COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2021 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria Accompanying the COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2021 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union
Date: 2021-07-20
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Bulgaria, administrative transparency, coronavirus disease, corruption, democracy, epidemic, independence of the judiciary, infringement of EU law, political rights, rule of law

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 20.7.2021  SWD(2021) 703 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2021 Rule of Law Report    Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria Accompanying the COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2021 Rule of Law Report    The rule of law situation in the European Union {COM(2021) 700 final} - {SWD(2021) 701 final} - {SWD(2021) 702 final} - {SWD(2021) 704 final} - {SWD(2021) 705 final} - {SWD(2021) 706 final} - {SWD(2021) 707 final} - {SWD(2021) 708 final} - {SWD(2021) 709 final} - {SWD(2021) 710 final} - {SWD(2021) 711 final} - {SWD(2021) 712 final} - {SWD(2021) 713 final} - {SWD(2021) 714 final} - {SWD(2021) 715 final} - {SWD(2021) 716 final} - {SWD(2021) 717 final} - {SWD(2021) 718 final} - {SWD(2021) 719 final} - {SWD(2021) 720 final} - {SWD(2021) 721 final} - {SWD(2021) 722 final} - {SWD(2021) 723 final} - {SWD(2021) 724 final} - {SWD(2021) 725 final} - {SWD(2021) 726 final} - {SWD(2021) 727 final}  
 
 
ABSTRACT 

Reforms in Bulgaria in areas including justice and corruption have been first followed by the 
Commission through the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) and are currently 
followed under the Rule of Law Mechanism. In response to the 2020 Rule of Law Report, the 
Bulgarian authorities adopted a dedicated Action Plan covering issues in all four pillars. 

Judicial  reform  in  Bulgaria  has  been  a  gradual  process  with  important  implications  for 
judicial  independence  and  public  confidence,  but  challenges  remain.  A  new  law  on  the 
Prosecutor  General  and  his/her  deputies  had  entered  into  force.  In  the  meantime,  that  same 
law has  been challenged before the Constitutional  Court, which declared it unconstitutional 
As  a  consequence,  the  challenge  with  the  accountability  and  criminal  liability  of  the 
Prosecutor  General  remains.  Concerns  related  to  the  composition  and  functioning  of  the 
Supreme Judicial Council also remain. A reform on this matter had been proposed in a draft 
new  Constitution  but  this  was  ultimately  not  adopted.  The  Inspector  General  and  the 
Inspectors  of  the  Inspectorate  to  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council  continue  their  work  despite 
their  mandate  ending  in  April  2020.  The  promotion  regime  within  the  judiciary  raises 
concerns as appointments of judges to higher positions have not been carried out as per the 
ordinary procedure of open competition. Despite legislative efforts, digitalisation of justice is 
still  lagging  behind  in  practice.  Efficiency  of  the  administrative  justice  system  is  showing 
significant progress.  

The implementation of the institutional reforms on anti-corruption has been consolidated. The 
new  anti-corruption  strategy  for  the  period  2021-2027  was  approved,  with  a  new  set  of 
priorities,  namely  strengthening  capacity  to  combat  corruption;  increasing  accountability  of 
local authorities; and creating an environment against corruption capable of timely responses. 
Significant  challenges  remain  concerning  the  effectiveness  of  measures  related  to  the 
integrity  of  public  administration,  lobbying  and  whistleblowing  protection,  where  no 
dedicated regulation exists. Despite the increased investigative activity and the reinforcement 
of  resources,  final  convictions  for  high-profile  cases  of  corruption  remains  low  and  a  solid 
track-record of final convictions remains to be established in this respect. 

As regards media pluralism, the Bulgarian legal framework is based on a set of constitutional 
safeguards  and  legislative  measures.  New  legislation  has  been  adopted  to  transpose  the 
Audiovisual  Media  Services  Directive,  which  aims  to  strengthen  the  independence  of  the 
media regulator, the Council for Electronic Media. Lack of transparency of media ownership 
remains  a  source  of  concern.  The  working  environment  and  safety  of  journalists  do  not 
appear  to  have  improved.  The  COVID-19  pandemic  has  affected  media  plurality  and 
protection  of  journalists  in  economic  terms,  particularly  when  it  comes  to  regional 
journalism, but no specific support measures have been put in place. 

Regarding checks and balances, the limited use of impact assessment and public consultation 
in  the  legislative  process  remains  a  concern,  especially  for  draft  laws  proposed  by  the 
Parliament. Similar concerns also remain with the practice of introducing important changes 
through  amendments  to  other  unrelated  legal  acts,  which  bypass  public  consultation  and 
impact assessment requirements. The emergency regime related to the COVID-19 pandemic 
is still in place. The resources of the National Human Rights Institutions have been increased. 
The  draft  law  on  foreign  funding  for  Non-Governmental  Organisations  was  abandoned  but 
civic space in the country remains narrowed.  

1 

 
 
 
 
 
The Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) was established at the accession to the 
European Union in 2007 as a transitional measure to facilitate Bulgaria’s continued efforts to 
reform its judiciary and step up the fight against corruption and organised crime1. In line with 
the decision setting up the mechanism and as underlined by the Council, the CVM ends when 
all  the  benchmarks  applying  to  Bulgaria  are  satisfactorily  met2.  The  Commission’s  latest 
CVM report, adopted in October 2019, recorded that Bulgaria had made a number of further 
commitments  and concluded that the progress  made under the CVM was sufficient  to  meet 
Bulgaria’s commitments made at the time of its accession to the EU. As the Commission also 
underlined,  Bulgaria  will  need  to  continue  working  consistently  on  translating  the 
commitments  specified 
legislation  and  on  continued 
implementation. Any decision on the end of the CVM will take duly into account the position 
expressed by the Council and the European Parliament3. 

into  concrete 

the  report 

in 

I.  JUSTICE SYSTEM  

The judicial system of the Republic of Bulgaria4 includes a total number of 182 courts which 
are  ordinary  and  specialised.  As  a  general  rule,  the  ordinary  courts  hear  cases  in  three 
instances, with the system of these courts comprising 113  district courts, 28 regional courts 
and  5  courts  of  appeal.  The  specialised  courts  include  military,  criminal  and  administrative 
courts.  The  Supreme  Court  of  Cassation  is  the  court  of  last  instance  in  cases  heard  by 
ordinary,  military  and  specialised  criminal  courts,  while  for  administrative  cases,  the 
Supreme  Administrative  Court  is  the  court  of  last  instance.  The  judiciary  also  includes  the 
Prosecutor’s  Office,  while  the  Constitutional  Court  of  Bulgaria  is  not  part  of  it.5  The 
Prosecutor’s Office has a unified structure and is headed by the Prosecutor General6. Bulgaria 
participates  in  the  European  Public  Prosecutor’s  Office.  The  Supreme  Judicial  Council 
(“SJC”) is the highest administrative authority in the Bulgarian judiciary. It is responsible for 
managing the judiciary and ensuring its independence. Judges, prosecutors and investigators7 
are appointed, promoted, transferred and dismissed by their respective chamber (Judges’ or 

1   Following  the  Council  conclusions  of  17  October  2006  (13339/06),  the  Mechanism  was  established  by 

Commission Decision of 13 December 2006, OJ L 354, 14.12.2006, p. 58. 

2   Council Conclusions on the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, 12 December. 
3   Whereas the European Parliament initially supported a termination of the CVM (see the letter from President 
Sassoli of 20 December 2019 to President von der Leyen), it has now taken another position (see European 
Parliament  resolution  of  8  October  2020  on  the  rule  of  law  and  fundamental  rights  in  Bulgaria 
(2020/2793(RSP)).  In  the  Council,  no  consensus  has  been  reached  on  conclusions  on  the  matter.  In  its 
Presidency report of 13 December 2019, the Finnish Presidency has noted the division within the Council on 
the line to be taken with regard to Bulgaria. 

4   For  a  description  of  the  judicial  structure  see  e.g.  CEPEJ  (2020),  Study  on  the  functioning  of  the  judicial 

systems in the EU Member States. 

5   See 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, p. 2.  
6   Art. 126 to 128 from the Constitution. 
7   Venice Commission opinion (CDL-AD(2019)031) para. 13-14: The majority of the investigators are police 
officers,  procedurally  supervised  by  the  prosecutors;  a  smaller  number  of  investigators  have  the  status  of 
magistrates  and  work  in  the  National  Investigative  Service  or  in  investigative  units  which  are  part  of 
prosecutors’  offices  at  regional  level.  Procedurally,  they  are  all  under  the  supervision  of  prosecutors. 
Procedural  supervision  means  that  all  decision  by  an  investigator  can  be  overturned  by  a  supervising 
prosecutor.  The  supervising  prosecutor  is,  in  turn,  subject  to  a  supervision  by  a  hierarchically  superior 
prosecutor, up to the level of the Prosecutor General. 

2 

 
                                                 
Prosecutors’) of the Supreme Judicial Council8. The Supreme Bar Council is an independent 
and self-governing body established by law9. 

Independence 

The level of perceived judicial independence in Bulgaria remains low among the general 
public  and  average  among  companies,  and  has  decreased  slightly  compared  to  2020. 
Only  31%  among  the  general  public  consider  it  to  be  ‘fairly  or  very  good’.  The  level  of 
perceived  independence  among  companies  remains  average,  with  43%  considering  it  to  be 
‘fairly  or  very  good’10.  The  level  of  perceived  judicial  independence  has  remained 
consistently low among the general public during the last five years. Among companies, the 
level  of  perceived  judicial  independence  used  to  be  very  low  until  2019  and  ever  since  it 
remains average despite slight fluctuations. 

The  new  law  concerning  the  accountability  and  criminal  liability  of  the  Prosecutor 
General  and  his  or  her  deputies  has  been  declared  unconstitutional  and  challenges 
remain.  The  lack  of  a  possibility  for  an  effective  criminal  investigation  concerning  the 
Prosecutor General and his or her deputies has been a long-standing issue which was raised 
not only by the European Commission11 but also by the European Court of Human Rights 12 
and  the  Council  of  Europe13.  The  combination  of  the  powers  of  the  Prosecutor  General14 
together  with  his  position  in  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council15  results  in  a  considerable 
influence within the Prosecutor’s Office, potentially in the Supreme Judicial Council (both in 

8   The Plenary of the Supreme Judicial Council has 25 members. The Supreme Judicial Council is composed 
by  a  Judicial  Chamber  and  a  Prosecutorial  Chamber.  The  Judicial  Chamber  is  composed  of  six  judges 
elected by judges, six members elected by Parliament and the presidents of the two highest courts, who are 
ex  officio  members.  The  Prosecutorial  Chamber  is  composed  of  four  prosecutors  and  one  investigating 
magistrate elected by their peers, five members elected by Parliament, and the Prosecutor General, who is an 
ex officio member. 

9   See 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, p. 3.  
10   Figures 48 and 50, 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard. The level of perceived judicial independence is categorised 
as  follows:  very  low  (below  30%  of  respondents  perceive  judicial  independence  as  fairly  good  and  very 
good); low (between 30-39%), average (between 40-59%), high (between 60-75%), very high (above 75%). 

11   Progress report Bulgaria 2019[COM(2019)498], p. 6. 
12   ECtHR, judgment of 5 February 2010, Kolevi v. Bulgaria, paras. 121-127, 129, 135 and 136. 
13   Council  of  Europe,  Supervision  of  the  execution  of  the  European  Court’s  judgments,  Committee  of 
Ministers  Decision  CM/Del/Dec(2021)1398/H46-6  of  11  March  2021  and  CM/Notes/1398/H46-6  of  9-11 
March  ;  Committee  of  Ministers  Decision  CM/Del/Dec(2020)1377bis/H46-9  of  1-3  September  2020  and 
CM/Notes/1377bis/H46-9  of  3  September  2020.  See  also  Committee  of  Ministers  (Interim  Resolution 
CM/ResDH(2019)367  of  5  December  2019  and  CM/Notes/1362/H46-6  of  3-5  December  2019;  Venice 
Commission Opinion (CDL-AD(2019)031). 

