COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard
Date: 2021-07-08
Institutions: Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, European Commission
Subjects: EU Member State, EU statistics, access to the courts, application of EU law, area of freedom, security and justice, independence of the judiciary, judge, judicial proceedings, judicial reform

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 8.7.2021  COM(2021) 389 final  COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard  
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION 

Effective justice systems are essential for implementing EU law and for upholding the rule of 
law  and  the  values  upon  which  the  EU  is  founded.  National  courts  act  as  EU  courts  when 
applying  EU  law.  It  is  national  courts  in  the  first  place  that  ensure  that  the  rights  and 
obligations  provided  under  EU  law  are  enforced  effectively  (Article  19  of  the  Treaty  on 
European Union (TEU)). 

Effective  justice  systems  are  also  essential  for  mutual  trust,  the  investment  climate  and  the 
sustainability  of  long-term  growth.  For  this  reason,  improving  the  efficiency,  quality  and 
independence  of  national  justice  systems  continues  to  feature  among  the  priorities  of  the 
European  Semester  –  the  EU’s  annual  cycle  of  economic  policy  coordination.  The  2021 
annual  sustainable growth strategy (1), which sets out  the economic and employment  policy 
priorities  for  the  EU,  reiterates  the  link  between  effective  justice  systems  and  the  business 
environment  in  Member  States.  Well-functioning  and  fully  independent  justice  systems  can 
have  a  positive  impact  on  investment  and  therefore  contribute  to  productivity  and 
competitiveness. They are also important for ensuring effective cross-border enforcement of 
contracts  and  administrative  decisions  and  dispute  resolution,  which  are  essential  for  the 
functioning of the single market (2). 

Against this background, the EU Justice Scoreboard presents an annual overview of indicators 
focusing on the essential parameters of effective justice systems:  

  efficiency;  
  quality; and  
 

independence.  

The  2021  edition  (the  Scoreboard)  further  develops  the  indicators  on  all  three  elements, 
including on the digitalisation of justice, which has been of particular importance to keep the 
courts  functioning  during  the  COVID-19  pandemic  as  well  as  more  generally  to  promote 
efficient and accessible justice systems (3).  

 The European Rule of Law Mechanism – 

As  announced  in  the  political  guidelines  of  President  von  der  Leyen,  the  Commission  has 
established a comprehensive European Rule of Law Mechanism  to deepen its monitoring of 
the  situation  in  Member  States.  The  Rule  of  Law  Mechanism  acts  as  a  preventive  tool, 
deepening  dialogue  and  joint  awareness  of  rule  of  law  issues.  At  the  centre  of  the  new 
Mechanism  is  the  annual  Rule  of  Law  Report,  which  provides  a  synthesis  of  significant 
developments – both positive and negative – in all Member States and the Union as a whole. 
The  2020  Rule  of  Law  Report  was  published  on  30 September 2020  and  was  based  on  a 

1  
2  

3  

COM(2020) 575 final. 
See  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions ‘Identifying and addressing barriers 
to the Single Market’ COM(2020)93 and accompanying SWD(2020)54.  
See  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European 
Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions  ‘Digitalisation  of  justice  in  the 
European Union: A toolbox of opportunities’ COM(2020)710 and accompanying SWD(2020)540. 

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variety of sources, including the EU Justice Scoreboard (4). The 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard 
has been further developed also to reflect the needs for additional comparative information as 
observed  during  the  preparation  of  the  2020  Rule  of  Law  Report  and  with  a  view  to 
supporting further the annual Rule of Law reports.  

4   

https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/2020-rule-law-report-communication-and-country-chapters_en  

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What is the EU Justice Scoreboard?  

The EU Justice Scoreboard is an annual comparative information tool. Its purpose is to assist the EU 
and Member States improve the effectiveness of their national justice systems by providing objective, 
reliable  and  comparable  data  on  a  number  of  indicators  relevant  for  the  assessment  of  the  (i) 
efficiency,  (ii)  quality  and  (iii)  independence  of  justice  systems  in  all  Member  States.  It  does  not 
present an overall single ranking, but gives an overview of how all the justice systems function, based 
on indicators that are of common interest and relevance for all Member States. 
The Scoreboard does not promote any particular type of justice system and treats all Member States on 
an equal footing.  
Efficiency, quality and independence are essential parameters of an effective justice system, whatever 
the model of the national justice system or the legal tradition in which it is anchored. Figures on these 
three parameters should be read together, as all three elements are often interlinked (initiatives aimed 
at improving one may have an influence on another).  
The Scoreboard mainly presents indicators concerning civil, commercial and administrative cases, as 
well  as  certain  criminal  cases,  in  order  to  assist  Member  States  in  their  efforts  to  create  a  more 
efficient investment, business and citizen-friendly environment. The Scoreboard is a comparative tool 
which  evolves  in  dialogue  with  Member  States  and  the  European  Parliament  (5).  Its  objective  is  to 
identify the essential parameters of an effective justice system and to provide relevant annual data. 

What is the methodology of the EU Justice Scoreboard? 

The Scoreboard uses a range of information sources. The Council of Europe’s European Commission 
for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) with which the Commission has concluded a contract to carry 
out a specific annual study provides large parts of the quantitative data. These data cover 2012 - 2019, 
and  have  been  provided  by  Member  States  according  to  CEPEJ’s  methodology.  The  study  also 
provides  detailed  comments  and  country-specific  factsheets  that  give  more  context.  They  should  be 
read together with the figures (6). 
Data  on  the  length  of  proceedings  collected  by  CEPEJ  show  the  ‘disposition  time’  which  is  a 
calculated length of court proceedings (based on a ratio between pending and resolved cases). Data on 
courts’ efficiency in applying EU law in specific areas show the average length of proceedings derived 
from  actual  length  of  court  cases.  Note  that  the  length  of  court  proceedings  may  vary  substantially 
between areas within a Member State, particularly in urban centres where commercial activities may 
lead to a higher caseload. 
Other sources of data, which cover the period from 2012 to 2020, are: the group of contact persons on 
national  justice  systems  (7),  the  European  Network  of  Councils  for  the  Judiciary  (ENCJ)  (8),  the 
Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU (NPSJC) (9), the Association of 

5  

6 

7  

8 

9   

E.g.  European  Parliament  resolution  of  29  May  2018  on  the  2017  EU  Justice  Scoreboard 
(P8_TA(2018)0216). 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/justice-and-fundamental-rights/effective-justice/eu-justice-
scoreboard_en 
To  help  prepare  the  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  and  to  promote  the  exchange  of  best  practice  on  the 
effectiveness of justice systems, the Commission asked Member States to designate two contact persons, 
one from the judiciary and one from the ministry of justice. This informal group meets regularly. 
ENCJ  unites  the  national  institutions  in  the  Member  States  that  are  independent  of  the  executive  and 
legislature, and that are responsible  for supporting the judiciaries in the independent delivery of justice: 
https://www.encj.eu/ 
NPSJC  provides  a  forum  that  gives  European  institutions  the  opportunity  to  request  the  opinions  of 
Supreme  Courts  and  to  bring  them  closer  by  encouraging  discussion  and  the  exchange  of  ideas: 
http://network-presidents.eu/ 

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the  Councils  of  State  and  Supreme  Administrative  Jurisdictions  of  the  EU  (ACA-Europe)  (10),  the 
European  Competition  Network  (ECN)  (11),  the  Communications  Committee  (COCOM)(12),  the 
European Observatory on infringements of intellectual property rights(13), the Consumer Protection 
Cooperation Network (CPC) (14), the Expert Group on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 
(EGMLTF) (15), Eurostat (16), and the European Judicial Training Network (EJTN). 
Over the years, the methodology for the Scoreboard has been further developed and refined in close 
cooperation  with  the  group  of  contact  persons  on  national  justice  systems,  particularly  through  a 
questionnaire  (updated  annually)  and  collecting  data  on  certain  aspects  of  the  functioning  of  justice 
systems. 
The availability of data, in particular for indicators on the efficiency of justice systems, continues to 
improve as  many Member States have invested in their capacity to produce better judicial statistics. 
Where  difficulties  in  gathering  or  providing  data  continue  to  exist,  this  is  either  due  to  insufficient 
statistical  capacity  or  to  the  fact  that  the  national  categories  for  which  data  are  collected  do  not 
correspond exactly to the ones used for the Scoreboard. Only in very few cases is the data gap due to a 
lack  of  contributions  from  national  authorities.  The  Commission  continues  to  encourage  Member 
States to further reduce this data gap. 

How does the EU Justice Scoreboard feed into the European Semester and how is it related to the 
Recovery and Resilience Facility? 

The Scoreboard provides elements for assessing the efficiency, quality and independence of national 
justice  systems  and  thereby  aims  at  helping  Member  States  to  improve  the  effectiveness  of  their 
national justice systems.  By  comparing  information  on  the justice  systems,  the Scoreboard  makes  it 
easier to identify best practice and shortcomings and to keep track of challenges and progress made. In 
the context  of  the  European  Semester,  country-specific  assessments are  carried out through  bilateral 
dialogue with the national authorities and stakeholders concerned. Where identified shortcomings have 
macroeconomic significance, the European Semester analysis may lead to the Commission proposing 
to the Council to adopt country-specific recommendations to improve the national justice systems in 
individual Member States (17). The Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) will make available more 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15  

16 
17  

that 

intends 

the  Commission 

to  adopt  on  digital  market 

ACA-Europe  is  composed  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  EU  and  the  Councils  of  State  or  the  Supreme 
administrative jurisdictions of each EU Member State: http://www.juradmin.eu/index.php/en/ 
The  ECN  has  been  established  as  a  forum  for  discussion  and  cooperation  of  European  competition 
authorities in cases where Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU are applied. 
The ECN is the framework for the close cooperation mechanisms of Council Regulation 1/2003. Through 
the  ECN,  the  Commission  and  the  national  competition  authorities  in  all  EU  Member  States  cooperate 
with each other: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/index_en.html 
COCOM is composed of representatives of EU Member States. Its main role is to provide an opinion on 
the  draft  measures 
issues: 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/communications-committee 
The European Observatory on Infringements of Intellectual Property Rights is a network of experts and 
specialist  stakeholders.  It  is  composed  of  public-  and  private-sector  representatives,  who  collaborate  in 
active working groups. https://euipo.europa.eu/ohimportal/en/web/observatory/home  
CPC is a network of  national authorities responsible  for enforcing EU consumer protection laws in EU 
and 
countries: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/performance_by_governance_tool/consumer_protection_c
ooperation_network/index_en.htm  
EGMLTF meets regularly to share views and help the Commission define policy and draft new legislation 
on 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/financial-
crime/index_en.htm 
Eurostat is the statistical office of the EU: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/about/overview 
In the context of the European Semester, the Council, on the Commission’s proposal, addressed country-
specific recommendations relating to their justice system to seven Member States in 2019 (HR, IT, CY, 
HU,  MT,  PT  and  SK)  and  eight  Member  States  in  2020  (HR,  IT,  CY,  HU,  MT,  PL,  PT  and  SK). 

anti-money 

laundering 

financing: 

terrorist 

EEA 

and 

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than  EUR  670  billion  in  loans  and  grants,  of  which  each  Member  State  would  need  to  allocate  a 
minimum of 20% to digital transition. The Recovery and Resilience Facility offers an opportunity to 
address  country-specific  recommendations  related  to  national  justice  systems  and  to  accelerate 
national  efforts  to  complete  the  digital  transformation  of  justice  systems.  In  this  context,  the 
Commission has to assess whether the Member States’ recovery and resilience plans are expected to 
contribute to effectively addressing all or a significant subset of challenges identified in the relevant 
country-specific  recommendations  or  challenges  identified  in  other  relevant  Commission  documents 
adopted in the context of the European Semester (18). 

Why are effective justice systems important for an investment-friendly business environment? 

Effective justice systems that uphold the rule of law have a positive economic impact. Where judicial 
systems  guarantee  the  enforcement  of  rights,  creditors  are  more  likely  to  lend,  businesses  are 
dissuaded  from  opportunistic  behaviour,  transaction  costs are  reduced  and  innovative  businesses  are 
more  likely  to  invest.  The  beneficial  impact  of  well-functioning  national  justice  systems  for  the 
economy  is  supported  by  a  wide  range  of  studies  and  academic  literature,  including  from  the 
International Monetary Fund (19) the European Central Bank (20), the OECD (21), the World Economic 
Forum (22), and the World Bank (23). 
A study has found that reducing the length of court proceedings by 1% (measured in disposition time 
(24)) may increase growth rate of thenumber of firms (25) and that a higher percentage of companies 
perceiving the justice system as independent by 1% tends to be associated with higher firms’ turnover 
and  productivity  growth  (26).  Another  study  has  indicated  a  positive  correlation  between  perceived 
judicial independence and foreign direct investment flows (27).  
In  addition,  several  surveys  have  highlighted  the  importance  of  the  effectiveness  of  national  justice 
systems  for  companies.  For  example,  in  one  survey,  93%  of  large  companies  replied  that  they 

18  

19  

20 

21 

22 

23 

24  

25  

26  
27  

Moreover,  the  Commission  monitors  judicial  reforms  in  BG  and  RO  under  the  Cooperation  and 
Verification Mechanism. 
Article  19(3)(b)  of  Regulation  (EU)  2021/241  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  12 
February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility, OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17. 
IMF, Regional Economic Outlook, November 2017, Europe: Europe Hitting its Stride, pp. xviii, pp. 40, 
70: 
https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/REO/EUR/2017/November/eur-booked-
print.ashx?la=en  
ECB, ‘Structural policies in the euro area’, June 2018, ECB Occasional Paper Series No 210: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecb.op210.en.pdf?3db9355b1d1599799aa0e475e5624651  
See e.g. ‘What makes civil justice effective?’,, OECD Economics Department Policy Notes, No. 18 June 
2013 and ‘The Economics of Civil Justice: New  Cross-Country  Data and Empirics’, OECD Economics 
Department Working Papers, No. 1060. 
World  Economic  Forum, 
https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-competitiveness-report-2019  
World Bank, ‘World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law, Chapter 3: The role of law’, 
pp. 83, 140: http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2017  
The  ‘disposition  time’  indicator  is  the  number  of  unresolved  cases  divided  by  the  number  of  resolved 
cases  at  the  end  of  a  year  multiplied  by  365  (days).  It  is  a  standard  indicator  defined  by  Council  of 
Europe's CEPEJ: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/default_en.asp 
Vincenzo  Bove  and  Leandro  Elia;  The  judicial  system  and  economic  development  across  EU  Member 
States,  JRC  Technical  Report,  EUR 28440  EN,  Publications  Office  of  the  EU,  Luxembourg,  2017: 
http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC104594/jrc104594__2017_the_judicial_syste
m_and_economic_development_across_eu_member_states.pdf 
Idem. 
Effect  of  judicial  independence  on  foreign  direct  investment  in  Eastern  Europe  and  South  Asia;  Bülent 
https://mpra.ub.uni-
Dogru; 
muenchen.de/40471/1/MPRA_paper_40322.pdf . EU Member States included in the study were: BG, HR, 
CZ, EE, HU, LV, LT, RO, SK and SI. 

‘The  Global  Competitiveness  Report  2019’,  October  2019: 

2012,  MPRA  Munich 

Archive: 

Personal 

RePEc 

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systematically review the rule of law conditions (including court independence) on a continuing basis 
in the countries they invest in (28). In another survey, over half of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SME’s)  replied  that  cost  and  excessive  length  of  judicial  proceedings,  respectively,  were  the  main 
reasons for not starting court proceedings over infringement of intellectual property rights (IPR) (29). 
The Commission’s Communications on ‘Identifying and adressing barriers to the single market’ (30) 
and the single market enforcement action plan (31) also provide insight into the importance of effective 
justice systems for the functioning of the single market, in particular for businesses.  

How  does  the  Commission  support  the  implementation  of  good  justice  reforms  through  technical 
support? 

Member  States  can  draw  on  the  Commission’s  technical  support  available  through  the  Directorate-
General for Structural Reform Support (DG REFORM) under the Technical Support Instrument (TSI) 
(32)  which  has  a  total  budget  of  EUR  864.4  million  for  2021  to  2027.  From  2017  to  2020,  the 
Structural Reform and Support programme had a budget of EUR 222.8 million and has supported over 
1  000  reform  projects  in  27  Member  States  in  many  areas.  In  the  area  of  justice,  this  included  for 
example technical support to improve the efficiency of the court system, to reform the judicial map, on 
court  organisation,  on  the  design  or  implementation  of  e-justice  programmes  and  cyber  justice,  on 
case-management  systems,  on  the  selection  and  promotion  process  for  judges,  for  the  training  of 
judges,  improvement  of  insolvency  frameworks  and  for  the  out-of-court  resolution  of  consumer 
disputes. In addition, the TSI also complements the Commission’s measures to address the economic 
consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, namely the Recovery and Resilience Facility, as the TSI 
can  support  Member  States  in  the  preparation and  implementation  of  their  Recovery  and  Resilience 
plans. 

Why does the Commission monitor the digitalisation of national justice systems? 
Digitalisation of justice is key to increasing the effectiveness of justice systems and an obvious tool for 
enhancing  and  facilitating  access  to  justice.  The  COVID-19  pandemic  brought  to  the  forefront  the 
need for Member States to accelerate modernisation reforms in this area. 
Since 2013, the EU Justice Scoreboard has included certain comparative information with respect to 
the digitalisation of justice across the Member States, for example for online access to judgments or 
online claim submission and follow-up. 

28  

29  

30  
31  

32 

The Economist Intelligence  Unit: ‘Risk and  Return  – Foreign Direct Investment and the  Rule of Law’, 
2015 http://www.biicl.org/documents/625_d4_fdi_main_report.pdf, p.22. 
EU  Intellectual  Property  Office  (EUIPO),  Intellectual  Property  (IP)  SME  Scoreboard  2016: 
https://euipo.europa.eu/tunnel-
web/secure/webdav/guest/document_library/observatory/documents/sme_scoreboard_study_2016/Execut
ive-summary_en.pdf 
COM(2020)93 and SWD(2020)54.   
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and  Social  Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions  ‘Long  term  action  plan  for  better 
implementation and enforcement of single market rules,’ COM(2020)94, see in particular actions 4, 6 and 
18.  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes/overview-funding-
programmes/structural-reform-support-programme-srsp_en   
TSI  regulation  was  adopted  in  March  2021  and  according  to  article  5  its  aim  is  to  support: 
“….institutional  reform  and  efficient  and  service-oriented  functioning  of  public  administration  and  e-
government, simplification of rules and procedures, auditing, enhancing capacity to absorb Union funds, 
promotion  of  administrative  cooperation,  effective  rule  of  law,  reform  of  the  justice  systems,  capacity 
building  of  competition  and  antitrust  authorities,  strengthening  of 
financial  supervision  and 
reinforcement of the fight against fraud, corruption and money laundering” (emphasis added). 

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The Commission’s Communication on Digitalisation of justice in the European Union – A toolbox of 
opportunities  (33),  adopted  in  December  2020,  represents  a  strategy  aiming  at  improving  access  to 
justice and the effectiveness of justice systems using technology. As outlined in the Communication, a 
number of additional indicators will be included in the EU Justice Scoreboard as of 2021. The purpose 
is  to  ensure  comprehensive  and  timely  in-depth  monitoring  of  progress  areas  and  challenges 
encountered by Member States in their efforts towards the digitalisation of their justice systems. 

