Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘A strong transatlantic partnership based on the common values of democracy and the rule of law, key in tackling global challenges and preserving the international order’ (own-initiative opinion)
Date: 2021-12-09
Institutions: European Economic and Social Committee
Subjects: NATO, United States, common security and defence policy, cooperation policy, democracy, foreign policy, international relations, international security, rule of law








C_2022152EN.01005601.xml










6.4.2022   


EN


Official Journal of the European Union


C 152/56






Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘A strong transatlantic partnership based on the common values of democracy and the rule of law, key in tackling global challenges and preserving the international order’
(own-initiative opinion)
(2022/C 152/09)






Rapporteur:



Christian MOOS





Co-rapporteur:



Peter CLEVER











Plenary Assembly decision


25.3.2021




Legal basis


Rule 32(2) of the Rules of Procedure




 


Own-initiative opinion




Legal basis


Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure




 


Resolution




Section responsible


Section for External Relations




Adopted in section


17.11.2021




Date adopted in plenary


9.12.2021




Plenary session No


565




Outcome of vote
(for/against/abstentions)


211/3/5




1.   Conclusions and recommendations









1.1.


An international order where the rule of law prevails rather than the rule of the strongest is inextricably linked to the principles of democracy and the rule of law.












1.2.


Democracy and the rule of law are not possible without the involvement of a pluralistic, independent and vibrant civil society that includes autonomous social partners. This is why it is so important that the recommendations in this opinion on transatlantic civil society, in particular to promote a transatlantic platform, are put into practice.












1.3.


Within the EU, the democratic foundation of some Member States has become more fragile.












1.4.


The geopolitical changes over the past two decades have caused serious harm to the multilateral international order and significantly weakened key international organisations. China in particular, but also Russia and, closer to home, Turkey, pose particular challenges that Europe can only face through a renewed transatlantic partnership, while conversely the USA also depends on its democratic allies in the world, particularly Europe.












1.5.


The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) supports the idea of an Alliance of Democracies and recognises, in a spirit of self-criticism, that a greater commitment to defending universal values and rights is urgently needed. Together, the EU and the US should be an anchor for democracy, peace and security around the world, the rule of law, and human rights for all.












1.6.


The hasty withdrawal of US armed forces and their allies from Afghanistan paints a dire picture of just how much the free world depends on the security assurance provided by the USA.












1.7.


The EU must speak with one voice in foreign and security policy and reconsider its ambiguous concept of ‘strategic autonomy’ in favour of strategic capacity.












1.8.


There must be no equidistance between Europe and the world’s major powers. The EU, together with the USA and in the framework of the Alliance of Democracies, should defend the liberal international order and, in particular, pursue a ‘strategy of cooperative containment’ towards China.












1.9.


The OSCE is a key pillar of the pan-European security architecture and as such should be consolidated for dialogue with Russia. The Nord Stream 2 project should be put on hold for as long as Russia continues to violate international law in Ukraine, otherwise Moscow will gain greater leverage over eastern European countries.












1.10.


The European security architecture must be strengthened together with NATO; there should also be a dialogue on values within NATO.












1.11.


Civil society cooperation needs to be further strengthened in the transatlantic context. The joint dialogue on citizens’ rights, resilience to disinformation, media freedom, climate action, social rights and consumer protection, and on supporting democracy, as guaranteed by the EESC in the EU, is particularly important in this connection. In the long term, the transatlantic partnership can give way to transatlantic integration.




2.   The rule of law and liberal international order









2.1.


The EESC notes that there is an inseparable link between a liberal international order and a foundation of democracy and the rule of law at home. If those democratic entities governed by the rule of law lose power in relation to authoritarian or totalitarian players, it will be impossible to uphold a liberal international order. By analogy, if mercantilism and protectionism replace rules-based free trade, this will encourage those forces that question rule-of-law-based liberal democracy within countries too.












2.2.


