REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Evaluation report pursuant to Article 38 of Regulation 1141/2014 on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations
Date: 2021-11-25
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: European Parliament, European party, application of EU law, foundation, party financing

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 25.11.2021  COM(2021) 717 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL  Evaluation report pursuant to Article 38 of  Regulation 1141/2014 on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations  
 
 
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED 

AFCO 

European Parliament Committee on Constitutional Affairs 

APPF 

EPRS 

EU 

Authority for European political parties and foundations 

European Parliament Research Service 

European Union 

EUPFs 

European political foundations 

EUPPs 

European political parties 

EUPP/Fs 

European political parties and foundations 

IAS 

NGO 

International Accounting Standards 

Non-governmental organisation 

ODIHR 

Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 

OSCE 

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 

TEU 

Treaty on the European Union 

TFEU 

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 

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I. 

INTRODUCTION 

Regulation  1141/20141  (the  ‘Regulation’)  governs  the  statute  and  funding  of  European 
political  parties  (EUPPs)  and  European  political  foundations  (EUPFs).  It  established  a 
European  legal  personality  for  both  European  political  parties  and  foundations  (EUPP/Fs), 
defined  the  criteria  for  their  registration  and  set  out  rules  for  their  governance.  The 
Regulation also created an independent oversight body, the Authority for European political 
parties and foundations (APPFs), and strengthened the control mechanisms over EUPP/Fs.  

The  Regulation  was  adopted  under  the  ordinary  legislative  procedure,  in  accordance  with 
Article 224 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It entered into 
force on 24 November 2014 and became applicable on 1 January 2017. The provisions on the 
funding  of  EUPP/Fs  entered  into  effect  as  of  financial  year  2018.  Simultaneously,  the 
Financial  Regulation2  was  amended  to  introduce  specific  provisions  on  contributions  from 
the  EU  budget  to  EUPPs.  These  provisions  are  now  found  in  Articles  221  to  232  of  the 
Financial Regulation. 

In the run-up to the 2019 elections to the European Parliament, the Regulation was amended 
twice with a limited number of targeted amendments to address its most critical loopholes:  

  The first of these amendments3, requested by the European Parliament, was to make the 
links between European and national political parties more transparent by making access 
to funding from the EU’s budget conditional on the EU member parties’ publishing, in a 
clearly  visible  and  user-friendly  manner,  the  political  programme  and  logo  of  the 
European  political  party  concerned.  In  addition,  the  amending  Regulation  tightened  the 
conditions for registration as an EUPP, rendering it contingent upon the applicant being 
supported  by  seven  national  political  parties  from  seven  different  Member  States. 
Therefore,  unlike  in  the  past,  individual  parliamentarians  could  no  longer  support  an 
application for registration. As a result, in 2018 the APPF deregistered two EUPPs4,5 and 
one  affiliated  EUPF6  for  failing  to  provide  proof  that  they  satisfied  the  tightened 
minimum  representation requirements. The verification mechanism for compliance with 

1  Regulation  (EU,  Euratom)  No  1141/2014  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  22  October 
2014 on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations, OJ L 317, 
4.11.2014, p. 1–27. Available at: 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014R1141  
https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/e9488da5-d66f-11e8-9424-01aa75ed71a1/language-
en/format-PDF/source-86606884   

2 

3   Regulation  (EU,  Euratom)  2018/673  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  3  May  2018 
amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014 on the statute and funding of European political parties 
and European political foundations, OJ L 114I, 4.5.2018. Available at:  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32018R0673 

4   Decision  of  the  Authority  for  European  Political  Parties  and  European  Political  Foundations  of  13 
September  2018  to  remove  Alliance  for  Peace  and  Freedom  from  the  Register,  OJ  C  417,  16.11.2018. 
Available at:  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2018.417.01.0011.01.ENG&toc=OJ:C:2018:417:TOC 

5   Decision of the Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations of 29 August 
2018  to  remove  Alliance  of  European  National  Movements  from  the  Register,  OJ  C  417,  16.11.2018. 
Available at:  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2018.417.01.0009.01.ENG&toc=OJ:C:2018:417:TOC 

6   Decision  of  the  Authority  for  European  Political  Parties  and  European  Political  Foundations  of  13 
September  2018  to  remove  Europa  Terra  Nostra  from  the  Register,  OJ  C  418,  19.11.2018.  Available  at: 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2018.418.01.0004.01.ENG&toc=OJ:C:2018:418:TOC  

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EU  values  was  also  amended  so  the  European  Parliament  may  request  the  Authority  to 
launch the mechanism not only acting on its own initiative, but also following a reasoned 
request from a group of citizens. Finally, Article 27 on sanctions was amended to ensure 
that,  if  an  EUPP/F  no  longer  fulfils  one  or  more  of  the  conditions  for  registration,  it  is 
removed from the Register. 

