REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the application of Directive (EU) 2021/555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021 on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons
Date: 2021-10-27
Institutions: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: 3D printing, EU Member State, application of EU law, arms trade, exchange of information, firearms and munitions, information system, personal weapon, traceability

EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 

Brussels, 27.10.2021  
COM(2021) 647 final 

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
THE COUNCIL 

on the application of Directive (EU) 2021/555 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 24 March 2021 on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons 

EN 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 

The  2020-2025  EU  action  plan  against  firearms  trafficking1  adopted  in  July  2020  flags 
the  full  implementation  of  the  Firearms  Directive  as  a  top  priority,  and  the  Counter-
Terrorism Agenda of December 20202 confirmed this.  

This  report  provides  an  assessment  of  the  application  of  the  Council  Directive 
91/477/EEC  of  18 June  1991  on  control  of  the  acquisition  and  possession  of  weapons 
(hereafter  the  “Firearms  Directive”),  as  required  by  its  article  17  after  its  latest 
amendment  in  2017.3  In  the  meantime,  the  Firearms  Directive  and  its  subsequent 
amendments where replaced and repealed by, and codified in Directive (EU) 2021/555 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021.4 For the sake of clarity, 
unless  otherwise  stated,  the  numbering  of  articles  mentioned  in  the  report  refer  to  the 
numbers of Directive (EU) 2021/555 currently in force. 

Pursuant  to  Article  17  (now  24),  the  report  must  notably  examine  the  categories  of 
firearms and issues related to the implementation of the system for the European firearms 
pass, to marking and to the impacts of new technologies such as 3D printing, the use of 
QR code and the use of radio-frequency identification (RFID). As announced by the EU 
Strategy to tackle Organised Crime 2021-2025,5 this  report also identifies initial means 
of  improving  the  legal  framework.  In  preparing  this  report,  the  Commission  relied 
primarily  on  the  transposition  measures  notified  by  Member  States,  as  well  as  on 
publically available information. 

In addition, in November 2019, the Commission circulated to Member States a detailed 
questionnaire  dealing  with  the  topics  mentioned  in  Article  17  (now  24),  to  which  19 
Member States replied. The Commission presented a summary of these replies during the 
meeting  of  the  Firearms  Committee  on  18  December  2019  and  held  preliminary 
discussions in the Committee on that basis.  

Furthermore, the Commission has been actively participating in the Firearms priority of 
the  European  Multidisciplinary  Platform  Against  Criminal  Threats6  (hereafter  “the 
Firearms platform”) and in the European Firearms Expert group,7 which helped identify 
the current and potential firearms threats and the impact in the criminal activity.  

1   COM(2020) 608 final 

2   COM(2020) 795 final 

3   OJ L 137, 24.05.2017 p.22-39  

4   OJ L 115, 6.4.2021, p.1-25 

5   COM(2021) 170 final  

6   EMPACT  (https://www.consilium.europa.eu/es/documents-publications/publications/empact/) 

is  a 
platform  which  enable  the  structured  cooperation  between  law  enforcement  agencies,  customs,  tax 
authorities,  magistrates  of  Member  States,  European  Institutions  and  Agencies  and,  where  relevant, 
third countries, international organisations and the private sector in operational cycles of four years. 

7   Sub-group of the law enforcement working party (LEWP), within the Council of the European Union. 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/preparatory-bodies/law-enforcement-working-party/ 

1 

 
 
 
                                                      
However, due to severe delays of transposition at national level8 the Commission could 
not carry out a full conformity assessment of national laws and practices. 

In  July  2020,  the  United  Nations  Office  on  Drugs  and  Crime  published  an  Issue Paper 
entitled  “Illicit  Trafficking  in  Firearms,  their  Parts,  Components  and  Ammunition  to, 
from  and  across  the  European  Union”,  which  provides  important  considerations  and 
policy  recommendations  on  the  current  threats  and  legal  loopholes  in  the  control  of 
firearms at global level.9 

2.  IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FIREARMS DIRECTIVE 

The  Firearms  Directive  regulates  the  acquisition,  possession,  and  the  commercial 
exchange  within  the  EU  of  civilian  firearms  (e.g.  firearms  used  for  sport  shooting  and 
hunting). It sets common minimum standards, which all Member States have to transpose 
in their national weapon laws, and aims at balancing internal market objectives (i.e. the 
cross-border movement of firearms) and security policy objectives (i.e. the high level of 
security  and  protection  against  criminal  acts  and  illicit  trafficking) within  the  EU.  This 
Directive constitutes a development of the Schengen acquis, as it is part of the common 
set of EU rules which enable the free movement of persons.  

The  Directive  was  revised  after  the  entry  into  force  of  the  United  Nations  Protocol 
against the illicit manufacturing on firearms (the Firearms Protocol) in 200510 and then in 
2017, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 2015. 

8   The Commission opened infringements proceedings for lack of transposition of the Firearms Directive 
against 25 Member States and against 20 Member States for two Implementing Directives on marking 
and alarm and signal weapons – see section 2.2 for more details 

9   United  Nations,  Vienna,  2020.  https://www.unodc.org/documents/firearms-protocol/2020/UNODC-

EU-Report-A8_FINAL.pdf 

10   Transposed  in  the  EU  legal  order  by  Council  Decision  2014/164/EU  of  11  February  2014  on  the 
conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and 
Trafficking  in  Firearms,  Their  Parts  and  Components  and  Ammunition,  supplementing  the  United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (OJ L 89, 25.3.2014, p. 7). 