The EESC believes a liberal international order to be the prerequisite for a rules-based, fair and sustainable trading system, and the achievement of the Paris climate targets, of the United Nations sustainable development goals as well as of social justice, equal opportunities, gender equality and non-discrimination. An international order based on the law of the jungle, isolationism, efforts to be self-sufficient, and hierarchical power-based trade relations can neither cultivate and consolidate creative and innovative entrepreneurship that produces long-term economic success nor realise ambitious environmental and social policy objectives.












2.3.


The EESC therefore favours strengthening fundamental rules that govern interaction between states through the United Nations and its subsidiary agencies, and welcomes the idea of an Alliance of Democracies. It was only thanks to the democratic influence of the United States that the international institutions could be set up at all after the second world war, and they only have a future with a United States on board that is democratic and open to the wider world.












2.4.


In a spirit of self-criticism, the EESC observes that after the end of the Cold War, not just European political players, but also organised civil society in Europe assumed for too long that the universal values of democracy and the rule of law were guaranteed. However, there are powerful actors in the world who, although bound by these values under international law, have, in practice, fundamentally ignored them. The preservation of our value-based order cannot be taken for granted.












2.5.


The values that guide countries and alliances based on democracy and the rule of law are values that characterise the multilateral order that the EU continues to uphold, though its own power to do so remains limited. These values are rooted in the separation of secular and religious power, the Magna Carta, habeas corpus, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the UN General Assembly. They constitute a prerequisite for liberal democracy and the rule of law. The EU, the USA and friendly liberal democracies share these values. Article 30 of the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights expressly states that: ‘Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.’












2.6.


Common to liberal democracies is that their existence is inextricably linked to a pluralistic, independent and vibrant civil society.




3.   The importance of transatlantic relations for Europe’s place in the world









3.1.


The geopolitical changes over the past two decades have caused serious harm to the liberal international order and significantly weakened key international organisations. The dominant forces have been an increasingly aggressive ruling elite in the People’s Republic of China and a dangerous heightening of isolationism on the part of the United States.












3.2.


Given its own social tensions and the global nature of the challenge, the United States cannot manage the task of preserving a liberal international order alone. The US population regards costly military operations in distant parts of the world with great scepticism. As Afghanistan so grimly illustrates, there is an urgent need for a new, credible strategy among liberal democracies and for greater European involvement, in order to relieve the burden on the USA. This must not be limited to military capabilities, albeit these will play a role.












3.3.


In 2011 the US turned away from a destabilised Middle East, disillusioned. The resulting vacuum was filled initially by the Islamic State movement. When the latter was largely wiped out in Iraq and Syria, it was Russia in particular that filled the gap. During the same critical year, the then US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton declared that the political future would be determined in Asia, not in Afghanistan or Iraq. Europe and the Middle East had become peripheral to US interests and American strategy. In the light of Afghanistan, this policy, which is dangerous for Europe’s stability and security, seems set to continue under President Biden.












3.4.


Europe is still not the focus of US foreign policy. The USA is directing its full attention and resources to the unchecked rise of China, which has possibly been accelerated by the pandemic. Added to this, the situation in Latin America has become difficult once again, with authoritarian and corrupt regimes, not to mention failed states. Latin America is closer to the USA than Europe or, say, Africa because of the population displacements taking place there. Africa, with the world’s fastest growing population, hardly receives any American attention at all. Neighbouring Europe, on the other hand, does show an interest in Africa but it lacks a strategy, unlike China which is very active in the region.












3.5.


China’s rapid economic expansion unleashed in the late 1980s by Deng Xiaoping has continued, and since Xi Jinping took office, the country has increasingly boldly asserted its claim to be a new global power. From a developing country ruled by a dictatorship with a peaceful foreign policy, China has turned into a surveillance state with an overbearing, at worst aggressive, military stance in Asia and a (once again) pervasive totalitarian presence at home. The EU does not have a visible strategy for dealing with China, and during the German Presidency forced through a politically fuelled bilateral investment agreement that requires too little from China, including on the implementation of fundamental rights such as freedom of association, and that at best serves European interests only superficially. The EESC is very concerned about possible consequences, particularly as regards disinformation and influence, as the agreement also opens up the news, media and entertainment sectors to Chinese investment.












