COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Subsidiarity Grid Accompanying the document Proposal for a Council Directive restructuring the Union framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity (recast)
Date: 2021-07-14
Institutions: Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union, European Commission
Subjects: electrical energy, energy-generating product, environmental tax, fiscal policy

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 14.7.2021  SWD(2021) 640 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Subsidiarity Grid Accompanying the document Proposal for a Council Directive restructuring the Union framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity (recast) {COM(2021) 563 final} - {SWD(2021) 641 final} - {SWD(2021) 642 final} - {SEC(2021) 663 final}  
 
 
Subsidiarity Grid 

1.  Can the Union act? What is the legal basis and competence of the Unions’ intended action? 

1.1 Which article(s) of the Treaty are used to support the legislative proposal or policy initiative? 

The proposal is based on Article 113 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 
which permits the EU to lay down harmonised rules in order to ensure the proper functioning of the 
internal market. This article provides for the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special 
legislative  procedure  and  after  consulting  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Economic  and  Social 
Committee, to adopt provisions for the harmonisation of Member States' rules in the area of indirect 
taxation.  Additionally,  appropriate  provisions  of  fiscal  nature  intended,  inter  alia,  to  preserve  and 
protect the environment can be adopted according to Article 192(2), first paragraph, of the TFEU. 

1.2 Is the Union competence represented by this Treaty article exclusive, shared or supporting in 
nature? 

In the case of taxation, the Union’s competence is shared. 
Article 113 of the Treaty on the  Functioning of the European Union provides that the Council shall 
adopt provisions for the harmonisation of legislation concerning excise duties to the extent that such 
harmonisation is necessary to ensure the establishment and the functioning of the internal market. 

Subsidiarity does not apply for policy areas where the Union has exclusive competence as defined in 
Article 3 TFEU1. It is the specific legal basis which determines whether the proposal falls under the 
subsidiarity control mechanism. Article 4 TFEU2 sets out the areas where competence is shared 
between the Union and the Member States. Article 6 TFEU3 sets out the areas for which the Unions 
has competence only to support the actions of the Member States. 

2.  Subsidiarity Principle: Why should the EU act? 

2.1 Does the proposal fulfil the procedural requirements of Protocol No. 24: 

-  Has there been a wide consultation before proposing the act? 
- 

Is there a detailed statement with qualitative and, where possible, quantitative indicators 
allowing an appraisal of whether the action can best be achieved at Union level? 

The  present  proposal  has  been  formulated  taking  into  account  a  wide  range  of  external 
contributions.  Stakeholders  were  consulted  first  via  the  Inception  Impact  Assessment  feedback 
mechanism and then via a dedicated Public Consultation.  
The public consultation was open from 22 July 2020 to 14 October 2020. In total, 563 responses from 
25 Member States and from 5 third countries were received, together with 129 position papers. 
Besides  the  public  consultation,  direct  consultations  with  Member  States,  including  requests  for 
input in view of the computation of effective tax rates, as well as with other stakeholders were also 
undertaken.  An  external  study  on  the  taxation  of  the  aviation  has  also  been  commissioned  by  DG 
TAXUD for the purpose of the impact assessment. 

2.2 Does the explanatory memorandum (and any impact assessment) accompanying the 

Commission’s proposal contain an adequate justification regarding the conformity with the 
principle of subsidiarity? 

1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12008E003&from=EN  
2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12008E004&from=EN  
3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12008E006:EN:HTML  
4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12016E/PRO/02&from=EN  

1 

 
 
                                                           
The  proposal  falls  under  shared  Union  and  Member  State  competence.  Therefore,  the  subsidiarity 
principle applies. Article 113 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides that 
the Council shall adopt provisions for the harmonisation of legislation concerning excise duties to the 
extent that such harmonisation is necessary to ensure the establishment and the functioning of the 
internal market. Additionally, appropriate provisions of fiscal nature intended, inter alia, to preserve 
and protect the environment can be adopted according to Article 192(2), first paragraph, of the TFEU 
The proposal for the revision of the ETD and its timing need to be seen in the broader context of the 
EU energy and climate change agenda. The objective to bring the ETD more closely in line with the 
EU  objectives  and  goals  in  this  field  can  only  be  implemented  by  means  of  an  act  adopted  by  the 
Union, recasting the ETD. 

2.3 Based on the answers to the questions below, can the objectives of the proposed action be 

achieved sufficiently by the Member States acting alone (necessity for EU action)? 

