulted in 
a quasi-permanent reintroduction of controls at parts of the internal borders. In 2020, the 
COVID-19 pandemic triggered both the reintroduction of new internal border controls, as 
well as the prolongation of existing internal border controls. 

This practice undermines the essence of the Schengen space as an area without internal 
border controls, provided for in Article 3(2) TEU, Article 67(2) TFEU and the provisions 
of  Protocol  (No  19)  on  the  Schengen  acquis.  It  is  also  in  clear  contravention  of  the 
provisions  of  the  SBC  that  regulate  in  secondary  law  the  exceptions  to  the  absence  of 
border  controls.  These  provisions  emphasize  that  the  reintroduction  of  internal  border 
controls  is  only  allowed  as  a  measure  of  last  resort  and  of  a  temporary  nature  and  if 
necessary to counter threats to public policy or internal security, respecting the principle 
of proportionality. 

This note is part of a series of the Meijers Committee commenting on the Commission's 
New Pact on Migration and Asylum, COM(2020) 609 final. Please find all our comments 
on www.commissie-meiiers.nl.  

Notwithstanding legitimate concerns of the Member States for public policy or internal 
security, and more recently public health, the extent and duration of the reintroduction of 
internal border controls is neither proportionate nor necessary. In addition, the Court of 
Justice  of  the  European  Union  (CJEU)  has  clearly  held  that  a  Member  State  cannot 
simply invoke Article 72 TFEU, without proving that recourse to that article is necessary 
for  the  exercise  of  its  responsibilities  for  the  maintenance  of  law  and  order  or  internal 
security.  With  respect  to  Article  4(2)  TEU,  the  CJEU  has  held  that  the  reference  to 
national  security  goes  beyond  objectives  of  combating  crime  in  general,  even  serious 

EN 

80 

  EN 

 
 
crime,  and  of  safeguarding  public  security.  Threats  to  national  security  can  be 
distinguished,  by  their  nature  and  particular  seriousness,  from  the  general  risk  that 
tensions or disturbances, even of a serious nature, affecting public security will arise.  

The  Meijers  Committee  regrets  that  there  are  no  (publicly)  available  reports  informing 
the Council and Parliament, and no Commission opinions on the reinstatement of internal 
border controls, as required under Article 33 SBC. The Commission should provide the 
necessary  information  which  allows  other  Member  States,  the  EU  institutions  and  the 
general  public  to  monitor  compliance  of  the  reinstatement  of  controls  at  the  internal 
borders with Union law. 

Furthermore,  the  Meijers  Committee  regrets  the  lack  of  enforcement  action  by  the 
Commission. This has resulted in legal uncertainty for Union citizens and third-country 
nationals  alike,  as  well  for  national  administrative  and  judicial  authorities.  This  is 
evidenced  by  the  preliminary  reference  of  the  Austrian  Landesverwaltungsgericht 
Steiermark on the reintroduction of controls at the Austrian internal borders. The Meijers 
Committee  stresses  that  the  enforcement  of  EU  law  in  a  core  area  of  European 
integration is too important to be left to private persons in individual cases. 

Finally,  in  relation  to  the  recent  reinstatement  of  border  controls  by  different  Member 
States  in  response  to  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  the  Meijers  Committee  notes  that  the 
SBC lacks an explicit legal basis for the reintroduction of border controls on the ground 
of public health. 

In light of the above, the Meijers Committee urges that a new Strategy on the future of 
Schengen clarifies the rules for the reinstatement of controls at the internal borders and 
amends the SBC to this effect. 

Recommendations 

Exhaustively  regulate  the  rules  and  procedures  for  the  temporary  reintroduction 

• 
of internal border controls. 

List  and  define  in  more  detail  the  possible  grounds  for  the  reintroduction  of 

• 
internal border controls. 

• 
Add 'public health' as a ground for the reintroduction of internal border controls, 
applying the definition as provided in Article 2(21) SBC and referring to the WHO list of 
infectious or contagious parasitic diseases. 

Provide  for  a  special  procedure  in  case  of  prolonged  threats  to  public  order, 

• 
national security or public health, and to include in this procedure: 

- sufficient  safeguards to  ensure that the reintroduction of internal  border controls  does 
not go beyond what is absolutely necessary; 

- the obligation for Member States to submit, after an initial period of reintroduction of 
border controls, a motivated request to the Commission for further prolongation;  

EN 

81 

  EN 

 
 
- the obligation for a Member State to, after a fixed number of prolongations of internal 
border  controls,  submit  a  motivated  request  to  the  Council  for  further  prolongation, 
subject to (reverse) qualified majority voting. 

• 
Clearly  state  whether  and  if  so  under  what  conditions  different  grounds  for  the 
reintroduction of internal border controls may be applied cumulatively and consecutively. 

Clearly define the monitoring and information obligation of the Commission and 

• 
Member States concerned, including a clear time frame. 

Make  clear  that  controls  within  the  territory  of  a  Member  State  are  to  be  given 

• 
priority over the reinstatement of internal border checks. 

Ref.2 Schengen Evaluation Mechanism 

The Meijers Committee welcomes the further development  of the Schengen Evaluation 
Mechanism (SEM) to ensure the correct and full implementation of Schengen rules and 
to  strengthen  mutual  trust  between  Member  States.  Effective  implementation  and 
enforcement  of  the  Schengen  rules  is  key  to  the  confidence  and  success  of  the  area 
without internal border controls. 

The Meijers Committee encourages the Commission to make the results of the review of 
Council Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013 based on Article 22 of that Regulation publicly 
available.  Already  at  this  stage,  based  on  the  experience  in  practice  with  the  current 
mechanism, it wishes to put forward a number of suggestions for improvement. 

Recommendations 

Include a general evaluation per Member State of compliance with the Schengen 

• 
acquis rather than on selected topics only. 

Improve  the  overall  transparency  of  the  SEM,  with  due  respect  for  sensitive 

• 
information. 

Incorporate  fundamental  rights  compliance  and  involve  the  Fundamental  Rights 

• 
Agency. 

• 

Enable the Commission to determine the composition of the evaluation teams. 

Include  EU  experts  from  relevant  bodies  and  agencies  in  evaluation  teams,  in 
• 
addition  to  Commission  and  Member  State  experts,  such  as  Frontex,  as  well  as  an 
independent expert appointed by the European Parliament. 

Allow  evaluation  teams  to  be  allowed  to  pay  unannounced  on-site  visits  to 

• 
Member States, instead of having to give a 24-hour notice as is currently required. 

Improve  the  follow-up  to  the  findings  of  the  SEM  by  providing  for  shorter  and 

• 
clearer deadlines on the evaluators and the Member States being evaluated. 

Empower the Commission rather than the Council to adopt recommendations on 

• 
the basis of evaluations. 

EN 

82 

  EN 

 
 
• 
Facilitate  access  of  individual  Members  of  the  European  Parliament  to  the 
evaluation  reports.  Ensure  that  the  Commission  informs  both  the  Council  and  the 
European  Parliament  of 
the 
recommendations based thereon. 

the  findings  of 

teams,  as  well 

the  evaluation 

Ensure that the Commission makes the findings of the evaluation teams, as well 
• 
as the recommendations based thereon, publicly available, with due respect for sensitive 
information. 

Ref. 3 Checks within the territory 

Both  in  the  New  Pact  on  Migration  and  Asylum  and  in  the  Communication  on  the 
approach  for  restoring  the  freedom  of  movement  and  lifting  internal  border  controls  in 
relation  to  COVID-19,  the  Commission  points  at  the  use  of  'controls  based  on  risk 
assessment or local police measures' as a viable alternative to internal border controls.130 
It also refers to the use of 'new technology and smart use of IT interoperability' to make 
controls 'less intrusive'.131 These proposals are in line with earlier recommendations and 
guidelines.132 

The Meijers Committee emphasizes that the use of police checks and new technologies 
should  not  result  in  restrictions  to  travel  for  EU  citizens  and  third-country  nationals 
within the Schengen territory, since this would undermine the very goal of the Schengen 
cooperation:  seamless 
internal  border  controls. 
Interoperability, or the interlinked usage of EU large-scale databases (SIS, Eurodac, VIS, 
EES,  ETIAS  and  ECRIS-TCN)  and  the  access  to  law  enforcement  authorities  to 
administrative data on third-country nationals, coupled to new technologies of biometrics 
and surveillance, may result in a 'multiplication of borders', meaning that persons may be 
controlled at any time at any place: at the external borders, but also within the territory. 

travel  within  an  area  without 

Furthermore, the application of police controls within the Schengen area should be in full 
compliance with national and European data protection standards and non-discrimination 
legislation.  The  discretionary  powers  of  police  and  immigration  authorities  inside  the 
territory  and  within  internal  border  areas,  combined  with  the  possibility  to  check 
aforementioned  data  systems,  creates  a  risk  that  third-country  nationals  or  those 
considered  to  be,  putatively  or  by  Union  law,133  will  be  more  often  stopped  for 
identification  and  comparison  of  their  (biometric)  data.  Consequently,  they  may  be 
confronted  with  disproportionate  or  arbitrary  barriers  of  entry,  expulsion,  or  law 
enforcement  measures.  Research  carried  out  in  the  Dutch  border  area  identified  a  clear 

130 COM(2020) 609 final, p. 15 and C(2020) 3250 final, p. 10. 
131 COM(2020) 609 final, ibid 
132 Recommendation (EU) 2017/820 of 12 May 2017 and Annex to COM(2012) 230 final. 
133  This  risk  will  increase  if  the  EU  maintains  or  introduces  rules  similar  to  Article  2  of  Regulation 
2019/816,  stating  that  certain  Union  citizens  should  be  treated  as  third-country  nationals,  see  our  earlier 
comments CM1710, CM1711 and CM1812, available at www.commissie-meiiers.nl. See also Bast, J. et al, 
Human Rights Challenges to European Migration Policy (REMAP study), October 2020, p. 108, 
http://www.migrationundmenschenrechte.de/kontext/controllers/document.php/19.c/9/52276f.pdf. 

EN 

83 

  EN 

 
                                                 
risk of discrimination and racial profiling by police and border guards when controlling 
individuals during mobile spot checks.134 

In earlier comments, the Meijers Committee has expressed its concerns with regard to the 
use and possible discriminatory effects of large-scale databases such as SIS, VIS, ETIAS 
and ECRIS-TCN, and the framework of interoperability, not only at the external borders 
but also within the Schengen territory.135 In this regard, the Meijers Committee refers to 
the  report  on  the  use  of  digital  border  technologies  by  the  UN  Special  Rapporteur  on 
contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance 
published in November 2020. In this report, the Rapporteur expresses her concerns about 
the  discriminatory  and  exclusionary  effects  of  these  digital  technologies  without 
necessary  human  rights  safeguards.  The  report  also  describes  how  these  measures  are 
deployed to advance existing racially discriminatory and xenophobic ideologies, in part 
due to wide-spread perception that migrants and refugees are to be considered as per se 
threats to security.136 

The CJEU has in a series of cases circumscribed the discretionary power of the Member 
States  to  exercise  border  controls  in  its  territory.137  Nevertheless,  questions  remain  as 
regards  the  role  of  private  companies  in  carrying  out  checks  on  behalf  of  the  Member 
States.  In  the  Touring  Tours  case  these  checks  were  equated  with  controls  within  the 
Member  States.  However,  this  does  not  do  justice  to  the  specificity  of  these  controls, 
being  carried  out  by  private  operators  in  another  Member  State  than  the  one  that 
prescribes these controls. 

The  Meijers  Committee  recommends  a  better  regulation  and  delimitation  of  police 
powers  of  the  Member  States  in  border  areas.  Importantly,  these  controls  should  be 
carried out in full compliance with EU law, including respect for fundamental rights and 
freedoms. To this effect the Commission should submit proposals, either of a legislative 
nature or in the form of guidelines. 

Recommendations 

Further define the notion of 'checks within the territory', to  delineate them from 

• 
border controls. 

Further regulate the conditions under which 'checks within the territory' can take 

• 
place in border areas. 

134 Van der Woude, M. and Van der Leun, J., 'Crimmigration checks in the internal border areas of the EU: 
finding the discretion that matters', European Journal of Criminology 2017 14 (1), p. 27-45. 
135  See  our  earlier  comments  CM1802  (interoperability)  and  CM1902  (ECRIS-TCN),  available  at 
www.commissie- meiiers.nl. 
136 UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related 
intolerance, Report A/75/590, November 2020, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/newyork/Documents/A-75-590- 
AUV.docx 
137 Melki & Abeli, joined cases C-188/10 and C-189/10; Adil, case C-278/12 PPU and A. (Europabrücke), 
case C- 9/16. 

EN 

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• 
Specify that, to the extent to which police controls take place in border areas and 
are aimed at the prevention of irregular migration or illegal border crossing, the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights applies. 

• 
Codify  the  guidance  provided  by  the  case  law  of  the  CJEU  and  specify  more 
clearly  what  is  required  in  terms  of  intensity,  frequency  and  selectivity  to  distinguish 
police controls from border controls. 

Regulate  the  position  of  private  companies  when  obliged  to  carry  out  controls 

• 
within the territory on behalf of the Member States. 

• 
Prevent racial profiling, invasive checks, and the abuse of discretion by requiring 
national  authorities  to  develop  guidelines,  training  programs,  accessible  complaint 
mechanisms  and  a  system  of  consistent  monitoring  and  evaluation  of  controls  taking 
place within border areas. 

Ensure  access  to  effective  judicial  protection  for  individuals  with  regard  to 
• 
actions  and  decision-making  based  on  foreign  SIS  alerts  or  risk  assessment,  but  also 
information as stored in other EU databases, as Eurodac, VIS, ETIAS, and ECRIS-TCN, 
not  only  at  the  external  borders  but  also  within  the  territory,  including  internal  border 
areas. 

Ensure  that  any  use  of  technological  means  complies  fully  with  applicable 

• 
national and EU data protection and non-discrimination legislation. 

4. Enlargement of the Schengen Area 

A new Strategy on the future of Schengen will need to address the position of Schengen 
candidate countries, i.e. those Member States that have acceded to the European Union, 
but in relation to whom there has not  yet been a Council Decision taken to lift internal 
border checks. 

Already, the Schengen evaluation mechanism plays an important role in the assessment 
of  the  readiness  of  the  Schengen  candidate  countries.  This  role  could  be  reinforced. 
Currently there are four Member States that have been declared technically ready by the 
Commission  to  join  the  Schengen  area.  A  number  of  Member  States  has  however 
blocked  the  adoption  of  a  unanimous  Council  Decision  that  would  allow  for  full 
accession to the Schengen area, based on political concerns in relation to the respect for 
the rule of law and corruption in the Member States concerned. 

The  Meijers  Committee  would  like  to  point  out  that  despite  resolutions  from  the 
European Parliament calling for an end to this situation, the exclusion of these countries 
from  the  Schengen  area  continues  to  this  very  day.138  The  extended  stay  of  these 
countries in the 'Schengen waiting room' has a number of undesirable consequences. 

138  European  Parliament  Resolution  of  11  December  2018  (P8_TA(2018)0497)  and  of  13  October  2011 
(P7_TA(2011)0443). 

EN 

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The  current  situation  leads  to  a  de  facto  dual  external  border,  a  duplication  of  border 
controls,  and  the  primacy  of  security  measures  over  facilitating  borderless  travel  in 
Europe.  Schengen  candidate  countries  have  increasingly  been  allowed  to  participate  in 
Schengen developing measures, notably the interoperability initiative, without benefitting 
from the lifting of internal border checks. This means that a number of Member States, 
their citizens  and the third-country national  legally present  in  their territory, are denied 
the  benefits  of  the  objective  laid  down  in  primary  law,  namely  the  establishment  of  an 
area without internal borders. 

Schengen  candidate  countries  guard  their  external  borders  in  line  with  EU  standards, 
including  the  relevant  parts  of  the  SBC,  and  are  assisted  in  doing  so  by  the  European 
Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). The CJEU has made it clear that participation 
in  measures  related  to  the  external  borders  presupposes  participation  in  the  underlying 
Schengen rules, more specifically the lifting of checks at the internal borders.  

Finally,  this  situation  creates  considerable  uncertainty  as  to  the  legal  regime  that  is 
applicable at the external borders of the Member States that fully participate in Schengen 
and border a Schengen candidate country, given that internal and  external borders have 
been defined as mutually exclusive. 

Recommendations 

For this reason, the Meijers Committee recommends that a new Strategy on the future of 
Schengen includes: 

• 
Clear  rules  governing  the  accession  to  the  Schengen  area  once  a  candidate 
Member State has acceded, comparable to  the Copenhagen  criteria for accession to  the 
European Union itself. 

A  path  towards  accession  for  the  current  Schengen  candidate  countries,  based 

• 
upon binding rules and strict conditionality. 

• 
A  clearly  defined  role  for  a  revised  Schengen  evaluation  mechanism  and  the 
vulnerability  mechanism  under  the  European  Border  and  Coast  Guard  Regulation 
(Article 13) in order to access independently and objectively fulfillment of the criteria for 
accession to Schengen. 

• 
Clarification  in  the  SBC  as  to  the  applicable  legal  regime  at  the  at  the  external 
borders of a Member State fully participating in Schengen and the external borders of a 
Schengen candidate country. 

5. Concluding remarks on recent developments 

Finally, the Meijers Committee would like to briefly comment on the call put forward in 
November 2020 by the French President Macron for a reform of the Schengen area and 
closer cooperation in the area of internal security. 

The Schengen flanking measures have always  had a dual  nature. On the one hand they 
comprise  measures  regulating  visa,  borders,  migration  and  asylum,  on  the  other  they 
concern  police  cooperation  and  judicial  cooperation  in  criminal  matters. Although  both 
deserve  to  be  included  in  a  new  Strategy  for  the  future  of  Schengen,  it  should  be 

EN 

86 

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emphasized  that  the  primary  objective  of  both  types  of  flanking  measures  has  always 
been to facilitate free travel and lift internal border controls. 

Although  Member  States  may  have  legitimate  concerns  of  public  order  and  national 
security, it is  highly doubtful that these can be  addressed through the return of internal 
border controls. Border controls have a highly symbolic value, but are seldomly the most 
effective  means  in  the  fight  against  terrorism  and  organised  crime,  as  the  recent  terror 
attacks  taking  place  in  Vienna  and  Paris  have  sadly  shown.  These  attacks  took  place 
despite  the  existence  of  controls  at  the  internal  borders.  In  this  regard  much  more 
emphasis should be placed on effective cooperation between law enforcement staff and 
the  accurate  and  timely  exchange  of  information,  which,  however  should  at  all  times 
respect the basic principles of criminal justice and fundamental rights. 

As  regards  the  call  for  a  reinforcement  of  the  external  borders,  the  Meijers  Committee 
recalls  that  a  recent  amendment  to  the  founding  Regulation  of  Frontex  has  already 
significantly reinforced the powers of this agency in the field of border management and 
return.  It  is  submitted  that  all  efforts  should  be  on  the  implementation  of  this  new 
mandate,  and  that  no  further  legislative  changes  should  be  proposed  before  a  thorough 
evaluation of the new legal framework has been carried out. 

Costs of non-Schengen:  Directorate-General  for  Internal  Policies Policy  Department  A: 
Economic  and  Scientific  Policy,  European  Parliamentary  Research  Service  European 
Added Value Unit, PE 578.974-May 2016: “Cost of non-Schengen: the impact of border 
controls within Schengen on the Single Market”, requested by the European Parliament's 
Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection.  

EN 

87 

  EN 

IPOL_STU(2016)578974_EN.pdf 
 
 
 
ANNEX 5: CONCLUSIONS OF THE CHAIR – SCHENGEN FORUM 30 NOVEMBER 2020 

Schengen is one of the biggest achievements of European integration and is cherished by 
European citizens. Schengen has been seriously put to the test this year in particular and 
Member States have the responsibility to rebuild trust in the area of freedom, security and 
justice  and  ensure  that  citizens  can  fully  reap  the  benefits.  A  strong  Schengen  area  is 
essential for the well functioning of the internal market and for the post-Covid economic 
recovery. The following six conclusions can be drawn from the 1st Schengen Forum: 

1.  The Schengen  Forum highlighted the need for  joint action  in  a number of areas to 
strengthen  the  political  and  operational  governance  of  the  Schengen  area  so  as  to 
make it more efficient, more resilient and reinforce mutual trust. Targeted technical 
consultations will take place over the coming months in order to further deepen the 
issues  raised  during  the  Forum  and  a  2nd  Schengen  Forum  will  be  organised  in 
Spring 2021, ahead of the adoption by the Commission of a new Schengen Strategy. 

the 

to  focus  on 

2.  On  the  specific  issue  of  external  borders,  the  Forum  discussions  highlighted  the 
the  new  IT-architecture  and 
implementation  of  1/ 
need 
interoperability  of  the  external  border  management  systems;  and  2/  the  standing 
corps  of  the  European  Border  and  Coast  Guard.  The  implementation  of  both  these 
elements  requires  strong  political  support  as  well  as  adequate  human  and  financial 
resources. There is also a need to reinforce procedures to ensure that nobody enters 
the EU territory without being checked. 

3.  Concerning  the  Schengen  evaluation  mechanism,  the  importance  of  increasing  its 
effectiveness and efficiency was noted so as to bring concrete improvements on the 
ground  and  increase  trust.  The  Commission’s  five  year  report,  the  study  recently 
published by the European Parliament and the outcomes of the  Forum will all feed 
into the forthcoming legislative initiative to revise the legal framework. 

4.  As regards crisis management, we need a contingency plan to neutralise or at least 
limit the risk that possible future crises may again disrupt the area of free movement. 
It is important to react in a quick and coordinated manner whenever a serious crisis 
calls for it. The EU needs to have strong rules and procedures in place to handle such 
situations. 

5.  As  regards  controls  at  internal  borders,  the  Forum  underlined  that  these  must  be 
truly measures of last resort. Existing controls need to be lifted as soon as possible. 
In  order  to  do  so  successfully,  current  alternative  measures  should  be  reinforced 
and  additional  ones  should  be  considered:  reinforcing  police  cooperation  in  the 
Union and exchanging relevant data between law enforcement authorities were some 
of the key measures mentioned. The best use of new technologies must be ensured 
for  the  protection  of  our  citizens  and  for  the  facilitation  of  travel.  Existing 
technologies should be applied to their full and additional  joint work in the area of 

EN 

88 

  EN 

 
security  research  is  desirable.  Technologies  must  of  course  be  managed  in  a 
transparent manner and in a manner compatible with data protection rules. 

6.  The  EU  should  update  its  legal  framework  which  is  today  no  longer  fully  fit  for 
purpose. The current legal rules applicable to the management of the external borders 
and  to  the  temporary  reintroduction  of  controls  at  the  internal  borders  should  be 
reviewed  taking  into  account  the  lessons  learnt.  A  legislative  initiative  revising  the 
Schengen Borders Code will be presented in this respect. 

