COVID-19 and China’s global image.
Date: 2021-11-30
Institutions: European University Institute
Subjects: China, coronavirus disease, image, international relations

POLICY BRIEF

COVID-19 and China’s global 
image

With the outbreak of the novel coronavirus, the PRC experienced 
one  of  its  worst  internal  and  international  crises,  in  economic 
terms but above all in terms of image and prestige. The COVID-19 
pandemic,  in  fact,  came  at  a  critical  juncture  in  both  China’s 
internal  and  international  relations,  given  that  in  recent  years 
the communist Government has become a target of criticism on 
various internal and international issues. At the same time, it rep-
resented a crucial challenge for the CCP, which was preparing to 
celebrate  its  100th  anniversary  and  the  achievement  of  its  first 
«centenary goal».

Beyond the undeniable effects on the country’s economy, undoubt-
edly  the  most  relevant  effects  were  recorded  in  terms  of  image 
and reputation, as has emerged in different global opinion polls. 
Despite the Chinese authorities’ highly effective management of 
the health emergency crisis after a first period of inaction, Beijing’s 
authoritarian rule has again been an object of consistent criticism 
from liberal Western democracies, both on the intrusive methods 
adopted to cope with the crisis and its aggressiveness in imposing 
its official narrative regarding events. After analysing the effects 
of COVID-19 on China’s global image, the paper focuses on the 
importance  of  «image»  for  China  and  its  quest  for  prestige  and 
image-building  throughout  history,  with  special  reference  to  the 
communist experience. In the last part, it reflects on the opportu-
nity that vaccine diplomacy may represent for China to recover its 
reputation. 

Author

Barbara Onnis, University of Cagliari

EU-Asia project 

Issue 2021/57
November 2021

POLICY BRIEF1. Introduction 

2020  was  a  real  annus  horribilis  for  China  as  it 
experienced  one  of  its  worst  international  crises, 
being  the  first  epicentre  of  the  novel  coronavirus 
pandemic.  Beyond  the  effects  on  the  country’s 
economy,  which  cannot  be  neglected  –  in  recent 
years  China  has  recorded  its  lowest  growth  rates 
since 1978 – undoubtedly the most relevant effects 
were recorded in terms of its image and reputation. 

In  this  article,  I  first  analyse  the  effects  of  the 
COVID-19 pandemic on China’s global image in a 
very crucial period in which the Chinese Communist 
Party was preparing to celebrate its 100th anniver-
sary  and  the  achievement  of  its  first  «centenary 
goal».  I  also  underline  how  the  crisis  contributed 
to precipitating a situation for the country that was 
already  evident.  In  the  following  section  I  briefly 
focus  on  the  significance  of  «image»  for  China 
and  the  Chinese,  while  China’s  quest  for  prestige 
and image-building throughout history, with special 
reference to the communist experience, is examined 
in the successive section. In the conclusion, I reflect 
on  the  opportunity  that  vaccine  diplomacy  may 
represent for China to recover its image. 

2. The effects of the pandemic on 
China’s global image

In  the  30th  study  session  of  the  Political  Bureau 
of  the  Chinese  Communist  Party  (CCP)  Central 
Committee focused on strengthening China’s inter-
national  communication  capacity  in  Beijing  on  31 
May 2021, Chinese President Xi Jinping told senior 
Communist Party officials that it was important for 
the  country  to  be  “open  and  confident,  but  also 
modest  and  humble”  and  present  an  image  of  a 
“credible,  loveable  and  respectable  China”  (要注
重把握好基调，既开放自信也谦逊谦和，努力塑造
可信、可爱、可敬的中国形象).  He  also  spoke  of 
the need for China to “expand its circle of friends” 
(不断扩大朋友圈)  by  revamping  its  image.1  These 
remarks  were  quite  distinct  from  the  belligerent, 
arrogant and at times threatening tones Xi Jinping 
has  adopted  on  more  than  one  occasion  in  the 
last  few  years  and  they  appeared  to  observers  to 
be a rare admission of Beijing’s growing isolation, 
which  was  exacerbated  by  the  novel  coronavirus 
(henceforth  COVID-19)  pandemic,  thus  marking  a 
possible shift in China’s diplomatic approach, which 
according  to  analysts  had  become  increasing-

ly  antagonistic.  The  Chinese  leader’s  comments, 
in fact, came amid deteriorating relations with key 
global  powers  and  negative  perceptions  of  China 
at  record  high  levels  in  many  parts  of  the  world. 
Chinese observers agree in considering Xi’s call to 
be a recognition of Beijing’s international isolation, 
which is exacerbated by aggressive «wolf warrior» 
diplomacy  and  ineffective  propaganda,  and  an 
attempt  to  influence  campaigns  abroad  to  impose 
the  country’s  narrative  on  COVID-19.  It  is  even 
possible  that  the  Chinese  president  had  been 
persuaded by those, including party loyalists, who 
have been arguing that the «wolf warrior» approach 
has been counterproductive and has contributed to 
undermining the country’s global image.2