The  contribution  of  taxation  to  the  European  Green  Deal  climate  and  environmentally-related 
objectives can be ensured most adequately at the EU level. In fact, only a harmonised framework can 
help  to  attain  the  EU  levels  of  ambition  in  these  areas  while  seeking  to  preserve  both  the 
competitiveness  of  the  productive  sectors  and  the  adequate  level  playing  field  among  sectors  and 
energy uses. Similarly, the EU’s contribution to achieve higher climate ambitions globally will be most 
effective if the EU coordinates all the possible policy instruments, including taxation, in the context of 
an ambition plan, which encompasses also the extension of the ETS and other relevant policy actions. 
Member States acting alone cannot achieve the objectives of the proposed action. 

(a)  Are there significant/appreciable transnational/cross-border aspects to the problems being 

tackled? Have these been quantified? 

The Energy Taxation Directive (ETD) is predominantly a single market directive so the great majority 
of  the  issues  at  stake  are  of  a  cross-border  nature.  There  are  no  global  quantified  cross-border 
impacts  of  the  inharmonious  application  of  the  ETD  due  to  the  complexity  of  framework  and  the 
flexible application throughout the EU. However, it is recognised that motor fuels that can be easily 
and legally transported across borders. If the final prices in the neighbouring states vary significantly, 
it creates an incentive to consumers crossing borders in order to refuel their vehicles at lower prices 
(tank tourism) in bordering regions thus depleting revenues in one Member States while inflating in 
another. The extent of this phenomenon, while observable, is nevertheless of a local nature. 

(b)  Would national action or the absence of the EU level action conflict with core objectives of 

the Treaty5 or significantly damage the interests of other Member States? 

It  could  happen,  particularly  in  the  frontier  regions  of  countries  with  significantly  diverging 
frameworks, including effective tax rates. If the Member States apply highly divergent national rates, 
in particular in combination with a wide range of tax exemptions and reductions, they create a risk of 
distortion of the level playing field across the involved sectors of the economy and an erosion of the 
tax base in high-taxing countries, notably for motor fuels that can be easily and legally transported 
across  borders  as  explained  above.  The  harmonisation  of  energy  taxation  through  the  Energy  Tax 
Directive  should  contribute  to  avoid  the  harmful  effects  of  energy  tax  competition  between  the 
Member  States,  stemming  for  example  from  the  relocation  of  consumers  of  energy  (in  particular 
businesses) to Member States with more beneficial tax regimes. 
Besides, without coordinated effort and same goals in perspective, the actions of one Member State 
could  be  threatened,  or  neutralised,  by  the  lack  of  similar  action  –  or,  in  worst  case  scenario,  a 
contrary action – by another Member State. 

5 https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-in-brief_en  

2 

 
 
                                                           
(c)  To what extent do Member States have the ability or possibility to enact appropriate 

measures? 

Under the existing provisions, Member States can increase the rates of their energy taxes, decide not 
to make use of possible exemptions and reductions or introduce climate related objectives. They are 
in principle free to set the levels of taxation as they please as long as the minimum levels specified in 
the  Directive  are  respected.  However,  such  national  approaches  risk  distorting  the  internal  market 
and  undermining  the  Green  Deal  objectives  due  to  the  non-harmonised  structure  and  level  of  the 
national taxes. The Member States would need to multilaterally approximate their rates to create a 
more even level playing field but  that  is unlikely to happen as the directive  leave a great  room for 
manoeuvre  and  the  Member  States  fix  their  rates  in  the  context of  their  national  energy,  climate, 
fiscal and social policies. Since the actions of any given economic agent, including a state, are driven 
by own interest, in order to preserve the internal market, a framework of common acceptable rules 
with common acceptable minimum rates would preserve the interest of the EU as a whole. 

(d)  How does the problem and its causes (e.g. negative externalities, spill-over effects) vary 

across the national, regional and local levels of the EU? 

Some  problems  are  indeed  accentuated  in  frontier  areas  between  neighbouring  Member  States, 
where  there  was  evidence  of  relocation  of  the  consumption  of  motor  fuels  and  heating  fuels.  For 
example,  Member  States  have  the  possibility  of  setting  national  rates  above  the  minimum  levels 
defined in the ETD, resulting in highly divergent national rates for transport fuels. These differences 
induced  a  phenomenon  of  consumers  crossing  borders  in  order  to  refuel  their  vehicles  at  lower 
prices (tank tourism) in bordering regions. This indicates local distortion of competition while in all 
conformity with the current framework. 

