REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Report on Competition Policy 2020
Date: 2021-07-07
Institutions: Directorate-General for Competition, European Commission
Subjects: EU competition policy, State aid, anti-trust legislation, competitiveness, control of State aid, control of restrictive practices, coronavirus disease, epidemic, merger control, restriction on competition, single market

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 7.7.2021  COM(2021) 373 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Report on Competition Policy 2020 {SWD(2021) 177 final}  
 
 
REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE 
COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE 
COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS  

Report on Competition Policy 2020  

1. Introduction  

This report is the first account of the competition policy developments under the Commission 
led  by  President  von  der  Leyen1.  Covering  the  developments  in  EU  competition  policy  in 
2020, it also is the 50th report addressed by the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.  

The legitimacy of EU competition policy is grounded in the Treaties that have entrusted the 
Union with an exclusive competence in this area as a necessary tool to support the functioning 
of  the  internal  market2.  For  more  than  60  years,  EU  competition  enforcement  has  been 
paramount to  preserve and foster the European  economy  based on European values such  as 
fairness,  rule  of  law  and  trust.  Competition  policy  also  evolves  in  tandem  with  societal, 
economic and regulatory changes. Today – when the EU faces one of its biggest crises ever – 
a robust competition policy in the EU is more important than ever to contribute to economic 
dynamism, essential for a faster recovery. 

Throughout the first year of the Von der Leyen Commission, EU competition policy played a 
key  role  in  the  Commission’s  efforts  to  respond  to  and  overcome  the  health  and  economic 
crisis caused by the COVID-19 outbreak. Competition policy also was paramount to facilitate 
the  path  to  recovery  while  bearing  in  mind  the  green  and  digital  transitions  of  the  EU 
economy. In line with the mission letter addressed by President von der Leyen to Executive 
Vice-President Vestager3, the Commission continued to ensure that competition rules remain 
fit  for  the  modern  economy,  vigorously  enforced  and  contribute  to  a  strong  European 
industry, both within the EU and on the global stage.  

In 2020, the competition policy toolkit proved to be relevant, agile and rapidly adjustable to 
the exceptional circumstances of the health and economic crisis. By responding and adjusting 
quickly, the Commission’s competition  policy helped to  meet  the needs of EU industry  and 
citizens while preserving competitive markets. This became particularly prominent in a series 
of actions which allowed for quick support from public sources to flow to the real economy or 
were part of the broader policy agenda aiming at restoring sustainable growth, while avoiding 
unnecessary market distortions. 

1  Political  Guidelines for  the  next  European  Commission  –  A Union  that  strives  for  more  – My  agenda  for  Europe, 
2019-2024 by candidate for President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen, See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/political-guidelines-next-commission_en_0.pdf. 
2 Article 3 TFEU. 
3 Mission letter to Executive Vice-President Vestager, 1.12.2019. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/sites/comm-cwt2019/files/commissioner_mission_letters/mission-
letter-margrethe-vestager_2019_en.pdf.  

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On 13 March 2020, the Commission set out in its Communication on a coordinated economic 
response to the COVID-19 outbreak4 the various options available to Member States outside 
the  scope  of  the  EU  State  aid  control  and  which  they  could  put  in  place  without  the 
involvement  of  the  Commission.  These  included  measures  applicable  to  all  undertakings 
regarding  wage  subsidies,  suspension  of  payments  of  corporate  and  value  added  taxes  or 
social welfare contributions, or financial support directly to consumers for cancelled services 
or tickets not reimbursed by the operators concerned.  

On 19 March 2020, the Commission adopted a Temporary Framework for State aid measures 
to  support  the  economy  and  revised  it  several  times  as  the  COVID-19  crisis  progressed5. 
the  Commission  adopted  a  Temporary  Framework 
Moreover,  on  8  April  2020, 
Communication, setting out the main criteria that the Commission will follow when assessing 
cooperation  projects  aimed  at  addressing  a  shortage  of  supply  of  essential  products  and 
services during the Coronavirus outbreak6. At the same time, the Commission put in place a 
number of measures to ensure business continuity and continued to ensure the implementation 
of the EU merger rules, to avoid market power growing on the back of the crisis.  

To ensure that competition rules remain fit for purpose and fully able to deal with challenges 
such as structural problems in digital markets and foreign subsidies distorting competition in 
EU markets, the Commission took major policy initiatives in 2020. For example, it tabled a 
proposal for a Digital Markets Act and published a White Paper on foreign subsidies, to kick 
start the reflection on how to address the distortive effects on the Internal Market that foreign 
subsidies may have. 

The  Commission  showed  its  readiness  to  use  competition  policy  to  contribute  to  the 
preparation of the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility7. The Commission 
has  assisted  the  Member  States  preparing  Recovery  and  Resilience  Plans,  including  from  a 
competition policy point of view, and has published a number of  guiding templates to assist 
Member  States  in  the  design  of  their  national  Recovery  and  Resilience  Plans  to  ensure  that 
they are in line with EU State aid rules.  

While  addressing  the  immediate  challenges  posed  by  the  pandemic,  EU  competition 
enforcement in 2020 contributed to the longer term objectives of the 2019-2024 Commission 
such as “A Europe fit for the digital age”, “A European Green Deal”, and “An economy that 
works for people”. The Commission proposal for the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-
2027  included  an  important  change  in  including  a  dedicated  component  for  competition 
policy within the Single Market Programme. This will provide stable financing of measures 

4 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European 
Central Bank, the European Investment Bank and the Eurogroup: Coordinated economic response to the COVID-19 
Outbreak, COM(2020) 112 final. 
5 Communication from the Commission: Temporary framework for State aid measures to support the economy in the 
current COVID-19 outbreak (OJ C 91I, 20.3.2020, p. 1), as amended by Commission Communications C(2020) 2215 
(OJ  C  112I,  4.4.2020,  p.  1),  C(2020)  3156  (OJ  C  164,  13.5.2020,  p.  3),  C(2020)  4509  (OJ  C  218,  2.7.2020,  p.  3), 
C(2020) 7127 (OJ C 340I, 13.10.2020, p. 1) and C(2021) 564 (OJ C 34, 1.2.2021, p. 6). 
6 Communication from the Commission: Communication from the Commission Temporary Framework for assessing 
antitrust issues related to business cooperation in response to situations of urgency stemming from the current COVID-
19 outbreak, OJ C 116, 8.4.2020, p. 7. 
7  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  establishing  a  Recovery  and  Resilience 
Facility, COM(2020) 408 final, 28.5.2020. 

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enhancing the Commission’s enforcement capacity, for instance the development of advanced 
intelligence and investigative methodologies. The funding will also allow the Commission to 
strengthen its cooperation with public administrations in the EU and elsewhere8. 

2.  EU  Competition  policy  mobilised  to  alleviate  the  impact  of  the  COVID-19 
pandemic  

2.1. State aid policy facilitated COVID-19 support by the Member States  

In 2020, with the rapid spread of the COVID-19 pandemic and its profound adverse impact on 
the EU economy, national and EU policymakers were forced to react quickly and on various 
fronts  to  address  this  unprecedented  threat.  Decisive  action  included  notably  the  EUR  750 
billion NextGenerationEU recovery instrument9, the activation of the general escape clause of 
the Stability and Growth Pact10, and the joint procurement of different medical devices, such 
as ventilators, masks, and, finally, of vaccines.  

In  this  context,  the  EU  competition  policy  became  an  important  component  of  the  crisis 
response stabilising the economy. This applied in particular to State aid policy. Well-targeted 
public  support  was  crucial  to  counter  the  damage  inflicted  on  healthy  undertakings  and  to 
preserve the continuity of economic activity. At the same time, the Commission ensured that 
public support could reach companies in need and that harmful subsidy races were avoided. 

The Temporary  Framework  adopted  at  the beginning of the crisis  set  out the conditions  the 
Commission  would  apply  to  declare  aid  compatible  with  Article  107(3)(b)  TFEU  (aid  to 
“remedy  a  serious  disturbance  in  the  economy  of  a  Member  State”)11.  The  Temporary 
Framework  was  amended  several  times  in  2020,  demonstrating  the  Commission’s  ability  to 
adapt the rules to the changing nature of the crisis.  

In  April  2020,  it  was  extended  to  cover  support  to  companies  that  develop,  test  and 
manufacture  much  needed  products  to  fight  the  Coronavirus  such  as  vaccines,  medicines, 
medical  devices,  disinfectants  and  protective  equipment,  as  well  as  wage  support  and  tax 
deferral  schemes12.  The  second  amendment  adopted  in  May  2020  set  out  the  criteria  how 
Member States could carry out recapitalisations and provide subordinated debt to companies 

8 Regulation (EU) 2021/690 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing a programme 
for  the  internal  market,  competitiveness  of  enterprises,  including  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises,  the  area  of 
plants, animals, food and feed, and European statistics (Single Market Programme) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 
99/2013, (EU) No 1287/2013, (EU) No 254/2014 and (EU) No 652/2014, OJ L 153, 3.5.2021, p. 1-47. 
9  NextGenerationEU  –  part  of  the  Multiannual  Financial  Framework  2021-2027  -  is  a  EUR  750  billion  temporary 
recovery  instrument  to  help  repair  the  immediate  economic  and  social  damage  brought  about  by  the  Coronavirus 
pandemic. The Recovery  and Resilience  Facility is the centrepiece of NextGenerationEU with EUR 672.5 billion in 
loans and grants available to support reforms and investments undertaken by EU countries. See: Council Regulation 
(EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 
to 2027, OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 11–22. 
10 Articles 121 and 126 TFEU. 
11 Communication from the Commission: Temporary Framework for State aid measures to support the economy in the 
current COVID-19 outbreak, OJ C 91I, 20.3.2020. 
12  This  extension  of  the  Temporary  Framework  sets  out  the  conditions  the  Commission  would  apply  to  declare  aid 
compatible with Article 107(3)(c) TFEU (“aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain 
economic  areas,  where  such  aid  does  not  adversely  affect  trading  conditions  to  an  extent  contrary  to  the  common 
interest”). 

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in  need.  A  third  amendment  in  June  2020  extended  the  Temporary  Framework  to  enable 
Member States to provide public support to all micro and small companies, even if they were 
already  in  financial  difficulty  on  31  December  2019.  A  fourth  amendment  was  adopted  in 
October 2020, prolonging the scope of the Temporary Framework by six months until 30 June 
2021  and  enabling  recapitalisation  support  until  30  September  2021.  In  view  of  the  second 
wave of the COVID-19 outbreak and the longer than initially expected duration of the crisis, 
the  fifth  amendment  in  January  2021  prolonged  all  measures  set  out  in  the  Temporary 
Framework,  including  recapitalisation  measures,  until  31  December  2021  and  expanded  the 
scope of the Temporary Framework by increasing the ceilings set out in it, and by allowing 
the conversion of certain repayable instruments into direct grants until the end of 2021.  

In a very short time, the Commission adopted a large number of State aid decisions under the 
Temporary Framework allowing Member States to adopt measures  alleviating the economic 
effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2020, the Commission adopted 598 COVID-19 related 
State aid decisions13. In this period, the Commission authorised State aid that can be estimated 
to  EUR  3.08  trillion14.  A number  of  these  aid  measures  have  been  co-financed  by  cohesion 
policy, notably thanks to the two emergency response packages proposed by the Commission, 
and approved by the European Parliament and the European Council in 2020: the Coronavirus 
Response  Investment  Initiative  (CRII)  and  the  Coronavirus  Response  Investment  Initiative 
Plus (CRII+). 

Several  Member  States  notified  “umbrella  schemes”  covering  different  sectors  of  the 
economy through different types of aid, including support targeted at small and medium-sized 
enterprises  (SMEs).  For  example,  France  notified  a  EUR  7  billion  umbrella  scheme 
supporting SMEs in particular. The scheme included several types of support, such as direct 
grants,  loans  with  favorable  interest  rates  and  state  guarantees  for  loans15.  A  number  of 
Member States, including Denmark, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Romania, Belgium and Slovakia, 
notified aid specifically in support of SMEs. Aid to SMEs was provided in various forms such 
as  tax  deferrals  (Denmark)16,  public  guarantee  schemes  (Bulgaria)17  and  grants  covering 
interest on existing debt obligations (Greece)18.  

