Agricultural land market regulations in the EU Member States.
Date: 2021-11-17
Institutions: Joint Research Centre
Subjects: EU Member State, agricultural land, agricultural policy, farm rent, land policies, land use, legislation, price of farm land, research report

Agricultural land market regulations in 
the EU Member States 

Liesbet Vranken, Ewa Tabeau, Peter Roebeling 
and Pavel Ciaian with contributions from 
country experts 

2021 

EUR 30838 EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This publication is a technical report by the Joint Research Centre (JRC), the European Commission’s science and knowledge service. It 
aims to provide evidence-based scientific support to the European policymaking process. The scientific output expressed does not imply a 
policy position of the European Commission. Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is 
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of the European Union concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation 
of its frontiers or boundaries. 

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JRC126310 

EUR 30838 EN 

PDF 

ISBN 978-92-76-41990-7 

ISSN 1831-9424 

doi:10.2760/86127 

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2021 

© European Union, 2021 

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How to cite this report: Vranken, L., E. Tabeau, P. Roebeling, P. Ciaian with contributions from country experts, Agricultural land market 
regulations in the EU Member States, EUR 30838 EN, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2021, ISBN 978-92-76-
41990-7, doi:10.2760/86127, JRC126310. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contents 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................................... 3 

1. 

2. 

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................ 6 

CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................................ 8 

2.1. 
2.2. 
2.3. 
2.4. 

THE IMPORTANCE OF LAND MARKETS AND LAND REGULATIONS ................................................................................. 8 
BENEFITS OF SALES AND RENTAL MARKETS ............................................................................................................ 8 
POLICIES AFFECTING LAND USE AND TRANSFER ....................................................................................................... 9 
MEASURES SERVING DIFFERENT PURPOSES .......................................................................................................... 10 

3. 

DATA AND METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................................................ 11 

3.1. 
3.2. 
3.3. 

COUNTRY EXPERT SURVEY: STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRES ..................................................................................... 11 
SEMI-STRUCTURED GROUP INTERVIEWS WITH COUNTRY EXPERTS ............................................................................ 11 
COUNTRY REPORTS BY EXPERTS ........................................................................................................................ 12 

4. 

OVERVIEW OF AGRICULTURAL LAND MARKET REGULATIONS .................................................................... 13 

4.1. 
4.2. 

STRUCTURED CROSS-COUNTRY TABLES ............................................................................................................... 13 
STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF LAND MARKET REGULATIONS ........................................................................................ 24 

5. 

COUNTRY-LEVEL QUALITATIVE DESCRIPTION OF LAND MARKET REGULATIONS ......................................... 33 

5.1. 
5.2. 
5.3. 
5.4. 
5.5. 
5.6. 
5.7. 
5.8. 
5.9. 
5.10. 
5.11. 
5.12. 
5.13. 
5.14. 
5.15. 
5.16. 
5.17. 
5.18. 
5.19. 
5.20. 
5.21. 
5.22. 

BELGIUM ..................................................................................................................................................... 33 
BULGARIA .................................................................................................................................................... 35 
CZECHIA ...................................................................................................................................................... 36 
DENMARK .................................................................................................................................................... 37 
GERMANY .................................................................................................................................................... 38 
ESTONIA ...................................................................................................................................................... 40 
IRELAND ...................................................................................................................................................... 41 
SPAIN .......................................................................................................................................................... 42 
FRANCE ....................................................................................................................................................... 44 
CROATIA ...................................................................................................................................................... 45 
ITALY ........................................................................................................................................................... 47 
LATVIA ........................................................................................................................................................ 48 
LITHUANIA ................................................................................................................................................... 50 
HUNGARY .................................................................................................................................................... 51 
NETHERLANDS .............................................................................................................................................. 53 
AUSTRIA ...................................................................................................................................................... 54 
POLAND ....................................................................................................................................................... 57 
ROMANIA .................................................................................................................................................... 58 
SLOVENIA ..................................................................................................................................................... 59 
SLOVAKIA ..................................................................................................................................................... 60 
FINLAND ...................................................................................................................................................... 63 
SWEDEN ...................................................................................................................................................... 64 

6. 

IMPLICATIONS AND CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISONS OF LAND MARKET REGULATIONS ........................... 67 

6.1. 
6.2. 
6.3. 
6.4. 
6.5. 

MEASURES TO PROTECT THE TENANT ................................................................................................................. 67 
MEASURES TO PROTECT THE FARMLAND OWNER .................................................................................................. 70 
MEASURES TO PROTECT THE NON-FARMLAND OWNER .......................................................................................... 70 
MEASURES TO PREVENT FRAGMENTATION .......................................................................................................... 71 
OTHER MEASURES ......................................................................................................................................... 71 

i 

 
 
 
6.6. 

COMPARISON BETWEEN EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATES ................................................................................ 72 

7. 

8. 

CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................................ 79 

REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................................... 84 

ANNEX 1: COUNTRY EXPERT QUESTIONNAIRE ..................................................................................................... 89 

ANNEX 2: COUNTRY REPORT TEMPLATE ............................................................................................................ 109 

ANNEX 3: DESCRIPTION AND SCALE OF LAND MARKET MEASURES ................................................................... 111 

ANNEX 4: TABLES WITH INDICES (NUMERICAL SCALES) TO DESCRIBE THE MEASURES ....................................... 116 

ANNEX 5: REGULATORY PROFILES BY COUNTRY ................................................................................................ 120 

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................................................... 124 

LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................................................. 125 

LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................................................. 126 

ii 

 
 
 
 
 
Authorship  

This report is an outcome of joint work of the core authors, Liesbet Vranken (KU Leuven), Ewa Tabeau (Wageningen 
Economic Research (WEcR)) and Peter Roebeling (WEcR), based on inputs from experts from the 22 countries listed 
below. Pavel Ciaian (Joint Research Centre) revised the report and contributed additional analyses in different parts 
of the report. 

The country experts jointly contributed the country reports, completed country questionnaires and provided other 
materials,  including  legal  sources,  references,  relevant  publications  or  parts  thereof.  They  participated  in  focus 
group  discussions  and  co-authored  the  section  with  the  country-level  qualitative  descriptions  of  land  market 
regulations. 

EU Member State 

Country expert  Affiliation 

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Czechia 

Denmark 

Germany 

Estonia 

Ireland 

Spain 

France 

Croatia 

Italy 

Latvia 

Liesbet Vranken 

Division of Bioeconomics, KU Leuven, Belgium 

Marian Rizov 

Lincoln International Business School, University of Lincoln, 
United Kingdom 

Tomas Ratinger 

Department of Economic Development, Czech University of 
Life Sciences Prague, Czechia 

Ladislav Jelinek 

Institute of Agricultural Economics and Information, Czechia 

Henning Otte 
Hansen 

Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of 
Copenhagen, Denmark 

Alfons Balmann 

Florian Heinrich 

Raul Omel 

Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition 
Economies, Germany 

Institute of Economics and Social Sciences, Estonian 
University of Life Sciences, Estonia 

Shailesh 
Shrestha 

Rural Economy, Environment and Society Department, 
Scotland’s Rural College, United Kingdom 

Jason Loughrey 

Teagasc – the Agriculture and Food Development Authority, 
Athenry, Ireland 

Ana Sanjuan 

Hugo Ferrer 
Pérez 

Laure Latruffe 

Agro-food Economics Department, Centre of Agro-food 
Research and Technology, Spain 

French National Institute for Research on Agriculture and 
Environment, and University of Bordeaux, France 

Ornella Mikuš 

Faculty of Agriculture, University of Zagreb, Croatia 

Paolo Sckokai 

Jerzy Michalek 

Department of Agro-food Economics, Catholic University of 
the Sacred Heart, Italy 

Independent Senior Consultant; previously Institute of 
Agricultural Economics, University of Kiel, Germany, and 
European Commission, Spain 

Independent Senior Consultant; previously Institute of 
Agricultural Economics, University of Kiel, Germany, and 
European Commission, Spain 

Lithuania 

Jerzy Michalek 

Hungary 

Imre Ferto 

Szilárd Podruzsik 

Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional 
Studies, Budapest, Hungary 

1 

 
 
EU Member State 

Country expert  Affiliation 

Netherlands 

Austria 

Poland 

Romania 

Slovenia 

Slovakia 

Finland 

Sweden 

Huib Silvis 

Martien 
Voskuilen 

Wageningen Economic Research, Netherlands 

Klaus Salhofer 

Universität für Bodenkultur Wien, Austria 

Heidi Leonhardt 

Dominika 
Milczarek-
Andrzejewska 

Cristian 
Kevorchian 

Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw, Poland 

Romanian Academy of Sciences, and Institute of Agricultural 
Economics, University of Bucharest, Romania 

Andrej Udovč 

Biotechnical Faculty, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia 

Jan Pokrivcak 

Anna Bandlerová 

Department of Economics, Slovak University of Agriculture, 
Slovakia 

Olli Niskanen 

Natural Resources Institute Finland (LUKE), Finland 

Allard Jellema 

Wageningen Economic Research, Netherlands 

Huib Silvis 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
Executive summary 

Agricultural  land  is  an  essential  asset  for  societal  development  in  general,  and  for  food  production  and  the 
development of rural regions in particular. Recognising the need to protect and sustain some of the economic, social 
and environmental benefits, agricultural land markets are subject to various regulations across the countries of the 
world, as well as across the EU. EU Member States (MS) have put in place various national laws establishing different 
conditions and restrictions for agricultural land market transactions covering rental markets, sales markets or both. 
The adoption and implementation of agricultural land market regulations  are under the jurisdiction, and are the 
decision,  of  Member  States.  There  is  no  specific  (secondary)  EU  legislation  regulating  land  market  transactions. 
However,  the  acquisition  of  farmland  falls  within  the  area  of  EU  law  related  to  the  free‑movement  principles 
governing the functioning of the EU internal market. The EU treaties prohibit imposing restrictions on the movement 
of capital, which is one of the four fundamental freedoms of the EU internal market. The EU treaties also recognise 
the distinctive nature of agricultural land and allow the imposition of restrictions on foreign investments in farmland, 
if  they  are  proportionate  to  the  protection  of  legitimate  public  interests,  including,  for  example,  preserving 
agricultural communities, developing and maintaining sustainable agriculture, or preventing land speculation. 

In  recent  years,  the  European  Commission  and  the  European  Parliament  have  initiated  a  number  of  research 
activities related to agricultural land market regulations and the impact of different policies (such as the common 
agricultural policy) on land market functioning. There also exists abundant academic literature analysing these policy 
questions. Most of the previous studies on agricultural land market regulations either date back to 2017 and cover 
only selected new MS (1) (Ciaian et al., 2018), or date back to 2014 and cover a wider set of MS (i.e. 24) (Swinnen, 
Van Herck and Vranken, 2014a). Since then, many MS have updated their regulatory frameworks, particularly new 
MS after the expiration of the transitional restrictions on agricultural land acquisitions by foreigners, which were 
introduced after their EU accession. 

The objective of this report is to provide an overview of  agricultural land market  regulations in the EU  MS. This 
report builds upon the framework developed by Swinnen, Van Herck and Vranken (2014a) to provide comprehensive 
and structured analyses of the different agricultural land market regulations across MS. The report describes the 
situation of land market regulations as it was in 2020 in 22 MS. The analyses of agricultural land market regulations 
provided in this report are based on information obtained from the MS country experts using the following three 
tools: (i) structured questionnaires, (ii) semi-structured group interviews and (iii) country reports. The input compiled 
by land market experts through these tools is based on MS legislation and other relevant documents (e.g. official 
documents and academic literature) that contain information on agricultural land market regulations and/or their 
implementation. 

The measures in place in the 22 MS are grouped in five categories; each category includes several specific measures 
detailing specific land market rules: 

  M1, measures to protect the tenant: minimum rental contract duration, maximum rental price, automatic 

rental contract renewal, conditions for rental contract termination, and tenants’ pre-emptive rights; 

  M2, measures to protect the farmland owner: restrictions on legal form of buyer, restrictions on nationality 
of buyer for legal entities and natural persons, restrictions on residence of buyer, restrictions on experience 
of  buyer,  maximum  sale  price,  pre-emptive  right  of 
(neighbouring)  farmers  and  maximum 
transacted/owned area; 

(1) 

New MS includes countries that joined the EU in or after 2004. 

3 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
  M3, measures to protect the non-farmland owner: minimum rental price and maximum duration of a rental 

contract; 

  M4, measures to prevent land fragmentation: lower plot size limit and regulations on pre-emptive buying 

rights of the co-owner; 

  M5, other measures targeting the agricultural land market: requirement to publish sale offers, procedures 
for sale of public land, share deal approvals, pre-emptive right for state/public bodies, pre-emptive rights 
for  family  relatives,  moratorium  on  transferring  ownership  after  acquisition  and  moratorium  on  selling 
public land. 

To  facilitate  the  comparison  of  regulatory  environments  between  MS,  the  report  quantifies  the  land  market 
regulations by constructing a set of regulation indices (numerical scales or count of measures) for all five groups 
of measures, following the approach of Swinnen, Van Herck and Vranken (2014a). 

Overall, 24 different measures regulating the land markets were identified in the 22 EU MS (5 on tenant protection, 
8 on farmland owner protection, 2 on non-farmland owner protection, 2 on preventing fragmentation and 7 other 
measures). The median number of all measures regulating land markets in all 22 MS is 7.88, and the average is 
about 7 measures. 

While some countries have heavily regulated markets (e.g. Croatia, Hungary, Poland and Romania), other countries 
have a very liberal approach to land markets (e.g. Czechia, Denmark, Ireland and Finland). Countries with heavily 
regulated land markets can mainly be found among the new MS. The country with the highest number of measures 
is  Hungary  (14.25  measures)  followed  by  Poland,  Croatia  and  Romania  with  12.75,  11.5  and  11.25  measures, 
respectively.  France  and  Lithuania  each  have  about  9  measures  in  place.  The  MS  with  the  lowest  numbers  of 
regulations are Ireland, Denmark and Finland (0.375, 1.25 and 2.25 measures, respectively). 

Among the 11 countries with a relatively high number of regulations in place, only two countries (France and Spain) 
are old MS, whereas nine are new MS. This pattern is reversed among the 11 countries with a relatively low number 
of regulations: only two are new MS (Czechia and Estonia) and the remaining nine are old MS. 

The analyses of the report show considerable heterogeneity between MS in the type of agricultural land market 
regulations in place. Some MS, such as Belgium, France and the Netherlands, have very strict tenancy regulations, 
since  many  farmers  are  accessing  land  through  rental  markets  in  these  countries.  Slovakian  agriculture  is 
characterised by large corporate organisations that are renting land from numerous small landowners. Regulations 
protecting the tenant might, in such circumstances, rather favour large-scale farms. In some countries that used to 
focus on ownership-cultivation (e.g. Denmark), tenancy is getting more important and longer-term leases are being 
encouraged, while obligations for owners to run the property themselves or to live on the property are abolished. 
Tax exemptions are sometimes introduced in some MS to steer transactions, for example to stimulate long-term 
lease or to ensure that land remains under active farming. 

In Croatia, Hungary, Poland and Romania, many regulations exist to protect the farmland owner, particularly small- 
and medium-scale farmers. In Hungary and Poland, legal entities cannot own land. In Croatia, some (temporary) 
restrictions regarding land acquisition by foreign owners are in place. In several MS (e.g. Croatia, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania and Slovenia), the acquisition of land is subject to the condition of agricultural experience by the acquirer. 
Pre-emptive rights are given to neighbouring farmers in several new MS (e.g. Bulgaria, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania 
and Slovenia) and in some old MS (e.g. Italy and Austria), or are given to adjacent landowners (e.g. Estonia and 
Spain). In some countries, residence requirements are introduced (e.g.in Bulgaria Croatia, Poland and Romania). 

4 

 
 
 
Regarding measures to protect the non-farmland owner, regulations on minimum rental prices and maximum rental 
contract duration can protect non-farm owners and can be found in old and new MS. However, in new MS these 
regulations pertain mostly to the rental of state land. 

Many countries take measures to prevent fragmentation. In some countries, there are absolute size limits below 
which a plot cannot be divided (e.g. in Bulgaria, Spain and Slovakia). In others, sale of a plot might be refused if it 
leads to unfavourable plot sizes (e.g. in Austria). In many countries, co-owners have pre-emptive rights. 

In many new MS, one can find other measures, typically including regulations that were introduced to limit excessive 
concentration  or  limit  speculation  by  investors  not  actively  involved  in  agriculture  and/or  foreign  investors.  For 
example,  such  measures  include  requirements  regarding  the  publication  of  sales  offers  (e.g.  Latvia,  Lithuania, 
Hungary, Austria, Romania and Slovenia), specific procedures regulating the sale of state-owned land (e.g. Bulgaria, 
Czechia, Estonia, Spain, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia), pre-emptive rights for 
state/public  bodies  (e.g.  Germany,  France,  Croatia,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Hungary,  Poland,  Romania,  Slovenia  and 
Finland), pre-emptive rights for family relatives (e.g. Czechia, Poland, Romania and Slovenia) and pre-emptive rights 
for adjacent landowners or neighbouring landowners (e.g. Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary and Poland). 

5 

 
 
 
 
 
1. 

Introduction 

Agricultural  land  is  an  essential  asset  for  societal  development  in  general,  and  for  food  production  and  the 
development of rural regions in particular. Agricultural land is instrumental in providing livelihoods for farmers and 
in  ensuring  food  security  for  the  general  population.  Land  is  also  one  of  the  main  factors  generating  various 
economic, environmental and social benefits in rural areas. Recognising the need to protect and sustain some of 
the economic, social and environmental benefits, agricultural land markets are subject to various regulations across 
the countries of the world, as well as within the EU (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2012; 
Forbord,  Bjørkhaug  and  Burton,  2014;  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development  (OECD),  2009; 
Sharma and Jha 2016; Swinnen, 2002;). 

EU Member States (MS) have put in place various national laws establishing different conditions and restrictions for 
agricultural land market transactions covering rental markets, sales markets or both. National land laws regulating 
land  transactions  serve  various  objectives,  for  example  keeping  land  in  agricultural  use,  maintaining  a  rural 
population, addressing land fragmentation, or monitoring and possibly reducing land concentration (2). Sometimes 
they aim to strengthen the position of local farmers, as opposed to foreign investors (3). 

The adoption and implementation of agricultural  land market regulations  are under the jurisdiction, and are the 
decision, of MS. There is no specific (secondary) EU legislation regulating land market transactions. However, the 
acquisition  of  farmland  falls  within  the  area  of  EU  law  related  to  the  free‑movement  principles  governing  the 
functioning  of  the  EU  internal  market.  More  specifically,  the  EU  treaties  prohibit  imposing  restrictions  on  the 
movement of capital, which is one of the four fundamental freedoms of the EU  internal market (4). These treaty 
provisions also apply to agricultural land. The EU treaties also recognise the distinctive nature of agricultural land 
and  allow  the  imposition  of  restrictions  on  foreign  investments  in  farmland,  if  they  are  proportionate  to  the 
protection of legitimate public interests, including, for example, preserving agricultural communities, developing and 
maintaining  sustainable  agriculture,  or  preventing  land  speculation.  Moreover,  the  jurisprudence  of  the  Court  of 
Justice  of  the  European  Union  (CJEU)  legitimises  this  course  of  action (5).  However,  drawing  a  line  between 
proportionate  and  a  disproportionate  protection  of  public  interests  might  not  always  be  clear-cut  and  remains 
challenging to several MS. 

Contributing  to  the  debate  on  foreign  investment  in  agricultural  land  was  the  objective  of  an  Interpretative 
Communication  of  the  Commission  on  the  Acquisition  of  Farmland  and  EU  Law,  OJ 2017/C 350/05,  dated 
18.10.2017 (6),  referring  to  the  benefits  and  challenges  of  foreign  investment  in  agricultural  land.  The 
communication did not only respond to the European Parliament’s request to publish guidance on how to regulate 
agricultural land markets in conformity with EU law, but also aimed at ‘informing the debate on foreign investment 
in farmland, assisting Member States that are in the process of adjusting their legislation or may wish to do so at 
a  later  stage,  as  well  as  helping  to  promote  the  wider  dissemination  of  best  practices  in  this  complex  area.’ 
(OJ 2017/C 350/05, p. 5). Therefore, the communication provides a valuable framework for this report and offers 
guidance for the interpretation of our results and final conclusions. 

In  recent  years,  the  European  Commission  and  the  European  Parliament  have  initiated  a  number  of  research 
activities related to agricultural land market regulations and the impact of different policies (such as the common 
agricultural policy (CAP)) on land market functioning. There also exists abundant academic literature analysing these 

(2) 
(3) 

(4) 
(5) 
(6) 

Commission Interpretative Communication on the Acquisition of Farmland and EU Law (OJ 2017/C 350/05, 18.10.2017). 
The term ‘foreign investors’ is used in this report to mean intra-EU investors, as most acquisitions of agricultural land in the EU take place 
in intra-EU settings. 
Alongside free movement of goods, services and people. 
Commission Interpretative Communication on the Acquisition of Farmland and EU Law (OJ 2017/C 350/05, 18.10.2017). 
Commission Interpretative Communication on the Acquisition of Farmland and EU Law (OJ 2017/C 350/05, 18.10.2017). 

6 

 
 
 
                                                 
policy  questions.  For  example,  in  2008,  a  study  funded  by  the  European  Commission  investigated  land  market 
regulations in the EU and the distributional and capitalisation effects of the decoupled payments adopted as part 
of  the  2003  CAP  reform  (Swinnen,  Ciaian  and  Kancs,  2008).  The  possible  land  capitalisation  effects  of  the 
subsequent CAP reform proposal in 2013 were discussed in a study funded by the European Parliament in  2013 
(Swinnen et al., 2013), while the impacts of the implementation of the 2013 CAP reform were examined in a Joint 
Research Centre (JRC) study of 2016 (Ciaian, Kancs and Espinosa, 2018). Alongside the CAP-related studies, the 
European  Commission  initiated  several  additional  research  activities  to  explore  the  transitory  restrictions  on 
agricultural land acquisitions by foreigners imposed  by new MS after their EU accession (European Commission, 
2017; Swinnen and Vranken, 2009), and to document land regulations  that were adopted in some new MS as a 
response  to  the  expiration  of  these  transitory  restrictions  (Ciaian  et  al.,  2018).  Academic  literature  discusses  a 
variety of aspects related to agricultural land markets. The most prominent literature relates to the analyses of the 
diversity  of  land  market  regulations  in  the  EU  (Swinnen,  Van  Herck  and  Vranken,  2014a,  2014b)  and  the 
capitalisation effects of the CAP subsidies on land values (e.g. Baldoni and Ciaian, 2021; Ciaian and Kancs, 2012; 
Guastella et al., 2018; Karlsson and Nilsson 2014; Kilian and Salhofer, 2008; Kilian et al., 2012; Klaiber, Salhofer 
and Thompson, 2017; Michalek, Ciaian and Kancs 2014; O’Neill and Hanrahan, 2016; Patton et al., 2008). 

The objective of this report is to provide an overview of agricultural land market regulations in the EU MS. Most of 
the  previous  studies  providing  detailed  information  on  agricultural  land  market  regulations  date  back  to  2017, 
covering only selected new MS (Ciaian et al., 2018), or back to 2014, covering a wider set of MS (i.e. 24) (Swinnen, 
Van Herck and Vranken, 2014a). Since then, many MS have updated their regulatory frameworks, particularly new 
MS  after  the  expiration  of  the  transitional  restrictions  on  agricultural  land  acquisitions  by  foreigners  that  were 
introduced after their EU accessions. Such information is relevant for understanding the overall development of the 
land regulatory framework in the EU and can provide insight into the potential implications for the implementation 
of the CAP and of the European Green Deal, in particular with respect to the framework’s effects on young farmers’ 
access to land, farm structural change and competitiveness of the EU land market. 

This  report  builds  upon  the  framework  developed  by  Swinnen,  Van  Herck  and  Vranken  (2014a)  to  provide  a 
comprehensive  and  structured  analyses  of  agricultural  land  market  regulations  in  multiple  MS.  The  report  also 
attempts  to  update  and  improve  the  land  regulation  indicator  developed  by  Swinnen,  Van  Herck  and  Vranken 
(2014a). The information on and analyses of agricultural land market regulations provided in this report are based 
on the adopted legislation across the MS covered, as well as on inputs obtained from the agricultural land market 
experts (MS country experts), who studied the relevant documents (including, for example, the MS legislation, other 
official documents and academic literature). This information collection was carried out in 2020 as part of the JRC 
project Agricultural Land Market Regulations in the EU Member States. As a result, this report describes the situation 
of land market regulations as they were in 2020 in 22 MS (7). 

The  report  is  structured  as  follows.  Section 2  outlines  the  conceptual  background  on  land  markets  and  land 
regulations.  Section 3  describes  the  data  and  the  methodological  framework  applied  to  analyse  the  collected 
information  on  land  market  regulations.  Section 4  provides  an  overview  and  statistical  analyses  of  land  market 
regulations  implemented  in  the  MS  studied,  structured  in  harmonised  cross-country  tables.  Section 5  provides 
individual qualitative descriptions of land market regulations for each MS covered in the report. Section 6 discusses 
the  implications  and  cross-country  comparisons  of  the  land  market  regulations.  Finally,  Section 7  concludes  the 
report.  

(7) 

The  MS  covered in  the  report  are  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Czechia,  Denmark, Germany,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Spain,  France, Croatia,  Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland and Sweden. These MS were selected to cover 
different EU regions in terms of socioeconomic situation and regulatory framework in place. 

7 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
2.  Conceptual background 

2.1. 

The importance of land markets and land regulations 

Well-functioning  land  markets  are  of  utmost  importance  for  economic  development,  particularly  in  rural  areas 
(Deininger and Feder, 2001). Land is an important factor for the production of agricultural goods. Well-functioning 
land markets (both sales and rental) allow the transfer of land to more efficient producers. In addition, land can be 
a source of political power. It is a store of wealth and a financial asset, and is used to hedge against inflation, which 
makes it attractive for investors who lack the skills and/or interest to farm. As land is often used as collateral, well-
functioning land markets are often instrumental in the development of credit markets (Brandão and Feder, 1995). 
Credit markets, in turn, can stimulate productive investments in land, at least if tenure and/or property rights are 
secure (Faruqee and Carey, 1999; Feder and Nishio, 1998). 

Land regulations will affect the functioning of the land market, and therefore have important equity and efficiency 
consequences. Insights into the functioning of the land market are also important from an EU policy point of view. 
The  CAP  is  a  community-wide  policy  providing  various  types  of  support  to  the  agricultural  sector  and  rural 
development. It has evolved quite extensively since its establishment in 1962, but some of the main goals remain 
to  support  farmers  and  improve  agricultural  productivity,  ensuring  a  stable  supply  of  affordable  food  and 
safeguarding EU farmers so they can make a reasonable living (European Commission, 2021). To what extent the 
goals can be reached will depend on country-specific characteristics and regulations. Land regulations interact with 
agricultural policies, such as agricultural subsidies that can be capitalised in land prices (Baldoni and Ciaian, 2021; 
Ciaian, Kancs and Swinnen, 2010; Ciaian et al., 2021; Patton et al., 2008; Van Herck, Swinnen and Vranken, 2013). 
If regulations differ  across  countries, the redistributive impact  of subsidies will also  vary  across countries. Land 
regulations may also affect farm structural change. The adopted land laws potentially affect reallocation of land 
among farms and individuals’ decisions to exit and enter the farm business. This is because land regulations often 
impose various restrictions and/or priority rights in accessing land to certain market participants (e.g. pre-emptive 
rights  to  farmers,  restrictions  on  farmland  ownership  to  certain  entities,  maximum  owned  area).  Again,  land 
regulations may interact and affect the performance of CAP measures that, among other goals, aim to promote 
generational renewal in the agricultural sector to address the ageing of the EU’s farmers by supporting the entry of 
young farmers into the sector (Dwyer et al., 2019; European Commission 2016, 2020a). 

2.2.  Benefits of sales and rental markets 

Land  sales  markets  are  considered  an  important  instrument  to  enhance  efficiency.  Land  sales  are  supported 
because they transfer full rights to new users, are more likely to increase access to credit (as land can be used as 
collateral)  and  provide  optimal  incentives  for  investment  by  providing  permanent  security  rights  (Binswanger, 
Deininger and Feder, 1993, 1995). However, the performance of the sales market may be far from the theoretical 
ideal if imperfections exist in other markets (e.g. labour, credit, insurance) or if transaction costs for land sales are 
high (Deininger, 2003). In such circumstances, it can be difficult for efficient producers to access land via sales; 
hence, rental markets have their advantages (8). Rental markets allow more flexible adjustments in land size with 
relatively low transaction costs so that land is more easily reallocated to more efficient producers; rental markets 
also require limited initial capital outlay for accessing land, thus leaving more capital for productive investments. 
As a result, land renting has the potential to facilitate structural change by encouraging new entrants into the sector 
(including  young  farmers),  who  are  usually  more  credit  constrained – renting  offers  them  a  cheaper  means  of 
accessing land (Swinnen, Vranken and Stanley, 2006; Vranken and Swinnen, 2006; Wastfelt and Zhang, 2018). 

(8) 

For the importance of land renting across MS, see Baldoni and Ciaian (2021). 

8 

 
 
 
                                                 
2.3.  Policies affecting land use and transfer 

The functioning of land markets, and to what extent the aforementioned benefits are realised, depends on formal 
and  informal  mechanisms  for  defining  and  enforcing  use  and  ownership  rights.  An  absence  of  well-defined  or 
adequately enforced land property rights in land hampers the functioning of both land sales and rental markets and 
leads to inefficient outcomes. 

Given the importance of land and the functioning of land markets, it is not surprising that government interventions 
that influence the land market are widespread. Land regulations have been widely introduced that can constrain 
both the supply of and the demand for land, and can affect both sales and rental transactions. Regulations might 
restrict individual property rights. Such restrictions can pertain to the time horizon over which property rights are 
held. Other regulations might pertain to limitations on use, the security of tenure or transferability of land. 

Some policies, including regulations and other non-regulation policies, have a direct impact on land markets, while 
others have an indirect impact. The presence of landowners without legal titles, multiple titles for the same plots, 
inappropriate legislation governing the issuing of titles or  a legal restriction on issuing tiles (e.g. for small farms 
below a certain threshold) could result in tenure insecurity (Brandão and Feder, 1995; Vranken et al., 2011). Tenure 
insecurity is a result of inadequate land administration, legal frameworks incapable of delineating boundaries of a 
land plot and an inability to settle disputes. Prohibition of land transactions can have far-reaching consequences 
from an efficiency point of view, as land cannot fluently move from less to more efficient producers. If sales are 
prohibited,  land  can  less  easily  be  used  as  collateral,  which,  in  turn,  might  negatively  affect  credit  market 
development. 

Some regulations (e.g. prohibition of foreign ownership, self-farming obligations, pre-emptive rights to farmers) are 
often introduced to avoid land being bought by speculators and/or foreign investors (9). Nevertheless, under specific 
conditions, investment in land by actors not interested in farming can be beneficial. Speculation provides liquidity 
to the market and transfers risk to those who have a comparative advantage in risk management (Brandão and 
Feder, 1995). The acquisition of agricultural land by foreigners is an issue of particular concern because of the fear 
of land concentration and excessive land speculation. Nevertheless, foreign investments can have beneficial effects 
as  they  can  contribute  capital, technology  and  know-how,  thereby  improving  the  productivity  of  the  agricultural 
sector (10). However, the acquisition of land by (foreign) investors yields benefits only when information is evenly 
accessible and when markets are competitive (e.g. when  property  rights are  clear and enforceable).  Asymmetric 
information can be a source of speculation. Individuals often have a disadvantage in transfers with corporations, as 
the latter often have better access to information and a wider (political) network. Rather than prohibiting certain 
transactions,  it  might  be  more  desirable  to  focus  policy  attention  on  eliminating  the  sources  of  asymmetric 
information or on creating national institutions and rules that give proper incentives to all market players (domestic 
and foreign buyers, tenants, landlords and owner-cultivators) so that multiple benefits (access to capital, know-how 
and technology; productivity gains; access to land use; and tenure security) can be realised. 

Rent controls and other tenure regulations are often introduced to  protect tenants from eviction and  high  rents 
and/or to establish rules that enhance tenants’ security of long-term investments in land development. However, 

(9) 
(10) 

Commission Interpretative Communication on the Acquisition of Farmland and EU Law (OJ 2017/C 350/05, 18.10.2017). 
Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council,  Review  of  the  transitional  measures  regarding  the  acquisition  of  agricultural  real  estate 
foreseen in the Accession Treaty 2005, 14.12.2010, p. 2; Report from the Commission to the Council, Review of the transitional measures 
regarding the acquisition of agricultural real estate set out in the 2003 Accession Treaty, 16.7.2008, p. 7; European Commission press 
memo 
release 
(https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_11_244). 
See, for example, Dries et al. (2009), p. 1755; Dries and Swinnen (2004), pp. 1525–1541; Swinnen, van Herck and Vranken (2016), p. 202; 
Swinnen  and  Vranken  (2007),  executive  summary,  p. ii;  and  Swinnen  and  Vranken  (2010),  executive  summary  and  Chapters 2  and  7 
(concluding remarks). 

(http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-10-1750_en.htm?locale=en); 

Commission 

European 

press 

9 

 
 
 
                                                 
 
very strict tenancy regulations might backfire if they reduce the amount of land that is offered for rent or if they 
diminish  a  landowner’s  incentive  to  make  land-related  investments  (Swinnen,  Van  Herck  and  Vranken,  2016). 
Excessively  strict  tenancy  regulations  may  also  constrain  farm  structural  change  and  discourage  younger 
generations from entering the sector. Therefore, the efficiency and equity effects of strict rental controls and tenure 
regulations are not straightforward. 

Land fragmentation is often considered detrimental, as it entails costs (Faruqee and Carey, 1999) (11). However, 
some degree of fragmentation could have advantages and reduce risks (e.g. the heterogeneity of soil and growing 
conditions can reduce the risk of total crop failure, allows producing a wider mix of crops, facilitates crop rotation). 
Scattered plots might also enable farmers to ease their seasonal labour bottlenecks (which could result in higher 
yields) and to smooth their income. The latter explains why fragmentation persists for the demand side, in other 
words  why  land  users  are  in  favour  of  fragmentation.  Not  surprisingly,  there  exists  empirical  evidence  that 
fragmentation is not as inefficient as widely assumed, particularly if there are imperfections in other markets (e.g. 
insurance or labour markets) (Blarel et al., 1992). However, fragmentation may persist even without a demand-side 
desire for it. Legal disputes, inheritance rules and transaction costs may be causes of persistent fragmentation; in 
such circumstances, fragmentation is more likely to have negative effects (Faruqee and Carey, 1999; Vranken, Noev 
and Swinnen, 2004). Given these potential negative effects of land fragmentation, countries often introduce various 
land regulations to prevent or reduce landownership fragmentation, land use fragmentation or both. 

2.4.  Measures serving different purposes 

Governments have introduced a vast array of measures that can serve different purposes. Swinnen, Van Herck and 
Vranken (2014a) make a distinction between four categories of measures: (1) measures to protect the tenant, (2) 
measures  to  protect  the  owner-cultivator,  (3)  measures  to  protect  the  owner  and  (4)  measures  to  prevent 
fragmentation. The first set of measures aims to protect a tenant’s access to land and includes regulations that 
impose a minimum rental contract duration, maximum rental prices, automatic rental contract renewal, conditions 
for rental contract termination and pre-emptive purchasing rights for the tenant. The second group of measures (to 
protect the owner-cultivator) includes regulations regarding maximum sales prices, pre-emptive buying rights for 
neighbouring  farmers  and  maximum  transacted  area.  These  measures  typically  favour  landownership  by  the 
cultivator and, hence, discourage land being bought by investors not interested in farming or not willing to farm. 
The third group of measures (to protect the owner) includes measures to protect the non-farm owner. This comprises 
regulations  regarding  minimum  rental  prices  and  maximum  tenancy  duration  so  that  the  non-landowners  can 
relatively easily rent out the land to another, more beneficial, tenant (from the landowner’s point of view that could 
be a tenant who pays a higher rent or who takes better care of the land). Finally, the last group of measures (to 
prevent fragmentation) includes regulations regarding minimum plot sizes and pre-emptive rights for co-owners. 

(11) 

For example, land fragmentation may induce costs because travel time between fields increases, land is lost for boundaries and access 
routes, the scope for irrigation and soil conservation is reduced and the realisation of economies of scale is reduced (Faruqee and Carey, 
1999). 

10 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3. Data and methodology 

The analyses of agricultural land market regulations provided in this report are based on information obtained from 
the  agricultural  land  market  experts  (MS  country  experts)  using  the  following  three  tools:  (i)  structured 
questionnaires, (ii) semi-structured group interviews and (iii) country reports. The input compiled by land market 
experts through these tools is based on the MS legislation and other relevant documents (e.g. official documents, 
and  academic  literature)  that  contain  information  on  agricultural  land  market  regulations  and/or  their 
implementation. The information collection was carried out in 2020; thus, the report represents the state of  the 
agricultural land market regulations as it was in 2020 in the included MS. 

3.1.  Country expert survey: structured questionnaires 

A survey among agricultural land experts from the included MS was conducted to collect up-to-date information on 
land  regulations.  A  structured  questionnaire  was  used  for  this  purpose.  The  questionnaire  contains  modules  on 
landownership, sales and rental regulations. For more details on the content of the questionnaire, see Annex 1. 