33  

COM(2020) 710 final. 

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2. 

CONTEXT: DEVELOPMENTS IN JUSTICE REFORMS IN 2020 

In  2020,  a  large  number  of  Member  States  continued  their  efforts  to  further  improve  the 
effectiveness of their justice systems. Figure 1 presents an updated overview of adopted and 
planned measures across several areas of justice systems in Member States engaged in reform 
activities. 

Figure  1:  Legislative  and  regulatory  activity  concerning  justice  systems  in  2020  (adopted 
measures/initiatives under negotiation per Member State) (source: European Commission (34))  

In  2020,  procedural  law  continued  to  be  an  area  of  particular  focus  in  a  large  number  of 
Member States with a significant amount of ongoing or planned legislative activity. Reforms 
concerning the status of judges and the rules for legal professionals also saw elevated activity. 
A  number  of  Member  States  were  in  the  process  of  introducing  legislation  for  the  use  of 
information and communication technologies (ICT) in their justice systems. The momentum 
from preceding years for measures concerning the administration of courts continued in 2020. 
Activity in other areas, such as alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods, rules regarding 
prosecutors  or  court  fees  slowed  down.  Some  Member  States  are  already  actively  using  or 
planning to make use of artificial intelligence in their justice systems. The overview confirms 
the observation that justice reforms require time  – sometimes spanning several  years – from 
their  announcement  until  the  adoption  of  the  legislative  and  regulatory  measures  and  their 
actual implementation on the ground. 

The COVID-19 pandemic has also created new challenges that highlighted the importance of 
accelerating  reforms  to  digitalise  the  justice  system.  In  this  context,  several  Member  States 
adopted  new  measures  to  ensure  the  regular  functioning  of  courts,  while  guaranteeing  the 
continued and easy access to justice for all, in particular through the adaptation of procedural 
rules. The Association of the Councils of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of 
the  EU  (ACA-Europe)  developed  a  questionnaire  examining  the  impact  of  the  COVID-19 
pandemic  on  the  professional  activity  of  the  supreme  courts.  Respondents  included  the 

34 

The information has been collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice 
systems for 26 Member States. DE explained that a number of reforms are under way on judiciary, where 
the scope and scale of the reform process can vary within the 16 federal states. 

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Supreme Administrative Courts, and by the Supreme Courts (members of the Network of the 
Presidents  of  the  Supreme  Judicial  Courts  of  the  EU  (NPSJC)).  Without  examining  the 
substantive  measures  taken  to  deal  with  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  Figure  2  presents  the 
changes to procedural law adopted by the Member States to facilitate judicial functions of the 
courts, either through new legislation, Supreme Court rulings, court regulations or practices. 

Figure 2: Changes in procedural  rules in Supreme Courts due to  COVID-19 pandemic 
(source: ACA-Europe and NPSJC (35))  

(*) For each Member State, left column presents the practices in Supreme Courts, and right column 
presents the practices in Supreme Administrative Courts (column marked with letter ‘A’). The Member 
States  appear  in  the  alphabetical  order  of  their  geographical  names  in  the  original  language.  BE: 
Conseil  d’Etat  (Council  of  State)  and  Cour  de  Cassation  (Supreme  Court).  BG:  Върховен 
административен  съд  (Supreme  Administrative  Court).  CZ:  Nejvyšší  správní  soud  (Supreme 
Administrative  Court)  and  Nejvyšší  soud  (Supreme  Court).  DE:  Bundesverwaltungsgericht  (Federal 
Administrative Court). EE: Riikohus (Supreme Court). IE: Chúirt Uachtarach (Supreme Court). EL: 
Συμβούλιο της Επικρατείας (Council of State). ES: Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court). FR: Conseil 
d’Etat  (Council  of  State),  Cour  de  Cassation  (Supreme  Court).  HR:  Visoki  upravni  (Supreme 
Administrative Court). IT: Consiglio de Stato (Council of State). CY: Supreme Court. LV: Augstākā 
tiesa  (Supreme  Court).  LT:  Vyriausiasis  Administracinis  Teismas  (Supreme  Administrative  Court). 
LU:  Cour  administrative  (Administrative  Court)  Cour  de  Cassation  (Supreme  Court).  HU:  Kúria 
(Supreme Court). MT: Court of Appeal. NL: Hoge Raad (Supreme Court), Centrale Raad van Beroep 
(highest  administrative  court 
in  social  cases),  Raad  van  State  (Council  of  State).  AT: 
Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Supreme Administrative Court), Personalsenat (special evaluation panel) of 
the  superior  court,  Oberster  Gerichtshof  (Supreme  Court).  PL:  Naczelny  Sąd  Administracyjny 
(Supreme  Administrative  Court).  PT:  Supremo  Tribunal  Administrativo  (Supreme  Administrative 
Court. RO: Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (Supreme Court). SI: Vrhovno sodišče (Supreme Court). 
SK: Najvyšší súd (Supreme Court). FI: Korkein hallinto-oikeus (Supreme Administrative Courtt). SE: 
Högsta  förvaltningsdomstolen  (Supreme  Administrative  Court).  No  data  from:  BG:  Върховен 

35  

Two  questionnaires  have  informed  this  chart,  one  from  ACA  Europe  and  one  from  the  Network  of  the 
Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU (NPSJC). For some Member States, there is only one 
column present in the chart. In these cases, there is no Supreme Administrative Court, or no answers were 
provided to the survey sent to the NPSJC.  

9 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
касационен  съд  (Supreme  Court);  HR:  Vrhovni  sud  (Supreme  Court);  IT:  Corte  Suprema  di 
Cassazione (Supreme Court); SE: Högsta domstolen (Supreme Court). 

3. 

KEY FINDINGS OF THE 2021 EU JUSTICE SCOREBOARD 

Efficiency, quality and independence are the main parameters of an effective justice system, 
and the Scoreboard presents indicators on all three. 

3.1. Efficiency of justice systems 

The  Scoreboard  presents  indicators  for  the  efficiency  of  proceedings  in  the  broad  areas  of 
civil,  commercial  and  administrative  cases  and  in  specific  areas  where  administrative 
authorities and courts apply EU law(36). 

3.1.1. Developments in caseload 

The caseload of national justice systems increased in several Member States, compared to the 
previous  year,  while  decreasing  or  remaining  stable  in  others.  Overall  it  continues  to  vary 
considerably  between  Member  States  (Figure  3).  This  shows  the  importance  of  remaining 
attentive to caseload developments to ensure the effectiveness of justice systems. 

Figure 3: Number of incoming civil, commercial, administrative and other cases in 2012, 
2017 – 2019 (*) (1st instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study (37)) 

(*)  Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious 
cases,  non-litigious  land  and  business  registry  cases,  other  registry  cases,  other  non-litigious  cases, 
administrative  law  cases  and  other  non-criminal  cases.  Methodology  changes  in  LV  (applied  retroactively  to 
2017), SK and SE (data for 2017 has been adapted to include migration law cases as administrative cases, in 
line with CEPEJ methodology).  

36  

37  

The  enforcement  of  court  decisions  is  also  important  for  the  efficiency  of  a  justice  system.  However, 
comparable data are not available in most Member States. 
2020  study  on  the  functioning  of  judicial  systems  in  the  EU  Member  States,  carried  out  by  the  CEPEJ 
Secretariat 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/justice-and-fundamental-
the 
rights/effective-justice/eu-justice-scoreboard_en 

Commission: 

for 

10 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 4: Number of incoming civil and commercial litigious cases in 2012, 2017 – 2019 
(*) (1st instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*)  Under  the  CEPEJ  methodology,  litigious  civil/commercial  cases  concern  disputes  between  parties,  e.g 
disputes  about  contracts.  Non-litigious  civil/commercial  cases  concern  uncontested  proceedings,  e.g. 
uncontested payment orders. Methodology changes in EL and SK. Data for NL include non-litigious cases. 

Figure  5:  Number  of  incoming  administrative  cases  in  2012,  2017  –  2019  (*)  (1st 
instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study)  

(*)  Under  the  CEPEJ  methodology,  administrative  law  cases  concern  disputes  between  individuals  and  local, 
regional or national authorities. DK and IE do not record administrative cases separately. Dejudiciarisation of 
some administrative procedures have occurred in RO in 2018. Methodology changes in EL, SK and SE. In SE, 
migration cases have been included under administrative cases (reotractively applied for 2017). 

11 

 
 
 
 
  
 
3.1.2. General data on efficiency 

The  indicators  on  the  efficiency  of  proceedings  in  the  broad  areas  of  civil,  commercial  and 
administrative cases are: (i) estimated length of proceedings (disposition time), (ii) clearance 
rate, and (iii) number of pending cases. 

 Estimated length of proceedings – 

The length of proceedings indicates the estimated time (in days) needed to resolve a case in 
court,  meaning  the  time  taken  by  the  court  to  reach  a  decision  at  first  instance.  The 
‘disposition  time’  indicator  is  the  number  of  unresolved  cases  divided  by  the  number  of 
resolved cases at the end of a year multiplied by 365 (days) (38). It is a calculated quantity that 
indicates  the  estimated  minimum  time  that  a  court  would  need  to  resolve  a  case  while 
maintaining the current working conditions. The higher the value, the higher is the probability 
that it takes the court longer to reach a decision. Figures mostly concern proceedings at first 
instance courts and compare, where available, data for 2012, 2017, 2018 and 2019 (39).Figures 
8  and  10  show  the  disposition  time  in  2019  in  civil  and  commercial  litigious  cases,  and 
administrative  cases  at  all  court  instances,  and  Figure  22  shows  the  average  length  of 
proceedings in money laundering cases at first instance courts. 

Figure 6: Estimated time needed to resolve  civil, commercial, administrative and other 
cases in 2012, 2017 – 2019 (*)(1st instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*)  Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious 
cases,  non-litigious  land  and  business  registry  cases,  other  registry  cases,  other  non-litigious  cases, 
administrative law cases and other non-criminal cases. Methodology changes in SK. Pending cases include all 
instances in CZ and, until 2016, in SK. LV: the sharp decrease is due to court system reform, and error checks 
and data clean-ups in the Court’s information system. 

38 

39 

Length  of  proceedings,  clearance  rate  and  number  of  pending  cases  are  standard  indicators  defined  by 
CEPEJ: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/default_en.asp 
The years were chosen to keep the eight-year perspective with 2012 as a baseline, while at the same time 
not  overcrowding  the  figures.  Data  for  2010,  2013,  2014,  2015  and  2016  are  available  in  the  CEPEJ 
report. 

12 

 
 
 
                                                           
Figure  7: Estimated time needed to resolve  litigious civil  and commercial cases at first 
instance in 2012, 2017 – 2019 (*) (1st instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*)  Under  the  CEPEJ  methodology,  litigious  civil/commercial  cases  concern  disputes  between  parties,  e.g 
disputes  about  contracts.  Non-litigious  civil/commercial  cases  concern  uncontested  proceedings,  e.g. 
uncontested  payment  orders.  Methodology  changes  in  EL  and  SK.  Pending  cases  include  all  instances  in  CZ 
and, until 2016, in SK. Data for NL include non-litigious cases. 

Figure  8:  Estimated  time  needed  to  resolve  litigious  civil  and  commercial  cases  at  all 
court instances in 2019 (*) (1st, 2nd and 3rd instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) The order is determined by the court instance with the longest proceedings in each Member State. No data 
are  available  for  first  and  second  instance  courts  in  BE,  BG  and  IE,  for  second  instance  courts  in  NL,  for 
second and third instance courts in  AT or for third instance courts in  DE and HR. There is no third instance 
court in MT. Access to a third instance court may be limited in some Member States.  

13 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Estimated time needed to resolve administrative cases at first instance in 2012, 
2017 – 2019 (*) (1st instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Administrative  law cases  concern disputes between individuals and local,  regional or national authorities, 
under the CEPEJ methodology. Methodology changes in EL and SK. Pending cases include all court instances 
in CZ and, until 2016, in SK. DK and IE do not record administrative cases separately. CY: in 2018, the number 
of  resolved  cases  has  increased  as  a  consequence  of  cases  being  tried  together,  the  withdrawal  of  2  724 
consolidated cases and the creation of an Administrative Court in 2015. 

Figure 10: Estimated time needed to resolve administrative cases  at all court instances 
in 2019 (*) (1st and, where applicable, 2nd and 3rd instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) The order is determined by the court instance with the longest proceedings in each Member State. No data 
available: for the first instance court in LU, and for the second instance courts in MT and RO, and for the third 
instance court in PL. The supreme or another highest court is the only appeal instance  in CZ, IT, CY, AT, SI 
and  FI.  There  is  no  third  instance  court  for  these  types  of  cases  in  HR,  LT,  LU  and  MT.  The  highest 
Administrative Court is the first and only instance for certain cases in BE. Access to third instance court may be 
limited in some Member States. DK and IE do not record administrative cases separately. 




14 

 
 
 
 
 Clearance rate – 

The clearance rate is the ratio of the number of resolved cases over the number of incoming 
cases.  It  measures  whether  a  court  is  keeping  up  with  its  incoming  caseload.  When  the 
clearance rate is around 100% or higher, it means the judicial system is able to resolve at least 
as many cases as come in. When the clearance rate is below 100%, it means that the courts are 
resolving fewer cases than the number of incoming cases. 

Figure  11:  Rate  of  resolving  civil,  commercial,  administrative  and  other  cases  in  2012, 
2017 – 2019 (*) (1st instance/in % — values higher than 100 % indicate that more cases are 
resolved than come in, while values below 100 % indicate that fewer cases are resolved than 
come in) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*)  Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category  includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious 
cases,  non-litigious  land  and  business  registry  cases,  other  registry  cases,  other  non-litigious  cases, 
administrative law cases and other non-criminal cases. Methodology changes in SK. IE: the number of resolved 
cases  is  expected  to  be  underreported  due  to  the  methodology.  IT:  different  classification  of  civil  cases 
introduced in 2013. 

Figure 12: Rate of resolving litigious civil and commercial cases in 2012, 2017 – 2019 (*) 
(1st instance/in %) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Methodology changes in EL and SK. IE: the number of resolved cases is expected to be underreported due 
to  the  methodology.  IT:  different  classification  of  civil  cases  introduced  in  2013.  Data  for  NL  include  non-
litigious cases. 

15 

 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Rate of resolving  administrative cases in 2012, 2017 – 2019 (*) (1st instance/in 
%) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Past values for some Member States have been reduced for presentation purposes (CY in 2018 = 219%; IT 
in  2012=279.8%);  Methodology  changes  in  EL  and  SK.  DK  and  IE  do  not  record  administrative  cases 
separately. In CY the number of resolved cases has increased as a consequence of cases being tried together, the 
withdrawal of 2 724 consolidated cases and the creation of an administrative court in 2015. 

 Pending cases – 

The number of pending cases expresses the number of cases that remains to be dealt with at 
the end of the year in question. It also influences the disposition time. 

Figure 14: Number of pending civil, commercial and administrative and other cases in  
2012, 2017 – 2019 (*) (1st instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*)  Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category  includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious 
cases,  non-litigious  land  and  business  registry  cases,  other  registry  cases,  other  non-litigious  cases, 
administrative law cases and other non-criminal cases. Methodology changes in SK. Pending cases include all 
instances in CZ and, until 2016, in SK. IT: different classification of civil cases introduced in 2013. 

16 

 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Number of pending litigious civil and commercial cases in 2012, 2017 – 2019 
(*) (1st instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study) 

 (*) Methodology changes in EL and SK. Pending cases include all instances in CZ and, until 2016, in SK. IT: 
different classification of civil cases introduced in 2013. Data for NL include non-litigious cases. 

Figure  16:  Number  of  pending  administrative  cases  in  2012,  2017  –  2019  (*)  (1st 
instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*)  Past  values  for  some  Member  States  have  been  reduced  for  presentation  purposes  (EL  in  2012=3.5). 
Methodology changes in EL and SK. Pending cases include all instances in CZ and, until 2016, in SK. DK and 
IE do not record administrative cases separately. 

17 

 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1.3. Efficiency in specific areas of EU law 

This section complements the general data on the efficiency of justice systems and presents 
the average length of proceedings (40) in specific areas when EU law is concerned. The 2021 
Scoreboard  builds  on  previous  data  in  competition,  electronic  communications,  EU 
trademark, consumer law and anti-money laundering. The areas are selected because of their 
relevance  for  the  single  market  and  the  business  environment.  In  general,  long  delays  in 
judicial proceedings may have negative consequences on rights stemming from EU law, e.g. 
when  appropriate  remedies  are  no  longer  available  or  serious  financial  damages  become 
irrecoverable. 

– Competition – 

Effective enforcement of competition law ensures a level playing field for businesses and is 
therefore  essential  for  an  attractive  business  environment.  Figure  17  presents  the  average 
length of cases against decisions of national competition authorities applying Articles 101 and 
102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (41). 

Figure  17:  Competition:  average  length  of  judicial  review  in  2013,  2017  –  2019  (*)  (1st 
instance/in days) (source: European Commission with the European Competition Network) 

(*) IE and AT: scenario is not applicable as the authorities do not have powers to take respective decisions. AT: 
data includes cases decided by the Cartel Court involving an infringement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, but 
not  based  on  appeals  against  the  national  competition  authority.  An  estimation  of  length  was  used  in  IT.  An 
empty column can indicate that the Member State reported no cases for the year. The  number of cases is low 
(below five per year) in many Member States, which can make the annual data dependent on one exceptionally 
long or short case. 

40  

41  

The length of proceedings in specific areas is calculated in calendar days, counting from the day on which 
an action or appeal was lodged before the court (or the indictment became final) until the day on which 
the court adopted its decision (Figures 16-21). Values are ranked based on a weighted average of data for 
2013 and 2017-2019 for Figures 16-18, data for 2013, 2016, 2018 and 2019 for Figure 19, and data for 
2014  and  2016-2019  for  Figures  20  and  21.  Where  data  was  not  available  for  all  years,  the  average 
reflects the available data, calculated based on all cases, a sample of cases or estimations. 
See 
and  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN 
Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1/2003  of  16  December  2002  on  the  implementation  of  the  rules  on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, 
p. 1–25, in particular Articles 3 and 5.  

18 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
– Electronic communications – 

The  objective  of  EU  electronic  communications  legislation  is  to  raise  competition,  to 
contribute to the development of the single market and to generate investment, innovation and 
growth. The positive effects for consumers can be achieved through effective enforcement of 
this legislation which can lead to lower end user prices and better quality services. Figure 18 
presents  the  average  length  of  judicial  review  cases  against  decisions  of  national  regulatory 
authorities applying EU law on electronic communications (42). It covers a broad spectrum of 
cases, ranging from more complex ‘market analysis’ reviews to consumer-focused issues. 

Figure 18: Electronic communications: average length of judicial review in 2013, 2017 – 
2019  (*)  (1st  instance/in  days)  (source:  European  Commission  with  the  Communications 
Committee) 

(*) The number of cases varies by Member State. An empty column indicates that the Member State reported no 
cases for the year (except PT for 2017-19, and RO for 2018: no data). In some instances, the limited number of 
relevant cases (CY, MT, SK, FI, SE) can make the annual data dependent on one exceptionally long or short 
case and result in large variations from one year to the other. DK: quasi-judicial body in charge of 1st instance 
appeals. EE: The average length of judicial review cases in 2013 was 18 days. ES, AT, and PL: different courts 
in charge depending on the subject matter.  

