COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT Accompanying the document DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on information exchange between law enforcement authorities of Member States, repealing Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA
Date: 2021-12-08
Institutions: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: EU Member State, area of freedom, security and justice, criminal law, disclosure of information, exchange of information, fight against crime, judicial cooperation, offence, organised crime, terrorism

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 8.12.2021  SWD(2021) 374 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT  Accompanying the document DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on information exchange between law enforcement authorities of Member States, repealing Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA      {COM(2021) 782 final} - {SEC(2021) 420 final} - {SWD(2021) 377 final}  
 
 
Table of contents 

GLOSSARY................................................................................................................................................................... 3 

1. 

INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT .............................................................................................. 4 

1.1. 
1.2. 
1.3. 

BACKGROUND ......................................................................................................................................................... 4 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ............................................................................................................................................ 5 
THE POLICE COOPERATION CODE ................................................................................................................................ 6 

2.  PROBLEM DEFINITION ........................................................................................................................................10 

2.1. 

PROBLEM 1: RULES AT NATIONAL LEVEL IMPEDE THE EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT FLOW OF INFORMATION .................................. 10 
2.1.1.  What is the problem? ................................................................................................................................ 10 
2.1.2.  What are the problem drivers? ................................................................................................................. 11 
How will the problem evolve without intervention? ................................................................................. 13 
2.1.3. 

2.2. 
PROBLEM 2: STRUCTURES AT NATIONAL LEVEL ARE NOT SET UP AND EQUIPPED IN A SUFFICIENTLY EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE 
MANNER .......................................................................................................................................................................... 13 
2.2.1.  What is the problem? ................................................................................................................................ 13 
2.2.2.  What are the problems drivers? ............................................................................................................... 14 
How will the problem evolve without intervention? ................................................................................. 19 
2.2.3. 
2.3. 
PROBLEM 3: THE FREE CHOICE OF COMMUNICATION CHANNEL(S) BETWEEN MEMBER STATES CAUSES RECURRENT DUPLICATION OF 
REQUESTS ......................................................................................................................................................................... 19 
2.3.1.  What is the problem? ................................................................................................................................ 19 
2.3.2.  What are the drivers? ............................................................................................................................... 21 
How will the problem evolve without intervention? ................................................................................. 22 
2.3.3. 

3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? ................................................................................................................................22 

3.1. 
3.2. 
3.3. 

LEGAL BASIS .......................................................................................................................................................... 22 
SUBSIDIARITY: NECESSITY OF EU ACTION .................................................................................................................... 22 
SUBSIDIARITY: ADDED VALUE OF EU ACTION ............................................................................................................... 23 

4.  OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? ............................................................................................................23 

4.1.  GENERAL OBJECTIVE ............................................................................................................................................... 23 
SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................................................... 23 
4.2. 

5.  WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? ...................................................................................................24 

5.1. 
5.2. 

BASELINE REPRESENTING CURRENT SITUATION ............................................................................................................. 24 
DESCRIPTION OF POLICY OPTIONS .............................................................................................................................. 24 

Objective I: Facilitate equivalent access for law enforcement authorities to information held in another 

5.2.1. 
Member State, while complying with fundamental rights and data protection requirements ................................ 24 
5.2.2. 
Objective II: Ensure that all Member States have an effective functioning Single Point of Contact (SPOC), 
including when a judicial authorisation is required to provide the data upon request of another Member State, 
and ensuring its effective cooperation with Police and Customs Cooperation Centres (PCCCs) ............................... 25 
5.2.3. 
Objective III: To remedy the proliferation of communication channels used for law enforcement 
information exchange between Member States while empowering Europol as the EU criminal information hub for 
offences falling within its mandate (unless otherwise regulated by EU law)  .......................................................... 28 
5.3.  OPTIONS DISCARDED AT AN EARLY STAGE .................................................................................................................... 29 

6.  WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? ..........................................................................................30 

6.1. 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT EXPECTED IMPACTS .................................................................................................................. 31 
6.2.  OBJECTIVE I: FACILITATE EQUIVALENT ACCESS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES TO INFORMATION HELD IN ANOTHER MEMBER 
STATE, WHILE COMPLYING WITH FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND DATA PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS ...................................................... 33 

1 

 
6.3.  OBJECTIVE II: ENSURE THAT ALL MEMBER STATES HAVE AN EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING SINGLE POINT OF CONTACT (SPOC), 
INCLUDING WHEN A JUDICIAL AUTHORISATION IS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE THE DATA UPON REQUEST OF ANOTHER MEMBER STATE, AND 
ENSURING ITS EFFECTIVE COOPERATION WITH POLICE AND CUSTOMS COOPERATION CENTRES (PCCCS) ............................................. 36 
6.4.  OBJECTIVE III: TO REMEDY THE PROLIFERATION OF COMMUNICATION CHANNELS USED FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION 
EXCHANGE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES WHILE EMPOWERING EUROPOL AS THE EU CRIMINAL INFORMATION HUB FOR OFFENCES FALLING 
WITHIN ITS MANDATE (UNLESS OTHERWISE REGULATED BY EU LAW) ............................................................................................ 38 

7.  HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? ...................................................................................................................41 

7.1.  OBJECTIVE I: FACILITATE EQUIVALENT ACCESS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES TO INFORMATION HELD IN ANOTHER MEMBER 
STATE, WHILE COMPLYING WITH FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND DATA PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS ...................................................... 41 
7.2.  OBJECTIVE II: ENSURE THAT ALL MEMBER STATES HAVE AN EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING SINGLE POINT OF CONTACT (SPOC), 
INCLUDING WHEN A JUDICIAL AUTHORISATION IS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE THE DATA UPON REQUEST OF ANOTHER MEMBER STATE, AND 
ENSURING ITS EFFECTIVE COOPERATION WITH POLICE AND CUSTOMS COOPERATION CENTRES (PCCCS) ............................................. 43 
7.3.  OBJECTIVE III: TO REMEDY THE PROLIFERATION OF COMMUNICATION CHANNELS USED FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION 
EXCHANGE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES WHILE EMPOWERING EUROPOL AS THE EU CRIMINAL INFORMATION HUB FOR OFFENCES FALLING 
WITHIN ITS MANDATE (UNLESS OTHERWISE REGULATED BY EU LAW) ............................................................................................ 45 

8.  PREFERRED POLICY OPTION: A GAME CHANGER FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION ...............................47 

8.1.  OVERVIEW OF THE PREFERRED POLICY OPTION ............................................................................................................. 47 
PREFERRED POLICY OPTION CUMULATED ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES ..................................................................... 50 
8.2. 
8.3.  MAIN TYPES OF COSTS EXPECTED TO BE REDUCED/INCREASED WITH THE PREFERRED POLICY OPTION ....................................... 51 

9.  HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? ......................................................................53 

ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ....................................................................................................................54 

ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION .................................................................................................................56 

ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW? ..................................................................................................................87 

ANNEX 4: SUPPORTING INFORMATION ON THE HIGH-LEVEL PROBLEMS AND THEIR IMPACTS ON THE CORE 
PROBLEMS .................................................................................................................................................................92 

ANNEX 5: SUPPORTING INFORMATION ON THE PROBLEMS 1, 2 & 3 ....................................................................... 115 

ANNEX 6: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CONSULTATIONS ................................................................................................... 151 

ANNEX 7: DISCARDED OPTIONS ............................................................................................................................... 200 

ANNEX 8: AD HOC WORKSHOPS (SUMMARIES) ....................................................................................................... 206 

ANNEX 9: COMPLEMENTARY INFORMATION ON THE EXPECTED EFFECTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS IN THE MEMBER 
STATES ..................................................................................................................................................................... 223 

ANNEX 10: COMPLEMENTARY INFORMATION ON THE POLITICAL FEASIBILITY OF ENVISAGED MEASURES ............. 228 

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GLOSSARY 

Term or acronym 

Meaning or definition 

CCWP 

CEA 

CISA 

CMS 

EBCGA 

EDPS 

EMCDDA 

EMPACT 

EU 

eu-LISA 

Europol 

FL 

FRA 

JHA 

LEAs 

LEWP 

Customs Cooperation Working Party 

Cost-Effectiveness Analysis 

Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement 

Case Management System 

European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) 

European Data Protection Supervisor 

European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction   

European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats 

European Union 

European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT 
Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice  

European Police Office 

Fuzzy Logic 

Fundamental Rights Agency 

Justice & Home Affairs 

Law Enforcement Authorities 

Law Enforcement Working Party 

Naples II Convention 

Convention on mutual assistance and cooperation between customs 
administrations  

OCG 

OLAF 

PCCC 

SAC 

SOC 

SFD 

SIENA 

SIRENE 

SPOC 

TEU 

TFEU 

Organised Criminal Group(s) 

European Anti-Fraud Office 

Police and Customs Cooperation Centres 

Schengen Associated Countries 

Serious and Organised Crime 

Swedish Framework Decision 

Secure Information Exchange Network Application 

Supplementary Information Request at the National Entries 

Single Points of Contact 

Treaty on European Union 

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 

3 

 
 
 
 
1.  1. INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT 

1.1.  Background 

Security  and  cross-border  crime  are,  by  definition,  international  issues.  As  set  out  in  the  EU 
Security Union Strategy, Europe faces evolving and increasingly complex security threats. These 
threats  spread across borders  and manifest  themselves in  organised crime groups that engage in  a 
wide  range  of  criminal  activities.  According  to  the  EU  Serious  and  Organised  Crime  Threat 
Assessment  2021  (SOCTA),  more  than  70%  of  organised  crime  groups  are  present  in  more  than 
three  Member  States1.  The  2021  SOCTA  and  the  EMCDDA  European  Drug  report2  outline  a 
number of areas where serious and organised crime appears to be on the rise3. At the same time, as 
set out in the December 2020 Counter-Terrorism Agenda, the EU remains on high terrorist alert4. 

The  SOCTA  also  outlines  ways  in  which  serious  crime  is  evolving.  Notably,  technological 
advancements  have  created  opportunities  for  new  types  of  cross-border  crime,  and  for 
modernising  traditional  forms  of  crime.  Linked  to  this,  the  increased  use  of  digital  technologies 
means there is no longer a need for a perpetrator to be in the same location as a victim.  The Covid-
19 pandemic has accelerated the rise in technology-facilitated serious and organised crime. 

The  growing  mobility  of  people  within  the  EU  creates  additional  challenges  in  preventing  and 
fighting  all forms  of  criminal  threats.  In 2017,  EU internal border  regions covered  approximately 
40% of the EU's territory and were home to 30% of the population, i.e. 150 million people. Almost 
2  million  people  commuted  across  borders,  including  1.3  million  cross-border  workers5.  In  2018, 
residents of the EU made in total 1.1 billion trips, either for business or privately  – an increase of 
11% since 2014. In 2019, 3.3% of the EU citizens of working age (20-64) had a nationality of an 
EU  Member  State  other  than  the  EU  Member  State  of  residence,  compared  to  2.4  %  in  20096. 
Despite  the  COVID-19  pandemic  having  reduced  intra-EU  mobility,  flows  of  people  will  likely 
continue to be important in the near future. 

The rapidly evolving criminal and terrorist landscape and the mobility of people suggest that cross-
border  cooperation  between  law  enforcement  authorities  in  the  EU  and  the  Schengen  area 
will remain crucial to tackle criminal offences, and allow EU citizens to safely enjoy their rights 
of free movement in the future7. However, there are still obstacles for data exchange between law 
enforcement, which leads to blind spots and loopholes (for instance information not exchanged or 
exchanged too late) for criminals and terrorists that act in more than one Member State. The cross-
border  nature  of  crime  requires  Member  States  to  be  able  to  rely  on  one  another  through  cross-
border law enforcement cooperation, based on respect for fundamental rights. 

Law  enforcement  cooperation  is  an  area  of  shared  competence  between  the  EU  and  the 
Member States. Most of the EU legal framework underpinning law enforcement cooperation was 
designed  30  years  ago  through  the  1990  Convention  Implementing  the  Schengen  Agreement 
(CISA)8.  The  Convention  entails  a  number  of  obligations  for  contracting  Parties  regarding  police 
cooperation  at  their  common  internal  borders,  at  the  external  borders  of  the  Schengen  territory 

1 Europol (2021) Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA): A corrupting influence. 
2 European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), European drug report 2021 – trends and 

developments.  

3 For example, the use of violence by criminals involved in serious and organised crime appears to be increasing; 

unprecedented quantities of cocaine are trafficked into the EU from Latin America and criminal groups are scaling up 
their capacities to produce and distribute synthetic drugs.  

4 COM(2020) 795 final. 
5 European Commission (2017), Boosting Growth and cohesion in EU border regions. link. 
6 Eurostat (2020) EU citizens living in another Member State - statistical overview. As of 8 April 2021: link.  
7 Complementary information can be found in annex 4.  
8 It has been further complemented by a high number of bi-tri-multilateral agreements (60 were identified). 

4 

 
                                                                 
(land,  international  airports,  and  sea)  and  within  the  Schengen  area  in  general  to  counteract  any 
security deficit caused by the abolition of the checks at the internal borders. 

The Commission and EU agencies support the Member States by providing  means and tools 
for  the  exchange  of  information  between  national  law  enforcement  authorities,  such  as  the 
Schengen  Information  System  (SIS),  inter  alia  used  to  exchange  data  on  wanted  and  missing 
persons  and  objects  in  real  time,  and  the  Prüm  mechanism,  aimed  to  step  up the  exchange  of 
biometric  and  vehicle  registration  data  information,  between  authorities  responsible  for  the 
prevention and investigation of criminal offences.  

The 2006 Swedish Framework Decision (SFD) complements these tools by introducing horizontal 
rules on the exchange of information between law enforcement authorities of EU Member States to 
conduct  criminal  investigations  or  criminal  intelligence  operations.  The  SFD  sets  out  rules 
regarding time limits and standard forms for the exchange of any type of information or data held 
by  law  enforcement  authorities  (principle  of  availability),  on  prior  request  or  spontaneously, 
ensuring  that  procedures  for  cross-border  data  exchanges  are  not  stricter  than  those  applying  to 
exchanges  at  national  level  (principle  of  equivalent  access).  It  also  covers  the  channels  of 
communication to be used. A response should be made within 8 hours where the request is urgent. 
In other cases, countries should respond within 14 days. 

Europol,  the  EU  law  enforcement  agency,  supports  EU  Member  States  in  their  fight  against 
terrorism,  cybercrime  and  other  serious  and  organised  forms  of  crime,  notably  through  the 
collection, analysis and exchange of information with Member States.  

The  EU  has  also  fostered  greater  cooperation  between  law  enforcement  bodies  through  the 
publication  of  recommendations  and  guidelines  (e.g.  on  national  Single  Point  of  Contact 
responsible  for  law  enforcement  exchange  of  information).  Those  seek  to  lay  out  the  grounds  for 
adopting common approaches to  the access and the exchange of information within the EU. They 
also seek to clarify the implementation of binding rules9. 

1.2.  Recent developments 

In  recent  years,  much  progress  has  been  made  to  improve  the  exchange  of  information  between 
Member States and to close down the space in which terrorists and criminals operate.  

The legislative framework on counterterrorism and information  exchange was strengthened in  the 
aftermath  of  the  terrorist  attacks  in  Europe.  Following  the  migration  crisis  of  2015,  the  general 
architecture of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) information systems and databases was overhauled 
with a focus on interoperability and dynamic convergence between security, borders and migration 
management. The mandates of JHA agencies are continuously being strengthened to allow them to 
provide enhanced support to Member States in their operational activities.10 

Strategic documents underpin the Commission’s efforts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness 
of law enforcement cooperation in the EU. These include the Security Union strategy11, the new 
counter-terrorism  agenda  for  the  EU12,  the  EU  Strategy  to  tackle  Organised  Crime  2021-
202513  and  the  new  Schengen  Strategy14.  All  stress  the  need  to  improve  the  timely  access  and 
smooth  exchange of information  for law  enforcement  purposes, both  between Member States  and 
with Schengen Associated Countries (SAC). 

9 Complementary information can be found in annex 5.  
10 In December 2020, the Commission tabled a legislative proposal to strengthen the mandate of Europol (COM(2020) 
796  final).  The  mandate  of  the  European  Border  and  Coast  Guard  Agency  was  reinforced  in  November  2019  (see 
Regulation (EU) 2019/1896).  

11 COM(2020) 605 final. 
12 COM(2020) 795 final. 
13 COM(2021) 170 final. 
14 COM(2021) 277 final. 

5 

 
                                                                 
In spite of the progress made in recent years, important challenges remain, a very pressing one 
among  these  being  that  law  enforcement  authorities  do  not  always  effectively  and  efficiently 
exchange information with their partners in other Member States. 

The co-legislators have repeatedly called for further EU action to address these challenges. The 
European Parliament resolution ofDecember 2020 on the EU Security Union Strategy stresses that 
"measures in the framework of the Security Union Strategy must be sufficiently flexible to respond 
to constantly changing circumstances and criminal organisations changing their modus operandi". 
The Council takes a comparable stance in the Council Conclusions of November 2020 on Internal 
Security and European Police Partnership, which asked the Commission “to consider consolidating 
the EU legal framework to further strengthen cross-border law enforcement cooperation”15. 

1.3.  The Police Cooperation Code 
In  line  with  the  call  by  President  von  der  Leyen  in  her  Political  Guidelines16  to  "leave  no  stone 
unturned  when  it  comes  to  protecting  our  citizens",  the  Commission  Work  Programme  for  2021 
announced a legislative initiative to "modernise existing intra-EU law enforcement cooperation by 
creating an EU police cooperation code"17. 

A  proposal  for  setting  up  a  Police  Cooperation  Code  on  Information  Exchange  and 
Communication (PCC) would aim at the codification of organisational and procedural aspects of 
information exchange and communication between law enforcement authorities in the EU.  

It would deal with the cross-cutting 'horizontal' aspects of information exchange between Member 
States. This proposal would not touch upon the system-specific dimensions of individual systems or 
frameworks  such  as  the  Schengen  Information  System,  Passenger  Name  Record  (PNR)  or  Prüm, 
which  address  the  processing  of  specific  data  categories  for  specific  purposes  and  are  therefore 
regulated by specific legal instruments.  

The  proposal  for  a  PCC  would  repeal  and  replace  the  2006  SFD.  In  doing  so,  the  SFD  will  be 
"lisbonised", i.e. it will be turned into a legislative instrument to be adopted by both the Council and 
the European Parliament in the ordinary legislative procedure. 

Moreover,  a  PCC  proposal  would  form  part  of  a  coherent  package  with  upcoming  measures  to 
reinforce  operational  cross-border  police  cooperation  and  the  upcoming  proposal  revising  the 
Automated  Data  Exchange  Mechanism  for  Police  Cooperation  ("Prüm  II").  The  "Prüm  II" 
proposal will aim at strengthening the technical architecture of the Prüm exchange, broadening its 
scope of data categories and streamlining and accelarating its post-hit data exchange. The reinforced 
"Prüm  II"  proposal  would  provide  specific  rules  and  possibilities  for  the  automated  exchange  of 
specific – and particularly important – data categories (e.g. fingerprints, DNA, facial images) within 
the  overall  framework  and  general  rules  for  general  information  exchange  that  the  Police 
Cooperation Code will provide. 
A  PCC  proposal  would  fit  together  with  the  2020  proposal  revising  the  Europol  mandate18.  The 
latter aims at strenghening the agency's mandate on the processing of large and complex datasets, 
cooperation with privates parties, and the use of the Schengen Information System. A PCC proposal 
would build on and further develop Europol as a criminal information hub in the EU. 

As an important measure to enhance security within the EU, a PCC proposal would also contribute 
to a fully functioning and resilient Schengen area as set out in the Schengen Strategy. It would help 
ensure a high level of security within the territory of Member States and hence support a Schengen 

15  European  Parliament  resolution  of  17.12.2020  on  the  EU  Security  Union  Strategy  (2020/2791(RSP))  and  Council 

Conclusions 13083/1/20 REV 1, 24.11.2020 on Internal Security and European Police Partnership. 

16 Political Guidelines: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/political-guidelines-next-commission_en_0.pdf  
17 COM(2020) 690 final. 
18 COM(2020) 796 final. 

6 

 
                                                                 
area without controls at internal borders. It would therefore complement the proposal announced in 
the June 2021 Schengen Strategy19 to amend the Schengen Borders Code20.  

Whilst taking these complementary developments fully into account, this impact assessment focuses 
on the envisaged scope of a proposal for a Police Cooperation Code, namely the 'horizontal' cross-
cutting  aspects  of  information  exchange  and  communication  between  competent  law 
enforcement authorities in EU Member States. 

19 COM(2021) 277 final. 
20 Regulation (EU) 2017/458. 

7 

 
                                                                 
Intervention logic: Problems, problem drivers, objectives and options 

High level problem: A number of criminal markets are evolving and expanding while cross-border mobility is increasing21. 

Core problem: Law enforcement authorities do not always effectively and efficiently exchange information with their partners in other Member States.  

  Problems 

Drivers 

Objectives 

Options 

1  Rules  at  national  level  impede  the 
effective  and  efficient  flow  of 
information:  

The  2006  Swedish  Framework 
Decision  is  not  fully  implemented, 
preventing law enforcement authorities 
from 
from  other  Member  States 
receiving  such 
in  an 
effective and efficient way. 

information 

2 

Structures at national level are not 
set  up  and  equipped 
in  a 
sufficiently  efficient  and  effective 
manner: 

Member  States  do  not  always  have 
the necessary structures in place to 
exchange  information  effectively  and 
efficiently  with  other  Member  States: 
the 
Member  States  do  not  have 
to 
necessary  structures 
in  place 
receive 
from 
other Member States, channel them to 
the  right  authorities  at  national  level, 
and  provide  the  requested  information 
in an effective and efficient way. 

information 

requests 

 

 

Law  enforcement  authorities  do  not  fully  apply 
the  principles  agreed  under  the  2006  Swedish 
Framework Decision. 
There  is  no  clear  understanding  of  the  data 
available  for  possible  exchange  from  another 
Member State. 

 

  Deadlines  are  usually  not  met  when  a  judicial 
authorisation is required to deliver the requested 
information. 
The  distinction  between  "urgent",  "non-urgent" 
and  "other  cases"  provided  for  in  the  Swedish 
Framework Decision is unnecessarily complex.  
The  Swedish  Framework  Decision  is  not  aligned 
with  the 2016  Law  Enforcement  Data  Protection 
Directive. 

 

law 

To  facilitate  equivalent  access 
for 
enforcement 
authorities  to  information  held 
in  another  Member  State  (similar 
to 
to 
information  within  a  Member 
State),  while  complying  with 
fundamental 
rights  and  data 
protection requirements. 

granted 

access 

the 

 

 

 

 

 

Single  Points  of  Contact  (SPOCs),  Police  and 
Customs  Cooperation  Centres  and  other 
equivalent  structures  are  set  up  differently, 
having  different  supervising  authorities,  roles, 
means and capabilities.  
They  are  not  always  structured  or  manned 
appropriately,  nor  equipped  with  necessary 
information management tools.  
There  are  delays  in  the  judicial  authorisation 
process in cases where this is needed. 
Language  barriers  hamper  the  efficient  cross-
border exchange of information. 
Limited  training  available  for  staff  involved  in 
information exchange and cooperation. 

To ensure that all Member States 
have  an  effective 
functioning 
Single Point of Contact (SPOC), 
judicial 
including  when 
authorisation 
to 
provide  the  data  upon  request  of 
another  Member  State,  and 
ensuring  its  effective  cooperation 
with  Police  and  Customs 
Cooperation Centres (PCCCs).  

a 
required 

is 

  Option 1.1:  New  flanking soft measures  (training, 

Commission guidance) 

  Option  1.2:  Option  1.1  +  simplify  the  SFD  use  + 
improve  clarity  on  the  national  data  sets 
law 
for  possible  exchange  with 
available 
enforcement authorities of other Member States; 
  Option  1.3:  Option  1.2  +  provisions  ensuring 
compliance  with  deadlines  requirements  by  which 
data is to be made available to another Member State 
(including when a judicial authorisation is required).  

  Option  2.1:  Continue  with  Council  non-binding 
guidelines  on  Single  Points  of  Contact  +  new 
flanking soft measures (training, financial support, 
Commission guidance); 

  Option 2.2: approximation of minimum standards 
on  the  composition  of  the  Single  Points  of  Contact 
(including  when  a 
is 
required),  its  functions,  staffing  and  IT  systems,  and 
its cooperation with regional structures such as Police 
and  Customs  Cooperation  Centres  +  flanking  soft 
measures (as in option 2.1); 

judicial  authorisation 

  Option  2.3:  harmonisation  of  rules  on 

the 
composition of the Single Points of Contact (including 
when  a  judicial  authorisation  is  required),  its 
functions,  staffing  and 
its 
cooperation  with  regional  structures  such  as  Police 
and  Customs  Cooperation  Centres  +  flanking  soft 
measures (as in option 2.1). 

IT  systems,  and 

21 Complementary information on high level issues and their links with the core problems can be found in annex 4.  

8 

 
 
 
 
                                                                 
3 

The  free  choice  of  communication 
between  Member 
channel(s) 
recurrent 
States 
duplication of requests: 

causes 

Member  States' 
law  enforcement 
authorities  use  a  variety  of  different 
channels  to  send  information  request 
to other Member States and respond to 
them,  which  hampers  effective  and 
efficient exchange of information.  

their 

information  exchange  between 

Member States have not agreed on a single channel 
of 
law 
for  cases  with  an  EU 
enforcement  authorities 
dimension, leading to duplication of requests, undue 
delays  and  occasional  information  loss,  and  also 
depriving  their  competent  authorities  from  Europol's 
support  even  though  they  call  on  the  Agency  to  be 
the  EU  criminal  information  hub  and  to  deliver 
intelligence-led products. 

To  remedy  the  proliferation  of 
communication  channels  used 
for  law  enforcement  information 
Member 
exchange 
between 
States  while 
empowering 
the  EU  criminal 
Europol  as 
for  offences 
information  hub 
falling  within  its  mandate  (unless 
otherwise regulated by EU law).  

  Option  3.1:  Continue  with  Council  non-binding 
guidelines  and  Recommendations  to  put  Europol  in 
copy  when  using  SIENA22  in  cases  within  Europol' 
mandate  +  new  flanking  soft  measures  (training, 
financial support); 

  Option  3.2:  Obligation  to  use  SIENA  as  preferred 
communication channel + obligation to put Europol 
in  copy  when  using  SIENA  in  cases  within  Europol's 
mandate + flanking soft measures (as in option 3.1)  

information  exchange 

  Option 3.3: obligation to use SIENA by default for 
all  bilateral 
(unless 
otherwise  regulated  by  EU  law)  +  obligation  to  put 
Europol  in  copy  when  in  cases  within  Europol's 
mandate,  both  after  the  end  of  a  transition  period 
and with  Internal  Security  Fund support  for  the 
SIENA  roll-out  +  flanking  soft  measures  (as  in 
option 3.1) 

22 Europol's "Secure Information Exchange Network Application". 

9 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
2.  2. PROBLEM DEFINITION  

The evolution of the EU security landscape and the increased cross-border mobility call for more 
effective and efficient exchange of information between Member States. Noted inefficiencies stem 
from three vertical problems. 

2.1. Problem 1: Rules at national level impede the effective and efficient flow of information 

2.1.1.  2.1.1.  What is the problem? 

Member  States'  Law  Enforcement  Authorities  (LEAs)  are  involved  in  daily  cross-border 
information exchanges related to operations against criminal offences23.  

Yet,  rules  at  national  level  impede  the  effective  and  efficient  flow  of  information.  While  EU 
measures  are  supposed  to  ensure  access  to  information,  their  scope  is  often  unclear  and  law 
enforcement authorities  face  difficulties in  interpreting  and  implementing relevant  EU provisions. 
As a case in point, the 2006 Swedish Framework Decision is found unclear and complex, thereby 
hampering  the  full  implementation  of  the  principles  of  availability/equivalent  access  of  relevant 
information  in  a  cross-border  context24.  As  a  consequence,  the  Framework  Decision  is  not  fully 
implemented and rules at national level continue to impede the flow of information. 

Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA ('Swedish Framework Decision' - SFD)25 

As a development of the Schengen Acquis, Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA ('Swedish Framework Decision' 
-  SFD)  sets  out,  in  particular,  the  rules  regarding  time  limits  and  standard  forms  for  cross-border  information 
exchange,  on  prior request or  spontaneously, between  the  designated  competent  law enforcement  authorities of  the 
Member States for the purpose of:  

     •  preventing,  detecting  and  investigating  offences  or  criminal  activities  which  correspond  to  or  are  equivalent  to 

those referred to in the European arrest warrant, or  

     •   preventing  an  immediate  and serious  threat  to public  security.  The  designated  authorities  are obliged  to reply 
within  at  most  eight  hours  in  urgent  cases,  as  long  as  the  requested  information  or  intelligence  is  directly 
accessible to law enforcement authorities.  

Information may not be provided if:  

•  national security is at stake,  
•  current investigations may be jeopardised, 

     •  the request pertains to an offence punishable by a term of imprisonment of one year or less under the law of the 

requested Member State,  

•  the competent judicial authority withholds access to the information.  

23 Survey: Q 31, 83% (n=53) of LEAs respondents reported information sharing took place always or very frequently in 
relation  to  drugs,  73%  (n=38)  in  relation  to  illegal  immigration  and  68%  in  relation  to  both  terrorism  (n=26)  and 
cybercrime (n=34). See Annexes 2, 6 & 9 . 

24    The  SFD  has  been  regularly  and  thoroughly  monitored  and  evaluated  as  part  of  the  Schengen  evaluation  and 
monitoring  process  carried  out  for  the  past  6  years  in  field  of  police  cooperation.  The  Schengen  evaluation  and 
monitoring process consist of questionnaires and one-week on-site visits (announced or unannounced) by an expert 
team  involving  national  experts  from  other  Member  States,  Commission  representatives  and  experts  from  EU 
Agencies. The evaluation team inquires into the practical application of the SFD by national police authorities in their 
daily  work,  e.g.  how  the  national  police  authorities  request  information  from  other  Member  States,  and  how  they 
respond  to  such  requests  that  they  receive  from  other  Member  States.  The  evaluation  team  can  directly  address 
relevant  persons  and  has  access  to  all  areas,  premises  and  documents  required  for  the  evaluation.    All  Schengen 
countries have been evaluated from 2015 to 2019 (26 countries). A new evaluation cycle started in 2020 (starting with 
countries evaluated in 2015). Over 30 evaluations have thus been carried out in field of police cooperation over the 
past  6  years.  The  country  reports  drawn  up  following  each  evaluation  analyses  the  qualitative,  quantitative, 
operational, administrative  and organisational aspects and list any deficiencies identified during the evaluation. The 
country reports offer sound and first-hand information on the application of the SFD in the Member States, making 
the  SFD  one  of  the  best  evaluated  policies  in  the  justice  and  home  affairs  domain,  and  providing  a  very  solid 
knowledge base for evidence-based law-making. 

25 Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the exchange of information and 

intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the Member States, OJ L 386/89, 29.12.2006. 

10 

 
 
                                                                 
The terms 'information and/or intelligence' cover the following two categories:  

•  any type of information or data which is held by law enforcement authorities  

     • any type of information or data which is held by public authorities or by private entities and which is available to 

law enforcement authorities without the taking of coercive measures. 

The content of these categories depends on national legislations. The type of information available from each Member 
State is set out in national sheets (Council guidelines)26. Data is to be shared with Europol insofar as the information 
or  intelligence  exchanged  refers  to  an  offence  or  criminal  activity  within  the  Europol  mandate.  Information  and 
intelligence  will  be  processed  in  accordance  with  the  relevant  Europol  handling  codes.  SIENA,  (Europol's  Secure 
Information  Exchange  Network  Application)  supports  the  exchange  of  information  in  accordance  with  the  'Swedish 
Framework Decision'.  

Member States ensure that conditions for cross-border information exchange are not stricter than those applicable for 
an  internal  case.  The  competent  law  enforcement  authorities  are,  in  particular,  not  obliged  to  ask  for  judicial 
agreement  or  authorisation  prior  to  cross-border  information  exchange,  if  the  information  sought  is  available  at 
national  level  without  such  agreement  or  authorisation.  If,  however,  judicial  authorisation  is  required,  the  judicial 
authority shall, when issuing its decision, is required to apply the same rules in the cross-border case as in a purely 
internal case. Information requiring judicial authorisation is indicated in the national fact sheets.  

Since the standard request form has been found too cumbersome by practitioners, a non-compulsory request form for 
information  and  intelligence  has  been  developed.  When  it  is  not  feasible  to  use  this  simplified  form,  the  use  of  a 
different form or unstructured free-text is preferred. 

The  requesting  Member  State  may  choose  between  any  of  the  existing  channels  for  international  law  enforcement 
communication (SIRENE27, Europol, INTERPOL, bilateral contact points). The replying Member State normally uses the 
same  channel  as  used  for  the  request.  If,  however,  the  requested  Member  State  replies,  for  legitimate  reasons, 
through another channel, the requesting authority is informed of this change. The language used for the request and 
supply of information shall be the one applicable for the channel used. 

2.1.2.  2.1.2. 

 What are the problem drivers?  

As  indicated  above,  at  EU  level,  the  principles  for  the  exchange  of  law  enforcement  information 
and intelligence of cross-border relevance are laid down in the 2006 Swedish Framework Decision, 
notably through its two key principles of availability and equivalent access. 

This means that:  

 

 

a law enforcement officer in  one Member  State in  need of information  and intelligence  in 
order to carry out his duties can obtain it from another Member State; and that 
the  law  enforcement  authorities  in  the  Member  State  that  holds  this  information  and 
intelligence will make it available for the declared purpose, taking account of the needs of 
investigations pending in that Member State; and that 

  once information and intelligence is available in a Member State, it should be shared across 
borders  under  the  same  conditions  which  govern  information  sharing  at  national  level, 
meaning that the rules applied in a cross-border case are not stricter than those applying to 
data exchanges at national level ("principle of equivalent access")28. 

In practice, as evidenced in the Schengen evaluations in the field of police cooperation, the Swedish 
framework  Decision  is  hardly  used,  as  the  availability  of  many  options  for  cooperation  or 
information exchange limits its added value, and it overlaps with the Convention Implementing the 
Schengen  Agreement  (CISA),  with  many  articles  worded  in  a  similar  way29.  The  envisaged 
proposal  will  address  this  discrepancy  by  expanding  the  scope  of  the  SFD  to  "preventing  and 
detecting  criminal  offences",  thereby  fully  superseding  Articles  39  and  46  CISA  and  hence 
providing the necessary legal clarity. 

26 Council document 5825/20 ADD 1 REV 1, 2.12.2020, Manual on Law Enforcement Information Exchange.  
27 Supplementary Information REquest at the National Entry. 
28 See Council document 6261/17, 4 July 2017, ibidem p. 31. 
29 A number of Member States indicated that the different scope  of the SFD and the CISA (respectively "conducting 
criminal  intelligence  operations"  and  "preventing  and  detecting  criminal  offences")  makes  it  unclear  if  and  to  what 
extent the CISA (Art. 39 and 46) is still applicable, despite that the SFD was expected to replace the CISA as the key 
legal basis for information sharing relevant to law enforcement cooperation. This results in a limited contribution of 
the  SFD towards  simplification and streamlining of the EU framework. They also  questioned the  need to have two 
pieces  of  legislation  (the  SFD  and  the  CISA)  instead  of  just  one  piece  of  legislation  with  a  broader  and  more 
comprehensive scope. 7 Schengen evaluation reports. 

11 

 
 
                                                                 
The quantification of information exchange and its breakdown per communication channel was not 
possible for lack of national and comparable data. Indeed, 17 countries have reported not to produce 
complete  and  comparable  statistics  regarding  the  information  requests  exchanged  pursuant  to  the 
SFD,  while  seven  indicated  to  keep  statistics  and  five  to  do  so  only  for  information  shared  with 
Europol30.  

Collection of statistics concerning information exchange 

*Blue cells: statistics are collected. Grey cells: no data available 

Source: EY/RAND Study' elaboration based on desk research 

Deadlines  are  usually  not  met  when  a  judicial  authorisation  is  required  to  deliver  the  requested 
information. 

Indeed, the more authorities  are concerned, the more procedural steps have to be followed, hence 
the  need  for  additional  time  to  cope  with  all  procedures31.  Representatives  from  national  judicial 
authorities have pointed out that the EU legal bases for information exchange in law enforcement 
cooperation is complex, creating burdensome, laborious and unclear processes to be followed32. 

This  issue  is  further  exacerbated  by  the  fact  that  what  is  regarded  as  an  information  request  for 
police officers in one country might be regarded as an information request for judicial authorities in 
another  country,  depending  on  the  rules  at  national  level.  Hence,  different  authorities  may  be 
concerned  depending  on  the  specific  national  institutional  framework,  further  undermining  the 
overall efficiency of the process33. Furthermore, there is no obligation to have a judicial authority 
functionally  available  24/7  within  the  national  Single  Point  of  Contact  (SPOC  –  national 
information hub centralising the reception, processing and the sending of the information  – in and 
out), thereby slowing down the judicial authorisation process, where it is needed. 

The distinction between "urgent", "non-urgent" and "all other" cases provided for in the SFD and 
the  SFD  forms  to  be  used  (on  a  voluntary  basis)  for  information  exchange  is  unclear  and 
(unnecessarily) complex. 

The  SFD  does  not  define  "urgent  cases",  "non-  urgent  cases"  and  "all  other  cases",  which  are 
deductively  identified  as  those  not  fitting  the  "urgency  criteria".  Such  a  deductive  process  takes 
time.  Some  guidance  on  the  possible  understanding  of  "urgency"  is  offered  by  Council  (non-
binding) guidelines34, which, however, has not led to a convergence of national practices. 

Moreover, the forms for submitting and requesting information included in the SFD are rarely 
used35.  They  are  considered  time-consuming  and  labour  intensive,  and  the  Member  States  prefer  
free-text  messages36.  Hence,  although  the  SFD  forms  were  expected  to  boost  a  standardised  and 
efficient  exchange  of  information,  their  limited  use  results  in  a  limited  harmonisation  of 
communication procedures. 

30  Council  Document  14755/1/12,  Swedish  Framework  Decision  (SFD)  implementation  –  Assessment  of  compliance 
pursuant to Article 1(2). 
31 Council Document 14755/1/12. 
32 Survey: Q 15, 3 national judicial authorities' representatives. 
33 Huybreghts, G. (2015), The Schengen Convention and the Schengen acquis: 25 years of evolution. ERA Forum. 
34  Council  Document  9512/1/10,  REV  1,  17.12.2010,  Guidelines  on  the  implementation  of  Council  Framework 

Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006. 

3515 Schengen evaluation reports. Technical workshop held on 24 March. 
36  Council  Document  14755/1/12,  Swedish  Framework  decision  (SFD)  implementation  -  Assessment  of  compliance 

pursuant to Article 11(2). Available at: link. Technical workshop held on 24 March 2021.  

12 

 AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE EL ES FI FR HR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MT NL NO PL PT RO SE SI SK Statistics regarding the SFD                                Statistics regarding  information shared  with Europol                                  
 
                                                                 
The Swedish Framework Decision is not aligned with the 2016 Law Enforcement Data Protection 
Directive. 

The exchange of personal data pursuant to the SFD is not aligned with the 2016 Law Enforcement 
Data Protection Directive (LED)37. Indeed, Article 8 SFD states that the use of the information and 
intelligence  exchanged  must  be  subject  to  the  national  data  protection  provisions  of  the  Member 
State  receiving  the  information,  according  to  the  same  rules  as  if  they  had  been  gathered  in  that 
Member State.  

Moreover, when providing information and intelligence, the competent law enforcement authority 
may impose  additional  conditions  that are in  accordance  with  its national  law on their use by the 
receiving competent law enforcement authority. The Commission committed to "make a legislative 
proposal,  which  as  a  minimum  will  entail  an  amendment  of  Council  Framework  Decision 
2006/960/JHA to ensure the necessary data protection alignment, in the last quarter of 2021"38.  

In practice, law enforcement authorities do not have a clear understanding of the data available for 
possible exchange with their counterparts in other Member States. 

The content of these data depends on national legislations. The type of information available from 
each  Member  State  is  set  out  in  national  fact  sheets  (compiled  in  Council  guidelines)39.  Yet,  the 
awareness of these national fact sheets remains limited.  This results in unnecessary wide requests 
leading  to  lengthy  processing  time.  In  other  instances,  data  that  would  have  been  needed  is  not 
included in the exchange while unnecessary one is provided. 

2.1.3.  2.1.3. 

 How will the problem evolve without intervention?  

Member  States  alone  would  not  be  able  to  ensure  the  full  implementation  of  the  principles  of 
availability  and  equivalent  access  to  information.  This  means  that  the  current  uncertainties  with 
regard  to  the  applicable  legislation  and  the  data  available  for  possible  exchange  between  the 
Member States would remain and continue to negatively affect the effective and efficient sharing of 
information, thereby leaving the impacts in the  evolution of the EU security landscape and in the 
increased cross-border  mobility essentially unaddressed.  In practice,  there would continue to  be  a 
lack of clarity on what data are available in different Member States. The respect of deadlines for 
urgent  information  requests  would  remain  unlikely  when  a  judicial  authorisation  is  required.  The 
distinction  between  urgent  and  non-urgent  cases/all  other  cases,  and  the  forms  to  be  used  for 
information exchange will remain (unnecessarily) complex. 

Without intervention, the 2006 Swedish Framework Decision will remain unaligned with the 2016 
Law  Enforcement  Data  Protection  Directive  (LED).  This  means  that  even  though  Fundamental 
Rights would remain adequately safeguarded, improvement would not be brought forward. 

2.2.Problem  2:  Structures  at  national  level  are  not  set  up  and  equipped  in  a  sufficiently 

efficient and effective manner 

2.2.1.  2.2.1.  What is the problem? 

Member  States  do  not  always  have  the  necessary  structures  in  place  to  exchange  information 
effectively  and  efficiently  with  other  Member  States.  Where  Single  Point  Of  Contacts  (SPOCs), 
Police and Customs Cooperation Centres (PCCCs) and other equivalent structures at national level 

37 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons  with  regard  to  the  processing  of  personal  data  by  competent  authorities  for  the  purposes  of  the  prevention, 
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences and on the free movement of such data. 
38 COM(2020)262, Way forward on aligning the former third pillar acquis with data protection rules. 
39 Council document 5825/20 ADD 1 REV 1, 2.12.2020, Manual on Law Enforcement Information Exchange.  

13 

 
 
                                                                 
exist  they  do  not  always  play  their  coordination  role  and  lack  resources  to  face  the  increasing 
number of requests.  

Notably,  SPOCs,  PCCCs  and  other  equivalent  structures  often  have  outdated  IT  infrastructure. 
They  are  not  always  equipped  with  the  necessary  information  management  tools  (e.g.  a  case 
management system with a common dashboard and automatic data upload and cross-check). 

National and regional information hubs (SPOC and PCCC) 

Nearly  all  Member  States  have  implemented  the  policy  of  channeling  as  much  information  exchange  as  possible 
through a single point of contact. The Single Point of Contact (SPOC) is the national "one-stop shop" for international 
law enforcement cooperation, gathering under the same management structure all main international law enforcement 
communication  channels  (INTERPOL,  Europol  and  SIRENE40).  Such  innovation  was  introduced  as  an  attempt  to 
reconcile  Member States'  fragmented  law enforcement  authorities'  landscape  with  the  growing  need  to  jointly  tackle 
cross-border threats of shared competence (e.g. drug trafficking). At the nexus of cross-border information exchange 
and  national  coordination  between  different  law  enforcement  authorities,  the  SPOC  concept  greatly  facilitates 
information flows.  

The  understanding  of  what  defines  a  SPOC  varies  among  the  Member  States.  The  2014  Council  (non-binding)  draft 
guidelines  tentatively  indicate  how  SPOCs  can  be  structured  to  maximise  the  use  of  resources,  avoid  overlaps  and 
make  cooperation  with  other  Member  States  more  efficient,  expedient  and  transparent41.  From  these  guidelines, 
Member  States  should  select  the  solution  appropriate  for  their  situation  in  view  of  the  common  and  agreed  aim  of 
enhancing  international  cooperation,  and  consider  appropriate  ways  of  informing  other  Member  States  about  the 
solution  selected  with  a  view  to  the  exchange  of  best  practices.  This  Council  non-binding  guidance  has  not  led  to  a 
sufficient convergence of national practices. 

Information (mostly concerning petty crimes) is  notably exchanged through Police and Customs Cooperation Centres 
(PCCC), set up in border regions between two to four European countries, thus alleviating the national SPOC from an 
overflow  of  requests.  59  PCCCs  have  been  set  up  across  most  Member  States  and  Schengen  Associated  Countries. 
Similar duties are ensured by other equivalent bodies, such as police (only) cooperation centres or police and border 
guards cooperation centres. These PCCCs (regional information hub) are not always under the umbrella of the national 
SPOC, preventing the SPOC from having a full picture of information exchanged and preventing possible links. 

2.2.2.  2.2.2.  What are the problems drivers?  

SPOC do not always play their coordination role and lack resources to face the increasing number 
of information requests. 

Member States  are free  to  decide  which law enforcement  authorities  and  services  are represented 
within  their  SPOCs42.  Although  different  manuals  and  national  factsheets  have  been  produced  in 
order to facilitate a harmonised approach to the way national SPOCs are organised43, there are still 
significant differences across countries as regards the structures at national level44. 

For  example,  in  some  countries  the  SPOC  includes  the  Europol  National  Unit  (ENU),  the 
Supplementary  Information  Request  at  the  National  Entry  (SIRENE)  bureau  and  the  INTERPOL 
National Central Bureau, while in other countries these units are not included. Such differences lead 
to confusion when it comes to the cross-border exchange of information. 

Thus, when a request for information is addressed to a specific Law Enforcement Authority (LEA) 
or  a  dedicated  service  within  a  LEA,  the  requesting  Member  State  does  not  know  in  advance 
whether this entity is included or not within the SPOC of the receiving Member State. This leads to 

40 Each state operating the Schengen Information System (SIS) has set up a national SIRENE Bureau, operational 

24/7, that is responsible for any supplementary information exchange connected to SIS alerts. 

41 Council document 10492/14, Draft Guidelines for a SPOC for international law enforcement information exchange. 
427 Schengen evaluation reports. Technical workshop held on 24 March 2021. 
43 Council Document 10492/14; Council Document 12093/19,  Draft Council Conclusions on establishing a 'Heads of 
SPOC' network; Council Document 5825/20 ADD 1 REV 1, Manual on Law Enforcement Information Exchange. 

44 At the time of their Schengen evaluations (carried out between 2016 and 2019), 3 countries were not considered to 
have a SPOC in place, while, in one, the SPOC was still not operational. Some of the countries consider the SPOC to 
be the front-office, others see it as the entire structure comprising the three main international police communication 
channels (INTERPOL, Europol and SIRENE). Such a structure may also contain other strategic or support services. 
Whereas one country reported that its SPOC was run by a staff of 7, another country indicated that its SPOC was run 
by 287 persons (they are also acute differences between similar size  countries  showcasing the diversity of Member 
States approaches and the related efficiency of their IT architecture). 

14 

 
 
                                                                 
a  risk  of  duplication  of  requests,  which  are  sent  both  to  the  SPOC  and  to  the  specific  service. 
Moreover, SPOCs face a high workload notably due to the practice of "fishing" and difficulties in 
the choice of the most appropriate communication channels to be used to exchange information45. 
Additionally,  the  SPOCs  –  and  in  some  cases  also  the  PCCCs46  –  lack  resources  to  timely  and 
effectively  address  the  increasing  number  of  requests  they  receive47.  The  increasing  amount  of 
information  requests  has  not  been  accompanied  by  a  proportionate  increase  of  the  resources 
allocated  to  manage  these  requests48.  The  lack  of  sufficient  resources  allocated  to  the  SPOCs  is 
particularly challenging in cases of urgent requests for information49.  

Pursuant  to  Article 4  of the Swedish  Framework Decision (SFD), urgent requests for information 
shall be addressed within 8 hours. This timeframe is not critical per se and it seems well suited to 
share  information,  which  is  necessary  to  carry  out  the  investigation.  However,  if  several  urgent 
requests are received at the same time, enough officials would need to be available to manage them 
in  parallel,  and  this  is  problematic  since  human  resources  within  the  SPOCs  are  limited.  This  is 
particularly challenging since the SFD does not envisage an automated tool for issuing reminders of 
the information requests.  

Hence, timely responses depend on the SPOC's capacity to monitor and track the deadlines in the 
Case  Management  Systems50.  There  is  often  a  lack  of  a  modern  information  management 
architecture that would alleviate tensions on limited human resources. 

SPOC's staff 

*Blue cells: number of SPOC’s staff. White cell: no data available. Grey cells: no Schengen evaluation report available. 
Source: EY/RAND study' elaboration based on Schengen evaluation reports 

Examples found in Schengen evaluations in the field of police cooperation (2015-2019) 

-  In  three  countries,  the  total  number  of  messages  exchanged  through  all  channels  used  by  the  SPOC  has  been 
increasing over the past years and was not mirrored by a comparable increase in the number of available staff, leading 
to challenges to cope with all requests for information; 

- In one country, the human resources allocated to the national SPOC are deemed insufficient to properly address all 
requested exchanges of information; 

-  In  one  country,  the  number  of  SPOC  staff  has  decreased  recently  despite  a  sizable  increase  in  the  number  of 
messages exchanged. 

Information  from  (i)  different  units  within  the  SPOCs  and  (ii)  from  the  PCCCs  (and  equivalent 
structures  in  the  border  area)  is  not  always  integrated  in  the  SPOC  information  management 
system. 

In some Member States there is no integration of information included in databases owned by the 
different  law  enforcement  authorities,  which  form  part  of  the  same  SPOC  and/or  the  PCCC.  The 
lack  of  integration  of  information  collected  and  stored  by  different  law  enforcement  authorities 

45 Fishing means that one or several Member State' law enforcement agencies may receive the same information request 
via several channels without any clear link to a specific case (catch all fishing request), thus leading to duplication of 
work. Technical workshop held on 24 March.  

46 Council document 14623/17, 27.11.2017 - Information Management Strategy (IMS): action list No 5 and proposal 

for action list No 6 - State of play of "PCCC: European dimension" (Action No 7). 

475  Schengen  evaluation  reports.  ICMPD  (2010)  Study  on  the  status  of  information  exchange  amongst  LEAs  in  the 

context of existing EU instruments. Available at: link. 

48 Comparative analysis of the Schengen evaluation reports. See complementary information in annex 5. 
49 5 Schengen evaluation reports. Technical workshop held on 24 March 2021. 
50  Survey:  Q  41,  69%  (n=99)  of  LEAs  respondents  reported  that  differences  between  countries  in  the  capacity  to 
regularly monitor the different communication channels (e.g. SIENA, SIS/SIRENE, EIS and INTERPOL) as well as 
in the response time to requests sent via these platforms hamper cross-border law enforcement cooperation. 

15 

 
 
                                                                 
results  in  a  risk  of  duplications  of  both  uploads  and  searches  of  information,  hence  reducing  the 
overall efficiency of information exchange51. 

Direct and user-friendly access to all relevant EU and international databases and platforms is not 
the norm in the SPOCs and the PCCCs. The specific national law enforcement authorities (LEAs) 
entitled to access and use EU and international databases and platforms vary between the Member 
States. 

An  additional  issue  hampering  a  smooth  cross-border  exchange  of  information  is  that  the  SPOCs 
and  the  PCCCs  do  not  always  have  direct  and  user-friendly  access  to  all  relevant  EU  and 
international databases and platforms, limiting their capacity to effectively support cross-border 
exchange of information52, thus hampering cross-border law enforcement cooperation53. As regards 
the PCCCs, out of 59 PCCCs active in Europe, only 14 are connected to Europol SIENA54. Besides 
the  PCCCs,  this  consideration  also  applies  to  regional  and  local  level  law  enforcement  authority 
investigation departments that most of the times do not have access to SIENA55. 

Examples found in Schengen evaluations in the field of police cooperation (2015-2019) 

-  One  country  reported  that  the  customs  Liaison  Official  at  Europol  is  the  only  national  customs  staff  granted  with 
direct access to the Europol Information System; 

-  One  country  reported  to  have  no  Case  Management  System  (CMS)  in  place  at  the  international  police  in  the  unit 
responsible for all matters relating to international police cooperation and communication within the police; 

- In one country, national LEAs do not have direct access to the national identity document registry; 

- In one country, the national police database is not linked to the national case management system; 

- In one country, the search criteria for the national police database do not fully mirror those for accessing the data 
included  in  the  SIS  II  database.  For  this  reason,  officials  have  difficulties  to  retrieve  information  from  the  different 
databases,  especially  when  they  lack  specific  information  such  as  the  passport  nationality  or  document  type,  which 
may be required by one information system and not by the other; 

-  In  one  country,  each  national  police  force  has  its  own  database  which  is  not  accessible  to  and  interoperable  with 
databases used by other police forces: in order to check whether a person or object has been registered in a specific 
database,  officials  from  each  agency  have  to  perform  separate  searches  in  their  corresponding  databases,  each 
accessible  from  different  workstations.  Hence,  the  risk  of  waste  of  time  and  duplication  of  information  and  related 
searches; 

-  In  one  country,  incoming  requests  for  information  are  managed  by  the  international  police,  which  consists  of 
different  units,  each  having  its  own  case  management  system.  When  the  request  is  received,  the  overarching  unit 
forwards it to the different units; this double-step process takes time, and this could represent a hurdle in the case of 
urgent requests; 

- Similar issues are reported also in another two countries, where manual double-checking by officials is performed to 
avoid duplications of information and requests; 

-  Moreover,  duplications  are  particularly  challenging  where,  like  in  one  country,  there  are  no  available  electronic 
means for automatically identifying cases of duplications of information between the workflow systems; 

- In one country, requests and messages received through i24/7, SIS, SIRENE and SIENA are entered into the SPOC’s 
case  management  system.  However,  the  information  included  in  the  messages  is  not  automatically  cross-checked 
against the national databases and this means that the checks have to be performed manually; 

- In one country, limited interoperability is further exacerbated by the fact that international information exchanges at 
the local or regional levels are not systematically reported to the SPOC undermining its coordination role. 

51  9  Schengen  evaluation  reports.  Interviews:  11  representatives  from  four  EU  bodies.  European  Confederation  of 
Police  (EuroCOP)  supporting  Commission's  initiative  to  streamline  and  consolidate  existing  instruments  for  cross-
border  police  cooperation  (2020).  Survey:  Q  29,  34%  (n=38)  of  LEAs  respondents  pointed  out  that  the  lack  of 
coordination between SPOCs and PCCCs hampers law enforcement cooperation. 

52  21  Schengen  evaluation  reports.  Survey:  Q  44,  71%  (n=101)  of  LEA  respondents  reported  that  access  to  SIENA, 
SIRENE,  EIS,  and  INTERPOL  exchange  channels  and  databases  differs  between  countries  to  a  moderate,  high 
degree, or very high degree. 

53 Survey: Q 41, Survey: Q 41, 71% (n=101) of LEAs that responded to the online survey reported that the different 
tools  for  which  the  access  to  SIENA,  SIS/SIRENE  and  INTERPOL  exchange  channels  and  databases  is  regulated 
between  countries  hamper  cross-border  law  enforcement  cooperation  through  the  platforms  listed  above  from  a 
moderate to a very high degree. 

54 Council document 14629/17, State of play of the roll-out of SIENA regarding PCCCs - Outcome of questionnaire. 
55  17  Schengen  evaluation  reports.  Interviews:  2  EU  Agency  representatives.  4  Member  States'  representatives  at  the 

Technical Workshop held on 24 March 2021. 

16 

 
 
                                                                 
National LEAs have limited awareness and knowledge of relevant databases. 

Cross-border  information  sharing  is  further  hampered  by  the  national  LEAs'  limited  awareness 
and  knowledge  of  relevant  databases.  Notably,  the  majority  of  Member  States  reported  that 
national LEAs' officials are not completely aware of all the law enforcement databases available to 
them or they are not sufficiently experienced and proficient in their use56.  

The  SPOCs  often  face  IT  capacity  issues  when  dealing  with  the  increasing  requests  for  urgent 
information.  

This is further challenged by the fact that the SPOCs and the PCCCs are not always equipped with 
the  necessary  information  management  tools,  preventing  an  efficient  tracking/filing  of 
information in cross-border cases57. 
For instance, some SPOCs have limited access to relevant national databases58. Since they cannot 
access directly the databases of other law enforcement authorities, they need to ask officials within 
those authorities to  collect  and share the information. This  delays the overall exchange process59. 
Difficulties related to the steps needed for the SPOCs to obtain the relevant information included in 
national databases are further exacerbated by the actual limited interconnectivity between national 
law enforcement databases60. 

Main features of SPOC's Case Management System 

Source: EY/RAND Europe Study’s elaboration based on desk research (dark grey cells indicate that no information is 
available) 

The  use  of  rudimentary  search  tools  hampers  the  adoption  of  transliteration  and  "fuzzy  logic" 
search. 

Furthermore,  the  exploitation  of  the  full  potential  of  existing  databases  is  hindered  by  the  use  of 
rudimentary  search  tools,  which  prevent  the  adoption  of  transliteration61  techniques  and  "fuzzy 
logic"62 search functions. The lack of transliteration and fuzzy logic search options within national 

56 24 Schengen evaluation reports. Technical workshop held on 24 March 2021. 
57 10 Schengen evaluation reports. 
58 5 Schengen evaluation reports. SWD/2020/327 final. Available at: link. 
59 Council Document 14755/1/12. 
60 17 Schengen evaluation reports. Technical workshop held on 24 March 2021. Commission Staff Working Document 

SWD/2020/327 final. Available at: link. 

61 Transliteration is the process of representing words/names from one language using the alphabet or writing system of 
another  language  (multilingual  name  recognition).  E.g.  the  letter  "o"  can  be  'ò',  'ó',  'ô,  'õ',  'ö',  'ø'  depending  on  the 
language/alphabet used. 8 Schengen evaluation reports. 

62 A fuzzy database is a database which is able to deal with uncertain or incomplete information using fuzzy logic. i.e. 

the ability to find matches even when a person' name is misspelled. 10 Schengen evaluation reports. 

17 

 
 
                                                                 
databases and information systems prevents officials to get a full picture about the person they are 
looking  for  in  the  systems  through  a  unique  query.  As  a  result,  officials  have  to  carry  out  a  new 
search  for  each  personal  detail  they  are  investigating,  resulting  in  an  increased  workload,  which 
slows down the search process (e.g. inversion of first and last name, different spelling used for the 
same individual notably stemming from different languages, alphabets and diacritic accents). 

Examples found in Schengen evaluations in the field of police cooperation (2015-2019) 

-  In  one  country,  a  transliteration  issue  was  identified  when  some  letters  were  entered  differently  or  in  case  some 
letters were left out at the end of the name, as the system was not able to find matches in the databases; 

-  In  one  country,  issues  were  reported  related  to  transliteration  and  fuzzy  logic  searches  in  the  national  application 
used for mobile access to police databases. In particular, when there is some uncertainty if a given word corresponds 
to the surname or name of a suspect, the system is not able to search both fields at the same time, which means that 
an official has to make the search twice; 

- In one country, the same problem was identified with reference to the interconnection with SIS: due to the lack of 
fuzzy logic instruments, some SIS hits were missed; 

-  In  one  country,  the  need  to  repeat  a  search  was  raised,  as  the  on-site  team  noted  that  the  inversion  of  the 
name/surname is not possible, and a second search must be carried out; 

-  In  one  country,  if  a  record  includes  special  characters,  the  system  will  not  be  able  to  identify  it  unless  these 
characters are included in the search term. Moreover, there were differences depending on the tool used as fuzzy logic 
searches were not possible on the fixed stations or on mobile devices; 

- In one country, none of the information systems that have been assessed included a “fuzzy logic” search capability; 

-  In  one  country,  the  absence  of  a  universal  search  tool  incorporating  fuzzy  logic  results  in  that  law  enforcement 
officials  have  to  repeat  a  search several  times  in order  to ensure  that  all  the  relevant  records  are  considered,  which 
increases the risk of missing possible matches. 

There  is  limited  availability  of  training  for  law  enforcement  staff  involved  in  cross-border 
information exchanges and cooperation. 

Training concerning  cross-border law enforcement cooperation  is not held on a regular basis 
at  national  level  and  does  not  always  take  into  account  the  latest  changes  in  the  EU  law 
enforcement legislative framework in a timely manner (e.g. new EU or Schengen-related legislative 
initiatives)63. In practice, this implies that training for staff involved in cross-border cooperation is 
often based on informal mentoring by experienced colleagues, which has a negative impact on the 
number of officials who possess the necessary skills to properly manage all the different procedures 
and information tools required64. Moreover, this training is often voluntary, thus leaving room for 
heterogeneous skills between police officials, and it is not always systematic for newcomers in the 
SPOCs and PCCCs65. 

Language barriers hamper the efficient cross-border exchange of information. 

Finally,  language barriers  were  reported by some Member States  as  hampering the cross-border 
exchange of information66. Officials engaged in cross-border cooperation are not always proficient 
in  English  and  this  has  a  twofold  drawback.  First,  since  EU  official  communication  channels 
requires the exchange of information in a language that can be understood by the receiving Member 
State, officials who are not proficient in English or in the language of the requesting country prefer 
to  exchange  information  via  informal  channels  (e.g.  email,  etc.).  Second,  even  when  official 
channels are used, information is often reported in a rudimentary English. Thus, officials receiving 
a request for information often need to take time to translate it67. 

63 9 Schengen evaluation reports. Survey: Q 59, 58% (n=67) of LEAs respondents confirmed that the lack of knowledge 
and  training  among  law  enforcement  practitioners  about  how  to  apply  for  or  implement  investigative  tools  act  as 
barrier for effective cross-border cooperation. 

64 COM/2020/779 final. Available at: link. 
65 8 Schengen evaluation reports. 
66 12 Schengen evaluation reports. Survey: Q 34, 35 LEAs' representatives reported that language barriers are among 

the main issues they face when sharing information. 

67 Some IT features allow for an automatic "rough" translation service.  

18 

 
 
                                                                 
2.2.3.  2.2.3.  How will the problem evolve without intervention? 

Whilst  it  remains  possible  that  the  SPOCs  and  PCCCs  will  over  time  incrementally  update  and 
improve their information management systems, these developments would not be aligned between 
the  Member  States  and  the  current  efficiency  and  effectiveness  gaps  are  expected  to  remain.  The 
varied  competences  of  the  SPOCs  across  the  EU  would  continue  to  hamper  the  efficient  and 
effective exchange of information, notably because adequate access to key databases and platforms 
would not  be ensured in all SPOCs and PCCCs. Moreover, some SPOCs  would continue to  have 
insufficient resources to address the information requests received within the deadlines in all cases.  

The latest cycle of Schengen evaluations in the field of police cooperation revealed, in a number of 
Member  States,  deeply  engrained  internal  coordination  issues  between  different  law  enforcement 
authorities, preventing the proper functioning of their national SPOC/PCCCs. 

Such internal issues have been proven to significantly hinder the efficient and effective functioning 
of the SPOC/PCCCs and hence the exchange of information between Member States. For example, 
some national SPOCs/PCCCs do not have a direct access to relevant national databases, nor benefit 
from  a  modern  information  architecture,  thereby  preventing  necessary  cross-match  with  EU  and 
International databases.  

Furthermore, designing IT upgrades can be complex and the implication far reaching rendering an 
efficient internal coordination even more essential. A general finding of the Schengen evaluations 
points  to  the  need  to  address  national/domestic  structures,  processes  and  procedure  in  order  to 
improve the exchange of information between Member States in the framework of EU law.  

Member States would not ensure appropriate and uniform level of training in intra-EU cross-border 
cases, in foreign languages and in the adequate use relevant databases and communication channels 
either. Law enforcement authorities will not effectively and efficiently exchange information with 
their  partners  in  other  Member  States,  thereby  leaving  the  impacts  in  the  evolution  of  the  EU 
security landscape and in the increased cross-border mobility essentially unaddressed. 

2.3. Problem 3: The free choice of communication channel(s) between Member States  causes 

recurrent duplication of requests 

2.3.1.  2.3.1.  What is the problem? 

Member  States'  law  enforcement  authorities  use  a  variety  of  different  channels  to  exchange 
information, leading to recurrent duplication of requests and creating confusion due to the number 
of  information  systems  that  can  be  used68.  Three  main  channels  are  used  for  cross-border 
information  exchange,  each  based  on  national  units  in  each  Member  State  that  use  a  related 
communication tool:  

  SIRENE  Bureaux  can,  following  a  hit  on  an  alert  in  Schengen  Information  System  (SIS), 
obtain supplementary information from the Member State that issued the alert. They operate 
24/7 and follow the procedures of the SIRENE Manual.  

  Europol  National  Units  (ENUs)  exchange  information  with  Europol.  They  may  also 
exchange information bilaterally on crime outside Europol's mandate and without involving 
Europol. ENUs can exchange information directly or through Europol Liaison Officers, who 
are  part  of  an  ENU  but  stationed  at  Europol  headquarters.  A  secure  communications  tool, 

68 1 Schengen evaluation report. technical workshop held on 24 March 2021. Q 41, 87% (n=57) of LEAs' respondents 
reported  that  the  high  number  of  communication  channels  for  EU  information  exchange  overburdens  the  officials 
involved in cross-border cooperation.  

19 

 
 
                                                                 
 

SIENA69, has been developed by Europol for exchanges with Europol and between Member 
States.  
INTERPOL  National  Central  Bureaux,  operating  24/7,  exchange  information  with 
INTERPOL as well as bilaterally without involving INTERPOL. National Central Bureaux 
use the I-24/7 communication tool developed by INTERPOL.  

Other  channels  include  bilateral  Liaison  Officers  (stationed  in  other  Member  States  and  typically 
used in more complex cases) and PCCCs. 

Member States use different channels to different extents to request, send and receive information, 
which  hampers  effective  and  efficient  exchange  of  information.  This  was  also  confirmed  by  a 
number  of  stakeholders  who  also  pointed  out  that  the  use  of  different  tools  at  the  same  time 
contributes to the duplication of requests. Such cases of duplications of requests due to the use of 
different channels concerning the same piece of information were also reported during the technical 
workshop held on 24 March 202170. 

On  top  of  noted  duplications,  the  use  of  different  communication  channels  leads  to  the  Europol 
Secure  Information  Exchange  Network  Application  (SIENA)  to  being  underused  in  spite  of  its 
tailored  features  and  strong  data  security  infrastructure.  Even  when  Member  States  use  Europol 
SIENA  they  can  choose  not  to  involve  Europol  in  their  bilateral  exchanges  even  though  the 
information exchanged falls under the Europol mandate. This significantly hinders Europol' ability 
to fulfil its support function, thereby creating an important information gap.  

There  are  also  differences  at  national  level  as  regards  the  access  to  EU  instruments.  In  some 
Member  States  all  Law  Enforcement  Authorities  (LEAs)  have  access  to  SIENA,  in  other  ones,  
access  to  SIENA  is  only  granted  to  a  single  national  authority  that  coordinates  the  information 
exchange  thereby  hampering  its  full  use71.  Consequently,  most  of  the  times,  regional  and  local 
investigation services do not have access to SIENA. This is particularly important considering that 
SIENA seems to be one of the preferable tools to share sensitive and confidential information since 
it allows to securely exchange data. 
This  issue was  also  raised in  the recent  evaluation of the EU Policy Cycle 2018-202172. Notably, 
the  effectiveness  of  SIENA  was  hindered  by  the  fact  that  national  stakeholders  regularly  have  to 
firstly share information with the central authority which in turn shares it with other countries. This 
double-tier  process  delays  the  overall  process,  with  possible  negative  impact  on  international 
investigations where timely information sharing is crucial for success73.  

Ideally, the SPOC should ensure that a request is sent through one channel only. The SPOC Front 
desk is crucial in choosing the most appropriate and relevant channel by gathering all requests ("in" 
or "out") dealt with by the SPOC, before dispatching them to the relevant desk (SIRENE Bureau, 
INTERPOL  National  Central  Bureau,  Europol  National  Unit,  and  bilateral  liaison  officers)74.  So 
far, a number of national SPOC use internal guidelines recommending or requiring the specific 

69 Secure Information Exchange Network Application. SIENA is Europol's secure communication system, Europol and 
its  cooperation  partners  exchange  operational  and  strategic  crime-related  information  and  intelligence,  including 
operational  data  on  persons. SIENA  is  a  messaging  system  offering  different  message  types  for  different  purposes, 
including data exchange in accordance with the Swedish Framework Decision. 

70 2 Member States' representatives at the Technical workshop held on 24 March 2021. Interviews: 1 EMPACT Driver. 
Moreover, the  information received often includes details  and data,  which are not  necessary to address  the  specific 
request.  This  results  in  unnecessary  time  to  process  all  answers  to  the  same  request.  Moreover,  participants  in  the 
workshop  confirmed  that  the  information  is  not  always  exchanged  using  the  appropriate  channels  and  tools  (e.g.  a 
request from one Schengen country to another to locate a person is sent via I-24/7 and not through the SIRENE). 

71 In some Member States, investigators can use SIENA directly, shortening the information exchange process. 
72 EY, RAND (2020) Evaluation Study on the EU Policy Cycle/EMPACT 2018-2021. (Unpublished). 
73 Survey for the Evaluation study on the EU Policy Cycle 2018-2021: 5 EMPACT Drivers and 11 Action Participants. 
74 Provided all channels are available to a SPOC and the SPOC is able and ready to use all channels appropriately. 

20 

 
 
                                                                 
use  of  a  communication  channel  for  specific  purpose,  thereby  ensuring  consistency  and  avoiding 
duplication  of  requests.  Other  SPOCs  rely  on  officers'  habits  and  personal  preferences.  Such 
leeway  result  in  inefficiencies  in  a  cross-border  context.  Council  guidelines  did  not  led  to  a 
convergence of national practices either75.  

The current  proliferation of information  exchange channels  has also  meant  that different  Member 
States  have  invested  in  different  information  exchange  channels,  thus  not  always  matching  the 
investments made in other Member States and hence hindering and effective use of the investments 
made domestically. Some Member States lack the necessary funding. Correspondingly, the present 
proposal will be flanked with financial support via the national programmes under the EU Internal 
Security Fund. 

