COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Measures adopted by the Member States to protect the EU's financial interests in 2020 Implementation of Article 325 TFEU Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 32nd Annual Report on the protection of the European Union's financial interests - Fight against fraud - 2020
Date: 2021-09-20
Institutions: European Anti-Fraud Office, European Commission
Subjects: EU Member State, EU budget, EU strategy, activity report, coronavirus disease, epidemic, fight against crime, financial control, fraud, fraud against the EU

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 20.9.2021  SWD(2021) 264 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Measures adopted by the Member States to protect the EU's financial interests in 2020 Implementation of Article 325 TFEU Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 32nd Annual Report on the protection of the European Union's financial interests - Fight against fraud - 2020 {COM(2021) 578 final} - {SWD(2021) 257 final} - {SWD(2021) 258 final} - {SWD(2021) 259 final} - {SWD(2021) 262 final} - {SWD(2021) 263 final}  
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................. 3 

1.  PROTECTING THE EU’S FINANCIAL INTERESTS ............................................. 4 

2.  OVERVIEW  OF  THE  MEASURES  TAKEN  BY  MEMBER  STATES  IN 

2020 ............................................................................................................................. 4 

3.  ANTI-FRAUD  MEASURES  ADOPTED  BY  THE  MEMBER  STATES 

AND THE ANTI-FRAUD CYCLE ............................................................................ 5 

4.  PROGRESS ON NATIONAL ANTI-FRAUD STRATEGIES ................................ 10 

5.  ANTI-FRAUD MEASURES BY THE MEMBER STATES ................................... 13 

5.1.  Austria ............................................................................................................. 13 

5.2.  Belgium ........................................................................................................... 14 

5.3.  Bulgaria ........................................................................................................... 16 

5.4.  Croatia ............................................................................................................. 18 

5.5.  Czechia ............................................................................................................ 20 

5.6.  Denmark .......................................................................................................... 22 

5.7.  Estonia ............................................................................................................. 24 

5.8.  Finland ............................................................................................................. 26 

5.9.  France .............................................................................................................. 27 

5.10.  Germany .......................................................................................................... 28 

5.11.  Greece   ........................................................................................................... 30 

5.12.  Hungary ........................................................................................................... 32 

5.13.  Ireland   ........................................................................................................... 34 

5.14.  Italy 

 ........................................................................................................... 35 

5.15.  Latvia 

 ........................................................................................................... 37 

5.16.  Lithuania .......................................................................................................... 39 

5.17.  Luxembourg .................................................................................................... 41 

5.18.  Malta 

 ........................................................................................................... 42 

5.19.  The Netherlands ............................................................................................... 43 

5.20.  Poland   ........................................................................................................... 44 

5.21.  Portugal  ........................................................................................................... 46 

5.22.  Romania ........................................................................................................... 48 

5.23.  Slovakia ........................................................................................................... 50 

5.24.  Slovenia ........................................................................................................... 52 

5.25.  Spain 

 ........................................................................................................... 54 

 
 
5.26.  Sweden  ........................................................................................................... 56 

6.  ADDITIONAL MEASURES REPORTED BY THE MEMBER STATES ............. 58 

6.1.  Croatia ............................................................................................................. 58 

6.2.  Estonia ............................................................................................................. 58 

6.3.  France .............................................................................................................. 58 

6.4.  Germany .......................................................................................................... 59 

6.5.  Hungary ........................................................................................................... 59 

6.6.  Latvia ............................................................................................................... 60 

6.7.  Lithuania .......................................................................................................... 61 

6.8.  Romania ........................................................................................................... 61 

6.9.  Spain ................................................................................................................ 62 

7.  TRAINING ON THE IRREGULARITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (IMS) 

ORGANISED BY THE MEMBER STATES ........................................................... 64 

8.  CASE STUDIES REPORTED BY MEMBER STATES ......................................... 65 

8.1.  Belgium ........................................................................................................... 65 

8.2.  Bulgaria ........................................................................................................... 65 

8.3.  Croatia ............................................................................................................. 66 

8.4.  Estonia ............................................................................................................. 66 

8.5.  Greece .............................................................................................................. 67 

8.6.  Hungary ........................................................................................................... 68 

8.7. 

Italy .................................................................................................................. 68 

8.8.  Lithuania .......................................................................................................... 69 

8.9.  Romania ........................................................................................................... 70 

8.10.  Slovakia ........................................................................................................... 70 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 

AFCOS 

Anti-fraud coordination service 

AM 

CAP 

EDES 

EPPO 

ERDF 

ESF 

Mutual assistance 

Common agricultural policy 

Early Detection and Exclusion System 

European Public Prosecutor’s Office 

European Regional Development Fund 

European Social Fund 

ESI Funds 

European Structural and Investment Funds 

NAFS 

TOR 

TFEU 

VAT 

National anti-fraud strategy 

Traditional own resources 

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 

Value-added tax 

3 

 
 
 
 
1.  PROTECTING THE EU’S FINANCIAL INTERESTS 

Protecting  the  EU’s  financial  interests  is  a  shared  responsibility  between  the  European 
institutions and the EU’s Member States. The Member States contribute the largest share 
of the EU budget, collect the traditional own resources (TOR)1 on behalf of the EU, and 
directly manage about two thirds of EU expenditure. 

Article  325(2)  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  (TFEU)  states 
‘Member  States  shall  take  the  same  measures  to  counter  fraud  affecting  the  financial 
interests  of  the  Union  as  they  take  to  counter  fraud  affecting  their  own  financial 
interests’.  

According  to  Article  325(5)  TFEU,  the  ‘Commission,  in  cooperation  with  Member 
States, shall each year submit to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on 
the measures taken for the implementation of this Article’.  

To  compile  this  document,  and  gather  the  necessary  information  to  prepare  the  report 
referred to in Article 325(5), the Commission has asked Member States to report on the 
most important measures they have taken to protect the EU’s financial interests. Member 
States were asked to submit no more than three measures in detail, with the possibility to 
provide summarised information about additional ones. Member States have contributed 
to this document using the web platform EU Survey. 

2.  OVERVIEW OF THE MEASURES TAKEN BY MEMBER STATES IN 2020 

Member States reported 68 measures in 2020 to protect the EU’s financial interests and 
fight  fraud.  Member  States  were  invited  to  report  on  –  at  most  –  three  of  their  most 
important  anti-fraud  measures.  This  document  therefore  offers  a  good  –  albeit  non-
exhaustive – overview of trends and priorities in the anti-fraud measures implemented by 
Member  States.  In  some  instances,  there  may  be  more  than  three  measures  effectively 
reported  because  Member  States  may  report  ‘single’  or  ‘package’  measures.  Package 
measures usually encompass a number of instruments adopted at the same time and that 
pursue  the  same  objective.  On  the  total  number  of  reported  measures,  22  (32%)  were 
‘package’ measures. 

Some  Member  States  also  reported  additional  measures  beyond  the  three  requested. 
Across  all  Member  State  contributions,  nine  additional  measures  were  reported.  These 
additional measures are detailed in Section 6 of this document. Ten Member States also 
reported  case  studies  on  how  they  were  protecting  the  EU’s  financial  interests.  These 
case studies are presented in Section 8. 

Reported  measures  are  categorised  under  four  different  categories: 
administrative, organisational and operational.  

legislative, 

A legislative measure is an act adopted by a legislative body or having legal force. 

An  administrative  measure  is  a  legal  act  adopted  by  an  administrative  body  to 
implement actions provided for by legislative acts.  

1  Traditional own resources for the period 2014-2020 are mainly customs duties on imports from outside 

the EU and sugar levies. 

4 

 
                                                 
An organisational measure is a decision or any other non-legislative act taken to change 
the organisational setting of an administration or body whose tasks and activities related 
to the protection of the EU’s financial interests. 

An  operational  measure  is  any  action  undertaken  by  an  administration  or  body  whose 
tasks  and  activities  related  to  the  protection  of  the  EU’s  financial  interests,  where  that 
action has a direct impact on their operations.  

In  2020,  measures  focusing  on  operational  aspects  were  the  most  reported,  and  were 
present in 44% of the reported initiatives, as shown in Figure 1. 

Figure 1: Distribution of reported measures by type2 

44%

50%

45%

40%

35%

30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

25%

22%

21%

Operational

Legislative

Administrative

Organisational

3.  ANTI-FRAUD MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE MEMBER STATES AND THE ANTI-FRAUD 

CYCLE 

The fight against fraud can be truly effective if it follows a holistic and comprehensive 
approach and takes into account all the steps of the anti-fraud cycle. The concept of the 
anti-fraud  cycle  is  grounded  in  the  observation  that  the  EU’s  financial  interests  are 
protected by many players, processes and stages. These players, processes and stages are 
deeply  interconnected  and  influence  each  other.  The  anti-fraud  cycle  is  presented  in 
Figure 2 below. 

2  When reporting a package of measures, more than one category can be included in that package. 

5 

 
 
                                                 
Figure 2: The anti-fraud cycle 

Prevention

Detection

Recovery and 
sanctions

Investigation 
and 
prosecution

In 2020, Member States reported measures covering the entire anti-fraud cycle. However, 
as  in  previous  years,  the  measures  reported  in  2020  focused  on  fraud  prevention  and 
detection  (around  70%  of  measures  focused  on  fraud  prevention  and  detection).  Fewer 
measures  focused  on  investigation  and  in  particular  on  reparation  (sanctions  and 
recovery), as shown in Figure 3. 

Figure 3: Reported measures and steps of the anti-fraud cycle 

71%

69%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

25%

16%

Prevention

Detection

Investigation and
prosecution

Recovery and sanctions

This distribution is broadly similar to the distribution over the last 3 years, and Member 
States show a high degree of consistency and continuity in their measures from  year to 
year.  

When  reporting  the  adopted  measures,  Member  States  also  indicate  specific  areas 
addressed by the measures. These areas are: 

  public procurement 
 

financial crime (including anti-money laundering) 

6 

 
 
 
  organised crime 
  corruption 
  conflict of interest 
 
fraud definition 
  anti-fraud coordination services (AFCOS) 
  whistleblowing 
  customs/TOR/illicit trade 
  shared management and control of EU funds 
  anti-fraud strategy and anti-corruption strategy 
  other areas. 

A measure  can address  more than one  area  at  the same time.  Figure 4 shows the  areas 
addressed by the reported measures. 

Figure 4: Measures by area addressed 

As  in  previous  years,  several  reported  measures  addressed  ‘shared  management  and 
control  of  EU  funds’  and  ‘public  procurement’.  In  2020,  Member  States  devoted 
particular attention to ‘anti-fraud strategies and anti-corruption strategies’ and ‘conflict of 
interest’.  Figure  5  further  breaks  down  the  same  information  by  Member  State  and  by 
area concerned. 

7 

 
 
Figure 5: Number of measures reported by area 

Most of these measures (65%) targeted specific budgetary sectors.  

Figure 6: Cross-cutting measures that address several sectors vs sectoral measures that focus on 
a single sector 

Figure 7 breaks down this information by Member State. 

8 

Member StateNo of measurespublic procurementfinancial crime (incl. money laundering)organised crimecorruptionconflict of interestfraud definitionanti-fraud coordination services - AFCOSwhistle-blowingcustoms / TOR / illicit tradeshared management and control of EU fundsanti-fraud or anti-corruption strategyOtherBE311123BG331121111211CZ3111211DK3121DE321332131EE3111IE1111EL31211111111ES323FR21111HR31211IT3112121CYLV33LT312211LU1111HU311111MT11NL312AT21112PL31111PT3121211RO3111SI311121SK32211FI11SE312221TOTAL681917991485312231716% of total100%28%25%13%13%21%12%7%4%18%34%25%24% 
 
 
Figure 7: Cross-cutting measures vs sectoral measures by Member State 

Member State 
Austria 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Czechia  
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
TOTAL 

Cross-cutting 

Sectoral 

TOTAL 

1 
2 

1 

2 

1 
2 
1 
1 
1 

2 
1 
1 

1 

2 
2 

2 
23 

2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
3 
1 
1 

2 
1 
2 

2 
3 
1 

3 
2 
3 
1 
1 
3 
3 
1 
42 

2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
1 
2 
3 
3 
3 
1 
3 
3 
3 
1 
1 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
68 

Among  the  sectoral  measures  reported,  23  relate  to  various  expenditure  sectors  and  18 
relate to revenue. Figure 8 shows that most of the adopted measures in the expenditure 
sectors largely relate to cohesion policy, followed by agriculture and fisheries. 

Figure 8: Sectoral measures: expenditure 

9 

 
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
  
  
 
4.  PROGRESS ON NATIONAL ANTI-FRAUD STRATEGIES 

By the end of 2020, 14 Member States3 had reported having adopted their national anti-
fraud  strategies  (NAFS).  Of  these  14,  Czechia  informed  the  Commission  that  it  had 
updated  its  strategy,  but  had  not  yet  sent  the  Commission  the  new  document;  and 
Portugal said it had adopted a NAFS, but had not yet formally communicated nor sent it 
to  the  Commission.  However,  some  of  these  NAFS  need  to  be  updated.  Of  the  12 
Member States that replied they did not have a NAFS in place4, 55 indicated that they had 
launched a procedure to adopt one, as shown in Figure 9. 

The NAFS situation has improved compared to last year, when only 10 Member States 
indicated they had a NAFS in place. 

The implementation of the national recovery and resilience plans would be a good time 
for Member States that do not have a NAFS in  place  to draw up a NAFS based on the 
guidelines prepared by the Commission in collaboration with Member State experts. For 
Member States that already have a NAFS in place, they could take another step forward 
by updating the NAFS to take into account the risks linked to the implementation of the 
Recovery and Resilience Facility. 

3  Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Portugal, 

Slovakia, Sweden. 

4   Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, 

Slovenia, Spain. 

5   Belgium, Estonia, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania. 

10 

 
                                                 
Figure 9: NAFS state of play6 

A NAFS makes it possible to structure the fight against fraud affecting EU and national 
budgets at Member State level. It also makes it easier to: 

i. 

ii. 

iii. 

iv. 

identify vulnerabilities to fraud in  national  systems,  assess the main fraud risks, 
and decide on/implement appropriate responses;  

evaluate progress  made,  and adapt  responses to  both  the trends in  fraud and the 
resources available;  

involve  all  relevant  stakeholders,  in  particular  with  more  collaborative  and 
coordinated actions.  

harmonise  the  response  to  fraud  risks  throughout  the  country,  especially  if  the 
country has a decentralised management structure. 

6 Some Member States have broader strategies, not limited to anti-fraud issues. 

11 

 
 
                                                 
The benefits of a NAFS are set out in the three bullet points below. 

  A  NAFS  helps  to  effectively  and  efficiently  protect  the  EU’s  financial  interests 
(e.g. by improving the prevention, detection and fight against corruption and any 
other illegal activities affecting the EU’s financial interests). 

  A NAFS sets out a better framework upon which the administrations involved in 
implementing and monitoring EU funds can: (i) work to improve administrative 
capacity; and (ii) determine more precisely the roles and responsibilities of all the 
bodies  involved.  This  would  make  it  easier  to  better  coordinate  the  national 
institutions’ legislative, administrative and operational activities. 

  A NAFS can help to recover more unduly spent  funds from the EU’s budget.  It 
can  also  help  to  set  proportionate  and  dissuasive  penalties  for  undue  spending 
under the applicable law. 

12 

 
 
 
5.  ANTI-FRAUD MEASURES BY THE MEMBER STATES 

5.1.  Austria 

Expenditure  –  Agriculture,  fisheries,  cohesion  policy  and  Fund  for  the  Most  Deprived: 
Audit strategy  

In 2020, Austria drew up an audit strategy. The aim of this strategy was to describe both 
the bodies responsible and the measures put  in  place. The audit strategy also  described 
the  administrative  systems  in  place  for  checks,  recovery  measures,  and  penalties.  This 
strategy should ensure that all audit bodies in Austria have a common understanding of: 
(i) existing procedures; (ii) room for improvement; and (iii) current best practices. 