14   The  Prosecutor  General  may  annul  or  amend  any  decision  taken  by  any  prosecutor  which  has  not  been 
reviewed  by  a  judge.  Furthermore,  he  may  second  prosecutors  without  their  consent,  for  a  period  of  3 
months within a calendar year, and issue written instructions to prosecutors, concerning only the application 
of  the  law,  including  in  individual  cases.  The  Prosecutor  General  also  has  significant  powers  over  the 
prosecutors who are the heads of offices at district and provincial level.  

15   In the Prosecutors’ Chamber (composed of four prosecutors and one investigating magistrate elected by their 
peers,  five  members  elected  by  Parliament  -–  currently  all  also  of  which  are  prosecutors  or  investigating 
magistrates in the current composition -– and the Prosecutor General), the Prosecutor General, an ex officio 
member and chairman, plays a decisive role in relation to the career and disciplinary proceedings regarding 
prosecutors.  In  the  Plenary,  the  prosecutorial  members  usually  vote  as  a  block  supporting  the  Prosecutor 
General. 

3 

 
                                                 
the  Prosecutorial  Council  and  in  the  Plenary)  and  within  the  magistracy16.  On  29  January 
2021, the Parliament approved a law concerning the execution of the Kolevi judgment of the 
European  Court  of  Human  Rights17,  establishing  a  new  framework  for  any  investigation 
against  the  Prosecutor  General  and/or  his/her  deputies18.  The  new  mechanism  entrusted  a 
special  prosecutor  with  any  investigation  against  a  Prosecutor  General  and/or  his  or  her 
deputies19. Any refusal by the special prosecutor to open an investigation  would have been 
open to judicial review20 before the Specialised Criminal Court at first instance21. Following 
some  of  the  suggestions  made  by  the  Council  of  Europe22,  the  new  law  provided  for  the 
appointment of the special prosecutor by the Plenary of the Supreme Judicial Council instead 
of its Prosecutorial Chamber. On 10 February 2021, the President of the Republic challenged 
the  constitutionality  of  the  new  law  before  the  Constitutional  Court23.  Consequently,  the 
Plenary of the SJC decided to suspend the procedure for selection of the special prosecutor 
awaiting  the  decision  of  the  Constitutional  Court24.  On  11  May  2021,  the  Constitutional 
Court delivered a decision with which declared unconstitutional the provisions challenged by 
the  whole  mechanism 
the  President  of 
unconstitutional25.  Furthermore,  following  a  recommendation  from  the  Commission,  on  23 
February 2021, the Bulgarian authorities asked a new opinion of the Venice Commission26 on 
this law. However, due to the Constitutional court decision, the expected opinion will not be 
issued. A number of other issues concerning this law have been identified by the Council of 
Europe27.  These  stem  from  the  abovementioned  considerable  influence  of  the  Prosecutor 
General28, which may lead to control on the candidacies for the special prosecutor29 and on 

the  Republic,  consequently  considering 

16   Council  of  Europe,  Supervision  of 

judgments, 
CM/Del/Dec(2021)1398/H46-6 of 9-11 March 2021. See also 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country chapter on 
the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, p. 3.  

the  European  Court’s 

execution  of 

the 

17   ECtHR, judgment of 5 February 2010, Kolevi v. Bulgaria  
18   Law  supplementing  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code  promulgated  in  the  State  Gazette  under  No.  16  of  23 

February 2021. 

19   This special prosecutor was to be appointed upon a proposal of six members of the Plenary of the Supreme 
Judicial Council or by self-nomination for five years by a majority of fifteen votes (out of twenty five) in the 
Plenary of the Supreme Judicial Council. In carrying out the investigation, the special prosecutor may have 
been  assisted  by  an  investigating  magistrate  from  the  Specialised  Prosecutor’s  Office.  At  the  end  of  the 
mandate, the special prosecutor would have been able to become a judge or an investigating magistrate, or 
remain a prosecutor, at the same level as the position held in the Prosecutor’s Office before the mandate or at 
a higher level. The special prosecutor would have enjoyed hierarchical and decision-making independence. . 
20   The refusal, by an ordinary prosecutor, to open an investigation is not subject to judicial review; it can be 

revoked only by a higher-level prosecutor. 

21   Cases  investigated  by  the  special  prosecutor  were  to  be  treated  by  the  Specialised  Criminal  Court  at  first 
instance, the Specialised Criminal Court of Appeal at second instance, and the Supreme Court of Cassation 
at last instance. 

22   Council  of  Europe,  Supervision  of  the  execution  of  the  European  Court’s  judgments,  Committee  of 
Ministers  Decision  CM/Del/Dec(2021)1398/H46-6  of  11  March  2021  and  CM/Notes/1398/H46-6  of  9-11 
March. The bill took into consideration some of the preliminary comments of the Human Rights Directorate 
of the Council of Europe sent to the Bulgarian authorities on 15 December 2020, on 18 and 19 January 2021. 

23   Constitutional Case No. 4 of 2021. 
24   Decision of the Plenary of the SJC, Protocol No.6 of 8 April 2021. 
25   Constitutional Court Decision No. 7 of 2021. 
26   In  the  absence  of  improvements  to  address  the  existing  concerns,  the  Department  for  the  Execution  of 
Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights stated that the new mechanism should be considered a 
temporary solution.  

27   CM/Del/Dec(2021)1398/H46-6 of 9-11 March 2021 
28   Council  of  Europe,  Supervision  of 

the 

judgments, 
CM/Del/Dec(2021)1398/H46-6 of 9-11 March 2021. See also 2020 Rule of Law Report Country chapter on 
the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, page 3.  

the  European  Court’s 

execution  of 

4 

 
                                                 
his appointment30. On 11 March 2021, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe31 
stressed  the  importance  of  reducing  the  influence  of  the  Prosecutor  General  within  the 
Prosecutor’s  Office,  any  potential  influence  in  the  SJC32  and  within  the  magistracy,  so  to 
allow for the implementation of an effective investigation mechanism, including by extending 
the judicial review to any prosecutorial refusals to open investigations33.  

The  absence  of  judicial  review  against  a  decision  of  a  prosecutor  not  to  open  an 
investigation  raises  concerns.  On  11  March  2021,  the  Committee  of  Ministers  of  the 
Council of Europe has reiterated its recommendation regarding the introduction of a judicial 
review  for  prosecutorial  refusals  to  open  an  investigation,  together  with  arrangements  to 
avoid  an  excessive  additional  workload  for  courts  and  prosecutors34.  This  recommendation 
has  been  made  in  the  context  of  the  Council  of  Europe  enhanced  supervision  mechanism 
triggered  following  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  ruling,  which  considers  the 
ineffectiveness of criminal investigations a systemic problem35.  

The  concerns  related  to  the  composition  and  functioning  of  the  Supreme  Judicial 
Council  remain.  Тhe  situation  where  the  overall  number  of  judges  elected  by  their  peers 
does  not  amount  to  a  majority  remains  unchanged36.  Furthermore,  as  explained  in  the 
previous  paragraph,  the  Prosecutor  General  continues  to  play  a  decisive  role37  in  the 

29   Potential  candidates  being  prosecutors  could  fear  career  risks,  in  case  their  candidature  is  opposed  by  the 
Prosecutor General, because all members of Prosecutorial Chamber of the Supreme Judicial Council are also 
subordinates  to  the  Prosecutor  General  (H/Exec(2021)9  11  March  2021,  Memorandum  prepared  by  the 
Department for the Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights).  

30   Because  of  the  combination  of  the  powers  of  the  Prosecutor  General  and  his/her  position  in  the  Supreme 
Judicial Council, voting by a majority of 15 out of 25 votes in the Plenary “does not make impossible for a 
Chief  Prosecutor  to  be  able  to  influence  the  appointment  or  the  career  of  persons  responsible  for 
investigating him or her”, as required by the Committee’s Interim Resolution CM/ResDH(2019)367. Indeed 
11 members (out of 25) from the Prosecutorial Chamber might vote as a block in defense of the interests of 
the Prosecutor General. In this way they could veto decisions of the Plenary or oblige the Plenary to consider 
only candidates accepted by a Prosecutor General. Moreover, with the support of other few members under a 
“de  facto  leverage”  of  the  Prosecutor  General  (CM/Notes/1398/H46-6),  they  can  represent  the  main 
component of the majority. 

31   Committee of Ministers decision CM/Del/Dec(2021)1398/H46-6 
32   This also taking into consideration that the  election of a  new  SJC  will take place in 2022. In this context, 
while indicating that the proposed mechanism could only be considered a temporary solution before broader 
reform  would  be  taken,  the  Council  of  Europe  has  suggested  to  introduce  a  double  majority  for  the 
appointment of the special prosecutor in the Plenary of the SJC.  

33   It has to be recalled that in the past, concerns were expressed as to the possibility of introducing a judicial 
review because such an amendment  would interfere  with the constitutional competences of the Prosecutor 
office. With the new law having introduced a judicial review of any refusal to open an investigation against 
the Prosecutor General and his or her deputies, any doubt in that respect has disappeared. 

34   See 

CM/Del/Dec(2021)1398/H46-6, 

para. 

3; 

CM/Del/Dec(2020)1377bis/H46-9, 

para. 

4; 

CM/Del/Dec(2019)1362/H46-6 

35   European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 3 June 2015, S.Z. v. Bulgaria, 29263/12 
36   CM/Rec(2010)12, para 27; Venice Commission opinion (CDL-AD(2020)035), para. 44; JSA, Art. 16(3) and 
(4) - The Judges’ chamber of the SJC (14 members) is presided by either one of the ex officio members, the 
President of the Supreme Court of Cassation or the President of the Supreme Administrative Court. Six of 
the  members  are  elected  directly  by  judges  and  six  others  are  elected  by  Parliament.  A  majority  can  be 
reached, both in the Plenary of the SJC and the Judges’ chamber, without the votes of the judges elected by 
their peers. 

37   Due to the position of the Prosecutor General within the Prosecutor’s Office and his role as a chairman of the 
Prosecutors’  chamber,  he  has  a  decisive  role  in  the  Prosecutors’  chamber  and  by  extend  an  important 
influence in the Plenary of the Supreme Judicial Council. 

5 

 
                                                                                                                                                        
Prosecutors’  chamber38  and  preserves  significant  influence  on  the  Plenary39  and  potentially 
also  on  the  Judges’  chamber40,  since  lay  members41  elected  to  the  Judges’  chamber  by 
Parliament  may  also  come  from  the  ranks  of  the  prosecutors42.  Voting  practice43 
demonstrates the limited influence in decision-making of the peer-elected judges in the SJC 
and the potential influence of the Prosecutor General over the SJC. Notwithstanding progress 
made through earlier reforms44, the situation of the SJC continues to be a source of concern 
for  the  Council  of  Europe45  and  various  stakeholders46.  Though  reforms  have  resulted  in  a 
more balanced composition of the SJC,47 the involvement of prosecutors, and the Prosecutor 
General  in  particular,  in  the  governance  of  judges  continues  to  raise  concerns48.  The 
attempted amendments to the Constitution changing the composition of the SJC49, tabled in 

38   JSA, Art. 16 (3) and (4) - The Prosecutors’ chamber (11 members) is presided by the ex officio member the 
Prosecutor General and it consists of five members elected by the Parliament, four by prosecutors and one by 
investigators elected by their respective peers. 

