Evaluation of EU budget support to Rwanda (2011-2018) : final report. Volume I.
Date: 2021-12-03
Institutions: Directorate-General for International Partnerships
Subjects: EU aid, EU budget, Rwanda, aid evaluation, development policy, economic consequence, energy market, farming sector, nutrition

Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 
Final Report 

VOLUME I 

November 2020 

___________ 

Evaluation carried out on behalf of the European Commission 

International 
Cooperation and 
Development  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consortium composed of GDSI Limited, 
Altair Asesores S.L., A.R.S. Progetti S.P.A., EEO Group, NSF Euro Consultants s.a,  
GDSI UK Ltd, Pohl Consulting & Associates 

The project is implemented by GDSI Limited, Altair Asesores S.L, NSF Euro Consultants s.a 
Contact Person: Pauric Brophy 

FWC COM 2015 

EuropeAid/137211/DH/SER/Multi 

Specific Contract N° 2019/401881 

Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

This evaluation was commissioned by 
the Evaluation and Results Unit of the DG DEVCO (European Commission) 

This evaluation is supported and guided by the European Commission and presented by GDSI 
Limited. The report does not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of the European Commission 
or authorities of the Republic of Rwanda 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements  

The evaluation was carried out by a team of consultants led by GDSI Limited. The team was 
composed of: 

  Dr. Geske Dijkstra, Team Leader and Expert in Evaluating Budget Support 
  Ms. Ruth Maria Käppler, Aid Evaluation Expert  
  Mr. Martin Caldeyro, Agriculture Evaluation Expert  
  Mr. Leszek Kasprowicz, Energy Evaluation Expert 
  Mr. Jonathan Kaminski, Econometrician 
  Mr. Stephen Hitimana, Public Finance Management Expert 
  Mr. Athanase Matata Mandevu, Decentralisation Expert 
  Mr. Bernard Habimana, Research Assistant 
  Mr. Mauro Napodano, Methodological Advisor (Inception phase)  
  Mr. Pauric Brophy, GDSI Project Manager 
  Anna Lobanova, GDSI Project Coordinator. 

The  main  report  was  authored  by  Dr.  Geske  Dijkstra,  Martin  Caldeyro,  Ruth  Maria  Käppler  and 
Leszek Kasprowicz. 

The evaluation team would like to thank the Evaluation Managers at DEVCO 04, Ximena Rodriguez, 
and, during the important final stages of the project, Konstantinos Berdos, for their support and for 
their  fruitful  and  pleasant  cooperation.    We  are  also  grateful  to  the  Management  Group  and  the 
Country Reference Group for their constructive comments on the different draft reports. Finally, we 
thank all persons in and outside Rwanda who have been willing to give their time in order to provide 
us with information and to share their views with us in interviews and focus groups.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LEGAL NOTICE 

This document has been prepared for the European Commission however, it reflects the views only of the authors, and the European 
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ISSN 2529-3338 

doi: 10.2841/752823 

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CONTACT INFORMATION 

European Commission 
Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) 
Directorate D - Sustainable Development Policy and Coordination 
Unit D.4 - Performance, Results and Evaluation; Internal Communication, Knowledge Management and Collaborative Methods 
Email: INTPA-EVALUATIONS@ec.europa.eu  
B-1049 Brussels, Belgium 

EU International Partnerships: 
https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/our-impact/monitoring-and-evaluation_en 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 
Final report:Volume I 

i 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

5. 

4. 

3. 

2. 

4.1. 
4.2. 

3.1. 
3.2. 
3.3. 
3.4. 
3.5. 

1.1. 
1.2. 
1.3. 
1.4. 
1.5. 

2.1. 
2.2. 
2.3. 
2.4. 
2.5. 

Executive summary ................................................................................................................... v 
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1 
1. 
Management of the evaluation ............................................................................................. 1 
Scope of the evaluation ........................................................................................................ 1 
Methodology and data collection ......................................................................................... 4 
Context ................................................................................................................................. 6 
Structure of this report .......................................................................................................... 7 
The relevance of budget support ................................................................................. 8 
Alignment with GoR policies and with EU and other DPs development strategies ............. 8 
Quality of performance assessment frameworks .................................................................. 9 
Adequacy of complementary measures .............................................................................. 11 
Flexibility in adjusting to country context .......................................................................... 13 
Consideration of cross-cutting issues ................................................................................. 14 
Direct outputs of budget support ............................................................................... 16 
Effect on budgets ................................................................................................................ 16 
Predictability of budget support resources ......................................................................... 17 
Policy dialogue frameworks ............................................................................................... 18 
Donor coordination ............................................................................................................. 20 
Reduction of transaction costs ............................................................................................ 20 
Induced effects on policies and institutions............................................................... 21 
Macroeconomic management and domestic resource mobilization ................................... 21 
PFM, transparency and accountability at central and local level ....................................... 24 
Effects on Energy sector ............................................................................................. 27 
Energy policies  .................................................................................................................. 27 
Institutional capacities for policy implementation ............................................................. 27 
Emergence of least-cost electric system expansion planning ............................................. 28 
Use of renewable energy sources (RES) ............................................................................ 29 
Evolution of energy costs and tariffs .................................................................................. 31 
Energy access and affordability .......................................................................................... 31 
Quality of electric services and energy losses .................................................................... 33 
Use of biomass resources and efficient cooking methods .................................................. 34 
Overall ................................................................................................................................ 36 
Effects on Agriculture and Nutrition ........................................................................ 38 
Agricultural and related Policies ........................................................................................ 38 
Institutional capacities for policy implementation ............................................................. 41 
Climate resilience of rural households ............................................................................... 43 
An inclusive high value chain in agriculture ...................................................................... 47 
Food and nutrition security of rural households ................................................................. 48 
Conclusions from the econometric study ........................................................................... 50 
Overall ................................................................................................................................ 51 
Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 53 
Conclusions on the overall effectiveness of budget support .............................................. 53 
Conclusions on budget support delivery ............................................................................ 57 
Sector conclusions .............................................................................................................. 60 
Recommendations ....................................................................................................... 62 
General ............................................................................................................................... 62 
Budget support delivery ..................................................................................................... 65 
Sector recommendations .................................................................................................... 67 

5.1. 
5.2. 
5.3. 
5.4. 
5.5. 
5.6. 
5.7. 
5.8. 
5.9. 

6.1. 
6.2. 
6.3. 
6.4. 
6.5. 
6.6. 
6.7. 

8.1. 
8.2. 
8.3. 

7.1. 
7.2. 
7.3. 

8. 

6. 

7. 

 
 
 
 
ii  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

Final report: Volume I 

List of Tables 
Table 1: Correspondence Evaluation Questions, level and steps of analysis, and chapter in this 

main report ............................................................................................................................... 4 
Table 2: Fixed tranches in EU budget support operations, also in percent ............................................ 9 
Table 3: Performance indicators of the ten EU budget support contracts, by type and by success 

(met, partially met or not met), in number and in percent of total ......................................... 10 
Table 4: Energy generated from renewable sources [GWh] ................................................................. 30 
Table 5: Overview of conclusions by cluster ......................................................................................... 53 
Table 6: Overview of recommendations by cluster ............................................................................... 62 

List of Figures 
Figure 1: Overview of the ten EU budget support programmes, with time period and committed 

amounts (including Complementary Measures) ...................................................................... 3 
Figure 2: Comprehensive Evaluation Framework .................................................................................. 5 
Figure 3: EU SBS, total SBS and the budget for Agriculture, in Billion RwF ...................................... 16 
Figure 4: EU SBS, total SBS and the budget for Energy, in Billion RfW .............................................. 17 
Figure 5: Synthesis of results for Energy .............................................................................................. 37 
Figure 6: Synthesis of results for Agriculture and Nutrition ................................................................. 52 
Figure 7: Synthesis of results ................................................................................................................ 54 

The following chapters can be found in Volume II- Annexes: 

Annex 1. Evidence matrix 
Annex 2: Econometric analysis 
Annex 3: Project Terms of Reference 
Annex 4: Object of the evaluation 
Annex 5: Methodology and full Evaluation Matrix  
Annex 6: Context of evaluation  
Annex 7. List of respondents 
Annex 8: Bibliography 
Annex 9: Minutes of the discussion seminar. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 
Final report:Volume I 

iii 

List of acronyms 

AMIS 
ASCBP 
ASIP 
CABIRA 
CARI 
CEF 
CFSVA 
CIP 
CM 
CSO 
DFID 
DPCG 
DPO 
DPs 
EC 
EDCL 
EDF 
EDPRS 
EICV 

EDPRS 
EICV5 
EQ 
ESSP 
EU 
EUCL 
EUD 
FA 
FAO 
GBS 
GCCA 
GDP 
GoR 
Ha 
HLPD 
IFMIS 
IL 
IMF 
IR 
JADF 
JRLO 
JSR 
LPG 
LTR 
LUC 
LWH 
M&E 
MINAGRI 
MINECOFIN 
MININFRA 
MTEF 
NAEB 
NAO 
NAP 
NECDP 

Agriculture Management Information System 
Agriculture Sector Capacity Building Plan 
Agriculture Strategy Investment Plan 
Cabinet d’Ingénierie et de Recherche Appliquée 
Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security 
Comprehensive Evaluation Framework 
Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis  
Crop Intensification Programme 
Complementary Measure 
Civil Society Organisation  
UK’s Department for International Development  
Development Partners Coordination Group  
Development Policy Operation 
Development Partners  
European Commission 
Energy Development Corporation Limited 
European Development Fund 
Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy  
Enquête Intégrale sur les Conditions de Vie des ménages (Integrated Household Living 
Conditions Survey) 
Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey  
Evaluation Question 
Energy Sector Strategic Plan 
European Union  
Energy Utility Corporation Limited 
European Union Delegation 
Financing Agreement 
Food and Agriculture Organization 
General Budget Support 
Global Climate Change Alliance 
Gross Domestic Product 
Government of Rwanda 
Hectare 
High Level Policy Dialogue 
Integrated Financial Management Information System  
Intervention Logic 
International Monetary Fund 
Inception Report 
Joint Action Development Forums  
Justice, Reconciliation, Law and Order  
Joint Sector Reviews  
Liquefied Petroleum Gas 
Land Tenure Regularization Program  
Land Consolidation Programme 
Land Husbandry Water Harvesting and Hillside Irrigation Project 
Monitoring & Evaluation 
Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources 
Ministry of Economic Planning and Finance  
Ministry of Infrastructure 
Medium-Term Expenditure Framework 
National Agricultural Export Development Board 
National Authorizing Officer 
National Agricultural Policy  
National Early Childhood Development Programme 

 
 
 
 
iv  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

Final report: Volume I 

NGO 
NIP 
NISR 
NSEM 
NST 
OAG 
OBI 
OECD-DAC 

PEFA 
PER 
PETS 
PFM 
PfR 
PMO 
PS 
PSTA 
RAB 
RALGA 
RBA 
RCSP 
RDB 
REG 
RES 
RFRDP 
RRA 
RURA 
RwF 
SCAB 

SBS 
SE4ALL 
SRC 
SWG 
TA 
TECAN  

TIR 
ToR 
TWG 
UK 
UN 
USAID 
US$ 
VUP 
WASH 
WB 
WFP 

Non-Governmental Organization 
National Indicative Plan 
National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda 
National Multisectoral Strategy to Eliminate Malnutrition 
National Strategy for Transformation  
Office of the Auditor General 
Open Budget Index 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance 
Committee 
Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Assessment 
Public Expenditure Review 
Public Expenditure Tracking Survey 
Public Financial Management  
Programme for Results 
Prime Minister´s Office 
Permanent Secretary 
Strategic Plan for Agricultural Transformation 
Rwanda Agricultural Board 
Rwandan Association of Local Government Authorities 
Rights Based Approach 
Rwanda Civil Society Platform 
Rwandan Development Board  
Rwanda Energy Group  
Renewable Energy Sources 
Rural Feeder Road Development Programme  
Rwanda Revenue Authority  
Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Authority  
Rwandan Francs 
Strengthening Civil Society Organisation Capacity in Promoting Sustainable Agriculture Policies 
and Citizens Participatory Budgeting 
Sector Budget Support  
Sustainable Energy for All Initiative 
Sector Reform Contract 
Sector Working Group  
Technical Assistance 
Technical Assistance to Enhance GoR’s Capacities in the Agriculture sector for the sustainable 
use of land and water resources, value creation and Nutrition security 
Transparency International Rwanda 
Terms of Reference 
Technical Working Groups 
United Kingdom  
United Nations 
United States Agency for International Development  
United States Dollar 
Vision 2020 Umurenge Program  
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Services 
World Bank  
World Food Program 

 
 
Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 
Final report:Volume I 

v 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

BACKGROUND, CONTEXT AND OBJECTIVES 

The context for 
budget support 
operations in Rwanda 

Since 2003, the EU has provided budget support to Rwanda, first as General 
Budget Support in a joint donor framework, and since 2012 mainly as Sector 
Budget  Support.  Under  the  current  programming  (11th  EDF,  2014-2020), 
budget support represented more than 85% of total EU aid to the country.  

Rwanda presents a complex environment for EU budget support operations. 
On  the  one  hand,  the  country  has  strong  leadership,  a  clear  vision  on 
development,  and well elaborated strategies.  It  has achieved high economic 
growth  rates  over  the  past  20  years  while  maintaining  macro-economic 
stability  and  government  officials  at  all  levels  are  highly  committed  to 
achieving the national objectives. The Imihigo system,1 a framework of annual 
performance targets to be achieved by government officials from the top level 
down, fosters this commitment. In this sense, the capacity of the government 
to  achieve  difficult  policy  targets  is  potentially  high.  The  country  also  has 
strong  aid  coordination  and  well-developed  structures  for  policy  dialogue 
between the Government of Rwanda (GoR) and Development Partners (DPs).  

On the other hand, academic literature depicts the country as being governed 
in a centralised way and national planning is top-down in nature.2 The strong 
drive for economic growth leads to a prioritisation of public investment over 
recurrent  expenditure.  As  a  result,  there  has  been  relatively  little  attention 
given to the building of institutional capacities for planning, implementation, 
and monitoring of policies. Although the Imihigo system helps to focus efforts 
on the annual targets, it also, and perhaps somewhat paradoxically, contributes 
to  a  weakening  of  these  capacities.  It  reduces  efforts  to  achieve  policy 
objectives  that  are  not  included  in  Imihigo  targets  or  that  are  not  (easily) 
measurable, such as quality aspects, and it leads to a neglect of data collection 
on indicators that are not in Imihigo.  

Evaluation objective  The  objective  of  this  evaluation  is  to  provide  an  overall  independent 
assessment of ten EU budget support operations to Rwanda carried out over 
the  period  2011-2018.  The  evaluation  aims  to  identify  lessons  learnt  and 
produce recommendations to improve current cooperation with Rwanda and 
inform the design of future EU’s operations in the country.  

The operations to be 
evaluated 

The  ten  budget  support  operations  selected  for  assessment  comprise  one 
General  Budget  Support  operation  and  nine  Sector  Budget  Support 
programmes. The nine Sector Budget Support programmes include operations 
in  the  Justice,  Reconciliation,  Law  and  Order  sector  (1  operation),  Social 
Protection (1 operation), Agriculture and Nutrition (6 operations), and Energy 
(1 operation). The Sector Reform Contracts on Energy and on Agriculture and 

1 Government officers at all levels, and also households, commit to achieve annual performance targets that are strictly 
monitored. 
2 Matfess, Hillary (2015). ‘Rwanda and Ethiopia: Developmental authoritarianism and the new politics of African strong men’. African 
Studies Review, 58 (2), pp. 181-204.  Hasselskog, Malin (2018), Rwanda’s ‘home-grown initiatives’: Illustrating inherent contradiction 
of the democratic, developmental state. Development Policy Review, 36, pp. 309-328.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
vi  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

Final report: Volume I 

Nutrition are ongoing. The total commitment on the ten operations is € 725 
million. 

The evaluation carried out an in-depth analysis of the results chain for the two 
main sectors covered by the budget support operations, namely Energy, and 
Agriculture and Nutrition. 

Applying OECD 
budget support 
methodology 

The evaluation  covers the four different  inputs  of budget  support:  financial 
resources,  policy  dialogue,  complementary  measures  and  performance 
assessment  frameworks.  The  evaluation  follows 
the  Comprehensive 
Evaluation  Framework  recommended  by  the  OECD  for  evaluating  budget 
support.  

MAIN EVALUATION FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 

Relevance of budget 
support 

In  general,  EU  budget  support  inputs  were  appropriate  and  relevant  in  the 
political,  economic  and  social  context  of  Rwanda  and  were  appropriately 
adjusted to changing GoR priorities.  

Performance  indicators  were  relevant  to  the  sectors  they  covered  and  were 
based on national strategies, thus guaranteeing their ownership. The quality of 
most indicators was good, meaning that they were formulated in such a way 
that the government had an incentive to reach the target. But there were a few 
exceptions,  particularly  in  cases  where  the  achievement  of  the  targets  was 
largely beyond government control. However, government officials tended to 
give priority to the achievement of Imihigo targets and this meant that the GoR 
did not always allocate sufficient attention and resources to the measurement 
of  other  indicators  and  targets  of  national  plans,  including  the  performance 
targets  of  the  EU  budget  support  programmes.  This  greatly  reduced  their 
incentive effect. 

Most complementary measures were designed in a way that contributed to the 
objectives of budget support. However, a substantial proportion of the planned 
complementary  measures  on  the  on-going  sector  budget  support  operations 
were not yet carried out by 2019, due to changed GoR priorities or diverging 
views  between  GoR  and  the  EU  on  the  content  of  these  complementary 
measures.  

The mainstreaming of  cross-cutting issues in  budget support operations has 
been  uneven.  Although  cross-cutting  issues  (human  rights,  gender  equality, 
good  governance,  environmental  sustainability,  climate  resilience,  rights-
based  approach,  HIV/AIDS)  are  usually  integrated  in  programming  and 
planning  documents,  they  are  -  with  the  exception  of  the  environment  and 
climate change – hardly evident during programme implementation.  

Expanded fiscal 
space 

Budget support resources have contributed to expanding the fiscal space for 
the government and this space has mainly been used for increasing investment. 
There is limited correlation between the size of budget support transfers and 
sector budgets, and the government budget for Energy even decreased between 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 
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vii 

Complementary 
measures 

Policy dialogue 

Macro-economic 
management 

Public finance 
management 

National and local 
governance 

2015 and 2017. Predictability of EU budget support was high and transaction 
costs for both EU and GoR are lower than in the case of project aid. 

Most complementary measures were implemented successfully and helped to 
achieve  the  objectives  of  budget  support.  However,  the  lack  of  common 
understanding between GoR and EU on the objectives and scope of Technical 
Assistance to the core agencies in the Agriculture and Energy sectors made 
this support less effective.  

EU budget support has contributed a little to the strengthening of the sector 
policy development processes. In agriculture, budget support has contributed 
to  a  marginal  increase  in  the  participation  of  the  private  sector,  farmers’ 
organisations and civil society in the policy dialogue. But since the demise of 
general budget support in 2015, the policy dialogue on macro-economic issues 
has weakened. In addition, the top-down nature of national planning, and the 
absence of the highest decision-making levels in these dialogues, limit their 
productivity.  The  different  policy  dialogues  have  been  more  effective  for 
operational and technical issues than for strategic discussions on objectives, 
policies and (spending) priorities. 

Rwanda’s macro-economic management has generally been assessed as good, 
but there has not been any influence of EU budget support in this area. In the 
absence of  a macro-economic policy dialogue, the EU has not  been  able  to 
discuss its concerns on macro-economic policies directly with GoR.  

Most  improvements  in  PFM  systems  for,  for  example,  budgeting,  revenue 
mobilization,  reporting,  procurement  and  auditing,  are  due  to  government 
efforts  and  to  TA  offered  by  several  DPs  outside  the  budget  support 
framework. However, some specific performance indicators of sector budget 
support contracts had a positive effect on the production of (district) budget 
execution reports, district performance reports, and on the publication of an 
Agriculture  Public  Expenditure  Review  (PER)  and  an  Agriculture  Public 
Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS). With the exception of the publication 
of  Agriculture  PER  and  PETS,  budget  support  has  had  little  success  in  its 
efforts to improve transparency.  

The  contribution  of  budget  support  to  improving  capacities  for  planning, 
implementation and monitoring at national level is limited to a few institutions 
or  programmes  that  were  able  to  use  Technical  Assistance  or  other 
Complementary  Measures  well.  These  included  the  National  Institute  for 
Statistics Rwanda (NISR) and the National Strategy to Eliminate Malnutrition 
(NSEM).  Technical  assistance  for  improving  capacities  for  implementation 
and  especially  Monitoring  and  Evaluation  (M&E)  in  core  agencies  in 
Agriculture and Energy was not very effective because of an absence of mutual 
understanding between EUD and GoR on the content and objectives of this 
TA.  Although EU  budget  support  played  an  important  role  in  setting  up 
systems  for  M&E  in  energy  and  agriculture,  these  systems  were  still  weak 
during the period relevant for the evaluation and there were severe limitations 
in coverage, reliability, validity and accessibility of data. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

Final report: Volume I 

Policy formulation 
and implementation 
processes in the 
Agriculture and 
Energy sectors 

Energy outcomes 

Outcomes in 
Agriculture 

As  mentioned  above,  some  specific  performance  indicators  contributed  to 
improving  (financial)  reporting  by  districts.  In  addition,  budget  support 
resources may have contributed to an expansion of local government staff.  

In  both  Energy  and  Agriculture,  budget  support  has  contributed  a  little  to 
improved policies. In Energy, the policy dialogue and performance indicators 
contributed to setting more realistic policy goals and to a greater application 
of least-cost electricity generation planning – although the latter was still not 
optimal by 2019. The EU, together with other DPs, also managed to reach an 
agreement with GoR on more realistic standards for solar systems, which may 
contribute to the further expansion of off-grid connections. The most recent 
strategic plan for Agriculture is of better quality than the previous ones. It has 
benefitted  from  consultations  with  all  involved  DPs  and  with  farmers’ 
organizations,  civil  society  organisations  and  the  private  sector.  EU  budget 
support  and  other  EU  interventions  have  contributed  to  this  participatory 
process.  EU  policy  dialogue  and  performance  indicators  led  to  some 
improvements in (local) service delivery in energy and agriculture. 

The improved planning of the electricity system, to which budget support has 
contributed,  may  lead  to  reduced  energy  costs  in  the  future.  This  is  very 
important as energy costs in Rwanda are currently among the highest in Sub-
Saharan  Africa.  Access  to  energy,  both  on-grid  and  off-grid,  increased,  but 
there is little evidence that budget support contributed to this increase. In the 
first years of the EU budget support to the energy sector the public budget for 
energy decreased and this was probably a key factor in explaining the failure 
to achieve government targets for the number of new on-grid connections. In 
the last year of the evaluation period, both budget support funds and the policy 
dialogue may have played a positive role in improved access to energy.  

Government policies that were underpinned by budget support also set out to 
increase  the  share  of  renewable  energy  sources  (RES)  and  to  improve  the 
balance  between  supply  and  demand  of  biomass  resources,  in  particular 
through increasing the use of improved cook stoves. In the latter two areas, the 
effect of the EU efforts was limited to some increased awareness among policy 
makers of their importance. And although the quantity of electricity generated 
from RES increased somewhat, mainly due to favourable weather conditions, 
the share of RES in total generation capacity did not. The fact that the indicator 
was formulated as an increase of electricity generated from RES as compared 
to the previous year did not contribute to achieving the objective of reducing 
the share of traditional and polluting energy sources. 

The  budget  support  funds  appear  to  have  supported  the  government’s 
agricultural modernisation policies. These policies led to higher production of 
the priority crops maize, paddy rice, wheat, beans, Irish potatoes and cassava, 
as well as of meat. Overall growth of the agriculture sector was high at 5.5%. 
This led to increased food self-sufficiency at the national level. However, this 
growth did not bring improved food security and dietary diversity to the farm 
families who were producing these high-priority crops. 

The  agricultural  modernisation  policies  also  led  to  an  expansion  of  area 
cropped,  but  this  often  had  the  unintended  effect  of  contributing  to 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nutrition 

Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 
Final report:Volume I 

ix 

deforestation, soil depletion, erosion and more vulnerability to climate change. 
In order to counter this increased vulnerability, the government has invested 
in  irrigation,  land  terracing  and  agroforestry,  but  coverage  is  still  low  and 
quality  of  design  and  implementation  is  not  always  adequate.  Progress  in 
applying climate resilience practices, another objective of budget support, has 
so far been limited. 
The  EU  feeder  roads  programme  has  contributed  to  the  expansion  and 
rehabilitation  of  the  feeder  road  network,  which  has  been  shown  to  reduce 
poverty and inequality in the rural communities served by these roads.  

EU  budget  support  has  contributed  somewhat  to  reducing  malnutrition  in 
Rwanda.  This  mainly  arose  as  a  result  of  specific  programmes  and 
complementary measures in the area of nutrition, and less so by programmes 
that  supported  government  policies  aimed  at 
increasing  agricultural 
production.  

More  concretely,  EU  support  to  the  National  Multisectoral  Strategy  to 
Eliminate Malnutrition contributed to a reduction in stunting (low height-for-
age  in  children)  from  43%  in  2012  to  35%  in  2018,    and  to  a  reduction  in 
wasting (low weight-for-height) among pregnant women, from 7 to 1% in the 
same  period.  However,  stunting  prevalence  is  still  considered  “high”  by 
international standards. 

Impact on economic 
growth 

Rwanda  had  a  high  economic  growth  rate  over  the  evaluation  period, 
averaging  7.3%  per  annum.  Budget  support  funds  have  contributed  to  this 
growth. The fiscal space provided by the budget support resources has been 
used to  fund public investment,  which has been the key driver of Rwandan 
growth over the period. 

Impact on poverty 
and equality 

Over the long run (since 2005), poverty and inequality have been reduced in 
Rwanda, but between the two latest household surveys (2013/14 and 2016/17) 
the reduction in income poverty was very small and not statistically significant 
–  despite  the  high  growth  rates.  In  fact,  the  growth  elasticity  of  poverty 
reduction in Rwanda between 2001 and 2017 was less than 20%, and much 
lower than in comparable countries such as Senegal, Burkina Faso or Uganda.3 
This low elasticity and the stagnation in poverty reduction can be explained by 
structural factors, but also in part by government policies that have become 
less  pro-poor  over  time.  EU  budget  support  has  attempted,  through  policy 
dialogue  and  other 
their 
implementation more inclusive, but this was not very successful.  

to  make  government  policies  and 

inputs, 

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS 

OVERALL 

A continuation of EU 
budget support 

Given  its  potential  for  systemic  change,  EU  budget  support  should  be 
continued. The relative importance of budget support in the EU’s overall 

3 World Bank (2019), Rwanda: Systematic Country Diagnostic.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
x  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

Final report: Volume I 

aid portfolio should be dependent on the level of commitment by GoR and 
EU to the key conditions for making budget support more effective. These 
key conditions are elucidated in the recommendations presented below. 
Should full commitment to the implementation of these recommendations 
not be evident, the EU may consider a more balanced approach, carefully 
paying  attention  to  the  possibilities  of  other  aid  modalities,  including 
project aid, for achieving policy objectives.  

Budget  support  has  provided  the  fiscal  space  to  drive  economic  growth 
through  public  investment  but  its  impact  on  institutions,  policies  and  their 
implementation has in most instances been limited. It is important to improve 
the conditions for effective budget support in line with the recommendations 
that follow below. At the same time, earmarked support in the form of project 
aid,  or  budget  support  operations  with  a  strong  output  focus  like  the  Rural 
Feeder Roads programme, have been shown to achieve more concrete results 
and impact. Project aid also allows for the provision of direct support to civil 
society, private sector and to vulnerable groups or regions. Depending on the 
progress made in implementing the recommendations, the EU may consider a 
larger share of project support in the aid portfolio. 

Recommendation for EU and GoR. 

Higher level GoR 
engagement for 
effective policy 
dialogue 

In future budget support operations, a higher government level should be 
engaged in the HLPD, for example the Prime Minister’s Office and/or the 
President’s Office, in addition to the ministers.  

Although fora for the sector policy dialogues and for the dialogue on Public 
Finance Management do exist, the top-down planning existing in Rwanda and 
the  fact  that  the  highest  decision-making  levels  are  absent  from  these 
dialogues, limit their effectiveness. In practice, the existing policy dialogues 
are more effective for discussing operational issues than for more fundamental 
policy issues. For all these reasons, it is essential that any future budget support 
operations secure a regular policy dialogue between the EU and the highest 
decision-making levels.  It may be considered to  alternate  meetings with the 
highest  levels  (“summit  HLPD”)  with  regular  HLPD  meetings,  while  also 
strengthening  reporting  channels  between  GoR  representatives  in  the  latter 
meetings and higher GoR officials. 

Recommendation for EU and GoR. 

Providing for a 
macro-economic 
dialogue 

In future budget support operations, it would be desirable to re-establish 
a macro-economic dialogue between the GoR and the EU, other concerned 
donors, and the IMF.  

Given the large volume of EU budget support grants, it is important that the 
EU  is  able  to  discuss  macro-economic  and  fiscal  policies  with  the  GoR.   
Currently there is no adequate forum for discussing these policies in Rwanda. 
The  re-establishment  of  a  macro-economic  dialogue  between  GoR  and  all 
concerned donors (EU, World Bank, etc.) plus the IMF would solve this issue. 
Preferably, this dialogue should be held more than once a year. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 
Final report:Volume I 

xi 

Recommendation for EU and GoR. 

Support to the private 
sector, civil society 
and farmers’ 
organisations 
continues to be 
important 

In, or next to, future budget support operations, the EU should continue, 
and  increase,  support  to  private  sector,  civil  society  and  farmers’ 
organisations to strengthen them, to promote their participation in SWGs and 
TWGs and to help them engage in policy-making, policy implementation and 
M&E  processes.  This  can  be  done  through  Complementary  Measures  and 
through project interventions. 

Recommendation for EU. 

More attention to 
improving the 
management and use 
of data 

The  government  should  dedicate  more  attention  and  resources  to 
improving information management and use of data.  