In fact, the net deterioration in the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC)’s global image can be considered 
one of the worst consequences of the outbreak of 
the  coronavirus,  one  which  has  consequently  led 
to a marked worsening of its international environ-
ment. As  emerged  in  different  global  opinion  polls 
conducted in 2020 and early 2021, public attitudes 
to China have sharply changed as a direct conse-
quence of the spread of COVID-19 in the world, and 
especially  the  initial  mismanagement  of  the  crisis 
and the aggressive narrative imposed by Beijing to 
change the general perception of the country from 
«virus  infector»  to  «world  saviour».  In  particular, 
surveys  by  the  Pew  Research  Center  revealed 
that  China’s  image  had  reached  its  lowest  point 
since  the  think  tank  began  surveying  global  per-
ceptions  of  the  country  in  the  early  2000s.3  More 
than two-thirds of people in the countries surveyed 
– fourteen largely Western and advanced economy 
nations, 
including  Australia,  Canada,  France, 
Germany,  Japan,  Italy,  South  Korea,  Spain,  the 
United Kingdom and the United States – declared 
they  had  no  confidence  in  the  Chinese  President 
to  do  the  right  thing  with  regard  to  world  affairs, 
and  more  than  three  in  five  on  average  thought 
China had done a bad job in dealing with the coro-
navirus  outbreak.  The  most  negative  views  on 
China’s coronavirus performance came from three 
nations in its close proximity, namely Japan, South 
Korea  and  Australia.  In  specific  contexts  like  the 
American  one,  the  negative  feelings  were  directly 
linked to China’s lack of respect for human rights, 
together  with  economic  issues.  Similarly,  in  the 
European  context  there  was  a  generalized  sense 
of growing mistrust of the Chinese leadership and a 
consequent decline in Chinese soft power, as was 

1 

2 

3 

 ‘加强和改进国际传播工作 展示真实立体全面的中国’ (Xi Jinping: Strengthening and Improving International Communication Work to Demon-
strate a Realistic, Three-dimensional and Comprehensive China), Renmin Ribao, 2 June 2021. 

 ‘Xi Jinping calls for more «loveable» image for China in bid to make friends’, BBC, 2 June 2021.

‘Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries’, Pew Research Center, 6 October 2020.

2  

  Robert Schuman Centre | November 2021

confirmed in a report published in April 2021 by the 
European  Think-tank  Network  on  China  (ETNC), 
significantly entitled China’s Soft Power in Europe 
Falling on Hard Times.4 Other studies conducted by 
the European Council on Foreign Relations and the 
Palacký University Olomouc in the Czech Republic 
(in  partnership  with  other  European  researchers) 
in  June  and  November  2020  respectively  showed 
similar  results.  In  particular,  the  Czech  Universi-
ty’s  study,  which  was  conducted  in  13  European 
countries  (including  10  EU  members),  revealed 
how perceptions of China significantly worsened in 
10  of  the  countries,  with  Serbia  being  one  of  the 
exceptions.5 

While  these  results  could  be  considered  a  quite 
obvious outcome, the situation was no better in the 
PRC’s  neighbourhood,  particularly  central  Asian 
countries, the importance of which in the expansion 
and  reach  of  the  Belt  and  Road  Initiative  hardly 
needs  to  be  emphasized,  as  has  been  shown  by 
The Diplomat.6 This is despite the fact that it was not 
directly related to the spread of the coronavirus. In 
southeast Asia the picture is mixed, as was shown 
by  a  poll  conducted  by  Singapore’s  ISEAS-Yusof 
Ishak  Institute  (formerly  the  Institute  of  Southeast 
Asian  Studies)  and  published  in  February  2021. 
The  study  revealed  that  while  most  countries  ac-
knowledged that the PRC had contributed the most 
to  the  region  in  coping  with  the  pandemic,  the  re-
spondents appeared to be sceptical about China’s 
prowess in the region.7 

In  other  contexts  where  Chinese  influence  is  well 
consolidated,  the  situation  was  apparently  the 
same,  but  on  closer  inspection  some  differences 
can  be  seen.  In  Latin  America,  surveys  showed 
a  rise  in  anti-Chinese  rhetoric  at  the  beginning 
of  the  crisis,  even  in  friendly  countries  such  as 
Brazil  and  Venezuela,  which  imitated  Trump’s  US 
in  downplaying  the  gravity  of  the  pandemic  and 
calling  COVID-19  «the  Chinese  virus».  Some 
countries  (Argentina,  Brazil  and  Mexico)  which 
had  always  expressed  favourable  opinions  about 

China  witnessed  significant  manifestations  of  an-
ti-Chinese xenophobia as soon as the coronavirus 
reached  the  region.8  However,  Beijing’s  capacity 
to move quickly to rebrand itself as a donor rather 
than a recipient of aid, especially as the US inter-
rupted international supply chains and directed all 
its efforts domestically (also in vaccine diplomacy), 
contributed to inverting the trend and strengthening 
the country’s status in Latin America.9

In Africa the situation appeared to be more complex 
and multifaceted. Despite the discrimination African 
nationals had suffered on Chinese soil, as was ex-
emplified by the Guangzhou incident in early April 
2020,  China  has  intentionally  kept  Africa  high  on 
its  agenda,  and  its  aid  diplomacy  has  contributed 
to rescuing its image in the continent,10 by demon-
strating  it  is  a  cooperative  global  partner  and  a 
global  power  through  its  mask  and  vaccine  diplo-
macies carried out through both bilateral channels 
and  multilateral  initiatives,  such  as  the  COVID-19 
Vaccines Global Access (COVAX initiative).

