COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Turkey 2021 Report Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2021 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy
Date: 2021-10-19
Institutions: Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, European Commission
Subjects: Türkiye, accession criteria, accession negotiations, pre-accession strategy, regional cooperation

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Strasbourg, 19.10.2021  SWD(2021) 290 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Turkey 2021 Report Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions  2021 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy {COM(2021) 644 final} - {SWD(2021) 288 final} - {SWD(2021) 289 final} - {SWD(2021) 291 final} - {SWD(2021) 292 final} - {SWD(2021) 293 final} - {SWD(2021) 294 final}  
 
 
Table of Contents 

1. 

INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................ 2 

Context  2 

1.1.  
1.2. Summary of the report  ............................................................................................... 3 

2. 

CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS .......................................... 10 

2.2. 

2.1. 

Functioning of democratic institutions and Public Administration   Reform ........... 10 
2.1.1. Democracy ..................................................................................................... 10 
2.1.2. Public Administration Reform .......................................................................... 18 
Rule of law and fundamental rights ..................................................................... 21 
Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights ........................................ 21 
Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security ............................................. 41 
2.3 Economic criteria ....................................................................................................... 53 
2.3.1. The existence of a functioning market economy ............................................... 53 
2.3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the 

2.2.1. 
2.2.3 

Union .................................................................................................. 61 
2.4. Public Procurement, Statistics, Financial control ......................................................... 64 
Chapter 5: Public procurement ................................................................................. 64 
Chapter 18: Statistics ................................................................................................ 66 
Chapter 32: Financial control .................................................................................... 67 

3.  GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND REGIONAL COOPERATION ...................................... 70 

4. 

ABILITY TO ASSUME OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP ........................................................... 73 

Cluster 2: Internal Market ................................................................................................ 73 
Chapter 1: Free movement of goods ......................................................................... 73 
Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers .......................................................... 75 
Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services ............................ 76 
Chapter 4 - Free movement of capital ....................................................................... 77 
Chapter 6: Company law ........................................................................................... 78 
Chapter 7: Intellectual property law .......................................................................... 79 
Chapter 8: Competition policy ................................................................................... 80 
Chapter 9: Financial services ..................................................................................... 82 
Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection ............................................................ 84 
Cluster 3: Competitiveness and inclusive growth ............................................................... 86 
Chapter 10: Information society and media ............................................................... 86 
Chapter 16: Taxation ................................................................................................ 88 
Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy ............................................................... 90 
Chapter 19: Social Policy and employment ................................................................ 91 

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Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy ............................................................... 94 
Chapter 25: Science and Research ............................................................................. 96 
Chapter 26: Education and culture ............................................................................ 97 
Chapter 29: Customs union ....................................................................................... 99 
Cluster 4: The Green agenda and sustainable connectivity ............................................... 100 
Chapter 14: Transport policy ................................................................................... 101 
Chapter 15: Energy ................................................................................................. 102 
Chapter 21: Trans-European networks .................................................................... 104 
Chapter 27: Environment and climate change .......................................................... 105 
Cluster 5: Resources, agriculture and cohesion ............................................................... 108 
Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development ....................................................... 108 
Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy ................................... 109 
Chapter 13: Fisheries .............................................................................................. 110 
Chapter 22: Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments .................... 111 
Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions ....................................................... 112 
Cluster 6: External relations ........................................................................................... 113 
Chapter 30: External relations ................................................................................. 114 
Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy ..................................................... 115 

5. 

ANNEX I – RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND TURKEY ...................................................... 119 

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1. 

INTRODUCTION  

1.1.   CONTEXT 

Turkey remains a key partner for the European Union. Turkey has been linked to the EU by 
an  Association  Agreement  since  1964  and  a  Customs  Union  was  established  in  1995.  The 
European  Council  granted  Turkey  the  status  of  candidate  country  in  December  1999  and 
accession  negotiations  were  opened  in  October  2005.  Within  the  framework  of  accession 
negotiations,  16  chapters  have  been  opened  and  one  of  these  was  provisionally  closed.  The 
General  Affairs  Council  conclusions  of  June  2019  reiterated  the  Council’s  position  of  June 
2018  that  under  the  current  circumstances,  Turkey’s  accession  negotiations  have  effectively 
come to a standstill, no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing1. Over the 
reporting  period,  the  Turkish  government  did  not  reverse  the  negative  trend  as  regards  the 
reform agenda despite the Turkish government’s repeated commitment to the objective of EU 
accession. The EU’s serious concerns on the continued deterioration of democracy, the rule of 
law, fundamental rights and the independence of the judiciary have not been addressed. There 
was further backsliding in many areas.  

Relations  with  the  EU  deteriorated  until  December  2020,  mostly  due  to  actions  taken  by 
Turkey  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean,  directly  challenging  the  rights  of  the  Republic  of 
Cyprus  in  its  maritime  zones.  In  addition,  there  was  a  sharp  increase  in  provocative  action 
taken  by  Turkey  against  Greece,  a  failure  to  advance  in  the  Cyprus  settlement  process,  and 
assertive  action  by  Turkey  in  most  of  the  surrounding  regional  conflicts,  in  ways  that  often 
were  at  odds with  broader EU interests. Two individuals  remain listed under the November 
2019  framework  for  restrictive  measures  for  Turkey’s  unauthorised  drilling  activities  in  the 
Eastern Mediterranean2. The duration of this framework was extended by an additional year 
in November 20203.  

Tensions  in  the  Eastern Mediterranean  eased  in  the  beginning  of  2021.  The  EU  re-affirmed 
that it has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean 
and  in  the  development  of  a  cooperative  and  mutually  beneficial  relationship  with  Turkey. 
The  EU  offered  to  nurture  a  more  positive  dynamic  in  EU-Turkey  relations  by  expressing 
readiness to engage with Turkey in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner in a number 
of areas of common interest, subject to the conditionalities set out by the European Council. 
In  that  context  high  level  dialogues  were  held  on  climate  and  migration  and  security  to  be 
followed  by  the  dialogue  on  health  soon.  At  the  same  time,  the  European  Union  remained 
committed  to  defending  its  interests  and  those  of  its  Member  States  and  uphold  regional 
stability.  

Turkey continued its enormous efforts to host the largest refugee population in the world with 
around 3.7 million Syrians under temporary protection and more than 320 000 non-Syrians, 
including those who hold or have applied for international protection status. The EU Facility 
for  Refugees  in  Turkey  contributed  to  these  efforts,  with  the  full  EUR  6  billion  operational 
budget  of  the  Facility  contracted  by  the  end  of  2020  and  over  EUR  4.2  billion  had  been 
disbursed by August 2021. In addition to the EUR 6 billion already mobilised under the EU 
Facility  for  Refugees,  in  2020  and  2021  EUR  585  million  were  earmarked  from  the  EU 
budget for humanitarian support and to continue two important cash support programmes for 
refugees.  In  June  2021,  the  Commission  proposed  to  allocate  EUR  3  billion  in  additional 
assistance to Syrian refugees and host communities in Turkey.  

1 The European Council conclusions of December 2006 remain in force. 
2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32019D1894&from=GA 
3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32020D1657&from=EN  

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The  March  2016  EU-Turkey  Statement  continued  yielding  results  and  remained  the  key 
framework governing cooperation on migration despite Turkey’s repeated calls to update the 
Statement.  Problems  arose  over  implementation  of  the  Statement  due  to  Turkey’s  unilateral 
suspending returns of irregular migrants and rejected asylum seekers from the Greek islands 
from  March  2020  onwards,  the  emergence  of  alternative  smuggling  routes  to  Cyprus  and 
Italy.  

The reporting period continued to be marked by the detrimental impact of the global COVID-
19  pandemic.  By  early  October,  Turkey  had  recorded  around  7.2  million  cases  and  about 
64 000  deaths  related  to  the  pandemic.  Around  71  %  of  the  population  had  been  fully 
vaccinated.  Turkey  took  considerable  measures  to  boost  domestic  demand  and  soften  the 
economic  repercussions  of  the  pandemic.  Since  the  beginning  of  the  pandemic  the  EU  has 
stood by Turkey and taken several measures, including by reallocating over EUR 103 million 
of  EU  funds  to  help  prevent  and  treat  COVID-19  and  to  mitigate  the  economic  and  social 
impact. 

1.2. SUMMARY OF THE REPORT4 5 

There  are  serious  deficiencies  in  the  functioning  of  Turkey’s  democratic  institutions. 
Democratic backsliding  continued during the reporting period. Structural  deficiencies of the 
presidential system remained in place. Key recommendations of the Council of Europe and its 
bodies remain to be addressed. The Parliament continued to lack the necessary means to hold 
the government accountable. The constitutional architecture continued to centralise powers at 
the  level  of  the  Presidency  without  ensuring  a  sound  and  effective  separation  of  powers 
between the executive, legislative and the judiciary. In the absence of an effective checks and 
balances mechanism, the democratic accountability of the executive branch remains limited to 
elections.  Targeting  of  the  opposition  parties  continued,  including  by  the  Constitutional 
Court’s acceptance of an indictment by the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation 
seeking  to  close  down  the  second  largest  opposition  party,  which  contributed  to  weakening 
political pluralism in Turkey. During the report period, the President dismissed the governor 
of the Central Bank twice. 

Despite  ending  the  state  of  emergency  in  July  2018,  certain  legal  provisions  granting 
extraordinary  powers  to  government  authorities  and  retaining  several  restrictive  elements 
from the emergency rule remained integrated into law, which continued to have a significant 
impact  on  democracy  and  fundamental  rights.  In  July  2021,  Turkey's  parliament  approved 
a bill that extends the duration of these restrictive elements of the state of emergency for one 
more  year.  The  Inquiry  Commission  on  the  State  of  Emergency  has  not  yet  finalised 
examining its caseload concerning the public servants who were dismissed by decree during 
the emergency rule.  

Pressure  on  mayors  from  opposition  parties  by  the  ruling  coalition  government  further 
weakened  local  democracy.  Mayors  from  the  opposition  parties  faced  administrative  and 
judicial  investigations.  In  the  south-east,  the  forcefully  dismissed  mayors  continued  to  be 

4  This  report  covers  the  period  from  June  2020  to  June  2021.  It  is  based  on  input  from  a  variety  of  sources, 
including contributions from the government of Serbia, the EU Member States, European Parliament reports and 
information  from  various  international  and  non-governmental  organisations.  This  also  includes  the  results  of 
comparative assessments and indices produced by other stakeholders, in particular in the area of rule of law. 
5  For  the  state  of  play  the  report  uses  the  following  assessment  scales:  early  stage,  some  level  of  preparation, 
moderately  prepared,  good  level  of  preparation  and  well  advanced.  For  progress  made  during  the  reporting 
period,  the  following  scale  has  been  used:  backsliding,  no  progress,  limited  progress,  some  progress,  good 
progress and very good progress. Where appropriate, also interim steps have been used. 

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replaced  by  government-appointed  trustees,  denying  citizens  their  chosen  representation.  In 
most cases, the incoming trustees have kept the municipal assemblies suspended. Hundreds of 
local politicians and elected office holders were arrested on terrorism-related charges. 

The  situation  in  the  south-east  remained  very  worrying.  The  government  carried  out 
domestic  and  cross-border  security  and  military  operations  in  Iraq  and  Syria.  The  security 
situation  remained  precarious  in  border  areas  with  recurrent  terrorist  acts  by  the  Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK), which remains on the EU list of persons, groups and entities involved 
in  acts  of  terrorism.  The  EU  unambiguously  condemned  the  PKK’s  attacks  and  expressed 
solidarity with the families of the victims. While the government has a legitimate right to fight 
terrorism, it is essential that it does so in accordance with the rule of law, human rights and 
fundamental  freedoms.  Anti-terror  measures  need  to  be  proportionate.  There  were  no 
developments  on  the  resumption  of  a  credible  political  process  to  achieve  a  peaceful  and 
sustainable  solution.  Human  rights  organisations  and  opposition  parties  reported  serious 
violations of human rights by security forces. 

Around  4  000  members  and  officials  of  the  People’s  Democratic  Party  (HDP)  remain  in 
prison, including a number of parliamentarians. In June, the Constitutional Court accepted an 
indictment  demanding  the  closure  of  the  HDP,  seeking  a  political  ban  for  451  HDP 
executives,  including  the  party’s  co-chairs  and  all  past  and  present  members  of  Parliament 
and executives as well as a freeze on the party’s bank accounts. There were pending requests 
by the prosecution in the Parliament to lift the immunity of almost all HDP lawmakers.  

On civil society issues, serious backsliding continued. Civil society faced continuous pressure 
and  their  space  to  operate  freely  has  continued  to  diminish  limiting  their  freedom  of 
expression and freedom of association. The new law on preventing financing of proliferation 
of  weapons  of  mass  destruction  raises  concerns  with  regard  to  possible  restrictions  on  the 
activities of human rights defenders and civil society. 

The legal and institutional framework governing the security and intelligence sector remained 
unchanged  with  reinforced  civilian  oversight  of  the  security  forces  under  the  presidential 
system. The government took steps to further consolidate the civilian control of the security 
forces.  

Turkey  has  some  level  of  preparation/is  moderately  prepared  in  the  field  of  public 
administration  reform.  It  made  no  progress  during  the  reporting  period.  Turkey  lacks 
a comprehensive public administration reform  agenda and a lead institution in charge of the 
process.  Concerns  remained  over  the  accountability  of  the  administration  and  human 
resources  management.  The  political  will  to  reform  is  still  lacking.  Although  policy 
coordination  among  central  government  institutions  remained  strong,  policymaking  is  not 
evidence-based or participatory. The politicisation of the administration continued. Women’s 
representation remained low in the higher echelons of the bureaucracy.  

Turkey’s judicial system is at an early stage of preparation. The serious backsliding observed 
since  2016  continued.  Concerns  remained,  in  particular  over  the  systemic  lack  of 
independence of the judiciary and undue pressure on judges and prosecutors. The new human 
rights action plan envisages certain positive measures but it does not address any of the key 
shortcomings  related  to  the  independence  of  the  judiciary.  In  particular,  no  measures  are 
envisaged to improve respect for the principle of the separation of powers or to improve the 
structure and the selection process of members of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors, long 
outstanding  recommendations  of  the  Council  of  Europe  Venice  Commission  and  the 
European  Commission.  Despite  their  acquittal,  none  of  the  judges  or  prosecutors  dismissed 
following the coup attempt were reinstated. The lack of objective, merit-based, uniform and 
pre-established criteria for recruiting and promoting judges and prosecutors remains a source 

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of concern. The institution of criminal law judges of peace continued to raise concerns over 
their jurisdiction and practice. 

Regarding  the  fight  against  corruption,  Turkey  remained  at  an  early  stage  of  preparations 
and  made  no  progress  in  the  reporting  period.  The  country  did  not  establish  anti-corruption 
bodies in line with Turkey’s international obligations. The flaws of the legal framework and 
institutional  architecture  allowed  undue  political  influence  in  the  investigation  and 
prosecution  phases  of  corruption  cases.  The  accountability  and  transparency  of  public 
institutions need to be improved. The absence of an anti-corruption strategy and action plan 
indicated a lack of will to fight decisively against corruption. Most of the Council of Europe’s 
Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) recommendations have not been implemented. 
Overall, corruption is widespread and remains an issue of concern. 

Turkey has some level of preparation in the fight against organised crime and made limited 
progress.  Cooperation  between  Europol  and  Turkey  is  based  on  a  Strategic  Agreement  on 
Cooperation, which entered into force in July 2004. Negotiations concerning an international 
agreement  on  the  exchange  of  personal  data  between  Europol  and  the  Turkish  authorities 
competent for fighting serious crime and terrorism are ongoing, requiring Turkey to reform its 
legislation  aligning  its  data  protection  law  with  the  European  standards.  Turkey  should 
improve  its  track  record  on  dismantling  criminal  networks  and  confiscating  criminal  assets. 
The  legal  framework  regulating  the  fight  against  money  laundering  and  terrorist  financing 
needs to  be improved in  line with  the recommendations of the  Financial  Action Task  Force 
(FATF)  and  those  of  the  Venice  Commission  on  the  law  on  preventing  financing  of 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Efforts are needed to improve the legislation on 
cybercrime and witness protection.  

The  deterioration  of  human  and  fundamental  rights  continued.  Many  of  the  measures 
brought  in  during  the  state  of  emergency  remain  in  force.  The  legal  framework  includes 
general  guarantees  of  respect  for  human  and  fundamental  rights  but  the  legislation  and 
practice  still  need  to  be  brought  into  line  with  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights 
(ECHR)  and  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  (ECtHR)  case-law.  Broad-scale 
restrictions imposed on the activities of journalists, writers, lawyers, academics, human rights 
defenders  and  critical  voices  continued  to  have  a  negative  effect  on  the  exercise  of  their 
freedoms  and  have  led  to  self-censorship.  Turkey’s  refusal  to  implement  ECtHR  rulings, 
notably  in  the  cases  of  Selahattin  Demirtaş  and  Osman  Kavala,  further  increased  concerns 
regarding  the  judiciary’s  adherence  to  international  and  European  standards.  Turkey’s 
withdrawal  from  the  Istanbul  Convention  also  put  into  question  its  commitment  to  such 
standards. The new human rights action plan, which promised reforms in a number of areas, 
does not address critical issues.  

Serious backsliding continued on freedom of expression. Legislation and its implementation, 
especially  national  security  and  anti-terrorism  provisions,  continued  to  contravene  the 
European Convention on Human Rights and other international standards and to diverge from 
ECtHR  case  law.  The  dissemination  of  opposition  voices  and  freedom  of  expression  were 
negatively  affected  by  the  increasing  pressure  and  restrictive  measures.  Criminal  cases  and 
convictions  of  journalists,  human  rights  defenders,  lawyers,  writers,  opposition  politicians, 
students and social media users continued.  

There was further serious backsliding in the area of  freedom of assembly and association in 
light of recurrent bans, disproportionate interventions and excessive use of force in peaceful 
demonstrations,  investigations,  administrative  fines  and  prosecutions  against  demonstrators 
on  charges  of  terrorism-related  activities.  Legislation  and  its  implementation  are  not  in  line 
with the Turkish Constitution, European standards or with international conventions.  

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The  rights  of  the  most  disadvantaged  groups  and  of  persons  belonging  to  minorities  need 
better  protection.  Roma  remained  largely  excluded  from  formal  jobs  and  their  living 
conditions  severely  deteriorated.  Gender-based  violence,  discrimination,  hate  speech  against 
minorities,  in  particular  against  lesbian,  gay,  bisexual,  transgender,  intersex  and  queer 
(LGBTIQ) persons are still a matter of serious concern.  

On migration and asylum policy, Turkey made some progress. After the incidents of March 
2020 when Turkey actively encouraged migrants and refugees to take the land route to Europe 
through  Greece,  the  situation  has  eventually  de-escalated.  Some  progress  was  made  on 
strengthening surveillance and protection capacity of the eastern land border. The EU-Turkey 
Statement of March 2016 continued to deliver results and Turkey continued to play a key role 
in ensuring effective management of migratory flows along the eastern Mediterranean route. 
The  return  of  irregular  migrants  from  the  Greek  islands  under  the  EU-Turkey  Statement 
remained  however  suspended  by  Turkey  citing  COVID-19  restrictions.  However, 
resettlements from Turkey to the EU resumed in July 2020 despite restrictions. Although the 
volume of irregular arrivals to Greece fell, smuggling routes to Italy and to the government-
controlled  areas  of  Cyprus  were  increasingly  used.  Turkey  has  still  not  implemented  the 
provisions  relating  to  third-country  nationals  in  the  EU-Turkey  readmission  agreement, 
despite  these  entering  into  force  in  October  2017.  Overall,  the  number  of  illegal  border 
crossings  between Turkey  and Greece still remained significantly lower than it was  prior to 
the adoption of the EU-Turkey Statement. 

Turkey continued to make significant efforts to host and meet the needs of the largest refugee 
community in the world. The full operational budget of EUR 6 billion under the Facility for 
Refugees  was  contracted  by  the  end  of  2020  and  over  EUR  4.2  billion  was  disbursed  by 
August 2021. Efficient integration measures are necessary to address the extended presence of 
refugees  in  the  country.  Access  to  public  health  for  migrants  and  refugees  should  be 
increased. No outstanding visa liberalisation benchmarks were fulfilled. Turkey still needs to 
further align its legislation with the EU acquis on visa policy.  

Turkey’s increasingly assertive foreign policy continued to collide with EU priorities under 
the CFSP, notably due to its support for military action in the Caucasus, Syria and Iraq. While 
the  institutional  framework  enabling  Turkey's  participation  in  the  CFSP  and  the  Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is in place, Turkey maintained a very low alignment rate 
of  around  14  %.  Turkey’s  military  support  in  Libya,  including  the  deployment  of  foreign 
fighters on the ground, and its persistent criticism of, and lack of cooperation with Operation 
IRINI,  are  detrimental  to  the  EU’s  effective  contribution  to  the  UN  arms  embargo 
implementation,  and  have  led  to  conflicting  approaches  on  Libya.  Turkey  wants  to  see 
a stable and prosperous Syria, an objective it shares with the EU. However, Turkey pursued 
its  own  military  action  in  northern  Syria,  including  through  Turkish-backed  militias.  At  the 
same  time,  Turkey  increased  the  provision  of  basic  services  and  extended  its  infrastructure 
networks in northern Syria. 

In  November  2020,  the  Council  extended  the  duration  of  the  existing  framework  for 
restrictive  measures  in  response  to  Turkey’s  unauthorised  drilling  activities  in  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean.  In  its  conclusions  of  December  2020,  the  European  Council  strongly 
condemned  Turkey’s  unilateral  actions,  provocations  and  escalated  rhetoric  against  the  EU, 
EU  Member  States  and  European  Leaders.  The  tensions  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean 
decreased as from the beginning of 2021. Turkey stopped its illegal hydrocarbon exploration 
activities  in  the  maritime  zones    of  Greece  and  Cyprus.  However,  in  early  October  Turkish 
warships  obstructed  the  vessel  Nautical  Geo  from  conducting  a  survey  in  the  Cypriot 
Exclusive  Economic  Zone,  and  Turkey  issued  a  NAVTEX  for  conducting  seismic  surveys 
which would  encompass parts of Cyprus’ EEZ.  Furthermore,  Turkey  continued  undertaking 

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actions  towards  changing  the  status  of  the  fenced-off  city  of  Varosha  with  unacceptable 
unilateral  decisions  which  go  against  the  relevant  UN  SC  Resolutions  550  (1984)  and  789 
(1992).  The  EU  has  strongly  condemned  Turkey’s  unilateral  steps  and  the  unacceptable 
announcements  made  by  the  Turkish  President  and  the  leader  of  the  Turkish  Cypriot 
community  on  20  July  2021  on  the  further  reopening  of  the  fenced-off  town  of  Varosha  in 
Cyprus,  and  called  for  the  immediate  reversal  of  these  actions  and  the  reversal  of  all  steps 
taken on Varosha since October 2020. 

The  EU  has  repeatedly  stressed  the  need  for  Turkey  to  respect  the  sovereign  rights  of  EU 
Member States, which include entering into bilateral agreements and exploring and exploiting 
their natural resources in accordance with the EU acquis and international law, including the 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Turkey needs to commit itself unequivocally to good 
neighbourly relations, international  agreements and to  the peaceful settlement  of disputes in 
accordance with the United Nations Charter, having recourse, if necessary, to the International 
Court of Justice.  

Turkey failed to ensure full and non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol 
to  the  EU-Turkey  Association  Agreement  and  the  removal  of  all  the  obstacles  to  the  free 
movement of goods, including restrictions on direct transport links with Cyprus. There was no 
progress on normalising bilateral relations with the Republic of Cyprus and the informal talks 
in April 2021 failed to pave the way for the resumption of formal negotiations.  

The March 2021 and the June 2021 European Council recalled the European Union’s strategic 
interest  in  a  stable  and  secure  environment  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  and  in  the 
development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Turkey. In light of the 
discontinuation of illegal drilling activities, the resumption of bilateral talks between Greece 
and Turkey and the forthcoming, at that time, talks on the Cyprus problem under the auspices 
of the United Nations, the leaders offered to nurture a more positive dynamic in EU-Turkey 
relations.  To  this  end,  they  expressed  readiness  to  engage  with  Turkey  in  a  phased, 
proportionate  and  reversible  manner  in  a  number  of  areas  of  common  interest,  subject  to 
Turkey  meeting  the  established  conditionalities  set  out  in  previous  European  Council 
conclusions,  and  provided  that  the  de-escalation  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  is  sustained. 
The  leaders  called  on  Turkey  to  abstain  from  renewed  provocations  or  unilateral  actions  in 
breach of international law. Taking into account the Joint Communication, they reaffirmed the 
determination  of  the  European  Union,  in  case  of  such  action,  to  use  the  instruments  and 
options  at  its  disposal  to  defend  its  interests  and  those  of  its  Member  States  as  well  as  to 
uphold regional stability. 

Turkey  continued  to  assert  the  validity  of  the  Turkish-Libyan  maritime  delimitation  and 
military agreements of 2019. The EU considers this an infringement of the sovereign rights of 
third  States,  not  complying  with  the  Law  of  the  Sea  and  having  no  legal  consequences  for 
third States.  

Regarding  the  economic  criteria,  the  Turkish  economy  is  well  advanced,  but  made  no 
progress  over  the  reporting  period  and  serious  concerns  persist  over  its  functioning.  The 
authorities issued a sizeable and wide-ranging set of measures to boost domestic demand and 
soften  the  economic  repercussions  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic.  As  a  result,  the  economy 
rebounded  quickly  from  the  crisis,  reaching  pre-crisis  levels  already  in  the  third  quarter  of 
2020.  Amid  a  strong  policy  response  to  the  crisis,  institutional  and  policy  coordination 
weaknesses  undermined  the  credibility  and  effectiveness  of  authorities’  actions  and  the 
imbalances  increased.  The  macroeconomic  policy  mix  relied  too  heavily  on  the  credit 
channel, while direct fiscal support measures were rather limited in view of the magnitude of 
the social and labour market challenges. The strong monetary expansion last year weakened 

7 

 
 
the lira, increased inflation and dollarization, and triggered portfolio outflows. The closing of 
the  current  account  deficit  in  2019  turned  out  to  be  short-lived  and  external  imbalances 
remain  a  major  vulnerability.  Monetary  policy  tightened  in  autumn  2020  but  the  abrupt 
dismissal  of  the  central  bank  governor  in  March  2021,  only  four  months  after  his 
appointment,  stirred  financial  market  instability  and  called  into  question  the  authorities’ 
commitment to reducing inflation. 

The institutional and regulatory environment weakened further and there are persistent issues 
with the predictability, transparency, and implementation of regulations. Market exit remained 
costly and slow. The informal  sector declined during the crisis  but  still accounts for a large 
part of the economy. State intervention in price setting mechanisms persists. The provision of 
State aid lacks proper rules on implementation, enforcement and transparency. Supported by 
loose  monetary  policy  until  the  autumn  2020  and  favourable  regulatory  measures,  bank 
lending  grew  strongly,  spurred  in  particular  by  state-owned  banks.  The  banking  sector 
remained well capitalised, benefiting from regulatory forbearance and other crisis-mitigation 
measures. The pandemic had a deeply negative impact on the labour market and on poverty. 
The  number  of  discouraged  workers  increased  significantly  and  employment  levels  fell  far 
below  from  where  they  were  a  few  years  ago.  Female  labour  market  participation  and 
employment  remained  at  particularly  low  levels.  The  proportion  of  young  people  not  in 
employment, education or training increased. 

Turkey made limited progress and has a good level of preparation in achieving the capacity to 
cope with the competitive pressure and market forces within the EU. Despite some progress 
made  in  improving  access  to  education,  the  mismatch  between  the  education  system  and 
labour market needs persists. Expenditure on research and development continued increasing 
at  a  slow  pace,  but  remained  well  below  the  government’s  target.  Supported  by  favourable 
financing  conditions  and  concessional  lending,  investment  activity  rebounded  in  2020. 
Progress was made with regard to the diversification of energy supplies and the development 
of  the  renewable  energy  sector.  The  extension  of  local  content  requirement  practices 
continued  to  raise  concerns.  The  relative  share  of  the  EU  in  Turkey’s  foreign  trade  slightly 
increased, despite extensive deviations by Turkey  from its obligations under the EU-Turkey 
Customs Union. 

Regarding  its  ability  to  assume  the  obligations  of  membership,  Turkey’s  alignment  with 
the EU acquis was very limited and pursued on a rather ad hoc basis. 

The  internal  market  cluster  is  key  to  the  good  functioning  of  the  Customs  Union  and  to 
integrating Turkey in the EU’s single market. Turkey has achieved a good level of preparation 
for the free movement of goods. Although it continued to align with technical EU legislation 
under the ‘New and Global Approach’, technical barriers to trade remain, which hamper the 
good functioning of the  Customs Union. Preparations in  the areas of freedom  of movement 
for workers and right of establishment and freedom to provide services are at an early stage as 
many  professions  are  closed  to  EU  nationals.  Turkey  is  moderately  prepared  on  free 
movement of capital notably because of the substantial remaining obstacles for acquisitions of 
assets  and  real  estate.  It  improved  its  legal  framework  regulating  the  fight  against  money 
laundering and terrorism financing. It has reached a good level of preparation in terms of the 
legislative  alignment  of  consumer  and  health  protection,  as  exemplified  by  Turkey’s  strong 
vaccination  campaign  against  COVID-19.  However,  in  both  areas,  there  is  a  need  to 
strengthen  administrative  capacity,  consultations  and  coordination  among  stakeholders. 
Turkey has some level of preparation in the area of competition policy. There is a continued 
lack of State aid implementation rules, enforcement and transparency, while the institutional 
set up remains incomplete. In the cluster on competitiveness and inclusive growth, there has 
been  mostly  backsliding  on  the  economic-related  chapters.  This  was  notably  the  case  on 

8 

 
 
enterprise and industrial policy, mainly due to Turkey bringing in measures incompatible with 
EU industrial policy principles, and on economic and monetary policy, reflecting intensified 
political pressure on the central bank. There was also backsliding in the area of social policy 
and  employment,  linked  to  the  curtailment  of  trade  union  rights,  the  lack  of  genuine  social 
dialogue  and  persistent  levels  of  informal  economic  activity.  On  taxation,  while  Turkey  is 
moderately  prepared,  there  is  a  need  for  a  clear  strategy,  avoiding  frequent  changes  in  tax 
rates and enabling tax information exchange with all EU Member States. Turkey maintains a 
good  level  of  preparation  for  the  customs  union  but  made  limited  progress,  including  in  its 
implementation.  Turkey’s  deviations  from  its  obligations  under  the  EU-Turkey  Customs 
Union  continue,  contributing  to  a  high  number  of  trade  irritants.  Turkey  has  some  level  of 
preparation in the area of information society and media. It continued backsliding, mostly due 
to inadequate competition, concentration of media ownership and the lack of independence of 
regulatory  authorities.  Turkey’s  preparations  in  the  area  of  science  and  research  are  well 
advanced  and  it  continued  to  implement  the  action  plan  to  boost  the  national  research  and 
innovation  capacity  and  to  align  with  the  European  Research  Area  (ERA).  Turkey  is 
moderately  prepared  on  education  and  culture,  and  needs  to  further  improve  inclusive 
education, with a particular focus on girls and children from disadvantaged groups. 

Regarding  the  cluster  on  the  Green  Agenda  and  Sustainable  Connectivity,  Turkey  is 
moderately  prepared  in  transport  and  energy  policies.  It  has  made  some  progress  on  energy 
and transport networks, with the construction of the Halkali-Kapikule railway line connecting 
the  Bulgarian  border  to  Istanbul  continuing.  Turkey  has  some  level  of  preparation  on 
environmental  and  climate  change  and  faces  critical  environmental  and  climate  challenges, 
both as regards mitigation and adaptation. It made some progress, including the ratification of 
the  Paris  Agreement  on  climate  change  and  increasing  capacity  in  waste  management, 
wastewater  treatment  and  on  legislative  alignment,  but  enforcement  and  implementation 
remain weak. Turkey needs to follow up with an enhanced nationally determined contribution 
under  the  Paris  Agreement,  long-term  strategic  decarbonisation  and  adaptation  plans  and 
appropriate legislation reflecting them domestically. . 

On  the  cluster  covering  resources,  agriculture  and  cohesion,  Turkey  reached  some  level  of 
preparation in the area of agriculture and rural development. However, there was backsliding  
over the reporting period, as its agricultural policy diverged from the main principles of the 
EU common agricultural policy. Turkey is a major exporter of food products to the EU, and 
made limited progress in the area of food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy. Turkey 
needs to make further progress on meeting EU standards, particularly on pesticide residues. It 
made  good  progress  on  fisheries  in  implementing  the  fisheries  law,  resources  and  fleet 
management,  and  inspection  and  control.  Turkey  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  area  of 
regional policy and the coordination of structural instruments. Overall, it made some progress 
in this area, especially in accelerating the absorption of IPA II funds and in addressing some 
structural  weaknesses.  Turkey  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  financial  and 
budgetary  provisions  and  made  limited  progress  during  the  reporting  period  to  strengthen 
administrative capacity or to design implementing rules for the correct application of the own 
resources system. 

Turkey is moderately prepared in the area of external relations, notably due to the continuing 
deviations  from  the  Common  Customs  Tariff  and  the  common  commercial  policy.  It  made 
limited  progress  in  the  reporting  period,  when  it  successfully  concluded  a  trade  agreement 
with the UK after the EU-UK agreement. Turkey has some level of preparation in the area of 
foreign,  security  and  defence  policy.  There  was  backsliding  in  the  framework  of  political 
dialogue  on  foreign  and  security  policy  as  Turkey’s  increasingly  assertive  foreign  policy 
collided with the EU priorities under the common foreign and security policy. 

9 

 
 
Overall, in many areas further significant efforts are needed on legislative alignment with the 
EU  acquis.  In  all  areas,  implementation  and  enforcement  needs  substantial  improvement. 
Ensuring  the  independence  of  regulatory  authorities  and  developing  administrative  capacity 
are key for Turkey to achieve further progress. 

2. 

CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS  

2.1. 

       Functioning of democratic institutions and Public Administration   Reform  

2.1.1. Democracy 

There  are  serious  deficiencies  in  the  functioning  of  Turkey’s  democratic  institutions. 
Democratic backsliding  as well as deep political  polarisation  continued during the reporting 
period.  Structural  deficiencies  of  the  presidential  system  remained  in  place.  Despite  ending 
the state of emergency in July 2018, certain legal provisions granting extraordinary powers to 
government  authorities  and  retaining  several  restrictive  elements  of  the  emergency  rule 
remained integrated into law. In July 2021, Turkey's Parliament approved a bill that extends 
the  duration  of  these  restrictive  elements  of  the  state  of  emergency  for  one  more  year.  The 
Inquiry  Commission  on the  State  of  Emergency  has  not  yet  finalised  the  examination  of  its 
caseload concerning the public servants who were dismissed by decree during the emergency 
rule. This prevented them from launching appeal procedures. 

Elections 

No elections were held in the reporting period. In the south-east, mayors, elected in 2019 and 
forcefully dismissed, continued to be replaced by government-appointed trustees, which is a 
source  of  significant  concern  as  it  undermines  local  democracy  and  denies  citizens  their 
chosen representation. The new human rights action plan foresees changes to the legislation 
on political parties and elections, which provides an opportunity to bring Turkish legislation 
in  line  with  international  obligations  and  standards  for  conducting  democratic  elections. 
Turkey needs to take steps to improve the broader environment for elections.  

The legal framework for elections and political parties remains problematic and needs to be 
aligned with the outstanding recommendations of the Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Venice Commission. Turkey also needs to address broader 
questions with regard to democratic media plurality and provide equal and fair conditions to 
all political parties and candidates.  

The human rights  action plan announced in March 2021 foresees changes to the legislation 
on political parties and elections.  This represents an important opportunity as  past elections 
were  marked  by  undue  restrictions  of  certain  fundamental  freedoms,  including  the  right  to 
vote and be elected and the freedom of expression. Turkey should introduce key amendments 
to the election legislation with proper consultation, which would provide stability of the legal 
framework in line with international good practice.  

In  the  south-east,  48  mayors  had  been  forcefully  dismissed  and  replaced  by  government-
appointed  trustees,  denying  citizens  their  chosen  representation.  No  steps  were  taken  to 
address  the  June  2020  opinion  of  the  Venice  Commission,  according  to  which  decisions  to 
deny mayoral mandates to HDP candidates who received the highest number of votes at the 
municipal elections of March 2019 in six municipalities and to give these mandates to second-
placed AKP candidates, were deemed not consistent with international norms and standards, 
and should be reversed. The Venice Commission further emphasised that, while the removal 
of  elected  officials  may  exceptionally  be  justified  by  the  need  to  prevent  officials  from 

10 

 
 
abusing their office to favour terrorist activities, replacing elected officials by candidates who 
lost the election, without repeating elections, cannot be justified on this basis. 

Parliament 

The  presidential  system  has  largely  weakened  the  Parliament’s  legislative  and  oversight 
functions.  The  President  possessed  vast  legislative  powers  and  continued  to  curtail  the 
legislative role of the Parliament through presidential  decrees  and decisions regulating key 
policy  areas.  Policy  deliberations  forging  cross-party  consensus  rarely  occurred.  The 
Parliament  continued  to  lack  the  necessary  means  to  hold  the  government  accountable. 
Targeting  of  the  opposition  parties  continued,  including  by  the  Constitutional  Court’s 
acceptance of an indictment by the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation seeking 
to  close  down  the  second  largest  opposition  party,  which  contributed  to  the  weakening  of 
political pluralism in Turkey. 

Inter-party electoral alliances were sustained in the Parliament. The parliamentary majority of 
the ruling AKP-led alliance marked the Parliament’s legislative and agenda-setting functions. 
Opposition  parties  failed  to  exert  influence  in  parliamentary  discussions.  Key  public  policy 
discussions forging cross-party compromises very seldom occurred within the Parliament. 

The  presidential  system  has  weakened  the  Parliament’s  legislative  function,  in  particular 
due to the extensive use of Presidential decrees and decisions. During the reporting period, the 
Parliament  adopted  61  pieces  of  legislation  out  of  the  821  proposed  bills.  77  presidential 
decrees were issued on a wide range of policy areas including in the socio-economic policy 
areas, which do not fall within the remit of presidential decrees.  

As an example, the withdrawal  from  the  Istanbul  Convention, which had been unanimously 
ratified by the Parliament in 2011, was implemented by a presidential decision, without any 
involvement of the Parliament. 

Parliamentary  oversight  of  the  executive  remained  very  weak.  The  Parliament  lacks  the 
necessary means to hold the government to account. Members of Parliament can only address 
written  questions  to  the  Cabinet  members.  They  cannot  ask  questions  to  the  President. 
Presidential decrees remained exempt from parliamentary control. Parliamentary oversight of 
public spending needs to be improved.  

The  judiciary  systematically  targeted  parliamentarians  from  the  opposition  parties  on  the 
account  of  alleged  terrorism-related  offenses.  Currently,  4  000  HDP  members  and  officials 
remain in prison, including a number of parliamentarians. In June 2021, the Justice Ministry’s 
prosecutors  submitted  to  the  Turkish  Grand  National  Assembly  summaries  of  proceedings 
seeking  to  lift  the  legislative  immunity  of  20  opposition  lawmakers  from  six  different 
opposition  parties.  The  parliamentary  immunity  system  did  not  provide  adequate  legal 
protection that would allow the parliamentarians from the opposition to express their opinions 
within the boundaries of freedom of speech.  

Legal  actions  against  representatives  of  the  opposition  parties,  notably  the  People’s 
Democratic  Party  (HDP),  increasingly  endangered  political  pluralism.  In  the  current 
legislative term, four opposition deputies were stripped of their immunities and arrested due 
to terrorism-related charges. One of them re-gained his parliamentary status after his appeal to 
the Constitutional Court. Two former co-chairs Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ and 
other former HDP deputies remained in jail. 

In June 2021, the Constitutional Court accepted an indictment seeking the closure of the HDP. 
The  Prosecutor  alleged  that  the  HDP  became  the  focus  of  activities  aiming  to  disrupt  the 

11 

 
 
 
indivisible  integrity  of  the  State  with  its  nation  by  acting  as  an  extension  of  the  Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK). The prosecutor also sought a political ban of 451 HDP members and 
a freeze of the party’s bank account. The move to close down the second largest opposition 
party  appears  to  be  politically  motivated  and  seriously  undermines  the  legitimacy  of  the 
Turkish democratic institutions and political pluralism in the country.  

The  legal  framework  for  elections  and  political  parties  remains  problematic.  The  10  % 
electoral threshold is the highest among Council of Europe members. It contradicts the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and hinders the representation of many 
Turkish voters. Turkey did not take any step to align with the outstanding recommendations 
of  the  OSCE  Office  for  Democratic  Institutions  and  Human  Rights  and  the  Venice 
Commission (see also Elections). 

Representation of women in Parliament remained low (17.32 %). Despite the Committee on 
Equality  of  Opportunity  for  Women  and  Men  and  some  individual  deputies’  efforts,  the 
Parliament did not prioritise advancing gender equality across the country.  

Governance 

The presidential system continues to be characterised by a lack of checks and balances and 
by  politicisation  of  the  public  administration.  Most  regulatory  authorities  remain  directly 
linked  to  the  Presidency.  The  recommendations  of  the  Council  of  Europe  Venice 
Commission on the presidential regime still need to be addressed. Pressure on mayors from 
opposition parties by the ruling coalition government further weakened local democracy.  

The  presidential  system  remained  characterised  by  a  lack  of  the  necessary  checks  and 
balances required to safeguard against an excessive concentration of power in one office and 
to ensure the independence of the judiciary, as highlighted in the 2017 opinion of the Venice 
Commission.  The presidential  system negatively  affected  the functioning  of the branches of 
government and the state administration. The President’s political accountability is limited to 
elections, due to a lack of effective checks and balances.  

The  use  of  traditional  instruments  of  oversight  of  the  executive  by  Parliament,  such  as 
a vote of confidence and the possibility of oral questions to the executive, is still not possible; 
only written questions can be addressed to the Vice-President and ministers. The politicisation 
of  the  administration,  judiciary  and  the  security  sector  further  increased.  Most  of  the  key 
institutions  are  directly  attached  to  the  Presidency.  The  civil  service  has  been  politicised, 
especially in the senior managerial levels. 

The  legal  framework  enabled  undue  political  influence  over  regulatory  authorities.  Most 
regulatory authorities remain directly linked to the Presidency and the President has the power 
to  nominate  the  heads  of  the  vast  majority  of  the  public  regulatory  authorities.  During  the 
reporting period, the President dismissed twice the governor of the Central Bank. 

Despite  the  increase  in  the  caseload  of  the  Ombudsman,  the  institution  remained  silent  on 
politically critical issues concerning fundamental rights. The Ombudsman still lacks ex officio 
powers to initiate investigations and to intervene in cases with legal remedies.  

Local government 

The  pressure  of  the  government  over  opposition  mayors  further  intensified.  Mayors  of  the 
opposition parties faced  politically motivated administrative and judicial investigations. The 
Court  of  Cassation  upheld  the  prison  sentence  for  the  Istanbul  provincial  chair  of  the  main 
opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), Canan Kaftancıoğlu, who was charged for her 
social media posts.  

12 

 
 
The situation of local democracy in the south-east further deteriorated. 48 HDP mayors were 
removed  from  office  on  grounds  of  terrorism-related  changes  since  the  local  elections  in 
2019. Additionally, one CHP mayor in the region of Izmir was replaced due to alleged links 
to the Gülen movement. Governors, as trustees, continued to hold the posts of the dismissed 
mayors. In most cases, the incoming trustees have kept the municipal assemblies suspended. 
Hundreds  of  local  politicians  and  elected  office  holders  were  arrested  on  terrorism-related 
charges.  All  these  measures  ran  counter  to  the  basic  premises  of  democracy  by  denying 
citizens their chosen representation. According to the Venice Commission, the voters’ choice 
needs  to  be  restored  either  by  reinstating  the  suspended  mayors  or  determination  of  acting 
mayors by the elected municipal assemblies or by organising repeat elections. 

A  lawsuit  was  filed  against  İstanbul  Metropolitan  Mayor  Ekrem  İmamoğlu  on  the  grounds 
that in his press release of November 2019 he allegedly insulted the members of the Supreme 
Election Council (YSK) after the İstanbul elections had been cancelled. 

The legal  framework regulating the Ministry of  Interior’s tutelary powers over elected local 
office holders was not revised in line with Turkey’s commitments under the European Charter 
of Local Self-Government.  

The  municipal  law  envisages  local  administrations'  engagement  with  citizens  and  civil 
society.  Citizens’  assemblies,  which  aim  to  bring  together  professional  and  civil  society 
organisations  and  other  local  stakeholders,  remained  inactive  in  most  provinces.  Some 
municipalities  increased  their  level  of  transparency  and  accountability  through  innovative 
solutions, such as live broadcasting of municipal tenders. 

The  representation  of  women  at  local  level  continued  to  be  low.  Only  2  of  30  (6.6  %) 
metropolitan mayors and 42 of 1 389 (3 %) mayors are women.  

Civil Society 

Serious  backsliding  regarding  the  civil  society  environment  continued.  Civil  society  faced 
continuous pressure and their space to operate freely has continued to diminish, limiting their 
freedom  of  expression  and  freedom  of  association.  Turkey  did  not  implement  the  ECtHR 
judgement,  which  ruled  for  the  immediate  release  of  Osman  Kavala,  a  prominent  human 
rights defender. His continued pre-trial detention, further prolonged on 1 September 2021, had 
a deterrent effect on the work of the civil society at large. Human rights organisations, which 
were  closed  under  the  state  of  emergency,  were  not  offered  any  legal  remedy  in  relation  to 
confiscations.  

The new law on preventing financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction raises 
concerns with regard to possible restrictions on the activities of human rights defenders and 
civil society.  

Despite all impediments, civil society remained vocal, involved in civic life and reported on 
developments  as  much  as  possible.  Systematic  and  inclusive  mechanisms  for  consulting  a 
wide  spectrum  of  rights  based  civil  society  organisations,  notably  on  new  legislation  and 
policies need to be in place.  

A  powerful  and  diverse  civil  society  is  a  crucial  component  of  any  democratic  system  and 
should  be  acknowledged  and  treated  as  such  by  the  state  institutions.  Civil  society 
organisations in Turkey continued to make crucial contributions on key challenges facing the 
country,  notably 
the  areas  of  education,  anti-discrimination,  female  workforce 
participation, awareness-raising regarding ethnic and social tolerance, hate crimes monitoring 
and support for refugees. Civil  society  working in the area of human rights  faced increased 
pressure,  in  particular  following  detentions  and  arrests  of  activists  and  human  rights 

in 

13 

 
 
defenders.  Court  cases  with  severe  sentences  and  frequent  investigations  led  to  increased 
challenges and a hostile environment for the civil society. 

The ongoing court case of prominent human rights defender Osman Kavala, held in pre-trial 
detention since November 2017, is deeply worrying in view of the relevant ECtHR judgment, 
which  became  final  in  May  2020.  The  judgement  underlined  that  in  addition  to  violating 
Osman  Kavala’s  right  to  liberty  and  security,  his  pre-trial  detention  is  serving  ulterior 
purpose, namely to silence him and dissuade other human rights defenders, contrary to Article 
18  of  the  ECHR.  The  Council  of  Europe  urged  the  Turkish  authorities  to  ensure  Osman 
Kavala’s  immediate  release.  In  December  2020,  the  Constitutional  Court  rejected  for  the 
second  time  the  individual  application  from  Osman  Kavala  concluding  that  his  right  to 
personal  liberty  and security had not  been violated. As underlined by the Commissioner for 
Human Rights, the decision of the Istanbul 13th Assize Court of 1 September 2021 to prolong 
the detention of Mr Osman Kavala perpetuates the violation of both his human rights and of 
Turkey’s  obligation  to  abide  by  a  final  judgment  of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights. 
Another  symbolic  case  against  human  rights  defenders,  the  Büyükada  case  was  pending 
before the Court of Cassation.  

Portrayal  in  some  media  outlets  of  some  of  activists  as  criminals,  including  for  accepting 
funds from international donors remains a matter of serious concern. Defamatory rhetoric by 
public  officials  casts  serious  doubt  on  the  respect  for  a  fair  trial  and  the  presumption  of 
innocence.  

The pressure faced by female politicians and women’s organisations activists characterised by 
frequent  detention,  investigation,  and  arrest  created  a  serious  hurdle  for  the  exercise  of 
freedom  of  association,  freedom  of  expression,  and  for  participation  in  political  life. 
Discriminatory discourse and hate speech targeting LGBTIQ community increased. 

International non-governmental organisations, including those providing humanitarian aid to 
refugees,  also  faced difficulties in  their work in  Turkey. No effective domestic remedy  was 
provided for the confiscation of assets from civil society organisations closed by emergency 
decrees. 

The legal framework regulating the work of civil society organisations lacks clarity in terms 
of the distribution of responsibilities among public institutions as well as arbitrariness in the 
implementation  of  the  relevant  legislation.  It  was  still  compulsory  for  all  associations  to 
register  all  their  members  in  the  information  system  of  the  Ministry  of  Interior.  This  legal 
obligation  is  not  in  line  with  the  OSCE/Council  of  Europe  guidelines  on  freedom  of 
association. The overly broad definition of terrorism and its interpretation by the judiciary has 
a worrisome deterrent effect on civil society. 

The  law  on  preventing  financing  of  proliferation  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction  came  into 
force  in  December  2020  after  a  speedy  parliamentary  procedure  without  any  prior 
consultation  and  public  debate.  Three  UN  Special  Rapporteurs,  among  many  national  and 
international  stakeholders,  shared  their  concerns  over  the  law  and  argued  that  it  might  pose 
new  limitations  to  freedom  of  association  and  has  a  negative  impact  on  fundraising.  The 
Venice Commission, while fully recognising Turkey’s difficult security situation, also shared 
these concerns.  It underlined that the introduced measures  go beyond what is necessary and 
proportional, and some of them will have a chilling effect on NGOs. The law on collection of 
aid  continues  to  impose  burdensome  requirements  for  permits  that  discourage  fundraising 
activities by civil society organisations. These include prior notification for each fundraising 
activity and lengthy authorisation processes. Public funds are not distributed in a transparent 
way  and  the  distribution  process  does  not  allow  for  the  full  involvement  of  civil  society 
organisations  and  other  stakeholders  at  every  stage.  The  existing  tax  system  impedes  the 

14 

 
 
functioning  and development of foundations and associations. The status of ‘public benefit’ 
for  associations  and  ‘tax  exemption’  for  foundations  is  vaguely  defined  and  granted  by  the 
President.  The  space  for  foreign  donors,  which  provide  financial  support  to  civil  society  in 
Turkey under current Turkish legislation, is increasingly shrinking.  

Other  barriers  to  civil  society  and  freedom  of  association  remain,  notably  cumbersome 
administrative procedures and repetitive frequent inspections and fines. Provisions restricting 
registration,  procedures  for  obtaining  required  permits  and  the  functioning  of  associations 
need  to  be  revised,  including  facilitating  the  activities  of  international  and  national  NGOs 
working with refugees and migrants in Turkey. 

There is  still  no comprehensive government  strategy or mechanism in  place  for cooperation 
with civil society or for improving the legal framework. Nor is there any legal framework or 
transparent  and  consistent  practice  for  public  consultations.  Independent  civil  society 
organisations  are  largely  excluded  from  the  consultations  that  are  part  of  policy-making 
processes  and  monitoring.  It  is  crucial  that  the  elements  of  full  participatory  approach  are 
adopted  for  a  functioning  democracy.  Overall,  the  legal,  financial  and  administrative 
environment needs to be more conducive to developing civil society in Turkey. 

Civilian oversight of the security forces 

The legal and institutional framework governing the security and intelligence sector remained 
unchanged, with strengthened civilian oversight under the presidential system. Broad powers 
over  the  security  forces  lie  within  the  executive  branch.  During  the  reporting  period,  the 
government  took  steps  to  further  consolidate  civilian  control  of  the  security  forces.  As  of 
March 2021, the Ministry of Defence was entitled to propose military personnel’s promotion 
and appointment, a legal mandate that previously belonged to the General Staff.  

However,  the  transparency  and  accountability  of  military,  police  and  intelligence  services 
remained very limited. The culture of impunity remained prevalent and the security personnel 
continued to enjoy significant judicial and administrative shelters in cases of alleged human 
right violations and disproportionate use of force. In June 2021, the Parliament adopted a law 
introducing  legal  shelters  and  exceptions  to  the  military  personnel.  Except  the  cases  of  in 
flagrante  delicto,  the  investigation  of  offences  committed  by  the  military  staff  is  subject  to 
prior authorisation. The parliamentary oversight of the security agencies was ineffective. The 
legal framework for overseeing military expenditure was not improved.  

There  were  further  dismissals  and  arrests  of  officers  in  relation  to  the  coup  attempt  of  July 
2016.  

Situation in the east and south-east 

The situation in the south-east remained very worrying. The government carried out domestic 
and  cross-border  security  and  military  operations  in  Iraq  and  Syria.  The  security  situation 
remained  precarious  in  border  areas  with  recurrent  terrorist  acts  by  the  Kurdistan  Workers’ 
Party (PKK), which remains on the EU list of persons, groups and entities involved in acts of 
terrorism.  The  EU  unambiguously  condemned  the  PKK’s  attacks  and  expressed  solidarity 
with  the  families  of  the  victims.  While  the  government  has  a  legitimate  right  to  fight 
terrorism, it is essential that it does so in accordance with the rule of law, human rights and 
fundamental  freedoms.  Anti-terror  measures  need  to  be  proportionate.  There  were  no 
developments  on  the  resumption  of  a  credible  political  process  to  achieve  a  peaceful  and 
sustainable solution. 

15 

 
 
Visits  by  his  family  and  lawyers  to  life-sentence  serving  PKK  leader  Öcalan  were  allowed 
only intermittently. There were renewed hunger strikes in several prisons demanding an end 
to Öcalan’s isolation and protesting against human rights violations in prisons.  

Provincial  governorates  declared  recurrent  military  security  zones  in  rural  settlements.  The 
curfew  in  six  districts  of  Diyarbakir's  Sur  municipality,  in  place  since  December  2015,  was 
not lifted. The Venice Commission’s opinion on the legal framework governing curfews are 
yet  to  be  implemented.  Investigations  into  the  deaths  of  civilians  during  security  operations 
under curfews in 2015-2016 in towns such as Cizre did not progress.  

Human rights organisations and opposition parties reported serious violations of human rights 
by  security  forces,  including  alleged  instances  of  torture,  ill-treatment,  arbitrary  arrests  and 
procedural rights violations in prisons and in police and gendarmerie establishments.  