39   JSA,  Art.  30(1)  and  32  -  The  Plenary  of  the  SJC  (25  members)  is  comprised  of  the  members  of  both 
aforementioned chambers and is presided by the Minister of Justice, who does not have the right to a vote. 
The plenary of the SJC decides upon the draft budget, disciplinary removal from office and proposals for the 
appointment of the Presidents of the Supreme  Cassation Court,  the  Supreme  Administrative Court and the 
Prosecutor  General  (JSA,  Art.  30(2)).  The  two  chambers  take  decisions  on  appointment,  promotion, 
relocation  and  release  from  office,  matters  related  to  acquisition  and  restoration  of  tenure  and  decide  on 
disciplinary sanctions (JSA, Art. 30(5));voting majority for decisions of the Judges’ chamber are described 
in Art. 33 para 4 of the JSA.  

40   Venice Commission opinion (CDL-AD(2017)018), para. 19. 
41   Lay members are all elective members within the meaning of the Judicial System Act. 
42   JSA  Art.  16,  para.  3  requires  the  election  by  chamber  to  be  held  from  among  judges,  prosecutors, 
investigating  magistrates,  academic-degree-holding  scholars  in  legal  sciences,  lawyers  and  other  jurists  of 
high  professional  standing  and  moral  integrity,  taking  into  account  their  professional  qualification  and 
specialization.” – Currently there are no prosecutors in the Judges’ chamber, however it appears that in the 
previous Judges’ chamber some members were former prosecutors.  

43   For important decisions, members from the Prosecutors’ chamber seem to vote in block, together with the 
Parliament elected members of the Judges’ chamber. See Committee of Minister of the Council of Europe 
(CM/Del/Dec(2021)1398/H46-6); see also Plenary of the SJC decisions  - Protocol No.24 of 2019, vote for 
the election of the Prosecutor General; Protocol No. 27 of 2019, re-vote for the election of the Prosecutor 
General;  Protocol  No.26  of  2020,  vote  to  stop  the  discussion  whether  to  initiate  a  disciplinary  proceeding 
against the Prosecutor General based on a signal  from a  professional organisation; Protocol No.2 of 2021, 
vote for preparing an analysis on the proposal for giving the management of a real estate (summer resort) to 
the Supreme Judicial Council for the needs of the Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Bulgaria; Protocol 
No.2  of  2021,  vote  for  giving  the  management  of  a  real  estate  (summer  resort)  to  the  Supreme  Judicial 
Council, for the needs of the Prosecutor's Office of the  Republic of Bulgaria; Protocol No.3 of 2021, vote 
discussion  and  adoption  of  a  model  for  reorganisation  of  the  judicial  structures  at  regional  level  and 
Roadmap with an action plan for reorganisation of the judicial structures at district and appellate level; See 
also a potential voting pattern in the Judges’ chamber of the SJC  – Protocol No.1 of 2021, votes related to 
the new Judicial map; Protocol No.2 of 2021, votes related to additional positions in lower instance courts; 
Protocol No.3 of 2021, votes related to changes to the judicial regions’ borders. 

44   Amendments to the Constitution of Bulgaria (2015) – Art. 130a; Amendments to the JSA (2016) – Art. 30(1) 
45   Committee  of  Ministers  decision  CM/Del/Dec(2021)1398/H46-6.  See  also  Venice  Commission  opinion 

(CDL-AD(2020)035), para. 40. 

46   Contributions from UN OHCHR Regional Office for Europe, Magistrats Européens pour la Démocratie et 

les Libertés and Bulgarian Institute for Legal Initiatives Foundation for the 2021 Rule of Law Report. 

47   Venice Commission opinion (CDL-AD(2017)018), para. 9. 
48   Venice  Commission  opinion  (CDL-AD(2020)035),  para.  42,  Venice  Commission  opinion  (CDL-

AD(2017)018), para. 16, 17 and 19. 

49   It is to be noted that a change in the composition of the SJC requires a revision of the Constitution, which 
may be decided either upon the Grand National Assembly procedure, as sought by the Bulgarian authorities 
at  the  end  of  2020,  or  by  the  simplified  ordinary  National  Assembly  procedure,  similarly  to  the  reform 
undertaken  in  2015.  See  also  Constitutional  court  Decision  No.  3  of  2003,  Decision  No.  8  of  2005  and 
Refusal to give a decision on Case No. 7 of 2015. 

6 

 
                                                 
September  2020,  were  intended  to  partially  address  these  concerns50.  Addressing  the  issue 
regarding the SJC’s composition has  become a more pressing matter because the system  in 
place would impact the future elections for members of the SJC, due to the forthcoming end 
of  their  current  mandates,  and  would  also  impact  other  important  positions  within  the 
judiciary51.  Concerning  the  functioning  of  the  SJC,  a  positive  development  has  been  the 
introduction of an online register of positions taken by the SJC, including its Plenary and the 
two chambers, against threats  to  judicial independence52. However, the register covers only 
cases in which the SJC or other bodies of the judiciary have taken a position and not all cases 
of attacks against judicial independence, which some stakeholders consider as insufficient53. 
In addition, stakeholders have also pointed to cases where some of the positions taken by the 
SJC are characterised as contrary to the members of the judiciary itself54. 

The  Action  Plan  adopted  to  address  certain  challenges  expressed  in  the  2020  Rule  of 
Law Report covers, among others, judicial reform. On 6 November 2020, the Government 
issued  an  Action  Plan55  in  order  to  complete  the  reform  on  the  accountability  and  criminal 
liability  of  the  Prosecutor  General,  to  improve  the  functioning  and  composition  of  the 
Inspectorate to the Supreme Judicial Council56, to revise the criteria allowing for additional 
remuneration of magistrates, and to address challenges related to judicial independence.  

A  working  group  has  been  established  on  a  possible  reform  of  the  composition  and 
functioning of the Inspectorate to the Supreme Judicial Council. As part of the previously 
mentioned Government’s Action Plan, in December 2020, the Minister of Justice established 
a  working  group57  tasked  with  drafting  legislative  amendments  to  address  the  Inspectorate 
related  issues  identified  as  a  concern  by  the  2020  Rule  of  Law  report58  and  by  the  Venice 
Commission59.  Currently,  the  Inspectorate  checks  the  activity  of  the  judiciary,  carries  out 

50   On  17  August  2020,  the  Prime  Minister  announced  in  a  video  message  that  his  party  will  propose  a draft 
Constitution. On 2 September 2020, the draft new Constitution was filed at the Parliament. On 18 September 
2020,  the  speaker  of  the  Parliament  asked  the  Venice  Commission  for  an  opinion  on  the  draft.  On  25 
November 2020, the Parliament voted against the draft new Constitution and finally in December 2020, the 
Venice Commission released their opinion on the draft. 

51   The  term  of  the  current  SJC  runs  until  October  2022  and  the  new  members  will  be  appointed  as  to  the 
previously mentioned procedure. The term of the current President of the Supreme Court of Cassation runs 
until 10 February 2022 and the new one is elected by the SJC plenary.  

52   Access  to  the  register  can  be  found  here  -  http://www.vss.justice.bg/page/view/106204.  The  Register 

includes also the positions of other bodies of the judiciary, including administrative heads and judges. 

53   On 24 October 2020, in an interview, the Deputy Chairman of the National Assembly  at the time accused 
named judges of the Supreme Court of Cassation, who ruled in a case concerning him, of being biased. The 
SJC adopted a position, on 3 November 2020, to defend the judges after having been asked to do so by a 
professional organisation. In October 2020, a website specialising in legal news published a decision of the 
Specialised Criminal Court of Appeal, in which the appellate judge (also Administrative head of the court) 
gives  a  personal  assessment  of  the  professional  qualities  of  the  first  instance  judge.  A  professional 
organisation asked the SJC to take a position and to develop a criteria for the admissible language, which the 
higher  court  should  use  in  order  not  to  jeopardise  the  objective  and  subjective  independence  of  the  court. 
Nevertheless, no position was taken and no criteria was developed. 

54   Declaration  against  the  President  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Cassation  by  the  President  of  the  Supreme 
Administration Court, position of 8 Mary 2020. Declaration against the President of the Supreme Court of 
Cassation by the Prosecutors’ chamber, protocol No.16 of 13 May 2020. See also 2020 Rule of Law Report, 
Country chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, , footnote 37, p.6. 

55   “Plan for the implementation of measures in response to the recommendations and the identified challenges 

in the European Commission’s Rule of Law Report” (Action Plan) 

56   See below paragraph on the possible reform of the Inspectorate to the SJC. 
57   See Action plan adopted by the Council of Ministers; See also Ordinance No. LS-13-88/21.12.2020 
58   Input from Bulgaria for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p.3 
59   Venice Commission (CDL-AD(2017)018), para. 58. 

7 

 
                                                 
checks  on  the  integrity  and  potential  conflicts  of  interest  of  magistrates,  and  proposes  the 
opening  of  disciplinary  proceedings  regarding  magistrates  to  the  SJC.  The  Inspectorate 
consists of an Inspector General and ten Inspectors, who are independent and elected by the 
National  Assembly60.  The  mandate  of  the  working  group  includes  a  review  of  integrity 
checks,  disciplinary  liability  of  magistrates,  creation  of  deontological  prevention  system, 
property and interests declarations61 as well as formalising the current practice that allows the 
Parliament  to  appoint  the  Inspector  General  and  the  Inspectors  from  among  the  persons 
nominated by the plenaries of the Supreme Courts and professional organisations62. However, 
there is no specific timeline for the finalisation of the amendments and the concerns related to 
judicial  independence  and  the  exercising  of  pressure  on  judges,  raised  by  the  2020  Rule  of 
Law  Report63  and  the  Venice  Commission64,  remain.  The  Inspector  General  and  the 
Inspectors continue to work on the basis of a mandate that has expired65, under the principle 
of  continuity66.  To  be  noted  that  other  institutions  are  also  in  this  situation:  five  other 
independent and supervisory authorities operate on the basis of an expired mandate67. In other 
cases, changes in the rules of election and mandate allowed for the automatic re-election of 
their current directors68. 

The  promotion  regime  of  magistrates  still  raises  concerns.  Magistrates  are  normally 
promoted  after  passing  a  competition69.  However,  in  practice,  no  competition  process  for 
promotion  of  judges  has  been  completed  for  more  than  three  years70.  In  addition  to  the 
normal promotion process through a competition, there is a promotion of lay members of the 
SJC at the end of their mandate. The plenary of the Supreme Court of Cassation challenged 
the  constitutionality  of  the  new  law  before  the  Constitutional  Court71  considering  it  was  a 
case  of  automatic  promotion.  On  11  May  2021,  the  Constitutional  Court ruled  that  the  law 
providing a promotion of lay members of the SJC at the end of their mandate is constitutional 

60   Art. 132a of the Constitution. 
61   Under section 1a of the JSA 
62   Input from Bulgaria for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p.3 
63   See 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, , pp. 7-8. 
64   Venice Commission (CDL-AD(2017)018), para. 58. 
65   The procedure for election of a new Inspectors and Inspector General was supposed to start no later than 9 
February  2020  for  the  Inspector  General  and  no  later  than  14  January  2020  for  the  Inspectors  (JSA,  Art. 
44(1)).  Such  procedure  has  not  been  initiated  to  this  date.  A  similar  situation  occurred  also  during  the 
mandate of the previous Chief Inspector who operated under a de facto 2 year extension of the mandate. 
66   Constitutional  Court  Decision  No.  13  of  2010  on  Case  No.  12  of  2010,  where  the  Court  ruled  that  the 

principle of continuity is applicable to college governed bodies.  

67   Commission  for  protection  of  personal  data,  mandate  expired  since  16  April  2019;  Commission  for 
consumer  protection,  mandateexpired  since  27  March  2020;  Commission  for  energy  and  water  regulation, 
mandate expired since 20 April 2020. 

