Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on information exchange between law enforcement authorities of Member States, repealing Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA
Date: 2021-12-08
Institutions: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: EU Member State, area of freedom, security and justice, criminal law, disclosure of information, exchange of information, fight against crime, judicial cooperation, offence, organised crime, terrorism

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   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 8.12.2021  COM(2021) 782 final 2021/0411 (COD)  Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on information exchange between law enforcement authorities of Member States, repealing Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA {SEC(2021) 420 final} - {SWD(2021) 374 final} - {SWD(2021) 377 final}  
 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 

1. 

CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 

• General context 
As set out in the EU Security Union Strategy1, the new Counter-terrorism agenda for the EU2 
and  the  EU  Strategy  to  tackle  Organised  Crime  2021-20253,  transnational  threats  call  for  a 
coordinated, more targeted and adapted response. While national authorities operating on the 
ground are on the frontline in the fight against organised crime and terrorism, action at Union 
level  and  global  partnerships  are  paramount  to  ensure  effective  cooperation  as  well  as 
information  and  knowledge  exchange  among  national  authorities,  supported  by  a  common 
criminal  law  framework  and  effective  financial  means.  Furthermore,  organised  crime  and 
terrorism  are  emblematic  of  the  link  between  internal  and  external  security.  These  threats 
spread  across  borders  and  manifest  themselves  in  organised  crime  and  terrorist  groups  that 
engage in a wide range of criminal activities.  
In  an  area  without  internal  border  controls  ('the  Schengen  area'4),  police  officers  in  one 
Member State should have equivalent access to the information available to their colleagues 
in another Member State (subject to the same conditions). They should cooperate effectively 
and by default across the Union. Exchange of information on criminal matters is thus a key 
enabler to safeguarding security in the Schengen area.  

Together with the abolition of internal border controls within the Schengen area, a set of rules 
for  information  exchange  and  police  cooperation  were  agreed  upon  in  the  Convention 
Implementing  the  Schengen  Agreement  (CISA).  In  addition,  the  Schengen  Information 
System (SIS) was established, creating a common EU security and border database containing 
information on wanted and missing persons and objects in the forms of alerts. 

According  to  the  EU  Serious  and  Organised  Crime  Threat  Assessment  2021  (EU  SOCTA), 
more than 70% of organised crime groups are present in more than three Member States5. The 
2021 EU SOCTA and the EMCDDA European Drug report6 outline a number of areas where 
serious  and  organised  crime  appears  to  be  on  the  rise.  At  the  same  time,  as  set  out  in  the 
December 2020 Counter-Terrorism Agenda7, the EU remains on high terrorist alert. 

The Schengen area is the largest free travel area in the world. It allows more than 420 million 
people  to  move  freely  and  goods  and  services  to  flow  unhindered.  By  removing  border 
controls between Member States, the Schengen area has become part of our European way of 
life. It is a symbol of Europe's interconnectedness and of the ties between European citizens8. 
The Schengen area also contributes to the efficient functioning of the Single Market, and thus 
to the growth of the Union's economy9.  

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COM(2020) 605 final. 
COM(2020) 795 final. 
COM(2021) 170 final. 
The Schengen area is composed of Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France,  Germany,  Greece,  Hungary,  Iceland,  Italy,  Latvia,  Liechtenstein,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg, 
Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.  
Europol (2021), European Union Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (EU SOCTA). 
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), European drug report 2021.  
COM(2020) 795 final. 
Eurobarometer 474: The Schengen Area. 
COM(2021) 277 final, 2.6.2021. 

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However, the growing mobility of people within the EU also creates additional challenges in 
preventing  and  fighting  criminal  threats,  and  in  ensuring  public  safety.  Almost  2  million 
people  commuted  across  borders,  including  1.3  million  cross-border  workers10.  Despite  the 
COVID-19 pandemic having reduced intra-EU mobility, flows of people will likely continue 
to be important in the future. 

In recent years, the Schengen area has been repeatedly put to the test by a series of crises and 
challenges which have led several Member States to reintroduce internal border controls. One 
reason  Member  States  have  given  for  such  a  decision  has  been  the  uncontrolled  secondary 
movements11  of  irregular  migrants,  which  these  Member  States  consider  to  pose  a  serious 
threat to public policy or internal security, justifying the need to reintroduce border controls. 
Pursuant  to  Regulation  (EU)  2016/39912  ('Schengen  Borders  Code'),  the  temporary 
reintroduction of border controls may be used only for a limited period of time, in exceptional 
circumstances (such as the migratory crisis observed in 2015/2016), as a last resort measure.  
In  particular,  there  is  room  for  improvement  as  regards  the  use  of  police  checks  and 
cooperation,  including  of  course  with  regard  to  information  exchange  and  communication. 
These  measures,  in  particular  if  combined,  have  the  potential  to  yield  the  same  results  in 
controlling secondary movements as temporary internal border controls, and are less intrusive 
when it comes to the free movement of persons, goods and services. 

The rapidly evolving criminal landscape and the mobility of people suggest that cross-border 
cooperation between law enforcement authorities in the EU and the Schengen area is crucial 
to tackle criminal offences, and allow citizens and third country nationals legally staying on 
the territory to safely use their free movement. However, important challenges remain for law 
enforcement  authorities'  ability  to  exchange  information  with  their  counterparts  in  other 
Member States in an effective and efficient manner. This capability still varies greatly among 
the Member States highlighting a degree of fragmentation detrimental to the effectiveness and 
efficiency of information exchange. As a result, criminals and groups of criminals continue to 
take advantage of these inefficiencies to operate across borders, and secondary movements of 
irregular migrants will continue to pose a problem. 

• Reasons for and objectives of the proposal 

The overall objective of this proposal is to legislate on organisational and procedural aspects 
of  information  exchange  between  law  enforcement  authorities  in  the  EU  with  a  view  to 
contributing  to  the  effective  and  efficient  exchange  of  such  information,  hence  protecting  a 
fully functioning and resilient Schengen area. The proposal is (notably) without prejudice to 
the  rules  regulating  the  information  exchange  on  alerts  in  the  SIS  via  the  Supplementary 
Information Request at the National Entries (SIRENE) Bureaux.  

This proposal for a Directive on information exchange between law enforcement authorities 
of Member States forms part of a coherent package also comprising a proposal for a Council 
Recommendation  reinforcing  operational  cross-border  police  cooperation,  a  proposal  for  a 
Regulation revising the Automated Data Exchange Mechanism for Police Cooperation ("Prüm 
II") as well as a proposal amending the Schengen Borders Code as set out in the Commission 
Communication of June 2021 "A strategy towards a fully functioning and resilient Schengen 
area"13.  Together,  these  proposals  seek  to  establish  a  Police  Cooperation  Code  with  the 

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European Commission (2017), Boosting Growth and cohesion in EU border regions. 
Other most frequent reasons notified by the Member States included the migratory crisis of 2015/2016, 
persistent terrorist threat and the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (Schengen Borders Code). 
COM(2021) 277 final, 2.6.2021. 

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objective  of  streamlining,  enhancing,  developing,  modernising  and  facilitating 
law 
enforcement cooperation between relevant national agencies, thus supporting Member States 
in their fight against serious and organised crime and terrorism. 

Taking full account of the opinion expressed by the co-legislator, this proposal is based on the 
findings  presented  in  the  accompanying  Impact  Assessment.  These  findings  also  cover 
information, analyses and recommendations stemming from the Schengen evaluations in the 
field  of  police  cooperation  carried  out  in  the  past  six  years,  the  Communiction  from  the 
Commission  on  the  way  forward  on  aligning  the  former  third  pillar  acquis  with  data 
protection rules14, the extensive consultations with relevant stakeholders in the past two years, 
and the important body of Council guidance papers developed for the last 15 years. Based on 
this combined analysis, three main objectives were identified. The present proposal seeks to 
achieve them by addressing three underlying problems. 

(1)  Lack of clear and robust common rules on information exchange 

The  first  objective  of  this  proposal  is  to  ensure,  under  precise,  consistent  and  common 
rules,  the  equivalent  access  for  any  Member  State's  law  enforcement  authorities  to 
information available in other Member States for the purpose of preventing and detecting 
criminal  offences,  conducting  criminal 
investigations  or  criminal  operations,  while 
complying with fundamental rights, including data protection requirements. 

Member  States'  Law  Enforcement  Authorities  (LEAs)  are  involved  in  daily  cross-border 
information exchanges related to operations against criminal offences. Yet, rules at national 
level  impede  the  effective  and  efficient  flow  of  information.  The  general  rules  for  the 
exchange of law enforcement information which has cross-border relevance among Member 
States'  law  enforcement  authorities  are  laid  down  in  Council  Framework  Decision 
2006/960/JHA simplifying the exchange of information between law enforcement authorities 
of the Member States of the European Union (hereinafter referred to as 'Swedish Framework 
Decision' or 'SFD'15), adopted in 2006 before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. The 
Swedish Framework Decision partially superseded the police cooperation Chapter of the 1990 
Convention Implementation the Schengen Agreement16. 

The Swedish Framework Decision lays down the principles according to which information 
should  be  shared  (principles  of  availability  and  equivalent  access),  the  timeframe  within 
which a request for information should be replied to, the forms that should be used to lodge 
and  reply  to  such  requests,  as  well  as  the  data  protection  safeguards  to  be  ensured  when 
handling these information.  

In  practice,  however,  the  2006  Swedish  Framework  Decision  is  unclear,  thereby  hampering 
the  full  implementation  of  the  principles  of  availability/equivalent  access  of  relevant 
information in a cross-border context17. As a consequence, rules at national level continue to 
impede  the  flow  of  information  despite  the  efforts  made  to  complement  the  Swedish 
requirements  by  means  of  Council  non-binding  guidance18.  
Framework  Decision 

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COM(2020) 262 final, 24.6.2020. 
OJ L 386, 29.12.2006, p. 89–100.  
OJ L 239, 22.9.2000, p. 19–62. 
These  outstanding  issues  have  notably  been  highlighted  in  the  Schengen  evaluations  in  the  field  of 
police  cooperation.  These  country  report  evaluations  underline  the  existence  of  diverging  practices 
depending  on  the  other  State  party.  They  also  cover  relevant  Council  guidance  papers  and  the  police 
cooperation chapter of the  1990 Convention Implementing the  Schengen  Agreement and their related 
bi/multilateral agreements. 
For example: Council doc. 5825/20 of 2/12/2020, Manual on Law Enforcement Information Exchange. 

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Consequently,  the  current  uncertainties  would  remain  and  continue  to  negatively  affect  the 
effective and efficient sharing of information, thereby leaving the impacts in the evolution of 
the EU security landscape and in the increased cross-border mobility essentially unaddressed. 

For  this  reason,  establishing  a  legal  framework  by  means  of  a  Directive  for  these  purposes 
will  allow  a  better  monitoring  and  enforcement  of  rules  at  EU  and  national  levels,  while 
ensuring  a  convergence  of  national  practices,  thereby  improving  the  effectiveness  and 
efficiency of information flows between Member States. 

(2)  Lack  of  common  structures  and  efficient  management  tools  for  exchanging 

information 

The  second  objective  of  this  proposal  for  a  Directive  is  to  approximate  common 
minimum standards with a view to ensuring an efficient and effective functioning of the 
Single  Points  of  Contact.  These  common  minimum  requirements  cover  the  composition, 
structures, responsibilities, staffing and technical capabilities. 

Member States are responsible for the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of 
internal security19. They are in principle free to organise their law enforcement authorities and 
services as they see fit. When it comes to law enforcement cooperation structures, all Member 
States have set up or are in the process of setting up a Single Point of Contact20 competent for 
channelling  as  much  information  exchange  as  possible.  Based  on  national  law  or  internal 
rules,  law  enforcement  authorities  may  also  exchange  information  directly  between 
themselves. Although different manuals and national factsheets have been produced in order 
to facilitate a harmonised approach to the way national Single Points of Contact are organised, 
there  are  still  significant  differences  across  Member  States  as  regards  their  structures, 
functions, means and capabilities.  

As  a  result,  Member  States  do  not  always  have  the  necessary  structures  in  place  to 
exchange  information  effectively  and  efficiently  with  other  Member  States.  National 
Single Points of Contact do not always play their coordination role and can lack resources to 
face the increasing number of requests. 

Notably, they are not always equipped with the necessary information management tools (for 
example,  a  case  management  system  with  a  common  dashboard  and  automatic  data  upload 
and cross-check). Additionally, the Single Points of Contact do not always have direct and 
user-friendly  access  to  all  relevant  EU  and  international  databases  and  platforms. 
Moreover, some Single Points of Contact have limited access to relevant national databases, 
which further delays the overall information exchange process. Furthermore, the Single Points 
of  Contact  can  lack  resources  to  timely  and  effectively  address  the  increasing  number  of 
requests  received.  Indeed,  this  rising  trend  has  not  always  been  accompanied  by  a 
proportionate increase of human and IT resources.  

