Syria’s electricity sector after a decade of war : a comprehensive assessment.
Date: 2021-07-30
Institutions: European University Institute
Subjects: Syria, economic reconstruction, electrical industry, energy cooperation, energy transport, foreign investment, industrial infrastructure, post-war period, self-sufficiency in energy, war damage

Syria’s Electricity Sector 
After a Decade of War: 
A Comprehensive Assessment

Sinan Hatahet and Karam Shaar

Research Project Report  
Wartime and Post-Conflict in Syria 
Issue 2021/13 - 30 July 2021

© European University Institute 2021
Content and individual chapters © Sinan Hatahet and Karam Shaar, 2021

This work has been published by the European University Institute,
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies.
This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. 
Additional reproduction for other purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of 
the authors. 
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the year and 
the publisher.

Requests should be addressed to med@eui.eu.
Views expressed in this publication reflect the opinion of individual authors and not those of the 
European University Institute.

Middle East Directions
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies

Research Project Report
RSCAS/Middle East Directions 2021/13
30 July 2021

European University Institute
Badia Fiesolana
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI)
www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/
cadmus.eui.eu

Funded by 
the European Union

2  

Syria’s Electricity Sector 
After a Decade of War:  
A Comprehensive Assessment

Sinan Hatahet* and Karam Shaar**

*  Sinan  Hatahet  is  a  senior  research  fellow  at  the  Sharq  Forum,  Omran  for  Strategic  Studies  and  a  research 
associate in the Wartime and Post-Conflict in Syria project in the Middle East Directions programme at the Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (EUI). Hatahet’s research interests include the dynamics of Syria’s national 
and local economies; non-state actors; the Kurdish political movement; and the emerging regional order in MENA.

** Karam Shaar is the Research Director of the Operations and Policy Center and a Non-Resident Scholar at the 
Middle East Institute. His research focuses on Syria’s political economy.

3  

Table of Contents

Executive Summary  

Introduction  

1. Unmet Needs and Inefficiency in the Pre-War Decade  
1.1. Increasing Dependence on Gas-Fuelled Generation  
1.2. Lost in Transmission  
1.3. Demand Composition and the Supply Gap  
1.4. Regional Connectivity and Cooperation  

2. Impact of the Conflict  

2.1. Damage to Generation and Transmission Infrastructure   
2.2. Daunting Costs and Slow Reconstruction  
2.3. Changes in Production and the Promise of Green Alternatives  

3. Foreign Assistance and Investments: Disillusion and Reality   

3.1. Sanctions and the Loss of Potential Support  
3.2. Assistance from Assad’s Allies  

3.2.1. Iran  
3.2.2. Russia  
3.2.3. Companies from other countries  

Conclusion: Bottlenecks and Future Prospects  

Annex: Interactive Dashboard for the Electricity Generation Plants  

  5

  6

  8
  8
  10
  12
  12

  14
  14
  15
  16

  19
  19
  21
  21
  22
  23

  25

  27

4  

Executive Summary

Before  the  2011  conflict,  Syria’s  electricity  infrastructure  was  barely  functional.  There  were  high 
production and transmission losses with frequent load shedding, especially in the summer. Syria had 
poor structural and performance indicators: power losses stood at nearly 26% and there were 43 days 
of power outage per year. Tariffs were low due to heavy government subsidies. 

However, ten years of war has worsened matters considerably. Per capita consumption of state electricity 
is 15% of what it was in 2010. For instance, in the first half of 2021, Aleppo had ten-hours of rationing for 
every hour or half an hour of power; Damascus had, instead, five “dead” hours for one hour of electricity. 
The damage to the grid and substations can be fixed at reasonable rates with local expertise. This is 
not the case, though, with power generation plants. The conflict saw four of the 14 plants suffer serious 
damage, representing nearly 18% of the pre-war installed capacity nationwide. Two other plants near 
Hama and Damascus have also been damaged but have since been partially repaired.

In 2021, the Ministry of Electricity estimated the sector’s production and transmission reconstruction 
cost at USD 2.4 billion. Though difficult to quantify, indirect losses in lost output in other sectors due 
to electricity cuts are likely to be orders of magnitude higher. Firms in regime-held areas identify the 
interruption to essential services as their main obstacle to doing business.

Renewable energy use was falling even before the conflict, from 20% in the early 1990s to 5% as the 
conflict began. With the continued slowdown in water flow from Turkey and the failure to fix hydroelectric 
turbines, hydro sources contributed only 2% of public supply in 2020. While the government has made it 
easier for private investors to participate in the green electricity sector, especially wind and solar energy, 
their contribution remains negligible.

Despite much talk and numerous memoranda of understanding, very little of the production capacity 
has been repaired. The country’s two principal backers, Russia and Iran, have shown little appetite for 
following  through  on  agreements  due  to  the  government’s  inability  to  secure  funding. The  country’s 
most pressing need is not restoring its production capacity, but, rather, sourcing enough fuels to reach 
its  existing  potential  and  fixing  the  damaged  grid.  These  electric-related  problems  are  complex  and 
regional politics, sanctions, and technical issues all play their part. But Syria’s current electricity crisis 
is, at base, financial.

5  

Introduction

Improving electricity generation and distribution were central in the modernisation narrative of the 
Syrian  regime.  Since  the  1960s,  consecutive  Baath  governments  have  reinforced  state  control  over 
the chain of production. This has meant investing in new power plants, transmitters, and expanding the 
distribution grid into rural areas; all with heavy subsidies. 

Up until the outbreak of war in 2011, the country had enough fuel resources to cover most of its oil and 
gas needs for electricity generation. However, the infrastructure needed to be modernised, with high 
production and transmission losses. Additionally, demand was outstripping generation capacity. This 
was due to a lack of investment and resulted in frequent load shedding, especially in the summer. 

Neglect, robbery, vandalism, and shelling damaged electricity infrastructure during the conflict. Since 
2012,  failures  in  electricity  supply  have  become  a  chronic  problem  affecting  vital  services  and,  with 
them, people’s livelihoods. The lack of electricity impeded economic activity as the economy continued 
to  contract,  especially  during  the  period  2011-2016.1 According  to  the  2018  World  Bank  Enterprise 
Report, “the intermittent supply of electricity and fuel constitutes the greatest challenges for Syrian firms, 
with 67.5% of firms citing electricity interruptions as a major or severe problem”.2 Electricity interruptions 
were, in fact, the most serious reported problem across all categories. In 2021, the situation became still 
worse, with rationing paralysing most economic activity for hours and hours.

Assessing the needs, resources and obstacles to the rehabilitation of the power infrastructure in Syria 
is crucial for understanding the challenges and opportunities for economic recovery and stabilisation. 
In post-conflict countries such as Iraq, Lebanon, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, the electricity sector played 
a  vital  role  in  economic  recovery.  Numerous  studies  have  investigated  the  performance  of  post-war 
governments  in  rehabilitating  the  electricity  sector,  the  potential  for  adopting  renewable  energy,  and 
the impact of informal electricity generators and producers.3 Nevertheless, recent efforts to assess the 
sector in Syria are incomplete. 

UN  ESCWA  studies  published  in  2016  and  2020  documented  the  effect  of  the  conflict  on  Syria’s 
economy.4  The  report-writers  included  several  guiding  principles  and  a  preliminary  action  plan  for  
post-war  scenarios,  but  they  did  not  provide  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  electricity  sector.  Similarly,  a 
2017  World  Bank  study  looked  at  the  overall  impact  of  the  conflict,  but  did  not  evaluate  electricity 
infrastructure.5  The  Syrian  Centre  for  Policy  Research  also  monitored  the  impact  of  the  conflict  on 
different economic sectors, with only limited electricity supplies.

1  Rabie  Nasser  et  al.,  “Justice  to  Transcend  Conflict,”  Policy  Report,  Syrian  Centre  for  Policy  Research,  27  May  2020,  

https://bit.ly/2UU2Xc7 

2  Kinley Salmon, Nabila Assaf and David Francis, “Surviving Firms of the Syrian Arab Republic: A Rapid Assessment,” Policy Research 

Working Paper No. 8397, World Bank Group, 2 April 2018, https://bit.ly/3ydX6wH 

3  Henrietta Moore and Hannah Collins, “Decentralised Renewable Energy and Prosperity for Lebanon,” Energy Policy 137, 16 November 
2019,  https://bit.ly/2V7RnKe;  Georges  El-Jamal,  Hussain  Ibrahim  and  Mazen  Ghandour,  “Investigation  of  the  Technical-Economic 
Contribution of Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency: Lebanese Context,” (paper presented at REDEC 2014, 2nd Renewable Energy 
for Developing Countries, Beirut Lebanon, 26-27 November 2014) https://bit.ly/2VZQBPT; Harry Istepanian, “Iraq’s Electricity Crisis,” The 
Electricity Journal 27, no. 4, 1 May 2014, https://bit.ly/3rJpog7; Dana Abi Ghanem, “Energy, The City and Everyday Life: Living With Power 
Outages in Post-War Lebanon,” Energy Research & Social Science 36, February 2018, 36-43, https://bit.ly/378KKKd; Mohammad Ismail 
Khan, “Power Sector Strategy for the Afghanistan National Development Strategy,” Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Ministry of Energy 
and Water, 28 May 2007, https://bit.ly/3BeTQ5W; Roland Neifer, “Technical Assistance Consultant’s Report: Afghanistan: Addendum to 
the Afghanistan Power Sector Master Plan,” Think Asia, 28 November 2014, https://bit.ly/3kxALGe; Nysret Avdiu and Ali Hamiti, “The New 
Generation Investment and Electricity Market Development in Kosovo,” (paper presented at the International Conference on Renewable 
Energies and Power Quality, Las Palmas de Gran Canaria Spain, 11-13 April 2011), 929–34, https://bit.ly/3rFE5AL 

4  Khalid Abu-Ismail  et  al.,  “Syria  at  War:  Eight Years  On,”  ESCWA  and  University  of  St. Andrews,  2020,  https://bit.ly/2VWh9RZ;  Khalid  

Abu-Ismail et al., “Syria at War: Five Years On,” ESCWA and University of St. Andrews, 2016, https://bit.ly/2VWwvpy 

5  World Bank, “The Toll of War: The Economic and Social Consequences of the Conflict in Syria,” 10 July 2017, https://bit.ly/3zaUeAF 

6  

This paper provides the first comprehensive assessment of Syria’s electricity sector before and during 
the conflict and looks at prospects for the sector. The research focuses on regime-held areas because of 
the centrality of Damascus in managing the electricity sector. The opposition wants autonomy in north-
western and north-eastern Syria. But large-scale electricity production is not within the mandate of local 
authorities, and this is unlikely to change anytime soon. 6 The paper relies on compiling official annual 
reports published by the Ministry of Electricity, international data, analytical reports, public tenders, and 
news articles.

