COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council to improve the working conditions in platform work in the European Union
Date: 2021-12-10
Institutions: Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, European Commission
Subjects: EU employment policy, digital transformation, labour law, online platform worker, self-employed person, staff, working conditions

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 10.12.2021  SWD(2021) 396 final/2  CORRIGENDUM This document corrects SWD(2021) 396 final of 9.12.2021. Reformatting of pages 10-11.  The text shall read as follows: COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT  Accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council  to improve the working conditions in platform work in the European Union  
 
 
Table of Contents 

1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................3 
1.1 Political context ......................................................................................................3 
1.2 Legal context ..........................................................................................................4 
2. PROBLEM DEFINITION ...........................................................................................................................5 
2.1 What is the problem? .............................................................................................5 
2.2 What are the problem drivers? ...............................................................................8 
2.3 Why is it a problem? ............................................................................................13 
2.4 How will the problem evolve? .............................................................................14 
3. WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? ............................................................................................................... 16 
3.1 Legal basis ...........................................................................................................16 
3.2 Subsidiarity: Necessity and added value of EU action ........................................17 
4. OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? ...................................................................................... 18 
5. WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? ........................................................................... 19 
5.1 What is the baseline against which options are assessed? ...................................19 
5.2 Policy options addressing the risk of misclassification (Policy Area A) .............22 
5.3 Policy options addressing algorithmic management (Policy Area B) .................25 
5.4  Policy  options  on  enforcement,  traceability  and  transparency,  including  in 

cross-border situations (Policy Area C) ...........................................................29 
5.5 Accompanying measures .....................................................................................31 
5.6 Options discarded at an early stage ......................................................................32 
6. WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? .................................................................. 32 
6.1 Impacts of options under Policy Area A ..............................................................33 
6.2 Impacts of options under Policy Area B ..............................................................37 
6.3 Impacts of options under Policy Area C ..............................................................39 
7. HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? .................................................................................................. 40 
7.1 Effectiveness ........................................................................................................40 
7.2 Efficiency .............................................................................................................42 
7.3 Coherence ............................................................................................................44 
8. PREFERRED OPTION ............................................................................................................................. 45 
9. HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? ........................................ 49 
ANNEXES: TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................................... 51 

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Glossary  

For the purpose of this document, the terms below have the following meaning:  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

“people working through platforms” or “persons performing platform work” refers 
to  individuals  performing  work  organised  via  a  digital  labour  platform,  regardless  of 
these  people’s  legal  employment  status  (worker,  self-employed  or  any  third-category 
status). The term ‘platform worker’ is only used as an equivalent when quoting official 
documents which contain such term; 

 “digital labour platform” refers to  a private internet-based company which provides 
an online service ensuring the supply of on-demand work, performed by individuals for 
individual  or  corporate  customers,  regardless  of  whether  such  work  is  performed  on-
location  or  online.  Throughout  the  report,  the  term  is  used  interchangeably  with 
“platform”; 

“on-location labour platform” refers to a digital labour platform which only or mostly 
organises  work  performed  in  the  physical  world,  e.g.  ride-hailing,  food-delivery, 
household tasks (cleaning, plumbing, caring…) 

“online  labour  platform”  refers  to  a  digital  labour  platform  which  only  or  mostly 
organises work performed in  the online world,  e.g. AI-training, image tagging, design 
projects, translations and editing work, software development; 

“platform  work”  refers  to  the  work  performed  on  demand  and  for  remuneration  by 
people working through platforms, regardless of their employment status, of the type of 
platforms (on-location vs online) or the level of skills required; 

“algorithmic  management”  refers  to  automated  monitoring  and  decision-making 
systems  through  which  digital  labour  platforms  control  or  supervise  the  assignment, 
performance,  evaluation,  ranking,  review  of,  and  other  actions  concerning,  the  work 
performed by people working through platforms; 

“false  self-employment”  refers  to  a  situation  in  which  a  person  is  declared  as  self-
employed while fulfilling the conditions characteristic of an employment relationship. 

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1.  INTRODUCTION 

1.1 Political context 

The  digital  transition,  accelerated  by  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  is  re-defining  the  EU’s 
economy as well as its labour markets. Platform work has become an important element of 
this newly emerging social and economic landscape. It carries a great innovation potential 
and creates many opportunities, by helping people complement their revenues from other 
jobs  and  expand  their  entrepreneurial  activities.  The  flexibility  in  working  hours  enables 
many to enjoy a better work-life balance. It also offers new job-opportunities to people who 
face  high  entry-barriers  to  labour  markets,  such  as  youth  and  migrants.  Still,  it  presents 
important challenges. Many of the issues faced by people working through platforms  (see 
Section 2) are difficult to address with existing legal frameworks (see Section 1.2). As digital 
labour  platforms  disrupt  traditional  services  and  introduce  new  ways  of  working, 
technological change must go hand in hand with fairness in line with the EU’s social model.  

This is why, in her Political Guidelines1, President von der Leyen pledged to address the 
changes brought by the digital transformation to labour markets, by looking into ways to 
improve  the  working  conditions  of  people  working  through  platforms  and  supporting  the 
implementation  of  the  European  Pillar  of  Social  Rights.  The  Pillar  and  its  Action  Plan, 
endorsed by Member States, social partners and civil  society  at  the Porto Social Summit in 
May  2021,  provide  a  framework  at  EU  level  for  tackling  the  challenges  posed  by 
digitalisation.  The  European  Parliament2,  the  Council3,  the  European  Economic  and 
Social Committee4 and the Committee of the Regions5 have all called for specific action on 
platform work, allowing its opportunities to be reaped and its challenges tackled in view of 
supporting the conditions for a sustainable growth of digital labour platforms in the EU. The 
Commission  Work  Programme  for  20216  announces  a  legislative  initiative  based  on 
Article 153 TFEU in the fourth quarter of the year, subject to consultation of social partners. 
The  two-stage  consultation  took  place  between  24  February  and  7  April  (first  stage)7  and 
between  15  June  and  15  September  (second  stage)8.  For  a  synopsis  of  social  partners’ 
responses in the two-stage consultation, see Annex 2.  

1 Available online.  
2 The European Parliament report on “fair working conditions, rights and social protection for platform workers 
– new forms of employment linked to digital development” calls on the Commission to propose a directive on 
fair working conditions in platform work, including a rebuttable presumption of an employment relationship for 
platform workers. Available online.  
3 Council Conclusions “The Future of Work: the European Union promoting the ILO Centenary Declaration”, 
October 2019; Available online. 
4  EESC  opinion:  Fair  work  in  the  platform  economy  (Exploratory  opinion  at  the  request  of  the  German 
presidency). Available online. 
5 CoR opinion: Platform work – local and regional regulatory challenges. Available online. 
6 Available online. 
7 Available online.  
8 Available online.  

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1.2 Legal context  

1.2.1 Relevant social and labour acquis 

The  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the  European  Union  protects  and  promotes  a 
broad range of rights  in  the work  context.9  The EU has  created a minimum  floor of labour 
rights that apply to workers in all Member States, although their enforcement is for national 
authorities. A number of EU legal  instruments  regulate working  conditions,  for instance on 
limitations  to  working  hours,  occupational  health  and  safety  risks  and  on  the  lack  of 
predictability and transparency of working conditions, as well as access to social protection. 
However, most of these only concern people classified as workers, which is not the case for 
many  of  those  working  through  platforms  (see  Section  2.2.1).  Furthermore,  the  specific 
challenges of algorithmic management in the platform work context (see Section 2.2.2), are 
not  covered by existing labour laws at  EU level. (For an analysis of the relevant  EU social 
and labour acquis, see Annex 6.) 

1.2.2 Relevant internal market acquis  

The  EU’s  acquis  on  the  internal  market  includes  relevant  laws  for  the  platform  economy, 
such  as  the  General  Data  Protection  Regulation10  and  the  Platforms-to-Business  (P2B) 
Regulation.11 The European Commission has also put forward new legislative proposals of 
relevance,  such  as  the  Digital  Services  Act  (DSA)  package12  and  the  Artificial  Intelligence 
Act (AIA)13, and is preparing an initiative to ensure that EU competition law does not stand 
in  the  way  of  collective  agreements  that  aim  to  improve  the  working  conditions  of  certain 
solo self-employed people (including those working through platforms).14 (For an analysis of 
the  relevant  EU  internal  market  acquis,  see  Annex  7.)  In  spite  of  these,  many  platform 
work  challenges  remain  (see  Section  5.1).  For  example,  in  the  algorithmic  management 
context, such challenges reflect the important role that the representatives of people working 
through  platforms  and  labour  inspectorates  could  play  in  bringing  about  better  working 
conditions.  The  personal  and/or  material  scopes  of  these  instruments  do  not  cover  the  full 
array of specificities of platform work. Also, the case-law on the applicability of the EU’s 
internal market acquis to digital labour platforms is not conclusive. (For an overview of 
relevant court and administrative decisions, see Annex 10.) 

1.2.3 Relevant national initiatives  

National responses to platform work are diverse and developing unevenly across Europe. A 
few  EU  Member  States  (EL,  ES,  FR,  IT  and  PT)  have  adopted  national  legislation 
specifically  targeting  the  improvement  of  working  conditions  and/or  access  to  social 
protection in platform work. In some Member States (AT, DK, EE, FI, HU, HR, LU, RO, SK 
and SI) people working through platforms may be indirectly affected by wider, non-platform 
specific legislative initiatives. In others (DE, LT and NL), potentially relevant legislation is 
being debated. (For an overview of national responses, see Annex 9.) 

9  These  include  workers’  right  to  information  and  consultation  within  the  undertaking  (Art.  27),  right  of 
collective bargaining and action (Art.28), protection in the event of unjustified dismissal (Art.30), and fair and 
just working conditions (Art.31). 
10 Regulation (EU) 2016/679. Available online.    
11 Regulation (EU) 2019/1150. Available online. 
12 COM/2020/825 final. Available online.  
13 COM/2021/206 final. Available online.  
14 Available online. 

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2.  PROBLEM DEFINITION 

The below ‘problem tree’ illustrates how the drivers analysed in the following section relate to the problem this 
initiative aims at tackling, with its underlying consequences for different stakeholders.  

2.1 What is the problem? 

Some people working through platforms face poor working conditions and inadequate 
access to social protection. In many cases, this concerns people working through platforms 
who are false self-employed, i.e. their employment status is misclassified (see Section 2.2.1). 
Those who are workers are entitled to the rights and protections of the national and EU labour 
acquis,  such  as  on  collective  bargaining,  minimum  wage,  working  time,  paid  annual  leave, 
parental  leave,  and  occupational  health  and  safety.  In  most  instances,  workers  are  also  the 
only  ones  to  have  adequate  access  to  social  protection.  The  genuine  self-employed  do  not 
have access to such rights and protections (with some exceptions15). Some, but not all, may 
be  able  to  improve  their  situation  by  means  of  their  autonomy  and  stronger  labour  market 
position.16  

15 In most Member States, and at EU level, labour law is based on a binary distinction between worker and self-
employed.  Some  Member  States  (e.g.  DE,  ES,  FR,  IT,  PT),  however,  have  created  a  third/intermediate 
category of employment, granting self-employed individuals some of the rights of workers while maintaining 
elements of the autonomy enjoyed by the self-employed.  
16This may not always be the case, for instance for self-employed people in a weak position. It is for this reason 
that, in parallel to the initiative supported by this report, the Commission is also looking into ways to ensure that 

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Misclassified people working through platforms have thus neither the rights and protections 
of  the  national  and  EU  labour  acquis  that  workers  have,  nor  the  autonomy  and  stronger 
labour market position enjoyed by some genuine self-employed people (see Section 2.2.1). In 
concrete terms, this means that they may not have access to:  

  Decent pay – Around 55% of people working through platforms earn less than the net 

hourly minimum wage of their country.17  

  Balanced working time schedules – On average, people working through platforms 
spend 8.9 hours per week doing unpaid tasks (such as researching tasks, waiting for 
assignments,  participating  in  contests  to  get  assignments  and  reviewing  work  ads), 
against  12.6  hours  doing  paid  tasks.  The  unpredictability  of  platform  work  may  be 
detrimental to the work-life balance of those performing it.  

  Health and safety provisions – Accidents and occupational injuries insurance is only 
made available by 23% of digital labour platforms18, with one survey highlighting that 
circa  42%  of  people  working  through  delivery  platforms  have  been  involved  in  a 
collision.19  A  study  has  found  that  only  18%  of  riders  in  Spain  wears  a  helmet20, 
possibly because of a lack of provision of it by the platform, lack of obligations to do 
so and personal risk-taking attitudes. Approximately 50% of people working through 
online  platforms  suffer  from  clinical  levels  of  social  anxiety,  well  above  the  7-8% 
found in the general population.21  

  Coverage  against  occupational  risks  –  Platforms  representing  97%  of  earnings  in 
platform work in the EU do not pay contributions towards unemployment benefits.22 
Most platforms do not want to offer social protection to people working through them 
because they fear this might be used in court to reclassify them as employers.23  

  Facilitated procedures to claim their rights – In most Member States, the only way 
for people working through platforms to challenge a misclassification (and/or retrieve 
the rights linked to another employment status) is by judicial means. Such procedures 
require some knowledge of legal procedures or access to relevant professionals (e.g. 
lawyers), and entail substantial costs. These may range from EUR 300 (in DE, based 
on a person’s income) to EUR 5000 (in IE, including lawyers’ fees).24  

EU  competition  law  does  not  stand  in  the  way  of  collective  agreements  that  aim  to  improve  the  working 
conditions  of  solo  self-employed  people  (including  those  working  through  platforms).  The  latter  initiative 
overlaps with the one supported by this report, in that it targets, amongst others,  genuine self-employed people 
working  through  platforms.  Some  options  considered  by  this  report  also  target  genuine  self-employed  people 
working through platforms (see Section 5). 
17  This  concerns  people  who  are  in  main,  secondary  or  marginal  platform  work  (i.e.  work  more  often  than 
sporadically). PPMI (2021). Study to support the impact assessment of an EU initiative on improving working 
conditions in platform work. Available online. 
18 De Groen W., Kilhoffer Z., Westhoff L., Postica D. and Shamsfakhr F. (2021). Based on a smaller subset of 
52 observations than the overall database of 516 platforms. 
19 Christie N. and Ward H. (2019) The health and safety risks for people who drive for work in the gig economy, 
Journal of Transport and Health, 13 (1), 115-127. 
20 Gaibar, L. (2021). Cuando ser rider es un riesgo para la salud. El Salto. Available online. 
21  Bérastégui  P.  (2021).  Exposure  to  psychosocial  risk  factors  in  the  gig  economy:  a  systematic  review. 
Available online.  
22 De Groen W., Kilhoffer Z., Westhoff L., Postica D. and Shamsfakhr F. (2021). Digital Labour Platforms in 
the  EU:  Mapping  and  Business  Models.  Study  prepared  by  CEPS  for  DG  EMPL  under  service  contact 
VC/2020/0360. Available online. Based on a smaller subset of 52 observations than the overall database of 516 
platforms. 
23  See  Annex  10  –  This,  however,  does  not  seem  to  be  a  criterion  applied  by  courts  when  deciding  on  a 
reclassification case (see footnote 45 below). 
24 PPMI (2021).  

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In parallel, some of these people are subject to a certain degree of control by some platforms, 
which  use  algorithms  to  assign  tasks  to,  monitor,  evaluate  and  discipline  them.  Such 
technologically-enabled control25 is often referred to as “algorithmic management”26, which 
further exacerbates their working conditions and their risk of being misclassified (see Section 
2.2.2). Understanding how one’s behaviour (e.g. whether one accepts a task or not) influences 
access  to  future  task  opportunities  is  paramount,  as  it  has  implications  for  the  income  of 
people working through platforms, irrespective of their employment status. Since algorithmic 
management  is  a  relatively  new  phenomenon  and  is  largely  unregulated,  the  challenges  it 
poses are also faced by those working through platforms who are classified as workers and by 
the  genuine  self-employed.  The  negative  effects  of  a  potentially  widespread 
misclassification  of  the  employment  status  compounded  by  the  control  exerted  by  the 
platforms  through  algorithmic  management,  as  well  as  by  the  difficulties  related  to 
enforcement, traceability and transparency in cross-border situations, are not limited to 
platform  work.  However,  they  are  much  stronger  and  more  frequent  on  platforms  – 
whose  business  models  are  founded  on  algorithmic  management  –  than  in  ‘traditional 
businesses’27:  according  to  one  survey,  only  42%  of  EU  enterprises28  use  at  least  one  AI-
based technology.29  

Platforms  have  played  an  important  role  at  the  beginning  of  the  pandemic  in  allowing 
many businesses the flexibility to stay afloat. For example, many restaurants kept working 
during lockdown, supported by the services food-delivery platforms offered. Despite this 
flexibility, the COVID-19 crisis has further highlighted the importance of access to social 
protection and support against occupational risks for people working through platforms. 

The  EIGE  2021  survey  has  showed  that  80%  of  people  engaged  in  platform  work 
experienced some kind of negative effects related to COVID-19 lockdowns at some point, 
affecting their or their partner’s ability to work (e.g., they or their partners lost jobs, had 
financial  difficulties,  got  sick,  had  to  take  leave,  had  to  take  care  of  sick  children  or 
elderly people). However, only less than half of them received government support (e.g., 
sick  or  unemployment  benefits,  wage  support).  Few  on-location  platforms  voluntarily 
compensated for lost income of people  working  through them in  case they  became sick 
with COVID-19 or had to quarantine due to coming in contact with an infected person.   

Data access and collection challenges make it difficult to estimate the exact number of people 
working through platforms, and thus the exact number of those who may be affected by the 
aforementioned downsides of platform work. Based on a survey done in  preparation of this 
report, there may be around 28.3 million people working through platforms in the EU-

25 The notion of “control” referred to in this document does not bear any consequences for an assessment of the 
platforms’  intermediary  liability  under  Directive  2000/31/EC  (available  online)  or  under  the  proposed  Digital 
Services Act (available online).   
26 Wood, A., Algorithmic Management: Consequences for Work Organisation and Working Conditions, Seville: 
European Commission (2021), JRC124874. Available online. 
27 ‘Traditional businesses’ as in not operating in the platform company. 
28  European  Commission  (2020).  European  enterprise  survey  on  the  use  of  technologies  based  on  artificial 
intelligence. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. Available online. 
29  The  survey  considered  the  following  AI-based  technologies:  process  or  equipment  optimization;  anomaly 
detection;  process  automation;  forecasting,  price  optimization  and  decision-making;  natural  language 
processing;  autonomous  machines;  computer  vision;  recommendation/  personalization  engines;  creative  and 
experimentation activities; sentiment analysis.   

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27 (6 million on on-location platforms, 22 million on online ones).30 A relevant share of these 
may be misclassified (see Section 2.2.1). The same difficulty exists for the estimation of the 
number of digital labour platforms active in the EU. A very conservative estimation31 found 
there  may  be  more  than  500  active  platforms  –  a  majority  of  which  are  on-location  –, 
mostly concentrated in  Western and Southern Member States (DE, ES, FR, IT, NL) and 
some  Eastern  Member  States  (PL,  RO).32  Approximately  361  of  them  are  SMEs33,  against 
155 larger enterprises. The former may face unfair competition by the latter. Amongst other 
factors contributing to larger platforms’ size and success, there is the compensation of losses 
by investors with the aim to establish future quasi-monopolies by driving competitors out of 
business.34 Such losses are dampened through high profits, thanks to artificially low costs vis-
à-vis  consumers,  made  possible,  among  other  things,  by  lowering  labour  costs  through  the 
misclassification of workers as false self-employed.  

The  business  models  of  many  digital  labour  platforms  may  often  be  based  on  cutting 
social costs in the short-term to be more competitive and gain significant shares of the 
market  they  operate  within  in  the  medium-term.  Such  economic  strategy  is  not 
conducive to long-term economic sustainability. It may also challenge the levelling of the 
playing  field  within  the  platform  economy.  Moreover,  the  aforementioned  challenges  in 
platform  work  are  spurring  governments  to  take  action.  This  creates  significant  legal 
uncertainty  for  platforms,  who  have  to  comply  with  diverging  policy  approaches  and 
heterogeneous judicial outcomes across Member States (see Annexes 9 and 10, respectively). 
Such  context  does  not  support  the  conditions  for  a  sustainable  growth  of  digital  labour 
platforms in the EU.  

2.2 What are the problem drivers? 

2.2.1 Risk of employment status misclassification35  

The  key  challenge  in platform  work  is  the  risk  of  misclassification  of  the  employment 
status.  The  employment  status,  i.e.  being  classified  as  a  worker  or  as  a  self-employed, 
determines  access,  or  lack  thereof,  respectively,  to  the  EU  and  national  labour  acquis.  It  is 
therefore a key gateway to tackle most of the challenges in platform work which are related 
to  working  conditions  and  access  to  social  protection,  apart  from  the  specific  challenges 
posed by algorithmic management in the context of platform work. 

Determining  the  correct  employment  status  is  not  straightforward  and  depends  on  national 
laws and CJEU case-law. However, in most cases, the level of control exerted over the person 
performing the work is one main element to consider. High levels of control are generally a 
defining  characteristic  of  an  employment  relationship.  Of  the  28.3  million  people  working 
through platforms in the EU-27, circa 5.5 million are estimated to be subject to a certain 
degree  of  control36  from  the  platform  they  work  through.  These  are  spread  between  on-
location  platforms  (2.3  million  people)  and  online  ones  (3.2  million  people).  The  risk  of 

30 These findings are in line with other scientific attempts at quantifying the number of people working through 
platforms, see Annex A5.1. 
31 De Groen W., Kilhoffer Z., Westhoff L., Postica D. and Shamsfakhr F. (2021). 
32 PPMI (2021).  – Section 2.1.1 
33 PPMI (2021).  – See Annex A3.3 
34  Dean,  S.  (2019).  Uber  fares are  cheap,  thanks  to  venture  capital.  But  is  that  free  ride  ending?  Los  Angeles 
Times. Available online. 
35 For a fine-grained analysis of this internal driver, see Annex A11.1. 
36 In terms of not being able to set their own working time schedules and pay rates – see Annex A5.1 

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misclassification is proportionately much higher in the former (2.3 million out of 6 million, 
i.e. 38%) than in the latter (3.2 million out of 22 million, i.e. 15%). Given that around 90% 
of people working through platforms are estimated to be formally self-employed37, it is 
likely that most of those 5.5 million people are misclassified. The assessment of such risk of 
misclassification is based on the supposed subordination of these people to the platform they 
work through, and not on the frequency/intensity of work they perform (i.e. weekly number 
of hours and/or percentage of income derived from platform work).  

The  risk  of  misclassification  is  primarily  driven  by  a  lack  of  regulatory  clarity.  No 
Member State has so far comprehensively addressed the risk of misclassification in platform 
work.  Some  Member  States  (IT,  ES,  FR)  have  opted  for  sectoral  legislation,  focusing  on 
transport and delivery platforms.38 A large number of Member States (BE, DE, EL, ES, FR, 
IE,  IT,  MT,  NL,  SE)  clarify  ambiguous  employment  relationships  through  legal, 
administrative or case law-based procedures which refer to general labour market situations 
and  do  not  take  into  account  the  specificities  of  platform  work.  The  flexibility  inherent  in, 
and the constantly evolving business models  of,  platforms have largely prevented the latter 
set  of  tools’  effectiveness.  This  is  mirrored  in  the  high  number  of  court  and  administrative 
procedures initiated across the EU and beyond. 

Indeed,  the  lack  of  regulatory  clarity  on  the  employment  status  in  platform  work  is 
compounded by the unconsolidated jurisprudence on the matter.  In Member States and 
beyond,  there  have  been  more  than  100  court  decisions  and  15  administrative  decisions  on 
cases of alleged misclassification in platform work.39 Although these procedures have often 
produced  contradictory  outcomes,  most  have  led  to  the  reclassification  of  the  concerned 
people  working  through  platforms  (particularly  on  on-location  ones  in  the  transport  and 
delivery sectors, which are likely the ones exerting the most control, see Section 2.2.2).40 

The risk of misclassification is also driven by the weak labour market position of many 
of  those  concerned  by  it.  Challenging  a  misclassification  requires  people  to  be 
knowledgeable about their rights and to be able to organise themselves and face the potential 
consequences  of  a  lawsuit.  This  is  especially  difficult  for  people  in  a  weak  labour  market 
position,  such  as  low-income  groups,  young  people  and  those  with  a  migrant  background. 
Minimum  wage  earners  make  up  half  the  digital  labour  platforms’  workforce  (see  Section 
2.1).  People  working  through  platforms  in  the  EU  are  younger  than  workers  in  ‘traditional 
businesses’.41  In  2018,  the  average  age  was  33.9  years  in  platform  work  compared  to  42.6 
years in ‘traditional’ businesses. The proportion of foreign-born people doing platform work 
as a main occupation42 in the EU was 13.3%.43  

37 De Groen W., Kilhoffer Z., Westhoff L., Postica D. and Shamsfakhr F. (2021). 
38  Italy’s  law  (available  online)  grants  some  labour  rights  to  self-employed  food-delivery  riders  and  extends 
worker-like  protections  to  those  with  a  third  category  status  whose  work  is  managed  by  the  platform  or  by  a 
third  party.  Spain’s  law  (available  online)  introduces  a  rebuttable  presumption  of  an  employment  relationship 
for riders working for food-delivery platforms.  
39 These took place in BE, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT, NL and SE. – European Centre of Expertise in the field 
of  labour  law,  employment  and  labour  market  policies  (ECE).  “Case  Law  on  the  Classification  of  Platform 
Workers: Cross-European Comparative Analysis and Tentative Conclusions”, May 2021. Available online.  
40  To  date,  there  has  been  no  court  or  administrative  decision  on  reclassification  concerning  people  working 
through online platforms. – Ibidem. 
41 Urzi Brancati, M.C., Pesole, A. and Fernandez Macias, E., (2020).  
42 As per COLLEEM terminology, “main platform workers” are those who claim to work more than 20 hours a 
week providing services via digital labour platforms or earn at least 50% of their income doing so. “Secondary 

9 

 
 
                                                           
 
Stakeholders’  views:  Social  partners  agree  with  the  Commission  that  the  risk  of 
misclassification is an important challenge in platform work. Other stakeholders, such as civil 
society  organisations  and  associations  representing  people  working  through  platforms, 
generally agree on its importance within the debate on platform work.  

2.2.2 Issues related to algorithmic management44 

Poor working conditions in platform work are also related to algorithmic management, 
which  is  inherent  to  the  business  model  of  digital  labour  platforms.  Algorithmic 
management is particularly relevant for the allocation of tasks. More than half of platforms 
active in the EU (mostly on-location ones) grant low autonomy on task allocation (i.e. people 
are not free to choose which tasks to perform).45 It also entails surveillance, which is present 
in  some  form  in  platforms  representing  over  90%  of  overall  earnings  in  the  platform 
economy.46 The degree of algorithmic control varies a lot across sectors and platforms. On-
in  food-delivery)  exert  significant  algorithmic  control.47 
location  ones  (particularly 
Furthermore,  it  can  conceal  employment  subordination  behind  a  claim  of  independence, 
based on a lack of human managers (it thus facilitates misclassification). Where there might 
be  humans  reviewing  automated  decisions,  they  might  lack  protection  against  undue 
repercussions  for  not  enforcing  automated  decisions  affecting  people  working  through 
platforms.  

The lack of autonomy and the surveillance induced by algorithmic management in platform 
work  can  have  negative  impacts  on  the  working  conditions  of  people  subject  to  it,  for 
instance in terms of psychosocial stress (as people working through platforms feel constantly 
watched  and  evaluated)48,  risk  of  accidents  (as  algorithms  may  incentivise  dangerous 
behaviour,  for 
income 
unpredictability (algorithmic scheduling allows the allocation of shifts at short notice).50 

instance  by  offering  bonuses  for  faster  deliveries)49  and 

platform workers” are those respondents who provide services via digital labour platforms more than ten hours a 
week and earn between 25% and 50% of their income from platform work. Survey respondents who work less 
than 10 hours a week and earn less than 25% of their income providing services via digital labour platform are 
called “marginal platform workers”. – Urzi Brancati, M.C., Pesole, A. and Fernandez Macias, E., (2020).  
43 Globally, 17% of all people doing online platform work were foreign-born (38% in developed countries and 
7%  in  developing  ones).  –  International  Labour  Office  (2021),  “The  role  of  digital  labour  platforms  in 
transforming the world of work” (particularly Section 5.1.1). Available online. 
44 For a fine-grained analysis of this internal driver, see Annex A11.2. 
45 De Groen W., Kilhoffer Z., Westhoff L., Postica D. and Shamsfakhr F. (2021). Based on a smaller subset of 
52 observations than the overall database of 516 platforms. 
46 Ibidem. Based on a smaller subset of 52 country-platform observations than the overall database of 516 digital 
labour platforms. 
47  K.  Griesbach,  A.  Reich,  L.  Elliott-Negri  and  R.  Milkman  (2019).  Algorithmic  control  in  platform  food 
delivery work. SOCIUS: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World. Volume 5:1-15. Available online. 
48 Indeed, risks of stress and anxiety arise if workers feel that decisions are being made based on numbers and 
data  that  they  have  neither  access  to  nor  power  over  –  OSH  and  the  Future  of  Work:  benefits  and  risks  of 
artificial intelligence tools in workplaces (July 2019). Available online.  
49 Pierre Bérastégui (2021). 
50  European  Institute  for  Gender  Equality  (upcoming).  Artificial  intelligence,  platform  work  and  gender 
equality. Publication expected December 2021. 

10 

 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Algorithmic management in a workplace context is not limited to digital labour platforms. It 
is used in very different ways - from very basic monitoring of work schedules, shifts and working 
hours  to  more  complex  applications  aimed  at  task  allocation  and  pay  calculation.  The  foremost 
example  is  that  of  online  retailers’  warehouses,  where  products  for  delivery  are  arranged 
according  to  an  order  that  is  only  known  by  the  algorithm  underpinning  hand-held  devices, 
through which the workers are guided in their filling up of delivery trollies in the most efficient 
order.  Such  management  systems  are  now  spreading  to  supermarket  warehouses  too  (Wood, 
2021).  

There is currently limited evidence on the size of the issue. Estimates range from 7% (Eurostat) 
to 12% (ESENER) of enterprises using AI, but these concern different applications and types of 
AI-enabled  technology.  A  survey  carried  out  for  the  purposes  of  this  report  found  that  42%  of 
European companies use at least one AI-based technology. Such discrepancies show that, to date, 
it is not yet clear to what extent its limited application to ‘traditional’ workplaces affects people’s 
working  conditions  there,  nor  what  is  its  actual  take-up  by  companies  in  terms  of  automated 
management tasks. To the contrary, algorithmic management is inherent to the business model of 
platforms,  where  all  but  a  few  management  tasks  directly  related  to  the  services  offered  are 
automated.  To  date,  algorithmic  management  is  therefore  a  platform  work  quasi-specific 
challenge, which is not replicated to the same extent in the wider employment context. 

Because  it  is  a  relatively  new  phenomenon,  algorithmic  management  remains  largely 
unregulated  under  both  the  labour  and  internal  market  EU  acquis  (see  Annexes  6  and  7, 
respectively). It can thus have nefarious effects on the working conditions of people working 
through  platforms,  regardless  of  their  employment  status.  Genuine  self-employed  people 
working  through  platforms  are  negatively  affected  by  the  lack  of  safeguards  against 
monitoring, surveillance and unaccountable, automated decisions concerning their contracts. 
People working through platforms as workers face the same challenges and more, including 
the impossibility for their representatives to be fully informed and consulted by platforms and 
the lack of appropriate safety and health rules catering to the specificities of platform work. 
Those affected the most are  however  false self-employed people,  who, in addition  to  all of 
the  above  issues,  struggle  to  challenge  their  employment  status  even  more  so  than  in 
‘traditional companies’ with similar misclassification practices. This is because platforms are 
able  to  conceal  their  employer-like  behaviour  behind  algorithmic  management,  the  true 
functioning  of  which  is  difficult  to  both  understand  and  prove  in  legal  and  administrative 
proceedings.  

Such  challenges  are  driven  by  information  asymmetries51  and  insufficient  dialogue 
between platforms and (representatives of) people working through them (see Annex A11.2). 
Platforms  contribute  to  these  challenges  through  their  terms  and  conditions,  which  may 
unilaterally  regulate  pay,  working  time,  dispute  resolution,  customer  service  etiquette  and 
more, while using technological means to monitor, evaluate and discipline people’s work.52 
This  leads  to  unclear  responsibilities  and  lack  of  redress  mechanisms  vis-à-vis 
unintelligible  and  unaccountable  decisions,  for  instance  as  regards  work  sanctions  and 

51  The  lack  of  full  information  on  work  possibilities  and  conditions  on  the  side  of  people  working  through 
platforms  is  particularly  problematic  in  food-delivery  platforms,  which  are  amongst  the  ones  exerting  the 
strongest algorithmic control. Ravenelle, Alexandrea J. (2019). Hustle and Gig: Struggling and Surviving in the 
Sharing Economy. Berkeley: University of California Press. Available online. 
52 De Groen W., Kilhoffer Z., Westhoff L., Postica D. and Shamsfakhr F. (2021) 

11 

 
 
 
                                                           
contract  terminations.53  In  2019,  riders  were  unfairly  discriminated  against  by  Deliveroo’s 
algorithm, which did not distinguish illegitimate from legitimate reasons for being unable to 
work, such as being sick.54  In 2020, people working through UberEats  blamed unexplained 
changes  to  the  algorithm  for  affecting  their  jobs  and  incomes.  When  they  asked  for 
explanations,  they  were  told  there  was  no  “manual  control”  on  task  allocation55,  leading  to 
lack of clarity for the people working through the platform on how the algorithm affects their 
working conditions.  

The  impossibility  to  transfer  reputational  data  across  platforms  is  also  problematic. 
Although reputational data is not exclusive to digital labour platforms, in this context client-
driven ratings determine people’s access to future tasks and/or job assignments. Because such 
ratings are linked to the platform through which they were given, the people they refer to are 
also tied to that very platform. This often causes a ‘lock-in effect’, by which people face too 
high an opportunity cost (in terms of future task assignments) to switch to the competitors of 
the platform through which they have built their online reputation. This issue  also causes a 
complementary problem, by which incumbent people working through a platform who have 
good  ratings  tend  to  attract  all  the  best  assignments,  to  the  detriment  of  newcomers  with 
scarce or negative ratings (‘superstar effects’)56. Overall, these issues reduce the professional 
mobility  and  weaken  the  bargaining  power  of  people working  through  platforms,  and 
prevent  genuine  competition  between  platforms.  To  date,  there  is  no  evidence  of  such 
problems existing or being particularly prominent outside of the platform economy.  

The General Data Protection Regulation and the forthcoming Artificial Intelligence Act both 
include important provisions for the challenges of algorithmic management, but do not fully 
address  challenges  of  platform  work  from  a  labour  law  perspective  (see  Section  5.1  and 
Annex 8). The same is true for the P2B Regulation and the forthcoming Digital Services Act 
(see Section 5.1 and Annex 7).  

Stakeholders’  views:  Trade  unions  recognise  the  challenges  of  unregulated  algorithmic 
management  in  platform  work  and  have  expressed  the  fear  that  they  may  spread  beyond 
platform work. Employers’ representatives stress that the spread beyond platform work 
is already happening.57 A majority of platforms believe there is a need to increase the basic 
level  of  transparency  vis-à-vis  algorithms  (without  touching  upon  business  secrets  and 
intellectual  property  issues),  their  ‘understandability’  and  human  oversight.  National 
authorities, academics and experts also agree on the importance of ‘algorithmic management’ 
within the debate on platform work.  

53  The  lack  of  full  information  on  work  possibilities  and  conditions  on  the  side  of  people  working  through 
platforms  is  particularly  problematic  in  food-delivery  platforms,  which  are  amongst  the  ones  exerting  the 
strongest algorithmic control. Ravenelle, Alexandrea J. (2019). Hustle and Gig: Struggling and Surviving in the 
Sharing Economy. Berkeley: University of California Press. Available online. 
53 International Labour Office (2021). 
54 This resulted in a 2021 court ruling condemning Deliveroo’s discriminatory practices. Available online. 
55 Available online.  
56  Eurofound  (2017),  Coordination  by  platforms  –  Literature  review.  Luxembourg:  Publications  Office  of  the 
European Union. Available online.  
57 For a comprehensive overview of social partners responses in the two-stage consultation, see Annex 2. 

12 

 
 
                                                           
2.2.3 Issues  related to  enforcement, traceability and transparency, including  in 

cross-border situations58 

Issues related to enforcement, traceability and transparency, including in cross-border 
situations exacerbate the problem of poor working conditions and inadequate access to 
social  protection.  National  authorities  do  not  have  easy  access  to  data  on  platforms  and 
people working through them, e.g. on their employment status, on the share of them who are 
actually active (and not merely enrolled without having done any tasks59) and on platforms’ 
terms and conditions. Only a minority of platforms’ terms and conditions (19%) clearly 
spell out the contractual relations with the people working through them.60 

The  problem  of  traceability  is  especially  relevant  when  platforms  operate  in  several 
Member States, making it unclear where platform work is performed and by whom.  There 
is,  generally  speaking,  an  insufficient  identification  of  platforms  operating  in  the  EU. 
Furthermore,  59%  of  all  people  working  through  platforms  in  the  EU  engage  with  clients 
from  outside  their  country  of  origin,  often  simultaneously  and  under  different  employment 
statuses  and  terms  and  conditions.61  22%  of  platforms  operating  in  the  EU  are  from  third 
countries,  while  19%  do  not  have  EU  legal  representatives;  41%  operate  in  more  than  one 
Member  State.62  It  is  noteworthy  that  traceability  is  not  only  a  problem  within  online 
platforms  work,  but  also  in  on-location  ones.  Indeed,  even  if  the  latter  intermediate  work 
which  is  carried  out  physically  in  a  specific  place,  it  is  often  far  from  clear  where  such 
platforms  are  legally  based  and  which  rules  on  employment,  tax  and  social  protection 
contributions  inform  their  terms  and  conditions.  This  has  repercussions  for  people  working 
through platforms, but also for Member States’ authorities (see Section 2.3).  

Stakeholders’  views:  Social  partners  agree 
the  Commission  has  sufficiently 
acknowledged  the  cross-border  dimension  of  platform  work  in  its  preliminary  analysis. 
Trade  unions  believe  this  is  one  of  the  main  reasons  warranting  EU  action.  Most 
platforms  acknowledge  that  enforcement,  traceability  and  transparency,  especially  in  cross-
border  situations,  is  a  noteworthy  issue  in  platform  work,  as  do  a  majority  of  public 
authorities and many academics and experts.  

that 

2.3 Why is it a problem? 

Consequences for people working through platforms: As a result of their employment status 
misclassification,  some  people  working  through  platforms  may  not  be  covered  by  the 
rights and protections of the EU and national labour  acquis they should be entitled to. 
This  often  leads  to  low  and  unpredictable  earnings,  precariousness,  poor  safety  provisions, 
higher risk of accidents due to a lack of protective equipment, lack of career perspectives and 
training  opportunities.  These  challenges  are  exacerbated  by  platforms’  use  of  algorithmic 
management,  which  is  characterised  by  information  asymmetries  and  lack  of  scrutiny  in 
social  dialogue  and  collective  negotiations.  Platforms  can  thus  conceal  misclassification 
practices  more  easily.  Also,  many  people  working  through  platforms  are  unable  to  appeal 

58 For a fine-grained analysis of this internal driver, see Annex A11.3. 
59  For  example,  within  the  sample  group  of  all  workers  registered  on  online  platforms  Upwork,  Guru, 
PeoplePerHour and Freelancer, less than 20% had completed at least one assignment – PPMI (2021).  – Section 
2.1.1   
60 Ibidem. 
61 PPMI (2021) – Section 7.1 
62 De Groen W., Kilhoffer Z., Westhoff L., Postica D. and Shamsfakhr F. (2021).  

13 

 
 
 
                                                           
against algorithmic management decisions because of unclear responsibilities and a  general 
lack of redress mechanisms. As an indirect effect of Member States’ difficulties in accessing 
and processing relevant information on platforms, including in cross-border situations, people 
working through them are negatively impacted by the lack of enforcement of rules aimed at 
improving their situation, and by the potential inefficacy and/or limitations of future policies. 

Consequences for businesses, markets and consumers: Because of Member States’ diverging 
approaches  to  platform  work  and  national  courts’  heterogeneous  decisions  on  the 
employment  status,  digital  labour  platforms  face  legal  uncertainty  and  obstacles  to  the 
scaling-up  of  their  business.  This  prevents  a  sustainable  growth  of  the  platform 
economy in the EU and leads to a general fragmentation of the single market. Platforms 
which  contract  genuine  self-employed  people  may  refrain  from  providing  social  benefits, 
insurance  or  training  measures  on  a  voluntary  basis,  for  fear  of  being  reclassified  as 
employers  as  a  result  (‘chilling  effect’).  Platforms  employing  workers  and  traditional 
businesses  may  face  unfair  competition  by  platforms  which  cut  costs  by  misclassifying  as 
self-employed the people working through them. The same unfair practice may give them a 
dominant position in the market, with detrimental effects for consumer welfare. Businesses in 
sectors  where  algorithmic  management  is  not  widespread  may  face  unfair  competition  by 
platforms and other companies cutting costs through unfair or illicit algorithmic management 
practices.  Algorithm-driven  unfair  practices  may  also  undermine  consumer  trust  and  affect 
consumer welfare, in view of their negative impact on working conditions in platform work 
and  the  general  reputation  of  platforms.  The  difficulties  faced  by  Member  States  vis-à-vis 
data  access  and  enforcement  of  rules,  including  in  cross-border  situations,  may  result  in 
further legal uncertainty for businesses. SME platforms may face unfair competition vis-à-
vis bigger, international players who are able to conceal their operations behind multi-
market presence claims.  

Consequences  for  Member  States:  The  misclassification  of  people  working  through 
platforms translates into fewer revenues flowing into public budgets, since self-employed 
people  tend  to  pay  lower  taxes  and  seldom  pay  into  social  protection  schemes.  Some  self-
employed people may autonomously decide not to pay social protection contributions due to 
individual  risk-aversion  (‘behavioural  bias’).  The  lack  of  legal  certainty  concerning  the 
employment  status  challenges  Member  States’  agency,  by  preventing  their  enforcement  of 
labour, social protection and tax rules. Such challenges are mostly felt in Member States with 
higher shares of people working through platforms (DE, FR, IT, ES, NL, PL and RO), which 
are also, to date, the most active in terms of relevant policy actions (alongside AT, BE, DK, 
EL,  IE,  LU  and  PT).63  Member  States’  prospective  attempts  at  tackling  the  challenges  of 
platform work are also constrained by the lack of relevant information because of data access 
and  sharing  challenges,  including  in  cross-border  situations.  Indeed,  it  may  be  difficult  for 
Member States to retrieve information on where platform work is performed and by whom, 
especially if platforms are based in one country and operate through people based elsewhere. 

2.4 How will the problem evolve? 

Without  policy  action,  the  number  of  people  working  through  platforms  under  poor 
working  conditions  and  without  adequate  access  to  social  protection  will  most  likely 
continue to increase (see Section 5.1), in parallel with the growth of the platform economy 
as a whole. This makes the aforementioned challenges all the more pressing. 

63 PPMI (2021) – Section 5.1  

14 

 
 
                                                           
In the last five years, the EU’s platform economy revenues have increased dramatically. 
A  conservative  estimate  puts  this  growth  at  around  500%,  from  EUR  3  billion  in  2016  to 
EUR 14 billion in 2020. An estimated three-quarter of these revenues originated from ride-
hailing and delivery platforms.64 A more realistic estimate puts revenues in 2020 at EUR 20.3 
billion.65 This was part of a total e-commerce sales growth of 12.7%, amounting to EUR 717 
billion.66 Megatrends such as globalisation, digitalisation and other societal changes will 
spur a similarly sustained growth in the next few years (see Annex 12). Alongside North 
America, Europe will drive the growth of the global ‘gig economy’, which will likely reach 
EUR 385.9 billion in 2023, up from EUR 184.9 billion in 2018.67 

The number of platforms active in the EU has also grown incrementally and will likely keep 
doing so in the next few years. Online platforms were predominant until 2015, but since then 
have  been  surpassed  by  on-location  ones.  A  conservative  estimate  in  2020  found  there 
were  235  active  online  platforms  to  355  on-location  ones  in  the  EU-27.68  The  Member 
State from which most platforms originate is FR (89), followed by BE (49), ES (44), DE (41), 
NL (38) and IT (26).69 In terms of aggregate earnings of people working through platforms, 
DE-originated platforms are largest (about EUR 1 billion), followed by FR (EUR 0.7 billion), 
NL  (EUR  0.4  billion),  ES  (EUR  0.4  billion)  and  EE  (EUR  0.2  billion).70  The  25  largest 
platforms  of  the  same  conservative  estimate71  account  for  about  four-fifths  of  the  total 
earnings  of  people  working  through  platforms,  suggesting  the  digital  labour  platform 
economy  in  the  EU-27  is  arguably  highly  concentrated.  Most  of  these  offer  on-location 
services  (ride-hailing  and  delivery).  Most  platforms  are  of  EU  origin  (77%  in  absolute 
numbers). These account for half of the aggregate earnings of people in platform work, with 
the overwhelming majority of the other half coming from platforms originally from the US.72 

These numbers could decrease if smaller platforms are pushed out of the market, while total 
revenues will keep on growing. A projection done for this report foresees fewer than 300 
on-location  platforms  in  the  EU-27  by  203073,  while  global  revenues  from  ride-hailing 
platforms alone are expected to more than double by 2026, from EUR 95.8 billion (2020) to 
EUR  195  billion.74  This  could  result  in  the  predominance  of  large  platforms,  which  might 
thwart  competition,  innovation  and  the  bargaining  power  of  people  working  through 
platforms,  with  detrimental  effects  for  their  working  conditions.  New,  transnational  trends 
like  the  emergence  and  growing  popularity  of  ‘dark  kitchens’  and  ‘dark  stores’75,  or  other 

64 De Groen W., Kilhoffer Z., Westhoff L., Postica D. and Shamsfakhr F. (2021).  
65 PPMI (2021).  
66 Europe 2020: Ecommerce Region Report. Available online.  
67 This report uses ‘gig economy’ as a term to describe a set of economic activities including, but not limited to, 
digital labour platform services. – Mastercard and Kaiser Associates (2019). Mastercard Gig Economy Industry 
Outlook and Needs Assessment. Available online. 
68 PPMI (2021).  
69  The  larger  number  of  platforms  in  these  countries  might  partially  be  explained  by  the  methodology  of  the 
study (see Annex A5.1), whilst more evidence was available for larger countries. Moreover, BE’s large number 
is largely due to its official register of recognised platforms in the ‘sharing economy’. 
70 Ibidem. 
71 When measured by the aggregate earnings of people working through platforms.  
72 De Groen W., Kilhoffer Z., Westhoff L., Postica D. and Shamsfakhr F. (2021). 
73 PPMI (2021).  
74 Mordor Intelligence (2021). Ride-hailing market - Growth, trends, COVID-19 impact, and forecasts (2021  - 
2026). Available online. 
75 ‘Dark kitchens’ and ‘dark stores’ are restaurants and supermarkets which are not consumer-facing. They offer 
their  products  through  delivery  only.  Food-delivery  platforms  like  Glovo,  Deliveroo  and  UberEats  are 
expanding into these (see article). The novelty surrounding them is not without controversy (see article).  

15 

 
 
                                                           
responses to changing consumer preferences, might pose new challenges to the world of work 
and make policies targeting platform work even more difficult to future-proof.   

3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? 

3.1 Legal basis 

Article 153(1) TFEU provides the legal basis for the Union to support and complement the 
activities  of  the  Member  States  with  the  objective  to  improve  working  conditions,  social 
protection  and  social  protection,  workers’  health  and  safety,  and  the  information  and 
consultation of workers, among others. In those areas, Article 153(2)(b) TFEU empowers the 
European Parliament and the Council to adopt – in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure  –  directives  setting  minimum  requirements  for  gradual  implementation, 
having regard to the conditions and technical rules obtaining in each of the Member States. 
This  legal  basis  would  enable  the  Union  to  set  minimum  standards  regarding  the  working 
conditions  of  people  working  through  platforms,  where  they  are  in  an  employment 
relationship  and  thus  considered  as  workers.  The  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union 
(CJEU) has ruled that “the classification of a ‘self-employed person’ under national law does 
not  prevent  that  person  being  classified  as  a  worker  within  the  meaning  of  EU  law  if  his 
independence  is  merely  notional,  thereby  disguising  an  employment  relationship”.76  False 
self-employed people would thus also be covered by EU labour legislation based on Article 
153 TFEU.  

Should  possible  Union  action  also  address  the  situation  of  genuine  self-employed  people 
working through platforms in relation to the protection of their personal data processed by 
algorithmic management systems, it would be appropriate to base it, in as far as those specific 
rules  are  concerned,  on  Article  16  TFEU.  Article  16  TFEU  empowers  the  European 
Parliament and the Council to adopt – in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure – 
directives  laying  down  rules  relating  to  the  protection  of  individuals  with  regard  to  the 
processing  of  personal  data  by  Union  institutions,  bodies,  offices  and  agencies,  and  by 
Member States when carrying out activities which fall within the scope of Union law, and the 
rules  relating  to  the  free  movement  of  such  data.  This  legal  basis  could  be  combined  with 
Article 153 TFEU, as both share the same legislative procedure, and would allow including 
genuine self-employed into the scope of a Directive addressing algorithmic management, as 
far as the processing of personal data by automated monitoring and decision-making systems 
is concerned. 

Alternatively, a Directive addressing the situation of genuine self-employed people working 
through  platforms  as  business  actors  could  be  based  on  an  internal  market  legal  basis. 
Possible  provisions  in  the  TFEU  include  Article  53(1)  –  which  empowers  the  EU  to  issue 
directives coordinating national provisions concerning the uptake and pursuit of activities as 
self-employed persons – or Article 114 allowing for the approximation of laws with regard to 
the  establishment  and  functioning  of  the  internal  market.  The  situation  of  genuine  self-
employed people working through platforms might otherwise be addressed through measures 
based  on  Article  352  TFEU.  This  would  either  imply  a  Directive  or  a  Council 
Recommendation (in coordination with Article 292 TFEU, by which the Council can adopt 
recommendations acting on a proposal from the Commission).  

76  CJEU,  cases  C-256/01,  Allonby,  and  C-413/13,  FNV  Kunsten  Informatie  en  Media.  Available  online, 
respectively, here and here.  

16 

 
 
                                                           
3.2 Subsidiarity: Necessity and added value of EU action 

Only an EU initiative can set common rules on how to address the risk of misclassification 
of the employment status that apply to all relevant platforms operating in the EU, while also 
preventing  fragmentation  in  existing  and  forthcoming  regulatory  approaches  to  algorithmic 
management and addressing the cross-border dimension of platform work.  

The specific EU added value lies and results in the establishment of minimum standards 
in  these areas, below which Member States cannot  compete, but  which can be expanded at 
national  level.  This  may  foster  upwards  convergence  in  employment  and  social  outcomes 
across  Member  States.  Such  action  would  not  unduly  increase  the  possible  administrative 
burden for platforms, and would take into account the impact on SMEs (see Annex A3.3).  

National  action  alone  would  not  achieve  the  EU’s  Treaty-based  core  objectives  of 
promoting  sustainable  economic  growth  and  social  progress,  as  Member  States  may 
compete with one another to attract platforms’ investments by lowering the social standards 
and  working  conditions  of  people  working  through  them,  or  simply  by  not  enforcing  their 
own rules. Some Member States may also see their interests damaged by the limitations 
posed to policy action by the legal uncertainty and lack of clear information on platform 
work, stemming from heterogeneous national legislative approaches across the EU and from 
authorities’ lack of means to ensure compliance of digital labour platforms with such rules.  

The working conditions and social protection of people doing cross-border platform work is 
equally uncertain and depends strongly on their employment status. National authorities (such 
as labour inspectorates, social protection institutions and tax agencies) are often not aware of 
which platforms are active in their country, how many people are working through them and 
under  what  employment  status.  Risks  of  non-compliance  with  rules  and  obstacles  to 
tackling  undeclared  work  are  higher  in  cross-border  situations,  in  particular  when 
online platform work is  concerned.  In this context,  relevant  actions aimed at  tackling the 
cross-border challenges of platform work, including but not limited to social dumping risks 
and lack of data to allow for a better enforcement of rules, are best taken at EU level.  

4.  OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? 

The EU’s ambition is to be digitally sovereign in an open and interconnected world, and 
to  pursue  digital  policies  that  empower  people  and  businesses  to  seize  a  human-centred, 
sustainable and more prosperous future.77   

The general objective of this initiative is to: 

Improve  the  working  conditions  and  social  rights  of  people  working  through  digital 
labour  platforms,  including  with  the  view  to  support  the  conditions  for  sustainable 
growth of digital labour platforms in the European Union.  

The specific objectives through which the general objective will be addressed are to: 

(1) Ensure that people working through digital labour platforms have – or can obtain 
–  the  correct  legal  employment  status  in  light  of  their  actual  relationship  with  such 
platforms and gain access to the applicable labour and social protection rights. 

77 Commission Communication (February 2020), “Shaping Europe’s Digital Future”. Available online. 

17 

 
 
                                                           
(2)  Ensure  fairness,  transparency  and  accountability  in  algorithmic  management  in 
the platform work context. 

(3)  Enhance  transparency,  traceability,  and  awareness  of  developments  in  platform 
work and improve enforcement of the applicable rules for all people working through 
digital labour platforms, including those operating across borders. 

5.  WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? 

 The below graph illustrates the intervention logic underpinning the development of the policy options, based on 
the analysis of the problem drivers and the problem definition (see Section 2).  

5.1 What is the baseline against which options are assessed? 

Platforms’ business  models will likely spread to new sectors and transform them. This 
can  lead  to  certain  improvements,  such  as  more  efficient  processes,  with  algorithms 
effectively  managing  a  vast  pool  of  data  and  proposing  user-friendly  solutions.  This  can  in 
turn expand business opportunities and lead to job creation. Still, such positive developments 
are  unlikely  to  reflect  on  the  quality  of  jobs  in  the  platform  economy.  In  a  scenario  of  no 
relevant  action  at  EU  level,  the  number  of  people  working  through  platforms  who 
experience  poor  working  conditions  and  inadequate  access  to  social  protection  is 
expected to increase, in parallel with the growth of platform work as an overall trend. There 

18 

 
 
are  28.3  million  people  working  through  platforms  in  the  EU-27.78  It  is  estimated  that  this 
number will reach 43 million by 2025 and  remain stable thereafter.79 

The risk of misclassification of the employment status in platform work will continue to 
be  unaddressed  at  EU  level.  Some  Member  States  may  put  forward  relevant  policies  to 
address  this  risk  and  may  also  tackle  its  underlying  problem  of  inadequate  access  to  social 
protection in the context of their national implementation of the Council Recommendation on 
access  to  social  protection  for  workers  and  the  self-employed.  However,  in  the  absence  of 
common minimum standards across the EU, platforms will take advantage of fragmentation 
and, as is already happening80, quit stringently regulated markets, while remaining active in 
Member  States  with  laxer  rules  (‘regulatory  shopping’).  The  fear  of  losing  the  platforms’ 
investments, sources of income for people working through them and services appreciated by 
consumers  will  push  national  governments  to  compete  with  one  another  to  offer  the  most 
accommodating  conditions  to  platforms.  In  the  medium  to  long  term,  only  large  platforms 
will be able to grow and sustain a loss-making business model in a market dominated by legal 
uncertainty,  due  to  heterogeneous  jurisprudential  approaches  across  Member  States.  The 
already high costs of non-compliance with rulings on misclassifications will  multiply.81 
This  will  push  smaller  players  who  are  unable  to  sustain  such  costs  out  of  the  market, 
contributing  to  the  concentration  of  the  EU’s  platform  economy.  Traditional  companies 
employing  workers  in  sectors  where  platforms  are  also  active  will  continue  to  face  unfair 
competition  by  the  false self-employment  model.  The forthcoming initiative  on collective 
bargaining for self-employed people in a weak position will likely bring benefits to those 
falling under its scope, especially in terms of stronger bargaining power in the labour market 
(for further details on the overlaps and differences between this latter initiative and the one 
supported  by  this  report,  see  Annex  7).  However,  the  problems  related  to  misclassification 
will persist. 

Without further action, issues related to algorithmic management in platform work will 
persist.  Relevant  challenges  will  be  partially  addressed  at  EU  level  through  a  combined 
effect of the Platforms-to-Business (P2B) Regulation, the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR)  and  the  Artificial  Intelligence  Act  (AIA).  The  P2B  Regulation  may  prevent  some 
unfair  practices  of  platforms  vis-à-vis  the  self-employed  people  falling  under  its  scope82  – 
e.g. on the transparency and intelligibility of platforms’ terms and conditions, on fair contract 
termination  notice  periods,  and  on  fair  redress  mechanisms  –  although  workers  (including 
reclassified ones) will remain unprotected. Building on the GDPR83, some Member States 
may decide to introduce specific rules on the processing of workers’ personal data and 
algorithmic  management,  but  this  may  lead  to  ‘regulatory  shopping’  practices  by  platforms 
similar 
the  risk  of 
misclassification. Automated decisions taken solely by algorithms will remain subject to the 

those  expected  vis-à-vis  national  rules  aiming 

to  address 

to 

78 PPMI (2021).  
79 Ibidem. 
80 E.g. in ES following the introduction of the ‘Riders Law’ (available online).  
81  In  Italy  alone,  fines  imposed  on  on-location  platforms  for  misclassification  in  2021  amounted  to  EUR  733 
million. In Spain, in 2020 and 2021, such fines amounted to EUR 23.5 million – PPMI (2021).  
82  The  P2B  Regulation  only  covers  “business  users”,  which  can  include  self-employed  people  acting  in  a 
commercial  or  professional  capacity  which  through  online  intermediation  services  offer  services.  Available 
online. 
83 Article 88 of the GDPR provides that “Member States may, by law or by collective agreements, provide for 
more specific rules to ensure the protection of the rights and freedoms in respect of the processing of employees' 
personal data in the employment context”. Available online. 

19 

 
 
 
                                                           
GDPR  if  producing  legal  or  similarly  significant  effects.  More  legal  clarity  on  what 
constitutes such effects and on the exceptions to the rule in the context of platform work will 
remain  necessary  to  ensure  an  efficient  protection  of  the  rights  of  people  working  through 
platforms. Platforms could exploit this loophole. Existing transparency provisions under the 
GDPR will continue not to extend to the representatives of people working through platforms 
and  labour  authorities.  The  adoption  of  the  AIA  will  tackle  discrimination  and  bias  in 
high-risk AI systems, ensuring the protection of fundamental rights in the EU. This will lead 
to improved trust in AI systems and to a better uptake of the technology. However, within the 
meaning of the proposed AIA, platforms, and not the people working through them, are to be 
considered as the ‘users’ of high-risk AI systems. The transparency provisions for high-risk 
systems therefore do not extend to the people affected by such systems.84 Once adopted, the 
AIA will improve transparency before the placement of algorithmic management systems on 
the market – by ensuring that platforms as users of high-risk AI systems have access to the 
necessary  information  on  the  potential  consequences  of  said  systems  for  employment 
contexts.  Issues  related  to  transparency  on  how  the  behaviour  of  people  working  through 
platforms  affects  their  access  to  tasks  which  arise  post-placement  will  remain  unaddressed. 
This  will  leave  them  exposed  to  the  risks  of  a  use  of  algorithms  potentially  shaped  by 
platforms against the interests of people working through them.   It is estimated that around 
72.5  -  101  million  Europeans85  could  be  already  exposed  to  some  algorithmic  processes  at 
their workplace (on data uncertainties regarding the use of algorithms in the broader labour 
market, see the box in section 2.2.2.). If left unregulated in platform work contexts, it is 
unlikely that a horizontal approach will effectively address the challenges posed by AI to the 
world of work, since these will be too broad for constantly evolving business models not to 
filter  through  potential  legal  loopholes.  The  negative  aspects  of  algorithmic  management 
will  thus  continue  to  affect  stress  levels,  work-life  balance  and  income  stability86  in 
platform  work,  only  to  be  then  replicated  in  traditional  businesses  once  a  sufficient 
number of these will have taken up AI-driven practices. 

Issues  related  to  transparency  and  enforcement,  including  in  cross-border  situations, 
will  remain  unaddressed.  The  growth  of  platform  work  in  all  sectors  will  spur  Member 
States  to  take  action  through  policies  tackling  its  different  challenges.  Said  policies  would 
however be thwarted by the lack of cross-border data sharing and reporting obligations. In the 
continued  absence  of  relevant  rules  at  EU  level,  non-transparent  business  models  will 
likely spread among platforms, which by means of their cross-border nature would be able 
to operate in different Member States while only being registered in one (or, illegally, none). 
This  lack  of  transparency  would  exacerbate  the  difficulties  faced  by  Member  States  in 
understanding  where  some  types  of  platform  work  are  being  performed,  by  whom  and 
according  to  which  regulations  (or  lack  thereof).  Some  forthcoming  EU  initiatives  would 
introduce  binding  Business-to-Government  (B2G)  data-sharing  schemes87  and  corporate 

84 The following AI systems used by platforms are considered high-risk according to the AI Act: “AI systems 
used  in  employment,  workers  management  and  access  to  self-employment,  notably  for  the  recruitment  and 
selection of persons, for making decisions on promotion and termination and for task allocation, monitoring or 
evaluation of persons in work-related contractual relationships.” 
85 This number includes people working through platforms as well as people working in traditional businesses. 
PPMI (2021).  
86 Mateescu A. and Nguyen A. (2019). Algorithmic Management in the Workplace. Data and Society Explainer. 
Available online. 
87 As part of the European Strategy for Data, adopted in February 2020, the Commission has proposed a  Data 
Governance Act establishing thematic, common European data spaces. The forthcoming Data Act proposal, due 
by the end of 2021, will regulate i.a. public authorities’ access to privately held data. However, these initiatives 

20 

 
 
                                                           
 
reporting obligations88, but their scope would be too narrow and too wide, respectively, for 
platforms  to  be  captured  in  any  meaningful  way.  Governments  will  face  growing 
difficulties  in  the  enforcement  of  rules  on  labour,  tax  and  social  protection,  especially  in 
cross-border  situations.  They  may  also  face  increasing  fiscal  shortfalls  caused  by  platforms 
not  paying  taxes  nor  social  protection  contributions.  Some  Member  States  may  introduce 
reporting obligations, but platforms’ ‘regulatory shopping’ would make them ineffective.  

5.2 Policy options addressing the risk of misclassification (Policy Area A) 

The policy options to address  the risk of misclassification of the employment status in 
platform work differ in strength and expected impacts. Most of the following options are 
not  mutually  exclusive.  Depending  on  the  desired  level  of  ambition,  options  A1  and/or  A2 
could be combined with either A3a, A3b or A3c. 

5.2.1 Option A1: Interpretation and guidance 

This  option  would  provide  non-binding  guidance  to  economic  actors,  policy-makers  and 
legal  institutions  on  the  interpretation  of  national  (and  EU)  case  law  on  the  concept  of 
‘worker’,  notably  on  the  jurisprudence  on  misclassification  in  the  platform  economy.  This 
would  include  possible  criteria  or  indicators  in  favour  of,  or  against,  the  existence  of  an 
employment relationship (or of self-employed activity) in platform work. 

5.2.2  Option  A2:  Shift  of  the  burden  of  proof  and  measures  to  improve  legal 

certainty 

This option would introduce the below set of procedural facilitations and dispute prevention 
mechanisms. They would allow misclassified self-employed people on platforms to challenge 
their  employment  status,  and  digital  labour  platforms  to  ascertain  the  correct  employment 
status for a given business model: 

—  a  rule  on  shifting  the  burden  of  proof:  to  contest  their  self-employed  status  in  legal 
proceedings,  people  doing  platform  work  would  only  have  to  establish  basic  proof  of 
elements indicating an employment relationship (prima facie evidence). It would then be 
for the digital labour platform to prove that the person is in fact self-employed; 

—  a  certification  procedure  would  enable  digital  labour  platforms,  as  well  as  people 
working through them (or their representatives), to obtain legal certainty concerning the 
correct designation of the contractual relationship between the digital labour platform and 
the person working through it. The decision to certify such status would be taken through 
a  simplified  out-of-court  procedure  by  an  independent  body  (e.g.  labour  authority, 
university),  after  analysing  relevant  facts  and  hearing  both  sides.  It  would  apply  to  all 
contractual  relations  of  the  digital  labour  platform  sharing  the  same  organisational 
features  and  be  valid  for  as  long  as  the  platform  does  not  substantially  change  the 
contractual conditions; 

will not frame any specific information on platform work and will not apply to SMEs, which most digital labour 
platforms are.  
88  The  proposal  for  a  Corporate  Sustainability  Reporting  Directive  (available  online),  put  forward  by  the 
Commission in April 2021, will require certain companies to produce yearly, non-financial reports on internal 
activities concerning i.a. employment and social  policies. However, such reporting obligations  will be general 
and will not require companies to disclose number of workers or their employment status. 

21 

 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
  a  clarification  that  insurances,  social  protection  and  training  measures  voluntarily 
provided or paid by the platforms should not be considered as indicating the existence 
of  an  employment  relationship.  This  would  remove  the  ‘chilling  effect’  that  keeps 
platforms from improving working conditions of the genuine self-employed.  

The  combination  of  these  instruments  would  ensure  a  balanced  approach  to  achieving  the 
correct employment status classification. Platforms operating through genuine self-employed 
people would have an incentive to engage in the certification procedure, through which they 
would obtain a certain legal certainty for their business model in a relatively hassle-free and 
low-cost  process.  It  would  be  possible  to  challenge  decisions  on  certification  in  court,  but 
such  challenges  would  no  longer  benefit  from  the  shift  in  the  burden  of  proof.  The 
clarification  on  insurances,  social  protection  and  training  measures  would  further  reassure 
platforms  operating  through  genuine  self-employed  people,  while  allowing  for  the  latter’s 
conditions  to  improve.  In  situations  of  misclassification,  the  shift  of  the  burden  of  proof 
would  guarantee  that  false  self-employed  people  working  through  them  have  a  simplified 
way to obtain their correct employment status classification.  

5.2.3  Option  A3:  Rebuttable  presumption  (including  a  shift  in  the  burden  of 

proof) 

This option would introduce a rebuttable presumption of the existence of an employment 
relationship  with  digital labour platforms.  It would  thus  determine the  employment status 
that should apply as a standard rule. The presumption would not be absolute.  Digital labour 
platforms would be able to counter it in legal or administrative proceedings by proving that 
the person working through them is correctly classified as self-employed. It thus contains a 
shift  in  the  burden  of  proof,  as  in  Option  A2,  but  without  the  need  for  the  claimant  to 
present any prima facie evidence. Moreover, such presumption could be relied on not only by 
individuals in reclassification claims before courts or administrative bodies, but also by: 

 
trade unions when organising collective representation, action or bargaining; 
 
labour inspectorates when conducting inspections or imposing sanctions; 
  social protection or tax authorities when collecting contributions or taxes. 

The personal scope of this option could be diversified as follows: 

  Sub-option  A3a:  Rebuttable  presumption  applied  to  on-location  digital  labour 
platforms,  where  misclassification  is  frequent.  All  successful  reclassification  cases 
identified  (both  jurisprudential  and  administrative)  concerned  on-location  platform 
work.  

  Sub-option A3b: Rebuttable presumption applying to all digital labour platforms 
exerting  a  certain  degree  of  control  over  people  working  through  them  and  their 
work.  Such  control  by  digital  labour  platforms  could  be  established  through  a  non-
exhaustive list of indicators, including, for instance, the following: 
-  effectively determining, or setting upper limits for, the level of remuneration;  
-  controlling  or  restricting  the  communication  between  the  person  performing 

platform work and the customer after the intermediation has taken place;  

22 

 
 
 
 
 
 
- 

requiring  the  person  performing  platform  work  to  respect  specific  rules  with 
regard to appearance, conduct towards the customer or performance of the work; 

-  verifying the quality of the results of the work.89 

  Sub-option A3c: Rebuttable presumption applied to all digital labour platforms, 

regardless of the type and /or control exerted.  

5.2.4 Stakeholders’ views90 

Most platforms91 and employers’ representatives92 oppose the idea of reclassification of 
people working through them as workers through a rebuttable presumption, as per Option A3. 
Two  notable  exemptions  are  represented  by  Dutch  food-delivery  platform  JustEat 
Takeaway93  and  Finnish  food-delivery  platform  Wolt.94  Some  online  platforms  say  they 
would  consider  leaving  the  EU  market  if  such  options  concerned  them.  Employers’ 
representatives  acknowledge  the  challenges  related  to  the  risk  of  misclassification,  but 
maintain that addressing them should be a national prerogative.95 

Some on-location platforms advocated a certification procedure similar to that proposed 
under Option A2. The preferred option for most on-location platforms would be reassurances 
allowing  people  to  remain  self-employed  while  gaining  the  right  to  collectively  bargain 
(which  is  the  subject  of another  initiative  under  preparation  by  the  Commission)  and  being 
given some social protection by platforms, e.g. sick leave and insurance (Option A2).  

While agreeing with platforms and employers’ representatives that businesses and consumers 
would  probably  face  higher  costs  as  a  result  of  reclassification,  trade  unions  and 
representatives  of  people  working  through  platforms  stress  that  the  improvement  of 
employment  standards  should  be  the  priority  of  this  initiative  and  that  concerns  over 
costs cannot overshadow the need for better working conditions in platform work. 

89 Those criteria would be elaborated taking into account existing case-law on the employment status in platform 
work, see Annex 10. 
90  As  expressed  in  the  two-stage  social  partners’  consultation  (see  Annex  A2)  as  well  as  in  fact-finding 
workshops  organised  by  the  Commission  and  bilateral  meetings  held  with  the  Commission  and  interviews 
conducted in the context of the study supporting this impact assessment (see Annex A2.3).  Stakeholders were 
consulted at a stage when policy options were still being defined, so their views concern more generally defined 
policy instruments than those described in Sections 5.2.1-5.2.3. 
91  The  Commission  has  consulted  and/or  held  bilateral  meetings  and/or  interviewed  through  the  contractor 
carrying out the study supporting this impact assessment  with at least 28 digital labour platforms: Bolt,  Wolt, 
Uber,  DeliveryHero,  Deliveroo,  Heetch,  Scribeur,  Testbirds,  Workis,  Glovo,  Zenjob,  Voocali,  JustEat 
TakeAway,  Care.com International, Pozamiatane.pl,  TaskHero, TaskRabbit, Jovoto, MelaScrivi,  ClickWorker, 
Wirk,  Freelancer,  Solved.fi,  Didaxis,  Hlidacky,  FreeNow,  Upwork  and  Stuart.  It  has  also  held  meetings  with 
associations representing platforms such as Move EU and the Association of Freelance Platforms (API), as well 
as the association representing German digital companies Bitkom. 
92  The  following  six  replied  to  the  Social  Partners’  consultation:  BusinessEurope,  SGI  Europe,  SMEunited, 
Council  of  European  Employers  of  the  Metal,  Engineering  and  Technology-Based  Industries  (CEEMET), 
Hotels,  Restaurants  and  Cafés  in  Europe  (HOTREC)  and  World  Employment  Confederation  Europe  (WEC-
Europe). 
93 JustEat Takeaway’s CEO, Jitse Groen, came out in favour of a rebuttable presumption in an op-ed published 
in the Financial Times in February 2021. Available online.  
94  On  19th  October  2021,  a  Wolt  representative  shared  the  position  paper  “Developing  a  European  Way  for 
Platform Work” with the European Commission services, arguing in favour of a rebuttable presumption based 
on legal criteria drawing upon CJEU case-law.  
95 For a comprehensive overview of social partners responses in the two-stage consultation, see Annex 2. 

23 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
All trade unions96 and representatives of people working through platforms97 agree that 
a  clarification  of  an  employment  relationship  is  needed.  According  to  many  of  them, 
platforms  should  employ  people  working  through  them  if  they  fall  under  the  criteria  of  an 
employment relationship (Option A3b). Some, stressed that the chosen policy option should 
allow for case-by-case determination of an employment relationship, as there are different 
types  of  platforms  with  various  forms  of  work  organisation.  This  would  be  possible  under 
Option  A3b.  Some  trade  unions  said  that  reclassification  should  be  limited  to  on-location 
platforms  only,  where  false  self-employment  is  more  frequent  (Option  A3a).  Others  would 
prefer a rebuttable presumption applying to all platforms. Some expressed a preference for a 
simplified, out-of-court administrative procedure to reclassify workers (Option A2). 

