COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2021 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary Accompanying the COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2021 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union
Date: 2021-07-20
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Hungary, administrative transparency, coronavirus disease, corruption, democracy, epidemic, independence of the judiciary, infringement of EU law, political rights, rule of law

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 20.7.2021  SWD(2021) 714 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2021 Rule of Law Report    Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary Accompanying the COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2021 Rule of Law Report    The rule of law situation in the European Union {COM(2021) 700 final} - {SWD(2021) 701 final} - {SWD(2021) 702 final} - {SWD(2021) 703 final} - {SWD(2021) 704 final} - {SWD(2021) 705 final} - {SWD(2021) 706 final} - {SWD(2021) 707 final} - {SWD(2021) 708 final} - {SWD(2021) 709 final} - {SWD(2021) 710 final} - {SWD(2021) 711 final} - {SWD(2021) 712 final} - {SWD(2021) 713 final} - {SWD(2021) 715 final} - {SWD(2021) 716 final} - {SWD(2021) 717 final} - {SWD(2021) 718 final} - {SWD(2021) 719 final} - {SWD(2021) 720 final} - {SWD(2021) 721 final} - {SWD(2021) 722 final} - {SWD(2021) 723 final} - {SWD(2021) 724 final} - {SWD(2021) 725 final} - {SWD(2021) 726 final} - {SWD(2021) 727 final}  
 
 
ABSTRACT 

As regards efficiency and quality, the Hungarian justice system performs well in terms of the 
length of proceedings and has a high level of digitalisation. The gradual increase of salaries 
of judges and prosecutors continues. However, as regards judicial independence, the justice 
system has been subject to new developments adding to existing concerns, expressed also in 
the context of the Article 7(1) TEU procedure initiated by the European Parliament. The new 
rules allowing for appointment of members of the Constitutional Court to the Supreme Court 
(Kúria) outside the normal procedure, have been put in practice, and enabled the election of 
the  new  Kúria  President,  whose  position  was  also  endowed  with  additional  powers.  This 
Kúria President was elected despite a negative opinion of the National Judicial Council. The 
recommendation  to  strengthen  judicial  independence,  made  in  the  context  of  the  European 
Semester,  remains  unaddressed.  This  includes  the  need  to  formally  reinforce  the  powers  of 
the independent  National Judicial  Council to  enable it to  counter-balance the powers of the 
President of the National Office for the Judiciary.  

The implementation of the anti-corruption strategy is ongoing but its scope remains limited. 
Shortcomings  persist  as  regards  political  party  financing,  lobbying  and  ‘revolving  doors’. 
Risks of clientelism, favouritism and nepotism in high-level public administration as well as 
risks  arising  from  the  link  between  businesses  and  political  actors  remain  unaddressed. 
Independent  control  mechanisms  remain  insufficient  for  detecting  corruption.  Concerns 
remain regarding the lack of systematic checks and insufficient oversight of asset and interest 
declarations.  New  criminal  law  provisions  aim  to  address  foreign  bribery  and  informal 
payments in healthcare. While the indictment rate for corruption cases is high, and some new 
high-level  corruption  cases  were  opened  since  2020,  the  track  record  for  investigations  of 
allegations concerning high-level officials and their immediate circle remains limited.  

Media  pluralism  remains  at  risk.  Concerns  persist  with  regard  to  the  independence  and 
effectiveness  of  the  Media  Authority,  also  in  the  light  of  the  Media  Council’s  decisions 
leading to independent radio station Klubrádió being taken off air. While no media support 
schemes were established to counter the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on news media 
outlets, significant amounts of state advertising have continued to permit the government to 
exert indirect political influence over the media. Access to public information was tightened 
through emergency measures introduced during the pandemic, making timely access to such 
information harder for independent media outlets. Independent media outlets and journalists 
continue to face obstruction and intimidation. 

As regards the system of checks and balances, the transparency and quality of the legislative 
process remain a source of concern. An amendment to the constitution will limit the powers 
of Government as regards the ‘state of danger’ regime after July 2023. The Commissioner for 
Fundamental Rights has gained more competences, but its independence has been questioned 
by  stakeholders.  The  Commission  launched  infringement  proceedings  to  ensure  the 
implementation of the Court of Justice judgment on the law on the transparency of foreign-
funded civil society organisations. Subsequently, Parliament repealed the law and introduced 
new rules on legality checks for civil society. Pressure remains on civil society organisations 
critical  towards  the  government,  whilst  concerns  have  been  expressed  about  newly 
established  private  trusts  receiving  significant  public  funding,  managed  by  board  members 
close to the current government. 

1 

 
I. 

JUSTICE SYSTEM  

Hungary  has  a  four-tier  ordinary  court  system.  113  district  courts  operate  at  first  instance, 
while  20  regional  courts  hear  appeals  against  district  court  decisions  and  decide  on  certain 
cases at first instance. Five regional appeal courts decide on appeals against decisions of the 
regional  courts.  The  main  role  of  the  Supreme  Court  (Kúria)  is  to  guarantee  the  uniform 
application of the law. The Fundamental  Law tasks the President of the National Office for 
the Judiciary (NOJ), elected by Parliament, with the central administration of the courts. The 
National  Judicial  Council  is  an  independent  body,  which,  under  the  Fundamental  Law, 
supervises the NOJ President and participates in the administration of the courts. Judges are 
appointed by the President of the Republic following a recommendation of the NOJ President 
based  on  a  ranking  of  candidates  established  by  the  local  judicial  councils  (composed  of 
judges elected by their peers). The NOJ President cannot deviate from this ranking without 
the prior consent of the National Judicial Council. The Constitutional Court is not part of the 
ordinary court system, and reviews the constitutionality of laws and judicial decisions. The 
prosecution  service  is  an  independent  institution  vested  with  powers  to  investigate  and 
prosecute  crime.  The  Hungarian  Bar  Association  and  the  regional  bar  associations  are 
autonomous self-governing public bodies1. 

Independence  

Perceived judicial independence continues to be average among the general public and 
low  among  companies.  The  perceived  independence  of  courts  and  judges  by  the  general 
public  continues  to  be  average,  dropping  from  48%  in  2020  to  40%  in  2021.  32%  of 
companies perceive judicial independence as ‘fairly or very good’2, an increase compared to 
the 26% in 2020. As regards the general public, there has been a negative trend in perceptions 
in the last five years (interrupted in 2020)3; as regards companies, after a significant drop in 
2019, perception continued to improve4. 

The  National  Judicial  Council  continues  to  face  challenges  in  counter-balancing  the 
powers  of  the  President  of  the  National  Office  for  the  Judiciary  as  regards  the 
management  of  the  courts.  As  indicated  in  the  2020  Rule  of  Law  Report5,  the  National 
Judicial  Council  is  facing  a  series  of  structural  limitations  that  prevent  it  from  exercising 
effective oversight regarding the actions of the NOJ President. The National Judicial Council 

1   The  Hungarian  Bar  Association  is  vested  with  the  duties  to  represent  the  legal  profession  vis-à-vis  the 
government,  exercise  a  general  oversight  over  the  regional  bar  associations,  determine  certain  rules 
pertaining  to  the  legal  profession  by  issuing  by-laws  and  to  review  the  decisions  of  the  regional  bar 
associations relative to disciplinary measures. (Contribution from the Council of Bars and Law Societies of 
Europe for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 22.) 

2   Figures 47 and 49, 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard. The level of perceived judicial independence is categorised 
as  follows:  very  low  (below  30%  of  respondents  perceive  judicial  independence  as  fairly  good  and  very 
good); low (between 30-39%), average (between 40-59%), high (between 60-75%), very high (above 75%). 

3   Figure 44, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard; Figure 47, 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
4   Figures 46 and 48, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard; Figures 49, 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
5   The  NOJ  President  is  nominated  by  the  President  of  the  Republic  and  elected  by  Parliament  with  a  two-
thirds majority from among judges with at least five years’ experience as a judge for a period of nine years, 
without the possibility of re-election. The National Judicial Council is composed of the Kúria President ex-
officio and 14 judges-members (and 14 substitute members) elected by their peers for a period of six years, 
without  the  possibility  of  re-election.  The  NOJ  President  operates  under  the  supervision  of  the  National 
Judicial Council. 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, pp. 2-
3. 

2 

 
                                                 
has  no  legal  personality6  and  has  no  right  to  propose  legislation  or  to  be  consulted  on 
legislative  proposals  affecting  the  justice  system7.  New  members  and  substitutes  have  been 
elected to the National Judicial Council8; it has an agreed budget, and the NOJ President has 
provided it with  one additional staff member9. The current NOJ President cooperates better 
with the Council than his predecessor, but that cooperation is limited to the extent required by 
law10,  and  no  legislative  steps  have  been  taken  to  address  structural  issues.  The  Council 
recommendations11  in  the  context  of  the  European  Semester,  to  ‘strengthen  judicial 
independence’ remain to be addressed. The NOJ President has repeatedly filled vacancies in 
higher courts, without a call for applications, with judges performing administrative tasks in 
the NOJ12. 

The  President  of  the  Kúria,  the  Supreme  Court,  has  received  additional  powers  in 
organising  the  functioning  of  that  court.  As  of  1  January  2021,  new  rules13  entered  into 
force, allowing the Kúria President to set up judicial panels composed of a presiding judge14 
and  four  judges15  for  certain  groups  of  cases,  following  a  non-binding  opinion  of  the 
department  concerned  and  of  the  judicial  council  of  the  Kúria.  This  further  increased  the 
administrative  powers  of  the  Kúria  President,  which  include  appointing  presiding  judges16, 
assigning judges and presiding judges to chambers17, appointing heads of department18, and 

6   Contribution from the European Association of Judges for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 9. 
7   Information received from the National Judicial Council in the context of the country visit to Hungary. The 
Council  is  not  allowed  to  communicate  through  the  courts’  website  (Contribution  from  the  European 
Association  of  Judges  for  the  2021  Rule  of  Law  Report,  p.  9.)  beyond  the  publication  of  information 
required by law. When the NJC wanted to reach every judge via email (e.g. to consult them on the draft of 
the  new  code  of  ethics),  a  special  email  address  was  registered  for  the  National  Judicial  Council  in  the 
official email system to directly communicate with the whole judiciary. 

8   Input from Hungary for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 5. 
9   Contribution from the European Association of Judges for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 9. 
10   Information received from the National Judicial Council in the context of the country visit to Hungary.  
11   See 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 3. 
12   Contribution from the European Association of Judges for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 7. Section 58(3) 
of Act CLXII of 2011 on the Legal Status and Remuneration of Judges. See, e.g., Decisions 83.E/2020. (II. 
21.) OBHE and 62.E/2021. (III. 12.) OBHE. 

13   Act CLXV of 2020 amended Section 10(2) of Act CLXI of 2011 as of 1 January 2021. The introduction of 
panels of five has to be indicated in the case allocation scheme (input from Hungary for the 2021 Rule of 
Law Report, p. 4.); the department composed of judges (kollégium) concerned gives a non-binding opinion 
on the introduction of panels of five (Section 10(2) of Act CLXI of 2011); the judicial council of the Kúria 
gives a non-binding opinion on the case allocation scheme (Section 151(1)(d) of Act CLXI of 2011). Also, 
Act  CLXV  of  2020  introduced  Sections  118(6)  and  127(2a)  of  Act  CLXI  of  2011,  allowing  the  Kúria 
President to appoint a Vice-President to act as Secretary General ad interim and linking the term of office of 
the (deputy) Secretary General to that of the Kúria President. 

14   Presiding  judges  are  appointed  by  the  Kúria  President  (Section  128(3)  of  Act  CLXI  of  2011)  following  a 
non-binding opinion of the competent department (Sections 131(c) and 132(4) of Act CLXI of 2011). The 
presiding  judge  decides  on  the  composition  of  the  panel  hearing  a  given  case  and  appoints  the  judge-
rapporteur. 

15   Normally, judicial panels hearing the cases (eljáró tanács) are composed of a presiding judge (tanácselnök) 
and two other judges belonging to the same chamber  (ítélkező tanács). The number of judicial posts in the 
Kúria  is  not  set  by  statute,  but  is  determined  by  the  NOJ  President  (See  Section  76(4)(a)  of  Act  CLXI  of 
2011). Currently, there are 114 posts (see Decision 14.SZ/2021. (II. 24.) OBHE), 24 of them are vacant. It is 
to  be  noted  that  the  Kúria  President  decides  on  the  appointment  of  Kúria  judges;  the  President  of  the 
Republic only plays a formal role (Figure 54, 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard). 

16   Section 128(3) of Act CLXI of 2011. 
17   In a given chamber, there can be more than one presiding judge. In that case the Kúria President assigns one 
of  them  to  perform  administrative  tasks.  The  chambers  are  organised  in  civil,  criminal  and  administrative 
departments.  The  head  of  department  distributes  cases  among  the  chambers  following  the  case  allocation 

3 

 
                                                 
 
establishing  the  case  allocation  scheme  among  chambers19.  The  Kúria  President  also  has 
important powers as regards the role of the Kúria in ensuring the uniform application of law 
by  courts20.  To  that  effect,  the  Kúria  makes  uniformity  decisions  which  are  binding  on 
courts21. When a chamber wishes to deviate from the Kúria’s published case law, it must stay 
the proceedings and request a uniformity decision22. The uniformity panel can be chaired by 
the Kúria President  or  Vice President23;  its  six members are selected by the chair on an  ad 
hoc  basis  from  among  judges  of  the  given  department.  Moreover,  the  parties  may  lodge  a 
uniformity  complaint  against  a  final  decision  of  the  Kúria  if  it  deviates  from  the  Kúria’s 
published  case  law24.  The  uniformity  complaint  panel  is  chaired  by  the  Kúria  President  or 
Vice  President;  its  eight  members  are  selected  by  the  chair  based  on  an  algorithm25.  The 
uniformity  complaint  panel  may  quash  final  decisions  handed  down  by  the  chambers  in 
individual cases26. The Kúria’s judicial bodies (e.g. the judicial council or the departments), 

scheme. The municipal chamber reviews the legality of municipal decrees; its members are appointed by the 
Kúria President. 

18   The full court and the competent department give a non-binding opinion on the candidates (Sections 131(a) 

and (c) and 132(4) of Act CLXI of 2011). 

19   The Kúria’s judicial council and the departments give a non-binding opinion on the case allocation scheme 
(see Section 9(1) of Act CLXI of 2011). Since 1 January 2021, the  Kúria President has modified the case 
allocation scheme nine times.  