On the other hand, other reports have contributed 
to highlighting how Beijing has managed to use the 
pandemic crisis instrumentally to boost its image in 
global media coverage. In particular, a study by the 
International  Federation  of  Journalists  conducted 
between  December  2020  and  January  2021  and 
involving  about  fifty  journalists  from  as  many 
countries  from  six  regions  of  the  world  (Asia-Pa-
cific, Africa, Europe, Latin America, North America 
and  MENA)  revealed  how  China’s  state  media 
helped  improve  Beijing’s  image  around  the  world 
during  the  pandemic  by  resorting  to  successful 
media  internationalization  tactics  which  the  PRC 
has adopted for several years now – content-shar-
ing agreements, free tours to China for journalists 
and memoranda of understanding with internation-
al outlets and unions – with results that are easy to 
imagine.11 That said, according to Maria Repnikova, 
director of the Center for Global Information Studies 
at Georgia State University and a China specialist, 
interviewed by The Guardian, the question of “how 

4  https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2021-04/Report_ETNC_Chinas_Soft_Power_in_Europe_Falling_on_Hard_Times_2021.pdf. 

5 

‘China, Europe, and Covid-19 Headwinds’, European Council on Foreign Relations, 20 July 2020; ‘European Public Opinion on China in the 
Age of COVID-19’, Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS), 16 November 2020.

6 

‘At 100 Years Old, China’s Communist Party Still Can’t Get Along with Its Next-Door Neighbors, The Diplomat, 21 June 2021.

7  https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/The-State-of-SEA-2021-v2.pdf.

8 

9 

‘Latin America Used to Be Positive Toward China. COVID-19 Might Change That’, The Diplomat, 10 April 2020.

‘Vaccine diplomacy strengthens China’s stature in Latin America, US congressional panel hears’, South China Morning Post, 21 May 2021.

10  ‘Coronavirus: how China plans to restore its image in Africa’, The Africa Report, 20 April 2020; ‘How «Mask Diplomacy» Rescued China’s 

Image in Africa’, Defense One, 10 March 2021.

11  The Covid-19 Story: Unmasking China’s Global Strategy’, May 2021 (https://www.ifj.org/fileadmin/user_upload/IFJ_-_The_Covid_Story_Re-
port.pdf). On Chinese media internationalization, see Daya Kishan Thussu, Hugo de Burgh & Anbin Shi, China’s Media Go Global, Routledge, 
2017.

3  

  COVID-19 and China’s global image

effective these efforts are in shaping public percep-
tions about China” remains open since “information 
flooding does not necessarily equate to a change in 
perceptions”.12

What is certain is that the general worsening in per-
ceptions of China globally did not go unnoticed by 
the Chinese communist authorities. According to the 
Reuters news agency, an internal report published 
in April 2020 by the China Institutes of Contempo-
rary  International  Relations  (CICIR)  –  a  think  tank 
affiliated  with  the  Ministry  of  State  Security  –  and 
presented  at  the  beginning  of  May  to  China’s  top 
leaders contributed to revealing Beijing’s awareness 
of  the  deterioration  in  its  global  image  by  empha-
sizing  that  global  anti-Chinese  sentiment  was  at 
its  highest  since  the  1989  Tiananmen  Square 
crackdown. According to the internal sources who 
spoke with Reuters, the CICIR report even warned 
that China should be prepared for a possible armed 
confrontation in a worst-case scenario.13 

In fact, the COVID-19 pandemic came at a critical 
juncture  in  China’s  relations  with  the  West  and 
has  accelerated  a  process  that  was  already  in 
motion.  In  recent  years,  the  Chinese  communist 
Government has become a target for criticism on a 
number of issues affecting both the internal sphere 
(repression  of  Hong  Kong’s  democratic  activists; 
human rights violations against the Uyghur Muslim 
minority  in  Xinjiang)  and  the  international  sphere 
(the  trade  war  with  the  United  States,  criticism  of 
the  modus  operandi  of  the  Confucius  Institutes 
and  the  alleged  «debt  trap  diplomacy»  exercised 
by Beijing within the Belt and Road Initiative, BRI). 
This converging crisis, combined  with many politi-
cally  delicate  commemorative  anniversaries  (from 
the centenary of the May 4th Movement to the 30th 
anniversary of Tiananmen), led the Sino-American 
political  scientist  Minxin  Pei  to  define  2019  as  an 
annus horribilis for China. Even more relevant is the 
fact that the Chinese president in a speech at the 
Central  Party  School  of  the  CCP  at  the  beginning 
of  the  same  year  sounded  the  alarm  and  warned 
officials  that  sources  of  turmoil  and  points  of  risk 
were  multiplying  globally. Therefore,  China  had  to 
be ready to face major risks (重大风险) on all fronts, 
such  as  «black  swan»’  (黑天鹅)  and  ‘grey  rhino’  (
灰犀牛)  events.14  Interestingly,  many  articles  have 
been written equating  the  outbreak of the corona-
virus  with  a  «black  swan»  and/or  a  «grey  rhino», 

with the majority inclined to see it as a «grey rhino», 
considering  the  pandemic  was  wholly  predictable. 
In  fact,  many  observers  had  predicted  it  –  from 
Nassim  Nicholas  Taleb,  who  in  2007  coined  the 
term  «black  swan»  in  his  best-selling  2007  book 
with that title, to Bill Gates, who in a 2015 TED talk 
entitled The next outbreak? We’re not ready, talked 
about the spread of a potential virus and stressed 
the need for the world to be well-equipped to tackle 
the crisis. In their views the pandemic was “a portent 
of a more fragile global system”.15

