COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION - SYNOPSIS REPORT Accompanying the Proposal for a Council Recommendation on operational police cooperation
Date: 2021-12-08
Institutions: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: EU police cooperation, Schengen Agreement, cross-border cooperation, external border of the EU, fight against crime, illegal migration, internal border of the EU, organised crime, trafficking in human beings

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 8.12.2021  SWD(2021) 375 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION - SYNOPSIS REPORT  Accompanying the Proposal for a Council Recommendation on operational police cooperation {COM(2021) 780 final}  
 
 
SYNOPSIS REPORT 

This  report  provides  a  summary  of  all  stakeholder  consultation  activities  undertaken  while 
preparing  the  Commission  proposal  for  a  Council  Recommendation  on  operational  police 
cooperation. 

1.  CONSULTATION STRATEGY 

The  aim  of  the  consultation  was  to  receive  relevant  input  from  stakeholders  to  enable  an 
evidence-based preparation of future Commission initiatives  on improving law enforcement 
cooperation between Member States. 

Stakeholders  were  consulted  between  July  2019  and  July  2021.  This  consisted  of  expert 
workshops  in  2019  followed  by  expert  and  policy  discussions  in  relevant  Council  working 
parties, which led to Council Conclusions on issues covered by this proposal. 

The  Commission  also  gained  extensive  knowledge  of  the  issues  at  hand  from  the  ongoing 
Schengen evaluations on police evaluation that have been carried out in all Schengen States 
since 2019 and are still ongoing. In addition, it conducted targeted stakeholder consultations 
by way of an external study and two workshops it hosted with Member States and Schengen 
Associated Countries’ representatives.  

The  Commission  identified  relevant  stakeholders  and  consulted  them  throughout  the 
development of this proposal. It sought views from a range of subject matter experts, national 
authorities, civil society organisations and from members of the public on their expectations 
and concerns relating to strengthening law enforcement cooperation in the EU.  

2.  CONSULTATION ACTIVITIES (SUMMARY) 
2.1. Feedback on the inception impact assessment 

As  part  of  the  inception  impact  assessment  on  an  ‘EU  police  cooperation  code  –  tackling 
cross-border  serious  &  organised  crime’,  the  Commmission  organised  a  call  for  feedback, 
seeking views  from interested stakeholders, from 28 September to 16 November 2020. The 
consultation,  which  sought  feedback  from  public  authorities,  businesses,  civil  society 
organisations and the public, was open from 4 May 2020 to 9 July 2020.  Respondents were 
able to provide online comments and submit position papers to provide more background on 
their views. The Commission received four contributions1, which were integrated as part of 
the study’s findings. 

2.2. Consultations during the study to support the preparation of an impact assessment 
on EU policy initiatives facilitating cross-border law enforcement cooperation  

2.3.1. Feedback on the public consultation  

The  public  consultation  was  carried  out  from  19  April  to  14  June  2021.  The  Commission 
received 20 contributions, which it integrated as part of the study’s findings. 

2.3.2.  Targeted consultation – questionnaires 

The Commission also held an online survey in the form of questionnaires made accessible to 
targeted stakeholders via the EUSurvey tool as part of the study. This consultation aimed to 
receive  feedback,  comments  and  observations  on  the  challenges  identified  in  the  legal 
proposal.  The  questionnaires  were  tailored  to  different  stakeholders.  The  Commission 
received 239 contributions, which served as the basis for the study’s findings. 

1  

EU police cooperation code – tackling cross-border serious & organised crime (europa.eu) 

1 

 
 
                                                           
2.3.3.  Consultation of Member State experts by way of meetings 

In the course of the consultation undertaken as part of the study, the contractor organised two 
workshops  on  24  March  and  25  May  2021.  Representatives  of  the  Member  States,  the 
Council Secretariat and the Commission were invited. The first workshop aimed to exchange 
views with and between Member States and Schengen Associated Countries on their current 
challenges  when  engaging  in  cross-border  law  enforcement  cooperation  and  on  possible 
options addressing them and their respective impacts.  
The Commission also made use of the Law Enforcement Working Party (LEWP)2 meetings 
of  22  February  and  16  March  2021  to  brief  Member  States  on  its  preparatory  work  and 
relevant technical deliberations, in the context of strengthening law enforcement cooperation, 
and to explore Member States’ views on the problems and potential solutions. The same was 
done at  the Customs Cooperation Working Party (CCWP)3 on 23 March 2021. On 26 May 
2021, the contractor carrying out the study presented the findings from the questionnaire sent 
to national Single Points of Contact to gather additional information.  