Eastern  and  south-eastern  provincial  governors  declared  frequent  blanket  bans  on  all 
demonstrations and events, with the longest repeated ban in Van in force since 2016. A very 
broad interpretation of the fight against terrorism, growing restrictions imposed on the rights 
of  journalists,  political  opponents,  bar  associations  and  human  rights  defenders  working  on 
the  Kurdish  issue  raised  repeated  concerns.  Associations,  Kurdish-language  media  outlets, 
and  cultural  rights  institutions  remained  mostly  closed.  In  April  2021,  the  Constitutional 
Court annulled a provision of the emergency decree that set the basis for the closures of media 
outlets  on  the  ground  of  "posing  a  threat  to  national  security”  in  2016.  The  Constitutional 
Court also reversed a provision that paved the way for the seizure of the properties of those 
that were shut down. 

Attempts to link the HDP to a terrorist organisation, and prosecute it accordingly, intensified. 
In June, the Constitutional Court accepted an indictment demanding to close down the HDP, 
seeking political ban for 451 HDP executives, including the party’s co-chairs and all past and 
present  members  of  Parliament  and  executives  as  well  as  a  freeze  on  the  party’s  bank 
accounts.  There  were  hundreds  of  new  detentions  and  arrests  of  elected  representatives  and 
mayors,  municipal  council  members  and  municipal  executives  in  the  east  and  south-east  of 
Turkey on terrorism-related charges. Requests by the prosecution in the Parliament to lift the 
immunity  of  almost  all  HDP  lawmakers  are  pending.  Former  HDP  co-chair  Selahattin 
Demirtaş  was  not  released  from  prison  despite  two  final  ECtHR  judgements  ruling  for  his 
immediate  release.  The  Constitutional  Court’s  ruling  of  June  2020  on  the  violation  of 
Demirtaş’s right to liberty and security was not implemented.  

Overall,  48  elected  mayors  were  replaced  by  state  appointed  trustees,  out  of  the  65 
municipalities  won  by  the  HDP  in  the  March  2019  local  elections.  Since  the  first  trustee 
appointment in June 2019, 83 co-mayors were detained. Currently six HDP co-mayors are in 
prison,  and  five  co-mayors  are  under  house  arrest.  In  metropolitan  municipalities  alone, 
almost  100  elected  municipal  assembly  members  were  suspended.  These  dismissals  and 
arrests triggered reactions across the political landscape and civil society, as well as from the 
international  community.  As  a  long-standing  member  of  the  Council  of  Europe  and 
a candidate country, Turkey must safeguard its democratic system, including the freedom of 
political association. 

Court cases launched against government-funded construction projects on cultural, historical, 
and  religious  heritage  sites  damaged  in  2015  and  2016  are  ongoing.  There  were  renewed 
tensions  around  several  projects,  which  are  considered  to  be  culturally  and  environmentally 
destructive, such as the mining project in Tunceli Mountains, which is part of a national park 
and a sacred site for Alevis. The Ilisu Dam on the Tigris River flooded most of the historic 
town in Hasankeyf and surrounding sites, natural habitats and historical heritage. The serious 
risk of such damages had been raised for years by residents and activists.  

16 

 
 
There was still no comprehensive, consistent approach in place in relation to missing persons, 
to the exhumation of mass graves or to the independent investigation of  all alleged cases of 
extrajudicial killing by security and law enforcement officers. Most of the investigations into 
cases of enforced disappearance from the 1990s have faced the 20-year statute of limitations. 
Out of more than 1 400 cases of missing persons, only 16 court cases have been launched. 14 
ended in acquittals of the alleged perpetrators, two are ongoing and two other cases are before 
the Court of Cassation.  

Refugees and internally displaced persons  

Turkey  continues  to  host  the  largest  number  of  refugees  worldwide.  According  to  Turkey’s 
Directorate-General  of  Migration  Management,  Turkey  hosted  3  670  342  Syrian  refugees 
with  temporary  protection  status,  some  92  000  Syrians  with  legal  residency  and  110  000 
Syrians with Turkish citizenship. The number of Syrian refugees who voluntarily returned to 
Syria from Turkey stood at 420 000 according to the Turkish government. Besides the Syrian 
refugees,  Turkey  hosts  320  000  asylum-seekers  and  refugees  from  countries  including  Iraq, 
Afghanistan,  Iran  and  Somalia  as  of  January  2021,  according  to  the  United  Nations  High 
Commissioner for Refugees.  

In 2020, Turkey granted international protection (refugee status, conditional refugee status or, 
subsidiary  protection)  to  8  753  applicants  (5  449  in  2019).  The  authorities  rejected  10  674  
applications  compared  with  5  212  in  2019.  The  backlog  of  international  protection 
applications remains high. Human rights organisations and lawyers reported challenges with 
access to registration in several provinces. Barriers to registration compound vulnerability of 
applicants as they increase the risk of detention and deportation. In December 2020, 886 653 
foreign  nationals  holding  residence  permits  were  present  in  Turkey,  including  humanitarian 
residence holders.  

Turkey  continued  to  refuse  to  resume  the  readmission  of  returnees  from  the  Greek  islands, 
interrupted in March 2020, citing COVID-19 restrictions despite the European Commission’s 
repeated requests to fully implement all the provisions of the EU-Turkey Statement. However, 
resettlement of Syrians from Turkey to the EU Member States resumed in July 2020 with the 
necessary health precautions in place. 

Disaggregated data on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on refugees was not available. 
The  pandemic  had  a  disproportionately  negative  effect  on  vulnerable  groups  including 
refugees  and  internally  displaced  persons,  who  were  already  living  in  dire  economic 
conditions. Many refugees lost jobs in the informal sectors of the economy. Others continued 
to  be  exploited  in  the  informal  economy  and  their  poverty  and  unregistered  status  inhibited 
access to health care, social security, benefits and other services. Administrative requirements, 
restrictions  on  the  freedom  of  movement  and  prejudice  were  among  the  main  obstacles  to 
secure a formal (legal) employment.   

Turkey  made  sustained  significant  efforts  to  provide  support  for  refugees  and  ensure  wider 
access  to  healthcare  and  schooling,  with  768  839  children  enrolled  in  formal  education  by 
December 2020, compared to 684 728 children in 2019. However, more than 400 000 school-
aged  refugee  children  were  still  out-of-school  and  did  not  have  any  access  to  education 
opportunities. Syrian refugees continued to benefit from free-of-charge healthcare provided in 
177 Migrant Health Centres funded by the EU through its Facility for Refugees in Turkey and 
in Turkish hospitals. Many cities continued to enhance municipal services and infrastructure 
to respond to the population increase as a result of the influx of refugees.  

Turkey  needs  to  further  align  its  practice  with  European  standards  in  removal  centres,  in 
particular with regard to protection of human rights, including access to legal counselling and 

17 

 
 
interpreters  and  protection  of  vulnerable  groups,  in  particular  children  staying  with  their 
families.  

There was limited progress on the situation of internally displaced persons resulting from the 
violence in  the south-east  in  the 1990s  and in  more recent  years. The COVID-19 pandemic 
exacerbated  economic  exclusion  and  deteriorating  living  conditions  for  internally  displaced 
persons. 

2.1.2. Public Administration Reform 

Turkey  has  some  level  of  preparation/is  moderately  prepared  in  the  field  of  public 
administration  reform.  There  was  no  progress  during  the  reporting  period.  Overall,  the 
country  lacks  a  comprehensive  public  administration  reform  agenda  and  a  relevant  leading 
institution  in  charge.  Concerns  remained  over  the  accountability  of  the  administration  and 
human  resources  management.  The  political  will  to  reform  is  still  lacking.  Policymaking  is 
not  evidence-based  or  participatory.  The  politicisation  of  the  administration  continued. 
Women’s representation remained low in the higher echelons of the bureaucracy. Last year’s 
recommendations were not implemented. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular:  

  prepare  and  present  an  inter-institutional  public  administration  reform  plan  in  line  with 

EU principles and values, and with the necessary political ownership and support; 

  ensure that the Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures provides for an 
effective  remedy,  which  safeguards  the  right  of  every  individual  to  a  fair  administrative 
process; 

  introduce merit-based appointments and promotions for the senior managerial positions of 

the civil service.  

Strategic framework for public administration reform  

Turkey  has  not  produced  an  overarching  strategy  or  planning  document  on  public 
administration reform. The continued absence of political support and the limited ownership 
shown  by  the  administration  have  further  compromised  the  conditions  for  a  comprehensive 
governance  reform.  Several  planning  documents  and  sectoral  policy  documents  on  various 
aspects of public administration reform exist but provide only a fragmented framework. Most 
of these policy documents do not specify the expected costs of reform measures, so financial 
sustainability of public sector reforms is not guaranteed (see Chapter 32 – Financial control). 
An  administrative  unit 
to  coordinate,  design,  and  monitor  public 
administration reforms needs to be established. Such a unit would need to coordinate with the 
Ministry  of  Treasury  and  Finance,  to  ensure  coherence  of  strategic  and  fiscal  planning  and 
efficiently address managerial accountability. 

legally  entitled 

Policy development and coordination  

The  centralisation  of  policymaking  under  the  presidential  system  continued.  The  collegiate 
decision  making  was  further  reduced  by  the  stronger  role  of  the  Presidency.  Policy 
coordination  among  central  government  institutions  has  remained  strong  in  practice.  The 
Presidential administration and the Presidential Councils continued to play an increasing role 
in  policy  making,  while  the  policymaking  role  of  ministries  further  diminished.  Most 
regulatory authorities are linked by law to the Presidency. 

The  link  between  policymaking  and  financial  planning  remains  weak.  An  inclusive  and 
evidence-based  policymaking  process  is  still  absent  and  there  is  no  legal  obligation  for  the 

18 

 
 
  
Presidency and ministries to conduct public consultations. During the reporting period, public 
consultations seldom took place.  

Evidence-based  policymaking  instruments,  such  as  regulatory  impact  assessments  were  not 
used by the executive and by the legislative branch which has no resources to conduct them. 
In the absence of systematic ex-post monitoring and public reporting on the implementation 
of  key  government  programmes,  the  public  scrutiny  of  government's  work  has  remained 
inadequate, contributing to the lack of accountability of the administration.  

Public financial management  

lacking  an  overarching  public 

Turkey  continues 
financial  management  reform 
programme.  The  annual  budget  is  prepared  as  part  of  the  medium-term  budgetary 
framework. Public procurement legislation is not in line with the EU acquis. The vast number 
of exemptions inserted into the Law on Public Procurement disrupts public transparency and 
accountability  (See  also  Chapter  5).  In  the  absence  of  adequate  ex-post  monitoring  and 
reporting, major public investment programmes lack transparency. There is no clear strategy 
for domestic revenue mobilisation; ad hoc tax changes continued (see also Chapter 16). The 
implementation of the strategy and an action plan for the fight against the informal economy 
(2019-2021) continued at a good pace. 

As  regards  external  audit,  the  Turkish  Court  of  Accounts’  ex-post  controls  continued  to 
provide  substantive  information  for  parliamentary  oversight  as  well  as  for  the  public.  The 
Court  of  Accounts’  reports  produced  mass  media  coverage  about  alleged  corruption  and 
misuse of public resources. However, there remained certain shortcomings. Under the Law on 
the Turkish Court of Accounts, certain institutions are exempted from the Court’s remit and, 
thus, from the associated parliamentary scrutiny. The parliamentary and judicial follow-up to 
audit reports need to be improved. 

The limited parliamentary oversight of the budget resulted in reduced budget transparency. 
The  Turkish  State  Wealth  Fund  lacks  accountability  and  transparency;  its  investments  and 
borrowing is not integrated into the budget. Annual budgetary figures are aggregated and the 
budget reports are hard to comprehend. Opportunities for citizens to engage in the budgetary 
process were absent in the reporting period. 

Public service and human resources management  

The civil service remains substantially governed by the Civil Servants’ Act of 1965. The need 
for new legislation on the public service has been raised several times, but a non-systematic 
approach  continued  to  prevail.  Turkey  is  still  missing  an  overall  civil  service  strategy  and 
overall monitoring report on the implementation of civil service policy. 

The  civil  service  legal  framework  does  not  guarantee  neutrality,  continuity  or  merit-based 
recruitment  and  promotion  procedures.  Numerous  reported  incidents  affirmed  the 
politicisation of the civil service. The President dismissed two Central Bank Governors in the 
reporting  period.  Moreover,  between  March  and  May  2021,  the  President  dismissed  and 
replaced  four  of  the  Central  Bank’s  seven-member  Monetary  Policy  Committee.  The  first 
phase  of  external  recruitment  for  entry-level  positions  is  based  on  merit,  whereas  the  oral 
interview phase remains poorly regulated and thus open to political patronage. Nepotism was 
prevalent  in  the  absence  of  competitive  objective  criteria  for  the  top  civil  service  posts  and 
access to top civil service positions was prone to political interference. 

Accountability of the administration  

In  the  presidential  system,  the  organisation  of  the  state  administration  follows  centralised 
lines of accountability to the Presidency. Accountability of agencies remains largely weak 

19 

 
 
and  internal  control  and  audit  does  not  function  effectively.  Most  executive  institutions  are 
formally embedded in ministries, although they retain autonomy over day-to-day operational 
management.  The  roles  and  responsibilities  of  different  institutions  are  still  not  fully  clear, 
which has a negative impact on efficiency, transparency and accountability.  

State institutions are required to submit annual accountability reports on the use of resources 
to  achieve  targets,  but  a  systematic  follow-up  mechanism  by  the  executive  was  not  put  in 
place.  Institutions 
lack  a  culture  of  managerial  accountability  and  delegation  of 
responsibilities (see Chapter 32 - Financial control).  

Citizens’  right  to  good  administration  is  formally  ensured  through  relevant  internal  and 
external  oversight  arrangements,  such  as  internal  audit  and  control  units,  and  the  Turkish 
Court  of  Accounts.  The  impact  of  the  control  functions  was  however  limited.  The  role  of 
oversight  institutions  such  as  the  Ombudsman  remained  limited  in  the  absence  of  ex  officio 
powers (see Governance).  

The right to access public information is regulated by the Law on the Right to Information. 
There is no centralised independent body in charge of overseeing the implementation of the 
law. The law allows for broad exemptions on grounds of protecting state secrets, commercial 
secrets  and  personal  data.  The  absence  of  a  revised  legislation  covering  those  areas  of 
exemption, limits the citizens’ access to information.  

Easy  online  access  led  to  about  1.3  million  applications  for  access  to  information  in  2020, 
with 7 % of refusals. 

Concerns remain as regards the Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures. 
There  are  11  544  applications  pending.  Strong  concerns  remain  as  to  whether  each  case  is 
being  examined  individually,  the  rights  of  defence  of  those  dismissed  are  respected  and  the 
assessment  procedure  is  in  line  with  international  standards.  Since  there  were  no  hearings, 
there was a general lack of procedural rights for applicants and decisions were taken on the 
basis of the written files related to the original dismissal, all of which called into question the 
extent to which the Inquiry Commission is an effective judicial remedy. 

Service delivery to citizens and businesses  

There is still no law on general administrative procedures in Turkey. The lack of such legal 
framework makes it difficult to assess to what extent the principles of good administration are 
guaranteed  and  hinders  work  on  simplifying  administrative  procedures  as  well  as  cutting 
red tape. In this context, citizens and businesses are faced with increasing legal uncertainty. 

There is no central policy or co-ordination mechanism for improving horizontally the overall 
quality of services. Most of the institutions developed service delivery standards within their 
own  legal  remit.  No  institution  is  responsible  for  overall  promotion  or  measurement  of  the 
quality  of  public  services.  Given  the  particular  conditions  imposed  by  the  COVID-19 
pandemic,  e-government  services  and  administrative  simplification  progressed  further.  The 
number  of  e-government  users  exceeded  54.2  million.  Ministries,  central  government 
agencies and municipalities developed their online services. 

20 

 
 
2.2. 

 Rule of law and fundamental rights  

Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights  

The EU’s founding values include the rule of law and respect for human rights. An effective 
(independent,  of  quality  and  efficient)  judicial  system  and  effective  fight  against  corruption 
are of paramount importance, as is respect for fundamental rights in law and in practice. 

Turkey is at an early stage of applying the EU acquis and European standards in this area. 
Serious  backsliding  continued  during  the  reporting  period.  Major  issues  identified  in 
previous reports were not addressed, in particular the systemic lack of independence of the 
judiciary  and  the  urgent  need  to  improve  the  human  rights  situation.  A  new  human  rights 
action  plan,  while  a  welcomed  initiative  in  principle,  did  not  present  concrete  steps  to 
remedy the most acute problems in this area.  

Undue pressure on judges and prosecutors continued to have a significant negative effect on 
the independence and the overall quality of the judiciary. The negative effects of the large-
scale  dismissals  of  judges  and  prosecutors  continued  to  weigh  on  the  efficiency  and 
professionalism of the judiciary. Turkey’s refusal to implement the rulings of the European 
Court of Human Rights further increased concerns regarding its judiciary’s adherence to the 
international and European standards. 

Corruption  remained  widespread  and  continued  to  be  an  issue  of  concern.  There  was  no 
progress  in  addressing  the  many  gaps  in  the  Turkish  anti-corruption  framework,  which  is 
a sign of a lack of will to fight decisively corruption. 

Serious backsliding continued on human rights. Broad restrictions imposed on the activities 
of  journalists,  writers,  lawyers,  academics,  human  rights  defenders  and  critical  voices 
continued to have a negative effect on the exercise of their freedoms. Turkey’s withdrawal 
from  the  Istanbul  Convention  raised  further  concerns  about  its  adherence  to  international 
human rights standards.  The damage caused by the state of emergency on the fundamental 
rights and the related legislation adopted was not remedied.   

Functioning of the judiciary 

Turkey  is  at  an  early  stage  in  this  area.  Serious  backsliding  continued  as  further  judicial 
decisions  contradicted  the  ECtHR  case  law.  The  new  human  rights  action  plan  envisages 
certain  measures  to  improve  the  independence  of  the  judiciary.  However,  the  human  rights 
action plan does not address any of the key shortcomings related to the independence of the 
judiciary.  Despite  their  acquittal,  none  of  the  judges  or  prosecutors  dismissed  following  the 
coup attempt were reinstated. The lack of objective, merit-based, uniform and pre-established 
criteria for recruiting and promoting judges and prosecutors remains a source of concern. No 
changes  were  made  to  the  institution  of  criminal  law  judges  of  peace  and  concerns  remain 
regarding their jurisdiction and practice. 

The recommendations of last year were not addressed. In the coming year, Turkey should in 
particular:  

  create  a  political  and  legal  environment  that  allows  the  judiciary  to  perform  its  duties 
independently  and  impartially,  respecting  European  standards;  strengthen  judicial 
responsibilities,  with  the  executive  and  legislature  fully  respecting  the  separation  of 
powers;  and  ensure  that  lower  courts  respect  judgments  by  the  Constitutional  Court, 
whose decisions should follow ECtHR jurisprudence; 

  amend  the  structure  and  process  of  selecting  the  members  of  the  Council  of Judges  and 

21 

 
 
Prosecutors  so  that  the  role  and  influence  of  the  executive  is  limited,  and  introduce 
safeguards against any interference by the Council of Judges and Prosecutors or high level 
officials in judicial proceedings; 

  provide effective guarantees against transfers of judges without their consent;  

  in accordance with the guaranteed judicial independence under the Constitution, limit any 
suspension  of  judges  from  office  to  cases  where  there  are  well-founded  suspicions  of 
serious misbehaviour and take measures to remedy the damage caused by the dismissals 
that took place in breach of procedural rights; 

  revise  the  system  of  disciplinary  proceedings  so  that  it  is  based  on  objective  criteria 

without undue influence from the executive; 

  in relation to the administrative and judicial measure taken against individuals, ensure that 
any  allegation  of  wrongdoing  or  crime  is  subject  to  due  process,  based  on  concrete 
evidence, in line with fully transparent procedures under the authority of an independent 
judiciary; 

  ensure  that  all  judicial  proceedings  respect  fundamental  rights,  including  procedural 
rights, in particular the presumption of innocence, individual criminal responsibility, legal 
certainty, the right to defence, the right to a fair trial, equality of arms and the right to an 
effective appeal.  

Strategic documents 

The  implementation  of  the  Judicial  Reform  Strategy  for  2019-2023  continued.  The  Judicial 
Reform Strategy Action Plan was announced in October 2020. According to the authorities, 
the  rate  of  implementation  of  the  Strategy  is  around  50  %.  However,  there  is  no  evidence-
based assessment of the results of its implementation.  

A  new  human  rights  action  plan  announced  in  March  2021  foresees  some  notable 
improvements,  including  limited  activities  to  improve  the  independence  of  the  judiciary. 
However, it does not effectively address the key shortcomings to tackle the systemic lack of 
the  independence  of  the  judiciary.  Most  importantly,  the  human  rights  action  plan  does  not 
address  the  Venice  Commission’s  opinion  on  the  constitutional  amendment  of  April  2017, 
referring  to  the  principle  of  separation  of  powers  and  the  revision  of  the  structure  of  the 
Council of Judges and Prosecutors. 

Management bodies 

Concerns remain around the structure of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors, the lack of 
independence from the executive and the appointment process of its members. In accordance 
with  the  Constitution,  four  members  out  of  13  are  appointed  by  the  President  and  seven 
members are appointed by Parliament by qualified majority. None is elected by their peers. In 
May  2021,  the  President  appointed  four  new  members  and  the  Parliament  appointed  seven 
new members. The remaining two seats are attributed ex officio to the Minister of Justice and 
the  Deputy  Minister,  who  are  also  appointed  by  the  President.  The  budget  allocated  to  the 
Council  of  Judges  and  Prosecutors  is  93  163  000  TRY  (9  150  405  EUR)  for  2020  and 
103 209 000 TRY (10 148 850 EUR) for 2021.  

Due to its lack of independence, the Council of Judges and Prosecutors remains suspended, 
since  December  2016,  from  participating  in  the  European  Network  of  Councils  for  the 
Judiciary.  

Independence and impartiality 

22 

 
 
Although  judicial  independence  is  set  out  in  the  Constitution  and  the  relevant  legislation, 
there were further concerns regarding the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. In 
June  2021,  the  Constitutional  Court  accepted  the  indictment  to  close  the  second  largest 
opposition party HDP.  

The  shortcomings  identified  in  the  December  2016  opinion  of  the  Venice  Commission, 
related to the minimal standards for dismissals of judges as well as legal safeguards regarding 
the transfer of judges and prosecutors are yet to be addressed. Appeals against such transfers 
are  possible  but  usually  unsuccessful.  Throughout  2020,  the  transfers  of  judges  and 
prosecutors without their consent and without any justification apart from requirements of the 
service  continued.  In  May  2021,  the  Council  of  Judges  and  Prosecutors  transferred  3  070 
judges and prosecutors, just before the end of the Council’s mandate. Overall, 3 968 judges 
and  public  prosecutors  were  dismissed  for  alleged  links  to  the  Gülen  movement  since  the 
attempted coup.  

The  human  rights  action  plan  foresees  a  few  activities  to  improve  the  independence  of  the 
judiciary, including the prevention of frequent transfer of judges, geographical guarantees for 
judges  and  prosecutors,  a  review  of  the  disciplinary  and  promotion  system  of  judges  and 
prosecutors  and  an  improved  inspection  system  based  on  objective  criteria.  Most  of  these 
activities were already included in the Judicial Reform Strategy.  

Representatives of the executive and the legislature continued to publicly criticise and openly 
reject the ECtHR case law and the Constitutional Court. The leader of the MHP, part of the 
ruling coalition, pleaded for the abolition of the Constitutional Court. The Council of Judges 
and Prosecutors took no action against the members of courts who refrained from abiding by 
Constitutional  Court  judgments.  Judicial  independence  was  further  undermined  by  public 
comments of representatives from the executive and legislature, including from the President 
over ongoing judicial cases. 

Justice  professionals  frequently  resorted  to  pre-trial  detention,  while  European  standards 
consider it a last resort measure and for the shortest amount of time. The ECtHR concluded 
in  several  cases,  including  in  the  judgement  of  Selahattin  Demirtaş,  that  the  judicial 
authorities’ decision to extend the detention was based on grounds that were not sufficient to 
justify such decision and its duration.   

The recommendations of the Venice Commission’s opinion on the criminal peace judgeships 
have not been implemented. Under the current system, criminal law judges of peace have far-
reaching  powers  while  objections  to  their  decisions  are  not  reviewed  by  a  higher  judicial 
body but by another criminal judge of peace.  

Lawyers,  especially  those  providing  legal  assistance  to  Human  Rights  Defenders  and  civil 
and  political  activists,  faced  considerable  obstacles  in  performing  their  work,  including 
pressure and external interferences. Such interferences entail the refusal of admissions to the 
profession  of  lawyer  for  those  who  were  dismissed  by  a  state  of  emergency  decree.  The 
elections  of  most  of  the  Bar  Associations  were  prevented  from  taking  place  due  to  the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Consequently, the elections of the Union of Turkish Bar Associations 
were not held.  

Accountability  

Mechanisms to detect breaches of the integrity rules and enforce disciplinary penalties need 
to be made effective and free from political interference. However, they are undermined by 
the  lack  of  independence  of  the  Council  of  Judges  and  Prosecutors.  Some  members  of  the 
judiciary were subjected to sanctions for the legitimate exercise of their professional duties. 
The examination lodged in February 2020, by the Council of Judges and Prosecutors into the 

23 

 
 
three judges who acquitted the defendants in the Gezi Park trial due to a lack of evidence is 
still pending.  

The  obligation  of  judges  and  prosecutors  to  declare  their  assets  every  five  years  is  still 
applicable. It remains important to have a credible and functioning verification system and to 
ensure that due follow-up is given to late or wrong declarations of assets. No information is 
available as to sanctions imposed in case of breach of this procedure. 

Professionalism and competence 

Recruitments of judges and prosecutors continued to be carried out through a non-transparent 
selection process. The Ministry of Justice supervises the selection boards for new judges and 
prosecutors, and manages their yearly appraisal. The Council of Judges and Prosecutors itself 
plays no role in the selection boards, even though it takes the final decision on recruitment. 
There  was  no  progress  concerning  the  establishment  of  objective,  merit-based,  uniform  and 
pre-established criteria for recruiting and promoting judges and prosecutors. The legal exam 
introduced in October 2019 for prospective judges, lawyers or public notaries to be conducted 
by the Higher Education Council has yet to take place. 

Quality of justice 

The  pre-service  training  of  candidate  judges  and  prosecutors  as  well  as  in-service  trainings 
continued  to  be  delivered  by  the  Justice  Academy  of  Turkey.  While  the  Academy  has 
scientific,  administrative  and  financial  autonomy  by  law,  concerns  remain  related  to  its 
independence, as it has no general assembly or board of directors and the management is left 
to its president, who is appointed by the President of the Republic. The lack of independence 
of  the  Academy  affects  its  capacity  to  provide  training  programmes  that  meet  the 
requirements  of  openness,  competence  and  impartiality.  The  European  Judicial  Training 
Network  (EJTN)  decided  at  its  2021  General  Assembly  to  maintain  the  suspension  of  the 
observer status of the Judicial Academy of Turkey decided in 2017. 

The  human  rights  action  plan  envisages  modifications  of  the  seating  order  to  ensure  that 
defendants  enjoy  a  more  effective  access  to  the  legal  assistance  of  a  lawyer  during  the 
hearing. The objectives announced in the human rights action plan should also improve the 
quality of judicial decisions in terms of legal reasoning and factual evidence. Particularly in 
terrorism-related  cases,  there  is  a  need  to  eliminate  the  concerns  that  evidence  extracted 
coercively  may  be  used  to  convict  people.  Evidence  presented  by  the  defence  needs  to  be 
duly reflected in the court’s assessment. The system of confidentiality of decisions should be 
revised, as it is still used in many cases to limit access to justice and the right of defence.  

Frequent  transfers  of  judges  and  prosecutors  continued  to  negatively  affect  the  quality  of 
justice along with posting of newly recruited judges and prosecutors with less experience to 
the criminal courts.  

Efficiency 

While  the  Judicial  Reform  Strategy  aimed  to  increase  the  quality  and  quantity  of  human 
resources, this goal was not achieved yet and did not lead to a reduction of the current backlog 
of cases. The budget for the judiciary was almost TRY 20 billion in 2020 (around EUR 2.02 
billion), representing 0.32 % of GDP and EUR 25 per inhabitant and TRY 24 billion for 2021 
(around EUR 2.42 billion).  

Large parts of the judiciary continued to be under severe pressure to handle cases in a timely 
manner,  as  the  effects  of  the  large-scale  dismissals  were  still  observed.  Regarding  the 
backlog  of  cases  in  the  high  courts,  in  June  2021  there  were  43  372  pending  cases  for  the 
Constitutional Court, compared to 36 265 in June 2020, and 133 428 for the Council of State 

24 

 
 
as of 31 March 2021. In 2020, the regional court of appeals received a total of 724 558 cases 
and dealt with 799 974 cases. It settled 780 193 cases. The Code of Procedures in general is 
free of formalism and does provide adequate tools in cases of urgency. Nevertheless, abusive 
delays  are  not  sanctioned.  Individual  applications  to  the  Constitutional  Court  continued  to 
increase.  Since  the  individual  applications  started  in  September  2012,  it  received  a  total  of 
295 038 individual applications as of 31 December 2020 and has concluded 257 108 of them. 
The Court has found violation of at least one of rights in 14 027 applications. The number of 
pending applications is  37 930. In 2020, 40 402 applications were lodged and 45 414 were 
concluded.  

As of April 2021, there were 19.7 judges and 8.6 prosecutors per 100 000 inhabitants (against 
the  European  average  of  21  judges/12  prosecutors  per  100  000  inhabitants).  There  were 
21 979 judges and prosecutors in total, 1 379 of whom were recruited in 2020.  

Fight against corruption 

Turkey is at an early stage in the fight against corruption and there was no progress during 
the reporting period. The country has not  established anti-corruption bodies  in  line with  the 
United  Nations  Convention  against  Corruption,  to  which  Turkey  is  party.  The  flaws  of  the 
legal  framework  and  institutional  architecture  allowed  undue  political  influence  in  the 
investigation and prosecution phases of corruption cases. The accountability and transparency 
of  public  institutions  need  to  be  improved.  The  absence  of  an  anti-corruption  strategy  and 
action  plan  indicated  a  lack  of  will  to  fight  decisively  corruption.  Most  of  the  Council  of 
Europe’s  Group  of  States  against  Corruption  (GRECO)  outstanding  recommendations  have 
not been implemented. Overall, corruption is widespread and remains an issue of concern.  

In  this  regard,  the  Commission’s  recommendations  of  the  last  years  are  maintained.  In  the 
coming year, Turkey should in particular:  

  effectively  implement  its  international  obligations  in  relation  to  the  fight  against 
corruption, including adhering to the United Nations Convention against Corruption and 
the Council of Europe Conventions; 

  ensure  effective  follow-up  to  the  recommendations  issued  by  the  GRECO,  including  by 

adopting the necessary legislation; 

  establish  a  track  record  of  successful  prosecution  of,  and  convictions  for  high-level 

corruption; 

  adopt an anti-corruption strategy, reflecting a clear political will and vision to effectively 

address corruption, underpinned by a credible and realistic action plan. 

Track record 

The  track  record  of  investigation,  prosecution  and  conviction  in  corruption  cases  remained 
poor, particularly in relation to high profile corruption cases implicating politicians and public 
officials. The President dismissed the Minister of Trade in April 2021, amidst allegations of 
a corruption scandal implicating her family members and advisors in public tenders. Despite 
suspicions  raised  by  public  revelations,  no  judicial  investigation  was  launched.  The  main 
opposition  party,  CHP,  filed  a  motion  requesting  a  parliamentary  inquiry  commission  to 
investigate  the  allegations.  Corruption-related  sentences  need  to  be  more  dissuasive.  The 
corruption  perception  remains  high  and  was  further  exacerbated  by  public  accusations  from 
a mafia  leader  targeting  several  government  members  and  public  figures  for  their  alleged 
involvement in corruption and other crime cases.  

Institutional framework 

25 

 
 
Prevention measures 

Turkey  has  still  not  established  any  permanent,  functionally  independent  anti-corruption 
body.  Inspection  units  within  the  administration  remained  ineffective.  The  coordination 
between various preventive bodies such as the audit and inspection units and the prosecution 
offices  remained inadequate. The legal  framework of anti-corruption also  remained weak in 
the private sector. There were no awareness-raising campaigns on anti-corruption.  

Law enforcement 

There  were  no  prosecution  services  nor  courts  specialised  in  anti-corruption  cases.  The 
executive exerted undue political influence over judicial police. Financial investigations were 
not  systematically  carried  out  in  corruption  and  organised  crime  cases.  Financial  control  of 
political parties remained ineffective. 

Legal framework 

Turkey is party to all international anti-corruption conventions. However, Turkey fails to fully 
align with the provisions of these conventions. Previous anti-corruption strategies and action 
plans have not been effectively followed up. The legislative reforms foreseen in previous anti-
corruption strategies have not been undertaken. The legislation on whistle-blower protection 
and public procurement is not aligned with the EU acquis. 

No  tangible  progress  was  made  to  implement  GRECO’s  recommendations.  In  its  Second 
Interim  Compliance  Report  under  the  Fourth  Evaluation  Round,  published  in  March  2021, 
GRECO  concluded  that  no  changes  intervened  in  Turkey  since  the  adoption  of  the  Interim 
Report in March 2019:  out of 22 recommendations in the area of “Corruption prevention in 
respect  of  members  of  Parliament,  judges  and  prosecutors”,  only  three  remain  satisfactorily 
implemented.  Nine  recommendations  are  still  only  partially 
ten 
recommendations remain not implemented. GRECO further underlined the absence of a law 
on ethical conduct for members of Parliament and the lack of measures to ensure integrity of 
Members of Parliament.  

implemented  and 

Under the Third Evaluation Round, officially closed in October 2020 after 10 years, Turkey 
implemented  satisfactorily  only  seven  of  the  17  recommendations.  More  specifically,  as 
regards the transparency of political financing which was assessed under that Round, only one 
GRECO recommendation out of nine has been fully implemented over the last 10 years.   

Shortcomings remain unaddressed in the Criminal Code, which do not meet the standards put 
in  place  by  the  Criminal  Law  Convention  on  Corruption.  The  significant  number  of 
exemptions  included  in  the  Law  on  Public  Procurement  created  a  grey  area  for  corruption. 
The  legal  privileges  and  shelters  of  public  officials,  such  as  the  requirement  for  prior 
authorisation  from  their  hierarchy  before  starting  an  investigation  of  alleged  wrongdoing, 
continued  to  provide  legal  protection  for  public  officials  in  anti-corruption  criminal  and 
administrative  investigations.  The  legal  framework  on  preventing,  prosecuting  and  issuing 
penalties  for  conflicts  of  interest  as  well  as  on  declaring,  verifying  and  disclosing  assets 
remained inadequate and unaddressed. Turkey took no steps to align its legislation governing 
lobbying. 

Strategic framework 

The  2010-2014  as  well  as  2016-2019  anti-corruption  strategies  and  their  respective  action 
plans failed to meet most of their stated objectives. Outstanding measures have not yet been 
implemented. Turkey again failed to take measures that will strengthen its overall capacity to 

26 

 
 
 
coordinate, implement and monitor all anti-corruption actions among the relevant preventive 
institutions and law enforcement agencies.  

Fundamental rights  

The  deterioration  of  human  rights  continued  and  no  progress  was  made  on  last  year’s 
recommendations. Many of the measures introduced during the state of emergency remain in 
force and continue to have a profound and devastating impact on people in Turkey. The legal 
framework includes  general  guarantees of respect for human and fundamental rights but the 
legislation  and  practice  still  need  to  be  brought  into  line  with  the  European  Convention  on 
Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case-law.  

The  Council  of  Europe’s  Parliamentary  Assembly  continued  its  monitoring  of  Turkey’s 
respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Broad scale restrictions imposed on 
the activities of journalists,  writers, lawyers, academics, human rights  defenders and critical 
voices continued to have a negative effect on the exercise of their freedoms and lead to self-
censorship. Turkey’s continued refusal to implement ECtHR rulings, notably in the cases of 
Selahattin Demirtaş and Osman Kavala, further increased concerns regarding the judiciary’s 
adherence to the international and European standards.  

Turkey’s  withdrawal  from  the  Istanbul  Convention  also  questioned  its  commitment  to  such 
standards. The new human rights action plan, which promised reforms in a number of areas, 
does not address critical issues.  

In  addition  to  addressing  the  shortcomings  set  out  in  this  section,  which have  still  not  been 
addressed, in the coming year Turkey should in particular: 

  align  criminal  and  anti-terror  legislation  and  their  implementation  with  European 

standards, ECHR and ECtHR case-law and Venice Commission recommendations; 

  ensure that any allegation of offence is subject to due process, based on concrete evidence 
and  fully  transparent  procedures  under  the  authority  of  an  independent  and  impartial 
judiciary,  and  fully  respecting  the  right  to  a  fair  trial  and  relevant  procedural  rights,  in 
particular the presumption of innocence, individual criminal responsibility, legal certainty, 
the right to defence, equality of arms and the right to an effective appeal; 

  ensure the effectiveness of the Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures 
as a domestic remedy and that all public-sector employees arbitrarily dismissed during the 
state  of  emergency  continue  to  be  re-instated,  and  appropriately  compensated  for  any 
harm, including loss of earnings; 

  effectively  tackle  all  forms  of  violence  against  women,  including  domestic  violence, 
psychological and physical abuse, sexual harassment, rape, crimes committed in the name 
of  “honour”,  stalking,  and  forced  marriage;  implement  measures  to  prevent  violence 
against women, to protect the victims and to prosecute the perpetrators. 

Turkey is a party to most international human rights instruments, although the respect for 
fundamental rights in practice continued to be undermined. The withdrawal from the Council 
of  Europe  Convention  on  preventing  and  combating  violence  against  women  and  domestic 
violence  (“Istanbul  Convention”)  was  widely  considered  to  be  an  important  setback.  It  also 
led  to  renewed  legal  debates  regarding  Turkey’s  possibility  to  withdraw  from  other 
international conventions. In June 2021, the Constitutional Court ruled that the President has 
the  authority  to  withdraw  Turkey  from  international  conventions  by  Presidential  decree  and 
rejected the request for the suspension of the enforcement of the withdrawal from the Istanbul 
Convention made by a number of political parties and CSOs. Turkey has not  yet signed the 

27 

 
 
International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance and 
the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
The  full  monitoring  procedure  by  the  Parliamentary  Assembly  of  the  Council  of  Europe 
continued. 

In 2020, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found violations of the ECHR in 
97  cases  (out  of  104)  relating  mainly  to  freedom  of  expression,  the  right  to  liberty  and 
security,  protection  of  property,  the  right  to  fair  trial,  freedom  of  assembly  and  association, 
respect for private and family life and right to life. During the reporting period, 10 790 new 
applications  were  registered  by  the  ECtHR.  In  January  2021,  the  total  number  of  Turkish 
applications  pending  before  the  Court  was  13  491.  There  are  currently  225  cases  against 
Turkey in the enhanced monitoring procedure.  

In the case of Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (No. 2), in December 2020, the Grand Chamber 
of the ECtHR ruled that by initially detaining Mr Demirtaş and then prolonging his detention 
for over four years, the Turkish Government had pursued an ulterior motive of preventing him 
from carrying out his political activities, depriving voters of their elected representative, and 
‘stifling  pluralism  and  limiting  freedom  of  political  debate:  the  very  core  of  the  concept  of 
a democratic society’. The ruling concluded that Turkey had violated Article 18 of the ECHR, 
while there were insufficient reasons  for continued  detention and ordered for his immediate 
release. The Court also stated that the continuation of Mr Demirtaş’ pre-trial detention would 
amount to prolongation of the violations of ECHR, as well as breach of Turkey’s obligation to 
abide by the Court’s judgment in accordance with Article 46(1) of ECHR. At the same time, 
the  Grand  Chamber  found  no  violation  of  Article  5(4)  ECHR  concerning  lack  of  speedy 
judicial review by the Turkish Constitutional Court.  

In the case of Kavala v. Turkey, in March 2021 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe recalled the ECtHR’s findings that the applicant’s arrest and pre-trial detention took 
place  in  the  absence  of  evidence  to  support  a  reasonable  suspicion  he  had  committed  an 
offence (violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention) and pursued an ulterior purpose, namely 
to  silence  him  and  dissuade  other  human  rights  defenders  (violation  of  Article  18  taken  in 
conjunction  with  Article  5  §  1);  and  that  the  one  year  and  nearly  five  months  taken  by  the 
Constitutional  Court  to  review  his  complaint  was  insufficiently  “speedy”,  given  that  his 
personal liberty was at stake (violation of Article 5 § 4). The Council of Ministers reiterated 
their call for  the applicant’s immediate  release.  Finally,  the Council of  Ministers decided to 
examine the applicant’s situation at each regular and human rights meeting of the Committee 
until such time that he is released. 

In  March  2021,  the  Committee  of  Ministers  of  the  Council  of  Europe  reviewed  Cyprus  v. 
Turkey as well as Varnava and others. The Committee underlined that it remained urgent for 
the  Turkish  authorities  to  maintain  their  proactive  approach  to  providing  the  Committee  on 
Missing  Persons  (CMP)  with  all  necessary  assistance.  The  Committee  urged  the  Turkish 
authorities  to  provide  the  CMP  proprio  motu  with  all  information  from  all  the  relevant 
Turkish  archives,  including  military  archives,  relating  to  burial  sites.  The  Committee  noted 
with  interest  the  information  provided  by  the  Turkish  authorities  on  the  progress  of 
investigations  conducted  by  the  “Missing  Persons  Unit”  in  the  northern  part  of  Cyprus. 
Finally, the Committee insisted again firmly on the unconditional obligation of Turkey to pay 
without further delay the just satisfaction awarded by the European Court in Cyprus v. Turkey 
and Varnava v. Turkey. 

Regarding the implementation of the Demopoulos v. Turkey decision of 5 March 2010, 6 856 
applications  from  Greek  Cypriot  owners  have  to  date  been  lodged  with  the  Immovable 
Property Commission (IPC). As of June 2021, 1 227 applications had been concluded through 

28 

 
 
amicable settlements and 34 through formal hearings. Altogether, the IPC has so far paid out 
the equivalent of approximately EUR 368 million in compensation. 

On the promotion and enforcement of human rights, a new human rights action plan was 
adopted and published in March 2021. The defined objectives of the human rights action plan 
include: a stronger system for the protection of human rights, strengthening the independence 
of  the  judiciary  and  the  right  to  a  fair  trial,  legal  predictability  and  transparency,  protection 
and  enhancement  of  freedom  of  expression,  association  and  religion,  strengthening  of 
individual  liberty  and  security  and  safeguarding  the  physical  and  moral  integrity  and  the 
private life of individuals. It also foresees to improve protection of property rights, protection 
of vulnerable groups, to strengthen social welfare, and provide a high-level administrative and 
social awareness on human rights. The human rights action plan foresees 393 activities to be 
implemented within two years. Several foreseen activities are repetitions of actions included 
in earlier strategy documents.  

Although numerous consultations and workshops were held in the preparation of the human 
rights  action  plan,  including  with  some  rights-based  civil  society  organisations,  no  advance 
draft of the  human rights  action plan was shared with  relevant  stakeholders. This  prevented 
meaningful input on policy proposals. The Council of Europe and the European Commission 
were not consulted on the basis of an elaborated draft, only on an initial outline. The human 
rights  action  plan  does  not  include  specific  objectives,  activities,  indicators,  references  and 
timelines.  No  evidence-based  assessment  of  the  implementation  of  the  human  rights  action 
plan  on  the  Prevention  of  ECHR  violations  (2014-2019),  the  previous  strategy  document  in 
this area, was used to prepare the new action plan.   

The human rights  action plan does not address  critical  issues underpinning the deteriorating 
and worrying human rights situation in Turkey. In particular, the action plan does not address 
the  primary  criticism  incorporated  in  the  opinion  of  the  Venice  Commission  on  the 
constitutional amendment of April 2017, including on the independence of the judiciary. No 
concrete plans are presented for amending the Turkish Penal Code, the Anti-Terror Law, the 
Internet  Law, the Code on Criminal Procedures, and the Law on Enforcement of Sentences. 
The action plan does not refer to gender equality.  

The  Human  Rights  and  Equality  Institution  of  Turkey  (HREI)  and  the  Ombudsman  are  the 
main  human  rights  institutions.  The  Ombudsman  Institution  only  processes  complaints 
against the actions of the public administration and has no ex-officio powers while the HREI 
only  accepts  cases  outside  the  remit  of  the  Ombudsman.  Neither  of  these  institutions  is 
operationally, structurally or financially independent, and their members are not appointed in 
compliance  with  the  Paris  Principles.  The  HREI  has  not  applied  for  an  accreditation  to  the 
Global  Alliance  for  National  Human  Rights  Institutions  and  does  not  comply  with  the 
European Commission’s Recommendation on Standards for Equality Bodies.  

The  effectiveness  of  both  institutions  in  dealing  with  applications  is  very  limited.  In  2020, 
HREI received 1 363 applications, visited 13 institutions including prisons and 10 visits were 
carried out by June 2021; 10 visit reports are pending. Certain HREI members demonstrated a 
negative  attitude  towards  basic  human  rights,  including  gender  equality,  women's  rights, 
LGBTIQ rights, and expressed support for the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention, all 
of which contradict the stated objectives of the institution.  

A total of 2 591 applications were filed to the Parliament’s Human Rights Inquiry Committee 
in 2020.  

Human  rights  defenders  faced 
judicial 
prosecutions,  violent  attacks,  threats,  surveillance,  prolonged  arbitrary  detention  and  ill-

increasing  pressure 

intimidation, 

through 

29 

 
 
treatment.  This  continued  to  have  a  chilling  effect  on  the  independent  civil  society.  Smear 
campaigns by some media outlets close to the government and an aggressive rhetoric by high 
government officials towards human rights defenders continued to create a climate of fear and 
narrowed  the  space  for  critical  views.  Furthermore,  lawyers  providing  legal  assistance  to 
human  rights  defenders  and  civil  and  political  activists  continued  to  face  considerable 
obstacles  in  performing  their  work  and  were  themselves  at  risk  of  arrest,  detention  and 
prosecution.  

In January 2021, in the Gezi case of human rights defenders and civil society representatives, 
the  Court  of  Appeals  overturned  the  February  2020  ruling  that  had  acquitted  the  nine 
defendants and imposed a travel ban on them.  

The Turkish authorities did not follow up on the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers’ 
regular interim resolutions strongly urging Osman Kavala’s immediate release. In December 
2020,  the  Constitutional  Court  also  published  its  reasoned  judgement  where  it  rejected  the 
second  individual  application  of  Osman  Kavala,  concluding  that  the  applicant's  right  to 
personal liberty and security had not been violated. On 1 September 2021, an Istanbul Court 
ruled to prolong the detention of Mr Kavala.  

The trials continued against the group of 11 human rights defenders in the Büyükada Island 
case  for  alleged  links  to  a  terrorist  organisation.  A  regional  court  upheld  the  convictions  of 
four  of  them,  including  the  former  director  of  Amnesty  International  Turkey  on  terrorist 
charges.  The  case  is  pending  before  the  Court  of  Cassation  where  its  Chief  Prosecutor  has 
demanded  to  acquit  three  defendants  but  to  uphold  the  prison  sentence  for  the  former 
Amnesty International director.  

In  February  2021,  the  Minister  of  Interior  harshly  criticised  the  Human  Rights  Association 
following  its  press  statement  on  the  deaths  of  13  Turkish  citizens  in  northern  Iraq's  Gara 
region. Subsequently, the Human Rights Association chairperson was briefly detained by the 
police.  

Many women human rights defenders and activists were detained and faced pecuniary fines 
while protesting against the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention.  

The  court  case  regarding  the  killing  of  Lawyer  Tahir  Elçi  in  2015,  then  chairperson  of  the 
Diyarbakır Bar Association, started in Diyarbakır in October 2020.  

Concerning  the  right  to  life,  no  steps  were  taken  to  ensure  credible  and  effective 
investigations  into  reported  killings  by  the  security  authorities,  which  remains  a  serious 
concern. According to independent data, in 2020 the right to life of at least 3,291 people was 
violated. In March 2021, the Constitutional Court concluded that the right to life of a Nigerian 
citizen  killed  by  the  police  during  his  detention  in  2007  was  violated,  and  sentenced  the 
responsible  police  officer  to  16  years  of  imprisonment.  Two  villagers  in  Van  province  who 
were  taken  away  by  a  military  helicopter  and  allegedly  tortured  after  being  detained  in 
November 2020 applied to the Constitutional Court. One of the villagers subsequently died of 
his injuries. There is still no credible investigation carried out into this incident. As a positive 
development,  the  Diyarbakır  Governorate  gave  permission  in  April  to  investigate  a  police 
officer in the case of a 12-year-old child killed in 2015.  

Overall, impunity is a major source of concern. The legislation adopted in June 2016 granting 
judicial privileges to  the security forces and increasing  the risk of impunity is  still in  force. 
The authorities need to take urgent measures to align this legislation with the ECtHR case-law 
and  standards.  No  measures  were  taken  to  effectively  investigate  and  sanction  the  reported 
killings by the security authorities in the southeast, especially in relation to the events in 2015. 
In  the  court  case  on  the  killing  of  a  university  student  during  the  Newroz  celebrations  in 

30 

 
 
Diyarbakır  in  2017,  the  perpetrator  police  officer  was  acquitted  in  November  2020  of  the 
charge  of  “killing  with  intent”.  In  many  cases,  authorities  denied  permission  to  prosecute 
public  servants.  Alleged  cases  of  abductions  and  enforced  disappearances  by  security  or 
intelligence  services  in  several  provinces  continue  to  be  reported  since  the  attempted  coup 
with no adequate investigations carried out. The cases of at least two dozen persons allegedly 
abducted by state agents for many months have  not  yet  been effectively  investigated by the 
Turkish  authorities.  In  April  2021,  the  Ministry  of  Interior  issued  a  circular  preventing 
citizens  from  recording  videos  of  police  officers  during  demonstrations,  raising  further 
concerns over the weakening of law enforcement officers’ accountability and the prevention 
of evidence collection. 

Credible  and  grave  allegations  of  torture  and  ill-treatment  continued  to  be  reported. 
According  to  available  reports,  torture  and  ill-treatment  still  occur  in  detention  centres, 
prisons  and  in  informal  places  of  detention  as  well  as  on  the  streets,  mostly  during 
demonstrations  and  meetings.  There  are  reported  allegations  of  torture  and  ill-treatment  in 
prisons.  Ill-treatment  and  excessive  use  of  force  took  place  in  particular  during  the 
demonstrations  in  the  Boğaziçi  University  protests  and  the  Pride  marches.  There  was  an 
increase in the number of claims of strip searches while entering the prison facilities or while 
being detained. Although the legislation allows such practice in certain circumstances, rights 
activists and victims argue that strip searches are often implemented not in accordance with 
procedures. The publication of the pending 2016 report of the Council of Europe’s Committee 
for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) was not authorised by the authorities. The last CPT visit 
to Turkey took place in January 2021. The Human Rights and Equality Institution of Turkey 
(HREI),  which  should  act  as  the  national  preventive  mechanism,  does  not  meet  the  key 
requirements  under  the  Optional  Protocol  to  the  UN  Convention  against  Torture  and  other 
Cruel,  Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT) and is not  yet effectively 
processing cases referred to it. Effective prison monitoring boards need to be set up.  

The  legislation,  which  allows  for  a  maximum  police  custody  period  of  up  to  12  days,  is  in 
contravention  of  ECtHR  case  law  (maximum  of  four  days)  and  needs  to  be  revised. 
Complaints,  reports  and  any  indications  of  torture  or  ill-treatment  need  to  be  investigated 
swiftly, effectively and impartially; perpetrators must be prosecuted and convicted in line with 
Turkey’s international obligations, in particular with the ECHR and the UNCAT. 

Overcrowding and  deteriorating  prison  conditions  continue to  be  a source of deep  concern. 
Turkey  was  the  Council  of  Europe  Member  State  with  the  highest  overcrowding  rate  (127 
inmates  per  100  available  places).  The  new  human  rights  action  plan  includes  an  overall 
commitment to improve living conditions in prisons and address the well-being of juveniles.  

Allegations continued of human rights violations in prisons, including arbitrary restrictions on 
the rights of detainees, denial of access to medical care and the use of torture, mistreatment, 
prevention of open visits, and solitary confinement.  

Hunger strikes in some prisons demanded an end to PKK leader Öcalan’s isolation and an end 
to  violations  of  detainees’  rights  in  prisons.  Investigations  of  allegations  of  abuse  and 
inhuman  or  degrading  conditions  continued  to  be  limited,  and  the  results  of  such 
investigations  were  not  generally  documented  in  a  publicly  accessible  manner.  Prison 
monitoring  boards  remained  largely  ineffective  and  the  HREI,  which  should  act  as  the 
national  preventive  mechanism  is  not  independent.  The  government  did  not  allow  NGOs  to 
monitor  prisons.  The  Human  Rights  Inquiry  Committee  has  received  3  363  applications  on 
human  rights  violations  from  detainees  and  prisoners  since  June  2018  but  has  found  no 
violations in any of the cases.  

31 

 
 
On the protection of personal data, no steps were taken to align the 2016 data protection law 
with  the  EU  acquis.  This  constitutes  an  obstacle  to  the  possible  cooperation  with  Eurojust,  
Europol and, more generally, in a number of policy areas. Turkey still needs to address inter 
alia  concerns  on  the  exceptions  for  law  enforcement  and  the  independence  of  the  Personal 
Data  Protection  Authority.  Turkey  still  has  not  yet  signed  the  2018  Protocol  amending  the 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal 
Data (Council of Europe, CETS No 223).  

On  freedom  of  thought,  conscience  and  religion,  freedom  of  worship  continued  to  be 
generally  respected.  The  lack  of  legal  personality  of  non-Muslim  communities  remains  a 
serious issue and the Venice Commission recommendations on the legal status of non-Muslim 
religious  communities  and  the  right  of  the  Orthodox Patriarchate  of  Istanbul  to  use the  title 
“Ecumenical” have yet to be implemented. The long lasting problem of election procedures of 
minority  foundations  was  not  addressed.  Several  ECtHR  judgments  regarding  conscientious 
objection are yet to be implemented. School textbooks need to be revised in order to remove 
all discriminatory elements against all religions and faith groups.  

Following  the  decision  to  turn  Hagia  Sophia  into  a  mosque  in  July  2020,  two  UNESCO 
advisory  missions  took  place  in  October  2020  and  January/  February  2021,  to  review  the 
impacts of change of status of Hagia Sophia and Chora (another museum among the World 
Heritage  Sites  in  Turkey  that  was  converted  into  a  mosque  in  August  2020),  on  the 
Outstanding  Universal  Value  of  the  properties.  No  steps  were  taken  to  open  the  Halki 
(Heybeliada) Greek Orthodox Seminary, which remains closed since 1971. 

