COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT Accompanying the document Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the transparency and targeting of political advertising
Date: 2021-11-25
Institutions: Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, European Commission
Subjects: advertising, data protection, election, natural person, personal data, political parties, political propaganda, provision of services, referendum, single market

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 25.11.2021  SWD(2021) 355 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT  Accompanying the document Proposal for a  REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the transparency and targeting of political advertising {COM(2021) 731 final} - {SEC(2021) 575 final} - {SWD(2021) 356 final}  
 
 
Table of contents 

1. 

2. 

INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT ................................................................3 

PROBLEM DEFINITION .....................................................................................................................5 

2.1.  Scope and context ..............................................................................................5 
2.2.  What are the problems? .....................................................................................7 
2.3. How will the problems evolve? ..........................................................................20 

3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? ......................................................................................................... 22 

3.1.  Legal basis .......................................................................................................22 
3.2.  Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action ...............................................................23 
3.3.  Subsidiarity: Added value of EU action ..........................................................24 

4.  OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? ................................................................................ 25 

4.1.  General objectives ............................................................................................25 
4.2.  Specific objectives ...........................................................................................25 

5.  WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS ....................................................................... 26 

5.1.  What is the baseline from which options are assessed? ...................................26 
5.2.  Description of the policy options .....................................................................28 
5.3.  Options discarded at an early stage ..................................................................35 

6.  WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? ............................................................ 35 

6.1.  The baseline scenario .......................................................................................35 
6.2.  Assessment of the options ................................................................................36 
6.2.1. Economic impacts ............................................................................................36 
6.2.2. Social impacts ..................................................................................................42 
6.2.3. Fundamental rights impacts .............................................................................43 

7.  HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? ............................................................................................. 46 

7.1.  Effectiveness ....................................................................................................47 
7.2.  Efficiency .........................................................................................................48 
7.3.  Coherence with other initiatives ......................................................................49 

8. 

PREFERRED OPTION ....................................................................................................................... 50 

9.  HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? .................................. 53 

ANNEXES .................................................................................................................................................... 56 

GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................. 56 

ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ............................................................................................. 59 

ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION ....................................................................................... 61 

ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW? ........................................................................................... 78 

ANNEX 4: ANALYTICAL METHODS ...................................................................................................... 84 

1 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX 5: CONTEXT, SCOPE OF THE MARKET, AND OTHER ASPECTS RELEVANT TO THE 

PROBLEM DEFINITION ................................................................................................................... 88 

ANNEX 6: INTERVENTION LOGIC ........................................................................................................ 122 

ANNEX  7:  LEGISLATION  ADDRESSING  POLITICAL  ADVERTISING  ACROSS  MEMBER 

STATES ............................................................................................................................................. 123 

ANNEX 8: PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF EU ACQUIS .......................................................... 159 

ANNEX 9: ILLUSTRATIVE USE CASES ................................................................................................ 218 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT  

The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, announced in her political 
guidelines1  that  the  European  Democracy  Action  Plan  (EDAP)2  ‘will  include  legislative 
proposals to ensure greater transparency on paid political advertising and clearer rules on 
the  financing  of  European  political  parties.’  EDAP,  presented  by  the  Commission  in 
December 2020 highlights the ‘clear need for more transparency in political advertising and 
communication,  and  the  commercial  activities  surrounding  it’  and  announced  that  ’the 
Commission  will  present  a  legislative  proposal  on  the  transparency  of  sponsored  political 
content’, to ‘complement the rules on online advertising in the forthcoming DSA, with the aim 
to  have  dedicated  rules  in  place  sufficiently  ahead  of  the  May  2024  European  Parliament 
elections’.  To  that  end,  the  2021  Commission  work  programme  includes3  a  proposal  for 
greater transparency in paid political advertising. 

The Commission’s initiative on the transparency of political advertising aims to support the 
functioning of the single market for political advertising services (‘political ads’) addressing 
the  growing  patchwork  of  legislation  in  this  area  and  related  barriers  including  in  terms  of 
compliance  cost  and lack of legal  certainty.  It aims  to  promote high European standards of 
transparency in political campaigning and free and fair elections in the EU level,  strengthen 
the  resilience  of  democratic  processes  in  the  EU  and  combat  disinformation,  information 
manipulation and interference in elections. 

Political advertising is a tool in campaigning to convey political messages to voters. It aims to 
influence  people’s  views  on  political  subjects  and  their  voting  decisions,  and  is  often 
specifically  regulated  nationally,  with  a  specific  focus  on  transparency.4  The  traditional 
media  for  political  ads  used  to  be  newspapers,  posters,  radio  and  television.  Today,  these 
have increasingly been displaced by the digital sphere. Digital technologies have also made 
political  advertising  cheaper  and  increased  the  number  and  types  of  service  available  to 
support campaigning. The cross-border nature of  online political advertising has challenged 
the  relevance  of  national  rules,  which  typically  included  restrictions  to  ensure  democratic 
accountability and fairer processes and economic operators face difficulties to determine and 
adapt to applicable rules, limiting their ability to offer advertising services. 

Online  political  ads  are  commonly  targeted  at  groups  of  users,  based  on  the  processing  of 
personal data5. Targeting (directing an ad to a specific group of people based on some shared 
characteristics)  can  be  very  sophisticated.  While  this  can  beneficial  in  addressing  political 
messages to concerned citizens, the Cambridge Analytica scandal6 revealed a need to address 

1 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/resources/library/media/20190716RES57231/20190716RES57231.pdf 
2  The  EDAP  presents  measures  to  protect  the  integrity  of  elections,  promote  democratic  participation  and  address 
disinformation 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2020%3A790%3AFIN&qid=1607079662423  
3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar%3A91ce5c0f-12b6-11eb-9a54-
01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_2&format=PDF  
4 See Annex 7. 
5 While alternatives such as contextual advertising exist, current prevalent practices are based on track-and-target, i.e. on the 
(2020). 
to 
processing 
https://panoptykon.org/sites/default/files/publikacje/panoptykon_to_track_or_not_to_track_final.pdf  
6  Personal  data  belonging  to  Facebook  users  were  illegally  processed.  The  company  developed  elaborated  psychological 
profiles and offered its consulting services to  various political campaigns, targeting voters  without consent with messages 
designed to influence their vote. 

Panoptykon, 

personal 

track?” 

track 

data. 

“To 

See 

not 

of 

or 

3 

 
 
 
                                                           
this  phenomenon7.  It  brought  to  light  unauthorised  interference  in  elections  (including  by 
foreign  state  actors),  exploitation  of  online  social  networks  to  mislead  voters,  and 
manipulation  of  the  debate  and  their  choices8,  using  psychographic  profiling  and  opaque 
practices  that  conceal  or  misrepresent  key  information9.  Other  techniques  are  also  used  to 
spread  or  amplify  manipulative  political  ads.  The  application  of  opaque  algorithms  and  the 
analysis of personal information allow the tailoring and targeting of political ads, which can 
exploit vulnerabilities of voters, including in another Member State. The volumes of data at 
stake  are  important,  including  data  derived  from  the  use  of  social  media  and  commercial 
practices (e.g. consumer profiles), combined with offline data. 
This  initiative  will  build  on  and  complement  relevant  EU  law10,  including  Regulation 
2016/679 (GDPR), the recent proposals for a Digital Services Act (DSA)11 and for a Digital 
Markets  Act  (DMA)12,  addressing  economic  operators  and  issues  identified  for  political 
advertising13. It is being complemented by other initiatives including the update of the self-
regulatory Code of Practice on disinformation14, based on the recently published Commission 
guidance15. This proposal will also be in synergy with the efforts led by the EU externally, in 
the field of election observation (EU Election Observation Missions and their follow-up) 

Both  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  have  expressed  concerns  about  the  lack  of 
transparency  in  political  advertising  and  the  use  of  (micro)targeting16.  Different  Parliament 
committees have engaged on this topic, in particular the Constitutional matters (AFCO), the 
Internal  Market  (IMCO)  committees  and  the  Special  Committee  on  Foreign  Interference  in 
Democratic  Processes  in  the  EU,  including  Disinformation  (INGE).  The  Parliament  has 
called  for  legislative  and  non-legislative  policy  measures.  The  Council  has  supported 

of 

an 

via 

the 

ads 

can 

play 

role. 

Including 

spreading 

important 

in  which 

7 Concerns about the effects of new advertising practices erodes citizens’ trust in online ads and digital markets. See ‘Online 
advertising: the impact of targeted advertising on advertisers, market access and consumer choice’ Study for the EP IMCO 
committee: 
 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/662913/IPOL_STU%282021%29662913_EN.pdf.  
8 
disinformation, 
https://www.disinfo.eu/advocacy/open-letter-to-eu-policy-makers-how-the-digital-services-act-dsa-can-tackle-
disinformation/?utm Half of Internet-using Europeans say they have been exposed to or personally witnessed disinformation 
on the Internet. https://fronteirasxxi.pt/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/ebs_507_en.pdf   
9  In  particular,  the  origin  and  political  intent  behind  political  communications,  their  sources  and  funding.  See  the 
Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council  and  the  European  Economic  and  Social 
Committee – Report on the 2019 elections to the European Parliament, COM(2020)252 final. 
10 See detailed description and analysis in Annex 8. 
11  The  DSA  proposal  includes  general  transparency  obligations  on online  advertising  for  online  intermediaries,  horizontal 
due diligence obligations for very large online platforms and a governance framework  https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-
regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12418-Digital-Services-Act-package-ex-ante-regulatory-instrument-of-very-large-
online-platforms-acting-as-gatekeepers  and  https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12417-
Digital-Services-Act-deepening-the-Internal-Market-and-clarifying-responsibilities-for-digital-services. 
12 Digital Markets Act proposal: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2020%3A842%3AFIN. This 
illegal  content  online  https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
includes  non-binding 
market/en/news/commission-recommendation-measures-effectively-tackle-illegal-content-online;  as  well  as  a  voluntary 
Code of Conduct against Hate Speech https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/document.cfm?doc_id=42985 
13 This initiative addresses all actors involved in financing, preparing, placing and disseminating political advertising (thus 
beyond the immediate publishers of ads, political and marketing consultancies, advertising and campaign organisations, and 
other relevant service providers). For a description of the articulation between the current initiative and other EU acts (DSA, 
Regulation 1141/2014, etc.), see Annex 8.  
14 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_19_6166 
15 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/guidance-strengthening-code-practice-disinformation  
16 Microtargeting and targeting are often used interchangeably – see Glossary. 

recommendations  on 

tackling 

4 

 
 
 
                                                           
initiatives  to  promote  free  and  fair  elections  and  democratic  resilience,  and  Member  States 
have been involved in preparing the EDAP and this initiative17.  

2.  PROBLEM DEFINITION 

2.1. 

Scope and context 

There is no EU-wide common concept of political advertising and Member States use various 
approaches18.  For  the  purposes  of  this  impact  assessment,  political  advertising19  will  be 
understood as the promotion of a message, published by any means, and which is being paid 
for by, or disseminated by or on behalf of a political actor, or which may be understood as 
seeking  to  influence  the  outcome  of  the  election  or  the  voting  behaviour  (especially  when 
published  during  an  election  period).  This  includes  ads  on  all  media  platforms  (including 
online and offline) disseminated in the European Union, ‘issues ads’, and political advertising 
which may also have commercial purposes20. A broad range of service providers is involved 
in political ads, online and offline, in their preparation, publication and dissemination.21  

Issues with regard to political ads online emerged in the public sphere in March 2018, when it 
was  revealed  that  Facebook  data,  including  Like  data,  on  more  than  87  million  users  was 
used by political consulting firm Cambridge Analytica to target voters during elections22.  

There are significant differences between political advertising and other forms of advertising 
in  the  single  market.  Misleading  commercial  advertising  is  already  forbidden  according  to 
Directive  2006/114/EC.  Addressing  political  advertising  as  other  commercial  advertising 
would  not  be  possible  due  the  specific  context  of  political  advertising  and  the  close 
relationship  with  elections,  freedom  of  expression  and  political  pluralism  among  others. 
Transparency  of  political  advertising  is  also  linked  to  accountability  and  democratic 
oversight, as an essential democratic principle. 

The  Commission’s  report  on  the  2019  elections  already  noted  the  importance  of  increased 
transparency of political advertising to ensure resilience and integrity of electoral processes in 
the  EU.  It  also  noted  the  limited  implementation  of  the  2018  Electoral  package 
recommendation in this respect and the need for further measures. The report highlighted the 
close  connection  between  a  lack  of  transparency  in  political  advertising,  the  misuse  of 
algorithmic targeting and the increased risk of interference in and manipulation of democracy 
in  the  EU.  The  Commission’s  joint  Communication  on  tackling  COVID  disinformation  of 
June 2020 described the ‘infodemic’ which accompanied the coronavirus pandemic and the 
challenges  this  posed  including  for  democracy  and  democratic  processes,  and  pointed  to 
concrete measures at EU level to address these challenges. 

17 For more details on the European Parliament and the Council, see Annex 5. 
18 National definitions tend to focus on the actors sponsoring ads or on the political intent of the message. 
19 ’Ads’ is defined variously in existing law - See Glossary in the Annexes. 
20 Where this is the case, the rules on commercial communications may also apply. An example is a company promoting its 
products through an ad which also promotes certain political views (such as a candidate’s stance on climate  change). See 
section 6 in Annex 7. 
21 For a full description of the relevant service providers and the different value chains involved, see Annexes 3 and 6. 
22 Other examples have been documented by the literature. 

5 

 
 
 
                                                           
Some  Member  States  have  legislated  or  intend  to  further  legislate  in  the  field  of  political 
advertising  for  reasons  of  public  interest.  As  a  result,  a  patchwork  of  national  rules  is 
emerging  and  likely  to  increase.  Heterogeneous  national  specific  requirements  on  political 
advertising  and related  barriers  obstruct the exercise of fundamental  freedoms  with  a direct 
effect on the functioning of the internal market. Member States’ regulation on transparency of 
political advertising goes beyond what applies to other forms of advertising. The aim of such 
national  regulation  is  primarily  to  prevent  citizens  from  being  misled  in  their  democratic 
choices,  support  their  genuine  political  participation  and  accountability  of  political  actors, 
contributing to fair and free democratic processes and their oversight, and preventing external 
interference23.  Differences  concern,  for  instance,  diverse  requirements  for  each  media  (e.g. 
TV  and  radio  and  online  services),  transparency  related  to  the  funding  of  political  ads,  the 
way  ads  should  be  labelled  or  what  must  be  made  public  during  election  periods  and 
oversight. Further, the regulation of issues ads is even more heterogeneous, even as their role 
in  shaping  political  campaigns  and  influencing  the  outcome  of  elections  is  more  and  more 
recognised24. 

The  fragmentation  leads  to  impediments  for  service  providers  including  when  providing 
cross-border  services.  It  significantly  increases  compliance  costs  to  adapt  to  the  different 
jurisdictions and is a source of legal uncertainty on the applicable transparency requirements. 
It  further  restricts  the  possibilities  and  choice  for  cross-border  campaigning  for  political 
actors like European Political Parties.  

The  heterogonous  regulation  impacts  companies  operating  in  a  cross-border  context.  It 
prevents  some  operators,  especially  SMEs25,  which  could  offer  their  political-ads-related 
services in different Member States from entering the market. There are also many economic 
actors providing novel  ad-related services, such as those providing data-driven analysis and 
programmatic ads. It may be unclear whether and how these providers are affected by rules 
designed  for traditional  campaigning.  In the cases  where service providers are  able to  offer 
cross-border  services,  the  currently  heterogeneous  legal  standards  also  lead  to  oversight 
related  issues  as  affected  citizens,  the  competent  authorities  and  the  advertisers  and  related 
services  providers  can  be  located  in  different  Member  States.  This  results  in  tensions  and 
barriers in the internal  market for services connected to political ads.  It also  generates poor 
regulatory outcomes, which combined with the lack of transparency and other issues related 
to  the  monitoring  and  enforcement  of  relevant  rules,  undermines  the  integrity  of  electoral 
processes  and  citizen’s  confidence  in  them.    National  action  to  address  the  situation  is  not 
fully effective and creates further barriers, and the same applies to private sector policies.  

that 

made 

aware 

23 For instance, the Council of Europe Recommendation No. R (99) 15 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on 
measures concerning media coverage of election campaigns states that, if paid advertising is allowed, it should be subject to 
some minimum rules: 1) equal treatment (in terms of access and rates) of all parties requesting airtime, and 2) the public to 
for, 
be 
https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016805e3c6b  For an analysis  of the application of key 
principles including transparency in regulating the political process, and an account of the role of transparency in deterring 
foreign interference in elections, see Regulating Election Finance, A Review by the Committee on Standards in Public Life 
July 
2021. 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/999636/CSPL_Regulating
_Election_Finance_Review_Final_Web.pdf  
24 Guidance on strengthening the Code of Practice on Disinformation, p9 (referred to above). 
25 One stakeholder reported that smaller companies may be prevented from entering political advertising markets due to the 
costs of complying with the applicable regulations. Legal fragmentation presents a higher burden to SMEs. 

message 

been 

paid 

has 

the 

6 

 
 
 
                                                           
Although  the  DSA  will  strengthen  transparency  and  supervision  of  online  ads,  including 
political ads, it will not address the specifics of political advertising. The DSA provides a set 
of  horizontal  rules  which  apply  to  information  society  services26.  The  transparency 
requirements provided by this new framework will complement those foreseen by the DSA 
by addressing the entire spectrum of economic actors involved in the preparation, publication 
and dissemination of political advertising, following a problem-specific value chain approach 
and imposes corresponding obligations on types of actors. While the DSA requires platforms 
to  disclose  the  identity  of  the  advertiser  (irrespective  of  whether  it  refers  to  political  or 
commercial  ads),  the  political  ads  initiative  will  require  them  to  also  provide  information 
about the political affiliation and on the funding of the ads.  

National  rules  apply  to  European  political  parties  (EUPPs)  on  issues  not  regulated  by 
Regulation  1141/2014.  The  Regulation  does  not  address  political  ads  directly  –  only  as 
regards  the  rules  on  the  application  of  EU  funds.  Accordingly,  campaigns  by  EUPPs  are 
potentially  subject  to  different  national  rules  (e.g.,  rules  on  what  constitutes  political 
advertising,  targeting,  and  periods  in  which  political  ads  are  restricted),  despite  the 
transnational character of EUPPs and the EU-wide character of the issue they campaign on. 

2.2.What are the problems? 

Summary of key problems 
1 - For cross-border providers of political ads27 

2  -  For  democratic  processes  and 
political  parties  in  the  EU,  linked  to 
internal market problems  

Related to transparency, targeting, and monitoring and enforcement 
a.  Additional  costs  and  lack  of  legal  certainty  for 
economic  actors  (incl.  EU  SMEs28  seeking  to 
offer and scale up their services across borders) 
including  when  providing  multi-medium  and 
multi-Member State campaigns,29 caused by: 
i.  fragmented rules and definitions; 
ii.  rules and procedures that are not always clear, 

ads;  

Poor national regulatory outcomes caused 
by:  
a. Insufficient transparency and clarity for 
individuals,  ‘interested    actors’30  and 
national authorities, leading to: 

i.  non-recognisability  of  political 

transparent or easily accessible. 

b.  Regulatory  arbitrage  and  circumvention  of 
relevant  rules  by  economic  actors  offering 
political  ads  services  (regulatory  failure)31 

ii.  reduced accountability;  
iii.  circumvention of relevant rules. 
b. Negative impacts on citizens’ rights and 
democratic  processes,  from  the  use  of 

26  The  DSA  takes  an  horizontal  approach  vis-à-vis  online  intermediaries  (starting  from  the  actors  involved)  while  the 
political ads initiative takes an horizontal approach on political ads applying to different actors. 
27 Issues under points 1 and 2 are applicable to online and offline services, albeit in different ways/to different extents. 
28 Large non-EU platforms have a prominent market position in the EU. They establish their policies (e.g. Facebook rules on 
2019 EP elections).  
29 As reported in the interviews conducted by the contractor. 
30 ‘Interested actors’ in this context refers to a subgroup within citizens/individual residing in the EU who play a particular 
role  in  the  democratic  process  in  ensuring  that  political  actors  are  held  to  account.  This  includes  journalists,  researchers, 
elections  observers,  civil  society  organisations  and  other  actors.  This  function  is  understood  to  be  distinct  from  the 
monitoring and enforcement role played by competent authorities, which is treated in another point.  
31 For online and broadcast media, internal market principles which enable the provision of relevant services from another 
Member State on the basis of that state’s rules can  mean that relevant rules in the receiving state might not be taken into 
account. In a few Member States, third country providers are barred by national rules from offering such services (e.g. as in 
the  Irish  2020  proposal  for  an  Electoral  Reform  Bill).  https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/34cf6-general-scheme-of-the-
electoral-reform-bill-2020/  

7 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
driven  by  differing  substantive  obligations  and 
enforcement  (costs),  and  different  possibilities 
to provide services (obstacles).  

c.  Additional  regulatory  burden  for  offline  actors 
in  political  ads,  caused  by  the  differences 
between online and offline regulation (itself also 
driven by limited regulatory capability). 

targeting  and  other  techniques  with 
political ads; 

c. Insufficient possibility for authorities to 
monitor  and  enforce  relevant  rules 
across borders. 

3 – Political parties in the EU 
a.  Inconsistent and insufficient transparency of political ads issued by EUPPs, because: 

i.  The  legal  framework  (Reg.  1141/2014)  does  not  provide  for  sufficient  transparency  for 
political  advertisements  disseminated  by  EUPPs.  Divergent  national  frameworks  apply  to 
their political ads32;  

ii.  The  regulation  at  EU level  is  not  consistent (Reg.  1141/2014)  with  national regulation.  It 
pursues objectives connected to financial rules, not to ensuring electoral standards33. Links 
between national and EU campaigns are not made clear on the face of the ads34. 
Inconsistent  and  sometime  insufficient  transparency  of  political  ads  issued  by  national 
political  parties  especially  for  the  context  of  European  elections,35  due  to  the  fragmented 
situation.36 

b. 

2.2.1.  Obstacles  to  the  cross-border  provision  of  online  political  advertising  services  in  the 
internal market (Problem 1) 

Political  ads  services  in  the  internal  market  include  political  advertising  delivered  through 
broadcast media, various online channels (social media, banner ads, video-sharing spots etc.) 
and through other offline means, including billboards, print media and direct mailing. They 
can involve a large number of related supporting services, such as data services, copywriting, 
analysis and financial services, often provided by SMEs37.  

It  is  challenging  to  isolate  political  advertising  from  other  advertising  services  in  market 
statistics38.  The  study  and  consultation  did  not  manage  to  obtain  comparable  data  on  the 
offline  publishing  sector,  outside  of  the  disclosures  made  in  the  context  of  national 
elections39.  Regarding  online  advertisement  publishing  activity,  there  is  a  lack  of 
transparency that makes  is  almost  impossible to obtain accurate, consistent  and comparable 
data. Nevertheless, it is clear that the size and complexity of the political advertising market 

32  Responses  to  the  consultation  process  did  not  identify  any  examples  of  national  rules  being  enforced  in  the  context  of 
campaigns sponsored by EUPPs, but this could change.  
33 For instance, while political parties make declarations on the money they spent on political advertising, this is not declared 
during the elections but only within 6 months of the end of the fiscal year, and not in sufficient detail.  
34 This is particularly problematic if EUPPs engage in EU-level campaigning to affect the outcomes of European Parliament 
elections.  Or,  as  mentioned  in  the  draft  EP  report  on  the  application  of  Regulation  1141/2014,  if  EUPPs  campaign  to 
influence the outcome of national referenda on  European matters,  https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/AFCO-
PR-692733_EN.pdf  
35 In the context of EU elections, candidates and campaigns are mainly sponsored by the national political parties, through 
campaigns which may also be run in multiple Member State. 
36 This is the case when campaigns target diaspora communities residing in other Member States but who vote in national 
elections in their Member State of origin, or in connection with campaigns by multi-Member State political parties during 
European elections, such as Diem25 and Volt. 
37 For a profile of the market, the service providers and value chains involved, see Annex 5, in particular 2.5. 
38 Most agencies providing political ads (including ad tech companies, platforms and marketing consultancies) also work on 
other kinds of campaigns. There can be specialisation in certain Member States for certain support services, such as political 
campaign and electorate analysis consultancies.  
39 Only a few Member States provide for these to be published, such as Latvia, and the former Member State. 

8 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
is increasing both within and outside the EU – particularly online, where the EU market was 
estimated to be worth over EUR 100 million in 201940.  
Political advertising services are regulated in diverse ways41. When offered across borders in 
the internal market, certain rules can affect economic actors involved, i.e. those regulating:  

1.  the  availability  of  political  ads  (rules  banning  political  ads  or  banning  cross-border 
provision  of  such  services,  setting  prices  or  other  issues  determining  access  to  the 
debate, and the period/scope of circulation); 

2.  the  advertisements  themselves  (rules  on  content  and  transparency  around  them  – 
requiring the publication of logos, sponsor details, spending – as well as prohibiting 
certain content, such as hate speech). 

This initiative focuses on the second category, and particularly on transparency requirements. 
The initiative does not consider interventions regarding prohibitions of content or of political 
ads  per  se,  except  to  the  extent  that  transparency  supports  oversight  of  such  rules. A  key 
aspect  of  the  regulation  of  political  advertising  is  transparency  to  enable  their  easy 
identification by viewers to prevent manipulation, democratic accountability and oversight by 
competent authorities.  

Moreover,  transparency  appears  to  be  the  key  available  area  for  harmonisation,  which  de 
facto allows for shaping the emerging market for political advertising services in a way that 
minimises fragmentation, barriers and costs for economic actors. 

Stakeholders’  views:  In  the  consultation  process,  Member  State  authorities  and  civil  society 
contributions  highlighted  that  the  current  fragmentation  has  enabled  the  circumvention  of 
transparency requirements and drove some activity to less regulated Member States, also away from 
the  more  strictly  regulated  offline  services.  Further, they  noted  how  recent  uncoordinated  action  by 
Member States to address these issues has exacerbated rather than corrected this situation42. 

The  fragmentation  of  transparency  requirements  for  political  ads,  with  differences  in  their 
substance, scope, implementation and enforcement between Member States, and between the 
policies  applied  by  leading  ad  publishers,  generates  various  costs  and  challenges  for 
economic actors operating across borders or seeking to do so. 

2.2.1.1. Additional costs and compliance burden for economic actors (Problem 1.1) 

Driven  by  rules  which  are  not  always  clear,  transparent  or  publicly  available:  Reliable 
information about applicable requirements (including the procedures to be followed) can be 
challenging  for  service  providers  to  obtain  outside  their  specific  jurisdiction,  especially  as 

40 However, the varying definitions applied both by regulators and by the economic actors providing such services  means 
that reliable figures are difficult to obtain and to compare between Member States, media and sectors. For a description of 
the advertising market in the EU with estimated figures, see section 1.2 of the underlying study.  
41  In  2013,  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  (ECHR)  observed  there  was  a  lack  of  European  consensus  on  how  to 
regulate paid political advertising in broadcasting, referring to a patchwork of legislation at national level – as well as a great 
variety of approaches and requirements – for online political advertising. It pointed out that this leads to inconsistent – across 
national  jurisdictions  –  and  unclear  obligations  especially  for  actors  operating  in  a  cross-border  context.  ECHR  (2013), 
Judgement 48876/08, Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom. http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-119244. 
42 In the consultation process, CSOs pointed to varying levels of regulation in the Member States as contributing to decisions 
about  the  location  of  certain  service  providers.  Cf.  also  Irish  Parliamentary  Library  and  Research  Service  (2021),  Note 
evaluating 
advertising. 
to 
https://data.oireachtas.ie/ie/oireachtas/libraryResearch/2021/2021-02-08_l-rs-note-the-regulation-of-online-political-
advertising-evaluating-the-government-s-proposals_en.pdf. 

government 

proposal 

political 

regulate 

online 

the 

9 

 
 
 
                                                           
they are not always clear and easily accessible. For instance, in some Member States, they are 
provided by standard-setting bodies or national authorities, rather than in law43.  

Driven by fragmented rules, definitions and requirements:  

Operators affected by these rules  must invest in separate compliance steps  and  adapt  to  the 
various  requirements  of  the  different  EU  jurisdictions44  to  provide  services  in  the  internal 
market. Fragmentation is exacerbated by the scope of national rules differing, with different 
actors being covered, and by varying obligations depending on the period, sponsor, medium, 
content  and  objective  of  the  ad45.  As  an  example  of  the  potential  effect  of  differing 
definitions,  online  audio-visual  ads  prepared  in  the  Netherlands  with  a  political  aim  but 
without affiliation  to  a specific political  party would not  be subject to  the rules  applying to 
political campaigns if disseminated into Denmark, but would be subject to such rules if they 
were disseminated into Ireland or Cyprus46. Publishers and campaign agencies need to ensure 
that  ads  are  adapted  to  each  jurisdiction’s  transparency  requirements,  such  as  on  logos, 
affiliation and funding, but also to related obligations e.g. connected to access to the media. 
In  this  respect,  political  ads  offered  across  borders  in  the  internal  market  differ  from 
commercial ads, where such rules are (largely) harmonised47. 

The relevant national rules on transparency of political advertising thus differ depending on 
what  counts as  ‘political advertising’,  as  per national  definitions. This  means that what  can 
count as a political advertisement in one state (and thus also potentially engage other rules), 
might not in another, or vice versa, which complicates cross-border campaigns. 

They  further  differ  depending  on  whether  they  apply  to  a  specific  medium:  some  Member 
States have distinct rules for print, radio, television and online media, whereas for others the 
rules apply to multiple media at once, or regardless of the medium, or explicitly to traditional 
media  and  implicitly  to  other  media.48  Only  four  Member  States  have  (or  will  soon  have) 
rules  specifically  for  online  media.  This  kind  of  fragmentation  obliges  service  providers 
interested  in  providing  political  advertising  services  to  carefully  assess  the  whole  legal 
framework applicable to each media for each Member State where they want to provide their 
services. 

Further, even when two Member States have rules in place for the transparency of political 
advertising  on  a  given  medium,  the  elements  of  transparency  required  to  be  disclosed  may 

in 

the  EU:  Rules  &  Practices’ 

43 Such as limits to advertising in specific media, on transparency about sources or separation of advertising from editorial 
content:  these  can  be  found  in  national  law  and  constitutions  as  well  as  in  professional  standards  (for  instance  among 
journalists)  and  guidelines  from  regulators,  such  as  media  authorities.  For  an  overview  see  ‘Internal  Media  Plurality  in 
Audiovisual  Media  Services 
(ERGA  Report)  https://erga-online.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2019/01/ERGA-2018-07-SG1-Report-on-internal-plurality-LQ.pdf, in particular from p 27.  
44 This was mentioned in the consultation as a potentially significant additional cost in a campaign preparation process, 
involving the investment of time from regulatory compliance officers or external contractors to determine the specific 
requirements applicable per jurisdiction in a multi-Member State campaign, as well as the additional work needed from 
copywriting, design and translation to implement any required differences to the appearance of material prepared, as well as 
further costs to prepare and make any necessary declarations, e.g. regarding sponsors or costs, where needed.  
45 See Annex 9, which illustrates the various ways that legal fragmentation increases costs and adds compliance burdens to 
the political ads value chain when services are provided across borders. 
46 In Ireland, such an ad would not be allowed on broadcast media but could be viewed online, while in Cyprus it would in 
principle merely need to be labelled as paid for. 
47 See Annex 8, especially internal market and consumer protection rules. 
48 For instance, in HU the transparency requirements for political advertising that is allowed only apply to press products and 
posters, whereas in SK the rules are framed so as to require disclosure of the identity of the sponsor for “broadcast political 
advertising,  published  paid  advertising,  published  election  posters  and  all  other  methods  of  conducting  an  election 
campaign” (emphasis added).  

10 

 
 
 
                                                           
still differ strongly, for instance in terms of the amounts paid for the advertisement49 or of the 
actors to be identified in the ad50. Having to disclose different elements across Member States 
requires having different versions of the same advertisement ready (or different transparency 
notices), and when they are disseminated online it requires controlling carefully the audience 
to which each version of the advertisement is shown. 

Similarly,  the  few  Member  States  which  recently  passed  or  intend  to  pass  rules  concerning 
the transparency of targeting techniques also require different elements to be disclosed, some 
going  much  further  in  terms  of  the  explanation  of  the  process  behind  the  targeting 
technique51. 

Beyond transparency disclosures in the advertisement itself, some Member States also require 
some form of transparency through reporting obligations (either only from political actors, or 
also  from  service  providers)  concerning  the  political  advertising  services  contracted  and 
political advertisements circulated on their behalf52. 

Inconsistent rules not only drive fragmentation in the internal market directly, they also have 
an  indirect  effect  through  private  sector  policies  and  service  availability.  Economic  actors, 
including Code of Practice on disinformation signatories, therefore respond to the increased 
compliance risk and the uncertainty by applying different commercial strategies in their terms 
of service regarding political ads, to adapt to the fragmented regulatory context and to limit 
their liability in terms of compliance with different requirements53. Such existing policies can 
include opting not to provide services to actors established in other Member States (including 
in the context of EU elections), or not providing services in more than one Member State, for 
commercial reasons.   
It was in this context that Facebook54, as of the 2019 European parliamentary elections, took 
the decision to require that political ads may only be disseminated in a Member State  if the 
can  advertiser  provides  identification  documentation  or  a  proof  of  residence  issued  by  the 
state in question. This rule meant that for EUPPs to campaign online across the EU through 
one of the main social media platforms, they would have had, on the basis of the contractual 

49 For instance, an online platform in FR only has to disclose the amount paid for the promotion of an online advertisement if 
it  is  superior  to  a  specific  threshold  (€100),  whereas  a  similar  obligation  of  the  forthcoming  IE  law  foresees  no  such 
threshold for online publishers. 
50  A  political  advertisement  (including  online)  run  in  in  CZ,  LT,  FR  or  FI  must  bear  the  name  of  the  sponsor  and  of  the 
publisher, but in SK their address is also to be disclosed, and the forthcoming IE rules also foresee the disclosure of their 
email address and, where applicable, the website address of the buyer. 
51  Whereas  FI  requires  information  as  to  why  an  advertisement  is  targeted  at  the  person,  and  the  identity  of  the  person 
responsible  for  advertising,  FR  requires  information  about  the  methods  of  distribution,  the  existence  of  financial 
compensation,  the  extent  of  the  distribution  (number  of  views,  type  of  target  population,  etc.),  and  whether  they  were 
generated automatically or not. The forthcoming IE rules require the disclosure of information about targeting, including a 
description of the criteria used and of the characteristics of the target audience. 
52 HR requires political actors to report on donations they received (not only financial, but also in terms of services provided 
free of charge) and on election campaign costs, requiring them to retain very specific information for each expenditure on 
the purpose of the cost, the number of media services contracted and performed, the name of supplier, the name of the social 
network, the OIB of the supplier, the address of the supplier, the date or period of advertising services, the invoice payment 
date, the amount paid and the market value of the product or service used. In contrast, in RO the electoral competitors more 
simply  report  on  the  description  of  the  online  electoral  propaganda  materials,  their  production,  period  and  broadcasting 
space.  Moreover,  in  HR  the  reporting  requirements  also  apply  to  providers  of  media  advertising  services,  which  have  to 
retain information on the contracts they have concluded with electoral participants in relation to their election campaigns. 
53 Including Facebook/Instagram, Google/Youtube, Snap, Twitter, and TikTok – see Annex 7. 
54 Snapchat and Microsoft imposed the same requirement as Facebook. Google permitted political ads in Europe for entities 
established in one Member State. Twitter banned all political advertising. Each large platform applied its own definition of 
political ads and its interpretation of the obligations applicable to advertisers seeking to use their services. 

11 

 
 
 
                                                           
terms  of  a  company,  to  be  established  in  each  Member  State55  and  administrate  their 
campaigns locally. This increased the cost of campaigning and limited the options available 
to EUPPs56 and any other actor wishing to campaign on European issues or in more than one 
EU Member State.  

By taking such actions, private actors – in particular if they are gateway intermediaries – act 
as  de  facto  enablers  and/or  quasi-regulators  of  political  ads57. Their  decisions  can  have  the 
effect of further partitioning the internal market or otherwise affecting its functioning58. This 
limits the choice of service providers available to actors wishing to sponsor political ads such 
as political parties and candidates59, including EUPPs.  

Consequences: service providers can decide to limit the services they offer in some Member 
States,  or  across  borders  altogether,  because  the  costs  of  adapting  their  services  to  the 
different regulatory requirements makes service provision unattractive.60  

Stakeholders’  views:  Feedback  from  stakeholders  suggests  that  fragmentation  of  conditions  for 
providing services related to political ads disproportionally affect SMEs61. SMEs are viewed as being 
least  able  to  both  resource  the  legal  due  diligence  necessary  to  provide  services  in  more  than  one 
Member State62 and comply with  the requirement to be established in every  Member State where a 
political ad campaign is to run (as required by some Member States and certain large platforms). 

2.2.1.2  Regulatory  arbitrage  and  circumvention  of  relevant  rules  by  providers  offering 
political ads services (regulatory failure) (Problem 1.2) 

In  the  consultation,  Member  States’  competent  authorities  indicated  that  a  concern  in  their 
oversight  of  political  ads  during  national  electoral  campaigns  was  the  circumvention  of 
national  rules.  This  happened  through  the  delivery  of  political  ads  services,  particularly 
online, across borders within the internal market63. 

This problem is driven by differences in the:  

55  Under  Regulation 1141/2014 on  the  statute  and  funding of  European  political parties  and  foundations,  EUPPs  are  only 
required to be established in one Member State, and most are established in Belgium only. 
56  Seven  EUPPs  co-signed  a  letter  (https://europeangreens.eu/news/co-signed-letter-european-political-parties-addressed-
facebook-new-advertising-rules)  asking  Facebook  to  drop  its  advertising  policy  preventing  cross-border  advertising.  The 
conference  of  presidents  of  the  European  Parliament  expressed  concerns  underlining  that  the  measures  imposed  by  the 
companies ignore the pan-European nature of the EU institutions, European political groups and parties, which all operate in 
the  whole  EU  (see  for  instance  https://www.politico.eu/article/facebook-european-elections-advertising-political-social-
media-europe/). 
57 Political advertising is moving increasingly online and handled through services operated by a few very large platforms, 
predominately Facebook and Google. This includes the ads published on their social media, video sharing and other services, 
as well as programmatic advertising and other up and downstream services that they also provide. The key figures and trends 
are presented in Annex 2 and in the underlying study. 
58 Indeed, they are implemented on the basis of different private definitions of political ads, and may reduce transparency, as 
platforms implementing such bans do not provide transparency about how they apply them, nor about the ads that they do 
publish. 
https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/3703/apart-google-facebook-and-twitter-what-are-other-
platforms-doing-about-political-ads as well as Annex 7, table 8.4. 
59 Mentioned in the consultations both by political actors wishing to address diaspora communities in national elections, and 
by political actors campaigning on the same platform in multiple states in the context of EP elections. 
60 As reported in the stakeholder consultations by economic actors and in the interviews conducted by the contractor. 
61 Underlying study. 
62 This was estimated by industry respondents in the consultation to require at least 1 FTE from an appropriately qualified 
legal advisor for each campaign. 
63 Such activity was described in the consultation. It has also been reported in connection with specific recent elections, for 
instance: 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/dark-money-investigations/did-dark-money-and-dirty-tactics-swing-scottish-
election/. 

See 

e.g. 

12 

 
 
 
                                                           
i.  cost of complying with the transparency obligations in certain Member States, for instance as 

regards specific disclosures, information retention or other steps64.  

ii.  monitoring and enforcement of relevant rules. In certain Member States, the relevant rules are 
not  applicable  or  are  not  enforced,  either  online  or  outside  of  electoral  periods.  Cooperation 
mechanisms to support enforcement are limited.  

Uncertainty about which rules apply and a lack of information about online activity can also 
drive  differences  in  regulatory  outcomes  and  hence  the  commercial  decisions  taken  by 
service  providers  (including  those  established  outside  the  internal  market)  about  their 
political ad services. 

Consequences: This tends to direct cross-border services away from more regulated Member 
States65 towards less regulated ones, or where enforcement is limited. 

The difficulty for Member State competent authorities to monitor ads in their jurisdiction and 
enforce  their  rules  for  political  ads  originating  from  abroad  is  felt  to  be  disadvantaging 
domestic service providers in some Member States. Restrictions in Member States are being 
considered to prevent the circulation of political ads from other Member States or from non-
EU countries66. 

The legal analysis confirms that such circumvention cannot be addressed by Member States 
acting individually. While the introduction of the DSA will improve the overall transparency 
of advertising and support cross-border oversight of the obligations it imposes, issues specific 
to  political  ads  will  remain  unresolved,  including  the  need  to  cover  the  transparency  of 
programmatic ads, and to provide transparency of political ad spend and financing. 

2.2.1.3 Additional regulatory burden for offline operators in political ads (Problem 1.3) 

Member  States  regulate  more  those  political  ads  which  are  disseminated  through  offline 
media (radio, TV, print etc.) than those distributed online67. 

Offline  operators  therefore  face  a  heavier  regulatory  burden  than  those  working  with 
online  political  ads68. This  burden  is  increased  if  the  services  are  delivered  across  borders 
because the relative advantage of the lighter requirements of providing ad services online is 
multiplied  by  the  fragmentation  costs.  This  also  places  EU-based  service  providers  at  a 

64 This can also concern national regulation of other aspects than transparency, but transparency (or a lack thereof) is key to 
enabling  circumvention.  E.g.  in  Spain,  data  processing  (such  as  targeting)  that  attempts  to  influence  [desviar]  the  will  of 
voters is prohibited by the DPA; see Annex 7. Political ads could therefore  de facto not be targeted online in Spain under 
certain  conditions  (for  instance  in  connection  with  an  election,  or  otherwise  where  the  aim  is  influence  voters),  and 
advertisers would have to ensure that ads do not unlawfully process personal data in Spain for this purpose. 
65 Or from Member States where obligations are based on the applicability of a national electoral period. 
66 E.g. Ireland is considering such a rule – see Annex 7.  
67 The absence or weakness of regulation for online political ads contrasts with the regulation offline, given the increasing 
shift to online campaigning. In Animal Defenders, the ECtHR reasoned that offline political ads could be subject to a stricter 
regime than online ads on account of their specific characteristics, including their strong impact. The situation has evolved 
since 2013, and online political ads are becoming more common and sophisticated. Stakeholders reported in the consultation 
process that there is no level-playing  field between offline (extensively regulated) and online (limited regulation if at all). 
See above (footnote 49 on ECHR) and Annex 2 for details. Also, some Member States ban political ads in certain conditions 
– see Annex 7. For instance, in Greece and Ireland, the ban is limited to broadcasting services, while political ads in print 
and online are allowed. 
68 E.g., some Member States regulate the labelling of political ads on broadcast media but do not have, or do not apply such 
rules  to online  ads. See  Annexes  6  and 8  for  an  analysis  of  the  applicable  framework,  and  Annex  9  for  examples  of  how 
these differences work in practice. See also points raised by interested industry associations in the consultation.  

13 

 
 
 
                                                           
disadvantage  to  online  service  providers  established  outside  the  EU,  who  can  avoid  certain 
compliance costs altogether69.  
Consequences:  While  not  the  only  factor  driving  political  ads  online70,  these  issues 
contribute to the trend for political parties, candidates and groups to use online ads rather than 
more strictly regulated offline media. This further distorts competition and favours a limited 
number of large online operators. 

2.2.2. Problems for democratic processes linked to internal market issues (Problem 2) 

There  is  a  substantial  body  of  national  regulation  applicable  to  political  ads,  including 
electoral  and  political  party  rules,  political  funding  and  transparency  rules  and  regarding 
relevant  audiovisual  media  and  other  media  services.  There  are  also  relevant  EU  rules. As 
described in  Section 2.2.1, in  the  Member States where  political  ads  are  permitted, specific 
provisions  condition  the availability  of political  ads (regarding medium,  period, actors etc.) 
and their  content (transparency  and other rules)71. These  rules  are specific  to  each Member 
State  and  reflect  their  respective  democratic  traditions72,  which  have  in  common  principles 
such as  addressed by  the  Council of Europe’s Venice Commission73. They  seek to  promote 
free and fair elections and accountability in the democratic debate, including by ensuring that: 

a plurality of political actors have access to the means to communicate their message to voters;  

 
  political actors campaign in the open and can be challenged on the claims they make; 
 
 

resources are used transparently74; 
citizens  are  provided  with  the  information  they  need  to  evaluate  the  political  messages  they 
receive and make their minds up freely; and 
foreign actors and powerful commercial interests are not able to control the political debate. 

 

Citizens,  civil  society  and  national  authorities  have  indicated  concerns  that  the  monitoring 
and enforcement of such rules in  political  ads is being eroded, especially  online and across 
borders,  threatening  the  integrity  of  democratic  processes.75  Practical  examples  of  this 
situation, such as those mentioned in the problem definition chapter, occur on an increasingly 
regular  basis.  Beyond  the  EU  instruments  relevant  to  the  regulation  of  political  ads76,  the 
European Commission has issued soft-law measures to help respond77, but concerns remain. 
These  concerns  are  closely  linked  to  the  internal  market  issues  related  to  the  regulation  of 
transparency  of  political  ads.  Addressing  them  in  this  initiative  will  improve  fundamental 

the  same 

traditional  media 

69 Eurobarometer 25/03/2021 showed that eight in ten Europeans consider that online social networks and Internet platforms 
should  observe 
in  a  pre-election  period.  https://fronteirasxxi.pt/wp-
rules  as 
content/uploads/2021/06/ebs_507_en.pdf  
70  The  relatively  low  price  and  high  impact  of  online  political  ads,  in  particular  when  combined  with  targeting  and  other 
amplification techniques available in the online context, are the main reason. See for instance EPD: A comprehensive plan to 
innovate 
https://epd.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/a-civil-society-vision-for-the-european-
in  Europe. 
democracy-action-plan-input-paper.pdf  
71 See Annex 7 for a presentation of the availability and content of relevant national legislation in this area. 
72  In  particular,  the  balance  between  national  institutions,  political  actors,  citizens  as  voters,  and  other  actors  such  as 
journalists and civil society more broadly, that contributes to the democratic debate and oversight. 
73Cf. 

Commission 

democracy 

electoral 

matters, 

referred 

practice 

Venice 

above. 

code 

of 

in 

https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2002)023rev2-cor-e 

74 This is linked to the fact that access to resources is often regulated. 
75  See  also  Council  of  Europe  ‘Internet  And  Electoral  Campaigns:  Study  on  the  use  of  internet  in  electoral  campaigns’ 
https://rm.coe.int/use-of-internet-in-electoral-campaigns-/16807c0e24  
76 See 2.1 above and Annex 8. 
77 Commission 2018 electoral package; Code of Practice on Disinformation. 

14 

 
 
 
                                                           
rights  (see  section  6).  They  are  also  relevant  for  problem  2.3.  They  are  summarised  below 
and presented in more detail in Annex 5, section 2. 

2.2.2.1.  Negative  impacts  of  current  framework  on  regulatory  outcomes  across  borders 
(Problem 2.1) 

The  differences  and  gaps  in  national  regulation  and  self-regulation  (detailed  in  Annex  7) 
result in poor regulatory outcomes for cross-border campaigns, in particular regarding non-
recognisability of political ads by individuals, lack of accountability in the debate and risk 
of electorate illicit manipulation. 

This problem has the following drivers: 

  Societal  and  political  actors  lack  information  to  hold  political  actors  and  parties 
accountable  on  their  online  political  ads  activities  and  thereby  play  their  role  in  the 
democratic process. 

  Political actors are unable to exercise mutual scrutiny and Member States have difficulties 
to  monitor  and  enforce  relevant  rules  which  they  have  adopted  to  protect  the  public 
interest. 

  Limited legislation providing insufficient information, especially online. 
 

Insufficient  information  provided  by  the  various  actors,  and  ineffective  collaboration 
between national authorities and economic actors78.  

Consequences: All stakeholder groups underlined the negative impact of the poor regulatory 
outcomes on democratic processes and on public trust in political ads. It has prompted some 
Member States  to  unilaterally  prepare  relevant  legislation. These Member States and others 
have  also  indicated  that  neither  national  regulation  nor  self-regulation  are  likely  to  be 
effective  in  addressing  the  cross-border  aspect  of  this  problem  without  a  sufficient  EU 
framework to support them. 

2.2.2.2 Targeting  techniques  in  online  political  ads  create  problems  for  citizens  and  for  the 
democratic process (Problem 2.2) 

Online  political  advertising  are  different  from  traditional  political  campaigning  due  to  the 
actors  involved  (including  foreign-based  actors  from  inside  or  outside  the  EU),  the  type  of 
media  being  used  (by  nature  not  confined  to  national  border)  and  the  possibility  to  use 
techniques tailoring the information provided to different audiences without the possibility to 
consult what other audiences have been exposed to. This allows a political actor to highlight a 
different  issue  for  each  voter,  leading  to  a  different  perception  of  the  actor’s  priorities79. 
These techniques altering or tailoring the visibility of ads can be very elaborated, and can be 
based on extensive knowledge about individuals, including their vulnerabilities, with the aim 
to impact voters’ behaviour. Further, the same tools that allow people to be targeted can also 
be used to exclude people from messages that, in a democracy, they have a right to hear. 

Targeting online greatly differs from targeting offline. While advertisers will aim to promote 
their information in specific journals, TV channels, locations etc. based on the categories of 
the groups that gather there (which amounts to a certain form of targeting), online advertising 
allows for a selection of audience that is both much narrower (to the level of micro-groups, or 

78 See Annex 5. 
79  The  future  of  online  advertising,  a  study  by  Duncan  Mccann,  Will  Stronge,  Phil  Jones.  https://www.greens-
efa.eu/en/article/document/the-future-of-online-advertising  

15 

 
 
 
                                                           
even individuals) and less evident to those exposed to it – also because  the targeted groups 
will  be  ad  hoc80.  Beside  the  level  of  granularity  that  can  be  achieved  and  the  level  of 
knowledge  about  each  individual  targeted,  online  ads  can  also  be  targeted  to  appear  at 
specific moments in specific places designed to exploit the moments where they will be most 
sensitive to certain kind of information, hence manipulation. 

Online  advertising  and  advanced  data  processing  and  analysis  thus  enable  a  number  of 
techniques  to  target  and  amplify  the  impact  of  political  ads81.  The  personal  data  can  come 
from a number of sources, such as online activity, surveys, the electoral roll etc., and is used 
for  a  number  of  purposes,  including  to  plan  campaigns  and  shape  messages,  as  well  as  to 
establish the criteria for the targeting of programmatic ads, etc. 

Recent  elections  in  the  EU  have  shown  that  the  impact  and  the  use  of  targeting  is 
increasing82,  and  targeted  ads  account  for  an  increasing  proportion  of  overall  political 
campaign  spending83.  Despite  the  existence  of  comprehensive  common  EU  data  protection 
rules and guidance, transparency on the use of such targeting techniques remains insufficient. 
This  includes  for  instance  the  amounts  being  spent  in  such  techniques  and  publically 
available  information  on  the  techniques  used84.  Political  ads  can  avoid  scrutiny  by  being 
narrowly  targeted  to  (and  hence  only  visible  by)  certain  audiences  or  profiles,  allowing 
political  actors  to  make  irreconcilable  promises  to  different  segments  of  the  electorate  and 
manipulate  the  public85.  The  absence  of  due  transparency  about  the  targeting  behind  a 
political ad exposes individuals to a greater risk of being manipulated.  More details of such 
abusive and sometimes unlawful practices related to these techniques are documented in the 
literature86 and public concerns have been expressed87 – with targeting of political ads being 
argued to be problematic per se88, even in the absence of psychographic profiling techniques 
such as used by Cambridge Analytica. The use of sensitive categories of personal data is also 
considered  problematic  and  liable  to  misuse;  the  public  in  particular  is  opposed  to 
microtargeting  that  is  about  certain  content,  including  political  advertising,  or  based  on 

Report 
and  UNESCO 

80  While  a  reader  of  a  left-wing  magazine  will  understand  that  all  readers  of  this  magazine  are  deemed  of  interest,  and 
therefore exposed to the promotional information of specific advertisers because the reader base of this medium, targeting 
online focuses on ad-hoc groups which share specific, often apparently unrelated characteristics, and based on (sometimes 
extensive amounts of) information about the individual – with ads which may reach (or follow) the individual throughout the 
web regardless of the website visited.  
81 For a summary, see  for instance Council of Europe ‘Internet And Electoral Campaigns: Study on the use of internet in 
electoral campaigns’ https://rm.coe.int/use-of-internet-in-electoral-campaigns-/16807c0e24, section 4. 
82  IDEA  (2020),  Online  Political  Advertising  and  Microtargeting:  the  latest  legal,  ethical,  political  and  technological 
https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/online-political-advertising-and-
evolutions.  Webinar 
Series 
microtargeting-latest-legal-ethical; 
Times. 
https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000371486/PDF/371486eng.pdf.multi  
83 See underlying Study. 
84 This is increasingly a focus for standards-setting bodies and civil society. See for instance Council of Europe Toolkit for 
Civil Society organisations: Monitoring Of Media Coverage Of Elections’ https://rm.coe.int/monitoring-of-media-coverage-
of-elections-toolkit-for-civil-society-or/1680a06bc6  
85  IDEA  (2020).  Online  Political  Advertising  and  Microtargeting:  the  latest  legal,  ethical,  political  and  technological 
evolutions (referred to above). 
86 (Micro)Targeting can easily conceal its intent and nature, making difficult to estimate the size and scale of the problem. 
See underlying study. 
87  Kozyreva,  A.,  Lorenz-Spreen,  P.,  Hertwig,  R.  et  al.,  Public  attitudes  towards  algorithmic  personalization  and  use  of 
personal  data  online:  evidence  from  Germany,  Great  Britain,  and  the  United  States.  Humanit  Soc  Sci  Commun  8,  117 
(2021). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-00787-w  
88 Dobber, T. & Ó Fathaigh, R. & Zuiderveen Borgesius, F. J. (2019). The regulation of online political micro-targeting in 
Europe.  Internet  Policy  Review,  8(4).  https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/regulation-online-political-micro-targeting-
europe  

and  Media 

in  Digital 

Elections 

report 

16 

 
 
 
                                                           
certain  sensitive  attributes  including  political  affiliation89.  Watchdog  organisations  and 
national  authorities  appear  unable  to  oversee  this  activity  effectively,  and  are  calling  for 
action  to  revise  rules  on  political  ads  to  address  the  implications  of  targeting90.  These 
practices create particular horizontal problems for citizens and the democratic process. 

National  rules  on  political  ads  can  also  be  engaged  by  targeting  activity,  and  new  national 
measures are being considered, but they will not address the cross-border nature of this issue 
and  are  unlikely  to  be  effective.  Annexes  7  and  8  present  the  relevant  national  and  EU 
provisions, and point to the gaps and challenges.  

Consequences:  The  way  targeting  (and  amplification)  techniques  are  used  with  political 
advertising, and the limited transparency and control applied to them undermines trust in the 
use of such services among citizens and government authorities, and has a knock-on effect on 
perceptions  of  the  integrity  of  elections  and  the  democratic  process.  Member  State  and 
private sector actions in response have been driven by the association of targeting of political 
ads  with  foreign  interference  and  disinformation.  While  these  actions  have  limited  the 
availability of services, they have not provided effective solutions to the problems associated 
with using targeted political ads. Proposals in the European Parliament91, the EDPS92 and at 
national level have included banning targeting. 

2.2.2.3. Member States are unable to monitor and enforce transparency of political ads, and 
other relevant rules (Problem 2.3) 

National competent authorities encounter challenges with monitoring and enforcing relevant 
rules connected to political ads, particularly online and across borders driven by: 

Lack  of  resources,  capacity,  competence  regarding  political  ads:  The  lack  of  appropriate 
powers  and  resources  is  raised  by  both  civil  society  and  international  organisations93.  The 

law 

and 

civil 

commercial 

89  Kozyreva,  A.,  Lorenz-Spreen, P.,  Hertwig,  R.,  Lewandowsky,  S.  &  Herzog,  S.  M. Public  attitudes  towards  algorithmic 
personalization  and  use  of  personal  data  online:  Evidence  from  Germany,  Great  Britain,  and  the  United  States.  Humanit. 
Soc. Sci. Commun. 8, 1–11 (2021). 
90 See Joint Report of the Venice Commission and of the Directorate of Information Society and Action against Crime of the 
Directorate  General  of  Human  Rights  and  Rule  of  Law  (DGI),  on  Digital  Technologies  and  Elections,  adopted  by  the 
Council  of  Democratic  Elections  at  its  65th  meeting  (Venice,  20  June  2019)  and  by  the  Venice  Commission  at  its  119th 
Plenary  Session  (Venice,  21-22  June  2019)  CDL-AD(2019)016-e;  and  Declaration  of  the  Committee  of  Ministers  of  the 
Council 
https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/09/CoE-190213-Declaration-on-manipulative-capabilities-of-
Europe. 
of 
algorithmic-processes.pdf  
91 European Parliament resolution of 20 October 2020 with recommendations to the Commission on a Digital Services Act: 
adapting 
17 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2020-0273_EN.html  
 European Parliament resolution of 20 October 2020 with recommendations to the Commission on the Digital Services Act: 
Improving 
33 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2020-0272_EN.pdf  
92 https://edps.europa.eu/system/files/2021-02/21-02-10-opinion_on_digital_services_act_en.pdf  
93  This  confirmed  by  a  review  of  OSCE  reports  on  elections  in  Member  States  in  the  past  years.  For  example,  in  Italy, 
Regional  Electoral  Guarantee  Boards  reported  a  lack  of  capacity  to  verify  candidate’s  campaign  finance  reports. 
Furthermore,  it  was  mentioned  that  competent  bodies  lack  the  power  and  resources  to  conduct  an  efficient  supervision, 
investigation  and  enforcement  of  political  finance  regulation:  OSCE/ODIHR  (2018),  Italian  Republic  Parliamentary 
elections 
Report. 
https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/9/5/383589_1.pdf. Similar issues were mentioned for Portugal, Bulgaria, Latvia and 
Slovenia:  OSCE/ODIHR  (2020),  Portugal  Presidential  Election  24  January  2021,  ODIHR  Needs  Assessment  Mission 
(2021),  Republic  of  Bulgaria 
Report.  https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/c/a/473994_1.pdf;  OSCE/ODIHR 
Parliamentary 
Report. 
Mission 
April 
https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/0/476866_0.pdf;  OSCE/ODIHR  (2019),  Republic  of  Latvia  Parliamentary 

(2020/2018(INL)), 

commercial 

Assessment 

Assessment 

functioning 

paragraph 

paragraph 

operating 

Elections 

Election 

Mission 

ODIHR 

ODIHR 

entities 

Market 

online, 

March 

Single 

Needs 

Final 

2018 

2021 

rules 

the 

the 

for 

of 

4 

4 

17 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
 
legal  mapping  in  Annexes  8  and  in  the  underlying  study  shows  that  only  few  national 
authorities and bodies are empowered to supervise online political ads.  

Extraterritorial nature of the enforcement of online political  ads: National authorities and 
bodies reported insufficient capabilities for oversight of political advertising across borders, 
while  the  market  for  political  ads  is  becoming  increasingly  cross-border.  National  rules 
cannot  easily  be enforced across borders. With  the exception of the  voluntary  exchanges of 
information  and  practices  in  the  European  cooperation  network  on  elections  (ECNE), 
Member States reported little cooperation among authorities on these specific topic. EU law 
provides for oversight mechanisms related to specific aspects of activity relevant to political 
ads (see Annex 8). 

Insufficient  coordination  on  political  ads  among  national  authorities:  Outside  of  EU-
coordinated  governance,  including  under  the  GDPR  or  as  envisaged  for  the  DSA,  the  legal 
mapping  describes  the  diversity  of  existing  authorities  and  bodies  in  the  different  Member 
States,  all  playing  a  role  based  on  different  legal  acts.  The  OSCE  reports  on  EU  Member 
States’ elections provide various examples of insufficient coordination in this area.  

First impact: Fragmented enforcement of rules and fragmentation of sanctions applicable 
at  national  level:  The  lack  of  capacity  and  knowhow  by  national  competent  authorities  to 
properly  enforce  legislation,  as  well  as  the  insufficient  coordination  between  these  bodies, 
affect enforcement at national level.  

Second impact: Use of undeclared sources and interference by foreign actors: Difficulties 
exist  with  the  lack  of  transparency  including  the  financing  used  to  conduct  political 
advertising across borders. This enables foreign state and non-state actors to manipulate and 
interfere in the democratic debate and elections in the European Union. 

2.2.3. Political parties in the EU: insufficient and inconsistent transparency (Problem 3) 

Political  parties  in  the  EU  do  not  provide  enough  information  about  their  advertising  for 
citizens to recognise them as political  advertising, to know how much money was spent on 
them, what techniques were used to target and amplify them, or to identify which parties and 
campaigns they are affiliated with. Insofar as this problem relates to the activities of national 
political  parties,  it  is  already  discussed  in  problem  2  (especially  on  targeting  and  on  the 
enforcement of national rules), and the rest of problem 3 will therefore focus on EUPPs. 
This issue is relevant for EUPPs as their campaigning activity grows94 and they increasingly 
campaign cross borders on ‘European political issues’95. The main driver for this is that EU 

6 

2018 

ODIHR 

October 

Mission 

Election 

Assessment 

Report. 
Elections 
https://www.osce.org/files/Latvia%202018%20parliamentary_final%20report_17.01.2019.pdf;  OSCE/ODIHR 
(2018), 
Republic  of  Slovenia  Early  parliamentary  elections  3  June  2018  ODIHR  Election  Assessment  Mission  Final  Report. 
https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/0/d/394106.pdf. 
94 Annual funding for EUPPs has increased from under EUR 10 million in 2004 to around EUR 50 million in 2021. Both the 
individual  party  audit  reports  on  the  EP’s  DG  Finance  website  and  the  EUPPs’  annual  financial  statements  indicate  that 
advertising activities of various kinds (on print, audiovisual, telecommunications and online media) account for a significant 
part of expenditure. This point was also reflected in the consultation. EUPPs’ expenditure on these various kinds of ads is 
in  Annex  5,  section  2.6.  (referred  websites:  https://www.europarl.europa.eu/contracts-and-
compared  over 
grants/en/political-parties-and-foundations/audit-reports-and-donations 
and 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/groups/accounts_en.htm).  
95 As reported in the Commission’s 2019 European Parliamentary elections report, p 13. 

Final 

time 

18 

 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
rules  applicable  to  EUPPs  do  not  provide  for  specific  transparency  for  political  ads,  when 
disclosed to citizens. Further national rules are heterogeneous and generally not enforced for 
political advertising sponsored by EUPPs. This may be related to a focus placed by national 
oversight  bodies  on  national  campaigns.  EUPPs  and  European  political  foundations  are 
regulated  by  Regulation  1141/2014,  with  national  law  otherwise  being  applicable96.  The 
Regulation  regulates  the  statutes  and  funding  of  EUPPs97  and  does  not  directly  address  the 
transparency  of  political  ads.  It  obliges  European  political  foundations  to  use  their  funding 
activities only for a closed list of tasks, which does not include political advertising as such98. 
The  Regulation  also  prohibits  EUPPs  from  (i)  directly  or  indirectly  funding  other  political 
parties,  and  in  particular  national  parties  or  candidates,  and  (ii)  financing  referendum 
campaigns99. The Regulation provides for verification of compliance with certain registration 
conditions  and requirements100, and on infringements  of rules on the protection of personal 
data101. 

Regulation  1141/2014  includes  transparency  obligations  in  relation  to  financing  and 
expenditure  for  electoral  campaigns,  published  in  annual  financial  statements102.  It  also 
requires  the  Authority  competent  for  EUPPs  to  provide  on  its  website  information  about 
contributions and donations collected from EUPPs103. The Authority does provide some non-
binding recommendations104, however without follow-up monitoring of compliance. Further, 
the  Recommendation  accompanying 
the  Commission’s  2018  Electoral  package 
recommended  that  EUPPs  take  steps  to  provide  a  range  of  information  about  their 
advertising, including about targeting105.  

Consequences: In the 2019 European Parliamentary elections, the EUPPs did not effectively 
deliver the level of transparency recommended in the 2018 elections package106. While most 

takes 

into  account 

the  European  Parliament’s  ex-post  evaluation  of 

96  This  Regulation  is  evaluated  within  the  scope  of  another  Commission  initiative  (https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-
regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12811-European-political-parties-and-foundations-review-of-rules-on-legal-status-and-
funding_en),  which  also 
the  regulation 
(https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/662646/EPRS_STU(2021)662646_EN.pdf).  Neither  consider 
the operation of the Regulation from the perspective of political ads, and this aspect is detailed here. 
97 This concerns in particular their registration and financing, which are overseen by a specially established Authority and 
DG Finance of the European Parliament. 
98  In  other  words,  European  political  foundations  are  prohibited  from  running  political  ads.  European  political  parties, 
however, are not. 
99  Entities  bound  by  Regulation  must  observe  in  their  programme  the  values  for  which  the  Union  is  founded  including 
democracy and respect for fundamental rights.  
100 Article 10 of the Regulation. This includes to observe the values on which the Union is founded. 
101 In 2018 the Regulation was amended to include a procedure under Article 10a to enable the Authority to take note of such 
violations  notified  by  a  national  competent  authority  and  refer  such  case  to  a  committee  of  independent  eminent  persons 
established by Article 11, for a potential recommendation for the application of sanctions.  
102  In  which  EUPPs  usually  distinguish  between  expenditure  on  print,  audiovisual  and  online  ads.  They  have  to  be  made 
available to the public by the European Parliament https://www.europarl.europa.eu/groups/accounts_en.htm. 
103  This  obligation  is  provided  in  Article  32(1)(e)  and  (f)  of  the  Regulation,  and  such  information  is  accessible  via  this 
dedicated website: Donations and contributions / Authority for European political parties and European political foundations 
– European Parliament http://www.appf.europa.eu/appf/en/donations-and-contributions.  
104 The Authority for EUPPs prepared a number of principles for the scope, content and transparency of political campaigns 
organised  by  EUPPs.  See  for  instance  the  Authority’s  2020  activity  report,  which  sets  out  these  principles,  and  indicates 
them 
framework. 
http://www.appf.europa.eu/cmsdata/238104/2020_AnnualActivityReport_AuthorityEUPPsEUPFs.pdf 
105 Which included the labelling of political ads to enable a person to recognise them as such, the publication of their logo or 
name  in  an  ad,  and  information  about  the  amounts  spent,  the  circulation  of  the  ads  (impressions,  distribution),  and 
information  on  the  use  of  targeting  or  other  methods:  https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/soteu2018-cybersecurity-
elections-recommendation-5949_en.pdf  
106 Commission’s 2019 European Parliamentary elections report. Only the logos on online and offline political ads by some 
of the larger parties were made accessible to citizens. The Logos project further reports that national member parties largely 

inspiration 

legislative 

reforms 

current 

the 

for 

as 

to 

19 

 
 
 
                                                           
 
political  advertisements  sponsored  by  the  EUPPs  merely  aimed  to  raise  awareness  of  the 
European elections and promoted electoral participation, the EUPPs did make increased use 
of targeted political advertising to cover substance issues like climate change107.  

For the future, the  European  Parliament  has  indicated  its  intention to  further strengthen the 
European  dimension  of  the  European  elections.  On  this  basis,  it  is  to  be  expected  that  the 
proportion of political ads sponsored by EUPPs  that address European political themes will 
increase. In this context, the need for transparency of political ads to ensure accountability in 
the democratic process would increase, which may prompt Member States to seek to enforce 
national rules in connection with political ads at European level. 

A  parallel  revision  of  Regulation  1141/2014  proposes  substantive  rules  to  strengthen  the 
European  dimension  and  protection  of  rights  and  values  in  the  European  political  process, 
including issues  identified in  the overall governance. That  initiative and the  one considered 
for EUPPs in the present impact assessment reinforce each other, with the former clarifying 
among other rules on how EUPPS can receive funding, and the latter increasing transparency 
and  accountability  on  the  origin  of  the  funds  and  spending  in  the  context  of  political 
advertising. 

2.3. How will the problems evolve? 

An increasing number of internal market issues are expected to be identified in the provision 
of cross-border political ads services.  Offline political  ads will continue  to be  seen as  more 
burdensome and less attractive. The proportion of political ads which will be published online 
and which could a priori be provided by cross-border operators is likely to increase. Cross-
border  services  will  continue  to  be  affected  by  the  costs  of  fragmentation,  and  this  will 
continue  to  further  concentrating  advertising  business  towards  the  limited  number  of  very 
large  providers  able  to  absorb  the  compliance  costs  and/or  position  themselves  to  benefit 
from  the  lighter  regulation  in  certain  Member  States.  This,  together  with  the  fact  that 
increased  fragmentation  and  costs  will  affect  the  possibilities  for  SMEs  to  enter  in  this 
market, was reported by stakeholders as problematic.  

The cross-border dimension of political ads should further increase, as the number of mobile 
EU citizens exercising their electoral rights across borders is on the rise. Political parties will 
increasingly  conduct  cross-border campaigns, for instance  on European  themes like climate 
change.  These  trends  will  make  more  acute  the  problematic  regulation  of  political  ads 
services  as  well  as  inconsistencies  and  gaps  in  the  regulation  of  ads,  especially  political 
parties.  Additional  enforcement  of  national  political  campaigning  rules  on  political  ads 
sponsored  by  political  parties,  would  further  increase  fragmentation  and  deter  European 
political  campaigns.  In  light  of  the  Parliament’s  explicit  request  to  strengthen  respect  for 
democratic  principles  including  transparency108,  political  parties  may  act  voluntarily  to 

See 

2019 

Commission’s 

fail to implement the Regulation’s display requirement and ensuring the necessary visibility of their link to their European 
party of affiliation. https://eudemocracy.eu/logos-project  
107 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/com_2020_252_en_0.pdf  
108 See draft report of the AFCO Committee on the reform of the Electoral Law of the European Union (2020/2220(INL)) at: 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/AFCO-PR-693622_EN.pdf The draft includes a draft recital that ‘the goal 
of more transparency in political advertising and communication should also be reflected in the provisions of the Electoral 
Law’;  see  also  the  European  Parliament  resolution  of  7  October  2020  on  the  establishment  of  an  EU  Mechanism  on 
Democracy,  the  Rule  of  Law  and  Fundamental  Rights  https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2020-
0251_EN.html  

Parliamentary 

European 

elections 

report, 

13. 

p. 

20 

 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
implement  the  2018  transparency  recommendations  for  their  political  ads.  Efforts  could  be 
made to apply national (in most cases Belgian law109) provisions to European parties in this 
respect, though national provisions would only apply within their national scope.  

As political ads move increasingly online, regulatory outcomes from national legislation will 
continue to be poor. The disparity of the national requirements in the internal market is likely 
to  increase110  together  with  inconsistent  across  national  jurisdictions  or  ineffective 
enforcement. This will add legal uncertainty and costs for service providers.  

As  indicated  in  Section  2.1  above,  while  its  scope  is  different,  the  DSA  will  already 
significantly  enhance  the  transparency  of  ads  on  online  platforms111.  The  DSA  will  not, 
however, regulate political ads displayed on other services or provided and produced by other 
services, nor on offline political ads. The information that it requires to be published with all 
ads  will  not  include  spending  information  and  other  elements  identified  as  relevant  to 
political ads. 

Signatories  of  the  existing  Code  of  Practice  on  Disinformation  provide  information  on  ad 
spend in their political ad repositories112. While it will continue to evolve under the Guidance 
of  the  Commission,  the  Code  needs  to  be  complemented  with  relevant  binding  obligations 
related  to  the  specific  area  of  political  ads  to  ensure  a  level  playing  field  in  the  internal 
market, consistent regulation and the protection of rights113.  

While  the  DSA  represents  a  significant  step  forward  in  the  governance  of  many  relevant 
online activities114, including the collection of information from online intermediaries115, the 
oversight  it  establishes  is  linked  to  the  substantive  obligations  in  the  DSA  itself  and  its 
addressees,  and  will  thus  not  cover  all  the  service  providers  and  activities  involved  in 
political ads116.  

Unauthorised actors will continue to interfere in the EU’s democratic debate and manipulate 
the information environment, threatening its democratic processes. This is especially harmful 
during  electoral  periods.  With  rapidly  evolving  technologies  and  tools  that  facilitate  the 

as 

such 

States, 

Sweden, 

109  For  instance,  in  this  context  Belgian  law  includes  a  definition of  political  ads  during  a  pre-election  period  and  certain 
limits  to  its  use,  supervised  by  a  national  authority.  This  authority  does  not  currently  oversee  the  campaigning  activities 
conducted by EUPPs. 
110 The rapid spread of targeting and its potential to affect democratic discourse have also triggered Member State actions to 
complement  the  existing  legal  frameworks.  Ireland  in  particular  is  preparing  a  law  which  could  impact  the  cross-border 
provision of  services,  i.e.  the  placement  of  ads  by  non-Irish  EU  citizens  and  companies.  General Scheme  of  the  Electoral 
Reform Bill 2020, pp233-261. The Netherlands is also preparing specific rules focused on transparency in advertising, and 
instance 
other  Member 
https://www.academia.edu/37352763/CYBER_SECURITY__How_can_the_Swedish_Government_prevent_Political_Micr
oTargeting_from_threatening_the_Electoral_Process_A_Policy_Memo_Security_Policy_and_Strategy_in_Cyber_Space 
Member States are likely to reserve certain activities for national providers or to impose specific national requirements. 
111 See section 5.1 on the baseline scenario, and Annex 8 for more details on the DSA, where the overlap and differences 
with this initiative are laid out. 
112 With the proposed DSA, the Code of Practice will be complemented with regulatory oversight. 
113 Assessment of the Code of Practice on Disinformation. 
114 The Member State where a service provider is mainly established would be in charge of monitoring and enforcement of 
the DSA. Each Member State would designate one or more competent authorities to do this. Designated national authorities 
for monitoring and enforcement would be coordinated by an EU level Board. The DSA also provides for joint investigations 
and  inter-Member  State  cooperation,  as  well  as  corresponding  obligations  on  service  providers  to  provide  duly  ordered 
information to competent authorities. 
115 Where they already enjoy a power to order that such information be provided. 
116 Notably ad intermediaries involved in programmatic advertising. 

considering 

options: 

see 

are 

for 

21 

 
 
 
                                                           
manipulation  of  the  debate  online,  in  particular  artificial  amplification  and  engagement, 
increased transparency of political ads is crucial to safeguard the integrity of EU elections.  