  The  second  amendment7  was  adopted  as  part  of  the  Commission’s  2018  European 
elections  package8,  comprising  of  a  set  of  provisions  which  aimed  at  securing  free  and 
fair  elections  and  was  triggered  by  the  ‘Facebook/Cambridge  Analytica’  scandal9.  The 
amendment  introduced  a  verification  procedure,  imposing  sanctions  on  EUPP/Fs  that 
deliberately influence, or attempt to influence, the outcome of elections to the European 
Parliament  by  taking  advantage  of  breaches  in  data  protection.  This  amendment  also 
granted the APPF additional resources and gave it more independence. 

According to the Regulation’s evaluation clause in Article 3810, the European Parliament has 
to publish a report on the Regulation’s application by the end of 2021. The Commission has 
to  present  its  own  follow-up  report  within  6  months  of  the  adoption  of  the  European 
Parliament’s  report,  accompanied,  if  relevant,  by  a  legislative  proposal  to  amend  the 
Regulation. The European Parliament adopted its report on 11 November 202111. The present 
report fulfils the Commission’s legal obligation pursuant to Article 38 of the Regulation. 

The  present  evaluation  report  covers  the  period  between  the  Regulation’s  entry  into 
application on 1 January 2017 and the publication of this report.  

The  overall  assessment  of  the  Regulation’s  practical  application  is  positive,  especially 
regarding its relevance and EU added value, and there are no calls for a major overhaul of the 
current  system.  However,  the  Commission  has  identified  a  number  of  shortcomings  in  the 
system  that  undermine  the  Regulation’s  effectiveness,  efficiency  and  coherence  with  other 
EU policies. These shortcomings have to do with: (i) the funding of EUPP/Fs, (ii) democratic 

7   Amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2019/493 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 March 
2019  amending  Regulation  (EU,  Euratom)  No  1141/2014  as  regards  a  verification  procedure  related  to 
infringements  of  rules  on  the  protection  of  personal  data  in  the  context  of  elections  to  the  European 
Parliament, OJ L 85I , 27.3.2019. Available at: 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32019R0493  
Content of the 2018 electoral package available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_5681 

9   The  scandal  broke  in  2018  following  reports  from  former  employees  of  the  consultancy  company 
Cambridge  Analytica  that  the  company  had  commissioned  an  app  made  available  to  Facebook  users  to 
harvest  data  from  them  and  their  circle  of  contacts  and  that  this  data  was  used  subsequently  to  target 
political messaging in the context of a number of elections in subsequent years. Data was taken from US 
citizens and from citizens of a number of EU countries. Regulators took follow-up actions. 

10   Article 38: Evaluation  

‘The  European  Parliament  shall,  after  consulting  the  Authority,  publish  by  31  December  2021  and  every 
five years thereafter a report on the application of this Regulation and on the activities funded. The report 
shall indicate, where appropriate, possible amendments to be made to the statute and funding systems.  
No more than six months after the publication of the report by the European Parliament, the Commission 
shall present a report on the application of this Regulation in which particular attention will be paid to its 
implications  for  the  position  of  small  European  political  parties  and  European  political  foundations.  The 
report shall, if appropriate, be accompanied by a legislative proposal to amend this Regulation.’ 

11   European  Parliament  resolution  of  11  November  2021  on  the  application  of  Regulation  (EU,  Euratom) 
No 1141/2014 on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations, 
(2021/2018/INI), available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2021-0454_EN.html  

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values , visibility and gender balance (iii) the enforcement and sanctioning mechanisms and 
(iv) administrative burden. 

II.  METHODOLOGY 

The  evidence  supporting  this  evaluation  was  collected  through  the  informal  consultation  of 
main  stakeholders  who  were  interviewed  and  were  asked  open  questions.  These  included 
EUPP/Fs, the APPF, the services of the European Parliament’s Authorising Officer, Member 
States,  Members  of  the  European  Parliament  and  non-governmental  organisations  (NGOs). 
The  evaluation  report  also  takes  into  account  the  European  Parliament’s  report  on  the 
application of the EUPP/F Regulation adopted on 11 November 2021 pursuant to Article 38 
of the Regulation. 