2.3.4. Semi-structured interviews 

The  consultation  conducted  as  part  of  the  study  included  targeted  bilateral  and  multilateral 
semi-structured  interviews  with  stakeholders  on  the  basis  of  formalised  and  open-ended 
questions allowing for open and in-depth discussions. These interviews were conducted from 
March to June 2020 via teleconferencing. They included in particular relevant EU agencies, 
services and Commission Directorates-General, national experts and academics. 

3.  STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION 

A large number of stakeholders were consulted either directly by the Commission, during the 
study  or  during  the  discussions  in  the  relevant  Council  working  parties  that  addressed  the 
issues covered by the present proposal.  

The stakeholders included:  

  EU  institutions,  agencies  and  bodies  (e.g.  Europol,  Frontex,  eu-LISA,  Eurojust,  EU 
Agency  for  Fundamental  Rights  (FRA),  EU  Agency  for  Law  Enforcement  Training 
(CEPOL), the General Secretariat of the Council);   

 

law  enforcement  and  judicial  authorities  in  the  Member  States  and  Schengen 
Associated Countries (e.g. police, customs);   

  data protection authorities;  

  non-governmental organisations, academia, civil society organisations. 

Feedback on the inception impact assessment included responses from members of the public 
and non-governmental organisations with an interest in this field.  

4.  METHODOLOGY AND TOOLS 

During the consultation process, the Commission applied a variety of methods and forms of 
consultation. They included: 

2  

3  

This is a Council preparatory body that handles work relating to legislative activities as well as cross-
border policing and related operational issues. 
This  is  a  Council  preparatory  body  that  handles  work  relating  to  operational  cooperation  among 
national customs administrations. LEWP and CCWP are now referred to as LEWP-Police and LEWP-
Customs in the Council.   

2 

 
 
 
                                                           
• 

• 

open consultation  on the  inception  impact  assessment, which sought  views from 
all interested parties; 
targeted stakeholder workshops that focused on subject matter experts, including 
practitioners at national  level. Taking into account the technicalities and  specific 
requirements  and  characteristics  of  the  subject,  the  Commission  focused  on 
targeted  consultations,  addressing  a  broad  range  of  stakeholders  at  national  and 
EU level.  

The Commission took into account the findings of the ‘Study to support the preparation of an 
impact  assessment  on  EU  policy  initiatives  facilitating  cross-border  law  enforcement 
cooperation’.  This  was  commissioned  by  DG  HOME  and  developed  by  a  consortium  of 
contractors  based  on  desk  research  and  the  following  stakeholder  consultation  methods: 
scoping  interviews,  questionnaire  and  online  survey  (open  public  consultation),  semi-
structured interviews, case studies and two online workshops. 

The Commission also  took into account  the findings of the Schengen evaluations  on police 
cooperation  carried  out  by  the  Commission  and  Member  State  experts,  which  included 
adetailed  questionnaire,  planned  and  unplanned  on-site  visits  and 
interviews.  The 
Commission participated in the following evaluations in the field of police cooperation: 2015 
–  Austria,  Belgium,  Germany,  the  Netherlands,  Liechtenstein;  2016  –  Luxembourg,  Italy, 
Greece, Croatia, Malta, France; 2017 – Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, Norway, Portugal, Spain; 
2018 – Estonia, Finland,  Latvia,  Lithuania, Switzerland;  2019  – Czechia,  Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia,  Slovenia;  2020  –  Germany,  Austria,  Lichtenstein;  2021  –  Belgium,  the 
Netherlands, Cyprus, France, Italy, Malta. 

In addition, the Commission  took  into account  the expert discussions that  took  place in  the 
Council for the preparation of Council Conclusions on the subject. These included replies to 
written  questionnaires  together  with  expert  and  policy  discussions  in  the  relevant  Council 
working parties. 

The aforementioned range of viewpoints ensured that the Commission proposal addressed the 
needs and took account of the concerns of a wide range of stakeholders. Moreover, it allowed 
the  Commission  to  gather  necessary  data,  facts  and  views  on  the  relevance,  effectiveness, 
efficiency, coherence and EU added value of the proposal.  

Taking  into  consideration  the  COVID-19  pandemic  and  related  restrictions  and  inability  to 
interact  in  person  with  relevant  stakeholders,  the  consultation  activities  focused  on 
alternatives such as online surveys, semi-structured phone interviews as well as meetings via 
video conference. 

5.  RESULTS 

5.1.  CONSULTATION ON THE INCEPTION IMPACT ASSESSMENT  

This public consultation on the inception impact assessment received four answers. Two were 
from  members  of  the  public,  one  from  a  private  company  and  one  from  a  European  police 
trade union association. All the responses have been published in full online. 

