Restoring "lost connections" between the EU and the UK as a consequence of Brexit through local and regional authorities.
Date: 2021-09-07
Institutions: Commission for Citizenship, Governance, Institutional and External Affairs
Subjects: European Committee of the Regions, European Union, United Kingdom, decentralisation, regional and local authorities, regional cooperation, withdrawal from the EU

Commission for
Citizenship, Governance,
 Institutional and External Aﬀairs

X
E
V

I
C

Restoring "lost connections"
 between the EU and the UK
 as a consequence of Brexit through
 local and regional authorities

© European Union, 2021 
Partial reproduction is permitted, provided that the source is explicitly mentioned. 

More information on the European Union and the Committee of the Regions is available online at 
http://www.europa.eu and http://www.cor.europa.eu respectively. 

QG-09-21-366-EN-N; ISBN: 978-92-895-1110-0; doi: 10.2863/60143 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This report was written by Machteld Bergstra, Jan Hagemejer,  
Kateryna Karunska (CASE) 

It does not represent the official views of the  
European Committee of the Regions. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contents 

1 

Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1 

2  Policy areas affected by Brexit ....................................................................... 3 

Impact on LRAs ............................................................................................ 13 
3 
4  Avenues for re-building cooperation ............................................................ 19 

5  Conclusions and recommendations............................................................... 29 

References ........................................................................................................... 31 

Annex A: List of experts interviewed ................................................................. 39 

List of figures 
Figure 1. Policy areas affected by Brexit .............................................................. 4 
Figure 2. Avenues for re-building cooperation between EU and UK LRAs ...... 21 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List of abbreviations 

AER 
BAR 
CASE 
CBHD 
CEMR 
CPMR 
CoR 
EC 
EGTC 
EHIC 
ETC 
EU 
ICBAN 
INTA 
LRA 
MFF 
MS 
NGO 
RTA 
RQ 
UCLG 
UK 
UN 
VET 

Assembly of European Regions 
Brexit Adjustment Reserve 
Center of Social and Economic Research 
Cross Border Healthcare Directive 
Council of European Municipalities and Regions 
Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions 
Committee of the Regions 
European Commission 
European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation 
European Health Insurance Card 
European Territorial Cooperation 
European Union 
Irish Central Border Area Network 
International Urban Development Association 
Local and Regional Authorities 
Multiannual Financial Framework 
Member States 
Non-governmental organisation 
Resident Twinning Advisor 
Research Question 
United Cities and Local Governments 
United Kingdom 
United Nations 
Vocational education and training 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Main  authors  (in  alphabetical  order):  Machteld  Bergstra,  Jan  Hagemejer, 
Kateryna Karunska 
Quality control: Katarzyna W. Sidło 

The  authors  would  like  to  thank  the  following  interviewees  for  their  time  and 
insights (in alphabetical order):  

  Representatives of the Brittany Region services 
  Ms. Machtelijn Brummel, Interreg Europe & Interreg North Sea region 
  Mr. Shane Campbell, Irish Central Border Area Network 
  Mr. Charles H. Collinson, H.M. Government of Gibraltar 
  Cllr Alison Evison, COSLA - Convention of Scottish Local Authorities  
  Mr. Martin Gillen, Northern Ireland Water and SWELL Programmes 
  Dr. Simone Goedings and Ms. Kim de Vries, Netherlands Association of 

Municipalities 

  Representatives  of  the  Hauts-de-France  Region:  Mission  to  the  EU  and 

Directorate for Europe 

  Ms. Gunn Marit Helgesen, Norwegian Association of Local and Regional 

Authorities 

  Prof. Jens Holscher, Bournemouth University Business School 
  Mr. Grzegorz Kubalski, Association of Polish Counties 
  Ms. Gina McIntyre, Special EU Programmes Body 
  Ms. Pamela Mulder, Interreg 2 Seas 
  Cllr Michael Murphy, Tipperary County Council and Irish Delegation to 
the EU Committee of the Regions, member of the European Committee of 
the Regions 

  Ms. Agi Musset, Interreg VA France (Channel) England 
  Ms. Lisa O'Kane, Northern Ireland Local Government Association 
  Mr.  Jean  Peyrony  and  Mr.  Raffaele  Viaggi,  Transfrontier  Operational 

Mission  

  Mr. Ximo Puig i Ferrer, Regional Government of Valencia, member of the 
European  Committee  of  the  Regions  and  member  of  CoR-UK  Contact 
Group 

  Mr. Michiel Rijsberman, Council of the Province of Flevoland, member of 
the European Committee of the Regions and member of CoR-UK Contact 
Group 

  Mr.  Davide  Strangis  and  Ms.  Elise  Wattrelot,  Conference  of  Peripheral 

Maritime Regions 

  Mr.  Karl  Vanlouwe,  Flemish  Parliament,  member  of  the  European 

Committee of the Regions and member of CoR-UK Contact Group 

as well as other interviewees who preferred to remain anonymous.

 
 
 
1  Introduction 

The United Kingdom (UK) left the European Union (EU) on 31 January 2020. 
However, the terms  of  the  UK’s departure from the EU  were  to a large extent 
unclear until as late as December 2020, which marked the end of the transition 
period.  While  Brexit  itself  was  negotiated  at  the  highest  levels  of  national 
governments and EU authorities, it also affects local communities and regions. In 
recognition of that fact, the European Committee of the Regions (CoR) launched 
a UK Contact Group intended to maintain lines of communication between local 
and  regional  authorities  (LRAs)  in  EU  and  UK  cities,  regions,  and  devolved 
administrations.  This  study  aims  to  provide  scientific  support  to  the  CoR-UK 
Contact Group in  the assessment of the impact of  Brexit on the functioning of 
LRAs, analysing the lost connections between the UK and the EU at the local and 
regional  level  as  well  as  exploring  possible  avenues  and  methods  of  future 
cooperation between EU and UK LRAs following Brexit.  

The study analyses the main policy areas affected by Brexit (Section 2) and the 
related impact on LRAs (Section 3). As Brexit is a largely unprecedented event 
which  unfolded  alongside  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  we  greatly  rely  on 
information  gathered  through  stakeholder  interviews,  who  deserve  profound 
acknowledgments. They include representatives of LRAs and LRA associations 
located in the EU regions with most ties to the UK as well as selected UK regions, 
coordinators of cross-border projects, and representatives of academia. To assess 
possibilities  for  future  cooperation,  this  study  discusses  the  main  drivers  and 
challenges  to  cooperation  imposed  by  Brexit  as  well  as  the  key  factors  for 
maintaining or restoring further cooperation between EU and UK LRAs (Section 
4). It also presents relevant examples of functioning cooperation frameworks and 
successful  bottom-up  initiatives  that  can  be  used  by  LRAs  to  leverage  future 
cooperation opportunities. The last section of the study provides brief conclusions 
and recommendations. 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2  Policy areas affected by Brexit 

Although the Brexit agreement applies to the entire scope of EU-UK cooperation 
(see  Figure  1),  its  main  impact  will  be  on  economic  and  policy  cooperation 
between EU Member States (MS) and the UK due to the UK’s departure from the 
Single  Market1.  Similarly,  no  EU-UK  joint  framework  was  maintained  in  the 
areas of  foreign policy,  external security, and defence cooperation  once the 
Brexit agreement set in.  

1 e.g., free movement of goods, services, and people; integration of financial, audio-visual, and transport services; 
as well as aviation and energy markets, among others. 

3 

 
 
 
                                           
Figure 1. Policy areas affected by Brexit 

Source: own elaboration based on European Commission (2020), Benson (2020), Lessard-Phillips & Sigona (2019), McKee 
& McKee (2018), and interviews.  
Note 1: “Circles” include policy areas most affected by Brexit and “boxes” specify the main aspects that were affected within 
each policy area. 
Note 2: Items in grey include policy areas where effects are mostly concentrated at the national level, while items  in blue 
include policy areas where Brexit effects are of highest relevance for LRAs and are discussed further in this report.  