Expenditure  –  Cohesion  policy:  Preventing  irregularities  through  a  high  density  of 
checks 

The  Austrian  authorities  conducted  many  checks  under  Article  125(4)  of  Regulation 
1303/2013  for  the  2014-2020  programming  period.  These  checks  helped  to  prevent 
irregularities.  The  audit  procedures  required  the  managing  bodies  to  audit  100%  of  the 
expenditure submitted by beneficiaries. National rules on eligibility and requirements in 
the  management  and  control  systems  should  increase  efficiency.  Standardised  forms 
(checklists) improved the quality of the accounts submitted. The entire funding process, 
including  the  accounting  process,  was  set  out  in  a  central  database.  In  addition,  the 
authorities  used 
the  European 
the  ARACHNE  data-mining 
Commission, for risk assessment and risk analysis. 

tool,  provided  by 

13 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionInvestigation and prosecutionRecovery and sanctionAnti-fraud or anti-corruption strategySingleAdministrativeNEligibility criteria; management of funds; monitoring/desk checks; on-the-spot checks; audit checklist; penalty; recoveryDescribing the administrative systems for the checks; recovery measures and penalties put in placeSAnti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReason for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionRecovery and sanctionPublic procurement; conflict of interest; shared management and control of EU funds; anti-fraud or anti-corruption PackageAdministrativeAEligibility criteria; management of funds; on-the-spot checks; irregularities reporting; penaltiesSOperationalAIT-tools; depiction of the entire funding procedure, including the accounting process, in a central database; use of ARACHNEEnhanced information flow; targeting of checksCross-cutting measure; checking and guaranteeing the use of funds and reporting irregularities detected. 
 
 
 
5.2.  Belgium 

Horizontal: Measures to strengthen monitoring 

Belgium reported that, on top of its existing internal monitoring measures, it took several 
additional measures in  2020 to  strengthen monitoring. These measures are described in 
the three sentences below. 

1.  The Brussels-Capital  Region  (dealing with  the European Regional Development 
Fund  (ERDF))  introduced  monitoring  measures  and  systematically  followed-up 
state aid rules and public-procurement rules.  

2.  The  ministry  of  the  German-speaking  Community  drew  up  and  applied  a 
handbook  on  internal  monitoring  (this  indirectly  affected  the  European  Social 
Fund (ESF)). 

3.  The Brussels-Capital Region (dealing with the ESF) computerised and simplified 
monitoring  by  calling  on  the  help  of  Actiris  Partners,  the  public-sector 
employment agency for Brussels. 

Expenditure  –  Agriculture,  fisheries  and  cohesion  policy:  Measures  to  strengthen 
integrity and prevent conflicts of interest 

Belgium  reported  that,  on  top  of  its  existing  measures,  it  also  took  several  additional 
measures in 2020. Two of these are set out below. 

1.  The  Flemish  Department  for  Agriculture  developed  its  integrity  policy  by 
identifying functions vulnerable to integrity risk and creating a contact point for 
questions on integrity.  

2.  The Federal Department for Structural Funds (dealing with the ERDF) adopted a 
declaration  on  anti-fraud  policy  based  on  a  Commission  template.  A  similar 
declaration exists for the Flemish Agency for Structural Funds (dealing with the 
ERDF) as well as for the Flemish and Walloon agriculture agencies. 

The aim of these measures was to identify vulnerabilities to integrity and take preventive 
action to remedy these vulnerabilities. This was in line with the Commission’s increased 
focus on conflict of interest (Article 61 of the Financial Regulation). 

14 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReason for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionShared management and control of EU funds; anti-fraud or anti-corruption strategy; state aidPackageAdministrativeNManagement of funds; monitoring/desk checks; audit checklist; investigation ERDF BXL: Strengthen administrative controls to ensure the use of European funds in accordance with the legislation on state aid.HOperationalAIT tools; web reporting/hotline; flagging practice; risk indicators; increased number of checksEnhanced ex-post controls 
 
Revenue – Customs and tax fraud: National operational plan 2020 

The Belgian national operational plan for 2020 further elaborated on the policy plan of 
the Belgian General Administration of Customs and Excise adopted in 2015. Part of the 
policy  plan  of  the  Belgian  General  Administration  of  Customs  and  Excise  focused  on 
using OLAF fraud reports by analysing and opening investigation cases where needed. 

An essential part of safeguarding the EU’s financial interests is to investigate – and take 
appropriate  action  against  –  the  potential  evasion  of  anti-dumping  and  countervailing 
duties.  

The minimum threshold for opening an investigation into customs fraud is EUR 10 000 
in evaded customs duties. For mutual assistance (AM) messages, the Belgian authorities 
collaborate  closely  with  the  Department  of  Risk  Management,  which  draws  up  risk 
profiles. When these ‘SPS-forms’ hit in relation to a potential fraud covered by an AM 
message, the verifying first-line agent contacts the pre-designated case officers. The pre-
designated  case  officers  then  check/take  samples  of  the  goods  potentially  subject  to 
customs fraud/evasion of anti-dumping and countervailing duties. 

15 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReason for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionSOperationalARisk indicatorsTargeting of checksNeutral on resourcesConflict of interest; integrity and transparency measurePackageOrganisationalAInter-agency cooperation; fraud awareness trainingAnti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReason for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralDetectionInvestigation and prosecutionSOperationalAIT tools; risk indicators; monitoring of container traffic in the port of AntwerpEnhanced coordination; targeting of checks; targeting of investigationsTo clarify or consolidate existing rulesPublic procurement; anti-fraud or anti-corruption strategy; investigating customs fraudPackageAdministrativeAMonitoring/desk checks; investigation 
 
 
 
 
5.3.  Bulgaria 

Horizontal: Adoption of a national strategy for preventing and combating irregularities 
and fraud affecting the financial interests of the EU over the period 2021-2027 

The main objective of the Bulgarian national strategy for the programming period 2021-
2027  adopted  on  12 November 2020  is  to  continue  Bulgaria’s  efforts  to  better  prevent, 
detect  and  counter  irregularities  and  fraud  on  the  expenditure  and  revenue  sides  of  the 
EU  budget.  The  preparation  and  adoption  of  the  strategy  follows  on  from  the  actions 
taken by the Bulgarian authorities to protect the financial interests of the EU (reflected in 
the national strategy for preventing and combating irregularities and fraud affecting the 
financial  interests  of  the  EU  for  the  period  2014-2020),  and  is  in  line  with  Bulgaria’s 
commitments. 

Bulgaria  stated  that  this  measure  was  important  because  it:  (i)  reflected  the  country’s 
desire to continue its efforts to better prevent, detect and counter irregularities and fraud 
on the expenditure and revenue sides of the EU budget; and (ii) complies with Bulgaria’s 
commitments undertaken for the period 2014-2020. 

The  national  strategy  outlines  the  objectives  of  the  competent  national  authorities  in 
Bulgaria that work to prevent and combat irregularities and fraud affecting the financial 
interests of the EU for the period 2021-2027. It also takes into account the new initiatives 
undertaken  to  protect  the  EU’s  financial  interests  at  European  level:  (i)  Directive  (EC) 
2017/1371; (ii) Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939; and (iii) Directive (EU) 2019/1937 
of the European Parliament and of the Council. 

Expenditure – All areas of expenditure: Amendment to the Regulation on the reporting of 
irregularities constituting grounds for making financial corrections  

In  2020,  Bulgaria  reported  on:  (i)  an  amendment  to  its  Regulation  on  the  reporting  of 
irregularities  constituting  grounds  for  making  financial  corrections:  and  (ii)  the 
percentage  indicators  for  determining  the  amount  of  financial  corrections  under  the 
European  Structural  and  Investment  Funds  (ESI  Funds)  Act  that  was  passed  on 
4 March 2020.  

The  Regulation  on  the  reporting  of  irregularities  constituting  grounds  for  making 
financial corrections: (i) sets out in detail the powers of those involved in managing and 
monitoring the ESI Funds; (ii) states the necessary minimum controls; and (iii) lays down 
the  procedure  for  recovering  irregular  expenditure.  The  Regulation  also  lays  down  the 
rules governing the payment, management and monitoring process. 

16 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionInvestigation and prosecutionRecovery and sanctionPublic procurement; financial crime; organised crime; conflict of interest; fraud definition; AFCOS; Whistleblowing; Customs; shared management; control of EU funds; anti-fraud strategy PackageLegislativeNTo continue efforts to better prevent; detect and counter irregularities and fraud on the expenditure and revenue sides of the EU budgetTo enforce the rules in line with developments in EU lawH 
 
The purpose of the changes introduced by Bulgaria’s Council of Ministers Decree No 35 
of 4 March 2020 is to align the approach taken to beneficiaries of programmes financed 
by  the  EU  with  developments  in  EU  law.  The  amendments  to  the  Regulation  on  the 
reporting  of  irregularities  provide  the  necessary  legal  rules  to  allow  the  European 
Commission’s previous guidelines to be applied to contracts, which fall within the scope 
of the European Directives of 2004. 

Horizontal: Use of a centralised electronic platform in public procurement 

In  2020,  Bulgaria  reported  that  it  had  begun  using  a  centralised  electronic  platform  in 
public procurement. This measure is  significant  because, according to  the requirements 
of  the  applicable  European  directives,  it  gradually  introduces  an  obligation  for  all 
procuring  entities  to  use  the  centralised  electronic  platform  in  accordance  with  Article 
39(a)(1) of Bulgaria’s Public Procurement Act.  

The measure included the adoption of a timetable for the sequence in which the various 
entities would start using the centralised electronic platform (the Centralised Automated 
Information  System  for  Public  Procurement)  under  Article  39(a)(1)  of  the  Public 
Procurement Act. With the adoption of the timetable, the centralised electronic platform 
will  start  to  be  gradually  used.  The  purpose  of  this  platform  is  to  update  the  public 
procurement  procedure  and  make  it  easier  to  use.  The  platform  offers  users  an  easy, 
convenient 
faster  and  more  secure 
communication  between  the  contracting  entity  and  interested  parties.  It  also  makes  it 
easier  to  prepare  and  exchange  the  documents  required  to  participate  in  the  tender 
procedure. 

interface.  Electronic  procurement  enables 

17 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralInvestigation and prosecutionTo enforce the rules in line with developments in EU lawHPublic procurement; conflict of interest; control of EU fundsSingleLegislativeAPowers; recoveryAnti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionPublic procurement; adoption of a timetable for the sequence in which the various entities will start using the centralised electronic SingleLegislativeNDefinition of a specific topicTo enforce the rules in line with developments in EU lawH 
 
 
 
 
5.4.  Croatia 

Horizontal: Implementation of anti-fraud policy for operational programmes 

In  2020,  Croatia  reported  on  the  implementation  of  anti-fraud  policy  by  two  different 
programmes:  (i)  the  Managing  Authority  for  Efficient  Human  Resources  2014-2020 
operational  programme;  and  (ii)  the  operational  programme  for  food  and/or  basic 
material assistance 2014-2020. 

Revenue – Customs: Enhanced controls in the port of Rijeka  

On  13 January 2020,  customs  officers  from  the  port  of  Rijeka  carried  out  an  enhanced 
check  on  two  containers  that  were  on  their  way  from  South  Korea  to  a  recipient  in 
Slovenia.  The  cargo  declared  in  the  customs  document  was  LDPE  (polyethylene). 
However, cigarettes  were found hidden inside the containers: 9.3 million ‘Moro’ brand 
cigarettes and 5.7 million ‘Manchester’ brand cigarettes. The cigarettes were seized and 
criminal charges were filed against the offender. 

In this specific case, customs officers shared information with officers from the Ministry 
of Interior, who filed criminal charges with the State Attorney’s Office. Throughout the 
operation, the customs agency and the Ministry of Interior worked together and shared all 
important information. 

18 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDefinition of fraud; anti-fraud or anti-corruption strategySingleAdministrativeAMonitoring/desk checks; reporting of irregularities To clarify or consolidate existing rulesHAnti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralInvestigation and prosecutionSCustoms/TOR/ illicit tradeSingleOperationalNStructured cooperation with law enforcement; structured cooperation with judicial authoritiesEnhanced coordination and cooperation 
 
 
Revenue  –  Tax  fraud:  Implementation  of  the  General  Audit  Support  System  at  the 
Croatian Tax Administration 

Croatia implemented this project in 2018-2021. The project involved: (i) procurement of 
the  IT  system;  (ii)  adapting  the  system  to  the  needs  of  the  tax  administration;  and  (iii) 
training  users  on  the  system.  The  system  enables  audit  sectors/offices/field  offices  to 
perform  checks,  desk  audits  and  comprehensive  audits  based  on  risk  analysis  and 
activated risks produced by a separate risk-management system. 

19 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionInvestigation and prosecutionFinancial crime; definition of fraudPackageOperationalNIT tools; risk indicatorsTargeting of checks; targeting of investigationsS 
 
 
 
5.5.  Czechia 

Horizontal:  Adoption  of  organisational  measures  in  the  public  prosecution  system  as 
part of setting up the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) 

In  2020,  Czechia  reported  on  the  adoption  of  organisational  measures  in  the  public 
prosecution  system  as  part  of  setting  up  the  EPPO  and  the  scheduled  launch  of  the 
EPPO’s  activities  in  2021.  The  proper  conduct  of  criminal  proceedings  concerning  the 
EU’s  financial  interests  requires:  (i)  setting  up  mechanisms  for  mutual  cooperation 
between  national  prosecuting  authorities  and  the  EPPO;  and  (ii)  paving  the  way  for 
European prosecutors to exercise their powers in the Member State. 

Expenditure – Cohesion policy: Update of procedures for checking ownership structures 
and conflicts of interest 

In  2020,  the  Czech  Managing  Authority  for  the  Research,  Development  and  Education 
Operational  Programme  updated  its  procedures  for  checking  ownership  structures  and 
conflicts  of  interest.  The  managing  authority’s  operating  manual  now  includes 
procedures  for  checking  the  risk  of  conflicts  of  interest  among  public  officials  under 
Section  4(c)  of  Act  No  156/2006  on  conflicts  of  interest.  The  ownership  structure  of 
applicants/partners  is  checked  by  the  managing  authority  before  issuing  a  legal 
instrument. Subsequently, in the course of the administrative handling of each request for 
payment and during on-the-spot checks, staff from the managing authority check whether 
the ownership structure has changed since the legal instrument was issued. 

If this check reveals a match between an applicant’s beneficial owner or partner with a 
financial stake and the managing authority’s list of public officials, the data are checked 
in  other 
the 
applicant/partner with a financial stake. If the applicant/partner is found to have a conflict 
of interest, the procedure is terminated and no grant is awarded. 

information  systems  by 

information/documents 

requesting 

from 

20 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralDetectionInvestigation and prosecutionRecovery and sanctionPublic procurement; financial crime; organised crime; conflict of interestSingleOrganisationalNCompetence; inter-agency cooperation; adoption of measures to organise competitions for the position of European Delegated Applicants; appointment of the selection board, initiation of the selection procedure, selection of candidates for these positions, while creating the conditions for the future exercise of their functions by the National Public Prosecutor’s OfficeNeutral on resourcesHAnti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionSConflict of interest; shared management and control of EU fundsSingleOperationalAIncreased number of checksTargeting of checks; targeting of investigations; enhanced ex-ante controls 
 
 
Revenue – Customs: Accelerating the process of determining a customs debt 

In 2020, Czechia reported that it had sped up and simplified the process for determining a 
customs debt and entering it in the accounts after a post-release control.  

The  new  Section  88(a)(4)  of  the  Tax  Code  allows  an  additional  payment  notice  to  be 
served at the same time as a notice of completion of a post-release control under Article 
48  of  Regulation  (EU)  No  952/2013.  This  will  reduce  the  time  limit  for  entry  in  the 
accounts by up to 9 days, as what used to be two successive actions can now be carried 
out simultaneously. Before the amendment, notice of completion of the control had to be 
served before the additional payment notice could be sent. 