68   On  the  11  February  2021,  the  National  Assembly  adopted  amendments  to  the  Law  on  protection  of 
competition, which allowed for an extension of the mandate of the current director of the supervisory body 
with 2 more years. His current mandate was supposed to expire in June 2021 See also Law amending the law 
on protection of competition - https://www.parliament.bg/bg/laws/ID/163501; The management board of the 
National Institute  for Justice Management (composed by five  members of the SJC, the Minister of Justice 
and one member of the Ministry of Justice) changed the rules for appointment of the director of the Institute, 
allowing for almost automatic re-appointment of the current director. 

69   All  competition  procedures  are  conducted  in  accordance  with  the  terms  and  conditions  of  the  Judiciary 

System Act. 

70   Ordinary competitions for promotion have been announced during 2018, 2019 and 2020, but none of  them 

has been completed (http://www.vss.justice.bg/page/view/1878). 

71   Request  of  20  December  2020  addressed  by  the  Plenary  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Cassation  to  the 

Constitutional Court – Case No. 15 of 2020. 

8 

 
                                                 
because  the  SJC  is  still  involved  in  the  decision72.  Stakeholders  criticised  the  absence  of 
regular competitions for promotion and the promotion mechanism of the SJC members73. The 
absence  of  regular  competitions  has  resulted  in  an  increasing  number  of  secondments.  In 
particular,  stakeholders  reported  that,  since  2017,  the  number  of  seconded  judges  has  been 
increasing74 as well as the number of long secondments (with consent)75, sometimes for up to 
90-100  months  or  more76,  in  order  to  fill  in  higher-ranking  positions77.  European  standards 
highlight  promotion  based  on  merit78  and  secondment  happening  with  consent  and  on  a 
temporary basis, used only in exceptional circumstances79. The situation where there are no 
regular  merit-based  promotions  may  affect  judicial  independence.  Concerns  have  also  been 
raised80 in the context of the envisaged judicial map reform where judges from district courts, 
which  would  become  part  of  regional  courts,  would  be  automatically  promoted  to  a  higher 
position81.  Since  the  discussions  are  at  an  early  stage  there  is  scope  to  have  a  wide 
consultation on the reform of the judicial map82. Furthermore, it is important that any reform 
of  the  judicial  map  is  based  on  a  thorough  assessment  of  its  likely  effects,  and  preserves 
judicial independence and access to justice83. 

The SJC is  modifying the criteria  for deciding on additional  remuneration.  In order to 
address  the  Council  of  Europe  concerns  regarding  the  broad  discretionary  powers  of  the 
Courts Presidents for allocating additional remuneration of magistrates, two working groups 
have  been  set  up  84.  The  draft  rules  were  prepared  in  March  2020,  however,  they  have  not 

72   Constitutional Court Decision No. 6 of 2021 on Case No. 15 of 2020. 
73   Contribution from the  Magistrats Européens pour la Démocratie et les Libertés for the 2021 Rule of Law 

Report, p. 15. 

74   In 2017, there were 83 seconded judges; in 2018, there were 104 seconded judges; in 2019, there were 144 
seconded  judges;  in  2020,  there  were  202  seconded  judges.  For  more  information,  see  study  provided  by 
Institute for Market Economics (IME)  

75   In  2020,  there  were  59  judges  seconded  for  more  than  24  months.  For  more  information,  see  study  on 

secondment of magistrates prepared by Institute for Market Economics (IME). 

76   See  Register  of  seconded  magistrates  by  the  courts  from  10.12.2020  prepared  by  the  SJC.  See  also 

Contribution from the Supreme Court of Cassation for the 2021 Rule of Law Report. 

77   Such  a  distorted  practice  of  secondment  is  reported  to  be  used  for  secondment  without  consent  in  the 
Prosecutor’s  Office  as  alleged  punishment.  Contribution  from  Bulgarian  Institute  for  Legal  Initiatives  and 
the  President  of  the  Court  of  Cassation  for  the  2021  Rule  of  Law  Report  and  information  received  in  the 
context of the country visit. 
78   CM/Rec(2010)12, para 44. 
79   Venice Commission (CDL-AD(2017)018), paras. 86 and 87. 
80   More than 500 judges signed an open letter to the SJC against the chosen model for judicial map reform. The 

Supreme Bar Council also criticised the reform. 

81   Input  from  Bulgaria  for  the  2021  Rule  of  Law  Report,  p.  15;  Contribution  from  the  Supreme  Court  of 

Cassation for the 2021 Rule of Law Report.  

82   The  Ministry  of  Justice  has  organised  a  series  of  public  discussions  (14,  25  and  29  of  June  2021)  on  the 
proposed model for reform of the judicial map with a participation of a broad range of representatives from 
various  professional  organisations  in  the  field  of  justice,  justices  from  the  Supreme  Court  of  Cassation, 
lawyers, local courts, municipalities and NGO`s representatives. 

83   Revised Guidelines on the Creation of Judicial Maps to Support Access to Justice within a Quality Judicial 

System As adopted on the CEPEJ’s 22th plenary meeting, on 6 December 2013. 

84   According  to  the  information  received  by  the  Bulgarian  authorities  in  relation  the  “Action  Plan”,  upon  a 
decision of the SJC’s Plenum on protocol No. 26/22.10.20, It. 32, a working group to propose to the SJC’s 
Plenum  amendments  and  supplements  to  the  Rules  for  determining  and  paying  of  bonus  remuneration  to 
magistrates  was  established,  which  was  meant  to  set  clear,  objective  and  transparent  criteria  for  defining 
supplementary  remuneration  and  for  limiting  the  discretionary  powers  of  administrative  managers  at  the 
Judiciary. The working group includes members of the Supreme Judicial Council, representatives of judicial 
authorities and of the Supreme Judicial Council administration. This working group decided to wait for the 
adoption of rules under Art. 233, Para. 6, sentence one of the JSA (on the basis of the workload level of the 

9 

 
                                                 
 
been discussed in the SJC plenary and have not been made public85. It is therefore too early to 
assess whether the identified concerns have been addressed in light of the recommendations 
of  the  Council  of  Europe.  It  is  important  that  any  amendment  takes  into  account  such 
recommendations86. 

The online register on magistrate’s membership in professional organisations has been 
removed.  The  requirement  for  magistrates 
in  professional 
organisations87 was repealed in 2020. At the time of the publication of the 2020 Rule of Law 
Report, the online database of magistrates participating in professional associations was still 
available on the website of the SJC. Meanwhile, the authorities have addressed this concern 
and, since 14 January 2021, the register is no longer available online.  

to  declare  membership 

Quality 

Court fees have been reduced for claims introduced online.  Amendments in the Code of 
Civil Procedure provided for a reduction by 15 percent of the fee due when the application 
for protection and assistance has been performed electronically. However, the measure is still 
too limited to substantially lower court fees to initiate proceedings88 because it concerns only 
electronically submitted files and not all cases. Moreover, this measure does not concern the 
threshold for legal aid89, nor does it exempt legal aid recipients from court fees90. The impact 
of  the  reform  is  also  jeopardised  by  the  lack  of  digitalisation91.  Furthermore,  specific 
concerns regarding limited access to justice for women and girls have been raised by the UN 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women92. 

respective  judicial  body,  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council  may  determine  additional  remuneration  to  judges, 
prosecutors and investigating  magistrates), as prepared by  the  working  group established by a decision on 
protocol  No.  3/19.02.20,  It.  1.1.  and  protocol  No.  7/27.05.20,  It.  4.1.  of  the  Judicial  Map,  Workload  and 
Judicial  Statistics  Committee  to  the  Judges’  College  at  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council.  By  a  decision  of 
22.06.2021, the Judges` College of the Supreme Judicial Council adopted Rules for determining the amount 
of additional remuneration under the terms of Art. 233, para. 6, sentence one of the Judiciary  System Act. 
The adopted Rules still need to be sent to the Budget and Finance Committee at the SJC Plenary and to the 
Judicial  Map,  Workload  and  Judicial  Statistics  Committee  of  the  Judges`  College  for  action  according  to 
their  respective  competence.  According  to  GRECO,  the  system  of  applying  supplementary  remuneration 
appears  still  to  be  subject  to  broad  discretionary  decisions  and  risks  of  undue  influence.  GRECO  Fourth 
Evaluation  Round  –  Evaluation  report,  recommendation  x,  para.  26;  See  also  Venice  Commission  (CDL-
AD(2010)004),  para.  46  and  51;  Recommendation  CM/Rec(2010)1  of  the  Committee  of  Ministers  of  the 
Council of Europe, para. 55 

85   Input from Bulgaria for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 7. 
86   Recommendation  CM/Rec(2010)12  of  the  Committee  of  Ministers  to  member  states  on  judges: 
independence,  efficiency  and  responsibilities,  para  55:  “Systems  making  judges’  core  remuneration 
dependent  on  performance  should  be  avoided  as  they  could  create  difficulties  for  the  independence  of 
judges”. 

87   COM(2019)498, p. 6, footnote 29; Venice Commission (CDL-AD(2020)017), para. 29. 
88   2020 Rule of Law Report, Country chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, p. 9. Regarding the level 

of fees in civil and commercial cases see Figures 24 and 25, 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard.  

89   In the current state of the legal aid system in Bulgaria, even a person whose income is at or slightly below 

the Eurostat poverty threshold is not entitled to legal aid. Figure 24, 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard 

90   Figure 25, 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
91   In practice, currently, there  is no possibility to  file a case  online; no possibility to participate  in a hearing 
through videoconference; no possibility to file a case online. For more information see Figure 39 to 45, 2021 
EU Justice Scoreboard 

92   More  particularly,  notably  owing  to  pervasive  corruption,  social  stigma,  inaccessibility  of  the  judicial 
system,  gender  bias  among  law  enforcement  officers,  including  the  police,  and  limited  knowledge  among 
judges  and  law  enforcement  authorities  of  the  1979  Convention  on  the  Elimination  of  All  Forms  of 

10 

 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
Amendments  were  introduced  to  allow  for  the  use  of  videoconferencing  in  civil, 
administrative and criminal proceedings. On 17 December 2020, amendments to the Code 
of  Civil  Procedure,  Administrative  Procedure  Code  and  Criminal  Procedure  Code  were 
adopted. They allow for the use of videoconferencing in civil and administrative proceedings, 
and  in  criminal  proceedings  for  the  collection  of  evidence.  However,  in  practice  it  appears 
that  the  system  is  not  implemented  yet93.  Further  improvements  have  been  announced 
through  two  projects  in  the  context  of  the  National  Recovery  and  Resilience  Plan  of 
Bulgaria94.  Notwithstanding  these  reforms  and  plans,  currently  it  is  not  possible  for  court 
staff  and  judges  to  work  securely  remotely95,  and  secure  electronic  communication  is 
available  only  for  communication  between  courts  but  not  with  other  legal  professionals96. 
While  it  is  possible  to  access  electronic  files  for  ongoing  and  closed  cases  and  to  receive 
information  online  about  court  fees,  it  is  still  not  possible  to  initiate  proceedings  online,  to 
file  an  application  for  legal  aid  online  and  the  official  court  documents  cannot  be  served 
electronically97.  The  European  Social  Fund  funded  project  (2016-2020)  “Development  of  a 
Model for Optimization of the Judicial Map of Bulgarian Courts and Prosecutor’s Offices and 
of a Unified  Information System for Courts”  98, covers a total  of seven activities, including 
two specifically linked to digitalisation and e-justice99. Concerns have been raised regarding 
the  implementation  of  Unified  Court  Information  System  (UCIS)  in  the  absence  of  a  full 
digitalisation  process100.  The  COVID-19  pandemic  has  illustrated  the  shortcomings  of  the 
country’s  judicial  system  in  the  area  of  digitalisation  of  justice.  During  the  state  of 
emergency101, for one month the processing of court cases was suspended, with the exception 
of urgent cases102. Once the state of emergency was declared by the Council of Ministers on 
13 March 2020, the Judges’ College of the SJC adopted a new organisation of work in courts 
to limit contagion. However, remote hearings have been conducted in very limited cases on 
the initiative of specific courts, and remote working has been an exception103. 