6 

In opposition-held areas (Idlib and northern Syria) and AANES territory, only early recovery projects in the electricity distribution network 
have been attempted. In Turkish zones of influence, electricity supply has increased but notably due to service provision from Turkey, 
as Turkish-Syrian companies have connected the local transmission grid with Hatay and Kilis’s. The SRTF - a multi-donor trust fund that 
serves as a channel for funding from the international community - has also financed and installed a number of small power generators to 
service hospitals and support some agricultural projects, principally in northern Aleppo and the AANES region. However, no major power 
generation capacity has been added to any of these regions. Turkey has also provided northern Aleppo and Idlib with electricity, but no 
major power generation capacity has been added to any of the regions outside of regime control. Sinan Hatahet, “The Recovery of the 
Local Economy in Northern Aleppo: Reality and Challenges,” Research Project Report, (Florence: European University Institute, Middle 
East Directions, Wartime and Post-Conflict in Syria, 25 March 2021), https://bit.ly/3d3LaW8 

7  

1. Unmet Needs and Inefficiency in the Pre-War Decade

The Syrian electricity sector was a state-owned monopoly, and the main contributor to the sector was 
and still is the Ministry of Electricity (Figure 1). In 2010, the government started to encourage private 
investment in the sector but nothing had come of this by the time war broke out. After years of central 
control, the regime’s decision to allow the private sector in was part of a wider push for liberalisation. 
However, a surge in private and international investment was always unlikely due to operational hurdles 
and due also to the lack of genuine competition. 

Figure 1: Public Electricity Sector Management Structure 

Source: Ministry of Electricity – Syria

Syria’s electricity infrastructure prior to the war was facing an increasing number of challenges. There 
were high production and transmission losses with frequent load shedding, especially in the summer. 
Compared with countries at similar levels of development, Syria trailed behind both in terms of structural 
and performance indicators: there were almost 26% power losses;7 and 43 days of power outage per 
year.  Syria  had  low  tariffs  though:  4.42  USD  cents  per  kWh.8  The  sector’s  ability  to  match  growing 
demand was very uncertain. 

1.1. Increasing Dependence on Gas-Fuelled Generation

Before the conflict, there were 14 Syrian power plants, 11 of which operated with fossil fuels and 
the remaining three of which depended on hydro energy. Overall, as of 2010, combined-cycle turbines 
produced  48.9%  of  the  total  electricity  supply,  compared  with  44.5%  from  steam  turbines  and  5.6% 
from hydro (see Figure 2 and the Annex for further details). Alternatives such as nuclear energy were 
considered but never materialised due to economic and political difficulties. The oldest plant in operation 
is Tabqa Dam, which has been online since 1973. The newest is the Jandar plant expansion, which was 
completed in 2011.

7  Public  Establishment  of  Electricity  for  Generation  and  Transmission  (PEEGT),  “Annual  Statistical  Report  -  2012”  (in  Arabic),  2012,  

https://bit.ly/3itm8kL

8  Husam Beides et al., “Syrian Arab Republic Electricity Sector Strategy Note,” Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP), 

World Bank, 15 August 2009, https://bit.ly/3wOSgo7

8  

 
 
Figure 2: Electricity Production by Energy Source 

Source: International Energy Agency (1990-2011) and Public Establishment for Electricity Generation (2012-2020)9

In  the  early  2000s,  Syria’s  reliance  on  gas  for  power  generation  increased  considerably  for  four 
reasons.  First,  there  was,  from  the  late  1990s,  a  decline  in  domestic  oil  output.  Second,  combined 
cycle power plants were increasingly used due to their enhanced efficiency. Third, there was improved 
access to natural gas both locally and internationally. Fourth, there were logistical reasons. Oil can be 
easily carried in tankers. But gas requires the construction of pipelines and liquefaction stations prior to 
transportation. As a result, Syria exported its excess oil supply and consumed all of its locally-produced 
gas. Although the regime was not motivated by environmental considerations, the reliance on gas had a 
less negative impact on the environment as emissions produced from gas combustion are much lower 
than those from oil.

The  key  turning  point  in  gas  reliance  came  in  2008,  as  the  development  of  new  gas  fields  was 
accompanied  by  a  sharp  increase  in  production  volume.  In  2010,  10,830  million  cubic  metres  were 
produced, as against 6,240 million in 2008, close to a twofold increase. While all gas production was 
consumed  locally,  from  2008,  it  was  possible  to  import  more  gas  from  Egypt  through  the Arab  Gas 
Pipeline.10  This  increase  in  access  to  natural  gas  accelerated  the  development  of  combined  cycle 
plants, and its share of electricity generation jumped 13% from 2008 to 2011. Between 2007 and 2010, 
1,050 MW was added by installing new gas-fired turbines and by expanding two existing power plants.11

To face its energy and electricity supply shortfall, Syria was encouraged by international development 
funds to explore the possibility of implementing renewable energy projects. These could have benefited 
from favourable environmental conditions – Syria has around 300 sunny days a year – and it also has 
many areas where the average annual  wind speed exceeds six m/s.12 But the Ministry of Electricity 
never seriously pursued this option as it wanted quicker solutions to close the demand-supply gap. 

The only renewable source of energy the Syrian state adopted was hydropower generation. Hydropower 
generation remained, however, marginal. Poor water availability in the Euphrates (due to climate change) 

9  Hydro  electricity  production  is  assumed  to  have  not  changed  in  2019  and  2020  from  2018. The  statistics  offered  by  the  International 
Energy Agency (IEA) are at odds with those from the PEEG. For example, in 2018, the former claims Syria produced 18,210 GWh, while 
the PEEG claims 26,514. Prior to that, the numbers matched rather well. 

10  Plans to import from Iran, Iraq and Azerbaijan were also being considered.

11  The al-Nasrieh and Zayzoon power plants converted to a combined cycle in 2007, and so did Tishreen, Baniyas, and Jandar in 2009, 

2010, and 2011.

12  Ahmad Al-Jamil and Gennady Ivanovich Sidorenko, “Energy Visions 2035 for Syria,” Journal of Physics: Conference Series 1614, 2020, 

https://bit.ly/3BV0ApM 

9  

and restricted water flow from Turkey, meant that hydropower generation fell as a share of all electricity 
production from nearly 23% in the 1990s to only 5.5% in 2010. The later figures are comparable with 
other countries in the Middle East and North Africa, where renewable energy does not exceed 7% of 
the generation mix.13

1.2. Lost in Transmission

The transmission grid is the second most important component of the power sector as it connects 
generation plants with electricity consumers. In Syria, the transmission grid mainly consisted of overhead 
power  lines  of  various  capacities  which  carried  the  current  over  long  distances.  The  advantage  of 
overhead cables is their relatively lower installation and maintenance costs. Their biggest disadvantage, 
however, is the vulnerability of its cables and towers to the weather and other external factors.

In 2010, the primary transmission grid consisted of 5,719 km 230 Kilovolt (kV) lines and 1,594 km of 400 
kV high voltage lines.14 Transmission lines with higher voltages reduce technical losses in distribution 
and  are  usually  employed  to  connect  regional  hubs  called  “buses”.  However,  to  make  high-voltage 
electricity transport possible, the electricity must first be converted to higher voltages with transformers, 
introducing  an  additional  infrastructure  cost.  In  Syria,  priority  was  given  to  expanding  the  installed 
generation capacity rather than to optimising electricity distribution and transmission. 