2.3.2.  2.3.2.  What are the drivers? 

Member States have not agreed on a single channel of information exchange between their law 
enforcement  authorities  for  cases  with  an  EU  dimension.  The  choice  of  channel  is  only  partly 
regulated  by  EU  law:  SIS  requests  for  supplementary  information  must  be  made  via  SIRENE 
Bureaux,76  and  information  exchange  with  Europol  via  ENUs.77  Otherwise  the  choice  is  up  to 
Member States78. 
There is not a clear rationale behind the choice of one tool instead of the other79. Some Member 
States have moved towards more systematic use of the Europol channel. Others continue to rely a 
good deal on the INTERPOL channel for intra-EU cooperation, the attraction of which seems to lie 
partly in its traditional central role in international police cooperation, partly in its perceived ease of 
use, and partly on Member States officers' habits and personal preferences80. 

The  limited  training  hampers  the  efficient  use  of  available  tools  for  exchanging  information  by 
national  law  enforcement  officials.  As  regards  the  PCCCs,  out  of  59  PCCCs  active  in  Europe  in 
2017, only  nine  were  connected to SIENA81 (against  14 PCCCs  in  2021, thereby indicating slow 
progress). 

Communication channel used for police cooperation 

75 Council document 5825/20, 2.12.2020, Manual on Law Enforcement Information Exchange. 
76 SIS requests for post-hit supplementary information must be done via SIRENE Bureaux. 
77 Europol National Unit. Information exchange with Europol must be done via ENUs. 
78  Comparative  analysis  of  the  Schengen  Evaluation  Reports.  Survey:  Q  40,  LEAs  respondents  agreed  that  although 
SIENA  is  the  most  frequently  used  tool  (77%,  n=128),  all  used  INTERPOL  I24/7  to  a  high  or  very  high  extent 
(INTERPOL: 52%, n=87).  

79 Comparative analysis of the Schengen Evaluation Reports. 
80 Survey: Q 2 SPOC's representatives, 1 PCCC representative. 1 Schengen evaluation report. 
81 Council document 14629/17, State of play of the roll-out of SIENA regarding PCCCs. 

21 

 
 
 
 
                                                                 
*Blue  cells:  both  channels  are  used  indifferently.  Light  grey  cells:  preferred  channel  of  communication.  Dark  grey 
cells: No Schengen evaluation report available 
Source: EY/RAND Europe Study’s elaboration based on a questionnaire on the developments  since the update of the 
SPOC guidelines in 2014 

2.3.3.  2.3.3.  How will the problem evolve without intervention? 

The  planned  changes  to  SIENA  that  are  currently  envisaged  by  Europol  are  expected  to  lead  to 
some clear improvements with regard to the cross-border exchange of information, notably due to 
its anticipated doubling of end-users. 

Yet, Member States would only slowly update their IT information management system to integrate 
these upgrades. Member States are also expected to continue to send requests to multiple countries 
at  the  same  time  via  parallel  channels  to  "fish"  for  information,  leading  to  duplication  of  work. 
Member  States  will  remain  free  to  choose  not  to  copy  Europol  in  their  exchanges  via  Europol 
SIENA even when this concerns an offence falling under the Europol mandate. The qualitative and 
quantitative  information  flow  towards  Europol  would  thus  only  increase  in  a  piece-meal  manner 
across  the  European  Union,  hampering  Europol's  ability  to  support  Member  States  in  their  cross-
border investigations. 

In  the  absence  of  further  intervention,  formal  and  informal  processes  that  have  been  established 
over the years are expected to remain intact. This means that stakeholders are expected to continue 
to use ad hoc processes. One example is, of course, not sending an information request via SIENA, 
but  simply  calling  the  official  counterpart  in  another  country  or  requesting  information  via  an 
informal  email.  Informal  practices  have  been  and  remain  an  important  part  of  law  enforcement 
cooperation today. This being said, such traditional ways of working may no longer prove adequate 
in the future. More specifically, while they may work well between Member States where frequent 
contacts  and  cooperation  are  established,  this  may  not  be  the  case  with  other  Member  States. 
Existing  Council  guidelines  did  not  manage  to  ensure  a  satisfactory  convergence  of  national 
practices. Updated guidance is thus unlikely to achieve further results. 

Without  intervention,  law  enforcement  authorities  will  continue  not  to  effectively  and  efficiently 
exchange information with their partners in other Member States, thereby leaving the impacts in the 
evolution  of  the  EU  security  landscape  and  in  the  increased  cross-border  mobility  essentially 
unaddressed. 

3.  3. WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? 

3.1. Legal basis 

A  legislative  proposal  following  this  impact  assessment  would  be  based  on  Article  87  (2)  of  the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).  

3.2.  Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action 

The  objective  of  improving  information  flows  between  relevant  law  enforcement  authorities  and 
with  Europol,  cannot  be  sufficiently  achieved  by  the  Member  States  acting  alone.  Owing  to  the 
cross-border  nature  of  crime,  the  Member  States  are  obliged  to  rely  on  one  another.  This  can  be 
better achieved at the level of the Union. 

Despite the existence of a number of national and regional measures in place that aim to strengthen 
national  capacity  to  deploy  coordinated  actions  against  common  threats  and  challenges,  Member 
States alone would not be able to ensure the full implementation of the principles of availability and 
of equivalent access to information. Member States would not overcome current differences among 
SPOCs  (and  in  its  relation  with  PCCCs),  which  hinder  the  efficient  exchange  of  relevant 
information across countries. They would not ensure appropriate and uniform level of knowledge of 
and capacity to use relevant databases and communication channels. 

22 

 
 
The EU is better equipped than individual Member States to ensure the coherence of actions taken 
at the national level, address the divergence of practices, prevent duplications and uncertainties and 
eventually ensure an efficient counter-action to cross-border crime. The need for EU intervention is 
widely supported by Law Enforcement Authorities (LEAs) answering the survey with 82% (n=131) 
of respondents reporting a need for EU action from a moderate to a very high extent. 

3.3.  Subsidiarity: Added value of EU action 

EU action in response to the identified problems is expected to bring added value for the entire EU 
with a ripple effect on Schengen Associated Countries, and therefore to its citizens. Common EU 
level  rules,  standards  and  requirements  facilitating  these  information  exchanges  on  cross-border 
crime  between  law  enforcement  authorities  will  generate  significant  economies  of  scale  while 
ensuring high-level data security and data protection standards.  

Additionally,  common  standards  allow  for  the  automation  of  information  exchange  workflows, 
releasing  law  enforcement  officers  from  a  number  of  labour-intensive/time-consuming  manual 
activities, thereby increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of national practices. 

Law  enforcement  cooperation  at  EU  level  does  not  replace  different  national  policies  on  internal 
security. It does not substitute the work of national law enforcement authorities. Quite the contrary, 
EU  level  action  supports  and  reinforces  national  security  policies  and  the  work  of  national  law 
enforcement  authorities,  helping  them  to  enforce  the  law  against  criminals  and  terrorists  that  act 
across  borders.  Differences  in  the  legal  systems  and  traditions  of  the  Member  States,  as 
acknowledged  by  the  Treaties82,  remain  unaffected  by  this  EU  level  support.  The  envisaged 
proposal,  a  Directive,  would  introduce  an  obligation  of  result.  In  full  line  with  the  subsidiarity 
principle, Member States will remain free to determine the most appropriate means to achieve the 
prescribed results. 

4.  4. OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? 

4.1.  General objective 

Law  enforcement  work  is  inherently  an  information-based  activity.  The  successful  prevention, 
detection and investigation of criminal offences, require a fast, streamlined and systematic access to 
all relevant information. 

The  general  objective  of  the  initiative  is  to  ensure  the  timely  access  and  the  smooth  exchange  of 
necessary  information,  thereby  enabling  effective  and  efficient  cooperation  between  law 
enforcement authorities to counter the cross-border dimension of criminal action while ensuring a 
high level of protection of fundamental rights and personal data. 

4.2.  Specific objectives 
The specific policy objectives of this initiative respond to the three problems identified in chapter 2: 

  To  facilitate  equivalent  access  for  law  enforcement  authorities  to  information  held  in 
another  Member  State,  while  complying  with  fundamental  rights  and  data  protection 
requirements; 

  To  ensure  that  all  Member  States  have  an  effective  functioning  Single  Point  of  Contact 
(SPOC),  including  when  a  judicial  authorisation  is  required  to  provide  the  data  upon 
request  of  another  Member  State,  and  ensuring  its  effective  cooperation  with  Police  and 
Customs Cooperation Centres (PCCCs)83; 

82 Article 67(1) TFEU. 
83 This will also require that the PCCCs have the necessary structures, staffing and IT systems. 

23 

 
 
                                                                 
  To  remedy  the  proliferation  of  communication  channels  used  for  law  enforcement 
information  exchange  between  Member  States  while  empowering  Europol  as  the  EU 
criminal information hub for offences falling within its mandate (unless otherwise regulated 
by EU law)  

5.  5. WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? 

5.1.  Baseline representing current situation 

The baseline is a "no policy change" scenario (option 0). This implies: 

  No  additional  regulatory  intervention  is  implemented  by  the  EU  to  the  exception  of  the 

alignment the 2006 SFD with the 2016 Law enforcement data Protection Directive84; 

  No specific flanking support measures are undertaken by the EU, such as awareness raising, 
training,  funding  etc.  in  order  to  improve  access  to  and  exchange  of  information  between 
Law Enforcement Authorities; 

  No further technical changes are implemented by the EU, e.g. in relation to technical means 

to access and share information via SIENA, apart from what is already planned. 

  However,  the  Commission  committed  to  ensure  the  alignment  of  the  2006  SFD  with  the 
2016  law  enforcement  data  protection  Directive  (LED).  Consequently  at  the  very  least,  a 
targeted amendment would be necessary. 

As  a  result,  law  enforcement  authorities  will  not  effectively  and  efficiently  exchange  information 
with  their  partners  in  other  Member  States  and  with  Europol,  causing  operational  hurdles  in  the 
daily law enforcement practices. 

In addition, differences with regard to the efficiency and effectiveness of SPOCs, PCCCs and other 
equivalent structures are expected to continue to exist and hamper the level playing field between 
Member States. 

Europol  is  making  efforts to  improve SIENA. The planned  changes are expected to  lead to  some 
improvements  with  regard  to  the  cross-border  exchange  of  information  already  in  the  baseline 
scenario85. 

If no further action is taken (other than the ones already agreed or underway), LEAs will likely face 
additional challenges in keeping pace with criminal groups in the near future. LEAs are expected to 
take advantage of and use new technologies to cope with evolving criminal patterns. 

5.2.  Description of policy options 

5.2.1.  5.2.1.  Objective  I:  Facilitate  equivalent  access  for  law  enforcement  authorities  to 
information held in another Member State, while complying with fundamental rights and 
data protection requirements 

Policy option 1.1: New flanking soft measures (training, Commission guidance)  

The problem described in chapter 2 will be addressed, to the extent possible, via support measures 
aiming to improve awareness, the implementation of EU provisions as well as national capabilities 
through dedicated funding via the Internal Security Fund (ISF). 

84  Directive  (EU)  2016/680  on  the  protection  of  natural  persons  with  regard  to  the  processing  of  personal  data  by 
competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences 
or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data. 

85  See  Europol's  plan  concerning  the  extension  of  SIENA  access:  https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-

services/services-support/information-exchange/secure-information-exchange-network-application-siena  

24 

 
 
                                                                 
This  could  cover  training,  Commission  guidance  (e.g.  on  the  use  of  communication  channels,  on 
SPOCs,  on  PCCCs  and  on  information  exchange,  the  provision  of  a  matrix  concerning  which 
information  channel  should  be  used  in  what  cases,  and  the  provision  of  information  concerning 
what data are available in the Member States). Europol would be asked to speed up the SIENA roll-
out. 

As a result of the lisbonisation of the SFD, possible future guidelines will no longer be developed 
by  the  Council  but  by  the  European  Commission.  These  new  guidelines  will  require  an  active 
support from the Member States given national specificities and related technicalities. 

Policy option 1.2: Option 1.1 + simplification in the use of the SFD +  improve clarity on the 
national data sets available for possible exchange 

Based on the Council guidance, the Schengen evaluations in the field of police cooperation, and on 
the  Study'  findings,  the  policy  option  1.2  will  cover  Option  1.1,  extended  to  the  revision  of  the 
Swedish  Framework  Decision  with  a  view  to  clarify  and  simplify  its  use,  thereby  improving  the 
implementation of the principles of availability and of equivalent access. 

This would be achieved through: 

  Adaptations to the SFD to remove references to "other" cases and also remove the forms for 

information exchange (two annexes of the SFD); 

  Commission Guidelines clarifying the data sets available for possible exchange; 
  Clarification of the scope of operations to which the SFD applies86. 

Policy option  1.3:  Option  1.2 + provisions ensuring compliance with deadlines requirements 
by  which  data  is  to  be  made  available  to  another  Member  State  (including  when  a  judicial 
authorisation is required) 

Based on the Council guidance, the Schengen evaluations in the field of police cooperation, and on 
the  Study'  findings,  the  policy  option  1.3  will  cover  option  1.2  and  extend  the  revision  of  the 
Swedish Framework Decision to ensuring compliance with deadlines requirements by which data is 
to be made available to another Member State (including when a judicial authorisation is required). 

5.2.2.  5.2.2.  Objective II: Ensure that all Member States have an effective functioning Single 
Point of Contact (SPOC), including when a judicial authorisation is required to provide 
the  data  upon  request  of  another  Member  State,  and  ensuring  its  effective  cooperation 
with Police and Customs Cooperation Centres (PCCCs)  

Policy option 2.1: Continue with Council non-binding guidelines on Single Points of Contact + 
new flanking soft measures (training, financial support, Commission guidance)  

Based on the Council guidance, the Schengen evaluations in the field of police cooperation, and on 
the Study  findings, the policy  option  2.1 will limit  itself to  supporting measures to  improve the 
effective and efficient role of SPOCs/PCCCs and any other relevant structures.  

Recommendations  (Commission  Guidance  – 'soft law') would be made with  a view to  support 
Member States  in setting up and developing  common requirements  for  modern case management 
systems (CMS). This would include: 

  Guidance  on  a  list  of  possible  common  requirements  for  the  functionalities  of  the  Case 

Management System (CMS), e.g.: 
o  Degrees of urgency should be linked with a deadline (e.g. when a deadline draws near, 

automated alerts should be triggered); 

86 i.e., the explicit coverage of the prevention and detection of criminal offences (as in CISA). 

25 

 
 
 
                                                                 
o  Selection (in a multiple-choice list by the requesting Member State) and cancellation of 

the degrees of urgency should be done manually; 

o  One CMS for receiving, sending and dispatching messages (follow up, manage, store and 
exploit  the  international  exchange  of  information).  The  Universal  Message  Format 
(UMF) is to be used87; 

o  The  Case  Management  System  (CMS)  should  be  able  to  import  and  export  incoming 
messages  from  e-mail,  documents  or  web  applications  to  reduce  the  number  of 
registration acts to the minimum; 

o  Clear  identification  of  the  case  and  its  components:  within  the  case  (unique  case 
number), all documents and acts should be clearly identified. The CMS should be able to 
make  links  between  persons/objects;  per  item  –  per  act;  author,  date  and  time.  This 
should be done automatically on the basis of the user profile; 

o  Automation of data cross-check, e.g. through improved search tools and the adoption of 

o 

transliteration and “fuzzy logic” search; 
further  coordination  between  the  SPOCs  and  the  PCCCs  (and  other  relevant  bodies) 
through the interconnectivity between their respective CMSs; 
o  Generation of necessary statistics for national analytical needs. 

  Guidance  on  accreditation  of  the  CMS  (security  needs,  security  check  for  data  access,  data 
protection,  handling  codes,  confidentiality,  access  rights  by  different  units  and  to  EU 
databases); 

  Guidance on quality control: Through subject-based registration and the use of structured and 
mandatory fields and multiple-choice lists, certain quality requirements can be met beforehand 
without needing to conduct additional checks afterwards; 

  Guidance on availability of technical support; 
  Training on CMS use. 

Updating  existing  Council  guidelines  in  view  to  achieve  further  approximation  of  practices  will 
require  an  active  support  from  the  Member  States  given  national  specificities  and  related 
technicalities. IT upgrades would require financial supports. 

Policy  option  2.2:  Approximation  of  minimum  standards  on  the  composition  of  the  Single 
Points of Contact (including when a judicial authorisation is required), its functions, staffing 
and  IT  systems,  and  its  cooperation  with  regional  structures  such  as  Police  and  Customs 
Cooperation Centres + new flanking soft measures (as in option 2.1) 

Based on the Council' guidance, the Schengen evaluations in the field of police cooperation, and on 
the  Study'  findings,  the  policy  option  2.2  will  ensure  the  approximation  of  common  minimum 
requirements regarding the SPOCs/PCCCs' (and any other relevant bodies) environment (structure, 
composition,  role,  IT  capabilities  and  staffing).  These  common  minumum  requirements  ('hard 
law') will cover:  

  Establishment  of  the  SPOC  as  a  "one  stop  shop"  for  LEA  cooperation  through  common 

minimum standards. A SPOC should:  

o  Be,  at  the  minimum,  informed  about  all  international  law  enforcement  cooperation 
requests  dealt  with  at  national  level,  and,  in  addition,  be  established  as  the  preferred 
hub to handle intra-EU law enforcement cooperation requests; 
o  Operate 24/7 (including when a judicial authorisation is required); 

87  The  UMF  defines  standards  for  cross-border  information  exchange  between  information  systems,  authorities  or 

organisations. This ensures an effective data processing across information systems. 

26 

 
 
                                                                 
o  Have full access  to  all relevant  EU and international  law enforcement  databases (i.e. 
Schengen  Information  System  (SIS),  Europol  databases,  INTERPOL  databases  and 
software applications; 

o  Be  connected  to  Europol  SIENA  (for  intra-EU  cases),  INTERPOL  I24/7  (for  cases 

o 

involving third countries having no access to Europol SIENA) and SIS;  
Involve  staff  in  the  SPOC  who  have  full  access  to  all  relevant  national  case 
management systems (including  those managed by customs and border guards where 
relevant); 

o  Ensure that all relevant information from the Police and Customs Cooperation Centres 

(PCCCs) is integrated in the SPOC information system; 

o  Have  arrangements  for  indirect  (e.g.  on  a  hit/no  hit  basis),  but  quick,  effective  and 
efficient access to relevant databases of other authorities or bodies (including customs, 
border guards and tax authorities where relevant); 

o  Ensure  further  coordination  between  the  SPOCs  and  the  PCCCs  and  other  relevant 
entities  through  the  interconnectivity  between  the  national  SPOC  and  the  national 
PCCCs (and any other equivalent bodies) Case Management Systems. 

  Establishment of new provisions on the skills of law enforcement officials working primarily 

on international cases: 

o  Provision  on  appropriate  English  skills  as  a  criterion  ("entry  criterion")  for  specific 
roles  within  certain  law  enforcement  agencies  working  primarily  on  international 
cases; 

o  Provision  on  mandatory  training  on  EU  law  enforcement  cooperation  for  officials  in 
specific  roles  relevant  for  cross-border  law  enforcement  and  at  specific  levels  (e.g. 
newcomers/senior officials). 

  Establishment of flanking soft measures in the form of training measures: 

o  Establishment  of  an  awareness  raising  and  training  campaign  within  the  EU  law 

enforcement community; 

o  CEPOL to provide training material to law enforcement agencies (e.g. on how to use 
EU databases efficiently). The training material should focus on aspects common to all 
the Member States. The Member States would need to prepare additional training on 
the specificities in the individual country; 

o  CEPOL to provide voluntary induction training on cross-border law enforcement; 
o  Expansion  of  the  existing  CEPOL  practice  to  provide  online  courses  on  an  ad-hoc 

basis on new EU level developments; 

o  Performance of a regular review of the training content provided by CEPOL. 

  Establishment of common minimum requirements for Case Management Systems (CMS) for 
the SPOCs/PCCCs and other equivalent bodies (see policy option 2.1 where these measures 
would only be proposed as non-binding guidance). 

Policy  option  2.3:  harmonisation  of  rules  on  the  composition  of  the  Single  Points  of  Contact 
(including  when  a  judicial  authorisation  is  required),  its  functions,  staffing  and  IT  systems, 
and its cooperation with regional structures such as Police and Customs Cooperation Centres 
+ new flanking soft measures (as in option 2.1) 

Based on the Council' guidance, the Schengen evaluations in the field of police cooperation, and on 
the  Study'  findings,  the  policy  option  2.3  will  ensure  the  harmonisation  of  rules  regarding  the 
SPOCs/PCCCs'  (and  any  other  relevant  bodies)  environment  (structure,  composition,  role,  IT 
capabilities and staffing). 

This option will cover the same measures as described in policy option  2.2. The legal provisions 
would however be more precise where relevant. Such harmonisation would be carried out through 

27 

 
 
a proposal for a Regulation and would consequently offer the advantage to impose an "EU model" 
for information exchange. 

Contrary  to  option  2.2,  where  Member  States  would  retain  the  possibility  to  chose  how  to  best 
implement common minimum requirements and decide to go beyond them where they see fit, the 
harmonisation  by  means  of  a  Regulation  would  bind  Member  States  not  only  regarding  the 
objectives to be achieved but also with regards to the means to achieve them.  

Consequently, the impact of options 2.2 and 2.3 on Member States would thus differ considerably. 
The Regulation would also be directly applicable.  

Measures covered by option 2.3 (Regulation) and not by option 2.2 (Directive) would notably seek 
to  define  a  detailed  check  list  of  features  for  SPOCs,  PCCCs  and  for  their  Case  Management 
System (beyond com mon minimum requirements); e.g.: 

o  Requirement to set up a front desk at SPOC to determine which office/contact point 

will deal with the incoming request; 

o  Requirement to determine the priority level of the request at the Front Desk; 

o  Empower  the  SPOC  management  to  impose  an  arbitrage  in  case  of  disagreement 

between law enforcement authorities composing the SPOC;  

o  Requirement  to  set  up  the  SPOC  in  a  secure  working  environment,  including  high 
level  of  security  and  safety  of  the  premises  and  is  equipped  with  back-up  power 
systems; 

o  Requirement for the SPOC to use of the Universal Message Format as a standard for 

structured, cross-border information exchange; 

o  mandatory  development  of  fuzzy  search  (notably  multi-category  search,  partial 

search, any name search) and transliteration tools; 

o  automated  attribution  of  a  single  registration  number  to  every  case,  unique  for  the 

involved cooperation channels such as SIRENE, INTERPOL, Europol, etc.; 

o  Case  Management  System  able  to  import  and  export  incoming  messages  from  e-
mail, documents or web applications to reduce the number of registration acts to the 
minimum. The same could apply to the exportation of generated messages; 

o  Requirements regarding the training of staff... 

5.2.3.  5.2.3.  Objective  III:  To  remedy  the  proliferation  of  communication  channels  used  for 
law  enforcement  information  exchange  between  Member  States  while  empowering 
Europol  as  the  EU  criminal  information  hub  for  offences  falling  within  its  mandate 
(unless otherwise regulated by EU law)  

Policy option 3.1: Continue with Council non-binding guidelines and Recommendations to put 
Europol  in copy when using SIENA88 in cases within Europol' mandate + new  flanking soft 
measures (training, financial support) 

Policy option 3.1 will limit itself to supporting measures to improve the effective and efficient use 
of  SIENA.  They  will  mandate  Europol  with  training  in  the  use  of  SIENA  and  support  Member 
States'  effort  notably  through  funding.  The  following  non-legislative  improvements  to  SIENA 
would also be recommended: 

88 Europol's "Secure Information Exchange Network Application". 

28 

 
 
                                                                 
  Establishment  of  new,  simpler  and  more  user-friendly  forms  (e.g.  design  and  accessibility, 
types  of  information  required  and  clarifications  and  wording,  multiple-choice  alternatives, 
removal  of  references  to  "other  cases")  and  implementation  of  these  in  SIENA.  The  forms 
should include factual reasons for the information request; 

  Extension of the functionalities of SIENA, such as the introduction of an automated display of 

a hit/no hit indication (plus a possibility to request further information). 

Updating  existing  Council  guidelines  in  view  to  achieve  further  approximation  of  practices  will 
require  an  active  support  from  the  Member  States  given  national  specificities  and  related 
technicalities. 

Policy  option  3.2:  Obligation  to  use  SIENA  as  the  preferred  communication  channel  + 
obligation  to  put  Europol  in  copy  when  using  SIENA  in  cases  within  Europol's  mandate  + 
new  flanking soft measures (as in option 3.1) 

Policy option 3.2 will clarify existing guidelines on the preferred channels of communication. These 
provisions will cover: 

  Establishment  of  the  information  channel  to  be  used:  Establishment  of  SIENA  as  the 
preferred channel of communication for information exchange in an intra-EU context, while 
maintaining  Member  States’  possibility  to  choose  another  communication  channel. 
INTERPOL  I24/7  should  be  used  in  cases  where  third  countries  are  involved  in  the 
exchange of information. SIENA would need to be monitored 24/7 at national level. There 
would  also  be  an  obligation  to  put  Europol  in  copy  in  cases  concerning  information 
exchange within Europol's mandate. 

Policy option  3.3:  obligation to use SIENA by default for all bilateral  information exchange 
(unless  otherwise  regulated  by  EU  law)  +  obligation  to  put  Europol  in  copy  when  in  cases 
within Europol's mandate, both after the end of a transition period and with Internal Security 
Fund support for the SIENA roll-out + new flanking soft measures (as in option 3.1) 

With Policy option 3.3, Europol SIENA will become the mandatory channel of communication by 
default  for  police  cooperation89  between  EU  Member  States90  (excluding  those  situations  where 
other channels are required by EU law, e.g. SIS). This means that for cases that only have an EU 
dimension or in  relation to  which it is  not (yet) clear if they also  concern third countries, SIENA 
should be used as channel for information exchange91. 

This obligation will only come into force after a necessary transition period allowing the full roll-
out of SIENA to all relevant end users. Funding will be made available to support Member States 
necessary IT upgrades. Additional (flanking) measures correspond to policy option 3.1.  

5.3. Options discarded at an early stage 
Following  the  consultation  of  stakeholders,  the  Commission  discarded92  the  option  of  expanding 
legislative changes to the 1998 Naples II Convention on mutual assistance and cooperation between 

89 This would not affect the work and cooperation of intelligence services. 
90  Member  States  will  no  longer  be  able  to  choose  another communication  channel.  Exceptions  would  be  considered 

under clearly defined circumstances. 

91 SIENA is used by 20.000 SIENA end-users (originating from 2.300 law enforcement authorities). 1.3 million SIENA 
messages were exchanged in 2020. The number of SIENA messages only continues to increase. In the first six months 
of this year, SIENA has experienced a strong increase of 26% when compared to the same period last year (note that 
COVID has not slowed down the exchanges). 

92 Additional discarded options can be found in annex 7. 

29 

 
 
                                                                 
customs  administrations.  This  decision  has  been  taken  in  view  of  necessity  and  proportionality 
considerations, customs cooperation being mostly of administrative nature. 

Customs  administrations  are  nevertheless  fully  covered  as  competent  authorities  under  the 
objectives of this initiative with a view to improve cooperation between relevant law enforcement 
authorities (notably against tax crimes e.g. tobacco smuggling): 

  Objective  I:  Customs  administrations  are  competent  under  the  Swedish  Framework 
Decision.  Its  revision  by  means  of  a  Directive  thus  covers  its  use  by  customs 
administrations; 

  Objective II: customs administrations are to become part of the SPOC where this is not yet 
the case and where relevant. This includes necessary access to relevant customs databases 
and  case  management  system  (also  in  Police  and  Customs  Cooperation  Centres  –  where 
they exist); 

  Objective III: customs administrations, as part of the SPOC, are to use Europol SIENA by 
default when engaging with another Member State and copy Europol when concerning an 
offence within Europol's mandate.  

6.  6. WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? 

This  chapter  assesses  all  policy  options  identified  in  section  5.2  against  the  baseline  options 
identified  in  section  5.1.  Given  that  the  baseline  scenario  is  evidently  unsuited  to  address  the 
problems  identified  in  chapter  2  (problem  definition),  this  impact  assessment  will  not  assess  the 
baseline scenario any further93. 

These  impacts  cover  a  wide  range  of  parameters,  including  effectiveness,  efficiency,  EU  added 
value,  proportionality  and  coherence.  These  criteria  are  further  elaborated  upon  regarding  the 
combined preferred option. 

No  direct  environmental  and  economic  impacts  were  clearly  identified  per  policy  option. 
Nevertheless, the following high-level impacts could be mentioned: 

  Environmental impact: A small negative impact is expected on the environment due to the 
expected  increase  in  electricity  consumption  in  relation  to  computers  and  servers  used  for 
information exchange. 

  Economic impact: Immediate economic impacts of any of the above options will be limited 
to the design, development and operation of the new processes. The costs will fall to the EU 
budget and to Member State authorities operating the systems. They will vary depending on 
the Member States national specificities and needs. ISF94 funding will be made available to 
support Member States necessary IT upgrades. The proposed measures may have a positive 
impact on small and medium-sized enterprises given the need for IT-related products. An 
indirect  positive  economic  impact  could  be  found  in  a  more  effective  fight  against 
counterfeited good, thereby better protecting SMEs' intellectual property rights. 

93 The baseline scenario is expected to, one the one hand, have a small positive impact as regards the achievement of the 
horizontal objective. It will have no identified impact on  objective I (alignment with the LED excluded). Regarding 
objective  II,  the  current  differences  between  the  national  set-ups  are  expected  to  continue  to  exist  and  hamper  the 
level  playing  field  between  Member  States.  Regarding  objective  III,  Europol  is  expected  to  make  further 
improvements  to  SIENA,  potentially  doubling  the  number  of  users.  However,  this  will  not  adequately  address  the 
current and expected future challenges. 

94 Internal Security Fund 2021-27. With an overall budget of EUR 1.9 billion, the Internal Security Fund, will finance 
actions  in  the  field  of  fight  against  terrorism  and  radicalisation,  serious  and  organised  crime,  cybercrime  and  the 
protection of victims. Member States will implement the largest share of the allocation through multiannual national 
programmes.  In  addition  to  this,  the  Commission  will  also  implement  actions  of  particular  EU  value;  the  Union 
actions. 

30 

 
 
                                                                 
6.1.  Fundamental Right expected impacts  

The provisions on data protection and privacy contained in the 2006 Swedish Framework Decision 
(SFD) are outdated. The full alignment with the 2016 Data Protection Law Enforcement Directive 
(LED) is a legal obligation. This is relevant with regard to Article 7 (Respect for private and family 
life) and Article 8 (Protection of personal data) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In line 
with that,  the Commission committed in a 2020 Communication to "make a legislative proposal, 
which as a minimum will entail an amendment of Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA to 
ensure the necessary data protection alignment, in the last quarter of 2021 95.  

The  sharing  of  information  between  Law  Enforcement  Authorities  has  a  potential  impact  on 
Fundamental  Rights.  This  concerns  the  Articles  2  (Right  to  life),  3  (Right  to  the  integrity  of  the 
person), 6 (Right to liberty), 17 (Right to property) and 45 (Freedom of movement and of residence) 
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 

Data  protection  impact:  EU  institutions  and  Member  States  are  bound  to  the  Charter  of 
Fundamental  Rights  of  the  EU  when  they  implement  EU  law  (Article  51(1)  of  the  Charter).  The 
options presented in this impact assessment need to be balanced with the obligation to ensure that 
interferences  with  Fundamental  Rights  that  may  derive  from  them  are  limited  to  what  is  strictly 
necessary to  genuinely  meet  the objectives of  general interest  pursued,  subject  to  the principle  of 
proportionality (Article 52(1) of the Charter).  

Exchange  of  information  has  an  impact  on  the  right  of  protection  of  personal  data.  The  latter  is 
established  by  Article  8  of  the  Charter  and  Article  16  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the 
European Union. As underlined by the Court of Justice  of the EU96, the right  to  the protection of 
personal data is not an absolute right, but must be considered in relation to its function in society. 
Data protection is closely linked to respect for private and family life, protected by Article 7 of the 
Charter, and in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.  

No potential harmful effect of the policy options on other Fundamental Rights has been identified, 
as the impact of these policy options is limited to impacts on the right to the protection of personal 
data. 
The Law Enforcement Data Protection Directive 2016/680 (LED)97 already applies to personal 
data  processing  activities  carried  out  on  the  basis  of  the  SFD.  The  revision  of  the  Swedish 
Framework  Decision  will  ensure  its  explicit  alignment  with  the  LED.  It  will  contain  a  new 
provision stating that the legal instrument is without prejudice to the LED. The application of the 
Law  Enforcement  Data  Protection  Directive  remains  a  matter  of  national  competence  when 
applying EU law. Concerning data protection, national law transposing the Law Enforcement Data 
Protection Directive are applicable to data exchanges between Member States. 

The SFD will be aligned with the 2016 Law Enforcement Data Protection Directive (as part of the 
baseline scenario) thereby ensuring the high level of data protection provided by the wider EU data 
protection regime. While maintaining the specific data protection safeguards already provided for in 
the  SFD,  the  alignment  with  the  Law  Enforcement  Data  Protection  Directive  will  provide  the 
necessary safeguards for the cooperation between police authorities in the EU. 

95  COM(2020)262,  Way  forward  on  aligning  the  former  third  pillar  acquis  with  data  protection  rules.  As  per  this 
Communication, the alignment of the SFD with the 2016 Law Enforcement Data Protection Directive will:  

 
 

specify the types of personal data that can be exchanged; 
further  clarify  the  safeguards:  in  particular  the  requirement  of  a  necessity  and  proportionality  assessment  of 
each information exchange; 

  make  reference  to  the  applicability  of  the  Law  Enforcement  Data  Protection  Directive  and  the  high  level  of 

protection that is provides. 

96 Court of Justice of the EU, Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert (2010). 
97 Directive (EU) 2016/680, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016. 

31 

 
 
                                                                 
Taken  together,  this  will  provide  all  the  necessary  safeguards.  As  the  Law  Enforcement  Data 
Protection Directive provides the required level of data protection in the Union, there is no need to 
go beyond it. Instead, the alignment will ensure full consistency with the wider EU data protection 
rules. 

Each of the options meet an objective of general interest, which is the safeguarding of the internal 
security of the European Union. Therefore, for each option,  the impact  on  Fundamental  Rights is 
assessed based on necessity of the measure and its proportionality to the objective. 

The impacts are assessed on a scale ranging from 'highly positive impact' (+++) to 'highly negative 
impact'  (---),  with  intermediate  scores:  'significant  positive  impact'  (++),  'significant  negative 
impact' (--), 'low positive impact' (+), 'low negative impact' (-), 'neutral – no impact' (0). 

More specifically, it should be noted that various elements considered under this legal proposal may 
have different impacts on fundamental rights, as outlined below. 

Legal barriers 

Adaptations  to  the  2006  Swedish  Framework  Decision,  notably  Article  8  on  data  protection,  to 
ensure  alignment  with  the  LED  are  expected  to  positively  impact  safeguarding  citizens' 
fundamental rights. 

Moreover, a number of additional, targeted procedural safeguards would be introduced by the new 
legislative instruments which may have a positive impact on the citizens' right to the protection 
of personal data: 

  The establishment of new provisions ensuring compliance with the deadlines by which data 
are to be made available to another Member State may have a positive impact  on citizens' 
Fundamental Rights. Indeed, possible suspects who are being wrongfully accused of crimes 
are expected to be cleared faster. This is expected to improve safeguarding, for instance, the 
citizens' right to liberty, freedom of movement and of residence; 

  The provision on training and updated guidance for officials in relation to the access to and 
exchange  of  information  may  increase  the  efficiency  of  law  enforcement  cooperation 
processes.  This  is  also  expected  to  contribute  to  potentially  clear  citizens  from  wrongful 
charges in a swifter fashion; 

  The  clear  establishment  of  SIENA  as  the  mandatory  information  channel  to  be  used  by 
default is expected to have a positive impact by minimising the opportunities for officials to 
"fish"  for  specific  information  that  could  compromise  suspects'  Fundamental  Rights. 
Furthermore,  the  use  of  SIENA  for  information  exchange  between  Member  States  will 
improve  the  safeguard  of  data  protection  standards  given  the  state-of-the-art  security  and 
built-in data protection parameters SIENA offers; 

  A modern SPOC, equipped with a proper information management architecture, will be able 

to track access to databases thereby ensuring proper use. 

  The removal of references to "other" cases in the SFD is also expected to positively impact 
on  safeguarding  fundamental  rights,  as  it  may  contribute  to  reducing  the  likelihood  of 
unsolicited  information  about  citizens  is  being  exchanged  between  Member  States. 
Moreover,  by  removing  the  category  "other"  cases,  all  cases  would  either  be  "urgent"  or 
"non-urgent". This is expected to speed up the process of requesting information and, thus, 
could have a positive impact on citizens' Fundamental Rights. 

Technical barriers 

At the technical level, there are potential risks to Fundamental Rights in relation to the use of Case 
Management Systems (CMSs) by SPOCs. The measures considered aims to address existing risks 
by  introducing  common  requirements  for  the  functionalities  of  the  CMSs  run  by  SPOCs,  e.g. 
establishing one CMS for receiving, sending and dispatching messages. This is expected to reduce 

32 

 
 
the number of  cases in  which case management is  distributed across several  platforms and layers 
which, in turn, is expected to reduce the risk of officials unduly being able to access and exchange 
information.  

Moreover, improvements  with  regard to  the clear identification of the case and its components in 
the  CMS  are  expected  to  positively  impact  on  citizens'  Fundamental  Rights.  The  likelihood  of 
confusing cases and, as a consequence access and exchange unsolicited information is expected to 
be more limited than in the baseline scenario. 

The  introduction  of  a  need  for  an  accreditation  of  Member  States'  CMS  with  regard  to  security 
needs, security check for data access, data protection, handling codes, confidentiality, access rights 
by different  units and to EU databases is  expected to  positively impact  Fundamental  Rights.  Law 
enforcement authorities' IT systems are a prime target for hackers and, thus, under constant scrutiny 
with regard to their security and potential to ensure citizens' privacy. Therefore, the accreditation of 
CMS  satisfying  certain  technical  minimum  quality  criteria  is  expected  to  add  an  additional 
safeguard  for  IT  systems  being  compromised  by  criminals.  Other  safeguards  are  ensured  by  the 
Member  States  as  per  their  transposition  of  the  Law  Enforcement  Data  Protection  Directive 
2016/680 (LED). 

Structural barriers 

At the structural level, the measures envisaged ensure that SPOCs are, at the minimum, informed 
about  all  international  law  enforcement  cooperation  requests  dealt  with  at  national  level,  and,  in 
addition, established as the preferred hub to handle intra-EU law enforcement cooperation requests. 
The increased ability and role of the SPOCs to coordinate law enforcement cooperation is expected 
to  have  a  positive  impact  on  citizens'  Fundamental  Rights,  since  cases  can  be  administered  more 
swiftly and discretely without multiple authorities being unduly involved in the processes. 

At the same time, however, providing SPOCs via the involvement of different types of eligible law 
enforcement officials with full access to EU and international law enforcement databases could be 
regarded by some stakeholders (e.g. Non-Governmental Organisations) as an excessive measure in 
view  of  providing  law  enforcement  authorities  with  only  the  necessary  access  to  information. 
Similar to the argumentation in relation to the legal and technical barriers, additional and updated 
training on EU law enforcement cooperation (including by CEPOL) is expected to increase citizens' 
Fundamental  Rights  thus  effectively  and  efficiently  mitigating  the  risk  of  unnecessary  and 
disproportionate access to personal data. 

Problem 1: Rules at national level impede the effective and efficient flow of information 

6.2.Objective  I:  Facilitate  equivalent  access  for  law  enforcement  authorities  to  information 
held  in  another  Member  State,  while  complying  with  fundamental  rights  and  data 
protection requirements 

Policy Option 1.1: New flanking soft measures (training, Commission guidance) 

1. Impact on citizens and businesses [+] 

Expected impact of policy option 1.1 

 

Low positive impact to the security of the European citizens and societies. The simplification/clarification in 
both  the  scope  and  the  use  of  the  Swedish  Framework  Decision  and  supporting  soft  measures  would 
marginally  support  Member  States  to  more  effectively  counter  any  forms  of  criminal  offences.  This  would 
also marginally reduce undue delays in the information sharing. 

2. Impact on national authorities [+] 

 

Low  positive  impact  on  national  authorities,  which  could  marginally  contribute  to  efficiently  combat 
criminal  offences,  because  of  the  simplification/clarification  in  the  scope  and  use  of  the  Swedish  Framework 
Decision and the adoption of supporting soft measures.  

 

A low negative impact would be a possible marginal workoad increase for national SPOCs. 

33 

 
 
 
3. Impact on EU bodies [+] 

 

The adoption of supporting soft measures would marginally contribute to increase the quality and quantity of 
information shared with Europol. 

4. Effectiveness in meeting the policy objectives [+]  

 

This policy option would marginally address the objective of facilitating the implementation of the principle of 
equivalent  access  to  information  and  intelligence  held  in  another  Member  State  while  complying  with 
fundamental  rights  and  data  protection  requirements.  If  the  later  would  be  fully  covered  such  would  be  the 
case for the former. 

 

The better respect of deadlines, including when a judicial authorisation is required, would not be ensured.  

5. Efficiency in meeting the policy objectives [++]  

 

 

 

This option may generate cost at EU and Member States. 

The extent of these costs may vary depending on the nature and scale of the soft measures. 

Some of  these  costs  would  already  be covered  by relevant  EU  agencies  as  part  of  their support  functions  to 
Member States (e.g. training). They don't outweight benefits. 

6. Legal feasibility [++] 

 

This policy option will require changes to the 2006 Swedish Framework Decision. It ensures the respect of the 
conferral of powers and of fundamental rights. 

7. technical feasibility [+++] 

 

This  policy  option  would  be  technically  feasible.  Member  States  would  need  to  take  the  necessary  steps  to 
ensure the implementation of updated guidances and related trainings. 

8. Coherence with other measures [+]  

 

This  policy  option  would  marginally  complement  other  Commission  initiatives  such  as  the  Commission 
proposals for a new Schengen border code, for Prüm II on automated information exchange and for Europol. 

Policy option 1.2: Option 1.1 + simplification in the use of the SFD +  improve clarity on the 
national data sets available for possible exchange 

1. Impact on citizens and businesses [++] 

Expected impact of policy option 1.2 

 

Significant positive impact to the security of the European citizens and societies. On top of option 1.1, the 
simplication in the use of the SFD and improved clarity on the national data sets available to law enforcement 
authorities  of  other  Member  States  would  significantly  support  Member  States  to  more  effectively  counter 
any forms of criminal offences. This would also moderately reduce undue delays in the information sharing.  

2. Impact on national authorities [++] 

 

 

Significant  positive  impact  on  national  authorities,  which  could  significantly  contribute  to  efficiently 
combat criminal offences, because of the swifter information exchange.  

A moderate negative impact would be a possible moderate workoad increase for national SPOCs. 

3. Impact on EU bodies [++] 

  On  top  of  option  1.1,  the  simplication  in  the  use  of  the  SFD  and  improved  clarity  on  the  national  data  sets 
available  for  possible  exchange  would  significantly  contribute  to  increase  the  quality  and  quantity  of 
information shared with Europol. 

4. Effectiveness in meeting the policy objectives [++]  

 

This  policy  option  would  significantly  facilitate  the  implementation  of  the  principle  of  equivalent  access  to 
information and intelligence held in another Member State while complying with fundamental rights and data 
protection requirements. 

 

The respect of deadlines, including when a judicial authorisation is required, will not be ensured. 

5. Efficiency in meeting the policy objectives [++]  

 

 

As option 1.1 + option 1.2 which would generate costs for a number of Member States.  

These  costs  will  vary  significantly  depending  on  the  national  solution  considered  by  the  concerned  Member 
States. They don't outweight benefits. 

6. Legal feasibility [++] 

34 

 
 
 
 
 

This  policy  option  will  require  changes  to  the  Swedish  Framework  Decision.  It  ensures  the  respect  of  the 
conferral of powers and of fundamental rights. 

7. technical feasibility [+++] 

 

This  policy  option  would  be  technically  feasible.  Member  States  would  need  to  take  the  necessary  steps  to 
ensure the implementation of new legal provisions.  

8. Coherence with other measures [++]  

 

This  policy  option  would  significantly  complement  other  Commission  initiatives  such  as  the  Commission 
proposals for a new Schengen border code, for Prüm II and for Europol. 

Policy option 1.3: Option 1.2 + provisions ensuring compliance with deadline requirements by 
which  data  is  to  be  made  available  to  another  Member  State  (including  when  a  judicial 
authorisation is required) 

1. Impact on citizens and businesses [+++] 

Expected impact of policy option 1.3 

  Highly  positive  impact  to  the  security  of  the  European  citizens  and  societies.  On  top  of  option  1.2, 
provisions ensuring compliance with deadlines requirements by which data is to be made available to another 
Member  State,  including  when  a  judicial  authorisation  is  required,  would  highly  support  Member  States  to 
more  effectively  counter  any  forms  of  criminal  offences.  This  would  also  cleary  reduce  undue  delays  in  the 
information sharing.  

2. Impact on national authorities [+++] 

  Highly positive impact on national authorities, which could highly contribute to efficiently combat criminal 
offences, because of the provisions ensuring compliance with deadlines, including when a judicial authorisation 
is required.  

 

A  significant  negative  impact  would  be  a  possible  significant  workoad  pressure  for  national  SPOCs  to 
deliver in a timely fashion. 

3. Impact on EU bodies [+++] 

  On  top  of  option  1.2,  the  the  provisions  ensuring  compliance  with  deadlines,  including  when  a  judicial 

authorisation is required would highly contribute to facilitate the timely support of Europol. 

4. Impact on fundamental rights [++] 

 
 

Siginificant positive impact. 
Compliance with the deadlines by which data are to be made available to another Member State is often not 
ensured.  One  of  the  negative  consequences  could  be  that  citizens  who  are  (wrongfully)  subject  to  criminal 
investigations are not cleared from pending charges as swiftly as possible. This option would address that.  

5. Effectiveness in meeting the policy objectives [+++]  

  Highly  positive  impact.  This  policy  option  would  clearly  address  the  objective  of  facilitating  the 
implementation  of  the  principle  of  equivalent  access  to  information  and  intelligence  held  in  another  Member 
State  while  complying  with  fundamental  rights  and  data  protection  requirements.  The  better  respect  of 
deadlines, including when a judicial authorisation is required, would be ensured. 

6. Efficiency in meeting the policy objectives [++]  

 

 

As option 1.2 + option 1.3 which would generate costs for a number of Member States.  

These  costs  would  vary  significantly  depending  on  the  solution  adopted  by  the  concerned  Member  States  to 
ensure the functional availability of a judicial authority. They don't outweight benefits. 

7. Legal feasibility [++] 

 

This  policy  option  will  require  changes  to  the  Swedish  Framework  Decision.  It  ensures  the  respect  of  the 
conferral of powers and of fundamental rights. 

8. technical feasibility [+++] 

 

This  policy  option  would  be  technically  feasible.  Member  States  would  need  to  take  the  necessary  steps  to 
ensure the implementation of new legal provisions. 

9. Coherence with other measures [+++]  

  Highly  positive  impact.  This policy  option would  clearly  complement other  Commission  initiatives  such  as 

the Commission proposals for a new Schengen border code, for Prüm II and for Europol. 

35 

 
 
 
 
 
Problem  2:  Structures  and  IT  systems  at  national  level  are  not  set  up  and  equipped  in  a 
sufficiently efficient and effective manner 

6.3.Objective II: Ensure that all Member States have an effective functioning Single Point of 
Contact (SPOC), including when a judicial  authorisation is  required to provide the data 
upon request of another Member State, and ensuring its effective cooperation with Police 
and Customs Cooperation Centres (PCCCs) 

Policy option 2.1: Continue with Council non-binding guidelines on Single Points of Contact + 
new flanking soft measures (training, financial support, Commission guidance)  

1. Impact on citizens and businesses [+] 

Expected impact of policy option 2.1 

 

Low positive impact to the security of the European citizens and societies. The adoption and development of 
soft  measures  would  marginally  support  Member  States  to  more  effectively  counter  any  forms  of  criminal 
offences. This would also marginally reduce undue delays in the information sharing.  

2. Impact on national authorities [+] 

 

 

Low  positive  impact  on  national  authorities,  which  could  marginally  contribute  to  efficiently  combat 
criminal offences, because of the adoption and development of support measures.  

A  low  negative  impact  would  be  a  possible  marginal  workoad  increase  for  national  SPOCs  however 
marginally offset by the improvements the soft measures would bring. 

3. Impact on EU bodies [+] 

 

The adoption and development of support measures would marginally contribute to increase the quality and 
quantity of information shared with Europol. 

4. Impact on fundamental rights [+] 

 

Low positive impact. Possible guidance on the implementation of the 2016 law enforcement data protection 
Directive  (LED)  at  national  level  would  better  safeguard  the  Right  to  respect  for  private  and  family  life  and 
the Right to protection of personal data. They would not have additional capabilities in data processing. 

5. Effectiveness in meeting the policy objectives [+]  

 

This  policy  option  would  marginally  address  the  objective  of  an  effective  functioning  of  the  SPOCs,  PCCCs 
(and any other equivalents bodies).  

  Given national specificities, actual progress would essentially be left to Member States' ability and wilingness 

to diligently follow up on updated guidances.  

  Member  States  developments  may  not  be  aligned,  thereby  further  deepening  existing  differences  in  the 

functionning of the SPOC, PCCCs and any other equivalent bodies. 

6. Efficiency in meeting the policy objectives [++]  

 

 

 

This option may generate cost at EU and Member States. 

The extent of these costs may vary depending on the nature and scale of the soft measures. 

Some of  these  costs  would  already  be covered by relevant  EU  agencies  as  part  of  their support  functions  to 
Member States (e.g. training). They don't outweight benefits. 

7. Legal feasibility [0] 

 

This  policy option  would require  no  legal  changes. It  is de  facto  in  line  the conferral of  powers  and  with  the 
respects of fundamental rights. 

8. technical feasibility [+] 

 

This policy option would be technically feasible. Its extent would depend on the level of ambition and on the 
technical requirements needed at national level. 

9. Coherence with other measures [+]  

 

This  policy  option  would  marginally  complement  other  Commission  initiatives  such  as  the  Commission 
proposals for a new Schengen border code, for Prüm II and for Europol. 

Policy  option  2.2:  Approximation  of  minimum  standards  on  the  composition  of  the  Single 
Points of Contact (including when a judicial authorisation is required), its functions, staffing 

36 

 
 
 
 
and  IT  systems,  and  its  cooperation  with  regional  structures  such  as  Police  and  Customs 
Cooperation Centres + new flanking soft measures (as in option 2.1) 

1. Impact on citizens and businesses [++] 

Expected impact of policy option 2.2 

 

Significant  positive  impact  to  the  security  of  the  European  citizens  and  societies.  The  approximation  of 
common minimum standards in the functioning of the SPOCs, PCCCs and any other equivalent bodies would 
significantly support  Member States  to  more  effectively counter  any  forms  of  criminal offences.  This  would 
also significantly reduce undue delays in the information sharing.  

2. Impact on national authorities [++] 

 

 

Significant positive impact on national authorities, which could significantly contribute to efficiently combat 
criminal  offences,  because  of  what  the  approximation  of  common  minimum  standards  would  bring  in  the 
functioning of the SPOCs, PCCCs and any other equivalent bodies. It would also facilitate the link with judicial 
authorities whenever judicial authorisation is needed. 

A  negative  impact  would  be  a  likely  workoad  increase  for  national  SPOCs  however  offset  by  the 
improvements the approximation of common minimum standards would bring. 

3. Impact on EU bodies [++] 

 

 

The  adoption  and  development  of  support  measures  would  significantly  contribute  to  increase  the  quality 
and quantity of information shared with Europol. 

The  adoption  and  development  of  flanking  soft measures  (training,  financial  support,  guidance)  would  be 
essential.  

4. Impact on fundamental rights [++] 

 

Significant  positive  impact.  Since SPOCs  are  not  always  informed  about  all  international  law enforcement 
cooperation requests dealt  with  at  national  level,  there  is a  risk  that procedures  are  being  duplicated or  "fly 
below  the  radar"  which,  for  instance,  can  be  a  risk  in  relation  to  the  rights  to  privacy  since  the  same 
information  can  be  requested  a  number  of  times.  Minimum  requirements  regarding  the  functioning  of  the 
SPOC will also improve the efficiency and effectiveness of information sharing thereby more swiftly contribute 
to establishing a possible offender implication (or lack thereof).  

5. Effectiveness in meeting the policy objectives [++]  

 

This policy option would  significantly address the objective of an effective functioning of the SPOCs, PCCCs 
(and any other equivalents bodies).  

6. Efficiency in meeting the policy objectives [++]  

 

 

 

As option 2.1 + option 2.2 which would generate costs for a number of Member States.  

These  costs  would  vary  significantly  depending  on  the  effectivenss  and  efficiency  of  the  national  SPOCs  and 
PCCCs (if any).  

This would essentially cover possible IT upgrades. They don't outweight benefits. 

7. Legal feasibility [++] 

 

This  policy  option  would  require  new  provisions  regarding  the  functioning  of  the  SPOCs,  PCCCs  and  any 
other  equivalent  bodies.  These  provisions  ensure  the  respect  of  the  conferral  of  powers  and  of  fundamental 
rights (approximation of common minimum standards. Member States are free to go beyond as they see fit).  

8. Technical feasibility [+] 

 

 

Even  though  this  policy  option  would  be  technically  feasible,  the  extent  of  this  approximation  would  vary 
significantly from one Member State to the next depending on national needs.  

The  adoption  and  development  of  flanking  soft measures  (training,  financial  support,  guidance)  would  be 
essential. 

9. Coherence with other measures [++]  

 

This  policy  option  would  significantly  complement  other  Commission  initiatives  such  as  the  Commission 
proposals for a new Schengen border code, for Prüm II and for Europol. 

Policy option 2.3: Harmonisation of rules on the composition of the Single Points of Contact 
(including  when  a  judicial  authorisation  is  required),  its  functions,  staffing  and  IT  systems, 
and its cooperation with regional structures such as Police and Customs Cooperation Centres 
+ new flanking soft measures (as in option 2.1) 

37 

 
 
 
 
 
1. Impact on citizens and businesses [+++] 

Expected impact of policy option 2.3 

  Highly  positive  impact  to  the  security  of  the  European  citizens  and  societies.  The  harmonisation  of  rules 
concerning  the  functioning  of  the  SPOCs,  PCCCs  and  any  other  equivalent  bodies  would  highly  support 
Member  States  to  more  effectively  counter  any  forms  of  criminal  offences.  This  would  also  clearly  reduce 
undue delays in the information sharing.  

2. Impact on national authorities [+++] 

  Highly  positive  impact  on  national  authorities,  which  could  significantly  contribute  to  efficiently  combat 
criminal offences, because of the harmonisation of rules concerning the functioning of the SPOCs, PCCCs and 
any  other  equivalent  bodies  would  bring.  It  would  also  facilitate  the  link  with  judicial  authorities  whenever 
judicial authorisation is needed. 

 

A  negative  impact  would  be  a  likely  workoad  increase  for  national  SPOCs  however  offset  by  the 
improvements the harmonisation of rules would bring. 

3. Impact on EU bodies [+++] 

 

 

The harmonisation of rules concerning the functioning of the SPOCs, PCCCs and any other equivalent bodies 
would highly contribute to increase the quality and quantity of information shared with Europol. 

The  adoption  and  development  of  flanking  soft  measures  (training,  financial  support,  guidance)  would  be 
essential.  

4. Impact on fundamental rights [+++] 

  Highly  positive  impact.  Since  SPOCs  are  not  always  informed  about  all  international  law  enforcement 
cooperation  requests  dealt  with  at  national  level,  there  is a  risk  that  procedures  are  being  duplicated  or  "fly 
below  the  radar"  which,  for  instance,  can  be  a  risk  in  relation  to  the  rights  to  privacy  since  the  same 
information can be requested a number of times. Harmonisation of requirements regarding the functioning of 
the  SPOC  will  also  improve  the  efficiency  and  effectiveness of  information sharing  in  a standardised  fashion, 
thereby more swiftly contribute to establishing a possible offender implication (or lack thereof). 

5. Effectiveness in meeting the policy objectives [+++]  

  Highly positive impact. This policy option would clearly address the objective of an effective functioning of 

the SPOCs, PCCCs (and any other equivalents bodies).  

6. Efficiency in meeting the policy objectives [++]  

 

 

The costs of option 2.3 would be fairly comparable to those of option 2.2.  

These costs would essentially cover IT upgrades. They don't outweight benefits. 

7. Legal feasibility [-] 

 

This  policy  option  would  not  be  fully  aligned  with  the  subsidiarity  principle  and  existing  national  legal 
traditions. 

8. technical feasibility [---] 

 

 

This  policy  option  would  not  be  technically  feasible  given  the  major  technical,  legal  and  financial 
implications.  

The  adoption  and  development  of  flanking  soft measures  (training,  financial  support,  guidance)  would  be 
essential. 

9. Coherence with other measures [+]  

  Highly  positive  impact.  This policy option  would  clearly  complement  other Commission  initiatives  such  as 

the Commission proposals for a new Schengen border code, for Prüm II and for Europol. 

Problem  3:  The  free  choice  of  communication  channel(s)  between  Member  States  causes 
recurrent duplication of requests 

6.4.Objective  III:  To  remedy  the  proliferation  of  communication  channels  used  for  law 
enforcement information exchange between Member States while empowering Europol as 
the EU criminal information hub for offences falling within its mandate (unless otherwise 
regulated by EU law) 

38 

 
 
Policy option 3.1: Continue with Council non-binding guidelines and Recommendations to put 
Europol  in copy when using SIENA98 in cases within Europol' mandate + new flanking soft 
measures (training, financial support) 

1. Impact on citizens and businesses [+] 

Expected impact of policy option 3.1 

 

Low positive impact to the security of the European citizens and societies. The adoption and development of 
support measures would marginally support Member States to more effectively counter any forms of criminal 
offences. This would also marginally reduce undue delays in the information sharing.  

2. Impact on national authorities [+] 

 

Low  positive  impact  on  national  authorities,  which  could  marginally  contribute  to  efficiently  combat 
criminal  offences,  because  of  the  adoption  and  development  of  support  measures.  Updated  guidance  could 
reduce the recurrent duplication of request across several communication channels. 

3. Impact on EU bodies [+] 

 

The adoption and development of support measures would marginally contribute to increase the quality and 
quantity of information shared with Europol via SIENA. 

4. Impact on fundamental rights [+] 

 

Low positive impact through soft measures aiming at improving the choice of the communication channel, 
thereby  possibly  reducing  the  duplication  of  requests  across  several  communication  channels.  Law 
enforcement  authorities  will  remain  free  to  consider  what  types  of  information  should  be  made  available  for 
possible exchange. They would not have additional capabilities in data processing. 

5 Effectiveness in meeting the policy objectives [+]  

 

 

This policy option would marginally address the objective of setting up a default communication channel for 
law enforcement exchange between Member States.  

Actual  progress  would  essentially  be  left  to  Member  States'  ability  and  wilingness  to  diligently  follow  up  on 
updated guidances.  

6. Efficiency in meeting the policy objectives [++]  

 

 

 

This option may generate cost at EU and Member States. 

The extent of these costs may vary depending on the nature and scale of the soft measures. 

Some of  these  costs  would  already  be covered  by relevant  EU  agencies  as  part  of  their support  functions  to 
Member States (e.g. training, SIENA roll-out). They don't outweight benefits. 

7. Legal feasibility [0] 

 

This  policy option  would require  no  legal  changes. It  is de  facto  in  line  the conferral of  powers  and  with  the 
respects of fundamental rights. 

8. technical feasibility [++] 

 

Even though this policy option would be technically feasible, favouring the use of Europol SIENA as channel of 
communication  between  Member  States  for  offences  falling  within  the  Europol  mandate,  through  guidelines, 
would require the full roll-out of SIENA to all relevant end-users. 

 

Significant technical and financial support will be needed. 

9. Coherence with other measures [+]  

 

This  policy  option  would  marginally  complement  other  Commission  initiatives  such  as  the  Commission 
proposals for a new Schengen border code, for Prüm II and for Europol. 

Policy  option  3.2:  Obligation  on  Member  States  to  use  SIENA  as  the  preferred 
communication  channel  +  obligation  to  put  Europol  in  copy  when  using  SIENA  in  cases 
within Europol's mandate + new flanking soft measures (as in option 3.1) 

1. Impact on citizens and businesses [++] 

Expected impact of policy option 3.2 

98 Europol's "Secure Information Exchange Network Application". 

39 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
 

Significant positive impact to the security of the European citizens and societies. The obligation to use use 
SIENA as the preferred communication channel while putting Europol in copy when this concerns its mandate 
would significantly support Member States to more effectively counter any forms of criminal offences.  

2. Impact on national authorities [++] 

 

 

Significant  positive  impact  on  national  authorities,  which  could  significantly  contribute  to  efficiently 
combat  criminal  offences,  because  of  the  obligation  to  use  communication  channels  for  the  same  purpose 
while putting Europol in copy when this concerns its mandate. 

This would significantly address the issue of duplication of requests through several communication channel, 
thereby saving offciers' valuable time. 

3. Impact on EU bodies [++] 

 

The obligation to use SIENA as the preferred communication channel while putting Europol in copy when this 
concerns  its  mandate  would  significantly  contribute  to  increase  the  quality  and  quantity  of  information 
shared  with  Europol  via  SIENA.  It  would  also  improve  the  security  of  information  as  compared  to  ad  hoc 
exchanges of information. 

 

This would likely have a negative impact on Europol' workload. 

4. Impact on fundamental rights [++] 

 

 

Significant  positive  impact  through  provisions  aiming  at  improving  the  choice  of  the  communication 
channel, thereby reducing the duplication of requests across several communication channels (clarify existing 
guidelines in a (binding) legal proposal, notably making of SIENA the preferred channel of communication for 
intra-EU cooperation). It would also improve accountability as compared to ad hoc exchanges of data. 

The  use of  different  information  channels  in  addition  to  SIENA does  not  ensure  as  efficiently  as  possible  law 
enforcement processes. Thus, citizens may face undue processing time in case they are wrongfully subject to 
a criminal investigation. This option would partly address that. Law enforcement authorities will remain free to 
consider  what  types  of  information  should  be  made  available  for  possible  exchange.  They  would  not  have 
additional capabilities in data processing. 

5. Effectiveness in meeting the policy objectives [++]  

 

This  policy  option would  partly  address  the objective of  setting  up  a default  communication  channel for  law 
enforcement exchange between Member States.   

6. Efficiency in meeting the policy objectives [++]  

 

 

 

As option 3.1 + option 3.2 which would generate cost for a number of Member States.  

These  costs  would  vary  significantly  depending  on  the  effectiveness  and  efficiency  of  the  SIENA  access  at 
national level. This would essentially cover possible IT upgrades. 

At  the  same  time,  under  this  policy  option,  Europol  could  more  efficiently  support  Member  States  in 
preventing and combatting  criminal offences, because of the economies of scale of performing such tasks at 
EU level. They don't outweight benefits. 

7. Legal feasibility [++] 

 

This policy option would require legal changes. They would ensure the respect of the conferral of powers and 
of fundamental rights. 

8. technical feasibility [++] 

 

Even  though  this  policy  option  would  be  technically  feasible,  favouring  the  use  of  SIENA  as  channel  of 
communication between Member States for offences falling within the Europol mandate would require the full 
roll-out of SIENA to all relevant end-users. 

 

This would require significant technical and financial support. 

9. Coherence with other measures [++]  

 

This  policy  option  would  significantly  complement  other  Commission  initiatives  such  as  the  Commission 
proposals for a new Schengen border code, for Prüm II and for Europol (see Schengen Strategy). 

Policy option  3.3:  obligation to use SIENA by default for all bilateral  information exchange 
(unless  otherwise  regulated  by  EU  law)  +  obligation  to  put  Europol  in  copy  when  in  cases 
within Europol's mandate, both after the end of a transition period and with Internal Security 
Fund support for the SIENA roll-out + new flanking soft measures (as in option 3.1) 

1. Impact on citizens and businesses [+++] 

Expected impact of policy option 3.3 

  Highly positive  impact  to  the  security of  the  European  citizens  and  societies.  The obligation  to  use SIENA 

40 

 
 
 
 
while copying Europol for offences within its mandate would highly support Member States to more effectively 
counter any forms of criminal offences.  

2. Impact on national authorities [+++] 

  Highly positive impact on national authorities, which could highly contribute to efficiently combat criminal 
offences, because of the obligation to use communication for the same purpose while putting Europol in copy 
when this concerns its mandate. 

 

This would fully address the issue of duplication of requests through several communication channel. 

3. Impact on EU bodies [+++] 

 

The  obligation  to  use  SIENA  by  default  while  copying  Europol  for  offences  within  its  mandate  would  highly 
contribute  to  increase  the  quality  and  quantity  of  information  shared  with  Europol  via  SIENA.  It  would  also 
improve the security of information as compared to ad hoc exchanges of information. 

 

This would likely have a negative impact on Europol' workload. 

4. Impact on fundamental rights [+++] 

  Highly  positive  impact  through  provisions  aiming  at  improving  the  choice  of  the  communication  channel, 
thereby ending the duplication of requests across several communication channels (clarify existing guidelines 
in a (binding) legal proposal).  

 

The  use of different  information channels  in  addition  to SIENA does  not  ensure  as efficiently  as possible  law 
enforcement processes. Thus, citizens may face undue processing time in case they are wrongfully subject to 
a  criminal  investigation.  This  option  would  address  that.  They  would  not  have  additional  capabilities  in  data 
processing. 

  Given the high level of security of SIENA, its use by default would  more  effectively and efficiently  safeguard 

data protection. It would also improve accountability as compared to ad hoc exchanges of data. 

5. Effectiveness in meeting the policy objectives [+++]  

  Highly positive impact. This policy option would fully address the objective of setting up SIENA as default 
communication  channel  for  law  enforcement  exchange  between  Member  States  for  offences  within  Europol 
mandate.  

6. Efficiency in meeting the policy objectives [++]  

  Option 3.3 would not generate additional cost in comparison with Option 3.2.  

 

At  the  same  time,  under  this  policy  option,  Europol  could  highly  efficiently  support  Member  States  in 
preventing and combatting  criminal offences, because of the economies of scale of performing such tasks at 
EU level. They don't outweight benefits. 

7. Legal feasibility [++] 

 

This policy option would require legal changes. They would ensure the respect of the conferral of powers and 
of fundamental rights. 

8. technical feasibility [++] 

 

 

 

Even  though  this  policy  option  would  be  technically  feasible,  making  of  SIENA  channel of  communication  by 
default between Member States for offences falling within the Europol mandate would require first the full roll-
out of SIENA to all relevant end-users. 

This would require technical and financial support.  

That is why such provision would only enter into force after a transition period allowing the SIENA full roll-out. 

9. Coherence with other measures [+++]  

  Highly  positive  impact.  This policy option would  clearly  complement other Commission  initiatives such  as 

the Commission proposals for a new Schengen border code, for Prüm II and for Europol. 

7.  7. HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? 

7.1.Objective  I:  Facilitate  equivalent  access  for  law  enforcement  authorities  to  information 
held  in  another  Member  State,  while  complying  with  fundamental  rights  and  data 
protection requirements 

Comparative assessment for objective I 

option 1.1 

option 1.2 

option 1.3 

1. impact on citizens and businesses 

2. impact on national authorities 

3. impact on EU bodies 

+ 

+ 

+ 

41 

++ 

++ 

++ 

+++ 

+++ 

+++ 

 
 
 
4. impact on Fundamental Rights 

5. effectiveness in meeting the policy objectives 

6. efficiency in meeting the policy objectives 

7. legal feasibility 

8. technical feasibility 

9. coherence with other measures 

Preferred policy option 

n/a 

+ 

++ 

0 

+++ 

+ 

n/a 

++ 

++ 

++ 

+++ 

++ 

++ 

+++ 

++ 

++ 

+++ 

+++ 

X 

The policy options are cumulative in the sense that policy option  1.2 builds on policy option 1.1, 
and policy option 1.3 builds on policy option 1.2. 
Policy option 1.3 is the preferred option99. Under this policy option, not only the 2006 Swedish 
Framework  Decision  (SFD)  will  be  aligned  with  the  2016  Data  Protection  Law  Enforcement 
Directive (LED), but its use will be simplified. The data sets available for possible exchange will  
also  be  clarified.  Furthermore,  the  revision  of  the  deadline  requirements,  even  when  a  judicial 
authority  is  involved,  will  improve  the  timely  access  to  information.  Flanking  measures  will  be 
defined by a supporting informal expert group set up by the Commmission. This policy option will 
have a positive ripple effect on Schengen Associated Countries.  

Indeed, as part of the online survey conducted within the framework of this study, almost all Heads 
of SPOCs of the EU Member States and Schengen Associated Countries confirmed that the existing 
barriers  lead  to  increased  time  needed  for  investigations,  as  well  as  –  in  the  worst  case  – 
discontinued investigations. Moreover, according to the survey respondents, delays were estimated 
to  typically  be  of  two  to  four  weeks  in  almost  half  of  the  cases  in  which  delays  occurred.  Even 
longer  delays  were  reported  to  be  experienced  in  the  largest  part  of  the  rest  of  the  cases 
experiencing  delays.  Such  delays  are  clearly  hampering  the  efficient  implementation  of  law 
enforcement operations in intra-EU cross-border cases. 

Efficiency  and  effectiveness.  Policy  option  1.3  is  more  efficient  and  effective  than  the  policy 
options  1.1  and  1.2.  Limiting  the  revision  of  the  SFD  to  a  necessary  alignment  with  the  LED 
(baseline  scenario)  would  represent  a  missed  opportunity  to  also  address  additional  well  known 
issues hampering the full use of the SFD. Given the cumulative nature of these 3 options, options 
1.2  (simplication  in  the  use  of  the  SFD)  would  significantly  improve  on  option  1.1  while  falling 
short of addressing the need for timely access to  necessary information (option 1.3). These issues 
have  been  persistently  noted  in  the  Schengen  evaluation  country  reports  in  the  field  of  police 
cooperation. Council guidelines (non-binding) have not led to a necessary convergence of national 
practices  (while  recent  Council  Conclusions  insisted  on  the  need  to  support  the  "development  of 
smooth and swift information exchange"). 