The  European  Confederation  of  Police  (EuroCOP)  indicated  the  need  to  improve  police 
cooperation, which is  particularly  relevant  for border territories. They  should  be allowed to 
develop direct cooperation between corresponding police forces under Article 40 of the 1990 
Convention 
(CISA).  EuroCOP  supported 
streamlining and developing the different EU legal texts and non-binding guidelines on police 

the  Schengen  Agreement 

Implementing 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
cooperation into one consolidated legal text and turning some of the most advanced types of 
police  cooperation  included  in  recent  bilateral  cooperation  agreements  between  Member 
States into EU law. This includes the creation of a comprehensive list of investigative tools 
for effectively fighting serious and organised crime. 

5.2.  STUDY TO SUPPORT THE PREPARATION OF AN IMPACT ASSESSMENT ON EU 

POLICY INITIATIVES FACILITATING CROSS-BORDER LAW ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION  

The  study  highlighted  specific  areas  where  there  is  scope  for  improvement  on  cross-border 
cooperation.  This  includes  the  use  of  joint  patrols  at  border  regions.  While  recognised  as 
good practice and despite the existence of specific EU measures aimed at regulating their use, 
there  is  evidence  that  they  are  underused.  Besides  joint  patrols,  mutual  assistance  during 
large-scale events has also proved to be limited.  

Three main drivers contribute towards an insufficient deployment of joint operations: a) the 
legal driver, namely the limited and at times asymmetric conferral of executive powers of law 
enforcement officials operating in the respective host countries, as well as limited awareness 
of  these  powers  on  the  ground;  b)  the  technical  driver,  namely  that  officials  on  the  ground 
have  limited  remote  access  to  relevant  law  enforcement  databases;  c)  structural  drivers, 
namely  that  specialised  national  analytical  departments  rarely  cooperate  with  similar 
departments in other countries to design actionable joint cross-border threat assessments/risk 
analysis and the limited integration of police and customs information and analysis.  

With respect to hot pursuits, the study identified inconsistencies that hamper the efficient use 
of this tool during cross-border operations.  Even  though the use of CISA  as the legal  basis 
ensures  a  certain  degree  of  consistency,  bilateral  agreements  often  add  a  number  of  more 
specific  and  operational  rules  for  the  implementation  of  the  tool  in  the  different  regional 
contexts. This results in the same tool being regulated differently depending on the regional 
agreement under which it is applied. Issues mainly relate to differences in the right granted by 
the  national  law  to  foreign  officials  to  arrest/apprehend  a  suspect.  Differences  in  territorial 
and  time  restrictions  represent  another  barrier  to  the  use  of  cross-border  hot  pursuits,  with 
countries  applying  different  restrictions  to  foreign  officials  when  implementing  these  tools. 
On  surveillance,  besides  differences  in  the  surveillance  methods  adopted  at  national  level, 
there  are  also  differences  in  the  maximum  time  allowed  by  different  Member  States  or 
Schengen  associated  countries  to  carry  out  surveillance  activities.  This  leads  to  cases  (in 
countries  where  this  period  is  comparatively  shorter)  in  which  the  timeframe  might  not  be 
sufficient to get evidence about a criminal activity or organisation.  

The  study  also  identified  the  limited  availability  of  training  for  law  enforcement  staff 
involved in cross-border cooperation. Training is not conducted on a regular basis and does 
not always take into account the latest developments. There is also a limited awareness and 
knowledge  of  relevant  databases  and  about  the  executive  powers  conferred  by  different 
Member  States.  Language  barriers  also  hamper  effective  cross-border  operational  police 
cooperation. 

5.3.  WORKSHOPS ON THE FUTURE OF EU LAW ENFORCEMENT. 

Given  the  sensitivities  relating  to  police  cooperation  between  Member  States,  the 
Commission launched a series of consultations with external stakeholders as early as 2019 as 
part  of  the  ‘future  of  EU  law  enforcement’  initiative.  It  gathered  experts  from  the  Member 
States and relevant Justice and Home Affairs agencies in a series of workshops to discuss the 
current  challenges  and  outlook  on  different  topics  relating  to  police  cooperation  and 
information  exchange.  Participants  included  all  27  Member  States,  Schengen  Associated 

4 

 
 
Countries, relevant EU agencies such as Europol, Frontex, eu-LISA, Eurojust and FRA, and 
the General Secretariat of the Council. 