4 

 
The primary impact on LRAs is likely to play out through changes in the economic 
environment  of  local and regional communities  and  less  seamless cross-border 
processes. Yet, while the extent of integration between EU and UK LRAs could 
be  affected  to  a  certain  degree2,  established  connections  are  likely  to  be 
maintained. Post-Brexit cooperation will thus be driven by decades of successful 
cooperation,  developed  partnerships,  and  established  economic,  social,  and 
cultural  links  regardless  of  available  funding.  In  addition,  the  preferential 
arrangements provided by the Brexit agreement, including, in particular, digital 
trade, open and fair competition, public procurement, climate change and joint 
carbon  pricing  regimes,  thematic,  judicial,  law  enforcement,  and  social 
security cooperation (European Commission, 2020), will create opportunities for 
new synergies and partnerships between LRAs.  

The remainder of this section analyses Brexit-related changes across the policy 
areas of highest relevance to LRAs. 

Cross-border and interregional cooperation 

The UK has decided to opt out of the European Territorial Cooperation (ETC) 
framework,  including  all  Interreg  programmes3,  starting  from  the  next 
programming period (2021-2027)4. ETC programmes currently provide the main 
framework for joint actions and policy exchanges between regional and local 
actors  from  the  UK  with  different  MS.  The  aim  of  ETC  programmes  is  to 
encourage LRAs and social and economic actors to overcome “border effects” – 
understood as barriers that reduce interaction between partners on two sides of a 
border – and to address problems more effectively across borders (Colomb, 2018). 
For the 2014-2020 programming period, the UK committed to five cross-border 
four 
cooperation  programmes,  six 
interregional programmes5 with a total budget of up to EUR 10.1 billion6. This 
covers various Interreg programmes and projects in which the UK is a  partner, 
and which do not close until the end of 2023, meaning that up to 2023, the UK is 
still involved in Interreg activities. The programmes in which the UK participates 
share a focus on climate change action, the environment and resource efficiency, 
low  carbon  technology,  research  and  innovation,  and  tourism.  Under  the 

transnational  programmes,  and 

2  As  a  result  of  the  discontinuation  of  the  common  cooperation  frameworks  (e.g.,  regional  development  and 
cohesion funds, agriculture and rural development funds, and NextGenerationEU, among others) and a decrease 
in the funding dedicated to joint cross-border initiatives. 
3 Interreg operates on three levels: cross-border (Interreg A), transnational (Interreg B), and interregional (Interreg 
C)  cooperation.  For  more  details  see:  European  Commission.  Interreg:  European  Territorial  Co-Operation. 
Available at: https://bit.ly/3qPXxu6. 
4 Interreg North Sea Region. Update on the future of UK programme participation, 07 July 2020. Available at: 
https://bit.ly/3hFQkbR.  
5 Interreg. UK Programmes’ contact points. Available at: https://bit.ly/2Vc0dqe.   
6 European Commission. Interreg: European Territorial Co-Operation. Available at: https://bit.ly/3qPXxu6.   

5 

 
 
 
 
                                           
Withdrawal  Agreement7,  it  is  agreed  that  all  EU  projects  and  programmes 
under the 2014-2020 planning period will be financed as originally planned. 
This means that all beneficiaries, including those from the UK, will continue to 
participate  in  the  programmes  until  their  closure  and  will  remain  eligible  for 
further funding as part of the 2014-2020 period8 but will not be eligible to apply 
for funding under the EU Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021-20279.  
The  only  exception  to  the  UK  withdrawal  from  ETC  Programmes  is  the 
PEACE Plus programme10, running from 2021-2027, which is a successor to 
the current PEACE programme and encompasses projects previously conducted 
under  the  Interreg  VA  programme.  The  UK  has  committed  to  providing 
significant additional funding to the PEACE Plus programme in a bid to signal its 
commitment to the stability and prosperity of Northern Ireland11.  

Movement of people 

According to the most recent United Nations (UN) international migration data, 
more  than  1.29  million  UK-born  people  live  in  the  EU-27  (30%  of  all  British 
citizens living abroad), with 68% of them living in Ireland, Spain, France, and 
Germany  alone.  Similarly,  migrants  from  the  EU  represent  about  3.3  million 
people or 35% of all foreigners that reside in the UK12.  

With EU citizens representing 7.6% of total employment in the UK in 2019 (up 
from 4.8% in 2010)13, the seamless mobility of people is one of the crucial success 
factors  for  cross-border  cooperation  and  local  development.  Yet,  it  remains 
challenging to find a balance between the rights of citizens to move, work, study, 
and reside across the EU and the eagerness of MS to ensure preferential treatment 
for their citizens (Maas, 2020).  

7 European Commission. The EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement. Available at: https://bit.ly/3AttJbf.   
8 Interreg Europe. Projects with UK partners can continue as planned, 3 February 2020. Available at: 
https://bit.ly/3jPgk7k.    
9 European Commission. Questions and Answers on the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union 
on 31 January 2020, 24 January 2020. Available at: https://bit.ly/3wk2hcB.   
10 Government of the UK. UK government announces additional £200 Peace Plus funding. Available at: 
https://bit.ly/3ypa1vl.   
11 As of April 2021, the tensions in Northern Ireland following Brexit are high with cases of violent unrest, see 
e.g., Fox Kara. What’s behind the recent violence in Northern Ireland? 10 April 2021. CNN. Available at: 
https://cnn.it/3wk2AEh.  
12 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs. International Migrants Stock, 2019. Available at: 
https://bit.ly/3jRdL4C.   
13 Eurostat. Population by sex, age, country of birth and labour status, 2019. Available at: 
https://bit.ly/2UpM7kK.  

6 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
As recent studies (Benson, 2020; Maas, 2020; Lessard-Phillips & Sigona, 2019; 
Fleming  et  al.,  2018;  Miller,  2018)  show,  Brexit  is  likely  to  exacerbate  the 
vulnerability of the EU citizens living in the UK and the British citizens living in 
the EU alike. With their legal status being changed, people find themselves being 
repositioned within local labour markets and being “judged as ‘deserving’ or 
‘undeserving’ of the privilege of staying put” (Benson, 2020). Even those who 
were well-established before Brexit can fall short of the bureaucratic requirements 
as new provisions are being introduced (Benson, 2020, O’Reilly, 2020).  As of 
June 2021, 6.02 million applications have already been submitted in the UK as 
part of the EU Settlement Scheme14, far exceeding the 2019 official estimates of 
approximately  3.7  million  EU  citizens  in  the  UK15.  Decisions  on  about  0.57 
million applications are still pending, while some estimated tens of thousands of 
EU citizens who might not have applied by the deadline16, including the older and 
vulnerable  populations,  are  at  risk  of  losing  their  right  to  work  and  access  the 
welfare system17.  

A  number  of  interviewees  have  also  underlined  that  the  uncertainty  that 
surrounds Brexit outcomes raises concerns on the material, emotional, and 
cultural aspects of the new cooperation framework.  
At the operational level, tourism and labour markets are expected to be most 
affected by the changes in border crossing procedures following Brexit.  

Tourism 

With the freedom of movement gone, the value of the UK passport as measured 
by  the  Quality  of  Nationality  Index  has  already  dropped  out  of  the  top  10  list 
(Kochenov,  2020).  While  the  Brexit  agreement  includes  special  provisions  for 
short-term travel and business visitors, cross-border travel will now require an 
international passport instead of the previously accepted national ID cards18. 
Thus,  as  underlined  by  a  number  of  interviewees,  Brexit  will  result  in  a  less 
seamless  travel  experience  and  more  restricted  temporary  residence 
decisions, especially for the youth and retired populations (O’Reilly, 2020).  