EN 

89 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX 6: LIST OF REINTRODUCED BORDER CHECKS AT INTERNAL BORDERS 

Member States’ notifications of the temporary reintroduction  
of border control at internal borders  
pursuant to Article 25 and 28 et seq. of the Schengen Borders Code 

NB  Member State 

Duration 

Reasons/Scope 

293  Denmark 

292  Germany 

291  Austria 

290  Norway 

289  Hungary 

288  Portugal 

287  France 

286  Spain 

285  Germany 

284  Belgium 

283  Finland 

282 

Iceland 

12/05/2021-
11/11/2021 

12/05/2021-
11/11/2021 

12/05/2021-
11/11/2021 

11/04/2021-
10/05/2021 

08/04/2021-
18/04/2021 

01/04/2021-
15/04/2021 

01/05/2021-
31/10/2021 

06/04/2021-
16/04/2021 

01/04/2021-
14/04/2021 

02/04/2021-
18/04/2021 

01/04/2021-
30/04/2021 

28/03/2021-
16/04/2021 

Terrorist  threats,  organized  criminality  threats,  Coronavirus 
COVID-19;  to  be  determined  but  may  concern  all  internal 
borders 

Secondary movements,  situation at  the external  borders;  land 
border with Austria 

Secondary movements, risk related to terrorists and organized 
crime,  situation  at  the  external  borders;  land  borders  with 
Hungary and with Slovenia 

Coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

Coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

Coronavirus COVID-19; internal border with Spain 

Continuous 
Coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

terrorist 

threat, 

secondary  movements, 

Coronavirus COVID-19; land border with Portugal 

Coronavirus  COVID-19;  internal  borders  with  the  Czech 
Republic 

Coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

Coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders except the border 
with Iceland 

Coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

EN 

90 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
281  Hungary 

280  Austria 

279  Hungary 

278 

Iceland 

277  Belgium 

276  Belgium 

275  Germany 

274  Portugal 

273  Norway 

272  Spain 

271  Hungary 

270  Finland 

267  Germany 

266  Portugal 

265  Belgium 

264  Hungary 

263  Spain 

29/03/2021-
07/04/2021 

30/03/2021-
28/04/2021 

22/03/2021-
28/03/2021 

18/03/2021-
27/03/2021 

27/03/2021-
01/04/2021 

18/03/2021-
26/03/2021 

18/03/2021-
31/03/2021 

17/03/2021-
31/03/2021 

12/03/2021-
10/04/2021 

16/03/2021-
06/04/2021 

16/03/2021-
21/03/2021 

19/03/2021-
17/04/2021 

04/03/2021-
17/03/2021 

02/03/2021-
16/03/2021 

26/02/2021-
17/03/2021 

28/02/2021-
15/03/2021 

01/03/2021-
16/03/2021 

Coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

Coronavirus  COVID-19;  borders  with  the  Slovak  Republic 
and the Czech Republic 

Coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

Coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

Coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

Coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

Coronavirus  COVID-19;  land  and  air  border  with  the  Czech 
Republic, air border with Austria 

Coronavirus COVID-19; internal border with Spain 

Coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

Coronavirus COVID-19; land border with Portugal 

Coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

Coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders except the border 
with Iceland 

Coronavirus  COVID-19;  land  and  air  border  with  the  Czech 
Republic, air border with Austria 

Coronavirus COVID-19; internal border with Spain 

Coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

Coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

Coronavirus COVID-19; land border with Portugal 

EN 

91 

  EN 

 
262  Austria 

261  Germany 

260  Finland 

259  Portugal 

258  Germany 

257  Spain 

256  Norway 

255  Belgium 

254  Austria 

253  Portugal 

252  Spain 

251  Hungary 

250  Belgium 

249  Finland 

248  Austria 

247  Austria 

246  Finland 

28/02/2021-
29/03/2021 

24/02/2021-
03/03/2021 

22/02/2021-
18/03/2021 

10/02/2021-
01/03/2021 

14/02/2021-
23/02/2021 

10/02/2021-
01/03/2021 

10/02/2021-
12/03/2021 

06/02/2021-
25/02/2021 

08/02/2021-
27/02/2021 

31/01/2021-
09/02/2021 

31/01/2021-
10/02/2021 

29/01/2021-
27/02/2021 

27/01/2021-
05/02/2021 

27/01/2021-
25/02/2021 

19/01/2021-
07/02/2021 

09/01/2021-
18/01/2021 

11/01/2021-
09/02/2021 

Coronavirus  COVID-19;  borders  with  the  Slovak  Republic 
and the Czech Republic 

Coronavirus  COVID-19;  land  and  air  border  with  the  Czech 
Republic, air border with Austria 

Coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders except the border 
with Iceland 

Coronavirus COVID-19; internal border with Spain 

Coronavirus  COVID-19;  land  and  air  border  with  the  Czech 
Republic, air border with Austria 

Coronavirus COVID-19; land border with Portugal 

Coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

Coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

Coronavirus  COVID-19;  borders  with  the  Slovak  Republic 
and the Czech Republic 

Coronavirus COVID-19; internal border with Spain 

Coronavirus COVID-19; land border with Portugal 

Coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

Coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

Coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders, since 15/02/2021 
all internal borders except the border with Iceland 

Coronavirus  COVID-19;  borders  with  the  Slovak  Republic 
and the Czech Republic 

Coronavirus  COVID-19;  borders  with  the  Slovak  Republic 
and the Czech Republic 

Coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

EN 

92 

  EN 

 
245  Hungary 

244  Finland 

243  Hungary 

242  Finland 

241  Austria 

240  Norway 

239  Finland 

238  Hungary 

237  Germany 

236  Norway 

235  Norway 

234  Denmark 

233  Sweden 

232  France 

231  Finland 

230  Finland 

30/12/2020-
28/01/2021 

14/12/2020-
12/01/2021 

30/11/2020-
29/12/2020 

23/11/2020-
13/12/2020 

12/11/2020-
11/05/2021 

12/11/2020-
09/02/2021 

11/11/2020-
22/11/2020 

31/10/2020-
29/11/2020 

12/11/2020-
11/05/2021 

12/11/2020-
11/05/2021 

13/10/2020-
11/11/2020 

12/11/2020-
11/05/2021 

12/11/2020-
11/05/2021 

01/11/2020-
30/04/2020 

12/10/2020-
10/11/2020 

18/09/2020 
18/10/2020 

Coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

Coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

Coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

Coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

Secondary movements, risk related to terrorists and organized 
crime,  situation  at  the  external  borders;  land  borders  with 
Hungary and with Slovenia 

Coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

Coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

Coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

Secondary movements,  situation at  the external  borders;  land 
border with Austria 

Terrorist  threats,  secondary  movements;  ports  with  ferry 
connections to Denmark, Germany and Sweden 

Coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

Terrorist  threats,  organized  criminality  threats,  Coronavirus 
COVID-19;  to  be  determined  but  may  concern  all  internal 
borders 

Terrorist  threats,  shortcomings  at  the  external  borders;  to  be 
determined but may concern all internal borders 

Terrorist  threats,  situation at  the external  borders:  all internal 
borders 

Coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

– 

Coronavirus COVID-19; borders with Lithuania and Poland  

EN 

93 

  EN 

 
229  Finland 

228  Norway 

227  Hungary 

18/09/2020 
18/10/2020 

– 

Coronavirus  COVID-19;  borders  with  Iceland,  Norway, 
Sweden, Germany, Slovakia, Estonia 

14/9/2020 
13/10/2020 

30/9/2020 
30/10/2020 

– 

Coronavirus COVID-19: all internal borders 

– 

Coronavirus COVID-19: all internal borders 

226  Finland 

18/09/2020 
18/10/2020 

– 

Coronavirus  COVID-19;  borders  with  Austria,  Belgium, 
Switzerland,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Greece, 
Italy, 
Hungary,  Spain,  France,  Luxembourg,  The  Netherlands, 
Malta, Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia 

225  Hungary 

01/09/2020- 
30/9/2020 

Coronavirus  COVID-19:  to  protect  public  health,  all  internal 
borders 

224  Finland 

24/08/2020-
18/09/2020 

223  Norway 

222  Lithuania 

221  Finland 

220  Finland 

219  Lithuania 

218  Finland 

217  Spain 

216  Portugal 

14/08/2020-
13/09/2020 

16/08/2020-
14/09/2020 

10/08/2020-
08/09/2020 

27/07/2020-
25/08/2020 

17/07/2020-
15/08/2020 

15/07/2020-
11/08/2020 

21/06/2020-
30/06/2020 

16/06/2020-
30/06/2020 

Coronavirus  COVID-19;  borders  with  Austria,  Belgium; 
Switzerland,  Czech  Republic,  Germany,  Denmark,  Spain, 
France,  Iceland,  Luxembourg,  Malta,  The  Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia 

coronavirus COVID-19; internal air, land and sea borders  

coronavirus COVID-19; internal air and sea borders  

coronavirus  COVID-19;  borders  with  Spain,  Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Poland, France, Sweden, Czechia, Austria, Slovenia 
and Switzerland  

coronavirus  COVID-19;  borders  with  Spain,  Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Poland, France, Sweden, Czechia, Austria, Slovenia 
and Switzerland  

coronavirus COVID-19; internal air and sea borders  

coronavirus  COVID-19;  borders  with  Spain,  Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Poland, France, Sweden and Czechia 

coronavirus COVID-19; borders with Portugal 

coronavirus COVID-19; land border with Spain 

EN 

94 

  EN 

 
215  Germany 

16/06/2020-
21/06/2020 

214 

Iceland 

213  Finland 

212  Lithuania 

211  Switzerland 

210  Czechia 

209  Spain  

208 

Iceland 

207  Belgium 

206  Austria 

205  Lithuania 

204  Slovakia 

203  Spain 

202  Estonia 

201 

Iceland 

16/06/2020-
22/06/2020 

15/06/2020-
14/07/2020 

17/06/2020-
16/07/2020 

09/06/2020-
15/06/2020 

14/06/2020-
30/06/2020 

08/06/2020-
21/06/2020 

04/06/2020-
15/06/2020 

09/06/2020-
14/06/2020 

01/06/2020-
15/06/2020 

01/06/2020-
16/06/2020 

28/05/2020-
26/06/2020 

24/05/2020-
07/06/2020 

18/05/2020-
16/06/2020 

14/05/2020-
03/06/2020 

coronavirus  COVID-19;  air  borders  with  Spain  (lifting  the 
controls  reintroduced  on  the  basis  of  coronavirus  at  the 
borders with Austria, Switzerland, France, Denmark and Italy 
as of 15 June 2020) 

coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

coronavirus  COVID-19;  all  internal  borders,  except  borders 
with  Norway,  Denmark, 
Iceland,  Estonia,  Latvia  and 
Lithuania 

coronavirus  COVID-19;  internal  air  and  sea  borders  (lifting 
the  border  controls  at  the  land  border  with  Poland  as  of  12 
June 2020) 

coronavirus  COVID-19;  all  internal  air  and  land  borders 
except from borders with Liechtenstein 

coronavirus  COVID-19;  all  internal  air  borders  (lifting  the 
border controls at the internal land borders as of 5 June 2020) 

coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

coronavirus  COVID-19;  land  borders  with  Germany,  Italy, 
Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Slovakia and Czechia 

coronavirus COVID-19; land border with Poland, sea borders, 
air borders 

coronavirus COVID-19, all internal borders 

coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

coronavirus  COVID-19;  internal  air  and  sea  borders  (lifting 
the border controls  at  the internal  land borders as  of 15 May 
2020) 

coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

EN 

95 

  EN 

 
200  Germany 

199  Portugal 

198  Spain 

197  Poland 

196  Slovakia 

195  Hungary  

194  Spain 

193  Finland 

192  Lithuania 

191  Czechia 

190  Austria  

189 

Iceland 

188  Poland 

187  Portugal 

186  Germany 

16/05/2020-
15/06/2020 

15/05/2020-
15/06/2020 

15/05/2020-
24/05/2020 

14/05/2020-
12/06/2020 

08/05/2020-
27/05/2020 

12/05/2020-
11/11/2020 

10/05/2020-
24/05/2020 

14/05/2020-
14/06/2020 

14/05/2020-
31/05/2020 

14/05/2020-
13/06/2020 

08/05/2020-
31/05/2020 

04/05/2020-
15/05/2020 

04/05/2020-
13/05/2020 

05/05/2020-
15/05/2020 

05/05/2020-
15/05/2020 

coronavirus  COVID-19;  land  and  air  borders  with  Austria, 
Switzerland,  France,  Denmark,  Italy  and  Spain,  sea  border 
with Denmark; 

coronavirus COVID-19; land border with Spain 

coronavirus COVID-19; all internal sea and air borders 

coronavirus COVID-19; land borders with Czechia, Slovakia, 
Germany, Lithuania, sea borders, air borders 

coronavirus COVID-19, all internal borders 

coronavirus COVID-19; all land and air borders 

coronavirus COVID-19; all land borders 

coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

coronavirus  COVID-19;  land  borders  with  Germany  and 
Austria, air borders 

coronavirus  COVID-19;  land  borders  with  Germany,  Italy, 
Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Slovakia and Czechia 

coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

coronavirus COVID-19; land borders with Czechia, Slovakia, 
Germany, Lithuania, sea borders, air borders 

coronavirus COVID-19; land border with Spain 

coronavirus  COVID-19;  land  and  air  borders  with  Austria, 
Switzerland, France, Luxembourg, Denmark, Italy and Spain, 
sea border with Denmark 

185  Czechia 

24/04/2020-
14/05/2020 

coronavirus  COVID-19;  land  borders  with  Germany  and 
Austria, air borders 

EN 

96 

  EN 

 
184  Switzerland 

183  Norway  

182  Belgium 

181  Spain 

180  Hungary 

179  Estonia 

178  Austria 

176  Lithuania 

175 

Iceland 

174  Austria 

173  Belgium 

172  Slovakia 

171  Germany 

171  Estonia 

02/05/2020-
08/06/2020 

05/05/2020-
16/05/2020 

08/05/2020-
08/06/2020 

26/04/2020-
10/05/2020 

01/05/2020-
11/05/2020 

01/05/2020-
17/05/2020 

28/04/2020-
07/05/2020 

28/04/2020-
14/05-2020 

24/04/2020-
04/05/2020 

12/05/2020-
11/11/2020 

19/04/2020-
08/05/2020 

17/04/2020-
07/05/2020 

15/04/2020-
05/05/2020 

12/05/2020-
11/11/2020 

15/04/2020-
01/05/2020 

coronavirus  COVID-19;  all  internal  air  and  land  borders 
except from borders with Liechtenstein 

coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

coronavirus COVID-19; all land borders 

coronavirus COVID-19; all land and air borders 

coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

coronavirus  COVID-19;  land  borders  with  Germany,  Italy, 
Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Slovakia and Czechia 

coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

secondary movements, risk related to terrorists and organized 
crime,  situation  at  the  external  borders,  risk  of  Coronavirus 
causing  additional  migrant  movements;  land  borders  with 
Hungary and with Slovenia. 

coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

coronavirus COVID-19, all internal borders 

coronavirus  COVID-19;  internal  land  and  air  borders  with 
Austria,  Switzerland,  France,  Luxembourg,  Denmark,  Italy 
and Spain, sea border with Denmark 

secondary  movements,  situation  at  the  external  borders;  land 
border with Austria 

coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders  

EN 

97 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
 
170  Portugal 

169  Norway 

168  Poland 

167  Hungary 

166  Slovakia 

165  Spain 

164  Austria 

163  Lithuania  

162  Switzerland 

161  Sweden 

15/04/2020-
05/05-2020 

15/04/2020-
05/05/2020 

15/05/2020-
13/08/2020 

12/05/2020-
12/11/2020 

14/04/2020-
03/05/2020 

11/04/2020-
01/05/2020 

08/04/2020-
17/04-2020 

11/04/2020-
26/04/2020 

10/04/2020-
27/04/2020 

13/04/2020-
27/04/2020 

12/04/2020-
02/05/2020 

12/05/2020-
12/11/2020 

coronavirus COVID-19; land border with Spain 

coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders  

coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders  

terrorist  threats,  secondary  movements;  ports  with  ferry 
connections with Denmark, Germany and Sweden; 

coronavirus COVID-19; land borders with Czechia, Slovakia, 
Germany, Lithuania, sea borders, air borders 

coronavirus COVID-19; all land and air borders 

coronavirus COVID-19, all internal borders 

coronavirus COVID-19; all land borders 

coronavirus  COVID-19;  land  borders  with  Czechia  and 
Slovakia 

coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

coronavirus  COVID-19;  all  internal  air  and  land  borders 
except from borders with Liechtenstein 

terrorist threats, shortcomings at the external borders;  

to be determined but may concern all internal borders 

160  Denmark 

12/05/2020-
12/11/2020 

coronavirus  COVID-19  (to  the  extend  necessary),  terrorist 
threats, organized criminality; all land, air and sea borders.  

159  Austria 

158  Finland 

08/04/2020-
27/04/2020 

14/04/2020-
13/05/2020 

After  lifting  the  COVID-19  travel  restrictions,  the  border 
controls  will  be  limited  to  the  Danish  land  and  sea  borders 
with Germany and Sweden (Øresundsforbindelsen).  

coronavirus  COVID-19;  land  borders  with  Germany,  Italy, 
Switzerland and Liechtenstein 

coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

EN 

98 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
 
04/04/2020-
24/04/2020 

04/04/2020-
24/04/2020 

01/05/2020-
31/10/2020 

30/03/2020-
19/04/2020 

26/03/2020-
15/04/2020 

26/03/2020-
15/04/2020 

27/03/2020-
11/04/2020 

26/03/2020-
15/04/2020 

25/03/2020-
13/04/2020 

24/03/2020-
13/04/2020 

25/03/2020-
04/04/2020 

27/03/2020-
15/04/2020 

28/03/2020-
17/04/2020 

26/03/2020-
15/04/2020 

23/03/2020-
12/04/2020 

20/03/2020-
30/03/2020 

157  Switzerland 

156  Czechia 

155  France 

154  Belgium 

153  Portugal 

152  Norway 

151  Spain 

150  Germany 

149  Poland  

148  Lithuania  

147  Switzerland 

146  Estonia 

145  Switzerland 

142  Belgium 

EN 

coronavirus COVID-19; all air borders except air borders with 
Liechtenstein 

coronavirus  COVID-19;  land  borders  with  Germany  and 
Austria, air borders 

continuous  terrorist  threat  and  the  risk  of  terrorists  using  the 
vulnerability  of  States  due  to  COVID-19  pandemics,  support 
to  measures  aiming  at  containing  the  spread  of  virus;  all 
internal borders 

coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

coronavirus COVID-19; land border with Spain 

coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

coronavirus COVID-19; all land borders 

coronavirus  COVID-19;  internal  land  and  air  borders  with 
Austria,  Switzerland,  France,  Luxembourg,  Denmark,  Italy 
and Spain, sea border with Denmark 

coronavirus COVID-19; land borders with Czechia, Slovakia, 
Germany, Lithuania, sea borders, air borders 

coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

coronavirus COVID-19; all air borders except air borders with 
Liechtenstein 

coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

coronavirus  COVID-19;  air  borders  with  Italy,  France, 
Germany, Austra and Spain 

coronavirus  COVID-19;  land  borders  with  France,  Germany 
and Austria 

coronavirus COVID-19; land border with Italy  

coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders  

99 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
141  Germany 

140  Austria 

139  Hungary 

138  Switzerland 

137  Finland 

136  Spain 

135  Portugal 

134  Switzerland 

133  Norway 

132  Estonia 

131  Czechia 

130  Germany 

129  Lithuania 

128  Poland  

19/03/2020-
29/03/2020 

18/03/2020-
07/04-2020 

22/03/2020-
11/04/2020 

18/03/2020-
28/03/2020 

19/03/2020-
13/04/2020 

17/03/2020-
26/03/2020 

16/03/2020-
26/03/2020 

16/03/2020-
26/03/2020 

16/03/2020-
26/03/2020 

17/03/2020-
27/03/2020 

18/03/2020-
04/04/2020 

16/03/2020-
26/03/2020 

14/03/2020-
24/03/2020 

15/03/2020-
24/03/2020 

coronavirus COVID-19; air borders with Austria, Switzerland, 
France,  Luxembourg,  Denmark,  Italy  and  Spain,  sea  borders 
with Denmark 

coronavirus  COVID-19;  land  borders  with  Germany,  Italy, 
Switzerland and Liechtenstein 

coronavirus  COVID-19;  land  borders  with  Slovenia,  Austria 
and Slovakia, all air borders 

coronavirus COVID-19; air borders with Spain, Italy, France, 
Germany and Austria 

coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

coronavirus COVID-19; all land borders 

coronavirus COVID-19; land border with Spain 

coronavirus  COVID-19;  land  borders  with  France,  Germany 
and Austria 

coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders  

coronavirus COVID-19; land borders with Latvia, air borders, 
sea borders 

coronavirus  COVID-19;  land  borders  with  Germany  and 
Austria, air borders 

coronavirus  COVID-19; 
Luxembourg, France, Switzerland and Austria.  

land  borders  with  Denmark, 

coronavirus COVID-19; all internal borders 

coronavirus COVID-19; land borders with Czechia, Slovakia, 
Germany, Lithuania, sea borders, air borders 

127  Denmark 

12/11/2019 
12/05/2020 

– 

coronavirus COVID-19, terrorist threats, organized criminality 
from Sweden; all land, air and sea borders 

127  Austria 

14/03/2020-
24/04-2020 

coronavirus  COVID-19;  land  borders  with  Switzerland  and 
Liechtenstein 

EN 

100 

  EN 

 
126  Switzerland 

125  Czechia 

124  Hungary 

123  Austria 

122  Spain 

121  Norway 

121  Sweden 

120  Denmark 

13/03/2020-
23/03/2020 

14/03/2020-
18/03/2020 

12/03/2020-
22/03/2020 

11/03/2020-
21/03/2020 

28/11/2019-
13/12/2019 

12/11/2019 
12/05/2020 

12/11/2019 
12/05/2020 

12/11/2019 
12/05/2020 

coronavirus COVID-19; land border with Italy  

coronavirus  COVID-19;  land  borders  with  Austria  and 
Germany, air borders 

coronavirus  COVID-19;  land  borders  with  Austria  and 
Slovenia 

coronavirus COVID-19; land border with Italy 

XXV  United  Nations  Conference  on  Climate  Change 
(COP25) 
in  Madrid;  Air  borders  (mainly  Madrid  and 
Barcelona  airports),  sea  borders,  mainly  ports  in  northern 
Spain,  land border  with  France, keeping the usual  authorized 
crossing points. 

– 

terrorist threats, secondary movements; 

ports  with  ferry  connections  with  Denmark,  Germany  and 
Sweden; 

– 

terrorist threats, shortcomings at the external borders;  

to be determined but may concern all internal borders; 

– 

terrorist threats, organized criminality from Sweden;  

land  border  with  Germany  and  with  Sweden, 
connections to Germany and to Sweden, until 12 May 2020; 

ferry 

119  Austria 

12/11/2019 
12/05/2020 

– 

(as  of  mid-March),  secondary 
coronavirus  COVID-19 
movements,  risk  related  to  terrorists  and  organized  crime, 
situation at the external borders;  

118  Germany 

117  France 

12/11/2019 
12/05/2020 

31/10/2019- 
30/04/2020 

land borders with Hungary and with Slovenia; 

– 

secondary movements, situation at the external borders;  

land border with Austria; 

coronavirus COVID-19 (as of beginning of March), persistent 
terrorist threat, upcoming high profile political event in Paris, 
secondary movements;  

all internal borders; 

116  Norway 

12/05/2019-
12/11/2019 

security situation in Europe; all internal borders with an initial 
focus  on  ferry  connections  with  Denmark,  Germany  and 
Sweden; 

EN 

101 

  EN 

 
115  Sweden 

114  Denmark 

113  Austria 

112  Germany 

111  France 

12/05/2019-
12/11/2019 

12/05/2019-
12/11/2019 

12/05/2019-
12/11/2019 

12/05/2019-
12/11/2019 

01/05/2019-
31/10/2019 

serious  threat  to  public  policy  and  internal  security;  to  be 
determined but may concern all internal borders; 

severe  threat  to  public  order  and  internal  security;  internal 
border with Germany (land and ports with ferry connections) 

security  situation  in  Europe  and  continuous  significant 
secondary  movements;  land  borders  with  Hungary  and  with 
Slovenia; 

migration and security policy; land border with Austria 

Terrorist threats, situation at the external borders 

110  Poland 

10-16/02/2019 

Ministerial  to  Promote  a  Future  of  Peace  and  Security  in  the 
Middle East; all internal borders 

109  Sweden 

108  Poland 

107  Austria 

106  Norway 

105  Sweden 

104  Denmark 

103  Germany 

102  France 

101  Austria 

12/02/2019 
11/05/2019 

– 

serious threat to public policy and internal security; all internal 
borders 

22/11/2018 
16/12/208 

12/11/2018 
11/05/2019 

12/11/2018 
11/05/2019 

12/11/2018 
11/02/2019 

12/11/2018 
11/05/2019 

12/11/2018 
11/05/2019 

01/11/2018 
30/04/2019 

17/09/2018-
21/09/2018 

-

climate conference COPT 24, all internal borders  

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

-

security  situation  in  Europe  and  threats  resulting  from  the 
continuous  significant  secondary  movements;  land  borders 
with Hungary and with Slovenia 

security  situation  in  Europe  and  threats  resulting  from  the 
continuous  significant  secondary  movements;  all  internal 
borders  with  an  initial  focus  on  ferry  connections  with 
Denmark, Germany and Sweden 

serious threat to public policy and internal security; all internal 
borders 

persistent  and  severe  threat  to  public  order  and  internal 
security;  all internal  borders with  an initial  focus on the land 
border with Germany and ports with connection to Germany 

threats  resulting  from  the  continuous  significant  secondary 
movements; land border with Austria 

Terrorist  threats,  situation  at  the  external  borders,  upcoming 
high level political meetings 

informal meeting of the European Council in Salzburg; border 
Salzburg  and  Upper  Austria  to  Germany,  border  East  Tyrol 
and Carinthia to Italy, Salzburg Airport (all arriving flights) 

EN 

102 

  EN 

 
100  Austria 

09/07/2018 
13/07/2018 

– 

informal  meeting  of  Justice  and  Home  Affairs  Ministers  in 
Innsbruck;  border  Tyrol  to  Germany,  border  North  Tyrol  to 
Italy, Innsbruck Airport (all arriving flights). 