3.2.  Semi-structured group interviews with country experts 

Additional insights that, for various reasons, could not be captured in the questionnaire were collected through semi-
structured  expert  interviews.  To  this  end,  an  online  focus  group  discussion  format  was  used.  This  allowed  the 
collection  of  additional  qualitative  insights,  such  as  information  on  the  practicalities  of  implementation,  which 
complemented  the  structured  tables  summarising  the  available  information  (see  Section 4).  Four  focus  group 
discussions were organised with different subgroups of country experts in the second half of September 2020 (see 
Table 1). 

Table 1: Timing and composition of the online focus group discussions 

Focus Group 
Group I 

15 September 
2020, 
9:30-12:30 hours 

# 
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

EU Country  Country Expert 
Austria 

Klaus Salhofer, 
Heid Leonhardt  
Liesbet Vranken 

Belgium 

Netherlands  Huib Silvis, 

Sweden 

France 

Martien Voskuilen 
Huib Silvis, Allard 
Jellema 
Laure Latruffe 

6 

Spain 

Ana Sanjuan, 
Hugo Ferrer Pérez 

Group II 

16 September 
2020, 
13:30-16:30 
hours 

1 

2 

Bulgaria 

Marian Rizov 

Romania 

Cristian 
Kevorchian 

3 

Czechia 

Tomas Ratinger 

11 

Affiliation 
Universität für Bodenkultur Wien, Austria 

Division of Bioeconomics, KU Leuven, 
Belgium 
Wageningen Economic Research, Netherlands 

Wageningen Economic Research, Netherlands 

French National Institute for Research on 
Agriculture and Environment, and University 
of Bordeaux, France 
Agro-food Economics Department, Centre of 
Agro-food Research and Technology, Spain 

Lincoln International Business School, United 
Kingdom 
Romanian Academy of Sciences, and 
Institute of Agricultural Economics, University 
of Bucharest, Romania 
Department of Economic Development, 
Czech University of Life Sciences, Czechia 

 
 
 
  
Focus Group 

# 
3 

4 

EU Country  Country Expert 
Ladislav Jelinek 
Czechia 

Slovakia 

Jan Pokrivcak 

Affiliation 
Institute of Agricultural Economics and 
Information, Czechia 
Department of Economics, Slovak University 
of Agriculture, Slovakia 

Group III 

1 

Poland 

23 September 
2020, 
9:30-12:30 hours 

2 

3 

4 

Dominika 
Milczarek-
Andrzejewska 
Ornella Mikus 

Croatia 

Estonia 

Raul Omel 

Latvia 

Jerzy Michalek 

5 

Lithuania 

Jerzy Michalek 

6 

Italy 

Paolo Sckokai 

Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of 
Warsaw, Poland 

Faculty of Agriculture, University of Zagreb, 
Croatia 
Institute of Economics and Social Sciences, 
Estonian University of Life Sciences, Estonia 
Independent Senior Consultant; previously 
Institute of Agricultural Economics, University 
of Kiel, Germany, and the European 
Commission, Spain 
Independent Senior Consultant; previously 
Institute of Agricultural Economics, University 
of Kiel, Germany, and the European 
Commission, Spain 
Department of Agro-food Economics, 
Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Italy 

Group IV 

1 

Ireland 

Shailesh Shrestha  Rural Economy, Environment and Society 

24 September 
2020, 
9:30-12:30 hours 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

Finland 

Olli Niskanen 

Germany 

Denmark 

Alfons Balmann, 
Florian Heinrich 
Henning Otte 
Hansen 

Slovenia 

Andrej Udovč  

Hungary 

Imre Ferto 

Department, Scotland’s Rural College, United 
Kingdom 
Natural Resources Institute (LUKE), Finland 

Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development 
in Transition Economies, Germany 
Department of Food and Resource 
Economics, University of Copenhagen, 
Denmark 
Biotechnical Faculty, University of Ljubljana, 
Slovenia 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Hungary 

3.3.  Country reports by experts 

Country  reports  with  qualitative  insights  were  produced  by  the  experts  as  sources  of  information  for  further 
processing in the report analyses. These reports describe factual, detailed, country-level information regarding the 
measures and the implementation of measures (e.g. presence and functioning of land-related institutions). If within-
country variations were observed in the measures and in the way in which they are implemented, the country reports 
aimed to substantiate this. Furthermore, the country reports provided a description of surrounding regulations (e.g. 
credit market related) that might affect land regulations. The template used for the country reports can be found 
in Annex 2. Summary country reports are provided in Section 5. 

12 

 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
4. Overview of agricultural land market regulations 

4.1.  Structured cross-country tables 

Using the information collected through structured questionnaires,  semi-structured group interviews and country 
reports, the agricultural land market regulations are presented in a standardised and structured way in cross-country 
tables by applying the updated framework developed in Swinnen, Van Herck and Vranken (2014a). Such a format 
allows  the  integration  of  a  wide  range  of  underlying  information  and  makes  cross-country  comparison  more 
straightforward. Following this approach, the measures in place in the included MS are grouped into the following 
five categories: 

  M1 – measures to protect the tenant (Table 2); 
  M2 – measures to protect the farmland owner (Table 3); 
  M3 – measures to protect the non-farmland owner (Table 4); 
  M4 – measures to prevent land fragmentation (Table 5); 
  M5 – other measures targeting agricultural land markets (Table 6). 

Each  category  includes  several  measures  detailing  specific  land  market  rules  present  in  the  included  countries. 
Table A3 in Annex 3 details the measures, while Tables 2–6 provide a brief qualitative description of each measure 
for all five groups of measures as applied in all 22 MS included in the report. More specifically, Tables 2–6 indicate 
whether a particular measure is present in a given MS and any peculiarities or exceptions applied in different MS. 

Following  Swinnen,  Van  Herck  and  Vranken  (2014a),  we  attempt  to  quantify  the  land  market  regulations  by 
constructing a set of regulation indices (numerical scales or count of measures) for all five groups of measures. 
This is done to facilitate the comparison of regulatory environments  between MS.  Descriptions of the numerical 
scales used to quantify the measures can be found in Table A3 in Annex 3. In brief, each measure gets a score that 
ranges  from  0  to  1,  0  being  ‘no’  (not  exercising  a  given  regulation)  and  1  being  ‘yes’  (exercising  a  regulation). 
Answers other than ‘no’ and ‘yes’ were coded with fractions from the interval 0–1, depending on the actual situation 
in a country. Tables that describe the measures with indices (numerical scales) are reported in Tables A4.1–A4.4 in 
Annex 4. 

Overall, the report covers the ‘old’ agricultural land market regulations studied previously in Swinnen, Van Herck and 
Vranken (2014a), and also a group of ‘new’ agricultural land market regulations, added under the heading ‘other 
measures’.  The  ‘old’  agricultural  land  market  regulations  relate  to  several  groups:  protection  of  the  tenant,  M1 
(Table 2) (12);  protection  of  the  non-farmland  owner  (cultivator  and  non-cultivator),  M3  (Table 4);  and  measures 
preventing land fragmentation, M4 (Table 5). For the ‘old’ category ‘measures to protect the farmland owner, M2’ 
(Table 3), some measures from Swinnen, Van Herck and Vranken (2014a) were removed while others were added. 
This was done because the exemption regarding the restrictions on the nationality of foreign owners was only a 
temporary  derogation.  Instead,  new  measures  were  introduced  after  the  derogation  period.  Table 3  describes 
whether there are restrictions regarding nationality for buyers from EU MS. Some countries have restrictions for 
non-EU buyers; however, these are not reported in Table 3. 

The ‘new’ agricultural land market regulations group (‘other measures, M5’) comprises requirement for publication 
of sale offers, formal procedures for sale of public land, ‘share deals’ approvals, pre-emptive rights for state/public 

(12)  Note that measures to protect the tenant (M1) in Table 2 report whether there are conditions to terminate a rental contract. This does not 
capture the more regular conditions such as right to determine a rental contract with prior notice or contractual obligations not being 
fulfilled (e.g. not paying the rent). Rather, it captures whether there are additional conditions under which a rental contract can be ended 
by the owner (e.g. if a rental contract can be ended only if the owner decides to cultivate the plot himself or herself). 

13 

 
 
 
                                                 
bodies, pre-emptive rights for family relatives, (temporary) moratorium on transferring ownership after acquisition 
and (temporary) moratorium on selling public land (Table 6). Several measures from this group can and should be 
interpreted  together  with  other  groups,  for  example  protecting  the  landowner-cultivator  or  preventing  land 
fragmentation.

14 

 
 
 
Table 2: Measures to protect the tenant, by country, around 2020 

Minimum rental 
contract duration 

Maximum rental price 

Automatic rental 
contract renewal 

Conditions for rental 
contract termination 

Pre-emptive rights for 
tenant 

Country 

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Czechia 

Denmark 

Germany 

Estonia 

Ireland 

Spain 

France 

Croatia 

Italy 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

Hungary 

Netherlands 

Yes 

Yes, for certain 
contracts 
No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

No 

No 

Yes 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

No 

No 

No 

Yes 

No 

No 

No 

No, but contract can be denied 
if price is unreasonable 

Only if included in 
contract provision 

No 

No 

No 

Yes 

Yes, but only for state-owned 
land 
No 

Yes, but only land resulting 
from land reform 

No 

No 

Yes, but only for regulated 
tenancy contract, not for 
liberalised 

Yes 

Only if included in 
contract provision 
Yes 

Yes 

No 

Only if included in 
contract provision 
No 

No 

No 

Yes, but only for 
regulated tenancy 
contract, not for 
liberalised 
Yes, with limited 
duration 
No 

15 

Yes 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes, but only for sale of 
state land 
No 

Yes, but only indirectly 
through public organisation 
if non-farmer wants to buy 
land 
Yes 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes, but only for sale of 
state land 
Yes 

Yes, unless sold to family or 
unless the acquirer (other 
than the tenant) owns less 
than 10 ha for natural 
persons or 5 ha for legal 
persons 
Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

No 

Yes 

Austria 

Poland 

No, but reference 
contract duration exists 
No 

No, but contract can be denied 
if price is unreasonable 
No 

 
 
Country 

Romania 

Slovenia 

Slovakia 

Minimum rental 
contract duration 

Yes 

Yes, for rented state 
land 
Yes 

Finland 

Sweden 

No 

No 

Maximum rental price 

Automatic rental 
contract renewal 

Conditions for rental 
contract termination 

Pre-emptive rights for 
tenant 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes, renewal according 
to old terms and rental 
price equal to cadastral 
price if the landlord does 
not respond to tenant’s 
renewal offer within 
2 months 
No 

Yes 

No 

No 

Yes 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

No 

Yes 

16 

 
 
 
 
 
Restrictions on 
residence of 
buyer 

Restrictions on 
experience of 
buyer 

Maximum sales 
price 

Table 3: Measures to protect the farmland owner, by country, around 2020 

Country 

Belgium 
Bulgaria 

Czechia 
Denmark 
Germany 

Restrictions on 
legal form of 
buyer 

No 
No 

No 
No 
No 

Restrictions on 
nationality of 
buyer for legal 
entities 
No 
No 

Restrictions on 
nationality of 
buyer for 
natural person 
No 
No 

No 
No 
No 

No 
No 
No 

Estonia 

Yes 

No 

No 

Ireland 
Spain 

No 
No 

No 
No, except for 
specific regions 

No 
No, except for 
specific regions 

No 
Yes, except for 
self-employed 
farmers 
No 
No 
No 

No 

No 
No 

No 
No 

No 
No 
No 

No 

No 
No 

France 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

17 

No 
No 

No 
No 
No, but 
transaction can 
be denied if price 
is excessive 

No 

No 
No 

No, but 
transaction can 
be denied if price 
is excessive 

Maximum 
transacted/own
ed area 

No 
No 

No 
No 
No 

No 

No 
Not for sales, but 
renting in land as 
tenant is 
forbidden if a 
certain area is 
already in 
ownership 
No, but the sale 
can be 
denied/annulled if 
transacted area 
is too large 

Pre-emptive 
rights for 
(neighbouring) 
farmers 
No 
Yes 

No 
No 
No, unless there 
is an acceptable 
justification (e.g. 
farmer can 
consolidate or 
has lost land, or 
the share of 
owned land is 
low) 
No, but pre-
emptive rights for 
adjacent 
landowner 
No 
No, but pre-
emptive rights for 
adjacent 
landowner 

No, but existence 
of priority order 
of buyers outside 
pre-emptive 
rights with (1) 
tenant, (2) 
neighbouring 
young farmer or 
(3) other 

 
 
Country 

Restrictions on 
legal form of 
buyer 

Restrictions on 
nationality of 
buyer for legal 
entities 

Restrictions on 
nationality of 
buyer for 
natural person 

Restrictions on 
residence of 
buyer 

Restrictions on 
experience of 
buyer 

Maximum sales 
price 

Croatia 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

No 

Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Hungary 

No 
No 
No 
Yes 

Netherlands 
Austria 

No 
No 

Poland 

Yes 

Romania 
Slovenia 
Slovakia 
Finland 
Sweden 

No 
No 
No 
No 
No 

No 
No 
No 
Yes, neither 
foreign nor 
domestic legal 
entities can 
acquire land 
No 
No 

Yes, neither 
foreign nor 
domestic legal 
entities can 
acquire land 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 

No 
No 
No 
No 

No 
No 

No 

No 
No 
No 
No 
No 

Pre-emptive 
rights for 
(neighbouring) 
farmers 
neighbouring 
farmer 
Yes, for farmers 
with residence in 
the country for 
the sale of state 
land 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 

Maximum 
transacted/own
ed area 

Yes 

No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 

No 
Yes 

Yes 

No 
No 
No 
No 
No 

No 
No 
No 
No 

No 
No 

No 
No 
No 
Yes 

No 
No 

Yes 

Yes 

No 
No 
No 
Yes 

No 
No, but 
transaction can 
be denied if price 
is excessive 
No 

No 
Yes 

No 

Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 

No 
No 
No 
No 
No 

Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 

Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 

18 

 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Measures to protect non-farmland owners, by country, around 2020 

Country 
Minimum rental price 
Belgium 
No 
Bulgaria 
No 
Czechia 
No 
Denmark 
No 
Germany 
No 
Estonia 
No 
Ireland 
No 
Spain 
No 
France 
Yes 
Croatia 
Yes, for state-owned land 
Italy 
No 
Latvia 
Yes, but only for state-owned land leased with redemption rights 
Lithuania 
Yes, for municipality-owned land 
No 
Hungary 
Netherlands  No 
No 
Austria 
No 
Poland 
No 
Romania 
No 
Slovenia 
A non-binding minimum rental price exists, which is set at a very low level 
Slovakia 
No 
Finland 
No 
Sweden 

Maximum rental contract duration 
No 
Yes, but only for certain types of tenancy contracts 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Existence of reference contract durations 
Yes 
No 
Yes, but only for state-owned land leased with redemption rights 
Yes, but only for state-owned land 
Yes 
No 
Existence of reference contract durations 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 

19 

 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Measures to prevent fragmentation, by country, around 2020 

Country 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Czechia 
Denmark 
Germany 
Estonia 
Ireland 
Spain 
France 
Croatia 
Italy 
Latvia 

Lithuania 
Hungary 

Netherlands 
Austria 

Poland 
Romania 
Slovenia 
Slovakia 
Finland 
Sweden 

Lower plot size limit 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Subdivision of already consolidated plot not allowed 
No 
No 

No 
State land cannot not be subdivided into plots of < 1 ha or < 3 ha for 
orchards 
No 
Transfer can be denied if it leads to disruption of a favourable land 
structure 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 

Pre-emptive right of co-owner 
No 
Yes 
Yes, but only for 6 months after acquisition 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes, unless sold to family or unless the acquirer (other than the co-owner) 
owns less than 10 ha for natural persons or 5 ha for legal persons 
Yes 
Yes 

No 
No 

No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 

20 

 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Other measures, by country, around 2020 

Country 

Requirement for 
publication of sale 
offers 

Procedures for 
sale of public 
land 

Share deal 
approvals 

Pre-emptive rights 
for state/public 
bodies 

Belgium 

No 

No 

No 

Bulgaria 

No 

Yes 

Czechia 

Yes, for state land 

Yes 

No 

No 

Denmark 

No 

Germany 

No 

Estonia 

Ireland 
Spain 

France 

No 

No 
No 

No 

Croatia 

No 

No 

No 

Yes 

No 
Yes 

No 

Yes 

Administrative 
approval needed for 
the transfer of shares 
of a legal entity that 
owns agricultural land 
No 

No 

No 
No 

Transfer of shares can 
be forbidden, but only 
if totality of shares is 
transferred/sold 
No 

21 

Pre-emptive 
rights for 
family 
relatives 

(Temporary) 
moratorium on 
transferring 
ownership after 
acquisition 

(Temporary) 
moratorium on 
selling public land 

No 

No 

No 

No 

Yes 

Yes, but only for land 
acquired from state 
or municipalities 
Yes, but only for land 
acquired from state 
or municipalities 

Yes 

No 

No 

No 

No 

Governmental body 
can take possession of 
the land under specific 
conditions, for 
example to build new 
residential area 
No 

Yes, but only 
municipalities and 
regions have pre-
emptive rights 
(without payment) for 
state land 
No 

Yes 

No 

No 
No 

Yes 

Yes 

No 

No 

No 
No 

No 

No 

No 

No, but granted tax 
reliefs might have to 
be returned 
No 
Yes, if tax reduction or 
exemptions were 
granted 
No 

No 

Speed of 
privatisation of 
public land is limited 
Yes 

No 
No 

No 

Yes 

 
 
Country 

Requirement for 
publication of sale 
offers 

Procedures for 
sale of public 
land 

Share deal 
approvals 

Pre-emptive rights 
for state/public 
bodies 

Pre-emptive 
rights for 
family 
relatives 

(Temporary) 
moratorium on 
transferring 
ownership after 
acquisition 

(Temporary) 
moratorium on 
selling public land 

Italy 

Latvia 

No 

Yes 

Lithuania 

Yes 

Hungary 
Netherlands 

Yes 
No 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 
No 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

No 
No 

Austria 

Poland 
Romania 

If a non-farmer 
wants to buy a piece 
of land, this has to 
be announced 
publicly and local 
farmers are able to 
make an offer for 
4 weeks (1 month) 
Yes, for state land 
Yes 

Slovenia 

Yes 

No 

Yes 

Yes 
No 

No 

Yes 
No 

No 

Yes, if tax reduction or 
exemptions were 
granted 
Yes, but only for land 
acquired from state 
or municipalities 

Yes, if public land is 
subject to specific 
constraints 
No 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

No 

No, but pre-
emptive rights 
for tenant, co-
owner or state 
do not apply if 
sold to a 
spouse or 
relative of 
second or 
third degree 
No 

No 

No, but a maximum 
of 300 ha can be 
acquired from the 
state 
No 
Yes 

Yes 
Governmental body 
can take possession of 
the land under specific 
conditions, for 
example to build new 
residential area 
No 

Yes 
No 

No 
Yes, if tax reduction or 
exemptions were 
granted 

No 

No 

No 

Yes 
Yes 

Yes 

22 

Yes 
Yes 

Yes 

Yes 
No, but granted tax 
reliefs might have to 
be returned 
No 

Yes 
No 

No 

 
 
Country 

Requirement for 
publication of sale 
offers 

Procedures for 
sale of public 
land 

Share deal 
approvals 

Pre-emptive rights 
for state/public 
bodies 

Slovakia 
Finland 

Yes 
No 

Sweden 

No 

Yes 
No 

Yes 

No 
No 

? (13) 

No 
Yes 

No 

Pre-emptive 
rights for 
family 
relatives 

(Temporary) 
moratorium on 
transferring 
ownership after 
acquisition 

No 
No 

No 

No 
Yes, if tax reduction or 
exemptions were 
granted 
No 

(Temporary) 
moratorium on 
selling public land 

No 
No 

Yes, if land is 
needed for special 
reasons, which could 
include cultural 
environment, 
defence, nature 
conservation and 
recreation 

(13) 

The question mark expresses a rather complex case. No formal share deal approvals are in place in Sweden, but an acquisition permit is required in some circumstances for some special areas 
(sparsely populated or redevelopment areas). The questions mark was considered to be “0” in regulations score calculations and in charts. 

23 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
4.2.  Statistical overview of land market regulations 

This section provides a brief statistical analysis of the results from the cross-country comparisons (Tables 2–6) by 
group of measures. It discusses some basic descriptive statistics and presents charts summarising the findings. 
The discussion follows the order of the cross-country tables from Section 4.1. 

All statistics presented below are based on numerical equivalents of the verbal expressions of measures included 
in Tables 2–6, (i.e. in terms of numbers representing counts of measures), following the numerical scales detailed 
in Table A3 in Annex 3 and explained in Section 4.1. The scores for all measures are reported in Tables A4.1–A4.4 
in Annex 4. 

4.2.1. Measures to protect the tenant (Table 2) 

Table 2 (Section 4.1) contains results for five regulations related to the tenant protection applied in the included 
MS. The median number of regulations (the bars in yellow in Figure 1) for tenant protection is 2, which is very close 
to the average total score of 2.09 regulations, out of the range of minimum 0 to maximum 5. Estonia, Latvia and 
Hungary observe the median level (2) of the total score. On average, approximately 2 regulations are in place in 
the 22 countries (out of a maximum of 5) that protect the tenants of farmland. 

Two countries, Belgium and France, are characterised by maximum protection of the tenant (maximum score of 5 
regulations). Spain, the Netherlands and Slovakia also have relatively high numbers of measures in place for the 
protection of land tenants: 4, 3.75 and 3.5, respectively. 

Two countries, Denmark and Finland, observe no tenant protection at all (score 0). Eight other countries also have 
a low total score for tenant protection, including Ireland (0.125) and Czechia (0.5), where scores are close to zero. 

24 

 
 
Figure 1. Total score on tenant protection in 22 MS, around 2020 

Median 
2.00 
to 

Average 
2.09 
related 

Minimum 
0.00 
statistics 

Maximum 
5.00 
NB: Empirical 
(Section 4.1). 
Average means the arithmetic mean. Median is the middle number in a sorted list of numbers with the same amount of numbers 
below and above. Skewness is a measure of symmetry, or more precisely, the lack of symmetry. A distribution, or data set, is 
symmetric if it looks the same to the left and right of the centre point; the skewness for a normal distribution (fully symmetric) 
is zero. Kurtosis is a measure of whether the data are heavy-tailed or light-tailed relative to a normal distribution. The kurtosis 
for a standard normal distribution is 3. Positive kurtosis indicates a ‘heavy-tailed’ distribution and negative kurtosis indicates a 
‘light-tailed’ distribution. 

Skewness 
0.42 

Kurtosis 
–0.79 

Table 2 

from 

data 

Generally, the distribution of the number of regulations of the 22 EU MS for the protection of farmland tenants 
concentrates towards lower values of the total score (Figure 2). For a majority of the countries (13 out of 22), the 
total score is between 0 and 2, meaning they exercise only two or fewer regulations for land tenant protection. 
Seven countries have a total score of between 2.1 and 4, and only two countries have between 4.1 and 5 regulations 
(Belgium and France). In these two countries, the protection of the tenant is clearly the greatest. 

25 

0123456Total Score on Tenant Protection 
 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of the total score on tenant protection, 22 MS, around 2020 

4.2.2. Measures to protect the farmland owner (Table 3) 

The median score of farmland owner protection equals 1 measure, whereas the average score is 1.59 measures 
(Figure 3), out of the range of minimum 0 to maximum 8 regulations (no country has all eight regulations in place). 
Both these values are low, indicating a generally low number of protective measures for farmland owners in the 
22 countries studied. Germany, Spain, Italy, and Latvia observe the median level (1) of the total score, and Bulgaria, 
Estonia  and  France  score  close  to  the  average  number  of  the  measures  exercised  (1.5).  Thus,  on  average,  1.5 
measures are in place in Bulgaria, Estonia and France (out of a maximum of 6 observed) to protect the farmland 
owner. 

Hungary has the greatest protection of the farmland owner (6 regulations). Croatia and Poland also have a relatively 
high number of protective measures for farmland owners, as they score 5.5 points (out of a maximum of 8). 

Eight countries (Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Finland and Sweden) exercise no 
farmland owner protection at all (score 0). Nine other countries have a low total score (1–2): Germany, Spain, Italy 
and  Latvia  (each  with  1  measure);  Bulgaria,  Estonia  and  France  (each  with  1.5  measures)  and  Lithuania  and 
Slovenia (each with 2 measures). 

26 

853420.02.04.06.08.010.00-11.1-22.1-33.1-44.1-5No. of CountriesTotal Score on Tenant ProtectionDistribution of 22 Countries on Total Score on Tenant Protection 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Total score on protection of the farmland owner, 22 MS, around 2020 

Maximum 

Minimum 

Average 

Median 

Skewness 

Kurtosis 

6.00 

0.00 

1.59 

1.00 

1.37 

1.02 

NB: Empirical statistics related to data from Table 3 (Section 4.1). 

Generally, the distribution of the scores of the 22 EU MS on the level of protection for the farmland owner is highly 
asymmetric  and  strongly  concentrates  around  the  lowest  values  of  the  total  score  (peak  at  0–1;  12  countries; 
Figure 4). The total number of regulations is lower than 3 measures for almost all countries (19 out of 22). Only 
three  countries  score  high,  that  is  between  5.1  and  6  regulations  (Croatia,  Hungary  and  Poland).  No  country 
exercises all eight measures investigated. 

Figure 4. Distribution of the total score on farmland owner protection, 22 MS, around 2020 

27 

01234567Total Score on Protection of the Farm Land-Owner 125200300024681012140-11.1-22.1-33.1-44.1-55.1-66.1-77.1-8No. of CountriesTotal Score on Farm Land-Owner ProtectionDistribution of 22 Countries on Total Score for Farm Land-Owner Protection 
 
 
 
4.2.3. Measures to protect non-farmland owners (Table 4) 

The median score of non-farmland owner protection equals 0.31 measures, whereas the average score is 0.49 
regulations (Figure 5), out of a range of minimum 0 to maximum 2 regulations (no country has both regulations in 
place). Both these values are low, indicating a low number of protective measures for non-farmland owners in the 
22 countries studied. Austria exercises close to the median number of regulations (0.125), and Bulgaria and Latvia 
implement an average number of measures (0.5 each). Thus, on average, a fraction of one measure is in place in 
these countries (out of a maximum of 1.5 observed) to protect the non-farmland owner. 

Croatia has the greatest protection of farmland owners (maximum score of 1.5). Ten countries (Belgium, Czechia, 
Germany,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Spain,  Italy,  the  Netherlands,  Poland  and  Slovenia)  have  no  non-farmland  owner 
protective measures at all (score 0). Three other countries also have a low total score (0.5 or less): Bulgaria, Latvia 
and Austria. 

Figure 5. Total score on protection of the non-farmland owner, 22 MS, around 2020 

Maximum 

Minimum 

Average 

Median 

Skewness 

Kurtosis 

1.50 

0.00 

0.49 

0.31 

0.36 

–1.61 

NB: Empirical statistics related to data from Table 4 (Section 4.1). 

The distribution of the scores of the 22 EU MS on the protection level for non-farmland owners is highly asymmetric, 
and peaks around the lowest values of the total score (0–0.5; 13 countries; Figure 6). Almost all countries (19 out 
of 22) have the total number of regulations up to 1 point. Only three countries score higher, that is between 1.01 
and 1.5 points (Croatia, France and Slovakia). 

28 

00.511.52Total Score on Protection of the Non-Farm Land-Owner  
 
 
Figure 6. Distribution of the total score on non-farmland owner protection, 22 MS, around 2020 

4.2.4. Measures to prevent fragmentation (Table 5) 

The median score for preventing land fragmentation equals 0.50 measures, whereas the average score is 0.63 
measures, out of a range of minimum 0 to maximum 2 regulations (Figure 7). Both these values are relatively low, 
indicating a rather low number of measures taken for preventing fragmentation in the 22 countries studied. Croatia, 
Latvia and Austria observe the median level of the total score (0.5). Thus, a fraction of one measure is in place in 
these countries (0.5 out of the maximum of 2 observed) to prevent fragmentation. 

Bulgaria, Spain and Slovakia  have the highest number of regulations preventing land fragmentation (2  out of 2 
regulations), followed by Hungary, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Romania and Slovenia, which each score between 1 
and 1.5. Nine countries (Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, France, the Netherlands, Poland, Finland and Sweden) 
observe no measures preventing land fragmentation at all (score 0). Four more countries  also have a low total 
number of land fragmentation regulations (0.5 or lower): Croatia, Latvia, Austria and Czechia. 

The distribution of the scores of the 22 EU MS on preventing land fragmentation is highly asymmetric and peaks 
around the lowest values of the total score (0–0.5; 13 countries; Figure 8). Almost all countries (18 out of 22) have 
a total score of between 0 and 1 regulation. Only four countries score higher, that is between 1.01 and 2 regulations 
(Bulgaria, Spain, Slovakia and Hungary). 

29 

13630036912150.00-0.500.51-1.001.01-1.501.51-2.00No. of CountriesTotal Score on Non-Farm Land-Owner ProtectionDistribution of 22 Countries on Total Score for Non-Farm Land-Owner Protection 
 
 
Figure 7. Total score on preventing land fragmentation, 22 MS, around 2020 

Maximum 

Minimum 

Average 

Median 

Skewness 

Kurtosis 

2.00 

0.00 

0.63 

0.50 

0.85 

–0.41 

NB: Empirical statistics related to data from Table 5 (Section 4.1). 

Figure 8. Distribution of the total score on preventing land fragmentation, 22 MS, around 2020 

4.2.5. Other measures of land market regulations (Table 6) 

Other measures regulating land markets in  the  22 EU  MS refer to  procedures related to transactions of state-
owned land and pre-emptive rights to land of the state/public bodies or family members and relatives. Seven such 
measures were investigated in this study. None of the 22 countries implemented all seven measures (Figure 9). 

30 

00.511.522.5Total Score on Preventing Land Fragmentation 13513036912150.00-0.500.51-1.001.01-1.501.51-2.00No. of CountriesTotal Score on Preventing Land FragmentationDistribution of 22 Countries on Total Score for Preventing Land Fragmentation 
 
 
 
 
The  median  score  of  the  other measures  regulating  land  markets  equals 1.75  measures, whereas the  average 
score is 2.24 measures, out of a range of minimum 0 to maximum 7 measures (all 7 measures were not in place 
in any country). Both these values are rather low, indicating a generally low number of other regulatory measures 
for land markets in the 22 countries studied. 

Poland has the highest score, with 6.25 measures exercised. Latvia, Lithuania and Hungary also have a relatively 
high number of other measures, as they implement between 4 and 4.75 regulations (out of 7). This is followed by 
Romania, Croatia, Slovenia, Czechia and Bulgaria, which have slightly above the average score (between 2.5 and 
3.25 measures). 

Estonia, Slovakia, France, the Netherlands and Austria observe a close-to-median level of the total score (2 or 1.5 
points).  Three  countries,  Belgium,  Denmark  and  Ireland,  exercise  the  fewest  other  measures  (score  0.25).  Eight 
other  countries  also  have  a  relatively  low  total  score  too  (1.50  or  less),  namely  Italy, Germany,  Spain,  Finland, 
Sweden, Belgium, Denmark and Ireland, all being old MS. 

Figure 9. Distribution of the total score on other measures of land market regulations, 22 MS, around 
2020 

Maximum 

Minimum 

Average 

Median 

Skewness 

Kurtosis 

6.25 

0.25 

2.24 

1.75 

0.92 

0.68 

NB: Empirical statistics related to data from Table 6 (Section 4.1). 

Similarly to the above results, the distribution of the scores of the 22 EU countries for other measures regulating 
land markets is highly asymmetric and concentrates around the lower values of the total score (0–2; 13 countries, 
11 of which are old MS; Figure 10). Another six countries (out of 22), all new MS, have total scores of between 2.1 
and 4 measures. One country, Poland, scores really high, with 6.25 regulations, suggesting an abundance of other 
regulatory measures in place. 

31 

01234567Total Score on Other Measures of Land Markets 
 
 
Figure 10. Distribution of the total score for other measures of land market regulations, 22 MS, around 
2020 

32 

310422010246810120-11.1-22.1-33.1-44.1-55.1-66.1-7No. of CountriesTotal Score on Other Measures Distribution of 22 Countries on Total Score on Other Measures 
 
 
 
 
5.  Country-level qualitative description of land market 
regulations 

This section provides a more detailed qualitative description of land market regulations for all 22 MS covered in 
the report and is primarily based on the country reports. The country qualitative descriptions also highlight some 
main aspects of the agricultural sector and land markets as background information for a better understanding of 
the implemented land market regulations across MS. 

5.1.  Belgium 

The number of farms in Belgium declined by 28 % between 2005 and 2016 (i.e. from 51 540 in 2005 to 36 890 
in 2016), while the average utilised area per farm increased from approximately 27 ha in 2005 to 37 ha in 2016 
(or 37 %) (Eurostat, 2020). The majority of agricultural land (83 %) is cultivated by natural persons, with an average 
farm size of 36 ha. The remaining land is cultivated by legal entities, who have a slightly larger farm size of 40 ha. 

An  important  challenge  for  the  agricultural  sector  in  Belgium  is  access  to  land  (Platteau  et  al.,  2018).  High 
population  density  and  urbanisation  increase  demand  for  ‘open  space’  or  unbuilt  land.  Scale  increase  and  the 
declining number of farms mean that many farm buildings and surrounding farmyards become  available to be 
repurposed  for other  non-agriculture-related  uses.  A  trend  of  ‘horsification’  and  ‘gardenification’  of  agricultural 
land has been observed, particularly around metropolitan areas (Bomans et al., 2010a, 2010b). Demand for land 
from  the  agricultural  sector  competes  with  demand  coming  from  recreation  and  nature  development.  These 
pressures  result  in  increasing  prices  for  agricultural  land,  which  makes  it  hard  for  young  farmers  or  farmers 
interested in increasing their scale to access land by purchasing on the sales market. The tenancy regulations in 
Belgium are relatively strict and strongly protect tenants. As a result, landlords seem to be less inclined or interested 
to rent out land to farmers (Swinnen, Van Herck and Vranken, 2016), which also makes it hard for young farmers, 
as well as farmers willing to expand, to access land by renting. Despite landowners being less inclined to rent out 
land, 63 % of the utilised area is rented. 

There are limited regulations related to the sales of land. Most regulations are related to land rental and are mainly 
protecting the tenant. Since 2014, the tenancy legislation became the responsibility of the regions, instead of the 
federal  state.  This  has  led  to  some  debates and  proposals  to  introduce  changes  to  the  tenancy  regulations.  In 
Wallonia, some changes have been introduced and entered into force on 13 January 2020. In Flanders, some issues 
related to tenancy regulations are being discussed, but new legislation had not been adopted at the time of writing. 
However,  even  with  the  existing  legislation,  tenants  still  receive  a  relatively  high  level  of  protection  under  the 
tenancy regulations. 

The tenancy regulations stipulate several provisions regarding rental. The tenancy regulations apply to the rental 
of immovable property, which, from the moment the tenant takes possession (at the beginning or during the lease 
period), can be used by the tenant primarily in agricultural business. ‘Agricultural business’ means the commercial 
exploitation of the immovable property with the purpose of production of agricultural products mainly intended for 
sale. However, this does not require the agricultural production to be a main occupation. The use of a plot of land 
for production of food for personal use is not covered by the tenancy regulation. ‘Business’ implies an economic 
operation,  carrying  out  a  ‘regular’  activity  and  the  presence  of  a  minimum  of  suitable  operating  equipment.  It 

33 

 
 
excludes  a  number  of  other  specific  uses,  such  as  the  lease  for  industrial  fattening  or  rearing  of  livestock 
independent of a farm, and cultivation contracts (14). 

Tenancy  contracts  have  a  minimum  duration  of  9 years.  In  the  absence  of  a  valid  termination,  the  rental  is 
automatically extended for consecutive periods of 9 years, even if the first period of use has lasted longer than 
9 years. For decades, this implied that, if no proper notice was given to terminate the contract, the rental continues 
for periods of 9 years. An important change is that, since 2020 in Wallonia, only three extensions are possible after 
the initial lease period. After the third extension, the rental agreement will thus end. However, if the tenant remains 
on the land after the third extension, this will result in a tacit extension and the rental agreement will continue from 
year to year. During that period of tacit renewal, no (privileged) lease transfer can take place. A new instrument 
has been introduced in Wallonia as well, namely the end-of-career lease. This lease is used to bridge the period 
between  the  end  of  a  regular lease  (read:  after the  third  renewal)  and  the  retirement  age  of  the  tenant  being 
reached. At the end of this agreement, the lessor will automatically have the free enjoyment of the lease property 
without the lessee being able to object to it. 

In addition, there is also the career lease, under which a landlord grants a tenant a fixed rental agreement until the 
latter has reached the age of 65 years, with a legal minimum lease duration of 27 years. The tenant must therefore 
be younger than 38 years at the time of entering into the career lease. However, this lease ends unconditionally 
upon reaching this age, and no lease renewal is possible. During the career lease, sublease and lease transfer are 
allowed. Unilateral cancellation during this period is not possible. This formula gives the tenant the security of a 
full  professional  career  and  offers  the  lessor  certain  advantages  in  terms  of  rent  and  income  taxes.  Only  the 
property tax is due, while the income from the career lease is not taxable. 

Landlords  can  terminate  a  rental  contract  only  under  specific  conditions.  For  example,  if  the  owner  or  a  close 
relative wants to cultivate the land himself or herself, the contract can be terminated at 2 years’ notice. The tenant 
can end the contract at any time with a minimum notice period of 1 year. 