It may consider the establishment of a national quality assurance system for 
M&E  at  the  level  of  MINECOFIN,  Prime  Minister’s  Office  (PMO)  or 
President’s  Office.  Such  a  high-level  M&E  system  would  benefit  from 
engagement of civil society and private sector representatives, as well as from 
support from Development Partners.  

Recommendation for GoR. 

More attention to 
cross-cutting issues 

In the future budget support operations, more attention should be paid to 
cross-cutting issues, in particular to the Rights-Based Approach (RBA), 
gender equality and climate change.  

These cross-cutting issues should not only be mentioned in project documents, 
but  they  should  be  effectively  applied  and  monitored  during  the  whole 
implementation period. 

Recommendation for EU and GoR. 

The need to have a 
permanent dialogue 
on scope and content 
of Technical 
Assistance 

Complementary  measures  including  Technical  Assistance  should  be 
continued.  

A better and more permanent policy dialogue between EUD and beneficiary 
institutions  is  essential  to  harmonize  expectations  about  the  objectives  and 
scope of Technical Assistance, and this dialogue should also lead to agreement 
on the institutional reforms to be achieved with this assistance. 

Recommendation for EU and GoR. 

Continue innovative 
efforts for increasing 
visibility of EU and 
its activities and 
values 

The EU should continue its innovative approach for making the EU, its 
activities and values visible in Rwanda. 

It is difficult to increase the visibility of results of budget support programmes 
since  all  results  are  achieved  through  national  government  budgets  and 
policies. The EU should therefore continue its innovative visibility strategy in 
which resources from both project aid and budget support are pooled in a way 
that targets the overall visibility of the EU Rwanda.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xii  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

Final report: Volume I 

Recommendation for EU.   

The careful selection 
of an appropriate mix 
of performance 
indicators 

In  future  budget  support  operations,  performance  indicators  for  the 
variable tranches should be a mix of process, policy, output and outcome 
indicators.  

Continuing to 
improve energy 
policies 

Both EU and GoR should pay careful attention at the design stage to discussing 
and  agreeing  upon  the  definitions,  measurement  and  methods  of  data 
collection  of  the  indicators,  including  their  reference  values.  Indicators  that 
cannot  be  measured  in  a  reliable  way  should  not  be  included.  In  addition, 
indicators should be designed in  such a way that there is  at  least  some link 
between government efforts and the achievement of the indicator. 

Recommendation for EU and GoR. 

A future budget support operation in Energy should continue to focus on 
support for improving policies and in particular on the application of least-
cost  system  planning  with  emphasis  on  demand-side  management,  on 
improving  M&E  systems,  on  increasing  the  share  of  renewable  energy 
resources,  on  reducing  the  gap  between  supply  and  demand  of  biomass 
resources  and  on  increasing  the  use  of  improved  cooking  stoves.    In 
considering future budget support for the sector, careful consideration should 
also be given to the potential for blended finance.  

Recommendation for EU and GoR. 

Towards an 
improved indicator 
for RES 

A possible approach for developing an effective indicator for an increase 
in Renewable Energy Sources (RES) involves an open and participatory 
planning  process  for  developing  an  energy  generation  expansion  path. 
This agreed path may serve as basis for an agreed time schedule for the 
construction and dispatch of renewable energy generation.  

Reliance  on  an  indicator  emphasizing  the  actual  construction  of  RES 
generation  is  preferable  to  using  the  current  indicator,  which  assesses  the 
actual annual output of RES generation and may result in payments favouring 
good atmospheric conditions rather than the actual RES capacity development. 

Recommendation for EU and GoR. 

Continuing to 
improve policies in 
agriculture and 
nutrition. 

Future budget support programmes in agriculture and nutrition should 
focus on support for improving policies, such that more attention is paid to 
farmers’  participation,  improving  climate  resilience,  fostering  agricultural 
research and extension services, avoiding the side effects of current policies 
(such  as  soil  depletion,  deforestation  and  erosion),  and  improving  food 
security at  household  level.  In addition,  they should  focus on strengthening 
implementation capacities and on strengthening capacities for M&E. 

Recommendation for EU and GoR. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 
Final report:Volume I 

1 

1. INTRODUCTION 
The European Commission has commissioned a team of consultants led by GDSI, Ireland, to evaluate 
EU budget support to Rwanda over the period 2011-2018. The general purpose of the evaluation is:4 

  To  provide  the  parties  involved  in  this  evaluation  and  the  wider  public  with  an  overall 

independent assessment of budget support operations to Rwanda. 

  To identify key lessons and to produce recommendations to improve current and inform future 

cooperation with Rwanda. 

The evaluation is to be used by the EU Headquarters and the EU Delegation in Rwanda, the European 
External Action Service (EEAS), the Government of Rwanda (GoR), in particular the Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN), the Ministry of Infrastructure (MININFRA), the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources (MINAGRI) and other agencies involved. In addition, 
the results may benefit other Development Partners in the sectors covered by this evaluation, as well 
as civil society, researchers, farmer organisations and the private sector. The evaluation is also meant 
to  serve  as  mid-term  evaluation  of  the  on-going  Sector  Reform  Contracts  in  the  Agriculture  and 
Energy sectors.  Finally, the evaluation results  are expected to inform the new 6-year cycle of EU 
cooperation with Rwanda.  

This  main  report  summarizes  the  results  of  our  assessment  of  EU  budget  support  operations  in 
Rwanda and outlines the key conclusions and recommendations. The content of this main report is 
based on detailed findings as provided in Volume II (Annex 1). This Introduction discusses the scope 
of the evaluation and the methodology applied, and it briefly sketches the context for the evaluation.  

1.1.  Management of the evaluation 

The overall evaluation process was led by a Management Group (MG). The MG is composed of a 
representative  of  the  Ministry  of  Economics  and  Finance  (MINECOFIN)  on  behalf  of  the 
Government of Rwanda, a representative of the EU Delegation in Rwanda, and  representatives of 
EEAS and of several concerned services of DG DEVCO (04 Evaluation, C1 Agriculture, C6 Energy, 
and A4 Budget Support). The Evaluation Manager in the DG DEVCO Evaluation Unit had a pivotal 
role in facilitating the evaluation process and assuring its quality.  Members of the MG have assisted 
the evaluators by providing information and access to key stakeholders in the country. In addition, 
they  have  provided  valuable  comments  to  drafts  of  the  Inception  Report,  Desk  Report,  and  Final 
report. 

In parallel with the MG, a Country Reference Group was established in order to provide feedback to 
the  MG  and  to  also  review  draft  reports.  Members  of  the  Country  Reference  Group  included 
stakeholders from other ministries and agencies concerned, representatives of the private sector, civil 
society,  farmers’  organisations,  other  Development  Partners,  and  academics.  It  was  chaired  by  a 
member of the EU Delegation. The Country Reference Group discussed the draft Inception Report 
and the draft Final Report. 

1.2.  Scope of the evaluation 

The evaluation covers ten budget support operations of the European Commission. They comprise 
one  General  Budget  Support  operation  and  nine  Sector  Budget  Support  programmes.  One  Sector 
Budget Support programme focuses on the Justice, Reconciliation, Law and Order (JRLO) sector, 

4 Terms of Reference see Annex 3 of Volume II of the report. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

Final report: Volume I 

one on Social Protection, six are related to Agriculture and Nutrition, and one focuses on the Energy 
sector (Figure 1).  

The EU budget support resources could be spent by the Government of Rwanda (GoR) at its own 
discretion. They were accompanied by policy dialogue and by so-called “complementary measures”, 
resources earmarked for specific activities. In addition, for each (usually) annual disbursement, the 
Government of Rwanda (GoR) had to meet four general eligibility criteria (for disbursement of the 
fixed tranches) as well as specific performance indicators (determining the extent of disbursement on 
the variable tranches). The evaluation therefore covers the four different inputs of budget support: 

  Financial resources 
  Policy dialogue on (sector) strategies, policies and implementation 
  General eligibility criteria and disbursement indicators 
  Complementary measures. 

The  total  commitment  on  the  ten  operations  was  €  725 million.  Some  programmes  started  before 
2011, and some committed amounts were not paid during the evaluation period, either because they 
were not due yet or because variable tranches were not paid or complementary measures not (yet) 
agreed upon.5  The total actually disbursed amount during the evaluation period was therefore € 538 
million.  The large majority of this,  € 527 million,  was  for the budget  support component and the 
remainder was for the complementary measures. 

The general eligibility conditions that had to be met for the fixed tranches of the (usually) annual 
disbursements covered three topic areas: sector policies, macro-economic management and stability, 
and Public Finance Management (PFM). From 2015 onwards, a fourth eligibility criterion was added, 
namely  that  of  Transparency.  Disbursements  indicators  for  the  variable  tranches  included  process 
(policy)  and  outcome  related  indicators.  The  majority  of  these  indicators  was  assessed  to  be  met; 
some of them were not (fully) met and this led to postponement or disallowance of part of the planned 
disbursement.  Most  complementary  measures  were  technical  assistance  activities,  but  they  also 
included studies, evaluations, communication activities, and audits.6 

In line with its Terms of Reference, the sector focus of this evaluation is on Agriculture and Nutrition, 
and Energy. These are also the sectors covered by the most recent, and still ongoing, Sector Reform 
Contracts (Figure 1). This evaluation also examines outcomes for the two general entry conditions, 
namely macroeconomic management and stability, and PFM and transparency. In addition, it looks 
at  outcomes  for  decentralization  and  local  governance  –  both  of  which  are  important  for  service 
delivery  in  agriculture  and  nutrition  and  discussed  in  the  policy  dialogues  around  PFM  and 
agriculture.  

5 See Annex 3 of Volume II of the report for details on the object of the evaluation. 
6 Five of the ten operations did not include Complementary Measures, see Annex 4, Object of evaluation.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Figure 1: Overview of the ten EU budget support programmes, with time period and committed amounts (including Complementary Measures)  

Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 
Final report:Volume I 

3 

2008 

2009 
MDG / General Budget Support – M€ 166.25  

2011 

2010 

2012 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

2019 

2020 

2021 

JRLO – M€ 14.5  

Social Protection -M€ 20  

Agriculture intensification – M € 15.5 

Decentralised Agriculture – M€ 39.6 (+M€ 0.4 complementary measures) 

GCCA – M€ 8.5  

Rural feeder roads – M€ 36 (+ M€ 4 complementary measures) 

Eliminate Malnutrition – M€ 28 (+ M€ 0.2 complementary 
measures) 

Agriculture SRC –M€ 182 (+ M€ 20  complementary measures) 

Energy SRC – M€ 156 (+ M€ 21 complementary measures) 

 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

Final report: Volume I 

1.3.  Methodology and data collection 

This  evaluation  applies  the  Comprehensive  Evaluation  Framework  (CEF)  recommended  by  the 
OECD/DAC.7  This Framework is based on an intervention logic of budget support, consisting of 
five levels: inputs, direct outputs, induced outputs, outcomes, and impact. Taking into account the 
effects of other inputs (government resources and policies, other external assistance) and other factors 
(for instance weather conditions, changes in export prices), and if a number of assumptions is met, 
the  intervention  logic  (or  CEF)  reflects  the  causal  chain  through  which  budget  support  inputs  are 
expected to contribute to the envisaged  impact. Figure 2 presents the CEF that formed the basis for 
this evaluation. 

Following  these  five  levels,  our  Inception  Report  has  formulated  nine  Evaluation  Questions  with 
several corresponding Judgement Criteria and Indicators.8 Table 1 shows the main topics of the nine 
Evaluation Questions (EQ) and the relationship between EQ and level of analysis.  

Table 1: Correspondence Evaluation Questions, level and steps of analysis, and chapter in this main report 

Evaluation Question (EQ) 

Level 

Number 
of EQ 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 

7 
8 
9 

Relevance of the design of budget support 
Direct outputs  
Macro-economic management 
Public Finance Management 
Local governance 
implementation 
Policy 
processes,  in  particular  in  Agriculture  and 
Energy sectors 
Outcomes in energy  
Outcomes in agriculture and nutrition 
Impact on growth and poverty reduction 
All 

formulation 

and 

1: Inputs 
2: Direct outputs 
3: Induced outputs 

Step 

1 

Chapter in main 
report 
2 
3 
4 

5 (Energy) 
6 (Agriculture) 

4: Outcomes 

5: Impact 
All 

2 

3 

5 
6 
7 
All 

The CEF also distinguishes between three steps in the analysis. Step 1 covers inputs, direct outputs 
and induced outputs (levels 1, 2 and 3) and EQs 1-6 (Table 1). It involves a contribution analysis, 
tracing the causal links from inputs, via direct outputs to induced outputs, taking all other possibly 
influencing factors into account. Step 2 first identifies the actual outcomes and impact (levels 4 and 
5) as intended by the government, and then examines what the determining factors for these outcomes 
and impact variables are. It covers evaluation questions 7, 8 and 9 and involves an attribution analysis. 
In order to identify causal factors for the outcomes in energy and agriculture, in particular, we carried 
out an econometric analysis. Throughout all five levels of analysis, we also looked for unintended 
side effects of budget support. Step 3 brings steps 1 and 2 together, and again involves a contribution 
analysis.  The  preliminary  findings  for  step  1  and  2  are  compared  and  then  reassessed  in  order  to 
identify, in a qualitative way, the contribution of budget support to government policies and to the 
outcomes and impact that budget support programmes intended to achieve. All chapters in this report 
reflect this reassessment. 

7 Van der Linde, M., & Valmarana, C. (2012). Evaluating budget support: Methodological approach. Report of the Budget Support 
Evaluation Steering Group. Paris: OECD DAC.  
8  See Annex 5 for the full Evaluation Matrix.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Figure 2: Comprehensive Evaluation Framework 

Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 
Final report:Volume I 

5 

 
 
 
 
6  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

Final report: Volume I 

The findings are based on an extensive study of documents and on a large number of interviews and 
focus  groups  discussions.9  Documentary  evidence  included  policy  documents,  reports,  studies, 
evaluations, and statistics available on the web and provided by the EU and GoR, as well as academic 
literature (see Annex 8 for the full list). We conducted interviews with: 

  Policy officers of the EU (in Brussels and in Kigali) 
  Policy officers of GoR, both at central and local level 
  Representatives of other Development Partners,  
  Civil society organizations  
  Private sector organisations and representatives 
  Members of Parliament 
  Consultants involved in Technical Assistance 
  Other independent experts.  

In total, more than 100 interviews and focus groups discussions were conducted.10 In carrying out 
such a wide consultation exercise, the team assured triangulation of findings.   

The team members visited Rwanda twice (excluding the dissemination phase). There was a first visit 
of one week in May 2019, in which the evaluation was presented and discussed with all stakeholders 
and a first round of interviews was held. Following the preparation of Inception and Desk Reports, a 
second visit to Rwanda was made in October 2019, with the aim of filling in remaining data gaps and 
to verify and expand the preliminary answers. After the second visit, the team recorded all (final) 
evidence according to JCs and indicators (Volume II, Annex 1), and, on this basis, prepared the main 
report. 

1.4. Context11 

Rwanda is a small landlocked country in Eastern Africa, with a population of 12.3 million. Around 
one million people live in the capital, Kigali. It has an annual Gross National Income per capita of 
US$  780,  which  means  it  is  still  classified  as  a  low-income  country.  The  country  has  a  turbulent 
history. The political and economic context is still heavily influenced by the genocide that took place 
in 1994, which had an important impact on the human and institutional capacities in the country. 

Since  1994,  the  Rwanda  Patriotic  Front  under  the  leadership  of  President  Paul  Kagame  runs  the 
country.  Rwanda  has  been  praised  as  a  highly  successful  developmental  state.12  The  country  has 
experienced  high  growth  rates,  7.3  %  on  average  between  2000  and  2018.  According  to  official 
figures, the poverty rate reduced from 60% in 2001 to 38% in 2017.13 Furthermore, it is, together with 
Cape Verde, perceived to be one of the least corrupt countries in Africa.14  

On the other hand, many academics point to the authoritarian features of the Rwandan state and the 
limited political space for civil society and citizens in general.15 Rwanda had a score of 22 (out of 
100) on political rights and civil liberties in the 2020 Freedom of the World Index, which means that 

9 See Annex 5 for a full description of the data collection methods. 
10 Annex 7 contains the full list. 
11 See Annex 6 for full country background. 
12 Booth, D., & Golooba-Mutebi, F. (2012). Development patrimonialism? The case of Rwanda. African Affairs, 111(444), 379-403.  
13 NISR 2018, EICV 2016/17 main report. 
14 Transparency International report 2017. 
15 Matfess, H. (2015). ‘Rwanda and Ethiopia: Developmental authoritarianism and the new politics of African strong men’. African 
Studies Review, 58 (2), pp. 181-204.  Purdeková, A. (2011). 'Even if I am not here, there are so many eyes': Surveillance and state 
reach  in  Rwanda.  The  Journal  of  Modern  African  Studies,  49(3),  475-497.  Thomson,  S.  (2011).  Whispering  truth  to  power:  The 
everyday resistance of Rwandan peasants to post-genocide reconciliation. African Affairs, 100(440), pp. 439-456.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 
Final report:Volume I 

7 

the  country  is  characterized  as  “not  free”.16  Some  scholars  argue  that  despite  clear  progress  in  a 
number of development indicators, the level of inequality (at the start of our evaluation period) was 
still very high and that this may pose a threat to sustainable development in the country.17 

As compared to many other Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, Rwanda has a strong ownership 
of  its  national  policies  and  has  formulated  clear  and  ambitious  development  goals.  The  (current) 
National  Strategy  for  Transformation  (NST  1,  2018-2024),  for  example,  aims  to  achieve  upper 
middle-income status by 2035. Government officials have a high commitment to national objectives. 
One factor contributing to this is the Imihigo system.  Government officials at all levels, and even 
households, promise to achieve annual performance targets. These targets are based on the national 
development strategies and are strictly monitored. The flipside of this system is that monitoring and 
accountability  focus  solely  on  the  agreed  targets  and  indicators,  disregarding  other  development 
objectives or objectives that cannot be easily measured. The Imihigo system on the one hand increases 
the country’s implementation capacity, as government officials give priority to the achievement of 
the targets. On the other hand, they may weaken these capacities in so far as other objectives and less 
measurable priorities are concerned. 

Over the years, donors have generously supported the government’s ambitious development plans. 
Although aid in relation to the country’s Gross National Income (GNI) declined over the evaluation 
period, it still represented 13.8% of GNI in 2017.18 Since 2008 the government has implemented a 
Division of Labour, according to which donors are assigned to specific sectors. 

From 2000 onward, many donors began to provide general budget support (GBS) in a harmonized 
framework. The EU joined in 2003. However, in 2008 the international enthusiasm for GBS began 
to wane, and in 2012, when a UN report showed that Rwanda was actively supporting military groups 
in neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo in 2012,19 donors suspended GBS and the dialogue 
framework around GBS was dismantled. Most donors switched to project aid, but some (EU and UK) 
started  to  provide  Sector  Budget  Support,  while  the  World  Bank  continued  with  (sector)  policy 
development loans.  

1.5.  Structure of this report 

This main report summarizes the evaluation results, highlighting key messages. The chapter structure 
broadly  follows  the  order  of  the  Evaluation  Questions,  with  chapter  2  covering  EQ  1,  chapter  3 
covering EQ 2, and chapter 4 covering EQs 3, 4 and 5 (Table 1). Chapters 5 and 6 each focus on one 
of the main sectors of EU budget support: Energy, and Agriculture plus Nutrition. Finally, chapter 7 
presents the conclusions and covers EQ 9, and chapter 8 presents the recommendations. At the start 
of chapters 2-6 in this main report a reference is made to the paragraphs in Annex 1 in Volume 2 
where more information can be found. 

16 Freedom House, Freedom of the World Index 2020. https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores 
17 Ansoms, A., & Rostagno, D. (2012). Rwanda's vision 2020 halfway through: What the eye does not see. Review of African Political 
Economy, 39(133), 427-450. Reyntjens, F. (2014). Political governance in post-genocide Rwanda. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
18 World Development Indicators, accessed 30 January 2020. The average over 2009-2011 was 18.1%. 
19Un Security Council, Addendum to the interim report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2012/348) 
concerning 
of  Rwanda. 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/DRC%20S%202012%20348%20ADD%201.pdf 

the  Government 

violations 

sanctions 

embargo 

regime 

arms 

and 

the 

by 

of 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

Final report: Volume I 

2. THE RELEVANCE OF BUDGET SUPPORT  
This  Chapter  presents  the  answer  to  EQ1:  To  what  extent  was  the  design  of  the  budget  support 
programmes appropriate and relevant in view of the political, economic and social context in Rwanda, 
the GoR’s policy framework, and the EU and other Development Partners’ development strategies? 
Additional information can be found in Annex 1, in particular JC 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and I 2.3.1 and I 2.3.3. 

After an assessment of the extent of alignment of budget support programmes with country policies 
and context and with EU and other Development Partners’ development strategies, the bulk of this 
chapter  is  dedicated  to  an  assessment  of  the  relevance,  quality  and  adequateness  of  the  design  of 
budget  support  programmes,  and  in  particular  of  the  performance  indicators  and  complementary 
measures.  

2.1.  Alignment  with  GoR  policies  and  with  EU  and  other  DPs  development 

strategies 

EU budget support interventions are highly relevant for the implementation of the GoR’s own 
policies and strategies.  

All budget support operations during the reference period are strongly aligned with the national policy 
framework, for example, with Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy – EDPRS I 
(2008-2012),  EDPRS  II  (2013-2018)  and  sector  policies  (see  Annex  1,  JC  1.1,  Table  18).  By 
supporting  GoR’s  own  policies,  the  EU  has,  in  principle,  assured  relevance  and  ownership  of  the 
budget support interventions. 

Overall, budget support inputs – a combination of financial inputs, dialogue, performance indicators 
and in most cases complementary measures – were appropriate and relevant in the political, economic 
and social context in Rwanda. They were suitable to support the achievement, to the extent possible,   
of expected government policy outcomes.  Interviews and the documentary review carried out show 
that the EUD was well aware of the political, macroeconomic or governance-related risks threatening 
the success of budget support and cared about mitigating them.  Budget support programmes were 
designed by the EUD in dialogue with Rwandan sector ministries and the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning (MINECOFIN).  

Budget Support programmes are well coordinated with EU and other Development Partners’ 
development strategies. The EU budget support operations show a high level of coherence with the 
EU Cooperation Strategy and National  Indicative Programmes (NIP).  This coherence was almost 
complete under the 11th EDF and NIP 2014-2020, when the two big Sector Reform Contracts were 
signed  as foreseen in  the NIP (for agriculture/nutrition and energy sectors). During the 10th EDF, 
several smaller sector budget support programmes were signed that were not explicitly mentioned in 
the  NIP,  but  were  in  line  with  it.  They  were  financed  under  the  Global  Climate  Change  Alliance 
(GCCA). EU budget support is also in line with EU global strategic orientations. The EU is committed 
to  international  aid  effectiveness  principles,  according  to  which  budget  support  is  the  preferred 
implementation modality.20 In 2013, the EU made the strategic decision to favour SBS above GBS, 
and Rwanda was considered to meet the conditions for SBS quite well, with rather good systems for 
policy planning, implementation and to some extent also monitoring.21 However, there are also some 
limitations in the capacities of GoR to implement their policies, and the policy-implementation gap 

20 See, for example, the Agenda for Change (2011) and the European Consensus on Development (2017).  
21 Interview with DEVCO staff. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 
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9 

seems  to  have  widened  over  the  evaluation  period  due  to,  among  other  factors,  the  increasing 
complexity of policies.22  

There is evidence that the EU has taken into account the interventions of other Development Partners 
(DPs).23  Coordination with  the strategies of other  DPs  is  done by the GoR, which  assigns certain 
sectors to specific donors in the framework of the Division of Labour, and through discussions in the 
Sector Working Groups (see also next Chapter). 

2.2.  Quality of performance assessment frameworks 

The  quality  of  most  performance  indicators  in  terms  of  relevance,  ownership,  coverage  and 
measurability were found to be usually good, but there were a few exceptions, particularly in 
cases where the achievement of the targets was largely beyond government control. There is an 
appropriate distribution between fixed and variable tranches. 

The  quality  of  design  of  budget  support  operations  is  high  and  generally  respects  the  EU  budget 
support guidelines. Almost all budget support disbursements comprised a fixed and a variable tranche. 
The  fixed  tranche  would  be  disbursed  if  the  general  entry  conditions  regarding  macro-economic 
management, PFM24 and sector policies were positively assessed. The variable tranche was linked to 
the  achievement  of  predefined  performance  indicators.  The  exception  was  SBS  for  Agricultural 
Intensification  (D-21623)  which  only  had  a  fixed  tranche.  In  most  cases  the  fixed  tranche 
corresponded to between 50% and 70% of the programme value, with the performance component 
accounting for between 30% and 50% (Table 2). Budget support performance frameworks are part of 
the formal agreements established between the EU and GoR (Financing Agreements) and as such, a 
regular dialogue is held on them. 

The mixture of variable and fixed tranches assured, on the one hand, a certain predictable inflow of 
funds thanks to the fixed tranches;25 on the other hand, it gave an incentive to the Government of 
Rwanda to achieve the foreseen indicators for variable tranches. In this way, the EU could encourage 
progress  in  policy  making  and/or  implementation.  Discussions  related  to  the  indicators  and  their 
achievement proved to be a good instrument for maintaining the dialogue around progress in policy 
implementation. 

Table 2: Fixed tranches in EU budget support operations, also in percent 

Programme / Year 

D-21004 MDG (no complete FA available)  

GCCA (1)D-21553 Environment and Natural 
Resources  
D-21572 Decentralised Agriculture  
D- 21623 Agricultural Intensification  

D-21680 SBS for the JRLO Sector  
D-22173 SBS Social Protection 
D-23259 Feeder Roads  

D-24780 SBS Nutrition  

Fixed 
tranche M€  
122.5 

Total in M€  
(excluding CM) 
175 

Fixed Tranche, in % 
of total excluding CM 
70.0 

2.3 

20.6 

15.5 
8 
13 

24 

16 

4.555 

39.6 

15.5 
12 
20 

36 

28 

50.5 

52.0 

100.0 
67.0 
65.0 

66.7 

57.1 

22 Interview EUD staff. 
23 See the donor matrix, showing which donor is active in the different sector, in NIP 2014-2020.  
24 From 2015 onward, transparency was added to PFM. 
25 Although fixed tranches theoretically could be withheld, in practice they were always disbursed, as the overall assessment of the 
general entry conditions was positive. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
10  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

Final report: Volume I 

GCCA (2)D-37416 Land administration and 
land-use monitoring 
D-37486 Agriculture and Food SRC  
D-38107 Energy SCR  

2 

85 
104 

4 

182 
156 

50.0 

46.7 
66.7 

Performance indicators in general had a good coverage of the sectors and were relevant for triggering 
improved sector performance. Most indicators were of good quality, in the sense of being formulated 
in such a way that the government had an incentive to reach the target.  However, the evaluation team 
identified a few indicators that were (partly) beyond control of government institutions. This holds 
true, for example, for the increase in off-grid energy connections of Solar Home Systems (for which 
private sector is largely responsible) and for the indicator stipulating an annual increase in energy 
generation from renewable resources (solar, hydro, wind).  This increase depends to a large extent on 
weather conditions so does not have an incentive effect on the government. To some extent, it also 
holds true for indicators on food security. 

Budget  support  programmes  had  a  mixture  of  process,  policy,  output  and  outcome  indicators.  In 
practice output indicators  were more likely to be met than the other types of indicators (Table 3). 
However, this does not mean that they were more relevant or more successful in triggering change. 
They may simply have been easier to meet. It is not possible to draw a conclusion on the relative 
strength of the different types of indicators for fostering desired processes, policies or programme 
objectives. The relative value of the various indicator types depends on the specific context of the 
sector   

Table 3: Performance indicators of the ten EU budget support contracts, by type and by success (met, partially 
met or not met), in number and in percent of total 

In absolute numbers 

In percent 

Type of 
indicator 
Process 

Policy 

Output 

Outcome 
PFM1 

Met 

Not met 

10 

5 

31 

17 

23 

3 

2 

2 

5 

2 

Partially 
met2 
3 

4 

1 

Total  Type of 

Met 

Not met  Partially 

Total 

indicator 

16  Process 

7  Policy 

33  Output 

26  Outcome 

26  PFM 

63 

71 

94 

65 

88 

19 

29 

6 

19 

8 

met2 
19 

0 

0 

15 

4 

100 

100 

100 

100 

100 

63 

Total 

82  Total 
 1Indicators related to Public Finance Management (PFM) are sometimes classified as process, and sometimes as outcome, depending on the objective 
of the budget support programme; for this reason they are also separately listed (in italics). The total in the last row only includes them once.    
2 This category also includes met later (once case) and not clear (one case). 

100 

12 

77 

15 

9 

7 

Sources: Financing Agreements and Disbursement Notes of the ten contracts. 

Performance indicators were usually based on national strategies, thus guaranteeing their ownership. 
The  EUD  organized  specific  meetings  for  agreeing  on  the  indicators  and  on  how,  and  by  which 
institution, they would be measured and reported. The outcomes of these discussions were clearly 
laid down in the FAs. Nevertheless, in some cases the GoR was not able to meet the targets, and 
disbursements related to a specific variable tranche were reduced or had to be postponed. Sometimes 
Rwandan partners faced difficulties in presenting the evidence for the achievement of the targets due 
to inadequate monitoring and reporting, and in other cases the targets were not achieved.  In both 
cases, there may have been some issues with the design of the programme, and in particular, with the 
formulation of performance indicators and targets, as will be shown below. 

Interviews  with  EUD  and  GoR  officials  reveal  that  GoR  officials  sometimes  had  not  sufficiently 
understood the definitions of the indicators and/or how the data should be measured and collected. 
Rwandan officials suggested that they had sometimes accepted the proposed indicators, even though 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 
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11 

they did not fully understand the exact definition of indicators or the data collection process – in order 
not to delay the approval of the budget support programme. Furthermore, due to staff rotation the 
persons participating in the discussions on indicators were not necessarily still in function when it 
came  to  reporting.  As  a  result,  the  National  Institute  of  Statistics  Rwanda  (NISR)  or  the  sector 
performance  monitoring  systems  were  not  able  to  present  the  data  when  needed.  In  some  cases, 
administrative  information  was  provided  which  was  not  considered  valid  evidence  for  the 
achievement of the indicators.26 However, it sometimes also happened, for example in the Agriculture 
SRC, that insufficient attention and resources were allocated to the measurement of the indicators.   