– EU trademark – 

Effective  enforcement  of  intellectual  property  rights  is  essential  to  stimulate  investment  in 
innovation.  EU  legislation  on  EU  trademarks  (43)  gives  a  significant  role  to  the  national 
courts, which act as EU courts and take decisions affecting the single market. Figure 19 shows 
the average length of EU trademark infringement cases in litigation among private parties. 

42   

43  

The calculation has been made based on the length of cases of appeal against national regulatory authority 
decisions  applying  national  laws  that  implement  the  EU  regulatory  framework  for  electronic 
communications  (Directives  2002/19/EC  (Access  Directive),  Directive  2002/20/EC  (Authorisation 
Directive),  Directive  2002/21/EC  (Framework  Directive),  Directive  2002/22/EC  (Universal  Service 
Directive),  and  other  relevant  EU  law  such  as  the  radio  spectrum  policy  programme,  Commission 
spectrum decisions, excluding Directive 2002/58/EC on privacy and electronic communications. 
Regulation  (EU)  2017/1001  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  14  June  2017  on  the 
European Union trade mark (OJ L 154, 16.62017, p. 1-99). 

19 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 19: EU trademark: average length of EU trademark infringement cases in 2013, 
2017  –  2019  (*)  (1st  instance/in  days)  (source:  European  Commission  with  the  European 
Observatory on infringements of intellectual property rights) 

(*) FR, IT, LT, LU: a sample of cases used for data for certain years. DK: data from all trademark cases (not 
only EU) in Commercial and Maritime High Courts; for 2018 and 2019, no data on average length due changes 
in data collection system. EL: data based on weighted average length from two courts.  ES: cases concerning 
other EU IP titles are included in the calculation of average length.  

– Consumer protection – 

Effective enforcement of consumer law ensures that consumers benefit from their rights and 
that companies infringing consumer laws do not gain unfair advantage. Consumer protection 
authorities and courts play a key role in  enforcing EU consumer law (44) within the various 
national enforcement systems. Figure 20 illustrates the average length of judicial review cases 
against decisions of consumer protection authorities applying EU law.  

For  consumers  or  companies,  effective  enforcement  can  involve  a  chain  of  actors,  not  only 
courts  but  also  administrative  authorities.  To  further  examine  this  enforcement  chain,  the 
length  of  proceedings  by  consumer  authorities  is  presented.  Figure  21  shows  the  average 
length of administrative decisions by national consumer protection authorities in 2014, 2016, 
2018-2019  from  the  moment  a  case  is  opened.  Relevant  decisions  include  declaring 
infringements  of  substantive  rules,  interim  measures,  cease  and  desist  orders,  initiation  of 
court proceedings or case closure. 

44   

Figures 19 and 20 relate to the enforcement of the  Unfair Terms Directive (93/13/EEC), the Consumer 
Sales and Guarantees Directive (1999/44/EC), the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (2005/29/EC) 
and the Consumer Rights Directive (2011/83/EC), and their national implementing provisions. 

20 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 20: Consumer protection: average length of judicial review in 2013, 2016, 2018 – 
2019 (*) (1st instance/in days) (source: European Commission with the Consumer Protection 
Cooperation Network) 

(*)  DE,  LU,  AT:  scenario  is  not  applicable  as  consumer  authorities  are  not  empowered  to  decide  on 
infringements of relevant consumer rules. The number  of relevant cases for 2019 is low (less than five) in EE, 
CY, NL, SI and FI. An estimate of average length was provided by EL and RO for certain years.  

Figure  21:  Consumer  protection:  average  length  of  administrative  decisions  by 
consumer  protection  authorities  in  2014,  2016,  2018  –  2019  (*)  (1st  instance/in  days) 
(source: European Commission with the Consumer Protection Cooperation Network) 

(*)  DE,  LU,  AT:  scenario  is  not  applicable  as  consumer  authorities  are  not  empowered  to  decide  on 
infringements of relevant consumer rules. The number of relevant cases for 2019 is low (less than five) in CY. An 
estimate of average length was provided by DK, EL, FR, RO and FI for certain years.  

21 

 
 
 
 
 
 
– Money laundering – 

In  addition  to  contributing  to  the  fight  against  crime,  the  effectiveness  of  the  fight  against 
money laundering is crucial for the soundness, integrity and stability of the financial sector, 
confidence  in  the  financial  system  and  fair  competition  in  the  single  market  (45).  Money 
laundering  can  discourage  foreign  investment,  distort  international  capital  flows  and 
negatively  affect  a  country’s  macroeconomic  performance,  resulting  in  welfare  losses, 
draining  resources  from  more  productive  economic  activities  (46).  The  Anti-money 
Laundering  Directive  requires  Member  States  to  maintain  statistics  on  the  effectiveness  of 
their  systems  to  combat  money  laundering  or  terrorist  financing  (47).  In  cooperation  with 
Member States, an updated questionnaire was used to collect data on the judicial phases of the 
national anti-money laundering regimes. Figure 22 shows the average length of first instance 
court cases dealing with money laundering criminal offences.   
Figure 22: Money laundering: average length of court cases in 2014, 2017 – 2019(*) (1st 
instance/in  days)  (source:  European  Commission  with  the  Expert  Group  on  Money 
Laundering and Financing of Terrorism) 

(*) No data for 2019: BE, DE, IE, EL, FR, HR, CY and PL. BG: The average length of the cases is calculated 
from the day of opening the court case to the day of the court decision in months. LU: Median- in 201: 36 days, 
in 2018: 49 days; Average length in 2018: 57 days (7 cases). ES, NL: estimated length. CZ: Length in months. 
HU: Average number of days was calculated based only on the number of cases resolved with a conviction. PT: 
Average number of days was calculated based on a sample. IT: data refer to the responding courts, covering 
about 99% in 2017; data refer to both trial and preliminary court hearings CY: Serious cases, before the Assize 
Court,  are  on average tried  within a year. Less serious offences, before the District  Courts, take longer to be 
tried.. SK*: data correspond to average length of the whole proceedings, including at appeal court. 

45 

46  

47  

Recital 2 of Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on 
the  prevention  of  the  use  of  the  financial  system  for  the  purposes  of  money  laundering  or  terrorist 
financing. 
IMF factsheet, March 8, 2018:  https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/31/Fight-
Against-Money-Laundering-the-Financing-of-Terrorism  
Article 44(1) of the Directive (EU) 2015/849. See also the revised Article 44 in Directive (EU) 2018/843, 
which entered into force in June 2018 and had to be implemented by Member States by January 2020.  

22 

 
 
 
                                                           
3.1.4. Summary on the efficiency of justice systems 
An  efficient  justice  system  manages  its  caseload  and  backlog  of  cases,  and  delivers  its 
decisions  without  undue  delay.  The  main  indicators  used  by  the  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  to 
monitor the efficiency of justice systems are therefore the length of proceedings (estimated 
or average time in days needed to resolve a case), the clearance rate (the ratio of the number 
of resolved cases over the number of incoming cases) and the number of pending cases (that 
remains to be dealt with at the end of the year). 

General data on efficiency 
The  2021  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  contains  data  on  efficiency  spanning  eight  years  (2012-
2019).  This  time-span  allows  to  identify  certain  trends  and  to  take  into  account  that  justice 
reforms often take time to show their impact. 
Looking  at  the  available  data  since  2012  in  civil,  commercial  and  administrative  cases, 
efficiency  has  improved  or  remained  stable  in  10  Member  States,  while  it  decreased,  albeit 
often only marginally, in nine Member States. 
Positive  developments  can  be  observed  in  some  of  the  Member  States  that  have  been 
identified in the context of the European Semester as facing specific challenges (48): 
  Since  2012,  and  based  on  the  data  existing  for  these  Member  States,  in  the  majority  of 
them,  the  length  of  first  instance  court  proceedings  in  the  broad  ‘all  cases’  category 
(Figure  6)  and  the  litigious  civil  and  commercial  cases  (Figure  7)  has  decreased  or 
remained stable. In administrative cases (Figure 9), the length of proceedings since 2012 
decreased  or  remained  stable  in  almost  all  of  these  Member  States.  Overall,  half  of  the 
Member States saw an increase in the length of proceedings in 2019. 

 

  The  Scoreboard  presents  data  on  the  length  of  proceedings  in  all  court  instances  for 
litigious civil and commercial cases (Figure 8) and administrative cases (Figure 10). Data 
show that in a number of Member States identified as facing challenges with the length of 
proceedings  in  first  instance  courts,  higher  instance  courts  perform  in  a  more  efficient 
manner. However, for some other Member States facing challenges, the average length of 
proceedings in higher instance courts is even longer than in first instance courts. 
In the broad ‘all cases,’ and the litigious civil and commercial cases categories (Figures 
11 and 12), the overall number of Member States where the clearance rate is more than 
100%  has  increased  since  2012.  In  2019,  the  majority  of  all  Member  States,  including 
most of those facing challenges, reported a high clearance rate (more than 97%), which 
means that courts are generally able to deal with the incoming cases in these categories. 
In  administrative  cases  (Figure  13),  a  larger  variation  of  the  clearance  rate  can  be 
observed  from  one  year  to  another  and  while  it  generally  remains  lower  than  in  other 
categories of cases, some Member States continue to make good progress.  In particular, 
more than half of the Member States facing challenges report an increase in the clearance 
rate in administrative cases since 2012.  

  Since  2012,  progress  is  continuing  in  almost  all  Member  States  facing  the  most 
substantial  challenges  with  their  backlogs,  regardless  of  the  category  of  cases.  Often 

48  

HR,  IT,  CY,  HU,  MT,  PL,  PT  and  SK  which  received  2020  European  Semester  country-specific 
recommendations, and BE, BG, IE, EL, ES, RO, and SI, for which the challenges have been reflected in 
the recitals of their 2020 country-specific recommendations and country reports.  
Variance in  the results over the 8  years analysed  may be explained by contextual factors (variations of 
more  than  10%  of  incoming  cases  are  not  unusual)  or  systemic  deficiencies  (lack  of  flexibility  and 
responsiveness or inconsistencies in the process of reform).  

23 

 
 
                                                           
substantial progress in reducing pending cases has been made for both litigious civil and 
commercial  cases  (Figure  15)  and  administrative  cases  (Figure  16).  Despite  these 
improvements,  significant  differences  between  Member  States  with  comparatively  few 
pending cases and those with a high number of pending cases remain. 

Efficiency in specific areas of EU law 
Data on the average length of proceedings in specific areas of EU law (Figures 17-22) provide 
an insight into the functioning of justice systems in these types of business-related disputes.  
Data on efficiency in specific areas of law are collected based on narrowly defined scenarios 
and  the  number  of  relevant  cases  may  appear  low.  However,  as  compared  to  the  calculated 
length of proceedings presented in the general data on efficiency, these figures provide for an 
actual  average  length  of  all  relevant  cases  in  specific  areas  in  a  year.  It  is  therefore  worth 
noting that several Member States that do not appear to be facing challenges based on general 
data on efficiency report significantly longer average length of cases in specific areas of EU 
law.  At  the  same  time,  the  length  of  proceedings  in  different  specific  areas  may  also  vary 
considerably in the same Member State. 

The figures for specific areas of EU law show the following trends: 
  For  competition  cases  (Figure  17),  as  the  overall  caseload  faced  by  courts  across 
Member  States  decreased  slightly,  the  length  of  judicial  review  decreased  or  remained 
stable  in  seven  Member  States,  while  it  increased  in  nine  other  Member  States.  As  in 
2018, only two Member States reported an average length exceeding 1 000 days in 2019, 
continuing the positive trends in this respect.  

  For  electronic  communications  (Figure  18),  the  case-loads  faced  by  courts  decreased 
compared  to  previous  years,  reversing  the  negative  trend  regarding  increased  length  of 
proceedings observed in 2018. In 2019, most Member States registered a decrease in the 
average lengths of proceedings or figures remained stable, compared to 2018, with only 
few showing an increase. 

  For EU trademark infringement cases (Figure 19), in 2019 trends stablisied compared 
to  previous  years.  Most  Member  States  managed  to  cope  better  with  their  caseload, 
registering  decreased  or  stable  lengths  of  proceedings,  while  few  others  saw  a  clear 
increase in the average length of cases.  

  The possible combined effect of the enforcement chain consisting of both administrative 
and judicial review proceedings is presented in the area of EU consumer law (Figures 20 
and 21).  In 2019, six Member States reported that  their  consumer protection authorities 
took  on  average  less  than  three  months  to  issue  a  decision  in  a  case  covered  by  EU 
consumer law, while in six other Member States they took more than six months. Where 
the  decisions  of  the  consumer  protection  authorities  were  challenged  in  courts,  in  2019 
the trends regarding the length of judicial review of an administrative decision diverged, 
with inceases in six and decreases in six other Member States compared to 2018. In two 
Member States the average length of judicial review remains at over 1 000 days.  

  The  effective  fight  against  money  laundering  is  crucial  in  protecting  the  financial 
system, fair competition and preventing negative economic consequences. Challenges in 

24 

 
 
length of court proceedings when dealing with money laundering offences may influence 
the  effective  fight  against  money  laundering.  Figure  22  presents  updated  data  on  the 
length  of  judicial  proceedings  dealing  with  money  laundering  offences.  It  shows  that 
while in more than half of Member States the first instance court proceedings take up to a 
year on average, these proceedings take around two years on average in several Member 
States (49). 

3.2. Quality of justice systems 

There  is  no  single  way  of  measuring  the  quality  of  justice  systems.  The  2021  EU  Justice 
Scoreboard continues to examine factors that are generally accepted as relevant for improving 
the quality of justice. They are grouped into four categories: 

1) accessibility of justice for citizens and businesses; 

2) adequate financial and human resources; 

3) putting in place assessment tools; and 

4) digitalisation. 

3.2.1. Accessibility 

Accessibility  is  required  throughout  the  whole  justice  chain  to  enable  people  to  obtain 
relevant  information  —  about  the  justice  system,  how  to  initiate  a  claim  and  the  related 
financial  aspects,  the  state  of  play  of  proceedings  up  until  their  end  —  and  to  access  the 
judgment online.  

– Legal aid, court fees and legal fees – 

The cost of litigation is a key factor for access to justice. High litigation costs, including court 
fees  (50)  and  legal  fees  (51),  may  hinder  access  to  justice.  Litigation  costs  in  civil  and 
commercial matters are not harmonised at EU level. They are governed by national legislation 
and therefore vary from one Member State to another.  

Access to legal aid is a fundamental right enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the EU (52). It allows access to justice for those who would not be able to bear or advance the 
costs of litigation. Most Member States grant legal aid based on the applicant’s income (53). 

49  

50  

51  
52  
53 

Directive  (EU)  2018/1673  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  23  October  2018  on 
combating money laundering by criminal law will eliminate legal obstacles that may delay prosecution, 
such as that a prosecution for money laundering  can only start when the proceedings for the underlying 
predicate offence have been concluded. Member States had to transpose the Directive before 8 December 
2020. 
Court fees are understood as an amount to be paid to initiate non-criminal law proceedings in a court or 
tribunal. 
Legal fees are the consideration for services provided by lawyers to their clients. 
Article 47(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. 
Member States use different methods to establish the eligibility threshold, e.g. different reference periods 
(monthly/annual income). About half of the Member States also have a threshold related to the personal 
capital of the applicant. This is not taken into account for this figure. In BE, BG, IE, ES, FR, HR, HU, 
LT,  LU,  NL  and  PT,  certain  groups  of  people  (e.g.  individuals  who  receive  certain  benefits)  are 
automatically entitled to receive legal aid in civil/commercial disputes.  Additional criteria that Member 
States may use, such as the merit of the case, are not reflected in this figure. Although not directly related 

25 

 
 
                                                           
 
Figure  23  shows  the  availability  of  full  or  partial  legal  aid  in  a  specific  consumer  case 
involving  a  claim  of  EUR  6 000.  It  compares  the  income  thresholds  for  granting  legal  aid, 
expressed  as  percentage  of  the  Eurostat  poverty  threshold  in  each  Member  State  (54).  For 
example,  if  the  threshold  for  legal  aid  appears  at  20%,  it  means  that  an  applicant  with  an 
income  20%  higher  than  the  Eurostat  poverty  threshold  in  their  Member  State  will  still  be 
eligible for legal aid. However, if the threshold for legal aid appears at below 0, it means that 
a person with an income below the poverty threshold may not be eligible for legal aid. 

Some Member States operate a legal aid system that provides for 100% coverage of the costs 
linked to litigation (full legal aid), complemented by a system covering partial costs (partial 
legal  aid),  the  latter  applying  eligibility  criteria  different  from  that  of  the  former.  Other 
Member States operate either only a full or partial legal aid system. 

Figure  23:  Income  threshold  for  legal  aid  in  a  specific  consumer  case,  2020(*) 
(differences in  % from  Eurostat  poverty threshold)  (source: European Commission  with the 
CCBE(55))  

(*) EE: decision to grant legal aid is not based on the level of financial  resources of the applicant. IE: partial 
legal  aid  has  to  take  into  account  also  the  disposable  assets  of  the  applicant.  LV:  thresholds  vary  by 
municipality,  upper  limit  is  represented  in  the  chart.  PT:  Legal  aid  is  a  decision  taken  by  the  Public 
Administration, with the Social Security Ministry assessing the applicant’s financial conditions under the law. 

Most  Member  States  require  parties  to  pay  a  court  fee  when  starting  judicial  proceedings. 
Recipients  of  legal  aid  are  often  exempt  from  paying  court  fees.  Only  in  Bulgaria,  Estonia, 
Ireland, Netherlands, Poland and Slovenia are recipients of legal aid not automatically exempt 
from paying court fees. In Czech Republic the court decides on a case-by-case basis whether 

54  

55  

to  the  figure,  in  several  Member  States  (AT,  CZ,  DE,  DK,  IT,  NL,  PL,  SI)  legal  aid  is  not  limited  to 
natural persons. 
To  collect  comparable  data,  each  Member  State’s  respective  Eurostat  poverty  threshold  has  been 
converted to a  monthly income. The at-risk-of-poverty (AROP) threshold is  set at 60 % of the  national 
median  equivalised  disposable  household  income.  European  Survey  on  Income  and  Living  Conditions, 
Eurostat table ilc_li01, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/ilc_li01/default/table?lang=en 
2020 data collected through replies by CCBE members to a questionnaire based on the following specific 
scenario: a dispute of a consumer with a company (two different values of the claim have been indicated: 
€6 000 and the Eurostat At-Risk-of-Poverty threshold in each Member State). Given that conditions for 
legal  aid  depend  on  the  applicant’s  situation,  the  following  scenario  was  used:  a  single  35-year-old 
employed  applicant  without  any  dependant  and  legal  expenses  insurance,  with  a  regular  income  and  a 
rented apartment. 

26 

 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
to exempt a legal aid recipient from paying court fees. In Luxembourg, litigants who benefit 
from legal aid do not have to pay bailiff fees. Figure 24 compares for two scenarios the level 
of the court fee presented as a share of the value of the claim.  If, for example, in the figure 
below the court fee appears at 10% of a EUR 6 000 claim, the consumer will have to pay a 
EUR 600 court fee to start judicial proceedings. The low value claim is based on the Eurostat 
At-Risk-of-Poverty threshold for each Member State. 