13  The  figure  includes  decisions,  adopted  under  the  exceptional  legal  basis  supporting  the  Temporary  Framework  as 
well  as  under  State  aid  rules  applying  in  non-exceptional  circumstances.  It  also  includes  subsequent  amendments  to 
previously adopted decisions. 
14 The amount includes State aid measures adopted under the Temporary Framework, all COVID-19 related State aid 
approved under other sets of State aid rules and adjusted amounts included in subsequent amendment decisions.  
15  Case  SA.56985  (2020/N)  France  –  COVID-19:  Régime  cadre  temporaire  pour  le  soutien  aux  entreprises, 
Commission Decision of 20.4.2020.  
See: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases1/202017/285598_2149988_102_2.pdf. 
16  Case  SA.57027  (2020/N)  Denmark  COVID-19:  Credit  facility  and  tax  deferrals  linked  to  VAT  and  payroll  tax, 
Commission Decision of 30.4.2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases1/202019/285826_2153371_56_2.pdf.  
17 Case SA.56933 (2020/N) Bulgaria COVID-19: intermediate SME loan guarantee program, Commission Decision of 
8.4.2020. See: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases1/202015/285460_2146849_41_2.pdf.  
18  Case  SA.56839  (2020/N)  Greece  COVID-19:  Support  to  SME  loan  obligations  in  the  form  of  grants  under  the 
Temporary Framework for State aid measures to support the economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak, Commission 
Decision of 8.4.2020. See: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases1/202016/285303_2147455_84_2.pdf.  

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Several  Member States  notified aid  to  support research, development,  testing infrastructures 
and  production  of  Coronavirus-related  products19.  For  example,  Germany  notified  an 
umbrella  scheme  to  support  research,  development,  testing  and  production  of  Coronavirus-
relevant products20. 

The  transport  sector  was  severely  hit  by  the  global  pandemic.  In  2020,  the  Commission 
adopted 42 decisions allowing State aid to airlines, airports and ground handling companies to 
address  their  liquidity  and  capital  needs  caused  by  the  COVID-19  pandemic.  A  number  of 
airlines  benefitted  from  aid  approved  under  the  Temporary  Framework  (Article  107(3)(b) 
TFEU), including Air France, Lufthansa, SAS, Austrian Airlines, airBaltic, Blue Air, KLM, 
Nordica,  Alitalia  and  Brussels  Airlines21.  Aid  to  airlines  was  also  authorised  under  Article 
107(3)(c)  TFEU  and  the  Guidelines  on  rescue  and  restructuring  aid22.  For  example,  the 
Commission  approved  State  aid  to  French  airline  Corsair.  The  airline’s  existing  financial 
difficulties were aggravated by the Coronavirus outbreak. Therefore, the State aid consisted of 
two  separate  measures;  EUR  106.7  million  in  restructuring  aid  and  EUR  30.2  million  to 
compensate  Corsair  for  damage  caused  by  the  Coronavirus  outbreak23.  Portuguese  airline 
TAP  did  not  qualify  for  aid  under  the  Temporary  Framework  because  the  company  was 
already in  financial  difficulty before 31 December 2019. The Commission approved a EUR 
1.2  billion  rescue  loan  to  TAP24.  The  Commission  also  approved  schemes  to  compensate 
regional  and  local  public  transport  companies  for  the  damage  suffered  as  a  result  of 
lockdowns  and  other  measures25.  In  addition  to  transport,  the  Commission  approved  under 
Article 107(3)(b) TFEU measures adopted by Member States for undertakings particularly hit 
by  the  outbreak,  for  example  in  the  tourism,  culture,  hospitality  and  retail  sectors26.  The 
Commission also adopted a number of decisions under Article 107(2)(b) TFEU (aid to make 
good  the  damage  caused  by  natural  disasters  or  exceptional  occurrences),  for  example  to 

19  For  instance  Italy  (SA.56786),  Belgium  (SA.57173  and  SA.57057),  France  (SA.57367),  Malta  (SA.57204  and 
SA.57075) and Czechia (SA.56961 and SA.57071).  
20 Case SA.57100 Germany – COVID-19: Federal Framework Aid for COVID-19 related R&D, investments in testing 
infrastructures and production, Commission Decision of 28.4.2021. See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_57100.  
21 See respectively cases SA.57082, SA.57153, SA.57369, SA.57543 and SA.58342, SA.57539, SA.58101, SA.57026, 
SA.56943, SA.57116, SA.57586, SA.58114, SA.57544.  
22  Communication  from  the  Commission:  Guidelines  on  State  aid  for  rescuing  and  restructuring  non-financial 
undertakings in difficulty, OJ C 249, 31.7.2014, p. 1-28. 
23 Case SA.58463 France – Restructuring aid for Corsair, Commission Decision of 11.12.2020. See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_58463. 
24 Case SA.57369 COVID-19 – Aid to TAP, Commission Decision of 10.6.2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_57369. 
25  For  example  Case  SA.57675  (2020/N)  Germany  COVID-19  –  scheme  for  regional  and  local  public  passenger 
transport, Commission Decision of 7.8.2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases1/202033/287584_2180796_60_2.pdf.  
26 For example case SA.58214 Ireland – COVID-19 Adaptation Fund for the Re-Opening of Tourism and Hospitality 
businesses, see: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_58214;  
Case  SA.57595  Croatia  –  State  Aid  Programme  of  the  Ministry  of  Culture  to  Support  the  Economy  in  the  Current 
COVID-19 Outbreak, see: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_57595;  
Case SA.59048 Denmark – COVID-19: Aid to cafés, restaurants, bars, nightclubs, venues & their suppliers, see:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_59048. 

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compensate  damages  to  the  self-employed,  to  subsidise  companies’  fixed  costs  and  to 
compensate losses due to the cancellation of sports events27.  

The Commission also approved under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU a range of State aid measures 
destined  for  specific  areas  of  Member  States.  Germany,  for  instance,  notified  a  EUR  46 
billion  fund  (‘BayernFonds’)  in  the  forms  of  guarantees,  recapitalisation  instruments  and 
subsidised  debt  instruments  for  Bavaria  to  provide  liquidity  and  capital  support  to 
enterprises28.  State  aid  measures  were  also  approved  for  Wallonia  and  Brussels  regions  of 
Belgium and the regions of Friuli Venezia Giulia and the South of Italy29. 

As  regards  the  amounts  approved  by  the  Commission,  there  were  very  large  differences 
between  Member  States.  These  differences  are  partially  explained  by  the  diverging  sizes  of 
the Member States’ economies. 

More  specifically,  around  51.5%  of  State  aid  approved  was  notified  by  Germany.  Italy 
notified  measures  that  represent  around  14.7%  of  the  entire  amount  of  State  aid  approved, 
while the aid notified by France represented 13.9% of this amount. The aid notified by Spain 
represented 4.8% of the entire amount of State aid approved, while the aid notified by Poland 
and  Belgium  corresponded  to  around  2%  and  1.8%  respectively.  Aid  notified  by  other 
Member States is estimated to be between 0.01% and 1.5% of the total estimated amount of 
EUR  3.08  trillion.  The  actual  economic  impact  of  the  State  aid  measures  depends  on  their 
the 
implementation,  not  on  budgets.  This 
implementation of COVID-19 related State aid measures and adapting its State aid strategy to 
the evolution of the situation on the internal market. 

the  Commission 

is  monitoring 

is  why 

Based on the replies of all 27 Member States to two consecutive surveys carried out  by the 
European Commission,  in  the period between mid-March  and end of  December 2020, EUR 
2.96 trillion in aid approved by then, around 544 billion euros was actually spent. In absolute 
terms, according to the preliminary data sent by Member States, France has granted more than 
a fourth of the total aid  paid out (EUR 155.36 billion), followed by Italy with 19.8% of the 
total  aid  paid  out  (EUR 107.9 billion), Germany  with 19.1% of the total aid  paid  out  (EUR 
104.25  billion)  and  Spain  at  16.7%  (EUR  90.8  billion).  In  relative  terms,  according  to  the 
preliminary data sent by Member States, Spain is the country that has disbursed the most as 
compared to its own GDP (7.3%),  followed by France (6.4%),  Italy (6.0%), Greece (4.4%), 
Malta (3.9%), Hungary (3.7%), Portugal (3.6%), Poland (3.6%) and Cyprus (3.5%). At EU 27 
level, the Coronavirus related State aid spending corresponds to around 3.9% of EU GDP. 

27 Case SA.56791 Temporary compensation scheme for self-employed financially affected by the COVID-19, 
Commission Decision of 25.3.2021, see: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_56791; Case SA.57291 COVID-19 
Compensation Scheme: Directive for fixed cost subsidies, Commission Decision of 23.5.2020, see: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_57291; Case SA.57614 
Compensation scheme for sport organisations, facilities and cancellation of sport events related to COVID-19 (the 
“COVID – Sport Programme”) – Czechia, Commission Decision of 22.7.2020. See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases1/202030/286956_2175432_128_2.pdf.  
28 Case SA.57447 Germany – COVID-19 measures of the BayernFonds. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases1/202040/286247_2192300_93_2.pdf.  
29 Cases SA.57083, SA.57056, SA.58802 and SA.57005. 

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Beyond  aid  notified  under  the  Temporary  Framework,  Member  States  are  entitled  to  adopt 
measures  that  fall  outside  the  scope  of  EU  State  aid  control.  State  aid  considered  less 
distortive,  for  example  aid  based  on  the  de  minimis  regulations30  or  under  certain  block 
exemption  regulations31  can  be  adopted  without  prior  approval  of  the  Commission.  These 
included  notably  measures  such  as  wage  subsidies,  payment  suspensions  of  corporate  taxes 
and VAT and social welfare contributions.  

2.2. Guidance to market participants in antitrust and merger control  

Preserving  market  discipline  to  secure  the  functioning  of  the  Single  Market  becomes  even 
more important  in  times of  crisis.  At the same time, it is  necessary  to  facilitate cooperation 
between companies when needed to fight the effects of the pandemic.  

In the area of antitrust, the Commission swiftly adopted a series of measures covering various 
areas. 

The  Commission  provided  guidance  to  market  participants  in  a  Communication32  and  in  an 
ad-hoc comfort letter, setting out the main criteria it uses when assessing cooperation projects 
aimed at addressing supply shortages of products and services essential during the COVID-19 
outbreak,  such  as  medicines  and  medical  equipment.  Moreover,  the  Commission  engaged 
with  companies,  for  instance  in  the  automotive  sector,  providing  informal  guidance  for  the 
types  of  cooperation  that  are  likely  to  be  unproblematic,  and  identified  the  necessary 
safeguards for such cooperation. 

On  30  April  2020,  the  Commission  issued  three  implementing  regulations  temporarily 
relaxing the scope of competition law rules in three agricultural sectors severely affected by 
the  COVID-19  pandemic33.  The  Implementing  Regulations  allowed  farmers  and  recognised 
Inter-Branch Organisations to take temporary collective actions to stabilise certain sectors.  