Some targets were not achieved because they were probably set at too high a level; in other cases, the 
resources provided to the sector institution (budget, staff) were not sufficient. Interviews with EUD 
staff  and  government  officials  suggest  that  targets  defined  in  national  policies  are  often  very 
ambitious. The EUD looks for alignment with national targets but also for defining targets which are 
realistic  and  achievable.  Thus,  in  some  cases  the  EUD  managed  to  convince  the  Government  of 
Rwanda to set targets (triggers) at a lower level than in the government plans.  

The  EUD  has  been  in  continual  dialogue,  both  formally  and  informally,  with  the  relevant  sector 
agencies  to  advise  on  possible  risks  for  non-achievement  of  triggers.  In  addition,  some  of  the 
complementary measures focused on increasing the monitoring capacity. While some indicators have 
been adjusted to more realistic levels, EU efforts were less successful for making sure that adequate 
resources were made available to  sector institutions  for meeting the targets  or for improving data 
quality and reporting.  

2.3. Adequacy of complementary measures 

Complementary  measures  as  foreseen  in  the  FAs  were  relevant  for  the  objectives  of  budget 
support,  and  many  have  indeed  contributed  to  these  objectives.  However,  for  some  it  was 
difficult to achieve an agreement between GoR and EUD, and some faced challenges in their 
implementation.  

Five out of ten budget support operations comprised complementary measures. Most complementary 
measures  were  technical  assistance  activities,  but  they  also  included  studies,  evaluations, 
communication activities,  small  projects  selected on the basis of a call for proposals27 and audits. 
Technical  Assistance  included  support  for  data  collection,  monitoring  and  evaluation,  and  other 
capacity building for sector institutions and for the NISR. The EU also financed studies to support 
policy  formulation,  studies  to  prepare  baselines  for  performance  indicators  and  feasibility  studies 
relevant for the targeted sectors. Although these complementary measures are not directly aiming to 
help  the  GoR  to  achieve  performance  indicators,  they  contribute  significantly  to  strengthening 
capacities  in  the  sector  institutions  and  permit  investment  in  studies  and  other  activities  which 
otherwise would not have been undertaken. Further complementary support closely linked to budget 
support was provided under other EU modalities or programmes (e.g. Framework Contracts and Food 
Facility  managed  by  EU;  Technical  Cooperation  Facility  and  PFM  basket  fund  managed  by 
MINECOFIN). 

In  general,  complementary  measures  as  foreseen  in  the  FAs  were  adequate  and  relevant  for  the 
country  context  and they contributed to  the objectives of budget  support.  However, by mid-2019, 
only  about  one-third  of  the  total  funds  for  complementary  measures  committed  under  ten  budget 
support operations had been disbursed.28 This can be explained by the fact that two recent SRCs with 

26 Interviews with EUD officials. 
27 This concerns “implementation of national food safety measures (2 lots)” under SCR Agriculture.  
28 Information provided by EUD and by DEVCO, see Annex 4: Object of the evaluation. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

Final report: Volume I 

large amounts allocated to complementary measures are still under implementation and as such the 
funds related to their complementary measures have not yet been fully disbursed or are even not yet 
contracted. In addition, some complementary measures for the SRC Malnutrition are on-going. 

Many of the intended complementary measures were implemented as foreseen and were useful to the 
GoR.  Examples include: 

  Support  for  the  monitoring  of  achievements  of  the  Multi-Sectoral  Strategy  to  Eliminate 

Malnutrition (under the SBS Malnutrition programme),  

  Support to GoR for the formulation of PSTA 4 and the 3rd Agricultural Sector Investment 

Plan (ASIP 3), implemented by FAO,  

  Support to the NISR for the testing and implementation of an Agricultural Household Survey, 
for conducting Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) in 2018, 
and for conducting agricultural impact analysis. The latter two were implemented by WFP 
and the World Bank, respectively.  

However, other complementary measures were not implemented as foreseen or faced some challenges 
in  implementation  or  in  reaching  their  objectives  fully.  A  specific  challenge  was  related  to  the 
interpretation of the scope of the Technical Assistance (TA) provided to different institutions under 
the  SRC  Agriculture  and  SRC  Energy.  While  the  original  aim  of  this  TA  was  the  long-term 
improvement of capacities, interviews with GoR and EUD stakeholders suggest that the ministries or 
senior staff of Ministries were more interested in support with daily operations and for achieving their 
Imihigo  indicators.  This  created  some  tensions  between  the  technical  assistance  team  and  the 
beneficiary institutions.    

Under  the  SBS  programme  for  feeder  roads,  several  complementary  measures  provided  TA  for 
establishing a feeder roads unit at MINAGRI that would work together with the Roads Authority and 
with local governments in strengthening maintenance capacities. However, the approach was changed 
during project  implementation  in  line with  decentralization policies. As such, after the end of the 
programme, the maintenance unit in MINAGRI was closed, its staff was dismissed and responsibility 
for maintenance of feeder roads was fully transferred to the districts.29 During our district visits we 
found that this is now carried out by members of Community Associations who receive some payment 
from  district  governments.  However,  these  actions  are  limited  to  clearing  and  carrying  out  small 
repairs.  

Under  the  ongoing  SCR  Energy,  half  of  the  funds  for  complementary  measures  were  originally 
allocated to the preparation of feasibility studies for the renewable energy sector. These funds have 
so  far  remained  unused  as  the  GoR  changed  priority  and/or  studies  were  financed  by  other 
development partners.30 As a result, these funds have to be reallocated.  

The difficulties in achieving agreements between GoR and EU on the design and content of some of 
the TA activities under the complementary measures limited the capacity development at MINAGRI 
and  MININFRA,  for  example  in  improving  data  collection  for  their  own  M&E  and  for  the  EU 
performance indicators.  

Nevertheless,  complementary  measures  were  generally  useful.  They  permitted  an  investment  of 
resources  directly  in  sectors  and  activities  which  were  considered  essential  for  the  success  of  the 
budget support intervention. The activities financed under complementary measures would probably 
not have been carried out if the EU had provided funding to the general budget only. By financing 

29 Interviews with EUD and with local governments. 
30 Interviews with EUD. See also chapter 5.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 
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13 

these complementary measures, it could be assured that some financial means and human resources 
were available to the sector in the short-term.  
VISIBILITY 

Making  budget  support  visible  is  a  challenge  but  EUD  has  accepted  this  challenge  and  the 
overall visibility of the EU and its values and activities is good. 

In cases where complementary measures were included in a budget support operation, one of these 
measures  aimed  to  promote  the  visibility  of  the  EU  in  Rwanda.  In  general,  making  the  results  of 
budget  support  programmes  visible  is  a  challenge  as  all  results  are  achieved  through  national 
government budgets and policies. As the GoR makes little effort to credit the EU with results achieved 
through budget support programmes or with project aid, the EU has to be proactive and undertake its 
own visibility actions.    

EUD  has  developed  a  visibility  strategy  and  has  opted  to  use  funds  available  for  visibility  under 
different budget support programmes and projects for the financing of a common visibility plan.  The 
funds are used for fostering the overall visibility of actions of the EUD.  Under a service contract, 
different  groups  of  activities  are  financed:  annual  events  (i.e.  street  fair  for  the  Day  of  Europe, 
exhibitions,  a road truck travelling to  different  districts  providing information on EU, concerts or 
films with European artists); and specific events (football matches, food fair, opera, hip-hop festival, 
film festival, participation of businesses in the AgriShow at EU village). 

No data are available on the proportion of the population that is aware of EU and EU activities in 
Rwanda, but the impression is that the EU’s visibility actions have been most effective amongst the 
better-off population living in Kigali and/or amongst those with access to modern communication 
systems. 

2.4.   Flexibility in adjusting to country context 

The EU has demonstrated flexibility in adjusting budget support inputs to an evolving country 
context. 

In general, budget support programmes focused on the objectives of governments strategies valid at 
the time of programme formulation. The majority of budget support programmes received several 
addenda to the Financing Agreement over their lifetime. Most frequently, these addenda extended the 
lifetime of the programme, redefined the disbursement calendar or redefined indicators. 

In 2018, the GoR requested amendments to the Financing Agreements of the on-going SRCs in the 
agriculture  and  energy  sectors,  which  have  been  approved.  The  amendment  for  the  Energy  SRC 
mainly relates to an adjustment of the implementation modalities for the complementary measures, a 
revision  of  the  methodology  for  calculating  the  variable  tranche  payment,  and  modifications  and 
updates for some indicators for the variable tranches. Amendments to the Agriculture SRC mainly 
relate  to  extending  the  periods  of  contracting,  implementation  and  execution  of  the  Financing 
Agreement as well as a revision of the methodology for calculating the variable tranche payment. It 
also modifies and updates some indicators for the variable tranches. Interviews with both EUD and 
government representatives confirm that the EU has shown a high level of flexibility. The ongoing 
TA program (TECAN) to MINAGRI is currently being evaluated, and EU and GoR are negotiating 
new projects in the energy sector in order to spend the funds originally allocated to studies.  

If performance indicators were not achieved, in several cases the opportunity was given to postpone 
achievement of these indicators, or even to use the undisbursed funds for other needs of GoR in the 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

Final report: Volume I 

same sector, in the form of project aid.31 During the visit of the evaluators, projects under discussion 
in  the  energy  sector  included,  for  example,  expanding  improved  cooking  stoves  in  schools,  or 
supporting the private sector. To the extent that these projects benefit the sector ministry plans, this 
practice may reduce the incentive effect of the performance indicators of the variable tranches. While 
regular budget support resources flow to the national budget and do not automatically increase sector 
budgets, these projects do. This means that the sector ministry is not negatively affected by the non-
performance and is actually benefitting from an intervention under project aid. On the other hand, the 
practice may be justified if the non-performance is caused by factors beyond the control of the sector 
ministry.  

2.5.  Consideration of cross-cutting issues 

The attention to cross-cutting issues in EU documents related to budget support programmes 
has gradually increased during the evaluation period. Cross-cutting issues are systematically 
mentioned  in  project  documents,  but  they  are  –  with  the  exception  of  governance,  the 
environment and climate change – hardly evident during programme implementation.  

The programmes  financed under the 11th  EDF address  cross-cutting issues more  comprehensively 
than those financed under the 10th EDF. Some of the cross-cutting issues such as climate change, 
governance and rights-based approach gained importance during the 11th EDF as a result of the new 
European Consensus on Development. The Budget Support Guidelines (September 2017) announced 
a  strategic  shift  in  EU  development  policy  towards  stronger  conditionality  on  human  rights, 
democracy  and  the  rule  of  law,  the  role  of  civil  society  and  other  elements  of  good  governance.  
Similarly, a review of GoR policy documents shows that the importance given to cross-cutting issues 
by GoR has increased during the same period.   

Governance: Governance aspects are systematically covered by indicators for the release of the fixed 
tranches of budget support interventions, in the form of PFM-related eligibility criteria. Furthermore, 
through complementary measures and other projects, the EU supports the Government’s objective of 
accountable  governance  by  strengthening  the  control  and  oversight  capacity  of  public  institutions 
such as Ministry of Justice, Parliament, Ombudsman, Office of the Auditor General, MINECOFIN 
and National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda (horizontal accountability). These actions also build 
civil  oversight  capacity  and  participation  (vertical  accountability).  Furthermore,  complementary 
measures support governance-related activities such as drafting of PSTA4, TA to planning and TA to 
monitoring. 

Rights-based approach: The European Consensus on Development commits the EU and its Member 
States to implementing a rights-based approach (RBA) to development cooperation, encompassing 
all  human  rights.  RBA  aims  to  align  development  cooperation  policies  to  the  human  rights 
commitments of partner countries; it is key to ensuring that no one is left behind and helps address 
the multiple discriminations faced by people in vulnerable situations. A rights-based approach means 
that individuals and communities should be fully supported to participate in the development of policy 
and practices which affect their lives, and to be aware of and to claim rights where necessary. 

Such a participatory approach has rarely been applied in most budget support programmes during the 
evaluation period. The recent budget support programmes, and in particular in agriculture, are the 
exception in the sense that EUD promoted the participation of farmers’ organizations and civil society 
in SWGs and policy development processes. Furthermore, the EU fosters the RBA with project aid. 

31 Interviews with EUD officials. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 
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15 

It can also be mentioned that the Sector Reform Contract (SRC) to Support Rwanda’s National Multi-
Sectoral Strategy to Eliminate Malnutrition includes reference to human rights issues related to child 
and  maternal  health  as  well  as  legal  issues  around  poverty  reduction,  food  security  and  changing 
property rights arising from Rwanda’s 2005 Land Reform which includes farmland consolidation.  

Gender:  Policy documents have addressed gender equality issues at various levels, reflecting the 
integration of these issues in the national policy framework. Important attention has also been given 
to  these  issues  by  many  DPs.  However,  the  level  of  gender  mainstreaming  in  Budget  Support 
operations  –  as  illustrated  by  the  limited  inclusion  of  gender-related  objectives  and  performance 
indicators in the SBS financing agreements and monitoring and evaluation activities – has remained 
weak. There exists no real gender approach nor have specific studies been undertaken for defining 
gender specific needs.  

However,  the  Financing  Agreements  in  energy  and  agriculture  mention  explicitly  that  a  gender  
mainstreamed and rights-based approach is to be followed; the objective is to ensure that both men 
and  women  benefit  equally  from  EU  project  and  programme  activities  and  to  make  it  possible to 
measure  progress  in  those  sectors.  The  SRC  Energy  includes  a  performance  indicator  that  was 
considered more important for women than for men, namely improved cooking stoves. For the on-
going  SRC  agriculture  and  nutrition,  it  was  attempted  to  include  gender-related  indicators,  but  it 
proved not  possible as, according to  EUD staff,  there were  insufficient  gender  disaggregated  data 
available for measuring them. Yet, the  National Gender Statistics Reports undertaken annually do 
present some gender indicators that might have been relevant for the SRCs. 

indicates  clearly 

Environment  and  Climate  Resilience:  The  CSP/NIP  2014-2020 
that 
environmental assessments will, if necessary, be undertaken during the identification and formulation 
phases.  The  level  of  mainstreaming  of  the  environment  and  climate  change  in  Budget  Support 
operations  is  relatively  high:  two  budget  support  interventions  were  financed  under  the  Global 
Climate Change Alliance (i.e. both GCCA programmes). The EU financed a Strategic Environmental 
Assessment (SEA) of the Agriculture Sector in  Rwanda (Safege, 2011-2012). This study gives an 
overview of the key environmental issues/challenges in the sector. This SEA was conducted during 
the formulation phase of Rwanda’s Strategic Programme for the Transformation of Agriculture III 
(PSTA3) for the period 2013-2018. Some budget support programmes, for instance SRC agriculture 
and GCCA, have contributed to reduced vulnerability to climate change as one of their objectives. 
Environment and climate change are streamlined in the recent SCRs in Agriculture and Energy. These 
recent programmes have several indicators related to agro-forestry, the sustainable management of 
resources, irrigation, and terracing with adequate monitoring of soil acidity. However, the evaluators 
could  not  identify  specific  indicators  on  expanding  research  on,  and  implementation  of  climate 
resilient agricultural practices. 

HIV/AIDS: HIV/AIDS as a crosscutting issue is not very present in the budget support operations 
subject to this evaluation. A single budget support operation made reference to HIV/AIDS. This was 
in  Complementary  measure  C-367786,  Institutional  Support  to  Feeder  Road  Rehabilitation  and 
Maintenance, and it simply encourages contractors to be aware of this disease and obliges them to 
take  out  health  insurance  for  their  employees.  The  absence  of  HIV/AIDS  in  EU  budget  support 
interventions is also related to the fact that EU is not active in the education or health sector, and that 
no relevant indicators are available in Rwanda for persons affected by HIV/AIDS.  

.   

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

Final report: Volume I 

3. DIRECT OUTPUTS OF BUDGET SUPPORT 
This Chapter presents the answer to EQ 2, “To what extent have the financial and non-financial inputs 
of EU budget support contributed to creating new opportunities for the GoR and improved the aid 
framework? And which have been the determining factors?” Additional information can be found in 
Annex 2, in particular JC 2.1, 2.2, 2.4. This chapter first examines the effects of EU budget support 
on government spending, then on policy dialogue, and finally on donor coordination and the reduction 
of transaction costs.  

3.1.  Effect on budgets 

The  size  of  the budget  available for  discretionary  spending  has increased  due  to  EU budget 
support, but this has not always led to additional resources for the targeted sectors. 

Budget  support  funds  have  contributed  to  the  expansion  of  discretionary  expenditure.  Indeed,  all 
budget support has been provided as unearmarked support to the National Budget.  However, EU 
budget support did not always lead to an increase in the budgets for the agriculture and energy sectors. 

Figure 3: EU SBS, total SBS and the budget for Agriculture, in Billion RwF 

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

2011/12

2012/13

2013/14

Total agriculture expenditure
EU SBS agriculture

2014/15

2015/16

2017/18
Agriculture expenditure minus project aid
Total SBS agriculture

2016/17

Sources: for EU SBS: file inventory disbursements; for budget data: MINECOFIN (revised budgets, organisational 
classification, including district expenditure), for SBS from other donors: MINECOFIN data. 

When comparing total EU budget support for agriculture32 with the total budget for agriculture, they 
move together in  all  years except  2012/13,  2013/14 and, to  some extent, 2016/17  (Figure  3). The 
same  conclusion  can  be  drawn  when  comparing  EU  budget  support  with  the  relevant  part  of  the 
agriculture budget (excluding project aid for the sector).33 When including SBS from other donors, 
the trend is more or less the same. However, it is striking that in 2016/17 and 2017/18, the total budget 
support for the sector exceeded the agriculture budget minus project aid.34  

The budget for the energy sector decreased during the first two years of the EU Energy SRC (Figure 
4). This decline was not mentioned in the EU sector policy assessments or discussed in the sector 
policy dialogue. In 2017/18, when GoR received a large Energy Policy Development Loan from the 

32 Including SBS contracts for Agriculture intensification, Decentralised Agriculture, GCCA, SRC Malnutrition and SRC Agriculture. 
We exclude the feeder roads contract as feeder roads are under a different organisation in the GoR budget.  
33 The total sector budget includes expenditure financed by (on-budget) project aid. Since budget support cannot influence that part of 
expenditure, the relevant comparison is with the sector budget excluding project aid.   
34 The (actual) outturns proved even lower than the revised budget presented here (see below). 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 
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17 

World  Bank,  the  energy  budget  increased  somewhat,  but,  even  then,  the  increase  was  not  in 
proportion to the size of that loan.  

Figure 4: EU SBS, total SBS and the budget for Energy, in Billion RfW 

180

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

2013/14

2014/15

2015/16

2016/17

2017/18

Total energy expenditure

Energy expenditure minus project aid

EU SBS for energy

Total SBS for energy

Sources: for EU SBS: file inventory disbursements; for budget data: MINECOFIN (revised budgets, organisational 
classification, including district expenditure), for SBS from other donors: MINECOFIN data. 

Government  officials  confirmed  that,  in  general,  an  increase  in  sector  budget  support  does  not 
automatically lead to an increase in the sector budget. The sector budgets are determined on the basis 
of the nationally defined priorities and performance indicators and take account of sectoral absorption 
capacities. Given that EU performance indicators are aligned with the national ones, the GoR argues 
that  achieving them is  automatically taken into account  as  well. Government officials  explain the 
decrease of the energy budget by pointing out that, during these years, the private sector began to 
make huge public investments in generation capacity. Yet, this can only be a partial explanation. The 
government could have allocated more resources to transmission and distribution in order to meet its 
targets for the increase of on-grid connections – targets which were missed. 

3.2. Predictability of budget support resources 

Predictability of budget support resources is high.  

The six-year duration of the most recent SRCs has further enhanced predictability. If there are delays 
in  disbursement,  they  are  in  most  cases  a  few  months  only.  With  the  exception  of  one  case, 
disbursements  were  always  made  in  the  same  fiscal  year.  Delays  are  often  due  to  lack  of  robust 
evidence on achievement of indicators in the disbursement request. For example, in SRC Agriculture 
and Nutrition the EUD had to ask the National Authorizing Officer (NAO) on several occasions to 
improve presentation of the claim for disbursement and to provide suitable evidence of achieving the 
indicators.35  

As discussed in Chapter 2, not all variable tranches were released fully. Budget support programmes 
financed  under  the  10th  EDF  achieved  most  of  the  objectives  related  to  indicators  for  variable 
tranches. Recent budget support interventions under the 11th EDF (SRC Energy and SRC Agriculture 

35 Review of EU documentation related to tranche release, interviews with EUD staff and GoR officials. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

Final report: Volume I 

and  Nutrition)  face  some  more  problems  in  achieving  their  objectives  in  terms  of  performance 
indicators,  often    because:  a)  the  targets  may  have  been  too  ambitious  and/or  the  sectors  did  not 
receive sufficient funding and/or they planned to achieve the objectives with the involvement of the 
private sector and this did not work out;  or  b) there is no reliable system available to provide suitable 
evidence – even though the sectors sometimes consider that they have achieved the targets.36  

The EUD is in continual dialogue with GOR to advise on how to overcome challenges in achieving 
indicator targets in order to improve predictability. During HLPD and other meetings between EUD 
staff and GoR officials, possible risks and challenges of non-achievement of the targets are discussed 
in order to give GoR sufficient time to prepare the evidence on achievement of the targets. 

3.3.  Policy dialogue frameworks 

EU  budget  support  has  contributed  to  some  extent  to  the  strengthening  of  the  sector  policy 
development processes and to an important but small increase in the participation of the private 
sector, farmers’ organisations and civil society, in particular in the agriculture sector dialogue. 
But the policy dialogue on macro-economic issues is weak. In addition, the top-down nature of 
national planning, and the absence of the highest decision-making levels in these dialogues, limit 
their productivity. The different policy dialogues have been more effective for operational and 
technical issues than for strategic discussions on objectives, policies and (spending) priorities. 

In general, Rwanda has had good frameworks for policy dialogue in place at national and sector level 
and both DPs and GoR are committed to this dialogue. Nevertheless, there are some limitations to 
this policy dialogue.  

With the dismantling of General Budget Support in 2012, the associated policy dialogue on macro-
economic  policies  and  related  issues  came  to  an  end.  For  GoR,  the  Development  Partners 
Coordination Group (DPCG) is now the forum for discussing macro-economic issues. However, for 
the  donor  community  this  forum  is  too  big  for  in-depth  discussions  as  it  includes  all  Permanent 
Secretaries (PS) and all donors. In addition, donor representatives in DPCG may not have macro-
economic expertise, and their interest in macro-economic issues may vary as most of them do not 
provide budget support. 

When  GBS  ended,  the  GoR  strengthened  sector  policy  dialogues  by  setting  up  Sector  Working 
Groups (SWG) in which all donors active in the sector participate. Donors are joined by the relevant 
government  agencies  at  Permanent  Secretary  level  by  civil  society  (often)  and  by  private  sector 
representatives (more rarely). The three SWGs relevant for this evaluation are Agriculture, Energy 
and PFM. The EU has strengthened the policy dialogue in these SWGs in different ways. The Energy 
SRC  had  a  specific  performance  indicator  and  target  on  setting  up  an  operational  M&E  unit  in 
MININFRA, and one that required this unit to present forward and backward reviews of the sector 
(which  are  then  discussed  in  the  SWG).  GoR  officials  credit  these  EU  indicators,  and  the  policy 
dialogue with the EU, with an improvement of the operation of the SWG in general: meetings are 
held more regularly, and there is better coordination of activities.  

The EU has strengthened both the SWG Agriculture and SWG PFM by being the co-chair of these 
Groups  for  several  years.37  The  other  co-chair  of  these  groups  is  the  main  Ministry  involved. 
According  to  government  officials  and  representatives  of  other  DPs,  the EU  has  helped  to  secure 
more regular meetings, more policy-relevant topics on the agenda, and has improved meeting reports.  

36 For details see Annex 1, J.C. 2.1. 
37 In PFM from 2015 to 2018, and in Agriculture from 2015 and on-going. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 
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However, opinions vary on the effectiveness of the PFM policy dialogue. Some argue that partners 
are  willing  to  work  together  for  improvements  and  that  there  is  mutual  trust.  Others  indicate  that 
policy dialogue in these areas focuses on operational issues and that more fundamental issues are not 
discussed. In addition, the PFM Consultative Forum, the highest policy dialogue forum in this area, 
has not met since 2017.  

In Agriculture, the EU has contributed to strengthening the SWG also by other means. First, the EU 
hired a consultancy firm to support the formalization of the Agricultural Sector Working Group.38 
Secondly, the EU contributed to the increased participation of private sector, farmers’ groups and 
civil society in the Agriculture SWG and in technical working groups. This was done through the 
policy dialogue and through specific support (complementary measures) to, for example, farmers’ 
organizations  and civil  society  umbrella organizations. Although progress has been  achieved, this 
participation still needs improvement. 39 

There  is  some  participation  of  private  sector  companies  in  the  Energy  SWG,  but  civil  society 
participation is lacking – mainly because there are hardly any civil society organisations active in the 
sector. Civil society is also absent from the PFM policy dialogue although there is evidence of some 
civil society organisations being invited for the latter.40   

A continuing challenge for all SWGs is the understaffing of government institutions; this sometimes 
hampers preparation of and reporting on policy dialogues, despite the support that is provided by the 
EUD and other DPs for these monitoring units. In addition, there are limitations in the extent to which 
these  dialogues  can  allow  for  exchanges  of  views  on  fundamental  issues.  The  large  number  of 
participants make real discussions or dialogues difficult.  It has also proven to be difficult to discuss 
politically sensitive issues.  For  example, the EU and other donors  are  not  always  able to  put  the 
allocation  of  government  expenditure  on  the  agenda.  Results  of  the  policy  dialogue  are  also 
constrained  by  the  fact  that  the  highest  decision-making  levels,  Ministers  or  the  Prime  Minister’s 
Office, are absent in such dialogues.41 As a result, the scope of these dialogues is often limited to 
more operational issues. 

In addition to these platforms in which all donors participate, budget support allowed the EU to have 
a  “High-Level  Policy  Dialogue”  (HLPD)  between  the  EU  and  the  GoR  on  the  Sector  Reform 
Contracts. Participants are the sector Minister and representatives of the related key departments, and 
from  EUD  the  Head  of  Delegation,  Head  of  Cooperation  and  the  head  of  the  respective  sector.  
Compared to the SWGs, this forum allows for more discussions on policy issues, as it only includes 
one donor (the EU)42 and  the relevant government agencies in the sector.  However,  many policy 
issues remain difficult to address. One important reason is that decisions on these policies are made 
at a higher government level.43 Another issue is that the government and the EU do not have the same 
understanding  of  the  objectives  and  scope  of  this  policy  dialogue.  The  EU  sees  it  as  a  forum  for 
discussing broader policy issues, while for the GoR, and in particular for MINECOFIN, it is mainly 
meant to discuss the performance indicators of the EU budget support operations.44 Nevertheless, the 
EU and through the EU, some EU Member States, can sometimes use the HLPD to tackle issues more 

38 Financed outside budget support under another instrument (Framework Contract) 
39 Interviews with DPs, private sector organizations and CSOs.  
40 Interview Transparency International Rwanda (TIR). TIR staff pointed to time constraints, and the same probably holds for other 
organisations.    
41 Interviews with GoR officials and EUD staff, analysis of lists of participants in meetings  
42 In the energy sector, (EU member state) Belgium has participated as well. 
43 Level of the President or Cabinet 
44 Interviews with EUD and MINECOFIN. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

Final report: Volume I 

effectively  than  would  have  been  possible  if  they  had  been  acting  individually  or  had  only  been 
providing project aid.45   

3.4.  Donor coordination 

EU  budget  support  has  contributed  somewhat  to  improved  donor  coordination  through  the 
provision of technical assistance and has played a positive role in donor coordination in sectors 
where the EU is active.  

At a general level, the GoR shows leadership in donor coordination, allocating sectors for intervention 
to each donor. However, there is no well-established coordination mechanism for technical assistance 
and  capacity  building  interventions.  Coordination  of  TA  at  sector  level  is  sometimes  assigned  to 
particular institutions or agencies; for example, USAID’s Power Africa has collected the information 
related to the energy sector. Furthermore, donors exchange information on intended capacity building 
interventions  in  the  SWGs,  but  full  information  on  what  other  donors  are  doing  is  usually  not 
available. In Agriculture, the EU has taken the initiative to map all TA to the sector, on the basis of 
information provided by DPs.46  

The positive role played by EU budget support in donor coordination generally is already evident 
from the EU contributions to improving the different sector policy dialogues.   In addition, there is 
some  further  evidence  that  EU  budget  support  operations  have  had  a  positive  effect  on  donor 
coordination:  

  EU’s  involvement  in  donor  coordination  and  joint  sector  reviews  and  other  papers  is 
appreciated by the other donors and by the private sector. The EU responses and comments 
to key sector papers are found useful by other actors.47  

  EU leadership was important in the formulation of a common position amongst DPs on the 

definition of standards for solar panels (see also chapter 5).   

  EU leadership was important in the formulation of a common position of DPs on the National 

Feeder Roads Policy and Strategy.48  

3.5.  Reduction of transaction costs 

Transactions costs of budget support are lower than for project aid and have been reduced over 
time due to the larger size of recent sector budget support operations.  

Both  GoR  officials  and  EUD  staff  confirmed  that  transaction  costs  (especially  time)  involved  in 
managing budget support are lower than for managing project aid. EUD respondents emphasised the 
extensive work related to the preparation and management of SRCs, but confirmed that it would be 
impossible to manage the same amount of development resources (as implemented through SRCs) 
by using a project approach. They also confirmed that the significantly larger size of budget support 
interventions  (under  the  11th  EDF)  has  reduced  workload  compared  to  small  budget  support 
interventions (under the 10th EDF).49 They added that budget support programmes imply a different 
workload distribution in the EUD with more workload on expat staff (in particular management and 
middle management) and less on local and finance and contract staff.  