The rental price is agreed between landlord and tenant, but a maximum rental price is set. This maximum price is 
based on the cadastral income and tenancy coefficient, which varies according to the agroecological region. The 
cadastral income is based on the annual net rental income that one would  have obtained in 1975 for the real 
estate  if  it  had  been  rented  out.  The  cadastral  income  is  indexed  on  a  yearly  basis.  The  tenancy  coefficient  is 
published in the Belgian Official Gazette. These coefficients are determined by the lease price committee. They can 
be different for land and buildings. 

If agricultural land is sold, the tenant has pre-emptive rights. Tenancy contracts are inheritable upon the death of 
the tenant or the landlord: the new acquirer of the land inherits the rental contract, but also the heir of the tenant 
inherits the rental contract. 

In certain areas, a land bank (which is a governmental body) has pre-emptive rights. The overall aim of this provision 
is to allow the implementation of policies and projects that are in the public interest. The land bank can exert the 
pre-emptive  right  to  realise  the  aim of  a  land  development  project  or a  project, plan  or programme  within  the 
framework of the land development decree, or for a land consolidation or nature development project, or to acquire 
land that is entirely or partially located in delineated flood areas or riparian zones. 

(14) 

‘Cultivation contract’ means the contract under which an operator of land (and pastures), after having carried out the preparation and 
fertilisation  works,  assigns  the  exploitation  of  a  specific  agricultural  crop  to  a  third  party  against  payment.  The  cultivation  contract 
assumes a use of less than 1 year. 

34 

 
 
                                                 
5.2.  Bulgaria 

All EU citizens can acquire agricultural land in Bulgaria. However, natural persons need to be residents and legal 
entities need to be established in Bulgaria for more than 5 years in order to be able to acquire ownership rights to 
agricultural land. Legal persons with registrations under Bulgarian law of less than 5 years may acquire ownership 
rights over agricultural land if the partners in the company, members of the association or founders of the joint-
stock company have been residing in the country for more than 5 years. Each ownership change must be witnessed 
and registered by a public notary. An important part of the procedure is that the public notary checks and ensures 
the legality of the transaction. In addition, citizens of MS of the EU – self-employed farmers, who wish to settle 
and reside permanently in Bulgaria and are registered following the procedure of the BULSTAT Register Act – may 
acquire the right of ownership of agricultural land (and forest land) for agricultural purposes. In such circumstances, 
there is no residence requirement at the time of land acquisition. Generally, neighbouring farmers and co-owners 
have pre-emptive rights to acquire ownership of agricultural land. This provision aims to reduce fragmentation of 
landholdings. 

Two types of tenancy contracts exist in Bulgaria. The first type includes ‘lease contracts’, which have a minimum 
duration  of  1 year and  a  maximum  duration  of  10 years  for  arable  land.  For  some  types of  land,  longer  lease 
contracts  are  possible.  Lease  contracts  are  always  concluded  in  writing  with  notarised  signatures,  and  the 
registration  of  the  tenancy  lease  contracts  in  the  land  register  is  compulsory.  Moreover,  termination  of  lease 
contracts needs to be entered in the notary books. The lease payment is determined by the Agricultural Lease Act. 
Given that the lease must be notarised, it implies a fairly easy way for the landowner to obtain a writ of execution 
and to enforce the amounts due through a bailiff, if the tenant does not pay the agreed rental price. In addition, a 
sketch/map  of  the  property  must  be  included  in  the  lease  contract,  which  ensures  clarity  in  identifying  the 
agricultural land involved. This minimises the possibility of disputes over the extent of the property. As a result, the 
lease contract conditions are protecting the rights of the non-farmer owner. 

The second type of tenancy includes ‘rental contracts’ without a minimum duration, but with a maximum duration 
of 5 years. This rental contract can be concluded orally; hence, registration in a land register is not mandatory. 

Both types of contract can be renewed so actual tenancy can last for longer periods, but there is no automatic 
renewal. The existing tenants have pre-emptive rights in the case of contract renewal. Tenancy contracts are not 
inheritable upon the death of the tenant, unless it is mentioned in the tenancy contract. 

A substantial amount of land (approximately one third of total agricultural land in 2015) is owned by the state or 
municipalities. Vacant agricultural land from the state or municipality land fund can be rented through tender or 
competition. The term of the lease agreement may not be longer than 10 years for arable land and 30 years for 
permanent crops, and not shorter than 5 business years, as established in the Agricultural Lease Act. 

Sales  of  public  land  are  done  through  a  competitive  procedure.  Eligible  parties  for  participation  in  auctions  of 
agricultural land from the state land fund or land owned by the municipalities can be only holders of registered 
compensation vouchers, of compensation bonds or of residential compensation bonds. Commercial companies (i.e. 
agricultural companies) cannot participate in the auctions or tenders. 

State or municipality land is sometimes also distributed to local individuals who do not own land or own a small 
amount  of  land  (often  acquired  as  a  result  of  land  restitution).  This  process  is  outlined  in  Article 20  of  the 
Agricultural  Land  Ownership  and  Use  Act  (ALOUA).  Article 21  of  ALOUA  lists  the  priority  with  which  land  is 
distributed. In this type of transaction/transfer, land is given free of charge to qualified individuals. Land is given 
to those who have a greater need. According to Article 21 of ALOUA, the priority in acquiring this land is given to 
individuals in the following order: persons engaged in agricultural activity in the settlement where land is located; 

35 

 
 
persons permanently residing in the settlement; agricultural specialists, as well as young families who carry out 
agricultural activity; and persons whose properties have been expropriated for state or public use. 

In terms of the implementation and enforcement of the land legislation in place in Bulgaria, the lease contract is 
more favourable to landowners who are unsure of the tenants’ intentions or who want a commitment for a longer 
time  period.  In  addition,  the  lease  contract  always  includes  a  map  of  the  property,  which  ensures  clarity  in 
identifying the agricultural land involved. This minimises the possibility of future disputes over the extent of the 
property and rental arrangements. However, one concern with short rental contracts is that fraud has often been 
encountered between owners and tenants. This contract type can be manipulated rather easily, as it is difficult to 
trace and verify the validity of signatures (if they existed at all) of individuals involved in the transaction. Therefore, 
the owners of agricultural land can easily be deceived. 

Public land, comprising state and municipal land funds, is an important tool for interventions in the agricultural 
land market in Bulgaria. The transactions with state and municipal land are carried out through formal, competitive 
procedures. The state and municipal land is primarily used to compensate former (natural persons) owners and to 
facilitate expansion of farmland for small and young farmers. 

5.3.  Czechia 

Landownership is highly fragmented in Czechia. In 2017, there were 3 250 000 private owners of agricultural land. 
A total of 3 198 000 natural persons own, on average, just a bit less than 1 ha. Half of them, around 1.6 million 
owners, own less than  0.25 ha. Furthermore, 52 000 legal entities own agricultural land. They own on average 
16 ha. The high level of fragmentation of landownership results in transaction costs when exchanging land. As a 
result, there is a desire to stimulate land consolidation. Land consolidation, whether simple or complex, builds on 
the voluntary participation of landowners and on the consensual approval of the land consolidation plan/project. 

To our knowledge, there is no available study in the literature that provides empirical evidence of the causality 
between land consolidation and land market functioning in Czechia. However, there is a commonly accepted view, 
and evidence from other countries suggests, that land consolidation contributes to overcome land market frictions 
(together with state land privatisation) (e.g. Crecente, Alvarez and Fra, 2002; Lerman and Cimpoieş 2006; Palmér, 
Munro-Faure and Rembold, 2004). The consolidated land generates benefits to owners, as it allows more efficient 
deployment for production, and to potential buyers or farmers interested to rent, as consolidation expands the plot 
size and potentially makes land more accessible. Both effects are expected to increase the sale or rental price of 
consolidated land. Furthermore, there are potential benefits of land consolidation for municipalities, since the land 
consolidation enables them to design their territorial (development) plans better. As a result, municipalities often 
carry out land consolidation before large infrastructure projects start. In other words, the intention to put forward 
essential infrastructural projects often triggers the land consolidation process in Czechia. 

Land  use  is  less  fragmented  in  Czechia,  as  it  is  consolidated  through  land  rental.  Overall,  a  large  share  of 
agricultural land is rented in Czechia. This share has decreased over the last few years, but it is still sizable at 74 % 
of total agricultural land in 2020. 

The Civil Code (Act No 89/2012 Coll.) governs agricultural land transactions (sales, renting) in Czechia, as well as 
any other property transactions. The Civil Code establishes rather liberal rules governing land market transactions. 
It does not limit ownership and tenancy in terms of size of the transacted property, legal status of the owners or 
their nationality (country of residence or citizenship of the owners). 

The Czech legislation gives pre-emptive rights only in limited situations. Family relatives and co-owners have pre-
emptive rights for 6 months following the owner’s acquisition of the land (in the case of inheritance). In the case 

36 

 
 
of state land, if the tenancy lasted for at least 36 months, then the tenant who rented the land has preferential 
right  to  buy  (privatise)  the  land.  Overall, the  pre-emptive  rights  can  be  settled  on  a  voluntary  basis  by  mutual 
agreement between owner and tenant. 

Land reforms (privatisation and restitution) have been largely finalised in Czechia. Therefore, there are hardly any 
issues  regarding  unknown  or  unidentified  owners,  or  people  with  unproven  restitution  claims.  The  unfinished 
restitution concerns only substitutions of land plots and financial compensation when the land property cannot be 
returned in the original location (i.e. this concerned only 425 ha as of 31 December 2018). 

About 212 000 ha are owned by public institutions and the state in Czechia. The sale of state land is regulated by 
Act No 503/2012 on State Land Fund, Article12 – sales to farmers. The sale of state land according to this law is 
done through public offers. Eligible buyers include agricultural entrepreneurs (natural or legal persons) who (i) have 
been involved in farming for at least 3 years and operate at least 10 ha in the cadastre or in the area neighbouring 
where the state land is for sale, and (ii) own at least 10 ha in the cadastre or in the neighbouring area and have 
farmed  at  least  10 ha  for  at  least  3 years  elsewhere  in  Czechia.  Farmers  who  rent  state  land  designed  for 
privatisation  for  at  least  3 years  have  a  pre-emptive  right  to  this land.  However,  under this  rule,  the  farmer  is 
eligible to acquire no more than 70 % of such an area. It should be noted that no state land was offered for sale 
through Act No 503/2012 in 2019 or 2020. Most of the sales of state land are actually carried out under the Act 
No 95/1999, which was replaced by Act No 503/2012. Municipalities and regions (kraj) have pre-emptive rights to 
transfer the ownership of the state land (without payment) to them as established in Article 7 of Act No 503/2012. 
Sales of land owned by municipalities and regions (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) 3, i.e. 
kraj) are not specifically regulated by a special law. 

Overall, the land market in Czechia is largely liberal. Natural and legal persons, regardless of their nationality, can 
freely buy and sell land. Taxation of landownership and transactions is rather moderate.  Thanks to these liberal 
conditions, demand for land purchases has been dynamic in recent years. Moreover, land tenancy conditions are 
predominantly set by the contractual parties, with minor (only administrative) state interference. The outstanding 
issues  are  access  to  land  plots  and  ownership  fragmentation,  which  largely  depend  on  the  progress  of  land 
consolidation. Thus, land consolidation is the main issue preoccupying agricultural policy and land authorities in 
Czechia. Another pressing issue associated with land tenancy is soil and biodiversity protection.  The current law 
stipulates  that  agricultural  land  should  be  maintained  so  that  it  is  fertile  and  that  soil  degradation  should  be 
prevented. However, the actual enforcement of the regulations is rather weak. There are indications that the CAP 
measures, such as the requirement to maintain land in good agricultural and environmental conditions, greening 
measures or the country’s maximum arable field size limit set at 30 ha, have contributed to an improvement of 
the environment. On the other hand, the evidence suggests that the CAP area payments have, to a large extent, 
been capitalised into land sale and rental prices. 

5.4.  Denmark 

Denmark’s agricultural land is mainly owned by cultivators or by the families of the cultivators. In Denmark, owner-
cultivation and family ownership are, by far, the dominant forms of ownership, and protection of owner-cultivation 
has been – and still is – mentioned in the Agricultural Act as a goal. 

The regulations of agricultural land in Denmark are predominantly formulated in the Agricultural Act, which covers 
all types of agriculture. Regulations have been liberalised and less emphasis has been put on owner-cultivation in 
the previous three to four decades. Access to new types of finance and new types of ownership were considered 
to be necessary for the development of a competitive agricultural sector. There is no longer an upper limit on how 

37 

 
 
much  land  a  farmer  can  own,  an  education  requirement  or  the  requirement  for  the  owner  to  run  the  property 
themselves. Furthermore, the requirement that the owner must live on the property has been dismantled. 

The potential for companies to own agricultural property has increased since 2010. Investors – Danish or foreign – 
can form a company that can acquire an agricultural property. The person who fulfils the conditions for personal 
acquisition of the agricultural property must have a controlling influence in the company. 

Not surprisingly, tenancy has become more important over the past few decades. In 1965, the share of rented land 
was less than 10 %, but this share increased to around 40 % in 2020. The share of farms cultivating rented land 
increased from less than 15 % to around 50 % from 1965 to 2020. By 2020, a farm cultivated, on average, 190 ha 
of land, of which 70 ha were rented. 

Overall  land  market  regulations  are  limited.  Both  rental  and  sales  markets  are  very  liberal  in  Denmark,  with  a 
limited number of measures implemented from the six categories listed in Tables 2–6. 

Enforcement and application of the legislation are considered to be functioning well. The set of rules is relatively 
transparent and simple to administer, and access to exceptions and interpretations is limited. 

The integration of corporate and personal data into public data systems in Denmark also makes it relatively easy 
to  link  and  assess  the  information  needed  to  ensure  enforcement  of  the  legislation.  Furthermore,  the  strong 
organisation and integration of farmers helps to monitor enforcement. It  is rather difficult for farmers or other 
land  market  actors  not  to  comply  with  the  main  rules,  as  those  who  would  suffer  from  non-compliance  can 
relatively easily uncover incorrect behaviours or practices. Overall, the legal system is considered to be effective, 
which, on the one hand, has a preventive effect and, on the other hand, also overturns illegal acts in this area. 

5.5.  Germany 

There are large differences in land use and ownership within Germany due to its diverse geopolitical history. There 
are huge differences in average regional farm sizes between the eastern and western part of Germany, but there 
are also large differences within regions. In the western part of Germany, the share of rented land is 56 %. In some 
regions, such as in Bavaria, most farms are part-time and hobby farms, often smaller than 10 ha. In Schleswig-
Holstein in the north, some 65 % of the land is farmed in farms that are larger than 100 ha. In the eastern part of 
Germany, there are much larger farms, with an average size of around 244 ha. The share of rented land in the 
eastern part is also larger than in the west, at 69 %. 

The most important regulations for agricultural land sales in Germany are the Grundstückverkehrsgesetz (GrdstVG) 
(law on land transactions) and the Reichssiedlungsgesetz (Reich Settlement Law). 

With regard to its regulatory effect, the current regulation of land sales has to be considered to be rather liberal 
and, in certain respects, vague. The GrdstVG, for example, states that every land purchase needs to be registered 
and approved by local authorities (usually district-level committees or offices). The approval of a purchase can be 
denied (GrdstVG, §9) only if: 

 
 
 

the purchase would lead to an ‘unhealthy distribution of land’; 
the transaction leads to an uneconomical fragmentation of plots; 
there is a imbalance between the price and the value of the land. 

Except for the requirement that a land plot must not become smaller than 1 ha, the reasons for a denial are rather 
vague. An unhealthy distribution is defined by stating that the transaction contradicts measures to improve the 
agricultural structure. An interpretation of what this means was developed by the German constitutional court, the 

38 

 
 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, in 1967 (12 January 1967, 1 BvR 169/63). Accordingly, denials of land sales need a 
sound reason, such as that the transaction indeed contradicts measures to improve the agricultural structures. The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht argued that, in the end, this means that land is bought by a non-farmer while a farmer 
who is in need of land would be willing to step into the contract and use a pre-emptive right. However, the interested 
farmer has to prove that s/he has a need for land, for example because they lost owned land, their share of owned 
land is low, or they are a neighbouring farm that can consolidate or reduce fragmentation. Otherwise, non-farmers 
have the same rights to buy land, and it would even be unconstitutional to prohibit the purchase of land by non-
farmers just because they want to invest in buying agricultural land. 

Pre-emptive rights for farmers exist, but the procedure is rather complex as farmers do not have direct pre-emptive 
rights, but have to exert their pre-emptive rights through public organisations. If a farmer is willing and allowed to 
use a pre-emptive right, a regional land settlement organisation needs to buy and register the land first. The farmer 
can buy the land from the land settlement organisation at a price that also includes the registration fees and land 
sales tax paid by the settlement organisation, which is typically around 5 %. Thus, using a pre-emptive right means 
that farmers must be willing to pay the land sales tax and registration fees twice, on top of the original price. 

Sales are also denied if there is an imbalance between price and value, particularly if the sales price is more than 
50 % above the value of comparable plots. In the state Baden-Württemberg, the upper ceiling is 20 % above the 
value. 

It is important to note that there are no restrictions regarding the sale of whole farms (including land). However, 
after the transaction, the buyer can liquidate the farm and, in that way, famers cannot exert their (indirect) pre-
emptive rights. 

The land rental market in Germany is regulated by the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, and by a specific agricultural law, 
the Landpachtverkehrsgesetz (LPachtVG). 

Land rental contracts are required to be registered at the responsible regional authorities. The conditions of the 
rental agreement can be rejected, as in the case of sales, when: 

 
 
 

the land rental leads to an unhealthy distribution, particularly to an unhealthy accumulation of land; 
the land rental leads to an uneconomical fragmentation of land; 
the rental price is unreasonable in relation to the income that could be achieved with proper sustainable 
cultivation of the land. 

If the land rental contract is not registered, no sanctions are imposed. As a result, it is estimated that only around 
25 % of the rental contracts are registered (Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft, 2019). Rental 
contract duration can be freely negotiated. 

With the exception of a lack of sanctions for non-registration of rental contracts and certain bureaucratic and tax 
burdens,  land  regulation  is  widely  enforced  in  Germany.  Nevertheless,  there  are  complaints;  for  example,  the 
Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture argues that deficits in the regulatory framework exist, such as share deals 
of  whole  farms  not  being  covered  by  the  GrdstVG  and  the  LPachtVG,  and  local  regulation  offices  not  properly 
checking for existing farms that might be interested in exercising a pre-emptive right or for reasons to reject a 
sales contract (Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft, 2019). Empirical evidence for such concerns 
is, however, weak and is based on hearsay rather than on validated facts. 

Based on these arguments, and due to increasing land sales and rental prices, since about 2015 there have been 
some debates to introduce new land market regulations, for example enforcing the registration of rental contracts; 

39 

 
 
introducing the ability to reject sales contracts due to a high ownership concentration; a need to approve share 
deals,  that  is  transaction  of  whole  farms;  abolish  double  taxation  of  pre-emptive  rights;  reduction  of  land 
development; and support for the establishment of young farmers. However, to date (2020), the proposals  have 
not yet translated into new land regulations. 

5.6. 

Estonia 

Agriculture in Estonia is characterised by a dual structure with a relatively small number of large farms and a large 
number of small farms. The majority of agricultural production and land use is concentrated in the large farms, 
even though they are outnumbered by the smaller ones. According to Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) data, 
around two thirds of agricultural land was rented in 2019. 

Land regulations are stipulated by the Land Cadastre Act, the Forest Act, the Planning Act and the Restrictions on 
Acquisition of Immovables Act (RT I, 4 July 2017, 64). There are no restrictions on the amount or quality of land, 
or on the intended use of such land, that can be owned by either a domestic natural person or natural persons from 
another country that is a contracting party to the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement or a member state of 
the OECD. However, there are restrictions on the acquisition of land by persons from third countries in certain border 
areas. Restrictions to land acquisition can also arise for national defence reasons. 

Legal persons, either domestic or from an EEA or an OECD country, have the right to acquire 10 ha of agricultural 
land without restrictions. For the acquisition of a larger area, additional requirements apply. The legal person has 
to be engaged in the production of agricultural products or forest management for 3 years preceding the year of 
land acquisition. 

For third-party nationals, approval of agricultural land acquisition by the local council is needed.  A third-country 
citizen can acquire land if s/he has resided in Estonia permanently for a period of at least 6 months immediately 
before  applying  for  the  authorisation,  or  if  the  citizen  has  been  engaged  in  agricultural  production  or  forest 
management  as  a  sole  proprietor  in  Estonia  for  1 year  immediately  preceding  the  year  of  applying  for  the 
authorisation. A legal person from a third country can acquire land if it has been engaged in agricultural production 
or forest management in Estonia for 1 year immediately preceding the year of applying for the authorisation, and 
if  a  branch  of  the  legal  person  is  entered  in  the  Estonian  commercial  register  according  to  the  Restrictions  on 
Acquisition of Immovables Act (§5(3)). 

Despite the restrictions imposed, it may still be possible for nationals or a legal person from a third country to buy 
land even if the above conditions are not met. A potential example of such a case would be the use of a local 
representative of the beneficial owner for land acquisition. 

Sales of public land are regulated by the State Assets Act (RT I, 10 December 2020, 32). Both the sale and the use 
of state land are generally carried out by auction. 

The lease of agricultural land is regulated by the Law of Obligations Act (RT I, 4 January 2021, 19). It stipulates, 
among other things, that the tenant has an obligation to take care of the land. The state land is rented through a 
public written auction. Auction notices are published at least 2 weeks before the auction in the publication Ametlikud 
Teadaanded (15). Information on the concluded lease agreements is published in the state real estate register. 

Despite the restrictions imposed on land acquisition by legal persons or nationals from a third country, they can 
still buy land even if the required conditions are not met. A typical way to do this is to use a local representative 

(15) 

https://www.ametlikudteadaanded.ee/ 

40 

 
 
                                                 
for  the  beneficiary  owner.  However,  such  cases  have  not  been  publicly  addressed  in  matters  related  to  the 
acquisition of agricultural land. 

5.7. 

Ireland 

There are around 137 500 farm holdings in Ireland, of which the specialist beef farms have the largest share of 
agricultural area, comprising approximately 46 % of the total agricultural land in Ireland. Most of the farms are 
relatively  small,  with  an  average  size  of  48 ha  per  farm,  and  around  40 %  of  farms  have  less  than  20 ha  of 
farmland. Average farms size differs between regions, with relatively smaller farm sizes in the north and west and 
larger farms in the south and east. 

The Irish land sales market is very small, with only around 13 500 ha of agricultural land sold in 2019. This quantity 
of land sales excludes sales transactions with a building included. However, the annual level of agricultural land 
sales accounts for less than 1 % of the total agricultural land. The market is slightly larger for land rental activity, 
with around 700 000 ha of land being rented out in 2010 (Central Statistics Office, 2012). It accounts for almost 
19 % of total agricultural land (excluding commonage). Around 30 % of farms rented some land in 2010, with an 
average area of around 19 ha of leased land per farm. 

Large areas of land are under a ‘conacre’ system, under which the landowner rents out land for 11 months. The 
tenant pays in cash and uses the land for one production cycle. The tenant can seek for further yearly extensions 
if the landowner is happy with the arrangements. There is no legal binding to let the land for the same tenant.  In 
the late 19th century, the system was preferred by the landowners because of their fears of losing land to the 
Land Commission if they rented out land for a longer period or of tenants having a legal right to the rented land. 
The downside of the conacre system is that tenants cannot make long-term plans to increase production efficiency. 
Policy reforms and tax incentives were introduced in 2012 to encourage land transactions and long-term rental 
contracts, to provide tenure security for tenants. Despite policy reforms and tax incentives, most (60–65 %) rented 
agricultural land is still rented out on a conacre basis. 

Land transactions  do  not  require  approval  from a  governmental  body,  but  they  need  to  be  registered  with  the 
Property Services Regulatory Authority (PSRA) and the local authority. 

Duty  and  stamp  duty  taxes  related  to  land  sales  transactions  are  exempted  and  reduced  under  specific 
circumstances, with the purpose of preserving cultural ties with the land (i.e. to keep land within a family), but also 
to keep it under active farming and to improve efficiency of land use. Buyers can get a stamp duty exemption if 
land is transferred between relatives or if the buyer has a farm restructuring certificate (an indication to expand 
the buyer’s own farming activities). Sellers get a relief from the capital gains tax if land is sold to a farmer or an 
owner of an existing farming system who can provide proofs of buying the land to expand farming business; if the 
landowner is selling his/her land and retiring from farming; if the buyer is an own child of the seller and maintains 
farming on the land (i.e. agricultural relief is granted); or if the buyer is making a profit from the non-agricultural 
use of the land (i.e. business relief is granted).  If agricultural reliefs have been activated, land cannot  be resold 
within 5 years of purchase, otherwise any tax reliefs received must be paid back. 

In the case of land rental transactions, tax exemption can be given to the tenant if the land is rented for a period 
of at least 5 years, if the tenant engages in maintaining farming on the land (i.e. agricultural relief is granted) or if 
the buyer is making a profit from the non-agricultural use of the land (i.e. business relief is granted). Tax exemptions 
can be granted to the landlord if the land is rented out for a period of 5 years. 

Ireland is characterised by a rather liberal approach to land transactions. Ireland does not have strict regulations 
on land transactions, neither on the persons or entities involved nor the area of land in any land transactions. The 

41 

 
 
cultural association of land and ownership is very strong in Ireland; hence, the land market is very small. Most of 
the land transfers are either moving land from one generation to another or through the rental market. There is no 
legal binding in the historical conacre system of renting out land. When an 11-month contract is over, the contract 
is extended for another 11 months unless the landowner or the tenant opt out of the contract. 

The  land  rental  market  has  become  more  formal  in  recent  years.  The  Property  Services  (Regulation)  Act  2011 
stipulates  that  rental  agreements  should  be  registered  with  the  PSRA  when  an  auctioneer  is  engaged  in  the 
transaction. This may include conacre agreements, but most conacre agreements do not involve an auctioneer and 
therefore lie outside those regulations. 

The Revenue Commissioners strictly implement the legislation in relation to the tax incentives for long-term land 
leasing. The Revenue Commissioners have ensured that the tax incentives are not exploited as a tax-avoidance 
mechanism. In general, it appears that long-term leases are registered with the PSRA when the lease qualifies for 
tax exemptions. 

According to the Property Registration Authority of Ireland, 93 % of the total land mass of Ireland and almost 90 % 
of the legal titles in Ireland are registered in the Land Registry. This includes both agricultural and non-agricultural 
land and indicates a high level of compliance with regulations around landownership registration (16). 

Some initiatives have also been taken to control activities that influence the rezoning of land and the agricultural 
land market. Persons engaged in lobbying need to register as lobbyists, and changes in zoning must fit in with the 
local development plans (which are required every 6 years). The current programme for government commits to 
ensuring that state lands being offered for sale will first be offered to the Land Development Agency automatically. 

The Department of Public Expenditure and Reform has reviewed the Regulation of Lobbying Act 2015 (Department 
of Public Expenditure and Reform, 2020). This review indicated that almost 2 000 organisations and individuals 
have registered their lobbying activity with the Standards in Public Office Commission. Overall, there is widespread 
opinion that the new lobbying legislation is successful, although various organisations (including the Standards in 
Public  Office  Commission)  have  sought  recommendations  for  some  further  reforms.  The  review  involved  a 
consultation process, with organisations submitting their recommendations for amendments. The  review did not 
recommend any amendments to the 2015 act on the basis that there was no ‘compelling business case for change’. 

5.8.  Spain 

The  Spanish  agricultural  sector  observed  a  trend  towards  fewer  farms  and  larger  average  farm  sizes,  with  a 
particularly sharp decline in the number of holdings that cultivate areas smaller than 2 ha and a slight increase in 
the number of farms cultivating more than 50 ha. 

Almost all land (almost 95 % of agricultural land) was in the ownership of natural persons in 2016. Between 2003 
and 2016, the share of rented utilised agricultural area (UAA) increased from 19 % to 33 %, while the share of 
land under owner-cultivation decreased from 94 % to 59 %. Land that was under other regimes increased from 
4 %  to  8 %.  Other  regimes  include  sharecropping  (aparcería),  communal  lands  lent  for  exclusive  use  (tierras 
comunales cedidas en suerte de explotación), lands exploited by free-of-charge provision (tierras explotadas por 
cesión gratuita), trust lands (en fideicomiso), lands in dispute (en litigio) and tenancy at sufferance (en precario). 

(16) 

https://www.prai.ie/fees/ 

42 

 
 
                                                 
In general in Spain, there are no restrictions on the nationality of a buyer when acquiring land. There are restrictions 
regarding the nationality of the buyer only when the transaction involves land located in specific areas, such as 
islands, Spanish territories in North Africa and the Strait of Gibraltar. 

Exemption from, or reduction of, transfer and registration taxes are applicable for the transaction of priority land. 
‘Priority land’ is land that is owned by professional farmers (either natural persons or legal entities) that allows the 
occupation of at least one unit of agricultural  labour (i.e. work by one  person full time  over 1 year) and whose 
labour income is between 35 % and 120 % of the reference income (i.e. the average national gross income  for 
non-agricultural activities). In the case of legal entities (cooperatives, Sociedad Agraria de Transformación (Agrarian 
Transformation Society) or others), at least 50 % of the members need to be professional farmers (Ley 19/1995 
de  Modernización  de  las  Explotaciones  Agrarias  (Law 19/1995  on  the  Modernisation  of  Agricultural  Holdings), 
Chapter I, Articles 4–6). A professional farmer is a natural person, the owner of agricultural land, who receives at 
least  50 %  of  his/her  income  from  agricultural  activities  or  other  complementary  activities  (e.g.  management, 
processing of farm products, direct sale, institutional representation), and at least 25 % of the income is directly 
linked to agriculture, and who devotes at least half a unit of agricultural labour to agricultural and complementary 
activities (Article 2.5). If transactions lead to a unification of plots of land into one single plot, it can become ‘priority’ 
land so that tax  exemptions  apply. To fully  benefit from these tax reductions,  partial or total transfers are not 
allowed during the subsequent 5 years. 

There are also special reductions in the transfer tax for young farmers: under  40 years of age, with agricultural 
qualifications or in the process of acquiring them within the following 2 years, already a professional farmer or 
with the intention of becoming one, and living in the county where the land is located. The land to be acquired must 
require the deployment of at least one unit of agricultural labour or the farmer commits to reach such occupation 
within 2 years (Article 2.7 of the aforementioned law). 

Landowners adjacent to the land that is for sale have pre-emptive rights under certain conditions. If the landowner 
owns ‘priority’ land, if the sold plot is less than twice the minimal agricultural size and if by acquiring the plot the 
landlord achieves a plot of minimal agricultural size or larger, then the adjacent owner has pre-emptive rights to 
acquire the plot. If none of the adjacent owners could achieve the minimum size, then the one with a larger plot 
has  the  pre-emptive  right.  Adjacent  landowners  also  have  pre-emptive  rights  for  plots  of  less  than  1 ha. 
Furthermore, tenants, co-owners and co-heirs hold pre-emptive rights. If pre-emptive rights are exerted, then land 
cannot be sold for 6 years from the year of its acquisition. 

The subdivision of agricultural land transacted on the sales market is regulated in Spain. However, there is not a 
unique minimum size; it varies geographically and depends on whether it is rain-fed or irrigated land. Nevertheless, 
subdivision is possible when land is sold to adjacent landowners, if both resulting plots are at least as big as the 
minimum agricultural unit, or when land is sold to the tenant who exerted pre-emptive rights, or because of forced 
expropriation. 

Rental contracts have a minimum duration of  5 years and are renewed with the initial duration of the contract. 
Under specific conditions, the contract can be terminated. Tenancy contracts are inheritable in the sense that the 
new acquirer of the land inherits the rental contract, but also the  heir of the tenant inherits the rental contract. 
Land rental contracts can be terminated if rent is not paid, if the tenant does not use the land for farming, if the 
tenant sublets the land or if the land is intentionally damaged. If the owners intend to end the contract at the end 
of  the  rental  contract  duration,  a  1-year  notification  period  applies  (otherwise  the  contract  is  automatically 
renewed). However, there are no specific conditions for the landowner establishing that they can end the contract 
only if they intend to cultivate the land himself or herself. 

43 

 
 
Natural persons who are already owners of more than 500 ha of rain-fed or 50 ha of irrigated agricultural land 
are not eligible to be tenants. When agricultural land is devoted to extensive livestock, then the limit is 1 000 ha. 
In the case of agricultural cooperatives, these area limits are multiplied by the number of members. 

There  are  special  procedures  for  the  sale  of  public  agricultural  land,  although  the  law  is  from  the  1970s  and 
currently only few sales of public land are carried out in Spain. 

Overall, the agricultural sector in Spain is subject to regulations that are relatively demanding, aiming, among other 
policy objectives, to stimulate land mobility. However, concerning land markets, there are few restrictions on land 
transactions in place both for natural and legal persons.  The exceptions are restrictions for land acquisition for 
national security reasons in specific geographical areas of the Spanish territory, and measures aiming to improve 
access to land for young people, to promote farmers’ cooperation and to increase the duration and flexibility of 
rental contracts. 

5.9. 

France 

In France (mainland France, excluding overseas regions), the UAA accounts for 54 % of the national area. In 2016, 
there were 437 400 farms, with an average farm size of 63 ha. Only 20 % of the UAA was in ownership-cultivation; 
the rest was rented. Of the 80 % that was rented, around 20 % (thus about 16 % of total UAA) was operated by 
farm partnerships or companies that rented from the farm partners. 

In  France,  any  land  sales  transactions  need  to  be  approved  by  the  Sociétés  d’Aménagement  Foncier  et 
d’Etablissement Rural (SAFERs) (Land Development and Rural Establishment Companies). The SAFERs’ role is to 
regulate the transfer of agricultural land, in view of avoiding speculation; favouring the settlement of farmers, in 
particular  young  farmers;  supporting  land  consolidation;  and  favouring  environmental  protection.  The  SAFERs 
intervene in land markets in case a transaction is not in line with the above objectives and priorities, and can reject 
the transaction before the ownership transfer is finalised. There is no legal maximum sales price. However,  the 
SAFERs intervene  when  the  price  asked  by  the  seller is  perceived  to  be  too  high  for  the  given  regional  context 
(region, type of land) and ask the seller for a decrease  in the price. Rejections of sales by the SAFERs may also 
happen when, for example, the sale implies the dismantling of a farm. With regard to the transfer of shares of an 
agricultural company, the SAFERs can stop a transfer of shares, but only in cases when the totality of the shares 
are sold at once. When only a part of the shares are sold, the SAFERs cannot intervene, sometimes giving rise to 
concerns over potential land grabbing. 

Land regulations in France strongly protect tenants. The level of rental prices is regulated, as well as the tenancy 
duration. Rental prices must fall within a range, with the minimum and maximum prices set each year by the state. 
The minimum lease durations are set for 9 years, 18 years or 25 years. There are tax incentives to conclude 18-
year rental contracts. Annual leasing is only possible when a successor is supposed to take over a farm (annual 
leasing cannot be renewed more than five times) or when the SAFERs rent out land. Rental contracts that are not 
written have 9 years’ duration by default. 

Rental contracts cannot be terminated by landowners before the end of the lease, except in cases when the land 
is sold. In such a case, the current tenant has pre-emptive rights to purchase the land. At the end of the lease, 
rental contracts are automatically renewed for the same duration. The landowners have the possibility to withdraw 
their land from the tenancy contract only if they (or their heirs) intend to farm the land for at least 9 years. In this 
case, landowners must inform the tenant at least 18 months before the termination of the rental contract. 

44 

 
 
Rental  contracts  are  inheritable  after  the  current  tenant’s  retirement  or  death,  that  is  the  farm  successor  is 
automatically the new tenant. Landowners are free to choose another farmer tenant only if the exiting tenant has 
no successor. 

Since  2016,  transferable  lease  contracts  (bail  cessible)  can  be  established,  under  which  the  exiting  tenant  can 
choose the new tenant. The transferable contracts can last only 18 years (not 9 years) and do not entail automatic 
renewal. 

In  2016  an  additional  type  of  rental  contract  was  introduced,  namely  the  environmental  lease  (bail 
environnemental). This contract can be concluded only at the start of a new contract or when an existing contract 
is renewed (an ongoing contract cannot be transformed, contrary to the bail cessible). With this contract, the farmer-
tenant commits to apply environmentally friendly practices on the rented land (to be agreed on by the tenant and 
the landowners); in exchange, the rental price required by the landowner can be set below the minimum regulated 
price. However, this type of rental contract has, so far, scarcely been used. 

Tenants have priority pre-emptive rights; the state (to urbanise land) and the SAFERs also have pre-emptive rights. 
The SAFERs cannot intervene in a sale of land between an owner and a tenant (who has pre-emptive rights on the 
land rented) if the tenant buyer has been operating the land for at least 3 years, and s/he commits to operate it 
for at least the next 9 years. There is an additional priority order for buyers for agricultural land acquisition (outside 
the pre-emptive rights): (1) the tenant on the land, (2) a neighbouring young farmer and (3) other neighbouring 
farmers. 

If the SAFERs deny a transaction because the price is not representative of market prices, the SAFERs negotiate 
with the parties involved in the transaction to reach an agreement. If this is not possible, the SAFERs have a pre-
emptive right and can purchase the land at the modified price. The land owned by the SAFERs is then sold to a new 
buyer or rented out until it is sold. However, some land transactions are not regulated by the SAFERs due to the 
fact  that  the  SAFERs  are  not  notified, although  the  transactions  are  subject  to  the  notification.  In  addition,  the 
SAFERs  sometimes  do  not  have  sufficient  funds  to  purchase  pre-empted  land,  which  reduces  their  power  to 
intervene in the land sale market. 

