COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT […] Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Contingency plan for ensuring food supply and food security in times of crisis
Date: 2021-11-12
Institutions: Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development, European Commission
Subjects: EU action, consumer protection, coronavirus disease, crisis management, epidemic, food policy, food resources, food security, foodstuff, security of supply, supply chain

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 12.11.2021  SWD(2021) 317 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT […] Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Contingency plan for ensuring food supply and food security in times of crisis {COM(2021) 689 final} - {SWD(2021) 318 final}  
 
 
STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT – CONTINGENCY PLAN TO 
ENSURE FOOD SUPPLY AND FOOD SECURITY 

CONTENTS 

Contents ..................................................................................................................................... 1 

Glossary ..................................................................................................................................... 3 

1. 

Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 5 

1.1.  Purpose and scope  5 

1.2.  Food supply and food security: concepts and definitions  6 

2.  The EU food sector: strengths, risks and vulnerabilities .................................................... 8 

2.1.  The EU food powerhouse  8 

2.1.1.  A leading agricultural producer with high food self-sufficiency 

8 

2.1.2.  A key actor on the global food market 10 

2.1.3.  A limited number of cases where the EU is strongly reliant on imports 

12 

2.1.3.1.  Agricultural commodities 

2.1.3.2. 

Fisheries and aquaculture 

12 

14 

2.1.3.3.  Member State level  15 

2.1.3.4. 

Inputs 18 

2.1.3.5.  Diversity of production and of supply chains 

19 

2.2.  Risks and vulnerabilities 

22 

2.2.1.  Risks to the food system 

22 

2.2.2. 

Potential vulnerabilities of the EU food supply chain  28 

3.  Food security policy in practice ........................................................................................ 43 

3.1.  EU policies  43 

3.2.  Member States’ policies 

55 

3.3.  Third countries and international organisations 

60 

3.4.  Private sector 

64 

4.  EU food crises preparedness and response ....................................................................... 68 

Defining contingency planning 

69 

The EU lacks a formal coordination mechanism for food crises  71 

Food security policy: building on lessons learned  72 

Better prepared for crises through contingency planning  73 

Contingency planning through improved processes 

75 

Annex I - Lessons learned from the COVID-19 crisis ............................................................ 77 

Introduction 77 

Disruptions in the agri-food sector 78 

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Agricultural production and incomes 

78 

Disruptions in the seafood sector  81 

Fisheries production and incomes 

81 

Food supply chain disruption 

Shift in the structure of demand 

81 

84 

The effect of policy measures adopted in the context of the COVID-19 crisis 

86 

Supportive and established policies 

86 

Specificities of COVID-19 91 

Room for improvement 

Reflection on the crisis 

92 

94 

Conclusions 97 

References  99 

Questionnaire - guidance stakeholders 

106 

Annex II – Minutes of the Expert Group meetings................................................................ 112 

First meeting Joint AGRI-MARE GREX on the F2F food contingency plan to ensure food 
supply and food security in the EU in times of crisis – 20 January 2021 - What are the lessons 
learnt from COVID-19 and other crises with regard to food security in the EU?  112 

Second Joint AGRI-MARE GREX on the F2F food contingency plan to ensure food supply 
and food security in the EU in times of crisis – 25 February 2021 - What are the threats to 
EU food security?  113 

Third Joint AGRI-MARE GREX on the F2F food contingency plan to ensure food supply 
and food security in the EU in times of crisis – 26 March 2021 - How are the EU, Member 
States, third countries and international organisations prepared to handle crises? 115 

Fourth Joint AGRI-MARE GREX on the F2F food contingency plan to ensure food supply 
and food security in the EU in times of crisis – 21 April 2021 - How are companies in the 
EU food system prepared to handle crises? 

117 

Fifth Joint AGRI-MARE GREX on the F2F food contingency plan to ensure food supply 
and food security in the EU in times of crisis – 20 May 2021 – JRC Workshop  119 

Sixth Joint AGRI-MARE GREX on the F2F food contingency plan to ensure food supply 
and food security in the EU in times of crisis – 16 June  - How to best organise a coordinated 
approach?  119 

Seventh Joint AGRI-MARE GREX on the F2F food contingency plan to ensure food supply 
and food security in the EU in times of crisis – 15 July 

122 

Annex III – Summary Of Questionnaires Addressed To Member States .............................. 123 

Lessons learnt from the COVID-19 pandemic 

123 

Main threats to EU food security  123 

Level of preparedness 

124 

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GLOSSARY 

Term or acronym 

Meaning or definition 

AWU 

CAP 

CFP 

CMO 

DG 

EGD 

EU 

F2F 

FAO 

FSC 

Annual work unit 

Common Agricultural Policy 

Common Fisheries Policy 

Common Market Organisation (Regulation) 

European Commission Directorate General 

European Green Deal 

European Union 

Farm to Fork Strategy 

Food and Agriculture Organization 

food supply chain 

GREX 

European Commission Expert Group 

HORECA 

hotels, restaurants and catering 

MS 

NATO 

OECD 

TFEU 

UN 

EU Member State 

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 

Organisation 
Development 

for  Economic  Cooperation 

and 

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 

United Nations 

3 

 
 
WEF 

WHO 

WTO 

World Economic Forum 

World Health Organisation 

World Trade Organization 

4 

 
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION  

1.1. 

Purpose and scope 

A  sustainable  food  system  must  ensure  a  sufficient  and  varied  supply  of  safe,  healthy  and 
nutritious, respectful of the environment, and affordable food to people at all times, not least 
in  times of crisis. The recent COVID-19  crisis  showed that the EU’s food supply  chain 
(FSC) is resilient, as it responded remarkably well to fast changing conditions: food supplies 
continued to be available throughout the crisis thanks to farmers, fishers, aquaculture producers, 
and other actors of the food chain. However, in the initial stages of the COVID-19 crisis, there 
were some issues that affected the normal functioning of the EU’s FSC and could have 
posed  a  threat  to  food  security.  These  included  border  controls  and  sanitary  measures  at 
various steps of that value chain that slowed down the free movement of people and goods and 
restricted the ability of the  Single Market to operate fully, to the benefit of consumers; and 
resulted in market disruptions due to the severe reduction of the demand for some products. 
Food security in the EU is of primary concern for EU citizens. A recent Eurobarometer survey 
finds 92% of respondents believe that it is important that the CAP aims to secure a stable supply 
of food in the EU1.  

The Farm to Fork Strategy2, part of the European Green Deal, envisages the development of a 
contingency plan by the Commission, to be activated when there is a crisis that affects the 
entire  or  part  of  the  EU  food  system,  and  endangers  EU  food  supply  and  food  security 3. 
According to the strategy, the contingency plan will include the creation of a coordinated crises 
preparedness and response mechanism, drawing on the lessons learned from past crises, and 
from  the  ongoing  COVID-19  pandemic.  This  contingency  plan  is  the  subject  of  a 
Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions.  

The Farm to Fork Strategy includes many actions and has a larger scope than addressing needs 
in times of crisis. At the heart of the European Green Deal, the Farm to Fork Strategy aims to 
make  food  systems  fairer,  healthier  and  more  environmentally-friendly.  One  of  the  key 
initiatives  is  a  Commission  proposal  for  a  legislative  framework  for  sustainable  food 
systems,  due  in  2023.  In  preparing  this  framework,  the  Commission  will  consider,  among 
others,  more  comprehensive  options  to  strengthen  the  resilience  of  food  systems  and  the 
system’s ability to respond to crises threatening food security, including possible legislative 
changes. The legislative framework for sustainable food systems will be subject to a separate 
process to the present one on the contingency plan. 

The  Commission  has  organised  a  large  consultation  process 4 ,  inviting  a  wide  range  of 
stakeholders to provide feedback on the form, nature and scope that the contingency plan for 
ensuring food supply and food security in the EU should take, in line with the Farm to Fork 
Strategy. The following stakeholders were consulted: operators in the FSC (producers, traders, 
processors,  distributors,  retailers,  food  service  providers)  and  their  associations;  other 

1   Special Eurobarometer 504 (November 2020) – Europeans, Agriculture and the CAP: 

https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2229. 

2   A Farm to Fork Strategy for a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system, COM(2020)381 final 
3   The overview page for this initiative: https://ec.europa.eu/info/food-farming-fisheries/key-policies/common-

agricultural-policy/market-measures/agri-food-supply-chain/contingency-plan_en. 
4   Consultation strategy, Contingency plan for ensuring food supply and food security. 

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stakeholders with an interest in FSC operation (input providers, packaging material suppliers, 
transport operators, insurers, NGOs, etc.); consumers and consumer groups. Member States, 
and some third countries, were also invited to contribute to the design of the contingency plan, 
as were several international organisations, think-tanks and the scientific community5 . 

A questionnaire targeted at stakeholders was also open for two months, in March and April 
2021  and  received  over  250  answers.  The  summary  of  the  main  answers  is  available  in  a 
separate synopsis report. In addition, the Commission prepared three separate questionnaires 
addressed to Member States authorities, the answers of which are summarised in Annex III. In 
addition,  the  initiative  was  presented  in  a  number  of  meetings  of  existing  consultative  fora 
(Civil Dialogue Groups, Market, Observatories, Advisory Councils, etc.) 

Finally, Annex I lists the conclusions drawn from a set of interviews of experts ran at the end 
of 2020. These interviews sought to draw lessons for the FSC from the COVID-19 pandemic.  

The purpose of this Staff Working Document is to provide an analytical summary of  the 
findings of the consultation described above. Three main areas are described: (1) strengths 
and weaknesses of the agricultural, fishery, and food sectors in addressing the challenges posed 
by a changing risk landscape; (2) policies in place to address such challenges in times of crisis; 
(3) possible improvements.   

1.2. 

Food supply and food security: concepts and definitions6 

There are many possible understandings of several of the concepts used in this document. Both 
Member States and stakeholders raised the issue of the need for a common understanding on 
concepts during consultation. This would be useful for more fruitful discussions on the process 
and content of policies in the area of food security. 

We will use the definition of food security set out by the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture 
Organisation’s Committee on World Food Security:  

“food  security  exists  when  all  people,  at  all  times,  have  physical  and  economic  access  to 
sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an 
active and healthy life”7. 

Concepts related to food security include: 

Food  availability:  the  availability  of  sufficient  quantities  of  food  of  appropriate  quality, 
supplied through domestic production or imports (including food aid). The expression  food 
supply used in this exercise would refer to this aspect of food security. 

Food  access:  access  by  individuals  to  adequate  resources  (entitlements)  for  acquiring 
appropriate foods for a nutritious diet. Entitlements are defined as the set of all commodity 
bundles over which a person can establish command given the legal, political, economic and 

5   In-depth exchanges were held, in particular, through seven joint DG AGRI-DG MARE- DG SANTE GREX 
meetings (for agricultural markets, in particular concerning aspects falling under the single CMO Regulation, 
sub-group on the contingency plan for ensuring food supply and food security; and for markets and trade in 
fishery and aquaculture products (MTFAP). See Annex II. 

6   For further elements see SAPEA, Science Advice for Policy by European Academies, A sustainable food 

system for the European Union, 2020. 

7   In relation to this definition, the OECD (2020) notes: “food security is not only a matter of food availability – 
people will only be food secure when they have access to it, and when it leads to good nutritional outcomes. 
A [further] requirement is stability of these dimensions over time”.  

6 

 
 
                                                 
social arrangements of the community in which they live (including traditional rights such as 
access to common resources).  

Utilisation: utilisation of food through adequate diet, clean water, sanitation and health care to 
reach a state of nutritional well-being where all physiological needs are met. This brings out 
the importance of non-food inputs in food security.  

Stability: to be food secure, a population, household or individual must have access to adequate 
food at all times. They should not risk losing access to food as a consequence of sudden shocks 
(e.g.  an  economic  or  climatic  crisis)  or  cyclical  events  (e.g.  seasonal  food  insecurity).  The 
concept of stability can therefore refer to both the availability and access dimensions of food 
security.8 

Food safety: refers to “handling, storing and preparing food to prevent infection and help to 
make  sure  that  our  food  keeps  enough  nutrients  for  us  to  have  a  healthy  diet”  (Food  and 
Agriculture Organisation). 

Food system resilience: supply chain resilience is defined as "the capacity of a supply chain 
to persist, adapt, or transform in the face of change"9. The Commission used in its 2020 annual 
Strategic Report10 the following definition: “resilience is the ability not only to withstand and 
cope  with  challenges  but  also  to  undergo  transitions  in  a  sustainable,  fair,  and  democratic 
manner”. We use these definitions, appropriately expanded, to the broader food system concept 
employed in the Farm to Fork Strategy. Food security and food supply are therefore linked to 
food system resilience. According to Antón11, there are several ways to improve food system 
resilience: i) investments in on-farm resilience capacities; ii) no-regret policies and investments 
in public goods; iii) greater focus on ex ante policies and strategies; iv) consider outcomes and 
interests  of  stakeholders;  v)  participatory  and  collaborative  processes.  The  revised  CAP 
mentions resilience as a key element within its specific objectives (which include the need to 
foster a smart, resilient and diversified agricultural sector ensuring food security). This is a core 
element  of  the  recommendations  addressed  to  Member  States  by  the  Commission  for  the 
drafting of their CAP national strategic plans12. In the same vein, the CFP has as one of its 
objectives  to  promote  the  development  of  fisheries  and  aquaculture  activities  that  are 
environmentally, economically and socially sustainable, and to contribute to healthy and stable 
food supplies and security for EU citizens. This is a key aspect addressed by Member States in 
the  drafting  of  their  national  programmes  under  the  European  Maritime,  Fisheries  and 
Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF), which supports the CFP, the EU maritime policy, and the EU 
agenda for international ocean governance. 

Food system: the definition of ‘food system’ has been debated in the preparation of the United 
Nations’  Food  Systems  Summit,  building  on  a  variety  of  previous  contributions 13 .  The 
definition proposed is as follows: “food systems encompass the entire range of actors and their 
interlinked  value-adding  activities  involved  in  the  production,  aggregation,  processing, 

8   http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/faoitaly/documents/pdf/pdf_Food_Security_Cocept_Note.pdf. 
9    Wieland, A., & Durach, C. F. (2021). Two perspectives on supply chain resilience. Journal of Business 

Logistics. 

10  2020 strategic foresight report. 
11  Antón, J., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021. 
12  Recommendations to the Member States as regards their strategic plan for the Common Agricultural Policy, 

COM(2020)846 final https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0846. 

13  Von Braun et al., Food Systems – Definition, Concept and Application for the UN Food Systems Summit, 

2020. 

7 

 
 
                                                 
distribution,  consumption  and  disposal  of  food  products  that  originate  from  agriculture, 
forestry or fisheries, and food industries”. Further, “the broader economic, societal and natural 
environments in which they are embedded” is relevant. The definition clarifies that not only 
production in the FSC is concerned, but also activities upstream, services and interlinked value 
chains:  “Production  at  the  beginning  of  value  chains,  of  course,  includes  the  farming 
communities but also pre-production actors, i.e., from input industries such as fertilizer or seeds. 
The  range  of  actors  also  includes  science,  technology  and  innovation  actors  that  are  partly 
integral to the food system, partly embedded, for instance, in the life science and health research 
systems.  In  food  industries’  processing,  foods  and  non-foods  result  from  interlinked  value 
chains. Related to these value chains is another set of relevant food systems actors, i.e. public 
and private quality and safety control organisations”. 

Food self-sufficiency is defined as the ability to meet consumption needs from own production, 
rather than by importing food. Food self-sufficiency gained increased attention in a number of 
countries in the wake of the 2007–08 international food crisis, as countries sought to buffer 
themselves from volatility on world food markets. Food self-sufficiency is often presented in 
policy  circles  as  the  opposite  of  free  international  trade  in  food,  and  is  widely  critiqued  by 
economists  as  a  misguided  and  counterproductive  approach  to  food  security,  that  places 
political priorities ahead of economic efficiency14; 

Food sovereignty: defined originally by Via Campesina15, the concept corresponds to a peoples’ 
or  a  countries’  right  to  independently  define  their  agricultural  and  food  policy,  without 
dumping vis-à-vis third countries,  prioritising local agricultural and food production in order 
to  feed  people,  and  giving  access  to  producers,  farmers  and  landless  people  to  land,  water, 
seeds, and credit.   

2.  THE EU FOOD SECTOR: STRENGTHS, RISKS AND VULNERABILITIES 

2.1.  The EU food powerhouse  

2.1.1.  A leading agricultural producer with high food self-sufficiency  

The self-sufficiency rate is an indicator used to describe the import (or export) level of reliance 
on trade for  specific  products.  For many food products,  the self-sufficiency of a country or 
territory is explained in part by natural conditions. For example, the self-sufficiency rate for 
wheat is above 100% in the EU because the natural conditions in the EU are very favourable 
to the production of wheat. On the other hand, the natural conditions for soya bean production 
are less favourable in the EU than in other parts of the world, and so the EU is a net importer 
of these products. Similarly, the EU self-sufficiency rate for tropical fruits is low due to the 
quasi-absence  of  tropical  climate  zones  in  the  EU 16.  Since  the  creation  of  the  European 
Economic  Community  in  1958,  the  EU  has  progressively  become  self-sufficient  in  most 

14  Jennifer Clapp, Food self-sufficiency: Making sense of it, and when it makes sense, Food Policy, Volume 66, 

2017, Pages 88-96. 

15  Claeys, P. (2013) Food sovereignty: a critical dialogue. 
16  Note that this use of the term ‘self-sufficiency’ does not account for substitutability between products – for 
example, consumers would substitute the consumption of tropical fruits by other types of fruits, to a degree, 
should the price of tropical fruits in the EU market increase. This substitution effect in product terms would 
also allow EU consumers to substitute, to an extent, for the nutritional benefits derived from tropical fruit. 
That is, de facto the EU’s self-sufficiency on food – for example at a nutritional level – is higher than what is 
suggested by the self-sufficiency rate at a product level that we employ in this section. 

8 

 
 
 
                                                 
primary  agricultural  products  in  volume terms (figure 1).  Beyond the natural  conditions for 
food production and consumers’ preferences in the EU, there are other factors determining the 
competitiveness of the agricultural, fishery and food sectors, among others supportive policies, 
such as the Common Agricultural Policy, the Common Fisheries Policy, and the Single Market. 

FIGURE 1. EU27 SELF-SUFFICIENCY RATE FOR SELECTED COMMODITIES17 

Source: DG Agriculture and Rural  Development,  based on Eurostat  data (2021 figures are 
estimates). 

On  average,  the  main  primary  products  in  which  the  EU  was  self-sufficient  in  2017-2021 
include: cereals (soft wheat, barley); sunflower; animal products (all meat and dairy products 
with  the  exception  of  sheep  and  goat  meat);  fruit  &  vegetables  (peaches,  nectarines,  fresh 
apples  and  processed  tomatoes,  and  close  to  100%  self-sufficiency  in  fresh  oranges,  fresh 
tomatoes,  and  processed  apples).  The  EU’s  production  surplus  is  most  significant  for  milk 
powders (whole and skimmed milk powder, whey), olive oil, and soft wheat.  

These  figures  are  for  aggregate  sectors  or  sub-sectors.  They  should  be  treated  with  caution 
when these sectors or markets are segmented, for instance in the case of meat, where various 
different types of cuts, with different values can exist - e.g., poultry breasts, legs or wings. An 
above  100%  self-sufficiency  in  poultry  production  does  not  mean  that  the  EU  only  exports 
poultry meat: EU consumers buy more poultry breasts, which are net imported, and less for 
other cuts, which are net exported.  

17  SMP self-sufficiency rates during this period were influenced by the opening of public stock intervention, 

which drove the production and storage of SMP. 

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Not all food commodities can be produced in  any given territory, due to its specific natural 
conditions or other factors influencing comparative advantage.  In the EU,  tropical  products 
(avocadoes, bananas, palm oil, cocoa, coffee, warm-water shrimps) are not produced in any 
significant scale, and need to be imported. Other products are produced under more favourable 
conditions out of the EU, but not in sufficient scale to meet demand. The main primary food 
products in which the EU was not self-sufficient included cereals (durum wheat, maize, rice), 
sugar, protein crops (lentils and chickpeas), oilseeds products (rapeseed, soya beans, palm oil), 
sheep and goat meat, fishery and aquaculture products (EU self-sufficiency averaged 42.5% in 
2018 for all fishery and aquaculture products and 14% for the top 5 species consumed in the 
EU (i.e., tuna, salmon, cod, Alaska pollock and shrimps18) and certain fruits and vegetables 
(such as processed oranges – mainly orange juice; see figure 2).  

FIGURE  2.  EU27  SELF-SUFFICIENCY  RATE  FOR  SELECTED  FRUITS  AND  VEGETABLES, 
OLIVE OIL AND WINE, FISHERY AND AQUACULTURE PRODUCTS 

250

200

150

100

50

0

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

Source: DG Agriculture and Rural  Development,  based on Eurostat  data (2021 figures are 
estimates);  for  fishery  and  aquaculture  products  EUMOFA,  based  on  EUROSTAT,  FAO, 
national administrations and FEAP data (2020 and 2021 data not available). 

2.1.2.  A key actor on the global food market 

The EU is a net exporter of agri-food products, and the sector contributes significantly to the 
EU’s economy. In 2020, net exports reached EUR 62 billion19.  Higher value products, such as 
processed food and food preparations, are the main drivers of the EU’s positive trade balance. 

Although more than 85% of EU agriculture and food production is consumed in EU domestic 
markets (traded within the Single Market, used at national, regional or local level), the share 

18  The EU fish market 2020 edition, EUMOFA. 
19  The EU imported EUR 122.3 billon of agri-food products and exported EUR 184.3 billion in 2020. 

10 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
of exports to  countries outside the EU increased  in  recent  years.  In some sectors,  extra-EU 
export opportunities played a large role in recent  income growth (e.g. wine, cheese and pig 
meat).  The  EU  has  found  important  export markets  in  particular  in  countries  where  dietary 
patterns  have  changed  with  economic  growth  or  the  adoption  of  westernised  consumption 
patterns, and where local climatic conditions limit production. This trend has accelerated in the 
past three decades, during which time the EU increased its production – and its surpluses – of 
certain primary agricultural products, most significantly dairy products (excluding butter) and 
pig meat. 

The increase in the EU’s agri-food net trade balance in the last decade, is due to significant 
competitiveness gains, in particular concerning high value added and quality products, and in 
spite of the higher production costs20 implied, among others, by higher EU production standards 
(notably related to food safety), the environment, or animal welfare. 

FIGURE  3.  EU  STRUCTURE  OF  AGRI-FOOD  TRADE  WITH  EXTRA-EU,  2011-2020  (IN 
MILLION EURO) 

Source: COMEXT 

The  EU  is  the  world’s  leading  agri-food  exporter,  and  ranks  within  the  top  three  world 
importers,  behind  the  US  and  China  (average  2017-2019).  According  to  the  OECD, 
participating  in  global  value  chains  generates  significant  economic  gains  as  it  fosters 
specialisation and productivity gains (OECD, 202121). 

Seafood is among the most traded food commodities. The EU is the largest seafood market in 
the world.  This  also  makes  the seafood system,  among others, more vulnerable to  systemic 
shocks that disrupt the flow of products and the livelihoods that depend on this trade. The extra-

20  Se section 4 costs of production in the EU of the factsheet on production, yield and productivity (2018). 
21  OECD, Global value chains: Efficiency and risks in the context of COVID-19 (11 February 2021). 

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EU trade balance deficit in fish products in 2019 was worth EUR 21 billion, which was slightly 
higher than the previous year. In a longer perspective, the deficit in real terms grew by 33% 
from 2010 to 2019.  

In 2019, extra-EU exports of fishery and aquaculture products reached a 5-year peak of 2.21 
million  tonnes,  and  showed  a  growth  of  7%  with  respect  to  2015.  The  EU  mainly  exports 
herring,  blue  whiting,  skipjack  tuna,  mackerel,  non-food  use  products  and  salmon.  Five 
countries receive 50% of EU exports: Nigeria, Norway, the USA, China and Egypt. Extra-EU 
imports of fishery and aquaculture products reached a 10-year high of 6.34 million tonnes in 
2019. More than one-quarter of extra-EU imports originates from Norway, the main supplier. 
China  is  second,  but  far  behind,  accounting  for  less  than  10%  of  the  total,  while  Iceland, 
Ecuador, Morocco, Vietnam and the United States follow, each covering about 5%. 

2.1.3.  A limited number of cases where the EU is strongly reliant on imports 

The preceding sections included a general discussion of EU self-sufficiency and the net trade 
position  for  agricultural,  fish,  and  food  products.  The  present  section  identifies  the  main 
products for which the EU relies on imports to ensure supplies. 

2.1.3.1.  Agricultural commodities 

For some specific products the EU has a significant trade deficit, which, on a first approach, 
may be considered to increase  in the vulnerability of the EU’s food system.  In some cases, 
imported  products  are  difficult  to  substitute  for,  be  it  in  terms  of  volume,  import  sources, 
quality or cost. For example, disruptions in oilseeds’ global trade and a consequent price spike 
for  protein  imports  would  result  in  higher  production  costs  for  meat  and  dairy,  with 
consequences in terms of production. A tight global cereal supply would affect both food and 
feed costs, with implications for the bio-economy.  A disruption of vegetable oil trade could 
affect  the  EU  biofuel  and  food  processing  sectors.  Still,  these  effects  would  have  to  be 
significant (for example, a combination of being reliant on a few import sources and a high 
vulnerability to climate change in those regions leading to sudden shortages22) and combined 
with further supply disruptions elsewhere in the EU to pose a serious challenge from a food 
security of supply perspective.  

The  self-sufficiency  ratio  of  the  EU  in  2019/2020  for  oilseeds  was  55%.  The  EU  mainly 
imports  soya  beans  (67%  of  total  EU  oilseed  imports)  to  produce  soya  meals  and  soya  oil 
(Figure 6). Imports of soya beans are necessary to produce animal feed items (with soya meals) 
and oil for human consumption or biodiesel (with soya oil). The EU imports mainly from the 
US (almost 50% of the total trimmed average imports in 2015-2019) and Brazil (around 25%). 
Rapeseed  imports  are  also  on  the  rise  due  to  reduced  domestic  output  (around  30%  of  EU 
domestic demand for rapeseed is met by imported products and close to 50% of EU rapeseed 
imports are sourced from the Ukraine). 

22  https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/global-climate-change-impacts-and. 

12 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Still, when it comes to feed protein, roughage represents 43% of total EU feed use (in protein 
content equivalent) according to the feed protein balance sheet23. About 32 million tonnes of 
protein from roughage was fed to animals across the EU in 2020/21. Concerning cereals, 14.2 
million tonnes of protein was sourced from domestically produced cereals. Still, the EU is a 
net importer of maize, which is a significant source of proteins for animal feed. The EU self-
sufficiency  ratio  is  80%  and  around  17.1  million  tonnes  are  imported  annually  (2016-2020 
average). The EU maize imports are following an upward trend to meet the feed demand. The 
EU is mainly importing maize from Ukraine and Brazil, which represent around 80% of total 
maize imports. Nevertheless, EU domestic production is also increasing, and up to 50 million 
tonnes of domestically produced maize are fed to animals in the EU.  

The EU self-sufficiency ratio for oil meals is slightly above the one for oilseeds (at 63% in 
2020/2021). Forty percent of EU domestic demand for oilseed meals is met by imports, with 
soya meals at more than 80% in its total oil meal imports. The EU imports soya meal mainly 
from South America (Brazil 48%, and Argentina 39%). 

The EU is also a net importer of protein crops (pulses with the exception of soya beans: peas, 
beans, etc.), which are mainly used in animal feed, but also in food. Regarding feed, around 
90%  of  the  protein  from  these  crops  is  sourced  domestically  (mainly  field  peas  and  broad 
beans). Other protein crops aimed at food consumption, such as lentils and chickpeas, are net-
imported  to  meet  increased  demand.  In  2020,  EU  chickpeas  imports  increased  by  32%, 
compared to the 5-year average of the previous years, and lentils imports increased by 16%. 

Concerning vegetable oils, the EU imports 40% of its needs, out of which around 70% are palm 
oil  imports.  For  palm  oil,  more  than  80%  come  from  two  countries.  The  main  sources  are 
Indonesia (almost 50% of total EU palm oil imports in 2020/21) and Malaysia (about 33%). In 
2020, 2.4 million tonnes of palm oil imports were directed to biodiesel production (34%) while 
4.7 million tonnes was used for food production.   

23  https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/food-farming-fisheries/farming/documents/eu-feed-protein-

balance-sheet_2020-2021_en.pdf. 

13 

 
 
                                                 
FIGURE 4. SHARE OF IMPORTS IN TOTAL EU DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION 

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

2014/2015

2015/2016

2016/2017

2017/2018

2018/2019

2019/2020

2020/2021

Protein crops

Oranges

  Soya beans

In  the  case  of  oranges,  a  distinction  should  be  made  between  imports  of  fresh  oranges  and 
processed  oranges.  The  EU  imports  a  large  majority  of  the  processed  oranges  it  consumes 
(predominantly in the form of juice) from Brazil (84% of total EU processed oranges imports 
on average in 2010-2020)24. 

In 2017, the global organic food and drink market reached EUR 92 billion25. The EU accounts 
for 37% of the global market for organic food and drink (EUR 34.3 billion). Over the last ten 
years, the EU market doubled its size and it continues to grow at a significant pace (+11% in 
2017 compared to 2016), indicating that it has not yet reached its maturity. The EU relies on 
imports of organic products to meet its demand, but no quantitative analysis has been conducted 
to date for these products.  

2.1.3.2. Fisheries and aquaculture 

The EU is a leading trader of fish and aquaculture products. In 2019, imports and exports of 
fisheries  and  aquaculture  products  between  the  EU  and  the  rest  of  the  world  totalled  8.55 
million tonnes, with a value of EUR 33 billion, making the EU the second largest trader of 
these products after China. The EU is a net importer, with a trade deficit of EUR 21 billion in 
2019. The majority of products produced, consumed and traded in the EU are wild products 
whereas farmed products are the majority at global level. 

The EU has a low self-sufficiency rate in fisheries and aquaculture products and it is largely 
dependent  on  imports  to  meet  internal  demand.   Imports  dominate  for  tuna,  salmon,  cod, 

24  The EU imports a high share of its demand for tropical products, such as coffee and cocoa. The lack of data, 
notably on EU production levels, impedes a full analysis for these sectors. While this is not strictly an issue 
of concern from a food security perspective, the consumption of these products is important and could be 
monitored with additional data. 

25  https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/food-farming-fisheries/farming/documents/agri-market-brief-18-

organic-imports_en.pdf. 

14 

 
 
 
                                                 
Alaska  pollock  and  shrimps  –  the  top  5  species  consumed  in  the  EU,  for  which  EU  self-
sufficiency averaged 14% in 2018. The EU is also partially dependant on processing activities 
outside its borders. Part of the seafood products, domestic or imported, are processed in third 
countries (e.g. peeling of shrimps or filleting of white fish). That is, part of EU exports are then 
reimported after being processed outside the EU. 

2.1.3.3. Member State level 

Natural conditions and agricultural and seafood production capacities are very diverse across 
the EU, with implications for food security26. The Single Market is of crucial importance to 
satisfying the demand for food of EU consumers. The Single Market allows food items to move 
freely from one Member State to another and to reach all regions across the EU. The Single 
Market also allows necessary inputs to food and agricultural production to reach those in the 
FSC that need them.  

One indicator that can be used to quantify this diverse situation in EU Member States is the 
self-sufficiency  rate.  This  rate  is  calculated  from  production  and  trade  figures  to  estimate 
consumption levels27. As shown in the graphs below, it is estimated that nine Member States 
are self-sufficient in arable crops (cereals and oilseeds), while eight are self-sufficient in animal 
products (meats and dairy products), and no Member State is self-sufficient in seafood. More 
specifically,  data  show  that  fourteen  Member  States  are  producing  enough  cereals  for  their 
domestic  production  (self-sufficiency  rate  exceeding  100%).  Twelve  Member  States  are 
producing oilseeds to sustain their demand. For some EU Member States, the self-sufficiency 
ratio exceeds  100%, and they have a surplus to  export within the Single Market  or to  third 
countries (figure 5). 

FIGURE 5. ARABLE CROPS SELF-SUFFICIENCY ACROSS THE EU 

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LT LV LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE

Cereals

Oilseeds

Source: DG AGRI-JRC Balance sheet 

Fourteen Member States are self-sufficient on dairy products.  For the case of all meats, ten 
Member States are self-sufficient (figure 6).  

26  See, for example: Economist Intelligence Unit, Global Food Security Index. 
27  DataM database: https://data.jrc.ec.europa.eu/dataset/33243e5e-44a1-4b43-9444-31d64dc7921f. 

15 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
FIGURE 6. ANIMAL PRODUCTS SELF-SUFFICIENCY ACROSS THE EU 

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LT LV LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE

Meats

Dairy products

Source DG AGRI_JRC Balance sheet 

While  the  above  analysis  gives  an  overview  of  the  situation  mainly  in  terms  of  aggregated 
arable and animal products, it is useful to have a more detailed monitoring of the situation at 
the level of specific commodities. 

Member  States  that  are  not  self-sufficient  in  a  specific  commodity  typically  use  the  Single 
Market  to  satisfy  demand.  For  instance,  in  Spain,  which  is  not  self-sufficient  in  cereals  or 
oilseeds, more than 80% of wheat and sunflower flows are imports from other EU Member 
States. Italy is self-sufficient at 53% for cereals, and 67% of their cereal imports come from 
within the Single Market.  External trade (with non-EU countries) is used to satisfy the demand 
for certain products. In France, the self-sufficiency ratio for soya beans is 46%, and extra-EU 
trade partners meet around 80% of the remaining demand. Denmark and Portugal, which have 
a self-sufficiency ratio for soya beans of 0% (meaning no production), trade mostly with extra-
EU partners to meet demand for this commodity (60% and 98%, respectively). As for fishery 
and  aquaculture  products,  for  which  no  Member  State  is  self-sufficient,  the  EU  is  able  to 
maintain a high level of fish and seafood apparent consumption (production plus imports minus 
exports) mainly by sourcing from other regions of the world through imports. 

The supply tables give an indication in value of how diverse the situation in the EU is, with 
regard to the share in value of imports (intra-EU or extra-EU) in the total supply of agricultural 
products, fish products and food products. For agricultural products and food products28, the 
average share of domestic sourcing is around 75% in the EU (with the remaining 15% sourced 
within the Single Market and 10% from third countries for agricultural products;  and, for food 
products,  19% from the  Single Market  and 6% from third countries).  A  certain  number of 
Member States with a strong agri-food sector source over 80% of both their agricultural and 
food products nationally (France, Italy, Spain, Poland, Romania). Germany has a high share of 
national sourcing for food products (76%) but less for agricultural products (60%) and relies 
on 24% of agricultural products imported from other Member States. Member States in the 
East and North of Europe rely more on imports to supply their agri-food markets. The supply 
of fish products is sourced much less from national sources than agri-food products: only 48% 
in average of fish products are used in the country where they have been produced (in value), 
while on average 28% is sourced from the Single Market and 24% from third countries. Imports 

28  In the sense of national accounts. 

16 

 
 
 
                                                 
prevail for tuna, salmon, cod, Alaska pollock and shrimps – the top 5 species consumed in the 
EU and for which EU self-sufficiency averaged only 14% in 2018.  

FIGURE  7.  SHARE  OF  NATIONAL  AND  IMPORTED  SOURCING  IN  THE  SUPPLY  OF 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS (2019) 

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

National supply

Intra Eu supply

Extra EU supply

  Source : Eurostat, National accounts (some MS unavailable) 

FIGURE  8  SHARE  OF  NATIONAL  AND  IMPORTED  SOURCING  IN  THE  SUPPLY  OF  FISH 
PRODUCTS (2019) 

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

National supply

Intra Eu supply

Extra EU supply

  Source : Eurostat, National accounts (some MS unavailable) 

17 

 
 
 
 
FIGURE  9  -  SHARE  OF  NATIONAL  AND  IMPORTED  SOURCING  IN  THE  SUPPLY  OF  FOOD 
PRODUCTS (2019) 

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

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2.1.3.4.Inputs  

The  EU  is  not  self-sufficient  in  certain  inputs  used  in  food  production.  Globally,  fertiliser 
production is rather concentrated in a few countries and, thus, the EU relies on a limited number 
of  sources  for  its  fertiliser  needs.  The  EU  imports  several  types  of  mineral  fertilisers  from 
Eastern  neighbourhood  countries  (such  as  Belarus,  Ukraine  and  Russia)  and  North  Africa 
(Algeria and Morocco). On average, in 2010-2020 and depending on the product, the EU relied 
up to 43% on a single country for fertilisers29. In the case of potassic fertilisers, the EU relies 
on Belarus and Russia for 59% of its imports. For phosphatic fertilisers, one third of the EU 
imports come from Morocco, while for nitrogen fertilisers (ammonia plus mineral nitrogenous 
fertilisers), 31% of the EU imports come from Russia. 

For  plant-protection  products  and  micronutrients  for  compound  feed,  although  detailed 
quantitative  data  are  not  easily  available,  the  EU  imports  mainly  from  a  few  countries  (in 
particular  from  China).  No  accessibility  issues  were  reported  during  the  COVID-19  health 
crisis for these products. 

For feed inputs, the reliance on the global supply chain posed challenges during COVID-19, 
especially in the beginning of the crisis30. Delays in sourcing of raw material for feed additives 

29  Share of Russian exports in EU total imports of fertilisers containing two or three of the fertilising elements 

nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium. 

30  FEFAC, presentation at GREX. 

18 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
(chemical precursors or substances themselves)31 and packaging (paper and cardboard, ink)32 
had a ripple effect on the rest of the food chain, although not to a major extent.  

The seed industry was able to avoid major disruption during COVID-19, thanks in part to a 
policy of diversification, including of location of research and development, of production and 
processing, and of packaging. The stability and continuity of policies is an important element 
to allow companies being better prepared to crises33. Still, the limited number of companies 
operating in the seed industry could be seen as a vulnerability in itself.  