The  European  Parliament  has  called  on  the  Commission  to  introduce  a  rebuttable 
presumption  of  an  employment  relationship  for  people  working  through  platforms  (Option 
A3), combined with the reversal of the burden of proof and possibly additional measures.98 

Some  representatives  of  national  authorities  expressed  a  preference  for  the  non-binding 
guidance  (Option  A1).  However,  there  were  diverging  opinions.  A  majority  of  the 
representatives  prefer  either  a  rebuttable  presumption  (Option  A3)  or  the  shift  in  the 
burden of proof (Option A2).  

A majority of experts and academics99 agreed that recommendations/guidance from the 
EU  would  not  be  effective  or  bring  any  change.  Most  experts  called  for  hard  law  which 
could help to bring claims in courts, specifying that a rebuttable presumption might only be 
suitable  for  on-location  platforms.  All  interviewed  experts  agreed  that  introducing  a  third 
category status would be ineffective and would increase legal uncertainty.  

5.3 Policy options addressing algorithmic management (Policy Area B) 

Algorithm-driven  business  models  and  automated  decision-making  bring  challenges  to 
working  conditions,  in  particular  in  platform  work.  The  initiative  would  build  upon  the 
existing instruments (labour law, GDPR, P2B) and proposed ones (AIA, DSA) to introduce 
new rights in this area to ensure fairness and transparency in algorithmic management in the 
platform work context, notably by bringing data rights within the remit of labour law, where 

96  The  following  eight  replied  to  the  Social  Partners’  consultation:  European  Trade  Union  Confederation 
(ETUC),  Eurocadres  (Council  of  European  Professional  and  Managerial  Staff),  European  Confederation  of 
Independent Trade Unions (CESI), European Transport Workers’ Federation (ETF), UNI Europa, the European 
services workers union, European Federation of Trade Unions in the Food, Agriculture and Tourism (EFFAT), 
CEC European Managers and European Cockpit Association (ECA). 
97  The  Commission  has  consulted  and/or  held  bilateral  meetings  and/or  interviewed  through  the  contractor 
carrying out the study supporting this impact assessment with the following 24 associations representing people 
working through platforms:  Riders & Derechos, United Freelancers, Collectif des livreurs autonomes de Paris 
(CLAP),  Les  Couriers  Bordelais,  Austrian  Trade  Union  (ÖGB),  Riders  Union  FNV,  Intersyndicale  National 
VTC,  Couriers'  Asociation,  Lithuania,  European  Alternatives,  UILTuCS  Uil,  Unión  General  de  Trabajadores, 
Riders Union Reggio Emilia, 3F Transport, CoopCycle, Smart, Person working through platforms (Germany), 
Asociación Española de Riders Mensajeros (Asoriders), Asociación Autónoma de Riders (AAR), AMRAS Pop-
up  Kollejtif  Kolyma2,  Zentrale,  ACEACOP  -La  Poit’  à  Vélo,  Liefern  am  Limit,  Deliverance  Milano,  Glovo 
couriers Poland. 
98 EP resolution on “fair working conditions, rights and social protection for platform workers  – new forms of 
employment linked to digital development”. Available online. 
99  These,  interviewed  in  the  context  of  the  interview  programme  of  the  PPMI  study  supporting  this  Impact 
Assessment, hail from universities, research institutes and think tanks.  

24 

 
 
                                                           
actors  such  as  trade  unions  and  labour  inspectorates  play  an  important  role.  The  options 
considered  build  on  the  evidence  that  algorithmic  management  is,  to  date,  a  platform  work 
quasi-specific  challenge  which  should  be  addressed  as  such.  They  differ  in  the  level  of 
ambition  and  in  the  personal  scope  considered  (workers  and  self-employed),  but  remain 
within the remit of digital labour platforms, catering to their business specificities. 

5.3.1 Option B1: Guidance 

This  option  would  consist  in  non-binding  guidelines  regarding  possible  actions  (e.g.  best 
practice  sharing,  information  campaigns,  setting  up  of  national  ombudsmen  offices  to  deal 
with  complaints)  by  Member  States  or  digital  labour  platforms  to  strengthen  the  rights  of 
people  working  through  platforms  vis-à-vis  algorithmic  management,  without  prejudice  to 
the role of the European Data Protection Board in issues falling under the scope of GDPR. 

5.3.2 Option B2: Transparency, consultation, human oversight and redress 

This  option  would  build  on  existing  data  protection  and  other  legislation  by  specifying  the 
application of certain GDPR rules in the context of platform work and by creating new labour 
rights and obligations for platforms [/employers] regarding: 

 

transparency  of  automated  monitoring  and  decision-making  systems,  to  make 
them  more  intelligible  to  the  people  affected,  their  representatives  and  labour 
inspectorates (including on task allocation and performance assessment); 
  consultation  with  workers’  representatives  on  substantial  changes 
organisation or in contractual relations linked to algorithmic management; 

in  work 

 

  human  oversight  and  review  of  significant  decisions  taken  by  algorithms  in 
individual cases (e.g. termination and suspension of accounts or decisions with similar 
effects); protection against undue repercussions for human supervisors; 
requests  to  provide  written  explanations  for  such  decisions  and/or  to  reconsider 
them within reasonable time periods (e.g. one week, longer deadline for SMEs); 
 
restrictions on the collection of certain data (e.g. while the person is not working); 
  risk assessments on the impact of algorithmic management on the safety and health 

of workers. 

The personal scope of these rights could cover: 

  Sub-option B2a: employed people working through platforms; 
  Sub-option B2b: employed and self-employed people working through platforms. 

Foreseen new material rights under option B2 would be key for shedding further light on the 
possible  concealment  of  the  exercise  of  control  by  platforms  via  algorithms.  As  such,  they 
will  reinforce  potential  new  measures  to  address  the  misclassification  of  the  employment 
status  (Policy  Area  A).  Beyond  the  notion  of  control,  however,  algorithmic  management 
influences  the  access  to  tasks  (and  hence  income).  Understanding  how  people’s  behaviour 
affects algorithmic decisions on task allocation might therefore be particularly important for 
the genuine self-employed working through platforms, who do not have the minimum level 
of income security and predictability guaranteed by the status of worker. 

Some of the provisions in existing and proposed EU legislation are relevant for the identified 
algorithmic  management  challenges,  still,  specificities  of  employment  relations  necessitate 
further action beyond what is achievable with these instruments. For example,  the proposed 
Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA) would ensure transparency and provision of information to 

25 

 
 
 
users of high-risk AI systems (platforms), but such rights do not extend to the people affected 
by  such  systems.  Because  it  is  essentially  a  product  safety  legislation,  the  AIA  introduces 
safeguards before AI systems are placed on the market, put into service and used. Its rationale 
therefore does not and cannot take into account the specificities of employment relations. For 
instance,  it  does  not  reflect  the  importance  of  social  dialogue  in  the  world  of  work.  It  also 
cannot  be  the  basis  for  specific  rights  and  rules  in  employment  relations,  which  have  been 
established over decades. Furthermore, the AIA proposal is based on an internal market legal 
basis (Article 114 TFEU). Without an EU-level labour framework for regulating algorithmic 
management, there is a risk that national regulations in this area (such as the recent Spanish 
‘Ley Riders’ law) might be seen by courts as infringing the functioning of the internal market 
and  thus  be  struck  down.  An  EU-wide  labour  law  framework  would  not  pose  this  risk. 
Besides, it is not an uncommon practice to introduce specific labour legislation even where 
general product safety rules exist already. Occupational safety and health rules are one such 
example. 

While GDPR provisions are relevant for increasing transparency to individual data subjects, 
they  do  not  apply  to  worker  representatives  or  to  labour  inspectorates.  GDPR  provisions 
(Article 22) granting the right for data subjects not to be subject to a decision based solely on 
automated processing do not specify which automated decisions are significant enough in the 
platform work context to necessitate human review. They are not very specific on which kind 
of information regarding automated monitoring and decision-making systems are to be made 
available. In the fast-moving platform work context it is also important to ensure that periods 
for  reaction  are  shorter  than  those  provided  by  redress  opportunities  available  under  the 
GDPR. For  further analysis  on the complementarities between Option  B2 and the  AIA and 
GDPR, see Annex 7.  

Finally, the Platforms-To-Business (P2B) Regulation provides for transparency, safeguards 
and  complaint  mechanisms  for  certain  self-employed  ‘business  users’  of  online 
intermediation  services  (those  engaged  in  direct  transactions  with  clients).  Moreover,  its 
material scope does not address issues such as the need for human monitoring of automated 
systems,  the  need  for  transparency  in  automated  monitoring  and  decision-making  systems 
(apart  from  ranking)  and  the  need  for  a  specific  review  mechanism  vis-à-vis  automated 
decisions with significant impacts on working conditions, so Option B2 would address these 
gaps for self-employed  people to  whom the P2B Regulation already  confers relevant  rights 
and  for  those  excluded  from  its  scope,  while  creating  new  rights  for  people  classified  as 
workers.  

5.3.3 Option B3: same as Option B2 + portability of reputational data 

In addition to the rights granted under Option B2, this option would promote the use of the 
existing  right  to  data  portability  under  the  GDPR  and  extend  it  to  reputational  data 
(including ratings by platforms and clients) to ensure better professional mobility across the 
platform economy. Platforms would need to make their reputational systems compatible 
and interoperable to ensure that such extended right to data portability could be exercised 
efficiently. The scope of this option could differentiate between: 

  Sub-option B3a: employed people working through platforms; 
  Sub-option B3b: employed and self-employed people working through platforms. 

26 

 
 
 
5.3.4 Stakeholders’ views100 

Most platforms and employers’ representatives believe that the GDPR, P2B and proposed 
AI Act regulations  are sufficient  to address  algorithmic management  challenges.  If a new 
instrument  is  to  be  pursued,  they  believe  guidelines  would  suffice  (Option  B1).  101    Some 
have  called  for  an  approach  based  on  transparency,  human  oversight  and  accountability  in 
full  respect  of  data  protection.102  Platforms  agree  that  the  new  measures  should  aim  at 
increasing the ‘understandability’ of algorithms, human oversight and right to redress. 
A  majority  of  platforms  and  employers’  representatives  saw  ratings  portability  as 
unfeasible from a technical infrastructure viewpoint. Even if it were feasible, some platforms 
believe they could not trust the ratings of competitors. They thus oppose Option B3.  

All trade unions and representatives of people working through platforms support EU action 
to address algorithmic management in the platform work context through hard law (as 
per  Options  B2  and  B3).  They  claim  that  non-binding  guidance  or  recommendations  as 
envisaged by Option B1 would be ineffective. A set of standards or rights established by the 
EU  should  allow  for  domestic  negotiations  and  the  development  of  national  rules.  Most 
representatives  are  against  the  automatic  termination  and  suspension  of  accounts  and 
support  the  idea  of  eliminating  such  practice  from  platform  work,  as  envisaged  by  Options 
B2 and B3. Some support Option B3, saying that the portability of ratings is important to 
ensure people working through platforms are not dependent on one platform and feel ‘locked 
in’.  

The European Parliament has called on the Commission to ensure algorithmic transparency 
in  platform  work.  Such  action  should  improve  rights  in  case  of  restriction,  suspension  or 
termination by the platform, by ensuring all people working through platforms have the right 
to  a  prior  reasoned  statement,  and,  if  this  is  disputed,  a  right  of  reply  and  to  effective  and 
impartial dispute resolution (Option B2).103  

Some  representatives  of  national  authorities  advocate  for  guidance  (Option  B1)  to 
strengthen the rights of people working through platforms vis-à-vis algorithmic management. 
Such  guidance  should  be  flexible  and  adjustable  in  view  of  the  rapid  developments  in  the 
field. Others worried that if guidance (instead of measures envisaged under Option B2 
and B3) are introduced, national regulatory actions may be too heterogeneous, leading 
to  further  problems  of  cross-border  social  dumping.  National  representatives  believe 
transparency  obligations  should  concern  a  platform’s  dealing  with  the  working  conditions 
(including information on how wages are determined) and people’s performance evaluations.  

100  As  expressed  in  the  two-stage  social  partners’  consultation  (see  Annex  2)  as  well  as  in  fact-finding 
workshops  organised  by  the  Commission  and  bilateral  meetings  held  with  the  Commission  and  interviews 
conducted in the context of the study supporting this impact assessment (see Annex A2.3).  Stakeholders were 
consulted at a stage when policy options were still being defined, so their views concern more generally defined 
policy instruments than those described in Sections 5.3.1-5.3.3. The stakeholders whose views are reported on in 
this section are the same as those specified in Section 5.2.4. 
101  The  P2B  Regulation  and  the  Artificial  Intelligence  Act  (AIA)  have  been  often  mentioned  by  platforms  in 
fact-finding workshops and discussions held with the Commission.  
102 See for instance the European Purpose Project, backed by EU-based on-location platforms Glovo, Bolt, Wolt 
and Delivery Hero, as well as French ride-hailing platform Heetch’s Charte d’Engagement and German digital 
business association Bitkom’s position paper. 
103 EP resolution on “fair working conditions, rights and social protection for platform workers – new forms of 
employment linked to digital development”. Available online. 

27 

 
 
                                                           
Most  interviewed  academics  argue  that  guidance  (Option  B1)  might  be  overlooked  by 
Member  States.  They  also  agree  that  while  regulating  at  EU  level  is  essential,  new  rules 
should leave room for national social dialogue and regulations. Most interviewed experts 
agree  that  a  new  law  enshrining  algorithmic  management  rights  in  the  labour  acquis  is 
necessary to complement the GDPR and P2B regulation.  

5.4  Policy  options  on  enforcement,  traceability  and  transparency,  including  in 

cross-border situations (Policy Area C) 

Cross-border  platform  work  creates  additional  challenges  to  national  authorities,  related  to 
verifying  platforms’  compliance  with  existing  laws  and  their  enforcement,  including  as 
regards collection of taxes and social protection contributions. Cross-border and technology-
driven business models are inherent to platform work and constitute part of the attractiveness 
of  its  working  conditions.  Indeed,  the  competitive  advantage  of  some  platforms  may 
rightfully  lie  in  their  superior  technological  know-how,  efficient  algorithmic  practices  and 
strategically  built  multi-market  presence.  The  following  policy  options  take  stock  of  this 
reality while aiming at increasing transparency in platform work and improving data access 
for  authorities,  including  in  cross-border  situations.  Platforms  would  therefore  not  be 
required  to  disclose  the  detailed  functioning  of  their  automated  monitoring  and 
decision-making  systems,  including  algorithms,  or  other  detailed  data  that  contains 
commercial secrets or is protected by  intellectual property rights. Rather, the following 
options  would  simply  require  them  to  make  publicly  available  the  data  they  hold  on  the 
number of people working through them, the jurisdiction under which they do so and based 
on what remuneration/working contracts agreed with them..  

5.4.1  Option  C1:  Clarification  on  the  obligation  to  declare  platform  work, 

including in cross-border situations 

This option would clarify the obligations of platforms which act as employers to declare the 
work  performed  through  them  to  the  authorities  of  the  Member  State  in  which  people 
working through platforms as workers pursue their activity, and to share relevant data (e.g. 
remuneration paid) with those authorities. This would support the traceability of cross-border 
platform  work,  close  data  gaps  and  provide  clarity  on  applicable  rules,  notably  labour  law, 
social protection  coverage and  coordination,  and  rules  regarding jurisdiction and applicable 
law,  and  thereby  contribute  to  the  enforcement  of  existing  rules.  It  would  also  ensure  that 
digital labour platforms are treated on an equal footing with offline businesses. 

5.4.2 Option C2: Publication requirements for platforms 

This option would require platforms to publish on their websites – for each Member State in 
which they are active – information on their most up-to-date Terms and Conditions for 
people  working  through  them,  the  number  of  people  working  through  them,  their 
employment status  and social  protection coverage, as  well as  operational  data such as the 
average remuneration, working time and number of tasks accepted/refused per worker. Such 
information  would  have  to  be  updated  on  a  regular  basis  (e.g.  twice  per  year)  or  provided 
upon  request  by  relevant  authorities.  Some  of  such  obligations  could  be  more  stringent  for 
platforms  of  a  certain  size,  allowing  for  a  more  proportionate  approach  vis-à-vis  SMEs. 
SMEs would thus be required to update their websites less frequently.  

Measures  under  Option  C2  would  complement  the  provisions  foreseen  at  the  moment  of 
writing  this  report  in  the  forthcoming  Data  Act  in  situations  where  governments  need  to 

28 

 
 
access data held by platforms for reasons of public interest (platforms qualifying as small and 
micro enterprises would likely be excluded from the obligation to provide such data). 

5.4.3 Option C3: Register of platforms 

This option would involve a central public register, covering all platforms active in a given 
Member  State.  Similarly  to  Option  C2,  this  register  could  also  include  the  most  up-to-date 
terms  and  conditions  of  platforms,  the  number  of  people  working  through  them  and 
information on under which status and social protection coverage they do so, as well as other 
operational data. Having these data in one central register would bring more transparency and 
easier access to information for regulators, enforcement authorities, people working through 
platforms, and other relevant stakeholders. Such information would have to be updated on a 
regular basis and could be more stringent for platforms of a certain size, allowing for a more 
proportionate approach vis-à-vis SMEs. SMEs would thus be required to input such a register 
less frequently. 

In addition to the options considered above, the relevance of platform work will be taken into 
account in the pilot project on the European Social Security Pass, whose aim is to explore 
the  feasibility  of  a  solution  to  digitise  the  cross-border  verification  of  social  protection 
coverage  and  entitlements.  Such  a  digital  solution  could  address  challenges  in  the 
identification of people working through platforms across borders or in two or more Member 
States for social protection coordination purposes. Since this is a separate initiative, it will not 
be assessed in this report. More information is provided in Annex A11.3. 

5.4.4 Stakeholders’ views104 

Employers’  representatives  call  for  additional  transparency  on  platform  data,  including 
in cross-border situations, but stress that it should not imply too many bureaucratic burdens 
for  smaller  platforms.  Some  platforms  stress  that  reporting  is  only  relevant  for  platforms 
which  do  not  employ  their  workers  (as  those  who  do  already  report  data  to  national 
authorities). They pointed to single market rules that are relevant to cross-border issues, 
which also apply to platforms and self-employed people working through them. SGI Europe 
singled  out  the  European  Labour  Authority  (ELA)  as  an  enabler  of  cross-border  good 
practices.105  

Online platforms put forward the idea of EU action to create a system for easing legal 
checks on freelancers. They believe it is currently difficult to carry out such checks (e.g. on 
work  permits)  on  people  who  want  to  work  through  them,  which  discourages  them  from 
entering markets in other Member States. Some platforms and associations have endorsed 
the  importance  of  public  institutions  accessing  privately  held  data  for  policymaking 
purposes.106  

104  As  expressed  in  the  two-stage  social  partners’  consultation  (see  Annex  2)  as  well  as  in  fact-finding 
workshops  organised  by  the  Commission  and  bilateral  meetings  held  with  the  Commission  and  interviews 
conducted in the context of the study supporting this impact assessment (see Annex A2.3).  Stakeholders were 
consulted at a stage when policy options were still being defined, so their views concern more generally defined 
policy instruments than those described in Sections 5.4.1-5.4.3. The stakeholders whose views are reported on in 
this section are the same as those specified in Section 5.2.4. 
105 For a comprehensive overview of social partners responses in the two-stage consultation, see Annex 2. 
106 See for instance the European Purpose Project, backed by EU-based on-location platforms Glovo, Bolt, Wolt 
and Delivery Hero, as well as European taxi industry group T4SM’s position paper.  

29 

 
 
                                                           
Trade  unions  and  representatives  of  people  working  through  platforms  would  want 
platforms to have a representative in each Member State they do business in, to increase legal 
accountability. They also stressed the importance of applying existing rules on the choice of 
jurisdiction (Brussels Ia and Rome I Regulations) to the context of platform work and that of 
existing  and  forthcoming  initiatives  on  social  protection  coordination  (e.g.  European  Social 
protection  Number).  ETUC  underlined  border  cooperation  between  labour  inspectorates  is 
very important and that ELA could play a crucial role in this.  

The  European  Parliament  has  called  on  the  Commission,  in  collaboration  with  Member 
States,  to  collect  robust  and  comparable  data  on  people  working  through  platforms.  This 
should  provide  a  more  accurate  idea  of  the  scale  of  digital  labour  platform  activity  and 
deepen the knowledge of the working and employment conditions of people working through 
platforms.107 

Representatives  of  national  authorities  stress  that  Member  States  have  different  sets  of 
competences  and  working  methods  vis-à-vis  cross-border  social  protection  and  taxation. 
Some  thus  support  having  guidance,  which  they  believe  would  therefore  benefit  all 
actors involved. Many of them endorsed having publication requirements, but stressed these 
should be limited to platforms above a certain size. 

Academics  think  some  information  held  by  platforms  would  be  useful  for  policymaking 
purposes,  since  it  is  currently  hard  for  policymakers  to  estimate  how  many  people  work 
through platforms, for how long, earning how much. Others do not believe that cross-border 
issues overall are a very urgent matter.  

5.5 Accompanying measures 

All policy options in the three areas presented above could be introduced in combination with 
accompanying  measures.  These  could  be  part  of  a  separate  Communication  or 
Recommendation, and could include: 

1.  Inviting  Member  States  to  provide  information,  advice  and  guidance  to  people 
working through platforms on the tax, social protection and/or labour law obligations 
and  data  protection  rights  related  to  their  platform  activity  via  information  websites 
and hotlines; 

2.  Supporting  social  dialogue  and  capacity  building  of  social  partners  in  platform 
work, 
including  establishment  of  communication  channels  allowing  worker 
representatives  to  contact  people  working  through  the  platforms  and  provide  them 
with relevant information; 

3.  Encouraging the exchange of best practices and mutual learning between Member 

States. 

The accompanying measures would have the purpose to enhance the effectiveness of Policy 
Areas  A,  B  and  C.  They  would  serve  as  a  bridge  between  this  initiative  and  other  related 
initiatives  of  the  European  Commission,  such  as  that  aimed  at  removing  obstacles  to 
collective bargaining for the self-employed in a weak position (see Annex 7) and other pre-
existing measures pertaining to the EU’s social and labour acquis (see Annex 6).  

107 EP resolution on “fair working conditions, rights and social protection for platform workers  – new forms of 
employment linked to digital development”. Available online. 

30 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Given  the  high-level  and  general  character  of  these  Accompanying  Measures,  their 
specific  impacts  would  be  too  difficult  to  assess.  They  thus  do  not  feature  in  Section  6. 
Nevertheless,  in  Section  8  their  positive  effects  are  considered  in  combination  with  the 
measures under the Preferred Option.  

5.6 Options discarded at an early stage 

Three options addressing the employment status of people working through platforms  have 
been discarded so far: 

  Defining  ‘workers’  at  EU  level  to  clarify  under  which  conditions  people  working 
through  platforms  benefit  from  labour  rights.  In  accordance  with  the  Treaties,  EU 
labour  law  can  only  “support  and  complement”  Member  States’  activities.  While 
CJEU case law interprets the personal scope of labour law directives, interfering with 
national  concepts  of  ‘worker’  and  ‘self-employed’  to  determine  the  employment 
status  of  people  working  through  platforms  at  EU  level  could  run  counter  the 
subsidiarity  principle.  Neither  trade  unions’  nor  employers’  representatives  support 
the introduction of an EU definition of ‘(platform) worker’. 

  Establishing  a  ‘third’  employment  status  at  EU  level  to  grant  certain  labour  and 
social protection rights to all people working through platforms, irrespective of their 
employment status. Both trade unions’ and some employers’ representatives reject the 
idea  of  establishing  an  intermediary  status  between  ‘worker’  and  ‘self-employed’  at 
EU  level,  on  subsidiarity  grounds.  Imposing  such  third  status  on  Member  States 
would be equally sensitive from  the point of view of subsidiarity, as it would imply 
going beyond the field of working conditions into matters of social protection. During 
the consultations carried out for this report, most interviewed representatives of public 
authorities said people working through platforms should be included in the EU’s 
two  existing  categories  of  employment  (i.e.  worker  and  self-employed)  without 
creating a third one.  

  Introducing a conclusive (‘irrebuttable’) presumption to the effect that all people 
working through platforms (possibly in a certain sector) would be deemed to be in an 
employment relationship, without any possibility for platforms to prove the contrary. 
Such  an  option  seems  disproportionate,  as  certain  platforms  which  are  legitimately 
based  on  a  self-employed  business  model  could  fall  within  the  scope  of  this 
presumption, merely because of their sector of activity. 

6. WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? 

The  measures  under  the  three  Policy  Areas  considered  in  Section  5  may  have  different 
impacts  on  different  stakeholders,  depending  on  which  options  are  implemented.  Options 
under Policy Area A may have low to high costs for businesses, offset by low to high benefits 
for  public  authorities  and,  most  notably,  people  working  through  platforms.  Options  under 
Policy  Area  B  are  likely  to  have  low  costs  for  businesses  and  high  benefits  for  people 
working  through  platforms,  both  workers  and  self-employed  depending  on  the  chosen 
personal scope. Options under Policy Area C may have low costs for businesses and public 
authorities, with  moderate to  high benefits  for the latter and, indirectly, for people working 
through platforms.  

31 

 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore,  the  combination  of  measures  under  Policy  Area  A  and  C  may  ensure  a 
level  playing  field  between  platforms  currently  operating  through  false  self-employed 
people,  on  the  one  hand,  and  platforms  operating  through  workers  as  well  as  traditional 
businesses, on the other.  The level  playing  field  would come through the aligniment  of  the 
costs (in terms of tax and social protection contributions) that would be faced by the former – 
following a reclassification– to those already borne by the latter as employers. Importantly, 
measures under Policy  Area  B concern the platform work-specific challenge of algorithmic 
managament. Although they aim at the introduction of new obligations which would only be 
faced  by  digital  labour  platforms,  this  would  not  disadvantage  them,  since  traditional 
businesses  do  not  make  use  of  AI-driven  practices  to  the  same  extent  (see  box  in  Section 
2.2.2). These measures would thus not negatively affect the level playing field.  

All measures considered under Policy Area A, B and C would have stronger impacts in those 
Member  States  where  platform  work  is  more  widespread  (mostly  Western  and  Southern 
Member  States  –  see  Annex  A4.2,  Figures  B  and  C).  When  it  comes  to  territorial  impacts, 
cities with up to 100,000 inhabitants could be impacted the most in terms of availability 
of  services  since  platforms,  if  forced  to  optimise  their  business  activities  because  of 
compliance  costs  with  this  initiative,  might  quit  small  smarkets  in  favour  of  larger  cities, 
where they could take advantage of economies of scale. Such impacts  would however only 
relate to on-location platform work. For this type of platform work, it is already the case that 
platform work is relatively more available in larger cities. Such platforms operate in only 3% 
of  all  cities  with  up  to  100,000  inhabitants,  but  in  39%  of  cities  with  more  than  1  million 
inhabitants. Evidence from the survey conducted for the study underlying this report108 shows 
also  that  most  of  the  people  who  work  through  platforms  are  concentrated  in  larger  cities. 
Among the respondents who provide on-location services, 28% were based in cities with up 
to  100,000  inhabitants,  while  the  remaining  72%  were  in  larger  cities.  For  a  more  fine-
grained territorial impacts analysis, see Annex A4.2. 

It should be noted that the analysis of impacts are subject to a certain degree of uncertainty, 
given  the  general  scarcity  of  data  available  on  platform  work  and  the  high  number  of 
assumptions  which  the  projections  and  forecasts  had  to  build  upon.  Further  details  on  the 
limitations of the impacts’ analysis are given in Annex A5.1. 

6.1 Impacts of options under Policy Area A109 

6.1.1 Economic impacts  

Benefits  for  businesses,  markets  and  consumers:  Measures  under  Policy  Area  A  would 
benefit  platforms  that  already  employ  workers  by  making  sure  that  platforms  operating 
through false self-employed people follow the same regulations and do not engage in unfair 
competition. For the same reason, temporary work agencies – e.g. those which supply riders 
to some delivery platforms – stand to gain from the measures under Policy Area A if, as it is 
likely,  platforms  reclassified  as  employers  were  to  use  their  services  to  deal  with  surges  in 
consumer demand. Most of the platforms affected under the different options would be of EU 
origin  (see  Tables  6-9,  Annex  4.1):  from  77%  under  options  A1  and  A3c  to  90%  under 
options A2 and A3a. 

108 PPMI (2021).  
109 Views by “interviewed” people reported upon in this Section are extrapolated from the interviews conducted 
in the context of the study supporting this impact assessment. See Annex A2.3.  

32 

 
 
                                                           
‘Traditional  businesses’  that  compete  with  platforms  by  operating  in  the  same  sector 
would  enjoy  indirect  benefits  from  measures  under  Policy  Area  A,  thanks  to  a  newly 
level  playing  field  in  the  costs  for  social  protection  contributions  (which,  to  date,  are  on 
average  24.5%  higher  for  companies  that  employ  workers  compared  to  those,  including 
platforms,  that  rely  on  self-employed  contractors110).  Platforms  which  offer  services 
through genuine self-employed people may benefit from increased legal certainty vis-à-
vis potential court challenges. Platforms operating through false self-employed would also 
benefit from increased legal certainty and lower non-compliance costs, which it is estimated 
would reach EUR hundreds of millions in the baseline scenario (see Section 5.1). 

Measures  under  Policy  Area  A  may  increase  the  quality  of  services  offered  to 
consumers on platforms. Interviewed stakeholders and experts argued this could be the case 
thanks  to  reclassification,  since  workers  would  receive  training  on  how  to  improve  their 
work.  For  example,  people  employed  by  Hilfr,  a  cleaning  services  platform  in  Denmark 
which signed a collective agreement with trade union 3F, are now eligible to receive training 
on  the  safe  use  of  chemicals.  This  may  explain  why  60%  of  Hilfr’s  revenues  come  from 
cleaners employed by the platform111, even though customers can also choose to hire the self-
employed cleaners who provide services at a lower price. 

Costs for businesses, markets and consumers: Measures under Policy Area A would affect a 
varying number of platforms (see Tables 6-9, Annex 4.1). Options A1 and A3c would affect 
all digital labour platforms currently active in  the EU. Option A2 would affect mostly ride-
hailing and delivery platforms  (around 25% of all  platforms). Option  A3a would affect  on-
location platforms representing around 64% of all platforms. Option A3b is expected to affect 
platforms  representing  around  32%  of  the  total.  If  forced  to  hire  their  self-employed 
contractors following a court’s reclassification, platforms would be faced with annual costs 
of up to EUR 4.5 billion, depending on the measures introduced (see Table 1, Annex 4.1). 
These  costs  would  include  the  increase  in  earnings  for  people  who  previously  earned  less 
than  the  minimum  wage  (which  they  would  be  entitled  to  after  reclassification),  the  social 
protection contributions made on their behalf, as well as taxes. Platforms facing such costs 
may decide to partially pass them on to their newly acquired workers (e.g. by lowering 
the salaries of those who were already earning above the minimum wage,  see next section), 
to businesses to whom they offer services or to their customers.  

Businesses that rely on platforms in their operations may be faced with higher service 
fees. These, compounded by the reduced number in people working through platforms, may 
lead  to  some  decrease  in  overall  revenues  (a  lack  of  data  does  not  allow  to  quantify 
objectively such loss). However, new companies might emerge to gain the market share 
of platforms  going out of business  because of the law.112  Companies based on alternative 
business  models,  such  as  cooperatives,  might  have  opportunities  to  grow  once  the  playing 
field were levelled. Interviewed academics and trade unionists foresee similar scenarios and 
pointed to the correlation between better working conditions of workers and their companies’ 

110 Eurostat (2021). Wages and labour costs. Available online.  
111 Information obtained from Hilfr on June 18, 2021. See Annex A2.3.  
112 News articles have already noted that the ‘Ley Riders’ is “leading to the emergence of new businesses that 
want to fill those last-mile delivery gaps for restaurants” – Moreno, M. A. (2021). Business Insider. Available 
online.  

33 

 
 
                                                           
productivity  that  is  found  in  literature113,  which  could  also  apply  to  platforms  after 
reclassification. 

Options  under  Policy  Area  A  may  increase  the  service  prices  paid  by  consumers, 
depending on how many platforms would become employers and on the revenue available to 
them to compensate for higher costs (instead of passing them entirely onto consumers). One 
platform  estimated  such  hikes  could  hover  around  30-40%  if  it  fell  under  the  scope  of  the 
rebuttable  presumption  (option  A3).  A  more  realistic  estimate,  based  on  available  case 
studies, puts this figure at around 24%.114 In the delivery sector, consumers may face longer 
waiting times as a result of fewer people offering services through platforms. The increase in 
consumer  prices  as  a  result  of  reclassification  might  be  lower  in  more  competitive 
markets, where companies might be pushed to cut costs (or profits) to remain competitive.  

The  impact  on  EU-wide  competitiveness  and  innovation  potential  may  be  null  to 
moderate, depending on the platforms affected. Most on-location platforms (i.e. delivery 
and ride-hailing) would be impacted equally in all Member States and their services’ extra-
EU exportability, which by the very nature of these services is low to null, would not change. 
A  minority  of  on-location  platforms  might  quit  less  profitable  markets  at  local  or  national 
level  (e.g.  if  knowledge  of  local  languages  is  not  needed  to  perform  that  very  service)  to 
compensate for overall higher costs. Online platforms operating in the EU may become less 
competitive  vis-à-vis  their  counterparts  active  in  more  laxly  regulated  markets.  They  could 
either go out of business or leave the EU. Such negative effects should be considered against 
a scenario of increased regulatory certainty and reduced legal risks. 

Benefits  for  Member  States:    Measures  under  Policy  Area  A  facilitating  reclassification 
may increase annual revenues for public authorities by up to EUR 3.98 billion.115 These 
would  come  in  the  form  of  additional  tax  and  social  protection  contributions  coming  from 
platforms,  workers  (including  newly  reclassified  ones)  and  genuine  self-employed  people 
(including those obtaining such status as a result of measures under Policy Area A).116 Up to 
EUR  2.64  billion  would  concern  on-location  platforms,  and  up  to  EUR  1.33  billion  online 
ones. Public authorities would also enjoy enhanced legal certainty and procedural clarity vis-
à-vis reclassification requests’ assessments and decisions.  

Costs for Member States: Options A2 and A3 could entail some costs for public authorities, 
who would have to deal with the certification and/or reclassification procedures. Such costs 
(entailing  setting  up  new  bodies)  may  be  negligible  or  may  be  compensated  by  the 
revenues  generated  by  those  very  bodies.  For  instance,  in  Italy,  the  setting  up  of  work 
contracts certification committees entailed una tantum expenses that were then offset by the 
income  generated  through  fees  paid  by  the  parties  to  the  certified  contracts  (such  fees  are 
established  at  local  level  and  vary  between  EUR  100  and  800).  Among  the  interviewed 
representatives of national authorities (see Annex A2.3), most could point to existing bodies 
which  could  deal  with  the  changes  brought  by  the  initiative.  Processing  misclassification 

113 See for instance R. Croucher, B. Stumbitz, M. Quinlan and I. Vickers (2013), Can better working conditions 
improve the performance of SMEs? An international literature review. Available online.  
114 PPMI (2021).  
115 PPMI (2021).  
116 Estimates of the social protection contributions took into account the differences in rates paid by workers and 
self-employed  people.  The  same  was  not  possible  for  the  estimates  of  the  income  taxes,  because  of  the  high 
number  of  credits  and  deductions  applied  across  Member  States  depending  on  a  high  number  of  individual 
circumstances (e.g. number of children, income etc). The income tax of workers and self-employed people was 
thus assumed to be the same. See Annex A5.1 for further details.  

34 

 
 
                                                           
claims  would  arguably  fall  under  the  already  foreseen  running  costs  of  courts  and 
administrative  bodies.  Furthermore,  the  increased  legal  certainty  stemming  from  options 
under Policy Area A may reduce the overall number of court and administrative cases related 
to misclassification in platform work. 

6.1.2 Social impacts  

Benefits  for  people  working  through  platforms:  Measures  under  Policy  Area  A  would 
improve  the  access  to,  and  ease  the  process  of,  litigation  to  address  misclassification.  This 
may  lead  to  the  reclassification  of  up  to  4.1  million  people  (up  to  2.35  million  on  on-
location platforms,  1.75 million on online ones) depending on the measures implemented 
(see  Table  2,  Annex  4.1).  As  a  consequence,  these  people  working  through  platforms 
reclassified as workers would be covered by the existing EU and national labour and social 
acquis.  This  would  bring  them  substantial  social  benefits  in  terms  of  improved  working 
conditions,  including  health  and  safety,  employment  protection  and  access  to  training 
opportunities.  As  workers,  they  would  also  gain  access  to  social  protection  according  to 
national  rules.  People  who  currently  earn  below  the  minimum  wage  would  enjoy 
increased  annual  earnings  of  up  to  EUR  484  million,  as  statutory  laws  and/or  industry-
wide collective agreements would cover them as well. This means an average annual increase 
in EUR 121 per worker, ranging from EUR 0 for those already earning above the minimum 
wage  before  reclassification  to  EUR  1800  for  those  earning  below  it.117  In-work  poverty 
would thus decrease as a result of reclassification. Income stability and predictability would 
improve.  Genuine  self-employed  people  working  through  platforms  (and  those 
confirmed  to  be  so  after  reclassification)  would  benefit  from  increased  legal  certainty. 
Up to 3.78 million people at risk of misclassification would be confirmed to be genuine self-
employed,  and  possibly  obtain  more  autonomy  and  flexibility  as  a  result.  If  implemented, 
option A2 may also lead between 1.5 and 2.47 million genuine self-employed people to enjoy 
better working conditions and improved access to social protection, as a result of the removal 
of the ‘chilling effect’ on platforms willing to offer such benefits.  

Costs  for  people  working  through  platforms:  Measures  under  Policy  Area  A  may 
negatively affect the flexibility enjoyed by people working through platforms. However, 
such flexibility, especially in terms of arranging work schedules, may be only apparent, since 
actual  working  times  depend  on  the  real-time  demand  for  services,  supply  of  workers,  and 
other factors.  

It  is  difficult  to  meaningfully  quantify  the  impacts  of  measures  under  Policy  Area  A  on 
overall employment levels. Such a quantification would have to consider a very high number 
of  variables  (e.g.  evolving  national  regulatory  landscapes,  shifts  in  platforms’  sources  of 
investment, reallocation of tasks from part-time false self-employed to full-time workers), as 
well as assumptions on the behaviour affected actors would have in response to the measures. 
There are some real-life examples which give an idea of how diverse the reactions could be to 
reclassification measures, depending on local circumstances and various factors. There is one 
example  provided  by  Uber,  in  Geneva,  which  reduced  employment  as  a  result  of 
reclassification; another example provided by Glovo, in Spain, which employed some of its 
couriers  and  changed  conditions  for  others  so  that  they  would  operate  as  genuine  self-
employed;  a  third  example  comes  from  Uber  Eats,  in  Spain,  which  turned  to  temporary 
agency work. Only one platform in Spain (Deliveroo) announced it would leave the market as 

117 Increased earnings factor in the increased income taxes, as per national rules on the matter. See Annex A5.1 
for further details.  

35 

 
 
                                                           
a result of the Ley Riders. It should be noted that this platform had then a weak position in 
the Spanish market, representing less than 2% of its global sales. At the same time, following 
the introduction of the Ley Riders, some new platforms entered or expanded their presence in 
Spain,  building  on  the  existing  demands  for  services,  and  offering  employment  contracts. 
Given the heterogeneity of results observed across markets, it is difficult to calculate the 
exact  impact  on  employment  levels  of  measures  leading  to  the  reclassification  of  the 
employment status.  

Moreover,  platforms  tend  to  cooperate  with  a  large  number  of  contractors  based  on 
fragmented tasks. Such tasks would likely be consolidated for employment contracts leading 
to possibly somewhat fewer jobs, but with a higher number of working hours. In such cases, 
the levels of employment would remain the same in terms of full-time equivalents.  

For  some  people  working  through  platforms  currently  earning  above  the  minimum  wage, 
reclassification  might  lead  to  lower  wages,  as  some  platforms  might  offset  higher  social 
protection costs by reducing salaries.  

6.1.3 Environmental impacts 

Measures  foreseen  under  Policy  Area  A  may  have  indirect  environmental  impacts,  both 
positive and negative (e.g. the growth of online platforms allowing for decreasing commuting 
trends and the reclassification of ride-hailing platforms thwarting the use of electric vehicles 
by drivers). Available evidence does not allow for a precise or meaningful assessment.  

6.2 Impacts of options under Policy Area B118 

6.2.1 Economic impacts 

Benefits  for  businesses,  markets  and  consumers:  Options  under  Policy  Area  B  would 
increase legal certainty for platforms  vis-à-vis  algorithmic  management, allowing for a 
sustainable growth of AI-based technologies in the EU. Most of the platforms affected are of 
EU origin: from  77% under options  B1,  B2b  and B3b to  93% under options B2a  and B3a. 
(For  further  characteristics  of  the  platforms  affected  under  the  different  Policy  Area  B 
options,  see  Tables  10  and  11,  Annex  4.1).  Compliant  platforms  would  also  improve  their 
business reputation as ethical data processors and gain the trust of consumers and regulators, 
with positive spill-over effects for their business revenues. Consumers would benefit from 
more  transparency  on  the  processes  underpinning  services  entailing  algorithmic 
management. Options under Policy Area B would also establish minimum market standards 
across Member States, ensuring a level playing field for all platforms in the EU.  

Costs for businesses, markets and consumers: Measures under Policy Area B would affect 
a varying number of platforms.  Options B1,  B2b and  B3b would  affect  all  digital  labour 
platforms  currently  active  in  the  EU.  Options  B2a  and  B3a  would  affect  platforms  that 
currently  employ  the  people  working  through  them  (8%  of  all  identified  platforms,  mostly 
on-location).  If  reclassification  were  to  happen  as  per  measures  under  Policy  Area  A,  this 
figure would increase to up to 32% of all platforms.  Platforms acting as employers as a result 
of options under Policy Area A would also have to face the compliance costs of consulting 
workers’ representatives on algorithmic management. These  costs could vary depending on 

118 Views by “interviewed” people reported upon in this Section are extrapolated from the interviews conducted 
in the context of the study supporting this impact assessment. See Annex A2.3. 

36 

 
 
                                                           
the extent, type and frequency of such consultations and on the scope of such measures (see 
Table 3, Annex 4.1). They could amount to some EUR 35 000 for all platforms combined. 119 

Similarly, under Policy Area B platforms would have to face the costs of ensuring human 
oversight  and  review  of  significant  decisions  taken  by  algorithms,  providing  written 
explanations of these decisions and internal redress mechanisms (a one-off expense to set up 
the  relevant  infrastructure,  and  possibly  running  costs  afterwards).  The  establishment  of  a 
right  to  data  portability  (Option  B3)  would  mean  that  platforms  would  need  to  make  their 
reputational  systems  compatible  and  interoperable,  through  good  willed  cooperation  and 
possibly substantial infrastructural expenses. Such requirements may have stronger effects 
on SMEs, which most platforms are (see  Section 6.1). Hence, the  facilitations foreseen  for 
SMEs  (see  Section  5.3.2).  Many  large  platforms  already  have  internal  dispute  resolution 
systems and would thus be better equipped to deal with additional requirements. Interviewed 
platforms and employers’ representatives had diverging views on the potential costs of Policy 
Area  B,  although  they  agreed  these  would  depend  on  the  extent  of  the  requirements. 
Competitiveness and innovation potential, including for SMEs, would not be negatively 
affected by these measures. Their limited administrative burdens would unlikely discourage 
companies from investing in the EU, which accounts for over 20% of the world’s market for 
AI  technologies.120  On  the  contrary,  the  legal  certainty  provided  by  these  measures  for 
existing and prospective platforms could spur further investments and innovation.  

6.2.2 Social impacts 

Benefits  for  people  working  through  platforms:  Covering  only  workers,  as  per  option  B2a, 
would  result  in  up  to  4 million  people  working  through  platforms  gaining  better  insight  on 
how  algorithms  affect  working  conditions.  Identified  needs  vis-à-vis  income  stability  and 
predictability for the remaining 24 million people would however not be addressed, as they 
will  not  gain  any  better  understanding  of  how  algorithmic  management  affects  task 
allocation. Covering both workers and self-employed people, as per option B2b, would lead 
to improved working conditions for up to 28.3 million people across the EU (see Table 4, 
Annex 4.1). This would  also  have positive spill  over effects  on their  earnings, as increased 
transparency  on  pay,  performance  evaluation  and  client-ratings  would  grant  them  firmer 
control  over  their  own  work  schedule  and  organisation  and  empower  them  to  defend  their 
rights.  For  instance,  trade  unions  and  representatives  of  people  working  through  platforms 
said algorithms could be amended to take into account the time spent waiting for meals to be 
prepared  and  packed,  waiting  at  red  lights  on  the  way  to  delivery  and  other  issues. 
Representatives  of  national  authorities  and  academics  also  expressed  this  view  (see  Annex 
A2.3).  Better  access  to  information  on  algorithmic  management  would  allow  to  better 
understand  to  what  extent  platforms  are  concealing  subordination  and  therefore 
misclassification. Understanding the algorithmic practices used to influence the behaviour of 
people  working  through  platforms  (e.g.,  nudges  such  as  bonuses  for  faster  food  delivery 
during  peak  demand  periods)  would  allow  to  prevent  health  and  safety  risks,  including 
stress  and  psychosocial  risks  which  are  widespread  in  platform  work  (see  Section  2.1). 
Better access to information on algorithmic management practices in platform work is 

119 Based on the cost of one two-hour consultation attended by one manager. 

120 Commission Staff Working Document (Impact Assessment) Accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation of 
the European Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonised rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial 
Intelligence Act) and amending certain Union legislative acts. Available online. 

37 

 
 
                                                           
 
likely  to  improve  social  dialogue.  Currently,  many  related  claims  rely  on  fragmented 
information,  which prevents  people  working through them  from  formulating clear demands 
and filing comprehensive and sound lawsuits (see Section 2.2.2). A right to reputational data 
portability,  if  efficiently  implemented,  would  likely  offer  more  opportunities  of  work 
mobility  and  career  development  for  people  working  through  platforms,  especially  online 
ones.  

6.2.3 Environmental impacts 

Measures under Policy Area B would have no noticeable impacts on the environment. 

6.3 Impacts of options under Policy Area C121 

6.3.1 Economic impacts 

Benefits  for  platforms  and  consumers:  Measures  under  Policy  Area  C  would  likely 
increase administrative transparency in platform work. This would improve the quality of 
services offered to consumers, thus their welfare, and foster trust in the platform economy as 
a whole. Hence, platforms may benefit from increased trust coming from public authorities, 
people  working  through  platforms,  and  potential  customers,  with  its  resulting  advantages. 
Measures  under  Policy  Area  C  would  also  contribute  to  a  level  playing  field  between 
platforms  currently  operating  through  false  self-employed  people,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
platforms operating through workers as well as traditional businesses, on the other. The level 
playing  field  would  come  through  the  alignment  of  the  costs  (in  terms  of  tax  and  social 
protection contributions) that would be faced by the former – following a reclassification as 
per measures under Policy Area A  – to those already borne by the latter as employers. The 
increased transparency and traceability ensured by measures under Policy Area C would thus 
facilitate the enforcement of the reclassification and its resulting alignment of costs between 
competitors. 

Benefits  for  Member  States:  Public  authorities  pointed  to  the  extra  budgetary  revenues 
that would derive from increased enforcement, traceability and transparency, including 
in  cross-border  situations.  Interviewed  academics,  who  also  espoused  this  view,  gave  the 
example of the Romanian tax reform (which equalised income tax for workers and the self-
employed) and stressed that cross-border transparency could underpin the reclassification of 
people  working 
relevant 
authorities.122  The  enhanced  traceability  of  cross-border  platform  work  would  support  the 
collection of additional revenues to public authorities, expected as a consequence of measures 
under Policy Area A (see Section 6.1.1). 

through  platforms’  employment  status,  by  empowering 

Costs  for  platforms:  The  three  options  under  policy  area  C  would  affect  all  digital  labour 
platforms currently active in the EU. Around 46% of them operate in more than one Member 
State, whereas 77% of all those platforms are of EU origin.123 (For further characteristics of 
the platforms affected under the different Policy Area C options, see  Table 12, Annex 4.1). 
The impacts of measures under Policy Area C are strongly interlinked with those under 
Policy  Area  A.  If,  depending  on  the  latter,  platforms  are  reclassified  as  employers,  they 

121 Views by “interviewed” people reported upon in this Section are extrapolated from the interviews conducted 
in the context of the study supporting this impact assessment. See Annex A2.3. 
122 In Romania, said Tax reform led to the reclassification of circa 2 million people.  
123 De Groen W., Kilhoffer Z., Westhoff L., Postica D. and Shamsfakhr F. (2021). Available online. 

38 

 
 
                                                           
would  become  subjected  to  a  number  of  reporting  requirements  depending  on  the  former. 
Option  C1  per  se  would  not  entail  any  costs  above  the  baseline,  since  it  would  clarify 
applicable rules and reinforce platforms’ awareness vis-à-vis their duty to comply with such 
rules in their capacity of employers. Options C2 and C3 would entail one-off administrative 
costs for platforms, depending on which measures under Policy Area C would be introduced 
(see Table 5, Annex 4.1). It is estimated that all on-location platforms combined would pay 
EUR  30  400  to  comply  with  the  reporting  obligations  under  option  C2,  whereas  for  online 
platforms  such  costs  would  amount  to  EUR  17  300.  Setting  up  national  registers,  as  per 
option C3, may entail substantial costs for both Member States (who would have to run them) 
and  platforms,  who  would  have  to  periodically  feed  into  theme.  It  was  not  possible  to 
precisely  assess these  costs.  Whereas  some interviewed platforms believe such costs would 
be negligible because relevant information is already collected, others feared that costs could 
escalate  depending  on  the  number  of  people  concerned  by  the  data124,  also  because  some 
platforms have many people signing up without ever doing any work.125 Some employer 
organisations spoke against reporting obligations, arguing that platforms are registered as any 
other  enterprise.  Measures  under  Policy  Area  C  would  likely  not  affect  the  EU’s 
competitiveness  or  innovation  potential,  given  the  very  limited  administrative  burdens 
entailed (including for SMEs).  

6.3.2  Social impacts 

Benefits  for  people  working  through  platforms  and  social  partners:  While  people  working 
through  platforms  might  not  immediately  feel  the  direct  effects  of  some  measures  under 
Policy  Area  C,  relevant  information  becoming  available  to  public  authorities  would 
strengthen the role of labour inspectorates, tax and social protection agencies and allow for 
improved  rules-enforcement  and  better  policy-making.  This  would  further  facilitate  the 
pursuit  of  the  objectives  underpinning  the  measures  under  Policy  Area  A.  The  enhanced 
traceability  of  cross-border  platform  work  would  improve  effective  access  to  social 
protection  of  people  doing  cross-border  platform  work  as  workers.  Trade  unions  and 
representatives  of  people  working  through  platforms  believe  increased  traceability  and 
transparency,  including  in  cross-border  situations,  would  prevent  social  dumping, 
expose the grey economy and reduce undeclared work. They also think it would foster social 
dialogue through improved clarity on who does what kind of platform work and where.  

6.3.3 Environmental impacts 

Options under Policy Area C would have no noticeable impacts on the environment. 

7. HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? 

Options  under  Policy  Areas  A,  B  and  C  are  compared  against  the  criteria  of  effectiveness, 
efficiency  and  coherence.  Based  on  this  assessment,  the  preferred  option  (see  Section  8)  is 
assembled as a package of the preferable options stemming from each Policy Area.  

124 One of the online platforms interviewed estimates it could cost EUR 10 000. 
125  For  example,  of  all  people  based  in  the  EU  who  registered  on  online  platforms  Upwork,  Guru, 
PeoplePerHour and Freelancer, less than 20% have completed at least one assignment. – PPMI (2021).  

39 

 
 
                                                           
7.1 Effectiveness 

‘Effectiveness’ refers to the extent that options under Policy Areas A, B and C help achieve 
the objectives of the initiative, as outlined in  Section 4 – See Table 13 below. When rating 
the  policy  options,  the  business,  employment,  competition  and  competitiveness  dimensions 
were all taken into account.  

Under  Policy  Area  A,  all  options  score  positively.  Option  A3b  (Rebuttable  presumption 
applied to platforms exerting a certain degree of control)  is the most effective. Option A1 
(Interpretation and guidance) is the least effective, since guidance alone would likely achieve 
fewer  results  than  stronger  measures.  Option  A2  (Shift  of  burden  of  proof  and  measures  to 
improve legal certainty) is quite effective, although it would require people working through 
platforms  to  proactively  provide  prima  facie  evidence  of  a  misclassification.  This  can  be 
difficult  for  people  in  a  weak  labour  market  position  (see  Section  2.2.1).  The  rebuttable 
presumption  (all  options  under  A3)  includes  by  definition  a  shift  in  the  burden  of  proof  – 
without  the  need  to  present  prima  facie  evidence  –  and  is  therefore  more  effective  in 
improving  working  conditions  in  platform  work.  Option  A3a  (Rebuttable  presumption 
applied to on-location platforms), while effective, has a narrow scope and would leave out a 
share  of  the  misclassified  people  in  platform  work,  i.e.  those  working  through  online 
platforms. Option  A3c (Rebuttable presumption applied to  all platforms) is  also  considered 
quite  effective.  Its  scope,  however,  encompassing  all  platforms  regardless  of  the  control 
exerted,  would  be  too  broad  and  encompass  also  many  online  platforms  which  operate 
through genuine self-employed people (see Section 2.2.1). Under A3c, these platforms would 
have  to  go  through  unnecessary  court  procedures.  The  general  objective  of  the  initiative 
would be best achieved under option A3b. In fact, option A3c would be equally effective in 
improving the working conditions of people working through platforms, but it would be less 
effective  than  A3b  in  supporting  the  conditions  for  sustainable  growth  of  digital  labour 
platforms  in  the  EU.  It  is  for  these  reasons  that  A3b  is  considered  the  most  effective 
option.  

Under  Policy  Area  B,  all  options  score  positively  in  terms  of  effectiveness.  Option  B1 
(Guidance),  though  effective,  would  have  limited  added  value  in  view  of  existing, 
overlapping  guidelines  e.g.  by  the  European  Data  Protection  Board.  Option  B2b 
(Transparency,  consultation,  human  oversight  and  redress  applied  to  employed  and  self-
employed people working through platforms) is quite effective, but B3b (same as B2b + data 
portability rights applied to employed and self-employed people working through platforms) 
is the most effective. B2b would target the algorithmic management challenges faced by all 
people  working  through  platforms,  regardless  of  their  employment  status  (unlike  its 
counterpart  option  only  targeting  workers,  B2a,  which  for  this  reason  has  a  lower  score). 
Option  B3b  would  be  equally  effective  in  improving  the  working  conditions  of  people 
working  through  platforms,  and  would  go  beyond  by  granting  them  additional  reputational 
data  portability  rights.  Based  on  the  stakeholder  consultations  carried  out  for  this  report, 
however,  the  practical  feasibility  of  B3b  has  been  put  into  doubt,  in  view  of  the 
disproportionate  administrative  and  compliance  costs  it  may  place  on  platforms  (especially 
SMEs).  B3a does the same but only targets workers. Hence, its lower score.  

Under Policy Area C, the most effective options are C1 (Clarification on the obligation to 
declare platform work, including in cross-border situations) and C3 (Register of platforms). 
The  former  would  make  sure  that  existing  rules  on  social  protection  coverage  and 
coordination,  as  well  as  other  relevant  laws  in  the  labour  domain,  apply  to  platforms 
operating across borders. The latter, by setting up national registers with  data on platforms, 
would contribute to solve many issues related to transparency and enforcement, including in 

40 

 
 
cross-border  situations.  Option  C2  (Publication  requirements  for  platforms),  while  quite 
effective,  would  require  Member  States’  authorities  to  proactively  look  for  relevant 
information on platforms’ websites. Hence, its lower grading compared to C1 and C3.  

Table 13: Comparison of the effectiveness of options under Policy Areas A, B and C 

Options 

Rating 

Baseline 

0 

A1 

+ 

A2 

++ 

A3a 

++ 

A3b 

+++ 

A3c 

++ 

A
a
e
r
a
y
c
i
l
o
P

B
a
e
r
a
y
c
i
l
o
P

C
a
e
r
a
y
c
i
l
o
P

for 

Criteria 
comparing 
options 

Options 

Rating 

for 

Criteria 
comparing 
options 

  Number  of  people  at  risk  of  misclassification  who  are  reclassified  as  workers  (with  accompanying 

benefits) 

  Number of people at risk of misclassification ending up in genuine self-employment 
  Number of people in better working conditions in self-employment 
  Easier access to/ process of litigation related to employment status 
  Effects on the sustainable growth of platforms in the EU 
  Effects on the EU’s competitiveness and innovation potential  
B2a 

B2b 

B3a 

B1 

Baseline 

0 

+ 

+ 

++ 

++ 

B3b 

+++ 

  Number  of  people  who  obtain  new  rights  regarding  transparency,  consultation,  human  oversight  and 

redress 

  Number of people who can improve their working conditions in platform work through data portability 
  Effects on the sustainable growth of platforms in the EU 
  Effects on the EU’s competitiveness and innovation potential  

Options 

Rating 

Baseline 

0 

C1 

+++ 

C2 

++ 

C3 

+++ 

for 

Criteria 
comparing 
options 

  Better knowledge on developments in platform work 
  Accessibility of information 
  Clarity on applicable rules for people working through platforms across borders 
  Consistency across Member States 
 
Feasibility of implementation 
  Effects on the sustainable growth of platforms in the EU 
  Effects on the EU’s competitiveness and innovation potential  

7.2 Efficiency 

‘Efficiency’ refers to the ratio of the benefits of each option to its associated costs (see Tables 
1-5, Annex 4.1 for a detailed overview of options’ economic and social impacts). All policy 
options assessed against the criterion of efficiency are compared to the baseline scenario (see 
Section 5.1).  

Under Policy Area A,  options  A2 (Shift  of  burden of  proof and measures to  improve legal 
certainty) and A3b (Rebuttable presumption applied to platforms exerting a certain degree 
of  control)  are  the  most  efficient  (see  Table  14  below).  Option  A1  (Guidance)  can  be 
considered quite efficient, since it has very few costs. However, it also comes with very few 
benefits,  given  its  non-stringent  measures.  Option  A2  has  moderate  costs  and  moderate 
benefits,  obtained  through  measures  that  increase  legal  certainty  while  improving  the 
likelihood of people working through platforms to gain their correct employment status. The 
latter element, however, would depend on people proactively bringing  prima facie evidence 
of their employment status to courts, which can be difficult for those in a weak labour market 
position (see Section 2.2.1) and in the context of algorithmic management (see Section 2.2.2). 
Hence, the benefits  would  probably be limited to  a sub-set  of proactive  and well-organised 
people  working  through  platforms.  Option  A3a  would  have  high  costs  for  the  platforms 
targeted and high benefits for the people working through them. However, within the broader 
context  of  platform  work,  it  would  have  a  limited  beneficial  impact  since  it  would  only 
concern a subset of people working through platforms. Option  A3b entails substantial costs 
for platforms fulfilling one of the ‘control’ criteria (see Section 5.2.3), but would also have 
substantial  and  immediate  benefits  for  the  many  people  who  would  be  re-classified  as 
workers as a result of the rebuttable presumption. Option  A3c would have high benefits for 
people working through platforms but arguably disproportionate costs for platforms, many of 

41 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
which would be unnecessarily targeted by the rebuttable presumption. A1, A2 and A3b are 
thus  considered  the  most  efficient  for  diverging  reasons:  A1  and  A2  have  low  and 
moderate  costs and low  and moderate benefits,  respectively.  A3b has  higher costs and 
higher  benefits.  Hence,  their  final  costs/benefits  ratio  is  similar,  albeit  with  very  different 
results in practice. Despite this, it should be noted that, because of its non-binding measures 
which would likely achieve little in practice, option A1 has a lower grading compared to A2 
and A3.  

Under Policy Area B, option B2b (Transparency, consultation, human oversight and redress 
applied  to  employed  the  self-employed  people  working  through  platforms)  is  the  most 
efficient  (see  Table  14  below),  allowing  for  the  benefits  of  a  regulated  algorithmic 
management to improve the working conditions of both workers and self-employed people in 
platforms.  As  explained  in  Section  2.1,  both  these  groups  are  affected  by  algorithmic 
management, regardless of their employment status. The costs for platforms associated to this 
option  are  moderate  compared  to  the  benefits  for  both  people  working  through  them  and 
platforms  themselves,  e.g.  thanks  to  improved  legal  certainty  (see  Section  2.3).  For  these 
reasons,  option  B2a  only  targeting  workers  would  bring  benefits  to  only  a  share  of  people 
affected  by  algorithmic  management,  while  entailing  moderate  costs  for  platforms.  Option 
B1, on the other hand,  would have few  costs but  also  very few benefits.  Option  B3 –  with 
both its sub-options providing data portability rights to workers (B3a) and workers plus the 
self-employed (B3b) – would entail substantially higher costs against only moderately higher 
benefits than B2, thanks to reduced ‘lock-in effects’ (see Section 2.2.2).  

Under Policy  Area C,  option  C1  (Clarification on the  obligation to  declare platform work, 
including  in  cross-border  situations)  is  the  most  efficient  (see  Table  14  below),  since  it 
would have no costs above the baseline (see Table 5, Annex 4.1) and would possibly bring 
benefits  in  terms  of  effective  access  to  social  protection  and  labour  law  applicability  for 
people  working  through  platforms.  Option  C2  (Publication  requirements  for  platforms), 
demanding  that  platforms  publish  relevant  data  on  their  websites  and  checking  the  ones  of 
interest to specific labour or tax inspections, would also be quite efficient, albeit with higher 
costs than C1. Option C3 (Register of platforms) would be arguably more beneficial than C2 
but  with  much  higher  costs  (which  would  arguably  offset  the  benefits,  hence  the  “0”).  For 
public  authorities  to  set  up  a  register,  collect  relevant  data  from  all  platforms  and  keep  the 
register up to date, as foreseen by option C3, would entail substantial expenses.  

42 

 
 
 Table 14: Comparison of the efficiency of options under Policy Areas A, B and C 

Options 

Rating 

Baseline 

0 

A1 

++ 

A2 

+++ 

A3a 

++ 

A3b 

+++ 

A3c 

+ 

Fulfilment of objectives in view of the following costs: 

Foregone platform revenue 
Foregone revenue for businesses that rely on platforms 

  Number of people working through platforms with increased working hours 
  Number of people losing the opportunity of platform work 
  Adjustment, administrative and compliance costs to platforms 
 
 
  Availability, cost and quality of service to consumers 
  Administrative cost to the public sector 
  Revenue of the public sector 
 
Baseline 

Public sector administrative and enforcement costs 

B2b 

B2a 

B1 

B3a 

0 

+ 

+ 

++ 

- 

Fulfilment of objectives in view of the following costs: 

  Adjustment, compliance and administrative costs to platforms 
 
 
Baseline 

Public sector administrative and enforcement costs  
Feasibility of implementation 

C1 

C2 

0 

+++ 

++ 

for 

Criteria 
comparing 
options 

Options 

Rating 

for 

Criteria 
comparing 
options 

Options 

Rating 

for 

Criteria 
comparing 
options 

Fulfilment of objectives in view of the following costs: 

 
Fragmentation across Member States 
  One-off and recurring costs for platforms 
 

Public sector administrative and enforcement costs 

A
a
e
r
a
y
c
i
l
o
P

B
a
e
r
a
y
c
i
l
o
P

C
a
e
r
a
y
c
i
l
o
P

B3b 

- 

C3 

0 

7.3 Coherence 

‘Coherence’  refers  to  the  coherence  of  each  option  with  the  values,  aims,  objectives  and 
existing and forthcoming initiatives of the EU.  

Under  Policy  Area  A,  all  options  score  positively  in  terms  of  coherence  (see  Table  15 
below),  in  so  far  as  they  contribute  to  the  Treaty-based  goals  of  promoting  employment  and 
improved  living  and  working  conditions  (Article  151  TFEU),  and  to  the  implementation  of  the 
European  Pillar  of  Social  Rights,  notably  of  the  Principle  5  on  ‘Secure  and  adaptable 
employment’,  Principle  7  on  ‘Information  about  employment  conditions  and  protection  in 
case of  dismissals’, Principle 10 on ‘Healthy, safe and well-adapted work environment  and 
data protection’ and Principle 12 on ‘Social Protection’. They also address the rights set out in 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU in relation to the right of workers to fair and just 
working conditions (Article 31). Option A1 (Guidance) has lower scores than A2 (Shift of the 
burden of proof and measures to improve legal certainty) and A3 (Rebuttable presumption) 
and its sub-options, since the less stringent nature of the measures it entails would translate in 
a  less  stringent  adherence  to  the  values,  aims  and  objectives  of  existing  and  forthcoming 
initiatives of the EU. As regards the sub-options  of A3, A3b is considered more coherent 
with  the  social  objectives  of  the  initiative  than  A3a,  which  has  a  limited  scope 
encompassing  only  on-location  platforms,  leaving  out  potentially  misclassified  people 
working through online platforms. In so far that it has a more proportionate approach, basing 
the  rebuttable  presumption  on  ‘control’  criteria  (see  Section  5.2.3),  A3b  supports  the 
conditions  for  a  sustainable  growth  of  platforms  in  the  EU  and  is  therefore  also  more 
coherent than A3c with the aims and objectives of the internal market acquis and with 
the principle of effectiveness of EU law.  

Under Policy Area B, all options score positively in terms of coherence, but with differences 
(see  Table  15  below).  The  less  stringent  nature  of  measures  under  option  B1  (Guidance) 
explains  the  lower  grade  in  terms  of  coherence.  Option  B2  (and  its  sub-options)  would 

43 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
usefully  complement  and  specify  existing  rights  under  the  GDPR  and  proposed  obligations 
under the AIA, and therefore obtains the highest score. The issue of data portability regarding 
ratings considered under option B3 (and its sub-options), however, would be more appropriate to 
be tackled through broader EU action in related policy areas (e.g. under the European Strategy for 
Data), as the challenges identified go beyond the context of platform work. 

Under  Policy  Area  C  all  options  score  positively  but  option  C1  (Clarification  on  the 
obligation to declare platform work, including in cross-border situations) scores higher than 
both  C2  (Publication  requirements  for  platforms)  and  C3  (Register  of  platforms),  since  it 
contributes to the correct application of existing laws. Option C2, while quite coherent, would 
nevertheless  impose  administrative  burdens  on  platforms.  C3  is  the  least  coherent,  since  it 
would potentially duplicate similar, existing registers for companies at national and EU level. 
— see Table 15 below.  

Table 15: Comparison of the coherence of options under Policy Areas A, B and C 
A1 

Baseline 

Options 

A2 

A3a 

Rating 

0 

+ 

++ 

++ 

A3b 

+++ 

A
a
e
r
a
y
c
i
l
o
P

B
a
e
r
a
y
c
i
l
o
P

C
a
e
r
a
y
c
i
l
o
P

for 

Criteria 
comparing 
options 

Options 

Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter). 
Principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights. 

  EU’s aims and objectives: EU’s internal market acquis & principle of effectiveness of EU law. 
 
 
  EU labour law acquis 
B1 

B2b 

B2a 

B3a 

Baseline 

Rating 

0 

+ 

++ 

++ 

+ 

for 

Criteria 
comparing 
options 

Options 

Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter). 
Principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights. 

  EU’s aims and objectives: EU’s internal market acquis & principle of effectiveness of EU law. 
 
 
  EU labour law acquis 
C1 

C3 

C2 

Baseline 

Rating 

0 

+++ 

++ 

+ 

for 

Criteria 
comparing 
options 

Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter) 
Principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights 

  EU’s aims and objectives: EU’s internal market acquis & principle of effectiveness of EU law 
 
 
  EU labour law acquis 
 
  Amended Directive on Administrative Cooperation (DAC7). 

‘Platform-to-Business’ or ‘P2B’ regulation 

A3c 

++ 

B3b 

+ 

8. PREFERRED OPTION 

Policy Area A 

  Rebuttable presumption applied to platforms that exercise  a certain degree of control  

including a shift in the burden of proof (option A3b) 

Policy Area B 

  Transparency,  consultation,  human  oversight  and  redress  for  both  workers  and  self-

employed people working through platforms (option B2b) 

Policy Area C 

  Clarification  on  the  obligation  to  declare  platform  work,  including  in  cross-border 

situations (option C1), combined with:  

Accompanying 
measures 

  Publication requirements for platforms (option C2)  
 

Invitation  to  Member  States  to  provide  advice  and  guidance,  to  encourage  social 
dialogue and exchange best practices and mutual learning.  

Under  Policy  Area  A,  the  preferred  option  is  a  rebuttable  presumption  limited  to  those 
platforms that exercise a certain degree of control over the people working through them 
and the work they perform (option A3b). This option also includes a shift in the burden of 
proof: once the presumption is triggered, it is up to the platforms which are presumed to be 
employers to prove otherwise in court. Considering all the three criteria, it is overall the most 

44 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
efficient,  effective  and  coherent  option.  Although  some  platforms  and  employers’ 
representatives believe that a rebuttable presumption may have unintended consequences for 
platforms with a business model legitimately based on self-employment, others126 support it, 
considering  it  as  a  fair  measure  bringing  legal  clarity  and  ensuring  a  level  playing  field 
between  platforms  operating  through  false  self-employed,  on  the  one  hand,  and  those 
operating  through  workers  and  traditional  businesses,  on  the  other.  Option  A3b  is  a 
proportionate  measure,  as  it  only  targets  platforms  that  behave  in  an  employer-like 
manner (based on a conservative estimate,  there are at least 166 such platforms in the EU, 
overwhelmingly  active  in  the  delivery  sector  –  see  Annex  A4.1).  The  threshold  to  prove 
control  of  the  performance  of  work  should  not  be  put  too  high,  lest  it  make  the  use  of  the 
presumption impracticable. The presumption is  rebuttable and therefore  does not  mean that 
there  is  no  place  for  genuine  self-employment  with  real  autonomy  in  platform  work.  This 
option  is  supported  by  many  representatives  of  national  authorities,  trade  unions  and 
representatives of people working through platforms  (see  Section 5.2.4). This option would 
allow the initiative to comply with the EU’s principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Its 
architecture  mirrors  the  feedback  collected  during  the  consultation  of  stakeholders  (see 
Annex  2),  notably  on  the  need  to  avoid  one-size-fits-all  measures.  Indeed,  option  A3b’s 
criteria-based  approach  would  allow  for  a  targeted  action  that  takes  into  account  the 
differences between platforms’ business models (introducing gradual administrative burdens 
based  on  the  likelihood  of  misclassification).  It  would  also  cater  to  Member  States’  social 
policy  traditions,  leaving  space  for  national  labour  law  definitions  against  which  the 
presumption  would  be  assessed.  It  should  be  underlined  that  the  above  measures  under  the 
preferred option would only target those people working through platforms who are at risk of 
misclassification, i.e. some 5.5 million people out of the overall 28 million. 

Under  Policy  Area  B,  the  preferred  option  is  a  package  of  rights  regarding  transparency, 
consultation,  human  oversight  and  redress  for  both  workers  and  self-employed  people 
working  through  platforms  (option  B2b).  This  option  is  the  most  effective,  efficient  and 
coherent  and  is  supported  by  trade  unions,  representatives  of  people  working  through 
platforms, most Member States’ authorities and some platforms. It would also be in line with 
the expectations of the European Parliament (see Section 5.3.4 and Annex A2.3). Option B2b 
would take into account  the challenges that the use of algorithms in  managing  a workforce 
poses to both workers and the self-employed. It would grant them rights to keep better control 
on how their personal data are being used and to challenge the decisions that are taken on this 
basis. It would improve collective rights and strengthen social dialogue. By building on and 
specifying  existing  data  protection  rights  (laid  down  in  the  GDPR),  this  option  would 
improve  legal  certainty  and  keep  the  additional  burden  for  platforms  to  a  strict  minimum. 
Including  the  self-employed  would  avoid  an  additional  disincentive  for  platforms  to  offer 
employment  relationships  to  the  people  working  through  them.  Options  B3a  and  B3b  (on 
reputational data portability for workers and workers plus self-employed, respectively) where 
closely  considered  as  possible  additions  to  this  package  of  rights,  but  were  ultimately 
discarded  based  on  a  balanced  consideration  of  stakeholders’  feedback:  notably,  platforms 
were  staunchly  against  these  interoperability  measures,  which  they  considered  too  costly  
(compared  to  the  benefits  delivered)  and  overreliant  on  businesses’  reciprocal  trust  and 
cooperation  in  ensuring  technological  compatibility  (see  Section  5.3.4).  Given  the  strong 
interlinks  between  the  risk  of  misclassification  of  the  employment  status  and  the  control 

126 E.g. Dutch food-delivery platform JustEat TakeAway and Finnish food-delivery platform Wolt (see Section 
5.2.4).  

45 

 
 
                                                           
exerted by platforms by means of algorithmic management (see Section 2.2.2), the preferred 
option under Policy Area B complements well the preferred option under Policy Area A.  

