REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS on the state of the transposition and implementation of Directive (EU) 2019/633 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on unfair trading practices in business-to-business relationships in the agricultural and food supply chain
Date: 2021-10-27
Institutions: Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development, European Commission
Subjects: EU Member State, agri-foodstuffs, application of EU law, food industry, restriction on competition, supplier, supply chain, unfair terms of contract

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 27.10.2021  COM(2021) 652 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS on the state of the transposition and implementation of Directive (EU) 2019/633 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on unfair trading practices in business-to-business relationships in the agricultural and food supply chain         
 
 
Contents 
1. 

Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 3 

1.1. 

Background and objectives of the Directive ................................................................................. 3 

1.2.  Objective and scope of this Report ............................................................................................... 3 

1.3. 

Transposition process ................................................................................................................... 4 

2.  General overview .................................................................................................................................. 4 

3. 

Specific points of analysis ..................................................................................................................... 5 

3.1. 

Scope of application and main definitions (Articles 1 and 2) ....................................................... 5 

3.1.1. 

Chain operators and supply relationships ............................................................................ 5 

3.1.2. 

Scope of application and business size ................................................................................. 6 

3.1.3. 

Territorial scope of application ............................................................................................. 6 

3.2. 

Prohibition of UTPs (Article 3) ...................................................................................................... 7 

3.3. 

Enforcement mechanisms (Articles 4-8) ....................................................................................... 9 

3.3.1. 

Designation of enforcement authorities (Article 4) .............................................................. 9 

3.3.2. 

Complaints and confidentiality (Article 5) .......................................................................... 10 

3.3.3. 

Designated authorities’ powers (Article 6) ......................................................................... 10 

3.3.4. 

Enforcement measures and sanctions (Article 6) ............................................................... 11 

3.3.5. 

Administrative, judicial enforcement and alternative dispute resolution .......................... 12 

4.  Conclusions ......................................................................................................................................... 13 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Member State abbreviations:  

Belgium  

Bulgaria  

Czechia  

Denmark  

Germany  

Estonia  

Ireland  

Greece  

Spain  

France  

Croatia  

Italy  

Cyprus  

Latvia  

Lithuania  

Luxembourg  

Hungary  

Malta  

Netherlands  

Austria  

Poland  

Portugal  

Romania  

Slovenia  

Slovakia  

Finland  

Sweden  

BE  

BG  

CZ  

DK  

DE  

EE  

IE  

EL  

ES  

FR  

HR  

IT  

CY  

LV  

LT  

LU  

HU  

MT  

NL  

AT  

PL  

PT  

RO  

SI  

SK  

FI  

SE  

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION 

1.1. 

Background and objectives of the Directive 

Following a long negotiation1, on 17 April 2019 the European Parliament and the Council adopted 
Directive (EU) 2019/633 on unfair trading practices in business-to-business relationships in the 
agricultural  and  food  supply  chain  (hereinafter  ‘the  Directive’).  The  Directive  was  introduced 
under Article 43 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to prohibit a list of unfair 
trading practices (UTPs) – mostly linked to significant imbalances in bargaining power between 
suppliers and buyers – that grossly deviate from good commercial conduct2. 

The Directive takes into account the negative impact of UTPs for farmers both as direct victims of 
these practices and as indirect victims of the cascading effects of these practices when they occur 
at the downstream stages of the chain3. Whereas most Member States (MS) had adopted national 
legislation  or  promoted  various  forms  of  private-sector  rules  well  before  the  Directive,  the 
fragmentation of this legal framework highlighted the potential benefit of adopting rules at the EU 
level4.     

The  Directive  is  binding  on  all  27 MS.  It  provides  for  a  minimum  level  of  harmonisation  by 
establishing a list of prohibited UTPs between buyers and suppliers in the agricultural and food 
supply  chain.  It  also  lays  down  minimum  rules  on  the  scope  of  its  application  and  the  main 
definitions  as  well  as  on  the  enforcement  of  those  prohibitions  and  the  coordination  between 
enforcement  authorities  of  the  different  MS.  MS  may  adopt  or  maintain  national  rules  that  go 
beyond the UTPs listed in the Directive provided that such national rules are compatible with the 
rules on the functionning of the internal market.        

1.2. 