Financial and human resources of the Specialised Criminal Court have been increased. 
The Specialised Criminal Court of first instance, which had been experiencing issues related 

Discrimination  against  Women.  Contribution  from  UN  OHCHR  Regional  Office  for  Europe  for  the  2021 
Rule of Law Report, p. 2. 

93   Figure 39 to 44, 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard; Information also received in the context of the country visit. 

(e.g. Association of Prosecutors in Bulgaria; Bulgarian Judges Association). 

94   Input from Bulgaria for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p.11. It is to be noted that the NRRP could be further 

amended and these projects might eventually be removed from the final plan. 

95   Figure 41, 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
96   Figure 42, 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
97   Figure 44, 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
98   Clarification  sent  by  the  SJC  regarding  the  Action  Plan  –  digitalisation.  As  to  UCIS,  the  abovementioned 
clarification as well as stakeholders during the country visits have informed about dissatisfaction by judges 
and staff which led to the suspension of the system on 16.09.2020 (further extended till 31.12.2020) for new 
cases. The clarification from the SJC announced that with decision of the Plenary starting from 01.01.2021 
till 01.06.2021 all courts will resume new cases.  

99   “Development and implementation of a Unified Court Information System – UCIS_” and the “Creation of a 
specialized  information  system  for  monitoring  and  analysis  of  the  factors  related  to  the  socio-economic 
development of the judicial district and the workload of the courts – SISMA”. 

100  More precisely stakeholders reported that everything is carried out on paper and then encoded in the system 
The  Supreme  Judicial  Council  is  implementing  a  number  of  projects,  funded  by  budgetary  resources  and 
external donor programs, to improve and enhance e-justice and facilitate its accessibility. 

101  Judges’ chamber SJC, Extraordinary Session, Short Protocol No. 9, 15 March 2020. 
102  Such  as  those  on  reviewing  pre-trial  detention,  or  undertaking  victim  protection  measures  and  child 
protection  measures.  See  also  Fundamental  Rights  Agency,  “Coronavirus  COVID-19  outbreak  in  the  EU 
Fundamental Rights Implications”, p.3. 

103  Contribution from the Supreme Court of Cassation for the 2021 Rule of Law Report. 

11 

 
                                                                                                                                                        
to  lack  of  human  or  financial  resources,  has  been  allocated  two  additional  positions  for 
judges104. This is a positive development which addressed a concern raised in the Bulgarian 
country  chapter  of  the  2020  Rule  of  Law  Report.  The  reported  investment  made  by  the 
Government in the justice system over the past years has been increasing105. 

A  new  legislation  has  amended  the  regime  applicable  to  law  firms.  In  February  2021, 
amendments to the Bar Act were introduced, making possible the setting up of sole proprietor 
lawyer’s  companies,  and  removed  the  ban  on  lawyers  serving  as  managers  and  executive 
directors  of  commercial  companies106.  These  amendments  create  the  opportunity  for  the 
setting up of more law firms, which would in turn increase the competition between lawyers 
and could allow for greater access to legal practitioners.  

Efficiency 

The  efficiency  of  administrative  justice  keeps 
improving.  The  performance  of 
administrative courts regarding the length of proceedings is among the most efficient in the 
EU107.  However,  the  lack  of  data  for  the  efficiency  of  litigious  and  non-litigious  civil  and 
commercial cases (first and second instance courts) does not permit a proper evaluation of the 
overall efficiency of the judicial system108. When it comes to the length of proceedings at the 
Supreme  Court  of  Cassation,  Bulgaria  continues  to  perform  well  in  comparison  to  other 
Member  States109.  Furthermore,  as  regards  efficiency  in  specific  areas  of  EU  law, 
proceedings  are  resolved  swiftly  in  the  area  of  electronic  communication  and  consumer 
protection110. 

II.  ANTI- CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK 

Following the comprehensive reform of 2017 and 2018, Bulgaria established the Commission 
for  Counteracting  Corruption  and  Illegal  Assets  Forfeiture  (hereinafter  the  Anti-corruption 
Commission).  This  Commission  is  mainly  responsible  for  both  the  preventive  and  the 
repressive  actions  regarding  high-profile  corruption,  keeping  and  managing  the  public 
register of asset declarations, monitoring and advising on issues related to conflict of interests 
as  well  as  the  confiscation  of  illegally  acquired  assets.  It  also  performs  institutional 
corruption  risk  assessments  in  order  to  develop  tailor-made  institutions’  integrity  action 
plans.  Following  this  assessment,  the  recommendations  delivered  to  public  institutions  are 
binding  and  follow-up  actions  are  to  be  regularly  reported  to  the  Anti-Corruption 
Commission.  The  competence  for  high-level  corruption  cases  was  transferred  to  the 
Specialised  Criminal  Courts  and  the  investigation  of  such  cases  is  carried  out  under  the 
supervision of the Specialised Prosecutor’s Office.  

104  Judges’ Chamber meeting, Protocol No. 3, 2 February 2021; Judges’ Chamber meeting, Protocol No. 6, 23 
February 2021. The Judges’ chamber of the SJC rejected the proposal of the Commission for Attestation and 
Competitions  to  the  SJC  to  not  grant  any  additional  positions  to  the  Specialised  Criminal  Court,  and 
afterwards approved two new positions to be added to the staff of the Specialised Criminal Court 

105  Figures 29-31, 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard.  
106  Law for amendment and supplement of the Bar Act - https://www.parliament.bg/bg/laws/ID/163509 
107  Figures 9 and 10, 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard. It is to be noted that there is no harmonised methodology to 

measure such performance. 

108  Figures 7 and 8, 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
109  Figure 8, 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
110  Figures 18 and 20, 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard. 

12 

 
                                                 
The perception among experts and business executives is that the level of corruption in 
the public sector remains high. In the 2020 Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency 
International,  Bulgaria  scores  44/100  and  ranks  19th  in  the  European  Union  and  69th 
globally111. This perception has been relatively stable112 over the past five years113. 

The Anti-Corruption Commission has further streamlined its organisational structure. 
It rationalised financial resources, which were increased in early 2021114. It also continued to 
increase  its  staff,  including  through  new  recruitments  of  inspectors  in  the  directorate 
responsible for combating corruption. In 2020, the Anti-Corruption Commission confiscated 
EUR 6.2 million115 of illegally  acquired property,  while 30 individuals  were sanctioned for 
conflicts  of  interest.  Compared  to  2019,  there  has  been  a  decrease  (of  about  20%)  in  the 
number  of  performed  inspections  as  well  as  in  the  reports  received  on  alleged  violations 
related to corruption116. 

The new anti-corruption strategy for 2021-2027 was adopted in March 2021. Drawing on 
lessons from the previous strategy, new priorities have been established as regards high-risk 
sectors,  including  strengthening  capacity  to  combat  corruption;  increasing  accountability  of 
local authorities; and creating an environment against corruption capable of timely responses. 
The  strategy  also  contains  a  list  of  relevant  goals,  performance  indicators,  and  responsible 
implementing entities117. 

The Action Plan adopted in November 2020 to address certain challenges expressed in 
the  2020  Rule  of Law Report  also  covers  issues  related  to  corruption.  The  Action  Plan 
aims to improve investigations and to continue reinforcing operations of the Anti-Corruption 
Commission. Moreover, as announced in the Action Plan, a reflection is ongoing to improve 
the  efficiency  of  investigations  and  trials.  On  30  March  2021,  a  working-group  was  tasked 
with  recommending  changes  to  the  Criminal  Code  as  to  improve  the  efficiency  of 
investigations and trials118. 

Despite increased investigative activity, results in final high-level corruption convictions 
remain  low with  no  solid  track-record  of final  convictions.  In  2020,  33  decisions  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Cassation  on  overall  corruption  cases  were  issued.  In  19  cases  the 
decisions were confirmed, in 8 cases the acts of the appellate court were revoked and returned 
for new consideration, in four cases the decisions of the appellate instance were amended and 

111  Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2020, pp. 2-3. The level of perceived corruption is 
categorised  as  follows:  low  (the  perception  among  experts  and  business  executives  of  public  sector 
corruption scores above 79); relatively low (scores between 79-60), relatively high (scores between 59-50), 
high (scores below 50). 

112  In 2015 the score was 41, while, in 2020, the score is 44. The score significantly increases/decreases when it 
changes  more  than  five  points;  improves/deteriorates  (changes  between  4-5  points);  is  relatively  stable 
(changes from 1-3 points) in the last five years. 

113  The Eurobarometer data on corruption perception and experience of citizens and businesses as reported last 
year is updated every second year. The latest data set is the Special Eurobarometer 502 (2020) and the Flash 
Eurobarometer 482 (2019). 

114  Input from Bulgaria for the 2021 Rule of Law Report. 
115  BGN 12,172,551.64 
116  Information and contribution received from the  Anti-Corruption Commission in the context of the country 

visit to Bulgaria. 

117  Contribution from the Anti-Corruption Commission. See also the Draft National Corruption Prevention and 

Counteraction Strategy (2021-2027). 

118  Input from Bulgaria for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 1. 

13 

 
                                                 
in  two  of  them  the  criminal  proceedings  were  resumed119.  On  17  December  2020,  OLAF 
recommended to  recover nearly EUR 6 million  after alleged abuse of power at  a Bulgarian 
ministry120.  Finally,  a  solid  track  record  of  final  convictions  in  high-level  corruption  cases 
remains to be established121. 

There is  limited evidence as to the effectiveness  of measures related to the integrity of 
the  public  administration.  The  enforcement  of  the  code  of  conduct  of  civil  servants122  is 
under the responsibility of institutional disciplinary commissions within each public service. 
Development  of  ethical  standards  of  conduct  of  senior  officials  (including  ministers  and 
mayors),  systems  for  verification  of  integrity  and  assistance  for  their  implementation  fall 
under the purview of the Anti-Corruption Commission123. Ethics provisions for members of 
the  Parliament  are  laid  down  in  the  rules  of  organisation  and  procedure  of  the  National 
Assembly124,  whose  implementation  is  the  responsibility  of  a  committee  of  the  National 
Assembly.  Whereas  the  legal  provisions  are  in  place,  there  is  no  factual  evidence  of  their 
implementation  or  effectiveness125.  Concerning  members  of  the  judiciary,  there  is  neither 
evidence  of  anti-corruption  training  being  provided  nor  of  an  advisory  committee  having 
been  set  up  for  matters  related  to  ethics.  Concerning  the  police  force,  since  2021,  the 
inspectorate  of  the  Ministry  of  Interior  has  deployed  a  new  system  for  video  recording  of 
actions  by  security  officers  and  road  patrols126.  Evidence  on  breaches  of  integrity  rules, 
including  corruption,  collected  through  a  video  recording  instrument,  have  been  used  to 
discipline, sanction or convict police officers from different departments127. 

A verification system for asset declaration and conflict of interest is in place. In 2020, the 
Anti-Corruption Commission conducted 21,587 verifications of declarations of property and 
interests  of  persons  holding  senior  public  positions  (compared  to  9,900  verifications 
conducted in 2019), including those of persons who participated in the local elections128. The 

119  Annual report of the activity of the Supreme Court of Cassation in 2020 , pp. 41-43. 
120  European Commission: European Anti-Fraud Office, OLAF recommends recovery of nearly €6 million after 

alleged abuse of power at Bulgarian ministry- EU PRESS RELEASE No. 04/2021. 