It has to be noted that the impact of Brexit on travel is, however, very difficult to 
ascertain in light of the COVID-19 pandemic that has also substantially reduced 

14  Government  of  the  UK.  EU  Settlement  Scheme  statistics.  02  July  2021.  Collection.  Available  at: 
https://bit.ly/2Uu2qN7.  
15 UK Parliament. Migration Statistics. 27 April 2021. Research Briefing. Available at: https://bit.ly/36nCwNL.  
16 Euronews. Post-Brexit residency: Many EU citizens face  uncertainty as UK deadline arrives. 30 June 2021. 
Available at: https://bit.ly/3jIu9EC.  
17 Gallardo Christina. FAQ: Post-Brexit residence deadline for UK and EU citizens. 21 June 2021. POLITICO. 
Available at: https://politi.co/3ymIFWy.  
18 Government of the UK. Visiting the UK as an EU, EEA or Swiss citizen. Guidance. 31 December 2020. Available 
at: https://bit.ly/3dNQM6E.  

7 

 
 
 
 
 
                                           
the  number  of  people  travelling  worldwide  (United  Nations  World  Tourism 
Organization [UNWTO], 2020).  

Health  tourists  and  residents  with  chronic  conditions  are  likely  to  be  affected 
substantially by the UK leaving the Cross Border Healthcare Directive (CBHD) 
and the European Health Insurance Card (EHIC) scheme, which allowed British 
citizens to benefit from choice of healthcare across the EU on the same basis as 
local citizens (McKee & McKee, 2018). Thus, the EHIC-related claims addressed 
to the UK by other EEA countries in 2015-2016 were over four times the number 
of reciprocal claims19. On the UK side, the EHIC will be replaced by the Global 
Health Insurance Card that will not cover planned treatments20. The absence of 
the  free  movement  of  people  would  thus  mean  the  lower  accessibility  of  and 
longer wait-times for health treatments only available in  the EU (or UK in the 
case of EU citizens). 

Labour market 

The effects on the labour market will be mostly felt in the bordering regions 
where a large number of people have to cross borders daily to go to work. Thus, 
as  reported  by  some  interviewees  and  the  Irish  Central  Border  Area  Network 
(ICBAN)  (2017),  Brexit  forced  a  number  of  people  and  businesses  in  the 
bordering  regions  to  relocate  across  borders  to  preserve  the  benefits of  EU 
membership. 

A number of sectors that rely on migrant workers are also expected to be affected 
by  the  post-Brexit  border  crossing  regulations.  As  mentioned  by  a  number  of 
interviewees, the situation of long-term migrants that already reside in the UK is 
likely to be unchanged while the inflow of new migrants is expected to be affected 
due to higher recruitment costs after Brexit. These include, in particular, the UK 
construction and social care sectors, which rely heavily on the EU skilled labour 
force, as well as the tourism and agriculture sectors, which employ the majority 
of  the  seasonal  workers  from  outside  the  UK  (Mohamed  et  al.,  2017  and 
interviews).  

19 UK Parliament. Health Services: Reciprocal Arrangements. Question for Department of Health. 27 February 
2017. Available at: https://bit.ly/3hm01xj.  
20 In Northern Ireland, the newly introduced Northern Ireland Planned Healthcare Scheme is set to replace the 
CBHD in the long-term. See more at Ireland’s Health Services. Cross Border Directive: get healthcare abroad. 
08 November 2018. Available at: https://bit.ly/3yvZwGn.  
8 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
Indeed,  according  to  a  recent  report,  the  share  of  EU-based  jobseekers  in  job 
searches  in  the  UK  fell  by  36%  for  all  jobs  and  by  41%  for  lower-paid  jobs 
between  2019  and  May  202121.  Furthermore,  the  COVID-19  pandemic  has 
certainly affected labour market dynamics in the UK, with a 14% and a 7% drop 
in the shares of job searches from the EU and outside the EU, respectively. The 
share of the latter, however, returned to its 2019 level by May 2021, while the 
share of EU jobseekers continues to decline22.This is also potentially an important 
loss for communities that provide temporary and seasonal workforce and rely on 
remittances from the UK, in particular the New Member States23.  

Research  

With about 20% of global research being produced in the EU24 and a third of UK 
scientific publications being co-authored with EU partners (Adams, 2017), Brexit 
creates risks of disrupting well-established research connectivity by affecting 
either direct research collaboration or student and staff exchange following the 
discontinuation of Interreg programmes. The 2016 referendum has thus already 
resulted  in  a  4.3  percentage  point  drop  in  the  share  of  EU  research  projects 
coordinated by UK-based teams (from 16.9% in 2016 to 12.6% in 2017)25. 
At the same time, continued participation in Horizon Europe could limit the 
potential disruption of research cooperation between the EU and the UK, the latter 
being the second largest net contributor to Horizon 2020 (EUR 6.9 billion) and 
one of the major recipients of the fund (14% of the total funds allocated over 2014-
2020) (Brien, 2020). Yet, as about 92% of all grants signed under Horizon 2020 
were  attributed to EU  MS, Brexit could lead to a change in the distribution of 
funding towards the remaining EU MS and the reduced involvement of UK-based 
partners26. Although participation is indeed open to non-EU countries, the primary 
reason for the extension of eligibility criteria is to support the integration of EU 
candidate  countries  and  the  capacity  building  activities  of  the  European 
Neighbourhood Policy (Highman, 2019).  

21 Kennedy Jack and Adrjan Pawel. International Jobseeker Interest in Britain is Changing After Brexit. 17 June 
2021. Indeed Hiring Lab. Available at: https://bit.ly/3qNwe3s.  
22 Ibidem. 
23 See for e.g., UK Office for National Statistics. Migrant labour force within the UK’s construction industry: 
August 2018. 23 August 2018. Available at: https://bit.ly/3hkm5bn.    
24 World Bank. World Development Indicators. Scientific and technical journal articles. Latest available data is 
from 2018. Available at: https://bit.ly/3hDvv0E.  
25 Matthews, David. UK-led research with EU funding drops sharply after Brexit vote. Times Higher Education, 
21 December 2017. Available at: https://bit.ly/2V7yPJL.  
26 Horizon Dashboard. Available at: https://bit.ly/3hkiGJP.   

9 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
Thus, while the current financing for the UK-based Horizon 2020 programmes is 
prolonged and it appears unlikely that Brexit will lead to the immediate disruption 
of collaboration, potential legitimacy concerns27 over UK access to EU funds and 
research grants (Highman, 2019) might reduce cooperation in the long term.  

While  the  most  prestigious  institutions  on  both  sides  could  compensate  for 
potential  losses  by  finding  alternative  cooperation  pathways  or  new  research 
partners, low and medium ranked institutions would be the most affected by 
the decrease of available funds, mobility possibilities, and the potential loss 
of  well-established  and  consistent  partnerships  (Highman,  2019  and 
interviews). On the other hand, some interviewees as well as Seidenschnur et al. 
(2019) have  emphasised  a  positive outlook on  the  durability of  the established 
research networks and the mutual importance of continuous cooperation. 

Student exchanges (Erasmus) 

Following  Brexit,  the  UK  will  no  longer  participate  in  the  Erasmus  exchange 
programme28.  Participation  will,  nonetheless,  be  maintained  for  Northern  Irish 
students due to funding provided by the Republic of Ireland29.  

The discontinuation of the Erasmus programme and the change of the fee status 
for EU citizens30 will mean that the EU students who want to participate in UK-
based programmes (both short and long term) will be subject to the same rules as 
non-EU  nationals,  with  higher  tuition  fees31,  visa  and  residence  permit 
requirements, and ineligibility for a number of loans and financial assistance 
mechanisms (James, 2016 and interviews). This might lead to higher competition 
between students from the EU (or the UK) and third countries32 for access to the 
limited number of spots available through non-Erasmus exchange frameworks. 
Further,  as  noted  by  the  interviewees,  the  newly  created  UK-based  Turing 
scheme33  set  to  replace  the  Erasmus  programme  in  the  UK  provides  limited 
exchange  and  financial  support  opportunities  and  is  currently  restricted  to  UK 
students going abroad. The disruption of the well-established framework therefore 

27 Against the background of discontinued UK contributions to EU research and development budgets and ever-
growing competition between universities and research institutions for the access to funds (Highman, 2019). 
28 For details on UK involvement see European Commission (2020). Erasmus+ Annual Report 2019. Available 
at: https://bit.ly/36e8jRx.   
29 Cerulus, Laurens. Ireland to fund Erasmus scheme for Northern Irish students. POLITICO, 27 December 2020. 
Available at: https://politi.co/3hHLPxh.   
30 UK Council for International Student Affairs. Brexit – fees and Student Support. 01 April 2021. Available at: 
https://bit.ly/2V3UoLi.  
31 See, e.g., Balan, Robert S. UK Tuition Fees for EU/EEA Students in 2021. Changes after Brexit. Study Portals. 
15 December 2020. Available at: https://bit.ly/3hDDr1R.  
32 e.g., USA, Canada, Australia, Japan, and South Korea. 
33 Government of the UK. New Turing scheme to support thousands of students to study and work abroad. 