21 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralRecovery and sanctionCustoms/TOR/illicit tradeSingleLegislativeADetermination and collection of customs debtTo clarify or consolidate existing rulesS 
 
 
 
5.6.  Denmark 

Expenditure – Cohesion policy: Merging data to identify cases of double financing 

In  2020,  Denmark  reported  on  an  investigation  that  involved  merging  data  from  the 
salary-compensation scheme with reporting data from the Danish Business Authority to 
identify  double  financing  (related  to  COVID-19).  Denmark  took  this  measure  because 
COVID-19 has increased the risk of fraud. The administrative control has been expanded 
with  additional  checks  to  ensure  that  participating  companies  do  not  receive  double 
financial support. 

Expenditure – Agriculture: Action plan on the CAP 

Denmark has implemented an action plan as a follow-up on conclusions and reports on 
the CAP from external experts in 2019. In 2020, Denmark implemented an action plan on 
the  basis  of  the  recommendations  to  improve  detection  and  follow-up  on  red  flags. 
Denmark’s agency responsible for providing payments from the CAP has designed a risk 
profile to register, prioritise and mitigate the risk of fraud. The administration responsible 
for fraud prevention in the CAP has also received additional funding. 

The  action  plan  is  designed  to  increase  Denmark’s  detection  and  follow-up  of  fraud  in 
the CAP. 

22 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionConflict of interest; shared management and control of EU fundsSingleAdministrativeNEligibility criteria; management of funds; monitoring/desk checks; expansion of administrative controlsTo clarify or consolidate existing rules; cross-cutting control with the Commission scheme and the salary compensation scheme.SAnti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionOrganisationalACompetenceIncreased resourcesOperational              N                    Risk indicatorsEnhanced information flow;  targeting of checks; enhanced ex-ante controlsSShared management and control of EU fundsPackageAdministrativeAManagement of funds; monitoring/desk checks; on-the-spot checksTo clarify or consolidate existing rules 
 
 
Expenditure – Fisheries: Anti-fraud strategy of the Danish Fisheries Agency 

The  Danish  Fisheries  Agency  adopted  its  own  anti-fraud  strategy  with  an  associated 
process  plan  in  the  summer  of  2020.  The  strategy  aims  to  protect  the  EU’s  financial 
interests and fight fraud. 

23 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionAnti-fraud or anti-corruption strategySingleOrganisationalNSimplification of procedures; process plan for the internal division of responsibilities for handling fraudNeutral on resourcesS 
 
 
 
5.7.  Estonia 

Revenue – Customs: Fight against fuel fraud 

In  2020,  Estonia  implemented  a  measure  that:  (i)  simplifies  monitoring  of  debunkered 
fuel; and (ii) helps to fight illicit trade in untaxed/smuggled fuel from ships registered in 
non-EU countries. 

The release of fuels, bunkered from a ship, may only take place in a port. This helps to 
prevent both marine pollution and fuel fraud. By allowing non-compliant bunker fuel to 
only  be  transferred  in  a  port,  risks  can  be  mitigated  by  control  activities.  This  also 
reduces the likelihood of oil products with customs status from non-EU countries being 
smuggled tax-free to the EU via Estonia’s territorial waters. 

Horizontal: Launch of a cybercrime information and notification website 

In  2020,  the  Estonian  Central  Criminal  Police  launched  a  cybercrime  information  and 
notification website: https://cyber.politsei.ee/en/report/.  

Estonia took this measure because personal and sensitive data can be found online. This 
could potentially attract criminals, and it is important that people can easily report such 
incidents if they become victims of cybercrime. 

Improvement of the public-procurement register 

In  2020,  Estonia  reported  on  an  improvement  of  its  public-procurement  register.  The 
register provides machine-processed open data on public procurement. Machine-readable 
open  data  enable  interest  groups  to  provide  applications  to  enhance  better  transparency 
and help prevent corruption (e.g. Transparency  International in Estonia is working on a 
project on using procurement open data to publish links between the people connected to 
contracting  authorities  and  winning  companies).  Open  data  is  also  used  in  a  project 
started  by  State  Audit.  Further  initiatives  are  expected  (https://riigihanked.riik.ee/rhr-
web/#/open-data). 

The  market  research  functionality  enables  contracting  authorities  searching  the  market 
before actually starting the procurement procedure. It helps learning the market players 
and  making  previous  contact  advertising  the  coming  opportunity  in  an  open  and  non-
discriminatory way. It enables better setting the requirements for the goods or services to 

24 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionCustoms/TOR/ illicit tradeSingleLegislativeADefinition of a specific topicTo remedy flawsSAnti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionHCybercrimeSingleOperationalNWeb reporting/HotlineEnhanced information flow 
 
 
be  purchased  and  getting 
the 
https://riigihanked.riik.ee/rhr-web/#/. 

indication 

for 

the  best  value 

for  money: 

25 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionPublic procurementPackageOperationalAIT tools; risk indicators; increased number of checks; transparencyTargeting of checks; targeting of investigations; enhanced ex-ante controls; enhanced ex-post controls; transparencyH 
 
 
 
5.8. 

Finland 

Expenditure  –  All  areas  of  expenditure:  Anti-fraud  cooperation  between  national 
authorities under the ESI Funds 

In  2020,  Finland  reported  that  it  had  launched  anti-fraud  cooperation  between  Finnish 
groups administering the ESI Funds to benefit from close cooperation and make practices 
consistent. The cooperation aims at  sharing and  developing  good practices  between the 
Funds. 

26 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionShared management and control of EU fundsSingleOrganisationalNInter-agency cooperationIncreased resourcesS 
 
 
 
5.9. 

France 

Horizontal:  Transposition  of  Regulation  (EU)  2017/1939  on  the  European  Public 
Prosecutor’s Office 

French Law No 2020-1672 of 24 December 2020 adapts national law to the creation of 
the EPPO. Under the Law, French delegated prosecutors will have extensive prerogatives 
to fight against acts detrimental to the EU’s financial interests. 

The  Law  details:  (i)  the  responsibilities  of  the  European  delegated  prosecutors;  (ii)  the 
applicable procedures; and (iii) the division of powers between the EPPO, the European 
delegated prosecutors and the French judicial authority. It also details the powers of the 
EPPO in customs infringements detrimental to the EU’s financial interests. It states that 
the Paris Judicial Court (Tribunal Judiciaire de Paris) and the Paris Court of Appeal will 
try  criminal  offences  detrimental  to  the  EU’s  financial  interests  that  fall  within  the 
jurisdiction of the EPPO. 

Horizontal: Creation of an inter-ministerial AFCOS 

French Decree No 2020-872 of 15 July 2020 on the inter-ministerial coordination of the 
fight  against  fraud  set  up  the  Inter-ministerial  Mission  Coordinating  the  Fight  against 
Fraud. This was designated as the French AFCOS. 

27 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralInvestigation and prosecutionRecovery and sanctionTo enforce the rules in line with developments in EU lawHFinancial crime; organised crime; customs/TOR/ illicit trade SingleLegislativeNPowers; criminal sanctionsAnti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionInvestigation and prosecutionAFCOSSingleOrganisationalN/AInter-agency cooperation; setting up a French AFCOSIncrease of resourcesH 
 
 
 
 
5.10.  Germany 

Expenditure  –  Cohesion  policy:  Self-assessment  of  fraud  risk  for  the  federal  ESF 
programme  

In  2020,  Germany  reported  on  its  self-assessment  of  fraud  risk,  a  self-assessment 
recommended  in  the  Commission  Guidance  Note  on  Fraud-Risk  Assessment  and 
Effective and Proportionate Anti-Fraud Measures. A report on the self-assessment was 
compiled  by  the  ESF  managing  authority  for  Germany’s  federal  ESF  operational 
programme. 

Expenditure – Cohesion policy: Fraud-risk assessment for the ERDF 

In 2020, Germany reported on the performance of a fraud-risk assessment for the Hessen 
ERDF  programme,  as  specified  by  the  Commission  in  its  guidance  note  on  anti-fraud 
measures. 

Anti-fraud cycle (North Rhine-Westphalia ERDF programme) 

In  2020,  Germany  reported  different  measures  taken  under  the  anti-fraud  cycle  of  the 
North Rhine-Westphalia ERDF programme. 

The  federal  state  of  North  Rhine-Westphalia  amended  its  framework  guidelines  on  the 
award  of  grants  from  the  ERDF  under  the  ‘Investment  for  Growth  and  Jobs’  objective 
(ERDF)  in  the  2014-2020  funding  period.  In  2020,  North  Rhine-Westphalia  also 

28 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionPublic procurement; corruption; conflict of interest; fraud definition; shared management and control of EU funds; anti-fraud or anti-corruption strategySingleOperationalAself-assessment of fraud risksAs part of the fraud risk self-assessment exercise, the impact and likelihood of common fraud risks occurring are assessed and the measures required to assess the risks are described.SAnti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionSPublic procurement; financial crime; corruption; conflict of interest; shared management and control of EU fundsSingleOperationalARisk indicatorsMonitoring and ensuring a tolerable risk level (net risk) in connection with ERDF support. Potential risks and the existing controls are identified and assessed for various risk areas. If the net risk level is not tolerable for individual risks, an action plan must be drawn up setting out additional measures.  
 
 
amended  the  general  ancillary  provisions  on  grants  to  support  projects  using  resources 
from the ERDF. 

At managing authority and intermediate-body level, the following measures were taken: 

i. 

separation of functions;  

ii. 

introduction of the ‘four-eyes’ principle;  

iii. 

use of the BISAM IT system for project implementation; 

iv. 

verification of the intermediate body’s work, including via BISAM; 

v. 

annual updates of SAT by the self-assessment team. 

At project level, the following measures were taken:  

i. 

transparent  conditions  for  assistance  were  decided  on,  among  other  things,  by 
making reference to the ERDF framework guidelines;  

ii. 

standardised forms were provided by the managing authority;  

iii. 

it  was  made  possible  to  verify  and  document  the  application,  payment  claim, 
factual  report  and  statement  of  expenditure  using  standardised  checklists  in 
BISAM;  

iv. 

on-the-spot verifications were introduced;  

v. 

a  new  rule  was  introduced  stating  that  a  statement  relevant  to  the  payment  of 
subsidies must be included in applications; 

vi. 

payments via BISAM were made possible;  

vii. 

support awarded was recovered, if necessary;  

viii. 

a guidance note on anti-fraud measures was published. 

29 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionOrganisationalACompetenceMore efficient use of resourcesRecovery and sanction   Operational               A     IT tools; web reporting/hotlineEnhanced coordination;  cooperation;  information flow and ex-ante controlsCorruption; conflict of interest; fraud definition; whistle-blowers; shared management and control of EU funds PackageAdministrativeAMonitoring/desk checks; on-the-spot checks; audit checklist; recoveryTo clarify or consolidate existing rulesH 
 
 
 
5.11.  Greece 

Horizontal:  Decision  setting  out  the  organisation  of  the  National  Transparency 
Authority/AFCOS 

In  2020,  Greece’s  independent  AFCOS  was  set  up  within  the  Directorate-General  for 
Integrity and Accountability. The responsibilities of the AFCOS include: (i) coordinating 
the bodies involved in  the fight  against fraud affecting the EU’s financial  interests;  (ii) 
cooperating with OLAF and the other Member States; (iii) reporting data and statistics to 
the European Commission; (iv) analysing data on fraud and irregularities; and (v) acting 
as a representative in national and international bodies. 

Within the Inspection and Control Unit of the National Transparency Authority, a Public 
Works and Transport Department was set up, partly to investigate complaints and carry 
out checks relating to:  

i. 

fraud and/or suspected fraud at all stages of the award of public supply contracts, 
public service contracts, and public works contracts, according to EU and national 
legislation; 

ii. 

protection of the EU’s budget and financial interests. 

Horizontal:  Transposition  into  Greek  law  of  Directive  (EU)  2017/1371  on  the  fight 
against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law 

Greece reported the adoption of Law No 4689/2020 (Government Gazette, Series I, No 
103,  27.5.2020).  It  transposes  into  Greek  law  Directive  (EU)  2017/1371  on  the  fight 
against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law. This Greek law 
lays  down  rules  on  the  definition  of  criminal  offences  and  sanctions  to  fight  fraud  and 
other illegal activities affecting the EU’s financial interests. The Law seeks to strengthen 
protection against criminal offences that affect those financial interests, in line with the 
existing body of EU law in this field. 

The Law includes specific articles on: (i) passive and active corruption that could affect 
the EU’s financial interests; (ii) cross-border VAT fraud; (iii) ancillary provisions on the 
protection  of  the  EU’s  financial  interests  under  criminal  law;  (iv)  money  laundering  to 
the detriment of the EU’s financial interests; and (v) statistical reporting. 

30 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionInvestigation and prosecutionPublic procurement; corruption; conflict of interest; AFCOS; Whistle-blowers; control of EU funds; anti-fraud or anti-corruption strategy SingleOrganisationalNCompetenceIncreased resourcesH 
 
Revenue – Customs and tax fraud: Measures that aim to reduce smuggling 

In  2020,  Greece  adopted  Law  No  4758/2020  (Government  Gazette,  Series  I,  No  242, 
4.12.2020) on the reduction of smuggling. This Law is intended to modernise the current 
legislative  framework  and  introduce  updated  tools  to  strengthen  action  in  this  area. 
Additionally,  the  Financial  Crime  Prosecution  Unit  (SDOE)  has  issued  an  operational 
guide on: (i) the legal content of commercial documents; and (ii) trade in and movement 
of  goods  and  provision  of  services.  This  guide  seeks  to  ensure  the  authenticity  and 
traceability of transactions and to help prevent illegal trade. 

The measures have three main effects, which are set out below.  

i.  The  measures  increase  coordination  among  the  relevant  law-enforcement 

authorities and make new electronic registers and tools available to them. 

ii.  The  measures  complement  the  current  penalty  framework  and  make  this 
framework stricter for: (i) offences related to smuggling and adulteration of fuel; 
(ii)  infringing  obligations  relating  to  either  the  fuel  input/output  system  and  the 
installation of GPS on vehicles/vessels carrying fuels. 

iii.  The  measures:  (i)  help  the  work  of  the  inspection  authorities;  (ii)  simplify 
procedures  for  destroying  tobacco  products;  and  (iii)  reduce  the  time  limits  for 
destroying tobacco products. 

31 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralInvestigation and prosecutionHFinancial crime (including money laundering)PackageLegislativeNDefinition of a specific topicTo enforce the rules in line with developments in EU law Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionInvestigation and prosecutionAdministrativeAMonitoring/desk checks; investigationTo clarify or consolidate existing rulesRecovery and sanctionOperationalAFlagging practice; increased number of checksEnhanced information flow and ex-post control; targeting of checks and investigationsFinancial crime (including money laundering); organised crime; Customs/TOR/ illicit trade PackageLegislativeACompetence; powers; financial penalties; other administrative penalties; more criminal sanctionsTo remedy flaws; to enforce the rules in line with developments in EU lawS 
 
 
 
 
5.12.  Hungary 

Expenditure – Cohesion policy and Fund for the Most Deprived: Use of ARACHNE and 
EDES 

Hungary is one of the countries using the ARACHNE fraud-prevention system set up by 
the  European  Commission.  Hungary  sent  updated  data  on  ARACHNE  three  times  in 
2020. In 2020, Hungary also joined the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) 
set  up  by  the  Commission  and  appointed  a  national  administrator  responsible  for 
managing  additional  access  rights  within  Hungary.  Using  the  EDES,  Hungary  is  also 
setting  up  a  record  in  one  of  its  national  IT  systems  of  enterprises  excluded  from  EU 
funding (EUPR). 

The  ARACHNE  system  provides  information  on  a  number  of  key  indicators  in  fraud 
prevention, and makes  it possible to  track these indicators over time. Hungary uses the 
system mostly for investigations, where ARACHNE provides information in addition to 
that  available  in  the  Hungarian  IT  system,  for  example  through  ARACHNE’s 
international company databases (ownership relations; headquarters; information on final 
owners; and small and medium enterprise classification). EDES contains information on 
organisations  excluded  from  EU  funding  by  the  European  Commission,  and  Hungary 
joining EDES has made it possible to monitor these organisations. 