The Commission conducted a 12-week long open public consultation between 30 March and 
22 June 202112. 

This evidence was complemented by desk-based research by Commission staff, two external 
expert  studies  and  the  existing  academic  research  on  the  subject  in  the  areas  of  law  and 
political sciences13.  

The financial data used  was publicly available on the  European Parliament website and the 
APPF website but also came from the European Parliament’s ex post evaluation study on the 
Regulation’s application14. 

III.  RELEVANCE 

The objective of the Regulation is to establish a regulatory framework enabling EUPP/Fs to 
fulfil  their  mission  under  Article  10(4)  TEU,  namely  to  ‘contribute  to  forming  European 
political awareness and to expressing the will of citizens of the Union’15 while ensuring their 
sound financial management and safeguarding against foreign interference. 

From all the consultations conducted by the Commission, a wide consensus emerged on the 
Regulation’s  relevance,  confirming  that  its  objective  remained  valid,  that  it  established  the 
appropriate  regulatory  framework  for  the  operation  of  EUPP/Fs  and  that  it  needed  limited 
targeted improvements.  

The report by the European Parliament Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) on the 
the 
application  of 
improvements  the  Regulation  has  brought  about  and  proposing  targeted  amendments  for 
addressing existing loopholes. 

the  Regulation  also  confirmed 

these  findings,  acknowledging 

IV.  EFFECTIVENESS 

The  mission  of  EUPP/Fs  is  to  help  shape  a  truly  European  political  space  and  promote 
democratic  values  within  and  beyond  the  EU’s  borders.  Some  provisions  in  the  current 

12  The full analysis of the open public consultation can be found in Annex II of SWD(2021) 359. 
13  The full bibliography of the consulted literature can be found in Annex V of SWD(2021) 359. 
14  Anglmayer I. (2021), Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 -ex post 

evaluation. Available at: 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/662646/EPRS_STU(2021)662646_EN.pdf 

15  Article 10(4) TEU. 

4 

 
                                                           
 
Regulation,  however,  do  not  allow  EUPP/Fs  to  completely  fulfil  this  mission,  thus 
diminishing the Regulation’s effectiveness. 

1.  Funding provisions 

a)  Income structure 

The  total  amount  of  EU  funding  for  EUPP/Fs  has  significantly  increased  over  time,  with 
EUR 46 million being earmarked for EUPPs and EUR 23 million for EUPFs in 2021.  

Figure 1 – Level of EU funding for European political parties and foundations 

Source: European Parliament Research Service 

Due to the co-financing obligation introduced in Article 17(4) of the Regulation, if EUPP/Fs 
fail to collect the matching own resources, their EU funding is lowered until it corresponds to 
90% and 95% of the total expenditure, respectively. 

This  means  that  if  EUPP/Fs  want  to  benefit  from  the  increased  budgetary  resources,  they 
have  to  secure  more  own  resources  over  the  years,  in  absolute  terms.  This,  however,  has 
proven problematic not only for smaller EUPP/Fs but for the larger ones as well (see Figure 2 
below)16.  

16   I. Anglmayer (2021), Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 -ex post 

evaluation, p.10. Available at:   
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/662646/EPRS_STU(2021)662646_EN.pdf  

5 

 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 2 – Maximum eligible contribution and final contribution to EUPPs from 
the EU budget per year 

Source: W. Wolfs, based on the reports of the Secretary-General of the European Parliament and 
Financial Overviews of the European Parliament’s DG FINS17 