While the EU is a net importer of fishmeal, mainly from Peru, major disruption was avoided 
during the COVID-19 crisis by sourcing from EU production, hence limiting exports thereof 
in the same period, combined with a global decrease of the demand. 

2.1.3.5.Diversity of production and of supply chains  

The EU’s real food security “insurance” is the presence of a diversity of skilled and generally 
well-organised farmers and fishers throughout the European Union territory, in combination 
with  well-functioning  markets,  implemented  technological  progress,  and  sustainable 
production.  Concerning  agriculture,  Europe’s  temperate  climate,  with  broadly  sufficient 
precipitation  throughout  the  year  and  moderate  temperatures,  is  an  important  guarantor  of 
stable  yields  at  a  high  level,  which  ensures  sufficient  production,  if  policies  are  in  place  to 
ensure that farmers can produce. 

There is  a large diversity of farming types in the EU34. In terms of asset  value, on average, 
Dutch and Danish farms held the highest amounts of assets (around EUR 3,118,000 and EUR 
2,689,000, respectively). This reflects the very high land prices and the large share in these 
Member States of types of farming that typically need considerable investment, such as dairy 
production, granivores and horticulture. In contrast, farms in Romania had the lowest total asset 
values (EUR 55 000), as they are characterised by less capital-intensive types of farming and 
lower land prices. In terms of labour, the average number of workers employed per farm in the 
EU stood at 1.6 Annual work units (AWU) in 2018. However, the average labour input varies 
considerably across Member States, ranging from 10.6 AWU per farm in Slovakia to 1 AWU 
in  Greece.  The  average  size  of  farms  studied  in  this  publication  (small  farms  are  not  well 
covered in the Farm Accountancy Data Network sample) was 37 ha in 2018. However, this 
average  size  varied  considerably  across  Member  States,  ranging  from  445  ha  per  farm  in 
Slovakia to 3 ha per farm in Malta. The average farm in the EU-28 had 16.1 ha of agricultural 
land in 201335. Most farms in the EU-28 can be characterised as small in physical terms, since 
66% had less than 5 ha of agricultural land, and only 7% more than 50 ha in 2013. Close to 
half (47%) of the very small farms (<5 ha) are located in Romania, with another 11% in Poland. 
At the EU level the CR5 (concentration ratio: the market share of the five largest firms) at farm 
level was 0.19% in 2010 (ranging from 0.4% in Germany to around 9% in Estonia), meaning 
there is a low level of market concentration in agriculture in the EU36.  

31  FEFANA, presentation at GREX. 
32  EUROPEN, presentation at GREX. 
33  Euroseeds, presentation at GREX. 
34  EU farm economics overview, 2021. 
35  Economic brief on Farm structures, 2018. 
36  Commission SWD Impact Assessment - Initiative to improve the food supply chain (unfair trading practices), 

2018. 

19 

 
 
                                                 
When looking towards the future, farming is likely to remain highly diversified in the EU. A 
foresight study on the farmers of the future states that “there will be a more diverse ecosystem 
of farms responding to […] challenges and opportunities – benefitting from technological and 
social innovation of the next 20 years. Those famer profiles that reflect the current mainstream 
of farming are expected to adapt and to still be around in 2040. They will be joined by the 
profiles that are currently considered to be emerging, but by 2040 are well established (cell 
farmer, controlled environment farmer, urban farmer, regenerative farmer, social care farmer, 
lifestyle farmer)37. 

Fishery  and  aquaculture  producers  in  the  EU  benefit  from  being  able  to  join  producer 
organisations (POs). There are around 220 such POs in the EU, representing roughly 80% of 
the  catches  in  value  and  volume.  Although  the  situation  varies  from  one  Member  State  to 
another  for  historical  or  cultural  reasons,  POs  globally  play  a  key  role  in  the  collective 
management  of  their  members'  activities  and  in  the  promotion  of  sustainable,  efficient  and 
viable  activities,  aligned  with  the  objectives  of  the  common  fisheries  policy  and  taking 
advantage of the market dynamics. POs played a decisive role in adapting and supporting their 
member’s activities to face the market disruptions resulting from external chocks, such as the 
outbreak of the COVID-19 crisis or Brexit.  

Downstream in the FSC, the EU food and drink industry is the largest manufacturing sector in 
terms  of  turnover  in  the  EU  (EUR  1.09  trillion),  and  the  biggest  industrial  employer    (4.4 
million employees). 99% of companies are SMEs (representing 60% of employment and 47.5% 
of turnover), 78% are micro enterprises of 0 to 9 employees (14.5% of employment and 5.7% 
of turnover) and only 1% are large companies (40% of employment and 52.5% of turnover). 
The industry is among the top three manufacturing industries in most Member States.  This 
diversity is still the main picture of the EU food industry, despite growing concentration: the 
top five food processing firms are estimated to represent an overall market share in retail of 
15%  in  a  majority  of  Member  States.  On  a  product  category  basis  however,  a  few  food 
industries are much more concentrated: for example in the biscuits or the confectionery sectors, 
the CR5 is above 60%.   

Food retail is also characterised by the existence of a high number of SMEs involved in food 
trade  (over  99%  of  the  enterprises,  representing  54%  of  turnover  and  56%  of  the  total 
employment), but with important differences across Member States. Large food retail chains 
account for a varying share of the market (from around 30% in IT to around 90% in FI). 

With such a diversity of actors in the FSC, the channels to bring food from the farm to the fork 
are themselves diverse. The case of tomato supply chain in Spain38, offers an illustration of this 
diversity:  a  ‘local’  supply  chain  represented  by  a  network  of  small-scale  agro-ecological 
farmers  selling  directly  to  consumers;  a  ‘mixed’  chain  from  medium-sized  semi-diversified 
farms selling through a cooperative to a network of grocery shops in the same region; and a 
‘global’ chain where tomatoes are produced on substrate in average- and large-sized farms of 
a specialised  region  (Almeria),  and sold to  a wholesale  cooperative that  supplies wholesale 
markets and, sometimes, directly to retailers throughout Europe. Just for short or for local FSCs 
the diversity of organisational arrangements is striking, from Community-supported agriculture 

37  Bock A.K. et al. (2020) Farmers of the Future. 
38  Gamboa, G., Kovacic, Z., DI Masso, M., et al. The Complexity of Food Systems: Defining Relevant 
Attributes and Indicators for the Evaluation of Food Supply Chains in Spain, Sustainability (2016). 

20 

 
 
                                                 
schemes,  to  diverse  types  of  on-farm  sales,  farmers  markets  or  shops,  public  procurement 
schemes, e-commerce arrangements, etc.39  

In terms of policy, favouring a diverse supply chain can contribute to food system resilience. 
A key characteristic of agriculture production is its dependence on the weather, and trade across 
regions of agricultural products is a way to hedge against unfavourable weather events in one 
or more specific regions40. The importance of trade for resilience is likely to increase in the 
face  of  the  climate  change41.  Similarly  to  the  approach  of  biodiversity  offering  a  buffer  for 
ecosystems  against  external  shocks,  it  can  be  demonstrated  that  diversity  of  supply  chains 
reinforces  the  capacity  of  a  city  to  resist  to  food  shocks,  for  instance  generated  by  drought 
events42. The existing FSCs system was remarkably resilient during the COVID-19 pandemic, 
including successfully innovating to respond to a fast changing situation43. This illustrates the 
ability that FSCs have to respond to market-led changes, including to shifts in consumer food 
demand towards short or local FSCs.   The role of short and local FSCs was also the subject of 
a  GREX  presentation  by  Via  Campesina 44 :  short  FSCs  can  still  work  in  events  where 
vulnerabilities linked to supply flows are at stake. Short FSCs have their role to play in such 
events, as shown during the COVID-19 pandemic, as alternatives to longer supply chains. But 
shocks can be of multiple types, and flexibility and options are needed. The literature shows 
that local food systems are not able to feed the whole world population on their own, and that 
global FSCs are essential  to  ensure an adequate and stable food supply45. That  is,  local  and 
global FSCs are complementary, from a resilience perspective. But further: local and  global 
FSCs  are  also  mutually  benefitting  and  reinforcing  each  other,  with  positive  spill-overs 
occurring from the operation of global, highly efficient and innovative FSCs contributing to 
the modernising and the spurring of innovation of local production systems46. 

39  Short Food Supply Chains and Local Food Systems in the EU. A State of Play of their Socio-Economic 

Characteristics. 

40  Dall'Erba, Sandy, Zhangliang Chen, and Noé J. Nava. "US Interstate Trade Will Mitigate the Negative 
Impact of Climate Change on Crop Profit." American Journal of Agricultural Economics (2021). 

41  Pérez Domínguez, I., Chatzopoulos, T., and Hristov J., Economic adaptation of EU agriculture to climate 

adversities: the role of trade as a buffer , 26 March 2021. 

42  Gomez, M., Mejia, A., Ruddell, B.L. et al. Supply chain diversity buffers cities against food shocks. Nature 

595, 250–254 (2021). 

43  https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/view/?ref=134_134305-ybqvdf0kg9&title=Food-Supply-Chains-and-COVID-
19-Impacts-and-policy-lessons&_ga=2.130541263.1760422270.1627227487-1315192944.1603338099. 
44  How can short food supply chains make Europe more resilient to food crisis? Presentation at the GREX 21 

April 2021. 

45  Kinnunen, P., Guillaume, J.H.A., Taka, M. et al. Local food crop production can fulfil demand for less than 

one-third of the population, Nature Food (2020). 

46  IFPRI Virtual Event – “Local vs Global? The role of trade in building food system resilience”, 
https://www.ifpri.org/event/virtual-event-local-vs-global-role-trade-building-food-system-
resilience?fbclid=IwAR3sFl1H5ps6zv9wsHoCxkrZwhi0RUMZTkO4Xjz5f0OnILyprR_xjDUeQ-c. 

21 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2.2.  Risks and vulnerabilities 

2.2.1.  Risks to the food system 

The Commission’s Megatrends Hub identifies fourteen global megatrends47. These are long-
term global driving forces that are observable in the present day and are likely to continue into 
the future. The JRC in the second GREX meeting (organised in February 2021) looked at how 
some of these megatrends are likely to affect food supply and food security in the EU, offering 
a categorisation in three groups (figure 10): 

1)  Mega-trends with a highly disruptive potential for FSCs, which include: security (attacks 
on  energy  or  other  critical  infrastructure);  expanding  use  of  technology  and  IT 
infrastructure  (for  example,  IT  failure,  cyber-attacks,  disruption  to  communication 
channels);  climate  change  (more  frequent  extreme  weather  events  and  natural  disasters, 
newly introduced and expanding pests); health (pandemics, biosecurity and bioterrorism); 
and social inequalities (social unrest, decreasing social capital). 

2)  At  a  lower  level  of  disruptive  potential:  mega-trends  related  to  work  and  migration 
(availability of workforce, organisational structures); education (training, misinformation); 
resource scarcity (land availability, water, nutrient scarcity); and the growing importance 
of East and South (geopolitics, international trade). Some of these may both bring risks to 
food security, as well as opportunities to improve food security (for example, international 
trade and migration dynamics can have a positive impact on system resilience); 

3)  Megatrends that reflect structural developments that have to be taken into account, but that 
have a lower disruptive potential in relation to food security: demographics (aging society, 
depopulation); the role of cities (city food policies, broader contingency plans at city level);  
governance (new networks, new actors);  consumerism (higher demand, food prices, food 
innovation). 

The  World  Economic  Forum  (WEF),  based  on  survey  results  in  its  Global  Risks  Report48, 
identifies the top global risks according to their time horizon (short-, medium-, and long-term), 
likelihood, and impact (see figure 11). According to WEF, the top short-term risks relate to 
diseases, livelihood crises, extreme weather events or cybersecurity. Medium-term risks are 
more structural (asset bubbles, debt crises). Long-term risks relate to the weakening of states 
or natural resources crises. WEF assesses four of the five most likely risks to be linked to the 
environment:  extreme  weather,  climate  action  failure,  human  environmental  damage,  and 
biodiversity loss. Another category of likely risks are related to technology (3 of the top ten 
risks  according  to  WEF:  digital  power  concentration,  digital  inequality  and  cybersecurity 
failure). Societal risks like diseases (pandemics) and livelihood crises are also seen to be both 
among the ten most likely and impactful.  

47  These long-term driving forces are identified and monitored by the Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC). 
They  are  continually  reviewed  by  JRC  experts  to  include  updates  and  accommodate  associated  trends  of 
relevance or interest for the EU Commission Services. The definitions of the 14 megatrends are available here. 

48  World Economic Forum: https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-risks-report-2021 and presentation at 

the GREX. 

22 

 
 
 
                                                 
FIGURE 10 - RESULTS OF A MAPPING EXERCISE OF 14 MEGATRENDS IN RELATION TO FOOD SECURITY 

Source: JRC, 2021

23 

 
 
 
FIGURE 11 - WEF SURVEY: PERCEIVED IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD OF GLOBAL RISKS 

Source: WEF, 2021 

Beyond this mapping of risks, the WEF also identifies frontier risks (see figure 12). These are 
seemingly less likely (low probability possibilities), but the impact of which could be large. An 
example of such frontier risk is that related to large volcanic eruptions, which are known to 
cause extreme climate and weather variations, depending on numerous factors including the 
location  of  the  volcanic  eruption,  its  timing,  duration,  etc.49.  In  1815,  Tambora  erupted  in 
Indonesia resulting in severe local and global impacts. 1816 was known as the ‘year without a 
summer’ in the Northern Hemisphere (America, Europe) and characterised by widespread crop 
failure50. 

49  Puma, M.J., Chon, S. and Wada, Y. (2015), Exploring the potential impacts of historic volcanic eruptions on 

the contemporary global food system. 

50  Oppenheimer, C. (2003) Climatic, environmental and human consequences of the largest known historic 

eruption: Tambora volcano (Indonesia) 1815. 

24 

 
 
 
                                                 
This illustrates the high degree of uncertainty around the nature of the next crises that could 
affect food security and food supply in the EU.    

FIGURE 12 - WEF FORESIGHT ON FRONTIER RISKS 

Source: WEF, 2021 

Two examples can be further detailed. Most of the risks among those quoted for food supply 
and food security are associated to shortages in the supply of food in terms of quantity produced 
(due  to  large-scale  crop  failures  or  conflicts).  Since  its  inception,  the  EU  has  largely  been 
preserved from such risks, but these should be kept in mind as possibilities. 

A clear outcome of the Commission’s own consultation process is that climate change-related 
weather events and environmental degradation are the perceived main source of risk to food 
security  in  the  EU  in  the  future:  60%  of  respondents  to  the  Commission’s  stakeholder 
questionnaire considered extreme weather events and global warming as the main threats to 
EU food security. This result was confirmed by participants in the GREX (Annex 2) and by 
the answers to the Commission’s “Member States’ questionnaire” (Annex 3). Global warming 
and climate change affect the phenology of plants and animals, the distribution of agro-climatic 
zones and fish populations, water availability, the development of pests and diseases, and yields 
- both in quality and quantity51. For any particular crop, the effect of increased temperature will 
depend: in some areas, warming may benefit the types of crops or allow farmers to shift to 
crops that are currently grown in warmer areas. Conversely, if the higher temperature exceeds 
a crop's optimum temperature, yields will decline. The increase of CO2 concentration can result 
in  increased  plant  growth,  but  also  reduced  nutritional  value.    Animal  production  is  also 
affected though heat stress, increased exposure to diseases and by the impact of drought and 
heat for example on pastures and feed grain production. Heat and cold waves, water scarcity 
and  droughts,  floods,  and  wildfires  will  all  directly  impact  farming,  as  well  as  indirectly 
through increased levels of weeds, pests and fungi that benefit from warmer and wetter climate 

51  OECD – opportunities and threats for agriculture https://www.oecd.org/agriculture/understanding-the-global-

food-system/opportunities-and-threats-for-agriculture/. 

25 

 
 
 
                                                 
and of CO2 fertilisation. The impact of climate change on EU agriculture has been modelled 
and shows that,  without  adaptation,  cereals  yields might  decrease, in  particular in  Southern 
Europe, with expected losses corresponding to 10% to 20% of the current yields, and up to 80% 
in Southern Europe in non-irrigated systems for maize, a crop that will become unavailable in 
regions  where  water  is  getting  scarcer 52.  Illustrating  the  North-South  divide  in  Europe  in 
relation to climate change,  wheat yields could on the contrary slightly increase in Northern 
Europe  (by  up  to  5%),  regions  that  would  benefit  from  more  precipitation,  an  anticipated 
growing cycle, and CO2 fertilisation effects. Given the severe climate change impacts on large 
agricultural  producers  outside  Europe,  EU  production  could  slightly  increase  as  Europe  is 
projected to have a comparative advantage. Globally, agricultural production is currently not 
expected to decline due to climate change before 205053. Other threats to EU food supply often 
identified  by  respondents  to  the  questionnaire  relate  to  the  environment  in  general,  with 
resource scarcity or degradation and biodiversity loss (e.g. pollinators), plant or animal health 
issues (uncontrolled plant or animal pests), and human health (pandemics).  

A decrease in the catches of wild fish is also likely to occur under the effect of climate change. 
Models show global marine life biomass could decrease by 5% to 17% under the sole effect of 
climate change, primarily driven by increasing seawater temperature and decreasing primary 
production (with important variations across regions and species)54. 

Recent extreme weather events such as unusually late cold spells combined with vegetation 
being in advance (in 2017, 2021), the increased frequency, intensity and length of droughts 
(2018, 2019), unusual heatwaves (2003, 2019) and floods (2021), show that climate change 
already  affects  agricultural  and  seafood  production  in  the  EU  today.  The  probability  of 
occurrence of years that are both warm and dry has doubled compared to the period 1961-9055. 
The IPCC 6th assessment report confirms that “many regions are projected to experience an 
increase  in  the  probability  of  compound  events  with  higher  global  warming.  In  particular, 
concurrent heatwaves and droughts are likely to become more frequent. Concurrent extremes 
at  multiple  locations  become  more  frequent,  including  in  crop  producing  areas  (...)” 56.  In 
addition,  the  joint  probability  that  key  crop  and  pasture  regions  simultaneously  experience 
severely warm conditions in conjunction with dry years has also increased. This affects the risk 
for  yield  shocks  for  regional  and  global  agricultural  markets  and  has  implications  for  food 
security,  in  particular  as  there  is  an  increase  in  the  probability  of  climatic  extremes  hitting 
several  major  agricultural  regions  simultaneously.  For  example,  this  increasing  risk  of 
simultaneous  failure  has  been  illustrated  for  wheat,  soybean  crops 57  and  maize 58 .  A  few 
countries  dominate  global  maize  production  and  trade.  Simultaneous  production  shocks  in 
these countries can have tremendous impacts on global markets. Such synchronous shocks are 
rare, but will become more likely if the climate continues to warm. The possibility that extreme 
weather events in different areas of the world happen close to each other in time, as shown in 

52  JRC, Climate change impacts and adaptation in Europe, 2020. 
53  European Environmental Agency, Global climate change impacts and the supply of agricultural commodities 

to Europe, February 2021. 

54  Lotze, Heike K., et al., Ensemble projections of global ocean animal biomass with climate change, 2018. 
55  Sarhadi, A., Ausin, M.C. et al., Multidimensional risk in a nonstationary climate: Joint probability of 

increasingly severe warm and dry conditions, 2018. 

56  IPCC, Climate change 2021, The Physical Science Basis, Summary for Policymakers, 2021. 
57  Gaupp, F., Hall, J. et al., Changing risks of simultaneous global breadbasket failure, 2018. 
58  Tigchelaar, M., Battisti, D.S. et al., Future warming increases probability of globally synchronized maize 

production shocks, 2018. 

26 

 
 
                                                 
the Northern Hemisphere in association with a meandering jet stream59, could further increase 
the probability of negative effects on crops. 

While climate change and related extreme weather events can affect the supply of food, other 
risks weigh on the capacity of the FSC to bring the food from producers to consumers. Cyber-
attacks affecting the IT systems of large companies in the agri-food sector have already resulted 
in  disturbance  to  the  food  chain.  For  instance,  food  systems  are  becoming  increasingly 
dependent on information networks - as is the case for every aspect of modern life. This implies 
considering the potential impact of cyber-insecurity on food systems60. Food processing uses 
increasingly sensors, for example to monitor food product temperature during processing and 
transportation,  ensuring  products  being  processed  or  transported  remain  at  optimal 
temperatures. A potential risk is that the sensors could be manipulated, allowing food products 
to  be  stored  at  less  than  optimal  temperatures  without  being  noticed,  thereby  leading  to  an 
enhanced risk of bacterial contamination or loss of shelf-life. Food systems are also reliant on 
just-in-time transportation: agricultural producers depend on timely transportation of seed, fuel, 
fertiliser  and  plant  protection  products,  as  well  as  on  the  timely  transportation  of  harvested 
crops to processors to ensure crop quality is maintained. Grocery retailers require the timely 
delivery of processed agricultural products, along with fresh fruits and vegetables, for ultimate 
delivery  to  the  consumer.  In  these  systems,  inventories  are  kept  light,  and  much  of  the 
“inventory” is in transit at any one time. Cyber-infrastructure breach in just-in-time distribution 
settings  could  have  seriously  disruptive  ripple  effects  across  the  supply  chain.  An  example 
occurred in June 2017 when the ‘NotPetya’ malware attack infected the IT networks of the 
shipping company Maersk. The company, which is responsible for 15% of all global freight, 
reported $300 million in losses. Ships could not be located at sea, nor could they be unloaded 
at port. All Maersk operations came to a standstill. It took 10 days for the company to restore 
all systems. According to Maersk Chairman Jim Snabe, ‘human resilience’ and support from 
customers made it possible for Maersk eventually to cover 80% of shipping volume through 
manual systems while IT was down. If the attack had spread more widely across the transport 
sector and related industries, damage costs could have grown exponentially with spill-overs 
across multiple sectors and economies. 

On the consumer side, the development of the Internet of Things could also imply risks for 
food—if  hackers  were  able  to  control  the  temperature  settings  on  smart  refrigerators, 
consumers could unwittingly be exposed to food spoilage or food poisoning. The capacity for 
disinformation on social media, and the degradation of trust towards traditional media outlets 
creates  an  environment  where  carefully-crafted  rumours  could  become  viral  for  instance 
concerning food safety.  

This  also  applies  at  farming  level,  with  the  development  of  precision  farming,  threatening 
potentially also supply, not only distribution:  sensors the rate of application of water, pesticides 
and herbicides, for activating ventilation systems or monitoring health of animals in livestock 
farms, autonomous robots (i.e. robotic milking machines) deployed in large part to relieve a 
shortage of labour on farms and driverless tractors are being tested. Attacks on these systems 
result in short term disruption of availability of information or long term manipulation of one 
or  more  of  the  data  inputs.  The  negative  potential  effects  (such  as  the  over-application  of 

59  Kornhuber, K., Coumou, D. et al., Amplified Rossby waves enhance risk of concurrent heatwaves in major 

breadbasket regions, 2020. 

60  Jahn, M.A., Oemichena, W. et al., Cyber Risk and Security Implications in Smart Agriculture and Food 

Systems, 2019. 

27 

 
 
                                                 
fertilizer,  etc.)  might  not  be  detected  until  it  is  too  late  in  the  growing  season,  causing 
irreversible damage. 

Based on the above, the EU FSC, and its capacity to provide food to EU citizens, is thus facing 
increasing levels of uncertainty and volatility. Further there may be risks that are unknown and, 
thus, unanticipated – which pose further challenges. 

2.2.2.  Potential vulnerabilities of the EU food supply chain 

The EU’s FSCs remained resilient during the COVID-19 crisis. The decline in food and drink 
industry production was much lower than compared to total manufacturing production (-9.1% 
in Q2 2019)61. Similarly, while the employment levels in the food and drink industry decreased, 
they did so to a lesser extent than for total manufacturing. 

As  shown  in  Annex  I,  some  bottlenecks  emerged  due  to  closed  borders  within  the  Single 
Market,  which  distorted  the  supply  for  inputs,  transport  of  goods  as  well  as,  through 
confinement and other issues, caused labour shortages. Another problem in supply arose from 
panic buying and stockpiling by consumers in the first weeks of the pandemic. Nevertheless, , 
supply chains stabilised quickly and remained resilient. 

During the second wave, the food industry was impacted to a lower extent than the first wave, 
as  some  producers  were  able  to  adapt  to  new  types  of  demand  and  outlets  (e.g.,  adjusted 
packaging,  labelling,  and  production,  delivery  or  take-away  services,  on-line  sales). 
Additionally,  borders  remained  open,  and  consumers  refrained  from  panic  buying  and 
stockpiling.  

Regardless  of  its  remarkable  resilience,  the  food  sector  faces  different  sets  of  challenges 
compared with other sectors that are not as critical for daily life. These challenges are linked 
at least to the five following factors: need for workers/labour, changes in consumer demand 
and habits, business continuity of food production facilities, changing food trade policies, and 
financial pressures in FSCs (see box 1 for an example from Nestle). The following subsections 
give an overview of the vulnerabilities by stage in the food system. One noteworthy aspect is 
the interdependence between the different sectors – from this perspective, a vulnerability in 
one specific sector can quickly become a vulnerability for the other sectors. 

61  de Vet, J.M., et al., Impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on EU industries, March 2021. 

28 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
BOX 1 - EXAMPLE FROM NESTLE62 

Challenges for the food supply chain 

Response 

Setting up COVID-19 steering committees (24/24h crisis management approach) 

- 

- 

 to protect employees, with additional safety measures, programmes to support the 
mental  health  of  employees,  protocols  with  labour  unions  on  health  and  safety  at 
work (both at company level and sector level), rewarding frontline employees with 
benefits,  remuneration  of  employees  affected  by  temporary  stoppage  for  a  certain 
duration; 

to ensure food supply and operative responsiveness, thanks to crisis management 
processes  (increased  inventories,  early  risk  identification,  strong  focus  on  supply 
base),  business  continuity  plans,  agility  (consider  all  options  and  procedures)  at 
supply  level,  transfer  and  share  of  contingency  volumes  and  technicians  between 
factories, development of visibility tools (for example, on transport, the online tool 
“Sixfold”  developed  with  a  supplier  to  ensure  visibility  of  delays  at  borders), 
preventive  measures  to  protect  drivers,  be  prepared  for  ‘plan  b’  in  transport  and 
distribution; 

- 

to help society where possible through public-private partnerships 

Lessons learned 

62  Praillet, R. Presentation at the expert group on the Contingency Plan for ensuring food supply and food 

security, 21 April 2021. 

29 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
Agricultural producers  
During  the  first  wave  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  farmers  in  the  EU  suffered  significant 
economic losses because of supply chain disruptions or the closure of specific trade channels 
(e.g. food services). These events led in some cases to production surpluses. Farm incomes in 
2020 declined 7.9%, corresponding to EUR 7.1 billion, compared to 201963. 

Overall, studies show that, despite the pandemic, EU agriculture performed relatively well in 
2020-21, with production and trade levels remaining stable. Prices also remained stable across 
sectors; according to FAO’s Food Price Index, global agri-food prices have even been on an 
upward trend over the last months. In the animal products sectors in particular (dairy and meats), 
price levels in 2021 are not only above last year but also clearly above the 5-year average. Still, 
there seems to be a low level of systematic planning by primary producers for the event of 
crises: 83% of the primary producers that responded to the Commission’s targeted stakeholder 
survey stated  they  did  not  have a  risk management  or contingency plan  in  place before the 
COVID-19 pandemic. 

Some sectors, however, were affected more severely than others. The whole or parts of the 
wine,  beer,  frozen/processed  potato  and  meat  (beef,  poultry)  sectors  were  impacted  by  the 
closure of restaurants. The flowers and plants sector experienced significant financial losses. 
The consumption of sugar also declined. 

Importantly, the pandemic significantly affected consumer preferences. It is possible that some 
of these changes may become structural (or have accelerated structural changes already taking 
place before the pandemic). Consumers are increasingly interested in buying food online, in 
convenience  shopping,  as  well  as  in  the  consumption  of  healthy  products.  However,  and 

63  European Parliament.- Research for the AGRI Committee, Preliminary impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic 

on European agriculture: a sector-based analysis of food systems and market resilience, 2021. 

30 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
especially for low-income groups, price has become a key determinant of food choice, often to 
the detriment of healthier options, in the face of increase economic uncertainty. 

The COVID-19 crisis has not significantly affected the capacity of the farming sector to keep 
its  business.  Shortages  that  could  be  feared  on  inputs  (fertilisers,  seeds,  plant  protection 
products and veterinary medicines and feed) did not materialise, thus had virtually no effect on 
the on-going and subsequent production cycles.   

BOX 2- EXAMPLE FROM ARLA FOODS64 

The Arla crisis management mechanism includes the following steps: 

Report:  clear  reporting  lines;  single  points  of  contact  in  countries;  regular  training  and 
guidance updates; 

Assess: quick 360º assessment and instant approval of assessed crisis level; 

Manage: crisis response structures set up ; roles and responsibilities assigned; 

Evaluate: ongoing feedback loop; evaluation of situation and link to response. 

Experience with COVID-19 

COVID-19 combined different crises elements and impacts, and tested the preparedness of 
the  company  like  never  before.  Arla  is  a  co-operative,  and  has  the  advantage  of  a  close 
relationship  between  farmer  and  company.  This  means  a  deep  understanding  about  the 
functioning  of  the  supply  chain.  While  consumption  patterns  remained  stable  for  dairy 
staples, several challenges arose, but dairy industry showed itself to be highly resilient. 

Lessons learned  

Resilience is not built overnight. There is a need for a strong policy, financial, and cultural 
environment to support the dairy sector. Supply can’t be quickly turned on and off; 

Global integrated supply chains give flexibility to move products to where they are needed, 
and to source inputs from the global market when needed;  

Flexibility and agility is key for decision-making. Speedy responses should be  replicated in 
the political and policy environment; 

Data-led decision-making: spend ‘peacetime’ building the processes so they can be quickly 
executed in a crisis; 

Partnerships can increase efficiency and effectiveness, but there concerns around what can 
be done under competition rules 

Fishers and aquaculture producers 
Drawing conclusions from the COVID-19 crises, the fisheries sector has been mainly affected 
by the changes in downstream demand, as well as by restrictions operations. The demand for 
certain species decreased substantially, in particular for demersal fresh fish fisheries, as sales 
decreased in the HORECA sector. For some time, exports were also restricted among other due 
to limited and costly air freight capacities. The working conditions in fishing vessels make it 

64  Morrisson, G., Arla Foods crisis preparedness and response, 21 April 2021. 

31 

 
 
                                                 
difficult to maintain physical distancing (as also mentioned in Annex 1). Consequently, many 
fleets had to cease their activity temporarily during the peaks of the pandemic and to change 
procedures on board. In addition, there was a need to alter control routines, since inspectors 
and observers were unable to board the vessels. 

In the aquaculture sector, farms had problems with decreased demand, which meant fish had 
to  be  kept  longer  in  facilities.  Consequently,  hatcheries  and  nurseries  had  problems  selling 
juvenile fish for the next stage of the production cycle. Farmers reported that reduced tourism 
led to low sales over the summer of 2020. Some MSs reported that the direct sales of some 
species increased in 2020 (but fewer fish may be available in 2021)65 

In  the  seafood  sector,  professional  organisations,  in  particular  producer  organisations 
recognised under the Regulation on the Common Organisation of the Market for Fishery and 
Aquaculture  products 66 ,  have  played  a  crucial  role  during  the  health  crisis,  for  the 
implementation of emergency measures, in particular in adapting their members’ production 
and marketing strategies to a suddenly changing and substantially lower demand. 

Processors  
The  COVID-19  pandemic  led  to  disruptions  in  the  food  processing  industry,  which  was 
affected by rules on social distancing, by labour shortages due to sickness, and by lockdown 
measures to contain the spread of the virus.  

In some instances, high levels of concentration in the processing sector may have compounded 
the negative effects of the pandemic.  

In  confined  spaces,  such  as  packing  plants  for  fruits  and  vegetables  or  meat  and  seafood 
processing  facilities,  social  distancing  measures  necessary  to  ensure  adequate  employee 
protection  reduced  the  efficiency  of  operations.  Many  firms  reported  high  rates  of  worker 
absenteeism  (for  example,  staff  availability  was  reduced  by  up  to  30%  in  French  meat 
processing facilities in the regions of the country worst hit by COVID-1967). Processors were 
also impacted by similar sanitary and confinement measures adopted by operators from which 
they source their raw material. 

In some cases, workers live together in overcrowded conditions, which further facilitates the 
spread  of  the  virus  and  impacts  worker  availability.  Meat  processing  appears  to  be  more 
sensitive than other types of food processing due to the labour intensive nature of operations68: 
multiple outbreaks have been reported in many major meat-producing countries in the EU and 
in third countries, affecting the meat market, with prices pushed upwards due to the incapacity 
of  processing  facilities  to  supply.  By  contrast,  grain  handling  and  processing  is  highly 
automated and less labour intensive, and did not experience the same disruptions as the meat-
processing sector. 

65  Study on the main effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the EU fishing and aquaculture sectors. European 

Commission, European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency. 

  https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/14f00b66-b139-11eb-8307-01aa75ed71a1. 
66  Regulation (EC) 1379/2013 on the Common Organisation of the Market for Fishery and Aquaculture Products. 
67  Food Supply Chains and COVID-19: Impacts and Policy Lessons. OECD Policy Responses to Coronavirus 
(COVID-19), 2 June 2020. https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/food-supply-chains-and-
covid-19-impacts-and-policy-lessons-71b57aea/. 

68  ILO, COVID-19 and its impact on working conditions in the meat processing sector, 2021. 

32 

 
 
                                                 
Retailers  
During the COVID-19 pandemic, food retailers experienced increased sales due to a sharp shift 
in consumer behaviour from out-of-home consumption (at school, at work or in restaurants) 
towards  food  consumed  at  home.  Retailers  of  frozen  and  packaged  foods  experienced  the 
steepest increase in sales. In the first weeks of the crisis, sales of frozen foods in France were 
63% higher than in 2019. Similarly, packaged food sales in Germany increased by 56%. Later 
on in the crisis during the summer of 2020, demand stabilised at 15% to 20% higher levels than 
during the same period in 201969. For the whole year 2020, grocery retail increased by 8% in 
volume and 10% in value70. 

Food retailers were able to adjust to the changing demand. This was particularly the case for 
large retailers. During the pandemic there were significant changes to how consumers buy their 
food. Online food sales registered a high growth during the first months of the pandemic (a 55% 
increase  in  2020).  This  corresponds  to  a  shift  of  market  share  of  1.5  percentage  points.  By 
comparison,  brick-and-mortar  supermarkets  lost  ground,  accelerating  some  previous  trends. 
Customers from all demographics, but notably those over 50, shifted to digital and delivery. 
This  has  created  an  environment  ripe  for  innovation,  with  a  need  to  realign  supply  chains, 
redefine what parts of the food workforce are essential, and gain a deeper understanding of 
how to connect with customers through social media. The potential long-term impact of the 
pandemic on the grocery and food retail sector includes increased competition in the online 
sales space71 and further digitisation, with consumer surveys showing this evolution is likely to 
continue. 

Other challenges for the retail sector relate to a deeper polarisation between consumers going 
to  more  expensive  products  (trade  up)  and  those  who  focus  more  on  cheaper  versions  or 
substitutes due to lower available income (trade down). Such evolution has affected loyalty to 
retail brands, with a significant share of consumers changing stores or banner. The health and 
environmental consciousness of consumers is also on the rise, with the number of eco-active 
consumers rising from 6 to 10 percent in France, Spain or Germany. 

Food services  
The HORECA sector estimates losses of 60% to 90% in 2020 compared to 2019. The main 
reasons  for  the  deep  impact  on  the  food  service  sector  are  related  to  the  repeated  targeted 
national restrictions limiting the functioning of restaurants, canteens, and bars. Food services 
are to an extent substitutable by physical or online retail food sales. As such, while the issues 
faced by the sector are linked to regulatory, social or economic factors, they seem limited from 
a food security of supply contingency planning perspective, unless large-scale disruption of the 
retail sector would take place. 

Labour 
COVID-19, and the resulting measures to contain the spread of infections have significantly 
affected the food-related workforce. Food is an essential sector that needs to keep producing 
during  the  crises,  and  workforce  availability  is  a  fundamental  part  of  the  sector’s  ability  to 
produce.  

69  de Vet, J.M., et al., Impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on EU industries, March 2021. 
70  McKinsey, Eurocommerce, Disruption and uncertainty,  The State of Grocery Retail, 2021. 
71  Deloitte, Understanding the impact of COVID-19 Grocery & Food Retail. 2020. 

33 

 
 
                                                 
To alleviate these issues, the Commission published practical guidelines to ensure that, within 
the EU, mobile workers who qualify as critical in the fight against the coronavirus pandemic 
can reach their workplace72. Farming is by definition a seasonal activity with certain peaks of 
work  along  the  year.  Seasonal  workers  are  critical  to  the  agricultural  sector  in  terms  of 
harvesting, planting and tending functions, especially in some labour-intensive sectors like fruit 
and  vegetables.  The  Commission  adopted  guidelines 73 to  ensure  the  protection  of  seasonal 
workers  in  the  EU  in  the  context  of  the  coronavirus  pandemic.  These  provide  guidance  to 
national authorities, labour inspectorates, and social partners to guarantee the rights, health and 
safety of seasonal workers, and to ensure that seasonal workers are aware of their rights. 

Migrant  workers  in  particular,  both  from  inside  the  EU  and  from  neighbouring  countries, 
provide  critical  labour  and  skills  to  labour-intensive  agriculture  in  EU  Member  States, 
including  by  filling  seasonal  jobs  for  which  is  often  difficult  to  find  suitable  local  labour. 
Germany,  Italy,  France,  Spain  each  receive  between  150,000  and  400,000  migrant  workers 
each year74. Migrant seasonal workers originate either from the EU (Romania, Bulgaria, and 
Poland in particular) or from outside the EU (Ukraine, Morocco, Albania, etc.). Between 2011 
and 2017, the number of intra-EU migrant farm workers increased by 36%, and the number of 
extra-EU ones by 31%. Such figures are considered to be underestimates.  