Horizontal – Adoption of a comprehensive anti-corruption package 

In 2020, Hungary reported that it had passed a comprehensive anti-corruption package in 
two parts: (i) a medium-term national anti-corruption strategy (Nemzeti Korrupcióellenes 
Stratégia - NKS) covering the period from 2020 to 2022; and (ii) a related action plan, 
which was adopted by Government Decision 1328/2020 of 19 June 2020. 

The measures primarily focus on fighting corruption. Some parts of the measures aim – 
whether  directly  or  indirectly  –  at  detecting  integrity  and  corruption  risks,  including 
fraud.  The  strategy  sets  out:  (i)  plans  to  strengthen  the  internal  control  system;  (ii)  an 
assessment  and  analysis  of  integrity  and  corruption  in  the  civil  service;  (iii)  a  study  of 
possible  legislation  addressing  integrity  risks  in  publicly-funded  investments;  and  (iv) 
training for investigative prosecutors in covert information gathering. 

The  main  objective  of  the  NKS  is  to  help  to  identify  and  manage  occurrences  of 
corruption  promptly,  thus  helping  the  public  administration  and  society  to  prevent, 
identify and manage these types of threat. The NKS also draws attention to a number of 
opportunities and instruments  that can be used to deal  legally with  the harm caused by 
corruption.  

The measures set out in the NKS cover the following areas of action: 

32 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionShared management and control of EU fundsPackageOperationalN/AIT tools; risk indicators; rolling out the use of ARACHNE; appointing a national administrator for EDES; working on the set up of a record in the Hungarian IT system of enterprises excluded from EU funding (EUPR) based on EDES dataEnhanced information flow; targeting of checks; targeting of investiagtionsS 
 
i. 

technology 

ii. 

rules  

iii. 

values. 

Revenue – Customs and tax fraud: Drawing up the 2021 plan for post-release checks 

In  2020,  Hungary  launched  several  investigations  into:  (i)  e-commerce  consignments; 
and (ii) consignments from a non-EU member of the EU’s customs union. The decision 
to  launch  the  investigations  was  based  on:  (i)  Hungary’s  own  analyses;  (ii)  alerts  from 
tax and customs directorates; and (iii) alerts from OLAF. The investigations were part of 
a  joint  tax  and  customs  initiative  against  businesses  suspected  of  evading  their 
obligations  to  pay  customs  duty  and  VAT.  Additionally,  customs  value  investigations 
were  extended  to  trade  in  textiles  and  fabrics,  taking  into  account  the  ‘estimated  fair 
prices’ in the THESEUS system for products originating in China. 

The  measures  put  in  place  aim  to:  (i)  ensure  preventive,  embedded,  ex-post  checks  for 
more  efficient  collection  of  customs  duties  and  VAT;  (ii)  encourage  lawful  behaviour; 
and (iii) prevent unlawful behaviour. A single system for assessing taxpayers (covering 
customs  duty  and  VAT)  will  speed  up  the  detection  of  new  fraud  schemes  and  enable 
appropriately targeted action by the authorities to better protect Member States’ revenues 
and the EU’s own resources. 

33 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReason for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionHOrganisationalN/AInter-agency cooperation; general trainingNeutral on resourcesCross-cutting measure; multi-agency measure/ measure with impact on various bodiesCorruption; anti-fraud or anti-corruption strategyPackageAdministrativeNidentify and manage occurrences of corruption promptlyAnti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionRecovery and sanctionEnhanced coordination; enhanced cooperation; enhanced information flow; targeting of checks; targeting of investigations; enhanced ex-ante controlsSOrganised crime; customs/TOR/ illicit trade SingleOperationalN/ARisk indicators; increased number of checks; structured cooperation with law enforcement 
 
 
 
 
5.13.  Ireland 

Horizontal: Amendment to the Criminal Justice Act  

In  2020,  Ireland  reported  on  an  amendment  to  the  Criminal  Justice  (Theft  and  Fraud 
Offences) Act which, when enacted, will give full effect to Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to 
the  Union’s  financial  interests  by  means  of  criminal  law.  The  amending  bill  has  gone 
through all stages  in  Seanad Éireann (the upper house of the  Irish Parliament) and was 
passed  by  that  house  on  26 November 2020.  The  bill  is  now  being  examined  by  Dáil 
Éireann (the lower house of the Irish Parliament). Subject to parliamentary consideration, 
it is expected that the bill will become law in February 2021. 

The Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences)(Amendment) bill 2020 amends Part 6 
of  the  Criminal  Justice  (Theft  and  Fraud  Offences)  Act  2001  to  give  full  effect  to 
Directive  (EU) 2017/1371.  It  also  amends  the  Criminal  Justice  Act  1994.  The  bill 
includes an expanded definition of fraud affecting the Union’s financial interests as well 
as a new offence of misappropriation. The bill also amends the Criminal Justice Act 1994 
to  enable the  freezing and confiscation of  criminal  ‘instrumentalities’ (property  used to 
commit crime) and proceeds from criminal offences. 

The maximum penalties provided for do not require amendment.  

34 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionInvestigation and prosecutionPublic procurement; financial crime (including money laundering); fraud definitionSingleLegislativeAAmendmends to the existing provisions in Part 6 of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001. Thisincludes an expanded definition of fraud affecting the Union's financial interests and a new offence ofmisappropriation. The maximum penalties provided for do not require amendment.to enforce the rules in line with developments in EU lawH 
 
 
 
5.14.  Italy 

Horizontal:  Legislative  decree  implementing  Directive  (EU)  2017/1371  on  the  fight 
against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law 

On  14 July 2020,  Italian  Legislative  Decree  No  75  was  adopted  to  bring  national 
legislation on financial crimes, corruption, smuggling and control of EU funds into line 
with Directive (EU) 2017/1371. 

Revenue – Tax fraud: Operational guidelines against VAT fraud 

In  2020,  Italy  issued  operational  guidelines  for  units  of  the  Italian  Guardia  di  Finanza 
(financial  police),  on  the  new  measures  introduced  by  the  Parliament  to  combat  excise 
and  VAT  fraud  in  the  fuel  sector.  The  guidelines  outline  the  main  fraud  schemes  and 
provide  guidance  on  how  to  select  taxpayers  for  checks  or  targeted  judicial  police 
activities. 

35 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionFinancial crime (including money laundering); corruption; customs/TOR/ illicit trade; shared management and control of SingleLegislativeACompetences; definition of a specific topic; financial penalties; other administrative penalties; new criminal sanctionsTo enforce the rules in line with developments in EU lawHAnti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionFinancial crime (including money laundering); corruption; customs/TOR/ illicit trade; shared management and control of SingleLegislativeACompetences; definition of a specific topic; financial penalties; other administrative penalties; new criminal sanctionsTo enforce the rules in line with developments in EU lawH 
 
 
Revenue – Customs: Implementation of control arrangements in application of Decision 
(EU) No 491/2020 

In  2020,  Italy  reported  on  the  implementation  of  post-clearance  checks  to  verify  that 
Decision (EU) No 491/2020 was being correctly applied. This Decision exempts goods 
intended to combat the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic from duty and VAT. Binding 
instructions  were  issued  to  customs  offices  to  ensure  that  all  operations  relating  to  the 
goods  referred  to  in  Decision  (EU)  No  491/2020  that  have  not  already  been  subject  to 
online checks or which have in any event been considered to be at risk, undergo a revised 
assessment. 

36 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionFinancial crime (including money laundering); corruption; customs/TOR/ illicit trade; shared management and control of EU fundsSingleLegislativeACompetences; definition of a specific topic; financial penalties; other administrative penalties; new criminal sanctionsTo enforce the rules in line with developments in EU lawH 
 
 
 
5.15.  Latvia 

Revenue  –  Tax  fraud:  Registration  of  websites  or  mobile-phone  applications  in 
commercial passenger transport  

Since  1  January  2020,  regulations  of  the  Latvian  Cabinet  of  Ministers  have  come  into 
force  that  affect  service  providers  for  websites  or  mobile  applications  in  commercial 
passenger  transport  by  taxi  and  car.  These  regulations  require  the  service  provider  to 
submit  information  to  Latvia’s  State  Revenue  Service  (SRS)  once  a  month  on  the 
services they have performed (commercial passenger transportation, drivers and vehicles) 
via the provider’s website or mobile application. 

The rules set out: 

i. 

ii. 

the procedure for: (i) registering a website or mobile-application service provider; 
(ii) cancelling the registration; and (iii) blocking a website or mobile application; 

the  functionality  of  the  website  or  mobile  application  and  the  information  the 
website or mobile application must provide; 

iii. 

the procedure for monitoring the activities of the service provider;  

iv. 

the procedure by which the service provider provides information to the SRS and 
the nature of this information.  

Previously,  providing  information  to  the  SRS  was  only  an  obligation  of  the  passenger 
carrier.  However,  passenger  carriers  often  use  third-party  websites  and  mobile 
applications when providing taxi services, making it difficult for the passenger carrier to 
provide  this  information.  The  new  regulations  are  intended  to  remedy  this  problem,  by 
requiring the website or mobile-application service provider to provide information to the 
SRS. Given that commercial passenger transport often operates in the shadow economy, 
the new regulation will also help to fight against VAT fraud. 

The  new  rules  mean  that  the  SRS  is  able  to:  (i)  obtain  and  select  data;  (ii)  prepare 
analytical reports for further preventive and control measures on taxpayers who perform 
commercial  passenger  transportation  by  taxi  and/or  car  using  websites  or  mobile 
application services; and (iii) compare these data from analytical reports with taxpayers’ 
tax  returns.  The  SRS  now  has  data  on  the  journeys  made,  the  carrier,  the  driver,  the 
vehicle, the fare, and the fee charged by the website. 

37 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReason for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionProtection of the EU's financial interests against (VAT) fraudPackageLegislativeNDefinition of a specific topic; SRS can obtain data and performdata selection, prepare analytical reports for further preventive and control measuresTo clarify and consolidate existing rules; to remedy flawsSOperationalNRisk indicatorsTargeting of checks; enhanced ex-ante controls 
 
Revenue – Tax fraud: Cheque lottery  

Since  1  July  2019,  the  Latvian  SRS  has  organised  a  cheque  lottery.  Anyone  can 
participate in the lottery by registering a cheque, receipt or ticket worth at least EUR 5 on 
the website www.cekuloterija.lv. The document certifying the transaction must be issued 
for a good or service received from a taxpayer registered in  Latvia. The SRS, based on 
the  cheque  lottery  data,  identifies  taxpayers  who  have  not  declared  the  income  from 
economic activity at all or declared it to a lesser extent. This allows the SRS to carry out 
preventive or control measures to ensure additional tax is declared. 

The  check  lottery  was  introduced  to:  (i)  promote  fair  competition  and  voluntary 
compliance  with  tax  obligations;  (ii)  combat  tax  fraud;  and  (iii)  encourage  shoppers  to 
demand checks and receipts for income. 2020 was the first full year that the check lottery 
operated. 

Revenue – Customs and tax fraud: Classification of taxpayers 

In  2020,  Latvia  reported  on  its  classification  of  taxpayers  by  tax-behaviour  patterns, 
taking into account certain characteristic features of tax-compliance discipline. The aim 
of  the  taxpayer  classification  is  to  help  the  SRS  tailor  its  approach  to  the  taxpayer 
behaviour  and  voluntary  compliance  with  obligations,  and  thus  strengthen  tax  payment 
discipline in the most efficient way. 

The system for segmentation of taxpayers works as a tool to prevent tax fraud. One of the 
risks analysed during the segmentation process is the risk of VAT tax fraud. 

38 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReason for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionSOperationalNWeb reporting/Hotline; risk indicators; increased number of checksTargeting of checks; enhanced ex-ante controls; enhanced ex-post controlsTo ensure voluntary tax complianceProtection of the EU's financial interests against (VAT) fraudPackageLegislativeNDefinition of a specific topicAnti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReason for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionSOperationalNRisk indicatorsEnhanced coordination; targeting of checks; enhanced ex-ante and ex-post controlsTo enhance existing measures; to improve the tax administration processProtection of the EU's financial interests against (VAT) fraudPackageAdministrativeNAll areas of tax administration 
 
 
 
 
5.16.  Lithuania 

Revenue – Customs and tax fraud: Joint operation JAD HANSA 

In 2020, Lithuania reported on the joint operation JAD HANSA (as part of the Europol 
programme  EMPACT  OAP  –  Excise  Fraud)  which  took  place  between  2  and 
13 November 2020. 15  EU Member States, the  UK, OLAF  and Europol participated in 
the joint operation. 

The operation targeted cigarettes illegally diverted from transit-customs procedures onto 
the  black  market.  The  customs  departments  of  the  UK  (HM  Revenue  &  Customs)  and 
Lithuania  (Customs  Criminal  Service)  led  the  joint  operation.  The  most  significant 
seizures  of  cigarettes  were  made  in  Lithuania  (28.75  million),  the  UK  (9  million)  and 
Poland (6 million). 

This  joint  operation  targeted  a  common  fraud  mechanism:  the  abuse  of  the  duty-
suspension regime and smuggling. The operation led to the arrest of 17 suspects and the 
seizure of 67 million cigarettes and 2.6 tonnes of tobacco. 88% of the cigarettes seized 
were produced in Belarus. 

Horizontal: Purchase of software and hardware to implement anti-money laundering and 
counter-terrorist financing measures 

In 2020, the Lithuanian Financial Crimes Investigation Service under the Ministry of the 
Interior  (which  is  also  the  Lithuanian  financial  intelligence  unit)  invested  in  analytical 
software  and  hardware  to  help  implement  anti-money  laundering  and  counter-terrorist-
financing measures. The main aim of the project was to develop an information system to 
prevent  money  laundering.  This  project  focuses  on:  (i)  risk  management  of  suspicious 
monetary operations or transactions (STRs); (ii) an electronic system for managing case 
information; and (iii) a ‘big data’ platform. 

The  capabilities  of  Lithuania’s  State  Revenue  Service  (SRS)  have  greatly  improved 
thanks  to:  (i)  modern  analytical  software;  (ii)  new  equipment;  (iii)  a  sophisticated 
management system  for  ‘big data’;  and (iv) sophisticated analytical  tools.  In particular, 
these  changes  have  helped  the  SRS  to  become  better  at:  (i)  collecting  and  storing  data 
received  from  national  and  international  sources  in  different  digital  data  formats;  (ii) 
performing  quick  searches  on  a  ‘big  data’  platform;  and  (iii)  analysing  data  on  a  ‘big 
data’  platform.  The  investment  improved  the  ability  of  the  SRS  to  combat  money 
laundering by: (i) detecting existing and newly emerging money laundering schemes; (ii) 
detecting  new  trends  in  criminal  behaviour;  and  (iii)  determining  ‘predicate  offences’ 
(the offences that generate the money that is subsequently laundered) such as fraud and 
tax evasion. 

39 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionInvestigation and prosecutionFinancial crime (including money laundering); organised crime; customs/TOR/ illicit tradePackageOperationalAFlagging practise; risk indicators; increased number of checks; structured cooperation with law enforcementEnhanced coordination; cooperation and information flow; targeting of checks and investigations; driving and monitoring the new EU EMPACT Operational Action Plan 2020 related to the EU crime priority 'excise fraud'S 
 
The updated IT solution was built in house and developed to meet the SRS’s needs for: 
(i) user-friendly workflow; (ii) ‘big data’ collection, storage and analysis; (iii) automated 
risk management of STRs; (iv) improved document management; and (v) more efficient 
cross-border/domestic information sharing. 

Expenditure – Agriculture: IT tools and regulatory measures 

One  of  the  regulatory  measures  adopted  by  Lithuania  in  2020  aimed  at  transparency 
during the procurement process. The measure involved developing IT tools to: (i) analyse 
the  practices  used  when  concluding  contracts  aimed  at  combating  COVID-19;  and  (ii) 
observe the situation in ‘single-supplier’ procurement. 