s
n
o

i
l
l
i

M

€ 16 

€ 14 

€ 12 

€ 10 

€ 8 

€ 6 

€ 4 

€ 2 

€ -

EPP

PES

ALDE

EGP

PEL

EDP

EFA

ECPM

ECRP

IDP

Max. Contribution 2018

Final Contribution 2018

Max. Contribution 2019

Final Contribution 2019

There are two reasons why EUPP/Fs find it difficult to raise own resources. On the one hand, 
the  Regulation  currently  provides  for  only  two  categories  of  resources:  contributions  and 
donations.  Stakeholders  argue  that  this  categorisation  is  too  simplistic  and  rules  out  the 
possibility of raising own resources from other sources such as sponsorship, publication fees, 
participation fees, sales, etc. On the other hand, the Regulation can currently be interpreted to 
mean  that  it  does  not  allow  for  contributions  from  member  parties  located  outside  the  EU. 
This  interpretation  was  confirmed  by  ruling  T-107/19  of  the  General  Court  (EUCJ)  of 
25 November 202018 that found that a party outside the EU did not fall under the definition of 
a ‘political party’ under Regulation 2004/2003, as it was not ‘recognised by, or established in 
accordance with, the legal order of at least one Member State’. Consequently, the EUCJ ruled 
that  payments  from  member  parties  located  outside  the  EU  could  not  be  considered 
contributions,  only  donations.  This  is  particularly  relevant  following  the  UK’s  withdrawal 
from  the  EU19.  In  addition  to  this  affecting  their  own  resources,  EUPP/Fs  argue  that  the 
prohibition  hampers  their  meaningful  relations  with  longstanding  partners  and  previous 
members  and,  consequently,  they  feel  limited  in  fulfilling  their  mission  to  promote 
democratic  values  beyond  the  EU’s  borders.  The  European  Parliament  also  identified  the 
restrictive  interpretation  of  the  EUPP/F  Regulation  regarding  contributions  from  members 
outside the EU as being problematic20. 

These difficulties lead to less income for EUPP/Fs which, as a consequence, means they can 
organise fewer activities to raise awareness on the European political debate. Therefore, the 

17   Wolfs W. (2021), Impact assessment study – Revision of Regulation 1141/2014, unpublished. 
18   Judgment  of 

the  General  Court  of  25.11.2020,  Alliance  of  Conservatives  and  Reformists 

in 

Europe/European Parliament, T-107/19, EU:T:2020:560. Available at: 
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=D94B8C2205E30C3FDCC31F18436119E5
?text=&docid=234334&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1694530  

19   Based on the Commission’s informal consultations with EUPP/F. 
20   European Parliament resolution of 11 November 2021 on the application of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 
1141/2014  on  the  statute  and  funding  of  European  political  parties  and  European  political  foundations, 
(2021/2018/INI), available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2021-0454_EN.html. 

6 

 
 
                                                           
 
current structure of own resources, coupled with the co-financing obligation, diminishes the 
Regulation’s effectiveness.  

b)  Transparency of donations 

Article  20  of  the  Regulation  prohibits  certain  types  of  donations;  namely,  donations  from 
non-EU countries, anonymous donations and donations exceeding EUR 18 000.  

However, due to  loopholes in  the Regulation,  foreign actors may be able  to  circumvent the 
current  provisions  through  intermediaries  based  in  EU  Member  States,  using  funds 
originating  from  non-EU  Member  States.  Furthermore, 
these  prohibitions  are  not 
accompanied  by  corresponding  enforcement  powers  for  the  APPF,  which  currently  cannot 
request additional information from donors21.  

In  addition,  some  NGOs22  and  the  OSCE/ODIHR  voiced  their  concern  over  the  delays  in 
publishing  information  related  to  donations23.  They  are  calling  for  real-time  publication  of 
such information, especially during electoral periods, in order to avoid foreign interference in 
elections so that voters can cast their ballot in an informed manner. The European Parliament, 
in its report pursuant to Article 38 of the EUPP/F Regulation, also identified room to improve 
the transparency of funding and donations, in particular in the Regulation24. 

The  current  system  of  transparency  is  therefore  deemed  not  sufficiently  effective  in 
preventing, detecting and/or fighting foreign interference. 

2.  Democratic values, visibility and gender balance 

a)  Obstacles  for  European  political  parties  and  foundations  to  fulfil  their  mission 

under Article 10(4) TEU 

Throughout the consultation process, EUPP/Fs highlighted the obstacles they face to increase 
their visibility at national level. Those obstacles prevent them from fulfilling their mission to 
‘contribute  to  forming  European  political  awareness  and  express  the  will  of  citizens  in  the 
Union’25  and  therefore  diminish  the  Regulation’s  effectiveness.  The  European  Parliament 
also identified these obstacles in its report pursuant to Article 38 of the EUPP/F Regulation26. 

One  of  these  obstacles  could  be  associated  with  the  current  prohibition  to  fund,  directly  or 
indirectly, elections, political parties, candidates or foundations at national level27. To address 
the ambiguity of what is meant by ‘indirect funding’, in the run-up to the 2019 elections to 
the  European  Parliament,  the  APPF  and  the  European  Parliament’s  Authorising  Officer 
devised five principles applicable to European Parliament election campaigns that, if adhered 

21  See,  for  instance,  the  intervention  of  M.  Adam,  Director  of  the  APPF,  in  the  European  Parliament 

Committee on Constitutional Affairs on 15 June 2021. 