In July 2019, the Commission organised a first expert workshop that covered topics on best 
practices  and  challenges  of  the  Police  Customs  Cooperation  Centres  (PCCCs),  joint  police 
stations, and cross-border investigations. The workshop also discussed the need to review the 
current  legal  framework  on  cross-border  operational  police  cooperation.  The  majority  of 
Member States supported the consolidation and modernisation of the EU legal framework on 
police  cooperation.  There  was  agreement 
texts  and 
bilateral/trilateral/multilateral agreements on police cooperation leave officers confused as to 
what  they  can  or  cannot  do,  which  often  significantly  limits  their  actions.  A  number  of 
Member  States  called  for  the  need  to  reinvent  the  PCCC  model  and  strengthen  it.  The 
presentation  on  the  permanent  joint  Franco-Swiss  operational  brigade  carrying  out  cross-
border investigations in France and Switzerland garnered interest from other Member States.  

the  different  EU 

that 

The first workshop concluded with a broad consensus among Member States on the need to 
develop  a  national  risk  analysis  structure  in  each  Member  State.  This  would  better  target 
operations  involving  police,  customs  and  border  guards.  National  risk  analysis  should  fully 
cover  the  cross-border  dimension  and  be  translated  at  tactical  and  operational  levels. 
Importantly,  PCCCs  could  contribute  to  the  development  of  a  more  precise  local/regional 
crime  threat  picture.  Participants  agreed  with  the  need  to  develop  permanent  structures  for 
joint  cross-border  investigation  at  local/regional  level,  possibly  by  setting  up  mixed 
investigator  teams  inspired  by  the  Franco-Swiss  and  German-Czech  permanent  police 
stations. In addition, there was broad agreement on the need to: 

  simplify  and  consolidate  the  EU  legal  framework  on  police  cooperation  so  as  to 
facilitate  and  broaden  the  use  of  cross-border  operational  tools,  in  particular  cross-
border hot pursuits and surveillance operation; 

  clarify the powers of police officers when acting on a foreign territory (same power 

to arrest, detain, use his firearms, liability); 
facilitate action in a neighbouring country. 

 

In October 2019, the Commission organised a second expert workshop that covered topics 
on police cooperation training. It aimed to identify good practices and concrete measures to 
boost the added value of EU support to law enforcement training in a cross-border context. 
The workshop discussed the role of CEPOL and Member States in providing training and the 
opportunity  to  create  an  ‘Erasmus  of  Police’  large-scale  exchange  programme  in  order  to 
foster a true culture of European policing. The presentation on the integrated joint training of 
police  cadets  between  the  French  gendarmerie  and  Spanish  Guardia  Civil  garnered  interest 
from other Member States.  

In December 2019, the Commission organised a third expert workshop that covered topics 
on  information  management  (access  to,  exchange  of  and  analysis  of  information  for  law 
enforcement purposes), notably the role of national Single Points of Contact. The workshop 
also  addressed  the  impact  of  new  technologies  and  innovation  on  law  enforcement,  in 
particular the development of the Europol Innovation Lab. 

In  January  2020,  the  Commission  organised  a  fourth  and  final  expert  workshop  on  the 
future of EU law enforcement. It focused on improving EU information systems in the area of 

5 

 
 
 
law enforcement.  The topics discussed related to  IT systems  such as Prüm, API or ETIAS, 
which are out of the scope of this Recommendation.  

5.4.  SCHENGEN EVALUATIONS ON POLICE COOPERATION 

The  Schengen  acquis  includes  rules  and  compensatory  measures  to  counterbalance  the 
absence  of  internal  border  controls.  The  Schengen  Evaluation  and  Monitoring  Mechanism 
monitors the implementation of the Schengen acquis by the countries that apply it in part or 
in full4. It also assesses: 

 

 

the capacity of those countries where internal border controls have not yet been lifted 
to implement the Schengen acquis in full5; 
the implementation of measures in the areas of external borders, return, visa policy, 
police  cooperation,  the  Schengen  Information  System,  data  protection,  and  the 
absence of internal border controls.  

The  Commission  carries  out  evaluations  over  a  five-year  cycle  following  multiannual  and 
annual  programmes,  together  with  experts  from  Member  States  and  EU  agencies 
participating  as  observers.  Each  country  is  evaluated  at  least  once  every  5  years.  These 
evaluations  provide  extremely  important  evidence  of  obstacles  that  hamper  police 
cooperation and good practices deployed in some Member States. The following paragraph 
summarises the main findings of these evaluations.  