121  2020 Rule of Law Report, Country chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, p. 12. In addition, in June 
2021  the  US  Department  of  Treasury  issued  sanctions  targeting  certain  Bulgarian  citizens  (including  a 
former  member  of  the  Parliament)  for  committing  acts  of  corruption  in  accordance  with  the  US  Global 
Magnitsky Act. U.S Department of Treasury, Specially designated nationals list update- 2 June 2021. 

122  Adopted  by  the  Council  of  Ministers  with  Resolution  No.  57  of  2  April  2020.  The  role  of  the  Code  of 
conduct of civil servants in the public sector integrity system is currently under review with the support of 
Organisation  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD)  within  the  project  “Driving  Public 
Administration Reform Forward”.  

123  Art. 32, para. 1, item 6 of the Law for combating corruption and forfeiture illegally acquired property. 
124  National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria (2017), Rules of organisation and procedure of the national 

assembly. 

125  Such as open or closed procedures, and decisions by the competent entities. 
126  A large number of body cameras have been provided by the Ministry of Interior (a project financed under the 

European Commission’s Internal Security Fund) and they have been deployed since 2021. 

127  Internal  security  report:  in  the  period  2014-2020,  eight  traffic  officers  were  convicted.  In  addition, 

information received in the context of the country visit to Bulgaria. 

128  In 2020, 83,316 declarations of assets and interest of persons working in the State administration were filed 
on time (i.e. 250 less than in 2019). In 46 cases, there was a violation of administrative rules (i.e. a decrease 
of  38%  compared  to  2019);  and  sanctions  were  issued  in  two  cases  (i.e.  a  decrease  of  50%  compared  to 
2019). In 2020, the internal inspectorates carried out 4,750 verifications (i.e. a decrease of 23% compared to 
2019).  In  2020,  there  were  21  administrative  breaches  found  (compared  to  six  breaches  for  2019);  with 
application  of  sanctions  in  four  cases,  in  addition  to  nine  cases  of  termination  of  employment  due  to 
incompatibilities (i.e. the same number of 2019). For 2020, the number of asset declarations of senior public 
office  holders  received  and  processed  has  decreased  of  about  36%  compared  to  2019.  The  number  of 

14 

 
                                                 
 
declarations are publicly accessible through the Register of Senior Public Office Holders on 
the  webpage  of  the  Anti-Corruption  Commission.  Conflict  of  interest  and  incompatibility 
measures for civil servants (applicable to the employees of the central and local government 
administration)  are  defined  in  the  Civil  Servants  Act,  the  Labour  Code,  the  Ministry  of 
Interior Act, the State Agency for National Security Act, the Customs Act and other organic 
laws129.  

Lobbying  still  lacks  dedicated  regulation.  Although  regulation  of  lobbying  is  part  of  the 
national action  plan  in  response to the 2020 Rule of  Law Report130,  concrete steps forward 
remain to be taken.  

There  is  no  specific  law  on  protection  for  whistleblowers.  However,  existing  criminal 
legislation131,  applicable  to  witnesses,  provide  mutatis  mutandis  protection  to  individuals 
reporting  instances  of  crimes,  including  corruption.  Anonymous  complaints  are  neither 
allowed  nor  protected,  hence  the  Anti-Corruption  Commission  cannot  use  the  information 
received from unknown individuals or undisclosed sources.  

The authorities have taken some measures to counteract corruption risks related to the 
COVID-19  pandemic  measures.  These  measures  cover  sectors  with  high  corruption  risk, 
such  as  healthcare  and  public  procurement.  Urgent  public  procurement  procedures  were 
deployed,  with  significant  use  of  negotiated  procedures  without  publication  and  simplified 
procedures (i.e. with single vendor or vendor with neither previously proven experience nor 
corporate  capacity  for  the  specific  contract).  As  a  part  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic  coping 
policy  approach,  representatives  of  the  Ministry  of  Interior132,  the  Ministry  of  Health  and 
control  authorities  meet  periodically  to  exchange  operational  information  and  decide  on 
measures to be taken, including countering risk of corruption. A separate unit has been set up 
in  the  Ministry  of  Interior  General  Directorate  Combating  Organised  Crime  to  counteract 
corruption in health care 133 

III.  MEDIA PLURALISM AND MEDIA FREEDOM 

The  Bulgarian  legal  framework134  is  based  on  a  set  of  constitutional  safeguards  and 
legislative  measures,  such  as  the  Radio  and  Television  Act135.  The  Access  to  Public 

declarations,  which  were  not  submitted  or  were  submitted  late  has  increased  of  about  160%  in  2020, 
compared to 2019. Input from Bulgaria for the 2021 Rule of Law Report. 

129  In 2020, the Anti-Corruption Commission conducted 28 verifications (compared to 17 for 2019) on cases of 
conflict of interest and incompatibility. In 2020 a total of 30 decisions establishing a conflict of interest were 
adopted, while in 2019 14 such decisions were adopted. Input from the Country for the 2021 Rule of Law 
Report. See also GRECO Fourth Evaluation Round – Second compliance report, recommendations iii and iv, 
para.  11.  GRECO  concluded  that  recommendations  iii  and  iv  on  asset  disclosure,  disclosure  and 
ascertainment of conflicts of interest and of its impact on the prevention and detection of corruption, have 
been implemented satisfactorily. 

130  As indicated in the 2020 Rule of Law Report, an analysis by the National Centre for Parliamentary Research 
covering the period April 2017 to December 2019 showed that nearly 37% of the adopted legal acts modify 
other acts by amendments, including in the transition and final provisions of the amending act. Stakeholders 
had  expressed  serious  concerns  that  this  practice  not  only  impacts  negatively  on  the  transparency  of  the 
legislative process in the country, but could in some cases be a sign of irregular lobbying. 

131  Article 123 (on protection of witness) of criminal procedure code.  
132  Directorate General National Police. 
133  Input from Bulgaria for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 29. 
134  The 2021 World Press Freedom Index of Reporters without Borders places Bulgaria at 112th position out of 

180 monitored countries, one place down compared to last year (the last place in the EU). 

15 

 
                                                                                                                                                        
Information  Act  regulates  access  to  public  information  and  the  re-use  of  public  sector 
information. The media regulator, the Council for Electronic Media (CEM), is set up by and 
functions in compliance with the Radio and Television Act. 

A  new  legislation  has  been  adopted  to  strengthen  the  independence  of  the  media 
regulator – CEM - and steps are taken to increase its resources. The National Assembly 
adopted in December 2020 the Act136 amending the Radio and Television Act, to transpose 
the  revised  Audiovisual  media  Services  Directive  (AVMSD).  This  will  enhance  the 
independence of the CEM, particularly by ensuring that it will follow the public interest, and 
takes actions for the protection of the freedom and pluralism of speech and information and 
the  independence  of  media  service  providers.  The  increase  of  EUR  574  867  (BGN  1,12 
million)  to  the  budget  of  CEM,  foreseen  in  the  2021  State  Budget,  aims  to  address  the 
concerns raised in the 2020 Rule of Law Report regarding CEM’s lack of resources necessary 
to  perform  its  tasks  effectively137.  Although  this  is  a  welcomed  development,  recently  in 
March and April 2021, the Government decreased the budget of the regulator138. Moreover, it 
remains  to  be  seen  if  the  planned  increase  in  the  budget  will  be  adequate  in  view  of  the 
additional tasks linked to the implementation of the revised AVMSD139.  

The lack of transparency of media ownership remains a source of concern.  Despite the 
regular updates of the CEM public register of linear and non-linear media services referred to 
in  the  2020  Rule  of  Law  report,  data  on  media  ownership  is  still  not  fully  disclosed  to  the 
public. Some stakeholders have raised concerns that the issue of media transparency may be 
aggravated by significant news media concentration that took place in 2020140.  

The  lack  of  regulatory  safeguards  for  fair  and  transparent  allocation  of  state 
advertising141 continues to raise concerns. Furthermore, stakeholders have highlighted that 
transparency in the allocation of public funding to media outlets remains problematic142. 

Political  interference  in  the  media  continues  to  be  a  pressing  issue.  Lack  of  legislation 
preventing  politicians  and  parties  from  owning  media  outlets  appears  to  be  an  important 
factor, and a higher risk in this regard was registered in the TV and newspaper sectors143. The 
authorities have presented an Action Plan including  this issue as one of the priorities in the 
Bulgarian National Development Programme 2030144. However, no concrete measures have 
been specified yet.  

The  COVID-19  pandemic  has  negatively  affected  media  pluralism  and  no  measures 
supporting directly the media sector have been put in place. The pandemic has affected 

135  Radio and Television Act.  
136  Promulgated in State Gazette issue 109/2020. 
137  2020 Rule of Law Report, Country chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, p. 15. 
138  Decree No. 113/ 29.03.2021 and Decree No. 177/ 29.04.2021. 
139  Information received from the CEM in the context of the country visit. 
140  Information  received  in  the  context  of  the  country  visit  to  Bulgaria  and  2021  Media  Pluralism  Monitor 
Bulgaria,  p.  12.  High  level  of  concentration  is  registered  in  the  TV  sector  (92%  total  market  share  of  the 
major  4  owners).  The  cumulative  audience  shares  of  top  4  TV  media  groups  (74%)  and  the  top  4  radio 
groups (79%) are also indicative of high concentration. The online media sector is characterized by a lack of 
precise data. 

141  2021 Media pluralism Monitor, Bulgaria, p. 15. 
142  Reporters without Borders, Bulgaria. 
143  Media Pluralism Monitor 2021, Bulgaria, p. 14. 
144  Ministry of Finance (2019), National Development Programme Bulgaria 2030. 

16 

 
                                                                                                                                                        
media  pluralism  and  protection  of  journalists  mainly  in  economic  terms,  due  to  salary  cuts 
and  delayed  payments,  with  a  severe  impact  on  regional  journalism,  as  highlighted  by 
stakeholders145. It is reported that some of the smaller and regional media went bankrupt as a 
consequence of the pandemic146. 

The working environment and safety of journalists continue to raise concerns147. Access 
to public information remains difficult and journalists continue facing political pressure and 
self-censorship148.  Six  new  alerts  regarding  attacks  and  harassment  of  journalists  were 
registered  on  the  Council  of  Europe  Platform  to  promote  the  protection  of  journalism  and 
safety of journalists149 since the last report. This includes one alert concerning the case of a 
journalist  who  was  allegedly  beaten  by  the  police  and  detained  for  24  hours,  which  the 
Prosecutor’s office refused to investigate. The other alerts regard attacks on and harassment 
of journalists, and other media actors as well as abusive lawsuits. Furthermore, the COVID-
19  pandemic  led  to  the  suspension  of  work  on  the  roadmap,  sent  in  March  2020  to  the 
Bulgarian authorities by Reporters without Borders, to address the press freedom concerns in 
Bulgaria,  including  aspects  such  as  journalists’  safety,  access  to  information,  allocation  of 
state advertising and media funding150. 

IV.  OTHER INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO CHECKS AND BALANCES 

Bulgaria  is  a  representative  democratic  republic  with  a  directly  elected  President,  a 
unicameral National Assembly and a Constitutional Court in charge of constitutional review 
of laws. The National  Assembly has a final  decision-making power when adopting laws151. 
Bulgaria  has  two  national  human  rights  institutions.  First,  the  Ombudsperson  is  an 
independent  constitutional  body,  elected  by  the  National  Assembly  and  tasked  with  the 
promotion  and  protection  of  human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms.  Second,  the 
Commission for Protection against Discrimination is a body that implements policies in the 
spheres of gender equality and non-discrimination.  