22   See, for instance, Kergueno, R. (2017), Fraud and boats: funding European political parties. Available at: 

https://transparency.eu/boatfraud/  

23  Kergueno,  R. 

(2017),  Fraud  and  boats: 

funding  European  political  parties.  Available  at: 

https://transparency.eu/boatfraud/  

24   See points 45 and 46 of the EP resolution. 
25  Article 10(4) TEU. 
26  See points 17, 27, 29 and 32 of the EP resolution. 
27  Article 22(2) of the Regulation. 

7 

 
                                                           
to,  would  mean  eligibility  for  EU  funding28.  While  this  has  improved  legal  certainty  to  a 
certain  extent,  it  has  not  allowed  for  the  increased  direct  involvement  of  EUPP/Fs  in 
campaigns in Member States. In addition, the EUPP/F Regulation currently prohibits the use 
of  EU  funds  in  national  referendum  campaigns,  even  on  issues  related  to  the  European 
Union; this  prevents  EUPP/Fs from  fostering the European dimension of such debates.  The 
European Court of Justice also refers to this prohibition in its ruling T-107/19 of the General 
Court (EUCJ) of 25 November 202029. 

Another  obstacle  to  the  visibility  of  EUPPs  at  national  level  is  the  lack  of  clarity  and 
insufficient related sanctions regarding the obligation for national affiliate parties to display 
the logo of the EUPP of which they are a member. Despite the obligation set out in Article 
18(2a) of the Regulation, European Democracy Consulting30 found that all EUPPs, with the 
sole exception of the European Democratic Party, have national member parties who do not 
display  their  logo  on  their  webpage.  Moreover,  85%  of  national  member  parties  do  not 
display  the  logo  of  the  EUPP  to  which  they  are  affiliated  in  a  ‘clear  and  user-friendly’ 
manner,  if  we  define  this  as  the  top  screen  of  national  parties’  webpages.  EUPP  logos  are 
overrepresented  in  the  bottom  screen,  with  close  to  58%  of  logos  found  there.  An 
overwhelming majority of logos are clearly ‘not visible’ (60%, and over 69%, if we include 
websites  not  displaying  any  logo).  Focusing  only  on  logos  ‘clearly  visible’  or  ‘moderately 
visible’,  71%  logos  fail  the  test,  and  up  to  78%,  if  we  include  websites  not  displaying  any 
logo. 

b)  Gender balance 

Currently,  the  Regulation  does  not  contain  any  transparency  obligation  on  gender  parity. 
When the Regulation was amended in 2019, co-legislators only agreed to mention a voluntary 
measure in Recital (5).  

The  World  Economic  Forum’s  Global  Gender  Gap  Report  found  that  the  gender  gap  in 
political empowerment remains globally the largest of the four gaps31 tracked, with only 22% 
closed to  date. While there has been a positive trend towards  greater  gender balance in  the 
European Parliament over the years32, voluntary measures have proven insufficient to ensure 
gender  parity.  As  of  January  2021,  the  percentage  of  female  Members  of  the  European 
Parliament  was  38.9%  compared  to  16.6%  in  the  first  directly  elected  legislature  in  1979. 
This is above the world average for national parliaments and above the European average for 
national parliaments, which is 30.5%. However, the European Parliament’s Research Service 
points  to  large  differences  between  Member  States  and  identifies  the  low  share  of  women 
among  candidates  as  an  underlying  cause  in  countries  with  a  low  proportion  of  female 
Members elected to the European Parliament. This, in turn, may be due to internal political 

28  Annual Activity Report 2020 of the APPF, p. 15. Available at:  

http://appf.europa.eu/cmsdata/238104/2020_AnnualActivityReport_AuthorityEUPPsEUPFs.pdf  

29   Judgment  of 

the  General  Court  of  25.11.2020,  Alliance  of  Conservatives  and  Reformists 

in 

Europe/European Parliament, T-107/19, EU:T:2020:560. Available at: 
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=D94B8C2205E30C3FDCC31F18436119E5
?text=&docid=234334&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1694530 

30   https://eudemocracy.eu/logos-project  
31  The three other tracks being economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, and health and 

survival. 