Objective and scope of this Report  

Article 13 of the Directive stipulates that MS must adopt and publish by 1 May 2021, the laws, 
regulations  and  administrative  provisions  needed  to  comply  with  this  Directive.  They  must 
immediately  communicate  the  measures  to  the  Commission  and  apply  them  no  later  than 
1 November 2021.  

1 See High Level Forum for a Better Functioning Food Supply Chain (2011), led by the European Commission, which 
endorsed a set of principles of good practice in vertical relations in the food supply chain, agreed by organisations 
representing most operators in the food supply chain. This led to the launch of the Supply Chain Initiative in 2013. 
The  following  are  some  recent  interventions:  by  the  European  Parliament:  Resolution  of  7  June  2016  on  unfair 
trading  practices  in  the  food  supply  chain;  by  the  Council:  Conclusions  of  12  December  2016  on  Strengthening 
farmers' position in the food supply chain and tackling unfair trading practices; by the Commission: Communication 
of the Commission of 28 October 2009 on a better functioning of the food supply chain in Europe; Communication 
of the Commission of 15 July 2014 on tackling unfair trading practices in the business-to-business food supply chain; 
and Report of the Commission of 29 January 2016 on unfair business-to-business trading practices in the food supply 
chain.  

2 Proposal for a Directive on unfair trading practices in business-to-business relationships in the food supply chain, 

Brussels, 12.4.2018, COM(2018) 173 final, 2018/0082 (COD), par. 2. 

3 See Directive, recital (7). 
4 See Directive, recital (8). See also Cafaggi, F. and Iamiceli, P., Unfair trading practices in the business-to-business 

retail supply chain (JRC112654). 

3 

 
 
 
                                                           
This  report  records  the  state  of  play  regarding  the  transposition  of  the  Directive  by  the  27 MS 
(Article  12(4))  and  takes  into  account  all  notifications  received  by  the  Commission  by 
31 July 2021. The report however does not provide an assessment of the transposition measures.  

1.3. 

Transposition process 

In the 2 years between the Directive’s adoption in April 2019 and the expiry of the transposition 
deadline in May 2021, the Commission closely accompanied MS in their respective transposition 
processes.  The  Commission  organised  four  dedicated  meetings  discussing  implementation 
requests  from  MS, replied to  around 50 individual written  implementation  requests and shared 
them  with  other  MS  via  a  dedicated  website.  In  addition,  a  number  of  bilateral  meetings  and 
exchanges of information took place and there was a further meeting with MS shortly after the 
transposition deadline to take stock of the transposition and its state of play.  

Under Article 8(3), the Commission has set up a public website5 providing contact details for the 
designated national enforcement authorities and links to their respective websites.  Furthermore, 
the Commission has set up a non-public website  to enable exchange of information among the 
enforcement authorities and the Commission. 

2. 

GENERAL OVERVIEW 

Under Article 13 of the Directive, MS had to transpose the Directive into their national law by 
1 May 2021. 

Some  15  of  the  27 MS  notified  their  national  implementing  measures  to  the  Commission  by 
31 July 2021, whereby the Directive had been completely transposed (BG, DK, EL, FI, IE, LV, 
NL, HR, HU, LU, DE, LT, MT, SE and SK)6. While FR notified the Commission that the Directive 
had only been partially transposed by that date, it is also included in this report’s analysis. This 
report focuses on the transposition by these 16 MS; therefore, references to ‘MS’ hereinafter relate 
to these 16 MS. 

On 23 July 2021, the Commission launched infringement procedures by way of letters of formal 
notice against the 12 MS7 that failed to notify complete transposition8.  

Eight MS transposed the Directive by means of introducing new and separate legislation9. Except 
for IE, these MS did not have national UTP rules beforehand. The other eight MS have transposed 

5 https://ec.europa.eu/info/food-farming-fisheries/key-policies/common-agricultural-policy/market-measures/agri-

food-supply-chain/unfair-trading-practices_en. 

6 By 1 May 2021, 4 of the 27 MS claimed they completed the transposition of the Directive (BG, DK, EL and NL), 
another four claimed they partially transposed it (EE, FR, FI and LV). By 31 July EE had notified a sole correlation 
table. 