20   Since  1  April  2020,  lower  level  courts  have  been  required  by  law  to  explain  why  they  do  not  follow  the 
interpretation of legal provisions given by the  Kúria in its published decisions. Such deviation is a ground 
for an extraordinary remedy before the Kúria. See e.g. Sections 561(3)(g), 648(d), 649(6), 652(1) of Act XC 
of 2017 on the Code of Criminal Procedure; Sections 346(5), 406(1), 409(3) and 424(3) of Act  CXXX  of 
2016  on  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure.  The  Council  of  Bars  and  Law  Societies  of  Europe  notes  that  these 
rules  were  introduced  without  consulting  the  judiciary,  that  the  availability  and  searchability  of  the 
precedents  published  by  the  Kúria  is  not  up-to-date,  with  individual  decisions  being  published  in  various 
publications, and that it is not clear whether only the ratio decidendi of decisions is to be followed or also 
obiter dicta. In its view, the new rules will reduce the judges’ autonomy with regard to the interpretation of 
the law in the light of the circumstances of the concrete  case. (Contribution from the Council of Bars and 
Law Societies of Europe for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 24.) 

21   Article  25(3)  of  the  Fundamental  Law.  The  uniformity  procedure  –  which  is  initiated  by  one  of  the 
chambers,  or  the  President,  or  (vice-)  head  of  department  of  the  Kúria,  the  president  of  a  regional  appeal 
court or the Prosecutor General – is different from the uniformity complaint procedure which is initiated by 
one of the parties to a case. 

22   Section 32(1)(b) and (2) of Act CLXI of 2011. Each department has its own uniformity panel.  
23   The Kúria Vice Presidents are appointed by the President of the Republic following a recommendation by 

the Kúria President (Section 128(1) of Act CLXI of 2011). 

24   Section  41/B  of  Act  CLXI  of  2011.  As  of  1  January  2021,  an  amendment  to  the  rules  specified  the  cases 
where the uniformity complaint had to be rejected, extended the scope of the judicial decisions that may be 
challenged  through  a  uniformity  complaint  (while  limiting  them  to  those  delivered  after  1  July  2020), 
strengthened the parties’ right of disposition in the proceedings (it entitled them to revoke their complaint), 
and allowed for the suspension of the court’s proceedings and the making of a reference for a preliminary 
ruling to the CJEU. The law  allows for the  establishment  of a uniformity complaint panel  with  more than 
nine members (which is also their minimum number). (Contribution from the  Kúria President for the 2021 
Rule of Law Report, pp. 9-10.) 

25   Section 41/A(1) of Act CLXI of 2011. As of 1 May 2021, the  Kúria President amended the case allocation 

scheme to introduce an algorithm for the composition of the uniformity complaint panels. 

26   Section 41/D(1)(c) of Act CLXI of 2011. The Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe notes that the 
new  system  of  uniformity  complaints  may  lead  to  confusion  and  decreased  independence  of  judges  while 
granting  too  much  decision-making  power  to  the  Kúria  (Contribution  from  the  Council  of  Bars  and  Law 
Societies of Europe for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 24.). 

4 

 
                                                                                                                                                        
which have a merely consultative role27, are unable to counter-balance the extensive powers 
of the Kúria President28. 

A new Kúria President was elected as of 1 January 2021 under the new special rules on 
judicial  appointments.  It  is  recalled  that  in  June  2020,  the  President  of  the  Republic, 
appointed as of 1 July 2020 eight members of the Constitutional Court as Kúria judges upon 
their request29, six of which without experience as a judge in an ordinary court. As explained 
in the 2020 Rule of Law Report, following an amendment adopted in 2020, members of the 
Constitutional Court, having obtained the status of a judge, could request to be appointed to 
the  Kúria  after  the  termination  of  their  service  in  the  Constitutional  Court30.  On  5  October 
2020, the President of the Republic recommended31 that Parliament elects one of them to the 
post  of  Kúria  President.  After  having  heard  the  person  concerned  in  line  with  the  relevant 
legal  provisions32, 
the  National  Judicial  Council  rejected  his  nomination  almost 
unanimously33.  After  having  terminated  his  membership  in  the  Constitutional  Court,  on  19 
October  2020,  the  nominee  was  elected  by  the  National  Assembly  to  the  post  of  Kúria 
President  as  of  1  January  2021  for  a  period  of  nine  years34.  Also  on  19  October,  the  then 
Kúria President assigned him to the Kúria, where he served as a presiding judge in one of the 
chambers until he took office as Kúria President. These developments confirm the concerns 

27   As  regards  the  appointment  of  court  managers  in  the  Kúria,  if  the  Kúria  President  wishes  to  appoint  a 
nominee  without  the  consent  of  the  judicial  body  concerned  (expressed  by  majority  of  votes)  he/she  must 
ask for the consent of the National Judicial Council (Section 132(6) of Act CLXI of 2011). 

28   Information received from the Hungarian Helsinki Committee in the context of the country visit to Hungary. 
For instance, the judicial council and the department give an opinion on the case allocation scheme (Section 
9(1) of Act CLXI of 2011).  

29   Under  the  normal  procedure,  judges  are  appointed  to  the  Kúria  by  its  President,  following  a  call  for 
applications,  on  the  basis  of  an  opinion  of  the  Kúria’s  competent  department  (kollégium)  and  of  an 
assessment  and  ranking  of  candidates  by  the  Kúria’s  judicial  council  composed  of  judges  elected  by  their 
peers.  Section  3(4a)  of  Act  CLXII  of  2011  allowing  the  judicial  appointment  of  members  of  the 
Constitutional Court, elected by Parliament, without a call for applications was introduced by Act CXXVII 
of  2019  on  the  amendment  of  certain  Acts  in  relation  to  the  single-instance  administrative  procedures  of 
district  offices  (‘the  omnibus  legislation’)  (2020  Rule  of  Law  Report,  Country  Chapter  on  the  rule  of  law 
situation  in  Hungary,  p.  5.).  On  21  September  2020,  the  National  Judicial  Council  called  on  the  NOJ 
President to propose legislation removing Section 3(4a) of Act CLXII of 2011 (Decision 107/2020. (IX.21.) 
OBT).  During  the  Council  meeting  of  9  September  2020, the  NOJ  President  and  the  representative  of  the 
Ministry of Justice were of the opinion that the National Judicial Council has no competence in the matter. 

30   Section 88(3) of Act CLXII of 2011. 
31   https://www.parlament.hu/irom41/13175/13175.pdf 
32   Section 103(3)(a) of Act CLXI of 2011. 
33   Thirteen judges-members  voted against.  The  one  vote in  favour  was cast by the  then  Kúria President (ex-
officio member of the National Judicial Council) (Contribution from the  Kúria President for the 2021 Rule 
of Law Report, p. 4.). The Council recognised the personal qualities and preparedness of  the nominee, his 
academic merits and the experience he gained in the field of justice, in a broader sense, as member of the 
Constitutional  Court  and  deputy  of  the  Prosecutor  General,  but  explained  the  rejection  by  referring  to  the 
nominee’s  lack  of  courtroom  experience  and  the  fact  that  his  candidacy  was  made  possible  by  legislative 
amendments which the Council considered were contrary to the constitutional requirement of independence 
and  impartiality  of  the  head  of  the  judicial  system  (Decision  120/2020.  (X. 9.)  OBT).  The  opinion  of  the 
National Judicial Council is not binding. The Government is of the opinion that this arrangement assures the 
involvement of the judicial bodies (Input from Hungary for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 2.). It is recalled 
that as of 1 January 2020, Section 1 of Act XXIV of 2019 amended Section 114(1) of Act CLXI of 2011 in 
the sense that time served as a senior legal secretary at the Constitutional Court or at an international court 
can be taken into account when calculating the five years’ ‘experience as a judge’ required for the post of the 
Kúria President. 

34   Input from Hungary for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 12. 

5 

 
                                                 
already  flagged  in  the  2020  Rule  of  Law  Report35,  with  an  appointment  to  the  top  judicial 
post  being  decided  without  involvement  of  a  judicial  body,  and  not  in  line  with  European 
standards36.  The  UN  Special  Rapporteur  on  the  independence  of  judges  and  lawyers 
characterised the election as an ‘attack to the independence of the judiciary and as an attempt 
to  submit  the  judiciary  to  the  will  of  the  legislative  branch,  in  violation  of  the  principle  of 
separation of powers’37. In the light of the administrative powers of the Kúria President and 
the key role of the Kúria in the justice system38, these developments raise serious concerns as 
regards judicial independence39. 

The practice of the  President of the National  Office for the Judiciary of annulling the 
procedures  for  selecting  court  presidents  and  appointing  ad  interim  court  presidents 
without the approval of the National Judicial Council continued. The NOJ President has 
continued  the  practice  of  cancelling40  –  in  a  growing  number  of  cases  and  often  without 
sufficient  explanations41  –  selection  procedures  for  court  presidents  and  other  court 
managers42,  even  where  there  were  suitable  applicants  supported  by  their  peers43.  This 
practice  was  criticised  by  the  National  Judicial  Council  already  under  the  mandate  of  the 

35   2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, pp. 5-6. 
36   Committee  of  Ministers  of  the  Council  of  Europe  Recommendation  CM/Rec(2010)12,  para.  47.  See  also 

Court of Justice case C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, A.K., para. 134. 

37   Letter  of  the  UN  Special  Rapporteur  on  the  independence  of  judges  and  lawyers  dated  15  April  2021. 
Moreover, as underlined by the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary,  the election to the post of 
Kúria  President  was  made  possible  by  ad  hominem  legislation  (European  Network  of  Councils  for  the 
Judiciary (2020)). Also to be recalled that the  Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe noted with 
concern the continuing absence of safeguards in connection with ad hominem constitutional-level measures 
terminating a judicial mandate, and Parliament’s competence, established in 2012 following the facts of the 
Baka v. Hungary judgment (Application No. 20261/12) of the European Court of Human Rights, to impeach 
the President of the Kúria without judicial review (1383rd meeting, 29 September – 1 October 2020). 

38   According to the Government, the key role of the Kúria in the Hungarian justice system is fully controlled 

by the Constitutional Court. 

39   According to the Court of Justice, Member States are required to ensure, in the light of the value of the rule 
of  law,  that  any  regression  of  their  laws  on  the  organisation  of  justice  is  prevented,  by  refraining  from 
adopting rules which would undermine the independence of the judiciary (see Case C-896/19, Repubblika, 
paras. 63 and 64). 

40   A  call  for  applications  is  declared  inconclusive  if  none  of  the  applications  is  accepted  by  the  appointing 
authority.  In  that  case,  a  new  call  for  applications  is  published.  If  the  new  procedure  is  also  declared 
inconclusive, the position of a court president (manager) may be filled by a person selected by the appointing 
authority for a maximum of one year. (Input from Hungary for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 2.) There is 
no  judicial  review  available  against  the  decision  of  the  NOJ  President  to  cancel  selection  procedures  for 
court presidents and other court managers, and the National Judicial Council is not involved. 

41   In  2020,  the  NOJ  President  cancelled  five  selection  procedures  for  court  managers  (court  presidents,  vice 
presidents, heads and vice-heads of division) where there was a candidate supported by the majority of the 
judicial  body  giving  an  opinion  (Decisions  373.E/2020.  (X.  1.)  OBHE,  388.E/2020.  (X.  19.)  OBHE, 
415.E/2020. (XI. 12.) OBHE, 443.E/2020. (XI. 30.) OBHE, 444.E/2020. (XI. 30.) OBHE. According to the 
Government, these decisions of the NOJ President were based on Section 133(1) of Act CLXI of 2011, had 
detailed reasoning, and  were published in the  official gazette and at the official  website  of the court.  As a 
result, three ad interim court presidents were appointed. At its meeting of 5 May 2021, the National Judicial 
Council expressed concerns because of the absence of unified criteria for cancelling a selection procedure by 
the NOJ President. 

42   Presidents and certain other managers of the regional courts and regional appeal courts are appointed by the 
NOJ  President  following  a  vote  by  the  court  concerned  sitting  as  a  full  court  by  a  secret  ballot.  The  NOJ 
President  may  appoint  any  candidate  who  received  the  majority  of  votes  (a  judge  can  support  more 
candidates at the ballot), but the appointment of a candidate who did not receive the majority of votes of the 
full  court  requires  the  prior  consent  of  the  National  Judicial  Council.  Regional  court  presidents  appoint 
district court presidents (Input from Hungary for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 2.). 

43   Contribution from the European Association of Judges for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 5.  

6 

 
                                                 
previous NOJ President44. Over the last year, the selection of court presidents was repeatedly 
delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic; as a result, vacant posts either remained empty or 
were filled by the NOJ President45 on a temporary basis, or the mandate of court managers 
was extended by legislation. The court presidents exercise powers that are relevant to judges’ 
career  perspectives.  Since  judges’  first  appointment  is  limited  to  three  years46,  the 
continuation of their judicial career depends on an assessment of their suitability for judicial 
tenure, for which the court president is to evaluate their judicial activity47. If judges are found 
suitable, the court president requests the NOJ President to recommend that the President of 
the Republic appoint them for an unlimited period of time48. If found unsuitable, they have to 
leave the bench at the end of the initial appointment49. The results of the evaluation may be 
challenged before the service court50; the service court cannot grant interim relief to prevent 
an  interruption  of  the  judicial  career  during  the  review  of  the  evaluation.  Also,  every  three 
years, the court president and the NOJ President may reassign judges – without their consent 
– to another court for up to one year, although in practice they have not availed themselves of 
this possibility since 201251. Concerns have been raised as regards the impact of this power 
on the irremovability of judges52. 

The  gradual  increase  of  salaries  of  judges  and  prosecutors  continues.  The  increase  in 
judicial salaries noted by the 2020 Rule of Law Report continued as foreseen in the omnibus 
legislation of 201953, and is expected to contribute to enhancing judicial independence. In the 
first  phase,  as  of  January  2020,  salaries  were  increased  on  average  by  32%54,  and  in  the 

44   2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 3. 
45   Contribution from the European Association of Judges for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, pp. 5-6. 
46   Section 23(1) of Act CLXII of 2011. Input from Hungary for the 2020 Rule of Law Report, p. 1. 
47   Section 24(2) and Chapter V  of  Act  CLXII of 2011. The evaluation by the court president is based on an 
assessment conducted by the head of department or by a judge appointed by the head of department (Section 
71(2) of Act CLXII of 2011. 

48   Sections 3(3)(c) and 24(3) of Act CLXII of 2011. 
49   Section 25(1) of Act CLXII of 2011. 
50   Sections  80  and  101  of  Act  CLXII  of  2011.  Members  of  the  service  courts  are  appointed  by  the  National 
Judicial  Council  (Sections  102(1)  and  145(2)  of  Act  CLXII  of  2011,  Section  103(3)(g)  of  Act  CLXI  of 
2011). 

51   Section 31(3) of Act CLXII of 2011. According to information provided by the Government in preparation 

of the 2021 Rule of Law Report. 