Hate speech and hate crimes against Christians and Jews continued to be reported (see below - 
Minorities). Alevis faced hate crimes, and investigations in this regard remained ineffective. 
A comprehensive legal framework in line with European standards needs to be put in place, 
and appropriate attention must be paid to implementing the ECtHR judgments on compulsory 
religion  and  ethics  classes  and  Alevi  worship  places.  Protestants  faced  problems  with 
recognition  of  their  places  of  worship.  Several  foreign  protestant  clergy  members  were 
deported or denied entry and refused visa permits.  

The increased work and influence of the Religious Affairs Presidency (Diyanet) continued in 
all spheres of public life. Its President publically targeted atheists in his several speeches.  

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

Freedom of expression  

Turkey  is  at  an  early  stage  in  this  area  and  the  serious  backsliding  continued  over  the 
reporting  period.  Legislation  and  its  implementation,  especially  related  to  national  security 
and  anti-terrorism  provisions,  continued  to  contravene  the  European  Convention  on  Human 
Rights and other international standards and to diverge from the case-law of the ECtHR. The 
dissemination of opposition voices and freedom of expression were negatively affected by the 
increasing  pressure  and  restrictive  measures.  Criminal  cases  and  convictions  of  journalists, 
human  rights  defenders,  lawyers,  writers,  opposition  politicians,  students  and  social  media 
users continued.  

The  Directorate  of  Communication  linked  to  the  Presidency,  in  charge  of  issuing  press 
accreditation,  continued  to  face  strong  criticism  as  a  considerable  number  of  press  cards 
cancelled  in  2020  were  not  renewed.  The  blocking  and  erasing  of  online  content  without 
a court order on an inappropriately wide range of grounds, based on the Internet Law and the 
general legal framework, continued.  

32 

 
 
The recommendations of the last four annual reports of the Commission were not addressed. 
In the coming year, Turkey should in particular:  

  release journalists, human rights defenders, lawyers, writers and academics being held in 

pre-trial detention; 

  ensure  a  safe,  plural  and  enabling  environment  for  the  media  to  carry  out  their  work 
independently  and  without  fear  of  reprisals  and  dismissals.  This  includes  ending  the 
practice, exercised by both state and non-state agents, of intimidating, interfering with and 
putting pressure on the media;  

  revise the existing legislation, in  particular the  Anti-Terror  Law, the Criminal  Code, the 
Data Protection Law and the Internet Law, to comply with European standards and ensure 
that it is implemented in a manner which does not curtail freedom of expression;  

  ensure that  criminal  law provisions on defamation and on other similar offences are not 

used as a means of putting pressure on critical voices.  

Intimidation of journalists  

Arrests,  detentions,  prosecutions,  convictions  and  dismissals  of  media  staff  leading  to 
censorship  and  self-censorship  among  media  professionals  further  increased,  including  for 
their reporting activities on COVID - 19. Overall, an estimated 60 journalists were in prison. 
In  2020,  at  least  48  journalists  were  taken  into  custody,  23  journalists  were  sentenced  to 
a total  of  103  years  in  prison.  As  of  January  2021,  at  least  353  journalists  have  been 
prosecuted in the last two and a half  years. In 2020, trials were launched against at least 53 
journalists.  Threats  and  physical  attacks  on  journalists  and  media  organisations  due  to  their 
work  continued  during  the  reporting  period.  Civil  society  organisations  reported  that  in  the 
first weeks of 2021, five opposition journalists from around Turkey were physically assaulted. 
In total, at least 18 journalists were attacked in 2020; attacks continued in 2021.  

Judicial cases against critical newspapers continued. In November 2020, a Court of Appeals 
reversed  the  ruling  of  acquittal  of  2019  of  three  defendants  standing  trial  for  having 
participated  in  the  “Editors-in-Chief  on  Watch”  campaign  in  solidarity  with  the  Özgür 
Gündem newspaper closed in 2016. There was no reparation for damages incurred by private 
media  companies  and  their  staff  by  the  takeover  by  the  state  during  and  after  the  state  of 
emergency. 

Legislative environment  

The  current  legislation  regarding  anti-terrorism,  the  internet,  intelligence  services  and  the 
Criminal  Code,  all  impede  freedom  of  expression  and  run  counter  to  European  standards. 
Selective  and  arbitrary  application  of  the  legislation  continued  to  raise  concerns  as  it 
infringes the basic principles of the rule of law and right to a fair trial. 

Implementation/institutions  

The  criminal  legislation  continued  to  allow  journalists’  prosecution  and  imprisonment  on 
extensive  charges  of  terrorism  (see  -  Judiciary),  insulting  public  officials,  and/or  allegedly 
committing crimes against the state and the government. Exercise of constitutional rights were 
cited as crimes and used as grounds for indictments, which often failed to establish direct and 
credible links with the alleged offence. For example participating in press statements, or trade 
union  activities  are  cited  as  support  to  terror  organisations.  Critical  journalists  were 
intimidated  with  judicial  investigations  and  court  decisions.  The  space  for  civil  society 
organisations  was  further  limited  by  the  criminal  convictions  and  fines  imposed  on  human 
rights defenders for participating in demonstrations, issuing press statements and carrying out 

33 

 
 
legitimate  activities.  The  Press  Advertisement  Agency  (BiK)  continued  to  impose  bans  on 
public advertising for media that criticised the government.  

The accreditation of journalists and the system of issuing press  cards needs to  be reformed. 
The removal of press cards on security grounds had a deterrent effect on the work of foreign 
correspondents in Turkey. According to the authorities, 1 238 press cards had been cancelled 
between December 2018 and December 2020.  

The journalist and writer Ahmet Altan, who had been imprisoned for the last four years under 
controversial charges, was eventually released by the Court of Cassation in April 2021. 

Article 299 of the Turkish Penal Code on insulting the President, which foresees a maximum 
sentence  of  four  years  in  prison,  was  used  extensively  to  prosecute  critical  voices. 
Investigations, arrests and prosecutions of journalists, writers, opposition politicians, students, 
youth and social media users (including children), for insulting the President, continued.  

As a matter of example, in March 2021 the Turkish Parliament revoked the parliamentarian 
status of opposition HDP deputy Ömer Faruk Gergerlioğlu after the Court of Cassation upheld 
his  prison  sentence  for  “spreading  terrorist  propaganda”  based  on  a  retweet  of  a  newspaper 
article that was still online at the date of reporting.  

In April 2021, an investigation was launched against officials of the opposition party CHP for 
allegedly  insulting  the  President,  after  they  accused  the  government  of  causing  the  Central 
Bank to run out of foreign exchange reserves and requested transparency on this issue.  

In April 2021, a judicial investigation was launched against 10 retired admirals, who signed 
a statement  expressing  their  concerns  over  the  government’s  possible  intention  to  withdraw 
from the 1936 Montreux Convention. In reaction, the President said that the retired admirals’ 
comments went beyond freedom of expression and aimed to inspire a military coup.  The 10 
former admirals were detained for eight days before being released under judicial control.  

In  several  cases,  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  ruled  that  the  Turkish  Government 
violated Article 10 of the ECHR, including in the cases against journalist and MP Ahmet Şık, 
Cumhuriyet  daily  and  singer  Atilla  Taş  who  got  a  prison  sentence  in  relation  to  the  coup 
attempt in July 2016. 

According to independent data, the authorities detained at least 2 123 protesters in at least 320 
law  on 
peaceful  assemblies  on  suspicion  of  “inciting  hatred”  and  “violating 
demonstrations” and for “resisting police orders.” The President, the leader of the MHP party 
and  the  Minister  of  Interior  used  inflammatory  and  polarising  rhetoric  calling  the  students 
“terrorists” and stigmatising the LGBTIQ community. After the appointment of a new rector 
to the Boğaziçi University by a presidential decision in January 2021, students from Boğaziçi 
and other universities supported by the university’s academics started protests. Many students 
were  charged  with  inciting  hatred  and  insulting  religious  values.  In  July  2021,  by 
a presidential decision, the Boğaziçi Rector was taken off duty. 

the 

The  Constitutional  Court  issued  several  judgements  in  individual  applications  in  which  it 
concluded  that  the  right  to  freedom  of  expression  was  violated.  In  spite  of  a  Constitutional 
Court  decision  of  July  2019,  that  established  a  violation  regarding  individuals  known  as 
‘Peace  Academics’,  and  the  consequent  acquittals  that  followed,  only  very  few  academics 
were reinstated and received a negligible compensation. The State of Emergency Commission 
has  still  not  examined  a  single  ‘Peace  Academics’  case  since  July  2017,  when  it  started 
receiving applications. Few academics have applied to the Constitutional Court due to lack of 
decision by the State of Emergency Commission. 

34 

 
 
In April 2021, after an application of the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP), 
the  Constitutional  Court  repealed  the  article  of  a  statutory  decree  that  paved  the  way  for 
closing newspapers, television channels and agencies and seizing their assets during the state 
of  emergency,  on  the  grounds  that  they  pose  a  threat  to  national  security.  According  to  the 
Constitutional Court, a court ruling is necessary even for a temporary closure, thus, the direct 
closure  of  media  outlets  constitutes  the  severest  interference  in  fundamental  rights  and 
freedoms. Nevertheless, the decision on this issue came after many seized assets and licences 
had been sold. 

There  are  no  official  statistics  on  banned  websites,  or  the  blockage  of  content  based  on 
decisions of criminal law judges of peace.  

Public Service Broadcasters  

The public service broadcaster Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) is affiliated 
with  the  Presidential  Communication  Authority,  and  the  Radio  and  Television  Supreme 
Council  (RTÜK)  with  the  Ministry  of  Culture  and  Tourism.  The  editorial  policy  of  TRT 
closely  reflects  the  government’s  official  lines.  There  was  no  improvement  in  the 
independence and neutrality of RTÜK. Members continue to be elected by Parliament without 
consultation of civil society or professional media organisations.  

RTÜK  continued  to  suspend  and  fine  independent  television  and  radio  channels  for  their 
broadcasting content on the vague grounds that it is ‘contrary to the national and moral values 
of  society,  general  morality  and  the  principle  of  family  protection’.  It  issued  an  excessive 
amount of monetary penalties on TV outlets critical of the government while mostly ignoring 
complaints  against  pro-government  ones  according  to  a  report  issued  by  a  RTÜK  member. 
RTÜK  opened  an  investigation  against  a  CHP  deputy  for  "insulting  the  army"  after  he 
criticised the sale of a military factory to Qatar, and issued a pecuniary fine on Habertürk TV 
for  airing  his  words.  A  new  independent  OLAY  TV  was  closed  down  after  26  days  of 
broadcasting due to pressures from the government.  

Economic factors  

The  Broadcasting  Law  does  not  ensure  fair  competition,  as  it  does  not  prevent 
monopolisation.  The  ownership  of  the  Turkish  media  outlets  lacks  transparency  and  a  few 
holding groups are close to the government, which undermines the independence of editorial 
policies.  The  economic  pressure  on  independent  media  outlets  was  heightened  because  the 
state-sponsored  advertising  was  not  fairly  distributed.  The  agency  responsible  for  the 
distribution  of  the  state  advertising  budget  took  no  steps  to  increase  its  accountability  and 
transparency,  in  particular  it  did  not  publish  its annual  reports.  Independent  and  sustainable 
financing of the public service broadcaster is not ensured. 

Internet  

Amendments  to  the  Internet  Law,  adopted  in  August  2020,  now  require  social  media 
companies  with  more than one million  users in  Turkey to  establish an office in  the  country 
and  locally  store  Turkish  users’  data.  Social  media  companies  are  also  required  to  address 
court removal and/or blocking orders within 24 hours and individual users’ takedown and/or 
blocking requests within 48 hours. Social media companies face fines of TL 5 to 10 million if 
they  fail  to  respond  to  takedown  and  blocking  requests  within  the  time  specified  and  are 
obliged  to  pay  compensation  for  damages  incurred.  As  of  April  2021,  all  companies, 
including Facebook, TikTok, Twitter and YouTube complied with the new legislation, raising 
concerns  that  the  government  will  be  able  to  easily  require  the  removal  of  content  deemed 
objectionable and companies will have little recourse to challenge such requests.  

35 

 
 
Professional organisations and working conditions  

The  representation  of  journalists  is  still  divided  between  the  professional  journalists’ 
associations and the pro-government union. Journalism in Turkey continued to be a precarious 
and  risky  profession,  with  low  wages,  high  risk  of  judicial  harassment  and  lack  of  job 
security.  Working  conditions  continue  to  be  instable,  trade  union  rights  are  insufficient  and 
labour  legislation  is  not  properly  applied.  Obtaining  press  cards  and  arbitrary  accreditations 
remain  major  problems.  Investigative  journalism,  politically  sensitive  issues  continue  to  be 
subject  to  editorial  pressure,  self-censorship  and  judicial  harassment  (see  also  Chapter  10  - 
Information society and media).  

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

There  was  serious  backsliding  in  the  area  of  freedom  of  assembly  and  association  where 
legislation  and  its  implementation  are  not  in  line  with  the  Turkish  Constitution,  European 
standards or with international conventions that Turkey is party to. There was an increase in 
application  of  bans,  disproportionate  interventions  and  excessive  use  of  force  in  peaceful 
demonstrations,  investigations,  administrative  fines  and  prosecutions  against  demonstrators 
on  charges  of  terrorism-related  activities.  The  applicable  ECtHR  case-law  on  freedom  of 
assembly  needs  to  be  implemented  without  delay  and  relevant  national  laws  need  to  be 
revised accordingly. 

A new law adopted in December 2020 on preventing financing of proliferation of weapons of 
mass  destruction  risks  to  increase  further  the  pressure  over  civil  society  organisations.  This 
law  was  based  on  the  recommendations  of  the  Financial  Action  Task  Force  (FATF). 
However,  there  are  strong  concerns  expressed  by  Turkish  civil  society,  the  Council  of 
Europe’s  Venice  Commission  and  Commissioner  for  Human  Rights  as  well  as  UN  Special 
Rapporteurs regarding several aspects of the legislation. The law notably vests the authority to 
the  Ministry  of  Interior  and  Provincial  Governors  to  dismiss  NGO  executives  based  on 
ongoing "terrorism-related" investigations or convictions, as well as suspends the activities of 
NGOs.  The  Ministry  and  Governors  are  also  authorised  to  monitor  the  NGOs'  fundraising 
activities and impose penalties for unpermitted campaigns. Furthermore, all associations and 
foundations  will  be  obliged  to  inform  the  Ministry  on  donations  they  receive  coming  from 
abroad. The law was not prepared in a participatory manner and was adopted in record time. 
Prior  to  its  adoption,  694  independent  civil  society  organisations  issued  a  statement  against 
the draft law. Several pro-AKP associations and foundations also campaigned against it. After 
the  adoption  of  the  law,  many  rights-based  NGOs  faced  audits  by  the  Ministry,  especially 
those  receiving  foreign  funds.  Any  measures  taken  to  counter  terrorism  must  comply  with 
Turkey’s other obligations under international law, including in the area of human rights.  

In  January  2021,  an  amended  regulation  gave  police  and  intelligence  services  access  to 
military  weaponry  upon  the  Minister  of  Defence’s  approval.  Such  weapons  can  be  handed 
over  in  case  of  terrorism,  societal  incidents  and  acts  of  violence  that  seriously  threaten 
national security, public order and public security.  

Protests  for  political  and  socio-economic  rights  were  banned  in  several  provinces  on  many 
occasions.  Demonstrations  of  dismissed  civil  servants  demanding  to  be  reinstated  and  of 
workers  demonstrating  for  their  health  rights  were  stopped.  37  persons  were  sentenced  for 
participating in the environmental protests organised in 2011 against the thermal power plant 
Project in Gerze. The power plant project was cancelled for violating the Law on Forests in 
2015 but the protesters continued to be sentenced for their protests. 

Newroz was celebrated by millions of people in the south-east on 20 March 2021. However, 
events  and  demonstrations  related  to  the  Kurdish  issue,  protests  against  the  appointment  of 

36 

 
 
trustees  or  organised  by  opposition  groups  were  prohibited  on  security  grounds.  Several 
provincial  governors,  especially  in  the  east  and  south-east,  continued  to  use  extraordinary 
powers  contained  in  a  law  introduced  after  the  end  of  the  state  of  emergency  to  restrict  the 
right to peaceful assembly, including through the imposition of blanket bans. In 2020, blanket 
bans on assemblies were issued 253 times and bans on specific assemblies were imposed 115 
times.  

The Law on Meetings and Demonstrations allows the administration to adopt decisions on the 
basis of abstract, discretionary and arbitrary criteria regarding the prohibition of meetings and 
demonstrations. Prohibitions based on the justification of disruption of public order, ensuring 
peace and internal  security as well as a number  of additional abstract  claims were routinely 
used. In the 15-day bans imposed regularly by the provincial governorates in many provinces, 
reference is made to the relevant articles of the law and no justification is cited. 

The  appeals  process  of  the  case  launched  by  the  Human  Rights  Association  to  cancel  the 
October  2018  regulation  which  obliges  associations  to  disclose  all  their  members  to 
authorities,  continued.  Court  cases  against  members  and  founders  of  the  Rosa  Women’s 
Association  also  continued.  Rosa  and  other  associations  in  the  south-east  were  subject  to 
police raids and operations. A court case was launched against 46 human rights defenders and 
relatives of victims of enforced disappearances who are part of the Saturday Mothers group in 
Istanbul.  

Turkey’s  new  Green  Party  filed  a  court  case  against  the  Interior  Ministry  for  failing  to 
complete registration procedures after submission of all necessary documents for six months. 
A  petition  on  the  establishment  of  the  Humanity  and  Freedom  Party  is  pending  before  the 
Ministry for the past three years. A closure case against the Anadolu Kultur is pending.  

Issues of labour and trade union rights are further covered in Chapter 19 - Social policy and 
employment. 

On property rights, the Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures is slow to 
issue  decisions,  lacks  transparency  and  does  not  provide  an  effective  domestic  remedy  for 
confiscations.  In March  2021, the Directorate-General  for Foundations  (DGF) took  over the 
ownership of the Taksim Gezi Park from the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (IBB). The 
IBB announced it would file a court case to contest this decision. 

In the south-east, restoration of cultural and religious heritage and urban housing construction 
continued,  as  well  as  court  cases  regarding  the  2016  expropriations  in  Sur.  Regarding  the 
implementation of the Law on Foundations to minority communities, most of the appeals for 
the restitution of property were pending either before a local court or before the ECtHR. The 
case of the Mor Gabriel Monastery Syriac Orthodox Church Foundation’s forestry lands was 
pending  before  the  ECtHR  Grand  Chamber.  Other  cases  in  relation  to  the  ownership  of  the 
land of the Mor Gabriel Monastery were ongoing. Other non-Muslim community foundations 
have properties not returned yet. Specific concerns regarding Christians and Jews in Antakya 
who are not  covered by  the Foundations  Law were not  addressed. The Council of Europe’s 
recommendations  on  protecting  property  rights  and  education  rights  still  need  to  be  fully 
implemented. The Council of Europe Resolution 1625 (2008) regarding property rights on the 
islands  of  Gökçeada  (Imbros)  and  Bozcaada  (Tenedos)  still  needs  to  be  fully  implemented. 
No steps were taken to revise the relevant legislation on the issue of property rights of non-
Muslim minorities and legislation covering all issues of property rights.  

In the field of non-discrimination, legislation is still not in line with European standards or 
enforced fully in practice. There are serious concerns that the Law on Security Investigations 
and Archive Checks of April 2021 will lead to profiling and discrimination of those selected 

37 

 
 
and  appointed  to  public  posts  as  well  as  to  further  politicisation  and  stigmatisation  of  large 
sections  of  the  society.  This  law  introduces  a  wide  range  of  factors  –  not  restricted  to  past 
final  convictions  –  when  making  investigations.  The  HREI,  which  is  also  in  charge  of 
applying  non-discrimination  legislation,  only  finalised  43  decisions  in  2020  out  of  276 
applications. School textbooks still need to be revised, especially regarding some content on 
secularism, religion and gender inequality. Turkey should urgently adopt a law on combating 
discrimination in line with the EU acquis as well as the ECHR, including sexual orientation 
and  gender  identity.  No  steps  were  taken  to  ratify  Protocol  12  of  the  Convention,  which 
provides for the general prohibition of discrimination, or to implement the recommendations 
of the Council of Europe’s European Commission against Racism and Intolerance. Hate crime 
legislation is still not in line with international standards and it does not cover hate offences 
based on sexual orientation, ethnicity, age or gender identity. Hate speech and hate crime are 
not prohibited by the anti-discrimination law. No progress was made towards the ratification 
of the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the criminalisation 
of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems. 

In the area of gender equality there was important backsliding on women’s rights. Turkey’s 
withdrawal  from  the  Council  of  Europe  Convention  on  preventing  and  combatting  violence 
against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention), followed by the adoption of 
a presidential  decision in  March 2021, represents  a clear  regression on the rights  of  women 
and  girls.  This  decision  compromises  the  women  and  girls’  rights  and  combatting  gender-
based  violence  in  Turkey,  and  sets  a  dangerous  precedent.  Following  the  withdrawal,  hate 
speech increased in the media against women organisations. In July 2021, the Constitutional 
Court  rejected  the  request  for  the  suspension  of  the  enforcement  of  the  withdrawal  and 
decided that it was within the President’s remit to withdraw from the Istanbul Convention. On 
1  June,  the  day  Turkey  officially  withdrew  from  the  Istanbul  Convention,  the  President 
announced the Fourth National Action Plan for Combating Violence against Women (2021-
2025). 

The  weak  implementation  of  legislation  and  low  quality  of  available  support  services,  also 
exacerbated  by  a  negative  rhetoric  from  high-level  officials  and  from  some  parts  of  the 
society  against  gender  equality,  remained  of  serious  concern.  Lack  of  judicial  and 
administrative  deterrence  against  perpetrators  of  crimes  against  women  continued  to  be  a 
matter of concern. A parliamentary commission  was established to investigate the causes of 
violence against women  and determine the measures to  be taken. According to  reports, 300 
women  were  killed  in  2021  and  another  171  women  died  under  suspicious  circumstances. 
Turkey  lacks  a  comprehensive  data  collection  system  in  this  area  to  assess  the  scale  and 
nature  of  the  issue.  In  court  cases  of  violence  against  women,  discretionary  mitigation 
continued to be applied.  

Other  key  issues  are  increased  female  unemployment  and  extreme  poverty  and  hunger, 
especially in the east and south-east. Incest was reported by civil society to be increasing but 
there  was  no  policy  action  or  acknowledgement  of  this  problem  by  the  authorities.  The 
promotion  of  stereotyped  gender  roles,  including  in  the  school  textbooks  and  in  the  media, 
need to be addressed without delay. Statements by the Ministry of Interior targeting women’s 
organisations  and  feminists  for  alleged  terrorist  links  threatened  the  existence  of  women’s 
associations. Independent women’s rights organisations continued to be largely excluded from 
the  process  of  drafting  relevant  laws  and  developing  policies  and  regulations  regarding 
women’s  issues.  The  Government  should  ensure  that  investigation  and  prosecution  of 
domestic  violence  and  the  specialised  services  available  to  survivors  and  witnesses  of 
violence are in line with international standards. 

There  was  limited  progress  on  the  rights  of  the  child.  In  October  2020,  a  dedicated 

38 

 
 
department  was  established  under  the  Ministry  of  Justice,  mandated  to  promote  rights  and 
services  for  vulnerable  groups  in  the  justice  system.  Despite  the  improvement  of  meeting 
rooms  in  courts,  problems  in  the  juvenile  justice  system  persist.  Juveniles  continued  to  face 
arrest and detention on charges of membership of terrorist organisations, often for long periods 
and not always in specialised institutions for children. The quality of legal aid for juveniles and 
rehabilitation  activities  continued  to  be  a  matter  of  concern.  Despite  steps  taken  to  improve 
conditions  in  the  detention  centres,  allegations  of  ill-treatment  continued  to  be  reported.  The 
draft National Strategy and Action Plan for the Prevention of Early and Forced Marriage is yet 
to  be  adopted.  With  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  gaps  widened  regarding  access  to  quality 
inclusive  education.  Child  protection  mechanisms  and  services  remained  limited.  Refugee 
children and their families were at a heightened risk and faced specific challenges in accessing 
the national child protection system.  

Concerning  the  rights  of  persons  with  disabilities,  Turkey  lacks  an  independent 
implementation and monitoring framework in line with the UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons  with  Disabilities.  Turkey  lacks  reliable,  up-to-date  data  on  the  situation  of  persons 
with disabilities. The Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services prepared a “vision 2030 
without  barriers”  policy  document  addressing  the  needs  of  persons  with  disabilities. 
Independent  living  and  an  inclusive,  accessible  society  are  among  the  eight  priority  policy 
areas. Turkey declared 2020 as the “Accessibility  Year”, and launched a public information 
campaign  including  an  accessibility  award.  An  accessibility  guideline  for  built  environment 
was  published.  Still,  the  legal  deadline  for  making  public  spaces  more  accessible  was 
extended  for  the  sixth  time  in  July  2020.  The  number  of  accessible  public  buildings  and 
public transport vehicles remained low and increased at a slow pace. The work of the National 
Monitoring  and  Evaluation  Committee  for  the  Convention  needs  to  be  stepped  up.  No 
national action plan on the rights of persons with disabilities is in place. Medical, charitable 
and  paternalistic  approaches  remain  dominant  among  the  public  and  some  public  officials. 
Disability  policies  need  to  be  mainstreamed  across  all  policy  areas  and  monitored  with 
participation of disability organisations.  

A  family  based  early  identification  and  intervention  programme  was  launched  to  address 
developmental risks of young children. Alternative care options for children with disabilities 
in institutions should be expanded. Turkey continued capacity-building activities to promote 
inclusive  education  services  at  all  levels.  However,  school  closures  due  to  the  COVID-19 
negatively  affected  access  of  children  with  disabilities  to  education,  despite  broadcasting 
school  classes  online  and  on  TV.  Participation  at  early  childhood  education  level  was 
particularly low. In the field of employment, the number of public servants with disabilities 
exceeded  57  000  in  2020,  and  the  rate  is  close  to  3  %.  The  employment  rate  in  the  private 
sector  is  much  lower,  partly  due  to  limited  physical  accessibility,  prejudices  and  skills 
mismatch.  Turkey  has  no  mental  health  legislation  and  no  independent  body  to  monitor 
mental health institutions. 

The  lack  of  protection  of  the  fundamental  rights  of  lesbian,  gay,  bisexual,  transgender, 
intersex  and  queer  (LGBTIQ)  persons  raised  further  serious  concerns.  Hate  speech  and 
smear  campaigns  by  government  officials  and  media  against  the  LGBTIQ  community 
increased,  notably  following  the  withdrawal  from  the  Istanbul  Convention  and  during  the 
Boğaziçi  students’  protests.  In  February,  the  Boğaziçi  LGBTI+  Studies  Club  was  closed  by 
a rectorate decision without proper justification.   

High-level  state  officials  regularly  referred  to  national  and  moral  values  while  targeting 
LGBTIQ. A criminal investigation was opened into the Ankara Bar Association after it filed 
a complaint against Diyanet’s President for his homophobic speech. The Minister of Interior 
and many media blamed the EU and the USA for funding LGBTIQ NGOs.  

39 

 
 
Discrimination,  intimidation  and  violence  against  the  LGBTIQ  community  continued  to  be 
a major problem, including against refugees. NGO reports indicated that a total of 1 476 hate 
speech  items  and  discriminatory  remarks  about  LGBTIQ  were  published  in  Turkish 
newspapers  in  2020.  Hate  speech  and  crimes  against  LGBTIQ  persons  were  not  effectively 
prosecuted. In November 2020, the Ministry of Trade decided to impose an 18+ warning on 
"LGBT and rainbow-themed products" on e-commerce sites. The Ministry of  Interior sent  a 
letter  to  several  city  councils,  inquiring  about  LGBTIQ  councils,  their  activities  and  their 
budget. The court case against Middle East Technical University (METU) students who took 
part  in  a  pride  gathering  on  the  university  campus  in  May  2019  continued.  The  Regional 
Administrative  Court  approved  the  verdict  of  an  Ankara  administrative  court  to  annul  the 
"second indefinite ban on LGBTI+ activity" declared by the Governor's Office of Ankara in 
October 2018. Overall,  freedom  of  assembly  and association  and freedom  of expression  for 
LGBTIQ NGOs was largely restricted. LGBTIQ activities and pride parades were banned or 
prevented by police in several provinces, including the biggest one in Istanbul, in June. The 
police  intervened  violently  against  a  journalist  and  LGBTIQ  demonstrators  and  at  least  20 
persons were detained.  

On procedural rights, efforts are needed to further align legislation with European standards. 
Due to its failure to respect procedural rules, Turkey has been repeatedly condemned by the 
ECtHR  for  violating  the  right  to  a  fair  trial  and  presumption  of  innocence.  The  anti-Terror 
Law still bans access to defence during the first 24 hours of police custody and the maximum 
detention period of up to 12 days before the detainee is brought before a judge is still in place. 
The  lack  of  professional  interpretation  services  in  judicial  proceedings  continued  to  be 
a problem.  The  authorities  undermined  fair  trial  guarantees  by  targeting  lawyers  for  their 
professional  activities.  Lawyers  continued  to  be  subject  to  increasing  pressure,  taken  into 
custody,  detained,  exposed  to  legal  harassment  through  investigations  and  criminal 
proceedings.  Those  dismissed  by  state  of  emergency  decrees  continued  to  be  often  barred 
from  acting  as  lawyers,  with  a  few  exceptions  following  the  July  2020  judgement  of  the 
Constitutional Court that this was a violation of their right to exercise their profession.  

Hate  speech  and  hate  crime  remain  a  serious  issue  for  minorities.  Acts  of  vandalism  and 
destruction  on  minority  worship  places  and  cemeteries  need  to  be  investigated.  Very  few 
offenders  were  effectively  prosecuted.  No  steps  were  taken  to  revise  school  textbooks  to 
delete  remnants  of  discriminatory  references.  The  election  of  board  members  of  minority 
foundations  had  been  halted  by  the  State  since  2013  after  annulment  of  the  existing 
regulation. In March 2021, in a landmark ruling, an administrative court overruled the circular 
that  had  annulled  the  regulation.  However,  the  Ankara  Regional  Court  of  Appeals  recently 
decided that it is up to the Council of State (CoS) to decide on this issue. Therefore, minority 
foundations all over Turkey can still not hold their board member elections, pending the CoS 
judgement. In April 2021, a 25-month prison sentence was issued against a Syriac Orthodox 
Priest  for  allegedly  aiding  a  terrorist  organisation.  State  subsidies  for  minority  schools  had 
almost come to a halt. Subsidies to the newspapers run by members of the Armenian, Greek, 
and  Jewish  communities  need  to  be  granted  by  the  Press  Advertising  Authority  (BiK).  The 
court case against public officials involved in the killing of Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in 
2007  ended  in  March  2021  with  the  acquittal  of  37  of  the  77  defendants.  The  files  of  12 
defendants who fled Turkey were separated because they could not be heard in this trial. The 
Parliamentary Human Rights Inquiry Committee established a sub-committee to look into the 
rights violations during the recent war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Full respect for and 
protection of language, religion, culture, cultural heritage and fundamental rights of minorities 
in accordance with European standards have  yet to be achieved. As the Venice Commission 
underlined  in  2010,  Turkey  should  continue  the  reform  process  and  introduce  legislation, 

40 

 
 
which  makes  it  possible  for  all  non-Muslim  religious  communities  to  acquire  legal 
personality. 

Concerning  Roma,  the  Government  declared  8  April  as  the  “Roma  Day”.  Turkey’s  first 
National  Roma  Strategy  will  expire  in  2021  and  has  yielded  limited  results  so  far.  A  new 
national  strategy  is  yet  to  be  adopted.  The  authorities  initiated  measures  to  strengthen  the 
monitoring and evaluation of the Strategy implementation but overall, the Roma community 
and  independent  civil  society  were  not  systematically  and  transparently  involved.  There  are 
no sectoral  strategies targeting Roma. The shift  to  distance education due to  the COVID-19 
pandemic  negatively  affected  the  participation  of  Roma  children  and  youth  in  education,  in 
the absence of access to internet or appropriate devices by many poverty-stricken households. 
Allegations of abuse of Roma children by wrongly diagnosing them with mental disabilities 
or  learning  difficulties  continued.  Employment  and  living  conditions  of  Roma  citizens 
deteriorated  severely  in  the  reporting  period  as  most  Roma  did  not  have  fixed  incomes.  No 
specific  housing  programme  for  Roma  was  completed,  while  several  urban  transformation 
projects covered Roma populated districts. Due to lack of title deed ownership by most Roma 
families, projects ended up with Roma moving out to find shelter elsewhere.  

There  is  a  need  for  increasing  the  availability  of  quality,  relevant  data  for  monitoring  the 
socio-economic  situation  in  Roma  densely  populated  districts.  A  few  cases  of  alleged  hate 
speech towards Roma was reported and brought to courts by NGOs. The Ombudsman and the 
Human  Rights  and  Equality  Institution  of  Turkey  did  not  carry  out  specific  work  on  Roma 
inclusion.  No  public  awareness  campaign  on  the  rights  of  Roma  were  conducted  in  the 
reporting period. Turkey needs to develop intersectoral campaigns on rights of Roma women, 
as a gender sensitive approach is missing in the National Roma Strategy. Turkey also needs to 
ensure  sustainable  inclusion  of  Roma  and  other  vulnerable  groups  in  post-COVID-19 
recovery measures. No EU-Turkey Joint Roma Seminar was held so far.  

On  cultural  rights,  the  Government  did  not  legalise  the  provision  of  public  services  in 
languages other than Turkish. Legal  restrictions on mother-tongue education in primary and 
secondary schools remained in place. In April 2021, the Minister of National Education stated 
that no language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at 
any institution of education. Optional courses in Kurdish are provided in public state schools, 
as  well  as  university  programmes  in  Kurdish,  Arabic,  Syriac  and  Zaza.  In  March  2021,  the 
Ministry announced quotas for teacher appointments, and only three teachers were allocated 
for  Kurdish  elective  language  courses  throughout  Turkey.  The  increased  powers  of  the 
governors  and  arbitrary  censorship  continued  having  a  negative  impact  on  arts  and  culture, 
already  negatively  impacted  by  the  COVID-19  pandemic.  Previous  efforts  of  ousted  HDP 
municipalities to promote the creation of language and culture institutions in these provinces 
were  further  undermined.  Kurdish  cultural  and  language  institutions,  Kurdish  media  outlets 
and  numerous  art  spaces  remained  closed  in  the  aftermath  of  the  coup  attempt,  which 
contributed  to  a  further  shrinking  of  cultural  rights.  (See  also  Chapter  26  -  Education  and 
culture). 

2.2.3  Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security   

The EU has common rules for border control, visas, external migration and asylum. Schengen 
cooperation entails the lifting of border controls inside the EU. There is also cooperation in 
the  fight  against  organised  crime  and  terrorism,  and  judicial,  police  and  customs 
cooperation. 

Turkey is moderately prepared in the area of justice, freedom and security. There was some 
progress, in particular in the area of migration and asylum policy. Some progress was made 

41 

 
 
on strengthening surveillance and protection capacity of the eastern land border. The return of 
irregular  migrants  from  the  Greek  islands  under  the  EU-Turkey  Statement  remained 
suspended since March 2020. Although the volume of irregular arrivals to Greece have fallen, 
smuggling  routes  to  Italy  and  to  the  government-controlled  areas  of  Cyprus  are  being 
increasingly  used.  Turkey  has  still  not  implemented  the  provisions  relating  to  third-country 
nationals  in  the  EU-Turkey  readmission  agreement,  despite  these  entering  into  force  in 
October  2017.  Turkey  continued  to  make  significant  efforts  to  host  and  meet  the  needs  of 
almost four million refugees, and in preventing illegal crossings towards the EU. Turkey still 
needs  to  align  its  legislation  on  data  protection  with  European  standards.  Most  of  the 
recommendations  of  last  year  were  not  addressed  and  remain  valid.  In  the  coming  year, 
Turkey should in particular: 

  fully  implement  the  EU-Turkey  Statement  of  March  2016,  notably  the  returns  from 
Greece and the prevention of irregular routes to all Member States and implement all the 
provisions of the EU-Turkey readmission agreement towards all EU Member States; 

  align  legislation  on  personal  data  protection  with  European  standards,  to  allow  for  the 
conclusion  of  an  international  agreement  for  the  exchange  of  personal  data  between 
Europol and Turkey; 

  revise  legislation  and  practices  on  terrorism  in  line  with  the  European  Convention  on 
Human  Rights,  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  case-law  and  the  EU  acquis  and 
practices. The proportionality principle should be observed in practice; 

  adopt  and  implement  a  strategy  and  action  plan  on  border  management  with  the  aim  to 
enhance coordination between border services at the national and international levels. 

Fight against organised crime 

Turkey  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  fight  against  organised  crime;  however  there 
was limited progress overall. The majority of the recommendations from last year remain to 
be addressed. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

  collect and use aggregate statistics to facilitate threat assessment, policy development and 
implementation  and  improve  the  track  record  on  dismantling  criminal  networks  and 
confiscating criminal assets; 

  improve the legal  framework regulating the fight  against money laundering and terrorist 
financing  further  to  the  2019  Financial  Action  Task  Force  (FATF)  Mutual  Evaluation 
Report and in line with the recommendations of the Venice Commission regarding the law 
on the prevention of financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; 

  improve its legislation on cybercrime and witness protection; 

  establish an Asset Recovery Office in line with the EU acquis; 

  conclude an international agreement on cooperation with Eurojust. 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

There  are  a  number  of  specialised  departments  dealing  with  various  forms  of  organised 
crime,  under  two  main  law  enforcement  agencies,  namely  the  gendarmerie  and  the  police 
under the Ministry of Interior (MoI). The Coast Guard Command is also an important force in 
the  prevention  of  the  crime  of  smuggling  and  trafficking  in  human  beings.  Operational 
capacity continued to be strengthened through new recruitments and trainings. 

42 

 
 
The legal framework for the fight against organised crime and police cooperation is partially 
aligned with the EU acquis. With the adoption of the law on prevention of financing of the 
proliferation  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction  in  December  2020,  certain  provisions  were 
introduced  to  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code  and  the  Law  on  Prevention  of  the  Financing  of 
Terrorism  regarding  the  confiscation  of  assets  deriving  from  criminal  activity  (see  below 
section on fight against terrorism).  

The Ministry  of  Interior continued the implementation  of the 2019-2021  action plan for the 
implementation of the National Strategy on Fight against Organised Crime. This is the second 
action plan implemented in line with the Strategy setting out actions to reach the overall aims, 
including  an  effective  institutional  cooperation  and  coordination,  as  well  as  stronger 
international cooperation. The Ministry of Interior reported that the implementation rate of the 
Action Plan reached 90 %.  

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

Measures  taken  after  the  attempted  coup  of  July  2016  continued  to  impact  the  professional 
capacity  of  the  law  enforcement  agencies.  In  2020,  126  personnel  (officers,  non-
commissioned officers, civil servants) from the Coast Guard Command were dismissed (104 
in  2019)  mostly  on  the  basis  of  terrorism-related  investigations.  Between  January  2020  and 
April 2021, 2 915 personnel (officers, non-commissioned officers and specialised sergeants) 
from the gendarmerie were dismissed (2 304 in 2019) due to terrorism and other disciplinary 
charges.  Around  14  900  personnel  of  the  above  categories  have  been  recruited  by  the 
Gendarmerie and Coast Guard in the same period. 

In 2020, 41 707 cases of organised crime (Articles 314, 315 and 220 of the Turkish Criminal 
Code)  were  adjudicated  in  front  of  criminal  courts.  17  305  of  these  cases  resulted  in 
convictions with 21 043 persons being convicted (in 2019, there were 1 544 cases with 2 374 
convictions).  More  than  600  operations  have  been  carried  out  by  the  Gendarmerie  and 
Turkish National Police (TNP) on organised crime, cybercrime, smuggling (including migrant 
smuggling and trafficking in human beings). 

The  Gendarmerie  strengthened  its  Department  on  Combatting  Cybercrime  with  new  human 
resources and trainings whereas the TNP carried out cyberpatrols working 24/7, including in 
the  Dark  Web.  In  2020,  17  911  cases  of  cybercrime  (Articles  243/1,  244,  103,  226  of  the 
Turkish Criminal Code) were tried before a criminal court. 5 364 cases resulted in convictions 
of 5 778 persons. 

Concerning firearms trafficking, 2 749 small and light weapons (SALW) were seized by the 
Gendarmerie and 141 614 by the TNP in the reporting period. In 2020, 519 cases of firearms 
trafficking (Articles 12 of the Turkish Criminal Code) were brought before a criminal court, 
169 of these were concluded with a conviction involving 311 persons. 

Cooperation  between  Europol  and  Turkey  is  based  on  the  Strategic  Agreement  on 
Cooperation since July 2004. The completion of an international agreement on the exchange 
of personal data between Europol and the Turkish authorities competent for fighting serious 
crime and terrorism is still pending as the Turkish data protection legislation is still not in line 
with the EU acquis. A Turkish Liaison Officer is seconded to Europol since 2016. 

In  2020,  Turkey  was  involved  in  three  cases  of  organised  crime  opened  at  Eurojust  and 
participated in a coordination meeting organised in one of them. 

A Cooperation Agreement with the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training 
(CEPOL) has been in place since 2010. Exchange programmes and training programmes were 
carried out involving the Gendarmerie and the TNP. 

43 

 
 
Turkey  raised  criticism  on  the  high  number  of  extradition  requests  linked  to  terrorism 
offences  that  were  not  accepted  (notably  by  EU  countries)  on  grounds  of  refugee  status  or 
citizenship granted to the person concerned. Turkey also raised concerns on the high number 
of red notices issued for individuals wanted for terrorism that were either denied or deleted by 
INTERPOL. 

Turkey continues to be an important transit and destination country for trafficking in human 
beings. By the end of 2020, the number of victims identified by Turkish authorities stood at 
282, representing a slight increase compared to 2019 when the number of victims identified 
was 215. By April 2021, 104 victims of trafficking in human beings have been identified. The 
majority  of  victims  have  been  subject  to  sexual  exploitation  followed  by  labour  force 
exploitation.  In  2020,  88  cases  of  trafficking  in  human  beings  (Article  80  of  the  Turkish 
Criminal  Code)  were  brought  before  criminal  courts  of  Turkey.  16  of  these  concluded  with 
the conviction of 30 offenders. 

In 2020, the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) established a shelter for 
victims of human trafficking in Aydın, which brings the total capacity to hosts victims to 90. 
The  Commission  Coordinating 
the  Fight  against  Human  Trafficking  encompassing 
representatives  of  DGMM,  law  enforcement  agencies  and  the  judiciary  convened  several 
times  during  2020.  Turkey  provided  various  anti-trafficking  training  to  law  enforcements 
agencies,  prosecutors  and  judges  through  national  initiatives  and  funding  from  the 
international community. 

Turkey worked with the Council of Europe (CoE) to improve the prevention and fight against 
trafficking in  human beings through the implementation  of the relevant  CoE Convention. A 
new action plan on trafficking in  human beings  called for by the CoE Group of Experts on 
Action  against  Trafficking  in  Human  Beings  (GRETA)  is  outstanding.  Skills  and  efforts  to 
identify victims of trafficking in human beings by law enforcement agencies and the judiciary 
need to be strengthened in particular when considering the large number of vulnerable persons 
in  the  country.  Public  awareness  on  indicators  of  victimhood  need  to  be  enhanced  to 
discourage exploitation. Trafficking for sexual exploitation and slavery, of persons in need of 
international protection should be investigated and monitored closely. Reasons leading to lack 
of  prosecution  of  the  crime  of  trafficking  in  human  beings  should  be  identified.  Data  on 
criminal  incidents,  apprehensions  linked  to  the  crime  of  trafficking  in  human  beings, 
prosecutions, sentences should be analysed to develop a corresponding response. 

Cooperation in the field of drugs 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

During the reporting period, no institutional changes were introduced. Turkey has developed a 
hierarchical multi-layer structure to fight against drug abuse. The High Council for the Fight 
against Drugs is responsible for inter-institutional coordination and monitoring. It includes all 
ministers involved in achieving the objectives of the National Strategy and Action to Combat 
Illegal Drugs for 2018-2023.  

The Turkish  Monitoring Centre for Drugs  and Drug Addiction (TMCDDA), attached to  the 
Turkish  National  Police,  has  been  a  full  member  of  the  European  Monitoring  Centre  for 
Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) since 2014.  Its  mandate is  to  monitor all aspects  of 
the use and abuse of illicit drugs, both at national and international level. It is also in charge of 
drafting  the  annual  Turkish  Drug  Report.  The  TMCDDA  manages  Turkey’s  National  Early 
Warning System (NEWS) on new psychoactive substances. A total of 928 new psychoactive 
substances have been included in the national legislation, 50 of which were put on the list in 
2020, and an additional 10 in the first quarter of 2021. TMCDDA’s newly developed ‘instant 

44 

 
 
data  flow  system’  became  operational.  The  system  uses  encryption  and  anonymisation  to 
safeguard  personal  data,  while  processing  aggregate  data  for  monitoring  and  reporting  to 
European and international organisations. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

Turkey  remains  a  transit  route  for  drugs  between  Asia  and  Europe.  In  2020,  Turkish  Law 
Enforcement conducted operations that resulted in the seizure of, inter alia, 93 741 221 kg of 
cannabis  (including skunk), 1 960 kg of cocaine, 11 096 328 ecstasy tablets  and 2 875 182 
captagon tablets. Compared to 2020, there was an increase in the seized amounts of cannabis, 
cocaine and ecstasy tablets, and a decrease in other mentioned illicit drugs. 

In 2020, a total of 54 325 cases (58 354 in 2019) involving 75 907 suspects (78 226 in 2019) 
were initiated by the prosecution for illicit drug related offences, with 18 478 suspects (21 482 
in 2019) convicted. Only 345 convictions were related to production and trafficking of drugs, 
while the rest concerned convicted dealers, suppliers and users. In the field of prevention, the 
Ministry of Health (MoH) operates 81 Counselling Centres in 64 provinces. In 2020, six new 
Centres  became  operational.  In  addition  to  MoH,  Turkish  NGOs  also  operate  counselling 
centres. The Anti-Drug Counselling Hot Line received 52 660 calls in 2020. With the consent 
of the caller, return calls are made to monitor and follow up treatment processes. 

There are 133 treatment centres for drug dependence in 24 provinces. 55 of the centres focus 
on  inpatient  treatment,  with  nine  dedicated  for  children.  The  remaining  78  are  outpatient 
centres, with 11 serving children exclusively. Interpretation services are available in treatment 
centres. In 2020, outpatient and inpatient treatment was provided to almost 212 000 patients 
in these centres.  

Fight against terrorism 

Turkish  efforts to  tackle terrorism resulted in  an improved security climate, but  Turkey still 
faces  threats  from  terrorist  groups.  The  EU  has  condemned  all  acts  of  terrorist  violence 
perpetrated  in  Turkey.  The  Government  has  a  legitimate  right  and  responsibility  to  fight 
terrorism, but efforts need to be undertaken in accordance with the rule of law, human rights, 
and  fundamental  freedoms.  Amending  the  Anti-Terror  Law  and  practices  in  line  with  EU 
standards and the EU acquis remains an essential step.  

In its threat perception, Turkey has prioritised the fight against the PKK and the dismantling 
of  the  Gülen  movement.  The  PKK  remains  on  the  EU’s  list  of  persons,  groups  and  entities 
involved in acts of terrorism.  

Institutional set-up and legal alignment  

The General  Directorate of Security of the Ministry of  Interior has  a specialised police unit 
responsible  for  counter-terrorism.  The  institutional  capabilities  are  well-developed.  Turkey 
needs to bring its legislation on terrorism and corresponding practices in line with European 
standards.  

Turkey also faces severe money laundering and terrorist financing risks. Aiming to mitigate 
these risks, Turkey has made progress in strengthening its anti-money laundering/countering 
the  financing  of  terrorism  (AML/CFT)  framework  over  the  years.  The  Financial  Crimes 
Investigation  Board, 
institutions,  prepared  a 
comprehensive  national  risk  assessment  document  in  2018.  In  line  with  this  document  and 
outstanding Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations, the country still needs to 
develop a comprehensive strategy and action plan on anti-money laundering and financing of 
terrorism. 

in  coordination  with  other 

relevant 

45 

 
 
In December 2020, Turkey adopted a law on the prevention of financing of the proliferation 
of  weapons  of  mass  destruction  with  a  view  to  comply  with  relevant  UN  Security  Council 
Resolutions  and the FATF recommendations.  The law also  addresses the outstanding FATF 
recommendations on tightening rules and regulations regarding NGOs to prevent financing of 
terrorism. However, there are strong concerns that the implementation of the law could further 
restrict  the  legitimate  activities  of  NGOs  and  put  additional  pressure  on  critical  voices.  The 
Venice  Commission  of  the  Council  of  Europe  noted  with  concern  that  certain  solutions 
chosen  by  the  legislator  go  beyond  the  scope  of  the  UN  Security  Council  Resolutions  and 
FATF  recommendations,  since  the  new  provisions  apply  to  all  associations,  irrespective  of 
their goals  and records of activities, and lead to  far reaching consequences for basic human 
rights.  The  implementation  of  the  Law,  notably  the  provisions  regulating  the  control  of  the 
NGOs, needs to be proportionate and pursue a risk-based approach. It is paramount that any 
measures taken to counter terrorism are in line with Turkey’s obligations under international 
law,  and  in  particular  international  human  rights  law  (see  Chapter  23  -  Judiciary  and 
fundamental rights). 

The effectiveness and timeliness of the asset freezing mechanism improved. The government, 
for the first time since the adoption of the Law on the Prevention of Financing of Terrorism in 
2013, froze the assets of 377 people and organisations on grounds of terrorism-related charges 
in April 2021. Additionally, the most recent decisions of the United Nations Security Council 
Sanctions  Committee  were  effectively  implemented  within  24  hours  through  Presidential 
Decisions in 2021. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity  

Turkey  continued  its  efforts  to  fight  home-grown  and  foreign  terrorist  fighter  (FTF)  cells. 
Cooperation continued with EU Member States on detecting and repatriating FTFs, which is 
one  of  the  key  areas  of  joint  interest.  Since  2011,  Turkey  issued  entry  bans  for  more  than 
100 000  foreigners  and  deported  more  than  8  000  foreign  terrorist  fighters  or  suspected 
foreign  terrorist  fighters,  of  which  over  1  000  in  2020.  However,  police  and  judicial 
cooperation  with  EU  Member  States  and  EU  agencies  in  combating  terrorism  remained 
limited due to the absence of a personal data protection law in line with European standards 
and the EU acquis, and differences over the definition of, and penalties for, terrorist offences. 
Turkey should continue its efforts to effectively prevent and counter radicalisation leading to 
violent extremism and terrorism, in full compliance with fundamental rights.  

The  Turkish  financial  intelligence  unit  (MASAK)  developed  a  strong  institutional  capacity 
and  in  cooperation  with  other  financial  institutions,  established  a  sound  track-record  during 
the  reporting  period.  MASAK  increased  its  staff  number  by  51  recruits  and  opened  a  new 
branch  in  Istanbul.  The  number  of  suspicious  transaction  reports  submitted  to  MASAK 
reached 237 531 and the number of files analysed by MASAK stood at 10 298 in 2020. The 
number  of  convictions  for  money  laundering  increased  in  recent  years.  There  were  53 
convictions for money laundering in 2018, which significantly increased to 95 convictions in 
2019, and 92 convictions in 2020. In February 2021, the Ministry of Justice issued a circular, 
which  envisaged  launching  systematic  inter-agency  financial  investigations  in  money 
laundering  and  terrorism  financing  investigations.  Still,  the  track  record  as  well  as  the 
cooperation  between  the  law  enforcement  agencies,  prosecution  and  financial  intelligence 
agency need to be further improved. 

Legal and irregular migration 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

46 

 
 
The Ministry of Interior’s Directorate-General of Migration Management (DGMM) is the key 
institution  for  managing  migration  in  Turkey.  The  DGMM  continued  to  employ  a  limited 
number  of  psychologists,  social  workers,  interpreters,  and  lawyers,  some  of  which  are 
financed  by  the  EU.  Even  though  foreseen  in  the  Law  on  Foreigners  and  International 
Protection, DGMM has still not established its overseas organisation in consulates of Turkey 
abroad. 

Turkey’s  Strategy  Document  and  National  Action  Plan  on  Irregular  Migration  covering  the 
period 2019-2025 was endorsed by the Migration Board. The strategy was prepared with the 
technical assistance of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), with EU financial 
support. The  action plan identifies institutions in  charge of  each strategic priority, timelines 
and  indicators  to  measure  the  effectiveness  of  implementation.  A  six-monthly  reporting 
mechanism is set up to monitor the implementation of the plan.   

The  implementing  regulation  following  the  amendment  to  the  Law  on  Foreigners  and 
International  Protection  introducing  alternatives  to  detention,  which  entered  into  force  in 
December 2019, still needs to be adopted. 

Turkey  set  up  a  National  Assisted  Voluntary  Return  mechanism.  A  cooperation  protocol 
between DGMM, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination 
Agency (TIKA) and the Red Crescent was signed in September 2020 to that end and a pilot 
return operation of 44 Afghanis was carried out in April 2021. 

In February 2021, the Ministry of Interior (MoI) published a regulation that allows the MoI to 
assign designated private areas as Intermediary Agencies for carrying out procedures linked to 
the  issuance  of  residence  permits  for  foreigners  and  submitting  the  applications  to  the 
provincial  directorates  for  migration  management  (PDMMs)  for  a  residence  permit  on  their 
behalf.  

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

The  EU-Turkey  Statement  continued  to  be  the  main  framework  of  cooperation  between  the 
EU  and  Turkey  on  migration.  Following  the  events  at  Pazarkule  border  crossing  point 
between  Turkey  and  Greece  in  March  2020,  the  rhetoric  on  non-prevention  of  irregular 
migration  to  the  EU  gradually  toned  down.  Turkey  expressed  interest  in  the  renewal  of  the 
EU-Turkey Statement on a number of occasions. 

According  to  the  IOM,  72  migrants  lost  their  lives  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  in  2020. 
Additionally,  at  least  60  migrants  died  when  a  boat  carrying  them  westwards  sank  in  Lake 
Van  in  eastern  Turkey.  There  was  an  average  of  around  40  daily  irregular  arrivals  from 
Turkey  to  Greece  in  2020,  down  from  202  in  2019.  Migrants  from  Afghanistan,  Syria  and 
Somalia  were  recorded  as  the  top  three  nationalities  on  the  sea  route  to  Greece,  whereas 
nationals  of  Turkey,  Afghanistan  and  Syria  were  the  top  three  groups  on  the  land  route. 
Concerning the migratory routes to other Member States, Cyprus continued to be the second 
most  common  EU  destination  for  irregular  migrants  arriving  from  Turkey  (mostly  via  the 
non-government  controlled  areas).  Overall,  in  2020,  around  5  800  irregular  arrivals  were 
recorded to Cyprus. Furthermore, the sea route to Italy saw an increase in smuggling activities 
with  irregular  arrivals  from  Turkey  going  up  by  more  than  100  %.  The  total  number  of 
irregular arrivals from Turkey to the EU in 2020 was 18 736, against 75 974 in 2019. 