Finally,  competent  authorities  will  have  increasing  difficulty  in  exercising  oversight  due  to 
the  lack  of  accessible  data  from  service  providers,  to  support  their  interventions  in  case  of 
unlawful behaviours affecting electoral campaigns in their country. Problematic activities will 
continue  in  areas  where  gaps  exist,  and  the  risk  of  interference  in  elections  through  the 
misuse  of  political  ads  will  persist.  The  existing  cooperation  structures  among  competent 
authorities at European level on their side will be unable to sufficiently address the problems 
identified117. 

What  are  the  consequences  of  the  problem?  The  above-described  issues  are  crosscutting 
and  would  continue  to  affect  negatively  the  Internal  Market  for  political  ads  and  fair 
democratic processes in Europe.  

3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? 

3.1. 

Legal basis 

Any  legislative  intervention  at  the  EU  level  must  relate  the  competences  of  the  Union 
legislator.  

Article  114  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  (TFEU)  enables 
measures  for  the  approximation  of  the  provisions  laid  down  by  law,  regulation  or 
administrative action in the Member States which have as their object the establishment and 
functioning  of  the  internal  market.  It  is  the  appropriate  legal  basis  for  an  intervention 
covering  service  providers  in  the  internal  market  and  address  differences  between  Member 
States’ provisions which obstruct  the fundamental  freedoms  and have a direct  effect  on the 
functioning of the internal market118. Differences in national laws exist and the national laws 
develop, given that some Member States have legislated or intend to legislate on political ads. 
By harmonising requirements applicable to transparency and the targeting of political ads on 
the  basis  of  Article  114  TFEU  (approximation  of  laws  for  the  improvement  of  the  internal 
market),  the  initiative  will  remove  certain  existing  obstacles  and  genuinely  enhance  the 
functioning of the internal market. 

Article  114  TFEU  does  not  presuppose  the  existence  of  a  link  with  the  free  movement  of 
services  in  every  situation  covered  by  the  measures  founded  on  that  basis119.  It  permits 
additional objectives to be pursued120.  It  is  logic that measures based on Article 114 TFEU 

117 The main available structures are ECNE and ERGA, which provides coordination for the implementation of the AVMSD 
–  but  the  authorities  composing  ERGA  may  not  have  been  tasked  nationally  with  the  oversight  of  electoral  rules,  which 
means  ERGA  could  be  partly  useful,  but  will  not  assuredly  be  able  to  always  provide  the  necessary  information.  The 
coordination  mechanism  under  the  GDPR,  in  turn,  includes  the  One-Stop-Shop  and  lead  authorities,  cooperation  among 
DPAs and under the EDPB, as well as a dispute-resolution mechanism; it is more effective, though it, too, faces structural 
issues. Its center of gravity however covers the processing of personal data. 
118  See,  e.g.,  Case  C-547/14,  the  Queen,  on  the  application  of:Philip  Morris  Brands  SARL,Philip  Morris  Ltd  British 
American Tobacco UK Ltd v. The Secretary of State for Health,, EU:C:2016:325, paragraph 58 
119 See Joined Cases C-465/00 and C-138/01 Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others, EU:C:2003:294, paragraphs 41 and 42. 
In this case, the Court of Justice ruled that the Data Protection Directive  95/46/EC (at that time based on Article 100A of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community) could be applied even though it applied to a wholly internal situation. See also 
Case C-101/01 Lindqvist EU:C:2003:596 , paragraphs 40 and 41. 
120 Case C-158/96 Kohll v. Union des caisses de maladie, EU:C:1998:171; Case C=120/95 Decker v. Caisse de maladie des 
employés privés, EU:C:1998:167, Case C-377/98 Netherlands v Parliament, ECLI:EU:C:2001:523, paragraph 27 and Case 
C-300/89, Commission v Council, ECLI:EU:C:1991:244, paragraph 13. 

22 

 
 
 
                                                           
touch  upon  many  different  areas,  because  the  economic  and  the  non-economic  aspects  are 
many  times  closely  intertwined.  As  confirmed  by  the  Court,  the  EU  legislature  cannot  be 
prevented from relying  on that legal  basis on the ground that the protection  of other policy 
objectives  is  a  decisive  factor  in  the  choices  to  be  made121.  What  is  relevant  is  that  the 
measures  adopted  on  that  basis  be  actually  intended  to  improve  the  conditions  for 
establishment and functioning of the internal market122. In its settled case law on the use of 
Article 114 TFEU123, the Court does not engage in weighing the importance of the internal 
market  and  the  other  objectives  pursued.  What  the  Court  focuses  its  analysis  on  is  on  the 
fulfilment of the conditions for the use of Article 114 TFEU, i.e., that the measure in question 
effectively pursues the internal market objective. Some examples in the EU acquis in which 
Article  114  TFEU  has  been  used  as  a  legal  basis  for  measures  that  pursue  other  objectives 
apart  from  the  improvement  of  the  internal  market  include,  for  instance,  Regulation 
1007/2009  on  trade  in  seal  products124,  Directive  98/44  on  the  legal  protection  of 
biotechnological inventions125, and the Consumer Credit Directive 2008/48/EC126. 

Article  114  TFEU  is  also  relevant  to  provide  obligations  on  service  providers  established 
outside  the  EU  where  their  service  provision  affects  the  internal  market,  when  this  is 
necessary for the desired internal market goal pursued. 

Article  16  TFEU  permits  the  Union  legislator  to  enact  rules  relating  to  the  protection  of 
individuals  as  regards  processing  personal  data  by  Union  institutions,  bodies,  offices  and 
agencies, and by the Member States when carrying out activities falling within the scope of 
Union law, and rules related to the free movement of such data. As the current initiative seeks 
to  address  problems  specific  to  the  use  of  personal  data  in  political  ads  (in  particular 
regarding their targeting), intervention will also be based on this provision.  

Article 224 TFEU is also relevant to provide for transparency standards applicable to EUPPs. 
On this basis, regulations governing EUPPs at EU level can be laid down 

3.2. 

Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action 

According to the principle of subsidiarity laid down in Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European 
Union  (TEU),  action  at  EU  level  should  be  taken  only  when  the  aims  envisaged  cannot  be 
achieved  sufficiently  by  Member  States  alone  and  can  therefore,  by  reason  of  the  scale  or 
effects  of  the  proposed  action,  be  better  achieved  by  the  EU.  Several  Member  States  have 
legislated or are about to legislate in the field of transparency of political ads to protect their 
electoral  processes127.  As  these  rules  diverge  in  their  scope,  content  and  effect,  a  patchy 
framework of national rules is appearing and risks to increase. This jeopardises an effective 
exercise of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services in the EU. Only 

121  See  C-491/01  The  Queen  v  Secretary  of  State  for  Health,  ex  parte  British  American  Tobacco  (Investments)  Ltd  and 
Imperial Tobacco Ltd. EU:C:2002:741, where the policy objective at hand was public health protection. 
122 Ibid, paragraph 60. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September  2009 on trade in seal 

products (Text with EEA relevance) 

125  Directive  98/44/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  6  July  1998  on  the  legal  protection  of 

biotechnological inventions 

126  Directive  2008/48/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  23  April  2008  on  credit  agreements  for 

consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC 

127  Ireland,  the  Netherlands  and  Sweden  in  particular  (see  Annex  7).  Further,  already  today,  a  number  of  Member  States, 
such as Germany, Austria, Denmark or France, have adopted or are in the process of adopting new laws to regulate digital 
services in relation to political advertising. 

23 

 
 
 
                                                           
intervention at European level can solve this problem, as regulation at national level is aimed 
at ensuring transparency and protecting the electoral process, with therefore little concern for 
the barriers erected to cross-border political advertising services in this exercise of otherwise 
national  competence.  Furthermore,  the  cross-border  nature  of  activities,  including  in  the 
online  environment,  creates  significant  challenges  which  purely  national  regulation  in  this 
domain would not be able to address. It is unlikely that Member States acting independently 
would be able to effectively  address the identified problems, except eventually if they (like 
Ireland does) decide to prohibit cross-border political advertising – something which further 
fragments the internal market. The Commission already highlighted the need for EU action in 
this  area  ahead  of,  and  following  the  2019  European  Parliamentary  elections,  in  the 
framework of the 2018 elections package.128 This need for EU action was also demonstrated 
by  the action of  certain  economic  actors providing political ads  and related services  and  of 
the  political  actors  making  use  of  them.  During  the  European  elections,  some  large  online 
platforms  took  steps  to  address  the  challenge  presented  by  legal  uncertainty  and 
fragmentation  of  the  internal  market,  by  only  servicing  discrete  Member  State  markets, 
essentially  partitioning  it.  This  proved  a  significant  issue  for  political  parties  seeking  to 
publish political ads EU-wide129.  

The competence to lay down regulations governing EUPPs resides with the EU.  

Further,  the  envisaged  policy  options  do  not  go  beyond  what  is  necessary  to  achieve  the 
identified  objectives  not  affecting  the  competence  of  Member  States  to  organise  elections. 
Subsidiarity is not only respected, but proportionality as well. 

3.3. 

Subsidiarity: Added value of EU action 

The initiative will only address activities where EU action is necessary for the functioning of 
the  internal  market,  for  a  high  standard  of  data  protection  in  targeting  practices,  and  to 
specify the transparency requirements for EUPPs. EU common standards for political ads and 
related  services  would  bring  enhanced  legal  certainty  especially  for  service  providers.  The 
incremental compliance costs of delivering a service across borders would be removed, and 
the  non-compliance  risk  reduced.  This  in  turn  would  remove  the  incentive  for  economic 
actors  to  partition  the  internal  market,  provide  a  fresh  incentive  for  the  provision  of  cross-
border services and for the development of new ones. EU rights, including fundamental rights 
would also be protected more effectively. 

In  contrast,  the  effects  of  any  action  taken  under  national  law  would  be  limited  to  a  single 
Member State and would risk being circumvented or difficult to oversee in relation to service 
providers from other Member States, and could conflict with the internal market. This does 
not  address  the  EU-wide  problems  identified,  and  can  also  exacerbate  the  effects  of 
fragmentation.  An  EU  system  would  also  help  competent  authorities  in  their  oversight 
functions, other stakeholders to exercise their role in the democratic process and increase the 

128 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_5681  
129 This was reported by economic actors, EUPPs and national political parties which campaigned in more than one Member 
State, such as Diem-25 and Volt. 

24 

 
 
 
                                                           
overall  resilience  of  the  European  Union  to  information  manipulation  and  interference  in 
electoral processes, including disinformation130.  

4.  OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? 

4.1.General objectives 

There are two general objectives:  

1.  Facilitate the provision of political advertising and related services in the internal market 
while  supporting  fair  democratic  processes  based  on  high  and  harmonised  transparency 
standards and lawful use of targeting techniques131.  

2.  Provide for high transparency standards for political parties in the EU supporting free and 

fair elections. 

4.2. Specific objectives  

General  objective  1:  Facilitate  the  provision  of  political  advertising  and  related  services  in  the  internal 
market while supporting fair democratic processes based on high transparency standards and lawful use of 
targeting techniques 

Specific objectives132: 

1)  Reduce  legal  fragmentation,  limit  circumvention  of  regulation  and  regulatory  arbitrage  and 
remove obstacles and reduce costs for the provision of cross-border services; 
2) Define high transparency standards for political ads (including issues ads), in particular to ensure that: 
Individuals are sufficiently aware of the nature of online political ads and can recognise online 
political ads and distinguish them from other types of online content; 
Interested  actors  –  civil  society  organisations,  academia,  elections  observers,  journalists  and 
political actors – have sufficient information to hold political actors accountable; 

ii. 

i. 

iii.  Member  States  competent  authorities  and  EU  authorities133  have  sufficient  information  on 

online political ads activities to take informed decisions on online political ads; 
Societal trust in the internal market for political ads increases. 

iv. 

3) Address specific data protection risks emerging from the use of some targeting and amplification 
techniques,  also  in  order  to  support  fair  elections  and  a  fair  democratic  debate,  and  to  ensure  that  the 
newly harmonised market for political advertising is not fragmented by rules regulating targeting. 
4) Ensure the effective oversight of the envisaged obligations and strengthen regulatory outcomes; 

General  objective  2:  Provide  for  high  transparency  standards  for  political  parties  in  the  EU,  supporting 
fair democratic processes 

130 The EU could act as a standard-setter for measures to promote democracy as a key value in the EU and the transparency 
of political ads globally and improve cooperation with like-minded third countries and international organisations. 
131 Standards on the use of targeting will also be coupled to the objective of achieving a high protection of personal data in 
political advertising practices. 
132 Note that reaching these objectives will also increase resilience against foreign information manipulation and interference. 
133  E.g.  in  the  enforcement  of  the  GDPR  or  the  DSA.  A  lead  authority  should  be  designated  for  the  monitoring  and 
enforcement of the provisions of this initiative where more than one could be competent without prejudice to the provisions 
on independent supervisory authorities and cooperation in Chapters VI and VII of the GDPR. 

25 

 
 
 
                                                           
Specific objectives: 

5)  Promote  stronger  transparency  and  free  and  fair  elections  through  compliance  with  relevant  rules 
among political parties in the EU, through binding rules, where the EU has competence (i.e. for EUPPs), 
in particular to ensure that:  

i. 
ii. 
iii. 

iv. 

transparency and accountability in political campaigning is promoted among political actors;  
resilience to manipulation and interference in the democratic debate is strengthened; 
the  European  dimension  of  European  parliamentary  elections  is  supported  through  the 
establishment of clearer rules for cross-border political ads; 
public awareness of political ads, of the techniques associated with it and of the applicable rules 
governing it, is promoted. 

The  Intervention  Logic  (relations  between  drivers,  problems,  consequences,  general  and 
specific EU objectives, options and expected impacts) is depicted graphically in Annex 6. 

5.  WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS 

5.1. 

What is the baseline from which options are assessed?134 

Under the baseline scenario, the EU regulatory framework will evolve, particularly as regards 
information society services, though specific legislation to fully address the issues identified 
would not be introduced. Once the DSA enters into application, it will clarify responsibilities 
and accountability for providers of intermediary services, and in particular online platforms, 
such as social media and marketplaces. Certain intermediary services135 would be subject to 
additional  due  diligence  requirements,  including  notice-and-action  procedures  for  illegal 
content  –  including  illegal  ads.  Online  marketplaces  would  be  obliged  to  collect,  store  and 
partially verify and publish information on traders using their services to ensure a safer and 
more  transparent  online  environment  for  consumers136.  Further,  ads  published  on  online 
platforms  will  be  clearly  distinguished  from  other  content,  would  directly  disclose  the 
advertiser as  well as  ‘meaningful information about  the main parameters used to  determine 
the  recipient  to  whom  the  advertisement  is  displayed’.  VLOPs  will  also  publish  ad 
repositories,  including  ‘whether  the  ad  was  intended  to  be  displayed  specifically  to  one  or 
more particular groups of recipients of the service and if so, the main parameters used for that 
purpose’, making this information available for e.g. vetted researchers or authorities. Further 
access to data by vetted researchers would also be possible. No information will be provided 
about the the political affiliation of ads, the money spent on them and its source. The chain of 
actors  involved  in  the  preparation,  placement  and  dissemination  of  the  ads  will  remain 
obscure, preventing the  effective oversight by public interest  actors and  authorities into the 
spending  of  political  actors  and  other  national  rules  relevant  to  electoral  processes. 
Transparency about the more detailed elements  on targeting will remain merely implicit (in 
the GDPR) or indicated as desirable (in EDPB Guidance). There will not be public scrutiny 
of the use of political ads online, except to a limited extent for actors in the DSA’s scope. The 
Commission  will  continue  its  monitoring  of  the  implementation  of  the  Commission’s 
Electoral  package  recommendation  on  transparency  and  combatting  disinformation  and  the 
coordination within the framework of ECNE137. In line with the Guidance on strengthening 

134 Based on the public consultations conducted for EDAP and this initiative, the findings of the report on the 2019 European 
elections  and  underlying  studies  and  questionnaire,  the  underlying  study  performed  to  support  this  initiative,  as  well  as 
specific elements from the impact assessment for the DSA and other relevant sources (Annex 8). 
135  Including  the  majority  of  online  service  providers  in  the  scope  of  this  initiative,  and  naturally  not  offline  actors  –  see 
Annex 8 for a description of categories of actors to which measures under the DSA and the current initiative will apply. 
136 See Annex 3. 
137 https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/soteu2018-cybersecurity-elections-recommendation-5949_en.pdf. 

26 

 
 
 
                                                           
the Code of Practice of Disinformation the Commission expects the signatories of the Code to 
step-up the Code’s measures on the transparency of political  and issues ads. The Code will 
evolve from a self-regulatory approach to a co-regulatory framework with the adoption of the 
DSA138. While the Code of Practice  aims to deliver industry-led solution regarding specific 
issues related to the transparency of political ads, it would not address all the specific areas 
related  to  political  ads.  Monitoring  and  enforcement  of  EU  data  protection  rules  would 
continue, as well as guidance on the consistent application of the GDPR139. 

The  baseline  would  also  benefit  from  measures  set  out  in  EDAP.  Further,  research  would 
continue  to  analyse  the  impact  of  these  voluntary  measures  and  unilateral  legislative 
measures being adopted by Member States.  

The problems identified in this impact assessment would continue to evolve as described in 
section  2.3.  Political  activity  will  move  increasingly  online,  making  cross-border  service 
provision a developing market, including in the context of European elections. The costs and 
obstacles  affecting  service  providers  (ad  agencies  and  publishers)  when  providing  their 
services across borders or in multiple states will persist. Issues identified for the democratic 
process related to the circulation of political ads in the internal market, will remain. Despite 
expected improvements, the lighter online regulation140 will continue to contribute to driving 
political  ads  services  online.  This  move  online  will  cause  national  rules  to  become 
increasingly  difficult  to  monitor  and  enforce.  Member  States  will  continue  to  respond  with 
diverging national solutions aiming to increase transparency and the possibility for oversight, 
without  the  coordinated  enforcement.  Large  platforms  with  a  presence  across  the  internal 
market will continue to control compliance risks through actions which partition the internal 
market. Obstacles will continue to prevent smaller companies from scaling up. The problems 
outlined above resulting from the non-transparency in political ads and regulatory failure will 
continue to evolve, including as regards the lack of power for citizens to inform themselves 
on political ads and hold political actors to account. 

In  the  context  of  European  elections,  EUPPs  intend  to  increase  their  campaign  activity,  for 
instance  on  transnational  issues  such  as  climate  change.141  Member  States  might  seek  to 
enforce  national  rules  in  connection  with  political  ads  targeting  their  citizens.  This,  and 
related  obstacles  to  cross-border  campaigning  may  significantly  reduce  the  possibility  for 
transnational  parties  and  movements  to  conduct  their  campaigns.  Similar  obstacles  could 
affect the right to campaign in multiple Member States for some national elections in Europe 
with diaspora constituencies. The existing, largely ex ante oversight framework will address 

138 The proposed DSA will provide a regulatory backstop to the Code, elevating the current self-regulatory regime to a co-
regulatory regime. The Code of Practice on Disinformation is also foreseen to become a Code of Conduct under the DSA, 
with a framework for monitoring, oversight and enforcement with respect to very large online platforms.  
139  In  particular  through  recent  Guidelines  of  the  European  Data  Protection  Board  on  the  targeting  of  social  media  users 
https://edpb.europa.eu/system/files/2021-04/edpb_guidelines_082020_on_the_targeting_of_social_media_users_en.pdf. 
These guidelines expressly refer to targeted political ads (“available online targeting mechanisms enable political parties and 
campaigns  to  target  individual  voters  with  tailored  messages,  specific  to  the  particular  needs,  interests  and  values  of  the 
target audience”). See also Commission guidance on the application of Union data protection law in the electoral context. 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52018DC0638  
140 This light regulation will continue being of concern to citizens. Already four in five Europeans are today in favour of the 
rules  observed  by  traditional  media  before  elections  being  applied  to  the  more  lightly-regulated  online  media. 
https://fronteirasxxi.pt/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/ebs_507_en.pdf 
141  As 
the 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/com_2020_252_en_0.pdf  

Commission’s 

Parliamentary 

European 

elections 

reported 

report, 

2019 

p13. 

in 

27 

 
 
 
                                                           
EUPPs’  transnational  campaigning  activities,  and  the  proposal  to  reform  the  regulatory 
framework may expand their scope. 

5.2. 

Description of the policy options 

The  objectives  are  addressed  by  two  packages  of  options,  which  differ  in  terms  of  level  of 
intervention  proposed.  The  packages  differ  in  their  approach  to  intervention,  but  share 
common elements, especially those soft measures when not replaced in option 2 by binding 
measures. They address the problems identified regarding the internal market for political ads 
as  they  concern  transparency  rules,  the  use  of  targeting  and  manipulative  amplification 
techniques,  oversight,  and  the  problems  identified  concerning  EUPPs  and  political  parties 
more generally. They build on the 2018 elections package and the experience gathered from 
it, other related EU policymaking, input received in the consultation and the guidelines and 
reports  published  by  relevant  standard  setting  bodies.  The  legislative  elements  build  on  the 
findings  of  the  mapping  of  the  relevant  Member  State  frameworks  (see  Annex  7)  and  are 
consistent with the acquis. 

Each  internal  market  option  aims  to  complement  and  not  amend  existing  EU  legislation 
applicable to offline and online political ads and services, including the DSA, EU consumer 
and data protection rules, audiovisual media rules and the digital single market.  

In turn, the options concerning EUPPs are prepared in close alignment with the initiative to 
reform the regulation on the statute and funding of EUPPs and foundations.  

The options addressed to economic actors in the internal market are as follows: 

1.  Limited  binding  measures  to  align  certain  definitions  and  provide  for  information 
retention,  and  soft  measures  and  standards  to  promote  transparency  in  the  use  of 
political  ads  online  and  offline  and  support  further  interventions,  including  self-
regulation. The soft measures also cover the use of targeting techniques. 

2.  Binding  measures  to  harmonise  transparency  requirements  for  political  ads 
accompanied by soft measures and standards. The binding measures also address the 
use of targeting techniques in political ads.  

The options addressed to political parties are as follows 

1.  Limited binding measures to adapt the existing framework on EUPPs to introduce 

an obligation for parties to support transparent use of political ads; and 

2.  Extending  the  existing  framework  to  introduce  complementary  obligations  on 
EUPPs  to  provide  meaningful  and  transparency  obligations  for  the  use  of  political 
ads.  

Further  non-legislative  measures  are  envisaged  to  incentivise  and  promote  equivalent 
standards nationally in European elections. 

Table 1 – Summary of measures addressed to economic actors in the internal market 

Option  1:  Limited  measures  to  promote 
transparency, 
issues  with 
address 
targeting and support oversight 

2:  Measures 

Option 
harmonise 
transparency,  address  issues  with  targeting 
and strengthen oversight 

to 

28 

 
 
 
 
 
Obligations 
economic 
related 
transparency 
political ads 

on 
actors 
to 
of 

Specific  measures 
targeting  and 
on 
manipulative 
techniques 

Powers of oversight 
bodies 

to 

to 

issues 

clarity 

economic 

transparency, 

existing  EU 

Limited common framing of political ads 
based  on  existing  national  definitions,  to 
provide 
actors, 
to 
incentivise compliance with relevant rules, 
and facilitate accountability and oversight. 
Passive142  obligation  on  all  actors  to 
retain  information  about  political  ads,  in 
addition 
common 
obligations143  (e.g. 
the  amounts  spent, 
source of funding, the scope of distribution 
and period of circulation of the ad). 
Soft  measures  addressed 
to  Member 
States  and  parties  to  address  the  provision 
of political ads to citizens with tailored and 
adequate 
facilitate 
accountability  and  oversight  and  address 
for  democratic  processes 
the 
associated with non-transparent ads. 
Obligation 
services 
on 
providers  to  cooperate  with  competent 
the 
authorities,  within 
initiative. 
Soft  measures  addressed 
to  Member 
States  and  political  parties  to  ensure  that 
adequate  and  specific 
is 
provided  about  the  use  of  targeting  and 
other  manipulative 
that 
voluntary  commitments  among  economic 
actors  on  the  points  raised  in  the  specific 
objectives  are  tackled including  within  the 
Code of Practice. 
  to  further 
Soft  measures  addressed 
empower  competent  bodies  to  request  and 
obtain relevant information. 

the  scope  of 

techniques,  so 

transparency 

relevant 

Further  support,  including  for  capacity 
building,  joint  action  and  the  exchange  of 
the 
good  practices 
framework of ECNE.  

in  particular 

in 

Harmonised  framing  of  political  ads  using  a 
combined  approach  based  on  existing  national 
definitions  as  well  as  self-identified  political 
and issues ads. 

Passive  obligation  on  all  actors  to  retain 
information  about  political  ads,  in  addition  to 
existing EU common obligations. 

to 

clarify 

obligations, 

Obligations  tailored  to  the  relevant  actors  to 
provide  citizens,  interested  actors  and  public 
authorities  specific  information  on  political 
facilitate 
ads, 
accountability  and  oversight  and  address  the 
issues for democratic processes associated with 
non-transparent ads. 
Obligation  on  relevant  service  providers  to 
cooperate  with  competent  authorities,  backed 
by provisions to empower authorities within the 
scope of the initiative. 

Binding EU-wide  limits to targeting with two 
sub-options detailed below. 
Soft  measures  addressed  to  Member  States 
and  political  parties  on  further  steps  to  limit 
other  manipulative  techniques,  such  as  buying 
inauthentic 
of 
accounts/networks. 

engagement 

fake 

and 

Powers for  competent authorities  to request 
information  and  to  enable  the  exchange  of 
information  among  competent  bodies,  within 
and  across  Member  States,  relying  on  existing 
national and EU governance frameworks. 

including 

Further  support, 
for  capacity 
building,  joint  action  and  exchange  of  good 
practices among authorities in particular in the 
framework of ECNE.   

Table 2 – summary of measures addressing political parties 

Option  1:  Limited 
amendment  to  the 

Option 2: Extending the Regulation 1141/2014 framework to 
introduce  complementary  obligations  on  EUPPs  and  active 

142 The relevant information is normally already available as part of the business process. It merely needs to be retained. The 
obligation  is  passive  in  the  sense  that  economic  actors  do  not  have  to  proactively  make  that  information  available  to 
interested actors – only upon request. 
143 This is additional to and without prejudice to harmonised obligations under EU laws such as the GDPR and DSA (see 
below). Not all concerned operators will be subject to the DSA, or the AVSMD. The GDPR will not apply to all activities as 
the processing of personal data is not per se at stake, even for online ads. 

29 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
European parties  

National parties 

Political  parties  in  the 
EU 

oversight 

Elaborated rules for EUPPs to ensure transparent management 
and  disclosure  of  political  ads,  including  obligations  to  ensure 
that  information  is  published  with  the  political ads,  to  limit the 
use  of  targeting  techniques,  as  well  as  to  retain  and  disclose 
further  information  (including  in  the  repository  below)  to 
provide accountability around the electoral period. 
Support an independent platform and party-neutral repository of 
information  about  political  ads  activity  in  European  elections, 
accessible in by all citizens. 

Regulation 
1141/2014 
framework 
Amend  the  existing 
to 
framework 
the 
include 
requirement 
that 
EUPPs  take  steps  to 
the 
promote 
transparent  use  of 
political 
and 
address targeting as a 
for 
condition 
receiving funding. 
Soft  measures  addressed  to  Member  States  and  national  parties  to  have  high 
transparency standards consistent with to those for EUPPs 
Promotion of a fair campaigning pledge among political actors, based  in particular  on 
high transparency standards, including on targeting, and a level playing field in the EU. 

ads 

Providing  identical  transparency  requirements  at  EU  level  is  the  element  available  for 
harmonisation that would most obviously make the biggest difference for service providers in 
the  internal  market.  However,  providing  identical  standards  on  the  use  of  targeting  in  the 
political ad context is closely linked to this harmonisation objective. Indeed, while the policy 
options  could  be  bundled  differently,  a  package  combining  hard  standards  on  transparency 
with soft measures on targeting would not address appropriately the objective of the Article 
114 TFEU legal basis that is the primary motive for the proposal aimed at economic actors. 
Indeed,  efforts  to  harmonise  the  market  for  political  advertising  by  focusing  on  high 
standards  of  transparency  without  also  harmonising  on  high  standards  regarding  the  use  of 
targeting  would  soon  be  met  by  new  fragmentation  from  Member  States  determined  to 
protect themselves from the risks emerging from the targeting techniques afforded by online 
media144.  Further,  even  in  the  consultation,  no  genuine  alternatives  to  a  ban  capable  of 
addressing the issues were suggested145. 

Policy option 1 – Limited harmonisation  

Transparency:  The  first  option  provides  for  limited  mandatory  common  transparency 
requirements for political ads (both online and offline) including on targeting. It relies on 
national  definitions  of  political  ads,146  which  for  the  most  part  a  priori  do  not  cover 
issues  ads.  This  would  provide  a  common  reference  point  for  service  providers  in  their 
contractual terms, and for competent authorities to exercise their oversight functions as well 
as  for  other  stakeholders  to  play  their  role.  A  specific  obligation  on  all  economic  actors 
involved in these political ads to retain relevant information about political ads (and provide 

144 E.g. the Netherlands and Sweden, see Annex 7. 
145 There are a number of reasons, including limitations of competence for the Commission to intervene, political feasibility, 
the political aims expressed in the Democracy Action Plan, and the existing policy initiatives (e.g. the Code of Practice) and 
the framing of any approach by the acquis (the DSA, the GDPR, the AVMSD and Regulation 1141/2014). 
146 A fuller account of such elements of national definitions is found in Table 8.1. in Annex 7. 

30 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
it  upon  request)  is  provided  to  facilitate  the  oversight  of  relevant  rules  and  democratic 
accountability147. 

Targeting:  Under  this  option,  Member  States  would  be  specifically  invited  to  provide  for 
standards  on  the  use  of  targeting  techniques.  This  would  support  voluntary  commitments 
fostering  democratic  accountability  among  economic  and  political  actors,  including  those 
within  the  Code  of  Practice.  This  would  be  without  prejudice  to  existing  legal  information 
obligations under the GDPR.  

Oversight:  Option  1  foresees  limited  measures  to  support  oversight  and  audit  including 
soft  measures  to  support  cross-border  cooperation  on  these  matters  and  enforcement.  It 
promotes  common  standards  (e.g.  Application  Programming  Interfaces  (‘APIs’),  data 
retention  protocols)  for  interoperable  ad  repositories,  the  ‘know  you  client’  data  for  the 
disclosures  to  support  interoperable  information  systems  and  processes,  and  allows  for  the 
effective oversight of, and research into, the circulated ads148. 

Stakeholders’ views: Most OPC respondents, across all stakeholders, supported specific measures to 
increase  oversight  of  competent  authorities  (73.7%).  Stakeholders  with  an  interest  in  monitoring 
political  ads  would  welcome  a  system  based  on  interoperability  through  which  data  from  multiple 
platforms could be easily accessed and common tools used across platforms. 

Political  parties:  Option  1  introduces  mandatory  transparency  standards  for  political  ads  in 
Regulation  1141/2014,  building  on  the  recommendations  in  the  Electoral  package.  EUPPs 
would have to provide ex ante to the Authority reassurances that they will take the necessary 
measures including through their own websites and via explicit commitments.  

Soft  measures  would  be  addressed  to  Member  States  and  political  parties  to  promote  high 
transparency  for  national  political  parties  equivalent  to  those  to  be  introduced  for  EUPPs. 
Political  actors would be invited to join, and Member States to  support, a fair campaigning 
pledge,  building  on  national  models,  to  promote  high  standards  of  transparency  and 
accountability in political ads, in particular on the use of targeting. 

Stakeholders’  views:  Member  States  have  shown  a  high  interest  regarding  the  creation  of  soft 
measures  such  as  code  of  conducts,  without  excluding  more  binding  measures.  The  Dutch  Code  of 
Conduct  established  in  2020  between  political  parties  and  online  platforms  is  considered  a  positive 
precedent  serving  as  a  good  example  of  best  practice  for  other  national  authorities149,  and  will  be 
complemented by the announced  NL Law on Political Parties (discussed in Annex 7). In Germany, 
there  has  been  call  for  a  regulation  for  political  actors  that  ensures  the  complete  transparency  of 
digital communication150 and, in various Member States, some parties have developed their own code 
of  conduct  in  this  respect  (see  Annex  7,  section  7).  Also,  stakeholders  consulted  as  well  as  some 
sources  in  the  literature151  agree  that  the  existence  of  an  ad  repository152  could  increase  the 
recognisability of online political ads. 

147 They could be required to make this information public or available to public authorities and relevant stakeholders in line 
with applicable rules – see below. 
148 These standards would be aligned to and as far as possible include standards set by the DSA proposal (Article 34). 
149 Drawing on the ECNE meeting on political advertising held on 25 March 2021.  
150  D64,  the  German  “center  for  digital  progress”  calls  for  a  regulation  for  political  actors  that  ensures  the  complete 
transparency  of  digital  communication.  Until  this  regulation  is  in  place,  D64  urges  democratic  parties  to:  commit  to  fair 
dealings  online  in  a  common  Code  of  conduct  for  all  democratic  parties  in  view  of  the  election  year  2021:  https://d-
64.org/themen/code-of-conduct/ 
151  Such  as  A  comprehensive  plan  to  innovate  democracy  in  Europe.  https://www.youthforum.org/comprehensive-plan-
letter 
innovate-democracy-europe. 

non-profits’ 

DisinfoLab 

other 

open 

also 

and 

See 

49 

31 

 
 
 
                                                           
 
5.2.2. Policy option 2 – More extensive harmonisation 

Transparency: Under policy option 2, a common approach to the concept of political ads 
would be defined. It would cover ads connected to a political actor, campaign or aim as 
defined nationally, and self-declared political ads153. This would include issues ads154. 

Option  2  includes  harmonised  transparency  requirements.  Beyond  the  transparency 
obligations vis-à-vis those directly exposed to the political ad, further requirements (proactive 
for  VLOPs,  upon  request  for  others  in  the  value  chain)  would  apply  vis-à-vis  interested 
actors155 and authorities.  

Stakeholders’ views: Stakeholders requested clearer and more uniformed concepts and definitions. In 
particular,  private  sector  companies  and  in  particular  major  online  platforms  suggest  adopting 
harmonisation legislation that would define political ads and clarify responsibilities. 

The  publishers  of  online  and  offline  political  ads  would  have  to  make  available 
information  (provided  in  a  transparency  notice  within  or  easily  retrievable  from  each 
political advertisement) about the amounts spent in an advertising campaign and their source, 
any  relevant  (nationally  defined)  campaign/party  registration  information  as  well  as  (where 
relevant)  a  link  to  official  information  sources  about  the  elections,  the  sponsor’s  identity, 
whether  and  how  the  advertisement  was  targeted  or  amplified,  the  scope156  and  period  of 
circulation  of  the  advertisement,  the  data  sources,  and  the  criteria  used  for  targeting157. 
VLOPs would also  have to  proactively  provide  this  information  in  their publicly  accessible 
ad repository, in addition to the information they already provide about ads under the DSA158.  
Ad  publishers159  would  have  to  issue  standardised  periodic  reports160  on  the  amounts 
received for the services they have provided connected to political advertisements and their 
targeting, aggregated to campaign or candidate. 

https://www.disinfo.eu/advocacy/open-letter-to-eu-policy-makers-how-the-digital-services-act-dsa-can-tackle-
disinformation/  
152 As put forward in the Commission Guidance on strengthening the Code of Practice on Disinformation. Examples of ad 
include  Google’s:  https://transparencyreport.google.com/political-ads/region/EU?hl=en  and  Facebook’s: 
repositories 
https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?active_status=all&ad_type=political_and_issue_ads&country=ES 
153 National definitions of political party, campaign, campaign period, political aim, or any other relevant definition used to 
establish the link with political ads would not be affected. 
154 Self-declaration would be incentivised through the legal certainty of inclusion within this EU framework, including the 
provisions on targeting. There is also political value in compliance. 
155 See specific objective 2ii. ‘Interested actors’ is intended as a privileged category of beneficiary of transparency; it would 
include actors playing an important role in the political debate (such as oversight on behalf of the public) and build on the 
idea of vetted researchers under Art. 31 DSA. 
156 The scope is the demographics (segments and numbers) targeted and expected to be reached.  
157  These  obligations  are  in  addition  to  and  without  prejudice  to  the  obligations  under  the  GDPR  and  DSA.  They  would 
complement existing legal information obligations under the GDPR, and codify elements of the guidance provided by the 
European Data Protection Board by making mandatory in the context of political advertising information to be provided to 
the  data  subject  (source  of  the  data  and  logic  involved)  to  be  provided  to  the  data  subject.  Where  there  is  overlap,  the 
obligations  are  complementary:  i.e.  they  make  the  relevant  information  available  to  the  public,  beyond  the  individual 
exposed to the ad, and they cover either political ads for which the GDPR is not involved (no personal data) or actors not 
already covered by the DSA. Under the GDPR, individuals must already know how they have been profiled, what data is 
processed (what for, its origin, etc.), who is targeting them, what criteria are being used and what segments they are placed 
into (see Annex 8); not all this information currently need to be provided directly with each ad, however, nor is it to be made 
available to the wider public. 
158  To  ensure  appropriate  oversight  and  scrutiny  of  advertising  practices,  ads  that  were  taken  down  (because  they  were 
judged unlawful or for other reasons) still need to be retained, although in the repositories this should be made available only 
in a distinct space available to the authorities and interested actors.  
159 Except those under a defined size (e.g. SMEs). 

32 

 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Other  economic  actors  involved  in  the  political  advertising  value  chain  would  have  to 
retain  (keep  record  of)  information  on  transactions,  including  amounts,  parties,  services 
provided and (where applicable) on the use of targeting, the relevant mechanisms, techniques 
and parameters used and the source(s) of personal data used. They would also have to provide 
this  information  down  the  chain  toward  the  eventual  ad  publishers  to  support  the  latter’s 
respective  proactive  obligations,  or  to  provide  the  information  themselves  upon  request  to 
interested actors.  

Additional measures on transparency could be provided through soft measures. 

Stakeholders’ views: The majority of respondents to the OPC supported the retention of information. 
On  ads  repositories,  71%  of  respondents  would like  that  publishers  of  political  ads  retain  at least  a 
minimum  of  information  from  those  placing  the  advertisements.  67%  considered  that  service 
providers  involved  in  political  ads  should  also  have  obligations  to  retain  and  provide  information. 
68%  stated  that  beyond  competent  authorities,  all  political  ads  should  also  be  made  available  to 
individuals through a repository. 

Targeting: Two sub-options are envisaged in policy option 2 for targeting. Elements of these 
two sub-options could be combined. Under sub-option 1, common standards would prohibit 
during reference periods161 the use of defined targeting that is based on sensitive data162.  

Under  sub-option  2,  common  standards  would  similarly  limit  the  use  of  some  targeting 
techniques  such  as  micro-targeting  and  targeting  based  on  certain  categories  of  personal 
data163,  but  also  beyond  electoral  periods.  However,  the  limitation  to  targeting  techniques 
would not  apply  under  certain  conditions  and when ads  are clearly labelled as political ads 
(thus  complying  with  the  other  specific  transparency  requirements  above)  and  when  the 
service provider implements and publishes a policy for political ads, with specific reporting 
in the annual report. 

Stakeholders’  views:  57.7%  of  OPC  respondents  consider  that  there  should  be  additional  limits  on 
targeting and amplification methods, besides compliance with existing data protection rules. Among 
these  57.7%,  respondents  favoured  either  a  ban  of  targeting  and  amplification  (especially  offline 
publishers, individuals and CSOs), or opt-in by user. 

Monitoring  and  enforcement:  Option  2  would  build  on  established  European  governance 
frameworks including those foreseen for the DSA164 and for the GDPR165. It would provide 
for the identification of a specific national contact point on the obligations envisaged by the 

in 

the 

provided 

Directive. 

Reporting 

Non-Financial 

160 As a part of annual reporting and to a format developed in cooperation with relevant economic actors and modelled on the 
framework 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014L0095 
161 i.e. the critical period ahead of elections, established nationally or on the basis of common standards. See for instance the 
Irish  Parliamentary  Library  and  Research  Service’s  Note  evaluating  the  government  proposal  to  regulate  online  political 
(2021),  pp  10-12.  https://data.oireachtas.ie/ie/oireachtas/libraryResearch/2021/2021-02-08_l-rs-note-the-
advertising 
regulation-of-online-political-advertising-evaluating-the-government-s-proposals_en.pdf  
162 This EU-wide prohibition would not affect the possibility to target based on broad or non sensitive categories, e.g. on the 
approximate place of residence of citizens or the rough age group they belong to, and could be calibrated to the electorate.  
Besides  targeting  based  on  sensitive  data,  other  techniques  with  a  potential  negative  impact  on  democracy,  such  as  the 
elaborated psychographic techniques used by Cambridge Analytica, could also be prohibited. 
163 This could include the special categories of personal data provided in Article 9 of the GDPR. 
164 The DSA governance would apply to actors in its scope for transparency requirements provided by this initiative. 
165 The GDPR framework would apply to actors in its scope for requirements under this proposal related to data protection, 
and in particular targeting techniques. 

33 

 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
initiative166. It would impose specific cooperation obligations to economic actors involved in 
the political ads value chain.  
With regard to the objective of achieving a ‘clear line of sight’167 and automated reporting in 
the  monitoring  of  the  political  ads  value  chain,  policy  option  2  would  specify  headline 
requirements  for  interoperable  information  systems  based  on  the  required  outcome 
(established  on  the  basis  of  the  transparency  needs).  This  would  enable  the  transparency 
obligations to be delivered efficiently for both their beneficiaries and for the addressees of the 
obligations.  

Additional measures would support the coordination of oversight of the envisaged measures 
at  EU  level,  as  well  as  strengthen  national  coordination  and  oversight  capability  among 
competent  authorities,  and  foster  pooled  resources,  joint  action  and  the  exchanges  of  good 
practices (including in the framework of the ECNE).  

Political parties: Policy option 2 would provide transparency obligations on political ads and 
limitations to their use of targeting techniques. EUPPs would be obliged to label their ads and 
to  publish  or  otherwise  make  available  additional  information168,  including  to  actively 
provide timely disclosures during the electoral campaign period169. Further obligations would 
ensure that parties retain sufficient information to support reporting and oversight functions. 

This  option  would  include  an  independent,  platform  and  party-neutral  repository  of 
information about political ads activity in elections to the European Parliament, accessible in 
real  time  by  all  individuals  and  with  corresponding  obligations  on  EUPPs  to  upload  their 
political ads and provide relevant disclosures170. 

Soft  measures  would  be  addressed  to  Member  States  and  national  political  parties 
recommending  introducing  equivalent  standards  for  all  political  actors  and  to  support  the 
establishment of a fair campaigning pledge. 

5.3. 

 Options discarded at an early stage 

Some options were discarded at an early stage, especially based on competence (subsidiarity) 
and proportionality criteria.  

1.  Any  ban  on  cross-border  political  advertising.  This  was  discarded  as  being  likely  to 
disproportionately  restrict  legitimate  activity  and  impact  on  fundamental  rights  while 
being unlikely to effectively address most problems identified. 

166 Existing authorities competent under EU law on (at least one aspect of) political ads are described in Annex 8. Option 2 
provides  additional  powers  to  competent  authorities  to  request  relevant  information  but  would  not  create  an  additional 
governance  structure.  The  increased  transparency  mandated  by  the  present  initiative  will  enable  competent  authorities  to 
exercise their existing powers better and more efficiently, especially in cross-border and/or online cases. 
167  To  enable  information  to  be  provided  forward  through  the  value  chain  to  publishers,  to  support  the  provision  of 
meaningful information on the political ads they publish, in particular as regards spend, which needs to be aggregated and 
could include information from several sources. 
168  Following  the  requirements  in  this  initiative,  i.e.  information  to  be  provided  on  the  face  of  the  ad,  on  the  EUPP’s 
dedicated space in the repository, and on its website. 
169 For elections to the EP. A common campaigning period may need to be provided, it would apply for these purposes. 
170  Political  ads  of  all  forms  should  be  included  in  this  repository;  this  means  not  only  ‘visual’  ads,  but  also  paid-for 
amplification in news feeds and search rankings, for instance. There the inclusion of a kind of ad is not straightforward due 
to its format, the authority in charge of the repository shall decide on the best technical means to include it. 

34 

 
 
 
                                                           
2.  A  general  ban  on  the  use  of  targeting  was  discarded  as  likely  disproportionate171.  It 
would  increase  the  cost  of  political  advertising  and  may  unduly  affect  lawful 
communications outside of electoral periods  and during which the main parties affected 
would  be  CSOs.  Such  a  ban  would  advantage  well-resourced  parties  able  to  afford 
untargeted online campaigns. 
Options based on opt-in  and opt-out  have been discarded on targeting as  this is already 
largely  addressed  by  the  GDPR,  does  not  address  the  fact  that  use  is  made  of  people’s 
vulnerabilities,  and  that  manipulation  can  be  at  stake  when  targeting  and  amplification 
techniques are being used to disseminate political advertising.  

3.  Extensive harmonisation of essential terms in the electoral process, such as political 
party  or  political  actor,  or  campaign  periods  versus  silence  periods.  These  concepts  are 
essential  parts  of  the  organisation  of  elections,  which  remains  largely  a  national 
competence172,  raising  issues  in  terms  of  subsidiarity  and  proportionality  (necessity  and 
EU added value).  

4.  Extensive harmonisation of substantial requirements for the electoral process other 
than  transparency.  It  would  not  be  possible  with  this  initiative  to  harmonize  all  the 
requirements applicable to political advertising across EU (e.g. who may sponsor an ad or 
how much they may spend), because the organization of elections and of political activity 
is  a  competence  of  Member  States.  There  are  specificities,  traditional  and  historic 
characteristics accompanying the advertising in political context that have to be taken into 
account  and,  in  contrast,  horizontal  transparency  and  measures  applicable  to  economic 
operators was indicated as something Member States would be willing to support.  

5.  Amending  the  ‘country  of  origin’  principle  for  political  ads,  whereby  providers  of 
online services are subject to the law of the Member State in which they are established, 
by  creating  an  horizontal  elections-related  carve-out  to  enable  the  direct  application  of 
national relevant rules on services in the internal market affecting national elections. This 
was  rejected  as  being  likely  to  undermine  the  internal  market  and  its  development, 
including for services unrelated to political ads, and reducing legal certainty for economic 
actors.  

6.  WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? 

6.1. The baseline scenario 

The impact of the baseline scenario is assessed under the problem definition.  

6.2. Assessment of the options  

The policy options were evaluated for the following economic, social, fundamental rights and 
other impacts. No environmental impacts are expected and are not considered further. 

6.2.1.  Economic impacts 

6.2.1.1.Functioning of the internal market 

Both options would have a positive effect on the functioning of the internal market. 

171 However, it was noted that not all forms of a ban would necessarily be disproportionate, as clarified by the ECHR in 2013 
regarding the UK ban on political ads on broadcast media previously cited. 
172  A  uniform  procedure  or  common  principles  can  be  established  at  EU  level  in  the  context  of  European  Parliamentary 
elections, the procedure provided by Article 223 TFEU. The right of initiative belongs to the European Parliament.  

35 

 
 
 
                                                           
Option 1 would partially reduce the costs resulting from legal fragmentation and uncertainty 
for economic actors, thereby facilitating the offering of political  ad services across borders. 
By  supporting  coordination  among  competent  authorities,  it  would  contribute  to  improving 
regulatory  outcomes  and  reduce  the  possibility  of  economic  actors  obtaining  an  unfair 
advantage by offering services from specific Member States. 

Option  2  would  further  remove  costs  resulting  from  the  legal  fragmentation  and 
uncertainty173,  also  facilitating  the  offering  of  services  across  borders.  By  clarifying  and 
harmonising  the  rules  on  the  retention  and  provision  of  information  for  the  purposes  of 
oversight  and  accountability,  it  would  remove  a  key  driver  of  compliance  costs  in  multi-
Member State and cross-border campaigns. In addition, it would add legal predictability for 
intermediary services active in several Member States, contributing to the  good  functioning 
of the internal market174. This option would also improve regulatory outcomes as competent 
authorities  increasingly  struggle  to  enforce  the  current  legal  framework.  Competent 
authorities from Member States other than the one where the provider is established will be in 
an  improved  position  to  monitor  ads  affecting  their  electoral  and  democratic  process  –  a 
currently complex and costly practice175. This should in turn improve trust and transparency 
in political ads services, removing the justification for national market segmentation, thereby 
increasing opportunities for cross-border services to develop.  
The measures on targeting would address the most problematic targeting techniques176 while 
also providing for the use of targeting in a manner which incentivises good practice. Tailored 
restrictions would  limit the availability of  certain elements  of such  services. This would be 
outweighed  by  opportunities  for  economic  actors  resulting  from  increased  trust  among 
citizens and regulators in the technique and from greater legal certainty of compliance in its 
use in the political context.  

In addition, this option would reduce the advantage derived from regulatory fragmentation by 
providers  of  services  for  online  ads  compared  to  offline  media177.  It  would  limit  unfair 
advantage being derived from offering political ads services from outside the internal market, 
and help ensure that all such services comply with norms established to protect the integrity 
of democratic processes. 

6.2.1.2.Competitiveness, innovation and investment 

Both options are expected to have a positive impact on the competitiveness, innovation and 
investment  in  cross-border  political  ads  services.  Both  are  proportionate  and  neither  would 
impose dissuasive requirements on service providers. The removal of the obstacles resulting 
from legal uncertainty and fragmentation will foster the development of a European industry 
of rights-compliant services, and will enable existing national enterprises to scale up. 

Option  2  would  have  a  greater  positive  impact  on  competitiveness,  innovation  and 
investment.  It  would  reduce  legal  fragmentation  and  help  create  a  stable  market  to  support 

173 Illustrated in Annex 9. 
174 Many consulted stakeholders underline the importance of a common definition and clear rules to foster legal certainty for 
both consumers and economic operators. 
175  A  consulted  national  authority  for  example  stated  that  the  effective  enforcement  of  transparency  obligations  is  not 
possible without common rules. Further illustrated in Annex 9. 
176 Using sensitive data, sophisticated profiling and reaching too narrow a proportion of the electorate. 
177  A  stakeholder  representing  audio  visual  media  outlets  states  that  there  is  a  need  to  address  the  regulatory  asymmetry 
between online and traditional media services. 

36 

 
 
 
                                                           
investment, enable national SMEs to scale up their operations and stimulate the development 
of  new  services  offered  at  EU  level.  Both  sub-option  of  option  2  could  slightly  limit  the 
choice in such services. Both sub-options incentives the development of an accountable and 
fair market for political ads targeting services. 

Costs and administrative burden on economic and political actors  

Both options would add compliance costs for economic actors providing services which are 
in scope and not currently regulated (or to be regulated by the DSA) – mainly online adtech 
and  related  service  providers,  though  some  smaller  online  intermediaries  could  be  affected 
despite the specific mitigation foreseen for SMEs. These are also expected to be compensated 
by the efficiencies realised from the removal of legal fragmentation that facilitate the cross-
border provision of services. The net expected result is a cost reduction against the baseline. 
The  measures  in  common  to  both  options  on  establishing  a  common  framing  and  passive 
transparency  for  political  ads  would  not  involve  more  than  one-off  adaptation  costs, 
especially as the retention of the information can be automated.  

Option 2 introduces some additional specific obligations over option 1 and the baseline which 
require  business  process  adaptation  and  technical  design  costs.  However,  the  provision  of 
information can for the most part be automated. The costs can be offset against the benefits of 
streamlining  oversight  and  compliance  and  the  removal  of  costs  associated  with  regulatory 
fragmentation. 

Estimates of costs for obligations addressed to economic actors 

Type 
obligation 

of 

Obligations 
on  economic 
actors 
related 
to 
transparency 
of  political 
ads 

Option 1: Limited measures 
to  promote 
transparency, 
address issues with targeting 
and support oversight 

Option  2:  Measures  to  harmonise  transparency, 
address targeting and strengthen oversight. 

Common framing of political ads 

All  economic  actors  are  expected  to  derive  cost  efficiencies  when  offering 
services through a common framing of political ads, with online intermediaries 
each  saving  around  EUR  400,000  per  annum178.  This 
is  expected  to 
proportionately benefit SMEs more than VLOPs, as they will be enabled to offer 
their services in the internal market. 

Passive obligation to retain information relevant to political ads oversight 

All  economic  actors  would  be  required  to  retain  transaction  data  on  political 
advertising  from  existing  business  process  and  management  information 
systems, to enable reporting and disclosures, and compliance with the obligation 
to  cooperate  with  competent  authorities.  Additional  ongoing  costs  are  not 
expected,  but  limited  one-off  costs  may  result  to  adapt  information  systems, 
including for SMEs. 

Obligation to cooperate with competent authorities 
All  economic  actors  would  be  expected  to  have  an  officer179  (or  legal 
representative) responsible for interaction with national authorities. SMEs would 
not need to  recruit additional staff and their costs  are expected to be absorbed. 

178 Estimation for companies present in three Member States, assessment based on the comparable DSA impact assessment 
SWD(2020) 348 final. See Annex 4.4 for details. 
179 Based on the feedback from stakeholders. 

37 

 
 
 
                                                           
Online  intermediary  services  will  already  have  a  single  point  of  contact  for 
authorities  under  the  DSA,  and  VLOPs  in  particular  will  also  under  the  DSA 
already  require  a  compliance  and  engagement  officer.  Data  protection  officers 
will already been designated under the GDPR as required by it. Costs would vary 
according  to  the  number  of  requests  –  potentially  0.5-1  FTE  (full-time 
equivalent) per political ad campaign180. 

Soft  measures  to  introduce 
on 
national 
transparency 

rules 

Ad  publishers  would  incur 
one-off  data  handling  and 
costs 
adaptation 
process 
where  national  rules  change 
between EUR 3,000 to 5,000 
per  enterprise181,  but  these 
would  only  be  offset  by 
fragmentation  reduction  if 
States 
all 
implemented 
soft 
measures  fully  and  in  an 
aligned way. 

Member 

the 

Obligations  to  publish  and  otherwise  provide 
information 

to  obtain  and  publish 

All  actors  would 
incur  costs  of  providing 
information to interested actors, depending on the 
number of requests. Ad publishers would have to 
make  one-off  data  handling  and  process 
adaptation  costs 
the 
necessary data on the face of the advertisements. 
These costs may be comparable to costs currently 
incurred  by  companies  that  voluntarily  disclose 
information, estimated at around EUR 10,000 to 
15,000  per  annum182.  VLOPs  may  need  to  make 
additional  costs  to  adapt  their  ad  repositories 
(provided under the DSA). 

These costs would be offset by the fragmentation 
reduction savings. 

Specific 
measures  on 
targeting  

Transparency on targeting 

Soft measures (option 1)  and binding measures (option 2)  would imply limited 
additional cost as they complement other transparency requirements. VLOPs and 
other operators are expected to incur costs to implement national measures in the 
absence of harmonisation183. 

Limits to targeting of political ads 

Suboption 1: ban during reference period 
It is unclear whether the estimated increase in the 
cost  of  running  online  political  ads  campaigns 
would result in a reduction in overall activity, or 
drive activity to different media184. 
VLOPs  would  incur  some  compliance  cost  and 
potentially  foregone  revenue.  Adtech  companies 
would be limited in their possibilities to provide 
sophisticated  political  ads  services  in  the  EU 

180 Due to the limited data available for this market, it is currently not possible to estimate how many economic operators 
would be affected. Further information in Annex 5.  
181 The underlying study bases this estimation on stakeholder consultations. 
182 This estimation is based on the feedback from stakeholders and refers to costs incurred by an average company based on 
the AdChoices self-regulatory program. 
183 It is challenging to estimate these. No information was provided on costs of the steps taken (if any) to adapt processes to 
the French requirements, currently the only national provisions to have specifically addressed this point. No estimate of costs 
has been published for the Irish bill that would introduce some obligations in this area. See Annex 7 for details. In France for 
example, online platforms must provide users with information on the identity of promotion sponsors and the remuneration 
received for such content. This information must be publicly available in a register. 
184  The  underlying  study  estimates  that  equivalent  online  advertising  would  be  almost  3  times  as  expensive  as  current 
targeted online ads.  

38 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
during elections periods. This would affect SMEs 
involved  in  this  aspect  of  the  market  (data 
brokers,  consultancies  and  other  intermediaries 
etc.). 

Suboption 2: conditional limits at all times  

VLOPS and ad tech companies administrating the 
conditional  restrictions  would  make  one-off 
process adaptation costs.  
Costs 
under 
significantly 
establishment of a common approach185. 

sub-option  would  be 
the 

this 
compensated 

through 

to 

actors 

request 

economic 

for  national  authorities 

Powers 
information  
All 
some 
administrative  costs,  depending  on  the  scope  of 
the powers required and the number of requests. 
This may be offset against the streamlining of the 
applicable  regimes,  and  is  mitigated  by  reliance 
on existing frameworks. 

could 

bear 

of 

Powers 
oversight 
bodies 

Framework 
information  

to 

enable 

the 

exchange  of 

implementing 
The  costs  of  designing  and 
necessary  APIs  and  adapting  business  processes 
can be absorbed into the general IT maintenance 
cycle. 

SME test186 

It  is  not  possible  to  fully  exempt  SMEs  from  the  transparency  requirements  as  they  are 
important actors in political ads. However, some support measures are foreseen187, as well as 
an  exemption.  SMEs  would  have  the  possibility  to  appoint  an  external  person  as  contact 
point. On the basis of a de mimimis threshold, enterprises would not have to conduct annual 
public reporting.   

Legal fragmentation in the internal market for political ads services is a significant barrier for 
SMEs,  amounting  to  prohibitive  legal  and  costs  obstacles  to  such  enterprises188.  SMEs  are 
also more affected by policies established by private sector actors and some Member States 

185 It would have a greater positive impact on competitiveness, innovation and investment. It will reduce legal fragmentation 
and help create a stable market to support investment, enable national SMEs to scale up their operations and stimulate the 
development of new services offered at EU level. 
186 SMEs are usually technological service providers, engaged in analysis and planning of political campaigns, the provision 
of ‘amplification and targeting services’ or ‘financial support services’ connected to the publication of political ads. SMEs 
raised certain concerns in the consultation, incl. the need to make sure that what is forbidden offline is also forbidden online, 
the need to define “political ads”, and some concerns on targeting and the use of political data. 
187 Incl. with potentially EU supportive intervention to co-fund public authorities and CSOs via financing programmes. 
188 Adapting to multiple regulatory regimes was described as requiring 1 FTE for a compliance officer merely to determine 
the relevant obligations, in addition to making any necessary changes.  

39 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
which limit the possibility to run campaigns to entities which are established in the Member 
State where the political ads would be published.  

Both  options  foresee  changes  that  would  impose  one-off  costs.  The  obligation  to  provide 
information  to  the  authorities  and  specific  actors  (including  other  enterprises  in  the  value 
chain)  involve  an  ongoing  compliance  cost.  Support  to  compliance  to  transparency 
requirements  should  be  offered  by  Member  States,  professional  associations  and  external 
consultancies. While the ongoing costs depend on  the volume of requests, the one-off costs 
described affect SMEs proportionately more than other actors.  

Option  2  offers  more  opportunities  for  such  costs  to  be  offset  by  savings  resulting  from 
simplification  of  the  rules  and  the  elimination  of  the  need  for  multiple  adaptations  when 
offering  services  across  borders.  This  would  increase  cross-border  activity  in  particular  for 
SMEs, which could offer their services to clients outside their Member State of establishment 
and would have the opportunity to scale up to operate at EU level. 

The ban on targeting based on sensitive data or specific techniques during reference periods 
under  suboption  1  of  option  2  would  affect  SMEs  which  process  data  for  political  ads 
purposes just like other economic actors. Suboption 2 is designed to rebalance the impact of 
limiting  targeting  for  political  ads  by  incentivising  high  standards  of  transparency  and 
accountability, also demonstrable to the wider public. Providing a common framework for the 
legitimate use of targeting in political ads could increase opportunities for SMEs to introduce 
new services and enter the market. 

Estimates of costs for obligations addressed to political actors 

Option 2: Extending the Regulation 1141/2014 framework to 
introduce complementary obligations on EUPPs  

to 

Option  1:  Limited 
amendment 
the 
Regulation 
1141/2014 
framework 

European 
parties  

Obligations on political parties to ensure that political ads are published transparently. 
The  changes  in  campaigning  processes  are  expected  to  be  offset  against  reduced 
compliance risk and increased certainty and possibilities to campaign resulting from 
greater  clarity  about  obligations  similar  to  audit  requirements  estimated  at  around 
EUR 75,000 to 150,000 annually189. 

National 
parties 

Should political parties follow similar transparency obligations to EUPPs’ (following 
the soft measures), the relevant parties could incur similar costs to the ones described 
above, proportionate to their own size. 

Political 
parties  in 
the EU 

All  parties  in  the  EU  are  expected  to  face  small  additional  recurring  administrative 
costs  related  to  complying  with  the  obligations  voluntarily  acquired  through 
participation in a fair campaigning pledge. There would be respective one-off costs to 
elaborating the fair campaigning pledge should they wish to make their own. 

6.2.1.3.Costs for public authorities of measures addressed to economic actors 

Both  options  would  aim  to  streamline  oversight,  providing  better  access  to  needed 
information, more opportunities for coordinated action and resource-sharing and clarity about 

189 The underlying study estimates this aspect of compliance costs to amount to around 5% of the overall audit. 

40 

 
 
 
                                                           
 
the responsible authority. This would result in more effective regulatory outcomes, especially 
between online and offline political ads. 

Option  2  would  harmonise  transparency  requirements  for  all  political  ads  and  establish 
certain limits to how online political ads may be targeted. It also provides support to Member 
State  authorities  to  request  information  to  support  their  tasks,190  to  facilitate  cross-border 
oversight.  It  could  result  in  some  costs  for  national  authorities:  one-off  costs  for  training 
administrative staff and ongoing costs of monitoring compliance  transparency and targeting 
obligations.  These  costs  are  expected  to  be  offset  against  the  efficiency  savings  expected 
from  the  harmonised  obligations  and  streamlined  and  strengthened  oversight  process,  but 
given  the  low  levels  of  current  enforcement,  particularly  online,  they  may  not  yield  a  net 
saving in this respect. 

Costs for public authorities of measures addressed to political actors: Given the low level of 
oversight  currently  reported,  impacts  would  be  modest.  Option  1  is  not  expected  to  require 
significant investment by the Authority, except for one-off training costs following a change 
in the scope of conditions considered.  

Option  2  would  require  the  Authority  to  ensure  the  technical  design,  operation  and 
maintenance of a suitable platform for the submission of these disclosures and the publication 
of  relevant  information  for  individuals.191  Considering  that  the  Authority  was  reinforced  in 
2019, the mentioned tasks could be integrated into current workflows and this option does not 
propose a drastic change to the Authority’s tasks. 

Costs similar to those in option 1 or 2 (depending on which is adopted) would be incurred by 
national  parties  and  national  authorities  in  the  Member  States  that  align  national  political 
parties’ transparency obligations to those introduced for EUPPs. These costs would be similar 
in kind, but proportionate to the parties’ size192. 

6.2.2.  Social impacts 

6.2.2.1.Stronger transparency for economic actors 

Both  options  enhance  transparency  in  the  use  of  political  advertising  and  hence  their 
recognisability, with a likely reduction of disinformation and other manipulations. This would 
make it harder for unauthorised actors to use tactics such as the inauthentic amplification of 
certain advertisements (or other tactics uncovered in the Cambridge Analytica scandal). Such 
activities,  conducted  with  or  without  the  knowledge  of  the  sponsor  of  the  ad,  have  the 
potential to unduly influence democratic debates and elections within the EU.  

Transparency  of  political  ads  would  improve  under  both  options  above  the  expected  levels 
compared  to  the  baseline  scenario.  Increased  transparency  and  accountability  of  involved 
actors  should  foster  a  culture  of  open  and  honest  political  campaigning.  There  would  be 
equally  a  small  positive  reputational  impact  for  economic  actors  resulting  from  facilitating 
transparency.  Providing  identical  transparency  requirements  at  EU  level  on  the  basis  of 
harmonised standards would make the biggest difference for service providers in the internal 
market.  

190 Especially the DSA, the GDPR and the AVSMD. 
191 The study estimates this as requiring between 2 FTE, potentially up to 7 FTE during the period around elections (three 
months), see underlying study. 
192 This reasoning also applies to the social and fundamental rights impacts discussed below (insofar as the impact involves 
political parties and authorities), and hence will not be repeated 

41 

 
 
 
                                                           
Option  2  increases  the  scope  of  the  measures  and  includes  further  harmonisation  of  the 
transparency  requirements  which  should  make  it  easier  for  citizens  to  recognise  more 
political  advertisements,  and  support  oversight  by  competent  authorities  as  well  as  scrutiny 
from interested actors (including CSOs, political actors, researchers, elections observers and 
journalists) to monitor online political ads in the EU and hold their sponsors to account. The 
strengthening of the quality of information available to interested actors can help enrich the 
political  debate  too,193  and  the  possibility  for  NGOs  to  sponsor  informational  ads  is  being 
preserved.  

By fostering a culture of open and fair political campaigning, these measures should enhance 
trust in the use of political ads, and more generally in the political debate and the integrity of 
the electoral process. It would contribute to a higher resilience of the EU electoral system to 
information manipulation and interference. 

6.2.2.2.Stronger transparency for political parties 

Both  options  would  complement  the  impact  of  the  measures  addressed  to  economic  actors, 
and increase the transparency provided by political  actors as sponsors of  political  ads.  This 
would be achieved at EU level by introducing concrete elements that EUPPs should ensure 
that are included in their political ads, replacing the existing and rarely applied patchwork of 
national  rules  with  a  common  standard.  At  national  level,  political  actors  would  be 
encouraged to comply through peer and political pressure, as well as through potential future 
national legislation to make best use of the strengthened EU-level framework. 

Under  option  2  the  likely  impact  of  information  standards  in  EUPPs’  political  ads  will  be 
reinforced  by  the  strengthening  of  the  governance  framework  to  provide  ongoing,  active 
supervision,  as  well  as  through  the  provision  of  an  independent  platform  and  party-neutral 
repository of information about political ads activity in European elections, accessible in real 
time by all individuals.  

6.2.2.3.Enforcement and supervision by authorities 

Both options entail improvements over the baseline, in strengthening regulatory coordination 
among  competent  authorities  especially  via  the  designation  of  contact  points  as  well  as  via 
more  operational  coordination  in  this  area  making  best  use  of  existing  frameworks.  This 
would ensure that oversight building on a common set of transparency requirements is better 
coordinated among national authorities. 

Option  2  introduces  specific  powers  for  competent  authorities  to  request  the  rapid 
transmission  of  additional  information  from  economic  actors  and  provides  for  monitoring 
and enforcement structures, building on existing oversight frameworks. This should improve 
the  effectiveness  and  consistency  of  the  oversight  among  Member  States.  Enabling  the 
exchange of information among market actors to ensure that transparency is meaningful and 
conducive to compliance with relevant electoral rules also supports effective oversight. 

6.2.2.4. Address abusive use of targeting 

193 It was observed in the national elections in the Netherlands in 2020 that the provision of information about political ads 
stimulated awareness on them and a national debate on their use. 

42 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
Both  options  would  lead  to  improvement  in  the  use  of  targeting  in  online  political 
advertising,  which  would  be  more  transparent  and  accountable.  Improved  transparency 
measures  in  coordination  with  existing  self-regulation  would  be  expected  to  increase 
awareness,  and  potentially  trust.  More  transparency  around  currently  opaque  targeting 
techniques is likely to indirectly limit targeting or make it more accountable. 

Option 2 on targeting and its suboptions introduces restrictions and conditions on the use of 
targeting (at all times or during specific critical periods).  

While a certain level of transparency on targeting practices is already provided under EU law, 
the  increased  mandatory  level  of  transparency  and  accountability  toward  individuals  and 
toward  society  at  large  is  likely  to  produce  greater  awareness  among  citizens  of  different 
techniques used to target and amplify the effectiveness of political messaging they see. It will 
allow  for  greater  public  scrutiny  of  differentiated  political  campaign  messaging  and  will 
empower citizens to hold political actors more accountable for their different messages and 
promises.  

The  proposed  regulation  could  also  reduce  the  perceived  and  actual  legal  and  reputational 
risk for political actors of cross-border campaigning, increasing opportunities for campaigns 
to reach diaspora communities and mobile citizens, as well as for transnational campaigns in 
the  European  elections.  By  clarifying  the  obligations  of  EUPPs,  this  option  strengthens  the 
EU dimension of the European Parliamentary elections. 

6.2.3.  Fundamental rights impacts 

All  options  have  a  positive  impact  on  fundamental  rights,  and  are  not  expected  to  have 
significant negative impact on fundamental rights.  

6.2.3.1.Freedom of expression and information194 

Both options enhance transparency and hence accountability195 and a priori do not negatively 
affect freedom of expression196. The issuance and disclosure of political ads as such, and their 
content,  remain  regulated  on  the  basis  of  relevant  national  and  EU  law.  The  initiative  does 
not interfere with the content of political messages. Option 2 could cover issues ads disclosed 
by CSOs or individuals. This could impact such actors which could become more reluctant to 
intervene  in  the  political  debate  if  their  anonymity  is  affected.  However,  this  should  be 
balanced  with  the  importance  for  citizens  to  get  a  fair  access  to  information,  understand 
where information comes from and not be subject of manipulative anonymous content. Both 
options positively impact such access to information with a more beneficial impact for option 
2. Such transparent and accountable disclosure of political ads also has spill-overs on users’ 
freedom of assembly and association, as well as on the protection of vulnerable groups from 
manipulation.  

194 Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
195 Current fragmentation and additional registration requirements currently imposed by private companies can limit freedom 
of expression and access to information by citizens.   
196 See European Court of Human Rights’ judgment Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom cited previously. 
In that case, the ECHR ruled in 2013 that the UK ban of political advertising on broadcast media did not violate Article 10 
(freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The court weighed the right to impart information 
and  ideas  of  general  interest  which  the  public  is  entitled  to  receive,  against  the  protection  of  the  democratic  debate  and 
political  process  from  distortion  by  powerful  financial  groups  with  advantageous  access  to  influential  media.  One  of  the 
main  considerations  in determining  that  the  ban did not  go  too  far  was  that  the  applicant  had  access  to  alternative  media. 
This applies here too, as advertisers will retain access to alternatives. 

43 

 
 
 
                                                           
A  limitation  of  targeting  techniques  under  sub-option  1  could  impact  on  freedom  of 
expression. This impact would be proportionate if limited in scope and balanced with impact 
to other fundamental rights. This option would significantly address the risk of manipulation 
of the democratic debate while respecting the freedom and pluralism of the media. 
6.2.3.2.Private life, secrecy of communications and data protection197 

Both  options  are  expected  to  impact  the  rights  to  the  secrecy  of  communications  and  to 
private life set in EU legislation. This is balanced by an overall positive effect on democracy 
and  electoral  rights.  Measures  which  would  identify  the  sponsor  of  a  political  ad  and  the 
amount  of  money  spent  on  an  ad  impact  the  protection  of  personal  data  and  have  to  be 
proportionate  to  the  policy  aim  sought:  to  ensure  that  individuals  engaged  in  the  political 
debate  use  political  ads  in  a  transparent  manner198.  The  enhanced  transparency,  conditions 
and restrictions on targeting should also benefit the right to data protection. 

Where  option  2  requires  from  large  online  platforms  facilitating  data  access  for  audits  and 
investigations by  interested actors  (furthering the freedom  of the arts  and sciences)199, such 
measures would not provide for any derogations from the EU data protection acquis. Only the 
relevant  data  should  be  made  accessible  to  stakeholders  including  to  conduct  research  on 
practices affecting the democratic debate and elections. Access would be designed in a non-
invasive way (e.g. through the use of anonymized data when feasible, and secure or protected 
access)200.  

Similarly,  where  option  2  requires  further  reporting  to  national  authorities,  this  can  entail 
communication of personal data of users of platforms placing the ads (and of users flagging 
the ads). This is a necessary measure for protecting the public interest at stake201 and would 
respect proportionality requirements by limiting it to data already collected by the platform. It 
would  imply  in  any  way  requirements  for  citizens  using  online  services  to  identify 
themselves.  

6.2.3.3.Right to property and freedom to conduct a business 

Option 1 does not affect these rights.  

In providing for obligatory limitations to the possibility to provide targeting of political ads 
on  the  basis  of  certain  data  or  techniques,  option  2  could  limit  the  freedom  to  conduct  a 
business.  This  impact  is  mitigated  using  two  approaches  detailed  in  the  suboptions,  which 
narrow the effect of the proposed limits to the most problematic targeting. 

6.2.3.4.EU electoral rights 

197 Respectively Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
198 This issue has been considered in comparable national legislation: The Joint Committee on Housing and Local 
Government of Ireland, which examined the Irish draft Elections reform bill, requested the national deputy Data Protection 
Commissioner’s view on the definitions for political ads and transparency obligations provided in that bill, and the latter 
indicated they were proportionate: 
https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/joint_committee_on_housing_local_government_and_heritage/2021-03-30/2/  
199 EUCHR Article 13.  
200  See  the  European  Digital  Media  Observatory  Working  Group  on  ‘Access  to  Data  Held  by  Digital  Platforms  for  the 
Purposes  of  Social  Scientific  Research’:  https://edmo.eu/2020/11/24/call-for-comment-on-gdpr-article-40-working-group/ 
Further,  the  access  should  be  direct,  real-time,  both  granular  and  in  aggregated/bulk  form,  and  the  data  should  not  be 
‘doctored’ or modified (except to the extent necessary for pseudonymisation / anonymisation). 
201 If personal data is part of the data, processing would be under Article 6(1)c and e) of the GDPR. This provision requires 
Member States to specify in their national framework the conditions for data processing by the requesting authorities. 

44 

 
 
 
                                                           
Both options will support the exercise of electoral rights202, They will also support free and 
fair  elections  and  a  fair  democratic  debate,  by  facilitating  transparent  cross-border  political 
ads achieving a high level of rights protection, including as regards the protection of personal 
data  and  ensuring  that  citizens  are  able  to  make  informed  political  choices  without 
manipulation  or  coercion.  The  options  addressed  to  political  actors  are  expected  to  have  a 
positive  impact  on  fundamental  rights  including  electoral  rights,  access  to  information  and 
data  protection.  Furthermore,  the  limitations  to  targeting  practices  of  policy  option  2  are 
coherent with, and have a positive impact on electoral rights as protected under international 
standards203.  