99  Norway 

12/05/2018– 
11/11/2018 

security  situation  in  Europe  and  threats  resulting  from  the 
continuous  significant  secondary  movements;  all  internal 
borders  with  an  initial  focus  on  ferry  connections  with 
Denmark, Germany and Sweden 

98 

Sweden 

12/05/2018– 
11/11/2018 

continuous  serious  threat  to  public  policy  and  internal 
security; all internal borders 

97  Denmark 

12/05/2018– 
11/11/2018 

96  Germany 

95  Austria 

94 

France 

12/05/2018– 
11/11/2018 

12/05/2018– 
11/11/2018 

30/04/2018-
30/10/2018 

security  situation  in  Europe  and  threats  resulting  from  the 
continuous  significant  secondary  movements;  all  internal 
borders with an initial focus on the land border with Germany 
and ports with connection to Germany 

security  situation  in  Europe  and  threats  resulting  from  the 
continuous  significant  secondary  movements;  land  border 
with Austria 

security  situation  in  Europe  and  threats  resulting  from  the 
continuous  significant  secondary  movements;  land  borders 
with Hungary and with Slovenia 

persistent terrorist threat; all internal borders 

93 

Sweden 

12-19/11/2017 

Social  Summit  for  Fair  Jobs  and  Growth;  Gothenburg 
Landvetter Airport and Svinesund (Sweden/Norway border) 

92  Norway 

91 

Sweden 

90  Denmark 

89  Germany 

12/11/2017 
12/05/2018 

12/11/2017 
12/05/2018 

12/11/2017 
12/05/2018 

12/11/2017 
12/05/2018 

- 

- 

- 

- 

security  situation  in  Europe  and  threats  resulting  from  the 
continuous 
ferry 
connections with Denmark, Germany and Sweden 

secondary  movements; 

significant 

security  situation  in  Europe  and  threats  resulting  from  the 
continuous 
selected 
harbours  in  Police  Regions  South  and  West  and  at  the 
Öresund Bridge; 

secondary  movements; 

significant 

security  situation  in  Europe  and  threats  resulting  from  the 
continuous  significant  secondary  movements;  internal  border 
with Germany; 

security  situation  in  Europe  and  threats  resulting  from  the 
continuous  significant  secondary  movements;  land  border 
with Austria and flight connections from Greece; 

EN 

103 

  EN 

 
88  Austria 

87 

France 

86  Norway 

12/11/2017 
12/05/2018 

- 

Security  situation  in  Europe  and  threats  resulting  from  the 
continuous  significant  secondary  movements;  land  borders 
with Hungary and with Slovenia 

01/11/2017 
30/04/2018 

26/08/2017- 
25/09/2017 

– 

Persistent terrorist threat 

All internal borders 

UCI Road World Championship in Bergen  

Bergen air border 

85 

Italy 

10-30/05/2017 

G7 Summit Taormina 

84  Norway 

83 

Sweden 

82  Denmark 

81  Germany 

80  Austria 

79  Norway 

78 

Sweden 

77  Denmark 

76  Germany 

75  Austria 

11/05/2017-
11/11/2017 

11/05/2017-
11/11/2017 

11/05/2017-
11/11/2017 

11/05/2017-
11/11/2017 

11/05/2017-
11/11/2017 

11/02/2017-
11/05/2017 

11/02/2017-
10/05/2017 

11/02/2017-
11/05/2017 

11/02/2017-
11/05/2017 

11/02/2017-
11/05/2017 

In line with Recommendation of the Council of 11 May 2017, 
in  the  Norwegian  ports  with  ferry  connections  to  Denmark, 
Germany and Sweden 

In line with Recommendation of the Council of 11 May 2017, 
Swedish harbors in the Police Region South and West and at 
the Öresund bridge 

In line with Recommendation of the Council of 11 May 2017, 
Danish  ports  with  ferry  connections  to  Germany  and  at  the 
Danish-German land border 

In line with Recommendation of the Council of 11 May 2017, 
land border with Austria 

In line with Recommendation of the Council of 11 May 2017, 
land border with Slovenia and with Hungary 

In  line  with  Recommendation  of  the  Council  of  7  February 
2017,  in  the  Norwegian  ports  with  ferry  connections  to 
Denmark, Germany and Sweden 

In  line  with  Recommendation  of  the  Council  of  7  February 
2017,  Swedish  harbors  in  the  Police  Region  South  and  West 
and at the Öresund bridge 

In  line  with  Recommendation  of  the  Council  of  7  February 
2017, Danish ports with ferry connections to Germany and at 
the Danish-German land border 

In  line  with  Recommendation  of  the  Council  of  7  February 
2017, land border with Austria 

In  line  with  Recommendation  of  the  Council  of  7  February 
2017, land border with Slovenia and with Hungary 

EN 

104 

  EN 

 
74 

France 

73  Malta 

72  Norway 

71 

Sweden 

70  Denmark 

69  Germany 

68  Austria 

67 

France 

66 

Poland 

65  Norway 

64 

Sweden 

63  Denmark 

62  Austria 

61  Germany 

27/01/2017-
15/07/2017 

21/01/2017-
09/02/2017 

12/11/2016 

12/02/2017 

12/11/2016 

12/02/2017 

12/11/2016 

12/02/2017 

12/11/2016 

12/02/2017 

12/11/2016 

12/02/2017 

26/07/2016-
26/01/2017 

04/07/2016 
02/08/ 2016 

10/06/2016 
12/11/ 2016 

08/06/2016 
12/11/2016  

01/06/16 
12/11/2016 

16/05/2016 
12/11/2016 

12/05/2016 
12/11/2016 

Persistent terrorist threat - all internal borders 

Malta Informal Summit and Joint Valetta Action Plan Meeting 
- air and sea borders 

In line with Recommendation of the Council of 11 November 
2016,  in  the  Norwegian  ports  with  ferry  connections  to 
Denmark, Germany and Sweden 

In line with Recommendation of the Council of 11 November 
2016,  Swedish  harbors  in  the  Police  Region  South  and  West 
and at the Öresund bridge 

In line with Recommendation of the Council of 11 November 
2016, Danish ports with ferry connections to Germany and at 
the Danish-German land border 

In line with Recommendation of the Council of 11 November 
2016, land border with Austria 

In line with Recommendation of the Council of 11 November 
2016, land border with Slovenia and with Hungary 

In relation to the emergency state as introduced further to the 
Nice attack 

All internal borders 

- 

NATO Summit, World Youth Days and visit of Pope 

All internal borders 

- 

- 

– 

- 

- 

In line with Recommendation of the Council of 12 May 2016 
under  Art.29  of  the  SBC  Norwegian  ports  with  ferry 
connections to Denmark, Germany and Sweden.  

In line with Recommendation of the Council of 12 May 2016 
under  Art.29  of  the  SBC  Swedish  harbours  in  the  Police 
Region South and West and at the Öresund bridge 

In line with Recommendation of the Council of 12 May 2016 
under Art.29 of the SBC Danish ports with ferry connections 
to Germany and at the Danish-German land border 

In line with Recommendation of the Council of 12 May 2016 
under Art.29 of the SBC, land border with Slovenia and with 
Hungary 

In line with Recommendation of the Council of 12 May 2016 
under Art.29 of the SBC, land border with Austria 

EN 

105 

  EN 

 
60 

France 

27/05/2016 - 

EURO 2016, Tour de France 

26/07/2016 

All internal borders 

59  Belgium 

58  Denmark 

23/02/2016-
22/04/2016 

04/03/2016 
02/06/2016 

Irregular  migrants  attempting  to  travel  to  UK  -  Border 
between the Province of West-Vlaanderen and France 

- 

Big influx of persons seeking international protection  

All internal borders, with focus on ferries from Germany and 
land border with Germany. 

57  Norway 

15/01/2016 
11/06/2016 

- 

Continues threat of big influx of persons seeking international 
protection  

All  borders  with  focus  on  ports  with  ferry  connections  to 
Norway via internal borders 

56 

Sweden 

10/01/2016-
07/06/2016 

Continuous  big 
protection 

influx  of  persons  seeking 

international 

All  borders,  with  special  focus  on  harbours  in  Police  Region 
South  and  Police  Region  West  as  well  as  on  the  Öresund 
Bridge between Denmark and Sweden. 

55  Denmark 

04/01/2016 
03/03/2016 

- 

Unexpected migratory flow 

All internal borders, with focus on ferries from Germany and 
land border with Germany.  

54 

France 

14/12/2015- 
26/05/2016 

In  relation  to  the  emergency  state  as  introduced  further  to 
Paris attacks 

53  Norway 

26/11/2015-
15/01/2016 

All internal borders 

Unexpected migratory flow 

All  borders  with  focus  on  ports  with  ferry  connections  to 
Norway via internal borders 

52  Austria 

16/11/2015 
16/05/2016 

- 

Continuous  big 
protection 

influx  of  persons  seeking 

international 

All  borders,  with  special  focus  on  the  land  border  with 
Slovenia, Hungary and Italy, subject to possible changes 

The border can be crossed only at authorised border crossing 
points (the list attached) 

51  Germany 

14/11/2015 
13/05/2016 

- 

Continuous big influx of persons seeking international protection 

All borders, with focus on the German-Austrian land border 

EN 

106 

  EN 

 
 
 
50 

France 

13/11-
13/12/2015 

21st UN Conference on Climate Change from 30 November to 
11 December 2015,  

49 

Sweden 

12/11 
09/01/2016 

internal land borders and air borders 

- 

Unprecedented influx of persons 

All  borders,  with  special  focus  on  harbours  in  Police  Region 
South  and  Police  Region  West  as  well  as  on  the  Öresund 
Bridge between Denmark and Sweden. 

48  Malta 

9/11 
31/12/2015 

- 

Valetta  Conference  on  Migration  and  Commonwealth  Heads 
of Government Meeting 

Terrorist threat and smuggling of illegal migrants 

Air and sea passanger terminal 

47  Hungary 

17-26/10/2015 

Big  influx  of  persons  seeking  international  protection,  land 
borders with Slovenia 

45-
46 

41-
44 

37 
-40 

Slovenia 

17-26/9;  

27/9-16/10/2015 

Big  influx  of  persons  seeking  international  protection,  land 
borders with Hungary 

Austria 

16-25/9;  

26/9-15/10; 
16/10-4/11/2015; 
5/11/2015-
15/11/2015 

Germany  

13-22/09;  

23/09-12/10; 
13/10-1/11/2015; 

2/11-13/11/2015 

Big  influx  of  persons  seeking  international  protection,  all 
borders,  focus  on  land  borders  with  Italy,  Hungary,  Slovenia 
and Slovakia 

Big  influx  of  persons  seeking  international  protection,  all 
borders with focus on Austrian land borders 

36  Germany 

16/5-15/6/2015 

G7 Summit  

35  Estonia 

31/8-3/9/2014 

Visit of the US President 

34  Norway 

24-31/7/2014 

terrorist threat 

33  Belgium 

1-6/2014 

G7 Summit 

32  Netherlands 

14-28/3/2014 

Netherlands  on  14-28  March  2014  Nuclear  Security  Summit 
in the Hague 

EN 

107 

  EN 

 
31 

Poland 

8-23/11/2013 

19th  session  of  the  Conference  of  the  Parties  to  the  UN 
Framework  Convention  on  Climate  Change  (UNFCCC),  the 
9th  session  of  the  Conference  of  the  Parties  serving  as  the 
Meeting  of  the  Parties  to  the  Kyoto  Protocol  and  the  39th 
Session of the Subsidiary Bodies in Warsaw (11-22/11/2013) 

All internal borders 

30  Norway 

3-12/12/2012 

Nobel Peace Prize ceremony in Oslo (10/12/2012) 

29 

Poland 

4/6/2012-
1/7/2012 

Euro 2012 Football Championships (8/6-1/7/2012) 

All internal borders 

28 

Spain 

2-4/5/2012 

Meeting  of  the  Governing  Council  of  the  European  Central 
Bank in Barcelona 

27 

France 

26 

Sweden 

25  Norway 

24  Austria 

23 

Portugal  

22  Latvia 

21 

France 

24/10/2011-
05/11/2011 

22/07/2011, 
23h00- 
23/07/2011, 
09h00 

22/07/2011, 
17h23--
25/07/2011, 
17h00 

04/06/-
09/06/2011 

16/11-
20/11/2010 

24/05-
01/06/2010  

28/05-
02/06/2010 

G-20 meeting in Cannes (03-04/11/2011) 

Bomb explosion in Oslo and shooting on the island Utøya on 
22/07/2011 

– 

Bomb explosion in Oslo and shooting on the island Utøya on 
22/07/2011 

World Economic Forum (07/06/-09/06/2011) 

NATO Summit in Lisbon (19/11/-20/11) 

NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Riga (28/05-01/06/2010). 

Franco-African Summit in Nice (31/05-01/06/2010). 

20  Estonia 

17-23/04/2010 

Informal meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Tallinn (22-
23/04/2010). 

19  Malta 

5-18/04/2010 

Visit of Pope Benedict XVI (17-18/04/2010) 

18  Denmark 

1-18/12/2009  

UN  Climate  Change  Conference 
18/12/2009). 

in  Copenhagen 

(7-

DK-DE and DK-SE borders 

EN 

108 

  EN 

 
 
17  Norway 

27/11/2009–
12/12/2009 

Nobel Peace Prize Ceremony in Oslo (10/12/2009). 

16 

France 

27/09/2009 

50th Anniversary of ETA. 

15 

Spain 

26-27/09/2009 

14 

France 

19/09/2009,  13h 
— 19:40 

FR-ES  land  borders,  BCP  border  complex  from  Hendaye  to 
Arneguy (14 border crossing points). 

Celebration  of  ‘Basque  Warrior  day’  in  the  Basque  Country 
and Navarra (ES) and in Pyrénées-Orientales (FR) 

ES-FR  land  borders  in  the  provinces  of  Guipuzcoa  and 
Navarra  

Demonstration by Batasuna in Bayonne.  

Five FR-ES border crossing points (highway A63, St Jacques 
international  bridge  ,  Béhobie  international  bridge,  Hendaye 
station, port of Hendaye)  

13 

Italy 

12 

France 

28/06/2009–
15/07/2009 

30/03/2009–
5/04/2009 

G8 Summit in L’Aquila (10-12/7/2009)  

Land, air and sea borders 

NATO Summit in Strasbourg (3-4/4/2009) 

Land and air borders with BE, LU, DE, CH, IT and ES 

11  Germany 

20/03/2009–
5/04/2009 

NATO  Summit  in  Strasbourg,  Baden-Baden  and  Kehl  (3-
4/4/2009). 

10 

Iceland 

05-07/03/2009 

Land, air and sea borders 

Visit of MC Hells Angels to the Icelandic Motorcycle club in 
Reykjavik. 

Air  borders  (16  flights  checked  from  SE,  DK,  NL,  FR,  DE, 
and NO) 

9 

Finland 

24/11/2008–
5/12/2008 

Meeting  of  Council  of  Ministers  of  OSCE  in  Helsinki  (4-
5/12/2008). 

Controls  mainly  at  Helsinki-Vantaa  airport  and  at  ports  of 
Helsinki and Turku 

8 

France  

27/09/2008,  08h 
— 18:45 

Demonstration  on  27  September  at  16:00  in  Bayonne, 
supervised by Batasuna. 

Five  FR-ES  border  crossing  points  (Hendaye:  highway  A63, 
St  Jacques  international  bridge,  Béhobie  international  bridge, 
Hendaye station, port of Hendaye) 

EN 

109 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 

Austria 

02/06/2008–
01/07/2008 

European  Football  Championship  EURO  2008,  AT  —  CH 
(7/6-29/6/2008). 

6 

Iceland 

2–3/11/2007 

Land and air borders 

Participation  of  MC  Hells  Angels  at  the  inauguration  of  the 
Icelandic Motorcycle club in Reykjavik (1-4/11/2007). 

Air borders (14 flights checked from SE, DK, FI, DE and NO) 

5 

Germany 

25/5–9/06/2007  G8 

in  Heiligendamm/Mecklenburg-Western 

Summit 
Pomerania (6-8/6/2007) 

Land, air and sea borders 

4 

France  

12–16/02/2007 

Conference of Heads of States of Africa and France in Cannes 
(13-16/2/2007). 

FR-IT  border 
notification)  

(detailed 

information  provided 

in 

the 

3 

Finland 

13–29/11/ 2006 

EUROMED meeting in Tampere. 

Controls  mainly  at  Helsinki-Vantaa,  Turku  and  Tampere-
Pirkkala airports and the ports of Helsinki, Hanko and Turku, 
FI-SE and FI-NO land borders  

2 

Finland 

9–21/10/2006 

Informal meeting of Heads of States and Government in Lahti. 

Controls  mainly  at  Helsinki-Vantaa,  Turku  and  Tampere-
Pirkkala airports and the ports of Helsinki, Hanko and Turku, 
FI-SE and FI-NO land borders 

1 

France  

21/10/2006,  08h 
— 20:00 

Youth Days of radical young Basques in Saint-Pée-sur-Nivelle 
and  demonstration  organised  in  Bayonne  by  the  support 
committee of Philippe Bidart. 

FR-ES land border (border crossing point on the highway A63 
in  Biriatou,  St  Jacques  bridge,  Béhobie  bridge,  Hendaye 
station) 

*  In  line  with  the  Schengen  Borders  Code  in  case  of  foreseeable  events  constituting  a 
serious  threat  to  the  internal  security  and  public  policy  the  Member  States  may 
reintroduce border control at internal borders for a period of up to 30 days or, if from the 
outset it is known that the serious threat will persist for a period exceeding 30 days, for 
the foreseeable duration of the threat. 

EN 

110 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 7: FACTS ON THE EVOLUTION OF THREATS 

Since 2015 (and until the outbreak of COVID-19), the six Schengen States which have 
reintroduced  border  controls  (Austria,  Germany,  France,  Sweden,  Denmark  and 
Norway),  have  been  referring  to  migration,  terrorism  and  the  situation  at  the  external 
borders  have  been  the  most  frequently  raised  to  in  order  to  justify  the  continuous 
prolongations  of  border  checks  at  their  internal  borders  by  the  six  Schengen  States 
mentioned  in  Table  1.  In  view  of  the  geopolitical  situation  as  well  as  thanks  to  the 
measures adopted by the European Union, the level of these threats has decreased since 
then. Unfortunately, this decrease has not  led to  lifting border  checks. Moreover, some 
Member  States  put  the  bar  very  low  when  it  comes  to  the  definition  of  what  can 
constitute a threat justifying the reintroduction of border checks. For instance, Austria is 
of  the  opinion  that  since  the  2015/2016  crisis,  the  Schengen  area  does  not  allow  for 
attaining the objectives set out in Article 3 TEU anymore.  

  Migration 

To  recall,  the  migratory  crisis  of  2015  brought  hundreds  of  thousands  of  persons  to 
Europe  mostly  fleeing  from  the  war  zones  in  Syria.  In  2015  alone,  more  than  868  000 
persons  entered  into  the  Schengen  area  irregularly  through  the  Aegean  sea139.  For  this 
reason, the Commission accepted the notifications of temporary reintroduction of border 
checks  at  internal  borders  submitted  at  that  time  by  Austria,  Germany,  Slovenia, 
Hungary,  Sweden,  Norway  and  Denmark.  Recital  26  of  the  Schengen  Borders  Code 
states that “Migration and the crossing of external borders by a large number of third-
country  nationals  should  not,  per  se,  be  considered  to  be  a  threat  to  public  policy  or 
internal security”, but the level of the migratory pressure was considered exceptional. In 
its  Opinion  of  23  October  2015  on  the  necessity  and  proportionality  of  the  controls  at 
internal  borders  reintroduced  by  Germany  and  Austria140,  the  Commission  explicitly 
approved  the  use  of  border  checks  at  internal  borders  as  a  tool  to  address  the 
extraordinary migratory pressure.  

The  available  data  on  migration  trends  demonstrate  that,  as  of  2018,  migratory  flows 
have returned to the levels before 2015. According to the data collected for the purpose 
of  the  Pact  on  Migration  and  Asylum,  there  were  141,700  illegal  border  crossings  in 
2019,  which  means  a  decrease  by  5%  compared  to  2018,  the  lowest  level  in  six  years. 
Moreover, in the period January-November 2020 there have been ‘only’ 114,300 illegal 
border crossings, i.e. 10% less than in the same period of 2019. Thus, the claims of some 
Member States that the data shows that migratory flows are currently getting back to the 
levels before the pandemic, cannot be accepted. 

These trends put in question the necessity of border checks and suggest that the Member 
States do not sufficiently adapt to the changing trends in their response. 

  Terrorism 

Also the trends regarding terrorism have evolved. While the Paris attack was committed 
by  an  organised  group  operating  from  another  Member  State,  the  vast  majority  of 
subsequent attacks have been committed by radicalised individuals who were residing in 

139 See Back to Schengen – a Roadmap’ COM(2016)120, p. 4. 
140 C(2015)7100 For full reference see Annex 11. 

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the territory of the Member State concerned. It is also striking that in two cases where the 
culprit crossed the border directly before or after the attack, the borders crossed were at 
that moment subject to reintroduced border checks141 that, however, did not lead to any 
arrest.  

  Management of the External Borders  

While in 2015/2016 the frontline Member States were exposed to extreme pressure, the 
situation  has  changed  since  then.  In  2016,  serious  deficiencies  identified  at  the  Greek 
external border142 led to the adoption of four Council Recommendations143 that, based on 
Article 29, called on five Member States to temporarily reintroduce border checks at their 
internal borders between May 2016 and November 2017. The creation and then further 
reinforcement of the European Border and Coast Guard in 2016 and 2019144, the ongoing 
implementation of interoperability and the setting up and upgrading of the large-scale IT-
systems  such  as  Entry  /Exit  System  (EES),  European  Travel  Information  and 
Authorisation  System  (ETIAS),  Schengen  Information  System  (SIS)  and  Visa 
Information System (VIS), have already significantly reinforced the management of the 
external borders and will further contribute to making the European border management 
the most modern border management system in the world, by the end of 2023.  