Department of Education. Press Release. 26 December 2020. Available at: https://bit.ly/3wkKB0q.   

10 

 
 
 
 
 
                                           
risks making the exchange process more demanding for both the participants and 
the authorities in charge of managing exchange flows, potentially leading to lower 
volumes  of  exchange  and  the  exclusion  of  less  prestigious  institutions  and 
participants with disadvantaged backgrounds. 

Some interviewees also underlined the importance of the UK as one of the main 
anglophone  destinations  for  outgoing  students  and  the  role  of  Erasmus+ 
programmes in the competitiveness of EU universities and their attractiveness for 
foreign students (Seidenschnur et al., 2019). Both Seidenschnur et al. (2019) and 
interviewees,  nonetheless,  express  confidence  in  the  strength  of  the  current 
connections which would allow maintaining close cooperation and would boost 
bilateral exchange flows outside the Erasmus+ programme. 

11 

 
 
 
 
 
3  Impact on LRAs 

The Brexit agreement does not directly regulate the cooperation framework for 
EU and UK LRAs; thus it is unlikely to be significantly affected by Brexit. The 
changes related to access to funding and eligibility to partake in the dedicated 
EU  cooperation  frameworks  could,  however,  have  an  indirect  impact  on  the 
scope  and  scale  of  cross-border  cooperation  projects.  Similarly,  Brexit 
ramifications  related to  the  Single  Market,  research,  education, and welfare 
systems integration are expected to have an indirect impact on communities and 
local economies through, among others, changes in the labour market, tourism, 
and local business dynamics.  

At the same time, LRAs and their cross-border cooperation will not be affected in 
the  areas  covered  by  foreign  policy,  external  security,  and  defence 
cooperation, which are dealt with at the national level and will benefit from the 
continuation of the EU-UK joint framework post-Brexit.  

Cross-border and interregional cooperation 

A shared sentiment among interviewees is that losing the UK as a partner in the 
Interreg  framework  reduces  the  ability  of  local  and  regional  governments  to 
initiate and maintain cross-border and interregional projects.  
The expected effects include: 

 
Loss  of  the  main  source  of  funding  for  cross-border  cooperation. 
Especially  for  MS  that  border  the  UK,  Brexit  means  a  big  loss  in  funding  for 
project  partners,  including  LRAs.  Interviewees  from  France,  the  Republic  of 
Ireland, and the Netherlands indicated that the UK was a partner in most of their 
cross-border programmes as well as a major budget contributor (e.g., up to a third 
of the budget of the Interreg North Sea). The UK’s departure also means the end 
of the UK-France Channel Interreg, Interreg 2 Seas, as well as Interreg Ireland-
Wales – all representing a significant loss of funding for the participating LRAs. 
Interviewees  widely  highlighted  that  LRAs  will  most  likely  not  be  able  to 
compensate  for  the  loss  of  the  Interreg  funding  using  regional  or  local  funds. 
While there is a widespread hope and willingness for cross-border activities to 
continue,  interviewees  argued  that  the  scale  cannot  remain  at  the  current  level 
without  additional  funding  being  added  from  the  national  or  EU  level34.  It  is, 
however,  highly  uncertain  whether  newly  set  up  compensatory  funds  will  be 
directed towards cross-border cooperation.  

34 The avenues to maintain and develop stronger relations in the future regardless of the funding available to LRAs 
are further discussed in Section 4 below. 

13 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
At the EU level, the Brexit Adjustment Reserve (BAR)35 was established 
 
to “counter unforeseen and adverse consequences in Member States and sectors 
that are worst affected”36. The results of the negotiations concluded on 17 June 
2021 confirmed the allocation of EUR 5 billion for the BAR37 with EUR 1 billion 
dedicated to Ireland alone38. A number of interviewees expressed hope that BAR 
could be used for cross-border cooperation; however, it is not currently mentioned 
as an explicit objective of the fund39. 

The UK national government has set a UK Community Renewal Fund40 
 
to replace investments from EU Structural Funds. The UK Community Renewal 
Fund  is  designed  as  a  temporary  programme  finishing  in  March  2022,  to  be 
followed by the UK Shared Prosperity Fund (Brien, 2021). Both programmes are, 
however, dedicated to reducing disparities in the levels of development across UK 
LRAs without a clear international dimension.  

1. 
Fewer  projects  were  developed  for  the  2014-2020  planning  period.  A 
number of interviewees stated that due to the uncertainty caused by Brexit, a share 
of Interreg project partners stopped developing projects with the UK, even though 
UK  partners  are  still  eligible  for  funding  available  under  the  MFF  2014-2020. 
This means that more applications might have been received and more projects 
could have been implemented if Brexit had not occurred. 

2. 
Losing a platform for finding partners. According to interviewees, the 
Interreg framework provides a platform that helps match partners in cross-border 
cooperation  projects.  International  contacts  are  also  encouraged  through 
conferences and meetings. As many cross-border projects spring from personal 
connections between representatives of LRAs, the loss of such a platform poses a 
challenge for new initiatives. 

35 European Commission. Proposal Brexit Adjustment Reserve, 26 December 2020. Available at: 
https://bit.ly/3qP1teA.   
36 Ibidem. 
37 European Parliament. Deal reached on EU fund to help regions and businesses adapt to Brexit. Press Release. 
17 June 2021. Available at: https://bit.ly/3xplk6K.  
38 Government of Ireland. Minister of State for European Affairs Thomas Byrne welcomes conclusion of the Brexit 
Adjustment Reserve negotiations and confirmation of over €1bn to Ireland. Press Release. 17 June 2021. Available 
at: https://bit.ly/3hlMypi.  
39  According  to  the  achieved  agreement,  the  BAR  will  support  measures  introduced  as  result  of  Brexit  and 
dedicated to the support of 1) local communities, businesses, and the self-employed, with a special focus on SMEs; 
2) reintegration in the labour market and jobs creation; 3) reintegration of EU citizens who left the UK because of 
Brexit; and 4) the functioning of certification and licencing schemes as well as borders, customs, fisheries, and 
phytosanitary and security controls. For more details, see: European Parliament. Deal reached on EU fund to help 
regions and businesses adapt to Brexit. Press Release. 17 June 2021. Available at: https://bit.ly/3xplk6K.  
40 Government of the UK. UK Communities Renewal Fund: prospectus 2021-22, updated 24 March 2021. 
Available at: https://bit.ly/3wkILwz.   

14 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
3. 
Diverging  legislation.  With  the  UK  being  outside  the  EU  framework, 
existing cross-border cooperation will be affected through changes in the financial 
framework, as well as the gradual divergence of the legislation and organisational 
structures on both sides. This could affect ongoing cooperation projects and limit 
the  possibilities  to  undertake  new  cross-border  projects  in  the  future.  From  a 
practical point of view, this can entail additional red tape and regulatory burdens 
for the LRAs on both sides.  

Movement of people 

With the UK no longer participating in the free movement of people, the expected 
effects on LRAs include the following: 

1. 
Pressure on the local economy, as LRAs on both sides could benefit from 
the  presence  of  foreign  residents  (O’Reilly,  2020)  in  the  form  of  increased 
commercial  activity,  buying  real-estate,  paying  local  taxes,  and  regular  tourist 
inflows. The disruption of free movement could, in turn, lead to: 

 
workforce  shortages,  particularly  in  the  fields  that  rely  on  foreign 
workforce, i.e., social care, construction, and agriculture (Sandford, 2016), thus 
pressuring the delivery of needed local services (e.g., affordable housing or care).  

 
increased bureaucratic burden for the companies operating internationally, 
workers  relying  on  daily  cross-border  commutes,  and  LRAs  charged  with 
establishing  a  supportive  ecosystem  for  local  businesses  and  communities  and 
managing cross-border movements.  