45 The case study Rwanda on the evaluation of EU sustainable energy cooperation (2011-2016), and iinterviews with EU member state 
and EUD staff. 
46 The evaluators received this list from EUD; it was las updated in May 2018 (See Table 31 in Annex 2).  
47 Interviews with DPs and GoR officials  
48 Joint Development Partners’ comments on the draft National Feeder Roads Policy and Strategy, Kigali 10.12.2015. 
49 This holds true for the SBS contracts; the GBS under the 10th was the largest of all.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 
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21 

The evaluators have made an approximate estimation of the transaction costs to the EU for budget 
support  and  project  approach.  The  information  for  making  the  comparison  is  mainly  based  on 
interviews with EUD staff during the field visits, general information known about budget support 
programmes, analysis of documentation prepared related to tranche releases, and experiences of the 
evaluators  related  to  reporting  needs  for  interventions  under  the  project  approach.50  The  exercise 
shows that the transaction costs of the project approach (even with projects of an average size of M€ 
20) are more than 60% higher than those of the SRC. If the (estimated) average size of projects is 
around M€ 10, the transaction cost difference between the two approaches increases considerably.  

Budget Support interventions are highly appreciated by MINECOFIN for the reason that it provides 
flexible financing to the budget. For MINECOFIN, budget support involves participation in HLPD 
and preparation by NAO of many documents for the disbursement requests – which imply relatively 
low transaction costs.  

But the burden on sector officials is higher. Sectors must make efforts to meet the general eligibility 
requirement (good sector policies) and must achieve the specific triggers for the variable tranches – 
without necessarily getting additional resources, as shown above. In addition, they must engage in an 
intensive policy dialogue with EUD: both formally in the HLPD but also informally through regular 
dialogues with EU officials. The situation under a project approach is very different: projects usually 
include the establishment of a well-staffed and well-equipped management unit permitting it to work 
under considerably easier conditions on the achievement of specific results for targeted beneficiaries. 
Yet, due to the fact that resources are used through the government’s own budgeting, procurement 
and implementation systems, and since indicators are, in principle, aligned with GoR own targets, 
overall transaction costs for budget support are much lower than for project aid, both for the EU and 
the government.  

4. INDUCED EFFECTS ON POLICIES AND 

INSTITUTIONS 

This chapter discusses the induced effects of the different budget support inputs on macro-economic 
management  and  domestic  revenue  mobilization,  on  the  quality  of  Public  Finance  Management 
(PFM), and on strengthening local governance (Evaluation Questions 3, 4 and 5). For a full overview 
of  findings  on  all  JCs  for  these  Eqs,  see  Annex  1.  The  chapter  first  assesses  the  effects  on 
macroeconomic  management  and  domestic  revenue  mobilization,  and  then  the  effects  on  PFM, 
transparency and local governance.  

4.1.  Macroeconomic management and domestic resource mobilization 

The  effect  of  the  different  budget  support  inputs  on  macroeconomic  management, 
macroeconomic stability and domestic revenue mobilization was limited. The resources helped 
to finance investment and thus may have contributed to the high economic growth. However, it 
appears that GoR macro-economic and fiscal policies were not sufficiently pro-poor and the 
EU, through its budget support operations, did not manage to reverse this. 

Over  the  evaluation  period,  EU  budget  support  funds  constituted  3%  of  Rwandan  government 
expenditure, on average. The trend is quite stable, with a dip in 2012/13 and a slight decrease in the 

50 Experiences gained by the evaluators as project managers for EU programmes and as evaluator or ROM experts of EU interventions 
implemented under project approach. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

Final report: Volume I 

two most recent years (2.8% in 2017/18 and 2.4% in 2018/19).51  There is no joint framework for 
budget support anymore52 and the share in the budget is low compared to countries where such joint 
frameworks  exist:  in  previous  budget  support  evaluations  for  Sub-Saharan  African  countries,  the 
(joint)  amount  provided  as  budget  support  ranged  between  6%  (Ghana)  and  23%  (Burundi)  of 
government expenditure, with an average of 13%.53   

In theory, the domestic macroeconomic effect (i.e. on public finance) of budget support funds can be: 
i) an increase in expenditure; ii) a reduction in the deficit after grants (or a reduction in public debt 
through debt amortisation); iii) a reduction in tax revenues; or iv) some combination of the three. The 
second possibility implies a contribution to macroeconomic stability, while the third is obviously a 
non-desired effect.54 In the case of Rwanda, there is no evidence for these two possibilities. Domestic 
revenues  have  increased, with  the share of tax revenues to  GDP rising from  12.4% in  2010/11 to 
16.0% in 2018/19. And the budget deficit remained more or less stable over the evaluation period, 
except for the years 2012/13 and 2018/19, when it was somewhat higher.55 Given the government’s 
ambition to foster growth and development, the most likely effect of the fiscal space provided by the 
resources has been an increase in expenditure. This is confirmed by a high-level government officer 
who stated that the EU budget support grants have helped to increase investment.56 This implies that 
there is no contribution to (internal) macroeconomic stability. 

With regards to the external accounts, budget support grants may help to increase imports, increase 
reserves, increase debt payments, or decrease exports, decrease other capital inflows, or lead to capital 
flight.57 In Rwanda, they most likely allowed for a combination of an increase in imports (to the extent 
necessary for investment) and a reduction in capital inflows (loans) for financing the current account 
deficit. To the extent that the latter has materialized, there has been a small contribution to (external) 
macroeconomic stability. 

Another expectation is that budget support resources influence the composition of spending, and in 
particular lead to more allocative efficiency than project aid. This usually means that governments 
can allocate more resources to recurrent expenditure, since project aid is usually tied to investment 
projects. For Rwanda, the evidence shows that the GoR most likely used the resources for investment. 
Nevertheless, allocative efficiency may still have improved due to the flexible fiscal space provided 
by budget support funds. 

The  other  budget  support  inputs,  the  policy  dialogue  and  Technical  Assistance  (TA)  may  have 
influenced  domestic  revenue  mobilization  and  macroeconomic  management.  However,  the 
contribution of the EU budget support inputs in these areas is marginal. First, as discussed in chapter 
3, the policy dialogue on macro-economic issues has weakened since the demise of GBS in 2012. 
The main dialogue is between GoR and the IMF. The EU and other development partners are invited 
to give their views during briefing and debriefing meetings  of all IMF (bi-annual) missions to the 
country.  But  for donors  this is  not  the same  as having  a direct  dialogue  with  GoR.  In theory, the 

51 Volume II, Annex 1, JC 2.1.  
52 Although a few bilateral donors (UK, Netherlands, Belgium) continued to provide sector budget support after the demise of GBS, 
they all stopped doing so after a couple of years, and since around 2016 only the World Bank remains as (other) budget support donor 
with its Development Policy Loans.   
53  Dijkstra,  G  (2018).  Budget  support,  poverty  and  corruption:  A  review  of  the  evidence.  Report  2018-04,  Expert  Group  for  Aid 
Analysis (EBA), Stockholm. www.eba.se 
54 When including the other inputs of budget support, policy dialogue and complementary measures, budget support is often expected 
to increase tax revenues. 
55 Measured in percent of GDP; data from MINECOFIN and (for GDP): NISR. See JC 3.1 in Annex 1 of Volume II.  
56 See also chapter 3, showing that the links between sector budget support and sector budgets are weak. 
57 See G. Dijkstra, A. De Kemp and D. Bergkamp, Budget Support: Conditional Results, IOB evaluation No 369, The Hague, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs The Netherlands, 2012, p. 96; in turn based on H. White and G. Dijkstra, Programme Aid and Development: Beyond 
conditionality. Routledge, 2003.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 
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23 

Development  Partners Coordination Group (DPCG) could  provide a forum  for a macro-economic 
dialogue. However, a meeting with all Permanent Secretaries and all donors, most of which do not 
provide budget support, is different from, and much less effective than, a meeting with MINECOFIN 
and budget support donors only. The EU, together with EU Member States, also has access to the 
Article 8 consultations with GoR.58 It once tried to raise a concern on the macro-economic situation 
in  this  forum,  but  it  appeared  that  the  government  did  not  really  want  to  discuss  the  issue in  this 
framework.  

Second,  the  EU  budget  support  programmes  did  not  include  complementary  measures  to  support 
macroeconomic  management  or  domestic  revenue  mobilization.  The  EU  did  contribute  to  a  PFM 
basket fund which has helped (among other things) to improve capacities of the Rwanda Revenue 
Authority (RRA), but this is not directly related to budget support. In addition, there is an on-going 
separate  EU  TA  project  to  the  RRA  on  transfer  pricing.  This  project  is  well-appreciated  by  the 
government, but again, this is not part of the budget support inputs.  

Over  the  evaluation  period,  the  IMF  assessments  of  macroeconomic  policies  have  always  been 
positive. The macroeconomic assessments of EUD, produced for all budget support disbursements as 
part  of  the  eligibility  criteria,  have  also  been  positive  over  the  evaluation  period.  But  these 
assessments usually also contain some critical remarks.  Indeed, most macro-economic indicators are 
good, and many show a positive trend.59 But there are some areas of concern with respect to Rwanda’s 
macroeconomic policies. 

A first issue is the somewhat high budget deficit and the related increase in public debt. The deficit 
(after grants) was around 5% of GDP between 2013/14 and 2017/18 and increased to 7% in 2018/19.60 
The debt/GDP ratio increased from 13% in 2010 to 35% in 2018.61 Although most of the debt is still 
concessional, the non-concessional part of the debt is gradually increasing. According to the latest 
Debt Sustainability Analysis conducted by IMF and World Bank staff, the debt is still sustainable62 
but opinions vary about whether future growth rates will be high enough to sustain the debt.63 

Secondly, and although tax revenues in percent of GDP have increased, this share is still low. The 
general opinion among GoR, IMF and most DPs is that it has become increasingly difficult to raise 
revenues  further,  given  the  small  tax  base  due  to  the  large  informal  economy.  However,  many 
companies benefit from tax exemptions for an estimated cost of 3.3% of GDP.64 According to the 
World Bank, these exemptions can be reduced, and this view is shared by EUD.65  

A third concern regards the composition of spending. First, we have pointed out that GoR most likely 
used the fiscal space provided by budget support resources for investment. Yet, public investment 
was already quite high66 at around 40% of total spending over the evaluation period (with no clear 

58 Article 8 of the Partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States on the one hand 
and the European Community and its member states on the other hand stipulates that there is a regular political dialogue between the 
parties with the aim of fostering shared priorities and agendas. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:eebc0bbc-f137-4565-
952d-3e1ce81ee890.0004.04/DOC_2&format=PDF 
59 See Annex 1, JC 3.1 and 3.2 for an overview. 
60 MINECOFIN budget data, based on revised budgets. 
61 World Bank, World Development Indicators database.  
62 IMF, Debt Sustainability Analysis, June 2019. 
63 Many interviews with government officials and with donors.   
64 Bode et al (2017). “Attracting investments while raising tax revenue: Recommendations for reviewing Rwanda’s tax incentives”. 
Policy note, International Growth Centre, Kigali, cited in World Bank (2018), Rwanda: Future drivers of growth, p. 131. 
65 They should be targeted better and should be linked to performance and to sunset clauses. World Bank 2018, Rwanda, Future drivers 
of growth; and interviews with EUD officials.  
66 For example, while in 2016 public investment (gross fixed capital formation) as share of GDP was 3.4% in Sub-Saharan Africa, on 
average (calculated from World Bank, World Development Indicators, accessed 27 May 2020), it was 10.9% in Rwanda (MINECOFIN 
figures).  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

Final report: Volume I 

trend).  In  view  of  the  consistent  complaints  on  understaffing  in  government  agencies,67  a  larger 
allocation to recurrent expenditure (including staffing) might have been better. In addition, there are 
concerns about the relatively low investment in agriculture (less than 10% of total investment), on 
the low spending on education, and on the high fiscal losses in the energy sector due to, among other 
factors,  excessive  investment  in  power  supply  in  combination  with  agreements  guaranteeing  high 
prices  to  suppliers  regardless  of  actual  demand.68  Another  worrying  trend  is  that  the  share  of  the 
budget  going  to  subsidies  for  state-owned  companies  including  Rwandair,  export  promotion 
activities, pre-financing peace-keeping operations and servicing debt is increasing. All in all, there 
are doubts about the pro-poorness of government macro-economic and fiscal policies. 

GoR is aware of the fact that the EU assesses the macroeconomic situation for each disbursement but 
does not perceive this as something to worry about as long as its policies are on track with the IMF 
programme69 – which has so far always been the case. It has an intensive dialogue with the IMF in 
which the IMF usually approves the policies and it considers that “the IMF represents the donors” on 
that matter. However, EUD does not always fully agree with the assessments of the IMF and perceives 
the lack of opportunities to directly discuss macroeconomic policies with GoR as a factor limiting the 
effectiveness of budget support. 

4.2.  PFM, transparency and accountability at central and local level 

There have been improvements in PFM, in local governance capacities and, to a much lesser 
extent, in transparency, but the contribution of budget support has been limited. The policy 
dialogue played a small role in initiating improvements in the more technical aspects of PFM, 
and  some  of  the  performance  indicators  targeted  to  specific  PFM  or  transparency  issues  at 
sector levels were successful.  

PFM  systems  have  improved  over  the  evaluation  period,  and  this  holds  in  particular  for  internal 
controls on execution, the timely production of budget execution reports and procurement systems.70 
In addition, the capacities for external oversight by, for example, the Office of the Auditor General 
(OAG) and Parliament have improved. The main factors driving these positive developments were 
the willingness and efforts of the GoR, and technical assistance provided by donors. This TA came 
from the IMF, the World Bank, and other donors, often through the PFM basket fund to which the 
EU contributed. The PFM basket funds has sub-funds for the OAG and the RRA. TA was especially 
helpful by introducing technical improvements such as IFMIS and the e-Procurement system.  

The  policy  dialogue  on  PFM  sometimes  played  a  role  in  initiating  and/or  coordinating  these 
improvements. This policy dialogue takes place in the PFM Consultative Forum, the PFM TWG and 
the  sub-TWGs  for  RRA  and  OAG,  in  which  the  EU  is  an  active  participant.71  The  donors  often 
recommended the carrying out of diagnostic studies, and the conclusions of these studies sometimes 
lead to changes in policies and procedures, and to technical assistance to support these changes. 

Some of the EU’s specific performance indicators may have contributed to the timely publication of 
budget execution reports.  The Decentralised Agriculture programme (with disbursements between 
2011 and 2015) included as one of its performance indicators that 90% of districts should submit 
financial reports on the previous year’s budget execution. This condition was always met, as 100% 

67 Many interviews with government officials and with donors.   
68 World Bank, Rwanda: Systematic Country Diagnostic 2019, and for high energy costs: Kojima. M and C Trimble (2016), Making 
power affordable for Africa and viable for its utilities. World Bank, AFREA and ESMAP and World Bank, 2019, Program document 
for a development policy credit to GoR for a Third Rwanda Energy Sector Development Policy Financing.  
69 Interview high-level government official. 
70 See for details Annex 1, JC 4.2. 
71 As highlighted in chapter 3, the PFM Consultative Forum is the highest body for the policy dialogue, but it has not met since 2017.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 
Final report:Volume I 

25 

of districts submitted these reports. The SRC Energy stipulated that there should be a mid-year budget 
review in Energy within three months of the end of the period, and that quarterly execution reports 
had to be published within 45 days of the end of the period. Both conditions were met when they 
were assessed (May and September 2016, respectively). However, the level of disaggregation in the 
MININFRA budget execution report was not considered sufficient for this trigger to be considered 
as “met” in May 2016.  

Furthermore, although the share of government entities that receive an unqualified opinion on their 
financial  statements  from  the  Office  of  the  Auditor  General  (OAG)  has  increased  from  36%  in 
2012/13 to 57% in 2017/18, there are big problems with agencies that are important for the on-going 
EU budget support operations. RAB, REG, EUCL, and EDCL still received an adverse opinion on 
their  financial  statements  in  2016,  2017  and  2018.  And  most  districts  (28  out  of  30)  received  a 
qualified  opinion.72  In  the  case  of  districts,  this  is  often  due  to  the  fact  that  OAG  examines 
consolidated statements that include reports of entities not yet included in IFMIS (schools) and about 
which OAG cannot check the accuracy of the statements.73  

Decentralisation and local governance capacities: Some improvements have also occurred in the 
fiscal framework for decentralisation and in capacities for service delivery in districts, although the 
contribution  of  budget  support  to  these  improvements  was  limited.  The  resources  may  have 
contributed to an expansion of local government staff. During our visits to four districts we found 
that  district  staff  for  implementation  of  agricultural  and  nutrition  policies  and  for  auditing  had 
increased, and recently districts also have an Energy Maintenance Officer. However, a recent study 
assessed the capacities at district level as still insufficient,74 and the satisfaction with agricultural and 
livestock services is lower than that with all other government services.75  

As  to  the  role  of  the  policy  dialogue,  the  EU  sometimes  attends  the  meetings  of  the  SWG  on 
Decentralisation and local governance but is not a very active participant. However, the PFM policy 
dialogue to some extent also covers district PFM capacities, and for example, discusses and promotes 
the roll-out of IFMIS and of the e-Procurement system.  

Complementary  measures  related  to  the  SRC  Agriculture  aimed  to  improve  district  planning 
capacities by improving data collection and availability. One technical assistance project established 
the Agriculture Management Information System (AMIS) to support planning at central and district 
level. In practice, data are collected for monitoring progress on Imihigo targets only. While districts 
supply information for the AMIS, they do not have their own MIS and work with excel sheets systems 
for monitoring the district plans.76 

Transparency: In the area of fiscal transparency, there are fewer improvements, and the PFM policy 
dialogue has not been able to change this. For example, the EU has argued unsuccessfully for a long 
time to publish the full OAG Reports (and not just the summary) and to publish budget execution 
reports in more detail, so that they can be compared with the budgets.  Donors, and in particular the 
EUD, advocated for including the improvement of fiscal transparency in the recently adopted PFM 
Sector Strategic Plan (2019-2024), but the GoR did not want this.  In 2019, the IMF carried out a 
Fiscal Transparency Evaluation,77 but the results are not yet public. Nevertheless, the GoR made an 
action plan in order to address the recommendations of the IMF Transparency Evaluation, and also 

72 OAG Executive Summary Annual Report 2018.  
73 Interview with OAG.  
74 Ministry of Local Government (2019), “Assessment of the impact of decentralisation policy implementation in Rwanda, 2001-2017.” 
75 Rwanda Governance Board, Citizen Score Card 2018.  
76 Interviews with staff in Rulindo and Rubavu. This issue was not raised in the other two districts visited. 
77 This IMF Evaluation has a slightly different content from what the EU considers “transparency”, for example covering technical 
issues like fiscal risk analysis. Source: interview with MINECOFIN official.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

Final report: Volume I 

to improve the country’s score on the Open Budget Initiative (OBI).78 This action plan was provided 
to the evaluators but it is not public.79 According to this document, Budget Framework Papers (the 
MTEF) are now (since the 2019/2020 budget) made public two months before they are discussed in 
Parliament. 

Some  of  the  triggers  for  variable  tranches  of  EU  budget  support  were  linked  to  the  transparency 
objective.  In  the  Energy  SRC,  the  EU  linked  part  of  one  of  the  variable  tranches  to  MININFRA 
making available a sufficiently disaggregated budget execution report, but this condition was not met. 
Another performance indicator asked for publication of the OAG report on MININFRA and REG. 
This condition was not met either. However, the EUD does receive these reports since then, which 
can be considered a partial success. 

In  view  of  the  consistent  adverse  OAG  opinions  on  RAB  –  the  agency  with  most  spending  in 
agriculture – and the qualified OAG opinions on the financial statements of most districts, the EU has 
required an  Agriculture  Public Expenditure Review (PER) and  an Agriculture Public Expenditure 
Tracking  Survey  (PETS),  in  2017/18  and  in  2018/19,  respectively.  Both  had  to  be  conducted 
according to World Bank guidelines. Although both conditions were not (fully) met at the moment 
of  the  disbursement  decision,  the  reports  met  the  required  standards  later  and  are  now  publicly 
available. They have contributed to improving the transparency of agriculture expenditure. 

The EU Decentralized Agriculture programme included a performance target on the percentage of 
districts submitting a performance report – later called Imihigo report – on the previous year. The 
target increased from 50% in 2011 to 90% in 2014. While the baseline (2006-2008) was zero, the 
targets  were  always  met,  so  this  implies  a  strong  increase  in  the  number  of  performance  reports 
presented. For the final year (2015), the indicator involved a harmonization of standards for Imihigo 
reporting, and this was also considered met. This can be considered a success. However, we do not 
know if this progress has been consolidated. The evaluation team observed that districts do publish 
their service charters and Imihigo performance reports on notice boards, often also at sector level. 
But  while  Imihigo  plans  are  sometimes  on  districts’  websites,  Imihigo  reports  are  not.80  So  the 
evaluation team was not able to check the content and extent of harmonization of these reports. 

Participation and accountability. Through other interventions, the EU has contributed to improving 
participation  and  accountability.  One  of  these  interventions  is  the  “Strengthening  Civil  Society 
Organisation  Capacity  in  Promoting  Sustainable  Agriculture  Policies  and  Citizens  Participatory 
Budgeting” (SCAB) project. With this support, Cladho-ActionAid Rwanda presented their concerns 
on  the  budget  to  the  Parliamentary  Budget  Committee.81  The  EU  also  supports  civil  society 
organizations that engage in expenditure tracking: Cladho, RCSP and TIR. The most active NGO in 
this area is TIR. It engages in advocacy at local level on the basis of OAG reports. It has had some 
success in changing policies, for example achieving a reduced interest rate for VUP (social protection) 
services. 

78 This score increased from 11 in 2010 to 36 in 2015, but then decreased to 22 in 2017. According to OBI, fewer budget documents 
were  publicly  available  in  the  latter  year  but  according  to  other  observers,  not  much  changed  between  2015  and  2017. 
EUD, 
https://www.internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/rwanda-open-budget-survey-2017-summary-english.pdf. 
Transparency and oversight of the budget, March 2017. 
79 MINECOFIN, Summary findings and recommendations from Fiscal Transparency Evaluation and OBI, action plan status 21 October 
2019. 
80 Own observation for the four districts visited. 
81 Rwanda.actionaid.org/stories/2019/civil-society-platforms-present-budget-framework-concerns-parliamentary-committee-0 

 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
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27 

5. EFFECTS ON ENERGY SECTOR 
This Chapter presents the answers to EQ 6,“To what extent and through which mechanisms (funds, 
dialogue  and  TA)  has  budget  support  contributed  to  an  improvement  in  policy  formulation  and 
implementation processes, and to its related accountability (including in public service delivery)?” 
and  to  EQ  7,  “To  what  extent,  in  the  Energy  sector,  have  the  development  outcomes  (including 
nutrition,  food  security,  gender  and  inclusive  development)  pursued  through  the  policies  and 
programmes  supported  by  budget  support  been  (or  are  being)  achieved?  Which  have  been  the 
determining factors of their achievement?” Additional information can be found in Annex 1, under 
EQ 6 (energy) and EQ 7. 

The chapter begins by assessing the effects of EU Budget Support on policies and implementation 
capacities, and then examines the outcomes of the policies and the possible factors that explain these 
outcomes, in particular related to least-cost electricity system planning and the evolution of energy 
costs, access and affordability, quality of services and energy losses, and use of biomass resources 
and efficient cooking methods. 

5.1.  Energy policies  

EU budget support has contributed to the improvement of energy policies and strategies and to 
an improvement in policy making and monitoring frameworks.  

Over the past two decades several national strategies were developed, which to varying degrees, have 
affected the energy sector. At the start of EU budget support, the monitoring frameworks for these 
policies and strategies were weakly developed.82 The EU Budget Support, through policy dialogue 
and through its performance indicators, contributed to more structured reviews of policies and their 
implementation.83 This can be seen as a direct output of budget support (Figure 5).  

Examples include establishing bi-annual Backward and Forward Looking Sector Reviews, periodic 
meetings of the Sector Working Group (SWG), Technical Working Groups (TWG) and High Level 
Policy Dialogue.  

Many of the strategies and policies in the energy sector contained very ambitious targets. The EU, 
together  with  other  DPs,  used  policy  dialogues  to  bring  in  a  great  deal  of  realism  that  helped  to 
establish more attainable targets or alternative courses of action (an induced output).  

5.2. Institutional capacities for policy implementation  

EU  budget  support  has  had  limited  effect  so  far  on  implementation  capacities  but  it  has 
contributed to setting up a Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) system that – although still weak 
during the evaluation period – is gradually gaining strength. 

The institutional framework of the sector was strengthened in 2014 with the creation of REG Ltd. and 
its subsidiaries: Energy Utility Corporation Limited (EUCL) and Energy Development Corporation 
Limited (EDCL). MININFRA has been responsible for formulating policies, and REG, EUCL and 
EDCL are implementing agencies. This has made for a clearer allocation of responsibilities, but the 
sector still experiences significant capacity gaps in planning and implementation and also in some 
technical skills. The Energy SRC contributed to the setting up of an M&E unit in MININFRA but so 

82 Technical Assistance Facility for the Sustainable Energy for All Initiative West and Central Africa. EuropeAid/134038/C/SER/Multi 
Contract No 2013/335152 Rwanda.   
83 EU documents, and Interviews with EUD and GoR staff. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

Final report: Volume I 

far it focuses on indicators included in the JSRs, on Imihigo targets, and on indicators for DP funded 
projects.  Our own  research showed that  the  available data on the  energy  sector are not  consistent 
across sources, formats, time periods (fiscal versus calendar year, quarterly versus annual), and years 
in which they are presented. Some data are simply inaccurate.84 Some EU complementary measures 
were targeted to improve capacities at MININFRA and REG, and also to improve data collection, but 
due to the aforementioned lack of common understanding of aims and scope of this TA, it has not 
achieved  much  up  to  the  end  of  the  evaluation  period.    Yet,  there  are  some  indications  of  recent 
improvements, especially in the M&E system.85 

5.3.  Emergence of least-cost electric system expansion planning   

The  policy  dialogue  and  performance  frameworks  related  to  budget  support  helped  to 
transform sector planning from a politically driven process to one that is based on economically 
justified decisions.  Nevertheless, it was work-in-progress by the end of the evaluation period 
with  room  for  further  improvements.  EU  complementary  measures  could  have  supported 
improvement but the GoR did not use this opportunity yet. 

Originally, the planning for expansion of electricity  generation capacity in Rwanda was done in a 
fairly arbitrary way.  This resulted in overly ambitious targets86 based neither on properly assessed 
future demand nor selection of adequate generation technologies.  The optimistic projections for load 
growth (i.e., demand) in the country did not materialize and the push for more generating capacity 
resulted  in  the  construction  of  more  power  plants.    The  effect  was  an  excessive  reserve  margin, 
substantially  exceeding,  for  some  years,  the  present  value  of  40%,  while  15%  would  be  more 
appropriate and sufficient.87   

As a result of the dialogue between EUD together with other Development Partners and GoR, a shift 
towards  evidence-based  planning  has  been  observed.    The  new  approach,  relying  on  least-cost 
planning principles and computer based modelling, resulted in the preparation of planning scenarios 
for long-term capacity expansion and consideration of various generation options.88  The process was 
still under development at the end of the evaluation period, as REG staff were continuing to  gain 
competence  in  structuring  planning  scenarios.    There  were  several  gaps  observed  in  the  scenario 
planning,  the  elimination  of  which  would  make  the  results  more  realistic  and  meaningful.    The 
absence of analyses of the risk of pursuing particular types of generation technologies is one such 
gap. Additionally, a study to identify the economic and technical limitations of the sizes of various 
generation options, especially renewables, would be a useful supplement to the long-term planning.  
Furthermore, the emphasis so far is primarily on generation technologies while the impact of demand-
side options, especially active load management, has been neglected. 

EU  Budget  Support,  through  its  complementary  measures,  could  have  played  a  major  role  in 
completing these and other studies.  However, MININFRA has not used this opportunity yet.89 

84 The detailed list and examples of encountered issues with data quality is presented in Volume II, Annex 1, under JC 7.1.  
85 Based on comments from GoR and EUD staff to our draft report. 
86  ESSP 2012-2018, ESSP 2018-2024 called for construction of 563 MW and 512 MW of generating capacity respectively, while the 
2018 installed capacity of 218 MW was more than sufficient for 150 MW of electric load. 
87  Calculations based on data provided by MININFRA. By 2019, 15% has become the official target for the reserve margin.   
88 Rwanda Least-Cost Power Development Plan (LCPDP) 2019-2040.  June 2019 
89 Interview with EUD on May 10, 2019. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 
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29 

5.4.  Use of renewable energy sources (RES) 

The EU performance indicator for the use of renewable resources was set in a way that meant 
that its achievement was more dependent on weather conditions than on government efforts; it 
did not lead to a reduction in the share of non-renewable and heavily polluting resources, such 
as diesel and peat. 

One of the objectives of the EU’s budget support in energy is to support the GoR in the setting-up 
and implementation of its sustainable energy policy. Sector Reform contracts may support the EU’s 
SE4ALL  (Sustainable  Energy  for  All)  action  agenda  with  the  aim  of  improving  the  enabling 
environment, attracting investments, reducing energy poverty and boosting sustainable growth.90  The 
SE4ALL initiative has three objectives to be achieved by 2030: 

1. Ensure universal access to modern energy services.  
2. Double the global rate of improvement in energy efficiency.  
3. Double the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix from 18% in 2012 to 38% 

in 2030.91 

In line with these objectives, one of the EU’s Budget Support indicators in Rwanda (Indicator no. 5), 
is based on the share of electricity generated from renewable sources in the energy mix.  The name 
of the indicator is misleading, since the disbursements under this indicator are not dependent on the 
share of renewable energy sources, but on achieving a greater amount of electricity generated from 
renewable sources as compared with that output in the previous year.92 The main intention of using 
this indicator for the purposes of Budget Support was to increase the energy output from RES and 
decrease the output of peat generation, which is a main source of pollution.93  However, as will be 
explained  below,  the  formulation  of  this  indicator  raises  some  questions  and  appears  not  very 
effective for achieving the intended aims.   