(e)  Is the problem widespread across the EU or limited to a few Member States? 

The  Energy  Tax  Directive  is  predominantly  a  single  market  directive  and  most  of  its  shortcomings 
relate  to  the  functioning  of  the  internal  market  as  a  whole.  The  directive  does  not  affect  all  the 
Member States in the same way given its ample scope for flexibility of its application, depending on 
national prerogatives. In general, two groups of Member States can be distinguished:  
- 
a  group  of  "low-taxing  Member  States",  typically  taxing  at  rates  close  to  the  minima  and 
having  had  often,  although  not  in  all  cases,  introduced  taxation  only  as  a  consequence  of  the 
existence of common minimum rates; 
- 
a  group  of  "high-taxing  Member  States"  with  tax  levels  more  or  less  clearly  above  the 
minima.  For  these  countries  the  existence  of  common  minima  is  particularly  important  to  reduce 
competitive disadvantages for their industry. These countries also often make use of the possibility 
to apply reduced rates for energy-intensive businesses. 

(f)  Are Member States overstretched in achieving the objectives of the planned measure? 

Measures at Member State level alone would not be able to achieve the objectives of the proposed 
initiative  or  the  objectives  of  broader  EU  policies.  Any  future  natural  alignment  across  the  EU 
Member States would likely be a lengthy and inefficient process. 

(g)  How do the views/preferred courses of action of national, regional and local authorities 

differ across the EU? 

One of the main concerns raised by the stakeholders relates to the relevance of the current ETD in 
terms  of  its  static  definition  of  energy  products  and  electricity.  The  consultation  conducted  in  the 
course of evaluation of the ETD also revealed that national authorities and economic operators are 
generally in favour of bringing new products under the coverage of the ETD, mostly to ensure equal 

3 

 
 
tax  treatment  of  different  products  for  the  same  use.  At  the  same  time,  no  Member  State  or 
economic  operator  was  in  favour  of  excluding  any  further  energy  products  or  uses,  which  are 
currently covered by the ETD.  
In some cases economic operators were motivated to include new products and uses into the scope 
of the ETD in order for those to be covered by exemptions and reductions. Although the ETD qualifies 
many of those products as taxable if used as motor fuel or for heating purposes, it does not provide 
any clear legal framework for the exemption of these alternative products used for similar purposes, 
as its provisions on exemptions and reductions mostly contain explicit references to energy products 
and electricity. 

2.4 Based on the answer to the questions below, can the objectives of the proposed action be 

better achieved at Union level by reason of scale or effects of that action (EU added value)? 

(a)  Are there clear benefits from EU level action?  

Yes. The absence of an increase in minimum rates for more than a decade at EU level has eroded the 
tax-induced price signal that was supposed to encourage investment in energy-efficient technology 
and  behaviour.  Moreover,  as  some  Member  States  have  increased  their  national  level  of  taxation 
since  then  while  others  have  not,  there  is  risk  of  growing  distortion  of  competition  in  the  single 
market and an erosion of the tax base in high-taxing countries, notably for motor fuels that can be 
easily and legally transported across borders. In spite of repeated Commission calls for a shift in the 
taxation  from  labour  to  environmental  taxes,  the  overall  percentage  of  tax  revenues  from 
environmental taxes in the EU has remained relatively unchanged over the last decade. 
Another  consideration  concerns  the  current’  directive’s  scope,  the  static  definition  of  energy 
products  and  the  evolving  energy  mix.  The  ETD  was  adopted  long  before  the  emergence  of  new 
technologies  and  uses  that  are  predicted  to  become  important  building  blocks  on  the  path  to  the 
EU's decarbonised future. As a result, the current ETD regime is not properly devised to ensure the 
preferential  treatment  of  these  new  energy  products  and  applications.  In  the  worst  cases, 
uncertainties resulting from the  ETD hinder investment in low-carbon technologies. By default, the 
ETD  applies  standard  tax  treatment  to  electricity  and  biofuels,  without  differentiating  between 
renewable  and  fossil  fuel  based  electricity  or  the  environmental  performance  of  biofuels.  In  the 
absence of differentiation of biofuels in the ETD, Member States would continue applying their own, 
often  diverging  classifications,  which  on  top  of  it  often  cannot  be  applied  to  the  characteristics  of 
biofuels produced in other Member States. Clearly, a common agreed framework for definition and 
treatment  of  energy  and  energy  products  would  be  by  far  more  predictable,  stable  and  less 
distortion-prone than individual actions by even group of Member States. 