Table 1: Summary of Internal Market impacts for each option considered (compared to the baseline) 

Impact assessed 

Baseline 

and 

innovation 

Economic impacts 
Functioning of the internal market 
Competitiveness, 
investment 
Costs  and  administrative  burdens  on 
economic operators (+SMEs) 
Costs for public authorities 
Social impacts 
Enforcement and supervision 
Fundamental rights impacts 
Freedom of expression and information 
and 
Private 
communications and data protection 
Right 
to  property  and  freedom 
conduct a business 
EU electoral rights 
Other impacts (coherence, etc.) 
Overall 

privacy 

life 

of 

to 

~ 
~ 
~ 

~ 

~ 
~ 
~ 
~ 

~ 

~ 

~ 

~ 
~ 
~ 

Option 1 
Limited measures to 
promote transparency, 
address issues with 
targeting and support 
oversight 
+ 
+ 
+ 

> 

> 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
++ 

~ 

+ 
+ 
+ 

Option 2 
Measures to harmonise 
transparency, address 
issues with targeting and 
strengthen oversight 

++ 
++ 
++ 

>> 

>> 
++ 
++ 
++ 
++ 
++ 

+ 

+ 
++ 
++ 

Table 2: Summary of Political parties’ impacts for each option considered (compared to the baseline) 

Impact assessed 

Baseline 

Economic impacts 
Functioning of the internal market 

~ 
~ 

Option 1 
Limited amendment to 
the Regulation 
1141/2014 framework 
+ 
+ 

Option 2 
Extending the 
Regulation 1141/2014 
framework  
++ 
++ 

202 Article 39 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. EU electoral rights include the right for every citizen of the Union to 
vote and to stand as a candidate at elections to municipal and EU elections in the Member State in which he or she resides, 
under the same conditions as nationals of that State. 
203  The  International  Standards  of  Elections  of  the  UN  Committee  on  Human  Rights,  ratified  by  all  EU  Member  States, 
entitle citizens to “be able to form opinions independently, free of […] compulsion, inducement or manipulative interference 
of  any  kind,”  as  well  as  to  vote  “without  undue  influence  or  coercion  of  any  kind  which  may  distort  or  inhibit  the  free 
expression of the elector's will”. See UN Committee on Human Rights, General Comment 25, "The Right to Participate in 
Public  Affairs,  Voting  Rights  and  the  Right  to  Equal  Access  to  Public  Service,"  1510th  meeting  (fiftyseventh  session). 
https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/4/a/19154.pdf  

45 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
and 

innovation 

Competitiveness, 
investment 
Costs  and  administrative  burdens  on 
economic operators (+SMEs) 
Costs for public authorities 
Social impacts 
Enforcement and supervision 
Fundamental rights impacts 
Freedom of expression and information 
Private 
of 
and 
communications  and  personal  data 
protection 
Right  to  property  and  freedom 
conduct a business 
EU electoral rights 

privacy 

life 

to 

~ 

~ 

~ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
~ 

~ 

~ 

+ 

> 

> 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
++ 

~ 

+ 

>> 

>> 
++ 
++ 
++ 
++ 
++ 

+ 

Other impacts (coherence, etc.) 
Overall 
The  tables  above  should be  read  in  vertical:  ‘~’  means  0  for  the  baseline.  ‘+’  pointing  to  a  better  performance  of  the 
option  than  the  baseline,  and  ‘++’  to  the  best  performance  among  the  options;  the  ‘>’  symbol  is  used  to  indicate 
higher costs than the baseline, and ‘>>’ the highest cost among the options. See Annex 4 for a detailed description. 

~ 
~ 
~ 

+ 
+ 
+ 

++ 
++ 
++ 

7.  HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE?  

The options were compared on the basis of the following four criteria: 

  Effectiveness, including to: 

1.  Reduce  legal  fragmentation,  limit  circumvention  of  regulation  and  regulatory 
arbitrage  and  remove  obstacles  and  reduce  costs  for  the  provision  of  cross-border 
political ads services in the internal market; 

2.  Increase transparency in political ads; 
3.  Regulate the use of targeting and other manipulative techniques; 
4.  Ensure  the  effective  oversight  of  the  implementation  of  envisaged  obligations  and 

strengthen regulatory outcomes; and 

5.  Promote  stronger  transparency  and  free  and  fair  elections  through  compliance  with 

relevant rules among political parties in the EU. 

  Efficiency: relating the anticipated costs of the measures against the expected benefits of 

increased effectiveness. 

  Coherence with existing and planned initiatives. 

  Proportionality: relating effectiveness against efficiency and any negative impacts.  

Table 3: Comparison of options against baseline 

Option 

Effectiveness 

Efficiency 

Coherence 

Proportionality 

Baseline 
Option 1 
Option 2 

1 
≈ 
+ 
++ 

2 
≈ 
+ 
++ 

3 
≈ 
+ 
++ 

4 
≈ 
+ 
++ 

5 
≈ 
+ 
++ 

≈ 
+ 
++ 

≈ 
+ 
++ 

≈ 
+ 
++ 

7.1. Effectiveness  

46 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.  Reduce  legal  fragmentation,  limit  circumvention  of  regulation  and  regulatory  arbitrage 
and  remove  obstacles  and  reduce  costs  for  the  provision  of  cross-border  political  ads 
services in the internal market; 

Both  options  would  increase  legal  certainty  over  the  baseline.  Option  1  would  be  a  partial 
step  towards  reducing  fragmentation,  but  it  would  leave  the  majority  of  the  substantive 
changes needed to convergent Member State regulation and self-regulation. Option 2 would 
increase legal certainty and reduce the scope for divergent regulation. It would provide a clear 
basis for  effective oversight,  increasing incentives  for legitimate market entry  and  reducing 
the incentives for circumventing relevant rules.  

With the soft measures proposed by some stakeholders and taken into account in option 1, no 
tools sufficient for effective oversight  are  provided, and further fragmentation will a priori 
not be preventable. Large platforms typically call for self-regulation and soft measures, and 
participate  in  self-  and  co-regulation  such  as  the  Code  of  Practice  on  Disinformation; 
however,  as  discussed  in  the  annex,  their  efforts  (e.g.  to  label  political  ads)  are  done 
inconsistently.  In  particular,  in  the  case  of  providing  researchers  with  access  to  their  data, 
their measures are indicated to be insufficient, inconsistent and non-transparent. 

2.  Increase transparency in political ads 

Both options increase transparency over the baseline. Option 1 is less likely to be effective: 
experience with the Electoral package recommendation and current national legislative plans 
do  not  suggest  that  convergent  regulation  is  likely.  Option  2  would  ensure  that  relevant 
advertisers provide with all political ads the information necessary for them to be recognised 
as such, for their sponsors to  be held  to  account  in  the political  process,  and for competent 
national  authorities  to  carry  out  their  oversight  functions  to  ensure  that  rights  are  protected 
and the democratic processes are not undermined. 

3.  Regulate the use of targeting and other manipulative techniques  

Both options will support self-regulation aiming to ensure more transparent targeting and the 
existing  transparency  and  personal  data  protection  framework.  Option  2  aims  to  introduce 
restrictions  to  how  and  when  targeting  can  be  used.  Suboption  1  would  prioritise  legal 
certainty and the effectiveness of protection during  nationally established reference periods. 
Suboption  2  would  promote  transparency  and  accountability  toward  society  at  large  and 
would  address  further  the  (e.g.  sensitive)  data  types  and  limit  the  scope  of  misuse.  Both 
suboptions  of  option  2  would  include  common  rules  on  transparency  around  targeting 
practices regardless of the targeting limitations. 

4.  Ensure  the  effective  oversight  of  the  implementation  of  envisaged  obligations  and 

strengthen regulatory outcomes 

Both  options  aim  to  support  capacity  building,  cooperation  and  the  strengthening  of  the 
existing and planned governance frameworks at EU and national levels. Option 1 focuses on 
supporting with soft measures the best use of these frameworks where they provide for cross-
border  enforcement.  Option  2  would  also  aim  to  ensure  that  the  gaps  in  these  governance 
frameworks204  are  closed  by  providing  powers  for  national  authorities  to  request  the 

204 Relevant economic actors and services are outside the scope of the e-Commerce Directive/DSA and the AVMSD – see 
Annex 8 for details on the existing relevant governance frameworks and where activities are beyond their scope. 

47 

 
 
 
                                                           
information  necessary  for  their  oversight  activities  for  political  ads,  and  to  be  enabled  to 
cooperate  in  investigation  and  enforcement  action.  Economic  actors  would  be  supported  to 
enable oversight by ensuring interoperability of information system in the political ads value 
chain through the development of common APIs and automation in the provision of the data 
needed by publishers to comply with transparency obligations.  

5.  Promote  stronger  transparency  and  free  and  fair  elections  through  compliance  with 

relevant rules among political parties in the EU 

Both  options  aim  to  ensure  that  EUPPs  use  political  ads  transparently  and  to  support  all 
political actors in achieving high standards of compliance in political campaigning. Option 1 
relies on the existing Regulation 1141/2014: supervision would be passive after the moment 
of registration and application for funding, and review would be conducted significantly after 
campaigning ends. Option 2 would provide obligations for active and timely disclosures for 
EUPPs. 
In  parallel  to  both  options  is  the  soft  measures  to  Member  States  to  align  transparency 
standards  for  their  national  parties  to  those  introduced  for  EUPPs,  which  would  have  a 
similar impact on free and fair European elections nationally. 

7.2. Efficiency 

The efficiency of the options weighs the qualitative cost-benefit analysis described in Annex 
3, as well as in the description of the impacts in section 6 above.  

For both options, online service providers would face non-negligible but variable compliance 
costs for the obligations related to  the  retention  of information  and its supply to  competent 
authorities, with the highest likely exposure being for ad publishers.  

Option  1  would  impose  fewer  direct  costs  on  economic  actors  and  national  authorities. 
Economic actors would continue to be exposed to many of the indirect costs of fragmentation 
described in the baseline scenario. 

Option  2  brings  with  it  additional  compliance  costs  for  economic  actors  to  implement  the 
specific  transparency  and  oversight  related  obligations,  with  both  one-off  adaptation  costs 
and ongoing compliance administrative costs. Overall costs on service providers are expected 
to be lower, however, as reduced fragmentation yields efficiency gains.  

7.3. Coherence with other initiatives205 

Both options are complementary to the objectives of the horizontal instruments establishing 
the single market for digital services, and align with the objective of empowering users and 
improving the opportunities for innovation and the supervision over digital services. Option 2 
would in particular strengthen opportunities for the development of an EU political services 
market, especially for online services. 

Option 2 also supports EU and Member State policies to combat interference and strengthen 
the resilience of democratic processes. Both options apply to the offline context in addition to 
online political ads. Member States already regulate offline political ads strictly on the basis 
of  the  UCPD  and  on  the  basis  of  their  respective  electoral  and  media  regulation.  Online 

205  The  coherence  of  the  present  initiative  with  each  relevant  EU  legislation  and  forthcoming  initiative  is  described 
individually in greater detail in Annex 8, under ‘space for action’ subheadings. 

48 

 
 
 
                                                           
advertising  is  addressed  to  an  extent  by  the  ECD,  and  more  so  by  the  DSA  proposal.  The 
measures  considered  in  this  proposal  will  therefore  close  gaps  of  substance  and  scope  and 
ensure coherence in the approach between media to addressing the specific issues raised by 
political ads.   
Similarly, targeting activities206 are already regulated by data protection rules (the GDPR and 
the ePrivacy Directive207), both online and offline.208 The measures assessed would frame the 
use  of  targeting  for  political  advertising  purposes,  by  mandating  specific  additional 
transparency obligations around its use and by banning certain forms of political ad targeting.  
Another initiative  coherent  with,  and  relevant  for the present initiative is  the DMA  (Digital 
Markets Act), which would apply to Core Platform Services designated by the Commission 
as gatekeepers, including their ad services. 

Proportionality:  Both  options  apply  the  principle  of  proportionality  and  necessity.  This  is 
based on the assessment that the fragmentation of the relevant regulatory framework  cannot 
be  addressed  by  independent  action  and  requires  intervention  at  EU  level.  All  proposed 
measures  are  proportionate  to  the  objectives  set,  though  the  first  suboption  of  option  2 
regarding  targeting  goes  further  in  restricting  economic  activity  to  protect  rights.  A 
fragmented  approach  across  Member  States  is  unable  to  ensure  an  appropriate  level  of 
protection  to  citizens  across  the  Union,  and  the  supervision  of  services  would  remain 
inconsistent. However, the effectiveness and proportionality of the second option in reaching 
the objectives is superior, not least in preventing future re-fragmentation of rules (something 
which no other option is able to do). 

8.  PREFERRED OPTION 

Against this assessment, the preferred option is a package comprising option 2 for the internal 
market with suboption 2 on targeting, and option 2 for political parties (see table under point 
5.2  above.).  This  preferred  set  of  options  would  best  meet  the  general  objectives  of  the 
intervention  and  would  mutually  establish  a  coherent  and  proportionate  framework  for 
political  ads  in  the  EU.  Further,  the  preferred  option  limits  the  impact  on  the  electoral 
systems as established by Member States in line with their respective traditions, focusing on 
the  cross-border  dimension  of  the  transparency  of  political  ads.  The  limitations  on  the 
targeting of political advertising are proportionate because they are strictly limited in scope to 
the specific targeting activities in the political  context that have been identified as posing a 
significant risk to individual’s fundamental rights. 

The choice of legal basis is justified by the need for a uniform application of the new rules, 
such as the definition of political advertising and the transparency obligations that economic 
operator  must  fulfil  when  preparing  or  disseminating  political  advertisement.  It  will  reduce 
legal  fragmentation  and  provide  greater  legal  certainty  by  introducing  a  harmonised  set  of 

206 See also Blasi and Vermeulen, “Reflections on the murky legal practices of political micro-targeting from a GDPR 
perspective,” International Data Privacy Law, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1093/idpl/ipab018 On offline activities, cf. also the 
UK Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) decision in the “Emma’s Diary” case, where the Labour Party profiled and 
sent targeted direct mail to mums living in areas with marginal seats –which was incompatible with the purpose for which 
personal data had initially been collected https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2018/08/emma-s-
diary-fined-140-000-for-selling-personal-information-for-political-campaigning/  
207 Targeting often requires tracking individuals’ online activities, which in turn often implies processing information on the 
individuals’ terminal – e.g. with cookies. This implies requiring prior consent. A proposal for an ePrivacy Regulation is 
being negotiated. Its content is consistent with  the transparency in political ads initiative. 
208 See the guidance issued by the Commission in 2018 as part of the elections package, referred to above. 

49 

 
 
 
                                                           
key  elements  for  the  provision  high  transparency  standards  for  political  advertising,  which 
will  provide  legal  certainty  for  economic  operators  and  prevent  divergences  hampering  the 
free provision of the relevant services within the internal market. 

Specific objective 

Preferred option 

Measures addressed to economic actors in the internal market 
Transparency 
in 
Establish  clear  common  standards 
political ads which provide market actors: 
 
clear  common  framing  for  political 
advertising; 

Common  framing  of  political  ads  using 
combined  approach,  building  on  existing 
national  definitions  as  well  as  self-identified 
political and issues ads.  

 

  Clear,  proportionate  specific  obligations 
for  each  category  of  actor  and  defined 
conditions  under  which  obligations  are 
incurred,  on  the  basis  of  clearly  defined 
key terms; 
streamlined  and  proportionate  reporting 
and  oversight  requirements  and  support 
for  collaboration  in  the  establishment  of 
technical interoperability standards; 
Ensure  common  obligations  and  clear 
common framing at EU level to provide: 
1.  Viewers of political ads with sufficient 

 

transparency to enable them to:  
recognise  a  political  advertisement  as 
such,  

  understand  the  wider  context  of  the 
political advertisement and its aims,  
  know  the  identity  of  the  actors  and 
interests  which  have  sponsored 
the 
advertisement, and  the other information 
such  as  period  of  dissemination  or 
amounts spent. 

 

3.  Member 

2.  ‘Interested actors’ of political ads with 
sufficient transparency to enable them 
to further determine: 
the  chain  of  actors  involved,  including 
the  sponsor’s  identity,  the  amounts  of 
money  spent  on  the  advertising  and  its 
sources,  linked  to  any  wider  associated 
campaign or interest group; 
States  with 
(through 

sufficient 
enhanced 
information 
the 
transparency) 
of 
monitoring 
financing, 
relevant  rules  on 
and 
preparation, 
dissemination  of  political  advertising, 
including those which regulate: 
expenditure; 
financial 

enable 
enforcement 

the 
placement 

political 

material 

and 

 
 

to 

or 

information, 
Passive  obligation  to  retain 
without  prejudice  to  the  proactive  information 
obligations  toward  targeted  data  subjects  under 
the  GDPR  and  DSA.  All  economic  actors  in 
information  regarding 
scope  retain  relevant 
transactions,  including  amounts,  parties  and  the 
use  of  targeting,  where  relevant.  All  economic 
actors  in  scope  provide  extracted  information 
forward through the value chain to the eventual 
ad publishers. 

Obligations  tailored  to  the  relevant  actors  to 
(upon 
(proactively)  provide  citizens,  and 
request)  interested  actors  and  public  authorities 
with  adequate  information  on  political  ads 
(this,  in  order  to  clarify  obligations,  facilitate 
accountability  and  oversight  and  address  the 
issues associated with non-transparent ads). 
These are considered to include: 
  Ad publishers label political ads as such on 
the  face  of  the  ad  (regardless  of  medium), 
and information to enable the wider context 
of the political advertisement and its aims to 
be  understood  (or  clear  indication  as  to 
where  this  may  be  found),  including  on  the 
the  period  of 
identity  of 
dissemination, 
spent,  or 
meaningful  detail  about  the  targeting  or 
used  where 
techniques 
amplification 
applicable; 

the  amounts 

the  sponsor, 

  Ad publishers which are VLOPS under DSA 
provide  the  relevant  additional  information 
in ad repositories, and include on the face of 
the ad a link to its location in the repository; 
  Ad  publishers  provide  additional  relevant 
information in a suitably aggregated form, to 
interested  actors  on  request  (e.g.  on  the 
value chain, or aggregated information on a 
specific advertisement campaigns). 
  Online  ad  publishers  enable  access 

to 

50 

 
 
 
 

 

 

 

between 

candidates 

contributions; 
equality 
(e.g. 
regarding parity of resources and airtime 
during election campaigns); 
silence  periods  and  the  periods  during 
which ads are permitted; 
the  nature  of  participants  (e.g.  third-
country corporate entities); 
the  profiling  and  targeting  of  voters, 
including  through  the  use  of  personal 
data; 

information  regarding  relevant  elections 
(link to official site). 

  Ad  publishers  disclose  to  the  wider  public 
ex  ante 
information  on  processing  of 
personal  data  involved  in  the  service  of  an 
ad  by  the  ad  publisher,  other  relevant 
intermediaries  or 
the  entity  on  whose 
interface the ad appears. 

  Ad  publishers  publish  information  in  their 
periodic reports on the services provided, for 
whom  and  for  how  much,  including  on 
targeting  services,  aggregated  to  campaign 
or candidate. 

  Obligation  to  cooperate  with  competent 
authorities,  backed  by  provisions 
to 
empower  relevant  authorities  to  support  the 
implementation of the initiative. 

Targeting and other manipulative techniques 
Establish  common  rules  which  impose 
proportionate limits on the use of targeting 
techniques for political ads, including 

 
 

enhanced transparency requirements;  
framing their use. 

Recommend 
manipulative 
amplification. 

standards 
techniques, 

for 
specific 
e.g.  unlawful 

should 

standards 

Powers of oversight bodies 
Common 
support 
oversight  and  audit,  and  the  application  of 
sanctions. 
Adequate powers to enable public authorities 
to  monitor  and  enforce 
the  measures 
envisaged in this initiative 
Framework 
the  exchange  of 
information among economic actors in the ad 
value chain to facilitate transparency 

to  enable 

Establish common rules for political ads which: 
- 

limit some targeting techniques – targeting 
based  on  the  special  categories  of  personal 
data  provided  in  Art.  9  GDPR  –  unless 
specific conditions are met, including: 
  implementing and publishing a policy for 
the targeting of political ads; and that 
  keeping  records  on  the  use  of  targeting 
(the relevant mechanisms, techniques and 
parameters  used  and  the  source(s)  of 
personal data used). 

Promote  common  standards  to  limit  the  use  of 
manipulative techniques. 

Powers  for  national  competent  authorities  to 
request  information  and  to  enable  the  exchange 
of  information  among  competent  bodies  within 
and  across  Member  States,  to  oversee  the 
compliance with this regulation. 
the  exchange  of 
Framework 
information among authorities and market actors 
in the ad value chain to ensure that transparency 
is meaningful. 
for  capacity 
Further 
building, joint  action  and the  exchange  of  good 
practice 

to  enable 

including 

support, 

Measures addressed to political parties 
Establish rules for EUPPs which promote the 
fair  and  transparent  use  of  political  ads, 
including: 
 

real  time  and  meaningful  provision  of 
information on expenditure; 

for  EUPPs 

to  ensure 
Elaborated  rules 
transparent  management  and  disclosure  of 
political  ads,  including  obligations  to  publish 
information  with  the  political  ads,  to  limit  the 
use  of  targeting  techniques,  as  well  as  to  retain 

51 

 
 
 
 
 
 
and  disclose  further  information  (including  in 
the  repository  below)  to  provide  accountability 
around the electoral period. 

  meaningful  ad 

labelling  and 

the 
provision of information about the use 
of targeting techniques; 
limitations 
the  use  of  certain 
characteristics or levels of granularity of 
targeting.  

to 

 

Support  an  independent  platform  and  party-
neutral repository of information about political 
ads activity in European elections, accessible in 
real time by all citizens. 

Participation in ‘clear line of sight’ initiative 
to  support  transparency  in  the  political  ads 
industry. 
Preparation  of  and/or  commitment  to  a  ‘fair 
campaigning pledge’. 
Promote  awareness  about  the  Commission’s 
transparent political ads policies. 
Soft measures addressed Member States to adopt standards for their  national political parties 
aligned  to  those  for  EUPPs,  and  to  support  fair  campaigning  pledges  based  on  transparency, 
open information and level playing field. 

9.  HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? 

The table below summarises tentative indicators proposed to monitor the achievement of the 
operational objectives209. An evaluation of the new legislative proposal should be conducted 
within  two  years  after  the  coming  elections  to  the  European  Parliament,  based  on  the 
proposed indicators, and every five years thereafter. Dedicated reports and surveys launched 
by the Commission including Eurostat and other entities will be used to monitor the situation. 

Data  on  the  following  items  will  be  collected  through  Eurobarometer  and  other  surveys 
directed  to  citizens.  The  existing  oversight  coordination  mechanisms  under  the  GDPR,  the 
AVSMD,  and  as  foreseen  for  the  DSA  will  be  used  to  collect  data.  This  will  also  be 
addressed  specifically  in  the  work  programme  for  the  ECNE.  The  implementation  of  the 
elements of the initiative will be assessed following each European Parliamentary election on 
the basis of specific data collection conducted with the support of external contractors. 

Operational objectives 

Establish  common 
transparency 
standards 
political 
advertising  which 
provide  economic 
actors with: 

in 

 Clear  common  framing  for 

political ads 
and 

 Clear 

proportionate 
specific  obligations  for  each 
category  of  actor  and  defined 
conditions 
which 
obligations  are  incurred,  on 
the  basis  of  clearly  defined 
key terms; 

under 

 Streamlined  and  proportionate 
oversight 
and 
reporting 
requirements  and  support  for 
collaboration 
the 
establishment  of 
technical 
interoperability standards; 

in 

 Reduced  costs  and  risk  for 

209 From the underlying study. 

Proposed indicators  Data sources 
Data  shared 
by  Member 
States 

  Access  to  the  cross-
border  political  ads 
market  (the  baseline 
being  the  evaluation 
and  figures  reported 
in 
impact 
assessment). 

this 

   Increase 

in 

the 
completeness 
of 
information  provided 
political 
on 
advertising 
(e.g. 
targeting 
labelling, 
techniques, 
paid 
funding); 
content, 
such 
of 
inclusion 

Stakeholders’ 
reports 

Eurostat 
(market 
trends) 

52 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
providing  political  advertising 
services in the EU; 

 A  level  playing  field  for  all 
relevant economic operators. 

information 
relevant 
available 
including 
repositories 
analysis, 
monitoring 
survey). 

the 
in 
publicly 
tools 
ad 
(textual 
media 
and 

 Estimates  of  political 
ads  labelled  as  such 
(baseline unknown);  
 Percentage  of  users 
interacted  with 
that 
labelled 
political 
advertisement  and/or  
read 
the  disclaimer 
accompanying 
political ads. 

Data  shared 
by  Member 
States  or  by 
publishers. 

Surveys  (the 
baseline 
is 
the 
respondents’ 
response 
to 
the OPC Q4). 

 Recognise  a  political  ad  as 

such;  
 Know 

the 
identity  of 
the 
interests  which 
actors  and 
have sponsored the political ad 
and;  

 Where relevant and in addition 
to the transparency obligations 
under  the  GDPR,  know  that 
the  political ads  was targeted 
to  them  and  have  access  to 
meaningful 
the 
targeting    or  other  technique 
being  used  and  its  democratic 
impact210. 

information 

 The 

full  chain  of  actors 

 Compliance  with  the 

transparency 
standards  as  reported 
interested 
by 
stakeholders 
(mainly 
qualitative). 

Stakeholders’ 
reports 

Surveys  (the 
baseline 
is 
the 
respondents’ 
to 
response 
the OPC Q4) 

involved;  

 The  amounts  of  money  spent 
its 
the  advertising  and 
on 
sources,  and  link  this  to  any 
wider  associated  campaign  or 
interest group; 

the 

 Meaningful and precise details 
about 
targeting  used 
(where relevant), including the 
amounts  spent  on  it,  and  the 
sources of data used; 

 The  scope  and  period  of 
an 
advert, 
circulation  of 
including 
meaningful 
information about variants and 
organic distribution. 

 Enhanced 

transparency 
requirements would permit the 
precise  characteristics  used  to 
be  understood  as  well  as  the 
role  played  by  the  platform’s 
prioritisation algorithms, and;  
 Demonstration  to  the  wider 
public  of  the  measures  taken 

 Level  of  compliance 
with  EU 
standards 
feedback 
based  on 
from  Member  States 
including 
data 
protection  authorities 
and citizens.  

 Amounts  and  quality 

Data  shared 
by  Member 
States 

Surveys  (the 
baseline 
is 
the 
respondents’ 

that 

Ensure 
the 
common  standards 
established  at  EU 
provide 
level 
individuals  with 
sufficient 
transparency 
enable them to:  

to 

that 

Ensure 
the 
common  standards 
established  at  EU 
provide 
level 
‘interested  users’ 
(researchers, 
and 
journalists 
interested 
other 
in 
the 
actors 
process) 
political 
of 
political 
advertising  with 
sufficient 
transparency 
enable 
determine:  

them 

to 
to 

Establish  common 
standards  to  limit 
of 
use 
the 
targeting 
techniques 
for 
political ads during 
certain  periods  or 
for  certain  actors; 

210 To be interpreted as an obligation in addition and cumulative to the obligations under Articles 13 and 14 GDPR. 

53 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
for 

e.g. 

certain 
unless 
conditions are met. 
Recommend 
standards 
specific 
manipulative 
techniques, 
unlawful 
amplification. 
Ensure 
the 
that 
common  standards 
established  at  EU 
provide 
level 
States 
Member 
sufficient 
with 
transparency 
to 
oversight 
enable 
and  enforcement 
of relevant rules as 
regards 
the 
financing, 
preparation, 
placement 
dissemination 
political 
advertising,  and  to 
support  oversight, 
and  the  application 
of sanctions. 

and 
of 

Establish  rules  for 
which 
EUPPs 
promote 
the 
transparent  use  of 
political 
advertising, 
including: 
Promote 
transparent 
political 
policies. 
measures 
Soft 
to 
addressed 
Member  States  to 
adopt standards  for 
national 
their 
parties 
political 
aligned to those for 
EUPPs. 

ads 

to minimise the risks posed by 
to 
targeting 
individuals’ 
to 
democratic societies at large. 

practices 
rights  and 

of  policies  and  other 
made 
information 
available 
by 
companies and parties 
and 
targeting 
on 
manipulative 
techniques. 

to 
response 
the OPC Q4) 

Stakeholders’ 
reports 

Including rules that regulate: 
 Expenditure; 
 Financial  or  material  political 

contributions; 

 Equality  between  candidates 
(e.g. 
regarding  parity  of 
resources  and  airtime  during 
election campaigns); 

 Silence 

the 
periods 
periods  during  which  ads  are 
permitted; 

and 

 The nature of participants (e.g. 
corporate 

third-country 
entities); 

 The  processing  of  personal 
data,  including  the  profiling 
and targeting of voters. 

 Real 

time  and  meaningful 
provision  of  information  on 
expenditure; 

 Meaningful  ad  labelling  and 
the  provision  of  information 
about  the  use  of  targeting 
techniques; 
 Limitations 

the  use  of 
to 
certain characteristics or levels 
of granularity of targeting;   
 Participation  in  ‘clear  line  of 
sight’ 
to  support 
transparency  in  the  political 
ads industry; 

initiative 

 Change 

in  political 

advertising: 
completeness  of  such 
information  provision 
labelling, 
(e.g. 
targeting 
techniques, 
paid content ranking). 
 Compliance  with  the 
EU level standards. 
 User  interaction  with 

key 
used 
targeted 

targeted 
advertisement; 
characteristics 
for 
advertisement; 
compliance 
transparency 
principles  of  political 
advertisement; 
existence  of  standards 
aligned  with  the  EU 
level ones. 

with 

 Compliance  with  EU 
standards  based  on 
feedback  in  particular 
from the Authority for 
political parties. 

 Self-reporting 

of 
compliance  with  EU 
rules  by  the  EUPPs 
on 
(based 
questionnaire). 

Data  shared 
by  Member 
States 

Surveys 

Stakeholders’ 
reports 
(including 
EUPP  annual 
reports, 
the 
where 
baseline 
the 
current  level 
of 
expenditure 
on 
ads) 

online 

Data  shared 
by Authority  

in 

Data 
available 
the 
Authority’s 
ad  repository 
for EUPPs 

Survey 
EUPPs 

for 

 Preparation 
commitment 
campaigning pledge’. 

of 

to 

a 

and 
‘fair 

54 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annexes 

Glossary and acronyms 

Meaning or definition 

‘Advertisement’  (or  ‘ad’)  means  –  for  the  purpose  of  this  impact  assessment  – 
information designed to promote the message of a legal or natural person, irrespective 
of  whether  to  achieve  commercial  or  non-commercial  purposes,  and  generally 
displayed against  a  form of remuneration specifically  for promoting that  information. 
Advertising  can  take  many  forms  on  any  medium,  including  but  not  limited  to, 
sponsored  targeted  messages,  sponsored  content,  sponsored  search  results,  paid-for 
amplification  in  news  feed  or  through  relevance  algorithms,  promotion  in  rankings, 
promotion of something/someone integrated into content (such as product placement), 
‘influencers’ and other endorsements. The term is defined and applied variously in EU 
and national law in a political context (see Annex 8), and these definitions and national 
definitions  of  political  party,  campaign,  campaign  period,  political  aim,  or  any  other 
relevant definition used to establish the link with political ads would not be affected.  

Searchable  database  of  advertising  made  available  through  application  programming 
interfaces and contains information about each advertisement, which can include212 the 
content  of  the  advertisement,  the  natural  or  legal  person  on  whose  behalf  the 
advertisement  is  displayed,  the  period  during  which  the  advertising  was  displayed, 
whether  the  advertisement  was  intended  to  be  displayed  specifically  to  one  or  more 
particular  groups  of  recipients,  and,  if  so,  the  main  parameters  used  for  that  purpose, 
the total number of recipients of the advertisement, and the amount spent. 

Term or acronym 

Ad / 
advertisement211 

Ad library / ad 
repository 

Ad publisher213 

Entity publishing a political ad:  
  Offline, the entity which broadcasts, publishes or otherwise disseminates the ad to 

the public;  

  Online, the entity which makes an ad available on its own online interface, or via 
an  interface  provided  by  another214,  where  the  ultimate  interface  of  publication 
merely displays content served by an intermediary, which is to be considered the 
effective publisher. 

Competent 
authorities 

Authorities  designated  by  Member  States  to  carry  out  enforcement  tasks  in  line  with 
applicable law.  

Disinformation 

False  or  misleading  content  that  is  spread  with  an  intention  to  deceive  or  secure 
economic or political gain and which may cause public harm215. 

European 
political parties 
(EUPPs)216 

Political alliance which pursues political objectives and is registered with the Authority 
for EUPPs and foundations. 

211 Based on Article 2(n) of the proposal for a Digital Services Act (DSA). 
212  The  DSA  includes  specifications  for  the  information  to be  retained  by  ad  repositories  maintained  by  very  large  online 
platforms. Currently various platforms maintain repositories including different information. 
213 See Article 2(n) DSA proposal:  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?qid=1608117147218&uri=COM%3A2020%3A825%3AFIN 
214 Thus including including ad networks and exchanges which place ads programmatically on third party interfaces. 
215    Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European  Economic  and  Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the European Democracy Action Plan – COM/2020/790 final – 3/12/2020: 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2020%3A790%3AFIN (‘EDAP’). 

55 

 
 
 
                                                           
ECNE 

European Cooperation Network on Elections 

Misinformation217  False  or  misleading content  shared  without  harmful intent  though the  effects can  still 
be harmful, e.g. when people share false information with friends and family in good 
faith. 

Online 
platforms218  

Political ad 
(political 
advertising) 

A provider of a hosting service which, at the request of a recipient of a service, stores 
and  disseminates  to  the  public  information,  unless  that  activity  is  a  minor  and  purely 
ancillary feature of another service and, for objective and technical reasons cannot be 
used without that other service, and the integration of the feature into the other service 
is  not  a  means  to  circumvent  the  applicability  of  EU  rules  applicable  to  online 
platforms.  

Information designed to promote a message, published by any means, and which fulfils 
at least one of the following conditions: 
being paid for by, or circulated on behalf of a political actor or; 
- 
- 
being published in a Member State during the period of three months before 
European  parliamentary  elections,  or  during  a  nationally  established  reference  period 
which may reasonably be believed as seeking to influence the outcome of the election 
or the voting behaviour of an individual or a group of individuals or; 
- 
being  published  in  a  Member  State  outside  a  nationally  established  election 
period  and  manifestly  seeking  to  directly  impact  the  outcome  of  an  election,  or  the 
voting behaviour of an individual or a group of individuals. 
Such  ads219  include  ‘issues  ads’,  and  are  ads  disseminated  in  the  European  Union 
regardless of the medium (offline or online).  

Programmatic 
advertising 

Process  of  automatically  buying  and  selling  digital  advertising  space  on  the  basis  of 
pre-established criteria. 

Profiling220 

Any  form  of  automated  processing  of  personal  data  consisting  of  the  use  of  personal 
data  to  evaluate  certain  personal  aspects  relating  to  a  natural  person,  in  particular  to 
analyse  or  predict  aspects  concerning  that  natural  person’s  performance  at  work, 
economic  situation,  health,  personal  preferences,  interests,  reliability,  behaviour, 
location or movements. 

Recommender 
system221 

A  fully  or  partially  automated  system  used  (for  instance  by  an  online  platform)  to 
suggest  in  an  online  interface  specific  information  to  recipients  of  the  service, 
including as a result of a search initiated by the recipient or otherwise determining the 
relative order or prominence of information displayed. 

Targeting222 

Directing an ad to a particular audience on the  basis of certain shared characteristics. 

216  Based on Article 2(3) to Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 
October 2014 on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations. Available over: 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014R1141 
217  Definition from the European Democracy Action Plan (‘EDAP’). 
218  Based on Article 2(h) DSA proposal. 
219 Defined variously in EU and national law (see Annex 8), but for current purposes to include any form of communication 
or representation on any medium disseminated in exchange for remuneration. 
220 Based on Article 4(4) of Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of natural 
persons  with  regard  to  the  processing  of  personal  data  and  on  the  free  movement  of  such  data,  and  repealing  Directive 
94/46/EC (hereafter “GDPR”). 
221 Based on Article 2(o) DSA proposal. See also the European Data Protection Board (hereafter ‘EPDB’) guidelines 8/2020. 
Recommender systems follow a variety of criteria and designs, sometimes personalised for the users. This personalisation is 
based  on,  i.e.,  a  user's  navigation  history,  profiles,  or  ratings  they  have  provided  other  products,  services  or  businesses 
they’ve interacted with in the past on the platform. The prominence of information on a recommender system (news feed, 
search engine, etc.) can be influenced by payment; this ‘amplification’ amounts to advertising – possibly political, depending 
on what or whom is being amplified. 

56 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Targeting can use personal data which is obtained directly from a user, or observed or 
inferred  from  the  user’s  online  behaviour  –  about  what  they  like,  who  they  are 
connected to, what their demographics are, what they have purchased, and more  — to 
tailor the recipients of a message to its intended audience, with the aim of increasing its 
impact.  Targeting  is  also  described  as  microtargeting,  to  emphasise  the  perceived 
granularity and accuracy of tailoring which can be achieved.  

Very large online 
platforms223 
(VLOPs) 

Online platforms which provide their services to a  number of average monthly active 
recipients of the service in the Union equal to or higher than 45 million. Designated by 
authorities  once  they  reach  a  user-base  of  over  10%  of  the  EU  population,  entailing 
significant  societal  risks  in  the  EU.  See  respectively  Articles  24  and  30  of  the  DSA 
proposal 

222  EDPB  guidelines  8/2020.  See  also  https://blog.mozilla.org/internetcitizen/2018/10/04/microtargeting-dipayan-ghosh/, 
quoted in Election-Watch-EU and OSCE Policy Paper of April 2021 on Artificial Intelligence’s (AI) Impact on Freedom of 
Expression in Political Campaign and Elections. 
223 Based on Article 25 DSA proposal. The DSA foresees that VLOPs will be designated as such by the competent authority 
provided under the DSA. 

57 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Annex 1: Procedural information 

1.  Lead DG, DEcide Planning/CWP references 

The  Staff  Working  Paper  was  prepared  by  the  Directorate-General  for  Justice  and 
Consumers. 

The Decide reference of this initiative is PLAN/2020/8647. 

2.  Organisation and timing 

The Impact Assessment was prepared by DG JUST as the lead Directorate-General. 

following 

services:  DG  COMP 

The  Inter-Service  Steering  Group  established  for  this  initiative  was  associated  and 
consulted  several  times  in  the  process  with  meetings  on  30 April,  7  June,  30  June  and 
finally on 25 August 2021, under the coordination of the Secretariat-General. It included 
(DG  Competition),  DG  COMM 
the 
(DG 
Communication),  DG  CNECT 
(DG  Communications  Networks,  Content  and 
Technology), DG EAC (DG Education and culture), DG FISMA (DG Financial Stability, 
Financial  Services  and  Capital  Markets  Union),  DG  GROW  (DG  Internal  Market, 
Industry,  Entrepreneurship  and  SME),  DG  JUST  (DG  Justice  and  Consumers),  JRC 
(Joint Research Centre), DG RTD (DG Research and Innovation), SJ (Legal Service), SG 
(Secretariat-General), EEAS (European External Action Service). 

The  last  meeting  of  the  ISSG,  chaired  by  the  Secretariat-General  of  the  European 
Commission was held on 25 August 2021 (minutes attached). 

3.  Consultation of the RSB 

An upstream  meeting took place on 11 February 2021 and the recommendations of the 
Regulatory Scrutiny Board were duly taken into account. The Regulatory Scrutiny Board 
discussed  the  draft  impact  assessment  in  the  hearing  that  took  place  on  29  September 
2021. 

4.  Evidence, sources and quality 

The evidence base is drawn in particular from the following:  

  The  implementation  of  the  Commission’s  September  2018  electoral  package224, 

as described in the Commission’s report on the 2019 elections225;  

  The  experience  combatting  disinformation  and  other  forms  of  information 
manipulation  and  interference  in  democracy  guided  by  the  Action  Plan  against 
disinformation226,  most  recently  reported  on  in  the  Commission  and  High 
Representative’s joint Communication, “tackling COVID disinformation”227;  

224 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_5681  
225 https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/com_2020_252_en_0.pdf and 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/swd_2020_113_en.pdf  
226 https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
homepage_en/54866/Action%20Plan%20against%20Disinformation  
227 https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/communication-tackling-covid-19-disinformation-getting-facts-right_en.pdf  

58 

 
 
                                                           
  The Commission’s assessment of the first year of operation of the self-regulatory 

Code of Practice on Disinformation228;  

  The  preparatory  studies  and  open  consultation  for  the  European  Democracy 
Action Plan229, the 2020 EU Citizenship Report230 and the Digital Services Act231, 
as well as an ongoing study on the use of digital tools in elections;  

  Standard  Eurobarometer  94.1  (the  fieldwork  for  which  was  conducted  in 
December 2020), which included five specific questions on elections relevant to 
this initiative, and other relevant Eurobarometers232; 

  Other material  as necessary, including the substantial research performed  by the 
Joint Research Centre within the Enlightenment 2.0 research programme233; 
  The  work  of  the  European  Cooperation  Network  on  Elections,  including  its 

mapping of relevant national laws and procedures; 

  An open public consultation on the present initiative and bilateral meetings with 

stakeholders (see Annex 2); and 

  A dedicated study from VVA with a backward-looking baseline description of the 
status quo and analysis, including a comprehensive legal and policy mapping of 
in  general, 
relevant  national  provisions  determining  political  advertising 
advertising  in  political  campaigns,  as  well  as  the  conduct  and  financing  of 
political campaigning (“the underlying study”)234. 

5.  Implementation plan 

An  implementation  plan  will  be  prepared,  tailored  to  the  policy  option  pursued. 
Evaluation of implementation of measures before, during and following the elections will 
be conducted as a part of the usual reporting process (would be included in the legislative 
proposal). 

228 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/assessment-code-practice-disinformation-achievements-and-
areas-further-improvement - Staff Working Document (SWD(2020)180) 
229 https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/report_edap_public_consultation_final.pdf   
230 https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/report-public-consultation-eu-citizenship-rights-2020_en    
231 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12418-Digital-Services-Act-package-ex-
ante-regulatory-instrument-of-very-large-online-platforms-acting-as-gatekeepers and 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12417-Digital-Services-Act-deepening-the-
Internal-Market-and-clarifying-responsibilities-for-digital-services  
232 Flash Eurobarometer 485 on EU Citizenship and Democracy 
https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/survey/getsurveydetail/instruments/flash/surveyky/2260
; The 2019 post-electoral survey https://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/files/be-
heard/eurobarometer/2019/post-election-survey-2019-complete-results/report/en-post-election-survey-2019-report.pdf; 
Standard Eurobarometer 90 – Media use in the European Union, December 2018 
https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/ResultDoc/download/DocumentKy/86432; Special 
Eurobarometer 477 Democracy and elections 
https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/search/477/surveyKy/2198; 
Flash Eurobarometer 469 Illegal content online 
https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/search/online/surveyKy/2201; 
Flash Eurobarometer 464 Fake News and Disinformation Online 
https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/search/online/surveyKy/2183; 
Special Eurobarometer 447 Online Platforms 
https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/search/online/surveyKy/2183. 
Special Eurobarometer 507 Democracy in the EU https://fronteirasxxi.pt/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/ebs_507_en.pdf  
233 https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/enlightenment-research-programme  
234  For 
advertising_en;  and  for 
political-advertising_en  

the  underlying  study  see  https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/study-preparation-impact-assessment-political-
it  annexes  https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/annexes-study-preparation-impact-assessment-

59 

 
 
 
                                                           
Annex 2: Stakeholder consultation 

1.  THE STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY 

The Commission conducted wide consultations on issues related to political advertising, 
digital  services  and  online  platforms  between  January  and  May  2021.  The  consultation 
process  built  upon  other  consultation,  which    helped  identify  the  key  issues  at  stake  as 
well  as  options  and  their  assessment.  An  open  public  consultation  (“OPC”)  from  22 
January to 2 April 2021 and a consultation on the inception impact assessment published 
on 26 January 2021 provided information  to  develop  the problem  definition and policy 
options. The OPC was promoted through the Commission’s website, as well as through 
specific networks. Broad outreach to the wider stakeholder community was organised by 
Communication services of the European Commission (notably via social media). 

The Commission organised meetings with key stakeholders to gather additional evidence 
and  data  on  the  specific  problems  addressed  by  the  initiative,  as  well  as  on  the  policy 
approach and its impacts. It also conducted targeted bilateral consultations and analysed 
numerous  position  and  analytical  papers  received  especially  in  the  context  of  the 
preparation  of  the  initiative.  The  preparation  of  this  impact  assessment  was  also 
supported  by  an  external  study.  The  contractor  also  conducted  a  series  of  individual 
consultations with key stakeholders (see section 4 below).  

Relevant  work  in  the  Council  (including  in  the  relevant  working  parties)  and  in  the 
European  Parliament  (including  in  the  Committees  in  charge  of  Constitutional  Affairs, 
Legal  Affairs;  Civil  Liberties,  Internal  Market  and  Consumer  Protection,  Justice  and 
Home  Affairs  and  the  Special  Committee  on  Foreign  Interference)  has  provided 
significant input to this process235.  

The  stakeholder  engagement  strategy  aimed  at  gathering  the  input  of  the  following 
actors: 

1.  Private  sector.  The  Commission  collected  the  input  of  businesses  involved  in  the 

value chain of political advertising: 

a.  Online intermediaries, including internet service providers; 
b.  Advertisers,  which  constitute  the  link  between  political  actors  and  service 

providers; 

c.  Telecommunication services; 
d.  Publishers  Trade  and  business  associations  representing  the  different 

interests of the businesses of the above categories, as well as SMEs. 
2.  National  authorities  including  through  the  European  Cooperation  Network  on 

Elections; 

3.  Political parties at EU level; 
4.  Civil society organisations advocating for fundamental and democratic rights (such 

as digital rights) and representing the interests of vulnerable groups; 

5.  Journalists and media organisations; 
6.  Academia and information technology communities;  

235  For  example,  the  INGE  and  IMCO  Committees  of  the  European  Parliament  had  specific  meetings  on  political 
advertising. 

60 

 
                                                           
7.  International  organisations  working  on  democratic 

issues  such  as  IDEA 

International236 and the Council of Europe237; 

8.  General public including citizens themselves through the OPC of which a thorough 

data analysis has been conducted. 

The different consultation tools and an overview of the results are described below. 

2.  OPEN PUBLIC CONSULTATION (OPC) – 22 January to 2 April 2021 

In  total  137  responses  were  received  in  the  context  of  the  OPC.  Most  feedback  was 
received  from  citizens  (EU  citizens  48%,  and  non-EU  citizens  1.4%),  NGOs  (20.4%), 
and  business  associations  (9.5%).  There  were  followed  by  ‘Other’  (6.5%),  private 
companies  (5.8%),  public  authorities  (4.3%),  academia  (2.1%),  consumer  organisations 
(0.7%), and trade unions (0.7%).  

The majority of respondents were from the EU. Their six main countries of origin were 
Belgium  (21.1%),  Germany  (10.9%),  Italy  (9.4%),  France  (8.7%),  Czech  Republic 
(6.5%) and Spain (6.5%). In addition, 12 position papers were submitted (see point 3.6 
below).  

2.1 Definition of political advertising 

On defining political advertising, the only item that respondents did not consider part of 
the  definition  of  political  advertising  was  essential  information  about  an  election. 
Respondents were split as to “get out to vote” campaigns should be also covered. A small 
majority considered issue based ads as political advertising (61.3%).  
58.3% of respondents considered that the definition of political ads should be set in law, 

while  27%  deem  that  it should  be  dynamically  adaptable.  The  former  state  that  a  legal 
definition is required to (a) provide legal certainty, (b) prevent grey areas and loopholes, 
(c)  have  a  strong  framework  to  prevent  electoral  manipulation  and  (d)  to  clearly  frame 
restriction on freedom of expression. The arguments for a dynamic definition are to (a) 

236 https://www.idea.int/  
237 https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal  

61 

 
                                                           
allow  quick  modifications  due  to  rapid  evolutions  in  technology,  (b)  ensure  fair 
competition and (c) that many political contents would not clearly be included in a fixed 
definition.  Some  advocated  for  a  legal  definition,  which  should  be  dynamically 
adaptable.  

2.2 Prior experience with political advertising 

Most  respondents  had  encountered  political  advertising  before,  mostly  in  the  form  of 
posters  (32.2%),  online  (26.3%),  and  on  TV  (10.9%).  77.4%  have  seen  online  political 
advertising.  

Respondents were asked if they consider they can easily retrieve pieces of information in 
current  online  political  advertisements.  The  responses  clearly  indicate  a  lack  of,  or 
unequal transparency in many different categories. The most striking missing items are  

- 

- 

- 

a) information about who is sponsoring the ad; 

 b) information about the amount paid; 

 c) information regarding the use of targeting.  

The  majority  of  business  associations  and  companies  did  not  provide  answers  to  these 
questions.  

Respondents largely indicated being unable to identify information about the sponsor of 
political advertising they had encountered. A large majority of them would favour the 
disclosure of this information in the ad itself. 

62 

 
 
EC public consultation on political advertising – improving transparency: respondents’ 
views on the need to disclose the sponsor of political advertising in the ad itself 

2.3 Potential legislation on online political advertising at EU level 

The majority of respondents (62%) were in favour of a legislative action at EU level on 
the funding of political advertising. It is worth noting that there is a significant number of 
respondents  (29%)  who  did  not  position  themselves  on  this  issue  (11.7%  maybe,  5.8% 
don’t know, 11.7% blank), mainly among business associations and companies.  

In their comments, several underlined the diversity of legislation across Member States 
as  an  issue.  Some  respondents  wrote  that  harmonised  EU  legislation  would  prevent 
national  authorities  to  circumvent  their  own  rules.  For  the  ones  favouring  legislation 
action at EU level, they suggested focusing on transparency of funding of political parties 
and foreign donations.  

For the ones  against an EU legislative intervention, the most commonly used argument 
was  that  electoral  matters  is  a  national  prerogative.  However,  they  would  support  the 
exchange of best practices and the adoption of guiding principles. 

On the sources  of funding, the table below  clearly shows a trend towards a citizen and 
participatory  approach  with  preferences  for  political  advertising  being  funded  through 
crowdfunding and by EU citizens. Most respondents voted against anonymous donations 
and funding from foreign sources, underlining a will to keep political campaigns outside 
the reach of external actors. This is confirmed by the fact that 70.1% of respondents are 
concerned  with  the  influence  of  foreign  actors.  In  general,  business  associations, 
companies, and public authorities did not position themselves on this issue. 

63 

 
 
Specific questions required the respondents to give their opinion on certain limitations at 
EU level. 43.8% of respondents (mostly citizens) indicated that the EU should limit the 
amount  of  money  allocated  to  political  advertising  per  campaign.  All  business 
associations, companies, and public authorities disagreed or did not answer.  

46%  agreed  with  the  statement  that  the  EU  should  limit  the  amount  of  money  that  a 
party, candidate, or campaign can receive from a single source. Again, this is supported 
mostly  by  EU  citizens,  while  business  associations,  companies,  and  public  authorities 
disagreed or did not reply. 

Subsequent questions required respondents to state the desirability of several disclosure 
requirements.  80.3%  agreed  that  there  should  be  EU  rules  requiring  all  political 
advertising  to  be  clearly  and  specifically  labelled.  72.3%  indicated  that  all  sponsors  of 
political ads should be disclosed within the ad itself and 64.2% that there should be rules 
requiring  political  ads  to  be  truthful  and  not  misleading.  While  positive  replies  were 
equally spread across stakeholders for the two first questions, business associations and 
companies showed more reluctance regarding truthfulness requirements. 

There was more uncertainty with regard to the need to regulate the allocation of online 
advertising space during election times (47.4% yes, 13.9% no, 19% maybe, 9.5% don’t 
know,  10.2%  blank).  Positive  replies  came  from  EU  citizens,  public  authorities, 
academia, and NGOs.  

2.4 European Elections & online political advertising 

Several questions specifically zoomed in on the aspect of European elections. A majority 
of  respondents  (68%)  voiced  their  support  for  common  political  advertising  rules  for 
European elections. Some of them argued that as Members of the European Parliament 
are  all  elected  to  the  same  body,  they  should  run  under  the  same  conditions.  Others 
reiterated the importance of transparency requirements to ensure the quality of European 
elections. A majority of respondents, across all stakeholders support specific measures to 
increase oversight of competent authorities (73.7%).  

On the identity of ad placers, a small majority (57%) of respondents favoured residence 
in  a  Member  State,  although  disagreeing  as  to  whether  it  should  be  limited  physical 
persons  or  not.  A  fair  share  (25%)  would  prefer  to  set  the  Member  State  where  the  ad 
will circulate as the criterion. Most business associations and companies did not reply.   

64 

 
 
  
The  table  below  shows  that  there  is  a  high  demand  for  transparency  when  it  comes  to 
online political advertising sponsored by European political parties (EUPPs) as well as a 
certain  distrust  towards  certain  amplification  and  data-driven  techniques  such  as 
targeting. However, political advertising should not be restricted for EUPPs. While again 
the  ‘yes’  responses  come  primarily  from  EU  citizens,  NGOs  have  joined  the  former 
while major platforms and some business associations have refrained to vote. 

2.5 
Transparency 
requirements 
and 
advertisement 
repositories 

like 

On 
ads 
repositories,  71% 
respondents 
of 
that 
would 
publishers 
of 
political ads retain at least basic information from those placing the ads. 67% responded 
that service providers involved in political ads should also have obligations to retain and 
provide information. 68% of the respondents stated that beyond competent authorities, all 
political  ads  should  also  be  available  to  citizens.  The  specific  content  that  should  be 
retained can be found in figure 5. The majority of respondents has shown its support for 
retaining extensive information.  Around 35% left  a blank answer for each option, most 
notably companies, including online platforms and business associations.  

2.6 Targeting and amplification methods 

57.7%  of  respondents,  mostly  EU  citizens,  NGOs,  and  public  authorities,  favoured 
additional  limits  on  targeting  and  amplification  methods,  besides  compliance  with  data 
protection  rules.  Few  respondents  submitted  additional  comments,  proposing  limits 
ranging  from  stricter  data  protection  rules,  stricter  transparency  requirements,  to  rules 
diminish the misleading potential of such techniques. Among these 57.7%, respondents 

65 

 
 
favoured either a ban of targeting and amplification, or an opt-in by the user. While most 
business  associations  and  companies  did  not  reply,  EU  citizens,  NGOs,  academia,  and 
public  authorities  further  considered  that  the  EU  should  regulate  the  following 
amplification  methods:  paid  for  likes,  bot  software  and  paid  for  influencers.  41.6%  of 
respondents,  spread across  stakeholders,  replied that  the targeting of political  ads could 
be allowed for certain criteria if relevant data protection rules are complied with.  

2.7 Positions of European political parties (EUPPs) and national parties 

EUPPs  were  invited  by  letter  to  provide  their  input  on  the  initiative.  Five  EUPPs 
submitted  a  contribution,  the  European  People’s  Party  (EPP),  the  Alliance  for  Liberals 
and  Democrats  for  Europe  (ALDE),  the  European  Green  Party  (EGP),  the  Party  of 
European Socialists (PES) and the European Free Alliance (EFA).  

All five parties support common rules at EU level. EFA highlighted that if the EU wants 
to create a stronger European-level democracy, EUPPs must be allowed to operate on a 
European level. The four other parties mentioned that this is particularly needed because 
they  are  concerned  by  the  practice  of  very  large  platforms  to  limit  the  placement  of 
online ads to the country in which they have a registered office, limiting their ability to 
reach  out  to  citizens  across  the  whole  EU.  Consequently,  these  four  parties  were  in 
favour of allowing any person or legal person residing in any Member State to place an 
ad. Specifically, ALDE proposed to establish ‘election labels’ for political advertising of 
EUPP  in  the  context  of  European  elections.  Regarding  definition,  PES  and  EPP 
supported an extensive definition, which includes ‘get out to vote’ campaigns, while the 
EGP preferred to exclude them. Both PES and EGP would set such definition in law. The 
same two parties  agreed that civil  society actors should be subject  to the same rules as 
political parties when placing political ads. 

PES,  EPP,  EFA  and  EGP  agreed  that  there  should  be  rules  at  EU  level  regarding  how 
political  ads  are  funded,  with  the  PES  only  accepting  crowdfunding  as  a  valid  source. 
Not all parties agreed that disclosing all sponsors of an ad was necessary - PES and EGP 
and  EFA  did.  EPP  and  PES  consider  that  European  parties  should  disclose  their  ad 
expenditures in real time. EFA supported the creation of a common database of political 
advertisements  to  be  kept,  with  relevant  information  on  who  is  paying  for  the  ad,  the 
amount spent, target audience, etc. PES, EFA and EGP agreed that such ad repositories 
should  be  made  available  to  citizens,  while  EPP  suggested  that  only  competent 
authorities  should  have  this  access.  They  had  different  views  regarding  transparency 
disclosure. EFA indicated that levels and limits of spending for national elections should 
be set at national level, and that an EU approach as to how these ads can be funded would 
be beneficial. 

On  targeting  and  amplification  techniques,  four  parties  (the  fifth  one  did  not  take  a 
stance)  considered  that  EU  data  protection  rules  would  be  sufficient  to  protect  EU 
citizens.  EGP  was  open  to  a  limit  the  processing  of  personal  data  for  targeting  and 
amplification,  namely  via  an  opt-out  for  users.  EUPPs  had  different  views  regarding 
transparency  disclosure  on  targeting:  ALDE  and  EGP  agreed  that  European  parties 
should  maintain  examples  of  ads;  ALDE  and  EPP  were  in  favour  of  disclosing  the 
targeting services used. .  

Furthermore,  national  political  parties  were  consulted  too,  albeit  indirectly:  Member 
States  were  requested  to  transmit  the  consultation  letter  to  their  national  parties  and 
consult  them,  in  order  that  Member  States’  position  in  the  consultation  reflect  the 
national  views  on  the  initiative.  Very  few  replies  were  received  from  national  political 
parties and could not be considered as representative. 

66 

 
2.8 Position of other stakeholders 

Below are the results of the consultation, broken down by category of respondents 

Civil  society  organizations  support  high  transparency  around  political  ads  including 
which adds are shown to whom, why, and who has paid for them238. They referred to the 
fact  that  the  EU  Code  of  Practice  against  Disinformation  (soft  measures)  was  not 
sufficient in this perspective as information for instance on targeting criteria was missing 
and  many  false  positive  and  negatives  occurred.  They  also  requested  the  issue  of 
targeting to be addressed beyond transparency239. Some have asked for a ban of targeting 
techniques  for  political  ads  (foreseen,  during  reference  periods,  under  sub-option  2  of 
policy  option  2)240.  Some  CSOs  advocated  for  an  obligation  to  set  up  ad  repositories 
(interoperable  at  EU  level)241,  and  also  underlined  that  ads  that  are  removed  should 
remain visible in ads repositories242, as envisaged in policy option 2 for very large online 
platforms.  

Member States welcomed the initiative and agreed with the need to regulate at EU level 
(online) political advertising243. Member States also repetitively supported measures that 
will enhance the cooperation from platforms (foreseen in both policy options) including 
access by researchers to more information on political ads (addressed in policy option 2). 
Certain  have  highlighted  the  limits  of  non-binding  measures,  the  importance  of 
transparency  (binding)  requirements  on  funding244  and  support  establishing  a  common 
definition of political advertising245 - which is envisaged in policy option 2. 

Industry  stakeholders  have  asked  for  a  common  EU  definition  that  allow  them  to 
determine  which  ads  are  political  ads246  and  a  common  approach  to  provide  for 
proportionate  requirements  to  label  sponsored  political  ads247,  including  as  regards  the 
identity of the sponsor of the ad. Both the establishment of an EU definition of political 
ads and the introduction of labeling requirements are measures included in policy option 
2.  Industry  “offline”  stakeholders  strongly  requested  a  level  playing  field  with  online 
stakeholders248.  Broadcasters  asked  for  binding  minimum  standards  for  political  ads on 
online  platforms  and  supported  a  ban  on  online  targeting  for  political  purposes  –
envisaged under suboption 2 of policy option 2249. At a stakeholder meeting on 11 May 

238 See, for instance, contribution by Who targets me (NGO) to the OPC, the statement issued by a coalition of 31 civil 
society organisations and experts (European Partnership for democracy), the position of Transparency international. 
239 For instance, the Association for International Affairs in Prague stated in its contribution to the OPC that targeting 
should be fundamentally regulated to avoid cases of election manipulations such as Cambridge Analytica. 
240 See, e.g. the contribution to the OPC of Centro per la Cooperazione Internazionale (NGO). 
241 Highlighted by the European Partnership for democracy in its contribution to the OPC. 
242 Dedicated meeting of 31 March 2021  with civil society organisations. 
243 See for instance, discussion in EUROPEAN COOPERATION NETWORK ON ELECTIONS on 25 March 2021. 
244 See contributions of media regulators (ERGA) in the OPC. 
245 See, e.g., German Media Authority (DLM) in the OPC. 
246 E.g. Facebook, Google and Tiktok, among others. 
247 E.g. Tiktok. 
248 E.g. the European Publishers Council and the Association of Commercial Television in Europe. Mediaset (off line 
operator)  stated,  for  instance,  that  compliance  with  all  its  obligations  related  to  political  advertising  requires  10  full 
time employees, which contrasts with the less regulated sector of online ads 
249 Written contribution of EGTA - association of television and radio sales houses 

67 

 
                                                           
2021, small tech providers requested a clear set of rules clarifying what is political ads, 
who can sponsor them and applicable transparency requirements.  

EUPPs have pointed out that labelling measures that help citizens to identify when they 
are being exposed to a political ad will contribute to strengthen European democracy250. 
They  were  particularly  concerned  about  how  the  policy  implemented  by  Facebook 
negatively affected their activities at EU/cross border level251. 

For citizens, the OPC shows that when it comes to targeting a majority supports a ban of 
targeting and or amplification or an opt-in. A minority could accept targeting if framed 
by criteria and data protection compliance. Besides, most citizens believe that publishers 
of  political  ads  should  retain  certain  basic  information  from  those  placing  such  ads, 
something addressed by both policy options. 

Other stakeholders: The supporting study by the contractor integrates a literature review 
in  section  2.1.  There  is  an  emerging  academic  consensus  on  the  need  for  specific 
transparency for political ads and controls on the use of personal data in connection with 
political  ads  online.  Guidance  from  international  standard  setting  bodies  such  as  the 
Council of Europe also call for specific transparency of political advertising, including in 
particular  on  sponsor  and  funding,  and  where  online,  on  the  mechanism  for  delivery 
(algorithms, data).  

3.  DEDICATED STAKEHOLDER MEETINGS 

Stakeholders  meetings  were  conducted  with  preparatory  work  ahead  of  each  meeting, 
including providing stakeholders with guiding questions structured to cover key aspects 
of  the  IA,  namely:  scope  and  definition,  the  use  of  targeting  and  data-driven 
technologies, the legal and regulatory framework, and solutions and options. Each group 
of  stakeholders  received  tailored  questions  aimed  at  taking  into  account  their 
specificities.  Meetings  were  moderated  in  a  way,  which  allowed  each  stakeholder,  to 
voice his  and her position beyond the questions  being  transmitted and make  comments 
on the envisaged initiative.  

Meetings  with  private  sector  actors  and  civil  society  organisations  were  composed  15 
stakeholders.  

3.1 Dedicated meeting of the Rapid Alert System (RAS) 

On  18  March  2021,  the  Commission  presented  the  state  of  play  of  the  initiative  and 
called  for  contributions  during  a  dedicated  meeting  of  the  Rapid  Alert  System. 
Representatives  of  Member  States  were  present  as  well  as  the  European  Regulators 
Group  for  Audiovisual  Media  Services.  This  meeting  provided  the  opportunity  to 
Member States to share their views and raise relevant points for discussion.  

3.2 Ninth meeting of the European Cooperation Network on Elections (ECNE) 

On  25  March  2021,  Member  States’  experts  were  consulted  in  the  framework  of  the 
European  Cooperation  Network  on  Elections.  The  Commission  outlined  envisaged 

250 E.g. ALDE. 
251 E.g. the Greens and the EPP. 

68 

 
 
                                                           
options for measures as set out in the inception impact assessment.252 The Commission 
has  shared  the  legal  mapping  to  the  membership  of  the  network  beforehand.  Each 
Member  State  then  had  the  opportunity  to  complete  the  mapping  as  well  as  present  its 
legal context at the meeting.  

Most Member States’ experts indicated that political advertising is regulated at national 
level through legislation on political party financing, broadcasting and print media, and 
electoral and campaign rules. The discussion showed that there is no uniform approach as 
to how to define political advertising, which authority is competent, and how to further 
regulate. Some Member States provide for extensive regulation while others regulate less 
and  emphasise  monitoring  and  oversight.  Some  noted  insufficient  cooperation  from 
platforms with national authorities as well as limitations of existing ad repositories. Other 
underlined  the  insufficient  enforcement  of  the  Code  of  Practice  on  disinformation. 
Experts suggested to limit microtargeting. Online advertising brings some benefits as it is 
increasingly shifting to the online environment, partly due to the pandemic of Covid-19. 
Experts underlined the need for complementarity between legislative instruments such as 
the DSA, the GDPR, the Code of Practice on disinformation, and the envisaged initiative.  

3.3  Dedicated  meeting  with  signatories  of  the  Code  of  practice  on  disinformation 
and private sector industry associations 

from 

industry  associations,  mainly 

On  26  March  2021,  the  Commission  has  organised  a  dedicated  meeting  to  collect  the 
input of the key stakeholders, signatories of the Code of Practice on disinformation and 
representatives  of 
the  advertising  and 
telecommunications  fields.  Overall,  participants  largely  welcomed  the  initiative.    There 
was  a  general  call  for  clear  and  long-lasting  definitions.  Participants  underlined  that 
national legislations widely vary across the EU and platforms have different policies for 
political  advertising.  Participants  supported  harmonised  legislation  across  the  EU,  with 
platforms  emphasising  the  need  to  adopt  rules,  which  fit  each  platform’s  specificities. 
Twitter  and  TikTok  indicated  that  they  do  not  allow  political  advertising  on  their 
platforms.  The  issue  of  influencers  has  been  raised  as  a  tricky  evolution,  which  makes 
proper monitoring of political advertising difficult. Snapchat insisted on the importance 
of  human  review  of  ads  as  well  as  the  need  to  provide  for  regular  updates  of  ad 
repositories, of which the access should be granted both to researchers and citizens.  

On targeting, Google indicated having introduced limitations regarding allowed criteria, 
being limited to age, gender, location, and general interest. Mozilla and the Association 
of Commercial Televisions (ACT) called for a limitation of targeting, notably drawing on 
data protection rules.  

ACT  suggested  that  the  priority  of  regulation  should  be  to  increase  safeguards  for 
citizens  rather  than  facilitating  business  activities  of  platforms.  ACT  also  called  for 
standards, which apply offline, to apply to the online environment. Google and ACT had 
different  view  as  to  whether  ads  that  were  taken  down  for  policy  violation  should  be 
disclosed in ad repositories.  

3.4 Dedicated meeting with civil society organisations 

On  31  March  2021,  the  Commission  held  a  dedicated  discussion  with  civil  society 
organisations  involved  in  the  defence  of  digital  rights  and  the  representation  of 
-IDEA 
following 
vulnerable  groups’ 

international  organisations 

interests.  The 

https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12826-Political-advertising-improving-

252 
transparency_en  

69 

 
                                                           
International  and  the  Council  of  Europe-  also  took  part.  Overall,  the  Commission’s 
initiative was largely welcomed by the participants.  

As other stakeholders, participants underlined the importance of articulating the initiative 
with other legislative instruments. Some participants stressed that it might be efficient to 
address on ad buyers and political parties when it comes to facilitating the enforcement 
of obligations. Common points with the ECNE meeting were shared such as the need for 
a  stronger  cooperation  between  Member  States  as  well  as  increased  communication 
between national  regulators and online platforms. Participants pointed at  weaknesses in 
the  regulatory  framework  of  Member  States.  Only  5  of  them  have  monitoring 
mechanisms for online expenditures of political parties during online campaigns.  

On  targeting  and  other  techniques,  several  issues  were  highlighted  by  participants. 
Firstly,  political  parties  are  increasingly  dependent  on  targeting  to  compete,  and  it 
favours more the affluent parties. Secondly, targeting lacks a clear definition. Thirdly, it 
is  very  difficult  to  know  how  algorithms  work.  Lastly,  major  platforms  do  not  respect 
data protection rules. Participants largely agreed that users should explicitly allow their 
data to be used. Ad quotas can help increase accountability of political parties.  

Regarding policy options, addressing political party financing was mentioned as a way to 
increase transparency that would allow to tackle the issue of influencer marketing, which 
is  not  covered  by  the  DSA.  Most  participants  agreed  with  the  fact  that  ads  that  are 
removed  should  remain  visible  in  ads  repositories  to  allow  researchers  to  work,  and 
authorities  to  make  parties  accountable.  Increasing  national  authorities’  capacities  and 
resources was deemed to be crucial to enforce regulations.  

3.5 Private sector  

On 12 May, the Commission met with the representatives of the broadcasting sector and 
SMEs  (ACT,  AER,  EGTA,  Schibsted,  FEDMA,  AIB  Europe,  News  Media  Europe, 
European  Newspaper  Publishers  Association,  EASA,  EACA,  DOT  Europe,  DDMA, 
EDAA)  where  the  envisaged  initiative  was  presented  with  its  context,  issues  addressed 
and  possible  options.  Most  participants  mentioned  the  need  to  make  sure  that  what  is 
forbidden  offline  is  also  forbidden  online  and  that  a  common  “political  advertisement” 
definition is needed. Some concerns on microtargeting and the use of political data were 
expressed. 

3.6 Written contributions and papers253 

The  following  stakeholders  have  submitted,  through  or  outside  the  OPC,  a  position  or 
policy paper, shared significant material, or held bilateral meetings with the Commission:  

1.  ALDE - Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe 
2.   EGP - European Green Party  
3.   EPP - European People's Party 
4.   PES - Party of European Socialists 
5.   EFA - European Free Alliance 
6.   AMO - Association for International Affairs 
7.   ACT - Association of Commercial Televisions 
8.   Avaaz Foundation 
9.   Belgian Association for Human Rights and Development 
10. CCIA - Computer and Communications Industry Associations 

253 We have received more documents than the number of stakeholders. 

70 

 
                                                           
11. DLM - The Directors’ Conference of the State Media Authorities (Die Medienanstalten - 

German Media Authority) 

12. EACA - European Association of Communication Agencies 
13. EDRi - European Digital Rights 
14. Election.Watch.eu 
15. EPC - European Publishers Council 
16. EPD - European Partnership for Democracy 
17. EU Disinfo Lab 
18. Facebook 
19. GISAD - Global Institute for Structure Relevance, Anonymity and Decentralisation 
20. Google 
21. IAB - Interactive Advertising Bureau 
22. IDEA International 
23. Institute for Information Law University of Amsterdam 
24. Ireland’s Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage 
25. Lithuania’s Electoral Commission 
26. National Electronic Mass Media Council (Latvia) 
27. ALIA - Autorité Luxembourgeoise Indépendante de l'Audiovisuel 
28. Oana Goga Univ. Grenoble Alpes, CNRS 
29. Panoptykon Foundation 
30. Newsguard 
31. CDT - Centre for Democracy & Technology 
32. ERGA - European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services 
33. PROVIDUS 
34. RESET.tech 
35. Snapchat 
36. TikTok 
37. Twitter 
38. Who Targets Me 

4.  SPECIFIC CONSULTATION CONDUCTED BY VVA 

The  contractor  VVA  has  been  commissioned  to  provide  a  study  to  support  the 
preparation of the initiative. Supported by targeted questionnaires, VVA  has conducted 
an extensive range of individual interviews with a total of 67 stakeholders coming from 
all  relevant  categories,  indicated  in  the  table  below.  These  interviews  and  the  insights 
shared therein gave access to VVA to data otherwise inaccessible publicly, and allowed 
VVA  to  draw  pertinent  conclusions  or  simply  to  confirm  arguments  made  in  the 
literature.   

Type of stakeholder 

Number  of  interviews  conducted  per  stakeholder 
type254 

International 
Institutions 

organisations 

or 

EU 

Member States Administrations 

Political parties and candidates 

Other political actors255 

13 

9 

7 

3 

254  Some  stakeholders  were  consulted  twice  on  different  aspects.  Different  departments  of  some  organisations  were 
contacted too. 

71 

 
 
                                                           
Civil society organisations256 

Academia 

Service Providers257  

TOTAL 

7 

4 

23 

67 

5.  OPEN PUBLIC CONSULTATION on EDAP 

In the public consultation on the European Democracy Action Plan258, respondents were 
asked whether they have been targeted259 with online content that related to  political or 
social  issues,  political  parties  (either  European  or  national),  political  programmes, 
candidates or ideas within or outside electoral  periods [referred to  as ‘targeted political 
content’].  They  have  also  been  asked  whether  this  has  occurred  only  ones  or  several 
times. 

Out  of  269  respondents  including  individuals,  NGO/academia  as  well  as  business 
associations and organisations, 71% have been targeted with such content several times. 
More  specifically,  as  regards  individuals,  72%  (out  of  n=205)  were  targeted  with  such 
content  once  or  several 
the  majority  of  companies/business 
organisations  responding  to  this  question  were  also  targeted  more  than  once  (9  out  of 
n=10).  NGOs/academia  also  expressed  similar  experience  and  the  percentage  for  this 
category of respondents amounts to 86% (out of n=43) for those targeted ones or several 
times.  The  responses  received  to  this  question  show  that  most  respondents  (n=269), 
whether  citizens,  NGO/academia  or  company/business  association)  answering  this 
question were targeted and the majority of these were targeted several times. 

times.  Similarly, 

255  Political  actors  other  than  political  parties  that  seek  online  political  advertising  services  active  in  issue-based 
advertisement. 
256 Civil society organisations whose activity revolves around online political advertising. 
257 Including umbrella organisations that represent at least 9000 organisations and 131 000 employers from the digital 
advertising sector and approximately 5000 broadcasting organisations 
258  Report  on  the  Public  Consultation  for  the  European  Democracy  Action  Plan  (EDAP)  –  September  2020,  not 
published yet. 
259 ‘Targeted’ referring to any paid-for advertisements and any form of personalised content promoted to the user. 

72 

 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Similar rules for offline and online political ads: Also, In the public consultation on the 
European  Democracy  Action  Plan,  83%  (from  n=280)  of  respondents  including  civil 
society  organisations,  national  authorities,  different  associations  and  some  platforms 
agree  that  similar  rules  should  apply  for  offline  and  online-targeted  political  content  to 
ensure  a  certain  level-playing  field  with  broadcasters,  radios  for  which  the  political 
advertising is strictly regulated. 