Furthermore,  according  to  the  Report  of  the  Commission  on  the  Functioning  of  the 
Schengen  Evaluation  and  Monitoring  Mechanism145,  ‘Based  on  the  42  evaluations 
carried out in relation to external border management, it can be concluded that Member 
States  are  to  a  large  extent  adequately  implementing  the  Schengen  Borders  Code  and 
managing external borders in line with the acquis. Decisive progress has also been made 
to harmonise Member States’ strategic approaches towards external border management 
by  the  gradual  implementation  of  an  integrated  border  management  system.  While 
serious deficiencies were identified in four Member States146, those countries swiftly took 
the  necessary  measures  to  address  the  most  important  deficiencies.  Today,  no  Member 
State  has  serious  deficiencies  in  this  area,  but  specific  challenges  remain  in  a  few 
countries that still need to be promptly addressed’.  

Therefore,  also  the  situation  at  the  external  borders  cannot  be  considered  to  justify 
Member States’ decisions on the prolongation of border checks at internal borders. 

141 The perpetrator of the Berlin attack in 2016 managed to cross the DE/FR border despite reintroduced 
border checks, before being shot in Italy. Similarly, the perpetrator of Nice attack in 2020 managed to cross 
the IT/FR border, without being detected.  
142 C(2016)1219 Commission Implementing Decision setting out a recommendation on specific measures 
to be taken by the Hellenic Republic following the evaluation report of 2 February 2016. 
143  Council  Implementing  Decision  (EU)  2016/894  of  12  May  2016  setting  out  a  recommendation  for 
temporary  internal  border  control  in  exceptional  circumstances  putting  the  overall  functioning  of  the 
Schengen  area  at  risk;  Council  Implementing  Decision  (EU)  2016/1989  of  11  November  2016,  Council 
Implementing Decision (EU)2017/246 of 7 February and Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/818 
of 11 May 2017. 
144 Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 (OJ L 295, 14.11.2019, p. 1–131). For full reference see Annex 11. 
145 
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/pdf/report_schengen_evaluation_and_monitoring_mechanism_com-2020-
779_0.pdf. 
146 In addition to Greece, serious deficiencies in external border management  were identified also by the 
evaluations of Spain, Sweden and Iceland in 2017. Re-visits were carried out in Sweden and in Iceland in 
2019. 

https://ec.europa.eu/home-

COM(2020) 

final, 

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* 

The mass influx of third country nationals in 2015/2016 and the series of terrorist attacks 
in 2015 and 2016 put a lot of pressure on the Member States and EU institutions. For the 
Commission, addressing these challenges and, in particular, assessing the seriousness of 
a threat to internal security was rendered even more difficult by the fact that it does not 
dispose of  any information concerning the primary  and secondary  effects of the border 
checks at the internal border. Also for that reason, the Commission opted for a dialogue 
with  the  Member  States  concerned,  instead  of  taking  formal  steps  (such  as  issuing  an 
opinion  on  the  necessity/proportionality  of  such  checks,  or  launching  an  infringement 
procedure). 

In  order  to  adapt  the  Schengen  Borders  Code  to  the  persistence  of  certain  threats,  the 
Commission tabled in 2017 a legislative proposal extending the applicable time-limits for 
border  checks  at  internal  borders  in  exchange  for  stronger  procedural  safeguards  (see 
Annex  17).  However,  the  compromise  discussed  in  the  trilogues  between  the  co-
legislators in February 2019 did not find sufficient support among Member States. 

In  parallel,  the  Commission  continued  the  dialogue  with  the  Member  States.  The 
discussion  was  taken  up  again  at  the  highest  political  level  at  the  Schengen  Forum  on 
30 November  2020.  The  participants  in  the  Forum  agreed  that  Schengen  needs  to  be 
preserved  and  that  this  requires  legislative  action  to  make  Schengen  fit  for  today’s 
challenges (see Conclusions of the Chair – Annex 9).  

Nevertheless, some Schengen States report that their citizens expect a certain degree of 
control  over  who  is  crossing  the  internal  borders.  Border  controls  are  a  very  visible 
measure and therefore well suited to demonstrate that the national authorities are taking 
decisive  action.  For  example,  according  to  the  research  carried  out  in  2016  by  the 
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), an international think-tank, 59 % of the 
population in Estonia was ready to give up the Schengen agreement to reduce perceived 
threats related to uncontrolled refugee flows. This high percentage might also have to do 
with the fact that, at least where internal border controls are limited to certain areas of the 
borders and are not continuous, a significant part of the population does not experience 
any  direct  negative  effects 
the  special 
EUROBAROMETER in 2018, nearly 40% of respondents never travel to other countries 
within the EU, thus making them less concerned by the border checks at internal borders. 
However,  it  should  be  underlined,  as  demonstrated  in  the  costs  of  non-Schengen,  the 
permanent reintroduction of border checks at the internal borders would affect all citizens 
indirectly,  irrespectively  of  their  travelling  habits,  as  this  would  generate  a  significant 
costs for the economy overall, without citizens necessarily being aware of this link. 

these  controls.  According 

from 

to 

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ANNEX 8: MEASURES BY THE SCHENGEN MEMBER STATES AT THEIR INTERNAL AND 

EXTERNAL BORDERS IN RESPONSE TO THE FIRST WAVE OF COVID-19 
(UNTIL 19 MARCH 2020) 

Member State 

Measures at the internal and external borders 

Austria 

Internal borders: Introduction of internal border control with IT (11 March 
2020) CH and LI (14 March 2020) for 10 days. Entry into AT from there is 
only  possible  with  a  health  certificate  (not  older  than  4  days)  or  when 
admitting  into  2  week  home  quarantine;  transit  without  further  stops  in 
Austria is allowed. Exceptions are foreseen for cross-border workers. 

External borders:- 

Belgium 

Internal borders: No special, restrictive measures at the border for the time 
being. 

External  borders:  The  Foreign  Affairs  Ministry  advises  against  any  travel 
abroad (14 March 2020). 

BE closed the visa sections and visa applications centers. Certain categories 
of  persons  will  be  able  to  still  apply  for  a  visa,  but  only  through 
appointment.  In  line  with  the  COM  communication  on  temporary 
restrictions for travelling to the EU and the agreement reached between EU 
heads  of  state  and  government  yesterday,  these  categories  mainly  concern 
persons who are family members of Belgian or European citizens and other 
third  country  nationals  who  have  justified  reasons  or  needs  for  traveling. 
Our consulates already advised applicants against travelling to the EU or to 
postpone travel under the current circumstances, and will continue to do so 
(17 March 2020). 

Bulgaria 

Internal borders:- 

External borders: At entry points: contact tracing (forms to be filled-in by 
all arriving passengers); brochures with information on COVID-19 and the 
necessary prevention measures translated in 10 languages. Ban on entry on 
the territory of the country from high-risk countries (a list updated on daily 
basis); Limitation of free movement in most affected districts. 

Croatia 

Internal borders: - 

External borders: - 

Cyprus 

Internal borders:- 

External borders: Entry into CY will only be granted to individuals who fall 
under the categories listed below, provided that, upon arrival, they submit a 
medical  certificate,  issued  no  more  than  4  days  before,  showing  that  they 
have  been  tested  negative  for  coronavirus,  by  certified  medical  centres  in 
their country of origin: 

-  Cypriot citizens/nationals 

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-  Legal residents of the Republic of Cyprus 
-  EU or TCNs who work in the Republic of Cyprus 
-  Nationals of countries that are in a designated diplomatic service or 

mission under bilateral or international conventions. 

-  EU  or  third  country  nationals  attending  educational  institutions  in 

the Republic of Cyprus. 

Those  who  fulfil  all the  aforementioned  conditions  will  be  placed  under a 
14-day  compulsory  quarantine  at  accommodation  facilities  designated  by 
the Republic of Cyprus (16 March – 30 April 2020). 

Czech Republic 

Internal borders: Introduction of internal border controls (12 March 2020).  

The measure concerns the land borders with DE and AT and the air borders 
(14 March 2020  – 18 March 2020): The internal borders with AT and DE 
can  only  be  crossed  at  designated  crossing  points  without  any  time  limit. 
Persons,  who  demonstrably  cross  internal  borders  on  a  regular  basis,  in 
particular cross-border / commune workers, may also cross at other crossing 
points.  

The  above-mentioned  obligation  does  not  apply  to  selected  categories  of 
persons for whom the restriction on the crossing of internal borders would 
be  disproportionate  and  in  some  cases  would  be  contrary  to  the  public 
interest. These include, for example, an integrated rescue system, people in 
the event of an unforeseen emergency, freight transport, etc.  

Prolongation of internal border controls 

The measure concerns the land borders with DE and AT and the air borders, 
and is in force until 4th April 2020 23:59 with the possibility of extension. 

The  internal  borders  with  DE  and  AT  can  only  be  crossed  at  designated 
crossing points without any time limit. 

External  borders:  Suspending  short  term/long  term/temporary/permanent 
visa and residence permits applications at the CZ embassies. 

Additional measures on cross border mobility: Entry ban for all foreigners 
(incl. EU nationals) with the exception of those foreigners with temporary 
and residence permit in CZ (16 March 2020). Various exceptions have been 
already approved (for international transport drivers and crews, cross-border 
workers/commuters, rescue services, diplomatic personnel, etc.). 

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All  foreigners  who  are  at  the  time  of  the  declaration  of  the  state  of 
emergency  in  the  territory  legally,  temporarily  or  permanently,  under  the 
rules for the stay of foreigners, are entitled to remain in the territory for the 
duration of the state of emergency (14 March 2020). 

Travel  ban  for  CZ  citizens,  as  well  as  for  foreigners  with  temporary  and 
residence permit in CZ (14 March 2020). The entry and travel bans will be 
applied  earlier  for  the  high  epidemic  risk  areas  defined  by  the  Health 
Ministry,  namely  AT,  BE,  CH,  DE,  DK,  ES,  FR,  IT,  NL,  NO,  SE,  UK, 
China, Iran, South Korea. 

Denmark 

Internal  borders:  Introduction  of  internal  border  controls  at  all  internal 
borders.  

Additional measures  also involve travel restrictions and control of persons 
at  Danish  borders:  Persons  who  do  not  live  or  work  in  DK  or  are  not 
crossing  the  borders  to  deliver  goods  or  services  –  or  for  other  equally 
relevant  purposes,  will  not  be  allowed  entry  (14  March  2020-  13  April 
2020).  

External  borders:  Recommendation  that  Danes  refrain  from  all  non-
essential  travels  out-side  Denmark  and  advise  Danes  travelling  abroad  to 
return to Denmark in the coming days.  

Estonia 

Internal borders: The border guard units (especially at air borders) continue 
to perform ordinary border checks activities.  

In  the  frame  of  mutual  assistance,  the  Police  and  Border  Guard  Board  is 
supporting  the  activities  of  the  Health  Board.  The  activities  are  aimed  at 
supporting preventive actions for reducing the risk of COVID-19 spreading 
(10 March 2020). 

Assistance includes: 

-  Distribution  of  information  in  car  terminals  of  Tallinn  Harbour, 
external land border crossing points (Narva-1, Koidula, Luhamaa), 
at the border between Estonia and Latvia (Valga, Ikla to passengers 
traveling by public/mass transport (coaches and buses)).  

-  At  the  passenger`s  request  the  body  temperature  measurement  by 
handheld  digital  body  temperature  devices  might  be  performed  by 
the Police Officers in all locations at the border. 

Introduction  of  internal  border  controls  at  land,  sea  and  air  borders 
(17 March 2020). 

External  borders:  Estonia  is  temporarily  suspending  the  admission  of 
applications for Schengen visas and long-stay visas to Estonia at Estonia’s 
representations and visa centres due to the spread of the coronavirus. This 

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also applies to Schengen visa applications processed by Estonia on behalf of 
another member state. 

By exception, visa applications can be submitted on humanitarian grounds 
(illness  or  funeral  of  a  close  relative),  for  transporting  goods  or  raw 
materials, for providing medical or other services essential for the resolution 
of the emergency, as well as by individuals whose parent, child or spouse is 
an  Estonian  citizen  or  holds  an  Estonian  residence  permit  or  right  of 
residence. 

During the emergency situation, previously issued and valid visas cannot be 
used to enter Estonia. 

Finland 

Internal borders: Introduction of internal border controls (18 March 2020 – 
13 April 2020). 

INTERNAL  BORDERS,  MEANING  TRAFFIC  BETWEEN 

AT 
FINLAND AND ANOTHER SCHENGEN STATE, IS ALLOWED:  

1. 

Return to Finland:  

a.  Finnish nationals and their family members 
b.  Nationals of other EU and Schengen countries, who are residing in 

Finland and their family members 

c.  Third country nationals residing in Finland with residence permit 

Returning  transit  traffic  to  other  EU  or  Schengen  country  or  via 

2. 
them: 

a.  Nationals of EU and Schengen countries and their family members 
b.  Third country nationals residing in another EU or Schengen country 

with residence permit 
Necessary  cross-border  work  traffic  and  other  necessary  traffic, 

3. 
which is: 

a.  Healthcare  and  rescue  service  professionals/personnel,  health 

researchers, and elderly care professionals 

b.  Transport personnel and other transport staff to the extent necessary 
c.  Workers,  who  based  on  permanent  employee  relationship  work 
daily in another country and returns back to the country of residence 
at least once a week, taking into consideration local circumstances 
and natural travel-to-work area 

d.  Diplomats,  staff  of  international  organisations,  military  personnel 
and humanitarian aid workers in the exercise of their functions 

e.  Necessary (return) transit and returns 
f.  Passengers travelling for imperative family reasons 
g.  Persons in need of international protection or for other humanitarian 

reasons 

h.  Other necessary and justified traffic. For example, other necessary 
traffic would be maintenance work, that requires maintenance team 

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or a person arriving from another country and this work cannot be 
postponed. 

External  borders:  AT  EXTERNAL  BORDERS,  MEANING  TRAFFIC 
BETWEEN  FINLAND  AND  NON-SCHENGEN  COUNTRY,  FOR 
EXAMPLE RUSSIA, IS ALLOWED:  

1. 

Return to Finland:  

a.  Finnish nationals and their family members 
b.  Nationals of other EU and Schengen countries, who are residing in 

Finland and their family members 

c.  Third country nationals residing in Finland with residence permit 

Returning  transit  traffic  to  other  EU  or  Schengen  country  or  via 

2. 
them: 

a.  Nationals of EU and Schengen countries and their family members 
b.  Third country nationals residing in another EU or Schengen country 

with residence permit 
Exit of third country national 

Necessary traffic, which is: 

3. 

4. 

a.  Healthcare  and  rescue  service  professionals/personnel,  health 

researchers, and elderly care professionals 

b.  Transport personnel and other transport staff to the extent necessary 
c.  Diplomats,  staff  of  international  organisations,  military  personnel 
and humanitarian aid workers in the exercise of their functions 

d.  Necessary (return) transit and returns 
e.  Passengers travelling for imperative family reasons 
f.  Persons in need of international protection or for other humanitarian 

reasons 

g.  Other necessary and justified traffic. For example, other necessary 
traffic would be maintenance work, that requires maintenance team 
or a person arriving from another country and this work cannot be 
postponed. 
Internal borders:- 

External  borders:  Travel  restrictions  except  air  travel.  Air  passengers  are 
treated in an individual manner (17 March 2020). 

France 

France provide information to the public through their network of embassies 
and  liaison  officers.  Third  country  nationals  are  prevented  from  boarding. 
(They see a drop in extra-Schengen travel of 75%; 25% are remaining EU 
nationals, only 5% have no right to enter FR) 

Germany 

Internal borders: Introduction of internal border control at the land borders 
with Denmark, Luxembourg, France, Switzerland and Austria for an initial 
period of ten days. The Federal Republic of Germany reserves the right to 
determine border-crossing points for border checks (16 March 2020). 

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Cross-border  commuters  remain  largely  unimpeded  until  17  March  2020 
without  proof  that  they  have  a  job  in  another  country.  Thereafter,  they 
should provide proof of such a job in order to be able to cross the border. 
Other  unnecessary  trips  into  and  out  of  high-risk  areas  will  no  longer  be 
permitted. 

External  borders:  If  a  foreigner  who  is  legally  resident  in  the  federal 
territory and does not possess a residence title applies for a residence title, 
his residence shall be deemed to be permitted up to the time of the decision 
by the foreigners authority. 

Greece 

Internal borders:- 

External borders: Temporary closure of land borders. 

Internal  borders:  Introduction  of  internal  border  controls  at  the  HU/  AT 
border and HU/SI border (12 March 2020). 

Introduction of internal border control at the HU/SK border and at all of the 
Schengen internal air borders as well (17 March 2020). 

Hungary shall permit entry the following border crossing points:  

-  with 

regard 

to 

Slovenia:  Rédics, 

Tornyiszentmiklós; 

Tornyiszentmiklós- Pince; and 

-  with  regard  to  Austria:  Hegyeshalom,  Sopron,  Rábafüzes;  also 

Fertőd, Kópháza, Kőszeg, Búcsú és Szentpéterfa. 

-  with regard to Slovakia: Rajka, Tornyosnémeti; also Parassapuszta, 

Vámosszabadi, Esztergom, Sátoraljaújhely 

-  Other  roads  crossing  the  border  along  the  indicated  border  areas 

will be closed. 

HU will extend the reintroduced border control measures at the land and air 
borders by 20 days (22 March 2020). 

External borders: No more visa issuing to Iranian citizens (16 March 2020).  

Non-Hungarian citizens arriving from abroad are denied access to Hungary. 
EEA  citizens  with  permanent  Hungarian  residence  card  receive  the  same 
treatment  as  Hungarian  citizens.  In  cases  deserving  special  consideration, 
the Hungarian National Police Headquarter may grant exemption from the 
travel  and  traffic  restrictions,  with  appropriate  precautionary  health 
measures (17 March 2020): 

- 
- 

- 

the person concerned has undergone a health screening, 
no  suspicion  of  COVID-19  infection  has  been  established  in  the 
course of the health screening, and 
the  person  concerned  has  been  registered  by  the  epidemiological 
authority 

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As a general rule, employees of public sectors which are most affected by 
the epidemic situation are prohibited from leaving Hungary. 

Iceland 

Internal borders: - 

External borders: - 

Ireland 

Internal borders: - 

External borders: - 

Italy 

Internal borders: - 

Latvia 

External borders: All flights from China, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan 
suspended. Before this date, all passengers arriving from those destinations 
were subject to medical screening (31 January 2020). 

Internal  borders:  Restriction  will  not  apply  to  cargo,  as  well  as  for  LV 
citizens and TCN with permanent residence rights in LV, who are returning 
to LV, and to TCN who wish to leave LV. The foreign diplomats working 
in  LV,  as  well  as  persons  arriving  in  LV  for  humanitarian  reasons  or 
according to LV national interests are excluded as well. 

Controls  will  not  be  introduced  on  the  EU's  internal  borders  (17  March 
2020). 

External  borders:  All  of  the  EU's  external  border  crossing  points  will  be 
closed for people and transport (Restrictions will not apply to cargo). 

Short-term  and  long-term  visas  for  entry  to  LV  will  not  be  issued  by  LV 
diplomatic and consular missions abroad, as long as the emergency situation 
exists. 

Liechtenstein 

Internal borders:- 

External  borders:  The  entry  for  people  from  high-risk  countries  are 
restricted. High risk countries are countries or areas that must have imposed 
extraordinary  measures  to  prevent  and  combat  the  new  Virus.  At  present 
Italy,  Germany,  Austria  and  France  are  designated  high-risk  countries. 
People  from  high-risk  countries  will  be  refused  entry  into  the  Customs 
Union  with Switzerland.  Exceptions  are possible. This  counts  for  example 
for  people  who  live  or  work  in  Liechtenstein.  The  person  that  intends  to 
enter  the  Customs  Union  has  to  prove  that  one  the  exceptional  conditions 
(Art.  3  of  the  Ordinance  on  measures  to  prevent  coronavirus,  LR 
818.101.24). 

Lithuania 

Internal  borders:  Introduction  of  border  control  at  all  internal  land-,  sea-, 
and air borders (14 March – 24 March 2020). 

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External  borders:  Lithuanian  consulates  worldwide  suspended  acceptance 
and  processing  of  visa  applications,  including  visa  applications  in 
representation of another Schengen states. 

Luxembourg 

Internal  borders:  Increased  border  controls  between  DE  and  LU  are 
expected to take place in the coming days. 

External borders:- 

Malta  

Internal borders:- 

External borders:- 

The Netherlands 

Internal borders: - 

External borders: Regular border regime in place. 

Norway 

Internal borders: Introduction of internal border controls at all NO borders 
(16 March 2020). 

External borders: Norway will temporary refuse applications for Schengen 
visa (considered to be a threat to public health). 

An  administrative  decision  may  be  taken  under  the  Immigration  Act  to 
reject a foreign national without a residence permit. Decisions are taken by 
the  Directorate  of  Immigration  or  the  police.  The  Ministry  of  Justice  and 
Public  Security  may  assign  decision-making  competence  to  another 
authority. Foreign nationals who are rejected shall leave the realm without 
undue delay. The first paragraph does not apply to EEA nationals, and their 
family  members  as  defined  under  section  110  the  Immigration  Act,  who 
reside or work in Norway. 

Suspension of all representation agreements until further notice. 

Internal borders: Introduction of internal border controls at border with CZ, 
SK, DE, LT as well as at sea and air border crossing points (15 March – 24 
March 2020). 

External borders: Entry ban for foreigners (15 March 2020). 

Internal  borders:  Introduction  of  internal  border  controls  at  border  with 
Spain (16 March – 15 April 2020). Activation of 9 authorized internal land 
border crossing points with Spain. 

External borders: All measures should be applied without prejudice of: 

a.  The  right  of  entry  for  national  citizens  and  holders  of  residence 

permits in both countries; 

b.  Circulation  of  diplomatic  personnel,  Armed  Forces  and  law 

enforcement; 

Poland 

Portugal 

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c.  Circulation for the purpose of family reunion of spouses or similar 

and family members up to 1st degree; 

d.  Access to  health  facilities,  under the terms  of  bilateral  agreements 

related to the provision of health care; 

e.  The right to exit of citizens living in another country 

Ban  on  disembarkation  of  passengers  and  crew  of  cruise  ships  with  the 
exception of national citizens and legal residents in Portugal. 

Suspension  of  granting  of  licenses  to  come  ashore  for  crew  members  in 
national ports. 

Romania 

Internal borders: - 

External borders:- 

Slovakia 

Internal  borders:  Slovakia  has  taken  police  and  medical  measures  at 
internal borders of the Slovak Republic with Hungary, Czechia and Austria 
(13 March 2020). The objective of such measures is to limit the spread of 
the new Coronavirus through querying the travel history and assessment of 
the health condition of travellers. 

External  borders:  Slovakia  does  not  allow  to  enter  the  territory  by  all 
foreigners except those, who: 

- 
- 
- 
- 

- 

have residence at the territory of Slovakia 
are diplomats accredited in EU member states 
are cross-border workers 
are  foreign  health  professionals  for  the  purpose  of  combating 
COVID-19 
are drivers of vehicles transporting the goods 

Slovenia 

Internal borders: - 

External  borders:  Due  to  limitations  on  travel  being  instituted  in  Europe 
and  elsewhere,  the  Ministry  of  foreign  affairs  has  issued  an  appeal  to 
citizens to delay any travel abroad and for those who are abroad to return to 
Slovenia immediately 9 March 2020) 

Spain 

Internal  borders:  Introduction  of  border  controls  at  the  land  borders  (17 
March – 26 March 2020). 

The  entry  into  national  territory  through  the  land  borders  will  only  be 
allowed to the following individuals: 

a)  Spanish nationals;  
b)  Residents in Spain;  
c)  Cross-border workers; 
d)  In  case  of  force  majeure,  duly  accredited  with  documentary 

evidence.  