7 BE, CZ, EE, ES, FR, IT, CY, AT, PO, PT, RO and SI. 
8 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_3903. 
9 DK, EL, IE, LT, LU, MT, NL and SE. The Lithuanian instrument, however, partially overlaps with an existing piece 
of legislation, namely the Law on the Prohibition of Unfair Practices of Retailers of 22 December 2009, no. XI-626, 
which  applies  to  retailers  with  significant  market  power  and  which,  in  the  case  of  conflict,  prevails  over  the 
transposition  instrument.  In  Sweden,  before  transposition,  UTPs  were  only  addressed  by  means  of  extending 
consumer protection to business-to-business relationships. 

4 

 
 
 
                                                           
it by means of using pre-existing legislation, amending it or incorporating it into a wider legislative 
instrument.  

Some 12 of the 16 MS have formally qualified the transposition measure as legislation on UTPs, 
without any reference (within this formal qualification) to market or competition law10. FI formally 
qualified the statutory instrument as a Market Act (providing additional rules on market regulation, 
such  as  those  on  agreements  under  Regulation  (EU)  No  1308/201311).  BG  introduced  a  new 
chapter (on UTPs in the agricultural and food supply chain) in its Competition Protection Act. FR 
supplemented provisions of the Commercial Code, whereas DE has added a new  section in the 
Agricultural  Market  Structure  Act  (now  known  as  the  ‘Act  on  strengthening  agricultural 
organisations  and  supply  chains’).  Except  for  LV,  whose  provisions  also  include  prohibitions 
applicable to non-food product retailers,  and FR, whose transposition is partially based on pre-
existing provisions that have a general (as opposed to an agri-food sector) scope, all other MS have 
adopted sector-specific legislation that exclusively applies to the agricultural and food sector. 

3. 

SPECIFIC POINTS OF ANALYSIS 

3.1. 

Scope of application and main definitions (Articles 1 and 2) 

Three aspects are particularly relevant when examining the scope of application: 

 

 

 

the type of operators in the agri-food supply chain covered and the type of relationships 
affected by the legislative measures; 

the relevance of business size as a reference for the scope of application; 

the territorial scope for applying the implementing measures.   

3.1.1.  Chain operators and supply relationships 

Some  14 MS  have  determined  the  scope  for  applying  the  implementing  measure,  taking  into 
account the  relationship between suppliers and buyers of agricultural and food products, as defined 
in the Directive12. Such relationships can occur at any stage of the supply chain and involve any 
type of buyer of agri-food products, be it a processor or a retailer.  

In one case (HU), the notified legislation seemingly limits its scope of application to traders ‘acting 
as a reseller of agricultural and food products purchased from suppliers directly or indirectly within 
the framework of gainful business activities unaltered and without processing’ (emphasis added). 
Therefore,  those  buyers  of  agricultural  products  that  engage  in  processing  before  reselling  the 
products are excluded from the scope of application.  

10 DK, EL, IE, LV, NL, HR, HU, LU, LT, MT, SE and SK; SK has formally qualified this piece of legislation as  

referring to unfair terms, in fact covering or including unfair practices within the concept of unfair terms. 

11 OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 671. 
12 Among these, LT has excluded from the buyer’s definition cooperatives or small communities and their members,  

 whereas SK has included under the buyer’s and supplier’s definition, legal persons that are not entrepreneurs. 

5 

 
 
 
                                                           
LV has expanded the scope to include relationships between suppliers and retailers (only) of non-
food products; a separate list of unfair practices applies in respect of retailers.           

None  of  the  MS  has  explicitly  expanded  the  scope  of  application  to  other  types  of  supply 
relationships, such as those primarily concerning the supply of physical inputs which are not agri-
food  products  under  the  Directive  (e.g.  fertilisers)13  or  services  beyond  those  covered  by  the 
Directive (e.g. digital services). 

3.1.2.  Scope of application and business size 

Except for FR and SK, all MS refer, to some extent, to business size as a criterion for limiting the 
scope of application of the adopted legislation or parts of it. Among these, however, five (BG, IE, 
LU,  MT  and  NL)  have  adopted  the  approach  set  out  by  the  Directive,  targeting  relationships 
between suppliers whose annual turnover is lower than a given threshold, and buyers whose annual 
turnover  is  higher  than  the  same  threshold.  The  other  nine  MS  have  enlarged  the  scope  of 
application to varying degrees. 