30 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the 
Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  to  de  minimis  aid,  OJ  L  352,  24.12.2013,  p.  1;  Commission 
Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid in the agriculture sector, OJ L 352, 24.12.2013 p. 9; Commission 
Regulation  (EU)  No  717/2014  of  27  June  2014  on  the  application  of  Articles  107  and  108  of  the  Treaty  on  the 
Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid in the fishery and aquaculture sector, OJ L 190, 28.6.2014, p. 45; 
and  Commission  Regulation  (EU)  No  360/2012 of  25  April  2012 on  the  application  of  Articles  107  and  108  of  the 
Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  to  de  minimis  aid  granted  to  undertakings  providing  services  of 
general economic interest, OJ L 114, 26.4.2012, p. 8.  
31 Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the 
internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 187 26.6.2014, 
p. 1; Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/1084 of 14 June 2017 amending Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 as regards aid 
for port and airport infrastructure, notification thresholds for aid for culture and heritage conservation and for aid for 
sport  and  multifunctional  recreational  infrastructures,  and  regional  operating  aid  schemes  for  outermost  regions  and 
amending Regulation (EU) No 702/2014 as regards the calculation of eligible costs, OJ L 156, 20.6.2017, p. 1.  
32  Communication  from  the  Commission:  Temporary  Framework  for  assessing  antitrust  issues  related  to  business 
cooperation in response to situations of urgency stemming from the current COVID-19 outbreak, OJ C 116, 8.4.2020, 
p. 7.  
33  Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  2020/593  of  30  April  2020  authorising  agreements  and  decisions  on 
market stabilisation measures in the potatoes sector, OJ L 140, 4.5.2020, p. 13; Commission Implementing Regulation 
(EU)  2020/594  of  30  April  2020  authorising  agreements  and  decisions  on  market  stabilisation  measures  in  the  live 
trees and other plants, bulbs, roots and the like, cut flowers and ornamental foliage sector, OJ L 140, 4.5.2020, p. 17; 
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/599 of 30 April 2020 authorising agreements and decisions on the 

7 

 
                                                           
 
In  addition,  the  European  Competition  Network  (ECN)  issued  a  joint  statement  on  the 
application  of  the  antitrust  rules  during  the  COVID-19  crisis  and  cooperated  closely  on 
COVID-19  related  competition  issues.  In  the  Joint  Statement34,  the  members  of  the  ECN 
expressed  their  understanding  that  the  extraordinary  situation  may  trigger  the  need  for 
companies  to  cooperate  to  ensure  the  supply  and  fair  distribution  of  scarce  products  to  all 
consumers.  They  stated  that  they  would  not  actively  intervene  against  necessary  and 
temporary measures put in place in order to avoid a shortage of supply. At the same time, it 
was of utmost importance to ensure that products considered essential to protect the health of 
consumers  in  the  current  situation  (e.g.  face  masks  and  sanitising  gel)  remain  available  at 
competitive prices. The ECN stated that it would therefore not hesitate to take action against 
companies taking advantage of the current situation by cartelising or abusing their dominant 
position.  Following  the  joint  statement,  the  Commission  and  the  national  competition 
authorities  have  worked  together  to  ensure  that  the  supply  of  essential  goods  and  services 
during the pandemic is not disrupted and that competition rules are applied coherently, both in 
the  case  of  enforcement  and  in  guiding  companies’  cooperation  initiatives  during  the  crisis. 
Thanks  to  the  close  cooperation  and  coordination  of  COVID-19  related  antitrust  cases  and 
guidance, the ECN was able to speak with one voice to companies seeking to design antitrust 
compliant initiatives. 

In merger control, the Commission was able to continue its activities while fully respecting its 
legal obligations and deadlines35. Despite the pandemic, 361 transactions were notified to the 
Commission in 2020. Like in previous years, most notified mergers did not raise competition 
concerns  and  could  be  processed  speedily.  The  Commission  adopted  352  merger  decisions 
and  intervened  in  18  cases.  In  the  latter  category,  13  mergers  were  cleared  subject  to 
commitments  in  first  phase36,  three37  were  cleared  with  remedies  after  a  second  phase 
investigation and one merger38  was  cleared unconditionally in  second phase.  The simplified 
procedure was used in 76% of all notified transactions in 2020.  

2.3. Preparing for the recovery and the exit from the crisis  

With funds of EUR 672.5 billion, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)39 accounts for 
the  largest  part  by  far  of  the  EUR  750  billion  NextGenerationEU  recovery  package40.  The 

planning  of  production  in  the  milk  and  milk  products  sector,  OJ  L  140,  4.5.2020,  p.  37.  These  Commission 
Implementing Regulations were followed by the adoption of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/975 of 
6  July  2020  authorising  agreements  and  decisions  on  market  stabilisation  measures  in  the  wine  sector,  OJ  L  215, 
7.7.2020, p. 13. 
34 Joint statement by the European Competition Network (ECN) on application of competition law during the Corona-
crisis. See: https://www.acceptance.ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/202003_joint-statement_ecn_corona-crisis.pdf.  
35  To  ensure  business  continuity  in  times  of  a  pandemic,  the  Commission  introduced  the  eNotifications  tool,  which 
allows firms to notify planned mergers online. 
36  Cases  M.9408  Assa  Abloy/Agta  Record,  M.9434  UTC/Raytheon,  M.9461  AbbVie/Allergan,  M.9502 
Synthomer/Omnova  Solutions,  M.9517  Mylan/Upjohn,  M.9546  Gategroup/LSG  European  Business,  M.9554  Elanco 
Animal Health/Bayer Animal Health Division, M.9674 Vodafone Italia/Tim/INWIT JV, M.9677 DIC/BASF Colors & 
Effects,  M.9728  Altice/Omers/Allianz/Covage,  M.9744  Mastercard/Nets,  M.9776  Worldline/Ingenico  and  M.9779 
Alstom/Bombardier Transportation. 
37 Case M.9014 PKN Orlen/Grupa Lotos, Case M.9730 FCA/PSA, Case M.9660 Google/Fitbit. 
38 Case M.9409 Aurubis/Metallo Group Holding. 
39  Regulation  (EU)  2021/241  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  12  February  2021  establishing  the 
Recovery and Resilience Facility, OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17-75; Commission Proposal of 28.5.2020 for a Regulation 
of the European parliament and of the Council establishing a Recovery and Resilience Facility, op. cit. In December 

8 

 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
RRF will support public investments and reforms in Member States, helping them to address 
the economic and social impact of the COVID-19 pandemic as well as to facilitate the green 
and digital transitions.  

2020 a political agreement was reached in the Council and the European Parliament approved the RRF regulation on 
9.2.2021.  
40 Other instruments to be used are for example the Just Transition Fund, the Digital Europe Programme, rescEU and 
the new health programme EU4Health. 

9 

 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Review of the Recovery and Resilience Plans of the Member States 
To  receive  grants  and  low-interest  loans  under  the  RRF,  Member  States  must  submit  Recovery  and 
Resilience  Plans  (RRPs)  to  be  vetted  by  the  Commission  before  disbursement  of  any  funds.  All 
projects in the RRPs must be assessed under the State aid rules. In the autumn of 2020, a number of 
Member States submitted draft RRPs to the Commission and DG Competition assisted in reviewing 
and advising on the draft RRPs. Moreover, DG Competition together with other Commission services 
assisted  Member  States  preparing  the  RRPs  in  compliance  with  the  State  aid  rules.  To  this  end  the 
Commission published a set of guiding templates in December 2020. The templates were updated in 
January 202141.  

3.  Ensuring  that  Competition  Rules  Remain  Fit  for  Purpose  –  An  Extensive  Policy 
Agenda  

In  2020,  the  Commission  continued  its  comprehensive  review  of  the  competition  rules  to 
make them fit for a changing market environment, including the accelerating digitalisation of 
the  economy.  The  review  also  follows  from  the  input  provided  by  the  three  independent 
Special Advisers in their report of April 2019 on digitisation and competition law42.  

In particular, the Commission advanced on its review agenda encompassing a large number of 
its key block exemption regulations, guidelines and notices as well as moved forward with a 
number  of  ongoing  initiatives  to  ensure  fair  competition  in  the  Single  Market,  such  as  the 
proposal on the Digital Markets Act and the foreign subsidies initiative. The Commission also 
finalised in 2020 its “fitness check” of the 2014 State Aid Modernisation package.  

3.1. New policy initiative to strengthen the competition policy toolbox 

As  a  center-piece  of  the  European  Digital  Strategy43,  presented  by  the  Commission  in 
February  2020,  the  Commission  put  forward  two  legislative  proposals  aimed  at  creating  a 
safer  digital  space  for  all  users  where  their  fundamental  rights  are  protected  and  creating 
competitive  conditions  allowing  innovative  digital  businesses  to  grow  within  the  Single 
Market and compete globally.  

In 2020, the Commission adopted a proposal for a Digital Markets Act for contestable and fair 
digital  markets44.  The  proposed  regulation  aims  at  addressing  structural  problems  in  digital 
markets, in particular large digital platforms acting as “gatekeepers”, that is to say platforms 
having an intermediation position linking a large user base to a large number of businesses. 
As part of the digital package, the Commission also tabled a proposal for a Digital Services 

41 Commission Staff Working Document: Guidance to Member States  – Recovery and Resilience Plans, SWD(2021) 
12 final, 22.1.2021. See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/document_travail_service_part2_v3_en.pdf. 
42 “Competition Policy in the Digital Era”, 2019, See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0419345enn.pdf.  
43 Shaping Europe’s Digital Future, Commission publication of 19.2.2020, ISBN 978-92-76-16362-6. 
44  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  contestable  and  fair  markets  in  the 
digital sector (Digital Markets Act), COM(2020) 842 final, 15.12.2020. 

10 

 
 
                                                           
Act45. Both Commission proposals are subject to the ordinary legislative procedure and will 
be discussed in Parliament and Council during 2021.  

Digital Markets Act  
The Digital Markets Act – proposed regulation to be adopted under Article 114 TFEU – would aim at 
preventing  gatekeepers  from  imposing  unfair  conditions  on  businesses  and  consumers.  Examples  of 
such unfair conditions include prohibiting businesses from accessing their own data, locking users into 
a particular service and limiting switching to alternative services. Companies would be designated as 
gatekeepers  under  the  act  if  three  cumulative  quantitative  criteria  are  fulfilled46.  Designated 
gatekeepers  would  be  subject  to  a  number  of  obligations  and  prohibitions  to  ensure  an  open  online 
environment that is fair for businesses and consumers, and open to innovation by all. To ensure the 
effectiveness  of  the  new  rules, the  possibility  of  sanctions  for  non-compliance with  the  prohibitions 
and obligations in the Digital Markets Act is foreseen.  

3.2. Updating merger and antitrust rules and guidance 

3.2.1. Progress in merger evaluation 

In 2020, the Commission progressed to the final stages of its evaluation of selected procedural 
and jurisdictional  aspects of EU merger  control47. A Staff Working  Document summarising 
the main findings of the evaluation was published on 26 March 202148. Following the results 
of  the  evaluation,  the  Commission  adopted  a  communication  providing  guidance  on  the 
application  of  the  referral  mechanism  between  Member  States  set  out  in  Article  22  of  the 
Merger  Regulation,  and  launched  an  impact  assessment  on  exploring  policy  options  for 
further targeting and simplification of merger procedures49.  

3.2.2. Review of rules on vertical supply and horizontal cooperation  

With  the  publication  of  a  Staff  Working  Document  in  September  202050,  the  Commission 
concluded  its  evaluation  of  the  Vertical  Block  Exemption  Regulation  (“VBER”)51  and  the 
Vertical Guidelines52. The evaluation assessed to what extent the current regime had achieved 

45 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council  on a Single Market For Digital Services 
(Digital  Services  Act)  and  amending  Directive  2000/31/EC,  COM(2020)  825  final,  15.12.2020.  The  act  would 
introduce  rules  for  online  services  (intermediary  services,  hosting  services  and  online  platforms).  Providers  of  such 
services  would  be  subject  to  among  other  things  transparency  and  reporting  requirements,  information  obligations, 
data sharing rules and codes of conduct. 
46  Some  large  online  platforms  act  as  “gatekeepers”  in  digital  markets.  The  Digital  Markets  Act  establishes  a  set  of 
criteria for qualifying a large online platform as a gatekeeper. These criteria will be met if a company: i.) has a strong 
economic position, significant impact on the internal market and is active in multiple EU countries, ii.) has a strong 
intermediation position, meaning that it links a large user base to a large number of businesses, and iii.) has (or is about 
to have) an entrenched and durable position in the market.  
47 The evaluation focussed on four topics, (i) possible further simplification of EU merger control, (ii) the functioning 
of  the  jurisdictional  thresholds,  (iii)  the  functioning  of  the  referral  system,  and  (iv)  specific  technical  aspects  of  the 
procedural and investigative framework for the assessment of mergers.  
48  Commission  Staff  Working  Document:  Evaluation  procedural  and  jurisdictional  aspects  of  EU  merger  control, 
SWD(2021) 66 final, 26.3.2021. See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_1384 
49 Communication from the Commission: Commission Guidance on the application of the referral mechanism set out 
in Article 22 of the Merger Regulation to certain categories of cases, C(2021) 1959 final, 26.3.2021. 
50 Commission Staff Working Document – Evaluation of the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation, SWD(2020) 173 
final, 8.9.2020. 
51 Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on 
the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  to  categories  of  vertical  agreements  and  concerted  practices,  OJ  L  102, 
23.4.2010, p. 1-7.  
52 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, OJ C 130, 19.5.2010, p. 1-46.  