is 

therefore  not  surprising 

It 
that  COVID-19 
translated into a deterioration of China’s image, both 
externally and internally – related especially to the 
ophthalmologist Li Wenliang, who first warned of the 
possible outbreak of an illness that resembled SARS 
in  Wuhan  at  the  end  of  December  2019  and  was 
punished for it before being acquitted and declared 
a hero in the aftermath of his death after contracting 
the  disease  himself  –  with  potential  consequenc-
es  for  the  party  and  the  Chinese  political  system 
in  a  very  crucial  period.  On  1  July  2021  the  CCP 
celebrated  its  100th  anniversary,  confirming  itself 
as  the  longest-lived  and  most  resilient  communist 
party  in  contemporary  history.  At  the  same  time 
the  PRC  celebrated  the  realization  of  the  first  of 
its  ‘two  centenary  goals  (两个一百年):  completing 
the building of a moderately prosperous society in 
all respects (小康社会). The stakes were therefore 
very high for China and its paramount leader, who 
has  put  the  «Chinese  dream»  and  the  renewal  of 
the nation at the top of his political agenda.

3. The significance of «image» for 
China and the Chinese 

In Chinese the word 面子literally means «face» but it 
also refers to reputation and social status in terms of 
prestige. In Chinese culture, in fact, different factors 
such  as  prestige,  dignity  and  reputation  converge 
in the concept of «face». This is why «losing face» 
(丢面子)is one of the worst things that can happen 
in the life of a Chinese, while «saving face» (换回
面子)  is  an  aim  to  be  preserved  at  all  costs.  This 
discourse can also be applied at the level of inter-
national politics. An emblematic case is represent-
ed  by  the  tense  relations  between  the  PRC  in  Xi 
Jinping’s first mandate and the Democratic People’s 
Republic  of  Korea  (DPRK)  of    Kim  Jong  Un,  when 
Pyongyang’s erratic behaviour threatened to make 

12   ‘China has used pandemic to boost global image, report says’, The Guardian, 12 May 2021.

13   ‘Exclusive: Internal Chinese report warns Beijing faces Tiananmen-like global backlash over virus’, Reuters, 4 May 2020.

14   Barbara Onnis, ‘China’s Foreign Policy 2019: Xi Jinping’s Tireless Summit Diplomacy Amid Growing Challenges’, Asia Maior, Vol. XXX/2019, 

p. 48.

15   ‘The Pandemic isn’t a Black Swan but a Portent of a More Fragile Global System’, The New Yorker, 21 April 2020.

4  

  Robert Schuman Centre | November 2021

China lose face, making it look like a «paper tiger» 
(纸老虎).16 

Many scholars agree on the relevance of image con-
siderations in the minds of Chinese decision-mak-
ers.17 For Ingrid d’Hooge, very few countries “are as 
sensitive to their image in the eyes of other nations 
as  China”.18  Despite  its  unquestioned  growing 
weight  in  world  politics  and  the  global  economy, 
China  often  feels  misunderstood  and  misjudged 
by  the  international  community  and  perceives  a 
potentially  hostile  international  environment  due 
to  mainly  negative  reporting  about  the  country  in 
Western  media.19  These  perceptions  are  relevant 
to the Beijing leadership since they are believed to 
influence foreign governments’ conduct toward the 
country. Therefore,  the  Chinese  leadership  keenly 
seeks to improve foreign perceptions of China and 
its  policies  through  active  public  diplomacy.20  A 
negative  image  is  detrimental  to  China’s  national 
interests  and  can  have  heavy  repercussions  on 
both  the  legitimacy  of  the  Chinese  Communist 
Party  and  the  country’s  soft  power  appeal.  Inter-
estingly,  in  2007  Joshua  Cooper  Ramo  –  who  in 
2004 coined the term «Beijing consensus» to label 
China’s  model,  which  was  increasingly  attracting 
many  developing  countries  in  search  of  their  own 
development path away from the impositions of the 
«Washington  consensus»  –  argued  that  China’s 
national  image  and  the  misalignment  between  its 
image  of  itself  and  how  it  was  viewed  by  the  rest 
of  the  world  might  represent  its  greatest  strategic 
threat in the near future in its quest to win «hearts 
and  minds».21  Against  this  background,  Chinese 
scholars  agree  that  China  needs  to  communicate 
with the world to counter the negative demonizing 
images spread by Western media and present the 
true image of the real China. 