EL has lowered the first threshold from EUR 2 million to EUR 500 000. HR, LV and SE have 
taken only the buyer’s size into consideration and apply the legislation to all buyers whose turnover 
exceeds EUR 2 million14. FI has taken the same approach; however, its legislation does not apply 
if the supplier’s turnover exceeds that of the buyer and, in any case, if it exceeds EUR 350 million. 
In DE, the Directive’s thresholds apply, but a wider application has been temporarily introduced 
for the sales of some food and agricultural products15, whereas in LT the extension concerns only 
the provisions on late payments, which applies to all buyers and benefits suppliers whose turnover 
does not exceed EUR 350 000. Conversely, in DK and HU, the business size only affects certain 
UTP prohibitions, whereas all other rules apply regardless of business size. 

3.1.3.  Territorial scope of application 

Most MS have followed the approach set out under Article 1(2) of the Directive, stipulating that 
the rules apply to sale transactions in which either the supplier or the buyer (or both) are established 
in the EU16. Four MS require that the rules apply to sale transactions in which either the supplier 
or the buyer (or both) are established in the respective MS itself (LU, LV, MT and SE) as opposed 
to throughout the entire EU.  

All MS, except DE and HU, have laid down the definitions of supplier and buyer irrespective of 
their  place  of  establishment,  as  provided  for  by  Article  2(2)  of  the  Directive.  Article  2(2)  also 
provides for Member States’ transposing measures to apply to buyers that are public authorities, 

13 One exception concerns a French measure on late payment provisions applying different terms than those provided       

for agricultural and food products, also to the sale of equipment and machinery used in agriculture. 

14 In the case of LV, this limitation does not apply to non-food retailers.  
15 Until 1 May 2025, the German transposing provisions also apply to the sale of milk and meat products and the sale 
of fruit, vegetable and horticultural products, including potatoes, by suppliers that have an annual turnover of up to 
EUR 4 billion in the respective sales segment in DE, provided the supplier’s total annual turnover does not exceed 
20% of the buyer’s total annual turnover. 

16 Expressly adopted in BG, DE, DK, EL, FI, HR, IE, LT and SK. 

6 

 
 
 
                                                           
only to the extent that they are established in the EU. The transposition legislation of FR, HU and 
NL does not contain any reference to the operators’ place of establishment.  

3.2. 

Prohibition of UTPs (Article 3) 

The Directive requires MS to prohibit a specific set of unfair practices,  splitting them into two 
groups:  (i) prohibitions  per  se  or  unconditional  prohibitions  (‘black  list’)  and  (ii) conditional 
prohibitions (‘grey list’), the latter list of practices that are prohibited unless agreed in clear and 
unambiguous terms upfront in the supply agreement or in a subsequent agreement between the 
supplier  and  the  buyer  (Article  3(2)).  Each  practice  is  specifically  defined  in  the  Directive. 
Exceptions  or  derogations  may  be  included  in  specific  instances.  While  conforming  to  the 
prescribed requirements, MS may: 

  use general clauses to enlarge the scope of prohibitions to practices that are not specifically 

listed; 

  add other practices to the lists; 

  extend the scope of listed prohibitions or make them stricter; 

  move practices from the ‘grey list’ to the ‘black list’.    

As long as they are in line with internal market rules, exceptions or derogations are possible under 
the ‘minimum harmonisation’ approach followed by the Directive which introduces a minimum 
common level of protection for all MS. Among the 16 MS examined here, five have transposed 
the Directive without any of the above extensions: both the ‘black’ and the ‘grey lists’ are those 
provided for by the Directive without any addition or relevant variation17. In two other MS (LT 
and SE) the lists mainly coincide but a few prohibitions are stricter than the Directive.   

Of the other nine MS, HR and LV have included a general clause prohibiting unfair practices in 
the light of general principles. DE has stipulated a general prohibition on using UTPs to exploit 
asymmetrical economic relations, but has also applied this prohibition to the practices listed in the 
Directive.  Some  countries  have  general  clauses  in  the  field  of  unfair  commercial  practices  or 
competition law. This is the case, e.g. for FR whose Commercial Code already contained general 
clauses applicable in the relevant field.   

All  MS  have  used  lists  of  prohibited  practices  and  most  of them  have  followed  the  distinction 
between ‘black’ and ‘grey’ practices. Only HU provides for a single (‘black’) list and explicitly 
bans a supplier from validly consenting upfront to the covered trading practices. Where ‘grey lists’ 
are used, MS impose transparency requirements concerning the type of information to be provided 
to the supplier in order to justify a ‘grey practice’.  