Under  policy  option  1.1,  the  identified  uncertainties  and  inefficiencies  in  the  intra-EU  law 
enforcement  cooperation,  including  the  current  incoherencies  between  different  legislative 
instruments  both  at  the  EU  level  and  between  the  Member  States  are  expected  to  remain  and 
eventually to increase.  

Political  feasibility.  Policy option  1.3 is  politically  feasible. A number  of Member States with  a 
less efficient SPOC may express concerns at their ability to meet deadline requirements when the 
involvement  of  a  judicial  authority  is  required.  For  this  reason,  policy  options  2.1,  2.2  and  2.3 
recommend  (option  2.1)  and  require  (option  2.2  and  2.3)  the  functional  availability  of  a  judicial 
authority, as it is already the case in more effective and efficient SPOCs (see  options 2.2 and 2.3 
below).  

99 Additional information on the impacts of policy options on Member States can be found in annex 9. 

42 

 
 
 
 
                                                                 
Coherence  and  proportionality.  Policy  option  1.3  is  in  full  coherence  with  past  and  envisaged 
initiatives,  notably  the  proposals  on  Europol,  Prüm  II  and  on  the  Schengen  Border  Code.  Policy 
option 1.3 is also proportionate to the identified problem and do not go beyond what is necessary 
to achieve the specific objective. 

7.2.Objective II: Ensure that all Member States have an effective functioning Single Point of 
Contact (SPOC), including when a judicial  authorisation is  required to provide the data 
upon request of another Member State, and ensuring its effective cooperation with Police 
and Customs Cooperation Centres (PCCCs) 

Comparative assessment for objective II 

option 2.1 

option 2.2 

option 2.3 

1. impact on citizens and businesses 

2. impact on national authorities 

3. impact on EU bodies 

4. impact on Fundamental Rights 

5. effectiveness in meeting the policy objectives 

6. efficiency in meeting the policy objectives 

7. legal feasibility 

8. technical feasibility 

9. coherence with other measures 

Preferred policy option 

+ 

+ 

+ 

+ 

+ 

++ 

0 

+ 

+ 

++ 

++ 

++ 

++ 

++ 

++ 

++ 

+ 

+++ 

X 

+++ 

+++ 

+++ 

+++ 

+++ 

++ 

- 

--- 

+ 

The  policy  options  are  partially  cumulative  in  the  sense  that  policy  option  2.2  builds  on  policy 
option 2.1, and policy option 2.3 builds on policy option 2.2 for the sole flanking soft measures. 
Policy  option  2.2  is  the  preferred  option100.  Under  this  policy  option,  national  and  regional   
information  hubs  will  benefit  from  the  necessary  approximation  of  commun  minimum  standards. 
This  will  cover  the  functionning,  staffing,  and  IT  information  systems,  while  ensuring  the 
interconnectivity between the national information management architecture with regional ones (if 
any). This will significantly improve the efficiency and effectiveness of these information hubs at 
national  and regional levels  (inter-agency  cooperation) but  also  at  EU level  (cooperation between 
national  SPOCs).  This  will  also  have  a  positive  ripple  effect  on  Schengen  Associated  Countries. 
Flanking measures will be defined and implemented to support Member States accordingly. 

Under policy options 2.2 and 2.3, Member States will be required to monitor SIENA 24/7 and to 
ensure the functional availability of a judicial authority. This good practice, identified in a number 
of Member States, has been noted to significantly improve the SPOC  ability to respond to urgent 
requests in a timely manner. 

Efficiency  and  effectiveness.  While  some  countries  do  not  seem  to  work  with  a  modern  Case 
Management  System  (CMS)  in  relation  to  cross-border  law  enforcement  cooperation,  other 
countries  have  systems  in  place  that  are  seamlessly  interoperable  and  integrated  with  Europol 
SIENA. Thus, the measures identified in policy option 2.2 are expected to contribute to level the 
playing field in terms of technical progress of law enforcement cooperation between countries and, 
thereby,  facilitate  the  access  to  and  exchange  of  information.  The  approximation  of  common 
minimum  requirements  will  ensure  coordinated  future  developments,  thereby  facilitating  and 
enhancing  internal  and  EU  cooperation.  Indeed,  data  can  be  exchanged  in  a  more  structured  and 
swifter way (e.g. via the Universal Message Format). 

100 Additional information on the impacts of policy options on Member States can be found in annex 9. 

43 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
A  large  majority  of  Member  States  participants  to  the  2nd  technical  workshop  held  in  May  2021 
indicated  that  the  envisaged  measures  centred  on  national  Case  Management  System  for  SPOCs 
would have a (very) positive impact on cross-border law enforcement cooperation101. 

Elements  of  the  policy  option  2.1  (non-binding  guidance)  are  expected  to  make  a  small  positive 
contribution  to  improving  the  efficiency  of  cross-border  law  enforcement  cooperation.  Yet,  this 
would not provide an adequate response from an efficiency perspective. Under policy option 2.1, 
the  identified  differences  and  inefficiencies  in  the  functioning  of  SPOCs  across  the  EU  would 
remain,  hampering  the  efficient  exchange  of  information,  notably  due  to  an  inadequate  access  to 
key databases and platforms in all SPOCs. The limited interconnectivity between different systems 
(e.g.  due  to  vast  differences  between  various  'in-house  solutions'  used  in  the  EU),  as  well  as  the 
limited functionalities of the Case Management System (CMS) in various Member States are also 
expected to remain and continue to hamper cross-border information exchange in the future. 

The plethora of existing databases, channels and systems, as well as the extent to which and how 
they  are  used  in  practice  by  officials  is  expected  to  continue  to  hamper  the  efficiency  of  law 
enforcement  cooperation  in  the  EU.  Fragmentation  concerning  the  associated  legal,  technical  and 
structural requirements at the EU and national levels, as well as established informal practices are 
expected to continue to be the main reasons for this.  

Moreover,  some  SPOCs  have  insufficient  resources  to  address  the  information  requests  received 
within  the  deadlines  in  all  cases.  There  is  also  a  need  to  further  ensure  that  law  enforcement 
authorities  involved  in  intra-EU  cross-border  cases  are  better  trained  on  recent  developments  and 
possess adequate language skills  to  communicate with  their peers. Whilst  it remains possible that 
the  SPOCs  and  PCCCs  will  over  time  incrementally  update  and  improve  their  information 
management systems, these developments would not be aligned between the Member States and the 
current barriers are expected to remain. 

Political feasibility. Unlike policy option 2.3, policy option 2.2 is politically feasible. The lack of 
effective and efficient functioning of national and regional information hubs (where they exist) have 
been  persistently  noted  in  the  Schengen  evaluation  country  reports  in  the  field  of  police 
cooperation. Council guidelines (non-binding) have not led to a necessary minimal convergence of 
national  practices  (while  recent  Council  Conclusions  insisted  on  the  need  to  support  the  "further 
development of relevant structures and platforms").  

This  approximation  of  common  minimum  standard,  notably  stemming  from  the  Heads  of  SPOC 
network102, express  a wide consensus  at  expert level. Ensuring the harmonisation  of rules  (option 
2.3) on issues not covered by EU provisions so far will not be supported by Member States given 
their far-reaching structural and financial implications. 

Coherence  and  proportionality.  Policy  option  2.2  is  in  full  coherence  with  past  and  envisaged 
initiatives  notably  the  proposals  on  Europol,  Prüm  II  and  on  the  Schengen  Border  Code.  Policy 
option 2.2 is also proportionate to the identified problem and do not go beyond what is necessary 
to achieve the specific objective. 

A  full  harmonisation  of  rules  (option  2.3)  do  not  meet  the  proportionality  test.  Indeed,  passing 
from  Council  non-binding  guidance  to  a  fully-fledged  harmonisation  by  EU  law  would  not  be 
feasible  given  the  major  technical,  legal  and  financial  implications.  The  approximation  of  core 
minimum  standards  is  considered  less  invasive  while  still  being  conducive  to  achieving  the 
objective II. 

101 See complementary information in annex 10. 
102  Council  Conclusions  12825/19,  8.10.2019 on  establishing  European network  of  Heads  of  SPOC  for  international 

law enforcement information exchange. 

44 

 
 
                                                                 
7.3.Objective  III:  To  remedy  the  proliferation  of  communication  channels  used  for  law 
enforcement information exchange between Member States while empowering Europol as 
the EU criminal information hub for offences falling within its mandate (unless otherwise 
regulated by EU law) 

Comparative assessment for objective III 

option 3.1 

option 3.2 

option 3.3 

1. impact on citizens and businesses 

2. impact on national authorities 

3. impact on EU bodies 

4. impact on Fundamental Rights 

5. effectiveness in meeting the policy objectives 

6. efficiency in meeting the policy objectives 

7. legal feasibility 

8. technical feasibility 

9. coherence with other measures 

Preferred policy option 

+ 

+ 

+ 

+ 

+ 

++ 

0 

+++ 

+ 

++ 

++ 

++ 

++ 

++ 

++ 

++ 

++ 

++ 

+++ 

+++ 

+++ 

+++ 

+++ 

++ 

++ 

++ 

+++ 

X 

The  policy  options  are  partially  cumulative  in  the  sense  that  policy  option  3.2  builds  on  policy 
option 3.1, and policy option 3.3 builds on policy options 3.2 for the sole flanking soft measures. 
Policy  option  3.3  is  the  preferred  option103.  Under  this  policy  option,  Member  States  will  be 
required to exchange information between them via SIENA (unless otherwise regulated by EU law) 
while  putting  Europol  in  copy  when  this  concerns  an  offence  within  Europol's  mandate.  Such 
requirement will only enter into force after a necessary transition period ensuring the full roll-out of 
SIENA  at  national  level.  This  will  also  have  a  positive  ripple  effect  on  Schengen  Associated 
Countries.  

Flanking  soft  measures  will  be  defined  and  implemented  to  support  Member  States  accordingly. 
Compared to the status quo, where Member States use different communication channels and often 
do not involve Europol in their bilateral exchanges, this will also significantly increase the amount 
of information that Member States will share with Europol on cross-border crime, and hence close 
an important information gap. 

The  main  difference  between  policy  option  3.2  and  3.3  lies  in  SIENA  being  the  "preferred" 
channel  of  communication,  thereby  still  leaving  room  for  Member  States  not  to  implement  this 
option if they so decide, and SIENA being the channel of communication “by default” for intra-EU 
communication. 

Policy  option  3.2  will  still  allow  Member  States  leeway  in  the  choice  of  the  communication 
channel in predefined cases, thereby promoting the use of Europol SIENA as the preferred channel 
of communication where relevant. The policy option 3.2 will thus seek to clarify existing Council 
guidelines  on  the  choice  of  the  appropriate  channel  in  a  (binding)  legal  text.  Policy  option  3.3 
ensures  a  more  coherent  approach,  one  giving  the  Europol  channel  a  central  role.  Member  States 
could still be allowed to use an alternative channel in exceptional circumstances (to be understood 
restrictively). 

Efficiency and effectiveness.  One result of Member States having a free choice of channel (apart 
from the legal requirements relating to SIRENE Bureaux and Europol National Units) is that they 
use  different  channels  to  different  extents  also  depending  from  officers'  habits  and  personal 

103 Additional information on the impacts of policy options on Member States can be found in annex 9. 

45 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
preferences. Some Member States have moved towards more systematic use of the Europol channel 
(SIENA). Others continue to rely a good deal on the INTERPOL channel.  

It is important to note that the Member States have divergent views in relation to the use of 
SIENA  as  default  channel  of  communication.  Some  Member  States  have  pointed  out  that  it  is 
important for their own purposes to be able to decide based on the case at hand in a rather flexible 
manner via which channel information should be exchanged. For instance, it is not always clear in 
practice to determine whether a specific case is only related to the EU or also has an international 
component. In such a case, making SIENA the default channel via which information is exchanged 
may  lead  to  double  work  if  the  case  turns  out  to  be  of  international  nature  in  relation  to  which 
INTERPOL I24/7 should rather have been used.  

However, the choice of the Europol channel (SIENA) is justified by its advantages. SIENA can be 
used for direct bilateral exchanges, but also facilitates sharing of information with Europol in line 
with legal requirements  of the Europol Regulation and the Swedish Framework Decision. SIENA 
messages are structured, can handle large data volumes and are exchanged with a high level of data 
protection  and  security.  The  Europol  Liaison  Officers  community  is  an  additional  benefit  as  they 
can  be  asked  to  intervene  where  necessary  to  facilitate  the  understanding  and  effectiveness  of 
information exchange.  

Europol  indicated  that  the  definition  of  SIENA  as  the  default  channel  (while  putting  Europol  in 
copy)  instead  of  as  a  preferred  channel  (policy  option  3.2)  is  in  particular  expected  to  further 
facilitate the access to and exchange of information and, inevitably, lead to a strong increase of the 
number of messages exchanged via SIENA. The yearly number of messages exchanged via SIENA 
is estimated to increase to up to 3.86 million messages in 2030 (against 1.3 million in 2020). 

Option  3.1  is  expected  to,  one  the  one  hand,  have  a  small  positive  impact  as  regards  the 
achievement of this objective, since Europol is expected to make further improvements to SIENA, 
potentially doubling the number of users. 

However,  the  extent  to  which  the  potential  efficiency  gains  may  actually  materialise  largely 
depends on Member States' commitment to the improvement of law enforcement cooperation and 
their  willingness  to  implement  (common)  changes  within  their  national  systems.  The  current 
differences  between  the  national  set-ups  are  expected  to  continue  to  exist  and  hamper  the  level 
playing field between Member States. Member States will remain free not to put Europol in copy of 
their exchanges via SIENA even when concerning offences falling into the agency' mandate. 

Under  policy  option  3.1,  the  identified  uncertainties  and  inefficiencies  in  the  intra-EU  law 
enforcement  cooperation,  including  the  current  duplication  of  requests  in  various  communication 
channels  both  at  the  EU  level  and  between  the  Member  States  are  expected  to  remain  and 
eventually to increase, causing undue delays and additional workload. 

For example, the practice of 'fishing' is likely to remain, meaning that a number of Member States 
or  national  LEAs  may  receive  the  same  information  request  without  any  clear  link  to  a  specific 
case, thus leading to duplication of work. Therefore, it is expected that the efficiency of future law 
enforcement cooperation will considerably lag behind its potential. 

Political feasibility. A number of Member States favours an approach that leaves wide flexibility to 
use different channels. While considered politically feasible104, the policy option 3.3 is likely to be 
closely analysed by the Member States. 

104 Based on the Study' findings: If SIENA was established as the preferred/default channel for information exchange, 
this would imply changes for 4 countries who currently prefer the I-24/7 channel. For those 17 countries which are 
indifferent  between  communication  channels  establishing  SIENA  as  the  preferred/default  channel  would  imply 

46 

 
 
                                                                 
 
Coherence and proportionality. While possibly more readily acceptable by a number of Member 
States, the policy option 3.2 is considered to be only partially  coherent with other EU measures, 
notably  the  Europol  Regulation  and  Council  Document  5503/21105  on  the  use  of  SIENA  as  a 
primary  communication  channel.  Because  the  policy  option  3.2  will  leave  Member  States  more 
leeway,  it  is  considered  to  falling  short  of  the  necessity  requirement,  while  policy  option  3.3  is 
considered  proportionate  to  the  identified  problem  and  do  not  go  beyond  what  is  necessary  to 
achieve the specific objective.   

Policy option 3.3 is fully in line with a decade-long political commitment to make of Europol the 
"hub  for  information  exchange  between  the  law  enforcement  authorities  of  the  Member  States,  a 
service provider and a platform for law enforcement services"106.  

In  coherence  with  this  2009  European  Council  strategic  guidance,  a  2021  Council  Presidency 
Document  also  states:  "applying  SIENA  as  the  default  communication  channel  would  add  to  the 
streamlining  of  law  enforcement  information  exchange,  and  increase  the  level  of  security  in  the 
context  of  police  cooperation  in  the  Union.  By  the  same  token,  it  would  enable  that  efforts  be 
focused on the development of a single instead of numerous solutions, thus fostering the objective of 
reaching enhanced EU internal security"107. 

8.  8. PREFERRED POLICY OPTION: A GAME CHANGER FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION 

Options 1.3, 2.2 and 3.3 form the preferred option.  

Taken together, the preferred policy option will streamline, clarify, develop and modernise cross-
border law enforcement cooperation while better safeguarding Fundamental Rights. It will also step 
up Europol support to Member States in countering evolving threats. The preferred policy option, a 
game  changer,  will  ensure  a  strong  convergence  of  national  practices  regarding  the  effective  and 
efficient functionning of SPOC, through common minimum standards. 

This choice reflects the best cumulative score of these options as regards to relevance, added value, 
effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and proportionality. It draws the lessons from the past and, at 
the  same  time,  is  sufficiently  ambitious.  The  approximation  of  common  minimum  (ambitious) 
standards will ensure a sufficient degree of convergence of national practices and ultimately deliver 
effective and efficient information flows. It respects the views of the Member States concerning the 
role of information exchange in addressing criminal offences while at the same time respecting also 
the legitimate expectations of the EU citizens and businesses as to  contribute to  the effective and 
efficient safeguard of the Schengen area as one of the main enablers of the freedom of movement of 
persons and goods108. 

8.1.  Overview of the preferred policy option 

specific objectives 

preferred policy options 

Objective  I:  Facilitate  equivalent  access  for 
law  enforcement  authorities  to  information 
held 
in  another  Member  State,  while 
complying  with  fundamental  rights  and  data 
protection requirements 

Policy  option  1.3:  Option  1.2  +  provisions  ensuring  compliance 
with  deadlines  requirements  by  which  data  is  to  be  made 
available  to  another  Member  State  (including  when  a  judicial 
authorisation is required) 

smaller  changes  as  for  those  who  clearly  prefer  the  I-24/7.  For  5  countries  which  use  SIENA  as  the  preferred 
communication channel, no change is expected. 

105 Council Document 5503/21, Secure communication channel in law enforcement cooperation – SIENA. 
106 European Council, "The Stockholm Programme", OJ C 115, 4.5.2010, p. 1–38. The European Council also invited 
the  Commission  to  "examine  how  it  could  be  ensured  that  Europol  receives  information  from  Member  States  law 
enforcement authorities so that the Member States can make full use of Europol capacities". 

107 Council Document 5503/21, 28.1.2021, Secure communication channel in law enforcement cooperation – SIENA. 
108 See Complementary information on political feasibility in annex 10. 

47 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Objective  II:  Ensure  that  all  Member  States 
have  an  effective  functioning  Single  Point  of 
Contact  (SPOC),  including  when  a  judicial 
authorisation  is  required  to  provide  the  data 
upon  request  of  another  Member  State,  and 
ensuring  its  effective  cooperation  with  Police 
and Customs Cooperation Centres (PCCCs) 

Policy  option  2.2:  Approximation  of  minimum  standards  on 
the composition of the Single Points of Contact (including when a 
judicial  authorisation  is  required),  its  functions,  staffing  and  IT 
systems, and its cooperation with regional structures such as Police 
and Customs Cooperation Centres + new flanking soft measures 
(training, financial support, Commission guidance) 

channels  used 

Objective III: To remedy the proliferation of 
communication 
law 
enforcement  information  exchange  between 
Member  States  while  empowering  Europol  as 
the  EU  criminal  information  hub  for  offences 
falling  within  its  mandate  (unless  otherwise 
regulated by EU law)  

for 

Policy  option  3.3:  obligation  to  use  SIENA  by  default  for  all 
bilateral  information  exchange  (unless  otherwise  regulated  by  EU 
law)  +  obligation  to  put  Europol  in  copy  when  in  cases  within 
Europol's  mandate,  both  after  the  end  of  a  transition  period  and 
with Internal Security Fund support for the SIENA roll-out+ new 
flanking soft measures (training, financial support) 

The  most  positive  cumulated  impacts  of  the  preferred  policy  option  are  expected  to  stem  from 
establishing the SPOC as a "one stop shop" for law enforcement cooperation in all Member States. 
Additionally: 

  The requirement to have full access to EU and international law enforcement databases (e.g. 
by involving staff in the SPOC who have full access) will constitute a key step forward, as 
the current uneven access to relevant databases by the SPOCs have a negative impact on the 
speed to which information can be exchanged. 

  The  requirement  to  have  a  judicial  authority  functionally  available  will  imply  that  those 
cases  where  a  judicial  authorisation  is  required  can  be  handled  more  swiftly  than  what  is 
currently the case, meaning that deadlines can be  more readily  met also  in these cases. At 
present, deadlines are almost always exceeded when a judicial authorisation is required. 
  The requirement for the SPOC to be, at the minimum, informed about all international law 
enforcement cooperation requests dealt with at national level will lead to better (statistical) 
information concerning the information exchanges and thus constitute an important basis for 
better informed future action. It will also mean that the SPOC will have better possibilities 
to assist with information exchanges. 

  The  requirement  to  set  up  a  Case  Management  System  (CMS)  with  common  minimum 
features at SPOC and ensure its interconnection with the PCCCs’ CMSs, will significantly 
improve  both  the  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of  national,  regional  and  EU  level  inter-
agency cooperation. 

  The  establishment  of  Europol  SIENA  as  the  default  (rather  than  the  preferred)  channel  of 
communication will add to the streamlining of law enforcement information exchange. 
  A key enabler to achieve the specific objectives is the establishment of appropriate training 

and financial support. 

The  consultation  process  revealed  some  political  red  lines  for  Member  States.  If  the  preferred 
options took note of them, the main reason for excluding a full harmonisation of the functioning of 
the  SPOC  by  means  of  a  Regulation  stems,  first  and  foremost,  from  the  wide  divergence  of 
practices,  legal  traditions  and  existing  set  up  in  place  at  national  level.  The  policy  options  would 
have therefore remained the same irrespective of their political feasibility.  

Ensuring the harmonisation of rules (Regulation) through a detailed check list of necessary features 
(option 2.3) on issues not covered by EU provisions so far will not be supported by Member States 
given  their  far-reaching  structural  and  financial  implications.  Such  harmonisation  may  also  be 
considered going beyond would be strictly necessary to achieve the main goal of this initiative. It 
would thus not pass the proportionality, necessity and subsidiarity tests. 

Even though the political feasibility of new measures in the area of law enforcement cooperation is 

48 

 
 
generally challenging, the preferred policy responds to calls for actions from the co-legislators. It 
will notably meet the objectives of the Council Conclusions of November 2020109 calling on: 

 

the  Member  States  to:  "take  all  necessary  steps  to  further  strengthen  operational  cross-
border  law  enforcement  cooperation  by  effectively  implementing  existing  instruments  and, 
where  appropriate  and  necessary,  by  consolidating,  simplifying  and  extending  the  legal 
foundations [and] swiftly improve means for regular or ad hoc exchange of information". 
  The  Commission  to  support:  "the  development  of  smooth  and  swift  information  exchange, 
further development of relevant structures and platforms; to consider consolidating the EU 
legal framework to further strengthen cross-border law enforcement cooperation" [and] 
"to duly take into account  – when assessing options for a proposal for a European Police 
Cooperation  Code  and  while  upholding  the  principle  of  national  sovereignty,  the  existing 
standards for the protection of fundamental rights, existing legal systems in Member States 
and  the  decisive  role  of  the  host  state  –  the  value  and  success  of  local,  regional,  bi-  and 
multilateral law enforcement cooperation between Member States". 

 

  Stakeholders' high-level support for the policy options 

Public authorities 

Law Enforcement Authorities 

SPOCs 

PCCCs 

Other 

Judicial 
Authorit 

Data 
Protect. 
Authorit 

NGOs & 
civil 
society 

Stakeholders in the Member States 

Topics 

Overarching topics 

Access to and exchange of information 

Specific topics 

Legislative improvements 

Provision of clarifications 

Introduction of new requirements 

Streamlining of existing requirements 

Alignment of different legal instruments 

Technical improvements 

Definition of technical requirements & functionalities 

Establishment of quality control mechanisms 

Structural improvements 

Establishment of organisational requirements 

Establishment of governance requirements 

Other improvements 

Provision of training 

Provision of awareness raising 

Provision of funding 

Source: EY/RAND Europe Study’s elaboration 

Cells that are marked in darker green denote a stronger positive impact on the different types of stakeholders. This 
table is not based on official positions provided by the Member States. 
Based  on  the  study'  findings  and  initial  feedback  at  political  level110,  there  is  a  general  trend 
towards high-level support among stakeholders. Law Enforcement Authorities (LEAs) seem to be 
more supportive of the elements of the policy options than judicial authorities. With specific regard 
to  data  protection  authorities,  it  is  crucial  to  note  that  the  support  is  contingent  on  the  extent  to 
which  the  protection  of  personal  data  is  safeguarded  throughout  all  measures  foreseen  under  the 
policy options.  

109 Council Document 13083/1/20, Council Conclusions on Internal Security and European Police Partnership, link 
110 Informal Council COSI meeting of 7-8 July 2021. 

49 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
Generally spoken, Non-Governmental Organisations and civil society organisations are supportive 
of the policy options as long as fundamental rights are safeguarded, and LEAs do not come into the 
possession  of  excessive,  unjustified  amounts  of  information  about  citizens  and  businesses  that  do 
not concern actual criminal investigations and/or legal proceedings before Court. 

The preferred policy option is also coherent with: 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

the EU Security Union Strategy for the period 2020 to 2025111, which points to the need 
to improve intra-EU operational law enforcement cooperation; 
the Counter-Terrorism Agenda112, which calls for a more effective interoperability of EU 
information; 
the  EU  Strategy  to  tackle  organised  Crime  2021-2025113,  which  is  focused  on  boosting 
law enforcement and judicial cooperation; 
the  new  Schengen  strategy114,  which  points  to  the  need  for  police  officers  to  cooperate 
effectively and by default across Europe; 
the 2020 Council Conclusions on Internal Security and European Police Partnership115, 
which  calls  for  the  consolidation  and  improvement  of  available  law  enforcement 
instruments; 
the  Commission  Recommendation  (EU)  2017/820116,  which  invites  Member  States  to 
strengthen cross-border police cooperation; 
the Commission Staff Working Document SWD/2020/327  final117,  which highlights  the 
need  to  address  the  deficiencies  and  the  recurrent  issues  affecting  law  enforcement 
cooperation, and; 
the  Council  Document  5503/21118  on  the  use  of  SIENA  as  a  primary  communication 
channel. 

The  high-level  issues  and  core  problems  stemming  from  them  as  well  as  their  likely  future 
development  are  addressed  by  the  preferred  policy  option  in  line  with  the  subsidiarity  and 
proportionality principles. 

8.2.  Preferred policy option cumulated advantages and disadvantages 

Main advantages 

Main disadvantages 

  Expected  to  facilitate  to  a  large  extent  the  swift  exchange  of  data via 
one  main  channel  and,  thus  in  turn  contribute  to  the  ability  to  more 
effectively fight SOC. 

  Necessitates  investments,  including 
for  IT-and  staff-related  investments 
at both the EU and national levels.  

  Establishes  a  level  playing  field  between  countries  from  a  technical 
perspective  by  introducing  common  functional  requirements  for  CMS 
and ensures that countries adequately reflect the practical importance 
of SPOCs and PCCCs within their national set-ups. 

  Has  a  large  positive  impact  on  increasing  the  coherence  of  the 

legislative framework at both the EU and national levels. 

  The policy option is expected to contribute in a largely positive way to 

safeguarding fundamental rights. 

 

Increases  need 
officials. 

for 

training  of 

111 Commission (2020), EU security union strategy - COM/2020/605 final, link. 
112 Commission (2020) A Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU: Anticipate, Prevent, Protect, Respond, link. 
113 Commission (2020) A EU Strategy to tackle organised Crime 2021-2025, link. 
114 Commission (2021), COM(2021) 277 final, A strategy towards a fully functioning and resilient Schengen area. 
115 Council Document 13083/1/20, Council Conclusions on Internal Security and European Police Partnership, link. 
116  Commission  Recommendation  (EU)  2017/820  of  12  May  2017  on  proportionate  police  checks  and  police 
cooperation in the Schengen area. Available at: link. 
117  Commission Staff Working Document on the Functioning of the Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism 
SWD/2020/327 final. Available at: link.  
118 Council Document 5503/21, 28.1.2021, Secure communication channel in law enforcement cooperation – SIENA. 

50 

 
 
 
 
                                                                 
Overall,  it  is  expected  that  the  preferred  policy  option  will  have  a  very  significant  impact  on  the 
effectiveness  of  EU  cross-border  law  enforcement  cooperation.  The  preferred  policy  option  will 
contribute  to  efficiently  reduce  specific  types  of  costs  related  to  law  enforcement  cooperation, 
while at the same time contribute to increasing others. 

It  can  be  expected  that  different  Member  States  will  be  affected  by  reduced/increased  costs  to 
varying  degrees  depending  on  how  much  aligned  their  current  national  set-up  already  is  with  the 
measures  envisaged  under  the  preferred  policy  option.  However,  reliable  quantitative  data  on 
costs are largely missing119. 

8.3.  Main types of costs expected to be reduced/increased with the preferred policy option 

Main types of costs increased 

Main types of costs decreased 

To ensure the efficient access to and exchange of necessary information among law enforcement 
authorities in an intra-EU context 

EU level: 

EU level: 

  EU funding (e.g. through Internal Security Fund) 

and financial support, as well as budget for 
procuring studies. 

  n/a 
Member State level: 
  Reduced working time due to better information to act on 

  Costs in relation to awareness raising and training 

(solving cases instead of managing them). 

(incl. by CEPOL). 

Member State level:  

  Reduced waiting time / time delays (e.g. due to waiting 

for information from LEAs in other countries). 

  Necessitates investments at MS level, including for 

IT- and staff-related investments.  

  Less time needed for case management. 
  Fewer resources needed for case management, i.e. more 

 

Increased budgetary spending by MS on officers’ 
training. 

resources spent on "solving cases". 

While highly depending from the specificities of each national  IT set-up and legal parameters, an 
estimation  of  possible  costs  has  been  provided  by  Europol.  These  costs,  deemed  acceptable,  are 
proportionate  to  the  identified  problem  and  do  not  go  beyond  what  is  necessary  to  achieve  the 
specific objective  (see below). The Annex 3 provide further details  on the methodology  issues to 
estimate anticipated costs. Given the lack of data, these costs are considered rough estimations. 

The costs associated with the development of SIENA and CMS 

The  direct  operational  costs  for  SIENA  are  1  to  1,2  million  EUR  per  year.  This  figure  does  not  factor  in  hardware, 
helpdesk,  infrastructure,  business  product  management  activities,  training,  etc.  However,  these  items  could  be 
estimated at around 0,5 million in addition.  

For a CMS, an estimation of costs is difficult, as they are largely depending on system complexity, number of users, 
functionalities,  licenses,  infrastructure, etc.  However,  it  can  be  estimated  that,  without infrastructure  and  hardware 
costs, the respective costs should be at least 150,000 EUR.  

The assumptions above are also presented in the following table.  

Estimation of costs for SIENA and CMS120 

MS package estimate121 

CMS for 10 MS 

10 x 150.000 

EUR 1,5 million  

SIENA integration in CMS for 20 MS                         

20 x 50.000 

EUR 1 million  

Total: EUR 2,5 million (one-
time investment needed) 

Source: Data provided by Europol 

119 Complementary information can be found in Annex 3.  
120  Respectively  only  10  and  20  Member  States  would  be  considered  here  (other  Member  States  being  adequately 

equipped).   

121  The  information  provided  should  be  used  carefully.  It  should  be  understood  as  "in  case  a  CMS  is  needed  for  10 
Member States, then costs would be…" and "in case SIENA would need to be integrated into the CMS in 20 Member 
States, the costs would be…" etc. Thus, the table does not provide actual costs but rather refers to actual costs under 
specific circumstances. 

51 

 
 
                                                                 
Based  on  the  estimation  above,  the  set-up  of  Case  Management  Systems  and  their  SIENA 
integration in PCCCs not yet equipped could possibly cost EUR 9 million (one-off). 

This cost is broken down as follow: 

  Out of the 59 identified PCCCs, 14 are already connected to SIENA; 
  The SIENA connection to a possible maximum of 45 PCCCs would cost EUR 2,250 million 

(45x EUR 50.000); 

  The set-up of CMSs in a maximum of 45 PCCCs would cost EUR 6,750 million (45x EUR 

150.000); 

  Hence a total of EUR 9 million (2,250 + EUR 6,750 million) for PCCCs; 
  This  would  be  considered  as  a  maximum  one-off  cost  given  that  a  number  of  PCCCs  are 
already  connected  to  the  SPOC  CMS.  Hence  the  SIENA  integration  in  the  SPOC  CMS 
would de facto cover the SIENA integration in the connected PCCCs. 

The necessary  IT upgrades in  both SPOCs and PCCCs  could thus  amount  to  a maximum  one-off 
grand total of EUR 11,5 million (2.5 + 9 million). 

These costs (one-off investment), deemed acceptable, are proportionate to the identified problem 
and do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the specific objective. As Member States are in 
any case pursuing a modernisation of their IT systems (also in the context of the interoperability of 
EU information systems), this provides a good opportunity for cost effective implementation of the 
envisaged changes. These costs do not cover training needs. As for IT upgrades, the training costs 
are highly depending from the specificities of each national IT set-up and legal parameters. 

The  costs  at  national  level  should  be  covered  by  Member  States'  programmes  under  the  Internal 
Security  Fund.122  The  Internal  Security  Fund  includes  the  specific  objective  to  "improve  and 
facilitate the exchange of information" and to "improve and intensify cross-border cooperation".123 
When preparing their national programmes, Member States are invited to include in their national 
programmes activities relevant to the upcoming Police Cooperation Code, with explicit reference to 
SPOCS and PCCCs, and the connection to SIENA. 

With a view to maximising the main advantages of the preferred policy option, and to minimise the 
main disadvantages to the extent possible, various success factors have been identified:  

  Provide sufficient funding and financial support to Member States in order to facilitate high-
level  political  support  for  the  preferred  policy  option,  as  well  as  to  ensure  the  necessary 
financial commitment; 

  Leverage and streamline existing IT-solutions (e.g. developed by Europol) in order to avoid 

Member States diverging at the technical level; 

  Provide sufficient funding and co-develop awareness raising campaigns targeted at EU law 

enforcement officials in relation to cross-border matters; 

  Provide  sufficient  funding  and  co-develop  specific  training  relevant  for  the  subject  matter 
covered by the preferred policy option and leverage existing training opportunities provided 
by CEPOL; 

  Closely  collaborate  with  Member  States  in  order  to  take  advantage  of  proven  operational 

practices; 

  Take appropriate action in unison with the Member States in order to identify and streamline 

good practices concerning the implementation of the preferred policy option; and 

  Continuously  collect  relevant  statistics  and  monitor  the  implementation  of  the  preferred 

policy option to enable swift action in case diverging implementation practices occur. 

122 Regulation (EU) 2021/1149. 
123 See Articles 3(2)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1149. 

52 

 
 
                                                                 
9.  9. HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? 

The evaluation of impacts will depend on the information to be received from the Member States. 
For this reason, the Directive Proposal would contain provisions on collection of data indicators 
on the quantity of information requested, sent, received; the number of urgent requests, the number 
of  urgent  requests  replied  on  time  and  a  breakdown  by  communication  channels  at  SPOC,  at 
PCCCs (if any) and at any other equivalent structures.  

The  responsibility  for  the  collection  of  the  relevant  monitoring  data  should  be  in  the  hands  of 
national authorities. The development of a modern information management architecture, as per the 
Directive  proposal,  will  greatly  facilitate  the  data  collection  exercise  at  no  additional  cost  by  the 
SPOCs.  

Subsequently, the monitoring of these activity indicators will be used to inform on the application 
of the Directive proposal. Three and five years after the transpositon deadline, , the Commission 
intends to submit to the European Parliament and the Council two reports. The first, assessing the 
extent  to  which  the  Member  States  have  taken  the  necessary  measures  to  comply  with  this 
Directive; the second, assessing its results against its objectives and the continuing validity of the 
underlying rationale and any implications for future options. 

Aside  from  this  legal  proposal,  the  Commission,  acting  by  virtue  of  its  administrative  autonomy, 
will set up an expert group composed by experts from each Member State, to advise and support the 
Commission  in  the  monitoring  and  application  of  the  Directive,  including  in  the  preparation  of 
Commission guidance papers.  

Main indicators for the monitoring of the preferred policy option contained in the Directive proposal 

Implementation ("outputs") 

Application ("results & impacts") 

Timely access 
to and smooth 
exchange of 
information 

  Number of non-urgent/urgent messages 

  Level of security in the EU 

sent/received, refused/accepted, 
fully/partially answered 

  Number of cases initiated/closed 

  Number of interactions (in-) directly leading 

to positive outcomes124 

  Level of awareness and knowledge among 

  Number of staff in SPOCs/PCCCs 

officials 

  Number of requests from non-proprietary 

  Degree of smoothness of law enforcement 

CMS/databases  

cooperation 

  Capital/operational expenditures, e.g. in 

relation to IT and training 

124 Depending on the type of case, this could mean e.g. apprehensions and arrests. 

53 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION 

1.  LEAD DG, DECIDE PLANNING/CWP REFERENCES 

The lead DG is the Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME). The agenda 
planning reference is PLAN/2020/8314 - HOME - EU police cooperation. 

The  Commission  Work  Programme  for  2021  announced  a  legislative  initiative  to  "modernise 
existing intra-EU law enforcement cooperation by creating an EU police cooperation code125. 

2.  ORGANISATION AND TIMING 

The inception impact assessment was published on 28 September 2020126 and open for feedback for 
a period of 8 weeks, until 16 November 2021127. 

An Inter-Service Sterring Group (ISSG), composed of representatives from SG, SJ, HOME, JUST, 
TAXUD and OLAF was set up. The ISSG met four times: 

  Comment on and validation of the Terms of Reference for the  Study underpinning this 

Impact Assessment and Consultation strategy, 30 October 2020; 

  Comment on and validation of the Study' Inception Report, 17 February 2021; 
  Comment on and validation of the Study' Interim Report, 29 April 2021; 
  Comment on and validation of the Study' Final Report, 21 June 2021.  

The Inter-service Group on the Security Union discussed a draft text of the impact assessment on 9 
July 2021. It was composed of representatives from SG, SJ, HOME, JUST, TAXUD, BUDG, EAC, 
CNECT, NEAR, MOVE, ECHO, ENV, EMPL, ENER, DEFIS, DIGIT, FISAM, FPI, GROW, HR, 
RTD, SANTE, TRADE, INPTA, REGIO, MARE, CERT-EU, ESTAT, JRC  OLAF, EEAS. 
The comments made by the ISG were integrated in the draft Impact Assessment. 

3.  CONSULTATION OF THE RSB 

On 19 August 2021, the Directorate-General  for  Migration  and  Home Affairs submitted the draft 
impact  assessment  to  the  Regulatory  Scrutiny  Board,  in  view  of  a  hearing  that  took  place  on  22 
September 2021. 

The opinion of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board was positive128. The following comments were made: 

Comments made by the RSB 

Amendments following RSB comments 

The  report  should  clarify  how  the  initiative  will 
articulate  with  the  Automated  Data  Exchange 
Mechanism  for  Police  Cooperation  (Prüm  II)  and 
the  Convention 
the  Schengen 
Implementing 
Agreement  (CISA).  It  should  also  clarify  that  the 
initiative aims to propose a Directive to update and 
the  pre-Lisbon  Swedish  Framework 
replace 
Directive  (adopted  by  both  the  Council  and  the 
European  Parliament  in  the  ordinary  legislative 
procedure) 

This was ensured accordingly, see: 

- added rationale on Prüm II p. 6. 

- added rationale on CISA p.10 (footnote 24) and p.11. 

125 COM(2020) 690 final, (19.10.2020), https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/2021-commission-work-programme-key-

documents_en 

126 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12614-EU-police-cooperation 
127 EU police cooperation code – tackling cross-border serious & organised crime (europa.eu) 
128 Ref. Ares(2021)58622323 – 27/09/2021. 

54 

 
 
 
                                                                 
The  problem  analysis  should  be  reinforced  with 
anonymised evidence from the Schengen evaluation 
reports. The report should also explain why Member 
States  do  not  or 
certain 
shortcomings themselves, e.g. ill-equipped national 
authorities, lack of common binding procedures 

cannot  address 

Regarding  personal  data  protection,  the  report 
should  explain  how  the  alignment  with  the  2016 
Law  Enforcement  Data  Protection  Directive  will 
provide  the  required  level  of  data  protection  in  the 
Union 

This was ensured accordingly, see: 

- added tables p. 12, 15, 17. 

- added boxes p. 15, 16, 18. 

- added rationale p. 20-21. 

This was ensured accordingly, see: 

- added rationale p. 31-32. 

This was ensured accordingly, see: 

- amended tables pp. 34 to 44, p. 46. 

- added rationale pp. 27-28, p. 50. 

The  political  feasibility  of  the  policy  options  should 
not  determine  their  substantive  assessment  but 
rather  be  considered  when  comparing  options.  The 
criteria  of  legal  and  technical  feasibility  should  be 
used to screen the options to be retained for further 
in-depth  analysis.  Only  feasible  options  should  be 
kept.  Any  difference  in  terms  of  their  performance 
should 
the  standard 
assessment  criteria  of  effectiveness,  efficiency  and 
coherence.  The  Board  notes  the  estimated  costs 
in  this 
and  benefits  of  the  preferred  option 
the  attached 
initiative,  as 
quantification 
technical 
comments have been sent directly to the author DG. 

summarised 
tables.  Some  more 

reflected  via 

then  be 

in 

4.  EVIDENCE, SOURCES AND QUALITY 

The  impact  assessment  is  notably  based  on  the  stakeholder  consultation  (see  annex  2).  The 
Commission applied a variety of methods and forms of consultation, ranging from consultation on 
the  Inception  Impact  Assessment,  which  sought  views  from  all  interested  parties,  to  targeted 
stakeholders'  consultation  by  way  of  a  questionnaire,  experts'  interviews  and  targeted  thematic 
stakeholder workshops, which focused on subject matter experts, including practitioners at national 
level.  Taking  into  account  the  technicalities  and  specificities  of  the  subject,  the  Commission 
emphasised in targeted consultations, addressing a broad range of stakeholders, at national and EU 
level. 

In  this  context,  the  Commission  also  took  into  account  the  findings  of  the  "Study  to  support  the 
preparation  of  an  impact  assessment  on  EU  policy  initiatives  facilitating  cross-border  law 
enforcement  cooperation",  which  was  commissioned  by  DG  HOME  and  developed  by  the 
contractor  based  on  desk  research  and  the  following  stakeholder  consultation  methods:  scoping 
interviews, questionnaire and online survey, semi-structured interviews, case-studies and two online 
workshops (see annex 2). 

55 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION  

This  annex  provides  a  synopsis  report  of  all  stakeholder  consultation  activities  undertaken  in  the 
context of this impact assessment. 

1.  CONSULTATION STRATEGY 

The aim of the consultation was to receive relevant input from stakeholders to enable an evidence-
based preparation of the future Commission initiative on a improving law enforcement cooperation 
between Member States. 

 The  stakeholders'  consultation  took  place  between  September  2020  and  July  2021  and 
encompassed, primarily, targeted stakeholders by way of the  Study and two workshops hosted by 
the Commission with Member States and Schengen Associated Countries' representatives.  

To do this, the Commission services identified relevant stakeholders and consulted them throughout 
the development of its draft proposal. The Commission services sought views from a wide range of 
subject  matter  experts,  national  authorities,  civil  society  organisations,  and  from  members  of  the 
public on their expectations and concerns relating to strengenting law enforcement cooperation in 
the EU.  

During the consultation process, the Commission services applied a variety of methods and forms 
of consultation. They included: 

 

 
 
 

the  consultation  on  the  Inception  Impact  Assessment,  which  sought  views  from  all 
interested parties; 
targeted stakeholder consultation by way of a questionnaire; 
expert interviews; and  
targeted  thematic  stakeholder  workshops  that  focused  on  subject  matter  experts,  including 
practitioners at national level. Taking into account the technicalities and specificities of the 
subject,  the  Commission  services  focused  on  targeted  consultations,  addressing  a  broad 
range of stakeholders at national and EU level.  

The Commission also took into account the findings of the "Study to support the preparation of an 
impact assessment on EU policy initiatives facilitating cross-border law enforcement cooperation", 
which was commissioned by DG HOME and developed by the contractor based on desk research 
and  the  following  stakeholder  consultation  methods:  scoping  interviews,  questionnaire  and  online 
survey, semi-structured interviews, case-studies and two online workshops. 

The  aforementioned  diversity  of  perspectives  proved  valuable  in  supporting  the  Commission  to 
ensure  that  its  proposal  address  the  needs,  and  took  account  of  the  concerns,  of  a  wide  range  of 
stakeholders. Moreover, it allowed the Commission to gather necessary data, facts and views on the 
relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and EU added value of the proposal.  

Taking  into  consideration  the  Covid-19  pandemic  and  the  related  restrictions  and  inability  to 
interact  with  relevant  stakeholders  in  physical  settings,  the  consultation  activities  focused  on 
applicable  alternatives  such  as  online  surveys,  semi-structured  phone  interviews,  as  well  as 
meetings via video conference. 

A  public  consultation  as  part  of  our  consultation  strategy  for  the  new  legislative  proposal  was 
carried out. 

56 

 
 
 
 
 
2.  CONSULTATION ACTIVITIES (SUMMARY) 

2.1. Feedback on the Inception Impact Assessment 

A call for feedback, seeking views from any interested stakeholders, on the basis of the Inception 
Impact  Assessment  was  organised  from  28  September  to  16  November  2020.  The  consultation, 
sought feedback from public authorities, businesses, civil society organisations and the public, was 
open for response from 4 May 2020 to 09 July 2020. Participants of the consultation were able to 
provide  online  comments  and  submit  short  position  papers,  if  they  wished,  to  provide  more 
background on their views. 4 contributions were received129. They were integrated as part of the 
study' findings. 

2.2. Consultations  that took place during the study to support the preparation of an impact 
assessment on EU policy initiatives facilitating cross-border law enforcement cooperation  

The Commission contracted an external consultant to conduct a study. It took place from January to 
August  2021.  It  involved  desk  research,  and  stakeholder  consultations  by  way  of  scoping 
interviews,  targeted  questionnaires,  a  survey,  semi-structured  interviews,  case-studies,  a  public 
consultation and two ad hoc workshops.  

2.3.1. Feedback on the public consultation  

The  public  consultation  was  carried  out  from  19  April  to  14  June  2021.  20  contributions  were 
received130. They were integrated as part of the study' findings. 

2.3.2. Targeted consultation by way of a questionnaire 

An  online  survey  in  the  form  of  questionnaires  made  accessible  to  targeted  stakeholders  via  the 
EUSurvey131  tool  was  also  held  as  part  of  the  Study.  The  objective  of  this  consultation  was  to 
receive  feedback,  comments  and  observations  on  the  challenges  identified  for  the  legal  proposal. 
The questionnaires were tailored to different stakeholders. 

239 contributions were received. They served as foundation for the study' findings. 

2.3.3. Member State experts' consultation by way of meetings 

In  the  course  of  the  consultation  undertaken  as  part  of  the  Study,  the  contractor  organised  two 
workshops  held  on  24  March  and  25  May  2021  to  which  representatives  of  the  Member  States, 
Council Secretariat and Commission were invited132. 

Ad hoc workshop of 24 March 2021 

On  24  March  2021,  the  contractor  organised  an  ad  hoc  workshop.  The  objective  was  to  have  an 
exchange  of  views  with  and  between  Member  States  and  Schengen  associated  countries  on  their 
current challenges when engaging in cross-border law enforcement cooperation.  

The 27 Member States, 3 Schengen associated countries, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) 
and Commission Directorate-Generals participated in the workshop. 

Ad hoc workshop of 25 May 2021 

On  25  May  2021,  the  contractor  organised  an  ad  hoc  workshop.  The  objective  was  to  have  an 
exchange of views with and between Member States and Schengen associated countries on possible 
options addressing identified challenges and their respective impacts. 

129 EU police cooperation code – tackling cross-border serious & organised crime (europa.eu) 
130 See the results' analysis in Annex 2. 
131  
132 See summaries of the meetings in Annex 8. 

57 

 
 
                                                                 
Council working groups 
The Commission also made use of the Law Enforcement Working Party (LEWP)133 meetings of 22 
February and 16 March 2021 to brief Member States on its preparatory work and relevant technical 
deliberations,  in  the  context  of  strengthening  law  enforcement  cooperation,  and  explore  Member 
States'  views  on  the  problems  and  potential  solutions.  The  same  was  done  at  the  Customs 
Cooperation Working Party (CCWP)134 of 23 March 2021. 

Head of Single Point Of Contact (SPOC) meeting of 26 May 2021 

On  26  May  2021,  the  contractor  presented  the  findings  from  the  questionnaire  sent  to  national 
Single Point of Contact (SPOC) with a view to gather additional opinions and rationale.  

2.3.4. Semi-structured interviews 

The  consultation  conducted  as  per  the  Study,  included  targeted  bilateral  and  multilateral  semi-
structured  interviews  with  stakeholders  on  the  basis  of  formalised  and  open-ended  questions 
allowing for open and in depth discussions. These interviews were conducted from March to June 
2020  via  teleconferencing.  They  included  in  particular  relevant  EU  agencies,  services  and 
Commission Directorates-general, national experts and academics. 

3.  STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION 

Stakeholders consulted135 included:  

law enforcement authorities in the Member States (e.g. police, customs);   
judicial authorities in the Member States;  

  EU institutions, agencies and bodies;   
 
 
  data protection authorities;  
  non-governmental organisation, academias, civil society. 

The feedback on the Inception Impact Assessment included responses from members of the public, 
and non-governmental associations with an interest in this field.  

4.  METHODOLOGY AND TOOLS 

Given the small number of results in the public consultation results have been proceed manually.  

Debate  and  answers  to  the  surveys,  interviews,  case-studies,  and  ad  hoc  workhops  involved  the 
reading of the consultation  responses in  full,  the drafting of minutes and the  noting  of  any issues 
and concerns. They were factored in as part of the Study on which this impact assessment is based. 

5.  RESULTS 

5.1. Consultation on the Inception Impact Assessment  

This  public  consultation  on  the  Inception  Impact  Assesssment  received  four  answers.  Two  from 
members of the public, one from a private company and one from a European police trade unions 
association. All the responses have been published in full online136. 

The  European  police  trade  unions  association  indicated  that:  "obtaining  relevant  information 
quickly at the time when it is needed is essential". "Under the current fragmented legal framework 

133 Law Enforcement Working Party (LEWP) is a Council preparatory body, which handles work relating to legislative 

activities as well as cross-border policing and related operational issues. 

134 The Customs Cooperation Working Party handles work regarding operational cooperation among national customs 

administrations and with a view to increasing their enforcement capabilities. 

135 See the list of stakeholders consulted in Annex 2.  
136 EU police cooperation code – tackling cross-border serious & organised crime (europa.eu) 

58 

 
 
                                                                 
for  law  enforcement,  information  received  by  national  police  forces  is  not  readily  accessible  by 
officers  on  the  ground".  It  supported:  "the  Commission's  initiative  to  streamline  and  consolidate 
existing instruments for cross-border police cooperation". 

The private company, involved in cyber-security issue, indicated "the possibility to provide police 
with the possibility for a transfer of the investigation from the jurisdiction of the victim to that of the 
police in the jurisdiction of the suspect" as an avenue to be explored.  

A member of the public mentioned the relevance of the European Arrest Warrant. The last answer 
was irrelevant. 

6.  HOW THE RESULTS HAVE BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT 

The results of the consultation activities have been incorporated throughout the impact assessment 
in each of the sections in which feedback was received. The consultation activities were designed to 
follow the same logical sequence as the impact assessment, starting with the problem definition and 
then moving on to possible options and their impacts.  

Using  the  same  logical  sequence  in  the  consultation  activities  as  in  the  impact  assessment  itself, 
facilitated  the  incorporation  of  the  stakeholders'  feedback  –  where  relevant  –  into  the  different 
sections of the impact assessment. 

Exhaustive presentation of the consultation activities as part of the support study  

This document presents the exhaustive findings from the consultation activities carried out as part 
of the Study to support the preparation of an impact assessment on EU policy initiatives facilitating 
cross-border law enforcement cooperation.  

Objectives and types of stakeholders consulted  

As part of the study, various consultations, both with key stakeholders and the public at large, were 
carried out. The aim of these consultations was to provide the European Commission with factual 
evidence  concerning  possible  problems  and  additional  measures  in  the  area  of  intra-EU  law 
enforcement cooperation. A wide range of stakeholders operating both at the EU and the national 
levels was consulted, using a combination of different consultation tools. The stakeholders can be 
organised into a number of general categories described in the Table below. 

Stakeholder category 

EU Agencies, Bodies and 
Networks 

National authorities 

Mixed EU level and national 
level stakeholders 

Other 

Categories of stakeholders involved 

European Commission 
EU bodies with relevant expertise 
LEWP members 
National LEAs 
National judicial authorities 
National data protection authorities 
EMPACT Support Managers 
EMPACT Drivers  
Members of the Academia and think tanks 
Members of the general public 

Source: EY/RAND Europe Study’s elaboration 

COnsultation methods and tools 

The following consultation methods were used as part of the study: 

  Online survey with LEAs, data protection authorities and judicial authorities; 
 

Interviews with: 

o  EU bodies; 
o  EMPACT actors; 

59 

 
 
o  Member State representatives (case studies); 
o  Academia; 

  Focus groups with representatives of Member States that cooperate within the framework of 

bi-/tri-/ multilateral agreements; and 

  Technical  workshops  with  representatives  of  Member  States  and  Schengen  Associated 

Countries, as well as EU-level stakeholders. 

In  addition  to  these  methods,  in  line  with  its  Better  Regulation  Guidelines,  the  European 
Commission  implemented  a  Public  Consultation  (PC)  of  all  relevant  stakeholders  interested, 
including  members  of  the  general  public.  The  consultation  was  hosted  on  the  European 
Commission’s  website  (ec.europa.eu)  in  all  EU  official  languages.  The  PC  ran  for  eight  weeks, 
from 19 April 2021 to 14 June 2021. In total, 20 replies were received. 

Online survey with LEAs, judicial authorities and data protection authorities 

An  online  survey  was  deployed  using  the  contractor’s  survey  tool.  The  survey  targeted  national 
LEAs,  national  judicial  authorities  (specifically,  Eurojust  national  desks  and  European  Judicial 
Network  contact  points)  and  national  data  protection  authorities.  The  consultation  ran  for  eight 
weeks,  from  5  March  2021  to  30  April  2021.  In  total,  239  responses  were  received:  216  from 
national  LEAs’  representatives,  13  from  national  judicial  authorities  and  10  from  national  data 
protection authorities. 

Interviews with EU bodies, EMPACT actors, Member States, and Academia 

In total 48 individual interviews were conducted with key stakeholders. These included: 

  20 interviews with EU bodies;  
  10  interviews  with  EMPACT  drivers  and  two  group  interviews  with  EMPACT  support 

managers (in total 21 interviewees); and 

  4 interviews with academics and members of think tanks. 
  12 group interviews with Member State representatives for the case studies. 

The interviewees were selected in agreement with the Commission. The interviews were conducted 
online, for most part via Teams. The interviews were used to collect data on the problems, possible 
solutions and the impacts of these.  

The  interviews  with  EU  bodies,  academia  and  think  tanks  were  focused  on  collecting  expert 
views  on  gaps  and  deficiencies  affecting  the  current  EU  framework  for  law  enforcement 
cooperation,  as  well  as  qualitative  and  quantitative  information  concerning  possible  impacts  of 
additional  measures.  The  interviews  with  members  of  academia  served  to  provide  relevant  inputs 
based on their knowledge and past research on cross-border police cooperation. 

The  involvement  of  EMPACT  support  mangers  and  operational  action  plan  (OAP)  drivers 
helped gaining a better understanding on the state play in the use, implementation and effectiveness 
of cross-border law enforcement cooperation measures/practices and investigative tools with regard 
to each specific priority crime area of the EU Policy Cycle, in order to understand whether there are 
measures/tools that are particularly used and effective in certain crime areas, but not in others. In 
other  words,  this  data  collection  exercise  allowed  the  Study  Team  to  change  the  angle  of  the 
analysis  from  the  legal  basis  (EU/national/international)  to  the  area  of  utilisation  of  specific 
measures/tools (i.e. priority crimes).  

In addition, interviews with national LEAs were performed at the end of phase 1 of the study in 
order to follow up on specific findings and issues identified during the assessment of the problems. 

60 

 
 
To account for possible national differences in the assessment of the impacts of the policy options, 
the Study Team undertook case study interviews with national stakeholders from a selected number 
of  Member  States  to  better  comprehend  the  heterogeneity  of  the  institutional  and  regulatory  law 
enforcement frameworks in the Member States and SAC, and related impacts of the options. Within 
this framework, an additional  12 interviews with 26 participants from five countries (Austria, 
France, Slovenia, Sweden and Switzerland) were conducted to provide Member State-level deep 
dives concerning the expected impacts of the policy options in their country.  

Focus groups with representatives of Member States and SAC 

In order to collect first-hand information on the use, practical implementation and effectiveness of 
four relevant bi/tri/multilateral agreements (i.e. the Benelux agreement; DE-CZ agreement; CH-FR 
agreement;  and  Nordic  countries  agreement),  the  Study  Team  organised  four  separate  focus 
groups  convening  the  parties  involved  in  each  agreement.  The  focus  groups  allowed  the  Study 
Team to develop an in-depth understanding of the content and scope of said agreements, as well as 
of their practical implications, including both strengths and weaknesses. The Study Team collected 
the necessary information to understand whether the agreements are outdated/underused or, on the 
opposite, whether they include measures on cooperation mechanisms or investigative tools that are 
innovative or have proved to be particularly effective in combating cross-border crime. The focus 
groups  involved  a  total  of  48  participants.  Each  group  included  participants  from  each  Member 
State  and  SAC  who  has  signed  the  agreement  and  included  stakeholders  from  different  agencies 
(for example, police, customs, and other specialist departments). 

Technical workshops with representatives of Member States and SAC 

Two  full-days  technical  workshops  were  organised  and  animated  by  the  Study  Team.  Each 
workshop involved close to 200 participants. The objectives of each workshop were as follows: 

  The  first  technical  workshop  took  place  on  24  March  2021  in  Phase  1  of  the  study  and 
involved  representatives  from  DG  HOME,  DG  JUST,  the  Council,  Europol  and  Cepol,  as 
well as representatives from all EU Member States and SAC. The participants were asked to 
provide their feedback on the nature and scale of identified problems, the EU dimension of 
the problems and the effective need for further EU action, thus allowing the Study Team to 
fine-tune  the  problem  definition  and  the  analysis  of  the  evolution  of  the  problem  in  the 
absence of any  additional  EU action. The first  technical  workshop  also  allowed the Study 
Team  to  cross-check  information  collected  through  other  sources  and  collect  missing  data 
and information to develop a more complete evidence-base. Finally, this meeting was also 
used by the Study Team to discuss and explore possible policy options addressing identified 
problems to be taken into consideration. 

  The second technical workshop took place on 24 May 2021 in phase 2 of the study. This 
workshop  involved  the  same  types  of  stakeholders  as  the  first  workshop,  namely 
representatives from DG HOME, DG JUST and the Council, as well as representatives from 
all  EU  Member  States  and  SAC.  The  participants  involved  in  this  workshop  had  the 
possibility  to  both  give  their  feedback  on  the  preliminary  content  of  the  policy  options  to 
address  the  current  problems  affecting  cross-border  law  enforcement  cooperation  and  to 
provide additional information on the likely impacts of the options, thus allowing the Study 
Team to fine-tune the definition of the options and the assessment of their impacts. 

Each workshop included: 

  Plenary  sessions  for  the  discussion  of  the  study  interim  findings  and  preliminary  results; 

and 

  Break-out sessions in smaller groups according to information exchange. 

61 

 
 
In addition to both technical workshops, the study team gave a presentation at the law enforcement 
working  party  (LEWP)  meeting  on  16  March  2021.  The  presentation  focused  on  the  study’s 
objectives  and  methodology.  This  synopsis  report  does  not  include  a  detailed  summary  of  this 
meeting since the study team was only present for its own presentation. 

Exhaustive results of the consultation activities carried out as part of the support Study 

This chapter presents the main findings derived from the various consultation methods. 

Online survey with LEAs, judicial authorities and data protection authorities 

As  indicated  above  in  section  1,  in  total  239  responses  were  received  to  the  online  survey:  216 
responses were received from national LEAs’ representatives, 13 from national judicial authorities 
and 10 from national data protection authorities. 

Measures/practices existing at EU and national levels including investigative tools 

As  concerns  the  existence  of  bi-/tri-/multilateral  agreements  concerning  law  enforcement 
cooperation, almost all of the survey respondents among LEAs (98%, n=62137) confirmed that their 
country  is  part  of  at  least  one  agreement  with  one  or  more  countries.  Moreover,  numerous  LEAs 
also  confirmed  that  the  agreements  in  many  cases  go  beyond  the  provisions  in  EU  instruments 
(n=19).  A  lower  number  of  respondents  indicated  that  they  address  specific  legal  challenges 
countries may face when cooperating on specific topics or using specific tools (n=5). A very limited 
number of respondents stated that the agreements they have entered into with other countries were 
an affirmation of cooperation, which either already existed prior to Schengen or is based on cultural 
values (n=3). Furthermore, according to a limited number of respondents, the perceived added value 
of the agreements included the clear outlining of rules and competencies (n=5), and fast information 
exchange  and  additional  competencies  beyond  what  is  outlined  in  EU  documents  (n=3).  Three 
respondents  explained  in  this  regard  that  the  agreements  in  their  country  had  more  added  value 
when they were created, compared to now, but that there is still value in them now. One respondent 
described the agreements as a daily manual for their tasks. 

The online survey also included questions on  data protection in relation to bi-/tri-/multilateral 
agreements, which were targeted at data protection authorities. Two thirds of the respondents from 
this  stakeholder  group  (66%  (n=6)  confirmed  that  they  had  previously  been  asked  to  advise  or 
comment on a bi-/tri- or multilateral agreement their country is part of. More than two thirds (70%; 
n=7)  stated  that  there  are  no  differences  in  breaches  between  the  implementation  of  multilateral 
agreements and the implementation of other cross-border cooperation matters. 

Finally,  according  to  the  judicial  authorities  that  responded  to  the  survey,  9%  (n=1)  of  the 
respondents  stated  that  judicial  authorities  always  need  to  be  involved  in  the  authorisation  of 
investigative  tools,  while  27%  (n=3)  confirmed  an  occasional  involvement.  However,  equally 
many respondents (37%; n=4) stated that no involvement of judicial authorities is required, while 
27% (n=3) indicated that they do not know. Regarding the supervision of investigative tools, 43% 
(n=3)  stated  that  judges  or  prosecutors  are  involved  in  supervising  the  measures,  while  an  even 
higher number (57%; n=4) stated that they are not. 

137  The  number  of  responses  (“N”)  denotes  the  number  of  valid  answers  for  a  specific  question,  not  the  number  of 
replies to the survey overall. Therefore, 62 responses can e.g. refer to a share of 98% of respondents whereas, at the 
same time, 131 responses can also correspond to a share of 82%. The “N”, thus, also always needs to be understood in 
view  of  the  specific  questions  and  number  of  answers  given  to  a  particular  question  –  not  the  overall  number  of 
respondents to the survey. 

62 

 
 
                                                                 
The need to harmonise investigative tools and for EU action 

The  need  for  EU  intervention  in  the  field  of  cross-border  exchange  of  and  access  to 
information  is  widely  supported  by  the  LEAs  answering  the  survey,  with  82%  (n=131)  of  the 
respondents  reporting  a  need  for  EU  action  from  a  ‘moderate’  to  a  ‘very  high’  extent.  The 
percentage of those supporting EU intervention to strengthen operational cooperation for public 
order  and  safety  was  somewhat  lower,  with  52%  (n=44),  reporting  a  need  to  intervene  from  a 
‘moderate’  to  a  ‘high’  extent.  Similarly,  54%  (n=83)  of  LEAs  answering  the  survey  reported  a 
strong need for EU intervention to improve operational cooperation to fight SOC. 

The problem definition 

Considering  the  issue  of  access  to  and  exchange  of  necessary  information  among  law 
enforcement  authorities,  LEAs  answering  the  survey  stated  that  information  exchanges  related  to 
operations  against  SOC  are  frequent,  and  those  related  to  public  safety  are  frequent  as  well, 
although  slightly  less  so.  However,  the  majority  of  LEAs  responding  to  the  survey  (82%,  n=98) 
reported to have experienced some problems when sharing information with other countries, such 
as  time  delays  to  receive  the  information  request  (30%  of  the  responses,  n=82).  As  pointed  out 
(62% of the responses, n=98), such issues are mainly due to the fact that the foundational EU legal 
framework  is  not  consolidated  in  all  areas,  it  is  spread  across  several  legislative  instruments  and 
allows  for  significant  flexibility  to  the  Member  States  and  SAC  regarding  the  implementation  of 
relevant EU provisions. 

Interviews 

EU bodies 

Interviews conducted in Phase 1 

In the first phase, interviews with EU bodies were conducted to explore the functioning of current 
law  enforcement  cooperation  practices,  including  current  problems  and  the  need  for  EU  action 
(CEPOL, EDPS, EJN, EJTN, EMCDDA, EPPO, EUCPN, Eurojust, Europol, FRA, OLAF). 

Policy objectives 

Representatives  from  EU  bodies  expressed  the  need  to  develop  instruments  setting  common 
standards and ensuring: 

  A convergence of LEAs towards a common understanding of the use of tools;  
  A common and shared assessment of threats affecting the EU;  
  A common practice to gather information from all EU Member States in a similar way and 

have comparable data available;  

On a more operational level, guidelines for information sharing were seen as flexible instruments as 
they  allow  Member  States  to  maintain  “room  for  manoeuvre”  and  adapt  them  to  their  specific 
needs.  Non-binding  documents  were  seen  as  a  compromise  reached  at  the  political  level,  as  it  is 
hardly possible to commit 27 Member States to only one binding still more effective document. 

Stakeholders  agreed  that  the  interoperability  of  databases  is  an  important  aspect  to  be  addressed 
with  the  aim  to  ease  cross-border  cooperation  and  to  overcome  the  current  issues  related  to  the 
presence of divergent approaches.  

63 

 
 
 
According to EU bodies' representatives, EU should also implement measures and mechanisms to 
compel Member States to share information with each other and with the relevant EU agencies. The 
final outcome should be the implementation of an automated process to access databases, in order 
to have a centralised system that every Member State and third countries can benefit from. 

Regarding data protection, it was seen as important that the legislative framework of data protection 
is  up  to  date  to  integrate  new  forms  of  cooperation  resulting  from  technological  innovation 
(artificial  intelligence  or  big  data).  Legislative  interventions  concerning  data  protection  should 
address: 

  Limited quality of data quality stored in databases; 
  Difficulties comparing data retrieved from different databases as they are stored differently; 
  Children’s fundamental rights as part of cross border investigations; 
  Sharing of sensible data with third countries, which may not apply EU standards concerning 

data protection. 

Interviews conducted in Phase 2 

As  second  round  of  interviews  with  EU  bodies  were  conducted  in  phase  2  of  the  assignment 
(CEPOL, EDPS, EJN, EPPO, EUCPN/ENAA, Europol, FRA, OLAF).  

The interviews served to gather additional detailed information concerning: 

  Possible EU measures to address  current problems affecting cross-border law enforcement 

cooperation; and  

  The likely impacts of these possible EU measures. 

The assessment of the impacts of the policy options 

Regarding information exchange via SIENA and other communication channels, interviewees 
from one EU body did not expect immediate positive direct impacts if English was established as 
the  default  language  for  the  use  of  SIENA.  The  stakeholders  instead  saw  positive  impacts  if 
bilateral  communication  takes  place  in  (common)  national  languages,  as  this  would  allow  for  a 
quicker  management  of  information  requests.  Instead  of  establishing  English  as  the  default 
language for the use of SIENA, the representatives considered the introduction of a translation tool 
as  more  suitable  for  information  exchange  concerning  cross-border  cases.  One  interviewee  from 
another EU body also highlighted that obstacles stemming from language barriers hamper efficient 
information exchange and stressed the need to address language barriers in the near future. In  yet 
another  interview,  a  critical  opinion  towards  the  establishment  of  SIENA  as  the  preferred/default 
channel for information exchange concerning intra-EU cross-border cases was voiced. Since it was 
cumbersome for one interviewee to get access to SIENA in his/her operational work due to security 
restrictions  of  his/her  organisation,  s/he  could  not  agree  on  positive  impacts  stemming  from  this 
potential EU measure. 

Concerning the definitions of requirements for data, one interviewee highlighted the importance 
of data accuracy in relation to data, which is subject to exchange. Errors in databases, which appear 
to  be  common,  undermine  the  added  value  of  databases  and  can  have  a  negative  impact  on 
fundamental rights, for instance if an innocent individual becomes subject to proceedings.  

As  concerns  training  activities,  interviewees  from  one  EU  body  did  not  see  immediate  positive 
impacts if shorter intervals between the EU-STNA were introduced (e.g. a reduction from four to 
two  years)  since  a  longer  cycle  allows  for  better  strategic  planning.  Similarly,  this  stakeholder 
advised  against  the  introduction  of  mandatory  training  on  EU  law  enforcement  cooperation  for 
officers  in  specific  roles  relevant  to  cross-border  law  enforcement  and  at  specific  levels,  as  this 

64 

 
 
 
stakeholder did not have positive experiences with the implementation of mandatory training a year 
ago.  Free  and  voluntary  learning  methods  were  considered  as  the  more  feasible  option  in  this 
regard. 

Interviewees  from  other  EU  bodies  highlighted  the  importance  of  awareness  raising  campaigns 
within  the  EU  law  enforcement  community.  Positive  impacts  from  awareness  raising  campaigns 
were expected, as many officials were stated to not be aware of the existing measures and policies 
in place to facilitate information exchange. 