32   Commission’s Report on the 2019 elections to the European Parliament, p. 5 Available at: Microsoft Word 
-  COM_2020_252_F1_COMMUNICATION_FROM_COMMISSION_TO_INST_EN_V10_P1_1079619 
(europa.eu) 

8 

 
                                                           
 
 
party  processes.  It  appears  that  EUPPs  missed  an  opportunity  to  encourage  their  national 
member  parties  to  promote  gender  balance  on  party  lists.  In  addition,  gender  parity  in 
EUPP/F  governing  bodies  has  not  been  achieved  either.  The  Regulation  therefore  fails  to 
effectively promote gender balance. 

c)  Compliance with EU values 

Article  3(1)  and  (2)  of  the  Regulation  obliges  EUPP/Fs,  but  not  their  member  parties,  to 
respect the EU’s fundamental values as defined in Article 2 TEU. To increase the protection 
of fundamental values, member parties in the Union should also respect those values and that 
EUPP/Fs have to ensure that their members outside the Union comply with equivalent values. 
The  European  Parliament’s  evaluation  report  pursuant  to  Article  38  of  the  Regulation 
recommends  amending  Article  3  in  order  to  clarify  that  the  respect  for  EU  fundamental 
values should apply to both the EUPP itself and to its member parties33. 

3.  Enforcement 

a)  Empowerment of the Authority for European political parties and foundations 

The Regulation established, for the first time, an independent supervisory body, the APPF, in 
order  to  ensure  an  impartial  oversight  over  the  activities  of  EUPP/Fs34.  However,  some 
loopholes in the current provisions restrict the APPF’s ability to carry out effective controls. 

The  Regulation  does  not  provide  the  APPF  with  sufficient  investigative  powers  in  case  of 
donations.  Donors in  the European Union (both natural  and legal  persons), who may  act  as 
strawmen to channel funds to EUPP/Fs, currently have no legal obligation to cooperate with 
the APPF. In addition, the Regulation does not set out minimum documentation standards or 
internal  control  mechanisms  for  accepting  donations.  So  the  APPF  may  easily  lack  the 
necessary evidence to effectively verify donations and the means to obtain it.  

Secondly, the APPF has warned that its limited resources may undermine its effectiveness in 
‘extraordinary or non-recurrent work streams such as formal investigations, litigation before 
the  Union  courts  and,  potentially,  verification  procedures  of  matters  related  to  European 
elections or matters affecting the respect for the values on which the Union is founded on the 
part of European political parties or European political foundations’35. 

b)  System of sanctions  

To date, the sanctions system has never been used.  

In the view of some, this could be due to the system’s rigidity, in that it does not allow the 
APPF to either prioritise the breaches of the Regulation that should be pursued as a matter of 
priority or to modulate the level and nature of sanctions to make it proportionate to the nature 
of  the  breach,  including  in  cases  of  neglect.  Moreover,  some  EUPFs  claim  that  the  current 

33   See point 9 of the EP resolution. 
34   Current tasks of the APPF include: decision on the registration and deregistration of EUPP/Fs; verification 
that the conditions for registration are being complied with; establishment and management of a register of 
EUPP/Fs;  control of compliance by EUPP/Fs  with specific obligations (in cooperation with the  European 
Parliament  and  by  the  competent  Member  States);  imposing  financial  sanctions;  publishing  specific 
information on its website, in line with Article 32 of the Regulation. 

35  APPF Draft budgetary plan for 2021, p. 1. Available at:  

http://www.appf.europa.eu/cmsdata/216549/Draft%20budgetary%20plan%202021.pdf  

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system of undifferentiated sanctions may negatively affect the smaller among them, because 
for  a  relatively  small  irregularity,  the  sanction  may  cause  bankruptcy.  This,  in  turn,  has  a 
negative impact on political plurality. 

c)  Unclear rules on eligibility for EU funding in a specific period  

During  the  informal  consultations  conducted  by  the  Commission,  both  the  APPF  and  the 
European  Parliament’s  Authorising  Officer  indicated  that  the  EU’s  financial  interests  were 
not sufficiently protected in case of the deregistration of an EUPP or EUPF.  

The  Regulation  is  currently  unclear  on  the  eligibility  of  their  expenditure  during  the  three-
month period that the Regulation stipulates it takes for a deregistration decision to enter into 
force36.  

In addition, the Regulation may benefit from further alignment with Article 297 TFEU that 
stipulates that ‘(...) decisions which specify to whom they are addressed, shall be notified to 
those to whom they are addressed and shall take effect upon such notification’.  

V.  EFFICIENCY 

The Regulation inflicts substantial levels of administrative burden on EUPP/Fs.  