As of August 2021, the total number of arrivals from Turkey to the EU was still around 20 % 
lower  compared  to  the  same  period  last  year.  The  migratory  pressure  at  the  Turkish-Greek 
land and sea borders remained low (roughly 60 % less compared to 2020), whereas sustained 
migratory  activity  continued  to  be  register  along  the  sub-route  to  Italy  (more  than  100  % 
increase). The total number of irregular arrivals to Cyprus also increased by more than 40 %. 

47 

 
 
In  parallel,  the  number  of  irregular  migrants  apprehended  within  Turkey  also  substantially 
decreased  from  454  662  in  2019  to  122  302  in  2020,  due  to  border  closures  and  global 
restrictions  to  movement  brought  by  COVID-19,  as  well  as  the  reduced  intensity  of 
smuggling  activities.  As  in  the  past  years,  irregular  migrants  from  Afghanistan,  Syria  and 
Pakistan  were  the  most  frequently  apprehended  nationalities.  The  Turkish  Coast  Guard 
rescued 20 380 irregular migrants at seas in the reporting period, compared to 60 802 in 2019. 
Turkey  has  persistently  raised  concerns  about  alleged  migrant  arrival  prevention  measures 
(so-called ‘pushbacks’) enforced by the Greek authorities in the Aegean Sea, but Greece has 
rejected these allegations. 

No  progress  was  made  as  regards  the  full  implementation  of  the  EU-Turkey  Readmission 
Agreement.  Turkey  maintained  its  position  that  it  would  not  implement  the  provisions 
concerning third-country nationals until the visa requirement for its citizens travelling to the 
Schengen  Area  is  lifted.  EU  Member  States  lodged  498  readmission  requests  for  Turkish 
nationals; 344 were accepted by Turkey and 74 were effectively readmitted.  

Return of irregular migrants from the Greek islands was unilaterally suspended by Turkey on 
public health grounds in March 2020 and remained so as of June 2021. The Commission and 
Greece  have  repeatedly  called  on  Turkey  to  resume  return  operations  in  line  with  the 
commitments  made  under  the  EU-Turkey  Statement.  The  resumption  of  returns  to  Turkey 
remains  key  to  effectively  fight  irregular  migration  and  human  smuggling  networks  in  the 
region.  Between  2016  and  2020,  2  140  persons,  including  412  Syrian  nationals,  were 
readmitted  to  Turkey  from  Greece  under  the  ‘One-for-One’  scheme.  The  bilateral 
Readmission  Protocol  between  Greece  and  Turkey  remained  suspended.  Turkey  did  not 
readmit  third-country nationals  from  Bulgaria under either the bilateral  border agreement or 
the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement. 

As regards resettlement from Turkey to the EU under the ‘One-for-One’ scheme, 2 422 Syrian 
refugees  were  resettled  to  11  Member  States  in  the  reporting  period,  despite  the  global 
suspension  of  resettlement  operations  in  the  first  half  of  2020  owing  to  the  COVID-19 
outbreak. Moreover, the Resettlement Support Facility run by the European Asylum Support 
Office  in  Istanbul  facilitated  the  processing  of  1  017  resettlement  candidates  in  2020.  The 
total  number  of  Syrian  refugees  resettled  from  Turkey  to  the  EU  Member  States  under  the 
‘One-for-One’  scheme  reached  30  477  as  of  22  August  2021.  At  the  same  time,  422  258 
Syrian  refugees  were  voluntarily  repatriated  from  Turkey  to  Syria  between  2016  and  2020 
according to the government. Of these, 101 000 were monitored by the office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) with respect to the voluntary nature of 
the repatriations. 

Turkey effectively returned 41 379 irregular migrants to third countries in 2020, against 103 
858 in 2019. None of these was carried out within the scope of the readmission agreements 
that  are  in  force  between  Turkey  and  third  countries.  Turkey  did  not  sign  any  new 
readmission agreements in the reporting period. 

Currently, Turkey hosts a sizeable number of the Afghan refugees. According to the Turkish 
authorities, in August 2021, Turkey hosted 300 000 Afghan nationals, 182 000 of whom were 
registered with the authorities. However, given the growing negative perception of migrants 
in  Turkey,  the  Turkish  authorities  stated  that  Turkey  is  not  able  to  admit  more  migrants. 
Turkish  authorities  are  committed  to  strengthen  border  control  at  the  eastern  and  southern 
borders  and  to  resume  return  operations  to  Afghanistan  as  soon  as  possible.  The  Turkish 
government  deployed  additional  police  and  gendarmerie  forces  to  the  border  area  and  took 
measures  to  improve  their  border  surveillance  system.  The  President  also  announced  the 

48 

 
 
 
acceleration  of  the  ongoing  construction  of  the  security  wall  on  the  border  between  Turkey 
and Iran. 

The  number  of  removal  centres  stands  at  26  with  a  total  capacity  of  16  108  people. 
Compared  to  the  previous  years,  overcrowding  was  not  observed  in  2020,  owing  to  the 
decrease  in  irregular  crossings  and  apprehensions.  Despite  the  increase  in  the  number  of 
lawyers handling cases in removal centres (from 4 187 in 2019 to 7 168 in 2020), access to 
legal counselling remained low, considering hundreds of thousands of migrants apprehended 
and placed in removal centres. Media, lawyers and NGOs reported incidents and allegations 
of human rights violations, including suicide, gender-based violence and barriers to accessing 
legal  aid.  The  newly  adopted  human  rights  action  plan  foresees  the  establishment  of  an 
effective  mechanism  to  review  the  complaints  regarding  the  conditions  in  the  Removal 
Centres. 

The  number  of  foreigners  legally  residing  in  Turkey  stood  at  886  653  at  the  end  of  2020, 
down from 1 101 030 in 2019. This decrease was a consequence of the travel restrictions, the 
backlog of pending applications that could not be processed due to the restrictions, and the 
new stricter rules on the renewal of tourism resident permits. Following the reintroduction in 
September 2018 of the lowered minimum amount of investment required to apply for Turkish 
investor  citizenship  scheme,  16  653  foreign  investors  received  Turkish  citizenship.  Such 
schemes  pose  risks  as  regards  security,  money  laundering,  tax  evasion,  terrorist  financing, 
corruption and infiltration by organised crime. As a candidate country, Turkey should refrain 
from any measure that could jeopardise the attainment of the EU’s objectives when using its 
prerogatives to award nationality (see Chapter 4 – Free movement of capital).  

DGMM carried out a series of meetings, trainings, and workshops with foreigners, students, 
academics,  NGOs  and  staff  of  public  administrations  to  implement  the  Harmonisation 
Strategy Document and National Action Plan adopted in 2018. Migration Information centres 
were set up in a number of provinces also with EU financial support. 

Asylum 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

The DGMM is the main institution responsible for all asylum-related procedures. The status 
determination  processes  are  carried  across 
the  provincial  directorates  of  migration 
management (PDMMs) and are harmonised by the International Protection Bureaus (Decision 
Centres)  in  Ankara  and  Istanbul,  established  in  2018  and  2019  respectively,  with  a  view  to 
reduce  case  backlog.  Specialising  on  interviews  and  drafting  decisions,  these  Decision 
Centres processed 2 480 applications in 2020. 

Legislation in this area is partially aligned with the EU acquis. The Law on Foreigners and 
International  Protection  maintains  the  reservation  (geographical  limitation)  expressed  in  the 
New York Protocol of the 1951 Geneva Convention, according to which the vast majority of 
persons  seeking  international  protection  in  Turkey  cannot  apply  for  fully-fledged  refugee 
status but for ‘conditional refugee’ status and subsidiary protection only. Conditional refugee 
status  limits  the  stay  in  the  country  ‘until  the  moment  a  recognised  conditional  refugee  is 
resettled  to  a  third  country’.  Syrian  refugees  are  granted  a  specific  refugee  status  under  the 
Temporary Protection Regulation. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

Turkey continued to host the largest refugee community in the world, with 3.7 million Syrians 
under temporary protection and more than 320 000 non-Syrians including those who hold or 
applied  for  international  protection  status.  The  number  of  asylum  seekers  declined  over  the 

49 

 
 
reporting period; 31 334 international protection applications were lodged in 2020, down from 
56  417  in  2019.  This  is  partly  explained  by  overall  decrease  in  cross-border  migratory 
movements  due  to  COVID-19  restrictions  and  reflects  the  global  decrease  in  asylum 
applications. Of the 31 334 applications, 22 606 were Afghans, 5 875 were Iraqis and 1 425 
were  Iranians.  In  2020,  Turkey  granted  international  protection  (refugee  status,  conditional 
refugee status or subsidiary protection) to 8 753 applicants, a notable increase from 5 449 in 
2019. The authorities rejected 10 674 applications compared to 5 212 in 2019.  

NGOs  reported  considerable  challenges  with  access  to  registration  in  the  first  place,  where 
individuals wishing to lodge an application in PDMMs are referred to other PDMMs, without 
a  formal  documentation  and  referral  system.  Such  de-facto  barriers  to  registration  hinder 
access  to  all  other  essential  services  and  put  asylum  seekers  in  an  irregular  situation  if 
apprehended.  Effective  access  to  international  protection  at  borders,  airports  and  removal 
centres  remain  limited  as  reported  by  NGOs  and  lawyers.  As  of  December  2020,  237 
interpreters  worked  at  PDMMs  and  Decision  Centres,  particularly  for  status  determination 
interviews. The availability of interpretation services needs to be further improved. 

While  a  large  majority  of  Syrians  are  registered  and  reside  in  various  provinces  across 
Turkey, 57 321 Syrians are hosted in seven temporary accommodation centres, down from 63 
518  in  2019.  Throughout  2020,  the  DGMM  continued  the  verification  of  data  of  Syrians 
under  temporary  protection,  updating  and  completing  the  information  gathered  during  their 
original registration. In 2020, 895 499 new verification procedures were carried out. 

The DGMM uses GöçNet, a government database containing data on applicants for temporary 
and international protection, including biometric data in the form of photos and fingerprints. 
The police and gendarmerie have access to GöçNet. 

Cooperation  between  the  DGMM  and  the  European  Asylum  Support  Office  (EASO) 
continued  in  2020  with  the  implementation  of  the  EASO-DGMM  Cooperation  Roadmap 
2019-2021,  which  aims  to  support  the  DGMM  in  areas  relating  to  country  of  origin 
information, training system, decision centres and mobile units, information management and 
analysis, people with special needs and contingency planning. 

The  Turkish  authorities  increased  efforts  to  facilitate  entrance  to  the  labour  market  and 
encourage  legal  employment.  Applicants  for  international  protection,  conditional  refugee 
status  holders  and  people  under  temporary  protection  (Syrians)  can  apply  for  work  permits. 
The  COVID-19  pandemic  increased  the  unemployment  rate  among  refugees  by  88  %  since 
March 2020, with 63 % of them being food insecure, according to recent NGO reports. 

In  2020,  the  full  operational  budget  of  EUR  6  billion  of  the  EU  Facility  for  Refugees  in 
Turkey (FRIT) was committed and contracted, with over EUR 4.2 billion disbursed by August 
2021.  On  top  of  the  Facility,  the  EU  also  committed  EUR  535  million  to  continue 
humanitarian support to refugees. The fifth  annual  report on the EU Facility for refugees in 
Turkey  provides  evidence  of  the  results  achieved  so  far,  and  how  vital  the  Facility  is  in 
supporting  refugees  and  host  communities  in  Turkey.  The  Facility  mobilises  both 
humanitarian  and  development  assistance  for  refugees  and  host  communities  in  Turkey  to 
meet  basic  needs,  increase  access  to  education  and  healthcare,  including  for  vulnerable 
groups, children and women.     

Visa policy 

Turkey made no progress in meeting the six unfulfilled benchmarks of the visa liberalisation 
roadmap,  namely  on 
the 
implementation  of  the  EU-Turkey  readmission  agreement,  cooperation  agreement  with 

law,  personal  data  protection 

the  anti-terror 

legislation, 

50 

 
 
Europol, implementation of the GRECO recommendations on anti-corruption, and the judicial 
cooperation with all EU Member States. Negotiations are ongoing with a view to concluding 
an international agreement between Europol and Turkey.  

Turkey  changed  its  visa  policy  towards  Iraqi  nationals  by  abolishing  the  possibility  of 
electronic visa and lifted the passport requirement for short stays entries for the nationals of 
Azerbaijan. 

Turkey  needs  to  further  harmonise  its  visa  policy  with  the  EU’s  visa  policy.  This  would 
include  further  aligning  Turkish  visa  requirements  with  the  EU  lists  of  visa-free  and  visa-
required countries, full phasing-out of the issuing of visas at borders (currently citizens of 24 
countries are eligible to obtain visa on arrival) and of electronic visas, and ensuring that the 
issuing  of  visas  at  its  diplomatic  missions  is  carried  out  in  line  with  the  conditions  and 
procedures  set  out  in  the  EU  Visa  Code.  Turkey  continues  to  apply  a  discriminatory  visa 
regime  towards  Cyprus,  while  it  has  abolished  short  stay  visa  requirements  for  26  EU 
Member States. 

Schengen and external borders 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

During the reporting period, no new legislation was adopted. The coordination of the work of 
the  state  bodies  dealing  with  border  management  matters  is  the  responsibility  of  the 
Directorate-General  of  Provincial  Administration  under  the  Ministry  of  Interior  (MoI).  The 
Border  Management  Implementation  Board,  which  should  meet  twice  a  year,  met  for  the 
fourth  time  in  October  2020  since  its  establishment  in  2016.  Its  supervising  body,  the 
Integrated Border Management Coordination Board, has not met so far. 

The  National  Coordination  and  Joint  Risk  Analysis  Centre  in  Ankara,  which  was  also 
formally established by the above Regulation in 2016 and which has received significant EU 
funding, has not become operational yet. 

In  February  2021,  the  institute  of  Heads  of  Civil  Border  Administration  was  established  by 
Presidential  Decree,  taking  over  the  border  management  responsibilities  from  Governors  in 
eleven border regions (mostly in the East of the country). The basic aim of this reform step 
was  to  strengthen  coordination  of  border  management  matters  at  central  level  under  the 
supervision of Directorate-General of Provincial Administration. In addition, two departments 
of the MoI in charge of irregular migration matters, the Counter Trafficking of Migrants and 
the Border Gates Departments, were merged into one service in 2020. 

In order to bring the country’s border management system in line with the EU acquis, Turkey 
should further enhance inter-service and international cooperation, accelerate the adoption of 
an  Integrated  Border  Management  (IBM)  strategy  and  update  its  National  Action  Plan  to 
Implement Turkey’s IBM Strategy of 2006. It also needs to enact new legislation to set up a 
non-military  border  management  body  in  charge  of  all  aspects  of  border  management, 
including border surveillance at the ‘green’ border, which is currently under the responsibility 
of the Turkish Land Forces. Turkey has committed to remove all anti-personnel landmines by 
31 March 2022, in order to fulfil its obligations under the Ottawa Treaty. So far, only a small 
border  stretch  of  a  total  of  2  949  km  has  been  cleaned  entirely.  Turkey  needs  to  increase 
substantially national investment to clean mined areas along the border with Syria, Iraq, Iran, 
Armenia  as  well  as  inside  Turkey.  Significant  financial  support  for  de-mining  is  currently 
provided by the EU. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

51 

 
 
Turkey  continued  investing  significant  efforts  and  financial  means  in  the  modernisation  of 
border security at the land frontier. After the construction of a wall and a barbed-wire fence, 
along the Syrian border, similar works, including the installation of modern communication 
and surveillance masts, continued at the Iranian border, partially funded by the EU. Identical 
masts are being erected also at the Western land border.  

Relations with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), which are based on 
a three-year Cooperation Plan covering the period 2020-2022, were negatively impacted by 
incidents at the Greek-Turkish land border and the Aegean Sea. Turkey does not participate 
in  Joint  Operations  of  Frontex.  Frontex  has  a  liaison  officer  permanently  based  in  Ankara. 
Cooperation with  neighbouring  Greece and Bulgaria in  the framework of a trilateral  Police 
and  Customs  Co-operation  Centre  at  the  Bulgarian-Turkish  border  crossing  point  Kapitan 
Andreevo/Kapıkule continued. 

Judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters 

Judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters is regulated by the Law on International 
Civil Law and Procedural Law, circulars, and international conventions. Turkey is a party to 
most of the international conventions. Turkey still needs to  accede to  relevant  international 
conventions in the area of civil justice, many of which were drawn by the Hague Conference 
on Private International Law, including in particular the Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 
on Choice of Court Agreements. Turkey has not yet ratified the European Convention on the 
Compensation  of  Victims.  More  effective  measures  are  needed  to  ensure  an  acceptable 
reduction  in  delays  to  proceedings  resulting  from  the  1980  Hague  Convention  on  civil 
aspects  of  international  child  abduction  and  to  foster  the  use  of  international  mediation  in 
such cases.  

The main legislation governing the judicial cooperation in criminal matters is in place since 
2016  and  Turkey  has  acceded  to  most  of  the  international  conventions.  The  new  legislation 
entails new mechanisms to speed up the international judicial cooperation in criminal matters, 
which has started to  yield positive results. 13 mutual legal assistance requests following the 
introduction  of  video  conferencing  have  been  processed,  out  of  which  two  have  been 
finalised. Under the new ‘consensual  extradition’ procedure,  extradition  of an offender now 
takes 1-2 months in average as opposed to classic extradition procedure lasting around a year. 
As  for  the  transfer  of  sentenced  persons,  introduction  of  the  procedure  of  ‘exact  execution’ 
paved the way to  the removal of the obligation of local  courts to  comply  with  the domestic 
legislation. In 2020, under the new procedure, overall 42 convicts were transferred to Turkey 
from  other  countries,  while  five  convicts  were  transferred  from  Turkey  to  other  countries. 
However,  the  independence  and  accountability  of  the  justice  system  has  to  be  substantially 
strengthened  for  a  smooth  application  of  the  principle  of  mutual  recognition  of  judgements 
and court decisions in criminal matters. 

During 2020, trainings on conventions on international legal assistance and corruption and on 
the  effective  use  of  international  cooperation  and  the  investigation  methods  of  offences  on 
financing  of  terrorism  and  money  laundering  were  provided  to  1  146  candidate  judges  and 
prosecutors. 

In  2020,  EU  Member  States  accepted  six  extradition  requests  from  Turkey,  while  50  were 
rejected and 150 are pending. There were four extradition requests from EU Member States, 
which are all pending. EU Member States  accepted five transfers of convicts to Turkey and 
Turkey accepted four transfers to EU Member States. Six contact points have been designated 
by  Turkey  to  coordinate  and  follow-up  judicial  cooperation  with  EUROJUST.  In  2020, 
Turkey was involved in  22 EUROJUST cases on terrorism, cybercrime, migrant smuggling, 

52 

 
 
corruption and fraud, an 83 % increase compared to the previous year (12 cases). However, 
the personal data protection law is not yet in line with European standards, which prevents the 
start  of  negotiations  for  an  agreement  with  the  EU  on  cooperation  with  EUROJUST. 
Cooperative relations should be established also with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office 
(EPPO), which started its operational activities in June 2021.  

2.3 ECONOMIC CRITERIA 

In  line  with  the  conclusions  of  the  European  Council  in  Copenhagen  in  June  1993,  EU 
accession  requires  the  existence  of  a  functioning  market  economy  and  the  capacity  to  cope 
with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. 

Economic governance has become even more central in the accession process in recent years. 
The  Commission's  monitoring  takes  place  in  two  processes:  the  Economic  Reform 
Programme  exercise  and  the  assessment  of  compliance  with  the  economic  criteria  for 
accession.  Each  enlargement  country  prepares  an  annual  Economic  Reform  Programme 
(ERP), which sets out a medium-term macro-fiscal policy framework and a structural reform 
agenda aimed at ensuring competitiveness and inclusive growth. The ERPs are the basis for 
country-specific  policy  guidance  jointly  adopted  by  the  EU  and  the  Western  Balkans  and 
Turkey at ministerial level each year. 

2.3.1. The existence of a functioning market economy 

The Turkish economy is well advanced, but made no progress over the reporting period and 
serious concerns persist over its functioning. 

53 

201820192020Turkey - Key economic figuresGDP per capita (% of EU-27 in PPS)1)64635964Real GDP growth 5.93.00.91.8Economic activity rate of the population aged 15-64 (%), total1)55.658.558.454.9      female34.538.338.735.0      male76.778.578.174.6Unemployment rate of the population aged 15-64 (%), total1)10.011.114.013.4      female12.314.016.715.1      male9.09.712.612.6Employment of the population aged 15-64 (annual growth %)2.72)1.8-2.4-4.3Nominal wages (annual growth %)12.418.326.218.0Consumer price index (annual growth %)8.616.315.212.3Exchange rate against EUR3.055.686.358.10Current account balance (% of GDP)-4.4-2.80.9-5.2Net foreign direct investment, FDI (% of GDP)1.11.20.80.6General government balance (% of GDP)1)-0.5-2.8-3.2-2.8General government debt (% of GDP)29.230.232.639.83)Notes: 1) Eurostat2) 2015-20173) State governmentSource: national sources2012-17 average 
 
 
The  authorities  delivered  a  sizeable  and  wide-ranging  set  of  measures  to  boost  domestic 
demand and soften the economic repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, the 
economy  rebounded  quickly  from  the  crisis,  reaching  pre-crisis  levels  already  in  the  third 
quarter  of  2020.  Amid  a  strong  policy  response  to  the  crisis,  institutional  and  policy 
coordination weaknesses undermined the credibility and effectiveness of authorities’ actions 
and  imbalances  increased.  The  macroeconomic  policy  mix  relied  too  heavily  on  the  credit 
channel, while direct fiscal support measures were rather limited in view of the magnitude of 
the social and labour market challenges. The strong monetary  expansion last year weakened 
the lira, increased inflation and dollarisation, and triggered portfolio outflows. The closing of 
the  current  account  deficit  in  2019  turned  out  to  be  short-lived  and  external  imbalances 
remain  a  major  vulnerability.  Monetary  policy  tightened  in  autumn  2020  but  the  abrupt 
dismissal  of  the  central  bank  governor  in  March  2021,  only  four  months  after  his 
appointment,  stirred  financial  market  instability  and  called  into  question  the  authorities’ 
commitment to reducing inflation. 

The institutional and regulatory environment weakened further and there are persistent issues 
with  predictability,  transparency,  and  implementation  of  regulations.  Market  exit  remained 
costly  and  slow.  The  informal  sector  declined  during  the  crisis  but  remains  large.  State 
intervention  in  price  setting  mechanisms  persists.  The  provision  of  State  aid  lacks  proper 
implementation  rules,  enforcement  and  transparency.  Supported  by  loose  monetary  policy 
until  the  autumn  2020  and  favourable  regulatory  measures,  bank  lending  grew  strongly, 
spurred  in  particular  by  state-owned  banks.  The  banking  sector  remained  well  capitalised, 
benefiting  from  regulatory  forbearance  and  other  crisis-mitigation  measures.  The  pandemic 
had a deeply negative impact on the labour market and poverty. The number of discouraged 
workers increased significantly and employment levels fell far below their height a few years 
ago. Female labour market participation and employment remained at particularly low levels. 
The proportion of young people not in employment, education or training increased. 

The  Commission’s  recommendations  from  2020  were  not  fully  implemented  and  remain 
valid. In order to improve the functioning of the market economy Turkey should in particular: 

  rebalance  the  policy  mix  towards  a  tighter  monetary  policy  stance  and  use  part  of  the 
available  fiscal  space  for  a  targeted  increase  of  budget  expenditure  to  soften  the  crisis 
impact on the labour market and alleviate poverty; 

  strengthen the independence of the central bank and improve monetary policy credibility 

in order to anchor inflation expectations and stabilise the exchange rate; 

  strengthen  the  business  environment,  reduce  state  interference  in  price  setting,  and 

enhance the transparency and control of State aid; 

  step up active labour market policies, in particular for young people and women, as well 

as the social dialogue. 

Economic governance 

Despite  a  strong  policy  response  to  the  crisis,  institutional  and  policy  coordination 
weaknesses undermined the credibility and effectiveness of authorities’ actions. Turkey 
delivered a sizeable and wide-ranging set of measures to boost domestic demand and soften 
the economic repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic. This helped the economy to return 
quickly  to  growth,  being  one  of  the  few  in  the  world  to  avoid  a  contraction  last  year. 
However,  the  excessive  reliance  on  the  credit  channel  weakened  the  lira,  depleted  foreign 
exchange reserves, and increased inflation, dollarisation, external imbalances and inequalities. 
Monetary  policy  has  slowly  reversed  course  in  the  summer  of  2020  and  tightened  more 

54 

 
 
decisively  since  November  under  the  watch  of  a  new  central  bank  governor.  However,  the 
abrupt dismissal of the governor in March 2021, barely four months into office, has called this 
policy shift and the turn to a simplified and more transparent policy framework into question. 
Maintaining  a  sufficiently  tight  monetary  policy  stance  over  a  prolonged  period  remains  a 
challenging  task,  as  demonstrated  by  a  long  history  of  missed  targets  and  rapid  policy 
reversals. The frequent changes at the helm of the central bank are the starkest manifestation 
of continued institutional weakness in the country’s Presidential system. Successive changes 
of the head of the statistical institute (TURKSTAT) and the fast dismantling of newly created 
advisory  boards  on  price  statistics  and 
labour  market  undermined  TURKSTAT’s 
independence and credibility. The policy guidance jointly agreed at the May 2020 Economic 
and  Financial  Dialogue  between  the  EU  and  the  Western  Balkans  and  Turkey  was 
implemented partially, with the rate of implementation improving over previous years. 

Macroeconomic stability 

The  Turkish  economy  was  resilient  and  rebounded  quickly  from  the  crisis,  but  the 
recovery  was  uneven  across  sectors.  Following  a  short-lived  contraction  in  the  second 
quarter due to containment measures, real GDP reached pre-crisis levels already in the third 
quarter  of  2020.  Overall,  a  large  policy  stimulus  and  a  strong  growth  momentum  shortly 
before  the  pandemic  helped  the  economy 
expand  by  1.8  %  in  2020.  The  good 
performance  extended  into  the  first  two 
quarters  of  2021  with  growth  rates  of 
7.2 %  and  21.7  %  y/y,  respectively.  After 
contracting  in  2019,  domestic  demand 
returned  to  growth  in  2020.  Favourable 
monetary  conditions  strongly  supported 
and 
robust 
investment.  An  outsized  build-up  of 
stocks,  another  important  contributor  to 
growth,  has  started  to  unwind  only  by  the  end  of  2020.  Import  growth  remained  relatively 
strong,  affected  by  exceptionally  high  non-monetary  gold  imports,  but  retracted  since  the 
fourth  quarter  of  2020  and  turned  negative  in  early  2021.  After  the  initial  shock  from  the 
pandemic, exports of goods rebounded quickly. They gathered pace along with the firming up 
of  global  demand  and  as  price  competitiveness  gains  supported  a  further  expansion  of 
Turkey’s market share in some non-EU markets. The economic recovery, however, remained 
uneven because of the high exposure to international tourism and transport – two of the most 
heavily  affected  sectors  in  the  pandemic,  which  still  feel  its  impact.  Due  to  tepid  pre-crisis 
growth,  resulting  from  the  unwinding  of  imbalances  after  the  currency  turmoil  of  2018, 
Turkey’s  real  income  convergence  with  the  EU  reversed  –  in  2019  its  per  capita  GDP  in 
purchasing power standards was only 59 % of the EU average, down from a high of 68 % in 
2015. However, it rebounded to 64 % in 2020 as the Turkish economy performed much better 
in comparison to a strong decline in the EU. 

consumption 

private 

The  closing  of  the  current  account  deficit  in  2019  turned  out  to  be  short-lived  and 
external  imbalances  remain  a  major  vulnerability.  With  domestic  demand  returning  to 
growth,  higher  import  of  non-monetary  gold  due  to  increased  financial  instability,  and  a 
crisis-induced  weakening  in  exports,  the 
current  account  moved  back  to  a  deficit  of 
5.2 % of GDP in 2020. The deficit declined 
somewhat in the beginning of 2021, driven 
by the recovery in exports of goods, imports 

55 

-8-6-4-20246810201520162017201820192020Graph 1: Turkey -Real GDP growth and contributionsPriv. cons.Gov. cons.GFCFStocksNet exportsreal GDP growthSource: Macrobond, own calculations% y-o-y-6-30320162017201820192020Graph 2: Turkey -Current account selected components and FDI Workers' Remittances balanceGoods and services trade balanceCurrent account balanceNet FDI% of GDPSource: IMF and Central Bank of Turkey 
 
suppression,  and  lower  gold  imports.  However,  it  remained  relatively  high,  reflecting  the 
strength of domestic demand, still subdued service exports, and negative terms of trade due to 
global commodity price increases. The strong monetary expansion in 2020 not only weakened 
the lira but also triggered financial market instability and portfolio outflows. Official foreign 
exchange  reserves  have  been  the  main  source  of  financing  of  these  outflows  and  of  the 
widening  current  account  deficit.  As  a  result,  central  bank  reserves  currency  composition 
worsened and reserves fell by more than 20 %, to their lowest level in a decade, while its net 
foreign assets (excluding borrowed funds) turned negative. Net foreign direct investment has 
further  declined 
remained  marginal,  despite  growing  price 
competitiveness. 

recent  years  and 

in 

Turkey  remains  highly  exposed  to  geopolitical  risks  and  changes  in  global  financing 
conditions. Geopolitical tensions, rising economic imbalances and overall policy uncertainty 
affected  negatively  the  country  risk  premium  and  investor  confidence  in  Turkey.  With  the 
exception of the short period between November 2020 and March 2021, marked by clear steps 
towards monetary policy normalisation, the five-year credit default swaps remained elevated 
above 350 basis points. The depreciation of the lira drove the external debt ratio further up to 
62.7 % of GDP at the end of 2020. Turkey’s external position, thus, is very vulnerable amidst 
an uncertain geopolitical environment and in view of a possible tightening of global financing 
conditions. The continued ability in particular of the banking sector to roll over its short-term 
external debt and the improvement in the short-term positive net foreign exchange position of 
the non-financial sector are key factors attenuating this vulnerability. 

Inflation  increased  and  price  pressures  have  become  entrenched  primarily  due  to  the 
lack of monetary policy credibility. The weakness of the lira, which lost 24 % against the 
U.S. dollar in 2020 and another 14 % by mid-June 2021, continued to be a major inflationary 
factor.  In  addition,  food  prices  increased  markedly  by  the  end  of  2020  and  have  remained 
elevated since then. Persistently high food price inflation not only hurts disproportionately the 
poor,  but  also  points  to  deep-rooted  structural  problems  in  the  agricultural  sector,  like  long 
supply chains and underdeveloped logistics and storage. Thus, despite lower energy prices in 
2020,  inflation  stayed  in  the  double-digits,  ending  2020  at  14.6  %.  As  energy  and  other 
commodity  prices  increased  since  the  beginning  of  2021,  inflation  picked  up  further  to 
19.25 %  y/y  in  August.  Producer  prices  also  continued  their  steep  rise,  from  5.5  %  y/y  last 
May to 45.5 % in August 2021, pointing to persistent inflationary pressures. The central bank 
was slow to react to rising inflation last  year and started to tighten its policy only in August 
2020.  It  tightened  more  decisively  under  a  new  central  bank  governor  who,  between 
November and March, raised the key policy rate by 875 basis points to 19 %. However, his 
abrupt dismissal triggered financial market instability and called into question the authorities’ 
commitment  to  reducing  inflation.  The  policy  rate  has  remained  unchanged  since  March, 
despite  increasing  inflation  and  inflationary  expectations.  The  frequent  dismissals  of  central 
bank governors and recurrent pressure by the authorities on monetary policy decision-makers 
to  lower  interest  rates  severely  undermine  the  bank’s  independence  and  its  credibility  and 
come  at  the  cost  of  higher  country  risk  premiums,  and  exchange  rate  and  financial  market 
instability. 

Fiscal policy tightened at the height of 
the  crisis,  despite  numerous  crisis-
related  measures.  The  fiscal  support 
package  to  cushion  the  crisis  impact 
amounted  to  slightly  more  than  2  %  of 
GDP, while most of the support (around 
10 % of GDP) was off budget in the form 

56 

010203040-6-4-202201520162017201820192020Graph 3: Turkey -Fiscal developmentsPrimary balance (lhs)Interest (lhs)GG balance (lhs)Public Debt (rhs)Source: Nationalsources% ofGDP 
 
of new or deferred loans backed by public guarantees. At central government level, the budget 
deficit was 3.4 % of GDP in 2020 – significantly below the revised target of 4.9 % of GDP. 
The  general  government  deficit  declined  from  3.2  %  of  GDP  in  2019  to  2.8  %  of  GDP  in 
2020,  notwithstanding  a  sharp  increase  in  interest  payments  and  lower  revenue  from  the 
central bank. The growing domestic demand and targeted tax increases on certain goods, such 
as motor vehicles, supported revenue. There was a rather modest increase in social spending 
and transfers to  households  and limited tax reductions and payment  deferrals.  However, the 
good revenue performance and cuts in government consumption and investment expenditure 
outweighed the impact of these measures on the deficit and allowed the government to reduce 
the budget deficit and achieve a better than planned result in 2020. While signalling a return 
to strict spending discipline, which had been a major economic policy asset until 2017, fiscal 
policy tightened in the midst of the crisis, restraining its support to the economy. The recently 
revised 2021 deficit took into account  the better than planned revenue performance in  2020 
(by 2.5 % of GDP) and cut the central government deficit target by 0.7 percentage points to an 
estimated 3.5 % of GDP. Although the budget deficit outperformed targets by a wide margin, 
government  debt  continued  rising.  It  went  up  by  close  to  7  percentage  points  to  39.8  %  of 
GDP in 2020 and continued growing in early 2021 mainly because of the depreciation of the 
lira. In addition, fiscal risks related to various contingent liabilities increased as well. 

The  macroeconomic  policy  mix  relied  too  heavily  on  the  credit  channel  and  a  loose 
monetary policy. Monetary policy overreacted to the crisis and the excessive credit creation 
spilled  over  to  weaken  the  lira,  worsen  financial  market  volatility,  and  increase  inflation. 
Direct  fiscal  support  measures,  on  the  other  hand,  were  rather  limited  in  view  of  the 
magnitude of the social and labour market challenges. Hence, a rebalancing of the policy mix 
towards  a  tighter  monetary  policy  stance  and  using  part  of  the  available  fiscal  space  for 
a targeted  increase  of  budget  expenditure  would  be  needed.  Institutional  weaknesses,  low 
policy  credibility  and  geopolitical  risks  seriously  undermine  the  effectiveness  of  the  policy 
mix. 

Functioning of product markets 

Business environment 

Turkey’s  institutional  and  regulatory  environment  weakened,  while  government 
intentions to improve the business climate are at an early stage. Starting a business is still 
relatively  cumbersome,  while  market  exit  has  also  remained  costly  and  time-consuming. 
Nevertheless,  the  pandemic  intensified  both  market  entry  and  exits.  The  number  of  newly 
established  businesses  increased  by  20.5  %  in  2020  as  compared  to  2019.  In  parallel,  the 
number of liquidated companies increased by 9.9 % and the number of closed ones by 16.4 % 
during  the  same  timeframe.  There  has  been  further  backsliding  in  the  areas  of  contract 
enforcement  and 
though  alternative  dispute  resolution 
mechanisms have been promoted, commercial judicial processes are slow and a large backlog 
of  commercial  court  cases  remains.  The  implementation  of  the  legislation  to  improve  the 
insolvency system is behind schedule and the process remains inefficient. In order to mitigate 
the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on businesses, all pending and new enforcement and 
bankruptcy procedures were put on hold until 15 June 2020 and concordat proceedings were 
suspended  as  well.  Turkey  lacks  a  systematic  consultation  mechanism  with  business 
organisations and social partners during the preparation of new legislation. 

insolvency  resolution.  Even 

There  has  been  serious  backsliding  in  recent  years  with  regard  to  the  judicial  system. 
Regulatory enforcement and the constraints on government power worsened the most, while 
scores  on  fundamental  rights  and  open  government  declined  from  already  low  levels.  The 
Government  adopted  a  Human  Rights  Action  Plan  and  an  Economic  Reform  Package  in 

57 

 
 
March 2021, envisaging a number of actions, including the development of alternative dispute 
resolution  methods,  strengthening  specialised  courts  and  reviewing  public  procurement 
legislation. Turkey further improved its performance in the area of property rights. However, 
intellectual  property  right  enforcement  remains  very  weak  (see  Chapter  7).  The  number  of 
companies  managed  under  the  trusteeship  of  the  Savings  Deposits  Insurance  Fund  is  still 
high. As of the end of 2020, the management of 796 companies based in 38 provinces across 
Turkey  with  a  total  asset  value  of  TRY  70.3  billion  (EUR  7.8  billion)  and  with  a  total  of 
40 061  employees,  remained  under  the  trusteeship  of  the  Fund.  Neither  a  schedule  for 
resolving the release of all companies from trusteeship, nor appropriate, effective and timely 
means of legal redress are in place. 

The  informal  sector  remained  structurally  high,  representing  a  considerable  share  of 
economic  activity,  well  above  the  OECD  average.  The  share  of  unregistered  employment 
fell  below  30  %  in  2020,  mainly  due  to  the  decline  in  informal  jobs  in  sectors  seriously 
affected  by  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  such  as  tourism  and  construction.  The  authorities 
continued  to  implement  the  Action  Plan  and  Strategy  for  the  fight  against  the  informal 
economy (2019-2021). The results of the actions taken so far are, however, difficult to assess. 
Among  others,  the  Revenue  Administration  aims  to  increase  the  level  of  voluntary 
compliance,  strengthen  audit  capacity,  review  and  regulate  the  legislation,  enhance  inter-
agency data sharing and increase awareness, but no concrete performance indicators against 
which to measure progress had been set. 

State influence on product markets 

The state continues intervening in the price-setting mechanism in key sectors. More than 
a  quarter  of  the  consumer  basket  is  composed  of  goods  whose  prices  are  set  or  heavily 
influenced  by  public  authorities  (price  limits,  tax  rate  adjustments).  Meanwhile,  Turkish 
regulators  have  been  carrying  out  intensive  price  audits  across  all  provinces  to  investigate 
unfair  pricing  and  stockpiling  practices.  In  2020,  495  firms  have  been  found  guilty  of 
charging exorbitant prices, mostly on food, protective masks, sanitizers and other basic goods. 
The  total  amount  of  the  administrative  fines  imposed  by  the  Unfair  Price  Evaluation  Board 
reached  TRY  15.5  million.  Within  the  scope  of  COVID-19  pandemic  measures,  Turkey 
reduced the VAT for a comprehensive list of goods and services from 18 % to 8 % and from 
8 %  to  1  %  for  others  until  the  end  of  July  2021.  VAT  for  private  education  services  (for 
2020-2021 academic years) was also lowered from 8 % to 1 %. The delivery of the COVID-
19 vaccines will also be subject to a reduced VAT rate until 31 December 2021. 

State aid transparency and control remained weak. Legislation to implement the State aid 
law, originally scheduled to be passed a decade ago, has still not been adopted. Turkey has not 
formally  set  up  a  comprehensive  State  aid  inventory  or  adopted  an  action  plan  to  align  all 
State aid schemes with the EU acquis. Additionally, Turkey has abolished the administrative 
structure responsible for implementing State aid legislation, while transferring its mandate to 
the  Economic  Policies  Council.  The  Directorate-General  for  Economic  Programs  and 
Research, established in 2019 under the Ministry of Treasury and Finance, was assigned the 
role of coordinating State aid. The current structure of State aid control is considered neither 
independent  nor operational  (see Chapter 8). The  project-based support reached 34 projects 
with  an  investment  amount  of  TRY  115.2  billion  as  of  June  2021.  Small  and  medium 
enterprises (SMEs) benefit from numerous support measures and initiatives, for which there is 
a lack of systematic monitoring, and evaluations are at an early stage. 

Privatisation and restructuring 

The  pace  of  privatisation  has  lost  momentum,  partly  due  to  the  crisis,  while  the 
sovereign  wealth  fund  expanded  its  hold  in  key  sectors  of  the  economy.  Privatisation 

58 

 
 
receipts decreased sharply over the last three years, from USD 1.4 billion in 2018 to USD 22 
million  in  2020.  The  privatisation  of  state-owned  sugar  factories  has  been  ongoing  in  the 
reporting period. For 2021, the Privatisation Administration has targeted the privatisation of 
electricity  generation  plants,  ports,  inspection  services  for  legal  metrology  and  real  assets. 
Government assets owned by the Turkey Wealth Fund (TWF) appear to be ring fenced from 
privatisation. The TWF holds shares in major companies in the financial, telecommunications, 
petrochemicals,  real  estate,  mining,  agriculture  and  transport  sectors.  In  2020,  it  increased 
further  its  presence  in  the  telecommunications  and  financial  sectors.  It  took  over  public 
insurance  and  individual  pension  companies  with  the  aim  of  consolidating  them  and 
increasing  its  share  in  the  non-banking  financial  industry  in  Turkey.  While  remaining  the 
largest  shareholder  in  Borsa  Istanbul,  it  sold  10  %  of  its  shares  to  the  Qatar  Investment 
Authority in  November  2020. The TWF made some progress  towards meeting the Santiago 
principles  on  transparency  and  accountability  by  publishing  its  activity  reports  and 
consolidated  financial  statements  for  the  years  2018  and  2019,  but  there  is  still  room  for 
improving  transparency.  According  to  its  consolidated  financial  statements,  at  the  end  of 
2019,  its  total  assets  amounted  to  TRY  1.5  trillion  (34  %  of  GDP).  The  TWF  continues 
benefiting  from  certain  exemptions  from  the  rules,  granted  following  the  outbreak  of  the 
COVID-19  pandemic  to  support  companies  of  strategic  importance  in  distress.  These 
exemptions  are  mostly  related  to  (publicly  held)  corporations’  transactions,  merger  and 
acquisition, unlawful exercise of control, and shareholders’ rights. 

Functioning of the financial market 

Financial stability 

The financial sector went through a rapid expansion, but faces adjustment needs in view 
of the upcoming lifting of forbearance measures. Commercial banks, state-owned banks in 
particular,  were  the  main  vehicle  of  the  policy  response  to  the  crisis.  Despite  rapid  credit 
growth,  the  banking  sector  remained  broadly  stable,  partly  thanks  to  the  relief  provided  by 
forbearance measures. The capital adequacy ratio of the banking sector declined somewhat in 
early  2021,  but  at  17.5  %  in  July  it  was  still  above  the  regulatory  minimum  and  historic 
averages. Pandemic-related incentives, which were extended until September 2021, continued 
to  affect  positively bank capital  positions. Regulatory  measures (extension of the period for 
delinquent  loans  to  be  classified  non-performing  to  180  days  and  postponement  of  loan 
instalments) and the rapid growth in lending had a strong impact on the non-performing loan 
(NPL) ratio, which even declined from 5.3 % in the beginning of 2020 to 3.7 % in July 2021. 
Stage 2 loans (loans for which the risk of non-payment has increased significantly) have also 
remained  broadly  stable  at  around  11  %  over  this  period,  although  loan  restructuring 
continued to cloud proper assessment. Bank profitability declined somewhat from an already 
low level  because of increased funding and provisioning costs and lower income from  fees. 
Profitability  continued  to  be  lower  in  state-owned  banks,  largely  because  of  the  authorities’ 
heavy reliance on these banks to boost lending. The dollarisation of the system increased from 
an  already  high  level  as  the  private  sector’s  desire  to  hedge  against  exchange  rate  volatility 
triggered  a  further  expansion  in  foreign  exchange  and  gold  deposits,  with  their  share  rising 
from  around  half  of  all  deposits  in  mid-2020  to  56  %  in  June  2021.  Despite  an  increased 
country  risk  premium  spilling  over  to  their  creditworthiness,  commercial  banks  managed  to 
maintain the rollover ratio  of their external  loans consistently above 90  % and continued to 
manage their excess foreign exchange liquidity through the swap markets. 

Access to finance 

Supported by loose monetary policy and strong regulatory measures, bank lending grew 
strongly. The authorities took wide-ranging measures to stimulate credit and provide liquidity 

59 

 
 
support to the economy. Consequently, loan growth accelerated rapidly in 2020. Although it 
slowed  down  as  monetary  policy  changed  course  and  regulatory  changes  expired  in  the 
autumn  of  2020,  total  credit  increased  significantly  since  the  beginning  of  2020  to  66  %  of 
GDP in June 2021. State-owned banks have led the lending spree and expanded their market 
share. Credit increased strongly both in the corporate and retail segment last year, spurred also 
by the support offered by the Credit Guarantee Fund, which doubled its allowable loan limits 
and extended its mandate beyond SMEs to households. While decelerating markedly in early 
2021, the growth of household loans still remained robust until mid-2021. Total bank assets 
increased from 104 % of GDP in 2019 to 121 % in 2020, while the share of foreign-owned 
banks in total assets declined slightly from 26.5 % to 25.1 %. The interest rate spread between 
USD commercial loans and deposits has declined since the beginning of 2020 and was around 
its long-term average in the first half of 2021. The spread in lira increased also approached its 
average but from a low level. 

Functioning of the labour market 

scheme, 

financed  by 

The  pandemic  had  a  major  negative  impact  on  employment  and  poverty.  The  labour 
market had not yet fully recovered from the 2018 recession, when the pandemic hit. Repeated 
lockdowns  and  reduced  economic  activity,  in  particular  in  a  number  of  labour-intensive 
sectors,  led  to  a  sharp  decline  in  employment,  most  notably  in  construction  and  services. 
Although the government introduced a job 
retention 
the 
Unemployment Insurance Fund, and a ban 
on  lay-offs,  which  benefitted  millions  of 
people,  employment  (15  years  and  above) 
fell  by  close  to  3  million  or  10  %  y/y  in 
April  2020.  It  started  to  recover  in  the 
summer  and  increased  further  by  June 
2021, with a notable rebound of industrial 
employment. However, employment levels 
and  the  employment  rate  remained  below 
their height a few years ago. The pandemic increased the number of discouraged workers and 
the  labour  force  participation  rate  fell  to  a  low  of  46.2  %  in  April  2020,  before  partially 
recovering  to  51.2  %  in  the  second  quarter  of  2021.  Male  and  youth  employment  bore  the 
brunt of the crisis, while female labour market participation and employment declined as well 
from  already  particularly  low  levels.  The  rate  of  youth  not  in  employment,  education  or 
training increased further. Undeclared work declined as the pandemic affected relatively more 
sectors with higher informality. The unemployment rate was broadly stable at around 13 % on 
average  in  2020  but  declined  by  mid-2021.  The  slack  on  the  labour  market,  however,  was 
evident  by  the  rise  in  the  composite  indicator  of  labour  underutilisation,  which  takes  into 
account  time-related underemployment  and potential  labour force. While  traditionally under 
20  %,  it  went  up  to  close  to  30  %  of  the  labour  force  in  the  spring  of  2020  and  was  still 
elevated  in  the  second  quarter  of  2021.  The  job-retention  measures  that  had  shielded  the 
labour  market  in  the  crisis  were  lifted  in  June.  Regional  labour  market  disparities  are 
significant, with the unemployment rate ranging from 8.0 % to 33.5 % in 2020. After nearly 
two decades of continuous decline, poverty increased sharply in  recent  years because of the 
deteriorating labour market situation. The proportion of people with per capita consumption 
of below $5.5 a day (2011 PPP) went up from 8.5 % in 2018 to an estimated 12.2 % in 2020. 
Income  inequality  worsened  as  well  with  the  Gini  coefficient  rising  to  0.41  in  2020  –  its 
highest level in a decade. 

60 

40455055606501020302014201520162017201820192020Graph 4: Turkey -Labour market trends(15-64 age group)Unemployment rate (lhs)Participation rate (rhs)Employment rate (rhs)Source: Eurostat 
 
2.3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the 
Union 

Turkey has made limited progress and has a good level of preparation in achieving the 
capacity to cope with the competitive pressure and market forces within the EU. Despite 
some  progress  made  in  improving  access  to  education,  the  mismatch  between  the 
education  system  and  labour  market  needs  persists.  Expenditure  on  research  and 
development  continued  increasing  at  a  slow  pace,  but  remained  well  below  the 
government’s  target.  Supported  by  favourable  financing  conditions  and  concessional 
lending,  investment  activity  rebounded  in  2020.  Progress  was  made  with  regard  to  the 
diversification  of  energy  supplies  and  the  development  of  the  renewable  energy  sector. 
The  extension  of  local  content  requirement  practices  continued  to  raise  concerns.  The 
relative  share  of  the  EU  in  Turkey’s  foreign  trade  slightly  increased,  despite  extensive 
deviations by Turkey from its obligations under the EU-Turkey Customs Union. 

The Commission’s recommendations from 2020 were not fully implemented and remain 
valid. In order to improve competitiveness and support long-term growth, Turkey should 
in particular: 

  continue  increasing  enrolment  in  education,  improve  vocational  education  and  

training and better adapt education and training to labour market needs; 

  take steps to open the gas market to competition; 

  remove all protectionist measures not in line with the EU-Turkey Customs Union. 

Education and innovation 

Turkey  has  made  some  progress  in  terms  of  improving  access  to  education.  Total 
expenditure on education was TRY 259.2 billion (6.0 % of GDP) in 2019, representing a real 
increase of 2.6 % year-on-year. Government spending was around three quarters of it or 4.4 % 
of  GDP  in  2019,  increasing  by  0.1pp  from  2018.  In  the  2019-2020  school  year,  enrolment 
rates  continued  increasing  for  preschool,  primary  (first  4  years),  lower  secondary  (second  4 
years),  and  in  upper  secondary  education  (final  4  years).  However,  the  net  enrolment  rate 
remained particularly  low in  the  age  group 3-5  years  and declined in  the tertiary education, 
while dropout rates remained high in secondary education. (see Chapter 26). The proportion 
of  students  in  vocational  and  technical  secondary  education  fell  further  to  28.6  %  (from 
37.2 % five years ago). The share of pupils in religious education remained broadly stable at 
close  to  11  %  in  the  upper  secondary  education,  but  increased  in  the  lower  secondary 
education to 13.6 %, up from 7.3 % five years ago. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Turkey 
has  launched  distance  learning  through  state-run  channels  and  internet  platforms.  Gender 
inequality in the educational system remains high. The scores obtained by Turkish students in 
the OECD 2018 PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) test improved, but 
still remained below the OECD average. Despite some improvements, the unemployment rate 
among  people  with  higher  education  was  12.8  %  in  2020.  There  is  a  persistent  mismatch 
between the requirements of the labour market and the skills acquired in the education system. 
However, as part of its Eleventh Development Plan, Turkey is increasing its efforts to align 
the  education  system  with  the  requirements  of  the  labour  market,  especially  by  further 
updating vocational  and  technical  education, developing digital  competencies and skills  and 
supporting the participation of young people in the labour market. 

The  private  sector  continues  to  lead  research  and  development  efforts.  Research  and 
development expenditure increased gradually from 0.8 % of GDP in 2013 to around 1.1 % in 

61 

 
 
2019, but still remained well below the government’s target of 1.8 % by 2023 and also below 
the EU average of 2.2 %. Almost two thirds of this investment came from the private sector. 
Cooperation  between  research  institutions  and  the  private  sector  still  needs  to  be  further 
strengthened. While the number of domestic patent applications increased by 0.9 % in 2020 as 
compared to 2019, Turkey’s total international patent applications decreased by 10.9 % in the 
same period.  

Physical capital and quality of infrastructure 

Supported  by  favourable  financing  conditions  and  concessional  lending,  investment 
activity  rebounded  in  2020.  High  investment,  in  particular  in  non-tradable  sectors, 
contributed  to  the  accumulation  of  macroeconomic  imbalances  that  led  to  the  abrupt 
depreciation  of  the  lira  in  2018.  The  ensuing  correction  was  short-lived  and,  driven  by 
significant monetary easing and government-subsidised lending, investment bounced back to 
27.4  %  of  GDP  in  2020.  The  share  of  construction  in  total  investment  went  down  from 
a plateau of 56 % in 2013-2018 to 46 % in 2020. The share of investment in machinery and 
equipment followed the opposite pattern, rebounding strongly from 34 % in 2018 to 42 % in 
2020. Public investment had been broadly stable for years at close to 4 % of GDP. However, 
because  of  efforts  to  limit  government  expenditure  and  contain  the  budget  deficit,  it  fell 
sharply to below 3 % in 2019-2020. The government has further advanced preparatory works 
for the Istanbul Canal project, connecting the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara, despite strong 
domestic opposition, environmental and social concerns, and unclear financing and economic 
returns. 

Despite improved diversification of energy supplies, issues remain with competition and 
pricing  mechanisms  in  the  energy  sector.  The  dominant  market  position  of  the  vertically 
integrated  National  Petroleum  Corporation  BOTAŞ  remained  unchanged.  This  affects  the 
viability  of  the  recently  established  Energy  Exchange  Istanbul  (EXIST),  where  a  market  of 
derivatives is expected to be launched in 2021. This should provide more depth and liquidity 
to  the  energy  market.  The  update  to  the  natural  gas  market  law  is  long  overdue.  Good 
progress  was  made  in  the  diversification  of  energy  supplies,  thanks  to  the  now  operational 
Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) transmitting gas to the European section of the Southern 
Gas Corridor (SGC) and the significantly increased liquefied natural gas imports in 2020. The 
renewable energy sector of Turkey continued to grow with the support of a generous feed-in-
tariff  scheme.  A  new  financial  support  scheme  entered  into  force  in  June  2021  (after  the 
previous one expired) and facilities commissioned until December 2025 will benefit from  it 
for  the  next  10  years  that  follow.  It  offers  overall  lower  support  than  before  and  is 
denominated  in  Turkish  lira.  The  state  made  a  commitment  to  update  the  mechanism  every 
quarter  in  order  to  adjust  it  for  inflation  and  exchange  rate  fluctuations.  The  new  scheme 
continues the financial incentives for the use of domestic equipment (55 % at the minimum) 
in  renewable  energy  installations.  The  extension  of  the  Local  Content  Requirement  (LCR) 
practices in Turkey continues to raise concerns. These practices contradict WTO and the EU-
Turkey  Customs  Union  rules  and  affect  the  EU  and  other  international  companies’ 
competitiveness on the Turkish energy market. 

Connectivity increased further but remained well below OECD average. The government 
considers  accelerating  the  digital  transformation  a  key  priority  to  boost  productivity  and 
competitiveness of the economy. The number of broadband internet subscribers reached 82.4 
million  in  2020,  up  from  76.6  million  in  2019.  Mobile  broadband  penetration  slightly 
increased, though it is still below the OECD average. The share of households with access to 
internet at home grew from 88.3 % in 2019 to 90.7 % in 2020. Over the same period, internet 
usage  by  individuals  aged  16-74  also  increased  from  75.3  %  to  79.0  %.  The  share  of 
individuals  using  e-government  services  reached  51.5  %  in  2020.  The  number  of  4.5G 

62 

 
 
subscribers increased to 77.3 million in the first quarter of 2021, of which 53.8 million were 
active users. 