Under Policy Area C, the preferred option is to combine a clarification on the obligation to 
declare  platform  work,  including  in  cross-border  situations  (option  C1)  with  a  duty  for 
platforms  to  publish  information  on  their  Terms  and  Conditions  for  platform  work,  the 
number of people working through them, their employment status, social protection coverage 
and other data concerning their work (option C2). It is the most efficient and coherent option. 
Although  option  C3  (Register  of  platforms)  would  also  be  very  effective,  it  is  the  least 
efficient.  It  also  raises  questions  of  subsidiarity,  since  requiring  Member  States  to  set  up 
national  business  registers  may  impinge  on  their  prerogatives  and  duplicate  existing 
databases. It may also not be proportional vis-à-vis SME platforms, which would have to go 
through lengthy bureaucratic processes to feed into the national registers this option entails. 
Option  C1  would  not  create  any  new  obligations,  but  ensure  that  digital  labour  platforms 
which act as employers are aware of and comply with their existing obligations to declare the 
work  and  share  relevant  data  with  the  authorities  of  the  Member  State  in  which  people 
working  through  platforms  as  workers  pursue  their  activity,  thereby  improving  their  social 
protection  coverage.  Option  C2  only  constitutes  a  light-touch  administrative  burden  for 
platforms,  but  would  shed  transparency  also  on  platforms  that  do  not  consider  themselves 
employers.  Therefore  it  would  greatly  facilitate  the  tasks  of  labour  inspectorates,  social 
protection  institutions  and  tax  authorities  to  enforce  rules  –  including  on  the  employment 
status – and collect contributions and taxes, in particular in cross-border situations. It would 
also  improve  transparency  for  workers  and  their  representatives.  For  SMEs,  the  periodicity 
and extent of such requirements would be less stringent. The preferred options under Policy 
Area C dovetail with the preferred options under Policy Areas A and B.  

Table 16 below summarises the main combined impacts of the preferred option. (For a 
more detailed analysis of such impacts, see Annex 3)  

Table 16: Comparison of the combined costs and benefits of the preferred option (A3b + B2b + C1+C2) 

Stakeholders 

People working through platforms 

Up  to  4.1m  people  reclassified  as 
workers  

Benefits 

Up to EUR 484m increase in earnings 

Platforms, businesses relying on them 
and consumers 
Increased legal certainty  

Member States 

Reduced  non-compliance  costs  in  the 
medium to long term  

Up  to  EUR  4bn  increased  revenues 
per  year  (social  protection  and  tax 
contributions) 

A
a
e
r
a
y
c
i
l
o
P

)
b
3
A
n
o
i
t
p
O

(

)
b
2
B
n
o
i
t
p
O

(

B
a
e
r
a
y
c
i
l
o
P

Costs  

Reduced 
flexibility 
misclassified workers 

for 

some 

Reduced  work  opportunities  in  some 
sectors 

Benefits 

Improved working conditions for over 
28m 
through 
platforms 

people  working 

Costs 

0 

Levelled playing field 

Levelled playing field 

Up  to  EUR  4.5bn  increase  in  costs  per 
year  

increase 

An 
platforms push costs on consumers 

in  consumer  prices 

if 

0 

Revenue losses (depending on a number 
of factors) 
Increased legal certainty 

Increased business transparency 

Increased consumer welfare 

Levelled playing field 

Increased legal certainty  

Increased business transparency 

Levelled playing field 

Negligible  one-off  costs 
transparency on algorithmic processes 

to  provide 

0 

to  EUR  35.000 

Up 
recurring  costs 
combined) to consult workers).  

increased 
(for  all  platforms 

in 

46 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)
2
C
+
1
C
s
n
o
i
t
p
O

(

C
a
e
r
A
y
c
i
l
o
P

(Indirectly) 
conditions and social protection 

improved 

working 

Increased legal certainty 

Increased legal certainty 

Increased business transparency 

Increased transparency 

Benefits 

(Indirectly) improved legal certainty 

(Indirectly) 
transparency 

improved 

business 

Levelled playing field 

Improved  enforcement  of  existing 
rules  on  labour  standards,  tax  and 
social protection contributions 

Costs 

0 

Less  than  EUR  30.300  for  on-location 
platforms (combined, one-off) 

than  EUR  17.200  for  online 

Less 
platforms (combined, one-off) 

Negligible costs  

In terms of choice of the legal instrument, the cornerstone of the package would be one or 
more Directives including relevant measures under all Policy Areas. A Directive is regarded 
as the most suitable to deliver on the objectives of the initiative and is also considered to be 
the  most  proportionate  and  effective  option.  It  provides  binding  minimum  requirements, 
while  it  leaves  room  for  the  Member  States  to  adapt  to  the  specific  national  contexts.  The 
binding  nature  of  a  Directive  and  its  enforceability  would  best  serve  the  objectives  of  this 
initiative. A Council Recommendation would not deliver the same improvement for people 
working through platforms as a Directive, due to its non-binding nature. The legal basis for a 
Directive enshrining the preferred option into law would be a combination of Articles 16 and 
153 TFEU. The former would cover provisions under Policy Area B on specific algorithmic 
management  rights  for  self-employed  people  and  workers  vis-à-vis  the  processing  of  their 
data  by  automated  monitoring  and  decision-making  systems.  The  latter  would  cover  the 
provisions under Policy Area A on the employment status misclassification, provisions under 
Policy  Area  B  on  specific  algorithmic  management  rights  pertaining  to  the  working 
conditions  of  workers  (such  as  information  and  consultation)  and  provisions  under  Policy 
Area C on the transparency and traceability of platform work.  

The  preferred  options  under  Policy  Areas  A,  B  and  C  would  be  complemented  by  the 
Accompanying  Measures  described  in  Section  5.5.  Although  these  would  be  part  of  a 
separate, non-legislative instrument, they would further enhance the role of social partners as 
well  as  of  national  institutions  in  pursuing  the  objectives  of  the  initiative,  in  respect  of  the 
principles  of  subsidiarity  and  proportionality.  Such  Accompanying  Measures  would  also 
contribute to minimising the costs and maximising the benefits of the initiative, by involving 
relevant  stakeholders  and  allowing  them  to  best  cater  the  implementation  of  the  preferred 
options under Policy Areas A, B and C to the needs of different business models and Member 
States’ diverse social policy and regulatory traditions. 

The preferred option would be fully compatible – from a legal and practical point of view – 
with a parallel initiative aiming to ensure that EU competition law does not stand in the way 
of collective agreements by solo self-employed in a weak position (including people working 
through platforms) to  improve their working  conditions  (see Annex 7). While the preferred 
option under Policy Area A would ensure the correct determination of the employment status 
of people working through platforms and therefore lead to better working conditions for false 
self-employed,  the  competition  law  initiative  would  ensure  that  genuine  self-employed 
working through platforms are also enabled to improve their working conditions by engaging 
in collective bargaining.  

A successful outcome for this package would consist in an attractive European model of 
platform  work,  bringing  false  self-employed  people  under  the  umbrella  of  labour  law  and 
social  protection,  improving  conditions  for  genuine  self-employed  people  working  on 

47 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
platforms, ensuring legal certainty and a level-playing field for digital labour platforms and 
giving public authorities the means to enforce legislation and rules. This package would be 
effective,  efficient  and  coherent,  as  it  would  take  advantage  of  the  positive  effects  of  the 
individual options while exploiting constructive synergies and interactions. It would also be 
proportional, in that it would foresee fewer publication requirements for SMEs. It would also 
not  place  costs  on  platforms  going  beyond  what  is  needed  to  make  the  initiative  effective. 
Such  a  package  would  be  respectful  of  the  principle  of  subsidiarity,  setting  minimum 
standards  which  Member  States  would  be  free  to  build  upon  based  on  their  national 
sensitivities. Such an approach is in line with the feedback received through the consultation 
of stakeholders and social partners, rejecting a one-size-fits-all approach.  

9. HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? 

Progress  towards  achieving  the  objectives  of  the  initiative  will  be  monitored  by  a  series  of 
core indicators related to the objectives of the initiative.  These and the related data sources 
are  summarised  in  Table  17  below.  The  monitoring  framework  will  be  subject  to  further 
adjustment  according  to  the  final  legal  and  implementation  requirements  and  timeline.  The 
initiative  could  be  evaluated  5  years  after  it  enters  into  force  in  line  with  the  Better 
Regulation  Guidelines.  This  would  take  into  account  a  two-year  period  of  transposition  by 
Member  States,  allow  sufficient  time  to  evaluate  effects  on  platforms’  business  models, 
which  may  need  some  time  to  adapt  to  the  new  rules,  and  to  gather  data  through  the  EU 
Labour  Force  Survey,  which  is  under  development,  and  which  would  provide  comparable 
data that could be used to set up qualitative benchmarks. 127  

Table 17: Indicators on progress towards the initiative’s objectives 
Operational objectives 
Specific objectives 

Indicators 

Sources of data 

the  rectification  of 

the 
Facilitate 
employment  status  of  misclassified 
people working through platforms.   

Ensure 
through 
that  people  working 
platforms  have  –  or  can  obtain  –  the 
correct legal employment status in light of 
their  actual  relationship  with  the  platform 
and  gain  access  to  the  applicable  labour 
and social protection rights. 

Prevent  the  misclassification  of  the 
employment  status  of  people  working 
through platforms.  

%  of  people  working 
reclassified as workers. 

through  platforms 

%  of  new  people  working  through  platforms  as 
workers (net of the reclassified ones). 

Ensure that, if reclassified as workers, 
people working through platforms can 
access  labour  and  social  protection 
rights.   

fairness, 

and 
Ensure 
accountability  in  algorithmic  management 
in the platform work context. 

transparency 

Improve information, consultation and 
redress  rights  and  mechanisms  for 
people working through platforms. 

%  of  people  who  are  satisfied  with 
the 
intelligibility  and  accessibility  of  the  terms  and 
conditions of the platforms they work through.  

Facilitate  the  disclosure,  scrutiny  and 
social 
platforms’ 
algorithmic use in the labour domain. 

dialogue  over 

% of all collective agreements involving platforms 
which cover algorithmic management.  

Transposition 
checks 

Member  States’ 
data 

Implementation 
report 

Labour 
Survey 

Force 

Implementation 
report 

Potential  ad  hoc 
survey/study 

127 While at the moment there is lack of EU-wide data on digital platform employment there is ongoing work to 
include it in the EU Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) and have first results by 2023. The EU-LFS will provide 
figures on numbers of people working through platforms, their employment status, working hours, income etc., 
which will be useful in monitoring the effects of the initiative.   

48 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Increase 
transparency of platforms.  

the 

administrative 

Enhance  transparency,  traceability,  and 
awareness  of  developments  in  platform 
work  and  improve  enforcement  of  the 
applicable  rules  for  all  people  working 
through 
those 
operating across borders. 

platforms, 

including 

Facilitate  the  enforcement  of  existing 
rules  related  to  platforms  and  people 
working through them. 

%  of  platforms  publishing 
terms  and 
conditions,  net  of  those  which  did  it  before  the 
initiative.  

their 

Transposition 
checks 

Member  States’ 
data 

% of platforms publishing relevant information on 
people  working  through  them,  net  of  those  doing 
it before the initiative. 
%  of  increased  fiscal  revenues  coming  from 
platforms.  

% of increased social protection revenues coming 
from platforms.  

%  of  increased  labour  authorities’  decisions  (as  a 
sign  of  enhanced  enforcement)  concerning 
platforms, the employment status and / or working 
conditions of people working through them.  

49 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEXES: TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Annex 1: Procedural information ..................................................................................... 52 

A1.1. Lead DG, Decide Planning/CWP references ...................................................... 52 

A1.2. Organisation and timing ...................................................................................... 52 

A1.3. Consultation of the RSB ..................................................................................... 52 

A1.4 Evidence, sources and quality .............................................................................. 55 

Annex 2: Stakeholders’ consultation ................................................................................ 57 

A2.1. Results of the first phase Social Partners’ consultation ...................................... 57 

A2.2. Results of the second phase Social Partners’ consultation ................................. 59 

A2.3 Other stakeholders’ consultation .......................................................................... 62 

Annex 3: Who is affected and how? ................................................................................. 75 

A3.1 Overview of benefits of the preferred option ....................................................... 78 

A3.2 Overview of costs of the preferred option ........................................................... 79 

A3.3 The SME test ........................................................................................................ 81 

Annex 4: Impacts of the policy options ............................................................................ 83 

A4.1 Tables on the impacts of the policy options ......................................................... 83 

A4.2 Territorial impacts of the policy options .............................................................. 96 

Annex 5: Analytical methods ......................................................................................... 100 

A5.1: Methodology and calculations .......................................................................... 100 

A5.2: Data visualisations ............................................................................................ 130 

Annex 6: Relevance of the EU’s social and labour acquis ............................................. 139 

Annex 7: Relevance of the EU’s internal market acquis ................................................ 142 

Annex 8:  Overview of complementarities of the preferred option with  the proposed AI 
Act and GDPR ................................................................................................................ 147 

Annex 9: Relevance of national initiatives on platform work ........................................ 150 

Annex  10:  Overview  of  decisions  by  national  courts  or  administrative  bodies  on  the 
employment status .......................................................................................................... 157 

Annex 11: Internal drivers analysis ................................................................................ 171 

A11.1 Internal drivers related to the employment status ............................................ 171 

A11.2 Internal drivers related to platforms’ algorithm-based business model ........... 179 

A11.3 Internal drivers related to the cross-border nature of platform work ............... 186 

Annex 12: External drivers analysis ............................................................................... 190 

50 

 
 
 
 
Annex 1: Procedural information 

A1.1. Lead DG, Decide Planning/CWP references 

The lead DG is DG EMPL, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion. 

Agenda planning: PLAN/2020/8677  

Work Programme reference: Policy Objective No.9, Section: A Europe Fit for the Digital 
Age, Initiative: Improving the working conditions of platform workers (legislative, incl. 
impact assessment, Article 153 TFEU, Q1/Q4 2021) 

A1.2. Organisation and timing 

An  Interservice  Steering  Group  (ISSG)  was  established  to  accompany  the  work  on  the 
initiative. The following DGs participated in the ISSG: SG, SJ, CNECT, COMM, COMP, 
ECFIN, ESTAT, GROW, IDEA, JRC, JUST, MOVE, RTD, TAXUD, TRADE.  

The Impact Assessment was assessed by the ISSG in two meetings: on 8 July and on 16 
September 2021. It was then assessed via an Interservice Consultation (ISC) launched on 
15  November  2021  (DGs  consulted:  AGRI,  CNECT,  COMM,  COMP,  EAC,  ECFIN, 
ESTAT,  GROW,  HOME,  IDEA,  JRC,  JUST,  MARE,  MOVE,  NEAR,  REGIO,  RTD, 
SG, SJ, TAXUD and TRADE). 

The Analytical Document accompanying the second phase consultation of social partners 
on  which  the  Impact  Assessment  is  based,  together  with  the  second  stage  consultation 
document,  was  shared  with  the  ISSG  on  19  May  and  adopted  following  ISC  (DGs 
consulted:  SG,  SJ,  AGRI,  CNECT,  COMM,  COMP,  EAC,  ECFIN,  ESTAT,  GROW, 
HOME, I.D.E.A, JRC, JUST, MOVE, REGIO, RTD, TAXUD, TRADE). The first stage 
consultation document was assessed by the ISSG on 5 May 2021 (present DGs: SG, SJ, 
CNECT, COMM, COMP, ECFIN, GROW, SJ, JRC, JUST, MOVE, TAXUD, TRADE) 
and  adopted  following  ISC  (DGs  consulted:  SG,  SJ,  AGRI,  CNECT,  COMM,  COMP, 
EAC,  ECFIN,  ESTAT,  GROW,  HOME,  IDEA,  JRC,  JUST,  MOVE,  REGIO,  RTD, 
TAXUD, TRADE). 

A1.3. Consultation of the RSB 

The Impact Assessment report was reviewed by the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB) 
on 27 October 2021. The RSB delivered a positive opinion with reservations on 29 October 
2021. The revisions introduced in response to the RSB opinion are summarised in the tables 
below. 

RSB’s requests for improvement 

Changes done in the IA 

(1) The report should clarify its scope as compared to 
that  of  the  parallel  initiative  on  collective  bargaining 
agreements for self-employed.  

Section  2.1  on  the  problem  definition  has  been 
edited  to  include  more  direct  reference  to  the 
collective  bargaining.  A  new 
initiative  on 
paragraph explaining in more detail the differences 
and interlinks between the two initiatives  has been 
added in Annex 7. 

It should be more specific on the main 
gaps  in  existing  or  planned  EU  legislation  this 
initiative aims to address (in particular 

Clarifications to this effect have been added under 
the  description  of  Option  B2  for  the  GDPR,  P2B 
regulation  and  AIA  (Section  5.3.2),  under  the 

51 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GDPR,  Platform-to-Business  Regulation,  Artificial 
Intelligence Act, Data Act).  

It  should  explain  to  what  extent  the  problem  of 
algorithmic  management  for  self-employed  is  already 
covered in the Platform-to-Business Regulation.  

description of Option C2 for the Data Act (Section 
5.4.2), as well as in Annex 7.  
Clarifications on how various measures under sub-
option  B2b  are  tailored  to  the  self-employed  in  a 
way  that  ensures  complementarity  with  the  P2B 
Regulation have been added to Section 5.3.2. 

It should discuss how the data portability rights could 
overlap  with  the  wider  provisions  that  would  be 
included in the Data Act. 

The  report  should  define,  upfront,  the  scope  of  this 
initiative.  It  should  clarify  to  what  extent  it  covers 
genuine  self-employed  and  people  having  platform 
work as a secondary or marginal job. It should explain 
why the initiative targets all 5.5 million people at risk 
of misclassification, and not only the 3.8 million who 
do platform work as a main activity. 

The  report  should  acknowledge  that  the  problem  of 
employment  status  misclassification  is  not  of  equal 
magnitude  between  online  and  on-location  labour 
platforms. 

Section  2.2.2  has  been  expanded  to 
include 
explanations  on  the  challenges  posed  by  the 
impossibility  to  transfer  reputational  data  across 
platforms. So has Section 5.4.2. Annex 7 was edited 
to  include  specific  references  to  the  Data  Act 
provisions  (notwithstanding  changes  which  may 
occur  between  the  publication  of  this  report  and 
the  adoption  of  the  Data  Act)  and  its  potential 
interlinks  with  the  initiative  supported  by  this 
report.  

The problem tree and intervention logic have been 
removed  from  the  Annexes  and  included  at  the 
beginning of Section 2 (problem tree) and Section 5 
(intervention  logic).  Clarifications  on  the  coverage 
of  genuine  self-employed  and  marginal  workers 
were added to Section 2.2.1, including on the risk of 
misclassification  being  proportionately  stronger  in 
on-location platforms and on the assessment of the 
risk  of  misclassification  being  based  on  the 
subordination of a person to a platform rather than 
the  frequency/intensity  of  their  work.  While  it  is 
not possible to say upfront that the initiative would 
only  target  misclassified  people  (since  measures 
under  policy  packages  B  and  C  target  all  people 
working through platforms), clarifications that the 
policy  option  targeting  misclassified  people  would 
risk  of 
target  all  5.5  million  people  at 
misclassification have been added under Section 8. 
Finally,  clarifications  on  the  legal  basis  have  been 
added to Section 3.1 and  Section 8, specifying how 
the preferred option would be enshrined into law in 
the form of a Directive with a combined legal basis 
of Articles 16 and 153 TFEU. 

(2)  The  report  should  explain  why  and  how  issues 
related  to  algorithmic  management  are  particularly 
problematic for platforms.  

Clarifications to this end have been included in the 
new  paragraph  in  Section  2.2.2,  as  well  as  in  the 
box under that same section.  

It  should  justify  the  need  for  platform-specific  action 
in the absence of a horizontal approach.  

It  should  clarify  any  links  between  algorithmic 
management 
of 
misclassification.  

addressing 

risk 

and 

the 

Clarifications  explaining  why  a  platform  work 
specific action is needed have  been included to the 
baseline 
the 
description  of  policy  options  on  algorithmic 
management (Section 5.3). 

(Section  5.1)  and 

scenario 

to 

Clarifications on the link between the employment 
status  misclassification,  algorithmic  management 
and  poor  working  conditions  have  been  added  in 
the form of a new paragraph in section 2.2.2. 

52 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It should explain how it would ensure a level playing 
field between platforms and traditional businesses. 

Clarifications  to  this  end  have  been  added  in  the 
form of an introductory chapeau to Section 6.  

(3)  The  report  should  explain  how  the  publication 
requirements in the transparency options would avoid 
the disclosure of commercially sensitive information.  

It  should  specify  the  more  stringent  obligations 
envisaged  for 
the 
obligations involved in the lighter approach for SMEs. 

larger  platforms  as  well  as 

(4)  The  report  should  further  develop  the  impact 
analysis.  It  should  identify  and  analyse  territorial 
impacts and impacts on employment.  

In particular, it should analyse whether an 
increase in business compliance costs  may result in a 
reduction in employment by platforms.  

It  should  analyse  to  what  extent  the  preferred  option 
will  affect  the  availability  of  services  for  on-location 
platforms  in  small  towns  and  regions  (territorial 
impacts).  

It  should  clarify  whether  the  estimated  increase  in 
earnings resulting from reclassification 
accounts for the additional income tax.  

It should also clarify how the tax contributions of 
self-employed  and  workers  are  factored  into  the 
estimates of revenues for public authorities. 

The chapeau paragraph under Section 5.4 has now 
been  expanded  to  explain  that  all  options  under 
Policy  Area  C  would  build  on  the  knowledge  that 
platforms  base  their  competitive  advantage  on 
technological know-how and algorithmically-driven 
efficiency, and would therefore not require them to 
disclose  commercially  sensitive  information  (incl. 
what  is  covered  by  intellectual  property  rights).  
Clarifications  on  why  the  traceability  of  platform 
work  is  also  a  problem  for  on-location  platforms 
have been added to Section 2.2.3. 

Further  details  on  the  ‘lighter’  approach  vis-à-vis 
SMEs  have  been  added  under  the  description  of 
policy  options  C2  (Section  5.4.2)  and  C3  (Section 
5.4.3). 

Section  1.2.3  has  been  aligned  to  Annex  9,  which 
has  been  edited  and  expanded  substantially  to 
include  a  comprehensive  description  of  relevant 
national  initiatives.  An  explanation  on  the  lack  of 
data on the effects of national initiatives was added 
at  the  beginning  of  Annex  9.  Reference  to  the 
national  implementation  plans  carried  out  by 
Member  States  in  compliance  with  the  Council 
Recommendation on access to social protection was 
added  to  the  baseline  scenario  (Section  5.1). 
References to territorial impacts were added to the 
chapeau  paragraph  under  Section  6.  Also,  a  new 
Annex (A4.2) on territorial impacts has been added 
to the IA report. The analysis of “Costs for people 
working  through  platforms”  under  Section  6.1.2 
has  been  expanded  to  further  clarify  why  it  is 
difficult  to  meaningfully  quantify  the  impacts  on 
employment  levels,  while  giving  a  few  real-life 
examples  of  what  has  happened 
in  different 
markets 
reclassification  policy 
affected  by 
measures.  

Clarifications  to  this  end  were  added  in  footnote 
115,  explaining  that  additional  net  earnings  of 
workers  would  take  into  account  higher  income 
taxes and social protection contributions.  

Further clarifications were added in the analysis of 
“Benefits  for  Member  States”  under  Section  6.1.1, 
as  well  as  in  footnote  115.  Annex  A5.1  was  also 
updated  to  clarify  further  how  the  calculations  on 
the  differences  between  workers’  and 
self-
employed 
income  taxes  and  social  protection 
contributions  were  taken  into  account  (main  text 
and footnote 201).  

53 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(5) The report should ensure analytical alignment with 
the  parallel 
initiative  on  collective  bargaining 
agreements for self-employed.  

Data,  definitions  and  forecasts  should  be  consistent 
and  apparent  differences  between  the  two  initiatives 
should be clearly explained. 

The  statistics  and  forecasts  had  already  been 
coordinated with the parallel initiative on collective 
bargaining.  Projections  on  the  growth  of  the 
number  of  people  working  through  platforms 
leading to  2030 have also been aligned.  Given that 
the  latter  initiative’s  personal  scope  is  narrower 
than  that  of this  initiative,  there  are  differences  in 
the  number  of  people  working  through  platforms 
considered by the two. A clarification to this effect 
has been added in Annex A5.1. 

(6) The methodological annex should include detail on 
the  methodological  approach  and  any  limitations  or 
uncertainties in the analysis.  

It  should  include  information  on  how  the  estimates 
were calculated and what the assumptions  were based 
on. 

(7)  The  report  should  present  stakeholder  views  with 
more  precision,  indicating  the  views  of  different 
categories  of  stakeholders  on  the  options.  It  should 
include  the  views  of  platform  businesses  in  the 
analysis  of 
them  more 
prominently in the discussion of the preferred option.  

impacts  and 

feature 

The  report  should  explain  how  it  takes  account  of 
dissenting views.  

A clarification on the uncertainties and limitations 
of the impacts’ analysis was added at the beginning 
of  Section  6.  Clarifications  on  how  the  identified 
megatrends  were  factored  into  the  projections  for 
the  number  of  platforms  and  people  working 
through  them  have  been  added  to  Annex  A5.1, 
(Baseline  projections  section).  In  Section  6,  under 
the caveat on data limitations, direct reference was 
made  to  the  methodological  annex  (A5.1),  which 
further  describes  the  assumptions  upon  which 
projections and forecasts were based.  

The  stakeholders  whose  views  are  reported  upon 
are  now  specified  in  footnotes  in  Section  5.2.4, 
giving  them  more  prominence.  The  views  of  two 
major platform stakeholders on policy options were 
added under Section 5.2.4, as was that of one major 
platform  stakeholder  under  Section  5.3.4.  Further 
clarifications  on  which  stakeholders  support  the 
preferred  option  were  added  to  Section  8,  under 
the description of Policy Area A measures.  

Explanations  on  why  dissenting  views  on  options 
B3a and B3b were taken into account (hence their 
non-inclusion  in  the  preferred  option)  were  added 
in  Section  8  under  description  of  Policy  Area  B 
measures.  

It  should  clarify  references 
‘experts’ and ‘interviewed people’. 

to  ‘representatives’, 

Clarifications  to  this  end  were  added  in  newly 
created footnotes 89, 90, 94 and 95. 

A1.4 Evidence, sources and quality 

The following expert advice has fed into the Impact Assessment: 

  External studies commissioned from external experts: 

PPMI  (2021).  Study  to  support  the  impact  assessment  of  an  EU  initiative  on  improving 
working conditions in platform work. 

54 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Digital Labour Platforms in the EU: Mapping and Business Models“ (2021) by CEPS  

“Study to gather evidence on the working conditions of platform workers“ (2020) by CEPS 

  Reviews by the European Centre of Expertise in the field of labour law, employment and 
labour market policies (ECE).  

“Case Law on the Classification of Platform Workers: Cross-European Comparative Analysis 
and Tentative Conclusions” (2021) 

“Thematic Review 2021 on Platform work“ (2021) based on country articles for the 27 EU 
Member States. 

  Eurofound reports: “Employment and Working Conditions of Selected Types of Platform 
Work“ (2018)  

  JRC reports: “Platform Workers in Europe Evidence from the COLLEEM Survey“ (2017), 
and  “New  evidence  on  platform  workers  in  Europe.  Results  from  the  second  COLLEEM 
survey“ (2020).  

  ILO  report:  “The  role  of  digital  labour  platforms  in  transforming  the  world  of  work“ 
(2021). 

  The European Parliament reports:  

“A Strong Social Europe for just transitions”  

 “Fair working conditions, rights and social protection for platform workers“ 

  CJEU cases 

  Relevant academic literature, as referred to in footnotes. 

55 

 
 
 
 
Annex 2: Stakeholders’ consultation  

A2.1. Results of the first phase Social Partners’ consultation 

The  first  phase  social  partners’  consultation  was  open  from  24  February  2021  to  7  April 
2021. The Commission received fourteen replies from European social partners representing 
trade unions and employers’ organisations at EU level. 

Six trade unions contributed to the consultation – the European Trade Union Confederation 
(ETUC),  the  Council  of  European  Professional  and  Managerial  Staff  (Eurocadres),  CEC-
European Managers, the European Confederation of  Independent  Trade  Unions (CESI) and 
the European Transport Workers’ Federation (ETF), and Eurocockpit.  

the  employers’  side,  eight  organisations  replied 

On 
the  consultation,  namely 
BusinessEurope, SGI Europe, SMEunited, the Council of European Employers of the Metal, 
Engineering and Technology-Based Industries (CEEMET), Hotels, Restaurants and Cafés in 
Europe  (HOTREC),  the  World  Employment  Confederation  Europe  (WEC-Europe),  the 
Retail,  Wholesale  and  International  Trade  Representation  to  the  EU  (EuroCommerce),  and 
the Airline Coordination Platform. 

to 

Identification of the issues and possible areas for EU action 

Trade unions and employers’ organisations generally agreed with the identification of the 
issues. Trade unions noted that the Commission’s consultation document did not raise some 
issues – ETUC for example mentioned that the Commission had not tackled the issue of the 
status  of  platform  companies  as  either  employers,  (temporary  work)  agencies  or 
intermediaries.  

Trade  unions  were  generally  supportive  of  an  EU  initiative  on  platform  work.  They 
highlighted that the employment status should be at the core of such action and they were in 
favour of a binding EU instrument. Regarding personal scope, ETUC and Eurocadres would 
like  to  see  the  initiative  extended  to  all  non-standard  forms  of  work.  CEC-European 
Managers  noted  that  the  enjoyment  of  rights  should  not  depend  on  the  distinction  between 
employment  and  self-employment.  ETUC  further  noted  that  the  level  of  rights  for  the  self-
employed needed to be decided nationally in cooperation with social partners. 

Employers’  organisations  were  generally  sceptical  of  an  EU  initiative  on  platform  work. 
They  argued  that  it  would  not  be  appropriate  to  introduce  one-size-fits-all  rules.  They 
recognised  that  there  was  a  need  for  action,  but  that  this  should  be  generally  taken  at  the 
national  level  and  within  the  framework  of  the  different  national  social  and  industrial 
relations systems. BusinessEurope noted potential action should respect the diversity of needs 
and desires of those working through platforms. 

Need and scope for EU action 

Regarding the types of platforms the possible initiative could cover, trade unions pointed out 
that EU action should cover both online and on-location platforms. Employers pointed to the 
diversity  of  platforms  business  models  and  the  fact  that  platforms  were  not  a  distinct 
economic sector as an argument against a one-size-fit all solution. BusinessEurope called for 
the EU to promote dialogue, facilitate exchanges of experience and best practice, which could 
cover all types of digital platform work. 

56 

 
 
 
 
Social  partners  had  diverging  views  on  the  material  scope  of  an  initiative.  Regarding 
employment  status,  trade  unions  would  like  to  see  the  introduction  of  a  rebuttable 
presumption  of  employment  status  with  a  reversal  of  the  burden  of  proof.  For  some  trade 
unions (ETUC, Eurocadres and ETF), the recognition of platforms as employers with sector-
specific  obligations  was  equally  important  and  necessary  as  the  clarification  of  the 
employment status of people working through platforms. 

Employers’ organisations noted that the determination of status should be done on a case-by-
case  basis  at  national  level  in  order  to  respect  the  different  Member  State  models. 
BusinessEurope  and  SGI  Europe  in  particular  highlighted  the  need  to  respect  individual 
decisions,  and  that  a  possible  initiative  should  not  force  people  working  through  digital 
labour platforms into an undesired employment relationship. 

Trade unions opposed the introduction of a third status for people working through platforms. 
On the employers’ side, EuroCommerce and WEC-Europe were also against a third category. 

Regarding  the  proposed  objective  to  ensure  fair  working  conditions  for  all,  trade  unions 
agreed  that  some  minimum  level  of  protection  should  apply  to  all  people  working  through 
platforms irrespective of employment status. CEC European Managers contended the level of 
protection  afforded  to  those  working  through  platforms  should  not  depend  on  the  sector  or 
activity. ETF recalled the need for wage- and occupational  health and safety (OSH)-related 
rights  for  people  working  through  on-location  platforms.  In  particular,  it  proposed  wages 
based  on  an  hourly  rate  to  account  for  waiting  time  and  suggested  that  platforms  provided 
safety instructions and equipment, and covered maintenance costs.  

Employers’ organisations agreed that all people should work under fair conditions, but where 
the people working through these platforms were classified as workers, existing labour laws 
already  apply.  They  agreed  that  there  might  be  a  need  for  the  platforms  to  provide  clear 
information to the people working through them in a transparent way, for instance on how the 
platform functions and its terms and conditions. 

Trade  unions  recognised  the  need  to  facilitate  access  to  social  protection.  ETUC  and 
Eurocadres  recalled  their  position  that  the  initiative  should  cover  all  non-standard  workers. 
Employers’ organisations agreed that access to social protection was important, but noted that 
EU instruments, such as the Council recommendation on access to social protection, already 
existed. 

Trade unions agreed that people working through platforms should enjoy certain rights when 
it  comes  to  automated  decision-making  and  the  use  of  algorithms.  Employers’ 
organisations  referred  to  existing  EU  initiatives,  such  as  the  General  Data  Protection 
Regulation  (GDPR)  and  the  Platform  to  Business  Regulation,  as  well  as  the  subsequently 
proposed Regulation laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (AI)128. 

Trade  unions  recognised  the  need  to  make  access  to  collective  bargaining  and 
representation  easier.  Employers’  organisations  recognised  the  need  to  make  access  to 
collective  bargaining  easier  if  when  assessed  on  a  case-by-case  basis,  and  only  for  those 
classified as workers. 

128 COM(2021) 206 final. Available online. 

57 

 
 
                                                           
Similarly, trade unions were supportive of access to training for all people working through 
platforms and on an equal footing with workers. ETUC and Eurocadres, in particular, stressed 
the  importance  of  recognizing  platforms  as  employers  when  it  came  to  financing  access  to 
training.  Employers’  organisations,  meanwhile,  recognised  the  importance  of  training  but 
highlighted that the EU should not determine how training was organised or financed. 

Regarding  cross-border  dimensions,  some  trade  unions  highlighted  the  importance  of 
cooperation  between  Member  States.  ETUC  specified  that  the  possibility  to  establish  a 
presumption  of  employment  relationship  should  be  made  in  the  country  where  the  worker 
operated and in accordance with national legislation. 

Employers’  organisations  recognised  the  cross-border  aspect  of  the  platform  economy  and 
welcomed  initiatives  that  worked  towards  a  better  digital  infrastructure  and  a  less 
burdensome  regulatory  approach,  which  particularly  affected  smaller  European  platform 
providers.  BusinessEurope  noted  the  need  for  a  risk-based  approach,  while  applying 
corrective measures on markets only when this was necessary and if not disproportionate. 

Willingness to enter into negotiations 

Neither  side  indicated  willingness  to  enter  negotiations  at  this  stage  of  the  consultation 
process. Trade unions brought up the need for urgent action, the low chances of successful 
negotiation  among  European  social  partners,  and  issues  with  collective  representation  in 
platform  work.  Employers’  organisations  noted  that  implications  for  the  self-employed 
from  platform  work  challenges  preclude  them  from  entering  negotiations.  Some  mentioned 
the  need  for  more  clarity  on  the  measures  the  Commission  intends  to  propose,  and  others 
brought  up  the  framework  agreement  on  digitalisation  reached  in  June  2020  as  explicitly 
applying to platform work. 

A2.2. Results of the second phase Social Partners’ consultation 

The second stage social partners’ consultation was open from 15 June to 15 September 2021. 
In total, 14 replies from recognised social partners were received. Eight trade unions and six 
employers’ organisations sent their replies.  

The  trade  unions,  which  contributed  to  the  consultation,  are:  European  Trade  Union 
Confederation  (ETUC),  Eurocadres  (Council  of  European  Professional  and  Managerial 
Staff),  European  Confederation  of  Independent  Trade  Unions  (CESI),  European  Transport 
Workers’  Federation  (ETF),  UNI  Europa,  the  European  services  workers  union,  European 
Federation of Trade Unions in the Food, Agriculture and Tourism (EFFAT), CEC European 
Managers and European Cockpit Association (ECA). 

the  employers’  side,  six  organizations 

the  consultation,  namely 
On 
BusinessEurope,  SGI  Europe,  SMEunited,  Council  of  European  Employers  of  the  Metal, 
Engineering and Technology-Based Industries (CEEMET), Hotels, Restaurants and Cafés in 
Europe (HOTREC) and World Employment Confederation Europe (WEC-Europe). 

replied 

to 

Objectives of a possible EU action  

Both  Trade  unions  and  Employers’  organisations  generally  agreed  with  the  overall 
objectives identified by the European Commission.  

58 

 
 
 
 
Trade  unions  strongly  object  a  third  status  for  people  working  through  platforms  and  any 
notion  of  platform  work  as  a  separate  form  of  work  necessitating  specific  rules  regarding 
employment or social protection. For some (ETUC, Eurocadres and ETF), the recognition of 
platforms as employers with sector-specific obligations is equally important and necessary as 
the clarification of the employment status of people working through platforms.  ETUC and 
Eurocadres  would like to  see the upcoming initiative extended to  all non-standard forms  of 
work. 

Additionally, trade unions support the plan to introduce new rights related to the algorithmic 
management,  notably  information  and  consultation  rights  for  workers  and  workers’ 
representatives,  exclusion  of  automated  firing,  right  to  data  protection  and  privacy  and 
portability of data. They consider existing GDPR rights need to be made more specific in the 
context of platform work, and that the proposed AI Act does not address the specificity of AI 
uses  in  employment  (ETUC).  Finally,  trade  unions  are  also  in  favour  of  the  reporting 
obligations of platforms, clarification of the applicable social legislation of the country where 
the  worker  executes  his  work  and  underline  the  role  of  social  partners  in  collective 
representation and social dialogue. 

Employers’  organisations  agree  that  there  are  issues  e.g.  regarding  working  conditions, 
misclassification  of  employment  status  or  access  to  information  that  should  be  tackled. 
However, they prefer that this is done at the national level, on a case-by-case basis and within 
the  framework  of  the  different  national  social  and  industrial  relations  systems.  Employers’ 
organisations further highlighted that any possible action at EU level should be in line with 
two  main  principles:  allowing  genuine  self-employed  to  be  able  to  fully  benefit  from  the 
autonomy  and  freedom  associated  with  their  status  and  support  sustainable  growth  of 
platforms.  (Business  Europe,  SME  United).  BusinessEurope  noted  potential  action  should 
respect the diversity of needs and desires of those working through platforms. 

Employers’ organisations recognize the need to improve the information and transparency 
of  algorithmic  decisions  and  data  privacy  of  people  working  through  platforms.  They 
however  consider  that  the  existing  (P2B  Regulation,  GDPR)  or  upcoming  (AI  Act)  legal 
instruments  are  designed  for  the  purpose.  The  focus  should  therefore  lie  on  efficient 
implementation  and  enforcement  of  these  regulations  at  the  national  level.  The  need  to 
improve  knowledge  and  clarity  on  the  applicable  rules  when  it  comes  to  cross-border 
platform work was also recognized by employers’ organisations.   

Possible avenues for EU action 

Trade unions call on the Commission to propose a Directive based on Article 153(2) TFEU 
that provides for the rebuttable presumption of an employment status with reversed burden of 
proof and a set of criteria to verify the status, and maintain that such instrument should apply 
both  to  online  and  on-location  platforms.    With  regard  to  the  criteria  to  verify  the 
employment  status,  ETUC  has  suggested  own  set  of  criteria  based  on  ECJ  decisions;  the 
ABC test from California was also proposed as a possible example (ETF).  

Trade  unions  agree  with  the  proposals  of  providing  improved  information  to  workers 
affected by algorithmic management and the need to reinforce information and consultation 
rights  on  algorithmic  management  systems,  and  the  protection  of  the  data  of  workers, 
ensuring  full  involvement  of  social  partners.  ETUC,  ETF  and  UNI  Europa  also  pointed  to 

59 

 
 
algorithmic worker surveillance and alerted that  such practices in the workplaces should be 
prohibited, also in view of increasing ‘platformization’ of traditional sectors. 

Trade  unions  also  highlighted  the  role  of  collective  bargaining  and  the  need  to  stimulate 
social dialogue in platform work and to support capacity building in this context. With regard 
to  cross-border  challenges,  trade  unions  stressed  the  need  for  transparency  and  reporting 
obligations as well as the need to improve enforcement of applicable rules. They stated that 
platform  companies  should  fall  under  the  same  rules  as  other  companies  in  cross-border 
situations. 

Employers’ organisations agree that people providing services through platforms should be 
correctly  classified.  They  are  however  against  a  rebuttable  presumption  of  employment 
coupled with a reversal of the burden of proof, in particular through a binding EU instrument. 
In their view it would take away individuals’ choice to be self-employed. Some maintained 
that a self-regulatory approach by platforms themselves, combined with a dedicated forum of 
key  actors  developing  guidance  on  determining  employment  status,  would  be  the  right 
approach  (BusinessEurope),  while  others  would  support  non-binding  measures  e.g.  EU 
guidelines or a Council Recommendation (SMEunited).  

Regarding  the  management  of  algorithms  employers’  organisations  do  not  believe  that  a 
separate  EU  initiative  on  issues  related  to  platform  work  is  necessary  in  view  of  the 
upcoming  Regulation  on  Artificial  Intelligence  that  should  also  cover  the  employment 
context.  A  proper  enforcement  of  existing  legislative  framework  (P2B  Regulation  and 
GDPR)  should  be  done  on  a  national  level  to  tackle  the  issues  with  respect  to  protecting 
personal  data  and  ensuring  transparency  and  accountability.  Employers’  organisations  also 
emphasised that Article153 TFEU cannot be used as a legal basis for the part of the initiative 
that concerns self-employed. 

Employers’  organisations  agree  that  having  access  to  reliable  data  is  important  when 
platforms,  or  self-employed  providing  services  through  a  platform,  are  operating  cross-
border. Apart from enforcement of existing rules, code of conduct/guidelines (HOTREC) or a 
register or reporting obligations by platforms e.g. on number of people working through them 
(SGI Europe), by platforms was proposed as a possible solution by some. 

Willingness to enter into negotiations 

Social partners concluded that they will not enter into negotiations. 

Trade Unions argue that the discussions with employers on this issues would not lead to any 
legislation as European employers’ organisations are not willing to enter discussion on legal 
frameworks. In addition, most platform companies deny that they are employers and are not 
members  of  employer  associations.  Finally,  with  respect  to  the  increasing  number  of  court 
cases, trade unions call for ambitious legislation without further delays (ETUC). 

Employers’  organisations  claim  that  since  the  initiative  does  not  only  concern  employees 
and the labour market as such, but also self-employed, it would not be appropriate for them to 
enter into negotiations, as this would go beyond their mandate. At the same time, regarding 
the  issue  of  employment  status,  which  falls  within  the  remit  of  social  affairs,  the  approach 
they  propose  for  a  dedicated  forum  would  naturally  involve  social  partners,  in  a  tripartite 
social dialogue setting. 

60 

 
 
A2.3 Other stakeholders’ consultation 

A number of stakeholders consultations have been performed to inform this initiative, 
including the Treaty-based two-stage consultation of the European Social Partners described 
in Annex 2. 

In December 2020, EU employment and social affairs ministers held a debate on platform 
work. They acknowledged that platform work is an international phenomenon with a strong 
cross-border  dimension,  and  that  therefore  there  is  a  role  for  the  EU  to  address  the  related 
challenges. 

The  European  Parliament  has  adopted  a  report  on  “A  Strong  Social  Europe  for  just 
transitions”129,  calling  on  the  Commission  to  propose  a  directive  on  decent  working 
conditions and rights in the digital economy. In November 2020, the European Parliament’s 
Employment  Committee  held  an  exchange  of  views  with  the  Commission  and  different 
stakeholders  on  platform  work.  On  16  September  2021  the  European  Parliament  adopted  a 
resolution  on  “fair  working  conditions,  rights  and  social  protection  for  platform 
workers – new forms of employment linked to digital development” (2019/2186(INI)).130  

The European Economic and Social Committee131 and the Committee of the Regions132 
have put forward opinions on platform work. 

Prior  to  the  launch  of  the  formal  consultation  of  the  social  partners,  the  Commission  held 
several  meetings  with  a  variety  of  stakeholders  in  different  formats  and  at  different 
levels,  to  make  sure  that  everyone’s  voice  is  taken  into  account  for  the  purpose  of  this 
initiative.  Grassroot  associations  representing  people  working  through  platforms,  digital 
labour platform companies, trade unions, experts from academia, international organisations, 
and  representatives  from  civil  society  were  among  the  stakeholders  that  the  Commission 
reached out to, and continues to engage with. 

In addition, an extensive interview programme was conducted in the context of the Impact 
Assessment study gathering insights from a diverse pool of stakeholders including workers’ 
organisations,  employers’  organisations,  policy  makers,  digital 
labour  platforms, 
representatives  of  people  working  through  platforms,  experts  and  academics.  In  total  61 
interviews were held between May and August 2021. 

A  public  consultation  on  the  platform  initiative  was  not  conducted.  However,  views  were 
collected within the framework of the open public consultation on the Digital Services Act 
which ran from 2 June to 8 September 2020 and which contained a Section on challenges of 
self-employed individuals offering services through platforms. 

Stakeholders’ meetings 

In support of its work on a legislative initiative to improve the working conditions in platform 
work,  the  Commission  gathered  evidence  from  different  stakeholders,  via  dedicated  and 
bilateral meetings.  

129 Available online. 
130 Available online 
131  EESC  opinion:  Fair  work  in  the  platform  economy  (Exploratory  opinion  at  the  request  of  the  German 
presidency). Available online. 
132 CoR opinion: Platform work – local and regional regulatory challenges. Available online. 

61 

 
 
 
                                                           
In  total,  the  Commission  was  in  contact  with  28  platforms,  4  organisations  representing 
platforms and 24 organisations representing people working through platforms, with several 
of them at multiple occasions. 

Digital  labour  platforms:  Bolt,  Wolt,  Uber,  DeliveryHero,  Deliveroo,  Heetch,  Scribeur, 
Testbirds,  Workis,  Glovo,  Zenjob,  Voocali,  JustEat  TakeAway,  Care.com  International, 
Pozamiatane.pl, TaskHero, TaskRabbit, Jovoto, MelaScrivi, ClickWorker, Wirk, Freelancer, 
Solved.fi, Didaxis, Hlidacky, FreeNow, Upwork and Stuart.  

Associations  representing  platforms  and  digital  companies:  Move  EU,  the  Association  of 
Freelance Platforms (API), Bitkom Association. 

Organisations  representing  platform  workers:  Riders  &  Derechos,  United  Freelancers, 
Collectif des livreurs autonomes de Paris (CLAP),  Les Coursiers Bordelais,  Austrian Trade 
Union  (ÖGB),  Riders  Union  FNV,  Intersyndicale  National  VTC,  Couriers'  Asociation, 
Lithuania,  European  Alternatives,  UILTuCS  Uil,  Unión  General  de  Trabajadores,  Riders 
Union  Reggio  Emilia,  3F  Transport,  CoopCycle,  Smart,  Person  working  through  platforms 
(Germany),  Asociación  Española  de  Riders  Mensajeros  (Asoriders),  Asociación  Autónoma 
de Riders (AAR), AMRAS Pop-up Kollejtif Kolyma2, Zentrale, ACEACOP -La Poit’ à Vélo, 
Liefern am Limit, Deliverance Milano, Glovo couriers Poland. 

On  20  and  21  September  2021  the  Commission  held  two  dedicated  meetings  with  the 
representatives of digital labour platforms and people working through platforms. The 
aim of the meetings was to collect views and opinions of relevant stakeholders regarding the 
possible avenues of EU action. 

25  organisations  were  invited  for  each  of  the  meetings,  representing  a  variety  of  platforms 
and platform workers’ associations, covering a wide range sectors and services (ride hailing, 
delivery,  household  services,  professional  services,  clickwork,  student  jobs  etc.),  different 
sizes, business models, geographical locations etc. 

The  following  digital  labour  platforms  were  present  at  the  meeting:  Bolt,  Wolt,  Uber, 
Delivery Hero, Deliveroo, Heetch, Scribeur, Testbirds, Workis, Glovo, Zenjob, Voocali and 
the Association of Freelance Platforms (API). 

Platform  workers  were  represented  by  the  following  organisations:  Riders  &  Derechos, 
United  Freelancers,  Collectif  des  livreurs  autonomes  de  Paris  (CLAP),  Les  Coursiers 
Bordelais, Austrian Trade Union (on behalf of GPA-DJP), Riders Union FNV, Intersyndicale 
National VTC, Couriers' Asociation, Lithuania, European Alternatives, UILTuCS Uil, Unión 
General de Trabajadores, Riders Union Reggio Emilia, 3F Transport. 

Platform  companies  said  that  they  share  the  overall  goal  of  the  Commission,  which  is  to 
ensure decent working conditions of people working through platforms. They were however 
opposing  the  proposed  means  to  achieve  this  objective,  notably  the  rebuttable  presumption 
and the reversal of the burden of proof. They pointed to the variety of business models and a 
general  desire  of  people  working  through  platforms  to  keep  their  self-employment  status. 
They  argued  that  the  platforms  would  be  willing  to  offer  better  conditions,  i.e.  social 
protections, insurance, fair compensation within the self-employed model, without the risk of 
reclassification. The participants  called  for more  legal  certainty, some of  them proposed  an 

62 

 
 
 
ethical charter as a self-regulation tool. Regarding the algorithmic management, they agreed 
that more transparency is need, notably on processes, key deliverables, allocation of tasks etc. 
Some participants asked for more clarity on the definition of algorithms for the purpose of the 
initiative and argued that ratings portability should not create incentive to introduce ratings. 

Platform  workers’  representatives  challenged  the  platforms’  classification  of  people 
working  through  them  as  self-employed,  noting  that  such  people  are  not  entrepreneurs,  but 
are  controlled  by  the  platforms.  They  highlighted  that  platforms  impose  the  status  of  self-
employment and the pay rates. Most of the participants were in favour of the introduction of a 
rebuttable  presumption  of  employment  status,  combined  with  a  reversal  of  the  burden  of 
proof.  Many  participants  explicitly  reiterated  their  opposition  to  a  third  status  in  platform 
work and welcomed the Commission intention not to introduce such a status in its upcoming 
proposal.  In  relation  to  the  algorithmic  management,  platform  workers  representatives 
pointed out that algorithms are not neutral and lead to optimisation of work in such a way that 
people working through platforms risk their health. As the income of people working through 
platforms depends on the speed of fulfilling the tasks, many of them have to perform as fast 
as possible. This increases physical risks, such as from road accidents. They also pointed out 
that  people  working  through  platforms  should  have  the  right  to  know  how  their  behaviour 
influences task allocation by algorithms. Some participants underlined that algorithms need to 
be  transparent  not  only  to  courts  but  also  to  the  people  working  through  platforms  and  the 
inspection services of Member States. They also called for the mass collection of private data 
by  platforms  to  be  stopped.  Some  of  them  noted  the  importance  of  data  portability  across 
platforms.  Many  of  the  participants  underlined  the  importance  of  ensuring  collective 
bargaining rights for the people working through platforms. They stressed that some drivers 
and riders seek help, but many more are in such a precarious position that they do not have 
the possibility to come forward to defend their own interests. Prior to the launch of the social 
partners consultation in February 2021, a number of stakeholders’ meetings were organised 
in 2020.  

As  a  major  stakeholder  event  “Platform  Work  Summit”  originally  planned  for  September 
2020 had to be cancelled due to the restrictions related to the COVID-19 crises, the event was 
replaced by several  online workshops  targeting  various groups of stakeholders  i.e. platform 
workers’  associations,  trade  unions,  platform  companies,  Member  States’  representatives, 
experts  from  academia  and  international  organisations  and  representatives  of  civil  society. 
Stakeholders’ meetings organised in 2020: 

26/06 - Technical workshop with representatives from ILO and Eurofound  
08/09 - Round-table with Commissioner Schmit and representatives from academia, platform                  
executives, platform associations and trade unions  
17/09 - Workshop with experts from academia and think tank researchers  
01/10 - Workshop with platforms’ executives  
05/10 - Workshop with platform workers associations  
12-14/10 - Mutual learning event organised by the German Presidency with Member States’ 
experts 
14/10 - Exchange with EMCO – Member States representatives  
08/12 – Strategic Dialogue with civil society organisations 

Overall, all stakeholders called for an action at EU level to articulate a common definition of 
platform work and establish harmonized approaches at EU level in order to bring clarity and 
certainty  over  the  applicable  rules  across  the  continent.  At  the  same  time,  the  stakeholders 

63 

 
 
 
 
 
warned  against  a  one-size-fits-all  approach  and  accentuated  that  the  EU  initiative  needs  to 
take  into  consideration  the  specificities  of  different  types  of  platform  work,  variety  of 
platforms’  business  models  and  differences  in  labour  and  social  traditions  across  Member 
States. 

In  addition  to  the  above,  numerous  bilateral  meetings  were  organised  between  the 
Commission  and  the  representatives  of  the  digital  labour  platforms,  platform  workers’ 
associations, national experts, academics and social partners. 

Stakeholders’ views on the main challenges in platform work: 

i. Employment status 
The  issue  of  employment  status  of  platform  workers  was  very  prominent  within  all  the 
discussions.  There  seemed  to  be  a  consensus  among  stakeholders  that  there  is  a  need  to 
clarify  the  essential  criteria  of  an  employment  status  to  avoid  the  issue  of  bogus  self-
employment.  The  majority  also  agreed  that  third  employment  status  is  not  a  suitable 
solution,  as  it  might  also  spread  among  the  most  vulnerable  employees  in  the  broader 
economy.  

Trade unions pointed to the fact that the status of platform workers varies according to the 
type  of  work  and  platforms  and  there  are  also  considerable  differences  among  Member 
States.  They  highlighted  that  in  case  atypical  workers  do  not  have  employee  status,  they 
should be entitled to protection equivalent to that of ordinary employees.  

Member  States  argued  that  the  issue  of  employment  status  is  broader  than  platform  work 
and expressed that employment contract type should be based on the platform character and 
nature of the relationship between the platform and the person providing a service through the 
platform. Member States and the  platform workers’ associations  also  pointed to  the  fact 
that there is a considerable share of genuine self-employment in platform work and that this 
flexibility  should  be  maintained  and  reflected  in  any  future  policy  initiative.  They  equally 
called for the enforcement of the existing labour law legislation.  

The  platform  companies  pleaded  for  decoupling  social  protection  from  the  employment 
status  as the current  rules do not  allow platforms in  many MSs to  offer social benefits  and 
insurance without facing a risk of worker misclassification.  

During the academic debate, some participants singled out the degree of control exercised by 
the platform as a possible criterion to determine the worker status. An option of regulating an 
activity rather than focusing on the status was also put forward. 

ii. Working conditions 
During  the  discussions  with  stakeholders  there  was  a  general  agreement  among  the 
stakeholders that fair  working conditions  should apply to  all platform  workers regardless of 
the types of their contract, forms of employment or labour law status.  

Trade unions highlighted that it is necessary to ensure that the remuneration or fees of self-
employed  persons  are  not  lower  than  those  of  employees  engaged  in  the  same  or  similar 
activities. They also argued that standby time and search times should be counted as working 
time. Similarly they pointed out to the risks in terms of civil liability and insurance which are 
borne by platform workers and stressed that e.g. in case of transport and delivery services, the 
platform companies should be responsible for accidents involving their workers. 

64 

 
 
 
Platform  workers’  associations  testified  that  working  conditions  and  earnings  of  platform 
workers deteriorated during the pandemic period, with an over-supply of platform labour and 
pay rates cut and dropped under the national minimum. They also pointed to increased health 
and  safety  risks  for  on-location  platform  workers,  particularly  in  the  transport,  delivery, 
household maintenance and care sectors and called for increased protections.  

Platform  companies  put  the  onus  on  adaptation  of  Member  States’  labour  and  welfare 
systems and suggested decoupling of benefits from employment status. They also pointed out 
that many platform workers are active on more than one platform  at  a time (‘multi-apping’) 
which complicates counting of the working time.  

Member  States  highlighted  the  contradiction  between  the  legal  status  of  platform  workers 
and the fact that they do not enjoy the same rights as “genuine self-employed”, such as the 
ability to set their own tariffs, or choose their working time. They emphasised the need for 
better  enforcement  of  existing  labour  law  and  claimed  that  the  main  responsibility  for 
ensuring  decent  working  conditions  should  remain  on  national  level.  Member  States  also 
stressed the need to create upskilling opportunities for platform workers.  

The academic experts suggested as a possible “soft” solution platforms-undersigned Codes 
of  Conduct,  at  the  same  time  argued  that  an  enforcing  and  monitoring  authority  would  be 
needed.  The  concept  has  already  been  tested  in  Germany  where  a  crowdsourcing  Code  of 
Conduct  sets  minimum  standards  with  respect  to  working  conditions  and  relations  between 
workers,  clients,  and  platforms.  An  Ombudsman  office  has  been  set  up  as  a  redress 
mechanism to deal with the disputes. 

iii. Access to social protection 
Trade unions emphasized that there is a need to ensure a minimum level of protection under 
labour  and  social  law  at  an  affordable  price  for  all  self-employed  persons  working  on 
platforms and to minimize the risks of insecurity. This includes adequate social protection in 
the  event  of  illness,  disability,  unemployment,  accident  and  old  age.  They  also  pointed  out 
that the platform work challenges should be tackled in the broader context of labour market 
precariousness particularly regarding self-employed workers. 

Platform workers’ associations highlighted that vulnerabilities of platform workers, notably 
the  access  to  social  protection  were  exacerbated  by  the  COVID-19  pandemic.  During  the 
crisis, many platform workers have had difficulties to access social protection, as a result of 
eligibility requirements and the nature of platform work as a supplementary income.  

From the perspective of platform companies, there is a need for creating harmonized rules 
across Member States to ensure a level playing field among platforms but also vis-à-vis the 
traditional  sectors  of  the  economy.  They  called  for  an  agile  way  of  establishing  decent 
working  conditions  and  basic  social  protection  for  platform  workers  without  endangering 
competitiveness and creating the risk of misclassification. They also suggested the adoption 
of  a  framework  of  portable  benefits  that  will  enable  platform  workers  to  optimise  their 
protection across all the online platforms they use. 

The Member States pointed to the fact that there are different protection needs  for diverse 
types  of  platforms  and  for  a  variety  of  work  arrangements  (part-time,  hybrid  income  etc.). 
According  to  MSs’  representatives  the  current  COVID-19  crises  has  shown  the  legal 
coverage gap of self-employed in general and of platform workers in particular. In contrast to 
standard  employees,  these  groups  had  no  access  to  the  widely  used  short-time  allowances 
(e.g.  Kurzarbeitergeld  in  Germany).  At  the  same  time,  they  argued  that  it  is  important  to 

65 

 
 
strike  the  right  balance  between  regulation  and  innovation.  The  potential  EU  regulation 
should make it possible for emerging small and medium-sized enterprises or start-ups to grow 
out  of  a  local  or  regional  niche.  Some  MSs  reported  having  measures  in  place  that  ensure 
social protection of platform workers. E.g. in Estonia, a physical person may open a ‘business 
account’ on the amounts received on which tax is paid and if enough social tax is paid, this 
guarantees the person access to health and pension insurance. 

iv. Algorithmic management 

Trade  unions  expressed  their  concerns  regarding  the  challenges  posed  by  usage  of 
algorithmic  management  solutions  for  workforce  management.  In  their  contribution  to  the 
DSA  consultation  trade  unions  pointed  to  the  specificities  of  platform-based  work,  i.e. 
transparency of online ratings, pay  periods, pay  transparency, privacy, data protection, data 
ownership and deactivation, as well as the risk of replication of discriminatory behaviour by 
algorithms. They emphasised the need for transparency on the functioning of work organised 
via platforms through algorithmic control, ranking and reputation systems and pricing. They 
also  stressed that  the portability of the  reputation acquired on the platform should be made 
possible in order to counter lock-in effects.  

The  challenges  of  algorithmic  management  were  extensively  discussed  during  the  debate 
with academics. According to the future of work experts, we witness a paradoxical situation 
when many platforms claim they are providing mere matchmaking services while they exert 
control  over  all  the  aspects  of  the  service  delivery:  from  setting  terms  and  conditions  and 
checking relevant qualifications to ensuring proper performance and payment. This “platform 
paradox” is  putting in  question the employment  status  of significant  proportion of platform 
workers.  The  academics  also  pointed  out  to  strategies  of  some  platforms  to  maintain 
competition  amongst  service  providers  and  use  various  incentives  to  increase  their 
participation on the market (so called “nudging”). 

Member States highlighted the fact that data about the scope and characteristics of platform 
work are still insufficient.  They argued the need of access to data collected by platforms, and 
accurate  reporting  by  platforms  most  importantly  regarding  the  income  data.  They  also 
suggested  that  a  framework  for  data  portability  should  be  created  respecting  data  privacy 
rules in line with GDPR provisions. The system of portable ratings would empower workers 
to negotiate better conditions on a platform or move to a different platform. 

Platform  companies  highlighted  positive  examples  of  automated  workforce  management, 
namely creating efficiencies in work allocation, optimizing supply and demand for services, 
as well as ensuring quality of services through online ratings and best prices for providers and 
customers. 

v. Cross-borders issues 
The  questions  of  cross-border  implications  of  platform  work  were  extensively  discussed 
during  the  peer-learning  event  organised  by  German  Presidency.  Several  Member  States 
pointed  to  the  fact  that  the  provision  of  work  by  the  employee  is  disconnected  from  the 
requirement of his physical presence in the workplace and increases the part of working time 
that  takes  place  outside  the  company's  premises,  thus  making  it  difficult  to  control  the 
implementation of labour law provisions and especially compliance with working time limits. 
The  potential  increase  of  platform  work  and  its  global  character  poses  a  risk  of  race  to  the 
bottom  in  terms  of  earnings  and  social  protections  of  platform  workers  and  create  negative 
externalities for the sustainability of national public budgets. Member States highlighted the 

66 

 
 
 
need to clarify the place for jurisdiction and called for an EU action in the area of labour law, 
taxation  and  social  protection  coverage  for  platform  work  with  cross-border  dimension.  In 
this context, Member States also stressed the role of labour inspectorates.  

Following the end of the second stage social partners’ consultation two additional meetings 
are  scheduled  for  September  2021  with  digital  labour  platforms  and  platform  workers’ 
representatives  to  discuss  the  possible  direction  of  EU  action  and  the  relevant  legislative 
instrument. 

Stakeholders’ interview programme for the Impact Assessment 

In total 61 interviews were held in the context of the Impact Assessment study between May 
and  August  2021  to  collect  views  from  workers’  organisations  (13  interviews),  employers’ 
organisations (6), policy makers (7), digital labour platforms (19), representatives of people 
working  through platforms  (8), experts and academics (8).  The interviews were focused on 
the policy options in the three identified areas: employment status, algorithmic management 
and cross-border transparency. 

Reflection on policy options: 

i. Employment status of people working though platforms 

All trade unions and representatives of people working through platforms agreed that a 
clarification of an employment relationship is needed. According to many, platforms should 
employ people working through them if the person falls under the criteria of an employment 
relationship.  Establishing  employment  criteria  is  a  priority  and  California  serves  as  a  good 
example on how to do it. Trade unions’ representatives stressed that the policy option should 
allow  for  case-by-case  determination  of  an  employment  relationship,  as  there  are  different 
types of platforms with various forms of work. The two options mentioned the most by trade 
unions  were  1)  shifting  the  burden  of  proof  to  the  platforms;  2)  establishing  a  rebuttable 
presumption of employment (which could apply to only on-location platform work or to all 
people working through platforms).  

Most  on-location  platforms  and  employer  representatives  do  recognise  that  the  current 
situation  of  some  of  the  workers  is  sub-optimal.  The  preferred  option  for  most  on-location 
platforms  is  ‘contractor  with  extra  protections’  model,  in  which  people  would  remain  self-
employed, but they would gain the right to organise collectively; while platforms would pay 
for  their  sick  leave  and  insurance;  and  ensure  other  work  protections.  Not  all  platforms  for 
on-location  work  completely  opposed  the  idea  to  reclassify  a  share  of  people  working 
through them as workers. However, platforms which agreed that bogus-self-employed should 
be  workers,  emphasised  the  importance  of  the  criteria  determining  on  who  qualifies  as 
genuine self-employed and who – does not. Some of the on-location platforms advocated for 
the certification procedure, applied in some countries outside the EU.  

Most representatives of national authorities expressed the need for EU guidance in terms of 
reclassification.  Some  expressed  a  preference  for  the  non-binding  guidance.  In  relation  to 
different  policy  options  there  were  diverging  opinions  with  majority  of  the  representatives 
preferring  either  rebuttable  presumptions  or  the  shift  of  the  burden  of  proof.  False  self-
employment  should  be  addressed  from  a  general  perspective  as  it  is  an  issue  not  only  in 
platform  work.  Some  authorities  expressed  that  they  plan  to  expand  the  social  protection 
framework for the self-employed which would address many issues related to platform work. 

67 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Almost  all  representatives  of  national  authorities  noted  that  the  self-employed  should  have 
the  right  to  collectively  bargain.  And  thus  the  EU  needs  to  address  the  competition  law 
preventing access to these rights.  

Majority of experts and academics agreed that recommendations/ guidance from EU would 
not be effective or bring any change. Most experts argue for hard law and regulation which 
could  help  to  bring  claims  in  courts.  The  majority  of  experts  considered  rebuttable 
presumption as a possible policy option but also stressed it might be applicable only to on-
location  platforms.  Experts  also  stressed  that  the  solution  should  be  more  universal  and 
beneficial for all non-standard workers rather than just for those in platform work. Rebuttable 
presumption could be formulated in a way to address on-demand work.  

The  creation  of  a  third/intermediated  status  did  not  receive  any  support  of  none  of  the 
stakeholders’ groups as it would create a system which is too difficult to navigate. Including 
people working through platforms under the protection of labour law was considered the best 
option by the majority of stakeholders. 

ii. Algorithmic management 

All  trade  unions  and  workers’  representatives  support  EU  action  to  address  algorithmic 
management through measures such as a Directive. They claim that non-binding guidance or 
recommendations  would  be  ineffective.  Most  trade  unions  and  workers‘  representatives 
agreed that the EU should focus on: increasing transparency, guaranteeing human oversight, 
ensuring  appropriate  channels  for  redress,  reinforcing  information  and  consultation  rights, 
strengthening  the  right  to  privacy,  promoting  ratings’  portability,  and  excluding  automatic 
contract  terminations.  When  it  comes  to  channels  for  redress,  representatives  supported 
including human oversight in this step. In addition, to redress mechanisms there should also 
be  communication  channels  to  report  technical  problems  or  errors  on  the  app.  Most 
representatives  spoke  against  the  automatic  termination  and  suspension  of  accounts  and 
supported  the  idea  of  eliminating  such  practice  on  platforms.  Almost  all  workers’ 
representatives  noted  that  stronger  protection  is  necessary  in  regards  to  data  collection  and 
use.  GDPR  regulation  should  be  complemented  as  platform  work  has  changed  the  ways  in 
which platforms use and collect data. Interviewees also stressed that people working through 
platforms should be able to challenge and negotiate algorithms. 

Majority  of  platforms  and  employer’s  organisations  agreed  that  regulation  for  AI  is 
necessary.  However,  most  said  that  the  current  GDPR,  P2B  and  AI  Act  regulations  are 
sufficient  and  if  any  new  rules  are  to  be  passed  they  should  avoid  overregulating.  Most 
platforms  and  representatives  argued  for  non-binding  guidelines.  Furthermore,  almost  all 
platforms  expressed  that  they  already  provide  information  in  regards  to  algorithmic 
management.  However,  defining  algorithmic  management  could  be  the  first  step  to 
understanding  whether  platforms  are  providing  enough  information.  Almost  all  platforms 
were against the idea of sharing their trade secrets and publishing information on algorithms 
used in platform work. Platforms agreed that the new regulation should aim to increase the 
‘understandability’  of  algorithms  and  human  oversight.  To  level  the  playing  field  a  basic 
level  of  transparency  should  be  provided  by  all  platforms.  Majority  of  interviewees  saw 
ratings portability as unfeasible as it would require making reputational information uniform 
across all platforms. The majority agreed that  the new regulation should include provisions 
concerning  automatic  termination  of  contracts  and  mechanisms  for  redress.  Almost  all 
platforms stressed that regulation should ensure EU companies do not lose their competitive 
advantage against other international companies.  

68 

 
 
 
Representatives  of  national  authorities  advocated  for  comprehensive,  non-binding 
guidelines  to  strengthen  platform  workers’  rights  in  algorithmic  management.  These 
guidelines should not include strict rules and should not take form of a Directive. Rather, they 
should  assist  MS  in  introducing  mechanisms  responding  to  the  issues  of  algorithmic 
management  (such  instruments  need  to  be  elastic  and  adjustable  in  view  of  the  rapid 
developments  in  this  field).  According  to  public  authorities,  transparency  rights  should 
primarily  concern  the  operating  mechanisms  of  the  platform,  the  working  conditions 
(including  information  on  how  the  salary  is  determined)  and  how  the  evaluations  are 
determined. Further, public authorities stressed these questions should not be addressed by a 
platform-specific instrument only as they are relevant also for all self-employed workers, and 
beyond.  Information  on  algorithmic  management  alone  might  not  be  enough.  Interviewees 
stressed  that  people  working  through  platforms  should  be  able  to  challenge  and  negotiate 
algorithms. 

Majority  of  experts  and  academics  argued  that  recommendations  and  guidance  regulating 
algorithmic management might  be overlooked by Member States. At the same time experts 
agreed  that  the  new  EU  regulation  should  leave  room  for  national  social  dialogue  and 
regulating  at  the  domestic  level.  The  EU  could  set  minimum  standards  for  algorithmic 
management  which  would  be  further  negotiated  by  social  partners  at  the  domestic  level. 
Majority  of  experts  agreed  that  a  new  regulation  is  necessary  which  would  complement 
GDPR and P2B  regulations. They stressed that the regulation should take into account  that 
algorithmic management is not a characteristic of platform work only and can be also found 
in  traditional  work  arrangements.  Experts  supported  that  the  regulation  should  focus  on  1) 
excluding automatic contract terminations; and 2) ensuring appropriate channels for redress. 
The  minimum  standards  could  include  information  on  task  allocation  and  reasons  for 
suspending or deactivating  accounts as  well as reputational rankings. Also, people  working 
through platforms should have the ability to negotiate algorithms. Experts also agreed that the 
new regulation should aim to diminish the risk of discrimination and arbitrary ratings. A body 
to  enforce  these  rights  would  be  necessary.  Most  considered  that  a  committee  of  non-
discrimination could be used or a new body should be created on a national level. 

iii. Cross-border transparency 

Trade unions and organisations of people working through platforms are in in general in 
favour  of  increasing  cross-border  transparency.  Some  trade  unions,  however,  suggest 
considering to oblige platforms to have their representative in each MS. This regulation could 
provide  that  if  there  is  no  platform  representative  in  a  MS,  such  a  platform  could  not  use 
work of a worker from this MS. Due to significant differences between national legislations, 
transparency in the area of labour market legislation through multilingual platforms should be 
increased in the first stage, then followed by advanced European integration in this area. 