While the grid reached 99% of the Syrian population,15 it was falling behind in terms of maintenance. 
Over the five years preceding the conflict, total electricity network losses represented, on average, more 
than 20% of Syria’s total production (Figure 3). Comparable power infrastructure systems internationally 
tend  not  to  exceed  8%  for  technical  losses  and  2%  for  non-technical  losses.16  Due  to  deteriorating 
transmission and distribution grids, technical losses represented nearly two-thirds of total losses, while 
non-technical  losses,  including  theft  and  billing  and  meter  reading  errors,  explained  the  rest  of  the 
deficit.17 

Figure 3: Consumption, Production, and Losses from 1990-2010 

Source: International Energy Agency

13  Global News Wire, “Middle East Renewables 2021 - Renewable Energy Policy,” 21 May 2021, https://bit.ly/3BcxBO1

14  Husam Beides et al., “Potential of Energy Integration in Mashreq and Neighboring Countries,” Energy Sector Management Assistance 

Program (ESMAP), World Bank, June 2010, https://bit.ly/3xOkEaZ 

15  Rodayna  Amer  and  Fareed  Abou  Hamed,  “Reality  and  Prospects  of  Wind  Power  in  Syria,”  Energy  Procedia  19,  2012,  55–62,  

https://bit.ly/3f76Pgr 

16   Beides et al., “Syrian Arab Republic Electricity Sector Strategy Note.”

17   Ibid.

10  

Nevertheless,  400  kV  transmission  lines  were  still  used  to  connect  the  major  consumption  hubs  to 
power  plants.  The  400  kV  south-north  transmission  interface  connected  major  generating  plants 
with the transmission grid and had ten buses, while the lower 230 kV network supplied load centres  
(Map 1). Despite its limited redundancy in equipment and lines, the reliance on the 230 kV transmission 
network persisted primarily due to limited transformation capacity in substations that are feeding major 
load centres. Indeed, the transmission grid consists of 13 high voltage 400/230/66 kV substations, 79 
smaller 230/66/20 kV substations, and 365 66/20 kV substations.18 

Map 1: Syria’s Transmission Grid 

Source: The authors based on “Analysis of the Performance of Syrian 400kV Electrical Network.”19

Around the world, transmission lines are highly interconnected to increase electricity supply reliability. 
However, in Syria, most of the 400 kV and 230 kV transmission lines were designed as a single circuit.
The 400 kV and 230 kV networks were constantly operated in parallel to ensure supply even when the 

18   Ibid.

19  Ibrahim Alwazah, Rinat Nasyrov and Raseel Aljendy, “Analysis of the Performance of Syrian 400 kV Electrical Network,” (paper presented 
at  UralCon  2020,  International  Ural  Conference  on  Electrical  Power  Engineering,  Chelyabinsk  Russia,  22-24  September  2020),  
https://bit.ly/3eyAsqN

11  

transmission line was open.20 In 2011, the transmission capacity of the 400 kV lines was 1,078 MW, a 
comparatively small value. This created genuine concern about the possible shortage of transmission 
capacity and required the construction of new transmission lines along multiple routes. 

1.3. Demand Composition and the Supply Gap

Access to electric energy was generally satisfactory as high electrification levels had been achieved, 
and  the  bill  for  electric  energy  was,  on  average,  a  small  percentage  of  household  expenditure.21  In 
2010, the PEDEEE registered nearly 5.4 million subscribers: each of them received annual subsidies 
of  USD  320.22 The  residential  sector  dominated  electric  consumption  with  layered  tariffs  to  increase 
access to electric energy in rural areas and to poor neighbourhoods in cities.

In the decade preceding the conflict, the demand for electricity increased by an average of 7.5% per 
year. This rapid consumption growth was due, first, to significant growth in the industrial and service 
sectors; second, a change in household consumption behaviour with the penetration of new energy-
hungry house appliances; and third, the lack of efficient energy conservation policies.23

Electricity demand was increasing faster than expansion in generation capacity, and this meant outages. 
Load  shedding  in  2009  was  671  gigawatt-hours  (GWh),  compared  with  391  GWh  in  2008,  and  was 
expected to grow in the following years.24 In 2010, peak demand reached 8,600 MW leading to frequent 
load shedding that summer. Over the same period, the total installed power generating capacity in Syria 
was 9,344 Megawatt (nameplate), of which only 7,200 MW was available.25 The difference was due to 
technical production losses in older technology turbines and transmission.

A  report  by  the  World  Bank,  in  cooperation  with  the  Syrian  Ministry  of  Electricity  in  2010,  looked  to 
the  future.  The  report-writers  estimated  that  about  USD  11  billion  of  investments  in  new  generating 
capacity (7,000 megawatts) and an expansion of the transmission and distribution networks would be 
required through 2020.26 To meet increasing demand, other suggestions were made. These included 
an  expansion  of  the  generation  mix,  transmission  grid  enhancement  and  an  increase  in  regional 
connectivity.

1.4. Regional Connectivity and Cooperation

In 1988, an agreement to build a regional electricity network was signed by Jordan, Syria, Egypt, 
Turkey, and Iraq.27 Each country undertook to upgrade its electricity system to a regional standard, and 
several interconnections between these countries were established. However, the Gulf War prevented 
the integration of Iraq, then the largest gas producer of the five. Moreover, the Arab Gas Pipeline was 
initiated  as  an  international  gas  infrastructure  project  from  Egypt  to  Turkey  via  Jordan  and  Syria.28 

20  Thus, if the 400 kV transmission line is brought down by a fault, the power flow in the 400 kV line will shift to the 230 kV line, and if the 
230 kV line becomes overloaded, this line will be cut off, too. This will cause successive overloading and cut-off in the line, and blackouts 
may spread over an extensive area. Tokyo Electric Power Services, “Study for Updating Syrian Electricity Sector in Syrian Arab Republic,” 
Japan International Cooperation Agency, March 2012, https://bit.ly/377fEme 

21  Sami Karaki, et al., “Networking and Outreach Activities in Jordan-Lebanon-Syria for Energy Access II,” The Energy Research Group - 

American University of Beirut, 14 February 2005, https://bit.ly/3xcrcz6 

22  Rodayna and Abou Hamed, “Reality and Prospects of Wind Power in Syria.”

23  Encouraged particularly by the relative low state-subsidised tariffs, the cost of production was estimated at 0.085 USD per kW. Source: 

Arab Union of Electricity, “Statistical Bulletin 2011 - 20th Edition,” 2011, https://bit.ly/3imbXOD

24  Beides et al., “Syrian Arab Republic Electricity Sector Strategy Note.” 

25  Arab Union of Electricity, “Statistical Bulletin 2011.”

26  Beides et al., “Syrian Arab Republic Electricity Sector Strategy Note.”.

27  Beides et al., “Potential of Energy Integration in Mashreq and Neighboring Countries.”

28  Rafael Leal-Arcas, Nelson Akondo and Juan Alemany Rios, “Energy Trade in the MENA Region: Looking beyond the Pan-Arab Electricity 

Market,” Journal of World Energy Law and Business 10, no. 6, January 2017, 520-549, https://bit.ly/3iYLGGv 

12  

The sections in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria were implemented in 2008, but the link to Turkey, through Kilis, 
was never completed.29 

The Syrian transmission grid was also connected to the Iraqi, Jordanian, Lebanese and Turkish power 
networks through nine interconnections.30 Due to its key geographic location, Syria has always been 
essential in developing regional energy markets. In theory, several projects could have spearheaded 
Syria’s integration with the regional and with the EU internal gas and electricity market. 31 Such projects 
included constructing a 400 kV link with Iraq and establishing a gas supply from Iraq’s Akass field.32 
Benefits  to  Syria  would  have  included  securing  necessary  gas  imports,  enhancing  bilateral  power 
exchanges with neighbouring countries, and taxing energy exchanges running through its territory. 

However,  in  practice,  bilateral  exchanges  between  Syria  and  its  neighbours  have  been  limited  to 
emergency  operations.  The  systematic  shortage  of  electricity  in  all  the  region,  save  for  Turkey,  has 
dampened  the  use  of  interconnection  capacities. According  to  official  data,  Syria  exported  only  902 
GWh (mainly from Lebanon and Jordan) and it imported only a little more than 1192 GWh (mainly from 
Turkey and Egypt) in 2011.33 Such projects require a high level of coordination between countries and 
ground to a halt following the outbreak of war in Syria in 2011. 

29  Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, “Arab Gas Pipeline Project – Third Stage (Aleppo – Kalas Section),” 11 February 2009, 

https://bit.ly/2TB4UJB 

30  Beides et al., “Syrian Arab Republic Electricity Sector Strategy Note.”

31  Paolo  Garonna  and  Katia Adamo,  “Euro-Mediterranean  Integration  and  Cooperation:  Prospects  and  Challenges,”  UNECE  Economic 

Essays, 73-84, 23 November 2017, https://bit.ly/3hLXdJS 

32  Beides et al., “Potential of Energy Integration in Mashreq and Neighboring Countries.”

33  Arab Union of Electricity, “Statistical Bulletin 2011.”

13  

2. Impact of the Conflict

The power sector and electricity provision were often used as a tool of collective punishment during 
the conflict. Either supply was cut to territories under opponents’ control or infrastructure was targeted, 
rendering it useless or at least reducing production and transmission capacity. Electricity infrastructure 
consequently saw massive damage. This meant substantial costs for repair, or the system was operated 
at a now reduced capacity. Sanctions have further complicated the export of spare parts and fuel, crucial 
to the re-establishment of service provisions across the country. This set of challenges not only affected 
the  daily  lives  of  ordinary  civilians,  commerce,  industry,  and  agriculture.  It  also  shaped  the  choices 
made by the Damascus government in responding to the electricity crisis currently unfolding in Syria.

2.1. Damage to Generation and Transmission Infrastructure 

Power generation and electricity transmission infrastructure were, as noted, damaged during the war. 
Armed actors – loyalist and opposition – have directly shelled power plants, have destroyed portions of 
the transmission grid and towers and have targeted gas pipelines feeding electric generators. 

During the conflict, three significant plants were destroyed: Aleppo Thermal Station in 2015;34 Zayzoon 
in  Idlib  in  2016;35  and  al-Taim  in  Deir  al-Zor  in  2017.36 Their  combined  nameplate  capacity  stood  at 
1,706 MW before the conflict, or nearly 18.25% of total nationwide capacity. 