EN 

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Foreign  personal accredited  as  a  member  of  diplomatic  missions,  consular 
offices and international organizations located in Spain, are exempted from 
these  measures  in  their  displacements,  provided  these  are  displacements 
linked to the performance of official duties. 

External borders:- 

Sweden 

Internal borders: - 

External borders: - 

Switzerland 

Internal borders: Introduction of internal border controls at border with IT 
(13  March  –  22  March  2020).  In  order  to  make  controls  at  the  internal 
border to IT effective and at the same time as efficient as possible, a certain 
channelling  to  larger  border  crossing  points  is  inevitable.  For  this  reason, 
smaller border crossing points will stay closed. 

Border  controls  now  also  apply  to  the  air  traffic  from  Italy,  France, 
Germany  and  Austria  (18  March  2020).  Swiss  border  control  authorities 
will  set  up  the  corresponding  arrangements  at  the  airports.  Furthermore, 
people  from  high-risk  countries,  who  comply  with  one  of  the  four  cases 
above, may only enter at the airports of Zurich, Geneva or Basel. 

External  borders:  Travel  restrictions  for  passengers  from  Italy,  France, 
Germany,  Austria,  Spain  and  from  all  non-Schengen  states  (18  March 
2020): 

People travelling from IT, FR, DE, AT and ES may only enter Switzerland 
in one of the following four cases: 

- 
- 
- 
- 

they are a Swiss citizen; 
they have a residence permit in Switzerland; 
for professional reasons; 
if they are in a situation "of absolute necessity".  

Suspension of issuing Schengen Visas for three months. 

EN 

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ANNEX 9: EXAMPLES OF GOOD PRACTICES DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC 

At the Hungarian/Slovenian land border,  a few days after borders shutdowns related to 
COVID-19,  both  countries  gave  clear  feedback  to  each  other  of  the  negative  impact  of 
this  measure.  As  a  result,  borders  were  reopened  for  cross-border  commuters,  farmers 
and owners of property in the neighbouring country. The authorities agreed to leave the 
most  important  border  crossing  points  open  to  passengers  and  to  freight  transport. 
Governments  acted  rapidly  and  in  an  organised  manner:  the  restrictions  for  passenger 
traffic in Őrség and freight transport in Lendava were quickly lifted. 

As  regards  twin  cities,  at  the  EE-LV  land  border  an  exemption  was  made  allowing 
residents of the twin towns of Valka and Valga to move across the Estonia-Latvia border 
for  ‘valid  reasons’.  A  valid  reason  was  considered  to  be  a  job,  family  or  residence  in 
Estonia, but residents had to be included in the list prepared by the Valka Municipality 
and  had  to  present  a  passport  or  ID  card  when  crossing  the  border.  These  rules  were 
taken in an effort to cause as little disruption as possible to daily life and the provision of 
services. 

Euregio Meuse-Rhin underlines the well-functioning  multi-governance cooperation of 
the local task-forces (Euregio’s Meuse-Rhin’s crisis management task force and citizen 
information  points)  with  the  regional  governments  and  the  national  governments  of 
Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. In this regard, the  trust building during non-
crisis times is essential in order to have structures already in place for crisis times and 
ensure a smooth cooperation and the possibility to bring the specific problems of border 
regions on the political agenda at regional and national level. 

In  order  to  enable  cross-border  commuters  to  comply  with  test  requirements  on  entry, 
COVID-19-test facilities directly at the border were built, for example at the German-
French border crossing point “Goldene Bremm”147. 

General  exemptions  from  quarantine  requirement  for  short-term  stays  within  the 
context of cross-border traffic were introduced by some Member States or regions, e.g. 
by the German Bundesland Nordrhein-Westfalen for stays of under 24h for cross-border 
traffic from BE, LU and NL148. 

a 

issued 

general 

ruling 
The  German  Bundesland  Nordrhein-Westfalen 
(Allgemeinverfügung)  on  4  April  2021  on  test  requirements  for  persons  entering  from 
high incidence areas, which extends the period of validity of negative test results for 
cross-border commuters and for regular visits of close relatives, partners and dependent 
children  in  the  Bundesland  to  72h  compared  to  48h  for  entries  for  other  reasons.  This 
way,  commuting  workers  can  cover  one  working  week  of  up  to  six  days  with  two 
negative COVID-19 tests instead of three.  In its  explanatory memorandum, the general 
ruling refers to the “close economic and personal ties” in border areas, and comes to the 
conclusion that the strict test requirements in case of the classification of a neighbouring 
country as “area of high incidence” would lead to a “considerable burden” on the border 

https://www.saarland.de/DE/portale/corona/impfungtest/testzentrum/testzentrum-dt-fr/deutsch-

147 
franzoesisches-testzentrum/deutsch-franzoesisches-testzentrum_node.html 
148 § 4(6) 1) CoronaEinrVO NRW of 15 January 2021, last amendment on 27 March 2021. 

EN 

124 

  EN 

 
                                                 
citizens. The extension of the validity of test results of these groups of persons is seen as 
a “proportionate balance” between infection control and the mobility of these groups of 
persons.  “The  mobility  of  employees  and  close  relatives  should  not  be  restricted  at  the 
expense of companies in border regions and families.”149 

149  Allgemeinverfügung  zur  Regelung  von  Ausnahmen  von  der  Testpflicht  bei  Einreise  aus 
Hochinzidenzgebieten  nach  §  4  Absatz  2  Nummer  5  der  Coronavirus-Einreiseverordnung, 
Allgemeinverfügung  des  Ministeriums  für  Arbeit,  Gesundheit  und  Soziales  vom  4.  April  2021, 
https://www.mags.nrw/sites/default/files/asset/document/210404_av_hochinzidenzgebiete.pdf 

EN 

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ANNEX 10: USE OF POLICE CHECKS AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
WITHIN THE LAST FIVE YEARS  

Based  on  the  Member  States’  written  contributions  on  the  discussion  paper  on  the 
stakeholder consultation: 

MS 

other compensatory measures in 
use 

Comments 

Austria 

-  Police  checks  in  the  border 
area  with  Italy,  Slovakia  and 
Czech Republic* 

-  Video surveillance 
-  Plate recognition system 
-  drones 

At  border  sections  that  are  heavily 
affected by illegal migration, police 
checks  are  no  alternatives 
to 
internal  border  controls.  Since  for 
example  not  all  neighbouring 
countries  apply  the  readmission 
agreements,  only  reintroduction  of 
border control  guarantee the return 
of  persons,  attempting  to  enter 
illegally, to the country of origin 

Video  surveillance 
is  used  at 
certain  border  crossings.  Mobile 
license  plate  recognition  is  used 
wherever  there  is  added  value  in 
terms  of  criminal  tactics.  Drones 
are  also  used  for  internal  border 
surveillance 

Czechia 

-  police  checks  as  within  the 
intensified 
territory, 
COVID-19 
of 

entire 
because 
measures 

The differences between intensified 
police checks in the area of internal 
borders  and  non-systematic  border 
checks: 

The 

• 
temporary 
reintroduction  of  border  control 
must be decided by the government 
and,  under  certain  conditions,  by 
the Ministry of the Interior  

Crossing of internal borders 
• 
at  any  point  may  be  restricted 
during 
temporary 
reintroduction  of  border  control  – 
crossing  may  be  allowed  only  at 
authorised crossing points 

the 

• 
Checks of persons purely in 
response  to  border  crossing  are 

EN 

126 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
possible  during 
reintroduction of border control 

the 

temporary 

Entry  may  be 
• 
during 
the 
reintroduction of border control 

refused 
temporary 

• 
Checks  of  residence  and 
other  police  checks  are  carried  out 
at all times, are targeted at security 
and  migratory  situation,  and  may 
only  be  conducted  based  on 
reasonable suspicion. 

for 

“Schleierfahndung” 

Germany does not consider the so-
called 
a 
substitute 
internal  border 
controls, but an instrument of daily 
practice, without the existence of a 
special 
situation. 
danger/threat 
(Border) police measures below the 
threshold 
temporary 
of 
reintroduction  of  internal  border 
controls  cannot  be  equated  with 
temporary  internal  border  controls 
due  to  the  different  prerequisites 
and legal consequences. 

Germany 

- 
-  drones 
- 
-  Germany 

license plate recognition,  

facial recognition. 

implements 
(border)  police  measures  in 
the  border  regions  (so-called 
“Schleierfahndung”)  in  close 
cooperation  with  the  police 
the 
authorities 
In 
neighbouring  countries. 
and 
view 
security 
these 
measures  were  intensified  in 
2019. 

of  migratory 
challenges, 

of 

EN 

127 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finland 

-  police  checks  as  within  the 
entire territory, intensified? 

- 

camera surveillance 

Intensified  use  of  police  checks  in 
the  areas  of  internal  borders  are 
only  enforced  if  the  case  is  based 
on  criminal  investigations,  crime 
prevention  or  individual  case  or 
phenomena  related  to  public  order 
or safety 

Finland  has  gained  experience  in 
free  movement  since  1950’s  when 
Nordic  Passport  Union  was 
the  union,  all 
created.  Within 
Nordic  countries  had  a  possibility 
to  flexibly  use  spot-checks  at  their 
“internal  borders”.  According  to 
our  experience,  this  measure  was 
less  intrusive  than  border  controls, 
and  not  viewed  to  hamper  free 
movement by the general public. 

relevant 

ideas:  Mobile 
Other 
networks  could  help  to  detect  if  a 
mobile  phone  crosses  the  border 
and this information can be used to 
alert 
illegal 
secondary movement. This solution 
would  require  connecting  Eurodac 
telephone 
and  SIS  data  with 
information. 

authorities 

for 

Croatia 

-  use  of  drones  and  automated 

plate readers 

Hungary 

-  police  checks  as  within  the 

territory 

Malta 

-  police 

checks, 

no 

intensification 

These  measures  are  reported  to  be 
used  in  addition  to  regular  checks 
given  the  situation  of  Croatia  with 
regard  to  whom  the  Council  has 
not  taken  the  decision  on  lifting 
border controls yet. 

The present system is adequate and 
do  not  see  any  need  for  major 
changes as the distinction is clear 

EN 

128 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Norway 

Poland 

-  use  of  API  data  from  ferries 
from 
and 

for  Norway 
Sweden 

bound 
Denmark, 
Germany. 

-  Ferry 

are 
companies 
responsible  for  checking  that 
the  passengers  have 
the 
necessary  travel  documents 
for  entry  into  Norway  before 
ferry. 
boarding 
Passengers  without 
such 
documents  shall  be  refused 
boarding. 
-  Police checks  

the 

The  pre-arrival  screening  of  this 
information  is  an  efficient  way  of 
controlling  large  passenger  flows 
while  minimizing  the  need  for 
physical controls. 

There is a room for more flexibility 
with  regard  to  the  police  checks 
carried  out  on  the  basis  of  art.  23 
these  police 
SBC.  Currently, 
checks  are  justified  with  the  right 
to  prove  identity  or  check  the 
legality of stay. 

More leeway to use targeted checks 
(identity/legality  of  stay)  with 
regard to internal flights, identified 
as posing additional risk (e.g. used 
for  secondary  movements),  could 
be considered. Such  checks should 
not  be  interpretd  ad  systematic 
checks  if  used  in  a  justified  and 
proportional manner. 

Joint  patrols  and  other  forms  of 
the 
police  checks 
recommendation were already used 
before and their use is continued. 

indicated 

in 

Slovakia 

-  Police cooperation 
-  Police checks intensified  

Intensified  police  checks  are  only 
police immigration checks 

Switzerland 

-  Checks  based  on  Customs 

Inspections 

certain 

situations, 

In 
it  has 
operational  advantages  to  perform 
checks at the border itself. 

EN 

129 

  EN 

A decisive factor to assess whether 
police  checks  at  internal  borders 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
become unlawful border controls is 
the  impact  that  these  checks  have 
overall  on  cross-border  traffic  in 
the  concerned  region.  Police  and 
customs checks are carried out on a 
risk-based approach. Switzerland is 
of the opinion that checks that only 
affect a fraction of the traffic and / 
or  persons  crossing  a  specific 
border  do  not  constitute  unlawful 
border checks at internal borders  

It  is  used  as  a  tactical  tool  for 
analysis, 
the 
search for persons 

investigations  and 

-  use  of  systematic 

recognition  on 
in 

license 
the 
the  border 

plate 
border  and 
region.  

* period before COVID 

EN 

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ANNEX 11: DUTCH @MIGO-BORAS SYSTEM 

FACTSHEET on the use of the @MIGO-BORAS system 

This  factsheet  provides  information  about  the  aim  of  and  methods  used  by  the  camera 

surveillance  system  developed  by  the  Royal  Marechaussee  (Koninklijke  Marechaussee; 

KMAR) to support mobile supervision controls. The system is called @MIGO-BORAS – 

a  Dutch/English  acronym  which  stands  for  Mobile  Information-Driven  Action  –  Better 

Operational  Results  and  Advanced  Security.  The  system  has  been  operational  since  1 

August 2012. 

Aim  

The system  will provide technical  support to  mobile supervision  controls  conducted by 

the  KMAR.  It  will  make  these  controls  more  information-driven  and  allow  them  to  be 

conducted more efficiently and effectively.  

Legal framework  

The crossing of internal borders between EU member states is governed by the Schengen 

Borders Code.150 Under Article 22 of the Code, ‘Internal borders may be crossed at any 

point without a border  check on persons,  irrespective of their nationality, being carried 

out.’  Article  23  of  the  Code  provides  that  ‘The  abolition  of  border  control  at  internal 

borders shall not affect the exercise of police powers by the competent authorities of the 

Member States under national law, insofar as the exercise of those powers does not have 

an effect equivalent to border checks.’ This also applies explicitly in border areas. 

In the Netherlands, police controls in the border areas are carried out by the KMAR. The 

KMAR  is  a  military  police  organisation  under  the  responsibility  of  the  Minister  of 

Defence.  However,  the  predominantly  civil  police  tasks  for  which  it  is  responsible  fall 

within  the  remit  of  the  civil  authorities.  Under  section  6  of  the  Police  Act  1993  and 

150  Regulation  (EC)  No.  562/2006  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  15  March  2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen 
Borders Code), OJ EU 2006, L 105/1. Amended Regulation (EU) 2016/399, OJ EU 2016 L77/1 

EN 

131 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
section 47 of the Aliens Act 2000, the KMAR is responsible for supervising compliance 

with  the  statutory  provisions  relating  to  aliens  in  the  Netherlands.  The  Minister  for 

Migration (the State Secretary of Security and Justice of the Netherlands) has authority 

over the KMAR in this respect. Within this framework the KMAR conducts operational 

supervision  of  aliens  (i.e.  the  mobile  supervision  operations  mentioned  above)  in  the 

internal border area with Belgium and Germany that extends 20 km into the Netherlands 

from the border.151 

Mobile supervision controls conducted by the KMAR are intended: 

1.  to combat illegal residence, organised or otherwise (human trafficking or people 

smuggling)  at  the  earliest  possible  stage  and  to  prevent  and  discourage  other 

prospective migrants from travelling to the Netherlands illegally; 

2.  to help combat cross-border crime and migration-related crime. 

The  timing,  duration  and  frequency  of  these  controls  fall  within  the  framework  of  the 

Schengen  Borders  Code  and  the  case  law  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European 

Union.152 153 

The Schengen Borders Code contains no specific rules governing camera surveillance in 

border areas.  In draft guidelines on the functioning of the Schengen area, the European 

Commission  recently  turned  its  attention  to  the  use  of  camera  surveillance  in  internal 

border areas, and specifically automatic number plate recognition.  In the Commission’s 

view, camera surveillance is permissible in these areas under European law as long as it 

is compatible with the Schengen Borders Code and does not have an effect equivalent to 

border checks.  

The  national  legal  framework  for  mobile  supervision  operations  applies  fully  to  the 

support provided by the @MIGO-BORAS surveillance system. The legal framework for 

the intensity and frequency of the controls is laid down in Dutch immigration legislation. 

Mobile  supervision  controls  can  be  carried  out  in  Dutch  territory  in  areas  up  to  20  km 

151 Section 50 of the Aliens Act 2000 in conjunction with article 4.17a and b of the Aliens Decree 
152 ECJ, judgment in Melki (C-188/10) and Abdeli (C-189/10). 
153 Section 50 of the Aliens Act 2000 in conjunction with article 4.17a (and 4.17b) of the Aliens Decree. 

EN 

132 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
from the border with Belgium and Germany. On a given road, they may be carried out 

for up to six hours per day and for a maximum of 90 hours per month.  

Mobile supervision  controls  are conducted on the basis of section 50 of the Aliens Act 

2000  and  article  4.17a  (and  b)  of  the  Aliens  Decree  2000.  The  powers  laid  down  in 

immigration legislation do not provide a specific basis for the use of camera surveillance 

or number plate recognition.  

The @MIGO-BORAS system has three functions:  

1.  to collect anonymous data for analysis and the construction of traffic profiles; 

2.  to observe vehicles and select those to be stopped and examined on the basis of 

analysis; 

3.  to  respond  to  quick  alerts  in  situations  where  there  has  been  a  serious  or  large-

scale  breach  of  the  legal  order  or  public  order  or  in  the  interests  of  emergency 

assistance (as in the case of an amber alert).  

For  immigration  law  purposes,  anonymous  data  only  will  be  used  for  the  first  two 

functions (analysis and surveillance). The data stored will not be traceable to individuals 

since  the  list  of  characteristics  that  forms  the  basis  for  data  collection  and  vehicle 

surveillance and selection is limited. Any data traceable to individuals (such as number 

plates) will be encrypted before they are processed. In the case of the third application, 

quick  alerts,  the  data  in  question  is  traceable  to  individual  motorists,  since  in  an 

emergency  scenario,  one  or  more  specific  number  plates  will  be  sought.  This  third 

application  does  therefore  constitute  an  infringement  (albeit  limited)  of  the  right  to 

privacy  as  laid  down  in  article  10  of  the  Dutch  Constitution,  article  8  of  the  European 

Convention  on  Human  Rights  and  articles  7  and  8  of  the  EU  Charter  of  Fundamental 

Rights.  The  statutory  basis  for  the  processing  of  personal  data  in  the  context  of  quick 

alerts can be found in section 2 of the Police Act. The Data Protection Authority (CBP) 

recognises  this  application  in  its  guidelines  on  automatic  number  plate  recognition 

systems.  This  infringement  is  proportionate  given  the  purpose  of  quick  alerts.  Such 

operations serve a justifiable purpose, i.e. investigating and preventing serious criminal 

offences (in situations where the assistance of the emergency services is required or there 

has been a particularly serious or large-scale breach of the legal order or of public order). 

EN 

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The  number  plate  data  collected  for  quick  alert  purposes  is  handled  by  a  very  small 

number of KMAR staff, limiting the infringement  of privacy rights.  Strict  criteria have 

been  laid  down  in  respect  of  who  may  access  the  data  and  under  what  conditions.  The 

data may be processed provided this is essential for investigative purposes or emergency 

services assistance.  

Organisation and design 

@MIGO-BORAS is a modular system, which can be operated according to the different 

functions for which it is designed.154 

The system consists of 15 fixed camera (or sensor) installations and six vehicle-mounted 

mobile sensors plus a central control application to which all data is sent and processed. 

The  fixed  sensors  are  positioned  in  the  main  through  routes  in  the  border  area  with 

Belgium and Germany and are used exclusively in Dutch territory.  

The  system  can  be  used  both  for  data  collection  and  for  surveillance.  These  specific 

functions are described in the section below on ‘Use’.  

During  data  collection  (function  1),  traffic  patterns  are  observed  in  accordance  with  a 

data collection plan. Smart sensors classify every passing vehicle by category (e.g. heavy 

goods  vehicle,  standard  car  or  SUV),  colour,  country/region  of  origin  and  time  and 

location. Vehicle and traffic-pattern risk profiles are then developed on the basis of these 

data.  No  number  plates  or  other  data  that  can  be  traced  to  individual  persons  will  be 

processed. 

When  function  2  (surveillance)  is  used,  the  system  observes  characteristics  of  passing 

vehicles during the limited periods in which it is operating as part of mobile supervision 

operations.  The  system  then  uses  existing  risk  profiles  to  establish  whether  a  passing 

vehicle  is  a  likely  candidate  for  a  vehicle  check.  In  doing  so  the  system  makes  the 

selection of vehicles for examination quicker and more objective. It is therefore a useful 

154  The  CBP's  guidelines  on  automatic  number  plate  recognition  systems  and  the  Brouwer-Korf 
Committee's recommendations were specifically considered throughout the design process. 

EN 

134 

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addition to existing KMAR practice based on the professional experience of its staff. It 

helps  optimise  implementation  of  KMAR  tasks  and  makes  staff  deployment  more 

efficient.  It  also  increases  the  likelihood  of  identifying  suspect  vehicles,  which  in  turn 

will  reduce  the  number  of  checks  to  which  bona  fide  motorists  are  subjected.  With 

assistance from @MIGO-BORAS the KMAR attempts wherever possible to conduct its 

controls in the right place, at the right time and on the right vehicles.  

When  function  3  (Quick  Alert)  is  used  in  exceptional  situations,  one  or  more  specific 

number plates is searched for in the system. 

Use 

In accordance with recently-amended national legislation, mobile supervision operations 

are  conducted  as  far  as  possible  on  the  basis  of  intelligence  held  and/or  empirical 

information  on  illegal  residence.  To  a  limited  extent,  mobile  supervision  controls  are 

conducted with a view to gathering intelligence on illegal residence.155 During the limited 

period in which mobile supervision operations can be conducted, the @MIGO-BORAS 

system will provide direct support by comparing characteristics of passing vehicles with 

existing  risk  profiles.  In  addition,  the  system  will  be  used  (on  the  basis  of  the  data 

collection  plan)  to  gather  anonymous  traffic-flow  data  which  will  help  analysts  when 

drawing up new risk profiles or improving existing ones.  

The three functions are explained in more detail below:  

1. Anonymous data collection and analysis  

The  data  collected  on  each  passing  vehicle  is  made  anonymous.  This  ensures  that  the 

vehicle  (and  its  passing  the  location  in  question)  can  no  longer  be  traced  back  to  an 

individual.  Once  this  data  is  anonymous,  it  is  analysed  and  then  used  to  draw  up  risk 

profiles.  It  is  also  used  to  help  analysts  recognise  trends  and  developments  in  traffic 

patterns.  The  latter  helps  KMAR  plan  and  manage  its  subsequent  mobile  supervision 

controls. The risk profiles will be used to support the system of aliens supervision. The 

legal  basis  for  this  process  lies  in  the  general  power  to  supervise  aliens  in  the 

155 Article 4.17a of the Aliens Decree 2000. 

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Netherlands. The profiles resulting from  the collection and analysis of anonymous data 

comply with applicable anti-discrimination legislation. The purpose of this function is to 

collect  information  that  can  be  used  for  data  analysis.  No  immediate  follow-up  takes 

place in the context of this function and thus no individual vehicle is subjected to a check 

directly as a result of it.  

2. Observing vehicles and selecting those to be stopped and examined 

The KMAR observes  vehicles and selects  those to  be stopped and examined using risk 

profiles drawn up on the basis of the analysis of the data obtained by @MIGO-BORAS 

(see function 1) and any other information at the KMAR’s disposal. The deployment of 

@MIGO-BORAS is based on a surveillance plan which specifies what sensors are to be 

activated and when. The use of @MIGO-BORAS is thus compatible with the provisions 

of article 4.17a of the Aliens Decree 2000. If a particular vehicle matches a particular risk 

profile, the controller receives a signal (a ‘hit’). The controller can then advise a mobile 

KMAR officer which vehicle should be subjected to a check. After making visual contact 

with the vehicle the officer will then either stop the vehicle in question or decide not to 

perform a check.  