2 

 
 
                                                      
STRATEGIC 
OBJECTIVE 

SPECIFIC 
OBJECTIVES 

OPERATIONAL 
OBJECTIVES 

Directive 
provisions 

Delegated Regulation (EU) 
2019/686 systematic exchange, 
by electronic means of 
information relating to the 
transfer of firearms within the 
Union. 

(EU) 
Delegated  Regulation 
2021/1423 
systematic 
exchange,  by  electronic  means 
of 
to 
refusals  to  grant  authorization 
to  acquire  or  possess  certain 
firearms. 

information 

relating 

Well functioning of the Internal market 

Allow the cross- border movement of firearms 

Maintain a high level of security and protection 
against criminal acts and illicit trafficking 

Harmonizing MS 
legislation / procedures 
concerning firearms. 

Enhancing the 
simplification of 
procedures for the 
acquisition, possession 
and transfer of firearms 

Licensing for dealers, 
brokers and private 
owners. 

Licensing for dealers, 
brokers and private 
owners. 

Categories of firearms. 

Categories of firearms. 

Computerized data-filing 
system and exchange of 
information. 

Computerized data-filing 
system and exchange of 

European Firearms Pass 

Preventing illicit 
manufacturing and 
trafficking of firearms. 

Improving the tracing of 
the firearms. 

Deactivation. 

Marking and traceability 

Implementing Regulation 
(EU) 2018/337 common 
guidelines on deactivation 

Salute and acoustic 

Alarm and signal weapons 

Implementing Directive (EU) 
2019/69 technical 
specifications for alarm and 
signal weapons. 

Implementing Directive (EU) 
2019/68 technical 
specifications for the 
marking of firearms and 
their essential components 

Computerized data-
filing system and 
exchange of information 

Visual representation of the Firearms Directive 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1.  Tasks of the Commission 

The  Firearms  Directive  requires  the  Commission  to  adopt  both  implementing  and 
delegated acts. Therefore, since its entry into force the Commission, adopted: 

1.  On  5  March  2018  (pursuant  to  Article  15(2)),  Implementing  Regulation  (EU) 
(EU)  2015/2403,  which 
Implementing  Regulation 
2018/337,  amending 
establishes  common  guidelines  on  deactivation  standards  and  techniques  for 
ensuring that deactivated firearms are rendered irreversibly inoperable.  

2.  On  16 January  2019  (pursuant  to  Article  4(3)),  Implementing  Directive  (EU) 
2019/68,  establishing  technical  specifications  for  the  marking  of  firearms  and 
their essential components under Council Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the 
acquisition and possession of weapons (see section 5.4.2). 

3.  On  16  January  2019  (pursuant  to  Article  14(3)),  Implementing  Directive  (EU) 
2019/69,  laying  down  technical  specifications  for  alarm  and  signal  weapons 
under Council Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the acquisition and possession 
of weapons.  

4.  On  16  January  2019  (pursuant  to  Articles  18(4)    and  21(5)),  Commission 
Delegated  Regulation  (EU)  2019/686,  laying  down  the  detailed  arrangements 
under Council Directive 91/477/EEC for the systematic exchange, by electronic 
means,  of  information  relating  to  the  transfer  of  firearms  within  the  Union. 
(see section 5.4.1)  

5.  On  21  May  2021  the  Commission  Delegated  Regulation  (EU)  2021/1423  on  the 

refusals to grant authorisations to acquire or possess certain firearms.  

6.  Two pilot projects to implement the administrative cooperation in relation to the 
two  Commission  Delegated  Regulations  above  (according  to  Article  4  of 
Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 which regulates the Internal Market Information 
System) 

2.2.  Transposition of the Directive and secondary legislation by the Member 

States. 

The Firearms Directive as amended in 2017 had to be transposed by 14 September 2018, 
except  Articles  4(4)  on  the  regulation  of  arms  dealers  and  brokers  and  4(5)  on  the 
establishment  of  the  data-filing  system,  which  had  to  be  transposed  by  14 December 
2019.  

In July 2019, the Commission sent a reasoned opinion to 20 Member States with respect 
to the first deadline,11 and sent on 24 January 2020 letters of formal notice to 17 Member 
States12 with respect to the second deadline, for failure to notify the national transposing 
measures.  

11   All but AT, BG, FR, LV, MT. 

12   All but IT, HR, BG, LV, LT, MT, NL, AT, PT, RO and FI. 

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The transposition deadline of the two Commission Implementing Directives on marking 
and  for  alarm  and  signal  weapons  was  on  17  January  2020.  On  28  May  2020,  the 
Commission  opened  infringement  cases  against  19  Member  States  (on  marking)13  and 
17 Member States (for alarm and signal weapons).14  

As  of  15  August  2021,  there  were  80  open  infringement  cases  relating  to  the  firearms 
directive  and  secondary  legislation.  All  these  cases  related  to  non-communication  of 
transposition  measures.  In  the  meantime,  the  Commission  received  notifications  of  full 
transposition from several Member States. Therefore it is expected that several cases will 
be closed in the coming months. 