3.5.1.


China is massively increasing its military capacity. The country has now become an openly bellicose new world power, threatening ever more starkly a possible invasion of Taiwan, seeking control of key global maritime trade routes, violating all the commitments it itself entered into to protect democracy and freedom in Hong Kong, and repressing Muslim populations in its north-western regions with extraordinary brutality. The latter does not prevent the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from immediately offering good relations to the Taliban at the moment of the Afghan collapse, since the Western failure in the Hindu Kush serves to empower the CCP in its preference for a multilateral, but unfree, international order. The concept of multilateralism, which has hitherto been viewed favourably, is thus being re-evaluated.












3.5.2.


Chinese influence in Europe has become a factor that cannot be ignored economically or politically. Beijing is patiently pursuing its Silk Road project, occupying strategic positions step by step, making countries in Africa and Asia politically dependent on it by offering large loans that are only outwardly bounteous, but that in reality leave them shackled. Beijing has also already achieved control over key infrastructure in south-eastern Europe. Examples in the EU are the port of Piraeus in Greece, the construction of motorways in Montenegro and the roll-out of 5G.












3.5.3.


Parts of the European economy, including German companies in particular, have now become dangerously dependent on the Chinese market, which initially made itself available to European industry in the role of subcontractor but without really opening up. Some companies are rightly reconsidering their supply chains, which are far too one-sided and ultimately dependent on the potentially arbitrary behaviour of Chinese leaders.












3.5.4.


Even since China joined the WTO, Chinese markets have been difficult to access or closed. There is certainly no question of fairness or reciprocity. The country is distorting global competition with its subsidies and stubbornly refuses to reduce overcapacity. The CCP-dominated state has always systematically conducted industrial espionage and exacted knowledge transfer through joint ventures. The country now only allows access to those foreign investors whose know-how it needs itself, continuing to protect its businesses from any risk in a way that distorts competition. All this is incompatible with a mutually accessible and fair market system.












3.6.


Since Vladimir Putin’s memorable speech in 2007 at the Munich Security Conference, Russia has regrettably departed more and more radically from its cooperation with the West. Moscow began using its neighbours’ dependence on natural gas supplies as a means of exerting pressure early on. Where that was no longer enough and the former Soviet Republics were becoming too close to the EU and thus to the West, or sought greater independence, the Russian leadership conducted covert or open warfare on its borders or in the former sphere of influence of the Soviet Union, annexing Crimea in violation of international law and Ukrainian territory in breach of Russia’s own assurances made under international agreements. The Kremlin took ruthless advantage of the instability that followed the short Arab Spring of 2011. It also wages cyber warfare against free democratic nations, conducts targeted misinformation campaigns, supports extremist movements and parties, and has demonstrably influenced votes in those democracies, notably the Brexit campaign and the 2016 US presidential election. It pursues its critics around the world, carrying out attacks on them, including within the European Union.












3.7.


Despite the agreement on refugees, Turkey has, under the rule of Recep Tayip Erdogan, not only moved far away from the EU politically, but also distanced itself more and more from the fundamental consensus of democratic states, making the country an increasingly problematic NATO partner. Tensions deliberately stoked in the eastern Mediterranean around the Greek islands and drilling off the coast of Cyprus, as well as Turkey’s role in parts of northern Syria occupied by Kurds, and in the Libyan war, have taken it further and further from the EU. Turkey’s withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention on protecting women from violence is a worrying political signal. Although EU accession — in any case a challenging and, at best, very long-term prospect — has receded ever further into the future, efforts are again under way to update the customs agreement, meet established criteria as a condition for progressive visa liberalisation, maintain high-level consultations and boost civil society contacts. It is worth noting that recent surveys show strong pro-European opinion among the Turkish public. But none of these things can happen until the Turkish government takes permanently effective action to underpin the desired de-escalation and rapprochement.