A modern information management architecture, already in use in some 'advanced' Single 
Points of Contact, can alleviate tensions on limited human resources through the integration 
of  information  held  by  competent  authorities  in  their  respective  databases,  thereby  also 
monitoring  and  tracking  the  deadline  for  answers  to  information  requests21.  Databases 

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Article 72 TFEU. 
The Single Point of Contact is the national information hub centralising the reception, processing and 
the  sending of the information to other countries. It gathers under the same  management structure  all 
main  international  and  EU  law  enforcement  communication  channels  (INTERPOL,  Europol  and 
SIRENE). 
See the Impact Assessment accompanying this proposal. 

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available at Single Points of Contact are not always used to their full potential either because 
of  rudimentary  search  tools,  preventing  the  adoption  of  transliteration22  techniques  and 
"fuzzy  logic"23  search  functions.  The  lack  of  transliteration  and  fuzzy  logic  search  options 
within information systems prevents officials from getting exhaustive results (hits) through a 
unique query. As a result, officials have to carry out a new search for each personal detail they 
are  investigating,  resulting  in  an  increased  workload,  which  slows  down  the  search  process 
(for example, inversion of first and last name, different spelling used for the same individual 
notably stemming from different languages, alphabets and diacritic accents). 

At  present,  deadlines  are  almost  always  exceeded  when  a  judicial  authorisation  is  required. 
The functional availability of a judicial authority, as it is already the case in more effective 
and efficient Single Points of Contact, will contribute to alleviate undue delays. Indeed, cases 
requiring a judicial authorisation can be handled more swiftly than what is currently the case, 
meaning that deadlines can be more readily met also in these cases. 

(3)  Lack  of  common  practice  in  the  use  of  existing  communication  channel(s)  to 

exchange information within the EU 

The  third  objective  of  this  proposal  for  a  Directive  is  to  remedy  the  proliferation  of 
communication  channels  used  for  law  enforcement  information  exchange  between 
Member States while reinforcing Europol’s role as the EU criminal information hub for 
offences falling within its mandate. 

Besides  a  number  of  system-specific  cases  regulated  by  EU  law  (i.e.  requests  for 
supplementary  information  related  to  SIS  alerts  must  be  made  via  SIRENE  Bureaux24,  and 
information exchange with Europol usually via ENUs25), Member States have not agreed on a 
single  channel  of information exchange between  their law enforcement authorities for cases 
with  an  EU  dimension,  leading  to  duplication  of  requests,  undue  delays  and  occasional 
information loss.  

As  a  result,  Member  States  use  different  channels  to  different  extents  to  request,  send 
and  receive  information,  often  without  any  clear,  pre-defined  rationale26,  which  hampers 
effective and efficient exchange of information.  This also deprives national authorities from 
Europol's  support  even  though  Member  States  call  on  the  Agency  to  be  an  EU  criminal 
information hub able to deliver qualitative information-led products. 

Single  Points  of  Contact  do  not  always  ensure  the  monitoring  of  existing  channels  24/7 
resulting  in  possible  negative  impacts  on  cross-border  cases  requiring  urgent  information 
sharing.  At  the  same  time,  Europol's  Secure  Information  Exchange  Network  Application 
(hereinafter  'SIENA')  is  being  underused  in  spite  of  its  tailored  features  and  strong  data 
security infrastructure. Even when Member States do use SIENA, they do not always involve 

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Transliteration  is  the  process  of  representing  words/names  from  one  language  using  the  alphabet  or 
writing system of another language (multilingual name recognition). E.g. the letter "o" can be 'ò', 'ó', 'ô, 
'õ', 'ö', 'ø' depending on the language/alphabet used. 
A  fuzzy  database  is  a  database  which  is  able  to  deal  with  uncertain  or  incomplete  information  using 
fuzzy logic. i.e. the ability to find matches even when a person' name is misspelled. 
The exchange of supplementary information related to SIS alerts must be done via a single network of 
national offices called SIRENE Bureaux. 
Europol National Unit. Information exchange with Europol must be done via ENUs using SIENA. 
A number of national SPOCs use internal guidelines recommending or requiring the specific use of a 
communication channel for specific purpose, thereby ensuring consistency and avoiding duplication of 
requests.  However,  other  SPOCs  rely  on  officers'  habits  and  preferences,  such  leeway  resulting  in 
inefficiencies in a cross-border investigation context. 

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(by  copying  in)  Europol,  even  though  the  information  exchanged  falls  within  its  mandate. 
This can create significant information gaps at EU level. 

• 

Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area 

The  present  proposal  is  consistent  with  existing  and  upcoming  policy  provisions  in  the 
domain  of  law  enforcement  cooperation.  Law  enforcement  cooperation  is  an  area  of  shared 
competence between the EU and the Member States.  In  recent  years, progress  was made to 
improve the exchange of information cooperation between Member States and to close down 
the  space  in  which  terrorists  and  serious  criminals  operate.  The  legislative  framework  on 
counterterrorism and information exchange was strengthened in the aftermath of the terrorist 
attacks in Europe. Following the migration crisis of 2015, the general architecture of Justice 
and Home Affairs (JHA) information systems and databases was overhauled with a focus on 
interoperability27  and  dynamic  convergence  between  security,  borders  and  migration 
management. Moreover, greater cooperation between law enforcement bodies was promoted 
at EU level through the publication of (non-binding) Council recommendations and guidelines 
seeking to facilitate the convergence of national practices. 

As the two legs of law enforcement cooperation essentially relate to (i) information exchange 
(which is the focus of the present proposal), and (ii) operational cross-border cooperation, the 
present proposal will form part of a coherent package with the accompanying proposal for a 
Council  Recommendation  on  aspects  of  cross-border  operational  police  cooperation.  This 
package is complemented with the parallel proposal for a Regulation revising the Automated 
Data Exchange Mechanism for Police Cooperation ("Prüm II"). The "Prüm II" proposal will 
aim at strengthening the technical architecture of the Prüm exchange, broadening its scope of 
data  categories  and  streamlining  and  accelarating  its  post-hit  data  exchange.  The  reinforced 
"Prüm II" proposal would provide specific rules and possibilities for the automated exchange 
of  specific  –  and  particularly  important  –  data  categories  (for  example,  fingerprints,  DNA, 
facial  images)  within  the  overall  framework  and  general  rules  for  general  information 
exchange that this Directive will provide. 

As  an  important  measure  to  enhance  security  within  the  EU,  the  present  proposal  will  also 
contribute  to  a  fully  functioning  and  resilient  Schengen  area  as  set  out  in  the  Schengen 
Strategy. This proposal is also in full coherence with the 2020 proposal revising the Europol 
mandate28 with a view to strenghening the agency's mandate on processing large and complex 
datasets  as  well  as  with  the  European  Production  and  Preservation  Orders  for  electronic 
evidence  in  criminal  matters29.  The  proposal  complements  the  legal  framework30  on  the 

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Regulation  (EU)  2019/817  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  20  May  2019  on 
establishing  a  framework  for  interoperability  between  the  EU  information  systems  in  the  field  of 
borders and visa and amending Regulations (EC) No 767/2008, (EU) 2016/399, (EU) 2017/2226, (EU) 
2018/1240, (EU) 2018/1726 and (EU) 2018/1861 of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
Council Decisions 2004/512/EC and 2008/633/JHA [2019] OJ L 135/27; Regulation (EU) 2019/818 of 
the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  20  May  2019  on  establishing  a  framework  for 
interoperability  between  the  EU  information  systems  in  the  field  of  police  and  judicial  cooperation, 
asylum and migration and amending Regulations (EU) 2018/1726, (EU) 2018/1862 and (EU) 2019/816 
[2019] OJ L 135/85. 
COM/2020/796 final. 
COM/2018/225 final - 2018/0108 (COD). 
OJ L 312, 7.12.2018,  p. 1–13. Regulation 2018/1860 on the use  of the  Schengen  Information System 
for the return of illegally staying third-country  nationals; Regulation 2018/1861 on the establishment, 
operation  and  use  of  the  Schengen  Information  System  (SIS)  in  the  field  of  border  checks,  and 
amending  the  Convention  implementing  the  Schengen  Agreement,  and  amending  and  repealing 
Regulation  No  1987/2006;  Regulation  2018/1862  on  the  establishment,  operation  and  use  of  the 
Schengen  Information  System  (SIS)  in  the  field  of  police  cooperation  and  judicial  cooperation  in 

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exchange of information on alerts in the SIS through the SIRENE Bureaux.  This proposal is 
without prejudice to all those other acts of Union law, as well as other ones such as Directive 
2019/1153  of  20  June  2019  laying  down  rules  facilitating  the  use  of  financial  and  other 
information  for  the  prevention,  detection,  investigation  or  prosecution  of  certain  criminal 
offences, and repealing Council Decision 2000/642/JHA for the purpose of facilitating access 
to and the use of financial information and bank account information by competent authorities 
for the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of serious criminal offences31.  

• 

Consistency with other Union policies 

The  present  proposal  aims  to  contribute  positively  to  a  fully  functioning  and  resilient 
Schengen  area,  allowing  more  people  to  move  freely,  and  goods  and  services  to  flow 
unhindered,  which  in  turn  contributes  to  the  efficient  functioning  of  the  Single  Market,  and 
thus to the growth of the Union's economy. The present proposal is therefore fully consistent 
with  other  Union  policies  in  the  field  of  employment,  transport,  and  ultimately  economic 
growth in intra-EU border regions, but also across the entire EU. 

2. 

• 

LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY 

Legal basis 

The legal basis for EU action in the field of intra-EU law enforcement cooperation is Title V, 
Chapter  5  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  (TFEU).  Pursuant  to 
Article  87  TFEU:  "the  Union  shall  establish  police  cooperation  involving  all  the  Member 
States'  competent  authorities, 
law 
enforcement  services  in  relation  to  the  prevention,  detection  and  investigation  of  criminal 
offences".  More  specifically,  Article  87(2)(a)  TFEU  relates  to  measures  concerning  the 
collection,  storage,  processing,  analysis  and  exchange  of  information  relevant  for  the 
prevention, detection and investigation of criminal offences. The present legal proposal is to 
be adopted according to the ordinary legislative procedure. 

including  police,  customs  and  other  specialised 

• 

Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence)  

EU  action  is  needed  to  properly  address  the  problems  identified  in  the  first  section  of  this 
explanatory  memorandum.  The  objective  of  improving  information  flows  between  relevant 
law enforcement authorities and with Europol cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States  acting  alone.  Owing  to  the  cross-border  nature  of  crime  and  terrorism,  the  Member 
States are obliged to rely on one another. Hence, the establishment of common rules for the 
exchange of information can be better achieved at the Union level. Despite the existence of a 
number of national and regional measures in place, Member States alone would not be able to 
ensure  the  full  implementation  of  the  principles  of  availability  and  of  equivalent  access  to 
information. If acting alone and on the basis of national schemes, Member States would not 
overcome current differences among Single Points of Contact, which hinder the efficient and 
effective  exchange  of  relevant  information  across  borders.  They  would  not  ensure  an 
appropriate and uniform level of knowledge of, and capacity in, the use of relevant databases 
and communication channels. 

The EU is better equipped than individual Member States to ensure the coherence of actions 
taken  at  national  level,  address  the  divergence  of  national  practices,  prevent  duplications, 
overlaps and uncertainties and eventually facilitate an efficient counter-action to cross-border 

criminal  matters,  amending  and  repealing  Council  Decision  2007/533/JHA,  and  repealing  Regulation 
No 1986/2006 and Commission Decision 2010/261/EU, as amended.  
OJ L 186, 11.7.2019, p. 122–137. 

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crime and terrorism.  EU action, in  response to  the identified problems, is expected to  bring 
added value for the entire EU, and therefore to its citizens, as it will render more resilient and 
robust the Schengen area, with a ripple effect on Schengen Associated Countries32. Common 
EU level rules, standards and requirements facilitating information exchange on cross-border 
crime between law enforcement authorities will generate significant economies of scale while 
ensuring high-level data security and data protection standards.  
Law  enforcement  cooperation  at  EU  level  does  not  replace  national  policies  on  internal 
security. It does not substitute the work of national law enforcement authorities. Instead, EU 
level  action  supports  and  reinforces  national  security  policies  and  the  work  of  national  law 
enforcement authorities against cross-border crime and terrorism.  

• 

Proportionality 

The present proposal aims to consolidate the EU legal framework in a single legal instrument 
on  information  exchange  through  the  'lisbonisation'  of  the  Swedish  Framework  Decision.  It 
also contains provisions stemming from a set of Council non-binding guidelines adopted over 
the past  15  years. Considering the call of the co-legislator and the willingness  expressed by 
Member States in the consultation phase, this proposal for a Directive addresses the identified 
problems without going beyond what is strictly necessary to achieve the objective of ensuring 
effective and efficient information flows between Member States. 