The measures oblige public buyers to state the price or costs that will be referred to when 
evaluating  the  acceptability  of  the  bid  before  starting  the  procurement  procedure  (the 
procurement  procedure  typically  begins  with  a  procurement  notification).  Information 
must  be  provided  in  the  section  of  the  e-procurement  platform  meant  for  the  buyers’ 
internal  use.  Any  changes  to  this  information  will  be  seen  in  audit  trail  showing  the 
history  of  the  procedure.  The  obligation  does  not  apply  when  the  price  or  costs  are 
indicated in the procurement documents. 

40 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionHFinancial crime (including money laundering); organised crime; SingleOperationalNIT tools; risk indicators; increased number of checks Enhanced coordination; cooperation; information flow and targeting of checks; modern in-house solution for an anti-money laundering information system Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionPublic procurement; corruptionPackageLegislativeAAdditional obligation for public buyers to guarantee tracking of the changes in price/costs that will bereferred to during the evaluation of the bidsTo clarify or consolidate existing rulesH 
 
 
 
 
5.17.  Luxembourg 

Horizontal: Administrative measure to fight against fraud 

Luxembourg  reported  that  the  ERDF  managing  authority  strengthened  its  internal 
administrative system in 2020 to detect and fight against fraud and conflicts of interest. It 
introduced in its administrative process: 

i. 

a certificate of independence; 

ii. 

a conflict-of-interest declaration form; 

iii. 

a procedure for reporting in the event of suspected fraud; 

iv. 

guidelines  to  manage  conflicts  of  interest  in  public-procurement  procedures 
(prevention, detection and management of conflicts of interest). 

41 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionTo clarify or consolidate existing rules; to enhance existing measuresHPublic procurement; conflict of interest; shared management and control of EU fundsSingleAdministrativeAManagement of funds 
 
 
 
5.18.  Malta 

Horizontal: Update of the national anti-fraud and corruption strategy (NAFCS) 

Malta reported that it was in the final stages of updating its NAFCS, last updated in 2008. 
The country’s Internal Audit and Investigations Department had the main responsibility 
for  the  update.  It  took  into  consideration  the  input  received  from  the  members  of  the 
coordinating  committee  set  up  by  the  Internal  Audit  and  Financial  Investigations  Act, 
Cap. 461 of the Laws of Malta. 

The main updates to the NAFCS were: 

i. 
ii. 
iii. 
iv. 
v. 

the inclusion of new members; 
an update on relevant legal measures taken; 
a revision of definitions where necessary; 
an updating of the legal situation; 
a list of actions taken and to be taken. 

The aim of the updated NAFCS is to continue to provide a normative, institutional and 
operational framework for the effective and efficient fight against fraud and corruption. 
The  updated  NAFCS  also  includes  an  action  plan  to  improve  the  strategy’s  objectives. 
The action plan focuses on four main priorities: 

i. 
ii. 
iii. 
iv. 

capacity building; 
drawing up a communication strategy; 
increasing national cooperation as much as possible;  
increasing EU and international cooperation as much as possible. 

42 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionInvestigation and prosecutionRecovery and sanctionAnti-fraud or anti-corruption strategySingleAdministrativeAThe NAFCS was updated because of the changes in recent years, includingregulatory and institutional changesTo enhance existing measuresH 
 
 
 
5.19.  The Netherlands 

Revenue – Customs: Prevention by customs of fraud relating to COVID-19  

In  2020,  the  Netherlands  reported  on  the  setting  up  of  an  action  centre  to  prevent  and 
fight against fraud relating to COVID-19 (smuggling, evasion of duty). 

Expenditure – Agriculture: Pre-filling parts of the digital application for subsidies  

In 2020, the Netherlands reported on the creation of an IT tool that: (i) pre-fills parts of 
the digital application for subsidies by using data already known to the payment agency; 
and (ii) sends an alert when it encounters inconsistencies with the data on record. 

Expenditure – Agriculture: Selection of lots susceptible to fraud 

In 2020, the Netherlands reported on the implementation of a new system, based on an 
algorithm to select companies with lots that are susceptible to fraud (i.e. lots where there 
is an increased risk of the subsidies being possibly claimed irregularly). 

43 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionOrganisationalNSetting-up of an internal action centreNeutral on resourcesOperationalNSpecific checks as a result of tax legislation (exemption legislation and reduced rate)Enhanced coordination; cooperation and information flow; targeting of checksCustoms/TOR/ illicit tradePackageAdministrativeNMonitoring/desk checks; on the spot checks; reporting of irregularitiesCombating the pandemicSAnti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionSShared management and control of EU fundsSingleOperationalAIT tools; increased number of checksEnhanced ex-ante controls to detect irregularities as early as possible in the application processAnti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralDetectionShared management and control of EU fundsSingleOperationalNIT tools; risk indicatorsTargeting of checksS 
 
 
 
 
 
5.20.  Poland 

Horizontal: Strengthening control mechanisms and means of monitoring public contracts 
financed by EU funds by amending the rules governing the control of public procurement  

In  2020,  Poland  implemented  measures  to:  (i)  simplify  the  procurement  process;  (ii) 
simplify  the  monitoring  of  the  procurement  process;  (iii)  support  the  contracting 
authorities;  (iv)  increase  transparency  and  accountability  in  the  management  of  public 
funds; and (v) improve the flow of information between control bodies. These measures 
ensure  that  the  award  and  control  of  contracts  is  more  transparent  for  the  contracting 
authorities,  contractors,  control  bodies,  and  the  general  public.  The  measures  help  to 
achieve the objective of protecting the financial interests of the EU. 

The  measure  changes  the  rules  governing  public  procurement  and  obliges  the  control 
bodies (including the managing authority and audit authority) to make certain documents 
available  in  the  public  information  bulletin  (these  documents  include  the  audit-
questionnaire  template,  information  on  the  checks  carried  out,  and  the  results  of  the 
checks).  These  requirements  will  help  to  promote:  (i)  a  sense  of  legal  certainty  among 
contracting  authorities;  (ii)  transparency  in  the  procurement  process  and  in  the 
monitoring of the process); and (iii) transparency in the authorities’ activities. They will 
also  alleviate  the  audited  entities’  concerns  about  the  way  in  which  the  authorities 
interpret the relevant laws. 

Expenditure  –  Agriculture:  New  anti-corruption  policy  at  the  Agency  for  Restructuring 
and Modernisation of Agriculture (the paying agency) 

Poland  reported  this  measure  taken  in  2020  because  it  was  necessary  to:  (i)  streamline 
and optimise anti-corruption processes; (ii) respond to suspicions of corruption; and (iii) 
implement  changes  in  both  the  oversight  of  sensitive  posts  and  the  procedures  for 
handling conflicts of interest.  

The  new  anti-corruption  policy  will  make  it  possible  to:  (i)  take  active  anti-corruption 
measures;  (ii) promptly  respond to  instances of corruption;  and (iii) handle information 
on instances of corruption appropriately. 

The purpose of the measure is to prevent corruption at the Agency for Restructuring and 
Modernisation of Agriculture. Some of the ways this will be achieved include: 

i. 

designating the areas at particular risk of corruption in more precise terms; 

ii. 

laying  down  detailed  rules  of  procedure  for  employees  if  they  encounter  or 
suspect corruption, or if they are exposed to pressure to behave corruptly;  

iii. 

clarifying the procedure for dealing with information on corruption;  

44 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionPublic procurement; shared management and control of EU fundsSingleLegislativeADefinition of a specific topic; Control of contract-award procedures, including control of contracts financed by EU fundsTo clarify or consolidate existing rules; to remedy flawsH 
 
iv. 

extending the scope of provisions governing conflicts of interest. 

Revenue  –  Tax  fraud:  Fighting  VAT  avoidance  and  evasion  through  real-time  control 
mechanisms 

In  2020,  Poland  reported  on  the  Regulation  of  the  Minister  for  Finance,  Funds  and 
Regional  Policy  amending  the  Regulation  on  exemptions  from  the  obligation  to  keep 
records when using cash registers (Journal of Laws, item 965). The amendment requires 
taxable  persons  conducting  business  in  the  area  of  transport,  hospitality,  catering,  and 
sale of coal products to keep records when they use cash registers. It also requires these 
cash  registers  to  be  made  available  to  the  tax  administration  online.  The  use  of  online 
cash registers is intended to increase the efficiency of the tax administration’s efforts to 
combat  undeclared  retail  sales  and  VAT  avoidance/evasion  through  real-time  control 
mechanisms. 

The  introduction  of  online  cash  registers  for  certain  groups  of  taxable  persons  is  an 
alternative  to  the  cash  registers  currently  in  use.  This  will  reduce  the  costs  taxable 
persons need to incur to comply with the obligation to register sales using cash registers. 
This will also improve the process of registering and controlling retail sales in real time. 
Applying  the  measure  to  taxable  persons  conducting  business  activities  in  the  area  of 
transport,  hospitality,  catering  and  the  sale  of  coal  products  will  give  these  persons  a 
modern and easy solution to register their sales. 

45 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionSAnti-fraud or anti-corruption strategySingleOrganisationalAFraud-awareness policy; preventing corruption at the agency for Restructuring and Modernisation of AgricultureNeutral on resourcesAnti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionFighting VAT avoidance and evasionSingleLegislativeADefinition of a specific topicTo clarify or consolidate existing rules; to remedy flawsS 
 
 
 
 
5.21.  Portugal 

Revenue  –  Customs:  Development  of  the  technical  conditions  necessary  to  implement 
common financial risk criteria and standards (FRC) 

In 2020, Portugal  reported on the development  of the technical  conditions necessary to 
implement  common  FRCs.  These  FRCs  ensure  the  uniform  application  of  customs 
controls in accordance with Commission Implementing Decision C(2018) 3293 final. 

Some of the FRCs have already been implemented. It is estimated that the process will be 
completed in the first quarter of 2021.  

The measure will make it easier to uniformly apply customs controls in accordance with 
Commission Implementing Decision C(2018) 3293 final. 

Revenue  –  Customs:  Development  of  the  interconnection  between  the  Automatic 
Selection System and the Low-Value Merchandise Import System (e-commerce) 

In  2020,  Portugal  reported  that  it  had  finished  the  functional  specifications  needed  to 
develop the interconnection between the Automatic Selection System and the Low-Value 
Merchandise  Import  System  (e-commerce).  The  measure  will  mitigate  the  risk  of  e-
commerce fraud. 

Expenditure – Cohesion  policy: Audit of operational programmes for the  programming 
period 2014-2020 

In 2020, Portugal reported on an audit of operational programmes for the programming 
period  2014-2020.  The  specific  objective  of  the  audit  was  to  confirm  whether  the 
respective  management  authorities  were  taking  effective  and  proportionate  anti-fraud 
measures to mitigate the residual risk of quantified fraud. 

46 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionFinancial crime (including money laundering); customs/TOR/ illicit tradeSingleOperationalAIT tools; risk indicators; increased number of checksEnhanced information flow; targeting of checks; enhanced ex-ante controlSAnti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionSFinancial crime (including money laundering); customs/TOR/ illicit tradeSingleOperationalAIT tools; risk indicators; increased number of checksEnhanced coordination and information flow; targeting of checks; enhanced ex-ante controls 
 
 
The aim of this audit was to ensure that effective and proportionate anti-fraud measures 
are taken to mitigate the risk of fraud in the implementation of EU funds. 

47 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionPublic procurement; conflict of interest; shared management and control of EU funds; anti-fraud or anti-corruption strategySingleOperationalNRisk indicators; increased number of checksEnhanced ex-ante and ex-post controlsS 
 
 
 
5.22.  Romania 

Romania:  Horizontal:  Strengthening  the  protection  of  the  EU’s  financial  interests 
through criminal law by updating the definition of fraud 

In 2020, Romania adopted a measure that strengthens the protection of the EU’s financial 
interests  in  Romania  through  criminal  law  by  updating  the  definition  of  fraud  (through 
Law  No  283/2000  transposing  the  corresponding  provisions  of  Directive  (EU) 
2017/1371).  Romania  also  adopted  Law  No  228/2020,  transposing  the  provisions  on 
confiscation and extended confiscation of Directive 2014/42/EU. 

Law  No  283/2020  transposes  Articles  3(2)(a),  3(2)(b),  3(2)(c),  4(4),  15(2)  and  Article 
18(2)  of  Directive  (EU)  2017/1371  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of 
5 July 2017  on  the  fight  against  fraud  to  the  Union’s  financial  interests  by  means  of 
criminal law. 

Romania: Horizontal: Strengthening  the fight  against financial crime (including  money 
laundering) by transposing several EU directives  

In 2020, Romania reported on how it had strengthened the fight against financial crime 
(including money laundering) by: 

 

through  Government 
(EU)  2018/843  (AMLD  V) 
transposing  Directive 
Emergency  Ordinance  No  111/2020,  by  updating  secondary  legislation  (nine 
orders); 

 

transposing Directive (EU) 2015/849 (AMLD IV);  

 

transposing Directive (EU) 2018/843 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 through 
Order  No  3746/2020  of  the  President  of  the  National  Agency  of  Fiscal 
Administration concerning the organisation  and operation of a central  electronic 
register of payment accounts and bank accounts identified by IBAN. 

These  measures  transpose  Directive  (EU)  2018/843  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of 
the Council of 30 May 2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the 
use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, 
and amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU. 

Romania’s  legislative  acts  to  transpose  these  measures  provide  for  the  creation  of  a 
central  electronic  register.  This  register  will  make  it  possible  to  quickly  identify  all 
natural and legal persons holding or controlling: (i) payment accounts and bank accounts 
identified  by  IBAN  (as  defined  in  Regulation  (EU)  No  260/2012  of  the  European 
Parliament  and  of  the  Council);  and  (ii)  safe-deposit  boxes  held  by  a  credit  institution 

48 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionInvestigation and prosecutionRecovery and sanctionTo enforce the rules in line with developments in EU lawHFraud definitionSingleLegislativeADefinition of a specific topic 
 
within  Romanian  territory.  The  register  will  also  provide  access  for  the  competent 
authorities so that they can check these accounts and safe-deposit boxes. 

Romania: Expenditure – Cohesion policy: Measures to make checks more efficient in the 
area of public procurement by digitalising the checks of ESI Funds competent bodies 

In  2020,  Romania  took  measures  to  make  checks  more  efficient  in  the  area  of  public 
procurement  by  digitalising  the  checks  made  by  the  competent  bodies  for  distributing 
ESI  Funds  (Emergency  Ordinance  No  65/2020  on  measures  to  digitise  the  system  of 
coordinating and managing European Structural and Investment Funds for the 2014-2020 
programming  period).  In  addition,  the  National  Agency  for  Public  Procurement 
digitalised  its  ex-ante  checks  (Emergency  Ordinance  No  114/2020  amending  and 
supplementing  certain  normative  acts  with  impact  in  the  field  of  public  procurement). 
Furthermore,  the  financial  correction  rates  in  accordance  with  Commission  Decision 
C(2019) 3452 were updated by Government Decision No 348/2020. 

The objective of these measures was to make administrative checks more efficient. This 
package of legislative measures regulates the exchange of information via an electronic 
data-exchange  system.  This  ensures  rapid  access  to  information  for  all  the  institutions 
involved in the management and control of structural funds. It also ensures rapid access 
to  this  information  for  beneficiaries  and  potential  beneficiaries.  This  in  turn  makes  it 
easier to effectively and transparently implement and absorb aid from the structural funds 
in Romania. 

49 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReason for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionInvestigation and prosecutionFinancial crime (including money laundering)PackageLegislativeACompetencesTo enforce the rules in line with developments in EU lawHOperationalNIT tools; increased number of checks; structured cooperation with law enforcement Enhanced cooperation; coordination and information flow; targeting of checks and investigationsAnti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionInvestigation and prosecutionRecovery and sanctionTo clarify or consolidate existing rules; to remedy flawsSPublic procurementPackageLegislativeACompetences 
 
 
 
 
5.23.  Slovakia 

Expenditure – Agriculture: Creation of an anti-corruption department in the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development  

Slovakia reported on the creation of an anti-corruption department. The department’s aim 
is  to  monitor,  inspect,  supervise  and  give  methodological  guidance  to  the  country’s 
Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Rural  Development.  It  hopes  to  have  an  impact  across 
Slovakian society. 