At  EU  level  the  proposed  initiatives  aimed  to  strengthen  the  enforcement  of  rules 
relevant  to  the  electoral  context  receiving  most  support  –  during  the  EDAP  public 
consultation  –  included:  European-level  obligations  on  political  advertising  service 
providers  (supported  by  79%  n=271),  European-level  shared  online  monitoring  and 
analysis  capability  being  made  available  to  national  authorities  (73%  n=271)  and 
strengthened  the  exchange    of information  and  monitoring  activity  across  borders 
and between authorities (67%). Cross-border recognition of certain national provisions 
received the lowest percentage (41%). 

Issue-based advertising and sponsored content of political context 

In  the  public  consultation  on  EDAP,  there  was  broad  agreement  by  respondents, 
including platforms, civil society organisations and other stakeholders to label sponsored 
issue-based advertisement (92% support from n=263).  

73 

 
 
 
The public consultation revealed some divergence of views on the issue whether issue-
based  advertisement  should  be  treated  the  same  way  as  political  advertisement,  but 
several  stakeholders  pointed  to  the  difficulties  to  distinguish  between  the  different 
categories of advertisement.  

81% (from n= 254) also support mandatory advertisement repositories/libraries for issue-
based advertisement.  

More specifically, the NGOs responding to the public consultation on EDAP were almost 
unanimously  supporting  labelling  of  issue-based  advertising,  and  almost  all  the 
respondents  either fully  agreed or somewhat  agreed that issue based-advertising should 
be  subject  to  similar  transparency  requirements  as  political  advertising  (see  Figure  3: 
EDAP  public  consultation  civil  society  responses). All  the  NGOs  disagreed,  that  issue-
based advertising should be left unregulated.  

Figure 1: EDAP public consultation civil society responses 

In  the  public  consultation  on  the  European  Democracy  Action  Plan260,  initiatives  that 
received  the  strongest  support  by  civil  society  organisations,  stakeholders  as  well  as 
individuals include: 
(i) 

disclosure  rules  supported  by  96%  (from  n=279)  of  respondents  (supporting 
‘absolutely’  or  ‘a  lot’)  including  civil  society  organisations,  stakeholders  and 
individuals. 

260  
published yet. 

Report on the Public Consultation for the European Democracy Action Plan (EDAP) – September 2020, not 

74 

 
 
 
                                                           
(ii) 

(iii) 

(iv) 

creation of open and transparent political advertisements archives and registries 
supported by 91% (from n= 273) (supporting ‘absolutely’ or ‘a lot’) 
political parties to disclose their campaign finances broken down by media outlet 
supported by 90% (from n=276). 
limitation  of  micro-targeting  of  political  content  supported  by  83%  (from  n= 
277) (‘absolutely’ or ‘a lot’)  

Significant  support  was  also  received  for  limiting  targeted  political  content  on  the 
election  day/just  before  (supported  by  67%  ‘absolutely’  or  ‘a  lot’  from  n=273)  and 
prohibiting foreign online targeted political content (supported by 60% ‘absolutely’ or ‘a 
lot’ from n=273). The views of respondents were rather mixed with respect to prohibiting 
targeted political content altogether, which is the option receiving the lowest supporting 
rate, with 29% in favour (from n= 272).  

In  addition,  still  in  the  public  consultation  on  EDAP;  69%  agree  that  microtargeting 
should be strictly limited: 

75 

 
 
Finally, in the 2020 public consultation of the European Democracy Action Plan, 38 out 
of 43 NGOs responding to the question fully agreed that micro-targeting criteria of 
political advertisement should be disclosed in advertisements. 

Figure 2: EDAP public consultation civil society responses 

76 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 3: Who is affected and how? 

1. Practical implications of the initiative 

Actor categories 

The  following  table  presents  a  summary  description  of  the  categories  of  actors 
considered in the political ads initiative, including examples where relevant, a description 
of their activities, and a  sketch analysis of how they  might be practically distinguished 
for the purposes of defining tailored obligations under the options considered.  

Category 
Very 
platform 
VLOPs) 

large 
(in 

online 
short: 

Example and comments 
Facebook, Twitter, Amazon, Google, etc. (includes some alternative 
platforms such as Quora and Reddit). Defined in DSA (Article 25 - 
>= 45 million monthly users). 

Other online platforms 

exchanges, 

Ad 
networks, ad platforms 

ad 

From the perspective of the measures envisaged, these large (social) 
media platforms act as publishers of political ads published through 
their  services  (e.g.  content  sharing,  search  engine,  online  retail 
services).  They  also  provide  distribution  services  for  advertising 
published  by  ad  networks  (e.g.  display  advertising  and  banner  ads 
incorporated  into  the  online  interfaces).  They  have  come  to  play  a 
gatekeeper role over political campaigning online. 

Political  advertising  on  these  platforms  is  targeted  either  through 
services  offered  by  these  platforms  directly  or  via  an  intermediary 
(and on the basis of data they provide or via an intermediary), and it 
is also subject to recommender algorithms. 

They are signatories of the Code of Practice on disinformation, and 
will be addressed in their advertising activity by the Digital Services 
Act.  VLOPS  have  various  policies  with  respect  to  political  ads 
(based on various definitions) and some maintain ad repositories. 
News websites, alternative media platforms, forums etc. Defined in 
the DSA (Article 2 – hosting service which stores and disseminates 
public information). 

Perform  the  same  roles  as  VLOPs  from  the  perspective  of  the 
measures  envisaged,  but  to  a  smaller  scale.  Publish  and  host  ads 
directly to users, offer targeting and hosting ad network content. 
Ad  networks/exchanges/platforms  (e.g.  Adcash,  Adform,  AdTaily, 
Criteo, Exoclick) fall under “intermediary services” within the DSA 
(Article 2(f)). Act as intermediaries between a public facing service 
which also hosts ads (such as a mobile app, webmail service, search 
engine, website etc.) and advertisers. Often use central web servers 
and  offer  targeting,  tracking  and  varying  degrees  of  control  to 
advertisers over where their ads will appear.  

The  transaction  can  be  quite  complex  –  supply  side  platforms 
intermediate between a website offering advertising space for sale in 
combination  with  a  specific  user  (identified  on  the  basis  of  an 
aggregation  of  personal  data  obtained  directly  from  the  user’s 
transactions  with  the  site  itself,  and  her  behaviour  as  monitored 

77 

 
 
online  via  cookies,  beacons,  browser  fingerprinting,  etc.  and  by 
other  websites),  and  an  ad  exchange,  which  will  offer  the  supply-
user  package  for  sale  to  the  highest  bidder  via  a  demand  side 
platform  which  intermediates  on  behalf  of  advertisers  looking  for 
specific user-types with a specific budget. 

Ad  platforms  are  often  used  to  generate  revenue  from  leftover  ad 
space  on  websites  which  platforms  have  not  sold  to  specific 
campaigns. Ad platforms can then sell an advertiser specific access 
to  such  space  –  usually  for  a  higher  price  –  or  sell  access  to  the 
network as a whole. 

While  they  fall  within  the  overall  scope  of  the  DSA,  as  bare 
“intermediaries” they have few obligations of relevance to political 
ads (obligation to cooperate with national authorities and offer some 
very limited reporting of interactions with national authorities). 
Includes intermediary services which do not involve the hosting and 
serving of ads – e.g. supply-side and demand-side platforms. Handle 
personal data but do not host content. Also required to comply with 
the GDPR.  
Includes services which are not specific to the online environment: 
ad  agencies,  design  agencies,  campaign  management,  and 
promotional, advertising and marketing consultancies. Are involved 
in the value chain, and create, plan and finance political ads.  
Broadcasters,  newspapers  and  periodicals,  billboards  and  other 
physical  media.  Partly  covered  by  the  AVMSD.  In  the  context  of 
political advertising, strictly regulated nationally.  

Other online ad services 

Other ad services 

Offline ad publishers 

Concretely, this means that: 

Publishers  of  online  political  ads  (platforms  and  in  the  case  of  banner  ads,  the  relevant 
agency) 

Required to provide additional information to individuals in the ad itself (e.g. on political links) 
and  obtain  additional  information  to  support  audit  and  oversight.  Ex  ante  transparency  for 
publishers  could  be  envisaged,  partly  to  address  the  issue  of  banner  ad  providers,  requiring 
websites to include information about the advertising brokers they contract with, enabling users 
to assure themselves that only standards-compliant brokers are used261. Programmatic advertising 
would be subject to limits on targeting and the conditions for its use. 

Very large platforms 

Specific reporting obligations regarding their actions in relation to political advertising and would 
have to include specific additional information in the online repositories of political ads (specific 
financial information). They would also need to include political ads and the activities within the 
scope  of  this  initiative  in  their  systemic  risk  assessment  to  be  conducted  under  the  DSA,  and 
publish  the  parts thereof that relate to targeting  and  amplification. VLOPS  would  be  subject to 
the targeting and amplification measures. 

Offline actors disseminating or broadcasting ads to individuals (not covered by the DSA) 

261 What this means in practice is that when visiting a site, app, platform or service which uses banner ads, you would 
be able to easily see (for instance in the browser address bar, as is the case now with certificates compliance) which 
banner ad providers (ad brokers) are contracted to provider advertising on the site. Such providers could themselves be 
required to provider transparency and certification of their compliance with relevant rules, such as the GDPR. 

78 

 
 
 
                                                           
Transparency requirements in their communications to individuals (to make certain information 
public in the ad itself) and to keep certain records to support audit and oversight. 

Entities providing financing in the context of the political ads 

Keep  records  and  provide  this  information  in  the  context  of  the  due  diligence  requirements, 
audits and to competent authorities. 

Design  and  ad  agencies  (online  and  offline),  ad-tech  companies  (ad  brokers,  data  brokers 
etc.), and campaign organisers 

Keep records in the context of the due diligence requirements and to support reporting, audit and 
oversight  by  competent  authorities.  Programmatic  advertising  would  be  subject  to  limits  on 
targeting and the conditions for its use. 

SMEs 

Particular  attention  will  be  paid  not  to  overburden  SMEs262  which  are  usually  technological 
service providers, engaged in the provision of ‘amplification and targeting services’ or ‘financial 
support services’  connected  to  the  publication  of  political  ads.  Such activities  need to  be  taken 
into account, proportionately, and this category of addressee cannot be immediately excluded. 

EUPPs 

They should be covered by specific binding obligations for political ads and regarding keeping 
records. The information will be attached to the ads or accessible from their website and include 
the  following:  name  of  the  party,  logo,  disclosure  of  the  amount  of  money  being  used  and 
information, where relevant, on the targeting techniques being used. 

262 SMEs’ were at stake in the Cambridge Analytica case. 

79 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
2. Summary of costs and benefits 

I. Overview of Benefits (total for all provisions) – Preferred Option 

Description 

Amount 

Direct benefits 

Comments 

Reduced legal fragmentation costs 

Removal of barriers and obstacles  

Increased legal certainty  

Cost reductions of around 1 FTE per 
economic actor per cross-border campaign. 

Applies to agencies and ad 
publishers when providing 
political ads across borders or 
in more than one Member State. 

Increased accountability and improved 
oversight. Reduced opportunities to mislead 
citizens 
Improved trust in political ads 

Simplification of regulatory oversight 
Reduced circumvention of rules and 
reduced non-regulated political ads in 
circulation 

Reduced opportunities to mislead citizens  
Improved trust in political ads 
Dissuades misuse of targeting and of 
personal data in targeting 

Political parties have greater certainty and 
clarity about their use of political ads 
Improved opportunities for multinational 
campaigning on European issues 
Reduction of incentives for restrictive 
private sector policies 

Indirect benefits 

More transparency in political ads 

More uniform and effective monitoring and 
enforcement of regulation of political ads 

Reduced impact on fundamental rights and 
democratic processes of the use of targeting in 
political ads 

Increased transparency in the use of political 
ads by national political parties 

Better regulation of campaigning organised by 
European political parties  

Increased opportunities for cross-border 
political ads services 

Reduced opportunities for interference in 
elections 

Improved protection of democratic principles 
and more resilient democratic processes  

II. Overview of costs – Preferred option 

Citizens/Consumers  

Businesses 

Administrations 

One-off 

Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent 

Adaptation 
of ad 
purchasing 
policies for 
political 
actors 

Common 
framing of 
political ads   

Direct costs 

Indirect costs 

Passive 
obligation to 

Direct costs 

Training and 
process 
adjustment to 
adapt to 
common 
framing 

Training and 
process 

80 

Training 
and capacity 
building  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
retain 
information 
about 
political ads 

Indirect costs 

Obligation to 
provide 
adequate 
information   

Direct costs 

Indirect costs 

Obligation to 
cooperate 
with 
competent 
authorities   

Direct costs 

Indirect costs 

Conditional 
limits to 
targeting   

Direct costs 

Indirect costs 

Direct costs 

Indirect costs 

Direct costs 

Powers for 
national 
authorities to 
request 
information 

Framework 
to enable 
exchange of 
information   

adjustment to 
adapt to 
common 
framing 

Data handling 
and process 
adaptation. 
Costs may be 
comparable to 
costs currently 
incurred by 
companies that 
voluntarily 
disclose 
information, 
estimated at 
around EUR 
10,000 to 
15,000 per 
annum. 

Variable costs 
of data 
acquisition and 
publication. 
Repository 
adaptation costs 

Provision 
against 
information 
requests, and 
upstream where 
not automated 
Costs would 
vary according 
to the number 
of requests – 
potentially 0.5-
1 FTE per 
political ad 
campaign. 

Training and 
process 
adaptation. 
GDPR 
certification 
costs 

Developing 
necessary APIs 
and other 
technical 
solutions 

81 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indirect costs 

Direct costs 

Indirect costs 

Further 
support for 
capacity 
building    

Elaborated 
rules for 
EUPPS   

Direct costs 

Indirect costs 

Direct costs 

Indirect costs 

Direct costs 

Indirect costs 

Support for 
repository of 
information 
about 
political ads 
for EUPPs  

Recommend
ations to 
Member 
States for 
their national 
political 
parties 

Data 
handling 
and process 
adaptation 

Additional audit 
requirements 
estimated at 
around EUR 
75,000 to 
150,000 
annually 

0.5 FTE per 
party for ~6 
months 
campaign 
period to make 
disclosures 

Training for 
EP staff to 
oversee 
additional 
audit 

Staff 
training 
Disclosure 
platform 
design/proc
urement 

Monitoring 
compliance 
transparency 
and targeting 
obligations 

82 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 4: Analytical methods 

1.  Analytical framework 

The  impact  assessment  is  prepared  on  the  basis  of  a  supporting  study,  an  open  public 
consultation and intensive direct stakeholder consultation and the relevant literature and 
recent EU publications (reports, studies and policy documents). It includes a full analysis 
of the status quo as a dynamic context, including: 

  The  relevant  legal  framework  and  anticipated  legislative  changes,  at  EU  and 
national level, including a qualitative description of gaps, overlaps and conflicts, 
as well as common elements.  

  A summary of the scope and context for the impact assessment is provided in the 
annexes, including a market analysis drawn from the supporting study, use cases 
to illustrate the various processes involved and to highlight where difficulties lie.  

The  objectives,  options  and  assessment  of  their  various  impacts  were  prepared  on  this 
basis.  Quantitative  data  on  the  specific  political  ads  markets  investigated  were 
challenging to obtain, as were quantitative data on the businesses and business processes 
affected.  

2.  Definition of political advertising and main addresses 

For the purposes of the overall impact assessment, a broad, inclusive approach was taken 
to political advertising (political ads throughout the text), which was taken to include the 
various national definitions based on partisan content, campaign periods, affiliation with 
political parties and actors, links to political funding, and to political themes. As such, it 
was  intended  to  include  issues  based  advertising,  while  acknowledging  that  beyond 
objective and nationally established criteria, the limits of concepts such as “issues based” 
or “politically themed” advertising would necessarily be contingent, involve a degree of 
subjectivity  and  judgement,  and  could  overlap  with  advertising  that  also  pursued 
commercial  or  public  informational  aims.  Specific  questions  in  the  open  public 
consultation and in the supporting study sought to obtain stakeholder input for the scope 
of political  advertising.  Further input was obtained from  the assessment  of the national 
legal  and  policy  framework,  which  established  common  characteristics  of  political 
advertising  and  related  definitions  (including  parties  and  campaign  periods),  as  well  as 
diverging and potentially conflicting terms. 

A corresponding approach was also applied to establishing the scope of economic actors 
potentially affected by relevant rules applied to political ads and the issues subsequently 
identified  specific  to  this  sector.  Online  and  offline  actors  were  considered,  and  the 
potential contribution to issues, as well as the extent that actors are currently addressed 
by relevant rules, was extensively assessed in the various value chains identified. These 
are described in greater detail in Annexes 2 and 5. 

3.  Assessment of fragmentation 

On the basis of extensive consultation with the Member States, including the preparation 
of  a  mapping  of  relevant  rules  and  policies,  as  well  as  the  research  conducted  for  the 
supporting study, the national frameworks applicable to political ads were described and 

83 

 
an analysis of the fragmentation in the internal market of rules applicable to the various 
categories  of  economic  actor  identified  which  are  potentially  addressed  by  such  rule 
when offering services was prepared. National rules and policies are analysed to present 
gaps, conflicts  and measures in  common from the perspective of rules which condition 
the availability of political advertising, which determine its content (except regulation on 
illegal content, which is out of scope of this initiative)  

4.  Estimates for costs for economic actors 

The  economic  costs  for  the  economic  actors  have  been  based  on  the  consultation. 
Specific  figures  for  costs  are  included  where  possible,  and  are  qualitatively  estimated 
where not. 

Assumptions for estimations based on the DSA impact assessment SWD(2020) 348 final: 

  Estimates are based on averages established based on data reported by companies 
for the notice and action and transparency obligations in the German law over a 
period of 6 months.  

  As there are significant differences in the scale of notices received and resources 
invested  by  different  companies,  estimates  were  corrected  based  on  simulated 
data  from  a  model  built  by  the  JRC  for  a  full  content  moderation  process  a 
company could put in place.  

  To estimate the duplication of costs across Member States, the indicators for the 
legal distance were also used to correct coefficients for the duplication of costs in 
scenarios  of  the  evolving  legal  fragmentation.  For  the  additional  costs  on  very 
large  platforms,  estimates  are  based  on  an  average  FTE  costs  of  EUR  110.000, 
benchmarks  of  risk  assessments  in  the  financial  sector  and  estimated  costs  of 
technical audits, reported data from stakeholders for maintenance of databases. 

5.  Comparison of options and proportionality 

The  tables  in  section  6  and  7  of  the  Impact  Assessment  should  be  read  in  vertical:  ‘~’ 
indicates  no  change  in  performance  compared  to  the  baseline.  ‘+’  pointing  to  a  better 
performance of the option than the baseline, and ‘++’ to the best performance among the 
options;  the  ‘>’  symbol  is  used  to  indicate  higher  costs  than  the  baseline,  and  ‘>>’  the 
highest cost among the options. 

Table  1  summarizes  the  impacts  of  the  options  with  regard  to  the  measures  addressing 
internal market issues and based on Article 114 TFEU. Table 2 summarizes the impacts 
of  the  options  with  regard  to  the  measures  addressing  European  political  parties  and 
based on Article 224 TFEU. The tables provide an overview of how the options compare. 
The  corresponding  narrative  sections  provide  explanations  as  to  why  which  option  is 
considered better for each category. 

84 

 
 
 
 
 
Annex 5: Context, scope of the market, and other aspects 
relevant to the problem definition 

This Annex provides additional information on the context of the initiative, on the market 
for political ads (size, scope, etc.), and develops  further aspects related to the problems 
identified with political advertising which could not be addressed at length in the Impact 
Assessment (for instance because not directly related to the 114 legal basis). 

1. Context 

1.1 Political context 

In the run up to  the March 2019 European elections, the Parliament recommended that 
transparency  of  political  advertising  be  based  on  effective  due  diligence  checks  of  the 
identity of sponsors263. In a resolution of October 2019264 the Parliament recognised the 
risks of foreign interference in elections, including through advertising. The subsequently 
formed  Special  Committee  on  Foreign  Interference  in  all  Democratic  Processes  in  the 
European  Union,  including  Disinformation  noted  that  political  advertisements  on  the 
internet  are  not  subject  to  the  same  disclosure  rules  and  restrictions  as  regards  foreign 
funding  for  those  on  television,  radio  and  in  print,  and  that  this  exposes  democratic 
processes  to  increased  risk.265  In  its  draft  report  on  its  proposal  to  reform  the  1976 
Electoral Act266 the European Parliament's Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO)  
underlines  the  importance  of  ensuring  a  high  standard  of  transparency  in  political 
advertising.  Responding  to  private  sector  policies  that  tended  to  divide  the  internal 
market  for  political  ads,  the  Presidents  of  the  European  political  groups  also  wrote  to 
Vice  President  Jourová  asking  for  the  Commission  to  ensure  pan-European  political 
communications.  
Before the last European elections, the Council and the Member States267 underlined the 
need  to  foster  and  facilitate  the  transparency  of  paid  political  advertisements  and 
communication (including on their  advertising purpose, the methods by which they are 
targeted  to  citizens,  and  their  funding).  In  October  2019268  the  Council  recognised  the 
many  challenges  confronting  democracies,  and  agreed  to  develop  a  common  and 
practical  response including emphasis  on promoting  greater transparency  of democratic 
processes, particularly of the financing of political and issue-based campaigning, as well 

to 

counteract 

propaganda 

263  See in particular points (p) and (aj) of European Parliament recommendation of 13 March 2019 to the Council and 
the  Vice-President  of  the  Commission  /  High  Representative  of  the  Union  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  Security  Policy 
concerning  taking  stock  of  the  follow-up  taken  by  the  EEAS  two  years  after  the  EP  report  on  EU  strategic 
communication 
(2018/2115(INI)) 
by 
against 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2019-0187_EN.html 
264 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2019-0031_EN.html 
265  Working  Document  on  covert  funding  of  political  activities  by  foreign  donors  of  22  April  2021 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/INGE-DT-689654_EN.pdf. 
266 https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2020/2220(INL)&l=en 
267 Conclusions of the Council and of the Member States on securing free and fair European elections. 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/02/19/securing-free-and-fair-european-elections-
council-adopts-conclusions/  
268Council  conclusions  on  Democracy  of  14/10/2019  https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12836-2019-
INIT/en/pdf  

parties 

third 

it 

85 

 
 
                                                           
as  to  ensure  that  the  rules  governing  elections  and  democracy  offline  can  be  applied 
effectively  online.  Finally,  in  February  2021,  Ministers  in  the  Council  expressed 
appreciation and overall support for the Commission’s work for the EDAP. 

1.2 Commission policies 

The  Commission  has  engaged  more  and  more  with  Member  States  in  policymaking 
linked  to  political  ads,  in  particular  to  address  the  new  challenges  of  the  digital 
transformation.  This  includes  the  proposed  Digital  Service  Act,  EU  data  protection 
legislation269,  initiatives  to  support  the  efficient  conduct  of  the  European  Parliamentary 
elections270, and the initiatives combating disinformation and other forms of information 
manipulation and interference271. 

In light of the 2019 elections, the Commission adopted a package of measures to support 
free and fair elections, with recommendations addressed to Member States and national 
and European political parties, which included measures to address disinformation272. As 
part  of  the  implementation  of  these  recommendations,  the  Commission  organised  back 
then three meetings of a specially created European Cooperation Network on Elections 
(ECNE)  to  exchange  good  practice  and  information  among  Member  States’  competent 
authorities.  

The Electoral Package recommendation 

The  Recommendation  recognised  that  election  periods  have  proven  to  be  particularly 
strategic  and  sensitive  for  online  circumvention  of  conventional  (“off-line”)  safeguards 
such  as  the  rules  applicable  to  political  communication  during  election  periods, 
transparency of and limits  to  electoral  spending,  silence periods and equal  treatment  of 
candidates, as well as for the prevention of cyber-enabled attacks. It noted that in light of 
the  targeting  of  Union  citizens  by  political  advertisements  which  were  not  transparent 
about  their  source  and  purpose  or  were  represented  as  something  else,  such  as  new 
editorial  or  social  media  posts,  the  transparency  of  political  advertisements  should  be 
enhanced. To that end,  Member States were  asked to  promote transparency  of political 
advertising in line with their applicable rules. This was to include the active disclosure to 
citizens of the Union of information on: 

 

the  political  party,  political  campaign  or  political  support  group  behind  paid  online 
political advertisements and communications; 

  on  campaign  expenditure  for  online  activities,  including  paid  online  political 

advertisements and communications, and  

269 Including the GDPR and the e-Privacy Directive. 
270 2013/142/EU: Commission Recommendation of 12 March 2013 on enhancing the democratic and efficient conduct 
of  the  elections  to  the  European  Parliament;  Commission  Recommendation  (EU)  2018/234  of  14  February  2018  on 
enhancing the European nature and efficient conduct of the 2019 elections to the European Parliament 
271  Guided  by 
(https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
homepage_en/54866/Action%20Plan%20against%20Disinformation)  reported  on  in  the  Commission  and  High 
Representative’s joint Communication, “tackling COVID disinformation.” 
272  https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/soteu2018-cybersecurity-elections-recommendation-5949_en.pdf;  Reported 
in https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/com_2020_252_en.pdf_en  

the  Action  Plan  against  disinformation 

86 

 
 
                                                           
  any  targeting  criteria  used  in  the  dissemination  of  such  advertisements  and 

communications273. 

to  conduct 

transparently  and 

their  campaign  activities 

Such rules were to be backed by sanctions. National and European political parties were 
asked 
the 
implementation  of  the  recommendations  on  Member  States’  authorities  through  the 
provision  of  pro-active  transparency  on  the  parties  websites  and  in  their  advertising 
activity. 
The implementation of these recommendations was described in the Commission report 
on  the  2019  elections274.  While  the  recommendations  on  establishing  national  and 
European  coordination  networks  could  be  implemented  promptly  and  showed  good 
results,  there  were  significant  challenges  for  Member  States  to  take  action  on  the 
transparency of political advertising. 

to  support 

It  emerged  from  the mapping of relevant  national  regulations  and processes which was 
facilitated by the ECNE (elements of which are presented and summarized in Annex 8) 
and  from  the  subsequent  discussions  in  the  network  itself275,  that  there  are  very  few 
examples  of  jurisdictions  where  transparency  of  political  advertising  is  required,  fewer 
still where such a requirement would apply online, and even where this is to be provided, 
there  is  no  possibility  to  provide  for  enforceable  transparency  with  a  cross-border 
dimension276. 

The impact assessment accompanying the DSA proposal characterises online advertising 
services as an area of particular evolution, and which, as digital services often delivered 
through  online  platforms,  are  inherently  cross-border  and  associated  with  a  number  of 
new  risks  and  challenges.  Its  assessment  of  the  baseline  scenario  noted  that  in  “the 
absence  of  further  EU  legislation  and  subject  to  enforcement  of  the  current  legal 
framework, legal fragmentation  in  areas  not  yet  subject  to  sector  specific legislation is 
likely to increase. Already today, a number of Member States, such as Germany, Austria, 
Denmark or France, have adopted or are in the process of adopting new laws to regulate 
digital services. A patchwork of national measures would not effectively protect citizens, 
given the cross-border and international dimension of the issues”.277 

To  the  extent  that  the  present  initiative  addresses  online  political  advertising,  it  largely 
comprises  a  specific  subset  of  the  elements  addressed  by  the  DSA  proposal,  for  which 
additional  and  specific  problems  and  solutions  are  identified  here,  alongside  data  and 
elements  addressing  certain  further  elements  regarding  offline  political  advertising, 
certain additional related services, and the part played by EUPPs and European political 
foundations. All these elements are described in the study and data prepared in support of 

through 

implementation  of 

273 At the time that the recommendations were prepared, these criteria represented a necessary first step to ensure that 
citizens could be  sufficiently informed about the political adverts they encountered. The current initiative builds and 
elaborates on this initial position. 
274  In  particular 
the  Commission’s  September  2018  electoral  package 
the 
(https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_5681) which is described in the Commission’s report on 
the 
and 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/swd_2020_113_en.pdf 
275 
cooperation-network-elections_en  
276  
foreseen by the GDPR. 
277 https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=72160 

Outsides  the  specific  requirements  for  transparency  to  be  provided  to  data  subjects  by  data  controllers 

https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/eu-citizenship/electoral-rights/european-

https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/com_2020_252_en_0.pdf 

elections 

2019 

87 

 
 
                                                           
this  impact  assessment,  which  also  presents  how  the  political  advertising  market,  the 
relevant current regulation at national and EU level function and are likely to evolve. The 
backward-looking aspects of the public consultation and the findings of the report on the 
2019  European  elections  complement  the  conclusions  of  the  underlying  study.  That 
report concludes that the political advertising market in the EU is growing and becoming 
ever  more  complex,  online  and  cross-border,  and  its  impact  on  electoral  outcomes  and 
the  democratic  debate  is  strengthening  the  trends  towards  polarisation,  as  well  as 
increased susceptibility to interference. At the same time, the regulatory context remains 
fragmented and will become increasingly so, despite the impact of the DSA on the online 
advertising market as a whole, as Member States continue in the efforts to control these 
cross-border activities nationally. 

1.2. The specificities of the political advertising market 

Transparency  is  particularly  needed  for  political  ads.  It  is  a  principle  of  a  democratic 
process,  as  noted  by  relevant  international  standards  setting  body.  The  EDAP  explains 
that  “Citizens,  civil  society  and  responsible  authorities  must  be  able  to  see  clearly  the 
source and purpose of such advertising. In the online environment, it is often difficult to 
recognise paid-for political material and distinguish it from other political content,278 not 
least because it can often appear as ‘organic’ content shared or created by other users. 
This creates legal uncertainties for service providers and other operators, in particular 
online  intermediaries,  political  consultancies  and  related  firms,  but  also  for  political 
parties, campaign organisations, candidates and for the public more widely, and affects 
accountability and oversight.” 

1.3. Different definitions and national rules 

Partisan or political advertising is defined in different ways in the Member States279. In 
some  Member  States,  political  advertising  may  only  be  placed  by  certain  actors  (e.g. 
political  parties  and  candidates)  and  is  strictly  regulated,  for  instance  as  regards  the 
period  during  which  they  may  be  disseminated.  Other  advertising  with  more  general 
political messages, aims or effects (i.e. regarding more general political issues such as the 
environment or migration – issues ads) is also placed, including by other actors (such as 
interest  groups,  companies,  civil  society,  citizens  but  also  political  parties)  and  during 
other  periods  than  in  the  context  of  an  election.  Some  Member  States  ban  such 
advertising, or seek to impose limits to it through media regulation, other Member States 
do  not,  or  rely  on  controls  on  political  parties  and  in  particular  their  fundraising  and 
spending to control such activities. 

The  lack  of  a  single  harmonised  definition  at  EU-level  for  ‘political  advertising’  is 
frequently  highlighted  in  the  literature  and  in  the  public  consultation280.  The  differing 

278  In  contrast,  a  2021  Eurobarometer  found  that  nearly  four  in  ten  Europeans  using  the  Internet  (37%)  have  been 
exposed  to  content  which  they  could  not  easily  determine  whether  it  was  a  political  advertisement  or  not. 
https://fronteirasxxi.pt/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/ebs_507_en.pdf  
279 See Annex 8 on legal mapping 
280  See  for  instance,  ERGA.  2019.  Report  of  the  activities  carried  out  to  assist  the  European  Commission  in  the 
intermediate monitoring of the Code of practice on disinformation (See: Annex I, Ref. No. 04); European Commission. 
2020. Assessment of the Code of Practice on Disinformation – Achievements and areas for further improvement (See: 
Annex I, Ref. No. 109); European Economic and Social Committee. 2020. The effects of campaigns on participation in 

88 

 
 
                                                           
 
approaches  to  the  concept  in  Member  States  emerges  from  different  national  political 
traditions.  Concretely,  what  is  a  political  advert  in  one  Member  State  might  not  be  in 
another,  and  may  be  regulated  very  differently.  Complying  with  different  rules  across 
Member  States  when  providing  services  relevant  to  political  advertising  (e.g.  support 
fundraising for a campaign, provide design, strategy and copy for adverts, and organise 
their dissemination) can be legally complex. It can discourage smaller enterprises. It has 
resulted in larger economic actors seeking to limit their exposure to compliance risk by 
limiting access to services to a national territory, regardless of applicable rules281. 

Regulatory  gaps  and  conflicts,  and  in  particular  decreased  transparency  of  political 
advertising, is  regarded  as creating risks for fair  and free elections.  In particular, in  the 
online environment it may be difficult to distinguish between paid-for political ads from 
other type of political ads or organic content created by users of platforms, which affects 
a number of actors in the electoral process.282 

1.4. Political Ads market and fast evolving landscape 

The market for political advertising, understood broadly, has developed greatly in recent 
years,  globally,  and  in  the  EU.  The  amounts  being  spent  have  steadily  risen283.  The 
digital  transformation  has  had  a  particularly  significant  effect  on  the  number  of  actors 
and services in  this market,  while previously political  advertising  campaigns in  the EU 
would  have  been  comparatively  modest  and  would  have  centred  on  a  few  traditional 
forms  and  during  relatively  limited  periods  before  elections.  These  included  print 
campaign  adverts  carried  in  newspapers  and  periodicals,  party  political  broadcasts  on 
television  and  radio  (often  strictly  time-limited),  and  leaflets,  billboards  and  direct 
mailings,  all  of  which  would  have  been  clearly  identifiable  as  political  adverts.  The 
publishers  and  the  parties  behind  them  were  also  identifiable,  and  there  were  a  limited 
number  of  usually  domestic  advertising  and  campaign  agencies  providing  the  copy, 
design, distribution and sometimes some ‘marketing’ advice. 

More recent elections have provided examples of how this market has changed, and how 
new  actors  have  entered  to  enable  new  kinds  of  advertising  and  related  services  to 
support  political  campaigns  and  the  communication  of  political  messages.  Besides 
publishers  and  advertising  agencies,  political  advertising  involves  a  large  number  of 
services,  in  addition  to  those  already  mentioned  for  conventional  political  advertising, 
including: 

 

 

in  financing:  microfunding,  crowdfunding  and  other  online  donation  platforms, 
banking finance (loans etc.), ad revenue generated from party and campaign websites; 
in  preparation:  copywriters,  design  agencies,  message  design  and  marketing 
agencies,  focus  group  and  other  research  companies,  political  consultancies  and 
political analysts (including those using personal data harvested from online activity); 

political decision-making (See: Annex I, Ref. No. 116); Hegelich, Serrano.  2019. Microtargeting in Germany for the 
2019  European  Elections  (See:  Annex  I,  Ref.  No.  107)  and  Who  Targets  Me.  2020.  How  to  take  a  “gold  standard” 
approach to political transparency and policy. (See Annex I, Ref. No. 184).  
281 Study on the impact of new technologies on free and fair elections (March 2021 – not yet published). 
282 See European Democracy Action Plan, page 4 (See: Annex I, Ref. No. 181).  
283 See the data on spending in the underlying study. 

89 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
 

 

in  placement:  online  platforms,  websites  (including  news  sites  and  political  party 
sites), forums and blogs, video sharing sites, influencers; 
in  dissemination:  ad  platforms/networks/brokers  (banner  ad  publishers),  targeting 
and media consultancies, data brokers; 

2. Scope 

2.1. Estimate on the size of the Political Ads market284 

Estimates of the size of the EU online political advertising market ranged from EUR 43 
million  to  almost  EUR  100  million  in  2019.  Google’s  transparency  report,  which 
records data from 20 March 2019 to 20 April 2021, reported that EUR 16,029,000 were 
spent in political advertising in the EU. Even though the EU online political advertising 
market has been steadily growing in the past years, it continues to be relatively small 
when compared with the market in the United States or Canada. The total amount spent 
on Google political  advertising in  these two  years in  the EU is  on par with  the amount 
spent  in  the  state  of  Ohio  for  only  a  slightly  longer  period  (30  May  2018  –  20  April 
2021). The total spent on political advertising in the USA in the period 30 May 2018-20 
April  2021  reached  EUR  622  million  (USD  751  million).  Note  that  this  spending 
coincides with the 2020 US Presidential election. 

The European Parliament spent EUR 3.3 million in Facebook ads, whereas the European 
Commission spent  EUR 105,000 in  the same period (beginning of March to  the end of 
May  2019).  The  Parliament  spending  was  fairly  uneven  across  the  EU  Member  States. 
Out  of  the  28  Member  States  back  then,  13  represented  more  than  20%  of  the  total 
invested in political ads on Facebook. It is worth noting that the European Parliament did 
not post any advert in Latvia, according to Google Transparency. 

Pan-European parties spent EUR 449,000 in total on Facebook advertising; a figure close 
to the budget of some national parties. The European Greens invested EUR 272,440 (plus 
EUR 20,951 by the European Free Alliance and EUR 2,065 spent on the Facebook page 
of  the  Europeans),  totalling  EUR  295,456.  Volt  and  DiEM25  also  spent  a  significant 
amount. ALDE expenditure was almost inexistent. 

Drawing on examples from recent national elections in the US, UK, and the Netherlands, 
the local elections in France as well as the European parliamentary elections in 2019, we 
can  see  that  the  overall  spending  on  political  advertising  has  increased,  and  moved 
online285.  

In the 2019 European Parliament elections, the expenditure in online political advertising 
reached EUR 23 million286 (figures vary according to sources). Most of the budget was 
spent in Facebook ads, with a significant cross border component. The figures are only 
expected to increase over time.  

Even as estimates put the size of the online political advertising market in Europe up to 
over EUR 100 million287, an ever-greater share of  political  advertising is  shifting away 

284 See annex 6 of the underlying study supporting this impact assessment for more complete data and figures. 
285 See data from underlying study. 
286 https://adtransparency.mozilla.org/eu/2019-05-17/eu/ 
287  According  to  analysis  by  the  political  tech  firm,  Worldacquire,  political  parties  and  organisations  across  Europe 
spent  at  least  €100  million  to  advertise  on  Facebook  and  Google  for  their  election  campaigns  in  2019 

90 

 
 
                                                           
 
from traditional media and into the online environment. This is due to factors including 
the relatively low cost of advertising online, the ease with which  online advertisements 
can  be  produced  and  disseminated,  and  the  anonymity  of  the  online  environment,  in 
comparison  to  advertising  through  traditional  media.  Stakeholders  interviewed  for  this 
study suggest that the shift towards online advertising has accelerated as a result of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. 

In  terms  of  the  problem’s  temporal  scope,  the  shift  to  online  means  that  political 
advertising  occurs  throughout  the  entire  legislative  cycle  and  is  not  restricted  to 
election  campaigns288.  This  presents  new  challenges  for  policymakers  and  regulators 
compared  to  the  traditional  journalistic  media  space.  The  period  during  which  political 
adverts  are  circulated  is  long,  and  has  likely  increased,  as  can  be  observed  from  the 
periods  during  which  unique  ads  appeared  on  Facebook  platforms  promoting  messages 
from  political  parties  contesting  the  recent  (March  2021)  national  elections  in  the 
Netherlands in the chart below. 

Figure 1: Number of ads on Facebook run by Dutch political parties before the General elections (15-17 
March 2021)289 

https://worldacquire.com/2019/12/30/which-political-parties-in-europe-spent-the-most-on-online-political-advertising-
in-2019/ 
288  How  Difficulties 
https://www.stiftung-nv.de/sites/default/files/snv_definingpoliticalads.pdf 
289 Source: https://dashboard.politieke-advertenties.nl/dashboard/en/index.html (accessed 30 March 2021). 

in  Delineating  Paid  Political  Communication  Can  Be  Addressed?  Available  at: 

91 

 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
As the variety of services available to political advertising have increased, especially in 
the  data-driven  targeting  and  message-shaping  domain,  so  have  the  amounts  spent  on 
them. The recent US elections provide an indication of trends in this respect, and while 
the particular financing arrangements available in US presidential elections enable vastly 
larger sums to be spent in political advertising and related services there, this trend, and 
the technologies applied, are observed in the EU too. 

2.2. Spending on the previous elections for the European Parliament (2019) 

Germany (EUR 5.5 million) and Spain (EUR 4.4. million) were the countries that spent 
the most in online political advertising during 2019290. Ten EU countries (AT, BE, DK, 
FR, DE, EL, IT, NL, ES and SE) saw spending on political ads in the excess of EUR 1 
million. Finland almost reaches this mark too. Conversely, six countries appear to have a 
smaller market during this period of under EUR 150,000 (BG, CY, EE, LV, LT, and SI). 

Considering  only  Facebook  (1  March  to  26  May  2019),  Germany  spent  EUR  3.46 
million  and  Spain  EUR  2.72  million.  Covering  a  longer  period  of  time,  Google 
Transparency  shows  that  the  country  with  the  most  spending  was  Romania  (EUR  2.7 
million), followed by Germany (EUR1.5 million) and the Netherlands (EUR 1.3 million). 
This is likely to reflect the electoral cycle, since Romania, the Netherlands and Germany 
all  oversaw  elections  during  this  period,  in  addition  to  the  2019  European  elections 
(presidential and legislative elections, general election in 2021, and elections in eight out 
of the 16 federated states (Länder) respectively). 

Except  for  the  European  Parliament,  Unidas  Podemos  (ES),  Vlaams  Belang  (BE)  and 
Ciudadanos (ES) ranked first in terms of total spending in Facebook. All three parties are 
rather new, which may support the literature arguing for the potential of targeted online 
advertising for disruptive political parties to reach audiences. 

A  number  of  well-known  NGOs  such  as  Greenpeace  or  Save  the  Children  also  appear 
among the top advertisers. This is relevant to the issue-based advertising trends discussed 
as part of political advertising. 

2.3. Cross-border aspect of the Political Ads market 

Based  on  the  analysis  of  the  information  available  in  Google  Transparency  the  total 
amount  of  cross  border  online  political  advertising  reached  EUR  6,193,950.00 
approximately.  Most  of  the  cross-border  flows  of  money  happened  between 
neighbouring countries. One of two exceptions is Slovakia and the United Kingdom. In 
total  volume  of  bilateral  expenditure,  the  Netherlands  tops  the  list  with  EUR  462,000 
spent in Belgium, Germany, and Ireland. Slovakia follows with EUR 259,850 spread in 
Czechia, Greece, Hungary and Poland. Sweden ranks third with EUR 239,400, all spent 
in Denmark. 

The  case  of  Romania  is  relevant.  National  advertisers  spent  €  164,100  across  nine 
Member States, namely: Bulgaria, Germany, Spain, United Kingdom, Greece, Croatia, 
Hungary, Italy, and the Netherlands. The receipt countries are a mix of neighbours and 
Member  States  where  there  is  a  big  community  of  nationals  from  Romania.  Reaching 
potential  voters  living  abroad  seems  to  be  one  of  the  main  drivers  explaining  these 

290 Also the UK spent EUR 11.5 million (of which EUR 3.31 million on Facebook), which participated in the European 
Parliamentary elections 

92 

 
 
                                                           
expenses.  In  this  respect,  Romania  and  Slovakia  were  the  two  Member  States  with  the 
most  companies  among  political  advertisers.  However,  since  the  Slovakian  diaspora  is 
not  as  prominent  as  the  Romanian  one,  the  price  of  Facebook  ads  or  even  the  service 
providers can explain this. 

Although  the  total  expenditure  is  not  as  high,  most  likely  due  to  the  lower  costs  of 
advertising,  it  is  worth  mentioning  the  flows  registered  in  the  Baltic  countries.  Latvia 
posted  advertising  in  Estonia  (EUR  1,250)  and  Lithuania  (EUR  13,750),  but  none  of 
these  seem  to  have  spent  anything  in  political  advertising  in  Latvia  nor  between 
themselves.  The  Visegrad  Group  (Poland,  Czechia,  Hungary  and  Slovakia)  also 
registered a significant amount of cross border money flows. 

Luxembourg  seems  to  be  the  only  Member  State  where  actors  did  not  engage  in 
cross  border  activity  in  any  direction.  Of  similar  interest  is  the  fact  that  no  adverts 
were  posted  in  Latvia,  Romania,  Sweden,  Slovenia  and  Slovakia  from  other  Member 
States. 

As regards as political candidates, it is relevant to mention the European wide coverage 
of  the  Polish  political  campaign.  The  current  president  of  Poland  is  Andrzeja  Duda 
(Komitet  Wyborczy  Kandydata  na  Prezydenta  Rzeczypospolitej  Polskiej  Andrzeja 
Dudy), who spent EUR 212,100 in 10,918 ads across 23 Member States, namely: AT, 
BE, BG, CZ, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, HR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, NL, PL, PT, RO, 
SE, SK. No ads were published in CY, EE, LV, and SI. The coalition in the opposition 
(Koalicyjny  Komitet  Wyborczy  Koalicja  Obywatelska  PO.  N  iPL  Zieloni)  spent 
approximately  half  of  the  money  EUR  109,750  in  double  of  the  ads,  22,787  in  19 
Member States: AT, BE, CY, CZ, DE, DK, ES, FR, GB, GR, HR, IE, IT, NL, PL, PT, 
RO, SE, SK.  

2.4. Cross-border spending on political ads 

The figure below illustrates the expenditure on political  advertising within the  Member 
States and political advertising with a cross-border component from 19 March 2019 to 19 
April  2021291.  As  reported  earlier,  the  total  amount  of  cross-border  online  political 
advertising reached EUR 6,193,950292. 

291  The  analysis  is  based  on  the  data  extracted  from  Google.  The  data  can  be  divided  into  political  ads  posted  in  a 
Member  State  (e.g.,  AT),  and political  ads  that  seem  to  be posted  from  a  different  Member  State  (e.g.,  AT,  DE).  In 
many cases the political ad seems to be simultaneously available in various Member States (e.g., AT, HU, SK) and its 
origin is difficult to track.  
292 This figure excludes pan-European political parties, the European Parliament, and other sources in Member States 
which could not be clearly identified.  

93 

 
 
                                                           
Figure 2: Cross-border political advertising293 

Source: underlying study’s author’s elaboration based on Google Transparency 

The  cross-border  activity  is  conducted  by  political  parties,  political  candidates,  civil 
society  organisations  and  companies.  Among  the  latter,  there  are  communication 
agencies, advertising and marketing agencies, consultancies and other businesses. Cross-
border  advertising  is  defined  as  a  service  in  which  the  actor  on  behalf  of  which  the 
service is provided is extraterritorial to the jurisdiction where the advert is posted.  

Table  3  below  lists  the  most  prominent  bilateral  cross-border  activity  in  terms  of 
expenditure. 

Table 3: Bilateral cross-border expenditure in the 2019 EP elections 

Direction of the expenditure 

Total 

Direction of the expenditure 

Total 

Germany to Austria 

€ 192,800 

Ireland to United Kingdom  

€ 145,600 

The Netherlands to Belgium 

€ 348,400  Slovenia to Croatia 

€ 130,300 

Poland to Germany 

€ 135,800  The Netherlands to Ireland 

€ 112,350 

Sweden to Denmark  

€ 239,400  Romania to Bulgaria 

€ 50,850 

Source: underlying study’s author’s elaboration based on Transparency Report Google 

As  it  can  be  observed,  most  of  the  cross-border  flows  of  money  occur  between 
neighbouring  countries  (with  the  exception  of  the  Netherlands  and  Ireland).  In  total 
volume of bilateral expenditure, the Netherlands tops the list with EUR 462,000 spent in 
Belgium  and  Ireland.  Slovakia  follows  with  EUR  259,850  spent  in  Czechia,  Greece, 
Hungary and Poland. Sweden ranks third with EUR 239,400, all spent in Denmark.  

293 NB: “MS” represents the expenditure within the Member State, while “other MS” indicates the expenditure coming 
from other Member States. 

94 

 
 
 
                                                           
The  case  study  on  the  2020  Presidential  Election  in  Poland  shows  that  cross-border 
posting  of  online  political  advertisements  is  not  a  phenomenon  limited  to  elections  to 
European Parliament, but that it also occurs during national electoral processes. Political 
parties and candidates can seek the vote of nationals residing in different Member States 
targeting  online  political  advertisements  at  them,  particularly  so  in  the  countries  where 
large diaspora communities reside. The case studies on the Constitutional Referendum in 
Ireland and the Spanish  Legislative elections (see  underlying study) also show how the 
funding  of  online  electoral  campaigns  and  the  use  of  dissemination  techniques  had  a 
cross-border dimension. 

The fact that cross-border adverting has been identified (and to an extent quantified) in 
26 Member States,  that it  is  present  in national  as well as European elections,  and that 
online  political  advertising  in  general  is  continuing  to  replace  its  offline  equivalent, 
indicates  that  the  phenomenon  will  continue  to  develop.  Further,  longitudinal  data  will 
need  to  be  analysed  to  understand  the  extent  to  which  cross-border  online  political 
advertising will continue to grow, however as presented in the next section focusing on 
the  actors  and  processes  involved  in  online  political  advertising,  the  complexity  of  this 
phenomenon is also growing, indicating a quickly developing and innovative market.  

2.5. Profile of service providers 

Having  a  closer  look  into  service  providers,  as  disclosed  by  Google’s  Transparency 
Report,  there  were  companies  with  a  widespread  activity  across  the  EU  Member 
States. Magnet Media, a media company with offices in Estonia and Latvia, spent EUR 
20,750 in 946 political ads in AT, BE, CZ, DE, ES, EU, FI, FR, HU, IE, IT, PL, RO, and 
SK.  None  of  the  ads  seems  to  have  been  posted  in  Estonia.  The  company  has  8 
employees  and  works  in  traditional  and  online  advertising.  mmb  media  Agentur  hr,  a 
marketing & advertising Croatian company that belongs to a Swiss conglomerate, spent 
EUR 22,250 in 2,781 ads in AT, BE, CZ, DE, ES, EU, FR, GB, HR, HU, IT, NL, PL, 
RO, SE, SI, SK. It has seven employees. Amerisoft SRL, a Romanian digital marketing 
and publishing company, spent EUR 147,000 in 6,719 ads in AT, BE, BG, DE, ES, EU, 
FR, GB, HU, IT, LT, NL, PL, PT, and RO. Information about the number of employees 
is unavailable. The Romanian political party Partidul Mişcarea Populară was among its 
clients. Another Romanian company, Atelierul de Internet SRL, spent EUR 603,750 on 
2,497  ads  posted  in  AT,  BE,  DE,  ES,  EU,  FR,  GB,  HU,  IE,  IT,  NL,  RO.  It  employed 
seven  people  in  2019.  The  correlation  among  its  turnover  and  the  2019  elections  is 
depicted in the Figure below. 

Although difficult to  accurately estimate,  the size of the cross-border online political 
advertising  market  is  rather  significant.  In  addition  to  European  elections,  the  free 
movement  of  European  citizens,  especially  in  those  Member  States  with  an  important 
diaspora,  also  constitute  an  important  part  of  the  business.  National  elections  have 
transcended  borders.  As  shown  above,  some  of  the  companies  involved  in  the 
provision  of  online  advertising  services  are  micro-enterprises  (with  less  than  10 
employees). 

Figure 4: Processes and actors in traditional political advertising 

95 

 
 
Traditional  political  advertising  is  a  relatively  simply  transaction  between  a  political 
actor (party, foundation, candidate or campaign organisation), and an ad publisher, either 
print,  broadcast  (radio  and  television)  or  other  physical  media  (billboards,  posters, 
leaflets).  It  can  involve  an  intermediary  service  (advertising  agency,  consultancy, 
marketing  and  branding  advice)  that  can  also  provide  services  not  related  to 
advertisements. It is typically strictly regulated in the Member States (see below). There 
is  a  relatively  simple  money  flow:  the  audience  funds  political  parties  (through 
contributions and donations), political parties hire different kinds of media to spread their 
messages to the audience. Political parties may hire intermediary services to assist them 
with  their  political  campaign.  Data  is  not  gathered  in  a  structured  way  and  the  kind  of 
media  used  only  allows  for  general  targeting.  It  should  be  noted  that  there  is  not  a 
significant  difference  between  traditional  political  ads  and  traditional  commercial 
advertisement as the money flow is the same. 

Figure 5: Processes and actors in modern political advertising 

Modern political advertising can involve a range of other actors and include a number of 
services.  Other 
intermediary  services  (advertising  agency, 
consultancy,  marketing  and  branding  advice)  some  new  services,  such  as  data  analysis 
firms,  have  been  used.  With  online  media,  it  has  become  possible  to  gather  structured 
data/information on the audience which enables political parties, non-party organisations 

traditional 

than 

the 

96 

Political partyAim: get the largest share of votesRole: Provide overall guidance and line to followPolitical consultancy / Communication / advertising agencyAim: develop overall strategy for campaignRole: develop strategy in coordination with political partyFundersAudienceNon-advert communicationPolitical advertisementMeetings, interviews, events Broadcast mediaPrint mediaOtherGeneral targetingMessageGeneral targetingMoneyflowMoneyflowMoney flow 
 
 
 
and  (Political  consultancy  /  Communication  and  Advertising)  agencies  to  tailor  their 
messages  to  specific  audiences.  This  process  adds  a  layer  of  complexity  as  besides  the 
money  flow  there  is  now  also  data  flowing  from  the  audience  to  data  analysis  firms 
(through online media) which is then made available to political actors. 

Depending on the online media used, the process is slightly different. The tables below 
provide a simplified overview of the actors involved and the flows of data and money in 
the case of the provision of ad banners, ad videos, and sponsored posts on social media 
respectively.  It  also  should  be  noted  that  both  the  data  and  money  flows  are  similar  in 
political and commercial advertising. 

Figure 6: Processes and actors in the market of ad banners 

When  a  Political  Party  (or  other  Political  actor)  wants  to  advertise  its  message  on  a 
website (ad banners), there is  usually no direct  contact  between advertiser and website. 
Advertisers use demand-side platforms to store their adverts and websites use supply-side 
platforms  that  help  them  to  manage  and  sell  their  inventory.  Ad  Exchanges  acts  as  an 
online marketplace that allows advertisers and publisher to buy and sell online inventory, 
auctioning  impressions  to  the  highest  bidder.  On  top  of  this  (mediated)  monetary 
transaction, there is also a data flow from the websites that gather and sell data towards 
data  analysis  firms,  which,  after  processing  the  data,  can  sell  it  to  other  actors  such  as 
political communication agencies. 

Figure 7: Processes and actors in the market of ad videos 

97 

 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Processes and actors in the market of social media sponsored posts 

As can be seen from figures 4 and 5, the processes and actors in the market of ad videos 
and social media sponsored posts are similar. Political actors (either directly or through 
an intermediary service provider like a political communication agency) spend money on 
online platforms in  order to  get  their message  advertised. The main difference between 
this  process  and  the  process  with  traditional  advertising  is  the  ability  of  platforms  to 
collect personal information on the audience, which enables the creation of targeted ads. 

2.6. EUPPs’ spending on advertising over time 

The  European  Parliament  publishes  annual  financial  statements  provided  by    all 
EUPPs.294  Each  annual  financial  reports  covers  one  year,295  from  1  January  to  31 
December  (except  for  the  last  two  EP  election  years,  where  there  is  a  statement  per 
semester).  The  reports  list  each  political  group’s  expenditure  on  publications  and 
advertising,  in  which  EUPPs  distinguish  between  5  categories:  Posters,  booklets, 
publications;  Advertising  inserts  and  audiovisual  advertising;  Advertising  material, 
novelty items, telecommunications advertising; internet sites and cyber advertising; visits 
to institutions, information stands. Based on these reports, the following graphs visualize 
the political groups’ general revenue and their spending on these different categories of 

294 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/groups/accounts_en.htm  
295 With the exception of 2014 and 2019, where biannual reports were submitted. 

98 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
advertisement.  More  detailed  information  is  not  available,  and  the  proportion  of 
informational and political ads is not known.  

 Figure 9: EUPP’s revenue between 2010 and 2019

99 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Absolute Spending by EUPP on Advertisement

Figure 11: Percentage of Revenue Spent on Advertising by EUPP 

The political groups generally spent a larger share of their revenue on advertisement in 
recent  years,  with  a  peak  in  2018.  Spending  plummets  significantly  in  2019  and, 
according  to  stakeholder  consultations,  the  reason  for  this  is  Facebook’s  2019  rule  that 
limited  the  placement  of  cross-border  advertisements.  Parties  had  allotted  significant 

100 

 
 
 
 
amounts for their online campaigns on Facebook for the 2019 EP elections, which they 
were not able to spend differently, leading to lower overall spending. 

Figure 12: EUPP spending on posters, booklets, publications 

Figure 13: EUPP spending on advertising material, novelty items, telecommunications advertising 

101 

 
 
 
 
Figure 14: EUPP spending on advertising material, novelty items, telecommunications advertising 

 Figure 15: EUPP spending on internet sites and cyber advertising 

102 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Party spending on visits to institutions, information stands 

EUPP spending on visits to institutions, information stands

1.200.000

1.000.000

800.000

600.000

400.000

200.000

0

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

EPP

ECR

S&D

ALDE

Renew

EFDD

Verts/ALE

GUE/NGL

Total

2. 

Other aspects relevant to the problem definition  

The  problem  definition  section  of  the  impact  assessment  addresses  a  number  of  issues 
related to  political  ads  from  an internal  market  perspective (as well as issues related to 
EUPPs).  Other  issues,  less  directly  related  to  article  114  TFEU,  are  briefly  mentioned 
because they are relevant  –  in  particular for the  policy options  on targeting and  for the 
section assessing the impacts of the policy options. These issues are examined in greater 
detail below. The numbering is kept for consistency. 

3.1 Problems for democratic processes linked to internal market issues (Problem 2) 

The  fragmentation  and  gaps  in  the  regulation  of  political  ads  also  result  in  poor 
regulatory outcomes and undermine democratic processes and trust among voters.  

As  described  in  Section  2.2.1  of  the  impact  assessment,  in  the  Member  States  where 
political ads are permitted, specific provisions condition the  availability of political ads 
(regarding  medium,  period,  actors  etc.)  and  their  content  (transparency  and  other 
rules)296.  These  rules  are  specific  to  each  Member  State  and  reflect  their  respective 
democratic traditions297. They tend to share certain objectives, including that: 

  a  plurality  of  political  actors  have  access  to  the  means  to  communicate  their 

message to voters;  

  political  actors  campaign  in  the  open  and  can  be  challenged  on  the  claims  they 

make; 

296  See Annex 8 for a presentation of the availability and content of relevant national legislation in this area. 
297  In  particular,  the  balance  established  between  national  institutions,  political  actors,  citizens  as  voters,  and  other 
actors contributing to the democratic debate and oversight, such as journalists and civil society more broadly. 

103 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
 

resources  are  used  transparently  (and  usually  that  there  is  some  balance  in  the 
access that political actors have to resources); 

  citizens  are  provided  with  the  information  they  require  to  evaluate  the  political 

 

messages that they receive and make their minds up freely; and 
foreign  actors  and  powerful  commercial  interests  are  not  able  to  control  the 
political debate. 

Beyond the EU instruments relevant to the regulation of political ads (see section 2.1 in 
the impact assessment, and Annex 9), the Commission has supported soft-law measures. 
As part of the Commission’s 2018 electoral package, the Commission recommended that 
Member States and political parties take measures to strengthen the transparency of paid 
political advertising, to ensure that parties and economic actors took the necessary steps 
to  ensure  that  individuals  could  recognise  a  political  ad  and  know  the  identity  of  its 
sponsor,  the  amounts  paid  for  it  and  the  use  of  targeting,  where  relevant. The  Code  of 
Practice on disinformation included commitments to ensure that the political advertising 
on  their  services  was  clearly  labelled  as  such,  and  that  viewers  should  be  able  to 
understand how it was targeted to them. 

The  2020  Commission  post-elections  report  shows  that  the  implementation  of  the 
recommendations encountered significant challenges, and while effective measures were 
taken by Member States to establish elections networks to improve coordination on these 
topics,  substantive  changes  to  relevant  rules  and  procedures  were  not  possible298. 
Moreover,  the  Commission’s  assessment  of  the  first  year  of  operation  of  the  Code  of 
Practice on Disinformation299 showed that, although the Code produced positive results, 
there  were  persisting  insufficiencies  in  the  signatories’  policies  and  actions  on  political 
ads transparency. These include inter alia the completeness of political ads repositories, 
the  limited  functionalities  of  application  programming  interfaces300  for  the  repositories, 
and  the  absence  of  uniform  registration  and  authorisation  procedures.  The  Guidance 
provided  by  the  Commission  on  the  update  of  the  Code  of  Practice  will  help  its 
signatories  to  address  these  weaknesses  and  foster  industry-led  solutions,  but  the 
assessment  also  noted  that  an  inherent  weakness  of  the  Code  was  its  self-regulatory 
nature. 

By providing for oversight and enforcement mechanisms, the DSA will provide the Code 
with  a  regulatory  backstop.  It  will  also  introduce  a  number  of  relevant  obligations  for 
online platforms that publish ads on their interfaces, as well as due diligence obligations 
for  very    large  online  platforms301.  While  these  initiatives  will  contribute  to  further 
accountability in the online ads environment, and will reinforce the ability of authorities 
to supervise political ads, a number of gaps will remain with respect to political ads. The 
scope of the  DSA is  wide, including but  not  limited to  political  ads.  For this reason, it 
does not include in the hard-law requirements disclosure of ad spend, one of the metrics 

298  The  implementation  of  these  recommendations  was  described  in  the  Commission  report  on  the  2019  elections 
and 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/com_2020_252_en_0.pdf 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/swd_2020_113_en.pdf 
299 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/assessment-code-practice-disinformation-achievements-and-
areas-further-improvement  
300  APIs,  a  software  interface  which  allows  external  actors  (limited)  access  to  a  platform’s  services  with  automated 
requests. 
301 See Annex 9 and notably the table “Detail of envisaged obligations introduced under solutions 1 and 2, alongside 
those anticipated for the DSA (baseline)” 

104 

 
 
                                                           
necessary for political accountability. As regards ad transparency measures, the scope of 
the DSA is focused on platforms that display ads on their interfaces, but does not cover 
the full range of political ads - that can be encountered online - to be addressed, including 
when  they  are  placed  on  third-party  websites302.  Not  all  actors,  and  especially  not  all 
offline actors involved in political ads are covered by these instruments, but this is out of 
scope of the problems addressed in the DSA.  

Current regulation and soft measures have not achieved their objectives in the context of 
political  ads,  especially  across  borders. This  can  be  observed  in  a  number  of  areas  and 
has several drivers, discussed below.  

3.2.  Negative  impacts  of  current  framework  on  regulatory  outcomes  across  borders 
(Problem 2.1) 

Non-recognisability of political advertising by individuals 

Offline political ads are usually labelled and some transparency information is provided 
in most Member States. Online, this is typically only done by certain platforms, usually 
voluntarily and inconsistently. The DSA will introduce labelling and certain transparency 
obligations  for  all  ads  in  its  scope,  but,  as  explained  here-above,  the  transparency 
measures do not cover all online ads and no offline ads, neither do they cover all the data 
necessary.  The  open  public  consultation303  indicated  that  respondents  across  the  EU 
encounter political advertising where they are unable to identify key elements including 
the  entities  sponsoring  the  ad,  the  amount  spent  on  placing  the  ad,  and  the  use  of 
targeting.  Online,  nearly  four  in  ten  Europeans  have  encountered  content  which  they 
could  not  clearly  identify  as  political  ads304.  They  can  confuse  political  ads  with 
journalistic content shared or created by others online305. Although of critical importance, 
labelling as such is not always sufficient on its own. In a recent German study306, almost 
60% of those interviewed thought that advertorials307 were genuine news content, despite 
labels. Other complementary measures on transparency at various levels are necessary. 

302 See in particular Annex 6 for a full description of the various services involved in political advertising. The DSA 
defines ads as ‘displayed by an online platform on its online interface against remuneration specifically for promoting 
that information’ where an online platform is a ‘hosting service which, at the request of a recipient of the service, stores 
and  disseminates  to  the  public  information’,  ‘online  interface’  means  any  software,  including  a  website  or  a  part 
thereof, and applications, including mobile applications, and a ‘hosting’ service consists of the storage of information 
provided by, and at the request of, a recipient of the service. In contrast, in simple terms, adtech advertising is where 
the  adtech  service  provider  acts  as  an  intermediary,  arranging  for  the  display  of  an  advertiser’s  ads  on  another 
company’s  website  or  app  (e.g.  a  news  media  service),  and  involving  a  number  of  ancillary  services  which  may  be 
provided by the adtech company or another service provider, such as the actual hosting of the ad, conducting a real-
time bidding process to establish which ad will be served to each website user, providing the data analysis used to base 
the bidding and targeting process etc. These are not ads under the DSA. 
303  European  Commission,  Political  Advertising  –  Increasing  Transparency.  https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-
regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12826-Political-advertising-improving-transparency 
304 Special Eurobarometer 507 “Democracy in the EU”, fieldwork October-November 2020, publication March 2021 
305  For  an  account  of  the  impact  of  labelling,  see  for  instance:  “When  politicians  go  native:  The  consequences  of 
political  native  advertising  for  citizens’  trust  in  news”  by  Magnus  Hoem  Iversen  and  Erik  Knudsen  (University  of 
Bergen, Norway) published in “Journalism”, a Sage journal, in 2019, Vol. 20(7) 961–978. 
306 
nv.de/sites/default/files/studie_quelleinternet.pdf  
307  An  advertisement  written  in  the  form  of  an  objective  editorial,  presented  in  a  printed  publication,  and  usually 
designed to look like a legitimate and independent news article. 

Internet?“,  March 

https://www.stiftung-

Verantwortung, 

„Quelle: 

Stiftung 

2021: 

Neue 

105 

 
 
                                                           
Lacking  transparency  presents  several  interconnected  problems  for  individuals  exposed 
to political advertising308. Citizens find it difficult to distinguish between information on 
political topics and political advertising309. This can undermine their assessment and even 
leaves  them  susceptible  to  manipulation.  In  particular,  the  political  nature  of  online 
political ads can easily be concealed from the viewer, and their content concealed from 
wider scrutiny. The online space also provides opportunities for non-transparent means of 
amplification,  such  as  networks  of  (semi-)inauthentic  accounts,  that  might  lead  to  a 
harder  distinction  of  the  nature  of  the  ad;  this  is  especially  true  if  the  labelling  of  a 
political ad is easy to remove. The lack of transparency in political ads, combined in the 
online world with proliferation of other information, can also make it difficult to identify 
essential official information about elections, such as on timing.  

Figure 17: OPC question on information about advertising 

The  potential  to  exploit  the  current  lack  of  transparency,  particularly  online,  to 
manipulate  the  electorate,  impacts  citizens’  and  governments’  trust  in  online  ads.  Such 
concern is relevant from an internal market perspective: it is reported as motivating the 
Irish  legislative  proposal  to  include  a  ban  on  online  political  ads  from  foreign  actors, 
including EU citizens310. 

Stakeholders’ views  

NGOs  and  academic  experts  interviewed  for  the  underlying  study  attribute  the  issue  of 
insufficient transparency of political ads largely to online platforms and political parties.  

Societal  and  political  actors  lack  information  to  hold  political  actors  and  parties 
accountable on their online political advertising activities 

308  How  can  the  Swedish  Government  prevent  Political  Micro-  Targeting  from  threatening  the  Electoral  Process? 
(2018) Knäpper Bohman, C. 
309 See, for example, Fool me once: Regulating “fake news” and other online advertising (2018) Wood, A. K., Ravel, 
A. M. Available at: https://southerncalifornialawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/91_6_1223.pdf 
310 
https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/34cf6-general-scheme-of-the-electoral-reform-bill-2020/  

(08/01/2021). 

pp246-248 

Electoral 

Scheme 

General 

Reform 

2020, 

Bill 

the 

of 

106 

 
 
 
                                                           
Certain  actors  play  a  specific  role  in  the  political  process  in  holding  political  actors  to 
account  and  in  supporting  a  plural  and  open  political  debate  (‘interested  actors’).  This 
journalists,  civil  society  organisations  (“CSOs”),  election  observers,311 
includes 
academia, citizens and political actors themselves. Member State regulatory frameworks 
can  include  specific  provisions  reflecting  the  role  such  actors  play  in  the  political 
process,  but  these  provisions  are  not  available  consistently  in  all  Member  States, 
especially online.  

They  can  be  related  to  the  rights  of  political  actors  to  access  the  debate  (for  instance, 
through  rules  specifying  the  amount  of  time  different  parties  or  candidates  may  run 
broadcast media slots) to the enforcement of other rights in the political process (such as 
the  right  to  reply  and  rectification312),  or  the  availability  of  information  to  interested 
actors  to  monitor  the  debate313  and  hold  politicians  to  account  for  their  campaign 
messages. 

To  play  their  role  as  watchdogs  in  the  democratic  process,  these  actors  need  access  to 
specific  information,  in  particular  ads’  sponsors,  amounts  spent  and  sources  of 
financing314.  The  literature  review  found  a  substantial  lack  of  quantitative  and 
comparable data on political advertising for electoral campaigns, particularly online.  

Stakeholders’ views 

CSOs  expressed  concerns  about  the  lack  of  transparency  on  online  advertisement  as  impeding 
their role in the democratic  process.315 They  indicated that transparency  should include  enough 
information  about  the  ads  to  allow  campaigns  to  be  followed  across  platforms  and  media,  and 
could be pre-processed to help actors make best use of it316.  

Within  its  (limited)  scope,  the  DSA  will  already  provide  researchers  with  access  to 
relevant  data held  by  online platforms  (transparency  reports317, obligation  from VLOPs 
to  make  publicly  available  an  ad  repository,  obligation  to  disclose  data  to  vetted 
researchers). Political actors and civil society will not, however, be provided such access 
directly.  
The EU Action Plan against Disinformation318  aims to support the creation of a multi-
disciplinary  community  of  independent  fact-checkers  and  researchers  focused  on 
emerging digital media vulnerabilities and disinformation campaigns within the EU. The 
new  European  Digital  Media  Observatory  (EDMO),  operational  from  June  2020,  will 

311    Accredited  election  electoral  observers  have  privileged  access  to  aspects  of  the  voting  process  in  some  Member 
States, but there are few other rules mandating transparency for this group. 
312  Approached  differently  in  the  Member  States.  The  right  to  reply  is  also  provided  for  television  broadcasting  in 
Article 28 AVMSD. 
313 See for on-line activities, the recently issued guidance for a new Code of Practice on Disinformation. 
314  This was highlighted notably by NGOs and more specifically by the civil society coalition active in the area in a 
statement. Governing Platforms Project, Putting Meaningful Transparency at the Heart of the Digital Services Act Why 
Data  Access  for  Research  Matters  &  How  we  can  Make 
it  Happen,  https://algorithmwatch.org/en/wp-
content/uploads/2020/10/Governing-Platforms_DSA-Recommendations.pdf 
315  Several highlighted key concerns in a joint statement on the topic 8 September 2020, Joint Call for Universal Ads 
Transparency: https://epd.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/joint-call-for-universal-ads-transparency.pdf  
316  In  this  regard,  actors  pointed  to  the policy  of  the  Netherlands  authorities  to  support  independent  organisations  to 
perform  such  pre-processing,  including  through  the  Political  Microtargeting:  Safeguarding  public  values  project 
https://politieke-advertenties.nl/22-2/  
317  And a database with statements of reasons for removal of content which is considered illegal or against terms and 
conditions of the service provider. 
318 Join (2018) 36 FINAL 

107 

 
 
                                                           
help build such a community and coordinate fact-checking and research efforts across the 
EU.319 The signatories of the Code of Practice on Disinformation committed to provide 
researchers access to data from their services, including on political ads320. The European 
Commission’s Guidance on the Code of Practice sets  out  how to  increase transparency 
regarding  political  and  issues  ads  on  signatories’  services,  including  with  efficient 
labelling of such ads,  increased transparency in  messaging platforms, measures to  limit 
the risks associated with micro-targeting and improved ad repositories. 

Together,  these  EU  initiatives  offer  only  a  partial  solution  to  the  needs  of  such  actors 
specific to oversight of political ads.  

Stakeholders’ views 

CSOs  were  sceptical  about  the  capacity  of  industry  initiatives  to  sufficiently  enhance 
transparency321.  They  did  not  find  the  platforms  self-regulatory  measures  sufficient  to  provide 
reliable data.322 They considered that the platform-provided libraries were poorly functioning and 
would need standards to ensure quality. In addition, they highlighted that mandatory ad libraries 
should exist for all online platforms.323  

Moreover,  stakeholders  highlighted  that  it  was  necessary  to  go  beyond  the  mere  publication of 
the  ads  and  to  address  the  influencing  methods  used  to  enhance  the  impact  of  ads,  including 
manipulating  ranking  and  placement  algorithms.  Political  actors  are  unable  to  exercise 
mutual scrutiny.  

Opaque political ads restrict possibilities for political actors to exercise mutual scrutiny. 
Based  on  the  feedback  from  Member  States,  if  a  party  breaches  electoral  rules,  for 
instance on party funding, it is currently unlikely that it will be possible to establish this 
through the available information  with  sufficient certainty  for other parties to  flag such 
activities to the public or the relevant authorities.324  

Member States are unable to monitor and enforce relevant rules325 
Competent  authorities face difficulties to  exercise their oversight  function326, especially 
in  cross-border  contexts.  There  are  also  important  discrepancies  between  the  oversight 
they are able to exercise online and offline327. 

Limited legislation providing insufficient information 

319 In September 2021, eight independent multidisciplinary hubs become operational  (each one covering one or more 
Member States). They will become part of EDMO network of hubs on digital media to contribute to the fight against 
disinformation across Europe. 
320 Efforts to implement these commitments have been criticised for being insufficient, inconsistent and untransparent. 
321 In observed through interviews, written EDAP public consultation responses, as well as public statements including 
(1) Governing Platforms Project, Putting Meaningful Transparency at the Heart of the Digital Services Act - Why Data 
Access for Research Matters & How we can Make it Happen (previously quoted), and (2) Joint Call for Universal Ads 
Transparency, https://epd.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/joint-call-for-universal-ads-transparency.pdf 
322 See the underlying study, in particular its table 1 (Examples of existing monitoring platforms). 
323 A comprehensive plan to innovate democracy in Europe. Available at:  www.youthforum.org/comprehensive-plan-
innovate-democracy-europe  
324 This was a discussion point within the Dutch Code of Conduct, elaborated within the framework of the last Dutch 
elections  and  signed  by  almost  all  national  political  parties  and  global  online  platforms.  Available  at: 
https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/news/news-pdfs/Dutch-Code-of-Conduct-transparency-online-political-
advertisements-EN.pdf 
325 This section does not cover data protection/targeting which are dealt with in a different problem. 
326 The national authorities responsible for the enforcement and oversight of rules on online political advertising tend to 
vary across Member States (as well as their exact competences) and their coordination is typically insufficient. 
327 See mapping of national legislation in Denmark in Annex 8. 