Choice of the instrument 

• 
Building on previous relevant Council Conclusions33, the present Commission proposal for a 
Directive aims to achieve effective and efficient information flows between law enforcement 
authorities of the Member States, by means of a substantial approximation of Member States' 
legislation  concerning  information  exchange  and  communication.  Its  provisions  ensure  the 
respect of the conferral of powers as well as the differences in the legal systems and traditions 
of the Member States, as  acknowledged  by the  Treaties.  In light  of the above, the proposed 
legal proposal takes the form of a Directive.  

3. 

• 

RESULTS 
CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS 

EX-POST 

EVALUATIONS, 

OF 

STAKEHOLDER 

Stakeholder consultations 

The  consultation  involved  relevant  stakeholders  from  a  wide  range  of  subject  matters, 
national  police,  customs, judicial and data protection  authorities, civil  society organisations, 
academia,  and  from  members  of  the  public  on  their  expectations  and  concerns  relating  to 
strengthening law enforcement cooperation in the EU34. 

The  Commission  used  different  means  of  engagement  such  as  targeted  questionnaires, 
experts'  interviews,  focus  groups,  case-studies,  and  organised  thematic  workshops  with 
Member States and Schengen Associated Countries' representatives. The subject matters and 
the  policy  options  presented  in  the  Impact  Assessment  accompanying  the  present  proposal 
were  also  discussed  within  the  relevant  Council's  Working  Parties  (for  example,  Law 
Enforcement  Working  Party/Police,  Law  Enforcement  Working  Party/Customs,  Standing 
Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security). 

32 
33 
34 

Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. 
Council Conclusions on Internal Security and European Police Partnership, 13083/1/20. 
An  exhaustive  presentation  of  the  stakeholder  consultations  is  found  in  the  Impact  Assessment 
accompanying the present proposal. 

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In  addition,  in  line  with  the  Better  Regulation  Guidelines35,  the  Commission  launched  a 
Public Consultation. The results of the consultation activities (20 answers) have been duly 
taken into account in the preparation of the present proposal36.  

• 

Collection and use of expertise 

Numerous  consultation  activities  –  such  as  scoping  interviews,  questionnaires  and  online 
surveys, semi-structured interviews, case-studies and focus groups – were also conducted by 
the  contractor  during  the  preparation  of  a  'Study  to  support  the  preparation  of  an  impact 
assessment on EU policy initiatives facilitating cross-border law enforcement cooperation'.  

• 

Impact assessment 

In line with  the Better Regulation guidelines, an Impact  Assessment  was carried out  for the 
preparation  of  the  present  legislative  proposal.  Based  on  its  findings,  the  Commission 
identified  three  main  problems  which  corresponds  to  three  main  specific  objectives  of  the 
present  proposal (as  mentioned above). Correspondingly, three policy options with  different 
degrees  of  intervention  were  considered  for  potentially  achieving  each  of  the  specific 
objectives37. 

Specific  objective  1:  Facilitate  equivalent  access  for  law  enforcement  authorities  to 
information  held  in  another  Member  State,  while  complying  with  fundamental  rights, 
including data protection requirements. 

Through:  

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

ensuring  alignment  of  the  provisions  currently  contained  in  the  2006 SFD  with  the 
2016 Data Protection Law Enforcement Directive; 

developing a set of new flanking ‘soft’ measures, such as training and Commission 
guidance on specific aspects law enforcement information exchange, as appropriate; 

improving the clarity of the SFD provisions. This is done through a clarification on 
the SFD scope and a simplification of its use. Commission guidance on the national 
datasets  available  in  each  Member  States  for  possible  exchange  may  also  be 
developed to further improve implementation, as appropriate; 

facilitating  compliance  with  deadlines  requirements  by  which  information  is  to  be 
made available to  another Member State, including when a judicial authorisation  is 
required.  

Specific objective 2: Ensure that all Member States have an effective functioning Single Point 
of Contact, including when a judicial authorisation is required to provide information upon 
request of another Member State. 

Through: 

(1) 

(2) 

developing a new set of flanking ‘soft’ measures, such as training, financial support 
and Commission guidance of relevance, as appropriate; 

establishing minimum common requirements on the composition of the Single Points 
of  Contact  (including  when  a  judicial  authorisation  is  required),  their  functions, 
staffing, capabilities. 

35 
36 
37 

SWD (2017) 350, 7.7.2017. 
EU police cooperation code – tackling cross-border serious & organised crime (europa.eu) 
See Impact Assessment accompanying this proposal. 

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Specific  objective  3:  Remedy  the  proliferation  of  communication  channels  used  for  law 
enforcement information exchange between Member States, while reinforcing Europol’s role 
as the EU criminal information hub for offences falling within its mandate.  

Through: 

(1) 

(2) 

developing  new  set  of  flanking  ‘soft’  measures,  such  as  training,  financial  support 
and Commission guidance on information sharing, as appropriate; 

requiring  Member  States  to  use  SIENA  for  all  bi-  and  multilateral  information 
exchanges under the proposed Directive after a necessary transition period ensuring 
the full roll-out of SIENA. 

These  measures  will  streamline,  clarify,  develop  and  modernise  cross-border  law 
enforcement  cooperation,  while  better  safeguarding  fundamental  rights  in  particular  as 
regards  the  protection  of  personal  data  (as  explained  below).  It  will  also  step  up  Europol 
support  to  Member  States  in  countering  evolving  threats.  The  preferred  policy  option  will 
ensure  a  strong  convergence  of  national  practices  regarding  the  effective  and  efficient 
functionning of Single Point of Contact, through common minimum standards. 

The  most  positive  impacts  of  the  preferred  policy  option  are  expected  to  stem  from 
establishing the Single Point of Contact as a "one-stop shop" for law enforcement cooperation 
in  all  Member  States.  The  establishment  of  Europol  SIENA  as  the  default  channel  of 
communication will add to the streamlining of law enforcement information exchange, while 
ensuring the convergence of information at Europol, and the security of such information (and 
personal data). The preferred policy option also contains flanking measures such as relevant 
trainings  and  financial  support,  key  enablers  to  achieving  the  specific  objectives  presented 
above.  The  preferred  option  reflects  the  best  cumulative  impacts  as  regards  to  relevance, 
added  value,  effectiveness,  efficiency,  coherence  and  proportionality.  It  draws  lessons  from 
the  past  and,  at  the  same  time,  is  sufficiently  ambitious.  The  preferred  option  takes  duly 
account  of  the  views  expressed  by  the  Member  States  while  responding  to  the  legitimate 
expectations of the EU citizens and businesses. In doing so, the preferred option contributes to 
the effective and efficient functioning of the Schengen area. 

• 

Fundamental rights 

The  Impact  Assessment  accompanying  the  present  proposal  analysed  the  effects  that  each 
policy options, including the measures envisaged by this proposal for a Directive, potentially 
have  on  fundamental  rights  of  citizens.  By  definition,  any  policy  options  addressing 
information  sharing  between  law  enforcement  authorities,  have  an  impact  on  the  right  to 
protection of personal data, as provided for by Article 8 of Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the EU (hereinafter: Charter) and Article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union. 

The  policy  options  also  have  a  potential  impact  on  other  fundamental  rights,  such  as  those 
protected  by  Articles  2  (Right  to  life),  3  (Right  to  the  integrity  of  the  person),  6  (Right  to 
liberty and security), 17 (Right to property) and 45 (Freedom of movement and of residence) 
of  the  Charter.  The  Impact  Assessment  considered  that  the  chosen  policy  options  are 
proportionate  since  they  are  limited  to  what  is  strictly  necessary  to  meet  the  objective  of 
safeguarding the internal security in the Schengen area while protecting the free movement of 
persons38.  

38 

See Impact Assessment accompanying this proposal. 

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Furthermore,  the  alignment  of  the  relevant  rules  on  exchanges  of  information  for  law 
enforcement  purposes  with  the  subsequently  adopted  and  applicable  rules  on  processing 
personal  data  for  law  enforcement  purposes  (pursuant  to  the  2016  Law  Enforcement  Data 
Protection  Directive;  hereinafter:  LED39)  are  expected  to  positively  impact  safeguarding 
citizens'  fundamental  rights.  The  use  of  SIENA  as  the  communication  channel  will  also 
enhance  the  security  of  the  personal  data  processing  systems  and  their  overall  protection 
against possible abuses. As the LED provides and ensures the required level of personal data 
protection in the Union, there is  no need to go beyond it. Instead, the alignment will ensure 
full consistency with the EU personal data protection rules, including those contained in the 
LED.  In  this  manner,  effect  is  given  to  the  Commission’s  commitment  contained  in  a  2020 
Communication  to  "make  a  legislative  proposal,  which  as  a  minimum  will  entail  an 
amendment  of  Council  Framework  Decision  2006/960/JHA  to  ensure  the  necessary  data 
protection alignment, in the last quarter of 2021"40.  

4. 

BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS 

While highly depending from the specificities of each national IT set-up and legal parameters, 
an  estimation  of  possible  costs  has  been  provided  by  Europol  and  reported  in  the  Impact 
Assessment accompanying this proposal. The necessary IT upgrades in both Single Points of 
Contact  and  Police  and  Customs  Cooperation  Centres41  were  estimated  to  amount  to  a 
maximum one-off total of EUR 11,5 million. These are deemed to be divided as follows: 

– 

– 

– 

– 

1,5 million to set-up Case Management Systems (CMS) in 10 MS (not yet equipped); 

1 million to integrate SIENA in the CMS of the Single Points of Contacts of 20 MS 
(not yet equipped); 

2,25 million to establish connection of Police and Customs Cooperation Centres with 
SIENA in a maximum of 45 Police and Customs Cooperation Centres (14 out of 59 
are already connected); 

6,75 million to set-up CMSs in a maximum of 45 Police and Customs Cooperation 
Centres (45x EUR 150.000). 

These costs (one-off investment) are deemed acceptable and proportionate to the identified 
problem and do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the specific objectives set out by 
this proposal for a Directive. It should be noted that Member States are in any case pursuing a 
modernisation  of  their  IT  systems  (also  in  the  context  of  the  interoperability  of  EU 
information systems). This provides a good opportunity for cost effective implementation of 
the  changes  envisaged  by  the  provision  of  this  proposal.  These  estimations  do  not  cover 
training needs since, especially for IT upgrades, the training costs are highly depending from 
the specificities of each national IT set-up and legal parameters.  

In  any  event,  the  costs  at  national  level  should  be  covered  by  Member  States'  programmes 
under the Internal Security Fund42. The Internal Security Fund includes the specific objective 
to "improve and facilitate the exchange of information" and to "improve and intensify cross-
border  cooperation"43.  When  preparing  their  national  programmes,  Member  States  are  thus 

39 
40 
41 

42 
43 

Directive (EU) 2016/680, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016. 
COM(2020)262, Way forward on aligning the former third pillar acquis with data protection rules. 
Police and Customs Cooperation Centres are regional information hubs set up in border regions of two 
or  more  Member  States.  They  are  composed  by  personnel  of  law  enforcement  authorities  from  these 
Member States. So far, 59 Police and Customs Cooperation Centres have been set up across Europe. 
Regulation (EU) 2021/1149. 
See Articles 3(2)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1149. 

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11 

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invited to include activities relevant for the implementation of the envisaged Directive, with 
explicit reference to  Single Points  of Contact and  Police and Customs Cooperation Centres, 
and the connection to SIENA. As some Member States are more advanced than others in their 
level  of  cooperation,  the  cost  of  implementing  the  proposed  Directive  will  vary  between 
Member States. 

Apart from  the  costs potentially covered by Member States’ programmes under the  Internal 
Security Fund, there will be no other costs borne at EU level. 

5. 

• 

OTHER ELEMENTS 

Implementation plans and monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements 

The  evaluation  of  impacts  of  the  proposed  measures  depends  on  the  information  to  be 
received from the Member States. For this reason, the present  proposal  contains  provisions 
on  collection  of  data  indicators.  The  responsibility  for  the  collection  of  the  relevant 
monitoring  data  should  be  in  the  remit  of  national  authorities,  ideally  the  Single  Points  of 
Contact. Subsequently, the monitoring  of these activity indicators will be used to inform on 
the application of the proposed measures.  

In  this  connection,  the  present  proposal  requires  the  Commission  to  submit  a  report  to  the 
European  Parliament  and  to  the  Council,  assessing  the  extent  to  which  the  Member  States 
have  taken  the  necessary  measures  to  comply  with  this  proposed  Directive.  The  relevant 
article also requires the Commission to submit a report to the European Parliament and to the 
Council  assessing  the  added  value  of  the  Directive,  5  years  after  the  entry  into  force,  and 
consider a possible review of the Directive upon relevance. 