(b)  Are there economies of scale? Can the objectives be met more efficiently at EU level (larger 

benefits per unit cost)? Will the functioning of the internal market be improved? 

It is not about the economies of scale but about a coordinated approach and harmonised rules. The 
rules  set  out  currently  are  no  longer  adapted  to  the  new  climate  change  and  energy  policy 
framework and contain several shortcomings from the perspective of the proper functioning of the 
internal market and in relation to the needs of the other EU policies. In particular energy and climate 
policies  and  initiatives  have  substantially  developed  since  the  ETD's  adoption.  The  EU  and  its 
Member States have committed to swiftly and fully implement the Paris Agreement, to contribute to 
the  fulfilment  of  sustainable  finance  goals,  and  to  continue  to  lead  in  the  fight  against  climate 
change. Taxation is set to play an important role in the achievement of these objectives but without 
a well designed EU framework, it will not happen.  
For example, the share of the ETD minimum in industrial prices has become insignificant and thus not 

4 

 
 
 
allowing for a positive contribution to the functioning of the EU internal market. Thus, the potential 
of  the  ETD  to  reinforce  core  EU  policies  aimed  at  driving  progress  towards  the  completion  of  the 
internal market remains untapped unless this is uniformly corrected throughout the entire EU.  
As put forward by the Commission in its 2018 Communication on a “Clean Planet for all - A European 
long-term  strategic  vision  for  a  prosperous,  modern,  competitive  and  climate  neutral  economy”, 
taxation  and  climate  action  and  energy  policies  should  be  aligned.  This  was  reiterated  in  the 2019 
Commission Communication, where it was stressed that a future energy taxation framework should: 
(i) support the clean energy transition; (ii) contribute to sustainable and fair growth; and (iii) reflect 
social equity considerations. 

(c)  What are the benefits in replacing different national policies and rules with a more 

homogenous policy approach? 

The  proposal  does  not  intend  to  replace  national  policies  and  rules  but  to  approximate  approach, 
coverage  and  tax  treatment  of  energy  and  energy  products  across the  EU to preserve  the  internal 
market.  The  ETD  sets  (only)  the  minimum  levels  of  taxation.  Member  States  are  free  to  set  their 
respective rates above these minima and introduce additional taxes, without an upper limit. These 
minimum rates have not been updated since the ETD was adopted, nor are they indexed to external 
developments  such  as  inflation  or  a  CO2  benchmark.  As  a  result,  they  have  remained  unchanged 
since the adoption of the current Directive, which has led to an erosion of the impact of minimum 
rates as well as to the increasingly diverging national implementation of nominal tax rates. Bringing 
the  minima  to  the  levels  corresponding  to  the  contemporary  conditions  and  broader  policy 
objectives would provide the safety net for the internal market and prevent race-to-the-bottom and 
unfair  competition  between  Member  States  (and  sectors).  The  current  directive  is  no  longer  fit  to 
achieve this purpose. 
The  ETD  also  lists  possible  reductions  and  exemptions.  The  conditions  under  which  these  can  be 
granted  are  defined  very  broadly,  resulting  in  highly  divergent  national  implementation  of 
exemptions and reductions. Beyond the discretionary application of exemptions and reductions, the 
discretionary  implementation  of  other  provisions  also  undermine  the  objective  of  harmonisation. 
Such  include:  uncertainty  in  the  application  of  the  control  and  movement  provisions  and  the 
definition  of  the  conditions  establishing  the  chargeable  event.  A  divergent  interpretation  and 
implementation  of  these  provisions  may  be  an  obstacle  to  the  free  movement  of  goods  and 
investment capital. 
For example, in some Member States, exemptions and reductions granted to large industrial users, 
result in an effective rate 90% lower than the nominal rate. In other Member States, the impact of 
reductions for the same type of consumer is limited to below 5%. 
Moreover,  as  highlighted  in  the  Communication,  the  presence  of  sector-specific  energy  tax 
exemptions or reductions, notably in the aviation, maritime and road haulage sectors and for energy-
intensive  industries,  in  general  substantially  weakens  the  incentives  for  investing  in  more  energy-
efficient capital stock and production processes in these sectors. These tax exemptions or reductions 
also  constitute  a  burden  for  other  sectors  and/or  private  households  that  have  to  make  up  the 
revenue shortfalls triggered by them. Furthermore, they may distort competition between industrial 
sectors and may promote inefficient and polluting modes of transport. 