108 

 
 
 
                                                           
Few Member States impose obligations to provide information on key aspects of online 
political advertising, such as the amounts spent328. When general legislation is in place, it 
is  usually  not  adapted  to  the  online  environment  or  to  cross-border  oversight  needs.  It 
emerged in the consultation for instance that when the rules on traditional media do apply 
to  social  media,  they  are  usually  not  monitored  there,  both  through  a  lack  of  requisite 
capability and powers in the competent authority329. Oversight is not consistent for online 
and offline media, leading to poor regulatory outcomes. 

This can contribute to specific issues with political advertising in multiple Member States 
or across borders. For instance, the national regulatory body of Lithuania acknowledges 
difficulties  in  monitoring  political  campaign  expenditure  on  political  advertising.  It 
referred  to  the  absence  of  a  proper  system  to  monitor  editorial  coverage  of  broadcast, 
online  and  print  media  during  election  campaigns,  and  having  to  rely  largely  on 
complaints or notifications received from third parties to detect cases of possible hidden 
advertising.330  In  France,  the  Commission  nationale  des  comptes  de  campagne  et  des 
financements  politiques  does  not  undertake  real-time  campaign  monitoring  or  obtain 
information from donors and service providers331.  

These  issues  are  linked  to  the  underlying  regulatory  framework.  For  instance,  in 
Denmark, internet resources, including online editions of newspapers or broadcasters, are 
not  covered  by  the  rules  that  apply  for  offline  political  ads332.  Similarly  in  Bulgaria, 
Czechia  and  Slovakia333  for  campaigning  on  social  networks  and  online  media.  In 
Romania,  political  ad  provisions  for  private  offline  broadcasters  appear  restrictive, 
whereas there are no such restrictions for print and online media334.  

Insufficient information and ineffective collaboration between national authorities and 
economic actors including online platforms and media 

The  information  published  by  ad  publishers  or  political  parties  about  their  online 
advertising  is  often  insufficient  to  permit  effective  oversight,  and  other  sources  of 
information are necessary. The information is generally published by parties or oversight 
bodies  with  a  certain  delay,  incomplete  and  not  precise  enough  to  evaluate  if  online 
political advertising expenditure is compliant with transparency requirements.  

Member  States  efforts  to  address  the  issue  remain  fragmented.  The  French  Law  of  22 
December  2018  to  counter  information  manipulation  introduced  a  duty  for  online 
platforms  to  cooperate  with  relevant  authorities  against  the  dissemination  of  false 

328 See Annex 8 on legal mapping in Member States. 
329 See underlying study. 
330  OSCE/ODIHR  (2019),  Republic  of  Lithuania  Presidential  Election  12  and  26  May  2019  ODIHR  Election  - 
Assessment Mission Final Report. Available at: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/a/e/433352.pdf 
331 OSCE/ODIHR (2017), Republic of France Presidential election 23 April and 7 May 2017 OSCE/ODIHR Election 

Expert Team Final Report. Available at: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/c/8/337346.pdf  

332 Internet platforms are unregulated, yet they can voluntarily register to become subject to the Media Liability Act. 
333  OSCE/ODIHR  (2021),  Republic  of  Bulgaria  Parliamentary  Elections  4  April  2021  ODIHR  Needs  Assessment 
Mission Report. Broadcasters and audio-visual online content will only be reviewed in case of complaints, while other 
media  are  monitored;  OSCE/ODIHR  (2017),  Czech  Republic  Parliamentary  Elections  20-21  October  2017, 
Presidential Election January 2018 OSCE/ODIHR  Needs Assessment Mission Report; OSCE/ODIHR (2019) Slovak 
Republic Presidential Election 16 and 30 March 2019, ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Final Report.  
334  OSCE/ODIHR  (2020),  Romania  Presidential  Election  10  and  24  November  2019  ODIHR  Election  Assessment 
Mission Final Report. Available at: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/a/449200_0.pdf 

109 

 
 
                                                           
information,  especially  during  the  election  period335,  but  it  has  faced  challenges  in  its 
application.  

Stakeholders’ views 

In the framework of ECNE336, Member States’ expressed the need for more effective oversight 
possibilities applicable both offline and online to address opaque practices related to political ads. 
They  underlined  that,  even  when  rules  apply  to  political  advertising  on  all  types  of  media 
including social media and platforms, online platforms do not wish to engage in collaboration or 
to share relevant information allowing competent authorities exercise their monitoring functions. 
Some national authorities reported that there is no cooperation with online platforms during the 
usual “reserve period” or “silence period” preceding polling day337. The lack of accessibility and 
transparency  about  online  political  content  leads  to  a  difficulty  to  access  the  content  of  the 
advertisements and their archives and the difficulty to access who financed these advertisements. 

Opaque  practices  related  to  political  ads  are  also  indicated  as  being  of  concern  in  the 
consultation,  such  as anonymous  online fundraising  through  e.g.  GoFundMe338.  In  Spain, there 
were concerns related to the use of messaging applications (e.g. WhatsApp) for campaigning due 
to difficulties in assessing the compliance of such campaign activities with legislation339.  

Consequences 

Stakeholder  groups  in  the  consultation  were  unanimous  in  recognising  the  negative 
impact  of  the  poor  regulatory  outcomes  on  democratic  processes  and  on  public 
confidence  and  trust  in  political  ads.  This  has  prompted  several  Member  States  to 
legislate and to prepare legislation unilaterally to address these issues. Yet, these Member 
States and others have also indicated that national regulation is unlikely to be effective in 
addressing the cross-border aspect of this problem without a sufficient EU framework to 
support them. 

2.2.2.2  Targeting  and  other  dissemination  and  amplification  techniques  in  online 
political ads create problems for citizens and for the democratic process (Problem 2.2) 

Targeting (also  referred to  as  microtargeting when tailored at  individual or small  group 
level)  is  increasingly  used  to  enhance  the  impact  of  political  ads  online.  It  is  used  to 
direct  specific  political  messages  to  selected  audiences  on  the  basis  of  personal  data 
based  on  interactions  between  citizens  and  online  service  providers.  It  is  used  to  tailor 
ads to individuals, including social media posts, banner ads, in app-ads, pop ups etc.340 

335  See  Article  11  of  French  Law  of  22  December  2018  to  counter  information  manipulation.  Online  platforms  are 
required to provide the Higher Audio-visual Council, responsible for regulating broadcasting in France, with an annual 
declaration of the methods of implementation of each of the measures taken to counter the spread of false information. 
Online platforms  must  provide  users  with  clear  and  transparent  information  about  the nature,  origin  and  methods  of 
disseminating content as well as the identity of persons paying remuneration in return for the promotion of information 
content.  
336  Ad  hoc  meeting  of  the  ECNE  of  25  March  2021:  https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-
rights/eu-citizenship/electoral-rights/european-cooperation-network-elections_en 
337 Two interviewed Member States public authorities stated that they did not manage to have a satisfactory, effective 
cooperation  with  large  online  platforms  so  that  the  latter  would  provide  them  with  sufficient  information  on  online 
political advertising conducted in election periods in their countries over the last two years to oversee these activities. 
338 OSCE/ODIHR (2020), Ireland Early Parliamentary Elections 8 February 2020 ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission 
Report. Available at: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/a/b/445528.pdf 
339  OSCE/ODIHR  (2019),  Kingdom  of  Spain  Early  Parliamentary  Elections  28  April  2019  ODIHR  Election  Expert 
Team Final Report. Available at: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/0/5/425336.pdf 
340 It consists of two steps: 1. collection and analysis of data to identify target groups, and 2. formulation of messages 
to share with each of the target groups identified. 

110 

 
 
                                                           
When information about the use of targeting techniques is not transparent, including on 
how personal data is obtained and processed and on amounts being spent in targeting, it 
impacts negatively the electoral process as it allows actors to target potential voters in an 
opaque manner. 

The use of targeting for online political advertising is associated with the mobilisation of 
the electorate341, particularly in a context of decreased participation in elections and low 
attachment to political parties. It allows new and small political parties, as well as other 
actors  in  democracy  that  may  not  have  the  resources  to  outsource  nor  engage  in 
overarching communication strategies, to amplify their voice. Stakeholders (particularly 
EUPPs  and  CSOs)  consulted  indicated  that  it  was  a  way  for  them  to  reach  potential 
voters and niche audiences easily, inexpensively and directly. Recent elections in the EU 
have  shown  that  the  use  of  targeting  is  increasing,  and  targeted  ads  account  for  an 
increasing proportion of overall political campaign spending342. 

The  effectiveness  of  targeting,  including  in  the  political  context,  seem  to  be  somewhat 
contested343,  as  some  targeting  techniques  would  seem  not  to  be  always  very  precise. 
Accuracy  depends  on  different  variables  (e.g.  relevance  of  data,  accuracy  of  modelling 
etc.). Yet  the sophistication of profiling and  automated analysis and decision  making is 
strengthening  the impact  of the technique, enabling  relevant  groups to be targeted with 
increasing precision344. Companies do not  publish details  on the targeting services they 
offer.  Abusive  and  sometimes  unlawful  practices  related  to  these  techniques  are  also 
documented  in  the  literature345. Watchdog  organisations  and  national  authorities  appear 
unable to oversee this activity effectively. These practices in connection with political 
ads create specific horizontal problems for citizens and the democratic process. 

Drivers of problems related to targeting 

Strong public concerns have been expressed about the targeting of political ads and the 
use of personal data for this purpose.346  

341 Jarusch, J. (2020) Defining Online Political Advertising. 
342 See underlying study. 
343 Krotzek, L.J. (2019). “Inside the Voter’s Mind: The Effect of Psychometric Microtargeting on Feelings Toward and 
Propensity to Vote for a Candidate”, International Journal of Communication vol. 13. 
344  Opinion  3/2018  EDPS  Opinion  on  online  manipulation 
https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-03-19_online_manipulation_en.pdf  
345  (Micro)Targeting  can  easily  conceal  its  intent  and  nature  making  difficult  to  estimate  the  size  and  scale  of  the 
problem. See underlying study. 
346 Kozyreva, A., Lorenz-Spreen, P., Hertwig, R. et al. Public attitudes towards algorithmic personalization and use of 
personal data online: evidence from Germany, Great Britain, and the United States. Humanit Soc Sci Commun 8, 117 
(2021). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-00787-w  

and  personal  data.  Available 

at: 

111 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 18 

Targeting of political ads is argued to be problematic per se347.  

techniques,  where  an 

Psychographic  profiling 
individual’s  special  personal 
characteristics  are  inferred  from  other  information  (e.g.  Cambridge  Analytica’s 
involvement in the 2016 US presidential campaign and in the Leave.EU campaign in the 
UK348)  are  regarded  as  particularly  threatening  as  it  enables  targeting  on  the  basis  of 
special  characteristics  by  proxy,  with  an  increased  risk  of  illegally  bypassing  informed 
consent (and broader user awareness) requirements.349 This defeats the purpose of the 
current framework,  undermining the rights which it intended to protect. 

Political ads can avoid scrutiny by being narrowly targeted to (and hence only visible 
by) certain audiences or profiles. Political actors can use targeting to make irreconcilable 
promises  to  different  segments  of  the  electorate350.  It  can  thus  be  a  powerful  tool  to 
manipulate  public  opinion,  and  exclude  certain  societal  groups  (‘redlining’,  affecting 
minorities and other vulnerable groups) from aspects of the public debate351. The ‘micro’ 
aspect  of  targeting  is  itself  part  of  the  issue  when  striving  for  transparency,  especially 
democratic transparency (i.e. not directed to the user per se, but to the wider public). Ads 
that are micro-targeted below a certain threshold are divulged to too small of an audience 
for society itself to exercise a form of democratic oversight, and it is hardly possible to 
keep track of who spreads what. 

347  Dobber,  T.  &  Ó  Fathaigh,  R.  &  Zuiderveen  Borgesius,  F.  J.  (2019).  The  regulation  of  online  political  micro-
targeting in Europe. Internet Policy Review, 8(4). DOI: 10.14763/2019.4.1440 
348  Bakir,  V.  (2020)  Psychological  Operations  in  Digital  Political  Campaigns:  Assessing  Cambridge  Analytica’s 
Psychographic Profiling and Targeting. Front. Commun. 5:67. doi: 10.3389/fcomm.2020.00067 
349 Note, for many kinds of targeting (also when not based on special categories of data), consent will be main lawful 
ground available – see EDPB Guidelines on the targeting of social media users. Further, “inferred” special categories 
of  data  are 
(see  pp.  24-26,  32-34).  https://edpb.europa.eu/our-work-tools/our-
documents/guidelines/guidelines-82020-targeting-social-media-users_en See also Annex 9. 
350 IDEA (2020). Online Political Advertising and Microtargeting: the latest legal, ethical, political and technological 
evolutions. Webinar Series Report. 
351 Jarusch, J. (2020) Defining Online Political Advertising. 

special  categories 

still 

112 

 
 
 
                                                           
When  information  about  the  use  of  targeting352  is  not  provided  in  a  political  ad, 
including on how personal data is obtained and processed and on the amounts spent on 
targeting,  this  can  result  in  individuals  being  targeted  unconsciously,  even  though  they 
may have consented to it somewhere. Its targeted nature and sponsored character are also 
not evident to other individuals exposed to the ad, such as when the targeted individual 
further disseminates it to his or her peers (‘organic distribution’). 

The  targeting  of  political  ads  can  also  be  exploited  to  manipulate  the  information 
environment and to disseminate disinformation,353 conspiracy narratives and hate speech. 
This  has been observed  in  successive elections  within the EU  and in third countries.354 
Transparency on the  funding of political  advertising is  crucial to  prevent  foreign actors 
from  manipulating  and  interfering  in  civic  discourse  inside  the  European  Union.  and 
narrowing  the  space  for  an  open  debate.  This  effect  is  also  exploited,  contributing  to 
fragmenting  public  space  and  polarising  public  opinion355.  This  can  compound  the 
problematic  effect  of  the  misleading  messaging  where  these  messages  circulate  within 
closed groups, preventing fact checking and rebuttal. This can segment and polarise the 
voter base and distort the political debate. 

The use of special categories of personal data (‘sensitive data’) can be problematic and 
liable  to  misuse.  Targeting  on  the  basis  of  political  views  (which  includes  inferred 
political views, and which still amounts to sensitive personal data under the GDPR) can 
be  consented  to  in  all  Member  States  except  for  Spain.356  .  This  knowledge  about 
individuals’ political views can be exploited to increase a malicious ad’s polarising and 
misleading impact, or create echo-chambers for instance.  

Other  forms  of  manipulation  of  the  online  environment,  such  as  the  use  of  inauthentic 
accounts or paid-for user engagement for amplification, also pose a risk to distort public 
opinion. Research357 suggests that there is a market for the sale of such services. When 
such  tactics  are  being  employed  in  the  context  of  political  advertising,  this  has  the 
potential  to  mislead  voters  about  the  popularity  of  a  party  or  a  political  programme. 
Funds could be used to buy such services like fake engagement or amplification online – 
making it crucial to include such manipulative behaviour in the considerations for rules 
on political advertising. 

Stakeholders’ views 

Almost 70% of the Open Public Consultation (OPC) respondents indicated to be unable to find 
information regarding targeting  - whether and why the ad was targeted at them. There is also a 
wide agreement among most stakeholders interviewed on the significant risks associated with the 
use of targeting in political advertising. Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and Member States 
electoral  authorities  underlined  the  peril  of  this  service  to  be  hired  by  actors  with  interests 
exerting  some  type  of  political  pressure,  focus  the  debate  and  influence  and  manipulate  public 

352 in addition to the information obligations towards data subjects under the GDPR. 
353 DisinfoLab and 49 other non-profits’ open letter. https://www.disinfo.eu/advocacy/open-letter-to-eu-policy-makers-

how-the-digital-services-act-dsa-can-tackle-disinformation/   

354  See  for  example,  Matthew  Crain  and  Anthony  Nadler  ‘Political  Manipulation  and  Internet  Advertising 
Infrastructure https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/jinfopoli.9.2019.0370  
355 Lewandowsky, S., Smilie, L., Garcia, D., Hertwig, R., et al. (2020) Technology and Democracy: Understanding the 
influence of online technologies on political behaviour and decision-making. European Commission, JRC Science for 
policy report. 
356 See Annexes 8 and 9. 
357 https://stratcomcoe.org/publications/the-black-market-for-social-media-manipulation/103  

113 

 
 
                                                           
opinion.  Similarly,  the  use  of  undeclared  sources  of  money  to  cover  expenditures,  making 
difficult to track who is behind the ads, was often mentioned by stakeholders interviewed across 
all categories  and  supported  by  scholarship. The  transparency  of  targeting  provided  voluntarily 
by  very  large  online  platforms  was  described  as  unreliable  and  insufficient  to  enable  users  to 
understand how targeting is used358. No information is provided on amounts spent.  

Consequences 

The  way  targeting  is  used  with  political  advertising  and  the  still  not  sufficient 
transparency  and  control  applied  to  it  through  regulation  and  self-regulation  has 
undermined trust in the use of such services among citizens and government authorities, 
and  has  a  knock-on  effect  on  perceptions  about  the  integrity  of  elections  and  the 
democratic process. The association of targeting of political ads with foreign interference 
and  information  manipulation,  including  disinformation  has  driven  Member  State  and 
private  sector  prohibitions  of  cross-border  activity,  which  has  in  turn  limited  the 
availability of services without addressing the problems connected to the use of targeting 
for  political  ads.  Proposals  in  the  European  Parliament  and  nationally  have  included 
banning targeting altogether, for all advertising.  

Current measures addressing this problem 

Targeting and other techniques which rely on processing of personal data can affect data 
protection rights as protected under EU law359. These rules impose inter alia significant 
conditions  on  how  personal  data  can  be  processed  including  collected  and  used  for 
specified,  explicit  and  legitimate  purposes,  requirements  for  lawful  processing  and 
obligations regarding fair processing and information in relation to the data subject. The 
GDPR also provides for monitoring and enforcement through independent national data 
protection  authorities,  backed  by  harmonised  powers  including  significant  fines.  The 
DSA  proposes  an  obligation  for  all  online  platforms  to  ensure  that  meaningful 
information  about  targeting  is  presented  to  the  user  in  connection  to  each  ad,  and  for 
VLOPs to publish targeting and delivery criteria in the ad repositories. VLOPs will also 
have to assess and mitigate risks that their services may pose e.g. on non-discrimination, 
freedom  of  expression  and  information,  or  the  intentional  manipulation  of  their  service 
with  a  negative  effect  on  electoral  processes,  public  health  or  civic  discourse.  National 
rules on political advertising can also be engaged by targeting activity360. Annexes 8 and 
9 present the relevant national and EU provisions.  

The  Code  of  Practice  on  Disinformation  includes  a  relevant  commitment  among  its 
signatories361  to  provide  transparency  about  the  use  of  targeting.  The  Commission’s 
Guidance  on  the  Code  calls  upon  signatories  to  further  strengthen  the  Code’s 
commitments in this regard, notably to contribute to limit or avoid risks associated with 
micro-targeting, to inform individuals when they are being micro-targeted, and to provide 
greater transparency and disclosure around the micro-targeting of political ads.  

358 See underlying study. 
359 See GDPR and Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning 
the  processing  of  personal  data  and  the  protection  of  privacy  in  the  electronic  communications  sector  (Directive  on 
privacy 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02002L0058-20091219  
360  Dobber,  T.  &  Ó  Fathaigh,  R.  &  Zuiderveen  Borgesius,  F.  J.  (2019).  The  regulation  of  online  political  micro-
targeting in Europe. Internet Policy Review, 8(4). DOI: 10.14763/2019.4.1440 
361 ‘Ensure transparency about political and issue-based advertising, also with a view to enabling users to understand 
why they have been targeted by a given advertisement’. 

communications), 

electronic 

and 

114 

 
 
                                                           
The  Electoral  Package  Recommendation  asked  Member  States  and  political  parties  to 
take steps to  ensure that information  was provided to  individuals about  targeting. Non-
binding initiatives at the civil society level include the “who targets me” project, which 
aims  to  enhance  the  recognisability  of  targeting,  and  AlgorithmWatch’s  Monitoring 
Instagram project, which aims to scrutinise the platform’s ad-related practices to hold it 
to  account.362  Such  valuable  independent  transparency  initiatives  are  fragile;  platforms 
can threaten them with lawsuits and arbitrarily shut down initiatives, as is the case with 
AlgorithmWatch’s  Monitoring  Instagram  project363  and  with  the  Online  Political  Ads 
Transparency Project from New York University.364 

While  some  information  about  targeting  is  now  provided  by  certain  platforms  about 
certain  political  ads,  there  continue  to  be  issues  concerning  the  consistency  and 
comparability of this information, as well as the ads which are either out of scope from 
such  policies  (such  as  where  they  are  provided  via  ad  intermediaries)  or  where  the 
criteria used for targeting are complex or indirect (‘mirror audiences’365). 

Self-regulation  has  not  provided  a  solution  to  the  issues  raised  by  transparency  in 
political  advertising.  National  measures  are  being  considered,  but  they  will  not  address 
the cross-border nature of this issue and are unlikely to be effective. 

2.2.2.3. Member State are unable to  monitor and enforce transparency of  political  ads, 
and other relevant rules (Problem 2.3) 

There  is  a  substantial  body  of  national  regulation  relevant  to  political  ads,  including 
electoral and political party rules, political funding and transparency rules and regarding 
relevant audio-visual media and other media services. There are also relevant EU rules, 
including  on  data  protection  and  audiovisual  media  services.  National  competent 
authorities encounter challenges with monitoring and enforcing these rules because they 
lack sufficient: 

 
information about the political ads in circulation, especially online; and  
  powers and capability to perform their oversight functions across borders. 

Lack of resources, capacity, competence regarding political advertising 

The  lack  of  appropriate  powers  and  resources  is  raised  by  both  civil  society  and 
international  organisations.  They  mentioned  the  under-capacity  of  relevant  authorities 
and bodies at Member States level to enforce regulation (including on the origin of funds 
used for political ads). A review of OSCE reports on elections in Member States in the 
past  years  highlights  a  lack  of  capacity,  resources  and  sometimes  knowhow  among 
entities in charge of monitoring and enforcement.366  

Similar 

projects 

https://whotargets.me/en/ad-targeting-in-the-german-election/ 

362 
Dataskop 
(https://dataskop.net/overview-in-english/)  and  the  Online  Political  Ads  Transparency  Project  from  New  York 
University (https://www.politico.eu/article/facebook-nyu-laura-edelson-political-ads/).  
363 https://algorithmwatch.org/en/instagram-research-shut-down-by-facebook/  
364 https://www.politico.eu/article/facebook-nyu-laura-edelson-political-ads/  
365 Mirror audiences are target groups based on similar characteristics as known audiences (for example, “all users who 
interacted with the party’s site on the platform”). Platforms often use algorithms to determine such audiences and thus 
do not know themselves how they were built.  
366  For  example,  in  Italy,  Regional  Electoral  Guarantee  Boards  reported  a  lack  of  capacity  to  verify  candidate’s 
campaign  finance  reports.  Furthermore,  it  was  mentioned  that  competent  bodies  lack  the  power  and  resources  to 
conduct an efficient supervision, investigation and enforcement of political finance regulation: OSCE/ODIHR (2018), 
Italian Republic Parliamentary elections 4 March 2018 ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Final Report. Available 

include 

115 

 
 
                                                           
 
The legal mapping indicates that very few national authorities and bodies are empowered 
to  supervise  online  political  advertising.  National  monitoring  and  enforcement  are 
strongest  with  respect  to  the  funding  of  political  parties  and  candidates  and  their 
financing of their campaigns offline. 

Extraterritorial nature of the enforcement of online political advertising 

National authorities and bodies reported limited resources and insufficient capacities for 
oversight  over  political  advertising  across  borders. The  market  for  political  advertising 
would tend toward becoming increasingly cross-border despite the obstacles,367 as many 
relevant service providers and platforms are based in a limited number of Member States 
(mostly  Ireland,  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands)  or  even  third  countries,  and  multi-
Member  State  or  cross-border  campaigns  are  becoming  more  common.  National  rules 
cannot  easily  be  enforced  across  borders,  and  with  the  exception  of  the  exchange  of 
information and practices coordinated in the European cooperation network on elections, 
Member States reported little cooperation among authorities in this respect. 

EU  law  provides  for  oversight  of  a  number  of  aspects  of  activity  relevant  to  political 
advertising. Annex 9 presents the relevant EU provisions.  

Insufficient coordination among national authorities in political advertising 

Outside  of  EU  coordinated  governance  (which  is  sketched  in  the  figure  above  and 
elaborated  on  in  depth  in  Annex  9),  the  legal  mapping  describes368  the  diversity  of 
existing authorities and bodies in the different Member States playing a role on the basis 
of  different  legal  acts.  The  OSCE  reports  on  EU  Member  States’  elections  provides 
various examples of insufficient coordination in this area369.  

This  increases  the  challenges  linked  to  cooperation  in  this  area.  The  European 
Cooperation  Network  on  Elections  (ECNE)  established  on  the  basis  of  the  2018 

at:  https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/9/5/383589_1.pdf.  Similar  issues  were  mentioned  for  Portugal,  Bulgaria, 
Latvia  and  Slovenia:  OSCE/ODIHR  (2020),  Portugal  Presidential  Election  24  January  2021,  ODIHR  Needs 
Assessment  Mission  Report.  Available  at:  https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/c/a/473994_1.pdf;  OSCE/ODIHR 
(2021),  Republic  of  Bulgaria  Parliamentary  Elections  4  April  2021  ODIHR  Needs  Assessment  Mission  Report. 
Available  at:  https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/0/476866_0.pdf;  OSCE/ODIHR  (2019),  Republic  of  Latvia 
Parliamentary  Elections  6  October  2018  ODIHR  Election  Assessment  Mission  Final  Report.  Available  at: 
https://www.osce.org/files/Latvia%202018%20parliamentary_final%20report_17.01.2019.pdf;  OSCE/ODIHR  (2018), 
Republic  of  Slovenia  Early  parliamentary  elections  3  June 2018 ODIHR  Election Assessment  Mission Final  Report. 
Available at: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/0/d/394106.pdf. 
367 See market analysis provided in VVA study. 
368 Underlying study. 
369 For instance in Bulgaria, the Council for Electronic Media is charged with monitoring content on certain television 
and  radio  stations.  However,  the  entity  has  no  authority  to  sanction  media  for  election-related  violations  but  must 
forward the issue to the Central Election Commission (CEC) which in turn can decide whether to review the issue or 
impose sanctions (OSCE/ODIHR (2021), Republic of Bulgaria Parliamentary Elections 4 April 2021 ODIHR Needs 
Assessment Mission Report. Available at: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/0/476866_0.pdf). In Italy, the law 
does not regulate the cooperation among the relevant competent bodies and a practical working arrangement was said 
to  be  lacking  (OSCE/ODIHR  (2018),  Italian  Republic  Parliamentary  elections  4  March  2018  ODIHR  Election 
Assessment  Mission  Final  Report.  Available  at:  https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/9/5/383589_1.pdf).  In 
Slovenia, the responsibilities to supervise the relevant rules on political advertising, in particular rules on election and 
referendum campaigns, on monitoring of the mandatory ‘silence  period’, on financing of the election campaigns, on 
supervision of electoral stations and finally, on monitoring any violation of political parties’ acts, is spread over five 
different  authorities.  In  turn,  these  authorities  are  spread  across  the  national  and  local  level  of  government: 
OSCE/ODIHR (2018), Republic of Slovenia Early parliamentary elections 3 June 2018 ODIHR Election Assessment 
Mission Final Report. Available at: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/0/d/394106.pdf.  

116 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Recommendation  supports  exchanges  of  practices  and  information  in  this  area,  and 
supported the preparation of the mapping for this impact assessment. 

First  impact:  Fragmented  enforcement  of  rules  and  fragmentation  of  sanctions 
applicable at national level 

The  lack  of  capacity,  resources  and  knowhow  of  national  competent  authorities  to 
properly  enforce  legislation,  as  well  as  the  insufficient  coordination  between  these 
entities  affect  enforcement  nationally.  In  light  of  the  country-of-origin  principle, 
enforcement is also affected by the limits to the imposition of sanctions for infringements 
of  national  rules  in  one  Member  State  based  on  political  advertising  (and  related 
activities)  originating  from  enterprises  established  in  another  Member  State370.  The 
different  sanctions  laid  down  by  various  Member  States  legal  systems,  such  as  fines, 
interim measures or for some imprisonment sentences (in more than a third of Member 
States), cannot be effective and dissuasive. 

Second impact: Use of undeclared sources and interference by foreign actors 

Difficulties exist with the lack of transparency including the use of financing to conduct 
political advertising across borders. It might not be declared to the competent authorities, 
or  it  might  be  from  sources  which  contravene  relevant  rules  in  certain  Member  States. 
This can concern anonymous donations or monetised content, or through crowdfunding 
campaigns,  which  might  contravene  relevant  rules. This  enables  foreign  state  and  non-
state actors to manipulate and interfere in the EU’s democratic debate.  

Stakeholders’ views  

Stakeholders interviewed by the contractor with direct experience on funding of political parties 
and  online  political  campaigns  indicate  that  the  legal  framework  and  its  enforcement  are  not 
adequate  to  counter  the  threats  of  uses  of  undeclared sources  in  online  political advertising.  In 
particular,  the  heterogeneity  of  the  regulation  at  the  Member  State  level  makes  it  easier  for 
foreign actors – private or State-sponsored – to interfere in electoral processes in the EU either 
supporting specific candidates or parties manipulate the information environment, including the 
dissemination of disinformation. 

370 For instance to enforce French provisions regarding political ads circulated into France by services established in 
Luxembourg, where the services comply with the national rules of Luxembourg. 

117 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Annex 6: Intervention logic 

118 

 
 
Annex 7: Legislation addressing political advertising across 
Member States 

1.  General rules on political advertising 

Sources 

Legal  practices  regarding  the  regulation  of  political  advertising  differ  across  Member 
States. Political advertising is governed by varying, sometimes cumulative, legal sources: 
1)  Constitutional  provisions  and  fundamental  rights;  2)  electoral  laws;  3)  general  laws 
applying to commercial and non-commercial advertising as well as advertising codes; 4) 
laws  on  (financing  of)  political  parties.  That  is  why,  political  advertising  is  often 
regulated through overlapping legislation. Several Member States are contemplating – or 
already in the process  of developing371 hard or soft law specifically for online political 
ads, as delineated in point 7 below. The current patchwork of legislation at national level 
applicable directly or indirectly to online and offline political advertising is such that the 
obligations imposed can be inconsistent and unclear, in particular for actors operating in 
a cross-border context. 

Members States apply different rules regarding the transparency requirements applicable 
to political ads, as is visible in Table 8.0 below. The rest of Annex 8 delves deeper into 
the analysis of other elements of the regulation of political advertising. 

The data presented in this Annex is based on submissions from Member State authorities, 
as well as on desk research. 

Table 8.0. Transparency requirements for publishing political ads (on at least one 
medium), grouped by Member State 

Clear separation from editorial content (labelling)   AT BG CY DE DK EL ES HU LT LV PL SI IE* NL* 
Identification of Advertiser  
(Depending on the type of material), the number 
of copies, identity and contact details of the 
publisher  
Amount of remuneration received for the ad 
Keep records on, report on or declare financing 
political activities and election campaigns 
IE* and NL*: forthcoming 

BG CZ DK FI FR IE LT LV PL SI SK IE* NL* 
FR LT DK HU IE LV RO IE* 

FR IE* 
FI HR HU LT LV PL PT IE* + 

Definitions372 

Political  advertising  defined  in  the  broadest  sense  refers  to  political  propaganda.  As  a 
rule, national advertising provisions are not applicable as they require payment or similar 
considerations.373  Only some Member States (7 in total) provide a specific definition of 
political ads: In CY, political advertisement is an “announcement or message of any kind 

371 In the case of IE and NL 
372 See table 8.1. 
373 This information was gathered in a 2006 survey by the European Platform of Regulatory Authorities (“EPRA”), 
mentioned in the 2013 European Court of Human Rights Case of Animal Defenders International v. The United 
Kingdom http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-119244  

119 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
transmitted  in  return  for  payment  or  consideration  by  a  candidate  in  presidential  or 
parliamentary  elections  or  European  Parliament  elections  or  any  other  election.”  FI 
defines  political  advertising  as  all  forms  of  advertising  by  parties,  candidate  or 
candidate’s  support  groups  during  any  elections  campaign.  HU  defines  it  as  a  program 
intended to promote or support a party, political movement or government, or to promote 
their names, purposes, activities, slogans, emblems; appearing or published in a manner 
similar to advertising. In LT, ‘political advertising’ means information disseminated by a 
state  politician,  political  party,  its  members,  a  political  campaign  participant,  on  behalf 
and/or in the interest thereof, in any form and through any means, for payment or without 
charge,  during  a  political  campaign  period  or  between  political  campaigns,  where  such 
information  is  aimed  at  influencing  voters’  motivation  when  voting  at  an  election  or  a 
referendum,  or  where  it  is  disseminated  with  the  purpose  of  campaigning  for  a  state 
politician, political party, its member or a political campaign participant as well as their 
ideas, objectives or programme. LV defines pre-election campaigning as political parties, 
associations  of  political  parties,  associations  of  voters  or  deputies  advertising  the 
candidate in the media or otherwise, if it contains a direct or indirect invitation to vote for 
or  against  a  political  party,  association  of  political  parties,  association  of  voters  or 
candidate  for  deputy.  SE  defines  advertisements    as  commercials  or  other  messages 
broadcast on behalf of someone else and that aim at promoting a cause or an idea and the 
specifies that opinion advertisements are messages broadcast on behalf of someone else 
and that aim at gaining support for political or religious ideas, or opinions related to the 
labour  market.  SK  defines  it  as  support  for  a  political  party,  political  movement,  party 
member or movement member or candidate, possibly in their favour during an election 
campaign or a referendum campaign, popularization of the name, brand or slogans of a 
political party, political movement or candidate. Some 8 other Member States (ES, FR, 
HR, IE, PT, SI)374 cover the concept of political advertisement by using the broader term 
of political/election campaign or political propaganda, which encompasses other kinds of 
activities (such as meetings, debates, handing of small gifts etc.). In BE, the definition is 
given indirectly as electoral propaganda expenses are defined as those “relating to verbal, 
written,  audio  and  visual  messages,  intended  to  favourably  influence  the  result  of  a 
political party and its candidates and issued within four months preceding the elections”. 
In IT, there is a definition of radio and television political communication as radio and 
television media of programs containing political opinions and evaluations. Other times 
the  political  advertising  concept  is  defined  in  the  generic  audiovisual  commercial 
communication  law  as  those  communications  that  “are  designed  to  support  a  cause  or 
idea” (AT). 

Some  Member  States  (CZ,  DK,  and  RO)  mention  either  political  advertisement  or 
political propaganda without further definition. 9 Member States (DE, EE, EL, SE, LU, 
MT, NL and PL) do not provide any definition for political advertisement yet.  

374 In Spain, political advertising is covered by the term “electoral campaign”  which means “all the lawful activities 
carried  out  by  candidates,  parties,  federations,  coalitions  or  groupings  in  order  to  get  votes”.  In  France,  similarly, 
political campaign is covered by the term electoral propaganda. In Portugal, “any type of activity which aims directly 
at  promoting  candidates  (be  it  of  candidates,  of  subscribers  of  candidates,  or  of  the  respective  political  parties 
supporting a specific candidacy), as well as the publishing of texts or images which express or reproduce the content of 
those activities” is considered political advertising. In Slovenia, political propaganda are the messages (spots) and other 
forms of political propaganda whose purpose is to influence the stance of voters in casting their votes in elections. This 
kind of election campaign is regulated only for 30 days before the day of voting. Political advertising outside of the 
election campaign period are considered as commercial advertising in line with the Mass Media Act. 

120 

 
                                                           
All  in  all,  even  when  Member  States  do  define  the  concept  of  political  advertisement, 
those  definitions  have  different  scopes  and  requirements  and  use  different  types  of 
criteria such as objective, subjective and time.  Sometimes, a payment is a requirement to 
qualify  as  an  ad.  Timing  is  also  an  important  factor  in  the  definition  of  political 
advertising  (as  for  some  Member  States,  only  those  during  the  electoral  period  will  be 
categorised as such),375 which is particularly relevant as in some Member States political 
ads are not allowed during certain periods before elections. 

Paid broadcast political advertising has long been statutorily forbidden in the majority of 
Western European Countries and several  countries from Central and Eastern Europe.376 
Even in countries that allow paid political advertising there are some restrictions on when 
it  is  allowed  to  run  political  ads.  The  scope  of  the  ban  on  political  advertising  usually 
does  not  relate  exclusively  to  election  periods,  political  parties  and  candidates  but  may 
also  include  other  issues  that  reflect  societal  debates  such  as  environmental  issues  and 
abortion.  Some  countries  provide  for  a  more  restricted  ban,  only  concerning  political 
actors  (parties  and  candidates).  The  ban  sometimes  only  covers  certain  types  of  media 
(for example TV ads but not advertisement on radio). Most of the countries which allow 
political  advertising  also  foresee  certain  legal  restrictions  to  avoid  the  discriminatory 
character  of  the  practice,  including  limits  on  the  duration  and  frequency,  scheduling, 
limits on charges, labelling, and equal conditions for all parties. AT, EE, FI and PL were 
given as examples of countries without restrictions on paid political advertising.  

Content377 

While  most  Member  States  do  not  have  explicit  rules  on  the  content  of  political 
advertisement  there  are  a  few  that  restrict  it.  Besides  some  limitations  arising  from 
provisions  from  criminal  law,  intellectual  property  law  and  other  legal  branches  not 
specifically  related  to  elections,  there  are  some  examples  of  provisions  that  election 
campaigns must be conducted honestly and fairly (CZ), that false information about the 
candidates  must  not  be  published  (CZ),  prohibition  of  materials  that  harm  the  good 
manner, honour and reputations of candidates (BG, RO) or that constitute hate speech or 
political  extremism  (RO,  DE378),  provisions  that  political  advertising  should  not  offend 
political  beliefs  (EL)  and  bans  on  campaigns  of  achievements  or  accomplishments  of 
public authorities (ES).  

In FR, there is a provision on “new elements of electoral controversy” where, in order to 
maintain the adversarial nature of the electoral debate, it is forbidden for any candidate to 
bring to the attention of the public a new element of electoral controversy at a time such 
that his opponents do not have the opportunity to respond meaningfully before the end of 
the  electoral  campaign.  Subsequently,  broadcasting  media  are  also  banned  from 
publishing comments by a candidate that include a new electoral argument to which their 
opponents  are  unable  to  offer  a  reasoned  response  before  the  end  of  the  election 
campaign.  

375 In Belgium, electoral propaganda expenses are those relating to verbal, written, audio and visual messages, intended 
to favourably influence the result of a political party and its candidates and issued within four months preceding the 
elections. In Slovenia, the election campaign is only regulated only for 30 days before the day of voting with political 
advertising outside of the election campaign period being considered as commercial advertising. Other Member States 
also use the time factor of the election period to define political advertisements. 
376 European Court of Human Rights, Animal Defenders International v.  The United Kingdom.  See particularly the 
references to the 2006 EPRA study. http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-119244  
377 See table 8.2 
378 NetzDG prohibits harmful contents that are exhaustively listed. Such content needs to be checked and deleted by the 
online provider if illegal. Among such content is hate speech and political extremism. 

121 

 
                                                           
In  HR,  at  certain  elections  (including  elections  for  the  European  Parliament)  an  Ethics 
Commission  is  established  as  an  ad-hoc  authority  to  ensure  ethical  and  democratic 
principles  in  the  election  are  adhered  to.  It  adopts  and  publishes  the  Electoral  Code  of 
Ethics  which  consists  of  codes  of  conduct  for  individuals  and  political  parties  in  the 
election campaign and in the electoral process. Within their competencies, they can issue 
announcement and warnings related to the content of the campaign. There are examples 
of  provisions  for  sign  language  interpretation  or  subtitles  to  be  included  in  political 
advertisements (HU). 

There are provisions forbidding the use of national symbols (either domestic or foreign) 
(BG,  RO)  or  religious  signs  or  images  (BG).  Some  Member  States  have  specific 
language  requirements  and  forbid  political  advertisement  that  is  not  in  their  own 
language (EE, LV in the future). 

Targeting 

It seems that Finland is one of the only three Member State that has rules explicitly on 
(micro) targeting. While targeted advertising and profiling based on personal date are not 
categorically  prohibited,  the  advertising  recipients  must  be  provided  with  sufficient 
information  on why  they are being targeted, who is  responsible for the  advertising  and 
how  they  can  exercise  their  data  protection  rights.  These  requirements  were  created 
through specific legislation379 with the aim to go beyond the GDPR.  

Ireland is another Member State which directly regulates micro-targeting: Part 3 Section 
30 of the Irish Data Protection Act makes it an offence for companies or corporate bodies 
to process the personal data of a child for the purposes of direct marketing, profiling or 
micro-targeting.380 Political advertising is perhaps less often targeted at children, but this 
situation  remains  relevant.  The  forthcoming  Irish  proposal  will  also  regulate  the 
transparency of targeting practices. 

Targeting political  ads based on political  opinions  (which constitutes sensitive personal 
data) is  in  practice  mostly  prohibited in  Spain.  Political  parties  were previously able to 
use  the  public  interest  legal  basis  (Art.  9(2)(g)  GDPR)  entrenched  in  the  national 
electoral  law  (LOREG  Art.  58  bis  1)381  to  process  such  data,  but  the  Spanish 
Constitutional  Court  struck  down  that  provision  of  the  law382Further,  consent  is  not  a 
possible  ground,  as  the  Spanish  implementation  of  the  GDPR,  the  Organic  Law  on 
Protection of Personal Data and Guarantee of Digital Rights, says that, in order to avoid 
discriminatory situations, the sole consent of the data controller shall not be sufficient to 
lift the prohibition on the processing of data the main purpose of which is to identify their 
ideology, trade union membership, religion, sexual orientation, beliefs or racial or ethnic 
origin.383 Parties are still allowed to process personal data manifestly made public by the 
data  subject  (9(2)(e)),  which  may  allow  them  to  target  electoral  propaganda  based  on 
political  opinions,  but  the  scope  for  this  is  very  limited.  Further,  as  regard  the  use  of 
targeting  techniques  as  such,  a  (legally  binding)  Circular  by  the  national  DPA  labels 
political  campaigning  as  a  “high  risk”  activity,  and  bans  any  form  of  data  processing 

379  The  Data  Protection  Act,  https://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/smur/2018/20181050.  For  an  English  translation  see: 
https://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2018/en20181050.pdf  
380 Data Protection Act 2018, Section 30, http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2018/act/7/section/30/enacted/en/html. 
381 https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-1985-11672&tn=0&p=20210707  
382 https://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/NotasDePrensaDocumentos/NP_2019_076/2019-1405STC.pdf  
383  Organic  Law  on  Protection  of  Personal  Data  and  Guarantee  of  Digital  Rights,  article  9. 
https://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-2018-16673   

122 

 
                                                           
(such as microtargeting) that attempts to divert [desviar] the will of voters, because not 
proportionate under GDPR requirements.384 The Circular further forbids profiling at the 
individual level or on the basis of very specific personal characteristics.  

Silence periods and timing for political advertising385 

20 Member States have established silence periods (sometimes called reflection days) in 
order to  prevent  voters  to be influenced in the immediate run-up to  the  election. These 
silence periods have different lengths (from one day to 55 hours before the voting) and 
scopes  (sometimes  only  broadcasters  are  forbidden  to  carry  content  relating  to  election 
issues  allowing  for  candidates  to  continue  campaigning  through  other  methods, 
sometimes  all  campaigning  activity  is  forbidden).  Even  when  there  is  not  a  silence 
period, election campaign in  polling stations is  still sometimes forbidden (DE, EE,  and 
FI).  It  varies  across  Member  States  whether  political  advertising  is  allowed  outside 
election  periods  (see  table  8.1).  Sometimes  the  only  “advertising”  allowed  is  the  one 
done  through  the  (free)  airtime  in  broadcast  media,  usually  during  election  periods, 
sometimes paid political advertising is allowed regardless of the timing. 

2.  Transparency requirements for political ads (whether offline or online)386 

While the European Court of Human Rights  observed  already in 2013 that there  was  a 
lack  of  European  consensus  on  how  to  regulate  paid  political  advertising  in 
broadcasting,387 the current patchwork of legislation at national level – together with the 
great  variety  of  approaches  and  requirements  –  applicable  directly  or  indirectly  to 
political advertising is such that the obligations imposed can be inconsistent and unclear, 
in particular for actors operating in a cross-border context. Some Member States forbid 
anonymous  political  advertising  and  others  require  some  specific  information  on  the 
identity of the sponsor to be displayed on the ad (BG, CZ, DK, FI, FR, IE, LT, LV, PL, 
SI, SK); in  FI, this is  a requirement only when the amount payed  for the ad is  above a 
certain threshold (€800 in municipal elections  or €1,500 in parliamentary, European  or 
presidential  elections). Some Member States (AT,  BG, CY, DE,  DK, EL,  ES, HU,  LT, 
LV, PL and SI) have requirements on the labelling of political advertisement, or at least a 
clear  separation  between  advertising  and  editorial  content,  to  ensure  they  are  regarded 
and  identifiable  as  such.  Sometimes  it  is  not  clear  whether  these  requirements  are  also 
applicable  to  the  online  environment  –  if  only  implicitly  –  as  they  are  provided  by 
general rules not specific to the online environment.  

FR  has  the  most  comprehensive  regulation  with  a  new  law  tackling  false  information 
with  specific  transparency  obligations  for  (some)  online  platforms,  including  providing 
users  information  on  the  identity  of  the  private  person  or  company  which  pays  the 
platform for the promotion of information content.  

The  relevant  national  rules  on  transparency  of  political  advertising  have  been  collected 
and  listed  in  table  8.3. There,  the  differences  in  transparency  requirements  are  put  into 

de 

bis 

384  Circular  1/2019,  de  7  de  marzo,  de  la  Agencia  Española  de  Protección  de  Datos,  sobre  el  tratamiento  de  datos 
personales  relativos  a  opiniones  políticas  y  envío  de  propaganda  electoral  por  medios  electrónicos  o  sistemas  de 
mensajería por parte de partidos políticos, federaciones, coaliciones y agrupaciones de electores al amparo del artículo 
del  Régimen  Electoral  General. 
19 
58 
https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2019/03/11/pdfs/BOE-A-2019-3423.pdf  
385 See table 8.1 
386 See table 8.3 
387  European  Court  of  Human  Rights,  Animal  Defenders 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-119244 

International  v.  The  United  Kingdom. 

la  Ley  Orgánica 

5/1985, 

junio, 

de 

de 

123 

 
                                                           
light - putting aside the fact that due to differences in definitions, an advertisement may 
count  as  political  in  one  Member  State  and  as  not  political  in  another.  In  particular, 
providing cross-border advertising may be confusing because while in HU and RO it is 
required  to  provide  information  about  the  sponsor  and  publisher  of  the  political 
advertisement,  that is  not  required when the ad is  an online ad, whereas  in  CZ,  LT,  FI, 
SK, FR, and (forthcoming) IE and NL this is the case (and the publisher may be termed a 
‘processor’, ‘intermediary’ or ‘supplier’ depending on the national framework). In FR, FI 
and  (forthcoming)  IE  and  NL  there  are  rules  specific  for  online  advertising,  with  the 
caveat for FR that they only apply to online platforms and intermediaries, whose number 
of  connections  on  French  territory  exceeds  5  million  unique  visitors  per  month  on 
average per year.  

Further,  while  in  CZ,  ES,  LT,  LV,  FI,  SK,  FR,  PL,  IE  and  NL  there  are  or  will  be 
transparency rules for online ads (or the existing rules simply apply online), they differ in 
that, of these, only the name of sponsor and publisher are to be provided in CZ, LT, LV 
FR, PL and FI, whereas in SK their address is also to be disclosed (and the forthcoming 
IE  rules  go  even  further,  requiring  the  name,  postal  address,  email  address  and,  where 
applicable, the website address of the buyer). Additionally, in IE the amounts paid for a 
political advertisement will have to be disclosed, whereas in FR the amount paid for the 
promotion of an online advertisement is to be disclosed only if superior to €100. In LT, 
the  transparency  disclosure  requires  information  on  the  source  of  the  funding  of  the 
advertisement. Further, RO, LT and LV require information to be provided in the ad on 
the intended reach, in case of printed advertisements (the number of copies), and in  FR 
and  IE  such  information  on  intended  reach  is  or  will  also  be  provided  for  online 
advertisements. 

In FR, the transparency requirements apply even if the sponsor is a company, whereas in 
CZ, LT, FI, SK they apply only if the sponsor is a person – and, for FI (and unclear for 
LT), only if the sponsor is a political actor in particular. 

The  few  Member  States  having  provisions  on  transparency  of  targeting  also  differ. 
Whereas FI requires information as to why an advertisement is targeted at the person, and 
the identity of the person responsible for advertising, FR requires information about the 
methods  of  distribution,  the  existence  of  financial  compensation,  the  extent  of  the 
distribution  (number  of  views,  type  of  target  population,  etc.),  and  whether  they  were 
generated  automatically  or  not.  The  forthcoming  IE  rules  require  the  disclosure  of 
information  about  targeting,  including  a  description  of  the  criteria  used  and  of  the 
characteristics of the target audience. 

In terms of disclosures also not in the advertisement itself, FI, LT, LV, HR, HU, PL, PT 
and  RO  have  reporting  requirements  for  political  actors  and/or  for  service  providers. 
When requiring political actors to report on donations they received, FI and HR require 
not  only  financial  elements,  but  also  reporting  in  terms  of  services  provided  free  of 
charge. Reporting requirements vary in terms of the kind of body reported to (e.g. to the 
Central  Electoral  Commission  in  LT,  to  the  Corruption  Prevention  and  Combating 
Bureau in  LV, in  the  Hungarian Gazette in  HU), the timing (e.g.  in  HR 7 days prior to 
elections, in RO 15 days then 30 days after the end of the electoral campaign, or in LV no 
later  than  3  days  after  entering  into  a  contract  with  a  service  provider/sponsor),  or  the 
elements to be disclosed (e.g. in HR this includes the OIB of the supplier and the date or 
period of advertising services, in FI the donations, in LV very detailed information about 
the  identity  of  the  sponsor  and  contracting  parties,  about  the  advert’s  form  and  its 
removal date, the procedures and terms of payment) (for more details, see table 8.3).  

124 

 
3.  Rules on Political advertising in Broadcasting media (TV and radio) 

Free Airtime for political parties or candidates 

Nearly all Member States have some rules on free airtime and how that free time should 
be  allotted  to  the  political  parties.  However,  the  specifics  of  these  arrangements  are 
different between Member States and sometimes are defined for each election. In some 
Member  States  every  party  is  given  the  same  amount  of  airtime,  in  others  airtime  is 
allotted  proportionally  to  the  results  of  the  last  elections  (sometimes  with  rules  for 
smaller or new parties to ensure some kind of political visibility to every party).  

Paid political advertising 

Besides  this  free  air  time  given  to  political  parties  there  are  different  rules  on  political 
advertising.  

Most  Member  States  forbid  paid  political  advertising,  others  restrict  this  prohibition  to 
specific periods. Even when allowed, there is usually some regulation (e.g. the broadcast 
service must give the same conditions and prices for every party).  

There  are  also  examples  of self-regulation  mechanisms and agreements,  either between 
political parties or between political parties and the media. Some of these agreements are 
valid just for a specific election.  

The objectives of these kinds of rules (both those on paid political advertising and those 
on  free  airtime  on  (public)  broadcast  services),  usually  designed  for  the  offline 
environment, can be easily defeated if they are not applied to online platforms.  

4.  Rules applicable to online advertising, and/or to online platforms 

Some  Member  States  (15)  have  rules  applicable  to  online  advertising  and/or  to  online 
platforms.  Only  three  Member  States  have  rules  specific  to  online  political  advertising 
(see  subjection  on  targeting  above).  The  other  Member  States  have  rules  to  offline 
political  advertising  that  (sometimes,  not  all  of  them)  are  also  applicable  to  the  online 
environment.  Many  times  there  is  no  explicit  reference  to  the  application  to  the  online 
environment. The application to the online environment comes as a natural interpretation 
of  the  law,  as  it  is  not  restricted  to  the  offline  environment.  It  varies  across  Member 
States  whether  national  legal  practice  regards  them  as  applicable  to  the  online 
environment (14 Member States) or not (10).  

Further,  the  legal  framework  is  also  complex  and  fragmented  within  the  27  Member 
States,  because  the  older  directives  –  the  e-Commerce  Directive,  for  instance  –  are 
minimal  harmonisation  instruments  (which  means  that  some  Member  States  have 
introduced  more  far-reaching  rules,  thereby  threatening  the  achievement  of  the  Digital 
Single Market).388 

In FR, a law was adopted on 22 December 2018, which aims to fight the manipulation of 
information  and  the  spread  of  false  information  online  during  electoral  campaign 
periods.389  It  lays  out  transparency  requirements  specifically  intended  for  online 
platforms.   

388 Fourberg et  al. (2021), “Online  advertising,  the  impact  of  targeted  advertising  on  advertisers,  market  access  and 
consumer 
choice.” https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/9b3cb8b5-d55b-11eb-895a-
01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-217130651  
389 https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/loi/2018/12/22/MICX1808389L/jo/texte  

125 

 
                                                           
The  ES  legislation  requires  transparency  regarding  the  political  nature  of  the  message, 
and only allows political actors to send or target such messages when using technological 
(including  web-based/online)  means.390  (See  sub-section  on  targeting  above.)  economic 
operators can act as processors for political actors, but cannot be the sponsors themselves 
of the political ads.   

IT saw, already in 1999, a proposal to regulate political advertising, which put online ads 
on the same footing as ads in print or broadcast;391 the part relating on online advertising 
was, however, not included in the final version of the law392. 

5.  Sanctions imposed by Member States 

A variety of sanctions are provided for in almost all Member States for violations of these 
rules, the most common sanctions being fines. Such sanctions can be relatively common 
in an electoral process. For example, in 2019, in Czechia, 68 administrative proceedings 
were launched during parliamentary elections, which resulted in a total of 36 fines issued. 
This  constitutes  a  high  number  of  sanctions  for  violations  of  electoral  rules.  Yet,  it  is 
unclear whether they were imposed in violation of political advertising rules as such393. 
Apart from fines, in more than a third of Member States, imprisonment sentences are also 
incurred  for  violation  of  these  rules.  In  this  context,  it  is  important  to  mention  the 
proportionality of the fines imposed for this type of violation. The OSCE report from the 
elections  in  Romania  in  2019,  mentioned  that  sanctions  for  non-compliance  with 
campaign  finance  provisions  were  revised  in  2015.  However,  they  were  said  to  remain 
too low to be effective or dissuasive394. Finally, another method for enforcing the relevant 
rules applicable to political advertising during election period in France is the application 
of  interim  measures  for  the  cessation  of  the  dissemination  of  false  information  on 
communication  services  to  the  public  online,  when  this  information  is  likely  to 
undermine the integrity of elections.395  

6.  Authorities responsible for Political Advertising 

There  is  a  variety  of  authorities  in  the  Member  States  with  responsibilities  related  to 
political  advertising,396  sometimes  there  are  multiple  competent  authorities  each  with 
different  duties397.  Usually, these  authorities are the Media Regulators or  the Electoral 
Authorities, but also media self-regulating bodies and auditing authorities. This oversight 
is  sometimes  linked  to  the  financing  of  political  parties  and  transparency  of  donations 
and  expenses  of  political  campaigns.  Sometimes  the  bodies  tasked  with  regulating 
Political Advertising are self-regulating bodies, focused on the media actors. Sometimes 
it is the authority for commercial ads that also oversees political ads (in LU, for instance). 
In some Member States there are multiple authorities with a limited territorial scope (DE 

su 

tv, 

più 

spot 

« Niente 

« Par  Condicio: 

390 https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-1985-11672&tn=0&p=20210707 Art. 58bis  
391  La  Republica, 
Internet » 
politici 
https://www.repubblica.it/online/fatti/condi/par/par.html  
392  La  Republica, 
https://www.repubblica.it/online/fatti/condi/emenda/emenda.html  
393 See the mapping of national legislation in the Czech Republic. 
394  OSCE/ODIHR  (2020),  Romania  Presidential  Election  10  and  24  November  2019  ODIHR  Election  Assessment 
Mission Final Report. Available at: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/a/449200_0.pdf  
395 See Article L163-2 of the French Electoral Code. 
396 See table 8.3 below. 
397 This is why the Commission proposed in 2018 to establish Network on elections, see 2018 elections package. 

settembre 

Internet 

legge » 

agosto 

radio 

1999). 

1999) 

testo 

esce 

(22 

dal 

(4 

di 

e 

126 

 
                                                           
and ES, for example). There is also some discrepancy across these authorities as regard 
to the scope of their investigative powers and the kinds of sanctions they can issue.398 

7.  Forthcoming national initiatives 

While  online  political  advertising  is  already  partly  regulated  in  Member  States  as 
described  above,  there  is  ongoing  national  legislation  being  prepared;  Ireland  and  the 
Netherlands  are  particularly  relevant,  as  well  as  Sweden.  The  Irish  Electoral  Reform 
Bill,399 proposed in 2020, is a legislative Act that would cover broad matters relating to 
elections,  including  a  section  dedicated  to  online  political  advertising.  The  Netherlands 
has two initiatives: recent soft law in the form of the 02/2021 Dutch Code of Conduct for 
Transparency in Online Political Advertisements,400 as well as upcoming hard law in the 
form of the Law on Political Parties,401 which will include provisions on online targeted 
political  advertising  (digital  campaigning  and  micro-targeting).  Swedish  authorities 
reported that legislating in this area was an option currently being considered, aiming at 
addressing both the lack of transparency in political parties’ online expenses as well as 
the risks associated with targeting.402 

In terms of soft law, beside the Dutch party-wide Code (which most but  not  all parties 
adhere  to),  there  is  also  the  emergence  of  a  patchwork  of  voluntary  commitments  by 
individual  political  parties,  with  at  least  in  Germany  the  Greens,403  SPD,404  Die  Linke, 
FPD and CDU,405 as well as LaREM406 in France and Possibile407 in Italy.  

Table  8.5  below  compares  the  envisaged  state  of  play  in  Ireland  and  the  Netherlands, 
highlighting the provisions most likely to be relevant for this Impact Assessment – with 
the  caveat  that,  the  texts  being  proposals,  their  provisions  are  likely  to  evolve.  What 
emerges is that even where they overlap, there remain tensions and discrepancies: some 
of  the  obligations  would  be  binding  in  one  Member  State  but  non-binding  in  the  other 
(e.g. on transparency of the ad’s intended or actual reach), and some of the requirements 

398 See underlying study, page 8. 
399 
of 

Scheme 

General 

the 

Electoral 

Reform 

Bill 

2020, 

pp233-261 

(08/01/2021). 

de 

on 

op 

law 

(“the 

(WPP) 

Partijen 

political 

parties”) 

Politieke 

(07/12/2020). 

(09/02/2021). 

of  Conduct  Transparency 

for  Online  Political  Advertisements 

https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/34cf6-general-scheme-of-the-electoral-reform-bill-2020/  
400  Dutch  Code 
https://www.idea.int/0073ites/default/files/news/news-pdfs/Dutch-Code-of-Conduct-transparency-online-political-
advertisements-EN.pdf  
401  Wet 
https://www.parlement.com/id/vlboezk3ftm8/wet_op_de_politieke_partijen  
402  With  reference  to  this  article :  Knäpper  Bohman,  “How  can  the  Swedish  Government  prevent  Political  Micro-
Targeting  from  threatening  the  Electoral  Process?  A  Policy  Memo  Security,  Policy  and  Strategy  in  Cyber  Space.” 
https://www.academia.edu/37352763/CYBER_SECURITY_How_can_the_Swedish_Government_prevent_Political_
Micro_Targeting_from_threatening_the_Electoral_Process_A_Policy_Memo_Security_Policy_and_Strategy_in_Cybe
r_Space  
403 Die Grünen, “Parteirat Selbstverpflichtung für einen fairen Bundestagswahlkampf” (Voluntary commitment to a fair 
Bundestag  election  campaign)  (15/05/2021).  https://www.gruene.de/artikel/selbstverpflichtung-fuer-einen-fairen-
bundestagswahlkampf  
404 SPD, “Acht punkte für Fairness im digitalen Wahlkamp” (Eight points for fairness in the digital election campaign) 
(07/05/2021). 
https://www.spd.de/fileadmin/Dokumente/Beschluesse/Parteispitze/PV_2021/SPD-PV-Kodex-
Fairness.pdf  
405  Individual  statements  by  Die  Link,  by  the  FPD  and  by  the  CDU.  https://www.rnd.de/politik/wahlkampf-im-netz-
selbstverpflichtung-der-parteien-zu-fairness-gefordert-UTINBQEYOJB5RGLL3NJ7OBOZNY.html  
406 La République en Marche (LaREM), “Prise de position sur la lutte contre les nouvelles formes d’ingérence et de 
propagande  numériques”  (Position  statement  on  the  fight  against  new  forms  of  foreign  interference  and  of  digital 
propaganda) 
https://storage.googleapis.com/en-marche-fr/COMMUNICATION/LaREM-
(June 
Publication_Ingerences-Propagande.pdf  
407 Possibile, “Una campagna web libera e uguale. E trasparente” (2017).  https://www.possibile.com/campagna-web-
libera-uguale-trasparente/  

2021). 

127 

 
 
 
                                                           
have  a  different  scope  or  require  a  different  level  of  detail.  This  risks  increasing  the 
existing  market  fragmentation.  Further,  it  appears  that  the  two  Member  States  do  not 
necessarily identify the same problems with online political advertising, or are looking to 
solve different parts of the same problem (with their Code of Conduct the Netherlands –  
unlike Ireland – also looks beyond transparency requirements and into the content of the 
ads,  especially  misleading  ads).  While  the  Irish  proposal  imposes  obligations  both  on 
economic actors and political parties, the provisions of the Dutch proposal only concerns 
political parties. Finally, each proposal leaves gaps which need to be filled according to 
this  Impact  Assessment  (e.g.  the  Irish  proposal  does  not  include  any  restrictions 
whatsoever on the criteria used for targeting). 

128 

 
Table  8.1 Political Ads – Definition, Free Airtime, Silence Period 

MS  Political Ads 
allowed 
AT  Allowed 
BE  Forbidden  

BG  Allowed408 
CY  Allowed 

CZ  Forbidden 
DE  Allowed409 
DK  Allowed410 

EE  Allowed 
EL  Allowed 
ES 

Forbidden
411 
Allowed 

FI 

FR  Forbidden 
HR  Allowed 

Definition 

No legal definition – Political advertising  seems to be encompassed by the term “Commercial communication” 
Content-based approach (with a timing element)   – “electoral propaganda  - verbal, written, audio and visual messages, intended to favorably 
influence the result of a political party and its candidates and issued within four months preceding the elections.” 
No legal definition. 
Actor-based  approach  -    “announcement  or  message  of  any  kind  transmitted  in  return  for  payment  or  consideration  by  a  candidate  in 
presidential or parliamentary elections or European Parliament elections or any other election.” 
No legal definition – the term “political commercial communication” is used 
No legal definition – the term “Werbung politischer Art/political advertising” is used 
Content-based approach  – “all  messages regardless of  its  form,  which  has  the purpose to promote or affect the opinion of different political 
questions, both at a local, national, and international level.” This definition is explicitly mentioned only for ads on TV 
No legal definition 
No legal definition – the term “display of messages of political parties” is used 
Actor-based  approach  (with  a  content  element)  –  electoral  campaign  “all  the  lawful  activities  carried  out  by  candidates,  parties,  federations, 
coalitions or groupings in order to get votes” 
Actor-based approach (with a timing element) - all forms of advertising by parties, candidate or candidate’s support groups during any elections 
campaign. 
No legal definition – the term “electoral propaganda” is used 
No legal definition (both an actor-based and content-based approach are used)– the term “ media advertising of political campaign” is used 
"election  campaign"  -  set  of  actions  taken  by  election  campaign  participants  relating  to  their  own  public  representation  and  the  public 
presentation and explanation of their own election programs in order to persuade voters to vote for them.  

Free 
airtime 
No 
Yes 

Silence 
Period 
- 
- 

Yes 
No 

Yes 
Yes 
No  

No 
Yes 
Yes 

No  

Yes 
Yes 

X 
X 

X 
- 
- 

X 
X 
X 

- 

X 
X 

408 Political advertising may not be carried out outside the scope of a political campaign, running for certain set of elections. This is so due to the fact that no commercial advertisement is allowed to spread 
messages that would make political influence or contain certain politically affiliated elements 
409 Just during the campaign period. Political advertising online does not seem to be prohibited, but needs to be clearly marked as such and the advertiser or sponsor needs to be indicated. 
410 There is a general ban for political advertisements on TV from employer organizations, unions, political parties, elected members or candidates running for election. Furthermore, three months before an 
election, it is forbidden to advertise any political messages on TV. 
411 Exception for periodical print media and private radio stations during the campaign period. 

129 

 
 
 
                                                           
HU  Allowed412 

IE 
IT 

Allowed413 
Allowed 

LT  Allowed 

LU  Allowed 
LV  Allowed 

MT  Allowed415 
NL  Allowed416 

Content-based approach - political advertising is a program intended to promote or support a party, political movement or government, or to 
promote  their  names,  purposes,  activities,  slogans,  emblems;  appearing  or  published  in  a  manner  similar  to  advertising.  Political  advertising 
means media content published in return of payment, intended to promote or support a nominating organization or an independent candidate, or 
promoting their name, purpose, activity, slogan, logo, press product or cinema audio-visual content.  
No legal definition 
Content-based  approach  -  Political  communications,  radio  and  television  political  communication  means  the  broadcasting  on  the  radio  and 
television  media  of  programs  containing  political  opinions  and  evaluations.  This  does  not  apply  to  the  broadcasting  of  news  in  information 
programs. 
Actor and content-based approach - political advertising means ‘information disseminated by a state politician, a political party, a member of a 
political  party,  a  political  campaign  participant,  on  their  behalf  and  /  or  interests  in  any  form  and  by  any  means,  paid  or  unpaid,  during  or 
between  political  campaigns,  aimed  at  influencing  voter  motivation  to  vote  in  elections,  or  in  a  referendum  or  the  dissemination  of  which 
promotes a state politician, a political party, a political a party member or participant in a political campaign, as well as their ideas, goals, or 
program’. 
No legal definition 
Actor  and  content-based  approach  -  pre-election  campaigning  -  political  parties,  associations  of  political  parties,  associations  of  voters  or 
deputies advertising the candidate in the media or otherwise, if it contains a direct or indirect invitation to vote for or against a political party, 
association of political parties, association of voters or candidate for deputy. 
No legal definition 
No legal definition 

Yes 

Yes 
Yes 

Yes 

Yes 
Yes 

Yes 
Yes 

X 

X 
X 

X 

X 
X414 

X 
- 

412 Political advertising is only allowed during election campaigns or when there is an already ordered referendum. 
413 There is a general ban for TV and Radio, but it is allowed for print and online. 
414  On  election  day,  it  is  forbidden  to  include  the  results  of  public  opinion  polls  on  popularity  of  political  parties,  association  of  political  parties,  voters  association  or  individual  deputy  candidates  in 
broadcasts of electronic mass  media on the election day during the course of election laid down in the law and to distribute broadcasts [in electronic mass  media] led by commentaries, interviews and 
reports  prepared  by  persons  who  have  been  nominated  as  deputy  candidates  or  who  before  the  elections  have  made  a  public  announcement  on  their  participation  in  activities  of  any  political  party, 
association  of  political  parties  or  voters  association.  On  the  Election  Day  and  the  day  before,  it  is  forbidden  to  place  pre-election  campaign  materials  in  electronic  mass  media  radio  programmes  and 
broadcasts,  public  use  outdoor  areas  and  indoor  premises,  publications,  and  authorities  and  capital  companies  as  well  as  conduct  the  campaign  as  a  paid  service  on  public  electronic  communication 
networks, including the Internet. However, on the Election Day it is possible to use free of charge broadcasting time, or place campaign materials in radio programmes and broadcasts of an electronic mass 
medium with the exception of cases described in the paragraph above. It is also possible to use pre-election campaign materials in the discussion programmes on the Election Day, if these programmes are 
not sponsored by a political candidate.  
415 Advertising in broadcast media cannot have a political nature. 
416  When  implementing  the  e-Privacy  Directive  in  the  Telecommunications  Act,  the  Dutch  legislator  opted  for  a  broad  interpretation  of  the  ban  on  spam,  which  also  includes  (automated)  political 
communication on the internet (section 11.7, “unsolicited communications for commercial, ideological or charitable purposes”) – if the recipient has not given permission to do so. This prohibition also 
applies to political advertisements as it includes “transmitting. Where Article 13 of the e-Privacy Directive leaves open the question of whether political advertising also falls within the definition of direct 
marketing, the Telecommunications Act clearly indicates that this is the case.  

130 

 
                                                           
PL  Allowed417 

PT 

Forbidden
418 

RO  Allowed 
SE  Allowed 

SI 

Allowed 

SK  Allowed 

Content-based approach definition (however, only certain types of actors are allowed to run political ads) - Election agitation (electioneering) - 
public inducing or encouraging to vote in a specific manner, including, in particular, to vote for a candidate of a specific  election committee. It 
can be carried out by election committees or voters after they receive a written permission from an electoral representative of a committee (Art. 
105, Election Code). 
Election  material  -  each  published  and  recorded  message  from  the  election  committee  related  to  elections.  Election  materials  should  clearly 
identify the election committee that they come from (Art. 109 par. 1 and 2 Election Code).  
Election broadcast – a part of a radio or television broadcast that does not come from the broadcaster and constitutes a separate whole due to its 
content or form (Art. 116a Election Code). The definition applies to election committee. 
Content-based  approach  -  Electoral  propaganda  -  any  type  of  activity  which  aims  directly  at  promoting  candidacies  (be  it  of  candidates,  of 
subscribers of candidates,  or of the  respective political parties supporting a  specific candidacy), as  well as the publishing of texts or images 
which express or reproduce the content of those activities”. 
No legal definition 
Content-based approach - opinion advertisements (åsiktsannonsering) - messages broadcast on behalf of someone else and that aim at gaining 
support for political or religious ideas, or opinions related to the labour market. 
Content-based approach - "political advertising" - any advertising during elections, referendums or related political activities in accordance with 
the applicable regulations governing this area. 
Content-based approach - political advertising for the purposes of that law as a form of “public administration aimed to provide: a) support for a 
political party, political movement, party member or movement member or candidate, possibly in their favour during an election campaign or a 
referendum campaign, b) popularization of the name, brand or slogans of a political party, political movement or candidate.” 

Yes 

X 

Yes 

Yes 
No 

Yes 

Yes 

X 

X 
- 

X 

X 

Table 8.2. Constraints on political advertisements (Financial, Content, Advertiser) 

MS
419 

Financial 
Limits/ 
Caps 

Content Rules 

Advertiser limitations (e.g. does it have to be a 
political party) 

AT  Yes 

BE  Yes 

There are no content rules for election campaigns in the Austrian electoral law. Advertisements could still be subject to subsequent 
bans or limitations but according to other provisions such as criminal law, intellectual property law, etc. 
 No information 

No 

 No information 

417 Only Election Committees may carry out political advertising. 
418 With limited exceptions. Publicity, dully identified, in periodical publications, radio broadcasting stations, social media and Internet, limited to the name, symbol, acronym of the party / coalition / group 
of citizens, and to information regarding a specific event. Article 10 of the Law on Political Advertising by Commercial Means. 
419 The colours in this column show if political ads are allowed (green), allowed but with strong restrictions (orange) or forbidden (red), as shown in the previous table. 

131 

 
 
                                                           
BG  Yes 

CY  Yes 

CZ  Yes 

Materials that harm the good manners, honor and reputation of candidates is prohibited. The use of the coat of arms or the flag of the 
Republic of Bulgaria or of a foreign country, as well as religious signs or images is also prohibited in the agitation materials; 
Yes, the political advertisement must not constitute a negative advertisement 

No information 

No information 

The  election  campaign  must  be  conducted  honestly  and  fairly,  false  information  must  not  be  published  about  the  candidates, 
parties, movements and coalitions.  

DE  No 

DK  No 

Yes,  NetzDG  prohibits  harmful  contents  that  are  exhaustively  listed  in  §  1  III  NetzDG.  Such  contents  need  to  be  checked  by  the 
online  provider  and  deleted,  if  illegal.  Among  such  contents  are  hate  speech,  political  extremism  etc  –  which  may  be  part  of  the 
political expression (also in the form of advertising). 
Yes, any advertisement in radio, television and on demand audio visual media services must be legal, seemly, honourable, true and 
conducted with clear social responsibility. 

EE 

No 

EL 

Yes 

Yes, ‘Signs, signposts, business type names and outdoor advertisements, including outdoor advertising, installed to a public place with 
the purpose of political campaigning, and the notices of a legal person shall be in Estonian’. This rule is also enforceable online. There 
is also a prohibition of the use of national symbols and colour combination of the Estonian flag in a misleading manner, or providing 
inaccurate information, contain denigration or discrimination on the grounds of nationality, race, age, colour, sex, language, origin, 
religion, political or other beliefs, financial or social status or other circumstances, or ignoring the principle of gender  equality. It is 
also forbidden to use the voice or image of a person who appears as an anchor or commentator in programmes on political events or 
issues or as an announcer in a news programme in ads on television. Advertisements cannot provide inaccurate information. 
Advertising should not offend political beliefs. 

ES 

Yes 

During the electoral period (from the calling of the elections to their celebration), it is forbidden any act organised or financed, either 
directly or indirectly, by the public authorities which contain mentions to any achievements, or that use images or expressions similar 

132 

Entity intending to conduct an electoral campaign 
the  awareness  of  a  political  party, 
without 
political  movement,  coalition,  their  candidate  or 
independent candidate is required to register as a 
“third  party”  before  entering 
the  election 
campaign. Registration is provided by the Office 
for  the  Supervision  of  the  Finances  of  Political 
Parties and Movements. 
No information 

In  television  and  in  radio  considered  as  public 
service  it  is  illegal  to  send  content  sponsored by 
employer  organisations  or  unions  or  political 
parties.  In  television  it  is  also  prohibited  to 
advertise  for  employer  organisations,  unions, 
political parties or elected members or candidates 
running for election. 
No information 

Only  political  party,  coalition  and  candidate. 
Candidates  are  banned  to  display  promotional 
messages via public and private radio and TV or 
pay-TV  service  providers.  The  appearance  of 
candidates  in  public  or  private  TV  is  permitted 
under  the  following  conditions:  at  any  national 
radio or TV station only one candidate is allowed 
to appear during the election period. In local and 
regional  radio  or  TV  stations, the  candidate  may 
appear two times during the election period. 
Only political formations contesting elections can 
campaign for elections 

 
 
FI 

No 

FR 

Yes 

HR  Yes 

HU  Yes 

IE 

IT 

Yes 

Yes 

to those used in the campaigns of any of the candidate political entities.  