CISA  introduced  provisions  to  increase  cooperation  and  information  exchange  between  the 
police forces of Member States as a compensatory measure to the abolition of internal border 
controls. These cover: 

  cooperation to prevent and detect crime;  
  operational  cooperation,  e.g.  the  possibility  to  extend  surveillance  or  to  pursue 

 

criminals across internal borders; 
the sharing of information to prevent and repress crime or threats to public order and 
safety.6  

The Schengen evaluations  carried out  by the Commission  in relation  to police cooperation7 
between  2015-2021  led  to  the  conclusion  that  Member  States  are  generally  compliant  with 
the  Schengen  acquis  in  the  field  of  police  cooperation.  However,  a  number  of  recurring 
deficiencies prevent Member States from reaching the full potential of some of the existing 
police cooperation and information exchange tools. The improvements most needed include: 

4  

5  

6  
7   

Article 1 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013 of 7 October 2013 establishing an evaluation and 
monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis and repealing the Decision of 
the Executive Committee of 16 September 1998 setting up a Standing Committee on the evaluation and 
implementation of Schengen. 
This  applies  to  Cyprus  and  Croatia.  As  specified  in  recital  28  of  the  SCH-EVAL  Regulation,  the 
evaluation of Bulgaria and Romania has already been completed pursuant to Article 4(2) of the 2005 
Act  of  Accession.  No  evaluation  would  be  carried  out  under  Article  1(b)  of  the  SCH-EVAL 
Regulation. 
Articles 39-41 and Article 46 of the CISA. 
Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council  and  the  European  Parliament  on  the  Functioning  of  the 
Schengen  Evaluation  and  Monitoring  Mechanism  pursuant  to  Article  22  of  Council  Regulation  (EU) 
No 1053/2013 First Multiannual Evaluation Programme (2015-2019), SWD/2020/327 final. 

6 

 
 
 
                                                           
  developing and sharing strategic crime threat assessments and risk analyses to allow 

 

 

a better joint response to cross-border crime ; 
revising the bilateral or multilateral agreements concluded by the Member States to 
extend  and  facilitate  the  possibilities  for  operational  cross-border  cooperation  (in 
particular cross-border surveillance and hot pursuits); 
the need for sufficient collection and analysis of statistics and radio communication 
interoperability. 

Cross-border surveillance and hot pursuit 

CISA provides the legal bases for cross-border surveillance (Article 40 CISA) and hot pursuit 
(Articles 41 to 43 CISA). The evaluations confirmed that the regulatory structure of Article 
41 CISA, namely the different options to choose from by way of unilateral declaration, leads 
to a scattered regulatory framework for hot pursuits. Moreover, the notion of  ‘caught in the 
act’  as  a  prerequisite  for  cross-border  hot  pursuits  can  lead  to  uncertainties  and  different 
interpretations  if  suspected  criminals  are  not  directly  caught  in  the  act,  but  detected  during 
controls away from the scene of crime, i.e. in the immediate border area. 

The  evaluations  also  revealed  that  even  though  the  use  of  CISA  as  the  legal  basis  for 
conducting  hot  pursuits  or  surveillance  ensures  a  certain  degree  of  consistency,  bilateral 
agreements often add a number of more specific and operational rules for the implementation 
of these tools in the different regional contexts. This results in the same tool being regulated 
differently depending on the regional agreement  under which it is  applied.  Issues identified 
mainly  relate  to  differences  in  the  right  granted  by  the  national  law  to  foreign  officials  to 
arrest/apprehend  a  suspect.  Some  agreements  grant  foreign  officials  only  the  right  to 
arrest/apprehend a suspect, while others do not. 

Territorial  and  time  restrictions  represent  another  barrier  to  the  use  of  cross-border  hot 
pursuits, with countries applying different restrictions to foreign officials when implementing 
these  tools.  The  evaluations  identified  in  particular  that  the  majority  of  Schengen  States 
impose  a  too  narrow  geographical  limit  or  time  limit  for  hot  pursuits.  The  majority  of 
Schengen States were also found to apply other rules that discourage hot pursuits in practice, 
for instance by prohibiting the right to stop, interrogate or detain a person and to use firearms 
for 
in 
bilateral/trilateral/multilateral  agreements,  issues  were  also  identified  in  relation  to  the 
relevance  of  EU  provisions  on  cross-border  hot  pursuits.  Since  the  definition  included  in 
Article 41 CISA only covers land borders, countries having sea or river borders cannot use 
cross-border hot pursuits unless covered in bilateral/trilateral/multilateral agreements. 

the  defence  of  others.  Besides  differences 

self-defence  or 

legitimate 

The  evaluations  revealed  other  difficulties  that  arise  when  pursuing  officers  use  different 
classes of service weapons than the officers in the country where the pursuit takes place. The 
evaluation teams found that a police force that is prevented from performing identity checks 
or  from  using  its  service  weapons  to  stop,  question  and  apprehend  a  suspect  or  protect 
themselves is likely to simply avoid engaging in a hot pursuit. 