The views of both online platforms and employer representatives with regard to increasing 
cross  border  transparency  are  rather  diverse.  Online  platforms  supported  EU  action  in 
creating  the  system  for  verified  freelancers.  In  order  to  save  time  and  resources,  online 
platforms support the idea of automatised reporting. They encourage the EU to create the API 
as the register system would require time to implement and transition to reporting. Employer 
representatives  advocate  for  transparency  but  stress  that  it  should  not  imply  too  much 
bureaucratic burdens, especially for smaller platforms. Therefore, they suggest to apply SME 
definition, which would imply that  only large platforms  need to  register.  Further,  employer 
organisations  believe  guidance  regarding  existing  legislation  could  be  elaborated  on  the 
implications  of  cross-border  platform  work.  Some  employer  organisations  spoke  against 
additional  registration  obligation,  arguing  that  platforms  are  registered  as  any  other 

69 

 
 
enterprise. Instead, they advocated for EU (rather than MS), level register in order to prevent 
further fragmentation and an unnecessary multiplication of tasks. 

The  majority  of  representatives  of  public  authorities  supported  increasing  cross-border 
transparency. Some of them argue that labour inspectorates in the different EU MS currently 
work quite differently, have different set of competences, therefore, some guidelines on the 
transnational rules applicable regarding social protection and taxation would benefit all actors 
involved. Having in mind the great uncertainty regarding the applicable law, it would be most 
useful  to  adopt  operational  guidelines  regarding  jurisdictional  issues,  based  on  the  existing 
instruments  (Rome  I  Regulation  and  Brussels  I  Regulation).  The  option  suggesting  that 
publication requirements could be limited to platforms above a certain size, could according 
to public authorities create incentives for platforms to look for such forms of their business 
operation which would circumvent this threshold. Some public authorities also claimed that 
creating  a  centralised  register  at  the  EU  level  would  not  be  a  feasible  option  as  it  would 
require  creating  such  registers  in  every  EU  MS  and  then  each  EU  MS  would  need  to 
communicate it to the EU. In addition, it would have to be continuously updated. 

Experts  and  academics  agreed  that  some  kind  of  provision  of  information  by  platforms 
would be useful. According to them, currently, it is hard to estimate how many people work 
through  these  platforms,  for  how  long,  what  are  their  earnings.  However,  some  of  them 
believe that cross-border issues overall is not a very urgent problem as many platforms have 
local  subsidiaries.  Furthermore,  some  respondents  from  academia  doubted  if  increasing 
transparency  with  regard  to  cross-border  issues  has  any  significant  benefits,  as  well  as  if  it 
would  work  in  practice.  They  highlighted  that  the  number  of  people  working  through 
platforms is constantly in flux and platforms may not be willing to share such information. 

Digital Services Act - Open Public Consultation 

Issues of the employment status and working conditions of people working though platforms 
had  been  covered  to  some  extent  also  in  a  public  consultation  on  the  Digital  Services  Act 
(DSA) that ran from June to September 2020. It explored emerging challenges in other areas 
related  to  online  platforms  and  digital  services,  including  the  situation  of  self-employed 
people offering services through platforms. 

Altogether  2863  replies  were  received  including  2182  individuals,  621  organisations,  59 
administrations  and  55  others.  The  questions  were  focused  on  rights  and  obligations  of 
platform  workers,  role  of  platforms,  the  contractual  relationship  with  the  platform  and 
customers  and  main  areas  for  improvement.  The  variety  of  services  offered  through  online 
platforms and covered by the responses included food delivery, household maintenance, ride-
hailing, software development, translations, art and design, health counselling or training. 

Most  individuals  and  organisations  highlighted  the  need  for  action  to  remove  existing 
obstacles  to  improve  the  situation  of  individuals  offering  services  online  and  offline.  The 
most frequently mentioned obstacle was the lack of clarity concerning the employment status 
of  individuals  offering  services,  including  the  risk  of  infringing  competition  law.  The  main 
concerns  of  the  individuals  supported  by  the  views  of  social  partners  and  trade  unions 
included the lack of social protection coverage, work precariousness and uncertainty vis-à-vis 
working time and risks of social dumping. The majority of respondents indicated that they are 
not  able to  collectively  negotiate their remuneration or other conditions vis-à-vis  platforms. 
The  public  authorities  also  argued  that  EU  measures  should  be  considered  addressing 
unjustified barriers to cross-border transactions. 

70 

 
 
 
Furthermore, the issue of the lack of transparency in  online ratings, lack of transparency in 
remuneration,  and  the  lack  of  possibility  to  organise  collectively  vis-à-vis  the  platform 
represented the three most pertinent challenges in the participants’ responses. A big majority 
of the respondents (both citizens and organisations) indicated that the possibility of collective 
bargaining would represent a significant improvement for individuals offering services both 
in the online and offline economy.  

Finally,  the  platforms  and  the  business  associations  highlighted  the  need  for  creating 
harmonized rules across Member States to ensure a level playing field among platforms but 
also  vis-à-vis  the  traditional  sectors  of  the  economy.  They  called  for  an  agile  way  of 
establishing  decent  working  conditions  for  platform  workers  without  endangering 
competitiveness and creating the risk of misclassification133. 

Views of the European Parliament 

The European Parliament Employment Committee issued a report on “Strong Social Europe 
for Just Transitions“ (co-rapporteurs Dennis Radtke (EPP, DE) and Agnes Jongerius (S&D, 
NL)  calling  on  the  Commission  to  propose  a  directive  on  decent  working  conditions  and 
rights  in  the  digital  economy,  covering  all  workers,  including  non-standard  workers  on 
atypical contracts, workers in platform companies and the self-employed. 

It called on the Commission to ensure in this directive that platform businesses comply with 
the existing national and European legislation, to clarify the employment status of platform-
based  workers  through  the  rebuttable  assumption  of  an  employment  relationship  and  to 
safeguard their working  conditions,  social protection  and health and safety,  as well as their 
right  to  organise,  to  be  represented  by  trade  unions  and  to  negotiate  collective  agreements, 
including for the self-employed. 

On  16  September  2021  the  European  Parliament  adopted  a  resolution  on  “Fair  working 
conditions,  rights  and  social  protection  for  platform  workers  –  new  forms  of 
employment  linked  to digital  development”  (2019/2186(INI))  –  rapporteur  Sylvie  Brunet 
(RE,  FR).134  The  resolution  calls  on  the  Commission  to  introduce  into  its  forthcoming 
proposal  a  rebuttable  presumption  of  an  employment  relationship  for  platform  workers,  in 
accordance  with  national  definitions  as  set  out  in  Member  States’  respective  legislation  or 
collective  agreements,  combined  with  the  reversal  of  the  burden  of  proof.  It  calls  on  the 
Commission and Member States to ensure appropriate protection of platform workers’ rights 
and well-being, such as non-discrimination, privacy, autonomy and human dignity in the use 
of  AI  and  algorithmic  management.  It  calls  for  a  European  framework  to  guarantee  people 
working for digital labour platforms have the same level of social protection as non-platform 
workers of the same category. This includes social protection contributions, responsibility for 
health and safety and the right to engage in collective bargaining to negotiate fair terms and 
conditions.  The  Resolution  was  adopted  with  524  votes  in  favour,  39  against  and  124 
abstentions. 

Results of the online panel survey 

To  ensure  that  the  impact  assessment  captures  the  views  of  those  most  affected  by  the 
initiative  –  people  working  through  platforms  and  other  workers  who  encounter 

133 Available online. 
134 Available online. 

71 

 
 
 
                                                           
algorithmic management practices in their work – online panel survey was carried out in 
nine Member States:  Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Romania and Spain. The countries were selected on the basis of a hierarchical cluster analysis 
to  make  sure  that  these  countries  are  representative  of  the  EU  in  terms  of  the  key 
characteristic of their labour markets and platform work. A sample of 10,938 valid responses 
was collected from daily internet users aged between 16 and 74 in these EU countries.  

The main results of the survey: 

  The  survey  shows  that  17%  of  EU  daily  internet  users  have  done  platform  work 
during the last six months. Of all daily internet users, 11% have worked at least once a 
month, and 3% worked more than 20 hours per week or earned more than half of their 
income through platforms. 

  Of  those  who  engaged  in  platform  work  at  least  once  a  month  during  the  last  half-
year, 44% performed high-skill online work; 29% - low-skill online work; 18% - low-
skill on-location work; and 9% - high-skill on-location work, based on the main type 
of work they did. 

  The  survey  indicates  that  76%  of  people  working  through  platforms  at  least  once  a 
month use more than one platform. The median number of platforms that workers in 
all types of platform work use is 2. 

  According  to  the  survey,  people  working  though  platforms  more  than  sporadically 
spent on average 8.9 hours per week on unpaid tasks, as compared to the average of 
12.6 hours spent on paid tasks. 

 

In an ideal situation, people would prefer to work, on average, 19.8 hours per week. 

  Talking  of  overall  experience  of  working  via  the  platform,  20%  faced  negative 
consequences from the platform when they refused clients or work assignments, and 
60% were not provided working tools, materials or protective equipment. 

  Moreover,  79%  of  people  working  though  platforms  more  often  than  monthly  think 
that  platforms  should  be  more  transparent  on  how  they  allocate  tasks  and  set  pay 
levels. 

  The survey indicates that 59% of all people working though platforms at least once a 
month worked for clients from other countries at least sometimes. Although the vast 
majority of these respondents reported that they served clients in other EU countries, 
the US was also indicated as a major market. 

  81%  of  people  working  through  platforms  at  least  once  a  month  indicated  that  they 
are  satisfied  or  very  satisfied  with  the  flexibility  of  working  times  and  hours  in 
platform work; and 84% - with the flexibility of working locations. 

  27% of people working through platform at least once a month reported that they are 
very  unsatisfied  or  rather  unsatisfied  with  the  availability  of  tasks  or  work 
assignments  on  platforms,  and  29%  of  people  working  though  platforms  more  than 
sporadically reported that they are unsatisfied with their pay levels on platforms. 

  Overall, 27% of daily internet users in the survey reported that they are employed, and 
software or algorithms are used at their workplaces at least for one (and 17% – at least 
for three) of the following purposes, automatically determining the following aspects 
of their work: 

72 

 
 
  For 16% of respondents - work schedules, shifts or working hours. 
  For 18% - pay. 
  For 9% - working locations or routes. 
  For 13% - content of work or tasks. 
  For 9% - pace of work. 
  For 10% - assessment of performance. 
  For 11% - specific clients they work with. 
  For 10% - collection of client or customer feedback about their work. 

  Algorithmic decisions sometimes feel unclear and untransparent. Whereas people feel 
controlled by algorithms, they also point out that they have few options to respond to 
decisions that they feel are arbitrary and unfavourable. 

  68% of people working through platforms at least once a month expressed an opinion 

that client ratings should have less impact on their work. 

73 

 
 
 
 
 
Annex 3: Who is affected and how? 

The preferred option consists of the following elements: 

Employment status 

Algorithmic 
management 

Cross-border 
transparency 

Accompanying 
measures 

  Rebuttable presumption applied to platforms that exercise a certain degree of control and 

 

shift in the burden of proof (option A3b) 
Transparency,  consultation,  human  oversight  and  redress  for  both  employed  and  self-
employed platform workers (option B2b) 

  Clarification  on  the  obligation  to  declare  platform  work,  including  in  cross-border 

 

 
 

situations (option C1), combined with: 
Publication requirement for platforms (option C2) 

Enforcement provisions (as part of a legislative instrument) 
Invitation to Member States to provide advice and guidance, to encourage social dialogue 
and to establish ombudsman institutions (as part of a non-binding instrument) 

Impacts on platforms 

The  preferred  option  under  Policy  Area  A  of  rebuttable  presumption  will  be  limited  to 
those  digital  labour  platforms  that  exercise  a  certain  degree  of  control  over  the  people 
working  through  them  and  the  work  they  perform.  This  is  likely  to  affect  specific  types  of 
platforms more than others:  

  Low-skill on-location services, known as app work, will be affected the most, as they 

tend to exercise the highest levels of control on their workers 

  Some  types  of  online  services,  such  as  online  micro-tasking,  could  fall  under  the 

scope as well. 

  Genuine  labour  marketplaces,  mostly  for  high-skill  online  and  on-location  services, 

will be out of scope of this option.  

  Other platforms for both highly-skilled and low-skilled online work might be affected 
– as some of them do not operate as pure marketplaces, and do exert notable levels of 
control on workers, or operate similarly to temporary work agencies (TWAs).   

Platforms are likely to seek legal certainty before legal disputes arise. They will be obliged to 
choose and implement a business model either in the direction of providing an employment 
contract;  or  minimise  the  level  of  control  to  ensure  genuine  self-employment,  or  a  hybrid 
model. Then the following directions of actions from the affected platforms can be expected, 
related to different costs: 

  A  considerable  share  of  on-location  platforms  might  adapt  their  business  model  to 
employ  people  working  through  them,  either  themselves  or  through  temporary 
employment  agencies.  While  some  of  these  platforms  will  be  incentivised  by  the 
signalling effect of the options, others will reclassify after lost court cases. A limited 
number of online platforms is likely to reclassify the people working through them – 
notably  where  the  tasks  require  knowledge  of  local  languages  or  access  to  local 
businesses and are therefore difficult to move out of the EU. Some large on-location 
and  online  platforms  will  implement  the  dual  strategy,  employing  workers 
themselves,  through  temporary  employment  agencies  and  services  contracts,  in 
various combinations. The costs for platforms will relate not only to one-off expenses 
of changing the platform business models, but also increased recurrent wage and non-
wage expenses. 

74 

 
 
  On-location  platforms  might  quit  less  profitable  markets,  at  local  (e.g.,  town,  city, 
region) or national level. A number of online platforms aiming to avoid litigation and 
fines,  or  for  which  employment  is  likely  to  undermine  their  business  models,  will 
either  go  out  of  business  or  leave  the  EU  markets.  This  may  cause  indirect  costs  of 
reduced competition and innovation.  

  A smaller number of on-location and larger number of online platforms might change 
their T&Cs in the way that their relationship with people working through them meets 
the  criteria  of  genuine  self-employment:  by  approximating  the  pure  marketplace 
model or making sure that platform cannot be considered the primary source of work-
related income. This will incur one-off compliance costs. 

Under the preferred policy options from  Policy Areas B and C, all types of platforms will 
face a slightly increased administrative burden due to the new obligations related to reporting 
and algorithmic transparency, consultation, human oversight and redress,  as well as one-off 
compliance costs for implementing the new structures and functionalities.  

Impacts on people working through platforms 

The preferred combination of options of the  Policy Area A will result into people working 
through platforms falling into one of several possible groups.  

  The reclassified workers, who are currently in the most precarious platform work, will 
get  more stable earnings, paid  leave, better social insurance coverage, compensation 
for standby  periods, and better health  and safety conditions  at  work. Some of them, 
however, might lose some flexibility related to independent contractor status.  

  The working conditions should also improve, in terms of autonomy and flexibility, for 
people who work through platforms that will ensure the genuine self-employment in 
their relationships with the workforce.  

  Platforms  optimizing their workforce under the new business  models  and/or leaving 
the  EU  or  specific  markets  would  reduce  the  opportunities  for  part-time  self-
employment for people working through platforms, and increase competition between 
people working through platforms in the EU.  

  The  reclassified  EU-based  online  freelancers  could  face  the  decreasing  demand  for 
their services, due to increased costs and administrative burden for their customers.  

As  a  result  of  the  preferred  options  from  the  Policy  Area  B,  both  reclassified  platform 
workers and people working through platforms who will be genuine self-employed, will have 
increased  rights  in  terms  of  algorithmic  transparency,  consultation,  human  oversight  and 
redress. These would grant the possibility to keep better control of how their personal data are 
being  used  and  to  challenge  the  decisions  that  are  taken  on  this  basis,  as  well  as  improve 
collective rights and strengthen social dialogue. As an indirect effect of these developments, 
further improvement in the working conditions of people working through platforms can be 
expected. This will be the result of platforms opening their algorithms up to external scrutiny, 
as well as their enhanced responsibility with respect to the people working through them.  

This impact will be further strengthened by the preferred options of Policy Area C, which, 
will  ensure  effective  access  to  social  protection  for  people  working  through  platforms  (as 
workers) in cross-border situations. It will also, indirectly, improve working conditions due to 
enhanced oversight  of platform  work, better policy making  and  greater transparency on the 
numbers of people working through platforms and their working conditions. 

75 

 
 
Impacts on consumers 

Impacts on consumers are mostly related to the preferred option under the Policy Area A.  

  Reclassification  may  increase  the  prices  for  consumers  of  on-location  services  0-
40%,  with  the  most  realistic  estimate  of  24%  based  on  available  case  studies, 
depending  on  the  extent  of  reclassification  and  other  revenue  sources  available  for 
platforms 

  The  availability/  supply  of  services  provided  by  platforms  is  likely  to  decrease  as 
platforms  exit  specific  markets  and  fewer  workers  provide  them  at  the  same  time/ 
peak periods.  

  The effects on the quality of services will be mixed, but mostly positive. On the one 
hand,  platforms  will  be  in  charge  of  worker  training  and  ensuring  the  quality  of 
services. On the other hand, especially in the segment of on-location services, lower 
availability of services may contribute to longer waiting times.  

Impacts on public authorities 

 

Implementation  of  the  preferred  options  under  all  Policy  Areas  will  introduce 
enforcement  costs  for  the  national  governments  and  authorities,  as  the  public  sector 
will have to introduce new procedures and/ or change the current procedures in order 
to apply and implement these measures.  

  The preferred option under Policy Area A is likely to have budgetary implications in 
terms of extra income that could be collected in the case of reclassification given that 
the  level  of  taxation  applicable  to  employees  is  higher  than  the  level  of  taxation  of 
self-employed independent contractors. 

  Thanks  to  the  Clarification  on  the  obligation  to  declare  platform  work,  including  in 
cross-border situations, national authorities will obtain clarity on the social protection 
coverage  of  people  working  through  platforms  as  workers,  and  on  the  relevant 
contributions  which  are  due.  Thanks  to  the  new  reporting  requirements,  the  public 
sector  will  also  have  better  access  to  information  about  platform  work.  This  will 
facilitate  the  work  of  labour  inspectorates,  social  protection  institutions  and  tax 
authorities  to  enforce  rules  –  including  on  the  employment  status  –  and  collect 
contributions and taxes. 

Other general impacts 

  Ambiguous  effect  on  GDP.  Negative  effect  on  GDP  possible  due  to  decreased 
consumption, lower business investment, and outsourcing of online platform work to 
third  countries.  A  positive  countervailing  effect  could  be  expected  as  some  people 
working  through  platforms  will  earn  higher  income  and  thus  are  likely  to  consume 
more. Additional taxes collected would increase public budgets, which could lead to 
greater government expenditure, resulting in a positive impact on GDP. 

  Classification  of  people  working  through  platforms  who  are  currently  bogus  self-
employed  will  bring  them  effectively  into  the  scope  of  employee  social  protection 
would broaden the tax and social contribution  base at  least  in  some Member States. 
This,  in  turn,  should  help  adjust  the  social  protection  systems  to  the  changing 
economy  and  the  world  of  work,  improving  their  adequacy,  sustainability  and 
resilience in the long term.  

76 

 
 
By  clarifying  the  obligations  of  digital  labour  platforms  in  the  EU,  the  considered  policy 
options  contribute  to  fostering  a  transparent,  rules-based  digital  single  market,  underpinned 
by a level playing field for all businesses and strong social rights for the people working in it. 
This has implications for the EU’s international partners, as it strengthens the Union’s values-
based approach to the digital transition.  

A3.1 Overview of benefits of the preferred option 

Overview of benefits (total of all policy options and accompanying measures) of the Preferred Option 

Stakeholder 

Description 

Amount 

People 
working 
through  platforms 
and 
(employed 
self-employed)  

Better  working  conditions 
social 
improved 
and 
people 
for 
protection 
reclassified  as  employees 
(combination 
of  Policy 
Options A2, A3b and B2b)  

Policy  Option  A3b  is  likely  to  contribute  to  the  reclassification  of  between  1.7 
million  (760  000  low-skilled  on-location,  60  000  high-skilled  on-location,  400  000 
low-skilled online and 500 000 high-skilled online) and 4.1 million people (2m low-
skilled  on-location,  340  000  high-skilled  on-location,  1.25m  low-skilled  online  and 
500 000 high-skilled online).  

The benefits for them: 

-  More stable and predictable income 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 

Longer and more stable working hours 
Compensation for standby working time 
Paid leave 
Fuller access to social protection 
Better opportunities for collective bargaining 
Better  health  and  safety  conditions  for  reclassified  on-location  workers 
(especially delivery riders and ride-hailing drivers) 

Of  those  who  would  be  reclassified  (in  the  upper  bound  scenario),  31%  would 
experience  a  rise  in  their  income  if  they  earned  at  least  the  minimum  wage  after 
reclassification.  This  results  in  a  total  increase  of  EUR 203-484 million  for  all 
platform  workers  in  EU-27,  or  an  average  increase  per  person  of  EUR  121.07  per 
year.  The  latter  would  vary  from  0  for  those  workers  who  already  make  minimum 
wage or more, to at most EUR 1800 per year for those who make less than minimum 
wage and work an average number of hours. 

In  addition  to  gains  from  the  increased  earnings,  reclassified  workers  would  also 
benefit from access to paid leave, valued at an average annual gain of EUR 178 per 
worker,  or  EUR  349  million  to  EUR  830  million  for  all  reclassified  workers  in  the 
EU combined (assuming that they would continue working the same number of hours 
as prior to reclassification). 

 Compensation  for  the  costs  of  COVID-19  protective  materials,  currently  borne  by 
on-location  workers,  can  reach  EUR  42  million  –  EUR  121  million  per  year.  In 
addition, reclassified delivery workers would receive a one-off benefit in terms of a 
high-visibility vest and helmet, valued at EUR 73.2 million. 

Health  and  safety  benefits  include:  reduction  in  injuries  and  fatalities  of  traffic 
participants  due  to  decreased  incentives  for  risky  behaviour  in  traffic;  wider  use  of 
safety gear as it is provided by platforms safety training provided by platforms. 

Policy Option B2b will strengthen the effect of Policy Option A3b and contribute to 
the improvement of the working conditions of platform workers:  

-  Workers  will  be  better  aware  about  algorithmically  made  decisions  that 
impact their working conditions (for example, allocation of work) and will 
be able to use a set of tools and procedures to challenge decisions that are 
not acceptable to them  
Platforms  will  design  the  algorithms  by  taking  workers’  position  into 
consideration in response to the consultation process  or as a result of the 
complaint-handling mechanism  

- 

As  an  effect  of  Policy  Option  A3b, up  to  3.78  million  people  who  are  currently  at 
risk of being misclassified, are likely to become genuine self-employed.  

Policy  Option  B2b  will  complement  the  beneficial  effect  of  Policy  Option  A3b, 
improving the self-employed’s working conditions:  

- 

- 

The  self-employed  persons  working  through  platforms  will  be  better 
aware  about  algorithmically  made  decisions  that  impact  their  working 
conditions  (for  example,  allocation  of  work,  determination  of  pay  rates) 
and will be able to use a set of tools and procedures to challenge decisions 
that are not acceptable to them  
Platforms  will  design  the  algorithms  by  taking  the  position  of  people 
working  through  platforms  into  consideration,  in  response  to  the 

77 

Better  working  conditions 
social 
improved 
and 
protection 
self-
for 
employed  working  through 
platforms  (combination  of 
Policy  Options  A3b  and 
B2b) 

the 

 
 
 
 
consultation process or as a result of the complaint-handling mechanism  

As  an  effect  of  Policy  Option  B2b,  people  working  through  platforms  will  be 
granted  rights  concerning  algorithmic  transparency,  consultation,  human  oversight 
and redress. This will apply to up to 28.29 million people currently working through 
platforms. These would grant the possibility for people working through platforms to 
better understand criteria used for algorithmic management; control of how their data 
is  being  used  and  challenge  the  decisions  that  are  taken  on  this  basis,  as  well  as 
improve collective rights and strengthen social dialogue. 

The legal and non-compliance costs are likely to increase in the short to medium term 
as  Policy  Option  A3b  would  make  it  easier  and  less  costly  for  people  working 
through  platforms  to  challenge  their  legal  status.  However,  such  costs  are  likely  to 
decrease in the medium to long term. Policy Option A3b provides for a clear set of 
criteria concerning the definition of control exercised by digital platforms over people 
working  through  them.  The  platforms  will  adapt  to  make  sure  that  their  business 
models take these criteria into consideration. 

Significant savings to platform companies are likely, given that the number of legal 
cases concerning misclassification has been increasing in the EU since 2015, resulted 
in  reclassification  decisions  in  65  out  of  observed  103  court  decision,  and  incurred 
cost for the on-location digital platforms from tens to hundreds of millions euros in 
legal costs and fines. 

Better  service  quality  of  on-location  platforms  due  to  better  supervision  of  service 
delivery,  training  to  people  working  through  platforms,  adequate  access  to  social 
protection and improved working conditions. 

Removal  of  the  unfair  competitive  advantage  of  platforms  relying  on  false  self-
employment vis-à-vis the companies that currently employ their workers.  

The clarification on the obligation to declare platform work, including in cross-border 
would  also  ensure  that  digital  labour  platforms  are treated  on an  equal  footing  with 
offline businesses vis-à-vis social protection coverage of their workers. 

transparency, 
Improved 
information 
and 
consultation  rights  (Policy 
Option B2b) 

Digital 
platforms 

labour 

Lower legal and compliance 
costs (Policy Option A3b) 

Reputational  and  business 
gains through higher service 
social 
quality 
and 
responsibility 
(Policy 
Options  A3b,  B2b,  C1and 
C2) 

Level  playing  field  with 
other 
and 
platforms 
traditional companies in the 
same sectors (Policy Option 
A3b and C1) 

Traditional 
businesses 
competing 
platforms 

with 

Consumers 

Public sector 

Improved 
services 
platforms 

quality 
provided 

of 
by 

Better  service  quality  of  on-location  platforms  due  to  better  supervision  of  service 
delivery,  training  to  people  working  through  platforms  and  improved  working 
conditions 

Increased  income  from  tax 
and 
protection 
contributions (A) 

social 

From on-location platforms: EUR 0.93 billion to EUR 2.64 billion per year 

From online platforms: EUR 0.74 billion to 1.33 billion per year 

of 

policies 

Better  implementation  and 
labour 
enforcement 
and 
market 
platform 
regulation 
(combination 
of  Policy 
Options  A3b,  B2b,  C1  and 
C2) 

Policy  Option  B2b  will  provide  better  transparency  concerning  algorithmic 
management, which underpins platforms’ business models.  

Policy Option A3b will provide more clarity to authorities concerning the criteria for 
assessing  the  extent  of  control  that  platforms  exercise  over  people  working  though 
them.  The  rebuttable  presumption  will  also  provide  the  authorities  instruments  to 
bring potential cases of misclassification to court.   

Policy Options C1 and C2 will ensure that people working through platforms cross-
border as workers have adequate access to social protection, as per relevant national 
rules of the country they work in. It will also ensure that digital labour platforms are 
treated on an equal footing with offline businesses. The publication requirements will 
enhance availability of data on people working though platforms that could be used 
for policy design, monitoring and implementation.  

A3.2 Overview of costs of the preferred option 

Overview of costs (total of all policy options and accompanying measures) of the Preferred Option 

People 
working 
through  platforms 
(employed and self-
employed) 

flexibility 

Loss  of 
and 
autonomy for the reclassified 
through 
people  working 
platforms 
(Policy  Option 
A3b) 

Some loss of flexibility and autonomy for those people (around 1.72 – 4.09 million 
people) who are currently working through platforms, are at risk of misclassification 
and will obtain the status of an employee after the policy options are implemented 

Lower  availability  of  work 
through platforms and  lower 
self-
income 
employed 
(Policy  Option 
A3b) 

the 

for 

Very  difficult  to  estimate  in  a  meaningful  way.  According  to  platforms,  reduced 
market  access  and  fewer  work  opportunities  for  41-80%  of  people  currently 
working through delivery and ride-hailing platforms.  

Potentially increased price competition by self-employed people who could set their 
own prices.  

78 

 
 
 
 
Digital 
platforms  

labour 

Increased 
legal 
compliance  costs 
Option A3b)  

and 
(Policy 

Administrative  costs  (Policy 
Option  A3b,  B2b,  C1  and 
C2) 

Costs  to  platforms  due  to 
rise  in  wages  for  people 
making  less  than  minimum 
wage,  and  social  protection 
contributions 
by 
employers 
Ambivalent 
revenue growth 

effect 

paid 

on 

Traditional 
businesses 

Consumers 

Public sector 

Loss of revenue 

Reduced  availability  and 
potentially  higher  prices  of 
platform services 

Administrative  costs  (Policy 
Options A3b, B2b, C2) 

Fewer EU citizens will provide services via online platforms because they could not 
compete on price with self-employed non-EU freelancers. 

Currently  legal  and  non-compliance  costs  are  from  tens  to  hundreds  of  millions 
euros for on-location platforms. As Policy Option A3b would make it easier and less 
costly for people working through platforms to challenge their legal status, the legal 
and non-compliance costs are likely to be even higher in the short to medium term. 
Nevertheless, they are expected to decrease below the baseline in the long run. 

Administrative  cost  of  hiring  employees  (recruitment,  contractual  arrangements, 
shift allocations, etc.) are not considered to change drastically given that platforms 
already  recruit  and  contract  people  as  independent  contractors.  Furthermore,  the 
processes are largely automatized. 

Legal research to adapt to changing employment rules in different Member States:  
one-off combined cost of legal research of at least EUR 557,000 + recurring costs of 
at least EUR 712.5 per expansion to a new country + the cost of adapting to the new 
legal rules. 

One-off  costs  of  providing  more  algorithmic  transparency  for  people  working 
through  platforms.  Recurring  cost  per  consultation  with  workers’  representatives 
estimated at EUR 67.36   for each platform (assuming one manager attends one two 
hour consultation), or EUR 199,665 across affected platforms. The recurring cost of 
ensuring human oversight and review of significant decisions taken by algorithms, 
providing  written  explanations  of  these  decisions,  and  internal  complaint-handling 
procedures.  Recurring  cost  of  maintaining  redress  mechanisms.  The  precise  costs 
per  platform  could  vary  depending  on  whether  the  platform  already  has  any 
complaint handling procedures and how many people work through the platform. 

The  clarification  on  the  obligation  to  declare  platform  work,  including  in  cross-
border situations would have no costs above the baseline, since it would make sure 
that platforms abide by the national rules they would have to comply with anyway, 
in their capacity of employers.  

Providing  information  on  the  web-site  regarding  the  number  of  people  working 
through platforms and their employment status: 
One-off cost per platform: EUR 92.28 
Combined one-off cost for all on-location platforms: EUR 30,360 
Combined one-off cost for online platforms: EUR 17,256 
Recurring  annual  cost  of  updates  per  platform:  between  EUR  0  (if  data  are 
automatically linked to the tool) and EUR 185 (if manual updates are needed) 
Combined cost of updates for all on-location platforms: EUR 0 – EUR 60,720.  
Combined cost of updates for all on-location platforms: EUR 0 – EUR 34,512 

Annual costs related to reclassification: EUR 1.87 – 4.46 billion    

In some relevant cases (i.e. Uber in Geneva following a court decision to reclassify 
workers),  a  drop  in  orders  was  reported  following  reclassification.  In  others  (i.e. 
Hilfr  in  Denmark  following  the  collective  agreement  with  3F),  an  increase  in 
revenues was observed.   
Difficult  to  assess  as  it  will  depend  on  market  structures,  platform  strategies  and 
those of their competitors, as well as level of dependence of restaurants on delivery 
platforms.  

Based on the case of Spain, around 0.16% - 1.0% of restaurant revenue lost. 

Reduced  availability  of  services  (especially  on-location)  as  on-location  platforms 
may cease operations in smaller cities 

Higher service prices from 0 to 40%, with 24% as the realistic scenario  

The  number  of  court  cases  concerning  misclassification  will  be  higher  than  the 
baseline in the short to medium term; then this number will decrease (A3b).  

Extra  resources  will  be  needed  in  order  to  carry  out  and  conclude  the  increased 
number  of  inspections, however  they  are  not considered  significant  in  view  of  the 
overall public spending on labour market supervision. 

Cost to public sector of overseeing how the platforms implement the transparency, 
consultation,  human  oversight  and  redress  are  not considered  significant given  the 
overall public spending on market regulation and monitoring (B2b).  

Cost  to  public  sector  of  monitoring  whether  platforms  publish  the  information 
requested and enforce the publication requirement if platforms do not comply (C2) 

79 

 
 
 
 
 
A3.3 The SME test 

1) Identification of affected businesses 
The businesses directly affected by the Initiative would be digital labour platforms. Since digital labour platforms tend to 
use independent contractors, the headcount criterion is far less important than the turnover or balance sheet criteria when 
defining SMEs. Using the available information on digital labour platforms’ turnover, we estimate that between 70% and 
92% of all digital labour platforms operating in the EU are SMEs. 
Businesses  indirectly  affected  by  the  Initiative  include  traditional  businesses  that  either  compete  with  digital  labour 
platforms (i.e. traditional taxi companies, nanny agencies, etc.) or rely on platforms in their operations (i.e. restaurants, 
fleet operators, some of the temporary work agencies which contract workers on behalf of platforms).  
To  estimate  the  number  of  businesses  providing  taxi  services,  we  consider  Structural  Business  Statistics  on  other 
passenger land transport (excluding rail). In 2017 there were: 

 
 
 
 

631 large businesses in EU-27 (using the headcount criterion); 
2,890 medium-sized businesses; 
14,971 small businesses; and 
79,040  micro  businesses  that  employ  between  2  and  9  people  (we  exclude  companies  that  employ  up  to  1 
person because these are self-employed people the impacts on whom are considered separately in the impact 
assessment).135 

It is not possible to estimate how many of the taxi services are in operating in the same markets as ride-hailing digital 
labour platforms. 
Regarding restaurants, in 2018 there were:136 

 
 
 
 

554 large businesses in EU-27; 
6,489 medium-sized businesses; 
110,482 small businesses; and 
471,532 micro businesses that employ between 2 and 9 persons (we exclude companies that employ up to 1 
person same as above).137 

It is not possible to estimate how many of the restaurants rely on delivery platforms, and to what extent. 
The number of businesses indirectly affected in other sectors cannot be estimated. 
2) Consultation of SME stakeholders 
In  the  two  stages  of  the  formal  consultation  of  the  social  partners,  SMEUnited  was  among  the  consulted  employer 
organisations, and submitted responses. 
In  total,  18  interviews  were  carried  out  with digital  labour platforms.  Given  that  headcount and  revenue  information  is 
available  only  for  a  limited  number  of  platforms,  the  selection  strategy  for  interviews  aimed  to  balance  between  11 
platforms  that  operate  in  multiple  countries  (Solved.fi,  Upwork,  Freelancer,  Wolt,  Uber,  Deliveroo,  Bolt,  Free  Now, 
DeliveryHero, Workis), and 8 platforms that operate in a single market only (Scribeur, Wirk, Voocali, Didaxis, TestBirds, 
Pozamiatane, Zenjob, TaskHero). 
Furthermore, 6 interviews with employers’ organisations were carried out to consider the effects on traditional businesses, 
including  SMEs.  These  include  Confederation  of  German  Employers'  Associations  (BDA),  AssoDelivery,  Lithuanian 
Business  Confederation,  Union  of  Entrepreneurs  and  Employers  (Związek  Pracodawców  Polskich  (ZPP)),  Employers‘ 
Confederation Concordia, and Spanish Confederation of Business Organisations (CEOE). 

3) Measurement of the impact on SMEs138 
To differentiate between the effects on SMEs and large platforms, we consider each impact separately: 

 

 

 

All  digital  labour  platforms  will  endure  an  increase  in  wages  paid  to  workers  (if  the  latter  currently  do  not 
make  at  least  minimum  wage)  and  an  additional  cost in terms  of  employers’  social  protection  contributions 
paid to tax authorities if they have to reclassify workers as a result of policy options A1-A3c. However, SMEs 
are  likely  to  be  more  affected.  While  non-wage  costs  in  EU-27  on  average  constitute  24.5%  of  total  labour 
costs, the share is likely greater for SMEs. According to the Centre for Economics and Business Research, as a 
business  increases  in  size,  a  greater  proportion  of  total  employment  costs  are  devoted  towards  productive 
assets such as wages, instead of overheads, meaning that firms may become more efficient with size.  In other 
words, the smaller the firm, the higher the share of non-wage costs relative to total employment costs.139 
Regarding  non-compliance  costs,  the  majority  of  court  decisions  in  misclassification  cases  that  concern 
platform  work  include  large  companies  such  as  Uber,  Deliveroo,  Roamler,  Glovo,  and  others  rather  than 
SMEs.140 Thus, even if Policy Area A policy options lead to an increase in litigation in the short term, SMEs 
are likely to be affected less than large digital labour platforms. 
The cost of legal research to adapt to employment rules in different Member States, and the actual one-off 
adaptation  costs,  will  likely  be  relatively  greater  for  SMEs  than  for  large  businesses.  This is because  large 
digital labour platforms already have legal staff, which might not be the case for micro and small businesses. 
This  could  influence  the  ability  of  SMEs  to  expand  to  other  countries  compared  to  large  firms.  However, 
SMEs would benefit from greater legal certainty when setting up in other Member States. Furthermore, several 

Details in: 
Section 
Economic 
impacts 
platforms. 

5.2.3, 

on 

5.2.3, 

on 

Section 
Economic 
impacts 
traditional 
businesses. 

Annexes 2 and 3 

Annexes 2 and 3 

Section 
summary 
available 
Section 6.1.3. 

6.1, 

in 

135 Eurostat table SBS_SC_1B_SE_R2, Available online. 
136 The figures include restaurants and businesses that provide mobile food services. 
137 Eurostat table SBS_SC_1B_SE_R2, Available online. 
138 Given the lack of information on digital labour platforms‘ turnover and headcount, it was not possible to differentiate 
the impacts between micro, small and medium-sized companies. 
139 The  Centre for Economics and Business  Research (CEBR) (2014). Cost of small business employment.  Available 
online. 
140 European Centre of Expertise (2021). Overview of court decisions. Shared with the research team by DG EMPL on 
April 12th, 2021. 

80 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
 

mitigating measures already exist which facilitate access to relevant information for all companies, and which 
would facilitate compliance by SMEs (see below).   
The  impact  on  revenue  growth  for  SMEs  may  be  the  same,  lower  or  higher  as  for  large  companies, 
depending on how much of the additional costs they pass onto consumers. For example, the Hilfr platform in 
Denmark experienced an increase in revenues in 2019 following the collective agreement with 3F (signed in 
August 2018), after  which  part  of  the  platforms’  workforce  became  employed.  On the  other hand,  Uber  – a 
much  larger  company  than  Hilfr  –  reported  a  drop  in  orders  in  Geneva  when  the  platform  reclassified  its 
workers following a court order because of price increases to customers and longer waiting times. 

Meanwhile,  SME  businesses  that  compete  with  digital  labour  platforms  (for  example,  taxis)  might  benefit  from 
options in Policy Area A to a greater extent than large businesses. This is because SMEs are more likely to be pushed out 
of  the  market  by  platforms  which  provide  similar  (i.e.  transportation)  services  compared  to  larger,  more  established 
businesses. 
Regarding businesses that rely on platforms in their operations, SME restaurants which rely on digital labour platforms 
might be disadvantaged compared to large restaurants because it may be more difficult for SME restaurants to withstand 
an increase in commissions if the digital labour platforms decide to pass on part of their higher expenses to their users.  

Policy  options presented in  Policy Area B may have stronger effects on SME digital labour platforms: most of the 
large platforms already provide at least some information on how their algorithms are formed and have internal dispute 
resolution systems for the people who work through platforms. Large businesses are also better equipped to deal with the 
additional  administrative  burden  than  SMEs  when  it  comes  to  consulting  worker  representatives,  providing  human 
oversight  of  significant  decisions  taken  by  algorithms,  or  carrying  out  risk  assessments  on  the  impact  algorithmic 
management on the safety and health of workers. 
Effects on traditional businesses from options in Policy Area B are considered negligible. 

Similarly as with Policy Area B, options under Policy Area C may be more costly for SME digital labour platforms. 
Reporting requirements in  Policy  Area  C would result in costs that are fixed or do not change much with the size of a 
business.  Publishing  the  number  of  people  who  work  through  the  platform,  including  their  employment  status,  takes  a 
certain amount of time, and it makes no difference that a larger business might have to fill in bigger figures than a smaller 
enterprise.  Larger  businesses  can  employ  specialists  to  deal  with  regulatory  obligations  more  efficiently.  For  larger 
businesses,  investment  in  computerisation  and  familiarisation  with  regulatory  obligations  will  often  be  worthwhile 
because  of  the  larger  number  of  cases  to  be  dealt  with.  This  too  results  in  higher  efficiency.  In  micro  enterprises  the 
entrepreneur  himself  will  often  be  responsible  for  taking  care  of  the  regulatory  obligations.  This  means  that  the  most 
valuable resource of the micro business will be occupied with tasks that do not directly contribute to the success of the 
enterprise.141 Nevertheless, the costs resulting from options in Package C are relatively small, at EUR 92.28 per platform 
to  present  information  about  the  people  working  through  the  platform  on  the  web  and  an  additional  EUR  0-184,56 
recurring costs every year depending on the update method chosen. In addition, digital labour platforms, even the smallest 
ones, are by definition highly digitalised, therefore processes to collect and update data should be possible to automate. 

The  provisions  foreseen  under  Policy  Area  C  on  the  obligation  to  declare  platform  work,  including  in  cross-border 
situations, would have no costs above the baseline for SMEs, since they would make sure existing rules at national level 
are complied with. 

Effects on traditional businesses are considered negligible. 

4) Assessment of alternative options and mitigating measures 

Given that each of the Policy Areas impose a greater burden on SMEs than on large companies, a number of mitigating 
measures already exist or could be considered: 

 

 
 

 

Adjustment  of  requirements  under  Policy  Area  B  (e.g.  longer  deadlines  to  provide  responses  for  request  of 
review of decisions)  
The reduction in the scope and/or frequency of information required to disclose and/or C. 
Availability  of  clear  information  and  relevant  templates  for  requirements  related  to  employment  status  – 
Member  States  are  already  obliged  to  provide  such  information  under  the  Posting  of  workers  enforcement 
directive:  (2014/67/EU, Article 5) and are encouraged to provide templates and models for documents related 
to the information for workers under the transparent and predictable working conditions directive (2019/1152, 
Article 5). 
Information on employment conditions for employers is already available via the Eures portal142 

Section 
summary 
available 
Section 6.2.3. 

6.2, 

in 

Section  6.3.2.2, 
summary 
available 
Section 6.3.3. 

in 

141  European  Commission  (2007).  Models  to  Reduce  the  Disproportionate  Regulatory  Burden  on  SMEs.  Brussels, 
Belgium. 
142 Available online 

81 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Annex 4: Impacts of the policy options 

A4.1 Tables on the impacts of the policy options 

Table 1: Summary of economic impacts of options under Policy Area A 

Impact 

Baseline 

A1 

A2 

A3a 

A3b 

A3c 

Prices 

Consumers 
enjoy 
competitive 
prices,  which 
some  argue  are 
below  the  true 
cost 
of 
operation. 

Negligible 
impact 
on 
consumers  in 
the 
short 
term;  higher 
than 
prices 
baseline 
in 
the long run if 
guidelines 
encourage 
select  MS  to 
adopt 
laws 
similar  to  the 
Riders’ Law. 

Consumers 

Assuming  that 
platforms 
cannot 
adapt 
their  business 
models to be in 
with 
line 
genuine 
self-
employment, 
prices  for  ride-
hailing 
and 
delivery 
services  could 
increase  up  to 
40%. 

Same as A2 for ride-
hailing  and  delivery 
platforms. 
Prices 
would  also  increase 
for  other  on-location 
the 
services, 
of 
hourly 
employed 
cleaners 
working  through  the 
Hilfr  platform  were 
higher 
9.4% 
compared to the self-
employed cleaners. 

i.e. 
rates 

Availability  of 
service 

Wide  coverage, 
including 
in 
small  towns,  for 
on-location 
services.143 
At 
least  117 
online  platforms 
active in all EU-
27 countries.144 

Same  as  ride-haling 
and delivery services 
for 
in  A2,  but 
supplied 
services 
through 
on-
all 
location platforms. 

Negligible 
impact  in  the 
short-term;  in 
the  long  run 
platforms 
could 
consider 
withdrawing 
from  markets 
(either 
individual  EU 
MS or smaller 
towns)  where 
adopt 
MS 
laws 
similar 
to  the  Riders’ 
Law 
a 
result  of  the 
guidelines. 

as 

Lower 
availability  of 
ride-hailing 
and 
delivery 
services  in  less 
densely 
populated areas 
if 
platforms 
switch 
cannot 
to genuine self-
employment. 
No 
regarding 
services 
supplied 
through  other 
platforms. 

impact 

Same as A3b. 

Same as A3b. 

Same  as  A3a 
for 
on-
location 
platforms. 
Prices  would 
remain 
unchanged 
for  tasks  that 
can 
be 
performed by 
freelancers 
outside 
of 
EU  (due  to 
downward 
on 
effect 
from 
prices 
competition). 
Prices  would 
for 
increase 
tasks 
that 
require  local 
language  or 
other 
expertise. 
Same  as  A3a 
regarding 
services 
supplied 
through  on-
location 
platforms. 
No impact on 
the 
availability 
of 
online 
services  that 
can 
be 
supplied  by 
freelancers 
outside 
EU. 
Negligible 
impact on the 
availability 
of 
online 
services  that 
require  local 
expertise  or 
language 
skills  –  even 
if 
targeted 
online 
platforms 
exit 
market, 
traditional 
businesses 
could  easily 
supply  these 

the 

the 

143 For example, see the cities where Uber operates: https://www.uber.com/global/en/cities/ 
144 CEPS (2021) dataset. 

82 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Same  as  A2,  but  for 
on-location 
all 
platforms. 

their 

services 
given 
online 
nature.     
Same  as  A2, 
for  all 
but 
targeted 
platforms. 

Same  as  A2, 
but for all on-
location  and 
online 
platforms. 

Quality 
service 

of 

Ongoing 
improvements in 
the  quality  of 
services 
provided 
through both on-
and 
location 
online  platforms 
as  a  growing 
of 
number 
(see 
people 
5.2) 
Section 
compete 
for 
customers. 

Negligible 
impacts in the 
short-run; 
mixed  effects 
on  quality  in 
the long run if 
guidelines 
encourage 
select  MS  to 
adopt 
laws 
similar  to  the 
Riders’  Law 
(see 
the 
previous 
discussion). 

Mixed  effects 
on  the  quality 
of  ride-hailing 
and 
delivery 
services: 
potentially 
improved 
quality  due  to 
employee 
training 
and 
discontinuation 
nudging 
of 
techniques  & 
surcharge 
pricing; 
reduced  quality 
in 
of 
terms 
longer  waiting 
lower 
times, 
impact 
of 
negative 
reviews, 
and 
lower  levels  of 
competition.  

Traditional businesses 

Effects 
on 
businesses  that 
compete  with 
platforms 

Traditional 
like 
businesses 
taxi  companies 
are 
losing  an 
increasing  share 
of the market, in 
to 
due 
part 
higher  cost  of 
employing 
workers. 

Slight 
improvements 
in 
terms  of 
fair 
competition 
be 
could 
in 
expected 
the  long  run, 
though 
by 
then 
many 
traditional 
businesses  in 
direct 
competition 
with 
labour 
platforms 
may 
longer 
operate. 

digital 

no 

on 
Effects 
businesses  that 
rely 
on 
platforms 

Restaurants  are 
increasingly 
utilising 
delivery 
platforms 
in 
their  operations, 
in 
especially 
light 
the 
of 
COVID-19 
pandemic. 
Temporary work 
are 
agencies 
utilised  by  few 
labour 
digital 
platforms 
for 
staffing 
decisions. 

on 

Negligible 
effect  in  the 
short 
run; 
possible 
negative 
effect 
restaurant 
revenues 
in 
the long run if 
guidelines 
encourage 
select  MS  to 
adopt 
laws 
similar  to  the 
Riders’  Law 
in Spain. 

of 
unfair 
for 

Improvements 
in  the  taxi  and 
delivery sectors 
of 
in 
terms 
ensuring 
fair 
competition  for 
traditional 
businesses  that 
employ 
workers. 
Possibility 
an 
advantage 
traditional 
businesses  (i.e. 
taxi 
companies) 
that 
bogus 
employment 
unless these are 
also regulated). 
Less  than 1.0% 
of 
restaurant 
revenue,  which 
EU-27 
in 
to 
translates 
EUR 
3.8 
billion. 
Increased 
demand 
for 
TWA  services 
both 
for 
and 
delivery 
ride-hailing 
services. 

promote 
self-

Same  as  A2,  but  the 
would 
Initiative 
a  greater 
benefit 
number 
of 
traditional 
businesses 
it 
would cover a wider 
scope  of  on-location 
services. 

as 

Same 
as 
but 
A3a, 
businesses  in 
direct 
competition 
with  targeted 
online  digital 
labour 
platforms 
would 
benefit.  

also 

likely 
that 

Same  as  A3b 
given  that  the 
remaining 
online 
platforms 
would 
prove 
their 
relationship 
with 
providing 
services 
through  them 
is 
genuine 
self-
employment. 

people 

for 

Same  as  A2 
restaurants. 
Increased 
demand 
for  TWA  services 
regarding  a  variety 
of 
on-location 
services. 

on 

Same  as  A2 
for 
restaurants. 
No 
information 
exists 
whether 
targeted 
online 
platforms 
could  turn  to 
for 
TWAs 
their  staffing 
needs. 

Same  as  A2 
for 
restaurants. 
No 
information 
exists 
on 
whether  any 
online 
platforms 
could  turn  to 
TWAs 
for 
their  staffing 
needs  –  some 
they 
said 
would 
leave 
the EU. 

Consumption 

Digital 
platforms 

labour 

Negligible 
impact  in  the 

Ambiguous 
effect: 

Ambiguous 
effect: 
reclassification  will 

Same  effect 
regarding on-

Same as A3b. 

Economy at large 

83 

 
 
 
 
 
 
generate  at  least 
EUR 
13.8 
billion  in  total 
revenue.145 

Net exports 

11.8 
million 
people in the EU 
provide  services 
to  clients  based 
outside 
the 
EU.146 

on 

run; 

long 
if 

short 
ambiguous 
impact 
consumption 
in 
the 
run 
guidelines 
encourage 
select  MS  to 
adopt 
laws 
similar  to  the 
Riders’  Law 
in Spain.  
No 
from 
baseline. 

change 
the 

Government 
spending 

Negligible 

Negligible 

be 
to 

location 
platforms  as 
in A3a. 
Not  possible 
estimate 
to 
impact 
the 
regarding 
online 
platform 
services 
given  lack  of 
historical 
precedent. 
Possibly 
negative 
effect  on  net 
– 
exports 
fewer 
EU 
citizens 
would 
able 
provide 
services  via 
targeted 
online 
platforms 
because  they 
not 
could 
in 
compete 
terms 
of 
price  with 
self-
employed 
non-EU 
freelancers. 
Same 
as 
A3a,  but  the 
impact 
would 
be 
greater  given 
the 
wider 
scope  of  the 
policy 
option. 

reduce 
the 
consumption  of  on-
location services, yet 
the 
increase 
consumption 
by 
reclassified  workers 
if 
incomes 
their 
increase. 

No  change  from  the 
baseline  given  that 
net  exports  are  less 
relevant 
on-
location platforms. 

for 

delivery 
yet 
the 

reclassification 
will  reduce  the 
consumption of 
ride-hailing 
and 
services, 
increase 
consumption 
by  reclassified 
workers if their 
incomes 
increase.  

change 
No 
from 
the 
baseline  given 
that net exports 
are 
less 
relevant for on-
location 
platforms. 

Same  as  A2,  but  the 
impact  would  be 
the 
greater  given 
wider  scope  of  the 
policy option. 

tax 

Additional 
contributions 
(due  to  greater 
employer  and 
employee 
social 
protection  rates 
compared 
to 
those  paid  by 
the 
self-
employed,  by 
10  percentage 
points 
on 
average  across 
EU-27)  could 
lead  to  greater 
government 
spending. 

Platforms 

likely 

greater 

than 
given 
some 

A 
negative 
impact 
A3b 
that 
online 
platforms 
would 
cease 
operations 
in 
the  EU  rather 
go 
than 
through 
the 
administrative 
burden 
of 
proving 
that 
their 
freelancers 
are 
self-
employed. 

genuine 

Same as A3b. 

of 

Number 
platforms 
affected  based 
very 
a 
on 
conservative 
estimate 
Annual 
earnings 
people 
working 
through 

of 

N/A  

More 
516 

than 

More than 127  More than 329 

More 
166 

than 

More 
516 

than 

EUR 
13.3 
billion regarding 
all people at risk 
of 
misclassification 

Social 
protection 
contributions 
would 
increase in the 

Additional 
EUR  0.8  –  2.2 
billion  per  year 
in 
costs 
regarding 

Additional  EUR  1.0 
– 2.9 billion per year 
regarding 
in  costs 
annual 
gross 
earnings  of  people 

Additional 
EUR  1.9  – 
billion 
4.5 
per  year 
in 
costs 

Same  as  A3, 
plus  litigation 
costs for more 
platforms  that 
will  have  to 

145  CEPS  (2021).  The  figure  is  an  underestimate  because  it  presents  information  from  200  out  of  500 
active digital labour platforms only. The estimate includes platform revenues, earnings of people working 
through platforms, and fourth party earnings. 
146 PPMI 2021 survey data. 

84 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
platforms  and 
related 
social 
protection 
contributions 

Non-
compliance 
costs 

Lately 
increasing  from 
tens to hundreds 
millions 
of 
euros 
for  on-
location 
platforms  only. 
No  litigation  for 
online 
platforms. 

long  run  if  a 
number 
of 
adopt 
MS 
laws 
similar 
to  the  Riders’ 
to 
Law  due 
the guideline. 

gross 
annual 
earnings 
of 
people  working 
through 
platforms 
compared 
the baseline. 

to 

working 
through 
platforms  compared 
to the baseline. 

Decrease 
below 
baseline 
the long run. 

the 
in 

Decrease 
the 
below 
baseline  in  the 
long  run,  even 
more  so 
that 
A1. 

Decrease  below  the 
baseline  in  the  long 
run,  even  more  so 
that A2. 

Legal  research 
to 
to  adapt 
different  EU 
employment 
rules 

least  EUR 
At 
for 
712.5 
platforms 
that 
employ  workers 
per  country  of 
operation. 

change 
No 
the 
from 
baseline 
in 
the  short-run; 
one-off  costs 
to  platforms 
countries 
in 
adopt 
that 
new 
legislation  as 
a  result  of the 
guidelines 
in 
the long-run. 

Revenue 
growth 

change 
the 

No 
from 
baseline. 

Revenues  of  on-
location 
platforms 
displaying 
a 
positive  growth 
trend. 
Not  possible  to 
estimate 
for 
online 
platforms. 

One-off 
combined 
cost for all platforms 
with 
self-
a 
employment  model 
of  at 
least  EUR 
557,000  +  recurring 
costs of at least EUR 
712.5  per  expansion 
to  a  new  country  + 
the  cost  of  adapting 
to 
legal 
rules,  yet  this  cost 
cannot be estimated. 
No  change  from  the 
for 
baseline 
platforms 
that 
employ workers. 

the  new 

Same as A2. 

One-off 
combined  cost 
for 
all 
platforms  with 
a 
self-
employment 
at 
model  of 
EUR 
least 
180,000 
for 
legal research + 
recurring  costs 
of at least EUR 
per 
712.5 
expansion  to  a 
new  country  + 
the 
of 
cost 
adapting  to  the 
new legal rules, 
this  cost 
yet 
cannot 
be 
estimated. 
No 
from 
baseline 
platforms 
employ 
workers.  

change 
the 
for 
that 

Ambiguous 
effect:  in  some 
relevant  cases 
(i.e.  Uber 
in 
Geneva 
following 
a 
court  decision 
reclassify 
to 
workers), 
a 
drop  in  orders 
was 
reported 
following 
reclassification. 
In  others  (i.e. 
Hilfr 
in 
Denmark 
following 
collective 
agreement  with 
an 
3F), 

the 

regarding 
annual  gross 
earnings  of 
people 
working 
through 
platforms 
compared  to 
the baseline. 
Same  as  A3a 
on-
for 
location 
platforms; 
slightly 
higher 
number  than 
baseline 
for 
targeted 
online 
platforms 
given 
the 
lack  of  fines 
online 
for 
platforms 
in 
the baseline. 
Same  as  A3a 
on-
for 
location 
platforms. 
Not  possible 
estimate 
to 
for 
online 
platforms, 
but  cost  per 
platform 
would 
higher 
for 
location 
platforms 
due 
higher 
average 
number 
countries 
online 
platforms 
operate 
in 
(17.3 vs 3.5). 
change 
No 
the 
from 
baseline 
for 
platforms 
that  employ 
workers. 
Same  as  A3a 
for 
on-
location 
platforms. 
Not  possible 
estimate 
to 
for 
online 
platforms 
given 
lack 
information 
on 
the 
revenues  of 
targeted 
online 
platforms 
and 
historical 
precedents. 

be 
than 
on-

the 
of 

similar 

the 

of 

to 

the 

rebut 
presumption 
but 
will 
ultimately  not 
be reclassified 
as employers. 

Same  as  A3 
on-
for 
location 
platforms; 
slightly 
higher 
number 
baseline 
all 
platforms 
given the lack 
of  fines  for 
online 
platforms 
the baseline. 

than 
for 
online 

in 

Same as A3b. 

Same as A3b. 

85 

 
 
increase 
in 
revenues  was 
observed.   

Public sector 

Trend 
concerning  
court 
cases 
higher  than  in 
the  baseline  in 
the 
short-
medium term. 
Costs 
for 
Member  States 
the 
to  assign 
certifying 
institution, 
develop 
procedure, 
conduct 
certification. 
Establishment 
of 
new 
institutions  not 
expected.   
Additional 
EUR 
726 
million  –  EUR 
billion 
1.95 
compared 
to 
the baseline 

the 

Cost of 
adapting the 
legal 
framework 
higher than 
under A3a or 
A3b 
Number of 
court cases 
higher than 
under A3b, 
because the 
number of 
platforms 
affected is 
higher 

Same as A3b 

Costs to the Member 
States  to  revise  their 
legal frameworks for 
implementing 
the 
rebuttable 
presumption 
The number of court 
cases 
concerning 
misclassification 
will  be  higher  than 
the  baseline  in  the 
to  medium 
short 
the 
term; 
number 
will 
decrease 

then 

to 

Costs 
of 
adapting  the 
legal 
framework 
roughly 
similar 
A3a 
of 
Number 
cases 
court 
than 
higher 
under  A3a, 
the 
because 
number 
of 
platforms 
affected 
higher  

is 

Additional  EUR 928 
million  –  EUR  2.64 
billion  compared  to 
the baseline 

1.67 
to 
3.98 

Additional 
EUR 
billion 
EUR 
billion 
compared  to 
the baseline 

Administrative 
costs  for  the 
public sector 

Several  FTEs 
for  the  EC  to 
develop 
the 
guideline  and 
ensure 
to 
further 
monitoring 
and update.  

Limited,  but 
above 
the 
baseline 
trend,  in  the 
medium 
to 
long term 

in 

EUR  1.6  billion 
3.7 
- 
EUR 
billion 
tax 
contributions 
from  people  at 
risk 
of 
misclassification 
in 
(or 
those 
main 
platform 
work concerning 
the  lower-bound 
estimate) 

tax 
social 

Increased 
and 
protection 
contributions 
due 
to 
reclassification 

Facilitation for 
tax  authorities 
labour 
and/or 
to 
inspections 
and 
detect 
pursue cases of 
false 
self-
employment 

Same as A3a 

Same as A3b 

Some 
facilitation, 
but  we  would 
expect 
not 
this 
that 
option  will 
significantly 
the 
increase 
number 
of 
cases  pursued 
decrease 
or 
the workload  

Some 
facilitation,  but 
not  significant 
enough  to  lead 
either 
to 
of 
increase 
decrease 
in 
terms  of  FTEs 
at 
these 
institutions 

clarity 

to 
to 
platform 

More 
authorities  how 
oversee 
work. 
resources 
Extra 
might  be  needed  in 
order  to  carry  out 
and  conclude 
the 
increased  number  of 
inspections. 

Table 2: Summary of social impacts of options under Policy Area A 

Impact 
Number of people 
at risk of 
misclassification  

Baseline 

Estimated 
5.51 million 
people in total 
(see Table 10) 

A1 

A2 

A3c 

A3b 

A3a 
The issue of misclassification resolved through a) employing people working through 
platforms; b) other outcomes (incl. retain current status, genuine self-employment, no 
longer working through platforms, better social protection or working conditions in self-
employment); c) ensuring that people working through platforms are genuine self-
employed. Under each option, a combination is expected (Note: more people within the 
‘Other’ category may become genuine self-employed, in addition to what’s indicated under 
(c), however data is not sufficient to make a more precise estimate)   
a) 1.72 – 4.1 
a) No 
million people 
change 
b) 24.19-26.56 
from the 
million people 
baseline in 
c) Up to 3.78 
the short 
million people 
term; 
above the 
baseline in 
medium to 
long term 
c) Up to 
2.25 

a) 0.57 - 1.54 
million people 
b) 26.74 – 27.71 
million people 
c) Up to 2.25 
million people* 

a) 0.82-2.35 
million people 
b) 25.94-27.46 
million people 
c) Up to 1.52 
million people* 

a) 1.72 – 4.1 
million people 
b) 24.19-
26.56 million 
people 
c) Up to 3.78 
million people 

86 

 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Income, social 
protection and 
working time of 
people working 
through 
platforms 

The self-
employed are 
not eligible 
for minimum 
wage, paid 
leave; they 
are to cover 
their working 
tools and 
protective 
materials. 

million 
people* 

Similar to 
A3b.  

Increased net 
wages to 
workers EUR 83 
million to EUR 
239 million per 
year 

Benefits for reclassified workers: lower income unpredictability and variability during low- 
and high-demand periods; paid holidays; shift of social contributions onto the employer and 
fuller social insurance coverage; coverage of expenses on work equipment and protective 
gear.  
Costs for reclassified workers: lower flexibility and autonomy, fewer options for multi-
homing. 
Benefits people working through platforms who become genuine self-employed: less 
control by platforms, ability to set working time and pay rates.  
Costs (indirect) for those who do not have employment contract with the platform company: 
platforms may prioritise orders to people under the employment contract; platforms sub-
contract work agencies, which may decrease the income of people working through 
platforms; ability to set rates might lead to the ‘race to the bottom’.   
Increased net 
Limited, 
wages to workers: 
but above-
EUR 203 million 
zero 
- 484 million per 
benefits in 
year. 
the 
The value of paid 
medium to 
leave for those 
long term. 
reclassified: EUR 
349 - 830 million 
per year   
Compensation for 
the costs of 
COVID-19 
protective 
materials for on-
location workers: 
EUR 42 million – 
EUR 121 million 
per year. 
One-off benefit 
for delivery 
workers: high 
visibility vest and 
helmet: EUR 73.2 
million.  

Value of paid 
leave in for those 
reclassified: 
EUR 173 million 
– EUR 411 
million per year 
Compensation 
for the costs of 
COVID-19 
protective 
materials for 
reclassified on-
location 
workers: EUR 
42 million – 121 
million per year. 
An additional 
one-off benefit 
for delivery 
workers in terms 
of a high-
visibility vest 
and helmet, 
valued at EUR 
73.2 million. 

Increased net 
wages to 
workers EUR 82 
million to EUR 
221 million per 
year 
Value of paid 
leave in for 
those 
reclassified: 
EUR 173 
million – EUR 
411 million per 
year 
Compensation 
for the costs of 
COVID-19 
protective 
materials for 
reclassified 
delivery and 
ride-hailing 
workers: EUR 
37 million – 104 
million per year. 
An additional 
one-off benefit 
for delivery 
workers in terms 
of a high-
visibility vest 
and helmet, 
valued at EUR 
73.2 million. 
For at least 1.5 - 
2.47 million 
people: better 
working 
conditions or 
social protection 
in self-
employment 

Situation related 
to health and 
safety, to which 
the employment 
status and 
platform 
practices 
contribute 

Costs of 
estimated 
number of 
additional 
road accident 
fatalities 
linked to ride-
hailing in EU-
27: EUR 
478.1 million 
– EUR 2.05 
billion per 
year 

Limited, 
but above-
zero 
benefits in 
the 
medium to 
long term 

Higher benefits 
compared to A1 
due to higher 
level of 
reclassification. 
Mostly in the 
low-skill 
transport and 
delivery work. 

Higher benefits 
compared to A2 
due to higher 
level of 
reclassification. 
Mostly in the 
low-skill on-
location type of 
platform work 

Higher benefits 
compared to A3a 
due to higher 
level of 
reclassification. 
Mostly in the 
low-skill on-
location type of 
platform work 

Similar to 
A3b 

87 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Possibility of 
flexible work to 
earn (additional) 
income and to 
work through 
several platforms 
simultaneously 

The monetary 
costs of fatal 
and non-fatal 
accidents at 
work of the 
people 
working 
through 
platforms in 
EU-27 could 
reach EUR 20 
billion per 
year. 
Majority 
people 
working 
through 
platforms 
have another 
job; also for a 
majority, an  
opportunity to 
earn extra 
income 
without 
commitment 
to platforms 
or clients was 
moderately to 
strongly 
important 

Loss of opportunities of sporadic/ marginal platform work, as platforms reduce the number 
of people working through them after reclassification or discontinue their operations, or 
prioritise orders to workers on employment contracts. For reclassified on-location workers: 
loss of opportunities to work through more than one platform at the same time, although 
non-simultaneous work through several platforms will remain possible. Because of this, 
low-skill on-location workers are likely to be more affected than people working through 
platforms online. 

No 
negative 
change 
from the 
baseline  

Up to 2.25 
million people 
among those 
who are 
potentially 
misclassified 
will become 
genuine self-
employed  

Up to 1.52 
million people 
who are 
potentially 
misclassified 
will become 
genuine self-
employed 

Up to 3.78 million 
people who are 
potentially 
misclassified will 
become genuine 
self-employed 

Up to 3.78 
million people 
who are 
potentially 
misclassified 
will become 
genuine self-
employed 

Table 3: Summary of economic impacts of options under Policy Area B 

Impact 

Baseline 

B1 

B2a 

B2b 

Costs to 
platforms 

Administrative 
costs to adapt 
to different EU 
regulations 
slightly higher 
than in the 
baseline 

Platforms 
benefit since 
algorithms 
allow them to 
efficiently 
manage large 
forces, yet 
different 
requirements 
regarding 
algorithmic 
transparency 
across various 
EU MS entail 
costs. 

Not possible to 
estimate the cost 
of providing 
more 
transparency 
without precise 
information on 
what platforms 
would be 
required to 
disclose. 
Cost per 
consultation 
with workers’ 
representatives 
estimated at 
EUR 67.36 for 
each platform 
(assuming one 
manager attends 
the 
consultation), or 
EUR 2,896 
combined for all 
platforms that 
currently 
employ workers. 
The cost of 
ensuring human 
oversight/review 
of significant 
decisions taken 
by algorithms, 
providing 
written 

Same as B2a 
regarding 
transparency 
requirements. 
Cost per 
consultation with 
workers’ 
representatives same 
as B2a, but the 
combined cost for 
all affected 
platforms is EUR 
34,758. 
The cost of ensuring 
human 
oversight/review of 
significant decisions 
taken by algorithms, 
providing written 
explanations of 
these decisions, and 
internal complaint-
handling procedures 
would vary similarly 
as in B2a, but the 
cost across 
platforms would be 
higher than in B2a 
because more 
platforms would be 
affected. 
The cost of risk 
assessment could be 
substantially higher 
than in B2a given 

B3b 
(portability 
element only) 
Overall cost 
would be much 
greater than 
B3a given a 
much larger 
number of 
platforms that 
would have to 
become 
interoperable.  

B3a 
(portability 
element only) 
Not possible to 
estimate the 
costs, but they 
would be 
substantial 
given that it 
took three years 
to get six 
platforms to 
contribute to the 
Data Transfer 
Project cited 
above. 

88 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
explanations of 
these decisions, 
and internal 
complaint-
handling 
procedures 
could vary 
substantially for 
each platform 
depending on 
whether it 
already has any 
complaint 
handling 
procedures and 
how many 
people work 
through the 
platform. 
Not possible to 
estimate the 
precise cost of 
conducting a 
risk assessment, 
but the cost 
would be rather 
small for 
platforms that 
employ workers 
assuming that 
the assessment 
regarding risks 
from 
algorithmic 
management 
could be 
integrated into 
the overall OSH 
assessment.One-
off cost to 
develop a 
communication 
channel: 
EUR 6,000-
35,700 per 
platform; 
EUR 258,000-
1.5 million for 
all platforms 
combined. 
Recurring cost 
to maintain the 
communication 
channel: 
EUR 1,500-
8,925 per 
platform per 
year; 
EUR 64,500-
382,775 per 
year in 
maintenance 
costs for all 
platforms 
combined. 

Limited costs to 
public 
authorities. No 
new institutions 
envisioned. 

Costs/ 
benefits to 
public 
authorities 

Costs/ benefits 
not possible to 
estimate 
because of the 
non-binding 
nature of the 
instrument and 
long causal 
chain 

that platforms 
currently do not 
perform OSH risk 
assessments for the 
self-employed. 
One-off cost to 
develop a 
communication 
channel: EUR 3.1-
18.4 million for all 
platforms combined;  
Recurring cost to 
maintain the 
communication 
channel: EUR 
774,000-4.6 million 
for all platforms 
combined. 

Limited costs to 
public authorities. 
No new institutions 
envisioned. 

Limited costs to 
public 
authorities. No 
new institutions 
envisioned. 

Limited costs 
to public 
authorities. No 
new institutions 
envisioned. 

89 

 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Summary of social impacts of options under Policy Area B 

Impact 

Baseline 

B1 

B2a 

B2b 

B3a (portability 
element only) 

B3b 
(portability 
element only) 

People gaining new rights with respect to the practices of algorithmic management in their work.  
<24.11 million 
0.86 – 2.05 
people 
million 
people 

<28.29 million 
people 

0.96 to 2.01 
million people 

1.72 – 4.01 
million people 

People 
exposed to 
algorithmic 
management 

A total of 
72.48 million 
- 101.05 
million 
people 
exposed to 
algorithmic 
management 
processes at 
their place of 
work (main or 
secondary) at 
least to some 
extent. Up to 
28.29 million 
of them are 
people 
working 
though 
platforms. 
There is 
currently a 
lack of 
clarity, 
transparency 
and platform 
accountability 
related to 
such working 
conditions.  

Table 5: Summary of economic and social impacts of options under Policy Area C 

Impact 
Administrative costs 
to platforms 

Baseline 
No administrative costs. 

C1 
Same as baseline. 
.  

Negligible 

Negligible 

Impacts on 
consumers, 
traditional 
businesses, and the 
economy at large 

C2 
Estimated total one-off 
cost per platform: 4 x 
23,07 = EUR 92.28 
Combined cost for all on-
location platforms – 92.28 
x 329 = EUR 30,360 
Estimated total one-off 
cost for online platforms – 
92.28 x 187= EUR 17,256 
Cost of updates could be 0 
if data is automatically 
linked with the feature 
(likely scenario). 
Double the costs above per 
year if manual updates are 
needed. 
Negligible 

C3 
Estimated one-off cost 
for on-location 
platforms – EUR 
105,660 
Estimated one-off cost 
for online platforms – 
EUR 299,356 
Cost of updates could 
be 0 if data is 
automatically linked 
with the feature (likely 
scenario). 
Double the costs above 
if manual updates are 
needed. 

Negligible 

Costs/ benefits to the 
public sector 

N/A 

Public sector 

Potentially 
increased 
revenues from 
social protection 
contributions, 
derived from 

Minimal costs to public 
authorities: public 
authorities monitor 
whether platforms publish 
the information requested 
and enforce the publication 

 Millions or thousands 
of EUR for a register, 
which will collect 
information on up to 
100 platforms per 
country. 

90 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
requirement if platforms 
do not comply. 

better compliance 
with employer’s 
obligations, 
depending on 
options under 
Policy Area A.  

Benefits 

Costs 

Social impacts for people working through platforms 

Member States may not 
always be aware of 
platform work being done 
by people residing within 
them, because its cross-
border nature allows for 
information concealment. 
People working through 
concerned platforms may 
therefore not have 
adequate access to social 
protection and labour 
rights. 
N/A 

People doing 
cross-border 
platform work as 
workers will have 
more adequate 
access to social 
protection and 
labour rights, 
according to the 
national rules of 
the Member State 
they work in. 