The anti-corruption department carries out financial controls on funds provided from the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and other EU funds. It also performs 
tasks  related  to:  (i)  combating  anti-social  activities;  (ii)  national  anti-corruption  policy; 
(iii) crime prevention; and (iv) the fight against corruption. The unit’s activities help to 
prevent and detect irregularities and fraud and thus to protect the EU’s financial interests. 

Horizontal: Extension of the powers of the Supreme Audit Office to submit reports to the 
meeting of the relevant committee of the National Council 

An amendment to the Act on the Supreme Audit Office of the Slovak Republic (which 
came into  force on 1 January 2020),  extended the powers of Slovakia’s Supreme Audit 
Office  (SAO  SR)  to  submit  to  the  relevant  committee  of  the  National  Council  of  the 
Slovak Republic (hereinafter ‘the NC SR’) a report on the result of its audits. 

This  means  that the audit findings are discussed  in  Parliament with  the participation  of 
the relevant ministers or representatives of state institutions. Members of Parliament are 
thus better informed about systemic shortcomings, risks in the implementation of public 
policies,  or  the  management  of  ministries.  This  will  allow  the  Parliament  to  exercise 
better control over the executive branch and the government. 

50 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionPublic procurement; corruptionSingleOrganisationalNReorganisation of existing bodies; competenceNeutral on resourcesSAnti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionHPublic procurement; conflict of interest; control of EU fundsSingleLegislativeAPowersto increase accountability, i.e. the discussion in the committee increases: (i) the effectiveness of preventive measures; and (ii) the responsibility of the ministry in question 
 
 
Expenditure  –  Cohesion  policy:  ISO  37001  Certificate  –  Anti-Corruption  Management 
System and code of conduct 

In 2020, Slovakia reported on the ISO 37001 Certificate – Anti-Corruption Management 
System  and  a  code  of  conduct.  This  is  an  organisational  measure  taken  by  the  Public 
Procurement Office on its surveillance work in the area of public procurement. 

It is important to increase awareness of the fight against corruption among all employees 
in  the  Public  Procurement  Office  and  to  strive  for  improvement  in  this  particular  area. 
The  Public  Procurement  Office  wants  to:  (i)  actively  fight  corruption;  (ii)  prevent  and 
minimise corruption risks; and (iii) be prepared to deal with possible corruption incidents 
when they arise. 

51 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionCorruptionPackageOrganisationalNTraining on fraud-awarenessNeutral on resourcesH 
 
 
 
5.24.  Slovenia 

Expenditure – Agriculture: Measures taken by the Agency for Agricultural Markets and 
Rural Development 

Slovenia  reported  on  four  measures  taken  by  the  Agency  for  Agricultural  Markets  and 
Rural Development. These measures are set out in the bullet points below. 

i.  A specific checklist related to the detection of fraud and artificial conditions was 

included in the checklists for verification of eligibility criteria. 

ii.  A special tab in the application called ‘Detecting fraud attempts’ was added. 

iii.  Ten questions (such as the two below) were introduced to detect ‘red flags’. 

a.  From the available data, can the applicant be connected to the provider or 

are there connections between the providers? 

b.  In  the  case  of  three  tenders,  is  it  clear  from  the  documentation  that  the 

three tenders can be linked to each other? 

iv.  A  webinar  was  organised  called  ‘Prevention  and  detection  of  fraud  and 
artificially  created  conditions’  for  all  employees  of  Slovenia’s  Agency  for 
Agricultural Markets and Rural Development.  

Measures (i)-(iii) are part of the implementation of a new measure under Slovenia’s rural 
development programme for 2014-2020, sub-measure M06.4: Support for investments in 
the establishment and development of non-agricultural activities and the establishment of 
control procedures for detecting fraud and artificially created conditions. 

Revenue – Customs and tax fraud: Update of customs risk analysis  

The  Financial  Administration  of  the  Republic  of  Slovenia  (FARS)  updated  its  customs 
risk analysis. This update was to implement amendments to Council Regulation (EU) No 
904/2010 on administrative cooperation and combating fraud in the field of VAT. 

The  customs  administration  must  apply  the  updated  risk  analysis  to  goods  declared  for 
free  circulation  to  protect  the  financial  interests  of  the  EU  and  its  Member  States. 
Common  FRCs  were  implemented  in  the  Slovenian  risk-analysis  system.  The  Council 
Regulation introduces: (i) several new forms of exchanges; (ii) the use of analytical tools 
(TNAs);  and  (iii)  cooperation  with  OLAF  and  Europol  when  assessing  the  riskiest 
transactions.  The  FARS  had  to  ensure  appropriate  risk  analysis  and  use  of  this  data  at 
national level. 

52 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralDetectionFraud definition; shared management and control of EU fundsSingleOrganisationalAGeneral training; training on fraud-awareness; simplification of proceduresNeutral on resourcesS 
 
Expenditure – Cohesion policy: Cooperation in proceedings before national courts  

Slovenia  reported  on  the  cooperation  of  the  Government  Office  for  Development  and 
European  Cohesion  Policy  with  the  State  Attorney’s  Office  on  proceedings  before 
national courts. 

53 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReason for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionSOperationalN/AIT tools; flagging procedure; risk indicatorsEnhanced coordination; cooperation and information flow; targeting of checks and investigationsTo clarify or consolidate existing rules; to enhance existing measuresFinancial crime (including money laundering); customs/TOR/ illicit trade; anti-fraud or anti-corruption strategyPackageAdministrativeAMonitoring/desk checks; on-the-spot checksAnti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralInvestigation and prosecutionRecovery and sanctionEnhanced coordination; cooperation; ex-ante controls and ex-post controls; targeting of investigationsSShared management and control of EU funds; Increased integrity and performance of control of EU fundsSingleOperationalAStructured cooperation with law enforcement; Improved structural cooperation with the State Attorney's Office 
 
 
 
 
5.25.  Spain 

Expenditure  –  All  areas  of  expenditure:  Cooperation  agreement  between  the  Spanish 
AFCOS and the Spanish police 

In 2020, Spain reported on the cooperation agreement between the Spanish AFCOS and 
the  Spanish  police  (Guardia  Civil).  This  cooperation  agreement  will  improve  the 
exchange  of  operational  information  and  operational/technical  support  between  the 
AFCOS and the Guardia Civil (technical unit for judicial police) in OLAF investigations 
and  investigations  carried  out  by  both  organisations.  It  will  also  improve  strategic 
cooperation and cooperation on training between the two organisations. In addition, the 
agreement  will  help  to  implement  the  recommendations  to:  (i)  better  structure  the 
coordination between administrative checks and investigations on one hand and criminal 
checks and investigations on the other (a recommendation made in the PIF Report 2018); 
and  (ii)  promote  systematic  cooperation  between  judicial  and  administrative  authorities 
(a recommendation made in the PIF Report 2017). 

Expenditure – All areas of expenditure: Direct access by AFCOS to the databases of the 
Spanish social-security system 

On April 23, the Inspectorate General of Finance (IGAE) (in which the Spanish AFCOS 
is  integrated)  and  the  Spanish  social-security  administration  signed  a  cooperation 
agreement. Under this agreement, several units of the IGAE, including the AFCOS, are 
granted direct access to some of the information included in the country’s social-security 
databases.  The  AFCOS  is  granted  access  to  this  information  for  investigating 
irregularities and fraud affecting the financial interests of the EU. OLAF also has access 
to this database for its own investigations. 

This measure will improve the efficiency of administrative investigations carried out by 
OLAF and/or the AFCOS, as the AFCOS will no longer have to ask for such information 
from  the  social-security  administration  but  can  instead  obtain  it  directly  from  its 
databases. This will reduce the time taken to respond to OLAF’s requests for this type of 
information. This is especially important in fraud cases linked to the false declaration of 
personnel  costs,  which  is  a  fraud  pattern  highlighted  in  recent  OLAF  annual  reports.  It 
will also reduce the risk that information about ongoing investigations is disclosed. 

54 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralInvestigation and prosecutionAFCOS; coordination between administrative and law enforcement authoritiesSingleAdministrativeNInvestigationTo formalise and better structure the cooperation between AFCOS and the Guardia Civil, including specific measures or activities in order to put into practice the duty to cooperate between these two national authoritiesS 
 
Expenditure  –  All  areas  of  expenditure:  Consolidation  of  cooperation  among  the 
national, regional and local anti-fraud authorities 

Spain  is  a  highly  decentralised  country,  and  several  regions  and  municipalities  have 
created  their  own  anti-fraud  administrative  agencies.  To  promote  cooperation  and 
experience  sharing  among  the  anti-fraud  authorities  across  the  three  levels  of 
government, two workshops were held during 2020. These workshops gathered all those 
anti-fraud agencies and  authorities under the informal Network of Administrative Anti-
fraud and Anti-corruption Agencies and Offices of Spain. 

It is essential to consolidate networks in which anti-fraud authorities working at the three 
levels of government can cooperate to better work together to fight fraud. The workshops 
transparency,  emergency 
discussed  whistleblower  protection,  confidentiality  vs 
procurement,  and  fraud  risks  during  COVID-19.  On  EU  funds  in  particular,  and  given 
that  the  AFCOS  participates  in  the  network,  the  network  makes  it  possible  to  share 
information  and  best  practices  in  this  field  (e.g.  OLAF  participated  in  one  of  the 
workshops with a presentation on fraud risks in EU-funded expenditure on health). 

55 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralDetectionInvestigation and prosecutionSAFCOS; Cooperation among national administrative authoritiesSingleOperationalNIT toolsEnhanced cooperation and information flowAnti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionInvestigation and prosecutionNeutral on resourcesSCooperation among admnistrative authoritiesSingleOrganisationalNInter-agency cooperation 
 
 
 
 
5.26.  Sweden 

Horizontal: Sweden’s participation in the EPPO 

On  14 November 2019,  the  Swedish  government  decided  to  appoint  a  commission  of 
inquiry  to  analyse  and  propose  legislative  changes  and  other  measures  needed  for 
Sweden’s participation in the EPPO. 

The  inquiry  presented  a  report  in  mid-December  2020.  The  report  has  been  sent  for 
consultation  to  relevant  government  agencies,  organisations,  municipalities  and  other 
stakeholders.  Following  the  consultation  period,  the  government  started  its  work  on 
drafting  the  legislation  and  will  present  a  government  bill  to  the  Riksdag  (Sweden’s 
parliament) for approval. 

Horizontal: Adoption of a Swedish national anti-corruption strategy 

In December 2020, the  Swedish  government  adopted an  anti-corruption  action plan  for 
the public administration. The action plan primarily targets  preventive work among the 
central government agencies, including government ministries. The working methods and 
recommendations  of  the  action  plan  are  also  relevant  for  preventive  work  in 
municipalities, regions and municipal companies. The aim of the action plan is to provide 
the  agencies  with  tools,  working  methods  and  best  practices  to  enable  them  to  pursue 
preventive, anti-corruption measures in an efficient and structured way. 

56 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralInvestigation and prosecutionFinancial crime (including money laundering); organised crime; shared management and control of EU fundsSingleOrganisationalNCompetencesIncreased resourcesHAnti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionHShared management and control of EU funds; anti-fraud or anti-corruption strategySingleOperationalNRisk indicators; increased number of checksEnhanced coordination; cooperation; information flow and ex-ante checks 
 
 
Horizontal: Better procurement statistics 

In  October  2019,  the  Swedish  Riksdag  adopted  a  bill  on  better  public-procurement 
statistics. The bill entered into force on 1 July 2020, and as of 1 January 2021, all public 
procurement  must  be  advertised  in  registered  databases.  This  new  legislation  makes  it 
easier to screen for cartel activity and other types of serious irregularities. Moreover, the 
legislation is an important step in providing secure information on how tax money is used 
and in following how the national procurement strategy is applied. 

57 

Anti-fraud cycle stepsArea coveredSingle / PackageType of MeasureNew / AmendmentScopeReasons for  measure / expected resultsHorizontal / sectoralPreventionDetectionPublic procurement; financial crime (including money laundering); organised crime; integrity and transparency measureSingleLegislativeADefinition of a specific topicTo clarify or consolidate existing rulesH 
 
 
 
6.  ADDITIONAL MEASURES REPORTED BY THE MEMBER STATES 

6.1.  Croatia 

Act  on  the  implementation  of  Council  Regulation  (EU)  2017/1939  of  12 October 2017 
implementing  enhanced  cooperation  on  the  establishment  of  the  European  Public 
Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’) 

Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 is in application and takes precedence over national 
law.  However,  an  analysis  of  the  relationship  between  this  Regulation  and  the  national 
legislation in force has shown the need to deal with specific matters through a national 
implementing  regulation.  Therefore,  on  18 December 2020,  the  Croatian  Parliament 
adopted  the  Act  on  the  implementation  of  Council  Regulation  (EU)  2017/1939  of 
12 October 2017  implementing  enhanced  cooperation  on  the  establishment  of  the 
European  Public  Prosecutor’s  Office  (‘the  EPPO’)7.  The  Act  creates  a  legal  and 
institutional framework for creating a decentralised level of the EPPO in Croatia through 
the  European  Delegated  Prosecutors’  Unit  (part  of  the  Office  for  the  Prevention  of 
Corruption  and  Organised  Crime).  The  Act  also  creates  a  new  category  of  authorised 
prosecutors – European Delegated Prosecutors – who have the power of state attorney in 
criminal cases falling within the remit of the EPPO. In addition, the Act also provides for 
the  subject-matter  and  territorial  jurisdiction  for  these  issues  and  regulates  matters  of 
compulsory insurance for European public prosecutors. The Act will enter into force on 
the date of entry into force of the European Commission decision referred to in Article 
120(2)  of  Council  Regulation  (EU)  2017/1939,  which  will  be  published  in  the  Official 
Journal of the European Union. 

6.2.  Estonia 

Cooperation and exchange of information between authorities 

The Estonian authorities continue to cooperate and exchange information via e-channels. 
The  focus  is  on  risk  assessment,  learning  from  each  others’  experience  and  using 
different IT tools. 

6.3. 

France 

Reorganisation of the audit authority for European funds in France  

On  the  ESI  Funds,  the  Commission  interministérielle  de  coordination  des  contrôles 
(CICC)  is  the  audit  authority  for  European  funds  in  France.  The  CICC  ensures  the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the necessary administrative procedures for the obligation 
to  report  irregularities,  suspected  fraud  or  established  fraud  to  OLAF.  It  carries  out  its 
duties  in  accordance  with  Regulation  (EU)  No  1303/2013  and  Delegated Regulation 
(EU) 2015/1970. 

Irregularities/fraud are examined in the control and audit reports and the annual control 
reports. 

The management authorities enter reports of irregularities  and/or suspected fraud in the 
IT  system  for  management  and  control.  The  CICC  examines  these  reports  and  either 
validates  or  rejects  them.  It  sends  validated  reports  to  OLAF  via  the  Irregularity 

7  Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia No 146/20 

58 

 
                                                 
Management  System  (IMS)  application.  Similarly,  the  management  authorities  and  the 
CICC make updates following court decisions handed down against fraud. 

In 2020, the CICC was reorganised. A cross-cutting department was set up in the area of 
audit.  This  department  guarantees  the  uniformity,  quality  and  supervision  of  the  audits 
by:  (i)  designing  and  monitoring  a  management  and  internal  control  system;  and  (ii) 
providing qualitative legal support. This department is responsible for legal work in the 
fight against fraud and for developing methods, tools and training on this subject. 

6.4.  Germany 

Regular coordination/updating of the management and control systems 

The Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture (BMEL) regularly coordinates and updates 
the  management  and  control  systems  (including  fraud-prevention  measures)  in  place  in 
different  organisations  (the  federal  government,  federal  states’  paying  agencies,  and 
managing authorities) in the agriculture and fisheries sector. 