52   GRECO  Fourth  Evaluation  Round  –  Second  Interim  Compliance  Report,  recommendation  xi,  para.  27. 
According European standards, a judge should not be moved to another judicial office without consenting to 
it,  except  in  cases  of  disciplinary  sanctions  or  reform  of  the  organisation  of  the  judicial  system  (see 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12, para. 52). 

53   2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 6. 
54   Stakeholders  reported  that,  as  prescribed  by  law,  the  first  phase  of  the  programme  disproportionately 
increased  the  salaries  of  court  presidents  and  other  court  managers  (Contribution  from  the  European 
Association of Judges for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 12, confirmed by information received from the 
National Judicial Council in the context of the country visit to Hungary). As of 1 January 2020, supplements 
related to court instances were raised from 10 to 20% for district court judges, from 20 to 40% for regional 
court judges, from 40 to 70% for regional appeal court judges, and from 60 to 120% for  Kúria judges. As 
regards  the  supplements  for  judicial  managers,  a  more  significant  increase  was  introduced.  E.g.  as  of  1 
January  2020,  the  salary  supplement  was  raised  for  heads  of  department  and  the  Secretary  General  of  the 
Kúria  from  60  to  200%,  for  the  presidents  of  regional  appeal  courts  and  the  President  of  the  Budapest 
Regional  Court  from  60  to  150%,  for  vice-presidents  of  regional  appeal  courts  and  presidents  of  regional 
courts  from  50  to  120%,  for  presiding  judges  in  the  Kúria  from  45  to  120%.  According  to  information 
provided by the Government, on district court level the average was 30%, as 29% for judges and 34% for 
court  managers;  on  regional  court  level  the  average  was  33%,  as  33%  for  judges  and  33%  for  court 
managers, as well.  

7 

 
                                                 
second phase, as of January 2021, by 12%. A further increase of 13% is scheduled for 202255. 
However, concerns persist56 as regards the system of bonuses and the power of the authorities 
managing the  courts to  award bonuses  to  judges  on a discretionary basis, without objective 
and transparent criteria57. 

Concerns  persist  as  regards  some  elements  of  the  organisation  of  the  prosecution 
service.  As  the  2020  Rule  of  Law  Report  noted,  the  prosecution  service  is  organised  in  a 
strictly hierarchical structure. While the independence of the prosecution service is enshrined 
in  law58, certain  elements  of the legal  framework led GRECO to  issue recommendations to 
review the rules  for appointment of the Prosecutor General in  order to  safeguard the office 
from  political  influence.  Whereas  most  recommendations  of  GRECO  related  to  the 
prosecution  service  have  been  implemented,  some  remain  unaddressed.  This  is  the  case  as 
regards the recommendation to remove the possibility to maintain the Prosecutor General in 
office  after  the  expiry  of  his/her  mandate59.  It  is  also  the  case  as  regards  GRECO’s 
recommendation  that  situations  in  which  a  superior  prosecutor  takes  over  a  case  from  a 
subordinate  prosecutor  be  guided  by  strict  criteria  and  that  such  decisions  be  justified  in 
writing60.  GRECO  also  recommended  to  enhance  accountability  and  transparency  of 

55   Input from Hungary for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 5. 
56   2020  Rule  of  Law  Report,  Country  Chapter  on  the  rule  of  law  situation  in  Hungary,  p.  7.  According  to 
information received from the Hungarian Helsinki Committee in the context of the country visit to Hungary, 
the  legal  rules  on  bonuses  (Section  189  of  Act  CLXII  of  2011)  are  very  vague,  leaving  much  room  for 
arbitrariness; there is no statutory list or definition of the types and forms of bonuses that the NOJ President 
and other judicial leaders can distribute among judges, nor are there clear criteria as to what can serve as the 
basis  of  such  decisions.  The  NOJ  President  refused  to  give  detailed  information  to  the  National  Judicial 
Council about the payment of bonuses because according to his interpretation of the law this topic is not part 
of  the  National  Judicial  Council’s  supervisory  powers  (information  received  from  the  National  Judicial 
Council in the context of the country visit to Hungary). 

57   The  average  ratio  of  normative  bonuses  payable  to  all  judges  and  court  staff  is  determined  by  the  NOJ 
President; court managers may decide to deviate from this average ratio, see Section 11(4) of Order 5/2013. 
(VI. 25.) OBH of the NOJ President (the decision is taken by the presidents of regional courts and regional 
appeal courts in respect of judges and court staff; the decision is taken by the NOJ President in respect of 
these  court  presidents  and  judges  assigned  to  the  NOJ;  and  by  the  Kúria  President  in  respect  of  Kúria 
judges).  Order  5/2013.  (VI.  25.)  OBH  does  not  contain  criteria  for  deviation  from  the  average  ratio  in 
individual  cases.  Moreover,  the  managers  may  award  further  (non-normative)  bonuses.  According  to  the 
Council of Europe, systems making judges’ core remuneration dependent on performance should be avoided 
as they could create difficulties for the independence of judges (Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12, para. 55). 

58   Contribution from Alapjogokért Központ for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 3. It is noted that there are no 
effective  remedies  against  decisions  of  the  prosecution  service  not  to  prosecute  alleged  criminal  activity 
detrimental  to  the  public  interest,  including  corruption,  fraud  affecting  the  EU’s  financial  interests  and 
embezzlement of public funds (Substitute private prosecution is not available if the victim is the state or an 
organ vested with public power (Section 787(3)(d) of Act XC of 2017 on the Criminal Procedure Code). 
59   GRECO Fourth Evaluation Round – Second Interim Compliance Report, recommendation xiv, para. 37. 
60   GRECO  Fourth  Evaluation  Round  –  Second  Interim  Compliance  Report,  recommendation  xv,  para.  42. 
Section 60/A of Directive 12/2012 (VI. 8.) of the Prosecutor General requires that the reason for the takeover 
be recorded in the file. According to the Government, the 2015 GRECO report used the word ‘potential’ to 
express that it referred only to hypothetical and not factual situations, and recommended further steps merely 
in  order  to  prevent  such  potential  scenarios;  nevertheless,  it  is  essential  for  the  proper  functioning  of  the 
prosecution service that the Prosecutor General’s position is filled even during the transitional period, until 
the  required  majority  is  formed;  this  majority  guarantees  the  independence  of  the  Prosecutor  General  and 
protects  the  separation  of  powers.  According  to  the  Government,  the  basic  guarantee  against  arbitrary 
decisions referred to in the GRECO Interim Compliance Report is provided by the Fundamental Law itself, 
which states in Article 29(1) that ‘the Prosecutor General and the Prosecutor's Office are independent’. The 
Government points out that this independence of the prosecution service is expanded by Section 3(3) of Act 
CLXIII of 2011 on the Prosecution Service. 

8 

 
                                                 
disciplinary  proceedings  against  prosecutors;  GRECO  remains  concerned  that  it  is  still  the 
direct  superior  prosecutor  who  decides  on  the  merits  of  the  case,  rather  than  an  impartial 
body61. The full implementation of these recommendations would have a positive impact on 
the anti-corruption framework. 

Quality  

The  digitalisation  of  the  justice  system  is  overall  high.  Hungary  continues  to  rank  very 
high when it comes to digital solutions to initiate and follow proceedings in civil/commercial 
and  administrative  cases62,  digital  solutions  to  conduct  and  follow  court  proceedings  in 
criminal cases63, and online access to published judgments by the general public64. Moreover, 
Hungary  has  very  good  results  as  regards  the  promotion  of  and  incentives  for  using 
alternative dispute resolution methods65. However, there are concerns as regards the level of 
inclusiveness  of  the  legal  aid  scheme66,  and  court  fees  in  commercial  cases  remain  high67. 
More training in communication could be made available for judges68.  

The  operation  of  the  courts  was  adapted  during  the  COVID-19  pandemic.  Digital 
solutions  (e.g.  a  remote  hearing  system)  were  already  in  place  at  the  outbreak  of  the 
pandemic.  The  use  of  remote  hearing  (videoconference)  tools  during  the  pandemic  has 
become  widespread69,  rendering  certain  court  proceedings  more  efficient70.  Certain  court 
procedures have been simplified71. On 8 March 2021, the Government introduced changes to 
procedural laws, aimed at facilitating the operation of the justice system during the ‘state of 
danger’72.  

Efficiency 

The efficiency in civil and administrative cases remains high. According to the 2021 EU 
Justice  Scoreboard,  Hungary  performs  very  well  as  regards  the  estimated  time  needed  to 
resolve  administrative  cases  at  first  instance73  and  at  all  court  instances74;  the  number  of 

61   GRECO  Fourth  Evaluation  Round  –  Second  Interim  Compliance  Report,  recommendation  xvii,  para.  52. 
GRECO  welcomed  the  entry  into  force  as  of  1  January  2019  of  the  amendment  to  Section  88(1)  of  Act 
CLXIV  of  2011,  envisaging  the  mandatory  involvement  of  a  disciplinary  commissioner  to  carry  out  the 
investigation.  

62   Figure 44, 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
63   Figure 45, 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
64   Figure 46, 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
65   Figure 27, 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
66   Figure 23, 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
67   Figure 25, 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
68   Figure 36, 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
69   In  2019  courts  had  conducted  6 426  hearings  via  videoconference  while  this  number  in  2020  was  20 569. 
(Input  from  Hungary  for  the  2021  Rule  of  Law  Report,  p.  11.).  The  system  of  training  with  digital  tools 
started slowly but has now become operational. (Contribution from the European Association of Judges for 
the 2021 Rule of Law Report, pp. 18 and 20.) 

70   Contribution from the European Association of Judges for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 9. 
71   Ibid. For example, a special law permits cases to be dealt with by written process even in litigation where 

such procedure was not previously provided.  

72   Government Decree 112/2021 of 6 March 2021. This Decree became inapplicable as of 23 May 2021. As of 
17 April 2021, Government Decree 182/2021 of 16 April 2021 amended Government Decree 112/2021; it 
allowed courts to hold hearings as of 20 April 2021. 

73   Figure 9, 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
74   Figure 10, 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard. 

9 

 
                                                 
pending  administrative  cases  at  first  instance  courts75;  and  the  number  of  pending  civil, 
commercial and administrative and other cases76. Hungary also performs well as regards the 
estimated time needed to resolve litigious  civil and commercial cases at first instance77 and 
the  rate  of  resolving  civil,  commercial,  administrative  and  other  cases78.  New  procedural 
rules  allow  as  of  9  July  2020  expedited  proceedings  in  cases  involving  civil  law  claims  of 
victims of crime79. 

Effective remedies in cases of excessively lengthy proceedings are being developed. The 
execution  of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  judgment  Gazsó  v.  Hungary,  is  still 
ongoing and Hungary remains under enhanced supervision of the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe as regards this matter80. On 15 June 2021, Parliament adopted a new 
law81  introducing  as  of  2021  a  compensatory  remedy  limited  to  excessively  long  civil 
proceedings. 

II.  ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK  

The  National  Protective  Service  (NVSZ)  under  the  oversight  of  the  Ministry  of  Interior 
coordinates anti-corruption activities in Hungary and is also responsible for the prevention of 
crime within the police, law enforcement, and other government agencies. The investigation 
and prosecution of corruption in the public sector fall under the exclusive competence of the 
Investigation  Division  of  the  Central  Chief  Prosecution  Office  of  Investigation  and  its  five 
regional offices. The prosecution service is supported by the investigative forces of the police 
and the National Protective Service. The State Audit Office has competences for the control 
of financial management of public funds and auditing of political parties. 

The  perception  of  public  sector  corruption  among  experts  and  business  executives  is 
that  the  level  of  corruption  in  the  public  sector  remains  high.  In  the  2020  Corruption 
Perceptions  Index  by  Transparency  International,  Hungary  scores  44/100  and  ranks  19th  in 

75   Figure 16, 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
76   Figure 14, 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
77   Figure 7, 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
78   Figure 11, 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
79   Act LXX of 2020. The courts act with urgency, the general time limit for taking an action being maximum 
eight  working  days.  If  the  court  needs  to  hold  a  hearing,  it  is  held  primarily  via  an  electronic 
communications network or other means capable of transmitting electronic images and sound. In appeal and 
review  proceedings  the  parties  may  not  request  the  holding  of  a  hearing.  (Contribution  from  the  Kúria 
President for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 9.) 

80   In  October  2018,  the  Government  tabled  in  Parliament  Bill  T/2923.  In  June  2021,  the  Committee  of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe noted  with great concern the absence of sufficiently tangible progress, 
notably that no concrete plan has been provided regarding the establishment  of compensatory remedies for 
administrative and criminal cases.   

81   Act XCIV of 2021. 

10 

 
                                                 
the  European  Union  and  69th  globally82.  This  perception  has  significantly  decreased83  over 
the past five years84. 

Some  revisions  were  introduced  to  criminal  law  legislation  to  address  foreign  bribery 
and  informal  payments  in  healthcare.  As  reported  in  2020  Rule  of  Law  Report,  the 
relevant anti-corruption offences are criminalised85. In response to a recommendation by the 
OECD86,  an  amendment  to  the  Criminal  Code  came  into  force  on  1  January  2021.  This 
amendment  modifies  the  definition  of  ‘foreign  public  official’  in  order  to  clarify  that  it 
includes  officials  of  foreign  public  enterprises.  It  also  introduces  stricter  sentences  for 
facilitation payments. Provisions on bribery were also amended to include undue advantage 
to healthcare professionals thus limiting the possibility of informal (‘gratitude’) payments in 
healthcare  and  making  the  promising  or  giving  of  undue  advantages  for  the  provision  of 
health services a subsidiary crime87.  

The  implementation  of  the  National  Anti-corruption  Strategy  for  2020-2022  and 
dedicated Action Plan is ongoing. As reported in 2020 Rule of Law Report, the scope of the 
anti-corruption strategic framework is limited to fostering integrity in public administration. 
The  Strategy88,  adopted  in  June  2020  foresees  actions  such  as:  the  introduction  and 
development  of  electronic  solutions  for  increasing  transparency  (e.g.  automated  decision-
making  system),  monitoring  integrity  risks,  integrity  training  for  civil  servants,  and 
specialised  anti-corruption  training  for  law  enforcement,  judges  and  prosecutors.  Other 
relevant  areas,  such  as  political  party  financing,  asset  disclosure,  lobbying  and  ‘revolving-
doors’ provisions are covered in specific instruments. However, since they are not covered by 
the  Strategy,  shortcomings  are  not  addressed  in  a  coordinated  manner89.  Similarly,  risks 
related to clientelism, favouritism and nepotism in high-level public administration or those 
arising from the interface between businesses and political actors remain unaddressed90. 