On cross-border surveillance operations, the evaluations revealed that some Schengen States 
impose  heavy  procedural  conditions  and/or  impose  additional  restrictions  on  officers  from 
other  Schengen  States,  for  instance  prohibiting  them  from  carrying  service  weapons.  Apart 
from  differences  in  the  surveillance  methods  adopted  at  national  level,  there  are  also 
differences  in  the maximum  time allowed among Schengen States to carry out  surveillance 

7 

 
 
activities. This leads to cases in which the timeframe is not sufficient to collect evidence on a 
criminal activity or organisation. Similarly, the different rules applied nationally to the use of 
audio and technical surveillance, including voice bugging and GPS tracking, and the fact that 
it is allowed in some but not all countries, hamper their use during cross-border operations. 
Furthermore, the differences in the types of institutions responsible for overseeing the cross-
border implementation of investigative tools or the absence of a central authority in charge of 
coordination  create  additional  obstacles  to  cooperation  needed  to  conduct  cross-border 
operations. 

Joint police patrols and other joint operations 

The evaluations found that joint patrols are not used to their full potential. They are often a 
random and routine exercise led only by quantitative indicators (for instance the requirement 
to  perform  two  joint  patrols  per  week),  depending  on  bilateral  agreements  and/or  practice, 
and  are  not  deployed  based  on  prior  joint  threat  analysis.  As  a  result,  their  benefit  is 
questioned.  

In  addition,  deployed  police  officers  do  not  usually  have  police  powers  in  the  hosting 
Member  State  and  struggle  to  access  relevant  databases  and  use  communication  tools 
effectively.  As  for  hot  pursuits,  the  limitations  affecting  the  right  to  stop,  question  and 
apprehend suspects and the use of service weapons in legitimate self-defence or the defence 
of  others  are  hindering  factors.  Moreover,  there  is  a  lack  of  centralised  statistics  on  joint 
operations carried out, which prevents further assessment on their use. 

Police and Customs Cooperation Centres (PCCCs) 

Schengen States have set up permanent structures to ensure cross-border police cooperation 
in  intra-EU  border  areas,  in  particular  PCCCs.  There  are  currently  59  PCCCs  across  the 
Schengen Area, mostly located at Schengen internal borders in order to address the security 
needs  in  border  regions.  Police,  customs  and  border  officers  of  two,  three  or  even  four 
Schengen  States  work  together  in  PCCCs  and  exchange  data  and  information  by  accessing 
their  own  national  databases  and  communication  systems.  The  evaluations  noted  that  only 
some PCCCs support cross-border operations, such as joint patrols and hot pursuits. PCCCs 
can  also  engage  in  a  ‘chain  request’,  whereby  an  information  request  is  passed  from  one 
PCCC to the next until it reaches its final recipient. This practice slows down the exchange of 
information and can create information gaps. 

Training  

The  evaluations  found  that  initial  national  training  on  cross-border  police  cooperation  is 
provided  to  newly  recruited  police  officers  in  the  Schengen  Area.  However,  joint  training 
between  the  relevant  national  authorities  and  neighbouring  countries  on  the  use  of  police 
cooperation tools has been assessed as insufficient as it can cause discrepancies and different 
interpretations  of  the  rules  that  can  be  applied  in  the  field.  Furthermore,  life-long  and 
specialised training is usually less common than initial training. Online training also remains 
underused by officers said to be ‘absorbed by their daily tasks’. As a result, both a poor level 
of  awareness  on  the  availability  of  such  training  materials  and  on  the  use  of  various 
international  police  cooperation  instruments  was  noted.  This,  depending  on  the  country 
evaluated,  is  extended  to  CEPOL  training.  There  is  often  a  lack  of  incentives  for  staff  to 

8 

 
 
commit to specialised training. In addition, certification processes are often not in place. This 
finding applies to the majority of the Schengen States evaluated. 

Radio telecommunication tools and mobile access to databases  

Cross-border  radio  communications  between  Schengen  States  are  hindered  by  the  lack  of 
interoperability  between  radio  equipment.  As  a  result,  the  majority  of  Schengen  States 
evaluated  resort  to  non-secure  radio  communication  tools  or  mobile  phones  in  order  to 
contact  their  respective  dispatch  unit  for  background  checks  when  operating  abroad.  This 
carries a risk of communication failures (frequent in mountainous areas), misunderstandings 
(e.g.  in  the  case  of  transliteration  issues)  or  undue  delays  with  alerts  for  discrete  checks. 
Moreover,  as  part  of  hot  pursuits  for  instance,  the  evaluations  noted  that  national  radio 
communication systems are interoperable only to a limited extent. In practice, this can lead to 
situations  in  which  officials  from  one  Member  State  cross  the  border  to  another  Member 
State as part of a hot pursuit, but lose the radio connection to their operations centre. This can 
lead to  a higher likelihood of suspects  evading police forces. The evaluation also identified 
the  absence  of  mobile  access  to  databases,  which  entails  similar  risks  to  the  lack  of 
interoperability of communications.  