It is unlikely that the food sector in several EU Member States would be able to work at normal 
capacity without the workforce originating from outside the country. This makes labour one of 
the critical inputs in the food system, in a food security context. During Spring 2020, some 
estimated that 40 to 50% of the migrant workforce needed was not available. EU governments 
took a range of actions to compensate for this lack of workers, from organising charter planes 
to  fly  in  the  workers,  to  extending  the  work  permits  of  those  on-site,  facilitating  change  of 
status  (from  student  to  seasonal  worker),  allowing  asylum-seekers  to  work,  or  encouraging 
local  population  to  step in.  Further, seasonal  workers’ can face risky working conditions  in 
pandemics, in some cases working in confined spaces with a lack of social distancing, sharing 
accommodation with poor hygiene conditions, or sharing transport.  

Inputs  

Fertilisers  
Farmers – and therefore the whole food chain - rely on the supply of fertilisers to grow crops. 
For this reason, the sector can be regarded as essential in a food contingency planning context. 
To increase the sustainability of agriculture, the Farm-to-Fork Strategy aims to reduce fertiliser 
use by at least 20%. Excessive nutrients in the soil can contribute to problems such as pollution 
of drinking water, soil acidification and climate change. Still, an adequate supply of nutrients 
and  micronutrients  in  the  soil  is  essential  to  crop  growth,  as  it  increases  the  production  of 
biomass in the plant and, thus, yields. 

In consultation, the European fertiliser industry highlighted the following actions as crucial to 
improve the resilience of the sector75: ensure the continuation of transportation and distribution 
of fertilisers in the Single Market during crises; ensure a safe and healthy environment for the 

72  European Commission, Coronavirus: Commission presents practical guidance to ensure the free movement 

of critical workers, March 2020. 

73  European Commission, Guidelines on Seasonal Workers in the EU in the Context of the COVID-19 

Outbreak, July 2020. 

74  European Parliament briefing, Migrant seasonal workers in the European agricultural sector, 2021. 
75  Fertilizers Europe, COVID-19: Implications for the European fertilizer industry, 2020.  

34 

 
 
 
                                                 
employees of the sector; ensure that agricultural inputs are listed as priority products, so that 
the transport and delivery of fertilisers would not face delays and disruptions at borders. 

Seeds 
Seeds can be high-tech, high value-added products, which form an important link in the FSC. 
3,500  new  varieties  are  authorized  for  marketing  within  the  EU  each  year,  and  more  than 
42,000  different  varieties  of  agricultural  and  vegetable  species  are  available  to  farmers  in 
Europe76. In planning seed security, it should be taken into account that the seed sector is global 
(more  than  25%  of  commercial  seed  used  worldwide  is  not  locally  grown).  Moving  seeds 
across  borders  enables  breeders  and  seed  producers  to  test  seeds  or  breeding  lines  under 
specific  regional  environmental  conditions,  timing  of  harvests,  and  localised  expertise. 
Unimpeded international movement of seeds is key to ensure that all farmers worldwide can 
access the high quality seeds, ultimately contributing to global agricultural productivity and 
food security. During consultation the European seeds industry highlighted the need to avoid 
restrictions to the free movement of seeds and related services in the EU, and to continually 
align the EU with international developments in the area of seed quality, seed health and market 
access requirements. 

Feed and feed additives  
The feed industry provides necessary inputs to  the  animal  farming  sector.  It  includes 3,500 
compound feed manufacturing sites located mainly in rural areas. Its main challenges during 
the  COVID-19  pandemic  were  essentially  related  to  other  stages  on  the  FSC:  logistical 
disruptions and uncertainties with regard to possible trade restrictions, worrisome for a sector 
where import dependency is high, impact on meat markets through reduced demand and meat 
industry capacities affected, and decreased availability of co-products (among others due to 
collapse in use of biofuels).   

In addition, feed additives are important from a food safety point of view (feed preservation 
and hygiene is essential in protecting human and animal health), for ensuring nutritional value 
and optimal digestibility of feed (resource efficiency, animal welfare, reduction of antibiotics), 
and for reducing emissions and waste. From a contingency planning point of view, the feed 
and  feed  additives  industry  is  also  important  because  the  sector  is  globalised,  innovative, 
addressing societal concerns like antimicrobial resistance, and diverse (the sector includes a 
large number of SMEs). Feed additives are largely imported77. A striking example are vitamins 
for which the share of imports, mostly from China, is extremely high (for instance, in the USA, 
above 80% of the total use for vitamins C, B1, B6, B1278). The situation is similar for other 
additives,  such  as  amino  acids,  trace  elements,  enzymes  and  others  -  markets  where  strong 
growth is expected (while overall feed demand is decreasing in the EU). This means that during 
the  COVID-19  pandemic,  disruptions  in  sea  transport  (shortage  of  containers)  resulted  in 
difficulties  to  ensure  supply.  Dependency  on  a  few  or  single  suppliers  justified  developing 
alternative sourcing, and delays in flows convinced companies of the need to develop regional 
stocks to be able to source more quickly.   

76  Euroseeds, presentation at GREX 21 April 2021. 
77  FEFAC, presentation at GREX, 25 February 2021; FEFANA, presentation at GREX, 21 April 2021. 
78  Shurson, J. and Urriola, P., Understanding the vitamin supply chain and relative risk of transmission of 

foreign animal disease, 2019. 

35 

 
 
                                                 
BOX 3 – EXAMPLE: THE EU ASSOCIATION OF SPECIALTY FEED INGREDIENTS AND THEIR 
MIXTURES (FEFANA)79 

Specialty Feed producers occupy an important place in the food chain – they hold only 3.5% 
of the volume, but 10% of the value of compound feed.  

The COVID-19 continuity plan for FEFANA’s production units includes: 

1. 

Local pandemic management teams and the identification of essential functions; 

Crisis  monitoring,  with  follow-up  of  the  spread  on  sites  following  international 

2. 
(WHO), national and regional authorities’ recommendations;  

Hygiene  and  protection  measures,  and  quarantine  rules  recommended  by  the 

3. 
national authorities. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

If needed, calls made to retired employees to work as back-up staff; 

Increased frequency of office and facilities cleaning; 

Strong limitation of inter-sites or plants visits, use of public transport; 

Mandatory  remote  work  for  European  employees  in  administrative  and  support 

7. 
functions; 

Hygiene  and  protection  measures  for  external  visitors  (for  example,  for  raw 

8. 
materials supply and transport of finished goods); 

In  addition,  the  early  designation  of  the  feed  additives  industry  as  essential  for  the  food 
chain, and the good coordination at national level (authorities and business operators), were 
key during the pandemic. 

Transport and logistics, advisory and consultancy 

Some  sectors  of  transport  and  logistics,  such  as  seaports  and  storage  facilities,  have  been 
dealing with pandemics and sanitary issues from the earlies history - the concept of quarantine 
originated  at  seaports.  Transport  and  logistics  operators  already  carried  out  some  safety 
measures that had to be implemented during the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, in bulk 
cargo  shipping  masks  are  customary  due  to  dust,  high  levels  of  automation  make  social 
distancing the norm with some operations, and there is a naturally high degree of ventilation is 
storage facilities. Also, the loading and discharging vessels implies a high volatility in daily 
labour demand and 24/7 availability, so port working systems are by design arranged based 

79  The EU Association of Specialty Feed Ingredients and their Mixtures, https://fefana.org/. 

36 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
on cellular working teams  which enables to  keep “cells” of workers without contact  among 
them. This provides resilience, if one cell is affected, the rest are not80. 

In terms of different means of transport, a key bottleneck – at least during the COVID-19 crisis 
-  seemed  to  be  sea  transportation,  mainly  due  to  insufficient  shipping  capacity81.  A  global 
shipping container shortage occurred through a combination of a slowdown in investment in 
new capacities, changes in consumption modes, with on-line purchases needing quick delivery, 
and  port  congestion82.  With  the  introduction  of  the  Commission’s  ‘Green  Lanes’  initiative, 
intra-EU  road  and  train  transportation  faced  fewer  problems.  The  transport  of  perishable 
products by air also saw significant falls in traded volumes for certain goods, such as seafood 
exported to remote markets, for which air freight was either unavailable or too expensive83. 

There are also indications that other services related to food production (for example, technical 
advice to farmers and other food supply chain operators, consultancy services, etc.) have been 
affected  by  the  COVID-19  pandemic 84.  Often  these  issues  were  related  to  the  freedom  of 
movement of workers and the classification (or not) of some business activities as ‘critical’.  

BOX 4 - EXAMPLE FROM UNISTOCK EUROPE85 

Most storage companies have in place certain procedures, for the safety of workers86: 

-  Strict  procedures  of  disinfection  of  machinery  cabins,  before  and  after  each 

shift/worker;  

-  Mandatory masking at all times; 
-  Dressing rooms and showers’ capacity reduced to 30%; 
-  Eating room capacity reduced to 15%; 
-  Contactless documentation of trucks and trains; 
-  Constant and transversal communication about the pandemic, helping to tighten ties 

among teams; 

-  Hydrogel easily available; 
- 

Intense signalling with instructions about proper procedure. 

BOX 5 - CASE STUDY: IATA87 

IATA lists the following elements to improve the distribution and flow of perishable goods, 
such as food, throughout the supply chain: 

  Ensure compliance with international standards, procedures and practices; 

80  UNISTOCK, presentation at GREX, 21 April 2021. 
81  UNIDO, Global maritime supply chains in times of COVID-19, July 2021.  
82  Rabobank, Global Freight Market Outlook, 2021. 
83  IATA, presentation at GREX, 21 April 2021. 
84  OECD, Services Trade Restrictiveness Index, 2021. 
85  Association of Professional Portside Storekeepers in the Food and Feed Chain, http://www.unistock.be/. 
86 UNISTOCK, presentation at GREX, 21 April 2021. 
87 The International Air Transport Association, https://www.iata.org/. See IATA, presentation at GREX, April 

2021. 
In maritime transport there are also actions for improved resilience. For example, several leading companies 
have joined the Neptune Declaration on Seafarer Wellbeing and Crew Change, 2021. 

37 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 

Improve handling and transportation performance (e.g. to address food wastage and 
loss);  

  Embed social responsibility and sustainability  practices,  and communicate actions 

taken to customers; 

  Apply  appropriate  quality  and  risk  management  processes  and 

increase 

collaboration; 

  Ensure product safety along the supply chain (e.g. food safety); 
 
industry  readiness  and  preparedness 

Improve 
regulations, training, certification and registry;  

through  applying  guidelines, 

  Apply a broader supply chain approach: a concerted effort to meet industry concerns 
and improve the level of competency, infrastructure, quality and training needed to 
ensure compliant handling and transportation of perishables throughout the supply 
chain. 

Packaging  
The packaging industry plays a key role in preventing food contamination, spoilage and food 
waste. Packaging shortages at times of crisis could worsen food availability issues. In the initial 
stages  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  the  packaging  supply  chain  faced  several  instances  of 
disruption88. The switch from food services to home cooking made it necessary to solve the 
mismatch of packaging: large quantities packages, usual at wholesale to foodservices, had to 
be  repacked  in  end-consumer  packages.  The  closure  of  raw  material  suppliers  during  the 
COVID-19  pandemic  in  2020  led  to  a  shortage  of  some  materials  in  2021,  while  demand 
resumed with on-line sales, notably concerning paper-based packaging. For example, some egg 
suppliers in the UK had to switch from cardboard packages to plastic ones89. 

88  EUROPEN, presentation at GREX. 
89  https://www.bristolpost.co.uk/whats-on/whats-on-news/britain-shortage-egg-boxes-supermarkets-4484632. 

38 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
BOX  6  –  EXAMPLE  FROM  THE  EUROPEAN  ORGANISATION  FOR  PACKAGING  AND  THE 
ENVIRONMENT 

  (EUROPEN)90 

Lessons learned from COVID pandemic 

How to improve crisis preparedness in the packaging supply chain 

Improving data visibility; 

-  Centralisation of risk management governance; 
- 
-  Expanding and harmonizing risk categories; 
-  Reassessing the supplier base; 
-  Holding inventory; 
-  Strengthening supplier-customer dialogue. 

Consumers 
One of the key consequences for consumers when food supply and food security are threatened 
is  to  see  consumer  prices  increasing  beyond  what  can  be  afforded.  Consumer  food  price 
inflation reached a multi-year high of 4.5% in April 2020, but returned below 2% year-on-year 
as from the month of August 2020. The high levels of food price inflation registered between 
April and June 2020 may have been, in part, due to higher than usual demand for food products 
during the period (for example, due to displaced demand), as well as logistical issues in supply 
chains and in shops, including due to social distancing and hygiene requirements. Since April 
2020, the deceleration of food prices (mostly from July 2020, inclusive) indicates an easing of 
these factors. Two sectors have seen significant increases of consumer prices: fruits (up to +15% 
year-on-year in May-June 2020) and vegetables (up +6% in April 2020, but with high prices 
already in 2019). For both categories, there is now deflation and the overall food inflation is 
low at 0.5% year-on-year during the first half of 2021. Seafood prices were affected in the same 
way, as EU households purchased more fishery and aquaculture products in 2020 than in 2019. 

90  The European Organization for Packaging and the Environment, https://www.europen-packaging.eu/. 

39 

 
 
  
 
                                                 
Europanel data on household consumption of fresh fish in the largest EU consuming countries 
show  increases  by  7%  in  value  and  by  4%  in  volume  from  2019  to  2020  for  fishery  and 
aquaculture products, most likely due to the closing of the HORECA sector. 

FIGURE  13  -  FOOD  AND  SELECTED  FOOD  ITEMS  PRICE  INDICES  TO  CONSUMERS  (YEAR-
ON-YEAR, % CHANGE) 

15,0%

5,0%

-5,0%

Food

Fish and seafood

Fruit

Vegetables

Source: Eurostat, price statistics 

Increasing prices are among the drivers that can trigger panic hoarding, the phenomenon of a 
sudden increase in buying of one or more essential goods in excess of regular need provoked 
by adversity, usually a disaster or an outbreak resulting in an imbalance between supply and 
demand, as defined in literature91. Hoarding can be due to a sense of perceived scarcity, that 
increased prices can reinforce, psychological (need to control) and social dimension as well as 
lack of confidence in the authorities. It can mix rational and irrational or emotional reactions92. 
From the rational side, consumers may consider shopping will be more difficult in times of 
crisis and decide to minimise the activity. Some governments suggested families to stockpile 
food, water and household essentials in March 2020. From the irrational side, some consumers 
may  be  affected  by  peer  influence  when  they  see  others  buying,  creating  a  herd  effect. 
Household  stockpiling  of  commodities  can  trigger  shortages  and  further  price  rise,  thus 
resulting  in  negative  externalities.  It  has  been  found  particularly  marked  for  non-perishable 
goods (although also signalled for fresh products), like for example canned fruit and vegetables 
or flour in Germany (over +100% in March 2020)93. It will disproportionately affect vulnerable 

91  Arafat, S.M.Y., Kuamr Kar, S. et al. (2020) Panic buying: an insight from the content analysis of media 

reports during COVID-19 pandemic. 

92  Wang, H.H. and Hao N. (2020) Panic buying? Food hoarding during the pandemic period with city 

lockdown. 

93  Lehberger, M., Kleih, S. and Sparke, K. (2021) Panic buying in times of coronavirus (COVID-19): extending 

the theory of planned behaviour to understand the stockpiling of non-perishable food in Germany. 

40 

 
 
  
 
                                                 
people such as those in rural areas and those with low incomes. This may create a sense of fear, 
anxiety, insecurity, and panic among those affected. Media play an important role in spreading 
the news; disseminating photos of empty supermarket shelves, which in turn increase fear and 
anxiety among people, but they can play a positive role by disseminating reassuring messages, 
reducing fear and changing the perception of possible scarcity. One policy pursued in Belgium 
consisted  in  banning  discounts  to  limit  hoarding  in  March  2020.  Such  policy  was  quickly 
abandoned being considered to have fuelled food price inflation94. 

As  noted  during  the  consultations,  the  largest  food  security  concern  during  the  COVID-19 
pandemic was due to the loss of income from economic shock95. Such loss of income, expected 
in times of crises, adds to persistent problems of food insecurity in developed countries, due to 
level of income, education, place of residence or others drivers of food insecurity. During the 
COVID-19  pandemic,  public  authorities  coordinated  efforts  to  provide  food  assistance  to 
vulnerable groups96. Measures mostly involve increasing funding for pre-existing programmes, 
but  also  new  measures,  including  meal  and  food  parcels  delivery  services,  free  meals  to 
children from low-income families, provision of protective equipment for volunteers in food 
banks and other charity organisations, increased budget for food assistance programmes with 
fund  raising  mechanisms  also  implemented  by  civil  society  organisations 97.  Some  MSs98 
published guidance to ensure safe food redistribution activities.  

Food banks played a role, but their activity has been hampered by a lack of volunteers, a lack 
of protective equipment at the start of the crisis, and an increased demand for food. 76% of 
food  banks  also  declared  they  experienced  a  drop  in  financial  resources 99.  The  shortage  of 
volunteers was due to the age of volunteers and to restrictions imposed by authorities, which 
implied  an  extra  recruitment  effort  in  particular  for  younger  volunteers  to  ensure  business 
continuity. Social distancing restrictions have also hindered food banks’ efforts to redistribute 
food  to  those  in  need  (for  example,  having  to  arrange  to  have  food  delivered  directly  at 
beneficiaries’ homes). Donations from food services decreased significantly while retail faced 
increased demand. Food banks stated there was in 2020 a steep increase in the demand for food 
aid, as they redistributed in the first months of the year more than double the amounts of food 
as  compared  to  the  previous  year,  2019 100 and  they  helped  more  than  34.7%  in  need  as 
compared to 2019101. 

Through the recovery of surplus food from the supply chain and its redistribution to people in 
need,  the  work  of  food  banks  addresses  both  food  insecurity  and  reduction  of  food  waste. 
Facilitating  food  donation  is  an  essential  measure  of  many  national  food  waste  prevention 
programmes in order to ensure that any surplus food generated in the food supply chain is made 
available, as a priority, for human consumption. Close cooperation between actors in the food 
supply  chain  is  crucial  to  ensure  safe  and  effective  food  donation  practices.  Government 

94  https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/belgium-ends-supermarket-discounts-ban/. 
95  Baldwin, K., Examples of crisis management from developed countries from a food security perspective, 

May 2021. 

96  Placzek, O., Socio-economic and demographic aspects of food security and nutrition, 2021. 
97 . Social Emergency Fund – FEBA Campaign Portal. 
98   Some examples can be found in the March 2020 edition of the EU Platform on Food Losses and Food Waste 
newsletter and in the resources library, Food loss and waste prevention during the COVID-19 crisis section of 
the European Commission’s Food waste website. 

99  European Food Banks Federation, European Food Banks in a post COVID-19 Europe, 2020. 
100 Idem.  
101 European Food Banks Federation, Annual Report 2020, 2021. 

41 

 
 
                                                 
authorities support such cooperation by laying down relevant rules and/or guidance as well as 
providing  incentives  for  food  donation  through  fiscal  measures  or  direct  funding102.  Some 
Member  States  have  in  addition  introduced  specific  regulatory  measures  to  stimulate  food 
donation. For instance, in France, since 2016, food surplus at the retail level that is still edible 
must be donated to food banks103; this obligation was extended, in 2019, to the food and drink 
industry (> 50M€ turnover) and collective catering (<3000 meals/day)104 and, in 2020, to the 
wholesale sector (if <50M€ turnover)105. Farmers in France can also donate produce from their 
farms that would otherwise be lost and in return receive a tax reduction. During COVID-19, 
initiatives 106 were  also  launched  to  find  alternative  destinations  for  surplus  food,  through 
implementation  of  “business-to-business” market  places,  reinforcing  the  existing  initiatives 
that exist in normal times to limit or avoid food waste.  

At  EU  level,  the  Commission  adopted  in  2020,  and  in  addition  to  EU  food  donation 
guidelines107 of 2017, - guidance on food safety management systems for food retail activities, 
including  food  donations108.  The  Commission  is  also  currently  amending  EU  food  hygiene 
rules109, in order to lay down certain requirements to promote and facilitate food donations, 
whilst guaranteeing safety for consumers. The Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived 
(FEAD) supports EU Member States’ actions to provide food and/or basic material assistance 
to the most deprived.. In response to the COVID-19 outbreak and growing needs, the Common 
Provisions Regulation and the FEAD Regulation were amended – first in April 2020 as part of 
the CRII+ initiative, to (i) allow for the use of indirect delivery modes, e.g. vouchers or cards 
(to  lower  the  risk  of  contamination),  (ii)  allow  for  the  purchase  of  personal  protective 
equipment  for  organisations  delivering  FEAD  support,  and  (iii)  improve  liquidity  in  the 
Member States, allowing them to use a 100% co-financing for one accounting year110. On 10  
February  2021,  the  FEAD  regulation  was  amended  a  second  time,  to  allow  for  additional 

102 FOODCLOUD is the largest social enterprise in Ireland matching businesses with surplus food to local 

charities and community groups; almost half of their operations are funded by the Irish government. Source: 
Benefacts.ie. 

103 French Government, LOI n° 2016-138 du 11 février 2016 relative à la lutte contre le gaspillage alimentaire, 

JORF n°0036 du 12 février 2016, texte n°2, 2016. 

104 French Government, Ordonnance n° 2019-1069 du 21 octobre 2019 relative à la lutte contre le gaspillage 

alimentaire, JORF n°0246 du 22 octobre 2019, Texte n° 23, 2019. 

105 French Government, LOI n° 2020-105 du 10 février 2020 relative à la lutte contre le gaspillage et à 

l'économie circulaire, JORF n°0035 du 11 février 2020, Texte n° 1, 2020. 

106 For example, in the Netherlands: Together Against Food Waste – Initiatives during the Covid 19 crisis; The 

B2B market place for good food. 

107 European Commission, EU guidelines on food donation, 2017. 
108 European Commission, Notice providing guidance on food safety management systems for food retail 

activities, including food donations, 2020.  

109 European Commission, Regulation (EU) 2021/382 of 3 March 2021 amending the Annexes to   Regulation 
foodstuffs as regards 
For further 

(EC) No 852/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the hygiene of  
food allergen management, redistribution of food and food safety culture, 2021.  
information: Food Donation (europa.eu). 

110 Regulation  (EU)  2020/559  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  23  April  2020  amending 
Regulation (EU) No 223/2014 as regards the introduction of specific measures for addressing the outbreak of 
COVID-19 OJ L 130, 24.4.2020, p. 7–10 . 

42 

 
 
                                                 
 
resources,  allocated  in  the  context  of  the  REACT-EU  initiative,  to  be  allocated  to  FEAD 
programmes (in addition to ESF and ERDF ones)111. 

Sudden changes of demand patterns for food (as was the case during the COVID-19 pandemic, 
but also in other events like the Russian embargo where food supply was not a stake, but where 
amounts of supply could suddenly not find their intended outlet), or disruptions in the food 
chain, as illustrated recently in January 2021 when goods traded between the EU and UK were 
reported to be spoiled due to delays in transport and logistics, represent a threat for increased 
levels of food waste. In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, disruptions in the food supply 
chain contribute to food losses and unnecessary food waste112. This includes unsold products, 
poorer quality due to difficulties in accessing inputs or because of longer transport times, or 
food losses due to shortage of seasonal workers. Potential losses due to difficulties to manage 
stocks, including strategic reserves, can also be feared.  

At household level however, there are indications that although the amount of food purchases 
increased during the lockdown, food waste actually decreased as people mainly bought more 
non-perishable food113. 26% of respondents to a consumer survey in the Netherlands indicated 
to waste less food at home thanks to better shopping planning (increased use of shopping lists, 
more longer shelf-life products, less impulsive buying), increased amounts of time spent on 
meal preparation and fewer leftovers, a better overview of what’s in stock, attention to expiry 
dates and fewer unexpected events114. Consumer surveys carried out in other Members States 
(e.g. Ireland115) have indicated similar findings. Limited food supplies, higher prices, limited 
employment  opportunities,  increased  time  in  the  home  allowing  improvement  of  cooking 
practices are all factors leading to decreased food waste at home116.  

3.  FOOD SECURITY POLICY IN PRACTICE  

3.1 EU policies 

The COVID-19 health crisis showed that the EU’s FSC is resilient to large-scale disruption, 
and  that  the  baseline  conditions  to  deal  with  crises  are  solid.  The  following  longstanding 
policies,  as  well  as  recently  adopted  measures  and  temporary  initiatives,  have  been 
instrumental in achieving this outcome.  

The Common Agricultural and Common Fisheries Policies (CAP and CFP), as set out in 
the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union117, allow farmers, aquaculture producers 
and fishers, processors, traders and retailers to make good quality, affordable food available to 
consumers at reasonable prices. These policies have within their objectives, among others, the 
need “to assure the availability of supplies” and “to ensure that supplies reach consumers at 
reasonable prices” (Article 39.1 of the Treaty). 

111 Regulation  (EU)  2021/177  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  10  February  2021  amending 
Regulation  (EU)  No  223/2014  as  regards  the  introduction  of  specific  measures  for  addressing  the  crisis 
associated with the outbreak of COVID-19 OJ L 53, 16.2.2021, p. 1–5. 

112 FAO (2020), Mitigating risks to food systems during COVID-19 : Reducing food loss and waste. 
113 Pappalardo, G., Cerroni, S. et al. (2020) Impact of Covid-19 on Household Food Waste: The case of Italy. 
114 WUR factsheet, Evenveel of minder voedselverspilling bij consumenten thuis door COVID-19, 2020. 
115 Irish food waste attitudes survey, 2020, available on www.stopfoodwaste.ie. 
116 Saulo, A. (2021) How the COVID-19 Pandemic Has Impacted Food Waste. 
117 Treaty on the functioning of the European Union. 

43 

 
 
                                                 
The main policy instruments to reach the objectives of the CAP are direct income support to 
farmers,  risk  management  tools,  other  instruments  for  rural  development,  and  market 
stabilisation  policies  under  the  Common  Market  Organisation  (CMO)  Regulation  for 
agricultural  products 118 .  Direct  payments  provide  an  income  safety  net  that  supports  the 
resilience of millions of EU farms, contributing to around 30% of the average income of the 
EU farming community depending on the years. They allow farmers to better cope with price 
instability119.  Rural  development  policy  makes  a  substantial  contribution  too  by  supporting 
investments, risk management, knowledge-building (including via the farm advisory system) 
and promoting the organisation of farmers in the supply chain. All these elements120 contribute 
to reinforce resilience and adaptability of farmers in times of crises. The CMO for agricultural 
products  includes  safety  nets  for  markets,  with  public  intervention,  private  storage  and 
exceptional measures to tackle market disturbance and /or specific problems. These tools have 
been used during the COVID-19 pandemics, as mentioned in Annex I, but also on the occasion 
of other crises that were not necessarily threatening food supply or food security in the EU, but 
that resulted in severe market disturbances negatively affecting the situation of EU farmers (for 
example the Russian embargo on EU food exports declared as from August 2014). 

The CAP is undergoing a process of reform, due to be implemented from 2023. The reform 
aims at further improving sustainable development and contributes to Green Deal objectives. 
The concept of resilience will figure even more prominently in this reform - including with a 
compound  indicator  measuring  the  economic,  social  and  environmental  resilience  of 
agriculture. 

The CMO for agricultural products will also be revised, and its large array of instruments 
and  practices  reinforced.  Exceptional  measures  will  now  also  cover  crises  related  to  plant 
health issues in certain sectors; the existing market observatories will be complement by new 
ones  and  benefit  from  a  clear  legal  base;  and  the  Commission  will  regularly  report  on  the 
implementation of exceptional measures. The future Strategic Plans Regulation includes rules 
to resolve specific problems in an emergency. Finally, the new financial reserve represents an 
improvement on the previous arrangements with the crisis reserve (higher amounts, of at least 
€450 million every year, and more easily directed towards measures such as emergency buying 
and private storage aid). 

In  the seafood  sector, the CFP’s  guiding principles are both  the need to ensure economic, 
social and environmental sustainability, and the need to contribute to the availability of food 
supplies. This contributes to a resilient food system. 

The Regulation on the Common Organisation of the Markets in fishery and aquaculture 
products (CMO)121 is an integral part of the CFP. The CMO was set up to stabilise the markets 
and guarantee a fair income for producers. Over the years, it has steadily evolved from a system 
involving  market  intervention  to  one  that  focuses  largely  on  sustainability.  Rules  and 

118 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/1308/oj. 
119 EEIG,  Agrosynergie,  Evaluation  study  of  the  impact  of  the  CAP  measures  towards  the  general  objective 

“viable food production”, 2020. 

120 Bergevoet R.H., et al., Improving crisis prevention and management criteria and strategies in the agricultural 

sector, 2019. 

121 Article 2 of the Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
December 2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy states that the CFP “shall ensure that fishing and 
aquaculture activities are environmentally sustainable in the long-term and are managed in a way that is 
consistent with the objectives of achieving economic, social and employment benefits, and of contributing to 
the availability of food supplies”. 

44 

 
 
                                                 
procedures  have  also  become  simpler,  and  governance  has  improved  since  Producer 
Organisations (POs) in the fishery and aquaculture sector have taken on more responsibility 
for managing their own activities through their production and marketing plans. The strong 
structuring of the sector around POs and their empowerment to collectively manage and control 
their members’ activities, as well as opportunities arising from the mutualisation of resources, 
are determinant in the ability to ‘fish for the market’, maximise revenues and adapt to external 
shocks. 

In response to the COVID-19 outbreak,  the Commission  also  provided rapid  support to  the 
sector through amendments to the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) and to 
the  regulation  on  the  CMO  in  fishery  and  aquaculture  products  to  allow  for  crisis 
compensation payments to the fishery, aquaculture and processing sectors. As mentioned in 
Annex I, in view of the usefulness of these measures, the new Fund for 2021-2027 – European 
Maritime Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF) – can support actions to build up and 
strengthen  the  resilience  of  the  sector,  and  includes  a  new  scheme  to  provide  financial 
compensation in case of exceptional events causing a significant disruption of markets, upon 
recognition  of  the  occurrence  of  such  events  by  the  Commission.  This  would  allow  rapid 
activation by the Commission of exceptional temporary emergency measures. 

Market  monitoring  tools  can  play  an  important  role  for  public  authorities  and  stakeholder 
during  crises.  Quick  access  to  market  information  allows  observing  market  developments 
during a crisis, and is critical to inform effective and speedy policy responses. At EU level, 
sectoral  market  monitoring  and  the  short-term  or  medium-term  outlook  activities  of  the 
European Commission support the work of the Market Observatories and the Civil Dialogue 
Groups. The CAP indicators (Common Monitoring and Evaluation Framework - CMEF) for 
the  CAP  2014-2020,  identifies  a  set  of  performance  indicators  in  four  categories:  context, 
output, result, and impact,  which help to provide objective market intelligence that is made 
publicly available (in particular through the Commission’s Agri-Food Data Portal122). In the 
seafood  sector,  the  European  Market  Observatory  for  Fisheries  and  Aquaculture  Products 
(EUMOFA123) provided prompt and targeted monitoring of the market developments, with a 
focus on those species most affected by the COVID-19 crisis. Open channels of communication 
between  the  Commission,  public  authorities  and  stakeholders  proved  to  be  critical  for  the 
exchange of robust qualitative information on market developments, in particular during the 
early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, where the food policy context was developing quickly. 
The European Commission also contributes with concrete information to the G20 Agricultural 
Market Information System (AMIS)124 monitoring activities. 

The General Food Law Regulation125, adopted in 2002 as a consequence of a series of food 
incidents in the late 1990s, lays down the general principles and requirements of food and feed 
law. While primarily addressing food safety, it is intrinsically linked to food security. It sets 
out an overarching and coherent framework for the development of food and feed legislation 
both at Union and national levels. To this end, it lays down general principles, requirements 
and procedures that underpin decision-making in matters of food and feed safety, covering all 
stages  of  food  and  feed  production  and  distribution.  It  also  sets  up  an  independent  agency 

122 https://agridata.ec.europa.eu/extensions/DataPortal/home.html. 
123 www.eumofa.eu. 
124 http://www.amis-outlook.org/. 
125 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002. 

45 

 
 
                                                 
responsible for scientific advice and support, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)126. 
Moreover, it creates the main procedures and tools for the management of emergencies and 
crises, detailed below, as well as the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF)127. 

The EU Single Market, with its free movement of goods, capital, services and people, ensures 
access  to  a  market  of  450  million  consumers  and  22.5 million  small  and  medium-sized 
enterprises. Keeping trade flowing within the internal market is paramount for ensuring food 
supply and food security in times of crises.  

As a consequence of the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in early spring 2020, with the 
aim to  protect  public health, Member States often closed their borders in a fragmented  and 
uncoordinated manner, including to the circulation of goods. This initially led to a disruption 
of the Single Market, with long waiting times for freight vehicles at borders and cargo flights 
disrupted, triggering some shortages of food in some locations, and general uncertainty in the 
reliability of the supply of goods.  

To ensure the continued functioning of supply chains in the Single Market, and so to avoid 
possible  shortages  in  the  context  of  the  COVID-19  emergency,  the  Commission  adopted 
specific guidelines  for border measures to protect health  and keep goods  and essential 
services available128.  

A Communication on the implementation of the ‘Green Lanes’129 followed the guidelines 
for border measures in March 2020. The Green Lanes Communication stipulates that freight 
vehicles should not face more than 15 minutes total delay in crossing internal borders in the 
Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T)  area, irrespective of the goods they carry, and 
sets out accompanying provisions for transport workers. 

The Commission adopted a further upgrade of the Green Lanes Communication130 on 28 
October  2020  with,  among  others,  a  focus  on  transport  workers,  stronger  coordination  and 
information, as well as on a crisis contingency plan. 

On 30 March 2020, seasonal workers in agriculture were qualified as ‘critical workers’ in the 
fight against the coronavirus pandemic. To ensure that mobile workers within the EU (cross 
border and seasonal workers) as well as third-country nationals (seasonal workers) that qualify 
as critical workers can reach their workplace, two Commission communications were adopted 
in the form of practical guidelines131.   

126 European Food Safety Authority. 
127 Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed. 
128 European Commission, COVID-19 Guidelines for border management measures to protect health and ensure 

the availability of goods and essential services, 2020. 

129 European Commission, Communication from the Commission on the implementation of the Green Lanes 

under the Guidelines for border management measures to protect health and ensure the availability of goods 
and essential services, 2020. 

130 Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  European  Council  and  the  Council 
upgrading the transport Green Lanes to keep the economy going during the COVID-19 pandemic resurgence, 
COM(2020)685. 

131 Communication from the Commission Guidelines concerning the exercise of the free movement of workers 

during COVID-19 outbreak, 2020/C 102 I/03 (mobile workers within the EU). 

  Communication from the Commission COVID-19 Guidance on the implementation of the temporary 

restriction on non-essential travel to the EU, on the facilitation of transit arrangements for the repatriation of 
EU citizens, and on the effects on visa policy, 2020/C 102 I/02 (third-country nationals). 

46 

 
 
                                                 
From the Single Market perspective, the COVID-19 pandemic has shown that some Member 
States may be tempted to implement uncoordinated unilateral measures in times of crisis. 
Several cases have been reported, both during the first lockdown and afterwards, when markets 
had recovered to a large extent. For example, the decision by the Romanian authorities through 
the Military Ordinance No. 8 of 9 April 2020 to restrict the export of certain grains, including 
within the Single Market, added to an already tense situation. The Ordinance added to logistical 
difficulties  in  road  freight  and  harbours,  and  could  have  led  to  price  increases  or  localised 
shortages of the supply of grains (in particular in MSs depending on Romania’s exports), if not 
finally withdrawn by the Romanian authorities. Similar measures, or general legal bases for 
export restrictions, were considered by several Member States during the COVID-19 pandemic 
(for example in Bulgaria, Slovenia, Latvia, and Lithuania). Other potential obstacles to the free 
movement of food products identified during the COVID-19 pandemic concerned rules or draft 
rules on setting maximum prices or margins (Romania, Poland, Lithuania, Slovenia, Latvia, 
Belgium, Spain); measures resulting in granting a favoured status to domestic/national products 
by means of minimum shares in retail outlets (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria), or by the 
promotion of national products or calls to buy national  (France, Bulgaria, Italy, Austria, Poland, 
Portugal,  Lithuania,  Croatia,  Romania,  Hungary,  Czech  Republic,  Slovakia  etc.).  All  these 
measures have  the potential  to fragment the Single Market, if not  justified by legitimate 
objectives and proportionate, which in times of crisis can result in significant consequences for 
the supply of food in the EU. The Commission has therefore inquired these cases and in several 
instances sent letters of formal notice.     

Finally,  a  Temporary  Framework  for  State  Aid  measures132   allowed  Member  States  to 
channel up to EUR 100,000 to individual farmers and up to EUR 120,000 per company active 
in the fishery and aquaculture sector facing liquidity shortages. More than EUR 60 billion seem 
to have been directly allocated in support to the food sector by MSs in form of state aid133 , to 
which the contribution of “umbrella state-aid schemes”, implemented by certain MSs such as 
Spain should be added. Most schemes targeted the primary production stage and did not target 
a specific sector. Most schemes consisted in direct subsidies, but other form of financial support 
such  as  credit  support,  flat-rate  payments,  or  tax  exemptions  were  also  implemented.  Non-
financial measures were also implemented by MSs, in particular concerning greater flexibility 
in working conditions.    

EU  Research  and  Innovation  (R&I)  policy  provides  a  means  to  align,  leverage  and  fund 
research  and  innovation  relevant  to  Europe  and  the  international  context.  For  example,  it 
rapidly  mobilised  funding  to  respond  to  the  COVID-19  crisis  and  address  EU  Green  Deal 
objectives through dedicated calls for proposals via Horizon 2020134. The former chanelled an 
EU contrubution of 1.4 billion EUR for the COVID-19 response135, while the latter provided 
over 70 million EUR worth of financing for 7 food systems-related demonstrators. Food system 
R&I is also a priority under the new Horizon Europe programme (2021-2027), which builds 
on existing strategic partnerships like the EU-African Union High Level Policy Dialogue of 
Food and Nutrition Security and Sustainable Agriculture (HLPD-FNSSA), and also foresees 

132https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/what_is_new/sa_covid19_2nd_amendment_temporary_framework

_en.pdf. 