Challenges remain as regards the investigation and prosecution of high-level corruption 
cases.  The  legal  framework  ensures  the  conditions  for  efficient  investigations  and 
prosecutions  and the police and the Prosecution  Service report adequate levels  of resources 
and  specialisation  to  carry  out  their  tasks.  However,  prosecutors  highlight  challenges  in 

82   Transparency  International,  Corruption  Perceptions  Index  2020  (2021),  pp.  2-3.  The  level  of  perceived 
corruption is categorised as  follows: low (the perception among  experts and business executives of public 
sector  corruption scores  above  79);  relatively  low  (scores  between  79-60),  relatively  high  (scores  between 
59-50), high (scores below 50). 

83   In 2015 the score was 51, while, in 2020, the score is 44. The score significantly increases/decreases when it 
changes  more  than  five  points;  improves/deteriorates  (changes  between  4-5  points);  is  relatively  stable 
(changes from 1-3 points) in the last five years. 

84   The Eurobarometer data on corruption perception and experience of citizens and businesses as reported last 
year is updated every second year. The latest data set is the Special Eurobarometer 502 (2020) and the Flash 
Eurobarometer 482 (2019). 

85   The  Criminal  Code  includes  the  relevant  definitions  of  corruption  and  related  offences  and  criminalises 
different  forms  of  bribery  and  trading  in  influence,  embezzlement,  misappropriation  of  public  funds  and 
abuse of public authority. 

86   OECD  (2019),  Implementing  the  OECD  Anti  Bribery  Convention  –  Phase  4  Report:  Hungary.  See  Act 

XLIII of 2020. 

87   Input from Hungary for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 19. 
88   Government Decision 1328/2020 of 19 June 2020 on Mid-term National Anti-corruption Strategy for 2020-

2022 and the accompanying action plan. 

89   See also 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 11. 
90   2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 11. 

11 

 
                                                 
detecting  corruption  and  obtaining  evidence  in  such  cases91.  Criminal  proceedings  for 
corruption offenses are mainly initiated on the basis of the criminal investigation activities of 
the  investigating  authorities.  The  majority  of  the  investigated  cases  are  detected  by  the 
National  Protective  Service.  Notifications  from  administrative  authorities  and  possible 
irregularities  signalled  through  preventive  tools  (e.g.  asset  declarations,  whistleblower 
reporting  channels,  information  from  various  registries)  play  a  relatively  smaller  role  in 
criminal  investigations92  and  independent  control  mechanisms  remain  insufficient  for 
detecting  corruption.  As  reported  last  year,  deficient  independent  control  mechanisms  and 
close  interconnections  between  politics  and  certain  national  businesses  are  conducive  to 
corruption. According to data from the prosecution service, the indictment rate for corruption 
cases  investigated  by  the  prosecution  is  overall  very  high  (86.5%)93.  Some  new  high-level 
cases  involving  politicians  were  opened  since  202094,  however  the  track  record  of 
investigations  of  allegations  concerning  high-level  officials  and  their  immediate  circle 
remains limited95, as noted in the 2020 Rule of Law Report96. The full implementation of the 
GRECO  recommendations  as  regards  the  effective  functioning  of  the  prosecution  would 
further strengthen the anti-corruption framework97. 

Integrity tests continue to be considered by the authorities as an effective deterrent to 
corrupt  behaviour  and  have  led  to  the  opening  of  several  criminal  cases  for  petty 
corruption in the reporting period98. As of 1 January 2021, a new amendment of the Police 
Act  entered  into  force  broadening  the  scope  of  staff  that  may  be  subject  to  integrity  tests 
beyond the police99. Accordingly, all staff of budgetary organisations under the supervision 
of the Government and members of the Government can now be subject to integrity tests.  

Hungary has an extensive asset disclosure system, however, concerns remain regarding 
the  lack  of  systematic  checks  and  insufficient  oversight  of  asset  and  interest 
declarations. The system in place requires members of Parliament, government officials, and 
public officials to declare their assets and interests. However, concerns remain as regards the 
lack  of  systematic  monitoring.  Verification  of  asset  declarations100  occurs  only  upon 
notification  of  suspicions  and  is  left  to  the  employer  of  the  public  official  or  to  the 
Parliamentary  Committee  on  Immunity  for  the  declarations  of  members  of  Parliament  and 

91   Information received from the prosecution service in the context of the country visit to Hungary. 
92   Information received from the prosecution service in the context of the country visit to Hungary. 
93   Information received from the prosecution service in the context of the country visit to Hungary.  
94   Two  cases  concern  a  Deputy  State  Secretary  accused  of  passive  bribery  and  a  senior  official  in  the  tax 
administration. Three further cases concern high-level persons with high-level positions in the private sector 
or  international  organisations  (Information  received  from  the  prosecution  service  in  the  context  of  the 
country visit to Hungary).  

95   The Prosecutor General’s Office noted that no separate statistics are kept on ‘high-level corruption’ cases as 

this is not a category defined in criminal law.  

96   2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 10. 
97   See page 8. GRECO Fourth Evaluation Round – Second Interim Compliance Report, recommendation xiv, 

paras. 37 and 42. 

98   In 2020, 245 such tests were carried out by the National Protective Service, leading to criminal proceedings 

against nine persons. Input from Hungary for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 13. 

99   See Section 7 of Act XXXIV of 1994 on Police. 
100  Declarations of assets – which are made public and are subject to verifications – do not cover fiduciary asset 
management  arrangements  (bizalmi  vagyonkezelői  jogviszony),  trusts  (vagyonkezelő  alapítvány),  private 
equity  funds  (magántőkealap)  and  life  insurance  policies.  Declarations  of  interest  –  which  are  not  made 
public and are not subject to verification – cover the status of trustee, trustee or beneficiary under a fiduciary 
relationship,  as  well  as  membership  in  a  foundation,  a  foundation’s  management  board  and  other  key 
positions (Information received from the National Assembly in the context of the country visit to Hungary). 

12 

 
                                                 
high-ranking government officials. The Committee reported that, in the past five years, out of 
16  notifications  submitted  for  verification,  15  were  rejected  as  not  substantiated.  In  the 
remaining case, the person concerned corrected his declaration of assets and liabilities and the 
procedure was not initiated101. As reported last  year102, suspicions of unjustified increase in 
wealth  may  lead  to  a  verification  procedure  conducted  by  the  National  Tax  and  Customs 
Authority.  However,  the  Tax  Authority  can  start  such  proceedings  only  if  investigative 
authorities have also opened criminal inquiries, which restricts the possibility for independent 
verifications. Following an amendment of the relevant rules103, members of Parliament must 
declare  to  the  Speaker  any  conflict  of  interest  or  incompatibility,  following  which  they  are 
subject to certain restrictions pending the resolution of the situation. However, declarations of 
interests  and  information  about  any  follow-up  are  not  publicly  available.  The  issue  of 
effective supervision, verification and enforcement of rules of conduct, conflicts of interests 
and  asset  declarations  for  members  of  Parliament  was  subject  to  recommendations  by  the 
Group  of  States  against  Corruption  of  the  Council  of  Europe  (GRECO),  which  have  been 
partly implemented104.  

The  regulation  of  lobbying  continues  to  remain  incomplete  and  lacks  systematic 
enforcement105.  There  is  no  mandatory  registration  of  lobbyists  and  disclosure  of  contact 
reports.  According  to  a  2013  Government  Decree106,  employees  of  state  administration 
bodies may only meet interest representatives in  relation to their work after informing their 
superiors,  who  may  prohibit  the  meeting.  Meetings  with  interest  representatives  have  to  be 
documented  but  there  is  no  obligation  to  make  the  encounters  public.  GRECO  has 
recommended  a  clear  set  of  rules  in  the  interaction  with  lobbyists  as  regards  members  of 
Parliament107. 

Clear  rules  as  regards  revolving  doors  and  cooling-off  periods  continue  to  be  lacking. 
Although  both  the  Labour  Code108  as  well  as  specific  legislation  applicable  to  public 
officials109  contain  confidentiality  clauses.  In  practice,  these  rules  are  not  enforced,  as  the 
Government  still  needs  to  specify  the  sectors  and  positions  where  a  clear  time  restriction 
applies for public officials to pursue business careers in the area in which they were active110.  

Party financing in Hungary remains a concern111. The State Audit Office is charged with 
overseeing the accountability of the use of public funds and controls the legality of financial 

101  Information received from the National Assembly in the context of the country visit to Hungary. 
102  See 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 11. 
103  Act XXXVI of 2012 on the National Assembly, amended in December 2019. 
104  GRECO  (2020),Fourth  Evaluation  Round  –Second  Interim  Compliance  Report  on  Hungary  –  Corruption 

prevention in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors, p. 5.  

105  See 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, pp. 11-12. 
106  Government  Decree  50/2013  of  25  February  2013  on  the  system  of  integrity  management  at  public 

administration bodies and the procedural rules of receiving lobbyists.  

107  GRECO (2020), Fourth Evaluation Round – Second Interim Compliance Report on Hungary  – Corruption 

prevention in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors. 

108  Section 8(4) of Act I of 2012. 
109  Section 93(1)(g) of Act CXXV of 2018. 
110  The  term  of  the  restriction  specified  by  law  is  the  equivalent  of  the  time  spent  on  the  job  subject  to  the 
restriction,  with  a  maximum  of  two  years  (Section  117(2)  of  Act  CXXV  of  2018).  Section  117(1)  of  Act 
CXXV of 2018 provides that the Government must determine the sectors and positions where a government 
official  may  not be employed after  the termination of  his/her public service. That provision remains to be 
implemented. 

111  2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 12. 

13 

 
                                                 
management of political parties. As also noted by GRECO, while some measures have been 
taken to ensure that the financial registries of political parties are transparent and up-to-date, 
to clarify party income sources and campaign periods, as well as to ensure a more in-depth 
monitoring, overall concerns remains as regards the transparency of party financing112.  

A  regulatory  framework  is  in  place  for  the  protection  of  whistleblowers  and  further 
steps are needed to enhance protection  in practice. The Whistleblower Protection Act113 
the  submission  of  complaints 
provides  anonymity  for  whistleblowers  and  enables 
electronically. The public interest disclosures are investigated by the institutions concerned, 
and their answer containing the result of the investigation is to be uploaded to the electronic 
registry. Whistleblowers may  not  be held  liable  for their  reporting unless they  are found to 
have intentionally made a false report114. The Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, acts as 
reporting  channel115  and  operates  the  electronic  platform  but  has  only  limited  formal 
competence  as  regards  whistleblower  complaints116.  The  OECD  recognised  the  positive 
aspects of the regulatory framework, but raised concerns as regards the effectiveness of the 
protection of whistleblowers117. 

The narrowing of the scope of application of public procurement rules has heightened 
the  risk  of  corruption.  A  new  law118  adopted  on  27  April  2021  repealed  a  specific 
requirement of the public procurement law119, thus  taking trusts established by the state, as 
well  as  legal  persons  managed  by  them,  out  of  the  explicit  scope  of  application  of 
procurement  rules  in  respect  of  procurements  financed  by  European  Union  funds120.  The 
same  law  also  removes  rules  aimed  at  preventing  conflict  of  interest,  thereby  allowing 
holders of public office to sit on the board of trustees of such trusts. 

112  GRECO (2019), Third Evaluation Round - Second Addendum to the Second Compliance Report, para. 24. 
113  Act CLXV of 2013 on complaints and whistleblowing. 
114  Act  CLXV  of  2013  provides  that  public  bodies  and  local  government  bodies  are  entitled  to  proceed  in 
matters  relating  to  reports  by  whistleblowers  (Section  1(1)  and  (4)).  Where  it  has  become  clear  that  the 
whistleblower  reported  untrue  information  of  crucial  importance  in  bad  faith,  and  it  gives  rise  to  an 
indication  that  a  crime  or  an  infraction  was  committed,  the  personal  data  of  the  whistleblower  shall  be 
handed over to the body or person entitled to carry out proceedings. Where it is likely that the whistleblower 
caused unlawful damage or other harm to the rights of others, his or her personal data shall be handed over 
to the body or person entitled to initiate or carry out proceedings, upon the request thereof (Section 3(4)). 

115  Other reporting channels are the Employer Channel and the Internal Control System of public bodies. 
116  See 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 12. In practice, 
the primary task of the Ombudsman is to forward the reports to competent authorities. These reports are not 
automatically transmitted to law enforcement authorities, and an administrative investigation is carried out 
instead  first  by  the  integrity  advisor  of  the  institution  concerned.  Integrity  advisors  report  directly  to  their 
head of institution. Either upon request or ex officio, the Ombudsman may, however, examine whether those 
authorities have followed up appropriately on the reports. The public interest disclosures are investigated by 
the  institutions  concerned,  and  their  answer  containing  the  result  of  the  investigation  is  uploaded  to  an 
electronic registry. 

117  https://www.oecd.org/corruption/anti-bribery/OECD-Hungary-Phase-4-Report-ENG.pdf.  
118  Act VIII of 2021 amending higher-education and certain related laws. 
119  Section  5(3)  of  Act  CXLIII  of  2015  on  public  procurement,  defining  the  entities  required  to  apply  public 
procurement rules: ‘In respect of procurements financed by European Union funds trusts established by the 
State shall apply the provisions of this Act, as well as legal persons maintained by such trusts […]’. 

120  Public-interest  trusts  performing  public  duties  and  legal  persons  maintained  by  them  are  not  expressly 
covered by Section 5(1) of Act CXLIII of 2015 on public procurement. They may fall under Section 5(2) but 
in  respect  of  procurements  financed  by  European  Union  funds  that  provision  does  not  cover  all  situations 
that were covered by the former Section 5(3), repealed by Act VIII of 2021.  

14 

 
                                                 
A number of OLAF investigations were completed with  the support of the Hungarian 
AFCOS  (anti-fraud  coordination  service).  In  recent  years,  the  number  of  indictments 
following  OLAF’s  judicial  recommendations  was  higher  in  Hungary  than  the  EU  average. 
However, despite repeated requests, the Hungarian authorities have not yet communicated an 
authority  in  charge  to  provide  assistance  to  OLAF  during  its  on-the-spot  checks  if  an 
economic operator subject  to  control refuses to  cooperate.  It  is  further noted in  the  field  of 
shared  management,  that  the  Hungarian  authorities  frequently  withdraw  projects  from  EU 
funding when OLAF issues a financial recommendation, or sometimes when the authorities 
become  aware  that  an  OLAF  investigation  has  been  opened.  Furthermore,  it  appears  that 
amounts due are not systematically recovered from the economic operator who committed the 
irregularity or fraud121. In such cases, the EU subsidy is simply replaced by national funds, 
with a negative impact on the deterrent effect of an OLAF investigation and higher risks for 
the  national  budget.  During  the  period  2016-2020,  Hungary  had  32  OLAF  investigations 
closed with a financial recommendation in the two main ares of shared management122. 