Eight  of  the  eleven  fossil-fuel-run  power  plants  maintained  partial  or  full  functionality  throughout  the 
fighting.37 The plants of Mhardeh38 and al-Zara39 near Hama, and Tishreen near Damascus,40 were also 
attacked, but the damage was less substantial there. The three hydroelectric dams on the Euphrates 
remained partially operational despite infrequent maintenance and neglect. But they were repeatedly 
disconnected from the grid.41

Transmission lines were also targeted during battles between opposition and regime forces and were 
subject  to  looting  and  theft.  In  2019,  the  PEEG  declared  that  out  of  its  345  towers,  165  had  been 
destroyed, damaged or stolen during the conflict.42 In addition, damage inflicted on 400 kV and 230 kV 
high voltage lines created isolated circuits and disconnected the bigger power plants from the rest of the 
grid and urban areas from generators in rural areas, which were often under the control of opposition 
forces. 

Gas  pipelines  and  infrastructure  were  also  targeted,  causing  significant  electricity  supply  disruption. 
The  year  2014  witnessed  the  peak  of  opposition  attacks  on  pipelines  with  the  suspension  of  gas  to 
several power plants across the country. For instance, the Arab Gas Pipeline, supplying gas from Egypt, 

34  The plant was subject to regime shelling and bombing when it was under the control of Syrian armed opposition groups and also suffered 
wide-spread looting after the Islamic State held it for a short while in 2015 and 2016. Ahmad Abdo, “Aleppo Thermal Plant, between ISIS 
Brutality and the Regime’s Madness” (in Arabic), Ayn al-Madina, 16 February 2016, https://bit.ly/2Wm9Y5K

35  Reportedly, it was first damaged by regime bombing and it was later looted by the Islamic Turkistani Party. Enab Baladi, “Battles Put the 

Largest Power Plant Out of Service in the Hama Countryside” (in Arabic), 21 August 2016, https://bit.ly/3xSYCnB 

36  The plant was reportedly destroyed by the International Coalition airstrikes on the Islamic State positions in the Deir al-Zor oil facilities. 

Deir ez-Zor 24, “International Coalition Fighters Target Al-Omar Oil Field” (in Arabic), 6 January 2017, https://bit.ly/2UEGKi5

37  Public Establishment for Electricity Generation, “Annual Statistical Report - 2020” (in Arabic), March 2021, https://bit.ly/3kCg7ol

38  The Syria Report, “New Power Plant Attacked by Armed Groups,” 3 June 2016, https://bit.ly/3imZpH1 

39  The  state’s  official  news  agency,  SANA,  has  blamed  the  al-Nusra  Front  and Ahrar  al-Sham  for  the  attack.  Rayyan  Muhammad,  “The 

Largest Thermal Power Plant in Syria Is Out of Service” (in Arabic), Al-Araby al-Jadeed, 26 June 2016, https://bit.ly/3l9im2U 

40  The Syria Report, “Tishreen Plant Attack Raises Power Outages in Damascus,” 23 June 2014, https://bit.ly/3z2Q3XA 

41  Syria  Electricity,  “After  a  Break  of  Six  Years,  The  Euphrates  Dam  Is  Connected  to  the  Public  Network”  (in  Arabic),  21  May  2019,  

https://bit.ly/2UTIdRp 

42  The Syria Report, “Attacks on Gas Network Continue to Disrupt Power Supplies,” 2 June 2014, https://bit.ly/3wND1f8 

14  

was  targeted  in  2014,  causing  power  outages  in  the  Damascus  governorate.43  In  the  Syrian  desert, 
pipelines were reportedly attacked west of Palmyra, and so was the pipeline connecting al-Shaer field 
to the Ebla gas processing plant, causing power cuts in Homs and Deir al-Zor.44 When the Jbeisseh gas 
plant was targeted, al-Zara and al-Taim power plants went off line as the gas supply was interrupted.45

The damage inflicted in the conflict is wide-ranging, then, reducing the production capacity, increasing 
technical losses in transmission and distribution, and throttling the fuel supply. Any effort to rehabilitate 
the power sector would not necessarily entail an equal response to all these three crucial components: 
there are different levels of urgency. The cost of reconstruction remains, though, extremely high.

2.2. Daunting Costs and Slow Reconstruction

The cost of fixing generating turbines varies significantly but often requires foreign expertise. The 
reconstruction of the power grid, on the other hand, involves restoring transmission lines and installing 
new substations. This can mostly be done with local expertise. As for transmission grid restoration costs, 
in 2016, Imad Khamis, the then Minister of Electricity, noted the urgent need to repair or replace five 
large 400/230/66 kV substations (USD 24 million per unit), thirty smaller 230/66/20 kV substations (USD 
18 million per unit), and at least thirty-five 66/20 substations (USD 3.5 million per unit).46 Additionally, the 
cost of building high voltage transmission lines is estimated to be about USD 120,000 per km for the 
400 kV lines and USD 70,000 for 230 kV lines. 

In spring 2021, the Ministry of Electricity estimated losses to the electricity sector since the beginning 
of the Syrian conflict at USD 2.4 billion in terms of production capacity and transmission reconstruction 
costs.47 However, overall losses to the sector should also count revenue losses, including unpayable 
and uncollectable bills and the depreciation in unused nameplate capacity due to fuel shortages and 
transmission  suspensions.  Generally  speaking,  economists  do  not  agree  on  a  single  measure  for 
indirect losses, making such estimates extremely difficult. 

Moreover,  the  effects  of  these  indirect  losses  are  compounded  and  imply  a  significant  dropping  off 
in  industrial  and  agriculture  productive  capacity  from  forgone  output.  In  fact,  according  to  the  2018 
Enterprise Survey, firms identified the interruption to services (electricity, water) as the main obstacles 
to  doing  business  in  regime-controlled  areas.48 There  is  little  data  available  on  the  actual  economic 
losses caused by power outages. In 2012, outages were estimated to account for USD 400 million and 
USD 2.29 billion just a year later.49 The head of the Electricity Ministry’s planning unit estimated indirect 
losses from lack of electricity to various sectors, residential zones, and institutions at nearly USD 60 
billion from 2012 to 2017.50 The vast discrepancies between 2012 and 2017 could be explained by the 
increasing intensity of fighting between regime and opposition forces. But they also cast doubts on the 
accuracy of government statements. 

43  The Syria Report, “Suspension of Supplies from Pipeline Lead to Renewed Power Outages,” 26 May 2014, https://bit.ly/3ewzk6W 

44  Zaman al-Wasl, “Explosion Targets the AGP in Qalamon” (in Arabic), 30 September 2014, https://bit.ly/3wUGVmw 

45  Although the Jbeisseh plant had a nominal capacity of 2.9 million cubic meters a day (cbm/day), it produced an average of only 800,000 

cbm/day in early 2014. The Syria Report, “Attack Suspends Production at Power Plant,” 3 February 2014, https://bit.ly/3iqcb7s 

46  B2B-SY, “The Damages to the Electricity Sector in Syria Are Recorded at More than 1,500 Billion Syrian Pounds, According to Prevailing 

Prices” (in Arabic), 1 March 2016, https://bit.ly/2UTMlkn 

47  Enab Baladi, “The Regime Government Issues a Report on the Extent of Damage to the Electricity Sector in Syria” (in Arabic), 12 April 

2021, https://bit.ly/3ktC1dl 

48  Salmon, Assaf and Francis, “Surviving Firms of the Syrian Arab Republic: A Rapid Assessment.”

49  The Syria Report, “Power Outages Cost the Economy SYP 23 Billion,” 22 January 2012, https://bit.ly/3iIRPq8; The Syria Report, “Economic 

Impact of Power Outages Estimated at SYP 218 Billion,” 18 February 2013, https://bit.ly/2TtpsUk. 

50  Reuters, “Syria Producing More Energy After Army Recaptures Gas Fields,” 26 September 2017, https://reut.rs/3BgklrD; 24 Media, “2.2 

Billion Dollars in Losses for Syria Due to Electricity” (in Arabic), 12 February 2013, https://bit.ly/3e8y2Px 

15  

Throughout  the  conflict,  the  Ministry  of  Electricity  has  had  little  success  in  restoring  or  improving 
production capacity. For instance: 30 MW were restored at the cost of USD 30 million in al-Zara; USD 35 
million were spent to maintain production in Mhardeh; USD 18 million to increase capacity in Tishreen; 
and USD 8 million to repair a station at al-Taim.51 Between 2016 and 2020, the Ministry also declared 
that SYP 100 billion was spent on restoring the transmission grid and rehabilitating damaged power 
towers.52 For more significant repairs, the Ministry has opted for external expertise and has accordingly 
multiplied the number of tenders it issued to repair the most damaged plants. It has had, though, little or 
no success. Syria would need capital inflows and it would need technology that the Ministry previously 
preferred  to  purchase  from  western  companies.  Neither  of  these  conditions  are  likely  in  the  current 
economic and political climate. Overall, electricity production capacity fell from nearly 9,344 MW in 2010 
to 5,150 in 2021.53

The de-escalation of the conflict, which started in late 2017, has allowed the regime and the opposition 
to conclude some local deals to reconnect and repair parts of the transmission grid. For instance, in 
2018, the Ministry of Electricity and opposition groups north of Homs reached a deal whereby electric 
supplies to the opposition were restored in return for repairing the 400 kV transmission line linking the 
Jandar power plant with the city of Hama.54 In 2019, a similar deal was reached to repair the 230 kV 
high voltage line linking the Tabqa hydroelectric power plant (under Syrian Democratic Forces control) 
to the Hama-2 transmission bus station (under regime control).55 