11 

 
                                                           
its objective of providing a safe harbour for vertical agreements that are on balance efficiency 
enhancing, creating legal certainty and reducing compliance costs. The aim of the evaluation 
was also to decide whether these rules should be allowed to lapse, be renewed in their current 
form or be revised.  

The  evaluation  showed  that  the  VBER  and  the  Vertical  Guidelines  remain  useful  tools  that 
facilitate self-assessment by businesses. However, markets have developed and the evaluation 
identified  a  number  of  issues  that  need  to  be  addressed.  The  Commission  has  launched  a 
review with the aim to have revised rules in place by 31 May 2022 when the current rules will 
expire. 

In  2020,  the  Commission  continued  its  evaluation  of  the  Research  &  Development  Block 
Exemption  Regulation  (R&D  BER)53  and  the  Specialisation  Block  Exemption  Regulation 
(Specialisation  BER)54,  together  referred  to  as  the  Horizontal  block  exemption  regulations 
(HBERs). The Commission Guidelines on horizontal cooperation agreements (HGL) provide 
guidance for the interpretation of the HBERs and for the application of Article 101 TFEU on 
other horizontal agreements. The HBERs will expire on 31 December 2022. The purpose of 
these  rules  is  to  make  it  easier  for  undertakings  to  cooperate  in  ways  that  are  economically 
desirable  and  without  adverse  effect  from  the  point  of  view  of  competition  policy.  The 
evaluation gathers evidence on their functioning and will allow the Commission to determine 
whether it should let the Horizontal Block Exemption Regulations and the Guidelines lapse, 
prolong their duration or revise them. A Staff Working Document is foreseen in 2021. 

In  2020,  the  Commission  continued  the  evaluation  of  the  Motor  Vehicle  Block  Exemption 
Regulation (MVBER) adopted in 201055. The purpose of the evaluation is to gather facts and 
evidence on the functioning of the motor vehicle block exemption regulation, along with the 
corresponding Guidelines, notably by verifying the extent to which its objectives are fulfilled. 
The  MVBER  expires  in  May  2023  and  requires  the  Commission  to  submit  an  evaluation 
report to the Parliament and the Council in 2021. 

3.2.3 Evaluation of the Market Definition Notice 

In 2020, the Commission also initiated an evaluation of the Market Definition Notice56. The 
Notice provides guidance on the principles and best practices of how the Commission applies 
the concept of relevant product and geographic market in its enforcement of EU competition 
law.  The  objective  of  the  evaluation  is  to  assess  whether  the  notice  is  still  fit  for  purpose, 
notably  in  light  of  recent  market  developments  across  different  sectors,  including  digital 
markets. The results of the evaluation will be published in 2021.  

53 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1217/2010 of 14 December 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union to certain categories of research and development agreements, OJ L 335, 
18.12.2010, p. 36-42.  
54 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1218/2010 of 14 December 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union to certain categories of specialisation agreements, OJ L 335, 18.12.2010, 
p. 43-47.  
55 Commission Regulation (EU) No 461/2010 of 27 May 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices in the motor vehicle 
sector, OJ L 129, 28.5.2010, p. 52-57.  
56 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, OJ C 372, 
9.12.1997, p. 5.  

12 

 
                                                           
3.2.4. Collective bargaining for the self-employed 

Digital platforms have affected the way people work. They provide access to work and greater 
flexibility but they can also lead to  greater vulnerability for some workers. Those providing 
services  through  digital  platforms  do  not  always  fit  into  traditional  employment  categories, 
and  it  is  not  always  clear  whether  EU  competition  rules  act  as  a  barrier  to  collective 
bargaining for those that need it. In June 2020, the Commission launched a process to assess 
whether there is a need for measures at EU level by providing increased legal certainty about 
the applicability of EU competition law to collective bargaining by self-employed. An initial 
information  gathering  process  was  conducted  as  part  of  the  consultation  on  the  Digital 
Services  Act.  In  parallel,  DG  Competition  engaged  closely  with  stakeholders  including 
platforms  and  social  partners.  In  January  2021,  the  Commission  published  an  inception 
impact assessment setting out the initial options for future action57. 

3.2.5.  Private  Enforcement  –  Implementation  report  on  Damages  Directive  and 
Communication on protection of confidential information by national courts  

The Damages Directive58 sets out rules to ensure that anyone who has suffered harm caused 
by an infringement of competition law by an undertaking or by an association of undertakings 
can  effectively  exercise  the  right  to  claim  full  compensation  for  that  harm  from  that 
undertaking  or  association  of  undertakings  before  national  courts.  In  December  2020,  the 
Commission  submitted  an  Implementation  Report  to  the  Parliament  and  the  Council  as 
required in the Directive59. 

The report takes stock of the implementation of some of the core rules of the Directive, such 
as  the  right  to  full  compensation,  disclosure  of  evidence,  evidentiary  value  of  infringement 
decisions,  limitation  periods,  passing  on  of  overcharges  and  estimation  of  harm.  Since  the 
adoption of the Directive in 2014, the number of damages actions before national courts has 
significantly increased and damages actions have become much more widespread in the EU. 
The  cumulative  number  of  cases,  by  date  of  first  judgment,  was  approximately  50  at  the 
beginning  of  2014  and,  after  a  sharp  increase,  amounted  to  239  in  2019.  These  239  cases 
came from thirteen Member States60. The Commission concluded that the Damages Directive 
is likely to have enhanced the awareness of victims of EU competition law infringements of 
their right to effectively claim damages for the harm suffered. 

Moreover,  the  Commission  adopted  a  non-binding  Communication  on  the  protection  of 
confidential information by national courts in proceedings for the private enforcement of EU 

57 Inception Impact Assessment – Collective bargaining agreements for self-employed – scope of application of EU 
competition rules, 6.1.2021. See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12483-
Collective-bargaining-agreements-for-self-employed-scope-of-application-EU-competition-rules. 
58  Directive  2014/104/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  26  November  2014  on  certain  rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member 
States and of the European Union, OJ L 349, 5.12.2014, p. 1-19. 
59 Article 20 Damages Directive. 
60 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, plus 
the United Kingdom. 

13 

 
                                                           
competition  law61.  The  Communication  provides  guidance  on  measures  that  national  courts 
can  impose  to  protect  confidential  information  throughout  and  after  the  closing  of 
proceedings. Examples of such measures are redactions, confidentiality rings, use of experts 
and hearings. 

3.3. Review of the State aid rules  

3.3.1. Fitness check of State aid rules concluded 

In 2020, the Commission concluded the fitness check62, started in 2019, of the State aid rules 
adopted  as  part  of  the  State  Aid  Modernisation  (SAM)  package.  The  Railway  Guidelines63 
and the Short-term  export credit Communication  (STEC)64 were also  included in  the fitness 
check. The Commission looked into whether the rules are still fit for purpose, also in the light 
of the European Green Deal65, the New Industrial Strategy66 and the Digital Strategy67 of the 
Commission.  

The results of the fitness check were published in October 2020. The Commission concluded 
that  the  rules  under  evaluation  remain  largely  fit  for  purpose.  However,  certain  provisions 
need  revisions,  including  clarifications,  further  streamlining  and  simplification,  as  well  as 
adjustments  to  reflect  recent  legislative developments, current  priorities, changes in  markets 
and technology developments. To allow sufficient time to amend the rules, the Commission 

61  Communication  from  the  Commission:  Communication  on  the  protection  of  confidential  information  by  national 
courts in proceedings for the private enforcement of EU competition law, OJ C 242, 22.7.2020, p. 1-17.  
62 The Fitness check covered the following rules, which were adopted as part of the State Aid Modernisation: General 
Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) (Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain 
categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty, OJ L 187, 
26.6.2014, p. 1-78); De minimis Regulation (Commission Regulation (EU) No 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the 
application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid, OJ L 
352, 24.12.2013, p. 1-8); Guidelines on regional State aid (Guidelines on regional State aid for 2014-2020, OJ C 209, 
23.7.2013,  p.  1-45);  Framework  for  State  aid  for  research  and  development  and  innovation  (RDI)  (Communication 
from the Commission: Framework for State aid for research and development and innovation, OJ C 198, 27.6.2014, 
p. 1-29);  Communication  on  important  projects  of  common  European  interest  (IPCEI)  (Communication  from  the 
Commission:  Criteria  for  the  analysis  of  the  compatibility  with  the  internal  market  of  State  aid  to  promote  the 
execution of important projects of common European interest, OJ C 188, 20.6.2014, p. 4-12); Guidelines on State aid 
to promote risk finance investments (Communication from the Commission: Guidelines on State aid to promote risk 
finance  investments,  OJ  C  19,  22.1.2014,  p.  4-34);  Guidelines  on  State  aid  to  airports  and  airlines  (Communication 
from the Commission — Guidelines on State aid to airports and airlines, OJ C 99, 4.4.2014, p. 3-34); Guidelines on 
State aid for environmental protection and energy (Communication from the Commission: Guidelines on State aid for 
environmental protection and energy 2014-2020, OJ C 200, 28.6.2014, p. 1-55); Guidelines on State aid for rescuing 
and restructuring non-financial undertakings in difficulty (Communication from the Commission: Guidelines on State 
aid for rescuing and restructuring non-financial undertakings in difficulty, OJ C 249, 31.7.2014, p. 1-28). In addition, it 
also covered the Railways Guidelines from 2008 and the Short term export credit Communication from 2012. Those 
rules  were  not  revised  as  part  of  the  State  Aid  Modernisation,  but  an  evaluation  was  relevant  in  the  light  of 
developments in EU law and the Commission’s case practice.  
63  Communication  from  the  Commission:  Community  guidelines  on  State  aid  for  railway  undertakings  OJ  C  184, 
22.7.2008, p. 13-31.  
64 Communication from the Commission to the Member States on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union to short-term export-credit insurance, OJ C 392, 19.12.2012, p. 1-7. 
65  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  European  Council,  the  Council,  The 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The European Green Deal, COM(2019) 
640 final, 11.12.2019.  
66  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  European  Council,  the  Council,  The 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A New Industrial Strategy for Europe, 
COM(2020) 102 final, 10.3.2020.  
67 Shaping Europe’s Digital Future, Commission Communication of 19.2.2020. 

14 

 
                                                           
has  prolonged68  the  validity  of  these  State  aid  rules  until  31  December  202169.  The  rules 
would otherwise have expired at the end of 2020.  

3.3.2. Review of State aid rules supporting the European Green Deal 

The  State  aid  rules  are  a  vital  part  of  the  green  transition.  In  line  with  the  Commission 
Communication on the European Green Deal and the principles of the fitness check, the State 
aid guidelines relevant for the European Green Deal currently undergo a targeted revision to 
be  finished  by  the  end  of  2021.  These  include  the  Regional  aid  Guidelines70,  IPCEI 
Communication71,  RDI  Framework72,  Risk  Finance  Guidelines,  Environmental  and  Energy 
Guidelines (EEAG)73 and relevant provisions of GBER74. The revised ETS Guidelines were 
adopted in 202075. 