133 Arcadia (2021), Preliminary impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on European agriculture: a sector-based  

analysis of food systems and market resilience. 

134 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1669. 
135 https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/coronavirus-response/overview-commissions-response_en. 

47 

 
 
                                                 
new instruments such as targeted flagship missions (Caring for Soil is Caring for Life136, 100 
climate-neutral cities by 2030 - by and for the citizens137, Mission Starfish 2030, restore our 
ocean and waters138, Climate Resilient Europe139, Conquering cancer, mission possible140)  and 
a number of international partnerships related to agriculture and food.   

BOX 7 - LESSONS FROM THE EU ENERGY SECTOR141 

There  are  various  emergency  procedures  within  the  EU  regulatory  framework  in  case  of 
major disruptions to energy supplies. The type of response depends on the type and level of 
emergency.  The  frameworks  concerned  are  Council  Directive  2009/119/EC,  imposing  an 
obligation on MSs to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products, and 
Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 
2017, concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply142.  

Oil supplies are secured through emergency stocks of 90 days of average net imports or 61 
days of average net consumption (whichever is higher). MSs have the obligation to develop 
contingency plans for the event of a major supply disruption and to ￼contract ￼with private 
companies  to  hold  the  stocks,  some  adopt  a  mixed  approach).  MSs  have  to  have 
arrangements in place for ￼transporting stocks, to ensure their release or effective delivery 
to  end  users  and  markets  within  time  frames  and  conditions  conducive  to  alleviating  the 
supply  problems  which  may  have  arisen.  Member  States  are  also  responsible  for  the 
identification, the accounting and the control of stocks. Despite the high costs of holding oil 
stocks, these provide a degree of resilience to the EU’s energy supply system. 

Moreover,  Member  States  have  reporting  obligations  about  those  stocks.  These  include 
keeping  a  national  register  of  emergency  stocks,  annual  reporting  to  the  European 
Commission and providing monthly data to Eurostat. 

A  consultative  Oil  Coordination  Group,  chaired  by  the  Commission  and  including 
representatives of the Member States, as well as, if needed, representatives from the sector 
concerned, contributes to analysing the situation within the EU with regard to security of 
supply for oil and petroleum products and facilitates the coordination and implementation of 
measures.  The group meets three times a year. 

Despite financial costs of holding oil and gas stocks, these provide a degree of resilience to 
the EU’s energy supply system. 

In  general,  the improvement of EU-level crisis  management is  high on the agenda in  many 
areas. Crisis management is seen as an essential issue for protecting and enhancing the present 

136 https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/4ebd2586-fc85-11ea-b44f-01aa75ed71a1/. 
137 https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/bc7e46c2-fed6-11ea-b44f-01aa75ed71a1/language-

en/format-PDF/source-160480388. 

138 https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/mission-starfish-2030-restore-our-ocean-and-waters_en. 
139 https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/climate-resilient-europe_en. 
140 https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/conquering-cancer-mission-possible_en. 
141 See slides from the relevant expert group meeting of 26 March 2021. 
142 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex:32009L0119;  
   https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32018L1581. 

48 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
and future wellbeing of EU citizens. Drawing on recent experience, many policy initiatives for 
better preparedness are being presented. The approach to crisis management aims to improve 
consistency and better integration across sectors143.  The Group of Chief Scientific advisors has 
been mandated to develop, in 2022, a scientific opinion with recommendations on EU strategic 
crisis  management  for  prevention,  preparedness,  response  and  resilience,  including  in  their 
operational aspects. The Commission has also incorporated strategic foresight in its work, to 
better  anticipate  future  crises.  In  2020,  the  first  annual  foresight  report 144 focused  on  how 
policies to improve resilience can open opportunities, after having mitigated vulnerabilities. It 
also  calls  for  closer  monitoring,  with  the  development  of  resilience  dashboards.  The  2021 
annual  foresight  report  will  address  the  issue  of  the  EU’s  open  strategic  autonomy,  with  a 
timeline  to  2040,  discussing  trends,  emerging  issues  and  uncertainties  for  ensuring  that 
mutually  beneficial  international  relations  are  developed,  while  protecting  from  unfair  and 
abusive trade practices.  

At  operational  level,  ARGUS,  a  crises  management  coordination  process  of  the  European 
Commission set up in 2005145, is responsible for managing transboundary crises that require 
action at EU level, including crises affecting multiple sectors. 

A major revision of ARGUS is currently underway, aiming at making ARGUS an integrated, 
cross-policy ‘EU crisis dashboard’, with a particular emphasis on supporting (i) foresight, risk 
assessment,  monitoring  and  early  detection;  (ii)  prevention  and  preparedness,  including 
resilience, and; (iii) response. 

With  regard  to  existing  crisis  management  procedures  with  a  link  to  the  food  security 
contingency plan, a mapping exercise was carried out across the Commission to take stock of 
existing sectorial procedures, including early warning systems146. 

The mapping is clustered in three categories: (i) sectoral contingency plans in specific policy 
areas with relevance for food security (table 1); (ii) early warning systems focusing on risks 
that  are  indirectly  linked  to  food  supply  and  food  security  (table  2;  and  (iii)  early  warning 
systems focusing on risks that, prima facie, have limited relevance in the context of food supply 
and food security.  

TABLE  1  -  SECTORAL  CONTINGENCY  PLANS  IN  SPECIFIC  POLICY  AREAS  WITH 
RELEVANCE TO FOOD SECURITY 

Nr. 

Directorate 
General 

1.   

ECHO 

Contingency plan 

Emergency  Response  Coordination  Centre 
(ERCC) 
contingency plans and maps related to natural and man-made 
risks (see box 8) 

2.    HOME 

Turkey/Western Balkan Route contingency plan 

143 Scientific Advice Mechanism (2021), Scoping paper, strategic management in the EU, Improving EU crisis 

prevention, preparedness, response and resilience. 

144 EC (2020), 2020 Strategic Foresight Report, Charting the course towards a more resilient Europe. 
145 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2005%3A0662%3AFIN. 
146 Early warning systems and rapid alert systems are used as a synonym in this context. 

49 

 
 
 
                                                 
3.   

SANTE 

4.    MOVE 

5.    GROW 

6.   

SANTE 

7.    DEFIS 

Implementing  Decision 

(EU)  2019/300 
Commission 
establishing a general plan for crisis management in the field 
of the safety of food and feed (see box 9) 

Pandemic  and  other  major  crisis  contingency  plan  for  the 
European freight transport sector, being prepared in 2021 

Single Market Emergency Regulation 

European  Health  Emergency  Preparedness  and  Response 
Authority (HERA)  
2016 Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats 

BOX 8- THE EUROPEAN UNION CIVIL PROTECTION MECHANISM AND THE EMERGENCY 
RESPONSE COORDINATION CENTRE (ERCC) 147 

The EU Civil Protection Mechanism (ECPM) aims to strengthen cooperation between 
the  EU  Member  States  and  six  participating  states  (Iceland,  Norway,  Serbia,  North 
Macedonia,  Montenegro,  and  Turkey)  on  civil  protection  to  improve  prevention, 
preparedness and response to disasters. At the heart of this Mechanism is the Emergency 
Response  Coordination  Centre  (ERCC).  It  coordinates  the  delivery  of  assistance  to 
disaster  stricken  countries,  such  as  relief  items,  expertise,  civil  protection  teams,  and 
specialised equipment. The ERCC ensures the rapid deployment of emergency support 
and  acts  as  a  coordination  hub  between  all  EU  Member  States,  the  six  additional 
participating states, the affected country, and civil protection and humanitarian experts. 
The centre operates 24/7 and can help any country inside or outside the EU affected by 
a major disaster upon request from the national authorities or a UN body. While Member 
States  are  responsible  for  the  security  and  safety  of  their  citizens,  they  have  the 
responsibility  to  support  other  disaster-affected  member  States  when  requested.  This 
principle is stated in the solidarity clause in Article 196 of the TFEU148. 

A Common Emergency and Information System (CECIS) is used as a secure web-based 
platform for immediate exchanges of information with Participating States. A training 
and exercise programme is maintained to support its functions. Civil protection modules 
consist  of  trained  teams,  experts  and  equipment  that  are  deployable  to  respond  to 
disasters. The response deployed by the ERCC consists of offers of assistance, experts, 
mobilisation of assets, co-financing, or can be of operational nature. Standard operating 
procedures or memoranda of understanding exist with other Commission services (DGs 
ENER,  HOME,  SANTE),  with  international  organisations  such  as  the  World  Health 
Organization (WHO), the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), 
the  International  Federation  of  Red  Cross  and  Red  Crescent  Societies  (IFRC),  the 
International  Organization  for  Migration  (IOM)  and  the  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency (IAEA), as well as neighbourhood countries and at regional level. 

147 https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/civil-protection/mechanism_en. 
148 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12016E196. 

50 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
BOX 9 - DG SANTE’S FOOD SAFETY CONTINGENCY PLAN 

The European Commission has in place, since 2004, a plan to manage incidents related 
to the safety of food or feed, in accordance with Article 55 of the General Food Law 
(Regulation (EC) No 178/2002). Drawing from experiences gained from multi-country 
foodborne incidents that occurred since 2004 in the EU such as E. coli in sprouts in 2011, 
Fipronil in eggs in 2017 or Listeria monocytogenes in frozen vegetables in 2018, this 
plan was revised in 2019 through Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/300 
establishing a general plan for crisis management in the field of the safety of food and 
feed.  

The  updated  plan  allows  to  address  more  effectively  multi-country  food/feed-borne 
incidents  linked  to  biological,  chemical  or  physical  hazards,  representing  direct  or 
indirect risks to human health, through enhanced Union coordination and, when required, 
the setting up of a crisis unit that brings together the Commission as well as relevant 
Member  States  and  Union  agencies.  It  sets  out  the  practical  procedures  necessary  for 
enhanced preparedness and for the management of incidents at Union level, including a 
communication strategy in accordance with the principle of transparency.  

A network of crisis coordinators is instrumental for the successful implementation of the 
plan and meets regularly and as necessary to take appropriate risk management measures 
when the origin of the outbreak is identified. The Commission organises regular (yearly) 
inter-sectoral simulation exercises, to test the use and usability of the existing systems 
and communication tools (such as the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed and the 
Early  Warning  and  Response  System)  during  a  multi-country  food  or  feed-borne 
outbreak and the ability of the Member States to work collaboratively and conduct the 
proper investigations if needed.  

The resulting enhanced preparedness at EU and national level is of increasing importance 
since modern analytical tools (whole genome sequencing) are expected to result in the 
detection of more outbreaks. This combination of structures, tools and procedures is key 
to ensuring a high level of food safety for EU consumers. 

51 

 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 - EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS FOCUSING ON RISKS INDIRECTLY LINKED TO FOOD 
SUPPLY AND FOOD SECURITY 

Nr. 

Institution/ 
Directorate 
General 

EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 
(SG.G.3) 

Early warning/rapid alert system of indirect relevance 

Community Capacity in Crisis Management 

COUNCIL  

IPCR (Integrated political crisis response) 

ECHO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

JRC  

MOVE 

HOME 

JRC 

JRC 

JRC 

ECHO 

EEAS 

European  and  Global  Flood  Awareness  System  by  the 
Emergency  Response  Coordination  Centre  (ERCC)  in  the 
EU Member States and beyond 

Early  Warning  Systems  and  Information:  Risk  forecast 
mapping and emergency or/and operational plans produced 
by ERCC 

European  Global  Drought  observation  system.  It  provides 
drought  risk  maps  and  indicators  and  emergency  drought 
maps as well. They could be integrated into Food security 
contingency plan 

European Forest Fires Information System (EFFIS). Forest 
fire forecast mapping and operational plans based on a DSS 
produced by ERCC 

Copernicus  Information  for  Emergency  Response  and 
Disaster  Risk  Assessment.  ERCC  provides  Rapid  risk 
mapping  supporting  operational  interventions.  in  addition, 
ERCC  provides  Risk  and  recovery  mapping  and  plans  to 
support disaster risk management and recovery activities 

Crop monitoring system 

EACCC (European aviation crisis co-ordination cell 

CIWIN 
Network) 

(Critical 

Infrastructure  Warning 

Information 

EFAS (European Flood Awareness System) 

EMS (Emergency Management System) 

Weather warnings – meteoalarm 

ERCC portal (Emergency Response Coordination Centre) 

EU conflicts early warning system  

52 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SANTE 

JRC 

SANTE 

GROW 

GROW 

SANTE 

SANTE 

EMSA 

SANTE 

SANTE 

EMSA 

EWRS (Early Warning Response System for communicable 
diseases) 

GDACS (Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System) 

GWIS (Global Wildfire Information System) 

ICSMS  (Information  and  Communication  System  for 
Market Surveillance) 

IMI (Internal Market Information System) 

RAS-BICHAT  (Rapid  Alert  System  for  Biological  and 
Chemical Attacks and. Threats) 

RASFF (Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed.) / iRASFF 
/ RASFF window  

Safe-Sea-Net  (vessel  traffic  monitoring  and  information 
system) 

ADNS  (Animal  Disease  Notification  System )/ ADNS  II / 
ADIS (evolution of ADNS) 

Harmful pests and diseases data collection 

Urgent Pollution Alert Section 

The European Union is involved in the protection of critical infrastructures that are essential 
for the functioning of our societies and economy, with  a view to  reduce vulnerabilities and 
offer safeguards from natural or man-made disruptions, intentional or not. The Commission 
has  been  active  in  this  area  since  2006,  with  its  European  Programme  for  Critical 
Infrastructures Protection. The Commission adopted at the end of 2020 a proposal for a new 
Directive on the resilience of critical entities149, to improve the pre-existing framework, in order 
to take into account a more diversified risk landscape, the challenges of technological advances, 
and the increasing interdependence between economic sectors and actors, as well as the cross-
border  dimensions  of  risks.  The  proposed  Directive  would  cover  various  sectors  (transport, 
energy, drinking water, wastewater, finance, banking, public administration, space, health and 
digital infrastructures), but not specifically food production, processing and distribution. The 
Commission proposes to assess later whether the food sector should also be covered. The new 
Directive will set out minimum requirements for MSs and for the critical entities identified, 
provide  a  procedure  for  the  identification  of  critical  entities,  and  maintain  a  dedicated 
knowledge hub within the Commission.  

In  2016,  the  European  Commission  and  the  High  Representative  of  the  Union  for  Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy adopted a Joint Framework to counter hybrid threats, and foster 
the  resilience  of  the  EU,  its  MSs  and  partner  countries,  while  increasing  cooperation  with 
NATO150. This framework provides for measures to prevent, respond, and recover from crisis 

149 COM(2020)829 of 16.12.2020. 
150 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_16_1227. 

53 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
by defining effective procedures to follow in the case a wide-ranging and serious hybrid attacks 
occurs. Hybrid threats are defined as mixture of activities often combining conventional and 
unconventional methods that can be used in a coordinated manner by state and non-state actors 
while remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare. The objective is not only to 
cause  direct  damage  and  exploit  vulnerabilities,  but  also  to  destabilise  societies  and  create 
ambiguity to hinder decision-making. One of the actions in this context aims at, in cooperation 
with MSs, improve awareness of and resilience to hybrid threats within existing preparedness 
and coordination mechanisms, including on food aspects: the Commission collaborates with 
the European Food Safety Authority to adapt to advanced scientific investigation techniques, 
for  a  more  precise  identification  and  sourcing  of  health  threats,  and  a  resulting  rapid 
management of food safety outbreaks. Developing a preparedness and coordination mechanism 
for  food  supply  and  food  security  will  contribute  to  take  into  account  these  aspects  in  the 
identification of hybrid threats151. 

the  MSs.  The  screening  Regulation  adopted 

A certain number of these infrastructures or of other assets can be subject to foreign direct 
investment  (FDI),  which  should  in  the  context  of  the  EU’s  openness  to  FDI  be  subject  to 
appropriate  screening  by 
in  March 
2019152 established an EU-wide framework in which the European Commission and the MSs 
can coordinate their actions on FDI. In this context, the Commission can issue opinions when 
an investment threatens security or public order in more than one MS. These provisions are 
now  fully  in  force,  and  several  of  the  cases  discussed  involve  risks  to  food  security  when 
dealing with investment in agricultural land, inputs or infrastructures used for the movement 
of agricultural commodities and food. In times of crisis, for health care in particular but not 
only, strategic assets in the EU are essential for Europe’s security. This motivates the call by 
the Commission to Member States to make full use of their existing screening mechanisms, 
and for strengthening their screening mechanisms where needed153.  

The  updated  EU  Industrial  Strategy 154 includes  actions to  ensure  that  the  Single  Market 
remains functional and that the availability and free movement of persons, goods and services 
continues in times of crises, through the design of a Single Market Emergency Instrument. 
This  will  include  further  information  sharing,  coordination  and  solidarity  when  MSs  adopt 
crisis-related measures, and will help to mitigate these policies negative impacts on the Single 
Market. The strategy also tackles the risks of interruptions to global supply chains affecting the 
availability of essential products, some of which are relevant to the food industrial ecosystem, 
such as some active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) that are often also used in the food and 
feed industry, or raw materials used as inputs in agriculture (i.e., fertilisers). The strategy also 
put forward the need to monitor strategic dependencies, in line with the principles of open 
strategic autonomy. Phosphate rock, used essentially for fertilisers, is mentioned in the list of 
critical  raw  materials  for  the  EU.  Other  critical  raw  materials  such  as  bismuth,  borate  or 
phosphorus play  a role in the food sector via their use in  pesticides and fertilisers. The EU 

151 European Commission, Joint report to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of the 
Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats - a European Union response, JOIN(2017)30 of 19.7.2017. 
152 Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a 

framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union. 

153 European Commission, Guidance to the Member States concerning foreign direct investment and free 
movement of capital from third countries, and the protection of Europe’s strategic assets, ahead of the 
application of Regulation (EU) 2019/452 (FDI Screening Regulation), C(2020)1981, of 26.3.2021. 

154 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Updating the 2020 New Industrial Strategy: Building a 
stronger Single Market for Europe’s recovery. COM(2021)350 of 5.5.2021. 

54 

 
 
                                                 
action  plan  for  critical  raw  materials155 envisages  actions  relating  to  the  development  of 
resilient value chains for EU industrial ecosystems, the reduction of dependency on primary 
critical  raw  materials  through  the  circular  use  of  resources,  sustainable  products  and 
innovation, the strengthening of sustainable and responsible domestic sourcing and processing 
of raw materials in the European Union, and the diversification of supply, with sustainable and 
responsible sourcing from third countries, and the strengthening rules-based open trade in raw 
materials and removing distortions to international trade. Concerning APIs, the EU has a strong 
production capacity, but relies to a certain extent on third countries in terms of processes and 
inputs required for manufacturing. The Commission has engaged in a structured dialogue on 
the security of medicines supply with relevant public and private actors of the pharmaceutical 
supply chain to better understand vulnerabilities and potential dependencies, and take measures 
to strengthen the resilience of pharmaceutical supply chains, and ensure the security of supply 
of medicines to patients in the EU. 

There are other sectoral initiatives of interest for the food system. To highlight a few, in the 
health  domain,  the  Commission  announced  a  number  of  lessons  learnt  from  the  experience 
with the COVID-19 pandemic, which will contribute to better anticipate public health risks and 
to  enhance  contingency  planning 156 ,  ranging  from  robust  global  surveillance,  enhanced 
preparedness, including through an annual state of preparedness report, a new framework for 
an EU pandemic state of emergency, and the development of a toolbox for crisis situations.  
The new European Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA) should 
be operational by early 2022.  

Within  the  Sustainable  and  Smart  Mobility  strategy 157,  the  Commission  announced  it  will 
prepare  crisis  contingency  plans  with  MSs  and  sector  representatives,  to  ensure  business 
continuity, and coordinate response measures in the transport sector during disruptive events.    

3.2 Member States’ policies 

The European Commission consulted Member States in the GREX (on a contingency plan for 
ensuring  food  supply  and  food  security158).    As  part  of  these  consultations,  Member  States 
provided  information  on  their  practices  and  views  on  food  security  in  a  questionnaire.  18 
Member States responded to the survey (DK, DE, IE, ES, FR, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, NL, AT, 
PT,  PL,  RO,  SK,  SI,  FI).  The  information  in  this  section  is  based  on  their  responses 
(summarised in more detail in Annex 3). 

In a majority of the Member States one single administration, i.e. the Ministry of Agriculture, 
or  other  ministries  (Home  Affairs,  Defence,  Economy,  etc.),  or  a  specific  agency  or  group, 

155 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social 

Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Critical Raw Materials Resilience: Charting a Path towards 
greater Security and Sustainability. COM(2020)474 of 3.9.2020. 

156 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Drawing the early lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic. 
COM(2021)380 of 15.6.2021. 

157 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social 

Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy – putting European 
transport on track for the future. COM(2020)789 of 9.12.2020. 

158https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=2730&NewSe

arch=1&NewSearch=1. 

55 

 
 
 
                                                 
 
deals with crisis management issues related to food security. Still, in several Member States 
different parts of the administration share this responsibility. In these cases, more than half of 
the  respondents  indicate  that  they  have  no  known  coordinating  team,  while  for  the  other 
Member States there is coordination through a shared team.  

The focus of administrations in Member States in terms of food security work is, mainly, on 
monitoring (mostly through regular market reports; 7 MSs), crisis management (9 MSs), and 
the management of inventories (7 MS have strategic reserves in place). In some Member States 
different administrations are responsible for the one or other aspect of this work (4 MS). 

Among the procedures in place to ensure food supply, seven Member States list the possibility 
to release food strategic stocks, and one Member State indicates the possibility of government 
buying and handing out food parcels to citizens, setting-up the logistics for an emergency value 
chain, introducing derogations to the food law, and the possibility of bans on hoarding, as well 
as distribution regulations. Another Member State recommends citizens keep household stocks 
for a minimum period of 10 days at all times. 

As  concerns  the  legislative  approach,  ten  Member  States  have  a  legislation  available,  one 
Member State has a memorandum with stakeholders, another one uses EU regulation as a basis 
for public intervention, and four Member States indicate having no known legislation in place.  

The  national  legislation  focuses  on  monitoring,  food  reserves  distribution,  food  supply 
(production,  logistics),  derogations  to  food  laws,  sharing  and  access  to  private  data,  and 
precautionary measures for long-term crisis preparedness. 

With regard to monitoring, six Member States have annual or regular reports on the state of 
markets and prices. One Member State, together with the main economic operators, monitors 
critical processes with regard to food security and food. Others mention no formal monitoring 
but  close  contact  with  market  participants,  a  balance  sheet  approach,  or  stakeholders 
involvement (covering voluntary reporting from food businesses in normal times, mandatory 
reporting in times of crises, and no obligation for market participants to report on stocks). 

As concerns indicators, Member States mention self-sufficiency for food and critical inputs, 
level  of  stocks  or  stock-to-use  ratios,  or  a  combination  of  several  indicators  such  as  self-
sufficiency and the ability to trade, measures of economic hardship and consumer confidence, 
monitoring of shortages. Some Member States mention risk scenarios or risk assessment linked 
to  the  establishment  of  food  reserves,  evaluating  the  effectiveness  programmes,  and 
considerations on international obligations and national security. 

Eleven Member States do not use thresholds that would trigger a crisis response. One Member 
State would generate a crisis response in the case of a serious threat to meeting vital needs, and 
when market interventions are not sufficient.   

Three of the 18 respondents do not currently foresee reviewing the plans they have in place. 
Three  Member  States  indicate  that  the  review  of  plans  is  a  continuous  process  in  their 
administrations.  Two  Member  States  are  currently  working  on  a  reform  to  establish  food 
reserves.  One Member State has decided to review its preparedness and response planning to 
reinforce its efficiency and the flexibility against major risks and threats. Other Member States 
are considering either reinforcing national strategic reserves, reviewing COVID-19 measures 
if  necessary,  or  reviewing  their  food  security  plans  as  a  consequence  of  the  Farm  to  Fork 
contingency plan for ensuring food supply and food security in the EU. Another Member State 

56 

 
 
mentioned  that  the  food  chain  should  be  taken  into  account  within  the  rules  on  critical 
infrastructure. 

Plans  for  restructuring    among  Member  States  also  include  introducing  a  civil  emergency 
planning  system,  conducting  a  review  of  national  risks  every  three  years,  and  reviewing 
preparedness  versus  emergency  measures,  and  the  role  of  agencies,  monitoring  and  data 
security, as well as the scaling-up of training activities on crisis management.  

The following sections consider food security contingency planning at country level, based on 
presentations by some individual Member States during the GREX consultation process. 

Germany159 
In Germany, there is a historical division between the Ministry of Agriculture, dealing with 
food security, and the Ministry of Interior, dealing with critical infrastructure and cybersecurity. 
The legal basis for this arrangement is found in the “Act on food security and precaution160”. A 
crisis is defined by the Federal Government if supply is seriously in danger for a large part of 
the population. Possible measures can affect production, prices, stocks or security of supplies.  
In Germany, public strategic reserves, held by the federal government, are a component of food 
security.  Moreover,  the  government  recommends  households  to  keep  private  food  stocks 
corresponding to 10 days of consumption.  

The COVID-19 crisis showed that in case of a crisis, food cannot be seen in isolation in policy 
terms, and needs to be addressed in conjunction with other relevant policies, including policies 
on critical infrastructure in the energy, transport and IT domains. The German authorities are 
examining  ways  to  improve  food  security  and  emergency  frameworks,  including  following 
recent German Court of Auditors reports (2011 and 2019). 

Denmark161 
The Danish food security contingency plan is part of a more general national crisis management 
system that applies to any type of incident. The crisis management system is activated in the 
event of extraordinary incidents requiring a coordinated response from the central authorities. 
The structure is a comprehensive network involving a high number of staff and agencies at 
national, regional and local level. General principles for preparedness and crisis management 
include sector responsibility, cooperation, precaution, subsidiarity and similarity (i.e. applying 
the  same  working  methods  in  times  of  crises  as  in  times  without  crises). The  Danish  crisis 
management organisational framework establishes and maintains the overview of the situation 
to ensure quick and effective decisions, ensure active cooperation and efficient coordination at 
all levels (national, regional, local), and provides information and instructions to the general 
public.  The structure proved to be effective during COVID-19. The framework is regularly 
used for animal health and welfare or food safety risks. An important element, which proved 
its worth for animal health and welfare or food safety, is the dialogue and relationship with 
stakeholders (business organisations, NGOs, industries, other authorities). 

Any level of the structure can trigger the plan and will get a reply within 1 hour. The network 
approach bases the national contingency plan on peer-to-peer exchanges, includes a holistic 

159 Rudloff, B., Contingency planning: the German case in light of conceptual criteria, 26 March 2021. 
160 Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz, Gesetz über die Sicherstellung der 

Grundversorgung mit Lebensmitteln in einer Versorgungskrise und Maßnahmen zur Vorsorge für eine 
Versorgungskrise, 2017. 

161 Kühn Hove, N., The Danish preparedness model – a network approach, 26 March 2021. 

57 

 
 
                                                 
view,  associating  stakeholder  and  industry  organisations,  and  builds  on  a  mindful  outlook 
(‘learn don’t blame’). Responses are targeted, there is no one-size-fits-all approach.   

Denmark carries out simulation exercises every other year. Simulation scenarios are chosen 
from a catalogue of scientifically plausible scenarios. Agencies are particularly committed to 
the exercise. A report on the learning points is sent to the Prime Minister and subsequently 
integrated into the national crisis management system. 

Finland162 
Finland’s  geographical  (above  60°  latitude,  which  implies  a  short  growing  season  and  the 
possibility  of  late  frost  in  spring,  as  well  as  early  frost  before  harvest,  possible  logistical 
difficulties if sea is freezing in harbours) and geopolitical situation (with a direct border with 
USSR during the cold war) are the main reasons for holding strategic food reserves.  

In Finland, the holding of strategic food reserves is organised in public-private cooperation. 
These reserves mainly  focus on milling quality  grains  for human consumption,  feed grains, 
feed  protein,  seeds  for  all  cereals  and  for  the  main  forage  crops.  No  reserves  are  held  for 
prepared food products.  Two to six months of reserves are held for grain commodities. 

The National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA) owns the stored grain. Registered companies 
(grain  companies  or  mills)  are  responsible  for  the  storage  and  renewal  of  the  grain,  under 
contract with NESA.  Minimum volumes and quality as well as renewal frequency are part of 
the contract. 

Challenges in this context include not obtaining milling quality every year, which is also an 
obstacle for recycling, as well a possible market disruption from a high stock-to-use ratio, and 
of recycling the stores. Logistic disruptions (sea freight and inland) can be an issue, changing 
circumstances can make it difficult to decide which products, and how much of these, to keep 
in storage. Locally grown protein crops and seeds are currently not included in the scheme, 
farmers do not take part in the storage today. 

BOX 10 – FOOD STOCKPILES AND STRATEGIC RESERVES 

Some countries keep public stocks of certain food (or feed) products. These stocks can be 
used for market management purposes (‘food stockpiles’, released or bought from the market 
over time to smooth over price movements, i.e. to affect prices), or to protect against sudden 
sharp  market  movements  due  to  catastrophic  events,  such  as  natural  disasters  or  war 
(‘strategic food reserves’, used to provide emergency supplies). One can distinguish buffer 
stocks  (used  to  stabilise  commodity  prices),  social  safety  net  stocks  (to  ensure  food 
distribution  programmes  to  the  most  deprived),  and  emergency  stocks  kept  to  provide 
assistance during transitory food shortages and crises, although the border between each type 
is often blurred and stockholding policies can pursue several objectives163. Some EU MSs 
and third countries maintain such stocks, with the choice of whether to do so, how, and for 
which products, guided by national circumstances. 

162 Schulman, M., Grain security Stocks in Finland, 25 February 2021. 
163 Deuss, A., Review of the performance and impacts of recent stockholding policies, 2015. 

58 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
Lower levels of self-sufficiency in food seem to be lead to a higher likelihood that public 
stocks are maintained by a country: reserves protect against poor harvests either domestically 
or internationally, with a view to ensure sufficient food availability164.  

For example in Germany, Federal cereals stocks (wheat, rye and oats) were of around 800 
thousand tonnes in  2017, i.e. around 1.7 weeks  of the  consumption of the cereals  stored. 
Additional  civil  food  stocks  of  rice  (100  thousand  tonnes),  dairy  products  (4.5  thousand 
tonnes of condensed milk) and pulses (40 thousand tonnes of peas and lentils) were kept. 

In Finland, cereals stocks (wheat and rye usually) amount to six months of consumption165, 
while stocks for seeds are kept to ensure the following year’s sowing, and some reserves are 
also contacted for feedstuffs.   

Switzerland has a comprehensive approach to strategic food reserves, with reviewed levels 
in  2019, reaching 3 to  4 months of consumption for several  cereals  (common  and durum 
wheat, rice, feedstuffs), as well as of sugar, coffee and cooking oils. Reserves of rapeseeds 
were introduced in 2019.   

Other  European  countries  declare  maintaining  strategic  food  reserves  but  do  not  disclose 
quantities and costs166. For instance, the Czech Republic stockpiles grains, sugar, meat and 
dairy products. In Poland the information regarding types of products, quantities and costs 
of maintenance are considered classified information. 

Sweden, on the contrary, will shut down its last emergency stocks, intended for wartime, in 
2022. Many countries do not maintain strategic food reserves as such (Austria, Denmark, 
France), but focus on other tools such as food distribution in case of emergency, or legal 
bases to seize products from manufacturers and suppliers in the case of emergency. 

There can be significant direct costs associated with keeping stocks of products, for example 
to maintain the underlying infrastructure, to keep perishable food products in a good state of 
use  over  prolonged  periods  of  time,  or  to  waste.  .  For  example,  in  Germany,  the  costs 
budgeted for 2021 amounted to EUR 21 million. Costs in Switzerland are estimated to be 
EUR 5.5 per capita per year for food and feed reserves. There are also indirect costs, related 
to distortive effects on market operation. These can even occur globally, for example in the 
case of the large-scale stockholding policies carried out in India or China. Market effects can 
occur at the time of constituting or releasing stocks, crowding-out stocking by the private 
sector, deviating public spending from other more profitable areas (such as investment), or 
to the vulnerability of such systems to speculative attacks, in particular when relying on price 
triggers rather than on objectives expressed in terms of quantities to be stored. 

Some countries adopt recommendations for households to keep food stocks at home, as a 
contingency measure. This is the case in Sweden, the United States of America167, and New 
Zealand  (3  days  of  stocks),  Germany  (10  days),  and  Japan  or  Australia  (14  days) 168.  In 

164 Gilbert, C., What are the threats to EU food security?, 25 February 2021. 
165 Bovin, A., Free market or food stockpiles, a comparative case study of food supply in a crisis perspective in 

Sweden and Finland, 2018. 

166 Ben-Yehuda, T., Emergency Food Reserves: a Comparative Study, 2015. 
167 https://www.ready.gov/. 
168 Keating, A., Food security in Australia: The logistics of Vulnerability, 2013. 

59 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Finland and the United Kingdom,  there is  a general  recommendation for citizens  to store 
products with a long shelf life. In most cases, the level of awareness and compliance with 
such recommendations by citizens is perceived to be low. 

In  terms  of  market  transparency  -  a  requirement  for  the  efficient  functioning  of  product 
markets - there is tension between calls by market participants for the need to increase data 
collection and publication on all food stocks (both public and private), and national security 
experts, who point out that part of the strategic value of keeping stocks in the form of food 
strategic reserves is that adversaries are kept in the dark about the full ability of a country to 
respond to attacks endangering food security. 

3.3 Third countries and international organisations 

Japan169 
In Japan, there is a strong focus on preparedness due to regular occurrences of natural disasters 
such as earthquakes, typhoons or heavy rains. Starting from the earthquake and the subsequent 
tsunami  in  2011,  a  shift  from  disaster  prevention  to  risk  mitigation  took  place,  aiming  at 
increasing the overall resilience of the food system, including a list of actions for on-farm risk 
mitigation with full checks on irrigation facilities, reservoirs and greenhouses. The Ministry of 
agriculture issues ‘to-do’ lists to  prepare farms to mitigate disasters,  with  recommendations 
concerning insurance coverage, business continuity, emergency electricity supply, etc.   

To address concerns about supply chain disruptions during the COVID-19 pandemic, Japan 
maintained continuous and accurate communication with the public and stakeholders (through 
dedicated business-continuity manuals for six sectors including food producers, processors and 
distributors), and provided emergency staff dispatched by the national government from least-
affected local governments to local governments affected the most. Moreover, Japan provided 
emergency support to farmers. Providing correct information to consumers was also prioritised, 
with simple messaging on the absence of risk of food shortages through video clips aired in 
news media regularly. 

With regard to public stockholding, Japan keeps public stocks of rice, and recommends private 
households to keep stocks corresponding to the quantity of 2 weeks of consumption. Trading 
companies also keep their own private stocks. 

United States170 
In the United States, the impact of COVID-19 on agriculture was mostly felt with regard to 
health issues in farm labour, in the processing sector and at ports, as well as with regard to 
lockdown measures in schools, businesses and restaurants. The US response to COVID-19 was 
to  reinforce  and  complement  standing  measures  supporting  farmers  and  vulnerable  groups, 
through several agricultural support programs and dedicated food assistance programs.  

A dedicated American Rescue Plan made available USD 4 billion for FSC assistance through 
purchase and distribution of agricultural commodities, as well as grants and loans. USD 300 
million of the total were reserved for the monitoring and surveillance of susceptible animals 

169 Yoneda, R., From Disaster Prevention to Disaster Mitigation, 26 March 2021. 
170 Glauber, J. W., COVID-19: Impacts on US Agriculture and the Government Response, 26 March 2021; 

Meyer, S., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021. 

60 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
with regard to COVID-19, another USD 100 million for the covering of overtime for inspection 
costs for small and very small meat and poultry processing facilities. Furthermore, funds were 
made  available  for  workers’  protection  against  COVID-19  and  for  providing  support  to 
individuals in need. 

The ‘Farmers to Families Food Box’ program, introduced in spring 2020, was designed and 
implemented as a temporary, emergency relief effort to respond to severe market disruption 
caused by the global pandemic. It contributed to distribute ready-to-eat boxes of fresh produce, 
milk,  dairy  and  cooked  meats  to  citizens  across  the  country.  While  the  initiative  was  well 
received and appreciated by farmers and vulnerable groups, it represented a certain cost and is 
planned to be phased out and to be replaced by fresh produce boxes as part of the Emergency 
Food Assistance Program. 

To address  perceived vulnerabilities in  supply chains  revealed during the  COVID-19 crisis, 
President Biden signed an Executive Order171 requiring a review of global supply chains that 
support key U.S. industries, and ordering U.S. government agencies to identify ways to secure 
the American economy against shortages of critical and essential goods. The Executive Order 
defined resilient supply chains as secure and diverse, facilitating greater domestic production, 
a range of supply, built-in redundancies, adequate stockpiles, safe and secure digital networks, 
and a maintaining a world-class American manufacturing base and workforce. 

The Order outlines two types of assessments by government agencies: (1) an initial 100-day 
Supply Chain Review focusing on key supply chain risks in four specific sectors relating to 
semiconductors, batteries, strategic minerals, and pharmaceuticals; and (2) more in-depth, one-
year  reviews  (Sectoral  Supply  Chain  Assessments)  in  certain  critical  business  sectors  e.g., 
national  defence,  public  health,  information  and  communication  technology,  energy, 
transportation, but also including supply chains for the production of agricultural commodities 
and  food  products.  The  Executive  Order  focused  on  information  gathering,  with  more 
comprehensive  reforms  and  supply  chain  strategies  to  follow  once  relevant  information  is 
collected. On June 8, 2021, the White House released the findings of the 100-day assessment 
of critical supply chains.172 The 100-day assessment report identified actions needed in both 
the  immediate  and  long  term  to  bolster  domestic  manufacturing  of  critical  goods,  reduce 
dependence on China and other foreign nations for supply chain needs, create jobs and address 
unfair trade practices. The administration announced a range of measures intended to reduce 
the country’s dependence on foreign suppliers for critical goods.  