17 DK, IE, LU, MT and NL. 

7 

 
 
 
                                                           
While distinguishing between ‘black’ and ‘grey lists’, a few MS have moved one or more ‘grey 
list’ practices into the ‘black list’18. Relatively more common is adding practices to the ‘black’19 
and ‘grey’20 lists.  

Unlike the  general  principle of the Directive, which is  only applied to practices  engaged in by 
buyers against suppliers, in SK some of the practices are prohibited for both contract parties (e.g. 
commercial retaliation). 

HU relies on a previously adopted legislative instrument without any specific modifications being 
made in the course of the Directive’s transposition. Most practices included in the Directive are 
covered,  though  are,  in  part,  defined  differently;  some  of  these  are  affected  by  wider  or  more 
stringent  prohibitions  but  a  few  are  seemingly  not  clearly  transposed  in  the  current  legislative 
instrument. This partly applies to FR, where only some practices have been specifically regulated 
by  the  transposition  legislation,  whereas  others  may  be  covered  by  general  clauses  of  wider 
application; a few practices are seemingly not specifically addressed in the notified legislation.  

Two  practices  included  in  the  ‘black  list’  deserve  special  attention  as  it  is  possible  for  MS  to 
provide variations within certain limits: payment delays and order cancellations. 

  Payment  delays:  11  of  the  16 MS  have  distinguished  between  perishable  and  non-
perishable product sales, establishing a 30-day term for the former and a 60-day term for 
the latter, as provided for in the Directive21. By contrast, BG and SE have introduced a 
single 30-day term for both perishable and non-perishable product sales. FI has followed 
the same approach but has made it possible, for non-perishable products, for a longer 60-
day term to be agreed in the contract (otherwise the 30-day default rule applies). Neither 
HU nor SK distinguish between perishable and non-perishable products; in these cases, the 
rule is generally more stringent: a 15-day term applies from the date of the correctly-issued 
invoice.  All  MS,  except  HU  and  SK,  have  incorporated  the  Directive’s  definition  of 
perishable  products  into  their  transposition  legislation.  FR  has  different  definitions  for 
‘perishable’ and ‘very perishable’ products. HR has added to its transposition legislation a 
list  of  perishable  products,  whereas  LT  has  vested  an  institution,  authorised  by  the 
Government, with the power to approve a list of perishable products. All MS, except HU, 
have incorporated the derogations provided for by Article 3(1), last indent, (or at least some 
of those22) and no additional derogations have been introduced.   

  Cancelleing orders at short notice: All MS, except HU and SK, include the 30-day period 
as a minimum standard for cancellation. Under Article 3(1)(b), four of them (DK, FR, IE 
and SE) empower the responsible Ministry (or the Government in the case of SE) to set 
periods of less than 30 days for specific sectors in duly justified cases. FR has introduced 
two shorter periods with regard to wholesalers (24 hours) and for fresh fruits and vegetables 
(3 days, unless the products are sold under a private label in which case 6 days apply). The 

18 DE, FR, HR, LV, SK: Return of unsold products (DE, FR, LV and SK), charges for fitting out premises (FR, HR 

and LV), and charges for stocking, displaying and listing (FR and LV). 

19 BG, EL, FR, HR (up to 18 more practices), HU, LV and SK.  
20 BG, HR, LV and SK.  
21 DE, DK, EL, FR, HR, IE, LT, LU, LV, MT and NL. 
22 DE, LT and SK. 

8 

 
 
 
                                                           
Hungarian  provision  has  a  different  structure,  literally  referring  to  changes  rather  than 
cancellation; no reference is made to a specific period for the advance notice. In SK, all  
buyers are prohibited from not fulfilling contractual obligations without legal justification.   

3.3. 

Enforcement mechanisms (Articles 4-8) 

3.3.1.  Designation of enforcement authorities (Article 4) 

All 16 MS informed the Commission that they designated one or more authorities to enforce the 
prohibitions laid down in Article 3 at national level (‘enforcement authority’). These authorities’ 
contact details and websites are available on a dedicated Commission website23. 

While most MS have opted for a single authority, four MS (DE24, EL, FI and LT25) have designated 
two authorities.  

In  general  terms,  the  choice  is  between  administrative  and  judicial  authorities,  and,  within 
administrative authorities, between independent administrative authorities and those that are part 
of the executive (i.e. ministries). Among independent administrative authorities, there is a choice  
between market, competition or sector-specific authorities. 