The amended ETS guidelines entered into force on 1 January 2021 with the start of the new 
ETS trading period. The ETS guidelines enable Member States to compensate companies in 
at-risk sectors for part of the higher electricity prices resulting from the carbon price signals 
created by the ETS (so-called indirect emission costs).  

In November 2020, the Commission invited comments76 from stakeholders on certain aspects 
of  the  Guidelines  on  State  aid  for  environmental  protection  and  energy,  in  view  of  their 
planned  revision.  The  Guidelines,  whose  validity  was  prolonged  until  31  December  2021, 
were evaluated as part of the fitness check. The evaluation showed that the Guidelines have 
facilitated  a  more  effective  and  less  distortive  deployment  of  State  resources  to  improve 
environmental  protection  and  achieve  the  objectives  of  the  Energy  Union.  However,  they 
need  to  be  adjusted  in  light  of  new  technologies  and  novel  support  types,  as  well  as  recent 
environmental and energy legislation and policy. 

68  Communication  from  the  Commission  concerning  the  prolongation  and  the  amendments  of  the  Guidelines  on 
Regional State Aid for 2014-2020, Guidelines on State Aid to Promote Risk Finance Investments, Guidelines on State 
Aid for Environmental Protection and Energy 2014-2020, Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring non-
financial  undertakings  in  difficulty,  Communication  on  the  Criteria  for  the  Analysis  of  the  Compatibility  with  the 
Internal  Market  of  State  Aid  to  Promote  the  Execution  of  Important  Projects  of  Common  European  Interest, 
Communication  from  the  Commission:  Framework  for  State  aid  for  research  and  development  and  innovation  and 
Communication from the Commission to the Member States on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union to short-term export-credit insurance, OJ C 224, 8.7.2020, p. 2-4. 
69  The  following  State  aid  rules  were  prolonged  until  31  December  2023:  General  Block  Exemption  Regulation 
(GBER), De minimis Regulation, Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring non-financial undertakings in 
difficulty. See also Commission Regulation (EU) 2020/972 of 2 July 2020 amending Regulation (EU) No 1407/2013 
as  regards  its  prolongation  and  amending  Regulation  (EU)  No  651/2014  as  regards  its  prolongation  and  relevant 
adjustments, OJ L 215, 7.7.2020, p. 3-7. 
70 Guidelines on regional State aid for 2014-2020, which entered into force on 1 July 2014, OJ C 209, 23.7.2013, p. 1.  
71 Communication from the Commission: Criteria for the analysis of the compatibility with the internal market of State 
aid to promote the execution of important projects of common European interest, OJ C 188, 20.6.2014, p. 4-12.  
72 Framework for State aid for research and development and innovation, OJ C 198, 27.6.2014, p. 1. 
73 Communication from the Commission: Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 2014-2020, 
OJ C 200, 28.6.2014, p. 1-55. 
74 Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the 
internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty. 
75  Communication  from  the  Commission:  Guidelines  on  certain  State  aid  measures  in  the  context  of  the  system  for 
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading post 2021, SEC(2020) 320 final, SWD(2020) 190 final, SWD(2020) 191 
final, SWD(2020) 192 final, SWD(2020) 193 final, SWD(2020) 194 final, SWD(2020) 195 final, 21.9.2020. 
76 Commission statement inviting comments on revision of Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and 
energy, 12.11.2020. 

15 

 
                                                           
In 2020, the Commission finalised the evaluation  of the 2014  Communication on  Important 
Projects  of  Common  European  Interest  (IPCEI)77,  as  part  of  the  fitness  check.  The  results 
showed that the IPCEI rules are broadly fit for purpose but that some targeted modifications 
may  be  warranted  in  light  of  the  practical  experience  gained  from  IPCEI  cases  (on 
microelectronics  and  batteries)  and  to  ensure  that  the  IPCEI  rules  fully  support  the 
Commission  priorities,  in  particular  the  European  Green  Deal  and  the  Digital  Strategy,  and 
facilitate  participation  by  SMEs.  The  consultation  on  a  revised  IPCEI  Communication  was 
launched in February 2021. 

3.3.3. Stakeholder consultation on the Broadband State aid guidelines 

In September 2020, the  Commission  launched a  public consultation  inviting  Member States 
and other stakeholders to provide their views and comments on the existing EU State aid rules 
on public support for the deployment of broadband networks78. The 2013 Broadband State aid 
Guidelines  enable  Member  States  to  provide  support  for  the  deployment  of  broadband 
networks,  subject  to  certain  conditions79.  The  public  consultation  is  part  of  an  overall 
evaluation  with  a  view  to  assess  whether  the  guidelines  are  still  fit  for  purpose  or  whether 
they will need to be updated in light of recent technological and market developments. 

3.3.4. Evaluation of the SGEI package continued 

In  2020,  the  Commission  continued  its  evaluation  of  the  package  for  Services  of  General 
Economic Interest (SGEI) adopted in 2012. The evaluation, initiated in 2019, covers the SGEI 
Communication,  SGEI  Decision,  SGEI  Framework  and  SGEI  de  minimis  Regulation80, 
insofar as they are applicable to health and social services (except the evaluation of the SGEI 
de  minimis  Regulation  which  covers  a  wider  range  of  sectors).  The  overall  objective  of  the 
package is to support Member States’ funding of SGEI of key importance to citizens and the 
society  as  a  whole,  while  preserving  the  key  aspects  of  State  aid  control.  The  goal  of  the 
evaluation  is  to  verify  if  the  SGEI  rules  applicable  to  health  and  social  services  are  still 
appropriate and still provide EU added value. The results of the evaluation will be published 
in 2021. 

3.3.5. Review of agricultural and fisheries State aid rules 

In 2020, the Commission continued its review of the agricultural and fisheries State aid rules. 
The review comprises the Agricultural Block Exemption Regulation (ABER)81, the State aid 

77 Communication from the Commission: Criteria for the analysis of the compatibility with the internal market of State 
aid to promote the execution of important projects of common European interest, OJ C 188, 20.6.2014, p. 4-12.  
78 Public consultation: Evaluation of State aid rules for broadband infrastructure deployment. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2020_broadband/index_en.html. 
79 Communication from the Commission: EU Guidelines for the application of State aid rules in relation to the rapid 
deployment of broadband networks, OJ C 25, 26.1.2013, p. 1-25. 
80 Evaluation of State aid rules for health and social services of general economic interest (SGEI) and of the SGEI de 
minimis Regulation. See: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/evaluation_sgei_en.html. 
81 Commission Regulation (EU) No 702/2014 of 25 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid in the agricultural 
and forestry sectors and in rural areas compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ L 193, 1.7.2014, p. 1. 

16 

 
                                                           
Guidelines  for  agriculture,  forestry  and  rural  areas82,  the  Fisheries  Block  Exemption 
Regulation  (FIBER)83,  the  Regulation  on  de  minimis  aid  in  the  fishery  and  aquaculture 
sector84  and  the  State  aid  Guidelines  for  fishery  and  aquaculture85.  Those  instruments  were 
prolonged in 2020, will expire now at the end of 2022 and are currently under evaluation. The 
evaluations  should  be  finalised  in  2021  and  followed  by  impact  assessments,  in  line  with 
Better Regulation requirements. The Commission carries out its revision with the objective to 
establish new sets of agricultural and fisheries State aid rules, which should start to apply in 
2023. 

4.  EU  competition  policy  contribution  to  digital  transition  and  reinforcing  the 
Single Market  

Through  the  headline  ambition  “A  Europe  fit  for  the  digital  age”,  President  Von  der  Leyen 
defined  the  digital  area  as  one  of  her  top  priorities  for  the  Commission  mandate.  In 
competitive markets firms must innovate and become more efficient to prosper. This applies 
in  particular to  innovation-driven and  fast-moving digital  markets.  Effective enforcement of 
the  EU  competition  rules  and  regulatory  reforms  are  of  vital  importance  in  the  digital 
transformation  of  the  EU  economy  contributing  to  a  resilient  recovery  in  the  EU.  By 
enforcing  the  EU  competition  rules,  the  Commission  continues  to  tear  down  remaining 
barriers to the Single Market.  

4.1.  Enforcement  in  antitrust  contributed  to  the  digital  transition  and  strengthening  of  the 
Single Market 

In  the  markets  for  systems-on-chips  (SoCs),  the  Commission  imposed  interim  measures  on 
Broadcom86, the world’s leading supplier of chipsets used for TV set-top boxes and modems, 
for  having  –  in  the  Commission’s  preliminary  view  –  abused  its  dominant  position  in  the 
markets  of  SoCs  for  (i)  TV  set-top  boxes,  (ii)  fibre  modems,  and  (iii)  xDSL  modems  by 
entering into agreements with manufacturers of TV set-top boxes and modems that contained 
exclusivity-inducing  provisions.  In  October  2020,  the  Commission  decided  to  make  legally 
binding a number of commitments offered by Broadcom87. Broadcom committed to suspend 
existing  exclusivity  or  quasi-exclusivity  arrangements  and  leveraging  provisions  concerning 
SoCs  for  TV  set-top  boxes  and  Internet  modems  contained  in  agreements  with  original 
equipment manufacturers. Broadcom agreed not to enter into similar agreements in the future. 

82 Commission Communication: European Union guidelines for State aid in the agricultural and forestry sectors and in 
rural areas 2014-2020, OJ C 204, 1.7.2014, p. 1. 
83  Commission  Regulation  (EU)  No  1388/2014  of  16  December  2014  declaring  certain  categories  of  aid  to 
undertakings active in the production, processing and marketing of fishery and aquaculture products compatible with 
the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ 
L 369, 24.12.2014, p. 37. 
84 Commission Regulation (EU) No 717/2014 of 27 June 2014 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty 
on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  to  de  minimis  aid  in  the  fishery  and  aquaculture  sector,  OJ  L  190, 
28.6.2014, p. 45. 
85 Commission Communication: Guidelines for the examination of State aid to the fishery and aquaculture sector, OJ C 
217, 2.7.2015, p. 1. 
86 Case AT.40608 Broadcom, Commission Decision of 16.10.2019. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/40608/40608_2791_11.pdf. 
87 Case AT.40608 Broadcom – Commitments under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003, 7.10.2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/40608/40608_2794_3.pdf.  

17 

 
                                                           
The Commission concluded the final probe in relation to the sale of licensed merchandise in 
January 2020. The Commission fined several companies belonging to Comcast Corporation, 
including NBCUniversal, EUR 14.3 million for breaching EU antitrust rules88. NBCUniversal 
included  clauses  in  licensing  agreements  for  film  merchandise  prohibiting  licensees  from 
selling online, selling outside specific territories or to  other than specified customers. These 
clauses partitioned the Single Market to the detriment of consumers. 

In February 2020, in the hotel accommodation services sector, the Spanish hotel group Meliá 
was  fined  EUR  6.7  million  for  including  clauses  in  its  agreements  with  tour  operators 
according to which those contracts were valid only for reservations of consumers who were 
resident  in  specified  countries89.  The  Commission  found  that  this  partitioned  the  Single 
Market by restricting the ability of the tour operators to sell freely the hotel accommodation in 
all  EEA  countries  and  to  respond  to  direct  requests  from  consumers  who  were  residents 
outside the defined countries. 

In 2020, the Commission made progress in its investigations in ongoing cases and launched 
several major antitrust investigations in the digital sphere.  