Sectoral and enterprise structure 

The services sector continued to dominate the economy, but has been strongly impacted 
by the COVID-19 pandemic. Its share in total value added decreased from 57.2 % to 54.9 % 
between  2019  and  2020,  mainly  as  contact-intensive  sectors,  such  as  hospitality  and  travel, 
were hard hit by the pandemic-related restrictions. Some sectors, like financial and insurance 
activities, and information and communication, however, performed very well, increasing also 
their  economic  weight.  The  construction  sector,  which  had  been  one  of  the  main  sectors 
driving economic growth before 2018, saw its share falling from 8.5 % in 2017 to 5.2 % in 
2020  –  a  level  not  seen  in  15  years.  Employment  in  the  construction  sector  decreased  from 
7.5 % in 2017 to 5.6 % of total employment in 2019 and remained largely unchanged in 2020. 
Industry accounted for 20.6 % of employment in 2020, up by 0.7pps from its 2019 level. In 
spite  of  the  pandemic,  it  managed  to  increase  its  share  of  GDP  from  21.1  %  to  22.1 % 
between  2019  and  2020.  Although  representing  only  6.7  %  of  GDP  in  2020,  agriculture 
continues  to  be  an  important  sector,  employing  17.7  %  of  the  workforce  (down  by  0.4pps 
from its 2019 level). 

Small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  (SMEs)  are  the  backbone  of  the  economy.  SMEs 
employ  around  three  quarters  of  Turkey’s  workforce  and  generate  more  than  half  of  the 
economy’s  total  value  added.  Turkey  continued  to  implement  various  economic  support 
schemes,  mostly  targeting  SMEs.  In  order  to  limit  the  negative  effects  of  the  COVID-19 
pandemic,  Turkey  adopted  support  mechanisms  for  enterprises  consisting  of  labour-related 
schemes (partial redundancy, short-time work, wage subsidy) and payment deferral measures 
(taxes, social security premiums, utility bills), while also providing financial support through 
loan  guarantees,  direct  lending  and  subsidies.  The  SME  support  administration  KOSGEB 
extended the scope of its TechnoInvest support programme to new products such as personal 
protective  equipment  and  disinfectants  and  granted  additional  grace  periods  for  eligible 
companies.  Further  assistance  was  provided  in  support  of  SMEs’  digitalisation  and 
internationalisation. There were  also  limited direct  cash transfers to  restaurants  and  cafes in 
order to compensate their turnover loss due to repeated lockdowns. 

Economic integration with the EU and price competitiveness  

Despite  a  notable  Brexit  effect,  economic  integration  with  the  EU  remained  high.  In 
2020,  Turkey  remained  the  EU’s  sixth  largest  trading  partner,  while  the  EU  remains  by  far 
Turkey’s  largest  trading  partner.  The  share  of  the  EU  in  Turkish  exports  decreased  from 
42.4 % in 2019 to 41.3 % in 2020 while the share of Turkish imports coming from the EU-27 
slightly  increased  from  32.3  %  to  33.4  %  between  2019  and  2020.  Trade  with  the  United 
Kingdom represented 6.6 % of total exports and 2.5 % of imports in 2020. The EU remained 
the largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Turkey. The EU’s share in the overall 
stock of FDI declined from 72 % in 2013 to 62 % in 2020 (58 % in 2019). Trade openness 
declined slightly in 2020, as the pandemic led to a contraction of exports of services. The fall 
in the lira’s value intensified in 2020, leading to a significant further depreciation of the real 
effective  exchange  rate,  which  reached  its  lowest  level  on  record  since  1994.  Turkey 
maintained  the  additional  duties,  of  which  the  scope  significantly  increased  during  the 
COVID-19 pandemic, on a large number of products of non-EU origin and in free circulation 
within the EU-Turkey Customs Union. The forced localisation policy in the pharmaceutical 
sector,  which  the  EU  has  challenged  at  the  World  Trade  Organisation,  remained  in  place, 
while  non-tariff  barriers  such  as  import  surveillance  and  customs  checks,  which  were 
intensified during the pandemic, continued to hinder trade flows. 

63 

 
 
2.4. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, STATISTICS, FINANCIAL CONTROL 

Chapter 5: Public procurement 

EU  rules  ensure  that  the  public  procurement  of  goods  and  services  in  any  Member  State  is 
transparent  and  open  to  all  EU  companies  on  the  basis  of  non-discrimination  and  equal 
treatment. 

Turkey  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  area  of  public  procurement,  made  no  progress  over 
the  reporting  year  and  large  gaps  remained  in  its  alignment  with  the  EU  acquis.  Turkey 
maintained  offsets  and  discriminatory  local  content  favouring  practices.  There  was  no 
implementation of the 2020 report's recommendations. 

In addition to addressing the shortcomings set out below, Turkey should in particular: 

  revise its public procurement legislation to further align it with the 2014 EU Directives on 
public procurement including utilities, concessions and public private partnerships and to 
increase transparency; 

  repeal  exemptions  contradictory  to  the  EU  acquis  and  eliminate  the  discriminatory 

domestic price advantage and offset practices; 

  establish  a  fully  independent  complaint  review  mechanism,  separate  from  the  legislative 

and regulatory responsibilities of the public procurement authority. 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

Concerning  the  legal  framework,  Turkey’s  national  public  procurement  legislation  broadly 
reflects  the  principles  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union.  However, 
compulsory  domestic  price  advantages  and  offsets  (such  as  the  Industry  Cooperation 
Programme  which  has  similar  effects  with  the  offset  practices),  that  allow  authorities  to 
demand  compensating  measures  if  goods  are  not  produced  domestically,  are  discriminatory 
and  thus  contradict  the  EU  acquis.  Turkey  removed  the  lower  limit  for  application  of  such 
offset practice. 

The  Public  Procurement  Law  (PPL)  is  partly  aligned  with  the  2004  EU  Public  Procurement 
Directives. However, many sector-specific laws limit transparency and the coverage of public 
procurement  rules  is  significantly  reduced  by  a  long  and  increasing  list  of  exclusions  of 
varying importance and scope. In June 2020, procurement by the State Supply Office of goods 
and services became obligatory for public institutions and organisations. The implementation 
of this mandatory centralised purchasing system practically increases the scope of exclusions 
since  the  procurements  by  the  State  Supply  Office  under  the  threshold  of  TRY  18.6  million 
(EUR  1.97  million)  are  exempted  from  the  PPL.  The  threshold  is  also  higher  than  the  ones 
applicable for supplies and services in the EU. 

64 

0102030201220132014201520162017201820192020Graph 5a: Turkey -Exports of goodsEUCEFTAOtherSource: WiiW% ofGDP0102030201220132014201520162017201820192020Graph 5b: Turkey -Imports of goodsEUCEFTAOtherSource: WiiW% ofGDP 
 
 
Turkey still does not  have a functioning single framework for coordinating, supervising and 
monitoring PPP operations.  
Turkey's  11th  Development  Plan  (2019-2023)  aims  at  increasing  domestic  production 
particularly  for  chemicals,  pharmaceuticals  and  medical  devices,  electronics,  machinery  and 
electrical  equipment,  automotive  and  railway  services  sectors  by  means  of  using  public 
procurement as a subsidising tool. For such purpose, a compulsory domestic price advantage 
of up to 15 % remains available for ‘medium and high-technology industrial products’ and the 
offset  practices  are  promoted.  The  percentage  of  international  tenders  where  domestic  price 
advantage applied is  high and has increased from  33 % in  2017 to  48  % in  2020, while the 
overall  value  of  such  tenders  increased  from  44  %  to  47  %  of  the  total  during  the  same 
timeframe.  Within  tenders  above  the  international  procurement  thresholds,  domestic  price 
advantage  distorting  competition  against  international  tenderers  was  applied  in  56  %  of 
supply,  60  %  of  work,  20  %  of  consultancy  and  71  %  of  service  tenders,  corresponding  to 
53 %, 57 %, 24 % and 70 % of total value, respectively. 

The  operational  independence  of  the  Public  Procurement  Board  within  the  Public 
Procurement Authority (PPA) is potentially impaired, since the President of the Republic is 
authorised to directly appoint its president and members without any specific requirements on 
education and sector experience. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

The size of the public procurement market in Turkey narrowed from 7.5 % of GDP in 2017 to 
3.3 % in 2019. In 2020, the market accounted for 3.4 % of GDP reflecting the decrease in the 
financial resources allocated to the public services. In 2020, the number of PPP projects was 
three, down from eight in 2019. 

Monitoring  of  the  contract  awards  and  implementation  is  satisfactory.  The  PPA  issues 
statistics  on  a  six-month  basis,  which  provide  the  source  for  measuring  performance  and 
making improvements  to  the public procurement  system. PPA should transparently continue 
reporting  the  number  of  international  tenders  (regardless  of  international  procurement 
thresholds) where domestic price advantage is applied. 

Contracting  authorities’  capacity  to  manage  public  procurement  processes  continued  to 
improve. Within the framework of COVID-19 administrative package, the PPA instructed the 
procurement authorities to use electronic procurement for the new and cancelled tenders. As 
a result,  during 
in  2020,  electronic  procurement 
implementation, which was put into practice in the last quarter of 2016, became an important 
tool  and  reached  17  359  (4,551  in  2019)  procurements  corresponding  to  TRY  38.3  billion 
(TRY 4.1 billion in 2019). 

the  COVID-19  pandemic  period 

Mechanisms  to  identify  and  address  corrupt  and  fraudulent  practices  are  in  place,  including 
rules  on  integrity  and  conflict  of  interest.  However,  the  use  of  the  negotiated  procedure, 
which  corresponds  to  more  than  one  fourth  of  all  tenders  (both  in  value  and  number), 
significantly increased in the last four years. When using this procedure, a specific sub-article 
(“Article  21/b”  of  the  PPL)  allows  the  contracting  authorities  to  limit  competition  and 
transparency.  In  2020,  Article  21/b  was  used  in  90  %  of  the  tenders  (in  value)  where  the 
negotiated procedure applied. Such a widespread use led to allegations of political influence 
on  public  tenders.  Turkey  needs  to  develop  instruments  to  evaluate  contract  performance 
including  the  economic,  effectiveness,  and  efficiency  of  public  procurement  proceedings. 
Turkey should also develop a risk indicator system that signals potential integrity problems in 
the procurement process. 

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Efficient remedy system 

The  right  to  legal  remedy  is  secured  in  the  Constitution  and  the  PPL  lays  down  the 
institutional set up and mechanism for handling complaints. The review and remedies system 
provides  for  effective,  swift  and  competent  handling  and  resolution  of  complaints  and 
sanctions.  However,  further  alignment  of  the  legislation  with  the  EU  Remedies  Directive  is 
needed. For such purpose, Turkey needs to establish a fully independent procurement review 
board,  separate  from  the  public  procurement  authority  and  ensuring  the  independence  of 
board members. 

The implementation capacity of the Public Procurement Board remains stable with 334 staff. 
The Public Procurement Board received 2 316 complaints in 2020 (3.53 % of contracts which 
allow  for  complaints),  compared  with  1  864  complaints  in  2019,  at  the  time  amounting  to 
2.87 % of the contracts. The appointment policy and the Board’s position as part of the PPA 
remained  a  concern.  A  fully  independent  Public  Procurement  Board  would  prevent  possible 
conflicts of interest and ensure transparency. 

Chapter 18: Statistics 

EU rules require that Member States are able to produce good quality statistics in line with 
the  principles  of  the  European  statistics  Code  of  Practice  and  based  on  professional 
independence, impartiality, reliability, transparency, and confidentiality.  Common rules are 
provided for the methodology, production and dissemination of statistical information. 

Turkey  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  area  of  statistics.  Turkey  made  some  progress  in 
further  aligning  with  the  EU  acquis  and  in  improving  the  compliance  level  with  respect  to 
annual  national  accounts  and  the  Excessive  Deficit  Procedure.  Frequent  changes  of  the 
president  of  the  Turkish  Statistical  Institute  (TurkStat)  and  other  management  positions 
significantly undermine the institution’s credibility. There was limited implementation of last 
year’s recommendations. 

In addition to addressing the shortcomings set out below, in the coming year Turkey should 
in particular: 

  further  align  national  accounts  and  financial  accounts  with  the  European  System  of 

Accounts 2010 (ESA 2010); 

  broaden and further reinforce coordination between TurkStat and other data providers; 

  improve statistics on agriculture, migration and asylum. 

As regards statistical infrastructure, Turkey’s statistics legislation is based on the European 
Statistics Code of Practice. TurkStat is  associated  to  the Ministry of Treasury and  Finance. 
There were increasing concerns regarding the transparency of the appointment and dismissal 
procedures within TurkStat, including in the post of its president, undermining significantly 
the  institution’s  credibility.  Efforts  continued  to  improve  the  use  of  public  institutions' 
administrative  records  and  their  integration  into  statistical  production  but  the  cooperation 
between  TurkStat  and  other  data  providers  should  be  developed  further.  Registers  in  the 
statistical  office  are  updated  regularly.  The  main  classifications  are  aligned  with  the  EU 
acquis. 

For macroeconomic statistics, efforts continued to integrate administrative records into the 
national  accounting  system.  Turkey  improved  annual  national  accounts  by  providing 
population data. However, employment data according to ESA 2010 was not provided. The 
GNI inventory submitted to Eurostat in 2017 still needs to be further aligned with Eurostat’s 
GNI  Inventory  Guide  and  the  GNI  calculations  need  to  be  brought  fully  in  line  with  ESA 

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2010.  TurkStat  did  not  transmit  the  annual  institutional  sector  accounts  for  2019.  Turkey 
made  progress  on  the  coverage  and  timeliness  of  the  quarterly  national  accounts,  however, 
quarterly sector accounts were not available. Turkey produces highly compliant statistics on 
international trade in goods. It improved quality and coverage of excessive deficit procedure 
tables.  Turkey  also  made  some  progress  in  the  implementation  of  Eurostat’s  methodology 
guidance, the provision of extensive explanatory notes on the data as well as the delimitation 
of the general government sector. It transmitted data on government revenue expenditure and 
detailed taxes based on ESA 2010 for 2009-2019. Further efforts are still required on fiscal 
reporting and notifications under the excessive deficit procedure. Turkey continued reporting 
quarterly balance of payments and international investment position data on a regular basis. 

Business statistics improved with the use of administrative records for indicators. Short-term 
statistics  are  largely  aligned.  Research  and  development  statistics  are  fully  compliant.  The 
annual surveys on information and communication technology are largely compliant with EU 
standards.  Rail,  maritime  and  regional  transport  statistics  are  highly  compliant,  but  further 
progress is still needed on road freight data. Tourism statistics are available, but need to be 
further aligned with the EU acquis. Foreign affiliate statistics have not been transmitted yet 
to Eurostat. 

As  for  social  statistics,  the  survey  on  income  and  living  conditions  is  carried  out  in 
compliance with  EU standards and data are sent to  Eurostat. Social protection statistics are 
highly compliant with EU standards and labour market statistics are fully aligned. TurkStat 
made some revisions in its labour force statistics in accordance with the new acquis. Data for 
the labour cost index is regularly provided, although incomplete. The  Structure of Earnings 
Survey is conducted every four years in compliance with the EU legislation. TurkStat did not 
provide  quarterly  job  vacancy  survey.  Statistics  on  education  and  vocational  training  are 
available. Public health statistics are available,  while further progress  is  needed for data on 
health  expenditure  and  non-monetary  healthcare.  Crime  statistics  are  produced,  but  efforts 
are  needed  on  criminal  justice  statistics.  Statistics  on  immigration  and  emigration  are 
produced. Asylum statistics are not yet collected according to the EU requirement. 

As  regards  agricultural  statistics,  no  agricultural  census  has  been  carried  out  since  2001. 
Statistics for crop and for most of the critical animal production, milk and dairy are available. 
Supply balance sheets are also available for almost all basic crop products and for wine. The 
economic accounts for agriculture are not fully compliant with the EU acquis. The results of 
the 2016 farm structure survey have still not been transmitted to the Eurofarm system. 

Energy  statistics  are  highly  compliant  with  the  EU  requirements.  Energy  prices  are  sent 
regularly  to  Eurostat  in  good  quality.  As  for  environmental  statistics,  waste  and  water 
statistics are produced, but further process is needed on water resources and water abstraction 
statistics.  Environmental  accounts  on  greenhouse  gas  emissions  and  statistics  on 
environmental  taxes,  material  flow  and  environmental  protection  expenditure  are  available. 
Significant  efforts  were  made  to  improve  the  compilation  of  the  monetary  environmental 
accounts modules. 

Chapter 32: Financial control 

The  EU  promotes  the  reform  of  national  governance  systems  to  improve  managerial 
accountability, sound financial management of income and expenditure, and external audit of 
public  funds. The financial  control  rules further protect  the EU’s financial interests against 
fraud in the management of EU funds and the euro against counterfeiting. 

Turkey has a good level of preparation on financial control. Limited progress was made in 
the reporting period, while last year’s recommendations were not addressed. Audit reports of 

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the  Turkey  Wealth  Fund  (TWF)  were  published  on  its  website,  and  some  companies  of  the 
Fund  are  directly  audited  by  the  Turkish  Court  of  Accounts  (TCA).  However,  the  TWF 
remained not fully subject to the direct audit by the TCA. The anti-fraud coordination service 
(AFCOS) network has  yet  to  be re-established.  The purpose, authority  and responsibility of 
internal audit is undermined by the absence of a legal requirement to have internal audit units 
in Ministries. Last year’s recommendations remain valid. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

  update  the  Public  Internal  Financial  Control  policy  paper  and  its  action  plan  and  ensure 
that  a  formal  coordination,  monitoring  and  reporting  framework  is  put  in  place  for  the 
updated action plan; 

  re-establish the AFCOS network and adopt a national anti-fraud strategy; 

  reconsider the arrangements that would include municipalities and state-owned enterprises 

in the treasury single account. 

Public internal financial control (PIFC) 

The  strategic  framework  is  partially  in  place.  The  update  of  the  Public  Internal  Financial 
Control  policy  paper  has  not  made  progress  since  2012.  Turkey  still lacks a  comprehensive 
strategic  framework  for  public  administration  reform  and  for  public  finance  management. 
Public  finance  management  related  goals  are  found  in  different  planning  documents  and 
strategies  by  various  institutions,  and  there  is  no  mechanism  in  place  to  coordinate 
implementation  of  reforms  and  to  ensure  regular  monitoring  and  reporting.  Exceptional 
management  and  control  procedures  or  derogations  applied  by  the  authorities  during  the 
COVID-19  crisis  need  to  be  well  documented,  accompanied  by  adequate  safeguards  and 
considered for special audits. 

The  Turkish  administration  has  a  uniform  management  structure  that  combines  elements  of 
managerial accountability and delegation with a results-oriented performance management 
system.  Further  efforts  are  needed  to  address  harmonisation  of  legislation,  managerial 
accountability, including reporting structures, delegation of decision-making responsibilities, 
and functioning of internal  control. The Public  Financial Management and Control (PFMC) 
Law applies to all public institutions and defines the elements of financial control. It sets out 
the  relevant  responsibilities  of  the  heads  of  public  institutions,  including  managerial  duties 
and  the  delegation  of  authority  to  authorising  officers,  with  the  Ministry  of  Finance  and 
Treasury assigned a coordinating role. 

The PFMC Law regulates internal control, which functions largely in line with international 
standards.  Full  implementation  of  internal  control  systems  continues  to  be  negatively 
impacted by capacity and ownership issues. The application of risk management is still at an 
early  stage,  and  monitoring  and  reporting  of  irregularities  are  yet  to  be  further  developed. 
Turkey  has  a  treasury  single  account,  but  the  inclusion  of  local  administrations  and  state-
owned enterprises within its scope raises concerns. 

Internal  audit  practice  is  regulated  in  line  with  international  standards  in  the  PFMC  Law. 
An  internal  audit  manual  and  a  code  of  ethics  are  in  place,  as  are  manuals  prepared  by  the 
Central  Harmonisation  Unit,  but  they  have  not  been  updated  since  2013.  There  is  no  legal 
requirement for Ministries to have an internal audit unit, just internal auditors, and there is no 
formal status for heads of internal audit as a Unit Head. There is no entity performing the role 
of  an  Audit  Committee  and  auditors  report  directly  to  their  Deputy  Ministers  or  a  senior 
manager.  These  reporting  arrangements  could  compromise  auditors’  independence  in 
planning  and  performing  their  work.  There  is  generally  a  lack  of  data  on  internal  audit 

68 

 
 
planning  and  implementation  of  recommendations.  There  is  no  systematic  follow-up  of  the 
implementation  of  internal  audit  recommendations.  The  existing  lack  of  clarity  in  the 
legislation  and  in  the  practice  between  the  internal  audit  and  inspection  organisations  do 
compromise the effectiveness of the internal audit function. 

Two  Central  Harmonisation  Units  (CHUs)  are  tasked  with  setting  standards,  monitoring 
and  reporting  on  PIFC  implementation.  The  CHU  for  financial  management  and  control 
defines  standards  and  methodology,  provides  guidance,  training  and  overall  coordination  to 
public administrations in this field, and does not perform internal control quality reviews. The 
Internal Audit Coordination Board is the CHU for internal audit, which notably monitors the 
internal  audit  systems  of  the  public  administrations,  develops  internal  audit  standards  and 
publishes  manuals.  The  Internal  Audit  Coordination  Board  consists  of  seven  members 
appointed by the President for a period of four years and is now fully attached to the Ministry 
of Finance and Treasury. Efforts should be made to ensure its independence and to strenghten 
its capacity, organisational structure and adequate resources to fulfill its mandate.  

External audit 

The constitutional and legal framework provides for the independence of the Turkish Court 
of Accounts (TCA). The TCA law is in line with International Organisation of Supreme Audit 
Institutions  (INTOSAI)  standards.  It  provides  for  an  almost  exhaustive  audit  mandate  and 
gives the TCA full discretion in discharging its responsibilities. Concerns exist around fiscal 
discipline,  transparency  and  accountability  in  relation  to  the  Turkey  Wealth  Fund  (TWF), 
chaired by the President of the Republic and not fully subject to the direct audit by the TCA. 
Some companies in the TWF portfolio are audited by the TCA and some TWF activities are 
not  subject  to  external  audit.  The  TWF  is  audited  by  an  independent  audit  firm  and  by 
auditors appointed by the President. Audit reports of the TWF are submitted to the Plan and 
Budget Committee of the Parliament and published on the TWF website. There are no notes 
accompanying  the  financial  statements,  which  may  raise  concerns  in  terms  of  full 
transparency.  

The  TCA  has  both  audit  and  judicial  functions.  In  2020,  it  had  1,874  staff,  including  830 
auditors  in  comparison  to  1,861  staff  in  2019,  of  which  804  were  auditors.  The  TCA  is 
implementing its 2019-2023 Strategic Plan which notably  foresees the development  of risk-
based  audit  and  strengthening 
its  human  resources  capacity.  The  TCA  published 
a Communication Strategy on the Plan in 2020. 

The  TCA  has  improved  the  quality  of  audit  work  and  now  carries  out  “value  for  money” 
performance  audits  as  per  international  standards  (7  started  in  2019  and  3  started  in  2020). 
The  TCA  annually  submits  four  audit  reports  to  the  Parliament  (External  Audit  General 
Evaluation Report, Accountability General Evaluation Report, Financial Statistics Evaluation 
Report,  and  Report  on  State-owned  Economic  Enterprises)  in  addition  to  a  statement  of 
general conformity. The reports of the TCA are only considered by the Parliament during its 
deliberations on the budget. 

Regarding the impact of audit work, the TCA assesses the internal control environment of 
audited entities as part of its audit work, and thus contributes to PIFC development. The TCA 
reports on state-owned enterprises are analysed by the commission of state-owned enterprises 
of  the  Parliament,  while  other  audit  reports  are  analysed  by  the  Parliament  committee  on 
planning and budget. The TCA reports are published online every year, with the exception of 
those on state-owned economic enterprises. TCA recommendations should be systematically 
and swiftly implemented by the audited institutions. A working group between the TCA and 
the Ministry of Treasury and Finance is operational. Increased parliamentary scrutiny on TCA 
audit findings and recommendations is still needed. There is a need for separating discussion 

69 

 
 
on budget and audit issues. The establishnent of a working group between the TCA  and the 
Parliament solely dedicated to  discuss performance of public institutions and their spending 
could be instrumental in this regard. 

Protection of the EU’s financial interests 

While Turkey has reached a good level of EU acquis alignment, it still needs to fully align its 
legislation with the EU Directive on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests 
by means of criminal law. The State Supervisory Council (SSC) was designated as the  anti-
fraud  coordination  service  (AFCOS),  but  an  AFCOS  network,  involving  other  relevant 
authorities, has to be re-established. Turkey also needs to adopt a national anti-fraud strategy. 
Turkey  should  significantly  strengthen  its  cooperation  with  the  European  Commission 
during investigations, and continue to report irregularities and suspected fraud cases. Turkey 
reported  672  cases  to  the  Commission  via  the  online  irregularity  management  system  from 
2012 to 2020, of which 72 cases in 2020. Turkey needs to continue to develop a solid track 
record on cooperation on investigations and reporting of irregularities. 

Protection of the euro against counterfeiting 

Turkey has reached a high level of EU acquis alignment in this area. Technical analysis of 
counterfeit  money,  including  euro  banknotes  and  coins,  is  carried  out  by  a  dedicated 
department  in  the  Central  Bank  and  technical  analysis  of  counterfeit  coins  including  euro 
coins  are  performed  by  the  Turkish  State  Mint.  Credit  institutions  that  do  not  withdraw 
counterfeits from circulation are subject to financial penalties. Turkey takes part in the actions 
of the Pericles 2020 programme. 

3. 

GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND REGIONAL COOPERATION  

Cyprus 

Due  to  continued  and  new  unauthorised  Turkish  hydrocarbon  exploration  activities  in  the 
maritime zones of Cyprus and Greece, tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean Sea 
increased in  the second  half of 2020.  In November 2020, the Council  extended the existing 
framework for restrictive measures in response to Turkey’s unauthorised drilling activities in 
the  Eastern  Mediterranean.  In  its  conclusions  of  December  2020,  the  European  Council 
strongly  condemned  Turkey’s  unilateral  actions,  provocations  and  escalated  rhetoric  against 
the EU, EU Member States and European leaders. 

The tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean decreased in the beginning of 2021. Among other 
steps  taken,  Turkey  stopped  illegal  drilling  activities  in  the  maritime  zones  of  Cyprus.  The 
European Council of March 2021 stated that provided that this de-escalation is sustained and 
that Turkey  engages constructively,  and subject  to the established  conditionalities set  out  in 
previous European Council conclusions, in order to further strengthen the recent dynamic, the 
EU  is  ready  to  engage  with  Turkey  in  a  phased,  proportionate  and  reversible  manner  to 
enhance  cooperation  in  a  number  of  areas  of  common  interest.  The  June  2021  European 
Council reiterated its full commitment to the comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem 
on the basis of a bicommunal, bizonal federation with political equality, in accordance with 
the  relevant  UN  Security  Council  Resolutions.  It  underlined  the  importance  of  the  status  of 
Varosha  and  called  for  full  respect  of  UN  Security  Council  Resolutions,  in  particular 
Resolutions 550, 789 and 1251.  

Following the change in leadership of the Turkish Cypriot Community in December 2020, the 
United Nations senior official for Cyprus held a series of meetings with representatives of the 
two  Cypriot  communities.  For  the  first  time  in  almost  four  years,  new  informal  talks  took 

70 

 
 
place  on  the  future  of  the  island  of  Cyprus  between  the  two  Cypriot  communities  and  the 
island’s three Guarantor Powers, the UK, Turkey and Greece in  Geneva in  April 2021.  The 
informal  meeting  did  not  pave  the  way  for  the  resumption  of  formal  negotiations.  The 
European Council of June 2021 regretted this development.  

Turkey  continued  to  challenge  the  status  of  the  fenced-off  city  of  Varosha.  Several 
representatives  of  the  Turkish  government,  including  the  President  and  the  Vice  President 
visited Varosha, promising financial support to  the development  of the  area. The December 
2020  European  Council  reiterated  its  October  2020  conclusions  and  condemned  Turkey’s 
unilateral steps in Varosha and called for full respect of UN Security Council Resolutions 550 
and 789. On 27 July 2021, the High Representative strongly condemned on behalf of the EU 
Turkey’s unilateral steps and the unacceptable announcements made by the Turkish President 
and the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community on 20 July 2021 on the further reopening of 
the fenced-off town of Varosha. In addition the High Representative welcomed the Statement 
made by the President of the UN Security Council on behalf of the Council on 23 July 2021.  

As emphasised in the Negotiating Framework and Council declarations, Turkey is expected to 
actively support the negotiations on a fair, comprehensive and viable settlement of the Cyprus 
issue  within  the  UN  framework,  in  accordance  with  the  relevant  UN  Security  Council 
resolutions and in line with the principles on which the EU is founded and the EU acquis. It is 
important that Turkey reaffirms its commitment to and constructive engagement to the United 
Nations-led  settlement  talks  on  Cyprus  in  line  with  the  relevant  UN  Security  Council 
Resolutions, including in its external aspects. No unilateral actions should be taken that could 
raise tensions on the island and undermine a return to talks. Related to Varosha, Turkey must 
immediately reverse the unilateral actions announced on 20 July 2021 and all steps taken on 
Varosha since October 2020 that run contrary to relevant UN Security Council resolutions. 

Turkey continues to refuse to recognise the Republic of Cyprus. Despite repeated calls by the 
Council and the Commission, Turkey has still not complied with its obligations as outlined in 
the  Declaration  of  the  European  Community  and  its  Member  States  of  21  September  2005 
and in Council Conclusions, including those of December 2006 and December 2015. Turkey 
has  not  fulfilled  its  obligation  to  ensure  full  and  non-discriminatory  implementation  of  the 
Additional  Protocol  to the Association  Agreement  and has not  removed  all  obstacles to  the 
free movement of goods, including restrictions on direct transport links with the Republic of 
Cyprus. 

Turkey continued to veto applications by the Republic of Cyprus to join several international 
organisations,  including  the  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development 
(OECD).  

Peaceful settlement of border disputes  

After  December  2020,  a  more  positive  dynamic  in  the  EU-Turkey  relations  was  observed 
following the de-escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean through the discontinuation of illegal 
hydrocarbon exploration and drilling activities by Turkey in the maritime zones of Cyprus and 
Greece and the resumption of exploratory talks between Turkey and Greece in January 2021. 
These talks should  remain  a valuable channel  of communication between both  sides to  find 
common ground for the start of negotiations on the delimitation of the continental shelf. The 
European  Council  of  March  2021  welcomed  these  developments.  In  addition,  the  European 
Council reaffirmed that the EU would remain committed to defending its interests and those 
of its Member States as well as to upholding regional stability. The Greek Foreign Minister 
visited  Ankara  on  15  April  and  the  Turkish  Foreign  Minister  visited  Athens  on  30-31  May 

71 

 
 
where  a  mutual  desire  to  promote  a  positive  agenda  was  ascertained.  The  Greek  Prime 
Minister and Turkish President met on 14 June.  

The  possible  extension  of  Greek  territorial  waters  to  12  nautical  miles  in  the  Aegean  Sea 
under Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea continued to weigh 
on Greece-Turkey relations, as the 1995 declaration of the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
that any unilateral action by Greece to extend its territorial waters would be considered casus 
belli still holds. 

Greece  and  Cyprus  continue  to  complain  about  repeated  violations  and  the  militarisation  of 
their territorial waters and airspace by Turkey. Flights over Greek inhabited areas continued 
to be reported, in violation of international law. Overflights of Greek mainland in the Evros 
river  border  region  were  also  reported.  As  highlighted  by  the  Council,  and  stemming  from 
obligations under the Negotiating Framework, Turkey is expected to unequivocally commit to 
good neighbourly relations, international agreements and the peaceful settlement of disputes 
having recourse, if necessary, to the International Court of Justice. Turkey must avoid threats 
and actions that damage good neighbourly relations, normalise its relations with the Republic 
of Cyprus and respect the sovereignty of all EU Member States over their territorial sea and 
airspace  as  well  as  all  their  sovereign  rights,  including  inter  alia  the  right  to  explore  and 
exploit  natural  resources,  in  accordance  with  EU  and  international  law,  in  particular  the 
United  Nations  Convention  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea  (UNCLOS).  Accordingly,  Turkey  is 
expected to refrain from any drilling activities of hydrocarbons in the maritime zones of other 
states. 

The  bilateral  Memorandum  of  Understanding  on  the  delimitation  of  maritime  jurisdiction 
areas  between  Turkey  and  the  National  Accord  Government  of  Libya  signed  in  November 
2019 remains in place despite the fact that it ignored the sovereign rights of Greece in the area 
concerned,  infringes  upon  the  sovereign  rights  of  third  States,  does  not  comply  with  the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences 
for third States.  

Regional cooperation 

Good neighbourly relations form an essential part of Turkey’s process of moving towards the 
EU.  Bilateral  relations  with  other  enlargement  countries  were  generally  good,  but  remained 
challenging with neighbouring EU Member States, particularly Greece and Cyprus. Tensions 
in  the  Aegean  Sea  and  Eastern  Mediterranean  were  not  conducive  to  good  neighbourly 
relations  and  undermined  regional  stability  and  security.  Turkey  continued  to  conduct  its 
proactive foreign and economic policy with the Western Balkans and supported the countries 
of the region in their respective efforts in joining NATO and the EU. Turkey also improved its 
relations in the fields of culture and security. Turkey assumed the Chairmanship-in-office of 
the  South-East  European  Cooperation  Process  (SEECP)  in  June  2020  for  one  year.  The 
Turkish  authorities  continued  to  exert  pressure  on  authorities  in  the  Western  Balkans  to 
locally  prosecute  and  extradite  alleged  members  of  the  Gülen  movement.  Turkey  provided 
medical  equipment  and  aid  to  all  Western  Balkans  in  their  fight  against  the  COVID-19 
pandemic. 

Turkey-Albania  relations  are  strong.  At  a  High-Level  Strategic  Cooperation  Council  in 
January 2021, both countries agreed to further upgrade bilateral cooperation in a number of 
areas.  Turkey  was  the  biggest  foreign  investor  in  Albania  and  a  big  donor  of  humanitarian 
and medical aid during the COVID-19 pandemic.  

72 

 
 
Turkey’s  relations  with  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  remained  positive.  The  tripartite  Bosnia 
and Herzegovina Presidency paid an official visit to Turkey in March 2021. Turkey agreed to 
donate 30 000 coronavirus vaccines to Bosnia and Herzegovina.  

Turkey maintained strong cultural and economic ties with Kosovo. 

Turkey and Montenegro continued developing their bilateral cooperation in all fields. Turkey 
was actively engaged in the economic, educational and cultural sector of North Macedonia. 
Turkey continued to provide humanitarian and development assistance to the country.   

Turkey developed its overall relations with Serbia and further increased its investments there, 
with  the  biggest  Turkish  investment  being  the  Serbian  section  of  the  Belgrade-Sarajevo 
highway. A high-level visit took place in October 2020.  

4. 

ABILITY TO ASSUME OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP 

CLUSTER 2: INTERNAL MARKET  

This cluster covers: free movement of goods (Chapter 1), freedom of movement for workers 
(Chapter  2),  right  of  establishment  and  freedom  to  provide  services  (Chapter  3),  free 
movement  of  capital  (Chapter  4),  company  law  (Chapter  6),  intellectual  property  law 
(Chapter  7),  competition  policy  (Chapter  8),  financial  services  (Chapter  9),  and  health  and 
consumer  protection  (Chapter  28).  This  cluster  is  key  to  the  good  functioning  of  the  EU-
Turkey Customs Union and to integrating Turkey in the EU’s single market. 

Turkey has achieved a good level of preparation for the free movement of goods. Although 
it  continued  to  align  with  technical  EU  legislation  under  the  ‘New  and  Global  Approach’, 
technical barriers to trade remain, which hamper the good functioning of the Customs Union. 
Preparations in the areas of freedom of movement for workers and right of establishment and 
freedom  to  provide  services  are  at  an  early  stage  as  many  professions  are  closed  to  EU 
nationals.  

Turkey  is  moderately  prepared  on  free  movement  of  capital  notably  because  of  the 
substantial remaining obstacles for acquisitions of assets and real estate. It improved its legal 
framework regulating the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing, but needs 
to ensure that implementation does not restrict the legitimate rights of NGOs. There is a good 
level  of preparation in  terms of legislative  alignment of consumer and health protection, as 
exemplified by Turkey’s strong vaccination campaign against COVID-19. However, in both 
areas,  there  is  a  need  to  strengthen  administrative  capacity,  consultations  and  coordination 
among stakeholders. Turkey has some level of preparation in the area of competition policy.  
There is  a continued lack of  State aid  implementation  rules, enforcement and  transparency, 
while the institutional set up remains incomplete. 

Chapter 1: Free movement of goods  

The free movement of goods ensures that many products can be traded freely across the EU 
based on common rules and procedures. Where products are governed by national rules, the 
principle of the free movement of goods prevents these from creating unjustified barriers to 
trade. 

Turkey has achieved a good level of preparation for the free movement of goods. It made 
no progress in addressing last year’s recommendations. While alignment with technical EU 

 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ 
Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence. 

73 

 
 
                                                           
in  place,  preventing 

legislation  under  the  ‘New  and  Global  Approach’  continued,  technical  barriers  to  trade 
remained 
the  free  movement  of  some  goods.  Requirements 
discriminating  against  EU  products  remained,  violating  Turkey’s  obligations  under  the 
Customs  Union.  Turkey  increased  its  product  safety  controls  under  the  risk-based  import 
control  system,  leading  to  unjustified  checks  and  causing  delays  in  EU  products’  access  to 
the Turkish market. 

In the coming period, Turkey should in particular: 

  eliminate non-tariff barriers to the free movement of goods that are in breach of Customs 
Union obligations, such as surveillance regimes for the import of certain products, export 
restrictions,  prior  registration  requirements,  conformity  assessments  and  inspections, 
licensing  surveillance  and  other  documentation  requirements  for  imports  and  non-
acceptance of EU good manufacturing practices certificates; 

  reconsider  schemes  imposing  local  content  requirements  or  relocation  of  production 

particularly in the area of medicines for human use; 

  increase the coverage and effectiveness of market surveillance measures. 

General principles 

The  framework  for  the  free  movement  of  goods  is  largely  in  place  in  Turkey.  However, 
issues  related  to  implementation  still  remain.  A  range  of  non-tariff  barriers  to  the  free 
movement  of  goods  that  are  in  breach  of  Customs  Union  obligations  are  still  in  place  and 
some  were  introduced  in  the  reporting  period.  These  included  surveillance  regimes  for  the 
import  of  certain  products,  export  restrictions,  prior  registration  requirements,  conformity 
assessments  and  inspections  under  the  risk-based  import  control  system,  licensing 
surveillance  and  other  documentation  requirements,  as  well  as  non-acceptance  of  EU  good 
manufacturing  practices  certificates  and  discrimination  against  EU  products.  Furthermore, 
schemes to ensure the local manufacture or local content requirements create de facto market 
access barriers for EU products and are considered not in line with the Customs Union. The 
prior  authorisation  requirement  for  exports  of  some  personal  protective  equipment  (PPE) 
introduced in March 2020 is still in place. 

Non-harmonised area 

Turkey adopted a new regulation on mutual recognition in the non-harmonised area in March 
2021  in  line  with  the  EU  acquis.  The  number  of  notifications  of  product  legislation  from 
Turkey  increased  from  7  in  2020  to  13  in  2021.  Considering  Turkey’s  economic  size, 
legislative  activity  and  link  with  the  European  Union  under  the  Customs  Union,  this  is 
insufficient. 

Harmonised area: quality infrastructure 

Turkey  is  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis  on  technical  regulations,  standards,  conformity 
assessment,  accreditation,  metrology,  and  market  surveillance.  Implementing  regulations 
were  published  on  general  product  safety,  the  Conformité  Européenne  mark  (CE  mark), 
conformity assessment bodies, notified bodies and conformity assessment methods.  

The  Turkish  Standards  Institute  is  independent  and  able  to  implement  European  and 
international standards. It has adequate staff resources and financing, and since 2012 is a full 
member of the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) and the European Committee 
for  Electrotechnical  Standardisation  (CENELEC).  By  April  2021,  it  had  adopted  21  372 
national standards aligned with European standards. The rate of harmonisation with CEN and 
CENELEC standards is 99 % and 96 %, respectively. Eight Turkish economic operators are 

74 

 
 
full members of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) and one is an 
observer.  

Turkey  had  51  notified  bodies,  two  technical  approval  bodies  and  three  recognised  third-
party organisations in place as of June 2021. The Turkish Accreditation Agency (TÜRKAK) 
is  a  signatory  of  nine  multilateral  agreements  as  part  of  the  European  cooperation  for 
Accreditation  association.  TÜRKAK  was  admitted  to  the  mutual  recognition  of  data 
agreement (MAD) of the OECD Good Laboratory Practices Working Group (OECD-GLP) in 
February  2020.  The  National  Metrology  Institute  (TÜBITAK-UME)  is  a  member  of  the 
European Association of National Metrology Institutes (EURAMET) and participates in the 
Committee  of  the  European  Metrology  Programme  for  Innovation  and  Research  (EMPIR). 
The  Ministry  of  Industry  and  Technology  participates  in  the  European  Legal  Metrology 
Organisation (WELMEC).  

Turkey  performs  market  surveillance  in  line  with  the  EU  acquis  and  submits  its  annual 
programme  to  the  European  Commission.  According  to  initial  data  from  the  Ministry  of 
Trade, the overall budget allocated to market surveillance decreased by 20 % in 2020. There 
was a decrease of 32 % in the number of products subject to market surveillance checks in 
2020  as  compared  to  2019.  Market  surveillance  is  not  performed  on  the  basis  of  risk 
assessment. Surveillance remained very limited with regard to e-commerce while the volume 
of online shopping increased. About 26 % of unsafe products were subject to fines in 2019 as 
compared  to  31  %  in  2018.  This  decline  raises  concerns  about  the  enforcement  of  product 
safety legislation.  

Harmonised area: sectoral legislation 

On the ‘new and global approach’ product legislation, legislation aligned to the EU acquis 
was  adopted  on  radio  equipment,  medical  devices  and  in  vitro  diagnostic  medical  devices. 
Implementing legislation was issued on lifts and equipment and protective systems intended 
for  use  in  potentially  explosive  atmospheres.  Turkey  adopted  implementing  legislation  on 
energy labelling and eco-design requirements for various product groups. 

On ‘old approach’ product legislation, Turkey adopted legislation to align with EU acquis 
on  emission  limits  of  internal  combustion  engines  for  non-road  mobile  machinery  and 
labelling  of  tyres  with  respect  to  fuel  efficiency.  Concerns  exist  with  regard  to  the 
implementation  of  EU  acquis  on  cosmetics  in  terms  of  registration  requirements  and 
notifications  on  the  product  tracking  system.  Amending  legislation  on  agricultural  and 
forestry tractors was  adopted in  April 2021 postponing  enforcement deadlines to  1 January 
2023. Turkey amended the legal base on the licensing of medicinal products for human use, 
allowing  the  approval  of  emergency  use  of  vaccines.  Turkey  did  not  accept  EU  good 
manufacturing practice (GMP) certificates  on medicines for human use, in  contradiction  to 
Customs Union rules. Turkey’s schemes impose the requirement of local manufacturing on 
medicines for human use and on agricultural and forestry tractors, which create market access 
barriers  for  EU  products.  Turkey  is  only  partly  aligned  with  the  European  Regulation  on 
Registration,  Evaluation,  Authorisation  and  Restriction  of  Chemicals  (REACH).  Turkey’s 
product safety controls on imported goods processed through the electronic TAREKS system 
require additional documentation and information for products coming from the EU, contrary 
to  Customs  Union  provisions.  In  2021,  textiles  and  footwear  were  also  covered  by  this 
requirement.  

On procedural  measures, there is  a specific licensing  and regulation system  for economic 
operators  dealing  with  drug  precursors,  with  a  strict  follow-up  and  monitoring  system  in 
cooperation  with  the  police  and  customs  authorities.  Turkey  is  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis 
regarding  licensing  procedures  for  firearms.  There  was  no  progress  on  alignment  with  the 

75 

 
 
EU acquis on cultural goods. 

Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers  

Citizens of one Member State have the right to work in another Member State and must be 
given the same working and social conditions as other workers. 

Preparations in the area of freedom of movement for workers are at an early stage and there 
was no progress during the reporting period. 

There was no progress on access to the labour market or coordination of social security 
systems.  So  far,  Turkey  has  concluded  15  bilateral  social  security  agreements  with  EU 
Member  States,  but  no  new  bilateral  social  security  agreements  were  signed  during  the 
reporting  period.  There  were  no  developments  on  future  participation  in  the  European 
employment services network (EURES). 

Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services  

EU natural and legal persons have the right to establish themselves in any Member State and 
to  provide  cross-border  services.  For  certain  regulated  professions,  there  are  rules  on 
mutual  recognition  of  qualifications.  Postal  services  are  gradually  being  opened  up  to 
competition. 

Preparations in the area of right of establishment and freedom to provide services are at  an 
early  stage.  There  was  no  progress  in  the  reporting  period.  Substantial  efforts  are  still 
required  to  align  with  the  EU  acquis.  There  was  no  implementation  of  the  2020  Report's 
recommendations which remain valid.  

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

  align with  the Services  Directive on the provision  of cross-border services and set  up  a 

Point of Single Contact; 

  align with EU acquis in the area of postal services; 

  align its national legislation with the EU acquis in the area of the mutual recognition of 

professional qualifications.  

There was no progress on the right of establishment where many requirements continue to 
restrict this right.  

Regarding  the  freedom  to  provide  cross-border  services,  registration,  licensing  and 
authorisation  requirements  are  still  in  place  for  service  providers  registered  in  the  EU.  The 
Point of Single Contact  has not  been set  up  yet.  Preparations are still ongoing to  transform 
the retail sector information system (PERBIS) into a sector-specific Point of Single Contact. 

No progress was made in the area of postal services. Regarding the provision of universal 
postal  service, Turkey is  yet  to  align with  the Postal Services Directive. A reserved area in 
the standard postal letter service sector and exclusive rights of the universal service provider 
are still maintained. National legislation is also still to be aligned with the provisions of the 
Regulation on cross-border parcel delivery services. 

On the mutual recognition of professional qualifications, some regulated professions still 
require  reciprocal  recognition.  Nationality  and  language  requirements  have  not  been 
removed. Alignment of national legislation with the EU acquis in this area needs to continue. 

76 

 
 
Chapter 4 - Free movement of capital  

In  the  EU,  capital  and  investments  must  be  able  to  move  without  restriction  and  there  are 
common rules for cross-border payments. Banks and other economic operators apply certain 
rules to support the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.  

Turkey  is  moderately  prepared  on  free  movement  of  capital.  Overall,  there  was  some 
progress  in  this  area  in  the  reporting  period.  Legislation  on  real  estate  acquisition  is  not 
aligned with the EU acquis. Restrictions imposed on capital outflows and foreign exchange-
denominated transactions after the August 2018 currency crisis are still in force. In the light 
of  the  recommendations  of  the  Financial  Action  Task  Force  (FATF),  Turkey  moderately 
improved its legal framework regulating the fight against money laundering and terrorism 
last  year’s 
financing.  There  was 
recommendations.  

implementation  of 

limited  progress 

the 

in 

In addition to addressing the shortcomings set out below, Turkey should in particular: 

  draft and adopt an action plan on real estate acquisition by foreigners to lift restrictions 

and increase transparency; 

  further align with the EU acquis by strengthening measures to prevent the misuse of its 
financial system for the purpose of money laundering and the financing of terrorism; 

  ensure full compliance with the outstanding FATF recommendations in the fight against 
terrorist financing and money laundering, and in line with the recommendations of the 
Venice  Commission  regarding  the  law  on  the  prevention  of  financing  of  the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 

On  capital  movements  and  payments,  Turkey’s  legislation  on  real  estate  acquisition  by 
foreigners  remains  opaque  and  does  not  apply  to  all  EU  nationals  in  a  non-discriminatory 
way.  Immovable  property  acquisition  by  citizens  of  neighbouring  countries  in  border 
provinces  is  restricted.  An  action  plan  to  further  liberalise  the  purchase  of  real  estate  by 
foreigners needs to be adopted and implemented, bringing Turkey’s laws in line with the EU 
acquis.  Restrictions applying to  foreign ownership remain in  place in  many sectors such as 
radio  and  TV  broadcasting,  aviation  and  maritime  transportation,  mining  and  electricity 
market.  The  restrictions  introduced  after  the  August  2018  currency  crisis  on  capital 
movements  for  residents  and  non-banking  corporations,  in  particular  for  transactions 
denominated in foreign currencies, are still in place. The obligation of transferring back the 
proceeds derived from export transactions into the country is still in force. The Banking and 
Supervision  Agency  (BRSA)  eased  the  restrictions  previously  introduced  in  April  2020 
regarding domestic banks’ ability to do swap operations and other derivatives operations with 
foreign  counterparties.  It  exempted  first  international  development  banks  and  then  non-
resident  banks  from  several  of  the  restrictions  imposed  on  access  to  Turkish  lira  liquidity 
under  some  conditions.  It  relaxed  the  limit  for  banks’  foreign-exchange  swap,  forward  and 
option transactions with foreign entities and increased the amount of lira swap and derivative 
products sold by banks to non-residents. 

Turkey has reached a good standard in payment systems. The Association of Payment and 
Electronic Money Institutions of Turkey (TÖDEB) was established as a public occupational 
organisation in June 2020. It is mandatory for a payment and electronic money institution to 
become member of this association. The Central Bank has introduced a new retail payment 
system  in  January  2021.  The  Instant  and  Continuous  Transfer  of  Funds  (FAST)  system 
allows fund holders to transfer instantly money between their accounts at different banks on a 
24/7 basis. At this stage, only banks operating in Turkey can participate in the system. The 

77 

 
 
FAST system was launched with a transaction upper limit of TRY 50 and then raised to TRY 
1 000. The Central Bank banned in April 2021 the use of crypto currency and crypto assets 
directly or indirectly as an instrument of payment. 

Turkey  made  limited  progress  in  the  fight  against  money  laundering  and  financing  of 
terrorism.  The  Financial  Crimes  Investigation  Board  (MASAK),  the  Turkish  Financial 
Intelligence Unit, developed a sound track-record during the reporting period. The number of 
suspicious transaction reports submitted to the MASAK reached 237 531 and the number of 
files  analysed  by  MASAK  was  10  298  in  2020.  There  were  53  convictions  for  money 
laundering in 2018, which increased to 95 convictions in 2019 and 92 convictions in 2020. 

In December 2020, the Parliament adopted the law on preventing financing of proliferation of 
weapons  of  mass  destruction.  Its  declared  objectives  are  to  ensure  compliance  of  Turkish 
legislation and procedures with relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. The law also aims 
at  strengthening  national  capacity  in  fighting  money  laundering  and  financing  of  terrorism 
and  complying  with  the  FATF  recommendations  in  terms  of  increasing  effectiveness  and 
dissuasiveness  of  the  Turkish  legal  framework  on  terrorist  financing  and  proliferation. 
Furthermore,  the  law  reformed  the  legal  framework  to  prevent  the  abuse  of  non-profit 
organisations  for  the  financing  of  terrorism.  Given  the  importance  of  the  law  and  clear 
indications that some of its aspects threaten the very existence of NGOs, it is important that 
any  measures  taken  to  counter  terrorism  are  in  line  with  Turkey’s  obligations  under 
international law, and in particular international human rights law. Turkey needs to continue 
addressing  outstanding  recommendations  to  avoid  FATF  listing  in  line  with  the  first 
enhanced  follow-up  report  by  the  FATF.  Failure  to  address  these  recommendations  puts 
Turkey at risk of being included in the EU list of high-risk third countries presenting strategic 
deficiencies in their anti-money laundering/countering financing of terrorism regimes. 

The government, for the first time since the adoption of the terrorism financing law of 2013, 
used  the  domestic  asset  freezing  instrument  against  377  people  and  organisations  in  April 
2021.  Legal  provisions  are  sufficient  to  conclude  that  the  United  Nations  Security  Council 
Resolutions are implemented without delay.  

Turkey  maintains  its  citizenship  law,  which  enables  foreign  investors  to  obtain  Turkish 
citizenship.  The  conditions  are  either  to  invest  USD  250  000  in  Turkish  real  estate,  which 
must be maintained for a minimum of 3 years, or deposit USD 500 000 into a Turkish bank 
account,  to  be  held  for  a  minimum  of  3  years  with  no  access  to  funds.  Such  investor 
citizenship schemes pose risks for the EU. A robust monitoring system linked to this scheme 
should  be  put  in  place,  in  particular  to  counter  possible  security  risks  such  as  money 
laundering, terrorist financing and infiltration of organised crime. Particular attention should 
be  given  to  enhanced  customer  due  diligence  in  the  context  of  the  investors’  citizenship 
programme. 

Chapter 6: Company law  

The  EU  has  common  rules  on  the  formation,  registration  and  disclosure requirements  of  a 
company,  with  complementary  rules  for  accounting  and  financial  reporting,  and  statutory 
audit. 

Turkey  is  well  advanced  in  the  area  of  company  law.  Limited  progress  was  made  in  this 
area  through  improved  commercial  registry  e-services,  and  in  the  area  of  corporate 
governance and shareholder rights. As no progress was made on financial reporting, the 2020 
recommendations remain valid. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

78 

 
 
  make progress in alignment with the EU acquis in the company law area; 

  adopt the financial reporting standards for small and micro companies to achieve further 

EU acquis alignment. 

On company law, no legislative action was taken during the reporting period. Alignment is 
needed  on  some  outstanding  issues  including  cross-border  mergers,  domestic  mergers  and 
divisions, and takeovers, while alignment is also needed with the 2019 company law acquis 
on  the  use  of  digital  tools  and  on  cross-border  operations.  As  regards  the  disclosure  of 
company  documents  there  are  still  no  provisions  in  place  requiring  publication  of  annual 
accounts  for  all  limited  liability  companies  in  the  business  register.  The  Ministry  of  Trade 
improved commercial registry e-services to include the general assembly module, electronic 
document  and  electronic  announcement  services.  However,  it  is  still  not  possible  to  file 
online  company  documents  to  the  business  register  or  to  complete  fully  online  the 
registration  process  of  limited  liability  companies  in  the  business  register.  In  the  area  of 
corporate governance and shareholder rights, Turkey has adopted significant measures in the 
field  of  material  transactions  or  Environmental,  Social  and  Governance  reporting  in  the 
context of listed companies.  