3.8.


These developments, which affect Europe in particular, have taken place within just over a decade: increasingly aggressive Putinesque revisionism, the turning away from Europe of a Turkish president pursuing neo-Ottomanist fantasies, the breakdown of order in large parts of the Near and Middle East, and Europe’s increasingly one-sided economic enmeshment with China. This has been accompanied by the decrease in Europe’s importance for US policy and a mutual political distancing following the ‘War on Terror’ after 2002. The United States and the EU nevertheless always have been, and still are, each other’s closest partners by far — politically, culturally and economically. The EU has a lot to offer in this transatlantic partnership, which is vital for the liberal international order.












3.9.


Until around 2010, the USA played an active role in supporting democracy in the new EU Member States. By 2010, the countries of Central Eastern Europe seemed to have developed into stable democratic market economies from the point of view of the United States, despite persisting problems of corruption, particularly in south-eastern Europe. However, the return to power of the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in 2010 marked the beginning of a transformation into an ‘illiberal democracy’. Hungary was the first EU Member State to take this path for a variety of reasons. A few years later, Poland also embarked on the path towards authoritarian democracy, with media pluralism and freedom and independence of the judiciary from government influence falling by the wayside. Other EU countries are showing varying degrees of tendency in this direction, leading increasingly to tensions with the USA.












3.10.


The stability of the democratic order is currently no longer guaranteed in several EU Member States. Certain governments are shifting towards authoritarian models and methods of governance that are completely incompatible with fundamental EU values. In addition, third countries seeking to destabilise Europe are making large-scale attempts to exert influence.












3.11.


Certain European NATO members, including Germany, the largest EU Member State in terms of population and economic performance, have not invested adequately in their defence capabilities over many years, thus failing to meet their contractual commitments under the alliance, and in Brussels have effectively advocated a stance of equidistance in relation to the major powers of the 21st century. It is obviously neither an effective nor a future-proof ‘concept’ for the EU to see the United States as a security partner, Russia as a source of raw materials, China as an economic El Dorado and Europe as a moral superpower, without actually having to develop its own foreign and security policy capability to defend stated interests and also to be able to robustly promote stability where this is necessary. Europe weakens its position to some extent by responding to attacks on the liberal international order, democracy and the rule of law with hesitancy, rather than with the necessary clarity. In doing so it leaves itself vulnerable and opens up scope for third countries to exert influence, including in the Western Balkans, which must be an integral part of the EU in the future.












3.12.


The EU seems to be adhering to a concept developed during the Trump era, referred to in Brussels as ‘strategic autonomy’, which is misleading to say the least. Strategic autonomy in foreign and security policy would not be in the spirit of a strong transatlantic partnership. Many politicians in the EU continue to dream about maintaining an equidistance in relation to the United States, Russia and China. Widespread sentiment among the population, including in parts of organised civil society, follows the same line. However, Europe is much closer to the USA than to China or Russia. There can be no question of maintaining the same distance to those powers.












3.13.


Together, the EU and the US should be an anchor for world democracy, peace and security, the rule of law and human rights for all. Yet, they have failed completely in Afghanistan. The hasty military withdrawal of Americans and their European allies from Afghanistan attests to just how much the free world, and thus Europe, depends on US power projection. In this situation, the EU reveals its alarming strategic weakness and lack of common foreign and security policy.




4.   Recommended action









4.1.


The EU should take up and support US President Biden’s proposal to set up an Alliance of Democracies, and should encourage the US to resolutely take the lead once again in upholding human dignity, freedom, democracy and the rule of law.












4.2.


Membership of this Alliance of Democracies must be conditional on there being no reason to doubt that a member’s governance is democratic and based on the rule of law.












4.3.