2.3. Changes in Production and the Promise of Green Alternatives

As set out in Figure 2, in 2012, total production stood at 41,772 GWh, then fell to 29,763 in 2013, 
23,819  in  2014,  19,396  in  2015,  and  8,529  GWh  in  2016. After  this  monotonic  decline  in  electricity 
output, a slight recovery occurred in 2017, with the recapture of large swathes of territory from Islamic 
State  and  other  opposition  factions.  The  recovery  continued  until  2019,  with  limited  repairs  and  a 
general improvement in economic activity in regime-held areas. In 2019, electricity production stood at 
26,755 GWh, nearly three times more than the lowest point in 2016. Nevertheless, production output 
fell again in 2020 due to challenges in procuring oil and gas.56 Partial data for 2021 suggest that total 
electricity output dropped to 24,959 GWh, which is 45% less than in 2011. Per capita consumption of 
state electricity stands at nearly 15% of what it was in 2010.57 

In 2020, nearly 70% of Syria’s power supply was generated by gas-run power plants, with the remainder 
operating primarily on oil derivates.58 Half of the required gas and oil are procured locally, while the 
regime relies on its allies to secure the rest.59 Thus far, the Iranian credit line has arguably financed 
most of Syria’s foreign oil procurement. But there have been irregular flows due to sanctions on both 
countries  and  due  to  logistic  difficulties,  including  Israel’s  targeting  of  oil  convoys.60  Moreover,  other 

51  The Syria Report, “Power Sector Losses Estimated at USD 2.4 Billion,” 21 April 2021, https://bit.ly/3iiHYY0 

52  The equivalent of 100 billion SYP in USD is meaningless due to exchange rate fluctuations.

53  Hanaa  Ghanem,  “A  Decrease  in  the  per  Capita  Share  of  Electricity  between  2011  and  2020  from  2,378  to  1,190  Kilowatt-Hours”  

(in Arabic), al-Watan, 5 July 2021, https://bit.ly/3rh3C2S 

54  Enab  Baladi,  “After  the  Agreement,  Maintenance  of  the  Homs  Countryside  Tension  Line  Will  Begin”  (in  Arabic),  27  January  2018,  

https://bit.ly/3xKD0K2 

55  Syria Electricity, “After a Break of Six Years, the Euphrates Dam Is Connected to the Public Network.”

56  Ghanem, “A Decrease in the per Capita Share of Electricity.”

57  Ibid.

58  Public Establishment for Electricity Generation,“Annual Statistical Report - 2020.” 

59  The  Syria  Report,  “Government  Puts  Wartime  Oil  Sector  Losses  at  USD  91.5  Billion, Admits  Gas  Oil  Shortages,”  10  February  2021, 

https://bit.ly/36L8mUY 

60  Gordon Lubold, Benoit Faucon and Felicia Schwartz, “Israeli Strikes Target Iranian Oil Bound for Syria,” Wall Street Journal, 11 March 

2021, https://on.wsj.com/3z9TonJ 

16  

sectors such as manufacturing and oil production also require gas and have recently started to increase 
their share of gas consumption. The Russian-run fertiliser plant at Homs, for instance, consumes 1.2 
million cubic metres a day, and the Ministries of Oil and Industry an additional 1.5 million.61

Given  the  state’s  failure  to  satisfy  electricity  needs,  local  communities  have  sought  alternatives. As 
early  as  2013,  black  markets  for  fuel  and  electricity-generating  supplies  were  flourishing.  In  many 
conflict-affected cities, commercial and private generators and batteries serve as the primary source 
of electricity for local inhabitants. Many households converted small electrical appliances so that they 
worked with twelve-volt batteries. To obtain electricity, people pay a subscription directly to generator 
owners. The subscription fee depends on the consumption of amperes. An “ampere” is sold for USD 
two on average, but it is subject to increases based on the market price for fuels. A family requires at 
least three to four amperes to cover their basic electricity needs, which amounted to nearly 10% of an 
average middle-class household income in 2018.62 However, recent hikes in the price of oil derivatives 
are likely to have made electricity far less affordable.63

The decline in overall electricity supplies has caused substantial disruptions in production cycles; most 
cities receive only a few hours of electricity a day. The Ministry has applied a “rationing” policy via load 
shedding through the country. In April 2021, Ghassan al-Zamil, the Minister of Electricity, announced 
the  unification  of  the  electricity  rationing  program  in  the  various  governorates,  so  that  power  would 
be delivered for an hour for every 4.5 “dead” hours.64 “Electricity rationing” is a term the Ministry has 
employed since the 1980s to describe the frequent load shedding caused by its inability to match power 
demand. Despite al-Zamil’s commitment to fair distribution, electricity availability varies considerably 
among neighbourhoods within a single city, and between urban and rural areas. Schedules are changed, 
in  an  unpredictable  fashion,  with  little  warning,  depending  on  fuel  availability.  For  instance,  in  2021, 
Aleppo witnessed a ten-hour rationing period for an hour or half an hour of power,65 while Damascus 
received one hour of power for five “dead” hours.66 

Unable  to  significantly  increase  current  production  levels,  the  NERC  has  increased  its  efforts  to 
accelerate the adoption of renewable energy. This process had already begun before the conflict but 
failed to pick up because of a lack of funds and expertise. The Damascus government had put forth 
several incentives to encourage private funds to invest in renewable energy. 

In 2016, President Assad issued the Private Public Partnership Law and set rules and regulations for 
investment in the electricity sector. The Prime Minister also issued executive order #1763 to set prices 
for buying electricity from privately-owned generators.67 In 2019, the Ministry of Electricity published a 
ten-year strategy to increase renewable energy output to 5% of total electricity production.68 Its strategy 
relies principally on: encouraging turnkey projects; granting tax reductions and offering incentives to 
manufacturers of relevant equipment; reducing tariffs on the import of related technology; and buying 
electricity produced by the private sector. To provide some form of stability to the contractors, the Ministry 
of Electricity set the buying prices in Euros and provided preferential rates for renewable energy from 
landfill gas, biomass, wind, and solar power. 

61  Al-Iqtisadi, “A New Gas Well Supports Electricity with 150,000 Cubic Metres per Day” (in Arabic), 23 May 2020, https://bit.ly/36OIfg1 

62  Youssef Diab and Abboud Hajjar, “Electricity in War-Torn Aleppo: A New Form of Urban Management,” Metropolitics, 23 November 2018, 

https://bit.ly/3x7oCug 

63  RT Arabic, “Syria, a New Rise in the Prices of ‘Unsubsidised’ Gasoline” (in Arabic), 6 July 2021, https://bit.ly/3ez6seu 

64  Syria TV, “The Assad Regime Announces the Unification of the Hours of Electricity Rationing in Its Areas of Control” (in Arabic), 15 April 

2021, https://bit.ly/3hq2NBo 

65  Enab Baladi, “Consolidation of Rationing and Promises to Improve Electric Power in Syria” (in Arabic), 15 April 2021, https://bit.ly/3ezhRLh 

66  Skype interview with a Damascus businessman, 18 May 2021.

67  Syrian Arab Republic Presidency of the Council of Ministers, “Resolution No. 1763” (in Arabic), 31 May 2016, https://bit.ly/3B3oeAi 

68  Syrian Arab Republic Presidency of the Council of Ministers, “The Ministry of Electricity’s Strategy for Renewable Energies until 2030”  

(in Arabic), 28 October 2019, https://bit.ly/3k7PTKd 

17  

Since  January  2019,  73  renewable  energy  projects  under  the  Private  Public  Partnership  Law  have 
been approved. Sanctioned projects mainly consist in photovoltaic stations, with a production capacity 
ranging from 1 to 5 MW, located in Rural Damascus, Homs, Hama, Tartus and Sweida governorates. 
Otherwise, only two wind turbines have been approved at Sheer in Hama governorate. The value of 
the declared assets of all these renewable energy projects amounts to a little over USD 170 million, but 
their actual value could be considerably higher.69 

Several companies are involved in the sector. We might mention a sample here: Blue Planet Alternative 
Energy, the Lebanese TFS Sal, Solarec (a joint venture between PEEG and Syronics), Al-Mashreq for 
Green Energy, Adel & Adam Trading LLC, the Syrian European Group for Heavy Industries (partner of 
the German company Harting GmbH), Nafori, Tamim Taleb Ali Establishment for Trading and Industry 
and Alma LLC. The owners of the companies are primarily Syrian nationals, and some are expats with 
experience in the field from Saudi Arabia, the EU and Ukraine. None, note, are from the Syrian business 
community which emerged in the years leading up to the war or thereafter. The lack of interest from 
regime businessmen points perhaps to low returns in this sector. Their engagement in the electricity 
sector continues to focus on oil procurement from north-eastern Syria and abroad and on the protection 
of oil and electricity production facilities.70 

Electricity from green sources does not, at present, exceed 1.5% of all generated power. Investors and 
contractors remain  reluctant  to  engage  further due  to the political  and  economic  instability  and  due, 
too,  to  the  fear  of  Western  sanctions.71  Regime-controlled  media  tends  to  exaggerate  green  energy 
successes, as part of a broader narrative that promotes the return of normalcy to Syria. Looking past 
the hype, Aleppo, Deir al-Zor, Daraa and Raqqa, where the electricity infrastructure suffered particularly 
badly, have not been affected by the current initiatives.