2. 

Increased budgetary and human resources pressure to: 

 
support adjustment to the new regulatory framework and management 
of the border crossing points with previously estimated daily cross-border flows 
of around 60,000 passengers and 12,000 trucks in the Channel41 and 14,000 EU 
workers  in  Gibraltar42.  With  more  border  checks  and  additional  bureaucratic 
provisions, the average passing time in the Channel is estimated to increase from 
the pre-Brexit 20 seconds per person to up to a minute, while port authorities also 
warn about expected “friction and delays”. In early 2021, France has already hired 
an  additional 700 border staff  and spent about EUR 40 million to adapt  to the 
return  of  border  controls  with  the  UK43.  Other  examples  mentioned  in  the 

41 How the Brexit deal will end free movement between UK and EU. France24, 31 December 2020. Available at: 
https://bit.ly/3ypyzEo.  
42 Minutes of the second meeting of the CoR-UK Contact Group, 16 November 2020. 
43 How the Brexit deal will end free movement between UK and EU. France24, 31 December 2020. Available at: 
https://bit.ly/3ypyzEo.  

15 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
interviews include the establishment of contact points to inform local businesses 
on post-Brexit changes and advise drivers on new customs forms and regulation, 
as well as the creation of extra parking lots to accommodate trucks waiting at the 
border points. The majority of the discussed initiatives have, nonetheless, received 
support and guidance from the relevant national authorities.   

 
accommodate  for  the  stay  formalisation  requirements  and  residence 
permit  requests  of  UK  (or  EU)  citizens.  Given  the  high  number  of  British 
citizens  in  some  MS,  the  spike  of  residence  requests  following  Brexit  could 
overburden  the local authorities that manage the process. As argued by Benson 
(2020), the announcement of the referendum results in 2016 and the uncertainty 
over Brexit negotiations have already led to an increase in information requests 
on  stay  formalisation  to  French  LRAs  and  long-term  residence  permit  and 
citizenship applications from the UK citizens residing in France.  

Research  

UK-based  researchers,  businesses,  and  public  bodies  will  remain  eligible  for 
bidding  within  Horizon  Europe44  –  the  EU-funded  research  cooperation  and 
innovation support framework open to third-country participants. It is important 
also  to  note  that  funding  of  ongoing  and  “in-flight”  projects  will  also  be 
maintained, based on the UK commitment to funding guarantee45. 

The primary effects on LRAs are twofold. 

1. 
There  is  a  potential  risk  of  disruption  of  close  research  synergies.  For 
example,  one  of  the  interviewees  pointed  out  that  while  the  preservation  of 
participation in Horizon Europe projects is of great benefit for all partners, there 
is  concern  among  local  authorities  that  triple  helix46  research  and  innovation 
cooperation will become more difficult after Brexit. 

2. 
EU-based partners (including LRAs) could, however, benefit from lower 
competition on bids and hence potentially have greater access to fund EU-wide 
research projects. In this light, a number of interviewees highlighted that while 
access  to  funding  will  be  maintained  for  UK  partners,  EU  LRAs  expect  that 
cooperation  will  be  jeopardised  by  additional  administrative  requirements  and 
steps  in  the  application  process  as  well  as  the  need  for  greater  justifications 
regarding  their  choice  of  partners.  They  thus  expect  to  prioritise  EU-based 
partners in future projects.  

44 With about a EUR 77 billion budget for the 2014-2020 period (EC, 2020). 
45 Government of the UK. UK Participation in the Horizon 2020 after Brexit. Guidance. 24 October 2019. 
Available at: https://bit.ly/3xyLAvz.   
46 i.e., cooperation between academic, industry, and government institutions.  

16 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
Other  implications  for  LRAs  include  divergences  of  public  procurement 
regulations in the UK and EU that may introduce friction into the cross-border 
provision of research services to LRAs by academic units, think tanks, and NGOs. 

Student exchanges (Erasmus) 

Unlike other areas, the UK’s departure from the Erasmus+ programme is unlikely 
to  directly  affect  LRAs  on  either  side  of  border.  Universities  and  other 
participating  educational  and  training  institutions  that  are  charged  with  the 
management of exchange flows will bear the highest and most immediate costs in 
terms  of  the  accommodation  of  newly  established  and  independent  exchange 
schemes  and  parallel  bureaucratic  process.  While  there  might  be  potential  for 
synergies, the initial stage will require additional human and financial resources 
dedicated to the exploration of the process and adaptation of the local networks to 
support students participating in the UK-based exchange scheme. 

At the same time, LRAs and local civil servants that have previously benefited 
from  professional  and  vocational  education  and  training  (VET)  exchange 
programmes as well as Erasmus-coordinated projects that support innovation in 
education will be directly affected by the disruption of the framework. Given that 
the  newly  established  Turing  scheme  is  set  to  prioritise  exchange  among 
universities  and  schools,  professionals  are  at  risk  of  being  left  behind  in  the 
transition process. 

As noted in the interviews, the main impact for LRAs will thus be the loss of the 
cultural and professional connections established through years of student and 
professional exchange. This lack of seamless cultural convergence and exchange 
of  knowledge  and  best  practices  would  make  the  eventual  re-building  of 
connections in other policy areas even more difficult and burdensome. 

17 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4  Avenues for re-building cooperation 

Enhancing cooperation and exchange in different areas 

We have identified the challenges and drivers for future cross-border cooperation 
based on academic literature and information obtained through interviews.  

Political will is key 

In the EU, the enthusiasm and political willingness to participate in cross-border 
cooperation  seems  to  remain  unchanged  after  Brexit.  Interviewees  widely 
emphasise  the  perceived  importance  of cross-border  cooperation.  The  question 
does not seem to be whether continued cross-border cooperation is desirable but 
rather how it can be achieved. 

In the UK, the picture appears more varied, with different positions noticeable 
among the UK national government, devolved governments, and LRAs. Scotland 
(Scottish Government, 2021), Wales47, and several LRAs, for example Cornwall 
County48 and the government of Gibraltar49, have expressed interest in continued 
cross-border  cooperation with the EU as well as participation in some form of 
student exchange.  

At the national level, the UK government has not expressed a clear indication of 
willingness to participate in Interreg programmes as a third country or to fund or 
engage  in  other  forms  of  cross-border  cooperation.  No  longer  tied  to  the  EU 
cohesion policy, the UK may want to direct its attention to cooperation on a more 
global scale. An exception is the PEACE Plus Programme50 used by the UK to 
signal its commitment to the stability and prosperity of Northern Ireland.  

The need for funding 

Securing adequate funding is a major challenge for the implementation of cross-
border projects (European Commission, 2017; Colomb, 2018). When government 
budgets  are  tight,  e.g.,  during  a  recession,  allocating  resources  to  cross-border 
cooperation can be seen as low on the list of priorities. As emphasised by a number 

47 Welsh Government. New International Learning Exchange programme to make good the loss of Erasmus+. 
Available at: https://bit.ly/2UvlR8g.   
48 Cornwall Brussels Office. Available at: https://bit.ly/3ABhaKL.  
49 As highlighted in our interview with a representative of the Gibraltar government.  
50 Government of the UK. UK government announces additional £200 Peace Plus funding. Available at: 
https://bit.ly/3ypa1vl.  

19 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
of  interviewees,  the  COVID-19  pandemic  has  put  many  LRAs  under  financial 
strain, undermining the availability of funding for cross-border projects. With the 
UK no longer a part of the Interreg framework, funding becomes a key challenge.  
Funding needs to be safeguarded by sustained political commitment and can be 
supported by a “business case” in which private actors contribute to the funding 
(European  Commission,  2017).  Interviewees  note  that  with  a  major  source  of 
funding disappearing, LRAs will need to clarify more than ever the added value 
of cross-border projects to attract new sources of funding.  