EMPACT actors 

Objectives and overview of the interviews with EMPACT drivers and support managers  

Interviews with EMPACT stakeholders were conducted as part of the study, including:  

  Ten individual interviews with EMPACT drivers; and  

  Two Group interviews with EMPACT support managers (4 and 7 interviewees respectively). 

A total of 21 stakeholders were interviewed in the individual and group interviews. 

Key results from the interviews 

Interviewees  were  asked  about  a  series  of  aspects  concerning  cross-border  cooperation,  their 
efficiency and challenges encountered.  

Structures for cooperation 

Interviewees  in  the  individual  and  group  interviews  were  asked  about  the  use  of  multiple 
structures  in  place  in  cross-border  cooperation.  The  following  structures  were  provided  as 
prompts  to  the  interviewees:  Single  Point  of  Contact  (SPOCs);  Police  and  Custom  Cooperation 
Centres  (PCCCs),  National  SIRENE  Bureaux;  Europol  Liaison  Officials;  Swedish  Framework 
Decision (SFD); Manual on cross border cooperation National Factsheets (13920/20). 

There was no overall consensus on which tool is the preferred tool. Different structures seem to be 
used in different  crime areas and countries. For example, the PCCCs between two countries were 
stated  to  work  well,  but  this  cannot  always  be  replicated  in  other  countries  due  to  resource 
constraints. The Swedish Framework Decision was highlighted as particularly useful for financial 
crimes.  Each  structure  in  place  was  created  with  a  specific  purpose  within  cross  border 
communication.  As  most  of  these  structures  were  created  decades  ago,  interviewees  voiced 
concerns over these structures not reflecting the current needs of investigation teams, in particular 
with regard to  cybercrime, where quicker and more direct  cooperation with experts in the field is 
needed.  

The potential of centralisation of these structures into one structure was discussed. Interviewees 
agreed that  the existing structures should be revised instead of creating a new one. Centralisation 
into one system was raised as potentially problematic due to the number of requests which would be 
going through the system per day. 
Interviewees  acknowledged  that  cross-border  cooperation  has  increased  over  the  past  decades. 
Cooperation has improved significantly already, however, the changing crime landscape is posing 
new  challenges.  Cross-border  cooperation  needs  effective  tools  to  address  new  types  of  crimes, 
such  as  cybercrimes,  and  new  types  of  criminal  networks,  online  and  dispersed  over  several 
countries. There is  a need to  reflect  this in  national  legislation and the  agreements  guiding cross-
border cooperation. Currently the required paperwork and often the national legislation is slowing 
investigations down. 

Information exchange platforms 

65 

 
 
Interviewees  in  the  individual  and  group  interviews  were  asked  about  the  use  of  information 
exchange platforms in place in cross-border cooperation. The following structures were provided 
as  prompts  to  the  interviewees:  SIENA;  the  Schengen  Information  System  (SIS);  the  Europol 
Information System (EIS); Interpol exchange channels; and the Visa Information System (VIS). 

Interviewees  found  that  there  are  currently  too  many  different  platforms  and  databases  for 
exchanging  information.  As  with  the  cooperation  structures,  interviewees  highlighted  that  these 
platforms/  databases  were  each  created  with  a  specific  purpose  in  mind.  However,  different 
countries  have  different  preferences  concerning  which  platform  to  use. Because  of  the  amount  of 
platforms  countries  can  choose  from,  information  is  often  scattered  and  it  is  unclear  what 
information  is  available.  Interviewees  suggested  reviewing  and  reforming  existing  platforms  and 
potentially link them, rather than creating a completely new tool.  

Trust  between  the  countries  involved  in  cooperation  was  mentioned  as  the  most  important  aspect 
for the efficient sharing of information. Interviewees explained that most countries are reluctant to 
upload sensitive information to share with everyone else and with Europol. 

Multilateral Agreements 

Interviewees  in  the  individual  and  group  interviews  were  asked  about  their  awareness  of  bi-/tri-
/multilateral  agreements  and  how  they  are  being  used  in  practice.  Few  interviewees  had 
experience  working  under  bi-/tri-/multilateral  agreements.  It  was  nevertheless  highlighted  that  for 
those  colleagues  working  in  the  border  regions,  these  agreements  are  useful  to  ensure  smooth 
cooperation.  It was highlighted that sometimes the bureaucracy  and national  legislation related to 
the agreements  can slow down cooperation in  border areas and make it more complicated for the 
officials working with them.  

Future Needs 

Interviewees  in  the  individual  and  group  interviews  were  asked  about  the  future  needs  in  cross-
border  cooperation.  Most  interviewees  acknowledged  the  progress  that  has  been  made  in  cross-
border law enforcement cooperation between different countries. However, interviewees requested 
reforms  to  reflect  the  changing  crime  landscape.  Especially  in  the  area  of  digital  crimes  legal 
reforms are required to account for the fast pace of the crimes. 

The harmonisation and revision of structures, tools and legislation was also mentioned as a point for 
EU wide action. 

Good practices  

Interviewees  also  provided  valuable  information  on  'good  practices'  in  different  areas  of  cross-
border law enforcement cooperation. Suggestions included:  

  SPOCs: For countries where the single points of contacts are well established, the SPOCs 

were seen as an added value to establish a course of action for the cooperation. 

  Trust  /  Personal  Networks:  Interviewees  mentioned  trust  as  the  key  element  for  cross-
border  cooperation.  It  was  explained  that  informal  networks  with  officials  from  other 
countries  with  whom  cooperation  has  existed  for  years  are  often  the  first  point  of  contact 
when  it  is  necessary  to  establish  cooperation  with  another  country.  The  network  of  the 
Europol liaison officials was also mentioned as a good practice for cooperation, where trust 
is built and which facilitates direct cooperation between the countries. 

  Trust / Crime-area specific network: The Joint Cybercrime Action Taskforce (JCAT) was 
mentioned as  a  good practice. This  taskforce connects  cybercrime experts from  across the 
EU  to  facilitate  cooperation.  Through  continuous  cooperation  trust  can  be  built,  which 
results  in  better  cooperation.  One  interviewee  highlighted  that  shared  knowledge  of  the 
language  and  terminology  in  this  crime  area  has  resulted  in  smoother  cooperation. 

66 

 
 
‘SMOKE’  was  also  mentioned  as  an  effective  network  of  cooperation  between  police, 
customs and the tobacco industry in combatting counterfeit cigarette production. 

  Accessibility of communication tools: In some countries the accessibility to, for example, 
SIENA  computers,  was  highlighted  as  well  developed.  Two  countries  were  mentioned  as 
good examples, since SIENA computers are accessible across these countries and available 
to the officials who may need it.  

  Bilateral agreements: 

o  Cooperation in border regions: Bilateral agreements are seen as the most effective 

way of cooperation in the border regions and day to day cooperation. 

Challenges  

Interviewees  were  generally  in  favour  of  international  cooperation  and  the  structures  and 
investigative  tools  which  can  be  used.  However,  the  interviewees  highlighted  a  set  of  challenges 
they face when employing the available structures and investigative tools in practice.  

  Lack  of  harmonisation  and  persistent  structural  differences  between  countries  were 

considered the biggest challenges for law enforcement cooperation.  

o  Legislative  perspective:  Several  interviewees  spoke  about  the  challenges  of  using 
tools  in  cross-border  cooperation  due  to  the  different  legislation  in  the  Member 
States. The rights of officials in countries across the EU and the Schengen area differ 
significantly and it is not always clear to foreign officials what rights they have. In 
addition, the authorisation of requests and tools is often regulated by national laws, 
creating substantial difficulties in cross-border cooperation. 

o  Operational  perspective:  Across  different  countries  the  LEAs  responsible  for 
investigations may vary distinctively. These differences may relate to the structure of 
the  police  and  customs  bodies  within  the  countries  or  to  the  rights  each  law 
enforcement agencies has within their own country. This can hinder cooperation, if it 
is  difficult  for  foreign officials to  assess  who the cooperation should be  with.  This 
challenge was highlighted in relation to structures, tools and information exchange.  

  Challenges related to the exchange of information:  

o  Existing  information:  It  is  often  unclear  what  kind  of  information  exists  in  other 
countries on persons or goods relevant to an investigation. Interviewees highlighted 
that  using  a  two-step  approach,  i.e.  making  a  request  first  to  see  if  information  is 
available and then to  request  the information  itself often prolongs  the investigation 
process. Member States often seem hesitant to share information in joint databases, 
often leading to a lack of data in those databases. 

o  Access  to  communication  tools:  The  access  to  communication  tools  differs 
significantly across Members. For example, in some countries SIENA computers are 
only available to officials in their capital city. 

o  Usage of information sharing tools: While recognising that existing structures for 
information exchange serve different purposes, the large number of different tools in 
use can pose challenges. There is variation with regard to which tool is used for what 
purpose  across  the  Member  States.  Sometimes  this  is  due  to  the  accessibility  or 
procedures  within  the  Member  States.  This  lack  of  harmonisation  leads  to 
information  for  one  case  being  partially  shared  through  one  tool  and  partially 
through  another,  sometimes  with  different  recipients  on  these  tools.  This  results  in 
officials  not  having  all  necessary  information.  It  was  also  mentioned  that 

67 

 
 
occasionally  requests  are  submitted  through  different  channels  resulting  in 
duplication of request. 

  Lack  of  human  resources  for  cooperation:  The  lack  of  personnel  allocated  to  handle 
requests  for  cross-border  cooperation  was  highlighted  as  a  challenge  for  cooperation. 
Interviewees  highlighted  that  those  handling  the  requests  are  often  overwhelmed  with  the 
number of requests received, which can delay responses to requests. It was also highlighted 
that  often  those  persons  that  are  responsible  for  handling  the  request  may  not  be  familiar 
with the specific crime area of the request, which can lead to issues in addressing it. 

  Lack  of  awareness  of  structures,  tools  and  platforms:  Several  interviewees  mentioned 
that a lack of knowledge about  the different  cooperation tools available to  officials  on the 
national level can hinder cooperation on the EU level. 

In summary  

Overall,  the  interviews  provided  a  wide  range  of  views  regarding  cross-border  law  enforcement 
cooperation  in  terms  of  what  is  working  well  and  what  is  not  working  so  well,  seen  through  the 
eyes  of  these  stakeholders.  The  interviews  shed  light  on  the  cross-border  law  enforcement 
cooperation  and  the  practical  realities  the  stakeholders  are  faced  with  every  day.  While  some 
structures  seem  to  be  working  well  and  facilitate  cooperation,  officials  are  often  using  informal 
structures to  ensure smooth  cooperation, as trust in  officials  from  other  countries is  mentioned as 
the base of cooperation and the amount of channels and structures available are often confusing to 
use  and  need  to  be  revised.  There  was  a  consensus  that  the  overall  cooperation  tools  were 
introduced for a good reason, but a revision needs to be done, especially within the changing crime 
landscape the EU and the Schengen Area are facing.  

Member State representatives (case studies)  

In agreement with the EU Commission, Austria, France, Slovenia, Sweden, and Switzerland were 
selected  as  case  study  countries.  The  five  case  study  countries  provide  a  mix  in  terms  of  the 
following criteria: 

  Population size: The selected case studies encompass countries with rather small (Slovenia) 
and large population sizes (France). In total, 23% of the population in the countries analysed 
in the study are covered.138 

  GDP per capita: The selection of case studies includes countries with rather low (Slovenia) 

and high (Austria, Sweden, Switzerland) GDP per capita. 

  Number  of  reported  challenges  in  the  countries:  The  selected  case  studies  encompass 
four countries (France, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland) that have high numbers of issues in 
existing sources that refer to all three core problems identified. 

  Number of bi/tri/multilateral agreements identified in the study: The selected countries 
are  either  countries  with  medium  number  of  agreements  (France,  Slovenia,  Sweden)  and 
high number of agreements (Austria, Switzerland). 

  Scope  of  the  bi/tri/multilateral  agreements  analysed  in  the  study:  The  case  study 
selection includes countries with agreements that cover most categories, i.e. SOC and public 
safety,  information  sharing  as  well  as  investigative  tools  and  joint  operations  (Austria, 
France, Slovenia), and countries that e.g. cover mostly SOC and not all investigative tools 
and joint operations (Switzerland, Sweden). 

138 Eurostat (2021) Population on 1 January. Available at: link. 

68 

 
 
                                                                 
  Coverage  of  investigative  tools:  Among  the  selected  case  studies,  all  but  one  country 

(Switzerland) cover all types of investigative tools. 

  Categories  of  competent  authorities  for  the  SFD:  The  selection  of  case  studies  covers 
countries  with  rather  low  numbers  (Slovenia)  and  rather  high  numbers  of  categories 
(Sweden) of competent authorities for the SFD. 

69 

 
 
 
Criteria for the selection of case study countries 

Country 

Population 
Size in 2020 

GDP per 
capita in 
2020 

Number of 
Reported 
Challenges 
in key 
sources 

Number of 
Agreements 
Identified 

Scope of the Bi-/Tri-/Multilateral Agreements 
Analysed 

Investigative 
Tools Coverage 

SOC / Public 
Order and 
Safety 

Information 
Sharing 

Investigative 
Tools and 
Joint 
Operations 

Austria 

8,900,000 

42,110 € 

5 

11-15 

Both 

Yes 

Yes 

France 

67,300,000 

33,690 € 

9 

6-10 

Both 

Yes in all but 
one agreement 

Yes in all but 
one agreement 

Slovenia 

2,100,000 

22,010 € 

10 

6-10 

Sweden 

10,300,000 

45,610 € 

8 

6-10 

Both in all but 
one 
agreement 
Only SOC 

Yes 

No 

Yes 

No 

All 

All 

All 

All 

Switzerland 

8,600,000 

75,890 € 

9 

11-15 

Only SOC in 
six 
agreements 

Yes 

Yes in all but 
two 
agreements 

All but use of 
informants 

Source: EY/RAND Europe Study’s elaboration , based e.g. on Eurostat and desk research 

Number of 
Categories 
of 
Competent 
Authorities 
for the SFD 

3 

3 

2 

4 

3 

70 

 
 
A  total  of  26  national  representatives  were  interviewed  in  the  five  case  study  countries  in  12 
individual  case  study  interviews.  Additionally,  two  follow-up  interviews  were  conducted  with 
representatives from Belgium.  

Number of participants per case study country 

Case study country 

Austria 

France 

Slovenia 

Sweden 

Switzerland 

Number of 
interviews 
1 

Number of 
participants 
1 

4 

4 

1 

2 

12 

6 

1 

6 

Source: EY/RAND Europe Study’s elaboration , based on case study interviews 

The case study interviews were conducted to gather additional detailed information concerning: 

  Possible EU measures to address current problems affecting cross-border law enforcement 

cooperation; and  

  The likely impacts of these possible EU measures.  

The interviews were structured around the topic of access to and exchange of information.  

Access to and exchange of information 

The  interviewees  from  the  case  study  countries  were  either  indifferent  or  favourable  towards  the 
potential EU policy measures that had been developed to address current challenges in relation to 
access to and exchange of information.  

With regard to the  set-up and competencies of  the SPOCs and  PCCCs, interviewees  from  two 
case study countries specified that they assume positive impacts from the policy options for those 
Member States that have not already set up their SPOCs and PCCC in line with the presented policy 
options.  However,  they  expected  little  impact  for  their  own  countries  as  they  are  mainly  already 
complying with the presented measures. For instance, the interviewees highlighted that they already 
have SPOCs operating 24/7 and that if there is an information request, requests can be handled in 
real-time  with  no  delays,  particularly  in  urgent  cases.  Other  representatives,  nevertheless,  also 
estimated that if the SPOC were to have full access to relevant national case management systems, 
the  time  saved  would  be  at  least  several  days,  as  for  non-urgent  cases  signatures  by  competent 
authorities are always required. 

As  concerns  the  SPOC/PCCC  Case  Management  Systems  (CMS)  in  the  Member  States,  one 
representative  explained  that  they  are  already  in  the  planning  phase  for  a  CMS  in  their  country, 
which  would  comply  with  the  presented  policy  options  such  as  the  usage  of  Universal  Message 
Format  or  that  the  degrees  of  urgency  should  be  linked  with  deadlines.  Hence,  no  major  impacts 
were  expected  from  the  introduction  of  these  potential  EU  measures.  Interviewees  from  another 
case  study  country,  however,  expected  positive  impacts  from  the  provision  of  a  list  of  common 
requirements  for  functionalities,  since  the  existing  CMS  are  typically  based  on  inhouse  solutions 
and,  consequently,  not  necessarily  tailored  to  the  needs  of  cross-border  law  enforcement 
cooperation. 

Interviewees voiced different expectations about the impacts in relation to information exchange via 
SIENA and other communication channels. On the one hand, representatives from two case study 
countries only saw limited added value if English were to be established as the default language 

71 

 
 
for the use of SIENA and found SIENA user-friendly already. Stakeholders from another country 
did, however, expect to see positive impacts in terms of a reduction in working time currently spent 
on  translation  if  English  was  established  as  default  language  for  the  use  of  SIENA.  These 
stakeholders  were  of  the  view  that  SIENA  could  be  made  more  user-friendly  if  a  translation  tool 
was  integrated  in  SIENA,  which  would  allow  SPOCS  to  allocate  human  resources  currently 
dedicated to help out on translation issues to other urgent tasks. 

The  stakeholders  from  the  first  two  countries  were  more  favourable  towards  new,  simpler,  and 
more  user-friendly  forms,  which  could  result  in  a  limited  positive  impact.  Similarly, 
representatives  from  the  third  case  study  country  indicated  that  they  would  expect  clear  positive 
impacts if more user-friendly forms were established.  

As  concerns  the  establishment  of  SIENA  as  the  preferred  or  default  channel  for  information 
exchange,  representatives  from  one  case  study  country  indicated  that,  although  they  use  SIENA 
already  very  frequently  as  their  most  important  information  exchange  channel,  their  LEAs  would 
greatly benefit from even more Member States and SAC using SIENA as the preferred channel. 

One  representative  stressed  that  they  in  particular  expected  positive  impacts  from  EU  measures 
addressing  the  use  of  secure  communication  means.  They  currently  rely  on  WhatsApp  for  fast 
cross-border communication and for sharing initiative information without personal data, but would 
prefer a police communication mobile app or platform linked to SIENA with encrypted messaging. 
Hence,  the  development  of  common  standards  for  secure  communication  means  and  the 
development  of  a  “central  LEA  app”  would  help  to  solve  the  security  problems  with  respect  to 
WhatsApp and reduce delays when waiting for replies and reactions from officials from the other 
side of the border. 

Interviewees  expressed different  expected impacts concerning  training activities. If English were 
defined as an appropriate criterion for specific roles within certain LEAs working on primarily on 
international cases, one interviewee saw little added value as those officials working in cross-border 
cases in his/her country who need to speak English have a sufficient command of English. On the 
other hand, representatives from another case study expected positive impacts. They illustrated their 
opinion with  the example of the usage of SIENA:  If an official  needs support  to  fill  in  a form  in 
SIENA, then the SPOCs helps with the translation. If appropriate English skills were defined as an 
entry criterion, then the SPOCs could spend less human resources (or less working time) to assist 
with  translations.  Concerning  the  introduction  of  mandatory  training  on  EU  law  enforcement 
cooperation  for  officials  in  specific  roles  relevant  for  cross-border  law  enforcement,  one 
interviewee  stressed  the  positive  impacts  that  could  stem  from  a  reduction  in  specific  initial 
training,  which  are  set  up  in  advance  before  each  joint  operations.  If  training  was  more 
standardised,  administrative  costs  for  the  performance  of  trainings  and  working  hours  spent  by 
officials on trainings could be reduced. 

The problem definition 

Developments in the Public Order and SOC landscape 

Overall, the interviewees agreed that major issues are related to collaboration to fight SOC. In 
particular, the experts reported the presence of three main types of organised crime groups: 

  Mafia-like groups: A group that has a significant size and structure, which could be active in 

the economic sphere in infiltrations and in the illegal economy. 

  Local  groups:  Small  groups  linked  to  the  territory  where  many  different  groups  operate, 

performing different activities and having a flexible organisational structure.  

  Emerging  groups:  A  mix  of  ethnic  and  local  groups  that  has  resulted  from  the  migratory 

process that has affected Europe. 

72 

 
With reference to these groups, the consulted experts reported that in Europe expect that while there 
will  be  fewer  mafia-like  groups,  emerging  ethnic  groups  will  be  increasingly  important  in  the 
future. 

Law enforcement cooperation 

The academic experts reported that, overall, the actual practice of law enforcement cooperation has 
not  significantly  changed  in  the  last  ten  years  and  is  still  strongly  based  on  direct  contacts  and 
trust between law enforcement officials, rather than on formal cooperation schemes. 

Information sharing 

Academics reported that one of the main emerging issues is the high volume of data (Big Data) to 
be analysed, since the analyses is challenging in cases of vast amounts of information, including the 
amount of additional human resources that are currently required. 

With reference to the exchange of information, experts were critical towards the current availability 
of external analyses concerning information exchange. For instance, key EU bodies were stated 
to give no access to independent researchers, which hampers transparency and objective analysis. 

Policy objectives 

Academic  experts  highlighted  that  when  designing  policies,  it  is  important  to  take  into  account 
different  and  sometimes  conflicting  types  of  rationales.  The  main  types  which  are  usually 
considered are: Economic rationality; political rationality; legal rationality and practical rationality. 
Therefore,  it  is  fundamental  to  achieve  a  proper  balance  between  the  different  rationalities  and 
consider the relevance of all of them. However, according to the academics consulted, EU policies 
usually  stem  from  political  rationality  and  this  in  many  cases  contrasts  with  practical  and 
professional rationality. 

Over the last ten years, there have been some important developments, but the steps forward have 
not  translated  into  operational  practices  that  are  easy  to  implement.  Indeed,  there  are  regulatory 
asymmetries between Member States that need to be reduced. Such asymmetries between Member 
States are exploited by criminals.  

Focus groups 

Objectives and overview of the focus groups  

Four  focus  groups  were  carried  out  to  inform  the  Study  to  support  the  preparation  of  an  impact 
assessment on the EU policy initiatives facilitating cross-border law enforcement cooperation.  

To inform the study and to make recommendations for possible additional measures in the area of 
intra-EU  law  enforcement  cooperation  and  to  propose,  assess  and  compare  policy  options  for 
possible  future  action,  the  Study  Team  conducted  interviews,  analysed  existing  bi-,  tri-,  and 
multilateral  agreements  on  law  enforcement  cooperation  between  EU  Member  States  and  carried 
out three hours long focus groups on four agreements.  

This synopsis report provides an overview of the focus groups conducted, which included:  

  The bilateral agreement between Switzerland and France;  
  The bilateral agreement between Germany and the Czech Republic; 
  The  trilateral  agreement  between  Belgium,  Luxembourg  and  the  Netherlands  (BENELUX 

agreement); and 

73 

 
  The  multilateral  agreement  between  Norway,  Sweden,  Denmark,  Finland,  and  Iceland 

(Nordic agreement). 

These four agreements were selected in consultation with DG HOME. They were chosen due to the 
strong history on law enforcement cooperation between the countries involved, which was expected 
to  yield  examples  of  good  practices  and  remaining  challenges  in  the  area  of  law  enforcement 
cooperation. The focus groups were conducted in the second half of March 2021. 

In  total  48  stakeholders  participated  in  the  focus  groups.  The  stakeholders  were  selected  for  their 
experience working under the respective bi-/tri-/multilateral agreement. This included stakeholders 
with  either strategic or operational  level  experience and stakeholders from  either police, customs, 
or, other specialist departments.  

Number of participants per focus group 

Agreements 

Number of participants 

Benelux Agreement (BE, NL, LU) 

DE – CZ agreement 

CH – FR agreement 

Nordic countries agreement (DK, FI, IS, NO, SE) 

9 

12 

10 

17 

Source: EY/RAND Europe Study’s elaboration , based on interviews of focus groups 

Results of the focus groups  

Benelux Agreement 

The focus group on the Treaty between the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Kingdom of Belgium and 
the  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxembourg  on  police  cooperation  was  conducted  on  19  March  2021.139  A 
total  of  nine  stakeholders  participated:  five  representatives  from  the  Netherlands,  two  from 
Luxemburg and two from Belgium. 

The purpose of the Treaty is to intensify political cooperation in the territories of the Contracting 
Parties  in  terms  of  prevention,  investigation,  and  detection  of  criminal  offenses  as  well  as  the 
maintenance of public order and safety. As the Treaty is currently in the process of being ratified by 
the  three  Member  States,  the  focus  group  also  looked  at  differences  between  the  currently 
applicable version of the Benelux Treaty adopted on 8 June 2004, and the new one of 23 July 2018. 
Discussions and responses from stakeholders during the focus group indicate that overall, the treaty 
aligns with the wider EU framework for cooperation and exchange, and it is effective in supporting 
daily  police  cooperation.  It  enables  law  enforcement  activities  to  be  conducted  without  being 
hindered by borders. Examples include having central contact points and providing joint training for 
specialised  interventions  to  police  units.  Moreover,  two  improvements  under  the  new  Benelux 
treaty include the fact that across border observation can start in the other country territory and that 
in the case of hot pursuit, authorities will have complete and unlimited access to proceed in other 
countries of the agreement.  

139  Treaty  between  the  Kingdom  of  the  Netherlands,  Kingdom  of  Belgium  and  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxembourg  on 
police cooperation (2018).  

74 

 
                                                                 
CZ – DE Agreement 

The focus group on the Treaty between the Czech Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany 
on Police Cooperation  was held on 17 March 2021.140 A total of 12 stakeholders took part: three 
representatives from the Czech Republic and nine from Germany. 

The  agreement  aims  to  generally  strengthen  the  cooperation  between  the  two  countries  and  to 
prevent  and  investigate  criminal  activities.  This  includes  cases  that  are  classed  as  a  crime  by  one 
party and as an administrative offence by the other party.  

During the discussion, the participants highlighted the need, importance, and effectiveness  of this 
bilateral  agreement.  They  explained  that  cooperation  between  the  two  countries  is  important 
because of crimes occurring regularly in the border region. Overall, the participants considered the 
cooperation  between  the  two  countries  to  be  speedy,  efficient,  and  overall  uncomplicated.  For 
instance, the agreement allows to exchange information directly with customs investigation officials 
and  mobile  units.  This  is  useful  especially  during  drug  investigation  cases  or  in  the  fight  against 
smuggling. Moreover, customs and police from both countries have the possibility to join common 
training, which are often both theorical and practical.  

The discussion also  indicated that a more centralised system  and an increased involvement of the 
judicial  authorities  would  be  useful  to  further  improve  the  cooperation  and  avoid  possible 
duplications in the exchange of information.  
CH – FR Agreement 

The focus group on the Agreement between the Swiss Federal Council and the government of the 
Republic  of  France  on  Cross-border  Cooperation  in  judicial,  police  and  custom  matters  was 
conducted  on  15  March  2021.141  A  total  of  ten  stakeholders  joined  the  discussion:  five  from 
Switzerland and five from France.  

The  objective  of  the  agreement  is  to  prevent  and  investigate  crimes  and  offences,  as  well  as  to 
ensure public order and safety. It came into force at a time in which Switzerland was yet part of the 
Schengen  agreement,  which  means  that  the  country  actively  pursued  bilateral  treaties  with 
neighbouring countries. The idea of the agreement was to be en pair with the EU standards and to 
further  address  the  needs  of  the  police  on  the  field.  They  rely  on  efficient  communication  and  a 
common language to ensure effective cooperation. For instance, they make use of liaison officials, 
of  various  platforms  that  connect  different  agencies,  and  of  more  informal  communication 
activities. Moreover, due to  the area hosting many  international  organisations, the agreement also 
allows  a  smooth  cooperation  during  demonstrations  (e.g.  demonstrations:  against  the  Turkish 
government;  for  Armenian  rights;  for  taxi  drivers;  for  women  rights),  and  the  possibility  to  share 
information concerning risks and threats to the public order.  

However,  some  existing  processes  make  it  difficult  for  officials  to  obtain  information  and 
intelligence  quickly.  Also,  the  lack  of  a  common  legal  procedural  code  is  limiting.  Large 
differences in the two countries’ legal structure can sometimes hinder effective cooperation.  

140  Treaty  between  the  Czech  Republic  and  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  on  Police  Cooperation  and  on 
amendments to the Treaty between the  Czech  Republic and the Federal  Republic of  Germany on amendments  to the 
European  Convention  on  Mutual  Assistance  in  Criminal  Matters  from  20  April  1959  and  the  facilitation  of  its 
application from 2 February 2000.  
141  Agreement  between  the  Swiss  Federal  Council  and  the  government  of  the  Republic  of  France  on  Cross-border 
Cooperation in judicial, police and custom matters (2007). 

75 

 
                                                                 
Nordic countries Agreement 

The  focus  group  on  the  Nordic  Administrative  Agreement  on  Cooperation  between  Police 
Authorities in the Nordic countries (NO-SE-DK-IS-FI) was conducted on 22 March 2021.142 A total 
of  17  stakeholders  participated:  two  representatives  from  Norway,  six  from  Sweden,  three  from 
Denmark,  three  from  Finland  and  three  from  Iceland.  The  participants  decided  to  start  the  focus 
group  by  delivering  a  brief  presentation  about  the  agreement.  As  part  of  this  presentation,  the 
stakeholders  mentioned  the  strategic  objectives  for  the  Nordic  police  cooperation  (2019-2022) 
which include effective law enforcement, progressive and  future-proof policing,  a strong  regional 
voice on the international Arena and good conditions for police work, in the Nordic region. 

The agreement, which is currently being evaluated, aims to prevent, detect, and investigate criminal 
offences in order to ensure public order and internal security. The discussion with the stakeholders 
indicated  that  this  agreement  constitutes  a  memorandum  of  understanding,  setting  out  the 
parameters  of  the  cooperation  between  the  Nordic  countries.  Stakeholders  believe  that  the 
cooperation is effective because it is mainly informal and based on trust. Cooperation takes place on 
a  daily  basis  and  is  continuous  between  the  Nordic  countries.  They  have  liaisons  officials  now 
covering  32  countries,  which  facilitates  communication  and  the  fight  against  crime.  All  countries 
that are party to the Nordic agreement have access to the different liaison officials (e.g. Norway has 
access to Danish liaison officials). They also have constant operative operations, e.g. on the bridge 
between Sweden and Denmark. 

Good practices  

The  focus  group  activity  also  informed  the  identification  of  good  practices  and  remaining 
challenges.  Several  focus  group  participants  expressed  that  bi-/tri-/multilateral  agreements  are 
useful,  as  they  can  provide  additional  provisions  that  may  be  not  covered  in  other  existing 
frameworks, such as the Schengen Agreement143 and the Prüm Convention.144 

The  discussions  of  the  participants  during  the  focus  groups  highlighted  the  following  as  good 
practices: 

  Common  training:  Considered  very  useful  to  learn  and  practice  new  skills,  establish 
trusting relationships and further foster the willingness to engage in cooperation. This also 
includes  information  sessions  provided  to  local  police  forces  with  the  aim  to  explain  the 
links  between  the  operational  level  and  the  bilateral  agreement  by  showing  the  judicial 
viewpoint of the agreement as well as the practical implementation. 

  Regular  meetings:  considered  good  opportunities  to  share  experiences,  discuss  particular 
issues  across  countries,  exchange  information  and  explore  strategies  to  prevent  serious 
organised crime as well as an opportunity to further foster cooperation. During the COVID-
19  pandemic  these  have  been  replaced  by  video  conferences,  and  have  also  been  used  to 
discuss the latest infection rates and how each country was coping with the situation. 

  Direct communication: The participants explained that quick communication is an essential 
facilitator  of  successful  collaboration.  Police  forces  need  to  communicate  efficiently  to  be 
one step ahead of criminals.  

142 Nordic Administrative Agreement on Cooperation between Police Authorities in the Nordic countries (2016). 
143  The  Schengen  acquis  -  Convention  implementing  the  Schengen  Agreement  of  14  June  1985  between  the 
Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic 
on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders (1990). Available at: link. 
144 Prüm Treaty (on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism, cross-border crime 
and illegal migration). Available at: link  

76 

 
                                                                 
  Liaison officials: These are considered essential for an effective cooperation. However, the 
number of liaison officials differ between the countries. For instance, the Nordic countries 
have  liaison  officials  (both  customs  and  police  forces)  in  about  32  countries,  giving  all 
countries that are a party to the Nordic agreement access to this kind of network, but it is not 
the case everywhere.  

  Willingness  to  cooperate:  By  all  the  participants  this  was  considered  a  fundamental 

ingredient of effective cross-border cooperation.  

Challenges  

Although  the  focus  group  participants  mentioned  many  advantages  of  the  bi-/tri-/multilateral 
agreements in question, and shared various good practices, they also touched upon some remaining 
challenges.  During  the  discussions  they  identified  a  few  shortcomings  of  -  and  gaps  in  -  the  EU 
framework for intra-EU law enforcement cooperation and shed light on internal cooperation issues. 
The key points highlighted below: 

  Lack  of  harmonisation  and  persistent  structural  differences  between  countries  were 

considered the biggest challenges for law enforcement cooperation.  

  Operational perspective: Another key deficiency identified is the limited  effectiveness of 
SPOCs,  often  due  to  the  limited  resources  allocated  to  them  at  the  national  level,  both  in 
terms of number and type of police forces available.  

  Challenges  related  to  the  exchange  of  information:  Difficulties  to  easily  find  out  what 
type  of  information  is  available  in  other  countries,  and  logistic,  budget  and  personnel 
limitations hinder the ability to exchange information and follow up quickly.  

In summary  

Overall,  the  focus  group  activity  provided  a  wide  range  of  views  regarding  cross-border  law 
enforcement cooperation in terms of what is working well and what is working less well. The focus 
groups shed light on the cross-border law enforcement cooperation related measures and practices 
existing at the EU and national level, within the countries of the agreements selected.  

Technical workshops  

First technical workshop 

The  first  technical  workshop,  which  was  held  on  24  March  2021  and  to  which  close  to  200 
participants  registered,  involved  a  presentation  by  the  Study  Team  of  preliminary  findings 
concerning notably the problem assessment and interactive parallel workshops.  

The main findings from the discussions in the break-out sessions in the workshop were as follows: 

What are the issues at stake?  

Access to and exchange of information 

  Key issues include limited awareness of and access to relevant EU and national databases as 

well as limited interoperability of national systems; 

  Some  issues  specifically  relate  to  the  implementation  of  the  SFD,  notably  the  forms 
the  definition  of 

too  cumbersome  and 

the  SFD  are 

included  as  an  annex 
urgency/timeframe is not clear; 

to 

77 

 
  Police-to-police requests instead of other equally effective mechanisms (such as EUCARIS, 

ECRIS, VIS etc). 

How are the current problems expected to develop in case no further EU action is taken? 

Access to and exchange of information 

  Current problems will become more relevant in case no further EU action is taken; 

  The worsening of current problems is mainly attributed to new and evolving technological 

developments likely to affect the access to and exchange of information. 

Is there a need for EU intervention to address current problems? 

Access to and exchange of information 

  Current problems need to be addressed at the EU level. 

What types of policy measures could be considered to address the current problems? 

Access to and exchange of information 

 

In order to improve access to and information exchange, EU intervention should ensure full 
interconnection and streamlining of available systems for the exchange of information, the 
overall  consistency  of  the  EU  legal  framework,  and  the  full  awareness  and  capacity  of 
national  law  enforcement  authorities.  It  should  also  ensure  the  integration  of  modern 
requirements into fundamental rights and data protection rules. 

Second technical workshop, 25 May 2021  

The  second  technical  workshop  aimed  at  collecting  national  stakeholder’s  points  of  view  on 
possible  EU  measures  to  address  current  problems  affecting  cross-border  law  enforcement 
cooperation  in  relation  to  the  access  to  and  exchange  of  information,  operational  cooperation  for 
public order and safety and operational cooperation for SOC and terrorism, as well as the discussion 
of likely impacts of these potential EU measures. Similarly to the first technical workshop, close to 
200 persons signed up for the workshop. The workshop took place on 25 May 2021. 

The main findings from each of the three breakout sessions are as follows: 

Breakout session 1 - Access to and exchange of necessary information 

  Set-up and competences of the SPOC and PCCCs 

o  Strengths:  Time  savings,  more  clarity  of  competences,  responsibilities  and  rules, 
increased monitoring of possibilities for the SPOCs concerning the cases, the access 
to  national  and international  databases and platforms, possibility to  ask  for judicial 
authority support at any moment, and common standards of CMS; 

o  Weaknesses: The feasibility of some of the measures depending on the national-set 
up  was  questioned,  and  the  structural  differences  of  SPOCs,  PCCCs  and  judicial 
authorities between Member States, and the actual availability of data highlighted as 
challenges. 

  SPOC/PCCC Case Management Systems in the Member States 

o  Strengths:  An  intelligent  tool  would  facilitate  the  workflow,  presence  of  minimum 
essential  requirements  for  CMS  for  all  Member  States,  time  savings,  better  data 
quality,  avoidance  of  duplications,  establishment  of  similar  workflows  in  different 
Member States; 

78 

 
o  Weaknesses: Costs for Member States in developing the CMS, feasibility linked to 
national specificities (the integration of specific solution within the national systems 
might  be  challenging,  depending  on  the  current  individual  solution  used  in  the 
Member State). 

 

Information exchange via SIENA and other communication channels 

o  Strengths: Time savings, increased clarity on which communication channel should 

be used when, increased level of security; 
o  Weaknesses: Complexity of access rights. 

  Use of secure communication means 

o  Strengths:  The  idea  of  a  “LEA  app”  was  considered  as  interesting  by  some 

participants. 

  Training activities 

o  Strengths:  Additional  material  provided  by  CEPOL  would  be  welcomed,  and 

harmonisation of the procedures would simplify the training; 

o  Weaknesses:  Training  should  not  be  too  general  but  targeted,  both  in  terms  of  the 
form and the content (e.g. efficient use of SIENA). The limited availability of time 
for the officials on the ground should be considered. 

Results from the public consultation  

1.  INTRODUCTION 

In  the  context  of  the  Study  to  support  the  preparation  of  an  impact  assessment  on  the  European 
Union (EU) policy initiatives facilitating cross-border law enforcement cooperation, carried out by 
EY and RAND Europe, a Public Consultation (PC) in all EU official languages concerning current 
problems  and  the  future  of  cross-border  law  enforcement  cooperation  was  carried  out  via  the 
Commission’s  tool  EUSurvey.  The  PC  ran  between  19  April  and  14  June  2021.  Overall,  20 
responses were received from stakeholders in 12 countries, including 10 Member States (AT, BE, 
CZ, DE, EL, ES, HU, IT, LU and PT), one Schengen Associate Country (CH) and one third country 
(US). 

2.  BACKGROUND INFORMATION 

Regarding  the  profile  of  the  respondents,  nine  answered  the  survey  as  individuals  (eight  EU 
citizens  and  one  non-EU  citizen),  while  the  remaining  11  respondents  answered  on  behalf  of  an 
organisation  (two  public  authorities,  one  business  association,  one  trade  union,  two  NGOs,  one 
academic/research  institution,  and  four  “other”).  The  size  of  the  concerned  organisations  was  the 
following: five large (250 or more employees), three medium (50 to 249 employees), two small (10 
to 49 employees) and one micro (1 to 9 employees) organisation. Of these organisations, five are 
included in the Transparency Register.145 

3.  PART I - QUESTIONS CONCERNING CURRENT PROBLEMS 

The threat landscape 

145  The  transparency  register  has  been  set  up  to  answer  core  questions,  such  as  what  interests  are  being  pursued,  by 
whom  and  with  what  budgets.  The  system  is  operated  jointly  by  the  European  Parliament  and  the  European 
Commission. Available at: link.  

79 

 
 
                                                                 
Considering the evolution of the crime situation in Europe, the majority of respondents agreed that 
the number of crimes increased in the last 5-10 years in all the main crime areas,146 with the highest 
rates for cybercrime, drugs and trafficking in  human beings. Similarly, the number is  expected to 
further  increase  in  the  next  5-10  years  (apart  from  trade  of  illicit tobacco).147  Moreover,  all  these 
crime areas  are  considered to  have  a cross-border dimension and require  EU-wide  cooperation of 
law  enforcement  authorities  to  be  properly  addressed,148  especially  cybercrime,  drugs,  terrorism, 
financial crimes and trafficking in human beings. 

From the point of view of  public order and safety, respondents  to  the public consultation  stated 
that the situation in the past-5-10 years did not deteriorate.149 Nevertheless, similar to the responses 
for the crime areas above, most respondents agreed that all the key areas under investigation require 
EU-wide law enforcement cooperation.150 

Cross-border law enforcement cooperation to fight transnational crimes 

Around half of the respondents  to  the consultation considered themselves to  have an extensive or 
even in-depth knowledge of the EU framework for cross-border law enforcement cooperation (56%, 
n=9).  The  position  of  the  respondents  on  the  effectiveness  of  the  current  cross-border  law 
enforcement cooperation mechanisms between EU Member States to fight transnational crimes 
overall is fairly positive, as 43% (n=6), consider it high, 43% (n=6) moderate and 14% (n=2) small. 
Similarly,  taking  into  consideration  the  situation  in  the  individual  crime  areas,  cooperation 
mechanisms  are  considered  effective  in  most  areas  to  a  moderate  extent,151  with  the  exception of 
cybercrime, for which respondents are divided (36%, n=5 small extent, 21%, n=3 moderate, 29%, 
n=4 high, and 14%, n=2 very high) and drugs (50%, n=7 responding high or very high extent). 

Cross-border law enforcement cooperation to ensure public order 

Regarding public order, half of the respondents deems cooperation mechanisms overall effective to 
a high or very high extent in protecting the mobility of EU citizens and safeguarding public order 
(50%, n=7). More specifically, a high level of effectiveness was noted in particular for international 
sport/music/cultural  events,  with  57%  (n=8)  of  the  respondents  indicating  that  it  is  effective  to  a 
high or very high extent. An overall relatively high proportion of the respondents were also of the 
view  that  cooperation  is  rather  effective  in  relation  to  cross-border  commuting,  with  50%  (n=7) 

146 Percentage of respondents stating that the number of crimes has slightly or significantly increased: cybercrime 93% 
(n=13),  drugs  93%  (n=13),  trafficking  in  human  beings  85%  (n=11),  organised  property  crime  75%  (n=9), 
environmental crimes 62% (n=8), trafficking of firearms 62% (n=8), illicit tobacco trade 58% (n=7), financial crimes 
54% (n=7) and terrorism 54% (n=7). 
147 Percentage of respondents stating that the number of crimes will slightly or significantly increase: cybercrime 93% 
(n=14),  financial  crimes  71%  (n=10),  trafficking  of  firearms  71%  (n=10),  drugs  67%  (n=10),  terrorism  67%  (n=10), 
organised  property  crime  65%  (n=9),  trafficking  in  human  beings  64%  (n=9),  environmental  crimes  57%  (n=8)  and 
illicit tobacco trade 43% (n=6). 
148  Percentage  of  respondents  stating  that  the  following  crime  areas  have  a  cross-border  dimension  to  a  high  or  very 
high  extent:  cybercrime  100%  (n=15),  drugs  100%  (n=15),  terrorism  100%  (n=15),  financial  crimes  93%  (n=14), 
trafficking  in  human  beings  93%  (n=14),  trafficking  of  firearms  79%  (n=11)  organised  property  crime  77%  (n=10), 
illicit tobacco trade 67% (n=10) and environmental crimes 53% (n=8). 
149 Percentage of respondents  stating that the security situation in the following areas did not deteriorate or did it to a 
small  or  to  a  moderate  extent:  cross-border  commuting  85%  (n=11),  international  sport/music/cultural  events  69% 
(n=9), and tourism 57% (n=8). 
150  Percentage  of  respondents  stating  that  the  following  areas  require  cross-border  law  enforcement  cooperation  to  a 
high or very high extent: pandemics 87% (n=13), natural disasters 80% (n=12), cross-border commuting 67% (n=10), 
tourism  67%  (n=10),  safeguard  of  national  public  order  and  safety  53%  (n=8)  and  international  sport/music/cultural 
events 47% (n=7). 
151 Percentage of respondents stating that cooperation mechanisms are effective to a moderate extent: financial crimes 
64% (n=9), trafficking of firearms 57% (n=8), organised property crime 50% (n=7), environmental crimes 46% (n=6), 
illicit tobacco trade 46% (n=6), terrorism 46% (n=6) and trafficking in human beings 42% (n=6). 

80 

 
                                                                 
stating that this is a achieved to a moderate extent and 43% (n=6) to a high extent. The opinion is 
more mixed for natural disasters, pandemics and tourism.152 

Barriers to cross-border law enforcement cooperation 

According  to  the  respondents,  the  main  issues  affecting  cross-border  law  enforcement 
cooperation  include  that  the  relevant  EU  legal  framework  is  not  consolidated  (i.e.  it  is  spread 
across  several  legislative  instruments),  and  that  it  is  not  consistently  implemented  across  the 
Member States (i.e. the Member States implement it differently), with 67% (n=10) and 64% (n=9) 
of respondents respectively stating that these issues are problematic to a high or very high extent. 
Considering  the safeguards  to  protect  fundamental  rights  of persons subject  to  measures of cross-
border  cooperation,  half  of  the  respondents  deems  them  sufficient  to  a  high  of  very  high  extent 
(50%,  n=8),  while  the  other  50%  (n=8)  stated  that  they  are  sufficient  only  to  a  small  or  to  a 
moderate extent. 

Investigative tools to tackle cross-border crimes 

Available investigative tools are considered to be effective in tackling and combating cross-border 
crimes,153 in particular Joint Police Offices and the interception of communication, although more 
trust  between  the  Member  States  was  stated  to  be  needed  to  a  high  or  very  high  extent  by  67% 
(n=10) of the respondents and higher technical and financial resources at the national level to a high 
or very high extent by 64% (n=9), and are thus are perceived to have the potential to enhance their 
use and overall effectiveness. 

Investigative tools to tackle serious and organised crime at the national level 

At the national level, investigative tools are considered to be less effective or even not effective at 
all,154  with  the  exception  of  the  interception  of  communication.  Thus,  the  large  majority  of 
respondents  sees  the  need  for  new  tools  to  investigate  organised  crime  groups  in  light  of  recent 
technological  advancements/new  technologies  and  the  ability  of  criminals  to  exploit  them  (82%, 
n=9). 

PART II - NEED FOR EU ACTION AND POSSIBLE POLICY OPTIONS 

According to  the majority  of respondents,  there is  a  need for EU intervention to improve cross-
border  law  enforcement  cooperation  through  the  adoption  of  legislative  and/or  non-legislative 
measures in the fight against serious and organised crime (86%; n=12), terrorism (79%, n=10) and 
other  transnational  crimes  (71%,  n=11),  while  such  need  is  not  perceived  to  be  as  strong  for 
ensuring public order against less serious offences (31%, n=4).  

Among those considering EU intervention to be necessary, the focus of such intervention should be 
the  revision  and  update of  existing  legislative  measures  according  to  16 respondents,  and  also  on 
non-legislative  measures  (e.g.  guidelines,  recommendations,  good  practices),  as  noted  by  11 
respondents. 

152  Natural  disasters:  8%  (n=1)  not  at  all,  31%  (n=4)  small  extent,  31%  (n=4)  moderate  extent  and  31%  (n=4)  high 
extent; pandemics: 8% (n=1) not at all, 27% (n=4) small extent, 38% (n=5) moderate extent and 23% (n=3) high extent; 
tourism: 29% (n=4) small extent, 29% (n=4) moderate extent and 43% (n=6) high extent. 
153  Percentage  of  respondents  stating  the  tools  are  effective  to  a  high  or  very  high  extent:  Joint  Police  Offices  71% 
(n=10), interception of communication 69% (n=9), Special Investigation Units 64% (n=9), covert investigations 62% 
(n=8), Joint Patrols 57% (n=8), controlled deliveries 54% (n=7), informants 54% (n=7), hot pursuit 50% (n=7), witness 
protection 50% (n=7) and cross-border surveillance 46% (n=6). 
154 Percentage of respondents stating the tools are not effective at all or to a small or moderate extent: informants 71% 
(n=10),  controlled  deliveries  69%  (n=9),  hot  pursuit  69%  (n=9),  witness  protection  64%  (n=9),  covert  investigations 
54% (n=7), surveillance 50% (n=7) and interception of communication 42% (n=6). 

81 

 
                                                                 
The answers to the more specific questions concerning possible measures likely to enhance intra-
EU law enforcement cooperation show a similar picture. Those measures which are considered to 
have  the  potential  to  contribute  to  improving  cross-border  cooperation  to  a  larger  (high  or  very 
high) extent are the modernisation of the EU legal framework for law enforcement cooperation to 
cope  with  new  challenges  posed  by  criminals  (67%,  n=10),  the  setting  up  of  new  operational 
initiatives for law enforcement cooperation (64%, n=7) and the simplification and streamlining of 
the EU legal framework for law enforcement cooperation (53%, n=8). Comparatively less relevant 
would be the creation of a single set of rules for all law enforcement authorities (police, customs, 
etc.)  (47%,  n=7),  the  definition  of  EU  common  rules  for  the  use  of  investigative  tools  to  combat 
serious  and  organised  crime/terrorism  (43%,  n=6)  or  the  design  of  non-binding  documents  (new 
recommendations, guidelines and good practices) for law enforcement cooperation (33%, n=5). The 
position  of  the  respondents  on  the  extent  to  which  the  adoption  of  measures  granting  additional 
powers to  law  enforcement  authorities  would require additional safeguards to  protect individuals’ 
fundamental rights is mixed.155 

List of the stakeholders consulted 

Interviews 

EU Bodies 

Overview of the number of stakeholders consulted from EU bodies 

EU Body/Institutions 
CEPOL 
EDPS 
EJN  
EJTN 
EMCDDA  
EPPO 
EUCPN 
Eurojust 
Europol 
FRA  

N° of Interviewees 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 

Source: EY/RAND Europe Study’s elaboration  

Academia and Think Tanks 

Overview of the number of stakeholders consulted from academia and think tanks 

Institution 
Leiden University 
Queen Mary University of London 
Tilburg University 
Transcrime (Università Cattolica of Milan) 

N° of Interviewees 
1 
1 
1 
1 

Source: EY/RAND Europe Study’s elaboration  

EMPACT Drivers 

155 13% (n=2) respondents stating to a very high extent, 20% (n=3) to a high extent, 20% (n=3) to a moderate extent, 
33% (n=5) to a small extent, and 13% (n=2) not at all. 

82 

 
 
                                                                 
Overview of the number of stakeholders consulted from EMPACT Drivers 

Member State 
Belgium 
France 
France 
Greece 
Italy 
Lithuania 
Spain 
Spain 

Priority 
Cybercrime 
Horizonal Expert Group on Document fraud 
Organised Property Crime (OPC) 
Facilitating Illegal immigration 
MTIC fraud 
Excise Fraud 
Firearms 
Drugs 

Source: EY/RAND Europe Study’s elaboration  

EMPACT Support Managers 

N° of Interviewees 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 

Overview of the number of stakeholders consulted from EMPACT Support Managers 

Priority 
Money laundering 
Cybercrime - CSA/CSE 
Excise and MTIC fraud 
Environmental crime 
OPC 
Cybercrime – Cyber attacks on information system 
Cybercrime – Non-cash payment Fraud 
Criminal Finances, Money Laundering and Asset Recovery 

N° of Interviewees 
1 
2 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 

Source: EY/RAND Europe Study’s elaboration  

Online survey 

LEAs 

Overview of the stakeholders consulted from LEAs 

Country 

Institution (n° of respondents) 

Austria 

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Croatia 

Cyprus 

Czech Republic 

Denmark 

Bundesministerium für Inneres 
Criminal intelligence service 
Ministry of Finance - Tax and Customs Administration 
Belgian federal police 
General Administration of Customs and Excises 
National Customs Agency of the Republic of Bulgaria 
Ministry of Interior  
Customs 
General Police Directorate, Criminal Police Directorate, General 
Crime Service (OPC and envir. Crime) 
Cyprus police - c.i.d. (ops) 
Department of Customs and Excise 
Intelligence management analysis subdirectorate 
N.f.i.p. cyprus police 
Customs 
The Police Presidium of the Czech Republic; Division for 
International Police Cooperation 
Police of the Czech Republic, National Organised Crime Agency 
Ministry of Interior 
Special investigation west / east jutland police 
Danish national police 
Copenhagen police - border crime centre oeresund 
Pccc padborg 

83 

 
Country 

Institution (n° of respondents) 

Estonia 

Finland 

France 

Germany 

Greece 

Hungary 

Ireland 
Latvia 

Liechtenstein 

Lithuania 

Luxembourg 
Malta 

Netherlands 

Norway 
Poland 

Portugal 

Romania 

Slovakia 

National Centre of Investigation 
Sydsjællands og Lolland Falsters politi 
Estonian Police and Border Guard Board 
National Bureau of Investigation / Finnish Police 
National police board  
Finnish border guard  
Nbi finland /spoc 
Finnish Police / National Bureau of Investigation  
Finnish customs 
Antinarcotics agency (ofast) 
Border police central directorate 
DCI - Direction de la cooperation internationale 
Dgddi 
French national border directorate 
Gendarmerie nationale 
National football information point 
National Gendarmerie / Central Service for Criminal Intelligence 
OCLDI - Central Office fighting against mobile organised crime 
Oclti 
Sirasco 
Bmi 
Bundeskriminalamt/federal criminal police office 
Central customs authority 
Hellenic police 
International law enforcement cooperation centre 
National Bureau of Investigation  
DG Law Enforcement Public Safety Protection and Guard 
Dg law enforcement duty department 
National Tax and Customs Administration 
An garda siochana - irish police  
State Revenue Service, Tax and Customs Police Department  
Pccc schaanwald 
National police  
Police Department under moi Public Police Board Response and 
Readiness Unit NFIP Lithuania 
Customs criminal service 
Grand ducal police 
Customs 
Customs 
Ministry of Justice and Security  
National police directorate 
Ministry of Finance / National Revenue Administration 
Polícia de Segurança Pública 
Policia judiciária  
Internal security system 
Guardia nacional republicana 
Tax and Customs Authority 
Polícia judiciária - ct national unit (unct) 
General Directorate for Operational Management - Ministry of 
Internal Affairs - Romania 
National Football Information Point - General Inspectorate of the 
Romanian Gendarmerie 
Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic 
National crime agency (naka) 

84 

 
Country 

Institution (n° of respondents) 

Presidium of Police Force, Criminal Police Bureau, Spectator 
Violence Unit, National Football Information Point 
Presidium of the Police Corps, Criminal Police Office, Department 
of Criminal Investigation 
General police directorate  
Policia nacional  
Nfip - policia nacional 
State Secretary for Security 
Comisaría General de Policia Judicial- Unidad Central de 
Delincuencia Especializada y Violenta- Brigada de Patrimonio 
Histórico 
Customs 
Customs 
The swedish police authority 
Swiss Federal Office of Police fedpol 
Source: EY/RAND Europe Study’s elaboration  

Slovenia 

Spain 

Sweden 

Switzerland 

National Judicial Authorities 

Overview of the stakeholders consulted from National Judicial Authorities 

Country 

Institution (n° of respondents) 

Cyprus 
Estonia 
Germany 
Latvia 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Romania 
Slovakia 
Sweden 
Switzerland 

Eurojust National Member 
Eurojust National Member 
Eurojust National Member 
Eurojust National Member 
Eurojust National Member 
Eurojust National Member 
Eurojust National Member 
Eurojust National Member 
Eurojust National Member 
Eurojust National Member 
Eurojust National Member 
Source: EY/RAND Europe Study’s elaboration  

National Data Protection Authorities 

Overview of the stakeholders consulted from National Data Protection Authorities 

Country 

Institution (n° of respondents) 

National Data Protection Authority 
National Data Protection Authority 
National Data Protection Authority 
National Data Protection Authority 
National Data Protection Authority 
National Data Protection Authority 
National Data Protection Authority 
National Data Protection Authority 
National Data Protection Authority 
National Data Protection Authority 
Source: EY/RAND Europe Study’s elaboration  

Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Estonia 
Hungary 
Lithuania 
Poland 
Romania 
Slovenia 

Focus groups 

Benelux Agreement 

85 

 
Overview of the stakeholders consulted with respect to the Benelux Agreement 

Country 

Institution (n° of participants) 

Belgium 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Netherlands 
Netherlands 

Federal Police (2) 
Police Grand-Ducale (2) 
Netherlands Defence Academy 
Ministry of Justice and Security (2) 
National Police (2) 

Source: EY/RAND Europe Study’s elaboration  

Czechia-Germany Agreement 

Overview of the stakeholders consulted with respect to the Czechia-Germany Agreement 

Country 
Czechia 
Czechia 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 

Institution (n° of participants) 

International police cooperation directorate (3) 
Cezch republic liaison officer 
Police Academy Hamburg 
Customs 
Bavarian State Police 
PCCC 
Ministry of Finance (2) 
Source: EY/RAND Europe Study’s elaboration  

France-Switzerland Agreement 

Overview of the stakeholders consulted with respect to the France-Switzerland Agreement 

Country 

Institution (n° of participants) 

France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
Switzerland 
Switzerland 

Nordic Agreement 

Secrétariat général des affaires européennes 
Direction de la Coopération Internationale (DCI) (2) 
Service de la Justice et des affaires intérieures (2) 
Police Nationale 
Gendarmerie 
Federal Police 
Département de la sécurité, de l'emploi et de la santé (3) 

Source: EY/RAND Europe Study’s elaboration  

Overview of the stakeholders consulted with respect to the Nordic Agreement 

Country 

Institution (n° of participants) 

Denmark 
Finland 
Iceland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Sweden 

Case study interviews 

National Police (3) 
National Police (3) 
National Police (3) 
National Police (2) 
Swedish Police Authority (4) 
Customs 

Source: EY/RAND Europe Study’s elaboration  

Overview of the stakeholders consulted as case studies 

Country 

Institution (n° of case study interviews) 

Austria 
France 

planned 
Ministry of the Interior, National Police, Gendarmerie (4) 

86 

 
Hungary 
Slovenia 
Sweden 
Switzerland 

planned 
Ministry of the Interior, Criminal Police Directorate (4) 
planned 
Federal Police (2) 

Source: EY/RAND Europe Study’s elaboration 

ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW? 

Main stakeholders impacted by the preferred policy option   

EU citizens 

The preferred policy option  aim to support law enforcement officers in the exercise of their tasks 
against  criminal  offences,  thereby  contribute  to  enhancing  the  security  and  well-being  of  EU 
citizens.  

Law enforcement authorities  

In particular the law enforcement authorities of Member States that are responsible for the exchange 
of international information, and the law enforcement officers on the ground, essentially in intra-EU 
border areas, having access to information. Europol and its secure communication channel SIENA 
and CEPOL, would also be impacted.  

Costs and benefits of the preferred policy option  

Costs of the preferred policy option 

The  preferred  policy  option  requires  IT  investments  at  national  level,  and  an  increased  need  for 
training of impacted law enforcement officials. Specifically, for those that have not already done so, 
national SPOCs and PCCCs will have to establish a CMS, and to roll-out Europol's SIENA to these 
structures, and to criminal investigators.  

For a CMS, a one-size fits all cost estimation is impossible, as national costs are largely depending 
on  system  complexity,  number  of  users,  functionalities,  licenses,  infrastructure,  etc.  For  Europol, 
the respective costs could be of EUR 150.000, without infrastructure and hardware costs.  

Establishing a common minimum set of data that has to be made available for exchange, as well as 
establishing  SIENA  as  the  privileged  channel  of  communication  and  defining  common 
requirements  for  functionalities  of  the  CMS  is  expected  to  have  a  very  positive  impact  on  the 
overall  efficiency  of  the  access  to  and  exchange  of  information.  It  can  be  expected  that  the 
exchange of information will become swifter, less time consuming, and overall less burdensome in 
view of the information that can reasonably be expected from counterparts in other countries. This 
has also been confirmed in various interviews with national stakeholders156.  

The possible costs associated with SIENA  

Europol  estimated  that  the  implementation  of  the  SIENA  functions  foreseen  in  the  baseline  scenario 
could  costs  individual  Member  States  around  EUR  50,000  on  an  annual  basis  over  the  next  five  to 
seven years for the implementation of SIENA web services. 

The  calculation  is  based  on  several  assumptions:  There  is  already  an  existing  case  management 
system technologically able to integrate with SIENA web services and the network infrastructure does 
not require additional investments. The average EUR 50,000 take into account EUR 30,000 to 40,000 

156 Interviews conducted on 27. and 28.05.2021, as well as 04., 07., and 08.06.2021 

87 

 
 
 
                                                                 
for technical development and 10,000 to 15,000 EUR staff training and technical visits to/by EUROPOL. 

Europol  estimated  that,  on  the  side  of  the  Member  States,  the  most  expensive  cost  item  relating  to 
SIENA would be its integration with national Case Management Systems. 

For  users  of  the  SIENA  web  application  the  costs  are  mainly  limited  to  maintaining  the  national 
connection point, whereas the maintenance of rack, server, encryption etc. would be under Europol’s 
responsibility. 

As the new functionalities would be made available incrementally, the learning curve would – as much 
as possible be levelled. This means that associated costs to ‘learn’ how to apply SIENA are expected to 
be marginal. 

With  the  launch  of  SIENA  BPL,  Member  States  would  be  able  to  take  advantage  of  their  secure 
infrastructure  which  allows  further  extensions  of  SIENA  without  incurring  costs  related  to  technical 
upgrades and accreditation to EU-RES. 

Based on previous experience in supporting Member States with implementation of the web services, 
Europol  estimated  their  necessary  budgetary  to  be  around  1  Mio.  Euro.  This  amount  is  expected  to 
facilitate the integration of SIENA web services in Member States that do not yet use it, e.g. through 
technical guidance on SIENA. 

However, the majority of participants of breakout session 1 indicated at the 2nd technical workshop 
that working time could be reduced to  a moderate extent only.  It  was explained, though, that this 
reduction  of  working  time  related  to  the  access  to  and  exchange  of  information  overall.  The 
working time spent on tasks of rather administrative nature, however, can be expected to decrease 
to a large extent. As a consequence, law enforcement officials are expected to be able to spend an 
even  larger  share  of  their  working  time  on  actually  contributing  to  ‘solving’  cases  rather  than 
managing them. 

Overall, the positive impacts of the measures on the efficiency of law enforcement cooperation are 
expected  to  be  balanced  from  an  efficiency  perspective  –  at  least  to  some  extent  –  by  the 
investments and operational costs the measures foreseen under this policy option may necessitate. 
More specifically, this refers to the following types of costs: 

 

Investments  in  IT-infrastructure  (both  hard-  and  software),  as  well  as  its  continuous 
maintenance (see textbox above); 

  Staff  costs  relating  to  an  overall  increased  workload  due  more  effective  law  enforcement 
cooperation  (i.e.  judicial  authorities  being  available  within  SPOCs  24/7,  more  cases  being 
handled, albeit in a more efficient manner); and 

  Time spent to train officials in relation to new legislative requirements, processes, IT tools, 

as well as language training. 

Moreover,  additional  infrastructure  costs  are  expected  to  be  incurred  stemming  e.g.  from  the 
increased  use  of  electricity,  the  use  of  office  space  (e.g.  rent,  heating,  depreciation  of  physical 
assets). Comprehensive quantitative evidence of the level of these costs is, however, not available.  

With specific  regard  to  necessary  investments  in  IT-infrastructure  and  maintenance  in  the  area  of 
cross-border  law  enforcement  cooperation,  no  evidence  is  available.  However,  the  European 
Commission published a report in 2018 in relation to the re-use of public sector information which 
references estimates for necessary technical and administrative investment costs for a national IT-
development and roll-out project relating to the re-use of data157. The data stems from Poland and is 
provided in the following table. 

157 European Commission (2018): Study to support the review of Directive 2003/98/EC on the re-use of public sector 
information. 
https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/impact-assessment-support-study-revision-public-
sector-information-directive  

See: 

88 

 
 
                                                                 
Cost item 

Budget (EURm) 

Illustrative example of IT-project costs 

IT equipment, programs and licenses, computers and servers 

Preparation of project, feasibility study 

IT services, audits and tests, APIs 

Legal services, translations, consulting 

Salaries (experts for open standards, trainers, portal design, partners) 

Other salary related costs 

Training 

Training material 

Information and promotion 

Total 

1.17  

0.20  

2.10  

0.15  

2.19  

0.05  

0.27  

0.03  

0.15  

6.28  

Source: European Commission (2018) 

The  illustrative  example  provided  in  the  table  above  should  be  treated  very  carefully:  It  does  not 
relate to IT developments in the area of cross-border law enforcement, but merely gives an idea of 
the  level  of  costs  for  an  IT  project.  For  comparative  purposes:  The  2020  German  federal  budget 
contained an item called “Police IT Fund” in relation to which EUR 4.38 million were allocated.158 
In  addition,  there  is  IT-related  budget  allocated  in  each  of  the  16  federal  states.  In  Bavaria,  for 
instance,  around  EUR  2.15  million  were  devoted  to  the  procurement  and  rental  of  hard-  and 
software in 2020159. A very rough estimate of the overall IT-budget allocated to the German police 
forces  (both  federal  and  state  levels)  could,  therefore,  be  between  EUR  28  and  39 million160.  It 
could be assumed that around 20% of that budget is spent on IT that is also used in some shape or 
form in relation to cross-border law enforcement cooperation. This equals an amount of EUR 5,6 to 
7.8 million – which is roughly in line with the estimate above from Poland. 

Member States are expected to incur costs related to the common minimum set of data that has to be 
made available by all Member States for exchange. These costs relate to both the implementation of 
the necessary IT systems, as well as the collection of statistics. The magnitude of costs per Member 
State depends on the extent to which the current systems are already aligned with the requirements 
foreseen  under  this  policy  option.  The  costs  are,  however,  expected  to  be  covered  within  the  IT-
related costs identified above. 

In particular streamlining awareness and knowledge across law enforcement officials may be a 
time-consuming, and thus budget-heavy exercise. It has repeatedly been pointed out by stakeholders 
at both the EU and national levels throughout this study that the knowledge and operational skills 
among officials in relation to cross-border law enforcement cooperation in the EU is insufficient to 
fulfil the tasks at hand in the most effective and efficient manner. 

Although CEPOL has been providing training over the past couple of years to an increasingly large 
number of officials (close to 40,000 in 2020), including in the area of law enforcement cooperation 
and information exchange, the share of officials that has already been (or much rather continuously 

158 Bundesregierung (2020): Bundeshaushaltsplan. Einzelplan  06. Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat 
p. 39. See: https://www.bundeshaushalt.de/fileadmin/de.bundeshaushalt/content_de/dokumente/2020/soll/epl06.pdf  
159  Freistaat  Bayern:  Haushaltsplan  2019 
Staatsministeriums 
https://www.stmfh.bayern.de/haushalt/staatshaushalt_2019/haushaltsplan/Epl03.pdf  
160 The budget of the state levels could e.g. range between EUR 1.5 and 2.15 million. 

/2020.  Einzelpna  03  für  den  Geschäftsbereich  des  Bayerischen 
See: 
Integration. 
für 

Innern, 

Sport 

219. 

und 

des 

p. 

89 

 
                                                                 
is) trained in this regard is considered to be comparatively low given the large amount of officials 
potentially  involved  in  cross-border  law  enforcement  operations.  It  is  expected  that  only  between 
1% and 3% of all officials have been trained with regard to cross-border matters so far. 

As part of an interview, CEPOL indicated that additional budget has been requested for the coming 
programming  period  in  relation  to  the  delivery  of  relevant  further  volume  of  cybercrime  related 
services, as well as further services on Artificial Intelligence (AI) and big data analysis. 

  With  regard  to  the  former,  CEPOL  for  2022  expects  an  increase  in  the  number  of  annual 
onsite of 270 plus 1,500 additional participants online compared to 2021. This would require 
–  on  top  of  the  planned  2021  resources  -  an  additional  budget  of  900,000  EUR  and  an 
additional  5  Fulltime  Equivalents  (FTEs)  –  more  specifically  2  FTEs  training  officials,  1 
Analyst, 1 eLearning official, and 1 ICT official). 

  As  concerns  the  latter,  CEPOL  estimated  that  this  would  require,  as  of  2023,  additional 
budget  around  750,000  EUR  plus  4  FTEs  –  more  specifically  2  FTEs  training  officials,  1 
Analyst, 1 eLearning official, and 1 ICT official). 

In  addition  to  the  efforts  of  CEPOL,  Member  States  themselves  are  already  taking  initiative  with 
regard  to  training  –  both  in  relation  to  information  exchange  and  operational  cooperation.  For 
instance, it was reported during the 2nd technical workshop in May 2021 that Belgium and France 
have an agreement in place about the mutual training of 7,000 officials to improve law enforcement 
cooperation with particular regard to road and train transport, as well as large events. In addition to 
the  costs  related  to  this  training,  it  was  explained  that  budget  is  used  to  provide  content  via  a 
platform, as well as software for phones and tablets. The French representative mentioned that their 
budget for a training app is around EUR 100,000. 

While  these  examples  only  serve  illustrative  purposes  and  cannot  be  aggregated  to  the  EU  level 
since  the  impacts  on  the  Member  States  are  likely  to  vary  vastly  due  to  existing  structures  and 
systems, this gives an idea of the level of investments needed. 

There are various additional non-legislative measures at EU level foreseen under this policy option 
that necessitate costs.  In relation  to  these, the table below provides potential  high-level  estimates. 
These  estimates  need  to  be  treated  very  carefully.  They  are  based  on  expert  judgment  and  the 
experience of the study team. Nevertheless, the estimates represent the best data available. 

Estimates for addition costs at EU-level related to information exchange 

Measure 

Provision of a matrix concerning which information channel should be used in 
what cases and provision of information concerning what data are available in 
the Member States (beyond the minimum required set).  

Cost estimate in 
Euro 

50,000 – 75,000 

Internal Security Fund (ISF) support would be foreseen for the SIENA roll-out. 

5.0 - 7.5 million 

Feasibility study on how to improve the secure digital and radio communication 
between the Member States.  

300,000 – 500,000 

Financial support to the work of the EU innovation hub and of the RECG (Radio-
communication Expert Group – Sub-group of the LEWP). 

750,000 – 
1.0 million 

Establishment of an awareness raising and training campaign within the EU law 
enforcement community. 

1.5 – 2.0 million 

CEPOL to provide training material to law enforcement agencies, e.g. on how to 
use EU databases efficiently. 