(d)  Do the benefits of EU-level action outweigh the loss of competence of the Member States 
and the local and regional authorities (beyond the costs and benefits of acting at national, 
regional and local levels)? 

The flexibility principle would remain for member States as they would still be allowed to apply some 
exemptions  and  set  rates  freely  as  long  as  they  stay  above  the  minima.  The  competence  transfer 
would be limited to agreeing on a common set of definitions and coordinated treatment of energy 
and  energy  products  for  tax  purposes,  including  agreed  minimum  rates.  Revision  of  the  energy 

5 

 
 
taxation  rules  would  help  to  address  global  challenges,  expressed  also  in  the  EU  strategic  policies, 
starting  with  the  European  Green  Deal’s  climate  neutrality  objectives  as  well  as  energy  market 
integration, bringing ultimate benefits to all EU citizens. Therefore, acting at the EU level will enable 
to  support  and  reinforce  the  cooperation  of  all  the  Member  States  in  contributing  to  the 
achievement of key energy and climate policy objectives. 

(e)  Will there be improved legal clarity for those having to implement the legislation? 

Yes. The high divergence of national frameworks for taxation of energy and energy products adds to 
the  complexity  of  the  system  and  increases  uncertainty  for  the  businesses.  Such  issues  are 
nevertheless case specific and depend on the nature and geographical scope of activities of any given 
business.  The  main  shortcomings  with  regard  to  clarity  and  completeness  of  provisions  as  well  as 
structure  of  the  ETD  include:  eleven  cases  of  late  transposition,  outdated  classification  under  the 
Combined Nomenclature (CN), and lack of clarity of several provisions of the ETD.  
Albeit  the  ETD  allows  for  the  update  of  CN  codes,  such  updates  cannot  result  in  the  addition  or 
removal  of  products  from  the  scope  of  the  ETD.  Since  the  technology  advanced  and  the  energy 
market  exhibits  an  array  of  new  products  not  included  in  the  current  directive,  a  section  of  the 
energy and energy products market is unregulated. Bringing the new products into the scope of the 
directive would provide common definitions, approach and this increase the certainty for businesses, 
amongst other improvements.  
In relation to the clarity of the ETD, different national interpretations emerged for specific provisions. 
These include:  definition of taxable products; tradable permit schemes; definitions of the uses which 
are out of the scope – mineralogical and metallurgical processes; or interpretation of the exemption 
related  to  motor  fuels  used  in  air  and  water  navigation,  etc.  There  is  also  the  need  to  align  the 
terminology of the ETD with case-law by the CJEU. Following the adoption of the Directive the CJEU 
has  clarified  the  interpretation  of  certain  provisions.  As  a  result,  the  text  of  the  Directive  and  the 
Court's  interpretation  could  lead  to  diverging  application of the  ETD  by the Member  States  and  to 
different understanding by the economic operators. 
For example, in the absence of differentiation of biofuels in the ETD, Member States apply their own 
classifications.  These  are  often  diverging  or  cannot  be  applied  to  the  characteristics  of  biofuels 
produced  in  other  Member  States.  As  a  result,  economic  operators  have  no  certainty  whether 
preferential  tax  treatment  applies  to  their  products  in  other  Member  States.  This  might  create  an 
insecure business environment for biofuel producers operating across borders.  
In  addition,  removing  provisions  that  are  no  longer  applicable,  would  improve  the  clarity  of  the 
legislation. 
Finally, provisions governing exemptions and reductions are not presented in the ETD in a structured 
way.  Instead,  such  provisions  are  spread  across  the  Directive,  with  some  sectors,  such  as  energy 
intensive  industries,  being  subject  to  multiple  provisions  contained  in  various  sections  of  the 
legislation. 

3.  Proportionality: How the EU should act 

3.1  Does the explanatory memorandum (and any impact assessment) accompanying the 

Commission’s proposal contain an adequate justification regarding the proportionality of the 
proposal and a statement allowing appraisal of the compliance of the proposal with the 
principle of proportionality? 