69  The declared capital of projects in Syria, in general, tends to be lower than the reality because of tax evasion.

70  Georges Haswani, Ayman al-Jaber and Hussam Qaterji are known for working in these areas.

71  Attaqa, “Syria Is Counting on Renewable Energy to Solve the Electricity Crisis” (in Arabic), 2 June 2021, https://bit.ly/3f1SPol 

18  

3. Foreign Assistance and Investments: Disillusion and Reality 

In a press conference held on 27 January 2021, the Minister of Electricity, Ghassan al-Zamil, launched 
a new campaign under the title “Imagine Your Life Without Electricity.” 72 The conference’s objective was 
to prepare the Syrian people for decreased electricity production and for further distribution difficulties. 
But it also served as an occasion for the Minister to announce new contracts to repair power plants in 
Aleppo and Deir al-Zor.

The  rehabilitation  of  the  Syrian  electricity  sector  requires  foreign  engagement.  This  is  true  for  the 
procurement of turbines to increase production capacity, for the spare parts necessary for replacing 
damaged  transformers,  and  for  the  repair  of  failing  plants.  International  sanctions  are  slowing  down 
this  process.  Moreover,  while  the  Syrian  government  has  the  expertise  to  fix  the  creaking  and  half-
destroyed transmission grid, it lacks the funds to do so. The government also lacks both the funds and 
the expertise for fixing or installing new production capacity. As an alternative, they have asked their 
foreign allies to implement and finance these ventures.

Before the conflict, the only investors in the Syrian electricity sector were the PEEG and the PEDEEE. 
However, the state had often relied on foreign funds to obtain low-interest loans for the longer repayment 
period  provided  by  developed  countries  and  Arab  Gulf  States.  Moreover,  the  Ministry  of  Electricity 
regularly brought in external expertise and know-how to import new technologies, turbines, and spare 
parts. As a result, foreign participation in Syria’s electricity sector was highly diversified,73 and contractors 
were  encouraged  to  finance  their  awarded  deals  with  international  funds  and  loans.  Sanctions  and 
political and economic instability have considerably changed the profile of the companies involved and 
the government’s modus operandi. 

3.1. Sanctions and the Loss of Potential Support

The  impact  of  sanctions  on  the  reconstruction  of  the  power  sector  is  multi-layered.  Firstly,  they 
impede  the  capacity  of  non-Syrian  companies  to  engage  with  the  regime.  Secondly,  they  restrict 
Damascus’  ability  to  fund  these  projects  as  financial  transactions  through  the  international  banking 
system are barred. Third, they thwart Syria’s access to energy markets both for fuel procurement and 
transportation. 

While the US had virtually no involvement in Syria’s electricity sector, Europe used to have a considerable 
influence. European companies bought crude oil, sold refined products, technology, spare parts, and 
built new power plants. European financial institutions, such as the European Investment Bank, also 
financed the expansion of the Syrian electricity grid in the early 2000s.74 Similarly, regional organisations 
financed studies and projects to help renew Syria’s creaking electricity sector. They even invested and 
issued concessionary loans to finance new power plants. For instance, the Arab Fund for Economic and 
Social Development,75 the Islamic Development Bank,76 and the Saudi Fund for Development backed 
various projects in the power sector in the pre-war decade.77

72  Al-Sharq al-Awsat, “‘Imagine Life without Electricity’ Is the Slogan of the Syrian Government for Citizens” (in Arabic), 29 January 2021, 

https://bit.ly/3i3lFVU 

73  With companies from Europe, Japan, China, South Korea, and to a lesser degree Russia, India, and Iran taking an active role.

74  In 2000 and 2001, the bank financed the electricity transmission and distribution network with USD 214 million. In 2004 it issued a loan 
of USD 240 million to finance the expansion of Deir Ali power plant, and USD 280 million for the construction of new power plant in Deir 
al-Zor.

75  KUNA,  “Fund  for  Economic  and  Social  Development  Lends  Syria  30  Million  Kuwaiti  Dinar”  (in  Arabic),  8  February  2005,  

https://bit.ly/2USOM6z 

76  Al-Jazeera, “The Islamic Bank Finances Two Power Plants in Syria” (in Arabic), 24 May 2006, https://bit.ly/3e8QRC4 

77  Al-Jazeera, “Saudi Arabia Finances a Power Station in Syria” (in Arabic), 6 April 2011, https://bit.ly/3huMCD4 

19  

US sanctions on Syria in August 2011 contributed to the fuel procurement crisis the electricity sector has 
experienced. Obama’s Executive Order 13582 designated several entities in the Syrian energy sector 
and prohibited all transactions with them, including transfers of funds, goods, and services.78 The Trump 
administration extended sanctions to Syrian individuals involved in financing the regime. Additionally, 
in June 2020, the US Congress signed the “Caesar Act” into law, authorising the US government to 
sanction foreign entities and individuals conducting business with the Syrian government and its military 
and intelligence agencies. The secondary objective of sanctions is to discourage foreign investments in 
Syria, including investments in the electricity sector.

The initial US sanctions in August 2011 were matched by the Arab states and Turkey in November of 
the same year, on respectively 27 and 30 of that month. The regional response came through the Arab 
League which prohibited dealings with Syria’s central bank and all trade exchanges except for strategic 
and vital food crops.79 Regional participation in this sanction regime was important for the success of 
US policy, as Arab financial institutions had previously awarded low-interest loans to Syria to expand its 
generation capacity. Turkey, meanwhile, had exported small amounts of electricity to Syria. Sanctions 
effectively ended these minor interventions.

The  EU  waited  until  19  January  2012  to  ban  companies  in  its  member  states  from  investing  in  the 
electricity sector. However, the European decision was the most important in terms of impact and in 
terms of technical details. EU Council Regulation, no 36 in that year, created two restrictions on the 
electricity sector. Firstly, there was a ban on providing financial loans and equity investment to Syrian 
entities  engaged  in  constructing  new  power  plants  for  electricity  production.  Secondly,  there  was  a 
ban on the sale, supply, transfer, and export of equipment and technology for constructing new power 
plants. The regulation only allowed limited exemptions for the performance of obligations in contracts 
concluded before 19 January 2012. In 2013, EU member states were allowed to deliver some power 
generation capacity to opposition-held areas (if supported by the Syrian National Coalition), for which 
they needed a specific license. 

As for oil procurement, the effect of sanctions is real but secondary, though it theoretically prevents the 
regime from oil procurement on international markets. Despite sanctions, the regime’s primary cause 
for fuel shortages is a lack of funds as two of the world’s largest energy suppliers, Iran and Russia, take 
no notice of sanctions, while Egypt remains happy to continue its supply of natural gas. In that sense, 
the Lebanese banking sector’s collapse has damaged Syria’s capacity to finance and pay for purchased 
oil and gas much more than EU or US sanctions. Regime businessmen had used their offshore bank 
accounts in Lebanon to circumvent sanctions on Syria.

In theory, these unilateral sanctions do not prevent the Ministry of Electricity from seeking expertise 
from other technology exporters. However, Syria is not able to access international funds for developing 
countries’  power  sector  such  as  the  Union  for  the  Mediterranean,  or  the  Clean  Technology  Fund. 
Sanctions also mean that Syria cannot benefit from technical support in maintaining power plants built 
by sanction-bound companies: for instance, Deir Ali, Jandar or al-Zara. A lack of funds and sanctions 
has obliged the Ministry to opt for less prestigious technology exporters and contractors such as those 
based in Iran and Russia.

While European companies are bound by EU sanctions, a few have explored the potential of investing in 
the Syrian power sector. Before the Syrian conflict, Siemens was particularly active, building a combined 
cycle extension to the Deir Ali power plant,80 and signing a contract in November 2011 to extend the 

78  US  Government  Publishing  Office,  “Executive  Order  13582  of  August  17,  2011.  Blocking  Property  of  the  Government  of  Syria  and 

Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to Syria,” 1 January 2012, https://bit.ly/2V38D3q 

79  The League decision was binding but allies kept trading and exchanging regardless. However, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait, the larger 

donors in the region, were the driving force behind the decision and their commitment to the ban was self-motivated. 

80  A.S.T.E, “Deir Ali”, 2016–2017 Al Shatta for Technical Engineering, https://bit.ly/3BgpxMf 

20  

al-Nasriyeh plant. In October 2010, a Greek-Italian consortium was awarded a contract to build a power 
plant in Deir al-Zor,81 and even though a sanction exception exists for projects signed before January 
2012, the project was never fully executed. Indeed, the political and economic climate halted all these 
projects, and only some expressions of interest have since been made. For instance, in April 2015, a 
relatively small German company called Power International signed an MoU in Damascus for delivering 
a 360 MW gas-powered plant.82 The MoU was never made concrete and was most probably a media 
stunt. Also, in August 2015, the Norwegian Jacobsen Elektro and the Austrian Harris Group Engineering 
companies reportedly met with the Ministry of Electricity in Damascus.83 No contract nor MoUs were 
signed, but the regime exploited the visit to promote its political narrative of economic recovery. 

3.2. Assistance from Assad’s Allies

Since 2012, dozens of licenses, contracts, and MoUs have been awarded to contractors to build 
power  plants  of  varying  sizes  and  technologies  across  the  country. The  Ministry  of  Electricity  is  still 
issuing tenders and trying to attract foreign funds for its projects. However, the choice of contractor is 
influenced by political considerations, and only a few projects have seen the light of day. Iran, Russia, 
and other BRICS countries are better placed to invest in the sector, thanks to their close relations with 
the regime. 

3.2.1. Iran

During  an  official  visit  to  Tehran  on  12  September  2017,  the  then  Minister  of  Electricity,  Zuhair 
Kharboutli,  signed  two  contracts  and  an  MoU  to  deliver  Iranian  equipment,  technology,  and  know-
how  for  the  electricity  sector.84  The  agreement  involved  an  extensive  list  of  projects,  including:  the 
construction of a 540 MW combined cycle power plant in Latakia; the supply of five power generators 
in  Baniyas  with  a  total  capacity  of  125  MW;  the  rehabilitation  of  two  turbines  in  the Aleppo Thermal 
Plant with a combined capacity of 400 MW; the rehabilitation of al-Taim power to produce 90 MW; and 
the maintenance of the Jandar plant.85 In total, these substantial agreements would have represented 
12.4% of Syria’s pre-war production capacity.