750,000 –  
1 million 

CEPOL to provide voluntary induction training on cross-border law enforcement.  200,000 – 400,000 

Expansion of the existing CEPOL practice to provide online courses on an ad-
hoc basis on new EU level developments.  

annually 

650,000 – 900,000 

90 

 
Measure 

Performance of a regular review of the training content provided by CEPOL and 
updating of material 

Source: EY/RAND Europe Study’s elaboration  

Benefits of the preferred policy option 

Cost estimate in 
Euro 

50,000 – 100,000 

annually 

While  the  costs  of  the  preferred  policy  option  can  be  roughly  estimated,  a  quantification  of  their 
benefits  is  more  difficult  to  achieve.  For  instance,  the  benefit  of  gaining  two  weeks'  time  in 
obtaining  an  information  from  another  Member  State  that  will  help  solve  a  crime  is  difficult  to 
quantify in monetary terms. 

Establishing a common minimum set of data that has to be made available for exchange, as well as 
establishing  SIENA  as  the  privileged  channel  of  communication  and  defining  common 
requirements  for  functionalities  of  the  CMS  is  expected  to  have  a  very  positive  impact  on  the 
overall  efficiency  of  the  access  to  and  exchange  of  information.  It  can  be  expected  that  the 
exchange of information will become swifter, less time consuming, and overall less burdensome in 
view of the information that can reasonably be expected from counterparts in other countries. This 
has also been confirmed in various interviews with national stakeholders161.  

Indicative overview of possible costs – Preferred option 

Citizens/Consumers  

Member State Administrations 

Union Agencies 

One-off 

Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent 

Direct costs 

Case Management Systems in 
SPOCs 

Case Management Systems in 
PCCCs and equivalent bodies  

SIENA integration in SPOCs 
CMSs 

SIENA integration in PCCCs  
CMSs 

Europol (including both policy 
options 3.2 & 3.3)  

Total 

Indirect costs 

Training 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

EUR 1.5m162 

unknown 

EUR 6.75m163 

unknown  

0 

0  

0 

0  

EUR 1m164 

unknown 

Unknown  

Unknown 

EUR 2.25m165 

unknown  

Unknown  

Unknown  

0 

0  

Unknown  

  EUR 1.7m  
as part of 
Agency' 
budget 

€11.5m 

unknown 

unknown 

unknown 

0 

As part of MS 
training budget 
+ ISF support 

unknown 

As part of 
Agency' 

161 Interviews conducted as part of the support Study on 27 and 28.05.2021, as well as 04., 07., and 08.06.2021. 
162 Only 10 MS are expected to invest in a CMS at SPOC (hence a possible indicative cost of EUR 150.000 per Member 
State. 
163 The set-up of CMSs in a maximum of 45 PCCCs would cost EUR 6,750 million (45x EUR 150.000). 
164 Only 20 MS are expected to invest in this integration (hence EUR 50.000 per Member State). 
165 Out of the 59 identified PCCCs, 14 are already connected to SIENA. The SIENA connection to a maximum of 45 
PCCCs would cost EUR 2,250 million (45x EUR 50.000). 

91 

 
                                                                 
 
budget 

(via national 
programmes)  

[Wide 
differences 
between MS 
needs] 

This  EUR  11.5  million  would  be  considered  as  a  maximum  one-off  cost  given  that  a  number  of 
PCCCs are already connected to the SPOC CMS. Hence the SIENA integration in the SPOC CMS 
would de facto cover the SIENA integration in the connected PCCCs.  

ANNEX 4: SUPPORTING INFORMATION ON THE HIGH-LEVEL PROBLEMS AND THEIR 
IMPACTS ON THE CORE PROBLEMS 

Security and cross-border crime are, by definition, an international issue. Most European countries 
agree that organised crime is a problem in their country.166  
As  made  clear  in  the  2021-2025  EU  Strategy  to  Tackle  organised  Crime167  and  the  2020  EU 
Security Union Strategy168 organised crime is, and will remain, a significant threat – causing harms 
to citizens, businesses, society and the economy. While organised crime is not a new threat, it is a 
persistent  and  serious  threat,  and  ever  evolving  to  exploit  opportunities  for  profit  and  evade 
detection and disruption.  

transportation  and 

Globalisation,  as  well  as  increasing  economic  and  social  integration  have  accelerated  the 
interconnection  between  domestic  illegal  markets  and  increased  mobility  of  criminals  across 
national  borders. Some of the initiatives that aimed to  promote legal  economic exchange, such  as 
deregulation  of 
illegal  economic 
exchanges.169  The  steady  increase  in  cross-border  passenger  and  freight  traffic  means  that  only 
selective  border  controls  are  possible.170  Within  the  Schengen  area,  internal  border  controls  have 
been  dismantled,  meaning  that  travel  and  communication  within  the  EU  has  become  easier.171 
Technological  advancements  have  created  opportunities  for  new  types  of  cross-border  crime,  as 
well  as  for  modernising  traditional  forms  of  crime.172  For  example,  the  illicit  drugs  market  has 
become  increasingly  global  and  uses  digital  technologies,  such  as  selling  drugs  online.173  The 

liberalisation,  also  benefitted 

trade 

166 Paoli, L. and Fijnaut C. (2004) General introduction. In: organised Crime in Europe: Concepts, Patterns and Control 
Policies in the European Union and Beyond C. Fijnaut and L. Paoli (eds.) Dordrecht: Springer. 
167 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the EU Strategy to tackle organised Crime 2021-2025 (SWD(2021) 74 
final).  
168  Communication  from  The  Commission  To The  European  Parliament,  The  Council,  The  European  Economic  And 
Social Committee And The Committee Of The Regions on the EU Security Union Strategy COM(2020) 605 final 
169 Paoli, L. and C. Fijnaut (2004) General introduction. In: organised Crime in Europe: Concepts, Patterns and Control 
Policies in the European Union and Beyond C. Fijnaut and L. Paoli (eds.), pp. 1-18. Dordrecht: Springer. 
170  Wagner  J.  (2021)  Transnational  organised  Crime  (TOC).  In:  Border  Management  in  Transformation.  Advanced 
Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications. Springer, Cham. Available at: link. 
171 Sallavaci, O. (2018) Strengthening cross-border law enforcement cooperation in the EU: the Prüm network of data 
exchange. Eur J Crim Policy Res 24, 219–235. link. 
172  Grabosky,  P.  (2013)  Organised  Crime  and 
10.1080/03071847.2013.847707. 
173 Spapens, T. (2015) Transnational organised crime. International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences 
(Second Edition), pp. 596-601. Available at: link. 

Internet,  The  RUSI  Journal,  158:5,  18-25,  DOI: 

the 

92 

 
 
                                                                 
advancements and increased use of digital  technologies also  mean there is  no longer a need for  a 
perpetrator to be in the same location as a victim.174 

Additionally,  the  increased  mobility  of  persons  across  Europe  means  that  there  is  a  significant 
movement of EU citizens for the purposes of tourism, and that sports, social and cultural events are 
attended by persons from across the EU 27 and the Schengen Associated Countries (SAC), meaning 
that  effective  preventive  and  responsive  actions  need  to  involve  cross-border  cooperation.  The 
growing  intra-EU  mobility  of  people  –  restrictions  due  to  the  COVID-19  pandemic  set  aside  – 
creates  additional  challenges  for  the  prevention  and  fight  against  all  forms  of  criminal  and  safety 
threats. All this has a significant  negative impact on the area of freedom, justice and security and 
calls  for  a  stronger  and  streamlined  cooperation  among  EU  Member  States  and  between  their 
competent law enforcement authorities.  

The  rapidly  evolving  criminal  landscape  and  the  mobility  of  people  suggests  that  cross-border 
cooperation between Law enforcement authorities in the EU and the Schengen area will be crucial 
to  tackle  criminal  offences,  ensure  public  order  and  safety  and  allow  EU  citizens  to  safely  enjoy 
their rights of free movement in the future.  

1.  The international mobility of criminal networks, the evolution of cross-border serious and 
organised crime (SOC), and the increasing associated harms 

Mobility of crime 

The 2021 European Union Serious and organised Crime Threat Assessment (EU SOCTA) makes it 
clear  that  international  mobility  is  defining  characteristic  of  criminal  networks  and  provides  a 
detailed overview of the situation175.  

Some criminal operations have global reach beyond borders.  

For instance, organised property crimes carried out in the EU continue to be perpetrated primarily 
by  mobile  organised  crime  groups  (MOCGs).  Mobility  remains  the  key  characteristic  of  these 
MOCGs and is used to avoid detection and minimise the risk of apprehension. MOCGs travel long 
distances and are typically active in several countries. They are highly flexible in the selection of 
their targets and will often change their country of activity to evade law enforcement or to respond 
to changes in the criminal landscape176. 

Some  locations  feature  characteristics  that  benefit  serious  and  organised  crime  in  the  EU  and 
beyond.  These  locations  are  used  to  facilitate  a  single  or  multiple  criminal  activities,  sometimes 
simultaneously.  Key  locations  attract  criminals  due  to  their  geographic  position,  proximity  to  or 
connections  with  source  countries  and  consumer  markets.  They  may  offer  efficient  transport 
infrastructures, business and investment opportunities or other advantages to criminals. 

Criminal  activities  in  border  regions  take  advantage  of  the  natural  delineations  of  individual  law 
enforcement jurisdictions, which create options to evade law enforcement and provide proximity to 
multiple markets. Within the Schengen Area, border travel is unimpeded, allowing free movement 
of  persons  across  borders.  Geopolitical  developments  determine  the  relevance  of  specific  regions 
for the flow of goods and people. Humanitarian emergencies, bilateral agreements and risk-reward 
considerations determine the attractiveness of a specific border region or section for criminals.  

174  Peter  Grabosky  (2013)  organised  Crime  and 
10.1080/03071847.2013.847707 
175 Europol (2021) Serious and organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA): A corrupting influence, European Union, 
p. 34 & 35. 
176 Europol (2021) Serious and organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA): A corrupting influence, European Union, 
p. 86. 

the  Internet,  The  RUSI  Journal,  158:5,  18-25,  DOI: 

93 

 
                                                                 
Urban areas are characterised by a concentration of people and often present a multitude of criminal 
opportunities.  Burglaries  are  concentrated  in  urban  areas.  Pickpockets  target  victims  in  crowded 
places  such  as  concerts,  markets,  on  public  transport  or  at  railway  stations.  Organised  robberies 
typically take place in urban areas and border regions. Victims of trafficking in human beings are 
typically exploited in urban areas where there is a larger potential client  base. Capitals and major 
cities  act  as  hubs  along  the  main  migrant  smuggling  routes.  Here,  migrants  are  temporarily 
accommodated  in  safehouses,  receive  fraudulent  documents,  plan  and  initiate  secondary 
movements. 

Remote  areas  provide  more  anonymity  conducive  to  other  criminal  activities.  Illicit  tobacco 
production  lines  are  usually  set  up  in  large  warehouses  in  remote  industrial  areas,  close  to 
transportation  hubs  like  motorways,  border  crossing  points  or  ports.  Remote  areas  in  the 
countryside are ideal locations for the dumping of chemical waste from synthetic drug production, 
toxic waste from fuel laundering and other waste products. Thefts of construction and agricultural 
machinery  are  more  likely  to  occur  in  rural  areas.  Archaeological  sites  and  places  of  religious 
worship situated in remote areas are targeted for theft and looting. Trafficking of human beings for 
labour exploitation often takes place in rural areas home to agricultural production. 

Airports  are  key  transit  points  for  goods  and  people,  both  licit  and  otherwise.  Criminals  make 
frequent  use  of  the  EU’s  main  airports  as  well  as  smaller  regional  airports  operating  low-cost 
airlines.  In  addition,  small  airfields  offer  convenient  access  to  the  EU  and  specific  regions. 
Trafficking  activities  by  air  have  been  disrupted  during  the  COVID-19  pandemic.  However, 
expansion plans for many major airports signal a further growth in passenger flows after the end of 
the pandemic. 

A dense network of well-maintained motorways facilitates the free movement of goods and services 
within the EU. It is also a major crime enabler allowing criminals to travel and move goods quickly 
and anonymously. Travel by road is the most accessible way of travelling within the EU. Transport 
means on the road include lorries, vans, buses, cars, caravans, or taxis. Some vehicles are equipped 
with sophisticated concealment methods to hide drugs and other contraband or persons. Motorway 
infrastructure is used for smuggling raw material to production facilities and for distributing illicit 
goods produced in the EU or arriving at entry points. 

A dense network of well-maintained motorways facilitates the free movement of goods and services 
within the EU. It is also a major crime enabler allowing criminals to travel and move goods quickly 
and anonymously. Travel by road is the most accessible way of travelling within the EU. Transport 
means on the road include lorries, vans, buses, cars, caravans, or taxis. Some vehicles are equipped 
with sophisticated concealment methods to hide drugs and other contraband or persons. Motorway 
infrastructure is used for smuggling raw material to production facilities and for distributing illicit 
goods produced in the EU or arriving at entry points. 

Other illegal goods such as illicit waste, synthetic drugs produced in the EU, and stolen vehicles or 
parts are shipped throughout the world departing from EU ports. 

Accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic, the shipping of orders placed online fulfilled by post and 
parcel services continues to expand in volume every year. Postal and parcel services are abused for 
the  distribution  of  illicit  goods  such  as  drugs  (cannabis,  cocaine,  synthetic  drugs  including  new 
psychoactive  substances),  counterfeit  currency,  stolen  and  fraudulent  documents  and  many  other 
illegal commodities.  

Clandestine  locations  such  as  private  or  rented  apartments  are  used  as  pop-up  brothels  where 
victims are sexually exploited, including children. Apartments serve as safe houses used to conceal 
irregular migrants in between different legs of their journeys.  

Reception centres for asylum applicants are targeted by human traffickers and migrant smugglers to 
recruit irregular migrants and potential trafficking victims. Upon their entry into the EU, facilitated 

94 

 
irregular  migrants  and  victims  of  THB  are  often  accommodated  in  reception  centres  where  they 
apply for international protection. 

Increasing and evolving serious and organised crime  

The  2021  EU  SOCTA  also  outlines  a  number  of  areas  where  SOC  appears  to  be  increasing.  For 
example,  the  use  of  violence  by  criminals  involved  in  SOC  is  assessed  to  be  intensifying, 
unprecedented  quantities  of  cocaine  are  trafficked  into  the  EU  from  Latin  America  and  criminal 
groups  are  increasing  their  capacities  to  produce  and  distribute  synthetic  drugs.177  Information 
compiled  by  Europol  in  the  2021  EU  SOCTA  also  indicates  that  there  is  a  growing  threat  from 
cyber-dependent crime – both in terms of the number and sophistication of attacks.  

In relation to the future need for law enforcement cooperation, the 2021 EU SOCTA outlines ways 
in  which  SOC  is  evolving.  Many  aspects  of  this  evolution  are  linked  to  technology  and  the 
digitisation of society, which creates new opportunities for criminals. The recruitment of trafficked 
human  beings,  for  example,  often  takes  place  online,  and  organised  crime  groups  (OCGs)  are 
making  use  of  cryptocurrencies.  Other  aspects  of  the  evolution  are  driven  by  avoidance  of  anti-
organised  crime  measures.  For  instance,  to  avoid  EU  anti-money  laundering  measures,  money 
laundering  attempts  are  “likely  to  be  displaced  towards  sectors  with  nascent  controls  or  limited 
oversight”.178  

The  way  in  which  the  COVID-19  pandemic  has  been  exploited  by  OCGs  demonstrates  the 
inherently adaptive and flexible nature of SOC. As the EU SOCTA points out – and as highlighted 
in  the  2021  Council  Conclusions179  –  OCGs  were  quick  to  adapt  to  the  COVID-19  crisis.  They 
changed  their  modi  operandi  to  exploit  opportunities  in  the  dynamic  and  uncertain  environment, 
targeting  individual  citizens,  businesses  and  the  public  sector  by,  for  example,  distributing 
counterfeit and substandard  personal  protective  equipment or performing  phishing  campaigns  and 
ransomware attacks on healthcare organisations.180  

The evolving nature of criminal networks 

There is also evolution in the nature and size of  criminal networks. Europol estimates that around 
one fifth of criminal networks are composed of no more than five members and are highly flexible. 
Most criminal networks do not follow strict hierarchical structures, but are rather loose and organic 
networks (see Figure 1 below),181 which makes them difficult to disrupt and dismantle, and which 
means  that  these  groups  are  more  able  to  flex  and  adapt  to  exploit  new  opportunitites.  For  this 
reason, the 2021 EU SOCTA182 lists high-risk criminal networks (including for corruption, money 
laundering and the use of firearms) as the most important crime threat facing the EU.  

Criminal networks in the EU operate across national borders, exploit legal business structures and 
are highly flexible and adaptive. The 2021 EU SOCTA estimates that around 80% of the criminal 
networks  engage  in  drug  trafficking,  organised  property  crime,  excise  fraud,  human  trafficking, 

177 Europol (2021) Serious and organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA): A corrupting influence, European Union. 
178  Europol  (2021)  Serious  and  Organised  Crime  Threat  Assessment  (SOCTA):  A  corrupting  influence,  European 
Union, p. 28. 
179 Council of the European Union. (2021). The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on internal security: threats, trends, 
resilience  and  lessons  learned  for  Law  Enforcement  Agencies:  outcomes  of  previous  discussion  and  draft  Council 
Conclusions. Brussels: Council of the European Union. 
180 Europol (2020) How COVID-19-related crime infected Europe during 2020. The Hague: Europol; Europol (2020) 
Serious and organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA): A corrupting influence, European Union.  
181 Europol (2021) Serious and organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA): A corrupting influence, European Union. 
182 Europol (2021) Serious and organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA): A corrupting influence, European Union. 

95 

 
                                                                 
online  and  other  fraud  and  migrant  smuggling.183  Around  7  out  of  10  operate  in  more  than  three 
countries and 65% involve individuals of several nationalities.  

OCGs  are  opportunistic,  for  example,  in  exploiting  innovations  in  transportation  to  develop  new 
modes  to  traffic  illicit  goods.184  As  described  above,  this  characteristic  has  also  clearly  shown 
during the COVID-19 pandemic. In general, OCGs tend to be flexible so as to mitigate risks, reduce 
operational costs and increase profit margins.  

Current Structures of Criminal Networks 

Source: EY/RAND Europe Study’s elaboration based on Europol SOCTA 2021 

The harms and security threat caused by organised crime 

SOC causes economic harms. A 2013 study conducted for the European Parliament concluded that, 
at a minimum, the annual direct cost of organised crime activities in the EU was EUR 126.3 billion, 
with over EUR 35 billion in additional related costs.185 Annual revenues  from nine main criminal 
markets186 in the EU were estimated at between EUR 92 billion and EUR 188 billion in 2019187 – 
between 0.66%-1.35% of the EU27 Gross Domestic Product (GDP).188  

The  analysis  shows  that  the  largest  markets  in  terms  of  revenues  were  missing  trader  intra-
community  fraud  (MTIC)  fraud189,  illicit  drugs,  illicit  tobacco  (specifically  cigarettes)  and  illicit 
waste.  However,  given  the  lack  of  figures  on  illicit  markets,  this  quantification  is  likely  an 
underestimation. The following table summarises low, mid, and high criminal revenue estimates for 
different criminal markets and years for the year 2019. 

Criminal markets and areas 

Headline criminal revenue estimates 

Mid 

Revenues, adjusted for inflation, 2019  
(EUR million) 
Low 

High 

183 Europol (2021) Serious and organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA): A corrupting influence, European Union. 
184 Europol (2015) Exploring Tomorrow’s organised Crime. The Hague: Europol. 
185 Levi, M., M. Innes, P. Reuter & Gundur R. (2013) The Economic, Financial & Social Impacts of organised Crime in 
the EU. As of 8 December 2020: link. 
186 Illicit drugs, THB, Smuggling of migrants, Fraud, Environmental crime, Illicit firearms, Illicit tobacco, Cybercrime, 
organised property crime. 
187  RAND  Europe  &  EY  for  the  EC  (2021)  Mapping  the  risk  of  serious  and  organised  crime  infiltrating  legitimate 
businesses. 
188 The EU GDP was EUR 13,900 billion in 2019. Eurostat (2020) Which EU Countries had the highest GDP in 2019? 
link.  
189  MTIC  fraud  is  a  form  of  VAT  crime  based  on  cross-border  transactions.  It  requires  Multilateral  Tax  Cooperation 
among Member States e.g. Council Regulation (EU) No 904/2010 of 7 October 2010 on administrative cooperation and 
combating fraud in the field of value added tax, MTIC is included within the EU priorities for the fight against serious 
and organized crime through EMPACT 2018-2021 & 2022-2025. 

96 

 
 
                                                                 
Criminal markets and areas 

Illicit drugs 

Trafficking  in  Human  Beings 
(THB) for sexual exploitation 
Smuggling of migrants 

MTIC fraud 

Illicit waste* 

Illicit  wildlife  (European  eels 
only) 
Illicit firearms 

Illicit cigarettes 

Card payment fraud 

Cargo theft* 

Mid 

30,688.41 

7,185.93 

289.37 

77,425.00 

9,506.62 

18.05 

408.09 

8,309.15 

1,816.43 

3,347.86 

ATM physical attacks* 

22.00 

Revenues, adjusted for inflation, 2019  
(EUR million) 
Low 

High 

26,708.13 

401.94 

215.60 

50,858.00* 

3,723.49 

4.71 

273.69 

8,012.62 

- 

144.39 

- 

35,514.56 

13,969.91 

363.15 

103,991.67 

15,289.74 

31.39 

753.96 

10,087.48 

- 

6,551.32 

- 

Total 

139,016.91 

92,181.00^ 

188,391.61^ 
Notes: Estimates have been adjusted for inflation using price index data from Eurostat (2020). The low 
and  high  estimates  have  been  generated  using  different  methodologies,  with  each  described  in  the 
annexes  that  support  the  market  analyses.  A  common  example  is  the  use  of  a  range  of  price  data.  In 
most cases, the mid estimate represents the mid-point (median) between the low and high value. These 
mid-point estimates should be interpreted with a high degree of caution because the distributions are not 
necessarily normally distributed, but have nevertheless been provided here for illustrative purposes.  
* Denotes that the estimate does not include all 27 EU Member States: MTIC fraud lower bound estimate 
excludes  HR  and  CY.  Illicit  waste  estimates  exclude  BE,  CY,  LU,  MT,  SI.  Lower  bound  cargo  theft 
estimates exclude AT,  BG, HR, CY, EE, FI, EL, LT, LU, ML, PL. Upper bound estimates exclude MT. ATM 
theft estimates exclude BE, BG, HR, EE, HU, LV, LT, MT, PL, SI. ^ Lower and upper boundary aggregate 
estimates presume card payment fraud and ATM attacks are equivalent to mid-level estimate. 

Source: RAND Europe & EY for the EC (2021) Mapping the risk of SOC infiltrating legitimate businesses 

These  revenue  estimates  present  only  a  limited  picture  of  the  complex  consequences  of  how 
organised crime undermines the business environment and rule of law. The revenues generated by 
SOC are  reinvested in further illicit activities or enter the legitimate economy, which undermines 
the business environment and leads to corruption as well as a lack of trust in institutions, while also 
negatively  impacting  the  growth  potential  of  the  economy.190  organised  crime  also  undermines 
personal and state security, and threatens safety, stability and development - at the individual, local, 
national and transnational levels.191  
Organised  crime  also  results  in  direct  costs  to  citizens’  health  and  security.192  For  example,  in 
relation  to  Trafficking  in  Human  Beings  (THB),  victims  (including  children)  are  recruited  into 
sexual  exploitation  and  forced  labour.193  To  control  victims,  traffickers  use  psychological  and 
physical  abuse.  There  is  evidence  that  persons  with  developmental  and  physical  disabilities  are 
targeted, and some evidence that age of identified victims is decreasing, with children constituting 
nearly a quarter (23%) of the identified victims.194. 

190 Europol (2021) Serious and organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA): A corrupting influence, European Union. 
191 UNODC and UNICRI (2005) Trends in Crime and Justice: The evolving challenge of transnational organised crime, 
25–54. 
192  RAND  Europe  &  EY  for  the  EC  (2021)  Mapping  the  risk  of  serious  and  organised  crime  infiltrating  legitimate 
businesses. 
193  RAND  Europe  &  EY  for  the  EC  (2021)  Mapping  the  risk  of  serious  and  organised  crime  infiltrating  legitimate 
businesses. 
194 European Commission. (2018). 'Second report on the progress made in the fight against trafficking in human beings 
(2018) as required under Article 20 of Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings 

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Impact on free flow of persons across internal borders within the Schengen area 

Organised crime has an indirect impact on the free movement of people within the EU. As concerns 
the  reasons  why  Member  States  have  introduced  temporary  controls  at  internal  borders  under 
Articles 25 and 28 of the Schengen Border Code195, out of 300 notifications between October 2006 
and  the  end  of  April  2021,  on  24  occasions  (8%)  the  reason  given  cited  terrorist  threats,  on  6 
occasions (2%) the reason was given as related to organised crime and 44 (15%) were for dealing 
with  demonstrations/sports/summits  etc.  (this  latter  reason  is  relevant  to  the  second  high  level 
problem, identified in the problem tree above). To put this in context, in nearly 170 cases (57%) the 
reason given was the COVID-19 virus – which was thus by far the most common reason given. 
The Commission has, on several occasions196, stressed that improved law enforcement cooperation 
and the use of police checks is a preferred compensatory measure to internal border control.  

2. The growing intra-EU mobility of citizens and the interconnection of EU markets 

The growing intra-EU mobility of people creates additional challenges for the prevention and fight 
against all forms of  criminal  and safety threats  (e.g. in  border regions,  in relation  to  international 
mass events, in touristic areas and in case of mass disasters). The main factors behind and effects of 
this high-level problem are presented below. 

EU mobility for work and leisure is increasing  
First, the intra-EU mobility continued to grow until the outbreak of COVID-19.197 The number of 
people residing in an EU-27 Member State other than the one of their citizenship have been notably 
increasing over the years. The total amount of these people in the EU-27 amounted to 14,4 million 
persons in 2020 and increased by 22% since 2014.198 It can be expected that a significant part of EU 
citizens  is  regularly  crossing  borders  to  travel  back  and  forth  between  their  Member  State  of 
residence and the Member Sate of citizenship and will continue to do so after the pandemic. 

In 2017, the EU internal border regions covered approximately 40% of the EU’s territory and were 
home to 30% of the population, i.e. 150 million people.199 In 2018, the residents of the EU made in 
total 1.1 billion trips, either for business or privately – an increase of 11% since 2014.200 In 2018, 
240 million persons in the EU (64 % of the population) went at least on one private trip (as opposed 
to business trips), an increase by 4 % since 2012.201 There has also been an increase in the number 
of EU citizens travelling for educational or training purposes.202 Lastly, there has been an increase 
in intra-EU migration of EU citizens. In 2019, 3.3% of the EU citizens of working age (20-64) had 

and  protecting  its  victims'.  Available  at:  link.  European  Commission.  (2020).  'Report  from  the  Commission  to  the 
European  Parliament.  Third  report  on  the  progress  made  in  the  fight  against  trafficking  in  human  beings  (2020)  as 
required  under  Article  20  of  Directive  2011/36/EU  on  preventing  and  combating  trafficking  in  human  beings  and 
protecting its victims {SWD (2020) 226 final}'. Available at link.  
195 Member States’ notifications of the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders pursuant to Article 
25  and  28  et  seq.  of  the  Schengen  Borders  Code:  https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-
do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/reintroduction-border-control/docs/ms_notifications_-
_reintroduction_of_border_control.pdf 
196 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION of 12.5.2017 on proportionate police checks and police cooperation in the 
Schengen area C(2017) 3349 final 
197 For intra-EU labour mobility, please see Eurostat (2021) People on the move. Available at link. Four cross-border 
tourism, please see Eurostat (2021) EU tourism halved in 2020. Available at link. 
198 Eurostat (2021) People on the move. Available at link. 
199  European  Commission  (2017)  Boosting  Growth  and  cohesion  in  EU  border  regions.  Brussels:  European 
Commission. Available at link . 
200 Eurostat (2020). People on the move – statistics on mobility in Europe. As of 8 April 2021: Available at link, p. 26. 
201 Eurostat (2020). People on the move – statistics on mobility in Europe. As of 8 April 2021. Available at: link, p. 28.  
202  European  Commission.  2020.  Erasmus+  Annual  Report  2019.  Luxembourg:  Publications  Office  of  the  European 
Union. As of 8 April 2021: link, p. 32. 

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a nationality of an EU Member State other than the EU Member State of residence, compared to 2.4 
%  in  2009.203  Similarly,  at  SACs/EU  air  borders,  Frontex  estimated  that  there  is  an  increase  in 
passenger flows of about 5% per year across Europe.204  

As  regards  cross-border  tourism,  the  number  of  nights  spent  at  tourist  accommodation 
establishments  in  foreign  Member  States  has  been  slightly  increasing  over  the  past  decade, 
amounting to almost three billion in 2019.205 As regards cross-border labour mobility, two million 
out  of  190  million  employed  persons  lived  and  worked  outside  their  home  Member  State206,  and 
this  number  has  also  been  increasing  in  the  past  decade.  After  the  COVID-19  crisis,  the  cross-
border  mobility  of  citizens  is  expected  to  continue  to  increase  in  the  EU.  It  can  be  expected  that 
criminals are as well increasingly mobile across-borders. The fact that there are no border controls 
in  the  Schengen  area  enables  criminals  to  cross-borders  as  they  like  without  being  subject  of 
controls,  which  makes  it  more  complicated  for  LEAs  to  monitor  criminal  activities.  Moreover, 
criminals use the mobility of citizens and cross-border traffic to smuggle illegal goods or irregular 
migrants across-borders. As a reference, the Swindon Railway station, in the UK, is known to be a 
gateway for children smuggling drugs into London.207  

Despite  the  fact  that  the  COVID-19  pandemic  has  drastically  reduced  pan-European  (and 
worldwide)  mobility  in  2020  and  2021,  the  flows  of  persons  will  likely  continue  to  increase  in 
importance again in the near future.  

The  movement  of  persons  creates  a  need  for  law  enforcement  cooperation  at  the  borders  and 
beyond 
Specifically at border regions, cooperation is needed, for example, to undertake transport control,208 
detain  or  pursue  suspects  crossing  borders  (travelling  by  car209  or  on  public  transport  such  as 
trains,210 for example) and search for missing persons.211 There is a daily need for law enforcement 
officials to be able to conduct “normal” and policing activities around and across borders regions.212  

In  addition  to  border  regions,  cooperation  is  needed  in  relation  to  demonstrations  attended  by 
international participants, state visits and summits, the protection of VIPs,213 and sports and music 
events  with  international  audiences.214  Indeed,  mass  gatherings  and  public  places  remain  a  key 
target  for  terrorist  attacks215  -  highlighting  the  threat  to  public  safety  and  the  need  for  continued 
cooperation.  

In the case of international events with spectators, it is of vital importance to have close operational 
cooperation  between  the  involved  authorities  “in  order  to  ensure  an  overall  situation  picture  and 
threat  assessment”.216 The  need for  cooperation is  thus  an important  part of the security policy at 

203 Eurostat (2020) EU citizens living in another Member State - statistical overview. As of 8 April 2021: link.  
204 Frontex (2020) Risk analysis for 2020. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, p. 36. 
205 Eurostat (2021) Nights spent at tourist accommodation establishments by residents/non-residents. Available at link. 
206 Eurostat (2021) People on the move. Available at link. 
207 BBC News (2021) Swindon railway station as gateway for drug trafficking. Available at link. 
208 Focus Group on FR-CH bilateral agreement. 
209 Focus Group on DE-CZ bilateral agreement. 
210 Focus Group on Benelux trilateral agreement. 
211 Survey: Q 92, 1 representative from a PCCC. 
212 Focus Group on Benelux trilateral agreement. 
213  Focus  Group  on  Nordic  multilateral  agreement;  Survey:  Q  13A,  1  National  EMPACT  Coordinators  (NEC),  2 
representatives from public order departments/ National Football Info Points (NFIP) and 1 representative from a PCCC. 
214 Survey: Q 13A, 2 representatives from public order departments/NFIP and 1 representative from a SPOC. 
215 Europol. 2020. EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. 
216 Survey: Q 92, 1 representative from a public order department/NFIP. 

99 

 
                                                                 
mass events.217 An example of a recognised good practice where this does happen frequently is at 
football matches, where there is a history of law enforcement cooperation.218 

The  need  to  manage  the  pandemic  is  another  issue,  which  has  created  an  increased  need  for 
cooperation  at  the  border  over  the  last  year,219  and  which  highlights  the  interconnectedness  of 
Member States and SACs  – with the impacts on health and security cascading between countries. 
The movement of persons for tourism similarly creates a demand for law enforcement cooperation.  

Cross-border  mobility,  in  particular  for  touristic  purposes  after  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  is 
expected  to  increase.  A  crucial  enabler  for  this  development  is  the  effective  and  efficient 
management  of  public  order  and  safety.  Therefore,  it  can  be  expected  that  the  measures  foreseen 
under this policy option  will have a  positive economic impact,  e.g. in  terms  of increased  GDP in 
tourism-related industries.  

Increasing interconnection of EU markets 

The increasing mobility of EU citizens has been accompanied by an increasing interconnection of 
EU markets both within the EU and with the rest of the world. In times of global trade, international 
value  chains  and  trade  flows,  trade  between  the  EU  market  and  other  world’s  economies  has 
become  more  and  more  interlinked.  EU  businesses  have  increasingly  organised  their  production 
globally  by  breaking  up  their  value  chains  into  smaller  parts  to  be  supplied  from  worldwide 
providers.  In the last  five  years, extra-EU imports  have significantly increased by  16% to  EUR 1 
935 billion  in  2019.220  A  relevant  example  of  how  world’s  economies  are  increasingly 
interconnected  is  the  major  interruption  of  trade  flows  caused  by  one  container  ship  blocking  the 
Suez Canal in March 2021.221  

As markets will likely continue to increasingly act globally and be interconnected, SOC is expected 
to globalise as well. As a reference, the cocaine drug market, the second largest illicit drug market 
in  the  EU  after  the  cannabis  market,  is  rapidly  more  acting  at  a  global  level  and  becoming  more 
globally connected. On the one hand, serious and OCGs from different nationalities are increasingly 
entering the cocaine market in the EU. Whereas Colombian and Italian serious and OCGs played a 
central role in the cocaine market in the past, serious and OCGs are increasingly of e.g. Albanian, 
British, Dutch, French, Moroccan, Spanish and Turkish origin. On the other hand, European serious 
and  OCGs  are  increasingly  establishing  presence  in  Latin  American  countries  in  order  to  better 
manage production facilities. As concerns the smuggling of cocaine, it is not only North Africa that 
is increasingly emerging as a significant transit point but also the EU, which is increasingly serving 
as a transit point for the cocaine markets in e.g. Australia, Russia and Turkey.222 In the near future, 
it is expected that serious and OCGs will continue to rapidly exploit opportunities that are arising 
from the existence of global commercial markets and the related global logistical developments. 

The  increasing  interconnection  of  the  EU  markets  has  not  translated  into  higher  levels  of  social 
equality  across  the  EU;  on  the  contrary,  social  and  economic  disparities  between  Member  States 
continue to persist in the long term. In terms of GDP and economic growth, the disparity between 

217 Council Document 13887/20 - Manual on cross-border operations. Available at: link. 
218 Council of the European Union (2016) Council Resolution concerning an updated handbook with recommendations 
for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with 
football  matches  with  an  international  dimension,  in  which  at  least  one  Member  State  is  involved  (‘EU  Football 
Handbook’). Official Journal of the European Union, 444(01). link. 
219 Survey: Q 13A, 1 representative from a PCCC and one representative from a specialised investigative Unit; Q 92, 1 
representative from a SPOC. 
220 Eurostat (2021) Extra-EU imports of main CPA groups, 2015-2019. Available at link. 
221 BBC (2021) Suez Canal reopens after giant stranded ship is freed. Available at link. 
222  Europol/European  Monitoring  Centre  for  Drugs  and  Drug  Addiction  (2019)  EU  Drug  Markets  Report  2019. 
Available at link. 

100 

 
                                                                 
Member  States  –  particularly  between  the  East-Central  Member  States  and  the  former  Member 
States  –  remains  large.  A  clear  example  is  the  difference  in  terms  of  GDP  per  capita  between 
Germany  and  Romania.  According  to  Eurostat  data,  the  GDP  per  capita  in  Germany  had  slightly 
increased  in  the  last  ten  years  and  amounted  to  40  070  Euros  in  2020.  In  Romania,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  GDP  per  capita,  despite  slight  increases  in  the  last  ten  years,  amounted  only  to  11 270 
Euros  in  2020.223  How  large  the  economic  disparities  are  is  also  visible  when  comparing  the 
average  GDP  per  capita  of  those  five  Member  States  with  the  highest  GDP  per  capita  with  the 
average for the five Member States with the lowest GDP per capita. Whereas the GDP per capita of 
the top five is not just far higher in absolute terms, it has also increased more in the past decade than 
the average GDP per capita for the five Member States with  the lowest  GDP (see  ).224 Economic 
disparities  are  an  opportunity  for  criminals  since  it  is  increasingly  attractive  for  them  to  travel  to 
wealthier  European  regions  and  commit  criminal  activities  there.  For  instance,  during  the  tourist 
season, organised groups of young children from Romania are sent to Paris, Berlin, London etc. for 
pickpocketing  among  tourists.225  It  is  expected  that  the  economic  disparities  will  likely  not  only 
persist but increase in the short term since a deep and severe recession at a global scale  has been 
forecasted because of the COVID-19 pandemic.226 

Development of GDP per capita at market prices  

Euros
70.000

60.000

50.000

40.000

30.000

20.000

10.000

0

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

EU-27 Member States
Low 5 Member States of the EU-27

Top 5 Member States of the EU-27

Source: EY/RAND Europe Study’s elaboration based on Eurostat (2021) 

A shift to the online world 

Another relevant social development is the incessant digitalisation of lives and production. The shift 
to the online world is not a recent process; however, it underwent a without precedents acceleration 
after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Before COVID-19, being online has already been a 
matter of course for many EU citizens with 85% of people using the internet at least once a week in 
2020. Since 2014, these numbers have been moderately increasing by 10% until the pandemic has 
seen  a  large  increase  in  internet  use.227  After  having  reached  a  peak  during  the  health  crisis,  it  is 
expected  that  the  life  of  many  EU  citizens  continues  to  take  place  online  to  a  significant  extent. 
Especially  the  prevalence  of  social  media  and  online  platforms  is  expected  to  increase.  It  is 
anticipated  that  leading  private  technology  firms  continue  to  dominate  the  digital  market  and  to 

223 Eurostat (2021) Gross domestic product at market prices. Available at link. 
224 Eurostat (2021) Gross domestic product at market prices. Available at link. 
225 Der Tagesspiegel (2016) So funktioniert das Netz der Taschendiebe. Available at link. 
226 Europol (2021) Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment: A corrupting influence, European Union.  
227 EU Commission (2020) Use of Internet and Online Activities. Available at link. 

101 

 
 
 
                                                                 
continue to retain their monopoly positions.  The monopoly on personal  data held by these private 
companies will continue to pose significant risks of criminal use of personal data.228 As regards the 
work force, close to 40% of those currently working in the EU began to telework fulltime as a result 
of  the  pandemic  in  2020.229  It  is  likely  that  a  significant  part  of  these  home-based  workers  will 
continue working remotely also after the end of the COVID-pandemic.  

3. Evolution of the situation 

Serious and organised crime, as well as situations critical for  public order and safety are complex 
and multi-facetted phenomena whose evolution is affected by surrounding social and technological 
developments. Technological developments have a direct impact on the prevalence and severity of 
SOC  and  situations  critical  for  public  order  and  safety.  Technology  is  used  to  facilitate  terrorism 
attacks, to create more innovative criminal business models, and to enhance communication among 
criminals.  Social  developments  expected  to  affect  criminal  threats  in  the  next  years  are  directly 
linked to the increasing interconnection of persons across the EU, which reduces, or even overrides, 
territorial distances, thus creating new opportunities for criminals to exploit. 

It should be noted that technological and social developments affect both criminal networks and law 
enforcement  agencies  (LEAs).  Criminals  are,  indeed,  dynamic  and  quick  to  exploit  the  latest 
technological  developments.  As  they  manage  to  quickly  adopt  and  integrate  new  emerging 
technologies  into  their  modus  operandi,  criminals  are  able  to  ensure  business  continuity  and  can 
further expand their criminal activities.230 Thus, LEAs face the challenge to keep pace with criminal 
groups. However, at the same time, LEAs can take advantage of and use new technologies to cope 
with evolving criminal patterns. 

The  criminal  use  of  technological  developments  varies  depending  on  the  specific  crime  area.  For 
instance,  technology  has  been  used  to  facilitate  and  improve  terrorism  attacks,  to  create  more 
innovative  criminal  business  models,  to  enhance  communication  among  criminals,  or  to  reduce 
chances of being caught. Specific examples of how new technologies may be exploited by criminal 
are:  

  AI: AI can be applied to traditional criminal activities such as password guessing and social 
engineering in order to maximise profits in a shorter time.231 LEAs, on the other hand, can 
use AI to forecast the likelihood and nature of criminal activities. For instance, a prefecture 
police in Japan has developed a tool to detect, analyse and predict the location and time for 
crimes and accidents based on data such as weather, past crimes in the area, urban mobility 
etc.232 

  3D Printing: as 3D Printing is becoming increasingly widely available, it can offer criminals 
new  opportunities  for  firearm  production  and  trafficking  or  for  the  trade  in  counterfeit 
goods.233 

  Robotics: drones, which can be considered as advanced equipment in the field of robotics, 
are  increasingly  sold  for  private  use  and  hence  easily  accessible  for  criminals.  Criminals 
may use them for several activities, including corporate espionage. On their side, LEAs can 
use drones as patrol drones for prisons and borders.234  

228 Europol (2021) Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment: A corrupting influence, European Union.  
229  Eurofund  (2020)  Living,  working  and  COVID-19,  COVID-19  series,  Publication  Office  of  the  European  Union. 
Available at link. 
230 Europol (2017) Serious and organised crime threat assessment. Available at link. 
231 Europol (2020) Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment. Available at link. 
232 Interpol/Unicri (2020) Towards responsible AI innovation. Available at link. 
233 Europol (2015) Exploring tomorrow’s organised crime. Available at link. 
234 Interpol/Unicri (2019) Artificial intelligence and robotics for law enforcement. Available at link. 

102 

 
                                                                 
  New payment methods: blockchain and the emergence of different cryptocurrencies ensures 
anonymous  online  money  transfers  for  criminals.  Cryptocurrencies  facilitate  payments  for 
transactions across all areas of cybercrime since reliability, irreversibility of transactions and 
anonymity  have  made  cryptocurrencies  as  the  default  payment  method  for  payments  from 
victims  to  criminals  (e.g.  in  the  case  of  ransomware)  or  criminals  to  criminals  (e.g.  in  the 
Dark web).235 

In  the  following,  illustrative  examples  in  three  crime  areas236  are  presented,  which  show  how 
criminals use the latest technological developments in different SOC areas and how the impact of 
such developments is likely to develop in the next years: 

  Cybercrime: Nearly all criminal activities include some sort of cyber dimension. Especially 
during  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  criminals  have  pushed  innovation  in  the  area  of 
cybercrime  by  devising  new  modi  operandi  and  by  adapting  existing  ones  to  exploit  the 
situation.  For  instance,  with  the  increasing  number  of  workers  working  remotely  due  to 
COVID-19,  criminals  increasingly  started  compromising  business  emails  and  using 
Artificial  Intelligence  (AI)  to  mimic  the  voice  of  a  CEO.  Other  examples  of  cybercrime 
attacks  include  ransomware  or  identity  fraud.  Despite  the  majority  of  cybercrimes  being 
well known, criminals have often succeeded due to insufficient cybersecurity. It is expected 
that  criminals  will  continue  to  invent  and  apply  different  forms  of  cybercrime  in  the  near 
future, making cybercrime remaining as one of the most dynamic forms of crime. 

  Financial  Crime:  It  is  expected  that  criminals  will  benefit  from  the  latest  technological 
developments and will increasingly commit financial crimes. The most prominent example 
of how criminals have used recent technological developments in the case of financial crime 
is  non-cash  payment  fraud.  In  2020,  non-cash  payment  fraud  increased  as  concerns  the 
sophistication of social engineering and phishing. An example of financial crime during the 
COVID-19  pandemic  is  the  abuse  by  criminals  of  the  support  and  recovery  funds,  which 
some  Member  States  established  to  stabilise their  economies.237  In  Germany,  for  instance, 
around 25,000 suspected cases of coronavirus aid fraud were investigated in spring 2021.238 

  Drug  trafficking:  Apart  from  small  disruptions  during  the  first  lockdown,  the  drug 
trafficking has continued as usual.239 Drug traffickers quickly adapted to travel restrictions 
and  border  closures  by  increasing  their  use  of  encrypted  messaging  services,  social  media 
apps,  online  sources  and  mail  and  home  delivery  services.240  For  instance,  encrypted 
software  based  on  Pretty  Good  Privacy  and  commercial  encryption  are  commonly  used 
among  drug  sellers  and  buyers.241  In  the  near  future,  criminals  are  likely  to  further  push 
innovation in drug production and trafficking methods, the establishment of new trafficking 
routes and the growth of online markets. 

One  important  social  development  with  respect  to  SOC  is  the  persisting  social  and  economic 
disparities  between  the  Member  States.  In  terms  of  GDP  and  economic  growth,  the  disparity 
between  Member  States  remains  large.242  At  the  same  time,  the  national  markets  are  increasingly 

235 Europol (2020) Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment. Available at link. 
236  The  two  crime  areas  (cybercrime  and  financial  crime)  were  selected  based  on  responses  from  the  online  survey. 
These two crime areas are the areas with the highest shares of expected significant or slight increases in the next 5-10 
years. Survey: Q 10, 87% (n=47) of LEA’s respondents indicated that cybercrime will slightly or significantly increase, 
75% (n=42) of LEA’s respondents indicated that cybercrime will slightly or significantly increase. 
237 Europol (2021) Serious and organised Crime Threat Assessment: A corrupting influence, European Union.  
238 Deutsche Welle (2021) COVID aid: Germany uncovers over 25,000 cases of fraud. Available at link  
239 Europol (2021) Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment: A corrupting influence, European Union. 
240 EMCDDA (2021) European Drug Report 2021. Trends and Developments. Available at link. 
241 Europol (2021) Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment: A corrupting influence, European Union. 
242 Eurostat (2021) Gross domestic product at market prices. Available at link. 

103 

 
                                                                 
interconnected  both  within  the  EU  and  with  the  rest  of  the  world.243  As  the  markets  will  likely 
continue to increasingly act globally and be interconnected, SOC is expected to further globalise as 
well.  As  noted  in  the  previous  section  on  the  high-level  problems,  the  cocaine  drug  market  is 
becoming  more  globally  connected  as  serious  and  OCGs  from  different  nationalities  are 
increasingly  entering  the  cocaine  market  in  the  EU.  Whereas  Colombian  and  Italian  serious  and 
OCGs  played  a  central  role  in  the  cocaine  market  in  the  past,  serious  and  OCGs  today  are  more 
often  of  e.g.  Albanian,  Moroccan,  Spanish  and  Turkish  origin.244  It  is  expected  that  serious  and 
OCGs will continue to rapidly exploit opportunities, which are arising from the existence of global 
commercial markets and the related global logistical developments. LEAs, on the other hand, will 
with some certainty at the same time increase their capabilities to fight the prevalence and severity 
of SOC, also in light of the increasing availability and possibilities of advanced technologies.  

As  concerns  situations  critical  for  public  order  and  safety,  one  example  of  technological 
developments for political or sports mass gatherings is the use of new technologies, such as end-to-
end encrypted communication apps, exploited by e.g. hooligans travelling across-borders to attend 
and riot at football matches.245 In recent years, the nature of terrorist attacks at mass gatherings has 
shifted to attacks being carried out by single individuals with little preparation and easily available 
weaponry.246 It is expected that this threat will increase, particularly as the latest technologies can 
be  misused,  e.g.  in  the  case  of  malicious  use  of  drones.247  As  LEAs  are  expected  to  increasingly 
cooperate  to  ensure  public  order  and  safety  during  political  mass  gatherings  or  to  prepare  for 
terrorist  attacks,  they  will  likely  continue  to  face  operational  technological  challenges  for  cross-
border  cooperation,  which  stem  from  limited  interoperability  of  the  databases  and  IT  systems  in 
place.248  

Social developments with respect to situations critical for public order and safety mainly relate to 
the  fact  that  intra-EU  mobility  continued  to  grow  until  the  outbreak  of  COVID-19.249  As  regards 
cross-border  labour  mobility,  two  million  out  of 190  million  employed  persons  lived  and  worked 
outside their home Member State in 2020250, and this number has also been increasing in the past 
decade.  As  concerns  cross-border  tourism,  it  has  continuously  intensified  in  the  last  decade,  but 
halved in 2020 compared to 2019 due to COVID-19.251 After the COVID-19 crisis, the cross-border 
mobility  of  citizens  is  expected  to  continue  to  increase  again  in  the  EU.  It  can  be  expected  that 
criminals are also increasingly mobile across-borders and are likely to use the mobility of citizens 
and cross-border traffic to smuggle illegal  goods or irregular migrants across borders.252   The fact 
that there are no border controls in the Schengen area enables criminals to cross borders as they like 
without being subject to controls, which makes it more complicated for LEAs to monitor criminal 
activities.  

To conclude, technological and social developments are expected to continue to affect both serious 
and  OCGs  and  LEAs.  As  criminals  are  likely  to  continue  to  be  quick  to  exploit  the  latest 
technological  and  social  developments,  LEAs  will  likely  face  the  challenge  of  keeping  pace  with 

243 Eurostat (2021) Extra-EU imports of main CPA groups, 2015-2019. Available at link. 
244  Europol/European  Monitoring  Centre  for  Drugs  and  Drug  Addiction  (2019)  EU  Drug  Markets  Report  2019. 
Available at link. 
245 BBC News (2016) Euro 2016: Who is to blame for the Marseille violence. Available at link. 
246 BBC News (2015) Paris attacks: What happened on the night. Available at link. 
247 EU Commission (2020) A Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU: Anticipate, Prevent, Protect, Respond. Available 
at link. 
248 Technical workshop held on 24 March 2021. 
249 For intra-EU labour mobility, please see Eurostat (2021) People on the move. Available at  link. Four cross-border 
tourism, please see Eurostat (2021) EU tourism halved in 2020. Available at link. 
250 Eurostat (2021) People on the move. Available at link. 
251 Eurostat (2021) Nights spent at tourist accommodation establishments – monthly data. Available at link. 
252 BBC News (2021) Swindon railway station as gateway for drug trafficking. Available at link. 

104 

 
                                                                 
criminal  groups.  In  the  near  future,  the  problems  are  therefore  expected  to  evolve  in  a  steady 
manner.  

Impacts of high-level problems on the core problems 

The  rapidly  evolving  criminal  landscape  suggests  that  cross-border  cooperation  between  LEAs  in 
the  EU  and  the  Schengen  area  will  be  crucial  to  tackle  SOC,  ensure  public  order  and  safety  and 
allow EU citizens to safely enjoy their rights of free movement in the future. As detailed above, the 
cross-border element of threats posed by SOC in the EU is becoming increasingly important. This is 
mainly  due  to:  (i)  the  evolution  of  the  nature  and  modi  operandi  of  intra-EU  OC  groups  that  are 
more and more characterised by a networked environment, where cooperation between criminals is 
fluid,  systematic  and  of  a  cross-border  nature;  and  to  (ii)  new  and  emerging  crime  opportunities, 
which are not limited to single Member States or SAC. Yet, the increasing intra-EU mobility calls 
for coordination among Member States in order to ensure effective policing activities towards the 
prevention  of  threats  to  public  order  and  safety,  for  instance  in  case  of  international  and  mass-
gathering events. 

However, there is evidence that the current intra-EU law enforcement cooperation suffers from 
uncertainties  and  inefficiencies  that  hinder  the  deployment  of  a  coordinated  response  and 
leaves room for vulnerabilities.  

The  following  sections  show  how  current  cross-border  law  enforcement  cooperation  is  not  fully 
suitable  to  face  emerging  security  threats  and  point  out  existing  issues  in  relation  to  information 
exchange.  The  analysis  covers  the  nature  and  scale  of  the  problems  identified,  shows  the 
shortcoming  of  the  existing  cooperation  measures  and  practices  and  describes  the  challenges  that 
remain to be addressed. 

Overview of the drivers and issues behind core problem #1 

Key drivers behind Core Problem 1 - The access to and exchange of necessary information among law 
enforcement authorities is subject to legal, technical and structural challenges 

Legal driver: Law 
enforcement 
authorities face 
difficulties in 
interpreting and 
implementing 
relevant EU 
provisions 

 

 

The  scope  of  application  of  some  EU  measures  is  unclear,  including  between  (i)  the 
Swedish  Framework  Decision  (SFD)  vs.  CISA  (i.e.  preventive  and/or  repressive 
operations) and (ii) the SFD vs. the Naples II Convention (whether only police or also 
customs authorities can use both these measures) 

There  is  no  requirement  to  ensure  that  a  common  minimum  set  of  data  is  made 
available for exchange 

  Deadlines  are  usually  not  met  when  a  judicial  authorisation  is  required  to  deliver  the 
requested information. There is no obligation to have a judicial authority available 24/7 
within  the  Single  Points  of  Contact,  thereby  slowing  down  the  judicial  authorisation 
process where needed. 

 

 

The distinction between urgent and non-urgent cases provided for in the SFD and the 
SFD  forms  to  be  used  (on  a  voluntary  basis)  for  information  exchange  is  unclear  and 
(unnecessarily) complex 

The  Swedish Framework Decision  is  not  aligned  with  the 2016  Law  Enforcement Data 
Protection Directive 

  SPOCs/Police Customs Cooperation Centres (PCCCs) are not always equipped with the 
necessary  information  management  tools  (e.g.  a  case  management  system  with 
common dashboard and automatic/semi-automatic data upload and cross-check)  

 

 

The use of rudimentary search tools hampers the adoption of transliteration and “fuzzy 
logic” search 

Law  enforcement  officials  on  the  ground  do  not  always  use  secure  communication 
means 

  SPOCs/PCCCs do not always play their coordination role and lack resources to face the 

increasing number of requests 

 

Information  from  (i)  different  units  within  the  SPOCs  and  (ii)  from  the  PCCCs  (and 

105 

Technical driver: 
Law enforcement 
authorities have 
insufficient 
knowledge of existing 
mechanisms, skill 
gaps and outdated IT 
infrastructure 

Structural driver: 
National and regional 
information hubs set 
up by law 

 
 
Key drivers behind Core Problem 1 - The access to and exchange of necessary information among law 
enforcement authorities is subject to legal, technical and structural challenges 

enforcement 
authorities have 
different roles, 
means and 
capabilities which 
make their 
cooperation sub-
optimal 

equivalent  structures  at  the  border  area)  is  not  always  integrated  in  the  SPOC 
information management system 

  Direct  and  user-friendly  access  to  all  relevant  EU  and  international  databases  and 

platforms is not the norm in the SPOCs and the PCCCs 

 

The  specific  national  stakeholders  entitled  to  access  and  use  EU  and  international 
databases and platforms vary between the Member States 

  National LEAs have limited awareness and knowledge of relevant databases 

 

 

 

There  is  limited  availability  of  training  for  law  enforcement  staff  involved  in  cross-
border information exchanges and cooperation 

The choice of channel for information exchange lies with the Member States, leading to 
a duplication of requests in some cases 

Language barriers hamper the efficient cross-border exchange of information 

Source: EY/RAND Europe Study’s elaboration  

******* 

Examples of criminal activity in the EU and their evolution 

The  following  three  examples  of  criminal  activity  in  the  EU  illustrate  recent  trends  in  criminal 
threats and give indications about likely future developments. 

As  long  as  travel  restrictions  are  in  place  due  to  the  pandemic,  criminals  are  producing 
and selling fake COVID-19 test certificates in the EU. Europol warns that fraudsters are 
able  to  produce  high-quality  counterfeit  or  fake  documents  with  high-quality  printers  and 
different software. Recent examples include: 

 

 

In France, a forgery ring was dismantled at the Charles de Gaulle Airport, which sold negative test 
results to passengers for EUR 300. 

In Spain, fraudsters were apprehended who sold fake test results for EUR 40.253  

In  France,  almost  thirty  hospitals  were  targeted  by  cyberattacks  in  2020,  while 
these  hospitals  struggled  with  COVID-19  patients.  During  these  cyberattacks,  malware 
paralysed the IT systems in hospitals, which often did not have sufficient security systems in 
place, until hospitals pay high ransoms. During a recent malware attack in Villefranche-sur-
Saône  near  Lyon,  operations  were  slowed  down.  While  the  lab  and  machines  could  operate,  the 
hospital  staff  could  not  process  results  through  computers.  This  forced  them  to  send  notifications 
around in the hospital manually on paper and increased the burden on health workers already dealing 
with the high pressure of COVID-19. Since the beginning of 2021, French authorities have monitored 
no less than one cyberattack per week against French hospitals.254 

A cross-border investigation of the Spanish Civil Guard, the Dutch Police, the  United States 
Homeland  Security  and  Europol  dismantled  an  OCGs  trafficking  cocaine  from  South 
America  to  Europe.  Latin  American  criminal  networks  are  increasingly  collaborating  with 
international EU-based criminal networks for cocaine shipping. In this case, the international 
cocaine  cartel  extended  over  Amsterdam,  Papendrecht,  Rotterdam,  Utrecht,  Valencia  and  Malaga. 
During the operation, the LEAs seized six tonnes of cocaine, jewellery, cash and encrypted devices. It 
is assumed that the cocaine cartel communicated via self-developed encrypted mobile applications.255 

Key relevant social and technological developments 

253 Europol (2021) Europol warning on the illicit sale of false negative COVID-19 test certificates. Available at link 
254 VOA (2021) Along with COVID, France’s Hospitals Battle Cyberattacks. Available at link. 
255 Europol (2020) Cocaine Cartel shipping from South America busted in Spain and the Netherlands. Available at link. 

106 

 
 
                                                                 
Social  and  technological  developments  affect  everyone,  the  citizens,  the  criminal  groups  and  the 
law enforcement authorities.  

How do criminals use the latest social and technological developments? 

The criminal use of social and technological developments varies depending on the specific crime 
area; thus, the impact of such developments on different  crime areas in the next  years is likely to 
vary as well.  

Expected impact of social and technological developments per crime area relating to criminals 

Crime area 

Criminal use of social and technological developments 

Cybercrime 

Financial crime 

Nearly  all  criminal  activities  include  some  sort  of  cyber  dimension.256  Especially 
during  the  pandemic,  criminals  pushed  innovation  in  the  area  of  cybercrime  by 
devising new modi  operandi  and  by  adapting  existing ones to exploit the situation. 
For  instance,  with  the  increasing  number  of  workers  working  remotely  due  to 
COVID-19, criminals increasingly started compromising business emails and using AI 
to  mimic  the  voice  of  a  CEO.257  Other  examples  of  cybercrime  attacks  include 
ransomware, where criminals increase pressure by threatening publication of data if 
the  victim  does  not  pay  or  identity  fraud,  where  criminals  misuse  personal 
information to commit crimes.258 Online frauds are further facilitated by the fact that 
criminals do not need to leave their place but either commit cybercrime anywhere in 
Europe  or  send  other  people  across-borders  in  order  to  commit  crime.  Despite  the 
majority  of  cybercrimes  are  well  known,  criminals  have  often  succeeded  due  to 
insufficient  cybersecurity.259  It  is  expected  that  criminals  will  likely  continue  to 
invent  and  apply  different  forms  of  cybercrime  in  the  near  future,  making 
cybercrime remaining as one of the most dynamic forms of crime. 

More  specifically,  the  following  types  of  future  trends  and  dynamics  can  be 
identified:  

  Cybercriminals  increasingly  work  together  to  maximise  their  profits,  which 
could result in more offerings, more diverse products and services, increased 
specialisation, and more integrated packages of CaaS. 

  Cybercrime  could  become  a  more  viable  career  for  able  hackers  if  criminal 

justice responses cannot keep up. 

  Cybercriminals could be driven deeper underground. 

It  is  expected  that  criminals  will  likely  benefit  from  the  latest  technological 
developments  and  will  likely  increasingly  commit  financial  crimes.  The  most 
prominent  example  of  how  criminals  have  used  the 
latest  technological 
developments  in  the  case  of  financial  crime  is  non-cash  payment  fraud.  In  2020, 
non-cash  payment  fraud  increased  in  sophistication  of  social  engineering  and 
phishing.  As  was  the  case  for  cybercrimes,  criminals  have  quickly  adapted  to  the 
social development that life increasingly shifts to the online world. Especially attacks 
via  mobile  phones  have  gained  importance  among  criminals  and  are  expected  to 
increase.  For  instance,  smashing  attacks  increased  during  the  pandemic,  where 
criminals send fraudulent text messages, pretending to be from trusted senders, to 
financial  institutions  and  their  customers.260  Another  recent  example  of  financial 
crime  during  the  pandemic  is  the  abuse  of  the  support  and  recovery  funds  by 
criminals  which  some  Member  States  have  established  to  stabilise  their 
economies.261  In  Germany,  for  instance,  no  less  than  25  000  suspected  cases  of 
coronavirus aid fraud are currently investigated.262 

256 Europol (2020) Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment. Available at link. 
257 Ibid. 
258 Ibid. 
259 Ibid. 
260 Europol (2020) Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment. Available at link. 
261 Europol (2021) Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment: A corrupting influence, European Union.  
262 Deutsche Welle (2021) COVID aid: Germany uncovers over 25,000 cases of fraud. Available at link  

107 

 
                                                                 
Crime area 

Criminal use of social and technological developments 

More specifically, the following types of future trends and dynamics can be identified 

 

There  is  an  emerging  trend  towards  fraudulently  trading  intangible  goods 
and services, such as cloud computing. 

  Due to Brexit, VAT fraud will likely be displaced to other countries.  

Drug trafficking  As  drugs  can  be  increasingly  purchased  online  in  the  Dark  web  and  are  delivered 
across Europe via parcel services, it becomes easier for consumers to access drugs. 
The  pandemic  has  barely  impacted  this  development.  Apart  from  small  disruptions 
during  the  first  lockdown,  the  drug  trafficking  has  continued  as  usual.263  Criminals 
are  expected  to  remain  quick  to  take  advantage  of  new  opportunities  and  to 
continue  to  make  the  drug  market  digitally  enabled.264  Also,  the  drug  market  is 
increasingly  globalising.  For  instance,  Mexican  drug  cartels  have  recently  set  up 
crystal meth production with Chinese chemicals in the Netherlands.265  

More  specifically,  the  following  types  of  future  trends  and  dynamics  can  be 
identified:  

  Drug  producers  are  maximising  their  production  outputs  by  using  new 
technologies, such as climate-control systems or solar-powered tube wells. 

  Herbal  cannabis,  synthetic  drugs  and  precursors  are  increasingly  produced 
illegally in the EU. These  drugs markets are  becoming  more profitable, due 
to regulatory loopholes and global commercial trafficking routes. 

  Online trade is becoming more prevalent in drug markets in Europe. 

Illicit 
trade 

tobacco 

As markets will continue to increasingly act globally and continue to be increasingly 
interconnected,  criminals  are  expected  to  commit  smuggling  operations  at  a  global 
scale. For instance, a recent fraud scheme detected by Europol consisted of illegally 
diverting cigarettes from EU internal and external transit customs procedures to the 
black market without paying millions in taxes.266  

THB 

More  specifically,  the  following  types  of  future  trends  and  dynamics  can  be 
identified:  

 

 

 

Tobacco products are more often smuggled in smaller shipment sizes. 

There is an increase in illicit domestic manufacturing. 

Tobacco  products  other  than  cigarettes  are  expected  to  increase  their 
market share. 

THB has  witnessed a constant development in the  EU  in recent years.  In 2018, no 
less than 14 000 victims were registered in the EU.267 As long as COVID-19 prevails, 
the  likelihood  of  THB  is  expected  to  decrease.  In  the  long  term,  the  social 
development  that  cross-border  mobility  is  increasing  and  that  borders  in  the 
Schengen  area  not  subject  to  controls  make  it  easier  for  criminals  to  smuggle 
human  beings  from  one  EU  Member  State  to  another.  As  soon  as  cross-border 
mobility  reaches  at  least  pre-crisis  levels,  THB  in  expected  to  go  up  again  since 
there  is  persistent  demand  for  low-wage  workers  employed  in  manual  jobs.268  As 
concerns technological developments, it is expected that the use of online platforms 
and  services  to  identify  and  advertise  victims  continues  to  increase  in  the  long 
term.269  Furthermore,  as  identity  fraud  becomes  increasingly  sophisticated, 
traffickers  are  expected  to  increasingly  use  stolen  personal  data  to  provide 

263 Europol (2021) Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment: A corrupting influence, European Union. 
264 European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, Europol (2019) EU Drug Markets Report.  Available at 
link. 
265 NDR Info (2021) Der grosse Sprung – Wie mexikanische Drogenkartelle nach Europa draengen. Available at link. 
266 Europol (2020) Customs thwart illegal cigarette trade in the EU and UK: 17 arrests and 67 million cigarettes seized. 
Available at link. 
267 European Commission (2020) Data collection on trafficking human beings in the EU. Available at link. 
268 Europol (2021) Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment: A corrupting influence, European Union. 
269 Ibid. 

108 

 
                                                                 
Crime area 

Criminal use of social and technological developments 

Organised 
property crime 

Environmental 
crime 

trafficking victims with new identities, which are unlikely to fall within risk categories 
of LEAs.270 

More  specifically,  the  following  types  of  future  trends  and  dynamics  can  be 
identified: 

 

 

 

 

 

Traffickers  are  increasingly  making  use  of  psychological  and  emotional 
violence and threats, rather than physical abuse, to control victims. 

People  with  developmental  and  physical  disabilities  are  increasingly  being 
targeted. 

The age of identified victims is decreasing. 

Traffickers continue to rely on social media, VoIP and instant messaging. 

Traffickers  increasingly  use  legal  businesses  that  can  conceal  exploitation, 
such as hotels and massage parlours. 

As long as COVID-19 prevails, the likelihood of organised property crime at private 
buildings  is  expected  to  decrease  since  people  spend  more  time  at  their  places. 
Commercial premises and  medical facilities,  on the  other hand, are expected  to be 
increasingly targeted.271 In the long term, criminals are expected to increasingly use 
e.g. drones in order to survey residential areas and to look for suitable properties to 
target. 

More  specifically,  the  following  types  of  future  trends  and  dynamics  can  be 
identified:  

  Domestic burglary, robberies and cargo theft are expected to rise slightly or 

stabilise. 

  Motor vehicle theft is expected to stabilise. 

 

Profitable  and  incidences  of  cultural  goods  trafficking  are  expected  to 
continue to grow. 

  Social media and  GPS allow  thieves across all organised property crimes to 

monitor targets and plan routes. 

  Online platforms are more and more used to sell loot anonymously. 

A  short-term  social  development  relates  to  COVID-19  waste  crime.  Since  the 
outbreak  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  there  has  been  an  increase  in  growth  in 
unlawful  sanitary  waste  treatment  and  disposal.272  In  the  long  term,  it  is  expected 
that this criminal activity will decrease and go down to pre-crisis levels. As concerns 
technological developments, the increasing reliance on technology in all areas of life 
and the built-in obsolescence for many devices generate unprecedented amounts of 
e-waste  in  the  form  of  e.g.  discarded  devices,  which  is  increasingly  exploited  by 
OCGs.  Electronic  devices  containing  precious  metals  such  as  gold  or  palladium  are 
trafficked  on  a  global  scale  just  like  drugs  or  firearms.  In  the  long  term,  the  illicit 
trade  in  e-waste is  expected  to  grow  both  in  terms of  quantities traded  and  in  the 
quality of the methods used by criminals.273 

More  specifically,  the  following  types  of  future  trends  and  dynamics  can  be 
identified:  

 

Illegal  waste  shipments  are  re-routed  to  emerging  important  countries, 
especially  in  South  and  South-East  Asia,  since  the  ban  of  solid  waste 
important by China in 2018. 

  Waste  Electrical  and  Electronic  Equipment  and  end  of  life  vehicles  are 

270 Europol (2015) Exploring tomorrow’s organised crime. Available at link. 
271 European Parliament (2020) Organised Property Crime in the EU. Available at link. 
272  Europol  (2020)  COVID-19  Waste  crime:  Europe-wide  operation  to  tackle  unlawful  sanitary  waste  disposal. 
Available at link. 
273 Europol (2015) Exploring tomorrow’s organised crime. Available at link. 

109 

 
                                                                 
Crime area 

Criminal use of social and technological developments 

Trafficking 
firearms 

of 

Illegal 
immigration 

emerging sub-markets in the illegal waste market. 

The development of firearms trafficking has been rather constant in the EU in recent 
years.274  The  increasing  trade  globalisation,  the  absence  of  border  controls  inside 
the  EU  and  the  availability  of  new  and  anonymous  payment  methods  will  likely 
increase  trafficking  of  firearms  in  the  future.  Moreover,  the  technological 
development  of  3D  printing  enables  criminals  to  exploit  new  opportunities  for 
firearm trafficking.275  

More  specifically,  the  following  types  of  future  trends  and  dynamics  can  be 
identified: 

 

 

There is an increased availability of weapons. 

The dark net is increasingly used to sell firearms. 

  Conflict areas were and still are a source of illicit firearms.  

Illegal immigration has been continuously increasing in the recent past with a peak 
during  the  refugee  crisis  in  2015  and  is  expected  to  continue  to  increase.276  The 
increasing exploitation of Big Data and personal data enables criminals to carry out 
complex identity frauds.277 For instance, criminals can sell these stolen identities to 
irregular  immigrants  who  wish  to  enter  the  EU.  As  long  as  COVID-19  prevails,  the 
likelihood  of  illegal  immigration  is  expected  to  slightly  decrease.  However,  in  the 
long term, technological developments in relation to identity frauds enable criminals 
to increase the severity of crime in the area of illegal immigration. 