Additional information on digital labour platforms and 
people working through them will strengthen the role 
of labour inspectorates and other public authorities 
and allow better policymaking and implementation. 
This, in turn, is likely to have several indirect positive 
effects on people working though platforms, including 
improved working conditions due to enhanced 
oversight of platform work, and greater transparency 
on the numbers of people working through platforms 
and their working conditions. 

N/A 

N/A 

91 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 Characteristics of the platforms affected by options A1 and A3c 
Platforms affected 
Type 

Online 

516 (100% of all identified platforms in a conservative estimate ) 

Services 

On-location 

Both 

Contest-based 

Delivery 

Domestic work 

Freelance 

Home services 

Medical consultation 

Microtask 

Professional services 

Taxi 

36% 

54% 

10% 

4.3% 

19.2% 

13.0% 

27.2% 

17.5% 

0.2% 

10.7% 

2.5% 

5.4% 

Countries of operation  
Origin 
Turnover 

54% operate in a single EU country only, 46% in more than one EU country 
77% originated in the EU, 23% outside the EU 
If  the  earnings  of  people  working  through  platforms  are  excluded,  data  are  available  for  132 platforms.  Of  these,  122 
(92%) had a turnover of less than EUR 50 million. 
If  the  earnings  of  people  working  through  platforms  are  included,  data  are  available  for  123  platforms.  Of  these,  86 
(70%) had a turnover of less than EUR 50 million.  

Source: CEPS dataset. 
Note:  the  services  typology  and  its  definitions  are  outlined  in  the  CEPS  study147.  The  true  number  of  platforms  affected  might  be 
higher. 

Table 7. Characteristics of platforms most affected by option A2 
Platforms affected 
Type 
Services 

127 (25% of all identified platforms in a conservative estimate) 
On-location 

Delivery 

Taxi 

78% 

22% 

Countries of operation  
Origin 
Turnover 

69% operate in a single EU country only, 31% in more than one EU country 
90% originated in the EU, 10% outside the EU 
If  the  earnings  of  people  working  through  platforms  are  excluded,  data  are  available  for  49  platforms.  Of  these,  43 
(88%) had a turnover of less than EUR 50 million. 
If the earnings of people working through platforms are included, data are also available for 49 platforms. Of these, 35 
(71%) had a turnover of less than EUR 50 million.  

Source: CEPS dataset. 
Note:  the  provisions  of  option  A2  (shift  in  the  burden  of  proof,  the  certification  procedure,  a  clarification  that  insurances,  social 
benefits and training measures voluntarily provided or paid by the platforms should not be considered as indicating the existence of 
an  employment  relationship)  apply  to  all  digital  labour  platforms,  but  the  table  describes  those  platforms  for  which  the  effects  of 
option A2 would be the costliest due to successful reclassification cases. The true number of platforms affected might be higher. 

Table 8. Characteristics of platforms affected by option A3a 
Platforms affected 
Type 

329 (64% of all identified platforms in a conservative estimate) 
84% on-location 
16% that provide both online and on-location services 

Services 

Contest-based 

Delivery 

Domestic work 

Freelance 

Home services 

Microtask 

Professional services 

Taxi 

0.30% 

30% 

20% 

9% 

26% 

2% 

3% 

9% 

Countries of operation  

70% operate in a single EU country only, 30% in more than one EU country 

147 Available online. 

92 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Origin 
Turnover 

89% originated in the EU, 11% outside the EU 
If  the  earnings  of people  working through platforms  are  excluded, data are  available  for  97 platforms.  Of these,  89  (92%)  had  a 
turnover of less than EUR 50 million. 
If the earnings of people working through platforms are included, data are also available for 95 platforms. Of these, 66 (69%) had a 
turnover of less than EUR 50 million.  

Source: CEPS dataset. 
Note:  the  services  typology  and  its  definitions  are  outlined  in  the  CEPS  study148.  The  true  number  of  platforms  affected  might  be 
higher. 

166 (32% of all identified platforms in a conservative estimate) 

Table 9. Characteristics of platforms affected by option A3b 
Platforms affected 
Type 

Online 

Services 

On-location 

Both 

Delivery 

Domestic work 

Freelance 

Home services 

Microtask 

Professional services 

Taxi 

20% 

77% 

4% 

51% 

8% 

15% 

2% 

10% 

1% 

13% 

Countries of operation  
Origin 
Turnover 

68% operate in a single EU country only, 32% in more than one EU country 
88% originated in the EU, 12% outside the EU 
If  the  earnings  of  people  working  through  platforms  are  excluded,  data  are  available  for  52  platforms.  Of  these,  47 
(90%) had a turnover of less than EUR 50 million. 
If the earnings of people working through platforms are included, data are also available for 51 platforms. Of these, 37 
(73%) had a turnover of less than EUR 50 million.  

Source: CEPS dataset. 
Note:  the  services  typology  and  its  definitions  are  outlined  in  the  CEPS  study149.  The  true  number  of  platforms  affected  might  be 
slightly higher. Only those platforms which are solely responsible for the matching process are presented in the table, even though in 
a  number  of  cases  both  the  platform  and  the  client/worker  might  be  involved.  This  is  because  platforms  solely  responsible  for 
matching arguably exercise the greatest level of control. 

Table 10. Characteristics of the platforms affected by options B1, B2b and B3b 
Platforms affected 
Type 

516 (100% of all identified platforms in a conservative estimate) 

Online 

36% 

Services 

On-location 

Both 

Contest-based 

Delivery 

Domestic work 

Freelance 

Home services 

Medical consultation 

Microtask 

Professional services 

Taxi 

54% 

10% 

4.3% 

19.2% 

13.0% 

27.2% 

17.5% 

0.2% 

10.7% 

2.5% 

5.4% 

Countries of operation  
Origin 
Turnover 

54% operate in a single EU country only, 46% in more than one EU country 
77% originated in the EU, 23% outside the EU 
If  the  earnings  of  people  working  through  platforms  are  excluded,  data  are  available  for  132 platforms.  Of  these,  122 
(92%) had a turnover of less than EUR 50 million. 
If  the  earnings  of  people  working  through  platforms  are  included,  data  are  available  for  123  platforms.  Of  these,  86 

148 Available online. 
149 Available online 

93 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
(70%) had a turnover of less than EUR 50 million.  

Source: CEPS dataset. 
Note:  the  services  typology  and  its  definitions  are  outlined  in  the  CEPS  study150.  The  true  number  of  platforms  affected  might  be 
higher. 

Table 11. Characteristics of the platforms affected by options B2a and B3a 
Platforms affected 
Type 

43 (8% of all identified platforms in a conservative estimate) 

Online 

On-location 

Both 

Delivery 

Domestic work 

Home services 

Professional services 

5% 

93% 

2% 

14% 

42% 

28% 

16% 

Services 

Countries of operation  
Origin 
Turnover 

79% operate in a single EU country only, 21% in more than one EU country 
93% originated in the EU, 7% outside the EU 
If the earnings of people working through platforms are excluded, data are available for 19 platforms. Of these, 17 (89%) 
had a turnover of less than EUR 50 million. 
If the earnings of people working through platforms are included, data are also available for 18 platforms. Of these, 13 
(72%) had a turnover of less than EUR 50 million.  

Source: CEPS dataset. 
Note:  the  services  typology  and  its  definitions  are  outlined  in  the  CEPS  study151.  The  true  number  of  platforms  affected  might  be 
higher. 

Table 12. Characteristics of the platforms affected by Policy Area C 
Platforms affected 
Type 

Online 

516 (100% of all identified platforms in a conservative estimate) 

Services 

On-location 

Both 

Contest-based 

Delivery 

Domestic work 

Freelance 

Home services 

Medical consultation 

Microtask 

Professional services 

Taxi 

36% 

54% 

10% 

4.3% 

19.2% 

13.0% 

27.2% 

17.5% 

0.2% 

10.7% 

2.5% 

5.4% 

Countries of operation  
Origin 
Turnover 

54% operate in a single EU country only, 46% in more than one EU country 
77% originated in the EU, 23% outside the EU 
If  the  earnings  of  people  working  through  platforms  are  excluded,  data  are  available  for  132 platforms.  Of  these,  122 
(92%) had a turnover of less than EUR 50 million. 
If  the  earnings  of  people  working  through  platforms  are  included,  data  are  available  for  123  platforms.  Of  these,  86 
(70%) had a turnover of less than EUR 50 million.  

Source: CEPS dataset. 
Note: the services typology and its definitions are outlined in the CEPS study152. The true number of platforms affected might be higher. 

150 Available online. 
151 Available online. 
152 Available online. 

94 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
A4.2 Territorial impacts of the policy options 

Data153 on the countries in which each platform operates also shows that most platforms are active 
in  the  Western  European  larger  countries,  as  opposed  to  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  and  small 
countries – although notable numbers of platforms are active there as well. 

Figure A. The number of platforms active in EU Member States 

Source: PPMI (2021). Based on CEPS (2021). 

It should be noted that available country-level  estimations vary notably. Given that very few EU-
level  surveys  exist  that  cover  this  topic  in  all  the  Member  States,  some  of  these  differences  also 
stem from differences in the methodology used. Although it is often hardly comparable, the figure 
below provides an attempt to group the Member States into low and high prevalence countries. 

153 De Groen W., Kilhoffer Z., Westhoff L., Postica D. and Shamsfakhr F. (2021). Available online. 

95 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure B. Prevalence of platform work in EU Member States based on different sources 

Source 

Low prevalence (0% -5%)154 

Eurobarometer, 2018 

CY,  LT,  PT,  EL,  DE,  EE,  SE, 
IT,CZ, MT 

Medium  prevalence  (5,01% 
- 10%) 
FI,  BG,  PL,  AT,  IE,  BE,  HR, 
LU, ES, DK, RO, SI, HU, NL, 
SK 

High 
10%) 

FR, LV 

prevalence 

(Over 

COLLEEM, 2018 

Huws et al, 2018 

ETUI, 2019 

2021 survey 

CZ, SK, HU, FI, FR, IT 

ES, NL, PT, IE, DE, LT, HR, 
RO, SE 

EE, NL, SE, FI, ES, AT, FR 

CZ, SI, ES, IT 

PL, BG, LV 

SK, HU 

DK, DE, FR, IT, LT, NL, PL, 
RO, ES 

Note on the reference periods: Huws et al 2018 – weekly platform work; Eurobarometer 2018 and COLLEEM 2018, ETUI 2019 – 
ever platform work, 2021 survey – platform work in 6 past moths. 

Given  that  the  Initiative  may  prompt  some  platforms  to  leave  smaller  towns  and  regions,  it  is 
important  to  understand  the  extent  to  which  platforms  operate  in  towns  and  smaller  cities.  Two 
separate data sources were combined to this end. 

First,  selected  nine  on-location  platforms  were  selected  based  on  the  large  number  of  cities  they 
operate in. These are: 

Just Eat 

  Glovo 
 
  Wolt 
  Deliveroo 
  Bolt 
  Uber 
  Free NOW 
  Taxi EU 
  Cabify 

On  their  websites,  all  these  platforms  provide  lists  of  cities  in  which  they  operate.  A  dataset  was 
created  on  this  basis,  merging  the  information  collected  through  a  desk  research  with  that  of 
publicly available World Cities database155, which provides information on the cities’ populations.  

Such a merged database shows that platforms vary greatly in terms of their activities in towns 
and  smaller  cities  (see  Table  1  below).  Only  10%  of  all  the  cities  where  Cabify  operates  have 
populations  of  up  to  100,000  people.  The  equivalent  statistic  is  83%  for  Glovo.  Across  the 
platforms selected, cities of up to 100,000 inhabitants on average comprise about half (47%) of all 
the cities where these platforms operate. It should be noted that the World Cities database does not 
include  data  on  the  population  of  699  out  of  2,191  (32%)  cities  where  the  selected  platforms 
operate. Many of them have fewer than 100,000 inhabitants. 

Table 1. Number of cities where selected platforms operate, by size of the city population 
Up to 100k 

Up to 1 mln 

Up to 1000 

Over 1 mln 

Up to 10k 

 Total 

Bolt 

0 

7 

97 

102 

15 

221 

154 Of ‘ever’ platform work. Exception is the data by Huws et al, which reported weekly platform work. However, the 
figures of at least weekly platform work seem to be over-estimated, and are higher than the incidence of “ever” platform 
work measured in other surveys.  
155 Available online.  

96 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                           
Cabify 

Deliveroo 

Freenow 

Glovo 

JustEat 

TaxiEU 

Uber 

Wolt 

0 

0 

0 

1 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

10 

0 

38 

2 

5 

2 

1 

1 

137 

6 

757 

43 

56 

65 

76 

7 

70 

11 

154 

52 

60 

79 

58 

2 

7 

7 

5 

6 

8 

14 

6 

10 

224 

24 

955 

103 

129 

160 

141 

Note: the table includes cities EU-27 for which population sizes could be identified from the World Cities database. 

Nevertheless, if it is considered that there are in general fewer large cities compared to small cities, 
it  is  clear  that  platforms  are  more  likely  to  operate  in  urban  areas.  Below,  in  Table  2,  the  same 
information as expressed in Table 1, but as a share of the total number of cities in each population 
size group. On average, the selected platforms operate in only 3% of all cities with up to 100,000 
inhabitants, but in 39% of cities with more than 1 million inhabitants. 

Table 2. Percentage of cities where selected platforms operate, by size of the city population 

Up to 1000 

Up to 10k 

Up to 100k 

Up to 1 mln 

Over 1 mln 

Bolt 

Cabify 

Deliveroo 

Freenow 

Glovo 

JustEat 

TaxiEU 

Uber 

Wolt 

0% 

0% 

0% 

0% 

3% 

0% 

0% 

0% 

0% 

0% 

0% 

0% 

0% 

1% 

0% 

0% 

0% 

0% 

2% 

0% 

2% 

0% 

13% 

1% 

1% 

1% 

1% 

27% 

2% 

18% 

3% 

40% 

14% 

16% 

21% 

15% 

75% 

10% 

35% 

35% 

25% 

30% 

40% 

70% 

30% 

Note: the table includes cities in EU-27 for which population sizes could be identified from the World Cities database. 

Furthermore,  it  is  important  to  consider  how  many  people  in  cities  of  different  size  rely  on 
platforms for income. To answer this question, people working through platforms identified in the 
PPMI 2021 survey by the city where they are based were geographically located on an EU map (see 
Figure C below).  

The  map  shows  that  most  of  the  people  who  work  through  platforms  are  concentrated  in  larger 
cities.  More  specifically,  of  the  respondents  who  provide  on-location  services  and  whose  city 
populations could be identified using the World Cities database mentioned above, 28% were based 
in cities with up to 100,000 inhabitants, while the remaining 72% were in larger cities.  

97 

 
 
  
Figure  C.  Distribution  of  people  working  through  on-location  platforms  in  the  PPMI  2021 
survey countries, in the EU 

98 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 5: Analytical methods 

A5.1: Methodology and calculations 

This annex describes the analytical methods used in the impact assessment.  

Estimation of the numbers of people working through platforms 

Estimation of the numbers of people working through platforms across the EU was complicated by 
the  fact  that,  differently  from  some  other  types  of  non-standard  work,  no  comparable  EU-level 
statistics  exist  on  the  number  of  people  engaged  in  this  type  of  labour  activity  post-pandemic, 
covering all the Member States. The relevant indicators are not measured in the EU-wide Eurostat 
surveys,  nor  collected  by  national  statistics  offices  using  comparable  methodologies.  Therefore,  a 
combination  of  sources  (and  assumptions  about  similarity  between  countries  covered  and  not 
covered by the surveys) was applied to estimate the shares of people in different types of platform 
work. 

To begin  with,  the  2021 survey of people working through platforms carried out  for  the PPMI 
study supporting this Impact Assessment156 served as the basis to estimate the prevalence rates. Its 
detailed methodology report with the considerations related to possible biases in data, is presented 
in Annex 4G157. This survey complemented earlier surveys such as COLLEEM 2017, COLLEEM 
2018  with  the  most  recent  data,  and  indicated  a  notable  growth  of  platform  work  in  view  of  the 
COVID-19  pandemic.  The  findings  of  the  2021  survey  also  indicate  that  a  large  share  of  people 
who worked through platforms in December 2020 – May 2021, started these activities in 2019-2021 
(57.7%).  If  the  COLLEEM  figures  are  viewed  using  this  new  information  (assuming  that  some 
people  who  worked  back  then  stopped  their  activities,  and  many  new  ones  started),  the  6-month 
prevalence rates of the 2021 survey seem reasonable.  

The  country  selection  for  the  survey  followed  a  specific  methodology,  showing  that  the  survey 
countries  represent,  on  several  indicators,  broader  regions/  clusters  of  countries  similar  in  the 
selection ciriteria (geography, use of internet, use of platforms, labour market indicators;).  

Nine countries were selected to carry out the survey in the EU. To make sure that the selection is 
representative of the  EU as a whole,  a number of indicators were considered during the selection 
The countries were then clustered based on the indicators using hierarchical cluster analysis. Ward’s 
method, using squared Euclidean distance, was applied for the grouping of cases. It minimises the 
variance  within  groups  and  maximises  their  homogeneity.  The  exercise  resulted  in  nine  clusters. 
The  size  of  the  clusters  varies:  some  include  one  country  only  (Greece)  whereas  others  include 
more  Member  States  (Cluster  2,  for  example,  includes  Denmark,  Germany,  Ireland,  Luxembourg 
and  Austria)  (for  more  details  on  the  clustering  methodology  see  the  PPMI  forthcoming  study, 
Annex  4G).  The  following  countries  were  selected,  representing  broader  geographical  regions/ 
clusters  that  they  belong  to:  Lithuania,  Denmark,  Germany,  the  Netherlands,  Poland,  Romania, 
France, Italy, Spain. 

With  the  quota  sampling  design  and  application  of  weights,  the  survey  sample  in  the  selected 
countries  technically  represents  201  million  EU-27  daily  internet  users  (out  of  total  265  million). 

156  PPMI  (2021).  Study  to  support  the  impact  assessment  of  an  EU  initiative  on  improving  working  conditions  in 
platform work. Available online. 
157 The annexes 4B, 4C, 4G mentioned in this Annex are the annexes of the above mentioned PPMI study.   

99 

 
 
                                                           
Based on that, it was assumed that the prevalence rate of the survey countries approximates the 
prevalence rate of EU-27. 

While the survey provided the data on how many people worked through platforms at least once 
during  a  period  of  six  months,  this  definition  was  too  broad  to  consider  the  numbers  of  people 
affected  by  the  initiative.  As  in  the  COLLEEM  analysis,158  data  on  frequency,  hours  and  income 
generated  from  platform  work  was  used  to  narrow  the  definition  and  categorise  the  intensity  of 
platform work activities (also see the table below): 

  Those who have provided labour services via platforms but more than a month ago159 before 
the  survey  (indicating  that  they  have  worked  less  than  once  a  month)  were  classified  as 
people in sporadic platform work. This category was not included in most of the analysis. 

  Those who worked through platforms in the month prior to the survey, but who spent less 
than 10 hours a week on platforms and got less than 25%160 of their income via platforms, 
were classified as people in marginal platform work. 

  Those who worked through platforms in the month prior to the survey,  and spent between 
10 and 19 hours per week or got between 25% and 50% of their income via platforms were 
classified as people in secondary platform work. As in COLLEEM, this category includes 
those people working through platforms who provided inconsistent information in terms of 
income and hours: those who spend more than 20 hours a week doing platform work but say 
they get less than 25% of their personal income via platforms; and those that say they get 
more than 50% of their income via platforms but say they spend less than 10 hours a week 
in platform work. 

  Those  who  provided  labour  services  via  platforms  in  the  past  month,  and  worked  through 
platforms at least 20 hours a week or got at least 50% of their income (excluding the cases 
mentioned above) were classified as people in main platform work. 

Classification of platform work by time and income (Table 1) 

Less than 10 hours a week 

Between 10 and 19 hours a 
week 
Secondary 

Marginal 

of  monthly 

Less  than 25%  of monthly 
income 
25-50% 
income 
More than 50% of monthly 
income 
No answer 
Source: Brancati, U., Pesole, A., & Férnandéz-Macías, E. (2020). 

Secondary 

Secondary 

Secondary 

Secondary 

Marginal 

Main 

More than 20 hours a week  No answer 

Secondary 

Main 

Main 

Main 

Marginal 

Secondary 

Main 

N/A 

Prevalence of each category of platform work was estimated using the weighted survey dataset, and 
was multiplied by the number of people aged 16-74161 and the share of daily internet users162 in the 
EU-27 to estimate the absolute figures of people potentially affected by the initiative. In total, over 
28  million  people  in  EU-27  have  worked  via  platforms  more  than  sporadically  between 
December 2020 and May of 2021.  

158  Brancati,  U.,  Pesole,  A.,  &  Férnandéz-Macías,  E.  (2020).  New  evidence  on  platform  workers  in  Europe.  Results 
from the second COLLEEM survey; p 15.  
159 According to Q7 of the 2021 survey. 
160 Q11 and Q51 of the 2021 survey. 
161 331,313,088, which was estimated using the Eurostat table DEMO_PJAN. 
162 As this was the target population of the survey; Eurostat [isoc_ci_ifp_fu] 

100 

 
 
 
                                                           
It  is  important  to  note  that  the  estimates  are  upper-bound  figures  based  on  triangulation  with 
available administrative data. For example, in Q2 2020, there were 141,000 micro-entrepreneurs in 
France  registered  as  working  in  transport  and  delivery  sectors.163  The  equivalent  figure  based  on 
PPMI 2021 survey data stands at 505,000 people. While the survey is likely to over-estimate people 
generating  income  through  platforms,  the  figure  based  on  administrative  data  is  likely  an 
underestimate. The true number might be higher because the figure does not take into account those 
who  are  employed  by  platforms,  or  those  who  work  through  platforms  without  registering  with 
public  authorities.  Furthermore,  the  delivery  sector  grew  substantially  during  the  pandemic.  This 
growth is captured by data reported in the survey given that it was collected in 2021, but is missing 
from  the  administrative  data.  Finally,  the  practice  of  renting  one’s  account  to  a  number  of  third-
country  nationals  is  prevalent  in  ride-hailing  and  delivery  work,  which  would  again  increase  the 
true number of people working through these platforms.164 

The prevalence of online platform work might also be overestimated because the survey was carried 
out  online.  Triangulation  with  other  sources  of  information  is  not  possible  because  other  surveys 
regarding  this  type  of  work  were  also  carried  out  online,  and  no  administrative  data  exists  to 
compare the results.  

Number of people at risk of misclassification 

Another major issue of data availability concerns the more specific question of the extent to which 
the  employment  status  of  people  working  through  platforms  is  misclassified.  Several  aspects 
contribute to this. First, determination of employment status of people working through platforms is 
in general a complicated question, which – as many cases identified in the Member States show – is 
brought  to  courts  on  individual  cases.  Therefore,  the  actual  extent  of  misclassification  is  very 
difficult to estimate. Neither EU-level, nor consistent national level data on misclassification exists. 
Moreover,  no  unified  criteria  for  determining  employment  status  exists  across  the  EU.  Individual 
Member  States  may  see  people  in  identical  employment  situations  differently  in  terms  of  their 
employment  status.  Therefore,  determining  the  possible  extent  of  misclassification  from  a  self-
administered  online  survey,  relying  on  the  respondent  self-reports,  may  not  produce  the  most 
reliable  information  even  if  a  large  number  of  indicators  is  considered.  The  impact  assessment 
therefore  applied  an  approach  to  use  a  number  of  indicators  in  the  survey  to  narrow  down  the 
numbers of people who are at risk of misclassification: 

  To begin with, these are the people who work through platforms more than sporadically 
(including  both  paid  and  unpaid  working  time).165  It  is  then  broked  down  by  narrower 
categories defined above, for which the Policy Options may have different impacts.  

  Furthermore,  some  sectors  (or  types  of  work)  in  the  labour  platform  economy  are  more 
likely to face the issues of misclassification than others. This especially concerns low-skill, 
on-location  work  (the  so-called  app-work,166  more  specifically),  such  as  ride-hailing, 
delivery services. The estimated number of people in these sectors is around 2.8 million in 

163  The  figure  relates  to  those  administratively  active.  Urssaf  (2021).  Auto-entrepreneurs,  par  secteur  d'activité. 
Available online. 
164  Alderman,  Liz  (2019).  Food-Delivery  Couriers  Exploit  Desperate  Migrants  in  France.  The  New  York  Times. 
Available online. 
165  This  threshold  allows  us  to  avoid  inflating  the  numbers  of  people  actually  working  though  platforms,  which,  as 
explained above, tends to be overestimated in the one-off, online surveys. 
166 Duggan, J., Sherman, U., Carbery, R., & McDonnell, A. (2020).  Algorithmic management and app‐work in the gig 
economy: A research agenda for employment relations and HRM. Human Resource Management Journal, 30(1), 114-
132.  

101 

 
 
                                                           
the  EU-27.  However,  different  considered  Policy  Options  may  affect  different  types  of 
platform work, so the table below (and the following tables) lists estimations for each.  

Estimated numbers of people working through platforms in EU-27, by type and intensity of 
work (Table 2) 

Low-skill on-location 
…of these transportation or delivery 
High-skill on-location 
Low-skill online 
High-skill online 
Total 
Source: estimations based on 2021 survey.  

Main 

1,043,000 
768,000 
471,000 
1,810,000 
3,762,000 
7,086,000 

Secondary 

1,993,000 
1,370,000 
1,058,000 
4,563,000 
6,492,000 
14,106,000 

Marginal 

1,148,000 
639,000 
311,000 
3,380,000 
2,257,000 
7,096,000 

Total 

4,184,000 
2,777,000 
1,840,000 
9,753,000 
12,511,000 
28,288,000 

  Survey respondents were grouped into the four categories (low-skill on-location; high-skill 
on-location;  low-skill  online;  high-skill  online)  using  the  following  mapping.  The  main 
criterion  regarding  assignment  to  high-skilled  work  was  whether  any  schooling  or  formal 
training was required to carry out the tasks. Respondents indicated tasks in Q2 ‘What type 
of web-based remote services have you provided via online platforms since December 
1, 2020?’ as well as Q3 ‘What type of on-location services have you provided via online 
platforms  since  December  1,  2020?’.  If  tasks  from  more  than  one  category  (low-skill 
on-location;  high-skill  on-location;  low-skill  online;  high-skill  online)  were  selected, 
respondents were then shown Q4 ‘Which of the following types of work via platforms did 
you  engage  in  most  often  since  December  1,  2020?’,  with  answer  options  being  the 
tasks  they  selected  in  the  two  previous  questions.  This  question  was  used  to  decide 
which category of work they should be assigned to.   

Mapping  of  survey  respondents  into  main  categories  of  platform  work  based  on  tasks  they 
perform (Table 3) 
Type of tasks 
Clerical and data-entry tasks  
Creative and multimedia work  
Sales and marketing support work  
Software development and technology work  
Writing and translation work  
Online micro tasks  
Other online professional services  
Transportation services  
Delivery services  
Housekeeping or other home services  
Construction and repair work  
Sports, beauty, health and wellness services  
Photography services  
Pet care  
Childcare or elderly care services  
Teaching or counselling services  
Tourism and gastronomy services  
Temporary auxiliary work  
Mystery shopper activities  

Category 
Low-skilled online 
High-skilled online 
High-skilled online 
High-skilled online 
High-skilled online 
Low-skilled online 
High-skilled online 
Low-skilled on-location 
Low-skilled on-location 
Low-skilled on-location 
High-skilled on-location 
High-skilled on-location 
High-skilled on-location 
Low-skilled on-location 
Low-skilled on-location 
High-skilled on-location 
High-skilled on-location 
Low-skilled on-location 
Low-skilled on-location 

  Although, as mentioned above, different Member States define the criteria for employment 
relationship  in  various  ways,  some  of  the  principal  indicators  aimed  at  determining 
subordination  are  mostly  consistent  (e.g.,  autonomy  or  lack  thereof  in  choosing  tasks/ 
projects, timeframes and setting costs, etc.). At the same time, however, they are difficult to 
capture,  especially  in  survey  self-reports.  Two  indicators  from  the  survey  were  therefore 

102 

 
 
 
used as proxies to determine groups of people in which subordination relationships are most 
likely:  situations  in  which  platforms  set  working  schedules  or  minimum  work  periods;167 
and not being able to set one’s own price rates.168 It was also assumed that platforms set pay 
rates  for  all  people  who  work  through  transportation  and  delivery  platforms  based  on  the 
observed business practices. Estimations of the size of this group, based on the 2021 survey 
data, are presented by type and intensity of platform work in the table below.  

Estimated numbers of people working through platforms who cannot set their schedules and 
pay rates in EU-27, by type and intensity of work (Table 4) 

Main 

Low-skill on-location 
…of these transportation or delivery 
High-skill on-location 
Low-skill online 
High-skill online 
Total 
Source: estimations based on 2021 survey. *Estimates are based on a small sample size.  

764,000 
574,000 
59,000 
402,000 
497,000 
1,723,000 

Secondary 
Marginal 
1,244,000 
967,000 
280,000* 
847,000 
1,414,000 
3,785,000 

& 

Total 

2,008,000 
1,541,000 
339,000* 
1,249,000 
1,911,000 
5,508,000 

It is important to note that the criteria listed above, and resulting figures denote the groups of people 
in different modes of platform work, within which misclassification is more likely. In other words, 
not  all  the  people  who  fall  within  this  group  may  be  misclassified,  because  it  depends  both  on 
national legislation and actual circumstances of specific employees. Nevertheless, these criteria are 
a  useful  proxy  for  estimating  the  possible  upper  limit  of  the  numbers  of  people  at  risk  of 
misclassification.  

Baseline projections 

The  baseline  projections  on  the  growth  of  the  platform  economy,  numbers  of  platforms  and 
numbers  of  people  working  through  platforms  were  based  on  the  available  data  including 
observations from two or more points in time: 

  Data  on  the  numbers  of  active  online  and  on-location  platforms  in  the  EU  covering  the 
period of 2003-2020, coming from the database of the project ‘Digital Labour Platforms in 
the EU: Mapping and business models’. 

  Data on the size of the digital labour platform economy covering the period of 2016-2020 
from the database of the project ‘Digital Labour Platforms in the EU: Mapping and business 
models’. 

  Administrative  tax  data  on  micro-entrepreneurs  in  the  transport  sector  in  France  in  2015-
2020, and on ride-hailing service providers in Lithuania in 2016-2020 (as such reliable data 
was available on the transportation sector only, the projections for on-location platforms and 
people working through them were limited to this sector).  

  Data on online platform labour supply from EU-27 workers in 2017-2021 from the Online 

Labour Index.169 

  Estimates  on  the  numbers  of  people  engaging  in  platform  work  of  various  frequency/ 
intensity,  based  on  the  COLLEEM  I  (2017),  COLLEEM  II  (2018)  and  2021  survey 

167 Q15 ‘Do the following statements apply to your overall experience of working via the platform  [indicated in 
Q6]?’, option ‘The platform set my working schedules and/or minimum work periods’ selected as ‘Yes’.  
168 Q15 ‘Do the following statements apply to your overall experience of working via the platform [indicated in 
Q6]?’, option ‘I could set the prices for my work/ services provided via the platform’ selected as ‘No’. 
169 Available online. 

103 

 
 
 
                                                           
conducted  for  this  impact  assessment.  The  detailed  methodology  of  these  estimates  is 
provided in the previous section of this annex.  

For  the  projections  in  the  number  of  people  working  through  platforms,  linear  equations  were 
applied using Trendlines function in MS Excel.  The assumptions behind this decision were based 
on the observable trends of globalisation, digitalisation and labour market transformation (described 
in Annex 12) that have driven the expansion of platform work so far and are expected to continue. 
These megatrends were already present during the time period (1985-2020) which was used when 
analysing temporary work agency jobs, and similarly pointed to the slowing in the growth of such 
jobs.  These  lessons  learned  were  incorporated  in  the  process  of  projecting  the  number  of  people 
working through platforms. 

These  projections  are  aligned  with  the  ones  produced  for  the  impact  assessment  of  the  upcoming 
initiative  on  collective  representation  for  the  self-employed.  However,  they  do  differ  slightly, 
because the initiative on collective representation of the self-employed disregards people for whom 
platform  work  is  a  marginal  activity,  as  defined  above.  They  argue  that  these  people  would  not 
engage in collective bargaining even if they had collective bargaining rights, hence including them 
in  the  impact  assessment  may  exaggerate  the  impacts  of  their  initiative.  Our  scope,  meanwhile, 
includes  people  who  work  through  platforms  in  a  marginal  way  because  they  will  fall  under  the 
scope of this initiative and are likely to experience its effects. 

Meanwhile, projections in the growth of the number of platforms were modelled using polynomial 
equations  as  they  maximised  the  R2  and  the  resulting  trend  better  reflects  the  slowdown  in  the 
proliferation of platforms observed in recent years.170Overall, forecasting using trendlines has been 
used in the literature when historical data about the variable of interest is available, showing that it 
can  produce  reliable  results  in  the  short-term.171  Nevertheless,  it  is  important  to  note  that  the 
trendline  approach  is  somewhat  less  reliable  in  the  medium  and  long-term.172  Taking  this  into 
account  as  well  as  the  years  for  which  historical  data  are  available,  the  forecasts  regarding  the 
growth in the number of platforms are limited to 2030. It is important to note that forecasts are more 
reliable in the near future.  

Number of people affected by each Policy Option of Policy Area A 

The  key  problem  Policy  Area  A  aims  to  address  is  misclassification  of  some  people  working 
through  platforms.  Five  directions  are  possible  for  people  working  though  platforms  as  platforms 
react to options under Policy Area A: 

  People working through platforms are reclassified to employees and employed by platforms 

or through Temporary Work Agencies (TWAs). 

  People working through platforms who become genuine self-employed. 

  People working through platforms who lose the possibility of such work. 

170 The R2 value ranges from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates perfect fit. 
171  For  example,  please  see:  Razak,  Mohamad  Idham  Md,  Roaimah  Omar,  Maymunah  Ismail,  Afzan  Sahilla  Amir 
Hamzah,  Mohd  Adnan  Hashim  (2013).  Overview  of  Zakat  Collection  in  Malaysia:  Regional  Analysis.  American 
International Journal of Contemporary Research Vol. 3 No. 8; Hu YJ, Chen J, Zhong WS, Ling TY, Jian XC, Lu RH, 
Thang ZG, Tao L (2017). Trend analysis of betel nut-associated oral cancer and health burden in China. The Chinese 
Journal of Dental Research 20(2). 
172  Chambers,  John  C.,  Satinder  K.  Mullick,  and  Donald  D.  Smith  (1971).  How  to  Choose  the  Right  Forecasting 
Technique. Harvard Business Review. Available online. 

104 

 
 
                                                           
  People  working  through  platforms  as  self-employed  who  see  their  working  conditions  or 

social protection improved. 

  People  working  through  platforms  who  are  not  affected,  and  continue  working  through 
platforms under the same model as they currently do (employed, genuine self-employed, or 
bogus self-employed).  

The  main  factors  determining  to  which  group  a  person  working  through  platforms  will  fall  into 
under different Policy Options will depend on the type of work and presence of subordination to/ 
control by the platform. 

Given the nature of data that can be drawn upon for this assessment, it is possible to estimate the 
following directions: 

  People working through platforms are reclassified to employees and employed by platforms 

or through TWAs (Temporary Work Agencies). 

  Other  outcomes  (incl.  retain  current  status,  genuine  self-employment,  no  longer  working 

through platforms, better social protection or working conditions in self-employment). 

  Genuine  self-employment.  (This  overlaps  partly  with  the  previous  category;  the  reason  is 
that in some cases the data allows to reason about what group of people is likely to become 
genuine self-employed, however the data is not sufficient to argue about the direction for the 
remaining  group(s)  and  this  direction  might  include  genuine  self-employment  as  well  as 
better social protection/ working conditions or leaving the platform work altogether). 

Policy Option A1: non-binding guidance 

The impacts of Policy Option A1 in terms of the numbers of people reclassified will be limited and 
in the short term will not differ from the baseline. In the longer term the effect is likely to be higher 
than zero.  

A  number  of  previous  EU  initiatives  provided  guidelines  and  recommendations  and  their 
implementation has already been monitored or evaluated. These include: 

  Council  Recommendation  of  8  November  2019  on  access  to  social  protection  for  workers 

and the self-employed.173 

  Council  Recommendation  of  15  February  2016  on  the  integration  of  the  long–term 

unemployed into the labour market.174 

  Council Recommendation of 22 April 2013 on establishing a Youth Guarantee. 
  Council  Recommendation  of  20  December  2012  on  the  validation  of  non-formal  and 

informal learning.175 

  EU Youth Strategy and the Council Recommendation of 20 November 2008 on the Mobility 

of Young Volunteers.176 

173  European  Commission  (2020).  Monitoring  of  the  Council  Recommendation  on  access  to  social  protection  for 
workers and the self-employed 
174  European  Commission  (2019)  Evaluation  of  the  Council  Recommendation  on  the  integration  of  the  long  –  term 
unemployed into the labour market. Report from the Commission to the Council. Brussels, 11.4.2019, COM(2019) 169 
final 
175  European  Commission  (2020)  Study  supporting  the  evaluation  of  the  Council  Recommendation  of  20  December 
2012 on the validation of non-formal and informal learning. Final Report. 

105 

 
 
                                                           
The  evaluations  of  these  initiatives  show  that  a  certain  number  of  Member  States177  have 
implemented a specific measure or a set of measures suggested in the recommendation document. 
In  some  cases,  the  pertinent  measures  have  already  existed  in  the  national  law  before  the 
recommendation;  in  other cases, the measures were taken after the recommendation was adopted. 
The evaluations point out that given the non-mandatory nature of the policy instrument and many 
intertwining factors, the causal links are difficult to establish. Nevertheless, the changes tend to be 
the 
most  visible 
recommendation.  In  other  words,  it  can  be  concluded  that  guidelines,  interpretation  and  similar 
elements have a sensitising effect on the stakeholders, especially in countries that previously did not 
use the suggested measures. It is very likely that after a recommendation is adopted, a number of 
Member States will use it as one of the sources for pursuing policy change. 

the  measures  suggested 

in  Member  States 

that  previously 

lacked 

in 

It  can  be  expected  that  Policy  Option  A1  would  highlight  platform  work  on  the  national  policy 
agendas  as  an  issue  area,  especially  in  Member  States  in  which  any  policy  measures  related  to 
platform work have not  been considered  yet, neither by policy makers, nor by other actors. As of 
early  2021,  the  group  of  such  countries  included  Bulgaria,  Czechia,  Cyprus,  Latvia,  Hungary, 
Poland  and  Slovakia.  In  countries  where  the  policy  or  social  partner  discussions  are  already 
ongoing, Policy Option A1 might provide more unified direction for different Member States.  

In  the  longer  term  the  effect  of  Policy  Option  A1  is  likely  to  be  higher  than  zero  due  to  the 
following reasons: 

  People  working  through  platforms  may  refer  to  the  guidelines  in  their  reclassification 
claims. Therefore, there could be a slight increase uptake of litigation by people working on 
on-location platforms.  

 

Interview  data  shows  that  digital  labour  platforms  and  policy  makers  from  the  Member 
States  would  welcome  policy  decisions  which  could  introduce  clarity  with  regard  to  the 
employment status of people working through them. Digital labour platforms would use the 
guidance  to  adjust  their  terms  and  conditions  to  make  sure  that  people  who  are  working 
through them comply as much as possible with the criteria for the genuine self-employed. 

  Table 4 indicates that around 1.52 million of people undertake high-skilled platform work in 
a  non-sporadic  way,    and  platforms  set  their  work  schedules  and  pay  rates.  This  puts  this 
group of people at risk of being misclassified. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that 
business  models  that  draw  on  the  highly  skilled  are  easier  to  combine  with  the  self-
employment status. Therefore, it is likely that guidance will be welcomed and used both by 
platforms and people working through platforms who want to make sure that their working 
relationship conforms to that of genuine self-employed. 

176  European  Commission  (2016).  Evaluation  of  the  EU  Youth  Strategy  and  the  Council  Recommendation  on  the 
mobility of young volunteers across the EU 
177  For  example,  ‘15  Member  States  have  improved  the  quality  of  their  measures  encouraging  registration  with  the 
Public  Employment  Services’:  European  Commission  (2019)  Evaluation  of  the  Council  Recommendation  on  the 
integration  of  the  long  –  term  unemployed  into  the  labour  market.  Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council.  
Brussels, 11.4.2019, COM(2019) 169 final;   European Commission (2019) Evaluation of the Council Recommendation 
on the integration of the long – term unemployed into the labour market. Report from the Commission to the Council.  
Brussels,  11.4.2019,  COM(2019)  169  final’  ‘Within  the  labour  market  (LM)  area,  validation  arrangements  were  in 
place  in  9  Member  States  in  2016…  by  2018  this  number  increased  to  18  Member  States’:  European  Commission 
(2020) Study supporting the evaluation of the Council Recommendation of 20 December 2012 on the validation of non-
formal and informal learning. Final Report. 

106 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
  Some  national  or  regional  authorities  may  use  the  interpretation  and  guidance  alongside 
examples  from  other  Member  States  (such  Riders’  Law  in  Spain)  as  sources  for  changing 
their policies in the direction which assumes that certain business models are incompatible 
with  the  self-employment  status.  In  the  medium  or  long  term  this  will  lead  to  a 
reclassification of a certain number of people working through platforms. This trend is most 
likely  to  affect  the  ride-hailing  and  food  delivery  sectors  due  to  high  level  of  control 
exercised by the platforms. The extent of reclassification is impossible to estimate because 
of the long causal chain and multiplicity of intertwining factors.  

Summary effects of A1 concerning the employment of people working through platforms  
High skill on-location 

Low-skill on location 

High-skill online 

Low-skill online 

(i) Employed after 
reclassification  
(ii) Other outcomes (incl. 
retain current status, 
genuine self-employment, 
no longer working through 
platforms, better social 
protection or working 
conditions in self-
employment)* 

(iii) (within ii) People at 
risk of misclassification 
who become genuine self-
employed* 

No change from the baseline in the short term, above the baseline in medium to long term 

No change from the baseline in the short term. In the longer term, the number of people at risk of misclassification is 
likely to decrease due to reclassification or genuine self-employment. 

People who are currently at risk of being misclassified will have their working arrangements revised and clarified so 
that they become clearly genuine self-employed. This will be pertinent to at least 2.25 million high skilled online and 
on-location people working through platforms who are currently at risk of being misclassified. 

* More people within the ‘Other’ category may become  genuine self-employed, in addition to what’s indicated in the 
line iii, however data is not sufficient to make a more precise estimate.   

Policy Option A2: Shift of burden of proof and measures to improve legal certainty 

Policy  Option  A2  would  introduce  procedural  facilitations,  both  for  misclassified  self-employed 
people  working  through  platforms  to  challenge  their  employment  status  and  for  digital  labour 
platforms to ascertain the correct employment status for a given business model. 

It is assumed that in response to Policy Option A2: 

  Some on-location platforms (particularly in ride-hailing and delivery sectors) will change to 

an employment model, employing workers either themselves or through TWAs.  

  Some  platforms  will  provide  real  autonomy  to  the  self-employed,  although  this  is  a  less 
viable  option  for  many  platforms  with  stronger  algorithmic  management,  necessary  for 
efficient provision of services.  

  The clarification that certain benefits for workers provided by platforms will not be used as 
indicators  of  an  employment  relationships,  meanwhile,  is  likely  to  improve  the  working 
conditions and social protection of the self-employed on platforms.  

  Few  on-location  platforms  under  the  pressure  to  reclassify  their  workers  (e.g.,  after  court 

rulings) will apply a dual model. 

  Very few online platforms might start using (on-demand) employment contracts, most likely 
through TWAs.  An example could  be the case  of Upwork in  California,  where they use a 
third-party payroll company providing employment contracts, allowing to comply with the 
ABC Test. 

People who will be mostly affected by Policy Option A2 are likely to be the ones who are already 
more likely to turn to courts with cases related to employment status and its misclassification. These 

107 

 
 
 
 
are,  first  of  all,  people  working  through  ride-haling  and  delivery  platforms.  The  estimated 
number of people working in these occupations across the EU as their main, secondary or marginal 
activity is up to 2.78 million (see Table 2). However, the characteristics of workers who are more 
likely  to  turn  to  courts  and  be  reclassified  includes  subordination  (or  control  exercised  by  the 
platforms). In ride-hailing and delivery sector, this figure  is up to 1.54 million (see Table 4). The 
estimate  of  1.54  million  is  very  much  an  upper  limit.  It  is  much  more  likely  that  reclassification 
decisions will be initiated by and affect those people for whom platform work is the main activity. 
This constitutes around 0.57 million people (Table 4).  

Clarification  regarding  voluntarily  funded  insurances,  social  benefits  and  training  measures  will 
prompt some platforms to improve the social protection and career opportunities also of some self-
employed  people  working  through  platforms.  In  the  interviews,  several  platforms  (such  as  Bolt, 
Wolt, Delivery Hero, Free Now and others) expressed that the current lack of clarity prevents them 
from  presenting the people working through them with  a better set of benefits.  More specifically, 
they are concerned that provision of such benefits could become an argument for the existence of an 
employment relationship in reclassification cases. The clarification would help solve this problem, 
provided  it  is  accepted  and  interpreted  consistently  across  the  EU  by  the  courts.  Overall,  the 
working conditions and social protection may improve for large number of people working through 
platforms.  It  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  those  most  likely  to  be  affected  are  low-skilled  on-
location  people  in  main  or  secondary  platform  work  (Table  2).  This  leaves  out  people  in 
marginal platform work as people might be expected to work a certain amount of time in order for 
the benefits to become applicable. Therefore, the total number of people concerned is 3.04 million. 
Given that, as explained in the previous paragraph, 0.57 to 1.54 million of such people are likely to 
be  reclassified,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  range  of  people  for  whom  the  working  conditions  and 
social protection is likely to improve, is 1.5 to 2.47 million people.178    

Similarly to Policy Option A1, it could be assumed that policy instruments under option A2 will be 
used  by  platforms  to  ascertain  that  people  working  through  them  are  genuine  self-employed.  For 
example,  platforms  may  consult  with  the  certifying  authorities  or  use  precedents  set  by  the 
certifying  authorities  to  align  their  terms  and  conditions  with  the  criteria  for  genuine  self-
employment  and  then  apply  to  get  the  certificate.  This  could  affect  at  least  the  high-skilled  on-
location  and  online  people  (2.25  million,  see  Table  4)  who  are  currently  at  risk  of  being 
misclassified,  because  the  business  models  that  draw  on  the  highly  skilled  are  easier  to  combine 
with the self-employment status.179  

Summary  effects  of  A2  concerning  the  employment  of  people  working  through  platforms 
(Table 5) 

Low-skill on location  High skill on-location 

Low-skill online 

High-skill online 

Total 

(i) Employed after 
reclassification  
(ii) Other outcomes 
(incl. retain current 
status, genuine self-

0.57 – 1.54 million 

0 

0 

0 

0.57 – 1.54 million 

178  The  lower  estimate  is  not  fully  consistent,  because  the  subtraction  3.04  –  1.54  includes,  within  1.54  people  in 
secondary as well as marginal platform work. The sample size is not sufficient to differentiate between these categories 
in .   
179 For example, the tasks implemented are much more diverse than those implemented by low qualification online and 
on-location people; the highly qualified also tend have more independence and much more direct relationship with their 
customers and clients. 

108 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
employment, no 
longer working 
through platforms, 
better social 
protection or working 
conditions in self-
employment)* 
(iii) (within ii) People 
at risk of 
misclassification who 
become genuine self-
employed* 
(iv) (within ii) Better 
working conditions or 
social protection in 
self-employment* 

2.64 - 3.61 million 

1.84 million 

9.75 million 

12.51 million 

26.74 – 27.71 million 

0 

Up to 0.34 million 

1.5 - 2.47 million 

0 

0 

0 

Up to 1.91 million 

Up to 2.25 million 

0 

1.5 - 2.47 million 

*  More  people  within  the  ‘Other’  category  may  become  genuine  self-employed  or  receive  better  social  protection  or 
working conditions, in addition to what’s indicated in the lines iii and iv, however data is not sufficient to make a more 
precise estimate.   

Policy Option A3: rebuttable presumption  

  A3a: Rebuttable presumption applying to on-location platforms. 

  A3b: Rebuttable presumption applied to platforms that exercise a certain degree of control. 

  A3c: Rebuttable presumption applying to all platforms. 

Sub-option A3a 

If rebuttable presumption is applied to on-location platforms (Sub-option A3a), it is reasonable to 
assume that:  

  This  option  would  mainly  affect  platforms  for  low-skill  jobs,  where  algorithmic 
management  is  strong,  and  subordination  of  people  working  through  platforms  to  them  is 
pronounced. On-location platforms operating as marketplaces will be only concerned to the 
extent that they exert strong control on their workers. 

  Many  on-location  platforms  will  adapt  their  business  model  to  employ  people  working 
through them, either themselves or through temporary employment agencies. While some of 
these  platforms  will  be  incentivised  by  the  signalling  effect  of  the  options,  others  will 
reclassify after lost court cases. 

  Some  large  platforms  will  implement  the  dual  strategy,  employing  workers  themselves, 
through temporary employment agencies and services contracts, in various combinations. 
  Some  platforms  may  quit  less  profitable  markets,  at  local  (e.g.,  town,  city,  region)  or 

national level. 

The impacts for people working through high-skill and through low-skill on-location platforms are 
expected to differ as currently they tend to use very different practices related to work organisation, 
client-worker matching and worker control. Low-skill on-location platforms are much more likely 
to  exert  control  or  sub-ordination  over  people  working  through  them.  Table  2  and  Table  4 
demonstrate  that  48%  of  those  doing  low-skilled  on-location  work  are  likely  to  be  at  risk  of 
misclassification; the same risk applies to 18% of those in high-skilled on-location work. It can be 
assumed  that  as  an  upper  bound  reclassification  will  apply  to  all  those  people  at  risk  of  being 
misclassified  and  who  are  working  non-sporadically  through  low-skilled  and  high-skilled  on-
location platforms (2.01 and 0.34 million respectively, Table 4). As a lower bound scenario, this 
could  only  concern  those  in  main  platform  work  (0.82  million  for  low-skill  and  high-skill 
platforms combined) as it is likely that platforms would only employ those people who work more 
hours. 

109 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Given the different business practices of low-skilled vs. high-skilled platforms, it is also reasonable 
to assume that the actual extent of reclassification for low-skilled platforms is more likely to be in 
the mid to higher range of the two bounds whereas for high-skilled platforms it will be much closer 
to the lower bound.  

In the scenario when those at risk of being misclassified (Table 4) are not reclassified as employees 
(e.g.  the  lower  bound  scenario),  they  could  either  lose  the  possibility  to  work  via  platforms 
altogether or are likely to become genuine self-employed. Notably, this is easier to do for high-skill 
on-location  platforms  compared  to  low-skill  on-location  platforms  as  the  high-skilled  platforms 
usually do not exert as high level of control over people working through them as it is the case with 
low-skilled platforms. 

Summary  effects  of  A3a  concerning  the  employment  of  people  working  through  platforms 
(Table 6) 

Low-skill on location  High skill on-location 

Low-skill online 

High-skill online 

Total 

(i) Employed after 
reclassification  
(ii) Other outcomes 
(incl. retain current 
status, genuine self-
employment, no 
longer working 
through platforms, 
better social 
protection or working 
conditions in self-
employment)* 
(iii) (within ii) People 
at risk of 
misclassification who 
become genuine self-
employed* 

0.76 - 2.01 million 

0.06 - 0.34 million 

0 

0 

0.82 – 2.35 million 

2.18 – 3.42 million 

1.50 – 1.78 million 

9.75 million 

12.51 million 

25.94 – 27.46 million 

Up to 1.24 million 

Up to 0.28 million 

0 

0 

Up to 1.52 million 

* More people within the ‘Other’ category  may become  genuine self-employed in addition to what’s indicated in the 
line iii, however data is not sufficient to make a more precise estimate.   

Sub-option A3b 

This Sub-option suggests applying the rebuttable presumption to platforms that exercise  a certain 
degree of control over the people working through them and the work they perform. Such control 
may,  for  instance,  consist  of  effectively  determining,  or  setting  upper  limits  for,  the  level  of 
remuneration; restricting the communication between the person performing platform work and the 
customer;  requiring  the  person  performing  platform  work  to  respect  specific  rules  with  regard  to 
appearance, conduct towards the customer or performance of the work; or verifying the quality of 
the results of the work. 

This Sub-option will affect the on-location platforms similarly to Sub-option A3a.  

The following effects on and responses from online platforms are likely:  

  A limited number of online platforms is likely to reclassify the people working through them 
–  mainly  those  which  exert  a  considerable  level  of  control  on  the  workers  (primarily 
platforms for micro-tasking). Pure marketplace-like platforms will not be affected, but other 
platforms for both highly-skilled and low-skilled work might be – as some of them do not 

110 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
operate as pure marketplaces, and do exert notable levels of control on workers, or operate 
similarly to TWAs.180  

  Some  platforms  will  change  their  Terms  &  Conditions  (T&C)  in  the  way  that  their 
relationship  with  people  working  through  them  meets  the  criteria  of  genuine  self-
employment.  This  might  be  done  by  approximating  the  pure  marketplace  model  (e.g.,  in 
terms  of  how  the  schedules  and  prices  are  set);  or  making  sure  that  platform  cannot  be 
considered the primary source of  work-related income (e.g., by setting  caps on how many 
hours can be worked or how much can be earned a month).  

  The  reclassified  EU-based  online  workers  may  face  decreasing  demand  for  their  services, 
due  to  increased  costs  and  administrative  burden.  Therefore,  only  a  small  number  of 
platforms – notably where the tasks require knowledge of local languages or access to local 
businesses  and  are  therefore  difficult  to  move  out  of  the  EU  –  will  adapt  their  business 
model  and  reclassify  workers  to  employees.  As  in  case  with  on-location  platforms,  some 
large  online  platforms  will  implement  the  dual  strategy,  employing  a  certain  number  of 
workers 
in  various 
combinations.  Other  platforms  that  want  to  avoid  litigation  and  fines,  or  for  which 
employment  would  completely  undermine  their  business  models,  will  either  go  out  of 
business or leave the EU markets. This would reduce the opportunities for self-employment 
for EU freelancers. 

through  TWAs,  cooperatives  services  contracts, 

themselves, 

The impacts  on the  online workers will vary  notably depending on the type and content of their 
work, as well as the specific platforms that they use.  

It is reasonable to assume that reclassification will concern only the people working through online 
platforms  who  are  controlled  by  the  platforms  to  a  notable  degree  and  are  at  risk  of  being 
misclassified.181 The upper limit of people working through online platforms possibly impacted by 
this  Policy  Option  is  3.16  million  across  EU-27  (low  skill  online  and  high-skill  online,  Table  4). 
Yet  given  the  very  different  level  of  control  that  low-skill  online  platforms  may  exercise  as 
compared  to  high-skill  platforms,  those  working  for  high-skill  online  platforms  and  for  whom 
platform  work  is  secondary  or  marginal  job,  are  unlikely  to  be  reclassified  in  any  circumstances. 
Therefore, as the upper bound scenario, the extent of reclassification may reach 1.75 million people 
working  through  online  platforms  (1.25  low-skilled  +  0.5  million  high-skilled).  Most  likely 
however, this is an extreme scenario. A more likely scenario is reclassification only of those in 
main platform work. This would set the extent of reclassification at 0.9 million (0.4 low-skilled + 
0.5 million high-skilled). 

Yet  even  this  number  may  turn  out  to  be  an  overestimate.  In  part,  it  is  based  on  data  from  an 
online  survey  which  is  likely  to  overestimate  the  total  number  of  people  working  through  online 
platforms  Furthermore,  this  estimate  does  not  consider  how  many  people  the  online  platforms 
would  actually  be  willing  to  employ,  as  none  of  them  could  provide  such  figures  during  the 
interviews.  Two  platforms  argued  that  they  may  cease  operations  in  Europe  in  the  case  they  are 
asked to employ people working through them. Following on this argument, it may be argued that 
only  those  platforms  for  whom  operations  in  Europe  are  essential  because  of  the  specificity  of 
service and the need for local expertise would choose to employ people after reclassification. The 
overview of the detailed skills data collected automatically from the four platforms for online work 

180 Potocka-Sionek, N. (2020). The changing nature of labour intermediation. Do algorithms redefine temporary agency 
work, New Forms of Employment, 169-190. 
181 The 2021 survey data on people working though platforms who cannot set their pay rates and schedules. 

111 

 
 
                                                           
allows  to  narrow  down  the  list  of  such  services  to:  writing  and  translation  in  EU  languages,  and 
professional services requiring knowledge of local requirements and regulations (e.g., architecture, 
legal advice, some types of engineering). According to OLI data on worker country by occupation, 
only  10%  of  European  workers  engage  in  these  types  of  work.182  Based  on  this,  it  could  be 
assumed that the figures of workers actually employed would be reduced significantly, for example 
to  around  0.04  million  and  0.05  million  in  low-skilled  and  high-skilled  online  work  respectively 
(i.e. 10% of 0.4 million low-skilled and 0.5 million high-skilled people working through platforms). 
The  remaining  people  working  through  online  workers  would  either  continue  to  work  as  genuine 
self-employed  (this  would  concern  the  majority  of  remaining  workers),  or  they  would  lose  the 
ability to work through platforms in the rare cases when they are in a subordinated relationship with 
the  platform  and  the  increased  costs  do  not  make  for  a  sound  business  case  for  the  platform  to 
continue operating in a particular Member State. The other possible outcomes (incl. retain current 
status,  genuine self-employment, no longer working through platforms,  better  social protection or 
working  conditions  in  self-employment)  would  concern  people  in  low-skilled  and  high-skilled 
online work (in Table 2) minus those potentially reclassified, which gives a range of 24.19 – 26.56 
million. 

In  line  with  the  arguments  presented  for  options  A1  and  A2,  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that 
especially for high skilled online platforms it will be quite easy to review their T&C to make sure 
that  the  status  of  people  working  through  such  platforms  is  that  of  genuine  self-employment. 
According to the 2021 survey, the number of such people is 1.91 million; taking into consideration 
the  assumed  highest  level  of  reclassification,  the  likely  number  of  genuine  self-employed  is  1.41 
million. Further, it could also be assumed that platforms will revise their Terms and Conditions so 
that low-skilled people working through platforms online (Table 4) who are not reclassified become 
genuine self-employed, which is up to 0.85 million people.      

Summary  effects  of  A3b  concerning  the  employment  of  people  working  through  platforms 
(Table 7) 

Low-skill on location  High skill on-location 

Low-skill online 

High-skill online 

Total 

(i) Employed after 
reclassification  

(ii) Other outcomes 
(incl. retain current 
status, genuine self-
employment, no 
longer working 
through platforms, 
better social 
protection or working 
conditions in self-
employment)* 
(iii) (within ii) People 
at risk of 
misclassification who 
become genuine self-
employed* 

0.76 - 2.01 million 

0.06 - 0.34 million 

0.4 – 1.25 million** 

0.50 million** 

1.72 – 4.1 million 

2.18 - 3.42 million 

1.50 – 1.78 million 

8.5 – 9.35 million 

12.01 million 

24.19 – 26.56 million 

Up to 1.24 million 

Up to 0.28 million 

Up to 0.85 million 

Up to 1.41 million 

Up to 3.78 million 

* More  people within the ‘Other’ category  may become  genuine self-employed in addition to what’s indicated in the 
line iii, however data is not sufficient to make a more precise estimate. 
** An even lower estimate of 0.04 – 0.05 million is possible following the reasoning presented above the table, yet it 
was not used for the calculation of the likely social and economic costs and benefits in the further chapters because of 
limitations to differentiate people working through online platforms by occupation using survey data.  

182 Data from 28 July 2021. Available online. 

112 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Sub-option A3c 

The  Sub-option  A3c  assumes  a  broader  and  less  specific  scope  for  the  rebuttable  presumption. 
Eventually the Member States will have to determine the definition of the platform and set criteria 
concerning the degree of control over people  working through platforms, which  would  determine 
the existence of the employment relationship. It means that: 

  Different  Member  States  may  set  slightly  different  criteria  and  thus  even  the  minimal 
threshold for applying the rebuttable presumption may differ among the Member States. 
In the medium to long term, administrative decisions and court cases will lead to a situation 
where  specific  business  models  for  which  the  rebuttable  presumption  will  apply  and  the 
number of platforms affected will be the same as under Options A3a and A3b. 

 

  However, the number of such administrative decisions and court cases  will be higher than 

under Options A3a and A3b because of the broader scope of the initiative.   

Based on this, it could be assumed that the impacts concerning the number of people affected will 
be the same as under Sub-option A3b. 

Calculation of costs and benefits for Policy Area A 

Impacts on people who work through platforms 

Benefits  related  to  income,  social  protection  and  working  time  of  people  working  through 
platforms were calculated. These, as well as other impacts presented below, rely on a number of 
assumptions: 

  All people who cannot set their schedule and pay rates would be reclassified under Option 
A3b  and  would  continue  to  be  employed  by  platforms,  unless  they  perform  high-skilled 
tasks through online platforms as a secondary and marginal occupation.183 This provides an 
upper-bound estimate of the level of impacts. Given that it may not make financial sense for 
platforms to employ people for whom platform work is a secondary or marginal occupation, 
the lower bound estimates consider only those workers for whom platform work is the main 
occupation. In reality online platforms may choose to employ an even more limited number 
of people (see the discussion  preceding  Table 8), for example, only those whose language 
skills  are  necessary  to  perform  the  tasks.  Nevertheless,  the  number  of  such  people  is  not 
possible  to  estimate  using  survey  data.  If  a  lower  share  of  people  providing  services  via 
online platforms were to be employed, the impacts on workers’ earnings, costs to platforms 
and public budgets would reduce in size. 

  People  not  making  hourly  minimum  wage  currently  will  make  minimum  wage  post-
reclassification.  The  wages  will  remain  the  same  for  those  who  already  make  minimum 
wage or more. The number of hours worked will  remain the same.  In reality, the working 
hours for the people who will be employed by platforms might increase to account for the 
fact  that  some  people  will  not  be  employed  following  reclassification.  Nevertheless,  this 
means that the effect on overall hours worked (as well as wages paid and received) will even 
out (i.e. higher number of hours for those who will be employed by platforms, zero to those 

183  The  same  assumption  applies  to  option  A3c.  For  options  A2  and  A3a,  the  sample  is  respectively  limited  to  1) 
delivery and ride-hailing platforms only; or 2) on-location platforms only, but those who cannot set their schedules and 
pay rates are still assumed to be reclassified. 

113 

 
 
 
                                                           
who  will  no  longer  work  through  platforms).  Otherwise,  platforms  would  not  be  able  to 
satisfy  the  demand  for  their  services.  Hence,  the  fluctuations  in  the  hours  worked  post-
reclassification between workers that will be employed and those who will no longer work 
through platforms are disregarded. 

  Those  people  who  sporadically  (less  than  once  a  month)  work  through  platforms  will  no 
longer  be  able  to  work  through  them.  This  is  in  line  with  the  percentages  presented  by 
platforms  in  interviews.  Impact  on  their  earnings  (and  tax  contributions)  is  assumed  to  be 
negligible  because  97%  of  the  people  working  through  platforms  sporadically  have  other 
jobs or occupations. 

  People who can set their pay rates and schedules, or who work through online platforms as a 
secondary or marginal high-skilled occupation, will continue to work through platforms as 
genuine  self-employed  in  Option  A3b.184  If  some  of  these  people  no  longer  work  through 
platforms  following  reclassification,  the  estimated  impacts  on  people’s  earnings,  costs  to 
platforms and tax contributions would respectively decrease. 

  All people currently working through platforms are assumed to be self-employed. Although 
this  is  not  the  case  in  reality  (i.e.  a  number  of  platforms,  such  as  Just  Eat  Takeaway.com 
employs part of all of their workers), the people who are employed by platforms cannot be 
reliably  identified  using  self-reported  survey  data.  Furthermore,  the  number  of  employed 
people  who  work  through  platforms  is  still  negligible  compared  to  those  who  operate  as 
independent contractors. 

Employing the assumptions outlined above, the impact on the net annual earnings of people who 
work  through  platforms  was  estimated  in  the  following  way.  First,  the  number  of  people  to  be 
reclassified under each option was estimated using survey data, taking those who cannot  set  their 
pay rates and schedules when working through platforms, with the exception of people working in 
high-skilled online work as a secondary and primary occupation. While imperfect in the context of 
all criteria that are used to establish an employment relationship, these two indicators do point to a 
level  of  subordination.  Furthermore,  considering  two  indicators  instead  of  one  provides  more 
confidence that platforms exercise a level of control over these people. The number of people to be 
reclassified  was  then  converted  to  represent  the  share  of  each  country’s  population  using  data  on 
16-74  year-olds  obtained  from  Eurostat.185  The  share  of  the  population  to  be  reclassified  was 
extrapolated  to  each  EU  country  using  the  clusters  that  were  employed  to  select  countries  to 
survey.186 This  ultimately resulted in  estimates of the number of people to  be reclassified in  each 
EU  country.  The  average  hourly  wage  of  the  people  to  be  reclassified,  median  hours  worked  per 
week and the  average number of weeks worked per  year in  each surveyed country was estimated 

184 The same assumption applies to A3c. Under A2, all people, other than those who work through delivery and ride-
hailing platforms and cannot set their pay rates and schedules, are assumed to continue working through platforms as 
genuine self-employed. Under A3a, all people, other than those who work through on-location platforms and cannot set 
their pay rates and schedules, are assumed to continue working through platforms as genuine self-employed. 
185 Eurostat table demo_pjan. 
186  only  one  country  from  a  cluster  was  surveyed,  the  reclassification  rate  from  that  country  was  applied  to  all  the 
countries in the same cluster. If more than one country from a cluster was surveyed, their average rate was applied to 
other countries in the cluster.  

114 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
using  survey  data187  and  extrapolated  to  non-surveyed  EU  countries  using  the  same  method  as 
outlined above. These variables, including the number of people to be reclassified, were multiplied 
together to arrive at the estimate of net annual earnings in each country in the baseline scenario.  

To  estimate  the  net  annual  earnings  under  Option  A3b,  the  minimum  wage188  was  assumed  for 
those people who would be reclassified under this  Option, if their estimated average hourly wage 
was less than the minimum wage of the country where they live. Annual net earnings under option 
A3b were then estimated using the same method as presented above, but with the updated average 
hourly rates. The overall impact of Option A3b on net annual rates was estimated by subtracting the 
net  annual  baseline  earnings  from  the  annual  net  earnings  estimated  under  Option  A3b.  See  the 
following  dataset  for  illustration.  Note  that  lower  bound  estimates  were  received  by  multiplying 
upper  bound  estimates  by  0.4201  –  the  share  of  people  at  risk  of  misclassification  for  whom 
platform work is  the main occupation.189 Variability  by  country  could  not  be established due to a 
limited sample size. 

The impact of Option A3c on earnings was assumed to be the same as A3b. The impacts of Options 
A2  and  A3a  were  estimated  using  the  same  methodology  as  for  A3b,  with  the  exception  that  the 
sample was limited to people working through the delivery and ride-hailing platforms only in A2, 
and all on-location platforms in A3a.  

187 Specifically, average hourly net earnings were estimated taking question Q50 ‘What is your usual total personal 
monthly income after taxes?’ and the mid-point of the range in Q51 ‘What percentage of your overall income (after 
taxes), indicated in the previous answer, usually comes from your work via online platforms?’. The median hours 
worked  per  week  were  derived  from  Q11  ‘Think  about  the  usual week that  you  have  worked  via  online 
platforms. How many hours per week did you spend searching or waiting for tasks/ work assignments, and how 
many implementing them?’, taking both hours spent searching/waiting for tasks and implementing them. The median 
(as  opposed  to  average)  value  was  chosen  because  the  distribution  of  hours  worked  per  week  was  strongly  right-
skewed. The average number of weeks worked per year was estimated using Q8 ‘How regularly have you worked via 
online platforms?’, with 2 weeks assumed for people who responded ‘I worked irregularly or occasionally, from time 
to time’; 6 weeks assumed for people who said ‘I worked regularly (once a week or more) for a period of  less than 3 
months’; and 26 weeks assumed for people who said ‘I worked regularly (once a week or more) for a period of more 
than 3 months.‘ 
188  Monthly  minimum  wages  were  taken  from  Eurostat  table  EARN_MW_CUR,  and  converted  to  hourly  rates  when 
divided  by  174,  which  is  the  yearly  average  number  of  working  hours  per  month.  No  minimum  wage  exists  in 
Denmark,  Austria,  Cyprus,  Finland,  Sweden  and  Italy,  so  the  wages  were  not  changed  for  people  in  these  countries 
when estimating the impacts of any of the options. 
189 The coefficient was 0.3725 and 0.3508 for Policy Options A2 and A3a respectively, as estimated using survey data. 

115 

 
 
                                                           
Monetisation of benefits to reclassified workers in terms of net earnings in A3b 
Country 

Annual net 
baseline 
earnings, EUR 

Average 
hourly A3b 
wage, EUR 

Annual net 
A3b earnings, 
EUR 

Reclassified 
people 

Average 
hourly 
baseline 
wage, 
EUR 

Median 
hours 
worked per 
week 

Average 
weeks 
worked per 
year 

A3b impact 
on net 
earnings, 
upper bound, 
EUR 

Austria 

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Cyprus 

Croatia 

Czechia 

Denmark 

Estonia 

Finland 

France 

Germany 

Greece 

Hungary 

Ireland 

Italy 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

Luxembo
urg 
Malta 

Netherlan
ds 
Poland 

Portugal 

Romania 

Slovakia 

Slovenia 

Spain 

Sweden 

73,216  

77,898  

91,226  

8,321  

28,268  

63,371  

36,543  

7,657  

75,939  

444,948  

823,781  

88,996  

91,451  

14.1  

12.2  

4.0  

7.3  

12.2  

4.0  

14.1  

4.0  

12.6  

12.2  

14.1  

9.0  

4.0  

39,350  

14.1  

332,552  

24,150  

16,335  

5,243  

3,178  

7.3  

4.0  

4.0  

14.1  

4.0  

243,119  

12.6  

356,884  

94,737  

251,798  

51,595  

19,280  

605,925  

4.0  

7.3  

4.0  

4.0  

4.0  

7.3  

138,301  

12.6  

23  

20  

22  

30  

20  

22  

23  

22  

24  

20  

23  

27  

22  

23  

30  

22  

22  

23  

22  

24  

22  

30  

22  

22  

22  

30  

24  

8.8  

10.3  

10.5  

12.4  

10.3  

10.5  

8.8  

10.5  

9.8  

10.3  

8.8  

11.7  

10.5  

8.8  

12.4  

10.5  

10.5  

8.8  

10.5  

9.8  

10.5  

12.4  

10.5  

10.5  

10.5  

12.4  

9.8  

208,113,569  

14.4  

212,200,280  

4,086,711  

195,130,315  

13.0  

207,242,521  

12,112,206  

84,714,763  

22,678,667  

4.6  

7.8  

97,291,530  

12,576,767  

23,948,448  

1,269,781  

70,808,856  

13.0  

75,204,132  

4,395,275  

58,847,502  

4.6  

67,584,012  

8,736,509  

103,872,716  

14.4  

105,912,457  

2,039,741  

7,110,337  

4.6  

8,165,939  

1,055,602  

225,605,982  

12.9  

231,491,102  

5,885,119  

1,114,574,562  

13.0  

1,183,758,877  

69,184,315  

2,341,567,376  

14.4  

2,387,548,566  

45,981,190  

248,239,915  

84,923,059  

9.5  

4.6  

262,824,379  

14,584,464  

97,530,749  

12,607,691  

111,851,127  

14.4  

114,047,540  

2,196,413  

906,309,202  

22,426,507  

15,168,611  

7.8  

4.6  

4.6  

957,053,559  

50,744,357  

25,755,949  

3,329,443  

17,420,545  

2,251,934  

14,901,657  

14.4  

15,194,279  

292,623  

2,950,871  

4.6  

3,388,958  

438,087  

722,281,655  

12.9  

741,122,971  

18,841,316  

331,409,888  

258,188,850  

233,825,257  

47,912,171  

17,903,459  

4.6  

7.8  

4.6  

4.6  

4.6  

380,611,052  

49,201,164  

272,644,874  

14,456,024  

268,538,992  

34,713,735  

55,025,219  

7,113,048  

20,561,409  

2,657,950  

1,651,335,774  

7.8  

1,743,794,256  

92,458,482  

410,878,668  

12.9  

421,596,779  
 Total:  

10,718,111  

483,928,059  

116 

 
 
                                         
                                
                                 
                                  
                                          
                                        
                                 
            
                                         
                                
                                 
                                
                                          
                                        
                                 
          
                                         
                                  
                                 
                                
                                             
                                          
                                   
          
                                           
                                  
                                 
                                
                                             
                                          
                                   
            
                                         
                                
                                 
                                
                                             
                                        
                                   
            
                                         
                                  
                                 
                                
                                             
                                          
                                   
            
                                         
                                
                                 
                                  
                                          
                                        
                                 
            
                                           
                                  
                                 
                                
                                               
                                          
                                     
            
                                         
                                
                                 
                                  
                                          
                                        
                                 
            
                                      
                                
                                 
                                
                                       
                                        
                              
          
                                      
                                
                                 
                                  
                                       
                                        
                              
          
                                         
                                  
                                 
                                
                                          
                                          
                                 
          
                                         
                                  
                                 
                                
                                             
                                          
                                   
          
                                         
                                
                                 
                                  
                                          
                                        
                                 
            
                                      
                                  
                                 
                                
                                          
                                          
                                 
          
                                         
                                  
                                 
                                
                                             
                                          
                                   
            
                                         
                                  
                                 
                                
                                             
                                          
                                   
            
                                           
                                
                                 
                                  
                                             
                                        
                                   
               
                                           
                                  
                                 
                                
                                               
                                          
                                     
               
                                      
                                
                                 
                                  
                                          
                                        
                                 
          
                                      
                                  
                                 
                                
                                          
                                          
                                 
          
                                         
                                  
                                 
                                
                                          
                                          
                                 
          
                                      
                                  
                                 
                                
                                          
                                          
                                 
          
                                         
                                  
                                 
                                
                                             
                                          
                                   
            
                                         
                                  
                                 
                                
                                             
                                          
                                   
            
                                      
                                  
                                 
                                
                                       
                                          
                              
          
                                      
                                
                                 
                                  
                                          
                                        
                                 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
The  benefit  in  terms  of  paid  leave  was  calculated  by  making  use  of  the  average  annual  hours 
worked  by  those  people  who  will  be  reclassified  under  Option  A3b,  estimated  using  the 
methodology presented above. An employed person gets around a month of paid holidays per year, 
and  there  are  1,920190  hours  of  paid  work  and  160191  hours  of  paid  leave  per  year,  so  each  hour 
worked generates 0.083192 hours of paid leave. The average annual hours worked by those people 
who will be reclassified were multiplied by 0.083 (the estimated hours of paid leave that each hour 
worked generates) to measure the paid leave not gained. These numbers were then multiplied by the 
number  of  people  who  will  be  reclassified  in  the  EU-27  and  their  average  hourly  wages,  and 
summed up. The estimates were produced using both the upper and lower bound ranges of people 
who will be reclassified under each option. See the dataset overleaf for the illustration. 