Each Sectoral Supply Chain Assessment expected in 2022, including that for agriculture and 
food, should review among others (i) the critical goods and materials underlying the supply 
chain in question,; (ii) the manufacturing or other capabilities needed to produce these goods 
and materials; (iii) sources of contingencies that may disrupt the supply chain (examples given 
include  cyber,  homeland  security,  health,  climate,  environmental,  ,  economic,  geopolitical, 
human-rights or forced-labour risks, or other contingencies).  

Switzerland173 
Switzerland  is  landlocked  and  imports  around  50%  of  its  food,  mostly  from  Europe. 
Switzerland is also an important axis for combined goods transport in Europe. Switzerland runs 

171 White House, Executive Order 14017 of February 24, 2021 on America’s Supply Chains. 
172 White House Fact Sheet,  Biden-Harris  Administration  Announces  Supply  Chain Disruptions Task Force to 

Address Short-Term Supply Chain Discontinuities, 8 June 2021. 

173 Mitteholzer, M. and Menzi, S., Food Security in Switzerland, 25 February 2021. 

61 

 
 
                                                 
a  compulsory  stockholding  scheme  for  certain  products.  This  is  part  of  a  wider  toolbox  to 
ensure food security, including also direct payments to farmers, free trade agreements, import 
promotion, the regulation of production, and rationing. 

through  private-public 
implements  compulsory  stockholding 
The  Swiss  government 
partnerships. The public National  Economic Supply  Agency ensures the supply of essential 
goods in the event of severe shortages. Around 35 staff, including communications and legal 
service staff, work in close collaboration with around 250 private key companies. 

Every four  years experts analyse the need to change the scheme (products, length of stock-
keeping,  volumes),  a  strategic  decision  is  made  by  the  Government,  details  of  the 
implementation of eventual changes are set out by the Ministry, and companies implement the 
decisions, which are controlled by the Ministry. 

The overall tendency since 1990 is that fewer types goods are kept in stock, and that existing 
compulsory stock volumes have been reduced (e.g. covering needs to 3 months, instead of 12 
months). However, analysis pre-dating the COVID-19 pandemic, indicated the need to expand 
stock new goods (e.g. seeds) and higher volumes. 

Food  and  feedstuff  stocking  costs  amount  to  EUR  5.50  per  capita  and  per  year.  Costs  are 
financed by levies on traders. Companies are entitled to add the levy of EUR 5.50 on prices, 
like a tax, and get coverage for eventual price losses on compulsory stocks. 

The release of stocks only occurs in the event of a severe nationwide shortage. Two different 
scenarios are defined for the release: (i) the Ministry decides to release stocks to bridge a short-
term supply bottleneck, whose end can be predicted with a high degree of probability and that 
requires less than 20% of the compulsory stockpiled quantity; (ii) the Government decides the 
release  in  case  of  a  severe  shortage  that  lasts  long  and/or  concerns  more  than  20%  of  the 
compulsory stock. The supply situation is analysed on the basis of data provided by companies. 
Considerable  obstacles  exist  to  prevent  abuse  and  avoid  creating  incentives  to  reduce  free 
operating stocks. 

NATO  
While civil preparedness is a national responsibility, it is also an issue of collective concern for 
NATO as such. In 2021, Heads of State strengthened a commitment originally issued in 2016, 
to enhancing resilience174.  

NATO’s  core  functions  of  civil  preparedness  are  continuity  of  government,  continuity  of 
essential  services  to  the  population  and  civil  support  to  military  operations.  These  draw  on 
seven  baseline  requirements,  among  which  figure  resilient  food  and  water  resources175.  The 
risks, threats and vulnerabilities that have been identified by NATO with regard to food and 
water security are:  

  cyber-risks; 

174 NATO, Strengthened Resilience Commitment. Article 8 of this strengthened commitment states: “We will step 
up  efforts  to  secure  and  diversify  our  supply  chains,  as  well  as  to  ensure  the  resilience  of  our  critical 
infrastructure (on land, at sea, in space and in cyberspace) and key industries, including by protecting them 
from harmful economic activities”. 

175 Baseline  requirements:  1.  assured  continuity  of  government  and  critical  government  services;  2.  resilient 
energy supplies; 3. ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people; 4. resilient food and water 
resources; 5. ability to deal with mass casualties; 6. resilient civil communications systems and; 7. resilient 
civil transportation system. 

62 

 
 
                                                 
inter-dependencies on other sectors (transport, energy, communication); 

 
  supply chain vulnerabilities; 
  shortage of qualified personnel (e.g. due to pandemics); 
 
 

impact of international trade disruptions and/or border closures; and  
impact of hybrid tools or conflict on food and water as well as contamination of food 
and water.  

To  address  the  risks,  threats  and  vulnerabilities  to  food  and  water  security,  NATO  issues 
guidance  to  national  authorities,  as  well  as  checklists  with  mitigation  measures  and  best 
practices.  With  regard  to  its  guidance  in  the  food  and  water  sectors,  NATO  has  recently 
complemented its ‘just in time’ planning with a ‘just in case’ planning. To that end it agreed 
on two new guidance documents in 2019: (i) Guidance on Security of Supply Arrangements 
for Food and Water Resources, with a focus on ensuring functioning markets, existing solutions, 
the complexity of food and water supply chains and key characteristics for a robust security of 
supply arrangements; (ii) Guidance to National Authorities on Managed Supply and Allocation 
Arrangements, focusing on cases where markets would fail, and emphasising the strengthening 
of national security of supply arrangements by transitioning to manage and allocate food and 
water resources. 

Building  resilience  is  a  high  priority  on  NATO’s  agenda.176 The  importance  of  NATO-EU 
cooperation is underlined by NATO, including staff-to-staff exchanges and cross-briefings. 

The Agricultural Market Information System177  
The Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS)178 is a G-20 initiative launched in 2011, 
grouping  28  members  (all  G20  members  plus  8  other  major  exporters  and  producers).  The 
OECD and the WTO collaborate in the collection and dissemination of policy information for 
the Agricultural Market Information System179. 

A key reason for the creation of AMIS is the continuing need for reliable data to assess whether 
and how a crisis is unfolding. AMIS’s work is based on the need for cooperation, transparency 
and a unified approach among countries to avoid panic on the markets.  

AMIS’s work on the COVID-19 pandemic and food security points to three lessons learnt for 
policy-makers:  (i)  anticipating  is  key  to  react  effectively,  including  to  unexpected  crises 
(increased importance of monitoring and information sharing in the context of a global food 
system). (ii) understanding causal links contributes to appropriate responses;; (iii) each crisis 
is unique and requires a unique set of solutions.  

AMIS’s structure has  three main elements: (i) a Global Food Market Information Group, in 
which technical representatives from AMIS members provide market and policy information 
(2 meetings per  year and monthly webinars); (ii) a Rapid Response Forum, in  which senior 
officials from AMIS members conduct early discussion about critical market conditions and 
ways to address them (1 regular meeting per year and additional meetings in case of emergency) 

176 See also: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm. 
177 Drechsler, D., AMIS – Enhancing market transparency and policy coordination, 26 March 2021.  
178 http://www.amis-outlook.org/. 
179 In their collaboration through AMIS, the OECD and the WTO focus on enhancing food market transparency 
and  policy  responses  for  food  security,  including  by  assessing  global  supplies  of  maize,  rice,  wheat  and 
soybeans and by providing a platform to coordinate policy action.  

63 

 
 
                                                 
and; (iii) the Secretariat, including 10 International Organisations (FAO, GEOGLAM, IFPRI, 
IFAD, IGC, OECD, UNCTAD, the World Bank Group, WFP, and WTO). 

The aim of the Market Monitor180 and in particular its policy development section is to provide 
updates of recent policy developments in real time. Policies covered are all policies related to 
the AMIS monitored commodities and biofuels, that could influence prices, trade, production 
and consumption. New  or modified laws, decrees, regulations  as well as  announcements of 
impending policy or market reforms fall under the conditions for inclusion. 

The  information  used  for  the  Market  Monitor  is  gathered  from  the  OECD,  WTO,  FAO, 
International Grains Council and other international organisations, or from news articles.  

During the preparatory European Commission workshops, AMIS representatives added that 
policy-makers should avoid that measures taken during crises become permanent (for example, 
this may risk prolonging the critical situation). With regard to knowledge on stocks, AMIS has 
released  a  database  on  international  best  practices  and  published  guidelines  for  stocks 
measurement181. AMIS highlights there are often data quality issues on information on stocks. 

3.4 Private sector  

The private sector showed itself to be a critical partner to EU and Member State administrations, 
as well as to the non-governmental sector in finding solutions to food system issues during the 
COVID-19 pandemic. It can be expected that the private sector would again play a significant 
role when similar challenges arise in the future. Businesses and their professional organisations 
played a vital  role in  response and recovery efforts in  countries affected  by COVID-19, by 
protecting their staff,  community and  clients  and by prioritizing containment, following the 
recommendations of the national health authorities and WHO.  

The  United  Nations  called  in  April  2020  on  all  businesses  and  corporations  to  take  three 
primary actions in response to the COVID-19 pandemic182: 

-  Adhere  to  health  and  safety  guidelines  and  provide  economic  cushions  to  workers, 
including through ensuring worker safety and social distancing, and secure wages for 
those working from home; 

-  Provide financial and technical support to governments by contributing to the COVID-

19 Solidarity Response Fund; 

-  Repurpose their facilities and business plans to focus on meeting the needs of the crisis. 

It is important to mention that there are substantial differences between traditional business 
disruption caused by natural events (e.g., hurricanes, earthquakes, tsunamis), human-made (e.g. 
cyber-risks, terrorism), technology or operational failures on one hand, and those caused by 
pandemic events on the other. Whereas traditional business disruption is usually limited to a 
particular  geographical  area,  a  pandemic  can  start  in  a  particular  area  and  quickly  spread 
globally. These differences persist due to the potential increased scale, severity and duration of 

180 http://www.amis-outlook.org/amis-monitoring#.YPa_WugzbIU. 
181 http://www.amis-outlook.org/resources-list/detail/en/c/1154853/. 
182 UN Business Guide on COVID-19, https://www.connectingbusiness.org/system/files/2020-04/COVID19-

BusinessGuide.pdf. 

64 

 
 
 
                                                 
pandemic  events,  necessitating  the  need  for  organizations  to  expand  beyond  traditional 
resilience planning strategies.  

Companies  do  well  to  incorporate  specific  pandemic  planning  considerations  into  existing 
resilience  management  activities,  to  provide  a  comprehensive  response  and  to  provide 
continuity  for  their  most  critical  products  and  services.  Additionally,  companies  should 
consider  establishing  pandemic-specific  policies  and  procedures,  capabilities  for  employee 
communications, telecommuting and personal or family leave to minimize disruptions. Due to 
the potential duration of pandemics, impacts on personnel in the regions that absorb additional 
work cannot be overstated, from the start of the pandemic to several weeks in, when contractor 
resources can start to meaningfully contribute183. 

In addition to general crises planning, which all organisations could consider, more specific 
private sector considerations could apply184. During the pandemic the US Federal Emergency 
Management Agency185 provided the following guidance:  

  Applying for a disaster loan186; 
  Contact  customers,  vendors  and  suppliers  to  determine  demand  or  potential  supply 

issues; 

  Review insurance policies to determine eligibility for coverage of business interruption 

or loss; 

  Establish  online  commerce  platforms,  train  staff  to  operate  in  an  e-commerce 

environment, and adjust business models for a new economy. 

Many companies have business continuity plans in place, including preceding the COVID-19 
pandemic.  Responses  to  the  targeted  questionnaire  show  that,  apart  from  the  primary 
production stage, about half of the companies in the food supply chain were implementing risk 
management or business continuity plans, and that 80% of these found them very useful.  For 
most companies these plans had however not been fully tested in practice before the global 
pandemic  broke  out.  Since  then,  several  companies  have  taken  additional  measures  to 
safeguard  employees  and  mitigate  financial  and  operational  exposure.  For  example,  many 
multinational  businesses  have  reduced  the  output  of  facilities  or  suspended  operations  in 
affected  regions,  as  travel  restrictions  and  mandatory  social  distancing  and  homeworking 
public safety measures were implemented. 

The OECD encourages business to take steps to ensure business continuity, in particular by 
managing risks to operations of core services, and by protecting critical infrastructures in case 
of shocks and ensuring such critical infrastructures may continue to exercise their functions187. 
Assessing progress on these recommendations, the OECD noted that countries made efforts to 

183 COVID-19 and pandemic planning: How companies should respond, Ernst & Young Global Limited, 

https://www.ey.com/en_be/covid-19/covid-19-and-pandemic-planning--how-companies-should-respond. 

184 Morgan, A., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021. 
185 Planning Considerations for Organizations in Reconstituting Operations During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 
US Federal Emergency Management Agency, https://www.fema.gov/press-release/20210318/planning-
considerations-organizations-reconstituting-operations-during-covid. 

186 In the EU context this could mean different types of support granted by the Member States, for example 

under the state aid Temporary Framework. 

187 OECD, Recommendation of the Council on the Governance of Critical Risks, 2014. 

65 

 
 
                                                 
implement them and even provided advisory services or guidelines in some cases, but that there 
was little evidence that this had an effect in practice188.  

BOX  11  -  ERNST  &  YOUNG  GLOBAL  11-STEP  GUIDELINES  FOR  FIRMS  TO  PLAN  AND 
RESPOND TO PANDEMICS189 

1.  Apply a people-first mind-set. The very first priority of an organisation during a 
pandemic should be the safety and well-being of its workforce. Employees are unable 
to focus on work responsibilities when their well-being and that of their family are 
in peril. Hence, the critical question firms must address at the onset of a pandemic 
event is whether their employees are safe, followed by whether they are available to 
perform critical functions. 

2.  Plan for geographical segmentation of functions and activities. As prudent risk 
management,  and  to  the  extent  possible,  companies  should  look  to  diversify  their 
supplier  base,  customers  and  third-party  service  providers  across  geographies,  to 
avoid  single  points  of  failure  and  increased  exposure  to  regional  outages  and 
geopolitical events. 

3.  Invest  in  technology  and  infrastructure  to  support  remote  work  and  virtual 
collaboration capabilities. Companies should invest in tools to enable personnel to 
work remotely and collaborate virtually, assess their current bandwidth to support 
remote work, perform periodic network stress testing, and identify workarounds for 
critical tasks that are not executable from home. It is worth noting that while remote 
working  is  a  viable  option  for  the  service  sector,  it  does  not  work  as  well  for 
manufacturing, thus resulting in critical impacts on product supply chains. 

4.  Consider the systemic nature of pandemics when designing response strategies. 
Companies must carefully design distinct strategies and plan around areas of high 
manual  intervention  and  concentration  risks,  including  single  points  of  failure. 
Companies should validate that contracts between country-to-country affiliates are 
in place to reduce uncertainty of terms, rates, payments and regulatory requirements; 
that data-sharing agreements are addressed within the contracts (e.g., General Data 
Protection  Regulation  requirements);  and,  as  required  in  regulated  industries,  that 
appropriate  licenses  are  in  place  to  conduct  additional  work.  Further,  companies 
should consider downstream dependencies. 

5.  Assess  reliance  on  third  parties.  Companies  must  develop  a 

thorough 
understanding  of  their  critical  third,  fourth  and  fifth  parties,  and  their  resilience 
programs,  and  develop  alternate  plans,  for  instance  insourcing  strategies  or 
substitutability, if the critical third party’s ability to perform services is impaired. 
6.  Engage with customers. Companies must continue to communicate with customers 
through  multiple  channels,  reinforce  that  customer  interests  are  a  priority,  and 
provide information to alleviate their concerns. A clearly drafted frequently-asked-
questions  document  published  and  disseminated  through  multiple  channels, 
including the company’s website and social media, can prove to be a useful tool to 
proactively address customer concerns. 

7.  Develop  a  robust  communication  strategy  (including  social  media).  For 
companies that have both retail and corporate customers, consistent messaging is key. 
All channels must reconcile (e.g., social media, customer call centres, public relations 
releases) to establish a robust communications strategy that clearly lays out process 

188 OECD, Assessing Global Progress in the Governance of Critical Risks, 2018. 
189 EY Global, COVID-19 and pandemic planning: How companies should respond, 19 March 2020. 

66 

 
 
                                                 
and protocols to engage with a wide set of stakeholders, inclusive of any legal and 
jurisdictional considerations. 

8.  Team  with  the  public  sector;  national,  state  and  local  agencies;  and  health 
officials.  Companies  must  leverage  advisories,  resources  and  health  and  safety 
measures  prescribed  by  international,  national  and  local  agencies  and  by  health 
officials,  and  refrain  from  distributing  conflicting  materials,  as  this  can  lead  to 
confusion and fear  among  employees. Companies must closely coordinate on any 
direct efforts (e.g., providing supplies) to support communities with local agencies 
to avoid chaos, and to not impede any public assistance efforts underway. Companies 
should establish communication strategies and channels to engage effectively with 
public authorities. 

9.  Increase rigor and complexity of testing. Companies must elevate the complexity 
of existing scenarios used for testing and simulations to assess their preparedness for 
pandemic events. This includes testing against scenarios that evaluate their response 
to extended periods of outages; total shutdown of a major operational facility, city or 
region; increased absenteeism (more than half workforce); multiple outages; and so 
on. 

10. Leverage  pandemic  command  centres  to  prioritize  and  govern  effectively.  As 
resources  become  constrained,  firms  must  constantly  re-prioritize  delivery  of 
products and services that are critical to meet customer needs and provide market 
stability.  Companies  must  have  a  clearly  documented  prioritization  framework, 
inclusive of associated risk tolerances, supported by a robust governance process to 
make risk acceptance decisions (e.g., discontinuation of certain services) during an 
event. 

11. Establish  crisis  management  exceptional  approval  processes.  Companies  must 
expand  on  existing  human  resources,  finance,  legal,  operations  and  business 
processes to accommodate certain critical exceptions, and clearly communicate the 
revised  policies,  criteria  and  processes  to  allow  such  waivers  in  an  accelerated 
manner 

IATA lists the following elements to improve the distribution and flow of perishable goods, 
such as food, throughout the supply chain: 

  Ensure compliance with international standards, procedures and practices; 
 

Improve handling and transportation performance (e.g. to address food wastage and 
loss);  

  Embed social responsibility and sustainability  practices,  and communicate actions 

taken to customers; 

  Apply  appropriate  quality  and  risk  management  processes  and 

increase 

collaboration; 

  Ensure product safety along the supply chain (e.g. food safety); 
 
industry  readiness  and  preparedness 

Improve 
regulations, training, certification and registry;  

through  applying  guidelines, 

  Apply a broader supply chain approach: a concerted effort to meet industry concerns 
and improve the level of competency, infrastructure, quality and training needed to 

67 

 
 
 
 
ensure compliant handling and transportation of perishables throughout the supply 
chain. 

More broadly, in order to be adequately prepared for food supply crises, business should ensure 
they have updated business continuity plans in place, at the company and industry level, also 
covering suppliers and logistics. 

4.  EU FOOD CRISES PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE190 

The ability of food systems to deliver safe, healthy and nutritious, affordable and sustainable 
food to consumers over time is of critical importance to the EU. In particular, food supply has 
to be guaranteed during large-scale crises. The Farm to Fork Strategy, part of the European 
Green  Deal,  as  well  as  the  CFP  with  regards  to  fisheries  and  aquaculture  products  and  the 
reformed CAP with regards to agri-food products, underscores that food system resilience and 
sustainability, including the guaranteed availability of food supplies, are at the core of the EU’s 
food policy.  In terms  of  supply, the combined effects  of the Farm to  Fork  Strategy and the 
Biodiversity Strategy targets are expected to result in a decrease of domestic supply by 10 to 
15% depending on the sectors concerned and of the net trade surplus in agri-food products191.  

The text of the Farm to Fork Strategy reflects early experience with the COVID-19 crisis. The 
Commission has mapped several key risks, threats and vulnerabilities, both in the strategy 
and  in  the  ensuing  evidence-gathering  process  informing  this  SWD,  that could  conceivably 
have affected the ability of the food system to deliver food to EU citizens. During the COVID-
19 crisis the EU food system responded well to challenges and food supplies were never at risk, 
so it is important to understand what is working well in the EU’s food system.  

While the issues that occurred were ultimately resolved effectively through ad hoc processes 
during this crisis, it became clear to the Commission and most other actors that more could be 
done beforehand to be prepared for crises challenging food security in the EU when these 
crises arrive. 

Future crises that threaten food security in the EU could be of a different nature to COVID-19. 
It is not a question of whether such high-impact events will happen in the future, but rather 
when: the likelihood of major crises is increasing over time, for example due to climate change 
and biodiversity loss, to accelerating technological development, or to cyber-attacks. 

Further, crises are increasingly transboundary and cross-sectoral in nature, due to the increased 
interconnectedness of the global economic system, technology and transport  – a fact that is 
particularly relevant to the EU policy space. In addition, the preparation and response context 
within which current and future contingency planning takes place is also more complex, be it 

190 This section draws extensively on evidence from a technical workshop organised by the Joint Research 

Centre to support the Commission’s contingency plan work, which will be subject to a technical report by the 
JRC.  

191 Barreiro-Hurlé, J., Bogonos, M. et al., Modelling Environmental and Climate Ambition in the Agricultural 

Sector with the CAPRI model, 2021. 

68 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
due to society’s decline in trust in institutions and expertise (deteriorating social capital), or the 
emergence and impact of social media (including concerted disinformation campaigns in the 
face of a need for a quick and effective public and private response to crises)192. This is a world 
of complex systems, including food systems that often interlock with other complex systems, 
in a way that is difficult to understand and address through policy. In such complex systems, 
accidents are, from time to time, inevitable, ‘normal accidents’ as Perrow would call them193. 
Constraints and pressures (technological, social, political, economic, ...) on systems are such 
that when  a shock arises  there is  an innumerate  number of simultaneous  decisions taken in 
times of crisis, that nobody can predict with certainty194. Still, there is a need to create effective 
transboundary crisis management capacities, based on clear definitions of the boundaries of 
responsibilities between the actors, which in the EU exists in areas such as counter-terrorism, 
cybersecurity, energy, transport, health and migration, but not food195. 

Defining contingency planning 

More broadly, it is possible also to think about improving food system resilience as a means 
to be better prepared as a whole to face crises. Contingency planning can be defined as one part 
of many in food system resilience, as well as be defined as separate in nature (for example, 
contingency planning has a short-term focus, and ‘resilience’ in this narrower sense would be 
understood from a more long-term perspective)196. 

Contingency  planning  can  also  be  seen  as  one  element  of  risk  management,  but  risk 
management is a broader term that carries a more holistic view of risk reduction and prevention 
than being prepared to respond effectively to crises197.  

In  general,  the  contingency  planning  process  can  be  seen  in  the  context  of  the  crisis 
management  cycle  (figure  14),  where  the  focus  is  primarily  in  preparedness  and  response 
(while awareness of the importance of other parts of the cycle remain important)198. The United 
Nations Office for Disaster Risk reduction199 defines contingency planning as a management 
process that analyses disaster risks and establishes arrangements to enable timely, effective and 
appropriate responses, covering according to IFRC200, three basic questions: (1) what is going 
to happen?; (2) what are we going to do about it?;  (3) what can we do ahead of time to get 
prepared? Based on scenarios of possible emergency conditions or hazardous events, it allows 
key  actors  to  envision,  anticipate  and  solve  problems  that  can  arise  during  disasters. 
Contingency planning is an important part of overall preparedness.  

192 Boin, A., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021. 
193 Perrow, C., Normal Accidents. Living with High Risk Technologies, 1984.  
194 Le Coze, J.-C., 1984-2014; Normal Accidents. Was Charles Perrow right for the wrong reasons ?, 2015. 
195 Andrée, K., et al., Crisis Management Capacity in the European Commission, European Council and the 

Council of the European Union, 2017; Boin, A., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021. 

196 Matthews, A., wrap-up  at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021. In the context of the F2F Strategy, in practical 

terms, the latter approach applies: system resilience aspects are covered under the sustainable food systems 
initiative (Action 1 of the F2F). 

197 Baldwin, K., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021; Baruth, B., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 

May 2021; Pursiainen, C., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021; Villasante, S., presentation at JRC 
Workshop, 20 May 2021. 

198 Matthews, wrap-up at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021. 
199 https://www.undrr.org/terminology/contingency-planning. 
200 The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, https://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-
do/disaster-management/preparing-for-disaster/disaster-preparedness-tools/contingency-planning-and-
disaster-response-planning/.  

69 

 
 
                                                 
Note then that this current SWD and the linked Communication focus on improving the ability 
of the EU to respond to crises once they occur, and do not cover structural aspect of food system 
resilience policy. 

FIGURE 14 - THE CRISIS MANAGEMENT CYCLE 

Source: Pursiainen, 2021. 

In practical terms, preparation (and responding) in the case of food security can focus primarily 
on early warning systems and on how to respond effectively once the crises occurs  - i.e., on 
contingency planning (see figure 15). 

FIGURE 15 - CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN A RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 

Source: Baruth 2021, drawing on the Global Commission on Adaptation report, 2019. 

70 

 
 
 
 
 
 
If the crisis management or the disaster cycle provide a structured description of the steps to 
follow to manage a crisis, one recurrent question is whether and how the crisis itself can be 
defined, when it comes to food supply and food security. Many scholars propose definition of 
a  crisis,  for  instance  Rosenthal  defines  it  as  “a  serious  threat  to  the  basic  structures  and/or 
fundamental values of a social system that requires urgent decisions under conditions of deep 
uncertainty”201. When it comes to agricultural markets crises, the debate is lively on how to 
define a crisis, in particular because, of defined, this could have consequences on the triggering 
of  policy  measures  including  market  and/or  support  measures.  The  Court  of  Auditors  for 
instance  recently  recommended  to  the  Commission  to  clarify  the  criteria  for  triggering  and 
ending exceptional measures202 or to establish thresholds for analysing potentially significant 
market  disturbances 203 ,  suggestions  the  Commission  did  not  fully  accept  for  the  reasons 
mentioned in both special reports. A recent study204 has looked at the issue and concluded that 
beyond a general definition (“an unforeseen, rare and severe market disturbance caused by a 
sudden disequilibrium in supply and demand, resulting in price or income drops”), there was 
no consensus on what could be actual trigger levels and that context-specific conditions needed 
to  be  assessed  on  a  case-by-case  basis,  notably  in  view  of  the  inter-relation  between  the 
different aspects of crisis (frequency, severity, suddenness). Such ‘market crises’ are usually 
characterised by excess  of supply or shortages of demand. They have important impacts on 
farmers,  fishers  and  other  stakeholders  in  the  chain,  should  be  subject  to  preparedness  and 
response, which is the case within the CAP and the CFP. In the case of the present SWD, crises 
affecting food supply and food security should be looked at. These, contrary to ‘market crises’ 
are likely to be characterised by the opposite situations of shortage of supply (extreme weather 
vent, supply chain disruption) or increased demand (large scale stockpiling for instance). These 
crises  are  even  less  subject  to  a  consensus  in  terms  of  quantitative  triggering  criteria  than 
‘traditional’ market crises.    

The EU lacks a formal coordination mechanism for food crises 

In the early stages of COVID-19, there were several instances of issues of policy coordination 
within the EU territory. The lack of an EU mechanism can affect the effectiveness, coherence 
and timeliness of the response to crises. During the COVID-19 pandemic suboptimal EU and 
Member State coordination gave rise to problems within the food system: 

1.  access to food system workers that needed to cross borders;  
2.  access  to  inputs,  other  materials  (e.g.  packaging),  and  food  system  services 

needed for production;  

3.  access to processing facilities and reduced processing capacity; and  
4.  the movement of food products within the Single Market.  

While in the case of COVID-19 these problems were solved within days and weeks through 
EU-level ad hoc coordination, when unresolved they threatened at some stage to amplify the 
negative effects of the crisis on EU citizens, as well as put at risk the livelihoods of people 

201 Rosenthal, U., et al. (Eds.). Coping with crises: The management of disasters, riots and terrorism, 1989, 

quoted by Boin, A., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021. 

202 ECA, Special report 23/2019, Farmers’ income stabilisation: Comprehensive set of tools, but low uptake of 

instruments and overcompensation need to be tackled, 2019. 

203 ECA, Special report 11/2021, Exceptional support for EU milk producers in 2014–2016, potential to improve 

future efficiency, 2021. 

204 DG AGRI, Improving crisis prevention and management criteria and strategies in the agricultural sector, 

2020. 

71 

 
 
                                                 
employed in the EU’s food system. As importantly, these problems put into question, for the 
first time in several decades, whether food security can be taken for granted throughout the EU 
territory. ‘Go-it-alone’ responses by EU Member States that run counter to the Single Market 
and other standing  EU policies can worsen  FSC  disruptions at  the EU level  and destabilise 
markets205. 

Enhanced coordination is clearly the main type of further action praised by the respondents to 
the  targeted  questionnaire  for  a  contingency  plan.  Over  60%  of  respondents  would  find 
improved  coordination  to  be  very  useful  and  over  70%  of  them  think  this  should  take  a 
compulsory form. 

These types of issues can only be effectively addressed by Member States and the European 
Union coordinating their action. Further, the developments on the ground during the pandemic 
showed that coordination that cuts across traditional policy areas will likely be necessary 
to address the impacts of eventual food crises. Quickly and effectively responding to a crises 
means  drawing  not  only  on  expertise,  capacity  or  networks  in  the  food  sector  but,  as 
importantly, from other areas, such as transport, health or labour policy. 

In addition, the early stages of the pandemic presented policy-makers at EU and MS level, as 
well as stakeholders and consumers, with a high-uncertainty environment, where information 
was  not  easily  accessible,  easily  verifiable,  or  easy  to  contextualise.  The  high  degree  of 
uncertainty when a crisis is unfolding is a particularly important aspect: it is often even more 
crucial  in  a  disaster  to  obtain  valid  information  as  to  what  is  happening  than  it  is  to  take 
immediate action. Contingency planning should help by providing the necessary channels for 
exchange  of  information  to  delay  impulsive  uncoordinated  reactions  in  preference  to 
appropriate and coordinated actions necessary in the situation206. 

Food security policy: building on lessons learned 

Crises  can  be  of  different  nature,  and  can  have  anticipated  and  unanticipated  elements. 
Indeed,  one  of  the  challenges  of  contingency  planning  is  to  be  prepared  to  deal  with 
unknowable  future  shocks  and  their  consequences.  This  raises  the  question  of  how  to 
coordinate effective ‘macro-level’ contingency planning, say at EU level, with the existence of 
specific risks that require specialised knowledge for an effective response, and that risks can 
be addressed at multiple levels, from EU to MS or regional authority, from consumer to FSC 
operator and to the broader food system, including packaging, transport, insurance, etc.207 

While  some  classification  and  conceptualisation  for  crises  is  possible,  it  is  important  to 
recognise  that  all  crises  are  different  and  that  often  decision-makers  have  to  operate  in 
conditions of deep uncertainty208. As such, there is a need for crisis response systems to be 
flexible - contingency planning should recognise this and not impose unnecessary constraints 
that may limit the ability to act effectively when a crisis occurs209. Contingency planning should 

205 International trade can equally be seen as contributing to the long-term resilience of the food system, 

similarly to EU policies such as the Single Market and the CAP and CFP (Jackson, L. A., presentation at JRC 
Workshop, 20 May 2021; Antón, J., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021). 

206 Perry, R.W. and Lindell, M.K., Preparedness for Emergency response: Guidelines for the Emergency 

Planning Process, 2003. 

207 Baruth, B., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021. 
208 Pursiainen, U., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021. 
209 Eriksson, E., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021. 

72 

 
 
                                                 
be  seen  as  a  continuous  process  with  the  aim  to  build  crisis  management  capabilities  and 
readiness,  more  than  the  drafting  of  a  written  physical  plan  which  would  not  guarantee 
preparedness. It is impossible to cover every contingency that might arise in connection with a 
future disaster event. Hence, the planning process should emphasise response flexibility so that 
those involved in operations can adjust to changing disaster demands. The planning process 
should focus on principles of response210, rather than on heavily elaborated plans which run the 
risk  of  becoming  sacred  documents,  not  questioned,  changed  and  adapted  if  needed,  thus 
hindering the response capability. 

We  should  also  be  aware  of  what  already  exists  in  terms  of  policy  that  shores  up  the  food 
system  and  improves  our  resilience,  including  our  ability  to  respond  to  crisis.    In  addition, 
existing policies, such as the CAP, with its contribution to ensuring production and diversity 
of supply  across the EU territory,  and the  Single Market, allowing the distribution  of these 
supplies  in  a  rational  and  quick  way,  showed  themselves  crucial  to  avoiding  disruption  of 
supply to consumers during the COVID-19 pandemic211.  

As important, the public response to crises should avoid adding to the problem. Notably, 
international trade contributes to resilience, and repeated evidence shows that avoiding panic 
reactions and maintaining food trade flows during times of crises is one of the most important 
elements in avoiding crisis escalation212. That during the COVID-19 pandemic, and contrary to 
past crises, international food trade did not face significant government-introduced barriers was 
key  to  maintaining  relative  market  stability.  This  is  evidence  both  that  lessons  have  been 
learned from past crises by the international community and that global responses are the right 
approach to dealing with global problems213.  

In planning for the future, including defining what good practices in terms of crisis response 
are, there is clearly value in  learning from previous crises. The OECD includes within its 
recommendation for the governance of critical risks the need to continuously share knowledge, 
including  lessons  learned  from  previous  events,  research  and  science  through  post-event 
reviews, to evaluate the effectiveness of prevention and preparedness activities.  

Finally, crises typically present economic, social and environmental challenges – that is to say 
that  all  of  the  elements  of  sustainability  are  present  when  a  crisis  occurs  (economic, 
environmental and social), and all need to be present in the solution. The F2F Strategy makes 
this link clear, adding that the EU’s response to crises should be based on the sustainability 
approach. 

Better prepared for crises through contingency planning 

The  role  of  contingency  planning  is  to  ensure  food  supply  to  citizens  when  a  shock  to  the 
system is so significant that the existing economic and regulatory structures of the food system 
find it difficult to ensure food security. Contingency planning is a part of a broader approach 
to food system resilience that further includes ‘structural’ food system policy aspects. These 

210 Perry, R.W. and Lindell, M.K., idem, 2003. 
211 Haniotis, T., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021. 
212 Poppe, K., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021. 
213 Haniotis, T., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021; Rudloff, B., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 

May 2021. 

73 

 
 
   
                                                 
related  structural  policies  can  be  on  the  supply  side  (e.g.,  food  production  diversification 
strategies, the  diversification of import sources, or establishing food reserves), the demand-
side  (food  affordability,  nutritional  aspects,  consumers  in  geographically  isolated  regions, 
income  and  health  inequalities),  or  have  a  cross-cutting  nature  (sustainability  of  the  food 
system, transport and logistics)214.  

A first step in contingency planning is to identify the threats, risks and vulnerabilities of the 
food system215. The first guideline for preparedness planning is that it should be based upon the 
best available and accurate knowledge of the threat and of likely human responses216. 

In  terms  of  threats,  this  would  imply  the  use  of  risk  identification  (‘which  risks?’)  and 
evaluation (‘how significant?’) systems. Further, the use of foresight techniques to be able to 
imagine possible futures can be fruitful, especially as for some high impact and low likelihood 
scenarios there may not be much extant evidence on which to base policy217. Where evidence 
does exist, processes to draw lessons from previous crises, including an evaluation of which 
responses were effective, is important to carry these lessons into planning for the future218.  And, 
finally,  build-in  thinking  on  the  increasingly  transboundary  nature  of  crises,  both  in  a 
geographic and policy meaning of the word, and, more broadly, on the implications of crises 
affecting complex systems, including accepting and adjusting for the fact that in the face of 
complexity some impact of crises may be unknowable in advance219. 

Specific  vulnerabilities  to  the  EU’s  food  system  identified  during  the  evidence-gathering 
process include reliance on certain critical inputs, such as certain ingredients (e.g. additives) 
from  potentially unreliable trading sources;  the need to  monitor system-level  resilience, but 
also resilience at specific stages of production, e.g. farm-level resilience, or on a sector basis, 
e.g., resilience of the poultry production sector220. As for other economic sectors, the update of 
the  Industrial  Strategy  foresees  that  there  will  be  a  thorough  mapping  of  each  industrial 
ecosystem, one of these being the agri-food ecosystem. The presence of primary producers and 
consumers  (i.e.,  not  only  purely  industrial  actors)  in  the  agri-food  ecosystem  adds  to  the 
importance of being thorough in the mapping of its specific risks and vulnerabilities.  

Given the dynamic nature of threats and vulnerabilities, as well as of crises once they would 
hit the food system, robust monitoring systems are a requirement for effective contingency 
planning221. Further, experience shows that every crisis is different,  and monitoring systems 
must  be  flexible  and  encompassing  enough  that  a  broad  range  of  relevant  information  is 
captured, often through the effective transmission of reliable qualitative information. When a 
crisis emerges, early-warning systems can provide precious time for responding, for example 
based on the identification of weather-related risks through satellite data222. The importance of 

214 Poppe, K., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021; Haniotis, T., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 

May 2021. 

215 Pursiainen, U., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021. 
216 Perry, R.W. and Lindell, M.K., idem, 2003. 
217 Report of the 5th SCAR Foresight Exercise Expert Group, Natural resources and food systems: Transitions 

towards a ‘safe and just’ operating space; Poppe, K., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021; Eriksson, 
E., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021. 

218 Villasante, S., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021; Horobin, D., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 

May 2021. 

219 Boin, A., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021. 
220 Meuwissen, M., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021. 
221 Pursiainen, U., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021. 
222 Baruth, B., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021. 