This is linked, on the one hand, to the double accounting requirement (i.e., the obligation to 
keep accounts according to both the legislation of the Member State where the EUPP/Fs have 
their  seat  and  the  International  Accounting  Standards  (IAS))  and,  on  the  other  hand,  to  the 
triple  verification  procedure  involving  the  external  auditor,  the  APPF  and  the  Authorising 
Officer of the European Parliament.  

The  obligation  for  EUPP/Fs  to  present  their  accounts  following  IAS  was  introduced  in  the 
2018 revision of the Regulation. All stakeholders, including the European Parliament, agree 
that  the  administrative  costs  resulting  from  this  obligation  for  such  small  organisations 
outweigh the benefits. While significant variations exist across EUPP/Fs, they spend around 
1,260 h (approximately 0.78 full time equivalent) on an annual basis on administrative tasks, 
with  an  additional  EUR 20 000  spent  on  tasks  that  are  outsourced.  Of  these  EUR 20 000, 
EUPP/Fs spend on average more than EUR 8 00037 to prepare the annual financial statements 
in  accordance  with  the  international  accounting  standards,  which  is  usually  an  outsourced 
task. This puts a particular strain on the functioning of the smaller EUPP/Fs which have more 
limited  resources.  At  the  same  time,  8  out  of  10  EUPPs  are  based  in  Belgium,  so  the 
comparability of accounts is largely ensured. In addition, in its 2020 Annual Activity Report, 
the  APPF  concluded  that  the  use  of  templates  prepared  by  the  APPF  has  significantly 
increased  the  comparability  of  the  submissions  of  the  different  EUPPs  and  EUPFs  and  has 
also  helped  to  harmonise  the  APPF’s  checks  of  the  different  files38.  The  use  of  IAS  can 
therefore be considered an inefficient and unnecessary measure.  

36  Pursuant to Article 16(1) and Article 10(5) of the EUPP/F Regulation, a decision to deregister an EU party 
or  foundation  enters  into  force  three  months  after  its  publication  in  the  Official  Journal  of  the  European 
Union. 

37  Wolfs W. (2021), Impact assessment study – Revision of Regulation 1141/2014, p. 5, unpublished. 
38  APPF Annual Activity Report 2020. Available at: 

http://www.appf.europa.eu/cmsdata/238104/2020_AnnualActivityReport_AuthorityEUPPsEUPFs.pdf  

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Also, the triple verification process applied to the accounts, which entails examination of the 
financial reports by both the APPF and the Authorising Officer of the European Parliament 
and  the  assessment  by  the  external  auditor,  results  in  a  double-spending  of  EU  taxpayers’ 
money. In addition to this inefficiency, the APPF and the European Parliament’s Authorising 
Officer have sometimes applied diverging interpretations of the rules, leading to an increased 
workload  and 
the  Commission’s 
consultation  process,  some  stakeholders  proposed  to  streamline  the  division  of  tasks  and 
responsibilities  between  the  APPF  and  the  European  Parliament’s  Authorising  Officer,  in 
order to eliminate overlaps, reduce the regulatory burden on the EUPP/Fs and increase legal 
certainty for them.  

the  EUPP/Fs39.  Throughout 

legal  uncertainty  for 

VI.  COHERENCE WITH EU POLICIES 

1.  European Democracy action plan 

Currently, the Regulation does not provide for full coherence with the European Democracy 
action  plan40,  which  identified  the  need  to  clarify  the  rules  governing  the  financing  of 
EUPP/Fs  and  to  launch  a  new  initiative  to  ensure  greater  transparency  in  paid  political 
advertising. The Regulation may therefore need to be amended to close current loopholes in 
the  Regulation  and  determine  the  obligations  of  EUPP/Fs  when  making  use  of  political 
advertising.  A  possible  amendment  in  this  regard  would  also  meet  the  request  from  the 
European Parliament,  which, in  its  report pursuant  to  Article 38 of the Regulation, stressed 
the need to address the risk of foreign interference41. 

2.  Gender equality strategy for 2020-2025 

By  not  containing  binding  provisions  to  promote  gender  equality  in  European  politics,  the 
EUPP/F Regulation is not fully consistent with the Commission’s gender equality strategy for 
2020-202542  that  states  that  ‘the  Commission  will  promote  the  participation  of  women  as 
voters  and  candidates  in  the  2024  European  Parliament  elections,  in  collaboration  with  the 
European  Parliament,  national  parliaments,  Member  States  and  civil  society,  including 
through  funding  and  promoting  best  practices.  European  political  parties  asking  for  EU 
funding  are  encouraged  to  be  transparent  about  the  gender  balance  of  their  political 
party members’. 