the 

international 

to  strengthen 

Since  Xi  Jinping  took  power,  the  phrase  «tell 
China  stories  well»  (讲好中国故事)  has  become 
a  fundamental  guide  to  China’s  approach  to 
public  diplomacy,  and  “an  encouragement  to  use 
China’s  own  communication  channels  to  promote 
and  testify  to  official  Chinese  views  and  opinions 
influence 
and 
of  China”.22  Xi  first  introduced  the  concept  in  a 
speech  to  the  National  Propaganda  and  Ideology 
Work  Conference  on  13  August  2013,  explaining 
his  approach  to  propaganda  and  international 
messaging  to  win  the  trust  of  international  public 
opinion  and  better  serve  the  national  interest.  In 
his  words,  “It  is  necessary  to  meticulously  do  a 
good  job  in  external  publicity,  innovate  in  external 
publicity  methods,  strive  to  create  new  concepts, 
new categories and new expressions that integrate 
China  and  foreign  countries,  tell  Chinese  stories 
well  and  spread  Chinese  voices  well”  (要精心做
好对外宣传工作，创新对外宣传方式，着力打造融
通中外的新概念新范畴新表述，讲好中国故事，
传播好中国声音).23  It  goes  without  saying  that  Xi 
Jinping’s understanding refers to stories that reflect 
the external propaganda objectives of the CCP and 
are premised on the Party’s control of the narrative 
both at home and abroad. Good examples of this un-
derstanding are the different diplomacies deployed 
during the pandemic, from «mask diplomacy» (口号
外交) to «vaccine diplomacy» (疫苗外交) and «wolf 
warrior diplomacy» (战狼外交). The first was aimed 
at promoting (and consolidating) an image of China 
as  a  responsible  power,  pushing  a  narrative  that 
presented its efforts in tackling the virus as effective, 
and  in  particular  fighting  against  criticism  related 
to  its  initial  mismanagement.  Similarly,  «vaccine 
diplomacy»  presenting  the  vaccine  as  a  «public 
good»  was  aimed  at  consolidating  China’s  image 
as a responsible power in an attempt to change the 
general perception of the PRC as the spreader of 
the virus, instead promoting a new vision of China as 

16   Barbara Onnis, ‘La responsabilità della Cina «a rischio». I rapporti sino-nordcoreani nell’era di Xi Jinping e Kim Jong-un’, in Wenxin L’essenza 

della scrittura. Contributi in onore di Alessandra Lavagnino, Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2017, pp. 577-590.

17   See Simon Rabinovitch, ‘The Rise of an Image-Conscious China’, China Security, Vol. 4, No. 3, Summer 2008, pp. 33-47; Ingrid d’Hooge, 
China’s Public Diplomacy, Routledge, 2015; Falk Hartig, Chinese Public Diplomacy. The Rise of the Confucius Institute, Routledge 2016.

18   Ingrid D’Hooge, China’s Public Diplomacy, p. 2.

19   Falk Hartig, Chinese Public Diplomacy, chap. 2.

20   Public diplomacy is a concept foreign to the Chinese language. Instead, the Chinese have always used the term «external propaganda» (对
外宣传or 外宣) to publicize their successes and strengthen the country’s image abroad. Unlike its English translation, in the Chinese language 
the term «propaganda» has a positive connotation, being associated with essentially benign activities. It was only with the beginning of the 
reform policy, and as a direct consequence of the globalization process, that China’s communication and external propaganda underwent a 
gradual process of modernization and expansion and started to be considered no longer from the perspective of propaganda, but rather from 
the perspective of public diplomacy.

21   Joshua Cooper Ramo, Brand China, The Foreign Policy Center, 2007.

22   Zhao Alexander Huang and Rui Wang, ‘Building a network to «Tell China Stories Well»: Chinese Diplomatic Communication Strategies on 

Twitter’, International Journal of Communication, Vol.13, 2019, pp. 2984-3007, p. 2094.

23   ‘习近平：意识形态工作是党的一项极端重要的工作’ (Xi Jinping: Ideological work is an extremely important task of the party), Xinhuanet, 20 

August 2013.

5  

  COVID-19 and China’s global image

the saviour of the world. While the first had mixed 
results,24  the  role  played  by  Beijing  in  the  global 
distribution  of  vaccines,  both  to  single  countries 
and  within  the  COVAX  initiative,  is  still  under 
scrutiny. In fact, its success or failure depends on 
many  factors,  starting  with  the  effectiveness  of 
the Chinese vaccines and the availability of other 
vaccines.25 As for «wolf warrior diplomacy», which 
is officially conducted by the Chinese Government 
through prominent diplomats and spokesmen for 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs using quite unusual 
channels  –  social  media  platforms  banned  in 
mainland China, primarily Facebook and Twitter – 
it was also intended to cope with the US narrative 
on the origins of the virus, which insisted on calling 
it  the  “Chinese  virus”  or  the  “Wuhan  virus”,  and 
to  propose  a  different  narrative  on  its  origins  by 
referring to conspiracy theories. 

these  actions  adopted  by 

All 
the  Chinese 
Government  to  change  the  COVID-19  narrative 
and  disassociate  itself  from  the  novel  coronavi-
rus  were  emblematic  of  China’s  concerns  about 
its  image.  In  the  words  of  Indian  scholar  Raj 
Verma, China intended to “portray itself as a Good 
Samaritan, a responsible and reliable partner and 
an essential global power”, but Beijing’s efforts to 
change the COVID-19 narrative also derived from 
“the need to maintain the CPC’s regime legitimacy” 
in consideration of the fact that the outbreak had 
created discontent among Chinese citizens about 
the  initial  mishandling  of  the  virus  by  the  central 
and local governments.26

4. The quest for prestige and image-
building in China’s foreign policy 

To  fully  understand  the  importance  of  a  good 
reputation  and  prestige  for  China  it  is  important 
to underline that the pursuit of international status 
was  a  constant  behind  Chinese  foreign  policy 
even in imperial times, when China had the pre-
sumption to present itself as the centre of civiliza-
tion. During the 1930s, the communists guided by 