6.5.  Hungary 

Further measures taken to help protect the EU’s financial interests 

In  addition  to  the  three  measures  described  in  detail  earlier  in  this  document,  the 
Hungarian  authorities  have  introduced  a  number  of  other  measures  that  help  to  protect 
the EU’s financial interests. Several measures presented in previous years also continued 
to  be  implemented  in  2020.  Given  their  limited  scope,  a  brief  description  of  these 
measures is provided below. 

i. 

In  the  part  of  the  Hungarian  Development  Policy  Database  and  Information 
System (FAIR) dealing with EU funds (EUPR), there was: (i) further refinement 
of  the  existing  fraud-prevention  function;  and  (ii)  streamlining  of  access  to  and 
designation of requests for information from public databases.  

ii.  Training  courses  were  provided  within  the  network  of  institutions  dealing  with 

EU funds. These courses included: 

 

 

‘Introduction  to  the  European  Structural  and  Investment  Funds  System’  and 
‘Preventing fraud in EU development policy and protecting the EU’s financial 
interests’, organised by the Ministry of Innovation and Technology; 

‘From  Stupidity  to  Fraud  –  Basic  anti-fraud  training’  organised  by  the 
Hungarian State Treasury. 

iii.  An amendment was made to the conditions for establishing the offence of money 
laundering in  the Criminal  Code. This  amendment  expands the substance of the 
offence  of  money  laundering.  It  requires:  (i)  greater  transparency  when 
establishing  the  facts;  (ii)  compliance  with  EU  law;  (iii)  the  creation  of  a 
classification  system  adapted  to  the  value  of  the  infringement;  (iv)  the 
incorporation  of  the  receipt  of  stolen  goods;  and  (v)  making  acts  preparatory  to 
money laundering criminal offences. 

iv.  The Public Procurement Authority took the following anti-corruption activities:  

59 

 
a.  it helped to put e-procurement into action; 

b.  it examined the legality of public procurement; 

c.  it provided information and training; 

d.  it  took  actions  to  increase  transparency,  such  as  maintaining  a  list  of 

prohibited tenderers and drawing up a code of ethics; 

e.  it sought statistical accreditation; 

f. 

it took organisational measures. 

v.  The State Audit Office of Hungary assessed the integrity controls responsible for 
ensuring  protection  against  threats  of  corruption  at  nearly  3 200  municipalities 
and  1 300  organisations.  The  audit  report  on  this  subject,  issued  by  the  State 
Audit Office of Hungary, is publicly available. 

vi.  The National Tax and Customs Administration (NAV) took two measures in the 

area of customs: 

a.  it  published  the  2021  plan  for  post-release  checks  and  the  annual  check 

exercise; 

b.  it  published  the  OWNRES  user  manual  as  updated  by  the  European 

Commission. 

vii.  The NAV’s Criminal Affairs Directorate developed  analysts’ investigative skills 

and resumed its evaluation and analysis of criminal activities. 

viii.  The Prime Minister’s Office took the following anti-corruption measures: 

a.  legislative  measures  in  the  field  of  public  procurement  (e.g.  amending 
Section  115  of  the  Public  Procurement  Act,  under  which  contracting 
authorities  can  no  longer  initiate  a  procedure  for  EU-funded  works 
contracts by directly inviting tenderers, but must first issue a public notice 
–  this  increases  transparency,  strengthens  fair  competition,  and  helps 
prevent potential conflicts of interest); 

b.  continuously operating and developing the electronic procurement system 

(EKR); 

c.  ensuring the interface between EKR and FAIR; 

d.  performing strict checks of public procurement procedures. 

6.6.  Latvia 

Recent legal developments and criminal cases 

In  2020,  work  continued  on  the  OLAF  support  law,  which  was  adopted  on 
21 January 2021. 

In 2020, the State Police for Prosecution submitted two criminal proceedings related to 
fraud in EU funds. A description of the two proceedings follows below. 

60 

 
i.  Criminal  proceedings  were  initiated  where  sufficient  evidence  was  obtained  to 
prosecute  three  people  who  tried  to  defraud  the  Rural  Support  Service.  These 
people  indicated  that  the  company  represented  by  them  had  purchased  new 
agricultural machinery, although the machinery was in fact counterfeit. The crime 
was  not  fully  committed  for  reasons  beyond  the  control  of  the  perpetrators. 
Prevented damage: EUR 28 385. 

ii.  Criminal proceedings were initiated in which sufficient evidence was obtained to 
prosecute  three  people  who  defrauded  the  Rural  Support  Service  by  overstating 
value  of  equipment  to  be  purchased  (involving  fictitious  intermediaries).  Thus, 
EUR 117 000 was defrauded. 

In 2020, two criminal cases were sent to trial. 

i. 

In  the  first  case,  two  people  between  2013  and  2015  used  forged  documents  to 
mislead the person responsible for issuing EU funds – the Latvian Investment and 
Development Agency (LIAA). EUR 210 954 was misappropriated, causing large 
losses to Latvia. 

ii.  The second case concerned events between 2011 and 2016, when a member of the 
board  of  a  company  submitted  false  information  to  the  LIAA  to  obtain  foreign 
property  to  fraudulently  obtain  EUR  4.1  million  of  EU  funds.  This  person  was 
also charged with money laundering. 

By order of the Prosecutor General,  a specialised branch of the prosecutor’s office was 
set up – the Prosecutor’s Office for the Investigation of Criminal Offences in the Service 
of  State  Institutions.  The  unit  will  carry  out  its  functions  in  criminal  proceedings  for 
corruption-related  offences,  which  in  some  cases  may  involve  damage  to  the  EU’s 
financial interests. 

6.7.  Lithuania 

Improvement of the Ministry of Finance’s online form for reporting corruption and fraud 

To  encourage  people  to  report  possible  cases  of  corruption  and  fraud  in  the 
administration  or  implementation  of  EU-funded  projects,  the  Ministry  of  Finance  (as 
Lithuania’s  managing  authority)  has  improved  the  section  of  its  website  for  reporting 
corruption  and  fraud  (www.esinvesticijos.lt).  This  website  now  includes  additional 
information  on anonymity, protection of whistleblowers, and the protection of personal 
data.  

The measure has improved the detection of fraud, corruption and conflict of interest. 

6.8.  Romania 

Legislative measure to prevent, detect and penalise irregularities 

Romania  passed  Government  Decision  No  348/2020  amending  and  supplementing 
Government  Decision  No  519/2014 
rates  of  percentage 
reductions/financial corrections applicable to the irregularities referred to in the Annex to 

establishing 

the 

61 

 
GEO No 66/2011 on preventing, detecting and penalising irregularities in the obtaining 
and use of European funds and/or the corresponding national public funds8. 

Decision  No  348/2020 
lays  down  a  unified  system  of  rates  of  percentage 
reductions/financial corrections applicable to the irregularities referred to in Annex 2 to 
Government Emergency Ordinance No 66/2011, approved with amendments by Law No 
142/2012,  as  amended.  The  unified  system  focuses  on  analysing  the  effects  of 
irregularities  on  procurement  procedures  with  proper  application  of  the  proportionality 
principle. 

The  newly  introduced  Annex  2  applies  to  new  cases  of  deviation  from  rules  on  public 
procurement/concession procedures carried out by beneficiaries of EU funds, as provided 
for in Commission Decision C(2019) 3452. 

6.9. 

Spain 

Procedures  for  anti-fraud measures laid down by the managing authority of  the ERDF 
and the coordination authority of the CAP to guarantee a coordinated approach 

The managing  authority  of the ERDF in  Spain  has laid down procedures for  anti-fraud 
measures to ensure a coordinated approach among all the country’s intermediate bodies. 

There  are  many  intermediate  bodies  in  Spain,  mainly  because  Spain  is  a  highly 
decentralised  country,  so  management  of  the  expenditure  co-financed  by  the  ERDF 
mainly relies on them. Although the adoption of anti-fraud measures has been delegated 
to  the  intermediate  bodies,  the  managing  authority  has  assumed  a  leading  role  to  give 
guidance  and  practical  steps  to  the  intermediate  bodies  for  the  adoption  of  anti-fraud 
measures. 

The result of this leading role is that every intermediate body has adopted its anti-fraud 
measures  on  the  basis  of  the  guidance  provided  for  by  the  managing  authority,  thus 
assuring  a  common  and  coordinated  approach  to  anti-fraud  measures.  The  guidance 
ensures  that  all  the  intermediate  bodies  apply  the  procedures  consistently  and  share  a 
common  terminology,  thus  making  it  possible  to  compare  the  performance  of  the 
different intermediate bodies in this field. 

Each intermediate body has carried out its own fraud-risk assessment and has drawn up 
its own handbook and adopted anti-fraud measures, based on the guidance and templates 
provided for by the managing authority. 

This system is being evaluated as good practice as part of a project being carried out by 
DG REGIO (‘Capacity building on identifying and preventing fraud and corruption in the 
ESI Funds’). This project is partly a continuation of the study carried out in 2018 (‘Stock 
taking study on preventing fraud and corruption in ESI Funds’). 

A similar initiative was taken with the paying agencies that manage CAP expenditure in 
Spain. The coordination authority in Spain (Fondo Español de Garantía Agraria) issued 
its  Circular  4/2020,  to  all  the  paying  agencies  in  2020  (there  is  one  paying  agency  per 
region). It aims at coordinating anti-fraud measures among all the paying agencies. The 
circular covers the whole anti-fraud cycle and includes a wide range of anti-fraud topics, 
such  as:  (i)  conflicts  of  interest;  (ii)  fraud-risk  assessment;  (iii)  red  flags;  (iv)  use  of 

8 

Published in the Official Gazette Part I No 363 of 6 May 2020 

62 

 
                                                 
databases  for  fraud  detection;  (v)  reporting  of  fraudulent  irregularities;  (vi)  raising 
awareness  on  combating  fraud;  (vii)  internal  procedures  on  how  to  deal  with  potential 
cases of fraud, etc. The Circular has a practical approach in that it includes templates or 
models for relevant documents, such us for: (i) following up fraudulent irregularities; (ii) 
sending  fraudulent  cases  to  the  prosecution  office;  and  (iii)  the  self-declaration  of  not 
having a conflict of interest, etc. 

63 

 
 
 
7.  TRAINING  ON  THE  IRREGULARITY  MANAGEMENT  SYSTEM  (IMS)  ORGANISED  BY 

THE MEMBER STATES 

The  IMS  has  more  than  3 000  users  across  the  27  Member  States  and  (potential) 
candidate countries. To support users, the Commission (OLAF) has put in place a system 
based on a ‘train the trainers’ approach. 

Based  on  this  decentralised  model,  225  training  sessions  were  organised  in  8  Member 
States, attended by 284 trainees, as shown in Figure 8. 

Figure 8: Training sessions organised by Member States in 2020 

Member State 

BG 

DE 

HR 

IT 

HU 

AT 

FI 

SE 

Number 
sessions 

10 

200 

6 

1 

3 

3 

1 

1 

TOTAL 

225 

of 

training 

Number of trainees 

14 

200 

11 

19 

32 

3 

2 

3 

284 

64 

 
 
 
 
8.  CASE STUDIES REPORTED BY MEMBER STATES 

8.1.  Belgium 

ESF Brussels-Capital Region – Establishment of ‘multi-partnership’ control 

Some partners are financed for two different measures – a phenomenon known as multi-
partnership.  To  ensure  that  there  is  no  double  subsidising,  cross-subsidisation  or  other 
fraud, Belgium has included a new multi-partnership option in its risk analysis. 

This means that, in cases of multi-partnership, the initial risk score is higher, and a single 
inspector  monitors  the  projects  of  the  partner  concerned.  The  aim  is  to  enable  the 
inspector  to  crosscheck  the  data  on  the  controls  to  ensure  that  there  is  no  double 
subsidising of the funds or personnel. 

8.2.  Bulgaria 

Misuse of EU funds in connection with the construction and purchase of equipment for a 
raspberry-wine production plant 

The State Fund for Agriculture checked the payment requests submitted by company X 
under Measure 4.2 ‘Investment and processing/marketing of agricultural products’ for the 
investment  ‘Construction  and  purchase  of  equipment  for  a  raspberry-wine  production 
plant’.  The  directorate  managing  the  measure  identified  concealed  construction  and 
installation works between February 2014 and November 2015. The finding proves that 
the  works  were  carried  out  before  the  date  of  submission  of  the  application  on 
18 December 2015.  Initially,  company  X  provided  the  construction  papers  with  the 
following  dates:  (i)  record  of  the  opening  of  a  construction  site  and  construction  line 
dated 18.2.2014; (ii) order book number 8 of 21.3.2014; and (iii) 12 documents/forms for 
activities subject to closure, issued in the period 10.6.2015-10.8.2015. At the same time, 
the  contract  concluded  between  the  State  Fund  for  Agriculture  and  company  X  for 
financial assistance dates back to 4 January 2017, which proves that all the above works 
started well before the submission of the application documents and before the signature 
of the contract with the State Fund for Agriculture. 

To  clarify  the  matter,  the  State  Fund  for  Agriculture  asked  the  applicant  about  the 
irregularities found.  

In the reply received, the manager of company X said that there had been a clerical error 
in drafting the construction documents of the project and that the company would submit 
a new, correct version.  

Following  an  analysis  of  the  newly  submitted  documentation  by  the  Fund’s  staff,  the 
investigation  noted  that  all  of  the  years  related  to  the  activities  carried  out  had  been 
changed  to  a  completely  different  year:  2016.  The  inspection  carried  out  by  the  Fraud 
Prevention  Directorate  discovered  that  construction  work  on  the  site  started  before  the 
fee  for  the  construction  permit  had  been  paid  and  was  not  duly  notified  to  the  Plovdiv 
Regional  Directorate  for  National  Construction  Supervision,  according 
the 
requirements of the Spatial Planning Act.  

to 

Infringements were identified on the part of the chief architects of the municipality of Y, 
who  did  not  comply  with  the  procedures  in  the  Spatial  Planning  Act  and  issued  a 
building  permit  and  a  commissioning  certificate  for  the  site.  In  the  case  file,  the 

65 

 
construction  documents  referred  to  designers  who,  in  the  course  of  investigations, 
declared that the signatures in the documents were not theirs.  

The investigation also led to the identification of a person employed by the manager of 
firm  X  on  the  basis  of  an  oral  agreement.  This  person  had  responsibility  for  ‘technical 
control’ of the site. This person had also drawn up, with the knowledge and consent of 
the  manager  of  firm  X,  technical  documentation  for  the  site,  including  construction 
documents  with  false  or  falsified  signatures.  In  this  form,  the  technical  documentation 
was submitted to the State Fund for Agriculture and to the Municipality of Y as proof of 
the performance of construction and installation works and hence entitlement to a grant 
in respect of the project. The Fraud Prevention Directorate also identified infringements 
that  pointed  to  the  irregular  and  incorrect  keeping  of  construction  records  under  the 
Spatial Planning Act [ZUT]. The suspicions of fraud aroused during the check, including 
the actions of the architects, formed the basis for issuing alerts to both the Prosecutor’s 
Office attached to the Supreme Court of Cassation [VKP] and the National Construction 
Supervision Directorate [DNSK], asking these bodies to carry out checks under the Code 
of Criminal Procedure [NPK] and the Spatial Planning Act respectively [ZUT]. 