Advertising  that  offends  human  dignity,  religious  or  political  convictions  may  not  be  presented  on  tv  or  radio.  Its  content  cannot 
discriminate based on race, gender or citizenship. The picture or voice of individuals who regularly present or take part in  news or 
current events programming may not be used in advertising 
“New element of electoral controversy”: In order to maintain the adversarial nature of the electoral debate, it is forbidden for any 
candidate to bring to the attention of the public a new element of electoral controversy at a time such that his opponents do not 
have the opportunity to respond usefully before the end of the electoral campaign.  
Subsequently, broadcasting media are also banned from publishing comments by a candidate that include a new electoral argument to 
which their opponents are unable to offer a considered response before the end of the election campaign 
No - At certain elections (including EU elections) an Ethics Commission is being established as an ad-hoc authority to promote and 
realize ethical and democratic principles in the election by making announcements and warnings. It adopts and publishes the Electoral 
Code of Ethics which consists of rules of conduct for individuals and political parties in the election campaign and in the electoral 
process.  To  some  extent,  within  their  competencies,  they  can  issue  announcement  and  warnings  also  relating  to  the  content  of  the 
campaign 
Those who order political advertisements to be broadcast in audiovisual media shall arrange for the advertisements to be subtitled or 
supplemented with sign language interpreting 
No regulation on the content of electoral material, including election posters, either during, or outside of, electoral campaigns. 

No information 

LT 

Yes 

No information 

LU  Yes  

No information 

LV  Yes 

MT  Yes 

During the pre-election campaign it is forbidden to retransmit foreign electronic media if these include campaign materials on political 
parties and their associations.  In 2020, the Parliament has adopted in the first reading the ban on paid pre-elections campaigning in 
languages other than Latvian (but the provision is not enforced yet) 
No information 

NL  No 

No information 

PL 

Yes 

Several restrictions with regards to election posters 

133 

No information 

No information 

No information 

No, posters may be placed or ordered by anyone. 

No 

No information 

There is no special regulation for third parties 

No information 

No information 

Yes  –  The  Foreign  Interference  Act  prohibits  an 
alien  to  perform,  do,  hold,  take  part  in,  aid  or 
abet,  or  allow  any  restricted  activity  in  Malta, 
including  any  activity,  or  participation  in  any 
activity, of a political nature or having a political 
purpose  at  any 
the  period 
commencing  nine  months  prior  to  the  date  on 
which Parliament is dissolved and the date of the 
publication of the results of an election. 
No information 

time  during 

Yes - The electoral committees whose candidates 
have  been  registered  shall  have  the  right,  during 
the  period  from  the  15th  day  before  the  election 

 
 
 
 
PT 

Yes 

No information 

RO  Yes 

SE 

No 

During  the  electoral  campaign,  discriminatory  messages  or  slogans  or  messages  inciting  to  hatred  and  intolerance  are  forbidden.  
Electoral  posters  which  mix  the  colours  in  a  sequence  which  reproduces  Romania’s  or  other  state’s  flag  are  forbidden.  During  the 
electoral shows, it is forbidden to combine colours, graphical signs or sounds evoking the national symbols of Romania or some other 
State. During electoral shows, the candidates shall have the following obligations:  a) not to jeopardise the constitutional order, public 
order, safety of persons and goods;  b) not to make statements that could harm human dignity or public morals;  c) to prove potential 
accusations  that  could  have  a  criminal  or  moral  impact  on  another  candidate;   d)  not to  urge  to hatred  or  discrimination  for  racial, 
religious, nationality, sex, sexual orientation, or ethnic considerations. 
No content rules 

SI 

Yes 

No content rules 

SK  Yes 

No information 

day  until  the  end  of  the  election  campaign,  to 
broadcast  election  programmes  free  of  charge  in 
the  programmes  of  public  radio  and  television 
broadcasters at the expense of these broadcasters.  
No information 

No information 

No information 

There is no limitation.  

No information 

134 

 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.3 Transparency requirements on Political Ads  

Member 
State 

Transparency  rules  on  political 
advertising?  

Rules for transparency of individual political advertisements 

What  information  is  to  be  published 
(separately, afterward) 

Competent authority 

Yes, and applicable online 

A clear separation of advertising from editorial content. 

Communications Authority (KommAustria) 

AT 

BE 

Conseil  Supérieur  de  l’Audiovisuel  de  la  Féderation 
Wallonie-Bruxelles  (Audiovisual  High  Council  of 
Wallonie-Bruxelles region). 
Vlaamse  Regulator  voor  de  Media  (Flemish  Media 
Regulator). 
Medienrat 
(German Community regulator). 
Council for Electronic Media (CEM) 

der  Deutschsprachigen  Gemeinschaft 

BG 

Yes 

Paid  political  advertising  during  pre-election  campaigns  is 
allowed, so long as: 
•  It  does  not  include  publishing  or  broadcasting  of  anonymous 
materials; 
•  A  visual,  audiо  or  audiovisual  sign  that  contains  a  label  or 
audible  message  that  the  material  contains  paid  political 
advertising;  

CY 

CZ 

DE 

Yes, but not applicable online  A clear separation of advertising from editorial content on radio 

Cyprus Radio Television Authority 

election 

and TV. 
through 
Promotion  or 
communication  media  must  contain  information  about  their 
sponsor  and  processor.  (The  dissemination  of  anonymous 
announcements 
their 
announcement and the end of voting is banned). 

agitation  disseminated 

concerning 

elections 

between 

A clear separation of advertising from editorial content. 

Yes, and implicitly applicable 
online 

Yes, for radio, television, and 
audiovisual media on demand 
of  national  scope,  but  not  for 
social media. 

Council  for  Radio  and  Television  Broadcasting  (Rada 
pro  rozhlasové  a  televizní  vysílaní):  a  supervisory 
body, discusses offenses and imposes sanctions 

Regarding  advertising 
in  audiovisual  on-demand 
services  the  competent  authority  is  determined  by  law 
of  each  of  the  Länder;  generally  the  competent 
authority 
regulator 
respective 
is 
(Landesmedienanstalt).  

(local) 

the 

DK 

Yes, but not applicable online 

For  print:  the  poster  must  bear  the  name,  email  and  phone 
number of the person who is responsible for placing it.  

For  audiovisual  (radio,  TV,  on-demand  video):  A  clear 

German Press Council for the press 
The Danish Press Council, 
Radio  and  Television  Board,  Danish  Agency  for 
Culture, Media Division 

135 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Member 
State 

Transparency  rules  on  political 
advertising?  

Rules for transparency of individual political advertisements 

What  information  is  to  be  published 
(separately, afterward) 

Competent authority 

EE 

EL 

ES 

FI 

separation  of  advertising  from  editorial  content.  It  must  be 
clearly stated in the advertisement who is the advertiser.  

Yes,420  but  not  applicable 
online 

A  clear  separation  of  advertising  from  editorial  content  (ads 
distinguishable from the rest of the programme by labelling) 

Yes,  and  specific  rules  for 
online 

Yes,  and  applicable  online, 
with 
for 
targeting 

specific 

rules 

Art. 58 bis LOREG:  The dissemination of electoral propaganda 
by  electronic  means  or  messaging  systems  and  the  engagement 
of  electoral  propaganda  on  social  media  or  equivalent  media  
shall prominently identify their electoral nature.  
The candidate, the candidate support group and any other entity 
working  exclusively  to  support  the  candidate  must  ensure  that 
the  paid  advertisement  included  in  or  intended  to  support  the 
election  campaign  indicates  the  payer  of  the  advertisement. 
However,    the  name  of  an  individual    may  not  be  disclosed  
without  his/her  express 
the  
  consent 
advertisement  paid  by    him/her  is  less  than  EUR    800  in 

the  value  of 

if 

The  expenses  of  the  political 
parties  and 
the  candidates  and 
elected  members  of  the  Hellenic 
Parliament  and  of  the  European 
Parliament,  are  published  on  an 
official 
is 
maintained  by  a  Parliamentary 
Service  supporting  the  work  of  the 
Audit Committee 
The electoral program 

website,  which 

Estonian  Consumer  Protection 
Regulatory  Authority 
(ECTRA) 
tehnilise järelevalve amet, TTJA) 
National Council for Radio and Television 
Others421 

and  Technical 
ja 
(Tarbijakaite 

Electoral Administration 

An  election  funding    disclosure  (to 
be submitted by the political parties 
to   the  NAOF    within  two   months 
of the  confirmation of  the election  
results), breaking down the election 
campaign  costs,  separated  between 
the  various  kinds  of  expenditure  or 

The National Audit Office (NAOF) oversees election 
campaign and political party funding and receives and 
publishes documents specified in the Act on Political 
Parties and the Act on a Candidate's Election Funding. 
Office of the Data Protection Ombudsman (in relation 
to Data Protection Act). The NAOF oversees that 
elections funding  disclosures  have all been submitted 

420 A) Presidential Decree 26/2012 "Codification in a single text of the provisions of the legislation for the election of deputies" (A’ 57), as in force. 
B) Law 3023/2003 “Financing of political parties by the state. Revenues and expenses, promotion, publicity and control of the finances of the political parties and the candidates for MPs” (A’ 146), as other 
supplementary laws apply. 
C) Law 2328/1995 "Legal status of private television and local radio, regulation of radio and television market issues and other provisions" (A’ 159), as in force. 
D) Presidential Decree 77/2003 "Code of Conduct for news and other journalistic and political programme" (A’ 75). 
421 A) The Audit Committee, 
B) The National Council for Radio and Television (NCRT), which is an Independent Authority. The NCRT gives an opinion on the ministerial decision on the broadcasting of pre-election messages of the 
political parties by the radio and television, on the appearances of the candidates for parliament and the appointed representatives of the political parties by the radio and television media in order to prevent 
any indirect promotion. It also controls the broadcasting market in the time before the pre-elections period. 
C) The Inter-Party Election Committee, which is a cross-party body and submits proposals for the proper implementation of the regulatory framework 

136 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Member 
State 

Transparency  rules  on  political 
advertising?  

Rules for transparency of individual political advertisements 

What  information  is  to  be  published 
(separately, afterward) 

Competent authority 

FR 

Yes,  and  specific  rules  for 
online 

Further,  there  is  soft  law422 
of 
the 
specifying 
information  to  be provided  to 
combat  the  dissemination  of 
false information. 

kind 

municipal  elections    or  less  than  EUR  1  500  in  parliamentary, 
European    or  presidential  elections.  (Act  on  a  Candidate’s 
Election Funding  (273/2009)) 
Persons  subject  to  advertising    must  be  informed  of  why  
information  is  targeted  at    them,  who  is  responsible  for 
advertising and how they can  exercise their data protection  
rights 
The  Electoral  Code  and  the  Law  to  counter  information 
manipulation impose transparency requirements. 

3  months  before  the  first  day  of  the  month  of  elections  of 
national character (e.g. EU, or presidential) and until the results 
are  known,  online  platform  operators  have  transparency 
obligations  relating  to  the  promotion  of  information  content 
linked to a debate of general interest. As such, online platforms 
and  intermediaries  whose  number  of  connections  on  French 
territory exceeds 5 million unique visitors per month on average 
per  year  must  provide  the  users  with  fair,  clear  and  transparent 
information  on  the  identity  of  the  private  person  or  the 
company,  which  pays  to  the  platform  for  the  promotion  of 
information content related to a debate of general interest.  
Online  platforms  and  intermediaries  must  also  make  public  the 
amount  of  the  remuneration  received  for  the  promotion  of 
such  content  when  the  amount  exceeds  a  specific  threshold 
(>100 € per content). They should also provide information as to 

advertising media. 

and they contain the  right  information  and no errors. 

The  information  required  of  online 
platforms  must  be  made  available 
to a  public in a register, regularly 
updated  during  the  campaigning 
period.   

Supreme  Audiovisual  Council  (Conseil  Supérieur  de 
l'Audiovisuel, CSA) 

422 The Electoral Code provides for the application for interim measures for the cessation of the dissemination of false information on communication services to the public online, when they are likely to 
undermine  the  integrity  of  elections.  Indeed,  Article  11  of  Law  of  22  December  2018  to  counter  information  manipulation  specifies  the  duty  of  cooperation of  online  platforms  in  the  first  against  the 
dissemination of false information. Consequently, the CSA can indeed issue recommendations towards online platforms to improve the effort to combat the propagation of false information that is likely to 
disturb public order or to affect the sincerity of the ballot. As such, the CSA issued its first recommendation on 15 May 2019 of the CSA to online platform operators as part of the duty to cooperate in the 
fight  against  the  dissemination  of  false  information,  the  CSA  monitors  the  obligations  on  online  platforms  operators,  which  can  involve  "informing  users  about  the  nature,  origin  and  methods  of 
disseminating content and the identity of persons paying remuneration in return for the promotion of information content". This recommendation also suggests how each of the possible measures should be 
implemented:  ‘transparency  of  algorithms’;  ‘promotion  of  content  from  press  companies  and  news  agencies  and  from  audiovisual  communication  services’;  ‘combatting  accounts  disseminating  false 
information on a massive scale’; ‘information of users on the nature, origin and modalities for dissemination of content, and the identity of individuals providing remuneration in return for the promotion of 
information content’; ‘promote media and information literacy’. As regards the monitoring of the implementation of these actions by online platforms, according to Article 11 of the Law of 22 December 
2018 Platforms must provide an annual declaration to the CSA of the methods of implementation of each of the measures taken pursuant to Article 11. Said article is reported below: 

137 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Member 
State 

Transparency  rules  on  political 
advertising?  

Rules for transparency of individual political advertisements 

What  information  is  to  be  published 
(separately, afterward) 

Competent authority 

the  use  of  the  individual’s  personal  data  in  the  context  of  the 
specific promotional material. 

Online Platforms should distinguish sponsored content from the 
rest,  and  should  specify  the  methods  of  distribution  of  the 
content,  indicating  as  far  as  possible  the  conditions  of  their 
publication such as the existence of financial compensation, the 
extent  of  the  distribution  (number  of  views,  type  of  target 
population,  etc.),  and  whether 
they  were  generated 
automatically or not. 

HR 

Yes423, and applicable online 

State Audit Office 
State Electoral Commission 
Ministry of Finance 
State Electoral Commission of the Republic of Croatia 
(with respect to financing supervision of election 
campaigns of election participants) 

No investigatory powers. 
The Act – Article 94: the authorised prosecutor shall be 
the State Attorney 

report  of  donations 

A 
(incl. 
donated  services)  and  of  election 
campaign  costs  to  be  published  7 
days prior to the elections424, and in 
information 
particular  containing 
for  each  expenditure  on 
the: 
purpose  of  cost,  the  number  of 
services  contracted  and 
media 
/ 
performed,  name  of  supplier 
recipient,  name  of 
social 
network,  OIB  of 
the  supplier, 
address  of  the  supplier  /  recipient, 
date 
invoice 
payment date, amount (amount paid 
and the market value of the product 
or service).  

/  period  of  use, 

the 

Additionally,  operators  providing 
media  advertising 
for 
election  campaigns  submit  to  the 
State  Electoral  Commission  their 
schedules  of  rates  charged  for 

services 

423  1.  Act  on  Financing Political  Activities,  Election  Campaigns  and  Referendums  (Official  Gazette  29/19  and  98/19).  2.  Ordinance on  the  manner  of  keeping  records,  issuing  certificates  and  entering 
reports on financing political activities, election campaigns and referendums in the information system for financing supervision (Official Gazette 71/19) 
424 Report of donations and election campaign costs: Article 11. 

138 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Member 
State 

Transparency  rules  on  political 
advertising?  

Rules for transparency of individual political advertisements 

What  information  is  to  be  published 
(separately, afterward) 

Competent authority 

HU 

Yes, but not applicable online 

IE 

Yes, but not applicable online 

Advertisements that are 
directed towards a political 
end are otherwise prohibited. 
Exemptions  are  provided  for 
advertisements  broadcast  at 
the  request  of  a  Referendum 
Commission  (an  independent 
body established under statute 
to  explain  the  subject  matter 
of  a  referendum,  to  promote 
public 
a 
awareness 
referendum  and  to  encourage 
the electorate to vote) and the 
party 
broadcasting  of 
political  broadcast  provided 
that a broadcaster does not, in 
the allocation of time for such 
broadcasts,  give  an  unfair 
to  any  political 
preference 
party. 

of 

a 

the 

from 

electoral 

participants 

election  campaign  advertising  and 
the  contracts  they  have  concluded 
in 
with 
relation to their election campaigns, 
and  they  publish  them  on  their 
websites 
election 
campaign start date 
Each  candidate  and  nominating 
organisation  shall  publish  in  the 
Hungarian  Gazette,  within  60  days 
of  the  parliamentary  election,  the 
amount,  source  and  method  of  use 
of  public  and  other  funds  and 
financial  support  spent  on 
the 
election. 

National Media and Infocommunications Authority 

Broadcast:  
Broadcasting Authority of Ireland.   

Print: An Garda Síochána.  

Advertising  in  print  media  is  subject  to  the  self-
regulatory code of the Advertising Standards Authority 
of Ireland (ASAI). However, political advertising is not 
within  the  scope  of  this  code,  and  therefore  the  ASAI 
does  not  consider  any  complaints  in  relation  to  this 
category of advertising. 

For political ads in press products: 
Political  advertisements  published  in  press  products  shall  be 
immediately  recognizable  and  distinct  from  other  media 
contents. The name, address or seat of the customer ordering 
the advertisement shall be indicated on the advertisement. 
For posters: 
Name  and  address  of  the  publisher  and  name  of  the  person 
responsible for publishing shall be indicated on the poster. 
Electoral  law  (1992)  provides  that  every  notice,  bill,  poster  or 
similar document used for electoral purposes is required to bear 
upon  its  face  the  name  and  address  of  the  printer  and 
publisher thereof.   
Printers’  and  publishers’ 
these 
failure 
requirements is an offence under the law (this is also applicable 
to anyone who causes the printing, publishing or posting). 

to  comply  with 

139 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Member 
State 

Transparency  rules  on  political 
advertising?  

Rules for transparency of individual political advertisements 

What  information  is  to  be  published 
(separately, afterward) 

Competent authority 

IT 

LT 

Yes 
(for  print),  and  soft 
measures  for their application 
legally 
online 
enforceable425)  
Yes, and applicable online 

(but 

not 

LU 

Yes, 

for 

audiovisual 

LV 

Yes, and applicable online 

All  political  ads  (irrespective  of  the  means  of  distribution, 
including  online)  must  be  marked  indicating  that  it  is  political 
advertising,  indicating  the  source  of  funding  (the  name  of  the 
individual  political  campaigner  and  their  campaign  account,  or 
state budget where applicable), the order number, the identity 
of  the  printer,  producer  or  disseminator.  (Also  requirements 
on  the  means/formalities  of  such  labelling  such  as  font  size,  or 
localisation within an audio political ad). 
Political  parties,  participants  of  a  political  campaign,  public 
information  producers  and  disseminators  are  obliged  to  declare 
all political advertising. 

Audiovisual  commercial  rules  require  a  clear  separation  of 
advertising  from  editorial  content.  (This  is  partly  applicable 
online: in the absence of a specific regime for political ads, some 
online audiovisual political ads are subject to the provisions for 
commercial ads.426) 
A full disclosure of the agreement between the campaigner and 
the service provider. 
All  political  ads  shall  include  the  name  of  the  sponsor  and  a 
clear and unambiguous indication that it is a political ad. 

When distributing printed political ads, the relevant edition shall 
in addition indicate the number of copies of the edition. 

the  end  of 

the 
Upon  reaching 
the  political 
election  campaign, 
candidates  have 
the 
records  of  their  expenditures  to  the 
Central  Electoral  Commission  for 
control. 

to  submit 

/ 

Service providers shall keep records 
the  political  ad  campaign 
of 
(expenses), 
each 
identifying 
campaigner  or  recipient  of  post 
services,  amount  of  funds  acquired 
for  the  placement  of  the  relevant 
advertising  material  or  service,  as 
well  as  persons  who  have  entered 

Communications  Authority  (Autrità  per  le  Garanzie 
nelle Comunicazioni – AGCOM) 

Radio  and  Television  Commission  of  Lithuania  – 
LRTK 
Radio  and  Television  Commission  of  Lithuania  – 
LRTK 
The  Central  Electoral  Commission 
complaints on non-labeled political ads online. 

investigates 

Independent  Audiovisual  Authority  of  Luxembourg 
(Autorité 
de 
l’audiovisuel) (ALIA) 

luxembourgeoise 

indépendante 

National Electronic Mass Media Council 

425 The regulator and competition authority for the communication industries in Italy (AGCOM) indicated the desirability of the transparency rules for political advertising in print to be applied online. 
AGCOM,  Guidelines  for  equal  access  to  online  platforms  during  the  2018  parliamentary  election  campaign  (2018).    https://www.agcom.it/documents/10179/9478149/Documento+generico+01-02-
2018/45429524-3f31-4195-bf46-4f2863af0ff6?version=1.0 These non-binding guidelines are reported not to have been followed by the parties in the 2018 elections, see Chiusi & Agosti, The Influence 
Industry Personal Data and Political Influence in Italy (2018), p5. https://cdn.ttc.io/s/ourdataourselves.tacticaltech.org/ttc-influence-industry-italy.pdf  
426 ALIA, Décision DEC0013/2020-P003/2019 du 6 juillet 2020 du Conseil d’administration de l’Autorité luxembourgeoise indépendante de l’audiovisuel concernant une plainte à l’encontre du service 
RTL 4. 

140 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Member 
State 

Transparency  rules  on  political 
advertising?  

Rules for transparency of individual political advertisements 

What  information  is  to  be  published 
(separately, afterward) 

Competent authority 

into  the  relevant  contract  on  behalf 
of 
(the 
commissioner of the ad). 

campaigner 

the 

on 

contracting 

information  on 

Service  providers  and  campaigners 
shall  send  a  notification  to  the 
Corruption 
and 
Prevention 
the 
Bureau 
Combating 
placement of pre-election campaign 
materials  or  provision  of  postal 
services  not  later  than  within  three 
working days after entering into the 
information  shall 
contract.  The 
include:  
1)  the  date  and  number  of  the 
contract; 
2) 
parties: 
a)  the  name,  registration  number 
and  registered  address  of  the  entity 
placing  the  pre-election  campaign 
material  (service  provider)  in  case 
of  a  legal  person,  otherwise  the 
given  name,  surname,  personal 
identity  number  (if  there  is  none  - 
the 
personal 
identification document number and 
date of issue, country and authority 
that  has  issued  the  document)  and 
the address of the declared place of 
residence  of  the  person  placing  the 
pre-election campaign material; 
3) 
the 
placement of pre-election campaign 
material: 
a)  the  date,  (where  applicable)  the 
size,  the  broadcasting  time  and 
duration  of  the  placement  of  each 

information 

regarding 

birth, 

date 

of 

141 

 
 
Member 
State 

Transparency  rules  on  political 
advertising?  

Rules for transparency of individual political advertisements 

What  information  is  to  be  published 
(separately, afterward) 

Competent authority 

campaign  material, 

pre-election 
including its removal date; 
5) the contract sum (with VAT); 
6) 
the  discounts  applied  and 
justification  thereof,  as  well  as  the 
contract  sum  (with  VAT),  which 
would have been effected in case if 
discounts were not applied; 
7) the procedures and terms  for the 
payment of contract sum; 
8)  other 
is 
considered  essential  by  the  entity 
placing  the  pre-election  campaign 
material (service provider). 
/ 

information  which 

No  

/ 

MT 

NL 

PL 

No, but: 
Soft law for print427 
Soft law for online428 
Yes, and applicable online 

to  be  easily 

All  advertisements  have 
advertisements  and  should  clearly 
committee from which they originate. 
For print: the editor is responsible for indicating the source of the 
election materials and who financed it 

recognizable  as 
the  election 

identify 

PT 

No 

/ 

Broadcasting Authority Malta 

Commissariaat voor de Media 

National  Broadcasting  Council 
Radiofonii i Telewizji) 
National Electoral Commission  

(Krajowa  Rada 

The  Portuguese  Regulatory  Authority  for  the  Media 
(ERC  –  Entidade  Reguladora  para  a  Comunicação 
Social) 

services 

Election  committees  are  obliged  to 
submit  financial  reports  including 
information  on  the  amounts  they 
spend  on  advertising,  broken  down 
into 
by 
newspapers  and  periodicals,  radio, 
television,  poster  carriers,  and 
Internet advertising.  
Every  campaign  expense  needs  to 
be  duly  identified  and  is  subject  to 
judicial oversight post-election  

provided 

RO 

Yes, but not applicable online  Electoral  competitors  shall  communicate,  for  all  the  printed,  Within  15  days  from  the  election  For the  printed electoral propaganda materials: 

427 Advertising Code, amended 2020, (Stichting Reclame Code) https://www.reclamecode.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/SRC_Code_Opmaak-CodeJaarverslag_2020_Compleet.pdf   
428 Advertising Code for Social Media & Influencer Marketing, 2014, amended 2019 (Reclamecode Social Media & Influencer Marketing) https://www.reclamecode.nl/nrc/reclamecode-social-media-rsm/ 
as well as the Dutch Code of Conduct Transparency Online Political Advertisements, 2021 https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/richtlijnen/2021/02/09/nederlandse-gedragscode-transparantie-online-
politieke-advertenties  

142 

 
 
 
                                                           
Member 
State 

Transparency  rules  on  political 
advertising?  

Rules for transparency of individual political advertisements 

What  information  is  to  be  published 
(separately, afterward) 

Competent authority 

(except one, on post-elections 
reporting, which encompasses 
online expenditures) 

audio  or  video  electoral  propaganda  materials  the  following 
details: 
a) the independent  candidate’s name, the name of the political 
party, of the electoral alliance/political alliance of which it forms 
part,  or  of  the  organisation  of  citizens  belonging  to  national 
minorities, as applicable; 
b) the name of the economic operator who made them; 
c) the unique identification number ascribed by the Permanent 
Electoral Authority; 
d)  for  print:  the  print  run,  for  the    electoral  posters  and  the  
booklets,  leaflets  and  other  printed  materials  in  the  same 
category. 

No 

/ 

date,  electoral  competitors  shall 
submit  to  the  Permanent  Electoral 
Authority,  in  written  and  electronic 
format, the statement on the number 
of  electoral  propaganda  materials 
produced and used, broken down by 
category. 

Within  30  days  of  the  end  of  the 
electoral 
electoral 
campaign, 
competitors  shall  transmit  to  the 
Permanent  Electoral  Authority 
information  on  the  description  of 
the  online  electoral  propaganda 
materials,  their  production,  period 
and broadcasting space. 
/ 

SE 

SI 

Yes, and implicitly applicable 
online 

SK 

Yes, and implicitly applicable 
online 

Media  publishers  shall  publish  the  name  of  the  customer 
commissioning  the  publication  of  election  advertising  content. 
Bulletins,  catalogues  and  other  information  publishing  media, 
posters, pamphlets, banners and video pages without live images, 
and telecommunications messages containing advertising content 
for an election campaign shall contain the name of the customer 
commissioning the publication of such content. Posters shall also 
bear a serial number (Election and Referendum Campaign Act). 
Commercial  advertising  must  be  clearly  recognisable  and 
visually  separated  from  the  mass  medium's  other  programmes. 
Advertisements  published  free  of  charge  must  be  specially 
designated as such (Mass Media Act) 
Everyone  who  conducts  an  election  campaign  is  obliged  to 
ensure  that  broadcast  political  advertising,  published  paid 
advertising,  published  election posters  and  all  other  methods  of 
conducting an election campaign contain information about the 
client and supplier (incl. name, surname and municipality of 
residence in case of a natural person, and the name, registered 
office and identification number of the organisation in case of 
a  legal  person).  The  same  applies  to  the  presentation  of  pre-

/ 

 / 

143 

Permanent Electoral Authority 
Electoral bureaus  

For the  audio or video electoral propaganda materials: 
National  Audiovisual  Council  (Consiliul  National  al 
Audiovizualului) 

Investigatory powers 

The  Swedish  Press  and  Broadcasting  Authorities 
(Myndigheten för press, radio och tv) 
Culture and Media Inspectorate (Ministry of Culture) 

Council  for  Broadcasting  and  Retransmission  of  the 
Slovak Republic 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Member 
State 

Transparency  rules  on  political 
advertising?  

Rules for transparency of individual political advertisements 

What  information  is  to  be  published 
(separately, afterward) 

Competent authority 

election and public opinion polls. If the broadcasting of political 
advertising  on  radio  last  less  than  30  seconds,  providing  the 
name of the client (e.g. political party) is sufficient. 

Table 8.4 Private sector political ads policies - VLOPS 

Obligation/VLOP COP signatory 

(“?” Indicates where policies information is inconclusive) 

Ad repository (maintenance) 

Ad repository (publication) 

DSA-like requirements, including: 

  Content of the advertisement 

  Natural or legal person on whose behalf the advertisement is displayed 

  Period during which the advertisement was displayed 

  Whether the advertisement was intended to be displayed specifically to one or more particular groups of recipients of 

the service and if so, the main parameters used for that purpose 

  Total number of recipients of the service reached and, where applicable, aggregate numbers for the group or groups of 

recipients to whom the advertisement was targeted specifically 

Amount spent and financial data 

Banner ads included 

144 

FB/ Instagram 

Google/ Youtube 

Snap 

x 

x 

x 

x 

? 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

? 

x 

? 

x 

x 

x 

x 

? 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Labelling of ads (visible to individuals through the ads themselves) 

DSA-like requirements, including: 

  That the information displayed is an advertisement 

  Natural or legal person on whose behalf the advertisement is displayed 

  Meaningful information about the main parameters used to determine the recipient. 

Name of any associated political campaign (plus registration information where relevant) 

Self-certification as political ad not associated with political campaign  

Due diligence/”know your client” data (retained from client) 

DSA requirements, including:  

  Name, address, telephone number and email address of economic operator 

  A copy of the identification document of the economic operator [advertiser]  

Where the advertiser is registered as a political campaign or as a political candidate, the register in which the 
advertiser is registered and its registration number or equivalent means of identification in that register; 

Self-certification by the advertiser that the advertising being placed complies with the applicable national rules. 

Self-certification by the advertiser that the advertising being placed, and the means by which it was prepared and 
disseminated, complies with the GDPR. 

x 

x 

x 

x 

? 

? 

x 

x 

Restrictions related to country of establishment of ad sponsor 

x (MS) 

x (EU) 

x (MS) 

145 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Twitter bans political ads on the basis of the following definition:  

“Twitter  globally prohibits the promotion of political  content. We have  made this decision based on our belief that political message reach should be 
earned, not bought. Ads that contain references to political content, including appeals for votes, solicitations of financial support, and advocacy 
for  or  against  any  of  the  above-listed  types  of  political  content,  are  prohibited  under  this  policy.  We  also  do  not  allow  ads  of  any  type  by 
candidates,  political  parties,  or  elected  or  appointed  government  officials.  News  publishers  who  meet  our  exemption  criteria  may  run  ads  that 
reference political content and/or prohibited advertisers under our political content policy, but may not include advocacy for or against those topics or 
advertisers”429 

TikTok bans political ads on the basis of the following definition: 

“We have chosen not to allow political ads on TikTok. Any paid ads that come into the community need to fit the standards for our platform, and the 
nature of paid political ads is not something we believe fits the TikTok platform experience. To that end, we will not allow paid ads that promote or 
oppose a candidate, current leader, political party or group, or issue at the federal, state, or local level – including election-related ads, advocacy 
ads, or issue ads.”430 

429 https://business.twitter.com/en/help/ads-policies/ads-content-policies/political-content.html  
430 https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-us/understanding-our-policies-around-paid-ads  

146 

 
 
 
                                                           
Table 8.5: Forthcoming national initiatives 

This table lists the obligations foreseen under the IE and NL forthcoming proposals regulating political ads, highlighting the overlap when there is any. It 
distinguishes between obligations for providers (economic actors) and obligations for buyers of political ads (political parties). It also puts side-by-side 
the NL proposal and NL code of conduct, because of their complementary character. The IE proposal is complete and in the later stages, whereas the NL 
proposal is currently only an announced forthcoming initiative, with little publicly-available information as to its provisions; a blank cell in the IE column 
(and NL Code of Conduct) means there is no applicable provision, whereas a blank cell in NL legislative column indicates lack of data.  

Irish legislative proposal431 

Dutch legislative 
proposal432 

Dutch Code of Conduct Transparency for 
Online Political Advertisements433 (soft law) 

Definition of political advertisement 

Definition of platform 

“online political advertisement” means any form of communication 
in a digital format commissioned for political purposes for 
placement, display or promotion on an online platform during an 
electoral period and for which a payment is made to the online 
platform” 

“political purpose” (Electoral Act, 2001) includes the direct and 
indirect promotion of, opposition to, and presentation of the 
interests, objectives, policies and comments of a political actor or 
of a third party with regard to a political campaign, referendum or 
election, and otherwise includes the act of influencing the outcome 
of the election, referendum or campaign. 
“online platform” means any public-facing website, web 
application, or digital application, including a social media 
network, advertising network, search engine or the seller of an 
online political advertisement, that  
(i) has 10,000 or more unique monthly visitors or users in the State 
for a majority of months during the 12 calendar months 
immediately preceding the date of the making of a polling day 
order for an election or a referendum, and (ii) receives payment for 

No definition 

431 General Scheme of the Electoral Reform Bill 2020, pp233-261 (08/01/2021). https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/34cf6-general-scheme-of-the-electoral-reform-bill-2020/   
432  Wet  op  de  Politieke  Partijen  (WPP)  (“the  law  on  political  parties”)  (07/12/2020).  https://www.parlement.com/id/vlboezk3ftm8/wet_op_de_politieke_partijen.  The  document  mainly  relied  on  is: 
Ministerie  van  Binnenlandse  Zaken  en  Koninkrijksrelaties,  Notitie:  Regulering  van  politieke  campagnes  (27  maart  2019).  Accessed  from  https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/wob-
verzoeken/2021/03/22/besluit-op-wob-verzoek-over-transparantie-van-politieke-advertenties. Further information was found in: Voortgang voorbereiding Wet op de politieke partijen, Brief van de Minister 
van 
(11/06/2020). 
Voorzitter 
https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2020Z10803&did=2020D23378  
433 Dutch Code of Conduct Transparency for Online Political Advertisements (09/02/2021). https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/news/news-pdfs/Dutch-Code-of-Conduct-transparency-online-political-
advertisements-EN.pdf  

koninkrijksrelaties 

Staten-Generaal 

binnenlandse 

Tweede 

Kamer 

zaken 

Aan 

van 

der 

en 

de 

de 

147 

 
 
 
  
  
  
  
                                                           
the placement, display or promotion of an online political 
advertisement on that website, application, social media network, 
advertising network or search engine 
“look alike targeting” means a targeting method that takes an 
existing target audience and uses machine learning methods to 
identify new persons who have similar characteristics or are 
engaged in similar activities on an online platform or platforms as 
the case may be 

The law would be applicable 

 
 

during an electoral period (30 days before polling) 
when the ad is commissioned (bought) by a political 
actor or by a person/entity seeking to influence the 
outcome of an election or a referendum held in 
Ireland 

Concerns Dutch political parties 
only.  
A different law may be made 
for online political ads by other 
actors. 

Definition of look-alike targeting 

Definition of broadly-conceived ‘digital 
political instruments’ 

Scope of application 

Obligations for platforms 
Policy on political 
ads 

On the procedures 
around ads 

On the content of the 
ads 

Identifiability of the ad as an ad 

To have a button, icon, tab, or hyperlink on the ad, with the text 
“Political Advert”, in a position where the viewer will readily see 
it, linking to a page clearly displaying a transparency notice 
(which is to be maintained with real-time info). 

148 

The concept of “digital political instruments” should be 
formulated in such a way as to avoid the need to adapt the 
HRF every time new technologies enter the market. 
[Therefore includes the instruments/tools of data analysis, 
micro-targeting and other digital technologies used to 
profile, reach and provide information to individuals.] 
Not particularly linked to any specific period such as 
elections. 

For online platforms and political parties/candidates 
only, and only signatories of the Code.  

Covers: 
 
 

primarily paid online political ads 
partly unpaid political reporting 

Commitment to have clear and transparent rules for 
placing and removing messages and advertisements.  

Commitment to develop and enforce platform policies on 
the safety and privacy of users and electoral integrity 
in relation to online political advertising. 

Commitment to remove political advertisements or any 
content that incite violence or hate speech within the 
shortest possible period of time once identified 

Commitment to consider countering any inaccurate 
information on the electoral process, such as voter, 
voting process and polling station information, in case 
such information is identified [including in an ad]. 

 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
 
Ad transparency 
requirements regarding: 

The ad buyer’s 
details 

name, postal address, email address and, where applicable, the 
website address of the buyer 

The law will mandate 
transparency on who paid for 
an ad 

Commitment to develop and enforce relevant 
transparency mechanisms 

Targeting 

Payment 

Time  

Reach  

 

 

confirmation of whether micro-targeting was applied 
in the placement,  display and promotion of the online 
political advertisement and, where applicable, a 
description of the criteria used 
confirmation of whether the target audience contains a 
look alike targeting list and, where applicable, a 
description of the characteristics of the target 
audience 

the amount paid for the online political advertisement, including 
the amounts paid for content creation and for online placement, 
display and promotion 
the number of days during which the online political 
advertisement will be  
placed, displayed and promoted on the online platform and the 
start and end date of the online advertising campaign 
the number of user impressions that the online political 
advertisement is intended to reach, and the number of active 
engagements by user 
Yes 

Online ad archive /library 

Identity verification measures 

Lack of, or inadequate cooperation from the 
ad buyer 

Customer due diligence 

Undue foreign influence 

 

 

 

 

Not a live archive: the ads and their transparency 
notice are to be transferred in the archive at the 
expiration of the period of the online advertising 
campaign, retained for min. 7 years. 
(No standards are specified on format to allow easy 
comparison between platforms.) 
Access is public, for the public interest and for the 
purpose of research  
The archive is to be transferred to the Electoral 
Commission if the platform is dissolved. 
Obligation to appoint a responsible person for the purposes of 
identifying and verifying the information and documentation 
provided by the buyer  
Not to provide the service sought by the buyer when unable to 
obtain the required information (for transparency notice) and 
documentation (for identification of buyer) 
monitor all dealings with a buyer by scrutinising transactions 
and the source of funds for those transactions, to determine 
whether or not there might be a breach of this law 
No person residing outside of the State, other than [an Irish 

149 

 Transparency on profiling 

Commitment to report adequately and clearly on “paid 
for by” 

Commitment to report adequately and clearly on spend 
and spending range 

Commitment to establish transparency on reach 

Commitment to provide relevant advertiser and 
advertisement details in publicly available libraries 
with easily downloadable and comparable data. 

Signatories to the code are invited to collaborate with 
researchers on political advertising libraries and make 
available any additional data to support such research, as 
far as it does not concern confidential information. 

Commitment to require and enforce registration by and 
verification of political advertisers. 

The payment or influence of 

Commitment to ban cross-border political 

 
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
resident, a corporate body based in Ireland, or a EUPP], may, 
either directly or indirectly, commission an online political 
advertisement. 

Ensure that there is no undue foreign influence: 
The responsible person at the platform shall take reasonable steps 
to determine whether or not the buyer of an online political 
advertisement, or a person connected with the buyer, is residing in 
a place outside of the State – in which case the responsible person 
shall (a) obtain approval from their senior management, and (b) 
determine the source of the funds. 

(digital) political campaigns 
from outside the EU (excluding 
contributions from voters residing 
there) is prohibited 

advertisements from outside the EU. 

Commitment to refuse direct purchases of political 
advertisements by foreign actors in support of the 
political party; refrain from receiving foreign funding 
to pay for online political advertisements, other than from 
party members living abroad. 

Post-election review 

Obligations on buyers of online political ads 
Transparency  

to provide the information for the transparency notice (non-
compliance is an offence) 

Online ad archive /library 

Consider conducting a post-election review on the Dutch 
electoral campaign and compliance with the  
code of conduct; consider the possibility of publishing a 
report in case there have been any relevant  
incidents in relation to the Dutch elections and the 
correlated platform actions 

Commitment to refrain from contracting or engaging 
intermediaries to place political ads without attribution to 
the party. 

Commitment to strictly adhere to online platforms’ 
advertisement policies and mechanisms 

Transparency obligations on political information for 
other [non-political] organisations should and will be 
regulated by other laws (e.g. the Criminal Code)  

The system of disclosure is the 
same as for the disclosure of the 
financial reports. 
Parties must be transparent on 
the amounts that they have paid 
above a certain threshold.  

Parties must report on the tools 
(e.g. targeting) used/purchased; 
they should report before the 
elections on the databases and 
search criteria they have used 
and how much they have paid 
for. 
Political parties are to upload the 
ads they run and the relevant 
information into an archive 
hosted by the supervisory 
authority. 

Cooperation with the platforms  

To comply with requests for information/documentation re- the 
identity of the buyer and the lack of foreign interference (non-
compliance is an offence) 

Restrictions on targeting 

No  

Transparency on profiling 

Commitment to provide faithful information for 
registration and verification processes, and to respond 
to inquiries regarding ad authorization  
and verification processes. 

  Maintain ethical limits to linking different 
data sets and uploading them to online 
platforms for the purpose of microtargeting 
Refrain from psychological profiling for 

 

150 

 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
  
Undue foreign influence 

No active obligations for political parties (only for platforms) 

Security requirements 

Authorities 
Supervision and enforcement 

Set-up of the (independent) Electoral Commission which may 
take any investigative actions as may be required to ensure that the 
Act’s provisions are being complied with. 
Its powers include: access to premises (with consent or a warrant), 
inspection, seizing of material, serving compliance notices 

Penalties 

Fines and/or imprisonment 

The payment or influence of 
(digital) political campaigns 
from outside the EU (excluding 
contributions from voters residing 
there) is prohibited 
Minimum requirements for 
information security for political 
parties. This is subject to the 
condition that the costs do not 
constitute a threshold to 
participate in the elections. 

The law will set up an 
independent supervisory 
authority.  
This authority will host the ad 
library where political parties 
will have to upload the ads they 
run and relevant information. 

targeting purposes 

Commitment to respond quickly and accurately 
to enquiries about placement and removal of 
messages  
and advertisements by competent authorities and 
political parties. 

Participation is voluntary and cannot replace 
existing  
or future legislation and regulations. Compliance is 
therefore not enforceable 

151 

 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
152 

Annex 8: Presentation and analysis of EU acquis  

Although there is no overarching legislative framework covering online targeted advertising 
at  the  EU  level,  different  legislative  measures  apply  to  advertising  (including  targeted 
advertising)  and  provide  certain  rights  to  individuals.  The  current  European  legislative 
framework  is  complex  and  only  addresses  certain  aspects  of  online  targeted  advertising, 
though, and sometimes in an indirect manner.  

These  measures  are  often  either  only  partly  applicable  to  online  political  advertising,  or 
exclude the latter from their scope altogether; this may be because their scope is restricted to 
a  specific  medium,  such  as  audiovisual  material,  or  because  the  scope  is  restricted  to 
advertising of a commercial nature. This body of relevant EU rules is presented below,434 and 
includes  the  (forthcoming)  DSA,  the  (forthcoming)  DMA,  the  ePrivacy  Directive435,  the 
GDPR436,  the  E-Commerce  Directive437,  the  Audiovisual  Media  Services  Directive438,  the 

434  A  great  deal  has  been  taken  and  adapted  from  the  following  study commissioned  by  IMCO:  Fourberg  et  al.  (2021), 
“Online  advertising,  the  impact  of  targeted  advertising  on  advertisers,  market  access  and  consumer  choice.” 
https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/9b3cb8b5-d55b-11eb-895a-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-
PDF/source-217130651  
435  Directive  2002/58/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  12  July  2002  concerning  the  processing  of 
personal  data  and  the  protection  of  privacy  in  the  electronic  communications  sector  (Directive  on  privacy  and  electronic 
communications): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02002L0058-20091219 
436 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons  with  regard  to  the  processing  of  personal  data  and  on  the  free  movement  of  such  data,  and  repealing  Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation-“GDPR”): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj 
437  Directive  2000/31/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  8  June  2000  on  certain  legal  aspects  of 
information 
Internal  Market 
society 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2000/31/oj 
438 Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual 
media 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02010L0013-20181218 

(Audiovisual 

commerce, 

Directive) 

electronic 

particular 

services, 

Services 

services 

Media 

the 

in 

in 

152 

 
 
 
                                                           
153 

Unfair Commercial Practices Directive439, the Consumer Rights Directive440, the Misleading 
and Comparative Advertising Directive441, the Directive on services in the internal market442 
and the Platform-to-Business Regulation443. There is also relevant soft law in the form of the 
Code of Practice on Disinformation. Also, this initiative is parallel to the one on the funding 
of EUPPs and European political foundations (see point 8.13 below)444.  

The  transparency  in  political  ads  initiative  in  particular  overlaps  with  the  DSA  and  with 
some of the commitments under the Code of Practice on Disinformation, insofar as it stems 
from, or strengthens elements of these two; the overlap is mapped in tables 2 and 3 below.  

Each piece of legislation is narratively described below, with a focus on the provisions most 
relevant  to  political  advertising.  The  governance  model  under  each  is  described.  Where 
relevant,  the  space  for  action  under  the  present  initiative  is  also  discussed,  i.e.  the  relation 
between the two, as well as the gaps the latter could fill. 

It is good to note already that even those laws that only regulate ads of a commercial nature 
remain  relevant  for  the  transparency  in  political  ads  initiative. This  is  particularly  the  case 
because  some  commercial  ads  are  also  political  ads  (such  as  when  an  economic  actor 
promotes  its  services  while  connecting  them  to  a  political  issue).  Rules  for  commercial 
advertising  are  also  relevant  for  the  status  quo  regarding  political  ads,  insofar  as  some 
authorities may decide – like the Luxembourgish audiovisual authority (ALIA) does445 – that, 
in  the  absence  of  a  specific  regime  for  online  political  ads,  the  rules  for  commercial  ads 
apply446. However, even where these rules apply, the analysis below shows that there is space 
for  action  under  the  transparency  in  political  ads  initiative,  because  even  under  consumer 
protection rules, it emerges that there is no specific obligation to inform consumers in a clear 
and  comprehensible  manner  that  they  are  facing  targeted  advertising,  or  regarding  the 
parameters  used  to  determine  the  recipient  or  the  content  of  the  advertising  (rules  are 
currently  limited  to  ranking  and  personalised  pricing).  Only  insofar  as  certain  advertising 
practices may be seen as a form of ranking can the information duties now contained in the 
UCPD, the CRD and in the P2B Regulation be seen as relevant.  

439  Directive  2005/29/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  11  May  2005  concerning  unfair  business-to-
consumer  commercial  practices  in  the  internal  market  and  amending  Council  Directive  84/450/EEC,  Directives  97/7/EC, 
98/27/EC  and  2002/65/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  and  Regulation  (EC)  No  2006/2004  of  the 
European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  (‘Unfair  Commercial  Practices  Directive’)  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02005L0029-20220528&from=EN 
440 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending 
Council  Directive  93/13/EEC  and  Directive  1999/44/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  and  repealing 
Council  Directive  85/577/EEC  and  Directive  97/7/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32011L0083 
441 Directive 2006/114/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 concerning misleading and 
comparative advertising https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32006L0114. 
442 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal 
market. http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2006/123/oj  
443 Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on promoting fairness and 
transparency 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1150 
444  Regulation  (EU,  Euratom)  No  1141/2014  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  22  October  2014  on  the 
statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations 
445 ALIA, Décision DEC0013/2020-P003/2019 du 6 juillet 2020 du Conseil d’administration de l’Autorité luxembourgeoise 
indépendante de l’audiovisuel concernant une plainte à l’encontre du service RTL 4. 
446 The AVMSD generally does not cover political ads. 

intermediation 

business 

services 

online 

users 

for 

of 

153 

 
 
                                                           
154 

Other legislation (such as the GDPR) applies to political ads and their targeting, but not in a 
comprehensive  way:  the  GDPR,  for  instance,  only  addresses  elements  relating  to  the 
processing  of  personal  data. Although  recent  proposals  by  the  European  Commission  (the 
DSA,  DMA)  will  fill  some  of  the  gaps  in  this  existing  framework,  the  need  for  horizontal 
legislation on political ads remains. 

Furthermore, regarding the governance of the different applicable rules, it emerges from the 
analysis  below  that  a  variety  of  authorities  may  be  competent  to  oversee,  supervise  and 
enforce  the  application  of  existing  rules  for  political  advertising  (see  Table  4  below). 
However,  there  is  no  authority  that  can  deal  with  a  problematic  political  ad  in  its  entirety, 
because  each  can  scrutinise  only  a  different  aspect  of  political  ads  –  one  being  the  data 
protection angle and another being the electoral rules angle, for instance. Each authority can 
only  tackle  one  aspect  of  any  given  problematic  political  ad  –  whereas  that  ad  may  be 
problematic  on  many  levels  –  and  there  is  little  structured  cooperation  foreseen  between 
relevant  authorities  beyond  certain  multilateral  and  EU  level  cooperation  groups.  Finally, 
another  governance-related  issue  is  that,  if  we  compare  what  the  applicable  EU-level  rules 
cover, we see that they provide a certain level of governance for some areas, but not for all 
areas  that  are  in  scope  of  the  present  initiative.  The  main  available  structures  are  ERGA, 
which provides coordination for the implementation of the AVMSD (which however does not 
foresee a task for national authorities to oversee political ads), and the European Cooperation 
Network  on  Elections  which  was  established  as  part  of  the  Electoral  package.  Neither  are 
able  to  mandate  coordination.  The  coordination  mechanism  under  the  GDPR,  in  turn, 
includes  the  One-Stop-Shop  and  lead  authorities,  cooperation  among  DPAs  and  under  the 
EDPB, as well as a dispute-resolution mechanism; it is more effective, though it, too, faces 
structural issues. 

It should be observed that the internal market options put forward in the transparency 
in political ads initiative are intended to complement and build upon existing legislation 
applicable to providers of political advertising services, and to be without prejudice to 
the  relevant  sectoral  and  market  legislation  applicable  to  offline  and  online  political 
advertising and services. In contrast, the options concerning political parties are prepared in 
close alignment with the parallel initiative to reform the regulation on the statute and funding 
of EUPP and foundations. The latter rules are mapped separately, at the end of Annex 9. 
9.1. The Digital Services Act (DSA proposal)447 

in 

the 

The  DSA  is  a  horizontal  instrument  aimed  at  establishing  the  essential  responsibility  of 
information  society  services  generally 
their 
responsibilities  as  intermediaries  in  light  of  national  prohibitions  of  hate  speech,  terrorist 
content  etc.  The  actors  covered  by  the  DSA  are  technical  intermediaries  (such  as  internet 
access  providers),  hosting  service  providers  (which  include  advertising  servers),  online 
platforms  (that  disseminate  content  to  the  public)  as  well  as  very  large  online  platforms 
(VLOPs) that have more than 45 million  monthly  active users in the EU. The  DSA’s rules 
differ  according  to  the  size  of  the  economic  actors,  with  VLOPs  being  subject  to  extra 
obligations.  

internal  market,  and  clarifies 

447 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Single Market For Digital Services (Digital 
Services 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
Directive 
content/en/TXT/?qid=1608117147218&uri=COM%3A2020%3A825%3AFIN  

2000/31/EC 

amending 

Act) 

and 

154 

 
 
                                                           
155 

A subset of the DSA’s provisions address online targeting by this sector. The rules are aimed 
to  make  sure  that  users  receive  more  information  to  help  them  make  informed  decisions 
online, and better protect their rights. This added transparency is also intended to enable the 
scrutiny by authorities and vetted researchers on how advertisements are displayed and how 
they  are  targeted.  Article  2(d)  of  the  DSA  defines  advertisement  in  the  online  domain  as 
“information  designed  to  promote  the  message  of  a  legal  or  natural  person,  irrespective  of 
whether  to  achieve  commercial  or  non-commercial  purposes,  and  displayed  by  an  online 
platform  on  its  online  interface  against  remuneration  specifically  for  promoting  that 
information”. 

In  addition  to  the  requirements  resulting  from  Article  6  of  the  e-Commerce  Directive,  all 
online platforms would be required448 by the DSA to ensure that the recipients of the service 
receive individualised information so that they can identify, for each specific advertisement 
displayed to each individual recipient, in a clear and unambiguous manner and in real time: 

 
that the information displayed is an advertisement; 
 
the (natural or legal) person on whose behalf the advertisement is displayed; and 
  meaningful information about the main parameters used to determine the recipient to 

whom the advertisement is displayed (for targeted advertising). 

VLOPs would have to comply with additional rules as set out in Section 4 of the DSA and in 
particular  would  have  to  compile  and  make  publicly  available  through  application 
programming  interfaces  (APIs)  a  repository  containing  certain  information.  The  repository 
would have to contain at least: the content of the advertisement; the person on whose behalf 
the  advertisement  is  displayed;  the  period  during  which  the  advertisement  was  displayed; 
whether the advertisement was intended to be displayed specifically to one or more particular 
groups of recipients of the service and if so, the main parameters used; the total number of 
recipients  reached  and,  where  applicable,  aggregate  numbers  for  the  group  or  groups  of 
recipients to whom the advertisement was targeted specifically.  

The Commission would have to support and promote the development of voluntary industry 
standards  to  ensure  the  interoperability  of  these  repositories.  The  Commission  would  also 
have to encourage and facilitate the development of codes of conduct at EU level to support 
and  complement  the  transparency  obligations  relating  to  advertisements  with  transparency 
obligations that would go beyond the imposed rules. 

The  DSA  proposal  sets  a  high  standard  of  transparency  and  accountability  on  how  the 
providers  of  platforms  moderate  content,  on  advertising  and  on  algorithmic  processes.  It 
provides  obligations  to  assess  the  risks  their  systems  pose  to  develop  appropriate  risk 
management  tools  to  protect  against  systemic  risks,  including  risks  to  the  integrity  of  their 
services being compromised by manipulative techniques. Additionally, the DSA will set out a 
co-regulatory backstop, including building on existing voluntary initiatives such as the Code 
of Practice on disinformation. 

The DSA proposal  is  without prejudice to,  and builds  on the liability rules for providers of 
intermediary  services  set  out  in  the  e-Commerce  Directive  –  by  now  established  as  a 
foundation  of  the  digital  economy  and  instrumental  to  the  protection  of  fundamental  rights 
online. The DSA being a Regulation, it harmonises those rules; it also clarifies some aspects 

448 Article 24 of the DSA proposal. 

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of  those  rules  to  eliminate  existing  disincentives  towards  voluntary  own-investigations 
undertaken by providers of intermediary services to ensure their users’ safety and to clarify 
their role from the perspective of consumers in certain circumstances. Those clarifications are 
intended to help smaller, innovative providers scale up and grow by benefitting from greater 
legal  certainty.  The  DSA  also  addresses  new  information  asymmetries  and  risks  that  have 
arisen  since  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Directive  and  were  thus  not  adequately  addressed 
therein, including in the area of online advertising systems (though only with regard to large 
platforms).  The  new  common  framework  of  requirements  applicable  to  certain  information 
society services (intermediaries) devised by the DSA goes well beyond the basic framework 
provided  by  the  E-commerce  Directive,  but  the  core  framework  for  the  functioning  of  the 
single  market  and  the  supervision  of  digital  services  is  already  set  in  the  e-Commerce 
Directive;  the  Directive’s  basic  structure  for  a  general  cooperation  mechanism  among 
Member  States  is  superseded  in  the  context  of  DSA  obligations  by  the  cooperation 
mechanism foreseen under the DSA. 

Governance 

The  Member  States  where  the  provider  is  mainly  established  would  be  in  charge  of 
enforcement of the rules under the DSA. Member States would have to designate one or more 
competent  authorities who would be responsible for the application and enforcement of the 
rules. One of these competent authorities would have to be designated as the Digital Service 
Coordinator  (DSC)  at  the  national  level.  DSCs  would  be  given  a  set  of  far-reaching 
investigation  and  enforcement  powers  (including  power  to  request  information,  on-site 
inspections, power to accept commitments from providers and to make them binding, to order 
the cessation of infringements and to  impose  fines). Were systemic  risks emerge  across the 
Union  (in  the  case  of  VLOPs),  the  proposed  Regulation  provides  for  supervision  and 
enforcement  at  Union  level.  For  VLOPs,  the  proposal  sets-out  an  enhanced  supervision 
system,  whereby  the  DSC  of  the  country  of  establishment  could  be  asked  either  by  the 
Commission  or  by  a  newly  created  European  Board  for  Digital  Services  to  investigate  a 
suspected infringement. Where infringements persist, the Commission could itself intervene 
and  the  DSC  would  be  removed  from  the  case.  The  DSA  further  provides  for  enhanced 
cooperation  among  national  DSCs,  to  guarantee  effective  oversight  and  enforcement.  The 
proposal  sets  clear  responsibilities  for  the  Member  State  supervising  the  compliance  of 
service  providers  established  in  its  territory  with  the  obligations  set  by  the  proposed 
Regulation.  

Additional  jurisdiction  rules:  The  general  rules  of  jurisdiction  of  the  DSA  follow  the  e-
Commerce  Directive’s  internal  market  clause  (see  below)  as  well  as  limited  liability 
principle.  The  DSA  adapts  the  e-Commerce  directive,  but  then  proposes  an  asymmetric 
framework of due diligence obligations and a common framework for enforcement.  

Space for action under the present initiative 

The  DSA  addresses  the  responsibilities  of  a  sector.  In  contrast,  the  issues  identified  in  this 
impact assessment with respect to political advertising are specific to this particular service, 
not  to  a  sector  in  general,  and  while  political  advertising  can  involve  a  range  of  diverse 
services,  its  specific  national  regulation  stems  from  the  role  that  political  ads  play  in  the 
political system. Horizontal legislation of general application is not suitable for this purpose. 

The DSA will require online platforms to label ads and provide certain information about the 
advertiser, extending the scope of requirements provided by the e-Commerce Directive to all 

156 

 
 
157 

types  of  ads,  beyond  commercial  ads.  The  DSA  is  therefore  highly  relevant  for  the 
transparency  in  political  ads  initiative  as  it  will  introduce  a  number  of  relevant  or 
overlapping obligations for online platforms that publish ads (including political ads) on their 
interfaces, as well as some due diligence obligations. The political ads initiative is designed 
to articulate with the proposed provisions of the DSA, and rely on the transparency measures 
that this instrument will introduce:449 options 1 and 2 introduce sectoral specification within 
this framework, as well as certain analogous measures addressing offline actors.  

However, the DSA was conceived to address a different issue, and its scope is different.  In 
particular, the obligations the DSA introduces do not address the specificities of political ads, 
especially regarding the substantive transparency that is needed. The DSA alone would not be 
sufficient  to  fully  address  the  problem  tackled  by  the  political  ads  initiative,  as  it  will  not 
cover  all  the  data  required  for  political  accountability  (depending  on  the  policy  option 
adopted, the present initiative may for instance require the disclosure of the amount of money 
spent on the ad or of the affiliation with a campaign). The DSA does not require that political 
ad spending is retained or provided to a broad range of interested actors – something needed 
and  foreseen  under  the  present  initiative  –  and,  similarly,  the  DSA  does  not  require  ad 
publishers to  publish reports on the amounts spent  on political  advertising, including on its 
targeting,  aggregated  to  specific  actors  of  interest,  whereas  the  initiative  foresees  this  – 
aggregated to campaign or candidate.  

Further, the DSA’s transparency requirements will fall upon a range of economic actors that 
is too narrow, instead of falling upon all the relevant actors and intermediaries of the adtech 
sector described in Annex 6; these transparency requirements will therefore not apply to the 
full range of political ads that can be encountered online, especially on third party websites 
which are not online platforms. In contrast, the political ads initiative will apply to a broader 
range  of  actors,  and  in  particular  will  require  the  relevant  data  to  be  transmitted  along  the 
chain of intermediaries involved in the provision of political ads, so as to ensure that the last 
actor of the chain is able to provide the adequate level of transparency to those viewing the 
ad.  It  will also  require (under Policy Option  2) that  ad publishers  who publish ads on their 
app, platform, website or other online service will make available ex ante (i.e. alongside the 
ad)  information  regarding  the  advertising  brokers  whose  adverts  they  carry,  with  an 
indication of their use of personal data and the qualities of the data used for targeting (such as 
location,  language,  age,  gender,  and  other  relevant  information  used),  and  links  to  an 
independent assessment of their compliance with relevant norms and of the risks posed to the 
democratic  debate  and  fair  elections.  Further,  the  initiative  will  also  apply  to  offline  actors 
involved in the broader process as well as to political parties (to a certain extent), whereas the 
DSA’s scope excludes them.450 

To put it differently: 

The DSA currently obliges VLOPs to disclose to a data subject viewing an ad, and to anyone 
looking in the ad repository, information about: the person on whose behalf the advertisement 
is  displayed;  meaningful  information  about  the  main  parameters  used  to  determine  the 

449 See the table “Detail of envisaged obligations introduced under solutions 1 and 2, alongside those anticipated for the DSA 
(baseline).” 
450 Which can be covered by national measures or the AVMSD. 

157 

 
 
 
                                                           
158 

recipient to whom the advertisement is displayed; the period during which the advertisement 
was displayed; whether the advertisement was intended to be displayed specifically to one or 
more particular  groups of recipients  of the service and if so, the main  parameters used;  the 
total number of recipients reached and, where applicable, aggregate numbers for the group or 
groups of recipients to whom the advertisement was targeted specifically. 

The  political  ads  initiative  will  oblige  the  publication  of  information  about:  the  political 
affiliation of the ad; the money spent on it and its source; the chain of actors involved in the 
preparation, placement and dissemination of the ad. It will also codify the elements about the 
targeting which are either implicit in the GDPR or indicated as desirable in EDPB Guidance, 
in  particular  requiring  the  publication  of:  the  inclusion  and  exclusion  parameters  used;  the 
means by which these parameters were established; the targeting methods used; the use and 
nature of third party analytical services; the source of the personal data used, and in particular 
a  notice  when  the  data  was  derived,  inferred,  and/or  provided  by  a  third  party.  The  above 
information will be made available to all individuals to whom a political ad is displayed (not 
just for publishers that are VLOPs), as well as in the DSA’s VLOPs’ ad repositories, and to 
interested actors who requests such information from other ad publishers.  

By creating the special category of political ads, the initiative enables research and scrutiny 
into  political  ads  to  a  scale  and  extent  not  possible  with  the  DSA  alone.  Further,  the  DSA 
foresees  special  access  to  VLOPs’  data  by  vetted  researchers,  whereas  the  political  ads 
initiative also foresees access by others, such as accredited election observers, journalists and 
Civil Society Organisations. 

In conclusion, compared to the DSA the present initiative foresees additional measures on the 
type  of  data  and  information  to  be  provided  on  the  face  of  political  ads  –  and  in  the  ad 
repositories, where applicable – and broadens the range of actors upon which the obligations 
are  imposed.  With  its  harmonised  obligations  regarding  political  ads,  the  present  initiative 
enables  research  and  scrutiny  into  political  ads  to  a  scale  and  extent  not  possible  with  the 
DSA alone – particularly by interested actors such as journalists, academics and civil society.  

Delta – obligations under the DSA and under the proposal: 

The DSA currently obliges VLOPs to disclose to a data subject viewing an ad, and to anyone 
looking in the ad repository, information about: the person on whose behalf the advertisement 
is  displayed;  meaningful  information  about  the  main  parameters  used  to  determine  the 
recipient to whom the advertisement is displayed; the period during which the advertisement 
was displayed; whether the advertisement was intended to be displayed specifically to one or 
more particular  groups of recipients  of the service and if so, the main  parameters used;  the 
total number of recipients reached and, where applicable, aggregate numbers for the group or 
groups of recipients to whom the advertisement was targeted specifically. 

The  political  ads  initiative  will  oblige  the  publication  of  information  about:  the  political 
affiliation of the ad; the money spent on it and its source; the chain of actors involved in the 
preparation, placement and dissemination of the ad. It will also codify the elements about the 
targeting which are either implicit in the GDPR or indicated as desirable in EDPB Guidance, 
in  particular  requiring  the  publication  of:  the  inclusion  and  exclusion  parameters  used;  the 
means by which these parameters were established; the targeting methods used; the use and 
nature of third party analytical services; the source of the personal data used, and in particular 

158 

 
 
 
a  notice  when  the  data  was  derived,  inferred,  and/or  provided  by  a  third  party.  The  above 
information will be made available to all individuals to whom a political ad is displayed (not 
just for publishers that are VLOPs), as well as in the DSA’s VLOPs’ ad repositories, and to 
anyone who requests such information from other (smaller) publishers.  

The key additions made by the political ads initiative are highlighted in the delta table below: 

159 

159 

 
 
Operators  which 
be 
have 
to 
transparent 
on 
political ads: 

Information 
about  the  ad  in 
the ad and in the 
repository: 

- VLOPs 

DSA 

The ad would need to ensure that the recipient 
can identify : 
the 
advertisement; 

information  displayed 

is  an 

- that 

- the 

person 

on  whose 
advertisement is displayed; 

behalf 

the 

- meaningful  information  about  the  main 
parameters  used  to  determine  the  recipient 
to whom the advertisement is displayed. 

The  repository  would  in  addition  have  to 
contain at least: 

- the content of the advertisement; 
- the  period  during  which  the  advertisement 

was displayed; 

- whether the advertisement was intended to 
be  displayed  specifically  to  one  or  more 
particular  groups  of  recipients  of 
the 
service and if so, the main parameters used; 
- the total number of recipients reached and, 
where  applicable,  aggregate  numbers  for 
the group or groups of recipients to whom 
the advertisement was targeted specifically. 

Special access : 

To vetted researchers 

160 

Political ads proposal 
- All publishers of political ads – VLOPs, but also smaller platforms, third party websites, apps, 
TV and radio broadcasters etc. 
- Not only publishers, but also intermediaries involved in the preparation and dissemination of 
political ads. 

 The ad and the repository would have to contain at least information on: 

- the advertiser and (where different) sponsor of the political ad; 
-  the  amounts  invoiced  for  the  services  in  terms  of  preparation,  placement  and  dissemination 
(including specifically targeting): exact amount per ad, and aggregated amount per campaign; 
- the sources of these financial means; 
- any relevant campaign or party to which the advertisement is affiliated, and where possible an 
URL link to official sources of information; 
-  the  identification  of  the  full  chain  of  operators  involved  in  the  preparation,  placement  and 
dissemination of the advertisement, as well as their role; 
- where the main or sole focus of the ad service being paid for relates to the promotion of existing 
(e.g.  user-generated)  content  (in  users’  social  media  feeds,  sponsored  search  results  etc.)  –  a 
description of the effect of this promotion (amplification); 

-  the  information  on  targeting  pursuant  to  the  GDPR  (see  delta  table  GDPR  below),  but 
specifically: 

- the inclusion and exclusion parameters used,  
- the means by which these parameters were established,  
- the targeting methods used, and particularly the use and characteristics of look-alike audience 
and similar techniques,  
- the use and nature of third party analytical services,  
-  the  categories  of  personal  data  used  for  the  targeting  and  for  the  elaboration  of  the 
targeting method,  
- the source of the personal data used, and in particular a notice when the data was derived, 
inferred, and/or provided by a third party; 

To  vetted  researchers,  elections  observers,  accredited  journalists,  registered  civil  society 
organisations, and political actors. 

160 

 
 
 
 
 
 
161 

9.2 The Digital Markets Act (DMA proposal)451 

The proposed Digital Markets Act (DMA) would apply to Core Platform Services  designated 
by the Commission as  gatekeepers, which are offered to business user or end-users that are 
located  in  the  EU,  irrespective  of  the  place  of  residence/establishment  of  the  gatekeeper. 
These Core Platform Services would be listed in an exhaustive manner in the proposed DMA 
and include for instance: online intermediation services; online search engines; online social 
networking  services;  video-sharing  platform  service;  number-independent  interpersonal 
communication  services;  and  advertising  services,  including  advertising  intermediation 
services, as long as they are offered by providers of the above services. 

Under  the  DMA,  gatekeeper  platforms  would  have  to  submit  to  the  Commission  an 
independently audited description of any consumer profiling techniques they use. They would 
also not be allowed to combine personal data sourced from these core platform services with 
personal  data from  any  other services offered by the gatekeeper or with  personal  data from 
third-party  services,  unless  the  end  user  has  been  presented  with  the  specific  choice.  This 
could  limit  the  ability  of  gatekeeper  platforms  to  engage  in  targeted  and  personalised 
advertising which draw on data from multiple sources.  

The other rules are mainly aimed at providing more transparency in the relationship between 
business users, i.e. between the gatekeepers and the advertisers and publishers:  

  Gatekeepers would also have to provide information to advertisers and publishers (if 
they  ask  for  it)  on  the  price  paid  by  each  of  them,  as  well  as  the  amount  or 
remuneration paid to the publisher, for the publishing of a given ad and for each of the 
relevant advertising services provided by the gatekeeper;  

  Gatekeepers  could  also  be  asked  to  provide  advertisers  and  publishers,  upon  their 
request  and  free  of  charge,  with  access  to  the  performance  measuring  tools  of  the 
gatekeeper and the information  necessary  for advertisers and publishers  to  carry out 
their own independent verification of the ad inventory; and 

  Gatekeepers  shall  also  refrain  from  engaging  in  self-preferencing  in  relation  for 
instance  to  the  ranking  of  their  products  and  services  compared  to  products  and 
services of third parties. 

Governance 

The  European  Commission  would  be  the  competent  regulatory  body  to  enforce  the  DMA. 
The  Commission  would  have  the  power  to  develop,  through  delegated  and  implementing 
acts, further aspects of the DMA, such as the list of gatekeepers’ obligations. It would have 
the power to request information from all undertakings, conduct on-site inspections and order 
interim  measures.  The  Commission  could  also  make  binding  commitments  proposed  by 
gatekeepers.  In  case  of  non-compliance  or  of  infringements,  the  Commission  could  impose 
fines. 

Space for action under the present initiative 

The  DMA  therefore  puts  forward  information  obligations  for  gatekeepers  toward  their 
business  users,  including  with  regard  to  political  advertising.  The  existence  of  these 

451 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on contestable and fair markets in the digital 
sector (Digital Markets Act). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2020%3A842%3AFIN  

161 

 
 
                                                           
162 

obligations, as well as the existing mechanisms for the provision of information, is relevant 
for, and taken into consideration in the transparency in political ads initiative – although the 
scope of the DMA provisions is limited to a very narrow range of actors. 
9.3. ePrivacy452 and the GDPR453 

Political  targeted  advertising  is  based  on  the  tracking  of  online  activities  and  processing  of 
personal  data.    The  GDPR  and  ePrivacy  Directive  currently  regulating  such  activities.  The 
Commission issued in 2018 a guidance on the application of data protection requirements in 
the electoral context including on micro-targeting454. 

The  ePrivacy  Directive  contains  rules  protecting  the  terminal  equipment  of  end  users. 
Accordingly, storing information and gaining access to information already stored in terminal 
equipment  of  a  subscriber/user  (e.g.  cookies  on  a  computer)  requires  the  prior  informed 
consent of subscribers irrespective of any qualification of personal data of these information. 
There  is  therefore  de  facto  an  opt-in  requirement  regarding  tracking455  for  the  purpose  of 
targeted advertising.  

A new ePrivacy Regulation is currently being negotiated, and the Council’s general approach 
allows further processing for compatible purposes, provided that, inter alia the information is 
not  used  to  determine  user  characteristics  or  to  build  profiles.456  The  proposed  Regulation 
also  explicitly  mentions  that  the  concept  of  direct  marketing  includes  ‘messages  sent  by 
political parties that contact natural persons via electronic communications services in order 
to promote their parties’, and ‘messages sent by other non-profit organisations to support the 
purposes of the organisation’. Further, it also states the necessity “to prohibit the masking of 
the  identity  and  the  use  of  false  identities”  while  sending  unsolicited  commercial 
communications for direct marketing purposes. 

The  e-Privacy  Directive  already  prohibits  unsolicited  communications  for  the  purpose  of 
direct marketing without the person’s prior consent; however, it leaves open whether political 
advertising  also 
the  definition  of  direct  marketing;  some  national 
implementations of the Directive (such as the Dutch457 or the UK458) clearly indicate that this 
is nationally the case. 

falls  within 

Under  the  e-privacy  Directive,  Member  States  must  ensure  that  the  competent  national 
authority and, where relevant, other national bodies have the necessary investigative powers 
and  resources,  including  the  power  to  obtain  any  relevant  information  they  might  need  to 
monitor  and  enforce  national  provisions  adopted  pursuant  to  this  Directive.  Under  the 
proposed  e-Privacy  regulation,  the  authorities  in  charge  would  be  the  same  as  under  the 
GDRP, the relevant elements of which will now be outlined. 

452  Directive  2002/58/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  12  July  2002  concerning  the  processing  of 
personal  data  and  the  protection  of  privacy  in  the  electronic  communications  sector  (Directive  on  privacy  and  electronic 
communications) http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2002/58/2009-12-19   
453 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons  with  regard  to  the  processing  of  personal  data  and  on  the  free  movement  of  such  data,  and  repealing  Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation). http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj  
454 See the 2018 electoral package. 
455  Article  29  Data  Protection  Working  Party,  2010,  Opinion  2/2010  on  online  behavioural  advertising,  22  June  2010, 
WP171,  p.  25.  Also  European  Data  Protection  Board,  2020,  Guidelines  8/2020  on  the  targeting  of  social  media  users,  2 
September 2020, pp. 19-21. 
456 General approach of the Council, Article 8(1)(h)(iii). 
457 Article 11.7 paragraph 1 Telecommunications Act. 
458 Information Commissioner’s Office, ‘Guidance on political campaigning’, 2018, p. 6. 