5.5.  COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS 

Under  the  German  Presidency,  the  Council  adopted  conclusions  on  internal  security  and 
European police partnership on 14 December 2020. The Conclusions – which were the object 
of  discussions  between  Member  States  in  the  Council’s  Law  Enforcement  Working  Party 
(LEWP-Police)  and  the  Council’s  Standing  Committee  on  Internal  Security  –  reiterate  a 
number  of  political  priorities  to  be  achieved  between  2020  and  2025.  These  include 
establishing  an  upgraded  acquis  on  cross-border  police  cooperation  including,  for  example, 
adequate  powers  for  cross-border  surveillance  and  hot  pursuit.  The  Conclusions  emphasise 
the need to take all necessary steps to further strengthen operational cross-border cooperation 
by  effectively  implementing  existing  instruments  and,  where  appropriate,  by  strengthening, 
consolidating and simplifying the legal foundations in order to keep the EU safe.  

The Conclusions observed growing discrepancies between CISA and the Prüm decisions on 
the  one  hand,  and  the  dynamically  evolving  practice  based  on  bilateral,  trilateral  and 
multilateral treaties and the practical requirements of contemporary law enforcement work on 
the  other.  This  results  in  uncertainty  over  the  applicability  and  scope  of  existing  forms  of 
cooperation  in  certain  cases.  As  a  result,  they  stressed  the  need  to  evaluate  the  legal 
requirements  of  cross-border  cooperation  instruments  that  enable  activities  such  as  cross-
border surveillance and cross-border hot pursuits against the necessities of contemporary law 
enforcement  work.  They  underlined  the  role  of  joint  police  patrols,  units  and  offices,  joint 
operation  points,  joint  action  days  and  joint  investigations.  These  (i)  strengthen  the 
maintenance  of  public  order,  crime  prevention  and  the  fight  against  crime  particularly  in 
border  regions;  (ii)  increase  the  subjective  sense  of  security  of  citizens;    and  (iii)  allow  for 
cooperation  between  law  enforcement  authorities  from  different  Member  States  to  enable 
regular joint services, thereby creating the basis for mutual trust. 

In  particular,  the  Conclusions  called  on  the  Member  States  to  take  all  necessary  steps  to 
further  strengthen  operational  cross-border 
(…) 
consolidating, simplifying and extending the legal foundations, including joint patrols, units, 
offices  and  operation  points,  and  to  further  increase  the  use  of  these  instruments  and  their 
effectiveness  and  cost  efficiency.  They  also  called  on  Member  States  to  extend  in  certain 
clearly  defined  circumstances  the  allocation  of  mutually  agreed  and  balanced  executive 

law  enforcement  cooperation  by 

9 

 
 
 
powers to foreign officers operating outside the  territory of their home  country so they  can 
fulfil their duties.  

On  cross-border  surveillance,  the  Conclusions  called  on  Member  States  to  clarify  and 
consider  simplifying  the  legal  requirements  for  conducting  such  surveillance,  while 
upholding  the  principle  of  national  sovereignty,  the  existing  standards  for  the  protection  of 
fundamental rights, existing legal systems in Member States and the decisive role of the host 
country to assess the standardisation of the measures that may be approved and the technical 
means  that  may  be  deployed,  e.g.  drones  and  localisation  devices.  They  also  called  for 
improved authorisation procedures, including by: 

redefining the distinction between urgent and non-urgent surveillance; 

 
  extending the required timeframe for obtaining authorisation for urgent surveillance 

as appropriate; 

  considering,  where  necessary  and  proportionate  under  strict  conditions  and  without 
affecting  the  existing  instruments,  including  mutual  legal  assistance  agreements 
where  applicable,  allowing  surveillance  to  be  launched  in  the  territory  of  another 
country before it continues in the home country of the officers involved. 