Benefits  related  to  the  protective  equipment  were  based  on  the  fact  that,  in  the  context  of  the 
pandemic,  the  masks  and  sanitizers  alone  could  cost  around  EUR  40193  for  a  person  per  month. 
Multiplied  by  the  number  of  people  working  through  on-location  platforms  who  would  be 
reclassified  (  0.82  million  –  2.35  million)  as  well  as  their  average  annual  working  hours  in  each 
country resulted in a monetary estimate of benefits for all workers combined. The estimate assumes 
that all people working through on-location platforms face similar expenditures regarding sanitizers 
and  delivery  platforms.
through 
and  masks 

as  do  people  working 

ride-hailing 

190 40 hours per week, 48 weeks per year.  
191 40 hours per week, four weeks pre year. 
192 160/1920 
193 Assuming a box of 50 masks, each of which is recommended for up to 4 hours of use, for EUR 15 (see here); and 1.2 
litre of hand sanitizer (3 ml per use, 20 uses per day, 20 days per month), for EUR 25 (here).  

117 

 
 
                                                           
Monetisation of paid leave benefit for reclassified workers under A3b 

Country 

Reclassified 
people 

Average 
hourly 
wage 

Median 
hours 
worked 
per week 

Average 
weeks 
worked 
per year 

Average 
annual 
hours 
worked 

Hours of 
paid leave 
generated 

Gain due to 
access to 
paid leave 
per worker 

Gain for all 
workers, 
upper 
bound, EUR 

Gain for all 
workers, 
lower 
bound, 
EUR 

Austria 

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Cyprus 

Croatia 

Czechia 

Denmark 

Estonia 

Finland 

France 

Germany 

Greece 

Hungary 

Ireland 

Italy 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

Luxembourg 

Malta 

Netherlands 

Poland 

Portugal 

Romania 

Slovakia 

Slovenia 

Spain 

Sweden 

73,216  

77,898  

91,226  

8,321  

28,268  

63,371  

36,543  

7,657  

75,939  

444,948  

823,781  

88,996  

91,451  

14.4  

13.0  

4.6  

7.8  

13.0  

4.6  

14.4  

4.6  

12.9  

13.0  

14.4  

9.5  

4.6  

39,350  

14.4  

332,552  

24,150  

16,335  

5,243  

3,178  

7.8  

4.6  

4.6  

14.4  

4.6  

243,119  

12.9  

356,884  

94,737  

251,798  

51,595  

19,280  

605,925  

4.6  

7.8  

4.6  

4.6  

4.6  

7.8  

138,301  

12.9  

23  

20  

22  

30  

20  

22  

23  

22  

24  

20  

23  

27  

22  

23  

30  

22  

22  

23  

22  

24  

22  

30  

22  

22  

22  

30  

24  

8.8  

10.3  

10.5  

12.4  

10.3  

10.5  

8.8  

201.4  

16.7  

240.6  

17,612,623  

7,399,063  

205.0  

17.0  

220.8  

17,201,129  

7,226,194  

230.5  

19.1  

88.5  

8,075,197  

3,392,390  

370.9  

30.8  

238.9  

1,987,721  

835,042  

205.0  

17.0  

220.8  

6,241,943  

2,622,240  

230.5  

19.1  

88.5  

5,609,473  

2,356,540  

201.4  

16.7  

240.6  

8,790,734  

3,692,987  

10.5  

230.5  

19.1  

88.5  

677,773  

284,732  

9.8  

236.2  

19.6  

253.0  

19,213,761  

8,071,701  

10.3  

205.0  

17.0  

220.8  

98,251,987  

41,275,660  

8.8  

11.7  

10.5  

8.8  

12.4  

10.5  

10.5  

8.8  

201.4  

16.7  

240.6  

198,166,531  

83,249,760  

310.9  

25.8  

245.1  

21,814,423  

9,164,239  

230.5  

19.1  

88.5  

8,095,052  

3,400,731  

201.4  

16.7  

240.6  

9,465,946  

3,976,644  

370.9  

30.8  

238.9  

79,435,445  

33,370,831  

230.5  

19.1  

230.5  

19.1  

88.5  

88.5  

2,137,744  

898,066  

1,445,905  

607,425  

201.4  

16.7  

240.6  

1,261,125  

529,799  

10.5  

230.5  

19.1  

88.5  

281,283  

118,167  

9.8  

10.5  

12.4  

10.5  

10.5  

10.5  

12.4  

9.8  

236.2  

19.6  

253.0  

61,513,207  

25,841,698  

230.5  

19.1  

88.5  

31,590,717  

13,271,260  

370.9  

30.8  

238.9  

22,629,525  

9,506,663  

230.5  

19.1  

230.5  

19.1  

230.5  

19.1  

88.5  

88.5  

88.5  

22,288,736  

9,363,498  

4,567,093  

1,918,636  

1,706,597  

716,941  

370.9  

30.8  

238.9  

144,734,923  

60,803,141  

236.2  

19.6  
Total: 

253.0  
177.7 

34,992,533  
829,789,128 

14,700,363  
348,594,41
3 

118 

 
 
                         
         
                     
                      
                  
                                                     
                                                                              
                                   
                             
                         
         
                     
                   
                  
                                                     
                                                                              
                                   
                             
                         
           
                     
                   
                  
                                                     
                                                                                
                                     
                             
                            
           
                     
                   
                  
                                                     
                                                                              
                                     
                                
                         
         
                     
                   
                  
                                                     
                                                                              
                                     
                             
                         
           
                     
                   
                  
                                                     
                                                                                
                                     
                             
                         
         
                     
                      
                  
                                                     
                                                                              
                                     
                             
                            
           
                     
                   
                  
                                                     
                                                                                
                                         
                                
                         
         
                     
                      
                  
                                                     
                                                                              
                                   
                             
                       
         
                     
                   
                  
                                                     
                                                                              
                                   
                          
                       
         
                     
                      
                  
                                                     
                                                                              
                                 
                          
                         
           
                     
                   
                  
                                                     
                                                                              
                                   
                             
                         
           
                     
                   
                  
                                                     
                                                                                
                                     
                             
                         
         
                     
                      
                  
                                                     
                                                                              
                                     
                             
                       
           
                     
                   
                  
                                                     
                                                                              
                                   
                          
                         
           
                     
                   
                  
                                                     
                                                                                
                                     
                                
                         
           
                     
                   
                  
                                                     
                                                                                
                                     
                                
                            
         
                     
                      
                  
                                                     
                                                                              
                                     
                                
                            
           
                     
                   
                  
                                                     
                                                                                
                                         
                                
                       
         
                     
                      
                  
                                                     
                                                                              
                                   
                          
                       
           
                     
                   
                  
                                                     
                                                                                
                                   
                          
                         
           
                     
                   
                  
                                                     
                                                                              
                                   
                             
                       
           
                     
                   
                  
                                                     
                                                                                
                                   
                             
                         
           
                     
                   
                  
                                                     
                                                                                
                                     
                             
                         
           
                     
                   
                  
                                                     
                                                                                
                                     
                                
                       
           
                     
                   
                  
                                                     
                                                                              
                                 
                          
                       
         
                     
                      
                  
                                                     
                                                                              
                                   
                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Impacts on platforms 

Number of platforms affected was estimated using the CEPS dataset.194 Only the active platforms 
were included in the estimates. The active platforms were filtered depending on each Policy Option:  

  all platforms were included in Option A1;  
  only those providing delivery and transportation services under A2;  
  all on-location platforms in A3a;  
  all platforms that pro-actively workers with clients in A3b; 
  all platforms under A3c. 

The  costs  to  platforms,  in  terms  of  higher  wages  paid  to  reclassified  workers  as  well  as 
employer  social  security  contributions  they  would  be  subject  to,  were  estimated  relying  on  the 
annual  net  earnings  of  workers described under benefits  for people working through platforms.  It 
was not possible to apply a different income tax rate for the self-employed in the analysis. Hence, 
the  considered  income  tax  rate  was  assumed  to  be  the  same  for  both  workers  and  the  self-
employed.195 

The  gross  annual  baseline  earnings  by  people  working  through  platforms  for  each  country 
separately were estimated using the following formula: 

𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 =  

𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
1 − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒

Where  the  total  tax  rate  for  the  self-employed  considers  the  income  tax196  and  social  protection 
contributions paid by the self-employed197, taking into account the share of people who do not pay 
taxes198, as per the following formula: 

𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 = (𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) ∗ 

(1 − 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑤ℎ𝑜 𝑑𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠) 

194  The  dataset  resulted  from  the  CEPS  (2021)  study  ‘Digital  Labour  Platforms  in  the  EU:  Mapping  and  business 
models,’ available online. 
195  While  there  are  sources  that  provide  information  on  the  different  income  tax  rates  paid  by  the  self-employed,  the 
information is not structured nor comparable across countries. For example, for Italy, the self-employed income tax rate 
is 24%, but various deductions or tax credits can be applied. In order to estimate the actual tax rate, the way in which 
various deductions / tax credits affect the rate would have to be taken into account for each EU Member State and for 
each  combination  of  individual  circumstances  (e.g.  taking  into  account  exemptions,  tax  rates  that  vary  by  size  of  the 
business, family composition, total income, number of children, etc.).  
196 For OECD countries, the combined central and sub-central (where applicable) income tax rate was taken from here. 
For the remaining countries, personal income tax rate was taken from here.  
197  For  OECD  countries,  taken  from  here,  including  the  consultation  of  attached  country  reports  when  needed.  For 
Germany  and  Denmark,  the  rate  was  set  to  0  following  the  information  presented  in  here  and  here;  Romania:  here; 
Bulgaria: here; Cyprus: here; Croatia: here; Malta: here.   
198 Operationalised using the question ‘Do you personally know any people who work without declaring all or part of 
their income to tax and social protection authorities’ from DG COMM (2020). Special Eurobarometer 498: Undeclared 
Work  in  the  European  Union.  Retrieved  from  here,  p.  34.  Note  that  the  Eurobarometer  also  included  a  question  on 
whether people themselves carried out any undeclared activities in the last 12 months, but the estimates were very low 
(4%  at  EU-27),  which  is  why  a  different  question  was  ultimately  chosen  to  estimate  the  rate  of  people  who  do  not 
declare part or all of their income. 

119 

 
 
 
                                                           
The  same  logic  was  applied  to  estimate  gross  annual  earnings  under  each  Policy  Option,  but  the 
total tax rate for the reclassified persons considered employer199 and employee200 social protection 
contributions instead of the contributions paid by the self-employed: 

𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒

= (𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
+ 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) ∗ 

(1 − 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑤ℎ𝑜 𝑑𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠) 

The  impact  of  each  Policy  Option  on  the  costs  to  platforms  were  derived  by  subtracting  gross 
annual  baseline  earnings  from  gross  annual  earnings  estimated  for  each  Policy  Option.  See  the 
dataset overleaf for illustration of the upper-bound impacts.  Lower-bound impacts were estimated 
by  multiplying  upper-bound  estimates  by  0.4201,  which  is  the  share  of  people  who  would  be 
reclassified under Option A3b for whom platform work is the main activity.201 

Estimation  of  non-compliance  costs  was  based  on  the  historical  precedents  and  examples  from 
some EU countries. These were compiled using the European Centre of Expertise overview of court 
decisions in the EU since 2015.202  

To  measure  the  costs  of  legal  research  to  adapt  to  the  different  rules  of  contracting  and 
employing individuals across EU-27, information from  an interview with one of the on-location 
platforms  was  used.  The  interviewed  representative  noted  that  it  took  50  hours  of  legal  research 
before  internationalisation  to  one  country  from  another.  Since  that  platform  employs  people  who 
work through it, 90% of research focused on labour law, while 10% - on civil law.  

It  was  assumed  that  a  paralegal  is  qualified  to  carry  out  such  research.  Using  the  Structure  of 
Earnings Survey, estimates were retrieved separately for men and women legal, social, cultural and 
related associate professionals working at companies of different sizes, which were then averaged 
for SMEs and larger firms. The employee was assumed to be 35 years-old, working full-time, in a 
capital  region  and  having  spent  3  years  with  the  company.  Applying  these  characteristics,  the 
average hourly rate of legal associate professionals in EU-27 is EUR 14.25.203  

Thus,  the  average  cost  for  each  platform  which  employs  workers  and  expands  to  another  EU 
country is estimated at: 50 x 14.25 = 712.5 euros per platform and per expansion to one country. 

This  estimate,  however,  is  lower-bound  because  the  interviewed  platform  conducted  additional 
research  regarding  social  protection  contributions,  yet  the  specific  number  of  hours  could  not  be 
specified.  Similarly,  the  cost  does  not  include  the  time  taken  to  update  Terms  &  Conditions,  etc. 
However, it was considered that these costs are negligible for online platforms because people all 
over the  world  can instantly sign up to  work through them, meaning that  online platforms do not 
need to consider the regulations of each country where freelancers are based. 

199 For OECD countries taken from here.; for non-OECD countries, here. 
200 For OECD countries taken from: For OECD countries, here.; for non-OECD countries, here. 
201 The coefficient was 0.3725 and 0.3508 for Policy Options A2 and A3a respectively, as estimated using survey data. 
202 Shared  with the research team by DG EMPL on  April 12, 2021. The overview  was produced as part of the study 
‘European  Centre  of  Expertise  (ECE)  in  the  field  of  labour  law,  employment  and  labour  market  policies.  Thematic 
Review 2021 on Platform work’, available online. 
203 Estimated using the Salary calculator based on the Structure of Earnings survey (2018), available online. 

120 

 
 
                                                           
In  order  to  calculate  legal  research  costs,  EUR  712.5  (recurring  costs  per  expansion  to  a  new 
country) was multiplied by the sum of EU countries in which on-location platforms that rely on a 
self-employment model operate, minus the countries where they are headquartered.   

121 

 
 
Monetisation of A3b impacts on costs to platforms, EUR 
Country 

Annual  net 
baseline 
earnings, 
EUR 

Self-
employed 
social 
protectio
n tax rate 

Incom
e 
tax 
rate 

Gross 
annual 
baseline 
earnings, 
EUR 

social 

Employe
r 
protectio
n tax rate 

social 

Employe
e 
protectio
n tax rate 

Tota
l 
A3b 
tax 
rate 

Gross 
annual  A3b 
earnings, 
EUR 

A3b  impact 
on 
gross 
earnings, 
upper 
bound, EUR 

Share 
of 
people 
who 
do  not 
pay 
taxes 

208,113,569  

195,130,315  

84,714,763  

22,678,667  

70,808,856  

58,847,502  

         0.26  

         0.21  

         0.28  

         0.16  

         0.20  

         0.21  

              -    

0.30  

0.33  

334,297,097  

0.21  

0.15  

0.44  

381,918,034  

47,620,937  

0.41  

0.41  

307,433,736  

0.27  
         0.19  

0.13  
         0.14  

0.48  

399,554,949  

92,121,213  

0.10  

0.38  

110,645,686  

0.27  

132,434,294  

21,788,609  

0.30  

0.38  

31,617,593  

0.29  

33,678,979  

2,061,386  

         0.08  

         0.08  

0.30  

0.42  

99,730,784  

0.39  

122,422,484  

22,691,700  

         0.17  

         0.20  

0.20  

0.38  

79,214,714  

0.34  
              -    

0.05  
              -    

0.36  

105,913,456  

26,698,742  

103,872,716  

0.42  

0.55  

127,860,250  

0.19  

130,371,033  

2,510,783  

0.31  

0.27  

13,307,142  

0.34  

0.36  

0.26  

403,046,323  

0.19  

0.32  

0.33  

1,660,191,47
7  

0.36  

0.02  

0.10  

0.11  

0.48  

15,800,816  

2,493,674  

0.48  

443,899,843  

40,853,520  

0.53  

2,509,275,13
6  

849,083,659  

0.31  

0.28  

3,025,841,46
1  

0.20  

0.20  

0.51  

4,895,962,81
7  

1,870,121,35
6  

Austria 

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Cyprus 

Croatia 

Czechia 

Denmark 

Estonia 

Finland 

France 

Germany 

Greece 

Hungary 

Ireland 

Italy 

7,110,337  

225,605,982  

1,114,574,56
2  

2,341,567,37
6  

248,239,915  

84,923,059  

111,851,127  

         0.33  

         0.23  

         0.17  

              -    

         0.07  

         0.18  

         0.04  

         0.24  

0.22  

0.59  

281,919,268  

0.25  

0.15  

0.38  

106,353,236  

0.17  

0.45  

0.26  

174,467,520  

0.09  

906,309,202  

0.31  

0.44  

1,308,637,57
2  

0.32  

Latvia 

Lithuania 

Luxembour
g 
Malta 

Netherlands 

22,426,507  

15,168,611  

14,901,657  

2,950,871  

         0.32  

         0.13  

         0.01  

         0.15  

         0.06  

0.26  

0.36  

35,855,857  

0.24  

0.24  

0.32  

20,143,595  

0.21  

0.39  

0.32  

20,472,910  

0.14  

0.35  

0.37  

4,307,841  

0.10  

Poland 

Portugal 

Romania 

Slovakia 

Slovenia 

Spain 

722,281,655  

0.46  

0.55  

940,366,174  

0.13  

         0.32  

         0.21  

         0.03  

         0.14  

         0.38  

         0.30  

331,409,888  

258,188,850  

233,825,257  

47,912,171  

17,903,459  

1,651,335,77
4  

0.08  

0.31  

456,104,592  

0.20  

0.29  

0.36  

379,332,467  

0.24  

0.10  

0.27  

258,341,904  

0.02  

0.16  

0.30  

60,893,278  

0.19  

0.20  

0.42  

27,086,774  

0.16  

0.27  

0.41  

2,477,130,26
1  

0.30  

0.16  

0.19  

0.04  

0.09  

0.11  

0.13  

0.11  

0.10  

0.28  

0.14  

0.11  

0.35  

0.09  

0.22  

0.06  

0.25  

352,750,560  

70,831,292  

0.31  

141,348,912  

34,995,677  

0.42  

198,006,076  

23,538,556  

0.40  

1,603,192,43
7  

294,554,864  

0.39  

42,233,471  

6,377,614  

0.39  

28,538,247  

8,394,652  

0.43  

26,718,321  

6,245,410  

0.35  

5,185,857  

878,016  

0.39  

1,210,560,89
0  

270,194,716  

0.29  

534,735,512  

78,630,919  

0.40  

458,072,705  

78,740,238  

0.34  

409,936,254  

151,594,351  

0.32  

80,537,833  

19,644,555  

0.34  

31,108,081  

4,021,307  

0.37  

2,768,992,81
5  

291,862,554  

Sweden 

         0.10  

410,878,668  

0.25  

0.44  

512,793,249  

0.31  

0.07  

0.36  

655,386,113  
Total: 

142,592,864  

4,461,143,16
4  

122 

 
 
           
         
         
                          
           
           
                               
                      
              
           
         
         
                          
           
           
                               
                      
              
              
         
         
                          
                               
                      
              
              
         
         
                            
                               
                        
                
              
         
         
                            
                               
                      
              
              
         
         
                            
           
           
                               
                      
              
           
         
         
                          
                               
                      
                
                
         
         
                            
           
           
                               
                        
                
           
         
         
                          
           
           
                               
                      
              
        
         
         
                       
           
           
                               
                   
            
        
         
         
                       
           
           
                               
                   
        
           
         
         
                          
           
           
                               
                      
              
              
         
         
                          
           
           
                               
                      
              
           
         
         
                          
           
           
                               
                      
              
           
         
         
                       
           
           
                               
                   
            
              
         
         
                            
           
           
                               
                        
                
              
         
         
                            
           
           
                               
                        
                
              
         
         
                            
           
           
                               
                        
                
                
         
         
                               
           
           
                               
                          
                   
           
         
         
                          
           
           
                               
                   
            
           
         
         
                          
           
           
                               
                      
              
           
         
         
                          
           
           
                               
                      
              
           
         
         
                          
           
           
                               
                      
            
              
         
         
                            
           
           
                               
                        
              
              
         
         
                            
           
           
                               
                        
                
        
         
         
                       
           
           
                               
                   
            
           
         
         
                          
           
           
                               
                      
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
Impacts on traditional businesses 

Upper-bound impacts under the Options A2-A3c for the businesses that rely on platforms in their 
operations were measured based on the Adigital study on the Spanish Riders’ Law. It indicated that 
restaurants will lose EUR 250 million during the first year after the Riders’ law goes into force in 
Spain.204 Taking into account that the revenues of the Spanish restaurant industry in 2019 stood at 
EUR  25.34  billion,205  it  was  estimated  that  a  drop  of  EUR  250  million  would  constitute  1.0%  of 
total restaurant revenue.  

Lower-bound impacts were estimated in the following way. Adigital estimated that restaurants will 
endure a EUR 250 million drop in revenues because:  

1)  services  will  no  longer  be  available  in  areas  with  fewer  than  100,000  residents,  which 

constitutes 10% of the delivery market;  

2)  in areas with 100,000-250,000 inhabitants, services will only be provided during peak hours, 

which constitutes 15% of the delivery market;  

3)  services  will  no  longer  be  available  in  the  most  remote  parts  of  cities  with  more  than 

250,000 inhabitants, which constitutes 8% of the delivery market; and  

4)  only  limited  service  will  be  provided  in  the  suburbs  of  the  cities  with  more  than  250,000 

inhabitants, which constitutes 23% of the market.  

Seeing  that  other  companies  like  Atajo206  are  already  emerging  in  cities  with  up  to  150,000 
inhabitants,  it was assumed that the impact  in  remote areas will be half as  strong as projected by 
Adigital, hence 5% of the market will be lost in towns with up to 100,000 residents and 4% in the 
most  remote  areas  of  cities  with  250,000+  inhabitants.  In  this  way,  it  was  recognized  that  the 
delivery business might not be viable in the most remote areas (hence, only partial replacement of 
platform  delivery  services  was  assumed).  Furthermore,  assumption  was  made  that  restaurants 
themselves  or  companies  that  emerge  to  replace  platforms  will  provide  deliveries  at  all  hours  in 
areas  with  100,000-250,000  inhabitants,  and  in  the  suburbs  (hence  effect  in  the  drop  of  orders  is 
assumed  at  0%).  Accordingly,  this  translated  to  a  9%  drop  in  the  delivery  market,  which  would 
reduce  restaurant  revenues  by  EUR  40.2  million  in  Spain,  which  would  constitute  0.16%  of  total 
restaurant revenue. 

Impacts on the public sector 

The  total  taxes  paid  to  the  public  sector  in  the  baseline  and  under  each  Policy  Option  were 
estimated by subtracting the net annual earnings (see Section 5.a) from gross annual earnings (see 
Section  5.b)207.  The  impact  of  each  Policy  Option  on  tax  revenues  of  the  public  sector  was 
estimated by subtracting the taxes paid in the baseline from the taxes paid under each option. Both 
upper and lower-bound estimates were produced as with impacts on net and gross earnings. See the 
following page for illustration. 

204 Adigital (2021). Análisis del impacto económico de la laboralización de repartidores. Available online. 
205 Statistics for 2020 are not available. Statista (2021). Revenue of the restaurant industry in Spain from 2015 to 2019. 
Available online.  
206  Translated  by  the  authors.  Moreno,  M.  A.  (2021).  La  ley  de  'riders'  impulsa  las  franquicias  de  esta  empresa  de 
repartidores con contrato laboral: ‘Cada vez tenemos más peticiones de restaurantes por miedo a que las plataformas no 
respondan’. Business Insider. Available online. 
207 Sections of the PPMI study. 

123 

 
 
                                                           
A3b impact 
on 
taxes, 
upper 
bound, 
EUR 

A3b  impact 
on 
taxes, 
lower 
bound, 
EUR 

43,534,226  

18,288,728  

80,009,007  

33,611,784  

A3b impacts on taxes paid to public budgets 
Country 

Annual  net 
baseline 
earnings 

Gross  annual 
baseline 
earnings, EUR 

Taxes  paid  in 
the baseline 

Annual  net 
A3b 
earnings 

Gross 
annual  A3b 
earnings, 
EUR 

Taxes  paid 
under A3b 

Austria 

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Cyprus 

Croatia 

Czechia 

Denmark 

Estonia 

Finland 

France 

Germany 

Greece 

Hungary 

Ireland 

Italy 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

Luxembour
g 
Malta 

Netherlands 

Poland 

Portugal 

Romania 

Slovakia 

Slovenia 

Spain 

Sweden 

208,113,569  

334,297,097  

126,183,528  

212,200,280  

381,918,034  

195,130,315  

307,433,736  

112,303,421  

207,242,521  

399,554,949  

169,717,75
4  

192,312,42
8  

84,714,763  

110,645,686  

25,930,923  

97,291,530  

132,434,294  

35,142,764  

9,211,841  

3,869,895  

22,678,667  

31,617,593  

8,938,926  

23,948,448  

33,678,979  

9,730,531  

791,605  

332,553  

70,808,856  

99,730,784  

28,921,927  

75,204,132  

122,422,484  

47,218,352  

18,296,425  

7,686,328  

58,847,502  

79,214,714  

20,367,212  

67,584,012  

105,913,456  

38,329,444  

17,962,232  

7,545,934  

103,872,716  

127,860,250  

23,987,534  

105,912,457  

130,371,033  

24,458,576  

471,041  

197,885  

7,110,337  

13,307,142  

6,196,805  

8,165,939  

15,800,816  

7,634,877  

1,438,072  

604,134  

225,605,982  

403,046,323  

177,440,341  

231,491,102  

443,899,843  

212,408,74
2  

34,968,401  

14,690,225  

1,114,574,56
2  

2,341,567,37
6  

1,660,191,477  

545,616,914  

1,183,758,87
7  

2,509,275,13
6  

1,325,516,2
59  

779,899,34
4  

327,635,715  

3,025,841,461  

684,274,086  

2,387,548,56
6  

4,895,962,81
7  

2,508,414,2
52  

1,824,140,1
66  

766,321,284  

248,239,915  

281,919,268  

33,679,353  

262,824,379  

352,750,560  

89,926,181  

56,246,829  

23,629,293  

84,923,059  

106,353,236  

21,430,177  

97,530,749  

141,348,912  

43,818,163  

22,387,986  

9,405,193  

111,851,127  

174,467,520  

62,616,393  

114,047,540  

198,006,076  

83,958,537  

21,342,143  

8,965,834  

906,309,202  

1,308,637,572  

402,328,371  

957,053,559  

1,603,192,43
7  

646,138,87
8  

243,810,50
7  

102,424,794  

22,426,507  

35,855,857  

13,429,350  

25,755,949  

42,233,471  

16,477,522  

3,048,171  

1,280,537  

15,168,611  

20,143,595  

4,974,985  

17,420,545  

28,538,247  

11,117,702  

6,142,717  

2,580,556  

14,901,657  

20,472,910  

5,571,254  

15,194,279  

26,718,321  

11,524,041  

5,952,788  

2,500,766  

2,950,871  

4,307,841  

1,356,970  

3,388,958  

5,185,857  

1,796,899  

439,930  

184,814  

722,281,655  

940,366,174  

218,084,519  

741,122,971  

1,210,560,89
0  

469,437,91
9  

251,353,40
0  

105,593,563  

331,409,888  

456,104,592  

124,694,705  

380,611,052  

534,735,512  

258,188,850  

379,332,467  

121,143,617  

272,644,874  

458,072,705  

233,825,257  

258,341,904  

24,516,647  

268,538,992  

409,936,254  

154,124,46
0  

185,427,83
1  

29,429,755  

12,363,440  

64,284,214  

27,005,798  

141,397,26
3  

116,880,61
6  

49,101,547  

47,912,171  

60,893,278  

12,981,107  

55,025,219  

80,537,833  

25,512,614  

12,531,506  

5,264,486  

17,903,459  

27,086,774  

9,183,316  

20,561,409  

31,108,081  

10,546,672  

1,363,357  

572,746  

1,651,335,77
4  

2,477,130,261  

825,794,487  

1,743,794,25
6  

2,768,992,81
5  

1,025,198,5
59  

199,404,07
2  

83,769,651  

410,878,668  

512,793,249  

101,914,582  

421,596,779  

655,386,113  

233,789,33
4  

131,874,75
3  

55,400,584  

124 

 
 
                       
            
                                     
                        
                                                
                                                
                                               
                     
                       
            
                                     
                        
                                                
                                                
                                               
                     
                         
            
                                        
                          
                                                
                                                   
                                                 
                       
                         
              
                                          
                          
                                                   
                                                     
                                                    
                           
                         
              
                                        
                          
                                                
                                                   
                                               
                       
                         
              
                                        
                          
                                                
                                                   
                                               
                       
                       
            
                                        
                        
                                                
                                                   
                                                    
                           
                            
              
                                          
                             
                                                   
                                                     
                                                 
                           
                       
            
                                     
                        
                                                
                                                
                                               
                     
                    
         
                                     
                     
                                             
                                             
                                             
                   
                    
         
                                     
                     
                                             
                                             
                                         
                   
                       
            
                                        
                        
                                                
                                                   
                                               
                     
                         
            
                                        
                          
                                                
                                                   
                                               
                       
                       
            
                                        
                        
                                                
                                                   
                                               
                       
                       
         
                                     
                        
                                             
                                                
                                             
                   
                         
              
                                        
                          
                                                   
                                                   
                                                 
                       
                         
              
                                          
                          
                                                   
                                                   
                                                 
                       
                         
              
                                          
                          
                                                   
                                                   
                                                 
                       
                            
                 
                                          
                             
                                                     
                                                     
                                                    
                           
                       
            
                                     
                        
                                             
                                                
                                             
                   
                       
            
                                     
                        
                                                
                                                
                                               
                     
                       
            
                                     
                        
                                                
                                                
                                               
                     
                       
            
                                        
                        
                                                
                                                
                                             
                     
                         
              
                                        
                          
                                                   
                                                   
                                               
                       
                         
              
                                          
                          
                                                   
                                                   
                                                 
                           
                    
         
                                     
                     
                                             
                                             
                                             
                     
                       
            
                                     
                        
                                                
                                                
                                             
                     
Country 

Annual  net 
baseline 
earnings 

Gross  annual 
baseline 
earnings, EUR 

Taxes  paid  in 
the baseline 

Annual  net 
A3b 
earnings 

Taxes  paid 
under A3b 

Gross 
annual  A3b 
earnings, 
EUR 

Total: 

A3b impact 
on 
taxes, 
upper 
bound, 
EUR 

A3b  impact 
on 
taxes, 
lower 
bound, 
EUR 

3,977,215,1
05  

1,670,828,0
66  

125 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
               
Calculation of costs and benefits for Policy Area B 

This  section  presents  the  analytical  methods  applied  for  the  estimations  of  costs  and 
benefits for the impact assessment for Policy Area B for various stakeholders.  

Impacts on people working through platforms 

The number of people affected by each Policy Option in Policy Area B were estimated in 
the following way: 

  B1:  based  on  the  fact  that  a  number  of  Member  States  are  in  the  process  of 
already enacting legislation that aims to safeguard workers regarding algorithmic 
management, it was assumed that only half of employed platform workers would 
benefit  from  the  rights  clarified  in  the  guidelines.  To  estimate  the  number  of 
employed  platform  workers,  the  preferred  Option  (A3b)  was  considered  (1.72  - 
4.1 million, see Table 8). 

  B2a:  all  employed  people  working  through  platforms  would  be  affected  by  the 
initiative. The number is based on the number of employed platform workers that 
would work via platforms under the preferred Policy Area A option (A3b). 

  B2b: at most, all people working through platforms more than sporadically would 
be affected. The estimate of 28.3 million is based on PPMI 2021 survey data (see 
Table 2). 

  B3a:  only  those  people  working  through  platforms  engaged  in  high-skilled  on-
location, low-skilled online and high-skilled online work  were considered given 
that  low-skilled  on-location  platforms  are  already  moving  away  from  rating 
systems, so as to preserve the self-employment model. An even greater shift away 
from  rating  workers  can  be  expected  as  a  result  of  Policy  Area  A  Options.  The 
estimates  are  based  on  the  people  who  would  be  employed  under  the  preferred 
option  (A3b)  (see  Table  7).  Specifically,  the  0.96-2.09  million  estimate  was 
derived  by  taking  the  total  number  of  employed  platform  workers  under  the 
preferred  option  (1.72  –  4.09  million)  and  subtracting  those  in  low-skilled  on-
location work (0.76 – 2.01 million). 

  B3b:  all  people  in  high-skilled  on-location,  low-skilled  online  and  high-skilled 
online work would benefit from the Policy Option, following similar reasoning as 
in  B3a.  The  precise  estimate  was  derived  by  taking  the  total  number  of  people 
who work through platforms more than sporadically (28.3 million – see Table 2) 
and subtracting the number of people who work in low-skill on-location platform 
work (4.18 million – see Table 2).  

Summary: numbers of people affected in different ways under each Policy Option B 
(portability 

(portability 

B2b 

B2a 

B2c 

B1 

B3a 
element) 
0.96-2.09 million 

B3b 
element) 
<24.12 million 

Number of people 
with new actionable 
rights 

0.86-2.05 
million  

1.72-4.1 
million 

<28.3 
million 

45.91-76.85 
million 

126 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Impacts on platforms 

Number of platforms affected was estimated using the CEPS dataset.208 Only the active 
platforms  were  included  in  the  estimates.  The  active  platforms  were  filtered  depending 
on each Policy Option:  

  all platforms under B1; 
  only those platforms that currently employ workers in B2a; 
  all platforms in B2b. 

The methodology for the costs to platforms due to Policy Options B1-B3b is explained in 
the PPMI study.209 

Calculation of costs and benefits for Policy Area C 

Number of people who provide cross-border services through platforms 

2021 survey of the PPMI study was used for estimating the number of people who work 
through platforms for clients in other countries, and the following questions in particular: 

  19) When working via online platforms, how often have  you worked for clients 

based in countries other than [system('country')]? 

 

 

 

 

 

( ) Never – all my clients are based in [system("country")] 

( ) Sometimes, but most of my clients are based in [system("country")] 

( ) Often – most of my clients are based outside [system("country")] 

( ) Always – all of my clients are based outside [system("country")] 

( ) Don't know/ not applicable 

  20) What countries were your clients based in? [select from a list or write in] 

The  majority  of  all  people  working  through  platforms  (59%),  engage  with  clients 
from  outside  their  country  of  origin  (always,  often  or  sometimes).  Based  on  the 
answers received, the estimate per type of plartform work is the following: 

Estimated numbers of people working through platforms for clients based in other 
countries at least sometimes 

Working more than sporadically 

Of  them  -  working  more  than  sporadically 
and at risk of misclassification 

Total 
Low-skill on-location 
High-skill on-location 
Low-skill online 
High-skill online 

16.69 million 
2.04 million 
1.01 million 
5.13 million 
8.51 million 

3.18 million 
0.97 million 
0.17 million 
0.66 million 
1.38 million 

Some of the figures may appear surprising (i.e.  1,140,000 people providing on-location 
services across borders). This is because people were classified into the four categories 

208 Shared with the research team by DG EMPL. The dataset resulted from the CEPS (2021) study ‘Digital 
Labour Platforms in the EU: Mapping and business models,’ available online.  
209 Section 6.2.2.Assessment of policy options (Policy Package B). 

127 

 
 
 
                                                           
(low-skill  on-location;  high-skill  on-location;  low-skill  online;  high-skill  online)  based 
on the type of work they engage in most often, using Q4 ‘Which of the following types 
of  work  via  platforms  did  you  engage  in  most  often  since  December  1,  2020?‘. 
However, questions 19 and 20 outlined above were asked about any platform work 
respondents have engaged in. This means that the number of people who engage in 
cross-border on-location platform work at least in part captures those who perform 
both on-location and online platform work. 

Impacts on platforms 

Number  of  platforms  affected  was  estimated  using  the  CEPS  dataset.210  All  active 
platforms  were  included  in  the  estimates.  The  methodology  for  estimating  the  costs  to 
platforms is outlined in the report. 

210 Shared with the research team by DG EMPL. The dataset resulted from the CEPS (2021) study ‘Digital 
Labour Platforms in the EU: Mapping and business models,’ available online.  

128 

 
                                                           
A5.2: Data visualisations 

The European platform labour economy has evolved rapidly in the past decade, although 
platform work is still more notable in some countries compared to others. To begin with, 
the growth of platform work economy can be illustrated by the proliferation of platforms 
in  the  past  decade.  For  example,  a  recent  study211  found  over  500  labour  platforms 
operating  within  the  EU  and/or  used  by  EU  citizens  to  generate  income  in  early  2021. 
The  majority  of  them  have  started  operations  since  2014,  and  the  overall  number  hast 
grown especially in 2014-2016 (see figure A below). 

Figure A. Number of labour platforms active in the EU 

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

Source: PPMI (2021). Based on CEPS (2021). Active platforms minus deactivated platforms by year. N=590. 

Before the pandemic, the size of the global platform work economy had been projected to 
increase  almost  twofold  from  2018  to  2023.212  However,  the  coronavirus  crisis  might 
have  further  encouraged  its  spread.  For  example,  based  on  the  data  of  the  newest 
platform work survey conducted by PPMI in late 2021, over 38% of the people working 
through platforms first started working via platforms in 2020 or 2021. Moreover, almost 
37%  reported  that  they  have  started  or  restarted  platform  work  because  of  COVID-19, 
while another 37% said they worked more hours via platforms than before because of the 
pandemic (see the figure below). 

211 De Groen W., Kilhoffer Z., Westhoff L., Postica D. and Shamsfakhr F. (2021). Available online. 
212 Bacchi, Umberto, Avi Asher-Schapiro (2020). The gig workers taking legal action to regain control of 
their data. Reuters. Available online. 

129 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure  D.  Impacts  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic  or  related  policy  measures  (e.g., 
lockdowns,  quarantine,  closures  of  businesses,  schools,  etc.)  on  the  work  via 
platforms (% of people who have worked through platforms) 

People who worked through platforms in
December 2020 - May 2021 (2021 survey)

People who worked through platforms in May-
November 2020 (EIGE survey)

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Yes, started or restarted working through platforms

Yes, worked more hours/ got more assignments

Yes, worked fewer hours or got fewer assignments

Yes, stopped working

No

Source:  2020  EIGE  survey;213  2021  survey  of  people  working  through  platforms  conducted  for  this  impact  assessment.  The  same 
question formulation was used in both surveys.  

According  to  COLLEEM  2017  data,  36.1%  of  people  working  through  platforms  have 
provided  services  to  clients  based  in  countries  other  than  their  country  of  residence. 
Among  people  who  engaged  in  online  services  on,  this  figure  was  32.5%,  and  among 
people engaged in on-location services only – 25.6% (and among people in both types of 
platform work  – 44.2%). The new data from 2021 survey show that  59% of all people 
working  though  platforms  for  clients  from  other  countries  at  least  sometimes  (see  the 
figure  below).214  Among  people  for  whom  the  main  activities  on  labour  platforms  fall 
under the category of online work, this figure was 62%, and among people mainly (but 
not  necessarily  exclusively)  engaged  in  on-location  wok  –  49%.  Although  the  vast 
majority of these workers reported that they served clients in other EU countries, the US 
was  also  indicated  as  a  major  market.215  Although  these  figures  may  include  situations 
other than what is here considered as cross-border platform work, they do show that it is 
especially relevant for people in online platform work.  

213 A survey was conducted by PPMI in 10 EU countries and collected responses from 5,000 people who 
have ever generated income via digital labour platforms. Data was weighted using Eurostat statistics of EU 
internet users.  
214 Q19. 
215 Descriptive analysis based on weighted COLLEEM 2017 dataset.  

130 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure  E.  2021  survey:  When  working  via  online  platforms,  how  often  have  you 
worked for clients based in countries other than [country of residence] 

9%

5%

19%

36%

Source : PPMI (2021).  

Never – all my clients are based in 
[country of residence]

31%

Sometimes, but most of my clients
are based in [country of residence]

Often – most of my clients are 
based outside [country of 
residence]

Always – all of my clients are based 
outside[country of residence]

Dont know/ not applicable

The  number  of  on-location  platforms  grew  rapidly  between  2010  and  2017,  but  their 
growth has slowed in the last three years. As a result, expectations are the number of on-
location  platforms  to  continue  growing  in  the  near  future,  but  at  a  slower  pace  than 
observed in the first half of the last decade, ultimately starting to decline due to market 
consolidation. 

Figure F. The number of active on-location platforms in EU-27, including projected 
trends 

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

2003

2006

2009

2012

2015

2018

2021

2024

2027

2030

Platforms

Projection based on 2017-2019

Projection based on 2003-2020

Source: PPMI (2021). Elaboration of the dataset compiled by de Groen, W. P., and Killhofer, Z. (2021) for the project ‘Digital Labour 
Platforms in the EU: Mapping and business models’. 
Note: The platforms were classified into on-location following the ILO 2021 typology, as modified in CEPS (2021). ‘Digital Labour 
Platforms in the EU: Mapping and business models’. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2021. 

The  growth  of  online  platforms  follows  a  similar  trend,  though  on-location  platforms 
have  outpaced  online  platforms  in  the  last  five  years.  Online  platforms  constituted  a 
larger  share  of  all  platforms  until  2015,  but  since  then  their  proliferation  has  been  far 
surpassed by on-location platforms.  In 2020, for  example, there were 235 active online 
platforms compared to 355 on-location platforms in EU27. Regarding future growth, the 
figure  below  follows  the  same  reasoning  as  presented  with  respect  to  on-location 
131 

 
 
 
 
platforms  above.  Nevertheless,  it  is  important  to  note  that  the  line  representing  higher 
growth  of  online  platforms  is  flatter  than  the  equivalent  projection  for  on-location 
platforms. This means that online platforms will likely continue to grow at a slower pace 
than businesses intermediating on-location services in the near future, prior to similarly 
declining. 

Figure  G.  The  number  of  active  online  platforms  in  EU-27,  including  projected 
trends 

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

1999

2002

2005

2008

2011

2014

2017

2020

2023

2026

2029

Online

Projection based on 2017-2019

Projection based on 1999-2020

Source: PPMI (2021). Elaboration of the dataset compiled by de Groen, W. P., and Killhofer, Z. (2021) for the project ‘Digital Labour 
Platforms in the EU: Mapping and business models’. 

The size of the platform economy in terms of total revenue has continued to grow even 
during  the  pandemic.  As  illustrated  in  the  figure  below,  the  size  of  the  EU  platform 
economy  in  the  taxi  sector  declined  in  2020,  but  it  was  more  than  compensated  by  the 
growth in the delivery sector when  platforms such as Uber and Bolt shifted focus from 
passenger  transport  to  food  deliveries.  The  revenues  of  the  platforms  mediating  online 
work,  too,  continued  to  grow  albeit  at  a  slower  pace,  from  EUR  0.7  billion  in  2019  to 
EUR 0.8 billion in 2020. It is thus reasonable to expect that the revenues of the platforms 
mediating both online and on-location work, will continue to grow despite the decline in 
the number of platforms. Note that the figures below are underestimates as they are based 
on information from a limited number of platforms. 

132 

 
 
 
Figure H. Size of the digital labour platform economy (billion EUR) 

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

0,0
0,8
0,3
1,8
0,4
2016

0,2
1,1
0,8

3,2

0,5
2017

0,5
1,4
1,8

4,1

0,7

0,8
1,4

3,5

4,7

0,7

2018

2019

0,5
1,5

7,8

3,1

0,8

2020

Online

Taxi

Delivery

Domestic and home services

Professional location-based services

Source: PPMI (2021).  Elaboration of CEPS (2021). 
Note:  The  size  of  the  platform  economy  reflects  the  consolidated  revenues  of  the parties  involved,  including  the  platforms,  people 
working through platforms and fourth parties. The figure was produced from data modelled using a sample of 26 large platforms. For 
more details, see CEPS (2021), Annex II. 

Overall, the number of people working through both on-location and online platforms is 
expected to increase 1.5 times by 2025, following which it is expected to slow. 

 25.000.000

 20.000.000

 15.000.000

 10.000.000

 5.000.000

 -

1
1
0
2

2
1
0
2

3
1
0
2

4
1
0
2

5
1
0
2

6
1
0
2

7
1
0
2

8
1
0
2

9
1
0
2

0
2
0
2

1
2
0
2

2
2
0
2

3
2
0
2

4
2
0
2

5
2
0
2

6
2
0
2

7
2
0
2

8
2
0
2

9
2
0
2

0
3
0
2

Main

Secondary

Marginal

Projected Main

Projected Secondary

Projected Marginal

Source: PPMI (2021).  elaboration based on COLLEEM I, COLEEM II, and PPMI 2021 surveys. 
Note: Given that only daily internet users were sampled in the PPMI 2021 survey, only this group was considered regarding 2017 and 
2018 estimates from COLLEEM I and COLLEEM II surveys as well. Marginal population is not directly comparable between 2017/8 
and 2021. The figure excludes people who work sporadically (less often than monthly). 

The actual numbers of people from the projection above are presented in the following 
table. 

Figure  J.  Projected  number  of  people  working  through  on-location  and  online 
digital labour platforms 2012-2030 

Year  Main 

2012 

1,136,784  

Secondary 
1,880,869  

Marginal 
1,301,379  

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

1,825,528  

3,341,769  

2,100,209  

2,514,272  

4,802,669  

2,899,038  

3,203,016  

6,263,569  

3,697,867  

3,891,760  

7,724,469  

4,496,697  

6,786,468  

9,768,756  

4,508,657  

133 

Total 

4,319,032  

7,267,505  

10,215,979  

13,164,452  

16,112,926  

21,063,881  

 
 
 
                           
                  
                          
                                    
                           
                  
                          
                                    
                         
                  
                          
                                    
                         
                  
                          
                                    
                         
                  
                          
                                    
                         
                  
                        
                                    
                         
Year  Main 

3,821,428  

Secondary 
11,268,314  

Marginal 
8,818,681  

5,957,992  

12,107,169  

6,893,184  

6,646,736  

13,568,069  

7,692,014  

Total 
23,908,423  

24,958,346  

27,906,819  

7,025,375  

14,243,506  

7,055,937  

28,324,817 216 

8,024,224  

16,489,870  

9,289,672  

8,712,968  

17,950,770  

10,088,502  

9,401,712  

19,411,670  

10,887,331  

10,090,456  

20,872,570  

11,686,160  

10,090,456  

20,872,570  

11,686,160  

10,090,456  

20,872,570  

11,686,160  

10,090,456  

20,872,570  

11,686,160  

10,090,456  

20,872,570  

11,686,160  

10,090,456  

20,872,570  

11,686,160  

33,803,766  

36,752,239  

39,700,713  

42,649,186  

42,649,186  

42,649,186  

42,649,186  

42,649,186  

42,649,186  

2019 

2020 

2021 

2022 

2023 

2024 

2025 

2026 

2027 

2028 

2029 

2030 

Source:  PPMI  (2021).    estimates  based  on  COLLEM  I  survey  for  2017; COLLEM  II  survey  for  2018, and  PPMI  2021  survey  for 
2021. The remaining years are estimated using a linear trendline. 

Note: the figure excludes people who engage in platform work sporadically, i.e. less often than monthly. Given that only daily internet 
users were sampled in the PPMI 2021 survey, only this group was considered regarding 2017 and 2018 estimates from COLLEEM I 
and COLLEEM II surveys as well. Marginal population is not directly comparable between 2017/8 and 2021. 

The projected numbers  of people working through platforms  per EU Member State  for 
2021 is shown in the figure below.  

Figure  K.  Projected  number  of  people  working  through  on-location  and  online 
digital labour platforms by EU-27 Member State, 2021 

Country 

EU 

Austria 

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Cyprus 

Croatia 

Czechia 

Main 

Secondary 

Marginal 

Total 

     7,025,375  

           14,243,506  

              7,055,937  

  28,324,817 217 

          94,104  

                 169,180  

                   99,509  

        362,775  

        157,685  

                 283,967  

                 165,764  

        607,417  

          95,535  

                 259,608  

                 141,144  

        496,288  

          21,065  

                   37,953  

                   18,130  

          77,149  

          50,409  

                   90,779  

                   52,991  

        194,179  

        138,930  

                 256,516  

                 150,449  

        545,895  

Denmark 

          65,188  

                 121,928  

                   67,350  

        254,440  

Estonia 

Finland 

France 

Germany 

Greece 

Hungary 

          17,849  

                   32,956  

                   19,329  

          70,133  

        120,960  

                 236,053  

                   77,627  

        434,639  

        804,189  

              1,448,221  

                 845,390  

     3,097,800  

     1,008,407  

              1,741,480  

              1,090,201  

     3,840,088  

        168,110  

                 302,836  

                 155,007  

        625,953  

        163,277  

                 515,936  

                 217,911  

        897,124  

216 The total figure for the EU (28,324,817) differs slightly from the one in Table 2 (28,288,000) as it was 
derived using a different method of extrapolation. 
217 Idem. 

134 

 
                  
                        
                                    
                         
                  
                        
                                    
                         
                  
                        
                                    
                         
                  
                        
                                    
                         
                  
                        
                                 
                         
                  
                        
                                 
                         
               
                        
                                 
                         
               
                        
                                 
                         
               
                        
                                 
                         
               
                        
                                 
                         
               
                        
                                 
                         
               
                        
                                 
                         
 
                                                           
Ireland 

Italy 

Latvia 

          48,751  

                   91,184  

                   50,368  

        190,284  

     1,116,982  

              1,885,604  

              1,129,792  

     4,132,378  

          32,634  

                   88,679  

                   48,213  

        169,525  

Lithuania 

          33,544  

                   61,935  

                   36,325  

        131,805  

Luxembourg 

            7,653  

                   13,759  

                     8,093  

          29,504  

Malta 

            7,319  

                   13,514  

                     7,926  

          28,760  

Netherlands 

        383,047  

                 747,513  

                 245,822  

     1,376,381  

Poland 

Portugal 

Romania 

Slovakia 

Slovenia 

Spain 

Sweden 

        580,723  

              1,835,021  

                 775,042  

     3,190,786  

        190,769  

                 343,705  

                 164,185  

        698,658  

        263,692  

                 716,556  

                 389,579  

     1,369,827  

          93,284  

                 294,767  

                 124,498  

        512,549  

          33,115  

                 104,639  

                   44,195  

        181,949  

     1,107,859  

              2,119,312  

                 789,721  

     4,016,892  

        220,295  

                 429,904  

                 141,375  

        791,575  

Source: PPMI (2021). Estimates based on PPMI survey for 2021. 
Note: the figure excludes people who engage in platform work sporadically, i.e. less often than monthly. The extrapolation was done 
using  the  clustering  exercise  performed  for  survey  country  selection.  The  same  prevalence  rate  for  non-surveyed  countries  was 
assigned from surveyed countries in the same cluster. If more than one country from a cluster was surveyed, their average prevalence 
rate was used for extrapolation to non-surveyed countries. 

The large majority of services offered by digital labour platforms in the EU require low 
and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  medium  skills.  Low  and  medium  skills  combined  account  for 
almost  90%  of  the  intermediated  work  in  terms  of  aggregate  earnings  of  the  people 
working  through  platforms.  High  skills  are  responsible  for  about  6%  of  intermediated 
platform work in the EU. 

Figure  L.  Skill  level  required  to  perform  service  on  DLPs  active  in  the  EU27 
(earnings of people working through DLPs); source – De Groen, W. (2021) 

The  large  majority  of  the  DLPs  active  in  the  EU27  are  of  European  origin.  In  March 
2021, there were 516 DLPs active in the EU27, of which 77% originated in the EU (see 
Figure 7). The share of EU27 DLPs becomes smaller when the activity on the platform is 
considered. In terms of earnings of the people working through the platform, EU27 DLPs 
account  for  about  half  of  the  earnings.  The  other  half  have  their  origin  in  the  United 
States. 

135 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure M. Origin of DLPs active in the EU27; source De Groen, W. (2021). 

The EU27 country from which the most active DLPs originate is France with 89 DLPs, 
followed by Belgium (49), Spain (44), Germany (41), the Netherlands (38) and Italy (26) 
(see  figure  below).  The  larger  number  of  DLPs  in  these  countries  might  partially  be 
explained  by  the  methodology  of  the  CEPS  (2021)  study,  which  aimed  to  ensure  good 
coverage  of  DLPs  across  the  entire  EU,  whilst  more  evidence  was  available  for  larger 
countries.  Moreover,  Belgium’s  large  number  is  largely  due  to  its  official  register  of 
recognised  platforms  in  the  ‘sharing  economy’.  In  the  other  EU27  countries,  up  to  14 
home-grown DLPs were identified. In Latvia and Bulgaria, no home-grown active DLPs 
were identified.  

If the size of the DLPs is based on the share of earnings of people working through DLPs 
in  the  EU27,  the  order  changes  significantly.  German-originated  platforms  are  largest 
with  about  EUR  1  billion  in  earnings  for  people  working  through  DLPs  in  the  EU27, 
followed  by  France  (EUR  0.7  billion),  the  Netherlands  (EUR  0.4  billion),  Spain  (EUR 
0.4 billion) and Estonia (EUR 0.2 billion). There are several reasons for the differences 
between  the  number  and  size  of  DLPs.  In  general,  the  countries  with  larger  domestic 
markets are larger in size (e.g. DE, ES and FR). But there are also countries with smaller 
domestic markets that have large platforms active in several EU countries (e.g. NL and 
EE). In turn, there are also countries with sizeable domestic markets that are smaller in 
size, as the local DLP market is dominated by foreign platforms (e.g. IT and PL).  

136 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure N. EU-originated DLPs  active in the EU27 by country of origin; source De 
Groen, W. (2021). 

About  a  quarter  of  the  active  DLPs  in  the  EU27  have  their  origin  outside  the  EU  (see 
figure below). Most of these DLPs have their origin in the US (58 out of 120 DLPs, or 
48% of the DLPs  with  their origin  outside the EU27) or the United Kingdom  (35), but 
there  are  also  several  DLPs  from  Australia  (7),  Switzerland  (4),  Canada  (2),  India  (2), 
Russia  (2)  and  the  United  Arab  Emirates  (2).  In  terms  of  earnings  of  people  working 
through  DLPs,  the  platforms  from  the  US  (EUR  2.6  billion)  and  the  UK  (EUR  0.3 
billion) are the largest, accounting for about 95% of earnings of people working through 
DLPs founded outside the EU. 

137 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 6: Relevance of the EU’s social and labour acquis 

In  order  to  prevent  unfair  competition  to  the  detriment  of  workers  and  a  race  to  the 
bottom  in  employment  practices  and  social  standards,  the  EU  has  created  a  minimum 
floor of labour rights that apply to workers across all Member States. The EU labour and 
social  acquis  has  grown  throughout  the  years  and  sets  minimum  standards  through  a 
number of key instruments.  

It should be noted that only workers who fall under the personal scope of such legal 
instruments  will  benefit  from  the  protection  they  afford.218  Self-employed  people, 
including  those  working  through  platforms,  fall  outside  the  scope  and  typically  do  not 
enjoy these rights, making the employment status a gateway to the EU labour and social 
acquis. (The only exception are the equal treatment directives which also cover access to 
self-employment, due to broader legal bases.219) 

Relevant legal instruments for employed people working through platforms include:  

  The Directive on transparent and predictable working conditions220 provides 
for measures to protect working conditions of people who work in non-standard 
and new working relationships. This includes  rules on transparency, the right  to 
information,  probationary  periods,  parallel  employment,  minimum  predictability 
of  work  and  measures  for  on-demand  contracts.  These  minimum  standards  are 
particularly  relevant  for  people  working  through  platforms,  given  their  atypical 
the  Directive  ensures 
work  organisation  and  patterns.  However,  while 
transparency  on  basic  working  conditions,  the  information  duty  on  employers 
does  not  extend  to  the  use  of  algorithms  in  the  workplace  and  how  they  affect 
individual  workers.  It  is  important  to  note  that  the  Directive  permits  Member 
States  to  exclude  from  its  scope  workers  with  a  very  low  number  of  monthly 
working hours. Zero-hour work contracts, however, cannot be excluded.   

  The  Directive  on  work-life  balance  for  parents  and  carers221  lays  down 
minimum requirements related to parental, paternity and carers’ leave and flexible 
work arrangements for parents or carers. It complements the Directive on safety 
and  health  at  work  of  pregnant  workers  and  workers  who  have  recently 
given  birth  or  are  breastfeeding222,  which  provides  for  a  minimum  period  of 
maternity leave, alongside other measures. 

  The  Working  Time  Directive  lays  down  minimum  requirements  for  the 
organisation  of  working  time  and  defines  concepts  such  as  ‘working  time’  and 
‘rest  periods’.  While  the  CJEU  has  traditionally  interpreted  the  concept  of 
‘working  time’  as  requiring  the  worker  to  be  physically  present  at  a  place 
determined by the employer, in recent cases the Court has extended this concept 
in particular when a ‘stand-by’ time system is in place (i.e. where a worker is not 

218  Some  instruments  define  the  personal  scope  by  reference  to  national  definitions  of  ‘worker’  or 
‘employee’  while others  do not include such reference. The CJEU has developed a  comprehensive case-
law to defining the personal scope of these instruments.  
219  Articles  19  and  157  TFEU  respectively.  The  latter  covers  “equal  treatment  of  men  and  women  in 
matters of employment and occupation”.  
220 Directive (EU) 2019/1152. Available online. Member States have until 1 August 2022 to transpose it.  
221 Ibidem. 
222 Directive 92/85/EEC. Available online.  

138 

 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                           
required to  remain at  his  or her workplace but  shall remain available to  work if 
called  by  the  employer).  In  the  2018  Matzak  case,  the  Court  made  clear  that 
‘stand-by’  time,  during  which  the  worker's  opportunities  to  carry  out  other 
activities  are  significantly  restricted,  shall  be  regarded  as  working  time.223  This 
interpretation may be relevant to people working through platforms.224 

  The  Directive  on  temporary  agency  work225  defines  a  general  framework 
applicable to the working conditions of temporary agency workers. It lays down 
the  principle  of  non-discrimination,  regarding  the  essential  conditions  of  work 
and  of  employment,  between  temporary  agency  workers  and  workers  who  are 
recruited  by  the  user  company.  Due  to  the  typically  triangular  contractual 
relationship  of platform work, this Directive can be of relevance. Depending on 
the  business  model  of  the  platform  and  on  whether  its  customers  are  private 
consumers or businesses, it might qualify as a temporary-work agency assigning 
its  workers  to  user  companies.  In  some  cases,  the  platform  might  be  the  user 
company  making  use  of  the  services  of  workers  assigned  by  temporary-work 
agencies.226  

  The Directives  on  part-time work227 and on  fixed-term work228 stipulate equal 
treatment in working conditions between workers employed under a part-time or 
fixed-term  contract  and  comparable  workers  engaged  under  a  ‘standard’ 
employment contract.  

  The  Occupational  Health  and  Safety  (OSH)  Framework  Directive229  lays 
down the main principles for encouraging improvements in the health and safety 
of  workers  at  work.  It  guarantees  minimum  health  and  safety  requirements 
throughout  the  European  Union,  with  Member  States  allowed  to  maintain  or 
establish more stringent measures.  

  The  three  directives  on  anti-discrimination  and  equal  treatment  lay  down  a 
general  framework for combating discrimination  in  the area of employment  and 
occupation  on  the  grounds  of  sex230,  racial  or  ethnic  origin231,  religion  or  belief, 
disability,  age  or  sexual  orientation,232  with  a  view  to  putting  into  effect  in  the 
Member States the principle of equal treatment.  

223 Judgment of the  Court (Fifth Chamber) of  21 February 2018 in Ville de Nivelles  v  Rudy Matzak, C-
518/15, ECLI: EU:C:2018:82. This line of reasoning was confirmed and elaborated in two 2021 judgments 
(Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 9 March 2021 in RJ v Stadt Offenbach am Main, C-580/19, 
ECLI:EU:C:2021:183;  Judgement  of  the  Court  (Grand  Chamber)  of  9  March  2021  in  -D.J.  v 
Radiotelevizija Slovenija, C-344/19, ECLI:EU:C:2021:182). 
224  The  UK  Supreme  Court  in  its  judgment  in  case  Uber  BV  v  Aslam  ([2021]  UKSC  5)  of  19  February 
2021 makes reference to this CJEU case-law. Available online.   
225 Directive 2008/104/EC. Available online. 
226  See  for  instance  the  case  of  JustEat:  Article  in  The  Guardian  (April  2021),  Just  Eat  to  offer  1,500 
Liverpool couriers minimum hourly rate and sick pay. Available online.  
227 Directive 97/81/EC. Available online. 
228 Directive 1999/70/EC. Available online. 
229 Directive 89/391/EEC. Available online.  
230 Directive 2006/54/EC. Available online.  
231 Directive 2000/43/EC. Available online.  
232 Directive 2000/78/EC. Available online.  

139 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
In addition, regulations on the coordination of national social protection systems apply 
to both employed and self-employed people working through platforms233. The rules on 
social  protection  coordination  do  not  replace  national  systems  with  a  single  European 
one, but they protect people’s social  protection rights when moving within Europe (EU 
27 + Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland). As a general principle, the social 
protection legislation applicable is that of the Member State in which the activity as an 
employed or self-employed person is pursued. 

Other, non-legally binding instruments are broader in scope and also cover self-employed 
people,  but  they  do  not  confer  any  rights  directly.  The  Council  Recommendation  on 
improving  the  protection  of  the  health  and  safety  at  work  of  the  self-employed234 
promotes  the  prevention  of  occupational  accidents  and  diseases  among  the  self-
employed, measures for promoting health and safety and surveillance, including access to 
training  in  the  area  of  health  and  safety.  The  Council  Recommendation  on  access  to 
social protection for workers  and the self-employed235  encourages  Member States to 
ensure  that  both  workers  irrespective  of  the  type  of  employment  contract  and  the  self-
employed  have  access  to  effective  and  adequate  social  protection.  Both  instruments 
provide guidance to Member States on measures that are particularly relevant for people 
working through platforms that do not have an employment relationship (or have a non-
standard employment relationship, in the case of the latter Recommendation), but do not 
confer  any  rights  on  those  people  directly.  However,  as  countries  implement  these 
Recommendations, provisions at national level may give rights to those concerned. 

The European Labour Authority (ELA)236  assists national  authorities in  EU Member 
States to help ensure that EU rules on labour mobility and social protection coordination 
are  enforced  in  a  fair,  simple,  and  effective  way.  Among  other  tasks,  ELA  facilitates 
cooperation and the exchange of information between EU Member States with a view to 
the consistent, efficient and effective application and enforcement of relevant Union law; 
coordinates  and  supports  concerted  and  joint  inspections;  and  supports  EU  Member 
States in tackling undeclared work. 

233  Regulation  (EC)  No  883/2004  of  29  May  2004  and  its  implementing  Regulation  (EC)  No  987/2009. 
Available online here and here.  
234 Council Recommendation of 18 February 2003 (2003/134/EC). Available online. 
235  Council  Recommendation  of  8  November  2019  (2019/C  387/01).  Available  online.  The 
Recommendation covers unemployment, sickness and health care, maternity and paternity, invalidity, old-
age and survivors’ benefits and benefits in respect of accidents at work and occupational diseases. 
236 ELA website available online. 

140 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Annex 7: Relevance of the EU’s internal market acquis 

Companies  operating  in  the  EU  have  access  to  the  world’s  largest  internal  market,  of 
approximately  450  million  consumers.  To  ensure  equal  business  opportunities  and  fair 
treatment to all consumers, the EU has developed an extensive regulatory acquis for the 
governance  of  its  internal  market,  ranging  from  product  liability  to  anti-merger  rules. 
Elements of this internal market acquis are particularly relevant for digital labour 
platforms: 

  The  Regulation  on  promoting  fairness  and  transparency  for  business  users  of 
online  intermediation  services  (the  so-called  ‘Platform-to-Business’  or  ‘P2B’ 
regulation)237  aims  at  ensuring  that  self-employed  ‘business  users’  of  an  online 
platform’s intermediation  services  are treated in  a transparent  and fair way and that 
they have access to effective redress in the event of disputes. It has a review clause 
concerning  the  potential  misclassification  of  ‘business  users’  as  self-employed.  The 
P2B Regulation’s relevant provisions include, among others: 

—  subject 

to  certain  conditions, 

the  right  to  prior  notice  before 

termination of a business users’ account at least 30 days in advance; 
—  the  right  to  terms  and  conditions  written  in  clear  and  intelligible 
language,  including  enhanced  transparency,  including  on  the  main 
parameters determining the ranking; 

—  transparency  on  differentiated  treatment  between  business  users 

affiliated to the platform and those unaffiliated; 

—  a  prohibition  of  retroactive  changes  to  a  platform’s  terms  and 
conditions except where they are required to respect a legal or regulatory 
obligation or when the changes are beneficial for the business users; 

—  the  right  for  representative  organisations  and  associations  to  have 
legal  standing  to  stop  or  prohibit  non-compliance  with  the  Regulation 
before courts at the national level. 

  The  General  Data  Protection Regulation238 lays  down rules for the protection 
of natural persons with regards to the processing of their personal data. It grants 
people working through platforms a range of rights regarding their personal data, 
regardless of their employment status. Such rights include, among others:  

—  the right of access to personal data, including the right to obtain a copy 

of one’s personal data undergoing processing;  

—  the  right  to  rectification,  including  the  right  to  have  one’s  data 

corrected if it is inaccurate;  

—  the  right  to  obtain  from  a  data  controller  a  restriction  of  the 

processing of one’s data under certain conditions;  

—  the  right  to  data  portability,  including  the  right  to  receive  and  have  one’s 
personal  data  transmitted  directly  from  a  controller  to  another,  where 
technically feasible; 
—  the  right  not  to  be  subject  to  a  decision  based  solely  on  automated 
processing  which  produces  legal  effects  concerning  the  data  subject  or 
similarly significantly affects him or her (with certain exceptions), as well 
as  the  right  to  transparency  on  the  existence  of  automated  decision-
making.  Where  automated  processing  is  permitted  under  the  exceptions, 

237 Regulation (EU) 2019/1150. Available online. 
238 Regulation (EU) 2016/679. Available online.    

141 

 
 
                                                           
the data controller must implement suitable measures to safeguard the data 
subject’s rights and freedoms and legitimate interests, at least the right to 
obtain human intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or 
her point of view and to contest the decision. 

While the latter is particularly relevant for people working through platforms subject to 
algorithmic  management,  recent  court  cases  have  highlighted  the  limitations  and 
difficulties  that  workers  –  and  most  notably  platform  workers  –  face  when  aiming  to 
assert  their  data  protection  rights  in  the  context  of  algorithmic  management.239  This 
concerns in  particular the difficulty to  draw the line between algorithmic decisions that 
do  or  do  not  affect  workers  in  a  sufficiently  ‘significant’  way.  Moreover,  while  the 
GDPR  grants  individual  rights  to  the  people  affected,  it  does  not  encompass  important 
collective  aspects  inherent  in  labour  law,  including  as  regards  the  role  of  workers’ 
representatives,  information  and  consultation  of  workers  and  the  role  of  labour 
inspectorates  in  enforcing  labour  rights.  The  legislator  therefore  provided  for  the 
possibility of more specific rules on data protection in the employment context, including 
as regards the organisation of work (Article 88 GDPR).  

  The  Late  Payment  Directive240  regulates  payment  terms  in  commercial 
transactions,  lays  down  penalties  in  case  of  delayed  or  non-payment  and 
addresses unfair payment  provisions and practices. The Directive applies  to  any 
commercial  transaction,  intended  as  the  supply  of  goods  and/or  provision  of 
services in exchange of payment, either between public authorities and businesses 
(G2B)  or  between  businesses  (B2B),  including  self-employed  people  working 
through platforms.  

In  addition  to  these  existing  laws,  the  European  Commission  has  recently  put  forward 
legislative proposals that may be of relevance to people working through platforms:  

  The  Digital  Services  Act  package,  which  includes  the  Digital  Services  Act 
(DSA) and the Digital Markets Act (DMA). The proposals were adopted by the 
European  Commission  in  December  2020  and  are  now  undergoing  the  ordinary 
legislative procedure.  

—  The  DSA  primarily  concerns  providers  of  intermediary  services,  and 
many of its provisions focus on  online  platforms.241 For example, online 
marketplaces,  social  networks,  content-sharing  platforms,  app  stores  as 
well  as  online  travel  and  accommodation  platforms  could  fall  within  the 
scope of the DSA. It sets out due diligence obligations for digital services 
as regards the fight of illegal content online, including potentially illegal 
listings  on  digital  labour  platforms,  while  preserving  the  fundamental 
rights  of  their  users  and  ensuring  the  competitiveness  and  innovation  of 
digital  services.  The  proposed  regulation  sets  out  obligations  for  online 
intermediaries  related  to  their  terms  and  conditions  as  regards  the 
restrictions  they  impose  on  the  use  of  information  provided  by  the 
recipients  of  the  service,  including  algorithmic  decision-making  and 
human  review,  and  the  enforcement  of  such  restrictions,  transparency 
reporting  obligations,  risk  assessment  obligations  and  risk  mitigation 

239 ECE, Jurisprudence of national courts in Europe on algorithmic management at the workplace, August 
2021 (forthcoming). 
240 Directive (EU) 2011/7. Available online.   
241 This term is used in the DSA and is broader than than “digital labour platforms.  

142 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
measures  for very large  online platforms as  regards the dissemination of 
the  prohibition  of 
the  negative  effects  for 
illegal  content  and 
discrimination,  as  enshrined  in  the  Charter.  The  DSA  also  provides  that 
national authorities can order, on the basis of national or  other EU laws, 
intermediaries  to  provide  them  information  about  the  recipients  of  their 
services  so  that  authorities  can  assess  compliance  by  such  recipients  of 
services with national or EU laws.  