Aside  from  this  legal  proposal,  the  Commission,  acting  by  virtue  of  its  administrative 
autonomy,  will  set  up  an  informal  expert  group  composed  of  experts  from  each  Member 
State,  to  advise  and  support  the  Commission  in  the  monitoring  and  application  of  the 
Directive,  including  in  the  preparation  of  Commission  guidance  papers.  This  expert  group 
could be built upon the existing informal Head of the Single Points of Contact' network. Last 
but  not  least,  the  evaluation  and  monitoring  mechanism  to  verify  the  application  of  the 
Schengen acquis in the field of police cooperation will continue to be carried out, in line with 
the current Council Regulation44, and eventually in line with its possible amendment45. These 
evaluation  reports  have  so  far  covered  the  implementation  of  the  Swedish  Framework 
Decision. Future evaluations will encompass the application of the envisaged new Directive. 

• 

Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the proposal 

This legislative proposal for a Directive is structured in six chapters:  

(1) 

law 
General  provisions  for 
enforcement  authorities  for  the  purpose  of  preventing,  detecting  and  investigating 
criminal offences (Art. 1 to Art. 3) 

information  exchange  between  Member  States' 

The first block of provisions builds on the structure and substance of the Swedish Framework 
Decision  in  force  since  2006.  In  addition,  it  brings  its  scope  and  contents  in  line  with  the 
provisions concerning police cooperation (Title V, Chapter 4) as introduced by the Treaty of 
Lisbon in force since 2009.  

44 
45 

OJ L 295, 6.11.2013, p. 27–37. 
Commission proposal for a Council regulation on the establishment and operation of an evaluation and 
monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis and repealing Regulation (EU) 
1053/2013, 2 June 2021. 

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Article 1 defines the scope of application of the horizontal rules for exchanging information 
for the purposes of preventing, detecting or investigating criminal offences. The provisions of 
this Directive apply unless otherwise regulated by other, specific acts of EU law.  

Article 2 defines a number of key terms, such as the authorities subject to the horizontal rules 
on  information  exchange,  the  criminal  offences  concerned  and  the  type  of  information 
available to law enforcement authorities.  

Article  3  outlines  three  principles  that  must  be  respected  when  exchanging  information 
between  the  Member  States  under  the  Directive:  the  principle  of  equivalent  access 
establishing  that  substantially  the  same  conditions  must  exist  for  information  exchanges 
within a Member State and between Member States; the principle of availability stating that if 
information  is  available  concerning  a  criminal  offence  in  a  Member  State,  this  must,  as  a 
general  rule,  be  made  available  to  other  Member  States  as  well;  and  the  principle  of 
confidentiality  guaranteeing  that  Member  States  respect  each  other’s  confidentiality 
requirements when treating such information by ensuring a similar level of protection. 

(2) 

Exchange of information through the Single Point of Contact (Art. 4 to Art. 6) 

Article  4  sets  out  a  number  of  requirements  regarding  requests  for  information  sent  to  the 
Single  Point  of  Contact.  This  notably  concerns  criteria  justifying  the  request  and  qualifying 
urgency. The request is to be submitted by the Single Point of Contact of other Member States 
or,  where  a  Member  State  decides  so,  by  other  law  enforcement  authorities.  The  language 
used  for  the  request  must  be  chosen  among  a  list  of  languages  that  each  Member  States  is 
obliged to establish and that is to be published in the Official Journal of the EU.  

Article 5 establishes the obligation for the Single Point of Contact receiving the requests for 
information referred to in Article 4 to process and respond to the requests within precise time 
limits,  which  may  be  derogated  from  only  in  certain  narrowly  specified  circumstances, 
namely, when a judicial authorisation is required. Such provision of information will have to 
be done in the same language used for the request.  

Article 6 lays down an exhaustive list of grounds that the Single Point of Contact may invoke, 
where objectively justified, to refuse the disclosure of the requested information, of which the 
relevant authority of the requesting Member State must be promptly informed. The possibility 
for  the  Single  Point  of  Contact  to  seek  clarifications  as  to  the  content  of  the  requests  is 
foreseen,  which  will  suspend  the  applicable  time  limits,  yet  only  if  the  clarifications  are 
objectively necessary to avoid the request being refused. In respect of other clarifications that 
may be deemed necessary, there will be no such suspension. 

(3) 

Other exchanges of information (Art. 7 to Art. 8) 

Article  7  establishes  the  obligation  for  Member  States  to  share  information  with  another 
(other) Member State(s) spontaneously, i.e. on the relevant authority’s own initiative without 
a request for information having been submitted,  when that information is likely to assist in 
achieving one of the purposes specified in the Directive. 

Article 8 ensures that the relevant Single Points of Contact are kept informed of any exchange 
of information upon request, other than requests submitted to the Single Point of Contact, i.e. 
either  information  exchanges  upon  request  handled  directly  between  law  enforcement 
authorities of different Member States or upon requests for information submitted by a Single 
Point  of  Contact  to  a  law  enforcement  authority  of  another  Member  State.  This  includes 
relevant  information  exchanges  by  Police  and  Customs  Cooperation  Centres  and  any  other 
equivalent bodies, in as far as they qualify as law enforcement authorities under the proposed 
Directive. 

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(4) 

Additional rules on the provision of information under Chapter II and III (Art. 9 to 
Art. 13) 

Article  9  addresses  situations  where,  under  the  national  law  of  the  Member  State  to  which 
relevant information is available, a judicial authorisation is required for the provision of that 
information, either upon request or spontaneously and either by the Single Point of Contact or 
by  a  law  enforcement  authority.  This  provision  gives  effect  to  and  further  specifies  the 
principle  of  equivalent  access,  meaning  that  substantially  the  same  conditions  must  apply 
when the requested information is subject to judicial authorisation, regardless of the fact that 
the information  is  to  be provided to  an authority of another Member State rather than to  an 
authority of the same Member State. This article also establishes that the authority concerned 
must  immediately  take  all  necessary  steps,  both  practically  and  legally,  in  accordance  with 
their national law, to obtain such judicial authorisation as soon as possible.  

Article  10  sets  out  certain  requirements  aimed  at  ensuring  adequate  protection  of  personal 
data, resulting in particular from the alignment with the rules of the LED. 

Article 11 regulates the language to be used by Single Points of Contact and law enforcement 
authorities in the situations specified in this Directive, both as regards the actual provision of 
information  and  any  other  communications  related  thereto.  No  such  language  requirements 
apply to the direct information exchanges and other communications referred to in Article 8.  
Member  States  are  to  establish  a  list  of  languages  acceptable  to  them,  which  should  also 
include English. Such lists must be published by the Commission in the Official Journal of the 
EU.  

Article  12  introduces  the  obligation  for  the  Single  Point  Contact  as  well  as  all  other  law 
enforcement  authorities  to  systematically  keep  informed  Europol  (meaning  'put  in  copy'), 
insofar  as  the  exchanges  concern  crimes  falling  under  the  scope  of  Europol’s  mandate  as 
specified in its basic act. This obligation ensures that Europol can fulfil its role of information 
hub in the EU in relation to information relevant for law enforcement purposes. 

Article 13 requires all relevant authorities to use – and, to that aim, be directly connected to – 
the Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA), managed by Europol, for all 
exchanges of information and related communications covered by the Directive. These rules 
on  the  mandatory  use  of  SIENA  do  not  apply  where  specific  acts  of  Union  law  contain 
different requirements on the communication channel to be used, for instance for information 
exchanges  governed  by  the  SIS  Regulation46,  given  that  exchanges  under  such  specific  acts 
are excluded from the scope of this Directive.  

(5) 

Minimum requirements on establishing a Single Point of Contact as a central entity 
to coordinate information exchange between Member States (Art. 14 to Art. 16) 

The fifth block of provisions sets out and builds on the obligation for each Member State to 
establish or designate a Single Point of Contact as the central entity coordinating information 
exchanges between its law enforcement authorities and those of other Member States within 

46 

OJ L 312, 7.12.2018,  p. 1–13. Regulation 2018/1860 on the use  of the  Schengen Information System 
for the return of illegally staying third-country  nationals; Regulation 2018/1861 on the establishment, 
operation  and  use  of  the  Schengen  Information  System  (SIS)  in  the  field  of  border  checks,  and 
amending  the  Convention  implementing  the  Schengen  Agreement,  and  amending  and  repealing 
Regulation  No  1987/2006;  Regulation  2018/1862  on  the  establishment,  operation  and  use  of  the 
Schengen  Information  System  (SIS)  in  the  field  of  police  cooperation  and  judicial  cooperation  in 
criminal  matters,  amending  and  repealing  Council  Decision  2007/533/JHA,  and  repealing  Regulation 
No 1986/2006 and Commission Decision 2010/261/EU, as amended. 

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the  scope  of  the  Directive.  It  lays  out  a  number  of  minimum  requirements  that  any  Single 
Point of Contact must comply with. 

Article 14 sets out the tasks and capabilities of the Single Point of Contact. In order to carry 
out  its  functions, the Single Point of Contact  is  to  have  access  to  the  necessary information 
and be kept systematically informed of all direct information exchanges between its national 
authorities and those of the other Member States. The actual establishment or designation of 
the  Single  Points  of  Contact  must  be  notified,  within  a  set  time  period,  to  the  Commission, 
which must then publish such notifications in the Official Journal of the EU. 

Article 15 establishes minimum requirements regarding the composition of the Single Point of 
Contact,  leaving  a  degree  of  flexibility  to  each  Member  State  to  determine  its  precise 
organisation  and  composition  as  deemed  most  appropriate  depending  on  its  national 
circumstances, provided the requirements of the Directive are met. 

Article  16  defines  minimum  requirements  for  the  Case  Management  System  of  the  Single 
Points of Contact. 

(6) 

Final provisions 

The  final  provisions  ensure  that  the  implementation  of  the  proposed  Directive  is  properly 
monitored.  Firstly,  by  the  Member  States,  through  the  obligation  to  collect  and  provide  a 
minimum set of statistical data on a yearly basis (Article 17). Secondly, by the Commission, 
through  the  obligation  to  report  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council,  having  regard 
inter alia to the data provided by Member States, thus allowing, thirdly, those two institutions 
to monitor the Directive’s implementation as well (Article 18).  

Finally, Articles 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 deal with a number of necessary legal-technical issues, 
namely, the deletion or repeal of pre-existing rules which the rules of the proposed Directive 
replace, transposition into national law, as well as entry into force and addressees. As regards 
the  existing  rules  contained  in  the  CISA  (Article  19),  Article  39  thereof  is  replaced  only 
insofar  as  it  relates  to  information  exchange  for  the  purpose  specified  in  the  proposed 
Directive. Article 39 continues to be applicable to other forms of police cooperation covered 
by  that  article.  In  contrast,  Article  46  of  the  CISA,  which  specifically  relates  to  such 
information exchange, is fully superseded by the proposed Directive and is therefore deleted.  

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2021/0411 (COD) 

Proposal for a 

DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 

on information exchange between law enforcement authorities of Member States, 
repealing Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA 

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 

Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union,  and  in  particular 
Article 87(2), point (a), thereof, 

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission, 

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments, 

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, 

Whereas:  

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

47 

48 

Transnational threats involving criminal activities call for a coordinated, targeted and 
adapted  response.  While  national  authorities  operating  on  the  ground  are  on  the 
frontline  in  the  fight  against  organised  crime  and  terrorism,  action  at  Union  level  is 
paramount  to  ensure  efficient  and  effective  cooperation,  including  as  regards  the 
exchange  of  information.  Furthermore,  organised  crime  and  terrorism,  in  particular, 
are emblematic of the link between internal and external security. Those threats spread 
across  borders  and  manifest  themselves  in  organised  crime  and  terrorist  groups  that 
engage in a wide range of criminal activities.  

In an area without internal border controls, police officers in one Member State should 
have, within the framework of the applicable Union and national law, the possibility to 
obtain  equivalent  access  to  the  information  available  to  their  colleagues  in  another 
Member State. In this regard, law enforcement authorities should cooperate effectively 
and  by  default  across  the  Union.  Therefore,  an  essential  component  of  the  measures 
that underpin public security in an interdependent area without internal border controls 
is police  cooperation on  the  exchange  of  relevant  information  for  law  enforcement 
purposes.  Exchange  of  information  on  crime  and  criminal  activities,  including 
terrorism, serves the overall objective of protecting the security of natural persons. 

Exchange of information between Member States  for the purposes of preventing and 
detecting  criminal  offences  is  regulated  by  the  Convention  Implementing  the 
Schengen  Agreement  of  14  June  198547,  adopted  on  19  June  1990,  notably  in  its 
Articles  39  and  46.  Council  Framework  Decision  2006/960/JHA48  partially  replaced 

Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the 
States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on 
the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders (OJ L 239, 22.9.2000, p. 19). 
Council  Framework  Decision  2006/960/JHA  of  18  December  2006  on  simplifying  the  exchange  of 
information  and  intelligence  between  law  enforcement  authorities  of  the  Member  States  of  the 
European Union (OJ L 386, 29.12.2006, p. 89). 