More  specifically,  the  following  types  of  future  trends  and  dynamics  can  be 
identified: 

 

The  routes  taken  and  country  of  origin  evolve  over  time.  The  Eastern 
Mediterranean  route  is  expected  to  remain  a  focus  of  the  smuggling  of 
migrants. 

  Hubs  where  demand  and  supply  of  smuggling  services  meet  are  rather 

stable over time. 

 

There can be an increase in the number of fraudulent documents as part of 
an increase in the abuse of legal channels to get into the EU.  

Source: EY/RAND Europe Study’s elaboration based on desk research 

How  do  LEAs  use  technological  developments  and  how  are  they  affected  by  the  latest  social 
developments? 

Social developments affect to all areas of SOC, requiring LEAs to increasingly cooperate across-
borders. Especially in the long-term, social developments such as increased intra-EU mobility and 
increasingly globalised criminal markets will put LEAs in front of operational challenges. Notably, 
the increasing prevalence and severity of SOC will likely require LEAs to involve more offices and 
officials,  to  invest  more  time  and  to  handle  higher  costs  caused  by  more  and  more  intense  joint 
operations.  Particularly  the  shift  to  the  online  world  will  put  LEAs  in  front  of  operational 
challenges.  The  increasing  digitalisation  and  use  of  social  media  go  hand  in  hand  with  the 
increasing spread of misinformation, fake news and conspiracy theories. Europol anticipates that the 
use of deep fakes will become a serious challenge for the digital environment.278 However, LEAs 
have limited powers to counter this information manipulation which can in the end distort political 
discourse or manipulate elections. 

274 EU Commission (2021) Trafficking in firearms. Available at link. 
275 Europol (2015) Exploring tomorrow’s organised crime. Available at link. 
276  Statista  (2021)  Number  of  illegal  entries  between  border-crossing  points  (BCPs)  detected  in  the  European  Union 
(EU) from 2009 to 2019. Available at link. 
277 Europol (2015) Exploring tomorrow’s organised crime. Available at link. 
278 Europol (2021) Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment: A corrupting influence, European Union. 

110 

 
                                                                 
 
As regards technological developments, in the short term, LEAs face operational challenges such 
as  limited  interoperability  of  national  law  enforcement  databases  and  limited  knowledge  of 
available databases279. These challenges could reasonably remain prominent in the near future but 
are expected to decrease in the long term. As these operational technological challenges decrease, 
LEAs  will  with  some  certainty  increase  their  capabilities  to  fight  the  prevalence  and  severity  of 
SOC  in  the  long  term,  also  in  light  of  the  increasing  availability  of  advanced  technologies  which 
can  be  used  by  them.  Looking  at  robotics  as  a  reference,  LEAs  are  expected  to  increasingly  use 
drones as patrol drones at borders. For instance, Frontex considers observing refugees in the central 
and  eastern  Mediterranean  with  drones  developed  by  the  military280,  whereas  this  form  of 
surveillance is already common practice in the United States. 
AI has emerged as the most promising technology to enhance law enforcement surveillance.281 The 
application  of  AI  technology  will  likely  increase  as  LEAs  aim  to  rely  on  a  more  data-driven 
approach to criminal investigations. The expected result of this is that LEAs will enhance detection 
rates  and  will  more  often  succeed  in  detecting  complex  structures  of  criminal  activity  when 
combatting  serious  and  OCGs.  The  following  illustrative  cases  show  how  AI  can  be  applied  in 
different areas of SOC and how it continues to gain importance in the near future:  

Crime areas 

Cybercrime, 
immigration 

Overview of potential uses of AI by LEAs for different crime areas 

Potential use of AI by LEAs 

financial 

crime, 

THB, 

illegal 

AI  can  be  used  to  combat  online  child  sexual 
abuse or terrorist use of social media.282  

Organised  property  crime,  environmental  crime, 
illicit tobacco trade, illegal immigration, THB 

recently  adopted  proposal 

AI and robotics can be used for robotic patrol and 
surveillance systems.283 It should be noted that in 
the 
for  an  AI 
Regulation,  the  use  of  AI  systems  for  real-time 
remote  biometric  identification  of  natural  persons 
in  public  spaces  –  which  is  considered  as 
particularly  intrusive  in  relation  to  the  rights  of 
freedoms  –  is  allowed  in  a  few  narrowly  defined 
situations.284 

Illicit  tobacco  trade,  drug  related  crimes,  THB, 
trafficking of firearms 

AI can be used for autonomous research, analysis 
and  reply  to  requests  for  international  mutual 
legal assistance.285  

All areas of SOC: 

AI can be used to forecast where and what types 
of  crimes  are  likely  to  occur  in  order  to  optimize 
law enforcement resources.286 

Source: EY/RAND Europe Study’s elaboration based on desk research 

How do citizens and businesses use technological developments and how are they affected by the 
latest social developments? 

279 Technical workshop held on 24 March. 
280 Euractiv (2020) EU signs €100m drone contract with Airbus and Israeli arms firms. Available at link. 
281  On  21  April  2021,  the  EU  Commission  adopted  a  proposal  for  the  Artificial  Intelligence  Act.  This  proposal 
highlights the important role of AI in the future and explicitly discusses the use of AI in the case of law enforcement. 
For further details, see EU Commission (2021) Artificial Intelligence Act. Available at link. 
282 Interpol (2020) Artificial intelligence and law enforcement: challenges and opportunities. Available at link. 
283 Interpol/UNICRI (2019) Artificial intelligence and robotics for law enforcement. Available at link. 
284 EU Commission (2021) Artificial Intelligence Act. Available at link. 
285 Interpol/UNICRI (2019) Artificial intelligence and robotics for law enforcement. Available at link. 
286 Ibid. 

111 

 
                                                                 
Most sport and mass gathering events have been cancelled since the outbreak of the pandemic and 
are cancelled or postponed in the upcoming months. It remains unclear to what extent a crowd will 
be allowed to attend the e.g. European Soccer Championship 2021 or Wimbledon 2021. Due to the 
pandemic,  businesses  are  expected  to  increasingly  rely  on  digital  tools  for  visitor  management, 
which  can  be  exploited  for  criminal  purposes,  e.g.  through  cyber-attacks.  In  the  long  run,  it  is 
assumed  that  mass  sports  events  will  take  place  without  COVID-restrictions  in  the  EU.287  For 
instance,  the  2024  Summer  Olympics  and  the  2023  Fédération  Internationale  de  Football 
Association (FIFA) Women’s World Cup are expected to take place under pre-crisis conditions. As 
concerns relevant social developments, likely challenges to public order and safety can be primarily 
linked  to  increasing  cross-border  mobility  of  sports  fans  travelling  to  other  Member  States  and 
SACs  in  order  to  attend  matches.  At  the  same  time,  likely  challenges  to  public  order  and  safety 
could be linked to the use of new technologies such as end-to-end encrypted communication apps, 
exploited by e.g. hooligans travelling across-borders to  attend and riot at  football matches as was 
the case during the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) Euro 2016 riots.288  

A similar argument applies to mass cultural events and political mass gatherings. Likely challenges 
to public order and safety can be linked, on the one hand, to the use of technologies such as end-to-
end  encrypted  communication  apps  by  event  attendees/organisers  and,  on  the  other  hand,  to 
ransomware attacks by criminals in order to commit identity fraud of ticket purchasers. An example 
for  identity  fraud  is  the  online  theft  of  personal  details  of  64000  visitors  of  the  Tomorrowland 
festival  in  Belgium.289  As  concerns  social  developments,  likely  challenges  to  public  order  and 
safety  can  be  primarily  linked  to  increasing  cross-border  mobility.  For  instance,  an  example  of  a 
threat  to  public  order  and  safety  were  political  activists  who  travelled  to  Hamburg  from  across 
entire Europe during the G20 summit in 2017.290  

As  previously  detailed  in  this  section,  cross-border  mobility  has  noticeably  increased  in  the  past 
decade with e.g. increasing cross-border commuting and constantly increasing cross-border tourism. 
As  concerns  cross-border  tourism,  it  has  continuously  increased  in  the  last  decade  but  halved  in 
2020 compared to 2019).291 After the COVID-19 crisis, it is expected that tourism will be at least 
back  to  pre-crisis  levels  once  borders  are  open  again  and  quarantine  rules  are  manageable  for 
tourists. 

Development of the number of nights spent at tourist accommodation establishments by non-
residents in the EU-27  

Nights spent 

250.000.000

200.000.000

150.000.000

100.000.000

50.000.000

0

1
1
0
2

n
a
J

1
1
0
2

l

u
J

2
1
0
2

n
a
J

2
1
0
2

l

u
J

3
1
0
2

n
a
J

3
1
0
2

l

u
J

4
1
0
2

n
a
J

4
1
0
2

l

u
J

5
1
0
2

n
a
J

5
1
0
2

l

u
J

6
1
0
2

n
a
J

6
1
0
2

l

u
J

7
1
0
2

n
a
J

7
1
0
2

l

u
J

8
1
0
2

n
a
J

8
1
0
2

l

u
J

9
1
0
2

n
a
J

9
1
0
2

l

u
J

0
2
0
2

n
a
J

0
2
0
2

l

u
J

287 Technical workshop held on 24 March. 
288 BBC News (2016) Euro 2016: Who is to blame for the Marseille violence. Available at link. 
289 The Brussels Times (2018) Hackers steal personal details of 64,000 Tomorrowland visitors. Available at link. 
290 Deutsche Welle (2017) After G20: A look at left-wing radicalism in Europe. Available at link. 
291 Eurostat (2021) Nights spent at tourist accommodation establishments – monthly data. Available at link. 

112 

 
 
                                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat (2021) 

As concerns cross-border commuting, it is assumed that cross-border commuting will likely to go 
back to increasing pre-crisis levels in the long run since important parts of cross-border commuters 
work in the construction field.292 Thus, one expected result related to the social developments is that 
businesses  will  increasingly  struggle  to  cope  with  the  increasing  numbers  of  foreign  visitors.  For 
instance,  businesses  in  Venice  could  reasonably  increasingly  struggle  with  waste  management 
during  tourist  season293  and  with  citizens  increasingly  overrunning  cities  like  Dubrovnik  with 
Games of Thrones tourism.294  

How do LEAs use the latest technological developments and how are they affected by the latest 
social developments? 

As  stated  in  the  previous  section,  it  is  assumed  that  mass  sports  events  will  take  place  without 
COVID-restrictions  in  the  EU  in  the  long  term  and  hence  require  substantial  preparation  of  joint 
operations  and  law  enforcement  cooperation  of  LEAs295  in  order  to  prevent  e.g.  football 
hooliganism  and  terrorism.  In  recent  years,  the  nature  of  terrorist  attacks  at  mass  gatherings  has 
shifted to attacks being carried out by single individuals with little preparation and easily available 
weaponry such as in the case of the attacks at the football match at the Stade de France in 2015.296 It 
is expected that this threat increases, particularly as the latest technologies can be misused, e.g. in 
the case of malicious use of drones.297 In difference to citizens and businesses, a result of this for 
LEAs is that LEAs have to cooperate across the entire EU to prepare for threats from single actor 
attacks  as  well  as  more  sophisticated  attacks.  Similarly  to  the  argument  made  in  the  section  for 
SOC, it is expected that the social developments relating to e.g. the increasingly global value chains 
will with some certainty require LEAs to increasingly cooperate across-borders.  

A similar argument applies to  mass cultural  events  and political  mass gatherings.  In difference to 
the  way  citizens  and  businesses  are  affected,  LEAs  face  operational  technological  challenges  for 
cross-border cooperation which stem from limited interoperability of the databases and IT systems 
in place.298 As is the case for mass sports events,  LEAs are expected to increasingly cooperate to 
ensure  public  order  and  safety  during  mass  cultural  events  and  political  mass  gatherings  and  to 
prepare  for  terrorist  attacks.  In  the  long  term,  it  is  expected  that  the  usage  of  technological 
developments by LEAs such as AI will reduce the severity of disruption of public order and safety. 

As  regards  cross-border  tourism  and  cross-border  commuting,  as  long  as  the  crisis  prevails,  the 
prevalence  of  tourism  and  cross-border  commuting  are  expected  to  remain  at  lower  levels  in 
comparison  to  the  pre-crisis  increases  in  tourism  and  commuting.  In  difference  to  citizens  and 
businesses,  LEAs  have  to  ensure  that  public  order  is  not  disrupted  by  e.g.  terrorism  in  the  public 
sphere  and  are  expected  to  increasingly  rely  on  the  use  of  technological  developments  such  as 
shared databases or cross-border radio-telecommunication solutions to ensure that public order and 
safety  –  and  in  the  short  run  especially  health  safety  –  is  guaranteed.  In  the  long  run,  where  it  is 
expected that  cross-border tourism  and cross-border  commuting to  increase,  LEAs will likely  use 
technological developments such as AI (a) to reduce the severity of disruption of public order and 
safety and (b) to enhance cross-border cooperation.  

292 Eurostat (2021) People on the move. Available at link. 
293 The Guardian (2019) Sinking city: how Venice is managing Europe’s worst tourism crisis. Available at link. 
294 Vox (2019) Game of Thrones tourism is wildly popular – and not just because the show is a hit. Available at link. 
295 Technical workshop held on 24 March. 
296 BBC News (2015) Paris attacks: What happened on the night. Available at link. 
297 EU Commission (2020) A Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU: Anticipate, Prevent, Protect, Respond. Available 
at link. 
298 Technical workshop held on 24 March 2021. 

113 

 
 
                                                                 
******* 

114 

 
 
 
ANNEX 5: SUPPORTING INFORMATION ON THE PROBLEMS 1, 2 & 3 

1.  HORIZONTAL SUPPORTING INFORMATION REGARDING THE PROBLEMS 1, 2 & 3  
Overview  

The EU framework for facilitating cross-border law enforcement cooperation is spread across 
a range of legislative texts and non-binding policy initiatives. The documentary review identified 
22 relevant EU measures that cover to different extent the three main areas of analysis of the study. 
More specifically, 15 legislative measures (i.e. Regulations, Directives and Council Decisions) and 
7 non-binding measures (i.e. manuals, handbooks, guidelines and factsheets) have been identified. 

The  EU  legal  framework  for  facilitating  cross-border  law  enforcement  cooperation  between  EU 
Member  States  and  the  Schengen  area  precedes  the  TFEU  and  includes  foundational  legal 
agreements, such as:  

  The  Schengen  acquis  –  the  1990  CISA,299  which  sets  out  the  terms  to  establish 
common  standards  for  controls  of  the  EU’s  external  borders  and  removed  border 
checks between the signature countries.300  

  The  1998  Naples  II  Convention  on  mutual  assistance  and  cooperation  between 
customs  administrations,301  which  includes  some  provisions  on  criminal  law 
enforcement cooperation. The Convention enables central coordinating units appointed 
within  each  national  customs  administration  to  exchange  requests  (in  principle  in 
writing)  for  information,  surveillance,  and  enquiries.302  Moreover,  the  Convention 
establishes  that  customs  administrations  must  provide  each  other  with  the  necessary 
staff and organisational support when cooperating on cross-border issues.303 

  Part  of  the  Prüm  Decisions  related  to  operational  cooperation.304  The  Prüm  Treaty 
was  fully  introduced  at  Union  level  by  Council  Decision  2008/615/JHA  on  the 
stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-
border  crime  and  by  Council  Decision  2008/616/JHA  on  the  implementation  of 
Decision 2008/615/JHA. 

  Council  Framework  Decision  2006/960/JHA  of  18  December  2006  (or  so-called 
Swedish Framework Decision (SFD))305 on simplifying the exchange of information 
and intelligence between LEAs of the Member States of the European Union. Adopted 
in  the  wake  of  the  2004  Madrid  attacks,  it  institutes  a  new  legal  system  improving 

299  The  Schengen  acquis  -  Convention  implementing  the  Schengen  Agreement  of  14  June  1985  between  the 
Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic 
on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders (1990). Available at: link.  
300  EU  countries  applying  the  Schengen  acquis  include  Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Austria, Italy, Greece, Denmark, Finland, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. Non-EU Member States applying the Schengen rules include Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and 
Liechtenstein.  
301 Close cooperation between EU customs administrations (Naples II Convention) (1998). Available at: link.  
302  Mutual  assistance  can  be  provided  also  spontaneously,  without  prior  request,  for  covert  surveillance  and  the 
provision of information. Ibidem.  
303 Special forms of cooperation listed in the Convention are: Mutual assistance Hot pursuit  — cross-border pursuit of 
suspects;  Cross-border  surveillance;  Covert  investigations;  Joint  special  investigation  teams;  Controlled  deliveries. 
Ibidem. 
304  Only  the  Articles  16-23  of  Council  Decision  2008/615/JHA  of  23  June  2008  on  the  stepping  up  of  cross-border 
cooperation,  particularly  in  combating  terrorism  and  cross-border  crime  and  Article  17  of  Council  Decision 
2008/616/JHA  are  covered  (another  legal  initiative  is  to  cover  the  remaining  parts  of  Prüm).  Council  Decision 
2008/615/JHA. Available at: link. Council Decision 2008/616/JHA. Available at: link. 
305 Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the exchange of information and 
intelligence  between  law  enforcement  authorities  of  the  Member  States  of  the  European  Union  (2006).  Available  at: 
link. 

115 

 
                                                                 
information  exchange,  for  example,  by  establishing  a  time-frame  for  responding  to 
requests.  According  to  the  SFD,  the  exchange  of  information  between  LEAs  of 
different  Member  States  should  not  be  subject  to  stricter  conditions  than  those  that 
apply between LEAs within a State. 

  Council Decision 2007/412/JHA of 12 June 2007 amending Decision 2002/348/JHA 
concerning  security  in  connection  with  football  matches  with  an  international 
dimension. The Decision aims to prevent and combat football-related violence in order 
to  ensure  the  safety  of  EU  citizens,  by  outlining  methods  for  internationally 
coordinated policing of football events. 

  Council Decision 2006/560/JHA of 24 July 2006 amending Decision 2003/170/JHA 
on the common use of liaison officers posted abroad by the law enforcement agencies 
of  the  Member  States,  which  amends  the  provision  of  Decision  2003/170/JHA 
establishing  a  common  framework  for  liaison  officers  seconded  from  the  Member 
States with the aim of improving cooperation in preventing and combating all forms of 
international crime.306 

While these conventions  and decisions contribute to  consolidating the  EU legal  framework in  the 
area of Freedom, Security and Justice, they do not apply to all EU Member States and SACs and 
leave considerable flexibility to the Member States in implementing them at the national level. 
For example, some EU Member States, including Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus and Romania, have not 
fully integrated the Schengen area, and Ireland has opted out of the Schengen Agreement. 

Additional  EU  legislation  has  been  introduced  since  the  TFEU  to  further  harmonise  EU  LEAs’ 
approach  and  cooperation  to  tackle  cross-border  crimes  and  ensure  the  safety  and  security  of  EU 
citizens.  These  legislative  tools  include,  among  others,  Regulations  on  the  creation  of  EU 
decentralised agencies in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice such as Europol, Frontex, 
Eurojust  and  eu-LISA.  These  agencies  play  a  crucial  role  in  facilitating  information  sharing  and 
supporting  operational  cooperation  between  Member  States  and  SACs.  More  specifically,  they 
contribute  to  the  assessment  of  common  security  threats,  help  define  common  priorities  for 
operational action, and promote and facilitate cross-border cooperation and prosecution. However, 
Member States’ and SACs’ engagement and contribution to the work of these agencies varies and 
the EU decentralised agencies have limited decision-making power and competences on operational 
matters. 

Besides  the  establishment  of  a  legislative  framework  facilitating  cross-border  law  enforcement 
cooperation within the EU and the Schengen Area, the EU has also fostered greater cooperation 
between law enforcement bodies through the publication of recommendations and guidelines, 
as well as a series of strategic and operational initiatives. 

Recommendations  and guidelines  developed  at  the  EU  level  are  non-binding  documents,  which 
seek  to  record  good  practices  for  law  enforcement  cooperation  within  the  EU  and  Schengen  area 
and  provide  additional  clarification.  These  non-binding  measures  provide,  among  the  others,  on 
instructions  to  implement  the  SFD  and  Naples  II  Convention,  recommendations  for  the  correct 
application  of  the  Schengen  Acquis,  on  Single  Point  of  Contacts  (SPOCs)  and  Police  Customs 
Cooperation  Centres  (PCCCs)  and  measures  to  prevent  and  control  violence  and  disturbances  in 
connection  with  football  matches  with  an  international  dimension.  While  these  recommendations 
and  guidelines  lay  out  the  grounds  for  adopting  common  approaches  to  tackling  cross-border 
crimes,  they  are  not  legally  binding  for  EU  Member  States  or  SACs.  As  such,  they  do  not 
participate in harmonising the legal framework for cross-border cooperation in the strict sense, but 
may  still  serve  to  align  the  approaches  of  the  Member  States  and  SACs  based  on  an  increased 

306 Council Decision 2006/560/JHA of 24 July 2006 amending Decision 2003/170/JHA on the common use of liaison 
officers posted abroad by the law enforcement agencies of the Member States. Available at: link. 

116 

 
 
                                                                 
common  understanding  of  and  approach  to  the  implementation  and  application  of  existing 
provisions. 

The following sections provide a descriptive overview of the nature and content of the EU measures 
related  to  the  three  dimensions  of  analysis  of  the  study,  i.e.  access  to/exchange  of  information, 
operational cooperation for public order and safety, and operational cooperation to combat SOC and 
terrorism. Moreover, specific EU measures have been identified in relation to data protection during 
cross-border law enforcement operations. These are also described. Finally, the last section focuses 
on  EU  measures  establishing  EU  decentralised  agencies  relevant  to  intra-EU  law  enforcement 
cooperation.  

The  table  below  provides  an  overview  of  all  identified  relevant  EU  measures  along  with  the 
relevant dimension(s) of analysis covered by each measure. It shall be noted that some EU measures 
include provisions that are relevant for more than one dimension of analysis. Given the horizontal 
nature of exchange of information, most of the measures analysed under this dimension also include 
provisions that are relevant to SOC and public order.  

EU measures by dimension of analysis 

Measures 

Binding measures  

CISA 1990 

Convention on mutual assistance and cooperation between customs administrations (Naples II 
Convention) - OJ C 24 1998 
Council Decision 2002/348/JHA concerning security in connection with football matches with an 
international dimension  
Council Decision 2005/671/JHA on the exchange of information and cooperation concerning 
terrorist offences 
Council Decision 2006/560/JHA of 24 July 2006 amending Decision 2003/170/JHA on the 
common use of liaison officers posted abroad by the law enforcement agencies of the Member 
States  
Council Decision 2007/412/JHA concerning security in connection with football matches with an 
international dimension 
Council Decision 2008/615/JHA on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in 
combating terrorism and cross-border crime  
Council Decision 2008/616/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the implementation of Decision 
2008/615/JHA on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating 
terrorism and cross-border crime 
Council Decision 2008/633/JHA concerning access for consultation of the Visa Information 
System (VIS) by designated authorities of Member States and by Europol for the purposes of 
the prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist offences and of other serious criminal 
offences 

Council Decision 2009/917/JHA on the use of information technology for customs purposes 

Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA on simplifying the exchange of information and 
intelligence (SFD) 
Regulation (EU) 2018/1860 on the use of the SIS for the return of illegally staying third-
country nationals 
Regulation (EU) 2018/1861 on the establishment, operation and use of the SIS in the field of 
border check 
Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 on the establishment, operation and use of the SIS in the field of 
police cooperation 
Regulation (EU) 2019/818 on establishing a framework for interoperability between EU 
information systems in the field of police and judicial cooperation, asylum and migration  
Non-binding measures 
Council Document 10000/07 - Proposal for a Council Recommendation on a standard 
procedure in Member States for cross-border enquiries by police authorities in investigating 

117 

 
Measures 

supply channels for seized or recovered crime-related firearms 
Council Document 9512/10 - Guidelines on the implementation of Council Framework Decision 
2006/960/JHA 
Council Document 9105/11 - PCCCs guidelines 
Council Document 6721/3/14 - Draft SPOC Guidelines for international law enforcement 
information exchange 
Council Document 10492/14 - Guidelines for a SPOC 
Council Document 13034/14 - Guidelines on the implementation of SFD 
Council Document 5825/20, 2 December 2020 (Manual on Law Enforcement Information 
Exchange) 
Council Resolution concerning an updated handbook with recommendations for international 
police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in 
connection with football matches with an international dimension (2006/C 322/01- Football 
Handbook) 
Data Protection (binding) 
Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy 
in the electronic communications sector 
Directive (EU) 2016/680 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of 
personal data  
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data 
Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 on the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies 
EU Agencies’ legal basis (binding) 
Regulation (EU) 2015/2219 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 
2015 on CEPOL 
Regulation (EC) No 1920/2006 on EMCDDA 
Regulation (EU) 2016/794 on Europol  
Regulation (EU) 2018/1726 on the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of 
Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA)  
Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 on Eurojust 
Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 on EBCGA 
Source: EY/RAND Europe Study’s elaboration based on desk research 

Access  to/exchange  of  information.  Most  efforts  to  harmonise  national  legislation  focus  on 
improving  information  sharing  between  LEAs  across  the  EU  and  the  Schengen  area.  There  are 
several  binding  measures  that  establish  provisions  on  the  access  to  and  exchange  of  information 
between  Member  States  and  SACs.  Together,  these  legislative  instruments  were  introduced  as  an 
attempt to reconcile Member States’ and SACs’ fragmented law enforcement approaches with the 
growing need to jointly tackle shared cross-border threats. As such, legislative efforts have sought 
to ensure that information available to LEAs in one Member State is also available to other Member 
States  or  SACs.  These  legal  texts  have  thus  introduced  cooperation  instruments  to  centralise 
intelligence used for law enforcement and facilitate the exchange of information.  

To this end, a "one stop shop" (OSS) strategy has been promoted at the EU level to increase cross-
border  information  exchange,  simplify  and  centralise  information  sharing  and  access  to 
information.307  Pursuant  the  OSS  strategy,  Member  States’  and  SACs’  Lead  Supervisory 

307  Council  Document  6721/3/14  -  Draft  SPOC  Guidelines  for  international  law  enforcement  information  exchange 
Available at: link.  

118 

 
                                                                 
Authorities308 may request/provide mutual assistance and conduct joint operations for carrying out 
investigations  or  for  monitoring  the  implementation  of  a  measure  concerning  a  data  controller  or 
processor  established  in  another  Member  State.  In  doing  so,  “Member  States  shall  ensure  that 
conditions  not  stricter  than  those  applicable  at  the  national  level  for  providing  and  requesting 
information  and  intelligence  are  applied  for  providing  information  and  intelligence  to  competent 
LEAs of other Member States”.309  

EU  legislative  measures  mainly  focus  on  the  types  of  information  to  be  exchanged  and  the 
actors  in  charge  of  such  an  exchange.  With  regard  to  the  types  of  information,  different  EU 
measures cover specific types of information, such as personal data, travel documents, information 
concerning  and  resulting  from  criminal  investigations,  terrorism  offences,  VISA  data,  road  traffic 
data, firearm data, immigration data. These legislative instruments are accompanied by non-binding 
measures  aimed  at  providing  recommendations  related  to  their  implementation.  For  example, 
Council Document 10000/07310 provides a Manual that shall be applied to a systematic tracking of 
firearms  aiming  at  combating  illicit  manufacturing  and  illicit  trafficking  and  using  means  and 
methods commonly agreed on and established by the EU Member States. 

Also  with  regard  to  the  actors  in  charge  of  exchanging  information,  different  measures  focus  on 
different types of actors responsible for exchanging specific types of information. For instance, the 
SIS framework – built on Regulation (EU) 2018/1860, Regulation (EU) 2018/1861 and Regulation 
(EU) 2018/1862 –on the establishment, operation and use of the SIS311 focuses on the exchange of 
supplementary information, such as information connected to alerts in SIS, via a dedicated channel 
(SIRENE  mail  relay)  and  the  SIRENE  Bureaux.  Regulation  (EU)  2019/818  on  establishing  a 
framework for interoperability between EU information systems in the field of police and judicial 
cooperation,  asylum and migration312 establishes  a  framework for interoperability across different 
systems,313 allowing for better detection of security threats and identity fraud, and helps preventing 
and combating illegal immigration through the establishment of: 

  A  European  search  portal  (ESP),  allowing  competent  authorities  to  search  multiple 

information systems simultaneously, using both biographical and biometric data; 

  A  shared  biometric  matching  service  enabling  the  searching  and  comparing  of  biometric 

data (fingerprints and facial images) from several EU information systems; 

  A  common  identity  repository  containing  biographical  and  biometric  data  of  non-EU 

nationals available in several EU information systems; 

308 Pursuant Regulation (EU) 2016/679, “In cases involving both the controller and the  processor, the competent lead 
supervisory  authority  should  remain  the  supervisory  authority  of  the  Member  State  where  the  controller  has  its  main 
establishment,  but  the  supervisory  authority  of  the  processor  should  be  considered  to  be  a  supervisory  authority 
concerned  and  that  supervisory  authority  should  participate  in  the  cooperation  procedure  provided  for  by  this 
Regulation”. 
309 Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA on simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence between 
law enforcement authorities of the Member States of the European Union, Art. 3 (3). Available at: link. 
310 Council Document 10000/07 - Proposal for a Council Recommendation on a standard procedure in Member States 
for cross-border enquiries by police authorities in investigating supply channels for seized or recovered crime-related 
firearms. Available at: link. 
311  Regulation  (EU)  2018/1862  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  28  November  2018  on  the 
establishment,  operation  and  use  of  the  Schengen  Information  System  (SIS)  in  the  field  of  police  cooperation  and 
judicial  cooperation  in  criminal  matters,  amending  and  repealing  Council  Decision  2007/533/JHA,  and  repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 1986/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Decision 2010/261/EU. 
Available at: link. 
312  Regulation  (EU)  2019/818  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  20  May  2019  on  establishing  a 
framework for interoperability between EU information systems in the field of police and judicial cooperation, asylum 
and migration and amending Regulations (EU) 2018/1726, (EU) 2018/1862 and (EU) 2019/816. Available at: link. 
313  The  Entry/Exit  System  (EES);  The  Visa  Information  System  (VIS);  The  European  Travel  Information  and 
Authorisation  System  (ETIAS);  Eurodac;  The  Schengen  Information  System  (SIS);  The  European  Criminal  Records 
Information System for Third-Country Nationals (ECRIS-TCN); Europol data; Interpol database. 

119 

 
                                                                 
  A multiple identity detector enabling the detection of multiple identities across different EU 

information systems.  

In order to cope with the increasing exchange of cross-border information, the Council Document 
10492/14  established  the  SPOCs  across  countries,314  in  order  to  maximise  the  use  of  available 
resources,  avoid  overlaps  and  make  cooperation  with  other  Member  States  and  SACs  more 
efficient, fast and transparent. Besides the SPOCs, other key actors in the intra-EU law enforcement 
landscape  are  the  PCCCs  set  up  by  Council  Document  9105/11315,  which  are  operational  centres 
responsible for handling crisis situations and events having an international dimension. Moreover, 
the National Firearms Focal Points (NFFP) were set up by COM (2015) 624 final316 with the aim 
to  develop  expertise  and  improve  analysis  and  strategic  reporting  on  illicit  trafficking  in  firearms 
notably through the combined use of both ballistic and criminal intelligence. 

In  relation  to  exchange  of  information  and  cooperation  concerning  terrorist  offences,  Council 
Decision 2005/671/JHA317 states that Member Statas shall appoint national competent authorities 
in  charge  of  sharing  relevant  information  with  other  Member  States  and  SACs  as  well  as  with 
Eurojust and Europol. 
Moreover,  pursuant  to  Council  Decision  2003/170/JHA318,  liaison  officers  posted  abroad  were 
established for maintaining contacts with the authorities in the countries or organisations where they 
are based with a view to contributing to preventing or investigating criminal offences” (Article 1). 
Pursuant Article 8, as amended by Council Decision 2006/560/JHA,319 Member States can request 
to  use  Europol  liaison  officers  seconded  to  third  countries  or  international  organisations  for 
exchanging information about serious threats of criminal offences and vice versa.  

Some EU legislative  measures introduced specific tools and information systems that can be 
used to exchange information between LEAs. Besides measures relating to horizontal platforms 
(e.g. SIS), there are also measures that cover tools for the exchange of specific types of information, 
such as drugs information (Reitox), identity documents (ESP),320 and customs information.  

It  is  worth  mentioning  that  most  EU  measures  relating  to  information  systems  refer  to  generic 
“electronic means of communication”, thus leaving room to the Member States to choose the most 
appropriate tool to exchange information.  

Furthermore,  Council  Decision  2009/917/JHA  on  the  use  of  information  technology  for  customs 
purposes321  established  a  joint  automated  information  system  named  “Customs  Information 
Systems”  (CIS)  with  the  aim  to  “assist  in  preventing,  investigating  and  prosecuting  serious 
contraventions  of national  laws  by making information  available more rapidly, thereby increasing 

314  Council  Document  10492/14,  Draft  Guidelines  for  a  Single  Point  of  Contact  (SPOC)  for  international  law 
enforcement information exchange. Available at: link.  
315  Council  Document  9105/11,  European  Best  Practice  Guidelines  for  Police  and  Customs  Cooperation  Centres 
(PCCCs). Available at: link.  
316 COM (2015) 624 final. Available at: link. 
317 Council Decision 2005/671/JHA of 20 September 2005 on the exchange of information and cooperation concerning 
terrorist offences. Available at: link. 
318 Council Decision 2003/170/JHA of 27 February 2003 on the common use of liaison officers posted abroad by the 
law enforcement agencies of the Member States. Available at: link. 
319 Council Decision 2006/560/JHA of 24 July 2006 amending Decision 2003/170/JHA on the common use of liaison 
officers posted abroad by the law enforcement agencies of the Member States. Available at: link. 
320  The  European  search  portal  (ESP)  allows  competent  authorities  to  search  multiple  information  systems 
simultaneously, using both biographical and biometric data and it can be therefore used to search data related to persons 
or their travel documents. 
321 Council Decision 2009/917/JHA on the use of information technology for customs purposes. Available at: link. 

120 

 
 
 
                                                                 
the  effectiveness  of  the  cooperation  and  control  procedures  of  the  customs  administrations  of  the 
Member States.” (Article 1.2).  

The information and data available in this system can be also personal  data with the specification 
that  they  must  be  inserted  in  the  system  with  some  limitation  (listed  in  the  article  4.2).  This 
information  is  accessible  to  Europol  and  Eurojust.  It  should  be  noted  that  “Only  the  supplying 
Member State shall have the right to amend, supplement, rectify or erase data which it has entered 
in the” CIS (article 13).  

The  CIS  is  a  part  of  the  Anti-Fraud  Information  System  (AFIS)  operated  by  the  European  Anti-
Fraud  Office  (OLAF),  which  hosts  a  set  of  anti-fraud  applications  under  a  common  technical 
infrastructure  aiming  at  the  timely  and  secure  exchange  of  fraud-related  information  between  the 
customs competent national and EU administrations.  

The  AFIS  includes  also  the  Customs  Investigation  Files  Identification  Database  (FIDE),  which 
stores data on persons and businesses who are or have been the subject of an administrative enquiry 
or a criminal investigation by a Member State customs authority. Council Decision 2009/917/JHA 
and Regulation 515/97322 provide the legal basis for CIS and FIDE and define their policy of access. 
CIS  and  FIDE  information  stored  under  the  Council  2009/917/JHA  is  accessible  to  all  Member 
States  customs  authorities,  Europol  and  Eurojust.  CIS  and  FIDE  information  stored  according  to 
Regulation  515/97  is  accessible  to  all  Member  States  customs  authorities  and  competent 
Commission departments. 

The  legislative  measures  that  have  introduced  tools  for  the  exchange  of  information  are 
accompanied by non-binding measures that provide instructions and operational details on specific 
EU provisions and include guidance for collecting and sharing data and information. For example, 
Council Document No 5825/20323 is a Manual on Law Enforcement Information Exchange, which 
as 
provides 
such 
information 
Interpol/Europol/SIRENE.  Council  Document  No  9512/10324  provides  Guidelines  on 
the 
information  about  proper  channels  of 
implementation  of 
communication to be used.  

including  practical 

exchanging 

the  SFD, 

channels 

different 

details 

via 

for 

The following table provides an overview of EU tools/databases and systems for the exchange of 
information, including: 

  Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA); 
  SIS II; 
  VIS; 
  Europol Information System (EIS); 
  Tools/information systems that are mainly used by a specific category of actors (CIS, 

EUROSUR, Prüm, National Football Info Points (NFIP), NFFPs networks); 

  Prüm automated data exchange systems; 
  Bilateral contacts.  

322 Regulation 515/97 is out of the scope of this study. Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 of 13 March 1997 on mutual 
assistance  between  the  administrative  authorities  of  the  Member  States  and  cooperation  between  the  latter  and  the 
Commission to ensure the correct application of the law on customs and agricultural matters. Available at: link. 
323 Council Document 5825/20, 2 December 2020,  Manual on Law Enforcement Information Exchange. Available at: 
link. 
324  Council  Document  9512/10,  26  May  2010  -  Guidelines  on  the  implementation  of  Council  Framework  Decision 
2006/960/JHA. Available at: link. 

121 

 
                                                                 
Overview of EU tools and information systems for the exchange of information 

Legal basis 

Actors entitled to use the 
tool 

Type of information exchanged 

Tool/ 
information 
system  

SIENA 

 National competent law 

enforcement authority325  

Provision of information and 
intelligence 

 Council 

Framework 
Decision 
2006/960/JHA  
 Regulation (EU) 

2016/794  

 Europol or Eurojust 

 ENUs  

 CISA - Art. 39 

 NCPs 
 SPOC  

 Council Document 

10492/14  

SIS II 

  

 Council Decision 
2007/533/JHA, 
 Regulation (EU) 

2018/1860 

 Regulation (EU) 

2018/1861 

 Regulation (EU) 

2018/1862 

 SPOC  
 Liaison officers 
 Bilateral channels based 

on cooperation 
agreements at national, 
regional and local level 
(PCCCs) 

 National competent law 
enforcement authority  

 Europol or Eurojust 
 National authorities 

responsible for border 
control326 

 Europol 
 Eurojust 
 Frontex 

 Regulation (EU) 

 ENUs 

2016/794  

VIS 

 COM (2015) 624 

final 

 Council Decision 
2008/633/JHA 

 NFFP 
 Europol 
 LEAs 
 Europol 

EIS  

 Regulation (EU) 

 ENUs 

2016/794  

Information preventing and 
combating organised crime, 
serious international crime and 
terrorism involving two or more 
Member States 
Cross-border and intra-European 
operational actions/ operations, 
public order/ security/preventing 
criminal offences/ mass 
gatherings/ disasters, serious 
accidents 
Information on criminal matters 

Conditions and procedures for 
entering and processing alerts in 
the SIS on persons and objects, 
and for exchanging supplementary 
information and data in police and 
judicial cooperation on criminal 
matters 

Information preventing and 
combating organised crime, 
serious international crime and 
terrorism involving two or more 
Member States 
Information in the area of firearms 
trafficking 

 Data and decisions relating to 
applications for short-stay 
visas to visit, or to transit 
through, the Schengen Area 
 Information preventing and 
combating organised crime, 
serious international crime and 
terrorism involving two or 

325 To be understood as a national police, customs or other authority that is authorised by national law to detect, prevent 
and  investigate  offences  or  criminal  activities  and  to  exercise  authority  and  take  coercive  measures  in  the  context  of 
such activities. The designation of national competent authority falls within each Member State’s competence.  
326  Including:  supplementary  information  requests  at  the  national  entry  bureau  (SIRENE  Bureau);  customs,  judicial, 
migration and visa issuing authorities under Regulation 1987/2006; vehicle registration authorities; and under the new 
Regulation 2018/1862, firearm, boat, aircraft registration authorities, security authorities. 

122 

 
 
                                                                 
 
Legal basis 

Actors entitled to use the 
tool 

Type of information exchanged 

Tool/ 
information 
system  

CIS 

 COM (2015) 624 

final 

 Council Decision 
2009/917/JHA 

 Regulation 
515/97 

FIDE327 

 Council Decision 
2009/917/JHA 

 Regulation 
515/97 

EUROSUR  

 Regulation (EU) 

2019/1896  

 NFFP 
 Europol 
 National competent 

customs administration 
 Competent Commission 

departments 

 Europol 
 Eurojust 

 National competent 

customs administration 
 Competent Commission 

departments 

 Europol 
 Eurojust 
 National authorities 

responsible for border 
management (NCPs) 

 Council Decision 
2008/615/JHA  

 NCPs 

 Council Decision 
2007/412/JHA  
 Council Resolution 
2006/C 322/01 
 COM (2015) 624 

final 

 CISA - Art. 39 

 NFIP 
 National competent 

authorities  

 NFFP 
 Europol 
 NCPs 
 SPOC  

Prüm 
network for 
the supply 
of non-
personal 
and 
personal 
data  
NFIP 

NFFP 

Bilateral 
and 
regional 
liaison 
officers in 
PCCC 
Bilateral 
contact 
points  

Liaison 
officers in 
liaison 
bureaux 

more Member States 

 Information in the area of 

firearms trafficking 

 Data on commodities, means 

of transport, businesses, 
persons, fraud trends, 
availability of expertise, items 
detained, seized or 
confiscated, cash detained, 
seized or confiscated 

 Data on persons or businesses 
subject to an administrative 
enquiry or a criminal 
investigation by a Member 
State customs authority.  

 Data on detecting, preventing 

and combating illegal 
immigration and cross-border 
crime 

 Supply of data in relation to 

major events; 

 Supply of information in order 
to prevent terrorist offences 

 Information on high-risk 

supporters; 

 Strategic, operational and 

tactical information 

 Information in the area of 

firearms trafficking 

 Cross-border and intra-

European operational actions/ 
operations, public order/ 
security/preventing criminal 
offences/ mass gatherings/ 
disasters, serious accidents 
 Provision of information and 

intelligence 

 National competent law 
enforcement authority 

 Europol or Eurojust 

 Council 

Framework 
Decision 
2006/960/JHA  
 CISA - Art. 47 
 Council Decision 
2006/560/JHA  

 Liaison Officers 

 Information on criminal 

matters 

Source: EY/RAND Europe Study’s elaboration based on desk research 

SIENA, SIS II, VIS and EIS are the tools/information systems that can be used by a wide array of 
actors ranging from Member States’ competent authorities, European Agencies (Europol, Eurojust, 
Frontex), and national bodies (e.g. SPOCs, PCCCs and NFFPs). 
Actors that more frequently are entitled to use the tools listed in the table below are: 

327 FIDE is out of the scope of this study. 

123 

 
 
                                                                 
  Europol  (5  tools/information  systems,  namely  SIENA,  SIS  II,  VIS,  EIS,  and  liaison 

officers in liaison bureaux); 

  Member  States’  competent  law  enforcement  authority  (4  tools/information  systems, 

namely SIENA, SIS II, VIS, and liaison officers in liaison bureaux); 

  Eurojust  (4  tools/information  systems,  namely  SIENA,  SIS  II,  CIS  and  bilateral 

contact points); 

  Europol  National  Unit  (ENUs)  (3  tools/information  systems,  namely  SIENA,  SIS  II 

and EIS). 

Thus, different tools can be used by the same actor, although each tool is intended to be used for 
different objectives/type of information, hence there is no overlap or inconsistency.  

Namely: 

-  Three  different  tools  can  be  used  by  ENUs  to  prevent  and  combat  organised 
crime, serious international  crime and terrorism  involving two or more  Member 
States: SIENA, SIS II and EIS; 

-  Two  different  tools  can  be  used  by  NFFPs  to  share  information  in  the  area  of 

firearms trafficking: SIS II and EIS  

Moreover,  different  actors  can  use  the  same  tool  (SIENA)  to  share  the  same  type  of 
information:  both  NCPs  and  SPOCs  can  share  information  related  to  cross-border  and  intra-
European operational actions/ operations. 

Some EU measures make a step further and provide indications in relation to the timing for 
the exchange of information and the language to be used. As for the timing, the SFD states that 
requests  for  information  shall  be  answered  within  eight  hours  (urgent  request),  one  week  (non-
urgent request) or 14 days (all other cases). Guidelines on the implementation of the SFD328 provide 
details  for  the  identification  of  “urgent  cases”,  however,  no  definition  of  “not  urgent”  and  “other 
cases” is provided.  

A  generic  timeframe is  also  provided by Council Decision 2008/633,  which requires to  exchange 
information “immediately and, in any case, no later than 60 days”.329 Concerning the language to be 
used, two relevant measures have been identified. Council Decision 2002/348 concerning security 
in  connection with  football matches with  an international  dimension states that “National  football 
information  points  shall  communicate  in  their  own  language,  with  a  translation  in  a  working 
language common to both sides, save as otherwise arranged between the parties concerned”330 and 
the Naples II Convention requires that “Requests shall be submitted in an official language of the 
Member  State  of  the  requested  authority  or  in  a  language  acceptable  to  such  authority”.331  These 
measures are aimed to ensure that information is exchanged in a way that can be understood by the 
receiving Member State. 

328 Council Document 13034/14 - Guidelines on the implementation of SFD. Available at: link. 
329 Council Decision 2008/633/JHA of 23 June 2008 concerning access for consultation of the Visa Information System 
(VIS)  by  designated  authorities  of  Member  States  and  by  Europol  for  the  purposes  of  the  prevention,  detection  and 
investigation of terrorist offences and of other serious criminal offences. Available at: link 
330 Council Decision 2002/348/JHA: Council Decision of 25 April 2002 concerning security in connection with football 
matches with an international dimension. Available at: link. 
331 Close cooperation between EU customs administrations (Naples II Convention) (1998). Available at: link.  

124 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
Overview of the extent to which the issues identified in the Impact Assessment are also reported in the Schengen Evaluation Reports (2015-
2019) 

The  Schengen  acquis  includes  a  wide-ranging  and  fast-developing  set  of  rules  as  well  as  compensatory  measures  to  counterbalance  the  absence  of 
internal border controls. The Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism monitors the implementation of the Schengen acquis by the countries 
that apply the Schengen acquis in part or in full. It also assesses the capacity of those countries where internal border controls have not yet been lifted 
to implement the Schengen acquis in full. 

The Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism assesses in particular, the implementation of measures in the areas of external borders, return, 
visa policy, police cooperation, the Schengen Information System (SIS), data protection, and the absence of border control at internal borders.  

The Commission carries out  evaluations  over  a five-year cycle  following multiannual  and  annual programmes, together  with  experts from  Member 
States as well as EU agencies that participate as observers.  

Each  country  is  evaluated  at  least  once  every  five  years.  Additional  ad-hoc  evaluations  in  the  form  of  unannounced  evaluations  or  revisits  can  be 
organised, as required. Thematic evaluations are an additional tool for assessing the implementation of specific parts of the Schengen acquis  across 
several countries at the same time. The figure below illustrates the five-year evaluations process. 

Evaluation reports are presented to the Schengen Committee (in which all Member States are represented) and, subject to its positive opinion, adopted 
by the Commission. Upon a Commission proposal, the Council adopts the recommendations to address any deficiencies identified in the evaluation 
reports, concluding the first phase of the evaluation. As a follow-up, the country concerned must submit an action plan listing the remedial actions to 
implement the Council recommendations. The Commission assesses the action plans in cooperation with the relevant evaluation experts. The evaluated 
country has an obligation to report on the progress made every three months. When all remedial actions have been taken, the Commission closes the 
evaluation concluding the second phase. 

125 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Core 
problem 

Drivers 

T
A

E
B

Z
C

E
D

K
D

E
E

L
E

S
E

I
F

R
F

R
H

U
H

T
I

T
L

U
L

V
L

T
M

L
N

L
P

T
P

E
S

I
S

K
S

H
C

S
I

I
L

l
a
t
o
T

f
o
e
r
a
h
S

s
e
i
r
t
n
u
o
c

Law 
enforcement 
authorities  
do not 
effectively 
and 
efficiently 
exchange 
information 
with their 
partners in 
other 
Member 
States  

Some requirements set in 
the SFD are unclear and 
(unnecessarily) complex  

Uncertainties in the use of 
the proper legal basis  

National LEAs have limited 
awareness and knowledge 
of relevant databases 

Limited offer of training 
that is focused on cross-
border law enforcement 
cooperation  

Language barriers hamper 
the cross-border exchange 
of information 

Use of rudimentary search 
tools hampers the adoption 
of transliteration and “fuzzy 
logic” search 

SPOCs do not always play 
their coordination role and 
lack resources to face the 
increasing number of 
requests  

Differences in access rights 
and use EU of and 
international databases and 
platforms between national 
law enforcement 
authorities 

Difficulties in the implementation of relevant EU provisions 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x  19  73% 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

7  27% 

Insufficient knowledge of existing mechanisms, skill gaps and outdated IT infrastructures 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x  24  92% 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x  20  77% 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

Differences in national implementation choices 

x 

x 

x 

x 

12  46% 

x 

x 

x 

x  13  50% 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

7  27% 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x  21  81% 

Total 

3 

1 

7 

2 

4 

6 

5 

6 

4 

4 

3 

5 

4 

6 

3 

1 

4 

3 

7 

5 

5 

6 

8 

4 

4 

5 

115 

Source: Elaboration by the Study to support the preparation of an impact assessment on EU policy initiatives facilitating cross-border law enforcement 
cooperation 

126 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
2.  VERTICAL SUPPORTING INFORMATION REGARDING THE PROBLEM 1  

Overview of binding EU measures with respect to the access to and exchange of information (Part 1) 

Objective 

Council Decision 
2006/560 on the 
common use of liaison 
officers posted abroad 

To ensure that Europol’s 
liaison officers seconded 
to third countries and 
international 
organisations provide it 
with information relating 
to serious threats of 
criminal offences to 
Member States for those 
criminal offences for 
which Europol is 
competent under the 
Europol Convention 

Council Decision 
2008/633 
(VIS for terrorist offences 
and of other serious 
criminal offences) 

To provide access to 
Member States' 
designated authorities 
and the European Police 
Office (Europol) for 
consultation of the Visa 
Information System (VIS) 
for the purposes of the 
prevention, detection and 
investigation of terrorist 
offences and of other 
serious criminal offences 

Type of information to be 
exchanged  

Serious threats of 
criminal offences 

VIS data (personal data, 
travel data) 

Tools/ information systems 
used to exchange 
information 

Substantiated request in 
written or electronic form 

Council Framework Decision 
2006/960 (SFD) 

Regulation 2018/1860  
Regulation 2018/1861 
Regulation 2018/1862 

Regulation 2019/818 
(Interoperability between 
EU information systems) 

  Regulation 2018/1860: to 
strengthen enforcement of 
the EU’s return policy and 
reduces incentives for illegal 
immigration into the EU. 
  Regulation 2018/1861: to 
define the establishment, 
operation and use of the 
Schengen Information 
System (SIS) in the field of 
border checks, and 
amending the Convention 
implementing the Schengen 
Agreement. 

  Regulation 2018/1862: to 
define the establishment, 
operation and use of the 
Schengen Information 
System (SIS) in the field of 
police cooperation and 
judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters 
Personal data and 
supplementary information 

To establish a European 
search portal (ESP) for the 
purposes of facilitating the 
fast, seamless, efficient, 
systematic and controlled 
access of Member State 
authorities and Union 
agencies to the EU 
information systems 

Personal data and travel 
documents 

SIS 

ESP 

To establish the rules under 
which Member States’ law 
enforcement authorities may 
exchange information and 
intelligence effectively and 
expeditiously for the purpose 
of conducting criminal 
investigations or criminal 
intelligence operations 

Information and intelligence 
referred to any type of 
information or data held by 
Law Enforcement Authorities 
(LEAs) or held by public 
authorities/private entities 
and which is available to 
LEAs without the use of 
coercive measures. 
  Annex A includes a form 

to be used by the 
requested Member State 
in case of 
transmission/delay/ 
refusal of information 

  Annex B: request form 
for information and 

127 

 
 
 
 
Council Decision 
2006/560 on the 
common use of liaison 
officers posted abroad 

Council Decision 
2008/633 
(VIS for terrorist offences 
and of other serious 
criminal offences) 

Council Framework Decision 
2006/960 (SFD) 

Regulation 2018/1860  
Regulation 2018/1861 
Regulation 2018/1862 

Regulation 2019/818 
(Interoperability between 
EU information systems) 

Specific actors involved in 
the exchange of 
information 

Europol liaison officers 

Designated authorities of 
Member States 

intelligence to be used by 
the requesting member 
state 

Competent law enforcement 
authority; 
Competent 
Prosecutor/Judicial authority 

Sirene Bureau 

Member State authorities 
and EU agencies having 
access to, at least, one of 
the EU information 
systems. Queries to the 
Common Identity 
Repository (CIR) shall be 
carried out by a police 
authority 

Timing for exchanging 
information 

Immediately and, in any 
case, no later than 60 
days 

Language to be used for 
the exchange of 
information 
Requirements for 
exchanging information 
relating to specific areas  

Urgent request of information 
or intelligence held in a 
database directly accessible 
by a law enforcement 
authority: 8 hours (able to be 
postponed to maximum 3 
days); 
Non urgent request of 
information or intelligence 
referred to the crimes above, 
held in a database directly 
accessible by a law 
enforcement authority: 1 
week; 
Other cases: within 14 days 
Language applicable for the 
channel used 

Two requirements are 
necessary:  
Access for consultation 
must be necessary for the 
purpose of the 
prevention, detection or 
investigation of terrorist 
offences or other serious 
criminal offences;  
There are reasonable 
grounds to consider that 
consultation of VIS data 
will contribute to the 
prevention, detection or 

128 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Council Decision 
2006/560 on the 
common use of liaison 
officers posted abroad 

Council Decision 
2008/633 
(VIS for terrorist offences 
and of other serious 
criminal offences) 
investigation of a criminal 
offence 
Each Member State shall 
adopt the necessary 
security measures with 
respect to data to be 
retrieved from the VIS 
pursuant to this Decision 
and to be subsequently 
stored 

Council Framework Decision 
2006/960 (SFD) 

Regulation 2018/1860  
Regulation 2018/1861 
Regulation 2018/1862 

Regulation 2019/818 
(Interoperability between 
EU information systems) 

Usage of channels for 
international law 
enforcement cooperation 
without any further 
specification 

Member States shall ensure 
that the independent 
supervisory authorities 
designated in each Member 
State monitor the lawfulness 
of the processing of personal 
data in SIS on their territory, 
its transmission from their 
territory and the exchange 
and further processing of 
supplementary information on 
their territory 

Biometrical templates shall 
be stored in the shared 
BMS only for as long as the 
corresponding biometric 
data are stored in the CIR 
or SIS.  
Common identity data shall 
be deleted from the CIR in 
an automated manner in 
accordance with the data 
retention provisions of 
Regulation (EU) 2019/816 

Mechanisms to ensure Data 
Protection when 
accessing/exchanging 
information 

Requirement to develop 
cross-border threat 
assessment/risks analysis 

Source: Elaboration by the Study to support the preparation of an impact assessment on EU policy initiatives facilitating cross-border law enforcement 
cooperation 

Overview of binding EU measures with respect to the access to and exchange of information (Part 2) 

Council Decision 
2005/671 (exchange of 
information and 
cooperation concerning 
terrorist offences) 

Council Decision 
2008/615/JHA 
(Prüm Decision) 

Objective 

To share information 
with Europol, Eurojust 
and Member States 

Type of information to be 
exchanged  

Personal data, relevant 
information concerning 
and resulting from 
criminal investigations 
conducted by LEAs 

To improve cross-
border cooperation 
and exchange of 
information between 
authorities 
responsible for the 
prevention and 
investigation of 
criminal offences 
Personal data and 
information 

Council Decision 
2007/412/JHA 
concerning security in 
connection with 
football matches with 
an international 
dimension 
The measure provides 
some amendments to 
the Decision 
2002/348/JHA 
concerning security in 
connection with 
football matches with 
and international 
dimension 
Strategic operational 
and tactical information 

Council Decision 
2002/348/JHA 
concerning security in 
connection with 
football matches with 
an international 
dimension 
To prevent and combat 
football-related 
violence  

Personal data 

129 

Naples II Convention 

Council Decision 
2009/917 
(Information 
technology for 
customs purposes) 

To establish Customs 
Information System;  
To establish customs 
files identification 
database 

To provide information 
which may enable the 
requesting Member 
State to prevent, 
detect and prosecute 
infringements 

Personal data and all 
data useful to achieve 
the objective in the 
following categories:  
Commodities;  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Council Decision 
2005/671 (exchange of 
information and 
cooperation concerning 
terrorist offences) 

Council Decision 
2008/615/JHA 
(Prüm Decision) 

Council Decision 
2002/348/JHA 
concerning security in 
connection with 
football matches with 
an international 
dimension 

Council Decision 
2007/412/JHA 
concerning security in 
connection with 
football matches with 
an international 
dimension 

with respect to 
terrorist offences 
which affect or may 
affect two or more 
Member States 

Tools/ information 
systems used to exchange 
information 

Specific actors involved in 
the exchange of 
information 

Specific National 
Contact Point (NCP)  

National football 
information point 
(NFIP) 

Information shall be 
exchanged using the 
appropriate forms 
contained in the 
appendix to the 
Football Handbook 
(2006/C 322/01)  
NFIP and competent 
authorities in Member 
States 

Naples II Convention 

Customs authorities 

Council Decision 
2009/917 
(Information 
technology for 
customs purposes) 

Means of transport; 
Businesses; 
Persons;  
Fraud trends;  
Availability of 
expertise; 
Items detained, seized 
or confiscated;  
Cash detained, seized 
or confiscated.  
No items of personal 
data shall be entered 
in any event within 
the category "fraud 
trends"  
Customs Information 
System (established 
for the purpose) 

Direct access to data 
entered into the 
Customs Information 
System shall be 
reserved to customs 
administrations, but 
may also include other 
authorities competent, 
according to the laws, 
regulations and 
procedures of the 
specific Member State 

Timing for exchanging 
information 
Language to be used for 
the exchange of 
information 

National language. 
Translation in a 
working language 
common to both sides 
should be used 

National language. 
Translation in a 
working language 
common to both sides 
should be used 

130 

Requests shall be 
submitted in an official 
language of 
the Member State of 
the requested 
authority or in a 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Council Decision 
2005/671 (exchange of 
information and 
cooperation concerning 
terrorist offences) 

Council Decision 
2008/615/JHA 
(Prüm Decision) 

Council Decision 
2002/348/JHA 
concerning security in 
connection with 
football matches with 
an international 
dimension 

Council Decision 
2007/412/JHA 
concerning security in 
connection with 
football matches with 
an international 
dimension 

Council Decision 
2009/917 
(Information 
technology for 
customs purposes) 

Requirements for 
exchanging information 
relating to specific areas  

Public order purpose 
(preventing and 
combating football-
related violence) 

Mechanisms to ensure 
Data Protection when 
accessing/exchanging 
information 

Requirement to develop 
cross-border threat 
assessment/risks analysis 

The level protection 
of personal data at 
the national level 
should at least be 
equal to that 
resulting from the 
Council of Europe 
Convention for the 
Protection of 
Individuals and its 
Additional Protocol 

Personal data shall be 
exchanged in 
accordance with the 
domestic and 
international rules 
applicable and using 
the appropriate forms 
contained in the 
appendix to the 
Football Handbook 
(2006/C 322/01)  

NFIP should provide at 
the request of another 
NFIP a risk assessment 
of their own country's 
clubs and national 

131 

Personal data may be 
entered into the 
Customs Information 
System only if there 
are real indications, in 
particular on the basis 
of prior illegal 
activities, to suggest 
that the person 
concerned has 
committed, is in the 
act of committing or 
will commit serious 
contraventions of 
national laws 

Data entered into the 
Customs Information 
System shall 
be kept only for the 
time necessary to 
achieve the purpose 
for which they were 
entered. The need for 
their retention shall be 
reviewed at least 
annually by the 
supplying Member 
State  

Naples II Convention 

language acceptable 
to such authority 
Request shall include: 
The applicant 
authority making the 
request; 
The measure 
requested;  
The object of, and the 
reason for, the 
request; the laws, 
rules and other legal 
provisions involved;  
Indications on the 
natural or legal 
persons being the 
target of the 
investigation; 
A summary of the 
relevant facts 
The customs 
authorities shall take 
into account in each 
specific case the 
requirements for the 
protection of personal 
data. They shall 
respect the relevant 
provisions of the 
Convention of the 
Council of Europe of 
28 January 1981 for 
the protection of 
individuals with regard 
to automatic 
processing of personal 
data  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Council Decision 
2005/671 (exchange of 
information and 
cooperation concerning 
terrorist offences) 

Council Decision 
2008/615/JHA 
(Prüm Decision) 

Council Decision 
2002/348/JHA 
concerning security in 
connection with 
football matches with 
an international 
dimension 

team 

Council Decision 
2007/412/JHA 
concerning security in 
connection with 
football matches with 
an international 
dimension 

Council Decision 
2009/917 
(Information 
technology for 
customs purposes) 

Naples II Convention 

Source: Elaboration by the Study to support the preparation of an impact assessment on EU policy initiatives facilitating cross-border law enforcement 
cooperation 

Overview of non-binding EU measures with respect to the access to and exchange of information  

Council Document No 
9512/10 (Guidelines on the 
implementation of SFD) 

Council 
Document 
10492/14 
(Guidelines for 
SPOC) 

Council 
Document 
6721/3/14 (SPOC 
guidelines) 

Council Document 
13034/14 
(Guidelines on the 
implementation of 
SFD) 

Council 
Document No 
9105/11 (PCCCs 
guidelines) 

Football 
Handbook 
(2006/C 322/01) 

Council 
Document No 
5825/20 
(Manual on Law 
Enforcement 
Information 
Exchange) 

Objective 

To enhance the effective 
and expeditious exchange 
of information and 
intelligence between law 
enforcement authorities 

To provide 
guidelines for 
SPOC for which 
SPOC should 
access, directly 
or at request 
from competent 
authorities, to 
the broadest 
range of relevant 
national 
databases and in 
any case to all 
those databases 
available to the 
authorities 
represented in 
the SPOC 

To provide 
guidelines for 
SPOC for which 
SPOC should 
access, directly 
or at request 
from competent 
authorities, to 
the broadest 
range of relevant 
national 
databases and in 
any case to all 
those databases 
available to the 
authorities 
represented in 
the SPOC 

132 

To provide 
guidelines for 
PCCCs for which 
PCCCs should act 
as a "facilitator" 
of information 
exchange 
between States.  

To provide a 
Handbook 
helping NFIP 
coordinating the 
exchange of 
information on 
football matches. 
The NFIP should 
contribute to 
public order, 
peace and safety, 
thus aiming at an 
efficient use of 
the available 
resources. The 
NFIP should also 
aim to facilitate 
international 
police 
cooperation 
regarding the 
police approach 
to the football 
issues and to 
promote the 
exchange of 
information 
between the 

 
 
 
 
 
Council Document No 
9512/10 (Guidelines on the 
implementation of SFD) 

Council 
Document 
10492/14 
(Guidelines for 
SPOC) 

Council 
Document 
6721/3/14 (SPOC 
guidelines) 

Council Document 
13034/14 
(Guidelines on the 
implementation of 
SFD) 

Council 
Document No 
9105/11 (PCCCs 
guidelines) 

Football 
Handbook 
(2006/C 322/01) 

Council 
Document No 
5825/20 
(Manual on Law 
Enforcement 
Information 
Exchange) 

Type of information to be 
exchanged  

Any type of information or 
data which is held by law 
enforcement authorities, 
public authorities or by 
private entities and which is 
available to law 
enforcement authorities 
without the taking of 
coercive measures 

Tools/ information 
systems used to exchange 
information 

Annex A :form to be used 
by the requested Member 
State in case of 
transmission/delay/refusal 
of information; 
Annex B: request form for 
information and intelligence 
to be used by the 
requesting Member State 

Any type of 
information 
contained in law 
enforcement 
databases, 
identity 
documents 
database, visa 
database, 
immigration 
office database, 
prisoners 
database, 
information 
exchange with 
the national 
liaison officers, 
border control 
database  
SIS, CIS and 
sTESTA network 

Any type of 
information 
contained in law 
enforcement 
databases, 
identity 
documents 
database, visa 
database, 
immigration 
office database, 
prisoners 
database, 
information 
exchange with 
the national 
liaison officers, 
border control 
database  
SIS, CIS SIENA, 
Interpol (I-24/7 
communication 
system), and 
sTESTA network 

133 

police services of 
the different 
countries 
General and 
personal 
information 

Information 
related to petty 
and moderately 
serious crime, 
illegal migration 
flows and public 
order problems 

Secure internal 
and external 
communications 
system, (e.g. 
systems similar 
to those 
employed by the 
national 
operational 
agencies - 
telephony, fax, e-
mail, etc.). To 
increase 
efficiency and 
budgetary 
rationality, each 
PCCC party 
should be able to 
use a national 
line to 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Council Document No 
9512/10 (Guidelines on the 
implementation of SFD) 

Council 
Document 
10492/14 
(Guidelines for 
SPOC) 

Council 
Document 
6721/3/14 (SPOC 
guidelines) 

Council Document 
13034/14 
(Guidelines on the 
implementation of 
SFD) 

Council 
Document No 
9105/11 (PCCCs 
guidelines) 

Football 
Handbook 
(2006/C 322/01) 

Council 
Document No 
5825/20 
(Manual on Law 
Enforcement 
Information 
Exchange) 

communicate 
with its home 
country agencies 
and authorities. 
Dedicated 
software should 
be installed in 
order to facilitate 
the circulation of 
information 
within the PCCC 
in real time and 
to ensure daily 
recording and 
fast processing of 
questions 
referred to it and 
standardised 
recording of 
statistics 
PCCCs and 
Member States 
national agencies 

Liaison officers, 
national football 
information 
point;  
for international 
tournaments, the 
formal request 
for support 
should come 
from the minister 
of the 
department 
responsible in the 
organising 
country, who will 
receive advice 
from the NFIP 
concerned 

Specific actors involved in 
the exchange of 
information 

Police, customs and other 
authority authorised by 
national law to detect, 
prevent and investigate 
offences or criminal 
activities 

SPOC 
Judicial 
authorities (when 
appropriate) 

Europol, Interpol, 
SIRENE 

Timing for exchanging 
information 

All databases are 
accessible to the 
unit on a 24/7 
basis, where 

134 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Council Document No 
9512/10 (Guidelines on the 
implementation of SFD) 

Council 
Document 
10492/14 
(Guidelines for 
SPOC) 

Council 
Document 
6721/3/14 (SPOC 
guidelines) 

Council Document 
13034/14 
(Guidelines on the 
implementation of 
SFD) 

Council 
Document No 
9105/11 (PCCCs 
guidelines) 

Football 
Handbook 
(2006/C 322/01) 

Council 
Document No 
5825/20 
(Manual on Law 
Enforcement 
Information 
Exchange) 

Language to be used for 
the exchange of 
information 

Member State language 

necessary via on-
call duty officers 

Requirements for 
exchanging information 
relating to specific areas  

Requests and answers 
exchanged shall always 
provide Europol in copy 
each time that the request 
falls under Europol's 
mandate 

A request is sent 
through one 
channel only and 
if it is sent 
through different 
channels at the 
same time, this is 
clearly indicated. 
The channel is 
not be changed 
during an on-
going operation 
or during any 
phase unless it is 
absolutely 
necessary and 
the partner’s 
choice of channel 
when replying to 
the requests is 
respected. A 
change of 
channel is 

135 

The national 
language can be 
used for the 
communication 
between the 
different NFIPs if 
a copy of it is 
provided in the 
working language 
common to the 
two parties 
(unless other 
arrangements 
have been made 
between the 
parties 
concerned) 
Public order 
purpose 
(preventing and 
combating 
football-related 
violence) 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Council Document No 
9512/10 (Guidelines on the 
implementation of SFD) 

Council 
Document 
10492/14 
(Guidelines for 
SPOC) 

Council 
Document 
6721/3/14 (SPOC 
guidelines) 

Council Document 
13034/14 
(Guidelines on the 
implementation of 
SFD) 

Council 
Document No 
9105/11 (PCCCs 
guidelines) 

Football 
Handbook 
(2006/C 322/01) 

Council 
Document No 
5825/20 
(Manual on Law 
Enforcement 
Information 
Exchange) 

communicated to 
all parties, 
including the 
reason for the 
change.  
The purposes of 
and restrictions 
on the processing 
of information 
defined by the 
provider of 
the information 
are respected.  
Whenever 
possible, the 
SPOC replies 
directly to the 
international 
request, where 
appropriate with 
copy to the 
concerned 
national 
authority. Where 
the SPOC cannot 
reply directly, it 
forwards the 
request to the 
appropriate 
competent 
national 
authority, even if 
the original 
request was 
wrongly 
addressed to 
another 
authority. 
When a request 
is refused, the 
grounds for 
refusal have to 

136 

 
 
Council Document No 
9512/10 (Guidelines on the 
implementation of SFD) 

Council 
Document 
10492/14 
(Guidelines for 
SPOC) 

Council 
Document 
6721/3/14 (SPOC 
guidelines) 

Council Document 
13034/14 
(Guidelines on the 
implementation of 
SFD) 

Council 
Document No 
9105/11 (PCCCs 
guidelines) 

Football 
Handbook 
(2006/C 322/01) 

Council 
Document No 
5825/20 
(Manual on Law 
Enforcement 
Information 
Exchange) 

be provided 
through the initial 
channel. When 
receiving a reply 
from the national 
authorities to an 
international 
request, the unit 
proactively 
verifies whether 
this information 
can be useful to 
another Member 
State, Europol or 
Eurojust and if 
this is the case, 
requests and 
encourages the 
owner of the 
information to 
transmit the 
information 
further 
The SPOC shall 
respect all 
applicable data 
protection rules  

137 

Mechanisms to ensure 
Data Protection when 
accessing/exchanging 
information 

The SPOC shall 
respect all 
applicable data 
protection rules 

Requirement to develop 
cross-border threat 
assessment/risks analysis 

The exchange of 
information must 
comply with 
current data 
protection and 
data 
dissemination 
provisions in the 
respect of the 
national 
legislation  

In accordance 
with the 
applicable 
national and 
international 
legislation, the 
NFIP should be 
responsible for 
administering the 
personal data 
regarding risk 
supporters 
With regard to 
football matches 
with an 
international 
dimension, it is 
necessary that 
the NFIP has at 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Council Document No 
9512/10 (Guidelines on the 
implementation of SFD) 

Council 
Document 
10492/14 
(Guidelines for 
SPOC) 

Council 
Document 
6721/3/14 (SPOC 
guidelines) 

Council Document 
13034/14 
(Guidelines on the 
implementation of 
SFD) 

Council 
Document No 
9105/11 (PCCCs 
guidelines) 

Football 
Handbook 
(2006/C 322/01) 

Council 
Document No 
5825/20 
(Manual on Law 
Enforcement 
Information 
Exchange) 

its disposal, for 
the benefit of the 
NFIPs of the 
other countries, 
an updated risk-
analysis related 
to its own clubs 
and its national 
team 

Source: Elaboration by the Study to support the preparation of an impact assessment on EU policy initiatives facilitating cross-border law enforcement 
cooperation 

Types of data available to SPOCs from databases managed by the SPOC and directly accessible 

T
A

E
B

G
B

Y
C

Z
C

E
D

K
D

E
E

L
E

S
E

I
F

R
F

R
H

U
H

E
I

S
I

T
I

I
L

T
L

U
L

V
L

T
M

L
N

O
N

L
P

T
P

O
R

E
S

I
S

K
  S

Wanted/missing persons 

Persons suspected of criminal activities 
(criminal intelligence) 

Stolen vehicles or stolen goods  

Database of firearms 

Photographs (persons) 

Fingerprints 

DNA 

Persons suspected of (a specific) crime 

Persons convicted of crime (criminal 
records) 

138 

l
a
t
o
T

21 

19 

19 

18 

16 

16 

16 

13 

13 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
A

E
B

G
B

Y
C

Z
C

E
D

K
D

E
E

L
E

S
E

I
F

R
F

R
H

U
H

E
I

S
I

T
I

I
L

T
L

U
L

V
L

T
M

L
N

O
N

L
P

T
P

O
R

E
S

I
S

K
  S

Passports and identity documents 

Border controls, border crossings and 
other border guard matters 

Reports (complaints) concerning crimes 
committed 

Photographs (other than persons) 

Information on modus operandi 

Vehicle data and information on vehicle 
owners (cars) 

Administrative register on persons 
(census) 

Decisions prohibiting entry to premises or 
restraining orders  

Customs authorities’ information on 
import, export and transit of goods 

Database of prison inmates 

Traffic violations and misdemeanours 

Police records 

Decisions prohibiting entry to country and 
residence concerning foreign nationals 

Stolen, lost or misappropriated passports 
and identity documents 

Wanted, stolen, lost, misappropriated or 
found firearms, used on national territory 

Other information that describes crimes 
committed or types of crime 

Stolen works of art 

139 

l
a
t
o
T

11 

11 

10 

8 

8 

7 

7 

7 

7 

7 

6 

5 

5 

5 

5 

4 

4 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
A

E
B

G
B

Y
C

Z
C

E
D

K
D

E
E

L
E

S
E

I
F

R
F

R
H

U
H

E
I

S
I

T
I

I
L

T
L

U
L

V
L

T
M

L
N

O
N

L
P

T
P

O
R

E
S

I
S

K
  S

Film or video recordings 

Database of residence permits and 
fingerprints of foreign nationals 

Information on identification 
(distinguishing marks or dental records) 

Photos of missing persons, unidentified 
bodies, unknown helpless persons and 
crime scene traces 

Traffic accidents and collisions 

Visa 

Documented questioning of suspects, 
witnesses, plaintiffs, experts etc. 