Figure  24:  Court  fee  to  start  judicial  proceedings  in  a  specific  consumer  case,  2020(*)  
(level of court fee as a share of the value of the claim) (source: European Commission with 
the CCBE(56)) 

NO 
DATA 

(*)  ‘Low  value  claim’  is  a  claim  corresponding  to  the  Eurostat  poverty  threshold  for  a  single  person  in  each 
Member State, converted to monthly income (e.g. in 2019, this value ranged from €193 in RO to €1 824 in LU). 
ES, PT: no data were provided. BG, RO: no information on court fees for a low value claim was provided. LU: 
Litigants have to pay bailiff fees to start proceedings as a plaintiff unless they benefit from legal aid. NL: Court 
fees  for  income  <€2 325/month.  AT:  The  maximum  amount  of  court  fee  depends  on  the  court’s  instance.  SE: 
Court fees differ in civil matters depending on the type of case. For disputes where the value of the claim is <€2 
253, the court fee is €86. In cases where the value of the claim is >€2 253, the court fee is €267. For other types 
of claims there are other court fees. 

56  

The  data  refer  to  income  thresholds  valid  in  2020  and  have  been  collected  through  replies  by  CCBE 
members  to  a  questionnaire  based  on  the  following  specific  scenario:  a  consumer  dispute  between  an 
individual  and  a  company  (two  different  values  of  the  claim  have  been  indicated:  EUR  6 000  and  the 
Eurostat At-Risk-of-Poverty threshold in each Member State). 

27 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Efficient contract enforcement is essential for the economy. The likelihood of recovering the 
actual costs of litigation strenghtens the position of the creditor seeking to enforce a contract. 
Typically,  the  creditor,  as  plaintiff,  is  required  to  pay  a  court  fee  for  filing  a  case  with  the 
court. The courts generally order the defendant who loses to  reimburse in full the court fees 
advanced by the plaintiff who has won. Figure 25 shows the level of court fee required to start 
judicial  proceedings  in  a  specific  commercial  case  concerning  a  dispute  between  two 
companies in cross-border commercial litigation on enforcing a contract, with a value of the 
claim at EUR 20 000. 

Figure 25: Court fee to start judicial proceedings in a specific commercial case, 2020 (*) 
(in EUR) (source: European Commission with the CCBE(57)) 

(*) Recovery of court fees is decided on a case-by-case basis in ES and EL. There is no full recovery of court 
fees by the winning party in and HU.  

It is common for the creditor to advance the fees of their own lawyer not only for the litigious 
phase but also during the pre-litigious phase. On reimbursement, most Member States apply 
the rule according to which the losing party is expected to bear not only their own legal costs, 
but  also  those  of  the  winning  party.  Such  a  fee-shifting  rule  deters  the  ﬁling  of  low-
probability-of-winning  cases,  while  it  encourages  the  filing  of  high-probability-of-winning 
cases.  Figure  26  shows  the  amount  the  court  would  award  to  the  successful  plaintiff  in  a 
specific commercial case scenario (see Footnote 58).  

Three main fee systems can be distinguished:  

(1) in Member States with a statutory fee system, reimbursement of legal fees depends on the 
level  of  statutory  fee  envisaged  for  the  work  carried  out  by  the  lawyer,  which  vary 
significantly between Member States;  

57  

The  data  have  been  collected  through  replies  by  CCBE  members  to  a  questionnaire  based  on  the 
following  specific  scenario  on  the  scenario  described  above.  CCBE  members  were  asked  to  provide 
information on the payable court fee to file the action in the case in the scenario.  

28 

 
 
                                                           
(2) in Member States without a statutory fee system, there is  either full (Hungary, Portugal, 
Finland) or partial (Poland, Latvia, Luxembourg) reimbursement of legal fees; and  

(3) in  a number of Member States the reimbursement is  decided by  the  court on a  case-by-
case basis.  

Figure 26: Recoverability of legal fees in a commercial trial, 2020  (*) (in EUR) (source: 
European Commission with the CCBE(58))  

(*) For this figure, legal fees do not include clerical costs and VAT, if payable. The hypothetical legal fee for the 
litgious phase provided for in the scenario is €1 650. Full recovery in systems without statutory fee means that 
this amount (€1 650) can be recovered. Member States with partial recovery (PL, LV, LU) are sorted by order of 
the recoverable legal fee  (highest to lowest,  amounts  range from €1 275 – €500). The  figure does not include 
information  on  the  recoverability  of  legal  fees  for  the  pre-litigious  phase,  which  is  is  not  envisaged  in  all 
Member States. AT: scenario not fully applicable to ATs system of reimbursement. MT: there is no concept of an 
hourly legal fee in MT, reimbursement is determined based on the value of the claim. IT: there is a statutory fee 
in IT (€3 235 in the scenario), but the court can decide on reimbursement within a set range. LT: court decides 
taking into account guidance by the Ministry of Justice, maximum amount in the scenario would be €3 350.  

58  

The  data  have  been  collected  through  replies  by  CCBE  members  to  a  questionnaire  based  on  the  same 
hypothetical  case  as  for  Figure  25  (see  Footnote  62).  The  following  scenario  was  used  as  a  basis  for 
calculating  the  legal  fees:  the  company  seeking  to  enforce  the  contact  contracted  a  specialised  and 
experienced lawyer, who carried out the following work: In the pre-litigious phase: 3 hours of work, one 
document produced for an hourly legal fee of EUR 200 (overall EUR 600). Litigious phase: 11 hours of 
work,  3  documents  produced,  2  court  hearings  for  an  hourly  legal  fee  of  EUR  200  net  (overall  EUR 
2 200). CCBE members were asked to provide information on a) the statutory fee foreseen for the work in 
the (pre-) litigious phase, if existing and b) the amount of legal fee that the court would reasonably order 
to be reimbursed by the losing party. (To be noted that the hypothetical hourly legal fee has been changed 
compared to the 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard, therefore the answers are not comparable). 

29 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
– Accessing alternative dispute resolution methods – 

Figure 27 shows Member States’ efforts in promoting the voluntary use of alternative dispute 
resolution methods through specific incentives, which may vary depending on the area of law 
(59).  

Figure  27:  Promotion  of  and  incentives  for  using  ADR  methods,  2020  (*)  (source: 
European Commission (60)) 

(*) Maximum possible: 68 points. Aggregated indicators based on the following indicators: 1) website providing 
information on ADR, 2) Publicity campaigns in media, 3) Brochures for the general public, 4) Court provides 
specific information sessions on ADR upon request, 5) ADR/mediation co-ordinator at courts, 6) Publication of 
evaluations on the use of ADR, 7) Publication of statistics on the use of ADR, 8) Legal aid covers (partly or in 
full)  costs  incurred  with  ADR,  9)  Full  or  partial  refund  of  court  fees,  including  stamp  duties,  if  ADR  is 
successful, 10) No lawyer for ADR procedure required, 11) Judge can act as mediator, 12) Agreement reached 
by the parties becomes enforceable by the court, 13) Possibility to initiate proceedings / file a claim and submit 
documentary  evidence  online,  14)  Parties  can  be  informed  of  the  initiation  and  different  steps  of  procedure 
electronically,  15)  Possibility  of  online  payment  of  applicable  fees,  16)  Use  of  technologies  (artificial 
intelligence applications, chatbots) to facilitate submission and resolution of the disputes and 17) Other means. 
For  each  of  these  17  indicators,  one  point  was  awarded  for  each  area  of  law.  IE:  administrative  cases  are 
subsumed within the category of civil and commercial cases. EL: ADR exists in the area of public procurement 
procedure  before  Administrative  Courts  of  Appeal.  ES:  ADR  is  mandatory  in  labour  law  cases.  PT:  for 
civil/commercial disputes, court fees are refunded only in case of justices for peace. SK: the Slovak legal order 
does  not  support  the  use  of  ADR  for  administrative  purposes.  FI:  Consumer  and  labour  disputes  are  also 
considered  to  be  civil  cases.  SE:  judges  have  procedural  discretion  on  ADR.  Seeking  an  amicable  dispute 
settlement is a mandatory task for the judge unless it is inappropriate due to the nature of the case.  

59  

60  

The  methods to promote and  incentivise  the use  of  ADR do not cover compulsory requirements to  use 
ADR before going to court, as such requirements raise concerns about their compatibility with the right to 
an effective remedy before a tribunal enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
2020 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

30 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
– Child-friendly justice –  

Figure 28 shows the various arrangements in Member States that make justice system more 
accessible  for  children  and  suited  to  their  needs,  for  example  by  providing  child-friendly 
information  on  proceedings  or  undertaking  measures  to  prevent  the  child  having  to  go 
through several hearings.  

Figure 28: Child-friendly justice, 2020 (*) (source: European Commission (61)) 

3.2.2. Resources 

Sufficient  resources,  including  the  necessary  investments  in  physical  and  technical 
infrastructure, and well-qualified, trained and adequately paid personnel of all categories, are 
necessary for the good functioning of the justice system. Without adequate facilities, tools or 
personnel with the required qualifications, skills and access to continuous training, the quality 
of proceedings and decisions is at stake. 

– Financial resources – 

The  figures  below  show  the  actual  government  expenditure  on  the  operation  of  the  justice 
system (excluding prisons), both per inhabitant (Figure 29) and as a share of gross domestic 
product  (GDP)  (Figure  30)  and,  finally,  the  main  categories  of  expenditure  on  law  courts 
(Figure 31) (62). 

61  

2020 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems and the 
European Judicial Training Network. 

62    General  government  total  (actual)  expenditure  on  the  administration,  operation  or  support  of 
administrative, civil and criminal law courts and the judicial system, including enforcement of fines and 
legal settlements imposed by the courts and operation of parole probation systems, and legal aid as well 
as  legal  representation  and  advice  on  behalf  of  government  or  on  behalf  of  others  provided  by 

31 

 
 
 
                                                           
 
Figure 29: General government total expenditure on law courts in EUR per inhabitant, 
2012, 2017 – 2019 (*) (source: Eurostat) 

(*) Member States are ordered according to the expenditure in 2019 (from highest to lowest). The following data 
are provisional: ES (2019), FR (2018, 2019), PT (2019) and SK (all years). Data extracted 08 April 2021.  

Figure 30: General government total expenditure on law courts as a percentage of GDP, 
2012, 2017 – 2019 (*) (source: Eurostat) 

(*) Member States are ordered according to the expenditure in 2019 (from highest to lowest). The following data 
are provisional: ES (2019), FR (2018, 2019), PT (2019) and SK (all years).  Data extracted 08 April 2021. 

government  in  cash  or  in  services,  excluding  prison  administrations  (National  Accounts  Data, 
Classification  of  the  Functions  of  Government  (COFOG),  group  03.3),  Eurostat 
table  gov_10a_exp, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database 

32 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Figure  31  shows  the  main  economic  categories  comprising  government  expenditure  on  law 
courts:  

1) wages and salaries of judges and court staff, including social contributions (‘compensation 
of employees’ (63));  

2) operating costs for goods and services consumed by the law courts such as building rentals, 
office consumables, energy and legal aid (‘intermediate consumption’ (64));  

3)  investment  in  fixed  assets,  such  as  court  buildings  and  software  (‘gross  fixed  capital 
formation’ (65)); and  

4) other expenditure. 

Figure 31: General government total expenditure on law courts by category (*) (in 2019, 
as a percentage of total expenditure) (source: Eurostat) 

(*)  The  following  data  are  provisional:  ES  (2019),  FR  (2018,  2019),  PT  (2019)  and  SK  (all  years).    Data 
extracted 08 April 2021.  

63  

64  

65  

Compensation  of  employees  consists  of  wages  and  salaries  in  cash  or  in  kind  (D.11)  and  employer's 
actual  and  imputed  social  contributions  (D.121  and  D.122).  See:  https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php?title=Glossary:Compensation_of_employees 
Intermediate  consumption  is  a  national  accounts  concept  which  measures  the  value  of  the  goods  and 
services consumed as inputs  by a process of production. It excludes  fixed assets  whose  consumption is 
recorded as consumption of  fixed capital. The goods and services may be either transformed or used up 
by the production process. 
See https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Glossary:Intermediate_consumption 
Gross  fixed  capital  formation,  abbreviated  as  GFCF,  consists  of  resident  producers’  investments, 
deducting disposals, in fixed assets during a given period. It also includes certain additions to the value of 
non-produced  assets  realized  by  producers  or  institutional  units.  Fixed  assets  are  tangible  or  intangible 
assets produced as outputs from production processes that are used repeatedly, or continuously, for more 
than 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
See: 
explained/index.php?title=Glossary:Gross_fixed_capital_formation_(GFCF) 

year. 

one 

33 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
– Human resources – 

Adequate human resources are essential for the quality of a justice system. Diversity among 
judges, including gender balance, adds complementary knowledge, skills and experience and 
reflects the reality of society. 

Figure  32:  Number  of  judges,  2012-2019  (*)  (per  100  000  inhabitants)  (source:  CEPEJ 
study) 

(*)  This  category  consists  of  judges  working  full-time,  under  the  CEPEJ  methodology. It  does  not  include  the 
Rechtspfleger/court clerks that exist in some Member States. AT: Data on administrative justice is introduced in 
the data since 2016. EL: Since 2016, data on number of professional judges includes all the ranks for criminal 
and political justice as well as administrative judges. IT: The regional audit commissions, local tax commissions 
and  military  courts  are  not  taken  into  consideration.  Administrative  justice  has  been  taken  into  account  since 
2018.  

Figure  33:  Proportion  of  female  professional  judges  at  Supreme  Courts  2018-2020  (*) 
(source: European Commission (66)) 

(*) The data are sorted by 2020 values, from highest to lowest. 

66  

European  Institute  for  Gender  Equality,  Gender  Statistics  Database:    https://eige.europa.eu/gender-
statistics/dgs/indicator/wmidm_jud_natcrt__wmid_natcrt_supcrt/datatable  

34 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 34: Number of lawyers, 2012 - 2019 (*) (per 100 000 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ 
study) 

(*) Under CEPEJ methodology a lawyer is a person qualified and authorised according to national law to plead 
and act on behalf of his or her clients, to engage in the practice of law, to appear before the courts or advise and 
represent his or her clients in legal matters (Recommendation Rec (2000)21 of the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe on the freedom of exercise of the profession of lawyer).  DE: no distinction is made between 
different groups of lawyers in Germany, such as between solicitors and barristers. FI: since 2015, the number of 
lawyers provided includes both the number of lawyers working in the private sector and the number of lawyers 
working in the public sector.  

– Training – 

Judicial training is important in contributing to the quality of judicial decisions and the justice 
service delivered to citizens. The data set out below cover judicial training in a broad range of 
areas, including communication with parties and the press and judicial skills.  

Figure 35: Share of continuous training of judges on various types of skills, 2019  (*) (as 
a percentage of total number of judges receiving these types of training) (source: European 
Commission (67)) 

(*)  Figure  35  shows  the  distribution  of  judges  participating  in  continuous  training  activities  (i.e.  those  taking 
place after the initial training period to become a judge) in each of the four identical areas as a percentage of 
the total number of judges trained in these types of training. Legal training activities are not taken into account. 
Judicial training authorities in EL, MT and PT did not provide specific training activities on the selected skills. 
DK: including court staff. AT: including prosecutors. 

67  

2019 data collected in cooperation with the European Judicial Training Network and CEPEJ. ‘Judgecraft’ 
includes activities such as conducting hearings, writing decisions or rhetoric. 

35 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure  36:  Availability  of  training  in  communication  for  judges,  2020  (*)  (source: 
European Commission (68)) 

(*) Maximum possible: 14 points. Member States were given 1 point if they have initial training and 1 point if 
they have continuous training (maximum of 2 points for each type of training). The source of the data changed 
as compared to previous editions of the Justice Scoreboard, affecting the comparability of the data.  DK: Covid-
19 pandemic had a major negative effect on the offer of continuous courses and seminars in 2020.  HU: Some 
training courses had to be cancelled due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 

3.2.3. Assessment tools 

Regular  evaluation  could  improve  the  justice  system’s  responsiveness  to  current  and  future 
challenges and therefore help the justice system increase its quality. Surveys (Figure 37) are 
essential in assessing how justice systems operate from the perspective of legal professionals 
and court users. An adequate follow-up on the surveys’ findings (Figure 38) is important to 
improving the quality of justice systems. 

68  

2020 data collected in cooperation with the European Judicial Training Network.  

36 

 
 
 
                                                           
Figure  37: Topics of surveys conducted among court users  or legal  professionals,  2019 
(*) (source: European Commission (69)) 

(*)  Member  States  were  given  one  point  per  survey  topic  indicated  regardless  of  whether  the  survey  was 
conducted at national, regional or court level. ‘Other topics’ include: surveys among lawyers on the functioning 
of certain courts (ES); surveys among litigants on the work of certain courts (LV); survey among the judiciary 
and  judicial  assistants  on  a  range  of  topics,  incl.  physical  accessibility  and  facilities  offered  to  children, 
respectful treatment of parties and the need for a sentencing policy (MT). In DE, a number of different surveys 
were carried out at the level of the federal states.  

Figure  38:  Follow-up  of  surveys  conducted  among  court  users  or  legal  professionals, 
2019 (*) (source: European Commission (70)) 

(*) Member States were given one point per type of follow-up.  

69  
70  

2019 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 
2019 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

37 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
3.2.4. Digitalisation 

The  use  of  information  and  communication  technologies  (ICT)  can  strengthen  the  Member 
States’ justice systems and make them more accessible, efficient, resilient and ready to  face 
current and future challenges. The COVID-19 pandemic has also adversely impacted national 
justice  systems  and  has  highlighted  a  number  of  challenges  affecting  the  functioning  of  the 
judiciary. 

Earlier editions of the EU Justice Scoreboard provided comparative data on certain aspects of 
the  ICT  in  justice  systems.  As  announced  in  the  Commission’s  Communication  on  the 
digitalisation  of  justice  in  the  EU  of  2 December 2020  (71),  the  Scoreboard  has  been 
substantially augmented with further data on digitalisation in the Member States. This should 
allow for more in-depth monitoring of progress areas and outstanding challenges. 

Citizen-friendly  justice  requires  that  information  about  national  judicial  systems  is  not  only 
easily accessible but is also tailored to specific groups of society that would otherwise have 
difficulties  in  accessing  the  information.  Figure  39  shows  the  availability  of  online 
information on specific aspects of national judicial systems and for specific groups of society. 

Figure  39:  Availability  of  online  information  about  the  judicial  system  for  the  general 
public, 2020(*) (source: European Commission (72)) 

(*) DE: Each federal state as well as the federal level decide individually which information to provide online. 

71  

72 

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions ‘Digitalisation of justice in the European Union: 
A toolbox of opportunities’ COM(2020)710 and accompanying SWD(2020)540.  
2020 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

38 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
– Digital-ready rules – 

The  use  of  digital  solutions  in  civil/commercial,  administrative  and  criminal  cases  often 
requires  appropriate  regulation  in  national  procedural  rules.  Figure  40  illustrates  the 
possibility  for  various  actors  to  participate  by  distance  communication  technology  (such  as 
videoconferencing),  and  reflects  the  current  situation  with  respect  to  admissibility  of  digital 
evidence.  