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(4) 

(5) 

(6) 

(7) 

49 

50 

51 

52 

53 

those  provisions  and  introduced  new  rules  for  the  exchange  of  information  and 
intelligence between Member States' law enforcement authorities.  
Evaluations,  including  those  carried  under  Council  Regulation  (EU)  1053/201349, 
indicated  that  Framework  Decision  2006/960/JHA  is  not  sufficiently  clear  and  does 
not  ensure  adequate  and  rapid  exchange  of  relevant  information  between  Member 
States.  Evaluations  also  indicated  that  that  Framework  Decision  is  scarcely  used  in 
practice, in part due to the lack of clarity experienced in practice between the scope of 
the  Convention  Implementing  the  Schengen  Agreement  and  of  that  Framework 
Decision.  

Therefore,  the  existing  legal  framework  consisting  of  the  relevant  provisions  of  the 
Convention  Implementing  the  Schengen  Agreement  and  Framework  Decision 
2006/960/JHA should be updated and replaced, so as to facilitate and ensure, through 
the establishment of clear  and harmonised rules,  the adequate and rapid  exchange of 
information between the competent law enforcement authorities of different Member 
States.  

In  particular,  the  discrepancies  between  the  relevant  provisions  of  the  Convention 
Implementing  the  Schengen  Agreement  and  Framework  Decision  2006/960/JHA 
should be addressed by covering information exchanges for the purpose of preventing, 
detecting or investigating criminal offences, thereby fully superseding, insofar as such 
exchanges are concerned, Articles 39 and 46 of that Convention and hence providing 
the necessary legal  certainty.  In addition,  the relevant  rules should be simplified and 
clarified, so as to facilitate their effective application in practice.  

It  is  necessary  to  lay  down  rules  governing  the  cross-cutting  aspects  of  such 
information exchange between Member States. The rules of this Directive should not 
affect  the  application  of  rules  of  Union  law  on  specific  systems  or  frameworks  for 
such  exchanges,  such  as  under  Regulations  (EU)  2018/186050,  (EU)  2018/186151, 
(EU)  2018/186252,  and  (EU)  2016/79453 of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 

Council  Regulation  (EU)  No 1053/2013  of 7 October  2013  establishing  an  evaluation  and  monitoring 
mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis and repealing the Decision of the Executive 
Committee  of  16 September  1998  setting  up  a  Standing  Committee  on  the  evaluation  and 
implementation of Schengen (OJ L 295, 6.11.2013, p. 27).  
Regulation  (EU)  2018/1860  of the European Parliament and of the  Council of 28 November 2018  on 
the  use of the  Schengen Information System  for the return  of illegally staying third-country nationals 
(OJ L 312, 7.12.2018, p. 1).  
Regulation  (EU)  2018/1861  of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 November 2018  on 
the  establishment,  operation and use  of the Schengen Information  System (SIS) in the field of border 
checks,  and  amending  the  Convention  implementing  the  Schengen  Agreement,  and  amending  and 
repealing Regulation No 1987/2006 (OJ L 312, 7.12.2018, p. 14). 
Regulation  (EU)  2018/1862  of the European Parliament and of the  Council of 28 November 2018  on 
the  establishment,  operation  and  use  of  the  Schengen  Information  System  (SIS)  in  the  field  of  police 
cooperation  and  judicial  cooperation  in  criminal  matters,  amending  and  repealing  Council  Decision 
2007/533/JHA, and repealing Regulation No 1986/2006 and Commission Decision 2010/261/EU (OJ L 
312, 7.12.2018, p. 56). 
Regulation  (EU)  2016/794  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  11  May  2016  on  the 
European  Union  Agency  for  Law  Enforcement  Cooperation  (Europol)  and  replacing  and  repealing 
Council  Decisions  2009/371/JHA,  2009/934/JHA,  2009/935/JHA,  2009/936/JHA  and  2009/968/JHA 
(OJ L 135, 24.5.2016, p. 53). 

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(8) 

(9) 

Council, Directives (EU) 2016/68154 and 2019/115355 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council, and Council Decisions 2008/615/JHA56 and 2008/616/JHA57. 

This  Directive  does  not  govern  the  provision  and  use  of  information  as  evidence  in 
judicial proceedings.  In particular, it should not be understood as establishing a right 
to use the information provided under this Directive as evidence and, consequently, it 
leaves  unaffected  any  requirement  provided  for  in  the  applicable  law  to  obtain  the 
consent from the Member State providing the information for such use. This Directive 
leaves acts of Union law on evidence, such as Regulation (EU) …/…58 [on European 
Production and Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters] and 
Directive  (EU)  …/…59  [laying  down  harmonised  rules  on  the  appointment  of  legal 
representatives  for  the  purpose  of  gathering  evidence  in  criminal  proceedings], 
unaffected. 

All  exchanges  of information under this  Directive should be subject  to three  general 
principles,  namely  those  of  availability,  equivalent  access  and  confidentiality.  While 
those principles are without prejudice to the more specific provisions of this Directive, 
they should  guide its interpretation and application where relevant.  For example, the 
principle  of  availability  should  be  understood  as  indicating  that  relevant  information 
available  to  the  Single  Point  of  Contact  or  the  law  enforcement  authorities  of  one 
Member State should also be available, to the largest extent possible, to those of other 
Member  States.  However,  the  principle  should  not  affect  the  application,  where 
justified,  of  specific  provisions  of  this  Directive  restricting  the  availability  of 
information, such as those on the grounds for refusal of requests for information and 
judicial  authorisation.  In  addition,  pursuant  to  the  principle  of  equivalent  access,  the 
access  of  the  Single  Point  of  Contact  and  the  law  enforcement  authorities  of  other 
Member States to relevant information should be substantially the same as, and thus be 
neither  stricter  nor  less  strict  than,  the  access  of  those  of  one  and  the  same  Member 
State, subject to the Directive’s more specific provisions. 

(10) 

In  order  to  achieve  the  objective  to  facilitate  and  ensure  the  adequate  and  rapid 
exchange  of  information  between  Member  States,  provision  should  be  made  for 
obtaining such information by addressing a request for information to the Single Point 
of  Contact  of  the  other  Member  State  concerned,  in  accordance  with  certain  clear, 
simplified and harmonised requirements. Concerning the content of such requests for 
information,  it  should  in  particular  be  specified,  in  an  exhaustive  and  sufficiently 
detailed manner and without prejudice to the need for a case-by-case assessment, when 

54 

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56 

57 

58 
59 

Directive (EU) 2016/681 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the use of 
passenger  name  record  (PNR)  data  for  the  prevention,  detection,  investigation  and  prosecution  of 
terrorist offences and serious crime (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 132). 
Directive (EU) 2019/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 laying down 
rules facilitating the use of financial and other information for the prevention, detection, investigation or 
prosecution  of  certain  criminal  offences,  and  repealing  Council  Decision  2000/642/JHA  (OJ  L  186, 
11.7.2019, p. 122). 
Council  Decision  2008/615/JHA  of  23  June  2008  on  the  stepping  up  of  cross-border  cooperation, 
particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime (OJ L 210, 6.8.2008, p. 1). 
Council Decision 2008/616/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the implementation of Decision 2008/615/JHA on 
the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime 
(OJ  L  210,  6.8.2008,  p.  12).  A  proposal  for  a  Regulation  on  automated  data  exchange  for  police 
cooperation ("Prüm II"), intends to repeal parts of those Council Decisions.  
Regulation proposal, COM/2018/225 final - 2018/0108 (COD).  
Directive proposal, COM/2018/226 final - 2018/0107 (COD). 

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they  are  to  be  considered  as  urgent  and  which  explanations  they  are  to  contain  as 
minimum.  

(11)  Whilst  the Single Points  of Contact  of each Member State should in  any  event have 
the  possibility  to  submit  requests  for  information  to  the  Single  Point  of  Contact  of 
another Member State, in the interest of flexibility, Member States should be allowed 
to  decide  that,  in  addition,  their  law  enforcement  authorities  may  also  submit  such 
requests. In order for Single Points of Contact to be able to perform their coordinating 
functions  under  this  Directive,  it  is  however  necessary  that,  where  a  Member  State 
takes such a decision, its Single Point of Contact is made aware of all such outgoing 
requests,  as  well  as  of  any  communications  relating  thereto,  by  always  being  put  in 
copy.  

(12)  Time  limits  are  necessary  to  ensure  rapid  processing  of  requests  for  information 
submitted  to  a  Single  Point  of  Contact.  Such  time  limits  should  be  clear  and 
proportionate and take into account whether the request for information is urgent and 
whether a prior judicial authorisation is required.  In order to ensure compliance with 
the applicable time limits whilst nonetheless allowing for a degree of flexibility where 
objectively  justified,  it  is  necessary  to  allow,  on  an  exceptional  basis,  for  deviations 
only where, and in as far as, the competent judicial authority of the requested Member 
State needs additional time to decide on granting the necessary judicial authorisation. 
Such a need could arise, for example, because of the broad scope or the complexity of 
the matters raised by the request for information.  

(13) 

(14) 

In  exceptional  cases,  it  may  be  objectively  justified  for  a  Member  State  to  refuse  a 
request for information submitted to a Single Point of Contact. In order to ensure the 
effective  functioning  of  the  system  created  by  this  Directive,  those  cases  should  be 
exhaustively specified and interpreted restrictively. When only parts of the information 
concerned  by  such  a  request  for  information  relate  to  the  reasons  for  refusing  the 
request, the remaining information is to be provided within the time limits set by this 
Directive. Provision should be made for the possibility to ask for clarifications, which 
should suspend the applicable time limits. However, such possibility should only exist 
where the clarifications are objectively necessary and proportionate, in that the request 
for information would otherwise have to be refused for one of the reasons listed in this 
Directive. In the interest of effective cooperation, it should remain possible to request 
necessary  clarifications  also  in  other  situations,  without  this  however  leading  to 
suspension of the time limits.       

In  order  to  allow  for  the  necessary  flexibility  in  view  of  operational  needs  that  may 
vary  in  practice,  provision  should  be  made  for  two  other  means  of  exchanging 
information, in addition to requests for information submitted to the Single Points of 
Contact. The first one is the spontaneous provision of information, that is, on the own 
initiative  of  either  the  Single  Point  of  Contact  or  the  law  enforcement  authorities 
without a prior request. The second one is the provision of information upon requests 
for  information  submitted  either  by  Single  Points  of  Contact  or  by  law  enforcement 
authorities  not  to  the  Single  Point  of  Contact,  but  rather  directly  to  the  law 
enforcement  authorities  of  another  Member  State.  In  respect  of  both  means,  only  a 
limited number of minimum requirements  should be set, in particular on keeping the 
Single  Points  of  Contact  informed  and,  as  regards  own-initiative  provision  of 
information, the situations in which information is to be provided and the language to 
be used.       

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(15)  The requirement of a prior judicial authorisation for the provision of information can 
be  an  important  safeguard.  The  Member States'  legal  systems  are  different  in  this 
respect  and  this  Directive  should  not  be  understood  as  affecting  such  requirements 
established  under  national  law,  other  than  subjecting  them  to  the  condition  that 
domestic  exchanges  and  exchanges  between  Member  States  are  treated  in  an 
equivalent  manner, both on the substance  and procedurally.  Furthermore, in  order to 
keep any delays and complications relating to the application of such a requirement to 
a  minimum,  the  Single  Point  of  Contact  or  the  law  enforcement  authorities,  as 
applicable,  of  the  Member  State  of  the  competent  judicial  authority  should  take  all 
practical  and  legal  steps,  where  relevant  in  cooperation  with  the  Single  Point  of 
Contact or the law enforcement authority of another Member State that requested the 
information, to obtain the judicial authorisation as soon as possible. 

(16) 

(17) 

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61 

62 

It  is  particularly  important  that  the  protection  of  personal  data,  in  accordance  with 
Union  law,  is  ensured  in  connection  to  all  exchanges  of  information  under  this 
Directive.  To  that  aim,  the  rules  of  this  Directive  should  be  aligned  with  Directive 
(EU)  2016/680 of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council60.  In  particular,  it 
should be specified that any personal data exchanged by Single Points of Contacts and 
law  enforcement  authorities  is  to  remain  limited  to  the  categories  of  data  listed  in 
Section  B  point  2,  of  Annex  II  to  Regulation  (EU)  2016/794  of  the  European 
Parliament  and  of  the  Council61.  Furthermore,  as  far  as  possible,  any  such  personal 
data  should  be  distinguished  according  to  their  degree  of  accuracy  and  reliability, 
whereby  facts  should be distinguished from personal  assessments, in  order to  ensure 
both  the  protection  of  individuals  and  the  quality  and  reliability  of  the  information 
exchanged. If it appears that the personal data are incorrect, they should be rectified or 
erased without delay. Such rectification or erasure, as well as any other processing of 
personal data in connection to the activities under this Directive, should be carried out 
in  compliance  with  the  applicable  rules  of  Union  law,  in  particular  Directive  (EU) 
2016/680 and  Regulation  (EU)  2016/679  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 
Council62, which rules this Directive leaves unaffected.  