The Commission carried out the transposition check and analysed whether the Member 
States  have  completely  transposed  Union  law  within  their  legal  systems,  including  the 
Member  States,  which  have  notified  the  national  transposition  measures  on  time.  The 
Commission  also  examined  non-notified  measures  to  assess  the  completeness  of 
transposition. 

The  initial  assessment  described  below  focuses  on  the  most  important  changes  to  the 
Directive introduced in 2017 and the two implementing Directives in 2019. 

Article  1  of  the  Directive  includes  15  definitions,  of  which  5  are  completely  new  and 
other have been updated. They notably ensure that the substantive scope (e.g. alarm and 
signal  weapons,  salute  and  acoustic  weapons),  and  the  personal  scope  (e.g.  collectors, 
museums, brokers) of the directive are applied in a consistent manner across the EU.  

22  Member  States  have  transposed  all  definitions  (Austria,  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Cyprus 
Czech  Republic,  Germany,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Greece,  Spain,  Finland,  France,  Croatia, 
Hungary,  Ireland,  Italy,  Lithuania,  Latvia, Malta, Poland, Portugal and Romania), three 
Member  States  transposed  only  part  of  the  definitions  (the  Netherlands,  Sweden  and 
Slovakia)  and two Member States did not notify any transposition measures (Luxemburg 
and Slovenia). 

The  Firearms  Directive  introduced  new  provisions  on  the  activities  of  the  dealers  and 
brokers (Articles 1(1), 4(4), 4(5) and 13(2)). All Member States except three (Denmark, 
Luxemburg and Slovenia) transposed all the provisions. 

Articles 4(1) and 4(2) substantially  amended the rules on marking. All Member States 
except two (Luxemburg and Slovenia) transposed all the provisions. 

Besides,  18  Member  States  transposed  the  provisions  of  Implementing  Directive  (EU) 
2019/68  related  to  marking  (Austria,  Belgium,  Cyprus,  Czech  Republic,  Germany, 
Denmark,  Estonia,  Greece,  Spain,  France,  Croatia,  Hungary,  Lithuania,  Latvia,  Malta, 
the Netherlands, Portugal and Slovakia), and 9 Member States did not notify any measure 
or  the  transposition  is  not  complete  (Bulgaria,  Finland,  Ireland,  Italy,  Luxemburg, 
Poland, Romania, Sweden and Slovenia). 

Articles  4(5)  and  18(4)  of  the  2017  revision  of  the  Firearms  Directive  improve  the 
quantity  and  the  quality  of  the  records  held  in  the  data-filing  systems  as  well  as  the 

13   All but DK, EE, FR, LT, LV, MT, NL, PT and SK. 

14   All but AT, BE, DE, DK, EE, FR, LT, LV, MT, PT and SK. 

5 

 
 
                                                      
exchange of information with and between national competent authorities. 23 Member 
States have fully transposed those provisions (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic,  Germany,  Estonia,  Greece,  Spain,  Finland,  France,  Croatia,  Hungary,  Italy, 
Lithuania,  Latvia,  Malta,  the  Netherlands,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania,  Sweden  and 
Slovakia), and four Member States did not notify any measure or the transposition is not 
complete (Denmark,  Ireland, Luxemburg and Slovenia). 

Article  9(1)  of  the  Firearms  Directive  lays  down  stricter  rules  concerning  the  most 
dangerous  firearms,  bringing  them  under  category  A,  where  those  firearms  are,  with 
some  limited  and  duly  reasoned  exceptions,  not  allowed  to  be  acquired,  possessed  or 
traded. All Member States except two (Luxemburg and Slovenia) transposed Article 9(1). 

The Firearms Directive updated several articles related to the European Firearms Pass, 
including the definition, the obligation to include a statement in the European Firearms 
pass  and  to  inform  the  other  Members  States  when  a  weapon  of  category  B  or  C  is 
subject  to  authorisation  or  prohibited.  All  Member  States  except  two  (Luxemburg,  and 
Slovenia) transposed all the provisions. 

Some alarm and signal weapons could also easily be converted into lethal firearms with 
simple  tools  and  minimum  knowledge.  This  modus  operandi  was  identified  as  a 
particular  threat  by  the  competent  authorities  of  the  Member  States  and  the 
Commission15,  which  led  to  the  introduction  of  new  provisions  into  the  Firearms 
Directive  (Article  1(1),  Article  14  and  Annex  I).  All  Member  States  except  four 
(Luxemburg, Sweden, Slovenia and Slovakia) transposed all the provisions. 

13  Member  States  transposed  implementing  Directive  (EU)  2019/69  laying  down 
technical  specifications  for  alarm  and  signal  weapons  (Austria,  Cyprus,  Germany, 
Denmark,  Estonia,  Spain,  Finland,  France,  Hungary,  Lithuania,  Latvia,  Portugal  and 
Slovakia),  and  14  Member  States  did  not  notify  any  transposing  measure  or  the 
transposition  is  incomplete  (Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Greece,  ,  Croatia, 
Ireland,  Italy,  Luxemburg,  Malta,  the  Netherlands,  Poland,  Romania,  Sweden  and 
Slovenia).  