The  energy  output  from  RES  power  plants  throughout  the  year  depends  primarily  on  weather 
conditions  (precipitation,  solar  insolation),  and  the  timing  and  size  of  the  electric  load.    During 
favourable  weather  and  power  system  conditions,  the  energy  generation  is  not  problematic;  the 
situation changes when these conditions are not favourable and availability of energy from the RES 
units decreases.   

During  the  period  of  2015-2019,  the  output  of  energy  generated  by  RES  and  corresponding 
compliance with the triggers for disbursements is presented in Table 4 below: 

90  European  Commission,  International  Cooperation  and  Development.  “Budget  support  and  sustainable  energy:    Methodological 
Note”. Also, teleconference with EC official, April 8, 2020. 
91 Current share of renewable energy in the global energy mix in Rwanda is above 50%. 
92 Indicator 5-Share of generated electricity from renewable sources in the energy mix.  Performance target: additional energy generated 
from renewable energy sources in energy mix including imports (hydro, geothermal) compared with baseline/previous year.  Financing 
Agreement Sector Reform Contract Special Conditions, Annex 1, Appendix 2, Table C. 
93 Teleconference with EC official, April 8, 2020. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

Final report: Volume I 

Table 4: Energy generated from renewable sources [GWh] 

Evaluation period 
Disbursement number 

2014-2015 
Baseline 

2015-2016 
Third 
Disbursement 

2016-2017 
Fourth 
Disbursement 

2017-2018 
Fifth 
Disbursement* 

2018-2019 
Sixth 
Disbursement* 

RES 
actual outputs [GWh] 

Increase in RES energy 
from the previous period 
[GWh] 
Minimum increase in 
required energy output 
[GWh] 

Disbursement [€] 

292.0 

361.5 

370.7 

429.8 

451.0 

69.5 

14.5 

9.2 

15.0 

59.1 

16.0 

21.2 

17.0 

1.2 M 
(100%) 

0.7 M  
(70%) 

1.0 M 
(100%) 

1.0 M 
(100%) 

Source: RURA Annual Reports 

* - estimates 

The third disbursement in 2017 was paid in full as the difference between the renewable energy output 
during the period of 2015-2016 and the base year exceeded many times the defined criterion.  During 
the following, fourth disbursement, the increase in RES energy generation was smaller than required, 
resulting in a 30% decrease in the payment.  The fifth disbursement was expected94 to be paid in full, 
as the difference between the evaluated periods was, again, significantly higher than required.  The 
situation is expected to be repeated during the Sixth Disbursement, since the difference in outputs is 
higher than required. Yet, as explained above, the achievement of the  objectives was more due to 
favourable weather conditions than to government efforts. 

A  further  question  is  whether  or  not  the  increase  in  renewable  energy  generation  has  resulted  in 
displacing  heavily  polluting  thermal  generation,  primarily  diesel  and  peat,  which  was  one  of  the 
cornerstones  of  establishing  this  indicator  in  the  first  place.    During  the  evaluation  period  (2015-
2018), the share of RES-generated energy has decreased by 4 percentage points from 56% to 52%, 
while at the same time the share of energy generated by non-RES has actually increased from 44% to 
48%, with the share of energy generation from peat increasing by 2 percentage points.   So, while the 
overall  objective  of  reaching  outputs  in  terms  of  GWh  was  fully  accomplished,  the  objective  of 
decreasing the share of thermal generation, especially from peat, was not.95 

Setting  minimum  increments  of  energy  output  each  year  as  qualifiers  for  budget  support  variable 
tranche disbursement is not stimulating more RES output when the weather and system conditions 
are favourable while the same criterion unnecessarily penalises the beneficiary when the RES output 
drops when the conditions are not favourable.96,97    

94 The fifth and sixth Disbursements are outside of the official scope of the Budget Support evaluation; however, they are presented 
here as a supporting information. 
95  For a more extensive discussion and more numerical data please refer to Volume II, Annex 1, EQ 7, Judgement Criterion 7.1. 
96  There is an absence of energy storage options during the Budget Support timeframe. 
97  While  redefining  the  indicator  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  report  a  suggestion  is  made  here  regarding  indicator’s  possible 
improvements: a modification to the indicator may be made to stimulate an economic dispatch of all available units, resulting in the 
lowest possible cost of reliably meeting the electrical load.  In the long run this approach will result in the lowest operational costs to 
the electric utility, a critical factor in the current REG’s financial situation.  To even out the playing field and fairly compare of available 
generation technologies, the cost adders may be factored during the planning process into the cost of energy generated by the polluting 
resources, to reflect their negative environmental externalities. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 
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31 

5.5.  Evolution of energy costs and tariffs 

Partly  as  a  result  of  improved  energy  planning,  the  average  cost  of  electricity  generation  is 
projected to start a downward trend in 2022, making the electric service more affordable. Tariff 
reforms have reduced costs for some consumers and EU budget support resources may have 
facilitated this. But costs are still high. 

It is expected that the new approach to energy planning will result in a better selection and use of 
supply-side (generation) options and, consequently, will lead to an eventual decrease in annual energy 
generation costs.  This outcome can be associated with Budget Support, through the influence of the 
EU and other DPs on improved policies. It may also have an effect on the high energy retail prices 
(see below). The cost reduction will not happen immediately as the system still struggles with the 
consequences  of  earlier  investments  in  thermal,  diesel  and  fossil-based  generation.  A  noticeable 
change in the rising annual energy costs is projected to happen after 2022, when the contracts for 
costly  thermal  (diesel)  generation  are  expected  to  expire98  and  the  composition  of  generating 
resources is realigned by bringing less expensive generation on-line.  

Affordability of on-grid connections steadily improves. The high costs of energy generation translate 
into high retail energy prices, which, while being cost-reflective, remain the highest among the Sub-
Saharan African countries.99 To soften the impact of high on-grid tariffs on low-income consumers 
and make the electric service more affordable, a new block tariff structure was introduced in January 
2017, with the lowest block designed for the lowest energy consumption tier.   

Similarly, to make the existing industrial consumers more competitive and prevent them from moving 
from Rwanda to neighbouring countries and, at the same time, to attract new businesses to choose 
Rwanda  as  their  base  of  operation,  the  industrial  tariffs  have  been  lowered  as  well.    There  is  no 
evidence of EU  Budget  Support  having an influence on the tariff formulation process.   However, 
some  funds  from  the  GoR  budget  were  transferred  to  REG  to  compensate  it  for  the  decrease  in 
industrial tariffs and the associated loss of revenue.100  Budget Support resources may have facilitated 
these transfers. 

5.6.  Energy access and affordability  

On-grid connections did not progress as intended in the early years (2015-2017), due to, among 
other factors, less than expected financial transfers from the GoR budget.  The situation has 
improved in the last year of the evaluation period and shows a possible positive impact of the 
Budget Support funds, without which even the current level of on-grid connections would not 
have been possible to achieve.101 

The electrification of Rwanda is ongoing through expansion of customer on-grid connections to the 
electric distribution network and through customer off-grid connections  to  individual Solar Home 
Systems (SHS) and micro-grids.102  Originally, ambitious goals were set to provide electricity to 70% 
of households - 48% on-grid and 22% off-grid - by the end of 2018.103  Later, the next edition of 
ESSP104 called for yet another set of ambitious goals: electrification of the entire country by the end 

98 Rwanda Least-Cost Power Development Plan (LCPDP) 2019-2040.  June 2019. 
99 https://www.statista.com/statistics/503727/retail-electricity-prices-in-africa-by-select-country. See also Volume II, Annex 1, JC 7.2. 
100 Details are presented and discussed in Volume II, Annex 1, JC 7.2. 
101 Interview with MININFRA. 
102 Micro grids is a niche development in Rwanda, serving only 3,236 consumers.  Rwanda Off-grid Sector Status Report 2018.  Update 
August 2019.  Energising Development. 
103 ESSP 2012-2018 
104 ESSP 2018-2024 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

Final report: Volume I 

of 2024 - 52% on-grid and 48% off-grid.  The EU Budget Support disbursement schedule called for 
more moderate results; the indicative targets for mid-2020 were set at 42% on-grid and 18% off-grid, 
a total of 60%. This target was significantly lower than the one established by the GoR for the end of 
2018.  The World Bank’s DPO targets for 2020 were similar - 61% for total connections, 38% on-
grid and 23% off-grid. 

On-grid and off-grid connections continue to increase. Access to, and use of, electricity has clearly 
increased over time.  According to the regression analysis carried out for this evaluation (see Annex 
2  in  Volume  II),  the  increases  in  on-grid  and  off-grid  electricity  connections  have  been  due  to 
additional  government  investment  (on-grid),  and  private  sector  and  NGO  contributions  (off-grid), 
especially in rural areas.  According to the Forward Looking Sector Review 2018/2019,105 1,371,950 
households  are  connected  to  electricity  (51%  of  total  households),  which  includes  1,021,734 
households connected to on-grid (38% of total households), and 350,216 households connected to 
off-grid  (13%  of  all  households).  This  was  slightly  lower  than  the  Budget  Support  performance 
indicators’ values for the variable tranche of the fourth disbursement, but sufficient for the EU to be 
considered met. The indicators for on-grid and off-grid access for the third tranche were not fully 
met.  The  government  had  misunderstood  the  calculation  methodology  and  believed  that  it  had 
reached over 95% of the target while in fact performance was lower. 

Affordability of electricity remains an issue. Despite the increase in the number of connections and 
the  overall  improvement  in  service  reliability  (see  below),  there  are  households  that  have  active 
connection to the electricity service but have yet to take full advantage of it.  Those customers face 
the dilemma of whether to buy food first before prepaying the electric service.106  Other consumers 
in poor households limit the electricity usage to lighting only and try to limit the overall consumption 
to  500  RwF,  the  amount  which  they  consider  affordable.  The  average  residential  electricity 
consumption continues to remain the lowest among the sub-Saharan countries.  The increased access 
to electricity services has not been accompanied by an increase in purchases of electrical appliances 
or an increase in the overall households’ energy consumption.  Similar trends exist amongst the off-
grid consumers.107 

The EU and other Development Partners have contributed to an improvement in standards for 
off-grid  solar  systems  which  facilitates  continued  private  sector  engagement.  However,  , 
affordability and future pace of off-grid connections’ growth remain an issue. The progress in 
off-grid electrification during 2015-2017  was  faster than in on-grid electrification.  Since off-grid 
solutions are mainly provided by the private sector and NGOs, the influence of government policies 
or resources, including Budget Support funds, is limited. The increase in off-grid connections in the 
early years was primarily driven by customers that could easily afford the system or at least make on-
time periodic payments agreed with the system provider.  It wasn’t unusual for well-off customers to 
acquire solar systems in  addition to on-grid connections in the areas where the power supply was 
unreliable due to  frequent  and/or prolonged interruptions of power.    In  addition,  assistance in  the 
provision of the Solar Home Systems by NGOs helped to some extent.   

Another factor that positively affected the sales of solar systems was the resolution of the issue of 
standards  for  the  systems  offered  on  the  market,  including  imported  units.108    Due  to  extensive 

105 Forward Looking Sector Review 2018/2019. 
106 Interview in Nyagatare. This interviewee estimates that 20 to 30% of the population in this rural area is connected but does not use 
electricity.   
107 Scaling up off-grid solar energy access through improved understanding of customers’ needs, aspirations and energy use of 
decentralised (SMART) Solar Home Systems – a case study of BBOXX customers in Rwanda.  Iwona Magdalena Bisaga, Centre for 
Urban Sustainability and Resilience. Department of Civil, Environmental and Geomatic Engineering, Faculty of Engineering 
University College London, 2018. 
108 In order to prevent poor quality equipment from entering the market the GoR introduced minimum technical standards without 
consulting them with the private sector. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
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dialogue between the GoR and the EUD and other Development Partners, the GoR reconsidered and 
adopted revised standards in 2018.109 These revisions made the units more affordable and eliminated 
the uncertainties faced by the manufacturers and importers of the solar equipment. 

However, the future expansion of off-grid connections may face a considerable challenge, especially 
in view of the 2024 target of 48% of all households connected to off-grid. Originally, during 2016-
2018 the consumers who could easily afford the Solar Home Systems became the owners of such 
systems.  Currently, the bulk of prospective off-grid consumers fall into Ubudehe categories 1 and 2, 
have a low income and rely heavily on instalment payments.   The minimum monthly payments for 
the simplest solar system are four times higher than the equivalent of electricity consumed.110  The 
service providers no longer take back the solar systems from the non-paying consumers; the systems 
are deactivated until the consumer has resources to make the payments upon which the systems are 
activated  again.  According  to  MININFRA,  a  discussion  with  the  World  Bank  is  taking  place 
regarding establishing financial assistance to prospective off-grid customers.111  

5.7.  Quality of electric services and energy losses  

The quality of electricity services has improved, and energy losses have decreased significantly 
but not due to EU budget support. Consumer complaints handling is lagging behind. 

Frequent system interruptions and extended periods without electricity services are slowly becoming 
a thing of the past.  Although the interruptions continue to occur, they are announced by the REG in 
advance and are not taking customers by surprise any more.   

Unlike  the  World  Bank  programme,  ,  the  original  EU  Budget  Support  scheme  did  not  have  any 
performance indicators related to system reliability.  After Addendum No. 2 to Financial Agreement 
No.  RW/FED/038-107,  signed  in  mid-2019,  such  a  performance  indicator  (a  System  Average 
Interruption Duration Index), has been introduced. In addition, the EU financed critical activities 
outside of the Budget Support, which positively contributed to improvements in quality of service 
and to a decrease in energy losses.  Improvements in the transmission and distribution systems can 
be attributed primarily to projects, including an EU aid project in the area of Kigali.112  

Nevertheless, quality of service is still an issue, especially in rural areas. It is not unusual, especially 
for the early line extensions, to end up with connecting lines that are inadequate for the purposes they 
serve.  Specific examples include the absence of three-phase lines connecting commercial and small 
industrial facilities as well as insufficient line capacity to provide enough electricity for existing or 
future demand.113 

Complaint  handling  is  advancing  but  still  needs improvement.  As  of  2018,  the  satisfaction  of  the 
residents of Rwanda with the electric service ranked 13th out 15 sectors.114  However, the satisfaction 
level of 61.3% was higher than the 2017 level of 58.1%,115 and the 2014 level of 37.7%, which was 
then the last out of all sectors.116  The fact that electric services are ranked that low is disturbing yet 

109 Ministerial Guidelines on Minimum Standards Requirements for Solar Home Systems.  Ministry of Infrastructure, August 10, 
2018. 
110 Rwanda Off-grid Sector Status Report 2018.  Update August 2019.  Energising Development. 
111 MININFRA, MG meeting on April 8, 2020. 
112 Energy Efficiency through Reduction of Losses in Kigali Grid Network.RW/FED/032-759.Total EDF contribution €23 mln. 
113 Interviews and own observations during visits to Nyagatare and Ruhango districts. 
114 Rwanda Citizen Report Card Survey. Rwanda Governance Board 2018. 
115 Rwanda Citizen Report Card Survey. Rwanda Governance Board 2017. 
116 Rwanda Citizen Report Card Survey. Rwanda Governance Board 2014. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

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somewhat  understandable  considering  the  fact  that  the  work  on  improving  the  reliability  of  the 
electric service is ongoing. 

In countries where large scale modernization of the electricity supply system takes centre stage, the 
main thrust of donors’ support is directed towards infrastructure issues; the consumer issues become 
secondary.    The  Budget  Support  scheme  did  not  include  any  indicators  addressing  the  state  of 
consumer affairs and its possible improvements, and thus, in a way, deemphasized its importance.  
Despite  administrative  rules  and  regulations  being  in  place117  and  REG’s  efforts  to  be  more 
responsive and proactive to consumer issues, the keeping of records of the complaints filed leaves a 
lot to be desired.  The records at RURA are incomplete and not properly categorized, and no records 
are kept at either REG or MININFRA.118  With the absence of this information, it is challenging to 
identify  the  main  issues  affecting  the  utility  company-consumer  relationship  or  to  plan  possible 
corrective measures.   

The experience of other developing countries119 suggests that, unless donors give specific attention 
to this area, it will continue lagging behind.  The preliminary work has been done by the World Bank, 
which  established  a  result  indicator  in  its  Development  Policy  Operation  for  the  GoR  to  initiate 
implementation and publishing of an annual customer satisfaction survey starting in 2020.120   

5.8.  Use of biomass resources and efficient cooking methods  

The use of biomass resources continues to the detriment of the country’s forest resources while 
the  implementation  of  efficient  cooking  lags  behind.  The  EU  Budget  Support  has,  to  date, 
brought some increased awareness among policy makers but has failed to bring any change in 
practice.   

The use of biomass and efficient cooking are, perhaps, the issues that have received most attention in 
the  policy  dialogue.  Although  these  issues  are  gradually  better  understood,  they  are  nevertheless 
yielding very limited results.  The imbalance between the demand for biomass and its sustainable 
supply has been documented through studies and forest inventories.  The EU included performance 
indicators for variable tranche disbursements on sustainable forestry, sustainable biomass energy, and 
cook stove efficiency with varying degrees of success.  Again, the GoR  set ambitious goals to be 
reached by 2024: reduction by half the number of households using three stone and traditional stoves; 
increase  of  the  number  of  households  using  cleaner  cooking  energy  technologies  to  80%;  and 
reduction of the use of biomass to 42%.121 

It has been recognized at the outset of the Budget Support activities that limited technical capacity 
existed  within  ministries  to  effectively  deal  with  these  issues.    On  the  one  hand,  awareness  is 
increasing due to dialogue initiated between EUD and the GoR, resulting in establishing baselines, 
initiating various studies and identifying elements for proper planning.  On the other hand, society as 
a  whole  is  slow  in  selecting  alternative  cooking  fuel.    Using  biomass  for  cooking  is  very  much 
entrenched in cultural habits.   

Increasing the use of improved cookstoves is important for reducing demand for firewood but also 
for improving the living conditions of women, as they are usually the ones who do household chores, 
including preparation of meals.  By cooking with firewood, and to some extent with charcoal, they 

117 Regulations and Guidelines, Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Authority. 
118 Interviews with staff MININFRA. 
119  For  example,  Armenia,  Georgia,  Kyrgyzstan,  Tajikistan,  and  Ukraine  (personal  experience of  evaluation  team).  Failure to  give 
attention to customer issues proved to lead to protesting in the streets.  
120 Third Rwanda Energy Sector Development Policy Financing.  The World Bank, August 2, 2019. 
121 ESSP 2018-2024 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
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face serious health risks, not to mention the inconvenience and substantial time required to handle the 
firewood. Therefore, women should be the ones who want to make the change and seek the use of 
better cooking methods.   

The role of women as decision makers in a household was not specifically addressed by any of the 
EU  Budget  Support  indicators.    However,  as  a  result  of  the  country’s  electrification,  new 
opportunities for enhancement of household operations became available.  That included choices of 
fuels for lighting, cooking, and other functions.  The divisions between urban and rural areas remain 
with women more often making decisions regarding, for example, the acquisition of cook stoves, in 
rural areas, while men more often do so in urban areas. The decision-making responsibility shifts to 
men when it comes to choosing household appliances, especially those not related to the kitchen.122   

However, the improved stoves were distributed  over two  years to  a mere 0.9% of the households 
instead of the expected 5% a year, thus failing to comply with the EU Budget Support indicators.123 
The energy efficient cook stoves offered by non-profit organizations and private organizations proved 
to be too expensive for purchase by the majority of the consumers.124  Another problem is that the 
use of improved cookstoves requires changing culturally embedded habits and practices. This may 
indicate that Budget Support is not an effective tool in changing those culturally embedded habits and 
customs. 

There are also misconceptions among consumers regarding the economics of using certain cooking 
fuels, like charcoal vs. LPG.125  It is a prevailing belief that charcoal is cheaper than gas.  Another 
argument is  that charcoal  is  safe while the  gas is prone to  explosions, while at  the same time the 
environmental  effects  of  indoor  pollution  due  to  charcoal  combustion  are  totally  neglected.    The 
charcoal production is very inefficient-it takes 10 tons of wood to produce 1 ton of charcoal.  To 
complete  the  “charcoal  picture”  it  has  to  be  noted  that  charcoal  production  is  a  very  profitable 
business, controlled by a powerful lobby. 

In  order  to  facilitate  large  scale  fuel  switching,  the  alternative  fuels  have  to  be  widely  available.  
However, the LPG distribution network and logistics of delivery are still getting off the ground.126 
Demand  for  firewood  continues  to  increase  and  exceeds  sustainable  production  capacity  of  forest 
resources.  When  it  comes  to  the  sustainability  of  forestry,  the  situation  is  alarming.    The  Budget 
Support indicator regarding the proportion of annual wood demand sustainably met locally did not 
show any improvement by the evaluation date of June 2017.  On the contrary, instead of showing that 
proportion to grow to 81%, it showed a negative trend.127  The proportion of annual wood demand 
sustainably met locally has steadily decreased to 47% in 2017 and will continue to fall to 30% until 
2021/2022.128 This is an alarming situation for Rwanda although more related to rural development 
rather  than  the  energy  sector  itself.    It  is  a  complex  issue  where  a  comprehensive  approach  to 
addressing all facets of the issue, not just the demand, is necessary. 

122 Beyond Connections.  Energy Access Diagnostic Report Based on the Multi-Tier Framework. The World Bank Group 2018. 
123 EU Communication re. Disbursement for Fiscal Year 2017/2018, 3rd fixed tranche (M€ 22), and 3rd variable tranche (maximum M€ 
10), 20/12/2017. EU Communication re. Disbursement for Fiscal Year 2018/2019, 4th fixed tranche (M€ 20), and partial 4th variable 
tranche (M€ 6.7), 7/3/2019. 
124 Interview with NGO staff. 
125 Liquefied Petroleum Gas. 
126 Interviews in the districts, October 28-30, 2019. 
127 EU Communication re. Disbursement for Fiscal Year 2018/2019, 4th fixed tranche (M€ 20), and partial 4th variable tranche (M€ 
6.7), 7/3/2019. 
128 idem 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
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Final report: Volume I 

5.9. Overall 

Figure 5 shows the results for the energy sector. A somewhat strengthened policy dialogue is the only 
direct output. The transfer of funds was in most years not accompanied by an increase in the public 
energy budget, so the link with “improvements in service delivery” only holds true for the last year 
of the evaluation period. Most linkages between budget support inputs and induced outputs are weak, 
but  the effect  of budget  support, and in particular of the policy dialogue,  on improved policies  is 
“moderate”.  In  the  case  of  “capacities  for  policy  implementation  and  M&E”,  and  “budget 
transparency”,  linkages  are  only  due  to  some  specific  performance  indicators  or  complementary 
measures. The strongest effect observed in this figure is the effect of “other EU interventions” (in 
green), and in particular that of a project that improved the reliability of electricity transmission and 
delivery in the Kigali area. 

As  a  result  of  (mostly)  weak  linkages  to  induced  outputs,  the  contribution  of  budget  support  to 
positive  outcomes  and  impact  has  also  been  limited.  There  may  be  a  limited  budget  support 
contribution  to  increased  on-grid  and  off-grid  access.  In  addition,  the  improved  energy  capacity 
planning, to which EU budget support contributed, is expected to help to reduce the high energy costs 
in the future. 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Synthesis of results for Energy 

Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 
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38  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

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6. EFFECTS ON AGRICULTURE AND NUTRITION 
This Chapter presents the answers to EQ 6, “To what extent and through which mechanisms (funds, 
dialogue  and  TA)  has  budget  support  contributed  to  an  improvement  in  policy  formulation  and 
implementation  processes,  and  to  its  related  accountability  (including  in  public  service  delivery)?  
And to EQ 8, “To what extent, in the Agriculture sector, have the development outcomes (including 
nutrition,  food security and inclusive development) pursued through the policies and programmes 
supported by budget support been (or are being) achieved? Which have been the determining factors 
of their achievement?” 

The chapter analyses how the different budget support inputs, through direct and induced outputs, 
contributed to Rwandan development outcomes in Agriculture and Nutrition. Figure 6:  provides an 
overview.  Additional  information  can  be  found  in  Annex  1,  in  particular  JC  6.1,  6.2,  6.3,  6.4 
(Agriculture), 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4 and 8.5, and in Annex 2. The chapter begins with assessing the effects 
of EU budget support on policies and implementation capacities, and then examines the outcomes of 
the policies and the possible factors that explain these outcomes, in particular related to improving 
climate  resilience,  establishing  a  high  value  chain  in  agriculture,  and  improved  nutrition.  A  final 
section highlights the main results of the econometric study. 

6.1.  Agricultural and related Policies  

There is a huge need for increasing agricultural production and productivity in Rwanda. GoR 
has  taken  up  these  challenges  by  carrying  out  agriculture  modernization  policies,  and  EU 
budget  support  can  be  considered  to  have  supported  these  policies.  These  policies  increased 
production but had unintended side effects on soil erosion, land degradation, and deforestation; 
in addition, the success of these policies was hindered by limited farmer participation. 

Rwanda suffers historically from a structural food deficit situation which is due to fragile soils with 
low levels of productivity and high and rising population density.129 The problems are exacerbated 
by subsistence farming systems and fragmented land. Land is the most valuable and productive asset, 
as also revealed by the econometric analysis (Annex 2). However, domestic production has not been 
able  to  meet  the  food  needs  of  the  population,  resulting  in  food  imports  and  food  aid.  Raising 
productivity  levels  in  smallholder  farms  therefore  represents  an  important  potential  driver  of 
economic growth and poverty reduction in Rwanda. Consequently, GoR has been implementing a 
long-term agricultural transformation strategy to address this structural issue. The EU Budget support 
SBS  Agriculture  Intensification130  (M€  15.5  for  the  period  2010-2012),  Decentralised  Agriculture 
(M€  40  for  the  period  2010-2016  and  SRC  Agriculture  (M€  182  for  the  period  2016-2021)  have 
contributed with funds, complementary measures and policy dialogue to the implementation of this 
GoR long-term policy package, which includes:   

  The  Crop  Intensification  Program  (CIP),  launched  in  2007,  to  increase  national  agricultural 
productivity of high-potential food crops (maize, wheat,  rice, Irish potato, cassava, soya bean, 
paddy rice and beans); contributing to self-sufficiency and food security at the national level.  
  The Land Use Consolidation (LUC), launched in 2007 and implemented from 2008 onward, as a 
major agricultural land transformation strategy in Rwanda, to reorganize highly fragmented land 
distribution and maximize/improve its use. 

  The LUC policy is also linked to the ‘Villagisation’ known as the new resettlement programme 
‘Imidugudu’, which started earlier in 2004. This programme concentrated the entire population 

129It increased from 321 people/km2 in 2000 to 512 people/km2 in 2019. (World Population Prospects, 2019). 
130 SBS Agriculture Intensification didn’t include complementary measures.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
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in villages in order to provide better housing, and more access to services (water, schools, health 
centres,  markets,  microfinance,  off-farm  businesses  opportunities,  social  security  and  other 
benefits). It also aimed at a better land use through liberating land for agriculture/crop production.  
  The Land Tenure Regularization Programme (LTR) developed a complete record of land tenure 
information  during  2009  to  2013  used  in  LUC.  All  forms  of  tenure  were  brought  under  one 
statutory system.  

  The  Decentralisation  policy  was  introduced  in  2000  with  three  goals:  the  promotion  of  good 
governance; the reduction of poverty and the promotion of efficient, effective and accountable 
service delivery.131 It includes fiscal and financial decentralisation. 

  The Zoning policy implemented in 2016 focuses on the territorial organization of value chains, 
for  example  improving  the  linkages  between  coffee  washing  stations  (CWSs)  and  farmers, 
improving  traceability  of  coffee,  and  reducing  the  role  of  middlemen  in  order  to  strengthen 
agricultural export growth.  

Use of consolidated land allows farmers to benefit from the various services under CIP: (i) subsidised 
seeds and fertilisers, (ii) extension services, (iii) post-harvest handling and storage (e.g. driers and 
food storage facilities) (iv) irrigation and mechanization by public and private stakeholders, and (v) 
concentrated markets for inputs and outputs. GoR has heavily promoted the use of fertilizers in the 
last decade. According to MINAGRI, the amount of fertilizers distributed has increased by almost 
24%  in  the  period  2011-2018,  from  44,294  to  55,152  MT.  Also,  according  to  RAB,  the  use  of 
improved seeds by small farmers has increased from 3% in 2006 to 12.5% in 2018. The timeliness of 
farmers’ access to seeds and fertilizers has improved since the introduction of the Smart Nkunganire 
System (mobile phones) by RAB in 2018.  

As a result, the cultivated area for the five priority crops (maize, rice, wheat, beans and Irish potatoes) 
has increased by approximately 130,000 hectares, equivalent to 15% of the cropping area, during the 
period 2014-2018.132 This increased cropping area resulted in an increase in national production of 
priority crops. Only wheat had an important increase in productivity (by 53 %), from 0.72 T/ha in 
2013/2014 to 1.10 MT/ha in 2017/2018. Irish potatoes had a smooth growth trend in productivity. 
Beans and paddy remained stable. Maize had a drop in the last two years. 