—  The  DMA  includes  rules  that  govern  so-called  ‘gatekeeper  online 
platforms’.  According  to  the  proposal,  gatekeepers  are  providers  of  core 
platform  services  (e.g.  online  intermediation  services)  with  an  important 
impact in the internal market, which act as gateways between businesses 
and consumers.  It  can-not  be excluded that the Digital  Markets  Act  may 
also  be  relevant  for  digital  labour  platforms  should  such  platforms 
constitute  core  platform  services  within  the  meaning  of  the  Digital 
Markets  Act,  and  should  providers  of  these  platforms  be  designated  as 
gatekeepers. 

tackles 

issues  related 

  When adopted, the proposed AI Act242 will address risks linked to the use of 
certain  AI  systems.  The  proposed  regulation 
to 
development, deployment and use of AI systems. It lists certain AI systems used 
in employment, worker management and access to self-employment that are to be 
considered as high-risk. It puts forward mandatory requirements that AI systems 
must comply with, as well as obligations for providers and users of such systems. 
Among other things, the proposal for an AI Act  imposes requirements to enable 
human  oversight  and  extensive  documentation  on  high-risk  AI  systems  and 
requires improved transparency of information to users (e.g. platform companies) 
of high-risk AI systems. The proposed AI Act foresees specific requirements on 
documentation, logging and transparency, and will ensure that platforms as users 
of high-risk AI systems will have access to the necessary information. In addition, 
the proposed AI Act addresses inherent challenges in the development of AI, such 
as  bias,  notably  by  setting  requirements  for  high-quality  datasets,  helping  to 
tackle the risk of bias and discrimination. 

  The  proposal  for  a  Machinery  Regulation,  which  was  adopted243  by  the 
European  Commission  in  April  2021,  has  implications  for  machinery  with 
embedded  AI  systems.  It  is  currently  undergoing  the  ordinary  legislative 
procedure.  

  The  amended  Directive  on  Administrative  Cooperation  (DAC7)244  was 
formally  adopted  on  22  March  2021.  It  sets  out  new  tax  transparency  rules  for 
digital  platforms  ensuring 
that  Member  States  automatically  exchange 
information on the revenues generated by sellers on digital platforms, whether the 
platform  is  located  in  the  EU  or  not.  It  could  have  an  indirect  effect  on  (self-
employed)  people  working  through  platforms  by  giving  more  legal  clarity  to 
digital  labour  platforms,  and  thus  scope  for  growth  with  the  additional  job 
opportunities this would bring. Importantly, the Directive only concerns reporting 
and consequent exchange of information regarding self-employed business users. 

242 COM(2021). Available online. 
243 COM (2021). Available online. 
244 Council Directive (EU) 2021/514 of 22 March 2021 amending Directive 2011/16/EU on administrative 
cooperation in the field of taxation ST/12908/2020/INIT, OJ L 104, 25.3.2021, p. 1–26. Available online.  

143 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
  A forthcoming separate EU initiative aims to ensure that EU competition law 
does  not  stand  in  the  way  of  collective  bargaining  for  self-employed  in  a 
weak  position.  Indeed,  under  competition  law,  self-employed  people  are  in 
principle  considered  “undertakings”  and  risk  infringing  the  prohibition  of  anti-
competitive  agreements  under  Article  101  TFEU,  if  they  negotiate  collectively 
their  fees  and  other  trading  conditions.  The  initiative  aims  at  providing  legal 
certainty  about  the  applicability  of  EU  competition  law  to  collective  bargaining 
by solo self-employed. It focuses on removing the chilling effect of competition 
law  on  collective  negotiations  by  some  solo  self-employed  who  may  have  little 
influence over their working conditions (in particular, solo self-employed who are 
in a position comparable to that of workers or in a weak bargaining position vis-à-
vis  their  counterparties).  It    does  not  require  the  conclusion  of  collective 
agreements  (which  remains  voluntary  among  the  negotiating  parties)  but  only 
clarifies  under  which  conditions  agreements  of  certain  solo  self-employed  with 
their counterparties may not fall under Article 101 TFEU or trigger a Commission 
intervention.  This  should among other things, reduce  enforcement and litigation 
risks (and the respective costs).  

Both  Commission  initiatives  cover  people  working  through  digital  labour 
platforms whose working conditions need to be improved. However, the initiative 
on the applicability of EU competition law does not cover workers (nor solo self-
employed who have been reclassified as workers). Moreover, the initiative on the 
applicability  of  EU  competition  law  on  collective  agreements  may  cover  also 
other  solo  self-employed  in  a  weak  position,  e.g.  those  who  are  active  in  the 
offline economy.  It is thus broader in scope than the initiative supported by this 
report, because it is not limited to digital labour platforms.  

The  initiative  on  the  applicability  of  EU  competition  law  would  have  a  direct 
effect on the people targeted by the initiative supported by this report only to the 
extent  it  would  bring  increased  legal  certainty,  notably  regarding  collective 
agreements of self-employed people working through digital labour platforms and 
only in so far these people have not been reclassified as workers.  

  The  forthcoming  Data  Act  initiative245  aims,  i.a.,  at  facilitating  business-to-
government  (B2G)  data-sharing.  Amongst  the  envisaged  measures,  B2G  data-
sharing  obligations  would  allow  public  authorities  to  request  companies 
processing data share such data for reasons of public interest. At the moment of 
writing  this  report,  the  Data  Act  proposal  had  not  yet  been  adopted. 
Notwithstanding potential changes in the proposal occurring after the publication 
of  this  report,  the  B2G  data-sharing  obligations  for  companies  processing  data 
would  likely  not  apply  to  small  and  micro  enterprises.  This  carve-out  may 
exclude several digital labour platforms from the scope of the Data Act.  

At  the  moment  of  writing  this  report,  the  Data  Act  also  foresaw  obligations  for 
companies  offering  data  storage  and  data  processing  services  linked  to  an 
underlying  product,  to  ensure  data  portability  to  their  customers  (e.g.  a  smart 
watch which stores and processes the health data of its owner). Such obligations, 

245 Available online.  

144 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
however,  would  not  apply  to  digital  labour  platforms,  which,  while  processing 
data, do not offer data storage services linked to an underlying product.  

Finally, it should be noted that  the existing jurisprudence on the applicability of the 
EU’s internal market acquis to digital labour platforms is not conclusive, mostly due 
to  their  constantly  evolving  business  models  that  make  laws  and  rulings  difficult  to 
future-proof.  For  instance,  the  CJEU  ruled  in  2017  that  UberPop,  one  of  the  services 
offered by Uber connecting non-professional drivers to customers, must not be classified 
as an information society service, but must be regarded as forming an integral part of an 
overall transport service which was thus subject to national transport regulations and did 
not  benefit  from  certain  protections  under  the  EU  internal  market  laws.246  Uber 
subsequently  ceased  to  offer  its  UberPop  service,  defining  itself  since  then  as  falling 
under the scope of information society services’ regulations, such as the P2B Regulation 
and the forthcoming DSA, rather than national transport regulations. In another case, the 
CJEU  ruled  in  2020  that  a  service  that  puts  taxi  passengers  directly  in  touch  with  taxi 
drivers by means of an electronic application, such as the one offered by Star Taxi App 
SRL, constitutes an information society service where it does not form an integral part of 
an overall service the principal component of which is the provision of transport.247 

246 CJEU, cases C-434/15, Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi (Uber Spain). Available online.  
247  CJEU,  cases  C-62/19,  Star  Taxi  App  SRL  v  Unitatea  Administrativ  Teritorială  Municipiul  Bucureşti. 
Available online. 

145 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Elements 
of 
the  preferred 
option 
on 
algorithmic 
management 
Increasing 
transparency  / 
improved 
information 
sharing 

Annex  8:  Overview  of  complementarities  of  the  preferred 

option with the proposed AI Act and GDPR  

Needs  to  specify  rights  regarding 
algorithmic  management  in  platform 
work (to be covered in the forthcoming 
initiative) 

Neither  GDPR  nor  guidelines  endorsed 
by EDPB define which type of decisions 
are significant enough specifically in the 
platform  work  context  to  fall  under  the 
GDPR transparency requirement.  

activities  where 

In case a data controller refuses to inform 
a data subject claiming that the decision-
making is not based solely on automated 
processing,  it  would  be  difficult  for  a 
data subject to verify this and to exercise 
effectively  his  or  her  rights  under  the 
GDPR. 
People  working through platforms  might 
not  be  fully  aware  of  the  personal  data 
processed  by  monitoring  systems  or  the 
processing 
such 
information  is  used  for  decisions  by 
automated  decision-making  systems,  so 
they  might  face  difficulty  to  formulate 
specific data requests.  
It might be necessary to specify the main 
points  which  people  working  through 
representatives  and 
platforms, 
national  labour  authorities  should  be 
informed about.  
GDPR rights are individual rights. Due to 
the  structural  imbalance  of  power  in 
labour 
on 
automated  systems  (though  not  personal 
data) 
to 
defend 
empowered 
institutions 
workers’ rights or ensure enforcement of 
such 
workers’ 
representatives  and 
labour  authorities 
(both  dimensions  not  covered  by  AIA 
and GDPR).   

should  also  be  provided 

information 

relations, 

namely 

rights, 

their 

to 

GDPR 

Proposed AI Act 

to 

on 

data 

13(2)(f), 

Art.  12-15:  General  information 
duties  of  the  data  controller  (i.e. 
the  platform)  towards  the  data 
subject  (i.e.  the  person  working 
through 
the 
platforms) 
collection and processing of  data. 
Communication should be done in 
a  concise,  transparent,  intelligible 
and  easily  accessible  form,  using 
clear and plain language.  . 
and 
Art. 
14(2)(g) 
to 
15(1)(h)  require  controllers 
provide 
subjects 
information  on  “the  existence  of 
automated  decision-making  …, 
meaningful  information  about  the 
logic  involved,  as  well  as  the 
significance  and  the  envisaged 
consequences  of  such  processing 
subject.”  This 
for 
to 
requirement 
limited 
is 
based 
decisions 
on 
solely 
automated 
processing  which 
produces  “legal  effects  …  or 
similarly significantly affect” data 
subjects.  
Recital  63:  Where  the  controller 
large  quantity  of 
processes  a 
information,  it  can  request  that 
data 
the 
information 
processing 
activities to which they relate. 

the  data 

requests 

specify 

or 

Art.13: 
for  AI 
obligation 
providers to ensure transparency 
and  provision  of  information  to 
users  of  high-risk  AI  systems 
(i.e. platforms).  
the 
No  obligations  vis-à-vis 
people  affected  by  AI  systems 
(i.e. workers).  

146 

 
 
 
Human 
oversight 
review 

/ 

a 

based 

person 

Art.  22  provides  for  the  right  for 
data subjects not to be subject to a 
on 
decision 
solely 
automated 
processing,  which 
produces  legal  effects  or  affects 
the 
similarly 
in 
significant way. 
few 
There  are,  however,  a 
the 
e.g.  where 
exceptions, 
decision 
on 
solely 
automated processing is necessary 
the 
for 
performance of a contract. 
In  such  cases,  the  data  controller 
must 
suitable 
safeguards, at least the right of the 
data  subjects  to  obtain  human 
intervention  (ex  post),  to  express 
their point of  view and to contest 
the decision.  

implement 

entering 

based 

into 

or 

of 

/ 

Review 
individual 
decisions 
complaint 
handling  

right 

Art.  22(3)  –  see  above:  the  data 
controller 
implement 
shall 
suitable measures to safeguard the 
data subject's rights and freedoms 
and  legitimate  interests,  at  least 
the 
to  obtain  human 
intervention  on  the  part  of  the 
controller,  to  express  his  or  her 
point  of  view  and  to  contest  the 
decision. 
Recital  71  -  …processing  should 
be  subject  to  suitable  safeguards, 
which  should 
include  specific 
information  to  the  data  subject 
and  the  right  to  obtain  human 
intervention, to express his or her 
to  obtain  an 
point  of  view, 
explanation 
decision 
the 
of 
reached after such assessment and 
to challenge the decision. 
Art.12(3):  -  The  controller  shall 
provide  information    on  action 
taken on a request  under Articles 

in 

particular 

oversight 
and 

Require  platforms  to  ensure  effective 
of 
human 
automated 
decision-making 
monitoring 
systems, 
individual 
decisions  taken  or  supported  by  such 
systems (compared to generalised human 
oversight  measures,  to  be  determined  by 
the providers of AI systems under the AI 
Act proposal). 
Ensure  that  the  people  in  charge  of 
human  oversight  have 
the  necessary 
competence, training and authority. 
Ensure 
adverse 
consequences  for  the  persons  exercising 
human 
overriding 
oversight 
automated decisions. 

protection 

from 

for 

Specify which decisions in particular are 
significant  enough  in  the  platform  work 
context  to  warrant  an  obligation  for 
platforms  to  provide  reasons  and  review 
such decisions. 
Require  a  prior  written  statement  of 
reasons in case of such highly significant 
decisions. 
Avoid  purely 
handling. 
Shortened  periods  for  reaction  in  cases 
where people working through platforms 
request  review  of  highly  significant 
decisions  (GDPR  foresees  1+2  months 
period). 

automated 

complaint 

Art.  14  –  High  risk  AI  systems 
must be designed and developed 
in  such  a  way  that  they  can  be 
effectively  overseen  by  natural 
persons. 

to 

fully 

signs 

understand 

Article  14  (4):The  measures  … 
shall  enable  the  individuals  to 
whom  human  oversight 
is 
assigned to do the following, as 
appropriate 
the 
circumstances: 
(a) 
the 
capacities and limitations of the 
high-risk AI system and be able 
to duly monitor its operation, so 
that 
anomalies, 
of 
dysfunctions  and  unexpected 
performance  can  be  detected 
soon  as 
and  addressed  as 
possible; 
(c) be able to correctly interpret 
the  high-risk  AI 
system’s 
output,  taking  into  account  in 
particular  the  characteristics  of 
the system and the interpretation 
tools and methods available; 
(d)  be  able  to  decide,  in  any 
particular  situation,  not  to  use 
the  high-risk  AI  system  or 
otherwise  disregard,  override  or 
reverse  the  output  of  the  high-
risk AI system; 
Recital  48:  The  natural  persons 
to  whom  human  oversight  has 
been  assigned  should  have  the 
necessary  competence,  training 
and  authority  to  carry  out  that 
role. 
No 
for 
specific  provisions 
redress  for  people  affected  by 
AI systems. 

147 

 
 
 
Consultation 
with  workers’ 
representatives 
on  substantial 
changes 
in 
work 
organisation or 
in  contractual 
relations 
linked 
algorithmic 
management 
Restrictions on 
data  collecting 
and processing 

to 

15  to  22  to  the  data  subject 
without  undue  delay  and  in  any 
event within one month of receipt 
of the request. That period may be 
extended  by  two  further  months 
into 
where  necessary, 
and 
the 
account 
number of the requests. 
Not applicable. 

taking 
complexity 

Not applicable. 

Introduce  an  obligation  for  platforms  to 
carry out information and consultation of 
workers  and  their  representatives  on 
decisions  regarding  the  introduction  or 
substantial  changes 
the  use  of 
automated  monitoring  and  decision-
making systems.  

in 

to 

relation 

in 
for  which 

Article  5  -  processing  has  to  be 
lawful,  personal  data  has  to  be 
collected  for  specified,  explicit 
and  legitimate  purposes  (purpose 
limitation)  and  limited  to  what  is 
the 
necessary 
purposes 
they  are 
processed (data minimisation). 
to  be 
Article  6  -  processing 
considered  lawful  whenever  it  is 
necessary  for  the  performance  of 
a  contract  or  consent  has  been 
granted  freely.  Consent  in  the 
employment  context  can  only 
rarely  be  considered  as  freely 
given.  Contract  as  a  legal  basis 
allows  only  the  processing  of 
personal data which is objectively 
necessary  for  the  performance  of 
the 
in 
question. 
GDPR  recognises  there  is  scope 
for  more  specific  labour  market 
rules. See recital 155 and Art. 88: 
“Member  States  may,  by  law  or 
by  collective  agreements,  provide 
for  more  specific  rules  to  ensure 
the  protection  of  the  rights  and 
freedoms 
the 
processing of employees' personal 
data in the employment context...” 

employment 

respect  of 

contract 

in 

that 

are  not 

Specify  that  digital  labour  platforms 
should not collect any data from platform 
workers 
intrinsically 
connected  to  and  strictly  necessary  for 
the organisation of work.  
Specify  what  in  particular  is  considered 
such data  that  should not be  collected in 
the context of platform work. 

Not applicable 

148 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 9: Relevance of national initiatives on platform work 

Nota  bene:  all  national  initiatives  addressing  platform  work  are  relatively  recent,  so  it 
was  not  possible  to  access  data  on  the  effects  of  their  practical  implementation.  While 
some  information  was  provided  by  Member  States’  authorities  in  their  national 
implementation plans of the Council Recommendation on access to social protection for 
workers  and  the  self-employed,  this  described  the  policy  measures  and  did  not  assess 
them.  

a) National initiatives related to employment status and working conditions 

National  responses  to  platform  work  are  diverse  and  are  developing  unevenly  across 
Europe.  A  few  EU  Member  States  (EL,  ES,  FR,  IT  and  PT)  adopted  national 
legislation  specifically  targeting  the  improvement  of  working  conditions  and/or 
access to social protection in platform work. In other Member States (AT, DK, EE, FI, 
HU, HR,  LU, RO,  SK  and SI), people working through platforms may be impacted by 
wider  legislation.  In  others  (DE,  LT  and  NL)  potentially  relevant  legislation  is  being 
debated.  

National  legislation  has  been  mostly  adopted  in  specific  sectors,  e.g.  in  the  sectors  of 
ride-hailing  services  and/or  in  food  delivery  services.  In  total,  national  experts  have 
catalogued  177  relevant  measures  across  the  EU27,  the  UK,  Norway  and  Iceland, 
excluding  tools  considered  very  general,  for  example  general  labour  law  (see  Figure 
13).248  These  177  measures  include  civil-society  actions,  such  as  collective  bargaining 
agreements and platform-driven responses.  

Figure 13: National initiatives related to platform work, including of civil society  

248  This  number  should  be  understood  very  cautiously,  as  it  is  not  always  easy  to  decide  when  a  tool  is 
relevant  enough  to  include,  Moreover,  it  often  proved  difficult  to  find  and  verify  responses  that  were 
initiated but abandoned, or simply pending. 

149 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
them:  dependent  employment  contracts  or 

In  Greece,  a  new  law249  was  approved  by  Parliament  in  June  2021.  It  introduces 
measures  for  people  working  through  platforms  by  officially  recognising  two  ways  of 
collaboration  between 
independent 
services/work  contracts.  It  de  facto  introduces  a  rebuttable  presumption  of  self-
employment  based  on  legal  criteria.  Most  importantly,  the  providers  of  independent 
services would acquire similar rights to those of workers; it provides for natural persons 
associated with these platforms with trade union rights, rights to establish a trade  union 
organisation, negotiate and draft collective agreements and go on strike. In that way, the 
rights  of  workers  on  platforms  are  to  be  protected,  regardless  of  the  type  of  contract 
through which they are connected with the platform.250 

In  Spain,  the  2021  ‘Ley  Riders’  law251  introduces  a  legal  presumption  that  delivery 
platform riders and drivers in the food and parcel delivery sector are workers, placing the 
burden on the platform to prove otherwise. The new law also requires the companies to 
provide trade unions with details on how, amongst other things, their AI systems assign 
jobs  and  judge  workers’  performance.  The  law  was  ratified  on  11  May  2021  and 
established  that  platforms  had  3  months  to  comply  with  new  regulations  and  reclassify 
the  concerned  people  as  workers,  granting  them  new  rights  as  well  as  access  to  social 
protection contributions.  

France  is  the  only  EU  Member  State  which  has  adopted  legislation  providing  some 
labour  and  social  rights  to  people  working  through  platforms  irrespective  of  the 
sector of economic activity, through a revision of the Labour Code in 2016.252 The law 
specifically  targets  technologically  and  economically  dependent  self-employed  by 
granting them access to a voluntary insurance against work accidents. Platforms have to 
pay the premiums unless they are providing a collective insurance for people working for 
them. People working through platforms are also granted the right to form a trade union, 
to  take  collective  actions  and  to  continuing  education  and  validation  of  the  acquired 
experience.  France  has  also  recently  adopted  a  transportation  law  (2019)253  which, 
amongst  other  things,  addresses  platform  work.  It  introduces  voluntary  charters  in 
which  platforms  can  offer  rights  and  obligations  to  riders,  while  classifying  them  as 
independent contractors. While the above mentioned Labour Code provisions apply to 
platform  work  as  self-employed  activity,  following  two  Court  de  cassation  rulings 
recognising  worker  status  of  people  working  through  platforms254  there  are  ongoing 
discussions  in  France  on  the  employment  status  of  people  working  through  platforms. 
Different  possibilities  are  being  considered,  including  the  use  of  a  third  operator  to 
provide  self-employed  people  working  through  platforms  with  the  status  of  worker 
(‘portage salarial’ or the use of existing legal status of ‘employed partner of a cooperative 
society’).255 

249 Law 4808/2021. Available online. 
250  T.  Koukoulaki,  E.  Georgiadou,  K.  Kapsali  (not  published).  Data  collection  template  for  Greece,  the 
Study  to  support  the  impact  assessment  of  an  EU  initiative  on  improving  the  working  conditions  of 
platform workers. 
251 Available online.  
252  Loi  n.  2016-1088  du  8  août  2016  relative  au  travail,  à  la  modernisation  du  dialogue  social  et  à  la 
sécurisation des parcours professionnels (1), also known as Loi El Khomri. Available online. 
253 Loi d’orientation de mobilite (LOM) 24.12.2019. Available online. 
254 Take Eat Easy (18 November 2018, case 17-20.079) and Uber (4 March 2020, case 19-13.316) 
255 J-Y Frouin (2020) Available online 

150 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
In  Italy,  regional  legislation  in  Piedmont  and  Lazio  (2019)256  directly  addresses  the 
working  conditions  and  social  protection  of  people  working  through  platforms  by 
improving  the  labour  and  social  rights  of  all  platform  workers  irrespective  of  their 
employment status. This includes minimum protection for all ‘digital workers’ including 
protection  in  the  event  of  accidents  at  work,  safety  training,  liability  and  accident 
insurance, and certain  social protections.  The law also  reiterates regional  prohibition  of 
compensation per task. In 2019, Italy also adopted national, specific legislation257 with 
a  view  to  increase  the  protection  of  the  working  conditions  of  self-employed  food 
delivery riders. The law provides: 

the right to have written and transparent working conditions;  
the right to information;  

 
 
  prohibition of piece-rate payments while hourly pay-rates have to be determined 
in  accordance  with  the  minimum  wages  that  are  paid  on  the  basis  of  collective 
agreements applied to workers in a similar sector;  
the right to supplementary payments for night work, work on public holidays and 
work performed in other exceptional circumstances. 

 

In  Portugal,  legislation  was  adopted  in  2018258  on  digital  labour  platforms  in  the 
passenger  transport  sector.  The  law  aims  at  regulating  the  activity  of  individual  paid 
transport  of  passengers  by  ordinary  vehicles  (TVDE).  By  stipulating  that  only  legal 
persons can be contracted by ride-hailing digital labour platforms, the law is addressing 
some of the challenges faced by drivers when they are directly engaged by a (most often 
local) company. The law also  ensures working  time limitations of drivers by  clarifying 
which existing provisions apply depending on whether the driver is  a worker or a self-
employed. In addition, it forbids the driver from working longer than 10 hours in a period 
of 24 hours. This rule applies regardless of the number of TVDE platforms with which 
the drivers have a contract. Also, the Green Paper on the future of work was presented in 
November 2020 to the social partners. It addresses several challenges related to platform 
work and includes proposals such as:  

 

 
 

the  creation  of  a  legal  presumption  on  the  status  of  worker  for  people  working 
through platforms;  
improved social protection for the self-employed; 
the collective representation of people working through platforms. 

In  Austria, in  early 2021, the Occasional  Transport Act259 was reformed to  cover both 
taxi  and  car  rental  companies,  with  which  ride-hailing  platforms  like  Uber  and  Bolt 
cooperate  in  the  country.  This  law  now  regulates  working  time  for  self-employed 
drivers,  including  the  weekly  maximum  of  48  hours,  resting  periods,  and  night  shifts. 
Furthermore,  self-employed  drivers  and  drivers  with  a  service  contract  in  passenger 
transportation are, according to the law, required to receive regular training. 

Denmark  has  put  forward  various  legislative  initiatives  that  indirectly  touch  upon  the 
working conditions of people working through platforms.260 For instance, the September 

256 Regione Lazio, Legge Regionale 12 aprile 2019, n.4.Available online.  
257 Legge 2 novembre 2019, n. 128, Conversione in legge, con modificazioni, del decreto-legge 3 settembre 
2019, n. 101. Available online. 
258 Ley n. 45/2018 Regime jurídico da atividade de trasporte individual e remunderado de passageiros em 
veículos descaracterizadosa partir de plataforma electrónica. Available online. 
259 Austria, Occasional Transportation Act (Gelegenheitsverkehrsgesetz) April 2021. Available online. 
260 PPMI (2021).  

151 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
2020 labour law reform reiterates the incentive to become self-employed and to improve 
the pay compensation  –  beyond maternity and parental benefits  – during  maternity  and 
parental  leave.  The  proposal  aims  at  ensuring  that  the  self-employed  (including  people 
working  through  platforms)  would  have  equal  access  to  social  protection  related  to 
childbirth  and  care  (as  workers  who  are  classified  as  employees  do).  Moreover,  it 
guarantees  that  self-employed  would  also  be  entitled  to  compensation  from  the 
equalisation  scheme.  Therefore,  people  working  through  platforms  would  have  greater 
financial  security  to,  for  example,  cover  the  fixed  expenses  of  their  business  while  on 
maternity and parental leave. The proposal is not yet adopted.   

In 2018, Estonia created a new legal form of self-employment, following debates on the 
future  of  work  and  digitalization  of  markets  and  economy.  The  Simplified  Business 
Income  Taxation  Act261 
‘part-time  self-employment 
intermediated  by  on-request  services  like  transportation,  accommodation,  and  food 
delivery’.  The  regulation  launches  a  system  of  Entrepreneur  Account  through  which 
natural  persons  can  sell  services  and  goods  to  other  natural  persons  and  sell  goods  to 
legal persons for up to EUR 25,000 annually (in order to avoid the abuse, no services can 
be sold to legal persons).  

the  status  of 

introduced 

Between  2017  and  2019,  Finland  amended  its  Act  on  Transport  Services262  to  include 
preconditions  for  digitalisation  and  new  business  concepts  in  transport,  and  promoting 
competition. The key aim of this initiative is the provision of customer-oriented transport 
services,  pursued  by  removing  taxi  permit  caps  and  fare  restrictions.  The  deregulation 
removed  the  numerical  restrictions  on  taxi  licences,  the  maximum  price  regulation  and 
the obligation to be organized by a dispatch centre. The new taxi legislation essentially 
legalized the previously ‘paused’ Uber Pop and made it possible for Uber to re-introduce 
a service organized with  self-employed drivers using their own cars (called Uber X) in 
Helsinki. The deregulation also opened the market to other ridesharing companies.   

In  2016,  Hungary  passed  Law  no.  LXXV,  requiring  ride-hailing  services  to  obtain 
dispatcher  services  permits,  which  were  required  for  traditional  taxi  companies.263 
Following  the  law,  Uber  ceased  operations  in  Hungary,  though  other  platforms  started 
operating  (i.e.  Taxify).264  Furthermore,  in  response  to  development  of  the  digital 
economy and its effect on the labour market skills, the Hungarian Government removed 
some restrictions towards short courses (under 30 hours) in order to have a more flexible 
approach towards such learning. 

In  2021,  Croatia  adopted  a  new  immigration  law  which  will  have  implications  for 
foreign  people  who  work  through  platforms.  It  introduced  the  special  category  of 
workers, the ‘digital nomads’. According to the Law, a digital nomad is a third-country 
national who is employed or performs business through communication technology for a 
company  or  his  own  company  that  is  not  registered  in  Croatia  and  does  not  perform 
business or provide services to employers in the territory of Croatia. As of 2021, digital 
nomads are entitled to a special kind of ‘nomad visa’ which allows them to pay income 
taxes in their home countries or where they legally reside. According to this law, a digital 
nomad that stays in the country for more than a year will be able to ask for permanent 

261 Riigikogu (2017). Simplified Business Income Taxation Act. Available here. 
262 Available online.  
263 Dunai, Marton (2016). Hungary passes law that could block Uber sites. Reuters. Available online. 
264 Meszmann T. T. (2018). Industrial Relations and Social Dialogue in the Age of Collaborative Economy 
(IRSDACE), National Report Hungary, CELSI Research report 27. Available online.  

152 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
residence.  Potentially  this  could  increase  the  number  of  people  working  through 
platforms in the country.265  

In  2020,  Luxembourg’s  Chambers  of  Workers  launched  a  comprehensive  legislative 
proposal266 to  treat  people  working  through platforms  as  posted workers,  meaning  they 
would  have  same  rights  as  employees.  This  proposal  has  been  discussed  in  the 
Parliament, but it is yet to be voted on. In 2021, a new legal reform of the taxi sector (Loi 
n. 7762) was  passed.  It  will come into force on  1 January 2022 and will include rental 
cars  with  driver  services  in  the  ‘taxi’ legislation. The  reform could translate into better 
conditions  for  ride-hailing  drivers  on  platforms,  aiming  at  putting  them  ‘on  the  same 
footing’ with ‘traditional’ taxi drivers in terms of rights and working conditions.267 

In July 2019, in Romania, a Government Emergency Ordinance 49/2019268 was passed 
to  regulate  the  ride-haling  sector  and  level  the  playing  field  between  ride-hailing 
platforms  and  traditional  transport  activities,  thereby  ensuring  that  providers  offer  a 
professional  service  in  safe  conditions.  The  ride-hailing  platforms  are  obliged  to  keep 
records  of  each  ride  for  5  years.  The  digital  platform  operator  is  obliged  to  have  and 
make  available  to  the  competent  authorities  all  the  required  information  they  have  on 
activities by  alternative transport operators via the digital  platform.  The obligations are 
necessary  to  ensure  that  a  company  is  abiding  by  work  and  rest  time  regulations.  This 
information  can  be  checked  against  the  Labour  Inspectorate  database  regarding  labour 
contracts. The ordinance entered into force on July 4, 2019. 

In  2019,  Slovakia  adopted  legislation  introducing  a  wider  definition  for  ‘dispatching 
services’  (platforms  are  not  considered  taxi  companies  but  dispatchers).  The  new 
legislation  abolished  several  requirements  that  were  previously  applied  to  the  taxi 
business, such as that to prove financial reliability, to have a proficiency test or to have a 
taximeter  at  all  times.269  This  new  definition  removed  most  of  the  requirements  for 
platform drivers that previously were applied and forced Uber to stop its operations in the 
country. The law has been in force since April 2019.  

At  the  end  of  2020,  Slovenia’s  government  adopted  a  proposal  to  amend  the  Road 
Transport Act270. This Act establishes a new type of work, occasional ‘chauffeur service’ 
(for which a state license is now obligatory), provides for the abolition of taximeters for 
taxi  drivers,  and  that  the  regulation  of  taxi  services  will  be  the  responsibility  of  local 
communities.  The  government  has  justified  this  policy  measure  as  an  opportunity  for 
entering  new  transport  services  and  work  through  platforms,  as  well  as  for  enhancing 
consumer choice and lower prices for users.271  

In addition to the aforementioned laws, several legislative proposals aiming at increasing 
protections  of  people  working  through  platforms  are  currently  being  discussed  by 
national administrations.  

265 Butković, Hrvoje (2021). European Centre of Expertise (ECE) in the field of labour law, employment 
and labour market policies. Thematic Review 2021 on Platform Work: Croatia. Luxembourg: Publications 
Office of the European Union, 2021. 
266  Luxembourg.  Chambers  of  Workers  (Chambre  of  Salariés  Luxembourg)  (2020).  Proposition  de  loi 
relative au travail fourni par l’intermédiaire d’une plateforme. Available online. 
267 PPMI (2021).  
268 PPMI (2021). 
269 De Groen W., Kilhoffer Z., Westhoff L., Postica D. and Shamsfakhr F. (2021). 
270 Road Transport Act. Available online (Accessed 14 December 2020).  
271 Gole, Nejc, (2020). Na mizi je zakon, ki bi v Slovenijo pripeljal Uber'. Delo, 9. 

153 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
In Germany, the Federal Ministry of Labour has published a Green and White Paper on 
the future of work, in which platform work has a prominent place. Among the proposed 
plans  are  the  inclusion  of  self-employed  people  working  through  platforms  into  the 
statutory  pension  insurance  scheme  and  the  improvement  of  their  work  accidents 
insurance.  The  Ministry  furthermore  proposes  to  establish  transparency  and  reporting 
obligations  for  all  platform  operators  and  the  right  to  portability  of  work  reviews  for 
people  working  through  platforms.  In  November  2020,  the  Federal  Ministry  of  Labour 
and Social Affairs issued a paper on ‘Fair Work in the Platform Economy”272, laying out 
key issues  it intends  to  look into to improve the working conditions  of people working 
through platforms. Among the proposals it will be considering is a reversal of the burden 
of  proof  to  facilitate  court  proceedings  regarding  the  potential  misclassification  of  the 
employment status of people working through platforms.  

In Lithuania, a draft proposal for amendment to the Commercial Code is currently being 
debated,  introducing  the  obligation  that  the  contracts  between  digital  labour  platforms 
and  self-employed  people  working  through  platforms  should  be  in  writing  and  contain 
provisions on the price, methods of payment, the procedures to change the contract terms 
and change of the prices. 

In  the  Netherlands,  the  debate  on  the  employment  status  of  people  working  through 
platforms is part of a wider debate on the growing diversification of non-standard forms 
of  work  and  flexible  work  arrangements  and  the  lack  of  coherence  between  labour, 
taxation  and  social  protection  legislation  between  the  different  employment  statuses.273 
The Netherlands already uses a legal rebuttable presumption of employment status which 
states that when a person performs work for more than twenty hours per month against 
remuneration for three consecutive months they are presumed to perform this work under 
a contract of employment. The burden of proof is shifted to the party that is engaging the 
worker.274 However, people working through platforms less than 20 hours per month in 
practice cannot rely on this legal presumption. In November 2020, the Dutch government 
announced it will further examine whether a legal presumption of employment status 
as a worker could be established specifically for platform work.275  

b) National initiatives related to the use of algorithms in the workplace 

Without  prejudice  to  the  internal  market  acquis,  existing  measures  address  more 
generally  algorithmic  management  at  the  workplace.  A  number  of  EU  Member  States 
have policies building on personal data protection laws or anti-discrimination legislation. 
This is the case in Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Estonia, France, Ireland, Luxembourg 
and  the  Netherlands.  Reference  to  privacy  policies  is  made  in  Czechia  and 
Luxembourg, while antidiscrimination legislation is built upon for the use of algorithmic 
management  and  AI  in  Germany  and  Italy.  In  Estonia,  legislation  on  legal 
responsibility has been highlighted as a relevant one for application also in the domain of 
AI  and  algorithmic  management.  In  Italy,  relevant  AI  policies  build  on  information 
rights  and  are  based  on  the  Charter  of  Bologna,  as  well  as  on  regulation  concerning 
remote monitoring.  

272 Available online. 
273 Commissie Regularing van Werk, (2020), In wat voor land willen wij werken?: naar een nieuw ontwerp 
voor regularing van werk  
274 an Voss, H (2017), “The Concept of ‘ Employee’: The Position in the Netherlands”. Available online. 
275 Letter of the Minister and the Secretary of State of Social Affairs and Employment. Available online.  

154 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Most Members States have also adopted or are in the process of adopting their national 
strategies on Artificial Intelligence, in line with the EU Coordinated Plan on Artificial 
Intelligence, which also refers to the impact of AI on the workplace.  

Belgium has adopted a guidebook on AI, which also stipulates recruitment processes via 
algorithmic management.  

In  January  2021,  Poland  saw  the  establishment  of  the  Policy  for  the  Development  of 
Artificial Intelligence, based on a Resolution of the Council of Ministers. This document 
seeks  to  regulate  the  use  of  AI  in  various  aspects  of  public  life,  including  work  and 
education, while acknowledging the risks connected with the use of digital technologies. 

Portugal  adopted  a  Green  Book  on  the  future  of  work,  which  also  includes  provisions 
for  stipulating  AI  at  workplaces.  In  addition,  Portugal  has  also  adopted  the  Charter  for 
Fundamental Rights in the Digital Era, which calls for transparency in using AI.  

No  EU  Member  State  has  adopted  legislation  specifically  addressing  algorithmic 
management  in  platform  work  with  the  exception  of  Spain,    where  the  ‘Ley  Riders’ 
passed in May 2021  includes a provision regarding transparency of algorithms and the 
use of AI to manage workforces. According to this, the worker needs to be informed of 
the parameters and rules on which algorithmic management is based, affecting decision-
making and impacting working conditions and access to work. 

c) National initiatives related to registration and reporting obligations 

In most Member States, digital labour platforms fall under the main national regulations 
applicable to businesses. No specific registration or licensing regime is applied, unless 
it  concerns  temporary  work  agencies,  which  are  usually  subject  to  specific  local 
registration or licensing legislation. Generally, platforms do not currently report on the 
payments  that  they  have  made  to  individual  people  working  through  platforms.  This 
may  lead  to  various  situations  of  un(der)declared  work  and  un(der)reported  income, 
especially given the transnational settings in which platform work is organised. However, 
several  Member  States  have  already  adopted  legislation  on  revenues  or  income 
generated by platforms or by people working through platforms. 

In France, since 2019, digital labour platforms are obliged to report to the tax authorities 
when payments to people working through them exceed EUR 3 000 per year. 

In Belgium, licensed digital labour platforms have to report annually to the Belgian tax 
authorities on the income that was paid to people working through them.  

In Estonia, in 2015, the government and ride-hailing platforms Taxify and Uber started 
to  collaborate  on  the  creation  of  an  information  system  to  simplify  the  income  and  tax 
declarations of the drivers. These have the option to declare their income through a pre-
filled form provided by the Tax and Customs Board. 

In Lithuania, since 2020, ride-hailing digital labour platforms are obliged to report to the 
tax authorities the data of the drivers that have made use of the app, as well as the income 
they have generated. Based on the data received, the tax authorities prepare preliminary 
tax returns for people working through ride-hailing digital labour platforms. 

155 

 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex  10:  Overview  of  decisions  by  national  courts  or 
administrative bodies on the employment status276 

Date 

Court/adminis
trative body 

Platform 

Classific
ation 

Conseque
nces 

Instan
ce 

Appeal 

Case No./link 

Uber 

self-
employed 

Belgium 
12/9/2015  Office  national 
de  la  sécurité 
sociale (ONSS) 
[National 
Social 
protection 
Office] 

23/2/2018  Commission 

Deliveroo 

worker 

9/3/2018 

Administrative 
de 
règlement 
de  la  relation 
de 
travail 
(CRT) 
[Administrativ
e  Commission 
for 
the 
Regulation  of 
Labour 
Relations] 
Commission 
Administrative 
de 
règlement 
de  la  relation 
de 
travail 
(CRT) 
[Administrativ
e  Commission 
for 
the 
Regulation  of 
Labour 
Relations] 

Deliveroo 

worker 

expertise 
Legal 
commissioned 
by 
the  Secretary  of 
State 
for  Social 
Fraud 

– 

116 
20180209 

FR 

– 

 - 

 - 

1st 

overruled 
for 
procedural 
reasons  by 
the 
the 
Labour 
Court 
3/7/2019 

on 

1st 

 - 

– 

113 
20180123 

FR 

– 

drivers 
responsible 
for  paying 
social 
protection 
contributio
ns 
reclassifica
tion 
for 
social 
protection 
purposes 
required 

reclassifica
tion 
for 
social 
protection 
purposes 
required 

16/1/2019  Tribunal 

de 

Uber 

self-
employed 

 - 

1st 

l’entreprise 
francophone de 
Bruxelles 
[Brussels 
Business 
Court] 

du 

Tribunal 
travail 
francophone de 
Bruxelles 
[Brussels 
Labour Court] 
Commission 
Administrative 
de 
règlement 
de  la  relation 
travail 
de 
(CRT) 
[Administrativ
e  Commission 
the 
for 

3/7/2019 

26/10/202
0 

Deliveroo 

 - 

Uber 

worker 

2nd 

1st 

the 

invalidatio
n  of 
CRT's 
decision  of 
9/3/2018 

Uber 
and 
the Belgian 
Platform 
rider 
association 
(BPRA) 
must  both 
be  seen  as 
employers  

R.G. 
A/18/02920 

no 

R.G. no 18/2076/A 

– 

187 
20200707 

FR 

– 

decision  on 
by 
appeal 
the 
Cour 
d'appel  de 
Bruxelles 
of 
15/1/2021 
not 
does 
focus 
on 
questions of 
worker 
status 
final 
decision 
pending 

appeal 
brought  by 
Uber before 
the Brussels 
Labour 
Court, 
pending 

276 For an analysis of this case-law including the criteria used for the assessment, see Annex A11.1. 

156 

 
                                                           
Regulation  of 
Labour 
Relations] 

Germany 
19/9/2018  Arbeitsgericht 

Fulda 
Labour Court] 

[Fulda 

self-
employed 

[platform 
linking  bus 
driver  and 
company] 

14/2/2019  Landesarbeitsg
ericht  Hessen 
[Hesse  Labour 
Appeals Court] 

[platform 
linking  bus 
driver  and 
company] 

self-
employed 

20/2/2019  Arbeitsgericht 

Roamler 

München 
[Munich 
Labour Court] 

self-
employed 

competenc
e  of 
the 
Civil Court 
instead  of 
the  Labour 
Court 
competenc
e  of 
the 
Civil Court 
instead  of 
the  Labour 
Court 
 - 

4/12/2019  Landesarbeitsg

Roamler 

self-
employed 

 - 

ericht 
München 
[Munich 
Labour 
Appeals Court] 
1/12/2020  Bundesarbeitsg
ericht  [Federal 
Labour Court] 

Denmark 
26/8/2020   Konkurrencerå
det 
(Competition 
Council) 

Roamler 

worker 

3rd 

referred 
back 
2nd 
instance  

to 

Hilfr 

self-
employed 

26/8/2020   Konkurrencerå
det 
(Competition 
Council) 

Happy 
Helper 

self-
employed 

Spain 
2/2/2017 

1/2018 

de 

Juzgado 
Mercantil 
Madrid 
[Madrid 
Commercial 
Court] 
Inspección  de 
trabajo [Labour 
Inspection] 

Blablacar  

self-
employed 

 - 

Deliveroo 

worker 

2/2018 

Inspección  de 
trabajo [Labour 
Inspection] 

Glovo 

worker 

29/5/2018 

Juzgado  de  lo 
Social 
de 
Barcelona 
[Barcelona 
Social Court] 

Take  Eat 
Easy 

worker 

law  by 

violation 
of 
competitio
n 
minimum 
pay rates 
violation 
of 
competitio
n 
minimum 
pay rates 

law  by 

retroactive 
imposition 
of 
social 
protection 
contributio
ns 
retroactive 
imposition 
of 
social 
protection 
contributio
ns 
reinstateme
nt 
and 
retroactive 
entitlement
s 
line 
in 
with 

157 

4 Ca 278/18 

1st 

upheld  by 
the  Labour 
Appeals 
Court 
14/2/2019 

on 

2nd 

 - 

10 Ta 350/18 

1st 

2nd 

on 

upheld  by 
the  Labour 
Appeals 
Court 
4/12/2019 
overruled 
by 
Federal 
Labour 
Court 
1/12/2020 
 - 

the 

on 

19 Ca 6915/18 

8 Sa 146/19 

9 AZR 102/20 

1st 

 - 

Konkurrencerådsaf
gørelse  den  26. 
august 2020 

1st 

 - 

Konkurrencerådsaf
gørelse  den  26. 
august 2020 

1st 

1st 

1st 

1st 

SJM M 6/2017  

non-published 
decision 

non-published 
decision 

213/2018 

 
 
 
 
 
Deliveroo 

worker 

1/6/2018 

Juzgado  de  lo 
Social 
de 
Valencia 
[Valencia 
Social Court] 

Glovo 

Glovo 

third 
category 
(TRADE) 

third 
category 
(TRADE) 

Glovo 

worker 

3/9/2018 

11/1/2019 

11/2/2019 

Juzgado  de  lo 
Social 
de 
Madrid 
[Madrid  Social 
Court] 
Juzgado  de  lo 
Social 
de 
Madrid 
[Madrid  Social 
Court] 

Juzgado  de  lo 
de 
Social 
Madrid 
[Madrid  Social 
Court] 

20/2/2019 

Juzgado  de  lo 
Social de Gijón 
[Gijón  Social 
Court] 

Glovo 

worker 

contract 
for 
indetermin
ate 
duration 
retroactive 
entitlement
line 
in 
s 
with 
contract 
for 
indetermin
ate 
duration 
 - 

1st 

244/2018 

1st 

284/2018 

12/2019 

53/2019 

the 

overruled 
by 
Madrid 
Appeals 
Court 
on 
27/11/2019 
upheld  by 
the Asturias 
Appeals 
Court 
25/7/2019 

on 

61/2019 

upheld  by 
the  Madrid 
Appeals 
Court 
3/2/2021 

on 

 - 

1st 

1st 

1st 

reinstateme
and 
nt 
retroactive 
entitlement
s 
line 
in 
with 
contract 
for 
indetermin
ate 
duration 
reinstateme
nt 
and 
retroactive 
entitlement
s 
line 
in 
with 
contract 
for 
indetermin
ate 
duration 
 - 

25/2/2019 

3/4/2019 

4/4/2019 

Juzgado  de  lo 
Social 
de 
Oviedo 
[Oviedo  Social 
Court] 
Juzgado  de  lo 
Social 
de 
Madrid 
[Madrid  Social 
Court] 
Juzgado  de  lo 
Social 
de 
Madrid 
[Madrid  Social 
Court] 

Glovo 

third 
category 
(TRADE) 

1st 

106/2019 

Glovo 

worker 

 - 

1st 

128/2019 

Glovo 

worker 

reinstateme
nt 
and 
retroactive 
entitlement
s 
line 
in 
with 
contract 
for 
indetermin
ate 
duration 
reinstateme

158 

1st 

134/2019 

1st 

upheld  by  130/2019 

4/4/2019 

Juzgado  de  lo  Glovo 

worker 

 
 
 
 
 
 
de 

Social 
Madrid 
[Madrid  Social 
Court] 

Juzgado  de  lo 
Social 
de 
Barcelona 
[Barcelona 
Social Court] 

Juzgado  de  lo 
de 
Social 
Barcelona 
[Barcelona 
Social Court] 

Juzgado  de  lo 
Social 
de 
Valencia 
[Valencia 
Social Court] 

Juzgado  de  lo 
Social 
de 
Barcelona 
[Barcelona 
Social Court] 
Juzgado  de  lo 
Social 
de 
Salamanca 
[Salamanca 
Social Court] 

Juzgado  de  lo 
Social 
de 
Madrid 
[Madrid  Social 
Court] 

29/5/2019 

21/5/2019 

10/6/2019 

11/6/2019 

14/6/2019 

22/7/2019 

de 
de 

10/6/2019  Tribunal 
Superior 
Justicia 
Asturias 
[Asturias 
Appeals Court] 
Juzgado  de  lo 
de 
Social 
Barcelona 
[Barcelona 
Social Court] 

30/7/2019 

de 
de 

19/9/2019  Tribunal 
Superior 
Justicia 
Madrid 
[Madrid 
Appeals Court] 
Tribunal 
Superior 
Justicia 
Madrid 

27/11/201
9 

de 
de 

nt 
and 
retroactive 
entitlement
s 
line 
in 
with 
contract 
for 
indetermin
ate 
duration 
 - 

1st 

 - 

1st 

retroactive 
imposition 
of 
social 
protection 
contributio
ns 
 - 

1st 

1st 

Glovo 

Glovo 

third 
category 
(TRADE) 

third 
category 
(TRADE) 

Deliveroo 

worker 

Deliveroo 

worker 

Glovo 

third 
category 
(TRADE) 

 - 

1st 

the  Madrid 
Appeals 
on 
Court 
18/12/2019 

overruled 
by 
Cataluña 
Appeals 
Court 
12/5/2020 
overruled 
by 
Cataluña 
Appeals 
Court 
7/5/2021 

the 

on 

the 

on 

overruled 
by 
Castilla 
Appeals 
Court 
7/5/2020 

the 

on 

202/2019 

205/2019 

197/2019 

193/2019 

215/2019 

Deliveroo 

worker 

Glovo 

worker 

retroactive 
entitlement
line 
in 
s 
with 
contract 
for 
indetermin
ate 
duration 
 - 

1st 

188/2019 

2nd 

1818/2019 

Deliveroo 

worker 

 - 

1st 

213/2019 

Glovo 

third 
category 
(TRADE) 

 - 

2nd 

715/2019 

overruled 
by 
Supreme 
Court 
25/9/2020 

the 

on 

Glovo 

worker 

reinstateme
nt 
and 
retroactive 
entitlement

159 

2nd 

1155/2019 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Madrid 
Appeals Court] 

Glovo 

third 
category 
(TRADE) 

Glovo 

worker 

12/11/201
9 

18/11/201
9 

Juzgado  de  lo 
Social  de  Vigo 
[Vigo 
Social 
Court] 
Juzgado  de  lo 
de 
Social 
Barcelona 
[Barcelona 
Social Court] 

Glovo 

worker 

line 

s 
in 
with 
contract 
for 
indetermin
ate 
duration 
 - 

reinstateme
and 
nt 
retroactive 
entitlement
s 
line 
in 
with 
contract 
for 
indetermin
ate 
duration 
 - 

1st 

1st 

642/2019 

325/2019 

2nd 

1155/2019 

27/11/201
9 

18/12/201
9 

1/2020 

de 
de 

Tribunal 
Superior 
Justicia 
Madrid 
[Madrid 
Appeals Court] 
Tribunal 
Superior 
Justicia 
Madrid 
[Madrid 
Appeals Court] 
Inspección  de 
trabajo [Labour 
Inspection] 

de 
de 

17/1/2020  Tribunal 
Superior 
Justicia 
Madrid 
[Madrid 
Appeals Court] 

de 
de 

3/2/2020 

de 
de 

Tribunal 
Superior 
Justicia 
Madrid 
[Madrid 
Appeals Court] 

17/2/2020  Tribunal 
de 
Superior 
de 
Justicia 
Castilla y León 
[Castilla 
Appeals Court] 

21/2/2020  Tribunal 
Superior 
Justicia 
Cataluña 
[Catalonia 
Appeals Court] 

de 
de 

Glovo 

worker 

 - 

2nd 

714/2019 

UberEats 

worker 

Deliveroo 

worker 

retroactive 
imposition 
social 
of 
protection 
contributio
ns 
 - 

1st 

2nd 

non-published 
decision 

40/2020 

pending 
appeal 
brought  by 
Deliveroo 
before 
Supreme 
Court 

the 

Glovo 

worker 

 - 

2nd 

85/2020 

2nd 

992/2020 

2nd 

1034/2020 

Glovo 

worker 

Glovo 

worker 

retroactive 
entitlement
line 
in 
s 
with 
contract 
for 
indetermin
ate 
duration 
reinstateme
nt 
and 
retroactive 
entitlement
s 
line 
in 
with 
contract 

160 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deliveroo 

worker 

Glovo 

worker 

27/4/2020 

7/5/2020 

Juzgado  de  lo 
Social 
de 
Zaragoza 
[Zaragoza 
Social Court] 

de 
de 

Tribunal 
Superior 
Justicia 
Cataluña 
[Catalonia 
Appeals Court] 

Glovo 

worker 

for 
indetermin
ate 
duration 
retroactive 
imposition 
of 
social 
protection 
contributio
ns 
reinstateme
nt 
and 
retroactive 
entitlement
s 
line 
in 
with 
contract 
for 
indetermin
ate 
duration 
 - 

1st 

123/2020 

2nd 

1432/2020 

2nd 

1449/2020 

12/5/2020  Tribunal 
Superior 
Justicia 
Cataluña 
[Catalonia 
Appeals Court] 

de 
de 

11/6/2020  Tribunal 
Superior 
Justicia 
Cataluña 
[Catalonia 
Appeals Court] 

de 
de 

de 
de 

16/6/2020  Tribunal 
Superior 
Justicia 
Cataluña 
[Catalonia 
Appeals Court] 
Juzgado  de  lo 
Social 
de 
Barcelona 
[Barcelona 
Social Court] 

7/9/2020 

Glovo 

worker 

 - 

2nd 

2405/2020 

Deliveroo 

worker 

 - 

2nd 

2557/2020 

Deliveroo 

worker 

1st 

723/2020 

2nd 

4021/2020 

3rd 

4746/2019 

1st 

non-published 
decision 

reinstateme
nt 
and 
retroactive 
entitlement
s 
line 
in 
with 
contract 
for 
indetermin
ate 
duration 
 - 

retroactive 
entitlement
s 
line 
in 
with 
contract 
for 
indetermin
ate 
duration 
retroactive 
imposition 
of 
social 
protection 

161 

22/9/2020  Tribunal 
Superior 
Justicia 
Cataluña 
[Catalonia 
Appeals Court] 

de 
de 

23/9/2020  Tribunal 
Supremo 
[Supreme 
Court] 

Glovo 

worker 

Glovo 

worker 

10/2020 

Inspección  de 
trabajo [Labour 
Inspection] 

Amazon 
Flex 

worker 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18/11/202
0 

20/11/202
0 

30/11/202
0 

11/12/202
0 

Juzgado  de  lo 
Social 
de 
Barcelona 
[Barcelona 
Social Court] 

Juzgado  de  lo 
Social 
de 
Santander 
[Santander 
Social Court] 

de 
de 

Tribunal 
Superior 
Justicia 
Madrid 
[Madrid 
Appeals Court] 
Juzgado  de  lo 
Social 
de 
Madrid 
[Madrid  Social 
Court] 

31/3/2021  Tribunal 
Superior 
Justicia 
Aragón 
[Aragon 
Appeals Court] 

de 
de 

3/2021 

Inspección  de 
trabajo [Labour 
Inspection] 

Deliveroo 

worker 

Glovo 

worker 

Glovo 

worker 

contributio
ns 
retroactive 
imposition 
of 
social 
protection 
contributio
ns 
retroactive 
imposition 
of 
social 
protection 
contributio
ns 
 - 

1st 

1st 

259/2020 

289/2020 

2nd 

1052/2020 

1st 

347/2020 

2nd 

- 

pending 
appeal 
brought  by 
Deliveroo 
before 
Supreme 
Court 
- 

the 

175/2021 

non-published 
decision 

Uber 

[employe
e  of  the 
VTC 
company] 

Deliveroo 

worker 

waiting 
time  to  be 
classified 
as  working 
time 
- 

Cabify 

- 

all 

fines 
imposed 
on 
involved 
companies; 
120 drivers 
enabled  to 
claim 
direct 
employme
nt  

Finland 
5/10/2020  Työneuvosto 

[Labour 
Council] 

5/10/2020  Työneuvosto 

France 
1/6/2015 

[Labour 
Council] 

de 

Conseil 
Prud’hommes 
de  Paris  [Paris 
Labour Court] 

[food 
delivery 
platform] 
[food 
delivery 
platform] 

LeCab 

worker 

worker 

- 

- 

self-
employed 

7/1/2016 

Cour 
d’appel 
de  Paris  [Paris 
Appeals Court] 

LeCab 

self-
employed 

5/9/2016 

de 

Conseil 
Prud’hommes 
de  Paris  [Paris 
Labour Court] 

Deliveroo 

self-
employed 

1st 

1st 

1st 

- 

- 

TN 1481-20 

TN 1482-20 

RG n° F14/7887 

upheld  by 
the 
Paris 
Appeals 
Court 
7/1/2016 

on 

2nd 

 - 

RG n° 15/06489  

RG n° F15/0164 

1st 

upheld  by 
the 
Paris 
Appeals 
Court 

on 

the 

competenc
e  of 
Business 
Court 
instead  of 
Labour 
Court 
competenc
e  of 
Business 
Court 
instead  of 
Labour 
Court 
 - 

the 

162 

 
 
 
 
 
Take  Eat 
Easy 

self-
employed 

 - 

1st 

Uber 

 - 

1st 

17/11/201
6 

14/12/201
6 

de 

Conseil 
Prud’hommes 
de  Paris  [Paris 
Labour Court] 

des 
Tribunal 
de 
affaires 
sécurité  sociale 
de 
(TASS) 
Paris 
[Paris 
Social 
protection 
Court] 

 -  (Social 
protection 
Administr
ation's 
claim  for 
reclassific
ation 
rejected 
for 
procedura
l reasons) 
worker 

20/12/201
6 

LeCab 

de 

Conseil 
Prud’hommes 
de  Paris  [Paris 
Labour Court] 

1st 

RG n° F16-04592 

RG n° 16-03915 

RG n° 14/16389 

on 

9/11/2017 
upheld  by 
Paris 
the 
Appeals 
Court 
20/4/2017 
pending 
appeal 
brought  by 
the 
URSSAF 
(Social 
protection 
Administrat
ion) 

upheld  by 
the 
Paris 
Appeals 
Court 
on 
13/12/2017 

20/12/201
6 

de 

Conseil 
Prud’hommes 
de  Paris  [Paris 
Labour Court] 

LeCab 

worker 

24/1/2017  Conseil 

de 

Prud’hommes 
de  Paris  [Paris 
Labour Court] 

30/1/2017  Tribunal 

de 
commerce  de 
Paris 
[Paris 
Business 
Court] 

Take  Eat 
Easy 

self-
employed 

Uber 

self-
employed 

grant 

retroactive 
obligation 
to 
wages, 
reimburse
of 
ment 
professiona
l  expenses, 
overtime 
supplement
s, 
compensati
on 
for 
disguised 
employme
nt 
retroactive 
obligation 
to 
wages, 
reimburse
ment 
of 
professiona
l  expenses, 
overtime 
supplement
s, 
compensati
on 
for 
disguised 
employme
nt 
unlawful 
dismissal 
 - 

grant 

and 

no 
condemnat
ion of Uber 
for  unfair 
competitio
n 
by 
circumvent
ing  social 
law 

163 

RG n° 14/11044 

1st 

upheld  by 
the 
Paris 
Appeals 
on 
Court 
13/12/2017 

RG n° F16/00407 

RG n° 2014054740 

1st 

1st 

upheld  by 
the 
Paris 
Appeals 
Court 
on 
12/10/2017 
decision  on 
by 
appeal 
the 
Cour 
d'appel  de 
of 
Paris 
12/12/2019 
(n° 
17/03541) 
does 
not 
on 
focus 
questions of 
worker 
status 

 
20/4/2017  Cour 

d’appel 
de  Paris  [Paris 
Appeals Court] 

Take  Eat 
Easy 

self-
employed 

 - 

12/10/201
7 

9/11/2017  Cour 

Cour 
d’appel 
de  Paris  [Paris 
Appeals Court] 
d’appel 
de  Paris  [Paris 
Appeals Court] 
Cour 
d’appel 
de  Lyon  [Lyon 
Appeals Court] 

13/12/201
7 

Take  Eat 
Easy 

self-
employed 

Deliveroo 

self-
employed 

 - 

 - 

LeCab 

worker 

13/12/201
7 

Cour 
d’appel 
de  Lyon  [Lyon 
Appeals Court] 

LeCab 

worker 

29/1/2018  Conseil 

de 

Uber 

self-
employed 

Prud’hommes 
de  Paris  [Paris 
Labour Court] 

24/5/2018  Tribunal 

correctionnel 
de  Lille  [Lille 
Criminal  Court 
] 

and 

Clic 
Walk 

self-
employed 

 - 

28/6/2018  Conseil 

de 

Uber 

Prud’hommes 
de  Paris  [Paris 
Labour Court] 

self-
employed 

 - 

28/11/201
8 

Cour 
cassation 
[Supreme 
Court] 

de 

Take  Eat 
Easy 

worker 

10/1/2019  Cour 

d’appel 
de  Paris  [Paris 
Appeals Court] 

Uber 

worker 

to 

referred 
back 
2nd 
instance  
referred 
back  to  1st 
instance  

164 

grant 

retroactive 
obligation 
to 
wages, 
reimburse
ment 
of 
professiona
l  expenses, 
overtime 
supplement
s, 
compensati
on 
for 
disguised 
employme
nt 
retroactive 
obligation 
to 
wages, 
reimburse
ment 
of 
professiona
l  expenses, 
overtime 
supplement
s, 
compensati
on 
for 
disguised 
employme
nt 
unlawful 
dismissal 
 - 

grant 

and 

2nd 

2nd 

2nd 

2nd 

the 

overturned 
by 
Supreme 
Court 
on 
28/11/2018 
 - 

 - 

 - 

RG n° 17/00511 

RG n° 17/03088 

RG n° 16/12875 

RG n° 17/00351 

2nd 

 - 

RG n° 17/00349 

1st 

 - 

RG n° F16/11460 

RG 
16040000134 

n° 

RG n° 17/04674 

Arrêt  n°1737  (17-
20.079) 

RG n° 18/08357 

1st 

1st 

3rd 

2nd 

on 

the 

overturned 
by 
Douai 
Appeals 
Court 
4/2/2020 
overturned 
by the Paris 
Appeals 
Court 
10/1/2019 
 - 

on 

upheld  by 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
on 
28/11/2018 

 
8/3/2019 

4/2/2020 

de 

Conseil 
Prud’hommes 
de  Lyon  [Lyon 
Labour Court] 

de 

Conseil 
Prud’hommes 
de  Paris  [Paris 
Labour Court] 

10/2/2020  Cour 

d’appel 
Douai 

de 
[Douai 
Appeals Court] 

Uber 

self-
employed 

 - 

Deliveroo 

worker 

and 

worker 

Clic 
Walk 

4/3/2020 

Cour 
cassation 
[Supremen 
Court] 

de 

Uber 

worker 

16/1/2021  Cour 

Uber 

self-
employed 

d’appel 
de  Lyon  [Lyon 
Appeals Court] 
d’appel 
Toulouse 

de 
[Toulouse 
Appeals Court] 
d’appel 
de  Paris  [Paris 
Appeals Court] 
Cour 
d’appel 
de  Paris  [Paris 
Appeals Court] 
d’appel 
de  Paris  [Paris 
Appeals Court] 

18/2/2021  Cour 

7/4/2021 

12/5/2021  Cour 

Bolt 

worker 

Deliveroo 

self-
employed 

Uber 

worker 

22/6/2021  Cour 

de 

cassation 
[Supreme 
Court] 

and 

 - 

Clic 
Walk 

RG n° 19/08056 

RG nº 19/07738 

1st 

1st 

on 

upheld  by 
the 
Lyon 
Appeals 
Court 
16/1/2021 
pending 
appeal 
brought  by 
Deliveroo 

RG nº 19/00137 

2nd 

pending 
appeal 
brought  by 
Clic 
and 
Walk 

3rd 

 - 

Arrêt  n°  374  (19-
13.316) 

2nd 

RG n° 19/08056 

entitlement
s 
line 
in 
with 
employme
nt  contract 
of 
indetermin
ate 
duration; 
indemnity 
for 
wrongful 
dismissal 
criminal 
responsibil
ity  of  the 
company 
and 
manager 
for 
disguised 
employme
nt, 
imposition 
of fines 
referred 
back 
2nd 
instance  
 - 

its 

to 

2nd 

2nd 

2nd 

 - 

 - 

 - 

RG n° 20/04502 

RG n° 18/02846 

RG n° 18/02660 

Arrêt n° 20-81.775 

3rd 

proceedings 
stayed 
pending  the 
reply by the 
Social 
Chamber 

 - 

 - 

entitlement
s 
line 
in 
with 
employme
nt  contract 
of 
indetermin
ate 
duration; 
indemnity 
for 
wrongful 
dismissal 
questions 
on  worker 
status 
referred 
from 
the 
Criminal to 
the  Social 
Chamber 
of 

the 

165 

29/1/2021  Cour 

Take  Eat 
Easy 

worker 

 - 

2nd 

 - 

RG n° 19/04534 

 
 
Ireland 
8/10/2018  Tax  Appeals 
Commissioner  

Dominos 
Pizza 

worker 

Court 

20/12/201
9 

High Court  

Dominos 
Pizza 

worker 

Italy 
7/5/2018  

Tribunale 
Torino 
Civil Court] 

di 
[Turin 

Foodora 

self-
employed 

 - 

10/9/2018  Tribunale 

di 
Milano  [Milan 
Civil Court] 

Glovo 

11/1/2019  Corte 

di 
di 
Appello 
Torino 
[Turin 
Appeals Court] 

Foodora 

self-
employed 

 - 

third 
category 
(lavoro 
etero-
organizza
to) 

24/1/2020  Corte 

di 

Foodora 

Cassazione 
[Supreme 
Court] 

third 
category 
(lavoro 
etero-
organizza
to) 

20/11/202
0 

di 

Tribunale 
Palermo 
[Palermo  Civil 
Court] 

Glovo 

worker 

23TACD2018 

IEHC  894 
No. 31 R] 

[2019 

upheld  by 
the  High 
Court 
on 
20/12/2019 
pending 
appeal 
brought  by 
Dominos, 
hearing  set 
for 
20/7/2021 

RG n. 4764/2017 

RG n. 6719/2017 

RG n. 468/2018 

1st 

1st 

2nd 

the 

overturned 
by 
Appeals 
Court 
11/1/2019 
 - 

on 

upheld 
(in 
essence)  by 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
24/1/2020 

on 

3rd 

 - 

RG n. 11629/2019 

RG n. 7283/2020 

1st 

pending 
appeal 
brought  by 
Glovo 

retroactive 
obligation 
pay 
to 
wages 
in 
line  with 
the 
collective 
agreement 
for 
the 
logistics 
and  freight 
transport 
sector,  but 
no 
protection 
against 
unlawful 
dismissal 
retroactive 
obligation 
pay 
to 
wages 
in 
line  with 
the 
collective 
agreement 
for 
the 
logistics 
and  freight 
transport 
sector,  but 
no 
protection 
against 
unlawful 
dismissal 
retroactive 
rights 
in 
accordance 
with 
employme
nt  contract 
concluded 
for 
indetermin
ate 
duration 

166 

 
 
 
 
 
(considerin
g 
applicable 
collective 
agreement)
; 
reinstateme
and 
nt 
compensati
on 
for 
unlawful 
dismissal 
retroactive 
rights 
in 
accordance 
with 
employme
nt  contract 
concluded 
for 
indetermin
ate 
duration 
(considerin
g 
applicable 
collective 
agreement)
; 
reinstateme
nt 
and 
compensati
on 
for 
unlawful 
dismissal 
applicabilit
y  of  OSH 
standards 

non-
applicabilit
y 
of 
prohibition 
anti-
of 
union 
behaviour 

retroactive 
obligation 
to 
pay 
wages  and 
social 
protection 
contributio
ns; 
fines 
for 
violation 
health 
of 
and  safety 
standards 
applicabilit
y 
of 
protection 
against 
employer's 
anti-union 

167 

1st 

RG n. 7283/2020 

1st 

RG n. 2949/2019 

1st 

RG n. 2425/2020  

Verbali 
accertamento 

di 

1st 

pending 
appeal 
brought  by 
Glovo  and 
Eat 
Just 
the 
before 
Administrat
ive Court 

1st 

RG n.  889/2021  

24/11/202
0 

di 

Tribunale 
Palermo 
[Palermo  Civil 
Court] 

Glovo 

worker 

31/12/202
1 

di 

Tribunale 
Bologna 
[Bologna  Civil 
Court] 

Deliveroo 

10/1/2021  Tribunale 

di 

Deliveroo 

Firenze 
[Florence  Civil 
Court] 

24/2/2021 

Ispettorato 
territoriale  del 
lavoro 
di 
Milano  [Milan 
Labour 
Inspectorate] 

Eat, 

Just 
Glovo, 
Uber  Eats, 
Deliveroo  

28/3/2021  Tribunale 

di 
Milano  [Milan 
Civil Court] 

Everli 

worker  or 
third 
category 
(lavoro 
etero-
organizza
to) 
self-
employed 
or 
third 
category 
(lavoro 
etero-
organizza
to) 
third 
category 
(lavoro 
etero-
organizza
to) 

third 
category 
(lavoro 
etero-
organizza
to) 

 
 
 
 
 
14/4/2021  Tribunale 
Bologna 
[Bologna  Civil 
Court] 

di 

Everli 

third 
category 
(lavoro 
etero-
organizza
to) 

21/4/2021  Tribunale 

di 

SocialFood   worker  or 

Palermo 
[Palermo  Civil 
Court] 

30/6/2021  Tribunale 
Bologna 
[Bologna  Civil 
Court] 

di 

Deliveroo 

third 
category 
(lavoro 
etero-
organizza
to) 

worker  or 
third 
category 
(lavoro 
etero-
organizza
to) 

behaviour 
applicabilit
of 
y 
protection 
against 
employer's 
anti-union 
behaviour 
applicabilit
y 
of 
protection 
from 
discriminat
ory 
dismissal  - 
reinstateme
nt 
a 
of 
worker 
non-
applicabilit
y 
of 
prohibition 
anti-
of 
union 
behaviour 

1st 

Decreto 

1st 

GL n. 740/2021 

RG n. 2170/2020 

1st 

pending 
appeal 
brought  by 
all 
four 
platforms 
before 
Milan 
Administrat
ive Court 

the 

Deliveroo 

self-
employed 

 - 

1st 

 - 

CV EXPL 18-2673  

The Netherlands 
23/7/2018  Rechtbank 
Amsterdam 
[Amsterdam 
Civil Court] 

15/1/2019  Rechtbank 
Amsterdam 
[Amsterdam 
Civil Court] 

Deliveroo 

worker 

1st 

upheld  by 
the  Appeals 
Court 
on 
16/2/2021 

CV  EXPL 
14763 

18-

CV  EXPL 
23708  

18-

1st 

pending 
appeal 
brough  by 
the 
trade 
union 
before 
Appeals 
Court 

the 

2nd 

 - 

200.268.510/01 

applicabilit
y  of 
the 
collective 
agreement 
the 
for 
road 
transport 
and 
haulage 
sector 
(separate 
judgment: 
CV  EXPL 
18-14762) 
Helpling to 
be 
classified 
as 
placement 
agency  for 
self-
employed 
workers 
thus 
and 
prohibited 
from 
charging  a 
commissio
n 
workers 
plaintiff 
permitted 
to 
amend 
and  extend 
appeal 
against  the 
Amsterda

from 

168 

1/7/2019 

Rechtbank 
Amsterdam 
[Amsterdam 
Civil Court] 

Helpling 

self-
employed 

23/6/2020  Gerechtshof 
Amsterdam 
[Amsterdam 
Appeals Court] 

Helpling 

 - 

 
 
 
pending 
appeal 
brought  by 
Deliveroo 
before 
the 
Hoge  Raad 
[Supreme 
Court] 
 - 

200.261.051/01 

- 

1st 

1st 

- 

CV  EXPL 
22882 

20-

Mål nr 3944-17 

1st 

upheld  by 
the 
Administrat
ive  Appeals 
Court 
on 
30/10/2019 

2nd 

Mål nr 5725-18 

1st 

 - 

2019/062973   

1st 

 - 

2020/000125  

1st 

- 

Civil 

m 
Court's 
decision  of 
1/7/2019 
 - 

2nd 

16/2/2021  Gerechtshof 
Amsterdam 
[Amsterdam 
Appeals Court] 

Deliveroo 

worker 

2/2021 

Inspectie 
Sociale  Zaken 
en 
Werkgelegenh
eid 
[Labour 
Inspection] 
13/9/2021  Rechtbank 
Amsterdam 
[Amsterdam 
Civil Court] 

(SZW) 

Temper 

worker 

Uber 

worker 

Sweden 
18/6/2018  Förvaltningsrät
ten 
i 
Stockholm 
[Stockholm 
Administrative 
Court] 

30/10/201
9 

i 

Kamarrätten 
Stockholm 
[Stockholm 
Administrative 
Appeals Court] 

9/10/2020  Arbetsmiljöver
ket 
[Work 
Environment 
Authority]  

13/10/202
0 

Arbetsmiljöver
ket 
[Work 
Environment 
Authority]  

22/6/2021  Förvaltningsrät
ten 
i  Malmö 
[Malmö 
Administrative 
Court] 

Cool 
Company 

self-
employed 

Cool 
Company 

self-
employed 

TaskRunne
r 

worker 

Tiptapp 
AB 

worker 

Task 
Runner 

self-
employed 

Report 
classifying 
the 
platform as 
temporary 
work 
agency 
Drivers  are 
covered  by 
the 
Collective 
Labor 
Agreement 
for 
taxi 
transport 

No 
responsibil
ity  of  Cool 
Company 
for  health 
and  safety 
standards 
No 
responsibil
ity  of  Cool 
Company 
for  health 
and  safety 
standards 
TaskRunne
r obliged to 
comply 
with  OSH 
standards 
Tiptapp 
AB 
obliged 
comply 
with  OSH 
standards 
No 
responsibil
ity  of  Task 
Runner  for 
health  and 
safety 
standards 

to 

169 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 11: Internal drivers analysis 

A11.1 Internal drivers related to the employment status  

The  key  challenge  in  platform  work  is  the  risk  of  misclassification  of  the 
employment  status.  Such  misclassification  negatively  affects  the  access  of  people 
working through platforms to existing labour rights and protection.  