Salute  and  Acoustic  Weapons  are  original  lethal  purpose  firearms  that  have  been 
modified in such a way that they cannot discharge a projectile, but only blank rounds of 
ammunition.  As  modifications  are  typically  made  only  to  the  chamber  and  barrel,  any 
person  with  minimum  knowledge  and  common  tools  could  illegally  convert  them  back 
into  lethal  firearms.  The  2017  revision  of  the  Firearms  Directive  also  addressed  this 
threat, by ensuring that they remain in their original category (Article 1(1) and Annex I). 
All  Member  States  except  five  (Luxemburg,  the  Netherlands,  Sweden,  Slovenia  and 
Slovakia) transposed all the provisions. 

Article 1(1) and Article 15 of the Firearms Directive, provide since 2017 for new rules on 
deactivated firearms, notably subjecting them to declaration, and specific rules for their 
verification, marking and transfers. 

15   From  2016  to  2020,  15  949  alarm  and  signal  weapons  of  the  brands  Ekol,  Zoraki  and  Bruni  were 
seized by the Member States, most of them within the Firearms platform, with contribution of Europol.  

6 

 
 
                                                      
All  Member  States  except  three  (Luxemburg,  Sweden  and  Slovenia)  transposed  all  the 
provisions.  

As  of  15  August  2021,  the  Commission  can  therefore  conclude  that  only  10  Member 
States  completed  the  transposition  of  the  provisions  analysed  in  this  report  and  that 
represent  the  main  changes  introduced  by  the  Firearms  Directive  in  2017  and  the  two 
Implementing Directives (Austria, , Cyprus, Germany, Estonia, Spain,  France, Hungary,  
Lithuania,  Latvia  and  Portugal),  15  Member  States  did  not  transpose  some  of  the 
provisions  (Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Greece,  Finland,  Croatia, 
Ireland, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Sweden and Slovakia) and two 
Member States did not notify any measure (Luxemburg and Slovenia). 

The  initial  assessment  described  above  is  without  prejudice  to  the  position  of  the 
Commission in ongoing or future infringement proceedings. Neither does it amount to a 
judgement  on  the  conformity  assessment  of  the  transposing  national  laws,  which  the 
Commission has yet to complete. In the initial phase of the assessment, the Commission 
already identified instances of incorrect transposition in several Member States. 

The Commission will therefore step up its monitoring of the implementation in Member 
States,  and  will make full  use  of the  powers  conferred  upon  it  by  the Treaty  whenever 
necessary. 

3.  FOCUS ON SPECIFIC ISSUES 

3.1.  Weapon categories. 

3.1.1.  General categorisation issues 

The  analysis  of  the  transposition  of the provisions,  which  represent  the most  important 
changes  to  the  Directive  introduced  in  2017,  reflect  the  complex  challenges  of 
transposition  of  some  definitions,  of  the  firearms  categories  in  Annex  I  and  of  the 
multiple exceptions reflected in several articles of the Firearms Directive.  

The  Firearms  Directive  has  added  new  firearms  to  the  list  of  prohibited  (category A) 
weapons. At the same time, it introduced a long list of exceptions to this prohibition, and 
submitted those firearms to authorisation in well-defined circumstances.  

In  addition,  alarm  and  signal  weapons  are  not  considered  firearms,  since  they  are 
considered  as  “not  capable  of  being  converted”,  while  deactivated  firearms  remain 
subject to declaration. Also, firearms that are converted to salute and acoustic weapons in 
a  way  that  make  them  permanently  unfit  to  fire  a  projectile  remain  classified  in  their 
original  category,  despite  the  fact  they  could  be  as  safe  as  genuine  alarm  and  signal 
weapons.  

Finally, law enforcement authorities have observed a surge in seizure of airsoft weapons 
(shooting  plastic  pellets  propelled  by  compressed  gas)  converted  to  fire  ammunition. 
Although such weapons are regulated as firearms in several EU Member States, they are 
currently excluded from the scope of the Directive.  

7 

 
 
Therefore, the Commission will assess the impact of clarifying the distinction between 
prohibited  firearms  and  firearms  subject  to  authorisation,  to  ensure that  prohibited 
firearms can only be possessed in very exceptional cases. A potential assessment could 
also  ensure  that  all  weapons,  which  are  unfit  to  fire  a  projectile  (either  after 
deactivation  or  by  their  manufacture)  but  could  be  converted  to  fire  a  projectile  with 
specialised tools and knowledge are at least subject to declaration. 

3.1.2.  Firearms firing small-calibre ‘Flobert’ ammunition  

Flobert ammunition and related weapons were developed in the 19th century for indoor 
shooting. They shoot percussion caps filled with a small projectile and a small amount of 
powder.  Flobert  ammunition  is  characterised  by  relatively  low  pressure  and  muzzle 
velocity and is nowadays advertised as firearms for target practice.  