In  November  2020,  the  Commission  issued  a  Statement  of  Objections  to  Amazon 
provisionally finding that Amazon had abused its dominant position in breach of EU antitrust 
rules90. Amazon acts as a retailer on its own marketplace and at the same time allows third-
party sellers to sell via that same platform. Amazon has access to important non-public data of 
those third party sellers. Amazon feeds this data into its retail business algorithms and uses it 
to  calibrate  Amazon’s  own  retail  offers  to  the  detriment  of  the  other  sellers  on  the 
marketplace.  In  the  Commission’s  preliminary  view,  this  behaviour  allows  Amazon  to 

88 Case AT.40433 Film merchandise, Commission Decision of 30.1.2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/40433/40433_734_3.pdf. 
89 Case AT.40528 Meliá (Holiday Pricing), Commission Decision of 21.2.2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/40528/40528_418_3.pdf.  
90 Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Amazon for the use of non-public independent seller data 
and opens second investigation into its e-commerce business practices, Commission press release of 10.11.2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2077.  

18 

 
 
                                                           
leverage its dominance in the market for the provision of marketplaces services in France and 
Germany. 

Also in November 2020, the Commission opened a second formal antitrust investigation into 
Amazon’s  business  practices91.  The  investigation  concerns  potential  self-preferencing  and 
discriminatory  practices  on the marketplace run  by  Amazon. The Commission  suspects  that 
Amazon may favour its own retail offers on the Amazon marketplace as well as offers made 
by sellers that use Amazon’s logistics and delivery services (so-called fulfilment by Amazon 
sellers). In particular, the Commission is investigating the criteria that Amazon sets to select 
the  winner  of  the  “Buy  box”  on  its  marketplace.  The  Commission  is  also  looking  into  the 
selection criteria that enable sellers to offer products to customers that use Amazon Prime, the 
company’s  loyalty  programme.  These  criteria  may  also  lead  to  preferential  treatment  of 
Amazon’s  retail  business  or  of  FBA  sellers.  For  sellers  to  generate  sales  on  the  Amazon 
marketplace, it is crucial to win the Buy box and to reach Amazon Prime customers.  

In  June  2020,  the  Commission  opened  four  formal  investigations  against  Apple.  The 
Commission  investigates  whether  Apple’s  terms,  conditions  and  other  measures  for 
integrating  Apple  Pay  in  merchant  apps  and  websites  on  iPhones  and  iPads  breach  EU 
antitrust rules. The Commission is also investigating Apple’s limitation of access to the Near 
Field Communication (NFC) functionality (tap and go) on iPhones for payments in stores and 
alleged refusals of access to Apple Pay92. 

In  addition,  two  investigations  follow  up  on  separate  complaints  by  Spotify  and  by  an  e-
book/audiobook  distributor  on  the  impact  of  the  App  Store  rules  on  competition  in  music 
streaming  and  e-books/audiobooks.  In  these  probes  the  Commission  investigates  whether 
Apple’s  rules  for  app  developers  on  the  distribution  of  apps  via  the  App  Store  violate  EU 
competition  rules93.  The  investigations  concern  in  particular  the  mandatory  use  of  Apple’s 
own  proprietary  in-app  purchase  system  (which  involves  Apple  charging  app  developers  a 
30% commission on subscription fees) and restrictions on the ability of developers to inform 
iPhone  and  iPad  users  of  alternative  cheaper  purchasing  possibilities  outside  of  apps.  The 
conduct in question may also dis-intermediate developers of competing apps from important 
customer  data,  while  Apple  may  obtain  valuable  data  about  the  activities  and  offers  of  its 
competitors. 

To allow the Commission to gain a more comprehensive understanding of competition issues, 
market  dynamics  and  business  challenges  in  the  consumer-oriented  “Internet  of  Things” 
sector, the Commission launched a sector inquiry into the Internet of Things in July 202094. 
The  Commission  will  examine  conduct  that  could  restrict  or  distort  competition  and  which 
could merit early intervention. The final report will be issued in 2022. 

91 Case AT.40703 Amazon – Buy Box, Commission Decision of 10 November 2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/40703/40703_67_4.pdf. 
92 Antitrust: Commission opens investigation into Apple practices regarding Apple Pay, Commission press release of 
16.6.2020. See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1075. 
93 Antitrust: Commission opens investigations into Apple’s App Store rules, Commission press release of 16.6.2020. 
See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1073. 
94  Commission  Decision  of  16.7.2020  initiating  an  inquiry  into  the  sector  for  consumer  Internet  of  Things  related 
products  and  services  pursuant  to  Article  17  of  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1/2003,  COM  (2020)  4754  final.  See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/IoT_decision_initiating_inquiry_en.pdf.  

19 

 
 
                                                           
In July 2020, the Commission fined three energy suppliers (Orbia, Clariant and Celanese) a 
total  of  EUR  260  million  for  colluding  to  buy  ethylene  at  the  lowest  possible  price  to  the 
detriment  of  ethylene  sellers95.  Ethylene  is  a  flammable  chemical,  primarily  used  to  make 
polyethylene,  the  most  common  plastic  in  use  today.  All  companies  admitted  their 
involvement, assisted the Commission with its investigation and agreed to settle the case. A 
fourth cartelist, Westlake, was not fined because it revealed the cartel to the Commission. 

The Commission concluded another two car parts cartel investigations in September 202096. It 
fined manufacturers Brose and Kiekert EUR 18 million in total. Magna and Brose took part in 
a bilateral cartel concerning door modules and window regulators97, while Magna and Kiekert 
colluded  in  relation  to  latches  and  strikers.  In  both  cartels,  the  companies  fixed  prices  and 
exchanged  commercially  sensitive  information.  Magna  was  not  fined  because  the  company 
revealed both cartels to the Commission. 

The Teva-Cephalon pay-for-delay agreement  
In November 2020, the Commission fined98 the pharmaceutical companies Teva and Cephalon EUR 
60.5  million  for  agreeing  to  delay  for  several  years  the  market  entry  of  a  less  expensive  generic 
version of Cephalon’s drug for sleep disorders, modafinil, after Cephalon’s main patents had expired. 
The agreement was concluded well before Cephalon was acquired by Teva. The agreement violated 
EU  antitrust  rules  and  caused  substantial  harm  to  EU  patients  and  healthcare systems  by  artificially 
keeping prices high for modafinil. 
The decision concerns a patent settlement agreement whereby Cephalon induced Teva not to enter the 
market with a generic version of modafinil, in exchange for a package of commercial transactions that 
were  beneficial  to  Teva  and  some  cash  payments.  Teva  held  its  own  patents  relating  to  modafinil’s 
production process and was ready to enter the modafinil market with its own generic version, which it 
had already started selling in the United Kingdom. Then, it agreed with Cephalon to withdraw from 
the  market  and  not  to  challenge  Cephalon’s  patents.  The  Commission’s  investigation  found  that  for 
several  years, this  “pay-for-delay”  agreement  had  the  object  and  the  effect  of  eliminating Teva  as a 
competitor and allowing Cephalon to continue charging high prices even if its main modafinil patents 
had long expired. 

95 Case AT.40410 Ethylene, Commission Decision of 14.7.2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/40410/40410_1654_6.pdf.  
96  In recent  years, the Commission has fined for cartel activities suppliers of automotive bearings, wire harnesses in 
cars, flexible foam used in car seats, parking heaters in cars and trucks, alternators and starters, air conditioning and 
engine cooling systems, lighting systems, occupant safety systems, and spark plugs, braking systems, seatbelts, airbags 
and steering wheels. 
97 Case AT.40299 Closure Systems, Commission Decision of 29.9.2020, public version not yet available. 
98 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2220. 

20 

 
                                                           
4.2. Merger control contributed to the digital transition and reinforced the Single Market 

In  May  2020,  the  General  Court  annulled  the  2016  Commission  decision  prohibiting  the 
merger  between  Hutchinson  3G  and  Telefonica  UK99.  The  Commission  had  found  that  the 
four-to-three  merger  would  have  led  to  an  increase  in  prices  and  restriction  of  choice  for 
consumers  in  the  mobile  telephony  market  in  the  United  Kingdom.  The  General  Court 
confirmed that the Commission can prohibit concentrations which do not create or strengthen 
a dominant position, but only if the merger would be liable to affect competition to an extent 
equivalent  to  the  effect  of  dominance.  The  General  Court  found  that  the  Commission  had 
failed  to  demonstrate  that  the  concentration  would  eliminate  an  important  competitive 
constraint,  thus  giving  rise  to  a  significant  impediment  to  effective  competition.  The 
Commission has appealed the judgment to the Court of Justice. 

In  November  2020,  the  Commission  approved,  subject  to  commitments,  the  proposed 
acquisition  of  Covage  by  SFR  FTTH,  a  company  jointly  controlled  by  Altice,  Allianz  and 
Omers100. SFR FTTH and Covage are major fibre network operators in France. Covage sells 
fibre network accesses at the wholesale level while Altice is active both at the wholesale and 
retail levels. The Commission found that the transaction would have given the merged firms a 
very  strong  position  in  the  market  for  wholesale  FTTO  (fibre-to-the-office)  services.  As  a 
result,  alternative  retailers  would  have  fewer  alternative  suppliers.  Since  Covage  would 
become vertically integrated in SFR’s retail activities, the merged entity would have both the 
ability and the incentive to prevent retail competitors from accessing Covage’s fibre capacity 
at  wholesale  level.  SFR  offered  to  divest  95%  of  Covage’s  FTTO  business  and  offered  to 
conclude  a  transitional  service  agreement  to  enable  the  divested  business  to  become  fully 
independent. 

The  Commission  conditionally  approved  the  acquisition  of  Fitbit  by  Google  in  December 
2020101. Fitbit develops, manufactures and distributes smartwatches and fitness trackers. The 

99  Case  T-399/16  CK  Telecoms  UK  Investments  Ltd  v  European  Commission,  Judgment  of  the  General  Court  of 
28.5.2020. See: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=T-399/16.  
100 Case M.9728 Altice/Omers/Allianz/Covage, Commission Decision of 27.11.2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_9728.  
101 Case M.9660 Google/Fitbit, Commission Decision of 17.12.2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_9660. 

21 

 
 
                                                           
Commission  had  concerns  that  Google  could  use  Fitbit’s  databases  to  increase  the  already 
vast amount of data Google possesses to personalise ads. Google would also be able to restrict 
competitors’  access  to  the  Fitbit  Web  Application  Programming  Interface  (API)  and  put 
competing  manufacturers  of  wrist-worn  devices  at  a  disadvantage  by  degrading  their 
interoperability with Android smartphones. To obtain clearance, Google committed not to use 
Fitbit  data  for  Google  ads  and  to  maintain  such  data  separate  in  data  silos.  Google  also 
committed  to  continue  allowing  relevant  third  parties  to  obtain  access  to  users’  health  and 
fitness data to software applications through the Fitbit Web API without charges and subject 
to  user  consent.  The  company  also  committed  to  continue  allowing  interoperability  with 
Android  smartphones  to  competing  wrist-worn  devices.  Finally,  the  commitments  include  a 
fast track dispute resolution mechanism that can be invoked by third parties. 

In  the  supply  of  motor  fuels  and  related  products,  the  European  Commission  conditionally 
approved  in  July  2020  the  acquisition  of  Grupa  Lotos  by  PKN  Orlen,  two  large  Polish 
integrated  oil  and  gas  companies102.  The  Commission  had  concerns  that  the  transaction,  as 
initially notified, would have harmed competition for motor fuels in Poland, jet fuel in Poland 
and  Czechia  and  related  products  such  as  different  types  of  bitumen  in  Poland.  PKN  Orlen 
offered a package of divestments and other commitments. The package included divestments 
of a stake in a refinery, storage depots, retail fuel stations and bitumen production facilities. 
The  Commission  concluded  that  these  remedies  would  allow  competitors  to  compete 
effectively with the merged entity. 

In the rail transportation sector, the Commission conditionally approved Alstom’s acquisition 
of Bombardier Transportation, in July 2020103. Alstom and Bombardier are global leaders in 
rail  transportation  and  compete  in  the  manufacturing  and  supply  of  very  high  speed  trains 
(‘very high speed rolling stock’) and railway signaling solutions. The Commission concluded 
that  the  transaction  would  have  raised  serious  competition  concerns.  Alstom  would  have 
become  the  undisputed  market  leader  in  very  high  speed  rolling  stock  and  mainline  rolling 
stock  as  well  as  in  mainline  signaling.  The  Commission  accepted  a  comprehensive 
commitments package offered by the merging firms, divesting train platforms and production 
facilities for very high speed rolling stock and mainline rolling stock. Alstom and Bombardier 
also  offered  to  supply  to  signaling  competitors  legacy  on-board-units,  necessary  interfacing 
information and support. 