The proposal complies with the proportionality principle for the following reasons.  
The  objectives  of  the  current  proposal  are  best  achieved  by  recasting  the  current  Directive  to  the 
effect  explained  above.  The  proposal  is  mainly  concerned  with  some  essential  components  of  the 
Directive: the structure of taxation and the relationship between the respective tax treatment of the 
various energy sources. 

6 

 
 
The proposal is in all respects limited to what is necessary in order to achieve the objectives pursued. 

3.2 Based on the answers to the questions below and information available from any impact 
assessment, the explanatory memorandum or other sources, is the proposed action an 
appropriate way to achieve the intended objectives? 

(a)  Is the initiative limited to those aspects that Member States cannot achieve satisfactorily on 

their own, and where the Union can do better? 

Yes.  In  the  absence  of  EU  level  action,  Member  States  would  find  it  very  difficult  to  coordinate 
enough and quickly enough respond to the global needs and challenges. It should be presumed that 
national interest would prevail over the ones of the EU as a community of states. In the worst case 
scenario,  the  diverging  directions  of  Member  States  actions  could  lead  to  compromising  other 
Member  States  efforts  or  to  deepen  the  fragmentation  of  the  internal  market.  The  revised  EU 
framework for taxation of energy and energy products would not deprive the Member States of their 
competence to design and run their energy and fiscal policies as long as they respect the minimum 
rates and common basic definitions and treatment of energy and energy products. 

(b)  Is the form of Union action (choice of instrument) justified, as simple as possible, and 

coherent with the satisfactory achievement of, and ensuring compliance with the objectives 
pursued (e.g. choice between regulation, (framework) directive, recommendation, or 
alternative regulatory methods such as co-legislation, etc.)? 

Proposed instrument: Directive. In this area already covered by an existing Directive, Member States 
should continue to retain an important margin of flexibility. Other means than a Directive amending 
Directive 2003/96/CE would thus be inadequate. 

(c)  Does the Union action leave as much scope for national decision as possible while achieving 
satisfactorily the objectives set? (e.g. is it possible to limit the European action to minimum 
standards or use a less stringent policy instrument og approach?) 

Yes.  Member  States  will  still  be  given  the  flexibility  necessary  to  define  and  implement  policies 
appropriate to  their  national  circumstances.  Within the  new  framework,  they can  still  design  fiscal 
arrangements made in connection with the implementation of the directive. In this regard, Member 
States might decide not to increase the overall tax burden if they consider that the implementation 
of such a principle of tax neutrality could contribute to the restructuring and the modernisation of 
their  tax  systems.  For example,  it  is  left  entire  up  to  the  Member  States  to  decide  if  and  how  the 
additional revenue from energy taxation could be used to reduce labour costs (e.g. by lowering social 
contributions).  
The  instrument  proposed  –  a  Directive  –  as  already  described  above,  provides  the  best  trade-off 
between  non-interventionist  EU  policy,  providing  framework  for  approximation  and  coordination 
rather  than  full  harmonisation,  thus  being  the  right  vehicle  to  achieving  the  Union  objectives 
recapitulated  under  the  Green  Deal.  A  more  stringent  instrument  would  unnecessarily  restrict  the 
Member  States  room  for  manoeuvre  when  it  comes  to  implementation  of  national  interest-driven 
policies. A weaker one, would risk not improving the status quo. 

(d)  Does the initiative create financial or administrative cost for the Union, national 

governments, regional or local authorities, economic operators or citizens? Are these costs 
commensurate with the objective to be achieved? 

Some  regulatory  costs  (mostly  managing  authorisations,  declarations  and  IT  systems  update)  will 

7 

 
 
 
arise for the traders in energy products newly introduced in the ETD’s scope and for administrations 
as these products will be subject to some provisions of the excise general arrangements. However, 
these  costs  should  be  limited  for  hydrogen  and  solid  biomass  traders  as  these  products  will  be 
allowed  the  same  movement  control  simplifications  as  natural  gas  and  coal  respectively.  The 
termination  of  excise  duty  exemptions  for  some  fuels  or  sectors  of  activity  (e.g.  aviation  and 
maritime) does not change the regulatory costs related to general arrangements as exempted fuels 
were anyway subject to holding and movement controls. 

(e)  While respecting the Union law, have special circumstances applying in individual Member 

States been taken into account? 

Yes as part of the impact assessment the Commission analysis reflected, to the extent possible, the 
economic and industrial structures of individual Member States 

8