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While  cookies  may  be  placed  and  accessed  according  to  the  ePrivacy  Directive,  the 
subsequent  processing  operations  on  personal  data  triggers  application  of  the  GDPR  rules. 
The GDPR requires that all data processing operations respect the principles of: 

 

lawfulness,  fairness  and  transparency:  in  addition  to  being  processed  lawfully, 
personal  data  must  be  used  in  a  way  that  is  fair,  i.e.  is  not  unduly  detrimental, 
unexpected  or  misleading  to  the  individuals  concerned,  and  must  be  done  in  a  way 
which  is  clear,  open  and  honest  –  transparency  is  an  overarching  principle,  with 
detailed provision on the ‘right to be informed’ and its modalities. 

  purpose  limitation:  the  GDPR  requires  controllers  to  collect  personal  data  for 
specified,  explicit  and  legitimate  purposes  and  not  further  process  that  data  in  a 
manner  incompatible  with  those  purposes.  The  GDPR  also  limits  the  processing  of 
personal data a new purpose other than that for which the data was collected, where 
this is not based on consent or on a clear obligation or function set out in law; in these 
cases the controller must assess whether processing for the new purpose is compatible 
with the original purpose. 

  data minimisation: the personal data shall be adequate, relevant and limited to what is 

necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed. 

  accuracy:  every  reasonable  step  must  be  taken  to  ensure  that  personal  data  that  are 
inaccurate,  including  letting  data  subjects  verify  themselves  and  erase  or  rectify 
inaccurate data they may have been associated with (e.g. through profiling).459 

  storage limitation: personal data shall be  kept in a form which permits identification 
of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the personal 
data are processed. 
integrity and confidentiality: personal data shall be processed in a manner that ensures 
appropriate security of the personal data, including protection against unauthorised or 
unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction or damage. 

 

  accountability: the data controller is responsible for, and must be able to demonstrate, 

compliance with the above principles and with the rest of the GDPR.  

Respect  of  these  core  principles  may  be  particularly  challenging460  –  but  also  particularly 
important – in the context of political targeted advertising. Beyond these fundamental axioms 
which are of particular relevance to the political ads initiative, the GDPR comprises further 
specific rules, delineated below. 

Lawfulness. The GDPR requires that data processing operations rely on one of the limitative 
legal grounds provided in its Article 6 and, with regard to the processing of personal data for 
the  purposes  of  (political)  targeted  advertising,  interpretative  guidelines  adopted  at  the  EU 
level  indicate  that  the  consent  of  the  data  subject  is  in  practice  the  only  appropriate  legal 
basis.461 Consent is presumed not to be freely given (and to therefore be invalid) if it does not 
allow  separate  consent  to  be  given  to  different  personal  data  processing  operations  despite 
this  being  appropriate,  or  if  the  provision  of  a  service  is  dependent  on  the  consent  despite 

459 Article 29 Working Party, 2018, Guidelines on automated decision-making and profiling for the purposes of Regulation 
2016/679, WP251 rev.01, pp17-18. 
460 Blasi and Vermeulen, “Reflections on the murky legal practices of political micro-targeting from a GDPR perspective,” 
International Data Privacy Law, 2021 (forthcoming). https://doi.org/10.1093/idpl/ipab018  
461 European Data Protection Board Guidelines 8/2020 on the targeting of social media users, 2 September 2020, paragraphs 
56, 65 and 66; and European Commission Guidance on the application of Union data protection law in the electoral context, 
A contribution from the European Commission to the Leaders’ meeting in Salzburg on 19-20 September 2018. https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52018DC0638  

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such  consent  not  being  necessary  for  such  performance.  Further,  even  if  the  processing  of 
personal  data  is  based  on  consent  of  the  data  subject,  this  would  not  legitimize  targeting 
which is disproportionate or unfair.462  

Special categories of data. The targeting of political or issue-based ads is likely to involve the 
processing of sensitive (or special) personal data, a category which includes data relating to 
political  opinions  (as  well  as  relating  to  racial  or  ethnic  origin,  religious  or  philosophical 
beliefs,  or  trade  union  membership).  There  is  a  general  prohibition  from  processing  such 
data; there are exemptions to this prohibition, the most relevant of which are the data subject 
having  given  explicit  consent  to  the  processing  of  those  personal  data  for  one  or  more 
specified purposes, or (for political parties) having a substantial public interest in compiling 
people’s  political  opinions,  provided  this  is  laid  down  in  Union  or  Member  State  law  and 
provided  that  appropriate  safeguards  are  established.463  In  the  absence  of  such  law,464  this 
means  that  the  prior,  explicit  consent  of  the  data  subject  is  required  in  order  to  deliver 
targeted  political  ads  –  except  where  Member  States  have  introduced  further  conditions  or 
limitations,  such  as  in  the  Spanish  Organic  Law  on  Protection  of  Personal  Data  and 
Guarantee of  Digital  Rights, which provides that  the prohibition  may not  be lifted with  the 
data subject’s consent. 

Automated decision-making. The targeting of political or issue-based ads is also a processing 
activity  that  is  likely  to  require  automated  decision-making  (if  not  for  the  attribution  of  a 
specific ad to a given individual, at least for their profiling). However, data subjects have the 
right  not  to  be  subject  to  a  decision  based  solely  on  automated  processing,  including 
profiling,  which  produces  legal  effects  concerning  them  or  similarly  significantly  affects 
them, unless such processing is carried out under strict conditions (in particular, with the data 
subject’s  explicit  consent).  Interpretative  guidelines  adopted  at  the  EU  level  indicate  that 
targeted  political  advertising  falls  into  this  processing  category  at  least  when:  it  has  the 
potential to significantly affect the circumstances, behaviour or choices of the individuals; it 
has a prolonged or permanent impact on the individual; it involves intrusive tracking and/or 
profiling; it exploits knowledge of the vulnerabilities of the data subjects targeted.465 Given 
the significance of the exercise of the democratic right to vote, personalised messages which 
have for instance the possible effect to stop individuals from voting or to make them vote in a 
specific  way  could  have  the  potential  of  meeting  the  criterion  of  significant  effect  (to  be 
assessed by the data controller). Hence, in this regard too, the provision of targeted political 
ads likely in practice requires the explicit prior consent of those who are to view them. 

Right of access. Under the GDPR, the data subject has the right to obtain from the controller 
confirmation as to whether or not personal data concerning him or her are being processed, 
and, where that is the case, access to the personal data and the following information: (a) the 
purposes of the processing; (b) the categories of personal data concerned; (c) the recipients or 

462 European Data Protection Board Guidelines 8/2020 on the targeting of social media users, 2 September 2020, p18. 
463  GDPR  recital  56  and  article  9(2)(g).  Cf.  also  EDPS  Opinion  3/2018  on  online  manipulation  and  personal  data. 
https://edps.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publication/18-03-19_online_manipulation_en.pdf  
464 One such law existed in Spain, but it was partially struck down by the Spanish Constitutional Court for not foreseeing the 
adequate safeguards; parts of it remain, allowing the political parties to target people based on their sensitive data if such 
periods. 
data 
https://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/NotasDePrensaDocumentos/NP_2019_076/2019-1405STC.pdf  
465  Commission Guidance on the application of Union data protection law in the electoral context, A contribution from the 
European Commission to the Leaders’ meeting in Salzburg on 19-20 September 2018, pp7-8. And EDPB Guidelines of the 
European Data Protection Board on automated decision making, WP251rev.01 as last revised and adopted on 06.02.2018. 

(including 

accessible 

electoral 

publicly 

online), 

during 

is 

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categories of recipient to whom the personal data have been or will be disclosed; (d) where 
possible, the envisaged period for which the personal data will be stored, or, if not possible, 
the  criteria  used  to  determine  that  period;  (e)  the  existence  of  the  rights  to  rectification,  to 
erasure  and  to  object;  (f)  the  right  to  lodge  a  complaint  with  a  supervisory  authority;  (g) 
where the personal data are not collected from the data subject, any available information as 
to  their  source;  (h)  the  existence  of  automated  decision-making,  including  profiling,  and 
meaningful  information  about  the  logic  involved,  as  well  as  the  significance  and  the 
envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject.  

These  user-oriented  transparency  obligations  are  very  relevant  for  the  transparency  in 
political ads initiative, where there will be some overlap. To ensure full transparency in the 
broader context of targeted advertising, EDPB guidance indicates that controllers may want 
to  consider  implementing  a  mechanism  for  data  subjects  to  easily  check  their  profile, 
including details of the information and sources used to develop it.466 The data subject should 
be able to learn the identity of the entity that is targeting him or her with ads, and controllers 
should  moreover  facilitate  access  to  information  regarding  the  targeting,  including  the 
targeting criteria that were used and the segments into which the data subject has been placed. 
Joint controllership. Following CJEU Jurisprudence,467 those relying on a platform’s targeted 
advertising  services  to  run  ads,  and  who  thereby  decide  who  to  target  and  through  what 
means,  will likely be joint  controllers with  the platform,  with  the responsibilities that come 
with  this  role.  This  is  relevant  regarding  the  transparency  of  political  advertising  and  the 
accountability  of  the  various  actors  involved  in  the  process.  They  shall  in  a  transparent 
manner determine their respective responsibilities for compliance with the obligations under 
the GDPR, and their arrangement shall duly reflect the respective roles and relationships of 
the joint controllers vis-à-vis the data subjects. The data subjects should be able to learn from 
the  platform  the  identity  of  the  joint  controller  they  are  not  in  contact  with  (here,  the 
advertiser), the essence of the arrangement between the joint controllers, and how to exercise 
their rights, because they can exercise their rights in respect to and against each of them. 

Impact  assessment.  Where  a  type  of  processing,  in  particular  using  new  technologies,  and 
taking  into  account  the  nature,  scope,  context  and  purposes  of  the  processing,  is  likely  to 
result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the controller shall, prior to 
the processing, carry out an assessment of the impact of the envisaged processing operations 
on the protection of personal data (DPIA). A DPIA is required in particular in the case of a 
systematic and extensive evaluation of personal aspects relating to natural persons which is 
based  on  automated  processing,  including  profiling,  and  on  which  decisions  are  based  that 
produce legal effects concerning the natural person or similarly significantly affect the natural 
person – a condition which, as indicated above, some forms of targeted political ads are likely 
to fulfil.  

EDPB  guidance  highlights  the  fact  that  additional  risks  may  emerge  depending  on  the 
purposes  of  the  advertising  campaign  and  its  intrusiveness,  or  if  the  targeting  involves  the 
processing of observed, inferred or derived personal data.468 Risks need to be mitigated, and, 
where  not  possible,  the  authority  needs  to  be  consulted;  the  authority  can  always  request 
access to the documented DPIA.  

466 European Data Protection Board Guidelines 8/2020 on the targeting of social media users, 2 September 2020, p29. 
467 Wirtschaftsakademie, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Fashion ID. 
468 European Data Protection Board Guidelines 8/2020 on the targeting of social media users, 2 September 2020, p17. 

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Codes  of  conduct.  Further,  compliance  with  approved  codes  of  conduct  by  the  relevant 
controllers  or  processors  shall  be  taken  into  due  account  in  assessing  the  impact  of  the 
processing  operations  performed  by  such  controllers  or  processors,  in  particular  for  the 
purposes  of  a  data  protection  impact  assessment.  The  drawing  up  of  codes  of  conduct  is 
encouraged,  taking  account  of  the  specific  features  of  the  processing  sector  at  hand.  The 
GDPR  foresees  that  associations  and  other  bodies  representing  categories  of  controllers  or 
processors may prepare codes of conduct, or amend or extend such codes, for the purpose of 
specifying the application of the GDPR – to be approved by the authority. A code of conduct 
for  targeted  political  advertising  may  be  relevant  and  appropriate  as  foreseen  under  the 
present initiative. Similarly, a data protection certification mechanisms, seals and marks, may 
be established for the purpose of demonstrating compliance with the GDPR. 

Research.  The  GDPR  adapts  the  data  processing  rules  (i.e.  applies  some  derogations, 
provided appropriate safeguards are in place) where personal data are processed for scientific 
or  historical  research  purposes,  statistical  purposes  or  for  archiving  purposes  in  the  public 
interest.  The  rules  amount  to  a  special  regime  affording  a  degree  of  flexibility  for  genuine 
research  projects  that  operate  within  an  ethical  framework  and  aim  to  grow  society’s 
collective  knowledge  and  wellbeing.  This  is  highly  relevant  for  research  into  political  ads, 
including through the ad repository and its API which is foreseen both in the DSA and in the 
political ads initiative. 

International  transfers.  Finally,  the  GDPR  also  provides  a  framework  for  the  transfer  of 
personal data to non-EU/EEA countries; such transfers are allowed under certain conditions, 
such  as  the  third-country  being  the  beneficiary  of  an  adequacy  decision.  Of  particular 
relevance  for  online  political  ads  is  the  2020  CJEU  Schrems  II  decision469,  which  struck 
down  a  mechanism  allowing  transfers  of  personal  data  to  the  United  States  and  therefore 
required that controllers adduce other appropriate safeguards. Both the EU Commission and 
the US government and working on a successor instrument. This situation is relevant because 
the  online  platforms  involved  in  the  provision  of  targeted  ads,  as  well  as  many  of  the  ad 
exchanges  and  ad  intermediaries,  are  based  in  the  US  (or  require  data  transfers  thereto), 
which means that targeted political ads using their services can currently in a lot of cases be 
legally impossible. 

Governance 

Regarding the governance mechanism of the data protection rules, the GDPR foresees one or 
more  independent  public  authorities  (the  national  data  protection  authorities  (DPA))  with 
investigative, corrective, authorisation and advisory powers with regard to the application of 
the rules on its territory. National DPAs are to cooperate with each other where appropriate by 
sharing  information  and  providing  mutual  assistance.  Where  a  data  controller  operates  in 
multiple member states, the DPA of the Member State where it has its main establishment in 
is  the  lead  authority  for  the  cross-border  processing,  and  can  handle  the  case,  cooperating 
with the other authorities concerned (One-Stop-Shop mechanism). 

The GDPR also foresees the European Data Protection Board (EDPB), a body of the Union 
with  legal  personality,  which  is  represented  by  its  Chair,  and  composed  of  the  head  of  one 
supervisory authority of each Member State and of the European Data Protection Supervisor 

469  Judgement  of  the  Court  (Grand  Chamber)  of  16  July  2020,  Data  Protection  Commissioner  v  Facebook  Ireland  Ltd, 

Maximillian Schrems, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559. 

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(the  DPA  for  the  EU  Institutions).  Among  other  tasks,  the  EDPB  ensures  the  consistent 
application of the GDPR through coordinated decisions, guidelines and recommendations.  

Space for action under the present initiative 

This  initiative  will  build  on  the  data  protection  acquis  and  on  the  governance  structures 
established by the GDPR and e-Privacy. No derogations from existing structure are envisaged 
and complementarity will be ensured. Part of the rationale for the additional rules under the 
initiative is that the GDPR and ePrivacy, while very relevant, do not address all the aspects of 
political ads that need to be harmonised or addressed according to the problem-definition in 
the impact assessment. 

More  transparency  is  required  for  political  ads  than  is  provided  under  the  privacy  and  data 
protection rules. Transparency is user-oriented in the latter, whereas political ads also call for 
transparency  toward  society  at  large  (e.g.  through  publicly-accessible  ad  repositories,  and 
publicly-available DPIAs). Further, and as indicated already by the authority who is the lead 
DPA  for  an  important  proportion  of  the  controllers  involved  in  online  advertising,  “data 
protection  law  does  not  mandate  the  provision  of  information  which  is  crucial  to  fair  and 
transparent online political advertising, including the source of funding for an advertisement 
in either an online or offline context.470  

The  accountability  principle  requires  that  data  controllers  be  able  to  demonstrate  its 
compliance with the GDPR, and this accountability is overseen by the DPAs. However, given 
there  is  a  strong  democratic  aspect  to  the  issues  related  to  political  advertising  and  its 
targeting, it is necessary that the wider democratic society be, too, able to exercise some form 
of scrutiny. This is why any DPIA conducted on the targeting aspect of the data processing 
needs  to  be  available  to  the  public,  not  just  to  the  DPAs  on  demand.  That  is,  both 
transparency  and  accountability  need  to  be  public-oriented  in  the  context  of  political 
advertising. 

Further, not  all political  ads involve the processing of personal data, for instance where the 
advertisement  is  not  targeted  (e.g.  contextual  advertising).  The  data  protection  rules,  while 
very  relevant,  are  not  sufficient  to  address  the  whole  range  of  political  ads.  Related  to  this 
aspect is the initiative’s goal of bringing as much harmonisation and clarity as possible in the 
offline environment too. A timely example of ‘offline’ political targeting is the 2018 decision 
of  the  UK’s  DPA  (the  Information  Commissioner’s  Office)  involving  “Emma’s  Diary,”471 
where  transparency  requirements  beyond  those  resulting  from  data  protection  rules  would 
have been appropriate. 

in 

470  Submission  of  the  Irish  Data  Protection  Commission  to  the  Parliament  consultation  regarding  the  proposal  for  a 
Regulation  of  Online  Political  Advertising 
Ireland,  2021,  p5.  https://assets.gov.ie/3709/041218154738-
73333d7db148411ab052af6a6352bb1f.pdf  
471 The ICO fined Lifecycle Marketing (Mother and Baby) Ltd, known as “Emma’s Diary”, £140,000 for illegally collecting 
and selling personal information of more than one million individuals. Emma’s Diary, which provides advice on pregnancy 
and  childcare,  sold  the  information  to  a third party  data  broker  for use  by  the  UK  Labour Party. On  foot  of  this,  the  data 
broker created a database which the Labour party used to profile new mothers in advance of the 2017 General Election. The 
Labour Party  was  able  to  profile  and  send  political  ads, in  the  form  of  targeted  direct  mail,  to  mums  living  in  areas  with 
marginal seats – a purpose incompatible with the purpose for which the relevant personal data had initially been collected. 
The ICO found that Emma’s Diary’s privacy policy did not detail that personal data would be used for political marketing or 
by  political  parties.  https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2018/08/emma-s-diary-fined-140-000-
for-selling-personal-information-for-political-campaigning/    

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Also, while the obligations related to transparency address the facilitation of the monitoring 
and  enforcement  of  rules  relevant  to  data  protection  and  hence  an  aspect  of  the  issues 
connected to targeting – with in particular the different actors in the value chain having to be 
very transparent  about their use of targeting –  a further line in the transparency in political 
ads  initiative  specifically  addresses  targeting  beyond  its  transparency  dimension,  with 
limitations during certain periods or regarding certain techniques. 

Delta – obligations under the GDPR and under the proposal:  

The GDPR currently obliges data controllers to disclose to a data subject at the moment of 
first  collection,  and  then  on  request  information  about:  the  purposes  of  the  processing;  the 
categories of personal data concerned; the recipients or categories of recipient to whom the 
personal  data  have  been  disclosed;  where  the  personal  data  are  not  collected  from  the  data 
subject, any available information as to their source; and the existence of automated decision-
making, including profiling, and meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as 
the significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject. Data 
controllers  may,  according  to  non-binding  EDPB  guidance  on  targeting,  also  offer 
information  about:  how  they  have  been  profiled;  what  data  is  processed;  who  is  targeting 
them; and what criteria are being used and what segments they are placed into. However, this 
is  in  practice  often  not  done.  The  above  information  is  only  made  available  to  the  data 
subject.  

The  political  ads  initiative  will  oblige  the  publication  of  information  about:  the  political 
affiliation of the ad; the money spent on it and its source; the chain of actors involved in the 
preparation, placement and dissemination of the ad. It will also codify the elements about the 
targeting which are either implicit in the GDPR or indicated as desirable in EDPB Guidance, 
in  particular  requiring  the  publication  of:  the  inclusion  and  exclusion  parameters  used;  the 
means by which these parameters were established; the targeting methods used; the use and 
nature of third party analytical services; the source of the personal data used, and in particular 
a  notice  when  the  data  was  derived,  inferred,  and/or  provided  by  a  third  party.  The  above 
information will be made available to the data subject, but also to anyone who looks into the 
VLOPs’ ad repositories, and to interested actors upon request for other (smaller) publishers.  

The key additions made by the political ads initiative are highlighted in the table below: 

168 

 
 
 
 
 
169 

GDPR 

and 

Identity 
contact 
details of: 

Information 
on 
targeting: 

the 

- The data controller, its representative; 
- The data protection officer; 
-  The  joint  controller  where  applicable  [In  the  context  of  targeted 
advertising,  the  advertiser  will  sometimes  be  a  joined  controller,  and 
therefore  its  identity  is  already  to  be  disclosed  to  the  data  subject 
pursuant to the GDPR]; 
To the individual, during the first contact prior to the collection of the 
data, then upon request: 

Political ads proposal 
- the advertiser; 
- the sponsor of the advertising (where ≠ advertiser); 
- information regarding their place of establishment or residence;  

To the individual, directly accessible in a transparency notice available in 
each  ad;  but  also  to  everyone  through  a  repository  for  VLOPs,  and  to 
interested actors upon request for other publishers: 

- the purposes of the processing; 
- the categories of personal data concerned; 
-  the  recipients  or  categories  of  recipient  to  whom  the  personal  data 
have been disclosed; 
-  where  the  personal  data  are  not  collected  from  the  data  subject,  any 
available information as to their source; 
- the existence of automated decision-making, including profiling, and 
meaningful  information  about  the  logic  involved,  as  well  as  the 
significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing for the 
data subject (Article 15(h)). 

- who is targeting you with this specific ad [if ≠ joint controller];  
- the number of individuals expected to be reached by the ad; 
-  any  relevant  campaign  or  party  to  which  the  advertisement  is  affiliated, 
and where possible an URL link to official sources of information; 
-  the  identification  of  the  full  chain  of  operators  involved  in  the 
preparation,  placement  and  dissemination  of  the  advertisement,  as  well  as 
their role; 
-  the  amounts  invoiced  for  the  services  in  terms  of  preparation,  placement 
and dissemination; 
- the sources of these financial means; 

EDPB  guidance:  controllers  may  want  to  consider  implementing  a 
mechanism for data subjects to know: 
- how they have been profiled; 
- what data is processed (and what for, where does it come from, etc.); 
-  who  is  targeting  them  with  this  ad  [iff  that  person  is  also  a  joint 
controller, a priori]; 
-  what  criteria  are  being  used  and  what  segments  they  are  placed into 
[unclear whether per ad or in general]; 

-  the  info  on  targeting  codifying  elements  which  were  either  implicit  in  the 
GDPR or indicated as desirable in EDPB Guidance, specifically requiring: 

- the inclusion and exclusion parameters used,  
- the means by which these parameters were established,  
- the targeting methods used, 
- the use and nature of third party analytical services,  
-  the  categories  of  personal  data  used  for  the  targeting  and  for  the 
elaboration of the targeting method,  
-  the  source  of  the  personal  data  used,  and  in  particular  a  notice  when 
the data was derived, inferred, and/or provided by a third party. 

169 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policies 

- a data protection policy if you process personal data; 

Sensitive data  -  a  general  prohibition  from  processing  sensitive  data;  there  are 
exemptions to this prohibition, the most relevant of which are the data 
subject having given explicit consent to the processing of those personal 
data for one or more specified purposes, or (for political parties) having 
a  substantial  public  interest  in  compiling  people’s  political  opinions, 
provided this is laid down in Union or Member State law and provided 
that appropriate safeguards are established. 

170 

-  a  policy  specifically  on  the  internal  rules  of  the  service  provider regarding 
targeting and amplification, if they engage in such practices, and delineating 
the steps take to comply with the proposal; 
- annual reporting 
-  a  specific  prohibition  from  targeting  data  subjects  with  political  ads 
based  on  sensitive  data  and/or  based  on  too  small  of  a  threshold,  with 
exemptions. 

170 

 
 
 
9.4. The e-Commerce Directive (ECD)472 

The basic framework regulating the provision of digital services in the internal market is 
the 2000 E-Commerce Directive. The goal of that directive is to allow borderless access 
to  digital  services  across  the  EU  and  to  harmonise  the  core  aspects  for  such  services, 
including  information  requirements  and  online  advertising  rules,  as  well  as  setting  the 
framework  for  the  liability  regime  of  intermediary  services  –  categorised  as  ‘mere 
conduits’, ‘caching services’, and ‘hosting services’ – for third party content.  

The e-Commerce Directive applies to “information society services”. This refers to “any 
service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the 
individual  request  of  a  recipient  of  services”,  regardless  of  whether  the  recipient  is  a 
consumer or a trader. The concept  of  “commercial  communications”  is  defined broadly 
as  “any  form  of  communication  designed  to  promote,  directly  or  indirectly,  the  goods, 
services or image of a company, organisation or person pursuing a commercial, industrial 
or craft activity or exercising a regulated profession.” 

Freedom  to  provide  services  and  freedom  of  establishment.  Under  the  internal  market 
clause  of  Article  3,  the  provider  of  information  society  services  can  “freely”  offer  its 
service across the single market by complying with the rules of the country in which it is 
established (‘country of establishment’). In parallel, none of its host Member States (i.e. 
Member  States  where  it  provides  its  service;  ‘country  of  destination’)  can  require  the 
same service provider to comply with additional rules in this Member State. Thus, as a 
matter of principle, the information  society service provider  cannot  face  any  restriction 
from another Member State (except exceptionally and on a case-by-case basis, following 
the  principle  of  proportionality  and  a  limited  list  of  derogation  conditions  provided  in 
Article 3(4)). 

Measures  protecting  users  of  information  society  service.  The  e-Commerce  Directive 
lays  down  several  measures  that  seek  to  protect  users  (e.g.  consumers,  business  users, 
public  authorities)  by  harmonising  certain  obligations,  primarily  concerning 
identification and transparency requirements imposed on providers of information society 
services. They include:  

•  Obligation  on  the  information  society  service  provider  to  make  available  its 
identity,  name,  geographic  address,  and  details  enabling  rapid  contact,  relevant 
registration  information  (in  trade  or  similar  registers),  and  VAT  number  where 
relevant.  

• Obligation to clearly identify commercial communications designed to promote 
directly or indirectly the goods, services or image of a company, organisation or 
person pursuing a commercial, industrial or craft activity or exercising a regulated 
profession  as  well  as  the  natural  or  legal  person  on  behalf  of  whom  the 
commercial  communication  is  made.  Further,  commercial  ads  must  be  clearly 
identifiable as such (labelled), and the natural or legal person on whose behalf the 
commercial communication is made shall be clearly identifiable. 

472  Directive  2000/31/EC  of  the  European Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  8  June  2000  on  certain  legal  aspects  of 
information  society  services,  in  particular  electronic  commerce,  in  the  Internal  Market  ('Directive  on  electronic 
commerce'). http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2000/31/oj  

171 

 
 
 
                                                           
Governance 

The  e-Commerce  Directive  also  lays  down  basic  principles  seeking  to  ensure  effective 
cooperation between Member States and effective enforcement of the Directive, which is 
effectively to be carried out by the Member States. To this end, the Directive envisages 
that any sanction in case of a violation of the e-Commerce Directive should be effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive.  In addition,  the available national  court actions should be 
effective  allowing  for  the  rapid  adoption  of  corrective  measures,  including  interim 
measures.  The  Directive  also  envisages  and  encourages  cooperation  and  mutual 
assistance between Member States and with  the Commission for the implementation  of 
the Directive, in  particular through the establishment of national  contact points.  Such a 
cooperation is  particularly  relevant  in  view of the envisaged close cooperation between 
country  of  origin  and  country  of  destination  as  regards  implementation  of  the  internal 
market principle laid down in Article 3 of the Directive. Finally, the Directive encourages 
the use of alternatives enforcement instruments such as codes of conduct at the EU level 
or out-of-court dispute settlement schemes. 

Space for action under the present initiative 

The  e-Commerce  Directive’s  internal  market  clause  is  crucial  for  the  cross-border 
provision  of  services,  including  of  political  ads.  In  contrast  however,  there  is  space  for 
action  on  other  provisions,  as  the  information  provisions  are  limited  to  commercial 
communications, and the online advertising landscape has changed dramatically since the 
Directive was adopted. 
9.5. The Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD)473  

The  AVMSD  requires  that  Member  States  ensure  that  video-sharing  platform  services 
take  appropriate  measures  to  protect  minors  from  harmful  content,  and  to  protect  the 
general  public  from  illegal  hate  speech  and  content  whose  dissemination  constitutes  a 
criminal  offence under  Union law (related to  terrorism, child abuse images, racism and 
xenophobia) as well as measures to ensure compliance with commercial communications 
requirements  under  the  AVMSD.  The AVMSD  is  a  minimum  harmonisation  directive, 
meaning  that  the  Member  States  are  allowed  to  introduce  more  detailed  or  stricter 
provisions than the minimum set of rules it contains. 

The AVMSD  was  revised  in  2018  and  now  specifies  that  that  data  collected  by  video 
sharing  platforms  (a  category  which  includes  some  social  media  platforms)  to  protect 
children  may  not  be  processed  for  commercial  purposes,  such  as  for  direct  marketing, 
profiling  and  behaviourally  targeted  advertising.  This  rule  mirrors  the  one  which  is 
already  in  place  for  (linear  and  non-linear)  audiovisual  media  service  providers. 
Similarly,  platforms  now  need  to  make  sure  that  their  audiovisual  commercial 
communications  are  recognisable  as  such,474  does  not  cause  any  physical,  mental  or 
moral detriment to minors, and does not include or promote discrimination on the basis 
of  sex,  racial  or  ethnic  origin,  nationality,  religion  or  belief,  disability,  age  or  sexual 
orientation. The video sharing platforms in scope need to take “appropriate measures” to 
make  sure  that  audiovisual  commercial  communications  (a  wide  term  that  covers 

473  Directive  2010/13/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  10  March  2010  on  the  coordination  of 
certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of 
audiovisual 
version). 
media 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2010/13/oj    
474 The European Commission’s 2018 Recommendation on disinformation and elections includes the suggestion that 
member  states  can  ‘draw  inspiration’  from  the  AVMSD’s  rules  on  the  recognisability  of  audio-visual  commercial 
communications when considering how to ensure transparency in paid online political advertisements. 

(Audiovisual  Media 

Directive) 

(codified 

Services 

services 

172 

 
                                                           
television  advertising,  sponsorship,  teleshopping  and  product  placement)  also  comply 
with  these  rules  –  including  those  communications  that  are  not  marketed,  sold  or 
arranged by them. Having a functionality for uploaders to declare whether videos contain 
commercial  communications  (as  far  as  they  know  or  can  be  reasonably  expected  to 
know) is one of the foreseen potentially appropriate measure. 

Paid  political  advertising  is  not  covered  by  the  definition  of  audiovisual  commercial 
communications. However, the definition of user-generated video may apply to campaign 
videos  and  videos  containing  political  communication  uploaded  by  a  political  party  or 
group  on  a  video-sharing  platform,  where  this  type  of  organic  content  would  still  be 
covered by the rules of the AVMSD. 

Governance 

The assessment of whether the measures are appropriate needs to  be carried out  by the 
national  regulatory  authority  of  the  Member  State  where  the  video-sharing  platform  is 
established.  Availability  of  out-of-court  redress  needs  to  be  ensured  and,  for  the  rest 
(penalties and other sanctions), Member States should decide. A cooperation mechanism 
is envisaged between the country of origin of a media service provider and the country 
where one or some of its services are wholly or mostly targeted to, with a view to ensure 
that  certain  public  interest  obligations  in  that  latter  country  are  complied  with.  Such 
system of cooperation is subject to specific substantive and procedural requirements that 
do prevail over those provided by the e-Commerce Directive, with regard to the specific 
services  at  stake.  This  system  of  cooperation  applies  to  broadcasting  and  video  on 
demand service providers but not to video-sharing platform service providers. 

The cooperation mechanism set out in the AVMSD aims to ensure that such services do 
not purposely establish themselves in the territory of one Member State while targeting 
another Member State with the aim of avoiding the stricter regulation of the later when it 
comes to matters of general interest. The main purpose is thus to reinforce the country of 
origin  supervision  and  enforcement  of  the  rules  to  services  established  in  its  territory 
while  allowing  certain  role  for  the  targeted  Member  State  to  safeguard  certain  public 
interests. 

In  2014,  the  Commission  implemented  its  Decision  on  establishing  the  European 
Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services475 (ERGA) – an advisory body to the 
Commission. The group’s task is to advise and assist the Commission in its work, both to 
ensure a consistent implementation in all Member States of the regulatory framework for 
audiovisual media services; to any matter related to audiovisual media services within the 
Commission's competence. The ERGA was created specifically to facilitate a closer and 
more regular cooperation between the competent independent regulatory bodies in order 
to achieve a successful development of an internal market for audiovisual media services, 
notably  in  view  of  increased  cross-border  distribution  and  the  regulatory  challenges 
linked  to  on-demand  services.  The  role  of  ERGA  was  strengthened  with  the  revised 
AVMSD. 

475  Commission  Decision  on  establishing  the  European  Regulators  Group  for  Audiovisual  Media  Services,  2014. 
https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/commission-decision-establishing-european-regulators-group-
audiovisual-media-services  

173 

 
 
                                                           
9.6.  The  Unfair  Commercial  Practices  Directive  (UCPD)476  and  the  Regulation  on 
cooperation  between  national  authorities  responsible  for  the  enforcement  of  consumer 
protection laws (CPC Regulation)477  A strong consumer protection framework regulates 
the content of advertising, though political advertising rarely also falls within the scope 
of  commercial  advertising.  The  relevant  Directives  contain  provisions  and  elements 
which could be of general pertinence for political ads – such as transparency obligations, 
clauses  relating  to  actions  that  impair  the  consumer's  ability  to  make  an  informed 
decision, or relating to the exploitation of a specific misfortune or circumstance of such 
gravity  as  to  impair  the  consumer's  judgement.  However,  these  consumer  protection-
oriented rules focus on commercial practices and pecuniary or physical harm, hence do 
not apply to political ads. 

Since  these  consumer  protection  laws  are  Directives,  they  leave  to  Member  States  the 
governance aspect of the law. The CPC Regulationwas introduced in 2017 to address the 
“ineffective enforcement in cases of cross-border infringements, including infringements 
in  the  digital  environment.”  It  requires  Member  States  to  designate  one  or  more 
competent authorities and a single liaison office that are responsible for the application of 
the  Regulation.  The  national  liaison  office  is  responsible  for  coordinating  the 
investigation  and  enforcement  activities  of  the  competent  authorities.  It  also  foresees  a 
Mutual Assistance  Mechanism,  which  allows  national  competent  authorities  to  request 
information and enforcement measures from another national competent authority. There 
is  also  a  possibility  for  coordinated  investigation  and  enforcement,  for  widespread 
infringements  (especially  if  they  have  a  Union  Dimension).    Where  appropriate,  the 
competent authorities may invite Commission officials and other accompanying persons, 
who  have  been  authorised  by  the  Commission,  to  participate  in  the  coordinated 
investigations, enforcement actions and other measures. 

The  UCPD  prohibits  unfair  business-to-consumer  commercial  practices,  including 
misleading  and  aggressive  practices  occurring  in  information  society  services.  The 
concept of “commercial practices” is defined broadly: advertising and marketing related 
to products are expressly included, regardless of whether these activities are carried out 
online  or  offline.  This  Directive  complements  the  e-Commerce  Directive  and  ensures 
complementary protection of the users of the information society services when they act 
as  consumers,  i.e.  for  purposes  outside  their  trade,  business,  craft  or  profession. 
Transparency  and  requirements  on  commercial  communications  already  established  in 
the  E-Commerce  Directive  are  further  reinforced  by  this  Directive  –  e.g.  in  making 
clearly identifiable a sponsored result on a search engine. 

Misleading omissions may be qualified as unfair practices, especially when information 
requirements  prescribed  by  Union  Law  in  the  field  of  advertising  or  advertising  are 
violated  (a  non-exhaustive  list  of  which  is  contained  in  Annex  II  to  the  Regulation). 
Following  the  modifications  introduced  by  the  Better  Enforcement  Directive,  the  main 
parameters used for ranking of products and their importance are considered as material 
information under UPCD if the consumers have the possibility to search products on the 

the  European  Parliament  and  of 

476 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-
to-consumer  commercial  practices  in  the  internal  market  and  amending  Council  Directive  84/450/EEC,  Directives 
97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 
of 
the  Council  (‘Unfair  Commercial  Practices  Directive’).  https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02005L0029-20220528&from=EN  
477 Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 on cooperation 
between  national  authorities  responsible  for  the  enforcement  of  consumer  protection  laws  and  repealing  Regulation 
(EC) No 2006/2004  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32017R2394  

174 

 
                                                           
basis of a query.  Under the UCPD, consumers should therefore be informed of any paid 
advertisement  or  payment  specifically  for  achieving  higher  ranking  of  products  within 
the search results. 

Governance 

Adequate  and  effective  means  should  be  implemented  by  the  Member  States  to  ensure 
that the practices carried out on the market comply with the rules of the UCPD.  
9.8. The Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive478 

Under  the  Directive  on  misleading  and  comparative  advertising,  traders  are  protected 
against  misleading  advertising  (from  other  traders).  Advertising  directed  at  businesses 
that is deceptive and is likely to injure a competitor is prohibited.  

Governance 

Adequate and effective means should be implemented by the Member States.  
9.9. Consumer Rights Directive (CRD)479 

The CRD applies  to  the  conclusion of sales and  services  contracts,  between consumers 
and professional traders.  

The CRD ensures that consumers are provided with a minimum set of information before 
being bound by a contract with a professional trader. Among other things, the trader must 
provide  consumers  with  information  about  the  main  characteristics  of  the  goods  or 
services, the identity of the trader, the total price of the goods or services, etc.  

Following  the  modifications  introduced  by  the  Better  Enforcement  Directive,  the  CRD 
makes  it  mandatory  to  inform  consumers  when  prices  were  personalised  by  means  of 
automated  decision  making,  before  the  conclusion  of  a  distance  contract.  Since  prices 
may be automatically personalised in advertising materials displayed to consumers, this 
modification  of  the  CRD  may  be  of  relevance  for  commercial  ads  (and  hence  for 
commercial ads that are also political). In addition, if the contract is concluded on online 
marketplaces,  the  provider  must  inform  consumers  about  the  main  parameters  used  for 
the  ranking  of  offers  and  their  relative  importance.  The  burden  of  proof  is  upon  the 
traders, regarding their information obligations. 

Governance 

Adequate  and  effective  means  should  be  implemented  by  the  Member  States  to  ensure 
the compliance with the Directive.  
9.10. The Directive on services in the internal market480 

The  Services  Directive  establishes  general  provisions  facilitating  the  exercise  of  the 
freedom of establishment for service providers and the free movement of services. It is a 
Directive  mandating  Member  States  to  provide  the  right  conditions  for  allowing  cross-
border  services  in  the  EU,  by:  simplifying  administrative  procedures  for  access  to, 

advertising 

comparative 

478 Directive 2006/114/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 concerning misleading 
and 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32006L0114  
479  Directive  2011/83/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  25  October  2011  on  consumer  rights, 
amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
repealing  Council  Directive  85/577/EEC  and  Directive  97/7/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32011L0083  
480  Directive  2006/123/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  12  December  2006  on  services  in  the 
internal market (the Information Society Services Directive). http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2006/123/oj  

(codified 

version) 

175 

 
                                                           
provision and exercise of services; providing points of single contact for administrative 
requirements; and providing the necessary information. Member States must assist, and 
cooperate with each other to achieve the goals of the Directive. 

The Directive reminds Member States of the principle of free movement, while accepting 
inroads  when  free  movement  collides  with  other  public  interests.  However,  before 
making  such  encroachments,  authorities  have  to  verify  and  recognize  any  protection 
already provided in the country of origin  - under the mutual recognition principle, they 
need to take into account what takes place in other countries before proceeding. 

The Services Directive does not concern services providers that are online platforms and 
intermediaries, nor does it concern electronic communications services and networks (for 
which the ePrivacy Directive applies), audiovisual services and radio broadcasting. 

Space for action under the present initiative 

The Services Directive enables such providers to provide their services wherever in the 
Union they are established. The present initiative will not conflict with it; this Directive 
is relevant for the problem-definition of the present impact assessment, however, because 
its existence means that where such service providers are unable to provide their services 
across borders, it is not because they are not allowed, but for other reasons – e.g. because 
they are discouraged by the complexity and costs.  
9.11. The Platform-to-Business Regulation (P2B)481 

The  P2B  deals  with  the  relationships  between  online  intermediation  services  or  online 
search  engines  and  professional  users  of  those  online  services.  It  establishes,  at  a 
European level,  a set  of mandatory  rules  ensuring  “appropriate transparency, as  well as 
effective  redress  possibilities”  for  professional  users  of  online  intermediation  services. 
The  relationships  considered  are  business  (platform)  to  business  (professional  users) 
relationships as long as the business users concerned target consumers through their use 
of the online platform services. 

Both  online  intermediation  services  and  online  search  engine  must  inform  their 
professional  users  of  the  main  parameters  determining  ranking  and  the  importance  of 
those  main  parameters  (including  on  the  possibility  to  influence  ranking  against 
remuneration). Under the P2B Regulation, they must also inform their professional users 
about any differentiated treatment which they may give, in relation to goods or services 
offered  to  consumers,  through  their  services.  Finally,  terms  and  conditions  of  online 
intermediation services must contain a description of technical and contractual access, if 
any,  to  personal  data  and/or  other  data  provided  by  professional  users  when  using  the 
service or generated through the use of the services. 

Governance 

The  Member  States  must  ensure  accurate  and  effective  enforcement  of  the  P2B 
Regulation.  They  are  not  obliged  neither  to  create  new  enforcement  bodies  (they  can 
entrust  existing  authorities  for  ensuring  such  an  implementation)  nor  to  provide  for  ex 
officio enforcement or to impose fines. 
9.11. The Code of Practice on Disinformation482 

transparency 

481 Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on promoting fairness 
and 
services.  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1150  
482 Code of Practice on Disinformation https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/code-practice-disinformation  

for  business  users  of  online 

intermediation 

176 

 
                                                           
As  part  of  the  European  Democracy  Action  Plan,  the  Commission  encouraged  the 
drawing  of  a  Code  of  Practice  on  Disinformation,  in  which  various  signatories  (online 
platforms, leading social networks, advertisers and advertising industry) made voluntary 
commitments  to  address  the  risk  of  disinformation  and  information  manipulation 
occurring  through  their  services.  Signatories  signed  up  to  commitments  which 
correspond  to  the  product  and/or  service  they  offer,  their  role  in  the  value  chain,  their 
technical capabilities and their liability regimes as provided under EU Law, which vary 
depending on the role they play in the creation and dissemination of the content at stake, 
and which includes, in some cases, political ads.  

The commitments under the Code are thus non-binding, and heterogeneous both in kind 
and  in  scope.  The  Code  and  its  implementation  have  shortcomings,  which  were  partly 
addressed in 2021 with the Commission Guidance,483 which strengthened the Code and 
already made way for it to evolve towards a co-regulatory instrument as outlined in the 
Digital Services Act. Table 2 below maps these commitments to the obligations foreseen 
under the transparency in political ads initiative, as the latter strengthens further some of 
the Code’s commitments, or renders some binding. 

The Code includes commitments to ensure some level of transparency about political and 
issue-based advertising, either on the face of the ad or in an ad repository: on labelling, 
on the targeting behind the ad, the sponsor’s identity, the amount spent, the volume and 
budget of political ads served by political advertisers in the Member States, the number 
of times each ad has been displayed online. Signatories to which this is relevant further 
commit to make reasonable efforts to ensure, through effective identity verification and 
authorisation  systems,  that  all  the  necessary  (transparency)  conditions  are  met  before 
allowing the placement of political ads.  

Signatories  further  commit  to  contribute  to  limit  or  avoid  risks  associated  with 
microtargeting  of  political  and  issue-based  ads.  In  this  regard,  they  are  to  ensure  full 
compliance  with  the  GDPR  and  other  relevant  laws,  in  particular  regarding  the 
acquisition of valid consent where required. 
The  Guidance484  exhorts  Signatories  to  allow  for  a  sufficient  level  of  access  for 
stakeholders  such  as  such  as  civil  society  organisations,  non-academic  research  centres 
and investigative journalists, in particular in Member States where there is not adequate 
academic capacity. 

Part  of  the  commitment  on  disinformation  is  for  Signatories  to  facilitate  cooperation 
with, and information-facilitation toward competent authorities. In terms of governance, 
while  Signatories  are  to  produce  regular  self-assessment  reports  and  maintain  a 
transparency  center  (where  policies  and  measures  are  clearly  communicated),  it  is  the 
European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA) that is to monitor 
the  implementation  of  the  Code  at  Member  State  level.  Key  Performance  Indicators 
(KPIs) are defined in the Commission Guidance in order to measure the implementation 
and  effectiveness  of  the  Code’s  commitments  and  the  Code’s  impact  on  the 
disinformation phenomenon.  

on 

Strengthening 

483  Guidance 
strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/guidance-strengthening-code-practice-disinformation  
484  The  Guidance  calls  for  reinforcing  the  Code  of  Practice  on  Disinformation  in  the  following  areas:  larger 
participation  with  tailored  commitments,  better  demonetising  of  disinformation,  ensuring  the  integrity  of  services, 
improving empowerment of users, increasing the coverage of fact-checking and providing increased access to data to 
researches and creating a more robust monitoring framework. 

on  Disinformation 

https://digital-

Practice 

Code 

the 

of 

177 

 
 
                                                           
Table 9.1: Substantive obligations and other relevant provisions in the acquis 
Obligation/actor485 
DSA 
Orders to provide information to national authorities – article 9 DSA 
Point of contact and legal representative – article 10 and 11 DSA 
Traceability data – article 22 DSA [for third parties offering services through platforms]:  
 
the name, address, telephone number and email address of economic operator  
 
a copy of the identification document of the economic operator  
 
the bank account details of natural person; 
 
[etc.] 
User-facing transparency of online advertising (labelling) – article 24 DSA: 
 
 
  meaningful information about the main parameters used to determine the recipient to whom the advertisement is 

the information displayed is an advertisement; 
the natural or legal person on whose behalf the advertisement is displayed; 

displayed (microtargeting transparency) 

Provide ad repository – article 30(1) DSA 
Ad repository transparency – article 30(2) DSA 
 
 
 
  whether the advertisement was intended to be displayed specifically to one or more particular groups of recipients of 

the content of the advertisement; 
the natural or legal person on whose behalf the advertisement is displayed; 
the period during which the advertisement was displayed; 

 

the service and if so, the main parameters used for that purpose (microtargeting transparency); 
the total number of recipients of the service reached and, where applicable, aggregate numbers for the group or groups 
of recipients to whom the advertisement was targeted specifically. 

Very large online 
platform (VLOPs) 
x 
x 
x 

Other online 
platforms 
x 
x 
x 

Intermediaries   

x 
x 

x 

x 

x 
x 

External risk assessment, auditing and public accountability – articles 25 – 33 DSA 
  VLOPs shall identify, analyse, assess and mitigate any significant systemic risks stemming from the functioning and 

x 

use made of their services in the Union, including: 

485 The DSA essentially groups the subjects of obligations into three groups: obligations applicable to all intermediaries, those applicable to online platforms and those applicable to very large platforms. 
There are some additional (not relevant to this initiative) distinctions for hosting and other services. The categories of subject identified for the political ads initiative do not map perfectly to this, but “Ad 
exchanges, ad networks, ad platforms” “Other online ad services” and “Other ad services” will sometimes fall under the DSA category of intermediary. These are items which might need to be covered by 
both instruments to ensure that relevant subjects are covered.  

178 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
o 

(c) intentional manipulation of their service, including by means of inauthentic use or automated 
exploitation of the service, with an actual or foreseeable negative effect on the protection of public health, 
minors, civic discourse, or actual or foreseeable effects related to electoral processes and public security.  
  When conducting risk assessments, very large online platforms shall take into account, in particular, how their content 

moderation systems, recommender systems and systems for selecting and displaying advertisement influence any 
of the systemic risks referred to above, including the potentially rapid and wide dissemination of illegal content and 
of information that is incompatible with their terms and conditions. 

Oversight and sanctions486 

E-Commerce directive487 

Definitions (article 2)  

Internal market (article 3) 

Principle excluding prior authorisation (article 4) 

Information to be provided (article 6) 

x 

x 

x 

"information society services" 
"service provider" 
"recipient of the service" 
"consumer" 
"commercial communication" 
Member States may not restrict the freedom to provide information society services from another Member State. 

Member States shall ensure that the taking up and pursuit of the activity of an information society service provider may 
not be made subject to prior authorisation or any other requirement having equivalent effect. 

In addition to other information requirements established by Community law, Member States shall ensure that 
commercial communications which are part of, or constitute, an information society service comply at least with the 
following conditions: 

(a) the commercial communication shall be clearly identifiable as such; 

(b) the natural or legal person on whose behalf the commercial communication is made shall be clearly 
identifiable; 

 (…) 

Cooperation (article 19) 

1. Member States shall have adequate means of supervision and investigation necessary to implement this Directive 
effectively and shall ensure that service providers supply them with the requisite information. 

486 Oversights and sanctions vary depending on the actors but all actors are subject to some kind of oversight and sanctions. 
487 http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2000/31/oj  

179 

 
 
 
                                                           
2. Member States shall cooperate with other Member States; they shall, to that end, appoint one or several contact 
points, whose details they shall communicate to the other Member States and to the Commission. 

3. Member States shall, as quickly as possible, and in conformity with national law, provide the assistance and 
information requested by other Member States or by the Commission, including by appropriate electronic means. 

4. Member States shall establish contact points which shall be accessible at least by electronic means and from which 
recipients and service providers may: 

(a) obtain general information on contractual rights and obligations as well as on the complaint and redress 
mechanisms available in the event of disputes, including practical aspects involved in the use of such mechanisms; 

(b) obtain the details of authorities, associations or organisations from which they may obtain further information or 
practical assistance. 

5. Member States shall encourage the communication to the Commission of any significant administrative or judicial 
decisions taken in their territory regarding disputes relating to information society services and practices, usages and 
customs relating to electronic commerce. The Commission shall communicate these decisions to the other Member 
States. 

For the purposes of this Directive, the definition of an audiovisual media service should cover only audiovisual media 
services, whether television broadcasting or on-demand, which are mass media, that is, which are intended for 
reception by, and which could have a clear impact on, a significant proportion of the general public. Its scope should 
be limited to services as defined by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and therefore should cover 
any form of economic activity, including that of public service enterprises, but should not cover activities which are 
primarily non-economic and which are not in competition with television broadcasting, such as private websites and 
services consisting of the provision or distribution of audiovisual content generated by private users for the purposes of 
sharing and exchange within communities of interest. 

For the purposes of this Directive, the definition of an audiovisual media service should cover mass media in their 
function to inform, entertain and educate the general public, and should include audiovisual commercial 
communication but should exclude any form of private correspondence, such as e-mails sent to a limited number of 
recipients. 
 

‘audiovisual media service’. 

180 

Audiovisual Media Services Directive488 

Scope (recitals 21 and 22) 

Definitions (article 1) 

488 http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/1808/oj  

 
 
                                                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

‘audiovisual commercial communication’  
‘programme’ 
‘editorial responsibility’  
‘media service provider’  
‘broadcaster’  
‘on-demand audiovisual media service’  
‘audiovisual commercial communication’  
‘television advertising’  
‘surreptitious audiovisual commercial communication’  
‘sponsorship’  
‘product placement’ 

Requirements for the AVS providers to be identifiable 
(article 5) 

The provider shall make easily, directly and permanently accessible to recipients its name, address, contact details 
(email address), and where relevant, the competent supervisory authority. 

Prohibition to use some data for advertising (‘Article 6a 
and Article 28b (3)) 

Requirements on commercial and sponsored content 
(articles 9 and 10) 

Compliance of providers regardless of whether the 
sponsored communications are theirs (Article 28b (2)) 

Personal data of minors collected or otherwise generated by media service providers and video-sharing platform 
providers to protect children shall not be processed for commercial purposes, such as direct marketing, profiling and 
behaviourally targeted advertising. 
9 (1) (a), audiovisual commercial communications shall be readily recognisable as such. Surreptitious audiovisual 
commercial communication shall be prohibited;  
   (b) audiovisual commercial communications shall not use subliminal techniques; 
   (c) audiovisual commercial communications shall not: 
(i) prejudice respect for human dignity; 
(ii) include or promote any discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, nationality, religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation; 
(iii) encourage behaviour prejudicial to health or safety; 
(iv) encourage behaviour grossly prejudicial to the protection of the environment; 

   (g) audiovisual commercial communications shall not cause physical, mental or moral detriment to minors. 

10 (1) (c) viewers shall be clearly informed of the existence of a sponsorship agreement. Sponsored programmes shall 
be clearly identified as such by the name, logo and/or any other symbol of the sponsor such as a reference to its 
product(s) or service(s) or a distinctive sign thereof in an appropriate way for programmes at the beginning, during 
and/or at the end of the programmes. 
Video-sharing platform providers shall comply with the requirements set out in Article 9(1) with respect to audiovisual 
commercial  communications  that  are  marketed,  sold  or  arranged  by  them,  and  shall  take  appropriate  measures  to 

181 

 
 
  
 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive489 

Definitions (article 2) 

Prohibition of unfair commercial practices (article 5) 

comply with the requirements set out in Article 9(1) with respect to audiovisual commercial communications that are 
not  marketed,  sold  or  arranged  by  them,  taking  into  account  the  limited  control  they  may  potentially  exercise  over 
those audiovisual commercial communications. 
Video-sharing  platform  providers  shall  clearly  inform  users  where  programmes  and  user-generated  videos  contain 
audiovisual commercial communications, provided that such communications are declared by  the  uploading  user, or 
provided the provider has knowledge of that fact. 

‘commercial practices’ (includes advertising and marketing related to products, regardless of whether carried out 
online or offline). 

‘to materially distort the economic behaviour of consumers’ means using a commercial practice to appreciably impair 
the consumer's ability to make an informed decision, thereby causing the consumer to take a transactional decision that 
he would not have taken otherwise.‘trader’ means any natural or legal person who, in commercial practices covered by 
this Directive, is acting for purposes relating to his trade, business, craft or profession 

‘business-to-consumer commercial practices’ means any act, omission, course of conduct or representation, 
commercial communication including advertising and marketing, by a trader, directly connected with the promotion, 
sale or supply of a product to consumers; 

‘professional diligence’ means the standard of special skill and care which a trader may reasonably be expected to 
exercise towards consumers, commensurate with honest market practice and/or the general principle of good faith in 
the trader's field of activity. 

‘undue influence’ means exploiting a position of power in relation to the consumer so as to apply pressure, even 
without using or threatening to use physical force, in a way which significantly limits the consumer's ability to make an 
informed decision; 

A commercial practice shall be unfair if: (a) it is contrary to the requirements of professional diligence, and (b) it 
materially distorts or is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour with regard to the product of the average 
consumer whom it reaches or to whom it is addressed, or of the average member of the group when a commercial 
practice is directed to a particular group of consumers. 

In particular, commercial practices shall be unfair if they are misleading or aggressive. 

Misleading actions and omissions (Articles 6 and 7) 

A commercial practice shall be regarded as misleading if it contains false information and is therefore untruthful or in 
any way, including overall presentation, deceives or is likely to deceive the average consumer, even if the information 

489 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02005L0029-20220528&from=EN  

182 

 
 
                                                           
Use of harassment, coercion and undue influence (article 9) 

is factually correct, in relation to one or more of the following elements, and in either case causes or is likely to cause 
him to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise: 

(c) the extent of the trader's commitments, the motives for the commercial practice and the nature of the sales 
process, any statement or symbol in relation to direct or indirect sponsorship or approval of the trader or the 
product; 

A commercial practice shall be regarded as misleading if, in its factual context, taking account of all its features and 
circumstances and the limitations of the communication medium, it omits material information that the average 
consumer needs, according to the context, to take an informed transactional decision and thereby causes or is likely to 
cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise. 

In determining whether a commercial practice uses harassment, coercion, including the use of physical force, or undue 
influence (and is therefore unfair and prohibited), account shall be taken of: (a) its timing, location, nature or 
persistence; (c) the exploitation by the trader of any specific misfortune or circumstance of such gravity as to impair 
the consumer's judgement, of which the trader is aware, to influence the consumer's decision with regard to the 
product. 

Commercial practices which are in all circumstances 
considered unfair (Annex I) 

11. Using editorial content in the media to promote a product where a trader has paid for the promotion without 
making that clear in the content or by images or sounds clearly identifiable by the consumer (advertorial). 

Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive490 

Ad for commercial purposes (article 2) 

(a) ‘advertising’ means the making of a representation in any form in connection with a trade, business, craft or 
profession in order to promote the supply of goods or services, including immovable property, rights and obligations; 

(b) ‘misleading advertising’ means any advertising which in any way, including its presentation, deceives or is likely to 
deceive the persons to whom it is addressed or whom it reaches and which, by reason of its deceptive nature, is likely 
to affect their economic behaviour or which, for those reasons, injures or is likely to injure a competitor; 

(c) ‘comparative advertising’ means any advertising which explicitly or by implication identifies a competitor or goods 
or services offered by a competitor; 

Consumer Rights Directive491 

Information requirements for distance and off-premises 
contracts (Article 6) 

1. Before the consumer is bound by a distance or off-premises contract, or any corresponding offer, the trader shall 
provide the consumer with the following information in a clear and comprehensible manner: 

490 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32006L0114  
491 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32011L0083  

183 

 
 
 
                                                           
Additional specific information requirements for contracts 
concluded on online marketplaces  (Article 6a) 

(a) the main characteristics of the goods or services, to the extent appropriate to the medium and to the goods 
or services; 
(b) the identity of the trader, such as his trading name; 
(c) the geographical address at which the trader is established and the trader’s telephone number, fax number 
and e-mail address; in addition, where the trader provides other means of online communication which 
guarantee that the consumer can keep any written correspondence, including the date and time of such 
correspondence, with the trader on a durable medium, the information shall also include details of those other 
means; all those means of communication provided by the trader shall enable the consumer to contact the 
trader quickly and communicate with him efficiently; where applicable, the trader shall also provide the 
geographical address and identity of the trader on whose behalf he is acting;  
(d) if different from the address provided in accordance with point (c), the geographical address of the place 
of business of the trader, and, where applicable, that of the trader on whose behalf he is acting, where the 
consumer can address any complaints;  
(e) the total price of the goods or services inclusive of taxes, or where the nature of the goods or services is 
such that the price cannot reasonably be calculated in advance, the manner in which the price is to be 
calculated;  
(ea) where applicable, that the price was personalised on the basis of automated decision-making; 

9.  As regards compliance with the information requirements laid down in this Chapter, the burden of proof shall be on 
the trader. 
1.  Before a consumer is bound by a distance contract, or any corresponding offer, on an online marketplace, the 
provider of the online marketplace shall, without prejudice to Directive 2005/29/EC, provide the consumer with the 
following information in a clear and comprehensible manner and in a way appropriate to the means of distance 
communication: 

(a) general information, made available in a specific section of the online interface that is directly and easily 
accessible from the page where the offers are presented, on the main parameters determining ranking, as 
defined in point (m) of Article 2(1) of Directive 2005/29/EC, of offers presented to the consumer as a result of 
the search query and the relative importance of those parameters as opposed to other parameters; 
(b) whether the third party offering the goods, services or digital content is a trader or not, on the basis of the 
declaration of that third party to the provider of the online marketplace; 
(c) where the third party offering the goods, services or digital content is not a trader, that the consumer rights 
stemming from Union consumer protection law do not apply to the contract; 
(d) where applicable, how the obligations related to the contract are shared between the third party offering 

184 

 
Platform-to-Business Regulation492 
Ranking (article 5) 

Differentiated treatment (Article 7) 

the goods, services or digital content and the provider of the online marketplace, such information being 
without prejudice to any responsibility that the provider of the online marketplace or the third-party trader has 
in relation to the contract under other Union or national law. 

2.  Without prejudice to Directive 2000/31/EC, this Article does not prevent Member States from imposing additional 
information requirements for providers of online marketplaces. Such provisions shall be proportionate, non-
discriminatory and justified on grounds of consumer protection. 

1.   Providers of online intermediation services shall set out in their terms and conditions the main parameters 
determining ranking and the reasons for the relative importance of those main parameters as opposed to other 
parameters. 
2.   Providers of online search engines shall set out the main parameters, which individually or collectively are most 
significant in determining ranking and the relative importance of those main parameters, by providing an easily and 
publicly available description, drafted in plain and intelligible language, on the online search engines of those 
providers. They shall keep that description up to date. 
3.   Where the main parameters include the possibility to influence ranking against any direct or indirect remuneration 
paid by business users or corporate website users to the respective provider, that provider shall also set out a 
description of those possibilities and of the effects of such remuneration on ranking in accordance with the 
requirements set out in paragraphs 1 and 2. 
4.   Where a provider of an online search engine has altered the ranking order in a specific case or delisted a particular 
website following a third party notification, the provider shall offer the possibility for the corporate website user to 
inspect the contents of the notification. 
1.   Providers of online intermediation services shall include in their terms and conditions a description of any 
differentiated treatment which they give, or might give, in relation to goods or services offered to consumers through 
those online intermediation services by, on the one hand, either that provider itself or any business users which that 
provider controls and, on the other hand, other business users. That description shall refer to the main economic, 
commercial or legal considerations for such differentiated treatment. 
2.   Providers of online search engines shall set out a description of any differentiated treatment which they give, or 
might give, in relation to goods or services offered to consumers through those online search engines by, on the one 
hand, either that provider itself or any corporate website users which that provider controls and, on the other hand, 

492 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1150  

185 

 
 
                                                           
Access to data (Article 9) 

other corporate website users. 
3.   The descriptions referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall cover in particular, where applicable, any differentiated 
treatment through specific measures taken by, or the behaviour of, the provider of online intermediation services or the 
provider of the online search engine relating to any of the following: 

(a), access that the provider, or that the business users or corporate website users which that provider controls, 
may have to any personal data or other data, or both, which business users, corporate website users or 
consumers provide for the use of the online intermediation services or the online search engines concerned or 
which are generated through the provision of those services; 
(b), ranking or other settings applied by the provider that influence consumer access to goods or services 
offered through those online intermediation services by other business users or through those online search 
engines by other corporate website users; 
(c), any direct or indirect remuneration charged for the use of the online intermediation services or online 
search engines concerned; 
(d), access to, conditions for, or any direct or indirect remuneration charged for the use of services or 
functionalities, or technical interfaces, that are relevant to the business user or the corporate website user and 
that are directly connected or ancillary to utilising the online intermediation services or online search engines 
concerned. 

1.   Providers of online intermediation services shall include in their terms and conditions a description of the technical 
and contractual access, or absence thereof, of business users to any personal data or other data, or both, which business 
users or consumers provide for the use of the online intermediation services concerned or which are generated through 
the provision of those services. 
2.   Through the description referred to in paragraph 1, providers of online intermediation services shall adequately 
inform business users in particular of the following: 

(a) whether the provider of online intermediation services has access to personal data or other data, or both, 
which business users or consumers provide for the use of those services or which are generated through the 
provision of those services, and if so, to which categories of such data and under what conditions; 
(b) whether a business user has access to personal data or other data, or both, provided by that business user in 
connection to the business user’s use of the online intermediation services concerned or generated through the 
provision of those services to that business user and the consumers of the business user’s goods or services, 
and if so, to which categories of such data and under what conditions; 
(c) in addition to point (b), whether a business user has access to personal data or other data, or both, 
including in aggregated form, provided by or generated through the provision of the online intermediation 

186 

 
services to all of the business users and consumers thereof, and if so, to which categories of such data and 
under what conditions; and 
(d) whether any data under point (a) is provided to third parties, along with, where the provision of such data 
to third parties is not necessary for the proper functioning of the online intermediation services, information 
specifying the purpose of such data sharing, as well as possibilities for business users to opt out from that data 
sharing. 

GDPR493 

Principles relating to processing of personal data (article 5) 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 

lawfulness, fairness and transparency 
purpose limitation 
data minimisation 
accuracy 
storage limitation 
integrity and confidentiality 
accountability 

Lawfulness of processing (article 6) 

Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the 6 legal bases applies. 

In the case of targeted political advertising however, EDPB guidelines show the difficulty of justifying the processing 
under a legal basis other than consent.494  

Conditions for consent (article 7) 

Conditions specific to children (article 8) 

‘Consent’ of the data subject means any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data 
subject's wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the 
processing of personal data relating to him or her. Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute 
consent. 

Processing based on a child’s consent is only lawful if the child is aged 16 or more, or to the extent that consent is 
given or authorised by the holder of parental responsibility over the child below that age. 

The controller shall make reasonable efforts to verify in such cases that consent is give or authorised by the holder of 
parental responsibility over the child, taking into consideration available technology. 

Children merit specific protection with regard to their personal data, as they may be less aware of the risks, 

493 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679  
494 European Data Protection Board, EDPB guidelines on the targeting of social media users (2021), paragraphs 56, 65 and 66. 

187 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
consequences and safeguards concerned and their rights in relation to the processing of personal data. Such specific 
protection should, in particular, apply to the use of personal data of children for the purposes of marketing or creating 
personality or user profiles and the collection of personal data with regard to children when using services offered 
directly to a child. 

Any information and communication, where processing is addressed to a child, should be in such a clear and plain 
language that the child can easily understand. 

Processing of special categories of personal data (article 9) 
(‘sensitive data’) 

General  prohibition  from  processing  sensitive  data,  i.e.  data  relating  to  racial  or  ethnic  origin,  political  opinions, 
religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership.  

Right of access (article 15) 

Relevant exemptions to this prohibition include: 

 

 

 
 

if the data subject has given explicit consent to the processing of those personal data for one or more specified 
purposes 
if  processing  is  carried  out  in  the  course  of  its  legitimate  activities  with  appropriate  safeguards  by  a 
foundation, association or any other not-for-profit body with a political, philosophical, religious or trade union 
aim and on condition that the processing relates solely to the members or to former members of the body or to 
persons  who  have  regular  contact  with  it  in  connection  with  its  purposes  and  that  the  personal  data  are  not 
disclosed outside that body without the consent of the data subjects 
if processing relates to personal data which are manifestly made public by the data subject 
if processing is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest, on the basis of Union or Member State law 
which shall be proportionate to the aim pursued, respect the essence of the right to data protection and provide 
for suitable and specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and the interests of the data subject. 

This last exemption is to be read together with Recital 56: Where in the course of electoral activities, the operation of 
the  democratic  system  in  a  Member  State  requires  that  political  parties  compile  personal  data  on  people's  political 
opinions,  the  processing  of  such  data  may  be  permitted  for  reasons  of  public  interest,  provided  that  appropriate 
safeguards are established. 
The  data  subject  shall  have  the  right  to  obtain  from  the  controller  confirmation  as  to  whether  or  not  personal  data 
concerning him or her are being processed, and, where that is the case, access to the personal data and the following 
information: 

(a) the purposes of the processing; 
(b) the categories of personal data concerned; 
(c)  the  recipients  or  categories  of  recipient  to  whom  the  personal  data  have  been  or  will  be  disclosed,  in 
particular recipients in third countries or international organisations; 
(d)  where  possible,  the  envisaged  period  for  which  the  personal  data  will  be  stored,  or,  if  not  possible,  the 
criteria used to determine that period; 

188 

 
(e)  the  existence  of  the  right  to  request  from  the  controller  rectification  or  erasure  of  personal  data  or 
restriction of processing of personal data concerning the data subject or to object to such processing; 
(f) the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority; 
(g)  where  the  personal  data  are  not  collected  from  the  data  subject,  any  available  information  as  to  their 
source; 
(h)  the  existence  of  automated  decision-making,  including  profiling,  and  meaningful  information  about  the 
logic  involved,  as  well  as  the  significance  and  the  envisaged  consequences  of  such  processing  for  the  data 
subject. 

Automated decision-making, including profiling (article 22)  The data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including 

Joint controllership (article 26) 

Risks, Data protection impact assessment (article 35) and 
prior consultation (article 36) 

profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her, unless such 
processing is carried out under strict conditions (particularly relevant: with the data subject’s explicit consent). 

Where two or more controllers jointly determine the purposes and means of processing, they shall be joint controllers. 
They shall in a transparent manner determine their respective responsibilities for compliance with the obligations under 
the GDPR. Their arrangement shall duly reflect the respective roles and relationships of the joint controllers vis-à-vis 
the data subjects. The essence of the arrangement shall be made available to the data subject. 

Where a type of processing, in particular using new technologies, and taking into account the nature, scope, context 
and purposes of the processing, is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the 
controller shall, prior to the processing, carry out an assessment of the impact of the envisaged processing operations 
on the protection of personal data. 

A data protection impact assessment (DPIA) shall in particular be required in the case of a systematic and extensive 
evaluation of personal aspects relating to natural persons which is based on automated processing, including profiling, 
and on which decisions are based that produce legal effects concerning the natural person or similarly significantly 
affect the natural person (on these ‘legal effects’, see the reference above to the 2018 Commission Guidance on the 
application of Union data protection law in the electoral context). 

Where appropriate, the controller shall seek the views of data subjects or their representatives on the intended 
processing. 

Article 36 GDPR: the controller shall consult the supervisory authority prior to processing where a DPIA under Article 
35 indicates that the processing would result in a high risk in the absence of measures taken by the controller to 
mitigate the risk. 

Codes of conduct (article 40) and their monitoring (article 
41) 

The Member States, the supervisory authorities, the Board and the Commission shall encourage the drawing up of 
codes of conduct intended to contribute to the proper application of this Regulation, taking account of the specific 
features of the various processing sectors and the specific needs of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. 

Associations and other bodies representing categories of controllers or processors may prepare codes of conduct, or 

189 

 
Certification (article 42) 

Governance, supervision 

Processing for research purposes 

Presumption of compatibility 

(article 5(1)(b)) 

amend or extend such codes, for the purpose of specifying the application of this Regulation, such as with regard to 
(among others): 

(c) the collection of personal data; 
(d) the pseudonymisation of personal data; 
(e) the information provided to the public and to data subjects; 
(f) the exercise of the rights of data subjects; 
(g) the information provided to, and the protection of, children, and the manner in which the consent of the 
holders of parental responsibility over children is to be obtained; 

The Member States, the supervisory authorities, the Board and the Commission shall encourage, in particular at Union 
level, the establishment of data protection certification mechanisms and of data protection seals and marks, for the 
purpose of demonstrating compliance with this Regulation of processing operations by controllers and processors. 

see table below, ‘Relevant EU level governance’ 

Personal data shall be:  

(b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is 
incompatible with those purposes; further processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or 
historical research purposes or statistical purposes shall, in accordance with Article 89(1), not be considered 
to be incompatible with the initial purposes (‘purpose limitation’) 

(article 6(4)) 

The personal data may be processed for a purpose other than that for which it has been collected if it can be ascertained 
as compatible with the initial purpose, taking into account, inter alia: 

a) any link between the purposes for which the personal data have been collected and the purposes of the 
intended further processing; (b) the context in which the personal data have been collected, in particular 
regarding the relationship between data subjects and the controller; (c) the nature of the personal data, in 
particular whether special categories of personal data are processed, pursuant to Article 9, or whether personal 
data related to criminal convictions and offences are processed, pursuant to Article 10; (d) the possible 
consequences of the intended further processing for data subjects; (e) the existence of appropriate safeguards, 
which may include encryption or pseudonymisation. 

Information requirements regarding the further processing 
(article 13(3) and 14(4)) 

Where the controller intends to further process the personal data for a purpose other than that for which the personal 
data were collected, the controller shall provide the data subject prior to that further processing with information on 
that other purpose and with any relevant further information (on the processing, on the data subject’s rights) 

190 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Longer storage for research purposes (article 5(1) (e)) 

Derogation from the prohibition to process sensitive 
personal data (article 9(2) (j)) 

Derogation from certain information requirements in the 
context of research (article 14(5) (b)) 

Personal data shall be: 

(e) kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes 
for which the personal data are processed; personal data may be stored for longer periods insofar as the 
personal data will be processed solely for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical 
research purposes or statistical purposes in accordance with Article 89(1) subject to implementation of the 
appropriate technical and organisational measures required by this Regulation in order to safeguard the rights 
and freedoms of the data subject (‘storage limitation’); 

The prohibition on the processing of sensitive personal data shall not apply where:  

(j) processing is necessary for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research 
purposes or statistical purposes in accordance with Article 89(1) based on Union or Member State law which 
shall be proportionate to the aim pursued, respect the essence of the right to data protection and provide for 
suitable and specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and the interests of the data subject.   

Where personal data have not been obtained from the data subject, the controller shall provide the data subject with the 
information (listed), except where and insofar as: 

(b) the provision of such information proves impossible or would involve a disproportionate effort, in 
particular for processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes 
or statistical purposes, subject to the conditions and safeguards referred to in Article 89(1) or in so far as the 
obligation referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article is likely to render impossible or seriously impair the 
achievement of the objectives of that processing. In such cases the controller shall take appropriate measures 
to protect the data subject's rights and freedoms and legitimate interests, including making the information 
publicly available; 

Derogation from erasure requirements (article 17(3) (d)) 

The right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’) shall not apply to the extent that processing is necessary: 

(d) for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical 
purposes in accordance with Article 89(1) in so far as the right referred to in paragraph 1 is likely to render 
impossible or seriously impair the achievement of the objectives of that processing; 

Right to object (article 21(6)) 

Where personal data are processed for scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes pursuant to 

191 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 89(1), the data subject, on grounds relating to his or her particular situation, shall have the right to object to 
processing of personal data concerning him or her, unless the processing is necessary for the performance of a task 
carried out for reasons of public interest. 

Safeguards and derogations relating to processing for 
archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or 
historical research purposes or statistical purposes (article 
89) 

Where personal data are processed for scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes, Union or 
Member State law may provide for derogations from the rights referred to in Articles 15 (right of access), 16 (right to 
rectification), 18 (right to restriction of processing) and 21 (right to object) subject to specific conditions and under 
appropriate safeguards (such as, for instance, pseudonymisation of the data), in so far as such rights are likely to render 
impossible or seriously impair the achievement of the specific purposes, and such derogations are necessary for the 
fulfilment of those purposes. 

Transfers of personal data to third countries or international 
organisations (articles 44, 45, 46, 47) 

Any transfer of personal data which are undergoing processing or are intended for processing after transfer to a third 
country or to an international organisation shall take place only if 

ePrivacy Directive495 

Definitions (article 2) 

- 

- 

the Commission has decided that the third country, a territory or one or more specified sectors within that 
third country, or the international organisation in question ensures an adequate level of protection. Or, in the 
absence of such a decision, if 
the controller or processor has provided appropriate safeguards, and on condition that enforceable data subject 
rights and effective legal remedies for data subjects are available. 

Binding corporate rules are also relevant. 

‘communication’ means any information exchanged or conveyed between a finite number of parties by means of a 
publicly available electronic communications service. This does not include any information conveyed as part of a 
broadcasting service to the public over an electronic communications network except to the extent that the information 
can be related to the identifiable subscriber or user receiving the information 

Confidentiality of the communications, store and/or access 
information in a user/subscriber’s terminal (article 5) 

Listening, tapping, storage or other kinds of interception or surveillance of communications and the related traffic data 
by persons other than users is prohibited without the consent of the users concerned. 