On  2  October  2018,  the  PEEG  awarded  the  Latakia  Power  Plant  project  to  Mapna  and  the Aleppo 
Thermal Plant to the Iran Powerplant Repair Company (IPRC).86 Mapna is an Iranian conglomerate, 
established  in  1993,  specialising  in  power,  oil  and  gas,  railroad  projects,  and  the  production  of  gas 
and steam turbines; IRPC, on the other hand, is affiliated with the Iranian Ministry of Energy and was 
established in 1981 as Fundamental Management of Tavanir Repairs. The Latakia deal is valued at USD 
472 million and stipulates the delivery of a first turbine within 18 months, a second six months later, and 
a third within 34 months, along with a 70km pipeline linking the plant with the gas distribution network.87  
The Aleppo project was awarded a contract worth USD 147 million to deliver turbines number 1 and 5 
on-site.88 

81  METKA, “Combined Cycle Power Plant of 724 MW, Deir Azzour, Syria,” accessed 12 July 2021, https://bit.ly/3ez0H0t 

82  Bachir  El  Khoury,  “Electricity: A  German  Company  Signed  a  Contract  with  Bashar Al-Assad’s  Syria”  (in  French),  Slate,  6  May  2015,  

https://bit.ly/3ktbXza 

83  Hazem al-Sabbagh, “Electricity Minister: We Will Support Foreign Investors in Power Sector,” Syrian Arab News Agency (blog), 18 August 

2015, https://bit.ly/36HGzVF

84  Reuters,  “Iran  Signs  Agreements  with  Syria  to  Repair  and  Restore  the  Electricity  Grid”  (in  Arabic),  9  December  2017,  

https://reut.rs/3kCEceZ 

85  Al-Jazeera, “Iran Signs a Contract to Supply Electricity to Aleppo” (in Arabic), 12 September 2017, https://bit.ly/3AUKJHm 

86  Syrian Arab News Agency, “Syrian-Iranian Talks to Enhance Strategic Cooperation in the Electrical Sector” (in Arabic), 29 September 
2018,  https://bit.ly/2UoVVvx;  Iran  Press,  “Tehran  and  Damascus  to  Boost  Cooperation  in  Electricity  Generation,”  2  October  2018,  
https://bit.ly/3hM47Pi 

87  Sputnik News, “At a Cost of EUR 400 Million ... a Syrian-Iranian Agreement to Establish an Electric Power Plant in Latakia” (in Arabic),  

2 October 2018, https://bit.ly/3xMl1mk 

88  Business 2 Business Syria, “Minister of Electricity: A Contract Worth EUR 124 Million with Iran... and This Is What It Includes?” (in Arabic), 

14 April 2021, https://bit.ly/3Bj3696 

21  

While the Syrian government does not have the financial resources to fund these projects, it can rely 
on credit from Iran to cover some of the costs. Even in cases where the Iranian credit line does not 
suffice, Tehran has often found additional resources to pay for its ventures in Syria. Iran has consistently 
sought concessions from the regime in exchange for its support in areas such as phosphates and oil. 
According to the Secretary for Syrian Affairs of the Arab and African Office of the Iran Trade Promotion 
Organization (TPO), Soheila Rasoulinejad, Iran’s exports of non-oil products to Syria between March 
and  May  2021  increased  by  73%  over  the  same  period  last  year.  The  hike  was  largely  due  to  the 
shipment of components and parts of steam turbines worth USD 30 million.89 The turbines are likely to 
have ended up in the projects in Latakia and Aleppo.

Nevertheless, it is worth noting that Iran’s margin of manoeuvre has, in financial terms, shrunk since 
the Trump administration reimposed and tightened sanctions on the country in late 2018. So, despite 
their  best  intentions,  Syria’s  Ministry  of  Electricity  and  Iranian  companies  struggle  to  honour  their 
commitments. For instance, in January 2020, the Ministry cancelled the IRPC contract citing difficulties 
in  procuring  the  necessary  spare  parts  and  insufficient  funds  for  the  repair  of  the Aleppo  plant. The 
PEEG eventually awarded the same contract with the same conditions to Mapna, nearly a year later. It 
is unclear how the project will be funded.

3.2.2. Russia

During an official visit to Moscow on 31 January 2018, the then Syrian Minister of Electricity, Zuheir 
Kharboutli, signed a “roadmap agreement” with Russia to build new power plants with a total capacity 
of 2,650 MW (28.3% of Syria’s production capacity before the conflict) and to repair three turbines in 
the Aleppo Thermal Plant.90 This agreement was initially agreed upon a few months earlier in Sochi on 
9 October 2017,91 and it included other projects in the energy and reconstruction sectors.92

The  electricity  part  of  the  agreement  stipulated  the  addition  of  two  steam  turbines  with  a  combined 
capacity  of  600  MW  in  Mhardeh,  and  two  other  turbines  with  the  same  capacity  at  Tishreen;  the 
construction of a new 500 MW combined-cycle plant in Deir al-Zor, and a 350 MW steam turbine in 
Aleppo. It included, too, the repair of three turbines with a total capacity of 600 MW each at the Aleppo 
Thermal Plant.93

The main contractor chosen by Russia to execute these projects is Technopromexport. In a step toward 
fulfilling the contract, the Rostec subsidiary signed an MoU with the Syrian Ministry of Electricity to carry 
out four power generation projects with similar specifics on 2 February 2018.94 The company had had 
experience operating in Syria: the first time between 1968 and 1973 with the construction of the Tabqa 
Dam;95 and the second time in 2006 when it brought in two 200-MW turbines to the Tishreen power 
plant.

However,  there  were  no  details  in  the  roadmap  on  the  financing  terms. The  value  of  these  projects 
is  estimated  at  more  than  USD  2.3  billion,  and  it  was  not  clear  whether  the  Ministry  of  Electricity 
was expected to fund them or whether Russia would do so through a loan or another credit facility.96 

89  Tehran Times, “Exports to Syria Jumps 73% in 2 Months on Year,” 21 June 2021, https://bit.ly/36P0Po0 

90  Jalal  Bakkour,  “Russia  Tightens  Its  Grip  on  the  Syrian  Energy  Sector”  (in  Arabic),  Al-Araby  al-Jadeed,  2  February  2018,  

https://bit.ly/3k9fYII 

91  Enab Baladi, “A Russian-Syrian ‘Roadmap’ in the Field of Oil, Gas and Electricity,” 10 October 2018, https://bit.ly/3ezknBd 

92  Sputnik  News,  “A  Roadmap  for  Russian-Syrian  Cooperation  in  the  Field  of  Energy,  Oil  and  Gas”  (in  Arabic),  9  October  2018,  

https://bit.ly/3AS7onN 

93  The  Syria  Report,  “Syria  Awards  Power  Plant  Contracts  to  Russia  but  Has  No  Money  to  Pay  for  Them,”  6  February  2018,  

https://bit.ly/3kxJGrm 

94  Reuters, “Russia’s Technopromexport May Rebuild Four Syrian Power Plants,” 2 February 2018, https://tmsnrt.rs/3ewSNEV 

95  World Bank Group, “Syria - Second Damascus Water Supply Project,” 31 March 1976, https://bit.ly/3xO7ieU 

96  The Syria Report, “Syria Awards Power Plant Contracts to Russia.”

22  

Unsurprisingly,  the  roadmap  –  lacking  financial  backing  –  was  never  implemented.  A  year  later,  to 
overcome  the  Ministry  of  Electricity’s  financial  difficulties,  Technopromexport  suggested  funding  the 
projects itself in exchange for receiving exploitation rights over the plant. However, it is not clear whether 
the Ministry has granted their request or not.97 

In November 2020, Stroyexpert Middle East was awarded a license to build two solar power stations, 
one in Homs with a capacity of 1 MW and another one in the Damascus suburbs with a 2 MW capacity.98 
There are no public records that show the level of advancement on these two projects.

3.2.3. Companies from other countries

India and China also have good relations with the regime and enjoy a considerable advantage in 
investing in the Syrian electricity sector. However, as public records show, their engagement has been 
limited and has primarily involved exporting equipment and spare parts to Syria. Except for official visits 
and meetings with Syrian officials, their approach to engagement in the sector has been prudent and 
exploratory. Fear of secondary sanctions and security and economic risks might explain their lack of 
interest. But the lack of funds to finance reconstruction projects in Syria has also considerably hampered 
their willingness to increase their market involvement. 

For instance, Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL), a state-owned Indian company, was awarded 
a USD 485 million contract for adding 400 MW to the existing Tishreen Power Plant near Damascus 
in  2008.99  The  project  was  partially  funded  by  the  Export-Import  Bank  of  India,  which  extended  a 
concessionary loan of USD 240 million and released the first instalment of USD 100 million in 2010.100 
The remaining USD 245 million was expected to be funded by Syria or by an international financial 
institution. Despite receiving equipment worth USD 75 million, BHEL suspended its work on the plant 
at the end of 2011 for security reasons.101 During an official Syrian visit to India in January 2016, the 
resumption of work on the Tishreen plant was announced.102 Three years later, the company’s return 
was once again proclaimed during an official Indian visit to Damascus,103 but there is still no indication 
of activity on the site. 