Some  firearm  manufacturers  in  several  EU  Member  States16  started  producing  some  of 
firearms  models  in  a  Flobert  calibre.  Based  on  information  and  reports  provided  by 
national  law  enforcement  agencies  and  EUROPOL,  there  are  essentially  two  types  of 
firearms,  which  can  shoot  Flobert  ammunition.  In  their  “classic  design”,  following  the 
standards of original versions of Flobert firearms, the internal mechanism and design of 
the barrel cannot be modified to shoot a different, more lethal kind of calibre. 

In their “modern design”, they are mostly  rifles, shotguns, sub-machine guns and short 
firearms and their internal mechanism is still capable of shooting 9 mm or similar calibre. 
In that case, only the barrel is modified by the installation of an inner barrel  inside the 
original one, narrowed to be suitable for 4 or 6 mm Flobert ammunition, and welded to 
the original one at the muzzle.  

Taking  advantage  of  the  delayed  or  incorrect  transposition  of  the  Firearms  Directive, 
lethal-calibre  firearms  categorized  under  category  B  or  C  are  sometimes  converted  to 
Flobert  calibre,  in  the  Member  States  where  these  types  of  firearms  are  still  subject  to 
declaration or even less restrictive conditions. 

The  2021  EU  Serious  and  Organised  Crime  Threat  Assessment,17  as  well  as  several 
reports  by  EUROPOL  have  highlighted  the  threat  of  the  illegal  conversion  of  the 
“modern  design”  Flobert  firearms,  which  led  to  thousands  of  seizures  across  the 
European Union. 

Pursuant  to  the  Firearms  Directive,  those  weapons  are  firearms,  as  the percussion  caps 
are  a kind of  combustible propellant. Neither the definition of firearm nor the different 
categories  make  a  reference  to  the  size  of  the  calibre  or  the  muzzle  energy,  which  are 
therefore irrelevant considerations to determine whether a Flobert weapon is a firearm, or 
of which category.  

The Commission calls on all Member States to properly transpose the Firearms Directive 
in  this  respect  by  properly  classifying  the  weapons  which  can  expel  Flobert 
ammunition as firearms according to Annex I of the Firearms Directive. 

16   So far detected in Slovakia and Czech Republic. 

17   SOCTA 2021 EU restricted version. 

8 

 
 
                                                      
3.1.3.  Antique firearms 

Firearms  that  could  potentially  qualify  as  “antique  weapons”  are  sometimes  used  in 
criminal activities, as shown for instance by the 2018 terror attack in Strasbourg where 
nine  people  were  killed  and  11  were  wounded.  Nevertheless,  Annex  I,  part  III  of  the 
Firearms  Directive,  provides  that  objects  that  are  regarded  as  “antique  weapons”  are 
excluded from the definition of “firearms” and therefore out of the scope of the Directive 
where these have not been included in the categories of the Directive and are subject to 
national laws.  

During  the  meeting  of  the  Firearms  committee  of  18  December  2019,  a  majority  of 
Member  States  pointed  out  that  they  would  be  in  favour  of  harmonising  the  rules  on 
antique weapons at EU level. Some of them questioned the very relevance of exempting 
antique firearms from the requirements of the Firearms Directive based on their year of 
manufacture rather than their capacity to cause harm. 

The Commission will assess the impact to include antique weapons in the scope of the 
Directive, in order to harmonise the rules across the Member States. 

3.2.  Illicit manufacturing – 3D printing and semi-finished components 

3D printing, also known as additive manufacturing, “refers to the various processes used 
in the manufacture of products, by depositing or fusing materials layer by layer”.18 

The  advent  of  3D-printable  firearms  and  the  possibility  of  using  them  for  criminal 
purposes has spurred a debate on gun control legislation around the world, including in 
the European Union.  

EUROPOL  warned19  that  technological  progress  would  make  3D  printing  widely 
available  in  the  future,  and  that  this  would  also  offer  opportunities  for  the  illicit 
production of and trade in firearms. On 9 October 2019, two people were shot dead in 
Halle (Germany), with the perpetrator using a homemade weapon, based on a blueprint 
downloaded  from  the  Internet  to  manufacture  the  weapon  partly  with  a  3D  printer.20 
There  is  a  slow  but  permanent  increase  in  the  number  of  seizures  of  such  kind  of 
firearms, including illegal manufacture of essential components.21 

The  threat  of  the  illegal  manufacturing  of  firearms  or  essential  components  with  3D 
printers  derives  from  the  relative  affordability  of  the technology  and  the  availability  of 

18   Source:  Digital  transformation  monitor,  The  Disruptive  nature  of  3D  printing,  January  2017, 

https://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-
databases/dem/monitor/sites/default/files/DTM_The%20disruptive%20nature%20of%203D%20printi
ng%20v1.pdf 

19    Source:  Triggering  Terror  -  Illicit  Gun  Markets  and  Firearms  Acquisition  of  Terrorist  Networks  in 
Europe.  Published  17/04/2018,  available  at:  https://vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/en/report/triggering-
terror-illicit-gun-markets-and-firearms-acquisition-of-terrorist-networks-in-europe/  ;  Europol  (2015), 
Exploring tomorrow’s organised crime, The Hague: Europol, p. 41.  