All MS have chosen administrative authorities. Most have opted to assign the main enforcement 
powers to an independent administrative authority: six to a competition authority26; four to a food 
market  authority27;  two  to  their  Ministry  of  Agriculture28;  two  to  an  authority  in  charge  of 
combating unfair commercial practices in the agri-food sector29; one to a government body within 
the Ministry of Economy and Finance30; and one to an authority for consumers and markets31.  

In MS where a second authority is designated, this is the competition authority (for DE, EL and 
LT)  or  the  food  authority  (for  FI).  Some  MS  provide  for  cooperation  duties  among  national 
authorities  and  bodies  that  may  help  enforce  the  relevant  legislation32.  Additional  cooperation 
duties with foreign enforcement authorities and the European Commission are specifically layed 
down in some national transposing measures as provided for under Article 833.  

23 https://ec.europa.eu/info/food-farming-fisheries/key-policies/common-agricultural-policy/market-measures/agri-

food-supply-chain/unfair-trading-practices_en.  

24 One enforcement authority is designated but some of its decisions will be shared with the Competition Authority. 
25 The second enforcement authority has only competence on practices engaged by retailers with significant market   

power. 

26 BG, DK, HR, LU, LV and SE. 
27 DE (Federal Office for Agriculture and Food, designated by the Federal Ministry), FI (Food Market Ombudsman), 

HU (Food Chain Safety Office, designated by the Government), and LT (Rural Business and Markets 
Development Agency). 

28 IE and SK. 
29 EL and MT.  
30 FR and DGCCRF (General Directorate for Competition policy, Consumer Affairs and Fraud Control). 
31 NL. 
32 BG, DE, EL, FI, LT and MT. 
33 BG, DE, DK, EL, FI, HR, IE, LT, LV, MT, NL, SE and SK. 

9 

 
 
 
                                                           
3.3.2.  Complaints and confidentiality (Article 5) 

Under all transposition instruments notified to the Commission, not only single suppliers, but also 
producer organisations or other organisations of suppliers and associations of such organisations 
have the right to submit a complaint to the designated enforcement authority.  

A vast majority of Member States’ transposition instruments have provided for means to safeguard 
the confidentiality of the complainant’s identity, the disclosure of which could be harmful to their 
interests  or  those  of  their  members  or  suppliers.  These  safeguards  should  normally  be  adopted 
upon the supplier’s request34; however, some national transposition measures also provide for an 
authority’s initiative in this regard35. In most cases, the complainant is requested to identify any 
information  for  which  it  requests  confidentiality36.  In  some  MS,  the  transposing  instruments 
include  the  possibility  to  discontinue  the  proceedings  where  this  would  cause  confidential 
information to be disclosed37. In LT, the enforcement authority may reject a confidentiality request 
if the specific information has an evidentiary value in establishing the infringment38. 

3.3.3.  Designated authorities’ powers (Article 6) 

Most MS vest the designated authorities with the powers prescribed by Article 6, namely:  

 

 

 

 

investigatory and monitoring powers39; 

the power to take decisions when an infringement of the prohibitions laid down in Article 
3 has occured 40; 

the power to require the buyer to end the prohibited trading practice41;  

the power to impose, or initiate proceedings  to impose fines and other equally effective 
penalties42 and interim measures addressed to the author of  the infringement, in line with 
national rules and procedures43 and 

 

the power to publish the decisions taken44.  

34 BG, DE, DK, EL, HR, HU, IE, LT, LU, MT, NL and SK. Among these, BG law sets out that the complainant’s 

identity must always remain confidential. 

35 e.g. HU. 
36 BG, DK, EL, IE, LU and NL. 
37 DE, DK, FI and MT.  
38 However, anonymous complaints are explicitly addressed in Lithuanian legislation. 
39 BG, DE, DK, EL, FI, FR, HR, HU, IE, LT, LU, LV, MT, NL, SE and SK. 
40 BG, DE, DK, EL, HR, HU, IE, LT, LU, LV, MT, NL and SE. 
41 BG, DE, DK, EL, FI, FR, HR, IE, LT, LU, LV, MT, NL, SE and SK. 
42 BG, DE, DK, EL, FI, FR, HR, HU, IE, LT, LU, LV, MT, NL, SE and SK. 
43 Specifically foreseen in the national transposition measures in: BG, DK, EL, FI, FR, IE, LT, LU, LV and NL. 
44 BG, DE, DK, EL, FI, FR, HR, HU, IE, LT, LU, MT, SE and SK. 