102 Case M.9014 PKN Orlen/Grupa Lotos, Commission Decision of 14.7.2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_9014.  
103 Case M.9779 Alstom/Bombardier Transportation, Commission Decision of 31.7.2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_9779.  

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The Fiat Chrysler / Peugeot merger 
In the automotive sector, the Commission approved, following an in-depth investigation and subject to 
conditions,  the  merger  between  Fiat  Chrysler  Automobiles  (FCA)  and  Peugeot  SA  (PSA)104.  The 
transaction  created  the  world’s  fourth  largest  automotive  group,  named  Stellantis.  The  Commission 
concluded that the merger would have harmed competition in the market for small light commercial 
vehicles  (LCVs)  in  several  Member  States.  The  merging  firms  committed  to  extend  the  current 
cooperation agreement between PSA and Toyota for small LCVs. PSA produces Toyota vehicles for 
sale in the EU. The extended agreement will increase the production capacity available for Toyota and 
transfer prices will be reduced for vehicles and associated spare parts and accessories. These measures 
allow  Toyota  to  compete  effectively  with  Stellantis  and  expand  in  the  EU  market  for  small  LCVs. 
Moreover,  FCA and  PSA agreed to amend  repair and  maintenance  agreements  concluded  with  their 
repairer networks. Access to the repairer networks will be facilitated, allowing  competitors and new 
entrants to compete in the market for small LCVs. 

4.3. State aid facilitated the digital transition and safeguarding the Single Market  

Broadband  infrastructure  that  meets  the  needs  for  very  high  digital  speeds,  capacities,  and 
quality  is  key  to  meeting  the  EU  2025  connectivity  objectives  set  out  in  the  Digital 
Strategy105. State aid contributes to the rollout of high performance broadband networks in the 
EU in addressing market failures, that is to say situations and areas where there is no incentive 
for commercial operators to provide sufficient broadband coverage. 

In August 2020, the Commission approved a EUR 200 million voucher scheme to help low-
income families in  Italy access high-speed broadband services106. The State aid scheme will 
reduce  the  digital  divide  in  Italy  while  limiting  possible  distortions  of  competition.  The 
Commission  also  approved  in  December  2020  a  EUR  20  million  voucher  scheme  to  help 
students in Greece access broadband services and benefit from remote online learning107.  

The  Commission  approved,  under  EU  State  aid  rules,  a  German  scheme  to  support  the 
deployment  of  very  high  capacity  broadband  networks  in  Germany108.  The  scheme  aims  at 
developing  a  new,  publicly  financed  very  high  capacity  connectivity  infrastructure  that  will 
deliver  a  faster  internet  for  households,  companies  and  public  institutions  in  Germany. 
Germany will prioritise households that  have access  to  speeds of less than 100 Megabit per 
second to contribute to reduce the digital divide between rural and urban areas in Germany. 
Under the scheme, Germany aims to make Gigabit networks available for all citizens by the 
end of 2025.  

104 Case M.9730 FCA/PSA, Commission Decision of 21.12.2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_9730.  
105 Commission Communication Shaping Europe’s Digital Future, 19.2.2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/communication-shaping-europes-digital-future-feb2020_en_4.pdf.  
106 Case SA.57495 Italy – Broadband vouchers for certain categories of families, COM(2020) 5269 final, Commission 
Decision of 4.8.2020. See: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases1/202037/286902_2187163_119_2.pdf. 
107 Case SA.57357 Greece – Broadband voucher scheme for students, COM(2020) 8441 final, Commission Decision 
of 3.12.2020. See: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases1/20212/288333_2230042_140_2.pdf. 
108 Case SA.52732 Germany – National gigabit scheme, COM(2020) 7859 final, Commission Decision of 13.11.2020. 
See: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases1/202048/288295_2213478_121_2.pdf. 

23 

 
 
                                                           
5. EU competition policy contribution to green transition 

The EU has  a firm ambition to tackle climate change and environmental degradation  and to 
drive forward the European Green Deal as Europe’s growth strategy. Green innovation is not 
only at the core of the EU’s political ambition, but also reflected in its regulatory proposals 
and  funding  priorities.  EU  competition  policy  is  well  placed  to  contribute  to  the  EU’s 
environmental  objectives  and  climate  targets,  including  the  decarbonisation  of  the  economy 
and  the  shift  in  the  transport  sector  from  polluting  fossil  fuels  to  alternative  fuels  in 
accordance with the Commission's mobility policy. 

In  this  context,  the  Commission  issued,  in  October  2020,  a  call  for  contributions  on  how 
competition  rules  and  sustainability  policies  work  together109.  The  Commission  invited 
various  stakeholders,  including  competition  experts,  academia,  industry,  environmental 
groups and consumer organisations to provide their views and input on how antitrust policy, 
merger  policy  and  State  aid  policy  work  together  with  environmental  and  climate  policies. 
The contributions fed into a conference held in February 2021. A report on reflections from 
the consultation process is scheduled for mid-2021.  

5.1. State aid facilitating green transition  

In  the  area  of  State  aid  control,  the  Commission  assessed  and  authorised  State  measures 
promoting  the  deployment  of  renewables,  improving  energy  efficiency,  supporting  where 
necessary  the  rollout  of  zero/low  emission  mobility  infrastructure,  stimulating  demand  for 
zero/low  emission  vehicles  for  public  and  private  transport,  and  reducing  CO2  and  other 
emissions (including decarbonisation measures) or improving circularity. 

In  July  2020,  the  Commission  approved  a  scheme  to  support  electricity  production  from 
renewable  sources  in  Ireland,  the  Renewable  Electricity  Support  Scheme  (RESS)110.  The 
RESS will help Ireland reach its national target to transition away from fossil fuels and reach 
a share of 70% of renewables in its electricity mix by 2030. The Commission found that the 
aid  is  necessary,  has  an  incentive  effect  and  is  proportionate  and  limited  to  the  minimum 
necessary, as the amount of aid will be set through competitive auctions. The case also shows 
how  to  support  projects  developed  by  renewable  energy  communities  and  for  communities 
that host projects supported by the RESS in line with State aid rules. 

The Commission concluded in May 2020 that the compensation of EUR 52.5 million granted 
by  the  Netherlands  for  early  closure  of  the  coal  power  plant  Hemweg  was  in  line  with  EU 
State  aid  rules111.  The  measure  will  contribute  to  reducing  CO2  without  unduly  distorting 

109 Competition Policy supporting the Green Deal  – Call for contributions, Commission memorandum of 13 October 
2020. See: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/information/green_deal/call_for_contributions_en.pdf. 
110 Case SA.54683 Irish RES electricity support, Commission Decision of 20.7.2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_54683. 
111 Case SA.54537 Netherlands – Prohibition of coal for the production of electricity in the Netherlands, Commission 
Decision of 12.5.2020. See: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases1/202025/284556_2165085_151_2.pdf.  

24 

 
                                                           
competition in the Single Market. The Commission reached a similar decision in relation to 
compensations for early closures of coal-fired plants in Germany112. 

In November 2020, the Commission approved a Romanian scheme to support the construction 
and/or upgrade of district heating systems, based exclusively on renewable energy sources113. 
The measure will enable a switch from fossil fuel energy production to heat production from 
renewable energy sources. The State aid rules allow Member States to support district heating 
generation  and  distribution,  subject  to  certain  conditions  set  out  in  the  Commission’s 
Guidelines on State aid  for environmental protection and energy.  The European Green Deal 
Investment  Plan  published  by  the  Commission  in  January  2020  allow  Member  States  to 
increase the maximum support amount for generating district heating. 

In  December  2020,  the  Commission  approved  a  EUR  30  billion  Dutch  scheme  to  support 
projects  reducing  greenhouse  gas  emissions  in  the  Netherlands114.  The  scheme  (Stimulering 
Duurzame  Energieproductie  (SDE++))  will  contribute  to  the  EU  environmental  objectives 
without unduly distorting competition. This innovative scheme will be open to projects based 
on various technologies (renewable electricity, gas and heat, the use of industrial waste heat 
and heat pumps, the electrification of industrial heat processes and electrification of hydrogen 
production,  and  carbon  capture  and  storage  for  industrial  processes,  including  hydrogen 
production  and  waste  incineration),  which  will  bid  for  support  on  the  basis  of  tons  of  CO2 
emissions abated compared to a baseline. 

Second important project of common European interest (IPCEI) on batteries 
Throughout 2020 discussions took place between 12 Member States and the Commission for a second 
IPCEI  on  the  battery  value  chain.  In  December  2020,  Austria,  Belgium,  Croatia,  Finland,  France, 
Germany,  Greece,  Italy,  Poland,  Slovakia,  Spain  and  Sweden  jointly  notified  the  second  IPCEI  on 
batteries  for  e-mobility  and  energy  storage.  The  project,  called  European  Battery  Innovation,  will 
support research and innovation in the battery value chain. The twelve Member States will provide up 
to  EUR  2.9  billion  in  funding  in  the  coming  years.  The  public  funding  is  expected  to  unlock  an 
additional EUR 9 billion in private investments. The project complements the first IPCEI in the battery 
value  chain  that  the  Commission  approved  in  December  2019.  The  project  is  consistent  with  the 
Commission’s policies to shift from the use of environmentally harmful fossil fuels to alternative fuel 
technologies  and  the  twin  transition  of  the  EU  economy  under  the  European  Green  Deal  and  the 
Digital Strategy115. In January 2021 the Commission adopted a decision authorising this IPCEI116. 

112  Case  SA.58181  Tender  mechanism  for  the  phase-out  of  hard  coal  in  Germany,  Commission  Decision  of 
25.11.2020. See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_2208.  
113 Case SA.55433 Romania – RES District heating projects, Commission Decision of 6.11.2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases1/20214/287759_2235900_143_2.pdf.  
114  Case  SA.53525  the  Netherlands  –  SDE++  scheme  for  greenhouse  gas  reduction  projects,  including  renewable 
energy, Commission Decision of 14.12.2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_53525. 
115 Commission Communication Shaping Europe’s Digital Future, 19.2.2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/communication-shaping-europes-digital-future-feb2020_en_4.pdf.  
116  State  aid:  Commission  approves  EUR  2.9  billion  public  support  by  twelve  Member  States  for  a  second  pan-
European research and innovation project along the entire battery value chain, Commission press release of 26.1.2021. 
See:  https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_226.  The  non-confidential  version  of  the  decision 
will  be  made  available  under  the  case  numbers  SA.55855  (Austria),  SA.55840  (Belgium),  SA.55844  (Croatia), 
SA.55846  (Finland),  SA.55858  (France),  SA.55831  (Germany),  SA.56665  (Greece),  SA.55813  (Italy),  SA.55859 
(Poland),  SA.55819  (Slovakia),  SA.55896  (Spain),  and  SA.55854  (Sweden)  in  the  State  aid  Register  on  the 
competition website. See: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/register/. 

25 

 
                                                           
During 2020 discussions continued between the Commission, Member States and industry for 
possible  new  IPCEIs  in  the  areas  of  hydrogen  technologies,  low  carbon  industries 
microelectronics and batteries. 

5.2. Antitrust enforcement and merger control contribute to the green transition 

Antitrust enforcement can target not only company behaviour potentially aimed at restricting 
competition  in  the  development  of  clean  technologies  but  also  deter  conduct  aimed  at 
foreclosing  access  to  essential  infrastructures  or  to  the  free  flow  of  resources  that  are 
necessary for the circular economy and the European Green Deal’s objectives. 