20   EUROPOL report 2019.RESTRICTED 

21   Bulletin EMPACT FIREARMS number 10 and 12. RESTRICTED 

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the  blueprints  on  the  Internet,  including  metallic  3D-printing  that  is  becoming  less 
expensive,22 notably with techniques such as direct metal laser melting.23  

Currently, the most dangerous threat is the manufacture of so called hybrid 3D-printing 
weapons, which rely on both 3D-printed parts and readily available components that are 
globally unregulated, such as steel tubing, metal bar stock, and springs.24 

Private 3D printing of firearms is already covered by the existing legal framework, as the 
Firearms  Directive  applies  equally  to  all  firearms,  whether  3D-printed  or  not:  they  can 
only  be  manufactured  by  licensed  dealers,  and  are  subject  to  restrictions,  such  as 
authorisation before private acquisition. 

The  Commission  will  assess  the  need  for  specific  rules  on  the  possession  and 
trafficking  of  blueprints  for  3D  printing,  including  the  prohibition  of  possession, 
publicity  and  distribution  of  digital  blueprints  and  their  hard  copies  by  non-authorised 
arms dealers, which have been proven to enable manufacturing of essential components 
of firearms. 

In addition, both the 2014 evaluation of the Firearms Directive25 and recent contributions 
from  Member  States  to  EUROPOL  and  the  Firearms  Platform26  highlighted  cases  of 
import from some non-EU countries of semi-finished essential components (usually 80% 
finished  polymer  frames  of  handguns  or  80%  finished  metal  barrel  of  long  firearms). 
They are not declared as essential components of firearms and usually enter the European 
Union  via  fast  parcel  and  carrier  services.  They  are  accompanied  with  instructions  on 
how to complete their transformation with ordinary tools.  

The  Commission  and  the  Member  States  will  discuss  the  issue  of  semi-finished 
firearms and essential components in the context of the Firearms Committee. It will also 
assess regulatory solutions in the future modernisation of the Regulation (EU) 258/2012 
establishing export authorisation, and import and transit measures for firearms.27 

3.3.  European Firearms Pass 

The  European  firearms  pass,  issued  on  request  by  Member  States  to  legal  owners  of  a 
firearms, enables hunters and historical re-enactors (for category C firearms), and target 
shooters  (for  category  A,  B  or  C),  to  travel  with  their  weapon  through  two  or  more 

22   Source: https://www.law.kuleuven.be/citip/blog/warning-toner-low-3d-printed-guns-and-the-law/ 

23 

  Source:  Metal  3D  Printing  in  Firearms:  Real-World  Case  Studies;  Published  18/01/2018. 
https://news.3deo.co/metal-3d-printing-firearms-case-studies  

24   Source: ARES.  Research Report number 8. Desktop  Firearms: emergent  small arms  craft production 
https://armamentresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/ARES-

2020. 

Technologies.  March 
Research-Report-8-Desktop-Firearms.pdf 

25   Source: Technopolis Consulting Group Belgium, Study on the Evaluation on the Firearms Directive, 

December 2014, Annex. https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/8385?locale=en 

26   EMPACT bulletin number 6. September 2018. RESTRICTED. 

27   Source:https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12855-Firearms-

review-of-export-rules-and-import-&-transit-measures_en 

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Member  States  without  prior  authorisation.  Where  a  Member  State  has  informed  the 
other  Member  States  that  the  possession  of  certain  firearms  is  prohibited  or  subject  to 
authorisation, statements to that effect must be added to the European firearms pass. 

During  the  evaluation  of  the  Firearms  Directive  in  2014,28  the  implementation  of  the 
European Firearms pass was assessed as positive by the Member States and associations, 
as it reduces the bureaucratic and economic burden for the users, especially for hunters, 
sport shooters and participants in historic reproduction events. 

After the revision of the Directive in 2017, during the consultations in the framework of 
the  Firearms  Committee  and  in  complaints  received  by  the  Commission,  stakeholders 
raised several issues: 

 

 

 

the  European  Firearms  Pass  does  not  appear  to  be  fully  recognised  in  all  Member 
States, which sometimes require additional prior authorisations to enable movements 
of firearms; 
controlling  movements  with  the  pass  may  be  more  difficult  than  for  permanent 
transfers - there is therefore a risk of abuses by people who illicitly use the European 
Firearms Pass when moving permanently to another country; 
there  is  the  need  to  harmonise  the  list  of  items  that  have  to  be  mentioned  in  the 
European  Firearms  Pass  due  to  differences  of  classification  of  firearms  or  their 
components from one Member State to another.  

Those aspects often result in the absence or incompleteness of the required statements on 
the pass. The development by the Commission of an EU Firearms Reference Table, as 
announced  the  EU  action  plan  on  firearms  trafficking  2020-2025,  will  help  in  bringing 
more clarity into this issue. The need for a fully digitalised European Firearms Pass, to 
ensure better exchanges of information between national authorities, will also need to be 
assessed. 

3.4.  Tracing of firearms 

3.4.1.  Electronic exchange of information on transfer of firearms 

In parallel to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/686 on exchange of information relating 
to  the  transfer  of  firearms  (see  point  3  of  this  report),  the  Commission  adopted 
Implementing  Decision  (EU)  2019/689  on  a  pilot  project  to  implement  certain 
administrative cooperation provisions set out in Council Directive 91/477/EEC by means 
of the Internal Market Information System,29 thus creating a temporary legal basis for the 
use of this system.  