In order to allow for adequate and rapid provision of information by Single Points of 
Contact, either upon request or on their own initiative, it is important that the relevant 
officials  of  the  Member  States  concerned  understand  each  other.  Language  barriers 
often hamper the cross-border exchange of information. For this reason, rules should 
be established on the use of languages in which requests for information submitted to 
the  Single  Points  of  Contact,  the  information  to  be  provided  by  Single  Points  of 
Contact as well as any other communications relating thereto, such as on refusals and 
clarifications, are to be provided. Those rules should strike a balance between, on the 

Directive  (EU)  2016/680  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  27  April  2016  on  the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for 
the  purposes  of  the  prevention,  investigation,  detection  or  prosecution  of  criminal  offences  or  the 
execution  of  criminal  penalties,  and  on  the  free  movement  of  such  data,  and  repealing  Council 
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA (OJ L 119 4.5.2016, p. 89). 
Regulation  (EU)  2016/794  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  11  May  2016  on  the 
European  Union  Agency  for  Law  Enforcement  Cooperation  (Europol)  and  replacing  and  repealing 
Council  Decisions  2009/371/JHA,  2009/934/JHA,  2009/935/JHA,  2009/936/JHA  and  2009/968/JHA 
(OJ L 135, 24.5.2016, p. 53). 
Regulation  (EU)  2016/679  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  27  April  2016  on  the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119 4.5.2016, 
p. 1). 

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one  hand,  respecting  the  linguistic  diversity  within  the  Union  and  keeping  costs  of 
translation as limited as possible and, on the other hand, operational needs associated 
with adequate and rapid exchanges of information across borders. Therefore, Member 
States should establish a list containing one or more official languages of the Union of 
their choice, but containing also one language that is broadly understood and used in 
practice, namely, English.  

(18)  The  further  development  of  the  European  Union  Agency  for  Law  Enforcement 
Cooperation  (Europol)  as  the  Union’s  criminal  information  hub  is  a  priority.  That  is 
why, when information or any related communications are exchanged, irrespective of 
whether that is done pursuant to a request for information submitted to a Single Point 
of Contact or law enforcement authority, or on their own-imitative, a copy should be 
sent to Europol, however only insofar as it concerns offences falling within the scope 
of  the  objectives  of  Europol.  In  practice,  this  can  be  done  through  the  ticking  by 
default of the corresponding SIENA box.  

(19)  The  proliferation  of  communication  channels  used  for  the  transmission  of  law 
enforcement  information  between  Member  States  and  of  communications  relating 
thereto  should  be  remedied,  as  it  hinders  the  adequate  and  rapid  exchange  of  such 
information.  Therefore,  the  use  of  the  secure  information  exchange  network 
application  called  SIENA,  managed  by  Europol  in  accordance  with  Regulation  (EU) 
2016/794, should be made mandatory for all such transmissions and communications 
under  this  Directive,  including  the  sending  of  requests  for  information  submitted  to 
Single Points of Contact and directly to law enforcement authorities, the provision of 
information  upon  such  requests  and  on  their  own  initiative,  communications  on 
refusals and clarifications, as well as copies to Single Points of Contact and Europol. 
To  that  aim,  all  Single  Points  of  Contact,  as  well  as  all  law  enforcement  authorities 
that  may  be  involved  in  such  exchanges,  should  be  directly  connected  to  SIENA.  In 
this regard, a transition period should be provided for, however, in order to allow for 
the full roll-out of SIENA. 

(20) 

In  order  to  simplify,  facilitate  and  better  manage  information  flows,  Member  States 
should  each  establish  or  designate  one  Single  Point  of  Contact  competent  for 
coordinating information exchanges under this Directive. The Single Points of Contact 
should, in particular, contribute to mitigating the fragmentation of the law enforcement 
authorities' landscape, specifically in relation to information flows, in response to the 
growing  need  to  jointly  tackle  cross-border  crime,  such  as  drug  trafficking  and 
terrorism.  For  the  Single  Points  of  Contact  to  be  able  to  effectively  fulfil  their 
coordinating functions in respect of the cross-border exchange of information for law 
enforcement  purposes  under  this  Directive,  they  should  be  assigned  a  number  of 
specific, minimum tasks and also have certain minimum capabilities.  

(21)  Those capabilities of the Single Points of Contact should include having access to all 
information available within its own Member State, including by having user-friendly 
access to all relevant Union and international databases and platforms, in accordance 
with the modalities specified in the applicable Union and national law. In order to be 
able to meet the requirements of this Directive, especially those on the time limits, the 
Single  Points  of  Contact  should  be  provided  with  adequate  resources,  including 
adequate translation capabilities, and function around the clock. In that regard, having 
a  front  desk  that  is  able  to  screen,  process  and  channel  incoming  requests  for 
information may increase their efficiency and effectiveness. Those capabilities should 
also include having at their disposition, at all times, judicial authorities competent to 
grant necessary judicial authorisations. In practice, this can be done, for example, by 

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(22) 

ensuring  the  physical  presence  or  the  functional  availability  of  such  judicial 
authorities,  either  within  the  premises  of  the  Single  Point  of  Contact  or  directly 
available on call.  

In order for them to be able to effectively perform their coordinating functions under 
this Directive, the Single Points of Contact should be composed of representatives of 
national law enforcement authorities whose involvement is necessary for the adequate 
and rapid exchange of information under this Directive. While it is for each Member 
State  to  decide  on  the  precise  organisation  and  composition  needed  to  meet  that 
requirement,  such  representatives  may  include  police,  customs  and  other  law 
enforcement authorities competent  for preventing, detecting  or investigating criminal 
offences, as well as possible contact points for the regional and bilateral offices, such 
as  liaison  officers  and  attachés  seconded  or  posted  in  other  Member  States  and 
relevant Union law enforcement agencies, such as Europol. However, in the interest of 
effective coordination, at minimum, the Single Points of Contact should be composed 
of  representatives  of  the  Europol  national  unit,  the  SIRENE  Bureau,  the  passenger 
information  unit  and  the  Interpol  National  Central  Bureau,  as  established  under  the 
relevant  legislation  and  notwithstanding  this  Directive  not  being  applicable  to 
information exchanges specifically regulated by such Union legislation. 

(23)  The  deployment  and  operation  of  an  electronic  single  Case  Management  System 
having certain minimum functions and capabilities by the Single Points of Contact is 
necessary to allow them to carry out their tasks under this Directive in an effective and 
efficient manner, in particular as regards information management. 

(24)  To enable the necessary monitoring and evaluation of the application of this Directive, 
Member States should be required to collect and annually provide to the Commission 
certain  data.  This  requirement  is  necessary,  in  particular,  to  remedy  the  lack  of 
comparable  data  quantifying  relevant  information  exchanges  and  also  facilitates  the 
reporting obligation of the Commission. 

(25)  The cross-border nature of crime and terrorism requires Member States to rely on one 
another  to  tackle  such  criminal  offences.  Adequate  and  rapid  information  flows 
between  relevant  law  enforcement  authorities  and  to  Europol  cannot  be  sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States acting alone. Due to the scale and effects of the action, 
this can be better achieved at Union level through the establishment of common rules 
on the exchange of information. Thus, the Union may adopt measures in accordance 
with  the  principle  of  subsidiarity  as  set  out  in  Article  5  of  the  Treaty  on  European 
Union.  In  accordance  with  the principle of proportionality, as set  out in  that  Article, 
this  Directive  does  not  go  beyond  what  is  necessary  in  order  to  achieve  those 
objectives. 

(26) 

In  accordance  with  Articles  1  and  2  of  Protocol  No  22  on  the  position  of  Denmark, 
annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European  Union, Denmark is  not  taking part in  the adoption of this Directive and is 
not bound by it or subject to its application. Given that this Directive builds upon the 
Schengen acquis,  Denmark  should,  in  accordance  with  Article  4  of  that  Protocol, 
decide within a period of six months  after the Council has decided on this Directive 
whether it will implement it in its national law. 

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(27)  This Directive constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis in 
which Ireland takes part, in accordance with Council Decision 2002/192/EC63; Ireland 
is therefore taking part in the adoption of this Directive and is bound by it. 

(28)  As  regards  Iceland  and  Norway,  this  Directive  constitutes  a  development  of  the 
provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement concluded by 
the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of 
Norway  concerning  the  latter's  association  with  the  implementation,  application  and 
development of the Schengen acquis64 which fall within the area referred to in Article 
1, point H of Council Decision 1999/437/EC65. 

(29)  As regards Switzerland, this Directive constitutes a development of the provisions of 
the  Schengen acquis within  the  meaning  of  the  Agreement  between  the  European 
Union,  the  European  Community  and  the  Swiss  Confederation  on  the  Swiss 
Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of 
the  Schengen acquis66 which  fall  within  the  area  referred  to  in  Article  1,  point  H  of 
Decision  1999/437/EC  read  in  conjunction  with  Article  3  of  Council  Decision 
2008/146/EC67 and with Article 3 of Council Decision 2008/149/JHA68. 

(30)  As regards Liechtenstein, this Directive constitutes a development of the provisions of 
the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Protocol between the European Union, 
the  Principality  of 
the  European  Community, 
Liechtenstein  on  the  accession  of  the  Principality  of  Liechtenstein  to  the  Agreement 
between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation 
on  the  Swiss  Confederation's  association  with  the  implementation,  application  and 
development of the Schengen acquis69 which fall within the area referred to in Article 
1,  point  H  of  Decision  1999/437/EC  read  in  conjunction  with  Article  3  of  Council 
Decision 2011/350/EU70 and with Article 3 of Council Decision 2011/349/EU71, 

the  Swiss  Confederation  and 

63 

64 
65 

66 
67 

68 

69 
70 

71 

Council Decision 2002/192/EC of 28 February 2002 concerning Ireland's request to take part in some of 
the provisions of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 64, 7.3.2002).  
OJ L 176, 10.7.1999, p. 36. 
Council  Decision  1999/437/EC  of  17  May  1999  on  certain  arrangements  for  the  application  of  the 
Agreement  concluded  by  the  Council  of  the  European  Union  and  the  Republic  of  Iceland  and  the 
Kingdom  of  Norway  concerning  the  association  of  those  two  States  with  the  implementation, 
application and development of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 176, 10.7.1999).  
OJ L 53, 27.2.2008, p. 52. 
Council Decision  2008/146/EC  of  28  January  2008  on  the  conclusion,  on  behalf  of  the  European 
Community, of the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss 
Confederation  on  the Swiss  Confederation's  association  with  the  implementation,  application  and 
development of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 53, 27.2.2008). 
Council Decision 2008/149/JHA of 28 January 2008 on the conclusion on behalf of the European Union 
of the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation 
on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the 
Schengen acquis (OJ L 53, 27.2.2008). 
OJ L 160, 18.6.2011, p. 21. 
Council Decision 2011/350/EU of 7 March 2011 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, 
of the Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation  and 
the Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement 
between  the  European  Union,  the  European  Community  and  the  Swiss  Confederation  on  the  Swiss 
Confederation’s  association  with 
the 
Schengen acquis, relating to the abolition of checks at internal borders and movement of persons (OJ L 
160, 18.6.2011). 
Council Decision 2011/349/EU of 7 March 2011 on the conclusion on behalf of the European Union of 
the Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the 

implementation,  application  and  development  of 

the 

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HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: 

Chapter I 

General provisions 

Article 1 
Subject matter and scope  

1. 

This  Directive  establishes  rules  for  the  exchange  of  information  between  the  law 
enforcement  authorities  of  the  Member  States  where  necessary  for  the  purpose  of 
preventing, detecting or investigating criminal offences. 

In particular, this Directive establishes rules on: 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

requests for information submitted to the Single Points of Contact established 
or  designated  by  the  Member  States,  in  particular  on  the  content  of  such 
requests,  mandatory  time  limits  for  providing  the  requested  information, 
reasons  for refusals of such requests and the channel of communication to be 
used in connection to such requests; 

the own-initiative provision of relevant information to Single Points of Contact 
or to the law enforcement authorities of other Member States, in particular the 
situations and the manner in which such information is to be provided;  

the channel of communication to be used for all exchanges of information and 
the  information  to  be  provided  to  the  Single  Points  of  Contact  in  relation  to 
exchanges of information directly between the law enforcement authorities of 
the Member States; 

the  establishment,  tasks,  composition  and  capabilities  of  the  Single  Point  of 
Contact, including on the deployment of a single electronic Case Management 
System for the fulfilment of its tasks.   

2. 

This  Directive  shall  not  apply  to  exchanges  of  information  between  the  law 
enforcement  authorities  of  the  Member  States  for  the  purpose  of  preventing, 
detecting  or  investigating  criminal  offences  that  are  specifically  regulated  by  other 
acts of Union law. 

3. 