However,  the  transformation  from  subsistence  farming  to  a  competitive  and  market-oriented 
agricultural sector faces some challenges, as discussed in some recent academic research on Rwanda.  
This research shows another perspective of the policies that have been implemented in recent years:   

  The increase in cropping area led to unintended side effects of deforestation, soil erosion, and 
greater rain run-off, increasing the vulnerability to climate change (further explained in 6.3). 
  The increased production of priority  crops (monocropping) at  the national  level  may not  have 
benefited vulnerable populations or food security at the household level,133 and may have reduced 
diet diversity (further explained in 6.5).134 

Another  issue  of  note  in  this  long-term  policy  package  is  the  limited  farmers’  involvement  in  its 
design and implementation. The central national planning process provides little space for farmers in 
the decision-making process on how to use their land, which crops to grow, and to whom to sell their 
production. Farmers’ participation is limited to: (i) providing their land parcels; and (ii) farming the 

131 Good Governance and Decentralization in Rwanda Vol. VI Special Issue. RDB.  June 2018. 
132 Based on NISR data presented in Annex 1, JC 8.2   
133  Ansoms,A  et  al.  (2018),  The  Rwandan  agrarian  and  land  sector  modernisation:  confronting  macro  performance  with  lived 
experiences on the ground, Review of African Political Economy, 45:157, 408-431, DOI: 10.1080/03056244.2018.1497590. 
134 Del Prete et al. (2019), Land consolidation, specialization and household diets: evidence from Rwanda. Food Policy.; 83:139–49 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2018.12.007 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
40  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

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consolidated plots as officials request. Farmers’ inclusion in LUC is voluntary but it is a prerequisite 
to access GoR programme/benefits (seeds, fertilizers, etc.). Ntihinyurwa and Masum show that 75% 
of the farmers participating in LUC were not consulted on the LUC policy, and 79% did not have a 
say in crop selection. Farmers are induced to grow the priority crops chosen by the government and 
this may be seen as a diminution of farmers’ land use rights.135  

Something  similar  happens  with  the  development  of  geographic  “zones”  around  coffee  washing 
stations (CWSs). Coffee farmers within a geographic zone are obliged to only sell to a specific CWS 
and that CWS must only buy from designated farmers. While zoning may bring some organization to 
the  coffee  sector,  it  will  do  so  by  limiting  the  choices  farmers  and  CWSs  have  in  their  trading 
partners.136 According to a study on farmers’ perceptions,137 there are unintended outcomes such as: 
(i) almost 50% of farmers do not know about the zoning policy or if it applies to them; (ii) Farmers 
feel negatively toward zoning, believing that it does not raise coffee cherry prices, and that it largely 
benefits coffee washing stations (CWSs) rather than farmers. Other issues raised include the reduction 
of farmers’ incomes through lack of buyer competition, weakening cooperatives by splitting members 
across multiple zones, and distributing zones such that CWS capacity may not match coffee supply. 

The  EU  budget  support  has  contributed  to  improved  policies  and  policymaking  in  the 
agriculture sector through policy dialogue and through specific complementary measures and 
other interventions, but these improvements are small, recent and have limited impact on the 
above-mentioned challenges.  

As discussed in chapter 3, the policy dialogue process on agriculture in the ASWG has improved 
thanks to a Complementary Measure (TA) to strengthen this ASWG. In addition, the inclusion of 
farmers’ organizations in the policy development process for PSTA 4138 in 2018 can be considered a 
major success of the EU budget support.139 The EU has promoted this participation via: (i) the policy 
dialogue; (ii) specific other interventions to strengthen these farmer organisations and CSOs; and (iii) 
complementary measures (through contracting FAO) that supported GoR in developing PSTA 4 and 
also proposed the inclusion of farmers organizations in the consultations on this new policy. This is 
an example of policy dialogue, complementary measures and other cooperation tools coming together 
in a synergistic way. Furthermore, the PSTA 4 is considered a better strategy than the previous ones. 
It  has  benefitted  from  broad  participation  (farmers’  organisations,  CSOs  and  many  DPs).  This 
consultation process was managed by FAO as part of the EU’s complementary measures.  

The EU also fostered participation of farmers and their representatives in policy processes outside the 
budget  support  framework,  for  example  via  the  SCAB  project140  (see  chapter  4).    Civil  society 
organisations that advocate for the interests of the rural poor, were supported in doing budget analysis. 
They presented their views, for example on the need for more investment in maintenance of irrigation 
and in capacities for doing soil analysis, to the Parliamentary Budget Committee, but it is not known 
whether this led to changes in the budget.141 

135 Pierre Damien Ntihinyurwa and Fahria Masum, Participatory Land Use Consolidation in Rwanda: From Principles to Practice. FIG 
Working Week 2017. Helsinki, Finland, May 30, 2017. 
136 AGRI LOGIC. Value Chain Analysis for the Coffee Sector in Rwanda Report for the CBI – 27 July 2018 
137 Gerard, A et al. Stakeholder Perceptions on Geographic Zoning in Rwanda’s Coffee Sector and Opportunities for Policy Adjustment. 
Feed the Future. Innovation Lab for Food Security Policy. Policy Research Brief 42 Africa Great Lakes Region Coffee Support Program 
(AGLC). July 2017.  
138 This was in line with recommendation 11 of the Mid-Term Review PSTA 3, p. 94. COWI. February 2017.  
139 Interviews EUD, FAO, other DPs and CSOs and farmer organisations. 
140  SCAB  Project:  Strengthening  Civil  Society  Organisation  Capacity  in  Promoting  Sustainable  Agriculture  Policies  and  Citizens 
Participatory Budgeting in Rwanda, implemented by Action Aid, Collective of Alliances and Leagues for the Defence of Human Rights 
in Rwanda (CLADHO) and Civil Society umbrella organization (CCOAIB). 
141https://rwanda.actionaid.org/stories/2019/civil-society-platforms-present-budget-framework-concerns-parliamentary-committee-0. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
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However, the improvements in policy processes described in this paragraph are small and recent, so 
they did not have effects on agricultural outputs or outcomes during the evaluation period.  

The  EU  supported  agricultural  policies,  outputs  and  outcomes  also  with  another  budget  support 
programme, namely the Rural Feeder Roads Development Programme (RFRDP). RFRDP aimed to 
enhance market access and reduce transport costs for people as well as for goods. It provided € 40 
million and had very specific performance indicators. Cumulatively, 700 kilometres of feeder roads 
had to be rehabilitated and 500 kilometres had to be maintained according to specific procedures in 
7 Districts. These road rehabilitation and maintenance targets were achieved. In this case, one could 
infer the existence of a direct relationship between the EU funds and outputs (Figure 6: ). In addition, 
an Impact Evaluation142 of feeder roads in Rwanda concluded with suggestive evidence that investing 
in feeder roads supports the development of the most inaccessible and disadvantaged areas. This study 
showed  that  feeder  road  rehabilitation  increases  average  household  income  in  remote  villages  by 
US$74  per  year. This  is  linked directly  with  poverty  reduction and reduction of inequality. Three 
other  donors  contributed  to  expanding  and  rehabilitating  the  feeder  road  network:  Netherlands, 
USAID and World Bank.  

6.2.  Institutional capacities for policy implementation   

The  EU  supported  capacities  for  implementation  and  monitoring  in  agriculture  through 
complementary  measures  and  through  the  policy  dialogue.    However,  there  were  important 
changes in the institutions involved  in the  agriculture  sector, which  affected implementation 
and M&E capacities during the period of the evaluation and thus also the effects of the EU 
efforts.   

MINAGRI and its agencies had several organizational and capacity needs assessments showing their 
organizational and capacity constraints for effective implementation.143 As a result, MINAGRI, RAB 
and NAEB were restructured to deliver EDPRS II and PSTA 3 in 2014. The restructuring reflected 
the national process of decentralisation of authority to districts, which is still on-going. MINAGRI 
was defined as responsible for policy setting and strategic planning for the sector; RAB, NAEB and 
local governments were exclusively charged with policy implementation, with greater authority and 
autonomy. Even in ideal circumstances, it takes time for such a comprehensive restructuring process 
to deliver and to become effective. In this case, the alignment of responsibilities, tasks, professional 
needs,  competences  and  procedures  was  not  sufficiently  reviewed  and  defined.144  As  a  result,  the 
Agriculture Sector Capacity Building Plan (ASCBP)145 observed some internal organizational issues 
at MINAGRI, such as: 

"Management responsibilities are rarely delegated"  
"Management and organisational processes are highly centralised"  

(i) 
(ii) 
(iii)  Staff observes "communication challenges“  
(iv)  "Consequently, (there is) no open learning environment (at MINAGRI), which discourages 
knowledge  sharing,  team  spirit,  constructive  debate,  and  efficient  quality  service 
delivery.”  

142 Rwanda Feeder Roads Impact Evaluation. Data and preliminary analysis. March 20, 2019. WB, EU and DIME. 
143 Bizoza, C et al. Capacity Strengthening Strategy through Capacity Needs Assessment for Country Level. Strategic Analysis and 
Knowledge  Support  System  (SAKSS).  March  2014.  Coffey  International  Development  Ltd.  Capacity  Needs  Assessment  for 
MINAGRI. Final Report. July 2013. 
144 MTR PSTA 3. COWI. February 2017. 
145 MINAGRI, Agriculture Sector Capacity Building Plan 2013-2018 (ASCBP), August 2013. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

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Although restructuring led to some improvements, MINAGRI, RAB and NAEB continued to face 
similar challenges to fulfil their mandates in policy development and implementation.146 As policies 
have become ever more complex, the gap between policy design and implementation has widened 
over time. While policies initially focused on delivering basic infrastructure and inputs, they now 
include engaging with the private sector, developing agri-food value chains, and strengthening core 
information systems relevant for evidence-based policy making and implementation. This requires 
new  capacities  and  skills  and  more  inter-sectoral  and  inter-institutional  coordination.  Another 
problem  was  that  Imihigo  performance  contracts  linked  to  specific  policy  goals  attracted  the  full 
attention of officials.  

In 2019, MINAGRI with support of the World Bank developed a new organisational review with a 
capacity needs assessment of MINAGRI, including a plan to improve organizational effectiveness,147 
within  the  context  of  the  new  PSTA  4.  The  study  was  a  disbursement  indicator  of  World  Bank 
Program-for-Results  (PfR)  Phase  2.  By  end  2019,  the  results  of  the  study  were  not  publicly 
available.148  The  World  Bank  has  linked  the  institutional  restructuring  process  to  disbursement 
indicators of PfR Phase 2.   

Given these institutional constraints, it has been difficult for the EU to improve the effectiveness of 
MINAGRI’s policies.  

Some  complementary  measures  in  this  area  were  successful.  EU  budget  support  attempted  to 
strengthen capacities for implementation and monitoring through several Complementary Measures. 
The EU commissioned a Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA)149 of the Agriculture Sector in 
Rwanda in 2012, which provided useful baseline information to optimise future policy development 
(PSTA 3 and EDPRS) on environmental management and resource use. This SEA identified factors 
that  limited  agricultural  development  and  the  environment  in  strategic  areas  -soil  and  water 
management, acid soils and nutrients, crops selection, climate change, rural feeder roads, M&E. This 
information was used in the SRC Agriculture for defining triggers for the release of budget support 
funds. Some other Complementary Measures were also successful, such as the support to the National 
Institute of Statistics (NISR) for GIS/remote sensing and ICT-based data supplies for the collection, 
storage and management of agricultural survey data, and the support to the WB for the design, testing, 
implementation and dissemination of rigorous agricultural impact evaluation, an activity which is still 
on-going. The support to NISR has improved the Institute’s technical capacities and equipment to 
upgrade  the  National  Seasonal  Agriculture  Survey.  The  Comprehensive  Food  Security  and 
Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) 2018 was also successfully carried out and provided useful data. 
All reports are publicly available.  

The EU-funded TA for MINAGRI to improve government policy, strategic planning, PFM and 
M&E capacities in the sector was much less successful. Although by the end of 2019 an evaluation 
of this TA was conducted, it is already clear that there is no common understanding of its role or 
purpose. MINAGRI is questioning the usefulness of EU-TA, specifically TECAN150 and the TA to 
NAEB (see for the latter 6.4). MINAGRI expects support on a day-to-day basis. It wants to optimise 
the TA program by applying time-based contracts rather than task-based contracts.  In the view of 
EUD, TA is  not  supposed to  do the daily work of  government  staff.  In addition,  the GoR should 
assign  more  technical  counterpart  staff  in  order  to  benefit  from  knowledge  transfer,  since,  at  the 
moment, staff absorption capacity is limited. Similar differences in views hold for other DPs’ TA to 
MINAGRI, for example AGRI-TAF (of DfID).  

146 World Bank, Rwanda - Transformation of Agriculture Sector Program 4 Program-for-Results Phase 2. PAD. May 2018 
147 The World Bank Implementation Status & Results Report. Seq 3. PfR-Phase 2. 11-Nov-2019 
148 Interview with DP staff 
149 SAFEGE. Strategic Environmental Assessment of the Agriculture sector in Rwanda. (SEA). January 2012 
150 Interview PS MINAGRI 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
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43 

In  addition,  there  is  no  evidence  that  EU  policy  dialogue  improved  the  restructuring  process  of 
MINAGRI and related agencies. Policy implementation and M&E continued to face such constraints 
as:  

•  According to PSTA 4, the Planning and Programme Coordination Directorate of MINAGRI 
is  meant  to  be  a  central  pillar  for  the  implementation,  as  well  as  for  the  monitoring  and 
reporting on budget support indicators. However, it has the same staff as in 2016. The EUD 
and  other  DPs  requested  MINAGRI  to  strengthen  this  Unit,  but  so  far  without  success.151 
MINAGRI argues that it is waiting for the result of the WB Organizational Development study 
mentioned above and wants to limit staff costs.152 

•  The M&E system (AMIS) implemented in MINAGRI (supported initially by EU and later by 
DFID) mainly focuses on Imihigo indicators. RAB and Districts submit data for it but do not 
use the AMIS system for their own purposes. Some RAB departments are developing their 
own M&E system in parallel, duplicating the AMIS. 

•  The EU and other DPs  question the quality of some data, in  particular administrative data 
provided  by  MINAGRI,  RAB  and  NAEB.  There  are  significant  differences  between 
administrative  data  that  often  reflect  double  counting  when  data  over  several  years  are 
presented, and data from specific studies to monitor performance indicators, for example in 
area under irrigation and agroforestry.153 

As mentioned in chapter 4, EU budget support had some induced outputs in the area of sector specific 
PFM improvements, in particular through performance indicators for the variable tranches. However, 
although  important  in  itself,  the  production  of  district  budget  execution  reports  and  performance 
reports, and the publication of Agriculture PER and PETS cannot be expected to have major effects 
on agricultural outputs and outcomes.    

6.3.  Climate resilience of rural households  

On  the  one  hand,  GoR  has  increased  national  climate  resilience  through  investment  in 
irrigation, erosion control and agroforestry. On the other hand, coverage is still low, the new 
climate smart agriculture practices are still only at research and/or seed multiplication stage, 
and the increase in cropping area has generated deforestation, soil erosion, and greater rain 
runoff, which, in turn, exposes rural households even more to climate change. Budget support 
did not have much influence on improving climate resilience of poor rural households. 

Rwanda is highly vulnerable to climate change and strongly reliant on rain-fed agriculture both for 
rural  livelihoods  and  for  export  crops  such  as  tea  and  coffee.  A  large  proportion  of  Rwanda’s 
inhabitants is very poor and lives in rural areas. They are directly dependent on natural resources, 
including water availability and soil quality. Therefore, the effects of a changing climate are strongly 
felt by the Rwandan economy and population. Changes in precipitation and temperature negatively 
affect crop yields and quality and increase the risk of new parasites and pests to humans, cattle and 
plants. Heavy rainfalls produce erosion and landslides, which can block roads and lead to shortages 
in production inputs. 

GoR aims to deal with this important structural issue through: (i) investment in irrigation; (ii) better 
land  use  and  erosion  control;  (iii)  expanding  agroforestry;  (iv)  developing  specific  climate-smart 
agriculture practices. However, as will be detailed below, progress is slow. One of the reasons for 

151 Interview EUD and DPs staff. 
152 Interview MINAGRI PS and Planning Unit Staff.  
153 Interviews several DPs, EUD and MINAGRI staff, 3rd EU Disbursement Note 13/11/2017 and EU disbursement Notes. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
44  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

Final report: Volume I 

this  slow  progress  is  that  investment  in  agriculture  constitutes  only  10%  of  total  investment  in 
Rwanda, which can be considered low given the huge challenges in this area and the large share of 
the population dependent on this sector (70%).154 Budget support did not have much influence on this 
low  level  of  investment.  As  shown  above  (chapter  3)  there  is  not  much  relationship  between  EU 
budget support for agriculture and agriculture expenditure, and the policy dialogue in agriculture was 
not able to change this either.  

Another reason  for the limited effectiveness  in  addressing climate change are the unintended side 
effects  of  agricultural  policies  as  mentioned  above  (6.1).  These  policies  (CIP,  LUC)  increased 
national production through land use changes and cropland expansion, but at the expense of Rwandan 
forest areas.155 While cropland only occupied 25% of the territory in 1990, this had risen to 58% in 
2016,  with  massive  deforestation  as  a  result.156  This  deforestation,    is  linked  with  erosion  and 
reduction in national soils’ rainwater infiltration capacity. In addition, the push for monocropping, 
the lack of crop rotation and the intensive use of fertilizers in some areas affected soil structure and 
soil fertility and promoted erosion. This means these policies contributed to bigger climate change 
exposure. In addition, measures to foster erosion control and irrigation were not always fully adequate 
either, as will be detailed below.  

There has been investment in radical terracing, but the quality of design and implementation 
of terracing does not take the soil acidity sufficiently into account. EU budget support has so 
far not been able to influence this. 

Rwandan soils are naturally fragile. Karamage and co-authors estimated the national soil loss due to 
erosion at 595 million tons per year, of which 95% was due to cropland erosion.157 The soil erosion 
rate  increases  exponentially  with  the  slope  of  the  cropland  linked  with  high  rainfall.  Soil  erosion 
reduces  soil  fertility  and  causes  declining  cropland  productivity.  It  also  produces  environmental 
damage in the form of sedimentation, pollution and increased flooding. The Rwandan landscape is 
characterised by high mountains and hills with very steep slopes which are the major cause of soil 
erosion and sedimentation.  Almost 77% of all cultivated land in Rwanda  is under the category of 
“moderate to high erosion risk soils” (slopes between 13-55%). Only 23% are classified under the 
“no or low erosion risk” category.158 Overcultivation and expansion onto marginal lands and steep 
slopes  is    as  a  result  of  land  scarcity  and  demographic  pressure.159  The  people  cultivating  these 
marginal croplands are usually poor and use their available resources until depletion. 

One of the solutions to erosion adopted by GoR is the implementation of radical terraces. This can be 
an effective measure to curb soil erosion risk in mountainous areas.160 According to MINAGRI data, 
during the period 2012-2018, the number of hectares with radical terracing implemented increased 
from 46,246 ha in 2012/13 to 118,399 in 2017/2018, reaching almost 15% of the area with high to 
very  high  erosion  risk.  At  the  same  time,  the  number  of  hectares  with  progressive  terracing  also 
increased, from 802,292 to 932,282. Although this implies a high national investment, the social costs 
of soil erosion can be higher than the costs of applying terracing,  and it therefore makes sense for 
public policy to support the application of terracing.  

154 World Bank, Rwanda: Systematic Country Diagnostic 2019. 
155 Using firewood for cooking contributes to deforestation as well. 
156 Karamage, F et al. Modelling Rainfall-Runoff Response to Land Use and Land Cover Change in Rwanda (1990–2016).  Water 
2017,9,147; doi:10.3390/w9020147 www.mdpi.com/journal/water 2 February 2017. 
157  Karamage,  F  et  al.  Extent  of  Cropland  and  Related  Soil  Erosion  Risk  in  Rwanda.  Sustainability  2016,  8,  609; 
doi:10.3390/su8070609. http://www.mdpi.com/journal/sustainability 
158 Ministry of Lands, Environment, Forestry, Water and Mining (MINITERE, 2007) 
159 The Nile River. Abdelazim, M Editor Faculty of Engineering Egypt. Springer 2017.  
160 “The mean cropland erosion rate in Rwanda could be reduced by 79% using radical terracing, leading to a drastic decrease of 
national soil loss by 75%”. Source Karamage, F et al. Extent of Cropland and Related Soil Erosion Risk in Rwanda. Sustainability 
2016, 8, 609; doi:10.3390/su8070609. , p. 13. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
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45 

Another important issue is the quality of terracing related with soil acidity. Soil Acidity is a major 
constraint  to  agricultural  production  in  Rwanda  affecting  physical  and  chemical  soil  conditions. 
Almost 75 % of Rwanda’s land is below the critical threshold (Ph below 5.5) of soil acidity.161 This 
is associated with a number of toxicities to plants (Aluminium) as well as mineral deficiencies.162 
Most of the crops grown in Rwanda have limited tolerance to acid soils.163 Therefore, farmers and 
national production/productivity would benefit a lot if this acidity would be measured regularly (every 
two to three years), in order to determine the lime requirements that can neutralise the acidity.164 If 
this does not happen, soil conservation measures cannot have an effect on production or on poverty 
reduction.  

The  SRC  Agriculture  includes  a  specific  indicator  for  the  next  disbursement  on  “No  of  Hectares 
handed over to farmers with an acceptable level of soil acidity (pH >5.2)”. The aim of this indicator 
is to increase awareness of the importance of quality (adequate soil Ph) next to quantity (number of 
hectares terraced) and to foster the development of an integrated approach to acid soils management, 
including and the broad lime adoption by farmers.  

Despite support offered by the EUD, the GoR may face a challenge in reporting on this indicator in 
a timely fashion. Our visits to districts revealed that soil acidity is not consistently measured yet. 165 

There  has  been  important  government  investment  in  irrigation,  with  some  role  for  budget 
support in particular through quantitative performance indicators, but area coverage is still 
low  (9%).  The  quality  of  design,  implementation  and  maintenance  of  big  irrigation  and 
drainage systems is not fully adequate and EU budget support has not been able to change this 
to a meaningful extent.  

Irrigation  allows  farmers  to  move  from  rain-fed  agriculture  to  diversified,  high  value  crops,  thus 
increasing cropping intensity, land productivity and reducing exposure to droughts. For this reason, 
irrigation development is a key priority for the Ministry of Agriculture. Irrigation was initially focused 
on lowlands (marshland areas) but GoR is extending irrigation to the hillside with higher costs and is 
also fostering small-scale schemes. 

The national potential area for irrigation is almost 580,000 ha.166 According to MINAGRI data, during 
the period 2012-2018, the number of hectares under irrigation increased by 180% in all 3 systems 
(marshland,  hillside  and  small-scale  schemes).  Approximately  52,000  hectares167  are  currently 
catered  for  by  irrigation  schemes  countrywide.  Budget  support  performance  targets  for  irrigation 
expansion  were  achieved.  Nevertheless,  only  7-9%  of  national  potential  area  is  currently  under 
irrigation schemes.168  

The irrigation development is government led (not demand driven) with the aim of achieving national 
food  security.  It  focusses  on  an  increased  supply  of  irrigation  water  to  water  users  through  the 
construction/rehabilitation of new/existing irrigation and drainage infrastructure (freely provided by 
GoR), together with the establishment and training of Irrigation Water Users’ Associations (IWUA) 

161 PSTA 4. July 2018.  
162 One Acre Fund. Managing Soil Acidity with Lime (2015) 
163 Nduwumuremyi A, et al. (2014). Soil acidity analysis and estimation of lime requirement for rectifying soil acidity.  Int. Inv.  J. 
Agric.  Soil Sci.  Vol. 2(2):22-26. 
164 FAO soils portal: (http://www.fao.org/soils-portal/soil-management/management-of-some-problem-soils/acid-soils/en/)  accessed 
April 2020.  
165 Situational evaluation done by Evaluation Team at the moment of Rwanda Field visit at Rulindo and Rubaru district, Interviews 
with EUD and MINAGRI staff. 
166 National Irrigation Master Plan 2010. Rwanda; and Rwanda Irrigation Policy and Action Plan. 2013  
167 MINAGRI Annual Report 2017/2018. September 2018. 
168 With MINAGRI data the share is 9%, an EUD study concludes that coverage is lower, namely 7%. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

Final report: Volume I 

to  be  responsible  for  the  management  of  the  newly  constructed/rehabilitated  irrigation  systems. 
However, this has not always led to the development of profitable and sustainable irrigated agriculture 
resulting in higher crop yields and more net income for farmers. This  can be explained, at least to 
some extent, by the lack of farmers’ participation and by inadequate management and maintenance.  
An academic study shows that only a minority of farmers  has  adopted the technology for hillside 
irrigation  four  years  after  its  introduction.  This  was  due  to  failures  in  labour  and  land  markets  in 
Rwanda. With so few farmers using irrigation within the scheme and benefiting from it, the gains in 
cash income are not sufficient for paying maintenance costs.169  

EU  budget  support  attempted  to  improve  the  quality  of  irrigation  systems.  A  budget  support 
complementary measure involved a study to assess the current state of irrigation and generated data 
for improving irrigation systems. This study found that only 25% of marshland irrigation systems and 
38% of hillside irrigation systems had a “good” overall physical condition, whereas respectively 58% 
and 46% were “moderate” and 15% were considered “poor”. The main challenges were related  to 
operational problems at intakes (gates missing, intakes blocked), flooding, over-irrigation and/or poor 
drainage, low water use efficiency and poor farmer organization within schemes. Also, in 91% of the 
assessed  marshland  and  in  77%  of  the  hillside  irrigation  systems,  farmers  experienced  labour 
shortages, especially during land preparation, seeding, weeding and harvesting. In marshlands, soil 
fertility and yields start diminishing due to the lack of proper irrigation and/or drainage maintenance 
or management. Only 20% of farmers paid the irrigation service fee (ISF) to IWUA for maintaining 
the irrigation scheme. 170 The results of this study were meant to be integrated in an updated Irrigation 
Masterplan,  which  was  a  priority  for  the  government.  It  was  also  a  performance  indicator  for 
disbursement of the variable tranche for the 4th disbursement on the SRC Agriculture and nutrition. 
However, in  2018 the EU concluded that there  was no draft Plan  yet  and that this target was not 
met.171  

The  GoR  is  implementing  an  agroforestry  policy  to  protect  against  soil  erosion  and  climate 
change. However, this is not sufficient to counter deforestation arising from other policies. 

The GoR is implementing an agroforestry policy to protect against soil erosion and climate change, 
by planting multipurpose tree species to deliver wood, fodder fruits and fix nitrogen to the soil. The 
EU  supported  this  by  having  an  indicator  for  disbursement  of  the  variable  tranche  stipulating  an 
increase  in  the  area  under  agroforestry.  In  addition,  the  EU  commissioned  a  study  (as  a 
complementary  measure)  in  order  to  verify  the  area  under  agroforestry  and  its  increase.  Using 
Geographic Information Systems, this study found that   the area under agroforestry increased from 
87,000 to 176,919 hectares between 2014 and 2018. 172  This increase of almost 90,000 hectares was 
just sufficient for disbursement. However, deforestation in Rwanda has continued and accelerated 
between 2010 and 2016, with 349,500 hectares of forest areas lost in that period on a net basis.173 

According to data provided by RAB, specific climate-smart agricultural practices (other than 
applying irrigation and agroforestry) are currently at early research stage or are in the seed 
multiplication phase. None is available for farmers and/or adopted by farmers yet. There is no 
evidence of a role of EU budget support in supporting these specific practices. 

169 Jones, Maria and et al. 2019. Factor Market Failures and the Adoption of Irrigation in Rwanda. Policy Research working paper; no. 
WPS 9092; Impact Evaluation series. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. 
170 Transtec/SHER/Agrotec, 2016 Technical assistance in the establishment of a baseline of agricultural households using irrigation 
systems. Final Report. Volume 1. 
171 EU Disbursement note for the 4th tranche of the SRC Agriculture and nutrition, p. 4. 
172 COWI, Preparation of Agroforestry Public Investment Projects. Intermediary Report. December 2018.  
173Karamage,  F  et  al.  Modelling  Rainfall-Runoff  Response  to  Land  Use  and  Land  Cover  Change  in  Rwanda  (1990–2016).  Water 
2017,9,147; doi:10.3390/w9020147 www.mdpi.com/journal/water2 February 2017. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
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6.4.  An inclusive high value chain in agriculture 

Developing an inclusive high value chain in agriculture is one of the objectives of EU budget 
support, but it is in its initial stages and EU budget support interventions have  so far had a 
limited impact on this objective. 

Between 2013 and 2018, the agriculture sector grew by 5.5% on average, with a range of variation 
between  3  and  7%      An  average  growth  of  5.5%  is  considered  relatively  high  by  international 
standards.  In  addition,  agriculture  exports  have  increased  while  imports  decreased.  Favourable 
commodity prices  over the evaluation  period contributed  to  a reduction of Rwanda’s trade deficit 
from US$ 1371 million in 2012 to US$ 871 million in 2017. 

EU  attempts  to  strengthen  capacities  for  upgrading  agricultural  exports  have  had  limited 
success so far. -SRC Agriculture has dedicated complementary measures to strengthen the capacity 
of NAEB/MINAGRI to upgrade the specialised quality infrastructure needed for agricultural exports 
including coffee, tea, fruit and fresh vegetables, honey, flowers, etc. These complementary measures 
include:  (i)  the  improvement  of  the  laboratory  buildings  to  international  standards  to  allow  the 
analytical equipment to  be installed and operated in conditions which will allow the laboratory to 
receive ISO 17025 accreditation; and (ii) TA for the strengthening of the technical advisory function 
of NAEB designed to catalyse the export growth. However, the tender for supplying and installing 
the laboratory  equipment  closed in  November 2019 so no results can be visible  yet.  Furthermore, 
NAEB authorities had their doubts on the value of EU Technical Assistance (implemented in May 
2018) because it had, in their view, limited results so far.174  

The  EU  also  supported  the  GoR  objective  to  increase  employment  in  export-oriented  value 
chains. However, it is difficult to show results in this area, also due to lack of data. The SRC 
Agriculture and nutrition had a performance indicator for disbursement of the variable tranche on 
“number of people employed in export-oriented agriculture”. But achievement of this indicator was 
beyond government control and also impossible to measure. For these reasons, in 2018 the indicator 
was changed to the number of coffee farmer groups trained in improved practices through “Farmer 
Field Schools”. Achievement of the targets was expected to raise both the quality and quantity of 
employment in the export value chain, and in particular in the important coffee sector. 

It is difficult to find data on the trend in employment in export agriculture. According to NAEB,175 
six agro-processing tea plants were established in the period 2014-2019. They employ 196 permanent 
and 8,610 temporary workers. According to the Rwanda Development Board, export diversification 
has  increased  due  to  a  number  of  new  products  such  as  stevia  and  essential  oils.    However,  the 
proportion of persons mainly working in market-oriented agriculture has decreased from 39% to 37% 
between  February  2017  and  February  2019,  while  the  proportion  of  agricultural  workers  mainly 
involved in subsistence agriculture increased from 61% to 63%.176 This is the opposite of the desired 
trend towards more workers in market-oriented agriculture.   