On  hot  pursuits,  the  Conclusions  called  on  Member  States  to  clarify,  while  upholding  the 
principle  of  national  sovereignty,  the  existing  standards  for  the  protection  of  fundamental 
rights, existing legal systems in the Member States and the decisive role of the host country, 
the  legal  conditions  for  hot  pursuits  to  adapt  the  legal  requirements  to  the  needs  of  the 
practitioners. This  could be achieved by broadening both the scope for hot pursuits and the 
competences  of  officers  operating  across  borders.  This  includes  improving  the  sharing  of 
localisation data, enabling hot pursuits whenever a person attempts to evade law enforcement 
procedures and allowing for hot pursuits to be carried out by land, air, sea and waterways. 

The  Conclusions  also  called  on  Member  States  to  (i)  increase  efforts  to  foster  recourse  to 
cross-border  cooperation,  in  particular  for  mass  gatherings,  disasters  and  serious  accidents 
with joint operational planning and exercises; (ii) swiftly improve the means for the regular 
or ad hoc exchange of information and direct communication, including common structures 
such as intranet platforms, operation control systems or radio communication networks; and 
(iii)  continue  developing  a  common  European  culture  for  law  enforcement  authorities  and, 
depending  on  the  operational  and  pedagogical  adherence  observed,  (gradually)  set  up  a 
national  mechanism  for  the  recognition  of  knowledge  acquired  in  other  Member  States  or 
even a common standard leading to European certification. 

Moreover, the Conclusions called on the Commission to consider consolidating the EU legal 
framework  in  order  to  further  strengthen  cross-border  law  enforcement  cooperation.  This 
includes  (i)  guaranteeing  data  protection  and  fundamental  rights;  (ii)  addressing  current 
operational needs; (iii) reviewing in particular the provisions in CISA Title III, Chapter 1 on 
Police  Cooperation,  (…)  Council  Decisions  2008/615/JHA,  2008/616/JHA  (Prüm  decision) 
(…) especially on hot pursuit and cross-border surveillance, which should be fully functional 
across  Europe;  (iv)  respecting  the  possibility  for  Member  States  to  work  out  the  details  of 
such  cooperation  and  provide  for  even  closer  cooperation  bilaterally.  The  Conclusions  also 
called on the Commission to step up its support for improved regional forms (structures) of 
cooperation  such  as  the  PCCCs,  joint  police  stations  and  joint  training  sessions,  while 
ensuring their efficient cooperation with Single Points of Contact. 

6.  HOW THE RESULTS HAVE BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT 

The  results  of  all  these  consultation  activities  have  been  duly  taken  into  account  in  the 
preparation of this proposal. It recommends actions to address the problems identified during 

10 

 
 
the  consultation  and  based  on  the  feedback  received.  It  aims  to  remove  existing  legal, 
technical and operational obstacles to operational cooperation between Member States and to 
implement  across  the  EU  a  number  of  best  practices  stemming  from  the  more  modern 
bilateral  agreements  between  Member  States.  The  proposal  puts  forward  a  number  of 
recommendations  that  directly  follow  up  on  the  Council  Conclusions.  In  this  context,  the 
proposal: 

  clarifies  and  aligns  the  rules  of  engagement  in  cross-border  law  enforcement 
operations to be able to monitor and arrest criminals and terrorists under surveillance 
or  involving  hot  pursuit,  joint  patrols  and  other  joint  operations  across  national 
territories as necessary;  

  allows remote access to their own databases in neighbouring Member States and the 

use of secure communications that can continue to function across borders;  

  expands  the  role  of  existing  PCCCs  to  become  joint  police  stations  capable  of  not 
only exchanging information, but also of planning, supporting and coordinating joint 
patrols and operations based on shared risk analysis; 

  uses targeted joint patrols and other joint operations in specific intra-EU border areas, 
based on prior analysis, to counter migrant smuggling as well as to prevent and detect 
illegal stays and cross-border crime linked to irregular migration;  

  uses targeted joint patrols and other joint operations in specific intra-EU border areas, 
based  on  prior  analysis,  to  counter  human  trafficking  and  to  identify  and  protect 
victims;  

  creates  a  coordination  platform,  together  with  the  Commission  and  Europol,    to 
support and target joint operations and patrols across the EU in order to maintain and 
strengthen public order and safety, prevent criminal offences or help address specific 
crime  waves  in  key  locations  or  during  specific  times  (e.g.  tourist  regions,  key 
criminal  hubs,  holiday  season),  during  mass  gatherings  (e.g.  large  sport  events, 
international summits), or in case of disasters and serious accidents;  

  expands  joint  training  and  exchange  programmes  for  police  cadets  and  the  lifelong 
training of officers involved in  operational  cross-border cooperation, and  reflects on 
the  creation  of  a  large-scale  pan-European  joint  training  programme  on  operational 
cross-border cooperation to create a true EU culture of policing. 

11