74 

 
 
                                                 
market  transparency  and  market  information  systems  was  particularly  highlighted  during 
consultation, as was the need to science-based decision support tools and platforms223. The EU 
in this domain benefits of a large number of information and early warning systems in place 
covering many areas of the food system: these should eventually completed on some aspects 
of  the  food  system  (ie  consumption  and  consumption  patterns)  and  made  more  performant 
(where possible: a study should be carried out on potential arising from big data and the Internet 
of Things and of the development of blockchain technologies for example in allowing actors 
in  the  food  system  and  policy-makers  to  benefit  from  better  information  in  times  of  crisis) 
thanks  to  the  progress  of  digitisation,  in  particular  to  benefit  from  real-time  information. 
Contingency planning should indeed also be able to be nimble and provide swift responses, 
to avoid having the crisis escalating. 

Following the contingency planning preparation stage, and further along the crisis management 
cycle, comes crisis response. This step happens once the crisis occurs, and involves activating 
the  procedures,  tools  and  measures  that  were  previously  put  in  place224.  These  may  include 
several routine tasks related to the containment of the source of the crisis and the mitigation of 
its effects. There are appropriate legal bases and decision-making processes for the adoption of 
crisis  response  tools  and  instruments  of  the  policies  concerned  and  contingency  planning 
should facilitate and ease the mobilisation of such instruments, not to duplicate the work or 
make the mobilisation of the existing tools more difficult. 

Finally,  consideration  has  to  be  given  to  the  resources  needed  for  effective  contingency 
planning, including financial, staffing, or equipment aspects, and keeping in mind the cross-
policy, and multi- level governance aspects of preparation. In practice, many of these resources 
may  already  be  available,  and  they  should  be  mobilised  effectively  towards  contingency 
planning  from  a  food  system’s  perspective.  This  should  include  appropriate  training  and 
exercise for the staff involved in these activities, if appropriate also for the policy-makers. 

With this  information  on threats  and vulnerabilities, policy-makers and stakeholders  can be 
more effective in mitigating risks and preparing for crises. In practice, responses by these actors 
can  focus  on  diversification  strategies,  reasonable  system  redundancies,  and  on  a  modular 
approach to food systems225. 

Contingency planning through improved processes 

At the core of the EU’s contingency plan to improve food security should be improved ex ante 
coordination,  which  is  needed  to  organise  a  concerted  response  when  a  crisis  occurs.  In 
particular, there is a need to maintain effective means to address transboundary crises in the 
food sector226. 

Effective  coordination  processes  for  contingency  planning  are  participatory  and 
collaborative227. Given the way the EU is organised, with Member States and supra-national 

223 Antón, J., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021. 
224 Pursiainen, U., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021. 
225 Antón, J., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021. 
226 Boin, A., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021; Rudloff, B., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 

2021. 

227 Antón, J., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021. 

75 

 
 
 
                                                 
institutions,  multi-level  governance  is  a  requirement  for  contingency  planning 228.  EU  food 
security  crises  would,  almost  by  definition,  be  transboundary  in  nature 229 .  Multi-level 
governance may also benefit from being extended to the subnational entities, including regions 
or cities230. Communication and coordination with international organisations (such as FAO, 
OECD, etc.), neighbouring countries, and major trading partners can be of benefit to the EU, 
to promote international policy consistency and  draw on each other’s expertise. The private 
sector. The EU’s contingency plan to improve food security would benefit from incorporating 
these elements as needed. 

Finally, one key element of collaborative preparation for crises is the opportunity for creating 
bonds  of  trust  between  the  individuals  who  will  be  called  to  respond  when  a  crisis  occurs. 
Developing trust and establishing a network between participants (‘social capital’), is likely to 
lead to more transparent communication and thus to a more effective response to crises231. 

In terms of processes of communication to the public in the context of crises contingency 
planning, information should be factual and proportionate and therefore contribute to assuage 
immediate  fears  that  may  lead  to  collectively  counter-productive  behaviours,  such  as  the 
hoarding of food or inputs needed for food production. Special communication skills to combat 
misinformation and attempts to undermine trust in public authorities and experts, in particular 
in social media platforms, may be needed to avoid unnecessarily escalation and creating ‘crises 
within a crisis’232). This includes the need for a coordinated communication between the EU 
and  the  Member  States,  including  at  regional  or  local  level,  and  where  needed  also  the 
stakeholders.  

228 Poppe, K., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021; Trondal, J., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 

2021. 

229 Boin, A., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021. 
230 Boin, A., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021. 
231 Horobin, D., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021. 
232 Boin, A., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 2021; Poppe, K., presentation at JRC Workshop, 20 May 

2021. 

76 

 
 
                                                 
ANNEX I - LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE COVID-19 CRISIS 

Introduction 

The year 2020 saw the world face a global pandemic that disrupted life in a variety of ways. 
We observed lockdowns in many countries, health systems at the limit of their capacity and 
threats  of  empty  shelves.  Consumers  stockpiled  at  the  beginning  of  lockdowns  that  led  to 
temporary  peaks  in  sales  of  certain  retail  commodities  (EC,  2020q).  COVID-19  came  as  a 
shock  but  is  still  not  over.  The  pandemic  affected  every  industry  including  the  food  sector 
(Staniforth, 2020) in the short and long-run. 

On  a  macro  perspective,  the  food  supply  chain  (FSC)  was  remarkably  resilient  and  food 
security233 was not endangered. Global prices of main commodities stayed strikingly stable234. 
The impact of the crisis on the agri- food sector has been limited and was much less than with 
other sectors, largely due to its resilience. The crisis rather sped up already ongoing trends such 
as e-commerce (EC, 2020p; EC, 2020q). While markets overall succeeded, there were local 
temporary challenges. 

The European Green Deal235 is a comprehensive strategy with several elements with the overall 
goal to make Europe climate-neutral by 2050. One element is the Farm to Fork Strategy that 
covers a range of initiatives around a healthy and sustainable EU food system. One is to develop 
a contingency plan by the Commission. This plan should be activated when there is a crisis that 
affects the entire or part of the food system in the EU and puts food security within the EU in 
danger.  It  will  include  the  creation  of  a  coordinated  crises  preparedness  and  response 
mechanism.  There  will  be  other  crises  affecting  the  food  system  in  the  future,  e.g.  other 
pandemics  (Bakalis,  et  al.,  2020)  natural  catastrophes,  food-borne  diseases,  wars,  etc.  The 
contingency plan aims to account for those unforeseen crises. It is complementary to actions to 
prevent or reduce the likelihood of crises, including actions to restore the health of the natural 
systems through the Biodiversity Strategy for 2030. 

As announced in the Farm to Fork Strategy, the Commission will draw on lessons learnt from 
past crises, including the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic in developing the contingency plan. 
We can  learn  from  vulnerabilities and strengths  in  the food system.  New ways  of working, 
investments,  and  reforms  can  enhance  the  resilience  of  the  food  sector 236 to  even  bounce 
forward in a sustainable manner without compromising other goals, such as those in the Green 
Deal (OECD, 2020b; JRC, 2020).  

This annex starts with outlining the main disruptions in the EU food sector. We continue with 
an  overview  of  public  sector  measures  and  highlight  supportive  ones  and  room  for 

233 “Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and 
nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (World 
Food Summit, 1996). 

234 See graphs in Annex on global food price index and selected agricultural commodity prices. 
235 The EU Green Deal thrives to make Europe the first climate-neutral continent. It is a plan to make the EU’s 
economy sustainable by increasing efficient use of resources by means of a circular economy and restoring 
biodiversity. More information can be found here: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-
2024/european-green-deal_en. 

236 The term ‘food system resilience’ has been defined (Tendall, et al., 2015) as the ‘capacity over time of a food 
system and its units at multiple levels, to provide sufficient, appropriate and accessible food to all, in the face 
of various and even unforeseen disturbances.’ 

77 

 
 
                                                 
improvement. The annex ends with reflections on the crisis and conclusions. The focus is on 
the production side; even if we refer to consumers to explain the effect demand changes had 
on the EU food sector. The sources are a mix of existing literature on COVID-19 and other 
crises,  and  interviews  with  different  European  stakeholders  in  the  food  sector  and  policy-
makers237. 

Disruptions in the agri-food sector 

Agricultural activities are usually dependent on the season and weather; hence, these need to 
follow a strict schedule. In addition, all processes and stages in the FSC are strongly connected; 
a delay at one end affects the whole chain. Any disruption might have negative effects on food 
quality,  freshness,  and  food  safety,  and  hinder  access  to  markets  and  affordability  (FAO, 
2020a). 

Still, agriculture has been amongst the least affected sectors and, in general terms, food kept 
being  available  during  the  crisis  (FAO,  2020b).  There  have  been  some  disruptions  on  the 
production side and one can distinguish between three main types: Agricultural production and 
incomes, FSC disruptions and shifts in consumer demand (OECD, 2020a; OECD, 2020b). One 
needs to differentiate between the initial weeks of the COVID-19 pandemic during the “first 
wave” and later continuous changes in production and consumption238. A crisis is (WUR, p.11) 
“an  unforeseen,  rare,  and  severe  market  disturbance  caused  by  a  sudden  disequilibrium  in 
supply and demand, resulting in price or income drops” (ECORYS; Wageningen Economic 
Research,  2019).  We  moved  from  the  crisis  to  a  persistent  change  in  living,  working  and 
consuming.  

A novelty in the COVID-19 crisis were disruptions in transport and logistics and labour that 
influenced agricultural production and supply chains. We will focus on these in the following 
overview.  

There is no homogeneous picture across stakeholders and countries. For example, Spain and 
Italy had much less time to respond during the first wave than other countries as they were 
more  significantly  impacted  sooner.  In  addition,  supply  chain  stakeholders  as  well  as 
commodities were affected to a different degree. The private sector reacted to the crisis with 
different measures. This annex outlines main differences and includes some examples. 

Agricultural production and incomes 
COVID-19 affected all FSC stages; agricultural production, postharvest handling, processing, 
distribution/retail/service, and consumption  (Aday & Aday, 2020). In the following section, 
we mainly focus on agricultural production and postharvest. 

Some  sectors  in  the  agri-food  sector  experienced  labour  shortages  due  to  initial  borders 
closures within the EU and outside (OECD, 2020a). Travel bans that started in March 2020 
within the European Union, as well as the closure of the Schengen Area, caused a threat to lack 
of available labour in several EU countries. Shortages of labour are particularly severe with 
those  businesses  that  require  high  amounts  of  seasonal  labour  and/or  labour-intensive 
production  (OECD,  2020c).  Despite  allowing  seasonal  workers  to  cross  borders  by  Mid-

237 See interview guiding questions in Annex, interviews are included in references. 
238 Due to economic change, there was and still is more demand from food banks in Europe from jobless 

including families with kids. Over 80% of European food banks experienced an increase in demand in March 
2020 (FEBA, 2020). 

78 

 
 
                                                 
March239, not all countries followed immediately. This caused labour shortages, especially in 
the fruit and vegetables sector as well as input delays for processing companies (Copa Cogeca, 
2020h;  Copa  Cogeca,  2020f;  PROFEL,  2020a).  Time  sensitive  and  labour  intensive 
commodities, e.g. asparagus and strawberries, were particularly at risk (Copa Cogeca, 2020c).  

Some national and private activities aimed at recruiting local workers for the harvest. Several 
Member States set-up online platforms to recruit national seasonal workers (OECD, 2020a). 
For example, French farms put out calls for unemployed urban workers to help in the fields. 
Cooperatives also tried to overcome agricultural production disruptions by hiring workers via 
online platforms. The response of these activities was limited, technology did not become an 
established way to hire workers. Hiring still mainly depends on agencies or private contacts 
and there is potential to use more technology in the future (Copa Cogeca, 2020a). Consequently, 
special  planes  flew  in  farmworkers,  mostly  paid  by  employers  (Nature  Plants,  2020;  Agro 
Alimentarias, 2020a; OECD, 2020a).  

Still, labour shortages did not cause major disruptions. For example, Germany, which was in 
need  of  seasonal  workers  from  several  countries  like  Poland,  Bulgaria,  and  Ukraine,  still 
overcame most labour shortages by a cooperation with local authorities and a quarantine system 
(DBV, 2020a). These activities were based on the EU policy measures green lanes and allowing 
seasonal  workers  to  cross  borders.  Green  lanes  aimed  at  guaranteeing  the  European  Single 
Market.  Border  crossings  were  asked  to  work  quickly.  The  measures  were  not  limited  to 
specific groups of goods240 and included transport workers (EC, 2020s). In total, more than 40 
000 seasonal workers entered Germany between April and Mid-June and were essential for the 
German harvest period (DBV, 2020b).  

Social  distancing 241  created  an  additional  challenge  once  labour  was  available.  Highly 
mechanized production of arable crops often had social distancing already in place. Labour-
intensive  agriculture,  such  as  fruit  and  vegetable  farming,  faced  next  to  a  lack  of  seasonal 
labour the challenge to enforce social distancing on the field. Changes in ways of working was 
necessary, e.g. working in shifts (Laborde, et al., 2020).  

The impact of the COVID-19 crisis  on agricultural  inputs was limited.  In March,  closing 
borders or slowing down the transnational movement of seeds could have affected production, 
certification, distribution, and cost of seed negatively. This, however, was not the case on a 
large scale. Spring and harvest seed was already in the respective countries before travel bans 
and  eased  the  possible  impact  (OECD,  2020c).  The  initial  concern  of  access  to  pesticides, 
mainly sourced from China, disappeared as China rather quickly ended the lockdown. Access 
to fertilisers also was not at risk with comparatively low prices. Local temporary disruptions 
were due to delays in transport (OECD, 2020d). For feed, global soya use increased leading to 
a tightening of stocks. In addition, there were some initial disruptions at ports due to COVID-
19 in exporting countries such as Brazil. However, these have been quickly resolved. At the 

239 We will cover green lanes and border crossings of seasonal workers in section ‘Policy measures’. These 

mainly overcame border issues and eased disruptions in agricultural production. 

240 Even if all goods were included in green lanes, a range of goods were classified as essential such as fresh 

food and essential food products, agricultural production inputs and medicine. These goods were supposed to 
be prioritized (EC, 2020s). 

241 “Social distancing is an action taken to minimise contact with other individuals; social distancing measures 

comprise one category of non-pharmaceutical countermeasures (NPCs) aimed at reducing disease 
transmission and thereby also reducing pressure on health services.” (European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control). 

79 

 
 
                                                 
same time, global soya production was expected to reach a new record in 2020, based on a 
recovery in the US and continuous increases in Brazil and Argentina (EC, 2020q; EC, 2020p). 
Supplies of organic feed input was an initial concern in March as supplies tightened (Coceral, 
et al., 2020b). 

The agricultural sector connects to other sectors. There were initial alarms about lack of access 
to machinery, and spare parts of machinery. At the end of March, there was a joint statement 
by  CEMA,  CEETTAR  and  CLIMAR242 that  agricultural  machinery  and  their  spare  parts  / 
servicing  must  qualify  for  the  green  lanes  (CEMA,  2020). Fears  did  not  materialize  and 
agricultural machinery was often included in exceptions from movement restrictions (OECD, 
2020e).  

Producers, who already delivered their produce through diversified channels, were better off 
to meet changing demands than those who only used specific distribution channels such as 
open markets or HORECA that experienced a collapse during the COVID-19 crisis (OECD, 
2020a). Farmers that offered tourism on their farm lost the additional income source (DBV, 
2020a). 

Cooperatives  set-up  online  meetings  to  enable  continuous  exchange  and  support.  Next  to 
learning  from  each  other,  they  also  helped  to  find  alternative  sales  channels.  The  lack  of 
broadband internet on the countryside as well as the lack of digital capacity especially with 
older farmers put a limit on these initiatives (Copa Cogeca, 2020a; Agro Alimentarias, 2020a; 
DBV, 2020a).  

Overall, the impact on agricultural production and income was limited. Preliminary results 
from  Eurostat 243 show  that  the  value  of  EU  agricultural  output  declined  by  1.6%  in  2020 
compared to the previous year, and was still slightly higher than the average of the previous 
three  years.  There  are  differences  across  countries,  the  Netherlands  for  example  was 
particularly hit hard due disruptions in the potato and flower sector. Preliminary estimates show 
an  overall  drop  in  EU  entrepreneurial  farm  income244 of  7.9%  compared  to  last  year.  This 
estimate does not include additional monetary support under the temporary framework of state 
aid245 (Matthews, 2021).  

Private sector measures  targeted agricultural production and income along the food chain. 
Food  companies  supported  other  actors  in  the  food  chain.  For  instance,  Nestle  extended 
payment  terms  for  HORECA  clients  (Nestle,  2020).  Food  processors  worked  closely  with 
farmers. Potato processors asked farmers to produce less while offering to pay the same amount 
despite lower production (EUPPA, 2020). Retailers levelled their influence to support farmers. 
For  example,  Carrefour  stores  in  Belgium,  who  usually  only  buy  local  products  in  a  40km 
radius, changed their policy to buy from farmers all over the country. On the other hand, Spar 
in Austria launched an initiative ‘best from home’ and started buying from farmers in a 30km 
radius to help them compensate for the loss in other sales channels (Eurocommerce, 2020d).  

242 CEMA: Association representing the European agricultural machinery industry, CEETTAR:  European 

Confederation of Agricultural, Rural and Forestry Contractors, CLIMMAR: Centre de Liaison International 
des Marchands de Machines Agricoles et Réparateurs. 

243 Eurostat, Economic accounts for agriculture – values at current prices, EU27. 
244 Entrepreneurial farm income = Agricultural output - compensation of employees + subsidies on production 

(while subtracting other taxes on production) - rents - interest paid. 

245 The temporary framework for state aid allowed countries to support their agricultural sector. The Netherlands 

notified € 650 million under the framework. 

80 

 
 
                                                 
Disruptions in the seafood sector 

Fisheries production and incomes 

The closure of hotels, restaurants and catering (HORECA) meant that the effects of COVID-
19 were felt immediately by both the fishery and the aquaculture sector due to the loss of these 
outlets for fresh species, which can account for up to 50% of market outlet for fresh fish in 
some countries such as Italy. In many Member States (MS), fishmongers, markets, and fresh 
counters in retail stores were also closed, leading to a further substantial drop in demand for 
fresh seafood. Restrictions on travel were imposed, flights were cancelled, airfreight capacity 
heavily reduced, and airfreight rates increased. As a result, access to fresh products to foreign 
markets reduced substantially or disappeared  

Many fishing fleets in the EU rely heavily on exports, both intra- and extra-EU. These fleets 
are highly affected by the reduced demand in Europe and lack of airfreight capacity to distant 
markets.  However,  in  order  to  adapt  to  the  reduced  demand,  several  POs  have  organized  a 
rotation  of  vessels  according  to  expected  buyers  at  auctions.  The  purpose  was  to  maintain 
profitable prices and a minimum activity for the auctions.  

Social distancing measures have created difficulties for many fishers. Some, unable to comply 
with the distancing measures, have been forced to stay in port. Others have been forced to stop 
fishing  as  they  have  been  unable  to  replace  their  crew  due  to  travel  restrictions,  and  crew 
replacement remains an issue for the long-distance fishing fleet. 

Data suggests that COVID-19 resulted in a decrease of 18% in the employment on-board for 
the EU fishing fleet in 2020246, with significant impacts also upstream in the value chain. 

In addition to the employment level, as the crew wage in some Member State fleet segments is 
correlated  to  the  value  of  landings,  there  has  been  a  general  decrease  of  the  crew  wage 
compared to previous years.  

Food supply chain disruption 

There were also early reports of disruptions downstream from the farm gate. These included a 
reduction in  available workforce, interruptions  in  transport  and logistics and delayed  FSCs. 
Consequently, production and distribution costs increased (OECD, 2020a). 

At the beginning of the pandemic, free movement of workforce was limited. Next to the effect 
on seasonal workers for agricultural production, employees that regularly cross borders to go 
to  work  experienced  troubles  as  some  Member  States  added  additional  barriers.  In  March, 
Czech authorities required employees who crossed the border to Austria and Germany a special 
pass issued by the border authorities (Eurocommerce, 2020b). 

Initial border closures and additional measures and checks have led to congestion and delays 
in transport and logistics. For example, in early March, there were long lines of lorries at the 
Slovenian  borders  due  to  additional  border  checks  from  Italy,  Hungary,  and  Croatia.  The 
passage through Slovenia also was limited due to Slovenian restrictions (Total Slovenian news, 

246 Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) - The 2020 Annual Economic Report 

on the EU Fishing Fleet (STECF 20-06), p 56. 

81 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
2020). Trucks from and to Italy were only allowed in convoys (~25 trucks) guarded by police 
and had to cross the country without stopping (Coceral, et al., 2020a). Austria checked every 
transporter in the early days of the pandemic (TomatoEurope, 2020). These measures led to 
significant delays. For example, a truck round trip Hungary-Italy that usually takes 36-48 hours, 
took seven days at the beginning of March (Coceral, et al., 2020a). These mainly affected the 
transit of perishable products (OECD, 2020b), but also posed logistical challenges to long-shelf 
products as it delayed production and delivery (PROFEL, 2020a). 

Workers in quarantine affected the availability of truck drivers to cross borders (Eurocommerce, 
2020a). The logistics sector moved from trucks to rails to reduce the number of drivers needed 
(JOC,  2020).  Truck  traffic  reduced  by  more  than  50%  in  Spain  and  37%  in  Italy  at  the 
beginning of the pandemic. In mid-April, the total truck distance in Europe was 24% lower 
than usually (OECD, 2020d). Truck drivers that were still driving faced additional challenges 
in the early days with closed truck stops and sanitary stations. Many Member States reacted 
swiftly to keep service stations open (Politico, 2020). 

Costs  increased  across  all  types  of  transport.  Several  shipping  containers  were  located  in 
Chinese ports at the beginning of the pandemic. Restrictions led to a shortage and thus to an 
increase  in  prices.  There  was  a  trickle-down  effect  on  the  price  of  cargo  hampering  trade 
(OECD, 2020b; EUPPA, 2020). As mainly essential products were moved across borders, truck 
companies added additional ‘empty kilometres’ increasing transport costs (EC, 2021b). Lower 
trade volumes in international freight raised costs (OECD, 2020b).  

Certification  checks,  including  those  that  are  required  to  facilitate  trade,  such  as  physical 
inspections of goods to certify compliance with sanitary and phytosanitary requirements (SPS) 
had to be handled (OECD, 2020b). However, digital versions of SPS solved the problem quite 
rapidly (OECD, 2020a). 

Supply chain disruptions, in particular, affected food-processing plants. The food industry is 
an already quite well equipped sector with high safety and hygiene standards. Still, sickness 
among workers led to additional labour shortages and reduced or stopped production (OECD, 
2020a). Many companies in food processing updated their safety protocols and incorporated 
protocols  for  new  employees  (PROFEL,  2020a;  TomatoEurope,  2020).  Digitalization  also 
helped to enable social distancing. Smart working procedures allowed to only leave essential 
workers in the factory (TomatoEurope, 2020; EUPPA, 2020).  

Still, outbreaks of COVID-19 in processing plants were prominent in the news. Germany had 
the  highest  number  of  outbreaks  in  slaughterhouses  and  meat  processing  plants.  Other 
European countries, such as Ireland and Poland, also had significant outbreaks. These often 
linked to the precarious living and working situations of many migrant workers. Many live in 
small flats with several co-workers (Deutsche Welle, 2020). Social distance inside the plants 
is difficult because workers stand side by side on production lines (Aday & Aday, 2020).  

Access to input and additional protective gear for processing and retail companies created 
initial disruptions. The first lockdown affected maintenance services for relevant machinery, 
limiting  access  for  processing  companies.  These  burdened  the  functioning  of  the  sector 
(TomatoEurope, 2020). Access to packaging material was limited or delayed due to disruptions 
in  trade  (CELCAA, 2020), for example for packaging of eggs  (Aday  & Aday, 2020). Food 
originally  produced  for  HORECA  had  to  be  repackaged  to  smaller  portions  for  retail 
(Eurocommerce,  2020a).  Some  stakeholders  lacked  protective  gear  at  the  beginning  of  the 
pandemic. Once it was available, it added costs of production (TomatoEurope, 2020; Coceral, 

82 

 
 
et  al.,  2020b).  However,  in  the  second  wave  there  was  a  coordinated  mask  supply  and  few 
shortages (Eurocommerce, 2020a). 

Supply chain disruptions led to additional costs for retail stores. There was a labour shortage 
as a proportion of staff was absent either due to sickness or the need to take care of children at 
home. Retail stores had to hire temporary workers to help in the stores. At the same time, the 
workload increased due to additional hygiene requirements. To ensure safety for consumers 
and  employees,  e.g.  to  keep  a  minimum  distance,  created  additional  time  and  costs.  Panic 
buying of consumers at the beginning of the pandemic as well as changed consumption patterns 
also added to additional workload. Shelves had to be refilled more regularly and the assortment 
needed to be adapted (Eurocommerce, 2020a; Mercadona & Asedas, 2020). Reliance on a few 
suppliers  in  some  cases  led  to  temporary  shortages  in  stores  underlining  the  need  for  a 
diversified supply chain, both European and global to meet demand (Eurocommerce, 2020a).  

An additional challenge could have been a higher incidence of unfair trading practices in the 
EU that affected the supply chain. Claimed examples are unilateral changes to contracts by 
claiming  force  majeure  circumstances  or  unilateral  changes  to  pricing  for  the  supplier, 
particularly  for  perishable  products,  with  no  change  in  consumer  price.  Another  claimed 
example  is  the  unilateral  removal  of  fresh  products  from  stores  and  consequently  refusing 
deliveries (Copa Cogeca, 2020d).  

On the other hand, the outstanding cooperation across the whole food chain was highlighted 
by several stakeholders (FoodDrinkEurope, 2020; Eurocommerce, 2020a; Agro Alimentarias, 
2020a).  Horizontal  cooperation  targeted  supply  chain  disruptions  (Copa  Cogeca,  2020i; 
Eurocommerce,  2020a;  FoodDrinkEurope,  2020).  Retailers  cooperated  by  exchanging 
information about stocks to manage supply chain disruptions and changes in demand (OECD, 
2020a).  Carrefour  offered  other  retailers  to  use  their  online  platform  to  sell  their  products 
(Eurocommerce, 2020a). Farm cooperatives enabled coordination and access to protective gear 
for farmers (Agro Alimentarias, 2020b). Food processing cooperatives exchanged ideas of how 
to handle safety issues (PROFEL, 2020a).  

Vertical cooperation complemented horizontal measures. Close connection to EU institutions 
proved  crucial,  as  well  as  good  cooperation  with  EU  professional  organisations,  sector 
associations,  company  members,  counterparts  at  national  level  and  other  agri-food  chain 
organisations (FoodDrinkEurope, 2020). Private stakeholders along the food chain cooperated 
to ensure food security in a team effort (Eurocommerce, 2020a; Agro Alimentarias, 2020a).  

The COVID-19 crisis had implications for food loss and waste. Supply chain losses increased 
because  of  logistical  bottlenecks  and  a  loss  in  demand  for  perishable  goods  that  are  often 
consumed away from home (e.g. milk, eggs and fresh fish) (OECD, 2020a). Farmers that had 
no outlet for their products had to discard their produce in some cases, such as potatoes or raw 
milk.  There  was  also  an  effect  on  vegetables  due  to  labour  shortage  for  the  harvest  (Copa 
Cogeca, 2020f).  

New  regulations  posed  additional  challenges  for  some  stakeholders  of  the  food  chain.  For 
example, on 1 April 2020 Regulation 2018/775 entered into force. Accordingly, the country of 
origin of the primary ingredient of a food needs to be indicated. Processing companies affected 
by the COVID-19 crisis  faced challenges to have the right  labels  in  place for the due date. 
Eventually, discussions with Member States led to more flexibility in the enforcement of these 
food-labelling provisions for a limited time (PROFEL, 2020b). 

83 

 
 
Shift in the structure of demand 

Shift in the structure of demand occurred that related to both, closure of HORECA and changed 
consumption  behaviour  at  home  with  a  surge  of  home  cooking  to  the  detriment  of  most 
convenience  foods.  The  changed  consumer  demand  due  to  COVID-19  differed  based  on 
several factors such as the price of products, income level of consumers and sociodemographic 
situation (Bakalis, et al., 2020). 

There was a large increase in retail demand for certain product groups during the first wave 
(OECD, 2020a). Some consumers started precautionary buying of a few goods in the very first 
weeks, especially long shelf-life products, such as pasta, rice, flour and yeast, and canned goods. 
The demand for different fruits increased away from short shelf-life fruits, such as strawberries, 
and towards longer shelf-life products, such as apples and oranges. It was a mix of a logical 
reaction of consumers, suddenly living and working at home with children home schooling, 
and  irrational  buying  due  to  the  uncertainty  of  the  situation  (Mercadona  &  Asedas,  2020; 
Eurocommerce, 2020a). Still, while some prices increased moderately (i.e. up to +5%) in April-
May 2020 for fresh fruit and vegetables, the situation quickly normalised.    

As COVID-19 continued, there was a trend towards local and healthy foods. Consumers also 
bought  more  products  for  baking  and  cooking  at  home.  The  demand  for  organic  products 
increased. At the same time, there was an amplified focus on price, especially for those, whose 
economic situation changed by losing jobs or moving into short-term work (Eurocommerce, 
2020a; Copa Cogeca, 2020d). Still, saving rates were all-time high in the second quarter of 
2020, nearly 25% and the highest for decades (Eurostat, 2020). Overall, HORECA and quality 
sectors suffered while other sectors like fruit and vegetables were less affected (Copa Cogeca, 
2020c; Agro Alimentarias, 2020a). 

Consumer change disruptions were product specific and often a combination of other external 
effects. The brief overview of commodities below indicates main changes to outline the effect 
on the food sector and is not a holistic impact assessment. The flower and plants sector suffered 
most and lost nearly all its demand. The consumption of alcoholic beverages decreased along 
with the close down of HORECA despite concerns of increased drinking at home to overcome 
loneliness  (spiritsNews,  2020).  Consequently,  hops,  malting  barley  and  wine  sales  dropped 
tremendously. For wine, stocks were in addition all-time high. This was a combined result of 
COVID-19,  large  harvest  of  the  previous  year,  trade  tensions  affecting  EU  exports  and 
decreased demand over time.  

High  quality  cuts  of  meat  produced  as  well  as  seafood  products  typically  sold  fresh  for 
HORECA were difficult to reroute, especially by the same price. Next to rerouting to retail, 
export and selling directly to consumers via online platforms helped, for example for sheep. 
Pork meat also suffered by lower pay out prices due to long waiting times in yards and therefore 
increased weight of pigs247. Pork prices were also affected by the African swine fever (ASF) 
and the import ban on pigs from Germany to China (EC, 2020n; DBV, 2020a). Poultry demand 
went initially down due to closure of fast food but was positively influenced by a demand shift 
to less expensive meats (EC, 2020q).  

Sectors like arable crops, dairy, olive oil and fruit and vegetables suffered little by shifts in 
demand.  Potatoes  were  affected  due  to  lockdown  measures  reducing  demand  for  frozen 
potatoes  (for  production  of  fries,  mostly  consumed  in  food  services,  fast  food,  and  other 

247 Supply chain disruption due to the virus in slaughterhouses. 

84 

 
 
                                                 
restaurants) (Agro Alimentarias, 2020b; Copa Cogeca, 2020b; Copa Cogeca, 2020c; EC, 2020q; 
DBV, 2020a). 

Businesses along the food chain partly adapted to shifts in demand, for example by switching 
production lines and increasing their capacity to manage larger inventories (OECD, 2020a). 
HORECA products  were partly  rerouted to  retail with  limited impact  (EUPPA, 2020;  Agro 
Alimentarias, 2020a). Either the amounts were too little to compensate for the loss or products 
were offered at a high discount leaving little margin for the producer (FoodDrinkEurope, 2020). 

Changes  in  consumer  demand  were  approached  by  the  private  sector  by  innovations, 
investments, and communication. Innovations to satisfy changed demand helped some sub-
sectors.  For  example,  recent  innovations  in  the  potato  sector  of  products  to  fry  at  home 
experienced a sales boost as consumers started preparing more food at home (EUPPA, 2020). 
Communication eased shifts in initial disruptions of consumer demand. Retail stores supported 
communication  to  avoid  panic  buying  and  calm  down  consumers  (Eurocommerce,  2020a; 
Mercadona & Asedas, 2020). Mercadona in Spain released general recommendations of how 
to do grocery shopping that was announced on different channels including social networks 
using the phrase “It will end. Overcoming fear together #Covid_19” (Mercadona, 2020). 

Consumers  shifted  to  buying  online  due  to  confinement  rules  and  social  distancing  needs. 
Around 15% of consumers248 have tried an online grocery website that they have never used 
before. However, the share of online sales in total sales is still rather low, for Germany it was 
1.5% before the crisis. Still, the COVID-19 crisis gave online grocery shopping a tremendous 
boost (Mc Kinsey, 2020). Those, who already had an online sales channel infrastructure, were 
better equipped to meet new demands. Others increased their investments in their online sales 
channels (Mercadona & Asedas, 2020; Eurocommerce, 2020a). 

The fishery and aquaculture sector has been particularly hard hit by the market disruption. 
The COVID-19 outbreak, lockdown and subsequent economic contraction has had significant 
socio-economic impacts on the EU fisheries and aquaculture sector.  

On  the  demand  side,  the  sudden  closure  of  sales  venues,  markets,  outlets  and  distribution 
channels (HORECA) drove prices and volumes to drop substantially as demand got weaker 
due to lower purchasing power. There were difficulties in continuity buying seafood products 
(demand shifted from perishable to preserved products, disruption of the supply chains). 

On the supply side, there was a slowdown of international trade, a decrease in fishing activity, 
partly because of declining demand but also due to health measures (need to maintain the safety 
distance between crew members at sea); and an increase in the cold storage and processing of 
seafood. Sustaining business operations the crisis in the backdrop became a top priority in order 
for the sector to safeguard its immediate viability and preserve activity in local communities. 

However, the sudden change of consumption of fishery and aquaculture products as a result of 
the lockdown did not last. Most EU consumers maintained their consumption of these products, 
and the limited share of consumers who decreased their consumption (10%) are most likely to 
name financial reasons as the main cause249.  

248 In Germany, France, UK, Spain and Italy. 
249 Eurobarometer on EU consumer habits regarding fishery and aquaculture products, EC, 2021. 

85 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
The effect of policy measures adopted in the context of the COVID-19 crisis 

Several policy measures were released on EU and national level to ease the impact of the crisis. 
Although  COVID-19  seems  exceptional,  various  events  and  shocks  affected  food  systems 
before  (Aday  &  Aday,  2020).  The  following  section  will  provide  a  differentiation  between 
measures already  applied in  previous crises  as  well as novelties with  COVID-19. We close 
with potential improvements as well as a short reflection on the crisis. The assessment is based 
on existing literature and interviews of several stakeholders in the food sector and is presented 
here to serve as a vehicle for discussion250. 

FIGURE 16 TIMELINE OF EU MEASURES 

Supportive and established policies  

Disruptions  in  the  beginning  of  the  COVID-19  crisis  as  outlined  above  were  subsequently 
reduced  by  diverse  policy  measures  (FAO,  2020b)  that  have  already  been  used  in  previous 
crises such as the Russian Embargo or the Dairy crisis. A short overview at the European level 
is presented below251.  

In April, a number of measures aimed to increase cash flow of farmers and ease disruptions on 
agricultural  income.  The  Coronavirus  response  investment  initiative  plus  (CRII+)  added 
flexibility and simplification in the use of the European structural investment funds (ESIF), 
including the European agricultural fund for rural development (EAFRD)  (EC, 2020b). The 
Commission  also  adopted  higher  advances  of  payments  for  farmers.  This  increased  the 
advances of direct payments (from 50% to 70%) and rural development payments (from 75% 
to  85%)  (EC,  2020d).  Payments  started  in  mid-October  (EC,  2020m).  The  scope  of  the 
European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) was also extended to allow compensations to 
fishers for the temporary cessation of their fishing activities caused by the pandemic and to 
aquaculture farmers and operators from the processing sector for economic losses caused by a 
public  health  crisis.  The  temporary  framework  for  state  aid  allowed  Member  States  to 
complement  EU  level  measures  to  increase  cash  flow  for  farmers,  operators  in  the  seafood 
sector and market companies. Another way of support was the extension of the CAP payment 

250 A timeline of selected national responses to the COVID-19 crisis with respect to border measures and EU 

policy measures can be found in the Annex. 

251An overview by type of measure can be found here: https://ec.europa.eu/info/food-farming-

fisheries/farming/coronavirus-response_en#measures.  

86 

 
 
  
                                                 
application deadline (EC, 2020l). While these measures were judged positively, there were 
claims that the amount of support should be higher (Copa Cogeca, 2020i). 

In the seafood sector, besides the amendment of the EMFF and the temporary framework for 
state  aid,  the  Commission  provided  rapid  support  to  the  sector  through  amendment  to  the 
Regulation on the common organisation of the markets (CMO) to allow for crisis measures 
and  compensations  payments.  EUR  136  million  in  22  Member  States  were  planned  for 
COVID-19  support  measures  under  EMFF.  61%  of  the  funds  were  spent  on  temporary 
cessation support, 17% on compensation to aquaculture producers, and 14% on support to the 
processing sector. Over 8,200 operations were selected, from the diversification of a marine 
plant  farm  into  producing  hand  sanitiser  to  innovative  fish  delivery  services  via  vending 
machines and online tools. Support from the European Regional Development Fund were also 
made available. Furthermore, the sector welcomed an emergency fund252 adopted to help the 
sector  and  marine  communities  to  adapt,  recover  and  evolve  in  the  face  of  the  existing 
difficulties. 