It is technically possible to use @MIGO-BORAS in conjunction with police information 

to investigate crime and enforce criminal law. This is not being done for the time being 

until  the  legal  framework  surrounding  the  statutory  basis  for  such  use  has  been 

determined  more  fully.  Under  the  general  police  powers  as  laid  down  in  the  Police 

Act,156 the system may be used for quick alerts in exceptional or urgent situations.  

3. Providing assistance when a quick alert is issued  

Under section 2 of the Police Act 1993, a quick alert (such as an amber alert or terrorist 

threat)  may  be  issued  in  the  interests  of  emergency  assistance  or  if  there  has  been  a 

serious  or  large-scale  breach  of  the  legal  order  or  of  public  order.  In  such  cases, 

@MIGO-BORAS may be used to follow up on an alert.  

156 Sections 2 and 6 of the Police Act 1993. 

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Inherent  in  the  system’s  design  are  a  number  of  options  that  fulfil  the  principle  of 

‘privacy  by  design’.  In  addition,  design  choices  were  made  to  maximise  the  system’s 

compatibility  with  the  KMAR’s  operational  processes  while  taking  account  of  current 

legislation  and  anticipated  developments  in  the  law.  Examples  of  the  choices 

underpinning the system’s design include: 

  The distinction between data collection and surveillance: 

o  When  in  data  collection  mode,  @MIGO-BORAS  registers  every  vehicle  that 

passes its sensors. Before the data is saved it is made anonymous. This means that 

the  number  plate  is  converted  to  a  code  that  cannot  be  traced  to  an  individual 

person. 

o  When in surveillance mode, the system compares the characteristics of a vehicle 

recorded by the sensors with those contained in a risk profile. Using the profiling 

model,  passing  vehicles  can  be  observed  and  compared  with  a  set  of  vehicle 

characteristics without the need to reveal number plates.  

  Data collection and surveillance are always performed on the basis of plans for each 

activity.  If  no  plan  is  active  the  central  application  will  receive  no  data  on  passing 

vehicles. 

o  The data collection plan contains the specifications of the sensors to be deployed 

(e.g. the location, time and duration of their use). It also contains the address to 

which the data obtained are to be delivered. 

o  The  surveillance  plan  contains  the  same  type  of  sensor  specifications  as  those 

included  in  the  data  collection  plan.  The  surveillance  plan  specifies  the  risk 

profiles with which the characteristics of passing vehicles are to be compared. It 

too  contains  the  address  to  which  vehicle  data  are  to  be  delivered  if  they 

correspond to those contained in the risk profile. 

  The system distinguishes between several types of target-group definitions to identify 

relevant  vehicles  as  specifically  as  possible.  It  is  possible  both  to  specify  known 

number  plates  and  to  specify  risk  profiles  that  contain  characteristics  relating  to 

vehicles in a given target group.  

Fictitious scenario 

A  combination  of  empirical  information,  KMAR  intelligence  and  general  police  data 

analysis has revealed that illegal migrants are being transported to Westland to work in 

EN 

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commercial  glasshouses  there.  Intelligence  suggests  that  white  minibuses,  mostly  from 

country  X,  region  Y,  are  being  used  for  this  purpose.  The  illegal  aliens  are  often 

smuggled into the Netherlands in  the early hours of the morning.  It  then  emerges from 

@MIGO-BORAS data collection that a noticeably high number of white passenger vans 

from country X, region Y has been observed moving in convoy between 01.00 and 02.00 

on Tuesday mornings, usually a quiet time. This turns out to be a weekly pattern – at the 

same location and the same time – which is at odds with the usual traffic pattern on other 

days of the week.  

The KMAR decides to plan a mobile supervision control at this time and draws up a risk 

profile based on the characteristics of such vehicles. When a certain vehicle passes, the 

system produces a hit matching the profile vehicle. The controller alerts a mobile officer 

to  the  hit.  The  officer  then  follows  the  vehicle  in  question  and  provides  visual 

confirmation of the passenger complement. The vehicle is then subjected to a check. 

Protection of privacy 

When control is carried out using risk profiles, officers may check a vehicle on the basis 

of a single hit. Should this lead to follow-up action provided for by law, the system will 

provide visual footage of the vehicle in question, plus the date, time and location of the 

check. The whole data set, including reference to the risk profile employed, is stored as 

part of the official report arising from the vehicle check. These data (which are traceable 

to  the  individual  concerned)  will  thereafter  be  stored  in  the  KMAR’s  operational 

processing system and not in the @MIGO-BORAS system. Under section 8 of the Police 

Data Act, these data may be stored for up to five years. Non-hits are not stored. 

If a particular vehicle is being sought in the context of a quick alert, the cooperation and 

assistance involved in processing data traceable to the individual concerned takes place 

in the context of national security and public order. If a hit is identified in the context of a 

quick  alert,  the  system  will  generate  footage  of  the  vehicle  and  the  date,  time  and 

location. The whole data set relating to the hit will be transferred to the requesting party 

(i.e. the Public Prosecution Service or the police) and stored in accordance with national 

legislation under that party’s responsibility. The KMAR does not store this data itself.  

EN 

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Since  the  system  uses  digital  technology,  it  was  registered  with  the  Data  Protection 

Authority  (CBP)  when  it  was  developed  in  2005.  Throughout  the  development  process 

designers took account of the CBP’s guidelines on automatic number plate recognition. 

The CBP has indicated that in line with established procedure, it waits until systems are 

operational before assessing whether they meet, statutory requirements.  

Everyone  is  legally  entitled  to  ascertain  whether  KMAR  has  processed  any  of  their 

personal data and, if so, which personal data it has processed.157 KMAR announces the 

presence  of  permanent  cameras  by  signs  at  the  side  of  the  road.  Information  about  the 

system and privacy issues is also publicly available online.  

Cooperation with neighbouring countries 

Neighbouring  countries  and 

the  Commission  has  been 

informed  about 

the 

implementation and function of the system.  

157 Sections 25 and 28 of the Police Data Act. 

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ANNEX 12: REPORTS RECEIVED BY MEMBER STATES WITH INTERNAL BORDER 
CONTROL IN PLACE BETWEEN MARCH AND JUNE 2020 IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
ARTICLE 33 SBC 

Reintroducing 
Member State 

Report 
received 
(yes/no) 

Austria 

Belgium 

Czech 
Republic 

Denmark 

Estonia 

no 

Yes 

yes 

no 

yes 

Finland 

yes 

France 

Germany  

Hungary 

no 

no 

yes 

Iceland 

yes 

Lithuania 

yes 

Norway 

Poland 

no 

yes 

Portugal 

yes 

Comments 

- 

20/03/2020  –  14/06/2020;  comprehensive  report,  covering 
all requested aspects and including statistical data 

14/03/2020  –  30/06/2020;  comprehensive  report,  covering 
all requested aspects and including statistical data 

- 

17/03/2020  –  16/06/2020;  the  report  covers  all  requested 
aspects, including basic statistical data 

19/03/2020  –  18/09/2020;  the  report  covers  all  requested 
aspects 

- 

- 

12/03/2020  –  30/06/2020;  the  report  covers  all  requested 
aspects (some very shortly) and includes statistical data 

24/04/2020  –  22/06/2020;  the  report  does  not  cover  all 
respected  aspects  (no  information  regarding  the  impact  on 
freedom  of  movement,  the  ex-post  assessment  of  the 
proportionality) and some aspects are only shortly addressed 

14/03/2020  –  14/09/2021;  comprehensive  report,  covering 
all  requested  aspects,  including  statistical  data  and  an 
additional section on lessons learnt  

- 

15/03/2020  –  12/06/2020;  comprehensive  report  including 
statistical data 

16/03/2020  –  30/06/2020;  the  report  does  not  cover  all 
respected  aspects  (no  information  regarding  the  impact  on 
freedom  of  movement  and  the  ex-post  assessment  of  the 
proportionality)  and  some  aspects  are  only  shortly 
addressed, it includes statistical data 

Slovakia 

yes 

08/04/2020  –  26/06/2020;  the  report  covers  all  requested 
aspects, although some aspects are only shortly addressed 

EN 

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Spain 

yes 

Switzerland 

yes 

General observations: 

14/03/2020  –  30/06/2020;  the  report  covers  all  requested 
aspects,  although  some  aspects  are  only  shortly  addressed 
and includes statistical data 

13/03/2020  –  15/06/2020;  the  report  does  not  cover  all 
respected aspects (no information regarding the operation of 
the  controls,  the  impact  on  freedom  of  movement,  the  ex-
post  assessment  of  the  proportionality), including  statistical 
data 

-  Most  reports  were  in  large  parts  rather  descriptive,  particularly  regarding  the  initial 
assessment of the criteria of the SBC. In  general, the content and shared information 
varies greatly, from detailed statistics to very general statements that a certain criterion 
is fulfilled. 

-  The reports did not access the effectivity and the proportionality of the reintroductions 
in a uniform manner. Particularly the assessment of the proportionality is not based on 
a common definition of “proportionate”. Only very few reports referred to the possible 
use  of  alternative  measures,  but  only  assessed  their  viability  and  effectivity  very 
briefly.  

-  Some reports did not draw a clear line between entry restrictions and border control, in 
essence assessing the criteria for the entry restrictions, not for the reintroduced border 
control. 

-  Apart  from  one  report,  which  included  a  section  on  lessons  learnt  from  the 
reintroduction,  no  issues  or  problems  during  the  reintroduction  were  raised  in  the 
reports. 

EN 

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ANNEX 13: API AND PNR 

API  data  refers  to  the  passengers’  identity,  usually  taken  from  their  official  documents,  as 
well  as  the  flight  information  for  passengers,  including  the  number  and  type  of  travel 
document  used,  nationality,  full  names,  the  date  of  birth,  the  border  crossing  point  of  entry 
into  the  territory  of  the  Schengen  Member  States,  mode  of  transport,  departure  and  arrival 
time of the transportation, total number of passengers carried on that transport, and the initial 
point of embarkation158. API data is highly valuable for internal security due to its accuracy 
and reliability. Carriers are obliged to transmit this data, by end of check-in, at their request to 
the  responsible  authorities  of  the  Member  State  that  the  passengers  will  enter  through  the 
authorised border  crossing point to  which the carrier will transport them. Under Union law, 
however,  air  companies  only  transmit  API  data  of  passengers  travelling  into  the  European 
Union to the border control authorities at destination, and only for border control purposes.159 
This  means  API  data  are  not  available  for  other  security  purposes,  and  notably  cannot  be 
collected for intra-Schengen flights. 

PNR  data160  is  provided  by  passengers  at  the  moment  of  booking  and  contain,  apart  from 
passenger’s  name  and  surname,  information  such  as  payment  details,  contact  details  or 
luggage  information.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  PNR  data  is  collected  for  commercial 
purposes and data crucial for the use for law enforcement purposes, such as passenger’s date 
of birth, are often missing. This is particularly relevant for the processing of PNR data against 
databases such as SIS: the processing of incomplete data may lead to a high number of false 
positive hits. Law enforcement practitioners have stressed that the best operational results are 
often  achieved  by  the  joint  processing  of  the  more  reliable  API  data  which  enables  the 
confirmation of the identity of passengers, together with richer PNR, which reveals important 
information  about  passengers’  travel  behaviour161.  API  also  allow  the  authorities  to  ensure 
that the system works in a targeted manner so that only those passengers who are genuinely 
suspicious are identified162. 

158 For more information see Directive 2004/82/EC on the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data, 
Study on Advance Passenger Information (API) – Evaluation of Council Directive 2004/82/EC on the obligation 
of  carriers  to  communicate  passenger  data:  https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/3ef3a394-
5dcb-11ea-b735-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF 
159 See Directive 2004/82/EC. For full reference see Annex 16 
160  The  collection  and  processing  of  PNR  data  in  the  EU  is  regulated  by  the  Directive  (EU)  2016/681  of  the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data for 
the  prevention,  detection,  investigation  and  prosecution  of  terrorist  offences  and  serious  crime,  OJ  L  119, 
4.5.2016, p. 132. 
161 SWD(2020) 128 final, p.43. 
162 Ibidem, p.26. 

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ANNEX 14: NEW IT ARCHITECTURE AT THE EXTERNAL BORDERS 

The Entry/Exit System (EES) is a new automated IT system for registering travellers from 
third-countries, both short-stay visa holders and visa-exempt travellers, each time they cross 
an EU external border and will replace the current system of manually stamping passports.  

ETIAS  is  also  a  new,  largely  automated  IT  system  created  to  identify  security,  irregular 
migration  or  high  epidemic  risks  posed  by  visa-exempt  visitors  travelling  to  the  Member 
States,  whilst  at  the  same  time  facilitate  crossing  borders  for  the  vast  majority  of  travellers 
who do not pose such risks. Non-EU nationals who do not need a visa to travel to Schengen 
will have to apply for a travel authorisation through the ETIAS system prior to their trip. EES 
and ETIAS are to be operational in 2022.  

The  Interoperability  Regulations  establish  a  framework  for  the  interoperability  of  the  six 
central  large-scale  IT  systems  in  the  field  of  borders,  security  and  migration,  namely  EES, 
VIS, ETIAS, Eurodac, SIS, and ECRIS-TCN. It will be operational from 2023. 

EN 

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ANNEX 15: BORDER AREAS 

In  the  absence  of  a  definition  of  the  border  area  in  the  Schengen  Borders  Code,  any  future 
reference to the border areas could be constructed as referring to one of the following: 

Local Border Traffic (Regulation 1931/2006)163 

The 2006 Regulation laying down rules on local border traffic at the external land borders of 
the  Member  States  allows  derogating,  for  persons  living  in  a  border  area,  from  the  general 
rules  on  border  checks  set  out  in  the  Schengen  Borders  Code.  The  aim  is  to  avoid  creating 
barriers  to  trade,  social  and  cultural  interchange  or  regional  cooperation  with  neighbouring 
countries.  The  Regulation  authorises  Member  States  to  conclude  bilateral  agreements  with 
neighbouring non-EU countries, provided these agreements fully comply with the parameters 
set by the Regulation. 

In the regulation, the border area has been defined as “an area that extends no more than 30 
kilometres from the border. The local administrative districts that are to be considered as the 
border area shall be specified by the States concerned in their bilateral Agreements as referred 
to in Article 13. If part of any such district lies between 30 and 50 kilometres from the border 
line, it shall nevertheless be considered as part of the border area”. However, this definition 
has been extended in 2011 in view of the specific situation of the Kaliningrad Oblast, to avoid 
the  division  of  integrated  areas  and  excludes  political  and  economic  centres.  According  to 
Regulation 1342/2011164, the border area include also specific districts and cities (e.g. Gdansk 
which is >100km from the border). 

NUTS 

In  accordance  with  Regulation  No  1059/2003  of  26  May  2003165,  the  NUTS  classification 
(nomenclature  of  territorial  units  for  statistics)  subdivides  the  economic  territory  of  the 
Member States, as defined in Decision 91/450/EEC, into territorial units. It ascribes to each 
territorial  unit  a  specific  code  and  name.  The  NUTS  classification  is  hierarchical.  It 
subdivides each Member State into NUTS level 1 territorial units, each of which is subdivided 
into  NUTS  level  2  territorial  units,  these  in  turn  each  being  subdivided  into  NUTS  level  3 
territorial  units  (Article  1).  Regulation  (EU)  2017/2391  of  12  December  2017  amending 
Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003 as regards the territorial typologies (Tercet) specifies that the 
common statistical classification of territorial units (NUTS) has been established in order to 
enable  the  collection,  compilation  and  dissemination  of  European  statistics  at  different 
territorial levels of the Union (Article 1). While this system is well-known to Member States 
it  should  be  noted  that  its  design  is  not  based  on  purely  geographical  criteria.  Instead,  the 

163 Regulation (EC) No 1931/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 laying 
down rules on local border traffic at the external land borders of the Member States and amending the provisions 
of the Schengen Convention OJ L 405, 30.12.2006, p. 1–22 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32006R1931 
164  Regulation  (EU)  No  1342/2011  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  13  December  2011 
amending Regulation (EC) No 1931/2006 as regards the inclusion of the Kaliningrad oblast and certain Polish 
administrative districts in the eligible border area, OJ L 347, 30.12.2011, p. 41–43 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32011R1342 
165  Regulation  (EC)  No  1059/2003  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  26  May  2003  on  the 
establishment of a common classification of territorial units for statistics (NUTS) 
OJ L 154, 21.6.2003, p. 1–41, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32003R1059.  

EN 

144 

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classification  of  NUTS  territorial  units  is  based  on  existing  administrative  units  in  the 
Member States and on their respective population numbers. While administrative units which 
reach the agreed thresholds for the respective NUTS level constitute a NUTS territorial unit 
by  themselves,  administrative  units  with  low  population  numbers  are  combined  with  others 
until they reach the required threshold, taking into consideration other relevant criteria, such 
as  geographical,  socio-economic,  historical,  cultural  or  environmental  circumstances166. 
Consequently,  the  size  of  these  units  varies  greatly  between  and  also  within  the  Member 
States167 depending on the population density in the areas concerned. Therefore, an approach 
based  on  NUTS  territorial  units  does  not  appear  suitable  as  a  point  of  reference  for  the 
definition of border areas.  

166 Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003, Article 3. 
167  See  maps  on 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/nuts-maps.  

the  NUTS  classification  of 

the 

territories  of 

the  different  Member  States  at 

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ANNEX 16: LIST OF LEGAL ACTS AND PROPOSALS MENTIONED IN THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Title/Link 

Council Regulation (EC) No 2679/98 of 7 December 1998 on the functioning of the internal market in 
relation to the free movement of goods among the Member States OJ L 337, 12.12.1998, p. 8–9 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A31998R2679 
Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, 
the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of 
checks at their common borders OJ L 239, 22.9.2000, p. 13 

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2000.239.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL
%3A2000%3A239%3ATOC 

Page 

53 

4 

Convention  implementing  the  Schengen  Agreement  of  14  June  1985  between  the 
Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of 
Germany  and  the  French  Republic  on  the  gradual  abolition  of  checks  at  their 
common borders, OJ L 239, 22.9.2000, p. 19 

4, 47 

 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2000.239.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL
%3A2000%3A239%3ATOC 

Council  Directive  2001/51/EC  of  28  June  2001  supplementing  the  provisions  of  Article  26  of  the 
Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 OJ L 187, 10.7.2001 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32001L0051 
Directive  2004/38/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  29  April 
2004  on  the  right  of  citizens  of  the  Union  and  their  family  members  to  move  and 
reside  freely  within  the  territory  of  the  Member  States  amending  Regulation  (EEC) 
No  1612/68  and  repealing  Directives  64/221/EEC,  68/360/EEC,  72/194/EEC, 
73/148/EEC,  75/34/EEC,  75/35/EEC,  90/364/EEC,  90/365/EEC  and  93/96/EEC 
(Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, p. 77–123 

47 

10 

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32004L0038 

Council Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013 of 7 October 2013 establishing an evaluation 
and  monitoring  mechanism  to  verify  the  application  of  the  Schengen  acquis  and 
repealing the Decision of the Executive Committee of 16 September 1998 setting up 
a Standing Committee on the evaluation and implementation of Schengen 

4 

OJ L 295, 6.11.2013, p. 27–37 

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32013R1053 

C(2015)7100  Opinion  of  23.10.2015  on  the  necessity  and  proportionality  of  the  controls  at  internal 
borders  reintroduced  by  Germany  and  Austria  pursuant  to  Article  24(4)  of  Regulation  No  562/2006 
(Schengen Borders Code) 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/default/files/e-library/documents/policies/borders-and-
visas/general/docs/commission_opinion_necessity_proportionality_controls_internal_borders_german
y_austria_en.pdf 
Communication from  the Commission to  the European Parliament and the Council: 
Back to Schengen - A Roadmap, 4 March 2016, COM(2016) 120 final 

31 

21, 
31, 

EN 

146 

  EN 

 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/default/files/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-
visas/schengen/docs/communication-back-to-schengen-roadmap_en.pdf 

37, 38 

Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 
2016  on  a  Union  Code  on  the  rules  governing  the  movement  of  persons  across 
borders (Schengen Borders Code), OJ L 77, 23.3.2016  

4 

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32016R0399 

(codifying  first  Schengen  Borders  Code:  Regulation  (EC)  No  562/2006  of  the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community 
Code  on  the  rules  governing  the  movement  of  persons  across  borders  (Schengen 
Borders Code), OJ L 105, 13.4.2006, p. 1–32, and subsequent amendments) 

Council  Implementing  Decision  (EU)  2016/894  of  12  May  2016  setting  out  a  recommendation  for 
temporary internal border control in exceptional circumstances putting the overall functioning of the 
Schengen area at risk; OJ L 151, 8.6.2016, p. 8–11 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016D0894 

Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1989 of 11 November 2016 setting out a  recommendation 
for  prolonging  temporary  internal  border  control  in  exceptional  circumstances  putting  the  overall 
functioning of the Schengen area at risk, OJ L 306, 15.11.2016, p. 13–15 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?toc=OJ:L:2016:306:TOC&uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2016.306.01.0013.01.ENG 
COM(2017)571  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  amending  Regulation  (EU)  2016/399  as 
regards  the  rules  applicable  to  the  temporary  reintroduction  of  border  control  at 
internal border. 

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52017PC0571 

Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/246 of 7 February 2017 setting out a Recommendation for 
prolonging  temporary  internal  border  control  in  exceptional  circumstances  putting  the  overall 
functioning of the Schengen area at risk OJ L 36, 11.2.2017, p. 59–61  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017D0246 

Council  Implementing  Decision  (EU)  2017/818  of  11  May  2017  setting  out  a  Recommendation  for 
prolonging  temporary  internal  border  control  in  exceptional  circumstances  putting  the  overall 
functioning of the Schengen area at risk OJ L 122, 13.5.2017, p. 73–75 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2017.122.01.0073.01.ENG 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION of 12.5.2017 on proportionate police checks 
and police cooperation in the Schengen area C(2017)3349  

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/default/files/what-we-do/policies/european-
agenda-
migration/20170502_recommandation_on_schengen_area_police_checks_and_coope
ration_en.pdf 

Regulation  (EU)  2017/2226  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  30 
November  2017  establishing  an  Entry/Exit  System  (EES)  to  register  entry  and  exit 
data and refusal of entry data of third-country nationals crossing the external borders 
of the Member States and determining the conditions for access to the EES for law 
enforcement purposes, OJ L 327, 9.12.2017. 

17, 
Anne
x 7, 
p.50 

Anne
x 7, p. 
50 

5, 31, 
37 

Anne
x 7, p. 
50 

Anne
x 7, p. 
50 

7, 18, 
29, 
31, 
38, 
39, 43 

6, 32 

EN 

147 

  EN 

 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017R2226 

Regulation  (EU)  2018/1240  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  12 
September  2018  establishing  a  European  Travel  Information  and  Authorisation 
System (ETIAS), OJ L 236, 19.9.2018. 

6, 32 

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32018R1240 

Regulation (EU) 2019/816 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 
2019  establishing  a  centralised  system  for  the  identification  of  Member  States 
holding  conviction  information  on  third-country  nationals  and  stateless  persons 
(ECRIS-TCN)  to  supplement  the  European  Criminal  Records  Information  System 
and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1726, OJ L 135, 22.5.2019, p. 1–26 

32 

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32019R0816 

 Regulation (EU) 2019/817 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 
2019  on  establishing  a  framework  for  interoperability  between  EU  information 
systems in the field of borders and visa, OJ L 135, 22.5.2019, p. 27. 