The  authorities  acknowledged  that  the  COVID-19  pandemic  may  increase  corruption 
risks, but no specific measures were deemed to be necessary123.  Stakeholders pointed to 
concerns  in  the  area  of  public  procurement,  where  derogations  from  procurement  rules  and 
direct  awards,  coupled  with  deficiencies  in  access  to  information  increase  the  risk  of 
corruption  and  raised  questions  as  regards  the  purchase  of  medical  equipment  through 
intermediary companies124. 

III.  MEDIA PLURALISM AND MEDIA FREEDOM 

Hungary’s Fundamental Law125 and sectoral legislation – in particular the Media Act126 and 
the  Freedom  of  the  Press  Act127  –  provide  the  legal  framework  for  the  protection  of  media 
freedom  and  pluralism.  The  Freedom  of  the  Press  Act  stipulates  that  freedom  of  the  press 
embodies independence from the State and from any organisations and interest groups. The 
right  to  access  public  information  is  recognised  by  the  Fundamental  Law  and  finds 
expression  in  the  Freedom  of  Information  Act128.  The  Media  Act  establishes  the  National 
Media  and  Info-communications  Authority  (the  Media  Authority),  whose  decision-making 
body is the Media Council129. Legislation was adopted in 2019 to align Hungarian legislation 
with the AVMS Directive130. 

121  Information from OLAF in preparation of this rule of law report. 
122  The  OLAF  Report  2020.  Financial  recommendations  are  addressed  by  OLAF  to  the  EU  institutions  or 
national authorities providing or managing EU funds to seek the recovery of the defrauded EU funds to the 
EU budget.  

123  Input from Hungary for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p.17. 
124  Information received in the context of the country visit to Hungary. See also contribution from K-Monitor 

and Transparency International Hungary for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, pp. 12-13. 

125  Article IX(2) stipulates that: ‘Hungary shall recognise and protect the freedom and diversity of the press and 
shall  ensure  the  conditions  for  the  free  dissemination  of  information  necessary  for  the  formation  of 
democratic public opinion’. 

126  Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and on the Mass Media as amended by Act LXIII of 2019. 
127  Act CIV of 2010 on the Freedom of the Press. 
128  Act CXII of 2011 on the Right to Informational Self-determination and on Freedom of Information. 
129  Between  2020  and  2021,  Hungary  fell  three  more  places  in  the  Reporters  without  Borders  World  Press 

Freedom Index, now registering at 92nd position worldwide and 26th position in the EU.  

130  Directive (EU) 2018/1808 of 14 November 2018. 

15 

 
 
                                                 
Concerns  persist  as  regards  the  independence  and  effectiveness  of  the  Media  Council 
and  the  Media  Authority.  Act  LXIII  of  2019,  transposing  the  revised  Audiovisual  Media 
Services Directive, strengthened certain  provisions relating to  the resources and operational 
transparency of the Authority131. The Authority has budgetary autonomy and reports annually 
to  the  Parliament.  It  employs  a  staff  of  650  persons132.  The  decision-making  body  of  the 
Media Authority, the Media Council, is composed of a President133 and four members elected 
by Parliament.  While the rules on nomination  – which have remained  unchanged since last 
year’s  report  –  favour  political  consensus  in  the  appointment  of  the  members  of  the  Media 
Council134, in practice they have led to the governing party nominating all members. Certain 
decisions  of  the  Media  Council  have  added  to  the  concerns  regarding  its  effective 
independence135.  The  2021  Media  Pluralism  Monitor  confirms  its  previous  assessment  that 
while  the  Media  Law  formally  guarantees  the  independence  of  the  Media  Authority,  the 
appointment  procedures  do  not  provide  adequate  legal  safeguards  for  independence,  once 
more registering medium risk for Hungary in terms of the independence and effectiveness of 
the Media Authority136.  

Media  pluralism  has  further  deteriorated  in  Hungary.  After  the  establishment  of  the 
‘KESMA’137 media conglomerate in November 2018, there has been, to date, no attempt by 
the  Media  Authority  to  examine  its  impact  on  the  plurality  and  diversity  of  the  Hungarian 
media market.  According to  stakeholders,  while  a broad  range of media  outlets  continue to 
operate  in  Hungary,  the  diversity  of  the  media  market  is  negatively  affected  by  the 
concentration  of  ownership  in  the  hands  of  a  few  pro-government  businesspersons  and  the 
resulting  lack  of  editorial  independence138.  Hungarian  and  European  media  freedom 

131  The Media Act lays down the objectives of the  Authority, stipulating that it is  ‘an autonomous regulatory 
agency subordinated solely to the law’ (Section 109) and that the Media Council is ‘an independent body of 
the Authority reporting to Parliament subject only to Hungarian law’ (Section 123).  

132  Information  received  from  the  National  Media  and  Info-communications  Authority  in  the  context  of  the 

country visit to Hungary. 

Media Council. 

133  The  President  of  the  Media  Authority  is  automatically  nominated  for  the  position  of  the  President  of  the 

134  Following  Venice  Commission  recommendations  (Opinion  CDL-AD(2015)015),  the  provisions  of  the 
Media Act relating to the appointment and dismissal of the chairperson and members of the Media Council 
were  amended  accordingly.  Section  124  of  the  Media  Act  requires  a  unanimous  decision  of  the  ad-hoc 
parliamentary committee in charge of  nominating candidates.  (The President of the Media Authority  is an 
ex-officio  candidate.)  The  nomination  committee  is  composed  of  one  Member  from  each  political  group; 
their  voting  power  reflects  the  size  of  the  political  group  they  represent.  If  the  nomination  committee  is 
unable to present four nominees within the prescribed time limit, it may nominate candidates with at least 
two-thirds of the weighted votes.  

135  Stakeholders observed that the Media Authority distributed radio frequencies to pro-government stations in 
non-transparent procedures (Contribution from the European Federation of Journalists for the 2021 Rule of 
Law  Report,  p.  35)  and  showed  bias  in  the  approval  of  the  media  market  mergers  (contribution  from 
Amnesty  International  Hungary,  Eötvös  Károly  Institute,  Hungarian  Civil  Liberties  Union,  K-Monitor, 
Mérték Media Monitor, Political Capital and Transparency International Hungary for the 2021 Rule of Law 
Report, p. 34). The decisions of the Media Authority may be subject to judicial review. 

136  Media Pluralism Monitor 2021, report on Hungary, pp. 11-12. 
137  Central  European  Press  and  Media  Foundation.  An  ad-hoc  report  by  the  Centre  for  Media  Pluralism  and 
Media Freedom concluded in 2019 that the establishment of KESMA would exacerbate the overall risks to 
media  pluralism  in  Hungary  (2020  Rule  of  Law  Report,  Country  Chapter  on  the  rule  of  law  situation  in 
Hungary,  p.  14).  On  25  June  2020,  the  Constitutional  Court  confirmed  the  constitutionality  of  the 
Government  Decree  classifying  as  of  national  strategic  importance  the  intention  to  extend  the  Central 
European Press and Media Foundation (Decision 16/2020. (VII. 8.) AB).  

138  According to the International Press Institute, content coordination of pro‐ government media, especially via 
the KESMA foundation, has led to a dominance of the state narrative particularly in rural areas (contribution 

16 

 
                                                 
 
organisations,  as  well  as  civil  society,  have  voiced  concerns139  with  regard  to  the  Media 
Council’s refusal to renew the broadcasting license of independent radio station,  Klubrádió, 
based on the station’s alleged failure to comply with certain administrative obligations. This 
has resulted in the radio being taken off air. On 17 June 2021, the  Kúria upheld the Media 
Council’s  decision.  On  9  June  2021,  the  Commission  launched  an  infringement  procedure 
against Hungary with regard to this case140. The 2021 Media Pluralism Monitor confirms the 
previous  year’s  high  risk  score  with  regard  to  news  media  concentration  in  the  light  of  the 
creation  and  operation  of  the  KESMA,  and  because  of  the  economic  takeover  of  the 
independent news media site Index.hu by pro-government interests141.  

Transparency  of  media  ownership  is  still  not  fully  guaranteed.  The  current  legal 
framework  contains  transparency  rules  on  media  ownership  only  in  specific  cases142,  and 
there  are  currently  no  plans  to  amend  it.  While  some  ownership  data  is  available  from 
national registers143, only basic information on company ownership is freely accessible from 
the company register144. The 2021 Media Pluralism Monitor continues to rate transparency of 
media ownership at high risk145.  

The allocation of state advertising continues to permit the Government to exert indirect 
political  influence over the media.  As reported last  year, there is  no legislation regulating 
the  distribution  of  state  advertising.  The  Media  Pluralism  Monitor  2021  highlights  that  the 
state  is  the  largest  advertiser  in  Hungary  spending  approximately  one  third  of  the  total 
advertising  revenue  of  the  market146.  The  data  reveals  that  in  2020  the  Hungarian  state 
increased its spending on advertising by 13.8% over 2019, with 85% of that revenue going to 

from  the  International  Press  Institute  for  the  2021  Rule  of  Law  Report,  p.  3).  Information  received  in  the 
context of the country visit to Hungary corroborated this assessment. 

139  Contribution  from  the  European  Federation  of  Journalists  for  the  2021  Rule  of  Law  Report,  pp.  37-38; 
contribution from the International Press Institute for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 2; contribution from 
Amnesty  International  Hungary,  Eötvös  Károly  Institute,  Hungarian  Civil  Liberties  Union,  K-Monitor, 
Mérték Media Monitor, Political Capital and Transparency International Hungary for the 2021 Rule of Law 
Report, p. 35; European Centre for Press and Media Freedom statement of 15 March 2021. 

140  The Commission considers that the Media Council’s decisions to reject Klubrádió’s application are based on 
questionable grounds, are disproportionate and non-transparent in breach of EU telecoms rules, set out in the 
European Electronic Communications Code (Directive (EU) 2018/1972). 

141  2021 Media Pluralism Monitor report on Hungary, p. 17 and 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on 
the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 14. In March 2020, a pro‐ government investor gained control over 
the company generating the revenue of Index.hu; in August 2020, the editor-in-chief was removed, leading 
to  the  mass  resignation  of  90  journalists,  who  described  the  dismissal  of  their  editor-in-chief  as  ‘an  overt 
attempt  to  apply  pressure’  (contribution  from  the  International  Press  Institute  for  the  2021  Rule  of  Law 
Report, p. 3; see also contribution from Amnesty International Hungary, Eötvös Károly Institute, Hungarian 
Civil Liberties Union, K-Monitor, Mérték Media Monitor, Political Capital and Transparency International 
Hungary  for  the  2021  Rule  of  Law  Report,  p.  39).  Subsequently,  the  former  Index.hu  crew  launched  an 
independent  news  portal,  Telex,  financed  privately  through  crowd  funding.  According  to  the  Government, 
the  dismissal  of  the  editor-in-chief  of  Index.hu  is  a  question  belonging  to  the  field  of  labour  law;  the 
employer  (a  business  organization,  market  actor)  has  the  right  to  terminate  the  legal  relationship  with  the 
employee based on the conditions and reasons stipulated by law; in connection with the specific decision of 
an employer, the Government does not have any competence. 

142  Linear  media  service  providers  must  notify  the  Media  Authority  about  their  (or  their  parent  company’s) 
direct or indirect ownership in media service providers. See 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on 
the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 14. 

143  Information received from the Government in the context of the country visit to Hungary. 
144  See 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 14. 
145  Media Pluralism Monitor 2021, report on Hungary, p. 13.  
146  Media Pluralism Monitor 2021, report on Hungary, p. 18.  

17 

 
                                                                                                                                                        
pro-government  media  companies147.  This  state  of  affairs  permits  control  over  both  pro-
government as well as certain independent outlets leading the Media Pluralism Monitor 2021 
to consider editorial independence being at the highest risk (92%) in the country148. While no 
media support schemes  were established to  counter the impact  of the COVID-19 pandemic 
on  news  media  outlets,  the  Media  Authority  exempted  commercial  linear  media  service 
providers from paying the quarterly media service provision fee for the first half of 2021. 

Access  to  public  information  was  tightened  through  emergency  measures  introduced 
during  the  COVID-19  pandemic.  The  rules  of  the  Freedom  of  Information  Act  have  not 
been changed; they provide that any ‘organ performing public duties’ must provide access to 
data of public interest under its control if so requested subject to the exceptions stipulated in 
that  Act149.  The  statutory  deadline  for  handling  such  requests  is  15  days,  which  can  be 
extended by  15 days150. However, during the pandemic, the Government  issued a  decree151 
allowing  public  authorities  to  delay  giving  access  to  public  documents  by  up  to  90  days  in 
case  such  provision  of  information  was  seen  as  ‘jeopardising  the  public  institution’s 
fulfilment of its duty related to the state of emergency’. On 13 April 2021, the Constitutional 
Court ruled that while the new provisions are in line with the Fundamental Law, derogations 
from  the  normal  deadlines  must  be  limited  to  the  cases  where  handling  the  request  would 
impede the holder of public information to perform tasks related to countering the pandemic 
and  need  to  be  duly  justified  in  writing152.  Stakeholders  pointed  out  that  in  practice  this 
derogation  was  often  abused  by  the  authorities,  with  a  major  impact  for  independent 
journalists  in  particular,  who  reportedly  could  not  obtain  timely  access  to  data  on  public 
spending  or  vaccinations153.  This  further  aggravated  the  situation  of  independent  media 
outlets that have difficulties to access information in a timely manner154. The deficiencies in 

147  Ibid., p. 18.  
148  Ibid., p. 17.  
149  Proactive  disclosure  of  data  also  remains  a  challenge,  with  70%  of  municipalities  failing  to  publish  the 
minimum required information on  their  website (Budapest  Institute,  Corruption  Research Center Budapest 
(2019).  Specific  legislation  limiting  access  to  documents  and  public  information  remain  in  force  (e.g. 
Section 5 of Act VII of 2015 related to the development of the Paks Nuclear Plant and Section 2(3) of Act 
XXIX of 2020 related to the implementation of the Budapest-Belgrade railway connection project. 

150  Section 29(1) and (2) of Act CXII of 2011. 
151  Government Decree 521/2020 of 25 November 2020. Under these rules the request could be fulfilled by the 
public service body within 45 days (contrary to the general rule of 15 days) after the receipt of the request, if 
it was probable that the fulfilment of the request in the 15-day time limit would endanger the performance of 
state  of  danger  related  public  tasks  performed  by  the  data  controller  public  body.  The  already  extended 
deadline could also be extended for no more than another 45 days if these conditions still applied. 