Documentation of search of premises, 
seizures, forfeited property or frozen 
assets 

Firearms tracing 

Observations or observation reports 

Operational analyses 

Unusual or suspicious money transactions 

Events registered by the police 

Case management system and workflow 
system 

Explosives and bombs database 

Documentation of crime scene 
investigations 

Information concerning foreign nationals 
(decisions and permits, measures 
imposed, etc.) 

140 

l
a
t
o
T

4 

4 

4 

4 

4 

4 

3 

3 

3 

3 

3 

3 

3 

3 

3 

3 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
A

E
B

G
B

Y
C

Z
C

E
D

K
D

E
E

L
E

S
E

I
F

R
F

R
H

U
H

E
I

S
I

T
I

I
L

T
L

U
L

V
L

T
M

L
N

O
N

L
P

T
P

O
R

E
S

I
S

K
  S

Specific and non-specific facts 

Persons who are the subject of a criminal 
investigation 

Organisations 

Objects 

Locations (search method on location) 

Stop list/alert list 

Counterfeit travel documents, money etc. 

Individuals reporting crime and victims of 
crime, witnesses 

Individuals to be traced on national 
territory as they are the subject of a 
judicial/administrative measure 

Bonds, securities stolen, lost, 
misappropriated or found 

Vessel data and owners of vessel or boat 

Reports on incidents 

Registration of private security companies 

Driving licences information 

Questioning or other records of 
conversations with persons cooperating 
with crime-fighting authorities 

Statements provided by undercover agents 

Compilations that contain appraised or 
non-appraised information on crime or 
criminal activities 

141 

l
a
t
o
T

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
A

E
B

G
B

Y
C

Z
C

E
D

K
D

E
E

L
E

S
E

I
F

R
F

R
H

U
H

E
I

S
I

T
I

I
L

T
L

U
L

V
L

T
M

L
N

O
N

L
P

T
P

O
R

E
S

I
S

K
  S

Documentation of phone tapping, room 
bugging, covert and video surveillance 
operations 

Documentation of medico-legal 
investigations 

Statistics (all kind of statistics) 

Information on ongoing inquiries 

Arrivals/Departures 

Incident register index 

Checks on persons or vehicles 

Police intelligence 

Preparation of plans and coordination of 
search measures and the initiation of 
emergency searches 

Tracing the origins of goods, particularly 
weapons 

Issuing urgent alerts on arms and 
explosives and alerts on currency 
counterfeiting and securities fraud 

Information on implementation of cross-
border surveillance, hot pursuit and 
controlled deliveries 

Individuals checked by police forces in the 
course of duty 

Individuals who are the subject of judicial 
measures 

Individuals who have committed an 
administrative violation 

Third-country nationals subject to an 
expulsion order or ordered to leave the 

142 

l
a
t
o
T

2 

2 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
A

E
B

G
B

Y
C

Z
C

E
D

K
D

E
E

L
E

S
E

I
F

R
F

R
H

U
H

E
I

S
I

T
I

I
L

T
L

U
L

V
L

T
M

L
N

O
N

L
P

T
P

O
R

E
S

I
S

K
  S

national territory 

Owners of vehicles, documents involved in 
crime, lost or found 

Individuals holding, buying, selling, 
storing or transporting weapons on or 
from national territory 

European individuals holding a work 
permit 

Individuals who are the subject of a 
foreign arrest warrant 

Individuals banned from sporting events 

Spouses of individuals involved in crimes 

Persons found dead 

Search due to administrative measures 

Police station buildings management 

Latent fingerprints and DNA databases 

Third-country nationals who have applied 
for asylum 

'Prisoners on leave' database 

Previous histories of natural and legal 
persons who have committed customs 
offences 

Data collected from submissions to the 
PHAROS platform for reporting unlawful 
conduct online 

Database of minor offences 

Previous enquiries – who has enquired on 
an entity 

143 

l
a
t
o
T

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
A

E
B

G
B

Y
C

Z
C

E
D

K
D

E
E

L
E

S
E

I
F

R
F

R
H

U
H

E
I

S
I

T
I

I
L

T
L

U
L

V
L

T
M

L
N

O
N

L
P

T
P

O
R

E
S

I
S

K
  S

Personal information on individuals 
interacting with LEAs – i.e. address, phone 
numbers, etc. 

Taxation, income and wealth data 

Customs auditing reports etc. 

Probation service client management 
system 

Register of preventive measures 

Register of wanted motor vehicles 

Register of wanted numeric objects 

Register of undesirable persons 

Persons under special protection 

National police system 

Europol index system 

False and Authentic Document Online 

Persons regardes as public order violators 
(location bans) 

Database of current investigations 

Unidentified persons 

Driving bans 

Controlled purchase, sale or seizure of 
material goods 

Organised crime groups 

Real property/land register 

144 

l
a
t
o
T

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Registration forms/data on foreign 
tourists from accommodation 
establishments 

Injunctions database: persons banned to 
leave the locality or not allowed to travel 
to certain localities 

'Banking fraud' database: persons 
suspected of having committed offences 
against banking system 

Digital facial recognition 

Information on address and 
accommodation 

Customs databases relating to the 
intracommunity delivery of goods 

Documentation of telecommunications 
monitoring 

T
A

E
B

G
B

Y
C

Z
C

E
D

K
D

E
E

L
E

S
E

I
F

R
F

R
H

U
H

E
I

S
I

T
I

I
L

T
L

U
L

V
L

T
M

L
N

O
N

L
P

T
P

O
R

E
S

I
S

K
  S

l
a
t
o
T

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

Total 

9 

13 

19 

7 

17 

20 

19 

11 

31 

9 

14 

15 

13 

4 

7 

0 

3 

0 

16 

12 

8 

11 

15 

10 

18 

30 

17 

30 

24 

20 

Source: Elaboration by the Study to support the preparation of an impact assessment on EU policy initiatives facilitating cross-border law enforcement cooperation based on National Fact Sheets from 
the Manual on Law Enforcement Information Exchange 

Types of data available to SPOCs from databases managed by another authority and indirectly accessible to the SPOC 

T
A

E
B

G
B

Y
C

Z
C

E
D

K
D

E
E

L
E

S
E

I
F

R
F

R
H

U
H

E
I

S
I

T
I

I
L

T
L

U
L

V
L

T
M

L
N

O
N

L
P

T
P

O
R

E
S

I
S

K
S

Identification of telecommunications 
subscribers 

Information (including personal data) 
held by telecommunication operators 

Passenger and freight lists of transport 

145 

l
a
t
o
T

10 

8 

7 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
A

E
B

G
B

Y
C

Z
C

E
D

K
D

E
E

L
E

S
E

I
F

R
F

R
H

U
H

E
I

S
I

T
I

I
L

T
L

U
L

V
L

T
M

L
N

O
N

L
P

T
P

O
R

E
S

I
S

K
S

companies 

Unusual or suspicious (money) 
transactions 

Real property/land register 

Identification (distinguishing marks or 
dental record) 

Fingerprints 

Information on company board of 
directors, operations, share capital etc. 

Information held by banks or financial 
institutions 

Register on enterprises and commercial 
companies 

Database of asylum seekers and illegal 
migrants 

Database of prisoners 

Credit information 

DNA 

Data on social benefits and welfare 

Taxation, income and wealth data 

Vessel data and owners of vessel or boat 

Photographs 

Film or video recordings 

Investigating the origin of motor 
vehicles and the data of vessels 
registered 

146 

l
a
t
o
T

5 

4 

3 

3 

3 

3 

3 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

1 

1 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
A

E
B

G
B

Y
C

Z
C

E
D

K
D

E
E

L
E

S
E

I
F

R
F

R
H

U
H

E
I

S
I

T
I

I
L

T
L

U
L

V
L

T
M

L
N

O
N

L
P

T
P

O
R

E
S

I
S

K
S

Database of insurance companies 

Passenger register (accommodation 
information) 

E-mail or website address 

Databases/files of private service 
providers (hotels, car rental companies, 
cruise companies) 

Databases/files of private 
clinics/hospitals 

Databases/files of advertising 
companies 

Money electronic transfer companies 

Passports and identity documents 

Citizenship records 

Gaming authority database 

Information from service providers 
about the localisation of mobile phones 

Status of foreign nationals 

Registered debts such as taxes, 
maintenance, fines, debts to individual 
guarantors, etc 

Reports, analyses and intelligence 
concerning criminal investigations 

Criminal intelligence register 

Customs authorities’ information on 
import and export of goods 

Intellectual property rights 

147 

l
a
t
o
T

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
A

E
B

G
B

Y
C

Z
C

E
D

K
D

E
E

L
E

S
E

I
F

R
F

R
H

U
H

E
I

S
I

T
I

I
L

T
L

U
L

V
L

T
M

L
N

O
N

L
P

T
P

O
R

E
S

I
S

K
S

Visa 

Management information system on 
cultural goods 

Information on transportation on inland 
waters 

Data concerning aircraft and owners of 
aircraft 

Persons convicted of crime (criminal 
records) 

Total 

1 

1 

3 

1 

3 

1 

1 

7 

5 

3 

3 

1 

7 

1 

4 

0 

0 

0 

3 

1 

2 

5 

11 

2 

1 

2 

7 

4 

4 

4 

Source: Elaboration by the Study to support the preparation of an impact assessment on EU policy initiatives facilitating cross-border law enforcement 
cooperation based on National Fact Sheets from the Manual on Law Enforcement Information Exchange 

Types of data available to SPOCs from databases managed by judicial authorities 

T
A

E
B

G
B

Y
C

Z
C

E
D

K
D

E
E

L
E

S
E

I
F

R
F

R
H

U
H

E
I

S
I

T
I

I
L

T
L

U
L

V
L

T
M

L
N

O
N

L
P

T
P

O
R

E
S

I
S

K
S

Information held by banks or financial institutions 

Information (including personal data) held by 
telecommunication operators 
Documentation of search of premises, seizures, 
forfeited property or frozen assets 
Documentation of phone tapping, room bugging, 
covert and video surveillance operations 
Documented questioning of suspects, witnesses, 
plaintiffs, experts etc. 

Passenger and freight lists of transport companies 

Persons convicted of crime (criminal records) 

Reports (complaints) concerning crimes committed 

Documentation of crime scene investigations 

Taxation, income and wealth data 

148 

l
a
t
o
T

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

l
a
t
o
T

21 

15 

7 

7 

5 

4 

4 

3 

3 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
A

E
B

G
B

Y
C

Z
C

E
D

K
D

E
E

L
E

S
E

I
F

R
F

R
H

U
H

E
I

S
I

T
I

I
L

T
L

U
L

V
L

T
M

L
N

O
N

L
P

T
P

O
R

E
S

I
S

K
S

DNA 

Statements provided by undercover agents 

Questioning or other records of conversations with 
persons who co-operate with crime-fighting 
authorities 
Compilations that contain appraised or non-
appraised information on crime or criminal 
activities 

Real property/land register 

Documentation of medico-legal investigations 

Information on unusual or suspicious (money) 
transactions 
E-mail accounts/ordinary mail (breach of 
correspondence secrecy) 

Identification of telecommunications subscribers 

Social insurance database 

Information obtained using coercive measures 

Registers of owners of non-listed fixed telephones, 
mobile telephones, faxes, TVs 

Medical reports (dental record) 

Checking the identity, duration and contact 
frequency of certain telecommunication addresses 

Unusual or suspicious money transactions 

Modus operandi 

Register of the Prosecutor's Offices 

Information managed by healthcare and connected 
institutions (medical and related data) 

Access to data classified as trade secrets 

Samples collected for the purpose of personal 
identification 

Decisions on persons regarding street bans 

Information obtained as a result of a bodily 
examination or a molecular genetic examination 
Information obtained as a result of an IT-
supported comparison of data 
Data and results of an investigation that have been 
obtained in the course of national criminal 
proceedings without the use of coercive measures 
Checks on content of correspondence, 
communications and deliveries 

Observations or observation reports 

Film or video recordings 

149 

l
a
t
o
T

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
A

E
B

G
B

Y
C

Z
C

E
D

K
D

E
E

L
E

S
E

I
F

R
F

R
H

U
H

E
I

S
I

T
I

I
L

T
L

U
L

V
L

T
M

L
N

O
N

L
P

T
P

O
R

E
S

I
S

K
S

l
a
t
o
T

Total 

6 

3 

8 

5 

5 

0 

4 

2 

3 

5 

2 

4 

3 

13 

1 

0 

1 

0 

8 

0 

5 

1 

5 

3 

2 

1 

3 

0 

5 

10 

Source: Elaboration by the Study to support the preparation of an impact assessment on EU policy initiatives facilitating cross-border law enforcement 
cooperation based on National Fact Sheets from the Manual on Law Enforcement Information Exchange 

150 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 6: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CONSULTATIONS 

Survey questionnaire for Law Enforcement Authorities 

N 

Section 

Sub-section 

Question 

Response options 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

PERSONAL 
INFORMATION 

PERSONAL 
INFORMATION 

PERSONAL 
INFORMATION 

PERSONAL 
INFORMATION 

PERSONAL 
INFORMATION 

PERSONAL 
INFORMATION 

THREAT 
LANDASCAPE 

Challenges 
related to SOC 

Your first name* 

open text 

Your last name* 

open text 

Name of the 
organisation you 
belong to* 

Your role* 

open text 

Your email address* 

open text 

Your country* 

To what extent has 
the number of 
crimes evolved in the 
past 5-10 years in 
the following areas in 
your country?* 

Drop down list of 27 + 
Schengen 

*Drugs  
*Illicit tobacco trade 
*Trafficking in human 
beings 
*Financial crimes 
*Cybercrime 
*Organised property 
crime 
*Environmental crime 
*Trafficking of firearms 

151 

s
t
i
n
u
n
o

i
t
a
g
i
t
s
e
v
n

i

d
e
s
i
l
a
i
c
e
p
S

l
a
c
i
t
y
l
a
n
a
d
e
s
i
l
a
i
c
e
p
S

s
t
n
e
m

t
r
a
p
e
d

r
e
d
r
o
/
y
t
e
f
a
s

c
i
l

b
u
P

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

t
c
a
t
n
o
c

f
o
s
t
n
o
P

i

l
l
a
b
t
o
o
F

d
n
a
s
t
s
i
l
a
i
c
e
p
s

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

s
m
o
t
s
u
C

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

s
A
E
L

l
a
n
o

i
t
a
N
r
e
h
t
O

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

C
E
N

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

s
C
O
P
S

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

s
C
C
C
P

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
N 

Section 

Sub-section 

Question 

Response options 

s
C
O
P
S

s
C
C
C
P

d
e
s
i
l
a
i
c
e
p
S

*Illegal immigration 
*Terrorism 
*Other (please 
specify) 

l
a
c
i
t
y
l
a
n
a
d
e
s
i
l
a
i
c
e
p
S

s
t
n
e
m

t
r
a
p
e
d

l
l
a
b
t
o
o
F

d
n
a
s
t
s
i
l
a
i
c
e
p
s

r
e
d
r
o
/
y
t
e
f
a
s

c
i
l

b
u
P

t
c
a
t
n
o
c

f
o
s
t
n
o
P

i

s
m
o
t
s
u
C

s
A
E
L

l
a
n
o

i
t
a
N
r
e
h
t
O

C
E
N

s
t
i
n
u
n
o

i
t
a
g
i
t
s
e
v
n

i

open text 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

8 

THREAT 
LANDASCAPE 

Challenges 
related to SOC 

9 

THREAT 
LANDASCAPE 

Challenges 
related to SOC 

9.A 

THREAT 
LANDASCAPE 

Challenges 
related to SOC 

Can you please 
provide some figures 
related to crimes 
occurred over the 
past 5-10 years or 
indicate where we 
could find them? 

In your view, to what 
extent do the 
following crime areas 
have a cross border 
dimension (i.e. 
require the EU-wide 
cooperation of law 
enforcement 
authorities to be 
properly 
addressed)?* 

Could you please 
specify any other 
relevant crime area 
which you think it 
has a cross border 
dimension? 

*Drugs  
*Illicit tobacco trade 
*Trafficking in human 
beings 
*Financial crimes 
*Cybercrime 
*Organised property 
crime 
*Environmental crime 
*Trafficking of firearms 
*Illegal immigration 
*Terrorism 

10 

THREAT 

Challenges 

How do you think the  *Drugs  

152 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
N 

Section 

Sub-section 

Question 

Response options 

s
C
O
P
S

s
C
C
C
P

d
e
s
i
l
a
i
c
e
p
S

l
a
c
i
t
y
l
a
n
a
d
e
s
i
l
a
i
c
e
p
S

s
t
n
e
m

t
r
a
p
e
d

l
l
a
b
t
o
o
F

d
n
a
s
t
s
i
l
a
i
c
e
p
s

r
e
d
r
o
/
y
t
e
f
a
s

c
i
l

b
u
P

t
c
a
t
n
o
c

f
o
s
t
n
o
P

i

s
m
o
t
s
u
C

s
A
E
L

l
a
n
o

i
t
a
N
r
e
h
t
O

C
E
N

s
t
i
n
u
n
o

i
t
a
g
i
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LANDASCAPE 

related to SOC 

crime areas listed 
below will evolve 
over the next 5-10 
years in your 
country?* 

11 

THREAT 
LANDASCAPE 

12 

THREAT 
LANDASCAPE 

Challenges 
related to the 
security of EU 
citizens moving 
across the EU 

Challenges 
related to the 
security of EU 
citizens moving 
across the EU 

In your view, how 
has the number of 
accidents linked to 
public order and 
safety evolved over 
the past 5-10 years 
in your country in 
the following areas?* 

Can you please 
provide some figures 
related to accidents 
occurred over the 
past 5-10 years or 
indicate where we 
could find them? 

*Illicit tobacco trade 
*Trafficking in human 
beings 
*Financial crimes 
*Cybercrime 
*Organised property 
crime 
*Environmental crime 
*Trafficking of firearms 
*Illegal immigration 
*Terrorism 
*Other (please 
specify) 

*International 
sport/music/cultural 
events  
*Flows of people 
moving for tourism 
*Flows of people 
moving for work 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

open text 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

13 

THREAT 
LANDASCAPE 

Challenges 
related to the 
security of EU 

In your view, to what 
extent do the 
following areas 

*International 
sport/music/cultural 
events  

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

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citizens moving 
across the EU 

13.A 

THREAT 
LANDASCAPE 

Challenges 
related to the 
security of EU 
citizens moving 
across the EU 

14 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Operational 
cooperation 
SOC  

require cross-border 
law enforcement 
cooperation (i.e. 
require the EU-wide 
cooperation of law 
enforcement 
authorities to be 
properly managed)?* 

Can you please 
specify any other 
type of event or 
activity which 
requires cross-border 
law enforcement 
cooperation in the 
area of public safety 
and/or public order? 

How often do law 
enforcement 
authorities in your 
country undertake 
operational 
cooperation with law 
enforcement 
authorities in other 
countries in relation 
to the following 
crimes?* 

*Flows of people 
moving for tourism 
*Flows of people 
moving for work 

*Drugs  
*Illicit tobacco trade 
*Trafficking in human 
beings 
*Financial crimes 
*Cybercrime 
*Organised property 
crime 
*Environmental crime 
*Trafficking of firearms 
*Illegal immigration  
*Terrorism 

15 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 

Operational 
cooperation 

Out of all cases 
where your country 

*Never had 
problematic cases 

154 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Question 

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FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

SOC  

undertook 
operational 
cooperation with 
other countries in 
relation to serious 
and organised 
crimes, what was the 
share of problematic 
cases?* 

*0-20% 
*20-40% 
*40-60% 
*60-80% 
*80-100% 
*All cases were 
problematic 

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16 

17 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Operational 
cooperation 
SOC  

What were the main 
reasons for the 
difficulties 
encountered? 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Operational 
cooperation 
SOC  

What were the main 
consequences of the 
difficulties 
encountered?  

*lack of clarity on the 
rules to be followed 
*missing or unclear 
points of contact  
*time delays 
*language barriers 
*different rules 
applicable to the same 
criminal act and 
investigative tools in 
the other country 
*high number of 
administrative 
requirements to 
comply with 
*lack of trust 
*other (please specify) 

*Increase of time 
needed for the 
investigations 
*Costs for complying 
with unexpected 

155 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N 

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Question 

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requirements 
*Impossibility to 
continue the 
investigation/case 
*Other (please 
specify) 

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18 

19 

20 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Operational 
cooperation 
SOC  

If difficulties 
encountered brought 
to time delays, can 
you please estimate 
these delays? 

* 1-7 days 
* 2-4 weeks 
*2-3 months 
*More than 3 months 
*Don't know 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Operational 
cooperation 
SOC  

If difficulties 
encountered brought 
to additional costs, 
can you please 
indicate the type of 
costs? 

*Costs related to 
additional staff needed 
*Costs related to the 
compliance with 
unexpected 
requirements of the 
other country 
*Costs related to the 
purchase of new 
equipment 
*Other costs (please 
specify) 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Operational 
cooperation 
Public Order  

How often do law 
enforcement 
authorities in your 
country undertake 
operational 
cooperation with law 
enforcement 
authorities in other 

*Crises and disasters 
*International 
sport/music/cultural 
events  
*Flows of people 
moving for tourism 
*Flows of people 
moving for work 

156 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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20.A 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Operational 
cooperation 
Public Order  

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Operational 
cooperation 
Public Order  

21 

22 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 

Operational 
cooperation 
Public Order  

What were the main 
reasons for the 
difficulties 
encountered? 

countries to ensure 
public order and 
safety?* 

Do you have any 
other relevant 
example of events or 
activities for which 
your country 
undertake 
operational 
cooperation with law 
enforcement 
authorities in other 
countries to ensure 
public order and 
safety? 

Out of all cases 
where your country 
undertook 
operational 
cooperation with 
other countries to 
ensure public order 
and safety, what was 
the share of 
problematic cases?* 

*Protection of public 
figures  

*Never had 
problematic cases 
*0-20% 
*20-40% 
*40-60% 
*70-80% 
*80-100% 
*All cases were 
problematic 

*Lack of clarity on the 
rules to be followed 
*Missing or unclear 
points of contact  
*Time delays 

157 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
N 

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Question 

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COOPERATION 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Operational 
cooperation 
Public Order  

What were the main 
consequences of the 
difficulties 
encountered?  

*Language barriers 
*Different rules 
applicable to the same 
criminal act and 
investigative tools in 
the other country 
*High number of 
administrative 
requirements to 
comply with 
*Lack of trust 
*Other (please 
specify; 

*Increase of time 
needed for the 
operation 
*Costs for complying 
with unexpected 
requirements 
*Impossibility to 
continue the operation 
*Other (please 
specify) 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 

Operational 
cooperation 
Public Order  

If difficulties 
encountered brought 
to time delays, can 
you please estimate 
these delays? 

* 1-7 days 
* 2-4 weeks 
*2-3 months 
*More than 3 months 
*Don't know 

Operational 
cooperation 

If difficulties 
encountered brought 
to additional costs, 

*Costs related to 
additional staff needed 
*Costs related to the 

158 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

23 

24 

25 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Question 

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ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Public Order  

can you please 
indicate the type of 
costs? 

26 

27 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Operational 
cooperation - 
structures 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Operational 
cooperation - 
structures 

To what degree do 
you use the following 
structures to 
cooperate with other 
law enforcement 
authorities in other 
countries?* 

Please list any other 
structures, not listed 
in the question 
above, that you use 
to facilitate 
cooperation with law 
enforcement 
authorities in other 
countries?  

compliance with 
unexpected 
requirements of the 
other country 
*Costs related to the 
purchase of new 
equipment 
*Other costs (please 
specify) 

*Single Points of 
Contact (SPOCs)  
*Police Customs 
Cooperation Centres 
(PCCCs) 
*National SIRENE 
Bureaux 
*Europol National 
Units 
*Europol Liaison 
Officers  
*Football Points of 
Contact 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

open text 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

159 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Question 

Response options 

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28 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Operational 
cooperation - 
structures 

To what degree are 
the following 
structures effective 
in facilitating cross 
border cooperation 
between law 
enforcement 
authorities in your 
country and law 
enforcement 
authorities in other 
countries?* 

29 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Operational 
cooperation - 
structures  

To what degree do 
the following issues 
hamper cross border 
law enforcement 
cooperation using 
the structures listed 
above?* 

*Single Points of 
Contact (SPOCs)  
*Police Customs 
Cooperation Centres 
(PCCCs) 
*National SIRENE 
Bureaux 
*Europol National 
Units 
*Europol Liaison 
Officers  
*Football Points of 
contact 

*Confusion caused by 
the number of 
different points of 
contact in the 
countries (for 
example, liaison 
officers, Single Points 
Of Contacts - SPOCs, 
SIRENE Bureaux, 
ENUs, Police Customs 
Cooperation Centres - 
PCCCs, SIRENE 
Bureaux etc.) 
*Differences between 
countries in the way 
that SPOCs are 
structured 
*SPOCs and PCCCs are 

160 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Section 

Sub-section 

Question 

Response options 

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not coordinated  
*Law enforcement 
practitioners are not 
aware of factsheets 
and manuals 
explaining the different 
roles and 
responsibilities 
*Factsheets and 
manuals providing 
implementation 
guidance are not kept 
up to date/are not 
clear, precise, 
committal enough to 
ensure proper 
implementation?  
*Lack of 
communication and 
coordination between 
different law 
enforcement 
authorities within 
countries 
*Lack of coordination 
between law 
enforcement and 
judicial authorities 
within countries 
*Lack of coordination 
between policing and 
customs authorities 

161 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Section 

Sub-section 

Question 

Response options 

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within countries  
*Developments in 
relation to customs 
cooperation have 
occurred in parallel to 
the EU legal 
framework for law 
enforcement 
cooperation thus 
creating risks of 
duplications, 
inconsistencies and 
inefficiencies in 
operational situations  

30 

31 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Operational 
cooperation - 
structures  

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Information 
exchange  

Please provide 
further information 
and examples to 
illustrate the issues 
that hamper the use 
of the structures 
listed above.  

How often do law 
enforcement 
authorities in your 
country undertake 
information sharing 
with law 
enforcement 
authorities in other 
countries in relation 
to the following 

open text 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

*Drugs  
*Illicit tobacco trade 
*Trafficking in human 
beings 
*Financial crimes 
*Cybercrime 
*Organised property 
crime 
*Environmental crime 
*Trafficking of firearms 

162 

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x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

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criminal threats?* 

How often do law 
enforcement 
authorities in your 
country undertake 
information sharing 
with law 
enforcement 
authorities in other 
countries for public 
order purposes?* 

Out of all cases 
where your country 
shared information 
with other countries, 
what was the share 
of problematic 
cases?* 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Information 
exchange  

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Information 
exchange  

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Information 
exchange  

What were the main 
reasons for the 
difficulties 
encountered? 

32 

33 

34 

*Illegal immigration  
*Terrorism 

*Crises and disasters 
*International 
sport/music/cultural 
events  
*Flows of people 
moving for tourism 
*Flows of people 
moving for work 
*Protection of public 
figures  
*Other (please 
specify) 

*Never had 
problematic cases 
*0-20% 
*20-40% 
*40-60% 
*60-80% 
*80-100% 
*All cases were 
problematic 

*unclear rules to be 
followed  
*missing or unclear 
points of contact  
*time delays 
*language barriers 
*inadequate tools for 
the exchange of 

163 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

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x 

x 

x 

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x 

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x 

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sensitive/confidential 
information 
*high number of 
administrative 
requirement to comply 
with 
*lack of trust 
*other (please specify) 

*Increase of time 
needed for the 
investigations/acquisiti
on of intelligence 
*Costs for complying 
with unexpected 
requirements 
*Impossibility to 
continue the 
investigation/case 
*Other (please 
specify) 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Information 
exchange  

What were the main 
consequences of the 
difficulties 
encountered?  

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Information 
exchange  

Information 
exchange  

If difficulties 
encountered brought 
to time delays, can 
you please estimate 
these delays? 

* 1-7 days 
* 2-4 weeks 
*2-3 months 
*More than 3 months 
*Don't know 

If difficulties 
encountered brought 
to additional costs, 
can you please 
indicate the type of 

*Costs related to 
additional staff needed 
*Costs related to the 
compliance with 
unexpected 
requirements of the 

164 

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x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

35 

36 

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38 

39 

40 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Information 
exchange - 
platforms 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Information 
exchange - 
platforms 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Information 
exchange - 
platforms 

other countries 
*Costs related to the 
purchase of new 
equipment 
*Other costs (please 
specify) 

*SIENA  
*Schengen 
Information System 
(SIS))/SIRENE 
*Europol Information 
System (EIS) 
*Interpol exchange 
channels and 
databases 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

open text 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

costs? 

To what degree do 
you use the following 
platforms to 
exchange 
information with law 
enforcement 
authorities in other 
countries?* 

Please list any other 
platforms, not listed 
in the question 
above, that you use 
to exchange 
information with law 
enforcement 
authorities in other 
countries 

To what degree are 
the following 
platforms effective in 
facilitating the 
exchange of 
information among 
law enforcement 

*SIENA  
*Schengen 
Information System 
(SIS))/SIRENE 
*Europol Information 
System (EIS) 
*Interpol exchange 

165 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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authorities in 
different countries?* 

channels and 
databases 

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41 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Information 
exchange - 
platforms 

To what degree do 
the following issues 
hamper cross border 
law enforcement 
cooperation through 
the platforms listed 
above?* 

*The EU legal 
framework for cross-
border law 
enforcement 
cooperation is not 
consolidated (i.e. it is 
spread across several 
legislative 
instruments) 
*Council guideline 
papers on info 
exchange are found 
not clear, precise and 
complete enough to 
offer added value in 
the implementation of 
the EU texts 
*The complexity 
(overlaps, 
discrepancies, gaps) in 
the EU legal 
framework for 
information exchange 
*The EU legal 
framework for cross-
border law 
enforcement 
cooperation is not 
consistently 

166 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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implemented across 
the countries (i.e. the 
countries implement it 
differently) 
*Access to these 
platforms differs 
between countries 
*Differences between 
countries in how 
regularly these 
platforms are 
monitored/ response 
times to requests sent 
via these platforms 
*Heterogeneity in law 
enforcement actors, 
tools, and capacities in 
relation to cross-
border cooperation 
creates confusion and 
burdens on the 
concerned 
stakeholders 
*Confusion due to the 
number of different 
exchange platforms 
and databases for EU 
information exchange 
*Data protection 
requirements limit 
exchange of 
information with law 

167 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Question 

Response options 

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enforcement 
authorities in other 
countries 

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THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Information 
exchange - 
platforms 

Please provide 
further information 
and examples to 
explain your answers 
about the issues that 
hamper the use of 
the platforms for 
exchange of 
information listed 

open text 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

42 

43 

44 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Cross-border 
threat 
assessment/ 
risk analysis  

How often do 
you/your department 
undertake cross-
border threat 
assessment/risk 
analysis?* 

*Always 
*Very frequently  
Occasionally  
*Very infrequently  
*Never 
*Don't know 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Cross-border 
threat 
assessment/ 
risk analysis  

What were the main 
reasons for 
undertaking cross-
border threat 
assessment/risk 
analysis? 

*To feed the design of 
national law 
enforcement strategies 
and actions 
*To plan joint 
operations/patrols 
*To regularly update 
the national 
intelligence picture 
*Other (please 
specify) 

45 

THE CURRENT EU  Cross-border 

If you/your 

*Yes 

168 

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x 

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FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

threat 
assessment/ 
risk analysis  

*No 
*Don't know 

department 
undertake cross-
border threat 
assessment/risk 
analysis, are these 
elaborated with 
other relevant 
national 
stakeholders? 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Cross-border 
threat 
assessment/ 
risk analysis  

If yes, what type 
stakeholders? (select 
all that apply) 

*Police 
*Customs 
*Financial 
Investigation Units 
*Other (please 
specify) 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Cross-border 
threat 
assessment/ 
risk analysis  

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Cross-border 
threat 
assessment/ 
risk analysis  

Does your 
department involve 
stakeholders from 
other concerned 
countries in the 
implementation of 
cross-border threat 
assessments/risk 
analysis? 

If yes, what type 
stakeholders in the 
other countries are 
usually involved in 
cross-border threat 
assessments/risk 
analysis? (select all 

*Yes 
*No 
*Don't know 

*Single Points of 
Contacts 
*Police Customs 
Cooperation Centres 
*Specialised 
investigation units 
*Specialised analytical 

169 

46 

47 

48 

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x 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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that apply) 

departments 
*Public safety/order 
specialists (especially 
the ones (who have 
been) involved in joint 
patrols, joint 
operations) 
*Football contact 
points 
*Customs 
*Other (please 
specify) 

49 

50 

51 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Cross-border 
threat 
assessment/ 
risk analysis  

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Cross-border 
threat 
assessment/ 
risk analysis  

Cross-border 
threat 
assessment/ 
risk analysis  

Are cross-border 
threat 
assessment/risk 
analysis shared with 
the neighbouring 
country(ies) in view 
of joint analytical 
documents?* 

*Yes 
*No 
*Don't know 

If yes, with which 
country(ies)? 

open text 

Can cross-border 
threat 
assessment/risk 
analysis be used to 
schedule the precise 
location and timing 

*Yes 
*No 
*Don't know 

170 

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THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Cross-border 
threat 
assessment/ 
risk analysis  

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Cross-border 
threat 
assessment/ 
risk analysis  

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Cross-border 
threat 
assessment/ 
risk analysis  

of joint operations?* 

If not, why? 

open text 

Can you please 
shortly describe how 
cross-border threat 
assessments/risk 
analysis is 
implemented? (e.g. 
type of information 
requested, types of 
analysis performed) 

Out of all cases 
where you/your 
department 
undertook cross-
border threat 
assessment/risk 
analysis, what was 
the share of 
problematic cases? 

open text 

*Never had 
problematic cases 
*0-20% 
*20-40% 
*40-60% 
*60-80% 
*80-100% 
*All cases were 
problematic 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Cross-border 
threat 
assessment/ 
risk analysis  

What were the main 
reasons for the 
difficulties 
encountered? 

open text 

52 

53 

54 

55 

56 

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x 

x 

x 

x 

THE CURRENT EU 

Investigative 

How often are the 

*Cross border 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

171 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

tools for cross 
border crimes  

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Investigative 
tools for cross 
border crimes  

following 
investigative tools 
used in cross-border 
investigations 
involving cooperation 
between law 
enforcement 
authorities in your 
country and those in 
other countries?* 

What other 
investigative tools, 
not listed above, are 
used in cross-border 
investigations 
involving cooperation 
between law 
enforcement 
authorities in your 
country and those in 
other countries? 

surveillance (physical) 
*Interception of 
communication 
*Covert investigations 
- undercover officers  
*Controlled deliveries  
*Informants  
*Hot pursuit  
*Special intervention 
units 
*Joint Patrols 
*Joint Police Offices 
*Witness protection 

open text 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Investigative 
tools for cross 
border crimes  

To what degree are 
the following tools 
effective in 
generating 
intelligence and 
evidence and/ or 
leading to the 

*Cross border 
surveillance (physical) 
*Interception of 
communication 
*Covert investigations 
- undercover officers  
*Controlled deliveries  

172 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

57 

58 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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disruption of crimes 
in cross-border 
investigations 
involving cooperation 
between law 
enforcement 
authorities in your 
country and those in 
other countries?* 

*Informants  
*Hot pursuit  
*Special intervention 
units 
*Joint Patrols 
*Joint Police Offices 
*Witness protection 

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59 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

Investigative 
tools for cross 
border crimes  

To what degree do 
the following act as 
barriers to the 
effective use of the 
investigative tools 
listed above in cross 
border cases?* 

*Differences in 
national legislation 
regarding the offences 
for which an 
investigative tool may 
be authorised 
*Differences in 
national definitions 
regarding the length of 
time for which a 
special investigative 
tool may be 
authorised/ regularity 
of review 
*Other differences in 
national legislation 
regarding definition 
and scope of 
investigative tools 
*Financial costs of 
conducting cross-
border operations 

173 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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utilising special 
investigative tools 
*Differences between 
countries in 
technologies (for 
example, different 
communications 
systems, different 
surveillance 
technologies)  
*Challenges in trust 
between countries 
*Restrictions on the 
ability to use 
investigative tools due 
to data protection 
regulations 
*Restrictions on the 
ability to use 
investigative tools due 
to fundamental rights 
protections 
*Lack of knowledge 
and training among 
law enforcement 
practitioners about 
how to apply for or 
implement 
investigative tools 

60 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 

Investigative 
tools for cross 

Please provide 
further details to 

open text 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

174 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

border crimes  

explain your answers 
above and to 
illustrate concrete 
examples of barriers 
to use of 
investigative tools in 
cross border cases.  

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61 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

General 

To what degree does 
the EU legal 
framework provide 
the necessary 
mechanisms for law 
enforcement 
authorities in your 
country to cooperate 
with other 
countries?* 

*Schengen acquis - 
1990 Convention 
implementing the 
Schengen Agreement 
of 1985 (CISA) 
*Swedish Framework 
Decision (Council 
Framework Decision 
2006/960) 
*Naples II Convention 
(1998) 
*Prüm Decision 
(Council Decision 
2008/615/JHA) 
*Council Decision 
2007/412/JHA 
concerning security in 
connection with 
football matches with 
an international 
dimension 
*Council Decision 
2006/560/JHA of 24 
July 2006 on the 

175 

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x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Question 

Response options 

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THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

General 

Has your country 
adopted other 
measures to enable 
cross border 
cooperation besides 
those provided by 
the EU legal 
framework?* 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

General 

If yes, why?  

62 

63 

common use of liaison 
officers posted abroad 
by the law 
enforcement agencies 
of the Member States  

*Yes 
*No 
*Don't know 

*The EU legal 
Framework does not 
properly address the 
needs of my country 
*The EU legal 
framework is too 
complex and difficult 
to implement  
*It is easier to use 
measures and 
practices which stem 
from a national 
strategy than those 
offered by the EU 
framework 
*Other (please 
specify) 

176 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

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64 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

General 

To what degree are 
the following non-
binding documents 
useful to ensure the 
proper 
implementation of 
the Swedish 
Framework Decision, 
the Schengen acquis 
(CISA Convention), 
Prüm decision on 
joint operations and 
other documents 
they refer to?* 

*Updated Catalogue of 
Recommendations for 
the correct application 
of the Schengen 
Acquis and Best 
practices: Police 
cooperation 
(15785/3/10); 
*Guidelines on the 
implementation of the 
Swedish Framework 
Decision (13034/14); 
*Draft Guidelines for a 
Single Point of Contact 
(SPOC) for 
international law 
enforcement 
information exchange 
(10492/14); 
*Manual on cross 
border operations 
(13887/20) and its 
National Factsheets 
(13920/20); 
*Manual on Law 
Enforcement 
Information Exchange 
(5825/20) 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

65 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 

General 

Can you please 
explain your 
previous assessment 

open text 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

177 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

64.A 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

General 

66 

THE CURRENT EU 
FRAMEWORK 
FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION 

General 

67 

MULTILATERAL 
AGREEMENTS 

Number and 
type 

and indicate aspects 
of the documents 
that require 
improvement 

Do you have any 
other example of 
Council guideline 
papers of relevance? 
Please specify. 

Do you see 
additional barriers 
(not already listed 
above) to cross 
border law 
enforcement 
cooperation and to 
the effective use of 
investigative tools in 
cross border cases? 
If yes please specify 

Has your country 
entered into any 
bi/tri/multilateral 
agreements 
regarding law 
enforcement 
operational 
cooperation or 
information 
exchange with law 
enforcement 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

open text 

x 

x 

x 

X 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

*Yes 
*No 
*Don't know 

178 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Question 

Response options 

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68 

MULTILATERAL 
AGREEMENTS 

Number and 
type 

69 

MULTILATERAL 
AGREEMENTS 

Number and 
type 

70 

MULTILATERAL 
AGREEMENTS 

Number and 
type 

71 

MULTILATERAL 
AGREEMENTS 

Number and 
type 

authorities in other 
countries?* 

If so, how many 
separate agreements 
has your country 
entered into? 

1 
2 
3  
4 
5-10 
More than 10 
I don't know 

What type of 
stakeholders are 
involved in the 
implementation of 
these agreements? 

*Only police 
*Only customs 
*Police and customs 
*I don't know 
*Other, please specify 

x 

x 

x 

x 

Can you please list 
the agreements and 
provide the reference 
to the legal 
documents? 

How frequently or 
infrequently are 
these 
bi/tri/multilateral 
agreements used in 
practice? 

open text 

x 

x 

*Very frequently (used 
in the majority of 
cross-border 
investigations with the 
signatory countries) 
*Occasionally (used in 
some cross border 
investigations) 
*Very infrequently 
(used in a small 
minority of cross 

179 

x 

x 

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Question 

Response options 

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72 

MULTILATERAL 
AGREEMENTS 

Scope and 
objectives 

73 

MULTILATERAL 
AGREEMENTS 

Scope and 
objectives 

74 

MULTILATERAL 
AGREEMENTS 

Scope and 
objectives 

What was the reason 
your country decided 
to enter in the 
bi/tri/multilateral 
agreements?  

What value did it add 
above existing EU 
and national 
frameworks 
facilitating cross 
border cooperation? 

Are the following 
included in the 
bi/tri/multilateral 
agreements that 
your country has 
entered into? 

border investigations) 
*Never 
*Don't know 

open text 

x 

x 

open text 

x 

x 

*Information sharing 
*Joint Patrols 
*Joint offices or joint 
Units 
*Hot (cross-border) 
pursuit  
*Cross border 
surveillance 
*Joint threat 
assessment/risk 
analyses in view of 
tailored joint 
operations 
*Communications 
*Access to national 
databases 
*Competence/ 

180 

x 

x 

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x 

x 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N 

Section 

Sub-section 

Question 

Response options 

74.A 

MULTILATERAL 
AGREEMENTS 

Scope and 
objectives 

75 

MULTILATERAL 
AGREEMENTS 

Good practices 
and areas for 
improvement 

authority on transport 
networks 
*Joint training 
*Authority to exercise 
police powers in 
another MS  

Is there any 
additional feature of 
the bi/tri/multilateral 
agreements that 
your country has 
entered into that was 
not listed above? 
Please specify. 

To what extent are 
these 
bi/tri/multilateral 
agreements effective 
in facilitating cross 
border cooperation 
between law 
enforcement 
authorities in your 
country and law 
enforcement 
authorities in other 
countries?  

Very high extent 
High extent 
Moderate extent 
Small extent 
Not at all 
Don't know  

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x 

x 

x 

76 

MULTILATERAL 
AGREEMENTS 

Good practices 
and areas for 
improvement 

To what extent do 
you agree with the 
following statements 
about the 

*In my country there 
are too many 
bi/tri/multilateral 
agreements, causing 

x 

x 

181 

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x 

x 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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e
h
t
O

C
E
N

s
t
i
n
u
n
o

i
t
a
g
i
t
s
e
v
n

i

N 

Section 

Sub-section 

Question 

Response options 

s
C
O
P
S

s
C
C
C
P

d
e
s
i
l
a
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c
e
p
S

bi/tri/multilateral 
agreements that 
your country has 
entered into? 

complexity 
*The bi/tri/multilateral 
agreements are 
outdated 
*The bi/tri/multilateral 
agreements should be 
used more 
*The bi/tri/multilateral 
agreements are 
procedurally heavy 
*The bi/tri/multilateral 
agreements do not 
provide the powers 
needed for effective 
cross border 
cooperation 
*Overall, the 
bi/tri/multilateral 
agreements work well 
*These agreements do 
not cover joint threat 
assessment/risk 
analyses in view of 
tailored joint 
operations; 
*When agreements 
provide for joint threat 
assessment/risk 
analyses, they are not 
been used in practice. 

77 

MULTILATERAL 

Good practices 

Are there any 

open text 

x 

x 

x 

182 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N 

Section 

Sub-section 

Question 

Response options 

s
C
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s
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d
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l
a
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a
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a
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a
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p
S

s
t
n
e
m

t
r
a
p
e
d

l
l
a
b
t
o
o
F

d
n
a
s
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s
i
l
a
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c
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p
s

r
e
d
r
o
/
y
t
e
f
a
s

c
i
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b
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t
c
a
t
n
o
c

f
o
s
t
n
o
P

i

s
m
o
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s
u
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s
A
E
L

l
a
n
o

i
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a
N
r
e
h
t
O

C
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N

s
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i

AGREEMENTS 

and areas for 
improvement 

78 

INVESTIGATIVE 
TOOLS USED AT 
THE NATIONAL 
LEVEL TO 
COMBAT 
ORGANISED 
CRIME 

Tools in use  

aspects of the 
bi/tri/multilateral 
agreements that 
your country is part 
on which you would 
recommend as good 
practice to other 
countries? 

How frequently do 
law enforcement 
authorities in your 
country use the 
following 
investigative tools to 
investigate serious 
and organised crime 
at the national 
level?* 

*Controlled delivery 
(i.e. allowing 
suspicious shipments 
or cargo to leave, pass 
through or enter a 
jurisdiction with the 
knowledge and 
supervision of 
authorities) 
*Hot pursuit 
*Surveillance – Audio 
surveillance (e.g. 
Phone tapping; VOIP; 
Listening devices)  
*Surveillance – Visual 
surveillance (e.g. 
Hidden video-
surveillance devices; 
body-worn video 
devices ; CCTV) 
*Surveillance – 
Tracking surveillance 
(e.g. 

183 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Section 

Sub-section 

Question 

Response options 

s
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s
C
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C
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d
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i
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a
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p
S

l
a
c
i
t
y
l
a
n
a
d
e
s
i
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a
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c
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p
S

s
t
n
e
m

t
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a
p
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d

l
l
a
b
t
o
o
F

d
n
a
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t
s
i
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a
i
c
e
p
s

r
e
d
r
o
/
y
t
e
f
a
s

c
i
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b
u
P

t
c
a
t
n
o
c

f
o
s
t
n
o
P

i

s
m
o
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s
u
C

s
A
E
L

l
a
n
o

i
t
a
N
r
e
h
t
O

C
E
N

s
t
i
n
u
n
o

i
t
a
g
i
t
s
e
v
n

i

GPS/transponders; 
mobile phones; radio-
frequency 
identification devices 
(RFID); biometric info 
technology) 
*Surveillance – Data 
surveillance (e.g. 
computer/internet 
(spyware); mobile 
phones; keystroke 
monitoring) 
*Undercover 
operations 
*Use of informants – 
Members of the public 
*Use of informants – 
Victim of a crime 
*Use of informants – 
Members of an 
Organised Crime 
Group (OCG) 
*Use of informants – 
Other police officers 
*Witness protection 

*Controlled delivery 
(i.e. allowing 
suspicious shipments 
or cargo to leave, pass 
through or enter a 
jurisdiction with the 

184 

79 

INVESTIGATIVE 
TOOLS USED AT 
THE NATIONAL 
LEVEL TO 
COMBAT 
ORGANISED 

Tools in use  

In what crime areas 
are the following 
tools used in your 
country?* 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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r
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f
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A
E
L

l
a
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o

i
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a
N
r
e
h
t
O

C
E
N

s
t
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u
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o

i
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a
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v
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N 

Section 

Sub-section 

Question 

Response options 

s
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s
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d
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S

CRIME 

knowledge and 
supervision of 
authorities) 
*Hot pursuit 
*Surveillance – Audio 
surveillance (e.g. 
Phone tapping; VOIP; 
Listening devices)  
*Surveillance – Visual 
surveillance (e.g. 
Hidden video-
surveillance devices; 
body-worn video 
devices ; CCTV) 
*Surveillance – 
Tracking surveillance 
(e.g. 
GPS/transponders; 
mobile phones; radio-
frequency 
identification devices 
(RFID); biometric info 
technology) 
*Surveillance – Data 
surveillance (e.g. 
computer/internet 
(spyware); mobile 
phones; keystroke 
monitoring) 
*Undercover/covert 
operations 
*Use of informants – 

185 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Section 

Sub-section 

Question 

Response options 

s
C
O
P
S

s
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C
P

d
e
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i
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a
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e
p
S

l
a
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i
t
y
l
a
n
a
d
e
s
i
l
a
i
c
e
p
S

s
t
n
e
m

t
r
a
p
e
d

l
l
a
b
t
o
o
F

d
n
a
s
t
s
i
l
a
i
c
e
p
s

r
e
d
r
o
/
y
t
e
f
a
s

c
i
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b
u
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t
c
a
t
n
o
c

f
o
s
t
n
o
P

i

s
m
o
t
s
u
C

s
A
E
L

l
a
n
o

i
t
a
N
r
e
h
t
O

C
E
N

s
t
i
n
u
n
o

i
t
a
g
i
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s
e
v
n

i

80 

INVESTIGATIVE 
TOOLS USED AT 
THE NATIONAL 
LEVEL TO 
COMBAT 
ORGANISED 
CRIME 

Tools in use  

What types of 
measures are 
required to 
implement the 
following 
investigative tools 
across borders?* 

Members of the public 
*Use of informants – 
Victim of a crime 
*Use of informants – 
Members of an 
Organised Crime 
Group (OCG) 
*Use of informants – 
Other police officers 
*Witness protection 

*Controlled delivery 
(i.e. allowing 
suspicious shipments 
or cargo to leave, pass 
through or enter a 
jurisdiction with the 
knowledge and 
supervision of 
authorities) 
*Hot pursuit 
*Surveillance – Audio 
surveillance (e.g. 
Phone tapping; VOIP; 
Listening devices)  
*Surveillance – Visual 
surveillance (e.g. 
Hidden video-
surveillance devices; 
body-worn video 
devices ; CCTV) 
*Surveillance – 

186 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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F

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r
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o
/
y
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a
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c
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f
o
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i

s
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u
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s
A
E
L

l
a
n
o

i
t
a
N
r
e
h
t
O

C
E
N

s
t
i
n
u
n
o

i
t
a
g
i
t
s
e
v
n

i

N 

Section 

Sub-section 

Question 

Response options 

s
C
O
P
S

s
C
C
C
P

d
e
s
i
l
a
i
c
e
p
S

Tracking surveillance 
(e.g. 
GPS/transponders; 
mobile phones; radio-
frequency 
identification devices 
(RFID); biometric info 
technology) 
*Surveillance – Data 
surveillance (e.g. 
computer/internet 
(spyware); mobile 
phones; keystroke 
monitoring) 
*Undercover/covert 
operations 
*Use of informants – 
Members of the public 
*Use of informants – 
Victim of a crime 
*Use of informants – 
Members of an 
Organised Crime 
Group (OCG) 
*Use of informants – 
Other police officers 
*Witness protection 

81 

INVESTIGATIVE 
TOOLS USED AT 
THE NATIONAL 
LEVEL TO 

Tools in use  

Please list any 
investigative tools, 
not listed in the 
previous question, 

open text 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

187 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Section 

Sub-section 

Question 

Response options 

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d
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l
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a
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a
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p
S

s
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m

t
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a
p
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l
l
a
b
t
o
o
F

d
n
a
s
t
s
i
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a
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p
s

r
e
d
r
o
/
y
t
e
f
a
s

c
i
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b
u
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t
c
a
t
n
o
c

f
o
s
t
n
o
P

i

s
m
o
t
s
u
C

s
A
E
L

l
a
n
o

i
t
a
N
r
e
h
t
O

C
E
N

s
t
i
n
u
n
o

i
t
a
g
i
t
s
e
v
n

i

COMBAT 
ORGANISED 
CRIME 

INVESTIGATIVE 
TOOLS USED AT 
THE NATIONAL 
LEVEL TO 
COMBAT 
ORGANISED 
CRIME 

INVESTIGATIVE 
TOOLS USED AT 
THE NATIONAL 
LEVEL TO 
COMBAT 
ORGANISED 
CRIME 

82 

83 

which are allowed 
and used in your 
country to tackle 
serious and 
organised crime at 
the national level 
and specify for what 
crime area they are 
used 

Can you please 
indicate relevant 
national documents 
where the tools and 
the related 
applicable rules are 
described? 

To what degree do 
you consider the 
following tools to be 
effective in 
combating organised 
crime or other 
serious crimes when 
investigating 
organised crime 
groups?* 

Tools in use  

Effectiveness of 
tools 

open text 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

*Controlled delivery 
(i.e. allowing 
suspicious shipments 
or cargo to leave, pass 
through or enter a 
jurisdiction with the 
knowledge and 
supervision of 
authorities) 
*Hot pursuit 
*Surveillance – Audio 
surveillance (e.g. 
Phone tapping; VOIP; 
Listening devices)  
*Surveillance – Visual 

188 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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F

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r
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f
a
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f
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A
E
L

l
a
n
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t
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N
r
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h
t
O

C
E
N

s
t
i
n
u
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o

i
t
a
g
i
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s
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v
n

i

N 

Section 

Sub-section 

Question 

Response options 

s
C
O
P
S

s
C
C
C
P

d
e
s
i
l
a
i
c
e
p
S

surveillance (e.g. 
Hidden video-
surveillance devices; 
body-worn video 
devices ; CCTV) 
*Surveillance – 
Tracking surveillance 
(e.g. 
GPS/transponders; 
mobile phones; radio-
frequency 
identification devices 
(RFID); biometric info 
technology) 
*Surveillance – Data 
surveillance (e.g. 
computer/internet 
(spyware); mobile 
phones; keystroke 
monitoring) 
*Undercover/covert 
operations 
*Use of informants – 
Members of the public 
*Use of informants – 
Victim of a crime 
*Use of informants – 
Members of an 
Organised Crime 
Group (OCG) 
*Use of informants – 
Other police officers 

189 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Section 

Sub-section 

Question 

Response options 

s
C
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s
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C
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d
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a
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s
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l
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a
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F

d
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a
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a
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p
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r
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d
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o
/
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f
a
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c
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b
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c

f
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P

i

s
m
o
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s
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s
A
E
L

l
a
n
o

i
t
a
N
r
e
h
t
O

C
E
N

s
t
i
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u
n
o

i
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a
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i
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s
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v
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i

84 

85 

86 

87 

INVESTIGATIVE 
TOOLS USED AT 
THE NATIONAL 
LEVEL TO 
COMBAT 
ORGANISED 
CRIME 

INVESTIGATIVE 
TOOLS USED AT 
THE NATIONAL 
LEVEL TO 
COMBAT 
ORGANISED 
CRIME 

INVESTIGATIVE 
TOOLS USED AT 
THE NATIONAL 
LEVEL TO 
COMBAT 
ORGANISED 
CRIME 

INVESTIGATIVE 
TOOLS USED AT 
THE NATIONAL 
LEVEL TO 
COMBAT 
ORGANISED 

Effectiveness of 
tools 

Effectiveness of 
tools 

Effectiveness of 
tools 

Are there any 
investigative tools 
currently available in 
your country that 
you would like to 
change - if so, how? 

Are there any 
investigative tools 
NOT currently 
available in your 
country that you 
would like to be able 
to use? 

Do you consider 
existing national 
safeguards as 
appropriate to 
protect the rights of 
the individuals when 
using the 
investigative tools 
listed above?* 

*Witness protection 

open text 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

open text 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

*Yes 
*No 
*Don't know 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

Effectiveness of 
tools 

If not, can you 
please explain why? 

open text 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

190 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Question 

Response options 

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p
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l
a
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y
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a
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a
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i
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a
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p
S

s
t
n
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m

t
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a
p
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d

l
l
a
b
t
o
o
F

d
n
a
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t
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a
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c
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p
s

r
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d
r
o
/
y
t
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f
a
s

c
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b
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c
a
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c

f
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t
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P

i

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s
u
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s
A
E
L

l
a
n
o

i
t
a
N
r
e
h
t
O

C
E
N

s
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CRIME 

88 

NEED FOR EU 
ACTION AND 
POSSIBLE 
SOLUTIONS 

Need for EU 
Action 

89 

90 

NEED FOR EU 
ACTION AND 
POSSIBLE 
SOLUTIONS 

Need for EU 
Action 

NEED FOR EU 
ACTION AND 
POSSIBLE 
SOLUTIONS 

Need for EU 
Action 

To what extent, in 
your view, is there a 
need for EU 
intervention to 
improve cross-border 
law enforcement 
operational 
cooperation to the 
following types of 
crimes?* 

*Drugs  
*Illicit tobacco trade 
*Trafficking in human 
beings 
*Financial crimes 
*Cybercrime 
*Organised property 
crime 
*Environmental crime 
*Trafficking of firearms 
*Illegal immigration  
*Terrorism 

To what extent, in 
your view, is there a 
need for EU 
intervention to 
improve cross-border 
law enforcement 
operational 
cooperation to 
ensure public order 
and safety?* 

*Crises and disasters 
*International 
sport/music/cultural 
events  
*Flows of people 
moving for tourism 
*Flows of people 
moving for work 
*Protection of public 
figures  

To what extent, in 
your view, is there a 
need for EU 
intervention to 
improve cross-border 
information 

Very high extent 
High extent 
Moderate extent 
Small extent 
Not at all 
Don't know  

191 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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i

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F

d
n
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s
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s

r
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o
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f
a
s

c
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b
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a
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o
c

f
o
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P

i

s
m
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s
u
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s
A
E
L

l
a
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o

i
t
a
N
r
e
h
t
O

C
E
N

l
a
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s
t
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m

t
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a
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x 

N 

Section 

Sub-section 

Question 

Response options 

s
C
O
P
S

s
C
C
C
P

d
e
s
i
l
a
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S

Very high extent 
High extent 
Moderate extent 
Small extent 
Not at all 
Don't know  

exchange among law 
enforcement 
authorities?* 

To what extent, in 
your view, is there a 
need for EU 
intervention to 
improve cross-border 
threat 
assessment/risk 
analysis?* 

If you see the need 
for EU intervention, 
can you please 
explain what would 
be the added value 
of the intervention 
compared to what 
countries could 
achieve alone? 

What type of 
measures the EU can 
adopt to improve 
cross-border threat 
assessment/risk 
analysis?  

91 

92 

93 

94 

NEED FOR EU 
ACTION AND 
POSSIBLE 
SOLUTIONS 

Need for EU 
Action 

NEED FOR EU 
ACTION AND 
POSSIBLE 
SOLUTIONS 

Need for EU 
Action 

Policy Options 

NEED FOR EU 
ACTION AND 
POSSIBLE 
SOLUTIONS 

NEED FOR EU 
ACTION AND 
POSSIBLE 
SOLUTIONS 

open text 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

open text 

x 

Policy Options 

To what extent do 
you think the 
following options can 
contribute to 

*Consolidation, 
streamlining and 
clarification of the EU 
legal framework 

192 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Section 

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Question 

Response options 

s
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s
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d
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improving cross-
border law 
enforcement 
cooperation between 
countries?* 

providing the basis for 
law enforcement 
cooperation 
*Modernisation of the 
EU legal framework 
providing the basis for 
law enforcement 
cooperation (e.g. by 
providing provisions to 
cover the use of recent 
technological 
developments) 
*Definition of 
minimum EU 
standards for 
organised crime 
investigations 
*Creation of a single 
set of rules for the 
same actions, whether 
carried out by the 
police or by customs 
authorities 
*Setting up new 
operational initiatives 
for law enforcement 
cooperation 
*Design of new 
recommendations, 
guidelines and good 
practices for law 
enforcement 

193 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Question 

Response options 

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95 

96 

NEED FOR EU 
ACTION AND 
POSSIBLE 
SOLUTIONS 

NEED FOR EU 
ACTION AND 
POSSIBLE 
SOLUTIONS 

Policy Options 

Policy Options 

97 

NEED FOR EU 
ACTION AND 
POSSIBLE 
SOLUTIONS 

Policy Options 

Please provide 
further details to 
explain your answer 

Please list any other 
changes or steps do 
you think should be 
taken to improve 
cross-border law 
enforcement 
cooperation between 
countries 

To what extent do 
you think EU 
intervention to 
harmonise the 
definitions and 
procedures relating 
to the following 
investigative tools 
would improve cross 
border cooperation?* 

cooperation 

open text 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

open text 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

*Controlled delivery 
(i.e. allowing 
suspicious shipments 
or cargo to leave, pass 
through or enter a 
jurisdiction with the 
knowledge and 
supervision of 
authorities) 
*Hot pursuit 
*Surveillance – Audio 
surveillance (e.g. 
Phone tapping; VOIP; 
Listening devices)  
*Surveillance – Visual 
surveillance (e.g. 
Hidden video-
surveillance devices; 

194 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Response options 

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body-worn video 
devices ; CCTV) 
*Surveillance – 
Tracking surveillance 
(e.g. 
GPS/transponders; 
mobile phones; radio-
frequency 
identification devices 
(RFID); biometric info 
technology) 
*Surveillance – Data 
surveillance (e.g. 
computer/internet 
(spyware); mobile 
phones; keystroke 
monitoring) 
*Undercover/covert 
operations 
*Use of informants – 
Members of the public 
*Use of informants – 
Victim of a crime 
*Use of informants – 
Members of an 
Organised Crime 
Group (OCG) 
*Use of informants – 
Other police officers 
*Witness protection 

98 

NEED FOR EU 

Policy Options 

Please provide 

open text 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

195 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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ACTION AND 
POSSIBLE 
SOLUTIONS 

NEED FOR EU 
ACTION AND 
POSSIBLE 
SOLUTIONS 

Policy Options 

NEED FOR EU 
ACTION AND 
POSSIBLE 
SOLUTIONS 

Need for EU 
Action 

further details to 
explain your answer 

Please list any other 
investigative tools 
you think should 
have common 
definitions or 
approaches at the EU 
level? 

To what extent do 
you think there is a 
need for EU action to 
harmonise and 
standardise the 
cooperation 
measures and 
standards currently 
included in 
bi/tri/multilateral 
agreements?* 

NEED FOR EU 
ACTION AND 
POSSIBLE 
SOLUTIONS 

NEED FOR EU 
ACTION AND 
POSSIBLE 
SOLUTIONS 

Need for EU 
Action 

Please provide 
further details to 
explain your answer 

Policy Options 

EU action might 
bring law 
enforcement 
authorities in your 
country to get 

99 

100 

101 

102 

open text 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

open text 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

196 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
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Policy Options 

General 

103 

104 

105 

General 

additional powers. To 
what extent do you 
think this requires 
additional safeguards 
to be adopted in 
your country?* 

Could you please 
illustrate the types of 
safeguards that you 
think should be 
adopted? 

Please include any 
additional 
contribution you 
would like to make 
to the study 

Would you like to be 
involved in the next 
consultation 
activities related to 
this study 
(interviews and focus 
groups)?* 

open text 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

open text 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

*Yes 
*No 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

94 

87 

72 

32 

50 

80 

80 

94 

197 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Source: Elaboration by the Study to support the preparation of an impact assessment on EU policy 
initiatives facilitating cross-border law enforcement cooperation 

198 

 
 
 
 
199 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX 7: DISCARDED OPTIONS 

In line with the Better Regulation Guidelines, a long list of policy options was prepared following the problem assessment, the assessment of the EU's 
right  to  act  and  the  identification  of  relevant  policy  options,  taking  into  account  the  evidence  of  specific  problems,  as  well  as  good  practices  and 
suggestions by stakeholders. 

The long list of options was subject to a screening in order to identify the most effective and viable sub-options, which were subsequently clustered 
into two comprehensive policy options (in addition to the status quo / baseline policy option). 

The screening was based on effectiveness and feasibility criteria. 

The findings of the assessment are presented in the table below. The sub-options that are of legislative nature are marked in bold. 

List of discarded sub-options (measures / elements) 

Identifier 

Potential sub-options 

Reason for discarding the sub-option 

1. The access to and exchange of necessary information among law enforcement authorities is subject to legal, technical and structural challenges  

1.1 Law enforcement authorities face difficulties in interpreting and implementing relevant EU provisions 

The scope of application of some EU measures is unclear, including between (i) the SFD vs. CISA (i.e. preventative and/or repressive operations) and (ii) the SFD vs. the Naples II Convention (whether only police or also 
customs authorities can use both these measures) 

The distinction between law enforcement authorities entitled to use the SFD and the Naples II Convention (notably police vs. customs) has proved ambiguous, since the competencies vary between law enforcement agencies 
and countries. 

Evidence is not available to support the repeal of the 
Naples II Convention 

2 

Provision of a definition of what competences the law enforcement authorities to which the new Law Enforcement Code is applicable need to 
have.  
The Naples II Convention would be repealed and the current scope of the SFP would apply also to customs. 
Exemplary definition: The new Law Enforcement Code should apply to Police and all other law enforcement authorities authorised by national law to 
detect, prevent and investigate offences or criminal activities, to exercise authority and take coercive measures or to execute criminal penalties and to 
prevent threats to public security. In addition, the new Law Enforcement Code should apply to all Customs authorities primarily responsible for the 
supervision of the Union's international trade, thereby contributing to fair and open trade, to the implementation of the external aspects of the internal 
market, of the common trade policy and of the other common Union policies having a bearing on trade, and to overall supply chain security. Customs 
authorities shall put in place measures aimed, in particular, at the following: 
(a) protecting the financial interests of the Union and its Member States; 
(b) protecting the Union from unfair and illegal trade while supporting legitimate business activity; 
(c) ensuring the security and safety of the Union and its residents, and the protection of the environment, where appropriate in close cooperation with 
other authorities; and 
(d) maintaining a proper balance between customs controls and facilitation of legitimate trade. 

It is not clear to which extent Articles 39 (CISA) and 46 (CISA) are still applicable and how to use these articles in relation to Article 12 of the SFD. 

200 

 
 
3 

New provision, following the definition of the SFD (Art. 12). Subsequent full repeal of Articles 39 (CISA) and 46 (CISA) and Article 12 SFD.  
Definition in Article 12 of the SFD: [To be added] 

The problem addressed through this sub-option is 
addressed through sub-option no. 1, which is included 
in PO2 and PO3. This sub-option would only have been 
relevant if a completely new legislative instrument 
would have been developed, which is not the case (SFD 
will be amended). 

The distinction between urgent and non-urgent cases provided for in the SFD and the SFD forms to be used (on a voluntary basis) for information exchange is unclear and (unnecessarily) complex 

The forms included in the SFD are time-consuming, labour intensive and not self-explanatory (both the form for the requesting MS and the requested MS). To be able complete the forms efficiently, LEAS need to know what 
information is available in other MS. 

5 

9 

10 

Development and implementation of a functionality within SIENA that resembles Interpol’s i24/7 channel, including (1) a hit/not threshold; and (2) in 
case of a hit, the possibility to request further information 

Sub-option merged with option no. 46; discarded as an 
individual sub-option due to insufficient effectiveness 
as a measure on its own 

Development of a "central LEA app" – linked, but not limited to SIENA – that is aligned with MS' national legislation regarding functionalities, access 
rights etc., which the MS would be free - but not required - to use. The app could provide functionalities such as contact details of and direct messaging 
to relevant counterparts in other MS, a search functionality for cross-border case requests, a Wiki and glossary, training content (see above), including 
access to good practices, a Q&A board / discussion forum 

While there was clear appetite for such an app, the sub-
option was discarded following the discussions in the 
2nd technical meeting in May 2021 due to a lack of 
political feasibility. 