Figure  40:  Procedural  rules  allowing  digital  technology  in  courts  in  civil/commercial, 
administrative and criminal cases (*) 

(*)  For  each  Member  State  the  first  column  presents  procedural  rules  for  civil/commercial  cases,  the  second 
columns  for  administrative  cases  and  the  third  column  for  criminal  cases.  Maximum  possible:  12  points.  For 
each criterion, two points were given if the possibility exists in all civil/commercial, administrative and criminal 
cases, respectively  (in criminal cases, the possibility  of hearing the parties  was  split to cover both defendants 
and victims). The points are divided by two when the possibility does not exists in all cases. For those Member 
States  that  do  not  distinguish  civil/commercial  and  administrative  cases,  the  same  number  of  points  has  been 
given for both areas. LU, CY and HR: none for administrative cases. 

39 

 
 
 
 
 
– Use of digital tools – 

Beyond digital-ready procedural rules, courts and prosecution services need to have in place 
the  appropriate  tools  and  infrastructure  allowing  for  distance  communication  and  secure 
remote access to the workplace (Figure 41). Adequate infrastructure and equipment is needed 
also  for  the  secure  electronic  communication  between  courts/prosecution  services  and  legal 
professionals and institutions (Figures 42 and 43). 

ICT,  including  innovative  technology,  plays  an  important  role  in  supporting  the  work  of 
judicial  authorities,  thus  significantly  contributing  to  the  quality  of  justice  systems.  The 
availability of various digital tools at the disposal of judges, prosecutors and judicial staff can 
streamline  work  processes,  ensure  fair  workload  allocation  and  lead  to  a  signficant  time 
reduction. 

Figure 41: Use of digital technology by courts and prosecution services (*) 

(*)  Maximum  possible:  7  points.  For  each  criterion,  one  point  was  given  if  courts  and  prosecution  services, 
respectively, use a given technology and 0.5 point was awarded when the technology is not always used by them. 

40 

 
 
 
 
 
Secure electronic communication can contribute to improving the quality of justice systems. 
The possibility for courts to communicate electronically between themselves, as well as with 
legal  professionals  and  other  institutions,  can  streamline  processes  and  reduce  the  need  for 
paper-based  communication  and  physical  presence,  which  would  lead  to  a  reduction  in  the 
length of pre-trial activities and court proceedings. 

Figure 42: Courts: electronic communication tools (*) 

(*) Maximum possible: 5 points. For each criterion, one point was given if secure electronic communication is 
available for courts. 0.5 was awarded when the possibility does not exists in all cases. 

Prosecution services are essential for the functioning of the criminal justice system. They can 
also benefit from having access to a secure electronic channel of communication, which could 
facilitate  their  work  and  lead  to  improved  quality  of  court  proceedings.  The  possibility  for 
secure  electronic  communication between prosecution services and investigating authorities, 
defence lawyers and courts would support the more expedient and efficient preparation of the 
proceedings before the court. 

Figure 43: Prosecution service: electronic communication tools (*) 

(*) Maximum possible: 5 points. For each criterion, one point was given if secure electronic communication is 
available for prosecution services. 0.5 was awarded when the possibility does not exists in all cases. Availability 
of electronic communication tools within procecution service includes communication with lawyers employed by 
the prosecution service. 

41 

 
 
 
 
 
 
– Online access to courts – 

The  ability  to  complete  specific  steps  in  a  judicial  procedure  by  electronic  means  is  an 
important  part  of  the  quality  of  justice  systems.  The  electronic  submission  of  claims,  the 
possibility  to  monitor  and  advance  a  proceeding  online,  or  affect  electronic  service  of 
document  can  tangibly  facilitate  access  to  justice  for  citizens  and  businesses  (or  their  legal 
representatives)  and  reduce  delays  and  costs.  Availability  of  such  digital  public  services 
would assist in taking courts one step closer to citizens and businesses, and by extension lead 
to an increased trust in the justice system. 

Figure  44:  Digital  solutions  to  initiate  and  follow  proceedings  in  civil/commercial  and 
administrative cases (*) 

(*)  Maximum  possible:  9  points.  For  each  criterion,  one  point  was  given  if  the  possibility  exists  in  all 
civil/commercial  and  administrative  cases,  respectively.  0.5  point  was  awarded  when  the  possibility  does  not 
exists in all cases. For those Member States that do not distinguish civil/commercial and  administrative cases, 
the same number of points has been given for both areas. HR: none for administrative cases. 

42 

 
 
 
 
 
The use of digital tools for conducting and following court proceedings in criminal cases, can 
also  help  guarantee  the  rights  of  victims  and  defendants.  For  example,  digital  solutions  can 
provide for confidential remote communication between defendants and their lawyers, allow 
defendants  in  detention  to  prepare  for  their  hearing,  or  assist  victims  of  crime  in  avoiding 
secondary victimisation.  

Figure 45: Digital solutions to conduct and follow court proceedings in criminal cases (*) 

(*) Maximum possible: 6 points. For each criterion, one point was given if the possibility exists in all criminal 
cases. 0.5 point was awarded when the possibility does not exists in all cases. 

– Access to judgments – 

Ensuring  online  access  to  judgments  increases  the  transparency  of  justice  systems,  helps 
citizens and businesses understand their rights and can contribute to consistency in case-law. 
The arrangements for online publication of judicial decisions are essential for creating user-
friendly search facilities (73) that make case-law more accessible to legal professionals and the 
general public. Seamless access to and easy reuse of case-law enables innovative ‘legal tech’ 
applications supporting practitioners.  

The online publication of court decisions requires balancing a variety of interests, within the 
boundaries set by legal and policy frameworks. The General Data Protection Regulation (74) 
fully  applies  to  the  processing  of  personal  data  by  courts.  A  fair  balance  has  to  be  struck 
between  the  right  to  data  protection  and  the  right  to  publicity  of  court  decisions  and 
transparency  of  the  justice  system  when  assessing  what  data  are  to  be  made  public.  This  is 
particularly  the  case  where  there  is  prevailing  public  interest  that  justifies  the  disclosure  of 
those  data.  In  many  countries,  the  law  or  practice  requires  the  anonymisation  or 

73  

74  

See Best practice guide for managing Supreme Courts, under the project Supreme Courts as guarantee for 
effectiveness of judicial systems, p. 29. 
Regulation  (EU)  2016/679  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  27  April  2016  on  the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 
1). 

43 

 
 
 
                                                           
pseudonymisation (75) of judicial decisions before publication, either in a systematic manner 
or upon request. Data produced by the judiciary are also governed by EU legislation on open 
data and the reuse of public sector information (76). 
The  availability  of  judicial  decisions  in  a  machine-readable  format  (77)  facilitates  an 
algorithm-friendly justice system (78). 

Figure  46:  Online  access  to  published  judgments  by  the  general  public,  2020  (*) 
(civil/commercial,  administrative  and  criminal  cases,  all  instances)  (source:  European 
Commission (79)) 

(*) Maximum possible: 9 points. For each court instance, one point was given if all judgments are available for 
civil/commercial  and  administrative  and  criminal  cases  respectively  and  0.5  points  when  some  judgments  are 
available. For Member States with only two court instances, points have been given for three court instances by 
mirroring the respective higher instance court of the non-existing instance. For those Member States that do not 
distinguish  the  two  areas  of  law  (civil/commercial  and  administrative),  the  same  number  of  points  has  been 
given for both areas. BE: for civil and criminal cases, each court is in charge of deciding on the publication of 
its  own  judgments.  DE:  each  federal  state  decides  on  online  availability  of  first  instance  judgments.  IE:  for 
criminal  cases,  summary  cases  are  not  generally  the  subject  of  a  written  judgment.  AT:  for  first  and  second 

75  

76  

77  

78  

79 

Anonymisation/pseudonymisation  is  more  efficient  if  assisted  by  an  algorithm.  However,  human 
supervision is needed, since the algorithms do not understand context. 
Directive 2003/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 November 2003 on the re-use 
of public sector information (OJ L 345, 31.12.2003, p. 90) and Directive (EU) 2019/1024 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on open data and the re-use of public sector information 
(OJ L 172, 26.6.2019, p. 56). 
Judgments  modelled  according  to  standards  (e.g.  Akoma  Ntoso)  and  their  associated  metadata  are 
downloadable  free  of  charge  in  the  form  of  a  database  or  by  other  automated  means  (e.g.  Application 
Programming Interface). 
See  also  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European 
Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions  –  A  European  strategy  for  data, 
COM(2020)  66  final,  Commission  White  Paper  on  Artificial  Intelligence  –  A  European  approach  to 
excellence and trust, COM(2020) 65 final, and Conclusions of the Council and the representatives of the 
Governments  of  the  Member  States  meeting  within  the  Council  on  Best  Practices  regarding  the  Online 
Publication of Court Decisions (OJ C 362, 8.10.2018, p. 2). 
2020 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

44 

 
 
 
                                                           
instance, judges decide which judgments are published. Decisions of the Supreme Court, that reject an appeal 
without  substantial  reasoning  are  not  published.  NL:  courts  decide  on  publication  according  to  published 
criteria. PT: for civil and criminal cases, a commission within the court decides on the publication. SK: for civil 
and criminal cases, decisions given in proceedings in which the public is excluded from trial and payment orders 
are not published. FI: courts decide which judgments are published. 

Figure  47:  Arrangements  for  producing  machine-readable  judicial  decisions,  2020  (*) 
(civil/commercial,  administrative  and  criminal  cases,  all  instances)  (source:  European 
Commission (80)) 

(*) Maximum possible: 24 points per type of cases. For each of the three instances (first, second, final) one point 
can be given if all judicial decisions are covered. If only some judicial decisions are covered at a given instance, 
only  half  point  is  awarded.  Where  a  Member  State  has  only  two  instances,  points  have  been  given  for  three 
instances by mirroring the respective higher instance as the non-existing instance. For those Member States that 
do not distinguish between administrative and civil/commercial cases, the same points have been allocated for 
both  areas  of  law.  ES:  The  use  of  the  General  Council  for  the  Judiciary  (CGPJ)  database  for  commercial 
purposes,  or  the  massive  download  of  information  is  not  allowed.  The  reuse  of  this  information  for  the 
elaboration of databases or for commercial purposes must follow the procedure and conditions established by 
the  CGPJ  through  its  Judicial  Documentation  Centre.  IE:  Anonymising  of  judgments  is  done  in  criminal 
proceedings (i.e. where statute requires, or a judge has, in accordance with principles established in case-law, 
directed,  that  the  identities  of  parties  or  persons  not  be  disclosed),  and  the  authoring  judge  is  required  to 
indicate the redaction to be made to any content which would tend to identify a person whose identity should be 
protected. 

80  

2020 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

45 

 
 
 
                                                           
3.2.5. Summary on the quality of justice systems 

Easy  access,  sufficient  resources,  effective  assessment  tools  and  digitalisation  are  the  factors 
that contribute to a high quality of justice systems. Citizens and business expect high quality 
decisions  from  an  effective  justice  system.  The  2021 EU  Justice  Scoreboard  develops  its 
comparative analysis of these factors. 

Accessibility 

This  edition  looks  again  at  a  number  of  elements  contributing  to  a  citizen-friendly  justice 
system: 

  The availability of legal aid and the level of court fees have a major impact on access to 
justice, in particular for people in poverty. Figure 23 shows that in some Member States, 
consumers whose income is below the Eurostat poverty threshold would not receive legal 
aid. Compared to 2019, the accessibility of legal aid has been tightened in about a third of 
the Member States and  widened in  five Member States, especially regarding partial legal 
aid. This development is in line with the longer-term trend, where legal aid has become less 
accessible in some Member States. The level of court fees (Figure 24) has remained largely 
stable since 2016, although several  Member States have raised the level  of court fees for 
low  value  clains.  The  burden  of  court  fees  continues  to  be  proportionally  higher  for  low 
value claims. The difficulty in benefiting from legal aid combined with high levels of court 
fees in some Member States could have a dissuasive effect for people in poverty to access 
justice.  

  The  level  of  court  fees  for  commercial  litigation  (Figure  25)  varies  greatly  among 
Member  States  (ranging  from  0.1%  to  6%  of  the  value  of  the  claim),  with  only  two 
Member States having no court fee at all. Figure 26 shows to what extent legal costs can 
be recovered by the winning party in a commercial case. Large differences regarding the 
recoverablity of legal fees for the litigious phase appear both between Member States with 
and  without  a  statutory  fee  system  as  well  as  within  these  groups  (in  particular  between 
more  and  less  generous  statutory  fee  systems).  In  addition,  in  many  Member  States, 
recoverability  of legal  costs depends on the courts’ discretion. The level  of  generosity  of 
the system for recovering legal fees can have either incentivising or deterring effects on the 
probability of filing a case, and therefore on the overall access to justice. 

  The  2021  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  extends  the  analysis  of  the  ways  in  which  the  Member 
States  promote  voluntary  use  of  alternative  dispute  resolution  methods  (ADR)  (Figure 
27)  for  private  disputes,  in  particular  the  possiblity  of  using  digital  technologies.  
Seventeen  Member  States  provide  for  a  possibility  to  initiate  proceedings  or  file  a  claim 
and submit documentary evidence online in at least certain types of disputes. In 19 Member 
States,  parties  can  be  informed  electronically  of  the  initiation  and  different  steps  of  the 
procedure  and  in  12  Member  States,  they  can  pay  applicable  fees  online.  In  8  Member 
States, technologies like artificial intelligence applications or chatbots can be used to ease 
submitting and resolving disputes.    

  For the second time, the 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard presents a consolidated overview of 
the measures taken by Member States for a child-friendly justice system (Figure 28). All 
Member States make at least some accommodations, most frequently having measures for 
child-friendly  hearings  (including  the  settings)  and  for  preventing  several  hearings  of  a 
child. Almost all Member States also provide training courses for judges on child-friendly 
justice. 

46 

 
 
 
Resources 

High quality justice systems in Member States require sufficient levels of financial and human 
resources,  including  the  necessary  investments  in  physical  and  technical  infrastructure, 
appropriate initial and continuous training, as well as diversity among judges, including gender 
balance. The 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard shows: 

 

In terms of financial resources, the data show that, overall, in 2019, general government 
total expenditure on law courts continued to remain mostly stable in Member States, with 
significant differences in actual amounts, both in EUR per inhabitant and as a percentage of 
GDP  between  Member  States  persisting  (Figures  29  and  30).  Almost  all  Member  States 
increased  their  expenditure  per  capita  in  2019  (an  increase  compared  to  2018)  and  a 
majority also increased their expenditure as percentage of GDP.  

  As  in  2020,  the  2021  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  also  shows  the  breakdown  of  total 
expenditure  into  different  categories  based  on  data  gathered  by  Eurostat.  Figure  31 
shows  major  differences  in  spending  patterns  among  Member  States.  On  the  one  hand, 
while  the  wages  and  salaries  of  judges  and  court  staff  (including  social  contributions) 
represent  the  biggest  share  in  most  Member  States,  investment  into  fixed  assets  such  as 
court buildings and software represents a lower share. On the other hand,  the expenditure 
on operating costs (e.g. building rentals, legal aid and other consumables) is significantly 
higher  in  a  few  Member  States  than  in  most  others.  This  breakdown  has  remained 
relatively stable year-on-year.  

  Women still represent less than 50 per cent of judges at the level of Supreme Courts in 
most  Member  States  (Figure  33).  The  evolution  over  the  three  year  period  from  2018  to 
2020  shows  that  trends  diverge  between  Member  States,  but  the  proportion  of  female 
judges at Supreme Courts has risen since 2010 in most Member States. 

  On  the  training  of  judges,  while  almost  all  Member  States  provide  at  least  some 
continuous training on judgecraft, fewer offer training on IT skills, court management and 
judicial ethics. Compared to the preceding year, the share of judges participating in training 
on IT skills grew slightly (Figure 35). On training to communicate with vulnerable groups 
of parties (Figure 36), most Member States provide training concerning victims of gender 
based  violence  and  more  than  half  of  the  Member  States  provide  training  on  gender 
sensitive  practices,  asylum  seekers  or  persons  with  different  cultural,  religious,  ethnic  or 
linguistic  background.  Training  on  communication  with  visually  or  hearing  impaired 
persons is available in about half of the Member States. Training on awareness raising and 
dealing  with  disinformation  is  available  only  in  slightly  more  than  half  of  the  Member 
States.   

Assessment tools 

  The  use  of  surveys  among  court  users  and  legal  professionals  (Figure  37)  was  slightly 
higher in 2019 than in the preceding years, with a stable number of Member States opting 
not  to  conduct  any  surveys.  However,  there  seems  to  be  some  variance  as  to  which 
Member States did not conduct surveys, indicating that sometimes surveys are conducted 
only  every  other/every  few  years.  Accessibility,  customer  service,  court  hearings  and 
judgments,  as  well  as  the  overall  trust  in  the  justice  system,  remain  recurring  topics  for 
surveys,  but  only  a  few  Member  States  inquired  about  the  satisfaction  of  groups  with 
special needs or about individuals’ awarness of their rights. All Member States who used 
surveys also ensured follow-up (Figure 38), although the extent of this follow-up continued 

47 

 
 
 
to vary greatly. Results generally fed into annual or specific reports and in many Member 
States they fed an evalution or were used to identify the need to amend legislation. 

Digitalisation 

  As  of  its  2021  edition,  the  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  includes  an  extended  component 
examining in detail aspects related to the digitalisation of justice. Although most Member 
States  already  use  digital  solutions  in  different  contexts  and  to  varying  degree,  there  is 
significant room for improvement. 

  Almost all Member States provide access to some online information about their judicial 
system, including a centralised web portal with online forms and interactive education on 
legal  rights  (Figure  39).  Differences  appear  on  the  content  of  the  information  and  how 
adequate it is to respond to people’s needs. For example, only a limited number of Member 
States  (12)  enable  people  to  find  out  whether  they  are  eligible  for  legal  aid  through  an 
interactive  online  simulation.  However,  a  website  with  online  forms  for  the  public  and 
companies or information for non-native speakers are available in the majority of Member 
States. 

  Less than half of the Member States have digital-ready procedural rules, which allow for 
the use of distance communication and for the admissibility of evidence in digital format 
only. In the remaining Member States this is possible only in limited situations. 

  On  the  use  of  digital  technology  by  courts  and  prosecution  services,  the  majority  of 
Member States already have different digital tools at the disposal of courts, prosecutors and 
staff  members.  While  most  Member  States  have  in  place  case-management  systems, 
videoconferencing  systems  and  the  possibility  for  teleworking,  there  is  still  a  need  for 
further progress in view of making automatic case allocation systems, artificial intelligence 
and blockchain-based tools more widely available.  

 

 

In  most  Member  States  courts  have  at  their  disposal  secure  electronic  tools  for 
communication. However, in a number of Member States courts are able to communicate 
via  secure  electronic  solutions  only  with  certain  legal  professionals  and/or  national 
authorities.  In  the  case  of  prosecution  services,  less  than  one  third  of  Member  States 
comprehensively provide for secure electronic communication with legal professionals and 
national institutions. 

In  civil/commercial  and  administrative  cases,  most  Member  States  provide  citizens  and 
businesses  (or  their  legal  representatives)  with  online  access  to  their  ongoing  or  closed 
cases, albeit in various degrees. Nevertheless, in criminal cases in the majority of Member 
States defendants and victims have very limited possibilities to follow or carry out part of 
their  case  using  digital  solutions,  while  in  some  Member  States  this  possibility  does  not 
exist. 