Concerning corporate accounting and auditing, alignment with the EU acquis on financial 
reporting standards for small and micro companies is long pending. There is still no clarity 
concerning alignment of non-financial information and reports on payments to government.  

Specific  provisions  apply  for  the  statutory  audit  of  public-interest  entities,  and  a  system  of 
investigations  and  sanctions  for  the  companies  that  are  subject  to  independent  audits  is  in 
place. The Public Oversight, Accounting and Auditing Standards Authority has inspected and 
investigated  selected  audit  files  of  70  audit  firms  and  4  auditors  in  2020.  Further  work  is 
required to align with the EU acquis on accounting and statutory audit. 

Chapter 7: Intellectual property law  

The  EU  has  harmonised  rules  for  the  legal  protection  of  intellectual  property  rights  (IPR) 
and of copyright and related rights. Rules for the legal protection of IPR cover, for instance, 
patents and trademarks, designs, biotechnological inventions and pharmaceuticals. Rules for 
the  legal  protection  of  copyright  and  related  rights  cover,  for  instance,  books,  films, 
computer programmes and broadcasting. 

Turkey  has  a  good  level  of  preparation  in  this  area  in  terms  of  legislation.  There  was  no 
progress  during  the  reporting  period.  Despite  some  trainings  for  the  customs  officers  on 
counterfeiting  and  increased  online  services  for  industrial  property  holders,  there  was  an 
increase  in  counterfeit  goods  originating  from  Turkey.  Recommendations  from  last  year’s 
report were only partially met and remain valid. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

 

improve  enforcement  measures  to  efficiently  fight  against  industrial  and  intellectual 
property infringements including online sales of counterfeit and pirated goods, improve 
the  specialisation  in  Intellectual  Property  Rights  (IPR)  courts  and  the  procedures  to 
obtain search and seizure warrants at lower criminal courts; 

  sustain  a  constructive  dialogue  with  IPR  owners  to  improve  efficient  implementation 
and effective enforcement  of the new  Industrial  Property  Law in  particular in  cases of 
cancellation requests of an unused registered trademark and in cases of accelerated and 
simplified destruction procedures; 

79 

 
 
  ensure  collection  and  processing  of  accurate  statistical  data,  especially  on  effective 
judicial  enforcement  of  intellectual  and  industrial  property  rights,  with  a  view  to 
facilitating the analysis of systemic IPR deficiencies in Turkey. 

Concerning  copyright  and  related  rights,  no  progress  was  achieved  as  the  long  pending 
draft Copyright Law was not adopted. Training on copyright and related rights protection was 
organised for police officers and anti-piracy commission members. Despite the high level of 
alignment with the EU acquis, systemic issues with regard to  collective rights management 
continued negatively affecting the overall efficiency of the copyright system.  

Even  though  physical  piracy  by  street  vendors  decreased  due  to  the  COVID-19  pandemic 
conditions,  unauthorised  use  of  copyrighted  material  via  online  platforms  increased.  Pirate 
traders  were  opening  e-shops  at  well-known  e-commerce  websites.  Economic  interests  of 
consumers and producers were infringed without efficient redress.  

The long awaited code of conduct  for patent agents  and trademark agents was adopted and 
the  supervision  of  trademark  and  patent  agents  improved  considerably.  Enforcement  of 
trademarks has become faster and more effective in the course of the reporting period. The 
Turkish  Patent  and  Trademark  Office  (TPTO)  continued  to  expand  the  use  of  online 
applications and developed its call centre services.  

Concerning judicial enforcement, the establishment of specialised Intellectual Property (IP) 
courts has strengthened the quality of IPR enforcement in Turkey by creating a framework in 
which  consistent  jurisprudence  can  be  developed.  However,  most  of  the  specialised  and 
experienced  IPR  judges  and  prosecutors  are  no  longer  serving,  while  the  number  of  IPR 
courts remains insufficient. Despite the possibility to demand higher sanctions, the criminal 
courts  rarely  order  deterrent  fines  for  commercial  scale  IP  infringements.  Difficulties  in 
obtaining  search  and  seizure  warrants  against  counterfeit  goods  worsened,  particularly  in 
Istanbul.  Enforcement  authorities,  in  particular  the  police  and  judges,  lack  sufficient 
resources  and  training  to  take  efficient  action  against  IP  infringements.  Although  the 
industrial property legislation allows for accelerated destruction, the related provisions were 
still  not  properly  enforced.  IPR  in  Turkey  continued  to  be  hampered  by  long  judicial 
proceedings,  insufficient  level  of  compensation,  delayed  verdicts  on  penalties,  and  storage 
costs of goods (paid  by  rights  holders). Revocation, opposition and invalidation  procedures 
for  trademarks  were  disproportionally  expensive  and  overly  long.  Judges  continued  to 
excessively  require  expert  witness  statements,  since  judges  lack  the  required  level  of 
specialisation. Conflict of interest situations of expert witnesses remained unsolved. 

On counterfeiting, Turkey continued to be among the top producers of counterfeit beverages, 
perfumes,  cosmetics,  shoes,  clothing,  and  personal  accessories.  Online  sales  of  counterfeit 
goods at well-known websites and consumer complaints about those goods increased. 

raining  sessions  for  customs  officers  on  counterfeit  goods  were  organised  with  the 
participation of around 100 trademark owners. Access to properly prepared statistical data on 
IPR was not ensured. Moreover, judicial statistics on IPR were not publicly accessible. 

There  is  a  need  for  awareness  campaigns  run  by  IPR-related  public  institutions  on  the 
dangers of counterfeiting and piracy on public health and consumer safety, as well as on the 
economic benefits of IPR-intensive sectors.  

Chapter 8: Competition policy  

EU rules protect free competition. They include antitrust rules against restrictive agreements 
between companies and abuse of dominant position and also include rules on concentrations 
between companies, which would  significantly impede  competition. EU  rules also  set  out  a 

80 

 
 
system  of  State  aid  control.  Governments  are  only  allowed  to  grant  State  aid  if  restrictive 
conditions are met, with a view to prevent distortion of competition. 

Turkey  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  competition  policy.  There  was  some 
progress during the reporting period concerning the alignment of the competition legislation 
with  the  EU  acquis.  Serious  concerns  persist  as  regards  the  legislative  framework, 
enforcement  capacity  and  transparency  in  the  field  of  State  aid.  The  Commission’s 
recommendations from previous years were not addressed and remain valid. 

In addition to addressing the shortcomings set out below, Turkey should in particular: 

  set  up  an  operationally  independent  State  aid  authority  and  ensure  transparent 

implementation of the State aid rules; 

  ensure implementation of the State Aid law by adopting implementing legislation without 

further delay; 

  provide access to a transparent and up-to-date inventory of all aid schemes. 

Anti-trust and mergers 

The  legislative  framework  is  broadly  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis.  The  Law  on  the 
Protection  of  Competition  broadly  reflects  Article  101  and  102  of  the  Treaty  on  the 
Functioning of the European Union. Implementing legislation in this field is largely in place. 
In June 2020, Turkey amended the Law on the Protection of Competition and introduced a 
significant  impediment  on  effective  competition  test  on  mergers  and  acquisitions,  “de 
minimis”  rule,  as  well  as  commitments  and  settlement  procedures.  The  implementing 
legislation  concerning  the  “de  minimis”  rule  and  the  commitment  procedure  were  put  into 
force in March 2021. 

Regarding  the  institutional  framework,  the  Turkish  Competition  Authority  is  responsible 
for implementing the Law on the Protection of Competition. Its remit is very similar to that 
of  the  European  Commission.  The  Competition  Board  is  the  decision  making  body  of  the 
Turkish  Competition  Authority  and  is  governed  by  seven  members.  Although  the  Turkish 
Competition  Authority  is  affiliated  to  the  Ministry  of  Trade,  it  has  administrative  and 
financial  autonomy.  However,  the  direct  appointment  of  the  President  and  the  members  of 
the  Competition  Board  by  the  President  of  the  Republic  without  specific  requirements  on 
education  and  sector  experience  and  involvement  of  other  relevant  institutions  (e.g.  the 
Turkish Parliament) impairs the independence of the Turkish Competition Authority. 

The  enforcement  capacity  of  the  Turkish  Competition  Authority  is  adequate.  In  2020, 
overall  implementation  was  effective  and  the  number  of  decisions  in  the  area  of  antitrust 
(65, as compared to 69 in 2019), exemption/negative clearance decisions (34, as compared to 
35  in  2019)  and  merger/acquisition/joint  venture/privatisation  (208,  as  compared  to  220  in 
2019) remained in the same range as in the previous year. The total amount of principal fines 
imposed  by  the  Authority  for  the  infringements  of  competition  cases  (fines  related  to 
substance) significantly increased to TRY 1.9 billion from an average of TRY 290 million for 
the  previous  five  years.  The  total  number  of  ex-officio  investigations  and  preliminary 
investigations  remained  low  (from  10  in  2019,  to  8  in  2020).  The  Turkish  Competition 
Authority conducted an average of 32 dawn raids throughout 2020. The Turkish Competition 
Authority needs to publish detailed data on complaints having led to investigations and dawn 
raids, in order to ensure transparency of its enforcement capacity. In 2020, 80 % of the 155 
judgements  concluded as a result of the appeals  against  the Turkish Competition  Authority 
decisions were upheld by Turkish courts. 

81 

 
 
State aid 

The legislative framework  is  partially in  line  with  the EU  acquis.  State aid  regulations  do 
not cover the agriculture, fisheries and services sectors, which are not part of the EU-Turkey 
Customs Union. Turkey’s primary State aid law is broadly in line with Articles 107 and 108 
of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union.  However,  it  is  not  practically 
enforceable  due  to  the  lack  of  implementing  legislation  and  an  operational  institutional 
framework. Turkey repealed a set of deadlines previously defined in the law and empowered 
the President  to  delay the enforcement of implementing legislation for an unlimited period. 
Therefore, Turkey still needs to adopt an action plan for alignment of the legislation with the 
EU acquis. 

Concerning the  institutional  framework, the Economic Policies Council is  responsible for 
implementing the State aid law and the President of the Republic is the appointing authority 
of  this  Council's  members.  The  Directorate-General  for  Economic  Programs  and  Research, 
established under the Ministry of Treasury and Finance, coordinates State aid. The existing 
structure is not considered operationally independent. 

Turkey is not implementing State aid control, notably because the organisational structure is 
not functional and the implementing legislation is not in force. In 2020, the implementation 
of the project-based investment programme, where public support is provided on a selective 
basis, reached 34 projects with an investment amount of TRY 115.16 billion. In 2019, Turkey 
put  in  place  the  technology-driven  industry  initiative  embedded  in  the  project-based 
investment  programme  and  the  general  2012  incentives  scheme.  This  incentive  scheme  is 
aimed  at  securing  or  increasing  the  domestic  production  in  medium-high-  and  high-
technology  level  products,  such  as  chemicals,  pharmaceuticals,  medical  and  dental 
instruments,  computers,  electronics  and  optics,  electrical  devices,  machinery,  transportation 
vehicles  and  other  industrial  products  critical  to  the  development  of  the  selected  sectors  as 
identified in the 11th Development Plan. In 2021, Turkey announced a total of 919 products 
to  be  supported  within  the  scope  of  this  scheme.  Award  decision  within  the  first  call 
announced for the machinery sector in October 2019 were finalised in May 2021 and did not 
include  financial  information  on  the  support  granted.  The  lack  of  a  transparent  State  aid 
inventory  covering  all  aid  schemes,  including  the  amount  or  budgeted  amount  of  the  state 
support granted, is a source of concern.  

Liberalisation 

Competition and State aid rules apply to state-owned enterprises. However, the competences 
concerning the privatisation process lie with the President, who has assumed power over the 
privatisation decisions and procedures. 

Chapter 9: Financial services  

EU rules aim at ensuring fair competition between and the stability of financial institutions, 
namely  banking,  insurance,  supplementary  pensions,  investment  services  and  securities 
markets. They include rules on authorisation, operation and supervision of these institutions. 

Turkey  has  a  good  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  financial  services.  There  was  some 
progress  during  the  reporting  period,  with  the  adoption  of  the implementing  regulation  for 
the  preparation  of  prevention  plans  by  systemically  important  banks.  Turkey  also  took 
important steps towards accelerating the digital transformation of the banking sector. There 
was little implementation of the 2020 report's recommendations. 

In addition to addressing the shortcomings set out below, in the coming year Turkey should 
in particular: 

82 

 
 
  further  strengthen  bank  governance  and  supervision,  crisis  management  and  the 

resolution framework; 

  improve  the  transparency  of  asset  quality  review  by  publishing  the  details  of  stress  test 

scenarios and methodology; 

  continue  to  support  the  development  of  Turkish  capital  markets  and  their  proper 

supervision. 

Regarding banks and financial conglomerates, Turkey adopted the regulation laying down 
the principles and procedures for the preparation and implementation of the prevention plans 
by  systemically  important  banks.  They  are  required  to  assess  any  potential  systemic  and/or 
bank-related  risks  that  could  lead  to  deterioration  of  their  financial  structure  and  to  present 
accordingly  measures  to  mitigate  those  risks  to  the  Banking  Regulation  and  Supervision 
Agency. 

In in order to encourage lending and sustain economic activity in the wake of the COVID-19 
crisis,  the  Turkish  authorities  adopted  a  series  of  measures,  including  application  of  low 
reserve  requirements  for  banks  with  a  growing  lending  portfolio,  credit  extensions, 
instalment  postponements  and  flexible  loan  payment  options.  As  of  the  end  of  2020,  the 
Central Bank lifted the rules linking the reserve requirement ratios and remuneration rates to 
real loan growth rates of banks. The Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency abolished 
completely the asset ratio requirement imposed to commercial and participation banks as of 1 
January  2021,  which  was  introduced  in  April  2020  to  promote  lending  and  support  the 
economy during the pandemic crisis. The capital adequacy ratio of the banking sector fell to 
17.9 % in April 2021, but remained above the regulatory minimum and historic averages. 

As part of the measures to mitigate the economic impact of the COVID-19 outbreak, the time 
allowed for certain loans to remain unpaid before they are classified as non-performing loans 
was  increased  from  90  to  180  days,  until  31  December  2020.  This  measure  was  further 
extended  until  end  of  September  2021.  This  measure  and  the  increase  of  new  loans 
contributed to the decline in the ratio of non-performing loans from 5.3 % in the beginning of 
2020 to 3.7 % in April 2021. Turkey needs to conduct comprehensive and transparent asset 
quality review processes and adopt a resolution plan for the non-performing loans. 

There was further progress in adapting new technological developments to banking services. 
The  Banking  Regulation  and  Supervision  Agency  introduced  electronic  agreements  for 
various  financial  transactions  and  developed  remote  identification  methods  to  help  banks 
acquire new clients and establish contractual relationships in electronic environment. 

In  the  area  of  insurance  and  occupational  pensions,  Turkey  adopted  in  June  2020  the 
legislative  framework  related  to  the  organisational  structure,  duties  and  authorities  and  the 
working  principles  and  procedures  of  the  Insurance  and  Private  Pension  Regulation  and 
Supervision Agency. The Agency effectively became operational. 

As regards financial market infrastructure, Borsa Istanbul introduced some amendments in 
the trading principles, the listing of capital market instruments and in the market structure of 
the equity market, mainly in view of increasing market liquidity.  

In  the  area  of  securities  markets  and  investment  services,  the  Banking  Regulation  and 
Supervision  Agency  changed  the  legislative  framework  to  expand  the  scope  of  financial 
instruments  eligible  for  repo  and  reverse  repo  transactions,  such  as  for  debt  instruments 
issued  by  the  Turkish  Wealth  Fund  and  the  participation  shares  of  some  investment  funds. 
Saving  finance  companies  were  included  in  the  scope  of  the  law  on  financial  leasing, 
factoring and financing companies and thus entered under the supervision of the Agency. 

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Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection  

EU rules protect consumers’ economic interests and in relation to product safety, dangerous 
imitations and liability for defective products. The EU also ensures high common standards 
for  tobacco  control,  blood,  tissues,  cells  and  organs  as  well  as  medicines  for  human  and 
veterinary use. The EU also ensures high common standards for upholding patients’ rights in 
cross-border  healthcare  and  tackling  serious  cross-border  health  threats,  including 
communicable diseases. 

There  is  a  good  level  of  preparation  for  legislative  alignment  of  health  and  consumer 
protection.  There  was  limited  progress  on  last  year’s  recommendations,  with  positive 
developments  on  institutional  capacity  in  public  health.  Positive  developments  were  also 
noted  on  establishing  a  constructive  dialogue  with  stakeholders  and  on  strengthening  the 
consumer movement.  

In the coming year, Turkey should continue to: 

  strengthen  consumer  rights  enforcement  and  further 

improve  coordination  and 
cooperation with the consumer movement and with enforcement bodies; increase raising 
awareness activities; take more measures on infringements in the digital environment and 
for special needs consumers; 

  increase  its  institutional/administrative  capacity,  inter-sectoral  cooperation,  financial 
resources  and  appropriate  diagnostic  facilities  to  address  public  health  issues  at  central 
and provincial level. 

Consumer protection 

The  national  legislation  is  mostly  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis  on  consumer  protection  in 
non-safety  related  issues.  In  July  2020,  the  implementing  legislation  on  identifying  main 
responsibilities  and  ethical  principles  of  expert  witnesses  assigned  to  consumer  arbitration 
committees  was  adopted,  which  was  considered  to  be  a  positive  development.  Further 
implementing  legislation  on  renewal,  certification,  marketing  of  second-hand  products  and 
authorisation  of  renewal  centres  which  aims  at  increasing  consumer  awareness  and 
preventing  consumer  complaints  in  this  field  was  adopted  in  August  2020.  An  action  plan 
and an agenda for supporting consumer organisations were adopted and a specialised unit for 
Consumer NGOs in the Ministry of Trade was established. 

The  Consumer  Information  System  (TÜBİS),  which  allows  consumers  to  submit  and  track 
their  complaints  electronically,  significantly  shortened  the  duration  of  the  processing  of 
consumer complaints. The first public policy analysis on consumer protection in Turkey was 
prepared. Dialogue among consumer NGOs was strengthened leading to the establishment of 
the  first  confederation  of  consumer  organisations.  Countrywide  trainings  for  judges  and 
arbitration  committee  members,  traders,  public  institutions  and  consumer  NGOs  continued. 
Further  and  sustainable  efforts  are  needed  to  improve  consumer  rights  enforcement, 
consumer  awareness  and  education,  cooperation  and  coordination  of  sectoral  stakeholders. 
Online sales of unsafe or counterfeit products threatening public health and consumer safety 
via e-commerce web-sites needs further regulation and monitoring. 

With regard to safety-related measures, the Unsafe Products Information System (GÜBİS) 
continued to make available information to consumers. The DG for Consumer Protection and 
Market Surveillance of the Ministry of Trade carried out product controls in 1 242 companies 
in 2020. The number of products inspected was 10 960 278, out of which 1 567 950 products 
were found unsafe and removed from the market, and administrative fines totalling TRY 995 
033 of were imposed against 35 companies. 

84 

 
 
Public health 

On  horizontal  aspects  of  public  health,  the  COVID-19  pandemic  has  pushed  the  health 
system and healthcare workers to their limits. Turkey was successful in keeping new case and 
mortality  rates much lower at  the onset  of the outbreak, compared to  other countries in  the 
region.  However,  between  end  July  and  November  2020,  the  official  reports  included  only 
the  number  of  patients  requiring  medical  attention,  and  did  not  include  confirmed 
asymptomatic  cases.  At  the  end  of  November  2020,  Turkish  authorities  adjusted  the  daily 
COVID-19  case  count  to  international  practice  of  counting  all  detected  cases,  including 
asymptomatic  ones.  Turkey  was  affected  by  a  third  wave  in  early  2021,  leading  to  a  sharp 
increase in number of people to be treated in intensive care units, fatalities and the imposition 
of  a  strict  new  national  lockdown  in  April  2021.  By  early  September  2021,  more  than  6.5 
million  people  have  been  infected  by  COVID-19  and  nearly  59  000  lost  their  lives  as  per 
official  figures.  According  to  local  authorities  and  professional  association,  the  actual 
numbers could be higher. More precise data regarding socio-demographic variables and key 
factors associated with the spread of the pandemic is needed for the fight against COVID-19. 

Turkey  launched  its  anti-  COVID-19  vaccination  programme  in  January  2021.  As  of 
beginning  of  September,  63 %  of  the  population  had  received  two  doses.  Turkey  is 
supporting six projects on national vaccine development, including one in the form of a nasal 
spray. Turkey stated its  commitment of intent to participate in  the COVAX facility but has 
not officially joined.  

tools,  guidelines,  and 

technical  support  for  strengthening 

In  the  field  of  communicable  diseases,  the  EU  supported  Turkey  to  build  capacity  by 
providing 
inter-sectoral 
coordination and enabled it to train personnel at central and provincial levels in support of the 
COVID-19 response. It also helped to reinforce the physical and human resources capacity of 
the ‘National virology laboratory’ for genomic surveillance and supported Turkey towards a 
well-functioning  early  warning  and  response  system,  in  the  area  of  epidemiology  and 
surveillance  capacity  of  the  public  health  system.  Cross-sectoral  linkages  and  coordination 
with other relevant structures, including the area of civil protection, remain to be enhanced. 
Turkey  needs  to  strengthen  and  further  expand  capacities  for  population-based  surveillance 
and testing for COVID-19 to monitor trends and detect clusters. 

The COVID-19 outbreak had an impact on the capacity of the health system to continue the 
delivery  of  essential  health  services.  The  ability  to  address  and  respond  to  non-
communicable diseases was disrupted, including for children. Non-communicable diseases 
are the leading causes of death and disability accounting for 89 % of all deaths, according to 
WHO.  

In the field of tobacco control, the regulation of March 2019 requiring plain packaging and 
larger  health  warnings  by  the  manufacturer  started  to  be  implemented  in  December  2019. 
From January 2020, tobacco products with previous packaging are not allowed to be sold in 
the domestic market. 

As  the  mental  health  services  were  disrupted  by  the  pandemic,  the  Ministry  of  Health 
established a hotline to offer consultation services on a 24/7 basis for the patients with mental 
health disorders. The National mental health action plan aimed to promote mental wellbeing 
was revised to cover the period 2020-23. An independent body to monitor and inspect mental 
health institutions remains to be established. 

As  regards  health  inequalities,  overall  access  to  health  services  was  maintained  also  for 
refugees  throughout  the  COVID-19  pandemic.  At  the  same  time,  the  most  vulnerable, 
including poorer segments  of society, those working in  the informal economy  and refugees 

85 

 
 
were affected disproportionately due to COVID-19-related restrictions and reduced economic 
activity.  This  has  led  to  reduced  access  to  food  and  adequate  nutrition  for  households  with 
low earnings.  

In  the  field  of  substances  of  human  origin,  despite  COVID-19,  there  was  good  progress. 
The patient blood management strategy and action plan was completed and national patient 
blood  management  guidelines  were  published.  Hemovigilance  system  became  operational 
and the entire transfusion system was integrated to the overall personal health data recording 
system  at  national  level.  The  capacity  remains  insufficient  for  enforcement,  inspection  of 
blood  banks  and  transfusion  centres  at  central  and  local  levels  and  for  tissue  and  organ 
transplantation. Turkey ranks first in the world for living organ donors, however, the rate for 
deceased organ donors is low due to religious, cultural, and ethical reasons resulting in high 
numbers of patients on waiting lists.  

CLUSTER 3: COMPETITIVENESS AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH  

This  cluster  covers:  information  society  and  media  (Chapter  10),  taxation  (Chapter  16), 
economic  and  monetary  policy  (Chapter  17),  social  policy  and  employment  (Chapter  19), 
industrial  policy  (Chapter  20),  science  and  research  (Chapter  25),  education  and  culture 
(Chapter 26), and customs union (Chapter 29).  

Turkey  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  information  society  and  media.  It 
continued  backsliding,  mostly  due  to  inadequate  competition,  concentration  of  media 
ownership  and  the  lack  of  independence  of  regulatory  authorities.  Turkey’s  preparations  in 
the area of science and research are well advanced and it continued to implement the action 
plan  to  boost  the  national  research  and  innovation  capacity  and  to  align  with  the  European 
Research  Area.  Turkey  is  moderately  prepared  on  education  and  culture,  and  needs  to 
further  improve  inclusive  education,  with  a  particular  focus  on  girls  and  children  from 
disadvantaged groups. 

On  the  economy-related  chapters,  there  has  been  mostly  backsliding  during  the  reporting 
period. This was notably the case on enterprise and industrial policy, mainly due to Turkey 
bringing in measures incompatible with EU industrial policy principles, and on economic and 
monetary policy, reflecting intensified political pressure on the central bank. There was also 
backsliding  in  the  area  of  social  policy  and  employment,  linked  to  the  curtailment  of  trade 
union rights, the lack of genuine social dialogue and persistent levels of informal economic 
activity. 

On  taxation,  while  Turkey  is  moderately  prepared,  there  is  a  need  for  a  clear  strategy, 
avoiding  frequent  changes  in  tax  rates  and  enabling  tax  information  exchange  with  all  EU 
Member  States.  Turkey  maintains  a  good  level  of  preparation  for  the  customs  union  but 
made  limited  progress,  including  in  its  implementation.  Turkey’s  deviations  from  its 
obligations under the EU-Turkey Customs Union continue, contributing to a high number of 
trade irritants. 

Chapter 10: Information society and media  

for  electronic 
The  EU  supports 
communications, electronic commerce and audio-visual services. The rules protect consumers 
and support universal availability of modern services. 

internal  market 

functioning  of 

the  smooth 

the 

Turkey  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  information  society  and  media. 
Backsliding continued. Inadequate competition in broadband market, excessive taxation and 
costs  for  operators  and  consumers  of  information  and  communications  technologies 

86 

 
 
remained.  Serious  concerns  regarding  the  lack  of  transparency  of  media  funding, 
concentration  of  media  ownership,  political  influence  on  editorial  policies,  restrictions  on 
freedom of expression and lack of independence of regulatory authorities were not addressed.  

As last  year’s recommendations  were not  addressed, they remain valid.  In the coming  year 
Turkey should in particular: 

  align the universal service, authorisation arrangements, market access and rights of way 

in electronic communications with the EU acquis; 

  strengthen  the  independence  of  the  regulatory  authority  and  its  board  members  and 
amend the Internet  Law in line with the Venice Commission’s recommendations with a 
view to ensuring media pluralism; 

  take steps to strengthen the public broadcaster’s independence. 

On  electronic  communications  and  information  and  communications  technologies,  no 
progress  was  made  in  aligning  the  legislation  with  the  EU  acquis  on  market  access  and 
universal  service.  The  lack  of  independence  of  the  Board  and  the  Cyber  Security  Council 
remains a concern. 

Competition in fixed voice market improved. The share of alternative fixed voice operators 
was  58.5  %  in  the  third  quarter  of  2020,  against  49.4  %  in  2019.  Lack  of  sufficient 
competition  in  the  broadband  market  remains.  Mobile  broadband  penetration  slightly 
increased to 78.2 % in the third quarter of 2020 against the OECD average of 112.8 %. The 
fixed broadband penetration rate was 19.1 % compared to the OECD average of 31.4 %. The 
number of 4.5G subscribers remained nearly stable with 76.5 million in the third quarter of 
2020 compared to 76 million subscribers in the last quarter of 2019. The Internet  Law was 
not  brought  in  line  with  the  UN  and  Council  of  Europe  recommendations.  This  remains  a 
source of concern. 

Regarding  the  information  society  services,  the  National  Cyber  Security  Strategy  (2020-
2023) was published. The number of services offered from the e-Government Gateway rose 
from  5170  in  2019  to  5450  in  2020  and  to  5479  in  April  2021.  The  number  of  integrated 
institutions  is  791.  The  proportion  of  citizens  using  e-government  slightly  increased  from 
51.2 % in 2019 to 51.5 % in the first quarter of 2020. 

In the area of audio-visual policy, Turkey’s mainstream media and TV stations are largely 
controlled  by  pro-government  companies  whose  other  commercial  interests  obstruct  media 
independence,  encourage  self-censorship  and  limit  the  scope  of  public  debate.  The  need  to 
access  fair,  balanced  and  impartial  news  coverage  became  even  more  vital  during  the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Channels critical of the Government’s handling faced heavy monetary 
fines by the media regulator Radio  and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK).  In April, the 
Constitutional Court repealed Article 2/4 of the Statutory Decree no. 6755, which paved the 
way for  closing newspapers, TV channels  and  agencies during the State  of Emergency “on 
the  grounds  that  they  pose  a  threat  to  national  security”.  As  a  consequence,  decisions  for 
closing  17  newspapers,  4  radio  channels,  4  TV  channels  (25  media  outlets  in  total)  were 
repealed.  

In the first quarter of 2021, RTÜK imposed 57 administrative monetary fines and a total of 
22 broadcast suspension penalties on TV outlets whereas no action was taken against radio 
outlets in this period. With the 2019 Regulation on Radio, Television and Voluntary Online 
Broadcasts,  RTÜK  also  has  the  authority  to  inspect  online  broadcasts,  including  news 
websites broadcasting from abroad. It obliges media service providers and platform operators 
that  wish  to  provide  services  solely  on  the  internet,  to  obtain  broadcasting  licenses.  As  of 

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April 2021, the Supreme Council granted Internet-TV television broadcasting licence to 280 
media  service  providers,  Internet-RD  radio  broadcasting  licence  to  640  media  service 
providers  and  Internet-IBYH  online  on-demand  media  service  licence  to  32  media  service 
providers.  Concerns  over  the  regulation  -  lacking  clarity  in  terms  of  its  scope,  definitions, 
licencing  criteria  and  costs,  and  containing  controversial  provisions  regarding  jurisdiction 
and restricting access to online content - were not addressed.  

The  Law  Amending  the  Regulation  of  Internet  Broadcasts  and  the  Prevention  of  Crimes 
Committed  Through  Such  Broadcasts,  known  as  the  Social  Media  Law  came  into  force  in 
October  2020.  Social  media  companies  with  more  than  one  million  users  in  Turkey  are 
required to establish legal in-country representation and to store user data of Turkish citizens 
to  servers in  the country. The law purports  to  make the internet  safer for users, combatting 
cybercrime and hate speech. Despite early resistance, all social media companies have now 
complied.  In  April  2021,  the  Ministry  of  Interior  announced  initiation  of  legal  proceedings 
against  5,478  persons,  including  detention  of  261  persons  and  arrest  of  11  persons  due  to 
their social media posts in March (see political criteria). 

Concerns  over  the  independence  of  RTÜK  were  not  addressed.  Parliament  elects  the  nine 
members  of  the  Supreme  Council  in  proportion  to  the  political  party  groups.  This  cannot 
exclude  political  interference.  Concerns  over  the  editorial  independence  of  the  public 
broadcaster  TRT  were  also  not  addressed.  TRT’s  senior  management  is  appointed  by  the 
President. TRT regularly disregarded the voice of the opposition, minorities and the activities 
of civil society organisations critical of government policies. 

A  course  on  media  literacy  is  included  under  the  list  of  elective  courses  for  primary  and 
secondary  schools.  The  course  programme  is  based  on  four  basic  skills  of  media  literacy: 
access,  analysis,  evaluation  and  production.  Additionally,  there  is  a  guiding  book  for 
secondary  schools  that  covers  new  issues  such  as  social  media,  digital  rights  and 
responsibilities.  

Chapter 16: Taxation  

EU rules on taxation cover value added tax and excise duties as well as aspects of corporate 
taxation.  They  also  deal  with  cooperation  between  tax  administrations,  including  the 
exchange of information to prevent tax evasion. 

Turkey  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  area  of  taxation,  where  no  progress  was  made. 
Recommendations of the last year were addressed only partially. In the tax screening process 
for  the  purposes  of  the  EU  list  of  non-cooperative  jurisdictions,  concerning  the  automatic 
exchange of financial account information, Turkey still needs to activate effectively exchange 
relationships with all EU Member States, without any exception. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

  put arrangements in place for the effective implementation of the automatic exchange of 

tax information with all EU Member States; 

  align the range of excisable energy products with the EU acquis; 

  continue  the  fight  against  the  informal  economy  and  transparently  present  the  progress 

through performance indicators. 

In the area of indirect taxation, a wide range of products continued to be subject to a 1 % 
value  added  tax  (VAT),  contrary  to  the  EU  acquis.  Turkey  needs  to  further  align  the 
legislation on structure, exemptions, special schemes and the scope of reduced rates with the 
EU  acquis.  In  2020,  as  part  of  the  measures  against  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  Turkey 

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reduced the VAT for a long list  of  goods  and services  from  18 % to 8  % and some others 
(including accommodation) from 8 % to 1 %. The measure was extended until the end of July 
2021.  In  addition,  VAT  for  private  education  services  (for  2020-21  academic  year)  was 
lowered from 8 % to 1 % and delivery of the COVID-19 vaccines until 31 December 2021 is 
subject to a 1 % VAT rate. 

Although the overall level of taxation on cigarettes is close to EU levels, Turkey’s legislation 
on  cigarette  excise  duties  is  not  in  line  with  the  EU  acquis  in  terms  of  the  specific  and 
proportional elements of the tax. Excise duties on energy products are generally well above 
the  EU  minimum  rates.  However,  contrary  to  the  EU  acquis,  coal  and  electricity  are  not 
subject  to  excise  duties.  Kerosene  is  subject  to  excise  duty,  but  a  0  %  tax  rate  applies. 
Implementation  of  a  digital  services  tax  (on  digital  advertising,  content  and  intermediary 
services)  at  7.5  %  has  started  since  March  2020.  The  systematic  practices  of  introducing 
temporary  tax  cuts,  restructuring  public  debts  and  capital  repatriation,  which  disrupt 
voluntary tax compliance, continued in 2020. 

In  the  area  of  direct  taxation,  in  December  2020  Turkey  introduced  its  sixth  capital 
repatriation  programme  since  2008.  Such  uninterrupted  periods  of  capital  repatriation  have 
adverse  effects  on  sustainable  voluntary  tax  collection.  In  April  2021,  Turkey  once  again 
temporarily increased the corporate tax from 20 % to 25 % for the current year and to 23 % 
for  2022,  which  impairs  the  predictability  of  the  tax  structure.  Corporate  tax  was  already 
temporarily increased from 20 % to 22 % for 2018, 2019 and 2020. The new rates are above 
the  21.5  %  average  for  statutory  corporate  income  tax  among  EU  Member  States.  Turkey 
delayed  the  implementation  of  the  luxury  housing  tax,  which  was  introduced  in  2019  for 
residential property with a value exceeding TRY 5 million until 2021. 

Regarding  administrative  cooperation  and  mutual  assistance,  on  18  February  2020,  EU 
Finance Ministers called on Turkey to comply with the requirements for effective exchanges 
of information under the OECD Common Reporting Standard by 31 December 2020. By the 
end of 2020, while Turkey had activated the exchange of information with 21 Member States, 
Turkey had made no progress in the effective exchange of information with the remaining six 
Member States. 

In its Conclusions of February 2021 the Council called on Turkey to fully commit on a high 
political  level  by  31  May  2021  to  effectively  activate  automatic  information  exchange 
relationships with the six remaining Member States by 30 June 2021, and to send information 
for fiscal year 2019 to all Member States by 1 September. In May 2021, the Turkish Minister 
of  Treasury  and  Finance  provided  such  high  level  commitment  in  writing  and  by  June, 
Turkey  activated  the  automatic  exchange  of  information  with  all  Member  States  expect 
Cyprus. 

Turkey’s level of implementation concerning the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax 
Treaty-Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting measures, particularly 
with  respect  to  Country-by-Country  Reporting,  is  also  being  monitored.  Turkey  remained 
committed  to  improving  its  rating  (due  towards  end  of  2022)  by  the  Global  Forum  on 
Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes for the implementation of the 
international  standard  for  exchange  of  information  on  request.  Failure  to  fulfil  these 
commitments  would put Turkey at  risk of being included in  the EU list of non-cooperative 
tax jurisdictions. 

In  the  context  of  the  COVID-19  response  measures,  in  March  2020,  the  Turkish  Revenue 
Administration  (TRA)  laid  down  the  principles  of  tax-related  components  of  the  stimulus 
package.  The  following  categories  of  taxpayers  were  granted  ‘force  majeure’  status  for  the 
period of 1 April to 30 June 2020 (or during the curfew declared by the Ministry of Interior): 

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(i) taxpayers with income tax liability in terms of commercial, agricultural and professional 
earnings; (ii) taxpayers operating in 17 sectors directly affected by the COVID-19 outbreak; 
(iii)  taxpayers  operating  in  sectors  where  activities  at  the  workplace  were  temporarily 
suspended by the Ministry of Interior; (iv) taxpayers and certified public accountants having 
chronic  illness  or  aged  65  and  over.  Force  majeure  status  meant  that  the  deadline  for 
submitting tax statements was extended to July 2020, and the due date for taxes was extended 
by six months.  

In January 2021, the taxpayers operating in sectors where employment at the workplace was 
temporarily suspended starting from 18 November 2020, were also considered to be in force 
majeure. In November 2020, the implementation of the 2 % tax (1 % until the end of 2020) 
on accommodation services was also delayed until 1 January 2022.  

Regarding operational capacity and computerisation, the TRA actively uses an electronic 
document  management  system.  The  e-tax  statement  implementation,  initiated  in  2004, 
reached  99.92  %  in  2020.  Efforts  to  establish  an  integrated  public  finance  management 
information system are ongoing. The implementation of the Strategy and an Action Plan for 
the  fight  against  the  informal  economy  (2019-21)  continued  but  no  performance  indicators 
were set to monitor the progress. 

Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy 

EU  rules  require  the  independence  of  central  banks  and  prohibit  them  from  directly 
financing  the  public  sector.  Member  States  coordinate  their  economic  policies  and  are 
subject to fiscal, economic and financial surveillance. 

Turkey  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  economic  and  monetary  policy. 
Backsliding  continued  during  the  reporting  period,  reflecting  the  intensified  political 
pressure  on  the  central  bank.  The  successive  dismissals  of  several  governors  undermined 
central  bank  independence  and  credibility  and  contributed  to  the  erosion  of  market 
confidence.  While  the  Economic  Reform  Programme  (ERP)  was  submitted  on  time,  fiscal 
notifications  were  submitted  with  some  delays.  There  was  limited  implementation  of  the 
2020 report's recommendations. 

In the coming year Turkey should: 

  strengthen the independence and credibility of the central bank; 

  implement  an appropriate monetary policy stance in  view of achieving and maintaining 

price stability; 

  further align fiscal reporting and notifications under the excessive deficit procedure with 

ESA 2010. 

On monetary policy, as set out in the legal framework, the primary objective of the central 
bank  is  to  maintain  price  stability,  with  inflation  target  being  jointly  determined  with  the 
government. However, the central bank has drifted away from the 5 % inflation target over 
the last decade and Turkey has been recording double-digit inflation rate since 2017, with an 
accelerating  trend  during  the  reporting  period.  Amid  the  growing  inflationary  pressure  and 
deterioration of macroeconomic imbalances, the  central  bank hiked its policy rate by 1,075 
basis points, from 8.25 % to 19 % between August 2020 and March 2021. After November 
2020, the decisions of the central bank indicated a policy shift, prioritising price stability, a 
simplification of the monetary policy framework and to some extent increased transparency 
in  monetary  policy  operations.  However,  the  unexpected  dismissal  of  the  central  bank 
governor  in  March  2021  again  raised  uncertainty  about  the  course  of  monetary  policy,  and 

90 

 
 
triggered  a  new  episode  of  exchange  rate  depreciation,  a  fall  in  foreign  exchange  reserves, 
a rise  in  inflation  expectations  and  a  spike  in  the  risk  premium,  largely  reversing  the  gains 
made since November 2020. 

The  legislative  changes  introduced  under  the  new  presidential  system  have  increased  the 
powers of the President of the Republic as regards the appointment and dismissal procedures 
of  the  central  bank  governor,  vice-governors  and  members  of  the  Monetary  Policy 
Committee.  The  three  successive  dismissals  of  the  central  bank  governor  in  less  than  two 
years  reflect  growing  political  interference  in  monetary  policy.  These  managerial  changes 
combined  with  the  political  pressure  on  the  central  bank  to  lower  interest  rates  further 
undermine its institutional and operational independence as well as its credibility. According 
to the central bank law, monetary financing of the public sector is prohibited and the public 
sector does not have privileged access to financial institutions. The principles for allocating 
the annual net profit of the central bank were changed in the law, as the obligatory allocation 
of  20  %  of  the  profit  to  the  Reserve  Fund  was  cancelled  and  the  transfer  of  accumulated 
extraordinary reserve funds to  the Treasury without  approval  of the General  Assembly was 
enabled. This was followed by very large transfers of the central bank profit to the Treasury. 

On economic policy, good progress  was made regarding the quality of public finance. The 
2021 budget law was prepared in line with program budgeting. However, further alignment 
with  the  Directive  on  requirements  for  budgetary  frameworks  is  needed,  including  the 
introduction  of  numerical  fiscal  rules  and  the  establishment  of  an  independent  fiscal  body 
that monitors the compliance with these rules. Although Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) 
tables were sent in better quality and coverage, there is still room for improvement in EDP 
and  government  finance  statistics.  Turkey  also  needs  to  improve  the  credibility  of 
macroeconomic  forecasts  and  present  a  more  comprehensive  alternative  macroeconomic 
scenario. 

The 2021-2023 Economic Reform Programme (ERP) was submitted on time. The structural 
reform  priorities  were  better  specified  than  in  previous  years.  However,  further  efforts  are 
needed to improve the quality of these measures in terms of description, timeline, estimated 
impact,  risks  and  performance.  The  policy  guidance  set  out  in  the  conclusions  of  the 
Economic and Financial Dialogue of May 2020 was partially implemented, with the rate of 
implementation improving over previous years.  

Chapter 19: Social Policy and employment  

EU rules in the social field include minimum standards for labour law, equality, health and 
safety at work and non-discrimination. They also promote social dialogue at European level. 

Turkey has  some level  of preparation  in  the area of social policy  and employment.  There 
was  backsliding  during  the  reporting  period.  The  2020  recommendations  were  not 
implemented. In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

  remove  obstacles  limiting  the  enjoyment  of  trade  union  rights  and  use  social  dialogue 

effectively, including for COVID-19 socio-economic recovery measures; 

  improve  the  implementation  of  legislation  pertaining  to  workers’  rights,  notably  labour 

law and health and safety at work;  

  promote  employment  of  women  by  stepping  up  work-life  balance  policies  and  care 
services and develop policy tools for the transition to formal employment in the aftermath 
of the pandemic, including for migrant workers and workers under temporary protection. 

Turkey  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  field  of  labour  law,  but  considerable  gaps  in 

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enforcement  and  implementation  remain.  The  labour  law  does  not  cover  agriculture  and 
forestry  workplaces  with  less  than  50  employees,  neither  domestic  workers,  except  for 
matters  of  health  and  safety  at  work.  A  regulation  on  teleworking  was  published  in  March 
2021,  the  impact  of  which  is  yet  to  be  seen.  In  2020,  the  rate  of  undeclared  work  fell  to 
30.6 %  (2019:  34.5  %),  largely  due  to  the  COVID-19  pandemic.  The  number  of  labour 
inspectors  (2019:  1060)  remained  below  the  benchmarks  set  by  the  International  Labour 
Organisation (ILO). In 2019, the number of inspected workplaces fell by 60 % (7,298; 2018: 
18,952). The legal ban on lay-offs introduced as part of the employment protection measures 
was  extended  until  30  June  2021.  Turkey  continued  the  implementation  of  the  national 
programme  to  eliminate  child  labour,  which  remains  a  serious  issue.  No  official  data  are 
available on the involvement of refugee children in child labour.  

In the field of health and safety at work, Turkey is largely aligned with the EU framework 
directive. However, the obligation for low hazard workplaces with less than 50 employees to 
use occupational safety specialist and workplace doctors was postponed, for the fourth time, 
until  July  2023.  The  national  health  and  safety  at  work  strategy  expired  in  2018,  and  the 
National Health and Safety at Work Council is inactive since 2018. In April 2020 legislation 
was  adopted  to  protect  health  care  professionals  from  violence  and  harassment,  increasing 
penalties  for  perpetrators.  Official  data  indicate  a  drop  in  the  number  of  occupational 
fatalities  from  1  541  in  2018  to  1  147  in  2019.  The  top  risk  sectors  were  construction  and 
transport.  A  very  low  number  (1  091)  of  occupational  diseases  was  reported  to  the  social 
security  institution  in  2019,  pointing  to  underreporting.  COVID-19  increased  health  and 
safety  risks  in  certain  sectors.  According  to  independent  sources,  330  health  workers  lost 
their live at work in 2020 (compared to 27 fatalities in 2019).  

There  was  no  progress  in  social  dialogue.  The  Economic  and  Social  Council  has  not 
convened  since  2009.  The  tripartite  consultative  committee  did  not  convene  either  in  the 
reporting  period.  Some  trade  unions  and  employers’  associations  put  forward  joint 
declarations  regarding  measures  to  be  taken  in  the  context  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic. 
14.4 % of registered private sector employees and 65.4 % of the public servants allowed to 
unionise  are  trade  union  members;  however,  only  7.8  %  of  registered  private  sector 
employees  are  covered  by  collective  agreements.  The  double  thresholds  for  collective 
bargaining  which  exist  at  workplace  and  sector  levels,  and  the  lack  of  right  to  strike  for 
public servants continue to be major deficiencies for the alignment with international labour 
standards  and  the  functioning  of  social  dialogue.  The  list  of  public  institutions  whose 
employees  are  not  allowed  to  unionise  remained  wide  compared  to  ILO  standards.  Police 
crackdowns on various trade union protests, systematic dismissals of workers attempting to 
organise  (despite  the  ban  on  lay-offs),  arrests  and  criminal  prosecutions  of  trade  union 
executive members continued. 

On  employment  policy,  the  labour  market  situation  deteriorated  further.  The  employment 
rate (20-64) continued to drop from 53.8 % in 2019 to 51 % in 2020. decrease from 34.4 % to 
32 % for women and for men from  73.2 % to  70.1 %). The decrease in  the unemployment 
rate (15-74) from 13.7 % in 2019 to 13.2 % in 2020 was likely due to the ban on lay-offs and 
unemployed people withdrawing from the labour force. In fact, the labour force participation 
rate  fell  from  58.4  %  in  2019  to  54.9  %  in  2020(women  from  38.7  %  to  35  %,  men  from 
78.1 %  to  74.6  %).  TURKSTAT  started  to  publish  the  composite  measure  of  labour 
underutilisation rate (15+) which reached 27.4 % in April 2021.  

The  youth  unemployment  rate  (15-24)  remained  almost  unchanged  (2020:  25.1  %,  2019: 
25.2 %), whereas the youth labour participation rate decreased markedly from 44.3 % (2019) 
to 39.0 % (2020) (men from 55.8 % to 50.1 %, women from 32.4 % to  27 %). The rate of 
young people neither in employment nor education or training (NEET) aged 15-29 increased 

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further (2020: 32 %, 2019: 29.5 %). Contrary to previous years, the increase was higher for 
men (from 18.3 % to 21.3 %) than for women (from 40.8 % to 42.8 %).  

The number of job and vocational counsellors in the Turkish Employment Agency (ISKUR) 
remained at the same level (4 781). COVID-19 restrictions led to a significant decrease in the 
number of people benefiting from active labour market programmes or on-the-job-trainings. 
Information on the effectiveness of the programmes is limited. ISKUR started to implement a 
new  counselling  model  targeting  NEETs  registered  in  its  database,  reaching  out  to  around 
175 000 NEETs.  

To  alleviate  the  negative  impact  of  COVID-19  on  the  labour  market,  Turkey  initiated  the 
‘Social  Protection  Shield’  programme.  Application  criteria  for  short-term  work  allowance 
(SWA), equivalent to 60 % of a minimum wage, were eased; by mid-April 2021, more than 
3.7 million employees were granted a SWA, and the scheme was prolonged until the end of 
June  2021.  Under  the  ban  on  lay-offs,  since  April  2020  more  than  2.5  million  employees 
received  a  cash  support  of  half  of  the  net  minimum  salary,  hardly  sufficient  to  make  ends 
meet  without  additional  income  or  savings.  In  August  2020,  the  ‘normalisation  support 
programme’ was launched, which benefitted more than 3 million workers. As of April 2021, 
the total amount of support provided exceeded TRY 51.4 billion. 

Informality continued to undermine the social security system. Moreover, informal workers 
could  not  benefit  from  the  SWA  or  cash  wage  support.  The  specific  situation  of  Syrian 
refugees  and  migrants  may  require  tailor-made  policy  responses.  It  is  estimated  that 
approximately one million Syrian refugees are employed, 95 % informally. The most recent 
available  official  data  indicate  that  by  the  end  of  2019,  slightly  less  than  100  000  work 
permits were granted to Syrian refugees. Roma citizens have been affected disproportionately 
in terms of job and income loss in the COVID-19 crisis. For people with disabilities, Turkey 
needs  to  expand  supported  employment  practices,  besides  promoting  inclusive  workplaces 
and provision of appropriate work equipment (see Chapter 23 – Judiciary and fundamental 
rights). 

Turkey has a good level of preparation for using the European Social Fund. The Ministry of 
Labour  and  Social  Security  continues  to  manage  similar  sectoral  funds  under  IPA 
programmes, covering areas of employment, education, lifelong learning and social inclusion 
(see Chapter 22 - Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments). 

Concerning social inclusion and social protection, Turkey does not have a specific policy 
framework for poverty reduction in place. The regular poverty and inequality measuring does 
not yet capture the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The COVID-19 pandemic and higher 
inflation have worsened the social situation of the population, despite the support measures 
provided by the government. Since there is no universal last-resort minimum income scheme 
in  place,  the  existing  social  assistance  schemes  were  increased  by  relatively  small  one-off 
payments. At-risk-of-poverty-or-social-exclusion rate increased to 33.2 % in 2019 (up from 
32.4 % in 2018 and considerably higher than the EU-27 average of 21.1 %). The at-risk-of 
poverty  rate  reached  22.4  %  in  2019  (EU-27:  16.5  %).  According  to  the  2020  survey  on 
income and living conditions conducted by Turkstat, persistent poverty rate reached 13.7 % 
(2018:12.7  %).  The  severe-material-and-social-deprivation  rate  rose  to  15.9  %  (2018: 
15.4 %). Income inequality remained well above the EU average with a Gini co-efficient of 
0.41.  The  income  quintile  ratio  (P80/P20)  rate  was  8.3  %.  Inequalities  and  poverty  have 
increased further in 2020. 

In  2020,  social  assistance  payments  amounted  to  TRY  69.3  billion  or  1.37  %  of  GDP. 
Quality  social  services  including  care  services  for  elderly  people  need  to  be  enhanced. 
Municipalities also provide social services and assistance at local level, amounting to 11 % of 

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total  social  assistance.  Some  municipal  fundraising  programmes  in  response  to  COVID-19 
were  blocked  by  the  government  in  2020  for  allegedly  political  motivations.  The 
implementation  of  the  National  Roma  Strategy  remained  limited.  Turkey  continued  the 
provision of a wide range of public and social services to almost 4 million refugees, of which 
3.6 million are Syrian nationals placed under the temporary protection regime. These efforts 
are partially funded by the EU.  

Turkey has no integrated strategy or action plan for non-discrimination in employment and 
social policy, and no data are available in this area. Discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
orientation and gender identity is not prohibited by law. Roma remain largely excluded from 
formal  jobs  in  the  absence  of  targeted  policy  measures.  The  hate  speech/negative  attitude 
towards LGBTIQ increased, which may have negative impact on access to employment and 
social protection. Discriminatory legislation and practices against persons with disabilities to 
access employment in certain occupations such as judges, prosecutors are still in place  (see 
Chapter 23 – Judiciary and fundamental rights). 

On equality between women and men in employment and social policy, the gender gap in 
the  labour  market  remains  very  high.  Discriminatory  stereotypes  concerning  roles  and 
responsibilities  of  women  and  men  remain  a  concern.  The  gender  employment  gap  of  38.1 
percentage points in 2020 is the highest among candidate countries and potential candidates. 
The enrolment rate in early childhood education (children aged 3-5) was still low at 41.78 %. 
The  implementation  of  some  programmes  supporting  employment  of  mothers  with  small 
children  continued,  however  the  number  of  beneficiaries  is  marginal.  Representation  of 
women in decision-making positions remained very limited (see Chapter 23 – Judiciary and 
fundamental rights). 

Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy  

EU enterprise and industrial policy strengthens competitiveness, facilitates structural change 
and  encourages  a  business-friendly  environment  that  stimulates  small  and  medium-sized 
firms. 

Turkey  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  area  of  enterprise  and  industrial  policy.  There  was 
backsliding in the reporting period, mainly due to the introduction of measures incompatible 
with  EU  industrial  policy  principles.  Major  challenges  concern  the  compatibility  of 
localisation  and  public  procurement  practices  with  the  EU  industrial  policy  principles,  the 
lack  of  transparency  in  State  aid  for  large  investments,  the  large  informal  economy,  long-
term  financing  needs  of  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  and  the  insufficient  legal 
framework for microfinance. Recommendations of last year’s report were addressed to a very 
limited extent. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

  remove  schemes,  such  as  local  content  requirements  and  public  procurement  price 
premiums, that are incompatible with industrial policy principles and substitute them with 
measures that encourage innovation effectively; 

  publish  the results  of the implementation of the  industry strategy  from  2019 to  2021 as 

well as the amounts distributed under the Industry Support Programme. 

  conduct  an  assessment  study  of  all  SME  support  measures  for  their  impact  and 

identification of gaps and overlaps. 

On enterprise and industrial policy principles, Turkey adopted a comprehensive economic 
reform  package  in  March  2021,  which  contains  measures  for  the  further  digitalisation  of 

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public  and  business  services  for  enterprises,  enhancing  digital  skills  (see  Chapter  10), 
reforming  State  aid  and  similar  incentives,  internationalisation  of  SMEs,  and  the  green 
transformation of industry, including notably the preparation of a circular economy plan (see 
Chapter 27). However, the package also includes measures incompatible with EU industrial 
policy  principles  and  in  some  instances,  with  the  commitments  under  the  Customs  Union, 
such  as  the  strategic  use  of  public  procurement  to  the  advantage  of  domestic  producers, 
purchase  guarantees  for  technology  transfer,  subsidies  for  the  manufacturing  of  key  export 
products and localisation. Turkey maintained the scope of the 15 % domestic price advantage 
in  public  procurement  with  compulsory  use  for  medium  and  high-technology  industrial 
products.  The  percentage  of  international  tenders  where  domestic  price  advantage  applied 
further  increased  in  2020  (see  also  Chapter  5).  Turkey  established  an  Industrialisation 
Executive Board in  October 2020, tasked to  take strategic decisions on public procurement 
and the localisation of supply chains among other issues. Localisation schemes continue to be 
in  place  or  are  planned  in  a  number  of  sectors  like  pharmaceuticals,  medical  devices, 
biotechnological  products  and  agricultural,  and  forestry  tractors.  A  stronger  research  and 
innovation  policy (see Chapter 25) under a more predictable innovation-friendly regulatory 
environment can constitute a more effective and EU-compatible strategic alternative. 