28   Study on the Evaluation on the Firearms Directive, op. cit. 

29  The Internal Market Information System was established by the Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012. It is a 
software  application  that  is  accessible  via  the  internet  and  was  developed  by  the  Commission,  in 
cooperation  with  the  Member  States,  to  help  Member  States  comply  with  information  exchange 
requirements  in  Union  acts  by  providing  a  centralised  communication  mechanism  to  facilitate  the 
cross-border exchange of information and mutual assistance. 

11 

 
 
 
                                                      
 
The Commission notes that the extent of its delegated powers only focused on exchanges 
of  information  on  transfer  authorisations.  The  Commission  could  therefore  not  require 
the  Member  States  of  residence  of  the  buyer  to  upload  the  authorisations  to  acquire 
firearms  in  the  system.  Neither  could  it  require  all  authorities  issuing  transfer 
authorisations to have a direct  connection to the system. Both issues hindered effective 
exchanges of information.  

There might therefore be a need to assess the impact of creating an express legal basis for 
the  use  of  Internal  Market  Information  System  in  the  Firearms  Directive  itself  and  to 
clarify further the responsibilities of national authorities. 

3.4.2.  Marking 

Proper  marking  of  firearms  increases  their  traceability  and  that  of  their  essential 
components.  To  that  purpose,  implementing  Directive  (EU)  2019/68  on  marking  lays 
down a minimum font size, a common marking  method on non-metallic  materials, and 
sets down the types of alphabet and numeral system used in the marking. 

Prior to adopting the implementing Directive, the Commission indicated that the issue of 
the depth of marking would be assessed within one year after its transposition deadline, 
with a view to introducing a requirement on this aspect into the Implementing Directive 
if appropriate. 

There was no consensus among Member States on minimum depths, which range from 
0.02 mm to 0.08 mm, mostly for commercial reasons. Neither the Firearms Directive nor 
the  Implementing  Directive  on  marking  provide  for  a  specific  marking  technology. 
Therefore,  all  technologies  ensuring  that  the  marking  is  “clear,  permanent  and  unique” 
(e.g.  mechanical  engraving,  laser  engraving  or  stamping)  can  be  compatible  with  the 
Directive.  

A common EU approach would ensure that erased marking can be recovered and that no 
unjustified  technical  barriers  are  placed  to  the  legal  trade  of  firearm  between  Member 
States.  The  Commission  will  therefore  rely  on  technical  reports  of  national  ballistic 
departments and proofing houses, and assess the pros and cons of the different options. 
Discussions  will  continue  within  the  Firearms  Committee,  in  view  of  assessing  the 
impact of updating the Implementing Directive (EU) 2019/68. 

3.4.3.  Technology to improve the tracing, the safety and security of the acquisition 

and possession of weapons. 

QR  (Quick-Response)  codes  is  a  type  of  two-dimensional  barcode  able  to  store 
information in a machine-readable optical marking. QR  codes  allow the  collection of a 
wider number of data compared to unidimensional bar codes. 

The cost of QR codes is relatively low. At present, they are mainly applied on firearms 
for inventory purposes, notably on QR-style stickers.30   

30   Source: https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/SAS-HB-06-Weapons-ID-ch3.pdf 

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Data Matrix codes, like QR codes, are composed by black and white modules ordered in 
a square pattern form. 

They provide a unique serial number and the manufacturer identification. When the code 
is damaged, the data of Data Matrix codes have a higher ability of being restored than the 
data of QR codes.31  Data Matrix are identified as the best at storing information in very 
small spaces.32  

To date, the Commission has no knowledge of Member States that are using QR codes 
and/or Data Matrix codes to monitor and to track firearms.  

Security concerns could represent an obstacle to the uptake of QR codes in the firearms 
market  as  they  can  be  hacked  and  enable  the  infection  of  the  reading  devices  and 
networks.  Therefore,  these  systems  do  not  always  generate  trust  from  both  firms  and 
consumer’s perspective. 

Besides, as a QR code is not directly legible and information cannot be extracted without 
a  reading  device,  questions  might  be  raised  on  the  practicability  of  this  technology  for 
law enforcement authorities seizing firearms (police, customs, border guards, etc.).  

Radio  Frequency  identification  (RFID)  appears  as  a  firearm-tracing  alternative  or 
reinforcement  to  classical  marking.  RFID  enables  the  transfer  of  data  to  automatically 
identify and track tags attached to objects. This technology would establish a relationship 
between a firearm and an object that activates it when close to it.  

Some tests seemed to demonstrate that the use of miniature low-cost RIFD tags on metal 
is  also  functional  for  tracking  firearms33.  Besides,  RFID  technology  together  with  a 
specific  software  is  able  to  track  the  position  of  firearms,  records  of  firearms 
maintenance and monitor the changes in the firearm custody.34   

There  are  concerns  related  to  the  use  of  this  technology,  as  it  may  be  used  to  collect 
information  that  is  directly  or  indirectly  linked  to  an  identifiable  or identified  person.35 
Another risk is that the system is considered as hackable.  

As things stand, this technology is not considered to be sufficiently safe to be rolled out 
at EU level.  