  Compared  to  previous  years,  online  access  to  court  judgments  (Figure  46)  has  not 
progressed,  particularly  for  the  publication  of  judgments  at  the  highest  instance:  17 
Member States publish all civil/commercial and administrative judgments and 15 Member 
States  also  publish  criminal  judgments  at  the  highest  instance.  These  numbers  invite  all 
Member  States  to  further  improve  as  decisions  at  the  highest  instance  play  an  important 
role for the consistency of case-law. Publication of judgments at second instance courts has 
not  progressed  either.  In  2020,  only  9  Member  States  published  all  civil/commercial  and 
administrative judgments of second instance courts online and 6 Member States did so for 
second instance criminal judgments, which is less than in 2019.  

  The  2021  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  continues  to  analyse  arrangements  in  place  in  the 

48 

 
 
Member States that can help to produce machine-readable judicial decisions (Figure 
47).  All  Member  States  have  at  least  some  arrangements  in  place  for  civil/commercial, 
administrative and criminal cases where a considerable variance among the Member States 
can  be  observed.  It  appears  that  administrative  courts  are  relatively  more  advanced  at 
creating  the  enabling  factors  for  an  algorithm-friendly  justice  system.  In  general,  a 
tendency to introduce more arrangements can be observed, particularly for the availability 
of  metadata  in  judgments  on  key  words,  date  of  decisions  and  the  regulation  of  personal 
data  in  the  published  judgments.  Compared  to  2019,  most  Member  States  reported  an 
improvement  in  2020.  Justice  systems  where  arrangements  for  modelling  judgments 
according to  standards enabling their machine readability have been put  in  place seem  to 
have the potential to achieve better results in the future.  

49 

 
 
 
 
 
3.3. Independence 

Judicial  independence,  which  is  integral  to  the  task  of  judicial  decision-making,  is  a 
requirement  stemming  from  the  principle  of  effective  judicial  protection  referred  to  in 
Article 19 TEU, and from the right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal enshrined 
in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (81). That requirement presumes:  

(a) external independence, when the body concerned exercises its functions autonomously, 
without  being  subject  to  any  hierarchical  constraint  or  subordinated  to  any  other  body  and 
without taking orders or instructions from any source whatsoever, thus being protected against 
external  interventions or pressure liable to  impair the independent judgment  of its members 
and to influence their decisions; and  

(b) internal independence and impartiality, when an equal distance is maintained from the 
parties  to  the  proceedings  and  their  respective  interests  with  regard  to  the  subject  matter  of 
those proceedings (82).  

Judicial independence guarantees that all the rights that individuals derive from EU law will 
be protected and that the values common to the Member States set out in Article 2 TEU, in 
particular the value of the rule of law, will be safeguarded (83). Preserving the EU legal order 
is fundamental for all citizens and business whose rights and freedoms are protected under EU 
law.   

The perceived independence of the judiciary is a growth-enhancing factor, as a perceived lack 
of  independence  can  deter  investments  (84).  In  addition  to  indicators  on  perceived  judicial 
independence from various sources, the Scoreboard presents a number of indicators on how 
justice  systems  are  organised  to  protect  judicial  independence  in  certain  types  of  situations 
where  independence  could  be  at  risk.  Reflecting  the  input  from  the  European  Network  of 
Councils  for  the  Judiciary  (ENCJ),  the  Network  of  the  Presidents  of  the  Supreme  Judicial 
Courts of the EU (NPSJC), and from the Expert Group on Money Laundering and Financing 
of Terrorism, the Scoreboard shows indicators on authorities involved and status of candidates 
for the appointment of Supreme Court judges, an overview of the hierarchical powers within 
the  prosecution  services,  as  well  of  the  possibility  to  have  a  review  of  a  decision  of  a 
prosecutor not to prosecute a case.  

81  
82  

83  

84  

See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT&from=EN 
Court of Justice, judgment of 19 November 2019,  A. K. and Others, C 585/18, C- 624/18 and C-625/18, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:982, paras. 121 and 122; judgment of 24 June 2019, Commission v. Poland, C-619/18, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:531 paras. 73 and 74; judgment of 27 February 2018,  Associação Sindical dos Juízes 
Portugueses,  C‑ 64/16,  EU:C:2018:117,  para.  44;  judgment  of  25  July  2018,  Minister  for  Justice  and 
Equality, C‑ 216/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:586, para. 65. 
Court  of  Justice,  judgment  of  24  June  2019,  Commission  v.  Poland,  C-619/18,  ECLI:EU:C:2019:531 
para. 44. 
In 2020, the World Economic Forum has not published the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) rankings 
due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 

50 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
3.3.1. Perceived judicial independence 

Figure  48:  Perceived  independence  of  courts  and  judges  among  the  general  public  (*) 
(source: Eurobarometer (85) — light colours: 2016, 2019 and 2020, dark colours: 2021) 

(*) Member States are ordered first by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts 
and judges is very good or fairly good (total good); if some Member States have the same percentage of total 
good, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and 
judges is fairly bad or very bad (total bad); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good and 
total bad, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and 
judges is very good; if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, total bad and of very good, 
then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is 
very bad. 
Figure  49  shows  the  main  reasons  given  by  respondents  for  the  perceived  lack  of 
independence  of  courts  and  judges.  Respondents  among  the  general  public,  who  rated  the 
independence of the justice system as being ‘fairly bad’ or ‘very bad,’ could choose between 
three  reasons  to  explain  their  rating.  The  Member  States  are  listed  in  the  same  order  as  in 
Figure 48. 

85  

Eurobarometer  survey FL489, conducted between 29 March and 9  April 2021. Replies to the question: 
‘From  what  you  know,  how  would  you  rate  the  justice  system  in  (our  country)  in  terms  of  the 
independence of courts and judges? Would you say it is very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad?’, 
see: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/justice-and-fundamental-rights/effective-justice/eu-justice-
scoreboard_en 

51 

 
 
 
                                                           
Figure  49:  Main  reasons  among  the  general  public  for  the  perceived  lack  of 
independence  (share  of  all  respondents  —  higher  value  means  more  influence)  (source: 
Eurobarometer (86)) 

Figure  50:  Perceived independence of courts and judges among companies (*)  (source: 
Eurobarometer (87) — light colours: 2016, 2019 and 2020, dark colours: 2021) 

(*) Member States are ordered first by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts 
and judges is very good or fairly good (total good); if some Member States have the same percentage of total 
good, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and 
judges is fairly bad or very bad (total bad); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good and 
total bad, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and 
judges is very good; if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, total bad and of very good, 

86  

87  

Eurobarometer  survey  FL489,  replies  to  the  question:  ‘Could  you  tell  me  to  what  extent  each  of  the 
following reasons explains  your rating of the  independence of the justice system  in (our country):  very 
much, somewhat, not really, not at all?’. 
Eurobarometer survey FL490, conducted between 29 March and 20 April 2021. Replies to the question: 
‘From  what  you  know,  how  would  you  rate  the  justice  system  in  (our  country)  in  terms  of  the 
independence of courts and judges? Would you say it is very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad?’, 
see: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/justice-and-fundamental-rights/effective-justice/eu-justice-
scoreboard_en;  in  2021,  the  sample  size of  companies surveyed was  enlarged to 500  for  all  Member 
States  except  for  MT,  CY  and  LU,  where  the  sample  was  250.  In  previous  years  the  sample  size 
was 200 for all Member States except for DE, ES, FR, PL and IT, where the sample was 400. 

52 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is 
very bad.  
Figure  51  shows  the  main  reasons  given  by  respondents  for  the  perceived  lack  of 
independence  of  courts  and  judges.  Respondents  among  companies,  who  rated  the 
independence of the justice system as being ‘fairly bad’ or ‘very bad,’ could choose between 
three  reasons  to  explain  their  rating.  The  Member  States  are  listed  in  the  same  order  as  in 
Figure 50. 

Figure 51: Main reasons among companies for the perceived lack of independence (rate 
of all respondents — higher value means more influence) (source: Eurobarometer (88)) 

88  

Eurobarometer  survey  FL490;  replies  to  the  question:  ‘Could  you  tell  me  to  what  extent  each  of  the 
following reasons explains  your rating of the independence of the justice system  in (our country):  very 
much, somewhat, not really, not at all?’. 

53 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
3.3.2. Structural independence  

The  guarantees  of  structural  independence  require  rules,  particularly  as  regards  the 
composition of the court and the appointment, length of service and grounds for abstention, 
rejection and dismissal of its members, in order to dispel any reasonable doubt in the minds of 
individuals  as  to  the  imperviousness  of  that  court  to  external  factors  and  its  neutrality  with 
respect to the interests before it (89). Those rules must, in particular, be such as to preclude not 
only  any  direct  influence,  in  the  form  of  instructions,  but  also  types  of  influence  which  are 
more indirect and which are liable to have an effect on the decisions of the judges concerned 
(90). 

European standards have been developed, particularly by the Council of Europe, for example 
in  the  2010  Council  of  Europe  Recommendation  on  judges:  independence,  efficiency  and 
responsibilities (91). The EU Justice Scoreboard presents certain indicators on issues that are 
relevant  when  assessing  how 
judicial 
independence. 

justice  systems  are  organised 

to  safeguard 

Specifically, this edition of the EU Justice Scoreboard contains new indicators on authorities 
involved and status of candidates for the appointment of Supreme Court judges (Figures 52 - 
54)  (92).  It  also  presents  an  overview  of  the  hierarchical  powers  within  the  prosecution 
services,  as  well  of  the  possibility  to  have  a  review  of  a  decision  of  a  prosecutor  not  to 
prosecute a  case  (Figures 55  - 57) (93). The figures present  the national  frameworks as  they 
were in place in December 2020.  

The figures presented in the Scoreboard do not provide an assessment or present quantitative 
data  on  the  effectiveness  of  the  safeguards.  They  are  not  intended  to  reflect  the  complexity 
and  details  of  the  procedures  and  accompanying  safeguards.  It  should  also  be  noted  that 

89  

90  

91  

92  

93  

See Court of Justice, judgment of 19 November 2019, A. K. and Others (Independence of the Disciplinary 
Chamber  of  the  Supreme  Court),  C-585/18,  C-624/18  and  C-625/18,  ECLI:EU:C:2019:982,  paras.  121 
and  122; judgment  of  24  June  2019,  Commission  v.  Poland,  C-619/18,  ECLI:EU:C:2019:531  paras. 73 
and  74;  judgment  of  25  July  2018,  LM,  C-216/18  PPU,  ECLI:EU:C:2018:586,  para.  66.  See  also 
paragraphs  46  and  47  of  the  Recommendation  CM/Rec(2010)12  Judges:  Independence,  Efficiency  and 
Responsibility (adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 17 November 2010) 
and  Explanatory  Memorandum,  which  provide  that  the  authority  taking  decisions  on  the  selection  and 
career  of  judges  should  be  independent  of  the  executive  and  legislative  powers.  With  a  view  to 
guaranteeing its independence, at least half of the members of the authority  should be judges chosen by 
their peers. However, where the constitutional or other legal provisions prescribe that the head of state, 
the government or the legislative power take decisions concerning the selection and career of judges, an 
independent  and  competent  authority  drawn  in  substantial  part  from  the  judiciary  (without  prejudice  to 
the rules applicable to councils for the judiciary contained in Chapter IV) should be authorised to make 
recommendations or express opinions which the relevant appointing authority follows in practice.  
See Court of Justice, judgment of 19 November 2019, A. K. and Others (Independence of the Disciplinary 
Chamber  of  the  Supreme  Court),  C-585/18,  C-624/18  and  C-625/18,  ECLI:EU:C:2019:982,  para.  123; 
judgment of 24 June 2019, Commission v. Poland, C-619/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:531 para. 112. 
See Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 Judges: Independence, Efficiency and Responsibility, adopted by 
the  Committee  of  Ministers  of  the  Council  of  Europe  on  17  November  2010  and  Explanatory 
Memorandum (‘the Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12’). 
The figures are based on the responses to an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close 
association  with  the  ENCJ.  Responses  to  the  updated  questionnaire  from  Member  States  that  have  no 
Councils for the Judiciary, are not ENCJ members, or their ENCJ membership has been suspended (CZ, 
DE, EE, CY, LU, AT, and PL) were obtained through cooperation with the Network of the Presidents of 
the Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU. 
The  figures  are  based  on  responses  to  an  updated  questionnaire  drawn  up  by  the  Commission  in  close 
cooperation with the Expert Group on Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism. 

54 

 
 
                                                           
implementing  policies  and  practices  to  promote  integrity  and  prevent  corruption  within  the 
judiciary  are  also  essential  to  guarantee  judicial  independence.  Ultimately,  the  effective 
protection of judicial independence also requires, beyond whatever necessary norms, a culture 
of integrity and impartiality, shared by magistrates and respected by the wider society. 

– Appointment of Supreme Court judges – 

Supreme Courts, as final instance courts, are essential to secure the uniform application of the 
law in Member States. It is for the Member States to organise the procedure of appointment of 
Supreme Court judges to ensure their independence and impartiality. In that respect, European 
law requires Member States to ensure that, once appointed, judges are free from influence or 
pressure from the appointing authority when carrying out their role (94). It is also necessary to 
ensure that the substantive conditions and detailed procedural rules governing the adoption of 
appointment decisions are such that they cannot give rise to reasonable doubts, in the minds 
of individuals, as to the imperviousness of the judges concerned to external factors and as to 
their  neutrality  with  respect  to  the  interests  before  them  (95).  Participation  of  independent 
bodies, such as councils for the judiciary, in the process of judicial appointment process may, 
in  principle,  be  such  as  to  contribute  to  making  that  process  more  objective,  provided  that 
such a body is itself sufficiently independent of the legislature and the executive (96).   

94  

95  

96  

Since  2019,  the  Court  of  Justice  issued  a  number  of  rulings  concerning  judicial  appointments  and 
requirements  of  EU  law  in  that  respect  (see,  to  that  end,  judgment  of  20  April  2021  in  case  C-896/19, 
Repubblika and Il-Prim Ministru, para. 56; judgment of 2 March 2021 in case C-824/18, AB, para. 122; 
judgment of 19 November 2019 in joined cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, AK et al, para. 133. 
Judgment of 20 April 2021 in case C-896/19, Repubblika and Il-Prim Ministru, para. 57; judgment of 2 
March 2021 in case C-824/18, AB, para. 123; judgment of 19 November 2019 in joined cases C-585/18, 
C-624/18 and C-625/18, AK et al., paras. 134 and 135. 
Judgment of 20 April 2021 in case C-896/19, Repubblika and Il-Prim Ministru para. 66; judgment of 2 
March  2021  in  case  C-824/18,  AB,  paras.  66,  124  and  125;  judgment  of  19  November  2019  in  joined 
cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, AK et al, paras. 137 and 138. 

55 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure  52  shows  an  overview  of  the  bodies  and  authorities  which  propose  judges  for  their 
appointment  as  Supreme  Court  judges  and  the  authorities  that  appoint  them,  as  well  as  the 
authorities which are consulted (e.g. judges).  

Figure 52: Appointment of Supreme Court judges: proposing and appointing authorities  
(*) (97)  

AT: proposal:  special chamber of the Supreme Court; appointment: President on advice of Minister of justice. LU: proposal 
and appointment: Cour supérieure de justice. DE: proposal: Richterwahlausschuss (Judges Election Committee, consisting 
of  the  Ministers  of  justice  of  the  16  federal  states  and  16  members  elected  by  the  federal  parliament  (“Bundestag”))  or 
Ministry  of  Justice;  appointment:  Richterwahlausschuss  following  consultative  advice  from  the  Präsidialrat  (Presidential 
Council  of  the  Supreme  Court,  consisting  of  its  president  and  judges  elected  by  all  the  judges  of  the  court  provides  a 
reasoned opinion on the personal and professional aptitude of each candidate) and with mandatory consent from Minister of 
Justice;  formal  appointment  by  the  President.  SK:  proposal:  Court  Presidents  or  Judicial  Council;  appointment:  Head  of 
State  on  advice  of  the  Judicial  Council.  SE:  proposal:  the  Judges  proposals  board;  appointment:    Government.  HR: 
proposal:  candidates  themselves  report  for  the  competition.  EE:  proposal:  Chief  Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court  after  open 
competition; Chief Justice shall first consider the opinion of the Supreme Court en banc and the Council for Administration 
of  Courts..  NL:  proposal:  Supreme  Court;  appointment:  Parliament.  PL:  proposal:  National  Council  of  the  Judiciary; 
appointment: President of the Republic.  RO:  no proposal for the appointment: a competition carried out by the Superior 
Council of  Magistracy  through  the  National  Institute  of  Magistracy.  CY:  President  appoints  on advice  of  the  president of 
Supreme Court. EL: proposal: Minister of Justice; appointment: Council for the Judiciary followed by a presidential decree 
implementing the decision.  BG: no proposal: competition procedure; appointment: The respective College of the Supreme 
Judicial Council. LT: The chart reflects the process for Supreme Court. A judge of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by 
the Seimas (proposal: President of the Republic. The candidates selected by the Selection Commission. The Judicial Council 
also  advises  the  President;  appointment:  Parliament.  .  Judges  of  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court  are  appointed  by  the 
President of the Republic. LV: proposal: President of Court with mandatory opinion of the Department of Supreme Court; 
appointment:  Parliament  for  external  candidates  and  Judicial  Council  for  judges.  IT:  On  the  proposal  by  the  CPGA,  the 
President of the Republic issues a decree on the appointment  of judges of the Council of State. FR: The appointing authority 
is  the  President  of  the  Republic,  who  must  formally  appoint  the  judges  (following  advice  of  CSM)  through  a  decree.  BE: 
proposal:  Council for  the  Judiciary  on  a  mandatory  advice  from  the Supreme  Court.  DK:  Judicial  Appointments  Council, 
with a vetting procedure by the Supreme Court, proposes one candidate to the Minister of Justice (formal appointment by the 
Head  of  State).  IE:  proposal:  the  Judicial  Appointments  Advisory  Board  selects  candidates  not  already  holding  judicial 
office and recommends them to the Government as being suitable for appointment to judicial office. The Government may 
select  serving  judges  for appointment  to  higher  judicial office;  appointment:  the  President  of  Ireland  on  the advice  of  the 
Government.  HU:  The  President  of  the  Kúria  informs  the  President  of  OBH  (  National  Office  for  the  Judiciary)  when  a 
judge’s position is vacant. The President of the OBH announces a public call for applications to the empty judiciary position. 
The  competent  collegium  of  the  Kúria  forms  an  opinion  on  each  applicant  by  a  secret  ballot.  It  gives  0-20  score  to  the 
candidates.  The  judicial  council  of  the  Kúria  forms  an  opinion  about  the  applicants  and  ranks  them  by  giving  scores  to 
evaluate their skills and attributes. The scores are defined by the decree of Minister of Justice. The scores can be the same as 
to all lower judicial positions. The President of Kúria can decide as following: a) to appoint the first ranked candidate. If the 
applicant was not a judge before, the President of Kúria must send the application to the President of the Republic to appoint 
the  judge;  b)  If  the  President  of  Kúria  wants  to  appoint  2nd  or  the  3rd  ranked  candidate,  he/she  needs  the  approval  of 

97  

Data collected through an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association with 
the  ENCJ.  Responses  to  the  updated  questionnaire  from  Member  States  that  have  no  Councils  for  the 
Judiciary  are  not  ENCJ  members,  or  whose  ENCJ  membership  has  been  suspended,  were  obtained 
through cooperation with the NPSC. 