6, 32 

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32019R0817 

Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on 
the  European  Border  and  Coast  Guard  and  repealing  Regulations  (EU)  No  1052/2013  and  (EU) 
2016/1624, OJ L 295, 14.11.2019, p. 1–131 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/1896/oj 

Anne
x 7, p. 
50 

COM/2020/609  COMMUNICATION  FROM  THE  COMMISSION  TO  THE 
EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT,  THE  COUNCIL,  THE  EUROPEAN  ECONOMIC 
AND  SOCIAL  COMMITTEE  AND  THE  COMMITTEE  OF  THE  REGIONS  on  a 
New Pact on Migration and Asylum 

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1601287338054&uri=COM:2020:609:FIN 

COM(2020)791final Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 
on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in 
the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters as regards 
the entry of alerts by Europol. 

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52020PC0791 

COM(2020)796final Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2016/794, 
as regards Europol’s cooperation with private parties, the processing of personal data 
by Europol in support of criminal investigations, and Europol’s role on research and 
innovation. 

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52020PC0796 

5 

6 

6 

Council  Recommendation  2020/912  of  30  June  2020  on  the  temporary  restriction  on  non-essential 
travel into the EU and the possible lifting of such restriction, OJ L 208I , 1.7.2020, p. 1–7 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32020H0912 

15, 
19, 
30, 48 

EN 

148 

  EN 

 
Communication from the Commission on the implementation of the Green Lanes under the Guidelines 
for border management  measures to protect  health and ensure the availability of goods and essential 
services 2020/C 96 I/01, C/2020/1897. 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52020XC0324(01) 

14, 
15, 23 

EN 

149 

  EN 

 
 
 
ANNEX 17: 2017 PROPOSAL OF THE AMENDMENT OF THE SCHENGEN BORDERS CODE 

The purpose of the 2017 proposal was threefold: 

- to update the time limits applicable to foreseeable events posing a serious threat to internal 
security and public policy offering also a solution to those Member States who may need to 
maintain border controls in parallel to national measures; 

- to underline the need of taking into account the voice of the Member States affected by the 
intended reintroduction of border controls, and finally; 

-  to  reinforce  the  existing  procedural  safeguards  to  assure  that  reintroduction  of  border 
controls is a last resort measure, applied only for as long as necessary and justified. 

Specific proposals: 

Article  25:  The  proposed  changes  concerned  the  length  of  the  maximum  time  limit  for 
reintroduction of border controls (1 year instead of 6 months) 

Article  27:  The  proposed  changes  in  Article  27  aimed  at  reinforcing  or  introducing  new 
procedural guarantees for the neighbouring Member States and ensuring that border controls 
are a last resort measure. They concerned, among others the following aspects: 

- Member States have been obliged to submit risk assessment for all notifications concerning 
temporary reintroduction of border checks at internal borders,  

- the Commission  has been obliged to  issue an  opinion on necessity and proportionality of 
decisions on reintroduction of border ion by the Commission in case of prolongations beyond 
6 months; 

Article  27a:  This  was  a  new  provision  providing  for  a  new  special  procedure  where  the 
serious threat to public policy or internal security exceeds one year. This procedure was to be 
used where the Member State is confronted with the same serious threat to the public policy 
or internal security beyond 1 year and where ‘commensurate exceptional national measures’ 
are  taken  within  the  territory  (e.g.  state  of  emergency).  It  assumed  that  the  Commission 
would  issue  an  opinion  with  regard  to  such  notification  and  that  the  Council,  taking  into 
account  the  said  opinion,  could  recommend  a  further  prolongation  of  border  control  for  6 
months renewable no more than 3 times. 

EN 

150 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
EN 

151 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 27.9.2017  COM(2017) 571 final 2017/0245 (COD)  Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 as regards the rules applicable to the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders   
 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 

1.  CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 

• 

Reasons for and objectives of the proposal 

Over the last two years, the European Union has witnessed a significant increase of temporary 
reintroduction  of  border  control  at  internal  borders.  Since  September  2015,  border  controls 
have  been  reintroduced  and  prolonged  almost  50  times  (as  compared  to  36  cases  of 
reintroduced  border  controls  in  the  period  2006-2015168).  This  was  due  to  the  secondary 
movements  of  irregular  migrants  and  the  increase  of  cross-border  terrorist  threats  posing  a 
serious threat to the internal security or public policy of a number of Schengen States. These 
serious threats compelled some Member States to prolong reintroduced border control several 
times, sometimes until the exhaustion of the current legal time frames.  

Already in May 2017 the Commission recognised that new security challenges have arisen in 
the past years, as demonstrated by repeated terrorist attacks. In this respect, whilst the current 
legal  framework has been sufficient  to  address  challenges faced until  now, the Commission 
started  a  reflection  on  whether  it  is  sufficiently  adapted  to  address  the  evolving  security 
challenges. 

Based  on  the  current  Schengen  rules,  border  controls  at  internal  borders  are  possible  for 
longer than six months when there are serious deficiencies in the external border management 
of  a  Member  State,  as  demonstrated  during  a  Schengen  Evaluation,  which  put  the  overall 
functioning  of  the  area  without  internal  border  control  at  risk  or  as  a  result  of  the  non-
compliance of a Member State with a Council decision identifying measures to mitigate the 
risks  in  the  control  of  external  borders  jeopardising  the  functioning  of  the  Schengen  area 
(Article  29  of  the  Schengen  Borders  Code  procedure,  as  modified  by  Regulation  (EU) 
2016/1624 of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard)169. In such cases, 
the  Council,  based  on  a  proposal  of  the  Commission,  can  recommend  that  one  or  more 
Member States decide to reintroduce border control at all or at specific parts of their internal 
borders,  for  a  specific  period  of  time,  not  exceeding  six-months  periods,  renewable  three 
times170.  

In  situations  where  the  serious  threat  to  public  policy  or  internal  security  is  not  related  to 
deficiencies  in  the  management  of  the  external  borders  as  demonstrated  during  a  Schengen 
Evaluation, the reintroduction of border control at internal borders is subject to the conditions 
and  time  limits  set  out  in  Articles  25  to  28  of  the  Schengen  Borders  Code.  Accordingly, 
border  control  at  internal  border  can  be  carried  out  for  up  to  six  months  -  in  case  of 

the 

list  of 

the  reintroduced  border  controls  at 

internal  borders  https://ec.europa.eu/home-

168  See 
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/reintroduction-border-
control/docs/ms_notifications_-_reintroduction_of_border_control_en.pdf. 
169  In  line  with  this  procedure,  on  12  May  2016  the  Council  recommended,  on  the  basis  of  a  Commission 
proposal,  that  five  Member  States  most  affected  by  the  secondary  movements  reintroduce  border  controls  at 
some of their internal borders. On 12 May 2017 the Council, authorised these five Member States for the third 
and last time to extend these controls until 11 November 2017. 
170 With the new European Border and Coast Guard Regulation which has brought new resources and tools (such 
as the mandatory vulnerability assessments and their follow up recommendations, and the mandatory pooling of 
resources) the EU border management is more resilient to new challenges, should they arise again. This should 
significantly limit the grounds for temporary reintroduction of border controls at  internal borders in relation to 
the situation at the external borders. 

EN 

152 

  EN 

 
                                                 
foreseeable events such as international sport or political events (Article 25), or for up to two 
months  -  in  cases  requiring  immediate  action  (Article  28).  In  the  interpretation  of  the 
Commission,  the  periods  of  reintroduced  border  control  under  Articles  28  and  25  can 
cumulate. This means that with regard to decisions on reintroduction of border controls based 
on  different  grounds,  each  notification  is  examined  individually  and  on  its  own  merits  with 
the applicable deadlines applying for each particular case.  

Overall, the use of temporary reintroduction of border control shows that the Member States 
apply this measure in a responsible manner171. The costs of a non-Schengen simulation clearly 
demonstrate that this is always a costly decision for the economy172.  

In the past two  years, the rules and procedure for prolongation of temporary internal border 
control proved however to be insufficiently adapted to address the increased threats to public 
policy  or  internal  security.  The  current  rules  are  also  not  promoting  the  use  of  alternative 
measures to mitigate serious threats. Moreover there is a need to ensure that the Member State 
intending to reintroduce or prolong border controls cooperates with its neighbouring Member 
States.  Finally,  there  is  a  need  to  better  reflect  in  the  legal  framework  the  obligation  for 
Member  States  to  assess,  well  in  advance  of  the  decision  on  the  reintroduction  of  internal 
border  control,  if  and  how  the  available  alternative  measures  could  address  the  identified 
threat, in line with the Commission Recommendation of 12 May 2017 on proportionate police 
checks and cross-border cooperation in the Schengen area, which, among others encouraged 
Member  States  to  give  precedence  to  proportionate  police  checks  over  the  temporary 
reintroduction of border control in case of a serious threat to internal security or public policy. 

In light of these considerations, the Commission came to the conclusion that there is a need to 
update the rules concerning the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders.  

In line with that conclusion, the objective of the proposal is:  

– 

– 

– 

– 

to ensure that the time limits applicable to the temporary border control at internal borders 
enable Member States to take, when necessary, the measures needed to respond to a serious 
threats to internal security or public policy;  

to introduce better procedural safeguards in order to ensure that the decision on temporary 
border control at internal borders or their prolongation is based on a proper risk assessment 
and is taken in cooperation with the other Member States concerned; 

To that end, it is proposed that: 

the  time  limit  for  temporary  reintroduction  of  border  control  at  internal  borders  for  the 
foreseeable duration of the serious threat is increased up to one year (instead of six months) 

171  Between  2006  i.e.  the  date  of  adoption  of  the  Schengen  Borders  Code  and  2015,  i.e.  at  the  wake  of  the 
migratory crisis, border controls have been reintroduced 36 times and hardly ever have been prolonged, lasting 
normally only for a few days or weeks. 
172 According to the Commission analysis of direct economic cost of non-Schengen i.e. the situation where the 
border controls have been reintroduced for a longer period of time delays at the borders would have a substantial 
impact  on  cross-border  transport  (notably  through  road),  tourism,  public  administrations  and  cross-border 
workers and travellers. For those categories, the direct costs are estimated to range between €5 and €18 billion 
per year (or 0.06%-0.13% of GDP), depending on the time spent due to delays. The medium-term indirect costs 
of  non-Schengen  may  be  considerably  higher  than  those  direct  estimates,  as  the  impacts  on  intra-community 
trade,  investment  and  mobility  would  be  unprecedented  if  rolling-back  Schengen  puts  at  risk  the  economic 
integration. 

EN 

153 

  EN 

 
                                                 
– 

– 

– 

and the limit for the length of prolongation periods is increased from up to 30 days to up to 6 
months. 

Member States will prepare and submit a risk assessment assessing how long the identified 
threat  is  expected  to  persist  and  which  sections  of  the  internal  borders  are  affected,  and 
demonstrating  that  the  prolongation  of  internal  border  control  is  a  last  resort  measure;  if 
border controls are prolonged for more than six months, the Member State will also explain 
retrospectively  how  border  control  contributed  to  address  the  identified  threat;  in  order  to 
guarantee the quality of such risk assessments, the relevant Agencies (European Border and 
Coast Guard and Europol) will be involved by the Commission. 

a better follow up to the opinion of the Commission expressing concerns on the necessity or 
proportionality of border controls and the consultation procedure involving the Commission, 
Member  States  and,  as  now  proposed,  relevant  Agencies,  is  put  in  place;  the  need  for 
cooperation with the neighbouring Member States affected by the intended border controls 
will be better ensured in the existing consultation procedure. 

a new possibility is introduced to extend internal border controls by a maximum period of 
two  years  where  the serious  threat to internal security  or  public  policy  persists  beyond  the 
one-year deadline, provided that it can be attributed to the same grounds (e.g. threat related 
to  the  operation  of  a  cross-border  terrorist  network)  and  that  commensurate  exceptional 
national  measures  are  taken  within  the  territory  to  address  the  threat  (such  as  the  state  of 
emergency). 

In the context  of these amendments,  the proposal  also  clarifies the wording determining the 
deadline applicable under Article 29 of the Schengen Borders Code.  

The proposal does not change the grounds for the temporary reintroduction of border control 
at internal borders as envisaged by the Schengen Borders Code.  

• 

Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area 

The proposal modifies the general deadlines for temporary reintroduction of border control at 
internal borders as set out in Article 25, namely, in case of foreseeable events/threats, while 
preserving the current principle of temporary reintroduction of border control and safeguards 
applicable  thereto,  with,  on  one  hand,  the  Commission  having  the  power  (and  the  duty,  in 
cases beyond six months) to take a stance on the necessity and proportionality of the intended 
checks  and,  on  the  other,  the  'consultation  procedure'  as  referred  to  in  Article  27(5)  of  the 
Schengen  Borders Code, now to  be reinforced by  the participation  of the relevant  Agencies 
having  the  expertise  to  assess  the  information  submitted  by  the  Member  State  concerned  in 
the  notification  and  the  risk  assessment.  Moreover,  the  criteria  for  the  temporary 
reintroduction  of  border  control  at  internal  borders  set  out  in  Article  26  of  the  Schengen 
Borders Code will continue to apply. 

The proposal strengthens the principle that reintroducing controls at internal borders must be a 
last-resort measure. Under Article 23 of the Schengen Borders Code, Member States remain 
entitled to carry out police checks within the territory, including in the border area, which in 
some cases can be an effective alternative to the temporary reintroduction of internal border 
control.  The  requirement  to  present  a  risk  assessment  demonstrating  that  the  intended 
reintroduction  or  prolongation  of  border  controls  is  a  last  resort  measure  should  further 
encourage  Member  States  to  consider  the  use  of  alternative  measures  such  as  reinforced 
police measures.  In that respect, the proposal will further support the implementation of the 

EN 

154 

  EN 

 
Commission  Recommendation  on  proportionate  police  checks  within  the  territory173,  where 
the Commission specifically encouraged Member States to give precedence to police checks 
over the temporary reintroduction of border controls at internal borders.  

The proposed changes are consistent with Article 72 TFEU as they do not affect the exercise 
of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law 
and order and the safeguarding of internal security. 

Article 29 of the Schengen Borders Code will continue to offer the only possibility to prolong 
border  controls  at  internal  borders  in  case  of  serious  deficiencies  in  the  management  of  the 
external  borders  by  a  Member  State  as  demonstrated  by  a  Schengen  Evaluation.  This 
possibility  has  been  recently  reinforced  by  relevant  provisions  in  the  European  Border  and 
Coast Guard Regulation, where the lack of proper follow-up from the side of a Member State 
to  a  negative  vulnerability  assessment  or  the  lack  of  request  from  a  Member  State  for 
sufficient support from the European Border and Coast Guard Agency to respond to a specific 
and  disproportionate  pressure  at  its  external  borders  putting  at  risk  the  functioning  of  the 
Schengen  area,  could  justify  temporary  reintroduction  of  border  controls  at  internal  borders 
(Article 19(10) of the Schengen Borders Code).  

• 

Consistency with other Union policies 

Pursuant to Article 26 of the Schengen Borders Code which continues to apply, any decision 
on  temporary  reintroduction  or  prolongation  of  internal  border  control  should  take  into 
account,  in  particular,  the  likely  impact  of  such  measure  on  the  free  movement  of  persons 
within  the  area  without  internal  border  control.  In  this  context,  it  should  be  recalled  that 
Directive  2004/38/EC174  does  not  contain  a  right  to  be  free  from  security  checks  on  the 
occasion  of  crossing  the  borders  at  which  controls  are  carried  in  line  with  the  Schengen 
Borders  Code.  Therefore,  the  updating  of  the  maximum  period  of  border  control  at  internal 
borders  does  not  per  se  imply  a  negative  impact  on  the  freedom  of  movement;  only  the 
abusive use of such possibility could affect the freedom of movement.  

To mitigate such risk, it is proposed that besides the existing possibility for the Commission 
to  voice  at  any  moment  its  concerns  related  to  the  necessity  or  proportionality  of  border 
controls  (their  reintroduction  or  prolongation),  there  will  be  now  an  obligation  on  the 
Commission to issue an opinion whenever border controls are carried out for longer than six 
months. The consultation procedure contains a further safeguard as it should now also involve 
the relevant Agencies. The proposed text for the consultation procedure, which would be led 
by the Commission, clarified that the views of the Member States affected by such controls 
are duly taken into account. 

The proposal contributes to enhancing security within the Schengen area by giving Member 
States a legal possibility to prolong, where necessary, internal border control to  respond to a 
serious threat to public policy or internal security that justifies such controls.  

Updating the Schengen legal framework in light of experience in facing up to new challenges 
in order to preserve its capacity to respond appropriately to persistent serious threats to public 

173 C(2017) 3349 final. 
174 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens 
of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, OJ 
158/77 of 30.4.2004. 

EN 

155 

  EN 

 
                                                 
policy or internal security, offering additional time that might be necessary to address them, is 
fully in  line with  the Commission's work set  out in  the European Agenda on Migration and 
the European Agenda on Security.  

2.  LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY 

• 

Legal basis 

The proposal is based on Article 77 (2)(e) TFEU. 

The  proposal  amends  Regulation  (EU)  No  2016/399  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 
Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons 
across borders (Schengen Borders Code).  

• 

Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence)  

Action in the area of freedom, security and justice falls within an area of competence shared 
between the EU and the Member States in accordance with Article 4(2) TFEU. Therefore, the 
subsidiarity  principle  is  applicable  by  virtue  of  Article  5(3) TEU,  according  to  which  the 
Union  shall  act  only  if  and  in  so  far  as  the  objectives  of  the  proposed  action  cannot  be 
sufficiently  achieved  by  the  Member  States,  either  at  central  level  or  at  regional  and  local 
level,  but  can  rather,  by  reason  of  the  scale  or  effects  of  the  proposed  action,  be  better 
achieved at Union level. 

The proposal  modifies  the existing provisions of Chapter  III of the Schengen  Borders Code 
related  to  the  temporary  reintroduction  of  border  control  at  internal  borders,  in  a  limited 
manner, with a view to respond to the recent experience in the last years where a number of 
Member  States  prolonged  several  times  the  initial  periods  of  reintroduced  border  control  at 
internal borders. 

The proposal also reinforces the obligations of Member States vis-à-vis neighbouring Member 
States,  affected  by  the  intended  reintroduction  or  prolongation  of  border  control,  as  the 
efficiency of the current provisions in this regard proved to be limited. 

The  objective  of  defining  the  scope,  duration  and  procedure  for  exceptionally  prolonging 
temporary  controls  at  specific  section(s)  of  the  internal  borders,  taking  into  account  the 
responsibilities of the Member States with regard to public order and internal security as well 
as the need to limit controls at internal borders to what is strictly necessary, so as to preserve 
the area without controls at internal borders, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States  acting  alone,  and  can  be  better  achieved  at  the  level  of  the  Union.  The  Union  may 
therefore adopt the proposed measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. 

• 

Proportionality 

The proposed changes in the rules on temporary reintroduction of border control at  internal 
borders  are  proportionate  to  the  objective  of  protecting  public  policy  and  ensuring  internal 
security in the area without internal border controls.  

The proposal fully recognises that under the Schengen rules the temporary reintroduction of 
border control and its subsequent prolongation must remain an exception, subject to specific 
rules common for the members of the Schengen area. 

The  proposal  is  responding  to  the  identified  shortcoming  in  the  existing  rules  as  regards 
persistent threats to public policy and internal security which have been experienced by some 

EN 

156 

  EN 

 
Member States in recent years (such as cross-border terrorist threats, secondary movements of 
irregular  migrants  that  justified  the  temporary  reintroduction  of  internal  border  control). 
Based  on  this  experience,  it  appears  that  even  the  practice  accepted  by  the  Commission  to 
combine the maximum time limits for border control at internal borders based on Article 28 
(events  requiring  immediate  actions)  and  Article  25  (foreseeable  events)  may  prove  to  be 
insufficient to address certain long-lasting threats.  

To that end, the proposal: 

1) Extends the general deadline for foreseeable events up to one year.  

This  maximum  deadline  is  expected  to  be  applied  if  threats  to  public  policy  or  internal 
security  cannot  be  addressed  within  a  few  months;  this  possibility  should  not  affect  the 
average  length  of  border  control  reintroduced  based  on  the  most  frequent  grounds  related 
generally to  sport or high level  political  events.  To recall, within these limits  set  out  by the 
Schengen Borders Code the decision on the actual duration of the temporary reintroduction of 
border  controls  under  Article  25  or  28  of  the  Schengen  Borders  Code  is  in  hands  of  the 
Member State. However, as the scope and duration of the temporary reintroduction of border 
control  at  internal  borders  should  not  exceed  what  is  strictly  necessary  to  respond  to  the 
serious threat, the Commission can oversee the actual length of such controls and may issue 
an opinion in this respect; in case of concerns related to the necessity or proportionality of the 
reintroduced border controls, or when border control at internal borders is carried out for more 
than six months, the Commission is obliged to issue an opinion.  

Furthermore,  any  possible  abuse  of  the  updated  timeframe  will  be  also  addressed  under  the 
general powers of the Commission as the guardian of the Treaties. 

Moreover,  any  reintroduction  or  prolongation  of  border  controls  will  be  subject  to  risk 
assessment which should look into the expected length of the threat and the border sections 
affected, assess the available measures and explain why the chosen one is considered to be the 
best  to  address  the  identified  threat.  After  six  months  of  effective  border  control,  the  risk 
assessment should also provide an analysis of how the previous prolongation(s) contributed to 
remedying the identified threat. 

2) The proposal also introduces a possibility exceptionally to prolong internal border control 
if the same threats  persist  beyond one  year but  only if the serious threat  to  public policy or 
internal security invoked to justify the prolongation of border control is specific enough and 
corresponds  to  commensurate  exceptional  national  measures,  in  particular  a  state  of 
emergency. In order to ensure the extraordinary nature of such further prolongation, a specific 
possibility to go beyond the general deadlines in the Schengen Borders Code would require an 
opinion  by  the  Commission  followed  by  a  recommendation  of  the  Council  setting  where 
appropriate, the conditions for cooperation between the Member States concerned and which 
would  constitute  a  prerequisite  for  any  prolongation.  The  recommendation  could  concern 
periods of up to six months, and could be prolonged no more than three times for up to six 
months each time, under the same procedure.  

• 

Choice of the instrument 

The  proposal  concerns  the  amendment  of  a  Regulation.  As  the  proposal  complements  the 
existing provisions of Title III, Chapter II concerning the temporary reintroduction of border 
control at internal borders of this Regulation, no other instrument than a Regulation would be 
appropriate. 

EN 

157 

  EN 

 
3.  RESULTS  OF  EX-POST  EVALUATIONS,  STAKEHOLDER  CONSULTATIONS 

AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS 

• 

Impact assessment 

The  proposed  amendment  allows  for  some  controlled  flexibility  within  the  existing  rules, 
without  altering  the  logic  of  the  exceptional  reintroduction  of  border  control  at  internal 
borders. This justifies a simplified analysis of the available options. There is therefore no need 
for a fully-fledged impact assessment. 

• 

Fundamental rights 

The proposed amendment respects the fundamental rights and principles set out in the Charter 
of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the  European  Union,  in  particular  the  freedom  of  movement  and 
residence (Article 45). The safeguards of Article 3a, Article 4 and Article 7 of the Schengen 
Borders Code continue to apply.  

4.  BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS 

The proposed amendment has no implications for the EU budget.  

5.  OTHER ELEMENTS 

• 

Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the proposal 

Article 25 is modified as follows:  

 

 

 

 

 

The maximum deadline for temporary reintroduction of border control in case of foreseeable 
events posing a serious threat to public policy or internal security, as set out in paragraph 4 
first  sentence  of  this  provision  is  prolonged  from  6  months  to  1  year.  In  line  with  that,  in 
order to make the length of renewable periods under this provision more proportionate to the 
overall  maximum  duration  of  border  controls,  paragraphs  1  and  3  are  also  modified  and 
provide for the extension of possible renewable periods from 30 days to 6 months. 

The  purpose  of  this  modification  is  to  take  into  account  the  persistent  serious  threats  to 
public  policy  or  internal  security  (such  as  cross-border  terrorist  threats  or  secondary 
movements  of  irregular  migrants  that  justify  temporary  reintroduction  of  internal  border 
control), which, as demonstrated over the last few years, may require more time to deal with.  