Mao Zedong also aimed to create a good image 
and  reputation  for  themselves,  both  internally 
and externally, in their fight against the Japanese 
invaders,  as  opposed  to  the  nationalists  headed 
by Chiang Kai-shek. Since 1949 this has been a 
key driver of the PRC’s foreign policy, with resto-
ration of China’s great power status identified as 
a central goal of Beijing’s sovereign foreign policy 
after  the  historical  trauma  of  foreign  domination 
during  the  notorious  ‘century  of  national  humilia-
tion’  (百年耻辱).  This  quest  for  recognition  char-
acterized  China’s  posture  in  the  international 
communist  movement,  where  Beijing  presented 
itself  as  an  alternative  source  of  ideological 
authority to Moscow.27 Prestige continued to orient 
Chinese  foreign  policy  after  the  end  of  the  Cold 
War, when new «identity management strategies» 
were formulated to achieve international recogni-
tion.28 While in the mid-1990s Beijing opted for a 
strategy of «social competition» with Washington 
based  on  a  supposition  that  the  international 
system  was  undergoing  an  inevitable  process  of 
multipolarization, in the late 1990s recognition that 
the  international  system  would  remain  unipolar 
for  the  foreseeable  future  led  to  a  new  strategy 
of  «social  creativity».  Since  status  requires 
acceptance by others, the “Chinese elites realized 
that they had to alter their behaviour to win recog-
nition  from  the  West”.29  Great  power  status  was 
therefore pursued by advancing China’s prestige 
through development of bilateral partnerships, in-
volvement in existing multilateral settings and es-
tablishing new regional organizations rather than 
by competing with the leading hegemon. 

Image-building  has  followed  the  same  trajectory, 
starting from the imperial age, when it represent-
ed an important part of Chinese statecraft with the 
Chinese empire presenting itself as a benevolent 
power  at  the  centre  of  the  world  (中国).  During 
the  Maoist  era  (1949-1976)  China  attempted  to 
convince  outsiders  that  it  was  a  revolutionary 
socialist power,30 and one of the ways in which it 
tried to project international soft-power messages 

24   Sylvain Kahn & Estelle Prin, ‘In the time of COVID-19, China’s mask has fallen with regard to Europe’, European Issues, No. 569, 7 Sep-

tember 2020; Charles Dust, ‘How China’s Mask Diplomacy Backfired’, The National Interest, 20 April 2021. 

25   Vaccine diplomacy deserves a separate article, but for the purpose of this analysis I will try to reflect in the conclusions whether vaccines 
can represent an opportunity to repair China’s damaged reputation. In fact, the vaccines game is still open, while the global vaccine short-
age is offering the PRC an international soft power boost, given its prior engagement in health diplomacy. 

26   Raj Verma, ‘China’s diplomacy and changing the COVID-19 narrative’, International Journal, Vol. 75, No. 2, 2020, pp. 255-6.

27   Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War, The University of North Carolina Press, 2001.

28   Deborah Welch Larson & Alexei Shevchenko, ‘Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy’, International Security, 

Vol. 34, No. 4, 2010, pp. 63-95.

29   Ibid, p. 82.

30   Simon Rabinovitch, ‘The Rise of an Image-Conscious China’, China Security, Vol. 4, No. 3, Summer 2008, p. 33.

6  

  Robert Schuman Centre | November 2021

beyond  conventional  diplomatic  channels  was 
by  inviting  so-called  «foreign  guests»  (外宾)  to 
carefully planned tours around the country, often 
with all expenses paid.31 In the reform era (1978-
present) the Beijing Government has been more 
committed  to  being  recognized  as  a  cooperative 
responsible player in the international system, and 
participation  in  global  governance  has  provided 
an  important  avenue  for  the  PRC  to  build  a 
benign and responsible image. In general, China 
has  been  seeking  to  build  a  good  international 
image,  with  shaping  a  favourable  external  envi-
ronment  for  domestic  development  as  a  primary 
goal.32 The approach has differed according to the 
multiple  identities  with  which  China  has  chosen 
to  identify  itself  depending  on  the  circumstanc-
es (a developing country; an emerging economy; 
a  rising  great  power),33  and  therefore  on  the 
country’s  capacity  and  international  standing. 
In  the  early  1990s  guided  by  Deng’s  principle  of 
“keeping a low profile” (韬光养晦) and “not seeking 
(绝不当头)  China’s 
international 
leadership” 
behaviour featured relative cooperation but limited 
contribution. In fact, China needed to recover from 
the Tiananmen crisis, which risked compromising 
the reform and opening-up policies and the focus 
on  modernization.  In  an  international  environ-
ment that was openly hostile to Beijing – as China 
was the only great power left to represent Marxist 
socialism – it necessarily had to work to rebuild its 
image and increase its influence. Its turn to multi-
lateralism, with gradual engagement in UN peace-
keeping operations, offers a good example in this 
sense.34  In  the  2000s,  a  major  aim  of  Beijing’s 
diplomacy was to address the negative impact on 
its  image  caused  by  the  so-called  China  «threat 
theory»  (中国威胁理论),  which  emerged  among 
American  neoconservatives  as  a  direct  conse-
quence  of  China’s  tremendous  economic  rise, 
soon  followed  by  a  military  and  geopolitical  rise. 