There is no restriction on the ownership of agricultural land by non-EU citizens, but there is a restriction on the 
farming use of the acquired land: non-EU citizens who want to farm the land must obtain farming authorisation. 

Publicly owned land is rarely sold in France. Only a few cases of public land sales have been recorded in recent 
years. For example, in 2020–2021, publicly owned land in Grignon, an area close to Paris used for decades by the 
National  Research  Institute  for  Agriculture,  Food  and  the  Environment  (INRAE)  and  the  agricultural  university 
AgroParisTech (land, buildings, farm), has been offered for sale. 

Overall, regulations are rather well enforced in France, except for two main situations. First, it is a requirement to 
notify  SAFERs  of  all  sales  transactions,  but  this  does  not  always  happen;  SAFERs  are  not  notified  of  some 
transactions (the exact figures are not available), meaning such transactions avoid the SAFERs intervention. Second, 
the informal and illegal practice of pas de porte (key money) is believed to be used, especially in northern France 
(the  estimate  of  an  exact  number  of  transactions  is  not  available).  This  is  an  unofficial  practice  that  involves 
unofficial payments in addition to the official price. 

5.10.  Croatia 

The farm structure is highly  polarised in Croatia, with few large farms and  many small  farms operating in the 
agricultural sector. According to the Farm Structure Survey, the average farmer used 11.6 ha of agricultural land 

45 

 
 
in 2016. The largest number of Croatian farmers – 93 430 farms, accounting for 69.5 % of the total number of 
farmers – use, on average, less than 5 ha of agricultural land. These small farmers use a total of 178 670 ha of 
agricultural land, accounting for 11.4 % of UAA. Large farmers use more than 100 ha of land per farm. There are 
1 620  such  farms;  they  account  for  1.2 %  of  the  total  number  of  farms  and  use  a  total  of  676 416 ha  of 
agricultural land (43.2 % of the UAA). The ownership of land is also highly fragmented. The land fragmentation in 
ownership and use strongly hampers land transactions as it generates transaction costs to land market participants. 

It is not straightforward to have a full picture of the ownership structure of agricultural land in Croatia, as more 
exact data are not available. However, according to an analysis conducted by the Agricultural Land Agency from 
2013 to 2018, the total agricultural land area was 2 695 037 ha in Croatia in this period, of which 890 214 ha (or 
33 %) were state owned while the remining 1 804 823 ha (67 %) were privately owned. Inefficient, lengthy, non-
transparent and inappropriate allocation of state-owned land is often perceived as an obstacle to a well-functioning 
land market in Croatia. 

Private land (rental or sale) transactions are subject to general regulations governing real estate transactions in 
Croatia. According to this law, private owners can freely sell and lease their agricultural land to other Croatian 
natural and legal persons, without the implementation of pre-emptive rights. 

Land regulation in Croatia mostly concerns the state-owned agricultural land and the land of persons who cannot 
be reached, or for whom their place of residence is unknown. According to the law Official Gazette No 20/118, the 
state-owned agricultural land can be leased, offered for temporary use, exchanged with other land or sold. Lease 
contracts are concluded for areas of maximum 100 ha per tenant for a duration of 25 years, which can be extended 
for an additional 25 years. As an exception, land foreseen to be restituted to persons whose property was taken 
during communism and land planned for other purposes can be leased for a period of up to 5 years. State-owned 
agricultural land may be sold on the basis of a public tender. One buyer can buy state-owned agricultural land in 
Croatia of up to a maximum of 50 ha for the continental area and up to 5 ha for the coastal area. One cadastral 
plot cannot be larger than 10 ha. The land bought from the state has to be cultivated for 10 years, and if the new 
owner intends to sell it, it has to be offered back to the state. The rule of domicile is also considered: the state land 
is distributed to farmers from the local area with the aim to discourage outmigration from rural areas. 

Priority to state land allocation is given to legal or natural persons in the following order: (1) small family livestock 
farms  not  owning  enough  agricultural  land  (in  the  case  of  lease),  (2)  farmers  who  already  use  the  land  in 
accordance with previously concluded contracts (in the case of sale), (3) young farmers, (4) other family farms, (5) 
natural or legal persons that have their residence or headquarters in the relevant local area, (6) cooperatives and 
other private companies registered to perform agricultural activities and (7) other private or legal persons already 
engaged in agriculture or planning to engage in agriculture. 

There are considerable legal issues regarding agricultural land owned by persons who cannot be reached, or  for 
whom their place of residence is unknown. The Ministry of Agriculture can lease such land for a duration of up to 
10 years to natural or legal persons who want to use it for agricultural production. The rent collected through the 
lease contract belongs to the original owner of the land and is kept in an account opened for this purpose. If the 
owner does not request the payment of the rent within 10 years from the conclusion of the lease contract, the 
collected funds are distributed to the state budget (25 %), regional government budget (10 %) and the budget of 
the local government where the land is located (65 %). 

The  law  on  agricultural  state  land  has  been  changed  frequently  in  the  last  30 years,  since  Croatia  has  had 
independent land legislation. This complicates enforcement and potentially leads to problems in its application. In 
the  past  3 years,  only  20 %  of  all  local  municipalities  announced  tenders  for  the  lease  of  state  land,  which 
represents only 50 % (460 000 ha) of the total state-owned land. There are numerous obstacles that slow down 

46 

 
 
the process of leasing or selling state agricultural land. Some argue that there is a lack of political will to cooperate 
across different policy departments (taxation, inheritance). Other put the blame on the lengthy process to return 
nationalised property to former owners, obsolete data in the land cadastre or lack of control by the state inspection 
office.  Overall,  there  is  no  available  information  on  how  local  self-government  units  manage  state-owned 
agricultural land, how the funds obtained through lease and concession are used or how eventual disputes with 
tenants who do not fulfil their contractual obligations are resolved. 

5.11.  Italy 

Farm structure in Italy is very fragmented, with the average farm size equal to 9.5 ha in 2016. Land regulations 
that  have  been  introduced  typically  aim  to  increase  the  average  farm  size,  by  consolidating  the  land  property 
through markets (by farmers), by liberalising land rental contracts and by pre-emptive rights on land acquisition. 

In the 1990s, strong increases in land prices were observed as a result of competition between alternative land 
uses (i.e. rural versus urban); increased productivity; and subsidy schemes, especially direct payments granted from 
the first pillar of the CAP. Currently, land prices are more or less stable. This can probably be linked to the financial 
crisis of 2008–2009, which has led many landowners to retain landownership (they are probably expecting a further 
increase in land values in the medium term), with a strong preference for renting out land. 

An important tool for land consolidation applied in Italy is pre-emptive rights. In the case of land sales, pre-emptive 
rights go to the following subjects (in priority order):  (a) the co-owner; (b) the tenant (whose contract  has been 
active for at least 2 years); and (c) the neighbouring farmers, as long as they can be classified as ‘family-based 
farmers’ or ‘professional farmers’ under the Italian law. 

Family-based farmers are defined by the national law as those farmers who, together with their family, spend at 
least one third of their working hours on the farm, with a minimum of 104 days per year. In addition, farming must 
be their prevalent working activity and their prevalent source of income. 

Professional farmers are defined by the national law as those farmers who spend at least 50 % of their working 
hours on the farm and get at least 50 % of their income from farming. In addition, professional farmers must meet 
at least one of the following criteria: (a) hold a degree in agricultural sciences or related subjects, (b) hold a high 
school diploma in agricultural sciences or related subjects, (c) have attended a professional qualification course in 
agriculture accredited by the regional authorities or (d) have at least 3 years of experience as an entrepreneur in 
the farming sector. 

Pre-emptive  rights  have  been  recently  extended  to  agricultural  legal  entities,  as  long  as  at  least  50 %  of  the 
members can be classified as ‘family-based farmers’ or ‘professional farmers’. Family relatives do not have any 
priority, except for the case of inheritance. If several family relatives inherit a specific amount of land that has to 
be divided among them and one of these inheritors wishes to sell their part of the land, the other family inheritors 
have pre-emptive rights. 

Landowners may try to avoid the use of the pre-emptive rights in order to be free when they decide to sell their 
land. For this reason, it is quite common that, in the rental contract, the landowner asks the tenant to commit to 
the release of the agricultural land at the end of the contract, which is interpreted by judges as a waiver of pre-
emptive rights. Concerning the pre-emptive rights of the neighbouring farmers, since the priority goes to the tenant, 
but s/he obtains such pre-emptive rights only after a minimum of 2 years of contract, landowners selling their land 
before the end of the 2 years can freely sell their land, because neither the tenant nor the neighbours can claim 
their pre-emptive rights. Moreover, landowners often engage in lawsuits in order to show that there is a physical 

47 

 
 
barrier between their farm and the neighbouring farm (i.e. a road, a channel or similar), such that the neighbours 
cannot claim their right. 

In the past 5 years, fiscal incentives are also used to stimulate land consolidation. The following provisions have 
been introduced since 2009, and some of them only very recently (2016): 

a) 

b) 

c) 

landowners  who  are  ‘family-based  farmers’  under  the  Italian  law  are  temporarily  exempted  from  any 
income tax or real estate tax on the use of land; 
tenants who are ‘family-based farmers’ under the Italian law are temporarily exempted from any income 
tax on the use of land; 
in the case of land purchase, buyers who are ‘family-based farmers’ or ‘professional farmers’ under the 
Italian law pay a registration tax that is equal to 1 % of the sales price (while the standard tax rate for 
non-farmers is 15 %). 

Since 1960, subsidised loans are available for tenants and sharecroppers wishing to buy the land they use. Over 
time, this opportunity has been extended to family-based farmers and professional farmers wishing to enlarge 
their farms. In the last few years, access to these subsidised loans has been limited to young new-entrant farmers 
(under  40 years  of  age).  Loans  are  typically  long-term  loans  (30 years)  and  beneficiaries  obtain  a  subsidy  for 
reducing the interest costs. 

Rental has become a crucial element for the consolidation  of farm structures in Italy. The share of rented land 
increased from 23 % in 2000 to 46 % in 2016. The average farm size of farms with all land owned by the farmer 
is only 6.5 ha, compared with an average size of  15.4 ha for farms  with all land rented, and  20 ha  for  ‘mixed’ 
farms with owned/rented land. Thus, land rental seems to be one of the key consolidation tools, especially for the 
largest farms. 

Historically, the duration of land rental contracts was established by law (15 years as reference length) and the 
rental price was computed using automatic calculations established by law. Now, both the duration and the rental 
price are freely set between landowner and tenant. The only requirement is that, in signing this type of ‘liberalised’ 
rental  contract,  tenants  and  landowners  must  be  supported  by  their  organisations  (i.e.  farmers’  unions  and 
landowners’ organisations). 

All sales of public land take place through a public auction. 

In general, the approach of the Italian legislation to land market regulation is rather liberal. This is the result of a 
process  that  took  place  over  several  decades,  with  the  objective  of  reducing  land  fragmentation,  by  both 
consolidating the land property by farmers and liberalising land rental contracts. In general, there are no major 
constraints concerning land transactions (both land sales and land rentals), except for pre-emptive rights, which 
are  the  cornerstone  of  the  most  important  laws  regulating  land  markets.  In  general,  all  major  provisions  are 
effectively enforced and the attempts of circumventing the laws are rather limited, although some practices of 
avoiding  the  formation  of  pre-emptive  rights  are  present  (see  above).  Nonetheless,  the  enforcement  of  the 
legislation has encountered several difficulties in reaching its long-term objective of favouring a consolidation of 
the farm structure, which is still extremely fragmented. For this reason, in recent years several fiscal incentives 
have been introduced (see above), and their impact in the medium term should be observed. 

5.12.  Latvia 

There is an observed a trend of land use concentration towards larger farms in Latvia. During 2005–2016, the UAA 
used by small and medium farms has been steadily decreasing. By 2016, almost 60 % of agricultural land was 

48 

 
 
cultivated  by  farms  that  manage  100 ha  or  more  of  agricultural  land.  This  also  suggests  relatively  low 
fragmentation  of  land  use  in  Latvia.  However,  landownership  is  more  fragmented.  There  are  around  241 000 
owners in Latvia who own, on average, 9 ha of land split into two plots. 

Only citizens and legal entities of the EU, the EEA or the Swiss Confederation can acquire agricultural land in Latvia. 
Foreign citizens have to provide a certificate proving their knowledge of the Latvian language (at least level B2). 
The language requirements also apply to shareholders of legal persons who jointly represent more than half of the 
company’s voting capital and who have the right to represent the company. In addition, if a natural person owns 
more than 10 ha or a legal person owns more than 5 ha, then the buyer has to be registered as a performer of 
economic activity in Latvia and has to confirm in writing that the agricultural activity on the land will start within a 
year after its purchase. 

There is an upper limit imposed on landownership in Latvia. Natural persons and legal entities cannot own more 
than  2 000 ha  of  agricultural  land.  To  avoid  a  person  owning  or  controlling  vast  areas  of  agricultural  land,  all 
related persons can jointly own a maximum of 4 000 ha. In the case of legal entities, the 4 000-ha limit is imposed 
for a holding company or a group of companies. 

Non-EU legal entities may acquire land only if they are registered in the Register of Enterprises of the Republic of 
Latvia and provided that more than 50 % of the company is owned by (a) Latvian citizens or Latvian governmental 
entities and/or (b) natural or legal persons from countries with which Latvia signed and ratified an international 
agreement on the promotion and protection of investments before  31 December 1996, or an agreement signed 
after this date but which provides for reciprocal rights to land acquisition. Legal entities that own any land in rural 
areas must inform the municipal council of any shareholder changes. 

The  municipal  commission  monitors  the  legality  of  agricultural  land  transactions.  The  approval  of  the  local 
government is needed to acquire landownership. The current market regulations related to these municipal control 
mechanisms  make  land  transactions  more  time-consuming  and  increase  the  administrative  burden  to  transfer 
landownership. 

Co-owners have pre-emptive rights, as do tenants who registered the rental agreement at the land register or at 
the municipality. Pre-emptive rights do not apply if the buyer owns (or will own after the transaction)  less than 
10 ha of land for natural persons or 5 ha of land for the legal persons. Moreover, the Latvian land fund has pre-
emptive rights to land acquisition. This was introduced in order to facilitate the acquisition of agricultural land by 
local farmers. However, the fact that the Latvian land fund has pre-emptive rights on almost all agricultural (or 
forestry) land may cause some uncertainties concerning planning land transactions and acquisitions for land market 
actors. 

Municipal agricultural land (without buildings) can be rented out with redemption (purchase) rights for a period of 
up to 12 years, with an annual land rent of 4.5 % of the land’s cadastral value. Only individuals (legal entities are 
not eligible) are entitled to redemption rights. In addition, they must not have owned agricultural land previously 
and  must  confirm  that  within  a  year  after  entering  into  their  lease  contract,  they  will  start  using  the  land  for 
agricultural operations. 

There are no strict regulations imposed on the duration of tenancy contracts  or rental price setting in Latvia. A 
minimum contract duration of 5 years (as of November 2014) is only required for the lease of municipal agricultural 
land with redemption rights (see above). Furthermore, a maximum rental price applies only in some exceptional 
circumstances (for land obtained through the land reform). Rental contracts are not automatically renewed, but the 
sitting tenant may have the pre-emptive right to renew the lease agreement after the expiry of the initial contract 
term if s/he has duly performed all of the obligations of the agreement. 

49 

 
 
Regarding  the  enforcement  of  the  land  market  regulations,  an  important  uncertainty  arises  from  the  legal 
conditions a foreign investor has to fulfil in order to purchase agricultural land. Since the legislative reform adopted 
in  2017,  foreign  investors  who  intend  to  acquire  agricultural  land  in  Latvia  must  demonstrate  an  advanced 
knowledge of the Latvian language. This applies both for a single investor and for the sole or majority shareholders 
of a company. Without proof of knowledge of the language, the land cannot be acquired. However, according to 
the  Latvian  Land  Privatisation  Law,  this  regulation  applies  only  to  EU  foreigners,  not  to  Latvian  citizens.  This 
provision suggests the presence of the ‘direct discrimination on grounds of nationality’ in the Latvian land market 
regulations. As a result, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the decision dated 11 June 2020 established that 
the current Latvian regulation violates European law, in particular freedom of establishment for services providers. 
Consequently, the land privatisation law might have to be adjusted, but at present it creates uncertainties for actors 
in the land market. 

Studies indicate that Latvian farmers are facing difficulties in accessing land (e.g. European Investment Bank, 2020) 
because the availability of fertile and accessible land is limited and rather expensive in the presence of rising land 
prices,  and  because  farmers’  access  to  the  credit  needed  to  finance  land  acquisitions  (or  the  construction  of 
buildings) is constrained. To address this problem, a new financial product has recently been offered by the Latvian 
state-owned finance institution (ALTUM), the so-called reverse leasing of agricultural land. Under this arrangement, 
a  farmer  sells  the  agricultural  land  s/he  owns  to  ALTUM,  continues  to  rent  and  uses  the  land  for  agricultural 
purposes, with the rights to re-purchase it back within 5 years. This financial product serves as a finance provision 
of last resort for farmers who do not have access to other financing possibilities. 

5.13.  Lithuania 

Agricultural  development  in  Lithuania  has  been  characterised  by  a  decrease  in  the  number  of  small  farms 
(particularly of those using less than 10 ha) and an increase in the number of large farms (particularly of those 
using more than 100 ha) in recent decades. The average farm size was around 19 ha in 2020. 

Currently, only up to 10 ha of agricultural land can be acquired in Lithuania, without restrictions, by natural and 
legal persons from countries that meet the criteria of the European and  transatlantic integrations. If persons or 
companies acquire a larger area of land, they must ensure that it is used for agricultural activities for a minimum 
of 5 years from the time of acquisition. A natural/legal person or related persons can acquire additional agricultural 
land in the territory of Lithuania as long as the total area of agricultural land acquired from the  state does not 
exceed 300 ha and the total area of agricultural land belonging to them (acquired from the  state and/or other 
persons) does not exceed 500 ha (except for livestock farming purposes). Related parties are considered the spouse, 
parents (adoptive parents) and their minor children (adoptees), as well as legal persons who control 25 % of the 
shares of another legal entity that acquired the state land, or a natural person who controls 25 % of the shares of 
the legal person who acquired the state land. Despite the current restrictions, there are instances in which natural 
persons and/or companies own more than these thresholds. According to various surveys, the biggest farmland 
owners currently own up to 24 000 ha of agricultural land (17). 

(17) 

Ramūnas Karbauskis, a member of the Lithuanian parliament and the leader of the ruling Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union, is the 
biggest landowner in the country. The delfi.lt news website (https://www.delfi.lt/) reported that Karbauskis owns 22 000–24 000 ha of 
land via his Agrokoncernas business group and as a farmer. Other big landowners include the businessman Darius Zubas and Fixed Yield 
Invest  Fund.  Zubas  owns  7 400 ha  of  land  via  Linas  Agro  Group,  and  the  Lithuanian  investment  fund  Fixed  Yield  Invest  Fund  owns 
6 400 ha of land. Austria’s Agroforst GmbH is the owner of 5 000 ha and comes in fourth, followed by businessman Kęstutis Juščius, 
with 4 300 ha (BNS 14 October 2019) (https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1106443/ruling-party-leader-the-biggest-land-owner-in-
lithuania). 

50 

 
 
                                                 
Natural and legal persons and legal entities who want to buy agricultural land in Lithuania must obtain consent 
from the National Land Service. 

Pre-emptive rights are enjoyed by co-owners, tenants, adjacent landowners, farmers (natural or legal persons) who 
cultivate land in the municipality or in a neighbouring municipality, and the state. The state may use its pre-emptive 
rights to acquire, at the price at which it is offered for sale and under same other sale conditions, private agricultural 
land that, according to valid detailed plans or special plans, is intended for public need or agricultural land intended 
for the implementation of the measures that are financed by the state budget and with EU funds for improving 
the  structure  of  agricultural  holdings  and  reducing  abandoned  land  areas.  The  state  land  fund  may  lease  the 
agricultural land required for the implementation of the measures that are financed by the state budget and with 
EU funds for improving the structure of landholdings and reducing abandoned land areas without an auction to the 
person/persons  who  has/have  used  it  on  legal  grounds  prior  to  the  passing  of  the  agricultural  land  into  state 
ownership. 

Restoration of ownership rights to land has largely been completed: 99.94 % of the claimed land has been restored. 
Around 7 % of agricultural land is currently rented out by the state to private users. State land is leased by auction 
to the highest bidder. However, there are exemptions when state-owned land is leased without auction. For example, 
state-owned land that does not exceed a prescribed size and is located between other state-owned land that is 
rented can be rented without auction to the lessee of the other state-land plots. The duration of a contract of lease 
of  agricultural  land  in  state  ownership  is  established  upon  the  agreement  between  the  lessor  and  the  lessee; 
nevertheless, the term may not exceed 25 years. 

Regarding private land rental transactions, the regulations are rather liberal in Lithuania. There is no maximum 
rental duration nor administrative (minimum or maximum) rental price for private tenancy contracts. Contracts are 
not automatically renewed, but the tenant has pre-emptive lease rights after the contract expiration. Registration 
of land rental agreements is compulsory in  the case of leasing state land. The tenant is obliged to register the 
state-land lease agreement with the Register of Real Estate of Lithuania within 3 months of the conclusion of the 
agreement. 

Irregularities linked to the implementation of the land regulations have been identified. Therefore, the Lithuanian 
Parliament  (Seismas)  recently  announced  its  plans  to  strengthen  the  control  of  transfer of  agricultural  land.  In 
particular, it intends to prevent the acquisition of more land than is permitted by law. Furthermore, by promoting 
the development of relevant e-services, the parliament intends to reduce the considerable administrative burden 
that falls on those who wish to register their farms (18). 

5.14.  Hungary 

The  Hungarian  agricultural  sector is characterised  by  a  dual  farm  structure  consisting  of  small-scale  individual 
farms, on the one hand, and relatively large-scale agricultural companies, on the other hand. In 2016, the individual 
farms cultivated about 58 % of the total agricultural land, with an average size of around 8 ha, while agricultural 
companies  cultivated  around  42 %  of  agricultural  land,  using,  on  average,  250 ha  per  farm.  Most  agricultural 
companies,  around  80 %,  cultivated  more  than  300 ha  per  farm  in  2016.  Around  59 %  of  individual  farms 
cultivated less than 1 ha while only 10 % of individual farms used an area exceeding 300 ha in the same year. 
Around 42 % of the UAA and forestry areas is rented in Hungary. 

The main aspect of the agricultural land market that is regulated in Hungary is landownership.  Of approximately 
6 million ha of agricultural land, agricultural companies own less than 3 % (around 140 000 ha). The companies 

(18) 

https://www.lrs.lt/sip/portal.show?p_r=35403&p_k=2&p_t=271881 

51 

 
 
                                                 
acquired ownership to this land before 1994. Since 1994, the adopted Land Act prohibits companies from buying 
land. Nevertheless, they do cultivate slightly more than two fifths of all agricultural land, which indicates that most 
is rented. 

All EU and Hungarian citizens can buy 1 ha of land without restrictions. Only registered farmers can acquire more 
than 1 ha. In that context, a farmer is a Hungarian or EU citizen who has an agricultural or forestry qualification as 
defined in the implementing regulation of the law, or has been engaged in agricultural and forestry activities in 
Hungary for at least 3 years in 5 consecutive years, or owns at least 25 % of a registered agricultural producer 
organisation. Farmers can acquire 300 ha of land, and their maximum holding can be up to 1 200 ha. Livestock 
farm operators and seed growers, on the other hand, can use 1 800 ha of land. 

A wide range of potential buyers have pre-emptive rights. When land is sold, the right of pre-emption belongs to 
the state in the first place. This is followed by  co-owners, the farmer who has been using the land for at least 
3 years, or a resident neighbour. A resident neighbour is a person who (1) lives within the municipality where the 
land is being sold and the land s/he owns or uses is adjacent to the land that is the subject of the sale, exchange 
or lease agreement, or (2) has lived for at least 3 years in a municipality that is adjacent to the municipality in 
which the land that is the subject of the sale, exchange or lease is situated, and the land that they own or use in 
the municipality in which they reside is adjacent to the land that is the subject of the sale, exchange or lease. During 
the acquisition of land, the law gives preference to the exercise of the pre-emptive right of family farmers, young 
farmers and beginner farmers. These preference options have importance if buyers have the same ranking among 
the pre-emptive rights holders. 

The land regulation (Land Act) in Hungary establishes a maximum sale price for land. For agricultural land, it is set 
as the index-based value reflecting the profitability of agricultural production over a 20-year period. For forests, it 
is the index-based value of forest production profitability for a 50-year period. In addition, prevailing prices in the 
specific region or locality are also considered and taken into account when calculating maximum sale prices. 

State land of more than 3 ha is sold through auction, while smaller plots are sold through a simplified procedure. 
During the auction, a plot of land may be sold at a price at least 10 % higher than the value determined by the 
national land fund, taking into account both county and local average prices. Maximum sales prices are also set for 
the sale of state land. To limit land fragmentation, state land plots cannot not be subdivided into plots smaller than 
1 ha (or 3 ha for orchards). 

Overall,  the  main  objectives  of  the  land  regulations  in  Hungary  are  to  promote  fair  allocation  and  access  to 
agricultural land; to curb speculative pressures; to retain the rural population; to favour agricultural practices that 
support landscape conservation; and to create viable farms, thereby ensuring a stable supply of affordable food. 
While some stakeholders argue that the land regulations in Hungary are appropriate and perform rather well in 
achieving the outlined objectives, others criticise that they restrict fundamental economic freedoms. For example, 
a ban on land acquisition by companies (legal persons) runs counter to the principle of free movement of capital. 
However, some argue that the absence of a ban would lead (and the evidence tends to suggest that it did lead in 
the past) to a convoluted and uncontrollable land use system. An example of a possible attempt to bypass the ban 
on land acquisition relates to the usufruct right (right of use). The past possibility of unrestricted use of the usufruct 
resulted in ‘abuses’ of this right, aiming to circumventing land acquisition bans. For this reason, the usufruct right 
was ruled out by the new Land Act from 2002 (with the exception of close relatives – which is often subject to 
criticism  as  well),  even  though  it  may  be  contrary  to  the  right  of  free  settlement  and  to  the  principle  of  free 
movement  of  capital.  As  a  result  of  such  conflicting  values,  the  Land  Act  is  under  scrutiny  by  the  European 
Commission, and, in connection with it, there are currently a number of infringement cases pending before the EU 
Court  of  Justice.  While  the  Land  Act  alone  may  not  be  suitable  for  achieving  the  set  long-term  goals,  such  as 

52 

 
 
retaining the rural population, some believe that it provides a better regulatory environment than the one in place 
before 2010, particularly in preventing land speculations and undesirable developments in the land market. 

5.15.  Netherlands 

The  agricultural  sector  in  the  Netherlands  has  been  characterised  by  a  declining  number  of  holdings.  The 
Netherlands  does  not  have  specific  legislation  on  the  selling  and  buying  of  agricultural  land.  There  are  no 
establishment or residence requirements and no requirements for professional qualifications. Nor are there any 
specific requirements for purchase contracts: there is no prior review or approval of purchase transactions,  and 
there are no requirements regarding the price or maximum size of an enterprise. 

The majority of the total cultivated area in the Netherlands – 1.8 million ha in 2019 – is owned by the user of the 
land (57.5 %). The ratio between ownership and lease has changed little from 2008 to 2019. However, the area 
under regulated lease has decreased significantly. New regulated lease contracts are rarely concluded. This has to 
do with the strong protection of the tenant, in particular the automatic extension of the lease, and the regulation 
of  the  lease  prices,  the  highest  permissible  lease  prices  per  lease  price  area.  The  short-term  deregulated 
(liberalised) lease does not have these characteristics and has therefore become more popular. 

Agricultural  tenancy  law  has  been  given  a  strong  mandatory  character;  it  contains  provisions  that  the  parties 
involved may not deviate from. Regulated rental contracts prescribe a maximum rental payment, have a minimum 
duration, are automatically renewed and termination can occur only under strict conditions (e.g. if the owner wants 
to cultivate the land himself or herself). 

Since 2007 deregulated (liberalised) tenancy agreements  are allowed for loose land; these agreements  involve 
hardly  any  protection  for  the  tenants.  It  is also  new  that  the  tenant  cannot  claim a  right  of  first  refusal  if  the 
landowner intends to sell the land to a ‘safe landlord’, that is a landlord who confirms that s/he will not invoke a 
provision to personally exploit the land. Lastly, the age limit of 65 years of the tenant as grounds for cancellation 
has been repealed. 

Both for regular (regulated) tenancy contracts and for deregulated lease contracts longer than 6 years, there are 
maximum allowable prices. This does not apply to liberalised lease contracts shorter than 6 years. 

Regular contracts have a duration of 12 years for a farm (including buildings) and 6 years for loose land. These 
contracts  are  automatically  renewed.  Leasehold  contracts  of  agricultural  land  have  a  minimum  duration  of 
26 years. Short-term liberalised contracts have a minimum duration of 1 year and a maximum duration of 6 years. 

The regular tenant is protected by the statutory pre-emptive right. Executing the pre-emptive right requires the 
buyer to continue the agricultural business. If resold within 10 years, a fee is payable to the lessor. The pre-emptive 
right of the tenant can be circumvented by sale to a ‘safe party’ (veilige verpachter) who does not intend to farm 
the land itself. 

The Municipalities Preferential Rights Act (Wet voorkeursrecht gemeenten) is an instrument that municipalities can 
use to acquire land under certain conditions. If a municipality intends to place a new residential area or business 
park on a piece of agricultural land, it can establish a pre-emptive right on the plot. If the owner of the plot wants 
to sell the land, s/he must first offer the plot for sale to the municipality. 

If land is sold, a transfer tax and insurance tax are due according to the Act on Legal Transactions Taxes (Wet op 
de belastingen van rechtsverkeer). Property transfer tax of 6 % of the price is payable by the buyer on the sale and 
transfer of real estate other than residential property (2 %). Since 1 January 2007, a general exemption applies to 

53 

 
 
the acquisition of cultivated land exploited for agriculture (Article 15, paragraph 1q). The land must be used for 
agricultural  purposes for a  period of  10 years following the transfer. To facilitate farm succession, some fiscal 
measures have been introduced. Tenancy is inheritable. 

The legal restrictions on the use of agricultural land that arise from agricultural and environmental policies give 
rise  to  a  variety  of  enforcement  and  application  issues.  However,  the  selling  and  buying  of  agricultural  land  is 
completely liberalised in the Netherlands. In the absence of special requirements, the transfer of landownership 
does not involve issues of enforcement and application.  The lease  market is a  different story. The rules of the 
regular lease agreements and the liberalised lease agreements should be clear for the parties and, in the case of 
disagreement, there are institutions and procedures in place. The informal lease agreements based on trust, which 
are also used to some extent in the Netherlands, represent a special case. For the landowner, there is a risk involved 
in informal land lease, because the informal tenant may inform the Agricultural Tenancies Authority of the lease 
practice. The Agricultural Tenancies Authority may then decide in favour of the tenant that a regular lease contract 
applies (with all the advantages for the tenant). 

5.16.  Austria 

According to the last agricultural census in 2016 (Eurostat, 2020; Bundesministerium für Landwirtschaft, Regionen 
und Tourismus (Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Regions and Tourism), 2020), the average farm in Austria manages 
19.8 ha of UAA. About 48 % of farms in Austria have less than 10 ha of UAA and only about 2 % have more than 
100 ha of UAA. There is a high share (more than 55 %) of part-time farms. Moreover, 96 % of all farms are family 
farms (with more than 50 % of regular labour being family members) and about 82 % of the sector’s workforce 
are farm family members. Hence, Austrian agriculture can be described as being dominated by small to medium-
sized, family-farms with a large share operating part time. 

Sales and renting land in Austria are subject to the general freedom of contract, as  with any other contract. The 
Austrian civil code provides some general rules on, for example, legal periods of notice of dismissal or provisions 
for the case that the landlord/tenant sells/transfers/inherits the land. However, fundamental contract terms  such 
as prices and durations (in the case of rental contracts) can be established freely by both parties. The regulations 
that are in place aim to sustain agricultural land for small and medium-sized family farms. 

In general, a transfer (including sales and exchanges) of agricultural land requires approval by a specific authority, 
the land transfer commission (Grundverkehrskommission). However, there are some exceptions to this general rule. 
Not all exceptions exist in all federal states, but in most of them transactions do not have to be approved if (Holzer, 
2018): 

i. 
ii. 
iii. 
iv. 

v. 

vi. 

vii. 

the whole farm is handed over to a successor; 
transactions are between spouses or close relatives; 
transactions are between co-owners; 
the acquisition of rights is in the public interest (e.g. for purposes of public transport or disposal 
facilities); 
legal transactions are in the course of an agricultural proceeding (e.g. land consolidations, flood 
prevention); 
the  transaction  is  of  land  below  a  certain  area  (trivial  limit)  (between  0.03 ha  and  0.3 ha, 
depending on the state); 
the location of the property is in a predominantly built-up area with a non-agricultural character 
(e.g. in cities). 

54 

 
 
The transfer of land can be refused for specific reasons explicitly given in the laws (and loosely translated here) 
(Holzer, 2018). 

 

 
 

 
 
 
 

 

 
 
 

If the sale is to a non-farmer, and a local famer is interested in buying the land (C, LA, S, ST, T, UA, V) (19). 
Once a non-farmer wants to buy a piece of land, this has to be announced publicly. Within a specified period 
of time (usually 4 weeks or 1 month), local farmers can make an offer. This can be interpreted as a pre-
emptive right of farmers against non-farmers (20). 
If mainly considered as a speculative capital investment (B, C, S, ST, UA). 
If the price is unreasonable high compared to the value of the property or if the price considerably exceeds 
the customary price (B, LA, S, ST, T, UA, V); only Tyrol defines this as 30 % above the customary price. 
If it is against the goal to strengthen or create a productive farming community (LA). 
If proper agricultural and forestry management cannot be guaranteed (C, LA, S, ST, T, UA, V). 
If the sale implies a devaluation of the remaining property (S). 
If the sale promotes the formation or expansion of large estates or private hunting areas, while there are 
small and medium-sized farmers interested in buying the land (B, C, S, V, UA). 
If the sale leads to a disruption of a favourable landownership structure (e.g. too small and too scattered 
plots or if it reverses conducted land consolidations) (B, C, S, ST, T, V, UA). 
If the sale leads to the development of a disadvantageous agricultural and forestry structure (C, S). 
If the sale leads to the emergence of uneconomically small properties (T). 
If it is an evasive transaction. 

For  non-EU  citizens  (both  natural  and  legal  persons),  no  exceptions  exist  for  the  transfer  of  agricultural  land. 
Approval can be denied for the reasons listed above. In addition, in most federal states of Austria, transfer of land 
to non-EU citizens is authorised only if there is a cultural, social or economic interest and state political interests 
are not affected. 

Rental contracts are subject to the general freedom of contract (based on the Austrian civil code), so if both parties 
agree, they can agree on any rental price or duration. However, if one party feels they have been treated unfairly, 
they may appeal to court based on the Landpachtgesetz, a law for conflict resolution. It  sets certain  minimum 
standards, primarily to protect tenants. Most notably, this legislation sets reference durations for renting (Holzer, 
Jilch and Wilfinger, 2013): 15 years for horticulture, viniculture and fruit culture farms; 10 years for all other farms 
and horticulture, viniculture and fruit culture plots; and 5 years for all other plots. 

Moreover, it specifies that rental rates should be adequate. The rental price should be ‘reasonable’ with respect to 
the earnings of both parties. The court decides on a by-case basis, based on local circumstances. The rental price 
should not deviate more than 50 % from the – locally determined – ‘reasonable’ price. 

Automatic renewal by implication (i.e. tacit; if there is no notification by the landlord) leads to an extension of the 
contract by 1 year; otherwise, it is not renewed. Tenancy is inheritable on both sides (landlord and tenant). In this 
case, special opportunities to end a contract early may apply. 

Land rental transactions – just like sales transactions – are, in general, subject to approval by the land transfer 
commission (Grundverkehrsbehörde). However, all states have some provisions that only certain rental transactions 
actually require approval (Holzer, 2018), for example for areas above a certain size (e.g. greater than 2 ha in C and 

(19)  B, Burgenland; C, Carinthia; LA, Lower Austria; S, Salzburg; ST, Styria; T, Tyrol; UA, Upper Austria; V, Vorarlberg. 
(20)  A farmer is defined as someone already managing a farm (on its own or together with family members or employees) or someone who 
wants to manage a farm (newcomer) and can prove that they have appropriate training. In some states, the former requires that at least 
25 % of total income is from farming. Legal entities can also be farmers. 

55 

 
 
                                                 
LA, greater than 5 ha in B), for long-term renting (e.g. more than 20 years or unlimited duration and area greater 
than 2 ha in ST), for renting entire farms or land with farm buildings (e.g. C, V), or if the prospective tenant is a 
non-farmer (e.g. S, T if area is greater than 3 ha). Only one state (UA) does not require any approval of land rental 
transactions. 

Stricter limits for the need for approval of rental transactions apply for non-EU citizens: approval is already required 
for smaller plots and shorter rental periods, and approval can be given only if an economic, social or cultural interest 
exists. 

In general, the law and the procedure (approval by the land transfer commission) is the same for asset deals and 
share deals. If the legal entity is ‘mainly’ agricultural or owns more than a certain amount of land, approval by the 
land transfer commission is necessary. Once a non-farmer wants to buy a piece of land, this has to be announced 
publicly and local farmers are able to make an offer for 4 weeks (1 month). 