152  Decision 15/2021. (V. 13.) AB. 
153  According to the European Federation of Journalists, the Government used the Covid-19 pandemic to exert 
further control over access to information by limiting access to press conferences, only responding to pro-
government  media  inquiries  and  placing  a  ban  on  local  health  sector  representatives  from  talking  to  the 
media but channelling all pandemic related questions through a central ‘operative unit’ (contribution from 
the  European  Federation  of  Journalists  for  the  2021  Rule  of  Law  Report,  p.  39).  This  assessment  was 
corroborated by information received in the context of the country visit to Hungary.  

154  According to the European Federation of Journalists, independent media outlets are not granted interviews 
by  public  officials  and  are  frequently  excluded  from  public  events  (contribution  from  the  European 
Federation of Journalists for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 38). Research by the Hungarian Civil Liberties 
Union  has  revealed  systemic  obstruction  of  the  work  of  the  independent  media  by  the  Government  in  the 
form  of  ignoring  press  inquiries,  open  rejection,  physical  restrictions  applied  to  journalists,  discreditation, 
stigmatisation,  and  intimidation  of  their  sources  (contribution  from  K-Monitor  and  Transparency 
International  Hungary  for  the  2021  Rule  of  Law  Report,  p.  18;  contribution  from  Amnesty  International 
Hungary,  Eötvös  Károly  Institute,  Hungarian  Civil  Liberties  Union,  K-Monitor,  Mérték  Media  Monitor, 

18 

 
                                                 
 
access to public information reported last year155, including as regards the charging of fees156, 
continue to be an issue also for the prevention of corruption. As the Ninth Amendment to the 
Fundamental  Law  gave  a  restrictive  definition  of  ‘public  funds’157,  questions  have  been 
raised  by  stakeholders  as  regards  possible  consequences  on  restricting  access  to  public 
information related to public companies and public-interest trusts158. 

Journalists and media outlets continued to face diverse threats in Hungary. According to 
stakeholders, journalists working for independent media are subject to negative narratives by 
pro-government  media159  and  by  government  representatives160.  Stakeholders  report  that 

Political  Capital  and  Transparency  International  Hungary  for  the  2021  Rule  of  Law  Report,  p.  43; 
Contribution from Civil Liberties Union for Europe for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 40). 
155  See 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 15. 
156  Government Decree 301/2016 of 30 September 2016 allows public institutions to require the reimbursement 
of the costs incurred by the requests of access to public information in case replying to the request  would 
entail  additional  work  on  the  part  of  the  public  authority  (e.g.  time  –  exceeding  4  hours  –  required  for 
finding, organising, copying and sanitising the documents requested). Out of the 300 complaints addressed 
by the  National  Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information in 2018, about 10% concerned 
the  unjustified  application  of  fees  (National  Authority  for  Data  Protection  and  Freedom  of  Information 
(2019). See 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 15. The 
Government notes that it is not mandatory to charge a fee for the additional work on the part of the public 
authority. Another issue is related to the length of court proceedings in access to public information cases; 
stakeholder report that on average, this may expand to a year and a half (contribution  from K-Monitor and 
Transparency International Hungary for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 6). 

157  According to the Venice Commission Opinion of 2 July 2021, one effect of the amendment may be that the 
inner workings of the newly established foundations and their revenue and expenditure could be considered 
as ‘private’ and therefore shielded from civil society and media scrutiny, as they are not subject to freedom 
of information requests by the citizens and the media, thus undermining the state’s transparency and freedom 
of  information  (Opinion  on  the  constitutional  amendments  adopted  by  the  Hungarian  parliament  in 
December 2020 (CDL(2021)028), para. 70). The Venice Commission clarified that the new definition does 
not dismiss private entities managing public funds from their duties of accountability, which are clearly set 
out  in  Article  39  (2)  of  the  Fundamental  Law.  Nonetheless,  the  publicity  of  these  funds,  and  the 
corresponding  guarantees  of  transparency,  may  become  more  uncertain  after  a  second  transfer  of  such 
‘public money’ to another entity. 

158  See,  e.g.  contribution  from  K-Monitor  and  Transparency  International  Hungary  for  the  2021  Rule  of  Law 
Report,  p. 18; contribution from  Amnesty International Hungary, Eötvös Károly Institute, Hungarian Civil 
Liberties  Union,  K-Monitor,  Mérték  Media  Monitor,  Political  Capital  and  Transparency  International 
Hungary for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 43; Contribution from Civil Liberties Union for Europe for the 
2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 4. Article 39(3) of the Fundamental Law defines ‘public funds’ as ‘revenues, 
expenditures  and  claims  of  the  State’.  The  impact  of  this  amendment  on  access  to  public  information,  in 
particular  as  regards  public  companies  and  public-interest  trusts  is  yet  to  be  seen.  The  Fundamental  Law 
requires that data relating to public funds and national assets be considered data of public interest (Article 
39(2)). The comprehensive legal definition of ‘public information’ (Section 3, point 5, of Act CXII of 2011 
on the Right of Informational Self-Determination and on Freedom of Information)  has  not been amended. 
According  to  the  Government,  the  amendment  to  the  Fundamental  Law  does  not  have  an  impact  on  the 
access to public information controlled by entities that perform public tasks, for example by public-interest 
trusts. However, in the application of the law, courts are required to interpret the text of laws in accordance 
with the Fundamental Law (Article 28 of the Fundamental Law). This amendment has already affected the 
case-law  on  the  judicial  enforcement  of  freedom  of  information:  on  11  January  2021,  the  Székesfehérvár 
Regional  Court  (judgment  26.P.20.281/2020/9),  confirmed  by  the  Győr  Regional  Appeal  Court  (judgment 
Pf.III.20.050/2021/3) on 29 April 2021, found that, for the purposes of the definition given in Article 39(3) 
of the Fundamental Law, the investment and construction works carried out by the defendant company and 
financed  from  EU  funds,  are  not  covered  by  the  terms  ‘revenues,  expenditures  and  claims  of  the  State’, 
therefore do not qualify as ‘public funds’, and consequently data related to them do not fall under the notion 
of ‘public information’.   

159  Contributions from the European Federation of Journalists and the International Press Institute for the 2021 

Rule of Law Report, p. 37 and p. 7, respectively. 

19 

 
                                                                                                                                                        
female journalists are in a more difficult situation; some also reporting gender-based online 
harassment161.  Courts  continued  to  order  interim  relief  banning  the  dissemination  of 
magazines162.  Since  October  2020,  the  Council  of  Europe’s  Platform  to  promote  the 
protection of journalism and the safety of journalists published five further alerts concerning 
Hungary.  These  concerned,  respectively:  the  dismissal  of  the  former  editor  of  online  news 
portal  Index.hu  prior  to  its  takeover;  instructions  issued  by  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs 
and  Trade  for  embassies  in  EU  Member  States  to  provide  information  with  regard  to 
professional trips undertaken by Hungarian journalists; an injunction issued by a civil court 
preventing a weekly newspaper from publishing an article on a company and its owners on 
data  protection  grounds;  the  police  interrogation  of  two  journalists  who  published  articles 
about  a  public  figure  and  the  above-mentioned  refusal  by  the  Hungarian  Media  Council  to 
renew  Klubrádió’s  radio  licence163.  In  2021,  the  Platform  published  one  alert  concerning 
what  the  Platform  called  a  ‘tirade  of  insults’  directed  against  an  Austrian  journalist  by  the 
Hungarian public broadcaster. 

IV.  OTHER INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO CHECKS AND BALANCES 

Hungary  is  a  parliamentary  republic  with  a  unicameral  Parliament  (National  Assembly). 
Parliament  –among  others–  adopts  and  amends164  the  Fundamental  Law  of  Hungary, 
legislates165, elects the Prime Minister, and elects  – by a two-thirds majority – the top rank 
public  officials166  of  the  country.  The  President  of  the  Republic  is  elected  by  Parliament. 
There are a number of institutions tasked with counter-balancing the powers of the legislature 
and  the  executive,  and  entrusted  with  guaranteeing  the  respect  of  the  constitutional  order, 
including  the  Constitutional  Court,  the  State  Audit  Office  and  the  Ombudsperson 
(‘Commissioner  for  Fundamental  Rights’).  In  addition  to  the  Government,  the  President  of 

160  Contribution from the European Federation of Journalists for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 37. 
161  Ibid. 
162  The Committee to Protect Journalists reported that a court in Budapest issued a preliminary injunction order, 
invoking data protection rules, concerning both the 29 September and the 15 October 2020 issues of Magyar 
Narancs, thus omitting part of an article by investigative journalist Ákos Keller-Alánt (contribution from the 
Committee to Protect Journalists for  the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 6). As reported last year, in January 
2020,  an  interim  relief  was  ordered  by  a  court  banning  the  dissemination  of  Forbes  Hungary  business 
magazine  invoking  data  protection  rules  (2020  Rule  of  Law  Report,  Country  Chapter  on  the  rule  of  law 
situation in Hungary, footnote 116). 

163  Hungary has replied to the first and last of the listed complaints stating that the Index.hu case is a matter of 

labour law and that the Klubrádió decision was taken by the independent Media Council. 

164  A two-thirds majority of all the members is required to adopt or amend the Fundamental Law (Article S(2) 

of the Fundamental Law). 

165  The  Fundamental  Law  provides  for  the  adoption  of  33  cardinal  laws  implementing  some  of  its  provisions 
and containing detailed rules on the functioning of key institutions or on the exercise of certain fundamental 
rights.  Cardinal  laws  may  be  adopted  or  amended  by  a  two-thirds  majority  of  the  members  of  Parliament 
present  (Article  T(4) of  the  Fundamental  Law).  The  Venice  Commission  has  criticised  Hungary  for  using 
cardinal acts beyond  what is strictly necessary, and even in respect of detailed legislation, which has been 
considered  questionable  from  a  democratic  perspective  as  it  makes  it  difficult  to  introduce  reforms  in  the 
future  (Opinion  CDL-AD(2012)009,  para.  47).  The  Government  argues  that  a  high  level  of  political 
consensus is needed to regulate the most important aspects of fundamental rights and the organisation of the 
State. 

166  The President of the Republic, the members and President of the Constitutional Court, the Kúria President, 
the Prosecutor General, the NOJ President, the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners for Fundamental 
Rights, the President of the State Audit Office, the President of the National Bank of Hungary. 

20 

 
                                                                                                                                                        
the  Republic  and  every  parliamentary  committee,  any  member  of  Parliament  may  table  a 
bill167. 

Frequent and sudden changes of the legislation continue to undermine the predictability 
of  the  regulatory  environment168.  Stakeholders  reported  that  the  pace  of  legislation  has 
accelerated  even  further  compared 
to  stakeholders, 
consultations, if any, are purely formal169. This raises questions as regards legal certainty and 
the quality of legislation. The short periods of time between the adoption and the entry into 
force of frequently changing rules do not always allow for the adequate preparation of their 
application.  

to  previous  years.  According 

During  the  reporting  period,  the  Government  declared  a  new  ‘state  of  danger’  in 
response  to  the  COVID-19  pandemic.  On  18  June  2020,  the  Government  terminated  the 
first  ‘state of danger’170.  In accordance with  the current  constitutional  rules, the duration of 
the  new  ‘state  of  danger’  introduced  on  4  November  2020  is  not  predefined,  and  the 
Government has discretionary power to maintain it or to terminate it171. Emergency measures 
(Government decrees) adopted under this regime may set aside any law and remain in force 
for  15  days  unless  their  extension  is  authorised  by  Parliament.  On  10  November  2020, 
Parliament authorised172 the Government to extend the applicability of emergency measures 
by 90 days173. On 8 February 2021, the Government terminated174 the ‘state of danger’, and 
on the same day declared175  it again.  This  way,  emergency measures could  remain in  force 

167  Article 6(1) of the Fundamental Law. In 2020, 15 Bills tabled by members (14 from the majority, 1 from the 
opposition)  were  passed  into  law  (information  received  from  the  National  Assembly  in  the  context  of  the 
country visit to Hungary). 

168  See 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 17. 
169  Contribution from the European Association of Judges for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 23; Contribution 
from Amnesty International Hungary, Eötvös Károly Institute, Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, K-Monitor, 
Mérték Media Monitor, Political Capital and Transparency International Hungary for the 2021 Rule of Law 
Report,  p.  46.  The  Government  is  of  the  view  that  the  constitutional  review  of  the  laws  extends  to  the 
assessment  of  formal  criteria  of  legal  certainty  as  well:  if  the  requirement  of  adequate  preparation  to  the 
application were not complied with, the Constitutional Court would declare the norm unconstitutional. 

170  On  11  March  2020,  the  Government  declared  a  ‘state  of  danger’  in  line  with  Article  53(2)  of  the 
Fundamental  Law.  On  30  March  2020,  Parliament  passed  a  new  law  that  allowed  the  Government  to  set 
aside any law by decree. The emergency powers granted appeared extensive, in light of the combined effect 
of  broadly  defined  powers  and  the  absence  of  a  clear  time  limit.  As  of  18  June  2020,  the  Government 
terminated the ‘state of danger’ and declared a ‘state of public health emergency’ until 18 December 2020 
(see  2020  Rule  of  Law  Report,  Country  Chapter  on  the  rule  of  law  situation  in  Hungary,  pp.  17-18). 
Subsequently,  the  Government  extended  the  ‘state  of  public  health  emergency’  until  18  June  2021.  The 
applicable  rules  are  laid  down  in  Chapter  XIV  of  Act  CLIV  of  1997  on  Health  Care.  It  is  noted  that,  in 
accordance  with  Chapter  IX/A  of  Act  LXXX  of  2007  on  the  Right  of  Asylum,  the  Government  has 
maintained since 10 March 2016 a state of crisis due to mass immigration. (Information received from the 
National Assembly in the context of the country visit to Hungary.) 

171  Article  54(3)  of  the  Fundamental  Law.  The  detailed  rules  applicable  to  the  emergency  measures  are 
determined  by  Act  CXXVIII  of  2011  on  Disaster  Management,  as  amended.  Section  51/A  of  this  Act  is 
essentially the same as Section 2 of Act XII of March 2020 (see 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter 
on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 17). 

172  Act CIX of 2020 on the containment of the second wave of the coronavirus pandemic. 
173  After the expiry of the 90 days, on 8 February 2021, Act CIX of 2020 became inapplicable, implying the end 

of a parliamentary authorisation to extend the applicability of the emergency measures. 

174  Government Decree 26/2021 of 29 January 2021. 
175  Government Decree 27/2021 of 29 January 2021. This Decree reintroduced  – without publishing – certain 
emergency  measures  (Government  Decrees)  issued  under  the  previous  ‘state  of  danger’  (they  had  become 
inapplicable  with  the  termination  of  the  ‘state  of  danger’,  in  accordance  with  Article  53(4)  of  the 
Fundamental Law). 