As part of the new strategy, Beijing increased its 
contribution  to  and  engagement  in  regional  and 
global  governance,  conveying  a  message  that 
China’s development would benefit the world. The 
Chinese Government adopted the idea of being a 
responsible power and advanced a narrative that 
China’s  development  was  peaceful  (和平发展) 
and represented an opportunity instead of being a 
threat.35 China’s behaviour during the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis, and its decision to not depreciate 
its currency, is widely perceived as the beginning 
of  the  effort  to  build  and  project  the  image  of  a 
«responsible  major  power»  (负责人大国),36  while 
the  global  financial  crisis  a  decade  later  created 
new  opportunities  for  the  country  to  increase  its 
say in global affairs, as the crisis shook faith in the 
liberal economic order. Many observers, including 
ones that had sceptically welcomed the idea of   a 
Beijing  consensus  proposed  in  2004  by  Joshua 
Cooper Ramo, had to recognize the effectiveness 
of the so-called «China model» in dealing with the 
crisis.37 

While  the  narrative  of  responsible  power  and 
peaceful  development  contributed  to  a  relatively 
positive  international  perception  of  China  in  the 
2000s,  concerns  and  criticisms  remained  due  to 
specific issues such as the Darfur crisis, China’s 
protection of military rule in Myanmar, its growing 
quest  for  energy  and  other  resources,  and  envi-
ronmental pollution.38 Increasingly active interna-
tional  behaviour  and  a  firmer  position  on  issues 
such  as  the  South  China  Sea  disputes  led  to  Xi 
Jinping’s  new  China  being  attributed  with  asser-
tiveness in its will to show itself as a great power 
wanting to make its voice heard by exercising its 
话语权, which literally means «right to speak» but 
in  a  broad  sense  indicates  the  power  to  dictate 
international rules and set the political agenda. Xi 
Jinping’s  definitive  abandonment  of  Deng’s  «low 

31   ulia Lovell, ‘The uses of foreigners in Mao-era China: «Techniques of Hospitality» and international image-building in the People’s Repub-

lic, 1949-1976’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Vol. 25, December 2015, pp. 135-158.

32  Rosemary Foot, ‘Chinese power and the idea of a responsible state’, The China Journal, Vol. 45, 2001, pp. 1–19; Li Mingjian, ‘China 

debates soft power’, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2008, pp. 287–308.

33  China’s «multiple identities» influence Chinese leaders’ articulation of foreign policy discourse and impact the country’s international im-
age, since its political discourse is perceived differently at the global level by different countries. On the rationale behind China choosing 
different types of identities according to the audience, see Dominik Mierzejewski & Bartosz Kowalski, China’s Selective Identities. State, 
Ideology and Culture, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. 

34  M. Taylor Fravel, ‘China’s attitude toward U.N. peacekeeping operations since 1989’, Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 11, 1996, pp. 1102–1121. 
See also Joan Wuthnow, Li Xin & Qi Lingling, ‘Diverse Multilateralism: Four Strategies in China’s Multilateral Diplomacy’, Journal of Chi-
nese Political Science, Vol. 17, 2012, pp. 269–290.

35   Zheng Bijian, ‘China’s ‘peaceful rise’ to great-power status’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5, 2005, pp. 18–24.

36   Deng Yong, ‘China: The post-responsible power’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 4, 2014, p. 120.

37  ‘杨继绳：我看 “中国模式” ’(How I see the China model), Yunhuang Chunqiu, 1 January 2011.

38   Stephanie Kleine-Ablbrandt & Andrem Small, ‘China’s new dictatorship diplomacy: Is Beijing parting with pariahs?’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 

87, No. 1, 2008, pp. 38-56.

7  

  COVID-19 and China’s global image

profile»  posture,  which  was  accompanied  by  a 
wise  and  refined  exercise  of  discursive  power, 
trespassing  often  and  willingly  into  aggressive 
language, on the one hand contributed to putting 
an end to the sense of victimization once and for all 
and on the other started a new era of growing as-
sertiveness and arrogance (combined with an au-
thoritarian drift domestically) that affected China’s 
image and its attractiveness to the detriment of its 
reputation and soft power. The crisis related to the 
COVID-19  pandemic  intervened  in  this  complex 
context, further complicating China’s global image. 

5. Conclusions: Can vaccines «save» 
China?

The COVID-19 pandemic represented one of the 
worst  internal  crises  in  the  last  few  decades  for 
the  PRC,  with  huge  repercussions  on  multiple 
fronts  (political,  economic,  social,  geopolitical), 
even though the Chinese Government, after a first 
period  of  inaction,  demonstrated  highly  effective 
management  of  the  health  emergency  crisis. 
Suffice  it  to  say  that  when  Europe,  the  US  and 
most of the advanced countries were still closed 
in  their  repeated  and  highly  debated  lockdowns, 
daily life in China had already gone back to normal 
and it was one of the few countries that registered 
economic  growth  in  2020.39  In  other  words,  the 
Chinese party-state once again demonstrated its 
resilience and ability to transform a crisis into an 
opportunity,  to  generate  political  consensus  and 
further  nourish  nationalist  sentiments.  Its  use 
of  highly  sophisticated  instruments  to  contain 
the  spread  of  the  virus  domestically  was  a  clear 
demonstration of the level of high technology de-
velopment  it  had  achieved.  The  aid  diplomacy 
and  the  production  of  its  own  vaccines  and  dis-
tribution of them to less developed countries – in 
line  with  the  Chinese  view  considering  vaccines 
to be «global public goods», and in stark contrast 
with  US  President  Donald  Trump’s  vaccine  na-
tionalism40 – aimed to emphasize China’s role in 
international governance as a «responsible stake-