174 At the time of Evaluation Mission, the tender for purchasing laboratory equipment was on going, and little practical results  could 
be seen.   
175 NAEB staff interview. 
176 NISR, Labour Force Survey, May 2019. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
48  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

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6.5.  Food and nutrition security of rural households  

EU  budget  support  has  contributed  somewhat  to  reducing  malnutrition  in  Rwanda.  This 
mainly  arose  as  a  result  of  specific  programmes,  complementary  measures  and  the  policy 
dialogue in the area of nutrition, and less so by programmes that supported government policies 
aimed at increasing agricultural production.  

EU budget support interventions through SRC Agriculture and SRC Malnutrition included two main 
lines  of  action  to  enhance  the  Food  and  Nutrition  Security  of  rural  households  in  Rwanda:  one 
fostering agriculture production and the other supporting Rwanda’s National Multisectoral Strategy 
to Eliminate Malnutrition (NSEM):  

  The Agriculture PSTA 3 and 4 seek to achieve food security through production growth and 
food  availability.  These  include  several  programmes  to  increase  nutrition-sensitive  food 
production,  such  as  the  Crop  Intensification  Programme  (CIP)  (higher  yields),  Land 
Husbandry  Water  Harvesting  and  Hillside  Irrigation  project  (LWH),  livestock  and  milk 
production  (Girinka  Program-One  Cow  per  poor  family  and  One  Cup  of  milk  per  child 
program in schools), aquaculture, kitchen gardens, small animals, etc. 

  The  NSEM  comprises  improved  child  assessments,  the  creation  of  vegetable  gardens  in 
schools,  a  school  feeding  programme,  provision  of  micronutrients  and  vitamins,  the 
strengthening of multi-sector capacities at central and local level and other measures. 

The SBS to eliminate Malnutrition contributed positively to the NSEM through policy dialogue and 
several complementary measures. To begin with, the NSEM itself was the result of improved nutrition 
governance. Together with other DPs, the EU advocated for more and higher-level coordination in 
nutrition policies. This has resulted in the highest level of multi-sectoral governmental cooperation 
for nutrition, namely via the Inter-Ministerial Coordination Committee within the Prime Minister’s 
Office  (PMO).  The  policy  dialogue  also  contributed  by  reviewing  performance  indicators  of  the 
strategy. 

EU complementary measures included (i) ) developing a country wide model for nutrition gardens in 
pre-primary,  primary  and  secondary  schools,    and  (ii)  providing  TA  to  improve  the  nutrition  of 
mothers and children through innovative and cost effective behavioural changes leading to improved 
nutrition outcomes. This TA support is considered very positive by the Rwandan authorities and was 
extended.177 Furthermore, the SRC Agriculture helped to finance the CFSVA in 2018, thus providing 
continuity of CFSVA implementation, which was very useful in generating reliable and comparable 
data.   

According to several CFSVA studies, national stunting decreased from 43% in 2012 to 37% in 2015 
and 35% in 2018,178 but it is still considered as “very high” by international standards. Stunting in 
rural areas is still almost three times that in Kigali, with 38% and 13%, respectively. Wasting among 
women of reproductive age also decreased from 7% in 2012 to 5% in 2015 and 1% in 2018.  

The improvement in national stunting and wasting indicators appears to be unrelated to a better food 
intake, as shown by the numbers below. It seems to be linked with the NSEM, and in particular the 
importance attached to  eliminating  malnutrition by the highest  national  authorities. The GoR also 
developed a National Early Childhood Development Programme (NECDP) that focused on reducing 
stunting by having Early Childhood Development sites in each village. The activities of NSEM and 

177 NECDP interview 
178 CFSVA 2012, 2015, 2018 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
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49 

NECDP  include  primary  health  care,  early  identification  of  pregnant  women  and  undernourished 
children, provision of high fortified food for these target groups, promotion of parents’ responsibility, 
social transfers, kitchen gardens and many other measures.  The EU budget support can be said to 
have contributed to this policy.  

The trends in other food security indicators are less favourable than those for stunting: 

•  While food consumption increased between 2006 and 2009, there is no visible improvement 
since 2009 and the situation deteriorated between 2012 and 2018. In 2018, 76% of households 
had acceptable food consumption, 20% had borderline and 4% poor food consumption.179 
•  The Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI)180 improved 
slightly during 2015-2018. The share of food secure households increased from 80.6% in 2015 
to 81.3 % in 2018. Although the percentage of food insecure households decreased, 467,000 
households still remain in a moderate or severe food insecurity situation.  

•  The consumption of nutrient-rich food items has not varied significantly during the period 
2015-2018.  The  Heme-iron  consumption  remains  a  constraint,  and  this  consumption  even 
decreased  in  2018:  79%  of  households  did  not  consume  any  iron  food  items  (meat,  fish, 
seafood, etc.) in the week before the survey. This deficiency leads to anaemia and reduces 
productivity and quality of life.  

•  There was a slight decrease in dietary diversity between 2015 and 2018. On average, Rwandan 
urban  populations  have  greater  variety  in  their  diet  than  rural.  However,  the  reduction  in 
dietary diversity due to mono-cropping policy has major implications for the food security of 
Rwandan farmers. 

These  not  so  favourable  developments  in  food  security  at  household  level  can  be  related  to 
agricultural policies, in particular CIP and LUC. One study showed that LUC had a positive impact 
on the consumption of roots and tubers, but led to a reduction in the consumption of meat, fish and 
fruits.181 LUC appeared to  encourage households to sell high quality nutritious food such as fruit, 
vegetables  and  animal-based  proteins,  and  buy  more  voluminous  amounts  of  nutritionally 
substandard goods, hence resulting in lower dietary diversity.182   

In general, the academic studies cited above (6.1) show that the policies  of increasing agricultural 
production  did  not  have  a  positive  effect  on  nutrition  or  on  reducing  the  vulnerability  of  rural 
households.  This  also  holds  for  the  One  Cow  and  Garden  policies:  households  with  livestock  or 
gardens  proved  to  have  a  higher  risk  of  stunting.  Apparently,  households  prefer  to  increase  their 
income by selling highly nutritious food.183  

Recently, and in response to the revealed decrease in intake of heme iron in 2018, the EU through 
policy dialogue has encouraged the GoR to foster small animal production at household level as a 
source  of  protein.  RAB  promotes  the  small  livestock  production  through  its  Animal  Resources 
Department. Due to exiguity of land, RAB officers encourage people to rear small animals and birds 

179 In 2012, 79% of households have acceptable food consumption, 17 % have borderline and 4% poor food consumption CFSVA 
2012 report. 
180 WFP introduced in 2015 the Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI) as a new corporate indicator 
to interpret food security situation. The CARI addresses the multiple dimensions of food security with indicators that are consistent 
with internationally accepted food security concepts. The CARI combines the available food security indicators in a systematic and 
transparent way to analyse and establish the level of food insecurity within a population. CFSVA 2015 and 2018. 
181 Del Prete et al. (2019), Land consolidation, specialization and household diets: evidence from Rwanda. Food Policy. Del Prete et 
al. 2019; 83:139–49 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2018.12.007 
182  Weatherspoon  et  al.,  “Stunting,  food  security,  markets  and  food  policy  in  Rwanda”,  BMC  Public  Health  (2019)  19:882.  
https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-019-7208-0 
183  Weatherspoon  et  al.,  “Stunting,  food  security,  markets  and  food  policy  in  Rwanda”,  BMC  Public  Health  (2019)  19:882.  
https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-019-7208-0 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
50  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

Final report: Volume I 

(goats,  pigs,  poultry  and  rabbits).  They  also  promote  local  forage  production  for  the  animals: 
sorghum, cassava and residues.184 However, in view of the results of these academic studies, it can 
be doubted whether these policies will be sufficient to improve nutrition. 

6.6.  Conclusions from the econometric study  

This  section presents  the main results of the econometric study  (Annex 2).  On the basis of NISR 
household  survey  data  it  explores  the  cause-effect  relationship  of  these  programmes  and  thus  the 
expected outcomes of Agriculture budget support to Rwanda during the 2011-2018 period. 

•  Cultivated  land  remains  the  most  important  production  input  with  around  50%  elasticity  of 
production. That means that each 10 % increase in cultivated land–area - all else being equal -
translates into a 5% increase in gross crop production value at household level. However, as this 
chapter has shown, it is almost impossible to further increase land use.  Increasing productivity 
and/or  more  off-farm  job  creation  is  needed  if  pressures  on  land,  poverty,  food  insecurity  are 
increasing. But it is a challenge to develop opportunities along the agriculture value chains, in 
services and in manufacturing to keep pace with the increase in population.185 

•  As  expected,  most  input  expenses  incurred  by  farmers  at  household  level  have  positive  and 
significant effects on crop production value, especially hired labour, fertilizers, insecticides, and 
agricultural capital. 

•  Among the policy variables, only erosion protection seems to have had a robust positive effect on 
crop production, but the effect is related to the selection of the most productive farmers. As a 
result, it contributed to  increased overall national production, but  did  not  affect  the  individual 
farmer level.  Plots equipped with protection against erosion have 18 % more crop production 
value  in  2016-17  than  in  2013/14.  Also,  as  the  erosion  protection  measures  are  much  more 
widespread than irrigation, they had a bigger absolute effect on food consumption in households. 
•  Conversely, the effect of irrigation (the effect on farmers who adopt irrigation) was big, around 
30% higher production levels for the same equivalent farm households, but this did not contribute 
to  higher  national  production  levels  because  it  did  not  contribute  significantly  to  increased 
production of the larger and more productive farms. There is more margin of improvement for 
irrigation schemes in the future (through better implementation and more use). Those results are 
somewhat  contradictory  to  other  impact  assessments,  such  as  the  one  done  by  Development 
Impact Evaluation (DIME). The differences can be explained by the fact that this study focuses 
on aggregate crop production by household, while DIME looks at crop production by plot. 
•  When examining the effect of policy measures on food consumption, the use of irrigation and of 
erosion control proved to have a positive effect, but LUC did not. Irrigation was the only policy 
measure that contributed to food security improvement.    

•  The growth in real consumption per adult equivalent between 2014 and 2017, as revealed by the 
household  surveys,  was  mostly  driven  by  urban  migration,  since  consumption  did  not  change 
significantly within rural or urban areas (the change in rural/urban household status contributed 
the most part of it).  

Overall, agricultural policies and policy interventions, especially erosion protection, have supported 
national production levels. Nevertheless, some interventions were not well designed and implemented 
to have stronger and more robust causal effects at the aggregate level, although irrigation might have 
helped to reduce rural poverty.  

184 Interviews with EUD and RAB staff. 
185 Bizoza, A. Population Growth and Land Scarcity in Rwanda: The other side of the “Coin”, University of Rwanda 
2014 Conference on Land Policy in Africa, Ethiopia 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
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51 

Finally, in the case of Rwanda, it is important to consider that while some policies or programmes 
may  not  be  entirely  efficient  from  an  economic  or  productivity  point  of  view,  there  are  other 
parameters,  such  as  food  security  and  national  security,  that  need  to  be  taken  into  account.  For 
example, the cost of producing wheat in Rwanda is higher than importing it, but by producing it in 
Rwanda the national supply is assured, the local economy is stimulated and income to small producers 
is generated. 

6.7. Overall 

Budget support inputs had some positive induced outputs, for example they led to an improved policy 
dialogue  with  somewhat  more  participation  of  farmers,  and  the  complementary  measures  led  to 
improved data availability (Figure 6). There is a clear contribution of budget support to improved 
policy  processes  and  policies  (top  of  figure).  The  contribution  to  improved  transparency  refers  to 
some specific achievements, namely the publication of the agriculture PER and PETS. Most budget 
support inputs provided a small (“weak”) contribution to one or more of the improvements in service 
delivery, but the linkage between performance matrix and service delivery is “moderate”. 

The feeder roads program had a strong effect on the rehabilitation of the feeder road network. This in 
turn has proven to have strong effects on reducing poverty and inequality (impact). Other than this, 
the linkages between induced outputs and outcomes and impact are weak. Another strong linkage that 
can be identified in Figure 6 is the green line between other EU interventions, i.e. support to farmers’ 
organizations, and their more effective participation in the policy dialogue.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
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Figure 6: Synthesis of results for Agriculture and Nutrition    

 
 
 
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53 

7. CONCLUSIONS 
A summary of the overall effects is provided in Figure 7. The direct outputs show some strengthening 
of  sector  policy  dialogues  but  a  weak  macroeconomic  dialogue.  As  could  be  expected  after 
presentation of the sector results, the direct outputs of complementary measures and of the transfer 
of funds are mixed. However, this transfer helped to reduce transaction costs and had a direct impact 
on economic growth due to the fact that the fiscal space was used for investment, and investment has 
been shown to be the main driving force behind high growth in Rwanda. 

Most  linkages  between  inputs/direct  outputs  and  induced  outputs  are  weak,  and  some  are  non-
existent.  The  latter  holds  true  for  macro-economic  management  (not  in  figure),  and  for  improved 
accountability and increased domestic revenues, both of which were influenced by project aid only. 
The only linkages that are a bit stronger than “weak” (they are “moderate”) are from policy dialogue 
to improved policy formulation, and from performance matrices to improved service delivery. Project 
aid also provided a contribution to improved PFM and procurement systems and to improved policy 
formulation (the strengthening of farmers’ organisations, in particular). There are no strong linkages 
between induced outputs and outcomes and impact. This evaluation also looked for unintended side 
effects of budget support but did not find any. 

The conclusions cover the main effects of budget support and are grouped in three clusters as shown 
in Table 5. 

Table 5: Overview of conclusions by cluster 

Cluster 
Conclusions 
effectiveness of budget support 

the 

on 

overall 

Conclusion 
C1. Overall links between the levels in the CEF  
C2. Effects on growth, poverty and sustainability 
C3. Effects on policies, capacities and governance 

Conclusions on budget support delivery  C4. Cross-cutting issues 

Sector conclusions 

C5. Complementary measures 
C6. Performance indicators 
C7. Energy 
C8. Agriculture and nutrition 

7.1. Conclusions on the overall effectiveness of budget support 

C1. Overall, the evidence shows an absence of strong links between the different levels in the 
Comprehensive  Evaluation  Framework.  This  is  due  to  the  complex  governance  context  in 
Rwanda, which both fostered and hindered the effectiveness of budget support. 

Budget support is meant to work through the policies and institutions of the recipient country. At the 
same time, the effectiveness of policies and institutions is supposed to be improved through policy 
dialogue, performance matrices and complementary measures. As can be observed in Figure 7, most 
relations between inputs, direct outputs, induced outputs, and outcomes and impact are weak, and 
some expected relations do not materialise at all. In addition, some links reflect the effect of other EU 
interventions only (the green ones). 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Figure 7: Synthesis of results 

 
 
 
Rwanda presents a complex environment for budget support. On the one hand, the country has strong 
leadership, a clear vision on development, and well elaborated strategies. The overall  objective of 
these  strategies  is  to  achieve  high  economic  growth.  The  current  strategy,  for  example,  aims  to 
achieve middle-income status by 2035.186 Government officials at all levels are highly committed to 
the national objectives. The Imihigo system, a system of annual performance targets to be achieved 
by government officials from the top level downward and on to households, fosters this commitment. 
The targets reflect the priorities of the GoR strategic plans. The high visibility of Imihigo results and 
the  possibility  of  sanctions  induce  all  government  officers  to  prioritize  the  achievement  of  these 
targets. In this sense, the implementation capacity of the government is potentially high. The country 
also has strong aid coordination, and well-developed structures for policy dialogue between GoR and 
Development Partners (DPs).  

On  the  other  hand,  governance  in  Rwanda  presents    authoritarian  characteristics    and  national 
planning is of a top-down nature.187 The strong drive for economic growth leads to a prioritization of 
public investment over recurrent expenditure, and thus to less attention to the capacities for planning, 
implementation, and monitoring of policies. Although the Imihigo system helps to focus efforts on 
the  annual  (short-term)  targets,  it  also,  and  perhaps  somewhat  paradoxically,  contributes  to  a 
weakening  of  these  capacities.  It  hampers  the  credibility  of  budgets  and  of  medium-term  budget 
planning due to the short-term nature of the targets, it reduces efforts for policy objectives that are 
not included in Imihigo targets or that are not (easily) measurable, such as quality aspects, and it leads 
to a neglect of data collection on indicators that are not in Imihigo. In addition, the strong pressure 
for meeting the Imihigo targets in full may reduce the reliability of monitoring.  

This complex context has contradictory effects on the effectiveness of the different inputs of budget 
support. Although the frameworks for policy dialogue exist, the top-down nature of national planning 
and the absence of the highest decision-making levels in these dialogues limits the possibilities to 
have a real dialogue on policies at a strategic level. In addition, after the demise of General Budget 
Support in 2012, the policy dialogue on macro-economic issues has weakened. All this implies that 
the policy dialogue has been more effective for  operational  and technical  issues than for strategic 
discussions on objectives, policies and (spending) priorities. 

At the same time, there were also limitations in the extent to which the different budget support inputs 
could have an effect on capacities for planning, implementation and monitoring. Government officials 
primarily focused on Imihigo targets. It has proven almost impossible to secure adequate capacities 
for policy implementation and monitoring of targets that were not part of Imihigo, even if they had 
been agreed upon as performance targets in EU budget support and were part of the policy framework 
set by the government. 

Many of the stronger links revealed in Figures 5 and 6 are presented in green, meaning that they are 
related to other EU interventions, i.e. project aid. And the strongest link between inputs on the one 
hand, and outputs and impact on the other hand is the result of the Rural Feeder Roads operation 
(Figure 6). An impact evaluation has shown that rural feeder roads raise the incomes of the poorest 
households in Rwanda, so this operation has clearly contributed to reducing poverty and inequality. 
However,  this  budget  support  operation  had  a  strong  output  focus,  with  performance  indicators 
stipulating certain kilometres of roads to be rehabilitated and maintained in a specific region of the 
country.  

186 National Strategy of Transformation (NST 1, 2018-2024).  
187  Matfess,  Hillary  (2015).  ‘Rwanda  and  Ethiopia:  Developmental  authoritarianism  and  the  new  politics  of  African  strong  men’. 
African Studies Review, 58 (2), pp. 181-204.   Hasselskog, Malin  (2018), Rwanda’s ‘home-grown initiatives’: Illustrating inherent 
contradiction  of  the  democratic,  developmental  state.  Development  Policy  Review,  36,  pp.  309-328.  Hasselskog  writes  “Though 
scholars  differ  widely  in  their  assessment  of  the  Rwandan  model  of  governance  and  development,  its  authoritarian  nature  is 
unanimously agreed upon.” (p. 310) 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
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C2. Budget support contributed to the high growth rate mainly through  financial resources, 
which  allowed  for  high  public  investment.  There  is  little  evidence  that  budget  support  has 
enabled more pro-poor or more environmentally sustainable growth.  

Rwanda  had  a  high  growth  rate  over  the  evaluation  period,  with  an  annual  average  of  7.3%.  The 
increase  in  fiscal  space  that  arose  from  the  EU  budget  support  has  mainly  been  used  for  public 
investment, and growth has been driven by investment. The fastest growing sectors over the period 
2005-2017 were Transport & Communication, Construction and Utilities. 

Over the long run (since 2005), poverty and inequality have been reduced in Rwanda, but between 
the two latest household surveys (2013/14 and 2016/17) the poverty reduction was very small and not 
statistically  significant  –  despite  the  high  growth  rates.  In  fact,  the  growth  elasticity  of  poverty 
reduction in Rwanda between 2001 and 2017 was less than 20%, and much lower than in Senegal, 
Burkina  Faso  or  Uganda.188  This  low  elasticity  and  the  stagnation  in  poverty  reduction  can  be 
explained by structural factors, but also in part by government policies that have become less pro-
poor over time. EU budget support has attempted, through the policy dialogue and other inputs, to 
make government policies more pro-poor, but this has not been very successful. Similarly, budget 
support inputs targeting a balance between demand and supply of biomass resources and favouring 
the use of climate-resilient agricultural practices, were hardly successful either.  

C3.    There  is  some  evidence  that  budget  support  led  to  improved  policy-making  processes, 
policies, capacities and governance, but the examples are limited in number.  

EU  budget  support,  through  specific  performance  frameworks,  complementary  measures  and  by 
acting as co-chair, has contributed somewhat to the strengthening of sector policy dialogue processes. 
In  agriculture,  this  strengthening  has  meant,  among  other  things,  that  there  is  now  some  farmer 
participation in policymaking. The different budget support inputs and other EU interventions have 
also led to an improved agricultural strategy in 2018, but it will take some time for its influence on 
sector  outputs  and  outcomes  to  emerge.  In  energy,  the  policy  dialogue  and  EU  budget  support 
performance targets have contributed to an improved policy framework for the sector. 

The  contribution  of  budget  support  to  improving  capacities  for  planning,  implementation  and 
monitoring  at  national  level  is  limited  to  a  few  institutions  or  programmes  that  were  able  to  use 
Technical  Assistance  (TA)  or  other  complementary  measures  well.  Such  institutions  include  the 
National Institute for Statistics Rwanda (NISR) or the National Strategy to Eliminate Malnutrition 
(NSEM).  

Most improvements in the capacity of institutions with a role in public finance management - like the 
Ministry of Finance (MINECOFIN), the Office of the Auditor General (OAG), the Rwanda Revenue 
Authority (RRA) and local government offices - are due to government efforts and to TA offered by 
several DPs outside the budget support framework. However, some specific performance indicators 
of  sector  budget  support  programmes  had  a  positive  effect  on  the  production  of  (district)  budget 
execution  reports,  district  performance  reports,  and  on  the  publication  of  an  Agriculture  Public 
Expenditure Review (PER) and an Agriculture Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS). 

With the exception of the publication of Agriculture PER and PETS, budget support  has had little 
success  in  its  efforts  to  improve  transparency.  The  Open  Budget  Index  (OBI)  shows  little 
improvement,  the  full  report  of  the  OAG  is  not  publicly  available,  the  results  of  a  recent  Fiscal 
Transparency Evaluation done by the IMF have not been made public, and the EU was not successful 

188 World Bank (2019), Rwanda: Systematic Country Diagnostic.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
in including transparency objectives in the most recent PFM Sector Strategic Plan. Yet, and again 
mainly due to government efforts supported by TA of many DPs, there have been improvements in 
Parliamentary  scrutiny  of  budgets  and  in  Parliamentary  oversight  of  budget  expenditure.  Other 
interventions of the EU have allowed several civil society organisations to engage more effectively 
in budget scrutiny and/or expenditure tracking.  

7.2.  Conclusions on budget support delivery 

CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES 

C4. The mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues in budget support operations has been uneven. 
Although cross-cutting issues are addressed in all budget support programming and planning 
documents, there exist certain challenges in the maintenance and streamlining of cross-cutting 
issues during programme implementation.  

Some  cross-cutting  issues  such  as  climate  change,  governance  and  rights-based  approach  gained 
importance  during  the  11th  EDF  only.  The  Budget  Support  Guidelines  (September  2017)  have 
announced  a  strategic  shift  in  EU  development  policy  towards  stronger  conditionality  on  human 
rights, democracy and the rule of law, the role of civil society and other elements of good governance.  
A rights-based approach means that individuals and communities should be able to participate in the 
development of policy and practices which affect their lives, and to claim rights where necessary. 
Implementation  of  a  rights-based  approach  requires  more  participation  of  final  stakeholders  in 
decision-making. This is challenging in the political context of Rwanda and has hardly been applied 
in  budget  support  programmes.  The  recent  budget  support  programmes,  and  in  particular  SRC 
Agriculture, are the exception in the sense that the EUD successfully promoted the participation of 
farmers’ organizations and civil society in the sector dialogue and in  policymaking. However, the 
roles of civil society and private sector remain limited in these processes.   

Other  governance  aspects  –  particularly  PFM-related  objectives  -  are  systematically  covered  by 
indicators  for  the  release  of  fixed  tranches  of  budget  support  interventions.  The  EU  supports  the 
Government's objective of accountable governance by enhancing control and oversight capacity of 
public institutions such as Parliament, Ombudsman, Office of the Auditor General, MINECOFIN and 
the National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda.  

The  financing  agreements  and  GoR  policy  documents  have  integrated  gender  equality  issues  at 
various levels. Attention has also been given to these issues by many DPs. Nevertheless, the level of 
mainstreaming  in  Budget  Support  operations  has  remained  weak.  There  exists  no  real  gender 
approach nor have specific studies been undertaken for defining gender-specific needs.  

The SRC Energy includes a performance indicator that is more important for women than for men, 
namely improved cooking stoves. For the SRC agriculture and nutrition, it was attempted to include 
gendered indicators, but  it proved  impossible because, according to the EUD, insufficient  gender-
disaggregated data were available. Nevertheless, the National Gender Statistics Reports undertaken 
annually do present some gender-related indicators that may be relevant for the SRCs. 
The level of mainstreaming of the environment and climate resilience in Budget Support operations 
is relatively high. Two budget support interventions were financed under the Global Climate Change 
Alliance.   The EU commissioned a Strategic Environmental Assessment on the agricultural sector in 
2012 and this influenced many of the objectives and performance indicators of the recent SRCs in 
Energy,  Agriculture  and  in  the  SBS  for  Feeder  Roads.  These  recent  programmes  have  several 
indicators related to agro-forestry, the sustainable management of resources, irrigation, and terracing 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

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with  adequate  monitoring  of  soil  acidity.  However,  given  the  huge  challenges  in  Rwanda,  more 
attention can be given to research on, and implementation of, climate resilient agricultural practices.  

HIV/AIDS  as  a  crosscutting  issue  is  not  very  present.  Low  presence  of  HIV/AIDS  in  EU  budget 
support interventions is also related to the fact that EU is not active in the education or health sector, 
and that no relevant indicators are available for persons affected by HIV.  

COMPLEMENTARY MEASURES 

C5.  Complementary  measures  are  highly  relevant  and  contribute  to  the  achievement  of  the 
objectives of the budget support. They allow for the funding of activities which otherwise may 
not  have  been  carried  out.  Furthermore,  they  bring  a  concrete  benefit  to  the  sector.  Some 
complementary  measures  faced  challenges  during  their  implementation  or  could  not  be 
implemented as foreseen due to changes in GoR priorities.  

The importance of complementary measures increased considerably during the 11th EDF and with the 
significant  increase  in  the  overall  volume  of  financing  of  Sector  Reform  Contracts.  Most  of  the 
complementary measures involved technical assistance activities, but they also included evaluations, 
communication campaigns, small projects selected on the basis of call for proposals and audits. The 
EU  also  financed  studies  to  support  policy  formulation  and  monitoring,  and  feasibility  studies 
relevant for the targeted sectors. Although these complementary measures are not directly aiming to 
help the GoR to achieve performance indicators, they make a significant contribution to strengthening 
capacities in the sector institutions. 

However, in several cases complementary measures could not be implemented as foreseen or faced 
some challenges in implementation or in reaching their objectives (fully). By mid-2019, only about a 
third of the total budget available for complementary measures on all ten budget support operations 
had  been  disbursed.189  However,  it  has  to  be  considered  that  the  two  on-going  SRCs,  with  large 
amounts  involved  in  complementary  measures,  were  still  under  implementation  at  the  end  of  the 
evaluation period and as such the funds allocated to their complementary measures have not yet been 
fully disbursed or are even not yet contracted.  

A  specific  challenge  was  related  to  the  interpretation  of  the  scope  of  the  Technical  Assistance 
provided to different institutions under the SRC Agriculture and SRC Energy. While the original aim 
of this TA was to improve long-term capacities, interviews with GoR and EUD stakeholders suggest 
that  the  ministries  were  more  interested  in  support  with  daily  operations  and  for  achieving  their 
Imihigo indicators. This created some challenges for the technical assistance team. The difficulties in 
achieving agreements between GoR and the EU on the content and implementation of some of the 
TA activities under the complementary measures limited the capacity development at MINAGRI and 
MININFRA,  for  example  in  the  areas  of  data  collection  for  their  own  M&E  and  for  the  EU 
performance indicators.   

Sometimes changes in GoR priorities made reorientation of the complementary measures necessary. 
Under  the  ongoing  SCR  Energy  half  of  the  funds  for  complementary  measures  was  originally 
allocated to the preparation of feasibility studies for the renewable energy sector. These funds have 
so  far  remained  unused  as  the  GoR  changed  priority  and/or  studies  were  financed  by  other 
development partners.  As a result, these funds have to be reallocated. Under the SBS programme for 
feeder roads, several subsequent complementary measures focused on TA for establishing a feeder 
roads  unit  at  MINAGRI  that  would  work  together  with  the  Roads  Authority  and  with  local 

189 Information provided by EUD and by DEVCO, see Annex 4: Object of the evaluation. 

 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
governments in strengthening maintenance capacities. However, during project implementation, and 
in  line with  decentralization policies, the responsibility for maintenance of feeder roads was fully 
transferred to the districts.190 As a result, the maintenance unit in MINAGRI was closed and its staff 
was dismissed. 

Some  of  the  complementary  measures  included  in  budget  support  operations  aimed  to  promote 
visibility of the EU in Rwanda. In general, it is difficult to increase the visibility of results of budget 
support programmes since all results are achieved through national government budgets and policies. 
As  the  GoR  makes  little  effort  to  credit  the  EU  with  results  achieved  through  budget  support 
programmes  or  project  aid,  the  EU  has  to  undertake  action  for  being  visible.    The  EUD  has 
implemented several activities and the overall visibility of the EU and its values and activities is good. 
No data are available on the percentage of persons that is aware of EU and EU activities in Rwanda, 
but the impression is that information on EU and EU activities is more widespread amongst the better-
off population living in Kigali and/or amongst those with access to modern communication systems. 
Nevertheless, although EU visibility has improved, the EU budget support interventions are not very 
well-known. 

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 

C6. Relevance, ownership, coverage and measurability of performance indicators were usually 
of good quality. If targets were not achieved this was either related to problems in monitoring 
and  reporting,  and/or  to  insufficient  resources  assigned  by  GoR  for  their  monitoring  or 
achievement . 

Performance indicators were, in general, relevant to the respective sectors and were based on national 
strategies, thus guaranteeing their ownership. The EUD looks for alignment with national targets but 
also  for defining targets  that are realistic and achievable. Thus, in  some cases the Government  of 
Rwanda  and  EUD  decided  to  set  targets  (triggers)  at  a  lower  level  than  that  contained  in  the 
government plans or to give more time for achieving the targets. 