The establishment of a post-monitoring mechanism is yet to be finalised. As reported in 
the  CVM  report  of  October  2019152  and  recalled  in  the  2020  Rule  of  Law  Report,  the 
Government decided to establish an additional, more comprehensive mechanism for domestic 
monitoring  centred  in  a  Coordination  and  Cooperation  Council  (‘post-monitoring  council’). 
The  aim  of  the  Council  is  the  assessment  of  Bulgaria’s  progress  in  judicial  reform,  fight 
against  corruption  and  organised  crime  in  an  independent,  transparent,  and  objective 

145  Information received in the context of the country visit to Bulgaria. 
146  2021 Media Pluralism Monitor, Bulgaria, p. 7.  
147  2020 Rule of Law Report, Country chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, p.17. 
148  Information received in the context of the country visit to Bulgaria. 
149  The authorities have not replied to any of the alerts. Council of Europe, Platform to promote the protection 

of journalism and safety of journalists. 
150  Reporters Without Borders, Bulgaria. 
151  Art. 87 of the Constitution: any member of the National Assembly or the Council of Ministers has the right 
to introduce a draft law. It is adopted by the National Assembly in two readings. The adopted draft law is 
sent  to  the  President  of  the  Republic  of  Bulgaria,  who  signs  a  decree  for  its  promulgation.  The  act  is 
promulgated in the State Gazette and enters into force three days after its publication, unless the act provides 
otherwise. See also the recent draft reform of the Constitution mentioned in footnote 40, which extended the 
right  of  legislative  initiative  also  to  the  Councils  for  the  judiciary.  However,  this  was  later  left  out  of  the 
draft. 

152  COM(2019)498, p.3. 

17 

 
                                                 
manner153. The activity of the Council would start once the CVM formally comes to an end. 
However,  the  establishment  of  the  Civic  Council  –  a  body  within  the  Coordination  and 
Cooperation  Council  that  includes  members  of  civil  society  and  for  which  a  selection 
procedure  had  been  launched  –  has  been  suspended,  awaiting  the  decision  of  the  Supreme 
Administrative Court on an appeal on the matter154. 

The Action Plan adopted in response to the 2020 rule of law report includes measures 
seeking to address some identified challenges on the checks and balances This includes 
steps to increase funds for the National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs), and to improve 
the decision-making process. For the latter, two initiatives were envisaged, the creation of a 
Guidance for ex-post impact assessment155 and conducting ex-post impact assessments of key 
laws156. 

A recent study confirms the limited use of public consultation and impact assessment, 
especially for legislation proposed by Members of Parliament. A study conducted by the 
National  Centre  for  Parliamentary  Research,  part  of  the  National  Assembly,  examines  the 
lawmaking activity of the National Assembly from April 2017 to March 2021157. The main 
findings confirm the increased number of draft laws proposed by Members of Parliament158, 
without  compulsory  stakeholder  consultation,  impact  assessment  and  compatibility  check 
with  EU  legislation159  that  applies  to  draft  legislation  proposed  by  the  Government.  The 
authorities committed to adhere to the recently reinforced rules160 and to continue the practice 
of  the  Government  of  submitting  draft  laws  to  the  Parliament  with  a  full  or  partial  impact 
assessment161. However, these efforts to improve the quality of impact assessment and public 
consultations  do  not  cover  the  draft  laws  proposed  by  Members  of  Parliament.  Moreover, 
even  though  the  drafting  of  an  impact  assessment  is  a  mandatory  step  in  the  legislative 
process since 2016, legislative intervention is based only in a limited number of the drafts on 
scientific expertise162. To address this, the authorities committed to start conducting ex-post 
impact  assessments  of  key  legislation,  for  which  Guidance  was  adopted  by  the  Council  of 
Ministers  on  3  December  2020163.  Furthermore,  public  consultation  and  stakeholders’ 
feedback  are  also  an  integral  part  of  the  process.  However,  in  most  of  the  proposed  draft 
legislation164 there is no information on public consultations or discussions organised by the 
Members  of  Parliament  or  the  Government  to  determine  the  problems  and  reasons  for  the 

153  The Decree No. 21 of 14 February 2020 has amended the original entry into force of the Decree (No. 240 of 

the Council of Ministers of 2019) establishing the National Mechanism for Monitoring.  

154  The appeal has been filed by the NGO affected by the cancellation of the initial procedure for selection of 

the so-called Civil Council within the post-monitoring mechanism. 

155  Adopted by Decision No. 885 of the Council of Ministers of 3 December 2020. 
156  The key laws are defined by the Council of Administrative Reform, after a 5-year term, as per the Law on 

Legal Acts of 2016. 

157  For more information see https://www.parliament.bg/pub/NCIOM/2021 
158  During  the  44th  National  Assembly,  more  than  60%  of  the  draft  laws  were  proposed  by  Members  of  the 
Parliament. – Study of the lawmaking activity of the National Assembly (April 2017 – March 2021), p.9. 

159  Study of the lawmaking activity of the National Assembly (April 2017 – March 2021), p.62. 
160  The  methodology  for  impact  assessment  was  updated  in  2019.  The  Council  for  administrative  reform  (a 
consultative  body  to  the  Council  of  Ministers)  approved  new  templates  and  guidance  on  the  impact 
assessments in February 2021. The government also publishes the list of impact assessments on its website 
for consultations. - www.strategy.bg. 

161  The website of the Parliament shows that the Council of Ministers’ draft laws have these documents. 
162  Study of the lawmaking activity of the National Assembly (April 2017 – March 2021), p.16 and p.20. 
163  Council of Ministers (2020), Guidance for ex-post impact assessment. 
164  In 93% of the draft legislation - See Study of the lawmaking activity of the National Assembly (April 2017 – 

March 2021), p.56-57. 

18 

 
                                                 
adoption  of  the  draft  law165.  Furthermore,  the  reasons  for  adoption  of  a  law  included  the 
views of some or all stakeholders in very few of the proposed draft laws166. 

The practice of introducing important legislative amendments through amendments to 
other  legal  acts  continues  to  raise  concerns.  The  legislative  technique  of  using  the 
transitional provisions of one legal act to introduce major amendments in another unrelated 
act  has  continued167.  This  confirms  the  concerns  raised  in  the  2020  Rule  of  Law  Report  as 
such amendments bypass the requirements for public consultation and impact assessment168. 
Moreover, another trend, which was identified in the 2020 Rule of Law Report, and continues 
to raise concerns, is the legislative practice of adopting major amendments between the first 
and second reading in the National Assembly without public consultation 169. 

The  emergency  situation  regime  related  to  the  COVID-19  pandemic  is  still  in  place. 
Following the adoption of the ‘state of emergency’ regime from 13 March to 13 May 2020170, 
on 12 May 2020, an amendment to  the Health Act  was adopted171  which introduced a new 
emergency  regime  (‘emergency  epidemic  situation’)172.  On  13  May  2020,  the  Council  of 
Ministers, on a proposal by the Minister of Health, decided to declare an emergency epidemic 
situation for the duration of one month, which has been regularly renewed and is still in force 
until  [31  July  2021].  This  new  emergency  regime  was  reviewed  by  the  Constitutional 
Court173, which decided on 23 July 2020 that the regime is compliant with the Constitution174.  

The  National  Assembly  adopted  rules  to  ensure  continuity  during  the  COVID-19 
pandemic.  In  order  to  adapt  to  the  situation,  the  National  Assembly  continued  its  regular 
work  and  on  6  November  2020  adopted  rules,  adding  the  option  of  videoconference 
participation  in  plenary  meetings  for  Members  of  Parliament  who  are  placed  under 
mandatory isolation or quarantine due to COVID-19175. On 23 November 2020, 54 Members 

165  See previous reference... 
166  In 9% of the draft legislation – See Study of the lawmaking activity of the National Assembly (April 2017 – 

March 2021), p.59. 

167  In 37% of the proposed draft laws, the final and transitional provisions amended another legislation, which is 
2% more in comparison to the previous National Assembly. Study of the lawmaking activity of the National 
Assembly (April 2017 – March 2021), p.46. (E.g. introducing amendments to the Criminal Code through the 
Maritime Merchant Code, making unregulated transport of people a criminal offense, despite it being already 
punishable under the administrative legislation). 

168  2020 Rule of Law Report, Country chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, , p.19. 
169  Information  received  in  the  context  of  the  country  visit  to  Bulgaria.  For  instance,  see  law  establishing  the 
mechanism for accountability and criminal liability of the Prosecutor General and his or her deputies, where, 
the  amendments  between  the  two  readings  were  introduced  at  the  deadline  and  approved  shortly  after 
without thorough debate The process can be explored at https://www.parliament.bg/bg/bills/ID/163448 

170  National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria (2020), 

Decision  to  declare  state  of  emergency-  13 
March  2020,  and  National  Assembly  of  the  Republic  of  Bulgaria  (2020),  Decision  to  extend  the  state  of 
emergency  –  3  April  2020  -  This  decision  gave  extensive  powers  to  the  Government  in  order  to  take  all 
necessary measures to deal with the emergency. 
171  Law to amend and supplement the Health Act. 
172  Art.  63  Health  Act.  According  to  this  new  regime,  the  Council  of  Ministers  could  declare  an  emergency 
epidemic situation for a certain period of time at the suggestion of the Minister of Health. This would allow 
some  of  the  measures  taken  under  the  state  of  emergency  to  continue  to  apply  and  new  ones  to  be 
introduced, despite the end of the state of emergency. 

173  On the request of the President of the Republic; Constitutional Court, Case No. 7 of 2020.  
174  Constitutional Court Decision No. 10 of 2020 of Case No. 7 of 2020, 23 July 2020.  
175  Input from Bulgaria for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p.42-43. 

19 

 
                                                 
of Parliament challenged the constitutionality of these rules before the Constitutional court176, 
which considered them compatible with the Constitution177. 

Financial  and  human  resources  of  the  National  Human  Rights  Institutions  have  been 
increased.  There  have  been  increases  in  the  budgets  of  the  Ombudsperson  and  the 
Commission for Protection Against Discrimination. The Bulgarian authorities informed that 
the budget forecast over the period 2021–2023 foresees an increase of 10% of the personnel 
funds for both institutions. Moreover, in view of improving the capacity of the institution of 
the Ombudsperson, the draft budget envisages additional expenditure178. 

The  draft  legislation  on  increased  transparency  of  foreign  funding  for  NGOs  has  not 
been  further  pursued.  The  draft  law  that  was  tabled  on  3  July  2020179  and  aimed  at 
imposing  new  obligations  on  non-profit  organisations  had  raised  concerns  among 
stakeholders180  as  regards  its  compliance  with  EU  law181.  Following  the  publication  of  the 
2020 Rule of Law Report, the draft law has not been further discussed182. Nevertheless, the 
civic space remains narrowed183, and in some occasions, members of the civil society appear 
to  be  under  pressure,  through  smear  campaigns,  intimidation  and  negative  narrative184.  In 
November 2020, at the occasion of the Universal Periodic Review, Bulgaria received several 
recommendations related to the need to improve civic space and to address intimidation and 
threats185. 

176  Constitutional Court Case No. 13 of 2020. 
177  Constitutional Court Decision No. 2 of 2021 on Case No. 13 of 2020. 
178  For more information see Action Plan with measures to address the concerns raised by the 2020 Rule of Law 

Report - https://www.strategy.bg/StrategicDocuments/View.aspx?lang=bg-BG&Id=1314 

179  Draft law 054-01-60 - Draft law amending and supplementing the law on non-profit legal entities. 
180  Concerns raised by stakeholders in their opinions published on the website of the  Parliament as part of the 
process for enacting the law include limitations of the freedom of association and free movement of capital, 
as well as the publicity of the register which could also result from implementing acts (see contribution from 
Bulgarian  Centre  for  Not-for-profit  Law,  Bulgarian  Donation  Forum,  Bulgarian  Helsinki  Committee),  - 
https://www.parliament.bg/bg/bills/ID/157496 

181  In the same line – see Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 18 June 2020, Commission v. 

Hungary, C-78/18.  