21 

 
                                                 
without parliamentary approval for a period of 15 days176. On 22 February 2021, Parliament 
authorised the Government to extend the applicability of emergency measures by 90 days177. 
On 18 May 2021, Parliament further extended the authorisation until ‘the 15th day following 
the opening day of the Autumn Session in 2021’178. Concerns179 over the current rules on the 
remain.  Despite  a  country-specific 
‘state  of  danger’  and  emergency  measures 
recommendation in the context of the 2020 European Semester180, interference with business 
activities  and  the  stability  of  the  regulatory  environment  continued,  and  some  emergency 
measures raise questions as regards their necessity and proportionality181. The Constitutional 
Court continued to review the constitutionality of certain emergency measures182. 

An amendment to the Constitution will limit the powers of Government as regards the 
‘state of danger’ regime. On 15 December 2020, the Ninth Amendment to the Fundamental 
Law  was  adopted  by  Parliament.  There  was  no  prior  stakeholder  consultation183.  It 
significantly changes the rules concerning the special legal order regime (including ‘the state 
of danger’) as of 1 July 2023. It reduces the types of special legal orders from six to three: 
state of war, state of emergency  and state of danger184. The amendment  does  not  affect  the 

176  The National Assembly is of the view that this technique did not encroach on its prerogatives and that these 
decrees  were  in  line  with  the  provisions  of  both  the  Fundamental  Law  and  the  relevant  laws  (information 
received from the National Assembly in the context of the country visit to Hungary). 

177  Act I of 2021 on the containment of the coronavirus pandemic.  
178  Act XL of 2021amending Act I of 2021 on the containment of the coronavirus pandemic. To be noted that 
the Autumn Session of Parliament is between 1 September and 15 December; the date of the opening day is 
unknown at this stage. 

179  The  emergency  powers  granted  appeared  extensive,  in  light  of  the  combined  effect  of  broadly  defined 
powers and the absence of a clear time limit (see 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of 
law situation in Hungary, p. 17). 

180  Council  Recommendation  of  20  July  2020  on  the  2020  National  Reform  Programme  of  Hungary  and 

delivering a Council opinion on the 2020 Convergence Programme of Hungary. 

181  For instance, on 7 April 2021, an Austrian insurance company announced that it had received a decision of 
the  Hungarian  Ministry  of  Interior  blocking  the  intended  acquisition  of  the  Hungarian  subsidiaries  of  a 
Dutch insurance company relying on Government Decree 532/2020 of  28 November 2020 – an emergency 
measure issued under the ‘state of danger’ regime – that deviates from the provisions of Act LVII of 2018 in 
as  much  as  it  provides  that  such  transactions  between  EEA  investors  need  to  be  declared  to  the  minister 
appointed by the Government who needs to take note of the declaration. 

182  2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 18. Most of the cases 
were  closed  without  a  decision  on  the  merits  (Orders  IV/74/2021,  IV/200/2021,  IV/02069/2020, 
IV/00295/2021,  3237/2021.  (VI.  4.),  3238/2021.  (VI.  4.),  3206/2021.  (V.  19.),  3178/2021.  (IV.  30.), 
3159/2021. (IV. 22.), 3413/2020. (XI. 26.), 3388/2020. (X. 22.), 3326/2020. (VIII. 5.)). The Constitutional 
Court found the emergency measures related to the general ban on assembly during the state of danger (case 
IV/288/2021) and the assignment of a special economic zone in the City of Göd (Decision 8/2021. (III. 2.) 
AB) to be constitutional, but set a constitutional requirement for their application. As regards the emergency 
measure disabling municipalities from obtaining income from motor vehicle taxes during the state of danger, 
the Constitutional Court dismissed the application filed by one fourth of members of Parliament (Decision 
3234/2020.  (VII.  1.)  AB).  The  Constitutional  Court  also  reviewed  Government  Decree  521/2020  of  25 
November 2020 extending the delay applicable access to public documents requests (see above, p. 18). 
183  The Venice Commission noted with concern that the amendments were adopted during a state of emergency, 
without any public consultation, and the explanatory memorandum consists of only three pages; the Venice 
Commission  stressed  that  this  speed  and  the  lack  of  meaningful  public  consultations  are  particularly 
worrisome  when  they  concern  constitutional  amendments  and  it  recalls  its  previous  warning  against  an 
‘instrumental attitude’ of Hungary’s governing majority towards the Fundamental Law, which should not be 
seen  as  a  political  instrument  (Opinion  on  the  constitutional  amendments  adopted  by  the  Hungarian 
parliament in December 2020 (CDL(2021)028), paras. 83 and 84). 

184  The circumstances for declaring a state of war (the present state of national crisis) and a state of emergency 
will be expanded, taking into account the requirements of the changing security environment (for example, a 
cyberattack that does not constitute an act of violence or an attack in the form of environmental pollution), 

22 

 
                                                 
 
current  rule  providing  that  under  a  special  legal  order,  the  application  of  the  Fundamental 
Law  may  not  be  suspended,  and  the  operation  of  the  Constitutional  Court  may  not  be 
restricted185.  In  case  of  state  of  danger,  Parliament  will  primarily  have  control  over  the 
maintenance of the special legal order186. The Government will be able to declare a ‘state of 
danger’ for a period of 30 days, and will be able to extend it only following an authorisation 
by Parliament. These new rules will increase oversight by Parliament187. 

The  powers  of  the  Commissioner  for  Fundamental  Rights  were  extended,  while 
questions  were  raised  about  its  independence.  On  20  November  2020,  the  Council  of 
Europe  Commissioner  of  Human  Rights  expressed  concerns  about  the  merger  of  the  Equal 
Treatment Authority and the Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, recalling 
that doubts remained about the appointment process of the incumbent and the adequacy of the 
institution’s  efforts  to  address  all  human  rights  issues  and  speak  out  in  a  manner  that 
promotes  and  protects  all  human  rights188.  The  national  human  rights  institution  was 
accredited  with  ‘A’  status  in  October  2014.  In  October  2018,  the  UN  Sub-Committee  on 
Accreditation  (SCA)  of  the  Global  Alliance  of  NHRIs  (GANHRI),  decided  to  defer  its 
decision  on  its  re-accreditation.  The  SCA  is  reviewing  the  Commissioner  for  Fundamental 
Rights189. As of January 2021, new legislation190 integrated the Equal Treatment Authority in 
the  Office  of  the  Commissioner  for  Fundamental  Rights.  In  the  performance  of  its  duties 
specified  in  the  Equal  Treatment  Act191,  the  Office  of  the  Commissioner  for  Fundamental 
Rights acts as an administrative authority192. The Commissioner may also initiate the review 
of  laws  by  the  Constitutional  Court193.  According  to  EU  law194,  equality  bodies  ‘may  form 

and Parliament  will be the only organ entitled to declare  them. (Input  from Hungary for  the 2021 Rule of 
Law Report, p. 27.) The Venice Commission highlighted that the impact of several provisions is difficult to 
assess without knowing the legislative changes that may be adopted following such provisions. It concluded 
that  the  Ninth  Amendment  mainly  leaves  the  specification  of  most  details  to  Cardinal  Acts,  which  could 
eventually  raise  some  serious  questions  regarding  the  scope  of  the  powers  of  the  State  during  states  of 
exception  (Opinion  on  the  constitutional  amendments  adopted  by  the  Hungarian  Parliament  in  December 
2020 (CDL(2021)028), recommendation f).  

185  Article  54  of  the  Fundamental  Law.  According  to  the  new  Section  48/A  of  Act  CLI  of  2011  on  the 
Constitutional Court, the meetings of the Constitutional Court may also be held by electronic means, based 
on the decision of its President. The new Section 68/A of the  same Act stipulates that at a time of special 
legal  order  a)  the  President  and  the  Secretary-General  shall  ensure  the  continuous  functioning  of  the 
Constitutional  Court  and  shall  take  the  necessary  organisational,  operative,  administrative  and  decision-
preparing  measures,  and  b)  the  President  may  authorise  a  derogation  from  the  rules  of  procedure  of  the 
Constitutional Court. (Input from Hungary for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, pp. 26-27.) 

186  Input from Hungary for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 27. 
187  The  new  Article  56(1)  of  the  Fundamental  Law  will  allow  the  President  of  the  Republic  to  authorise  the 

Government to extend the ‘state of danger’ if the Parliament is prevented from taking these decisions. 

188  Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatović statement of 20 November 2020. The 
merger  was  not  preceded  by  public  consultation  (Contribution  from  Ökotárs  -  Hungarian  Environmental 
Partnership Foundation for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 17). 

189  Contribution from the European Network of National Human Rights Institutions for the 2021 Rule of Law 

Report, p. 194. 

190  Act  CXXVII  of  2020  amending  certain  laws  with  a  view  to  securing  a  more  efficient  application  of  the 
requirement of equal treatment (adopted on 1 December 2020). The constitutional framework and the basic 
safeguards of independence in case of the Commissioner have remained unchanged. 
191  Act CXXV of 2003 on Equal Treatment and the Promotion of Equal Opportunities. 
192  Input from Hungary for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 28. 
193  Input from Hungary for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 27. The rules regarding the posterior review of laws 
was significantly changed by the Fundamental Law. Until 31 December 2011, anyone without legal interest 
could  submit  a  petition  seeking  the  constitutional  review  of  a  legal  norm.  According  to  the  new  rules, 
applicable from 1 January 2012, such procedure may only be initiated by the Government, one-quarter of the 
members of Parliament, the Kúria President, the Prosecutor General and the Commissioner for Fundamental 

23 

 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
part of agencies charged at national level with the defence of human rights or the safeguard of 
individuals’  rights’.  According  to  the  relevant  legal  framework,  the  Commissioner  for 
Fundamental  Rights  shall  be  independent,  subordinated  only  to  Acts  and  may  not  be  given 
instructions  regarding  its  activities.  In  this  regards,  the  Government  maintains  that  the 
executive  does  not  have  any  influence  on  how  the  Commissioner  performs  his  or  her 
activities.  However,  stakeholders  have  expressed  concerns  as  regards  the  independent  and 
effective functioning of the Commissioner195. 

Concerns have been expressed about the role of the Constitutional Court in reviewing 
final  court  decisions.  As  noted  in  the  2020  Rule  of  Law  Report,  following  a  legislative 
amendment,  administrative  authorities  may  challenge  before  the  Constitutional  Court  a 
judicial  decision  that  has  already  become  final,  if  it  violates  their  rights  and  curtails  their 
powers under the Fundamental  Law.  Over the past  year, public authorities have challenged 
before  the  Constitutional  Court  some  final  judgments  affecting  them,  handed  down  by 
ordinary  courts.  This  possibility  of  review  raises  questions  in  particular  as  regards  legal 
certainty196.  Moreover,  although  it  is  not  part  of  the  court  system,  the  Constitutional  Court 
hearing  constitutional  complaints  is  nonetheless  adjudicating  on  the  merits  of  the  case  and 

Rights.  The  incumbent  Commissioner  has  not  exercised  this  power,  including  for  instance,  as  regards  Act 
LXXIX of 2021 on ‘taking stricter action against paedophile offenders and amending certain laws to protect 
children’. The Government is of the view that following the abolition of the actio popularis for the posterior 
review of laws, the introduction of the  ‘real’ constitutional complaint against judicial decisions ensures an 
efficient protection for fundamental rights. 

194  Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of  racial 
or ethnic origin, OJ L 180, 19.7.2000; Directive 2004/113/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services, OJ L 373, 21.12.2004; Directive 
2006/54/EC on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and 
women in matters of employment and occupation (recast), OJ L 204, 26.7.2006; Directive 2010/41/EU on 
the application of the principle of equal treatment between men and women engaged in an activity in a self-
employed capacity and repealing Council Directive 86/613/EEC, OJ L 180, 15.7.2010. 

195  E.g. contribution from Háttér Society for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 10; Contribution from Amnesty 
International Hungary, Eötvös Károly Institute, Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, K-Monitor, Mérték Media 
Monitor, Political Capital and Transparency International Hungary for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 52. 
See also Commission Recommendation (EU) 2018/951 on standards for equality bodies, OJ L 167, 4.7.2018, 
p. 28. 

196  See 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 18. Under Article 
24(2)d) of the Fundamental Law and in accordance with Section 27 of Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional 
Court,  a person or organisation affected in concrete  cases may turn to the  Constitutional Court against the 
judicial decision that was contrary to the Fundamental Law if the decision, violates their rights laid down in 
the  Fundamental  Law,  and  the  possibilities  for  legal  remedy  have  already  been  exhausted  (constitutional 
complaint).  When  the  Constitutional  Court  establishes  that  the  judicial  decision  is  contrary  to  the 
Fundamental Law, it annuls the decision. The European Court of Human Rights considers the constitutional 
complaint  an  effective  judicial  remedy  to  be  exhausted  (see  decisions  of  the  European  Court  of  Human 
Rights  of  12  March  2019,  Szalontay  v.  Hungary,  71327/13;  of  12  November  2019,  Geréb  v.  Hungary, 
25520/13; and of 12 November 2019, Takács v. Hungary, 73665/17). Since 2012, 90% of the cases heard by 
the Constitutional Court have been constitutional complaints (information received from the Kúria President 
in  the  context  of  the  country  visit  to  Hungary).  Since  the  entry  into  force  on  20  December  2019  of  the 
amendment allowing entities exercising public power to challenge a final judicial decision, 7 constitutional 
complaints have been lodged by such entities. In 2020, private persons filed 412 constitutional complaints 
against a judicial decision. (Information received from the Office of the Constitutional Court in the context 
of  the  country  visit  to  Hungary.)  Between  2012  and  2020,  the  Constitutional  Court  quashed  117  judicial 
decisions (including 47  Kúria decisions) (contribution  from the  Kúria President for the 2021 Rule of Law 
Report, p. 10.) 

24 

 
                                                                                                                                                        
has  been  characterised  as  ‘a  court  of  fourth  instance’197,  acting  in  the  same  manner  as 
ordinary appellate courts198. In this context, it is recalled that members of the Constitutional 
Court  are  elected  by  Parliament  voting  with  a  two-thirds  majority199,  on  the  basis  of  broad 
eligibility criteria200. 

Civil  society  organisations  critical  towards  the  Government  remain  under  pressure. 
Following the Court of Justice’s ruling in the infringement action brought against Hungary by 
the Commission201, on 18 May 2021, Parliament adopted a new law202 repealing the Act on 
the transparency of foreign-funded  civil  society  organisations which breached EU law. The 
same law introduced new rules requiring the State Audit Office to carry out legality checks 
on the accounts of civil society organisations with an annual balance sheet total exceeding a 
certain  amount203.  Infringement  proceedings  are  currently  ongoing204  in  relation  to 
legislation205 that criminalises the organisation of assistance offered by persons on behalf of 
national,  international  and  non-governmental  organisations  to  people  wishing  to  apply  for 
asylum.  Another  law  introducing  a  special  25%  immigration  tax  applicable  to  financial 
support  to  organisations  carrying  out  ‘activities  facilitating  immigration’,  which  also  raised 
concerns206, continues to apply. The Government and pro-government media continue to use 
hostile  rhetoric  against  civil  society  organisations  that  take  a  critical  stance  towards  the 

197  Contribution from the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 23. 
The CCBE noted that the Constitutional Court increasingly acts as a court of fourth instance, reviewing the 
merits  of  judgments  by  the  ordinary  courts.  According  to  the  CCBE,  this  amounts  to  unnecessary 
intervention of the Constitutional Court in the functioning of the ordinary courts, questioning their judicial 
discretion and independence. 