Paragraph 2 is amended in order to insert the reference to the new Article 27a. 

An  extraordinary  possibility  of  prolonging  border  control  at  internal  borders  beyond  the 
maximum  deadline  is  added  in  paragraph  4.  Accordingly,  where  a  serious  threat  to  public 
policy or internal security persists beyond one year, the border controls can be exceptionally 
prolonged  for  renewable  periods  of  up  to  six  months,  and  for  a  maximum  period  of  two 
years, subject to the conditions and following the procedure set out in a new Article 27a. 

The  purpose  of  this  modification  is  to  make  the  updated  rules  more  resistant  to  the  new 
challenges.  

Article 27 is modified as follows: 

 

In  paragraph  1  which  is  defining  the  elements  of  the  intended  reintroduction  of  border 
control (which, based on Article 25(3), are also applicable to prolongations), a new point aa) 
is  added  introducing  a  new  obligation  for  the  Member  States  to  prepare  and  share  a  risk 
assessment.  Such  risk  assessment  should  assess  the  expected  length  of  the  threat  and  the 
affected  border  sections  and  demonstrate  that  border  controls  are  a  last  resort  measure.  It 
should  also  report  in  detail  on  the  coordination  with  the  neighbouring  Member  States 

EN 

158 

  EN 

 
concerned by such temporary border control at internal borders. In order to ensure the quality 
of this data, the Commission is required to involve the relevant Agency, depending on the 
threat underpinning the intended reintroduction or prolongation of border control (i.e. either 
the European Border and Coast Guard Agency or Europol). 

The  purpose  of  adding  this  new  element  is  to  underline  the  last  resort  character  of  border 
controls as a measure to address serious threats to public policy or internal security, which 
should be used only if other measures are considered not sufficient to attain the same results.

This objective is reinforced by the specific obligation imposed on the Member States going 
beyond  the  six  months  period  of  border  controls,  to  retrospectively  demonstrate  that  the 
reintroduced border control contributed to addressing the identified threat. 
The  amended  provision  also  underlines  the  need  of  coordination  with  the  neighbouring 
Member States affected by the intended border control.  

In  this  context,  in  point  e)  wording  is  added  to  clarify  that  the  coordination  with  the 
neighbouring  Member  States  concerned  should  take  place  before  the  decision  on 
reintroduction or prolongation of border controls at internal borders.  

Furthermore, the last sentence of this paragraph is modified to highlight that the cooperation 
with  the  neighbouring  Member  States  will  be  subject  to  the  particular  attention  from  the 
Commission, which may enquire more on that. 

In  view  of  the  specific  procedure  of  prolonging  border  control  beyond  one  year,  the 
circumstances under which the Commission is required to issue an opinion, as specified in 
paragraph 4, are modified accordingly. Following this modification, the Commission or any 
Member  State  may  issue  an  opinion  but  in  case  of  concerns  related  to  the  necessity  or 
proportionality of the intended border controls or when border control at internal borders is 
carried out for more than six months, the Commission is obliged to issue an opinion. This 
obligation  is  reinforced  and  updated  to  take  into  account  the  new  obligation  related  to 
preparing the risk assessment and the role of the Agencies in assessing it. 

Paragraph  5  which  is  setting  out  the  details  of  the  consultation  procedure  between  the 
Commission  and  the  Member  States,  is  also  updated  to  reflect  the  involvement  of  the 
Agencies.  Accordingly,  the  Agencies  are  expected  to  participate  in this  process.  The  other 
modifications reflect changes in previous paragraphs giving  more visibility to the check  of 
necessity  and  proportionality  of  the  intended  border  controls.  Finally,  the  proposed 
modifications  aim  at  ensuring  that  the  temporary  reintroduction  or  prolongation  of  border 
control at internal borders is accompanied in practice by coordination measures between the 
Member States concerned by such controls. 

 

 

As  mentioned  already  above,  a  new  Article  27a  is  added  with  a  view  to  determining  the 
conditions and procedure to be followed in case of a serious threat to public policy or internal 
security which exceeds one year.  

 

Paragraph  1  explains that border  controls  can  be  exceptionally  prolonged  beyond  one  year 
where a serious threat to internal security or public policy is sufficiently specific and persists 
beyond one year. This provision should be read in the light of Recital 8 which gives more 
guidance  how  the  specificity  of  the  threat  can  be  demonstrated.  Thus,  also  taking  into 
account the criteria for the temporary reintroduction of border control as set out in Article 26, 
border controls could be exceptionally prolonged beyond one year to support the exceptional 
measures taken  at  national  level to address  the  persisting  serious threat  to  public  policy  or 
internal security (such as the state of emergency). 

EN 

159 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 

Paragraph  2  refers  to  procedural  provisions  of  Article  27  which  should  continue  to  apply 
(conditions  related  to  the  content  of  a  notification,  rules  on  sharing  information  with  the 
European Parliament and the Council, the right to classify some information).  

Paragraph  3  and  4  set  up  the  procedure  to  be  followed.  Accordingly,  such  extraordinary 
prolongation  can  be  recommended  by  the  Council,  taking  into  account  the  opinion  of  the 
Commission (which is compulsory, in view of the modification in Article 27(4) as described 
27a).  
above, 

paragraph 

reflected 

Article 

and 

as 

of 

in 

3 

The prolongation can be recommended three times, for periods of up to six months each time, 
following  the  same  procedure.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  need  of  further  prolongation  of 
border  controls  at  internal  borders  beyond  one  year  is  likely  to  be  motivated  by  grounds 
which  touch on national  executive  and enforcement powers,  and  should  be corroborated  by 
commensurate exceptional national measures, it is proposed that the recommendation of the 
Council  should  not  depend  on  a  proposal  of  the  Commission  which,  given  these 
circumstances,  would  risk  relying  on  very  limited  information.  The  opinion  of  the 
Commission should however be duly taken into account by the Council.  

In line with the previous provisions requiring more involvement of the neighbouring Member 
States,  it  is  also  proposed  that  the  Council  in  its  recommendation  determines,  where 
appropriate, the conditions of cooperation between the Member States concerned. 

Article  2  of  the  Regulation  contains  standard  conditions  on  entry  into  force  and  scope  of 
application.  

EN 

160 

  EN 

 
 
 
THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT  AND  THE  COUNCIL  OF  THE  EUROPEAN 
UNION, 

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular 
point (e) of Article 77(2) thereof, 

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission, 

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments, 

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, 

Whereas: 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

(5) 

In an area where persons may move freely, the reintroduction of border control at internal 
borders should remain an exception. The reintroduction of internal border control should 
be decided only as a measure of last resort, for a limited period of time and to the extent 
that  controls  are  necessary  and  proportionate  to  the  identified  serious  threats  to  public 
policy or internal security. 

The identified serious threats can be addressed by different measures, depending on their 
nature and scale. The Member States have at their disposal also police powers, as referred 
to  in  Article  23  of  Regulation  (EU)  2016/399  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 
Council  of  9  March  2016  on  a  Union  Code  on  the  rules  governing  the  movement  of 
persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code)175, which, subject to some conditions, 
can  be  used  in  the  border  areas.  The  Commission  Recommendation  on  proportionate 
police checks and police cooperation in the Schengen area176 provides guidelines to the 
Member States to that end.  

In accordance with the provisions of Title III, Chapter II of the Schengen Borders Code, 
internal border control can be temporarily reintroduced as a last resort measure in case of 
a  serious  threat  to  public  policy  or  internal  security  for  a  limited  period  of  up  to  six 
months - for foreseeable events (Article 25), and for a limited period of up to two months 
-  for  cases  requiring  immediate  action  (Article  28).  These  time  frames  proved  to  be 
sufficient to tackle the serious threats related to the most frequent foreseeable events such 
as international sport or high level political events. 

However,  experience  has  shown  that  certain  serious  threats  to  public  policy  or  internal 
security, such as cross-border terrorist threats or specific cases of secondary movements 
of irregular migrants within the Union that justified the reintroduction of border controls, 
may persist well beyond the above periods. It is therefore needed and justified to adjust 
the time limits applicable to the temporary reintroduction of border control to the current 
needs,  while  ensuring  that  this  measure  is  not  abused  and  remains  an  exception,  to  be 
used only as a last resort. To that end, the general deadline applicable under Article 25 of 
the Schengen Borders Code should be extended to one year. 

In  order  to  guarantee  that  these  internal  border  controls  remain  an  exception,  Member 
States should submit a risk assessment concerning the intended reintroduction of border 
control or prolongation thereof. The risk assessment should, in particular, assess for how 
long the identified threat is expected to persist and which sections of the internal borders 
are affected, demonstrate that the prolongation of border controls is a last resort measure 

175 OJ L 77, 23.3.2016, p.1. 
176 C(2017) 3349 final of 12.05.2017. 

EN 

161 

  EN 

 
                                                 
(6) 

(7) 

(8) 

(9) 

(10) 

(11) 

(12) 

(13) 

and explain how border control would help in addressing the identified threat. In case of 
internal  border  control  going  beyond  six  months,  the  risk  assessment  should  also 
demonstrate  retrospectively  the  efficiency  of  the  reintroduced  border  control  in 
addressing  the  identified  threat  and  explain  in  detail  how  each  neighbouring  Member 
State affected by such prolongation was consulted and involved in determining the least 
burdensome operational arrangements. 

The quality of the risk assessment submitted by the Member State will be very important 
for the assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the intended reintroduction or 
prolongation  of  border  control.  The  European  Border  and  Coast  Guard  Agency  and 
Europol should be involved in that assessment.  

The power of the Commission to issue an opinion under Article 27(4) of the Schengen 
Borders  Code  should  be  modified  to  reflect  the  new  obligations  on  the  Member  States 
related to the risk assessment, including the cooperation with Member States concerned. 
When  border  control  at  internal  borders  is  carried  out  for  more  than  six  months,  the 
Commission  should  be  obliged  to  issue  an  opinion.  Also  the  consultation  procedure  as 
provided for in Article 27(5) of the Schengen Borders Code should be modified in order 
to  reflect  the  role  of  the  Agencies  (European  Border  and  Coast  Guard  Agency  and 
Europol)  and  focus  on  the  practical  implementation  of  different  aspects  of  cooperation 
between the  Member  States,  including the  coordination,  where appropriate,  of different 
measures on both sides of the border. 

In  order  to  make  the  revised  rules  better  adapted  to the  challenges  related  to  persistent 
serious  threats  to  public  policy  or  internal  security,  a  specific  possibility  should  be 
provided to prolong internal border controls beyond one year. Such prolongation should 
accompany  commensurate exceptional  national  measures  also  taken  within  the territory 
to address the threat, such as a state of emergency. In any case, such a possibility should 
not  lead  to  the  further  prolongation  of  temporary  internal  border  controls  beyond  two 
years. 

The reference to Article 29 in Article 25(4) should be modified with a view of clarifying 
the  relation  between the  time  periods  applicable  under  Article  29  and  Article  25  of  the 
Schengen Borders Code. 

The possibility to carry out temporary internal border controls in response to a specific 
threat to public policy or internal security which persists beyond a year should be subject 
to a specific procedure.  

To that end, the Commission should issue an opinion on the necessity and proportionality 
of  such  prolongation  and, where  appropriate,  on the cooperation  with the  neighbouring 
Member States. 

In  view  of  the  nature  of  such  measures,  which  touch  on  national  executive  and 
enforcement  powers  regarding  serious  threats  to  public  policy  or  internal  security, 
implementing  powers  to  adopt  recommendations  under  this  specific  procedure  should 
exceptionally be conferred on the Council. 

The  Council,  taking  account  of  the  Commission's  opinion,  may  recommend  such 
extraordinary  further  prolongation  and  where  appropriate  determine  the  conditions  for 
cooperation between the Member States concerned, with a view to ensuring that it is an 
exceptional measure, in place only for as long as necessary and justified,  and consistent 
with the measures also taken at the national level within the territory to address the same 
specific threat to public policy or internal security. The Council recommendation should 
be a prerequisite for any further prolongation beyond the period of one year and hence be 
of the same nature as the one already provided for in Article 29. 

(14) 

Since the objective of this Regulation, namely allowing the prolongation in exceptional 
cases of reintroduced border controls at specific section(s) of the internal borders for the 
time period necessary for a Member State to adequately respond to a persistent threat of a 

EN 

162 

  EN 

 
cross-border  nature,  is  to  complement  the  current  rules  on  temporary  reintroduction  of 
border controls at internal borders, it cannot be achieved by Member States acting alone; 
an  amendment  of  the  common  rules  established  at  Union  level  is  necessary.  Thus,  the 
Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in 
Article  5  of  the  Treaty  on  European  Union.  In  accordance  with  the  principle  of 
proportionality,  as  set  out  in  that  Article,  this  Regulation  does  not  go  beyond  what  is 
necessary in order to achieve those objectives. 

In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol No 22 on the position of Denmark, as 
annexed  to  the  Treaty  on  European  Union  and  to  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the 
European Union, Denmark is not taking part in the adoption of this Regulation and is not 
bound  by  it  or  subject  to  its  application.  Given  that  this  Regulation  builds  upon  the 
Schengen  acquis,  Denmark  shall,  in  accordance  with  Article  4  of  that  Protocol,  decide 
within a period of six months after the Council has decided on this Regulation whether it 
will implement it in its national law. 

This Regulation constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis, in 
which  the  United  Kingdom  does  not  take  part,  in  accordance  with  Council  Decision 
2000/365/EC177; the United Kingdom is therefore not taking part in the adoption of this 
Regulation and is not bound by it or subject to its application. 

This Regulation constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis, in 
which Ireland does not take part, in accordance with Council Decision 2002/192/EC178; 
Ireland is therefore not taking part in the adoption of this Regulation and is not bound by 
it or subject to its application.  

(15) 

(16) 

(17) 

(18)  As  regards  Iceland  and  Norway,  this  Regulation  constitutes  a  development  of  the 
provisions  of  the  Schengen  acquis  within  the  meaning  of  the  Agreement  concluded  by 
the  Council  of  the  European  Union  and  the  Republic  of  Iceland  and  the  Kingdom  of 
Norway  concerning  the  latter's  association  with  the  implementation,  application  and 
development of the Schengen acquis179, which fall within the area referred to in point A 
of Article 1 of Council Decision 1999/437/EC.180 

(19)  As  regards  Switzerland,  this  Regulation  constitutes  a  development  of  the  provisions  of 
the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement between the European Union, 
the  European  Community  and  the  Swiss  Confederation  on  the  Swiss  Confederation's 
association  with  the  implementation,  application  and  development  of  the  Schengen 
acquis181  which  fall  within  the  area  referred  to  in  Article  1,  point  A  of  Decision 
1999/437/EC182 read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council Decision 2008/146/EC.183 

177 Council Decision 2000/365/EC of 29 May 2000 concerning the request of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain  and  Northern  Ireland  to  take  part  in  some  of  the  provisions  of  the  Schengen  acquis  (OJ  L  131, 
1.6.2000, p. 43). 
178 Council Decision 2002/192/EC of 28 February 2002 concerning Ireland's request to take part in some of 
the provisions of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 64, 7.3.2002, p. 20). 
179 OJ L 176, 10.7.1999, p. 36. 
180  Council  Decision  1999/437/EC  of  17  May  1999  on  certain  arrangements  for  the  application  of  the 
Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom 
of  Norway  concerning  the  association  of  those  two  States  with  the  implementation,  application  and 
development of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 176, 10.7.1999, p. 31). 
181 OJ L 53, 27.2.2008, p. 52. 
182  Council  Decision  1999/437/EC  of  17  May  1999  on  certain  arrangements  for  the  application  of  the 
Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom 
of  Norway  concerning  the  association  of  those  two  States  with  the  implementation,  application  and 
development of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 176, 10.7.1999, p. 31). 
183  Council  Decision  2008/146/EC  of  28  January  2008  on  the  conclusion,  on  behalf  of  the  European 
Community,  of  the  Agreement  between  the  European  Union,  the  European  Community  and  the  Swiss 

EN 

163 

  EN 

 
                                                 
 
(20)  As regards Liechtenstein, this Regulation constitutes a development of the provisions of 
the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Protocol between the European Union, the 
European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein on 
the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European 
Union,  the  European  Community  and  the  Swiss  Confederation  on  the  Swiss 
Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the 
Schengen acquis184 which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point A of Decision 
1999/437/EC read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council Decision 2011/350/EU185.  

(21) 

This  Regulation  respects  fundamental  rights  and  observes  the  principles  recognised  in 
particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.  

(22)  Regulation (EU) No 2016/399 should therefore be amended accordingly, 

HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 

Regulation (EU) No 2016/399 is amended as follows: 

(1) 

Article 25 is replaced by the following: 

Article 1 

"1. Where, in the area without internal border control, there is a serious threat to 
public  policy  or  internal  security  in  a  Member  State,  that  Member  State  may 
exceptionally  reintroduce  border  control  at  all  or  specific  parts  of  its  internal 
borders for a limited period of up to 30 days, or for the foreseeable duration of 
the serious threat if its duration exceeds 30 days, but not exceeding six months. 
The  scope  and  duration  of  the  temporary  reintroduction  of  border  control  at 
internal  borders  shall  not  exceed  what  is  strictly  necessary  to  respond  to  the 
serious threat.  

2. Border control at internal borders shall only be reintroduced as a last resort, 
and  in  accordance  with  Articles  27,  27a,  28  and  29.  The  criteria  referred  to, 
respectively, in Articles 26 and 30 shall be taken into account in each case where 
a decision on reintroduction of border control  at internal borders is  considered 
pursuant, respectively, to Article 27, 27a, 28 or 29.   

3. If the serious threat to public policy or internal security in the Member State 
concerned persists beyond the period provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, 
that  Member  State  may  prolong  border  control  at  its  internal  borders,  taking 
account of the criteria referred to in Article 26 and in accordance with Article 27, 
on  the  same  grounds  as  those  referred  to  in  paragraph  1  of  this  Article  and, 
taking  into  account  any  new  elements,  for  renewable  periods  corresponding  to 

Confederation  on  the  Swiss  Confederation's  association  with  the  implementation,  application  and 
development of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 53, 27.2.2008, p. 1). 
184 OJ L 160, 18.6.2011, p. 21. 
185 Council Decision 2011/350/EU of 7 March 2011 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of 
the  Protocol  between  the  European  Union,  the  European  Community,  the  Swiss  Confederation  and  the 
Principality  of  Liechtenstein  on  the  accession  of  the  Principality  of  Liechtenstein  to  the  Agreement 
between  the  European  Union,  the  European  Community  and  the  Swiss  Confederation  on  the  Swiss 
Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis, 
relating to the abolition of checks at internal borders and movement of persons (OJ L 160, 18.6.2011, p. 
19). 

EN 

164 

  EN 

 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
the  foreseeable  duration  of  the  serious  threat  and  not  exceeding  six  months.

4.  The  total  period  during  which  border  control  is  reintroduced  at  internal 
borders,  including  any  prolongation  provided  for  under  paragraph  3  of  this 
Article, shall not exceed one year.  
In the exceptional cases referred to in Article 27a, the total period may be further 
extended by a maximum length of two years in accordance with that Article.  
Where there are exceptional circumstances as referred to in Article 29, the total 
period  may be  extended  by a maximum length of two years,  in accordance with 
paragraph 1 of that Article." 

(2) 

Article 27 is amended as follows: 

(i) In paragraph 1, a new letter (aa) is added as follows: 

"(aa)  a  risk  assessment  assessing  how  long  the  identified  threat  is  expected  to 
persist and which sections of the internal borders are affected, demonstrating that 
the  prolongation  of  border  control  is  a  last  resort  measure  and  explaining  how 
border control would help address the identified threat. Where border control has 
already  been  reintroduced  for  more  than  six  months,  the  risk  assessment  shall 
also explain how the previous reintroduction of border control has contributed to 
remedying the identified threat. 
The risk assessment shall also contain a detailed report of the coordination which 
took  place  between  the  Member  State  concerned  and  the  Member  State  or 
Member States with which it shares internal borders at which border control has 
been performed. 
The  Commission  shall  share  the  risk  assessment  with  the  European  Border  and 
Coast Guard Agency and Europol, as appropriate." 

(ii) In paragraph 1, letter (e) is replaced as follows: 

"(e) where appropriate, the measures to be taken by the other Member States as 
agreed  prior  to  the  temporary  reintroduction  of  border  control  at  internal 
borders concerned." 

 (iii) The last sentence in paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: 

"Where necessary, the Commission may request additional information from the 
Member State(s) concerned, including on the cooperation with the Member States 
affected by the planned prolongation of border control at internal borders as well 
as additional information needed to assess whether this is a last resort measure." 

(iv) Paragraph 4 is replaced by the following: 

"4. Following notification by a Member State under paragraph 1 and with a view 
to  consultation  provided  for  in  paragraph  5,  the  Commission  or  any  other 
Member State may, without prejudice to Article 72 TFEU, issue an opinion. 
Where the Commission has concerns as regards the necessity or proportionality 
of  the  planned  reintroduction  of  border  control  at  internal  borders  or  where  it 
considers  that  a  consultation  on  some  aspects  of  the  notification  would  be 
appropriate, it shall issue an opinion to that effect.  

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Where border  control  at  internal borders has already been reintroduced for  six 
months, the Commission shall issue an opinion. 

(v) Paragraph 5 is replaced by the following: 

"The  information  referred  to  in  paragraph  1  and  any  Commission  or  Member 
State opinion referred to in paragraph 4 shall be the subject of a consultation led 
by  the  Commission.  Where  appropriate,  the  consultation  shall  include  joint 
meetings  between  the  Member  State  planning  to  reintroduce  border  control  at 
internal  borders,  the  other  Member  States,  especially  those  directly  affected  by 
such  measures  and  the  relevant  Agencies.  The  proportionality  of  the  intended 
measures, the identified threat to public policy or internal security as well as the 
ways of ensuring implementation of the mutual cooperation between the Member 
States shall be examined. The Member State planning to reintroduce or prolong 
border control at internal borders shall take the utmost account of the results of 
such consultation when carrying out border controls. 

(3) 

A new Article 27a is added: 

Specific procedure where the serious threat to public policy or internal security 
exceeds one year 

"1. In exceptional cases, where the Member State is confronted with the same serious threat 
to  public  policy  or  internal  security  beyond  the  period  referred  to  in  Article  25(4)  first 
sentence, and where commensurate exceptional national measures are also taken within the 
territory to address this threat, the border control as temporarily reintroduced to respond 
to that threat may be further prolonged in accordance with this Article. 

2.  At  the  latest  six  weeks  before  the  expiry  of  the  period  referred  to  in  Article  25(4)  first 
sentence, the Member State shall notify the other Member States and the Commission that it 
seeks  a  further  prolongation  in  accordance  with  the  specific  procedure  laid  down  in  this 
Article.  The  notification  shall  contain  the  information  required  in  Article  27(1)(a) to (e). 
Article 27 paragraphs 2 and 3 shall apply. 

3. The Commission shall issue an opinion. 

4. The Council, taking due account of the opinion of the Commission, may recommend that 
the Member State decide to further prolong border control at internal borders for a period 
of up to six months. That period may be prolonged, no more than three times, for a further 
period  of  up to  six  months.  In its  recommendation,  the  Council shall at least indicate the 
information referred to in Article 27(1) (a) to (e). Where appropriate, it shall determine the 
conditions for cooperation between the Member States concerned." 

This  Regulation  shall  enter  into  force  on  the  twentieth  day  following  that  of  its 
publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. 

Article 2 

This  Regulation  shall  be  binding  in  its  entirety  and  directly  applicable  in  the  Member 
States in accordance with the Treaties. 

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Done at Brussels, 

For the European Parliament 
The President 

For the Council 
The President 

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