The use of electronic communications networks to store information or to gain access to information (e.g. cookies’ ID) 
stored  in  the  terminal  equipment  of  a  subscriber  or  user  is  only  allowed  on  condition  that  the  subscriber  or  user 
concerned is provided with clear and comprehensive information, inter alia about the purposes of the processing, and is 

495 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32002L0058  

192 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Unsolicited communications (Article 13) 

offered the right to refuse such processing by the data controller. 

Therefore, where the display of targeted advertisements on the users' page requires tracking, and read/write operation 
to match their "likes" with information already held by the platform, the users’ prior consent will be required. 

The use of automated calling systems without human intervention (automatic calling machines), facsimile machines 
(fax) or electronic mail for the purposes of direct marketing may only be allowed in respect of subscribers who have 
given their prior consent. 

DMA496 

Definitions (article 2) 

‘Gatekeeper’ 

‘Core platform service’ – which comprises: (h) advertising services, including any advertising networks, advertising 
exchanges and any other advertising intermediation services, provided by a provider of any of the core platform 
services. 

‘Information society service’ 

‘Ancillary service’ – which means services provided in the context of or together with core platform services, 
including fulfilment, identification or advertising services. 

‘End user’ 

‘Business user’ 

‘Ranking’ 

Obligations for gatekeepers (article 5) 

In respect of each of its core platform services identified pursuant to Article 3(7), a gatekeeper shall:  

(a) refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from 
any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services, and from signing 
in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data, unless the end user has been 
presented with the specific choice and provided consent 

(g) provide advertisers and publishers to which it supplies advertising services, upon their request, with 
information concerning the price paid by the advertiser and publisher, as well as the amount or remuneration 
paid to the publisher, for the publishing of a given ad and for each of the relevant advertising services 
provided by the gatekeeper. 

496 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2020%3A842%3AFIN  

193 

 
 
                                                           
Obligations for gatekeepers susceptible of being further 
specified (article 6) 

In respect of each of its core platform services, a gatekeeper shall: 

(d) refrain from treating more favourably in ranking services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or 
by any third party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar services or products of third party 
and apply fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such ranking; 

(g) provide advertisers and publishers, upon their request and free of charge, with access to the performance 
measuring tools of the gatekeeper and the information necessary for advertisers and publishers to carry out 
their own independent verification of the ad inventory; 

(j) provide to any third party providers of online search engines, upon their request, with access on fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms to ranking, query, click and view data in relation to free and paid 
search generated by end users on online search engines of the gatekeeper, subject to anonymisation for the 
query, click and view data that constitutes personal data; 

Obligation of an audit (article 13) 

A gatekeeper shall annually submit to the Commission an independently audited description of any techniques for 
profiling of consumers that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services. 

The Directive on services in the internal market497  

Scope (Article 2) 

Definitions (Article 4) 

This Directive shall not apply to the following activities: (c) electronic communications services and networks; (g) 
audiovisual services and radio broadcasting. 

‘service’ 

‘provider’ 

‘overriding reasons relating to the public interest’ 

‘commercial communication’ 

Administrative simplification (Articles 5 to 8) 

Simplification of procedures 

Points of single contact 

Right to information  

Procedures by electronic means 

Administrative cooperation among Member States (Article  Mutual assistance obligations 

497 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market. http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2006/123/oj  

194 

 
 
                                                           
28) 

195 

 
 
Table 9.2 – Mapping of Code of Practice commitments to proposed obligations under the 
political ads initiative 

Existing Code of Practice499 commitments and  
Guidance500 proposals  
Code of Practice:  
further 
Annual 
cooperation  with 
including 
responding  to  questions  and  making  information 
available upon request 

the  Commission, 

self-assessment 

reports, 

and 

Guidance: 
Access 
to  enable 
to 
competent  authorities  to  perform  their  monitoring 
and enforcement function 

information 

facilitated 

ERGA  to  monitor  implementation  of  Code  at 
Member State level 

Guidance:  
Possible further cooperation between platforms and 
Member  States  via  the  Rapid  Alert  System  (not 
linked specifically to advertising) 

facilitated 

information 

Guidance: 
Access 
to  enable 
to 
competent  authorities  to  perform  their  monitoring 
and enforcement function 
Guidance: 
Reasonable  efforts  to  ensure,  through  effective 
identity  verification and authorisation systems, that 
all 
the  necessary  conditions  are  met  before  
allowing the placement of these types of ads. 

Obligations (on VLOPs)498 under the political ads 
initiative 
Orders to provide information to national authorities  

Point of contact and legal representative  

Retain  relevant  basic  information  (client  account  number, 
amount, data, …) on political ads transactions 
Participate in transaction data sharing (to enable complete 
disclosures) 

Political ads ‘know your client’ data (traceability data + ): 

 

 

the  name,  address,  telephone  number  and  email 
address of economic operator  
a  copy  of  the  identification  document  of  the 
economic operator  
the bank account details of natural person; 
[etc] 

 
 
  where  the  advertiser  is  registered  as  a  political 
campaign  or  as  a  political  candidate,  the  register 
in  which  the  advertiser  is  registered  and  its 
registration  number  or  equivalent  means  of 
identification in that register; 
undertaking  that  applicable  national  rules  have 
been complied with 
certification  that  relevant  personal  data  was 
handled  in  a  manner  which  complies  with  the 
GDPR 

 

 

User-facing  transparency  of  online  advertising  (labelling) 
that the information displayed is an advertisement; 
 

the  natural  or  legal  person  on  whose  behalf  the 
advertisement is displayed; 

  meaningful  information  about  the  main  parameters 

Code of  Practice 
All 
clearly 
and 
distinguishable 
recognisable as paid-for content or labelled as such 

advertisements 
from 

should 
editorial 

be 
content 

498 These obligations are understood cumulatively to the obligations foreseen in the DSA proposals 
499 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/code-practice-disinformation  
500 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/guidance-strengthening-code-practice-disinformation  

196 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
the  recipient 
displayed 

to  determine 
is 

to  whom 
the 
(microtargeting 

used 
advertisement 
transparency) 
the  name  of  any  associated  political  campaign  (plus 
registration information where relevant) 
undertaking 
associated with political campaign  
Indication  on  the  face  of  the  ad  that  it  was  targeted 
(going beyond the DSA provision) 

(“issues”)  ad  not 

that  a  political 

 

 

 

Provide ad repository – article 30(1) DSA 

Interoperable repositories 

197 

Commit to enable “public disclosure” of  
of  political  advertising  (defined  as  advertisements 
advocating for or against the election of a candidate 
or  passage  of  referenda  in  national  and  European 
elections). 

Commit to use “reasonable efforts towards devising 
approaches  to  “publicly  disclose”  "issue-based 
advertising" (no definition). 

NB:  No commitment to provide disclosure info in 
the face of the label 
Guidance: 
Commit  to  ensure  effective  labelling  as  paid-for 
content  and  that  ad  relates  to  political  or  social 
issues;  possible  set  of  common  criteria  and 
examples of labels/marking 

Commit  to  integrate  research  on  effectiveness  of 
labels in informing users 

Commit to ensure that labels remain in place when 
users  share  political  or  issue-based  ads  in  an 
organic  way,  so  that  they  continue  to  be  clearly 
identified as ads (even in messaging platforms)  
Code of Practice: 
Commit to enable public disclosure  
of  political  advertising  (defined  as  advertisements 
advocating for or against the election of a candidate 
or  passage  of  referenda  in  national  and  European 
elections), which could include;  

 
 

actual sponsor identity; and  
amounts spent. 

Commit to use reasonable efforts towards devising 
approaches 
to  publicly  disclose  "issue-based 
advertising" (no  definition) 

Commit  to  encourage  market  uptake  of  tools  that 
help  consumers  understand  why  they  are  seeing 
particular advertisements. 

Guidance: 
Improve  quality 
ad 
repositories (see ad repository transparency below) 

completeness  of 

and 

- 

exchange 

cooperation 

Creation of a common repository of rejected ads 
Guidance:  
Cross-platform 
of 
information  on  disinformation  ads  refused  by  one 
platform  to  prevent  their  appearance  on  other  
platforms. 
APIs  (application  programming 
interfaces)  for 
political  ad  repositories  should  include  a  set  of 
search  criteria  
minimum 
to  perform) 
enabling 
customized  searches    to  retrieve  real  time  data  in 
standard 
cross-platform 
comparisons, research and monitoring 
If  repositories  of  issue-based  ads  are  established 
their APIs should have similar capabilities 

functionalities  and 

(users  and 

researchers 

permitting 

formats 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ad repository transparency – article 30(2) DSA 
 
 

the content of the advertisement; 
the  natural  or  legal  person  on  whose  behalf  the 
advertisement is displayed; 
the  period  during  which  the  advertisement  was 
displayed; 

 

  whether 

intended 

the  advertisement  was 

to  be 
displayed specifically to one or more particular groups 
of  recipients  of  the  service  and  if  so,  the  main 
parameters  used  for  that  purpose  (microtargeting 
transparency); 
the  total  number  of  recipients  of  the  service  reached 
and,  where  applicable,  aggregate  numbers  for  the 
group  or  groups  of 
the 
advertisement was targeted specifically 
spend data 
financing sources 

to  whom 

recipients 

 

 
 

risk 
External 
accountability  

assessment, 

auditing 

and 

public 

Maintain  and  report  on  political  ads  policy  (including  on 
targeting) 
Microtargeting:  “clean 
included on websites hosting banner ads 

label501/info 

targeting” 

to  be 

Microtargeting limits  

Public interest information promotion 

A code of conduct for online advertising (Article 36 DSA) 
Oversight  

-  Competent  authorities  and  Digital  Services 

Coordinators 

501 Not specifically covered in the existing Code or Guidance. 

198 

Code of Practice: 
Commit  to  enable  public  disclosure  of  political 
advertising  (defined  as  advertisements  advocating 
for or against the election of a candidate or passage 
of  referenda  in  national  and  European  elections), 
which could include;  

 
 

actual sponsor identity; and  
amounts spent. 

Commit to use reasonable efforts towards devising 
approaches 
to  publicly  disclose  "issue-based 
advertising" (no  definition) 

Commit  to  encourage  market  uptake  of  tools  that 
help  consumers  understand  why  they  are  seeing 
particular advertisements. 

Guidance 
Commitment  to  improve  the    completeness  and 
quality  of  the  information  in  their  repositories  of 
political  ads,  so  that    these  effectively  contain  all 
sponsored political content served. 

These repositories should provide current, regularly 
updated  information  on  the  volume  and  budget  of 
political  ads  served  by  political  advertisers  in  the 
Member  States,  the  number  of  times  each  ad  has 
been  displayed  online,  and  the  targeting  criteria 
used by the advertiser 
Guidance 
Signatories  should  integrate  relevant  research  to 
improve  the  effectiveness  of  labels  in  informing 
users. 

Code of Practice 
Commit  to  encourage  market  uptake  of  tools  that 
help  consumers  understand  why  they  are  seeing 
particular advertisements 

Guidance 
Commit  to  contribute 
to  limit  or  avoid  risk 
associated  with  microtargeting  of  political  and 
issue-based ads 

Full  compliance  with  GDPR  and  other  relevant 
laws 
Acquiring valid consent for collection of data 
Informing  individuals  that  they  are  being  micro 
targeted and what criteria and data is being used for 
that purpose 
Guidance 
Promotion  of  public  awareness  and 
resilience. 

social 

Code of Practice 
Annual 
cooperation  with 

self-assessment 

reports, 

and 

the  Commission, 

further 
including 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
- 

Jurisdiction (country of origin), requirements and 
powers 

responding  to  questions  and  making  information 
available upon request 

Guidance 
Regular reporting via harmonized template 
ERGA  to  monitor  implementation  of  Code  at 
Member State level 
Definition of KPIs and provision of information on 
KPIs 
Creation  of  a  Transparency  centre,  with  regular 
updating 

-  Complaints and Penalties 
-  Cross-border cooperation and joint investigation 
-  European Board for Digital Services 
-  Additional tasks (where the designated competent 
relevant 
authorities 
economic  actors/services  and  the  tasks  of  the 
DSC can be adapted) 

supervise 

already 

the 

-  Requirement 

to  coordinate  with  additional 

national competent authorities 

-  Additional  enhanced  supervision  task  to  ensure 

compliance with political ads initiative 

199 

 
 
 
 
 
Table 9.3 – Detail of envisaged obligations introduced under policy options 1 and 2 of the transparency in political ads initiative, alongside 
those anticipated for the DSA (baseline – in grey) 

Other online 
platforms 

Very large 
online platform 
(VLOPs) 
DSA 
x 

Pol.Ads  DSA 

Ad exchanges, 
ad networks, 
ad platforms   
DSA 
x 

Other online 
ad services 

Other ad 
services 

Offline ad 
publishers 

Pol.Ads  DSA 
(x) 

x 

Pol.Ads  DSA 
(x) 

x 

Pol.Ads  Pol.Ads 
(x) 

x 

Pol.Ads 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

(x) 
x 

x 

x 

x 

(x) 
x 

x 

x 

x 

x 
x 

x 

(x) 
x 

x 

Obligation/actor502 

Orders to provide information to national authorities on the basis 
of an order – article 9 DSA 
Provision empowering competent national authorities to make 
orders to support disclosures relevant and required under the 
political ads initiative 
Point of contact and legal representative – article 10 and 11 DSA 
Retain relevant basic information (client account number, amount, 
data) on political ads transactions 
Participate in transaction data sharing (to enable complete 
disclosures) 
Traceability data – article 22 DSA [for third parties offering 
services through platforms]:  
 

the name, address, telephone number and email address of 
economic operator  
a copy of the identification document of the economic 
operator  
the bank account details of natural person; 
[etc.] 

 
 
Political ads ‘know your client’ data (traceability data + ): 

 

x 

x 

x 

x 

  where the advertiser is registered as a political campaign 
or as a political candidate, the register in which the 
advertiser is registered and its registration number or 
equivalent means of identification in that register; 
undertaking that applicable national rules have been 
complied with 

 

502 The DSA essentially groups the subjects of obligations into four groups: obligations applicable to all intermediaries, those applicable to hosting services, those applicable to 
platforms (public facing hosting services) and those applicable to very large platforms. The categories of subject identified for the political ads initiative do not map perfectly to 
this, but “Ad exchanges, ad networks, ad platforms” “Other online ad services” and “Other ad services” will usually fall under the DSA category of hosting service.  

200 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
 

certification that relevant personal data was handled in a 
manner which complies with the GDPR 

User-facing transparency of online advertising (labelling) – article 
24 DSA: 
 
 

that the information displayed is an advertisement; 
the natural or legal person on whose behalf the advertisement 
is displayed; 

  meaningful information about the main parameters used to 
determine the recipient to whom the advertisement is 
displayed (microtargeting transparency) 

User-facing transparency of online advertising (labelling) – extra 
(where relevant): 

 

 

 

the name of any associated political campaign (plus 
registration information where relevant) 
undertaking that a political (“issues”) ad not associated 
with political campaign  
Indication on the face of the ad that it was targeted (going 
beyond the DSA provision) 

Provide ad repository – article 30(1) DSA 
Interoperable repositories 
Ad repository transparency – article 30(2) DSA 
 
 

the content of the advertisement; 
the natural or legal person on whose behalf the advertisement 
is displayed; 
the period during which the advertisement was displayed; 

 
  whether the advertisement was intended to be displayed 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 
x 
x 

x 

x 

x 
x 
x 

x 

x 

 

specifically to one or more particular groups of recipients of 
the service and if so, the main parameters used for that 
purpose (microtargeting transparency); 
the total number of recipients of the service reached and, 
where applicable, aggregate numbers for the group or groups 
of recipients to whom the advertisement was targeted 
specifically. 

Ad repositories: spend and financial data transparency 
External risk assessment, auditing and public accountability – 
articles 25 – 33 DSA 

x 

x 

x 

x 

201 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
x 

x 
x 

x 
x 

x 
x 

x 

x 
x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 
x 

x 
x 

x 
x 

x 
x 

(?) 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

Maintain and report on political ads policy (including on targeting) 
Microtargeting: “clean targeting” label/info to be included on 
websites hosting banner ads 
Microtargeting limits (specified below) 
Public interest information promotion 
Code of conduct for online advertising – article 33 DSA 
Oversight – articles 38-49 

-  Competent authorities and Digital Services Coordinators 
- 
Jurisdiction (country of origin), requirements and powers 
-  Complaints and Penalties 
-  Cross-border cooperation and joint investigation 
-  European Board for Digital Services 

Extension of oversight 

-  Additional tasks (where the designated competent 
authorities already supervise the relevant economic 
actors/services and the tasks of the DSC can be adapted) 

-  Requirement to coordinate with additional national 

competent authorities 

Enhanced supervision for VLOPs (power to intervene to enforce 
the DSA) articles 50-66 DSA 
Investigatory powers 

- 
-  Fines 

x 
x 

x 

Additional enhanced supervision task to ensure compliance with 
political ads initiative 

x 

202 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9.4. Relevant EU-level governance bodies  

Instrument 

Digital Services Act 503 

Governance responsibility/powers 

National designated Digital Services Authorities   Member  States  shall  designate  one  or  more  competent  authorities,  responsible  for  the  application  and 
enforcement  of  the  DSA.  One  of  the  competent  authorities  shall  be  designated  as  the  Digital  Services 
Coordinator, responsible for ensuring coordination at  a national level.  The Member States in which the 
main  establishment  of  the  provider  of  intermediary  services  is  located  shall  have  jurisdiction.  If  the 
provider of intermediary services does not have an establishment in the EU, but offers services in the EU, 
it will be under the jurisdiction of the Member State where its legal representative resides or is established. 
If the provider of intermediary service does not have a legal representative, all Member States shall have 
jurisdiction. In these cases, where a Member State decides to exercise jurisdiction it shall inform all other 
Member States and ensure that the principle of ne bis in idem is respected.  

Digital  Services  Coordinators  shall  have  powers  of  investigation  (to  require  within  a  reasonable  time 
period information relating to a suspected infringement, to carry out on-site inspections of premises, to ask 
for explanations and to record the answers), and enforcement powers (to accept the commitments by the 
providers  and  to  make  those  commitments  binding,  to  order  the  cessation  of  infringement  and  impose 
remedies proportionate to the infringement and necessary to bring the infringement effectively to an end, 
to  impose  fines  and  periodic  penalty  payments,  to  adopt  interim  measures  to  avoid  the  risk  of  serious 
harm). 

When  all  other  powers  have  been  exhausted,  the  infringement  persists  and  causes  serious  harm,  DSCs 
shall  also  have  the  power  to  require  the  management  body  of  the  providers,  within  a  reasonable  time 
period,  to  examine  the  situation,  adopt  and  submit  an  action  plan  setting  out  the  necessary  measures  to 
terminate  the  infringement,  ensure  that  the  provider  takes  those  measures,  and  report  on  the  measures 
taken and, where the DSC considers that the provider has not sufficiently complied with the requirements, 
that the infringement persists and causes serious harm, and that the infringement entails a serious criminal 
offence involving a threat to the life or safety of persons, request the competent judicial authority of that 
Member  State  to  order  the  temporary  restriction  of  access  of  recipients  of  the  service  concerned  by  the 
infringement  or,  only  where  that  is  not  technically  feasible,  to  the  online  interface  of  the  provider  of 
intermediary services on which the infringement takes place. 

Member  States  shall  lay  down  the  rules  on  penalties  applicable  to  infringements  of  the  DSA  by 

503 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?qid=1608117147218&uri=COM%3A2020%3A825%3AFIN  

203 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
providers of intermediary services under their jurisdiction. Penalties shall be effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive. The maximum amount of penalties imposed for a failure to comply with the obligations laid 
down  in  this  Regulation  shall  not  exceed  6  %  of  the  annual  income  or  turnover  of  the  provider  of 
intermediary  services  concerned.  Penalties  for  the  supply  of  incorrect,  incomplete  or  misleading 
information, failure to reply or rectify incorrect, incomplete or misleading information and to submit to an 
on-site  inspection  shall  not  exceed  1%  of  the  annual  income  or  turnover  of  the  provider  concerned. 
Member States shall ensure that the maximum amount of a periodic penalty payment shall not exceed 5% 
of the average daily turnover of the provider of intermediary services concerned in the preceding financial 
year per day, calculated from the date specified in the decision concerned. 

Where a Digital Services Coordinator has reasons to suspect that a provider of an intermediary service, not 
under the jurisdiction of the Member State concerned, infringed this Regulation, it shall request the Digital 
Services  Coordinator  of  establishment  to  assess  the  matter  and  take  the  necessary  investigatory  and 
enforcement  measures  to  ensure  compliance  with  this  Regulation.  Digital  Services  Coordinators  may 
participate in joint investigations, which may be coordinated with the support of the Board, with regard to 
matters covered by the DSA, concerning providers of intermediary services operating in several Member 
States.  Where  a  Digital  Services  Coordinator  of  establishment  has  reasons  to  suspect  that  a  very  large 
online  platform  infringed  the  DSA,  it  may  request  the  Commission  to  take  the  necessary 
investigatory and enforcement measures. 

The  European  Board  for  Digital  Services  is  an  independent  advisory  group  of  Digital  Services 
Coordinators on the supervision of providers of intermediary services. The Board shall advise the Digital 
Services  Coordinators  and  the  Commission.  The  Board  shall  support  the  coordination  of  joint 
investigations,  support  the  competent  authorities  in  the  analysis  of  reports  and  results  of  audits    of  very 
large online platforms to be transmitted pursuant to the DSA, issue opinions, recommendations or advice 
to  Digital  Services  Coordinators,  advise  the  Commission  to  take  measures,  support  and  promote  the 
development  and  implementation  of  European    standards,  guidelines,  reports,  templates  and  code  of 
conducts as provided for in this Regulation, as well as the identification of emerging issues, with regard  to 
matters covered by the DSA. 

The Commission, acting either upon the Board’s recommendation or on its own initiative after consulting 
the Board, may initiate proceedings in view of the possible adoption of decisions in respect of the relevant 
conduct  by  the  very  large  online  platform  (VLOP)  that  is  suspected  of  having  infringed  any  of  the 
provisions  of  the  DSA  and  the  Digital  Services  Coordinator  of  establishment  either  did  not  take  any 
investigatory or enforcement measures or requested the Commission to intervene.  

The  Commission  may  require  the  VLOPs  concerned,  as  well  as  any  other  persons  acting  for  purposes 
related to their trade, business, craft or profession that may be reasonably be aware of information relating 
to the suspected infringement or the infringement, including organisations performing audits, to provide it 
with relevant information. The Commission may conduct on-site inspections at the premises of VLOPs; it 

204 

European Board for Digital Services  

European Commission 

 
 
E-Commerce directive504 

- 

Regulation  on  cooperation  between  national 
authorities  responsible  for  the  enforcement  of 
consumer protection laws (CPC Regulation)506 

Competent Authorities and single liaison office  

may  issue  fines;  it  may  make  binding  the  commitments  made  by  the  VLOP;  it  may  also  take  interim 
measures where there is an urgency due to the risk of serious damage for the recipients of the service. 

The  directive  does  not  establish  any  European-level  governance  body.  It  creates  obligations  for 
Member  States  to  have  adequate  means  of  supervision  and  investigation  necessary  to  implement  the 
Directive  effectively  and  to  cooperate  with  other  Member  States,  appointing  one  or  several  contact 
points.505 

The e-Commerce Directive also encourages the use of alternatives enforcement instruments such as codes 
of conduct at the EU level or out-of-court dispute settlement schemes.  

Each Member State shall designate one or more competent authorities and the single liaison office that 
are  responsible  for  the  application  of  this  Regulation  (which  concerns  other  consumer  protection  laws). 
Within each Member State, the single liaison office is  responsible for coordinating the investigation and 
enforcement activities of the competent authorities.507 

Mutual Assistance Mechanism  

This Mechanism allows national competent authorities to request information and enforcement measures, 
from another national competent authority.508 

Coordinated 
Investigation  and  Enforcement 
Mechanisms  for  Widespread  Infringements  and 
for  Widespread  Infringements  with  a  Union 
Dimension  

Where there is a reasonable suspicion that a widespread infringement or widespread infringement with a 
Union  dimension  is  taking  place,  competent  authorities  concerned  by  that  infringement  and  the 
Commission shall inform each other and the single liaison offices concerned by that infringement without 
delay. The competent authorities concerned by  the  widespread infringement or  widespread infringement 
with  a  Union  dimension  shall  coordinate  the  investigation  and  enforcement  measures  that  they  take  to 
address  those  infringements.  They  shall  exchange  all  necessary  evidence  and  information  and  provide 
each  other  and  the  Commission  with  any  necessary  assistance  without  delay.  Where  appropriate,  the 

504 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32000L0031  
505 Article 19 of the Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects  of information society services, in particular 
electronic commerce, in the Internal Market ('Directive on electronic commerce'). 
506 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32017R2394  
507 Article 5 of the Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for 
the enforcement of consumer protection laws and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004. 
508 Articles 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the Regulation. 

205 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Recommendation on election cooperation 
networks, online transparency, protection 
against cybersecurity incidents and fighting 
disinformation campaigns in the context of 
elections to the European Parliament510 

ECNE - European Cooperation Network on 
Elections 

AudioVisual Media Services Directive511 

Contact Committee  

competent authorities may invite Commission officials and other accompanying persons, who have been 
authorised  by  the  Commission,  to  participate  in  the  coordinated  investigations,  enforcement  actions  and 
other measures.509 

Each Member State should set up a national election network, involving national authorities with 
competence for electoral matters and authorities in charge of monitoring and enforcing rules related to 
online activities relevant to the electoral context. The European Cooperation Network on Elections 
(ECNE) should facilitate the swift, secured exchange of information on issues capable of affecting the 
elections to the European Parliament including by jointly identifying threats and gaps, sharing findings 
and expertise, and liaising on the application and enforcement of relevant rules in the online environment. 
This forum provides the nucleus for real time European alert process and a forum for exchange of 
information and practices among Member State authorities. The online application of offline rules relevant 
to the electoral context, including inter alia measures to ensure transparency in online political advertising, 
is listed as one of the ECNE’s objectives. 

A  contact  committee  is  established  under  the  aegis  of  the  Commission.  It  shall  be  composed  of 
representatives  of  the  competent  authorities  of  the  Member  States.  The  tasks  of  the  contact  committee 
shall be to facilitate effective implementation of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive through regular 
consultation on any practical problems arising from its application, to deliver opinions on the application 
of the Directive by the Member States, to be the forum for an exchange of views, to discuss the outcome 
of regular consultations which the  Commission holds with representatives of broadcasting organisations, 
producers, consumers, manufacturers, service  providers and trade unions and the creative community, to 
facilitate  the exchange of information between the  Member States and the Commission on the situation 
and  the development of regulatory activities regarding audiovisual media services, taking account of the 

509 Chapter IV (Articles 15 to 25) of the Regulation. 
510 C(2019) 5949 final, and ECNE terms of reference https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/terms_of_reference.pdf  
511 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32010L0013 and revised with https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/1808/oj  

206 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
Commission Decision on establishing the 
European Regulators Group for Audiovisual 
Media Services513 

ERGA – European Regulators Group for 
Audiovisual Media Services 

Union’s audiovisual policy, as well as relevant developments in the  technical field and to  examine any 
development arising in the sector on which  an exchange of views appears useful. 512 

The  European  Regulators  Group  for  Audiovisual  Media  Services  (ERGA)  is  an  advisory  body  to  the 
Commission.  The  group’s  task  shall  be  to  advise  and  assist  the  Commission,  in  its  work  to  ensure  a 
coordinated  and  consistent  implementation  in  all  Member  States  of  the  regulatory  framework  for 
audiovisual media services;  to assist and advise the Commission, as to any matter related to audiovisual 
media services within the Commission's competence.  

Unfair Commercial Practices Directive514 

- 

The directive does not establish any European level governance body.  

Misleading and comparative advertising 
directive515 

- 

Consumer Rights Directive516 

The directive does not establish any European level governance body. Member States shall ensure that 
adequate  and  effective  means  exist  to  combat  misleading  advertising  and  enforce  compliance  with  the 
provisions on comparative advertising in the interests of traders and competitors. 

- 

The directive does not establish any European level governance body. 

Platform-to-Business Regulation517 

- 

The  Regulationdoes  not  establish  any  European  level  governance  body.  Member  States  are  not 
obliged neither to create new enforcement bodies (they can entrust existing authorities for ensuring such 
an implementation) nor to provide for ex officio enforcement or to impose fines. 

512 Article 29 of the Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation 
or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive). 
513 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/commission-decision-establishing-european-regulators-group-audiovisual-media-services.  
514 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1585324585932&uri=CELEX%3A02005L0029-20220528  
515 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32006L0114  
516 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32011L0083  
517 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1150  

207 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
General Data Protection Regulation518 

Supervisory authority 

European Data Protection Board 

Each Member State shall provide for one or more independent public authorities to be responsible 
for  monitoring  the  application  of  the  Regulation.  Each  supervisory  authority  shall,  on  its  territory, 
monitor  and  enforce  the  application  of  the  Regulation,  handle  complaints  lodged  by  a  data  subject, 
investigate, to the extent appropriate, the subject matter of the complaint and inform the complainant of 
the  progress  and  the  outcome  of  the  investigation  within  a  reasonable  period,  in  particular  if  further 
investigation  or  coordination  with  another  supervisory  authority  is  necessary,  cooperate  with,  including 
sharing  information  and  provide  mutual  assistance  to,  other  supervisory  authorities  with  a  view  to 
ensuring the consistency of application and enforcement of the Regulation, conduct investigations on the 
application of this Regulation, among other tasks. Each supervisory shall have  investigative, corrective, 
authorisation and advisory powers. 

The  lead  supervisory  authority  shall  cooperate  with  the  other  supervisory  authorities  concerned  in  an 
endeavour  to  reach  consensus;  they  shall  exchange  all  relevant  information  with  each  other.  The  lead 
authority may request at any time other supervisory authorities concerned to provide mutual assistance and 
may  conduct  joint  operations,  in  particular  for  carrying  out  investigations  or  for  monitoring  the 
implementation of a measure concerning a controller or processor established in another Member State. 

The European Data Protection Board is established as a body of the Union with legal personality. It is 
represented by its Chair, and composed of the head of one supervisory authority of each Member State and 
of the  European Data Protection Supervisor. It shall  ensure the consistent application of  the Regulation, 
advise  the  Commission  on  any  issue  related  to  the  protection  of  personal  data,  issue  guidelines, 
recommendations, and best practices, encourage the drawing-up of codes of conduct and the establishment 
of data protection certification mechanisms and data protection seals and marks, promote the cooperation 
and  the  effective  bilateral  and  multilateral  exchange  of  information  and  best  practices  between  the 
supervisory authorities.  

518 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016R0679  

208 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
9.13. EU acquis on European Political Parties 

European Political Parties (EUPPs) are regulated under the Regulation No 1141/2014 on 
the  statute  and  funding  of  European  political  parties  and  European  political 
foundations.519  The  regulation  provides  certain  limits  to  the  use  of  public  funds  by 
EUPPs, and financial reporting obligations guaranteeing that the funding and spending of 
EUPPs is transparent to the public. It permits EUPPs to campaign at European level, and 
requires EUPPs to obey relevant national rules when doing so.  

Regulation  1141/2014  includes  obligations  relevant  for  online  political  advertising 
conducted  by  EUPPs.  These  include  yearly  transparency  obligations  in  relation  to 
donations  and  contributions,  and  in  relation  to  the  financing  and  expenditures  for 
electoral campaigns. These take the form of financial statements, later made available to 
the  general  public  by  the  European  Parliament,520  and  where  the  EUPPs  traditionally 
distinguish  between  expenditure  on  print,  audiovisual  and  online  ads.  However,  it  is 
unknown  how  many  of  these  are  political  ads  (in  the  sense  of  conveying  a  political 
message – like issues ads do – as opposed to mere informational content such as when the 
elections  will  be  hosted),  though  the  proportion  is  reported  to  be  growing.521  Further, 
while  expenditure  linked  to  the  campaigns  is  to  be  clearly  identified  as  such  by  the 
EUPPs  in  their  annual  financial  statements,  this  does  not  guarantee  that  the  public  can 
identify with enough granularity what the resources spent in the campaign are or to which 
demographics they are targeted, and interested actors and public authorities cannot hold 
EUPPs  accountable  in  real-time  for  their  expenditures  in  online  political  advertising 
during elections (the statements are provided more than a year after the money has been 
used). 

The Regulation does not address online political advertising directly – only with respect 
to  the  rules  regarding  the  application  of  funds.  However,  it  restricts  European  political 
foundations to applying their funds to an exhaustive list of tasks, which does not include 
political ads – which means that in practice the foundations are prohibited from running 
political ads. In addition, the Regulation prohibits EUPPs and foundations from financing 
referendum campaigns. 

Besides this, this regulation sets the conditions to qualify as a EUPP and foundation. Both 
must observe, in particular in their programme and in their activities, the values on which 
the Union is founded, as expressed in Article 2 TEU, namely respect for human dignity, 
freedom,  democracy,  equality,  the  rule  of  law  and  respect  for  human  rights.  The 
Regulation  also  provides  for  an  Authority  for  EUPPs  and  European  foundations, 
established  for  the  purpose  of  registering,  controlling  and  imposing  sanctions  on  these 
entities. It further provides for an independent committee of independent eminent persons 
which, when requested by the Authority, shall give an opinion on any possible manifest 
and  serious  breach  of  the  values  on  which  the  Union  is  founded,  by  a  EUPP  or  a 
European political foundation. In particular, it shall assess whether a EUPP or a European 
political foundation has deliberately influenced or attempted to influence the outcome of 

519 Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 1141/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 on 
the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014R1141-20190327   
520 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/groups/accounts_en.htm    
521 As reported in the Commission’s 2019 European Parliamentary elections report, p13. 

209 

 
 
                                                           
elections  to  the  European  Parliament  by  taking  advantage  of  an  infringement  of  the 
applicable  rules  on  protection  of  personal  data.  Where,  in  accordance  with  the 
verification procedure, that is found to be the case, the Authority is to impose sanctions. 
This  is  particularly relevant  for political  advertising following the Cambridge Analytica 
case.  

 On  applying  for  funding,  EUPPs  must  provide  evidence  that  their  EU  member  parties 
have, as a rule, published on their websites, in a clearly visible and user-friendly manner, 
throughout  the  12  months  preceding  the  final  date  for  submission  of  applications,  the 
political programme and logo of the EUPP.  

In terms of governance, the Regulation clarifies that EUPPs shall be governed either by 
the regulation  itself, or,  in  matter not  regulated  by the regulation  or matters only partly 
regulated  by  it,  by  the  law  of  the  Member  States  in  which  the  EUPPs  and  foundations 
have  their  respective  seats.  However,  the  activities  carried  out  in  other  Member  States 
shall  be  governed  by  the  relevant  national  laws  of  those  Member  States.  (This  shows 
how, in the absence of a common European legislation, EUPPs are subjected to different 
national laws regarding the transparency of political advertising.) 

Table 8.5. Mapping obligations for EU Political Parties under Regulation 1141/2014 
and as amended under Regulation 2019/493   

Definitions (Article 2) 

‘European Political Party’ 

'European  political  foundation'  means  an  entity  which  is  formally  affiliated  with  a  EUPP,  which  is 
registered with the Authority, and which through its activities, within the aims and fundamental values 
pursued by the Union, underpins and  complements the objectives of the EUPP by performing one or 
more of the following tasks: 

(a) observing, analysing and contributing to the debate on European public policy issues and on 
the process of European integration; 
(b)  developing  activities  linked  to  European  public  policy  issues,  such  as  organising  and 
supporting  seminars,  training,  conferences  and  studies  on  such  issues  between  relevant 
stakeholders, including youth organisations and other representatives of civil society; 
(c) developing cooperation in order to promote democracy, including in third countries; 
(d)  serving  as  a  framework  for  national  political  foundations,  academics,  and  other  relevant 
actors to work together at European level; 

Prohibition of funding (Article 22) 

The funding of European political foundations from the general budget of the European Union or from 
any  other  source  shall  not  be  used  for  any  other  purpose  than  for  financing  their  tasks  and  to  meet 
expenditure directly linked to the objectives set out in their statutes. 

The  funding  of  EUPPs  and  European  political  foundations  from  the  general  budget  of  the  European 
Union or from any other source shall not be used to finance referendum campaigns. 

Accounts, reporting and audit obligations (Article 23)  

Within six months following the end of the financial year, EUPPs and European political foundations 
shall submit to the Authority: 

Their  annual  financial  statements  and  accompanying  notes,  covering  their  revenue  and  expenditure, 
assets and liabilities at the beginning and at the end of the financial year, in accordance with the law 
applicable in the Member State in which they have their seat and their annual financial statements on 

210 

 
 
 
the basis of the international accounting standards. 

An  external  audit  report  on  the  annual  financial  statements,  covering  both  the  reliability  of  those 
financial statements and the legality and regularity of their revenue and expenditure, carried out by an 
independent body or expert. 

The list of donors and contributors and their corresponding donations or contributions. 

Conditions for registration (Article 3)  

In  order  to  be  registered,  a  EUPP  or  European  Political  Foundation  must  observe,  among  other 
requirements, the values on which the Union is founded, as expressed in Article 2 TEU, namely respect 
for  human  dignity,  freedom,  democracy,  equality,  the  rule  of  law  and  respect  for  human  rights, 
including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. 

Sanctions (Article 27)  

Removal  of  the  EUPP  or  the  European  political  foundation  from  the  Register  (losing  legal  status  of 
EUPP) 

Financial sanctions  

Exclusion from Union funding for up to five years (or ten years in cases of repeated infringements)  

Responsibility of natural persons (Article 27a)  

Where  the  Authority  imposes  a  financial  sanction,  it  may  establish  that  a  natural  person  is  also 
responsible for the infringement.  

Authority for EUPPs and European political foundations (Articles 6 and 10) 

 An  independent  Authority  is  established  for  the  purpose  of  registering,  controlling  and  imposing 
sanctions  on  EUPPs  and  European  political  foundations  in  accordance  with  the  Regulation.  The 
Authority shall assess EUPPs’ compliance and shall decide on their registration and de-registration. 
Committee of independent eminent persons (Article 11)  
When requested by the Authority, the committee shall give an opinion on any possible manifest and 
serious  breach  of  the  values  on  which  the  Union  is  founded,  by  a  EUPP  or  a  European  political 
foundation.  To  that  end,  the  committee  may  request  any  relevant  document  and  evidence  from  the 
Authority,  the  European  Parliament,  the  EUPP  or  European  political  foundation  concerned,  other 
political  parties,  political  foundations  or  other  stakeholders,  and  it  may  request  to  hear  their 
representatives. 
Verification  procedure  (‘Article  10a):  If  the  Authority  is  informed  of  a  decision  of  a  national 
supervisory authority under the GDPR finding that a natural or legal person has infringed applicable 
rules on the protection of personal data, and if it follows from that decision, or if there are otherwise 
reasonable  grounds  to  believe,  that  the  infringement  is  linked  to  political  activities  by  a  EUPP  or  a 
European  political  foundation  in  the  context  of  elections  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Authority 
shall refer this matter to the committee of independent eminent persons. The committee shall give an 
opinion as to whether the EUPP or European political foundation concerned has deliberately influenced 
or attempted to influence the outcome of elections to the European Parliament by taking advantage of 
that infringement. The Authority shall decide whether to impose financial sanctions.  

211 

 
 
 
 
 
Annex 9: Illustrative use cases 

This  Annex  draws  attention  to  the  complexity  and  high  costs  falling  upon  economic 
actors and political parties wishing to engage in cross-border advertising services, in the 
present  state  of  non-harmonised  national  obligations  related  to  political  advertising 
activities. A number of use cases are provided to illustrate issues that can arise, including: 
additional  costs,  tensions  or  legal  uncertainty  regarding  the  applicable  rules  for  the 
provision  of  cross-border  services;  demanding  compliance  efforts  (such  as  training 
personnel,  complying  with  different  information  obligations  in  the  various  Member 
States,  requiring  legal  advice,  or  even  refraining  from  offering  cross-border  services); 
potential problems regarding the control and enforcement of national laws by the relevant 
authority, and circumvention issues.  

The  scenarios  below  envisage  the  provision  of  various  advertising  services  from  one 
Member State (MS A) to another (MS  B), with  one particular economic actor of the ad 
chain in focus (it may be a service provider, an ad intermediary, a social media platform, 
a political consultancy or communications agency, a website; it can be online or offline). 
Each  use  case  is  presented  in  the  form  of  a  table,  where  the  relevant  obligations 
applicable to both the political party and the economic actor are highlighted.  

Some use cases (such as 1 & 2) are to be read together, as they contrast one cross-border 
scenario  with  its  reverse,  highlighting  the  difference  in  terms  of  applicable  obligations, 
costs  and  constraints  –  and  in  particular,  where  applicable,  the  fact  that  a  service  is 
possible from MS A to MS B but not from MS B to MS A.  

Scenarios 

1)  SI service provider of online political advertising providing its services to HR 

political party 

From perspective of service provider 
in MS A 

From perspective of political party in MS B 

Slovenian 

legislation, 

Under 
the 
Slovenian  service  provider  can  provide 
its  services  to  a  Croatian  political  party 
outside  elections  period  and during  pre-
election campaigns. 

illustrate,  during 

the  2019  EP 
To 
elections, there  was political  advertising 
expenditures  from  Slovenia  to  Croatia, 
which amounted to €130,300.522 

HR  covers  political  ads  by  the  broader  concept  of  “election 
campaign”.  Political  actors  are  to  report  on  their  expenses 
on  social  platforms  (indicating  the  name  of  the  social 
network):  The  report  on  costs  (expenses)  referred  to  in 
paragraph 4 of this Article shall include the costs of advertising 
the  election  campaign  on  social  networks  and  the  costs  of 
media  advertising,  the  latter  of  which  shall  be  detailed  in  the 
report  on  media  advertising  of  the  election  campaign  referred 
to in Article 12 of this Ordinance.523  

522 Source: underlying study, table 2 (Bilateral cross-border expenditure in the 2019 EP elections). 
523  Ordinance  on  the  manner  of  keeping  records,  issuing  certificates  and  entering  reports  on  financing  political 
activities,  election  campaigns  and  referendums  in  the  information  system  for  financing  supervision  (Official  Gazette 
71/19). 

212 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
2)  HR service provider of online political advertising providing its services to SI 

political party 

From perspective of 
service provider in MS A 

From perspective of political party in MS B 

in 

Croatian 

The 
service 
provider  can  provide  its 
services 
to  a  Slovenian 
outside 
party 
political 
elections period and during 
campaigns, 
pre-election 
Croatia, 
whereas 
not 
advertising 
for  political 
permitted 
parties, 
and 
independent 
except 
representatives, 
during  election  campaigns 
in 
a 
accordance  with 
special  law  (art.  30  of  the 
Electronic media act). 

coalitions 

is 

The  principal  piece  of  legislation  governing  political  advertising  is  the 
Election  and  Referendum  Campaign  Act.  There  is  a  special  act  governing 
provisions  on  public  radio  and  television  during  the  campaign  periods 
(Radiotelevizija  Act).  On  financing,  the  Political  Parties  Act  is  also 
important.  There  is  no  legislation  governing  specifically  online  political 
advertising. 
Political  advertising  is  defined  by  Article  25  of  the  Slovenian  Advertising 
Codex  adopted  by  the  Slovenian  Advertising  Chamber:  “Any  advertising 
during  elections,  referendums  or  related  political  activities  in  accordance 
with the applicable regulations governing this area”. 

Paid  political  advertising  outside  elections  period  and  during  pre-
election campaigns is allowed in Slovenia.  

While the costs of the election campaign are legally limited as they may not 
exceed  the  maximum  allowable  expenditure,  the  costs  outside  the  election 
campaign for spending on advertising is unlimited. 
These  rules  (on  costs)  apply  to  all  political  advertising,  with  no 
distinction between "offline" and "online" political advertising. 

All propaganda that could change the opinion of  voters is  forbidden during 
the "election silence".  The posting of new posters during the election silence 
is  forbidden.  Since  the  2016  Supreme  Court  judgment,  the  election  silence 
applies  only  to  organisers  of  election  campaigns,  political  parties  and 
candidates  (case  IV  Ips  31/2016).  These  rules  are  also  applicable  and 
enforced online. 
There  are  no  particular  Slovenian  rules  applicable  to  online  platforms  and 
intermediaries such as social media: The same rules apply to online platforms 
as for offline media. 
[In Croatia, there are no specific regulations on online advertising during the 
pre/election  period.    The  Electronic  Media  Act  provides  for  general 
provisions  on  online  publications,  however  they  do  not  apply  to  social 
media.] 

3)  BE service provider of online political advertising providing its services to FR 

political party 

Instrument  From perspective of service provider in MS A 

French 
legislation 

The FR rules are quite strict  
FR  Electoral  Code  can  be  considered  to  define  online  political 
advertising  in  Article  L48-1,  which  specifies  that  the  prohibitions  and 
restrictions rules on electoral propaganda are applicable to any  message 
having  the  character  of  electoral  propaganda  disseminated  by  any 
means  of  communication  to  the  public  by  electronic  means.  It  must 
be  underlined  that  the  ban  on  distributing  publicity  for  propaganda 

From 
perspective of 
political party 
in MS B 
FR  rule  Art.  L-
52-16 :  No  form 
of 
commercial 
advertising  may 
for 
used 
be 
electoral 
purposes  for  the 

213 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of 

a 
benefit 
candidate  or  a 
list of candidates 
without 
the 
express  consent 
of  the  candidate, 
person 
the 
responsible 
for 
the  list  or  their 
qualified 
duly 
representative. 

purposes prohibits the commercial referencing of a website in  a search 
engine prior to an election, but not the creation of a website that is only 
accessible to voters who visit it intentionally. 

Article  L.  163-1  of  the  Electoral  Code  imposes  on  online  platform 
operators  transparency  obligations  relating  to  the  promotion  of 
information  content  linked  to  a  debate  of general  interest.  As  such, 
online  platforms  and  intermediaries  whose  number  of  connections 
on French territory exceeds 5  million unique visitors per  month on 
average per year must provide the users with fair, clear and transparent 
information  on  the  identity  of  the  private  person  or  the  company, 
which  pays  to  the  platform  for  the  promotion  of  information  content 
related  to  a  debate  of  general  interest  (décret  No  2019/297  du  10  avril 
2019).  
Online platforms and intermediaries must also make public the amount 
of the remuneration received for the promotion of such  content  when 
the amount exceeds a specific threshold. This information must be made 
available  to  the  public  in  a  register,  regularly  updated  during  the 
campaigning period. It is perfectly legal for a political party, candidate, 
or campaign to have a  website, a  Facebook page, a  Twitter account,  or 
any  similar  internet  presence,  but  it  is  illegal  to  pay  for  political 
advertising  during  the  period  that  runs  from  the  first  day  of  the  sixth 
month before an election, up to the end of the election. For example, the 
first round of the last French presidential election took place on 23 April 
2017, and the second round took place on 7 May 2017. From 1 October 
2016,  until  the  closing  of  the  last  polling  station  on  7  May  2017,  the 
candidates and their campaigns were prohibited from buying ads on the 
internet.  This  includes  not  only  banner  ads,  but  also  other  advertising 
techniques such as paid referencing, sponsored links, or the purchase of 
key words on search engines. 

Law  against  the  dissemination  of  false  information  of  22  December 
2018:  
Online  platforms  are  required  to  establish  a  way  for  users  to  flag 
false information likely to disturb public order or alter the sincerity 
of elections, especially when it is in content promoted for a third party. 
This method of flagging false information must be “easily accessible and 
visible.” Furthermore, online platforms are encouraged to take measures 
such as 

 
 

 

 

 

 

improving the transparency of their algorithms, 
promoting content from press agencies and radio and television 
services, 
fighting  against  accounts  that  massively  disseminate  fake 
information, 
the  person(s)  or 
informing  users  of 
organization(s) that bought paid content related to “a debate of 
national interest,” 
informing  users  of 
broadcasting content, and 
educating people about the media and information. 

the  nature,  origin,  and  manner  of 

identity  of 

the 

Article  13:  Online  platform  operators  must  designate  a  legal 
representative  in  France  to  serve  as  a  point  of  contact  for  the 
application of these provisions 

Some  provisions  of  this  law  aim  to  improve  transparency  for  political 

214 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
advertising  on  the  internet.  Specifically,  the  law  amended  the  Electoral 
Code to provide  that online platforms with at least five million unique 
visitors per month  must, during the three months preceding the first 
day  of  a  month  during  which  a  national  election  is  scheduled,  and 
until the end of that election, provide users with “faithful, clear, and 
transparent  information  on  the  identity”  of  the  person(s)  or 
organisation(s)  that  bought  paid  content  related  to  “a  debate  of 
national  interest.”  Additionally,  during  that  same  time-frame,  online 
platforms  are  required  to  give  their  users  “faithful,  clear  and 
transparent  information  on  the  use  of  their  personal  data  in  the 
context  of  promoted  information  content  related  to  a  debate  of 
national  interest.”  Furthermore,  during  the  same  time  period,  online 
platforms that are paid €100 or more per sponsored content must make 
the payment amount  public. Failure to abide by these requirements is 
punishable by up to one year in jail and a fine of €75,000. 
If  personal  data  is  processed,  the  GDPR  applies,  meaning  certain 
obligations fall on the controller. In particular, depending on the kind of 
service  offered  by  the  Belgian  service  provider,  and  in  particular 
depending  on  the  extent  to  which  either  side  defines  the  means  and 
purposes  of  the  processing,  either  the  political  party  will  be  the  data 
controller  and  the  service  provider  its  processor,  or  they  will  both  be 
joint controllers. 

GDPR 

Of particular relevance here is the French DPA’s guidance524 on political 
parties’  processing  of  personal  data  originating  from  social  media.  The 
DPA  distinguishes  between  two  categories  of  relevant  social  media 
users: the users who are in ‘regular contact’ with the political party (e.g. 
those who ‘follow’ an political actor’s social media page, if the said page 
duly  informs  them  about  the  data  collected,  the  purpose,  and  how  to 
object), and the users who have merely an ‘occasional contact’ with the 
party (e.g. they merely ‘liked’ one of its social media posts). The DPA’s 
guidance  indicates  that  the  consent  of  regular  contacts  (with  due 
transparency  on  the  aims,  means,  etc.  of  the  processing,  and  due 
respect to other GDPR obligations) is enough for the political party 
to process their personal data for 
- 
- 

sending them messages of political nature. 
enriching  and  cross-matching  the  party’s  database  about  its 
supporters (those that are regular contacts) on social media. 
profiling and targeting them. 

- 

As it intends to rely on the Belgian service provider to process its regular 
contacts’ data  as part of its electoral strategy, the French political party 
must have duly respected transparency requirements under GDPR article 
13. In particular, prior to providing their consent, these ‘regular contacts’ 
must  have  been  informed  about  the  purposes  of  the  processing  and  the 
recipients or categories of recipients of the personal data (the BE service 
provider). Depending on the role of the Belgian service provider (i.e. if it 
is  a  joint  controller,  not  a  data  processor),  it  may  have  to  take 
appropriate  actions  to  ensure  these  information  obligations  are 
fulfilled.  

Belgian 

The 
DPA’s 
guidance525 
is 
relatively similar 
to the FR on this 
topic.  
As  long  as  they 
duly 
are 
informed and are 
to  object 
able 
the 
anytime, 
subjects’ 
data 
consent 
is  not 
required  if  there 
is  an  existing 
relation  between 
the 
them  and 
party.  
the 
However, 
guidance 
only 
mentions this for 
the  purpose  of 
the 
“presenting 
person 
with 
political 
propaganda 
the 
within 
framework 
of 
elections”  (thus 
not for profiling, 
enriching 
databases, etc.)  

https://www.cnil.fr/fr/communication-politique-quelles-sont-les-regles-pour-lutilisation-des-donnees-issues-des-

524 
reseaux  
525 https://www.autoriteprotectiondonnees.be/publications/note-juridique-sur-les-elections.pdf  

215 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
4)  FR service provider of online political advertising providing its services to BE 

political party 

Instrument  From perspective of service provider 

From perspective of political party in MS B 

Political  parties  are  free  to  use  online  platforms 
(social  media)  for  political  advertising  /  self-
promotion. 

de 

l'élection 

la  Chambre 

Law of 4 July 1989. - Loi relative à la limitation 
et au contrôle des dépenses électorales [engagées 
[pour 
des 
représentants],  ainsi  qu'au  financement  et  à  la 
comptabilité ouverte des partis politiques. 
Art. 2: Paid political ads are allowed during pre-
election  campaigns.  No  party  is  allowed  to 
spend  more  than  EUR  1  Mio  for  an  election 
campaign.  According  to  VVA,  these  rules  are 
not  specifically  applicable/enforceable  online. 
Art. 4 §3 9° indeed states that « The following are 
not considered as election propaganda expenses: 
expenses relating to the creation, adaptation and 
management of Internet applications» 
Art.  4  provides  for  the  definition  of  electoral 
propaganda  expenses  as  being  all  expenses  and 
all  financial  commitments  relating  to  verbal, 
written,  audio  and  visual  messages,  intended  to 
favourably influence the result of a political party 
and its candidates and issued within four months 
preceding the elections. Yet,  there is no specific 
definition of online political advertising. 

Belgian 
legislation 

in MS A 

There  are  no  particular 
rules 
concerning  online  platforms  (social 
for  political  advertising. 
media) 
is  no  definition  of  online 
There 
political advertising. 
The  Vlaamse  Regulator  voor  de  Media 
recommends 
transparency 
imposing 
obligations such as found in the Code of 
practice  to  tackle  the  spread  of  online 
disinformation and false information. 

GDPR 

guidance526 
The  Belgian  DPA’s 
indicates  that  political  parties  do  not 
need the data subjects’ consent to serve 
them  “political  propaganda  within  the 
framework of elections” when these are 
in  regular  contact  with  the  party  (e.g. 
members)  –  provided 
they  duly 
informed about the purposes of the data 
processing  and  are  able  to  object  to  it 
anytime. 

is 

Despite  being  in  the  same  spirit,  the 
French  DPA’s  guidance527 
less 
permissive,  as  it  requires  consent  for 
targeting  these  regular  contacts  with 
political ads.  
arrangement 
contractual 
their 
In 
(between  controller  and  processor),  the 
BE  party  and  the  FR  service  provider 

526 https://www.autoriteprotectiondonnees.be/publications/note-juridique-sur-les-elections.pdf  
527 
reseaux  

https://www.cnil.fr/fr/communication-politique-quelles-sont-les-regles-pour-lutilisation-des-donnees-issues-des-

216 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
will  have  to  be  clear  with  each  other: 
the  BE  party  about  what  it  wants  the 
service  provider  to  do,  and  the  FR 
service provider about what it is legally 
allowed to do.  
In  consequence:  The  BE  political  party 
is  in  practice  incentivised  (but  not 
obliged) to rely on the services of a BE 
service  provider 
the 
services  of  a  FR  service  provider, 
because 
the 
political  party  to  collect  its  regular 
contacts’  consent  –  whereas  the  BE 
doesn’t.  

instead  of  on 

the  FR  one 

requires 

5)  Online social media platform established in France wishes to offer politically-
targeted political ads528 to ad agency in Spain, for circulation in Spain.  

This use case lists the obligations that fall upon two economic actors under the GDPR, AVMSD 
and DSA.  
As the GDPR is a Regulation, the same obligations apply in ES as in FR. The ES rules on the 
processing  of  sensitive  personal  data  are  more  restrictive  than  the  FR  rules,  however,  and  this 
impacts  what  kind  of  cross-border  advertising  services  can  be  offered.  This  is  specifically 
permitted  by  the  GDPR  .  It  is  a  limited  example  of  where  there  could  be  some  tensions  in  the 
legal  framework  applicable  to  market  actors  and  one  where  we  there  is  a  possibility  of  the 
national rule being circumvented in a cross-border context. 

Instrument  From  perspective  of  platform  (publisher)  in 

France 

From perspective of ad agency (advertiser) in 
Spain 

GDPR 

The  GDPR  rules  on  personal  data  processing 
apply. 
The creation and use of a social media account 
involves 
the  disclosure  of  a  number  of 
attributes,  which  may  include  name,  date  of 
birth,  gender,  place  of  residence,  or  political 
interests, for instance. This personal data can be 
used by the platform to develop criteria, based 
on  which  specific  ads  will  be  addressed  at  the 
users. 
To target users  with political  ads, the  platform 
first  comply  with  data  processing 
must 
principles  (e.g.  fairness,  data  minimisation, 
accountability)  and  have  a  valid  legal  basis 
(consent,  as  per  the  EDPB  Guidelines  on  the 
targeting of social media users, p18, p32). 

Article  9  GDPR  prohibits  the  processing  of 

The EDPB Guidelines on the targeting of social 
media  users  state  (para  117)  that  “If  a  targeter 
engages  a  social  media  provider  and  requests 
that  the  social  media  provider  targets  users 
based on a special category of data, the targeter 
will be jointly responsible [i.e. a joint controller] 
the 
with 
processing of the special category data.”  
The  Spanish  ad  agency  is  therefore  a  joint 
controller  in  this  case,  and  will  have  to  respect 
the  GDPR’s  rules  and  fulfil 
its  relevant 
obligations (cf. column on the left). 

the  social  media  provider 

for 

However,  a  Spanish  enactment  taken  to  adapt 
national laws to the GDPR, the Organic Law on 
Protection  of  Personal  Data  and  Guarantee  of 
Digital  Rights,  includes  a  provision  which 
affects  the  conditions  for  giving  consent  as  an 

528 Politically-targeted political ads are targeted based on sensitive data (GDPR article 9, ‘special categories of data’). 
They are a sub-set of the broader category of political targeted ads, which could also be targeted based on non-sensitive 
data, e.g. one’s age or location (if the latter is not used as a proxy for political opinions). 

217 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
special  categories  of  personal  data,  including 
personal  data  revealing  political  opinions, 
unless  one  relies  on  one  of  the  exemptions 
listed  in  the  article.  The  EDPB  Guidelines  on 
the  targeting  of  social  media  users  indicate 
(p18, p32) that the only adequate exemption for 
processing  special  category  of  data 
for 
targeting  purposes  would  be  the  data  subject’s 
explicit consent. 

The  French  social  media  provider  must 
therefore have been very transparent toward the 
user  about  the  processing  of  personal  data  and 
the serving of targeted ads on its platform. The 
consent  it  has  queried  from  the  social  media 
users  must  have  been  explicitly  about  the 
processing  of 
limited 
categories  of)  the  users’  personal  sensitive 
personal  data,  for  the  (limited)  purposes  of 
profiling them and targeting them with political 
ads.  (Blanket  collection  of  data,  for  vaguely-
defined  or  broad  purposes  is  not  allowed  in 
view  of  the  fairness,  purpose  limitation  and 
data minimisation principles.) 

(well-defined  and 

in 

The  EDPB  Statement  2/2019  on  the  use  of 
the  course  of  political 
personal  data 
campaigns  indicates  that  affecting  a  person's 
vote in an election through automated decision-
making  counts  as  a  legal  effect,  and  that 
“Profiling  connected 
targeted  campaign 
to 
messaging  may  in  certain  circumstances  cause 
‘similarly  significant  effects’.”  In  light  of  this, 
article  22  GDPR  (automated  decision-making) 
applies.  Because  of  that,  the  platform  must 
always  facilitate  the  social  media  users  the 
exercise of their right to withdraw consent and 
not to be subject to the processing any more. 

and 

(article 

35(3)(a) 

In  view  of  the  above,  the  platform  must  also 
have  conducted  a  Data  Protection  Impact 
Assessment 
(b)) 
beforehand.  
To fulfil the requirements of Article 15 GDPR 
(right of access) and to ensure full transparency 
in this context, the measures of the social media 
provider  to  facilitate  the  exercise  of  this  right 
should 
implementation  of  a 
mechanism  for  data  subjects  to  check  their 
profile  and  how  they  have  been  profiled, 
including details of the information and sources 
used  to  develop  the  profile  (EDPB  Guidelines 

include 

the 

appropriate  legal  basis  for  the  processing  of 
sensitive  data  (article  9).  More  specifically,  the 
law  states  that,  “For  the  purposes  of  Article 
9(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, in order to 
avoid  discriminatory 
sole 
consent  of  the  data  subject  shall  not  be 
sufficient  to 
lift  the  prohibition  on  the 
processing of data the main purpose of which 
is  to  identify  their  ideology,  trade  union 
membership, religion, sexual orientation, beliefs 
or racial or ethnic origin.” 

situations, 

the 

if  such  data 

Political  parties  may  not  use  the  explicit 
consent  legal  basis,  nor  the  public  interest 
legal basis previously entrenched in the national 
electoral law (LOREG Art. 58 bis, struck down 
by  the  Spanish  Constitutional  Court),  but  may 
target  electoral  propaganda  based  on  the 
processing  of  sensitive  data  during  electoral 
periods 
is  explicitly  made 
publicly  available  by  the  data  subject.    The 
Spanish DPA further forbids microtargeting that 
attempts to divert [desviar] the will of voters, as 
well  as  profiling  at  individual  level  or  on  the 
basis of very specific personal characteristics.529 
It  is  is  hence  very  difficult  in  practice  for 
Spain-based  companies  legally  to  sponsor 
political  ads  targeted  based  on  people’s 
political opinions.  

from  processing 

However,  following  the  e-Commerce  directive, 
if  a  service  complies  with  the  law  in  MS  A,  it 
may  circulate  to  MS  B.  The  France-based 
platform  is  therefore  itself  in  theory  not 
the  Spanish 
barred 
residents’ 
sensitive  personal  data  and 
targeting  them,  something  that  Spain-based 
companies  cannot  do  except  as  processor 
(neither to residents of Spain nor to residents of 
any other MS).  
The  Spanish  advertiser  being  a  joint  controller 
in this case, it must respect its obligations under 
the  (Spanish)  GDPR  and  therefore  cannot 
circumvent  the  Spanish  ‘rule’  on  politically-
targeted  political  ads  by  relying  on  a  non-
Spanish  Platform.  Further,  as  a joint  controller, 
the  Spanish  advertiser  must  ensure  that  the 
French  social  media  platform  is  aware  of  the 
relevant  obligations  the  advertiser  has.  The 
platform  is  therefore  unable  to  provide  the 
intended service to the advertiser in this case 

529  Circular  1/2019,  de  7  de  marzo,  de 
https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2019/03/11/pdfs/BOE-A-2019-3423.pdf  

la  Agencia  Española  de  Protección  de  Datos,  p4. 

218 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
on  the  targeting  of  social  media  users,  para 
100)  as  well  as  the  logic  involved  in  any 
automated decision-making system used by the 
controller.  Data  subjects  shall  further  have 
access  to  information  including  on  the  source 
of  personal  data  that  was  not  collected  from 
them,  and  on  “the  recipients  or  categories  of 
recipients to whom the personal data have been 
or  will  be  disclosed  [if  any],  in  particular 
recipients  in  third  countries  or  international 
organisations.” 
Data  subjects  also  have  a  right  to  rectification 
and  erasure  of  their  data:  the  measures  to 
facilitate  the  exercise  of  their  rights  should 
include  a  mechanism  enabling  them  to  access, 
rectify and erase directly the interest categories 
with  which  they  have  been  assimilated  by  the 
social media platform. 

In  the  context  of  targeted  advertising,  the 
platform  and  the  advertiser  may  be  joint 
controllers according to the GDPR (Article 26). 
It  needs  to  be  assessed  and,  if  this  is  the  case, 
the  responsibilities  of  each  side  must  be 
adequately  and  clearly  distributed  (e.g.  in 
practice,  the  French  platform  will  be  the  one 
the  data  subjects’ 
tasked  with  collecting 
consent).  With  joint  controllership,  the  data 
subjects  should  be  able  to  learn  from  the 
platform the identity of the joint controller they 
are  not  in  contact  with  (the  advertiser),  the 
essence  of  the  arrangement  between  the  joint 
controllers,  and  how  to  exercise  their  rights, 
because they can exercise their rights in respect 
to and against each of them. 

AVMSD 

the  ad 

is  audiovisual  material  of  a 

If 
commercial nature, the platform must:  
-  Mention  the  name,  address,  email  address 
of  the  media  service  provider,  as  well  as 
identify 
supervisory 
authority. 

competent 

the 

–  which  would  not  be  the  case  if  the 
advertiser  were  not  Spain-based,  even  if  the 
ads were still for circulation in Spain. 

Spanish  platforms  and 
targeters  suffer  a 
is  a 
competitive  disadvantage,  since 
there 
limitation  on  the  provision  of  cross-border 
services  (politically-targeted  political  ads)  by 
and  to  Spanish-based  entities.  Non-Spanish 
entities  can  circumvent  the  national  rule  if 
they  don’t  involve  Spanish  entities  in  the 
processing. Further, this situation creates a lack 
to 
of 
legal  clarity  for  platforms  desiring 
to/from 
offer/receive  cross-border 
Spain.  
This  case  shows  that  attempts  at  regulating 
political  targeting  itself  at  the  national  level 
would be very ineffective in terms of protection 
and  destructive  in  terms  of  market  growth;  if 
regulation is necessary, it should be done at EU 
level. 

services 

To  summarise,  the  existence  of  this  difference 
regarding  the  processing  of  sensitive  data  in 
Spain has the following potential effect: 

1.  A limitation on the provision of certain 
kinds of cross-border targeted political 
ad  services  to  and  from  Spain-based 
entities (intended as a safeguard for the 
protection of Spanish residents). 

2.  A  lack  of  legal  clarity  regarding  the 
cross-border 

these 

of 

provision 
services. 

3.  Extra compliance costs for Spain-based 
entities,  as  well  as  for  the  market 
players  willing  to  engage  with  Spain-
based entities (e.g. need for substantial 
legal advice to mitigate legal risk). 
4.  Risk  of  regulatory  arbitrage:  non-
Spanish  market  players  are  able  to 
circumvent  the  limitation  that  applies 
to  Spain-based  entities  – 
their 
personal  data  processing  does  not  rely 
on these entities. 

if 

5.  Unintended  disadvantage  for  Spain-
based  market  actors  which,  unlike 
actors  from  other  Member  States,  are 
unable to offer cross-border politically-
targeted  political  advertising  services 
(anywhere in the EU). 

219 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-  Label  the  ad  (i.e.  identify  it  as  a  product 

placement). 
-  Make  sure 

that 

the 
limitations  regarding  hate  speech  and 
harmful messages. 

the  ad  respects 

DSA 

The  platform  has  user-facing 
obligations: 

transparency 

•  stating  the  information  displayed  is  an 
advertisement. 
• the natural or legal person on whose behalf 
the advertisement is displayed. 
•  meaningful  information  about  the  main 
parameters used to determine the recipient to 
whom the advertisement is displayed. 

It  must  also  retain  and  display  it  in  an  ad 
repository, specifying: 

• the content of the advertisement. 
• the natural or legal person on whose behalf 
the advertisement is displayed. 
• the period during  which the advertisement 
was displayed. 
• whether the advertisement was intended to 
be  displayed  specifically  to  one  or  more 
particular groups of recipients of the service 
and if so, the main parameters used for that 
purpose. 
• the total number of recipients of the service 
reached  and,  where  applicable,  aggregate 
numbers 
the  group  or  groups  of 
recipients  to  whom  the  advertisement  was 
targeted specifically. 

for 

6)  Ad agency in MS A is commissioned by a Maltese political party to run political 

ads, for circulation in MS A and in Malta. 

Instrument/Obligations 

National laws 

From perspective of ad 
agency in MS A, 
circulating ads in MS A 

MS A’s laws apply, the 
ad agency can run the ads 
following the relevant 
national requirements 

From perspective of ad agency in MS A, 
circulating ads in Malta 

The Foreign Interference Act530 forbids political 
ads by ‘aliens,’ i.e. non-Maltese citizens, even 
if they are EU citizens. Aliens are forbidden 
from performing, doing, holding, taking part in, 
aiding or abetting, or allowing any restricted 
activity in Malta. 
The ad agency is able to run the Maltese ads in 
MS A, but not in Malta.  

7)  FR service provider of offline political advertising (broadcasting) providing its 

services to BE political party 

530 https://europam.org/data/mechanisms/PF/PF%20Laws/Malta/Malta_Foreign%20Interference%20Act_1982.pdf  

220 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Instrument 

From perspective of service provider 
in MS A 

From perspective of political party in MS 
B 

Belgium 
legislation 

not 

Art.  5  of  the  BE  Law  of  4  July  1989 
provides  that  during  the  4  months 
preceding  the  date  of  the  elections, 
the  political  parties  and  the  candidates, 
as well as third parties wishing to make 
propaganda  for  political  parties  or 
distribute 
candidates,  may 
commercial  advertisements  on  radio, 
television and in cinema. 
At  the  same  time  the  Law  of  4  July 
1989 explicitly allows the broadcasting 
on  radio  or  television  of  programmes 
containing  opinions  or  comments,  if 
these programmes are carried out in the 
same  way  and  according  to  the  same 
rules  as  outside  election  periods, 
without or without remuneration. 
It also allows the broadcasting on radio 
or  television  of  an  election  programme 
or  of  a  series  of  election  programmes, 
provided  that  representatives  of  the 
political  parties  may  take  part  in  these 
programmes. 
Finally, it is permitted to have radio or 
television  broadcasting  of  election 
programmes, 
their 
provided 
number  and  duration  are  determined 
according 
of 
the 
representatives  of  political  parties  in 
legislative assemblies 

number 

that 

to 

1)  BE Loi of 4 July 1989. - Loi relative à 
la limitation et au contrôle des dépenses 
électorales  [engagées  [pour  l'élection 
de  la  Chambre  des  représentants]], 
ainsi  qu'au 
la 
comptabilité 
partis 
politiques. 

financement  et  à 
ouverte 

des 

Art.  2:  Paid  political  ads  allowed  during 
pre-election campaigns. Maximum spend: 
EUR 1 Mio. 
Art. 4 provides for the definition of electoral 
propaganda  expenses  as  being  all  expenses 
and  all  financial  commitments  relating  to 
verbal,  written,  audio  and  visual  messages, 
intended  to  favourably  influence  the  result 
of  a  political  party  and  its  candidates  and 
issued  within  four  months  preceding  the 
elections. Yet, There is no specific definition 
of online political advertising. 
Art. 5: during the 4 months preceding the 
date  of  the  elections,  the  political  parties 
and  the  candidates,  as  well  as  third 
parties  wishing  to  make  propaganda  for 
political parties or candidates, may not to 
distribute  commercial  advertisements  on 
radio, television and in cinema. 

2)  BE  Regulation  –  Règlement  relatif  aux 
programmes de radio et de télévision en 
période électorale  

The  Regulation  applies  to  all  elections 
organised in Belgium, i.e. federal legislative 
elections, 
regional  elections,  European 
elections  and  municipal  and  provincial 
elections.  They  are  addressed 
to  all 
audiovisual media services publishers under 
the French Community of Belgium. They do 
not  apply  to  the  services  disseminated  on 
open platforms, published by or on behalf of 
candidates,  lists,  ideologies  or  parties  and 
electoral 
openly 
communication  thereof.  They  apply  during 
the three months preceding the ballot, except 
in  the  case  of  early  elections,  where  this 
period  may  be  brought  back  to  40  days 
(federal  legislative  elections  and  regional 
elections) or 50 days (local elections) before 
the  poll.  Publishers  are  responsible  for 
complying  with  this  Regulation  for  all 
programs  disseminated  on  the  services  they 
assume  editorial 
If  an 
audiovisual  media  service  publishers covers 

responsibility. 

dedicated 

the 

to 

221 

 
 
 
 
 
 
the  election  campaign  on  a  social  network 
account  open  to  its  name,  or  on  behalf  of 
one of its services, the Regulation applies to 
the  production  of  the  audiovisual  contents 
distributed therein. 

AVMSD 

retransmissions 

Article  3:  Member  States  shall  ensure 
freedom  of  reception  and  shall  not 
restrict 
their 
territory  of  audiovisual  media  services 
from  other  Member  States  for  reasons 
which fall within the fields coordinated 
by this Directive. 

on 

8)  BE service provider of offline political advertising (broadcast) providing its 

services to FR political party 

Instrument 

French 
legislation 

AVMSD 

From  perspective  of  service  provider  in 
MS A 

From perspective of political party in MS 
B 

the  electoral  campaigns, 

For  French  offline  service  providers: 
During 
the 
broadcasts  of  the  public  audio-visual 
communication  services  shall  be  made 
available  to  political  parties  and  groups 
(Article L167-1 of the Electoral Code). 

In  particular,  for 
the  first  ballot,  a 
transmission  time  of  seven  minutes  shall 
be  made  available  to  each  party  or 
political  group.  For broadcasts  preceding 
the second ballot, a five-minute broadcast 
period  is  made  available  to  the  same 
parties  and  political  groups.  In  addition, 
the expenses related to the official audio-
visual  campaign  are  the  responsibility  of 
the State. 

The  service  provider  cannot  propose  its 
services  to  French  political  parties  during 
the pre-election period but only during the 
‘campaigning  period’  (second  Monday 
before polling day – ending the day before 
polling  day  at  midnight  =  Art.  L47A  of 
Electoral  Code).  During  the  six  months 
prior  to  an  election  (pre-election  period) 
and  until  the  date  of  the  ballot  when  it  is 
acquired,  the  use,  for  the  purposes  of 
electoral  propaganda,  of  any  process  of 
commercial  advertising  in  the  press  or  in 
any  means  of  audio-visual  communication 
is  prohibited.  (Art.  L52-1  of  Electoral 
Code). 
Promotional  audio-visual  programmes 
of a political nature are prohibited at all 
times, 
including  during  pre-elections 
period (Article 14, para 2 and 3 of Law No 
86-1067 of 30 September 1986 on freedom 
of communication).  
During  the  six  weeks  preceding  polling 
day,  audio-visual  media,  in  particular,  the 
television 
publishers  of  radio  and 
services  must,  in  their  election  coverage, 
ensure  that  the  candidates  and  their 
supporters  “are  presented  fairly  and 
given  fair  access  to  airtime”  (Resolution 
No  2011-1  of  4  January  2011  relating  to 
the principle of political pluralism in radio 
and  television  services  during  the  election 
period).  News  coverage  unrelated  to  the 
election remains subject to these rules. 
Article  3:  Member  States  shall  ensure 
freedom  of  reception  and  shall  not  restrict 
territory  of 
retransmissions  on 

their 

222 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
audiovisual  media  services  from  other 
Member  States  for  reasons  which  fall 
within 
this 
Directive. 

the  fields  coordinated  by 

223