The EU should stand shoulder to shoulder with the world’s democracies and the USA to form a strong and credible global force and pursue a ‘strategy of cooperative containment’ (1) towards China. Cooperative containment of China, unlike containment during the Cold War, means the Alliance of Democracies honouring and safeguarding legitimate Chinese interests, while at the same time delivering a clear and robust diplomatic response when, as in the case of the Uighurs, serious human rights breaches occur or, as in the case of Hong Kong, China even violates international agreements it has entered into. These values must also be reflected when dealing with any EU-China investment agreement, and the EU should keep such an agreement on hold as long as the massive violations of human rights persist and fundamental rights such as freedom of association are not implemented.












4.4.


The OSCE is a pillar of the pan-European security architecture. It should be consolidated, especially for dialogue with Russia, in order to avoid further escalation of open and simmering conflicts (such as the one in Transnistria) and to lay the groundwork for future re-engagement subject to recognition of the international legal order. The results of strong-arm politics that breach international law must not be recognised, be it in Ukraine, Belarus or elsewhere. This must be a consistent, integral part of the common transatlantic strategy and the policy of the Alliance of Democracies.












4.5.


The EU should put the near-complete Nord Stream 2 project on hold until a solution is found to the conflict in Ukraine and as long as other fundamental breaches of international law are occurring — such as the deliberate suppression of the democratic opposition through persecution and arrests, as in the Navalny case. When it comes to energy supply, the EU must consistently work to realise the objectives of the Green Deal so as to diversify its energy sources. The legitimate interests of the EU Member States situated in the former Soviet sphere of influence must be fully taken into account with respect to gas contracts with Russia.












4.6.


It is true that NATO and the EU do not have exactly the same members, but NATO is the military alliance that provides security for the democracies in North America and Europe. Neutrality is only feasible for European countries in its presence and thus also in practice under its protective umbrella. EU countries should therefore agree on joint security policy structures that are compatible with consolidating the North Atlantic Alliance or that strengthen it for the long term.












4.7.


The EU countries that are members of NATO must comply with the contributions and commitments they agreed to under the alliance, specifically including the 2 % target, which was reaffirmed at the NATO summit in Wales in 2014. NATO is not synonymous with the proposed Alliance of Democracies, which also embraces the Pacific region. It has, and always has had, members with undemocratic systems of governance. However, NATO also needs to strengthen and clarify the process of discussing its values internally. Disregard for democracy and the rule of law should also have consequences in the NATO alliance. The security policy challenges of the future now lie not just in asymmetric threats from terrorist forces, but also and especially in the challenging of the international legal order, a system that is inseparably linked to the constitutional liberalism of the countries that belong to it.












4.8.


It is not without reason that Henry Kissinger asked for Europe’s phone number. The EU must improve the coordination of its external and security policy and in future pass responsibility for policy to the European Parliament and to an executive body that is controlled and legitimised by Parliament. Questions of external and security policy must be adopted by qualified majority in the Council. EU Member States must recognise that speaking with different voices divests them of all leverageable sovereignty. Sovereignty can only be created if power is pooled and instruments shared.












4.9.


The EU must rethink its concept of ‘strategic autonomy’, which is misleading to say the least. The EU is far from autonomous politically or militarily. Nor is autonomy desirable in a multilateral order that must be based on free, fair and sustainable trade. Strategic autonomy cannot and should not mean equidistance in relation to other powers. As an indisputable constitutional democracy based on the rule of law, the United States is and remains Europe’s indispensable economic and security partner that, despite all the conflicting interests, shares fundamental values on important matters of detail. While Beijing explicitly praises the enigmatic European concept of strategic autonomy, the reactions of many transatlantic partners clearly show that they either reject it or perceive it as ambiguous. But ambiguity is poison in a strategic partnership.












4.10.