56 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
National  Judicial  Council  (OBT).  He/she  must  justify  his  reasons  to  the  OBT  in  the  proposal.  The  2nd  or  the  3rd  ranked 
candidate can only be appointed if OBT gives its consent; c) annul the application if: there is no admissible application, the 
judicial council breached the rules of procedure, the appointment would cause conflict of interest, insufficient justification of 
the judicial council, change in the workload, budgetary issues occurred since the start of the application procedure or the 
position needs to be filled without application according to the law due to certain circumstances occurred since the start of 
the application procedure. MT: proposal: Prime Minister with consultative advice from Commission for the Administration 
of Justice; appointment: Head of state on advice of Prime Minister. ES: appointment: Head of state (the King) on advice of 
Council for the Judiciary. 

Figure  53  shows  whether  the  appointment  to  Supreme  Court  judges  is  possible  only  for 
existing  judges  or  if  external  candidates  can  be  appointed  to  Supreme  Court  judges,  either 
according to the same procedure as judges or according to a special procedure applicable only 
for persons who are not already judges in civil, criminal or administrative courts.  

Figure 53: Status of candidates for appointment as Supreme Court judges  (*) 

(*) BE: Apart from minimum requirements for becoming a judge, candidate for Supreme Court judge, must have 
15 years of professional experience, the latter 10 years as a magistrate.  BG: The candidate for a judge at the 
Supreme Court of Cassation/Supreme Administrative Court must take part in a competition. CZ: Candidate has 
to  exercise  legal  activity  for  at  least  10  years,  and  show  high  professional  knowledge  and  experiences.  DK: 
Candidate must have demonstrated suitability to seat in court as a test to vote first in at least 4 cases, of which at 
least  one  should  be  civil.  DE:  Apart  from  requirements  becoming  a  judge,  candidates  may  only  be  promoted 
according  to  their  aptitude,  qualifications  and  professional  achievements.  EE:  The  candidate  must  have  the 
abilities and personal characteristics necessary for working as a judge, and be an experienced and recognised 
lawyer. IE: High Court: practice as a barrister or a practising solicitor of not less than 12 years, including for a 
continuous period of minimum 2 years immediately before appointment.  A person was during this period of 2 
years: a judge of the ECJ, General Court, an Advocate-General  at the ECJ, a judge of the ECHR, a judge of the 
ICJ, a judge of the ICC, a judge of an international tribunal within the meaning of section 2 of the International 
War Crimes Tribunals Act, 1998 and was a practising barrister or a practising solicitor before appointment to 
that judicial office, shall qualify for appointment as a judge of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal or the 
High  Court.  EL:  At  least  15  years  of  service  both  in  the  first  and  second  instance  courts,  with  excellent 
performance  of  duties.  ES:  Education,  age  and  merit.  FR:  A  candidate  cannot  be  appointed  without  having 
experienced  another  hierarchy  position  or another  first  rank  position after  service  to  the  Supreme  Court  as a 
Conseiller référendaire, and must have held in the  function at least 3 years because of the training needed to 
master the cassation technique.  HR: Minimum of 15 years as a judicial official, a lawyer, or a public notary; 
university  professor  of  law  (with  a  minimum  of  15  years  of  professional  experience  after  passing  the  judicial 
examination);  a  renowned  lawyer  who  passed  the  judicial  examination  and  has  a  minimum  of  20  years  of 
professional  experience,  who has  proven  himself  or  herself  through  his or  her  professional  work  in a  specific 
area of law, and through the publication of professional and research papers. IT: Law university professors and 
lawyers in service for 15 years can be appointed  for extraordinary merits. Judges at the Council of State can be 
appointed among senior officers.  CY: At least 12 years of practice (including service in any judicial post) and 
being of high moral standard. LV: A person who has reached the age of 40 years. Judge of the first or second 
instance: at least 10 years of experience as a judge  and a positive opinion of the Department of the Supreme 
Court; at least 15 years of service as a legal academic personnel at an institution of higher education, a sworn 
advocate  or  a  prosecutor,  and  who  has  passed  the  qualification  examination,  and  a  positive  opinion  of  the 
Department of the Supreme Court; a person who had been in the office of a Constitutional Court judge, a judge 
of an international court or a judge of a  supranational court, and a positive opinion of the Department of the 
Supreme Court. LT: Judge or a person having a doctorate in law, having at least 10 years standing as a judge 

57 

 
 
 
or (and) having pedagogical work experience in law. LU: Judge who is at least 35 years old, with at least seven 
years of experience. HU: Special procedure: Members of the Constitutional Court can decide to become judges, 
and  after  they  leave  the  Constitutional  Court  they  will  become  Supreme  Court  judges  automatically.  Regular 
procedure:  For  existing  judges,  the  procedure  is  similar  to  the  application  procedure  for  any  other  judge’s 
position,  although  in  practice  the  applicants  are  usually  senior  judges  with  longer  judicial  experience.  If  the 
applicant  was  not  a  judge  before,  the  President  of  Kúria  must  send  the  application  to  the  President  of  the 
Republic  to  appoint  the  judge.  MT:  12  years  experience  at  the  Bar.  NL:  Extensive  experience  as  a  legal 
professional, and must excel in one or more areas of the law. AT: No specific formal requirements, apart from 
those for becoming a judge. Usually, only court of appeal judges or public prosecutors at appeal courts or at the 
Supreme Court are appointed. PL: A person who has completed higher education in law in Poland with the title 
of  master;  has  carried  out  the  duties  of  a  judge,  public  prosecutor,  president,  vice-president,  counsel  at  the 
General Counsel of Poland for at least 10 years or has worked as an attorney at law, legal counsel or notary for 
at least 10 years; was not in service, did not work nor was the associate of security authorities listed in the Law 
on  the  Institute  of  National  Remembrance  –  Commission  for  the  Prosecution  of  Crimes  against  the  Polish 
Nation; a habilitated doctor in legal sciences who has worked in a Polish higher education school, the Polish 
Academy of Sciences, a research institute or another academic institution.  PT: To be judge of second instance 
and be candidate of the public tender. RO: An exam organised by the SCM Judges’ Section, among the judges 
who, during the previous 3 years, held the office of judge within the courts of appeal, received the rating “very 
well” in their last 3 evaluations, were not disciplinarily sanctioned in the last 3 years, and have at least 18 years 
length of service as judge. SI: Person who fulfils general conditions for being appointed as a judge if he/she has 
successfully carried out a judicial function for at least 15 years or has at least 20 years of working experience in 
the legal area after passing the lawyer's state exam. A university associate professor of law may also be elected 
as a Supreme Court judge.  SK: Professional judicial exam and all judicial competences that are necessary to 
become  a judg,e and more than 15 years experience in a legal profession (advocate, judge, academic,...).  FI: 
The candidate, by his or her earlier service in court or in another position, has demonstrated that he or she has 
the  knowledge  of  the  field  in  question  and  the  necessary  personal  characteristics  required  for  successful 
performance  of  the  duties  of  the  position  to  be  filled.  SE:  Supreme  Court  Judges  complement  each  other  by 
being composed of lawyers with different experience from the different legal professions. 

Figure 54 presents the competence of the executive power and the parliament in appointing 
judges to Supreme Court judges upon submission from the proposing authorities (e.g. Council 
for the Judiciary or court). The size of the column depends on whether the executive or the 
parliament have the possibility to reject a candidate to Supreme Court judge, whether it can 
choose only among the proposed candidates, or whether it can choose and appoint any other 
candidate,  even  if  they  are  not  proposed  by  the  competent  authority.  In  case  of  non-
appointment  of  a  candidate  an  important  safeguard  is  the  obligation  to  provide  reasons  (98) 
and the possibility for judicial review of the decision (99). 

98   
99   

Judgment of 20 April 2021 in case C-896/19, Repubblika and Il-Prim Ministru, para. 71. 
Judgment of 19 November 2019 in joined cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, AK et al., para. 145. 

58 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 54: Appointment of Supreme Court judges: competence of the executive and the 
parliament (*) 

(*) DK: The Judicial Appointments Council recommends one candidate per opening to the Minister of Justice for 
all  judicial  appointments  except  for  the  Supreme  Court  President.  DE:  Minister  has  to  give  reasons  if  he/she 
refuses to give consent to the decision of the Judges Election Committee or if he/she gives consent to an election 
of  a  person  deemed  unqualified  by  the  Präsidialrat  (The  ‘Präsidialrat’  (Presidential  Council  of  the  Supreme 
Court), consisting of its president and judges elected by all the judges of the court).  IE: The figure reflects the 
competence of the Government. Under Art. 13.9 of the Constitution (i.e. a constitutional requirement rather than 
a  practice),  the  President’s  power  of  appointment  is  exercisable  only  on  the  advice  of  the  Government.  EL: 
President of the Republic issues a Presidential Decree upon the proposal of the Minister of Justice following the 
mandatory Decision of the Supreme Judicial Council. IT*: Supreme Court of Cassation (dealing with criminal 
and  civil  cases):  the  Council  for  the  Judiciary  (CSM)  appoints  judges.  IT:  Council  of  State  (dealing  with 
administrative  cases):  upon  proposal  of  the  Council  for  Administrative  Judges  (CPGA),  the  President  of  the 
Republic  appoints  judges,  having  no  discretion  in  this  regard.  CY:  The  President  of  the  Republic,  when 
appointing a judge of the Supreme Court, has no constitutional or legal obligation to follow the opinion of the 
Supreme  Court  but  as  a  rule  follows  it.  HU:  President  of  Republic  needs  to  continue  with  the  proposal. 
President of Kúria can annul the application. MT: The authority presented is the Prime Minister. AT: Under the 
Constitution, proposals of the Supreme Court are not binding. However, it is a general practice to appoint only 
candidates proposed by the Supreme Court. As to the President of the Supreme Court, the Federal President may 
reject  the  candidate  proposed  by  the  Minister  of  Justice,  but  he  may  not  appoint  a  person  who  had  not  been 
proposed. LU: There is no binding text on this subject, but so far, the appointing authority has never refused the 
nomination of a candidate proposed by the Court. SK: It never happened that if a candidate for a Supreme Court 
judge/President is not appointed, the appointing authority/body be required to provide him/her the reasons. HR: 
The  Council  for  the  Judiciary  can  decide  not  to  appoint  a  candidate  for  a  Supreme  Court  judge.  Only  a 
candidate for Supreme Court judge can appeal or request a review, if they are not appointed. ES: The Head of 
State (the King) as appointing authority must mandatorily follow the proposal of the Council for the Judiciary 
concerning judicial appointments and promotions. The  King has, therefore, no discretion and no obligation to 
provide reasons. The decision of the King has the form of a Royal Decree, is published in the  Official Gazette 
and may not be challenged as such. It is the previous decision by the Council to propose a candidate for judicial 
appointment  or  promotion  that  can  be  appealed,  initially  through  an  administrative  appeal  (decided  by  the 
Plenary  of  the  Council)  and  subsequently  through  judicial  review  before  the  Administrative  Division  of  the 
Supreme Court. PL: The President of the Republic is not obliged by law to provide reasons of not appointing a 
judge and is not obliged by law to appoint a candidate proposed by the Council. His/her prerogatives neither 
need to be reasoned nor there is any term fixed for making use of his/her prerogative. 

 – Safeguards relating to the functioning of national prosecution services in the EU – 

Public prosecution plays a major role in the criminal justice system as well as in cooperation 
between  Member  States  in  criminal  matters.  The  proper  functioning  of  the  national 
prosecution  service  is  crucial  for  the  effective  fight  against  crime,  including  economic  and 
financial crime, such as money laundering and corruption. According to the Court of Justice 

59 

 
 
 
of the EU case-law, in the context of the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision (100), 
the  public  prosecutor’s  office  can  be  considered  a  Member  State  judicial  authority  for  the 
purposes  of  issuing  and  executing  a  European  arrest  warrant  whenever  it  can  act 
independently,  without  being  exposed  to  the  risk  of  being  subject,  directly  or  indirectly,  to 
directions or instructions in a specific case from the executive, such as a Minister for Justice 
(101).  

The organisation of national prosecution services varies across the EU and there is no uniform 
model  for  all  Member  States.  However,  there  is  a  widespread  tendency  to  have  a  more 
independent prosecutor’s office, rather than one subordinated or linked to the executive (102). 
According to the Consultative Council of European Prosecutors, an effective and autonomous 
prosecution  service  committed  to  upholding  the  rule  of  law  and  human  rights  in  the 
administration of justice is one of the pillars of a democratic state (103). Whatever the model of 
the national justice system or the legal tradition in which it is anchored, European standards 
require  that  Member  States  take  effective  measures  to  guarantee  that  public  prosecutors  are 
able  to  fulfil  their  professional  duties  and  responsibilities  under  adequate  legal  and 
organisational  conditions  (104) and without unjustified interference (105).  In particular, where 
the  government  gives  instruction  of  a  general  nature,  for  example  on  crime  policy,  such 
instructions must be in writing and published in an adequate way (106). Where the government 
has the power to  give instructions to  prosecute a specific case, such instructions must carry 

100  

101  

102  

103  

104  

105  

106  

Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures 
between Member States (OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 1). 
Court  of  Justice,  judgment  of  27  May  2019,  OG  and  PI  (Public  Prosecutor’s  Office  of  Lübeck  and 
Zwickau),  Joined  Cases  C-508/18  and  C-82/19  PPU,  paras  73,  74  and  88,  ECLI:EU:C:2019:456; 
judgment  of  27  May  2019,  C‑ 509/18,  para  52,  ECLI:EU:C:2019:457;  see  also  judgments  of  12 
December  2019,  Parquet  général  du  Grand-Duché  de  Luxembourg  and  Openbaar  Ministerie  (Public 
Prosecutors of Lyon and Tours),  in Joined  Cases  C-566/19 PPU and C-626/19, ECLI:EU:C:2019:1077; 
Openbaar  Ministerie  (Swedish  Prosecution  Authority),  C-625/19 PPU,  ECLI:EU:C:2019:1078,  and 
Openbaar Ministerie (Public Prosecutor in Brussels),  C-627/19 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2019:1079; judgment 
of 24 November 2020, AZ, C-510/19, para 54, ECLI:EU:C:2020:953. See also judgment of 10 November 
2016, Kovalkovas, C-477/16 PPU, paras 34 and 36, ECLI:EU:C:2016:861, and judgment of 10 November 
2016, Poltorak, C-452/16 PPU, para 35, ECLI:EU:C:2016:858, on the term ‘judiciary’, ‘which must […] 
be  distinguished,  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of  the  separation  of  powers  which  characterises  the 
operation  of  the  rule  of  law,  from  the  executive’.  See  also  Opinion  No.  13(2018)  Independence, 
accountability  and  ethics  of  prosecutors,  adopted  by  the  Consultative  Council  of  European  Prosecutors 
(CCPE), recommendation xii. 
CDL-AD(2010)040-e Report on European Standards as regards the Independence of the Judicial System: 
Part II — the Prosecution Service — Adopted by the Venice Commission — at its 85th plenary session 
(Venice, 17-18 December 2010), para. 26. 
Consultative Council of European Prosecutors (CCPE) Opinion No. 15 (2020) on the role of prosecutors 
in emergency situations, in particular when facing a pandemic. 
Recommendation Rec(2000)19 on the role of public prosecution in the criminal justice system, adopted 
by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 6 October 2000 (the 2000 Recommendation), 
para. 4. 
The  2000  Recommendation,  paras  11  and  13.  See  also:  Opinion  No.  13(2018)  Independence, 
accountability  and  ethics  of  prosecutors,  adopted  by  the  Consultative  Council  of  European  Prosecutors 
(CCPE),  recommendations  i  and  iii;  Group  of  States  against  corruption  (GRECO),  fourth  evaluation 
round  “Corruption  prevention  -  Members  of  Parliament,  Judges  and  Prosecutors”,  a  vast  number  of 
recommendations ask for the introduction of arrangements to shield the prosecution service from undue 
influence and interference in the investigation of criminal cases. 
The 2000 Recommendation, para. 13, point c). 

60 

 
 
                                                           
with  them  adequate  guarantees  (107).  According  to  the  2000  Recommendation  of  the 
Committee  of  Ministers  of  the  Council  of  Europe,  instructions  not  to  prosecute  should  in 
principle  be  prohibited  or  be  exceptional  and  subject  to  specific  safeguards  (108).  Interested 
parties (including victims) should be able to challenge a decision of a public prosecutor not to 
prosecute a case (109), which also provides a form of accountability of prosecutors (110). 

In  order  to  present  the  autonomy  of  the  prosecution  services  in  the  Members  States,  the 
figures below provide an overview of the hierarchical powers within the prosecution services, 
as well of the possibility to have a review of a decision of a prosecutor not to prosecute a case. 
These  figures  do  not  assess  the  effective  functioning  of  the  prosecution  services,  which 
requires a qualitative assessment taking into account specific circumstances of each Member 
State. 

Figure  55  presents  the  main  management  powers  of  the  Prosecutor  General  over  lower 
ranking prosecutors to: 

1) issue general guidance regarding prosecution policy; 

2) give instructions regarding prosecution in individual cases; 

3) evaluate a prosecutor; 

4) promote a prosecutor; 

5) remove an individual case which was assigned to a prosecutor (transfer a case); 

6) decide on a disciplinary measure regarding a prosecutor; and  

7) transfer prosecutors without their consent.  

Apart  from  these  selected  main  management  powers,  the  Prosecutor  General  or  other 
authorities may have additional powers over national prosecution services (111). It should be 
noted  that  other  authorities  may  have  a  role  in  the  above  listed  management  powers  (e.g.  a 
disciplinary court may decide on certain disciplinary measures) (112). 

107  
108  

109  
110  

111  

The 2000 Recommendation, para. 13, point d). 
The  2000  Recommendation,  para.  13,  point  f).  See  also  Opinion  No.  13(2018)  Independence, 
accountability  and  ethics  of  prosecutors,  adopted  by  the  Consultative  Council  of  European  Prosecutors 
(CCPE), recommendation iv. 
The 2000 Recommendation, para. 34. 
CDL-AD(2010)040-e Report on European Standards as regards the Independence of the Judicial System: 
Part II — the Prosecution Service — Adopted by the Venice Commission — at its 85th plenary session 
(Venice, 17-18 December 2010), para. 45. 
For  example,  the  power  to  solve  conflicts  of  competence  between  Member  States'  public  prosecution 
offices;  to  acquire  data  and  information  from  lower  prosecution  offices  Furthermore,  the  Prosecutor 
General may play a role in bodies responsible for decisions regarding prosecutors, even if not taking such 
decisions directly. See also Figure 55 in the  2019 EU Justice Scoreboard, presenting the distribution of 
management powers over national prosecution services. 

112    For an overview of authorities involved in disciplinary proceedings regarding prosecutors, see Figures 53 

and 54 in the 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard. 