Initiating projects benefits from the autonomy of LRAs 

In many instances, cross-border projects are initiated by actors on the local and 
regional level, who then decide to collectively pursue funding and set up a project 
(Colomb, 2018 and interviews). 

A tradition of autonomy on the local and regional level and a supportive attitude 
of  higher-up  authorities  to  cooperation  is  seen  to  foster  cross-border  relations. 
Interviewees from France, the Netherlands, Norway, and Poland report that the 
UK  local  and  regional  governments  have  lower  levels  of  devolvement  and 
authority  on  the  local  level  than  LRAs  in  their  respective  countries51.  The 
responsibilities  and  the  way  in  which  UK  local  government  authorities  are 
organised  are  seen  as  very  different  from  continental  Europe.  This  leaves 
respondents  unsure  whether  LRAs  will  have  the  means  or  the  authority  to 
cooperate  across  borders  in  the  future.  With  political  support  for  cooperation 
varying across regions in the UK and the UK national government not yet vocal 
about the exact way forward, the extent to which UK LRAs have the autonomy to 
independently initiate new projects remains unclear. 

51 The  details of devolvement  at different  government levels can also be found at  European Committee of the 
Regions. Division of powers. Available at: https://bit.ly/2TxsUxt.   

20 

 
 
 
 
                                           
Figure 2. Avenues for re-building cooperation between EU and UK LRAs 

Source:  own  elaboration  based  on  O’Keeffe  and  Creamer  (2019),  Colomb  (2018),  EC  (2015),  LISER  (2015),  Perkmann 
(2003), and interviews. 

21 

 
 
Areas in which cooperation can be developed 

When looking for areas in which cooperation can be developed, one can first look 
at the areas which were focal points of the Interreg 2014-2020 planning period. 
The various programmes in which the UK took part shared an emphasis on52: 

1)  low  carbon  technologies;  2)  environment  and  resource  efficiency;  3) 
combating climate change; 4) research and innovation; and 5) tourism.  

Further cooperation can aim to address at least the abovementioned areas in order 
to mitigate lost connections. Additionally, cooperation can be developed at  the 
local and regional level in  the  areas previously dealt with on the EU level,  for 
example: 

mobility of people: supporting employment abroad and enabling residence 

 
decisions for people to relocate from the UK to the EU and vice versa. 

student exchanges: setting up local and regional exchange programmes. 

 
Based on the interviews, one can argue that for new cooperation to be valued by 
both sides, it may need to focus on projects that bring  a more direct economic 
benefit, in addition to a cultural benefit.  

Models of future cooperation 

Over the years, countries in the north (Scandinavia, the UK, and Ireland) have 
shown  a  preference  for  informal  cooperation,  whereas  in  the  west  (Germany, 
France,  and  Benelux)  and  the  south  (Spain,  Portugal,  and  Italy),  formal  cross-
border  cooperation  structures  such  as  the  European  Grouping  of  Territorial 
Cooperation (EGTC) have been more often established (European Commission, 
2015). This point was also emphasised in the interviews, with respondents from 
continental  Europe  pointing  at  a  possible  cultural  divide,  with,  for  example, 
French partners prioritising long-term planning and British partners having a more 
spontaneous approach to cooperation.  

Models of future cooperation between EU and UK LRAs include: 

52 See e.g., Interreg North Sea Region. Available at: https://bit.ly/3jJIBw5; Interreg Ireland – Wales. Available 
at: https://bit.ly/3yyiSel; Interreg France (Channel Manche) England. Available at: https://bit.ly/3ypgGFR; 
Interreg 2 Seas. Available at: https://bit.ly/2TGGZsb.   

22 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
1. 
Remaining  within  the  EU  frameworks  or  joining  newly  created  EU 
frameworks. A number of interviewees mentioned that the best way forward for 
the UK would be to try to preserve an EU framework or to be attached to some 
sort of framework (even if it is not established  yet). In essence, the UK would 
need to try to find a way to remain within certain EU frameworks in a way that 
would be acceptable for both sides. A larger framework does not only provide 
funding but also creates a way to find partners and join networks, something that 
is especially important for smaller entities. 

Regarding cross-border cooperation and Interreg programmes, in particular, 
the  UK  could  aim  to  participate  as  a  third  country  partner,  i.e.,  partners  from 
countries that do not participate directly in the Interreg Europe programme53 and 
cannot benefit from the European Regional Development Fund54. UK LRAs may 
wish  to  participate  in  Interreg  programmes  as  third  country  organisations. 
According to interviewees, this option has not been widely discussed. A number 
of interviewees reported it is rather difficult for non-EU countries to get involved 
and mentioned that this has never happened in the past Interreg periods. For the 
UK  to  participate  in  existing  Interreg  programmes,  it  may  additionally  be 
necessary for these programmes to be re-labelled from Interreg A (cross-border) 
to Interreg B (transnational), given that Interreg A programmes are reserved for 
areas along an internal EU border.  

2. 
Closer  cooperation within  the  functioning  international  frameworks. 
Regardless of the funding available to EU and UK LRAs, both sides can maintain 
and  develop  closer  relations  within  the  existing  multilateral  cooperation 
frameworks. These allow not only to build on the previous cooperation experience 
but also to explore new partnership opportunities, benefit from project support, 
and learn from the successful experience of peers within and beyond the EU. 

Established international LRA networks such as Eurocities and the Council of 
European  Municipalities  and  Regions  (CEMR)55  have  already  supported  and 
facilitated  cooperation  across  borders  on  topics  such  as  social,  economic,  and 
territorial cohesion56 and green transformation57.  

53 Interreg Europe. Frequently Asked Questions. Available at: https://bit.ly/3dL8hoo.  
54 European Commission. European Regional Development Fund. Available at: https://bit.ly/3dL8s32.   
55 Council of European Municipalities and Regions. More information available at: https://bit.ly/3yyjVLj.  
56 e.g., Council of European Municipalities and Regions. Cohesion policy. Available at: https://bit.ly/3hlOk9W.  
Eurocities.  Cities  call  for  new  EU  pact  for  just  and  sustainable  recovery.  6  May  2021.  Available  at: 
https://bit.ly/3hCbtDW.  
57  e.g.,  Eurocities.  Putting  people  first  in  the  green  energy  transition.  13  November  2020.  Available  at: 
https://bit.ly/3xky6U0.  

23 

 
 
 
 
 
                                           
Other  examples  of  similar  networks  that  remainn  open  to  EU  and  UK  LRAs 
regardless of the impact of  Brexit include  the  Congress of Local and Regional 
Authorities58,  United  Cities  and  Local  Governments  (UCLG)59,  Covenant  of 
Mayors60, International Urban Development Association (INTA)61, Metropolis62, 
the  Assembly  of  European  Regions  (AER)63,  Energy  Cities64,  as  well  as  the 
Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions (CPMR)65, in which Wales and the 
Scottish  Highland  Region,  Aberdeen  Shire,  Aberdeen  City,  Fife,  Southend-on-
Sea continue to be members.  

Further, LRAs can gain from greater involvement in multilateral cooperation 
fora, like the UN Climate Change Conference66 and the Conference of the Parties 
to the Convention on Biological Diversity67, which can lead to the development 
of closer connections along the lines of the agreed strategic priorities.  

3. 
Development of bottom-up frameworks. LRAs can work together on a 
bilateral and multilateral level, forming strategic partnerships with other LRAs to 
tackle common issues across borders. Such cooperation is frequently formalised 
using a Memorandum of Understanding. This form of cooperation can take the 
shape  of  the  technical  exchange  of  information  and  negotiations,  aiming  to 
support  international  connectivity.  A  number  of  interviewees  stressed  that  it 
would be preferable for LRAs to have a common framework for partnerships with 
the UK, either at the national or EU level. Examples of successfully established 
cooperation  frameworks  among  LRAs  –  including  ICBAN68  and  the  Straits 
Committee69 – can be used to re-build stronger connections across borders. 