In May, additional exceptional supportive measures targeted disruptions caused by changes in 
consumer  demand.  The  Common  Market  Organisation  (CMO)  regulation  for  agricultural 
markets from 2013, mainly based on well-established instruments253, offers several measures 
to act in a crisis that have already been used in  the Russian Embargo and the Dairy crisis. 
Article 219 empowers the Commission in case of market disturbance to adopt delegated acts 
to  address  the  market  disturbance  without  consulting  Member  States.  Article  220  enables 
timely exceptional support measures due to risks related to animal and plant health. Article 221 
ensures the power for measures to resolve specific problems, and article 222 enables to stabilise 
severely imbalanced markets and includes the possibility of collective action254. This includes 
joint  promotion measures, private storage or market  withdrawal  and temporarily derogating 
from competition rules (European Parliament, 2013). 

The  Commission  supported  private  storage  aid  for  milk  and  meat,  and  reopened  this 
possibility to fishers and – for the first time – to aquaculture producers to allow temporary 
withdrawal  of  products  (EC,  2020e).  Storage  opportunities  were  very  helpful  for  the  sector 
(DBV,  2020a).  Other  measures  allowed  flexibility  for  market  support  programmes  in 
several sectors such as wine and fruit and vegetables to limit available supply and rebalance 
the  market.  In  addition,  the  EC  temporarily  adopted  derogations  from  certain  EU 
competition laws (Article 222 CMO) for the milk, flower, and potato sectors. These allowed 
stakeholders  to  self-organise  and  implement  market  measures  to  stabilize  the  sector  for  a 
maximum of 6 months (EC, 2020e).  

In  June,  the  EC  launched  two  additional  calls  for  promotion  programme  proposals  that 
complemented  the  additional  market  measures  from  May  to  ease  disruptions  in  consumer 
demand. Those were valid for the following sectors hit hardest by the COVID-19 crisis: Fruit 
and vegetables, wine, live plants, milk and milk products, and potatoes (EC, 2020a).  

252 SURE - European instrument for temporary Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency. 
253 Newly Implemented Measures In 2013 Were The Crisis Reserve, Involvement Of Producer Organisations In 
Temporary Collective Action And Implementation Of Support Packages When Faced With Severe Crises 
(Agrosynergie, 2018). 

254 Temporarily Article 101(1) TFEU regulating common rules on competition is not applied to agreements and 

decisions of certain stakeholders in the agri-food sector. 

87 

 
 
 
                                                 
Some sectors particularly affected received specific support. In July, additional measures for 
wine  included  measures  such  as  derogation  from  competition  rules  (Article  222,  CMO),  to 
allow stakeholders to self-organise their sector and implement market measures to stabilize the 
market for a maximum period of 6 months. Additional support was the increase of the EU’s 
contribution of all national support measures to 70%, as well as advanced payments for crisis 
distillation  and  storage  (EC,  2020c).  Previous  crisis  management  also  targeted  particularly 
affected sectors, e.g. during the Russian embargo peaches and nectarines, or the dairy crisis 
namely dairy to support where mostly needed. 

88 

 
 
FIGURE 17. INFOGRAPHIC ON EU SUPPORT TO 
AGRICULTURE 

89 

 
 
 
Access to timely information and transparency helps in making rational choices. Previous 
crises  put  information  systems  in  place,  such  as  Agricultural  Market  Information 
System (AMIS) or the Milk Market Observatory (MMO) for dairy, to allow for access to 
information across countries. The launch of the AMIS in 2011 by the G20 ministers of 
Agriculture  aimed  to  enable  timely  and  accurate  access  to  information  in  a  transparent 
manner  after  the  2007-2008  food  crisis.  The  crisis  showed  serious  deficiencies  in  the 
quality of information, in particular with respect to forecasts and the level of stocks. AMIS 
was launched as a team effort for major players on the agri-food markets, public and private. 
Available data improved existing information systems and enables a joint understanding 
of food price developments and stocks (G20, 2011)255. The EU and other countries made 
use  of  AMIS  to  share  information  and  increase  market  transparency  during  COVID-19 
(OECD, 2020a). 

In the seafood sector, the Commission managed to closely monitor the developments in 
the market through its market intelligence tool, the European Market Observatory for 
Fisheries and Aquaculture Products (EUMOFA256), which provided prompt and targeted 
monitoring of the market developments, with a focus on those species most affected by the 
COVID-19 crisis and in close cooperation with stakeholders and national administrations.  

Guidance from EU level increased transparency and supported in limiting the effect of 
supply chain disruptions. The publication “Coronavirus: EU guidance for a safe return to 
the workplace” (EC, 2020g) proved very beneficial in guiding processing companies how 
to handle a COVID-19 outbreak in a most efficient manner (PROFEL, 2020a).  

The  communication  of  the  absence  of  food  safety  risks  was  essential.  The  European 
Food  Safety  Authority  claimed  already  early  in  March  that  food  is  no  source  or 
transmission route for COVID-19 and that food is safe (EFSA, 2020). The World Health 
Organisation and the FAO released a guidance early April stating that it is highly unlikely 
that  food  or  food  packaging  can  transmit  COVID-19  (FAO;WHO,  2020).  Overall,  that 
allowed food to pass borders without the fear of transmission257. 

Summarizing the measures above, a mix of measures was used to approach the crisis. An 
assessment of previous crises shows that the combination of measures is more successful 
than individual ones. For example, in the Dairy crisis, private storage alone had little effect 
as  the  amounts  were  too  big.  But,  private  storage  was  effective  together  with  other 
measures, such as public intervention and the milk reduction scheme (Agrosynergie, 2018). 
Hence, the flexibility to have different measures available that can be released quickly258 
is crucial to approach crises and support stakeholders. The CMO regulation for agricultural 
products, Articles 219 to 222, includes key elements of emergency responses and offered 
solutions for different types of crises with a range of available measures.  

There are several positive examples from MS activities. Authorities cooperated with the 
private sector to jointly overcome the new challenges posed by COVID-19 (TomatoEurope, 
2020).  Some  supported  to  overcome  supply  chain  disruptions.  Austria,  Bulgaria,  and 

255 Next to the platform, it consists of The Global Food Market Information Group, a Secretariat, and a Rapid 
Response  Forum.  The  latter  enables  early  discussions  about  critical  market  conditions  and  ways  to 
approach them (AMIS, 2020). 

256 www.eumofa.eu. 
257 There were some incidents when China restricted import of foods from some countries as they claimed 

to have found the virus on food packaging. Some countries blamed China for unjustified trade 
restrictions (Reuters, 2020). 

258 Without confirmation of EP and Council. 

90 

 
 
 
                                                 
Romania set up online platforms to connect farmers and consumers for direct purchases, 
although  with  limited  impact.  Others  supported  short  supply  chains.  Italy  and  Portugal 
launched  promotion  campaigns  to  support  consumer  purchases  of  national  products. 
Regulatory and administrative flexibilities were allowed for a limited time. For instance, 
Denmark increased flexible working hours in slaughterhouses to be able to both, produce 
meat and allow for social distancing. Poland extended the validity of health certificates for 
livestock.  There  are  examples  of  countries  that  approached  food  waste  and  engaged 
actively  in  rerouting  food  supply.  Czech  Republic  shared  food  from  the  school’s  food 
programme  to  food  banks  as  schools  closed  (OECD,  2020a).  Member  States  used  the 
temporary framework for state aid to support particularly affected sectors like potato and 
flowers (Matthews, 2021). 

Specificities of COVID-19 

The novelty with COVID-19 compared to previous crisis affecting food, was that specific 
measures  targeted  disruptions  in  logistics  and  transport  and  labour.  These  are  new 
elements beyond classical agricultural, fisheries and aquaculture policy and needed experts 
from other areas, such as trade and health. 

In March, the communication on green lanes were released to overcome initial disruptions 
in  logistics  and  transport  and  enforce  the  Single  Market.  Even  if  the  Single  Market  is 
established, the guideline green lanes is a novelty. It also covered procedures on how to 
handle health and safety issues. It ensured that EU-wide supply chains continued to operate 
after some countries closed their borders at the beginning of the pandemic. Crossing the 
border, including any checks and health screening, was supposed to not take more than 15 
minutes to minimize procedures and checks (EC, 2020k). Shortly after, cross-border and 
then seasonal workers were included in guidelines to ensure free movement of critical 
workers to ease labour shortages (EC, 2020i).  

Stakeholders across the  whole food chain pleaded to  keep markets  open. Overall, open 
borders and allowing seasonal workers to cross borders proved to be extremely helpful to 
all  stakeholders  in  the  sector  (PROFEL,  2020a;  Eurocommerce,  2020a;  Copa  Cogeca, 
2020a). 

Even if the approach for COVID-19 is special, the learning of the relevance of open trade 
to keep the food market functioning (FAO, 2020c) is not new. During the 2007-2008 
food  crisis,  many  major  producer  countries  imposed  export  restrictions  on  staple  foods 
such as rice and wheat. In total, more than 55 countries applied food trade measures. Export 
restrictions and hoarding increased the price  effects  or even caused them, consequently 
destabilising international markets (FAO, et al., 2011). We observed similar tendencies in 
March  2020.  At  the  peak,  21  countries  had  announced  or  introduced  temporary  export 
restrictions. However, by early July, only two countries imposed export restrictions and on 
a very small share of trade (Laborde, et al., 2020). AMIS provided relevant information on 
food  prices  and  stocks  of  key  stable  crops  to  support  in  making  rational  decisions  and 
keeping borders open (FAO, 2020c).  

91 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 18 - FAO YEARLY FOOD PRICE INDEX 

FIGURE 19 - PRICE DEVELOPMENT ARABLE CROPS 

The  Commission  also  supported  in  adapting  checks  and  controls  for  stakeholders  to 
focus on the essential aspects of operating. It reduced the number of physical on the spot 
checks and encouraged the use of technology (EC, 2020d). Digital versions of SPS were 
accepted that also overcame a lack of labour and was in line with social distancing needs 
(OECD, 2020a). The additional flexibility was very welcome in handling the crisis (Agro 
Alimentarias, 2020a).  

Room for improvement 

One main area of room for improvement is  enhanced coordination, both ex-ante and 
cross-policy. A couple of examples below highlight the additional needs. 

Uncoordinated border closures especially at the beginning of the crisis led to additional 
challenges. Green lanes were not  fully established in all countries, with partly differing 
rules  (Coceral,  et  al.,  2020b).  Some  Member  States  restricted  export  temporarily,  with 
potentially  damaging  effects 259 .  For  example,  in  April,  Romania  imposed  an  export 
restriction  on  several  agricultural  commodities  outside  the  EU.  The  export  ban  led  to 

259 Martin, W. and Anderson, K., 2012. Export restrictions and price insulation during commodity price 

booms. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 94(2), pp.422-427. 

92 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
disruptions for farmers and traders. Vessels were temporary blocked and led to financial 
losses for traders (Coceral, et al., 2020c). National rules changed very quickly and it was 
difficult to keep an overview due to both, overflow and lack of information (EC, 2020t). 

For  seasonal  workers,  diverging  national  rules  were  applied  for  many  months.  For 
example, the definition on what is a ‘red’ zone affecting quarantine times depending on 
which country to enter differed by country (Copa Cogeca, 2020i). That circumstance led 
to differences even for bordering countries. In April, Finland allowed Ukrainian seasonal 
workers to enter the country, while Sweden did not allow foreign labour to enter  (Copa 
Cogeca, 2020f). There were additional problems on a case-by-case basis, especially for 
Eastern Europe. In Romania, there were challenges to arrange flights, as Germany only 
allowed  Romanian  seasonal  workers  to  enter  by  plane  up  until  1  June  (Copa  Cogeca, 
2020h). Social distancing, an essential measure to limit the spread of COVID-19, was not 
provided during all travels. There were cases of seasonal workers, who crossed borders in 
crowded charter planes to reach their working destination (Euractiv, 2020b). 

The  amount  of  support  for  the  food  sector  beyond  the  EU  policies  differed  across 
countries.  The  temporary  framework  for  state  aid  measures  allowed  Member  States  to 
support stakeholders beyond the EU measures (EC, 2020m). In mid-May, eight countries 
have  used  this  additional  possibility.  Half  of  all  support  paid  in  the  EU  under  this 
framework was by the Netherlands for the sectors flowers, horticulture and potato. There 
were  claims  that  these  national  measures  could  distort  EU  competition  (Copa  Cogeca, 
2020g; Euractiv, 2020c). On the other hand, these sectors were the most vulnerable to the 
crisis and Member State support allowed to support sectors most in need beyond of what 
was available on EU level. 

A  strong  focus  on  local  food  sourcing  by  some  Member  States  partly  aggravated 
disruptions and added further frictions to intra EU food trade. Demand for local buying 
was both consumer-driven and privately and politically initialised. The latter was claimed 
to cause supply shortages and higher prices for consumers (Eurocommerce, 2020a). There 
were different levels of local food sourcing. One was the minimum proportion of shelves 
reserved for national products. For example, Bulgaria announced grocery chains need to 
sell Bulgarian food and source 90% of milk sold from Bulgaria. Reliance on a few suppliers 
increased and put food security at risk (OECD, 2020a). These measures worked against 
Article 34 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It prohibits 
measures that have an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions (European Parliament, 
2020).  Other  countries  made  a  call  to  buy  national  food.  Poland  publicly  denunciated 
companies that sourced raw products from outside Poland. France encouraged consumers 
to  buy  French,  while  Portugal  promoted  local  products  by  a  website  promoting  local 
producers (EC, 2020r). All these approaches were closely monitored by the Commission. 

There were other uncoordinated actions in food retail. To discourage panic buying some 
Member States partly banned promotions, such as Belgium, that led to effectively higher 
prices for consumers (Eurocommerce, 2020a). 

Another critique point is the lack of harmonisation at EU level. COVID-19 is a health 
crisis affecting the food sector, while health is not a European competence. Health policies 
are national policies that differed across countries and caused confusion. Social distancing 
measures varied widely across countries, not only in distance but also in way of calculating 
the  maximum  amount  of  customers  in  store.  This  added  higher  logistical  efforts  for 
international  retailers  to  abide  by  different  rules.  In  addition,  there  were  different 
classifications of what  items  are allowed to  be sold  during lockdowns  (Eurocommerce, 
2020a). France for example classified wine stores as essential stores (The Local, 2020). 
The  food  sector  in  total  has  not  been  labelled  as  essential  on  EU  level  despite  many 
93 

 
 
references to the word ‘essential’ in the public260. Outbreaks of COVID-19 in processing 
companies  were  handled  very  differently  at  the  beginning.  Communication  across 
countries via cooperatives and EU level guidelines helped to harmonize (PROFEL, 2020b).  

Even on the national level, regulations differed within one country across regions/federal 
states. A national player could be faced with several different rules resulting in a lack of 
transparency and increased transaction costs (PROFEL, 2020a; Agro Alimentarias, 2020b; 
Eurocommerce, 2020a). 

A lack of information and coordination between public and private stakeholders led 
to some measures far from business reality. Some Member States not only applied social 
distancing rules in retail stores, but also limited opening hours. This eventually led to more 
people in stores in shorter timeframe. In some cases, social distancing rules were based on 
fire regulations. The number of customers to enter a store was based on an arbitrary share 
of customers allowed based on fire regulations (Mercadona & Asedas, 2020). 

The technological capacity differs widely between Member States. Next to financial and 
market measures, increasing resilience of stakeholders can support in overcoming crises. 
One room for improvement would be to increase targeted financial support to enable more 
innovation in the sector. Stakeholders should have similar technological capacities across 
Europe  including  infrastructure  and  proficiency  (EUPPA,  2020;  Agro  Alimentarias, 
2020b).  

Reflection on the crisis 

Looking  at  the  outcome  of  the  COVID-19  crisis  so  far  based  on  private  and  public 
measures, there are a few reflections. These might be worth to focus on for any upcoming 
crisis for even better preparedness of the sector. 

Resilient  food  systems  require  collective  action  along  the  entire  chain  (Bakalis,  et  al., 
2020). The relationship between authorities and companies is key to handle a crisis with 
giving every stakeholder group responsibility and flexibility to act (TomatoEurope, 2020; 
Agro  Alimentarias,  2020b).  A  crisis  mechanism  should  include  private  and  public 
stakeholders along the whole food chain. Then, they can monitor and propose strategies to 
increase resilience by targeted coordination  (FAO, 2020a). A  team  effort  of public  and 
private stakeholders as well as international organizations should enable investments and 
reforms to enhance resilience of the food sector (OECD, 2020a).  

Increased  transparency  and  information  across  countries  would  support  food 
stakeholders. If full harmonisation across the countries on EU level were not possible, at 
least one “EU stop shop” that has all information in one place would go a long way. A 
central help desk could lower costs for receiving information on anything the food sector 
needs to know about differences across countries. This should include working processes 
and  adaptations,  employee  safety  and  communication  to  consumers  (PROFEL,  2020a; 
EUPPA, 2020).  

Increased coordination ex-ante and cross-policy would ease impacts of any upcoming 
crisis.  Uncoordinated  actions  from  Member  States  led  to  additional  disruptions  and 
confusion. A crisis mechanism as outlined above can serve this purpose. Learnings can be 
drawn from the Foot-and Mouth Disease (FMD). After the 2001 FMD outbreak several 
measures were put in place to increase resilience in case of a new outbreak. Some were 
linked to better coordination and cooperation, including a global cooperation together with 

260 See reference on essential goods defined in communication on green lanes in footnote 8. 

94 

 
 
                                                 
the  FAO  and  the  World  Organisation  of  Animal  Health  (OIE).  Their  work  included  a 
technical  guidance  for  affected  countries  to  overcome  an  FMD  outbreak  (FAO,  2021). 
Contingency plans were made obligatory for Member States with a “worst-case scenario”. 
These  include  all  areas  to  handle  a  potential  outbreak,  such  as  financial  and  personal 
resources, responsibilities and ways to communicate. Laboratories must collaborate with 
the respective EU Laboratory. The EC is now a key stakeholder in managing any potential 
upcoming outbreak (EC, 2021a; EC, 2003).  

Automation  and  technology  can  support  in  disease  related  crisis  such  as  allowing  for 
social  distancing  along  the  production  process  (Aday  &  Aday,  2020).  There  is  still 
significant  room for using technology for production and interaction with  consumers to 
make the food chain  more resilient. The use of information  technology via block chain 
could be one solution (Bakalis, et al., 2020). Digitalization requires certain basics to be in 
place,  a  sufficient  broadband  infrastructure  and  a  digital  literacy  of  stakeholders. 
Government solutions can close the digital gap by means of infrastructure and trainings 
(Agro  Alimentarias,  2020a;  FAO,  2020b).  On  the  flip  side,  an  increased  reliance  on 
technology  might  increase  our  vulnerability  for  certain  types  of  crises,  such  as  cyber-
attacks or crises caused by instability of the system, like a blackout. Increased usage of 
technology  needs  to  come  along  with  increased  security  and  back-up  plans  in  case  we 
cannot fall back to a technological solution (Financial Times, 2020). 

Incentives  and  investment  support  for  companies  to  innovate  could  help  private 
stakeholders  to  handle  a  crisis.  Companies  that  already  invested  in  innovations,  were 
adaptive to change their ways of working and using different sales channels. Consequently, 
they handled the crisis better than others (Eurocommerce, 2020a; EUPPA, 2020). 

Voluntary  short  supply  chains  can  contribute  to  a  resilient  food  sector.  Short  supply 
chains already gained traction before COVID-19, to reduce the number of intermediaries 
between  farmer  and  consumer.  Short  supply  chains  could  be  one  way  of  providing  a 
beneficial  framework  for  sustainable,  healthy,  and,  in  some  cases,  local  food,  while 
increasing resilience. At the same time, mostly food is a multicomponent formulation that 
consist of ingredients that are not locally available and diversification is essential (Bakalis, 
et al., 2020). Hence, the balance between short and long supply chains might be key. 

Forecasts and simulations might  become  essential  in  the short and long-term. For the 
short-term, demands could be determined and production adapted accordingly. Overall, an 
analytical  approach  allows  a  more  rational  response  to  crises  based  on  data  and 
transparency  avoiding  quick  emotional  responses.  For  the  long-term,  foresight  and 
planning  already  gained  importance  in  the  EC.  In  September  2020,  the  first  strategic 
foresight report was adopted to enable future-proof strategies and to align short and long-
term actions (EC, 2020f; TomatoEurope, 2020). There will be crises, we cannot predict, 
but by means of foresight one can establish the baseline and measure the impact261. One 
means is also scenario analysis to calculate a number of “What if” measures. The agri-food 
sector  can  learn  from  other  sectors  more  familiar  with  scenario  analysis,  such  as  civil 
protection. As a by-product, those scenarios also can show why the EU is supporting the 
agricultural sector (Siracusa, 2020).  

Looking back at all previous crises including COVID-19, the agricultural crisis reserve 
has never been used. It was included in the 2013 CAP reform, and a tool for additional 
financial support due to crises affecting production and/or distribution. € 400 million (in 
2011 prices) is originally deducted from the previous year’s budget from farmers' direct 

261 Moller, B. et al. (2020), Three scenarios for Europe’s food sector in 2035, Fraunhofer ISI. 

95 

 
 
                                                 
payments. Once the reserve is not used, farmers receive back the amount  the following 
year. Else, it needs to be reconstituted the next year. In the future, the reserve will not be 
automatically paid out to farmers and rather kept as a reserve if not used. With this tool 
untouched, other available measures might have been enough to respond to crises (Euractiv, 
2020a;  EC,  2018).  At  the  same  time,  this  sends  a  signal.  Some  stakeholders  raised  the 
question of how much more severe a crisis needs to be than COVID-19 to leverage the 
fund and support severely affected sectors (Agro Alimentarias, 2020b).  

It  is  crucial  to  keep  in  mind  that  crisis  measures,  while  being  flexible,  should  be 
‘exceptional’  to  avoid  becoming  a  safety  net 262 and  limit  farmers’  inherent  resilience 
capacity. Any support should avoid to distort market signals for producers to limit their 
flexibility to react to changes in the market. Exceptional measures should be timely limited 
and exchanged by structural measures to address the cause of the crisis as well as structural 
adaptation (EC, 2019a).  

Specific points relating to the lessons learnt from COVID-19 pandemic in the seafood 
sector  

In  the  seafood  sector,  it  is  observed  that  sustainability  pays  back  in  times  of  crisis.  
Despite the effects of the crisis, the EU fleet as a whole continues to be profitable at an 
overall level. This indicates a notable resilience of the EU fleet, which is the result of the 
efforts made by the sector in previous years to achieve sustainable fishing in growing 
number of stocks in conjunction with low fuel prices.  

Furthermore,  specifically  in  aquaculture,  even  with  volatile  market  conditions,  organic 
certified aquaculture products have, in general faced the pandemic well. Reportedly, 
presure on prices for conventional farmed fish have, to some extent, affected prices for 
organic products, but consumers with a preference for sustainable certified products seem 
to have a high degree of loyalty to organic farmed fish despite the higher price. 

Diversification is crucial. There was a sudden change in demand of fresh fisheries and 
aquaculture  products due to closing of the HORECA sector and the drastic fall of out-of-
home  consumption.  However,  this  was  compensanted  by  the  very  good  response  of 
processing  and  in  particular  canned  industry,  which  could  respond  to  changes  in 
consumption behaviours. 

The close relations with stakeholders (Advisory Councils) helped identify most urgent 
needs  and  actions  to  be  undertaken  by  the  Commission  to  alleviate  the  impact  of  the 
pandemic  on  the  sector.  It  was  based  on  their  recommendations  that  the  specific 
amendments to the EMFF and CMO took place. This resulted in the good outcome of the 
measures  adopted  such  as  those  supporting  Producer  Organisations  through  the  cold-
storage aid mechanism to help in price stabilization. Fishers, retailers and processors were 
confronted with limited stocking capacity. 

Markets understanding, emerging technologies, social innovations, a diverse portfolio of 
active stewardship of human actions are key to support a resilient seafood system. 

262 Direct payments also provide a type of safety net and build a buffer during crises. In 2019, direct 

payments made up around 70% of the whole CAP expenditure (OECD, 2020e). 

96 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
In the fisheries and aquaculture sector, the crisis highlighted the interconnection between 
the different stages of the supply chain and the need to ensure continuity along the chain, 
without any weak link, to supply the market from sea to plate. In some Member States, the 
COVID-19 crisis has reinforced the vertical cooperation within the value chain to adapt 
the  strategy  of  all  stages  depending  of  the  needs  of  the  other  actors  along  the  chain 
(e.g.  need for more pre-packed fish at retail stage requires adaptation at processing and 
production stage). For that purpose, it has been crucial to set-up proper consultative bodies 
or rely on existing ones. Interbranch organisations recognised under the CMO for Fishery 
and Aquaculture Products can be interesting tools  to  initiate the  cooperation  within the 
chain and increase reactivity of the supply chain as a whole in case of new crisis. In the 
seafood sector, recognised professional organisations, in particular producer organisations, 
have played a crucial role during the health crisis for the implementation of emergency 
measures, in particular for adapting their production and marketing strategies for  adapting 
supply to the market developments, thus showing the importance to continuously support 
these organisations to allow them to react rapidly to disruptions of the market.  

In view of the amendments to the EMFF and their success, the European Commission has 
already taken note of the lessons learnt from the crisis. The new fund for 2021-2027 
(European  Maritime  Fisheries  and  Aquaculture  Fund  –EMFAF-)  supports  measures  to 
build up and strengthen the resilience of the sector. Furthermore, it includes a new scheme 
providing  financial  compensation  in  times  of  exceptional  events  causing  a  significant 
disruption  of  markets,  upon  recognition  of  the  occurrence  of  such  events  by  the 
Commission.  This  will  allow  a  rapidly  and  agile  activation  by  the  Commission  of 
exceptional temporary emergency measures.   

Conclusions 

The food sector proved resilient in face of the COVID-19 crisis. One main advantage was 
an already quite prepared sector, as agriculture, fisheries and aquaculture naturally deal 
with  crises  related  to  weather,  climate  change  and  zoonosis  with  an  efficient  policy 
framework. 

There  is  a  strong  European  integration  of  agriculture,  fisheries  and  aquaculture 
formulated  in  the  CAP  and  the  CFP.  EU  measures  are  able  to  be  launched  quickly 
within the framework of the existing CAP and CFP, and their market pillars: the CMO 
regulations.  Main  measures  such  as  green  lanes  and  recognizing  seasonal  workers  as 
essential workers have been put into place already in March 2020. In April 2020, several 
measures  to  increase  cash  flow  of  farmers  followed.  Policy  measures  not  only  have 
financial and market effects but also a political effect. Announcements send signals and 
set expectations and influence behaviour (EC, 2019a).  

The ‘European Union guidelines for state aid in the agricultural and forestry sectors and in 
rural areas 2014 to 2020’263 do not define crises, nor did the CMO, despite regular calls. 
Any  definition  might  exclude  unforeseen  events.  Maintaining  freedom  of  action  is  a 
crucial element of resilience. 

One of the most important measures was to enforce the Single Market. Ensuring a Single 
Market with “no borders in the EU”  including transport and access to  labour proved 
essential,  as  ‘the  lighthouse  of  the  EU’  (EC,  2021b).  An  established  principle  was 

263 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014XC0701(01)&from=EN. 

97 

 
 
 
                                                 
translated  into  new  measures  such  as  green  lanes  to  respond  to  a  crisis  with  unique 
challenges.  Other  connected  sectors  such  as  transport,  logistics  and  labour  could  be 
combined in a common response to support the food sector. 

Several aspects are crucial for the enforcement of the Single Market. These are to monitor 
protectionist tendencies and avoid fragmentation and disruption of supply chains  (Copa 
Cogeca,  2020a;  FoodDrinkEurope,  2020;  Agro  Alimentarias,  2020b;  Eurocommerce, 
2020c). Trade needs to be facilitated very practically. For COVID-19 the digital issuance 
of permits and certificates as well as inspections and audits adjusted by social distancing 
needs were part of the efforts (Laborde, et al., 2020). Next to trade within the EU, keeping 
trade with outside the EU was as crucial (IFPRI, 2021). 

Overall, guidance and flexibility to act were key aspects that stakeholders along the food 
chain appreciated. Most of the EU level measures haven been well received by the food 
sector, with some stakeholders rating the management of the food chain a 9.5 out of 10 
(Mercadona & Asedas, 2020). The measures available are plentiful and proved to be useful 
for a range of crises beyond COVID-19. 

Overall, the assessment of the crisis management is positive. Still, very much in the spirit 
of ‘Never waste a crisis’, there are learnings to improve measures and preparedness for 
the future. Increased coordination and cooperation, information and communication 
are key elements to be addressed via a crisis mechanism as envisaged in the contingency 
plan. 

98 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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105 

 
 
1611563563-0-Ady1eT_ehaGeWnz2Q_btH3XbcLLpfUx37-
F1Yr0pirTpbagSX6MxG 

Questionnaire - guidance stakeholders 

1.  Overall,  how  prepared  have  you  been  for  the  crisis? What  could  you  have done 

better to better prepare yourself?  

2.  What were the main challenges you faced during the first COVID-19 wave?  
3.  What were the main measures you took to handle the crisis?   
4.  Has  the  crisis  changed  your  approach  and  planning  for risk management?  If  yes,  in 

what way  

5.  Which structures (private and/or public), that already existed, were helpful in handling 

the crisis, if any?  

6.  How did certain EU and/or national policies support your business? Which ones?  
7.  Were there certain  policies/decisions that  were  counterproductive  and  if  so,  which 

ones? How could things be done better in future?  

8.  Were there decisions by the private sector that helped dealing with the crisis? Others 

counterproductive?   

9.  What role did digitalization/technology play in handling the crisis and what role do you 

foresee for the future?  

10. What are main differences in handling the 2nd wave?  
11. What  is  your  overall  assessment  of your handling  the crisis? And of that  of  public 

authorities?  

12. How could the EU food chain become more resilient for future crises?  

106 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Detailed timeline of COVID-19 measures, including selected national responses 

Date 

Description 

Type 

Notes 

19  December 
2019 

An  outbreak  of  a  disease 
caused 
novel 
coronavirus  is  reported  in 
Wuhan, China 

by 

a 

Event 

January 

30 
2020 

is  declared  a 
COVID-19 
Public Health Emergency of 
international  concern by the 
World  Health  Organisation 
(WHO) 

International 
response 

9 March 

9 March 

11 March 

16 March 

17 March 

Italy  as  the  first  European 
country  issues  a  nationwide 
lockdown 

National 
response 

Announcement  EFSA:  no 
evidence 
is  a 
source or transmission route 
of COVID-19  

that  food 

EU 

Policy 
response 

first 

that  notifies 

European 
Austria 
the 
country 
of 
Commission 
reestablishment 
of 
temporary  controls  at  the 
internal Schengen borders 

National 
response 

for 

Guidelines 
border 
measures  to  protect  health 
and keep goods and essential 
services available 

EU 

Policy 
response 

Hungary 
and 
Estonia 
temporarily introduce border 
controls  

National 
response 

18 March 

temporarily 
Austria 
reintroduces border controls 

19 March 

19 March 

Finland 
introduces border controls 

temporarily 

Temporary  framework  for 
state aid measures 

National 
response 

National 
response 

EU 

Policy 
response 

107 

to 
Allows  Member  States 
channel  up  to  €  100  000  to 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
individual  farmers  who  are 
facing liquidity shortage 

The ceiling of the de minimis 
aid was increased to € 20 000 
(and up to € 25 000 in specific 
cases) 

processing 

and 
Food 
can 
marketing 
benefit from a maximum of € 
800 000. 

companies 

20 March 

Belgium 
introduces border controls 

temporarily 

National 
response 

23 March 

Implementation of the 'green 
lanes‘ 

EU 

Guideline  to  enforce  Singe 
Market. 

Policy 
response 

to 

Priority 
“essential” 
products  including  food,  but 
not limited to it. 

24 March 

Lithuania 
temporarily 
reintroduces border controls  

National 
response 

26 March 

27 March 

30 March 

Portugal 
introduces border controls 

temporarily 

National 
response 

Spain temporarily introduces 
border controls 

National 
response 

in 
workers 
Seasonal 
agriculture, 
fisheries  and 
aquaculture  are  qualified  as 
‘critical workers’ 

EU 

Policy 
response 

6 April 

Extension  of    application 
deadline for CAP payments 

EU 

Policy 
response 

Extended by one month from 
15 May to 15 June 

16 April 

Single 
advance payments 

application 

and 

EU 

Policy 
response 

EU 

Policy 
response 

rate 

Increase 
for  advance 
payments from 50% to 70% in 
direct payments and from 75% 
to 85% in rural development 

Possibility to replace physical 
inspections  and  on-the-spot 
checks  with 
alternative 
control evidence, such as geo-
satellite 
photos, 
tagged 
images,  documents,  video 
meetings, etc.  

Flexibility in CAP controls 

16 April 

108 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Amendments 
and Fisheries 
CMO regulations 

EMFF 

Rural Development – CRII+ 

EU 

Policy 
response 

EU 

Policy 
response 

23 April 

23 April 

support 

(including 

It allowed for crisis measures 
and  compensations  payments 
such  as  reopening  of  storage 
for 
mechanism 
aquaculture farmers), increase 
of 
to  market 
instruments  (production  and 
marketing  plans),  support  for 
the  temporary  cessation  of 
fishing 
activities, 
compensation 
to  producers 
and  processors,  and  specific 
measures  for  the  outermost 
regions.  

Operations  supported  under 
these temporary measures are 
retroactively  eligible  as  of  1 
February  2020  until  31 
December 2020. 

Introduces 
exceptional 
flexibility  and  simplification 
in  the  use  of  the  European 
investment  funds 
structural 
(ESIF), 
including 
agricultural 
the European 
fund 
rural 
development (EAFRD). 

for 

-  Flexibility  in  the  use  of 
financials instruments 

- Reallocation of funds 

-  Postponement 
submission of annual reports 

for 

the 

-  No 
partnership 
required 

amendments 

to 
agreements 

30 April 

Temporary 
individuals and SMEs 

lump-sums 

Private storage aid 

30 April 

to 

EU 

Policy 
response 

EU 

Policy 
response 

amount 

Maximum 
not 
exceeding € 5 000 per farmer 
and € 50 000 per SME 

aid 

Private 
for 
storage 
skimmed milk powder, butter 
and certain types of cheese as 
well  as  some  beef  and  sheep 
and goat products 

109 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 April 

Derogation 
competition law 

from 

EU 

EU 

Policy 
response 

Flexibility  in  sectoral  aid 
schemes 

30 April 

Applications for licences on 
tariff rate quotas 

8 May 

30 June 

7 July 

21 July 

2  calls  for  proposals  for 
promotion programmes 

package 

Additional 
exceptional 
measures for wine sector 

of 
support 

Adoption 
of  Recovery 
Package,  Next  Generation 
EU 

EU 

Policy 
response 

EU 

Policy 
response 

EU 

Policy 
response 

EU 

Policy 
response 

EU 

Policy 
response 

21 December 

First  COVID-19  vaccine 
authorized for use in the EU 

EU 

Policy 
response 

110 

Allows  operators  to  organise 
implement  market 
and 
measures  at  their  level  for  a 
maximum period of 6 months 

in 

the 
Flexibility 
implementation  of  market 
support programmes for wine, 
fruits  and  vegetables,  table 
olives and olive oil, apiculture 
and  the  EU’s  school  scheme 
(covering  milk, 
fruit  and 
vegetables) 

to 

2020), 

license 

MS’ 
issuing 
authorities will be enabled, for 
a  transitional  period  (until  31 
July 
accept 
electronic  copies  instead  of 
original paper documents with 
operators’ 
regard 
applications  for  licenses  on 
tariff  rate  quotas  (TRQs)  on 
agricultural  products  and  for 
licenses on Basmati rice. 

to 

Fruit  and  vegetables,  wine, 
live  plants,  milk  and  milk 
products,  and  potatoes  for 
transformation are the sectors 
eligible  for 
the  promotion 
support  of  €  10  million  (€  5 
million for multi programmes 
and  €  5  million  for  simple 
programmes).  

The EU granted a conditional 
marketing  authorisation  for 
the 
vaccine 
developed  by  BioNTech  and 
Pfizer 

COVID-19 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
More information can be found here: 

Timeline  of  EU  action:  https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/coronavirus-
response/timeline-eu-action_en 

COVID Social Impact Timeline: https://www.etui.org/covid-social-impact 

Overview 
do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/reintroduction-border-control_en 

temporary  border  controls:  https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-

Overview  of  travel  restrictions:  https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/all-you-
need-to-know-about-europe-lifting-its-internal-border-restrictions/  

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ANNEX II – MINUTES OF THE EXPERT GROUP MEETINGS 

First meeting Joint AGRI-MARE GREX on the F2F food contingency plan to 
ensure  food  supply  and  food  security  in  the  EU  in  times  of  crisis  –  20 
January 2021 - What are the lessons learnt from COVID-19 and other 
crises with regard to food security in the EU? 

Opening by M. Michael Scannell, DG AGRI  

M. Scannell highlighted the resilience of the EU food system in  ensuring the supply of 
quality  and affordable  food to  citizens during the Covid-19 pandemics, thus  avoiding a 
food  security  crisis  on  top  of  the  sanitary  crisis,  in  close  collaboration  with  MS  and 
stakeholders. However, despite the fact that the food supply chain was resilient overall, 
some national measures were interfering with the functioning of the Single Market and the 
food  system  during  the  early  stages  of  the  crisis.  This  is  why  in  its  Farm  to  Fork 
Communication, the Commission decided to come forward with a contingency plan. He 
was further looking forward to a constructive collaboration on this sensitive initiative and 
expressed  his  commitment  to  work  fast  and  constructively  to  meet  the  deadline  for  the 
Communication.  

Setting the scene  

The COM presented context, scope and timeline with regard to the Contingency plan by 
underlining  that  this  initiative  does  not  aim  for  a  legislative  proposal  and  that  it 
complements  a  further  initiative  planned  under  Farm  to  Fork  Action  n°1  (legislative 
framework for sustainable food systems planned for 2023). Moreover, the COM informed 
on the stakeholder consultation and presented the preliminary results on the feedback to 
the Roadmap, highlighting broad. Participation of observers was very active. In substance 
they raised questions  on the link between this initiative and the Sustainable  Investment 
Regulation,  called  on  the  COM  to  ensure  the  labour  force  in  the  food  and  feed  chain 
receives priority status at MS level, underlined the importance of giving the contingency 
plan a broad scope not strictly limited to pandemic situations and avoiding both extra and 
intra EU trade restrictions, as well as considering transport and logistics as an essential 
activity.  Observers  also  suggested  involving  the  private  sector’s  crises  management 
experts and taking inspiration from crises mitigation strategies available in other sectors, 
MS, or other parts of the world, expressed concerns with the narratives on national food 
sovereignty and highlighted the importance that a crisis response mechanism should take 
into account the structures that are already in place. 