Regarding the implementation and enforcement of the regulations,  according to the real estate transaction law, 
land  transfers  have  to  be  approved  by  a  regional  land  transfer  commission.  Since  the  decisions  of  these  land 
transfer commissions are not consolidated and made public, it remains unclear to what extent these commissions 
impede a liberal transfer of land. The only state publishing some information is Tyrol in a yearly report (Land Tirol, 
2019, 2020). In 2018, the six land transfer commissions of Tyrol approved 642 agricultural land transactions; in 
2019,  they  approved  678.  However,  in  2018,  there  were  818  (890  in  2019)  exceptions  based  on  the  reasons 
described  above  (e.g.  farm  succession,  transfers  in  the  public  interest).  In  addition,  another  339  (366  in  2019) 
exceptions were not covered by the reasons given above; these exception were, for example, land transferred to 
expand  commercial  and  industrial  sites  or  land  sold  to  building  cooperatives.  In  2018,  only  16  (14  in  2019) 
transactions were disapproved. In 19 (25 in 2019) cases, the pre-emptive right of farmers against non-farmers 
was applied. In 59 (65 in 2019) cases, EU citizens were involved in agricultural land transactions. Given the scarcity 
of land, documented by the high sales and rental prices, it can be assumed that Tyrol is a state where the land 
transaction law is probably executed more stringently than in most other states. According to Fankhauser et al. 
(2016),  based on a survey sent to the land transfer  commissions, the  most  common  reasons for refusal are a 
deterioration in agricultural structure or that the buyer is not willing or able to guarantee  proper agricultural and 
forestry management. To a lesser extent, applications are rejected due to an excessive purchase price. 

Two related provisions of most property transaction laws that have an impact on land sales and rental markets 
have been the issue of debate in recent years, and have led to adjustments in some states. First, before the mid 
2000s, most property transaction laws stipulated that a transaction of agricultural land could be approved only if 
the new owner would farm the land himself or herself, rather than rent it out to a  farmer. However, in a  case 
brought to the European Court of Justice (CJEU), in which a family foundation from Lichtenstein wanted to buy 
land in Vorarlberg and was refused, the court considered this to be incompatible with the free movement of capital, 
and pointed out that it reduces the amount of land that is available for renting, which, in turn, discriminates against 
farmers  who  cannot  afford  to  buy  land (21).  As  a  result,  most  states  adjusted  their  property  transaction  laws 
accordingly,  and  only  require  that  the  new  owner  guarantees  ‘proper  management’  of  the  agricultural  land  by 
farming  it  himself  or  herself  or  by  renting  the  land  to  a  tenant.  Second,  this  decision  has  implications  for  the 
legitimacy  of  the  described  ‘pre-emption’  right  of  farmers against  non-farmers, if  the  latter can  ensure  proper 
farming of the land by a tenant. Following an infringement procedure by the European Commission in 2010, some 
states have introduced (rather restrictive) exceptions to this pre-emptive right procedure, while others have not (22). 
Therefore, the original version of the pre-emptive right, which still exists in some states, can be considered unlawful 
(Holzer, 2018; Holzer, Jilch and Wilfinger, 2013). Notwithstanding these problems, the general approach and goals 

(21) 
(22) 

Commission Interpretative Communication on the Acquisition of Farmland and EU Law (OJ 2017/C 350/05, 18.10.2017). 
In regard to the infringement procedure, see CJEU, European Commission v Republic of Austria, Case C-516/10. 

56 

 
 
                                                 
of the Austrian real estate transaction laws (i.e. requiring approval by a commission for every transaction) have 
been found to be in line with EU legislation and are thus not seriously debated (23). 

It should also be noted that a substantial share of land that is rented is rented within families and otherwise well-
known people, for various reasons. Leonhardt, Braito and Penker (2019) found in a survey of 300 crop farmers that 
respondents rented over 20 % of land from family and another 75 % of land from people they knew personally. 
There may be several reasons for renting from/to family: landowners sometimes own land due to, for example, 
inheritance, but do not farm themselves and prefer to rent this land to farming family members. There are, however, 
also reasons of taxation and social security that may lead to pro forma renting between spouses or other family 
members. This land is then, while officially and per legal definition part of the rental market, not actually available 
on the open rental market. The finding that over 18 % of rented land was under oral contracts in the study by 
Leonhardt, Braito and Penker (2019) supports this argument. 

To summarise, the small percentage of rejected land transactions in Tyrol suggests that land transfer commissions 
do  not  massively  restrict  a  relatively  liberal  land market.  Though  challenged  by  a  decision  of  the  ECJ, the  pre-
emptive right of farmers against non-farmers is practised in some regions, but the actual scale remains unclear. 
There are differences between states (regions) as to how strictly this rule is applied. To attain a basic agricultural 
education is not very difficult or time-consuming (a course of 200 hours). Moreover, the pre-emptive right applies 
only if the farmer is willing to offer the same price as the non-farmer. Since a high share of agricultural land is 
rented from relatives and friends, the rental market might not be as liquid as suggested by the relatively sizable 
rental share (around 35 % in 2014). 

5.17.  Poland 

In 2019 there were over 1.4 million farms that used 14.7 million ha of agricultural land. The majority of agricultural 
land in Poland is owned by private owners (over 90 %). However, around 1.3 million ha still belongs to the state – 
managed by the state agency, the National Support Centre for Agriculture, which usually leases it to private farms 
(Główny Urząd Statystyczny (Statistical Office of Poland), 2020). 

Land use is very fragmented among many small family farms. Regulations are in place in Poland regulating the 
transaction of both private and state land, and mainly aim to support and protect family farms. 

Non-farmers can buy, without restrictions, only a plot smaller than 1 ha. Individual farmers running a family farm 
can  buy  plots  larger  than  1 ha.  An  individual  farmer  is  defined  as  a  natural  person  being  the  owner,  user, 
spontaneous owner or tenant of the agricultural property, with a total area not exceeding 300 ha. S/he must have 
agricultural  qualifications,  be  a  resident  of  a  given  municipality  (where  at  least  one  of  the  agricultural  plots  is 
located)  and  manage  the  farm  personally  for  at  least  5 years.  The  buyer  of  a  plot  larger  than  1 ha  (including 
purchased land) is obliged to run the farm for  at least  5 years.  During this  period, the plots of  purchased land 
cannot be sold or transferred to other persons. 

Sales of state land can take place only if, as a result of the transaction, the total area of agricultural land owned 
by the buyer does not exceed 300 ha. However, only land plots smaller than 2 ha can be sold, while plots larger 
than 2 ha can only be rented. In general, the sale of state-owned land is carried out by the state agency (i.e. the 
National Support Centre for  Agriculture). In accordance  with the  Act of 14 April 2016  on Suspension of Sale of 
Property from the Agricultural Property Stock of the State Treasury and Amendments to Certain Acts, sale of state 
property from the agricultural property stock is suspended for 5 years. 

(23) 

Commission Interpretative Communication on the Acquisition of Farmland and EU Law (OJ 2017/C 350/05, 18.10.2017). 

57 

 
 
                                                 
There are several limitations for legal entities to buy agricultural land. In fact, legal entities can acquire land only 
with the consent of the Director-General of the National Support Centre for Agriculture. 

Pre-emptive rights are granted to tenants who are individual farmers running a farm smaller than 300 ha, as well 
as to the state (i.e. the National Centre for Agricultural Support). The pre-emptive right does not hold if land is sold 
to a family relative (i.e. descendant, ascendant, siblings, parents’ siblings, spouse, adopted child or stepchild). It is 
worth noting that land transfer between family members accounts for a significant percentage of all transactions 
in Poland. The pre-emptive right also does not apply if the sale of agricultural property takes place between legal 
entities  of  the  same  church  or  religious  association.  In  addition,  the  pre-emptive  right  does  not  apply  to  the 
acquisition of agricultural real estate concluded between members of an agricultural cooperative (or by contracts 
for the sale of land contributions in such cooperatives). 

Land  regulations  have  changed  quite  significantly  in  Poland  over  the  past  few  decades.  After  a  period  of 
liberalisation  at  the  beginning  of  the  transition  period  in  the  1990s,  the  first  restrictions  on  the  freedom  of 
agricultural land trade were introduced in 2003, just before Poland’s accession to the EU. Further changes were 
introduced  as  a  response  to  the  expiration  of  the  transitional  restrictions  on  agricultural  land  acquisitions  by 
foreigners  in  2016.  Recent  amendments  to  the  legislation  in  2019  introduced  provisions  to  alleviate  existing 
restrictions,  but  the  overall  approach  has  not  changed  significantly.  The  regulations  are  often  considered  to  be 
rather restrictive (Najwyższa Izba Kontroli (Supreme Audit Office), 2019) and rather complex (24). The purpose of 
the  regulations  introduced  in  2003  and  2016  was  to  prevent  speculative  trade,  excessive  concentration  of 
agricultural land, and land grabbing of both private and state agricultural land. In principle, the regulations favour 
family farms that operate on land they own and include several limitations to the purchase of agricultural land by 
legal persons. It is actually almost impossible for legal persons to buy land, particularly larger plots of land. Some 
farms run by natural persons who want to enlarge their farms also perceive the regulations as unfavourable. Large 
farms run by natural persons are sometimes divided between family members into smaller farms to circumvent 
the 300-ha threshold. While the regulations might limit the acquisition of agricultural land by entities involved in 
non-agricultural activities, for speculative purposes or as a form of capital investment (Sejm, 2019), they might 
also limit the inflow of capital into the agricultural sector (Jędruchniewicz and Maśniak, 2018). 

Some studies argue that the pre-emptive right of tenants and of the National Support Centre for Agriculture was 
primarily introduced to create barriers to the acquisition of agricultural real estate by foreigners, rather than to 
shape and promote the development of the agricultural sector, as, for example, specified in the preamble of the 
land law (i.e. the Act of 11 April 2003 on Shaping the Agricultural System) (Truszkiewicz, 2019). 

Overall, the land regulation is strictly implemented and enforced in Poland. The National Centre for Agricultural 
Support, being the control agency, has become an important player in agricultural land markets. It not only manages 
agricultural land owned by the state, but it also exercises control over the private transactions of agricultural land. 

5.18.  Romania 

The total UAA in Romania amounted to 13.5 million ha in 2016. The majority of farms are of a relatively small size 
in Romania. In 2016, around 91 % of all farms (primarily family farms) cultivated areas smaller than 5 ha and 
used around 29 % of UAA, while less than 1 % of farms (usually legal entities) cultivated an area larger than 50 ha 
and used 51 % of UAA. The rest of the farms (approximately 8 % of all farms) were of medium size, between 5 ha 
and 50 ha, and used the rest of the UAA (20 %). 

(24) 

See,  for example, an  article  on the concept  of agricultural real estate under the Act  of  11 April  2003  on  Shaping  of  the Agricultural 
System (https://codozasady.pl/en/p/the-concept-of-agricultural-real-estate-under-the-agricultural-system-act). 

58 

 
 
                                                 
The primary subject of land market regulations in Romania are sale transactions. Both legal entities and natural 
persons can own land in Romania. However, conducting a sale transaction is a rather administratively demanding 
procedure in Romania. In order to sell agricultural land located outside a built-up area, the seller must submit to 
the town hall the application for displaying the sale offer in a designated public place, together with a series of 
documents. The sale offer needs to be displayed for 45 working days so that those who have pre-emptive rights 
can exercise their rights. The legislation grants pre-emptive rights for land purchase to co-owners, tenants, owners 
of neighbouring plots that have a common border with the land put up for sale, young farmers with domicile or 
residence in Romania for at least 1 year, the Academy of Agricultural and Forestry Sciences (Gheorghe Ionescu-
Șișești) and the agricultural-related research and development institutes (i.e. those active in the fields of agriculture, 
forestry and food industry), natural persons with domicile/residence located in the administrative territorial units 
where the land is located or in neighbouring administrative territorial units, and the Romanian state (through the 
State Domains Agency). 

If no pre-emptor shows intention to buy the land on offer, it still cannot be freely sold to any buyer, but must be 
made available to the following potential specialised buyers within an additional 30-day period: (1) individuals who 
have  been  domiciled  or  have  resided  in  Romania  for  the  preceding  5 years,  carry  out  agricultural  activities  in 
Romania and are registered by the Romanian tax authorities (i.e. this includes individual farmers); and (2) legal 
entities  with  a  registered  office  and/or  secondary  headquarters  in  Romania  in  the  preceding  5 years,  that  are 
involved  in  agricultural  activities  in  Romania  (representing  at  least  75 %  of  the  total  income),  with  a 
partner/shareholder who has a controlling influence in the company and has had domicile or residence in Romania 
in  the  preceding  5 years  (i.e.  this  includes  agricultural  companies).  If  the  potential  buyer  does  not  meet  these 
conditions, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development will issue a negative approval. If, within the 30-day 
period (and after the initial 45 working days, available to exercise the pre-emptive rights, have passed), none of 
the potential buyers meet the abovementioned conditions, the land can be sold to other buyers. Approval of a sale 
is always needed from governmental bodies (e.g. mayor’s office, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development) 
and the transaction needs to be registered in the land books (cadastre). 

Overall, the objective of the land market regulations in Romania is to prioritise access to land for young farmers 
and for existing farms that intend to expand and consolidate their agricultural production (both for family farmers 
and  agricultural  companies).  However,  some  experts  argue  that  the  land  market  regulations  impose  rather 
restrictive  conditions  on  some  investors  for  buying  land  in  Romania,  particularly  on  those  without  agricultural 
activities or those who want to expand certain investments. 

5.19.  Slovenia 

The total agricultural area of Slovenia is 676 000 ha, of which 605 000 ha is, according to the most recent 2016 
Farm Structure Survey (25), operated by 69 902 agricultural farms. The average size of a Slovenian farm is 6.9 ha. 
Farms cultivate 481 415 ha of the total agricultural area, and the rest of the total area represents non-productive 
agricultural  land.  Most  of  the  cultivated  area  is  permanent  grasslands  (276 244 ha),  followed  by  arable  land 
(176 807 ha).  The  vineyards  cover  15 241 ha,  and  orchards  and  olive  groves  cover  11 297 ha  (Farm  Structure 
Survey, 2016). 

Around 91 % of all agricultural land is in private ownership; the rest (9 %) is owned by the state and managed by 
the Farmland and Forest Fund (FFF). The FFF is the biggest and most important single player on the agricultural 
land market in Slovenia. It manages (through sale, acquisition and lease) the state-owned agricultural land, farms 
and forests. The main purposes and objectives of the FFF buying, selling and renting land is to contribute to the 

(25) 

https://www.stat.si/statweb/en/News/Index/6742 

59 

 
 
                                                 
consolidation of production properties, thereby ensuring a more economically rational size of plot, and to improve 
the size structure of farms. 

The  key  regulation  that  regulates  the  agricultural  land  market  in  Slovenia  is the  Agricultural  Land  Act  (ALA).  It 
establishes pre-emptive rights to different land market actors in the following order: (1) co-owners, (2) farmer-
owners whose land borders  with land that is on sale, (3) the tenant of the land for  sale, (4) other farmers, (5) 
agricultural organisations or sole proprietors who need land or a farm to perform agricultural or forestry activities 
and (6) the FFF. If the pre-emptive right-holders among farmers are ranked in the same place, the priority is given 
in the following order to (1) farmers for whom agricultural activity constitutes their sole or principal activity; (2) 
farmers who cultivate the land themselves; and (3) farmers appointed by the seller, except in the case of the sale 
of real estate owned by the state, in which case the farmer needs to be selected based on public auction. 

If nobody exercises the pre-emptive right, the seller can sell the agricultural land to anyone who has accepted the 
offer in a timely manner and in line with the procedures prescribed in the ALA, and if the concluded contract is 
approved by the responsible administrative unit. The precondition for such a buyer is to have a farmer status as 
defined in the ALA. 

The  process  of  approving  the  sale  of  agricultural  land  is  a  complex  and  demanding  administrative  procedure, 
especially in cases when several potential buyers accept the offer, as the responsible administrative unit has to 
decide which buyer can conclude the transaction with the seller. 

The Agricultural Holdings Inheritance Act regulates the division of agricultural holdings in the inheritance process. 
This regulation basically prohibits the division of farms of a size between 5 ha and 600 ha. These farms are called 
‘protected farms’. A farm is automatically classified in this category through an official procedure when − according 
to the official records − the farm falls within the defined margins. The regulation  stipulates that the ‘protected 
farms’ must be inherited by only one heir, while all the other legal heirs are compensated financially by the one 
taking over the farm. 

Some stakeholders – mainly farmers – consider the Agricultural Holdings Inheritance Act as the most restrictive for 
the  functioning  of  the  land  market.  It  influences  the  land  market  because  the  designation  of  ‘protected  farm’ 
effectively impedes the sale of any part of such farm separately from the whole farm. ‘Protected farms’ can be 
sold only as a whole (including agricultural land, forest and agricultural buildings) to other farmers. However, this 
is not common practice occurring in the Slovenian agricultural land market. In particular, the sale of the buildings 
is an obstacle, as they are usually together with the housing part of a farmyard. As the identification of a protected 
farm  is  an  administrative  procedure  done  automatically  by  the  responsible  local  authority,  resulting  in  an 
administrative decision, the regulation is strictly enforced. 

The ALA also regulates the lease of agricultural land by establishing the order of pre-emption beneficiaries and 
requires lease contracts to be registered. This part of the ALA legislation is not strictly enforced. In practice, the 
leasing procedure under the ALA is largely used only by the FFF, which is, as a manager of state-owned agricultural 
land, obligated to follow the law. Other stakeholders use the lease, as regulated by the ALA, only exceptionally; 
instead, unofficial rental agreements are widely used. The anecdotal evidence suggests that the process of selling 
or leasing land as regulated by the ALA is very time-consuming and procedurally complex. 

5.20.  Slovakia 

The  total  agricultural  area  in  Slovakia  is  2.39 million ha.  In  2017,  4.4 million  people  in  Slovakia  (out  of  a  total 
population of 5.4 million) owned agricultural land. On average, a landowner owned less than 1 ha of agricultural 
land,  split  into  around  two  plots.  A  land  plot  was  owned,  on  average,  by  12  persons.  There  were  100.7 million 

60 

 
 
agricultural  landownership  relationships in  Slovakia  in  2017.  The  extreme  landownership  fragmentation  causes 
significant transaction costs when buying or renting land. Not surprisingly, there is a strong need to consolidate 
land and it is high on the political agenda. In 1995, Act No 180/1995 Coll. on some measures for consolidation of 
landownership was adopted. It includes legal rules on the minimum sizes of agricultural land plots that are situated 
outside the built-up areas of municipalities. The act contains measures to prevent further land fragmentation. The 
owner has to pay a fee equal to 10 % of the value of the agricultural land when the new land plot created by 
subdividing the existing one is smaller than 2 ha but greater than 0.5 ha. A fee equal to 20 % of the agricultural 
land value has to be paid when the newly created plot is smaller than 0.5 ha but greater than 0.2 ha. The creation 
of land plots smaller than 0.2 ha is not allowed by law. However, there are some exemptions in the act. 

Landownership is fragmented, but that is not the case for land use. The average farm size is 73.6 ha in Slovakia, 
which is almost five times higher than the EU average farm size of 15.2 ha. A greater proportion of large farms 
are bigger than 100 ha in Slovakia than in the rest of the EU (European Commission, 2020b, 2020c). 

About  90 %  of  land  is  rented;  therefore,  rental  transactions  dominate  the  agricultural  land  market  in  Slovakia. 
Farms rent land mainly from natural persons (more than 50 %), from the Slovak Land Fund (26), from members of 
agricultural cooperatives or from other institutions (e.g. the Roman Catholic Church). About 60 % of land is rented 
for 5–10 years, 22 % of land is rented for 10–15 years and the remaining 18 % is rented for more than 15 years. 
Land renting is currently governed by Act 504/2003 Coll. on renting of agricultural land, agricultural enterprise and 
forest land. It stipulates that the minimum duration of a rental contract of agricultural land to conduct business by 
enterprises  is  to  be  5 years,  and  the  maximum  is  15 years.  In  the  case  of  the  renting  of  agricultural  land  for 
conducting  business  by  an  agricultural  enterprise  whereby  the  rental  contract  is  concluded  for  an  infinite  time 
period,  it  can  be  terminated  with  effect  from  1 November  2020  with  a  5-year  advance  notice  period.  The  law 
establishes a minimum rent of 1 % of the land value. In practice, the market rent is considerably higher than the 
minimum set by the law. If the landlord is the Slovak Land Fund, the internal rules of the Slovak Land Fund set the 
minimum rent to be 2.2 % of the land value in 2014 (27). The market rent is still about double the value of 2.2 % 
of the land value. In 2020, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development declared that the Slovak Land Fund 
will be charging the usual rent – the average rent in the cadastre area where the plot is located. 

The Slovak law protects the user of agricultural land (tenant) more than the owner (landlord), while there are no 
restrictions on ownership of agricultural land for EU nationals and no pre-emptive rights for buyers. It is important 
to note that, since 1 July 2014, Act No 140/2014 Coll. on the acquisition of the ownership of agricultural land has 
come into effect in Slovakia. This act aimed to introduce new rules on the acquisition of agricultural land. According 
to this act, the ownership of agricultural land may be acquired only by a person who has either permanent residence 
(in the case of a natural person) or a registered office (in the case of a legal person) in Slovakia for at least 10 years 
and carries out agricultural production for at least 3 years before the date of the conclusion of the land acquisition 
contract (28). The act also requires the publication of sale offers in designated public places. 

(26) 

(27) 

(28) 

The Slovak Land Fund is a legal entity established by the law for the administration of state land and of the land of unknown owners. 
The land of unknown owners is land without documentation of the land ownership due to missing data on the landlords, which were lost 
or destroyed in the past. The lands of unknown owners together with the state land occupy about one fourth of the total agricultural land 
in Slovakia. 
In compliance with the Slovak Land Fund General Director order, until 2014 the lease required by the Slovak Land Fund from the lessee 
was 1.5 % of the land price, determined according to Bonited Soil-Ecological Units. In 2014 the lease payment increased to 2.20 % of 
this price, and since 2015 it is yearly modified by the year-on-year average inflation rate published by the Statistical Office of the Slovak 
Republic for the previous year. These modifications aim to approximate the lease payment of the Slovak Land Fund land towards the 
market lease prices. 
Young farmers are not required to comply with the requirement to have carried out 3 years of business conduct in agricultural production. 
However, they cannot rent out, sell or donate the acquired agricultural land for 3 years from acquiring the ownership of the agricultural 
land. 

61 

 
 
                                                 
However, on 14 November 2018, the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic decided that Act No 140/2014 is 
against  the  constitution  and  repealed  some  of  the  provisions  of  the  law (29).  Following  this  decision  of  the 
Constitutional Court, there are no restrictions on ownership of agricultural land by EU nationals and no pre-emptive 
rights to acquire agricultural land in Slovakia. 

Regarding rental market regulation, the tenant has a pre-emptive right to enter into a new rental contract, except 
in specific conditions. Furthermore, the minimum duration of a rental contract is 5 years if land is rented by an 
enterprise to conduct business, and the contract cannot be terminated earlier, except by mutual agreement. The 
tenant has a right to ask for a reduction in rent if the expected revenues have not been achieved due to a substantial 
change  in  economic  conditions  or  if  the  prices  of  commodities  decline  by  half.  Finally,  tenancy  contracts  are 
inheritable. 

In Slovakia, about 77.5 % of agricultural land is privately owned, 16.7 % is owned by unknown owners and 5.8 % 
is state  land.  Land  of  unknown  owners  and  state  land is  managed  by  the  state-owned  Slovak  Land  Fund.  This 
means that more than 20 % of agricultural land is under state control. The state rents out these lands. As mentioned 
above, for a long time, it was rented out at administrative rents, which were considerably below market rents. This 
was changed in 2020 when the Slovak Land Fund started to use the usual rent, which is the average rent in the 
cadastre area where land is located. In renting out the land, the Slovak Land Fund is obliged by the law to give 
preference to young farmers (30); small farms (31) or microenterprises (32) that focus on special plant production or 
special animal production (33); farmers who, on at least half of the cultivated area, conduct special plant production 
(grow fruits and vegetables); or farmers who produce a final product and can prove that s/he owns agricultural 
land or rents agricultural land from other owners. However, in reality, the Slovak Land Fund rented only a very small 
area to small farms or young farmers. The reasons are that the rental contracts were signed for a long  duration 
initially, large farms have dominant positions and more access to information in the specific cadastres where the 
state land or land of unknown owners managed by the Slovak Land Fund is located, and the political influence of 
large farms. Furthermore, some rental contracts are problematic. This is the outcome of the situation of the land 
market,  which suffers from  extremely high transaction costs,  stemming  from  missing, erroneous or incomplete 
legal documents; old and imprecise maps; the difficulty or impossibility of contacting owners (e.g. deceased owners, 
absentee  owners,  owners  with  unknown  addresses,  co-owners  with  legal  conflicts  between  them,  incomplete 
inheritance processes); and imperfect correspondence between the land plot information system used to distribute 
direct  payments  and  cadastre  registers  to  register  landownership.  As  a  result,  rental  contracts  to  use  land  are 
incomplete in Slovakia. Some land plots are used by farms without a rental contract and some co-owners of a land 
plot did not sign the rental contract with the farm. In some cases, a majority of co-owners did not sign the contract 
with the farm. 

Act No 504/2003 Coll. deals with some problems in the rental market, but it does not solve them fully. According 
to the law, if a land user who uses he land without a rental contract proves that s/he proposed to conclude the 
rental contract and the landowner did not refuse to conclude the contract within 2 months from the day of receiving 
the proposal, it is assumed that the rental contract is established between the land user and the landlord for an 

(29) 

At the EU level, the European Commission initiated a process against Slovakia on the grounds that this act is against the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU. 

(30)  As defined in Art. 2, par. 1, letter n), of the Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (i.e. a person 

(31) 
(32) 
(33) 

not older than 40 years). 
As defined in Art. 2, par. 2, of Annex I of the Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014. 
As defined in art. 2 par. 3 Annex I of the Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014. 
Special  plant  production  is  represented  by  cultivation  of  vineyards,  hop  fields  or  orchards,  or  cultivation  of  special  crops  such  as 
vegetables,  root  crops,  legumes,  medical  herbs,  aromatic  herbs,  spice,  poppy,  hemp,  amaranth,  buckwheat  or  millet.  Special  animal 
production represents the  stocking density of agricultural land from 0.4 livestock unit per ha (for details,  see the Slovak government 
regulation No 416/2014). 

62 

 
 
                                                 
indefinite period of time. This strongly favours current land users in accessing land. In such a case, the proper notice 
to terminate the contract is 1 year. 

Imperfections  in  the  land  rental  market  are  tolerated  and  status  quo  prevails  if  there  are  no  conflicts  created 
between the owners, between the owners and users of land, or between the users of land. The conflicts often arise 
when new farmers, for example new young farmers, enter the business and attempt to rent land, or when farms 
attempt to expand. 

The number of conflicts over land use increased in Slovakia after EU accession with the introduction of CAP direct 
payments  (particularly  the  single  area  payment  scheme).  Land  conflicts  are  solved  by  agreement  or  the  legal 
system is used. The use of the legal system to solve land conflicts takes a significant amount of time, which causes 
a major problem for some farms in accessing land. 

The problem often arises with the so-called double declaration of land plots for direct payments. This is the case 
when two different farmers claim the right to use the same land plot to receive direct payments. In such a case, 
the paying agency refuses to pay direct payments to both farms, which could create significant problems for both 
of them, or for at least one of them. Double claims are sometimes used as a strategic behaviour of some farms 
to create costs for their competitor. 

5.21.  Finland 

In 2019, there were 46 800 farms in Finland, which was approximately 800 farms fewer than in 2018. The average 
farm size was 49 ha. A farm cultivates, on average, 17 different plots of land. Most farm holdings are family farms 
(86 %) in Finland. The average size of plots is around 2.37 ha (Hiironen and Ettanen, 2012). 

The amount of leased land in Finland is approximately 777 000 ha, or about one third of the UAA. The share of 
leased land increased between 1990 and 2000 from 15 % to 30 %, but has been steady ever since. Around 60 % 
of farms cultivate some leased land. Land renting is more common on livestock farms than crop farms: more than 
80 % of livestock farms cultivated some rented area. 

Agricultural land transactions are regulated by the same legislation as  regulates all other property transactions. 
The spirit of the regulations is relatively liberal: there are no restrictions on who can buy or own agricultural land. 
Foreigners and legal persons have equal rights to purchase land, except that an entity domiciled outside the territory 
of a MS of the EU or of a state belonging to the EEA or a national outside the EU or outside the EEA need to apply 
for permission 2 months before the transaction. This law came into force at the beginning of 2020. 

In any transaction, the municipality has a pre-emptive right to land acquisition, though it is rarely used in practice. 
Pre-emptive  rights  can  be  used  to  acquire  land  for  community  construction,  recreation  and  nature  protection 
purposes. The state has the pre-emptive right to purchase land close to the state borders, military areas or other 
special areas. These pre-emptive rights are used only exceptionally and are not per se related to agricultural land 
markets. 

Land  rentals,  including  plots  for  buildings,  etc.,  are  regulated  by  the  ‘Land  rental  act’  (Maanvuokralaki 
29.4.1966/258).  Agricultural  land  that  does  not  have  farm  buildings  may  be  leased  for  a  maximum  period  of 
20 years for conducting agricultural activities as the main purpose. The rental contract must be done in writing and 
signed by the involved parties. The exception is a lease for no more than 2 years’ duration, which may be agreed 
orally. The written contract must state when the contract period begins and when it ends. If this is not established 
in the contract, the duration is the same as in the oral agreement, that is 2 years. The written contract must include 
all the terms of the lease. A term that is not written in the contract is void. The rent price must be agreed and 

63 

 
 
written; however, it may be EUR 0. The termination terms in the contract are fully binding. A typical termination 
condition is a change of ownership without transfer of the lease to the new owner. If the termination conditions 
are not set in the lease contract, the change of landownership will not affect the lease, but the rent must be paid 
to the new owner. Tenancy agreements are inheritable in Finland. 

The transfer of land between different family generations can result in certain tax reliefs being granted (e.g. for 
property transfer tax). These tax benefits are binding for the successor and could be lost if the land is sold within 
5 years. 

Overall, natural persons and legal entities are free to buy or rent, under rather liberal conditions, whatever they 
wish in terms of farm and forest land. Since the land-related legislation is relatively liberal, it is well followed and 
enforced. The main challenges of the Finnish agricultural sector are related to the rigidity of the arable land markets 
and the ageing of farmers and landowners, which limits the availability of arable land to developing and expanding 
farms. 

5.22.  Sweden 

According to the Swedish Farm Register, there were around 63 000 farms in Sweden in 2016, with an average size 
of 41 ha of arable land per farm. 

Natural persons, both domestic and foreign, face almost no restrictions when acquiring agricultural land in Sweden. 
However, in certain sparsely populated areas and redevelopment areas (omarronderingsområde), all natural and 
legal persons (both domestic and legal) must, according to the Land Acquisition Act (Jordförvärvslag 1979:230), 
have permission to acquire agricultural land. 

The Land Acquisition Act has two main purposes. First, it aims to promote employment and housing in sparsely 
populated areas. If a person wants to acquire a property located in a sparsely populated area and this person does 
not intend to live on the purchased  property or work in the locality, permission for the acquisition is not given. 
Second, to maintain the balance between natural and legal persons owning agricultural properties and in order to 
avoid legal persons outcompeting natural persons on the agricultural land and forestry markets, strict rules are in 
place that limit legal persons’ opportunities to buy land from natural persons. 

In sparsely populated areas, a natural person (either domestic or foreign) does not have to apply for an acquisition 
permit in specific situations, for example if the person already owns part of the property or if the person has been 
registered in a sparsely populated area in the municipality where the property is located for at least 1 year. For a 
natural person to receive an acquisition permit in sparsely populated areas, the following conditions apply: 

 

 

the person must settle permanently on the acquired property within 12 months of the acquisition (proof 
must be provided); 
if  the  person  does  not  plan  to  permanently  reside  on  the  property,  they  must  instead  show  that  the 
acquisition will permanently contribute to local employment; 

  when acquiring a property dominated by agricultural land, the land is required to be used by someone who 

lives nearby; 

  when acquiring a property dominated by forest, the person must show that employment is imminent. 

If these conditions are not met, the authorities can refuse a permit. 

Legal persons (either domestic or foreign) are not required to apply for an acquisition permit when they acquire 
the property from a legal person, other than the property of a deceased person, and the property is not located in 

64 

 
 
a sparsely populated or redevelopment area. However, legal persons (both domestic and foreign) are required to 
apply for an acquisition permit when acquiring agricultural property, located in sparsely populated or redevelopment 
areas, from other legal persons or when acquiring agricultural property, regardless of area, from natural persons 
or  deceased  persons.  Legal  persons  may  be  granted  an  acquisition  permit  in  sparsely  populated  areas,  if,  for 
example one of the following conditions applies. 

 

 

 

 

The buyer agrees to relinquish the agricultural property either to a natural person or to the state for nature 
conservation purposes. In such a case, the relinquished agricultural property must, in terms of production, 
roughly correspond to the property referred to in the acquisition. 
The property is intended for purposes other than agriculture and forestry. When doing this, it must be clear 
from the municipality’s (where the property is located) adopted land use plan or an equivalent planning 
document that the property may be used for the purpose stated in the application for an acquisition permit. 
The acquisition mainly concerns forest land and the buyer conducts industrial activities in the locality for 
which timber from the acquired property is needed. 
For other special reasons that do not counteract the purpose of the Land Acquisition Act. 

The regulations imply that natural persons can relatively easily get permission to acquire land in sparsely populated 
areas,  but  this  does  not  hold  for  legal  persons.  A  government  inquiry  from  2014  confirmed  that  the  current 
legislation  makes  it  difficult  for  those  who  run  an  agricultural  activity  as  a  legal  entity  to  acquire  agricultural 
property. This legislation is also expected to affect the establishment of new businesses in rural areas (Statens 
Offentliga Utredningar (SOU), 2014). A government inquiry from 2015 stressed that the current legislation has an 
inhibiting effect on the competitiveness of the agricultural sector because it complicates the acquisition, exchange, 
transfer and sale of agricultural property and, in addition, creates administrative burdens (SOU, 2015). 

In the rental market, a distinction is made between ‘farm leases’ (gårdsarrende) and ‘side leases’ (sidoarrende). If 
an agricultural lease (jordbruksarrende) includes housing for the tenant, the lease is considered a ‘farm lease’. It is 
not compulsory for the tenant to live in the house. A such, a tenant can enter several farm leases simultaneously. 
Only natural persons (both domestic and foreign) can enter a farm lease. Thus, a legal person (both domestic and 
foreign) cannot enter a farm lease. The reason for this is that a legal person is not considered to be able to have a 
residence. In farm leases, provisions to protect the tenant (besittningsskydd) are included. Farm lease contracts are 
signed for at least a 5-year period. 

Agricultural leases that are not farm leases are considered side leases. A legal person can enter only side leases. 
In most side leases, no residential building is included. For side  leases, there is no  requirement for a  minimum 
rental period. 

Regulations regarding agricultural land rental are  mainly intended to protect the tenant.  One of the main legal 
provisions to protect the tenant is the so-called besittningskydd. According to this provision, a tenant is entitled to 
an automatic extension of the lease unless the landowner has good reasons not to extend the lease, for example 
if the landowner’s partner or children intend to use the leased land. In side leases, provisions to protect the tenant 
(besittningsskydd) are not applicable when the contract covers a maximum period of 1 year. In the event that a 
contract  period  exceeds  1 year,  provisions  to  protect  the  tenant  are  included  (Sveriges Domstolar,  2020).  Land 
tenancy is inheritable. 

According to the Land Code (Jordabalk), rental agreements for agricultural land must, under all circumstances, be 
written  (chapter 8,  3§,  Jordabalk  1970:994).  This  means  that  rights  set  through  an  oral  agreement  are  not 
enforceable. The parties in a rental agreement must also agree upon a rental price. If there is no rental price, there 
is no official rental agreement. In such a case, neither party can invoke any rule of law in the Land Code (Jordabalk 
1970:994).  Even  though  rental  agreements  are  required  to  be  written,  figures  from  the  Swedish  Board  of 

65 

 
 
Agriculture (Jordbruksverket) show that 69 % of agricultural rental agreements were in writing in Sweden in 2018. 
This suggests that a significant share of rental contracts are oral, under which the rules and regulations (e.g. those 
protecting  the  tenant,  besittningskydd)  are  circumvented  or  contractual  arrangements  are  not  enforceable. 
According to the survey of the Swedish government agency SOU , carried out between 2011 and 2014, 25 % of 
respondents  with  oral  rental  contracts  indicated  that  they  have  chosen  this  alternative  because  it  is  less 
complicated than the written contract, and 40 % of the respondents indicated that the issue of drawing up a written 
contract was never discussed (SOU, 2014). 

Finally, there are also some procedures in place for property sales (including land) by government agencies. The 
government agency selling the property is required first to consult other government agencies to check whether it 
is deemed probable that they need the property. In the next step, the government agency is required to inform the 
municipality  (prior  notice)  in  which  the  property  is  located  before  selling  the  property,  to  check  whether  the 
municipality is interested in acquiring the property. If the municipality shows interest, it must provide reasons why 
it wants to acquire the property. In all circumstances, the sale must take place under the market terms. 