Instead of strategic autonomy, the EU should pursue the goal of strategic capacity. The EU is now working on the concept of ‘assertiveness’, which is a step in this direction. However, it should set aside the rhetoric of superlatives that have characterised its 10-year plans at least since the Lisbon Strategy. To date the EU has not managed to achieve any critical goal it set out in those plans. It would do well to be more modest while acting more decisively and pre-emptively. It is not possible to simply declare or decide that one has the capacity to act or assert oneself. This has to be based on demonstrable facts.












4.11.


The EESC believes that bilateral trade and investment agreements should be framed in such a way that they can be integrated into a new world trading system. They must not stand in the way of a liberal, multilateral international order, but must secure and promote it. The transatlantic partnership must also be the basis for a renewed world trade order. The EU and the USA must show joint responsibility and leadership in the WTO and advocate for an effective model of multilateral relations, with a modern trade agenda that takes into account environmental and social aspects.












4.12.


A reliable transatlantic partnership is the key condition for maintaining an international legal order and peace. Any attempt to defend this outside of a close alliance with the United States is destined to fail, because Europe alone does not have the heft to prevent a hierarchical power-based international order that would have China at its centre.












4.13.


Together with the USA, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia and the world’s other liberal democracies, the EU can also safeguard democracy and the rule of law within its own borders and help to restore them where they have been eroded.












4.14.


The EU should promote and support the setting-up of a transatlantic platform of organised civil society with contact points in North America and Europe, as is currently being pioneered by EESC members with the involvement of non-EU Member States such as the United Kingdom. Only a vibrant civil society can create enthusiasm for shared values and safeguard them.












4.14.1.


A transatlantic dialogue forum on the future of democracy and a joint rule of law dialogue should be launched as a matter of urgency. Shared support for democracy, in Europe, the USA and other friendly countries, must be right at the top of the common transatlantic policy agenda.












4.14.2.


Transatlantic civil society should open a joint civil rights dialogue to raise awareness of things that have gone wrong and to influence politics on both sides of the Atlantic, building on best practice examples.












4.14.3.


Particular importance should be given to a transatlantic civil society dialogue in order to increase resilience against disinformation. In this connection, joint steps must be taken to defend media freedom in liberal democracies and to restore it in those places where, for whatever reason, it has been damaged, as it is a cornerstone of democracy and the rule of law and a direct expression of common transatlantic values.












4.14.4.


Similarly, climate action and shared efforts to slow global warming should also be the subject of a transatlantic civil society dialogue with a view to jointly identifying sustainable solutions that are open to technology.












4.14.5.


Another key theme for joint civil society dialogue on both sides of the Atlantic is the new social issue in the context of climate policy and digitalisation. How to secure social rights worldwide and improve opportunities and access, particularly the rights of independent entrepreneurs and of workers, is a matter in urgent need of shared answers, especially with regard to the future of liberal institutions and the stability of the liberal international order.












4.14.6.


With a view to future trade agreements and the pursuit of a strengthened multilateral order, the existing forms of transatlantic dialogue should be strengthened and, where necessary, reinstated. The recently established Transatlantic Trade and Technology Council is of particular importance in this connection, but it must be subject to the principles of full transparency.












4.15.


Europe will have to play its part and do more to pay its own way and shoulder its responsibilities. To achieve this, it will first have to resolve the issue of diverse positions on external and security policy and stop oscillating between excessive moralising and opportunism. The European Union must support the rule of law in international relations with a clear strategy in which external and security policy is conducted with a single voice and actively contributes to stabilisation of the multilateral order.












4.16.


In the long term, the transatlantic partnership should be further developed to bring in other economic partners, including Canada, the United Kingdom and other European countries that are not, or not yet, members of the EU. Transatlantic forums for dialogue with civil society in all its diversity, as exemplified by the EESC in Europe, are an important prerequisite for this, as is enhanced parliamentary dialogue.





Brussels, 9 December 2021.


The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG




(1)  Christian Moos & Peter Clever: China‘kooperativ eindämmen’ (cooperative containment of China), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30 April 2021.