61 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure  55:  Management  powers  of  the  Prosecutor  General  (*)  (Source:  European 
Commission with the Expert Group on Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism) 

(*) The Member States appear in the alphabetical order of their geographical names in the original language. 
BE: A right of injunction to prosecute upon the Prosecutor is provided by the Code of Criminal Procedure. CZ: 
power to give instructions in individual cases only within the Prosecutor General Office and towards high public 
prosecutor  offices.  EL:  General  Prosecutor  has  the  right  to  address  to  all  prosecutors of  the  country  general 
directions and recommendations, without being bound by the  formulation and the expression of their opinion. 
ES: The Attorney General sets internal orders and instructions appropriate to the service and to the exercise of 
prosecuting  functions,  which  may  be  general  or  related  to  specific  matters.  The  transfer  without  consent  is 
possible  only  in  cases  of  high  workload.  IT:  Prosecutors  General  at  the  Court  of  Appeal  have  the  powers  to 
remove an individual case in case of inaction; also, they can acquire data and information from the prosecution 
offices  of  the  district  and  to  send  to  the  Prosecutor  General  at  the  Court  of  Cassation,  in  order  to  verify  the 
correct and uniform functioning of the prosecution offices and compliance with the rules on due process. The 
Prosecutor General at the Court of Cassation is in charge by Law of the control over the National Anti-Mafia 
Directorate,  and  of  resolving  the  conflicts  of  competence  between  two  or  more  territorial  prosecution  offices. 
CY:  Attorney  General  decides  on  minor  disciplinary  violations.  In  serious  disciplinary  offences,  the  Attorney 
General  does  not  propose  sanctions  but  recommends  the  initiation  of  disciplinary  measures  by  the  Public 
Service Commission. LT: As to the instructions on individual cases, the Prosecutor General (PG) cannot instruct 
on  which  decision  to  make;  as  to  the  promotion  of  prosecutors,  the  PG  decides  on  the  conclusions  of  the 
Prosecutor  Selection  Commission  or  the  Chief  Prosecutor  Selection  Commission;  as  to  the  decision  on 
disciplinary  measure  the  PG  decides  on  the  conclusions  of  the  Prosecutor  Ethics  Commission  or  the  Internal 
Investigation  Commission.  The  PG  shall  not  have  the  right  to  remove  the  prosecutor  from  the  pre-trial 
investigation. LU: Prosecutor General has the power to instruct prosecution services to prosecute in a case (but 
cannot instruct not to prosecute). As to the promotion of a prosecutor, the state prosecutor / Prosecutor General, 
with a favourable opinion, suggests the promotion to the executive and the Head of State signs the nomination. 
AT: The  powers of the Prosecutor General do not include direct management over the prosecution service  as 
referred to in the chart. The Independent Personnel Body, consisting of four prosecutors, evaluates a prosecutor. 
PL:  The  Prosecutor  General  is  also  the  Minister  of  Justice.  RO:  The  General  Prosecutor  has  the  power  to 
transfer an individual case from a prosecution unit to another prosecution unit and to issue general guidance 
regarding prosecution policies, in order to guarantee a unitary approach on criminal investigations.  SI: Both 
the Prosecutor General and the head of State Prosecutor’s Offices have the powers to issue general guidance on 
prosecution policy and to remove an individual case assigned to a prosecutor. 

Figure  56  presents  a  factual  overview  of  the  main  management  powers  of  the  senior 
prosecutors over lower ranking prosecutors, which are to: 

1)  give instructions regarding prosecution in individual cases; 

62 

 
 
 
 
2)  reverse, modify or annul a decision (not) to investigate a criminal complaint, information 

or report; 

3)  reverse, modify or annul a decision to discontinue an ongoing investigation; 

4)  reverse, modify or annul a decision (not) to prosecute; and 

5)  remove an individual case which was assigned to a prosecutor (transfer a case). 

Apart from these selected main management powers, the senior prosecutors may have other 
powers not listed above. 

Figure  56:  Management  powers  of  the  senior  prosecutors  (*)  (Source:  European 
Commission with the Expert Group on Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism)  

(*) FR: Senior prosecutors may give instructions in case of a contestation of a dismissal of a case (classements 
sans  suite).  IT:The  removal  has  to  be  reasoned  and  issued  in  written  form.  LT:  Superior  prosecutor  has  no 
competence  to  give  instructions  on  the  type  of  the  procedural  decision  that  must  be  made.  The  superior 
prosecutor shall not have the right to remove the prosecutor from the pre-trial investigation.  NL:  As regards 
the instructions in individual cases,  the  law provides a legal basis for superior prosecutors to give  general or 
specific instructions. The law doesn’t specify on what subject (e.g. specific cases). Therefore practice tends to 
vary between different prosecution sections for superior prosecutors to give instructions for specific cases. 

Figure 57 presents the authorities that decide on a request to review a decision of a prosecutor 
not  to  prosecute  in  an  individual  case.  It  shows  who  conducts  a  check  on  the  work  of 
individual  prosecutors,  which  has  an  impact  on  the  functioning  of  the  prosecution  service. 
According to European  standards, the decision not  to  prosecute creates an issue in  terms  of 
accountability  of  prosecutors,  which  is  why  a  legal  remedy  is  important  (113).  In  some 
Member States, this decision is reviewed by different authorities: either superior prosecutors 
(including  where  relevant  Prosecutor  General),  a  court  or  other  authorities  (Ombudsman, 
Chancellor of Justice). In some Member States, the decision cannot be reviewed. Where such 
review exists, it can be initiated by an alleged victim, or by superior prosecutors on their own 
initiative. In some Member States, the superior prosector’s review decision can be subject to 
judicial  review.  The  chart  does  not  present  the  right  to  institute  private  prosecution,  where 

113  

CDL-AD(2010)040-e Report on European Standards as regards the Independence of the Judicial System: 
Part II — the Prosecution Service — Adopted by the Venice Commission — at its 85th plenary session 
(Venice, 17-18 December 2010), para. 45. 

63 

 
 
 
                                                           
those who consider themselves as victims of a crime have the right to continue prosecution by 
engaging a private lawyer, who represents  them in  front  of a criminal  court  in  the role of a 
private  prosecutor  (existing  in  Belgium,  Germany,  Spain,  France,  Croatia,  Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Hungary, Austria, Poland, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden. (114). 

Figure  57:  Authority  reviewing  a  prosecutor’s  decision  not  to  prosecute  (*)  (Source: 
European  Commission  with  the  Expert  Group  on  Money  Laundering  and  Financing  of 
Terrorism)  

(*) BG: The prosecutor decides whether the requirements of the law for initiating preliminary proceedings are 
present.  If  not,  the  prosecutor  issues  a  Decree  for  refusal  to  institute  preliminary  proceedings  (the  refusal  to 
open an investigation). This refusal is  is subject to appeal only before the higher-standing prosecutor’s office, 
except for the refusal to open an investigation of the Prosecutor for the investigation of the Prosecutor General 
or his or her deputies  which  is subject to a judicial review before  the Specialised Crim. Court.  If preliminary 
proceedings were initiated, once concluded, the prosecutor can terminate them or to bring the case to the court 
(the decision to prosecute). The decree not to start a prosecution for crimes with a victim, is subject to appeal 
before court within 7 days. If this term is not met, the decision can still be appealed but only before the higher-
standing prosecutor’s office. In cases of victimless crimes, the decision not to prosecute can only be revoked ex 
officio  by  the  higher-standing  prosecutor’s  office  by  a  signal  or  after  self-initiation.  DE:  Decisions  can  be 
reviewed  by  the  Prosecutor  General.  In  addition,  the  victim  can  invoke  the  Higher  Regional  Court  if  the 
Prosecutor  General  has  approved  the  decision  not  to  prosecute.  EE:  Not  applicable  in  case  of  a  victimless 
crime. A victim can file an appeal against the investigative body’s decision not to initiate criminal proceedings 
with  the  Prosecutor’s  Office.  The  decision  of  the  Prosecutor’s  Office  not  to  initiate  or  to  terminate  criminal 
proceedings  can  be  challenged  at  the  Office  of  the  Prosecutor  General.  The  decision  of  the  Office  of  the 
Prosecutor General can be challenged at the District Court. ES: Against the refusal of processing orders, only 
the person who has requested it will be granted to a reform appeal,   within 3 days following the notification.  
The  defendants  to  whom  these  decisions  of  the  instructor  on  the  reform  appeal  resolution  refer,  may  use  an 
ordinary  appeal, within 5 days following notification of the appealed order or the resolution of the appeal for 
reform.  FR:  Prosecutor  General  may  review  the  prosecutor's  decision  not  to  prosecute  on  victim's  request. 
victim  may  also  complain  before  the  investigative  judge.  HR:  In  victimless  crimes,  the  institution/person  who 
submitted  the  criminal  notification  can  request,  if  the  anti-corruption  prosecution  (USKOK)  dismisses  the 
notification,  review  before  the  collegium  at  USKOK,  and  then  before  collegium  of  State  Attorney’s  Office 
(DORH).  The  victim  can  initiate  private  prosecution  before  the  competent  court.  CY:  If  the  Attorney  General 
decided  not  to prosecute  a  case  (based  on  the  evidence at  hand  and  recommendations of  the  Attorneys  at  the 
Law Office), only the Attorney General can reverse such a decision. IE: A victim can request both reasons and a 
review of the decision not to prosecute, conducted by a lawyer in the Victims Unit in the Office of the Director of 
Public  Prosecutions.  In  victimless  crimes  An  Garda  Síochána  can  request  a  review  of  a  decision  not  to 
prosecute,conducted  by  a  senior  lawyer  in  the  Directing  Division  of  the  Office  of  the  Director  of  Public 
Prosecutions. LT: Decision of a pre-trial investigation officer not to commence a pre-trial investigation is made 
only with the consent of the head of the pre-trial investigation authority. The resolution not to commence a pre-
trial investigation within 24 hours shall be sent to the prosecutor who checks the decision within 10 days. The 

114  

Fundamental 
maps/comparative-data/victims-support-services/prosecution 

Agency, 

Rights 

https://fra.europa.eu/en/publications-and-resources/data-and-

64 

 
 
 
                                                           
rejected  decision  of  the  prosecutor  can  be  appealed  to  the  court.  The  resolution  of  a  pre-trial  investigation 
officer  can  also  be  appealed  to  the  prosecutor.  If  rejected,  the  prosecutor's  decision  can  be  appealed  to  the 
court. The judge's decision again can be appealed to the superior court. MT: Prosecution of criminal offences is 
being transferred from the police to the Office of the Attorney General. In October 2020, the Attorney General 
took  over  the  decision  to  prosecute  and  the  institution  of  prosecutions  before  the  inferior  courts  of  specified 
serious crimes. The transition is planned to be completed by the end of 2024. Regulation, entered into effect in 
October  2020,  provides  for  judicial  review  (before  civil  courts)  of  decisions  not  to  prosecute  of  the  Attorney 
General  on  the  ground  of  illegality  or  unreasonableness.  When  the  decision  to  prosecute  and  prosecution  is 
vested in the Commissioner of Police, challenge proceedings may be instituted before the Court of Magistrates.. 
AT: Review can be initiated by the victim or in some cases (including victimless crimes of a serious nature) by 
the the Commissioner for Legal Protection. PT: A prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute can be reviewed either 
through an autonomous procedural phase, the instrução (reopening of the inquiry), which specifically envisages 
the judicial confirmation of the decision to indict or to file the investigation. This reopening of the inquiry may 
be  requested by an  ‘assistente,’ if the procedure does not depend upon private prosecution, in respect of facts 
from  which  the  Public  Prosecution  has  not  accused.  A  prosecutor’s  decision  not  to  prosecute  can  also  be 
reviewed  before  an  immediate  superior  of  the  Public  Prosecutor  within  20  days  from  the  date  in  which  the 
opening of the inquiry may no longer be requested. In this case, the immediate superior of the Public Prosecutor 
may,  at  their  own  initiative  or  upon  request,  determine  that  a  charge  is  brought  or  that  the  investigations 
proceeds.  RO:  The  superior  prosecutor  can  (ex  officio)  review  any  decision  not  to  prosecute;  the  decision  to 
reopen the investigation must be confirmed by the judge. Everyone whose legitimate interests were affected by 
the  decision  not  to  prosecute  can  initiate  a  complaint  to  the  competent  judge  of  the  preliminary  chamber.  In 
victimless crimes, the superior prosecutor can review the decision not to prosecute. FI: Anyone can complan on 
a decision to the Prosecutor General, the Chancellor of Justice or the Ombudsman of the Parliament.  SI: State 
prosecutors  cannot  dismiss  criminal  complaints  for  certain  criminal  offences  without  the  co-signature  of  the 
head  of  state  prosecutor’s  office.  State  prosecutors  shall  inform  certain  categories  of  people  and  state 
authorities (including the FIU) that filed a criminal complaint, about their intention and reasons to dismiss it, 
and  enable  them  to  give  an opinion on  the  reasons  for  the  dismissal.  Once  the  decision  to  dismiss  a  criminal 
complaint or to discontinue prosecution has been taken it is final, but the injured party may decide to take over 
the (private) prosecution. SE: The decision is public. The victim of a crime as well as the suspect can ask for a 
review.  The  request  is  taken  care  of  by  the  prosecutor  who  made  the  decision.  In  case  of  new  evidence  or 
circumstances, the prosecutor can decide to take actions. If no new information, the Development Centre decides 
on revision.  

- Independence of Bars and lawyers in the EU - 

Lawyers and their professional associations play a fundamental role in ensuring the protection 
of fundamental rights and the strengthening of the rule of law. A fair system of administration 
of justice requires that lawyers be free to pursue their activities of advising and representing 
their clients. The lawyers’ membership of a liberal profession and the authority deriving from 
that membership helps to maintain independence, and bar associations play an important role 
in helping to guarantee lawyers’ independence. European standards require, among others, the 
freedom of exercise of the profession of lawyer, the independence of the bar associations and 
lay down the basic principles of disciplinary proceedings against lawyers (115).  

115  

Recommendation No. R(2000)21 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. 

65 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure  58:  Independence  of  Bars  and  lawyers,  2020  (*)  (source:  European  Commission 
with the CCBE(116)) 

(*) Maximum possible: 9 points. For the question related to guarantees for confidentiality of the lawyer/client relationship 
0.5 points were awarded for each of four scenarios (search and seizure of e-data held by the lawyer, search of the premises 
of the lawyer, interception of lawyer/client communication, surveillance of the lawyer or his/her premises) fully covered. For 
all other criteria fully met, 1 point was awarded. The points awarded were divided by 2 where the criterion is not fully met.  

116  

2020 data collected through replies by CCBE members to a questionnaire. 

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3.3.3. Summary on judicial independence 
Judicial  independence  is  a  fundamental  element  of  an  effective  justice  system.  It  is  vital  for 
upholding  the  rule  of  law,  the  fairness  of  judicial  proceedings  and  the  trust  of  citizens  and 
businesses in the legal system. For this reason, any justice reform should uphold the rule of law 
and comply with European standards on judicial independence. The Scoreboard shows trends 
in perceived judicial independence among the general public and companies. This edition also 
presents  some indicators concerning appointment of Supreme Court judges,  and an overview 
of the hierarchical powers within the prosecution services, as well of the possibility to have a 
review of a decision of a prosecutor not to prosecute a case. The structural indicators do not in 
themselves allow for conclusions to be drawn about the independence of the judiciaries of the 
Member States, but represent possible elements which may be taken as a starting point for such 
an analysis.  
  The 2021 Scoreboard presents the developments in perceived independence from surveys 

of the general public (Eurobarometer) and companies (Eurobarometer): 

  The Eurobarometer survey among the general public (Figure 48), presented for the 
sixth  time,  shows  that  the  perception  of  independence  has  improved  in  over  two 
thirds  of  the  Member  States  when  compared  to  2016.  The  general  public’s 
perception  of  independence  has  improved  in  more  than  three-fifths  among  the 
Members  States  facing  specific  challenges  looking  over  the  five-year  period. 
However,  compared  to  last  year,  the  general  public’s  perception  of  independence 
decreased  in  almost  half  of  all  Member  States  and  in  about  half  of  the  Members 
States  facing  specific  challenges,  and  in  a  few  Member  States,  the  level  of 
perceieved independence remains particularly low.  

  The  Eurobarometer  survey  among  the  companies  (Figure  49),  presented  for  the 
sixth time, shows that the perception of independence has improved in over half of 
the  Member  States  compared  to  2016.  However,    compared  to    last  year,  the 
companies’ perception of independence decreased in over half of all Member States 
(compared to last year this was the case in, three thirds of other Member States) and 
in about three fifths of Members States facing specific challenges. In a few Member 
States, the level of perceieved independence remains particularly low.  

  Among the reasons for the perceived lack of independence of courts and judges, the 
interference  or  pressure  from  government  and  politicians  was  the  most  stated 
reason,  followed  by  the  pressure  from  economic  or  other  specific  interests. 
Compared  to  previous  years,  both  reasons  remain  notable  for  several  Member 
States where perceived independence is very low (Figures 50 and 51). 

  Among  the  reasons  for  good  perception  of  independence  of  courts  and  judges, 
nearly  two  fifths  of  companies  and  of  the  general  public  (equivalent  to  43%  and 
38% of all respondents, respectively) named the guarantees provided by the status 
and position of judges. 

  Figures 52 to 54 present the situation regarding the appointment of Supreme Court judges 
in  all  Member  States.  Figure  52  shows  the  authorities  proposing  candidates  for  their 
appointment  as  Supreme  Court  judges  and  the  authorities  that  appoint  them.  Figure  53 
shows  whether  the  appointment  to  Supreme  Court  judges  is  possible  only  for  existing 
judges or if external candidates can be appointed to the Supreme Court, either according to 
the  same  procedure  as  judges  or  according  to  a  special  procedure  applicable  only  for 
persons  who  are  not  already  judges  in  civil,  criminal,  or  administrative  courts.  Figure  54 
presents the competence of the executive power and the parliament in appointing judges to 
Supreme Court judges upon submission from the proposing authorities. 

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  Figures  55  to  57  present  the  first  overview  of  the  internal  functioning  and  review  of  the 
work of the prosecution services. Figures 54 and 55 show the management powers of the 
superior prosecutors, including the Prosecutor General, over lower prosecutors. Figure 56 
presents the safeguards in place regarding the decision of a prosecutor not to prosecute. 
  Figure  58  shows  that  although  in  certain  Member  States  the  executive  plays  some 
supervisiory role as regards the Bar, the independence of lawyers is generally guaranteed, 
allowing  them  to  be  free  in  pursuing  their  activities  of  advising  and  representing  their 
clients.  

4. 

CONCLUSIONS 

The  2021  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  shows  a  continued  improvement  in  the  effectiveness  of 
justice systems in large majority of Member States. While it is too early in this edition to fully 
capture the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the efficiency of courts in handling cases, 
several figures can already provide some initial insights on how the justice systems responded 
to  it,  including  on  how  national  supreme  courts  adapted  their  procedures.  In  particular,  the 
new  dedicated  section  on  the  digitalisation  of  justice  systems  shows  that  the  majority  of 
Member States already  have different digital tools at the disposal of courts, prosecutors and 
staff  members,  but  significant  room  for  improvement  remains.  Furthermore,  challenges 
remain to ensure full trust of citizens in the legal systems of Member States where guarantees 
of  status  and  position  of  judges,  and  thereby  their  independence,  might  be  at  risk.  The 
information contained in the EU Justice Scoreboard contributes to the monitoring carried out 
in the framework of the European Rule of Law Mechanism and feeds into the Commission’s 
annual Rule of Law Report. 

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