8.3.  Croatia 

Customs case – irregularity and illegal treatment of tobacco precursors 

On  9 October 2020,  customs  officers  from  the  mobile  units  sector  and  police  officers 
stopped a truck  with  Croatian registration plates close to  the Slovenian  border-crossing 
point  at  Bregana.  The  driver  gave  a  CMR  document  for  surveillance  purposes  to  the 
customs officer. The document had no number, and was issued on 7 September 2020. It 
indicated that the consignor was from Greece and the consignee from Slovakia. During 
the  search  of  the  vehicle,  leaf  tobacco  with  a  gross  weight  of  12.75  tonnes,  and  net 
weight of 11.445 tonnes was identified inside the cargo area. The customs officer asked 
the  driver  to  show  the  notification  the  driver  had  sent  to  the  excise  liaison  office  of 
Croatia,  which  monitors  such  shipments  when  they  enter  or  leave  Croatian  territory. 
However, the driver did not show that notification as he did not have it. Thus, an offence 
was committed under the Excise Law, which led to the suspicion of illegal treatment of 
tobacco  and  to  a  detected  irregularity.  Customs  officers  found  other  documents  in  the 
truck  that  suggested  that  the  driver  also  transported  goods  on  7 September 2020  and 
24 September 2020, with no notification submitted. Following that, a fine was submitted 
to a legal and natural person, and a decision was issued for excise payment in amount of 
HRK 18 756 000 (about EUR 2.5 million). 

8.4.  Estonia 

Excise fraud related to weakness in the Excise Movement and Control System (EMCS) 

The Investigation Department of the Estonian Tax and Customs Board was in charge of a 
criminal  case in  2020, in which a  group of people was identified engaging in  unlawful 
acts  with  large  quantities  of:  (i)  goods  with  customs  preferences;  and  (ii)  excise  goods 
(Penal Code subsection § 393). 

The  people  in  question  declared  that  they  had  dispatched  light  alcohol  to  different  EU 
Member States, but in reality the goods were released for consumption in Estonia. As a 
result, the State retained an outstanding excise duty of more than EUR 530 000.  It  was 
ascertained in the course of proceedings that excise-exempt consignments of light alcohol 
(beer and cider) did not reach their destination. However, the electronic confirmation of 

66 

 
the  receipt  of  goods  in  the  EMCS  system  had  been  made  in  excise  warehouses  in 
Slovakia, Italy, Latvia and Denmark. Three citizens of the Republic of Estonia and two 
citizens  of  the  Republic  of  Latvia  were  detained  as  suspects  in  the  given  offence  in 
August 2020. 

8.5.  Greece 

Participation  of  the  Financial  Police  Directorate  of  the  Greek  Police  in  Operation 
OPSON  organised  by  Europol  and  Interpol,  with  the  support  of  OLAF,  to  tackle  food 
fraud in general and, more specifically, the illicit trafficking of counterfeit/fake and low-
quality food and beverages 

The specific objectives of the operation are to:  

i. 

protect public health; 

ii. 

prevent illicit trafficking in counterfeit/fake food and beverages; 

iii. 

identify  and  dismantle  groups  involved  in  organised  crime  and  trading  in 
counterfeit and low-quality food; 

iv. 

strengthen international cooperation; 

v. 

strengthen cooperation at national level between law-enforcement authorities and 
food inspection services; 

vi. 

strengthen cooperation with private partners from the food and beverage industry;  

vii. 

strengthen  cooperation  with  Europol, 
organisations. 

Interpol  and  other 

international 

The  Greek  Police,  and  in  particular  the  Financial  Police  Directorate,  participated  in 
Operation  OPSON  IX  and  in  the  individual  targeted  actions  on:  (i)  olive  oil  (in  which 
they  played  a  leading  role);  (ii)  wine  and  alcoholic  beverages;  and  (iii)  milk  and  dairy 
products. 

Operation  OPSON  IX  ran  from  December  2019  to  June  2020  and  involved  law-
enforcement  authorities  from  83  countries  around  the  world  (EU  Member  States,  other 
European countries and countries in Africa, America, Asia and the Middle East). It was 
supported  by  the  European  Anti-Fraud  Office  (OLAF),  the  European  Commission  and 
the European Union Intellectual Property Office.  

As  a  result  of  OPSON  IX,  more  than  26  000  checks  were  carried  out,  19  criminal 
organisations were dismantled, 406 people were arrested, and more than 12 000 tonnes of 
illegal  and  dangerous  goods  worth  approximately  EUR  28  million  were  seized  (see 
Europol press release of 22 July 2020). 

The  Financial  Police  Directorate  also  participated  in  Operation  OPSON  X,  which  ran 
from December 2020 to March 2021, and focused on specific targeted actions relating to 
wine and alcoholic beverages, as well as honey and products made from honey. 

67 

 
8.6.  Hungary 

Integrated  management  of  tax  risks  arising  from  import  procedures  and  related  EU 
transactions 

With  the  rise  of  e-commerce,  the  evasion  of  VAT  linked  to  import  procedures  and 
subsequent  commercial  transactions  poses  new  challenges  for  the  tax  and  customs 
authorities of EU Member States. 

In  Hungary,  a  number  of  anomalies  were  signalled  in  the  first  half  of  2020,  mainly 
involving consignments from East Asian countries and a non-EU member of the Customs 
Union. 

Because the tax and customs authority operates as an integrated organisation in Hungary, 
it has been possible to take concerted action in both fields. A pilot project in the fourth 
quarter of 2020 targeted combined checks at the most risky importers and their indirect 
representatives  requesting  customs  clearance.  Following  the  initiation  of  the  procedure 
for the release for free circulation (customs procedure 40), consignments were designated 
for  inspection  at  the  same  time  that  a  tax  check  was  initiated.  The  pilot  procedure 
produced significant results, but has also highlighted a number of difficulties. The means 
by which fraudulent taxpayers try to evade anti-fraud measures quickly became apparent. 

Overall,  the  combined  action  resulted  in  better-than-expected  results,  as  a  number  of 
fraudulent schemes came to light. The combined checks uncovered several instances of: 
(i)  goods  infringing  intellectual  property  rights;  (ii)  undeclared  goods;  and  (iii)  goods 
prepared  for  delivery  by  courier  and  addressed  to  private  individuals.  The  Hungarian 
authorities  managed  to  implement  temporary  insurance  measures  worth  hundreds  of 
millions  of  forint  and  to  thwart  the  activities  of  fraudulent  tax  entities.  The  tax  checks 
also  included  a  check  on  the  authenticity  of  Community  transactions,  and  so  several 
SCAC requests have been initiated. 

Within  the  scope  of  its  capacity  to  carry  out  checks,  Hungary’s  National  Tax  and 
Customs  Administration  will  seek  to  continue  this  inspection  method  in  2021.  By 
learning  from  the  experience  of  the  pilot  project,  Hungary  hopes  to  make  the  2021 
inspections  even  more  effective,  with  the  involvement  of  criminal  specialists  if 
necessary. 

8.7. 

Italy 

Customs fraud by misusing the inward processing procedure 

The  Guardia  di  Finanza  is  the  customs  authority  and  police  force  with  general 
responsibility for economic and financial matters. It acts to protect the financial interests 
of the  EU, including through:  (i) the surveillance of customs areas; (ii) local  economic 
monitoring  (including  by  air  and  sea);  (iii)  post-clearance  checks  (on  economic 
operators);  and  (iv)  criminal  investigation  activities.  Its  active  duties  include  post-
clearance  checks  under  Article  48  of  the  EU  Customs  Code,  carried  out  by  a  financial 
and  economic  police  unit  of  the  Guardia  di  Finanza.  These  checks  make  it  possible  to 
crack down on customs fraud committed by abusing the inward processing procedure in 
2020.  After  examining  the  economic  relations  between  an  Italian  undertaking  and  a 
Swiss  undertaking,  officers  identified  import  operations  carried  out  under  inward 
processing  that  were  fraudulently  declared  as  tax-exempt.  Instead  of  re-exporting  to 
Switzerland aluminium of a quality equivalent to that from Venezuela (99% purity), the 

68 

 
Italian  operator  sold  to  the  Swiss  undertaking  alloys  obtained  from  aluminium  scrap 
smelting. The inspection identified EUR 280 784 in evaded customs duties, and charges 
were brought against the offenders for aggravated smuggling. 

Customs  and Monopolies  Agency: INF-AM  OLAF communications,  investigative cases, 
imports of bicycles/e-bikes from Asian countries 

The  cases  concern  AM  communications  relating  to  imports  of  bicycles  and  electric 
bicycles  from  Asian  countries.  These  communications  showed  an  increase  in  abnormal 
import  flows  linked  to  circumvention  of  anti-dumping  duties  and  under-invoicing,  and 
also involved identity theft. The identity theft was examined by cross-referencing exports 
made  against  imports  recorded  in  DB  Surveillance  2,  on  the  basis  of  the  TARIC 
additional  codes  allocated  to  the  Chinese  exporters.  This  exercise  revealed  several 
anomalies, in particular for one undertaking which, according to Chinese export data, had 
exported  4  826  electric  bicycles  to  the  EU  from  July  2018  to  August  2019,  whereas  a 
higher number of 7 419 electric bicycles had been imported from the same undertaking 
under  the  additional  code  C416(33.4%  AD  and  CVD)  up  until  October  2019.  The 
undertaking  in  question  therefore  had  2  593  electric  bicycles  unaccounted  for.  The 
Customs  and  Monopolies  Agency  assumed  that,  in  order  to  pay  a  lower  duty,  forged 
invoices in the name of this undertaking may have been presented at import to the EU for 
electric bicycles produced and exported by  other Chinese undertakings classified under 
C999 (79.3%). 

8.8.  Lithuania 

Health centre 

The  Financial  Crime  Investigation  Service  launched  a  pre-trial  investigation  into  fraud 
and forgery of documents. This investigation was initiated in close cooperation with the 
Support Administering Agency. The investigation discovered that a company had signed 
a  support  agreement  with  a  project  value  of  EUR  4  713  507,  of  which  the  applicant’s 
own funds had to be EUR 2 613 507. 

The project was to construct and install a health-promotion centre. However, it was found 
that the beneficiary – in breach of the procurement procedures – had directly agreed with 
the contractor on the construction works. The beneficiary acted together with a contractor 
allegedly  having  the  goal  to  commit  fraud  by  avoiding  the  obligation  to  contribute  by 
own funds to the execution of the project. The beneficiary accepted documents from the 
contractor stating that significantly more works were carried out in reality and provided 
this false data to the Support Administering Agency with the aim of unlawfully acquiring 
high-value foreign assets (i.e. the support funds).  

When  submitting  payment  requests  to  the  Support  Administering  Agency,  the 
beneficiary  falsely  indicated  the  quantity  and  cost  of  the  works  carried  out,  and  thus 
illegally  obtained  EUR  210  875.19  from  both  the  EU  and  the  budget  funds  of  the 
Republic  of  Lithuania.  In  total,  the  beneficiary  attempted  to  fraudulently  receive  an 
additional EUR 451 231.92 in support from the EU and Lithuanian national funds. 

In  cooperation  with  the  Agency’s  staff,  the  misappropriation  of  EUR  451  231.92  in 
support funds was prevented. 

69 

 
8.9.  Romania 

European  Social  Fund  2014-2020  –  Unduly  obtained  EU  funds  for  promoting  social 
inclusion and combating poverty 

Following  the  notification  to  DNA,  DLAF  carried  out  two  checks  into  a  beneficiary 
obtaining  funds  to  implement  two  projects  carried  out  under  the  human-capital 
operational  programme  2014-2020.  This  programme  was  co-funded  from  the  European 
Social Fund via the human-capital operational programme 2014-2020, Priority Axis 4 – 
social inclusion and combating poverty, specific objective 4.2 – reducing the number of 
persons at risk of poverty and social exclusion in marginalised (non-Roma) communities 
by implementing integrated measures. 

The  projects  were  to  be  implemented  in  two  neighbouring  municipalities  in  Buzău 
County, considered to be marginalised and at risk of poverty. The projects aimed at: (i) 
helping  workers  to  travel  and  access  transport;  (ii)  promoting  social  inclusion;  (iii) 
combating poverty  and all forms  of discrimination;  (iv) investing in  education, training 
and professional training; (v) supporting the development and provision of socio-medical 
services;  (vi)  working  to  improve  living  conditions;  and  (vii)  increasing  awareness 
among  relevant  social  players  about  the  importance  of  equal  opportunity,  non-
discrimination and social inclusion. 

The  notification  concerned  an  applicant  who  submitted  false  documents  to  obtain 
funding:  a  qualitative  social  study  was  carried  out  which  declared  these  two 
municipalities  to  be  marginalised.  This  study  used  fictitious  data,  identity  data  of  non-
existent  persons,  forged  signatures,  and  conclusions  drawn  on  the  basis  of  false 
information. 

In  these  projects,  the  two  municipalities  were  not  listed  as  marginalised  in  the  Atlas  of 
marginalised  rural  areas  and  local  human  development  in  Romania.  Therefore,  DLAF 
checked the way in which the applicant declared these municipalities to be marginalised. 

The  check  revealed  issues  relating  to  the  insertion  of  fictitious  data  about  the  total 
number  of  inhabitants  in  the  zones  subjected  to  the  study  and  the  indicators  obtained. 
DLAF  notified  DNA  that  criminal  acts  had  been  committed  –  namely:  (i)  use  or 
submission, in bad faith, of false, inaccurate or incomplete documents or declarations, if 
the act results in the unlawful obtainment of funds from the EU budget with particularly 
serious consequences (Article 18(1)(1) and (3) of Law No 78/2000, as amended); and (ii) 
forgery of private documents (Article 322(1) of the Criminal Code). 

8.10.  Slovakia 

An  overview  of  the  most  frequent  irregularities  registered  in  the  IMS  and  the  most 
frequent  forms  of  fraud  in  the  implementation  of  EU  funds  identified  in  relevant 
programming periods 

To fulfil the tasks set out in the action plan of the national anti-fraud strategy, the Slovak 
AFCOS in cooperation with the national authorities prepared two specific documents, set 
out below. 

i. 

‘The  most  common  types  of  irregularities  registered  in  the  IMS  system  for  the 
programming periods 2007-2013 and 2014-2020’. 

70 

 
ii. 

‘The  overview  of  the  most  frequent  forms  of  fraudulent  behaviour  in  the 
implementation  of  EU  funds  identified  during  the  2007-2013  and  2014-2020 
programming periods’. 

The analysis under i. revealed that the high percentage of irregularities that fall under the 
category ‘Txx/99 – Other’ appears to be particularly problematic. This high percentage is 
an obstacle to a deeper analysis of the causes of irregularities in individual categories, as 
it indicates that many irregularities with different causes are being lumped into this single 
category.  The  Slovak  AFCOS  therefore  suggests  restricting  the  use  of  type  ‘Txx/99  – 
Other’,  only  to  the  specific  cases  where  it  is  objectively  not  possible  to  assign  an 
irregularity to a more specific type within the category.  

Even for the programming period 2014-2020, it is extremely important to constantly: (i) 
make efforts to eliminate the risk of irregularities; and (ii) work on procedures, processes 
and plans that will result in the prevention of irregularities with extremely high financial 
impact.  It is clear that – whether in number or financial impact  – the categories ‘T11 – 
Application’,  ‘T16  -  Action  (unfinished)’  and  ‘T40  -  Violation  of  public  procurement 
regulations’ are dominant. Based on this analysis, it is possible to state there is a need to 
focus  more  on  improving  processes  and  procedures  that  will  eliminate  the  risks  of 
irregularities, especially in the categories with the highest susceptibility to irregularities. 

The  analysis  under  ii.,  ‘the  Compendium’,  focuses  on  the  description  of  how  crimes 
affect  the  EU’s  financial  interests  in  Slovakia.  This  material  describes  the  cases  that 
competent judicial authorities identified as a specific infringement of law.  

The  Compendium  is  divided  into  two  parts  covering  the  2007-2013  and  2014-2020 
programming periods. All cases included in the Compendium contain an irregularity and 
a  description  of  a  suspected  fraud.  The  information  on  the  irregularity  includes:  (i)  the 
irregularity qualification; (ii) the type of irregularity; (iii) the authority that detected the 
irregularity; (iv) the detection method; (v) the classification of the case; (vi) the general 
identification of the applicant/recipient; and (vii) whether the irregularity was reported to 
OLAF.  

The description of the suspected fraud contains: (i) a description of how the fraud itself 
operated;  (ii)  the  identification  of  the  criminal  offence  under  national  law;  (iii)  the 
identity of the offender; (iv) the punishment the offender received; (v) the type of court 
decision and (vi) how long the criminal proceedings lasted. 

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