182  Once  the  mandate  a  National  Assembly  expires,  the  pending  draft  legislations  lapse.  They  may  be 
reintroduced  by  the  next  National  Assembly,  however,  the  legislative  process  should  start  from  the  very 
beginning. 

183  See  rating  given  by  Civicus,  Bulgaria.  Ratings  are  on  a  five-category  scale  defined  as:  open,  narrowed, 

obstructed, repressed and closed. 

184  Information received in the context of the country visit to Bulgaria. 
185  Contribution from UN OHCHR Regional Office for Europe for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, pp. 8-9 

20 

 
 
 
                                                 
Annex I: List of sources in alphabetical order* 

* The list of contributions received in the context of the consultation for the 2021 Rule of Law report 
can  be  found  at  https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-
law/rule-law/rule-law-mechanism/2021-rule-law-report-targeted-stakeholder-consultation. 

Bulgarian Centre for Not-for-profit Law (2021), Contribution from the Bulgarian Centre for Not-for-
profit Law for the 2021 Rule of Law Report. 

Bulgarian  Donation  Forum  (2021),  Contribution  from  the  Bulgarian  Donation  Forum  for  the  2021 
Rule of Law Report. 

Bulgarian Government (2021), Input from Bulgaria for the 2021 Rule of Law Report. 

Bulgarian  Government  (2021),  Draft  National  Corruption  Prevention  and  Counteraction  Strategy 
(2021-2027) (https://www.strategy.bg/PublicConsultations/View.aspx?lang=bg-BG&Id=5828). 

Bulgarian  Helsinki  Committee  (2021),  Contribution  from  the  Bulgarian  Helsinki  Committee  for  the 
2021 Rule of Law Report. 

Bulgarian Institute for Legal Initiatives Foundation (2021), Contribution from the Bulgarian Institute 
for Legal Initiatives Foundation for the 2021 Rule of Law Report. 

Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (2021), Media pluralism monitor 2021 – Report on 
Bulgaria. 

CEPEJ  (2013),  Revised  Guidelines  on  the  Creation  of  Judicial  Maps  to  Support  Access  to  Justice 
within  a  Quality  Judicial  System  (https://rm.coe.int/european-commission-for-the-efficiency-of-
justice-cepej-revised-guidel/168078c492). 

CEPEJ (2020), Study on the functioning of the judicial systems in the EU Member States. 

Civicus, Monitor tracking civic space – Bulgaria (https://monitor.civicus.org/country/bulgaria/). 

Constitutional Court Case No. 15 of 2020 - http://www.constcourt.bg/bg/Cases/Details/585 

Constitutional  Court  Decision  No. 
of 
6 
http://www.constcourt.bg/bg/Acts/GetHtmlContent/96c8d204-d2eb-4785-beac-7133ed3b6cd2 

on  Case  No. 

2021 

15 

of 

2020. 

Council  of  Europe,  Platform  to  promote  the  protection  of  journalism  and  safety  of  journalists, 
(https://www.coe.int/en/web/media-freedom/bulgaria). 

Council  of  Europe:  Committee  of  Ministers  (2010),  Recommendation  CM/Rec(2010)12  of  the 
Committee of Ministers to member states on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities. 

Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers (2019), Decision CM/Notes/1362/H46-6. 

Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers (2019), Interim Resolution, CM/ResDH(2019)367. 

Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers (2020), Decision CM/Del/Dec(2020)1377bis/H46-9. 

Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers (2021), Decision CM/Notes/1398/H46-6 of 9-11 March, 
(https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=0900001680a1abfa).  

Council  of  Europe:  Department  for  the  Execution  of  Judgments  of  the  European  Court  of  Human 
Rights (2021), Memorandum H/Exec(2021)9. 

Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2010),  Report on the Independence of the Judicial System 
Part I: The Independence of Judges (CDL-AD(2010)004). 

Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2017), Bulgaria - Opinion on the judicial system act (CDL-
AD(2017)018). 

Council  of  Europe:  Venice  Commission  (2019),  Bulgaria  -  Opinion  on  draft  amendments  to  the 
Criminal Procedure Code and the Judicial System Act, concerning criminal investigations against top 
magistrates (CDL-AD(2019)031). 

21 

 
Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2020), Bulgaria - Urgent interim opinion on the draft new 
constitution opinion (CDL-AD(2020)035). 

Council  of  Europe:  Venice  Commission  (2020),  Poland  -  Joint  Urgent  Opinion  of  the  Venice 
Commission and the Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of Law (DGI) of the Council of 
Europe on amendments to the Law on the Common courts, the Law on the Supreme court and some 
other Laws, (CDL-AD(2020)017). 

Council  of  the  European  Union  (2017),  Council  conclusions  on  the  Cooperation  and  Verification 
Mechanism (https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/20171212-st15587_en.pdf). 

Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 18 June 2020, Commission v. Hungary, C-78/18 

Council 
Guidance 
(https://www.strategy.bg/Publications/View.aspx?lang=bg-BG&categoryId=&Id=320&y=&m=&d). 

of  Ministers 

assessment. 

(2020), 

ex-post 

impact 

for 

Directorate-General  for  Communication  (2019),  Flash  Eurobarometer  482:  businesses’  attitudes 
towards corruption in the EU. 

Directorate-General for Communication (2020), Special Eurobarometer 502: corruption. 

European  Commission  (2019),  Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Council  on  Progress 
the  Cooperation  and  Verification  Mechanism, 
COM(2019)498 

in  Bulgaria  under 

European Commission (2020), 2020 Rule of Law Report - The rule of law situation in the European 
Union 

European Commission (2021), EU Justice Scoreboard. 

European  Commission:  European  Anti-Fraud  Office,  OLAF  recommends  recovery  of  nearly  €6 
million  after  alleged  abuse  of  power  at  Bulgarian  ministry-  EU  press  release  No.  04/2021 
(https://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/media-corner/news/01-02-2021/olaf-recommends-recovery-nearly-
eu6-million-after-alleged-abuse-power_en). 

European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 5 February 2010, Kolevi v. Bulgaria 

European  Network  of  Councils  for  the  Judiciary  (2019),  Independence  and  Accountability  of  the 
Judiciary – ENCJ Survey on the independence of judges. 

European  Parliament  (2020),  Resolution  on  the  rule  of  law  and  fundamental  rights  in  Bulgaria, 
(2020/2793(RSP). 

European  Parliament,  Member  states  must  stop  selling  EU  passports  immediately,  MEPs  demand- 
Press 
(https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-
room/20201016IPR89564/member-states-must-stop-selling-eu-passports-immediately-meps-demand). 

October 

release 

2020. 

22 

Finland’s  Presidency  of 
(https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14856-2019-INIT/en/pdf). 

the  Council  of 

the  European  Union  (2019),  Presidency  report 

Fundamental Rights Agency (2020), Coronavirus COVID-19 outbreak in the EU Fundamental Rights 
Implications 
(https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/bulgaria-report-covid-19-april-
2020_en.pdf).  

Fundamental  Rights  Agency  (2021),  Legal  environment  and  space  of  civil  society  organisations  in 
supporting fundamental rights in Bulgaria. 

respect 

GRECO (2015), Fourth Evaluation Round – Evaluation report on Bulgaria on corruption prevention 
in 
prosecutors: 
(https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000
016806c983f). 

parliament, 

members 

judges 

and 

of 

of 

for  Market  Economics 

Institute 
(2021),  Study  on 
(https://ime.bg/bg/articles/komandirovane-na-magistrati-ili-kadruvane-
tihomylkom/#ixzz6pUEALbxu). 

(IME) 

secondment  of  magistrates 

22 

 
Magistrats  Européens  pour  la  Démocratie  et  les  Libertés  (2021),  Contribution  from  Magistrats 
Européens pour la Démocratie et les Libertés for the 2021 Rule of Law Report. 

of 

Ministry 
2030 
(https://www.minfin.bg/upload/46720/National%2BDevelopment%2BProgramme%2BBULGARIA%
2B2030.pdf). 

(2019),  National  Development  Programme  Bulgaria 

Finance 

National  Assembly  of  the Republic  of  Bulgaria  (2017),  Rules of organisation  and  procedure  of  the 
National Assembly (https://www.parliament.bg/en/rulesoftheorganisations). 

National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria (2020),  Decision  to  declare  state  of  emergency-  13 
March 2020 (https://www.parliament.bg/bg/desision/ID/157374). 

National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria (2020), Decision to extend the state of emergency – 3 
April 2020 ( https://www.parliament.bg/bg/desision/ID/157396). 

Press release concerning the open letter to the SJC against the chosen model for judicial map reform 
signed by 500 judges. - https://news.lex.bg/564 

Press release from the Supreme Court of Cassation on the National Institute for Justice Management - 
http://www.vks.bg/novini/nip.html 

Reporters without Borders – Bulgaria, (https://rsf.org/en/bulgaria).  

Supreme Court of Cassation of Bulgaria (2019), Annual Report 2020. 

Supreme Court of Cassation of Bulgaria (2021), Contribution from the Supreme Court of Cassation of 
Bulgaria for the 2021 Rule of Law Report 

The 

Supreme 

Bar 

Council 

criticism 

about 

the 

judicial  map 

reform 

- 

https://www.vas.bg/bg/a/predlozheniyata-za-reforma-na-sdebnata-karta. 

Transparency International (2021), Corruption Perceptions Index 2020. 

U.S  Department  of  the  Treasury  (2021),  Specially  designated  nationals  list  update-  2  June  2021 

(https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20210602 ). 

UN OHCHR Regional Office for Europe (2021), Contribution from the UN OHCHR Regional Office 
for Europe for the 2021 Rule of Law Report. 

23 

 
 
 
 
Annex II – Country visit to Bulgaria 

The Commission services held virtual meetings in March 2021 with: 

  Access to Information Programme 
  Administration Modernization Directorate 
  Anti-Corruption Council 
  Anti-corruption Fund Foundation  
  Association of European Journalists – Bulgaria 
  Association of Prosecutors in Bulgaria 
  Audio-Visual regulator – CEM 
  Bulgarian Institute for Legal Initiatives  
  Bulgarian Judges Association 
  Centre for the Study of Democracy  
  Commission for countering corruption and for forfeiture of illegally acquired assets 
  For the truth project 
 
 
  Ministry of Culture  
  Ministry of Interior 
  Ministry of Justice 
  National Council for Journalistic Ethics 
  Office of the Prosecutor General 
  Sofia Bar Association 
  Specialised Criminal Court 
  Specialised Prosecutor's Office 
  Supreme Bar Council 
  Supreme Court of Cassation 
  Supreme Judicial Council 
  Union of Publishers in Bulgaria 

Inspectorate to the Supreme Judicial Council 
Institute for Market Economics  

* The Commission also met the following organisations in a number of horizontal meetings: 

  Amnesty International 

  Center for Reproductive Rights 

  CIVICUS 

  Civil Liberties Union for Europe 

  Civil Society Europe 

  Conference of European Churches 

  EuroCommerce 

  European Center for Not-for-Profit Law 

  European Centre for Press and Media Freedom 

  European Civic Forum 

  European Federation of Journalists 

  European Partnership for Democracy  

24 

 
 
  European Youth Forum 

  Front Line Defenders 

  Human Rights House Foundation  

  Human Rights Watch  

 

 

 

 

 

ILGA-Europe 

International Commission of Jurists 

International Federation for Human Rights 

International Planned Parenthood Federation European Network (IPPF EN) 

International Press Institute 

  Netherlands Helsinki Committee  

  Open Society European Policy Institute 

  Philanthropy Advocacy 

  Protection International  

  Reporters without Borders 

  Transparency International EU 

25