Performance  indicators  comprised  a  mixture  of  process,  policy,  output  and  outcome  indicators. 
Output indicators were more likely to be met than the other types of indicators. However, this does 
not mean that they were more relevant or more successful in triggering change. They may simply 
have been easier to meet. It is not possible to draw a conclusion on the relative strength of the different 
types  of  indicators  for  fostering  desired  processes,  policies  or  objectives  without  taking  into 
consideration the specific context of each indicator. The formulation of one performance indicator 
(on the amount of energy generated from renewable resources) was not fully adequate (see C7). 

In some  cases,  the  GoR  did  not meet  the targets,  and disbursements related to  a specific variable 
tranche  were  reduced  or  had  to  be  postponed.  Sometimes  Rwandan  partners  faced  difficulties  in 
presenting the evidence for the achievement of the targets due to inadequate monitoring and reporting. 
In some cases, sector ministries accepted the proposed indicators in order not to delay the approval 
of the budget support programme, even when they did not fully understand the exact definition of 
indicators or the data collection process. In other cases, due to staff rotation the persons participating 
in the discussions on indicators were not in office when it came to reporting. In some instances, the 
GoR did not allocate sufficient attention and resources to the measurement of the indicators. It also 
happened that the government provided administrative information which the EUD, sometimes after 
field visits, did not consider valid evidence for the achievement of the indicators.  Sometimes the 

190 Interviews with EUD and with local governments. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
60  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

Final report: Volume I 

targets  were not  achieved. Some targets  were beyond the control of the  government,  and in  other 
cases the resources provided to the sector institution (budget, staff) were not sufficient.  

The EUD has always been in dialogue, both formally and informally, with the relevant sector agencies 
on possible risks to the non-achievement of triggers. For example, the EUD advised on the way to 
collect  the  data  or  suggested  to  carry  out  studies  for  this  purpose.    In  addition,  some  of  the 
Complementary  Measures  focused  on  increasing  the  monitoring  capacity  of  sector  agencies  for 
adequate reporting. While the EU succeeded in adjusting indicators to more realistic levels, EU efforts 
were less successful in making sure that adequate resources were made available to sector institutions 
for achieving targets or for improving data quality and reporting.  

7.3.  Sector conclusions 

ENERGY 

C7. Budget support contributed to some extent to better policy-making processes in energy and 
to   better policies, most notably the setting of more realistic policy targets and the introduction 
of least cost electricity system planning. But for a variety of reasons, the contribution of budget 
support to improved policy implementation and to sector outcomes has been limited. 

The policy dialogue and specific performance indicators for the variable tranches of the Energy SRC 
contributed to improved frameworks for the sector policy dialogue in Energy and  led to improved 
reporting. SWG meetings are now more frequently held and Joint Sector Reviews (JSR) are prepared 
and discussed bi-annually. Nevertheless, the performance indicators that were included are limited in 
scope and sometimes lack reliability. 

Policy dialogue and performance indicators contributed to improved energy policies in general, and 
in particular to the application of least-cost system planning and to the setting of more realistic policy 
goals. It should also be noted that the EU, together with other DPs, achieved an agreement with the 
GoR on more realistic standards for solar systems, which may contribute to the further expansion of 
off-grid  solutions.  However,  the  elaboration  of  least-cost  development  planning  still  has  some 
deficiencies. For example, scenarios that are prepared as part of the planning process do not include 
risk analysis of system expansion alternatives, nor do they take account of demand-side management 
alternatives. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that improvements in electricity system planning may 
contribute to reduced energy costs in the future. 

Despite  the  best  efforts  of  the  EUD  to  improve  capacities  for  implementation  and  especially 
Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E), the Technical Assistance (TA) to the sector was not effective as 
a  consequence  of  stakeholders’  different  understanding  on  the  content  and  objectives  of  this  TA. 
Although EU budget support helped to set up a system for M&E in energy, this system was still weak 
at the end of the evaluation period and there were severe limitations in coverage, reliability, validity 
and  accessibility  of  data.  The  weak  monitoring  systems  also  affected  the  achievement  of  several 
performance indicators of budget support. 

During  the  first  years  of  the  SRC  energy,  government  budgets  for  the  energy  sector  decreased. 
Although  access  to  energy,  both  on-grid  and  off-grid,  definitely  increased,  the  lower  government 
transfer of funds to the sector, and in particular to REG, led to a lower than planned increase in on-
grid connections. The budget support performance indicator for on-grid increase was not always met 
either, although it was set at a lower level than that contained in the government plans.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy  dialogue  and  performance  indicators  also  focused  on  increasing  the  share  of  electricity 
generated from renewable energy sources (RES) and on improving the balance between supply and 
demand of biomass resources, in particular through increasing the use of improved cook stoves. In 
the  latter  two  areas,  the  effect  of  the  EU  efforts  was  limited  to  some  increased  awareness  among 
policy  makers  of  their  importance.  And  although  the  quantity  of  electricity  generated  from  RES 
increased  somewhat,  mainly  due  to  favourable  weather  conditions,  the  share  of  RES  in  total 
generation capacity did not. The fact that the indicator was formulated as an increase of generated 
RES as compared to the previous year did not contribute to achieving the EU objective of reducing 
the share of electricity generated from traditional and polluting energy sources.   

One notable effect of EU efforts is that energy interruptions are fewer and shorter. In the Kigali area, 
this can be attributed to a large EU project. 

AGRICULTURE AND NUTRITION 

C8. Despite considerable efforts from the EUD, the different budget support operations that 
supported agriculture and nutrition had only limited effects on desired outcomes. The strongest 
effects can be attributed to an SBS programme that had very specific performance indicators 
(Rural Feeder Roads), and to interventions outside the budget support framework. Yet, budget 
support contributed to some extent to the reduction in malnutrition, and to the recent increase 
in  participation  of farmers’  and  civil  society  organisations  in  the  policy  dialogue,  which has 
contributed to improved policy in the sector.   

EU budget support resources have contributed to the expansion and rehabilitation of the feeder road 
network, which has been shown to reduce poverty and inequality in the rural communities served by 
these roads. Budget support funds can be expected to have supported the government’s agricultural 
modernisation policies, which led to higher agricultural production and increased food security at the 
national level. However, these policies did not bring improved food security at household level and 
were accompanied by an expansion of area cropped, which led to deforestation, soil depletion, erosion 
and more vulnerability to climate change. The EU has raised the contradictory effects of the policies 
in the policy dialogue, but so far this has not led to adjustments.  

EU  budget  support,  and  in  particular  policy  dialogue,  some  complementary  measures  and  other 
interventions, contributed to an improved policy framework for agriculture. The most recent strategic 
plan has benefitted from consultations with all involved DPs and with farmers’ organizations, civil 
society organisations and the private sector. The participation of the latter three groups was fostered 
by several budget support inputs as well as other interventions. Given that the success of government 
policies in the past was hampered by a lack of farmer involvement in decision making, participation 
of farmers’ organisations and private sector is important. However, the participation is still limited, 
and the changes in the policy framework are recent and cannot be expected to have influenced sector 
outcomes to date. 

EU  budget  support  inputs  (policy  dialogue,  complementary  measures  and  specific  performance 
indicators) also aimed to build the institutional capacities to monitor and report on policies. Many of 
these efforts were successful. UN agencies contributed to policy development and carried out specific 
studies, such as the Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA), in areas that 
required specific knowledge. 

However,  the  on-going  TA  to  improve  capacities  of  MINAGRI  was  less  effective  due  to  the 
aforementioned divergence in understanding between GoR and EU on the objectives and content of 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

Final report: Volume I 

this TA. In fact, implementation and M&E capacities in the sector were already weak at the beginning 
of the evaluation period due to a comprehensive restructuring of the institutions involved. EU efforts 
have hardly succeeded in strengthening these capacities. As policies have become ever more complex, 
the gap between policy design and implementation has widened over time. While policies initially 
focused on delivering basic infrastructure  and inputs,  they now include  engaging  with  the private 
sector, developing agri-food value chains, and strengthening core information systems that are needed 
for evidence-based policy making and implementation. This requires new capacities and skills and 
more inter-sectoral and inter-institutional coordination. M&E systems in the sector also remain weak.  
The data collected is not always reliable and merely focus on the indicators mentioned in Joint Sector 
Reviews and Imihigo. 

The government has invested in irrigation, land terracing and agroforestry, but coverage is still low 
and quality of design and implementation is not always adequate. This is related to the fact that targets 
often focus more on quantity and less on quality. Progress in applying climate resilience practices has 
so far been limited. 

EU  budget  support  has  contributed  somewhat  to  reducing  malnutrition  in  Rwanda.  This  mainly 
occurred through specific programmes and Complementary Measures in the area of nutrition, and, to 
a  lesser  extent,  through  programmes  aimed  at  increasing  agricultural  production  –  since  higher 
production  was  not  accompanied  by  improved  food  security.  Complementary  Measures  helped  to 
improve  the  monitoring  of  food  security  and  nutrition.  They  also  supported  the  establishment  of 
school kitchen gardens and promoted behavioural changes that helped to improve nutrition amongst 
mothers and children.  This contributed to reductions in stunting in children and in wasting among 
pregnant women, but the former is still very high, especially in rural areas. 

8. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter presents the recommendations, clustered according to Table 6 

Table 6: Overview of recommendations by cluster 

Recommendations 
R1. Apply a balanced approach 
R2. Strengthen policy dialogue 
R3. Create a macro-economic dialogue 
R4.  Support  increased  participation  of  civil  society  and  farmers’  organisations  through 
complementary measures or project aid 
R5. Strengthen monitoring systems 
R6. CCIs 
R7. Complementary measures 
R8. Visibility 
R9. Performance indicators 
R10. Energy 
R11. Agriculture and nutrition 
R12. Feeder roads 

Clusters 
General 

Budget support 
delivery 

Sector 

8.1.  General 

R.1.  Given  its  potential  for  systemic  change,  EU  budget  support  should  be  continued.  The 
relative importance of budget support in the EU’s overall aid portfolio should be dependent on 
the level of commitment by GoR and EU to the key conditions for making budget support more 
effective. These key conditions are elucidated in the recommendations presented below. Should 
full commitment to the implementation of these recommendations not be evident, the EU may 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
consider a more balanced approach, carefully paying attention to the possibilities of other aid 
modalities, including project aid, for achieving policy objectives 

Budget support can be the most effective and efficient aid modality if the strategic policy priorities 
of  government  and  donor  to  a  large  extent  converge,  and  if  the  government  has  adequate 
implementation capacities. This evaluation has shown that Rwanda meets these conditions to a certain 
extent,  but  not  fully.  As  a  result,  most  links  between  the  different  levels  of  the  Comprehensive 
Evaluation Framework are weak and some expected induced outputs or outcomes did not come about. 
At the same time, this evaluation has shown that an EU budget support operation that was fully output 
focused (Rural Feeder Roads), as well as EU project aid, have been very effective for reaching policy 
objectives in sectors supported by budget support, and also for achieving impact on poverty reduction. 
By providing earmarked support in the form of project aid, quicker and more concrete results can be 
obtained.  Moreover,  project  aid  allows  for  the  provision  of  direct  support  to  civil  society,  private 
sector  or  vulnerable  groups  or  regions.  Recommendations  R2-R12  are  designed  to  improve  the 
conditions under which budget support can become more effective. Ultimately, the balance between 
budget support and project interventions should be based on the extent to which progress can be made 
in the implementation of these recommendations.  

Based on C1. 

R2. In future budget support operations, a higher government level should be engaged in the 
HLPD, for example the Prime Minister’s Office and/or the President’s Office, in addition to the 
ministers.  

As  mentioned  above,  effective  budget  support  requires  that  the  strategic  policy  priorities  of 
government and donor converge to a large extent. In practice, there will always be some differences 
in views about policy priorities, and these can be discussed in the policy dialogue. This evaluation 
has shown that Rwanda is a borderline case in its convergence to EU policy priorities. GoR and EU 
agree on the need for high growth and the EU appreciates the visions and strategies to achieve this 
objective. But there are some concerns, for example relating to the limited pro-poorness of fiscal and 
macro-economic policies, the lack of participation of farmers in policies that affect them, and the lack 
of priority given to avoiding the negative effects of growth on the environment (deforestation, soil 
erosion, etc.)  

Given  these  divergences,  a  high-quality  policy  dialogue  is  essential  in  Rwanda.  Currently,  many 
issues cannot be addressed in the policy dialogue. Although fora for the sector policy dialogues and 
for the dialogue on Public Finance Management do exist, the top-down planning existing in Rwanda 
and  the  fact  that  the  highest  decision-making  levels  are  absent  from  these  dialogues,  limit  their 
effectiveness. In practice, the existing policy dialogues are more effective for discussing operational 
issues than for more fundamental policy issues. For all these reasons, it is essential that any future 
budget support operations secure a regular policy dialogue between the EU and the highest decision-
making levels, such as Prime Minister’s Office and/or the President’s Office. This could be stipulated 
in the Financing Agreement or in a separate Memorandum of Understanding.  

It may be considered to alternate these meetings with involvement of the highest decision-making 
levels (“summit HLPD”) with regular HLPD meetings, while also strengthening reporting channels 
between GoR representatives in the latter meetings and higher GoR officials. 

Based on: C1 and C2. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
64  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

Final report: Volume I 

R3. In future budget support operations, it would be desirable to re-establish a macro-economic 
dialogue between the GoR, the EU, other concerned donors, and the IMF. 

The EU has provided a large amount of budget support funds to Rwanda over the evaluation period, 
with a total commitment of € 725 million in ten budget support programmes. Given this volume, it 
can be considered important that the EU is able to discuss macro-economic and fiscal policies with 
the GoR. However, as demonstrated in this report, there is no adequate forum for discussing macro-
economic and fiscal policies in Rwanda. The re-establishment of a macro-economic dialogue between 
GoR and all concerned donors (EU, World Bank, etc.) plus the IMF would solve this issue. Preferably, 
this dialogue should be held more than once a year. 

Based on: C1 and C2. 

R4.  In,  or  next  to,  future  budget  support  operations,  the  EU  should  continue,  and  increase, 
support  to  private  sector,  civil  society  and  farmers’  organisations  to  strengthen  them,  to 
promote their participation in SWGs and TWGs and to help them engage in policy-making, 
policy  implementation  and  M&E  processes.  This  can  be  done  through  Complementary 
Measures and through project interventions. 

The GoR intends to increase participation of the population in decision-making through many “home-
grown  initiatives”  such  as  Ubudehe,  Umuganda  and  Imihigo.    However,  academic  research  on 
Rwanda has shown that this participation is often limited to the implementation of policies, and does 
not imply co-deciding on policies or priorities.191 Nevertheless, some space has become available in 
recent years for civil society to give their views. The EU has contributed both to creating this space 
and to making civil society and farmers’ organisations more effective in using it. Examples include: 
(i) the participation of farmers’ organisations in the new agricultural strategy, which has arisen from 
several budget support inputs and a project and (ii) participation of civil society in the discussion on 
budget proposals.  

These  contributions  of  civil  society  and  farmers’  organisations  will  help  to  incorporate  the 
perspectives  of  the  poor  rural  population  and  other  vulnerable  groups  in  decisions  on  Rwanda’s 
priorities, and, in so doing, will increase the pro-poorness of policies. Evidence shows that budget 
support can have some success in increasing transparency, participation and accountability and that 
Complementary  Measures  or project  aid  to  specific groups can support this.  For direct  support to 
private sector and civil society, project aid seems to be most appropriate.  

Based on: C2, C4 and C8. 

R5. The government should dedicate more attention and resources to improving information 
management and use of data. It may consider the establishment of a national quality assurance 
system for M&E at the level of MINECOFIN, Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) or  President’s 
Office.  Such  a  high-level  M&E  system  would  benefit  from  engagement  of  civil  society  and 
private sector representatives, as well as from support from Development Partners. 

191  Gaynor,  Niamh  (2014).  ‘A  nation  in  a  hurry’:  the  costs  of  local  governance  reforms  in  Rwanda.  Review  of  African  Political 
Economy, Vol. 41, No. S1, S49–S63, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2014.976190; Hasselskog, Malin (2018). Rwanda’s ‘home-
grown initiatives’: Illustrating inherent contradiction of the democratic, developmental state. Development Policy Review, 36, pp. 309-
328. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
EU budget support inputs have had positive effects on the quality of available data in the country, 
especially  through  Complementary  Measures  that  carried  out  surveys  and  impact  analysis  and 
through  deployment  of  agencies  like  WFP,  FAO  and  the  World  Bank.  However,  the  efforts  to 
improve  M&E  systems  of  core  implementing  agencies  have  been  much  less  successful.  The 
government  did  set  up  monitoring  systems,  but  the  quality  of  administrative  data  remains  weak. 
Agencies  do  not  work  effectively  together,  and  the  data  collected  and  stored  is  neither  reliable, 
complete,  nor  consistent  across  years  and  regions.  The  systems  prioritise  the  collection  and 
publication  of  data  on  Imihigo  targets.  There  is  no  adequate  monitoring  of  the  indicators  of  the 
national  strategic  plans,  and  this  also  holds  true for  the  monitoring  of  EU  performance  indicators 
based on these national plans. The weak quality of data endangers the implementation of the national 
strategies. 

At the moment, GoR does not give sufficient attention to strengthening the M&E systems in agencies 
responsible  for  policy  design  and  implementation.  More  resources  should  be  dedicated  to  this.  In 
addition, establishing a national quality assurance system at a higher level (MINECOFIN, PMO or 
President’s office), may greatly improve the quality of M&E and will thus also foster the effectiveness 
of  policies.  Such  a  high-level  M&E  system  would  benefit  from  engagement  of  civil  society  and 
private sector representatives, as well as from support from Development Partners.  

Based on: C1, C3, C7, and C8. 

8.2. Budget support delivery 

CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES:  

R6. In the future budget support operations, more attention should be paid to cross-cutting 
issues, in particular to the Rights-Based Approach (RBA), gender equality and climate change.  
These cross-cutting issues should not only be mentioned in project documents, but they should 
be effectively applied and monitored during the whole implementation period 

A rights-based approach means that individuals and communities should know their rights. It also 
means that they should be fully supported to participate in the development of policy and practices 
which affect their lives and to claim rights where necessary. This aspect has to be strengthened in 
future interventions by strengthening civil society and increasing accountability towards the public. 
In order to promote the RBA, continuing the support to civil society and farmers’ organisations is 
important (see R4). 

Disaggregated indicators on gender are becoming increasingly available. In cases where they are not 
available, they can be generated in specific surveys or included in surveys (like agriculture survey, 
CFSVA and the general household surveys (EICV)) that are already being conducted. It should be 
noted that it is not sufficient to generate data about the sex of the household head as is commonly 
done in these surveys. Such data says little about the different situations or outcomes for women and 
men. 

Gender budgeting, as well as studies on gender-specific needs and challenges, are not yet available 
in  Rwanda.  Similarly,  little  is  known  on  the  specific  situation  and  needs  of  youth,  elderly  and 
vulnerable  groups,  such  as  the  Batwa.  In  line  with  the  EU’s  policy  imperative  to  “leave  no  one 
behind”, the EU can make a significant contribution by commissioning these kinds of studies in future 
interventions. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

Final report: Volume I 

Rwanda is highly vulnerable to climate change and strongly reliant on rain-fed agriculture. A large 
proportion of Rwanda’s inhabitants is poor or extremely poor and is heavily dependent on natural 
resources,  including  water  availability  and  soil  quality.  Changes  in  precipitation  and  temperature 
negatively affect crop yields and quality and increase the risk of new parasites and pests to humans, 
cattle and plants. Heavy rainfalls increase the already high erosion risk. While these issues have been 
addressed in EU budget support programmes supporting GoR terracing, irrigation and agroforestry 
policies,  more  attention  can  be  given  to  developing  and  promoting  climate  resilient  agricultural 
practices.  Furthermore,  the  theme  of  climate  resilience  should  be  addressed  in  collaboration  with 
farmers’ associations and civil society, not only by fostering concrete measures to improve climate 
resilience, but also by increasing awareness building and disaster preparedness.  

Based on C4. 

COMPLEMENTARY MEASURES 

R7. Complementary  measures including Technical Assistance should be continued. A better 
and more permanent policy dialogue between EUD and beneficiary institutions is essential to 
harmonize  expectations  about  the  objectives  and  scope  of  Technical  Assistance,  and  this 
dialogue  should  also  lead  to  agreement  on  the  institutional  reforms  to  be  achieved with  this 
assistance 

As concluded above, Complementary Measures contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the 
budget support. They permit  the earmarking of funds for activities which otherwise may not have 
been carried out. They bring a concrete benefit to the sector and can help to focus more directly on 
promoting the interests of poor and vulnerable groups.  They can also foster the implementation of 
cross-cutting issues (see R6).  

However,  some  of  the  technical  assistance  (TA)  to  the  core  implementing  agencies  was  less 
successful. GoR and EU proved to have different ideas on the objectives and scope of this TA. The 
implementation of Recommendation 5 will help to improve M&E systems, and this may also foster 
the effectiveness of TA for this purpose. In addition, however, TA should be a topic for the high-level 
policy dialogue between GoR and EU.  

Based on: C5, C7, and C8. 

VISIBILITY 

R8. The EU should continue its innovative approach for making the EU, its activities and values 
visible in Rwanda. 

It is difficult to increase the visibility of results of budget support programmes since all results are 
achieved through national government budgets and policies. The EU should therefore continue its 
innovative visibility strategy in which resources from both project aid and budget support are pooled 
in a way that targets the overall visibility of the EU, its activities and its values Rwanda.    

Based on C6.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 

R9.  In  future  budget  support  operations,  performance  indicators  for  the  variable  tranches 
should be a mix of process, policy, output and outcome indicators. Both EU and GoR should 
pay  careful  attention  at  the  design  stage  to  discussing  and  agreeing  upon  the  definitions, 
measurement and methods of data collection of the indicators, including their reference values. 
Indicators  that  cannot  be  measured  in  a  reliable  way  should  not  be  included.  In  addition, 
indicators should be designed in such a way that there is at least some link between government 
efforts and the achievement of the indicator. 

Some  of  the  performance  indicators,  and  especially  in  the  Energy  SRC,  were  (to  a  large  extent) 
beyond the control of the government. These most notably included the indicators on expansion of 
off-grid connections, on the use of improved cook stoves, and on the increase in generated capacity 
from  renewable  energy  sources.  Although  the  issues  covered  are  relevant,  it  is  recommended  to 
reformulate them in such a way that they can have the desired incentive effect on government efforts. 

As shown above, there were many problems with the measurement of the performance indicators. 
The lack of adequate reporting was often a reason why disbursements for the variable tranches could 
not be (fully) made. As a result, it was not clear whether the indicator had the desired effect on actual 
performance, and the incentive effect of the indicator was reduced. 

The implementation of R5, and thus increasing the attention and resources for M&E, would also help 
to ameliorate this issue. However, it is important that both partners pay careful attention to agreeing 
on  definitions,  measurement  and  data  collection  methods  at  the  design  stage  and  that  the  GoR 
allocates funds for this measurement. This will provide more certainty and predictability for GoR on 
disbursements  and  will  at  the  same  time  enhance  the  incentive  effect  on  actual  performance.  If 
indicators cannot be measured in a reliable way, they should be excluded.  

Based on C6, C7, C8. 

8.3.  Sector recommendations 

ENERGY 

R10.  A  future  budget  support  operation  in  Energy  should  continue  to  focus  on  support  for 
improving  policies,  and  in  particular  on  the  application  of  least-cost  system  planning  with 
emphasis on demand-side management, on improving M&E systems, on increasing the share 
of renewable energy resources, on reducing the gap between supply and demand of biomass 
resources and on increasing the use of improved cooking stoves.  In considering future budget 
support for the sector, careful consideration should also be given to the potential for blended 
finance. 

The most important success of the SRC energy was to help improving policy-making processes and 
policies. The EU can build on these successes by providing further support to improving policies. For 
example,  in  applying least  cost  electricity  generation planning, all options on the demand-side, in 
particular  load  management,  should  also  be  considered.  In  addition,  a  risk  analysis  of  system 
expansion alternatives should become part of the final selection of the least cost generation expansion 
plan.  

In reducing the gap between supply and demand of biomass  resources and  in fostering the use of 
improved cooking stoves, the EU has so far been able to raise awareness, which is important. It can 

 
 
 
 
      
 
  
 
 
 
 
68  Evaluation of EU Budget Support to Rwanda (2011-2018) 

Final report: Volume I 

form  the  basis  for  efforts  to  further  improve  policies  in  these  areas,  for  example  on  increasing 
information on, and expanding supply of, more sustainable cooking methods.   
It is  essential that data quality improves, and the EU can  make an important contribution through 
Complementary  Measures.  However,  the  long-term  success  of  these  efforts  is  dependent  on  the 
implementation of other recommendations, and in particular R5.  

Although this evaluation did not have the opportunity to study blended finance, this mechanism may 
have potential in Rwanda, especially in view of the need for big investments in the sector and the 
relatively low level of public debt in the country. For this reason, the EU should carefully consider 
blended finance as a possibility for the future.  

If the EU considers future budget support to this sector, it is also important to take into account the 
possible complementarities with budget support operations by other Development Partners, and in 
particular the World Bank’s DPO.   

Based on C3 and C7.  

R11. A possible approach for developing an effective indicator for an increase in Renewable 
Energy Sources (RES) involves an open and participatory planning process for developing an 
energy  generation  expansion  path.  This  agreed  path  may  serve  as  basis  for  an  agreed  time 
schedule  for  the  construction  and  dispatch  of  renewable  energy  generation.  Reliance  on  an 
indicator  emphasizing  the  actual  construction  of  RES  generation  is  preferable  to  using  the 
current indicator, which assesses the actual annual output of RES generation and may result in 
payments  favouring  good  atmospheric  conditions  rather  than  the  actual  RES  capacity 
development. 

Any design of an indicator related to energy generation has to be preceded by a thorough analysis, 
including,  but  not  limited  to,  numerical  simulations  through  the  use  of  planning  and  generation 
models.  This may appear to be a complicated and time consuming approach to follow but in reality, 
considering  the  stage  at  which  energy  system  planning  is  done  in  Rwanda,  it  may  not  be  so 
intimidating and may actually be quite feasible.   

The planning process has already been established by REG and focuses on estimating the electricity 
demand  and  developing  scenarios  for  future  electricity  generation  expansion.    In  a  nutshell,  the 
scenarios should include consideration of various demand-side management  options, both  passive 
and  active,  and  feasible  supply-side  options,  including  conventional  as  well  as  RES  generation 
options,  retirement of inefficient units, and consideration of other innovative solutions  that would 
limit the need for additional generation capacity without jeopardizing the overall reliability of the 
power system.  

The prerequisite for the proposed approach is to open the system planning process, so far under the 
exclusive  control  of  the  REG,  to  a  collaborative  process  where,  in  addition  to  REG,  many  other 
interested parties, including the donors, power developers, and general public, may participate in and 
contribute  to  the  dialogue  leading  to  the  development  and  testing  of  the  planning  scenarios  and 
ultimately leading to a development of the path for the electricity generation expansion in the medium 
timeframe192 based on the reached consensus.  On the basis of such an agreed expansion path, an 
indicator could be formulated that comprises the construction of renewable energy generation  and 
making that generation available for dispatch in the system.  The reward to the GoR would be a series 

192 For example, 15-year planning horizon. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
of  payments  according  to  the  agreed  time  schedule  for  this  actual  construction  of  renewable 
generation and for making that generation available.   

Reliance on the indicator emphasizing the actual construction of RES generation is preferable to using 
the current indicator, which assesses the actual annual output of RES generation.  As explained earlier 
in  the  report,  relying  solely  on  the  output  of  electricity  generation  from  renewable  resources  as  a 
criterion  for  indicator  evaluation  may  result  in  payments  favouring  good  atmospheric  conditions 
rather than the actual RES capacity development. 

The benefits and intended side-effects of this approach would include: 

-  Drawing on the existing expertise of the REG staff and involvement of external 

professionals willing to assist in the planning process. 

-  Consistency of energy system data on the demand- and supply-side that may be used by all 

- 

parties. 
Improvement in data availability and its verification for evaluating other indicators, 
especially related to electricity demand. 

-  Better understanding of the situation in the energy sector by all involved parties. 
- 

Increasing the level of knowledge of those not well represented so far, including the general 
public, the ultimate ratepayers, giving them a sense of ownership of the final planning 
outcome. 

-  Giving all interested parties an opportunity to participate in developing a common vision for 

energy system development; and, last but not least, 

-  Depoliticizing the process of energy system development. 

Based on: C7. 

AGRICULTURE AND NUTRITION  

R12. Future budget support programmes in agriculture and nutrition should focus on support 
for improving policies, such that more attention is paid to farmers’ participation, improving 
climate  resilience,  fostering  agricultural  research  and  extension  services,  avoiding  the  side 
effects of current policies (such as soil depletion, deforestation and erosion), and improving food 
security  at  household  level.  In  addition,  they  should  focus  on  strengthening  implementation 
capacities and on strengthening capacities for M&E. 

EU budget support has promoted the participation of civil society and farmers’ organisations in policy 
making.  Future  EU  budget  support  should  continue  to  insist  on  hearing  the  voices  of  the  rural 
population, and in particular those from the most deprived districts and from vulnerable groups, with 
particular  attention  to  women.    The  EU  should  strengthen  the  interests  of  these  groups  also  by 
commissioning  relevant  studies  (see  R4)  and  by  providing  direct  (project)  support  to  the  most 
deprived  populations.  This  would  mean  a  more  balanced  approach  between  budget  support  and 
project aid for the sector (see R1). 

The broad participatory process of the most recent agricultural strategy has also improved the content 
of this strategy. In future operations, the EU can attempt, together with other DPs, to further improve 
these policies such that the negative side effects on the environment and on vulnerable populations 
can be reduced.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Final report: Volume I 

Many objectives of the current SRC Agriculture were not achieved due to inadequate implementation 
capacity.  A  future  budget  support  operation  should  support  the  ongoing  restructuring  process  of 
MINAGRI, RAB, NAEB and districts, with a view to strengthening capacities for implementation 
and further the decentralisation process. 

Furthermore, it is essential that data quality improves, and the EU can make an important contribution 
through Complementary Measures. However, the long-term success of these efforts is dependent on 
the implementation of other recommendations, and in particular R5.