Introduction of a requirement to use a "central LEA app" (see non-legislative option), which: 
• Enables mobile access; 
• Facilitates direct information exchange; 
• Provides LEA Knowledge Management. 
In principle, the use of the app would be required in all situations referring to the preparation, implementation, and debriefing of cross-border law 
enforcement activities 

While there was clear appetite for such an app, the sub-
option was discarded following the discussions in the 
2nd technical meeting in May 2021 due to a lack of 
political feasibility. 

The notions of "non-urgent cases" and "other cases" as defined in the SFD forms (annexed to the SFD) for requesting/requested countries are unclear 

11 

Amendment of the two SFD forms for information exchange to remove the category “other cases”  

12 

Amendment of the two SFD forms for information exchange to provide a definition of non-urgent cases  

13 

Commission guidance on the definition of the term "non-urgent" cases, including the provision of examples of "non-urgent cases" 

Discarded due to inadequate expected effectiveness. 
The SFD forms are repealed under the retained policy 
options. 

Discarded due to inadequate expected effectiveness.  
The SFD forms are repealed under the retained policy 
options. 

The term "other cases" will be removed as part of the 
retained policy options, as this is expected to lead to 
greater effectiveness, hence leaving no need to clarify 
non-urgent cases. 

The respect for the principle of equivalent access is not always ensured, especially regarding urgent cases 

14 

Commission Communication, addressing how to handle information requests. If the authorisation of a judicial authority is required for information 
requested by another Member State, then the requested law enforcement authority is encouraged to take on the responsibility to ask for this judicial 
authorization, instead of simply denying the provision of the data requested   

Discarded due to inadequate expected effectiveness.  

201 

 
15 

New provision, establishing that if the authorisation of a judicial authority is required for information requested by another Member State, then 
the requested law enforcement authority shall take on the responsibility to ask for this judicial authorization, instead of simply denying the 
provision of the data requested   

Discarded due to inadequate expected effectiveness.   

The respect for the principle of availability is not always ensured 

16 

17 

Commission Communication on how to fill in the SFD form request form. The MS will be encouraged that the request sets out the factual reasons to 
believe that the relevant information and intelligence is available in another MS and explain the purpose for which the information and intelligence is 
sought in another MS and the connection between the purpose and the person who is the subject of the information and intelligence in order to avoid 
“fishing” (by e.g. sending a request for a cross-border check with a copy to all MS) 

Discarded due to inadequate expected effectiveness.  
The SFD forms are repealed under the retained policy 
options. 

Amendment of the SFD request form (and, subsequently, the form in SIENA). The request shall set out factual reasons to believe that the 
relevant information and intelligence is available in another MS and explain the purpose for which the information and intelligence is sought in 
another MS and the connection between the purpose and the person who is the subject of the information and intelligence in order to avoid 
“fishing” (by e.g. sending a request for a cross-border check with a copy to all MS) 

Discarded due to inadequate expected effectiveness.  
The SFD forms are repealed under the retained policy 
options. A similar sub-option has been retained, which 
does not make reference to the SFD form. 

The choice of channel for information exchange lies with the Member States, leading to a duplication of requests in some cases 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

1.2 Technical driver: Law enforcement authorities have insufficient knowledge of existing mechanisms, skill gaps and outdated IT infrastructure 

National LEAs have limited awareness and knowledge of relevant databases 

It is currently not clear to law enforcement officials what channels should be used for information exchange in what circumstances. Law enforcement officers thus spend a lot of (undue) time to understand what channels should 
be used in specific cases 

Commission Communication encouraging the MS to include training on the channels for information exchange in the basis police training and provide 
guidance on the channels via Intranet 
[Good practice from one MS: Guidelines regarding the channels for information exchange (accessible for staff members of the Integrated Police via the 
Intranet and is included in the basic police training).] 

Discarded as an individual sub-option. Merged with 
sub-option 34. 

New provision, establishing that the requested Member State should, in those cases when SIENA is not used, reply through the same channel as 
was used for the request 

20 

22 

Discarded due to inadequate expected effectiveness. 
PO2 and PO3 include an element according to which 
SIENA is the preferred or default option, which is 
expected to achieve higher effectiveness. 

Discarded due to the expected lack of political 
feasibility of the training app. 

Inadequate knowledge by national LEAs’ officers of how to use the platforms for law enforcement cooperation available to them 

25 

Development and implementation of an awareness raising and training campaign within the EU law enforcement community, e.g. via CEPOL: 
• Web-based and printed leaflets, including workflows / flow charts; 
• Short guidance videos in which workflows are explained in illustrative fashion; 
• Training with mock versions of platforms  
• A dedicated law enforcement training app that makes content accessible 

There is limited availability of training for law enforcement staff involved in cross-border information exchanges and cooperation 

Current training is not held on a regular basis and does not take into account the latest changes in the EU law enforcement legislative framework 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

202 

 
The available training is often (only) voluntary 

29 

New requirement for the MS to provide a minimum number of hours of training on cross-border law enforcement aspects for officers annually 

30 

Commission Communication encouraging the MS to establish schemes that provide (non-monetary) incentives for officers to participate in relevant 
training, e.g.: 
• Career development; 
• Gaining expertise and experience; 
• Development of specialist roles; 
• Professional networking and connections. 

No specific training is foreseen for newcomers in the International Police Cooperation departments, including in the PCCCs and the SPOCs 

Discarded, as this would not be limited to those 
involved in cross-border cases and would be too far-
reaching in view of the problems identified. 

Discarded due to the expected lack of political 
feasibility in combination with low effectiveness 

34 

New provision, establishing that the MS shall systemically provide an induction on cross-border law enforcement for newcomers. 
[Good practice from one MS: Common training approach for all police cadets with a view to improve the implementation of existing bilateral 
agreements, joint curricula in professional English, bilateral cooperation and cross-border regional cooperation, two pilot trainings in border regions 
or joint trainings/exercises on joint patrols, cross-border surveillance or hot pursuits] 

Discarded, as this would not be limited to those 
involved in cross-border cases, as it covers all 
newcomers. Sub-option 34 is determined to respect 
subsidiarity, while equally addressing the problems. 

Language barriers hamper the cross-border exchange of information 

National LEA staff dealing with international matters often report information in “rusty” English 

36 

Enhanced provision of English language training addressed at law enforcement officers by CEPOL.   

Discarded, as this would not be limited to those 
involved in cross-border cases and would be too far-
reaching in view of the problems identified. 

The use of use of rudimentary search tools hampers the adoption of transliteration and “fuzzy logic” search 

The lack of transliteration and fuzzy logic search options in national databases prevents officers to get a full picture about the person they are looking for in the systems through a unique query. This leads to an increased 
workload which slows down the search process 

40 

41 

Commission Communication encouraging the MS to establish of a law enforcement algorithm in national databases / a search engine that enables 
displaying search results that are similar to what is being queried (proxy results) 

New provision, establishing that the MS shall establish of a law enforcement algorithm in national databases / a search engine that enables 
displaying search results that are similar to what is being queried (proxy results) 

Discarded, as this would not be limited to cross-border 
cases and would be too far-reaching in view of the 
problems identified. 

Discarded, as this would not be limited to cross-border 
cases and would be too far-reaching in view of the 
problems identified and not respect the principle of 
subsidiarity. 

Law enforcement officers on the ground do not always use secure communication means 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

1.3 Structural driver: National and regional information hubs set up by law enforcement authorities have different roles, means and capabilities which make their cooperation sub-optimal 

SPOCs/PCCCs do not always play their coordination role and lack resources to face the increasing number of requests 

Existing manuals do not provide clear indications of how SPOCs shall be structured and organised. 

203 

 
44 

Mapping of the different types of law enforcement agencies involved in the national SPOCs (to be shared with other countries) and sharing of national 
good practices and concrete examples on the types of competences a SPOC should have, as well as tools concerning the establishment and efficient use 
of a SPOC, provided online 

Discarded due to inadequate expected effectiveness. 
This sub-option would not adequately solve the 
identified problems 

n/a 

n/a 

The functioning of the SPOCs, e.g. to promptly respond to the information requests received, is limited 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

SPOCs/PCCCs are not always equipped with the necessary information management tools (e.g. a case management system with common dashboard and automatic/semi-automatic data upload and cross-check) 

Lack of interconnectivity between the PCCC and SPOC information systems 

n/a 

n/a 

Lack of an efficient case management system 

n/a 

n/a 

National law enforcement databases are not connected with each other (e.g. due to technical interoperability) 

51 

Commission Communication encouraging the MS to interconnect national law enforcement databases 

n/a 

n/a 

Discarded, as this would not be limited to cross-border 
cases and would be too far-reaching in view of the 
problems identified and not respect the principle of 
subsidiarity. 

Information from (i) different units within the SPOCs and (ii) from the PCCCs (and equivalent structures at the border area) is not always integrated in the SPOC information management system 

Information from (i) different units within the SPOCs and (ii) from the PCCCs (and equivalent structures at the border area) is not always integrated in the SPOC information management system 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

Direct and user-friendly access to all relevant EU and international databases and platforms is not the norm in the SPOCs and the PCCCs 

SPOCS and PCCCs lack access to all relevant EU and international databases and platforms 

[Covered above in sub-options 43 and 44] 

The specific national stakeholders entitled to access and use EU and international databases and platforms vary between the Member States 

In some countries regional and local law enforcement authorities (especially customs) cannot access EIS, SIS, SIENA, VIS, Interpol’s databases and other international law enforcement information exchange channels directly, 
due to its centralised access rights on national level 

54 

Commission Communication encouraging the MS to ensure that also regional and local law enforcement authorities, including customs, have access to 
EIS, SIS, SIENA, VIS and Interpol's databases 

Discarded due to inadequate expected efficiency and 
political feasibility to be adequately implemented 
voluntarily by the Member States. 

204 

 
 
 
 
 
205 

 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 8: AD HOC WORKSHOPS (SUMMARIES) 

Ad hoc workshop of 24 March 2021 [As drafted by the independent contractor] 

Summary of the discussions332 

Attendees 

•  For the European Commission: 

o  DG  HOME:  Robertus  Rozenburg  (HOME  D.1),  Cecilia-Joanna  Verkleij  (HOME 
D.1), Patrick Hamon (HOME D.1), Antoine Billard (HOME D.1), Mickael Roudaut 
(HOME  D.1),  Aleksandra  Tukisa  (HOME  D.1),  Florence  Fensie  (HOME  D.1), 
Adrianna Miekina (HOME A.4), Massimiliano Minì (HOME D.5) 

o DG JUST: Eleni Chronopoulou (JUST C.3) 

•  For  the  Council  of  the  European  Union:  Jarek  Lotarski  (Legal  Service),  Radovan  Schida 

(General Secretariat) 

•  For  the  Contractor:  Katarina  Bartz,  Francesca  Migliavacca,  Emma  Disley,  Ilia  Gaglio, 

Florian Linz, Sara Filippo 

•  For  countries:  national  representatives  from  Law  Enforcement  Authorities  of  all  EU 

Member States and Schengen associated countries (except Iceland and Liechtenstein) 

Acronyms 

CISA 
CMS 
ECRIS 
EIS 
ETIAS 
EUCARIS 
ISF 
NFIP 
PCCCs 
SFD 
SIENA 
SIS (II) 
SPOCs 
VIS 

Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement 
Case Management System European Criminal Records 
Information System Europol Information System 
European Travel Information and Authorisation System 
European car and driving licence information system 
Internal Security Fund 
National Football Information Point 
Police and Customs Cooperation Centres 
Swedish Framework Decision 
Secure Information Exchange Network Application 
Schengen Information System 
Single Point of Contact 
Visa Information System 

332 

The representative from the Netherlands expressed a reserve clause on conclusions presented in this document. 

206 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
Opening remarks from the European Commission 

•  Security has been a priority for the European Commission  (hereafter the Commission) 
from its very beginning. A lot has already been done over the past years, like for instance: 
the revision of the Schengen Border Code, the revision of the Schengen Information System 
(SIS II) and the very recently adopted interoperability regulations.333 However, operational 
cross-border cooperation between Law Enforcement authorities inside the EU continues to 
face  challenges,  and  there  is  still  room  for  further  improvement.  The  findings  of  the 
Schengen  evaluations  in  the  field  of  police  cooperation,  and  recent  Council  analytical 
papers, further confirm this. 

•  The EU legal framework is highly fragmented and somewhat outdated. The 

bedrock  for  law  enforcement  cooperation  has  been  and  remains  the  1990  Convention 
Implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA). This has been complemented by the Prüm 
Decisions,334 widening the scope for operational cooperation also to public order and safety 
matters,  and  by  some  sectorial  Council  Decisions  such  as  the  one  on  Liaison  officers  for 
football  matches.  Member  States  and  Schengen  Associated  Countries  have  built  on  this 
foundation  to  further  develop  their  cooperation  through  bi/tri/multi-lateral  agreements. 
While these agreements may be subject to regular renegotiations by participating countries, 
the EU legal framework has not undergone a systematic and thorough update. Subsequently, 
the EU and bi/multilateral provisions are found to have drifted apart one from the other to 
various degree. 

•  Significant  principles  of  cross-border  cooperation  have  been  set  out  in  nonbinding 
Council  guidance  such  as  for  Single  Point  of  Contact  (SPOCs)  and  Police  and  Customs 
Cooperation  Centres  (PCCCs),  and  at  times  these  non-binding  provisions  are  found  to  be 
lacking the necessary enforcement powers. 

•  There is a need for European action at the external borders and within the EU. 

Even  though  each  Member  State  is  responsible  for  fighting  criminal  threats  on  its  own 
territory,  their  increasing  cross-border  dimension  calls  now,  perhaps  more  than  ever,  the 
need for EU action. Therefore, the Commission announced a legal initiative by the end of 
the year to modernise existing intra-EU Law Enforcement cooperation. The study that EY 
and  RAND  Europe  are  undertaking  will  provide  evidence  to  the  Commission  to  inform 
future decisions in this regard and aim, among others, to answer questions like: is the access 
to  information  by  SPOCs  or  PCCCs  fit  for  purpose?  What  do  we  need  to  better  address 
security risks during mass events? Do we need a significant step-up in the collective fight 
against  cross-border  crime?  Answering  these  questions  is  part  of  a  wider  consultation 
process composed of surveys, interviews and case studies each covering a different angle of 
the subject matter. The Technical workshop is part of the consultation process and aims to 
better understand what  works, what does not and what could be done in order to improve 
the  current  situation.  A  second  workshop  will  be  held  in  May  to  discuss  about  possible 
options for the future. 

Presentation of the study and preliminary findings 

•  There is not a clear-cut distinction between law enforcement authorities entitled to use 
the  Swedish  Framework  Decision335  (SFD)  and  those  entitled  to  use  the  Naples  II 

333 
Regulation  (EU)  2019/817  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  20  May  2019  on  establishing  a 
framework for interoperability between EU information systems in the field of borders and visa and Regulation (EU) 2019/818 
of  the  European Parliament and  of  the  Council  of  20  May  2019  on  establishing  a  framework for  interoperability  between  EU 
information systems in the field of police and judicial cooperation, asylum and migration. 
334 
The  Prüm  Decisions  refer  to  Council  Decision  2008/615/JHA  on  the  stepping  up  of  cross-border  cooperation, 
particularly  in  combating  terrorism  and  cross-border  crime  and  Council  Decision  2008/616/JHA  on  the  implementation  of 
Decision 2008/615/JHA. 
335 
and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the Member States of the European Union. 
The Annex IV of Council Guidelines on the implementation of Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 
on simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the Member States of the 
European Union (doc. 9512/1/10 REV1, 17 December 2010), list all LEAs that declared themselves competent under the SFD. 

Council  Framework  Decision  2006/960/JHA  of  18  December  2006  on  simplifying  the  exchange  of  information 

207 

 
                                                                 
 
Convention. In ES, the national legislation which transposes the SFD states that both Police 
and Customs can implement measures included in the SFD and in the Naples II. In IT, the 
Naples  II  Convention  can  be  implemented  only  by  Customs  authorities  and  law 
enforcement  authorities  with  Customs  duties.  When  ratifying  the  Convention,  Member 
States  have defined the  authorities that could implement  it. Even though Customs usually 
refer to the Naples II Convention and Police to the SFD, this clear distinction does not apply 
to all countries. 

• 

It  would  be  important  to  understand  if  the  issues  identified  are  affecting  a  significant 
proportion of cross-border cases or just a minority of them . The Contractor explained that 
the study will try to quantify where possible the scale of the issues identified, and stressed 
that  the  feedback  provided  by  stakeholders  will  be  key  to  this  end.  It  has  also  been 
underlined  the  existence  of  objective  limitations  in  retrieving  data  about  the  identified 
issues. There are no statistics on the number of cases not initiated or dismissed because of 
difficulties in the cooperation. 

Presentation  of  the  preliminary  results  of  the  analysis  of  the  problems  related  to 
cross-border law enforcement cooperation 

•  The Contractor illustrated the core problem identified, the related drivers and issues. 

Access to and exchange of information is sub-optimal 

•  Several  participants  have  experienced  issues  relating  to  the  access  to  and  exchange  of 

information with other Member States. 

•  Reported issues include: 

o Duplication of requests via different channels; 

o Requests sent before the needed checks in the relevant EU and international databases; 

o Inappropriate choice of the channel to exchange information; 

o  The  existence  of  a  chain  of  requests  when  a  country  needs  to  send  a  request  for 
information  to  another  not  neighbouring  country.  A  country  can  send  a  request  to 
another country based on the SFD but the receiving country may not accept it as the 
SFD has not been implemented in the same way; 

o  No  access  to  the  Europol  Information  System  (EIS)  for  the  Schengen  Associated 

Countries since they are not EU Member States; 

o Police authorities might have limited access to Customs' databases and vice versa due 
to  secrecy provisions (e.g. when  contacting a foreign Customs authority to request 
criminal  records  of  a  given  suspect,  in  some  countries  Customs  cannot  proceed 
because they do not have access to police databases). 

Other problems 

•  Overall, the problems and issues identified by the study reflect the current situation with few 

participants that highlighted the existence of additional issues such as: 

o Existence of different  traditions in the national administrative systems.  For instance, 
some  Member  States  have  a  complex  administrative  system,  with  a  number  of 
agencies  and  institutions  with  different  responsibilities.  Such  complexity  at  the 
national level might create difficulties during cross-border operations. 

This includes a number of customs authorities. 

208 

 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Break-out session 1 - Access to and exchange of information 

What are the issues at stake? Are there practical examples/cases that can illustrate the issues 
identified? 

•  The main issues concerning the access to and exchange of information relate to: 

o Limited awareness and knowledge of relevant EU and/or national databases and 
platforms for information exchange. There are still difficulties in the choice of the 
most appropriate communication channels, and this creates additional workload for 
the staff working in the SPOC. Concretely this reflects in: 

■  Duplication of requests in  different  channels  such as  the i24/7, the  Interpol 
information  exchange  system,  and  the  Secure  Information  Exchange 
Network Application by Europol (SIENA); 

■  Use  of  inappropriate  channels  (e.g.  request  from  one  SIS  II  country  to 

another to locate a person is sent via i24/7); 

■  Police-to-police requests instead of other equally effective mechanisms, such 
as the European car and driving licence information system (EUCARIS), the 
European  Criminal  Records  Information  System  (ECRIS)  and  the  Visa 
Information System (VIS). 

o  Limited  cross-matching  of  national  law  enforcement  databases  with  EU 
databases. In view of the increasing interoperability of EU databases in the future, it 
is  important  to  improve  information  exchange  between  Schengen  Associated 
Countries  and  Europol.  Moreover,  another  practical  obstacle  is  represented  by  the 
fact that Member States, which are full members of Europol, can restrict the access 
to their national data in two ways: they could apply high classification levels (such 
as "EU restricted" or more) on the information or they can require Europol to ask for 
their consent prior to sharing the information. In the daily practice, this means that 
countries which are partners but not full members of Europol (Schengen Associated 
Countries  and  Denmark)  often  experience  restrictions  in  the  access  to  data  and 
information. Even if there is currently a discussion between Europol Member States 
about how to reform Europol's regulation, Schengen Associated Countries have not 
been involved in these negotiations. It would be  important to amend the regulation 
in order to acknowledge the close relationship that Schengen Associated Countries 
have  with  EU  Member  States,  thus  enabling  their  effective  participation  within 
Europol.  In  this  way,  it  would  be  possible  to  distinguish  between  Member  States, 
Schengen Associated Countries and general Third Countries; 

o  Limited  access  to  EU  and/or  national  databases  relevant  to  law  enforcement 

cooperation; 

o Limited availability of secured information channels as well as limited mobile access 

to law enforcement databases; 

o  Fragmentation  of  the  EU  framework  for  cross-border  cooperation.  There  are  around 
31 binding and 18 non-binding measures concerning international Law Enforcement 
cooperation. This level of fragmentation makes it difficult for practitioners to have a 
holistic picture of the available tools; 

o  Mixed  opinions  on  the  existence  of  uncertainties  in  the  exchange  of  information 

created by the different scope of application of the SFD and the CISA. 

o There are some problems in the implementation of the SFD: 

■  Unclear definition of time limits (urgent, non-urgent and other cases); 

■  The form is too cumbersome; 

■  The form is not used; 
■  Principle  of  availability 

in  police-judicial 
cooperation  context).  It  could  happen 
that  local  police  officers  or 
departments  are  not  aware  of  EU  regulation  and  of  the  principle  of 

is  not  respected  (notably 

209 

 
availability. For instance, in a given Member State, there could be a SPOC 
and  several  state/local  police  forces  which  sometimes  are  not  aware  of  the 
functioning of the system; 

■  Obstacles linked to different national transposition measures. The provisions 
of  the  SFD  are  transposed  by  all  Member  States  but  differences  in  the 
national  transposition  can  affect  the  way  requests  for  information  coming 
from other Member States are managed; 

■  Cases of "fishing". Examples of one Member State sending an urgent request 
to  all  Member  States  under  the  SFD  without  any  indication  of  the  country 
they  are  seeking  for  an  answer.  This  creates  unnecessary  workload  for  the 
SPOCs; 

■  Requests  for  additional  information.  When  sending  a  request  to  another 
Member  State,  there  are  sometimes  issues  as  the  counterpart  may  request 
additional  documentation  (e.g.  a  European  Investigation  Order  or  Mutual 
Legal Assistance request). Member States can share information according to 
the SFD but in many cases they prefer to stay on the safe side and to request 
for additional documentation; 

o No issues have been raised regarding the requirements set in the  Prüm Decisions on 
the supply of information in order to prevent terrorist offences. Usually information 
concerning  terrorist  offences  is  exchanged  through  specific  information  channels 
and mechanisms which are identified based on available guidelines and operational 
instructions  (e.g.  Draft  SPOC  Guidelines  for  cross-border  law  enforcement 
information  exchange,  6721/14,  and  Proposal  for  a  Practical  Advisor  for  Law 
Enforcement  Information  Exchange,  6243/18),  rather  than  pursuant  to  the  Prüm 
Decisions. 

In light of likely future security, technological, social, policy and economic 

developments, how would the driver and the related issues evolve in case no further EU 
action is taken? 

•  Current issues related to the access to and exchange of information will likely become 

more relevant in the next 5-10 years in case no further EU action is taken. 

•  Technological, security and policy developments will significantly affect the evolution of 

the existing issues. Among the examples reported: 

o The use of artificial intelligence is likely to have a strong influence on criminals and 

police modus operandi; 

o  The  use  of  cryptocurrencies  poses  new  challenges  to  law  enforcement,  especially 

regarding handling these assets once they have been seized; 

o The increasing volume of data and information to be stored (e.g. means of proof for 
court)  is  challenging  the  current  capacity  of  the  databases  of  law  enforcement 
authorities. 

Is there a need for EU intervention to address this driver and the related issues? 

•  There is a need for EU intervention to address the issues related to the access to and the 

exchange of information. 

•  The EU intervention should focus on: 

o  The  interconnection  and  streamlining  of  available  systems  for  the  exchange  of 
information. Member States may currently adopt different communication channels 
since the EU measures in this regard are not binding. Different Member States may 
adopt  distinct  communication  channels  depending  on  the  crime  areas.  Some 
databases can be accessed only when performing a research in a specific crime area. 
This generates some limitations and might be a point of attention. According to the 
Prüm  Decisions,  in  order  for  one  Member  State  to  be  able  to  undertake  direct 

210 

 
exchanges with other Member States, 26 bilateral interfaces are required. However, 
it is not required to establish a connection with all Member States and therefore not 
all Member States are connected and share DNA, fingerprints and other kind of data; 

o The overall consistency of the EU legal framework; 

o Awareness and capacity of national law enforcement authorities. 

What types of policy measures could be considered to address the issues included under 
this driver? 

•  A  clearer  definition  and  regulation  of  the  SPOCs  through  binding  instruments  could  help 
Member  States  to  allocate  the  resources  needed  for  integrating  the  different  channels  in 
coordinated structures. 

•  Mixed views on the opportunity for the Commission to indicate a preferred communication 
channel (e.g. SIENA) to be used by all countries to exchange certain types of information 
with two participants considering this a good way to simplify cross-border cooperation and 
one  in  favour  of  leaving  room  to  national  law  enforcement  authorities  to  decide.  Without 
suggesting the Commission to indicate a preferred communication channel, it has also been 
suggested  to  define  harmonised  criteria  on  the  choice  of  the  channels  in  order  to  avoid 
duplications; 

•  Promotion  of  a  common  business  requirements  for  the  Case  Management  System  (CMS) 

among SPOCs; 

•  Ensure the presence of a SPOCs in all countries and ensure they can access all national and 

international databases; 

•  Organisation of specific trainings at the national level and through CEPOL webinars. 

Plenary discussion on the outcomes of the break-out sessions 

What are the issues at stake? 

Main findings 

1.  Access to and exchange of information 

■  Key issues include limited awareness of and access to relevant EU and national databases 

as well as limited interoperability of national systems; 

■  Some  issues  specifically  relate  to  the  implementation  of  the  SFD,  notably  the  form 
included within is too cumbersome and the definition of urgency/timeframe is not clear; 

Police-to-police  requests  instead  of  other  equally  effective  mechanisms  (such  as  EUCARIS, 
ECRIS, VIS etc). 

The main findings discussed during the break-out sessions have been confirmed and no comments 
were raised. 

Are there practical examples/cases that can illustrate the issues identified? 

Main findings 

1.  Access to and exchange of information 

■ Schengen Associated Countries do not have direct access to Europol's databases; 
■  Unnecessary  transmission  of  information  through  different  channels  (duplication  or 
requests through I-24/7 and SIENA). Use of inappropriate channel (request from one SIS 
II country to another to locate a person is sent via I-24/7); 

■  Requirements for the SPOC CMS (interconnection with different channels, national and 

EU databases, automation of checks). 

No additional examples have been provided. 

211 

 
In light of likely future security, technological, social, policy and economic 
developments, how would the driver and the related issues evolve in case no further EU 
action is taken? 

Main findings 

1.  Access to and exchange of information 

■  Current problems will become more relevant in case no further EU action is taken; 
■  The  worsening  of  current  problems  is  mainly  attributed  to  new  and  evolving 
technological developments likely to affect the access to and exchange of information. 

Is there a need for EU intervention to address this driver and the related issues? 

Main findings 

1.  Access to and exchange of information 

■ Current problems need to be addressed at the EU level. 

The main findings discussed during the break-out sessions have been confirmed and no comments 
were raised. 

What types of policy measures could be considered to address the issues included under this driver? 

Main findings 

1.  Access to and exchange of information 

■  In order to improve access to and information exchange, the EU intervention shall ensure 
full  interconnection  and  streamlining  of  available  systems  for  the  exchange  of 
information, the overall consistency of the  EU legal framework, and the full awareness 
and  capacity  of  national  law  enforcement  authorities.  To  a  lesser  extent,  it  should  also 
ensure  the  integration  of  modern  requirements  into  fundamental  rights  and  data 
protection rules; 

The  main  findings  discussed  during  the  break-out  sessions  have  been  confirmed  and  no  major 
comments were raised except for the following: 

•  With  regard  to  the  possibility  to  extend  the  scope  of  surveillance  activities  to  additional 
crime areas such as tobacco smuggling, it would be better and more important to extend the 
competences  of  certain  law  enforcement  authorities  instead  of  broadening  the  scope  of  a 
single investigative tool. 

Concluding remarks from the Commission 

•  The meeting achieved its intended goal to define the issues faced today by law enforcement 

authorities. 

•  The consultation activities for the study are still ongoing and all participants are invited to 

take part, especially to the online survey. 

•  The  Contractor  will  submit  the  study  interim  report  on  mid-April.  This  will  include  the 
analysis of the problem and then the study will focus on the possible future policy options. 
•  Another workshop will  be organised in  May to  discuss the impacts  of the possible policy 

options. 

212 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Ad hoc workshop of 25 May 2021 [As drafted by the independent contractor] 

Summary of the discussions336  

Attendees 
On  behalf  of  the  European  Commission:  Adrian  Perez-Martinez,  Aleksandra  Tukisa,  Anna 
Moscibroda,  Antoine  Billard,  Eleni  Chronopoulou,  Florence  Fensie,  Jesper  van  Putten,  Jolande 
Prinssen,  Julian  Siegl,  Mario  Cuschieri,  Massimiliano  Mini,  Mickael  Roudaut,  Oana  Hidveghi, 
Olivier Micol, Patrick Hamon, Pestelli Vanni, Sandra Moeller, Robertus Rozenburg. 

On behalf of the countries: National representatives from  Law Enforcement Authorities of all EU 
Member States and Schengen associated countries (except Iceland and Liechtenstein). 

Acronyms 
CISA   
CMS 
LEA 
MS 
PCCCs  
SFD 
SIENA  
SIS (II) 
SOC 
SPOCs  
UMF 
Welcome and presentation of the agenda 

Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement 
Case Management System 
Law Enforcement Authority  
Member State 
Police and Customs Cooperation Centres 
Swedish Framework Decision 
Secure Information Exchange Network Application 
Schengen Information System 
Serious and Organized Crime 
Single Points of Contact 
Universal Message Format 

The contractor welcomed all participants and thanked them for their participation. In the following, 
the contractor introduced the housekeeping rules for the workshop, including the relevant technical 
functionalities  of  the  tools  to  be  used  and  the  communication  rules.  As  a  closing  to  this 
introduction,  all  participants  were  invited  and  highly  encouraged  to  be  active  and  involved  in  the 
discussions ahead.  

As  a  next  point,  Slido  (as  well  as  its  relevant  functionalities)  was  introduced  as  the  tool  for 
launching poll questions (by emphasising that the choices uploaded by the participants will not be 
statistically  analysed  on  an  individual  level).  Again,  the  contractor  emphasised  the  importance  of 
interaction for the policy options to address current problems efficiently and effectively. 

Subsequently, the collection of national stakeholder’s points of view on the possible EU measures to 
address  current  problems  affecting  cross-border  law  enforcement  cooperation  as  well  as  the 
discussion  of  likely  impacts  of  these  measures  were  presented  as  the  overall  objective  of  the 
workshop.  

As a last point of the welcoming, the contractor underlined the fact that law enforcement authorities 
(LEA) of all member states (MS) and Schengen associated are represented in the workshop, which 
was jointly organised by Rand, EY, as well as the Commission. 

336 The representative from the Netherlands expressed a reserve clause on conclusions presented in this document. 

213 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
Opening remarks by the Commission 

The  Commission  welcomed  all  meeting  participants  and  introduced  the  group  of  participants  in 
further  detailing,  covering  200  experts  from  the  police,  customs,  SPOCS,  PCCCs,  investigators, 
authorities, specialists in joint cooperation and the national representatives from MSs and Schengen 
associated countries. 
The  Commission  referred  back  to  the  workshop  two  months  ago  (24  March)  and  pointed  out  the 
focus  of  this  workshop:  to  discuss  what  could  be  improved  in  cross-border  law  enforcement 
cooperation  and  possible  options  that  could  best  address  the  issues  and  facilitate  the  daily  life  of 
end-users,  as  well  as  the  likely  impacts  and  the  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of  the  options.  In 
addition, the (political) feasibility should be part of the discussion as well. 

In a next step, the Commission representative referred to the existing basis of this study, covering 
37  EU  measures  complemented  by  75  mutual  agreements,  as  well  as  to  the  fact  that  each  MS  is 
responsible for its own country security and fighting against terrorism within the EU. At the same 
time, the Commission stressed the importance of facilitating the exchange of information  through 
SPOCs and PCCCs in order to better address cross-border crime. 

For closing the opening  remark, the Commission emphasised its listening mode for the workshop 
due to the fact that the study is conducted independently by EY and RAND. 

Presentation of the study and (preliminary) findings 
After  the  presentation  of  the  study  as  well  as  the  preliminary  findings,  the  participants  of  the 
meeting were given the possibility to address their questions in a Q&A. The following points were 
mentioned/discussed in this context: 

The  problems  identified  in  the  problem  definition  are  considered  as  relevant  by  the  participants. 
However, most of these problems are already known to be such, not only in the EU, and shared by 
many stakeholders. The fact that there have already been developed a lot of (operational) practices 
to  address  these  problems  should  not  be  neglected.  The  improvements  aimed  at  with  the  policy 
options  presented  are  relevant  and  considered  as  positive.  They  should,  however,  also  take  into 
account what is already there as potential solutions. This argument was supported by more than one 
participant. In this context, one participant added that some options are considered to be constitute a 
positive change, such as the access  to  SIENA for all main  LEAs, but  their implementation  might 
create internal challenges/obstacles in the MS. 

Regarding the policy options, one participant is asking for more detail. This request could already 
be addressed during this meeting, when the policy options and respective measures were presented 
in further detail during the breakout sessions. 

The  Commission  answered  the  wish  of  two  participants  to  get  access  to  the  interim  report, 
confirming  that  the  final  report  will  be  accessible  for  all  participants  of  the  meeting  on  the  DG 
HOME website. 

In  this  regard,  more  than  one  participant  underlined  the  importance  of  providing  quantitative 
evidence, both for the problems as well as the policy options identified. The Commission answered 
this point by assuring that the final report will have a solid basis in this regard. 

One  of  the  participants  referred  to  the  material  scope  of  the  study,  asking  how  public  order  is  of 
interest for police cooperation. In the participant’s view, public order is an administrative liability 
while public safety refers to the security of citizens which falls into the scope of police liability. The 
Commission addressed this question by quoting the relevant EU article as a reference on the EU’s 

214 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
definition on public order and public safety (Art. 17 (1) of Council Decision 2008/615/JHA (Prüm 
Decision). 

Breakout sessions 

During  the  breakout  sessions,  the  participants  discussed  the  measures  presented  on  the  respective 
slides  of  the  Powerpoint  presentation  by  the  contractor  as  well  as  their  likely  impacts.  In  the 
following, the discussion points will be summarised and structured according to the main strengths 
and weaknesses of the measures presented as well as to additional key comments raised during the 
discussion. 

Breakout session 1 – Access to and exchange of necessary information 

Main outcome of the breakout session 

Set-up and competences of the SPOC and PCCCs 

The  main  strengths  of  the  measures  presented  concerning  the  set  up  and  competences  of  the 
SPOCs and PCCCs are: 

  Time savings: A definition of common competences of the SPOC and the PCCCs would, in 
the  view  of  the  participants  lead  to  time  savings  when  requesting/submitting  information 
(e.g. due to facilitated workflows and centralised communication by using the SPOC) 

  Clarity of competences, responsibilities and clear rules 
 
  The access to national and international databases and platforms for SPOCs and PCCCs is 

Increased monitoring of possibilities for the SPOCs concerning the cases 

considered as highly relevant  

  High relevance of possibility to ask for judicial authority support 24/7 
  Common (minimum) standards of a SPOC/PCCC Case Management System as well as the 
facilitate  workflow,  both  nationally  and 

functionality  of  cross-checking  would 
internationally 

The main weaknesses of the measures concerning the set up and competences of the SPOCs and 
PCCCs are: 

  The  feasibility  of  some  of  the  measures  related  to  PCCCs  were  questioned  by  some 
participants depending on the national  set  up and the overall role of PCCCs, both  varying 
significantly between MS 

  Following the point above, some participants stressed the point of structural differences of 
SPOCs,  PCCCs  and  judicial  authorisation  between  MS.  A  fact  that  might  be,  at  times, 
hampering  the  smooth  and  efficient  cross-border  cooperation.  It  may  also  touch  upon 
national competences   

  High  importance  of  actual  data  availability  for  appropriate  functioning  of  the  databases, 

platforms and CMS 

Additional key comments:  

  The  participants  suggested  to  consider  the  need  for  further  coordination  at  the  European 
level between the SPOCs, the PCCCs and other law enforcement units (e.g. liaison officers) 
  Additional  measures  should  also  be  considered  to  improve  the  use  of  resources  at  the 
national  level  allocated to  the SPOCs. For instance, the SPOC shall be sufficiently staffed 
and  trained  to  perform  their  tasks  effectively,  supported  by  an  IT-system  that  enables 
efficient processes and swift responses 

215 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Bilateral agreements depend on a common understanding and it might be difficult to reach 

the same kind of trust on a multilateral / EU level. 

  Participants  raised  the  point  of  automated  processes,  which  is  highly  needed,  due  to  the 

increasing volume of information requested, exchanged and stored. 

  Appropriate  EU  funding  for  establishing  a  SPOC  workflow  system  is  considered  to  be 

helpful 

  SPOC/PCCC Case Management Systems in the MS 

The  main  strengths  of  the  measures  presented  concerning  the  SPOC/PCCC  Case  Management 
Systems in the MS are: 

 

Intelligent  tool  including  statistical  data  would  facilitate  workflow,  both  within  the 
SPOC/PCCCs as well as between them 

  Minimum essential requirements for CMS for all MS 
  Time savings (e.g. speeding up the management of requests), access to information in real 

time 

  Better data quality and data quality control  improved quality of work 
  Avoidance of duplications 
  Establishment and enforcement of a common/similar workflow in different MS 
  The added value of this measure is considered to be relatively large 

The main weaknesses of the measures presented concerning the SPOC/PCCC Case Management 
Systems in the MS are: 

  Costs for MS in developing the CMS 
  Feasibility  linked  to  national  specificities  (the  integration  of  specific  solution  within  the 
national systems might be politically and technically challenging, depending on the current 
individual solution used in the MS) 

Additional key comments: 

  One central national workflow/CMS for all information exchanges 
  Automation of data cross-check 
  Universal message format (UMF) to be used 
  Data protection considerations 
  Access rights by different units need to be defined 
  Access rights to EU databases need to be defined 
 
  Access to technical support 
 

Interoperability between PCCCs’ CMS and the one of the SPOCs 

Information exchange via SIENA and other communication channels 

The main strengths of the measures presented concerning the information exchange via SIENA 
and other communication channels are: 

  Time savings 
 

Increased clarity on which communication channel should be used when (currently existing 
confusing in this regard leads to uncertainties and potentially double work) 
Increased level of security 

 

The main weakness of the measures presented concerning the information exchange via SIENA 
and other communication channels is: 
  Complexity of access rights 

Additional key comments: 

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  Necessary to consider further the use of other communication channels and the criteria for 

the use of the channels/matrix 

  Need to clarify the rules for the usage of SIENA for intra-EU communication 
  Use of Interpol when third countries are involved 
  SIENA is currently not monitored 24/7 by all MS, as it should be in view of the participants 
  Reference to the handling codes 
  Some of the measures proposed for SIENA are already in place or upcoming (and thereby to 

be discarded as part of this legal proposal) 

  Use of secure communication means  
  As a general comment made by the participants, the use of secure communication means is a 

horizontal issue that needs to be addressed across all policy options 

  The idea of a LEAs app was considered as interesting by some participants 
  Training activities 

The main strengths of the measures presented concerning training activities are: 

  Additional material provided by CEPOL 
 

It  is  crucial  for  officials  to  be  able  to  translate  the  content  of  trainings  into  practice. 
Therefore, the training should not be too complex and burdensome. An enabler in this regard 
could  be  the  introduction  of  more  harmonised  legal  requirements  and  measures  at  the  EU 
and national levels. 

The main weakness of the measures presented concerning training activities are: 

  Training should not be too general but targeted, both in terms of the form and the content 

(e.g. efficient use of SIENA) 

  Limited availability of time for the officers on the ground 

Additional key comments: 

  There is a need to consider the specificities of national situations and needs of specific LEAs 
  The  focus  of  the  training  should  be  on  practical  needs,  due  to  restricted  time  of  officers 

(concentrate on the most important) 

  Agreement on the need  for language trainings  (i.e. English) in  order to  communicate with 

other SPOCs 

  There should be both, training at EU level (CEPOL) and at national level (with leading role 

of SPOC) for international cooperation 

Comments by country representatives 

LV  agrees  with  the  proposal.  It  is  extremely  important  to  define  minimum  essential  mandatory 
requirements for the SPOC set up, position within the country, presence of judicial authority as well 
as  essential  requirements  to  the  case  management  system  used  by  SPOCs  and  relevant  access  to 
EU/international/national databases. 
BE indicates the measure is comprehensive, one point to be specified is the one about “be informed 
about or be responsible”, in their experience when cooperating with other countries there are strong 
barriers between SPOCs, PCCCs and liaison officers, that do not share databases nor CMS, are not 
aware of what the others do, there are no clear rules on which of the three is responsible for what. 
As  a  consequence,  if  you  send  a  request  to  a  PCCC  they  will  provide  an  answer  but  may  not  be 
aware  that  a  previous  investigation  on  the  topic  was  conducted  by  the  SPOC,  with  previous 
exchanges of information. So there should be coordination and they should work together as a one 
flow of information exchange. 

217 

 
 
 
 
 
 
CZ confirms that also other units deal with international cooperation, in particular specialised units 
such as counter-terrorism units, with their own ways of communication, as well as the customs, and 
all this information should be kept together. Also the lack of resources is a big issue, to deal with all 
the requests the SPOC would need a lot of resources, or would not be able to manage them, and this 
is  an  issue  for  all  the  countries,  without  qualified  people,  technologies,  such  as  an  integrated 
workflow,  the  issues  in  international  cooperation  are  not  manageable.  Also  training  is  important, 
end-users should be trained by the SPOC on how to tackle issues in international cooperation, as its 
officers should have the best knowledge and should share it, to make end-users more aware of the 
possibilities of cooperation. 
ES  mentions  that  the  SPOC  should  integrate  all  the  relevant  LEAS  in  the  country,  as  per  the 
guidelines.  Moreover,  the  SPOC  must  channel  the  requests  for  all  stakeholders  respecting  the 
national  and  international  mandates  as  well,  defining  sharply  the  contact  points,  without  other 
alternative and irregular means of information exchange. 
BG thinks that SPOCs should also be responsible for bilateral/regional cooperation, together with 
PCCCs. The minimum requirements for SPOC structure are mentioned in the SPOC Guidelines for 
international  law  enforcement  information  exchange  in  the  framework  of  the  DAPIX  Working 
Group  (nowadays  IXIM  Working  Party).  Agrees  that  SPOCs  should  also  have  a  main  role  in 
training  police  officers,  for  example  on  which  channels  should  be  used  for  international 
cooperation. 
DE notes that some of these points are not applicable to Germany for its constitutional background 
as federal republic, because they have 16 police forces (one for each Länder) and the Federal Police, 
and an integrated CMS and access to all databases are limited, so the measures should be adaptable 
by MS to their own national legislation and constitution. Moreover, merging PCCCs and SPOC in 
one structure would limit the capabilities of PCCCs. 
BE  affirms  that  it  was  not  pleading  for  merging  PCCCs  and  SPOCs,  but  to  make  sure  that  their 
respective workflows are coordinated and integrated. So that SPOC knows what PCCCs and LOs 
do and vice versa, without  duplications  and have parallel  information exchanges.  Being informed 
about  each  other’s  actions  is  the  minimum,  ideally  there  should  be  some  common  CMS  to 
automatically see this. But each should keep their competencies and specialty. On the question of 
whether the SPOC should be responsible for, the organisational level is an internal issue of the MS, 
for example in Belgium the SPOC, LOs and PCCCs are part of the same directorate, but the LOs 
are independent while the PCCCs are part of the SPOC. 
NL indicates that it is not clear which databases the Commission has in mind for the point on full 
access EU LE databases – and to what extent there will be access to these databases. 
LU indicates that the problem is always national implementation and national interpretation. 
LV agrees with  the colleagues regarding national  implementation  and interpretation. The national 
implementation  of different  guidelines  creates sort of misunderstanding,  misleading on the use of 
communication channels, info exchange etc. And it is hard to allocate adequate resources, organise 
training taking into account the current workload and a huge amount of work to be done manually. 
DE  points  out  that  an  additional  core  issue  -  already  in  context  of  the  set-up  of  SPOCs  -  is 
automation.  The  increasing  amount  of  international  data  exchange  (in  comparison  with  limited 
human resources in the SPOCs) shows a clear need to establish automated processes. 
LV indicates that the SPOC shall be the main coordinator for international info exchange. 
LT proposes that in order not to duplicate information between SPOC and PCCC, there should be 
one common management system which allows you to cross check info. 
CZ indicates that SPOCs must have an overview and that it is probably not possible SPOCs manage 
every request, but must know about it. So the request may be done by PCCC, but information must 
be  available  -  both  to  SPOC  and  all  PCCCs.  This  avoids  duplication  and  loss  of  information. 
Common  systems  solve  this.  On  the  point  of  having  a  judicial  authority  available  24/7,  also  this 
may be related to internal organisation of MS, but it is important to emphasise the importance of the 
availability  of  judicial  measures  for  the  SPOCs,  for  example  in  CZ  some  measures  allow  for 
centralisation  and  some  others,  such  as  arrest,  not,  as  the  legal  base  make  it  not  possible  to 

218 

 
centralise  decision  in  one  judge  or  public  prosecutor  sitting  in  the  SPOC,  so  the  solution  should 
allow to find rapidly the right one. So the solution is to make judicial support available. 
DE  clarifies  that  having  clear  rules  would  support  officers  under  pressure  in  choosing  the  right 
channel  to  ask  questions  to  international  partners, and make it quicker to receive an  answer, as it 
would not be needed to transfer the question to the right office. 
CH mentions that access to most relevant databases at one spot reduces the time. 
DK suggests that making data available for all Member States is also important. There are databases 
that should be feed by MS but are not. In the SIENA system, many MS sent requests to everybody, 
even for minor cases, while with this base of available data they could be more specific in choosing 
the MS and not contact everybody if not necessary, making time savings. So important to share data 
with Europol and in the EIS. There is a Council Decision about the information system saying that 
MS should share more information, so if data is available, they could save some time in SPOCs. 
BG indicates that if the SPOC officers (or even LE officers) have direct access to the relevant EU 
databases (SIS, ECRIS, EUCARIS, future Prüm revision) the information exchange will speed up 
and  there  are  recommended  Do’s  and  Don’ts  in  the  Practical  Advisor  to  the  Manual  on  Law 
Enforcement Information Exchange. 
ES is concerned about the incentives for PCCCs to use these services that are normally centralised. 
PCCCs should be coordinated by the SPOC, using for example the same CMS. 
CZ  indicates that Eucaris is not an  Interpol  database. Any police officer has  access  to  SIS, so no 
need  to  mention  as  special  with  PCCC.  Another  point  is  Europol  database  -  there  are  restricted 
access and not for PCCC, Concerning Eucaris - in our circumstances again all officers have access. 
Most crucial with PCCC is to have safe channel to exchange the information and to share and be co-
ordinated with SPOC. PCCC is in fact one of the channel. 
BG indicates that concerning the PCCC - their competences, information exchange channel, access 
to the databases depends on the bilateral/trilateral agreement among the MS 
CZ  mentions  that  SPOCs  have  a  specific  role,  e.g.  for  Europol  databases,  which  is  not  for  all 
officers. Or due to expert knowledge about the SIS or Interpol databases. Not to make queries, but 
to explain the outcome. Moreover, the SPOC operates 24/7. This is must already. SPOC works 24/7 
in all countries. The question is whether all authorities or channels are covered. 
CH raises the question if there is any SPOC that does not operate 24/7. ES confirms that ES offers 
a  24/7  service.  BG  agrees  that  concerning  the  24/7  operating  of  SPOC  it  should  be  taken  into 
account that not all ENU are 24/7 operational because there is no obligation in the current Europol 
regulation. 
SI mention that duplication can be avoided but there would be costs for MS to implement CMS. 
NL points to potential privacy issues. 
ES  indicates  that  there  could  be  information  from  three  different  sources  mixed,  with  different 
kinds of protections, so it would be important to check this is compliant with relevant legislation. 
DE suggests there could be issues with access rights to different services represented in PCCCs. 
BE  mentions  that  there  is  a  technical  solution  to  the  fact  that  different  services  are  in  PCCCs, 
certain  aspects  and  certain  information  in  the  CMS  can  be  made  not  accessible  to  everybody,  so 
different components can access only their part. Moreover, the universal message format should be 
taken  into  account,  there  is  project  at  EU  level  on  this,  the  information  exchanged  between  MS 
should  be  structured  in  a  certain  way  to  make  the  CMS  work  well,  helping  to  deal  with  the 
messages. 
CZ adds that 1) CMS should have automatic functions (e.g. automatic query on incoming request in 
the databases), 2) CMS shall be integrated with all channels, 3) CMS should be common to SPOCs 
and PCCCs to ensure that there is a sharing of information and avoidance of duplications, 4) there 
should be 24/7 technical support, 5) there should be also statistical tools. 
ES  confirms  that  the  structure  of  the  messages  is  provided  by  SIS  forms,  SIENA  and  Interpol 
messages  are  free-form,  and  hard  to  pattern,  but  solutions  as  UMF  can  be  used  for  entities 
exchange. 
BG confirms that parts of proposed measures for SIENA are already in place. 

219 

 
SE  indicates  that  the  Covid-19  pandemic  has  clarified  the  need  for  one  or  more  tools  to  secure 
virtual meetings for customs and other law enforcement authorities with the ability to join the tool/s, 
regardless of their location nationally. As we understand it Europol has a task to forward a proposal 
for solutions (building on SIENA). SE Customs use SIENA very frequently. 
SI  mentions  that  SIENA  is  developing  all  the  time.  The  problem  which  we  see  is  that  it  is  not 
monitored 24/7 in all MS. 
ES think the bulk of the design of those tool falls into SPOCs, as long as SIENA web services APIs 
are provided by Europol. Maybe redesigning the SIENA interface is a tall task ... 
CZ explains that SIENA is a complex tool, and its application as a secure communication channel 
could  be  questioned.  So  the  focus  should  be  only  on  one  solution,  but  on  the  need  for  police 
cooperation  to  have  a  secure  channel  of  communication.  SPOCs  use  secure  channels  but  police 
officers  use  whatever  they  find.  SIENA  have  different  meanings,  it  is  a  full  application,  and  it  is 
restricted so could not be linked easily with other systems for all police officers to use it. The secure 
communication between PCCCs is  done also  via sTESTA which is  probably more  general  -  only 
the "cable" not the full "app" as it is SIENA. Major point is to make clear rules which channel is 
used  and  bring  structure  to  those  not  structured  so  far  (as  SIRENE  has  complete  structured 
messages e.g.). 
NL indicates that a crucial aspect is that we still wish to exchange information through for example 
our  liaison  officers  throughout  Europe.  And  we  should  not  forget  the  24/7  channel  from  the 
Budapest  Convention.  We  do  however  have  the  opinion  that  information  exchange  over  Europol 
should prevail Interpol. 
DE explains that PCCCs have to use specific secure channels, and not everybody is aware of it. 
BG indicates that the general rules for the choice of the channel, to comply with the mandates of 
Europol,  Interpol, SIS and all other channels for cooperation and information exchange should be 
taken  into  account.  SIENA  is  very  user  friendly  for  information  exchange  in  English,  the  default 
language. As far as she knows, there are a lot of initiative in the SIENA roadmap that will simplify 
information exchange between LEAs, but it could not be default channel for cooperation, Europol 
has  operational  agreements  with  third  countries,  so  SIENA  can  be  used  also  with  them,  but  the 
choice is on the MS. 
ES  explains  that  SIENA  is  more  than  the  interface,  and  we  can  exploit  the  channel  and  its 
advantages without using the interface. The structure of the messages can be provided technically in 
the  CMS,  via  templates,  SIS  style.  Good  starting  point  is  devising  a  catalogue  of  usual 
communications amongst MS, and normalise those more frequent. 
CZ confirms the need to harmonise the use of channels in MS. Which does not mean prioritise just 
one, but making clear rules of use for all, to which channel should be used and for what. Technical 
solutions then can be found. Also the speed/way of reply is now different for channels and this shall 
be also considered. We need harmonisation and common standards, which would help. 
FR  responds  that  due  to  an  intensive  exchange  of  information  with  neighbouring  third  countries 
(Maghreb), they would not recommend to establish SIENA as  a default channel since we need to 
copy EU MS in these exchange via INTERPOL, or they will not see the exchanges happening with 
third countries. 
ES responds that for FR, that could be solved if the CMS is able to integrate communications from 
different sources in the same case files. 
BE  explains  that  for  FR,  the  rule  could  be  that  SIENA  is  preferred  channel  for  purely  intra-EU 
communication, but that once a third country is involved, Interpol becomes the preferred channel? 
ES explains that for CZ the problem is that sometimes the channel is identified with a certain unit, 
with  different  resources  and  backlogs.  Integration  of  the  channels  under  same  structures  could 
relieve the load. 
CZ responds that to the recent point on secure tool - this definitely covers the needs of officers for 
tool for secure individual communication. However there is question how to ensure, that with this 
secure bilateral communication between individual officers we do not miss some information which 
otherwise will go via e.g. SPOC. 

220 

 
CZ  points  out  that  there  are  many  interesting  parts  from  different  MS  and  agencies  and  suggests 
that all best practices could be put together in one. Furthermore, CZ points to the topic of complex 
training. At present, there are mostly specialised trainings which often serve as the only channel or 
are  the  only  training  available  in  a  specific  area.  CZ  explains  that  there  is  sometimes  even 
competition for certain tools or channels which is confusing for police officers in the streets. Police 
officers on the ground need solutions and do not care how it will be done.  
BG  asks  that  there  should  be  trainings  both  on  EU  level  (CEPOL)  and  on  national  level  (with 
leading role of SPOC) for international cooperation 
BE confirms that they are in favour of EU trainings provided by CEPOL or others, it is lacking at 
the moment. But the national implementation of EU legislation is always different, so we have to 
respect  these  differences,  there  should  not  be  a  unique  handbook  for  trainings,  but  more  targeted 
parts  and  courses,  for  instance  on  the  use  of  SIENA,  that  could  be  integrated  in  the  national 
framework. 
CZ explains that it is good to have a framework at EU level that is implemented than at national 
level.  There  should  be  differentiated  trainings  for  officers  depending  on  their  role,  as  there  are 
different  needs,  those  in  the  streets  receive  a  lot  of  information  and  trainings  and  thus  trainings 
should focus on the practical needs of the officers, trying to keep it simple. Also helping would be 
an  overall  harmonisation  of  cooperation  rules,  a  common  framework  would  make  also  training 
simpler. The use of English should be necessary knowledge. Thus the training must be different for 
different groups and focus must be very practical. 
BG indicates that there should be dedicated trainings both for law enforcement authorities and for 
the  SPOC  officers  (currently  there  is  ATHENA  2  project)  for  all  tools/legal  acts/channels  for  LE 
cooperation. 
CH  points  to  different  functions  with  different  needs.  Not  all  law  enforcement  officers  work 
internationally or with other languages. Some work with their neighbouring countries who speak the 
same language. 
CZ indicates that police cooperation is necessary and this needs to be made clear to all officers, not 
to  care  only  on  their  district,  create  an  atmosphere  and  feeling  going  beyond  technical  and  legal 
solutions to make it work. 

Second plenary session  
Following the breakout sessions, a summary of the results of each breakout session was presented 
and  put  to  discussion  by  the  contractor  in  the  plenary  (Please  see  the  specific  results  for  each 
breakout session above) 

As horizontal points, a clarification of definitions and processes, supporting soft measures, such as 
training  activities,  as  well  as  increased  funding  from  the  EU  for  cross-border  police  cooperation 
were mentioned as helpful via the chat function. 

Some  participants  clarified  that  by  answering  the  poll  questions,  the  MS representatives  have  not 
endorsed any policy options. The poll answers should be rather understood as experts’ views that 
were given spontaneously and therefore as an informal exchange. 

Final remarks by the Commission 
After  closing  the  second  plenary  session,  the  Commission  thanked  the  participants  for  their 
participation and recapitulated the objective of the meeting, namely the identification of the likely 
impacts of the policy options presented by the contractor. The Commission also underlined that the 
options  will  be  further  elaborated  and  assessed  based  on  the  input  provided  by  the  workshop 
participants. 

As  a  next  step,  the  Commission  provided  a  short  outlook  on  the  next  steps,  including  the 
commitment to provide the MS with the workshop presentation. 

221 

 
 
 
 
 
 
The Commission closed its final remarks by referring to the finalisation of the study this summer 
which the MS will be provided access to, once it will have been published. 

As  a  final  step,  the  contractor  also  thanked  the  participants  for  their  participation  and  officially 
closed the meeting. 

7th Heads of SPOC meeting minutes -– 26.05.2021 [drafted by the chair of the meeting – Italy] 

"The  EU  COM  introduced  the  initiative  concerning  the  "Study  to  support  the  preparation  of  an 
impact assessment on EU policy initiatives facilitating cross-border law enforcement cooperation". 
The  EY-RAND  experts  first  presented  the  objective/scope  of  the  study  which  is  based  on  the 
analysis  of  the  legislative  framework  for  cooperation  and  on  the  existing  investigation  tools.  The 
study will evaluate the need for possible additional measures and compare the potential impact. The 
activities conducted referred to an online survey, a technical workshop held on the 25th May 2021 
and consequent discussions with experts involved. 

The  territory  under  analysis  includes  27  MS  plus  4  Schengen  associated  Countries,  the  timeline 
refers  to  the  period  1990  (CAAS  undersigned  that  year)  –  2021  while  the  stakeholders  are  EU 
agencies and Bodies/networks, National Authorities plus Academia and “think tanks”. 

Being the study activity a very complex effort we suggest a careful reading of the presentation, but 
for the  extremely interesting part  related to  the SPOCs  we briefly highlight  some passages of the 
appreciated  presentation.  The  survey  allowed  to  underline  that  the  SPOC  is  the  most  common 
structure used for polcoop info exchange, in minor extent also the PCCCs were pointed out by the 
survey participants. As for the channels used, Interpol and SIRENE seem to play the relevant role 
while  SIENA  is  considered  the  most  effective.  Some  barriers  in  granting  the  info  exchange 
efficiency  were  detected  as  follows:  fact  sheets/Manuals  awareness  and  content  clarity, 
communications  hampered  by  lack  of  good  cooperation  between  SPOC  and  PCCS,  LEA  and 
Judicial  Authorities,  Police  and  Customs.  Confusion  on  the  use  of  channels  were  once  again 
underlined as well as the complexity of the Legal framework. 

The discussions of participants suggested as a way forward the consolidation/modernization of the 
existing fragmented legal acts, the setting up of basic and clear rules and the drafting of minimum 
standards. 

The  Chairman  welcomed  the  initiative,  which  respond  to  the  need  for  simplification  and 
modernisation in a more coherent contest of the current legal basis and of the procedures, which are 
still hampering the cross border cooperation. 

The participants unanimously agreed for the value of the initiative and expressed the need for being 
updated  on  the  process  developments.  The  ATHENA  team  confirmed  its  availability  in  keeping 
close contacts with the EU Commission for providing any further updates to the Heads of SPOC". 

222 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 9: COMPLEMENTARY INFORMATION ON THE EXPECTED EFFECTS OF THE 
POLICY OPTIONS IN THE MEMBER STATES 

Access to and exchange of necessary information 

Set-Up and competences of the SPOC and PCCC 

SPOC's staff 

42%

58%

Countries with available information on SPOC staff

Countries without available information on SPOC staff

Source: EY/RAND Europe Study’s elaboration based on Schengen evaluation reports 

 

 

In 13 countries, data on SPOC staff is available.  

In 18 countries, no data on SPOC staff is available.  

  All  countries  would  be  affected  if  were  to  be  established  as  “one  stop  shops”  for  LEA 
cooperation,  if  SPOCs  were  to  have  full  access  to  EU  and  international  law  enforcement 
databases or if they were to have full access to relevant national case management systems. 

 Main features of SPOC’s CMS 

Source: EY/RAND Europe Study’s elaboration based on desk research (dark grey cells indicate that no information is 
available) 

223 

 
 
 
  Five different SPOC workflow structures exist at national level,337 with 5 countries reported 

to have the most advanced model. 

  9 countries reported that the CMS of the SPOC has access to that on the rest of LEAs, 5 to 

that of PCCCs. 

Information exchange via SIENA and other communication channels 

Implementation of the Swedish Framework Decision 

20

15

10

5

0

15

1

10

5

Countries with no transposition

Countries with limited operational implementation

Countries with limited use of forms

Countries without available information

Source: EY/RAND Europe Study’s elaboration based on Schengen evaluation reports 

Implementation of the Swedish Framework Decision 

3%

16%

32%

48%

Countries with no transposition

Countries with limited operational implementation

Countries with limited use of forms

Countries without available information

Source: EY/RAND Europe Study’s elaboration based on on Schengen evaluation reports 

337  Model  A:  a  different  office  for  each  channel,  different  training  and  a  different  case  management  system  (CMS); 
Model  B:  a  different  office  for  each  channel,  different  training/assignments,  and  two  offices  share  the  same  CMS; 
Model C: SPOC sends and receives messages, while other offices handle the different channels. Different training for 
each office  and each office  has its own CMS; Model D:  One  CMS, one office  but separate  assignments and training 
depending  on  the  channel;  Model  E:  One  SPOC  handles  all  messages  through  one  CMS  and  all  staff  have  the  same 
training.  See  Note  from  the  Presidency  of  the  Council  of  the  EU  to  the  Working  Party  for  Schengen  Matters 
(SIS/SIRENE)/Mixed  Committee  (EU-Iceland/Norway  and  Switzerland/Liechtenstein  on  Single  Point  of  Contact 
(SPOC) - Possible mean for decreasing SIRENE workload (8031/19). 

224 

 
 
 
                                                                 
  15 countries report limited use of the forms of the SFD. If new, simpler, and more user-
friendly forms were to be introduced, these 15 countries might be particularly affected. 

  10 countries report limited operational implementation of the SFD. If new, simpler, and 
more user-friendly forms were to be introduced, these 10 countries might be particularly 
affected. 

Preferred communication channel 

20

15

10

5

0

17

5

4

5

SIENA as preferred channel

I-24/7 as preferred channel

Indifferent usage of channels

Countries without available information

Source: EY/RAND Europe Study’s elaboration based on Schengen evaluation reports 

Preferred communication channel 

16%

16%

13%

55%

SIENA as preferred channel

I-24/7 as preferred channel

Indifferent usage of channels

Countries without available information

Source: EY/RAND Europe Study’s elaboration based on Schengen evaluation reports 

 

If  SIENA  was  established  as  the  preferred/default  channel  for  information  exchange,  this 
would imply changes for 4 countries who currently prefer the I-24/7 channel. 

  For those 17 countries which are indifferent between communication channels establishing 
SIENA  as  the  preferred  /  default  channel  would  imply  smaller  changes  as  for  those  who 
clearly prefer the I-24/7. 

  For  5  countries  which  use  SIENA  as  the  preferred  communication  channel,  no  change  is 

expected. 

225 

 
 
 
 

If  English  was  established  as  the  default  language  for  the  use  of  SIENA  and  if  newer, 
simpler  and  more  user-friendly  forms  were  to  be  established,  all  countries  would  be 
affected. 

Number of supported operations 

Source: Europol338 

Number of exchanged messages in SIENA 

Source: Europol339 

338 Europol (2020) Welcome to Europol An Operational Overview.  
339 Europol (2020) Welcome to Europol An Operational Overview.  

226 

 
 
 
                                                                 
Number of initiated cases per year 

Source: Europol, SIENA Annual Report 2020340 

Effects of the envisaged measures on different types of stakeholders 

Based  on  the  assessment  above,  the  following  table  provides  an  indicative  view  on  the  extent  to 
which different types of stakeholders are expected to be affected by the elements concerning each 
of the specific objectives of the policy option.  

Impacts on different types of stakeholders 

Access to and exchange of information 

Law Enforcement 
Authorities 

Public 
authorities 

SPOCs 

PCCCs 

Other 

Judicial Authorities 

Data Protection Authorities 

NGOs 

Citizens / Businesses 

Source: EY/RAND Europe Study’s elaboration  

Cells that are marked in darker green denote a stronger positive impact on the different types of stakeholders, 
whereas cells that are denoted in yellow denote less strong positive impact. 

 The  table  shows  that  law  enforcement  authorities  and  citizens/businesses  are  slightly  positively 
affected  in  the  baseline  scenario.  However,  only  minor  positive  impacts  are  expected  for  other 
public authorities, as well as NGOs. 

340 Europol (2020) SIENA Annual Report 2020. 

227 

 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
ANNEX 10: COMPLEMENTARY INFORMATION ON THE POLITICAL FEASIBILITY OF 
ENVISAGED MEASURES  

Throughout  different  stages  of  the  study  supporting  this  impact  assessment,  numerous  types  of 
documents  have  been  reviewed  and  stakeholders  have  been  consulted  for  contributions  and 
feedback  in  order  to  co-develop  and  fine-tune  the  policy  options  (e.g.  through  interviews,  focus 
groups, the online survey, technical workshops, and the public consultation). 

This means that the elements of the policy options were, inter alia, drafted based on the contents of 
specific Council Conclusions and, for instance, the outcomes of various Heads of SPOC meetings, 
as well as based on the direct feedback voiced by individual representatives of Member States and 
other stakeholder groups. 

Similar is valid for the assessment of the impacts of the policy options: The primary source was the 
feedback  obtained  directly  from  Member  State  representatives  through  the  methodologies 
implemented as part of the study. 

However, due to the very tight timeframe of this study, the study process did not leave room for the 
Member States (or other stakeholders groups) to voice a politically negotiated and officially agreed 
position regarding the impact of the different elements of the policy options. Moreover, it turned out 
to be very  challenging to obtain factual reliable quantitative and qualitative information about the 
impacts of the policy options on specific Member States and the respective stakeholders affected. 

Therefore, the assessments of the impacts of the policy options have been carried out based on the 
best  information  available,  including  based  on  expert  judgment  and  the  experience  of  the  Study 
Team. 

Moreover, gauging stakeholders' high-level support for specific elements of the policy options has 
been  challenging  within  the  study  process.  It  should  be  noted  that  different  types  of  stakeholders 
may have different positions. 

For  instance,  the  extent  to  which  Member  States  may  support  the  establishment  of  a  common 
minimum set of data for exchange depends on a wide variety of factors such as: 

  Legal  situation  in  the  Member  States:  What  types  of  data  are  already  collected  and  being 
made available for exchange? Does the envisaged dataset necessitate and extension of that 
list or is this already sufficiently addressed in the current legal situation? 

  Political  preference  of  the  government:  If  additional  data  needs  to  be  collected  and  made 
available for exchange, is this regarded as politically opportune? To what extent would this 
be aligned with existing data protection rules, as well as safeguards for fundamental rights? 
Moreover, even those Member States that currently do collect those datasets that should be 
made available, may not be willing to share them with other Member States and SAC. 

  Perceived  complexity  to  implement  certain  elements  of  the  policy  options  in  practice:  To 
what  extent  and  how  do  legislative,  technical,  and  operational  changes  have  to  be 
implemented  in  order  to  enable  making  available  a  certain  set  of  data  to  other  Member 
States? What  is  a realistic timeline and  budget  that needs to  be allocated  and spent  in  this 
regard? 

  Type  of  stakeholder  queried  for  feedback  on  a  specific  element:  What  are  the  different 
positions of LEAs (including e.g. SPOCs and PCCCs), judicial authorities, data protection 
authorities, NGOs and civil society organisations? 

Although  a  complex  and  challenging  endeavour,  the  study  team  was  able  to  gauge  stakeholders' 
personal high-level views on the policy options throughout the study process in an indicative way 
(meaning not based on official positions established by stakeholders). The respective indications of 

228 

 
support  for  overarching  and  more  specific  elements  of  the  policy  options  by  various  types  of 
stakeholder groups have been provided in the following table using a rating from weaker (white) to 
stronger support (dark green). 

The table should only be read as an indication of the Study Team's understanding of general 
trends  concerning  the  potential  high-level  support  of  stakeholders  for  (specific  aspects  of)  the 
policy options. The table is not based on official positions provided by the Member States. In fact, it 
is very likely that specific stakeholders in specific Member States have a differing view from what 
is  indicated  in  the  table  when  it  comes  to  the  legal,  technical  and  structural  specificities  of  the 
elements of the policy options.  

Stakeholders' high-level support for the policy options 

Public authorities 

Law Enforcement Authorities 

SPOCs 

PCCCs 

Other 

Judicial 
Authorit 

Data 
Protect. 
Authorit 

NGOs & 
civil 
society 

Stakeholders in the Member States 

Topics 

Overarching topics 

Access to and exchange of information 

Specific topics 

Legislative improvements 

Provision of clarifications 

Introduction of new requirements 

Streamlining of existing requirements 

Alignment of different legal instruments 

Technical improvements 

Definition of technical requirements & functionalities 

Establishment of quality control mechanisms 

Structural improvements 

Establishment of organisational requirements 

Establishment of governance requirements 

Other improvements 

Provision of training 

Provision of awareness raising 

Provision of funding 

Implementation of further studies 

Source: EY/RAND Europe Study’s elaboration  

Cells that are marked in darker green denote a stronger positive impact on the different types of stakeholders, 
whereas cells that are denoted in yellow denote less strong positive impact 

The table shows that, overall at large, the Study Team has sensed a general trend towards high-level 
support among stakeholders. LEAs seem to be, generally spoken, more supportive of the elements 
of the policy options than judicial authorities. With specific regard to data protection authorities, it 
is crucial to note that the support is contingent on the extent to which the protection of personal data 
is safeguarded throughout all measures foreseen under the policy options. Generally spoken, NGOs 
and civil society organisations are supportive of the policy options as long as fundamental rights are 
safeguarded,  and  LEAs  do  not  come  into  the  possession  of  excessive,  unjustified  amounts  of 
information about citizens and businesses that do not concern actual criminal investigations and/or 
legal proceedings before court. 

229