10 

 
 
 
                                                           
In six MS, the enforcing authority also has the power to approve commitments undertaken by the 
infringer45, or to issue warnings46 or recommendations if an infringement occurs47. 

3.3.4.  Enforcement measures and sanctions (Article 6) 

Enforcement measures encompass a wide range of instruments, including sanctions, remedies, and 
commitments. 

The most common measures available to national enforcement authorities are financial sanctions, 
which  are  provided  for  in  all  16 MS.  While  the  Directive  does  not  stipulate  minimum  and 
maximum  thresholds  for  financial  sanctions,  some  MS  do.  Where  determined,  minimum  and 
maximum amounts differ across MS48. In some cases the maximum amount is determined on the 
basis of the infringing party’s turnover49; in other cases it is calculated as a percentage of one of 
the following: (i) the purchase price50; (ii) the charges imposed on the supplier51; or (iii) the profit 
made by the infringing party in the transaction affected by the unfair practice52. Some 10 MS do 
not provide minimum thresholds53 and 3 do not provide a maximum ceiling54. Six MS specify the 
criteria and factors involved in determining the amount of the sanction in specific circumstances, 
including the nature of the violation, its duration, and the extent to which the consequences were 
harmful55.  

Only LU and LT have explicitly incorporated the principle according to which penalties must be 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive.  

Greek legislation refers to proportionality and deterrence, but not to effectiveness, when regulating 
the  administrative  authority’s  power  to  identify  the  applicable  measures,  whereas  Finnish 
legislation refers to the need for reasonableness in determining financial sanctions but not to the 
other principles.  FI  also  applies  proportionality to injunctive measures but  only  on trade secret 
infringements56.  

In addition to financial sanctions there are remedies. 

Regarding the injunctions used to end an unfair practice, MS have often used some type of penalty  
to deter non-compliance57.  

45 HR and HU. 
46 FI and LV. 
47 EL. 
48 Minimum amounts range from EUR 70 (LV) to the equivalent of approximately EUR 2 550 (BG); maximum    

 amounts range from EUR 2 329.37 (MT) to EUR 2 million (FR). 

49 Also in these cases percentages differ, going from 0.2% (LV) to 10% (HU and NL). 
50 SK. 
51 SK. 
52 MT. 
53 DE, DK, EL, FI, FR, HR, IE, MT, NL and SE. 
54 DK, FI and HR. 
55 Criteria vary: EL, FI, HR, LV, SE and SK. 
56 The information on the French law is currently unavailable. 
57 BG, DE, DK, FI, FR, LT, LV, MT, NL, SE and SK. 

11 

 
 
 
                                                           
Similar to injunctions, national laws transposing the Directive have introduced other measures: 

 

the ‘compliance notices’ under Irish law; 

 

 

the ‘precautionary measures’ under Luxembourgish law; 

the Hungarian measures, enabling the administrative authority to prohibit the trader from 
applying the provisions of the standard service agreement if (i) it is not clearly worded, 
(ii) the service or consideration is not specified, or (iii) the fee charged is not proportionate 
to the costs.   

While civil remedies are rarely mentioned in transposing acts, there are some exceptions. Some 
MS  provide  for  contract  terms  to  be  nullified58;  others  provide  for  restitutionary59  or 
compensatory60 measures.  

Commitments  are  clearly  regulated  in  HR  and  HU.  Their  approval  by  the  enforcing  authority 
normally  excludes  a  finding  of  an  infringement  and  a  penalty,  unless  the  commitment  is  not 
fulfilled.  

3.3.5.  Administrative, judicial enforcement and alternative dispute resolution  

Most  measures  and  enforcement  mechanisms  referred  to  above  can  be  deemed  administrative 
enforcement. 