There are currently other possibilities to improve the traceability of the weapons, such 
as the use of discreet or invisible marking with special inks. The use of secured inks has 
been  proven  for  the  traceability  of  banknotes36  and  this  technology  is  used  on  metallic 

31   Source: https://blog.matthews.com.au/datamatrix-and-qr-codes-why-2d-codes-are-still-relevant-in-2016/  

32   Source : https://www.camcode.com/asset-tags/barcodes-data-matrix-vs-qr-codes/  

33   Source :https://www.conflictarm.com/technical/developing-rfid-solutions-in-support-of-stockpile-

management-and-postdiversion-tracing/  

34   Source:  Using  RFID 

to  Help  Track  Guns 

for  Firearm  Wholesalers  and  Distributors.  Published 

2013.https://www.rfidworld.ca/rfid-to-help-track-guns-by-firearm-wholesalers-and-distributors/1365  

35   Ibid.  

36    Source:https://www.ecb.europa.eu/euro/banknotes/ink-stained/html/index.en.html  

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goods  (such  as  consumer  packaged  goods)37  and  on  non-metal  materials  by  the 
pharmaceutical  companies.38  This  technique  could  also  be  effective  in  the  metallic  and 
non-metallic  components  of  firearms.  The  Commission  will  continue  to  monitor  those 
techniques in the Firearms committee.  

4.  CONCLUSIONS AND WAY FORWARD. 

All  stakeholders  agree  that  the  Firearms  Directive  was  instrumental  in  addressing  the 
main threats identified in the reports of the Member States (mainly within the framework 
of  the  Firearms  platform)39,  the  Analysis  project  of  weapons  and  explosives  of 
EUROPOL  and  the  EU  Serious  and  Organised  Crime  Threat  Assessment  presented  by 
EUROPOL in 2017 and 2021, including the use of automatic weapons, the reactivation 
of deactivated firearms, the conversion of salute and acoustic weapons and the of alarm 
and signal weapons. 

The Commission notes that the Firearms Directive improved the categories of firearms, 
their traceability, exchanges of information and administrative procedures. At this stage, 
only 10 Member States have fully transposed the provisions analysed in this report and 
that represent the main changes introduced by the Firearms Directive in 2017 and the two 
Implementing  Directives.  Beyond  notification  of  transposition,  the  Commission  is  also 
assessing  the  conformity  of  national  laws  with  the  Directive  and  has  already  identified 
instances  of  incorrect  transposition  in  several  Member  States.  This  implies  that  the 
benefits of the Directive cannot be exploited to the fullest. The Commission will continue 
to  support  Member  States  in  the  implementation  of  the  Firearms  Directive,  replying  to 
requests  for  clarifications,  and  organising  transposition  workshops  within  the  Firearms 
Committee, including technical meetings with specific Member States if necessary. 

The  Commission  will  also  step  up  its  monitoring  of  the  implementation  in  Member 
States,  and  will make full  use  of the  powers  conferred  upon  it  by  the Treaty  whenever 
necessary. It will notably give a particular attention to the issue of firearms firing small-
calibre  ‘Flobert’  ammunition  and  to  the  correct  use  and  recognition  of  the  European 
Firearms Pass.  

In  addition,  the  analysis  conducted  in  this  report  demonstrates  that  there  is  room  for 
further progress in the legal control of acquisition, possession and movements of civilian 
weapons. Options to explore to guarantee better legal control, could include: 

  clarifying  the  distinction  between  prohibited  firearms  and  firearms  subject  to 

authorisation; 

  ensuring that all weapons which could be converted to fire a projectile even with 

specialised tools and knowledge are at least subject to declaration; 

37  Source: https://www.reiner.de/index.php?UV-ink-with-handheld-inkjet-printer, 

https://www.sicpa.com/sicpa-history  

38   https://www.pharmtech.com/view/securing-the-pharmaceutical-supply-chain-with-full-traceability; 
https://www.pharmaceuticalprocessingworld.com/dna-marker-for-pharma-ink-ensures-traceability/  

39   Firearms trafficking is a priority for the Member States since 2014 in the framework of the European 

Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT)  

14 

 
 
                                                      
  providing for a fully digitalised European Firearms Pass; 
  keeping  in  their  original  category  all  firearms  that  have  been  legally  converted 

and modified; 

  harmonising the rules on antique firearms; 
  prohibiting the acquisition, publicity and possession of blueprints for 3D printing 

of weapons by non-authorised arms dealers,  

  giving an express legal basis to the use of Internal Market Information System in 

the Firearms Directive; 

  clarifying  further  the  responsibilities  of  national  authorities  in  exchanges  of 

information; 

  defining a minimum depth for the marking of firearms and essential components. 

The  Commission  will  therefore  conduct  an  impact  assessment  on  the  potential  for 
modifications to the Firearms Directive. The Commission will also continue to monitor 
directly and by EU funded projects the technological developments and market uptakes 
to improve the traceability and stockpile control of firearms, using different technologies 
applicable to other industrial sectors.  

These  key  actions  will  contribute  to  delivering  on  the  objectives  of  the  Firearms 
Directive: to allow the cross-border movement of firearms while maintaining a high level 
of security and protection against criminal acts and illicit trafficking of firearms. 

15