66 

 
 
 
Implications and cross-country comparisons of land 

6. 
market regulations 

Agricultural land market regulations can have important implications on land markets by altering the costs and 
benefits of land market participants in accessing, using and transacting agricultural land. On the one side, extensive 
agricultural land market regulations might increase transaction costs for land market participants, which can limit 
the reallocation of resources towards more efficient uses. On the other side, unregulated agricultural land markets 
might  have adverse implications for the farming sector and broader rural areas. We take a closer look at  such 
implications through the lens of this study’s results. To better visualise the land regulations in place across the MS 
studied, Table 7 and Figure 11 provide, for each country, a simple summation of the measures that are in place for 
all five groups of measures (based on the information provided in Tables A4.1–A4.4 in Annex 4). The next sections 
discuss the implications and cross-country comparisons of the land market regulations separately for each of the 
five groups of measures, as well as for all measures combined. 

6.1.  Measures to protect the tenant 

There are large differences across MS in the regulations that are implemented to protect tenants. This is linked to 
historical differences in how countries aimed to secure access to land for small farmers (Swinnen, 2002). Some 
countries stimulated owner-cultivation, while others enhanced the rental rights of tenants. In the latter countries, 
more regulations to protect tenants are in place. Table 7 and Figure 11 illustrate that a sizable number of measures 
to  protect  tenants  are  in  place  in  several  countries.  Figure 12  indicates  some  positive  correlation  between  the 
number  of  measures  in  place  to  protect  the  tenant  and  the  share  of  rented  land  in  the  studied  countries.  This 
positive  relationship  between  tenancy  protection  and  the  renting  of  land  could  reflect,  among  other  things,  a 
historical dependency of political power to protect the existing land use structures, tenancy protection regulations 
stimulating  higher  renting,  or  a  combination  of  both  these  factors.  Often  one  important  policy  objective  for 
introducing  tenancy  protection  is  to  stimulate  long-term  investment  in  agriculture  and  to  provide  more  secure 
access to land to  small and  medium-sized  farms, young  farmers and  credit-constrained farmers. However, the 
impact of the tenure protection may not always be straightforward and, in some cases, it could have unintended 
effects. For example, the highest number of measures are in place in Belgium, France, Spain, the Netherlands and 
Slovakia, respectively. However, extensive tenancy protection resulted in perverse effects (Swinnen, Van Herck and 
Vranken,  2016).  Land  rental  controls  and  regulations  regarding  contract  duration  enhanced  tenure  security. 
However, the regulations become so extensive that landlords were no longer willing to rent out their land. The sale 
prices of free land were considerably higher than the sale prices of land with a rental contract, and land sales prices 
increased much more than land rental prices, so that renting out land became less attractive (34). Moreover, young 
farmers were having difficulties accessing land through rental markets, as automatic renewal regulations caused 
that land to remain under the control of the sitting tenant, even if s/he aged and was farming the land extensively 
only (sometimes while simultaneously receiving a retirement pension). These developments have led to changes 
(i.e.  a  relaxation)  of  tenancy  regulations  in  some  countries.  For  example,  in  the  Netherlands,  the  principle  of 
liberalised tenancy contracts was introduced and is gaining popularity at the expense of the regulated contracts. 

In some countries that used to focus on self-ownership and have no to few measures to protect the tenant, land 
rental is becoming more important. For example, in Denmark there is no longer the requirement for the owner to 
run  the  property  himself  or  herself.  The  requirement  that  the  owner  must  live  on  the  property  has  also  been 

(34) 

For the development of land sales prices and land rental prices across time and MS, see Baldoni and Ciaian (2021). 

67 

 
 
                                                 
abolished. All this resulted in a considerable increase in the share of rented land, from 10 % in the mid 1960s to 
40 % by 2020. In Ireland, long(er)-term rental is stimulated through tax exemptions. 

Table 7: Summation of the number of measures per category and total score, 22 MS, around 2020 

Country 

Total (sum) to 
protect tenant 

Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Czechia 
Denmark 
Germany 
Estonia 
Ireland 
Spain 
France 
Croatia 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Hungary 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Poland 
Romania 
Slovenia 
Slovakia 
Finland 
Sweden 
Total 

5 
1.5 
0.5 
0 
0.875 
2 
0.125 
4 
5 
1 
1.125 
2 
1 
2 
3.75 
3.125 
1 
3 
2.5 
3.5 
0 
3 
46 

Total 
(sum) to 
protect 
farmland 
owner 
0 
1.5 
0 
0 
1 
1.5 
0 
1 
1.5 
5.5 
1 
1 
2 
6 
0 
2.5 
5.5 
3 
2 
0 
0 
0 
35 

Total (sum) 
to protect 
non-
farmland 
owner 
0 
0.5 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.125 
1.5 
0 
0.5 
1 
1 
0 
0.125 
0 
1 
0 
1.125 
1 
1 
10.88 

Source: Based on Tables A4.1–A4.4 in Annex 4. 

Total (sum) to 
prevent 
fragmentation 

Total (sum) of 
other measures 

Total 
score 

0 
2 
0.125 
0 
1 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0.5 
1 
0.5 
1 
1.25 
0 
0.5 
0 
1 
1 
2 
0 
0 
13.88 

0.25 
2.5 
2.875 
0.25 
1.25 
2 
0.25 
1.25 
1.5 
3 
1.375 
4.75 
4.125 
4 
1.5 
1.5 
6.25 
3.25 
3 
2 
1.25 
1.125 
49.25 

5.25 
8 
3.5 
1.25 
4.125 
5.5 
0.375 
8.25 
9.125 
11.5 
4.5 
8.75 
9.125 
14.25 
5.25 
7.75 
12.75 
11.25 
8.5 
8.625 
2.25 
5.125 
155 

68 

 
 
Figure 11. Total number of land market measures and their distribution  by category, 22 MS, around 
2020 

Total score and its distribution by category

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

Protect tenant

Protect farm landowner

Protect non-farm landowner

Prevent fragmentation

Other measures

Maximum 

Minimum 

Average 

Median 

Skewness 

Kurtosis 

14.25 

0.38 

7.05 

7.88 

0.05 

–0.51 

Source: Based on Tables A4.1–A4.4 in Annex 4. 

Figure 12. Correlation between the number of measures to protect the tenant and the share of land 
rented 

Correlation between the number of measures to protect the 
tenant and the share of land rented

)
e
r
o
c
s
(

t
n
a
n
e
t

t
c
e
t
o
r
p
o
t

s
e
r
u
s
a
e
M

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

R² = 0,1599

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Share of rented land (%)

Source: Measures to protect the tenant: based on Table A4.1 in Annex 4. The share of land rented: FADN for 2019. 

69 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2.  Measures to protect the farmland owner 

In some countries, owner-cultivation is strongly  encouraged  by the current regulations (e.g. in Hungary, Poland, 
Croatia and Romania; see Table 7 and Figure 11) aiming, among other things, to protect family farms; to protect 
local, small and young farmers; and to maintain farmland in agricultural use. Other countries might not have strict 
regulations such as maximum sales price or maximum transacted area, but transactions need to be approved by 
designated government bodies (e.g. in Germany, France and Austria ). Sales can be refused if, for example, the sale 
is  to  a  non-farmer, if  the  price  is unreasonably  high, if  the  sale  promotes the  formation  or expansion  of  large 
estates, if the land is not used for the intended purposes, to prevent undesirable farm structural change or to avoid 
fragmentation. Such approvals are mainly introduced to guarantee access to land for famers with small or medium-
sized farms. Caution is needed to ensure that the ability to refuse sales, just as prior authorisations, does not lead 
to  arbitrary  use  and  decisions  by  authorities,  and  it  should  be  ensured  that  it  does  not  lead  to  discriminatory 
conduct.  Moreover,  sales  refusal  or  prior  authorisation  of  sales  is  preferred  above  annulment  of  the  transfer 
afterwards, as the latter would undermine legal certainty (35) and result in insecure property rights. Pre-emptive 
rights granted to (neighbouring) farmers are relatively common in the studied countries. Such pre-emptive rights 
enhance access to landownership by farmers and discourage land sales to investors who have no interest in farming 
the land or who have no connection to the region. At the same time, caution is needed as pre-emptive rights to 
(neighbouring) farmers might reduce fragmentation, but increase  both ownership and use concentration among 
existing  farmers.  Nevertheless,  pre-emptive  rights  in  favour  of  farmers  could  be  considered  proportionate 
restrictions on the free movement of capital and are considered to be less restrictive than a prohibition of sales to 
non-farmers (36). The latter (prohibition of sales to non-farmers) might hold back inflow of capital in the agricultural 
sector (and  potential associated productivity  gains)  and  stimulate farmers to access land through  sales (rather 
than  through  renting).  This  might  put  certain  less  wealthy  and  more  credit-constrained  farmers  in  a 
disadvantageous position because their own financial resources would be needed for acquiring land, which leaves 
fewer  resources  for  productive  investments.  The  requirement  for  agricultural  experience  and  qualification  for 
buyers that is applied in some countries (e.g. in Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovenia) may facilitate the 
entry  to  the  sector  of  individuals  with  skills  that  can  stimulate  agricultural  productivity  improvement  and  the 
adoption of innovative farm practices; it may also promote a greater environmental awareness and adoption of 
environmentally  friendly  practices,  particularly  by  those  with  experience  and/or  education  in  ecology  and 
environmental fields. An adverse effect of a too narrow definition of experience and qualification could lead to 
reduced land access and prohibit entry into the sector of individuals from other fields (e.g.  those with technical 
experience)  whose  skills  could  be  particularly  desirable  to  promote  the  adoption  of  modern  technologies  (e.g. 
precision farming, robotics). 

6.3.  Measures to protect the non-farmland owner 

Measures  listed  in  this  category  include  regulations  on  minimum  rental  prices  and  maximum  rental  contract 
durations. These regulations could indeed favour the non-farmland owner who is guaranteed a minimum revenue 
(from  renting  the  land)  and  can  more  easily  allocate  the  land  to  a  more  beneficial  tenant.  At  the  same  time, 
maximum tenancy duration could result in that land becoming more mobile (and remaining for less time under the 
control of a sitting, sometimes ageing, tenant), which could then favour access to land by new or young farmers, 
or farmers wishing to expand their farm. 

In some countries where a lot of land is in state ownership or where a lot of land is still owned by ‘not identified’ 
owners (e.g. in Croatia, Hungary and Slovakia ), the measure regarding maximum tenancy duration ensures that 

(35) 
(36) 

Commission Interpretative Communication on the Acquisition of Farmland and EU Law (OJ 2017/C 350/05, 18.10/2017). 
Commission Interpretative Communication on the Acquisition of Farmland and EU Law (OJ 2017/C 350/05, 18.10/2017), 

70 

 
 
                                                 
land for rental purposes becomes more easily available for farmers other than the sitting tenant. Similarly, the 
minimum  rental  price  is  mainly  applied  to  state-owned  land  (e.g.  in  Croatia,  Latvia  and  Lithuania)  to  prevent 
underpriced lease of public assets to the private sector. 

6.4.  Measures to prevent fragmentation 

Land fragmentation is an issue of concern in many countries. Not surprisingly, many countries take measures to 
prevent fragmentation. In some countries, there are absolute size limits below which a plot cannot be divided (e.g. 
in Bulgaria, Spain and Slovakia). In others, there are no absolute measures, but the sale of a plot might be refused 
if  it  leads  to  unfavourable  plot  sizes  (e.g.  in  Austria).  While  regulations  to  prevent  fragmentation  are  often 
introduced from an efficiency perspective, they can lead to imperfections in property rights, which can result in 
suboptimal land allocations (both from an efficiency and equity point of view; see Vranken et al., 2011). 

In many countries, co-owners have pre-emptive rights. This does not only limit fragmentation, but can also ease 
access to land for heirs who take over a farm. In some countries, co-heirs have pre-emptive rights as well. 

6.5.  Other measures 

In half of the countries (Bulgaria,  Czechia, Estonia, Spain, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania,  Slovenia 
and Slovakia), there are specific procedures regarding the sale of state-owned land. Such measures will mainly 
have an impact on land exchanges if a large amount of land is still in state ownership or under the ownership of a 
government  body.  The  strict  procedures  regarding  the  sale  of  state-owned  land  are  often  introduced  with  the 
purpose to ensure a level playing field for all interested buyers (and to avoid some buyers taking advantage of 
their privileged position due to asymmetric information). At the same time, complex procedures might put certain 
buyers in an advantageous position (potential foreign buyers or those not farming or residing in the region might 
be at a disadvantage), which could result in less efficient outcomes (e.g. less inflow of capital, less transfer of risk 
to those who have a comparative advantage in risk management or less transfer of land to more efficient users). 

Pre-emptive rights vary widely between countries and seem to be an important tool to steer land transactions. In 
many countries, the state (or a governmental organisation) has pre-emptive rights (e.g. in Germany, France, Croatia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Finland). As a result, they can steer who gets access to 
land.  However,  it  seems  that  the  execution  of  these  pre-emptive  rights  differs  considerably  between  countries 
varying from exceptional (e.g. Finland) to more active use (e.g. France). 

Pre-emptive rights are also held by family relatives (e.g. in Czechia, Poland, Romania and Slovenia). This could have 
different purposes: landownership remains in local ownership and cultural ties with the land are preserved, but also 
access to land for local farmers can be facilitated. 

Pre-emptive rights are also  given to adjacent landowners or neighbouring landowners (e.g. in  Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Hungary and Poland). This could also serve different purposes: it could stimulate consolidation, but also ensure that 
land remains in local ownership. 

The publication of sale offers in a designated public place is required in several countries  (e.g. Latvia, Lithuania, 
Hungary, Austria, Romania and Slovenia), with the purpose of providing an opportunity to pre-emptors to exercise 
their rights, or to increase the transparency of the land market. On the one hand, this could increase land access 
for local farmers, particularly for those that have pre-emptive rights. On the other hand, external buyers may also 
benefit from greater transparency, particularly if it is more difficult for them than for local buyers to access local 
land market information. Sale offers must usually be published for a predefined minimum duration, which may 
generate some costs to buyers and sellers as it may delay the execution of the transaction and induce uncertainty 

71 

 
 
in certain buyers about the completion of the transaction (e.g. those without pre-emptive rights or pre-emptors 
with lower priority because a buyer with higher priority may exercise their right, implying that a transaction may 
not be certain to be completed even if initially pre-agreed with the seller) (Ciaian et al., 2017). 

Tax reliefs are often given if land is sold to family or when it is sold to keep it under active farming (e.g. Ireland, 
Spain and Finland). 

6.6.  Comparison between European Union Member States 

We  collected  information  about  24  different  measures  regulating  the  land  markets  in  22  EU  MS  (5 –  tenant 
protection, 8 – farmland owner protection, 2 – non-farmland owner protection, 2 – preventing fragmentation and 
7 – other measures). Hence, up to 24 measures could be in place in a single country. In reality (see Table 7 and 
Figure 11), the maximum implemented is 14.25 regulations. The median number of all measures regulating land 
markets in all 22 MS is 7.88, and the average is about 7 measures, out of the range of minimum 0 to maximum 
24  regulations.  Bulgaria  has  a  total  score  of  8  regulatory  measures  in  place  and  is  the  closest  to  the  median 
(Figure 11). 

Among the 11 countries with a relatively high number of regulations in place (to the left of the median in Figure 11), 
only 2 countries (France and Spain) are old MS and 9 are new MS. This pattern is reversed among the 11 countries 
with  a  relatively  low  number  of  measures  exercised  (to  the  right  of  median):  only  2  are  new  MS  (Estonia  and 
Czechia) and the remaining 9 are old MS. 

The  country  with  the  highest  number  of  regulations  is  Hungary  (14.25).  Poland,  Croatia  and  Romania  are  also 
characterised by a high number of measures regulating their land markets, as they have 12.75, 11.5 and 11.25 
regulations, respectively. France and Lithuania have about 9 measures in place. In all these countries, a multitude 
of measures are implemented, steering the land markets, but also potentially creating challenges for the agents 
(farmers, firms, others) operating in the markets. 

Three countries – Ireland, Denmark and Finland – have just a few regulations (0.375, 1.25 and 2.25, respectively). 
The land  markets in these countries  are  very liberal.  Seven other  countries exercise  fewer than  six  regulations, 
which is reasonably low: Estonia, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Italy, Germany and Czechia. 

The distribution of  the total number of land market  regulations in place in  the 22 EU  MS is characterised by a 
concentration of countries (13 out of 22) having their total number of regulations between 3.1 and 9 (Figure 13). 
The  distribution  is  left-skewed  with  the  peak  in  the  interval  of  3.1  to  6.  This  finding  is  consistent  with  similar 
distributions  for  the  main  groups  of  regulations  (tenant  protection,  farm  and  non-farmland  owner  protection, 
preventing land fragmentation and other measures) presented in Section 4 (Figures 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10). 

72 

 
 
Figure 13. Distribution of countries for the total number of measures regulating land markets, 22 MS, 
around 2020 

Table 7 and Figure 11 illustrate that countries vary in the ways in which they exercise their land market regulations. 
The picture of regulations identified for the 22 countries jointly does not closely resemble that across some of the 
countries or a group of the countries. In countries that have many regulations in place, such as Croatia, Hungary, 
Poland and Romania, measures that aim to protect the farmland owners are particularly widespread.  In France, 
land exchange is strongly regulated, but the regulations mainly focus on protecting the tenant. Bulgaria, Latvia and 
Lithuania also have a sizable number of regulations in place, but measures preventing fragmentation and other 
measures appear to have the largest share in the total score. Countries such as Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands, 
Austria  and  Slovakia  have  moderately  regulated  land  markets  while  regulations  that  protect  the  tenant  are 
omnipresent. In several new MS, such as Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and Romania, there are several 
land market regulations that were not considered in the classification by Swinnen, Van Herck and Vranken (2014a). 
These  countries  had,  for  several  years,  transitional  restrictions  on  the  acquisition  of  agricultural  real  estate 
(Swinnen and Vranken, 2009). These temporary measures have now been lifted (except for Croatia). Compared 
with land prices in the old MS, the prices in these countries are still relatively low (Baldoni and Ciaian, 2021; Eurostat, 
2018), which feeds the fear that land will be bought by investors who are not interested in farming the land and/or 
foreign farmers. As a result, new measures were introduced in these countries. Indeed, Figure 14 indicates some 
positive correlation between the number of regulations in place and the land price across countries. Regulations 
such as pre-emptive rights for local farmers, tenants, family relatives and the state or public bodies, alongside the 
maximum threshold imposed on a transacted or owned area, may, in some new MS, hold back land purchases by 
these non-local, non-farming investors. 

73 

3764200000.02.04.06.08.00-33.1-66.1-99.1-1212.1-1515.1-2417.1-1919.1-2121.1-24No. of CountriesTotal Score on All MeasuresDistribution of 22 Countries on Total Score on All Measures Regulating Land Markets 
 
 
Figure 14. Correlation between the number of all measures and the land prices 

Correlation between the number of all measures and land 
prices

e
r
o
c
s

l

a
t
o
T

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

R² = 0,114

0

10000

20000

30000

40000

50000

60000

70000

80000

Arable land price (Euro/ha)

NB: Germany and Austria are not included in the figure because land prices were not available for these two countries. 
Source: Measures to protect the tenant: based on Tables A4.1–A4.4 in Annex 4; arable land price (for 2019): Eurostat. 

Figures 15–17  confirm  that  a  variety  of  situations  are  in  place  in  the  22  MS  studied  in  this  report.  Figure 15 
complements Figure 11 by showing country scores for each main group of regulations (tenant protection, farmland 
owner protection, non-farmland owner protection, preventing land fragmentation and other measures). In Figure 15, 
countries are sorted in exactly the same way as in Figure 11 to make it easier to evaluate the variety of situations, 
that is in descending order of the total number of regulations for all measures in all 22 MS. The sorting makes it 
possible to more easily compare the results shown in the two figures. The pattern seen in Figure 11 for all measures 
seems not to correspond one to one to the patterns for the groups of measures in Figure 15. This means that the 
same countries have different numbers (proportions) of regulations in place in each main group of measures. The 
most correlated with the total score are the most numerous groups of measures, that is the tenant protection and 
other measures. 

74 

 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Country scores for land market regulations by group of measures, 22 MS, around 2020 

Figure 16 illustrates the percentage distribution of the total number of all measures in place in all 22 countries 
jointly, by main groups of measures. It shows that the two groups with the largest contributions are protection of 
the tenant (30 %) and other measures (32 %). The third biggest group relates to protection of the farmland owner 
(23 %). The remaining two groups of measures each have less than 10 % representation. 

Figure 17 illustrates the same percentage distribution in some selected countries (37). The eight country-specific 
charts included in Figure 17 are examples of how the same distribution looks in the eight countries with the most 
measures out of the 22 studied: Hungary, Poland, Croatia, Romania (each with between 7 % and 9 % share in the 
overall total number of measures for all 22 MS), France, Lithuania, Latvia and Slovakia (each with a 6 % share in 
the total number of measures in all MS). Notably, seven of the eight biggest contributors are new MS; France is the 
only old MS. 

(37) 

See also Annex 5. 

75 

0123456HungaryPolandCroatiaRomaniaFranceLithuaniaLatviaSlovakiaSloveniaSpainBulgariaAustriaEstoniaBelgiumNetherlandsSwedenItalyGermanyCzech RepublicFinlandDenmarkIrelandCountry scores on measures protecting tenant  
 
 
                                                 
The  greatest  shares  of  tenant  protection  measures  are  seen  in  France  (55 %)  and  Slovakia  (41 %),  both 
considerably  higher  than  the  30 %  share  of  tenant  protection  measures  for  all  22  MS  jointly  (Figure 16).  The 
greatest shares of farmland owner regulations are in Hungary (42 %), Poland (43 %) and Croatia (48 %), while this 
share for all 22 MS is only 23 %. Measures protecting the non-farmland owner are most prevalent in Croatia (13 %), 
France (12 %) and Slovakia (13 %); this value for all 22 MS jointly is only 7 %. Preventing land fragmentation is 
very strongly addressed in Slovakia (23 %, versus 9 % for all 22 MS). Finally, the greatest shares of other measures 
are  seen  for  Poland  (49 %),  Lithuania  (45 %)  and  Latvia  (54 %),  which  are  far  higher  than  the  share  of  other 
measures for all 22 MS jointly (32 %). This observation calls this group of measures to be inspected more in depth 
in order to learn more about the effects and importance of these ‘other’ regulations on and to the land markets. 

The country-specific figures are thus all different distributions, compared with the overall total for the 22 EU MS, 
except perhaps for Romania, which is rather similar to the total of the 22 EU MS. Moreover, the regulations exercised 
in the old MS more strongly address different groups of measures than the regulations exercised in the new MS. 
The examples of Belgium and the Netherlands in Figure 18 (each has a small 3 % share in the overall score for all 
22 MS) confirm that, in these two old MS, it is mainly regulations protecting the tenant that are in place, together 
with some other regulations. Not all old MS, however, follow this exact pattern; some old MS additionally prevent 
land fragmentation, and some protect the landowner-cultivator. The overall finding substantiates the conclusion 
that the group contributions of land market regulations exercised in the 22 countries vary by country and, to some 
extent, also by new and old MS; the contributions of individual measures might show even more variation. This calls 
for investigating the efficiency of the regulations in achieving the transition towards, and goals of, the Green Deal 
strategy of the EU in the MS. It would be useful to know which sets of regulations are more supportive and which 
are less supportive in achieving these goals. 

Figure 16. Distribution of the total score for all measures by groups of measures: all 22 MS 

76 

30%23%7%9%32%Shares of total scores for groups of land markets measures in the total score 22 MSProtect TenantProtect Farm Land-OwnerProtect Non Farm LandOwnerPrevent FramentationOther Measures 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Distribution of the total score for all measures, by groups of measures: the eight highest-
scoring countries 

77 

14%42%7%9%28%Shares of total scores for groups of land markets measures in the total score all measures: HUNGARYProtect TenantProtect Farm Land-OwnerProtect Non Farm LandOwnerPrevent FramentationOther Measures8%43%0%0%49%Shares of total scores for groups of land markets measures in the total score all measures: POLANDProtect TenantProtect Farm Land-OwnerProtect Non Farm LandOwnerPrevent FramentationOther Measures9%48%13%4%26%Shares of total scores for groups of land markets measures in the total score all measures: CROATIAProtect TenantProtect Farm Land-OwnerProtect Non Farm LandOwnerPrevent FramentationOther Measures27%27%9%9%29%Shares of total scores for groups of land markets measures in the total score all measures: ROMANIAProtect TenantProtect Farm Land-OwnerProtect Non Farm LandOwnerPrevent FramentationOther Measures 
 
 
Figure 18. Distribution of  the total score for all measures, by groups of measures:  Belgium and  the 
Netherlands 

78 

55%16%12%0%16%Shares of total scores for groups of land markets measures in the total score all measures: FRANCEProtect TenantProtect Farm Land-OwnerProtect Non Farm LandOwnerPrevent FramentationOther Measures11%22%11%11%45%Shares of total scores for groups of land markets measures in the total score all measures: LITHUANIAProtect TenantProtect Farm Land-OwnerProtect Non Farm LandOwnerPrevent FramentationOther Measures23%11%6%6%54%Shares of total scores for groups of land markets measures in the total score all measures: LatviaProtect TenantProtect Farm Land-OwnerProtect Non Farm LandOwnerPrevent FramentationOther Measures41%0%13%23%23%Shares of total scores for groups of land markets measures in the total score all measures: SlovakiaProtect TenantProtect Farm Land-OwnerProtect Non Farm LandOwnerPrevent FramentationOther Measures95%0%5%Shares of total scores for groups of land markets measures in the total score all measures: BelgiumProtect TenantProtect Farm Land-OwnerProtect Non Farm LandOwnerPrevent FramentationOther Measures71%0%29%Shares of total scores for groups of land markets measures in the total score all measures: NetherlandsProtect TenantProtect Farm Land-OwnerProtect Non Farm LandOwnerPrevent FramentationOther Measures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.  Conclusions 

The  objective  of  this  report  was  to  collect  data  and  information  on  agricultural  land  market  regulations 
implemented in different EU MS. The recent legislation adopted across the MS studied was the main foundation 
for carrying out this report, in order to update the analyses on agricultural land regulations done in the previous 
studies from 2014 and 2017 (Ciaian, Kancs and Espinosa, 2018; Swinnen, Van Herck and Vranken, 2014a). The 
report covers 22 MS and describes the situation of land market regulations as it was in 2020. 

The  analyses  of  the  report  are  based  on  input  from  agricultural  land  market  experts  and  the  latest  available 
documentation (e.g. MS legislation, official documents, academic literature), and take into consideration relevant 
theoretical and empirical developments  in the literature in the area of agricultural land market analysis, with a 
special focus on the EU. This report is the outcome of the JRC study entitled Agricultural land market regulations in 
the EU Member States, funded by the European Commission. It was carried out by a team made up of members 
from Wageningen Economic Research and the KU Leuven, and 22 country experts and associates. 

The  report  builds  upon  the  framework  developed  by  Swinnen,  Van  Herck  and  Vranken  (2014a)  to  provide  a 
comprehensive  and  structured  analyses  of  agricultural  land  market  regulations  in  the  MS  studied.  Overall,  the 
measures  in  place  in  MS  covered  are  grouped  into  five  categories  and  each  category  includes  several  specific 
measures detailing specific land market rules present in the included countries. More specifically, the following five 
categories of measures were considered in the report: 

  M1, measures to protect the tenant: minimum rental contract duration, maximum rental price, automatic 
rental contract renewal, conditions for rental contract termination, and tenants’ pre-emptive rights; 
  M2, measures to protect the farmland owner: restrictions on legal form of buyer, restrictions on nationality 
of buyer for legal entities and natural persons, restrictions on residence of buyer, restrictions on experience 
of  buyer,  maximum  sales  price,  pre-emptive  right  to  (neighbouring)  farmers  and  maximum 
transacted/owned area; 

  M3, measures to protect the non-farmland owner: minimum rental price and maximum duration of a rental 

contract; 

  M4, measures to prevent land fragmentation: lower plot size limit and regulations on pre-emptive buying 

rights of the co-owner; 

  M5, other measures targeting the agricultural land market: requirement to publish sale offers, procedures 
for sale of public land, share deal approvals, pre-emptive rights for state/public bodies, pre-emptive rights 
for family relatives,  moratorium on transferring ownership after acquisition and moratorium on  selling 
public land. 

The  first  four  groups  of  measures  are  similar  to  those  covered  previously  in  Swinnen,  Van  Herck  and  Vranken 
(2014a),  whereas  the  last  group,  ‘other  measures’,  includes  additional  measures  added  in  this  report.  Several 
measures from the last group can and should be interpreted together with other groups,  for example protecting 
the landowner-cultivator or preventing land fragmentation. 

Some of the agricultural land market measures considered in the report might be of particular interest, as they 
overlap  largely  with  the  measures  discussed  in  the  Commission’s  Communication, OJ 2017/C 350/05,  including 
prior administrative approval of land market transactions; requirements that an acquirer of agricultural land farms 
the land himself or herself, holds qualifications in farming and has been residing or doing business in the given 

79 

 
 
country, pre-emptive  rights  favouring tenants, neighbouring farmers or locals; and, finally, prohibiting selling to 
legal persons (38). 

The  abovementioned  measures  were  included  in  the  recent  amendments  to  the  legislation  in  Bulgaria,  Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia, and coincided with the end of the transitional periods during which the 
accession treaties allowed these countries to restrict EU investors from buying agricultural land in these countries. 
The new legislation filled a gap, which was no longer justified by EU law. In this context, the Commission expressed 
concerns that some of the new laws’ provisions infringe fundamental EU principles, such as the free movement of 
capital and non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality. In the Commission’s view, the new laws discriminate, 
through  their  practical  effects,  against  nationals  from  other  EU  countries  or  impose  other  disproportionate 
restrictions that could negatively affect investments (39). 

The matter is complex, however, as, under EU law, the definition and implementation of land market regulations 
by  EU  MS  can  take  into  account  multiple  agricultural  policy  objectives  that  justify  restrictions  on  fundamental 
freedoms. The objectives need to be clearly set out and the instruments proposed need to be proportionate to the 
objectives and not discriminatory (40). The assessment of proportionality and of the non-discriminatory character 
of land market regulations requires, thus, a good knowledge of the practical effects of the regulations in place and, 
owing to differences in interpretations of these effects, often involves interventions by a court of law, such as those 
provided in the recent past by the CJEU (41). 

Although we are not in the position to make any statements about whether or not any freedoms or rights of the 
EU were violated through the regulations concerned, our study shows that a number of regulations highlighted in 
the  Commission  Interpretative  Communication  OJ 2017/C 350/05  as  possibly  violating  the  free  movement  of 
capital and discriminating on the grounds of nationality are currently still in place in several countries. The overview 
of these measures and the countries that implement these measures can be found in Tables 2–6 of this report and 
can become a starting point for further exploration of the issue. 

This report focused on providing data and information on land market regulations currently exercised in the EU MS, 
and thus provided multiple outcomes in this area, including the following: 

  an overview of the number and type of agricultural land market regulations implemented in each of the 

22 MS studied (Section 4, Tables 2–6 and the related discussion); 

  a comparison of the number and type of the regulations in place across the 22 MS, thereby allowing an 
assessment of the character and, to some extent, the strength of the regulatory approaches applied in the 
22 countries (Section 6 and subsection 6.6); 

 

 

 

the possibility to compare the regulatory profiles across countries, with a particular focus on old and new 
MS (Section 6 and comparative part in subsection 6.6, as well as Annex 5); 

the possibility to make an initial assessment of the agricultural land market situations in the 22 countries 
studied, and compare the countries with each other; 

finally, country chapters on the agricultural land market regulations implemented by the 22 MS studied 
(Section 5). 

(38) 
(39) 
(40) 
(41) 

Commission Interpretative Communication on the Acquisition of Farmland and EU Law (OJ 2017/C 350/05, 18.10.2017, p. 9, par. ‘e’). 
Commission Interpretative Communication on the Acquisition of Farmland and EU Law (OJ 2017/C 350/05, 18.10.2017, p. 9, par. ‘e’). 
Commission Interpretative Communication on the Acquisition of Farmland and EU Law (OJ 2017/C 350/05, 18.10.2017, Sec. 5, p. 17). 
Commission Interpretative Communication on the Acquisition of Farmland and EU Law (OJ 2017/C 350/05, 18.10.2017, Sec. 4, p. 12–
17). 

80 

 
 
                                                 
The main conclusions of the report can be summarised as follows. 

Large  differences  in  agricultural  land  market  regulations  exist  between  countries.  Institutional,  economic  and 
political factors have had an impact on how farmers are accessing land (rental versus ownership-cultivation) and 
the regulations that are in place (Swinnen, 2002; Swinnen, Van Herck and Vranken, 2016). These historical factors 
have resulted in different land market developments so that there is no ‘one size fits all’ set of regulations that is 
optimal for all countries. While some countries have heavily regulated markets (e.g. Croatia, Hungary, Poland and 
Romania), other countries have a very liberal approach to land markets (e.g. Czechia, Denmark, Ireland and Finland). 

Some  countries,  such  as  Belgium,  France  and  the  Netherlands,  have  very  strict  tenancy  regulations.  In  these 
countries, many farmers access land through rental markets. However, regulations that are too extensive have had 
some perverse effects (Swinnen, Van Herck and Vranken, 2016); hence, countries with strict tenancy laws are, or 
have been, loosening these tenancy regulations. In Slovakia, quite a few tenancy regulations can also be found, but 
the power relations are quite different from those in Belgium, France and the Netherlands. Slovakian agriculture is 
characterised by large corporate organisations that are renting from numerous small, often absent, landowners. 
Regulations protecting the tenant might, in such circumstances, favour (or consolidate) large-scale farms. In some 
countries that used to focus on ownership-cultivation (e.g. Denmark), tenancy is getting more important and longer-
term leases are being encouraged, while obligations for owners to run the property themselves or to live on the 
property are being abolished. It is recognised that land rental can have important benefits for the development of 
the agricultural sector; rental markets allow cheaper access to land to expanding farms and young farmers, and 
they lock in fewer resources in land, which leaves more liquidity for productive investments that are particularly 
important for the adoption of modern technologies. Tax exemptions are sometimes introduced to steer transactions, 
for example to stimulate long-term leases or to ensure that land remains under active farming. Hence, not only 
land regulations but also surrounding (fiscal) policies have an impact on land exchanges. 

Countries with  heavily  regulated  land  markets  can  mainly  be  found  among  the  new  MS  (with  the  exception  of 
Czechia). In Croatia, Hungary, Poland and Romania, many regulations exist to protect the farmland owner. In Croatia, 
some  (temporary)  restrictions  regarding  land  acquisition  by  foreign  owners  are  in  place.  These  temporary 
restrictions have been lifted in other new MS, but there are other regulations in place that favour ownership by 
farmers, particularly those with small and medium-scale farms. For example, in Hungary and Poland, legal entities 
cannot own land. In Hungary, there is a restriction on the size of the transacted area. Not only in Croatia, Hungary, 
Poland  and  Romania,  but  also  in  Slovenia,  the  acquisition  of  land  is  subject  to  the  condition  of  agricultural 
experience by the acquirer, which, on the one hand, may stimulate improvement in agricultural productivity and 
environmental performance, but, on the other hand, may also restrict entry into the sector of individuals with other 
skills  relevant  for  rural  development  (e.g.  technical  experience),  whose  skills  could  be  particularly  desirable  to 
promote the adoption of modern technologies (e.g. precision farming, robotics). However, such a requirement is not 
per se needed to ensure that land remains in agriculture or is properly farmed or to promote rural development. 
Alternatively, non-farmers could be allowed to buy land on the condition that it is kept in agricultural use or on the 
condition that it is farmed properly (either by himself or herself or by a tenant). Pre-emptive rights are given to 
neighbouring farmers in several new MS (e.g. Bulgaria, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania and Slovenia) and in some old 
MS (e.g. Italy and Austria), or are given to adjacent landowners (e.g. Estonia and Spain). In some countries, residence 
requirements have been introduced (e.g. in Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland and Romania). Such regulations protect the 
farmland owner, but also discourage sales to investors who are not active in agriculture or to non-locals. At the 
same  time,  pre-emptive  rights  for  neighbouring  farmers  might  stimulate  concentration  of  land  among  existing 
farmers, particularly those with large farms, as they might have more resources at their disposal to access land 
through sales. 

In many new MS, one can find regulations categorised under ‘other measures’; these were not included in the study 
by Swinnen, Van Herck and Vranken (2014a). The ‘other measures’ category typically includes regulations that were 

81 

 
 
introduced  to  limit  excessive  concentration  or  limit  speculation  by  investors  not  actively  involved  in  agriculture 
and/or foreign investors. It includes requirements regarding the publication of sales offers and  the sale of state 
land. Both could increase transparency, but can also make the sales process more complex and (dis)advantage 
certain groups. Pre-emptive rights are an important tool to steer the land market. In some countries, they are given 
to  tenants  and  neighbouring  farmers,  which  can  protect  tenants  and  stimulate  ownership-cultivation.  In  other 
countries, they are given to adjacent landowners, which can reduce landownership fragmentation and stimulate 
land  consolidation.  However,  depending  on  the  local  landownership  structure,  pre-emptive  rights  for  adjacent 
landowners  might  also  favour  land  consolidation  among  more  wealthy,  less  capital-constrained  farmers. 
Consolidation in land use through rental might, in such circumstances, be a preferential way to realise efficiency 
gains without favouring more capital-endowed farms. Pre-emptive rights for adjacent landowners can also ensure 
that land remains in local ownership and that there is a local connection with the commune. If pre-emptive rights 
are given to family members, land remains in local ownership and cultural ties with the land are preserved, while 
sales to non-local acquirers are discouraged. Furthermore, regulations such as pre-emptive rights for the state or 
public bodies may hold back land purchases by non-local, non-farming investors and can be an important way to 
intervene in the land market. 