This Directive does not impose any obligation on Member States to: 

(a)   obtain  information  by  means  of  coercive  measures,  taken  in  accordance  with 
national law, for the purpose of providing it to the law enforcement authorities 
of other Member States; 

(b)  

store information for the purpose referred to in point (a); 

(c)   provide information to the law enforcement authorities of other Member States 
to be used as evidence in judicial proceedings 

Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community 
and  the  Swiss  Confederation  on  the  Swiss  Confederation’s  association  with  the  implementation, 
application  and  development  of  the  Schengen acquis relating  in  particular  to  judicial  cooperation  in 
criminal matters and police cooperation (OJ L 160, 18.6.2011). 

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4. 

This  Directive  does  not  establish  any  right  to  use  the  information  provided  in      
accordance with this Directive as evidence in judicial proceedings. 

For the purpose of this Directive: 

Article 2 
Definitions 

(1) 

'law  enforcement  authority'  means  any  authority  of  the  Member  States 
competent  under  national  law  for  the  purpose  of  preventing,  detecting  or 
investigating criminal offences;  

(2) 

'criminal offences' means any of the following:  

(a) 

offences  referred  to  in  Article  2(2)  of  Council  Framework  Decision 
2002/584/JHA72; 

(b)  offences referred to in Article 3(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/794; 

(c) 

(3) 

(4) 

tax crimes relating to direct and indirect taxes, as laid down in national law; 

'information' means any content concerning one or more natural persons, facts 
or  circumstances  relevant  to  law  enforcement  authorities  in  connection  to  the 
exercise  of  their  tasks  under  national  law  of  preventing,  detecting  or 
investigating criminal offences; 

'available' information means information that is either held by the Single Point 
of Contact or the law enforcement authorities of the requested Member State, 
or  information  that  those  Single  Points  of  Contact  or  those  law  enforcement 
authorities  can  obtain  from  other  public  authorities  or  from  private  parties 
established in that Member State without coercive measures; 

(5) 

‘SIENA’  means  the  secure  information  exchange  network  application, 
managed  by  Europol,  aimed  at  facilitating  the  exchange  of  information 
between Member States and Europol;  

(6) 

‘personal  data’  means  personal  data  as  defined  in  Article  4,  point  (1)  of 
Regulation (EU) 2016/679. 

Article 3 
Principles of information exchange 

Member  States  shall,  in  connection  to  all  exchanges  of  information  under  this  Directive, 
ensure that:     

(a) 

(b) 

any  relevant  information  available  to  the  Single  Point  of  Contact  or  the  law 
enforcement  authorities  of  Member  States  is  provided  to  the  Single  Point  of 
Contact or the law enforcement authorities of other Member States (‘principle 
of availability’); 

the conditions  for requesting  information  from  the Single Point of Contact  or 
the  law  enforcement  authorities  of  other  Member  States,  and  those  for 
providing information to the Single Points of Contact and the law enforcement 
authorities  of  other  Member  States,  are  equivalent  to  those  applicable  for 

72 

Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on  the European arrest  warrant and the 
surrender procedures between Member States (OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 1). 

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requesting  and  providing  similar  information  from  and  to  their  own  law 
enforcement authorities (‘principle of equivalent access’); 

(c) 

information  provided  to  the  Single  Point  of  Contact  or  the  law  enforcement 
authorities of another Member State that is marked as confidential is protected 
by those law  enforcement  authorities in  accordance with  the  requirements  set 
out  in  the  national  law  of  that  Member  State  offering  a  similar  level  of 
confidentiality (‘principle of confidentiality’). 

Chapter II 

Exchanges of information through Single Points of Contact 

Article 4 
Requests for information to the Single Point of Contact  

1. 

Member States shall ensure that their Single Point of Contact and, where they have 
so decided, their law enforcement authorities submit requests for information to the 
Single Points of Contact  of other Member States in  accordance with the conditions 
set out in paragraphs 2 to 5. 

Where a Member State has decided that, in addition to its Single Point of Contact, its 
law enforcement authorities may also  submit requests for information  to  the Single 
Points of Contact of other Member States, it shall ensure that those authorities send, 
at  the  same  time  as  submitting  such  requests,  a  copy  of  those  requests,  and  of  any 
other communication relating thereto, to the Single Point of Contact of that Member 
State. 

2. 

Requests  for  information  to  the  Single  Point  of  Contact  of  another  Member  State 
shall be submitted only where there are objective reasons to believe that: 

(a) 

(b) 

the requested information is necessary and proportionate to achieve the purpose 
referred to in Article 1(1);  

the requested information is available to the law enforcement authorities of the 
requested Member State.  

3. 

Any request for information to the Single Point of Contact of another Member State 
shall specify whether or not it is urgent.  

Those  requests  for  information  shall  be  considered  urgent  if,  having  regard  to  all 
relevant  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case  at  hand,  there  are  objective  reasons  to 
believe that the requested information is one or more of the following: 

(a) 

essential  for  the  prevention  of  an  immediate  and  serious  threat  to  the  public 
security of a Member State;  

(b)  necessary  in  order  to  protect  a  person’s  vital  interests  which  are  at  imminent 

risk;  

(c) 

necessary  to  adopt  a  decision  that may  involve  the  maintenance  of  restrictive 
measures amounting to a deprivation of liberty;  

(d) 

at imminent risk of losing relevance if not provided urgently.  

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4. 

Requests  for  information  to  the  Single  Point  of  Contact  of  another  Member  State 
shall  contain  all  necessary  explanations  to  allow  for  their  adequate  and  rapid 
processing in accordance with this Directive, including at least the following:  

5. 

1. 

(a) 

a  specification  of  the  requested  information  that  is  as  detailed  as  reasonably 
possible under the given circumstances;  

(b) 

a description of the purpose for which the information is requested; 

(c) 

the  objective  reasons  according  to  which  it  is  believed  that  the  requested 
information  is  available  to  the  law  enforcement  authorities  of  the  requested 
Member State; 

(d) 

an  explanation  of  the  connection  between  the  purpose  and  the  person  or 
persons to whom the information relates, where applicable;  

(e) 

the reasons for which the request is considered urgent, where applicable. 

Requests  for  information  to  the  Single  Point  of  Contact  of  another  Member  State 
shall  be  submitted  in  one  of  the  languages  included  in  the  list  established  by  the 
requested Member State and published in accordance with Article 11. 

Article 5 

Provision of information pursuant to requests to the Single Point of Contact  

Subject to paragraph 2 of this Article and to Article 6(3), Member States shall ensure 
that their Single Point of Contact provides the information  requested in  accordance 
with Article 4 as soon as possible and in any event within the following time limits, 
as applicable: 

(a) 

(b) 

eight hours, for urgent requests relating to information that is available to the 
law enforcement  authorities of the requested Member State without having to 
obtain a judicial authorisation;  

three calendar days, for urgent requests relating to information that is available 
to the law enforcement authorities of the requested Member State subject to a 
requirement to obtain a judicial authorisation;  

(c) 

seven calendar days, for all requests that are not urgent. 

The time periods laid down in the first subparagraph shall commence at the moment 
of the reception of the request for information. 

2. 

Where under its national law in accordance with Article 9 the requested information 
is available only after having obtained a judicial authorisation, the requested Member 
State may deviate from  the time limits referred to paragraph 1  insofar as necessary 
for obtaining such authorisation.  

In  such  cases,  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  their  Single  Point  of  Contact  does 
both of the following: 

(i)  

immediately inform the Single Point of Contact or, where applicable, the 
law  enforcement  authority  of  the  requesting  Member  State  of  the 
expected  delay,  specifying  the  length  of  the  expected  delay  and  the 
reasons therefore;  

(ii)   subsequently  keep  it  updated  and  provide  the  requested  information  as 

soon as possible after obtaining the judicial authorisation.  

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3. 

Member  States  shall  ensure  that  their  Single  Point  of  Contact  provides  the 
information requested in accordance with Article 4 to the Single Point of Contact or, 
where applicable, the law enforcement authority of the requesting Member State, in 
the language in which that request for information was submitted in accordance with 
Article 4(5).  

Member  States  shall  ensure  that,  where  their  Single  Point  of  Contact  provides  the 
requested  information  to  the  law  enforcement  authority  of  the  requesting  Member 
State, it also sends, at the same time, a copy of the information to the Single Point of 
Contact of that Member State. 

Article 6 
Refusals of requests for information 

1. 

Member States shall ensure that their Single Point of Contact only refuses to provide 
the  information  requested  in  accordance  with  Article  4  insofar  as  any  of  the 
following reasons applies: 

(a) 

the  requested  information  is  not  available  to  the  Single  Point  of  Contact  and  
the law enforcement authorities of the requested Member State;  

(b) 

the request for information does not meet the requirements set out in Article 4; 

(c) 

(d) 

(e) 

the  judicial  authorisation  required  under  the  national  law  of  the  requested 
Member State in accordance with Article 9 was refused;  

the  requested  information  constitutes  personal  data  other  than  that  falling 
within the categories of personal data referred to in Article 10, point (i);  

there  are  objective  reasons  to  believe  that  the  provision  of  the  requested 
information would: 

(i) 

be  contrary  to  the  essential  interests  of  the  security  of  the  requested 
Member State; 

(ii)  

jeopardise the success of an ongoing investigation of a criminal offence; 
or;  

(iii)   unduly harm the vital interests of a natural or legal person. 

Any  refusal  shall  only  affect  the  part  of  the  requested  information  to  which  the 
reasons set out in the first subparagraph relate and shall, where applicable, leave the 
obligation  to  provide  the  other  parts  of  the  information  in  accordance  with  this 
Directive unaffected.  

Member  States  shall  ensure  that  their  Single  Point  of  Contact  informs  the  Single 
Point  of  Contact  or,  where  applicable,  the  law  enforcement  authority  of  the 
requesting Member State of the refusal, specifying the reasons for the refusal, within 
the time limits provided for in Article 5(1).  

Member States shall ensure that their  Single Point of Contact immediately requests 
additional  clarifications  needed  to  process  a  request  for  information  that  otherwise 
would have to be refused from the Single Point of Contact or, where applicable, the 
law enforcement authority of the requesting Member State.  

The time limits referred to in Article 5(1) shall be suspended from the moment that 
the  Single  Point  of  Contact  or,  where  applicable,  the  law  enforcement  authority  of 
the requesting Member State receives the request for clarifications, until the moment 

2. 

3. 

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4. 

1. 

2. 

that  the  Single  Point  of  Contact  of  the  requested  Member  State  receives  the 
clarifications.  

The  refusals,  reasons  for  the  refusals,  requests  for  clarifications  and  clarifications 
referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4, as well as any other communications relating to the 
requests  for  information  to  the  Single  Point  of  Contact  of  another  Member  State, 
shall  be  transmitted  in  the  language  in  which  that  request  was  submitted  in 
accordance with Article 4(5).  

Chapter III 

Other exchanges of information 

Article 7 
Own-initiative provision of information 

Member  States  shall  ensure  that  their  Single  Point  of  Contact  or  their  law 
enforcement authorities provide, on their own initiative, any information available to 
them to  the Single Points  of Contact  or to  the law enforcement authorities of other 
Member  States,  where  there  are  objective  reasons  to  believe  that  such  information 
could  be  relevant  to  that  Member  State  for  the  purpose  referred  to  in  Article  1(1). 
However,  no  such  obligation  shall  exist  insofar  as  the  reasons  referred  to  in  points 
(c), (d) or (e) of Article 6(1) apply in respect of such information.   

Member  States  shall  ensure  that,  where  their  Single  Point  of  Contact  or  their  law 
enforcement  authorities  provide  information  on  their  own-initiative  in  accordance 
with paragraph 1, they do so in one of the languages included in the list established 
by the requested Member State and published in accordance with Article 11.  

Member  States  shall  ensure  that,  where  their  Single  Point  of  Contact  or  their  law 
enforcement authorities provide such information to the law enforcement authority of 
another Member State, they also send, at the same time, a copy of that information to 
the Single Point of Contact of that other Member State. 

Article 8 
Exchanges of information upon requests submitted directly to law enforcement authorities 

Member  States  shall  ensure  that,  where  Single  Points  of  Contact  or  law  enforcement 
authorities  submit  requests  for  information  directly  to  the  law  enforcement  authorities  of 
another  Member  State,  their  Single  Points  of  Contact  or  their  law  enforcement  authorities    
send,  at  the  same  time  as  they  send  such  requests,  provide  information  pursuant  to  such 
requests or send any other communications relating thereto, a copy thereof to the Single Point 
of Contact of that other Member State and, where the sender is a law enforcement authority, 
also to the Single Point of Contact of its own Member State.  

Chapter IV 

Additional rules on the provision of information under Chapters II and III 

Article 9 
Judicial authorisation 

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1. 

2. 

3. 

Member  States  shall  not  require  any  judicial  authorisation  for  the  provision  of 
information to the Single Points of Contact or law enforcement authority of another 
Member  State  under  Chapters  II  and  III,  where  no  such  requirement  applies  in 
respect  of  similar  provision  of  information  to  their  own  Single  Point  of  Contact  or 
their own law enforcement authorities.  