Accustomed to investing in high-risk environments, China has shown restraint in Syria. This was also 
true  before  2011,  showing  China’s  deeper  concerns  over  the  feasibility  and  rentability  of  long-term 
investments there. Instead, Chinese companies conducted short transactional deals focused on trade 
and the export of equipment. For instance, in 2018, they supplied 800 small electric generators and 60 
kilometres of cables as part of a Chinese grant of USD 12 million.104 In 2016, Xian Electric Engineering 
and Ri Liu Power International built a substation in Latakia governorate for a USD 15 million contract.105 
As the sector needs billions of dollars to be brought back to its pre-war state, China’s interventions are 
so small in magnitude that they have had no discernible impact on overall electricity supplies.

97  The Syria Report, “Russian Company Offers to Build Power Plant on IPP Terms,” 18 June 2019, https://bit.ly/3hOtKz3 

98  Stroyexpert  is  a  Russian  limited  liability  firm  that  has  set  up  several  local  companies  in  Syria  in  land  reclamation  and  that  trades  in 
industrial, automotive, dams, irrigation, and other types of equipment. The Syria Report, “Russian Firm Enters Syria’s Renewable Energy 
Sector,” 16 December 2020, https://bit.ly/3es24hp 

99  Reuters, “India’s BHEL Gets $485 Mln Contract for Syria Plant,” 30 June 2008, https://reut.rs/3zgzpnv 

100 Embassy of India in Damascus Syria, “BHEL, India and PEEGT of Syria Sign Contract for Tishreen Thermal Power Plant Expansion,”  

8 May 2014, https://bit.ly/36Lfdha 

101 Utpal Bhaskar, “Strife in Syria Halts Bhel’s `2,000 Crore Project,” Livemint, 15 April 2013, https://bit.ly/3rjEatE 

102 Business Standard, “India to Complete Stalled Projects in Syria | Business Standard News,” 13 January 2016, https://bit.ly/3BkX3RI 

103 Elizabeth Roche, “New Delhi Steps Up Bid to Help War-Torn Syria Rebuild Its Infra,” Livemint, 5 June 2019, https://bit.ly/2Tj7gN8 

104 Enab Baladi, “A Grant from China.. 800 Power Transformers Arrive in Syria” (in Arabic), 10 October 2018, https://bit.ly/2UZLA9u 

105 The Syria Report, “Chinese Companies Earn New Contracts in Electricity Sector,” 13 September 2016, https://bit.ly/3rh4Vic 

23  

In fact, China has never built a fully-fledged power plant in Syria.106 PowerChina and SinoHydro, two 
state-owned  engineering  companies,  have  shown  some  interest  in  increasing  the  Chinese  footprint 
in  the  sector,  but  no  concrete  agreements  have  emerged  to  date.  For  instance,  the  deputy  head  of 
PowerChina  visited  Latakia  to  discuss  the  construction  of  a  600MW  power  plant,  but  the  deal  was 
finally awarded to the less prestigious Mapna Iranian company. Chinese companies also considered 
participating in the reconstruction of Aleppo’s Thermal Plant, but Iranian and Russian companies ended 
up, as noted above, landing the contract. Similarly, officials from the Tebian Electric Apparatus company 
discussed  the  possibility  of  supplying  120MW  mobile  gas  turbines,107  but  talks  never  resulted  in  a 
contract. 

Iran’s  and  Russia’s  political  and  military  engagement  vis-à-vis  the  regime  justifies  their  contribution 
to its economic survival. But other energy technology exporters face considerable financial and legal 
challenges  before  entering  the  Syrian  market.  Hence,  it  is  unlikely  that  we  will  witness  increased 
investments from other countries in the Syrian power sector in the foreseeable future.

106 China National Electric Equipment Corporation (CNEEC) has been selected to build an extension to the al-Zara Power Plant in 2009, but 

the project was not carried out. 

107 Business 2 Business Syria, “The Ministry of Electricity Is Considering Importing Portable Gas Sets to Generate Electricity,” 27 September 

2016, https://bit.ly/3evRmGF 

24  

Conclusion: Bottlenecks and Future Prospects

Before  the  2011  conflict,  Syria’s  electricity  sector  was  trailing  other  developing  countries  both  in 
terms of structural and performance indicators, enduring nearly 26% of power losses and 43 days of 
power outage per year. However, ten years of war has made the situation immeasurably worse, with the 
per capita consumption of state electricity not even 15% of what it was in 2010. 

There  are  no  accurate  or  official  statistics  that  detail  the  number  of  beneficiaries  from  the  electricity 
produced by the PEEG today. Most recent official data suggest that the number of residential subscribers 
fell from 4.5 million in 2011 to 4.2 million in 2018 (a 6.7% decline).108 However, such figures do not take 
into account the former subscribers who are no longer serviced by PEEG in areas where the regime is 
no longer in control. Therefore, such data cannot be relied upon to estimate the change in the aggregate 
level of demand for electricity. However, it is safe to assume that the current number of beneficiaries 
from the electricity provided by the Ministry of Electricity cannot exceed 12 million, including the small 
areas in northeast Syria’s urban centres that remain under regime control.109 On the other hand, as 
stated earlier, electricity production capacity fell from nearly 9,344 MW in 2010 to 5,150 in 2021.110 In 
percentage  terms,  while  the  number  of  beneficiaries  fell  43.7%,  production  capacity  fell  by  a  similar 
rate, 44.8%. In fact, it is also safe to argue that electricity demand per capita has also fallen due to 
significant economic contraction, which means that the existing production capacity might be enough 
for the needs of the population.

With the current population size and the likely level of consumption, the problem with lack of access to 
electricity does not lie, in the first instance, with electricity production capacity. Instead, it depends on 
two other factors. First, there is the incomplete recovery of the transmission network in war-torn areas. 
Second, there is the lack of fuels to power the electricity plants. Throughout the conflict, while damage 
to infrastructure determined the upper bound of possible electricity supply, energy was often the key 
variable in determining output. After all, the PEEG has struggled and continues to struggle to obtain 
enough energy to operate the plants at maximum available capacity. For example, in 2021, to operate 
the  total  available  capacity  for  gas-powered  turbines  responsible  for  70%  of  the  supply,  the  PEEG 
requires 18 million cubic metres of gas daily, of which it was able to obtain only 8.2 million (46%).111

The difficulty in accessing energy sources to power the plants is partly down to decreasing oil production 
from regime areas and the control of the Autonomous Administration of North-East Syria over the majority 
of production facilities. Iran and Russia are expected to close the gap in fuel demand by exporting oil 
and gas to Syria, but there are considerable financial and logistical challenges for procurement.

Syria’s electricity production capacity might be enough for the current number of beneficiaries residing 
in regime-held areas and for their low level of economic activity. However, a political settlement that 
would pull the country back together, spur economic growth and increase the number of beneficiaries 
would  mean  that  the  electricity  sector  would  struggle  in  terms  of  output:  the  areas  outside  regime 
control do not have electricity production on an industrial scale. In such a scenario Syria might, with a 
functioning government, be able to convince donors and international electricity companies to invest or 
re-engage in the sector. But supply will likely take a few years to catch up with a reconstruction-led rise 
in demand. Sectors that are more reliant on electricity, such as industry, will struggle more than others. 

108 Arab Union of Electricity, “Statistical Bulletin 2011 - 20th Edition,” 2018, https://bit.ly/37dWniQ 

109 William Christou and Karam Shaar, “2021 Budget Reveals the Depth of Syria’s Economic Woes,” Atlantic Council, 1 December 2020, 
https://bit.ly/3xY9Qr4;  The  authors  argue  that  the  population  of  regime-held  areas  is  now  11.7  million.  In  addition,  300,000  people  in 
Northeast Syria benefit from Damascus supply of electricity but do not fall under direct regime control.

110 Pre-war available capacity is outlined in the Annex: “Interactive Dashboard for the Electricity Generation Plants,” Middle East Directions, 
Wartime  and  Post-Conflict  in  Syria,  30  July  2021,  https://bit.ly/3xV8kGb;  Ghanem,  “A  Decrease  in  the  per  Capita  Share  of  Electricity 
between 2011 and 2020.”

111  Ibid. 

25  

In the foreseeable future, regime areas will continue to muddle through. They will struggle to source 
enough  fuels  to  power  plants,  while  tinkering  with  the  electricity  grid  as  government  backers  refuse 
to  invest  heavily  in  supporting  it.  Until  then,  expect  more  dysfunctional  supply  and  the  use  of  small 
generators, much as in neighbouring Iraq and Lebanon, squeezing what remains of economic activity 
in  Syria.  Regulating  small  private  providers  and  improving  coordination  between  them  will  prove  a 
problem  for  the  whole  country  for  a  long  time  to  come.  With  no  improvement  in  the  finances  of  the 
Syrian government on the horizon, citizens will continue to suffer from a lack of electricity. Damascus’s 
inability to address the crisis will worsen the already deplorable humanitarian situation and add to the 
waves of migration.

26  

Annex: Interactive Dashboard for the Electricity Generation Plants

Designed by the authors, July 2021

This interactive dashboard contains information on the establishment year, production, energy source, 
military control, efficiency, and satellite imagery for all power generating plants in Syria throughout the 
conflict. Select an individual plant from the left of the dashboard to see the information relating to it. For 
example, in the photo below, you see the information relating to Zayzoon plant. This dashboard is best 
viewed on a pc, rather than on a mobile device: https://bit.ly/3xV8kGb

27  

 
Research Project Report 
Issue 2021/13
30 July 2021

doi:10.2870/939516
ISBN:978-92-9466-084-8
QM-02-21-984-EN-N