Regulations on minimum rental prices and maximum rental contract duration can protect non-farm owners and 
can be found in old and new MS. However, in new MS, these regulations pertain mostly to the rental of state land. 
If large amounts of land are still publicly owned, procedures for sales and rental of public land can be an important 
tool to intervene in the market. This can occur, for example, by setting a maximum duration or a minimum rental 
price for rental of state land so that land does not remain locked among sitting tenants (which are sometimes large 
corporations  with  a  dominant,  advantageous  position  at  the  time  the  rental  contracts  were  agreed).  In  such 
circumstances, the regulations rather favour new entrants (e.g. young farmers) or those looking to expand their 
farms. Land fragmentation is an issue in many countries. Not surprisingly, many countries take measures to prevent 
fragmentation. If co-owners have pre-emptive rights, than this not only limits fragmentation, but can also ease 
access to land for heirs who take over the farm. However, caution is needed. If measures, such as restrictions on 
minimum plot size, lead to imperfect property rights, then the overall effect might be less positive (Vranken et al., 
2004). 

Future research should focus on collecting information for MS that have not been included in this study (i.e. Greece, 
Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta and Portugal). It is also necessary to fill in the gaps in the existing knowledge. While 
the analyses of this report have some implications for the new CAP and the Green Deal strategy of the EU (e.g. for 
land restructuring, whether regulations facilitate young farmers’ entry to the sector, land succession, or promoting 
investments),  further  research  is  needed  to  better  understand  the  efficiency  of  the  land  market  regulations  in 
achieving the goals of the new CAP and the Green Deal. In this context, knowing which sets of regulations are more 
and which are less supportive to achieving these goals could be one of the priorities. 

Second, our assessment of the practice of implementation of the land market regulations in the EU is limited. In 
this  study  we  based  it  on  interviews  with  country  experts,  but  a  broader,  systematic  approach  would  be  more 
reliable  and  much  more  informative.  This  could  entail  a  topical  survey  among  participants  of  land  market 
transactions  represented  by  farmers  themselves,  especially  young  farmers;  farmers’  organisations;  agriculture 
sections of chambers of commerce; and other organisations and individuals involved in the transactions and in the 
process of implementation. 

Furthermore, improvements in the methodology could be addressed. One should take into consideration that the 
authors used their own judgement to construct the numerical scales presented in Tables A4.1–A4.4 based on the 
interviews and survey. Hence, when using these scales to construct a land regulation index, a triangulation with 
other experts might be useful. Next, to build a comprehensive land regulation index, one should go further than a 

82 

 
 
mere  augmentation  of  the  measures  considered  in  this  study.  Additional  measures  and  different  aggregation 
procedures could be considered (e.g. using different weighting factors). Finally, when constructing such an index, 
one could incorporate the level of how strictly the regulations are enforced. This could be captured by the weighting 
factors  based  on  additional  information  not  available  at  present,  or  through  a  kind  of  enforcement  or 
implementation assessment that feeds into the index. 

83 

 
 
 
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88 

 
 
 
Annex 1: Country expert questionnaire 

Country questionnaire for the study on 
‘Agricultural land market regulations in the EU Member States’ 

Dear expert, 

Thank you very much for taking the time to fill in the questionnaire below. 

It is a lengthy questionnaire in which we prompt you to specify agricultural land market restrictions, and in which 
we explicitly ask for restrictions according to owner, buyer or seller. It is unlikely that all restrictions apply in every 
country  and  often  the  restrictions  do  not  differ  according  to  the  type  of  owner,  seller or  buyer.  Therefore,  rest 
assured, you probably will not have to answer all sections or questions. Appropriate ‘skip’ and ‘go to’ instructions 
are included to ensure a smooth response flow. 

If any relevant information is not asked in the questionnaire, please do not hesitate to insert this information at 
any point. Such insertions are also welcomed if you feel that the predefined responses are not appropriate or too 
restrictive for the country or a part of it, or if the predefined answers do not allow for sufficient nuance. We often 
provide the response option ‘Other’, which is to be used for any additional and/or more detailed information. The 
option ‘Other’ can also be chosen if restrictions only sometimes hold. You can then further specify under which 
circumstances they do hold. 

In the Land Ownership modules, we explicitly provide the option to indicate whether there is a difference between 
farmers (farming legal entities) and non-farmers (non-farming legal entities). This option was not provided in the 
other modules. However, if there is also a difference between farmers and non-farmers when it comes to land 
sales  or  rental  transactions  or  restrictions,  then  please  always  specify  this  accordingly  in  the  concerned 
question/answer. 

The questionnaire enquires after general restrictions. If there are exceptions for certain regions that have more 
autonomy (e.g. South Tirol in Italy or Baden-Württemberg in Germany), please indicate this in the concerned 
question and add examples of regions for which the restrictions deviate. 

89 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Glossary 

The terms ‘land’ and ‘agricultural land’ are used interchangeably. They both relate to agricultural land. 

The term ‘foreign legal person’ refers to a legal entity that does not have its headquarters in the country or a legal 
entity of which the majority of the shares are owned by non-citizens of the country. 

The term ‘domestic legal person’ refers to a legal entity that has its headquarters in the country or a legal entity 
of which the majority of the shares are owned by citizens of the country. 

The term ‘land register’ refers to the office where information relating to real estate is registered and becomes 
public. 

The term ‘land cadaster’ refers to an institution with a main role to conduct land surveys (land mapping) and to 
provide cadastral data and legal information relating to real estate. 

If the land register and cadaster are integrated in your country, please mention this under Q145 and Q147. 

90 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country: 

Country expert(s): 

Date: 

… 

… 

… 

Please give the precise reference to the legislation(s) that stipulate(s) land market regulations: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 

Land ownership by domestic natural person 

1. 

Is there a restriction on the amount of land that can be owned by a domestic natural person? 

☐ No 
(go to q12) 

☐ Other 

☐Don’t know 
(go to q12) 

☐ Yes, for both farmers 
and non-farmers 
☐ Yes, but only for non-
farmers 
☐ Yes, but only for 
farmers 

2. 

If ‘Yes’ or ‘Other’, please describe the restriction (and, if applicable, how it differs between farmers and 
non-farmers): 
… 

3.  Does the amount of agricultural land that a domestic natural person is allowed to own depend on the 

quality of the land? 
☐ Yes for both farmers 
and non-farmers 
☐ Yes, but only for non-
farmers 
☐ Yes, but only for 
farmers 

☐ No 
(go to q5) 

☐ Other 

☐Don’t know 
(go to q5) 

4. 

If ‘Yes’ or ‘Other’, please describe, for each quality class, the amount of land that can be owned by a 
domestic natural person (and, if applicable, how it differs between farmers and non-farmers). 
– Quality 1: 
– Quality 2: 
… 
– Quality n: 

… 
… 

… 

5.  Does the amount of agricultural land that a domestic natural person is allowed to own depend on the 

destination (arable/pasture/…) of the land? 

☐ No 
(go to q9) 

☐ Other 

☐ Don’t know 
(go to q9) 

☐ Yes for both farmers 
and non-farmers 
☐ Yes, but only for non-
farmers 
☐ Yes, but only for 
farmers 

6.  What is the maximum amount of arable land that can be owned by a domestic natural person? If the 

maximum amount differs for farmers and non-farmers, please describe. 
… 

91 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.  What is the maximum amount of grassland/pasture that can be owned by a domestic natural person? If 

the maximum amount differs for farmers and non-farmers, please describe. 

… 

8.  Are there maximum restrictions on ownership by domestic natural persons for other agricultural land 

categories? If the maximum amount differs for farmers and non-farmers, please describe. 

☐ Yes  Please specify the maximum amount for each land category: 
… 
… 

– Category 1: 
– Category 2: 
… 
– Category n: 

… 

☐ No 
☐ Don’t know 

9.  Does the amount of land that a domestic natural person is allowed to own depend on the region where 

the land is located? (e.g. proximity to national borders, cities) 
☐ No 
(go to q11) 

☐ Other 

☐ Yes for both farmers 
and non-farmers 
☐ Yes, but only for non-
farmers 
☐ Yes, but only for 
farmers 

☐ Don’t know 
(go to q11) 

10.  If ‘Yes’ or ‘Other’, please describe for each region the amount of land that can be owned by a domestic 

natural person (and, if applicable, how it differs between farmers and non-farmers). 
– Region X: 
– Region Y: 
… 
– Region Z: 

… 
… 

… 

11.  If ‘No’, what amount of land can be owned by a domestic natural person (irrespective of the quality, 

destination, location)? 

… 

12.  Does a central, regional or local government (body) need to approve agricultural land ownership by a 

domestic natural person? 

☐ Yes for both farmers 
and non-farmers 
☐ Yes, but only for non-
farmers 
☐ Yes, but only for 
farmers 

☐ No 
(go to q14) 

☐ Other 

☐ Don’t know 
(go to q14) 

13.  If ‘Yes’ or ‘Other’, specify the approval procedure and rules to get approval (and, if applicable, how it 

differs between farmers and non-farmers). 
… 

92 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Land ownership by foreign natural person 

14.  Is there a restriction on the amount of land that can be owned by a foreign natural? 
☐ Other 

☐ No 
(go to q26) 

☐ Don’t know (go 
to q26) 

☐ Yes, restrictions 
apply to all EU and 
non-EU citizens 
☐ Yes, restrictions 
apply but only to 
non-farming EU 
and non-EU 
citizens 
☐ Yes, restrictions 
apply but only to 
farming EU and 
non-EU citizens 

☐ Yes, 
restrictions apply 
but only to all 
non-EU citizens 
☐ Yes, 
restrictions apply 
but only to non-
farming non-EU 
citizens 
☐ Yes, 
restrictions apply 
but only to 
farming non-EU 
citizens 

☐ Yes, 
restrictions 
apply but only 
to all EU 
citizens 
☐ Yes, 
restrictions 
apply but only 
to non-
farming EU 
citizens 
☐ Yes, 
restrictions 
apply but only 
to farming EU 
citizens 

15.  Do foreign natural EU citizens face restrictions other than those faced by domestic natural persons? 
☐ Don’t know 

☐ Other 

☐ Yes 

☐ No 

16.  Do foreign natural NON-EU citizens face restrictions other than those faced by domestic natural 

persons? 

☐ Yes 

☐ No 

☐ Other 

☐ Don’t know 

If you answered ‘No’ to both q15 and q16, then go to q26. 

17.  Does the amount of agricultural land that a foreign natural person is allowed to own depend on the 

quality of the land? 
☐ Yes, for all foreign 
EU and non-EU 
citizens 
☐ Yes, but only for 
foreign non-farming 
EU and non-EU 
citizens 
☐ Yes, but only for 
foreign farming EU 
and non-EU citizens 

☐ Yes, only for 
foreign EU citizens 
☐ Yes, but only for 
foreign non-
farming EU citizens 
☐ Yes, but only for 
foreign farming EU 
citizens 

☐ Yes, only for 
foreign non-EU 
citizens 
☐ Yes, but only for 
foreign non-farming 
non-EU citizens 
☐ Yes, but only for 
foreign farming 
non-EU citizens 

☐ No 
(go to q19) 

☐ Don’t know 

18.  If ‘Yes’ or ‘Other’, please describe, for each quality class, the amount of land that can be owned by a 
foreign natural person and, if applicable, how this differs with (non-)EU citizenship, and how it differs 
between farmers and non-farmers. 
… 
– Quality 1: 
– Quality 2: 
… 
… 
– Quality n: 

… 

93 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19.  Does the amount of agricultural land that a foreign natural person is allowed to own depend on the 

destination (arable/pasture/forest/…) of the land?  

☐ No 
(go to q23) 

☐ Don’t know 

☐ Yes, for foreign 
EU and non-EU 
citizens 
☐ Yes, but only for 
foreign non-farming 
EU and non-EU 
citizens 
☐ Yes, but only for 
foreign farming EU 
and non-EU citizens 

☐ Yes, only for 
foreign EU citizens 
☐ Yes, but only for 
foreign non-farming 
EU citizens 
☐ Yes, but only for 
foreign farming EU 
citizens 

☐ Yes, only for non-
EU citizens 
☐ Yes, but only for 
foreign non-farming 
non-EU citizens 
☐ Yes, but only for 
foreign farming non-
EU citizens 

20.  What is the maximum amount of arable land that can be owned by a foreign natural person? If there is 
a difference between EU and non-EU citizens and/or between farmers and non-farmers, please specify. 
… 

21.  What is the maximum amount of grassland/pasture that can be owned by a foreign natural person? If 

there is a difference between EU and non-EU citizens and/or between farmers and non-farmers, please 
specify. 
… 

22.  Are there maximum restrictions on the amount of land that can be owned by a foreign natural person 
for other land categories? If there is a difference between EU and non-EU citizens and/or between 
farmers and non-farmers, please specify. 

☐ Yes  Please specify the maximum amount for each land category: 

EU citizens   
– Category 1: 
– Category 2: 
… 
– Category n: 

… 
… 

… 

Non-EU citizens 

… 
… 

… 

☐ No 
☐ Don’t know 

23.  Does the amount of land that a foreign natural person is allowed to own depend on the region where the 

land is located? (e.g. proximity to national borders, cities) 
☐ Yes, only for 
foreign EU citizens 
☐ Yes, but only for 
foreign non-
farming EU citizens 
☐ Yes, but only for 
foreign farming EU 
citizens 

☐ Yes, only for 
foreign non-EU 
citizens 
☐ Yes, but only for 
foreign non-farming 
non-EU citizens 
☐ Yes, but only for 
foreign farming 
non-EU citizens 

☐ Yes, for foreign 
EU and non-EU 
citizens 
☐ Yes, but only for 
foreign non-farming 
EU and non-EU 
citizens 
☐ Yes, but only for 
foreign farming EU 
and non-EU citizens 

☐ No 
(go to q25) 

☐ Don’t know 

94 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24.  If ‘Yes’ or ‘Other’, please describe for each region the amount of land that can be owned by a foreign 

natural person and, if applicable, how this differs with (non-)EU citizenship, and how it differs between 
farmers and non-farmers. 
– Region X: 
– Region Y: 
… 
– Region Z: 

… 
… 

… 

25.  If ‘No’, what amount of land can be owned by a foreign natural person (irrespective of the quality, 

destination, location)? 
… 

26.  Does a central, regional or local government (body) need to approve agricultural land ownership by a 

foreign natural person? 

☐ Yes, for foreign 
EU and non-EU 
citizens 
☐ Yes, but only for 
foreign non-farming 
EU and non-EU 
citizens 
☐ Yes, but only for 
foreign farming EU 
and non-EU citizens 

☐ Yes, only for 
foreign EU citizens 
☐ Yes, but only for 
foreign non-
farming EU citizens 
☐ Yes, but only for 
foreign farming EU 
citizens 

☐ Yes, only for 
foreign non-EU 
citizens 
☐ Yes, but only for 
foreign non-farming 
non-EU citizens 
☐ Yes, but only for 
foreign farming 
non-EU citizens 

☐ No 
(go to q28) 

☐ Don’t know 

27.  If ‘Yes’, specify the approval procedure and rules to get approval. If there is a difference between EU and 

non-EU citizens and/or between farmers and non-farmers, please specify. 
… 

Land ownership by domestic legal person 

28.  Is there a restriction on the amount of land that can be owned by a domestic legal person? 

☐ No (go to q39) 

☐ Other 

☐ Don’t know 

☐ Yes, for both farming 
and non-farming legal 
entities 
☐ Yes, but only for non-
farming legal entities 
☐ Yes, but only for 
farming legal entities 

29.  If ‘Yes’, do domestic legal persons face restrictions other than those faced by domestic natural persons? 

☐ Yes  

☐ No (go to q39) 

☐ Other 

☐Don’t know 

30.  Does the amount of agricultural land that a domestic legal person is allowed to own depend on the 

☐ No (go to q32) 

☐ Other 

☐ Don’t know 

quality of the land? 
☐ Yes, for both farming 
and non-farming legal 
entities 
☐ Yes, but only for non-
farming legal entities 
☐ Yes, but only for 
farming legal entities 

95 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31.  If ‘Yes’ or ‘Other’, please describe, for each quality class, the amount of land that can be owned by a 

domestic legal person (and, if applicable, how it differs between farmers and non-farmers). 
… 

32.  Does the amount of agricultural land that a domestic legal person is allowed to own depend on the 

destination (arable/pasture/forest/…) of the land? 

☐ No (go to q36) 

☐ Other 

☐ Don’t know 

☐ Yes, for both farming 
and non-farming legal 
entities 
☐ Yes, but only for non-
farming legal entities 
☐ Yes, but only for 
farming legal entities 

33.  What is the maximum amount of arable land that can be owned by a domestic legal person? If there is a 

difference between farming and non-farming legal entities, please specify. 
… 

34.  What is the maximum amount of grassland/pasture that can be owned by a domestic legal person? If 

there is a difference between farming and non-farming legal entities, please specify. 
… 

35.  Are there maximum restrictions on the amount that can be owned by a domestic legal person for other 

land categories? 

☐ Yes 
Please specify the maximum amount for each other category: … 

– Category 1: 
– Category 2: 
… 
– Category n: 

… 
… 

☐ No 

☐ Don’t know 

36.  Does the amount of land that a domestic legal person is allowed to own depend on the region where the 

land is located? (e.g. proximity to national borders, cities) 

☐ No (go to q38) 

☐ Other 

☐ Don’t know 

☐ Yes, for both farming 
and non-farming legal 
entities 
☐ Yes, but only for non-
farming legal entities 
☐ Yes, but only for 
farming legal entities  

37.  If ‘Yes’ or ‘Other’, please describe, for each region, the amount of land that can be owned by a domestic 

legal person (and, if applicable, how it differs between farming and non-farming legal entities). 
… 

38.  If ‘No’, what amount can be owned by a domestic legal person (irrespective of the quality, destination, 

location)? 
… 

39.  Does a central, regional or local government (body) need to approve agricultural land ownership by a 

☐ No (go to q41) 

☐ Other 

☐ Don’t know 

domestic legal person? 

☐ Yes, for both farming 
and non-farming legal 
entities 
☐ Yes, but only for non-
farming legal entities 
☐ Yes, but only for 
farming legal entities 

96 

 
 
 
 
 
40.  If ‘Yes’, specify the approval procedure and rules to get approval (and, if applicable, how it differs 

between farming and non-farming legal entities). 
… 

Land ownership by foreign legal person 

41.  Is there a restriction on the amount of land that can be owned by a foreign legal person? 

☐ Yes, for all EU and 
non-EU legal entities 
☐ Yes, but only for 
non-farming EU and 
non-EU legal entities 
☐ Yes, but only for 
farming EU and non-
EU legal entities 

☐ Yes, only for EU 
legal entities 
☐ Yes, but only for 
non-farming EU 
legal entities 
☐ Yes, but only for 
farming EU legal 
entities 

☐ Yes, only for non-
EU legal entities 
☐ Yes, but only for 
non-farming non-EU 
legal entities 
☐ Yes, but only for 
farming non-EU 
legal entities 

☐ No (go to q53) 

☐ Don’t know (go to 
q53) 

42.  Do foreign, but EU, legal persons face restrictions other than those faced by domestic legal persons? 

☐ Yes 

☐ No 

☐ Other 

☐ Don’t know 

43.  If ‘Yes’, do foreign NON-EU legal persons face restrictions other than those faced by domestic legal 

persons? 

☐ Yes 

☐ No 

☐ Other 

☐ Don’t know 

If you answered no on both q42 and q43, go to q53 

44.  Does the amount of agricultural land that a foreign legal person is allowed to own depend on the quality 

of the land? 

☐ No (go to q46) 

☐ Yes, for all foreign 
EU and non-EU legal 
entities 
☐ Yes, but only for 
non-farming EU and 
non-EU legal entities 
☐ Yes, but only for 
farming EU and non-
EU legal entities 

☐ Yes, only for 
foreign non-EU 
legal entities 
☐ Yes, but only for 
non-farming non-EU 
legal entities 
☐ Yes, but only for 
farming non-EU 
legal entities 
45.  If ‘Yes’, please describe, for each quality class, the amount of land that can be owned by a foreign legal 

☐ Yes, only for 
foreign EU legal 
entities 
☐ Yes, but only for 
non-farming EU 
legal entities 
☐ Yes, but only for 
farming EU legal 
entities 

☐ Don’t know 

person. If there is a difference between EU and non-EU legal persons and/or farming and non-farming 
legal entities, please specify. 
… 

46.  Does the amount of agricultural land that a foreign legal person is allowed to own depend on the 

destination (arable/pasture/forest/…) of the land? 

☐ No (go to q50) 

☐ Don’t know 

☐ Yes, for foreign 
EU and non-EU legal 
entities 
☐ Yes, but only for 
non-farming EU and 
non-EU legal entities 
☐ Yes, but only for 
farming EU and non-
EU legal entities 

☐ Yes, only for 
foreign EU legal 
entities 
☐ Yes, but only for 
non-farming EU 
and non-EU legal 
entities 
☐ Yes, but only for 
farming EU and 
non-EU legal 
entities 

☐ Yes, only for 
foreign non-EU 
legal entities 
☐ Yes, but only for 
non-farming non-EU 
legal entities 
☐ Yes, but only for 
farming non-EU 
legal entities 

97 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47.  What is the maximum amount of arable land that can be owned by a foreign legal person? If there is a 
difference between EU and non-EU legal persons and/or farming and non-farming legal entities, please 
specify. 
… 

48.  What is the maximum amount of grassland/pasture that can be owned by a foreign legal person? If 

there is a difference between EU and non-EU legal persons and/or farming and non-farming legal 
entities, please specify. 
… 

49.  Are there maximum restrictions on the amount that can be owned by a foreign legal person for other 

land categories? 

☐ Yes 
Please specify the maximum amount for each other category and whether there are differences for EU and 
non-EU legal persons (entities) and/or farming and non-farming legal entities 
☐ No 

☐ Don’t know 

50.  Does the amount of land that a foreign legal person is allowed to own depend on the region where the 

land is located? (e.g. proximity to national borders, cities) 
☐ Yes, only for 
foreign EU legal 
entities 
☐ Yes, but only for 
non-farming EU 
legal entities 
☐ Yes, but only for 
farming EU legal 
entities 

☐ Yes, for all foreign 
EU and non-EU legal 
entities 
☐ Yes, but only for 
non-farming EU and 
non-EU legal entities 
☐ Yes, but only for 
farming EU and non-
EU legal entities 

☐ Yes, only for 
foreign non-EU 
legal entities 
☐ Yes, but only for 
non-farming non-EU 
legal entities 
☐ Yes, but only for 
farming non-EU 
legal entities 

☐ No (go to q52) 

☐ Don’t know 

51.  If ‘Yes’, please describe, for each region, the amount of land that can be owned by a foreign legal 

person. If there is a difference between EU and non-EU legal persons and/or farming and non-farming 
legal entities, please specify. 

– Region X: 
– Region Y: 
… 
– Region Z: 

… 

… 
… 

… 

52.  If ‘No’, what amount can be owned by a foreign legal person (irrespective of the quality, destination, 

location)? 
… 

53.  Does a central, regional or local government (body) need to approve agricultural land ownership by a 

foreign legal person? 

☐ Yes, for all EU and 
non-EU legal entities 
☐ Yes, but only for 
non-farming EU and 
non-EU legal entities 
☐ Yes, but only for 
farming EU and non-
EU legal entities 

☐ Yes, only for EU 
legal entities 
☐ Yes, but only for 
non-farming EU 
legal entities 
☐ Yes, but only for 
farming EU legal 
entities 

☐ Yes, only for non-
EU legal entities 
☐ Yes, but only for 
non-farming non-EU 
legal entities 
☐ Yes, but only for 
farming non-EU 
legal entities 

☐ No (go to q55) 

☐ Don’t know 

54.  If ‘Yes’, specify the approval procedure and rules to get approval. If there is a difference between EU and 

non-EU legal persons and/or farming and non-farming legal entities, please specify. 

98 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Land usage tax 

55.  Do land usage taxes (real estate tax) have to be paid? 

☐ Yes 

☐ No (go to q58) 

☐ Don’t know 

56.  Do land usage taxes have to be paid? 

☐Yes. The magnitude on a yearly basis is: 
__________ euro per ha/year 

__________ local currency per ha/year (local currency = …………) 
__________ % of the land value. Please specify how the land value is determined: 

OR 
OR 
… 

☐ Don’t know 

57.  If the agricultural land is rented, who is responsible for paying the land usage tax? 

☐ Owner 

☐ Tenant 

☐ Don’t know 

Land sales transactions – prices, taxes 

58.  Is there a minimum land sales price? 

☐ Yes 

☐ No 
(go to q60) 

☐ Other 

☐ Don’t know 
(go to q60) 

59.  If ‘Yes’ or ‘Other’, please specify the minimum land sales price and the currency, and indicate for which 
year the minimum sales price is given, as well as by which authority and by what method the minimum 
sales price is determined: 
Price 
Currency  
… 
If the minimum price is determined relative to a prevailing price (e.g. a reasonable price, average market 
price), then please describe how the minimum price is set; e.g., XX % of the average market price which 
is determined by …. 

Authority 
… 

Method 

Year 

… 

… 

… 

60.  Is there a maximum sales price? 

☐ Yes 

☐ No 
(go to q62) 

☐ Other 

☐ Don’t know 
(go to q62) 

61.  If ‘Yes’ or ‘Other’, please specify the maximum land sales price and the currency, and indicate for which 
year the maximum sales price is given, as well as by which authority and by what method the maximum 
sales price is determined: 
If the maximum price is determined relative to a prevailing price (e.g. a reasonable price, average market 
price), then please describe how the maximum price is set, e.g. XX % of the average market price which 
is determined by …. 
Price 
… 

Authority 
… 

Currency  

Method 

Year 

… 

… 

… 

62.  Does part of the land sales payment occur ‘under the table’? 

☐ Yes 

☐ No 
(go to q65) 

☐ Other 

☐ Don’t know 
(go to q63) 

63.  If ‘Yes’ or ‘Don’t know’, could you specify the reason? 

… 

99 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
64.  If ‘Yes’ or ‘Don’t know’, could you specify what percentage is paid ‘under the table’? 

… 

65.  Does the buyer need to pay a purchase (registration) tax? 

☐ Yes 

☐ No (go to q67) 

☐ Other 

☐ Don’t know (go to q65) 

66.  If ‘Yes’, what is the magnitude of the purchase (registration) tax? 

__________ euro per ha/year 

OR 
OR 

__________ local currency per ha/year (local currency = …………) 
__________ % of the sales price 

☐ Don’t know 

67.  Does the seller need to pay a land sales (capital profit) tax? 

☐ Yes 

☐ No 
(go to q69) 

☐ Don’t know 

68.  If ‘Yes’, what is the magnitude of the land sales (capital profit) tax? 

__________ euro per ha/year 

OR 
OR 

__________ local currency per ha/year (local currency = …………) 
__________ % of the sales price 

☐ Don’t know 

69.  Are there other costs related to the transfer of land? (e.g. notary costs, …) 

☐ Yes 

☐ No (go to q70) 

☐ Don’t know 

70.  If ‘Yes’, please specify these other costs. 

… 

Land sales transactions –pre-emptive rights, sales prohibitions, public land sales 

71.  Does any of the following persons have pre-emptive rights? 

Family relatives 
Tenant 
Co-owners 
Neighbouring farmers 
Farmers with residence (headquarters) in the country 
Adjacent land owners 
State 
Other 

☐ 
☐ 
☐ 
☐ 
☐ 
☐ 
☐ 
☐ 

72.  Are there restrictions regarding the subdivision and sale of a plot of agricultural land below a certain 

minimum size? 

☐ Yes 

☐ No 
(go to q74) 

☐ Other 

☐ Don’t know 
(go to q74) 

73.  If ‘Yes’, please specify the minimum size: _____ ha 

100 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
74.  Are there prohibitions to transfer agricultural land ownership rights (e.g. sell or donate) for a certain 

period after the purchase of agricultural land? 

☐ Yes. Please specify: 
☐ No 
☐ Other. Please specify: 
☐ Don’t know 

… 

… 

75.  Are there specific procedures for the sale of public land? 

☐ Yes. Please specify: 
☐ No 
☐ Other. Please specify: 
☐ Don’t know 

… 

… 

76.  Are there restrictions (moratorium) on the sales of public land? 
… 

☐ Yes. Please specify: 
☐ No 
☐ Other. Please specify: 
☐ Don’t know 

… 

77.  Is approval by a national, regional or local government (body) needed for the transfer of shares of a 

legal entity that owns agricultural land? 

☐ Yes. Please specify: 
☐ No 
☐ Other. Please specify: 
☐ Don’t know 

… 

… 

Land sales restrictions for domestic natural persons 

78.  Are there restrictions related to the acquisition of agricultural land by a domestic natural person? 

No 
Yes, land can only be sold to buyers with residence in the country 
Yes, land can only be sold to buyers with agricultural experience 
Do not know 
Other, please specify 

☐ 
☐ 
☐ 
☐ 
☐ 

79.  Is there a maximum amount of land that can be bought per transfer by a domestic natural person? 

☐Yes 

☐No 
(go to q89) 

☐ Other 

☐ Don’t know 

80.  Does the restriction regarding the amount of land that can be bought per transfer by a domestic natural 

person depend on the on the quality of the land? 

☐Yes 

☐No 
(go to q82) 

☐ Other 

☐ Don’t know 
(go to q82) 

81.  If ‘Yes’ or ‘Other’, please describe, for each quality class, the amount of land that can be bought by a 

domestic natural person. 
– Quality 1: 
– Quality 2: 
… 
– Quality n: 

… 
… 

… 

101 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
82.  Does the amount of agricultural land that a domestic natural person can buy per transfer depend on the 

destination (arable/pasture/…) of the land?  

☐Yes 

☐No 
(go to q86) 

☐ Other 

☐ Don’t know 
(go to q86) 

83.  If ‘Yes’ or ‘Other’, what is the maximum amount of arable land that can be bought per transfer by a 

domestic natural person? 
… 

84.  If ‘Yes’, what is the maximum amount of grassland/pasture that can be bought by a domestic natural 

person? 
… 

85.  Are there maximum restrictions on the amount of land that can be bought per transfer by domestic 

natural persons for other land categories? 

☐ Yes  Please specify the maximum amount for each other land category: 

– Category 1: 
– Category 2: 
… 
– Category n: 

… 
… 

… 

☐ No 
☐ Don’t know 

86.  Does the amount of land that a domestic natural person is allowed to buy per transfer, depend on the 

region where the land is located? (e.g. proximity to national borders, cities) 

☐Yes 

☐No 
(go to q88) 

☐ Other 

☐ Don’t know 

87.  If ‘Yes’, please describe for each region the amount of land that can be bought per transfer by a 

domestic natural person. 
– Region X: 
– Region Y: 
… 
– Region Z: 

… 
… 

… 

88.  If ‘No’, what amount of land can be bought per transfer by a domestic natural person (irrespective of the 

quality, destination, location)? 
… 

89.  Does a central, regional or local government (body) need to approve land purchase by a domestic natural 

person? 
Yes, always 
Yes, depending on the type of buyer (e.g. it depends on whether the buyer has residence in the 
country or not). Please, specify: 
Yes, depending on the type of seller (e.g. it depends on whether the seller is a legal or natural 
person; has residence/headquarters in the country). Please, specify: 
Yes, depending on the size of the area that is being transacted. Please specify size above which 
approval is needed. 
No 
Don’t know 
Other, please specify 

☐ 
☐ 

☐ 

☐ 

☐ 
☐ 
☐ 

102 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Land sales restrictions for domestic legal persons 

90.  Is there a maximum amount that can be bought per transfer by a domestic legal person? 

☐ Yes 

☐ No (go to q101)

☐ Other 

☐ Don’t know 

91.  If ‘Yes’, do domestic legal persons face restrictions other than those faced by domestic natural persons 

regarding the maximum amount that can be bought per transfer 

☐ Yes 

☐ No (go to q101) 

☐ Other 

☐ Don’t know 

92.  Does the restriction regarding the amount that can be bought per transfer by a domestic legal person 

depend on the on the quality of the land? 

☐ Yes 

☐ No (go to q94)  

☐ Other 

☐Don’t know 

93.  If ‘Yes’ or ‘Other’, please describe, for each quality class, the amount of land that can be bought per 

transfer by a domestic legal person. 
… 

94.  Does the amount of agricultural land that a domestic legal person can buy per transfer depend on the 

destination (arable/pasture/…) of the land? 

☐ Yes 

☐ No (go to q98) 

☐ Other 

☐ Don’t know 

95.  What is the maximum amount of arable land that can be bought per transfer by a domestic legal 

person? 
… 

96.  What is the maximum amount of grassland/pasture that can be bought by a domestic legal person? 

… 

97.  Are there maximum restrictions on the amount that can be bought per transfer by domestic legal 

persons for other land categories? 

☐Yes. 
Please specify the amount for each other land category 

☐ No 

☐ Don’t know 

98.  Does the amount of land that a domestic legal person is allowed to buy depend on the region where the 

land is located? (e.g. proximity to national borders, cities) 

☐ Yes 

☐ No (go to q100) 

☐ Other 

☐ Don’t know 

99.  If ‘Yes’, please describe, for each region, the amount of land that can be bought per transfer by a 

100. 

domestic legal person 
… 
If ‘No’, what amount can of land can be bought per transfer by a domestic legal person (irrespective of 
the quality, destination, location)? 
… 

101.  Does a central, regional or local government (body) need to approve land purchase by a domestic legal 

person? 
Yes, always 
Yes, depending on the type of buyer (e.g. it depends on whether the buyer has residence in the 
country or not). Please, specify:  
Yes, depending on the type of seller (e.g. it depends on whether the seller is a legal or natural 
person; has residence/headquarters in the country). Please specify: 
Yes, depending on the size of the area that is being transacted. Please specify the size above 
which approval is needed. 
No 
Don’t know 
Other, please specify 

☐ 
☐ 

☐ 

☐ 

☐ 
☐ 
☐ 

103 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Land sales restrictions for foreign natural persons 

102. 

Is there a maximum amount that can be bought per transfer by a foreign natural person? 

☐ Yes, for foreign 
EU and non-EU 
citizens 

☐ Yes, only for 
foreign EU citizens 

☐ Yes, only for 
foreign non-EU 
citizens 

☐ No (go to q114) 

☐ Don’t know 

103.  Do foreign, but EU, citizens face restrictions other than those faced by domestic natural persons 

regarding the maximum amount that can be bought per transfer 

☐ Yes 

☐ No 

☐ Other 

☐ Don’t know 

104.  Do foreign non-EU citizens face restrictions other than those faced by domestic natural persons 

regarding the maximum amount that can be bought per transfer 

☐ Yes 

☐ No 

☐ Other 

☐ Don’t know (go to q114) 

If you answered ‘No’ to both q103 and q104, then go to q114 

105.  Does the restriction regarding the amount that can be bought per transfer by a foreign natural 

person depend on the on the quality of the land? 

☐ Yes, for foreign 
EU and non-EU 
citizens 

☐ Yes, only for 
foreign EU citizens 

☐ Yes, only for 
foreign non-EU 
citizens 

☐ No (go to q107) 

☐ Don’t know 

106. 

If ‘Yes’, please describe, for each quality class, the amount of land that can be bought per transfer by 

a foreign natural person, and how this differs with (non-)EU citizenship. 
… 

107.  Does the amount of agricultural land that a foreign natural person can buy per transfer depend on the 

destination (arable/pasture/…) of the land? 

☐ Yes, for foreign 
EU and non-EU 
citizens 

☐ Yes, only for 
foreign EU citizens 

☐ Yes, only for 
foreign non-EU 
citizens 

☐ No (go to q111) 

☐ Don’t know 

108.  What is the maximum amount of arable land that can be bought per transfer by a foreign natural 

person? If there is a difference between EU and non-EU citizens, please specify. 
… 

109.  What is the maximum amount of grassland/pasture that can be bought per transfer by a foreign 

natural person? If there is a difference between EU and non-EU citizens, please specify. 
… 

110.  Are there maximum restrictions on the amount that can be bought per transfer by foreign natural 

persons for other land categories? 

☐Yes 
Please, specify amount for each other land category and 
how this differs with EU citizenship 

☐No 

☐ Don’t know 

111.  Does the amount of land that a foreign natural person is allowed to buy per transfer depend on the 

region where the land is located? (e.g. proximity to national borders, cities) 

☐ Yes, only for 
foreign EU citizens 

☐ Yes, for foreign 
EU and non-EU 
citizens  

☐ Yes, only for 
foreign non-EU 
citizens 
112.  If ‘Yes’, please describe, for each region, the amount of land that can be bought per transfer by a 
foreign natural person. If there is a difference between EU and non-EU citizens, please specify. 
… 

☐ No (go to q113) 

☐ Don’t know 

113.  If ‘No’, what amount can of land can be bought per transfer by a foreign natural person (irrespective of 

the quality, destination, location)? If there is a difference between EU and non-EU citizens, please 
specify. 
… 

104 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
114.  Does a central, regional or local government (body) need to approve land purchase by a foreign 

natural person? 
Yes, always 
Yes, depending on the type of buyer (e.g. it depends on whether the buyer has residence in the 
country or not). Please, specify:  
Yes, depending on the type of seller (e.g. it depends on whether the seller is a legal or natural 
person; has residence/headquarters in the country). Please, specify: 
Yes, depending on the size of the area that is being transacted. Please specify size above which 
approval is needed. 
No 
Don’t know 
Other, please specify 

☐ 
☐ 

☐ 

☐ 

☐ 
☐ 
☐ 

Land sales restrictions for foreign legal persons 

115. 