Member  States  shall  ensure  that,  where  their  national  law  requires  a  judicial 
authorisation for the provision of information to the Single Points of Contact or the 
law enforcement authority of another Member State in accordance with paragraph 1, 
their Single Points of Contact or their law enforcement authorities immediately take 
all  necessary  steps,  in  accordance  with  their  national  law,  to  obtain  such  judicial 
authorisation as soon as possible. 

The  requests  for  judicial  authorisation  referred  to  in  paragraph  1  shall  be  assessed 
and  decided  upon  in  accordance  with  the  national  law  of  the  Member  State  of  the 
competent judicial authority. 

Additional rules for information constituting personal data 

Article 10 

Member States shall ensure that, where their Single Point of Contact or their law enforcement 
authorities provide information under Chapters II and III that constitutes personal data: 

(i) 

(ii) 

the categories of personal data provided remain limited to those listed in 
Section B, point 2, of Annex II to Regulation (EU) 2016/794;  

their  Single  Point  of  Contact  or  their  law  enforcement  authorities  also 
provide, at the same time and insofar as possible, the necessary elements 
enabling the Single Point of Contact or the law enforcement authority of 
the  other  Member  State  to  assess  the  degree  of  accuracy,  completeness 
and  reliability  of  the  personal  data,  as  well  as  the  extent  to  which  the 
personal data are up to date. 

Article 11 
List of languages 

1.  

2.  

Member  States  shall  establish  and  keep  up  to  date  a  list  with  one  or  more  of  the 
official  languages  of  the  Union  in  which  their  Single  Point  of  Contact  is  able  to 
provide information upon a request for information or on its own initiative. That list 
shall include English.   

Member  States  shall  provide  those  lists,  as  well  as  any  updates  thereof,  to  the 
Commission.  The  Commission  shall  publish  those  lists,  as  well  as  any  updates 
thereof, in the Official Journal of the European Union.  

Article 12 

Provision of information to Europol 

Member States shall ensure that, where their Single Point of Contact or their law enforcement 
authorities  send  requests  for  information,  provide  information  pursuant  to  such  requests, 
provide  information  on  their  own  initiative  or  send  other  communications  relating  thereto 
under Chapters II and III, they also send, at the same time, a copy thereof to Europol, insofar 
as  the  information  to  which  the  communication  relates  concerns  offences  falling  within  the 
scope of the objectives of Europol in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/794.  

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1.  

2.  

1. 

2. 

Article 13 
Use of SIENA 

Member  States  shall  ensure  that,  where  their  Single  Point  of  Contact  or  their  law 
enforcement authorities send requests for information, provide information pursuant 
to  such  requests,  provide  information  on  their  own  initiative  or  send  other 
communications relating thereto under Chapters II  and III or under Article 12, they 
do so through SIENA. 

Member States shall ensure that their Single Point of Contact, as well as all their law 
enforcement authorities that may be involved in the exchange of information under 
this Directive, are directly connected to SIENA.  

Chapter V 

Single Point of Contact for information exchange between Member States  

Article 14 
Establishment, tasks and capabilities 

Each Member State shall establish or designate one national Single Point of Contact, 
which  shall  be  the  central  entity  responsible  for  coordinating  exchanges  of 
information under this Directive. 

Member States shall ensure that their Single Point of Contact is empowered to carry 
out at least all of the following tasks: 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

receive and evaluate requests for information; 

channel  requests  for  information  to  the  appropriate  national  law  enforcement 
authority  or  authorities  and,  where  necessary,  coordinate  among  them  the 
processing  of  such  requests  and  the  provision  of  information  upon  such 
requests; 

analyse  and  structure  information  with  a  view  to  providing  it  to  the  Single 
Points of Contact and, where applicable, to the law enforcement authorities of 
other Member States;  

(d)  provide,  upon  request  or  upon  its  own  initiative,  information  to  the  Single 
Points of Contact and, where applicable, to the law enforcement authorities of 
other Member States in accordance with Articles 5 and 7; 

(e) 

(f) 

refuse  to  provide  information  in  accordance  with  Article  6  and,  where 
necessary, request clarifications in accordance with Article 6(3); 

send requests for information to the Single Points of Contact of other Member 
States in accordance with Article 4 and, where necessary, provide clarifications 
in accordance with Article 6(3).  

3. 

Member States shall ensure that:  

(a) 

their Single Point of Contact has access to all information available to their law 
enforcement  authorities,  insofar  as  necessary  to  carry  out  its  tasks  under  this 
Directive;  

(b) 

their Single Point of Contact carries out its tasks 24 hours a day, 7 days a week;  

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31 

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(c) 

(d) 

their  Single  Point  of  Contact  is  provided  with  the  staff,  resources  and 
capabilities,  including  for  translation,  necessary  to  carry  out  its  tasks  in  an 
adequate and rapid manner in accordance with this Directive and in particular 
the time limits set out in Article 5(1);  

the  judicial  authorities  competent  to  grant  the  judicial  authorisations  required 
under  national  law  in  accordance  with  Article  9  are  available  to  the  Single 
Point of Contact 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.  

4. 

Within  one  month  of  the  establishment  or  designation  of  their  Single  Point  of 
Contact, Member States shall notify the Commission thereof. They shall update that 
information where necessary.  

The Commission shall publish those notifications, as well as any updates thereof, in 
the Official Journal of the European Union.  

1.  

2.  

1.  

73 

Article 15 
Composition 

Member  States  shall  determine  the  organisation  and  the  composition  of  its  Single 
Point of Contact in such a manner that it can carry out its tasks under this Directive 
in an efficient and effective manner.  

Member  States  shall  ensure  that  their  Single  Point  of  Contact  is  composed  of 
representatives  of  national  law  enforcement  authorities  whose  involvement  is 
necessary  for  the  adequate  and  rapid  exchange  of  information  under  this Directive, 
including at least the following insofar as the Member State concerned is bound by 
the relevant legislation to establish or designate such units or bureaux: 

(a)  

(b)  

(c)  

(d)  

the  Europol  national  unit  established  by  Article  7  of  Regulation  (EU) 
2016/794;  

the SIRENE Bureau established by Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 
of the European Parliament and of the Council73; 

the  passenger  information  unit  established  under  Article  4  of  Directive  (EU) 
2016/681; 

the  INTERPOL  National  Central  Bureau  (NCB)  established  by  Article  32  of 
Constitution of the International Criminal Police Organisation – INTERPOL. 

Article 16 
Case Management System 

Member  States shall ensure that their Single Point  of Contact  deploys and operates 
an  electronic  single  Case  Management  System  as  the  repository  that  allows  the 
Single  Point  of  Contact  to  carry  out  its  tasks  under  this  Directive.  The  Case 
Management  System  shall  have  at  least  all  of  the  following  functions  and 
capabilities: 

Regulation  (EU) 2018/1862  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  28 November  2018  on 
the  establishment,  operation  and  use  of  the  Schengen  Information  System  (SIS)  in  the  field  of  police 
cooperation  and 
in  criminal  matters,  amending  and  repealing  Council 
Decision 2007/533/JHA, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1986/2006 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council and Commission Decision 2010/261/EU (OJ L 312 7.12.2018, p. 56). 

judicial  cooperation 

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32 

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(a)  

(b)  

(c)  

recording  incoming  and  outgoing  requests  for  information  referred  to  in 
Articles  5  and  8,  as  well  as  any  other  communications  with  Single  Points  of 
Contact  and,  where  applicable,  law  enforcement  authorities  of  other  Member 
States  relating  to  such  requests,  including  the  information  about  refusals  and 
the  requests  for  and  provision  of  clarifications  referred  to  in  Article  6(2)  and 
(3) respectively; 

recording  communications  between  the  Single  Point  of  Contact  and  national 
law enforcement authorities, pursuant to Article 15(2), point (b); 

recording provisions of information to the Single Point of Contact and, where 
applicable,  to  the  law  enforcement  authorities  of  other  Member  States  in 
accordance with Articles 5, 7 and 8; 

(d)    cross-checking incoming requests for information referred to in Articles 5 and 
8,  against  information  available  to  the  Single  Point  of  Contact,  including 
information  provided  in  accordance  with  the  second  subparagraph  of  Article 
5(3)  and  the  second  subparagraph  of  Article  7(2)  and  other  relevant 
information recorded in the Case Management System;  

(e) 

(f) 

ensuring  adequate  and  rapid  follow-up  to  incoming  requests  for  information 
referred to in Article 4, in particular with a view to respecting the time limits 
for the provision of the requested information set out in Article 5; 

interoperable  with  SIENA,  ensuring 

be 
incoming 
communications through SIENA can be directly recorded in, and that outgoing 
communications  through  SIENA  can  be  directly  sent  from,  the  Case 
Management System; 

in  particular 

that 

(g)  generating statistics in respect of exchanges of information under this Directive 
for evaluation and monitoring purposes, in particular for the purpose of Article 
17; 

(h) 

logging  of  access  and  of  other  processing  activities  in  relation  to  the 
information contained in the Case Management System, for accountability and 
cybersecurity purposes. 

Member  States  shall  take  the  necessary  measures  to  ensure  that  all  cybersecurity 
risks  relating  to  the  Case  Management  System,  in  particular  as  regards  its 
architecture,  governance  and  control,  are  managed  and  addressed  in  a  prudent  and 
effective manner and that adequate safeguards against unauthorised access and abuse 
are provided for.   

Member States shall ensure that any personal data processed by their Single Point of 
Contact  are  contained  in  the  Case  Management  System  only  for  as  long  as  is 
necessary  and  proportionate  for  the  purposes  for  which  the  personal  data  are 
processed and are subsequently irrevocably deleted.   

2.  

3.  

Chapter VI 

Final provisions 

Article 17 
Statistics 

33 

EN 

  EN 

1.  

Member  States  shall  provide  the  Commission  with  statistics  on  the  exchanges  of 
information with other Member States under this Directive, by 1 March of each year. 

2.  

The statistics shall cover, as a minimum: 

(a)  

(b)  

(c)  

(d)  

the  number  of  requests  for  information  submitted  by  their  Single  Point  of 
Contact and by their law enforcement authorities; 

the  number  of  requests  for  information  received  and  replied  to  by  the  Single 
Point  of  Contact  and  by  their  law  enforcement  authorities,  broken  down  by 
urgent and non-urgent, and broken down by the other Member States receiving 
the information;  

the  number  of  requests  for  information  refused  pursuant  to  Article  6,  broken 
down per requesting Member States and per grounds of refusal; 

the  number  of  cases  where  the  time  limits  referred  to  in  Article  5(1)  were 
deviated  from  due  to  having  to  obtain  a  judicial  authorisation  in  accordance 
with  Article  5(2),  broken  down  by  the  Member  States  having  submitted  the 
requests for information concerned.  

Article 18 
Reporting 

1.  

2.  

The Commission shall, by [date of entry into force + 3 years], submit a report to the 
European  Parliament  and  to  the  Council,  assessing  the  implementation  of  this 
Directive.  

The Commission shall, by [date of entry into force + 5 years], submit a report to the 
European Parliament and to the Council assessing the effectivity and effectiveness of 
this Directive. The Commission shall take into account the information provided by 
Member  States  and  any  other  relevant  information  related  to  the  transposition  and 
implementation  of  this  Directive.  On  the  basis  of  this  evaluation,  the  Commission 
shall  decide  on  appropriate  follow-up  actions,  including,  if  necessary,  a  legislative 
proposal. 

Article 19 
Amendments to the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement 

From  [the  date  referred  to  in  Article  21(1),  the  first  subparagraph],  the  Convention 
Implementing the Schengen Agreement is amended as follows: 

(i)  Article 39 is replaced by this Directive insofar as that article relates to the 
exchange of information for the purpose referred to in Article 1(1) of this 
Directive; 

(ii)  Article 46 is deleted.  

Article 20 
Repeal 

Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA is repealed from [the date referred to in Article 21(1), the 
first subparagraph].  

References to that Framework Decision shall be construed as references to the corresponding 
provisions of this Directive. 

EN 

34 

  EN 

Article 21 
Transposition 

1.  

Member  States  shall  bring  into  force  the  laws,  regulations  and  administrative 
provisions necessary to  comply with this Directive by [date of  entry into force + 2 
years].  They  shall  forthwith  communicate  to  the  Commission  the  text  of  those 
provisions.  

They shall apply those provisions from that date. However, they shall apply Article 
13 from [date of entry into force + 4 years]. 

When  Member  States  adopt  those  provisions,  they  shall  contain  a  reference  to  this 
Directive  or  be  accompanied  by  such  a  reference  on  the  occasion  of  their  official 
publication. Member States shall determine how such reference is to be made. 

2.  

Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the main provisions 
of national law which they adopt in the field covered by this Directive. 

Article 22 
Entry into force 

This Directive shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in 
the Official Journal of the European Union. 

This Directive is addressed to the Member States in accordance with the Treaties. 

Article 23 
Addressees 

Done at Brussels, 

For the European Parliament 
The President 

For the Council 
The President 

EN 

35 

  EN