With  most  people  working  through  platforms  combining  features  of  subordination  and 
autonomy, it is not always clear whether they should be considered as workers or self-
employed,  and  what  obligations  would  fall  on  the  platforms  as  employers  or  as 
contracting entities. Only people who are considered as workers have access to the full 
set  of  labour  rights,  such  as  on  working  time,  paid  annual  leave,  maternity,  paternity 
and  parental  leave,  and  in  general  occupational  health  and  safety.  Workers  also  have 
easier  access  to  social  protection  (although  gaps  remain  for  workers  in  non-standard 
employment)  and  are  better  protected  in  cross-border  situations,  in  case  of  disputes  on 
jurisdiction or applicable law.  

A common feature of digital labour platforms’ business models is the characterisation of 
the  work  relationship  as  other  than  one  of  employment.  Platforms  often  rely  on 
“independent  contractors”,  “third-party  service  providers”  and  “freelancers”  to  offer 
services. Platforms define themselves as intermediaries connecting service providers to 
clients  and therefore describe the service providers’ status  as  independent contractors 
in their standard contracts. Contractual terms and conditions for service providers often 
explicitly exclude any status of employment and deny any responsibility of the platform 
as an employer.277  

The risk of false self-employment  
Various  aspects  of  how  services  are  provided  through  these  platforms  may  often 
resemble working conditions in an employment relationship. Hence, there is a high risk 
of misclassification, by  which people working through platforms are  classified as self-
employed despite not necessarily enjoying the full autonomy that comes with such status. 
Although  in  most  cases  people  working  through  platforms  have  the  freedom  to  decide 
whether  to  log  in  and  thus  when  to  work,  the  actual  organisation  of  work  may  be 
determined  by  the  platforms  themselves.  For  example,  through  their  terms  of  service 
agreements,  platforms  may  unilaterally  regulate  conditions  pertaining  to  pay,  working 
time,  dispute  resolution,  customer  service  etiquette,  and  more,  while  simultaneously 
using technological means to monitor and evaluate the work.278 This can lead to what is 
commonly referred to as false self-employment, depriving the people concerned of basic 
workers’ protection and often also limiting their access to social protection schemes. 

In platform work, the contractual relationship between the person providing work and the 
platform  will  in  most  cases  come  into  being  when  the  person  in  question  accepts  the 
platform’s terms and conditions online. Such contractual terms and conditions, though, 
are  often  expressed  in  opaque  and  unintelligible  ways,  thereby  compromising  the 
person’s ability to fully understand what they are signing up for, in particular where the 
Platform-to-Business Regulation279 does not apply.280  

277  Z.  Kilhoffer  et  al.  (2020),  Study  to  gather  evidence  on  the  working  conditions  of  platform  workers. 
Final report prepared for the European Commission, Brussels. Available online. ILO (2021).  
278 International Labour Office (2021), particularly Section 5.1.1. 
279 Regulation (EU) 2019/1150. Available online. 

170 

 
 
 
                                                           
The role of algorithms in concealing the employment status 
The contractual terms and conditions presented to people on platforms may not correctly 
reflect the actual treatment and relationship that will follow. This is due to the fact that 
many of the management operations on platforms are automated through the use of AI, 
particularly  in  instances  where  existing  regulations,  such  as  the  Platforms-to-Business 
Regulation, do not apply. 

Available evidence of this is often based on anecdotal accounts, mostly due to a lack of 
transparency of ‘black box’ decisions. For example, in 2020, some of the couriers and 
drivers of one of the biggest  food delivery platforms281  blamed unexplained changes  to 
the  algorithm  for  affecting  their  jobs  and  incomes.  When  they  asked  for  reasons  about 
their plummeting income, the company told them it had no human supervision over how 
many  deliveries  they  received.282  One  should  note  that  forthcoming  internal  market 
acquis may address issues related to transparency and responsibility in the development, 
deployment and use of AI systems used in the world of work.283 

The  impossibility  to  explain  certain  algorithmically-driven  decisions  and  the  lack  of 
responsibility  resulting  from  the  use  of  certain  algorithms  may  also  contribute  to  the 
potential misclassification of people on platforms, since their factual relationship with the 
platforms may not be that described in the contractual terms and conditions they signed 
up for. Therefore, the lack of transparency inherent in the technology further allows for 
concealment  of  factual  evidence  needed  to  establish  a  correct  employment  status 
classification.  

Flexibility and bargaining power 
Most digital labour platforms’ business models rely on contracting self-employed people 
rather than employing them  under labour law  conditions.  The reliance on contractors 
provides platforms with more flexibility than traditional service providers that rely on 
dependent workers, as it possibly allows them to adjust the supply of service providers to 
fluctuations  in  demand.284  The  administrative  steps  involved  in  recruitment  and 
workforce  management,  as  well  as  the  resulting  costs  in  terms  of  social  protection 
contributions  and  taxation,  possibly  to  be  provided  across  borders,  can  be  seen  by 
platforms as a burden on their competitiveness and agility on the market.  

The persons working through platforms, on the other hand, may not have a choice but to 
accept  the  standard  contracts  on  offer,  also  in  reason  of  the  fact  that  they  lack  any 
significant  bargaining  power 
the 
employment  status  and  the  resulting  rights  of  people  working  through  platforms  will 
therefore often be determined unilaterally by the platforms’ terms and conditions rather 
than  by  the  outcome  of  a  genuine  contractual  negotiation,  which  would  be  typical  for 
genuine self-employed activity. 

in  the  pre-contractual  stage.  In  practice, 

There are a few examples of platforms offering all or some of its workers an employment 
contract. In many of these cases, however, platforms use subcontracting business models 
with work providers in a position similar to temporary agency workers.285 Also, in some 

280  J.  Venturini  et  al.  (2016),  Terms  of  Service  and  Human  Rights:  An  Analysis  of  Online  Platform 
Contracts. Council of Europe and FGV Direito, Rio de Janeiro. Available online. ILO (2021). 
281 Uber Eats 
282 Available online.  
283 AI Act proposal. 
284  OECD  (2019),  Gig  economy  platforms:  boon  or  bane?  Economics  department  working  papers  No. 
1550. Available online.  
285 Eurofound (2018).  

171 

 
                                                                                                                                                                            
countries,  workers  can  be  classified  under  a  third  employment  status  –  this  is  a  hybrid 
classification  sitting  somewhere  between  that  of  worker  and  self-employed  in  terms  of 
rights and obligations. Nevertheless, the predominant employment model remains the 
self-employed status.286  

Uncertainty concerning the employment status 
Existing regulation on platform work at national level remains patchy and often limited 
to  specific  sectors.  This  means  that  many  people  working  through  platforms  often  fall 
between  the  cracks  of  labour  and  social  protection,  which  also  leads  to  a lack  of  equal 
treatment  between  them  and  traditional  workers.  A  blurred  distinction  between 
employers and clients, as well as grey zones between workers and self-employed people, 
lead  to  regulatory  uncertainty  over  applicable  rules,  thereby  affecting  the  working 
conditions of people on platforms and their access to social protection.  

Platform work is usually not legally recognised as a stand-alone form of work. Member 
States’  labour  regulations  typically  do  not  specify  the  employment  status  of  people 
working on platforms.287 Whether a person engaged in platform work is deemed to be an 
worker and thus falls under the remit and protection of labour law depends on the general 
rules on employment status in each Member State.  

These rules are not harmonised and, despite there being CJEU case-law on the concept 
of “worker”, there is no EU-wide definition used throughout the EU’s social and labour 
acquis. The CJEU’s approach to deciding who is a worker is to a large extent determined 
by whether an EU legal instrument refers to national definitions or not.288  

CJEU case-law on the platform economy 
The Court of Justice of the European Union has had several occasions to pronounce itself 
on the legal qualification of digital labour platforms. In a first series of rulings which do 
not directly touch on the labour law dimension of the platform economy but might have 
indirect  consequences  on  the  responsibilities  of  platforms  under  labour  law,  the  Court 
took  a  position  on  the  classification  of  services  provided  by  platform  operators  and  its 
regulatory  implications.289  In  relation  to  the  ride-hailing  platform  Uber,  the  Court  ruled 
that, in view of the high degree of control which the company exercises over the driver, 
the service delivered and its remuneration, the platform’s business model does not merely 
constitute an online intermediation service, but must be classified as a service in the field 
of  transport  and  therefore  must  comply  with  sectoral  rules  in  that  area.  By  contrast,  a 
platform such as Star Taxi  App which is  limited to  licensed taxi  drivers for whom this 
intermediary service is only one of several means of acquiring customers, which they are 
by no means obliged to use, and which does not organise the general functioning of the 
ride-hailing service by selecting the drivers, setting or collecting the fares or controlling 
vehicles or the behaviour of drivers, remains a company offering an information society 
service and is not classified as a ride-hailing service. It remains to be seen whether the 
Court will extend this reasoning to the obligations that digital labour platforms carry for 
the people working for them. 

286 Eurofound (2018). Kilhoffer et al. (2020). International Labour Office (2021). 
287 Eurofound (2018), p. 43.  
288 Risak/Dullinger (2018), The concept of worker in EU law: Status quo and potential for change, ETUI, 
Brussels.  Available  online;  Kontouris  (2018),  The  concept  of  ‘worker’  in  European  Labour  Law  – 
Fragmentation,  Autonomy,  and  Scope,  47(2)  Industrial  Law  Journal  192.  Available  online;  see,  for 
instance, CJEU, C-658/18, UX, 16.7.2020. Available online. 
289 CJEU, cases C-434/15, Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi (Uber Spain), C-320/16, Uber France, and C-
62/19, Star Taxi App. Available online, respectively, here, here and here.  

172 

 
 
                                                           
While the Court did not yet deal with the employment status in platform work directly, it 
was  seized  in  a  similar  case  of  a  neighbourhood  courier  providing  services  exclusively 
for  a  parcel  delivery  company  as  a  “self-employed  independent  contractor”.  The  case 
concerned the application of the Working Time Directive.290  In that instance, the Court 
did not exclude the classification of such a person as self-employed and indicated that the 
person’s  independence  is  based  on  a  number  of  indicators,  including:  the  possibility  to 
use  subcontractors  or  substitutes;  the  discretion  to  accept  or  not  to  accept  the  tasks 
offered  by  the  company;  the  freedom  to  provide  services  to  any  third  party,  including 
direct competitors of the company; and the discretion to fix his hours of work to suit their 
personal convenience.  

The  Court  also  made  clear  that  such  classification  can  only  hold  provided  that  the 
referring  court  ascertains  that  the  person’s  independence  from  the  company  is  not 
fictitious and that it is not possible to establish a relationship of subordination, which the 
referring court must do, taking into account all the relevant factors relating to that person 
and to the economic activity they perform.  

While  in  most  Member  States,  and  at  EU  level,  labour  law  is  based  on  a  binary 
distinction  between  worker  and  self-employed,  some  Member  States  (e.g.  Germany, 
France,  Italy,  Spain  and  Portugal)  have  created  a  third/intermediate  category  of 
employment,  usually  for  self-employed  individuals  depicting  a  degree  of  economic 
dependency towards a quasi-employer.291 This, as well as other contractual statuses used 
in platform work in Member States, may add to the enforcement complexity of laws and 
jurisprudence.  

In  situations  of  legal  ambiguity,  Member  States  either  approach  these  with  statutory 
definitions  of  the  employment  relationship  (e.g.  DE)  or  rely  on  criteria  developed  by 
case-law (e.g. IE, SE). Some Member States have laid down legal presumptions in their 
labour regulations to make it easier for individuals considering themselves as false self-
employed to claim their rights, either in specific sectors (e.g. BE), for certain professions 
(e.g. FR) or where a number of criteria are met (e.g. ES, NL, MT).  

Some  Member  States  (e.g.  BE,  IT,  MT)  provide  for  an  administrative  procedure 
involving an administrative or other independent body which allows a party to a contract 
to  ascertain  the  employment  status  involved.  However,  such  instruments  are  far  from 
universally  available  in  all  Member  States.  Labour  inspectorates  in  some  Member 
States  (e.g.  BG,  LV,  PL)  can  play  a  role  in  reviewing  and  assessing  contractual 
relationships  and  reclassifying  them,  but  their  resources  are  often  limited  and,  in  the 
absence  of  physical  work  premises,  as  is  often  the  case  in  platform  work,  they  are  not 
always fully aware of platforms’ activities.   

Challenging misclassification in court 
In many cases, a person who considers herself to be false self-employed does not have a 
choice  but  to  challenge  the  alleged  misclassification  through  legal  action  in  court. 
People working on platforms can seize a judge to challenge their employment status as 
determined  by  the  platforms’  terms  and  conditions  to  demand  re-classification  as  a 
worker or, typically after the contractual relationship has been terminated, to claim rights 
resulting from the worker status.  

290 CJEU, case C-692/19, Yodel Delivery Network. Available online. 
291 Eurofound (2018).  

173 

 
 
 
                                                           
Trade unions can support workers in their legal actions. However, due to the nature of 
platform work, which does not entail fixed job premises and is often being performed on 
wheels,  from  home  or  in  other  people’s  homes,  trade  unions  can  face  difficulties  in 
identifying and getting in touch with people working through platforms. 

According  to  the  general  rules  in  Member  States’  procedural  law  on  the  burden  of 
proof,  it  is  for  the  person  claiming  the  violation  of  a  right  to  establish  and  prove  the 
necessary facts before the court. This means that the onus lies with the worker claiming 
rights from the worker status. However, one of the crucial elements of an worker status – 
legal subordination – often cannot be inferred from the terms of the contract, but derives 
from the actual organisation of work. It is often difficult for people working on platforms 
to establish such facts, as they have only limited insights into the organisation of work, 
its allocation and control and the underlying mechanisms292, in particular where they are 
determined by algorithms. 

Despite such practical and procedural obstacles to redress, litigation on the classification 
of  platform  work  relationships  has  been  increasing  in  recent  years  in  the  absence  of  a 
specific legal framework. A significant number of court and administrative cases dealing 
with  the employment status  of people working through platforms has been observed in 
ten Member States.293 The majority of those cases dealt with on-location platform work 
in  the  passenger  transport  and  food  delivery  sectors.  However,  several  cases  also 
concerned other forms of on-location platform work, such as digital labour platforms for 
on-location micro-tasks294 and platforms intermediating cleaning or similar services. No 
cases  for  online  platform  work  were  identified.  The  fact  that  no  case-law  on  alleged 
misclassification in platform work was found in other Member States might be explained 
by  the  introduction  of  specific  regulation  on  the  matter295.  Alternatively,  this  may  be 
explained  by  structural  factors  in  those  countries  such  as  less  litigation  on  the 
employment status and on labour law matters in general, and the absence or weakness of 
workers’ organisations which typically support workers in bringing legal action to courts. 

Existing jurisprudence on the employment status 
This  case-law  has  an  important  impact,  as  courts  have  decided  in  favour  of 
reclassification in a significant number of the cases observed. Where cases have reached 
the  highest  court  in  a  Member  State,  the  courts  have  generally  ruled  in  favour  of 
employment status (France, Germany, and Spain). The only exception is Italy, where the 
Supreme  Court  applied  the  legal  regime  of  the  third  category  status  (lavoro 
eteroorganizzato) to food delivery couriers.296 In other countries, such as Belgium or the 

292 M. Risak (2017), Fair working conditions for platform workers: Possible regulatory approaches at the 
EU level, Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung. Available online.  
293  These  are  Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Ireland,  Italy,  the  Netherlands,  Spain  and 
Sweden. This Section draws heavily on an analysis of more than 100 court decisions and 15 administrative 
decisions on cases of alleged misclassification of platform workers in these Member States, carried out by 
the European Centre of Expertise in the field of labour law, employment and labour market policies (ECE). 
“Case  Law  on  the  Classification  of  Platform  Workers:  Cross-European  Comparative  Analysis  and 
Tentative Conclusions”, May 2021. Available online. For all other Member States, the absence of relevant 
case law has been confirmed by the respective national experts in the ECE network.   
294 An example of this is the Click and Walk platform in France which assigns on-location micro tasks such 
as mystery shopping to its users.  
295 For instance, Law 45/2018 in  Portugal requires ride-hailing platforms to conclude commercial contracts 
with a transport company that employs the drivers.  
296  It  is  to  be  noted,  however,  that  as  the  Supreme  Court  was  seized  by  the  platform  which  sought  a 
qualification of its workers as self-employed, it did not scrutinize the part of the appeal court’s assessment 
which denied a qualification as regular employees. 

174 

 
                                                           
Netherlands, litigation on misclassification in platform work have not reached the highest 
courts yet, but might do so in the near future.  

There where highest courts have decided on landmark cases, this case-law has often not 
settled the issue, as lower-instance courts have not always followed that jurisprudence 
in subsequent rulings. For instance, the Lyon Appeals Court found drivers working for a 
ride-hailing platform to be self-employed despite an earlier French Supreme Court ruling 
to the contrary. In Italy, the Palermo Civil Court went beyond the Supreme Court ruling 
by reclassifying food delivery riders as workers, while the Florence Civil Court rejected 
that  classification.  Spain  is  the  only  Member  State  where  case-law  seems  to  have 
consolidated  in  favour  of  reclassification  as  workers  as  a  result  of  a  high  number  of 
lawsuits. 

Drawing general conclusions from the national case law can be challenging given the 
diversity of approaches taken. Nevertheless, some common patterns can be observed. In 
general, courts have not been constrained by contractual stipulations, focusing instead on 
the  individual  circumstances  of  work  organisation  in  each  case.297  Also,  legal 
presumptions for an employment status in case some criteria are fulfilled have played a 
crucial  role  in  national  case-law  determining  the  status  of  people  working  through 
platforms, such  as in  Spain  or in  Belgium. On the contrary, the French  presumption of 
self-employed activity in case of entry in a business register appears to have significantly 
contributed  to  the  initial  reluctance  of  lower  courts  to  reclassify  people  engaged  in 
platform work as workers. 

The existence of third statuses between employment and self-employed activity has had 
different effects in Member States, owing also to the variation in rights attached to these 
statuses.  As  mentioned  above,  in  Italy  the  existence  of  a  third  status  has  facilitated  the 
reclassification of people working through platforms, without however closing the debate 
on a full worker status.  In Spain, courts are now regularly “upgrading” people working 
through  platforms  from  the  intermediate  status  (“TRADE”)  to  regular  worker  status, 
whereas the French Supreme Court has ruled in favour of the worker status even after the 
introduction of special rights for self-employed people working through platforms.     

Criteria for judicial assessment of the employment status 
The criteria for assessing the employment status and the importance attributed to specific 
features of the contractual  relationship  are  gradually shifting.  Although the  freedom of 
people working through platforms to decide if and when to work has frequently been 
relied upon as a reason to deny  worker status  by earlier judgments in  particular, courts 
are increasingly discarding such reasoning by focusing instead on those people’s lack of 
genuine independence. In the majority of judgments ruling in favour of reclassification, 
the unilateral imposition of terms and conditions by platforms, especially with regards to 
assignment and payment, has been relied upon as an indicator of the platforms’ control 
over  the  organisation  of  work.  In  the  view  of  judges,  sanctions  (or  less  favourable 
conditions  for  future  assignments)  in  case  of  non-acceptance  of  tasks  or  incentives  to 
work longer hours compensate for the lack of a contractual obligation to work.  

The  traditional  labour  law  criterion  of  subordination,  in  the  sense  of  direction  and 
control  of  the  workers’  activity  by  the  employer,  has  gradually  taken  on  a  different 
meaning due to the peculiarities of the role of algorithms in managing platform work. In 
the absence of a superior on the place of work, the judicial assessment focuses instead on 

297  Commonly  referred  to  as  the  “primacy  of  facts”  principle  –  see  article  9  of  the  ILO  Employment 
Relationship Recommendation, 2006 (No. 198). Available online. 

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the  presence  of  concrete  instructions  given  by  platforms’  algorithms  through  a 
smartphone  app  on  how  to  perform  services,  and  their  degree  of  detail.  Even  if  no 
specific instructions are given for individual tasks, the courts give more weight to the fact 
that  the  platforms  frequently  determine  and  dominate  all  aspects  of  the  service 
performed.  In  particular,  rulings  issued  by  courts  of  last  instance  refer  to  the  constant 
localisation of people working on platforms through  GPS technology,  as well as to  the 
platforms’  rating  systems  and  measures  of  performance  and  (mis)conduct,  which  can 
lead  to  sanctions  and  eventually  to  deregistration,  as  tools  of  control  that  indicate 
subordination.  

into 

the  platform’s  business  model  and 

Similarly,  courts  have  increasingly  come  to  consider  elements  of  organisational 
integration 
the  absence  of  genuine 
entrepreneurial independence of the people working through platforms as key factors 
in  assessing  the  employment  status  (in  addition  to  the  more  traditional  elements  of 
direction  and  control).  This  includes  considerations  on  whether  the  people  working 
through platforms appear, in the customers’ view, as independent entrepreneurs, whether 
they bear the economic risk of the enterprise in question and have opportunities to further 
develop  their  business,  or  if,  on  the  other  hand,  they  may  be  structurally  and 
organisationally  dependent  on  the  platform.  It  also  includes  the  issue  of  ownership  of 
equipment and infrastructure necessary for the service provision. In Spain especially, the 
courts have acknowledged that the platform app and thus the digital infrastructure are the 
main  means  of  production,  rather  than  the  smartphone  or  the  means  of  transport.  The 
courts’ focus on the organisational dependence of the people working through platforms 
– rather than on the lack of an explicit obligation to work – is also in line with established 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), according to which 
a  person  cannot  be  self-employed  if  they  cannot  independently  determine  their  own 
conduct on the market.298 

Overall,  a  clear  trend  can  be  observed  that  many  courts  have  developed  a  better 
understanding  of  the  organisation  of  platform  work,  of  the  role  of  algorithms  to 
manage  and  control  delivery  of  services  and  the  functioning  of  the  market,  and  have 
shifted their attention to these factors in order to reclassify the contractual relationship as 
one  of  employment.  However,  this  trend  is  not  followed  by  all  courts,  as  the 
jurisprudence is far from being settled. It is yet unclear whether courts in other Member 
States which have not yet had any cases will follow. 

Most  of  the  rulings  reclassifying  service  providers  as  workers  concerned  ride-hailing 
and  food  delivery  platforms,  but  the  two  decisions  by  higher  courts  in  Germany  and 
France  which  examined  digital  labour  platforms  intermediating  on-location  micro-
tasks  have  also  followed  this  direction.  So  far,  courts  have  been  reluctant  to  reclassify 
people offering their services as cleaners through platforms, taking into account that the 
remuneration  and  the  service  delivery  were  agreed  upon  mutually  between  the  person 
working  through  platforms  and  the  client,  with  limited  intervention  by  the  platform. 
However, the low number of cases and the fact that they were decided by first-instance 
courts (in Denmark and the Netherlands) does not allow for a general conclusion. 

The ambiguity of platforms’ business practices 
The diversity of approaches taken by national courts, both within and between Member 
States,  and  the  absence  of  case-law  in  many  others,  create  legal  uncertainty  for 
platforms and people working through them. However, legal uncertainty does not always 

298 Case C‑413/13, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media. Available online.  

176 

 
                                                           
stem  from  a  lack  of  regulation  or  diverging  court  rulings.  It  is  often  the  result  of 
platforms’  business  practices.  By  defining  their  business  model  as  the  provision  of 
intermediation  services  with  service  providers  as  independent  contractors,  platforms 
determine  various  conditions  related  to  remuneration,  working  time,  dispute  resolution, 
and  more.299  Strategies  used  by  some  platforms  to  avoid  obligations  as  employers  and 
reclassification  claims  include  complex  legal  set-ups  between  subsidiary  and  parent 
companies, mandatory arbitration clauses and making disputes subject to foreign law.300 
In some cases, following newly introduced legislation or court decisions, platforms have 
made  changes  to  their  business  model  or  their  contractual  terms  and  conditions. 
However  the  extent  of  these  changes  are  difficult  to  verify,  also  due  to  the  lack  of 
information, consultation and redress mechanisms vis-à-vis the organisational changes in 
question.301 

Changes  to  platforms’  business  models  following  regulatory  changes  or  court 
rulings in non-EU countries 

Following the passage of the AB5 law in the State of California in 2019, which extended 
the  worker  status  to  some  people  working  in  non-standard  arrangements,  including 
platforms,  some  digital  labour  platforms  first  argued  that  it  did  not  apply  to  them. 
Following  this,  Uber  made  changes  to  its  business  model,  allowing  for  drivers  in 
California to see the “pickup, trip time, distance, destination and fare upfront”.302 Finally, 
several ride-hailing companies funded a ballot initiative, Proposition 22, to exempt both 
ride-hailing  and  delivery  platforms  from  the  AB5  requirements,  while  also  granting 
drivers some new protections. Proposition 22 passed in November 2020 with 59% of the 
vote.303 

Similarly, Uber implemented the UK Supreme Court ruling of 19 February 2021 by re-
classifying  its  drivers  as  “workers”  under  UK  law  (a  status  more  akin  to  the  third 
category introduced by some EU Member States), but did not apply the ruling’s passage 
according  to  which  the  time  spent  by  drivers  logged  into  the  Uber  app  waiting  for 
assignments  was  to  be  counted  as  working  time.  Uber  argued  that  the  ruling  based  its 
decision on key features in the app from 2016 that are now defunct and that its definition 
of working time was consistent with the court ruling. Furthermore, the company argued it 
stopped  penalising  drivers  for  refusing  trips  in  2017,  removing  their  obligation  to 
work.304 

Digital  labour  platforms  can,  and  often  have,  updated  their  terms  of  use  in  order  to 
comply  with  the  law.  For  example,  in  2018,  when  the  General  Data  Protection 

299  Courts,  however,  have  been  challenging  platforms’  classifications.  For  example,  in  Case  C-434/15 
Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi v Uber Systems Spain SL. [2017], the Court of Justice of the European 
Union  held  that  Uber  is  not  a  mere  technological  intermediary,  rather  it  provides  services  in  the  field  of 
transport. Available online.  
300  International  Lawyers  Assisting  Workers  Network  (ILAW),  “Taken  for  a  ride:  Litigating  the  digital 
platform model”, Issue Brief, March 2021. Available online.  
301 For example, in France and Spain some platform companies did not change the employment status of 
their contractors even after rulings by the highest-instance courts.  
302  The  change  in  Uber’s  policy  was  signaled  in  a  blog  post  on  the  website  of  the  company.  Available 
online. 
303  Proposition 22 vote results available online.  
304 Article in the Financial Times,  Uber agrees to classify UK drivers as workers entitled to benefits, 16 
March 2021. Available online.  

177 

 
                                                           
Regulation  became  applicable,  many  platforms  updated  their  privacy  policies  to  signal 
their commitment to it.305   

The  variety  of  judicial  responses  to  platform  work,  as  well  as  the  constant  changes  to 
platforms’ business practices, create legal uncertainty at all levels, including for digital 
labour platforms, but in particular for the people working through them. The uncertainty 
over their employment status has a direct impact on the labour and social rights they can 
access, since the existence of an employment relationship is a key factor in cross-border 
situations and for benefiting from the EU labour and social acquis.  

A11.2  Internal  drivers  related  to  platforms’  algorithm-based  business 

model 

Platform work is by definition IT-driven, and some types of platform work can be 
easily delivered cross-border. This brings about certain challenges that have an impact 
on the working conditions of people working through platforms. Existing EU labour law 
does  not  tackle  algorithmic  management  challenges.  Currently,  the  internal  market 
acquis is developing in this area, but without focusing specifically on the perspective of 
people  providing  services  via  platforms.  Such  challenges  are  driven  by  the  lack  of 
transparency  and  clear  responsibility  associated  with  the  use  of  algorithms,  the 
information asymmetries and insufficient dialogue prevalent in platform work, as well as 
unclear and complicated relationships between platforms and authorities.  

Lack of information, consultation and redress  and unclear responsibilities in the use 
of algorithmic tools  

Lack  of  sufficient 
information,  consultation  and  redress  underpins  algorithmic 
management in platform work. Some academics note that algorithmic management may 
enable  forms  of  oversight  and  control  that  alter  the  traditional  role  of  managers  in 
workplaces (and human supervision in general) or remove them further from the scene of 
work.306 

The  particularities  of  how  automated  systems  are  designed  and  (“trained”  to)  operate 
result in three main challenges when applied in the world of work. At the same time, the 
extent  to  which  these  challenges  translate  into  specific  regulatory  failures  should  be 
assessed  both  from  the  perspective  of  EU  labour  law  as  well  as  in  the  context  of  the 
overall internal market acquis. Some issues may be addressed by existing and proposed 
horizontal legislation. 

  Bias  that  could  lead  to  discrimination.  There  are  two  ways,  in  which  bias 
towards  certain  groups  of  people  could  ‘creep’  in  algorithms.  Data  bias  could 
result when an algorithm finds a certain pattern in the data on which it is trained. 
This  could  for  example  be  a  correlation  between  certain  personal  characteristic 
(gender, age, ethnic origin etc.) and expected work performance. This could then 
introduce  or  reinforce  discriminatory  practices  vis-à-vis  the  affected  people,  for 
example  by  not  allocating  tasks  to  certain  individuals  based  on  some  personal 
traits,  or  excluding  certain  individuals  from  using  the  platforms  services  all 
together.  

305  See  for  example,  Uber’s  Privacy  Policy  dated  25  May  2018:  Available  online.  See  also  the  privacy 
policy for Upwork which has introduced a separate Data Processing Agreement in order to streamline its 
compliance with the GDPR. Available online. 
306 Katherine C. Kellog et al. (2020). 

178 

 
 
                                                           
The  EU  Fundamental  Rights  Agency  notes  that  discrimination  a  crucial  topic 
when  it  comes  to  the  use  of  AI,  because  the  very  purpose  of  machine  learning 
algorithms  is  to  categorise,  classify  and  separate.  Even  if  information  about 
protected attributes  (gender, age, ethnic origin) is  removed from  the data, it can 
still  be  inferred  via  proxies  (postal  code,  educational  institution,  etc.).307  This 
makes addressing potential discrimination more difficult. 

A  Eurobarometer  survey308  found  that  only  around  40%  of  EU  citizens  are 
concerned that using AI could lead to discrimination in terms of age, gender, race 
or  nationality  –  for  example,  in  taking  decisions  on  recruitment  or  credit 
worthiness.309 The possibility that this reflects a lack of general awareness on how 
automated systems could affect one’s rights (rather than a widespread trust in the 
technology) should not be discounted. 

Algorithms can also be discriminatory due to a bias in their programming. This could be 
the result of conscious or unconscious bias held by the human developing the algorithm 
and  could  lead  to  prejudiced  decisions  based  on  programming  rules.  This  potential  for 
bias is best exemplified by the fact that about 85% of AI developers are men.310 

Despite most of the focus being on negative outcomes of algorithmic bias, it should be 
noted  that  the  use  of  algorithms  can  also  lead  to  socially  important  outcomes,  such  as 
serving as a behavioural diagnostic and helping society understand the nature of human 
error. If implemented well, algorithms might also have the potential to reduce bias.311 

  Lack of transparency. Machine-learning-based algorithms have been labelled as 
‘black boxes’ due to a lack of clarity on how the system has been programmed to 
develop the rules, based upon which it fulfils its primary objective. 

This lack of transparency affects the understanding of how algorithms work, what 
the  implications  for  workers  are,  or  even  how  their  working  conditions  are 
affected.  Most  workers  currently  do  not  fully  grasp  what  kind  of  data  is  being 
collected about them, how it is being used, or how to contest it.312 In the platform 
economy, such lack of transparency can also reinforce power imbalances, leaving 
the  people  working  through  platforms  unable  to  challenge  unfavourable 
decisions,  while  at  the  same  time  not  having  access  to  certain  rights  and 
protections granted under labour law.313 

The EU Fundamental Rights Agency has noted the necessity to ensure that people 
can seek remedies when something goes wrong. To do so, they need to know that 
AI  is  being  used.  It  also  means  that  organisations  using  AI  need  to  be  able  to 
explain AI systems in use and how they deliver decisions based on them.314 

307 EU Fundamental Rights Agency (EU FRA) (2020). 
308 Eurobarometer 92.3 (2019). Available online. 
309 EU Fundamental Rights Agency (EU FRA) (2020). 
310 Michel Servoz (2019). 
311  Kleinberg  et  al.  (2018)  Human  decisions  and  machine  predictions.  Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics, 
133(1): 237-293. Available online. 
312 Katherine C. Kellog et al. (2020). 
313 To give a practical example, people working through platforms have blamed unexplained changes to the 
algorithm for having an impact on their access to  tasks (and hence income). When the couriers asked for 
reasons about their plummeting income, responses from the platform company advised them “we have no 
manual control over how many deliveries you receive.” Available online. 
314 EU Fundamental Rights Agency (EU FRA) (2020).  

179 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
The  lack  of  information  about  essential  aspects  of  the  working  relationship  is 
further  negatively  affected  by  a  limited  knowledge  about  relevant  rights  under 
existing  EU  instruments,  such  as  the  GDPR.  For  example,  For  example,  a 
Eurobarometer survey carried out in 2019 shows that only 40% of Europeans are 
aware that they have the right to have a say when decisions are automated. .315 

It is also worth noting that developers often make the claim that there is a trade-
off  between  the  transparency  and  the  effectiveness  of  algorithms  –  the  more 
understandable the system is, the worse it performs. 

  A  responsibility  gap.  Algorithmic  systems  allow  the  tracking,  disciplining  and 
setting  of  expectations  for  workers  without  any  human  supervision  and  control. 
This  could  undermine  existing  fundamental  rights  and  allow  companies  to 
distance  themselves  from  decisions  taken  via  algorithms  by  making  it  more 
difficult  to  identify  the  responsible  entity,  thereby  preventing  the  attribution  of 
(potential) obligations. This can create a responsibility gap due to the lack of a 
human ‘in the loop’ of an algorithmic decision. It might also prevent the effective 
exercise  of  the  right  of  workers  and  their  representatives  to  be  informed  about 
working  conditions  and  procedures. The proposed AI Act  and the  General  Data 
Protection Regulation introduce provisions for the human oversight of automated-
decisions.  Still,  specificities  of  employment  relations  might  necessitate  further 
action best tackled through the Treaty social chapter. 

The  EU  Fundamental  Rights  Agency  points  out  that  without  improved 
transparency  of  algorithmic  decisions,  individuals  may  not  be  able  to  defend 
themselves, assign responsibility for the decisions affecting them, or appeal  any 
decision  negatively  affecting  them.  In  this  regard,  opportunities  to  successfully 
complain against the use of AI and challenge decisions based on it are essential. 
This challenge is exacerbated by the complexity of algorithmic decision-making 
systems.  Furthermore,  a  particular  challenge  to  filing  successful  complaints 
against  automated  decisions  or  the  use  of  AI  in  general  relates  to  the  need  to 
explain decisions based on complex systems.316  

Algorithms can bring added value in managing efficiently the plethora of data and 
the  matching  of  supply  and  demand,  thereby  creating  new  business  models. 
However,  speeds  of  data  processing  can  ramp  up  the  pressure  to  rubber-stamp 
what  automated  systems  output,  due  for  instance  to  information  asymmetries 
between  the  human  validator  and  the  system  itself.317  Humans  responsible  for 
overseeing and controlling algorithms used for work monitoring and supervision 
and control might lack protection against undue repercussions in case they ignore 
automated decisions affecting workers. 

The  general  challenges  described  in  this  Section  and  inherent  in  the  nature  of  the 
technology enabling algorithmic management will not be subject to a possible initiative 
improving  the  working  conditions  in  platform  work,  as  they  are  dealt  with  through 
separate  instruments318.  When  applied  in  the  world  of  work,  however,  the  use  of 

315 Ibidem.  
316 EU Fundamental Rights Agency (EU FRA) (2020). 
317 The risk of automation bias is reflected in the proposed AI Act. 
318 Most notably the proposed AI Act. 

180 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
algorithms  results  in  specific  labour-related  challenges,  such  as  lack  of  information, 
consultation  and  redress  and  unclear  responsibilities  in  the  use  of  algorithmic  tools, 
which the potential initiative may aim to tackle.  

Information asymmetries and insufficient dialogue in platform work   

While  work  or  services  provided  via  digital  labour  platforms  have  opened  up  new 
opportunities,  there  is  growing  uncertainty  on  a  number  of  issues  relating  to  earnings, 
working conditions and social protection. To a significant extent, these challenges appear 
to link to information asymmetries and insufficient dialogue between platforms and 
the  people  working  through  platforms.  These  challenges  exist  in  other  non-standard 
forms  of  work  outside  of  the  digital  labour  platform  economy,  yet  the  opaqueness 
allowed for by new digital technologies seem to be exacerbating them.  

Despite  the  limited  research  on  this  aspect  of  the  digital  labour  platform  economy, 
scholars have pointed to the need for attention to the disruptive role of digital labour 
platforms  in  shaping  power  relations  and  communications.319  In  this  context,  the 
information and power asymmetries produced by platforms are arguably fundamental to 
the platforms’ ability to  exert supervision  and control over the people working through 
them, even if these are classified as self-employed.  

Indeed,  unclear  information  and  consultation  rights  can  affect  the  working 
conditions  of  people  working  through  platforms.  From  their  perspective,  it  can  be 
difficult  to  maintain  an  overview  of  existing  rights  and  regulations,  given  their 
complexity,  scarce  publicity  and  difficult  intelligibility  in  the  platforms’  terms  and 
conditions. People working through platforms often accept terms and conditions without 
a clear overview of the corresponding advantages and disadvantages, despite provisions 
in  existing  instruments,  such  as  the  GDPR320  and  the  Platforms  to  Business 
Regulation321. 
To some extent, the unbalanced power relationship due to the information asymmetries 
between  platforms  and  the  people  working  through  them  is  a  defining  feature  of  many 
digital  labour  platforms.  Scholars  argue  that  the  work  being  performed  on  digital 
labour platforms in some cases is shaped by the algorithmic deployment of a variety 
of business model decisions that generate information asymmetries. Hence, platforms 
exert “soft supervision” over the behaviour of people working through them.322  

In this way, the information asymmetries arise, as the rules made by the platforms may 
have the effect  of weakening the position in  the  negotiation process  of people working 
through them. Thus, due to the existence of information asymmetries, people voluntarily 
bind themselves to the protocol of the platform without having the ability to question the 
advantages and disadvantages associated with the protocol. At the same time, the lack of 
social  dialogue  and  collective  representation  amplifies  the  drawbacks,  as  these  would 
otherwise  be  a  tool  to  intervene  and  reduce  the  information  asymmetries  by  bringing 

319 A. Rosenblat and L. Stark (2016) Algorithmic Labour and Information Asymmetries: A Case Study of 
Uber’s Drivers in International Journal of Communication 10(2016), 3758-3784. Available online. 
320  GDPR  aims  to  address  information  asymmetries  by  providing  in  Article  12  that  the  “controller  shall 
take  appropriate  measures  to  provide  any  information  referred  to  in Articles  13 and 14 and  any 
communication  under Articles  15 to 22 and 34 relating  to  processing  to  the  data  subject  in  a  concise, 
transparent,  intelligible  and  easily  accessible  form,  using  clear  and  plain  language”.  In  addition,  the 
controller is obliged to facilitate the exercise of data subject rights under Articles 15 to 22. 
321  The  P2B  Regulation  only  covers  self-employed  ‘business  users’  engaged  in  direct  transactions  with 
customers. 
322 A. Rosenblat and L. Stark (2016). 

181 

 
                                                           
together  the  interests  of  people  working  through  platforms  vis-à-vis  digital  labour 
platforms themselves. 

Even  if  the  collective  representation  and  bargaining  power  of  people  working  through 
platforms were to be improved, this would not necessarily guarantee an improvement of 
the conditions, especially in case of people performing low-skilled, repetitive and easily 
replaceable  tasks.  While  collective  bargaining  can  be  an  effective  tool  to  reducing 
existing information asymmetries, it is important to stress that the issue of information 
asymmetries  and  insufficient  dialogue  goes  beyond  strictly  looking  at  the  legal 
employment status of the people working through platforms. Indeed, information and 
consultations rights, social dialogue, and collective organisation are also challenging due 
to the specificities of platform work. 

For example, platform  work often involves no  physical  shared workplace, even for on-
location  platforms,  which  means  that  people  working  through  platforms  rarely 
interact with each other, and that they may often not know who their peers on a given 
platform  are  or  even  how  to  contact  them.  Consequently,  collective  organisation  and 
representation  become  difficult  and  fragmented,  regardless  of 
the  employment 
relationship.  For  instance,  although  strikes  have  been  organised  through  social  media 
platforms,  the  success  of  these  is  dependent  on  whether  the  people  are  active  on  the 
social media platform in question and/or whether they become aware of the forthcoming 
strike in due time.  

Platforms’  business  models,  for  instance  those  relying  on  a  ranking  system,  may 
generate  competition  between  people  working  through  platforms  rather  than 
cooperation  with  the  aim  of  better  social  protection  and  working  conditions.  This 
appears  to  be  the  case  for  several  platforms,  where  couriers  are  ranked  according  to  a 
number of factors, including for example their ability to work during high-demand hours, 
the amount of completed orders, their average number of deliveries per hour as compared 
to the fastest courier, customer ratings and order history.323  

The issue of information asymmetries is exacerbated by the lack of transparency in 
algorithmic  management  for  the  people  working  through  platforms  and  their 
representatives,  as  needs  remain  to  improve  their  access  to  information  despite 
provisions  in  existing  and  proposed  EU  instruments  (see  Annex  8).  People  working 
through platforms have been seeking various unionised responses to the challenges of 
platform  work,  including  strike  actions  over  poor  wages  and  working  conditions. 
For  example,  the  city-based  ‘Riders  Union  Bologna’  was  established  with  the  aim  of 
setting  a  minimum  level  of  job  security,  full  accident  insurance  and  proper  and  free 
equipment,  guaranteed  working  hours,  decent  payment  and  compensation  in  case  of 
smog, rain and holiday work.324 Similarly, the ‘Wolt Workers Group’ is a Copenhagen-
based  worker  organisation  that  consists  of  a  group  of  riders  doing  deliveries  through 
Finnish  platform  ‘Wolt’  who  are  campaigning  for  better  pay  and  working  conditions, 
offering  general  advice  to  the  riders.325  This  is  done  through  petitions  and  protests,  the 
latest having taken place in February 2021, where riders protested against changes to the 
payment  model.  In  2018,  one  group  of  couriers  in  Spain  launched  its  own  delivery 

323 Pierre Bérastégui (2021) Available online 
324 Marco Marrone (2019) Rights against the machines! Food delivery, piattaforme digitali e sindacalismo 
informale in Labour&Law Issues, volume 5. No. 1. Available online. 
325 Eurofound (2021). 

182 

 
                                                           
platform,  ‘La  Pajara’326,  with  the  aim  to  establish  a  more  autonomous  business  model, 
giving  the  small  team  of  bicycle  couriers  a  fixed  salary,  health  benefits  and  parental 
leave. 

Various initiatives by social partners across EU Member States are also arising. One 
example is the Framework Agreement on Digitalisation adopted by the European Social 
Partners on 23 June 2020, which aims at laying out an inclusive approach to the digital 
transformation.  The  framework  agreement  analyses  the  impact  of  digitalisation  on  the 
workplace and covers all workers and employers in the public and private sectors and in 
all economic activities, including digital labour platforms.327 While this only covers the 
instances where an employment relationship exists, the challenges identified, such as the 
impact of Artificial Intelligence and ICTs on skills, work-life balance, work environment, 
and health and safety may indeed still be relevant for all people working through digital 
labour platforms.  

Additionally, new models of collective negotiations have been developed, for instance in 
the  case  of  Deliveroo  in  Belgium  who  employed  workers  through  the  intermediary 
‘SMart’. A survey suggests that the arrangement was primarily motivated by the specifics 
of  the  Belgian  tax  system,  but  that  it  nevertheless  provided  workers  with  protections, 
including  income  security.328  ‘SMart  coops’  operate  in  some  EU  Member  States329.  In 
return  for  a  fee,  SMart  helps  the  self-employed  with  administration,  accounting  and 
financial management tasks.  

Finally,  it  is  important  to  note  that  some  collective  agreements  have  already  been 
achieved  within  traditional  trade  union  frameworks.  For  instance,  ‘3F’  (the  United 
Federation  of  Danish  Workers)  was  able  to  conclude  a  temporary  collective  agreement 
with  the  cleaning  platform  ‘Hilfr’  in  2018.330  In  2019,  the  ‘Fellesforbundet’  union  and 
‘Foodora’ reached a collective bargaining agreement that includes an annual pay hike for 
full-time  riders  in  Norway.331  In  addition,  in  January  2021,  3F  and  the  employers’ 
organisation  ‘Dansk Erhverv’ reached a national sectoral  agreement for  delivery riders, 
which covers riders working through the food delivery platform ‘Just Eat’ in Denmark.332 
Similarly, in Austria social partners have concluded a sectoral collective agreements for 
bicycle couriers working under an employment relationship, who from January 1st, 2020 
could  benefit  from  a  minimum  wage  and  paid  leave.333  Although  these  collective 
agreements  may  be  limited  in  either  sectoral  scope  or  timeframe,  they  are  important  in 

326  La Pàjara. Available online. 
327 The European Social Partners Framework Agreement on Digitalisation was signed by BusinessEurope, 
ETUC, CEEP and SMEunited to support the successful digital transformation of Europe’s economy and to 
manage its large implications for labour  markets, the  world of  work and society at large. The agreement 
supports  the  successful  integration  of  digital  technologies  at  the  workplace,  investment  in  digital  skills, 
skills updating and the continuous employability of the workforce. The agreement enables employers and 
unions  to  introduce  digital  transformation  strategies  in  partnership  in  a  human  oriented  approach  at 
national,  sectoral,  company  and  workplace  levels,  including  on  the  modalities  of  connecting  and 
disconnecting and respect of working time rules and appropriate measures to ensure compliance. Available 
online  
328  Jan  Drahokopil  and  Agnieska  Piasna  (2019)  Work  in  the  platform  economy.  Deliveroo  riders  in 
Belgium and the SMart arrangement. Working paper 2019.01. Available online. 
329 Smart (2021) Available online. 
330    Kristin  Jesnes,  Anna  Ilsoe,  and  Marianne  J.  Hotvedt  (2019)  Collective  agreements  for  platform 
workers? Examples from the Nordic countries. Fafo. Available online. 
331 Eurofound (2021).  
332  Asger  Havstein  Eriksen  (2021)  Groundbreaking  agreement:  Danes  can  now  order  takeaways  with  a 
clean conscience in Fagbladet 3F. Available online. 
333 Eurofound (2021), Collective agreement for bicycle couriers in Austria. Available online.  

183 

 
                                                           
that they display social dialogue and collective representation as viable means to improve 
the working conditions in platform work. 

Digital  labour  platforms  are  also  starting  to  establish  standalone  business 
associations. For instance, ‘AssoDelivery’ is  an  Italian association in  the food delivery 
industry  to  which  Deliveroo,  Glovo,  SocialFood  and  Uber  Eats  adhere334,  and  which 
aims  to  ensure  that  food  delivery  platforms  have  a  unitary  representative  organisation. 
The  platforms  are  also  increasingly  publishing  collective  statement  of  principles, 
charters,  and  codes  of  conduct,  which  can  be  a  first  step  in  the  direction  of  more 
transparency  to  close  the  gap  in  information  imbalances  between  platforms  and  their 
associated workers. The fact that platforms are entering into collective associations may 
also  create  renewed  pressure  for  people  working  through  platforms  to  not  only  enter 
collective  representation  within  the  framework  of  a  single  platform,  but  also  to  seek 
broader  unionisation.  This  would  help  addressing  the  question  of  workers  working 
through  different  platforms  simultaneously  and  thus  having  to  prioritise  their  loyalties, 
although  it  would  perhaps  add  to  the  challenge  of  identifying  fellow  people  working 
through platforms. 

Platforms’ initiatives to improve working conditions and access to social protection 

Aside from initiatives directly linked to the COVID pandemic (see the box on the impact 
of  COVID  in  Section  3.1.1),  some  platform  companies  have  proposed  measures  to 
improve working conditions of self-employed people that provide services through them. 

These include for example: 

  Different  types  of  private  insurance  schemes,  such  as  Uber’s  partnership  with 

AXA or cooperation of Wolt, Deliveroo or Glovo with Qover; 

  Provision of training: either directly relevant for platform work (e.g. Frizbiz and 
Heetch  in  cooperation  with  a  home  improvement  and  gardening  retailer,  Leroy 
Merlin)  or  for  further  career  development  (Uber’s  cooperation  with  the  Open 
University in the UK); 

  Tools  for  more  control  and  transparency  over  earnings  (e.g.  Uber’s  earnings 

estimator in France); 

  Tools  for  recording  rankings  (Glovo  Pro  to  download  a  certificate  containing 

information on the metrics and evaluations). 

Some  platforms  have  also  committed  to  greater  transparency  and  improvement  in 
working  conditions  through  codes  of  conducts  such  as  the  Crowdsourcing  Code  of 
Conduct335  in  Germany  or  declarations  such  as  the  Charter  of  Principles  for  Good 
Platform Work336 or Statement of Principles of EU technology platforms.337  

334 Associazione Italiana de categoria. Available online.  
335 Available online.  
336 Available online.  
337 Available online.  

184 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
A11.3 Internal drivers related to the cross-border nature of platform 

work 

Platform work across borders can create difficulties for determining the law applicable 
to the contractual obligations between the platform and the person working through it, 
as  well  as  for  determining  which  courts  have  jurisdiction  over  disputes  relating  to 
such obligations, in particular in situations where the employment status is not clear.  

The Brussels Ia338 and Rome I339 regulations set out, respectively, rules on determining 
the  responsible  jurisdiction  and  the  applicable  law  in  cross-border  disputes.  In  such 
disputes between the employer and the worker these provisions derogate from the general 
rules concerning contracts, and providing certain safeguards, with the aim of protecting 
workers as the weaker party to a contract. Brussels Ia, in particular, stipulates that a 
worker may only be sued in the Member State of his/her domicile and that s/he may 
choose between several jurisdictions when bringing a claim against the employer. Rome 
I stipulates that while the parties to the employment contract can determine the law 
applicable  to  it,  they  cannot  contractually  opt  out  from  the  mandatory  legal 
provisions  of  the  country  whose  law  would  be  applicable  in  the  absence  of  the 
choice,  which  in  principle  is  the  law  of  the  country  “where  or  from  where  the 
worker habitually carries out his work”. As a result, a worker is entitled to protections 
under  the  more  favourable  mandatory  employment  law  of  these  Member  States.  These 
provisions  protecting  workers  do  not  apply  to  self-employed  whose  transactions  are 
governed  by  the  general  rules.  Hence,  legal  uncertainty  on  the  employment  status 
generates  further  doubts  on  whether  contractual  clauses  of  digital  labour  platforms 
regarding the choice of law and jurisdiction are valid or not.  

With  regard  to  social  protection,  Regulation  (EC)  No  883/2004  on  the  coordination  of 
social protection systems and its implementing Regulation (EC) 987/2009 lay down the 
common  rules  to  protect  people’s  social  protection  rights  when  moving  within  Europe. 
These rules also cover cross-border platform workers whatever status they hold in order 
to perform their activity (employed or self-employed) in the same way as other employed 
or self-employed persons. In particular, Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 sets rules for the 
determination  of  the  social  protection  legislation  applicable  in  cross-border  situations 
and,  in  order  to  resolve  the  conflict  of  law,  provides  in  Article  11(1)  that  persons  are 
subject to the legislation of a single Member State only. As a general principle, pursuant 
to Article 11(3)(a) of the Regulation, the social protection legislation applicable is that of 
the  Member  State  in  which  the  activity  as  an  employed  or  self-employed  person  is 
pursued. This applies even if the person concerned resides in another Member State or is 
employed by a firm whose registered office or place of business is situated in a different 
Member State. In the case of platform worker, a person who is employed by a platform 
established  in  one  Member  State,  but  carries  out  all  of  their  work  in  another  Member 
State  (e.g.  the  one  in  which  they  reside),  would  therefore  be  subject  to  the  social 
protection legislation of the latter State. Where that person regularly works in more than 
one  Member  State,  the  applicable  legislation  will  be  determined  by  Article  13  of  the 
Regulation.  

338 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 351, 
20.12.2012, p. 1. Available online. 
339 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the 
law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), OJ L 177, 4.7.2008, p. 6. Available online.  

185 

 
 
 
                                                           
Challenges  in  determining  the  social  protection  legislation  applicable  in  cross-border 
situations may arise due to  an unclear status  of people working through  platforms. The 
classification  of  these  people  in  national  law  bears  consequences  for  social  protection 
coordination law.340 For instance, if a person working through a platform is classified as a 
worker in Member State A (where s/he performs a significant activity of more than 25% 
and also resides) and as a worker in Member State B, Member State A will be competent 
for social protection. However, if, under the same conditions, Member State A classifies 
such person as self-employed, Member State B may be competent due to the priority of 
the Member State of employment over the Member State of self-employment. False self-
employment  or  unclear  employment  status 
therefore  further 
complicates the social protection coverage of people moving to another Member State or 
working across borders.  

in  platform  work 

As  announced  in  the  European  Pillar  of  Social  Rights  Action  Plan,  the  Commission, 
together with the Italian Social protection Institution Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza 
Sociale, launched in March 2021 a pilot project on the European Social protection Pass. 
The aim is to explore the feasibility of a solution to digitise the cross-border verification 
of  social  protection  coverage  and  entitlements,  currently  relying  on  paper-based 
procedures, the so-called Portable Documents and the European Health Insurance Card. 
This  would  improve  the  portability  of  social  protection  rights  across  borders  while 
helping reduce the risk of errors and fraud in the field of social protection coordination. 
Any  potential  initiative  which  may  follow  in  this  area  would  also  concern  platform 
workers in case they fall under the Social protection Coordination Regulations. 

A 2021 study by CEPS notes that, based on a selection of digital labour platforms, only a 
minority of terms and conditions (19% of selected digital labour platforms) clearly spell 
out the contractual relations between the platform and the person working through it. 341 

National  authorities do not have easy access  to data on platform work and people 
working  through  them,  which  is  especially  relevant  where  platforms  operate  in 
several  Member  States.  Data  gaps  regarding  the  latest  terms  and  conditions  of 
platforms,  and  the  number  and  employment  status  classification  of  people  working 
through them, affect the ability of relevant national authorities and stakeholders to bring 
about positive change, for instance through accurate and evidence-driven policymaking. 
It  is  not  always  clear  where  platform  work  is  performed,  which  can  lead  to  difficulties 
tracing and addressing cross-border challenges.   

The  high-level  expert  group  on  the  impact  of  the  digital  transformation  on  EU  labour 
markets,342 which was set up to provide analysis and advice to the Commission, noted in 
its  final  report  and  recommendations  the  need  to  create  a  Digital  Single  Window  for 
employment  contributions  and  taxes  for  self-employed  people  working  on  platforms. 
The high-level group further suggested that through a digital interface, automated reports 
from  platform  companies  could  allow  collecting  earnings  data  in  a  standardized  digital 
format to reduce the cost of compliance.343 

340  Strban  et  al  (2020),  Social  protection  coordination  and  non-standard  forms  of  employment  and  self-
employment: Interrelation, challenges and prospects, July 2020. Available online.  
341 Willem Pieter de Groen, Zachary Kilhoffer, Leonie Westhoff, Doina Postica and Farzaneh Shamsfakhr 
(2021). Available online. 
342 Available online.  
343 Ibidem. 

186 

 
                                                           
A subsequent study344 assesses the viability and feasibility of the concept of an EU-level 
“Digital  Single  Window.”  It  underlines  that  income  reporting  for  social  contribution 
purposes  presents  unique  challenges  due  to  the  complex  national  social  contribution 
rules. Some Member States have social contribution rules that are designed in accordance 
with  assumptions  about  regular  employment.  Such  design  could  therefore  make  it 
exceedingly  difficult  to  square  with  the  current  reality  of  platform  work.  A  focus  on 
income reporting for tax purposes could be considered as an alternative 
The  study  notes  that,  in  principle,  an  EU  Digital  Single  Window  could  serve  two 
functions: a disclosure function and an enforcement function. Disclosure function refers 
to  a  system  that  facilitates  income  data  reporting  at  EU  level,  in  order  to  facilitate 
collection  at  Member  State  level.  Enforcement  function  refers  to  a  system  that  would 
facilitate  actual  tax  collection  and  distribution  to  Member  States.    The  study  notes 
limitations  to  ensuring  an  enforcement  function  at  EU  level  and  looks  only  into  the 
disclosure function instead. 

The Digital Single Window study examines a centralized (‘hub and spoke’) approach, in 
which member states would nominate an (EU level) central agency (the “hub”) to receive 
income  data  from  all  the  platforms  with  users  in  the  Member  States  and  forward  it  to 
national tax and social protection agencies (the “spokes”), in whatever form they require 
(Figure 12 below). There is currently no precedent at EU level for such a model. 

Figure 12: Hub-and-spoke model of cross-EU platform income data reporting 

There are numerous challenges with such a centralized approach, in addition to the issue 
of having to  first  identify  all the platforms that  operate within the European Union. As 
income  taxation  is  a  national  competence,  there  are  legal  constraints  to  establishing 
such a data collection effort at EU level. Data protection rules stemming from the GDPR 
should  also  be  complied  with.  More  generally,  such  a  centralized  model  also  raises 
concerns  over  data  protection  and  cybersecurity,  with  the  concentration  of  taxpayers’ 
data in a single hub particularly problematic in this regard. National tax agencies would 
also not be collecting data directly from their local platforms, whereas the actual tax and 
social  protection  rules  applicable  to  platforms  and  people  working  through  platforms 

344 Vili Lehdonvirta and Daisy Ogembo (2019). A Digital Single Window for Income Data from Platform 
Work. Available online. 

187 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
would  be  national.345    Beyond  these  considerations,  there  are  also  the  significant 
administrative costs to be taken into account. 

The study also looks into a decentralized model of income reporting, with tax agencies in 
the Member States collecting data from the platforms registered in their jurisdiction and 
reporting the data regarding tax residents  of other member states to  the tax agencies in 
those Member States.346 It should be noted here that the Council has recently adopted a 
revision  of  the  Directive  on  Administrative  Cooperation  in  Tax  Matters  (DAC7 
revision), which in  essence represents  such an approach. The DAC7 revision is further 
described in Annex 7. 

Beyond putting forward  models for the operationalizing of a “Digital  Single Window,” 
the study notes also that insufficient data has repercussions for taxing and extending the 
social  protection  coverage  to  people  working  through  platforms.  This  is  further 
complicated  by  their  involvement  in  multiple,  simultaneous  engagements,  possibly  on 
different terms and under different employment statuses even within the same country.347  

The DAC7 revision  addresses the need for income-related data collection in  the digital 
labour platform economy,  when it  comes to  the  self-employed people  working through 
platforms. As Section 3.5.3 b on existing national measures in this area shows, however, 
there  are  still  considerable  gaps  when  it  comes  to  collecting  data  on  the  working 
conditions in platform work. Further efforts might therefore be necessary in this regard. 

345 Ibidem. 
346 Ibidem. 
347 Ibidem. 

188 

 
 
 
                                                           
Annex 12: External drivers analysis 

Megatrends: globalisation, digitalisation and societal changes  

Platform  work  is  a  new,  technology-enabled,  non-standard  form  of  work.  Its  rise  and 
main characteristics can be indirectly traced back to three megatrends that are affecting 
the world and having repercussions on a wide array of social and economic phenomena.  

The first one is globalisation. In the last  century, the acceleration in the opening up of 
borders and lowering of cross-country barriers has resulted in an exponential growth in 
the  global,  cross-country  flow  of  goods,  capital,  ideas  and  people.  This  has  brought  as 
many opportunities as challenges to the governance of labour markets and its institutions. 
The  globally  increased  competition  between  companies  has  led  them  to  seek  ways  of 
reducing  costs  to  make  up  for  decreasing  revenues.  Amongst  other  practices,  the 
widespread use of non-standard contracts, coupled with an increasing outsourcing of the 
workforce, has led to a decrease in overall standard employment, with detrimental effects 
for the working conditions and social protection of the workers concerned.348 Long-term 
corporate cost-cutting and streamlining has also been affecting the wages of workers. As 
of 2018, low-wage earners349 in the EU stood at 15.3% of the workforce (cfr. Figure 6). 
Low-wage earners were strongly represented among workers younger than 30 (25%) and 
among  workers  in  the  accommodation  and  food  services  (39%)  and  in  the  support 
services that include temporary work agencies (33.3%).350 

Figure 6: Share of low-wage earners in the EU, 2018 

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

Source: Eurostat (online data code earn_ses_pub1s). Note: data exclude apprentices.  

A  high  incidence  of  low-wage  earners  is  often  a  reflection  of  low  bargaining  power, 
especially in the context of a generalised decrease in trade union density and collective 
bargaining coverage.  

Although there have been attempts on the side of unions in various EU countries to reach 
out  to  people  working  through  platforms351,  collective  bargaining  in  the  platform 
economy remains very limited352 and data on trade union density on platforms is scarce 
or non-existent. Globalisation affects working conditions in platform work by putting the 

the  world:  Understanding  challenges,  shaping  prospects, 

348  Non-standard  employment  around 
International Labour Office – Geneva: ILO. 2016. Available online.  
349 Low-wage earners are defined by Eurostat as those employees earning two thirds or less of the national 
median  gross  hourly  earnings.  Hence,  the  threshold  that  determines  low-wage  earners  is  relative  and 
specific to each Member State. More information available online. 
350 Eurostat data, available online.  
351  Institut  de  Recherches  Économiques  et  Sociales  (2019).  Don't  Gig  Up  !  State  of  the  Art  Report. 
Document de travail, n° 02.2019. Available online.  
352 Eurofound Platform economy online repository – Collective Bargaining. Available online.  

189 

 
 
 
                                                           
pressure of competition on companies to reduce social standards in order to cut costs and 
increase  revenues.  Furthermore,  with  work  on  online  platforms  becoming  increasingly 
available,  the  incentive  is  high  for  companies  in  high-income  countries  to  purchase 
labour provided by workers in low-income countries. As of 2020, nearly 40% of online 
platform  work  demand  came  from  the  United  States,  whereas  over  50%  of  online 
platform work came from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.353  

Figure  7:  Distribution  of  global  labour  supply  and  demand  on  major  online 
platforms, by country and occupational category, 2018-2020 

Source: Graphical elaboration of data of the Online Labour Observatory  
(iLabour Project, Oxford Internet Institute and ILO) 

This is made possible by the second megatrend affecting working conditions in platform 
facilitating  communications  and 
work:  digitalisation.  Digitalisation  has  been 
international  cooperation,  allows  for  streamlined  management  and  organisational 
processes,  increased  transparency  and  cross-border  exchanges  of  ideas,  work  and 
practices.  The  ongoing,  internet-driven  ‘information  revolution’  is  facilitating  the 
emergence  of  business  models  based  on  the  collection,  processing,  management  and 
monetisation of large amounts of information (‘Big Data’).  

Digital  labour  platforms’  business  models  are  amongst  these.  They  collect  and  process 
information on the existing demand and available supply of a given service. They match 
the  demand  and  supply  efficiently  and  monetise  the  whole  procedure  by  charging 
customers, and in some instances the people working through platforms themselves, for 
the matching service. Digital tools allow them to break jobs down into micro-tasks and 
thus  facilitate  outsourcing  to  a  “crowd”.  Digital  labour  platforms  do  not  always  limit 
themselves to matching demand and supply, but exert a lesser or greater supervision on 
how  the  work  is  performed.  Hence,  the  challenges  their  business  model  poses  to  the 
world of work.  

Digitalisation mainly affects labour markets quantitatively in two ways: it has a positive 
effect  on  employment  growth  and  a  negative  one  on  wage  distribution.  Regarding  the 
first,  numerous  studies  have  found  a  correlation  between  digitalisation  and  a  net 

353 International Labour Office (2021). 

190 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
employment  growth,  meaning that overall new technologies create more jobs  than they 
replace. This is explained by the fact that digitally-induced automation mostly concerns 
single tasks rather than whole jobs, and in some instances this complements and boosts 
the  productivity  of  certain  jobs  leading  to  further  job-creation.354  Such  findings  should 
nonetheless be interpreted with the caveat that employment growth is higher for jobs at 
low-risk of automation, i.e. high-skilled jobs.355 

Digitalisation also affects labour markets qualitatively, for instance by changing the way 
people  interact  with  one  another  on  the  workplace  and  with  their  employer/contracting 
entity.  By  shifting  parts  or  all  of  these  interactions  to  the  digital  sphere,  new 
opportunities  but  also  new  challenges  arise  and  the  working  conditions  of  the  people 
involved  are  affected.356  For  instance,  digitalisation  has  led  to  a  proliferation  of  digital 
technology  start-ups  providing  automated  services,  such  as  virtual  assistant  services  or 
automated legal services. Though these companies advertise their services as AI-enabled, 
in practice, they are often performed by people working through digital labour platforms 
to varying degrees357. In fact, given the costs involved in automation, AI companies often 
prefer  to  outsource  tasks  to  human  workers  through  platforms.358  Digitalisation  can 
therefore  lead  to  the  creation  of  an  invisible  workforce,  which  increases  the  risk  of 
‘dehumanisation’ and ‘commodification of labour’, and raises concerns over the quality 
of jobs that survive automation359. 

The  growth  of  digitalisation  exacerbates  platforms’  benefits  of  so-called  “indirect  (or 
cross-side)  network  effects”.360  By  making  centralised  service-providers  like  platforms 
efficient and convenient for consumers: the more consumers a platform is able to reach, 
the more services it is able to offer to such consumers, which in turn makes the platform 
more attractive to other consumers, and so forth. Hence, a successful platform business 
model is based on quickly establishing, maintaining and further growing network effects, 
including  a  self-reinforcing  circle  of  market-share  growth,  with  long-term  detrimental 
effects on the bargaining power of people working through that same company, but also 
for  consumers  themselves.  Consumers  in  highly  concentrated  digital  labour  platform 
markets  face  higher  prices  and  fewer  alternatives.  Finally,  digitalisation  also  has 
qualitative effects on the accessibility and performability of work. When the assignment 
and the performance of jobs become available online, the kinds of people being assigned 
and performing such jobs change. This has demographic repercussions.  

354  C.  Frey  and  M.  Osborne  (2013),  The  Future  of  Employment:  How  susceptible  are  jobs  to 
computerization? Working Paper, Oxford Martin School – University of Oxford. Available online.  
P. Brandes and R. Wattenhofer (2016), Opening the Frey/Osborne Black Box: Which Tasks 
of a Job are Susceptible to Computerization?, ETHU Zurich, Switzerland. Available online.  
Arntz,  M.,  T.  Gregory  and  U.  Zierahn  (2016),  The  Risk  of  Automation  for  Jobs  in  OECD  Countries:  A 
Comparative  Analysis,  OECD  Social,  Employment  and  Migration  Working  Papers,  No.  189,  OECD 
Publishing, Paris. Available online.  
355 A. Georgieff and A. Milanez (2021), What happened to jobs at high risk of automation?, OECD Social, 
Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 255, OECD Publishing, Paris. Available online.  
356  International  Labour  Office  (2021),  World  Employment  and  Social  Outlook  2021: The  role  of  digital 
labour platforms in transforming the world of work, Geneva: Switzerland. Available online.  
357 Idem, p. 123. 
358  P.  Tubaro,  A.A.  Casilli,  and  M.  Coville  (2020),  The  trainer,  the  verifier,  the  imitator:  Three  ways  in 
which human platform workers support artificial intelligence, 7(1) Big Data & Society. Available online.  
359  V.  De  Stefano  (2018),  “Negotiating  the  algorithm”:  Automation,  artificial  intelligence  and  labour 
protection, Employment Working Paper No.246, International Labour Office, Geneva: Switzerland, p. 4. 
360 F. Zhu and M. Iansiti (2019), Why Some Platforms Thrive and Others Don’t, Harvard Business Review 
– January-February 2019 issue (pp.118-125). Available online.  

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In fact, the third megatrend affecting working conditions in platform work comprises an 
array  of  ongoing  societal  changes.  The  number  of  international  migrants  has  grown 
robustly  over  the  past  two  decades.  It  is  estimated  that  the  number  of  persons  living 
outside of their country of origin reached 281 million in 2020. Between 2000 and 2010, 
the  number  of  international  migrants  increased  by  48  million  globally,  with  another  60 
million added between 2010 and 2020. Much of this increase was due to labour or family 
migration. In terms of the regional distribution of where migrants live, Europe was home 
to the largest number of international migrants in the world in 2020: 87 million. Europe 
also  had  the  largest  share  of  intra-regional  migration,  with  70  per  cent  of  all  migrants 
born in Europe residing in another European country.361  

In 2007, the number of people living in cities worldwide surpassed that of rural areas for 
the first time in history. By 2050, the world population is projected to be 68% urban. In 
Europe, it will be 74.9%, compared to 51.4% in 1950.362 Migration and urbanisation go 
hand  in  hand  with  ongoing  changes  in  workforce  participation  patterns.  Today,  people 
working or actively seeking a job in the European Union are increasingly more likely to 
have a migrant background and/or to be women than in the past.  

food-delivery, 

Urban  population  growth  and  the  spread  of  related  urban  life-styles  drive  the  growing 
consumption  of  on-demand  services  such  as 
ride-hailing  and 
household/cleaning  services.  Platform  work  in  Europe  (and  most  notably  on-location 
platform  work)  is  concentrated  in  urban  areas  and  big  cities.363  In  this  context,  the 
opportunities  offered  by  platforms’  easy-to-access  jobs  with  low  entry-barriers 
(especially in terms of formal qualifications, language requirements and legal checks) are 
becoming  increasingly  known  and  attractive  for  migrants  and  people  who  have  more 
difficulty  accessing  more  traditional  jobs.  13.3%  of  people  working  through  platforms 
have  a  migrant  background.364  The  compound  effect  of  these  societal  changes,  with 
Europe’s population becoming increasingly more concentrated in cities on the one hand, 
and migrants and women being increasingly more represented in the workforce, impact 
both the demand and supply of digital labour platforms’ services.  

The combined effects of globalisation, digitalisation and societal changes, including the 
ageing  of  the  EU’s  population,  also  have  budgetary  repercussions  for  countries.  The 
pressure of  global competition on cutting corporate costs, digitally-enabled outsourcing 
processes,  a  wider  Section  of  the  population  entitled  to  pension  benefits  and  a  much 
slimmer one supposed to pay for it may end up limiting countries’ social policy options 
when  dealing  with  in-work  poverty  and  precariousness.  Member  States  may  have  less 
fiscal leverage to extend labour regulations (because of their intrinsic costs) and existing 
social  protection  regimes  to  non-standard  workers,  including  people  working  through 
platforms.  This  has  detrimental  effects  on  these  people’s  working  conditions,  ability  to 
smooth  consumption  and  face  unforeseen  fluctuations  in  their  income,  ultimately 
affecting the future sustainability of welfare systems.365 

361 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2020). International 
Migration 2020 Highlights (ST/ESA/SER.A/452). Available online.  
362  United  Nations,  Department  of  Economic  and  Social  Affairs,  Population  Division  (2019).  World 
Urbanization Prospects: The 2018 Revision (ST/ESA/SER.A/420). New York: United Nations. Available 
online.  
363 Urzi Brancati, M.C., Pesole, A. and Fernandez Macias, E. (2020). 
364 Ibidem.  
365  H.  Glennerster  (2010),  The Sustainability  of  Western  Welfare  States  in  The  Oxford  Handbook  of  the 
Welfare State, Edited by F. G. Castles et al., Oxford University Press  

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