Is there a maximum amount that can be bought per transfer by a foreign legal person? 

☐ Yes 

☐ No (go to 126)  

☐ Other 

☐ Don’t know 

116. 

Do foreign, but EU, legal persons face restrictions other than those faced by domestic legal 

persons regarding the maximum amount that can be bought per transfer? 

☐ Yes 

☐ No 

☐ Don’t know 

117. 

Do foreign, but non-EU, legal persons face restrictions other than those faced by domestic legal 

persons regarding the maximum amount that can be bought per transfer? 

☐ Yes 

☐ No 

☐ Don’t know 

If you answered ‘No’ to both q116 and q117, then go to q127 

118. 

Does the restriction regarding the amount that can be bought per transfer by a foreign legal 

person depend on the on the quality of the land? 

☐ Yes, for EU and 
non-EU legal entities 

☐ Yes, only for EU 
legal entities 

☐ Yes, only for non-
EU legal entities 

☐ No (go to q120) 

☐ Don’t know 

119. 

If ‘Yes’, please describe, for each quality class, the amount of land that can be bought by a 
foreign legal person. If there is a difference between EU and non-EU legal persons (entities), please 
specify. 
… 

120. 

Does the amount of agricultural land that a foreign legal person can buy per transfer depend on 

the destination (arable/pasture/…) of the land? 

☐ Yes, for EU and 
non-EU legal entities 

☐ Yes, only for EU 
legal entities 

☐ Yes, only for non-
EU legal entities 

☐ No (go to q124) 

☐ Don’t know 

121. 

If ‘Yes’, what is the maximum amount of arable land that can be bought per transfer by a 
foreign legal person? If there is a difference between EU and non-EU legal persons (entities), please 
specify. 
… 

122. 

If ‘Yes’, what is the maximum amount of grassland/pasture that can be bought by a foreign 
legal person? If there is a difference between EU and non-EU legal persons (entities), please specify. 
… 

105 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
123. 

Are there maximum restrictions on the amount that can be bought per transfer by foreign legal 

persons for other land categories? 

☐ Yes 
Please, specify amount for each category and whether 
there is a difference between EU and non-EU legal 
persons 

☐ No 

☐ Don’t know 

124. 

Does the amount of land that a foreign legal person is allowed to buy depend on the region 

where the land is located? (e.g. proximity to national borders, cities) 

☐ Yes, for EU and 
non-EU legal entities 

☐ Yes, only for EU 
legal entities 

☐ Yes, only for non-
EU legal entities 

☐ No (go to 126) 

☐ Don’t know 

125. 

If ‘Yes’, please describe, for each region, the amount of land that can be bought per transfer by 

a foreign legal person. 
… 

126. 

If ‘No’, what amount can of land can be bought per transfer by a foreign legal person 
(irrespective of the quality, destination, location)? If there is a difference between EU and non-EU legal 
persons (entities), please specify. 

127. 

Does a central, regional or local government (body) need to approve land purchase by a foreign 

legal person? 
Yes, always 
Yes, depending on the type of buyer (e.g. it depends on whether the buyer has residence in the 
country or not). Please specify:  
Yes, depending on the type of seller (e.g. it depends on whether the seller is a legal or natural 
person; has residence/headquarters in the country). Please specify: 
Yes, depending on the size of the area that is being transacted. Please specify size above which 
approval is needed. 
No 
Don’t know 
Other, please specify 

☐ 
☐ 

☐ 

☐ 

☐ 
☐ 
☐ 

Land sales – other 

128. 

… 

129. 

☐ Yes 

130. 

… 

Are there other restrictions regarding the sales of land that were not discussed? Please specify. 

Are there any ways to bypass the abovementioned land sales restrictions? 

☐ No 
(go to q123) 

☐ Don’t know 

If ‘Yes’, please describe which restrictions are bypassed and how? 

Land rental transactions 

131. 

Is there a minimum land rental price? 

☐ Yes 

☐ No 
(go to q134) 

☐ Don’t know 

106 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
132. 

If ‘Yes’, please specify (and indicate for which year the minimum land rental price is given and 

the currency): 
… 
Price 
… 

Currency  

Year 

… 

… 

If the minimum rental price is determined relative to a prevailing price (e.g. a reasonable price, average 
market price), then please describe how the minimum rental price is set, e.g. XX % of the average market 
price which is determined by …. 

133. 

Is there a maximum land rental price? 

☐ Yes 

☐ No 
(go to q135) 

☐ Don’t know 

134. 

If ‘Yes’, please specify (and indicate for which year the maximum rental price is given and the 

currency): 
Price 
… 

Currency  

Year 

… 

… 

If the maximum rental price is determined relative to a prevailing price (e.g. a reasonable price, average 
market price), then please describe how the maximum rental price is set, e.g. XX % of the average market 
price which is determined by …. 

135. 

Does part of the land rental payment occur ‘under the table’? 

☐ Yes 

☐ No (go to q138) 

☐ Don’t know 

136. 

… 

137. 

… 

138. 

☐ Yes 

If ‘Yes’ or ‘Don’t know’, could you specify the reason? 

If ‘Yes’ or ‘Don’t know’, could you specify what percentage is paid under the table? 

Is the tenancy duration restricted? 
☐ No 

☐ Don’t know 

139. 

Is there a minimum land tenancy duration? 

☐ Yes. Please specify: 
☐ No 
☐ Don’t know 

… 

140. 

Is there a maximum land tenancy duration? 

☐ Yes. Please specify: 
☐ No 
☐ Don’t know 

… 

141. 

Is the land tenancy contract automatically renewed 

Yes with duration of the initial contract 
Yes, with a limited duration. Please specify for which period it is automatically renewed 
No automatic renewal 
Other. Please specify: … 
Do not know 

☐ 
☐ 
☐ 
☐ 
☐ 

142. 

Is the land tenancy contract inheritable? 

☐ Yes 

☐ No 

☐ Don’t know 

107 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
143. 

Is it possible to enter in a land rental agreement orally? 

☐ Yes 

☐ No (go to q145) 

☐ Don’t know 

144. 

Is there any specific reason why people prefer to engage in oral land rental contracts? Please 

explain. 
… 

145. 
☐Yes, compulsory 

Are land rental agreements registerable in the cadaster? 
☐Yes, optionally 

☐No (go to 147)  ☐ Do not know 

146. 

Is there any specific reason why people register the land rental contract in the cadaster? Please 

explain. 
… 

147. 
☐Yes, compulsory 

Are land rental agreements registerable in the land register? 
☐Yes, optionally 

☐No (go to 149)  ☐ Do not know 

148. 

Is there any specific reason why people register the land rental contract in the land register? 

Please explain. 
… 

149. 

Is legal contract enforcement possible if one of the parties breaches the land rental contract 

terms? Please describe the procedure (e.g. how costly is it? Is the procedure clear? Is it a lengthy 
procedure?). 
… 

150. 

… 

151. 

Are there other restrictions regarding the land rental that were not discussed? Please specify. 

Are there any ways to bypass the abovementioned land rental restriction? 

☐ Yes 

☐ No 

☐ Don’t know 

152. 

… 

If ‘Yes’, please describe which restrictions are bypassed and how? 

108 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 2: Country report template 

Study on agricultural land regulations 

Template country report 

1.  Introduction 

Short description of the agricultural situation in the country, particularly of the issues relevant to the land market. 
This could include a description of farm structure (number of farmers or farming enterprises, share of agricultural 
land  cultivated  by  different  types  of  farmers  and  farming  enterprises),  tenancy  situation  (share  of  land  that  is 
rented), frequency of transactions, evolution of sales and rental prices, etc. The key focus of the report is on the 
regulations. However, statistics are very welcome, but should be considered more as a tool to support, for example, 
the impact of regulations on prices or to illustrate that certain regulations or procedures have a big impact given 
the  prevailing  farm  structures.  So,  statistics:  yes,  very  welcome,  but  one  should  not spend  overly  much  time  in 
collecting these data at the expense of collecting information on the regulations. 

2.  Key land regulations affecting land markets 

Describe the essence or ‘spirit’ of the regulations that are in place. Which regulations are having the most impact? 
Which are considered stringent? Which are considered to be important from the farmer, tenant and/or owner points 
of view? Which regulations are currently being debated or are under review? 

3.  Institutions (regulations, customs, practices) in the surrounding environments of 

the land market affecting its functioning 

Description of regulations, customs, practices that are having a strong impact on the functioning of the land market, 
but that are not mere ‘land market regulations’. 

Examples: 
 

If there are still large amounts of state land and if these are being exchanged, it is relevant to consider 
the procedures for its sale in the country report. How strict is the procedure? Does it favour certain 
groups? 

  Credit market might put certain groups in advantageous position to acquire land. 
 
  Other policies might have impacts on land functioning. Subsidies can be received if environmental 

Inheritance regulations might also affect land market functioning. 

structures are introduced (trees, pounds, etc., for soil improvement, reduction of soil erosions, water 
harvesting, etc.). This can have an impact on the market, demand for land, land prices. 
 
Land zoning and spatial planning can have a strong impact on the land market, on prices, on exchanges. 
  Other European directives can also have an impact such as the Nitrates Directive, or manure policies that 

 

affect the demand for and the price of land. 
In some regions, small plots of land might be incorporated into large fields, so that the withdrawal cost is 
high. This leads to specific power relations. Owners of small plots in the middle of a large field have low 
bargaining position to sell or rent. Is this the case? Are there any political or legal interventions, e.g. to 
consolidate land and empower owners? 

4.  Implementation and enforcement issues of land regulations 

109 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Description of the implementation and enforcement of the regulations. Some regulations might exist on paper, but 
might hardly be enforced. Other regulations might be enforced in such a way that they end up having unwanted 
effects. 

Examples: 

 

 

 

Rules regarding good management of agricultural land might exist, but might not be followed/enforced. 
As a result, plots remain unused, unmanaged and rewild. Owners hold on to their land for speculative 
reasons as this comes at hardly any cost (i.e. no land tax needs to be paid and no management required 
since rules are not enforced). 
Local council sometimes has to decide on transactions in, for example, border regions. Does what is or is 
not allowed depend strongly on composition of the councils, so that the outcome of the regulations is 
highly variable and dependent on who is sitting in the council? 
Every transaction might need to be approved by a land transfer agency, either at regional or at 
municipality level. These agencies can refuse a transfer if the transfer is not good for the family farming 
structure. This could, for example, result in a refusal to sell if land is transferred to a non-farmer, or to a 
non-EU citizen. However, the precise working of these agencies is rather opaque and its impact is 
therefore not well known. 

  Deviation from regulations regarding contract renewal might be allowed as long as there are no 

 

 

complaints. 
Procedures regarding the announcement of land sales and potential use of pre-emptive rights might lead 
to certain frictions that favour certain groups. 
Rental agreements might be based on unofficial agreements and might not be impacted by the existing 
regulations. 

5.  Other land-related measures not discussed elsewhere 

Please describe issues that do not fit under the other headings, but are relevant for the land market functioning in 
your country. 

6.  Reference list of legal regulations 

Please include a precise reference of the legislation and a website link if the relevant legislation is published on a 
website. 
Include also a copy of the legislation in the local language and in English if it exists. Even if a website exists with 
the text of the legislation, please copy and paste the text here, as not all websites are long-lived. 

7.  List of supporting materials (actual materials to be uploaded to SharePoint) 

This could include documents with detailed statistical information on land prices, frequency of sales and rentals, 
or documents illustrating the political and/or juridical debates regarding certain regulations. 

110 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 3: Description and scale of land market measures 

Table A3: Description and scale of land market measures 

Measure category 
M1. Measures to protect 
the tenant 

Measure 
Minimum rental contract 
duration 

Measure description 
Minimum duration of a rental 
contract 

Maximum rental price 

Maximum price per ha that is 
rented 

Automatic rental contract 
renewal 

Regulations in terms of 
automatic renewal of a rental 
contract at the end of the 
duration of a contract 

Conditions for rental contract 
termination 

Regulations in terms of rental 
contract termination 

111 

Measure scale 
1 = Existence of a minimum rental contract duration 
0.5 = Existence of minimum rental contract duration for certain types of tenancy 
contracts (Bulgaria); existence of minimum rental contract duration for rented 
state land (Slovenia) 
0.125 = Existence of reference contract durations (Austria) 
0 = No restrictions 
1 = Existence of a maximum price 
0.5 = Rental agreement can be denied if the price is unreasonable in relation to 
the income that can be achieved from the land (Germany, Austria); existence of 
maximum rental price for state-owned land (Croatia); existence of maximum 
rental price for land resulting from land reform (Latvia); maximum rental price 
for regulated tenancy contracts, not for liberalised shorter than 6 years 
(Netherlands) 
0 = No maximum price 
1 = Existence of automatic renewal with the duration of the initial contract or 
minimum tenancy duration 
0.5 = Existence of automatic renewal for period of 1 year (Austria); existence of 
automatic renewal if landlord does not react to the tenant’s renewal offer after 
2 months (Slovakia) 
0.25 = Automatic renewal for regular regulated contracts, but not for 
deregulated liberalised rental contracts (Netherlands) 
0.125 = Existence of automatic renewal if included in provisions of the contract 
(Germany, Ireland, Italy) 
0 = No automatic renewal 
1 = Termination is possible at the end of the contract and if some specific 
conditions are fulfilled 
0 = Termination is possible at the end of the contract 

 
 
Measure category 

Measure 
Pre-emptive rights for tenant 

Measure description 
Pre-emptive rights for a tenant 

M2. Measures to protect 
the farmland owner 

Restrictions on legal form of 
buyer 
Nationality of buyer in case of 
legal entities 

Restrictions on sales to non-
natural persons 
Restrictions on sales transactions 
by foreign legal entities 

Nationality of buyer in case of 
natural persons 

Restrictions on transactions by 
foreign natural persons 

Restriction on residence of buyer 

Restrictions on the residence of 
the buyer or headquarters of a 
buyer’s legal entities 

Requirements for experience of 
buyer 
Maximum sales price 

Restrictions on sales to non-
experienced farmers 
Maximum sales price per ha that 
is sold 

Measure scale 
1 = Existence of a pre-emptive right by the tenant 
0.5 = Pre-emptive rights for tenant, but only if state land is sold and if tenancy 
lasted for at least 36 months (Czechia); pre-emptive rights for tenant, but only if 
state land is sold (Croatia); pre-emptive rights for tenant, unless sold to family or 
unless sold to an acquirer (other than the tenant) who owns less than 10 ha for 
natural persons or 5 ha for legal persons (Latvia) 
0.25 = Tenant can indirectly exert pre-emptive right through public organisation 
if non-farmer wants to buy land, but use of pre-emptive rights should be 
justified, that is there must be a reason that farmers need more land (Germany) 
0 = No pre-emptive rights for the tenant 
1 = Restriction on sales to non-natural persons 
0 = No restrictions 
1 = Prohibition on legal entities with shares owned by foreigners buying land 
0.125 = A foreign legal entity is allowed to buy or rent any plot of agricultural 
land, except in specific regions (Spain) 
0 = No restrictions 
1 = Prohibition on a foreign natural person buying a particular plot of agricultural 
land unless they have been staying and farming in the country for at least 
3 years and they rented that particular plot before 
0.125 = A foreign natural person is allowed to buy or rent any plot of agricultural 
land, except land in specific regions (Spain) 
0 = No restrictions 
1 = Restrictions on sales to buyers who do not have their residence in the 
country or legal entities that do not have their headquarters in the country 
0.5 = Restrictions on sales to buyers who do not have their residence in the 
country, except for self-employed farmers (Bulgaria) 
0 = No restrictions 
1 = Existence of restrictions on sales to buyers with no agricultural experience 
0 = No restrictions 
1 = Existence of a maximum sales price 
0.5 = There is no legal maximum sales price, but transaction is denied/annulled if 
price is excessive (Germany, France, Austria) 
0 = No maximum sales price 

112 

 
 
Measure category 

Measure 
Pre-emptive rights for 
(neighbouring) farmer 

Measure description 
Pre-emptive rights for the 
neighbouring farmer 

Maximum transacted/owned area  Limitations to the maximum 
transacted agricultural area 

M3. Measures to protect 
the owner 

Minimum rental price 

Minimum rental price per ha that 
is rented 

Maximum rental contract 
duration 

Maximum duration of a rental 
contract 

M4. Measures to prevent 
fragmentation 

Minimum plot size 

A minimum plot size below which 
a plot cannot be subdivided for a 
transaction 

Measure scale 
1 = Existence of a pre-emptive right by a (neighbouring) farmer 
0.5 = Existence of a priority order for buyers (outside the pre-emptive rights) 
(France, Poland); existence of pre-emptive rights for adjacent land owners 
(Bulgaria, Estonia, Spain); existence of pre-emptive rights for farmers with 
residence in the country for the sale of state land (Croatia); existence of pre-
emptive rights if acceptable justification, for example share of owned land is 
small, farmer has lost owned land, neighbouring farm can consolidate or reduce 
fragmentation (Germany) 
0 = No pre-emptive rights for a neighbouring farmer 
1 = Existence of regulations on the maximum agricultural area that is transacted 
0.5 = Transaction needs to be approved and thus can be denied/annulled if the 
transacted area is too large (France) 
0.25 = Restrictions for foreigners to acquire land in specific regions (islands, 
border regions) and renting in land as tenant is forbidden if certain area is 
already in ownership (Spain) 
0 = No regulations 
1 = Existence of a minimum rental price 
0.5 = Existence of a minimum rental price for state-owned land (Croatia); 
existence of a minimum rental price for municipality-owned land (Lithuania) 
0.25 = Existence of minimum rental price for state-owned land leased with 
redemption rights 
0.125 = Existence of non-binding rental price (which is set at a very low level) 
(Slovakia) 
0 = No minimum rental price 
1 = Existence of a maximum rental contract duration 
0.5 = Existence of a maximum rental contract duration for certain types of 
tenancy contracts (Bulgaria); existence of a maximum rental contract duration 
for state-owned land (Lithuania) 
0.25 = Existence of a maximum rental contract duration for state-owned land 
leased with redemption rights (Latvia) 
0.125 = Existence of reference contract durations (Austria) 
0 = No restrictions 
1 = Existence of a minimum plot size 
0.5 = Approval of transfer can be denied if it leads to disruption of a favourable 
land structure (Austria); subdivision of already consolidated plot not allowed 
(Croatia) 
0.25 = State land will not be subdivided into plots of <1 ha, or <3 ha for 
orchards (Hungary) 
0 = No minimum plot size 

113 

 
 
Measure category 

Measure 
Pre-emptive rights for co-owner 

Measure description 
Pre-emptive rights for the co-
owner 

M5. Other measures 

Requirement for publication of 
sale offer 

Requirement to publicly 
announce the sales of 
agricultural land 

Procedures for sale of public 
land 
Share deal approval 

Procedures that are in place 

Approval needed for transfer of 
shares of legal entity that owns 
agricultural land 

Pre-emptive rights for 
state/public bodies 

Pre-emptive rights for the state 
or public body 

Pre-emptive rights for family 
relatives 

Pre-emptive rights for family 
relatives 

114 

Measure scale 
1 = Existence of a pre-emptive right of the co-owner 
0.5 = Pre-emptive rights for co-owners, unless sold to family or unless sold to an 
acquirer (other than the co-owner) who owns less than 10 ha for natural persons 
or 5 ha for legal persons (Latvia) 
0.125 = Existence of a pre-emptive right for the co-owner, but only for 6 months 
after the acquisition 
0 = No pre-emptive right for the co-owner 
1 = Requirement to publicly announce the sale of agricultural lands 
0.5 = If a non-farmer wants to buy land, this has to be announced publicly and 
local farmers are able to make an offer for 4 weeks (1 month) (Austria) 
0.25 = Sale of state-owned land needs to be announced publicly (Czechia, 
Poland) 
0 = No requirements to publicly announce the sale of agricultural lands 
1 = Regulations that steer the sales of public land 
0 = No regulations that steer the sales of public land 
1 = Approval by state (or public authority) is needed for the transfer of shares of 
a legal entity that owns agricultural land 
0.5 = Transfer of shares can be forbidden, but only if the totality of shares is 
transferred/sold (France) 
0.25 = Administrative approval needed for the transfer of shares of a legal entity 
that owns agricultural land (Denmark) 
0 = No approval by state (or public authority) is needed for the transfer of shares 
of a legal entity that owns agricultural land 
1 = Existence of a pre-emptive right for the state or public body 
0.25 = Government body can take possession of the land under specific 
conditions, for example to build new residential areas (Netherlands, 
municipalities have preferential rights; Belgium) 
0.125 = Municipalities and regions have pre-emptive rights (without payment) to 
state land (Czechia) 
0 = No pre-emptive right for the state or public body 
1 = Existence of a pre-emptive right for family relatives 
0.25 = No explicit pre-emptive rights for family relatives, but pre-emptive rights 
for tenants, co-owners or state do not apply if land is sold to spouse or relatives 
of second or third degree 
0 = No pre-emptive rights for family relatives 

 
 
Measure category 

Measure 
(Temporary) moratorium on 
transferring ownership after 
acquisition 

Measure description 
Temporary moratorium on 
transferring ownership rights 
after acquisition 

(Temporary) moratorium on 
selling public land 

Temporary moratorium on selling 
public land 

Source: Adapted from Swinnen, Van Herck and Vranken (2014a) 

Measure scale 
1 = Restriction to transfer ownership rights (e.g. sell or donate) after the 
purchase of agricultural land 
0.5 = Restriction to transfer ownership rights (e.g. sell or donate) of land acquired 
from state or municipality (Bulgaria, Czechia, Latvia) 
0.25 = Restriction to transfer ownership rights (e.g. sell or donate) of land if tax 
reduction or exemptions were granted (Spain, Italy, Netherlands, Finland), or if 
pre-emptive rights were used (Spain, Netherlands); land can be sold, but if sold 
within 5 years, the granted tax reliefs need to be returned (Ireland); land can be 
sold, but if sold within 8 years, an 80 % tax needs to be paid on the difference 
between the purchase and the sales prices (Romania) 
0 = No restriction to transfer ownership rights (e.g. sell or donate) after the 
purchase of agricultural land 
1 = Restriction to sell public land 
0.25 = Speed of privatisation of public land is limited (Germany) 
0.125 = Restriction to sell public land if land is subject to specific constraints (e.g. 
areas of specific environmental value or areas of specific historical/cultural 
value) (Italy); if land is needed for special reasons, which could include cultural 
environment, defence, nature conservation and recreation (Sweden); no 
restriction, but a maximum of 300 ha can be acquired from the state (Lithuania) 
0 = No restriction to sell public land 

115 

 
 
 
Annex 4: Tables with indices (numerical scales) to describe the measures 

Table A4.1: Measures to protect the tenant, by country 

Country 

Maximum rental price 

Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Czechia 
Denmark 
Germany 
Estonia 
Ireland 
Spain 
France 
Croatia 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Hungary 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Poland 
Romania 
Slovenia 
Slovakia 
Finland 
Sweden 
NB: Each measure ranges between 0 (no restrictions) and 1 (most restrictions). Scales are explained in Annex 3. 
Source: Own data based on expert survey, interviews and country reports (adapted from Swinnen, Van Herck and Vranken, 2014a). 

Conditions for rental 
contract termination 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 

Minimum rental 
contract duration 
1 
0.5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0.125 
0 
1 
0.5 
1 
0 
0 

Automatic rental 
contract renewal 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0.125 
1 
0.125 
1 
1 
0 
0.125 
0 
0 
0 
0.25 
0.5 
0 
1 
1 
0.5 
0 
1 

1 
0 
0 
0 
0.5 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0.5 
0 
0.5 
0 
0 
0.5 
0.5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 

Pre-emptive right for 
tenant 
1 
1 
0.5 
0 
0.25 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0.5 
1 
0.5 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 

116 

 
 
 
 
Table A4.2: Measures to protect the farmland owner, by country 

Country 

Restrictions legal 
form buyer 

Restrictions 
nationality buyer 
for legal entities 

Restriction 
nationality buyer 
natural person 

Restrictions 
residence buyer 

Restrictions 
experience buyer 

Maximum sales 
price 

Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Czechia 
Denmark 
Germany 
Estonia 
Ireland 
Spain 
France 
Croatia 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Hungary 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Poland 
Romania 
Slovenia 
Slovakia 
Finland 
Sweden 
NB: Each measure ranges between 0 (no restrictions) and 1 (most restrictions). Scales are explained in Annex 3. 
Source: Own data based on expert survey, interviews and country reports (adapted from Swinnen, Van Herck and Vranken, 2014a). 

0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.125 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 

0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.125 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 

0 
0 
0 
0 
0.5 
0 
0 
0 
0.5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0.5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 

0 
0.5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 

0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 

0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 

Pre-emptive 
right 
(neighbouring) 
farmer 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0.5 
0.5 
0 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0.5 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 

Maximum 
transacted/owne
d area 

0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.25 
0.5 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 

117 

 
 
 
Table A4.3: Measures to protect the non-farmland owner and measures to prevent fragmentation, by country 

Measures to protect the non-farm 
owner 

Measures to prevent fragmentation 

Country 

Smaller plot size 

Maximum rental 
contract duration 
0 
Belgium 
0.5 
Bulgaria 
0 
Czechia 
1 
Denmark 
0 
Germany 
0 
Estonia 
0 
Ireland 
0 
Spain 
0.125 
France 
1 
Croatia 
0 
Italy 
0.25 
Latvia 
0.5 
Lithuania 
1 
Hungary 
0 
Netherlands 
0.125 
Austria 
0 
Poland 
1 
Romania 
0 
Slovenia 
1 
Slovakia 
1 
Finland 
1 
Sweden 
NB: Each measure ranges between 0 (no restrictions) and 1 (most restrictions). Scales are explained in Annex 3. 
Source: Own data based on expert survey, interviews and country reports. 

Pre-emptive right 
for co-owner 
0 
1 
0.125 
0 
0 
? 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0.5 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 

Minimum rental 
price 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0.5 
0 
0.25 
0.5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.125 
0 
0 

0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
? 
0 
1 
0 
0.5 
0 
0 
0 
0.25 
0 
0.5 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 

118 

 
 
 
 
Table A4.4: Other measures targeting the agricultural land market, by country 

Country 

Requirement for 
publication of 
sale offers 

Procedures for 
sale of public 
land 

Share deal 
approvals 

Pre-emptive 
right for 
state/public 
bodies 

Pre-emptive 
rights for family 
relatives 

Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Czechia 
Denmark 
Germany 
Estonia 
Ireland 
Spain 
France 
Croatia 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Hungary 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Poland 
Romania 
Slovenia 
Slovakia 
Finland 
Sweden 
NB: Each measure ranges between 0 (no restrictions) and 1 (most restrictions). Scales are explained in Annex 3. 
Source: Own data based on expert survey, interviews and country reports (adapted from Swinnen, Van Herck and Vranken, 2014a). 

0.25 
0 
0.125 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0.25 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 

0 
0 
0 
0.25 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.5 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
? 

0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.25 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 

0 
0 
0.25 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0.5 
0.25 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 

0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 

(Temporary) 
moratorium on 
transferring 
ownership after 
acquisition 
0 
0.5 
0.5 
0 
0 
0 
0.25 
0.25 
0 
0 
0.25 
0.5 
0 
0 
0.25 
0 
1 
0.25 
0 
0 
0.25 
0 

(Temporary) 
moratorium on 
selling public 
land 

0 
1 
0 
0 
0.25 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0.125 
0 
0.125 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.125 

119 

 
 
 
Annex 5: Regulatory profiles by country 

Figure A5. Regulatory profiles by country 

(in descending order of country total score) 

120 

2611.254Total scores for groups of land market measures in the total score for all measures: HungaryProtect TenantProtect Farm Land-OwnerProtect Non Farm LandOwnerPrevent FramentationOther Measures15.5006.25Total scores for groups of land markets measures in the total score for all measures: PolandProtect TenantProtect Farm Land-OwnerProtect Non Farm LandOwnerPrevent FramentationOther Measures15.51.50.53Total scores for groups of land markets measures in the total score for all measures: CroatiaProtect TenantProtect Farm Land-OwnerProtect Non Farm LandOwnerPrevent FramentationOther Measures33113.25Total scores for groups of land markets measures in the total score for all measures: RomaniaProtect TenantProtect Farm Land-OwnerProtect Non Farm LandOwnerPrevent FramentationOther Measures51.51.12501.5Total scores for groups of land markets measures in the total score for all measures: FranceProtect TenantProtect Farm Land-OwnerProtect Non Farm LandOwnerPrevent FramentationOther Measures12114.125Total scores for groups of land markets measures in the total score for all measures: LithuaniaProtect TenantProtect Farm Land-OwnerProtect Non Farm LandOwnerPrevent FramentationOther Measures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
121 

210.50.54.75Total scores for groups of land markets measures in the total score for all measures: LatviaProtect TenantProtect Farm Land-OwnerProtect Non Farm LandOwnerPrevent FramentationOther Measures3.501.12522Total scores for groups of land markets measures in the total score for all measures: SlovakiaProtect TenantProtect Farm Land-OwnerProtect Non Farm LandOwnerPrevent FramentationOther Measures2.52013Total scores for groups of land markets measures in the total score for all measures: SloveniaProtect TenantProtect Farm Land-OwnerProtect Non Farm LandOwnerPrevent FramentationOther Measures41021.25Total scores for groups of land markets measures in the total score for all measures: SpainProtect TenantProtect Farm Land-OwnerProtect Non Farm LandOwnerPrevent FramentationOther Measures1.51.50.522.5Total scores for groups of land markets measures in the total score for all measures: BulgariaProtect TenantProtect Farm Land-OwnerProtect Non Farm LandOwnerPrevent FramentationOther Measures3.1252.50.1250.51.5Total scores for groups of land markets measures in the total score for all measures: AustriaProtect TenantProtect Farm Land-OwnerProtect Non Farm LandOwnerPrevent FramentationOther Measures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
122 

21.5002Total scores for groups of land markets measures in the total score for all measures: EstoniaProtect TenantProtect Farm Land-OwnerProtect Non Farm LandOwnerPrevent FramentationOther Measures50000.25Total scores for groups of land markets measures in the total score for all measures: BelgiumProtect TenantProtect Farm Land-OwnerProtect Non Farm LandOwnerPrevent FramentationOther Measures3.750001.5Total scores for groups of land markets measures in the total score for all measures: NetherlandsProtect TenantProtect Farm Land-OwnerProtect Non Farm LandOwnerPrevent FramentationOther Measures30101.125Total scores for groups of land markets measures in the total score for all measures: SwedenProtect TenantProtect Farm Land-OwnerProtect Non Farm LandOwnerPrevent FramentationOther Measures1.1251011.375Total scores for groups of land markets measures in the total score for all measures: ItalyProtect TenantProtect Farm Land-OwnerProtect Non Farm LandOwnerPrevent FramentationOther Measures0.8751011.25Total scores for groups of land markets measures in the total score for all measures: GermanyProtect TenantProtect Farm Land-OwnerProtect Non Farm LandOwnerPrevent FramentationOther Measures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
123 

0.5000.1252.875Total scores for groups of land markets measures in the total score for all measures: Czech RepublicProtect TenantProtect Farm Land-OwnerProtect Non Farm LandOwnerPrevent FramentationOther Measures00101.25Total scores for groups of land markets measures in the total score for all measures: FinalndProtect TenantProtect Farm Land-OwnerProtect Non Farm LandOwnerPrevent FramentationOther Measures00100.25Total scores for groups of land markets measures in the total score for all measures: DenmarkProtect TenantProtect Farm Land-OwnerProtect Non Farm LandOwnerPrevent FramentationOther Measures0.1250000.25Total scores for groups of land markets measures in the total score for all measures: IrelandProtect TenantProtect Farm Land-OwnerProtect Non Farm LandOwnerPrevent FramentationOther Measures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List of abbreviations 

ALA 

Agricultural Land Act 

ALOUA  Agricultural Land Ownership and Use Act 

B 

C 

Burgenland 

Carinthia 

CAP 

common agricultural policy 

CJEU 

Court of Justice of the European Union 

ECJ 

European Court of Justice 

EEA 

European Economic Area 

EU 

European Union 

FADN 

Farm Accountancy Data Network 

FFF 

Farmland and Forest Fund 

GrdstVG Grundstückverkehrsgesetz 

JRC 

Joint Research Centre 

LA 

Lower Austria 

LpachtVG 

Landpachtverkehrsgesetz 

MS 

Member State(s) 

OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 

PSRA 

Property Services Regulatory Authority 

S 

Salzburg 

SAFERs  Sociétés d’Aménagement Foncier et d’Etablissement Rural 

SOU 

Statens Offentliga Utredningar (Swedish Government Official Reports) 

ST 

T 

Styria 

Tyrol 

UA 

Upper Austria 

UAA 

utilised agricultural area 

V 

Vorarlberg 

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List of figures 

FIGURE 1. TOTAL SCORE ON TENANT PROTECTION IN 22 MS, AROUND 2020 ........................................................................ 25 
FIGURE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF THE TOTAL SCORE ON TENANT PROTECTION, 22 MS, AROUND 2020 ............................................. 26 
FIGURE 3. TOTAL SCORE ON PROTECTION OF THE FARMLAND OWNER, 22 MS, AROUND 2020 ................................................. 27 
FIGURE 4. DISTRIBUTION OF THE TOTAL SCORE ON FARMLAND OWNER PROTECTION, 22 MS, AROUND 2020 .............................. 27 
FIGURE 5. TOTAL SCORE ON PROTECTION OF THE NON-FARMLAND OWNER, 22 MS, AROUND 2020 .......................................... 28 
FIGURE 6. DISTRIBUTION OF THE TOTAL SCORE ON NON-FARMLAND OWNER PROTECTION, 22 MS, AROUND 2020 ...................... 29 
FIGURE 7. TOTAL SCORE ON PREVENTING LAND FRAGMENTATION, 22 MS, AROUND 2020 ...................................................... 30 
FIGURE 8. DISTRIBUTION OF THE TOTAL SCORE ON PREVENTING LAND FRAGMENTATION, 22 MS, AROUND 2020 ........................ 30 
FIGURE 9. DISTRIBUTION OF THE TOTAL SCORE ON OTHER MEASURES OF LAND MARKET REGULATIONS, 22 MS, AROUND 2020 ...... 31 
FIGURE 10. DISTRIBUTION OF THE TOTAL SCORE FOR OTHER MEASURES OF LAND MARKET REGULATIONS, 22 MS, AROUND 2020 ... 32 
FIGURE 11. TOTAL NUMBER OF LAND MARKET MEASURES AND THEIR DISTRIBUTION BY CATEGORY, 22 MS, AROUND 2020 ........... 69 
FIGURE 12. CORRELATION BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF MEASURES TO PROTECT THE TENANT AND THE SHARE OF LAND RENTED ......... 69 
FIGURE 13. DISTRIBUTION OF COUNTRIES FOR THE TOTAL NUMBER OF MEASURES REGULATING LAND MARKETS, 22 MS, AROUND 

2020 ............................................................................................................................................................. 73 
FIGURE 14. CORRELATION BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF ALL MEASURES AND THE LAND PRICES ..................................................... 74 
FIGURE 15. COUNTRY SCORES FOR LAND MARKET REGULATIONS BY GROUP OF MEASURES, 22 MS, AROUND 2020 ...................... 75 
FIGURE 16. DISTRIBUTION OF THE TOTAL SCORE FOR ALL MEASURES BY GROUPS OF MEASURES: ALL 22 MS ................................ 76 
FIGURE 17. DISTRIBUTION OF THE TOTAL SCORE FOR ALL MEASURES, BY GROUPS OF MEASURES: THE EIGHT HIGHEST-SCORING 

COUNTRIES ...................................................................................................................................................... 77 
FIGURE 18. DISTRIBUTION OF THE TOTAL SCORE FOR ALL MEASURES, BY GROUPS OF MEASURES: BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS . 78 
FIGURE A5. REGULATORY PROFILES BY COUNTRY ........................................................................................................... 120 

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List of tables 

TABLE 1: TIMING AND COMPOSITION OF THE ONLINE FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS .................................................................. 11 
TABLE 2: MEASURES TO PROTECT THE TENANT, BY COUNTRY, AROUND 2020 ........................................................................ 15 
TABLE 3: MEASURES TO PROTECT THE FARMLAND OWNER, BY COUNTRY, AROUND 2020 ........................................................ 17 
TABLE 4: MEASURES TO PROTECT NON-FARMLAND OWNERS, BY COUNTRY, AROUND 2020 ..................................................... 19 
TABLE 5: MEASURES TO PREVENT FRAGMENTATION, BY COUNTRY, AROUND 2020 ................................................................. 20 
TABLE 6: OTHER MEASURES, BY COUNTRY, AROUND 2020 ................................................................................................ 21 
TABLE 7: SUMMATION OF THE NUMBER OF MEASURES PER CATEGORY AND TOTAL SCORE, 22 MS, AROUND 2020 ....................... 68 
TABLE A3: DESCRIPTION AND SCALE OF LAND MARKET MEASURES ..................................................................................... 111 
TABLE A4.1: MEASURES TO PROTECT THE TENANT, BY COUNTRY ....................................................................................... 116 
TABLE A4.2: MEASURES TO PROTECT THE FARMLAND OWNER, BY COUNTRY ....................................................................... 117 
TABLE A4.3: MEASURES TO PROTECT THE NON-FARMLAND OWNER AND MEASURES TO PREVENT FRAGMENTATION, BY COUNTRY . 118 
TABLE A4.4: OTHER MEASURES TARGETING THE AGRICULTURAL LAND MARKET, BY COUNTRY ................................................. 119 

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doi:10.2760/86127 
ISBN 978-92-76-41990-7