The  results  of  performance  indicators  of  the  Industrial  Strategy  adopted  in  2019  were  not 
published. The informal economy remains a key challenge for Turkey. The implementation 
of  the  Action  Plan  and  Strategy  for  the  fight  against  the  informal  economy  (2019-2021) 
continued with  its focus on repression without addressing underlying business environment 
factors. Results are difficult to assess, since no concrete performance indicators were set and 
no  data  published.  Turkey’s  performance  in  enforcing  contracts  and  resolving  insolvency 
deteriorated in 2020. The Ministry of Industry and Technology established a virtual one-stop-
shop portal for information about investment support per sector in order to facilitate domestic 
and foreign direct investment. 

On  enterprise  and  industrial  policy  instruments,  Turkish  legislation  is  not  yet  fully 
harmonised with the Late Payment Directive. The 11th Development Plan and the Industrial 
Strategy focus on technological transformation of manufacturing. Turkey intends to support 
investment  in  400  product  groups  in  strategically  chosen  sectors  such  as  machinery, 
computer,  electronic,  optics,  electrical  hardware,  pharmaceuticals,  chemistry,  and  transport 
vehicles  under  a  technology-focused  Industry  Support  Programme.  In  the  first  call  of  the 
programme, 10 investment projects were supported with a total volume of EUR 81 million in 
the  machinery  sector.  The  repartition  of  State  aid  for  these  investments  was  not  disclosed, 
contrary  to  the  commitments  under  the  EU-Turkey  Customs  Union.  Turkey  continued  to 
implement  various  schemes  supporting  companies,  particularly  small  and  medium  firms. 
Support  for  innovation  eco-systems  is  fragmented  across  numerous  programmes  with 
regional  concentration  of  beneficiaries,  lacking  a  territorially-balanced  approach.  Smart 
specialisation  strategies  were  formulated  in  some  regions,  but  there  is  limited  information 
about  their  implementation.  During  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  Turkey  used  various  support 
mechanism  for  enterprises  consisting  of  labour-related  schemes  (partial  redundancy,  short 
work,  wage  subsidy),  deferral  measures  (taxes,  social  security  premiums,  utility  bills)  and 
financial  support  through  loan  guarantees,  direct  lending  and  subsidies.  The  assistance  was 
largely dominated by  a  credit impulse, led by state-owned banks. As of  June 2021, limited 
direct  cash  support  was  provided  to  tradesmen,  small  businesses  and  artisans.  The  share  of 
the stimulus package is estimated to be 12 % of GDP and some four fifths came through the 
credit channel. 

Several  technical  assistance  and  financing  schemes  run  by  the  SME  support  administration 
(KOSGEB) were operational. Additional schemes supported companies operating in COVID-

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19-relevant sectors. 87 technology development zones were in place, 73 of them operational. 
Their  transition  to  Green  Organised  Industrial  Zones  could  foster  renewable  energy  and 
circular  economy  innovations.  By  January  2021,  1  277  patents  were  obtained  from  39  940 
completed  projects  (in  comparison  to  1  117  patents  from  33  921  completed  projects  in  the 
previous reporting period). Turkey remained active in the COSME programme, the Erasmus 
for Young Entrepreneurs and the Enterprise Europe Networks).  

Chapter 25: Science and Research  

The  EU  provides  significant  support  for  research  and  innovation.  All  Member  States  can 
benefit  from  the  EU’s  research  programmes,  especially  where  there  is  scientific  excellence 
and solid investment in research. 

Overall,  Turkey’s  preparations  in  the  area  of  science  and  research  are  well  advanced. 
Turkey made some progress during the reporting period. Notably, the implementation of 
the  action  plan  to  boost  the  national  research  and  innovation  capacity  as  well  as  its 
alignment with the European Research Area (ERA) has contributed positively to Turkey’s 
better performance in Horizon 2020. Turkey also started informal association discussions 
for  Horizon  Europe.  Recommendations  of  last  year’s  report  were  addressed  at  good 
extent except for the new National Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy which is 
not completed yet. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

  continue  its  efforts  towards  aligning  its  national  research  area  (TARAL)  with  the 

ERA; 

  finalise the update of the National Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy; 

  assess its Horizon 2020 performance and prepare for Horizon Europe to maximise the 

benefits of EU R&I Framework Programmes. 

On research and innovation policy, the share of the R&D expenditure to GDP increased to 
1.06  %  in  2019  compared  with  1.03  %  in  2018  (EU28  average  was  2.19  %).  The  total 
number  of  full  time  equivalent  R&D  personnel  increased  to  182  847  in  2019  (by  6.2  %) 
compared with 172 119 in 2018. The share of female personnel remained at 32 %. Although 
the  progress  in  figures  continues,  the  gap  between  actual  figures  and  the  EU28  average 
remained  significant.  In  2020,  the  preparations  for  the  new  Science  Technology  and 
Innovation  Strategy  continued  with  the  preparation  of  “Prioritized  R&D  and  Innovation 
(RDI) Fields” document. The strategy should contribute to further impact of RDI outputs for 
more socio-economic benefits. 

In  2020,  the  implementation  of  Turkey’s  action  plan  to  boost  the  national  research  and 
innovation  capacity,  as  well  as  its  alignment  with  the  European  Research  Area  (ERA), 
contributed positively to Turkey’s performance in  Horizon 2020. Turkey’s success  rates in 
2019 and 2020 improved substantially compared to the average of previous years. However, 
the  overall  performance  throughout  the  Horizon  2020  programme  has  been  lower  than 
expected,  compared  to  Turkey’s  R&I  capacity.  Turkey  needs  to  assess  its  performance  in 
Horizon  2020  and  continue  its  actions  to  increase  the  participation  to  the  next  Framework 
Programme, Horizon Europe. 

On  Innovation  Union,  Turkey  dropped  from  a  ‘moderate  innovator’  in  2020  to  ‘emerging 
innovator’ according to the European Innovation Scoreboard for 2021. The country fell from 
74 % to 55 % of the EU average. This strong decline was due to reduced performance on the 

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indicators  using  innovation  survey  data,  enterprises  providing  ICT  training,  job-to-job 
mobility of human resources in science and technology, among others.    

On  Smart  Specialisation,  with  the  support  of  EU  funds  Turkey  started  to  improve  Smart 
Specialisation  Strategy  development,  implementation  and  networking  capacities  at  national 
and  regional  levels.  Five  regions  have  been  registered  in  the  EU  Joint  Research  Centre’s 
Smart Specialisation Platform. 

Turkey took several actions as a response to COVID-19 pandemic. These included launching 
the COVID-19 Turkey Platform that is involved in vaccine and drug development projects, 
specific calls to support research activities on diagnosis and treatment of COVID-19 and to 
analyse the social and economic impacts of COVID-19.  

Chapter 26: Education and culture  

The EU supports cooperation in education and culture through funding programmes and the 
coordination  of  Member  State  policy  through  the  open  method  of  coordination.  Member 
States must also prevent discrimination and ensure quality education for children of migrant 
workers, including those from disadvantaged backgrounds. 

Turkey is moderately prepared on education and culture. There was some progress on this 
chapter, notably regarding the good functioning of the national qualifications system. Turkey 
also  recognises  the  value  of  culture  in  development  policies  and  encourages  the  promotion 
and  protection  of  its  cultural  heritage.  Last  year’s  recommendations  were  only  partially 
implemented and remain valid. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

  further  improve  inclusive  education,  with  a  particular  focus  on  girls  and  children  from 
disadvantaged groups and closely monitor and continue work to reduce the proportion of 
school drop-outs; 

  further ensure the good functioning of the Turkish Qualifications Framework and Turkish 

Higher Education Quality Council; 

  take  concrete  steps  to  implement  the  2005  UNESCO  Convention  on  the  Protection  and 

Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. 

As  regards  education,  access  to  early  childhood  education  (ECE)  in  Turkey  varies  by  age 
group  and  region.  While  the  net  enrolment  rate  for  pre-school  education  (age  5)  further 
increased from 68.3 % to 71.2 % during the 2019-2020 school year (70.4 % for girls, 72 % 
for  boys),  the  combined  net  enrolment  rate  for  children  in  Turkey  aged  between  3  and  5 
remains  low  at  only  41.8  %.  Flexible  and  community-based  ECE  models  need  to  be 
implemented,  guided  by  clear  targets  and  strategies,  which  cover  vulnerable  children.  The 
overall quality of ECE services requires improvement. 

The net enrolment rate in primary schools grew slightly from 92.1 % to 93.6 %, with 93.5 % 
for girls and 93.7 % for boys. In lower secondary school, the net enrolment rate grew from 
93.3 % to 95.9 %, with a rate of 96.1 % for girls and 95.7 % for boys. In upper secondary 
education net enrolment increased from 84.2 % to 85.0 % (84.9 % for girls, 85.2 % for boys). 
In  higher  education,  the  net  enrolment  rate  decreased  from  44.1  %  to  43.4  %  (46.3  %  for 
girls, 40.6 % for boys). 

Both  the  number  and  the  rate  of  students  in  special  education  (students  with  special  needs 
who are in regular classes) increased slightly in  2020, from 398 815 in 2019 to 425 774 in 
2020,  which  represents  an  increase  from  1.65  %  to  1.74  %.  However,  there  is  a  large 

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disparity  between  number  of  girls  and  boys  with  special  needs  in  education  (269,897  male 
versus 155,877 female students).  

Turkey has been participating in the EU education programmes since 2004. Applications for 
the Erasmus+ programme further increased from 12 467 in 2019 to 13 079 in 2020, showing 
a  continuous  high  interest  of  Turkish  education  stakeholders  in  the  programme.  1  497  new 
projects  were  finally  contracted  in  2020  for  an  amount  of  EUR  124  million.  In  addition, 
applications for the European Solidarity Corps (ESC) programme increased from 349 in 2019 
to 896 in 2020; EU support was awarded to 269 projects for an amount of EUR 6.12 million 
(181 volunteering projects and 88 solidarity projects) involving more than 2 000 participants. 
To  mitigate  the  negative  effects  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic  on  both  beneficiaries  and 
implemented  measures 
potential  beneficiaries  of  Erasmus+  and 
recommended by the European Commission. 

the  ESC,  Turkey 

Turkey  is  at  an  advanced  stage  of  implementing  the  Bologna  process,  although  significant 
quality  differences  persist  among  Turkey's  207  higher  education 
institutions.  The 
reorganisation  of  the  Turkish  Higher  Education  Quality  Council  (THEQC),  the  national 
authority  evaluating  Turkish  higher  education  institutions,  led  to  greater  administrative  and 
financial independence. THEQC became a member of the European Association for Quality 
Assurance in Higher Education (ENQA) in April 2020.  

THEQC added an institutional accreditation programme to its quality assurance activities in 
2020.  In  order  to  guarantee  its  effectiveness,  relevant  higher  education  regulation  and 
procedures need to be further adapted to THEQC regulations. Furthermore, THEQC should 
aim  to  further  increase  the  size  of  permanent  staff  in  order  to  strengthen  its  operational 
independence. 

Implementation  of  a  national  vocational  qualifications  system  by 
the  Vocational 
Qualifications  Authority  (VQA)  is  ongoing.  VQA,  the  competent  authority  for  preparing 
national  occupational  standards  and  national  qualifications  and  for  authorising  certification 
bodies, is also in charge of implementing the Turkish Qualifications Framework (TQF). 

As  of  June  2021,  the  number  of  occupational  standards  and  qualifications  approved  by  the 
VQA increased satisfactorily for the functional implementation of the Turkish Qualification 
Framework;  however,  the  number  of  vocational  qualifications  certificates  still  needs  to  be 
increased  substantially.  Studies  regarding  the  full  implementation  of  TQF  continued  under 
the  coordination  of  the  VQA.  Private  education  certificates  were  integrated  within  the 
framework of VQA certificates. 

Although  the  European  Qualifications  Framework  is  referenced  within  the  TQF,  Turkey 
needs to  ensure that principles  and procedures relating to  quality assurance, credit systems, 
inclusion  of  qualifications,  and  validation  of  non-formal  and  informal  learning  are  fully  in 
place.  In  the  formal  vocational  education  and  training  sector,  implementing  the  modular 
curricula and credited module system, instead of the current class passing system, remains an 
important issue for the effective implementation of the TQF. 

As for culture, the Strategic Plan for 2019-2023 continued to be implemented. The strategy 
aims  to  develop  Turkey's  cultural  richness  and  diversity,  support  Turkey’s  transformation 
into an information society, facilitate access to culture and arts, increase the contribution of 
cultural industries to national income and strengthen intercultural interaction through cultural 
diplomacy.  The  strategy  also  underlines  the  need  for  increased  cooperation  with  local 
governments, private and civil initiatives with the overall decision-making power resting with 
the  Ministry  of  Culture  and  Tourism  (MoCT).  Cultural  non-governmental  organisations 
continued  their  efforts  to  strengthen  civic  participation  in  policy  making  and  strategy 

98 

 
 
formulation. 

The General Directorate of Copyrights of the MoCT is responsible for the coordination and 
implementation  of  the  2005  UNESCO  Convention  on  the  Protection  and  Promotion  of  the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions. Concrete action for the implementation of the Convention 
is yet to be taken.  

The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the vulnerability of the cultural sector. Public authorities 
offered  support,  but  the  measures  did  not  represent  a  sufficient  and  permanent  response. 
Without the necessary support and financial resources to keep them alive during the periods 
of lockdown, several theatre companies and galleries had to permanently close.  

Local authorities have the power to cancel artistic and cultural events. In November 2020, the 
Malatya  International  Film  Festival  was  cancelled  by  the  metropolitan  municipality  of 
Malatya.  The  cancellation  followed  the  announcement  of  the  festival  committee  that  a 
gender-neutral  “Best  Performance”  award  would  be  given  instead  of  “Best  Actor  and 
Actress”  awards.  In  a  written  statement  by  the  municipality,  it  was  stated  that  the  decision 
manifested  an  approach  incompatible  with  local  values.  The  Kurdish  theatre  play  Bêrû 
(“Faceless”  by  Dario  Fo)  was  banned  in  October  2020  on  grounds  of  disturbing  general 
public order and close links to the PKK (see Chapter 23 - Judiciary and fundamental rights). 

On youth and sport, Turkey has a relatively young yet ageing population and its median age 
is 32.6 (EU median age: 44). 13 million Turkish citizens are aged between 15 and 24. 

Turkey  is  among  the  top  beneficiaries  of  the  European  Solidarity  Corps  (ESC)  EU 
Programme, targeting youth. The Government expressed interest in renewing participation in 
the  ESC  in  the  2021-2027  period.  Between  2014  and  2020,  under  Erasmus+,  2  320  youth 
mobility and volunteering projects piloted by Turkish organisations were selected for a global 
amount of EUR 51.1 million. In 2020, there were 283 selected youth projects for an amount 
of EUR 9.5 million. 

Voluntary work continued to be promoted both officially and through civil initiatives. Turkey 
continued to take part in the European Sports Week initiative. 

Channels of youth participation in decision making processes, however, remained limited or 
ineffective.  Government  efforts  are  underway  to  establish  a  national  youth  council. 
Meanwhile,  there  is  already  an  independent  national  youth  council,  granted  an  observer 
member  status  by  the  European  Youth  Forum  in  2019,  yet  not  recognised  by  the 
Government.  

Chapter 29: Customs union  

All Member States are part of the EU customs union and follow the same customs rules and 
procedures.  This  requires  legislative  alignment,  adequate  implementing  and  enforcement 
capacity, and access to the common computerised customs systems. 

Turkey  maintains  a  good  level  of  preparation  for  the  customs  union.  There  was  limited 
progress in the reporting period. Turkey continued to apply additional duties on imports of 
a large number of products originating in third countries, which are in free circulation in the 
EU, or imported from third countries, in violation of the basic provisions of the EU-Turkey 
Customs Union. Duty relief, free zones  and surveillance measures remain not  fully  aligned 
with  the  EU  acquis.  This  is  not  compatible  with  Turkey’s  obligations  under  the  Customs 
Union either. The recommendations from last year were implemented to a limited degree. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

99 

 
 
  step up efforts to fully align new legislation with the EU Customs Code;  

  bring risk-based controls and simplified procedures in line with the EU acquis; 

  fully eliminate import and export restrictions hampering the effective free movement of 

goods. 

  withdraw additional duties on imported products and fully align its import duties with the 

EU’s Common Customs Tariffs. 

There  was  limited  progress  in  the  area  of  customs  legislation.  Turkey  amended  part  of  its 
legislation to remove the requirement for a certificate of origin for goods in free circulation in 
the  EU,  except  for  implementation  of  specific  trade  defence  measures.  However,  Turkey’s 
legislation remained contradictory in this area and implementation still remained ambiguous, 
which  led  the  customs  administration  to  provide  successive  clarifications.  Also,  Turkish 
customs law is yet to be harmonised with the EU Customs Code and more efforts are needed 
to  improve  risk-based  controls  and  simplified  procedures  with  a  view  to  facilitating 
legitimate trade, while ensuring security and safety. The designation of specialised customs 
offices is contrary to the provisions of the Customs Union. Rules on surveillance, free zones 
and duty relief are yet to be aligned with the EU acquis. Turkey maintained additional duties 
applied on imports of a large number of products originating in third countries, which are in 
free  circulation  in  the  EU  or  imported  from  third  countries.  It  also  maintained  export 
restrictions  on  copper  scrap  and  the  restriction  on  certain  leather  products.  These  measures 
are  in  breach  of  the  Customs  Union  rules,  as  reported  last  year.  Turkey  continued  to 
unilaterally  apply  disproportionally  high  duties  on  imports  of  sweet  corn  in  contradiction 
with Customs Union rules. 

On  administrative  and  operational  capacity,  efforts  to  strengthen  customs  enforcement 
capacity  for  border  controls  continued.  Further  alignment  is  required  to  improve  customs 
enforcement of intellectual property rights. Risk-based controls to enforce safety and security 
measures  need  to  be  significantly  improved.  Turkey  implements  the  computerised  transit 
system  as  part  of  its  membership  of  the  Convention  on  a  Common  Transit  Procedure. 
However,  tariff  IT  systems  are  not  yet  in  place.  The  IT  strategy  in  line  with  business 
initiatives  still  needs  to  be  implemented  and  the  documented  customs  business  processes 
aligned to the legal basis need to be kept up-to-date. 

CLUSTER 4: THE GREEN AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE CONNECTIVITY  

This  cluster  covers:  transport  policy  (Chapter  14),  energy  (Chapter  15),  trans-European 
networks (Chapter 21) and environment and climate change (Chapter 27).  

Turkey  is  moderately  prepared  in  transport  policy.  It  made  limited  progress  in  the 
reporting period, notably linked to the adoption of the road safety strategy and the update of 
the intelligent transport system strategy. On energy, while Turkey is  moderately prepared, 
it needs to further work on the gas market liberalisation and develop cooperation on nuclear 
safety and security. Turkey has made some progress on energy and transport networks, with 
the  construction  of  the  Halkali-Kapikule  railway  line  connecting  the  Bulgarian  border  to 
Istanbul continuing.  

Turkey  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  environment  and  climate  change,  and 
faces  critical  environmental  and  climate  challenges,  both  as  regards  mitigation  and 
adaptation.  It  made  some  progress,  including  the  ratification  of  the  Paris  Agreement  on 
climate change and increasing capacity in  waste management, wastewater treatment and on 
legislative  alignment,  but  enforcement  and  implementation  remain  weak.  Turkey  needs  to 

100 

 
 
follow up with  an  enhanced nationally determined contribution  under the Paris Agreement, 
long-term  strategic  decarbonisation  and  adaptation  plans  and  appropriate  legislation 
reflecting them domestically.  

Chapter 14: Transport policy  

The EU has common rules for technical and safety standards, security, social standards, and 
market  liberalisation  in  road  transport,  railways,  inland  waterways,  combined  transport, 
aviation and maritime transport. 

Turkey  is  moderately  prepared  in  transport  policy.  Limited  progress  was  made  in  the 
reporting  period.  Last  year’s  recommendations  were  addressed  partially:  Turkey  adopted  a 
road  safety  strategy  and  an  action  plan  covering  2021-2030  period  as  well  as  the  updated 
intelligent transport system (ITS) strategy and the corresponding action plan until 2023.  

In the coming year Turkey should in particular: 

  prepare  a  new  transport  strategy  covering  all  modes  of  transport  in  line  with  the 
Commission’s Sustainable and Smart  Mobility Strategy to  establish concrete targets  for 
substantial mitigation from transport sector emissions until 2030 and 2050; 

  adopt its new railways sector reform and phase out the subsidies to the incumbent railway 

operator; 

  consider  the  European  Intelligent  Transport  Systems  (ITS)  Framework  Architecture  as 

the overarching ITS architecture especially in the urban areas. 

As regards the EU acquis on general transport, the Turkish transport legislation is not fully 
aligned  with  the  acquis.  Turkey  is  still  not  aligned  with  the  Clean  Power  for  Transport 
package.  Urban  mobility  requires  a  more  comprehensive  policy  framework  and  a  clear 
institutional set up between central and local authorities. 

On  road  transport,  the  legal  framework  is  at  a  good  level  of  preparation  regarding  the 
alignment  with  the  EU  acquis.  Some  progress  was  made  in  the  reporting  period.  Turkey 
adopted  its  Road  Safety  Strategy  and  Action  plan  in  line  with  the  Stockholm  Declaration 
2020  and  the  EU  Road  Safety  Policy  Framework  2021-2030.  The  Ministry  of  Interior  was 
appointed  as  the  Road  Traffic  Safety  Lead  Agency.  Turkey  adopted  a  new  Intelligent 
Transport  System  (ITS)  Strategy  which  also  foresees  the  adoption  of  a  structured  legal 
framework to reach safe, smart and sustainable mobility. Turkey cooperated effectively under 
the EU’s Green Lanes initiative, during the COVID-19 pandemic Turkey is expected to align 
with  the  revisions  of  road  transport  acquis  regarding  the  First  Mobility  Package  as  these 
concern  driving  and  rest  periods,  positioning  by  means  of  the  tachograph,  access  to  the 
occupation of road transport operator and the international haulage market, as well as posting 
drivers in the road transport sector. 

Turkey is moderately prepared in the field of rail transport. Some progress was made during 
the  reporting  period.  The  institutional  setup  of  the  Turkish  railways  (TCDD)  still  does  not 
provide  for  effective  independence  neither  of  the  railway  operator  from  the  infrastructure 
manager,  nor  of  the  railway  regulator  from  the  Ministry  of  Transport  and  Infrastructure.  A 
new railway sector reform is needed and a new comprehensive railway framework law needs 
to be adopted. Regulation on railway interoperability is still in its final stage of preparation. 
Subsidies to the incumbent railway operator, continued to hamper the railway liberalisation 
process.  

Turkey  achieved  a  good  level  of  preparation  in  aligning  with  the  EU  acquis  in  the  field  of 
maritime transport. Limited progress was made during the reporting period. The maritime 

101 

 
 
single  window  established  in  2019  should  be  streamlined  with  the  acquis.  The  Directorate 
General  of  Maritime  Affairs  in  cooperation  with  the  European  Maritime  Safety  Agency 
organised  training  on  Marpol  Annex  VI,  ballast  water  management,  and  marine  pollution. 
Turkey should align with the new acquis on extensive application of the once-only principle 
on port reception facilities for the delivery of waste from ships. 

Turkey has limited inland waterways and it has not signed the main international agreements 
on this issue. Turkey has not yet aligned with the relevant EU legislation on inland waterway.  

While Turkey is moderately prepared in the field of aviation, there was no progress during 
the  reporting  period.  Further  efforts  are  needed  to  align  Turkish  regulations  with  the  EU, 
particularly  in  air  traffic  management  and  aviation  safety.  The  Commission’s  mandate  for 
negotiations  on  a  comprehensive  air  transport  agreement  expired  without  reaching  a  result 
and  no  progress  was  made  on  the  working  arrangements  between  the  Turkish  Directorate-
General  for  Civil  Aviation  and  the  European  Union  Aviation  Safety  Agency  (EASA). 
Moreover, the lack of adequate communication between air traffic control centres in Turkey 
and  Cyprus  continued  to  compromise  air  safety  in  the  Nicosia  flight  information  region, 
requiring an operational solution. 

There  was  limited  progress  on  combined  transport.  In  April  2021,  the  concept  of  ‘green 
logistics  /  transporter’  was  added  to  the  scope  of  the  draft  legislation  on  combined  freight 
transport.  

As long as restrictions remain in place on vessels and aircrafts registered in Cyprus, related to 
Cyprus,  or  whose  last  port  of  call  was  Cyprus,  Turkey  will  not  be  in  a  position  to  fully 
implement the EU acquis relating to this chapter. 

Chapter 15: Energy  

EU  energy  policy  covers  security  of  supply,  the  internal  energy  market,  hydrocarbons, 
renewable energy, energy efficiency, nuclear energy, nuclear safety and radiation protection. 

Turkey  is  moderately  prepared  in  this  chapter.  Overall,  limited  progress  was  made  with 
Turkey continuing to develop its regulatory framework on nuclear energy, despite structural 
and  staffing  issues  at  the  new  regulatory  body.  The  good  progress  on  security  of  supply 
continued. The 2020 recommendations were addressed to some extent. 

On hydrocarbons, Turkey stopped illegal drilling activities in the maritime zones  of Cyprus 
and the tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean decreased in the beginning of 2021. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

  deepen natural gas market reform by setting up a legally binding plan and a timetable for 
the  unbundling  of  activities  and  establishing  transparent,  cost-reflective  and  non-
discriminatory pricing in the gas sector. It should also update the natural gas market law 
to ensure compatibility with the EU's Third Energy Package; 

  adopt  legislation  in  line  with  the  Euratom  acquis,  clarifying  structural,  staffing  and 
coordination  issues  in  nuclear  energy  regulation  and  guarantee  the  independence  of  the 
newly established nuclear energy regulator; to complete legislative alignment in nuclear 
safety and stress tests on the Akkuyu nuclear power plant; 

  engage to discontinue local content requirement practices in the renewable energy sector, 

as such practices contradict WTO and EU-Turkey Customs Union rules. 

The  good  progress  on  security  of  supply  continued,  thanks  to  the  now  operational  Trans-
Anatolian  Pipeline  (TANAP)  transmitting  gas  to  the  European  section  of  the  Southern  Gas 

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Corridor (SGC). The gas flow to Europe started on 1 January 2021 with the completion of the 
Trans  Adriatic  Pipeline  (TAP).  The  construction  of  Turkey's  third  Floating  Storage 
Regasification  Unit  (FSRU)  LNG  terminal,  operated  by  BOTAŞ,  on  the  Aegean  coast  was 
completed. The Turkstream pipeline, linking Russia to Turkey, became fully operational and 
started to deliver gas to several southern EU Member states markets. 

On  the  internal  energy  market,  limited  progress  was  made  on  transparent,  cost-reflective 
and non-discriminatory pricing mechanisms for electricity and gas. The vertically integrated 
BOTAŞ  continued  to  enjoy  dominant  market  position.  This  affects  the  true  viability  of  the 
recently established Energy Exchange Istanbul (EXIST), where a market of derivatives was 
launched in 2021. This should provide more depth and liquidity to the market. 

The  natural  gas  market  law  update  is  long  overdue.  The  lack  of  progress  on  Turkey’s  gas 
market liberalisation is linked to, among others, the lack of transparency around the pending 
renegotiation of some of the country’s long-term natural gas supply contracts with Russia.  

In 2020, Turkey's spot LNG imports increased markedly. The spot volumes from Qatar grew 
by  32.1  %,  compared  to  last  year,  to  3.2  bcm.  Spot  LNG  imported  from  the  United  States 
reached 3 bcm, which is an increase of 144 % in comparison to last year. Turkey imported 
LNG also from Norway, France, Spain and Cameroon. 

On hydrocarbons, Turkey is at an advanced stage of alignment with the EU legislation but it 
has  to  further  align  with  Directive  2013/30/EU  on  the  Safety  of  Offshore  Oil  and  Gas 
Operations, also as regards transit of hydrocarbons. Due to continued and new unauthorised 
Turkish  hydrocarbon  exploration  activities  in  the  maritime  zones  of  Cyprus  and  Greece, 
tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean Sea increased in the second half of 2020. 
In  November  2020,  the  Council  extended  the  duration  of  the  existing  framework  for 
restrictive  measures.  Turkey  stopped  illegal  drilling  activities  in  the  maritime  zones  of 
Cyprus and the tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean decreased in the beginning of 2021. 

Following  a strategy of  maximising the use of domestic and renewable energy sources, in 
2020, the share of the country’s renewable energy in the electricity generation reached 44 %, 
most  of  which  came  from  hydropower  (29  %  percent).  The  ratio  of  renewable  energy 
installations in the total installed power generation capacity increased from 45 % last year to 
51 % in 2020. 

The  growth  in  Turkey’s  installed  renewable  energy  capacity  was  driven  mainly  by  private 
investments  benefitting from a preferential  USD-based feed-in-tariff, expiring in mid-2021. 
The extension of that support mechanism was announced in January 2021. Like before, a new 
financial support scheme entered into force in June 2021 (right after the current one expires) 
and facilities commissioned until  December 2025 will benefit from  it for the next  10  years 
that follow. Contrary to the previous scheme, the new one is based on the Turkish Lira. The 
new scheme continues the additional financial incentives for the use of domestic equipment 
in renewable energy installations initially by 5 years, until 2026. That extension of the Local 
Content Requirement (LCR) practices in Turkey continues to raise concerns. LCR practices, 
applied  especially  in  state-defined  Renewable  Energy  Zones,  contradict  WTO  and  the  EU-
Turkey  Customs  Union  rules  and  affect  the  EU’s  and  other  international  companies’ 
competitiveness on the Turkish energy market. 

There was some progress in the implementation of adopted legislation on energy efficiency. 
The  National  Energy  Efficiency  Action  Plan  (NEEAP)  of  2018  reflects  Turkey's  efforts  to 
achieve the objectives set out in the country's Energy Efficiency Strategy, on a year-by-year 
basis  towards  2023.  There  is  insufficient  clarity  on  policy  continuation  and  sustainability 
beyond that timeline. The national energy efficiency financing mechanism, envisaged under 

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the  NEEAP,  is  still  not  in  place,  despite  the  EU’s  recommendation  on  its  timely  adoption. 
National  financing  mechanism  for  energy  efficiency  was  not  established.  Procedures  and 
principles  regarding  Energy  Performance  Contracts  in  the  public  sector  were  published  in 
August 2020.  

On nuclear energy, nuclear safety and radiation protection, Turkey continued to develop 
its  regulatory  framework  despite  structural  and  staffing  issues  at  the  new  regulatory  body. 
Regulations  on  Management  of  Radiological  Emergencies,  on  Nuclear  Security  of  Nuclear 
Facilities  and  Nuclear  Materials,  on  Safeguards,  on  Nuclear  Export  Control,  on 
Environmental  Reinstatement  Activities  of  Areas  Exposed  to  Radioactive  Pollution  and  on 
Administrative Sanctions of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority were adopted. In March 2021, 
the country’s Constitutional Court annulled the 2018 Law by which the Nuclear Regulatory 
Authority (NDK) was established; to avoid a legal vacuum, the Court gave a transition period 
of  one  year  for  the  nuclear  regulatory  body  to  continue  its  activities  and  requested  the 
Government to prepare a new legislation which should enter into force no later than March 
2022. 

The  Turkish  Energy,  Nuclear  and  Mineral  Research  Authority  (TENMAK),  responsible, 
among  others,  for  radioactive  waste  management  and  disposal,  research  and  training 
activities in the nuclear energy sector, succeeded the older Turkish Atomic Energy Authority 
(TAEK). The transition  of qualified personnel  and functions between the two authorities in 
the nuclear energy sector has happened with little transparency.  

Regarding the Akkuyu nuclear power plant and following Turkey’s voluntary commitment of 
2011 to conduct stress tests using the EU model, an agreement between the Commission and 
the  Turkish  nuclear  regulatory  authority  has  been  reached  to  move  from  the  previously 
envisaged two-phase approach to  a more streamlined, single-phase approach. The next  step 
will  be  the  organisation  of  a  transparent  peer  review  of  Turkey’s  National  Report  by  the 
Commission  and  the  European  Nuclear  Safety  Regulators  Group,  in  which  Turkey 
participates as an Observer. 

Turkey still needs to accede to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management 
and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management; and become a member of the European 
Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange system. 

Chapter 21: Trans-European networks 

The  EU  promotes  trans-European  networks  in  the  areas  of  transport  and  energy  to 
strengthen the internal market and contribute to growth and employment. 

Turkey  is  well  advanced  on  trans-European  networks.  There  is  some  progress  on  energy 
networks, thanks to the now operational Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) transmitting gas 
to  the European section of the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC)  as  well on transport networks 
given  that  the  construction  of  the  Halkali-Kapikule  railway  line  connecting  the  Bulgarian 
border to Istanbul continued. Last year’s recommendations were only partially addressed. 

In addition to addressing the shortcomings set out below, in the coming year Turkey should 
in particular: 

  accelerate  efforts  to  align  with  key  pieces  of  the  EU  acquis  to  facilitate  alignment  in 

TEN-T networks; 

  establish  a  transparent,  cost-reflective  and  non-discriminatory  gas  transit  regime  in  line 

with the EU acquis; 

  accelerate efforts for the preparations of the third bridge railway connections. 

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As  regards  energy  networks,  there  was  some  progress  on  energy  networks,  thanks  to  the 
now operational Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) transmitting gas to the European section 
of  the  Southern  Gas  Corridor  (SGC).  As  regards  gas  networks  and  Transmission  System 
Operator  (TSO)  cooperation,  the  membership  of  Turkey’s  National  Petroleum  Corporation 
(BOTAŞ) to the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSO-G) 
is  not  foreseen.  The  state-owned  BOTAŞ  remained  vertically  integrated  and  dominant  on 
Turkey’s  gas  market  with  its  trading  and  grid  operator  functions,  which  stifles  market 
competition. The natural gas market law update is long overdue. Limited progress was made 
on establishing a transparent, cost-reflective and non-discriminatory pricing in the gas sector. 
(See Chapter 15 - Energy). Although the Turkish electricity Transmission System Operator's 
(TEIAŞ) observer membership of the European Network of Transmission System Operators 
for  Electricity  (ENTSO-E)  was  not  renewed,  TEIAŞ  continues  to  be  present  in  technical 
discussions of relevant working groups.  

As  regards  electricity  networks,  the  modernising  and  upgrading  of  the  Turkish  electricity 
network  in  line  with  the  ENTSO-E  standards  continued.  An  important  challenge  for  the 
Turkish electricity system will be to provide for a secure integration of increased amounts of 
renewable energy. In terms of interconnections with Europe, Turkey can import 650 MW of 
electricity and export 500 MW through its existing lines with Bulgaria and Greece. Technical 
studies  for  expansion  of  these  lines  and  a  new  interconnection  with  Romania  through  the 
Bulgarian system are ongoing. 

As regards transport networks, Turkey continued to regularly encode TEN-T network data 
to  the  transport  information  management  systems  (TIMS).  38  %  of  the  Halkali-Kapikule 
railway  line  project  has  been  completed  despite  the  COVID-19  pandemic  context.  The 
railway monitoring board was established and the first meeting was held in September 2020. 
Turkey needs to accelerate the work towards preparation and financing of the third Istanbul 
bridge  connections,  as  this  is  a  condition  in  the  financing  agreement  with  the  EU.  The 
remaining  land  acquisition  and  the  interface  of  the  Canal  Istanbul  project  with  the 
development of these railway projects continue to be a source of concern. 

Chapter 27: Environment and climate change 

The  EU  promotes  strong  climate  action,  sustainable  development  and  protection  of  the 
environment. EU law contains provisions addressing climate change, water and air quality, 
waste  management,  nature  protection,  industrial  pollution,  chemicals,  noise  and  civil 
protection. 

Turkey  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  this  area,  and  faces  critical  environmental  and 
climate  challenges,  both  as  regards  mitigation  and  adaptation.  There  was  some  progress, 
including in relation to the ratification of the Paris Agreement by the Turkish Parliament and 
thereby  addressing  an  important  recommendation  from  last  year.  In  the  field  of  climate, 
Turkey  needs  to  follow  up  with  an  enhanced  nationally  determined  contribution  under  the 
Paris  Agreement,  long-term  strategic  decarbonisation  and  adaptation  plans  and  appropriate 
legislation  reflecting  them  domestically.  Positive  developments  were  noted  on  increasing 
capacity in waste management and wastewater treatment as well as legislative alignment, but 
implementation  remain  weak.  Last’  year  recommendations  were 
enforcement  and 
implemented only partially and remain mostly valid. More ambitious and better coordinated 
environment  and  climate  policies  need  to  be  established  and  implemented.  Strategic 
planning, substantial investment and stronger administrative capacity are required as well. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

  complete  alignment  with  the  directives  on  waste,  water  and  industrial  pollution,  and 

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ensure that the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive is correctly implemented; 

  ensure  alignment with  the EU  acquis  and actual  implementation  on public participation 

and the right to access environmental information; 

  Enhance and  implement  its contribution  to the  Paris  Agreement on climate change, and 

complete its alignment with the EU acquis on climate action. 

Environment 

Turkey has achieved some level of preparation in the area of horizontal legislation. Turkey 
has an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) legislation which is mostly aligned with the 
EU EIA Directive. However procedures for transboundary consultations are not aligned with 
the  EIA  and  the  Strategic  Environmental  Assessments  (SEA)  Directives.  Regarding  the 
implementation  of  the  EIA  legislation,  there  are  remaining  concerns  about  the  non-
application  or  politicisation  of  court  decisions  in  controversial  projects  with  high 
environmental impacts and the respect of the right to environmental information. The public 
concerns on the Canal İstanbul Project - an artificial sea-level waterway connecting the Black 
Sea  and  the  Sea  of  Marmara  -  led  to  several  court  cases  against  the  EIA  approval. 
A comprehensive  impact  analysis  is  still  required  for  this  major  project  as  well  as  the 
initiation of transboundary consultations with the riparian EU Member States and other states 
of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. Turkey is still not party to the Aarhus and Espoo 
Conventions.  Turkey  has  aligned  with  the  SEA  Directive  in  some  sectors,  while  gradual 
implementation  for  different  sectors  was  ongoing.  Alignment  on  environmental  liability 
remains limited. Turkey revised its By-law on Environmental Inspections in June 2021. The 
National Environment Agency was established in December 2020 and is expected to become 
operational by 2022. 

Turkey  is  part  of  the  EU  sea  basin  strategy  Common  Maritime  Agenda  for  the  Black  Sea 
(CMA) endorsed by Ministerial declaration in May 2019. The CMA is a regional cooperation 
framework to support sustainable blue economy in the Black Sea whose goal is to focus on 
healthy marine and coastal ecosystems.  

On  air  quality,  national  legislation  still  needs  to  be  adopted  in  line  with  EU  directives  on 
ambient  air  quality  and  national  emissions  ceilings.  Severe  air  pollution  in  some  cities  is 
reported on an annual basis. A national strategy for air quality monitoring is in place and all 8 
planned  regional  networks  are  established  and  operational.  The  Stage  II  Petrol  vapour 
recovery legislation is in place for new installations and a phased implementation approach is 
adopted for existing installations.  

The  legal  framework  on  waste  management  is  partially  aligned  with  the  new  EU  acquis. 
Turkey adopted a strategy promoting a zero waste management approach, the efficient use of 
natural resources, landfilling reduction and increased recycling and reuse. In December 2020, 
Turkey introduced a ban on import of mixed plastics as of 2021, but did not ratify the Basel 
Convention 2019 Amendment. The legislation on zero waste adopted in July 2019 continued 
to  be  implemented.  The  Ministry  is  the  main  responsible  institution  for waste  management 
policy making. Turkey deferred its plans to introduce the deposit system from 2021 to 2022. 
Alignment  and  capacity  for  sorting,  recycling  and  medical  waste  treatment  continued. 
Significant efforts are necessary to implement waste management plans at local and regional 
level.  Legislation  on  ship  recycling  which  would  mirror  the  requirements  of  the  EU  Ship 
Recycling  Regulation  was  not  adopted.  There  are  concerns  regarding  safety,  sound  waste 
management and environmental hazards in the ship recycling facilities registered in the EU 
list of ship recycling facilities. In the meantime, the current notification procedure practices 
are in line with the Basel Convention. 

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In the  area of  water quality, the legislative alignment is  advanced but  implementation and 
enforcement should be improved. Transboundary consultations on water issues are still at an 
early  stage.  Turkey  did  not  align  yet  with  the  revised  EU  Directive  on  Drinking  Water. 
Wastewater treatment capacity increased as a result of continuous investments and with the 
establishment  of  1,134  waste  water  treatment  plants  in  the  country,  reached  a  coverage  of 
87 % of the municipal population. Turkey aims to reach 100 % by 2023. Turkey still needs to 
align with the EU Marine Strategy. 

Turkey  has  some  level  of  preparation  on  nature  protection.  No  progress  was  made  on 
adopting  the  framework  legislation,  the  national  biodiversity  strategy  and  an  action  plan. 
Planning and construction in wetlands, forests and natural sites are still not in line with the 
EU  acquis.  The  institutional  framework  for  managing  future  Natura  2000  sites  needs  to  be 
streamlined and adequately resourced. The review of the status of protected areas continued 
over  2020  in  a  non-transparent  and  non-participatory  manner  resulting  in  the  changes  in 
status and boundaries of a number of potential Natura 2000 areas. 

In industrial pollution and risk management, alignment with the EU acquis is at an early 
stage. Turkey still needs to align with the Industrial Emissions Directive, European Pollutant 
Release and Transfer Register (E-PRTR) legislation, the eco-management and audit scheme, 
solvents and the Paints Directive. 

On chemicals, the overall level of legislative alignment is advanced but implementation and 
enforcement remained weak. Turkey is only partly aligned with the European Regulation on 
Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH). Registration 
process  started  in  January  2021  via  the  Chemicals  Registration  System  (CRS)  with  a 
transitional period of enforcement from 2021 until 2023. Turkey adopted legislation aiming 
at the alignment with the latest EU Directive on Persistent Organic Pollutants in March 2021.  

Alignment  with  legislation  on  noise  is  well  advanced  but  implementation  and  enforcement 
need to be improved. Noise mapping and local noise action plans were not finalised.  

On  civil  protection,  Turkey’s  collaboration  under  the  EU  Civil  Protection  Mechanism 
(UCPM)  increased  in  2020,  both  in  registering  capacities  to  the  European  Civil  Protection 
Pool and offering assistance under the UCPM during emergencies. Turkey also showed more 
interest in obtaining support under the UCPM. Turkey submitted the country’s national risk 
assessment report. It still has to submit the summary of the assessment of risk management 
capability and information on priority prevention and preparedness measures for certain types 
of  disaster  risks,  as  required  by  the  revised  EU  civil  protection  legislation.  Turkey  is 
encouraged  to  install  the  Secure  Trans  European  Services  for  Telematics  between 
Administrators  (sTESTA)  system  to  be  able  to  connect  through  the  Common  Emergency 
Communication  and  Information  System  (CECIS)  with 
the  Emergency  Response 
Coordination Centre (ERCC) of the European Commission. 

Climate change 

Turkey made some progress on climate change over the reporting period, notably with the 
ratification  of  the  Paris  Agreement  in  October  2021  (pending  submission  of  its  ratification 
instrument to the United Nations) and announcing the country would aim at reaching net-zero 
emissions  by  2053.  These  steps  need  to  be  followed  up    with  the  swift  adoption  of  an 
enhanced  nationally  determined  contribution  and  a  long-term  strategy  under  the  Paris 
Agreement,  consistent  with  the  EU  climate  framework  and  factoring  in  the  perspective  of 
net-zero  by  2053;  the  existing  national  strategy  and  action  plan  address  climate  change 
mitigation  concerns  only  partially  and  in  a  short-term  perspective  (up  to  2023). 
Mainstreaming  of  climate  action  into  other  sector  policies  remained  limited.  Regarding  its 

107 

 
 
other  commitments  under  the  UN  Framework  Convention  on  Climate  Change,  Turkey 
submitted the latest national inventory on greenhouse gasses in April 2021.  

Turkey’s legislation was not aligned with the Emission Trading Directive and with the EU’s 
economy-wide greenhouse gas monitoring mechanism. Turkey still needs to fully implement 
the Fuel Quality Directive. Alignment on emissions standards for new cars was also pending. 
An alignment plan for the Carbon Capture and Storage Directive needs to be established. 

CLUSTER 5: RESOURCES, AGRICULTURE AND COHESION  

This  cluster covers: agriculture and  rural  development (Chapter 11), food safety, veterinary 
and  phytosanitary  policy  (Chapter  12),  fisheries  (Chapter  13),  regional  policy  and 
coordination  of  structural  instruments  (Chapter  22),  and  financial  and  budgetary  provisions 
(Chapter 33).  

Turkey reached some level of preparation in the area of agriculture and rural development. 
There  was  backsliding  in  the  reporting  period,  as  its  agricultural  policy  diverged  from  the 
main  principles  of  the  EU  common  agricultural  policy.  Turkey  is  a  major  exporter  of  food 
products  to  the  EU,  and  made  limited  progress  in  the  area  of  food  safety,  veterinary  and 
phytosanitary  policy.  Turkey  needs  to  make  further  progress  on  meeting  EU  standards, 
particularly on pesticide  residues.  It  made  good progress  on fisheries, in implementing the 
fisheries law, resources and fleet management, and inspection and control. 

Turkey  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  area  of  regional  policy  and  the  coordination  of 
structural instruments. Overall, it made some progress in this area, especially in accelerating 
the  absorption  of  IPA  II  funds  and  in  addressing  some  structural  weaknesses.  Turkey  has 
some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  financial  and  budgetary  provisions  and  made 
limited  progress  during  the  reporting  period  to  strengthen  administrative  capacity  and  to 
design implementing rules for the correct application of the own resources system. 

Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development  

The  common  agricultural  policy  supports  farmers  and  rural  development.  This  requires 
strong management and control systems. There are also common EU rules for quality policy 
and organic farming.  

Turkey reached some level of preparation in the area of agriculture and rural development. 
There was backsliding with respect to the recommendations from last year. There is still no 
strategy for producing agricultural statistics. Turkey’s agricultural support policy is moving 
away  from  the  common  agricultural  policy’s  principles  and  Turkey  restricts  imports  of 
agricultural products from the EU. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

  adopt and start to implement a strategy for producing agricultural statistics; 

  develop and start to implement a strategy to align its agricultural support policy with the 

EU acquis, including the definition of cross-compliance standards. 

On  horizontal  issues,  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Forestry  took  measures  to  minimise 
the  negative  impact  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic.  In  this  regard,  several  initiatives  were 
introduced  such  as  the  digital  agricultural  market,  agricultural  research  and  innovation,  an 
awareness  raising  campaign  on  food  waste,  and  digitalisation  of  training  and  extension 
services. 

Turkey  continued  to  move  away  from  the  principles  governing  agricultural  direct  support 

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under  the  common  agricultural  policy,  notably  by  increasing  the  support  coupled  to 
production and aiming at shifting to a region or basin-based management model. 

Turkey needs to take further steps for the implementation of the integrated administration and 
control system (IACS). The farm accountancy data network (FADN) covers all 81 provinces 
and was integrated into the agricultural production and registration system. The agricultural 
census is not  yet complete and the strategy for agricultural statistics remains to be adopted. 
Further alignment with EU policies requires the decoupling of payments from production and 
linking area-based payments to well-defined cross-compliance standards. 

On common market organisation, a regulation on beef carcass classification was published. 
Sharp decline in imports of live cattle, beef and derivate products from the EU continued in 
the  reporting  period.  Turkey  is  yet  to  fully  implement  its  obligations  under  the  EU-Turkey 
trade agreement for agricultural products, by opening quotas for beef and live animals on a 
lasting basis. Proper and transparent management of import quotas needs to be implemented. 

On rural development, the EU instrument for pre-accession assistance for rural development 
programme  (IPARD  II)  continued  operating  relatively  well  in  terms  of  calls  organised, 
applications submitted and contracts signed despite the COVID-19 pandemic. Ten calls were 
organised (of which 2  calls  in  2020). 24 223 project  proposals  were submitted (of which 5 
870 proposals in 2020), 8 502 contracts signed (of which 4 249 in 2020). Turkey amended its 
IPARD  II  programme to increase the uptake of the measures and to  accelerate spending of 
the  available  funds.  Under  the  LEADER  measure,  contracts  were  signed  with  50  Local 
Action Groups in 12 provinces and consultations started to expand LEADER applications in 
15 additional provinces. The National Rural Network continued its activities aimed at a more 
efficient  implementation  of  the  programme  and  coordination  among  various  stakeholders. 
Implementation  of  the  pilot  agri-environment-climate  measure  continued,  including  the 
preparation to expand its scope by adding a biodiversity protection operation. Turkey started 
actively preparing its next programme – IPARD III.  

On  quality  policy,  Turkey  continued  to  implement  legislation  on  the  protection  of 
Geographical Indicators, which is largely aligned to the EU acquis. Alignment with the EU 
acquis on principles and implementation of organic farming is well advanced. The Turkish 
Accreditation Agency accredits organic agriculture control bodies. 

Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy 

EU hygiene rules for foodstuff production ensure a high level of food safety. Animal health 
and welfare and the safety of food of animal origin are safeguarded together with the quality 
of seeds, the plant protection material, the protection against harmful organisms and animal 
nutrition. 

Turkey  reached  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  food  safety,  veterinary  and 
phytosanitary  policy.  There  was  limited  progress  in  the  past  year  concerning  the 
implementation of animal identification and registration. Last year’s recommendations were 
only  partially  taken  up.  Food  establishments  are  yet  to  be  upgraded  to  meet  relevant  EU 
standards. Full implementation of the EU acquis in this area requires significant further work. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→ upgrade food establishments to meet EU standards, and submit a national programme, 

→ make significant progress in meeting EU pesticide residues - maximum residue limits, and 

submit a monitoring plan; 

→ make further progress in addressing zoonoses. 

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There  was  limited  progress  in  aligning  and  implementing  the  EU  acquis  on  general  food 
safety.  The  number  of  RASFF-notifications  (Rapid  Alert  System  for  Food  and  Feed)  on 
findings  of  pesticide  residues  in  fruits  and  vegetables  imported  from  Turkey  into  the  EU 
remained  unacceptably  high,  especially  in  2020  when  new  standards  on  chlorpyrifos  and 
chlorpyrifos-methyl became applicable. Turkish  authorities are requested to do their utmost 
to improve this situation. 

Turkey is yet to fully align its veterinary policy with the EU acquis. The identification and 
registration  of  bovines  and  small  ruminants  continued.  Turkey  extended  the  electronic 
identification  system  to  cattle.  Identification  and  registration  of  equiadea  started.  Border 
control  posts  (BCP)  at  land  and  sea  borders,  and  at  the  (EU-funded  BCP)  Sabiha  Gökçen 
Airport in Istanbul were not fully operational. 

Turkey  continued  its  fight  against  animal  diseases.  Foot  and  mouth  disease  outbreaks 
decreased  as  a  result  of  mass  vaccination.  The  disease-free  zone  ensured  by  vaccination  in 
the  area  of  western  Turkey  bordering  Bulgaria  and  Greece  was  maintained  by  strict 
movement controls. Vaccination against lumpy skin disease continued. Significant efforts are 
still needed to fully align with the EU acquis on transmissible spongiform encephalopathies 
and surveillance systems, including full compliance with the February 1998 Decision of the 
EU - Turkey Association Council on the trade regime for agricultural products. A Regulation 
concerning sampling, transport, import, export and laboratory conditions on the trade regime 
of veterinary biological samples was published. 

Implementation  of  the  legislation  concerning  animal  welfare  during  transport  was  not 
launched and further structural and administrative work is necessary to fully implement the 
EU acquis in this area. There was some progress on zoonoses, with the implementation of the 
Salmonella control programme. 

Turkey  continued  implementing  training,  inspection  and  monitoring  programmes  for  the 
placing of food, feed and animal by-products on the market. The administrative capacity 
for official controls was improved. No progress was made on developing the national plan for 
upgrading agri-food establishments. Significant work is still needed to apply the new rules on 
registering  and  approving  food  establishments.  Substantial  work  is  also  required  on  animal 
by-products. Provisions for funding inspections are not yet aligned with the EU system. 

Alignment  of  food  safety  rules  with  the  EU  acquis  advanced  on  issues  such  as  labelling, 
additives  and  purity  criteria,  flavourings,  food  supplements  and  enzymes.  Progress  on 
specific rules for feed remained limited. 

Progress on the phytosanitary policy remained limited. Alignment is  yet to be ensured for 
novel food and for genetically modified organisms. 

Chapter 13: Fisheries  

The  common  fisheries  policy  lays  down  rules  on  fisheries  management,  protects  living 
resources  of  the  sea  and  limits  the  environmental  impact  of  fisheries.  This  includes  setting 
catch  quotas,  managing  fleet  capacity,  rules  on  markets  and  aquaculture  and  support  for 
fisheries and coastal communities. 

Turkey has some level of preparation in the area of fisheries. Good progress was made as 
regards implementation of the fisheries law, resources and fleet management, and inspection 
and control. Last year’s recommendations were largely taken up. 

In the coming  year, Turkey should in particular enhance further multilateral cooperation on 
fisheries, including at the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM), the 
Ministerial  Conference  on  Black  Sea  fisheries  sustainability  and  at  the  GFCM  post-2020 

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Strategy Conference, including on fisheries management, compliance and illegal, unreported 
and unregulated fishing.  

Some progress was made on resources and fleet management. Following the amendment of 
fisheries  law,  legislation  regulating  commercial  and  recreational  fishing  was  published  in 
August  2020.  The  legislation,  which  includes  provisions  on  technical  measures  (such  as 
minimum  mesh  size,  depth,  and  distance  from  the  coast,  fishing  gear,  minimum  sizes, 
maximum percentages of bycatch), covers the period of 2020-2024. The information systems 
established  to  manage  fisheries  and  fishing  fleet  became  functional  and  contributed  to 
monitoring, control and  surveillance. The institutional  capacity of data collection and stock 
assessment improved. 

On  inspections  and  control,  good  progress  was  made  in  legislative  alignment  and  on 
implementation  of 
the 
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas and the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean. 
Control measures and sanctions were further improved with implementation of the amended 
fisheries law. 

the  International  Commission  for 

the  recommendations  of 

On  market  policy,  through  EU  financial  assistance  Turkey  improved  the  institutional 
capacity  and  awareness  on  fisheries  producer  organisations.  Regarding  international 
agreements,  Turkey  continued  cooperating  with  the  EU  in  the  regional  and  international 
platforms. As the EU implements provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the  Sea,  inter  alia  in  the  common  fisheries  policy,  Turkey’s  ratification  of  the  Convention 
would improve cooperation with the EU on fisheries and maritime policy. 