 
Established in 1995, ICBAN aims to facilitate cross border partnerships of 
local  authorities  and  their  cooperation  on  regional  development  and  common 
socio-economic challenges in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. The 
initiative  provides  a  framework  for  closer  cooperation,  reciprocal  capacity 
building,  and  the  joint  implementation  of  cross-border  projects  in  the  region. 

58 Congress of Local and Regional Authorities. More information available at: https://bit.ly/3xoekXz.  
59 United Cities and Local Governments. More information available at: https://bit.ly/3dNG5Ba.  
60 Covenant of Mayors. More information available at: https://bit.ly/3hjYPKD.  
61 International Urban Development Association. More information available at: https://bit.ly/36iBVx8.  
62 Metropolis. More information available at: https://bit.ly/3ymQaga.  
63 Assembly of European Regions. More information available at: https://bit.ly/3hm4dx3.  
64 Energy Cities. More information available at: https://bit.ly/3qPuczP.  
65 Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions. More information available at: https://bit.ly/3jRm7t0.  
66  forthcoming  COP  26  in  Glasgow,  Scotland  (October-November  2021).  More  information  available  at: 
https://bit.ly/3xlrZPl.  
67 forthcoming UN Biodiversity Conference (COP 15) in Kunming, China (October 2021). More information at: 
https://bit.ly/3yvKErw.   
68 Irish Central Border Area Network. More information available at: https://bit.ly/36gL0GC.     
69 Provincie Zeeland. Straits Committee: samenwerkingsverband Europese kustprovincies. Available at: 
https://bit.ly/3xgwquB.   

24 

 
 
 
 
                                           
Thus, the established connections will likely be maintained and strengthened after 
Brexit following the joint approval of “The Framework of Regional Priorities”70 
for 2021-2027 by the member LRAs. While specific to the context of  the Irish 
region,  the  initiative  can  be  used  as  a  best-practice  example  of  the  successful 
establishment  and  formalisation  of  a  bottom-up  cooperation  framework  that 
provides a mutually beneficial, forward looking, and strategic response to local 
and regional challenges. 

 
The  Straits  Committee  was  launched  between  coastal  regions  that 
surround the Strait of Dover following an initiative by the Department of Pas-de-
Calais.  The  Straits  Committee  currently  includes  Hauts-de-France  Region,  the 
French departments of Pas-de-Calais and Nord (France), Kent County (UK), the 
provinces of Zeeland (Netherlands), and East- and West-Flanders (Belgium). The 
committee was set up to ensure continued collaboration as the UK and EU move 
towards  a  new  relationship.  The  partners  demonstrated  their  commitment  by 
signing  a  Memorandum  of  Understanding  for  the  Creation  of  the  Straits 
Committee.  The  committee  will  set  up  working groups in three  specific  areas: 
tourism, a knowledge network connecting the universities of the Straits area with 
the  other  local  stakeholders,  and  cross-border  initiatives  for  young  people, 
including  mobility,  internships,  and  exchanges of  experience71.  The  committee 
will  set  up  a  network  of  contact  points  in  each  partner  authority  to  facilitate 
participation in cross-border projects in the Straits area. Work is also being done 
to develop a small project support initiative, with each partner region contributing 
funding for setting up smaller projects. The latter is still being negotiated.  

4. 
Bilateral  cooperation.  This  is  the  most immediate  and  widely  practised 
form  of  cooperation.  In  the  absence  of  EU-wide  frameworks  and  despite  the 
outcome of the Brexit negotiations, LRAs on both sides are free to maintain and 
develop  bilateral  connections.  The  main  challenges  and  weaknesses  of  this 
approach as discussed throughout the interviews is the cost of establishing long-
term and mutually beneficial cooperation. This includes the administrative costs 
of finding and maintaining contacts with a multitude of individual partner LRAs, 
time  needed  to  develop  a  common  approach  and  establish  viable  modes  of 
cooperation,  as  well  as  the  potential  greater  need  for  funding  for  individual 
projects. Therefore, LRAs  twinning  and  dedicated  frameworks72  that facilitate 

70 ICBAN. Framework of regional priorities. Available at: https://bit.ly/3wj7S2U.  
71 Provincie Zeeland. Straits Committee: Launch conference and future perspectives. 05 February 2020. 
Available at: https://bit.ly/3jOEcbo.   
72  Including,  for  e.g.,  1)  twinning  mechanism  as  part  of  Pre-accession  Assistance  (IPA)  and  European 
Neighbourhood Policy. For more details see: European Commission. Twinning. Available at: https://bit.ly/3xrBigI; 
European  Commission.  Twinning.  Available  at:  https://bit.ly/3xrBigI;  European  Commission.  Overview  – 
Instrument  for  Pre-accession  Assistance.  Available  at:  https://bit.ly/3AAuPC3;  and  European  Commission.. 
European Neighbourhood Policy.  Available at: https://bit.ly/3qTQeS3; and 2) twinning  associations. For  more 
details  see:  UK  Office  for  National  Statistics.  Twinned  towns  and  sister  cities,  Great  Britain  and  Europe: 
September 2020. Available at: https://bit.ly/3jOitjK.  

25 

 
 
 
                                           
peer learning and the development of bilateral links can be used to support the 
transition. As confirmed during the interviews, twinning is yet another potential 
format  for  future  cooperation  which  deserves  renewed  attention  after  Brexit 
despite  being  little  used  over  the  past  20  years.  It  is  important,  however,  to 
consider  that  twinning  has  been  widely  seen  as  a  form  of  development  aid  in 
recent decades, which makes it less attractive for future EU-UK cooperation.  

Examples of efforts to maintain cooperation 

1. 
As an example of the role that a national government can play, one can look 
at  the  Irish  government,  which  is  trying  to  support  a  Shared  Island 
approach73 to joint challenges with Northern Ireland, for example when it comes 
to environmental or health risks. The Irish Government has a Shared Island Unit, 
aimed at working with the Northern Ireland Executive and the British Government 
to  address  strategic  challenges,  further  develop  the  all-island  economy,  foster 
North/South  cooperation,  enhance  dialogue,  and  support  a  comprehensive 
programme of research.  

2. 
Like many regional authorities throughout the EU, the region of Brittany, 
France, has been supporting local businesses to prepare for and deal with Brexit 
and to continue doing business with the UK74.  

3.  Wales has launched a new international learning exchange programme 
for 2022-2026 to compensate for the loss of Erasmus+75. Funded by the Welsh 
government, the scheme will allow learners and staff, both from Wales and those 
who  come  to  study  or  work in  Wales,  to  continue  to take  part  in  international 
exchanges in ways similar to Erasmus+, in Europe and beyond. This will support 
the  establishment of new partnerships  and  the  continuation of  those  developed 
under Erasmus+. The new programme will also fill in the gaps left by the Turing 
Programme, specifically in the aspects related to long-term funding, the retention 
of two-way exchanges, and the inclusion of youth work. 

Scottish  Government  allocated  GBP  3  million76  to  support  research 

4. 
cooperation between Scotland and the EU through Saltire Research Awards grant.    

73 Government of Ireland. Shared Island Unit. Available at: https://bit.ly/3jTFlyp.   
74 Bretagne Commerce International. Available at: https://bit.ly/3xn5JnV.   
75 Welsh Government. New International Learning Exchange programme to make good the loss of Erasmus+. 
Available at: https://bit.ly/2UvlR8g.   
76 Scottish Government. Strengthening links with Europe. 08 June 2021. Available at: https://bit.ly/2UwVe3o.  

26 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
5. 
The Government of Gibraltar, in our interview with a representative, has 
expressed  an  intention  to  continue  participation  in  Interreg  programmes77 
aiming to allocate funding from the local government.   

77 Gibraltar has been a partner in two Interreg programmes - the Interreg Mediterranean and the South West Europe 
Programmes.  See  Gibraltar  EU  Programmes  Secretariat.  European  Territorial  Cooperation.  Available  at: 
https://bit.ly/3hknH57.   