holder». Nonetheless, this did not translate into a 
more positive view of China worldwide. With a few 
rare  but  in  some  cases  significant  exceptions41, 
Chinese  methods,  in  particular  its  misuse  of 
artificial intelligence (AI) and intrusive technology, 
and  the  surveillance  system  employed  to  track 
the movement of citizens in collaboration with the 
country’s three most famous tech giants (Tencent, 
Alibaba  and  Baidu)  have  been  heavily  criticized 
as  extremely  invasive  tools  limiting  the  already 
scarce  individual  freedom.  In  other  words,  the 
authoritarian  nature  of  the  Chinese  Government 
that  made  a  quick  and  effective  response  to  the 
COVID-19 pandemic crisis possible has generated 
consistent criticism from liberal Western democra-
cies, thus confirming something that was already 
well  known:  the  fact  that  “the  second  largest 
economy  in  the  world,  perhaps  soon  to  be  the 
first, is still a society in which little or no space for 
personal privacy and freedom of speech is guar-
anteed”.42 In this sense, COVID-19 contributed to 
reviving longstanding debates about China’s lack 
of democracy and its authoritarian practices, often 
and willingly set aside for economic and business 
reasons, further complicating its relations with the 
world and (again) questioning its role in the inter-
national system. 

The  extent  to  which  vaccine  diplomacy  can  help 
restore  China’s  reputation  remains  to  be  seen. 
According  to  data  from  Bridge  Consulting,  an 
independent  mission-driven  consultancy 
that 
tracks  China’s  impact  on  global  health,  it  seems 
that  Chinese  vaccine  diplomacy  is  working  well. 
Despite  many  doubts  about  the  effectiveness 
of  «made  in  China»  vaccines  (Sinovac  is  51% 
effective,  while  Sinopharm  is  79%  effective),43 
the  global  vaccine  shortage  is  giving  China  an 
international  soft  power  boost  since  according 
to experts Chinese vaccines work better than no 
vaccines. So far Beijing has distributed almost 1 
billion doses, mainly in the Global South, and by 
the end of 2021 the PRC plans to have distribut-
ed 2 billion vaccine doses abroad.44 There are at 

39   ‘China’s economy grows 2.3% in 2020 as recovery quickens’, CNN Business, 18 January 2021.

40   ‘Trump signs order putting Americans at head of vaccine line, while vowing to work with world’, The National Observer, 9 December 2020.

41   Italy was one of these exceptions but, as is shown in the previously mentioned study by the International Federation of Journalists, it 
seems strictly related to the fact that at the beginning of the pandemic the country was the object of a heavy campaign of disinformation 
and misinformation.

42   Silvia Menegazzi, ‘China 2020: A foreign policy characterized by growing resilience, fading responsibility and increasing uncertainty’, Asia 

Maior, Vol. XXXI/2020, p. 49.

43   These two vaccines have been at the forefront of the PRC’s vaccine diplomacy, with Sinopharm’s vaccine having obtained full or emer-
gency approval in 53 nations and Sinovac’s jab in 29 countries. They were approved by the WHO in May and June 2021 respectively, while 
they are both awaiting acceptance by the European Medicins Agency (EMA).

44   ‘China’s COVID-19 Vaccine Diplomacy Reaches 100-Plus Countries’, Voanews, 18 September 2021. 

8  

  Robert Schuman Centre | November 2021

least three aspects of China’s vaccine diplomacy 
that  deserve  to  be  considered.  First,  the  speed 
with which China rolled out vaccines to countries 
with few other options (in the first few months of 
2021  it  was  reported  that  Beijing  had  prioritized 
exports  over  a  then  sluggish  domestic  rollout,  in 
stark  contrast  with  the  strategy  pursued  by  the 
US  and  Western  countries  in  general);  second, 
the  scale,  with  reference  to  both  the  number  of 
vaccine doses shipped around the world by China, 
and also to the number of new vaccine candidates 
in  the  clinical  stage  –  in  early  June  2021  there 
were 20, eight of which in phase 3; and third the 
simpler  logistics  of  Chinese  vaccines  compared 
with  Western  ones. The  fact  that  the  Sinopharm 
and Sinovac vaccines require only standard refrig-
eration  while  Pfizer  and  Moderna  need  extreme 
sub-zero  temperatures  represents  an  advantage 
for many low and middle-income countries in the 
Global  South,  because  of  their  hot  climates  and 
poor logistical systems.45 In addition to exporting 
huge quantities of vaccines, China is also building 
manufacturing  plants  around  the  world,  casting 
itself as a good global citizen even if there is no 
doubt  that  Beijing  sees  strategic  gains  from  its 
conduct.46 That said, as has already been pointed 
out, the vaccine game is still open and it is difficult 
to make any kind of prediction. Only time will tell 
if vaccines will be able to save China’s image and 
reputation.

45    Darren  Choi  &  Sean  Janke,  ‘«Vaccine  Diplomacy»?  –  China’s  Global  Vaccine  Efforts  and  Controversies’,  21  July  2021  (https://www.

ualberta.ca/china-institute/research/analysis-briefs/2021/vaccine-diplomacy.html).

46   ‘China’s global vaccine gambit: Production, politics and propaganda’, Asia Nikkei, 12 October 2021.

9  

  COVID-19 and China’s global image

The Global Governance Programme 

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© European University Institute, 2021
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  RSC | Policy Brief | Issue 2021/57 | November 2021

doi:10.2870/607816 
ISBN:978-92-9466-114-2 
ISSN:2467-4540 
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