VII.  EU ADDED VALUE 

The TFEU provides for the establishment of the rules governing EUPP at EU level in Article 
224,  stating  that  ‘the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council,  acting  in  accordance  with  the 
ordinary  legislative  procedure,  shall  lay  down  the  regulations  governing  political  parties  at 
European level referred to in Article 10(4) of the Treaty on European Union and in particular 
the rules regarding their funding’. 

39  Based on data received from European political parties and foundations for the external impact assessment 

study conducted by W. Wolfs, Katholieke Universiteit of Leuven in June 2021. 

40  COM(2020) 790 final. Available at :  

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/political-guidelines-next-commission_en.pdf  

41  Add footnote once report published. 
42  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European  Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Union of Equality: Gender Equality Strategy 
2020-2025, COM(2020) 152 final, p. 14. Available at: 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0152&from=EN 

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EU  intervention  in  this  field  is  therefore  necessary,  as  withdrawing  the  Regulation  would 
create a legal vacuum for EUPP/Fs. 

VIII. 

IMPACT ON SMALL EUROPEAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND FOUNDATIONS 

While  the  Regulation  has  been  found  to  provide  an  appropriate  regulatory  framework  for 
EUPP/Fs, some of its provisions create difficulties for the smaller ones. 

The  2018  revision  of  the  Regulation  changed  the  distribution  key  for  benefitting  from  EU 
funding, lowering the lump sum  of equally distributed funds to  10% from  15% for EUPPs. 
The European Parliamentary Research Service concluded that this reform hit smaller political 
parties (and their related foundations) hard,  whereas the financial impact  on larger political 
parties  was  negligible43.  As  a  consequence,  small  EUPP/Fs  would  need  to  raise  more  own 
resources  to  ensure  the  necessary  funding  for  their  activities.  During  the  consultations 
conducted  by  the  Commission,  small  EUPP/Fs  indicated  that  the  current  definition  of 
contributions  and  donations  provided  only  limited  possibilities  to  do  so  and,  therefore, 
requested amending the Regulation to cater for additional categories of own resources. 

The  obligation  to  present  their  accounts  also  in  the  IAS  form  puts  smaller  EUPP/Fs  under 
strain due to its resource-intensive nature (see section on efficiency). Small EUPP/Fs, along 
with all other stakeholder groups, have therefore called for this obligation to be removed. 

Currently,  European  political  parties  can  apply  for  funding  if  they  are  represented  in  the 
European Parliament by at least one Member. This threshold of representation has been seen 
as  too  low  by  the  larger  parties,  with  some  of  them  pushing  for  its  increase,  in  order  to 
prevent a possible misuse of public funding via ‘one-man parties’. Smaller EUPPs are against 
such change, pointing out that this would be detrimental to the pluralistic nature of European 
politics.  Taking  into  account  that  at  present  even  the  least  represented  EUPP  eligible  for 
funding (the European Christian Political Movement) has four Members, the practical impact 
of such potential change would be minimal44. 

IX.  CONCLUSION 

The present evaluation was carried out pursuant to Article 38 of the Regulation, the revision 
clause.  

It concludes that the Regulation provided a useful regulatory framework for EUPP/Fs to carry 
out their mission under Article 10(4) TEU. The objectives of the Regulation remain relevant, 
but  a  number  of  loopholes  have  been  identified  affecting  the  effectiveness,  efficiency  and 
coherence of the Regulation. 

The  Commission  will  address  these  loopholes  in  the  legislative  proposal  to  amend  the 
Regulation  that  accompanies  this  evaluation  report,  in  accordance  with  Article  38  of  the 

43  Anglmayer I. (2021), Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 -ex post 

evaluation. Available at: 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/662646/EPRS_STU(2021)662646_EN.pdf  

44  Anglmayer I. (2021), Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 -ex post 

evaluation. Available at: 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/662646/EPRS_STU(2021)662646_EN.pdf  

12 

 
                                                           
Regulation,  while  taking  into  account  the  tight  situation  and  increasing  pressure  on  the 
available appropriations under the Heading 7 European Public Administration45.  

45  Heading  7  European  Public  Administration  for  the  current  multiannual  financial  framework  (MFF  2021-
2027) was built on the principles of stable staffing for all institutions over  the period, and no more than a 
2%  increase  in  non-salary  related  expenditure.  Any  additional  proposals  will  have  to  be  accommodated 
under the margins remaining beneath the ceilings. 

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