27 

 
 
 
                                           
 
 
5 

 Conclusions and recommendations 

This study shows that Brexit indeed endangers the many links between the UK 
and  the  EU  that  have  been  gradually  built  up  over  the  long  period  of  the  UK 
presence in the EU. The impact on EU MS is likely to be highly uneven with the 
most severe effects expected in the neighbouring countries, including France, the 
Netherlands, and Belgium, as well as Ireland, which receives special attention in 
line with the Northern Ireland Protocol.  

As far as LRAs are concerned, the most important aspect of the EU-UK relations 
includes  the  discontinuation  of  UK  participation  in  EU  programmes,  which 
creates the risk of disrupting cross-border cooperation and reducing the scope of 
student and professional exchange. The restrictions on the mobility of people may 
also have a negative effect which has, nonetheless, been difficult to separate from 
the changes induced by the COVID-19 pandemic. 

From a technical point of view, Brexit shifts the relations between the EU and UK 
to  a  format  comparable  to  that  in  place  in  other  non-EU  countries  in  Western 
Europe – i.e., in Switzerland and Norway. These countries participate in various 
EU programmes as a full member or a partner country78, which, however, entails 
financial  contributions  from  national  budgets.  Our  interviewees  have  quite 
unequivocally  expressed  concerns  on  the  availability  of  and  willingness  to 
allocate comparable levels of funding by the UK for further cross-border projects. 
Moreover,  the  prevailing  expectation  is  that  the  UK  is  going  to  take  part  in 
projects  that  create  economic  value-added,  limiting  the  scope  for  other,  less 
tangible,  cooperation  goals.  Therefore,  the  possibility  that  the  UK  joins  the 
Interreg  programme  as  a  third  country  is  rather  limited.  Aside  from  the 
programmes where the participation of the UK is preserved (i.e., Horizon), Brexit 
narrows cooperation prospects between LRAs to smaller scale initiatives. 

However, the great value of the EU-driven programmes, apart from the funding, 
is  its  coordinating  and  motivating  role  as  well  as  its  support  in  matching 
cooperation  partners.  With  the  success  of  the  bottom-up  initiatives  being 
contingent  upon  well-established  personal  connections,  further  coordination 
efforts are needed on both sides to ensure continuation of the cooperation.  

This  report  has  looked  at  various  possibilities  for  cooperation  outside  the  EU 
framework and identified the following.  

78 Government of Norway. Participation in programmes and agencies. Available at: https://bit.ly/3qNzRXn.   

29 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
 
Bottom-up  initiatives  of  bilateral  and  multilateral  cooperation:  these 
may be based on previous cooperation links, personal connections, or a particular 
topic. One example of such an initiative is the Straits Committee, which looks at 
possibilities of continued cooperation in the territories along the Dover Strait.  

 
In these initiatives, it is key to find partners with common interests and 
problems, where cooperation is likely to benefit all sides. This will also help to 
mobilise  funding  for  such initiatives  and streamline  coordination and  lobbying 
efforts at the national and international levels. 

 
Decentralised  student  exchange  initiatives  can  be  a  way  forward  to 
partially alleviate the effects of the UK leaving the Erasmus programme. LRAs 
can  facilitate  and  coordinate  bilateral  and  multilateral  agreements  between 
academic units to support small scale exchange between universities.  

 
Twin  cities  and  twinning  projects  are  specifically  meant  to  support 
cooperation on common issues and peer learning between LRAs. Apart from the 
value-added from the projects themselves, they can help build up and maintain a 
network of contacts, which may serve as basis for other forms of cooperation. 

 
Shifting  focus  on  intra-EU  relations:  while  the  UK  is  certainly  an 
important partner to many EU MS due to its proximity and existing connections, 
some cooperation links are bound to gradually disappear. However, cooperation 
in  many  areas  does  not  require  immediate  geographical  proximity.  Thus,  EU 
countries  previously  active  in  the  expiring  Interreg  Channel  can,  for  example, 
choose to participate in the  Interreg North  Sea  Region  programme,  which also 
addresses some of the maritime and coastal issues. 

Moreover, political will at all levels of government on both sides  is the key to 
maintaining any form of cooperation. Hence, LRAs and LRA associations need 
to make national authorities aware of the need for continued cooperation and the 
concrete  losses  caused  by  its  discontinuation  in  order  to  find  funding  and 
institutional support. This is true in particular for the LRAs in the UK. Last but 
not least, the role of the Committee of the Regions and other LRA organisations 
is to underline the importance of ongoing cooperation with the UK to EU decision 
makers  in order to  accommodate  the post-Brexit  reality  in  the  EU  cooperation 
framework.   

30 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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38 

 
 
 
Annex A: List of experts interviewed 

The list below shows experts selected for consultations  (subject to interviewee 
approval before submission of the final version of the report). 

No  Country/region 

Name 

Function 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

France 
Northern Ireland, 
Ireland, Scotland 

Agi Musset 

Gina McIntyre 

Netherlands 

Pamela Mulder 

Gibraltar 

Charles Collinson 

United Kingdom 

Kevin Bentley 

Poland 

Grzegorz Kubalski 

France 

Amandine Sossa and 
Romain Wascat 

Northern Ireland 

Lisa O'Kane 

Netherlands 

Kim de Vries 

France 

Jean Peyrony 

France 

Sébastien Crom, Fanny 
Gasc, Aude Körfer, 
Claire Le Tertre 

12 

Netherlands 

Machtelijn Brummel 

13 

Ireland 

Keith Thornbury 

14  Northern Ireland 

Martin Gillen 

Contact point Interreg FR-UK France 
Chief Executive Officer, Special EU 
Programmes Body 
Contact point Interreg 2 Seas 
Netherlands 
Director of European Programmes and 
EU Programmes Facilitator; EU 
programmes funding agency Gibraltar 
EU Exit Force, Local Government 
Association 
Deputy Director of the Office, 
Association of Polish Counties 
Head of cross-border cooperation 
mission and policy advisor, Région 
Hauts-de-France; Policy officer to the 
EU for Horizon 2020, Région Hauts-
de-France 
Local Government Association for 
Northern Ireland 
Policy advisor, Association of Dutch 
Municipalities 
Director, Mission Opérationnelle 
Transfrontalière 
Regional Delegation of Brittany and 
Permanent Delegation of Brittany in 
Brussels  
Interreg Europe point of contact for 
Netherlands 
Contact point Interreg VA BREATH 
project, Dundalk University of 
Technology 
Contact point Interreg VA SWELL 
project, Northern-Ireland Water 

15  United Kingdom 

Jens Holscher 

Bournemouth University 

16 

17 

18 

19 

Ireland/Northern 
Ireland 

Shane Campbell 

Europe 

Davide Strangis and 
Elise Wattrelot 

Norway 

Gunn Marit Helgesen 

Scotland 

Alison Evison 

Chief Executive Officer, Irish Central 
Border Area Network 
Executive Director, Conference of 
Peripheral Maritime Regions; 
Executive Secretary of the Atlantic 
Arc Commission 
Norwegian Association of Local and 
Regional Authorities 
President COSLA 

Date of 
interview 
10 March 2021 

22 March 2021 

10 March 2021 

13 April 2021 

12 March 2021 

23 March 2021 

21 April 2021 

23 March 2021 

9 April 2021 

3 March 2021 

16 March 2021 

11 March 2021 

26 March 2021 

24 March 2021 

7 April 2021 

1 April 2021 

9 April 2021 

11 March 2021 

22 July 2021 

CoR members 

39 

 
 
 
 
 
 
20 

Netherlands 

Michiel Rijsberman 

21 

22 

23 

Ireland 

Michael Murphy 

Spain 

Ximo Puig i Ferrer 

Belgium 

Karl Vanlouwe 

Member of Flevoland provincial 
council, member of CoR-UK Contact 
Group 
Member of Tipperary County Council 
(IER) and head of CoR's Irish 
delegation 
President of the Valencia region, 
member of CoR-UK Contact Group 
Member of the Flemish Parliament, 
member of CoR-UK Contact Group 

12 March 2021 

2 April 2021 

8 April 2021 
(in writing) 
11 March 2021 

40 

 
 
 
EN

ISBN 978-92-895-1110-0
doi:10.2863/60143

QG-09-21-366-EN-N

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