198  Contribution from the Kúria President for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 2. According to the Government, 
members  of  the  Constitutional  Court  practice  de  facto  judicial  activity  (input  from  Hungary  for  the  2021 
Rule of Law Report, p. 12.). 

199  Parliament  elects  the  President  of  the  Constitutional  Court,  as  well  (Contribution  from  Századvég  for  the 

2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 6). 

200  Any Hungarian citizen who has no criminal record and has the right to stand as a candidate in parliamentary 
elections is eligible to become a Member of the Constitutional Court, if he/she: a) has a law degree; b) has 
reached 45 years, but not 70 years of age; and c) is a theoretical lawyer of outstanding knowledge (university 
professor or doctor of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences) or has at least twenty years of professional work 
experience in the field of law. Having been a member of Government or a leading official in any political 
party or having held a position of a leading state official in the four years prior to election shall disqualify 
persons  from  becoming  Members  of  the  Constitutional  Court.  (Input  from  Hungary  for  the  2021  Rule  of 
Law Report, p. 1.) 

201  Judgment of the Court of Justice of 18 June 2020, Commission v. Hungary, C-78/18. 
202  Act  XLIX  of  2021  on  the  transparency  of  civil  society  organisations  carrying  out  an  activity  capable  of 

influencing public debate and on the amendment of certain related laws.  

203  Under  the  already  existing  rules  (Sections  28  to  30  of  Act  CLXXV  of  2011  on  freedom  of  association, 
public-benefit status, and activities of and support for civil society organisations, and Sections 39 and 40 of 
Act CLXXXI of 2011 on the court registration of civil society organisations and related procedural rules), all 
civil  society  organisations  are  required  to  prepare  their  annual  accounting  report  regarding  their  assets, 
operations, finances and revenues. They are also required to report on their public-benefit activities, and the 
donations  received  under  the  scheme  allowing  citizens  to  offer  1%  of  their  personal  income  tax  to  civil 
society. (Contribution from Alapjogokért Központ for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 21.) On 1 July 2021, 
a  new  Government  Decree  (379/2021  of  30  June  2021)  entered  into  force,  requiring  civil  society 
organisations to include in the report on their public-benefit activities the names of their donors. On 17 July 
2021, Government Decree 437/2021 of 16 July 2021 repealed these provisions. 

204  Case C-821/19, pending, in which Advocate General Rantos delivered an Opinion on 25 February 2021.  
205  This 

‘Stop-Soros’ 

legislation 

labelled 

was 

Government. 

the 

by 

https://www.parlament.hu/irom41/00333/00333.pdf 

206  2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 19 which reported on 

criticism voiced in the Venice Commission and OSCE ODIHR Joint Opinion (CDL-AD(2018)035). 

25 

 
                                                 
Government207.  Civic  space  in  Hungary  is  rated  as  ‘obstructed’208.  According  to  the 
Government,  the  National  Cooperation  Fund  and  the  1%  personal  income  tax  donation 
scheme  are  financing  tools  designed  to  support  the  operation  and  activities  of  civil  society 
organisations209.  Nonetheless,  according  to  stakeholders,  the  civil  society  organisations 
continue to be underfinanced210, in particular if they are critical towards the government211. 
The Ninth Amendment to the Fundamental Law (15 December 2020) introduced a qualified 
majority  in  Parliament  for  amending  the  rules  on  public-interest  trusts  performing  public 
duties212.  A  new  law213  adopted  on  27  April  2021  has  created  a  legal  framework  for  the 
functioning  of  such  trusts214.  The  boards  of  trustees215  include  current  Ministers  and  State 
secretaries. Some stakeholders have expressed concerns216 about public assets being donated 
to such private entities, also taking into account the composition of the boards of trustees217. 
These developments take place against the background of the legal uncertainty noted above218 
as  regards  the  applicability  to  such  trusts  of  rules  on  public  procurement  and  on  access  to 
public information. The Venice Commission acknowledged that the new definition does not 
dismiss  private  entities  managing  public  funds  from  their  duties  of  accountability,  but  it 

207  Contribution  from  Amnesty  International  Hungary,  Eötvös  Károly  Institute,  Hungarian  Civil  Liberties 
Union, K-Monitor, Mérték Media Monitor, Political Capital and Transparency International Hungary for the 
2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 57. 

208  Rating by CIVICUS; ratings are on a five-category scale defined as: open, narrowed, obstructed, repressed 

and closed. 

209  Input from Hungary for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 28. 
210  According to the European Civic Forum, while civil society organisations were at the forefront of providing 
support to social groups most affected by the crisis stemming from the coronavirus pandemic (by providing 
food  aid,  supporting  digital  education,  disseminating  information  and  legal  aid,  among  others),  the 
Government  opened  no  additional  funding  sources  to  civil  society  (contribution  from  the  European  Civic 
Forum for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 38). 

211  Certain stakeholders note that democratic civil society in the country has been economically drained due to 
lack of access to the increasingly politicised public funding (contribution from the European Civic Forum for 
the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 39). 
212  Article 38(6) of the Fundamental Law.  
213  Act IX of 2021 on public-interest trusts performing  public duty. According to the Government, the aim of 
the legislation is to prevent such trusts from being constantly exposed to political debates, and to guarantee 
the fulfilment of their tasks. 

214  The  law  lists  33  trusts,  endowed  with  significant  public  assets  and  in  charge  of  the  operation  of  various 
higher  education  and  other  cultural  establishments,  each  of  them  founded  by  a  Minister  following 
authorisation by Parliament through specific legislation. E.g. the Mathias Corvinus Collegium, with a State 
secretary on its board of trustees, has received at least HUF 500 billion (EUR 1.4 billion), a sum equivalent 
to the aggregate annual budget of the entire higher education sector in Hungary, in various assets including 
real property, equity and cash (Contribution from K-Monitor and Transparency International Hungary for the 
2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 13). See Act XXVI of 2020 on supporting the talent management programme 
of  the  Mathias  Corvinus  Collegium  and  the  teaching  activity  of  the  Maecenas  Universitatis  Corvini 
Foundation; Section 6 and Annex 2 of Act CVI of 2020 on certain trusts and transfer of assets to these trusts. 
215  Public-interest  trusts  are  managed  by  a  board  of  trustees  of  at  least  five  natural  persons,  appointed  for  an 
unlimited  period  of  time.  After  the  transfer  of  the  rights  of  the  founder  from  the  Minister  to  the  board  of 
trustees,  only  the  board  will  be  able  to  remove  and  appoint  board  members.  The  board  may  amend  the 
statutes  of  the  trust.  The  new  law  allows  the  founder  to  give  up  any  form  of  control  over  the  board  of 
trustees, making its members autonomous and irremovable. 

216  Information received from the Hungarian Helsinki Committee in the context of the country visit to Hungary, 

referring to the creation of a ‘shadow state’. 

217  Contribution from K-Monitor and Transparency International Hungary for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 

13. 

218  See  the  anti-corruption  framework  section  (page  14)  and  the  media  pluralism  section  (page  19)  on  these 

topics. 

26 

 
                                                 
warned against the risk of removing public funds and public tasks from democratic control, 
also taking into account the new definition of public funds219. 

219  Opinion  on  the  constitutional  amendments  adopted  by  the  Hungarian  Parliament  in  December  2020 

(CDL(2021)028), paras. 66 and 70. 

27 

 
                                                 
Annex I: List of sources in alphabetical order* 

* The list of contributions received in the context of the consultation for the 2021 Rule of Law report 
can  be  found  at  https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-
law/rule-law/rule-law-mechanism/2021-rule-law-report-targeted-stakeholder-consultation. 

Alapjogokért  Központ  (2021),  Contribution  from  Alapjogokért  Központ  for  the  2021  Rule  of  Law 
Report. 

Amnesty  International  Hungary,  Eötvös  Károly  Institute,  Hungarian  Civil  Liberties  Union,  K-
Monitor,  Mérték  Media  Monitor,  Political  Capital  and  Transparency  International  Hungary  (2021), 
Contribution from  Amnesty  International  Hungary,  Eötvös  Károly  Policy Institute,  Hungarian  Civil 
Liberties Union, K-Monitor, Mérték Media Monitor, Political Capital and Transparency International 
Hungary for the 2021 Rule of Law Report. 

Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (2021), Media pluralism monitor 2021 – Report on 
Hungary 

Civil Liberties Union for Europe (2021), Contribution from Civil Liberties Union for Europe for the 
2021 Rule of Law Report. 

Committee to Protect Journalists (2021), Contribution from the Committee to Protect Journalists for 
the 2021 Rule of Law Report. 

Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (2021), Contribution from the Council of Bars and Law 
Societies of Europe for the 2021 Rule of Law Report. 

Council  of  Europe  Commissioner  for  Human  Rights  (2020),  Council  of  Europe  Commissioner  for 
2020 
Human 
(https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/commissioner-urges-hungary-s-parliament-to-postpone-
the-vote-on-draft-bills-that-if-adopted-will-have-far-reaching-adverse-effects-on-human-rights-in-). 

November 

Mijatović, 

statement 

Rights, 

Dunja 

20 

of 

European  Association  of  Judges  (2021),  Contribution  from  the  European  Association  of  Judges  for 
the 2021 Rule of Law Report. 

European  Centre  for  Press  and  Media  Freedom  (2021),  European  Centre  for  Press  and  Media 
Freedom statement of 15 March 2021 (https://www.ecpmf.eu/hungaryon-national-day-new-hope-that-
klubradio-may-return-to-airwaves/). 

European  Civic  Forum  (2021),  Contribution  from  the  European  Civic  Forum  for  the  2021  Rule  of 
Law Report. 

European Commission (2020), EU Justice Scoreboard. 

European Commission (2020), Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in 
Hungary. 

European Commission (2021), EU Justice Scoreboard. 

European Commission (2021), The OLAF Report 2021. 

European Federation of Journalists (2021), Contribution from the European Federation of Journalists 
for the 2021 Rule of Law Report. 

European  Network  of  Councils  for  the  Judiciary  (2020),  European  Network  of  Councils  for  the 
Judiciary 
(https://pgwrk-
websitemedia.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/production/pwk-web-encj2017-
p/News/Letter%20ENCJ%20RoL%20Hungary%20EC%2027%20October%202020.pdf). 

the  European  Commission  dated  27  October  2020 

letter 

to 

European  Network  of  National  Human  Rights  Institutions  (2021),  Contribution  from  the  European 
Network of National Human Rights Institutions for the 2021 Rule of Law Report. 

Government of Hungary (2021), Input from Hungary for the 2021 Rule of Law Report. 

28 

 
GRECO (2019), Third Evaluation Round – Second Addendum to the Second Compliance Report on 
Hungary  –  Transparency  of  Party  Funding.GRECO  (2020),  Fourth  Evaluation  Round  –  Second 
Interim  Compliance  Report  on  Hungary  –  Corruption  prevention  in  respect  of  members  of 
parliament, judges and prosecutors. 

Háttér Society (2021), Contribution from Háttér Society for the 2021 Rule of Law Report. 

International Press Institute (2021),  Contribution from the International Press Institute for the 2021 
Rule of Law Report. 

K-Monitor  and  Transparency  International  Hungary  (2021),  Contribution  from  K-Monitor  and 
Transparency International Hungary for the 2021 Rule of Law Report. 

Kúria President (2021), Contribution from the Kúria President for the 2021 Rule of Law Report. 

OECD (2019), Implementing the OECD Anti Bribery Convention – Phase 4 Report: Hungary. 

Ökotárs  -  Hungarian  Environmental  Partnership  Foundation  (2021),  Contribution  from  Ökotárs  - 
Hungarian Environmental Partnership Foundation for the 2021 Rule of Law Report. 

Századvég (2021), Contribution from Századvég for the 2021 Rule of Law Report. 

UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers (2021), Letter of the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers dated 15 April 2021. 

https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=26371  

Venice  Commission  (2021),  Opinion  on  the  constitutional  amendments  adopted  by  the  Hungarian 
parliament in December 2020 (CDL(2021)028). 

29 

 
Annex II: Country visit to Hungary 

The Commission services held virtual meetings in April 2021 with: 

  Alapjogokért Központ 
  Amnesty International Hungary 
  Corruption Research Center Budapest 
  Editors-in-Chief’s Forum (Főszerkesztők Fóruma)  
  ELTE Media and Communication Department 
  Eötvös Károly Policy Institute 
  Hungarian Bar Association 
  Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (TASZ) 
  Hungarian Helsinki Committee 
  Hungarian Association of Judges (MABIE) 
  K-Monitor 
  Kúria (Supreme Court) 
  Mathias Corvinus Collegium 
  Mérték Media Monitor 
  Ministry of Interior 
  Ministry of Justice 
  National Association of Hungarian Journalists (MÚOSZ) 
  National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information 
  National Judicial Council 
  National Media and Infocommunications Authority 
  National Office for the Judiciary  
  Nézőpont 
  Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights 
  Office of the Constitutional Court 
  Országgyűlés (National Assembly) Committee on Legislation 
  Országgyűlés (National Assembly) Committee on Immunity 
  Prosecution Service of Hungary  
  Procurement Authority 
  State Audit Office (Számvevőszék) 
  Századvég 
  Transparency International Hungary 

* The Commission also met the following organisations in a number of horizontal meetings: 

  Amnesty International 
  Center for Reproductive Rights 
  CIVICUS 
  Civil Liberties Union for Europe 
  Civil Society Europe 
  Conference of European Churches 
  EuroCommerce 
  European Center for Not-for-Profit Law 
  European Centre for Press and Media Freedom 
  European Civic Forum 
  European Federation of Journalists 
  European Partnership for Democracy  

30 

 
 
  European Youth Forum 
  Front Line Defenders 
  Human Rights House Foundation  
  Human Rights Watch  
 
ILGA-Europe 
 
International Commission of Jurists 
 
International Federation for Human Rights 
 
International Planned Parenthood Federation European Network (IPPF EN) 
 
International Press Institute 
  Netherlands Helsinki Committee  
  Open Society European Policy Institute 
  Philanthropy Advocacy 
  Protection International  
  Reporters without Borders 
  Transparency International EU 

31