Chapter 22: Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments  

Regional policy is  the EU’s main investment  policy for  sustainable and inclusive economic 
growth.  Member  States  bear  responsibility  for  its  implementation,  requiring  adequate 
administrative capacity and sound financial management of project design and execution. 

Turkey  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  area  of  regional  policy  and  the  coordination  of 
structural  instruments.  Overall,  some  progress  was  made  in  this  area,  especially  in 
accelerating  the  absorption  of  IPA  II  funds  and  in  addressing  some  structural  weaknesses. 
Last year’s recommendations remain valid. In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

 improve  the  formulation  of  a  general  framework  and  appropriate  statistical  tools  for 
monitoring  and  evaluation  of  the  National  Strategy  for  Regional  Development  (NSRD) 
and Regional Development Agencies' (RDA) performance. 

 continue  the  implementation  of  the  action  plan  established  by  the  National  IPA 
Coordinator (NIPAC), National Authorising Officer (NAO) and Audit Authority (AA) in 
order  to  strengthen  the  monitoring  activities  concerning  the  implementation  of  sector 
operational  programmes  and  prioritisation  of  actions  as  well  as  improve  the  overall 
performance in managing EU funds. 

No  progress  was  made  in  the  legislative  framework.  Mechanisms  for  evidence-based 
policymaking,  policy  and  programme  evaluations,  and  impact  assessment  are  not  yet  in 
place. 

Formulation  of  a  general  framework  and  appropriate  statistical  tools  for  monitoring  and 
evaluation  of  the  National  Strategy  for  Regional  Development  (NSRD)  and  Regional 
Development Agencies' (RDA) performance needs to be improved. Implementing legislation, 
which  would  enable  the  RDAs’  involvement  in  the  decision-making  processes  at  regional 
level,  was  not  enacted.  Despite  the  existence  of  a  NSRD  and  the  RDAs,  regional  level 

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considerations  were  still  not  fully  included  in  policy-making  at  central  level.  The  linkage 
between policy  documents  and institutional  plans remained weak and led to  deficiencies in 
the proper allocation of resources.  

On  the  institutional  framework,  some  improvements  concerning  capacities  for  IPA  II 
management  such  as  tendering,  contracting,  and  payment  execution  were  achieved.  The 
functioning  of  the  IMBC  authorities  is  monitored  by  the  National  IPA  Coordinator  office 
(NIPAC)  in  coordination  with  the  National  Authorising  Officer  (NAO)  under  the  regular 
oversight of the Presidential Office. The Financial Cooperation Committee, which groups all 
IMBC authorities, met regularly. The role of the NIPAC needs to be further strengthened to 
ensure effective coordination amongst ministries, prioritisation of interventions under IPA III 
and  monitoring  of  impacts.  Organisational  measures  within  the  Ministry  of  Treasury  and 
Finance need to fully guarantee the independence of the Audit Authority from the influence 
of the other bodies that are under its audit scope. 

There  continued  to  be  progress  in  strengthening  the  administrative  capacities  of  IPA 
management authorities, when it comes to internal procedures, contracting and disbursement 
rates. The implementation of the action plan established by the NIPAC and NAO continued 
to deliver positive results, despite some delays posed by the COVID-19 pandemic and related 
measures. 

Some  progress  was  made  in  programming.  Project  pipelines  were  established  by  all  IPA 
structures  for  the  IPA  II  period  2014-2020  under  multi-annual  operational  programmes 
(MAAPs),  despite  budgetary  cuts  applied  to  2019  and  2020  allocations.  Turkey  submitted 
action documents for 2021 and 2022 IPA allocations; however the number and overall budget 
of these proposals was excessive in light of the available annual resources in the EU budget, 
indicating a weak prioritisation capacity of the NIPAC. 

and 

Limited progress was achieved on monitoring and evaluation. Steps were taken to improve 
the  project  implementation,  data  analysis  and  overall  monitoring  capacity.  All  managing 
authorities 
own 
Information/Management Information Systems and a technical assistance for Result Oriented 
Monitoring  was  supporting  the  NIPAC  office  to  monitor  the  implementation.  However, 
capacities  must  be  further  strengthened,  on-the-spot  checks  monitoring  activities  improved, 
and reporting at outcome level enhanced. 

IPA  Coordinator 

the  National 

(NIPAC) 

have 

their 

Concerning financial management, control and audit, no de-commitments were performed 
at the end of 2020, notably because of increasingly higher absorption and contracting rates in 
the  MAAPs,  despite  the  adverse  effect  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic  and  related  measures. 
Implementation  and  disbursements  rates,  however,  need  to  further  progress.  The  Audit 
Authority  strengthened  its  capacities;  it  still  needs  to  improve  quality  controls,  control 
methodology  and  knowledge  of  its  staff  concerning  audit  of  infrastructure  projects  and 
verification of performance aspects, including compliance with sound financial management 
rules and outcome achievement (see Chapter 32 – Financial control). 

Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions  

This  chapter  covers  the  rules  governing  the  funding  of  the  EU  budget  (‘own  resources'). 
These  resources  mainly  consist  of:  (i)  contributions  based  on  the  gross  national  income  of 
each  Member  State;  (ii)  customs  duties;  (iii)  the  non-recycled  plastic  resource  and  (iv)  a 
resource based on value-added tax. Member States must have the appropriate administrative 
capacity  to  adequately  coordinate  and  ensure  the  correct  calculation,  collection,  payment 
and control of own resources. 

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Turkey  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  financial  and  budgetary  provisions. 
Limited  progress  was  made  during  the  reporting  period.  Solid  coordination  structures, 
administrative  capacity  and  implementing  rules  for  the  correct  application  of  the  own 
resources system will need to be set up in due course. Last  year’s recommendation was not 
addressed. 

In  the  coming  year,  Turkey  should  in  particular  further  align  the  GNI  Inventory  with 
Eurostat’s GNI Inventory Guide. 

Basic principles and institutions in the underlying policy areas linked to the application of the 
own resources system are already in place (see Chapters 16 - Taxation, 18 - Statistics, 29 - 
Customs union and 32 - Financial control). The Customs Union with the EU on processed 
agricultural  goods  and  industrial  goods  (with  the  exception  of  coal  and  steel  products) 
continues  to  ensure  considerable  alignment  of  Turkey’s  customs  legislation  with  the  EU 
acquis on customs while a draft customs law aligned with the Union Customs Code is yet to 
be adopted. This will facilitate preparation in traditional own resources, i.e. mainly customs 
duties. 

For  the  value  added  tax-based  resource,  preparation  is  needed  to  correctly  calculate  the 
VAT  base  and  the  weighted  average  rate.  Sound  measures  are  needed  to  combat  VAT  and 
customs  duties  fraud  and  resolute  actions  are  needed  to  tackle  the  non-observed  economy. 
Turkey  needs  to  further  align  the  legislation  on  structure,  exemptions,  special  schemes  and 
the scope of reduced rates with the EU acquis. 

Concerning the gross national income-based resource, Turkey needs to continue its efforts 
to bring its national accounts and GNI calculations fully in line with the European system of 
accounts (ESA 2010) and to improve exhaustiveness of the estimates, ensuring that they take 
account  of  the  non-observed  economy.  There  is  a  need  to  further  align  the  GNI  inventory 
with the Eurostat’s Inventory Guide and improve the timely transmission of data.  

As  concerns  the  administrative  infrastructure,  Turkey  needs  to  set  up a  fully  operational 
coordination  structure,  with  appropriate  administrative  capacity  and  implementing  rules,  to 
ensure that it will be able to correctly calculate, forecast, account for, collect, pay, control and 
report own resources to the EU in line with the EU acquis. 

CLUSTER 6: EXTERNAL RELATIONS  

There are two chapters in  this cluster: external  relations (Chapter 30), and foreign, security 
and  defence  policy  (Chapter  31).  Turkey  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  area  of  external 
relations, notably due to the continuing deviations from the Common Customs Tariff and the 
common  commercial  policy.  It  made  limited  progress  in  the  reporting  period,  when  it 
successfully concluded a trade agreement with the UK after the EU-UK agreement. 

Turkey  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  foreign,  security  and  defence  policy. 
There was backsliding in the framework of political dialogue on foreign and security policy 
as Turkey’s increasingly assertive foreign policy continued to collide with the EU priorities 
under the common foreign and security policy. 

Chapter 30: External relations  

The  EU  has  a  common  trade  and  commercial  policy  towards  third  countries,  based  on 
multilateral and bilateral agreements, and autonomous measures. There are also EU rules in 
the field of humanitarian aid and development policy. 

Turkey is moderately prepared in the area of external relations. There was limited progress 

113 

 
 
in the reporting period, notably in light of the conclusion of the agreement with the United 
Kingdom after the completion of the EU-UK new agreement. Turkey’s large deviation from 
the Common Customs Tariff remained with a wide scope of additional customs duties, and 
divergence from the EU Generalised Scheme of Preferences remained in place infringing on 
the EU-Turkey Customs Union. The recommendations from last year were not implemented. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→ urgently re-align the customs tariff with the Common Customs Tariff; 

→ complete alignment with the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences and dual-use export 

control regime. 

There was no progress on the common commercial policy. The additional duties applied on 
a  large  number  of  imported  products  remained  in  place  and  were  further  expanded  to 
additional  product  categories.  The  imposition  of  additional  duties  significantly  impaired 
Turkey’s once good level of alignment with the EU common commercial policy. In addition, 
Turkey did  not  converge to  the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences  in  terms  of either 
countries or products. New investigations initiated on the basis of weak evidence, and the use 
of  safeguards  where  more  targeted  trade  defence  measures  -  such  as  the  anti-dumping 
instrument - would have been more appropriate, remained a cause of concern. There is a need 
for closer coordination between the EU and Turkey within the World Trade Organisation, in 
particular on the Doha Development Agenda, in the OECD and the G-20. 

On export controls on dual-use goods, Turkey did not align with the EU position on certain 
multilateral  export  control  arrangements,  such  as  the  Wassenaar  Arrangement  on  Export 
Controls  for  Conventional  Arms  and  Dual-Use  Goods  and  Technologies,  and  the  Missile 
Technology  Control  Regime.  There  is  still  no  alignment  with  the  EU  position  on  medium- 
and long-term export credits. 

Regarding  bilateral  agreements  with  third  countries,  Turkey  concluded  a  free  trade 
agreement with the United Kingdom following the entry into force of the EU-UK Trade and 
Cooperation Agreement, aiming for trade continuity after the withdrawal of the UK from the 
EU. Turkey continued to implement its free trade agreement with Malaysia, although the EU 
has no such agreement with that country. In addition, Turkey concluded and implemented an 
agreement with Venezuela. 

As for  development policy  and  humanitarian aid, official  development  assistance (ODA) 
granted by Turkey stood at EUR 7 billion, equivalent to 1.12 % of its gross national income 
(GNI)  in  2020,  thus  further  exceeding  the  0.7  %  target  enshrined  in  the  Sustainable 
Development Goal 17. This assistance was largely directed towards humanitarian support for 
the Syria-related activities on Turkey’s own territory. 

Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy  

Member  States  must  be  able  to  conduct  political  dialogue  under  EU  foreign,  security  and 
defence policy, to align with EU statements, to take part in EU actions and to apply agreed 
sanctions and restrictive measures. 

Turkey  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  foreign,  security  and  defence  policy. 
There  was  backsliding  in  the  framework  of  political  dialogue  on  Common  Foreign  and 
Security Policy (CFSP) as Turkey’s increasingly assertive foreign policy continued to collide 
with  the  EU  priorities  under  CFSP,  notably  due  to  its  support  for  military  actions  in  the 
Caucasus, Syria and Iraq. While the institutional framework enabling Turkey's participation 
in  CFSP  and  the  Common  Security  and  Defence  Policy  (CSDP)  is  in  place,  Turkey 

114 

 
 
maintained  a  very  low  alignment  rate  of  around  14  %.  Turkey’s  military  support  in  Libya, 
including the deployment of foreign fighters on the ground, and its persistent criticism of, and 
lack of cooperation with Operation IRINI, are detrimental to the EU’s effective contribution 
to the UN arms embargo implementation, and have led to conflicting approaches on Libya. 
Turkey wants to see a stable and prosperous Syria, an objective it shares with the EU. The 
recommendations from last year were addressed only to a very limited extent.  

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular:  

  take decisive steps to significantly improve alignment with EU declarations and Council 

decisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy;  

  enhance further the political dialogue on foreign and security policy with the EU. 

The high level political dialogue between the EU and Turkey on foreign and security policy 
issues  did  not  take  place.  The  political  dialogue  took  place  only  at  senior  official  level.  In 
December 2020 and in June 2021, the President of the European Council and the President of 
Turkey held a telephone call discussing outcomes of European Council debates on Turkey; 
Contacts  at  Presidential  and  Ministerial  level  continued,  notably  in  the  framework  of  the 
April 2021 meeting of the Presidents of the European Council and the European Commission 
with  the  President  of  Turkey  in  Ankara.  In  August  2021,  the  President  of  the  European 
Council  and  the  President  of  Turkey  held  a  telephone  call  on  the  situation  in  and  around 
Afghanistan. The High Representative/Vice President met his Turkish counterpart on several 
occasions. Turkey attended a number of events organised or supported by the EU, including 
the Brussels V Syria Conference in March 2021. Discussions focused on regional conflicts, 
in particular Syria, Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. 

(See Political criteria – Regional issues and international obligations - for more information 
on  developments  on  bilateral  relations  with  other  enlargement  countries  and  EU  Member 
States.) 

The  institutional  framework  enabling  Turkey's  participation  in  the  common  foreign  and 
security  policy  (CFSP)  and  the  common  security  and  defence  policy  (CSDP)  is  in  place 
both  at  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  the  Ministry  of  Defence.  CFSP  alignment 
remained at very low levels reaching 14 % as of August 2021 compared to 11 % in 2020 and 
21 % in 2019. Turkey in particular never aligns with EU restrictive measures, including that 
of  economic  sanctions.  Regarding  CSDP,  Turkey  participated  in  Operation  EUFOR 
ALTHEA as the biggest non-EU troop contributor.  

Turkey continued to seek its involvement in EU defence initiatives (PESCO, EDF). Turkey’s 
narrow interpretation of the EU-NATO cooperation framework continued to pose an obstacle 
to  building a  genuine organisation-to-organisation relationship,  in  particular by limiting the 
exchange  of  information  and  blocking  the  inclusive  participation  of  all  Member  States  in 
joint activities of the two organisations.  

The  Turkish  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs’  annual  strategic  document  “Enterprising  and 
Humanitarian  Foreign  Policy”  is  regularly  updated  and  presented  to  the  Parliament  for 
approval. Turkey posits foreign policy narratives such as “local and national”, “strong in the 
ground,  strong  at  the  table”  or  “the  world  is  bigger  than  five”.  Turkey’s  foreign  policy 
dialogues with non-EU actors increasingly focused on trade and defence cooperation. Turkey 
stressed the importance of global cooperation in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. 

As a supporter of multilateralism, Turkey was contributing to nine international (UN, NATO 
and  EU-led)  peace  support  and  observer  missions.  Turkey  participated  at  the  virtual  UN 
General  Assembly  in  September  2020,  making  a  strong  plea  for  multilateralism,  and 

115 

 
 
continued  to  voice  support  for  the  reforming  of  the  UN  Security  Council.  It  reiterated  its 
dedication to the 2030 Agenda of the Sustainable Development Goals. Turkey participated at 
the  virtual  G20  Riyadh  Summit  in  November  2020  and  the  virtual  OSCE  Ministerial 
Council in December 2020. 

Turkey  participates  in,  and  complies  with,  the  different  international  regimes/instruments 
concerning  the  non-proliferation  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction.  However,  it  obstructs 
participation of the Republic of Cyprus in the Conference on Disarmament. 

With  regard  to  hybrid  threats,  in  the  context  of  international  conflicts  and  crises,  the 
circulation of false information on social media and in mainstream media has been observed 
also  in  the  Turkish  information  environment.  Access  to  factual  information,  while 
guaranteeing  the  full  respect  for  freedom  of  media,  is  crucial  to  mitigate  the  deepening  of 
existing tensions and to facilitate peace building as well as conflict prevention. 

Despite  a  number  of  challenges  in  bilateral  U.S.-Turkish  relations,  Turkey  remains  an 
important  partner  and  NATO  ally  for  the  United  States.  The  Turkish  purchase  of  Russian 
S-400  air  defence  missiles  has  led  to  Turkey  being  subjected  to  US  Countering  America’s 
Adversaries  through  Sanctions  Act  (CAATSA)  sanctions,  in  force  since  April  2021. 
Notwithstanding  the  imposed  sanctions,  Turkey  kept  refusing  to  part  with  its  military 
investment.  The  competent  US  appeals  court’s  decision  was  pending  over  Turkey’s  state-
owned Halkbank’s role in helping  Iran evading  US  sanctions.  Turkey continued to  demand 
the US to extradite Fetullah Gulen for having orchestrated the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey. 
US  support  to  the  Syrian  Democratic  Forces  (SDF)  was  a  major  grievance  of  Turkey. 
However,  the  engagement  of  the  new  US  administration  with  Turkey,  including  at  the 
Leaders’  level  was  constructive.  The  US  administration  expressed  its  intention  to  engage 
closely with Turkey on regional issues, including Afghanistan, humanitarian access to Syria, 
and  counterterrorism  activities.  Canada  cancelled  export  permits  for  military  goods  and 
technology to Turkey following the results of an investigation into allegations that Canadian 
technology  was  being  used  by  the  Azerbaijani  military  forces  in  the  Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict. 

Turkey maintained its contacts with the countries of Latin America through its humanitarian 
diplomacy, providing medical supplies and equipment to Paraguay, Brazil and Venezuela.  

Turkey  continued  to  pay  a  particular  attention  towards  Africa.  The  Third  Turkey-Africa 
Economic and Business Forum was organised online in October 2020, in collaboration with 
the  African  Union  Commission.  Turkish  interests  and  businesses  are  particularly  active  in 
Somalia, not without risks as often illustrated by al-Shabaab attacks on Turkish contractors. 

Turkey  improved  its  rhetoric  and  made  repeated  outreach  towards  Egypt.  Respective 
positions  were  still  divergent  on  many  issues,  notably  Libya,  energy  cooperation  in  the 
Eastern  Mediterranean  and  the  Muslim  Brotherhood.  Turkey  also  softened  its  tone  towards 
Israel,  however,  it  continued  to  criticise  its  settlement  policy  and  intervened  in  defence  of 
Palestinian interests, in particular during the flare-up of violence in May 2021. 

Regarding relations with Libya, Turkey repeatedly expressed that it favours an agreement in 
the  framework  of  the  Libyan  political  process.  Turkey  quickly  contacted  the  new  Libyan 
interim administration under the leadership of interim Prime Minister Dbeibah and the Head 
of  the  Presidential  Council  Menfi.  Turkey  continued  to  assert  the  validity  of  the  Turkish-
Libyan  maritime  delimitation  and  military  agreements  of  2019  which  the  EU  considers  an 
infringement upon the sovereign rights of third States, not complying with the Law of the Sea 
and having no legal consequences for third States. In April 2021, the first Turkey-Libya High 
Level  Strategic  Cooperation  Council  was  held,  focusing  on  political  and  economic  aspects. 

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Both sides signed five Memoranda of Understanding, mainly in the construction sector. 

The  persistent  foreign  interference  in  Libya  continued  to  challenge  seriously  the 
implementation  of  the  UN-led  Berlin  process.  Turkey  claimed  that  the  UN  embargo 
provisions,  the  articles  on  withdrawal  of  foreign  elements  and  the  suspension  of  military 
training  in  the  cease-fire  agreement  are  not  applicable  to  the  legitimate  government. On  a 
regular  basis,  the  Turkish  Ministry  of  Defence  issued  statements  on  ongoing  training  with 
Libyan  forces  and  the  legitimate  presence  of  Turkish  military  forces.  The  presence  of 
mercenary  forces  was  a  complicating  factor.  Turkey  maintained  its  unjustified  opinion  that 
Operation  IRINI  is  not  balanced  and  that  it  disproportionally  targets  the  Government  of 
National Accord. After the incident with the interception of the Turkish vessel by Operation 
IRINI,  the  EU  and  Turkey  established  a  clear  line  of  communication  to  prevent  potential 
miscommunication. 

The  EU  listed  a  Turkish  shipping  company  in  the  framework  of  violations  of  the  Libya 
weapons embargo.  

Turkey  remained  committed  to  the  political  process  in  Syria  and  engaged  with  Russia  and 
Iran  in  the  framework  of  the  Astana  Process,  complementing  the  Geneva  Process.  Turkey 
actively supported the work of the Constitutional Committee and continued to lend support 
and  assistance  to  the  opposition.  One  year  after  the  Syrian  regime’s  latest  large-scale 
offensive  on  Idlib,  the  cease-fire  agreed  in  March  2020  between  Turkey  and  Russia  held 
during  the  reporting  period,  although  cease-fire  violations  and  military  flare-ups  regularly 
took  place.  Turkish  troops  significantly  reinforced  their  military  presence  in  the  region. 
Turkey started dismantling certain military observation posts, which were encircled by Syrian 
regime forces. Since August 2020, joint Turkish-Russian patrols in Idlib on the M4 highway 
no longer took place due to  Russian safety  concerns for its troops. The  presence of radical 
elements in Idlib made for a complex picture on the ground. 

Since  Operation  Peace  Spring  in  October  2019,  Turkey  and  the  opposition  forces  it  backs 
kept control of the area between Tel Abyad and Ras al-Ayn, going 30 kilometres deep into 
the Syrian territory. The situation in this region remained fragile. Turkish forces engaged in 
“retaliation operations” in northeast Syria, in a claimed reaction against infiltration attempts 
by  Syrian  Democratic  Forces  (SDF).  Turkey  attached  no  credibility  to  the  intra-Kurdish 
dialogue in northeast Syria. 

Governors  in  Turkish  provinces  adjacent  to  Syria  played  a  central  role  in  building 
administrative capacities in Turkish-controlled northern Syria. Turkey developed housing and 
infrastructure in  the  regions it controlled, linking  them to  those of Turkey; it also  provided 
basic services to the local population. However, the human rights situation in northern Syria 
under the control of Turkish forces and Turkey-affiliated armed groups remained a matter of 
concern.  The  Turkish  authorities  supported  activities  conducted  by  the  Syrian  Interim 
Government  to  bring  back  stability  and  create  administrative  structures  on  the  ground. 
Despite efforts being made, as an occupying power Turkey needs to continue to address the 
human  rights  issue.  Turkey  cooperated  with  the  United  Nations  High  Commissioner  for 
Refugees.  

Turkey  maintained  close  relations  with  Iraq  and  various  high-level  meetings  took  place. 
Turkey also maintained good relations with the authorities of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. 
Turkey continued its anti-terrorism operations in the Iraqi territory, in particular against the 
PKK groups and entities involved in acts of terrorism. The recrudescence of such operations 
in  April and May 2021  was criticised by the  government  of  Iraq. Turkey  welcomed the  Al 
Ula  Declaration  ending  the  dispute  among  the  members  of  the  Gulf  Cooperation  Council. 
Turkey  had  an  intensive  cooperation,  including  a  military  base  with  Qatar,  which  is  also 

117 

 
 
engaged financially in Turkey. The relations with the Kingdom of South Arabia improved, 
despite the case of the Kashoggi murder, while the relations with the United Arab Emirates 
remained tense.  

Turkey supported the safeguarding of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on  Iran and 
acknowledged the EU initiatives on the matter. Turkey maintained a high-level dialogue with 
Iran. Some tensions  with  Iran  could  be noticed  in  the context  of the Syrian and north-Iraqi 
theatres. 

Turkey and Russia further developed their bilateral cooperation in a range of areas, including 
cooperation on defence, economy, energy, tourism and culture. They maintained an intensive 
involvement  in,  and  coordination  on  regional  conflicts  in  Syria,  Libya  and  Nagorno-
Karabakh, despite providing political  and military  support to  opposing parties. Turkish and 
Russian  leaders  spoke  regularly.  Turkey  also  coordinated  with  Russia  to  water  down  the 
NATO response to the forced diversion of an EU plane over Belarus. 

Relations with Ukraine further developed, with the Ukrainian President’s visit in Turkey in 
April  2021,  notably  in  the  areas  of  defence  and  aerospace  as  well  as  tourism.  Turkey 
continued  to  stand  on  Ukraine's  side  regarding  Russia's  illegal  annexation  of  Crimea  and 
support to the "rebels" in the Donbass region. 

Regarding  the  South  Caucasus  countries,  Turkey  focused  its  cooperation  on  energy, 
including TANAP  and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan  pipeline, as well as connectivity. The  Vice 
Prime  Minister  and  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  Georgia  visited  Turkey  in  March  2021. 
Turkey considered that bilateral issues between Georgia and Russia could be better addressed 
in  a  multilateral  platform.  Turkey  took  a  leading  role  in  supporting  Azerbaijan  military 
efforts  in  Nagorno-Karabakh,  providing  military  assistance,  intelligence  and  weapons,  and 
reportedly  support  through  foreign  fighters.  As  a  consequence,  relations  with  Armenia  did 
not improve.  

The “Asia Anew” initiative announced by Turkey’s Foreign Minister in August 2019 seeks 
to  diversify  Turkey’s  diplomatic  relations  and  enhance  its  ties  with  the  continent.  Joint 
projects with ASEAN were further developed, including on tourism, science and technology, 
higher education, disaster response and demining. 

Turkey  and  China  continued  working  together  to  align  Turkey's  Middle  Corridor 
infrastructure  strategy  with  China's  Belt  and  Road  Initiative.  Chinese  financial  investments 
into  Turkey  increased.  A  direct  train  link  between  the  two  countries  was  inaugurated.  In 
December  2020,  China  ratified  the  bilateral  extradition  agreement  with  Turkey.  The 
ratification  of  the  agreement  by  Turkey  was  pending.  Turkey  further  developed  its 
cooperation  with  Indonesia  in  the  defence  industry  area.  Turkey  and  Japan  made  no 
progress in negotiations for an economic partnership deal. Turkey’s Foreign Minister visited 
Pakistan in January 2021 and inaugurated a new Consulate General  in  Karachi.  He visited 
Bangladesh and Indonesia in December 2020, aiming to increase cooperation in the fields of 
economy and defence industry. 

into 

invested  further 

the  relations  with 

Turkey 
the  Turkic-speaking  Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan,  Turkmenistan,  and  Kyrgyzstan  focusing  on  trade,  connectivity  and  energy. 
The Turkish Foreign Minister visited Tajikistan in March 2021 to attend the 9th Ministerial 
Conference  of  the  Heart  of  Asia-Istanbul  Process.  The  latter  platform  focuses  on 
Afghanistan, where Turkey seeks to play a key role in the Taliban-led country and maintain 
its presence in Kabul.  

118 

 
 
5. 

ANNEX I – RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND TURKEY 

Within  the  framework  of  accession  negotiations,  16  chapters  have  been  opened  so  far  and 
one of these was provisionally closed. In June 2019, the General Affairs Council reiterated the 
Council’s position of June 2018 that Turkey has been moving further away from the European 
Union. Turkey's accession negotiations have therefore effectively come to a standstill and no 
further  chapters  can  be  considered  for  opening  or  closing.  The  EU  Leaders  confirmed  that 
dialogue  on  rule  of  law  and  fundamental  rights  remains  an  integral  part  of  the  EU-Turkey 
relationship. 

The Council conclusions of July 2019, adopted in response to Turkey’s provocative actions in 
the Eastern Mediterranean, remain valid. The Council decided to suspend negotiations with 
Turkey  on  the  Comprehensive  Air  Transport  Agreement,  not  to  hold  for  the  time  being  the 
EU-Turkey  Association  Council  as  well  as  further  meetings  of  the  EU-Turkey  high-level 
dialogues,  to  endorse  the  Commission’s  proposal  to  reduce  the  pre-accession  assistance  to 
Turkey for 2020, and to invite the European Investment Bank to review its lending activities 
in  Turkey,  notably  with  regard  to  sovereign-backed  lending.  The  EU  extended  the  existing 
framework for restrictive measures in response to Turkey’s unauthorised drilling activities in 
the Eastern Mediterranean. Two Turkish individuals remain on the list of designations under 
this sanctions framework. The EU also listed a Turkish shipping company in the framework 
of violations of the Libya weapons embargo.  

The  European  Council  repeatedly  stated  that  the  EU  has  a  strategic  interest  in  a  stable  and 
secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and 
mutually beneficial relationship with Turkey. The European Council of June 2021 welcomed 
the de-escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean, which needs to be sustained, and reiterated the 
EU’s  readiness  to  engage  with  Turkey  in  a  phased,  proportionate  and  reversible  manner  to 
enhance  cooperation  in  a  number  of  areas  of  common  interest,  subject  to  the  established 
conditionalities set out in March and in previous European Council conclusions. The October 
2020  European  Council  also  stressed  that  in  case  of  renewed  unilateral  actions  or 
provocations  in  breach  of  international  law,  the  EU  will  use  all  the  instruments  and  the 
options at its disposal, including in accordance with Article 29 TEU and Article 215 TFEU, in 
order to defend its interests and those of its Member States.  

Reforms and developments in Turkey continued to be monitored by the bodies set up under 
the  Association  Agreement,  with  subcommittees  kept  being  held  throughout  the  reporting 
period. The Commission, jointly with the European External Action Service, has maintained 
EU-Turkey  relations  in  all  key  areas  of  joint  interest  based  on  a  broad  engagement.  In 
December  2020,  the  President  of  the  European  Council  and  the  President  of  Turkey  held  a 
telephone call, followed  by contacts  at  Presidential  and Ministerial level. In April 2021, the 
Presidents of the European Council and of the European Commission met with the President 
of Turkey in Ankara. The High Representative/Vice President met his Turkish counterpart on 
several occasions. The political dialogue took place at senior officials level. 

Turkey  remains  the  EU’s  sixth  largest  trading  partner,  while  the  EU  is  Turkey’s  largest. 
Two out of five goods traded by Turkey come from or go to the EU and a significant part of 
foreign  direct  investment  in  Turkey  originates  in  the  EU.  As  part  of  the  Economic  Reform 
Programme  exercise,  Turkey  participated  in  the  multilateral  economic  dialogue  with  the 
Commission and Member States held in July 2021 to prepare the country for participation in 
multilateral surveillance and economic policy coordination as part of the EU’s Economic and 
Monetary  Union.  The  EU  and  Turkey  also  continue  to  coordinate  in  the  framework  of  the 
G-20.  

119 

 
 
to 

Regarding  the  Customs  Union,  the  Commission  adopted  a  recommendation  for  opening  of 
negotiations with Turkey on the modernisation of the Customs Union in December 2016. This 
recommendation  has  been  forwarded  to  the  Council  where  it  has  been  under  consideration, 
without  prejudice  to  Member  States'  position.  In  March  2021,  the  EU  Leaders  invited  the 
the 
Commission 
implementation of the Customs Union, ensuring its effective application to all Member States, 
and invited in parallel the Council to work on a mandate for the modernisation of the Customs 
Union. Such a mandate may be adopted by the Council subject to additional guidance by the 
European  Council.  The  Commmision  intensified  the  engagement  with  Turkey  to  discuss 
issues hampering the smooth functioning of the Customs Union, including in the framewok of 
the Customs Union Joint Committee in July 2021.  

to  address  current  difficulties 

talks  with  Turkey 

intensify 

in 

In  the  area  of  visa,  migration  and  asylum,  the  implementation  of  the  March  2016 
EU-Turkey  Statement  has  continued  to  deliver  concrete  results  in  reducing  irregular  and 
dangerous crossings on the Eastern Mediterranean Route to Europe and in saving lives at sea. 
Turkey sustained its considerable efforts to  provide significant  support to  close to  4 million 
refugees,  of  which  3.7  million  Syrians.  In  the  context  of  the  EU-Turkey  visa  liberalisation 
dialogue,  no  outstanding  visa  liberalisation  benchmarks  were  fulfilled.  The  EU  and  Turkey 
continued  negotiations,  launched  in  November  2018,  on  an  international  agreement  on  the 
exchange of personal data between Europol and the Turkish authorities competent for fighting 
serious crime and terrorism.  

Turkey and the EU continued to have fruitful cooperation under the Facility for Refugees in 
Turkey.  The  Facility  manages  a  total  of  EUR  6  billion.  The  full  operational  budget  of  the 
Facility was contracted by the end of 2020; disbursements have reached over EUR 4.2 billion 
in August 2021, with the balance to be disbursed in the course of implementation of Facility 
projects.  Facility  funding  continued  to  support  projects  focused  on  humanitarian  assistance, 
education,  migration  management,  health,  municipal  infrastructure,  and  socio-economic 
support.  In  2020  and  2021,  EUR  585  million  were  earmarked  from  the  EU  budget  for 
humanitarian  support  and  the  continuation  of  two  important  cash  support  programmes  for 
refugees. In March 2021, the members of the European Council agreed that the assistance of 
the European Union for  the refugees  and host communities be continued.  In June 2021, the 
Commission  proposed  to  allocate  EUR  3  billion  in  additional  assistance  to  Syrian  refugees 
and host communities in Turkey 

Regarding  bilateral  financial  assistance,  projects  under  the  Instrument  for  Pre-accession 
Assistance (IPA) for Turkey continued to be implemented, in compliance with the guidance 
of the EU Budgetary Authority. Financial assistance under the IPA III will focus on priorities 
linked  to  the  fundamental  pillars  of  the  enlargement  strategyas  well  as  on  building  more 
resilient  and  more  sustainable  economies  and  societies  after  the  impact  of  the  COVID-19 
pandemic. 

Turkey  participates  in  the  following  EU  programmes:  Erasmus+,  Horizon  2020,  Customs 
2020, Fiscalis  2020, COSME  (Competitiveness of Enterprises and Small  and Medium-sized 
Enterprises)  and  EASI  (Employment  and  Social  Innovation).  Since  2019  it  has  also 
participated  in  the  European  Solidarity  Corps  programme.  Turkey  participates  in  the 
European  Environmental  Agency,  the  European  Monitoring  Centre  for  Drugs  and  Drug 
Addiction and the Civil Protection Mechanism. 

120 

 
 
 
 
 
 
STATISTICAL DATA (as of 09.09.2021) 
Turkey 

Basic data 
Population (thousand) 
Total area of the country (km²) 

National accounts 
Gross domestic product (GDP) (million national currency) 
Gross domestic product (GDP) (million euro) 
GDP (euro per capita) 
GDP per capita (in purchasing power standards (PPS)) 
GDP per capita (in PPS), relative to the EU average (EU-27 = 100) 
Real GDP growth rate: change on previous year of GDP volume (%) 
Employment growth (national accounts data), relative to the previous year (%) 
Labour productivity growth: growth in GDP (in volume) per person employed, relative to the 
previous year (%) 
Unit labour cost growth, relative to the previous year (%) 
**3 year change (T/T-3) in the nominal unit labour cost growth index (2015 = 100) 
Labour productivity per person employed: GDP (in PPS) per person employed relative to EU 
average (EU-27 = 100) 
Gross value added by main sectors 
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 
Industry (%) 
Construction (%) 
Services (%) 
Final consumption expenditure, as a share of GDP (%) 
Gross fixed capital formation, as a share of GDP (%) 
Changes in inventories, as a share of GDP (%) 
Exports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 
Imports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 
Gross fixed capital formation by the general government sector, as a percentage of GDP (%) 

Business 

Note 

Industrial production volume index (2015 = 100) 
Number of active enterprises (number) 
Birth rate: number of enterprise births in the reference period (t) divided by the number of 
enterprises active in t (%) 
Death rate: number of enterprise deaths in the reference period (t) divided by the number of 
enterprises active in t (%) 

Note 

1) 

Note 

2008 
70 586 s 
780 053 w 

2015 
77 696 s 
780 077 w 

2016 
78 741 s 
780 077 w 

2017 
79 815 s 
780 077 w 

2018 
80 811 s 
780 085 w 

2019 
82 004 s 
780 085 w 

2008 
1 002 757 
525 995 
7 400 
12 680 
49.3 
0.8 
: 
: 

2015 
2 350 941 
777 042 
9 930 
19 440 
67.6 
6.1 
: 
: 

2016 
2 626 560 
785 619 
9 910 
19 080 
65.8 
3.3 
: 
: 

2017 
3 133 704 
760 497 
9 470 
19 720 
66.1 
7.5 
: 
: 

2018 
3 758 316 
658 464 
8 090 
19 530 
63.3 
3.0 
: 
: 

2019 
4 320 191 
679 510 
8 230 
18 940 
59.3 
0.9 
: 
: 

: 
: 
: 

8.3 
21.7 
7.6 
62.3 s 
74.7 
26.7 
2.1 
23.6 
27.0 
: 

2008 
68.8 
: 
: 

: 
: 
: 

7.8 
22.4 
9.2 
60.7 s 
73.8 
29.6 
-  1.4 
24.5 
26.6 
: 

: 
: 
: 

7.0 
22.2 
9.6 
61.2 s 
74.1 
29.1 
-  1.1 
23.1 
25.2 
: 

: 
: 
: 

6.8 
23.3 
9.6 
60.3 s 
73.0 
29.9 
0.8 
26.0 
29.7 
: 

: 
: 
: 

6.4 
24.9 
7.9 
60.7 s 
70.9 
29.7 
-  0.4 
31.2 
31.3 
: 

: 
: 
: 

7.1 
24.2 
6.0 
62.8 s 
72.4 
25.9 
-  1.1 
32.7 
29.9 
: 

2015 
100.0 
2 941 233 w 
12.9 

2016 
103.4 
2 981 381 w 
13.0 

2017 
112.7 
3 100 412 w 
14.1 

2018 
114.2 
3 160 371 w 
13.3 

2019 
113.6 
3 228 421 w 
12.9 w 

: 

11.4 

11.2 

12.1 

: 

: 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
People employed in SMEs as a share of all persons employed (within the non-financial 
business economy) (%) 
Value added by SMEs (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) 
Total value added (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) 

: 

: 
: 

75.1 sw 

74.6 sw 

74.2 sw 

: 

: 

124 863 sw 
228 309 w 

130 934 sw 
241 711 w 

127 683 sw 
236 088 w 

106 199 sw 
202 005 w 

110 591 sw 
208 171 w 

Inflation rate and house prices 
Consumer price index (CPI), change relative to the previous year (%) 
**Annual change in the deflated house price index (2015 = 100) 

Balance of payments 

Balance of payments: current account total (million euro) 
Balance of payments current account: trade balance (million euro) 
Balance of payments current account: net services (million euro) 
Balance of payments current account: net balance for primary income (million euro) 
Balance of payments current account: net balance for secondary income (million euro) 
Net balance for primary and secondary income: of which government transfers (million euro) 
**3 year backward moving average of the current account balance relative to GDP (%) 
**Five year change in share of world exports of goods and services (%) 
Net balance (inward - outward) of foreign direct investment (FDI) (million euro) 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) abroad (million euro) 
of which FDI of the reporting economy in the EU-27 countries (million euro) 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in the reporting economy (million euro) 
of which FDI of the EU-27 countries in the reporting economy (million euro) 
**Net international investment position, relative to GDP (%) 
Year on year rate of change in gross inflow of remittances (in national currency) from migrant 
workers (%) 

Public finance 
General government deficit / surplus, relative to GDP (%) 
General government gross debt relative to GDP (%) 
Total  government revenues, as a percentage of GDP (%) 
Total government expenditure, as a percentage of GDP (%) 

Note 

Note 
2) 
2) 
2) 
2) 
2) 

2) 3) 
2) 3) 
2) 3) 
2) 3) 
2) 3) 

4) 

Note 

2008 
10.4 d 
: 

2015 
7.7 d 
: 

2016 
7.7 d 
: 

2017 
11.1 d 
: 

2018 
16.3 d 
: 

2019 
15.2 d 
: 

2008 
- 26 805.1 w 
- 35 978.4 w 
12 855.6 w 
- 5 168.6 w 
1 486.3 w 
: 
: 
: 
11 763.7 w 
- 1 733.1 w 
: 
13 496.7 w 
: 
-  25.8 w 
17.7 sw 

2015 
- 28 986.2 
- 43 375.6 
21 856.4 
- 8 768.7 
1 301.7 
465.6 
-  5.0 
11.8 
12 768.8 w 
4 337.0 
- 1 837.2 w 
17 103.2 w 
8 078.3 w 
-  44.2 w 
6.2 sw 

2016 
- 24 218.4 
- 36 013.9 
18 511.9 
- 8 289.2 
1 572.8 
1 009.3 
-  3.8 
16.6 
9 748.8 w 
2 517.4 
-  972.9 w 
12 417.6 w 
3 872.4 w 
-  42.3 w 
-  10.8 sw 

2008 
: 
: 
: 
: 

2015 
0.5 w 
27.4 w 
32.2 w 
31.7 w 

2016 
-  1.3 w 
28.0 w 
32.5 w 
33.8 w 

2017 
- 35 995.3 
- 51 370.2 
22 968.3 
- 9 811.8 
2 218.4 
1 644.7 
-  3.8 
6.9 
7 433.8 w 
2 321.7 
713.8 
9 754.8 w 
2 555.0 
-  53.7 w 
-  13.3 sw 

2017 
-  2.8 w 
28.0 w 
31.2 w 
34.0 w 

2018 
- 17 588.5 
- 33 861.9 
25 774.4 
- 10 153.0 
651.9 
223.5 
-  3.5 
5.8 
7 937.3 w 
3 054.2 
1 718.2 
10 991.5 w 
3 143.6 
-  46.3 w 
: 

2019 
6 087.2 
- 15 000.2 
31 826.1 
- 11 484.5 
745.8 
547.5 
-  2.2 
7.6 
5 473.9 w 
2 618.7 
- 1 240.3 w 
8 095.6 w 
663.1 
-  45.4 w 
: 

2018 
-  2.9 w 
30.2 w 
31.8 w 
34.7 w 

2019 
-  4.5 w 
32.6 w 
31.0 w 
35.4 w 

Financial indicators 
Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to GDP (%) 
Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to total exports (%) 
Money supply: M1 (banknotes, coins, overnight deposits, million euro) 
Money supply: M2 (M1 plus deposits with maturity up to two years, million euro) 
Money supply: M3 (M2 plus marketable instruments, million euro) 
Total credit by monetary financial institutions to residents (consolidated) (million euro) 
**Annual change in financial sector liabilities (%) 

Note 
5) 

6) 

2008 
36.6 sw 
157.7 w 
39 927.2 w 
203 839.8 w 
214 472.6 w 
131 876.4 w 
: 

2015 
46.7 sw 
189.7 w 
98 076.2 w 
374 337.2 w 
387 803.0 w 
396 277.9 
14.4 

2016 
47.4 sw 
205.0 w 
103 610.0 w 
380 863.3 w 
393 176.4 w 
410 574.0 
17.0 

2017 
53.4 sw 
203.7 w 
99 085.3 w 
357 979.4 w 
370 812.2 w 
377 902.8 
20.8 

2018 
: 
186.4 w 
84 551.1 w 
321 665.1 w 
330 904.3 w 
349 175.5 
17.6 

2019 
: 
176.7 w 
108 082.9 w 
367 703.2 w 
384 031.8 w 
406 046.7 
18.9 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
**Private credit flow, consolidated, relative to GDP (%) 
**Private debt, consolidated, relative to GDP (%) 
Interest rates: day-to-day money rate, per annum (%) 
Lending interest rate (one year), per annum (%) 
Deposit interest rate (one year), per annum (%) 
Euro exchange rates: average of period (1 euro = … national currency) 
Trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries (2010 = 100) 
**3 year change (T/T-3) in the trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries 
(2010 = 100) 
Value of reserve assets (including gold) (million euro) 

7) 

8) 

: 
: 
16.09 
23.21 w 
19.12 w 
1.906 
106 
-8.8 sw 

10.9 w 
79 
10.70 
16.85 w 
10.72 w 
3.026 
65 
-23.3 sw 

7.1 w 
84 
9.32 
15.79 w 
10.33 w 
3.343 
60 
-29.1 sw 

9.1 w 
84 
11.58 
18.12 w 
13.53 w 
4.121 
50 
-44.2 sw 

2.3 w 
82 
17.76 
28.89 w 
22.31 w 
5.708 
36 
-46.3 sw 

3.3 w 
80 
20.52 
15.82 w 
14.56 w 
6.358 
32 
-47.0 sw 

2) 

50 485.5 w 

99 624.2 w 

95 863.2 w 

95 361.6 w 

78 770.5 w 

94 413.6 w 

External trade in goods 
Value of imports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 
Value of exports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 
Trade balance: all goods, all partners (million euro) 
Terms of trade (export price index / import price index * 100) (number) 
Share of exports to EU-27 countries in value of total exports (%) 
Share of imports from EU-27 countries in value of total imports (%) 

Demography 
Crude rate of natural change of population (natural growth rate): number of births minus 
deaths (per thousand inhabitants) 
Infant mortality rate deaths of children under one year of age (per thousand live births) 
Life expectancy at birth: male (years) 
Life expectancy at birth: female (years) 

Labour market 
Economic activity rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 that 
is economically active (%) 
*Employment rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 that are 
in employment (%) 
Male employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 
Female employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 
Employment rate for persons aged 55–64: proportion of the population aged 55–64 that are 
in employment (%) 
Employment by main sectors 
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 
Industry (%) 
Construction (%) 
Services (%) 
People employed in the public sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–64 
(%) 

Note 

9) 

Note 

Note 

2008 
136 441 
89 557 
- 46 884 
100.5 sw 
42.0 s 
34.4 s 

2015 
186 536 
129 555 
- 56 981 
107.1 sw 
37.2 s 
35.3 s 

2016 
179 468 
128 792 
- 50 676 
111.2 sw 
39.7 s 
36.3 s 

2017 
207 000 
139 229 
- 67 771 
105.0 sw 
40.9 s 
33.6 s 

2018 
188 337 
142 290 
- 46 047 
102.3 sw 
43.3 s 
32.9 s 

2019 
181 038 
153 201 
- 27 836 
102.7 sw 
42.2 s 
31.6 s 

2008 
12.7 

15.7 
: 
: 

2008 
53.4 

48.4 

72.7 
24.9 
27.5 

: 
: 
: 
: 
14.0 w 

2015 
11.8 

10.7 
75.4 
81.0 

2015 
59.9 

53.9 

75.3 
32.5 
31.8 

20.4 s 
20.1 s 
7.2 s 
52.4 s 
13.5 w 

2016 
11.2 

10.0 
75.4 
81.0 

2016 
60.9 

54.4 

75.5 
33.2 
33.4 

19.5 s 
19.5 s 
7.3 s 
53.7 s 
13.8 w 

2017 
10.8 

9.2 
75.7 
81.3 

2017 
61.9 

55.3 

76.1 
34.5 
34.4 

19.4 s 
19.1 s 
7.4 s 
54.1 s 
13.3 w 

2018 
10.1 

9.3 
76.2 
81.6 

2018 
62.3 

55.6 

76.0 
35.2 
35.3 

18.4 s 
19.7 s 
6.9 s 
54.9 s 
15.4 w 

2019 
9.1 

9.1 
76.4 
81.8 

2019 
62.2 

53.8 

73.2 
34.4 
33.6 

18.1 s 
19.8 s 
5.5 s 
56.6 s 
16.8 w 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
86.0 w 

86.5 w 

86.2 w 

86.7 w 

84.6 w 

83.2 w 

People employed in the private sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–64 
(%) 
Unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that is unemployed (%) 
Male unemployment rate (%) 
Female unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force aged 15–24 that is unemployed (%) 
Long-term unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that has been unemployed for 
12 months or more (%) 
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed at most lower secondary 
education (ISCED levels 0-2) (%) 
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed tertiary education (ISCED 
levels 5-8) (%) 

Social cohesion 
Average nominal monthly wages and salaries (national currency) 
Index of real wages and salaries (index of nominal wages and salaries divided by the 
inflation index) (2016 = 100) 
GINI coefficient 
Poverty gap 
*Early leavers from education and training: proportion of the population aged 18–24 with at 
most lower secondary education who are not in further education or training (%) 

Standard of living 
Number of passenger cars relative to population size (number per thousand population) 
Number of mobile phone subscriptions relative to population size (number per thousand 
population) 
Mobile broadband penetration (per 100 inhabitants) 
Fixed broadband penetration (per 100 inhabitants) 

Infrastructure 
Density of railway network (lines in operation per thousand km²) 

Length of motorways (kilometres) 

Innovation and research 

Public expenditure on education relative to GDP (%) 
*Gross domestic expenditure on R&D relative to GDP (%) 
Government budget appropriations or outlays on R&D (GBAORD), as a percentage of GDP 
(%) 
Percentage of households who have internet access at home (%) 

Note 
10) 

Note 

Note 
11) 

Note 

9.8 
9.7 
10.0 
18.5 
2.6 w 

8.3 

6.5 

2008 
956 w 
: 

43 
30.0 
45.5 

2008 
95.0 
920.0 bw 

0.0 w 
8 w 

2008 
11.2 sw 

1 922 

2008 
: 
0.69 
0.27 

25.0 

10.3 
9.2 
12.6 
18.5 
2.2 

8.9 

8.3 

2015 
1 828 w 
: 

42 
27.8 
36.4 

2015 
134.0 
935.2 w 

49.7 w 
12 w 

2015 
13.0 ds 

2 282 

2015 
: 
0.88 
0.34 

70.0 

10.9 
9.6 
13.7 
19.5 
2.2 

9.1 

9.3 

2016 
2 031 w 
: 

43 
26.6 
34.3 

2016 
142.0 
940.4 w 

64.8 w 
13 w 

2016 
13.0 ds 

2 542 

2016 
4.7 
0.94 
0.35 

76.0 

10.9 
9.4 
13.9 
20.5 
2.4 

8.9 

9.4 

2017 
2 287 w 
: 

43 
26.4 
32.5 

2017 
149.0 
964.0 w 

70.5 w 
15 w 

2017 
13.1 ds 

2 657 

2017 
4.4 
0.95 
0.34 

81.0 

10.9 
9.6 
13.8 
20.2 
2.4 

9.1 

9.8 

2018 
2 509 w 
: 

43 
25.8 
31.0 

2018 
151.0 
977.0 w 

74.5 w 
16 w 

2018 
13.2 ds 

2 842 

2018 
4.3 
1.03 
0.35 

84.0 

Environment 
*Index of greenhouse gas emissions,  CO2 equivalent (1990 = 100) 

Note 

2008 
176.7 w 

2015 
215.4 w 

2016 
226.9 w 

2017 
238.8 w 

2018 
237.5 w 

13.7 
12.4 
16.5 
25.2 
3.2 

12.3 

10.6 

2019 
2 857 w 
: 

42 
27.4 
28.7 

2019 
150.0 
972.0 w 

75.0 w 
17 w 

2019 
13.3 s 

3 060 

2019 
: 
1.06 
0.35 

88.0 

2019 
: 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Energy intensity of the economy (kg of oil equivalent per 1 000 euro GDP at 2015 constant 
prices) 
Electricity generated from renewable sources relative to gross electricity consumption (%) 
Road share of inland freight transport (based on tonne-km) (%) 

187.2 

171.4 

175.0 

175.3 

167.7 

168.4 

17.4 w 
94.4 w 

31.5 w 
95.9 w 

32.3 w 
95.6 w 

29.4 w 
95.4 w 

32.2 w 
94.8 w 

43.6 w 
: 

Energy 
Primary production of all energy products (thousand TOE) 
Primary production of crude oil (thousand TOE) 
Primary production of solid fuels (thousand TOE) 
Primary production of gas (thousand TOE) 
Net imports of all energy products (thousand TOE) 
Gross inland energy consumption (thousand TOE) 
Gross electricity generation (GWh) 

Agriculture 
Agricultural production volume index of goods and services (at producer prices) (2010 = 100) 
Utilised agricultural area (thousand hectares) 
Livestock numbers: live bovine animals (thousand heads, end of period) 
Livestock numbers: live swine (thousand heads, end of period) 
Livestock numbers: live sheep and live goats (thousand heads, end of period) 
Raw milk available on farms (thousand tonnes) 
Harvested crop production: cereals (including rice) (thousand tonnes) 
Harvested crop production: sugar beet (thousand tonnes) 
Harvested crop production: vegetables (thousand tonnes) 

Source: Eurostat and the statistical authorities in Turkey 

: = not available 
  b = break in series 
  d =  definition differs 
  p = provisional 

s = Eurostat estimate 

Note 

Note 

12) 

2008 
28 661 
2 134 
16 373 
838 
72 480 s 
99 480 
198 354 

2008 
: 
39 095.0 
10 859.9 w 
1.7 w 
29 568.2 sw 
12 243.0 w 
29 287.0 
15 488.0 
27 259.0 

2015 
31 459 
2 657 
12 798 
314 
103 741 s 
132 361 
261 288 

2015 
: 
38 551.0 
14 127.8 
1.6 w 
41 924.1 s 
18 654.7 w 
38 637.0 
16 023.0 
29 552.0 

2016 
35 705 
2 721 
15 498 
302 
106 071 s 
139 634 
273 694 

2016 
: 
38 328.0 
14 222.2 p 
1.3 w 
41 329.2 ps 
18 489.2 w 
35 724.9 
19 465.0 
30 267.0 

2017 
36 466 
2 695 
15 682 
292 
116 755 s 
150 445 
296 429 

2017 
: 
38 120.0 
16 105.0 p 
1.4 w 
44 312.3 s 
20 699.9 w 
36 598.8 
21 149.0 
30 826.0 

2018 
39 909 
3 010 
16 547 
351 
109 980 s 
148 120 
303 852 

2019 
45 134 
3 102 
17 429 
390 
105 649 s 
150 123 
302 796 

2018 
: 
38 239.0 
17 220.9 p 
1.6 w 
46 117.4 sw 
22 120.7 w 
34 705.8 
18 900.0 
29 987.0 

2019 
: 
37 712.0 
17 872.3 w 
1.4 w 
48 481.5 sw 
22 960.4 w 
35 202.1 
18 055.0 
31 041.0 

  w = data supplied by and under the responsibility of the national statistical authority and published on an "as is" basis and without any assurance as regards 

their quality and adherence to EU statistical methodology 
* = Europe 2020 indicator 
** = Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) indicator 

  Footnotes: 

1)  Area values are calculated by reference to corine classifications and adapted to LUCAS. 
2)  Average of year exchange rate used to convert to euros. 
3)  Based on BPM5. 
4)  End of year exchange rate used to convert to Turkish Lira. 
5)  End of year exchange rate used to convert to euros. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6)  The exchange rate is the Central Bank buying rate at the end of the year.  Data cover loans granted by MFIs to residents. Participation Banks and 

Investment and Development Banks are included. 

7)  Data cover debt securities and loans. 
8)  Average of monthly data. Overnight deposit facility. 
9) 

Indices are calculated with Fisher index formula and are 2010=100 

10)  Source: Income and Living Conditions Survey. 
11)  Main lines only. 

Area values are calculated by reference to corine classifications and adapted to LUCAS. 

12)  Excluding buffaloes.