Some  Member  States’  transposition  acts  explicitly  refer  to  both  administrative  and  judicial 
enforcement. More specifically, eight MS provide for the administrative authorities’ decisions to 
be appealed in court61. Moreover, the Finnish legislation sets out that certain powers (e.g. to issue 
penalties) are only assigned to  the court, whereas other measures (such as injunctions) may be 
adopted by both the administrative and the judicial authority. The Bulgarian legislation sets out 
that the institution responsible for specific proceedings under the transposing legislation must not 
prevent  a  party  to  a  supply  agreement  from  seeking  redress  by  means  of  another  established 
procedure,  implicitly  acknowledging  the  role  of  other  enforcers,  including  courts.  The  Latvian 
legislation stipulates that, concurrently with the Competition Council, under procedures laid down 
in  the  law  on  civil  procedure,  a  court  can  also  establish  whether  or  not  an  infringement  of  the 
transposition law took place. 

Clearly, these MS use a system of parallel remedies without, however, providing for specific rules 
of coordination between administrative and judicial authorities. 

As regards Article 7 of the Directive, seven MS provide for the possibility to resort to alternative 
dispute  resolution  mechanisms62.  Among  these,  the  Dutch  legislation  grants  the  Minister 
concerned the power to designate a dispute resolution committee and then to ‘affiliate’ a buyer to 

58 DE, FR and HU. 
59 FI (only in case of infringement of trade secrets) and IE (restitution of undue charges). 
60 FI (only in case of infringement of trade secrets), FR, LV and MT (where damages are liquidated by the 

Administrative Review Tribunal). 

61 BG, DE, DK, EL, FI, MT, NL and SE. 
62 BG, DE, EL, FI, LT, MT and NL. 

12 

 
 
 
                                                           
the appointed committee. The committee’s decision is binding upon the parties unless either party 
submits the dispute to the civil court within 3 months of its adoption. Under Maltese legislation, 
the  enforcement  authority  may  invite  parties  to  a  mediation  procedure  addressing  the 
quantification  of  damages.  No  coordination  mechanisms  with  administrative  and  judicial 
enforcement are explicitly regulated. 

None of the transposing legislation addresses the issue of extraterritorial power of administrative 
authorities.  Some  MS  specify  that  the  enforcing  authority  is  only  competent  with  regard  to 
practices occurring in relationships where the supplier or buyer, or both, is or are established in 
the authority’s MS63.  

In the specific case of transborder infringements, currently only the German transposing legislation 
seems to regulate forms of cooperation with administrative authorities of other MS. 

4. 

CONCLUSIONS 

Most  of  the  16  MS  analysed  in  the  context  of  this  report  have  made  efforts  to  transpose  the 
Directive in a timely manner. A large majority of these MS went beyond the minimum protection 
level  established  by  the  Directive.  Stricter  rules  are  in  principle  compatible  with  the  Directive 
provided they respect the EU’s internal market rules. MS generally follow the sectoral approach 
of this legislation and apply the provisions in the agri-food chain. Over half of the MS analysed in 
this report either depart from the turnover categories as defined in the Directive or even apply the 
rules regardless of the turnover of the operators concerned. Most MS have enlarged the Directive’s 
list of UTPs by adding prohibitions or making the prohibitions under the Directive more stringent. 
By contrast, the (few) MS that did not have legislation in place before the Directive’s transposition 
did generally align themselves with the Directive’s scope. While in most cases Member States’ 
transposition choices seem identical or equivalent to the rules set out in the Directive, there are 
some divergences. They will be analysed further.  

As regards the authorities entrusted with the enforcement of the UTP rules, MS focused on the 
role of administrative authorities, whereas judicial enforcement is provided for only to a limited 
extent.  Generally  speaking,  little  or  no  coordination  between  administrative  and  judicial 
enforcement authorities is provided for. While MS provide for the ability of producer organisations 
to submit collective complaints, other collective redress mechanisms remain largely unexplored. 
Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are occasionally referred to.  

As regards the enforcement measures, the main focus is put on financial sanctions and injunctive 
relief, with some MS introducing the possibility for parties to offer commitments. A few MS plan 
to  use  also  civil  remedies.  Very  limited  specifications  exist  regarding  the  effectiveness, 
proportionality and dissuasiveness of penalties and other sanctions.  

63 DE. 

13 

 
 
 
                                                           
A more  comprehensive  picture will emerge once  all MS  will have  completed  the transposition 
process.64 The first evaluation of the Directive at the EU level and a report on the main findings of 
that evaluation will be presented by 1 November 2025. 

64  Further  information  will  be  made  available  under  the  following  link:  https://ec.europa.eu/info/food-farming-

fisheries/key-policies/common-agricultural-policy/market-measures/agri-food-supply-chain/unfair-trading-
practices_en. 

14