Lessons learnt from COVID-19 for the agricultural and food markets 

 DG  AGRI,  MARE  and  SANTE  presented  a  brief  overview  of  their  respective  lessons 
learnt  (see  presentations  published  on  circabc  and  in  the  expert  groups  n  substance, 
participants and observers that expressed themselves highlighted the key-role of producer 
organisations and stressed the difference of impacts in EU regions, enquired about COM’s 
perspective  on  workers’  health  and  safety  measures,  and  stressed  the  importance  of 
communicating to consumers that derogations from controls will not necessarily put at risk 
food safety.  

Testimonies from the ground 

 A series of stakeholders representing the various stages of the food supply chain provided 
insights on how they managed to cope with the pandemic and what were the challenges 

112 

 
 
 
they had faced or were currently still facing. This included presentations from the primary 
production stage (agricultural cooperative, fish PO), food industry, transport, trade, retail, 
labour union and the food banks (see presentations published on circabc and in the expert 
groups register). 

Second Joint AGRI-MARE GREX on the F2F food contingency plan to ensure 
food supply and food security in the EU in times of crisis – 25 February 
2021 - What are the threats to EU food security? 

State of play on the process  

·  Final  roadmap  feedback  analysis:  COM  received  68  contributions  showing  a  broad 
support for the initiative.  

·  GREX  planning:  The  next  joint  GREX  of  26  March  will  reflect  on  preparedness  in 
different MS, third countries and of coordination at international level.  

Main threats to food security  

· Slido question 1: on threats considered having the greatest impact on EU food security. 
Answers  identified  “protectionism”  being  among  the  most  important  one,  as  well  as 
climate  and  weather-related  threats,  specifically  named  like  climate  change,  droughts, 
weather and climate risk. In addition, “interdependencies” and “internet failure” received 
high scores as well (out of 35 participating voters).  

· Geneva Centre for Security Policy on how to approach crises management: The expert 
mentioned in particular two dimensions underestimated in relation to food: the impact of 
‘just-on-time’  algorithms  on  vulnerabilities  of  the  food  chain  (as  soon  as  something 
happens, it cascades); the need to ensure primary transport of food (from production to 
users / retailers). Preparedness implies to identify well what crises we are talking about.  

·  JRC  on  Mega  trends  and  external  shocks.  The  presenter  went  through  mega  trends 
identified  by  the  JRC  and  described  which  ones  were  likely  to  impact  food  security 
(likelihood/ impact).  

· Slido question 2: The second Slido question was linked to the JRC presentation on 14 
megatrends  and  it  focused  on  their  disruptive  potential  EU  food  security.  38  voters 
participated,  and  a  great  majority  (61%)  of  them  identified  “Climate  change  and 
environmental degradation” having the greatest disruptive potential.  

 Focus on selected disruptors  

· Munich Re  (climate  change aspect):  experts from  Munich Re made a presentation  on 
increased probabilities of extreme events (frost, drought, heat waves) and also showed that 
the  probability  of  extreme  events  occurring  simultaneously  in  several  production  areas 
(and potentially leading to global crop failure that trade would not be able to buffer out, 
contrary to localised extreme events) is growing.  

· NATO: the presenter presented its recent and renewed framework on “resilience”, where 
one of the 7 items to assess in resilience deals with food and water supply (together with 
basic  government  services,  transport,  energy,  communication-IT,  etc..).  NATO  issues 
guidelines to its members on the matter and explained resilience assessment is a national 
competence.  

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· Q&A:  

The main threats to EU food security were subject to a discussion that evidenced climate 
change and environmental degradation were clearly picked by participants as the major 
threat.  Other  main  threats  mentioned  by  participants  were  internet  failure  and  the 
complexity of value chains and their interdependencies. Pandemics were not mentioned 
prominently.  

Vulnerabilities in the supply chain  

· Food industry vulnerabilities: FDE described its perception of vulnerabilities at the stage 
of the food chain : free movement of goods, logistic and transport, workers, packaging, 
markets.  

· Feed vulnerabilities: FEFAC also described the vulnerabilities detected during COVID 
on the feed industry: logistics, uncertainties around national restrictions to free movement 
of goods, shortage of micro nutrients, lack of safety equipment, animal production markets 
affected. Import dependency for some feed raw material and micro nutrients were stressed 
as well risks for the integrity of the chain in times of crises.  

· Seafood processors’ vulnerabilities: AIPCE  reflected on specific vulnerabilities in  the 
fish  sector  with  limited  capacity  to  increase  domestic    supply  in  a  context  of  import 
dependency. Climate change, geopolitics, disruptions in transport and logistics, availability 
of  key  inputs  and  workers,  degradation  of  the  sector’s  image  (food  safety,  plastic 
pollution). ,  

·Q&A: The discussion showed that overall there is a wide range of products offered by the 
EU  agriculture  allows  reasonable  possibilities  to  diversify  sourcing  domestically  (‘we 
produce  a  little  bit  of  all’  Food  Drink  Europe).  But  some  vulnerabilities  linked  to 
ingredients and inputs sourced/imported from single concentrated suppliers abroad were 
mentioned  (mainly  micronutrient  such  as  vitamins,  amino  acids  and  additives,  but  also 
some macronutrients like organic soya meal). Diversification looked more problematic in 
the fish sector. A mapping of which goods is the EU highly dependent on imports would 
be useful according to certain stakeholders.  

Ways to overcome vulnerabilities? The case of strategic reserves  

  SAIS  Bologna  Centre,  John  Hopkins  University.  Professor  Gilbert  started  with  a 
presentation framing the issue. Food reserves make sense in net importing areas (which is 
not the case in the EU, except for some commodities like soy or maize), he discussed the 
relative advantages and drawbacks of trade, public buffer stocks and export restrictions 
versus constitution of reserves.  

  The  Swiss  Federal  Office  for  National  Economic  Supply  presented  the  compulsory 
stockholding  scheme  in  place  in  Switzerland,  where  companies  have  to  keep  in  stocks 
some months of demand coverage for some commodities and inputs.  

  The  Finnish  experience  was  presented  by  COPA.  Strategic  reserves  are  in  place  in 
Finland due to the adverse climatic conditions and the geopolitical situation of the country. 
Grains and seeds are stored by private companies for a state agency.  

 Q&A: The discussion on strategic food reserves showed most policies dated from the 
cold  war  have  been  dismantled  in  Europe  in  the  last  30  years,  as  trade  rendered  them 
meaningless to ensure food security. Rising risks could change the perception. Costs of 
such systems range between 5 and 8 €/capita/year compensating the immobilisation of the 

114 

 
 
goods  and their  existence has  a depressing impact  on agricultural  prices  (Finland). The 
debate showed mixed opinions, with some calling the EU to gather strategic reserves like 
China, while others questioned the relevance of keeping strategic reserves. 

Third Joint AGRI-MARE GREX on the F2F food contingency plan to ensure 
food supply and food security in the EU in times of crisis – 26 March 2021 
-  How  are  the  EU,  Member  States,  third  countries  and  international 
organisations prepared to handle crises? 

State of play on the process 

State of play and brief overview of the stakeholder questionnaire. Contributions could be 
made  until  3rd  of  May.  Answers  would  be  part  of  the  Staff  working  document  to  be 
published together with the Communication expected in the fall. GREX planning: the next 
joint GREX on 21 April will reflect on crisis preparedness of companies within the EU 
food system. 

3 MS’ experience and third countries’ preparedness to handle crises  

Experiences from Member States (DE, DK and IT): 

In DE, two frames of governance are in place: the Ministry of Agriculture (on food security) 
and the Ministry of Interior (on critical infrastructures). The COVID-19 crisis showed that 
in case of crisis, food cannot be seen in isolation and need to be addressed in conjunction 
with other critical infrastuctures. The main challenges identified were how to ensure the 
interactions between the critical infrastructures (interface needed), and coherence across 
relevant policies. 

In  DE,  public  strategic  reserves  are  in  place  (held  by  the  federal  government).  The 
government also recommends households to keep private stocks corresponding to 10 days 
of consumption. 

o Q&A: There were questions on how ministries communicate with each other and the 
plans on a local level. In general, it is based on subsidiarity principle. 

In DK, the structure is comprehensive network with a high number of people and agencies 
involved (from the Prime Minister Office to local agencies). Stakeholders are also involved. 
General  principles  followed  are  those  of  cooperation,  precaution,  subsidiarity  and 
similarity (apply same working methods in times of crisis and normal times). The structure 
proved to be efficient during COVID-19. The approach is rather open and bottom-up as 
any level of the structure can trigger the system in order to get a reply in 1 hour as was the 
case for COVID-19. A great part of the response is based on peer-to-peer exchanges and 
open-minded approach (specific response for a specific type of crisis, no onesize-fits-all 
approach). 

o Q&A: A discussion on the simulation exercises carried out in DK followed. They are 
carried  out  every  second  year  and  agencies  are  committed  to  the  exercise.  Scenarios 
simulated are chosen from a catalogue of scientifically probable ones. Learning points are 
sent as a report to the Prime Minister and then integrated.  

In IT, the administration relies on a wide range of risk assessment (natural hazards, weather 
forecast,  system  of  early warning). During COVID-19, these different  work streams  on 
general crisis management facilitated communication and response, while highlighting the 

115 

 
 
 
need for a more holistic approach including of resilience and a wider framework to increase 
responsiveness. 

o Q&A: The interplay between the different work streams during COVID19 showed that 
while the general framework responded well, it is not intended to respond to unforeseen 
challenges. 

Experiences from third countries (JAPAN, US): 

In  Japan,  the  response  is  systematic  based  on  preparedness  arrangements.  A  shift  from 
disaster prevention to disaster mitigation aimed at increasing the resilience of the system. 
At the core of the COVID-19 response was continuous and accurate information flows to 
the  public  and  stakeholders  (with  dedicated  manuals)  and  emergency  staff  support 
dispatched by the national government to local governments affected the most. Japan has 
established as a priority ensuring people’s income would come back to normal after a crisis. 
Emergency support would for instance be provided to farmers. Experience linked to Italy 
regarding the importance of correct information (short video clips on stocks and ongoing 
imports in ports were provided to national media); and linked to Denmark in terms of sector 
specific business contingency plans (6 sectors; each including agricultural producers, food 
processors and distributors)  

o Q&A: Regarding public stockholding, Japan keeps public stocks of rice and recommend 
private  households  to  keep  stocks  corresponding  to  2  weeks  of  consumption.  Trading 
companies also keep stocks. 

The  US  response  to  COVID-19  was  to  reinforce  and  complement  standing  measures 
supporting farmers and vulnerable groups of civil society. The food industry responded 
well to the unexpected surge in grocery shopping. The initiative “Farmers to Family” food 
boxes  during  COVID19  was  accepted  well  and  appreciated  by  farmers  and  vulnerable 
groups,  but  more  expensive  in  comparison  to  other  support  programmes  such  as  food 
stamps. 

o Q&A: on public stockholdings, the  US  does  not  have them but read-to-eat  meals  are 
available, in the army and communities, to be provided in case of natural disasters. 

Inter-governmental cooperation 

This session complemented the previous ones by experiences in crisis management from 
inter-governmental cooperation (AMIS, DG ENER). 

The experience on international cooperation in the agricultural and food sector shared by 
the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS) of the G-20 highlighted the persisting 
need for reliable data to assess if a crisis is unfolding as well as the need for cooperation, 
transparency and a unified approach among countries to avoid panic on the markets. 

AMIS  additionally  shared  three  lessons  learnt  regarding  the  perspective  on  policy:  (1) 
Anticipation  is  key  to  react  also  to  unexpected  crises,  increasing  the  importance  of 
monitoring, a global system and information sharing. (2) Understanding causality ensures 
an appropriate response (multi-causality of price distortions). (3) Each crisis is unique and 
requires a unique set of solutions. Crisis measures should not become permanent or else 
they risk prolonging the critical situation. 

o Q&A: This  intervention was followed by a discussion on transparency  as well as the 
control and approval of data, elaborating the process of cross checking the numbers and 
publishing only peer-validated numbers. 

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Experiences from the European energy sector (DG ENER) 

The resilience measures for oil and gas supply and energy security strategy are based on 
transparency, coordination and monitoring, which are ensured by a reporting obligation. 
The EU regulatory framework provides for various emergency procedures in case of major 
supply disruption. The type of response depends on the scenarios or level of emergency. 
The oil and gas supply for example is secured through emergency stocks. MS have the 
obligation  to  develop  contingency  plans  and  keep  stocks  corresponding  to  61  days  of 
average net consumption, or 90 days of average imports, whichever is the greatest (some 
MS favour public stocks, other request private companies holding the stocks, some adopt 
a mixed approach). MS have a reporting obligation about those stocks. An oil coordination 
group  exists,  chaired  by  the  Commission,  with  the  participation  of  MS  representatives. 
Stakeholders may be invited to attend the meetings. 

o Q&A: This presentation was followed by a discussion on the related costs of the measure. 
Despite elevated costs of holding gas and oil stocks, they provide a degree of resilience. 

Reliance on trade 

Lastly, the meeting was closed with a session discussing the role of trade in ensuring food 
supply  and  food  security  (DG  AGRI,  DG  MARE,  Wageningen  University,  JRC  and 
Freshfel). The facts & figures on EU trade flows for agriculture and fish products show 
that the EU27 is a net importer only for certain commodities. For most of them, the EU is 
self-sufficient or net exporter. Intra-trade within the Single Market is crucial for ensuring 
food  supply  of  agricultural  products  at  MS  level.  There  is  however  a  significant  trade 
deficit  for  fishery  and  aquaculture  products.  The  majority  of  produced,  consumed  and 
traded  products  in  the  EU  are  wild  products  whereas  farmed  products  constitute  the 
majority of global trade. The consumption of fishery and aquaculture products in EU27 
remains stable. (DG AGRI, DG MARE). 

According to a study from Wagening University, based on a bio-physical model with no 
economic  impact  assessed,  NL  could  ensure  food  supply  in  case  of  autarky  under  the 
condition that they drastically change diet. The study did not envisage however what would 
happen in case of a succession of bad years (and the absence of trade to provide a buffer), 
for example due to climate change. 

According to the work of the JRC, trade and flexible trade policies can balance market and 
act  as  a  buffer  in  extremely  unfavourable  agro-climate  conditions,  depending  on  the 
elasticity  of  the  system.  Trade  liberalisation  and  stockholding  policies  could  further 
contribute to adaptation as they allow markets to better adjust to adverse climate extremes. 

The  fresh  fruit  and  vegetable  sector  can  turn  its  inherent  vulnerabilities  proactively  in 
preparedness as it is used to dealing with imbalances and challenges (perishability of the 
products, fragmentation of the production, occasional food safety incidents). 

Understanding  the  market  structure  is  important  for  an  appropriate  crisis  response, 
especially given the seasonality of the produce (Freshfel).  

Fourth Joint AGRI-MARE GREX on the F2F food contingency plan to ensure 
food supply and food security in the EU in times of crisis – 21 April 2021 
- How are companies in the EU food system prepared to handle crises? 

State of play on the process, B. LANOS DG AGRI 

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The commission presented the state of play of the consultation process and a brief overview 
of the stakeholder questionnaire. Contingency plan webpage on EUROPA available now. 
GREX  planning:  the  next  joint  GREX  on  20  May  will  be  a  workshop  organised  in 
collaboration  with  the  Joint  Research  Centre  and  will  aim  at  exploring  contingency 
planning with regards to food supply and food security from an academic perspective. 

A view on Global Risks in 2021 

The  World  Economic  Forum  (WEF)  presentation  on  the  Global  risk  landscape 
complemented previous GREX on risks. WEF indicated (like speakers in previous GREX) 
environmental  and  climate  risks  as  the  most  likely  and  with  the  greatest  impact 
(exacerbating other risks), along with pandemics or social risks, such as livelihood crisis 
(unemployment, social insecurity). They evoked ‘frontier risks’ as those less on the radar 
than  others,  representing  new  possible  shocks  with  high  uncertainties,  concerning  their 
likelihood and impact (i.e. geomagnetic disruptions, artificial intelligence escaping control, 
accidental wars etc.). WEF insisted on the importance of cross cutting framework, clear 
and  evidence  based  communication  to  the  public,  public-private  partnerships  (close 
coordination and communication between stakeholders and MS) and the scaling up of best 
practices. 

Crisis  preparedness  in  the  transport  and  logistics  sector  (DG  MOVE,  IATA, 
UNISTOCK)  

Concerning  transport  and  logistics,  the  Green  Lanes  communication  was  praised  by  all 
participants. DG MOVE confirmed a future freight transport contingency plan is currently 
being prepared at the request of the Council. Coordination and cooperation between COM 
and MS will feature high. The absence of priority for any goods (all freight transport should 
flow quickly, no good is more priority than other, even the perishable ones) will continue 
to be a characteristic: the logistics of segregating between types of goods would be difficult 
and  the  definition  of  where  priority  should  stop  is  impossible  in  view  of  the 
interdependencies of supply chains. 

The  prioritisation  of  the  safety  of  workers,  including  cross  borders,  was  particularly 
stressed. Both air and road transport industries were quite resilient and adapted with agility 
to the challenges of the crises, with air transport being more impacted (local regulations 
and cargo workers not considered as essential workers), but already back to pre COVID 
level  (even  higher  in  the  case  of  North  Pacific  flows),  thanks  to  transformation  of 
passengers planes into cargo (“preight” flights). 

Crisis  preparedness  in  the  inputs  and  packaging  sector  (EUROSEEDS,  FEFANA, 
EUROPEN)  

For  the  input  sector,  the  dependence  on  the  global  supply  chain  posed  challenges, 
especially in the beginning of COVID-19 crisis. Delays for sourcing of raw material for 
feed additives (chemical precursors and/or substances themselves) and packaging (paper 
and cardboard, ink) had a ripple effect on the rest of the food chain, although in general 
not to a major extent during COVID. Artificial disruptions should be avoided (e.g. due to 
container  capacity):  feed  ingredients  companies  try  to  have  at  least  two  suppliers  per 
product  sourced  (no  single  sourcing).  Local  and  global  sourcing  are  also  seen  as 
complementary.  The  just-in-time  algorithms  were  also  mentioned  to  be  questioned  and 
reviewed  now  (post  COVID)  by  companies.  The  seed  industry  was  able  to  avoid 
disruptions (all farmers could sow on time), also thanks to a policy of diversification of 
places  of  RD,  production  and  processing/packaging  (“spread  the  risk”).  Stability  and 

118 

 
 
continuity of policies was quoted as an important element to allow companies being better 
prepared to crises.  

Companies’  and  producers’  preparedness  to  handle  crises  (ARLA,  NESTLE, 
ROYALD AHOLD DELHAIZE) 

Companies  in  the  core  agri-food  chain  (Arla,  Nestlé,  Royal  Ahold)  presented  their 
operative responsiveness arrangements and the way they reallocate resources to essential 
production.  At  retail  stage,  panic  buying  caused  the  greatest  disruption. The  wellbeing, 
health and safety of employees (and farmers for the coop) was a key element mentioned 
by all speakers. In the case of Arla, the cooperative status helped with a closer relationship 
with  farmers  and  even  more  sense  of  community.  Crisis  management  led  by  zone  or 
country  CEO’s  based  on  continuous  reporting  and  monitoring  ensured  production 
according  to  market  needs:  data  was  key  for  this  purpose  (including  data  provided  by 
market  observatories).  Recognition  of  food  as  an  essential  activity  with  regards  to  the 
movement  of workers (essential workers) was a great  relief to  maintain production and 
flow of food in the chain. Cooperation between companies and stages of the food chain 
was  also  mentioned  as  useful  to  jointly  communicate  and  reduce  tendency  to  panic 
behaviour. 

Long and short supply chains: diversification and food system resilience 

A discussion on long and short supply chains/local food systems (defined in a presentation 
by  DG  AGRI)  in  terms  of  food  resilience  highlighted  the  need  for  global  food  supply 
chains  to  fulfil  food  supply  requirements  (currently  only  one  third  of  food  supply  can 
globally be considered to be local according to a Nature scientific article presented during 
the GREX by its author, Pekka Kinunnen). According to a presentation by Eurovia-Via 
campesina, local demands can however be met with short supply chains, depending on the 
local  production  and  limited  to  a  low  percentage  of  the  food  supply.  As  a  short-term 
response, short food supply chains can contribute to buffer certain type of crises, thanks to 
lower vulnerabilities to logistic and long-haul transport and are often linked to a sense of 
community, trust and solidarity. 

Fifth  Joint  AGRI-MARE  GREX  on  the  F2F  food  contingency  plan  to  ensure 
food supply and food security in the EU in times of crisis – 20 May 2021 
– JRC Workshop 

The fifth meeting of the series was combined with a technical workshop co-organised with 
the JRC and is subject to a specific full technical report264 that will be published separately.  

Sixth  Joint  AGRI-MARE  GREX  on  the  F2F  food  contingency  plan to  ensure 
food supply and food security in the EU in times of crisis – 16 June  - How 
to best organise a coordinated approach? 

Approval of the agenda and state of play on the process, by B. LANOS, DG AGRI 

The COM presented the housekeeping rules to ensure a smooth running of the meeting. 
The state of play was presented followed by the aim of the meeting. The aim was to discuss 
with  MS  mechanisms  and  ways  to  connect  and  build  upon  existing  structures  and  to 

264 https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC125831. 

119 

 
 
                                                 
 
understand how to best organize a coordinated approach. The next joint GREX on 15 July 
will present the outline of the Communication and other documents envisaged for Q4-2021. 

Summary of the results from the stakeholder questionnaire by M. FLEURECK, DG 
AGRI 

The targeted stakeholder questionnaire was open to all and closed on 3d May. Overall, 253 
contributions were received (13% private companies, 25% trade and business associations, 
45% individuals and 17% others). The aim of the questionnaire was to gather views on 
lessons learned, on the threats to EU food security, on crisis preparation and management 
in the food system and at public administration level. The final results will be included in 
the Communication and the accompanying Staff Working Document(SWD). 

Building up on current systems in place ( DG ECHO, DG SANTE) 

To connect and build upon existing structures, colleagues from DG ECHO and DG SANTE 
provided a good overview of EU crisis response systems currently in place:  

Introduction to the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) by DG ECHO:  

-  The Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) is an element of the Union 
Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM), which is set to strengthen the cooperation 
between the Union and the Member States and to facilitate coordination in the field 
of civil protection in order to improve the effectiveness of systems for preventing, 
preparing for and responding to natural and man-made disasters. 
 The  ERCC  is  involved  in  the  coordination  of  responses  to  different  types  of 
incidents,  including  natural  disasters,  public  health  emergencies,  etc.  Where 
requested, the ERCC can coordinate and co-finance the deployment of  Member 
States’ assistance  in the context of a food crisis, for instance in co-financing the 
transport of foodstuffs or deploying teams of experts. 

- 

-  The ERCC organises regular meetings of civil protection authorities and generates 
numerous informational materials aimed at monitoring and analysing ongoing and 
anticipated emergencies/crises, including, potentially, with a food crisis component. 
-  Both the UCPM and the ERCC have well-established arrangements with access to 
full-time, 24/7  staff and  response  capacities, as  well as  an  extensive network of 
expertise at both national and international level.  

-  UCPM capabilities are maintained through regular trainings and exercises. 
-  UCPM has been activated 102 times in 2020. 
- 

Introduction to the mechanism in case of Food Safety incidents by DG SANTE 

-  The legal framework from DG SANTE in case of Food safety incidents covers food 

and feed incidents related to biological, chemical and physical hazards. 

-  Three levels are foreseen in the general plan. 

1.  Preparedness  (crisis  coordinators  network,  alert  and  information  systems 
(interconnected),  laboratories,  training  and  exercises,  continuous  collection, 
monitoring and analysis of information); 

2. Enhanced EU coordination (analysis of the alert information system, involve 
EU  agencies,  use  of  crisis  coordination  network,  organisation  of  audio-  and 
video-conferences, 
coordination  of 
assessment  of 
initial 
communication lines); and 

impact, 

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3. Setting up a crisis unit (never happened so far).  

In conclusion, permanent action is needed. Enhanced preparedness at EU and national 
level in a structured way is of increasing importance. Cooperation is essential using 
existing networks.  

Six breakout sessions with a moderated discussion on how to build the most efficient 
system for a coordinated approach. 

Three sets of questions were discussed, on the pre-crisis situation, the early crisis and for 
when the crisis has unfolded. Topics included: 

-  Organisation of a dedicated structure 
-  Detection of a crisis 
-  Organisation of a coordinated response when the crisis emerges 
-  Useful tools to react quickly in times of crisis 
-  Ensure that there is trust in times of crisis 
-  Communication 
-  Measures to manage the crisis 

The  minutes  of  the  session  will  also  be  available  on  the  dedicated  webpage  on  the 
EUROPA website. 

Third session: Plenary session on the outcomes of the discussion 

Across the groups, many ideas have been confirmed and supported. 

-  Communication is paramount in times of crisis. 
-  Before the crisis occurs, monitoring and regular meetings were identified as core 
elements  of the EU approach. Maintaining a dialogue between MS and relevant 
stakeholders  of  the  food  sector,  will  also  contribute  to  build  trust  (among 
stakeholders, as well as with the public). Trust should be built continuously and 
before the crisis starts. 

-  During  the  initial  crisis  response,  coordination  and  a  coherent  communication 
strategy were identified as core elements to respond to a crisis and to e.g. prevent 
panic  buys.  Transparency  and  sharing  available  and  science-based  information 
should be part of that communication strategy. 
-  According to the discussions, the EU approach; 
include 

to 
communication/coordination,  which  is  adaptable  to  the  crisis  situation 
(including ad hoc experts).  

on/dedicated 

o  Should 

specialized 

forum 

a 

o  Should be flexible and agile, allowing a unique and tailored response to the 

unique crisis. 

o  Should  connect  existing  crisis  management  measures  and  tools  or 

incorporated them directly. 

o  Would  ensure  a  coherent  message  to  the  MS  and  stakeholders,  which  is 

adapted to the national context and disseminated to the public. 

o  Would include a permanent group with regular meetings (monitoring etc.) 

and ad hoc activities and crisis responses. 

o  Should involve local/regional authorities as well as stakeholders (retailers 
and  industry  organisations)  in  the  communication  strategy  can  prevent 
miscommunication and further ensures coherence. 

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o  Stakeholders,  especially  EU  organisations,  should  be  permanently 

represented in the forum as strategic contact points. 

Seventh Joint AGRI-MARE GREX on the F2F food contingency plan to ensure 
food supply and food security in the EU in times of crisis – 15 July 

This meeting was the last of the consultation process and was dedicated to a presentation 
by DG AGRI to the members the elements of reflection gathered during the consultation 
process that may feed the contents of the future Communication, first concerning, risks, 
vulnerabilities, strengths and resilience of the EU food system in times of crises, second 
concerning the possible actions foreseen in the Contingency Plan. 

Main feedback expressed: 

• wish that better data is gathered on stocks (both commercial and strategic) and expressed 
the need of proper training activities for building capacities to respond to crises. 

• doubts  that  the  complexity  of  the  seeds  supply  chain  with  multiple  stages  in  different 
places of the world was a vulnerability. 

• importance of having a balance between types of food supply chains (from short or local 
to longer ones), the latter praising the need to have a well functioning Single Market, the 
former evoking the role of short and local chains to respond to consumer demand during 
COVID. 

• appropriate policy tools should help  farmers to  face price volatility  and that there is  a 
need to ensure the right to food including healthy and quality food for all in times of crises.  

• a food security problem in the EU is likely to also be a global food security problem, and 
that account should be taken of the global picture and the international community in the 
EU contingency planning. 

• necessary links with market observatories and CDGs. 

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ANNEX III – SUMMARY OF QUESTIONNAIRES ADDRESSED TO MEMBER STATES 

As  part  of  the  GREX  meetings,  Member  States  were  asked  to  reply  to  a  series  of 
questionnaires,  in  which  they  could  indicate  their  lessons  learnt  from  COVID-19,  their 
perception of threats, and their state of crisis preparedness.  

Lessons learnt from the COVID-19 pandemic 

During the COVID-19 crisis, the main challenges to food supply/food security across MSs 
were related to logistics. While MSs indicated no significant disruption of food production 
in general, the demand shift from HORECA to retail posed challenges. Another bottleneck 
identified was the shutdown of some large processing plants. Overall, the open boarders 
for both goods and workers were perceived as critical to face these logistic challenges. 

Other issues mentioned were an increased production cost, the vulnerability of perishable 
goods,  and  difficulties  in  the  procurement  of  inputs  (seeds,  fertilisers,  feed  and 
additives, raw  materials  and  ingredients),  packaging  (EU  labelling  rules  compliance 
challenging) and  cleaning  products  (cleaning  of  production  facilities).  In  some  cases, 
problems occurred due to non-food uses of agricultural sector production (e.g. medical or 
pharmaceutical use).  

Providing adequate care for seasonal workers was also mentioned as one of the challenges 
faces by MSs, this was also due to difficulties in accessing personal protective equipment 
(PPE). Shortage of labour linked to illness, confinement measures or lacking of access to 
childcare (besides cross-border issues) were also mentioned in regards to workers.  

On the cooperation between the EU and MSS, several MSS expressed in interest in sharing 
best-practices and better coordinating information. 

Main threats to EU food security 

MSs identify disruptions of free trade, availability of labour and climate change and 
environmental issues (such as soil degradation, biodiversity loss, intensive agriculture & 
chemicals,  water resources) as their top  treats  to  EU  food security. This  is  followed by 
threats posed by import dependency, human or animal diseases and food safety.  

Other signs of caution in regards to food security are disruptions in energy supplies or of 
the internet network. Low production standards in third countries, the lower level of 
technology in some MSS, a low degree of producer organisation and underdeveloped short 
supply chains add constraints as well. Unforeseen large-scale demand shifts (e.g. COVID-
19  HORECA)  or  a  lack  of  instruments  and  financing  to  address  risks  and  disruptions 
increases vulnerability.  

From an environmental perspective, the main threats to food security are associated to 
climate  change  (such  as  reduced  yields  as  well  as  extreme  weather  events,  reduced 
nutritional  quality  of  food,  increased  food  prices,  etc. 265),  environmental  degradation 
(biodiversity,  the  loss  of  genetic  resources 266    and  agricultural  land  as  well  as  the 
deterioration of soil quality) and access to water resources. Other issues as unsustainable 
imports  (e.g.  of  feed  protein),  food  waste  and  loss  and  increased  demand  pressures  on 
production  (population  growth  and  rising  global  incomes),  bioterrorism  or  trade-offs 

265 IPCC, Special Report - Climate Change and Land, Chapter 5 – Food Security, 2020. 
266 On biodiversity loss and global food security see: IPBES, Global assessment report of the 

Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, 2019.  

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between  environmental  policy  and  food  production  have  been  mentioned  as  possible 
threats in the near or distant future as well.  

Main threats from a socio-economic side are producer viability and income (e.g. due to 
reduced  capacities;  uncertainty  and  volatility;  increased  sustainability  requirements; 
limited workforce; or ageing) followed by the reduction in consumption volumes (e.g. 
economic crises, economic inequality and rising inequalities). Labour shortages and low 
labour adaptabilities to change were seen as other socio-economic threats. Related to this 
are  supply  chain  disruptions  due  to  limitations  in  free  movement  of  people  and  goods 
(including inputs, consumables, capital goods such as machine parts or PPE). A lack of 
transparency concerning e.g. the level of stocks, and macro issues such as mass migration 
caused by environmental issues (such as deforestation, lack of access to water etc.) were 
mentioned in this regard. 

In  terms  of  geo-political  threats,  international  military  conflict  was  seen  as  having 
potentially  the  biggest  impact  followed  by  large-scale  restrictions  to  trade  and 
protectionism alongside the previously mentioned issues on environmental degradation 
and the difficulty to coordinate on an international scale.  

Livestock was cited as the most vulnerable sector due to multiple simultaneous threats: 
energy  and  water  use,  diseases,  feed  supply,  labour  availability.  Similarly,  crops  was 
identified as second most vulnerable sector due to its dependency on climate and weather, 
perishability  and  labour  availability.  The  processing  industry  was  also  mentioned 
frequently  due  to  the  dependency  on  labour  and  vulnerability  of  worker  health  and  the 
impact of safety risks. Sectors not investing in ‘future proofing’ (digitalisation, etc.) are 
also under greater threat than others.  

Regarding  national  contingency  plans,  of  the  MSs  who  responded,  more  than  half 
confirmed they have a contingency plan almost all of which said it included food security. 
Of the remaining MSs currently not having a contingency plan, several are preparing the 
plan or/and the legal basis for it. Of the MSs with a contingency plan, about half said their 
plan included strategic reserves, mostly stockpiles  of raw agricultural  materials.  In rare 
cases, the plan also included private stockpiles. However, the public stocks have not been 
used since the 1960s. 

Level of preparedness 

A close look at the level of preparedness and the MS level showed that within most MSs 
who answered the questionnaire, the responsible institution at MS level has a targeted 
focus on Crisis management, followed by monitoring and management of inventories. In 
some MSs, different administrations/agencies are responsible for one or the other.  

The MS procedures in case of crisis are diverse. In some MSs the alert system can be 
triggered through a bottom-up approach, while in some others it is data-driven based on 
the monitoring of overall food availability. In some MSs, a cross-sectorial crisis unit is 
summoned by the prime minister or even president, in which all relevant ministries are 
represented.  

In  regards  to  the  administration  involved  the  procedure  ranges  from  central 
administration or from one being ministry in charge (commonly the one responsible for 
civil protection), to both central and regional governments. Stakeholders are approached 
from  two  different  direction  across  MS,  in  some  communication  is  initiated  from 
stakeholders to administration and in others from administration to stakeholders. In other 

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MSs,  communication  on  crisis  development  is  coordinated  at  a  national  level  and 
disseminated to the other levels.  

The main strategy to ensure food supply indicated by most MSs is the release of food 
strategic stocks. Individual MSs also mentioned governments buying food, handling out 
food  parcels  to  citizens,  bans  on  hoarding  and  distribution  regulations,  setting-up  the 
logistics for an emergency value chain or even derogations to the Food Law. The strategy 
to ensure food supply chosen needs to respond to the magnitude of the crisis. Therefore, 
the strategies range from a local level and supply of basic human needs (such as water, 
food and shelter) to national level once the FSC is affected.  

The  instruments  most  commonly  used  among  MSs  are  legal  documents  (Law,  Act, 
Regulation) already implemented. Some MSs made no reference to a specific document. 
Individual MSs also sent out a memorandum to stakeholders or used an EU regulation, as 
a public intervention.  

The issues addressed in the legal instruments are mainly on monitoring, food reserves 
distribution, food supply  (production, logistics), derogations of the food laws, sharing 
and access to private data or precautionary measures on long-term crisis preparedness.  

Regarding the monitoring, most MSs are having annual or regular reports on the state of 
markets  and  prices.  Some  MSs  have  no  formal  monitoring  and  rely  on  close  contact/ 
market  observation  with  main  economic  operators.  Several  MSs  use  balance  sheets  to 
monitor the national food supply. Stakeholders are involved differently among the MSs. 
While  in  some  MSs,  stakeholders  are  invited  to  report  voluntarily,  in  other  there  is  no 
obligation for maker participants to report on stocks and in other MSs it is mandatory in 
case of a crisis.  

The indicators used for monitoring range from self-sufficiency for food and critical inputs 
or food security, level of stocks or stock-to-use ratio or the evolution of price. In some 
MSs a combination of indicators is used to better estimate the level of food security, for 
example: self-sufficiency and the ability to trade; others economic hardship and consumer 
confidence;  import  dependence,  level  of  stocks,  shortages,  risk  pictures,  potential 
alternatives;  or  risk  assessment  for  establishment  of  food  reserves,  effectiveness  of  the 
programme, international obligations, national security.  

For these indicators the majority of MSs do not have a threshold to trigger crisis response. 
In  one  MS  a  minimum  period  during  which  citizens  should  be  able  to  fulfil  their  food 
requirements is used as an estimate. In other MSs the evaluation encompasses the socio-
economic context. Again other MSs use as an indicator the market interventions in place 
or rather once their limit has been reached. The need for a threshold also depends on the 
response trigger. As in some cases a central unit or even the Prime Minister triggers the 
response, a threshold is  difficult to define given the compilation of various information 
sources and macro perspective.  

In terms of future preparedness, several MSs are reviewing their national contingency 
plans in terms of national strategic reserves, COVID-19 measures taken and their necessity. 
MSs  also  indicated  they  plan  to  review  their  plans  based  on  the  EU  contingency  plan. 
While in some MSs this process in ongoing as we are moving forward after the COVID-
19 crisis, for other MSs reviewing crisis preparedness is an ongoing process. Part of this is 
to regularly review the preparedness and response planning to reinforce the efficiency and 
the flexibility of crisis management. There is also a Nordic Council of ministers in which 
preparedness and resilience of food systems is part of the agenda. 

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According to some MSs, reforming the use of food reserves should be part of this review, 
while for other MSs, the top priority is to prepare for, anticipate and resist initial impact as 
well as longer term consequences. This includes issues related directly to food and drink 
but also cross-functional issues such as the logistics sector and critical infrastructures. 
Other MSs propose as part of the restructuring a civil emergency planning system or to 
include a regular review of national risks (e.g. every 3 years). Research and scaling up 
training activities on crisis management are also suggested. For some MSs data security 
as well as monitoring/evaluation is an important part of the reviewing process. A definition 
of  security  of  supply  and  the  role  of  agencies  as  well  as  a  clear  distinction  between 
preparedness and emergency is also mentioned. 

126