In  2020,  the  Commission  continued  its  investigation  against  BMW,  Daimler  and  VW 
(Volkswagen,  Audi,  and  Porsche)  for  a  suspected  restriction  of  competition  on  emission 
cleaning technology117.  

Antitrust  enforcement  action  can  also  play  a  role  in  supporting  the  European  Green  Deal 
objective  of  developing  a  competitive  and  attractive  passenger  rail  transport  sector.  In  that 
context, the Commission continued its ongoing investigations118. In the Czech Rail case, the 
incumbent  railway  operator  České  dráhy  (ČD)  is  suspected  of  predatory  pricing  on  the 
Prague-Ostrava passenger railway route, the backbone of the Czech rail network. In October 
2020, the Commission sent a Statement of Objections to České dráhy119. 

6.  An  Economy  that  works  for  people  –  EU  competition  policy  contribution  to  a 
deeper and fairer economic and monetary union 

The social market economy is a foundation the EU is built upon and EU competition policy 
underpins it.  Individuals and businesses thrive when the economy  works  for them.  In 2020, 
the  Commission  supported  this  Commission  headline  ambition  by  promoting  a  pro-
competition,  level  playing  field  and  digital  narrative  in  actions  aimed  at  implementing  the 
recovery  package  in  the  context  of  the  European  Semester,  the  Capital  Markets  Union,  the 
Banking Union, and effective taxation120. 

6.1. Ensuring sustainability in the banking sector 

In 2020, there were no new individual cases of State aid to financial institutions. Nevertheless, 
the  Commission  authorised  the  prolongation  of  already  existing  schemes  under  which 
Member States can assist, should the need arise in a concrete case, the orderly market exit of 
very small financial institutions or credit unions in distress. The Commission approved such 
schemes  in  Poland,  Italy  and  Ireland121.  The  Commission  also  approved  liquidity  support 

117 Case AT.40178 Car emissions, Statement of Objections of the Commission of 5 April 2019, See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_2008. 
118 The Commission will continue its antitrust investigations, including in case concerning suspected predatory pricing 
on the Prague-Ostrava passenger railway route, which is the backbone of the Czech rail network.  
119 Case AT.40156 Czech Rail. The Commission sent a Statement of Objections to České dráhy for alleged predatory 
pricing, See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2017. 
120 Communication from the Commission: Action Plan to fight tax evasion and to make taxation simple and easy (Q2 
2020) included in the Adjusted Commission Work Programme 2020 COM(2020) 440 final Annex 1 and 2, 27.5.2020.  
121  Case  SA.58389  Fifth  prolongation  of  the  resolution  scheme  for  cooperative  banks  and  small  commercial  banks, 
Commission Decision of 29.10.2020. See:  

26 

 
                                                           
 
schemes for viable banks with temporary liquidity issues, should the need arise in a concrete 
case, in Greece and Italy122.  

Member States continued to promote the creation or expansion of development banks. From a 
State aid perspective, publicly funded development banks can be active within a well-defined 
remit  that  addresses  market  failures  and  provided  that  they  do  not  crowd  out  commercial 
financial  institutions.  In  2020,  the  Commission  approved  funding  for  Invest  International,  a 
new development  finance institution in  the Netherlands123. The Commission also  authorised 
funding  for  the  setup  of  the  Scottish  National  Investment  Bank124.  Finally,  the  Commission 
approved the setting up of a new national development bank in Portugal, Banco Português de 
Fomento125. During the year 2020, no-aid schemes continued to apply in Italy (“GACS”) and 
Greece (“Hercules”), which have been introduced to address the legacy issue of high levels of 
non-performing loans (NPLs). These schemes represent successful examples of how Member 
States  can  help  banks  clean  up  their  balance  sheets  without  granting  aid  or  distorting 
competition. 

6.2. Taking action against selective tax advantages 

The fight against tax evasion and tax avoidance is high on the Commission’s agenda. In 2020, 
the Commission continued the investigation of alleged State aid granted by the Netherlands to 
Inter IKEA, to Starbucks and to Nike; on alleged aid granted by Luxembourg to Huhtamäki; 
and on alleged aid granted by Belgium to 39 individual aid beneficiaires of the Belgian excess 
profit scheme. 

In  July  2020,  the  General  Court  annulled  the  Commission’s  decision  of  2016,  where  the 
Commission  found  that  two  Irish  tax  rulings  in  favour  of  Apple,  constituted  incompatible 
State  aid.  The  General  Court  held  that  the  Commission  did  not  show  to  the  requisite  legal 

SA.58819 

SA.57053 

https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_58389;  Case  SA.56635  Tenth 
prolongation  of  the  Credit  Unions  Orderly  Liquidation  Scheme,  Commission  Decision  of  8.6.2020.  See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_56635;  Case 
11th 
prolongation  of  the  Credit  Union  restructuring  and  stabilisation  scheme,  Commission  Decision  of  8.5.2020.  See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_57053;  Case 
12th 
prolongation  of  Credit  Union  restructuring  and  stabilisation  scheme,  Commission  Decision  of  30.10.2020.  See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_58819;  Case 
16th 
prolongation  of  the  Credit  Union  Resolution  Scheme  2020-2021,  Commission  Decision  of  12.6.2020.  See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_57378;  Case  SA.57516 
Italian 
orderly liquidation scheme for small banks. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result&policy_area_id=3 
122 Case SA.57262 Prolongation of the Greek State Guarantee Scheme for banks 01.06.2020-30.11.2020 (Art. 2 of Law 
3723/2008), Commission Decision of 16.6.2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_57262; Case SA.57515 COVID-19 – 
Italian bank liquidity support scheme, Commission Decision of 10.11.2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_57515. 
123 Case SA.55465 Invest International, Commission Decision of 29.5.2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_55465.  
124 Case SA.54780 Scottish National Investment Bank, Commission Decision of 5.11.2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_54780. 
125 Case SA.55719 Banco Português de Fomento, Commission Decision of 4.8.2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_55719. 

SA.57378 

27 

 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
standard that Apple had been granted a selective economic advantage126. The General Court 
considered that the Commission did not prove that the contested tax rulings were the result of 
discretion exercised by the Irish tax authorities. Moreover, the General Court considered that 
the Commission did not succeed in demonstrating methodological errors in the contested tax 
rulings  which  would  have  led  to  a  reduction  in  Apple’s  chargeable  profits  in  Ireland.  The 
Commission has appealed the judgment to the Court of Justice127. 

7. Joining forces in fostering a European and global competition culture 

7.1.  Cooperation  with  national  competition  authorities  within  the  European  Competition 
Network 

In  2020,  the  Commission  and  the  national  competition  authorities  in  all EU  Member  States 
continued  to  cooperate  and  ensure  the  coherent  application  of  Articles  101  and  102  TFEU 
through the European Competition Network (ECN)128. The objective of the ECN is to build an 
effective legal  framework to  enforce EU competition law against companies who engage in 
cross-border business practices which restrict competition.  

In  2020,  139  new  investigations  were  launched  within  the  network  and  97  envisaged 
decisions  were  submitted.  These  figures  include  Commission  investigations  and  decisions, 
respectively.  On  top  of  these  cooperation  mechanisms  set  out  in  Regulation  1/2003,  other 
ECN  cooperation  work  streams  also  ensure  a  coherent  enforcement  of  the  EU  competition 
rules.  The  network  met  regularly  to  discuss  cases  at  early  stages,  policy  issues,  as  well  as 
matters of strategic importance.  In 2020, 24 meetings across horizontal working  groups and 
sector-specific  sub-groups  were  organised,  where  officials  from  EU  competition  authorities 
exchanged views. As described in Section 2.2. above, the ECN issued a joint statement on the 
application  of  the  antitrust  rules  during  the  COVID-19  crisis  and  cooperated  closely  on 
COVID-19 related competition issues. 

In  2020,  the  Commission  monitored  and  assisted  Member  States  in  their  efforts  in 
incorporating the ECN+ Directive into national law by 4 February 2021129. The Directive will 
ensure  that  when  applying  the  same  legal  provisions  –  the  EU  antitrust  rules  –  national 
competition  authorities  have  the  effective  enforcement  tools  and  the  resources  necessary  to 
detect  and sanction companies that infringe Articles 101  and 102 TFEU.  It will also  ensure 
that they can take their decisions in full independence, based on the facts and the law.  

126 Cases T‑ 778/16 and T‑ 892/16 State aid – Aid implemented by Ireland – Decision declaring the aid incompatible 
with  the  internal  market  and  unlawful  and  ordering  recovery  of  the  aid  –  Advance  tax  decisions  (tax  rulings)  – 
Selective tax advantages – Arm’s length principle), judgments of 15.7.2020. See:  
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=228621&doclang=en. 
127  Statement  by  Executive  Vice-President  Margrethe  Vestager  on  the  Commission’s  decision to  appeal  the  General 
Court’s judgment on the Apple tax State aid case in Ireland, Commission statement of 25.9.2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_20_1746.  
128 Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, p. 43-53 
and OJ C 374, 13.10.2016, p. 10. See:  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52004XC0427%2802%29.  
129  Directive  (EU)  2019/1  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  11  December  2018  to  empower  the 
competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the 
internal market, OJ L 11, 14.1.2019, p. 3-33.  

28 

 
                                                           
7.2. New policy initiative to strengthen the Commission toolbox in the global context 

Europe’s economy is open and closely interlinked with the rest of the world. For it to remain a 
strength,  the  EU  needs  the  right  tools  to  ensure  a  fair  business  environment  in  the  Single 
Market.  Subsidies  given  by  Member  States  have  always  been  subject  to  strict  EU  State  aid 
rules.  Subsidies  granted  by  non-EU  governments  to  companies  active  in  the  EU,  however, 
seem  to  have  an  increasingly  distortive  impact  on  the  internal  market,  but  fall  outside  EU 
State aid control.  

To  launch  a  debate  on  new  tools  to  address  this  regulatory  gap,  the  Commission  adopted  a 
White Paper on foreign subsidies130 in June 2020. An extensive consultation of stakeholders 
was carried out in 2020. The Commission will present a legislative proposal on levelling the 
playing field for foreign subsidies in 2021. 

White Paper on levelling the playing field as regards foreign subsidies 
The White Paper puts forward several complementary options to address the existing regulatory gap: 
Module 1 proposes the establishment of a general market scrutiny instrument to capture all possible 
market situations in which foreign subsidies may cause distortions in the Single Market. The proposed 
supervisory authority could act upon any indication or information that a company active in the EU 
benefits from a foreign subsidy and impose measures to remedy the likely distortive impact, such as 
redressive payments and structural or behavioural remedies. It could also consider that the subsidised 
activity  or  investment  has  a  positive  impact,  which  outweighs  the  distortion  and  not  pursue  the 
investigation further (the “EU Interest Test”). 
Module 2, aims at ensuring that foreign subsidies do not confer an unfair benefit on their recipients 
when acquiring (stakes in) EU companies. Companies benefitting from financial support of a non-EU 
government would need to notify their acquisitions of EU companies above a given threshold to the 
competent  supervisory  authority.  It  could  either  accept  commitments  by  the  notifying  party  that 
effectively remedy the distortion or prohibit the acquisition.  
Module 3 The White Paper proposes a mechanism where tenderers in public procurement procedures 
would  have  to  notify  financial  contributions  received  from  non-EU  countries.  The  competent 
authorities would then assess whether there is a foreign subsidy and whether it distorts the awarding of 
the  public  procurement.  In  such  a  case,  the  tenderer  could  be  excluded  from  the  procurement 
procedure. 

7.3. Multilateral and bilateral cooperation across the world  

The Commission continued to maintain active international cooperation131 in the competition 
field, both on the multilateral and bilateral levels, despite the constraints of the pandemic. 

The  EU  believes  firmly  in  the  strength  and  value  of  cooperating  and  also  reforming 
international organisations, like the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and other multilateral 
organisations  to  make them fit for today’s world.  Reforming the subsidy  rules is  one of the 
EU’s main priorities for the modernisation of WTO trade rules. To this effect, the EU, the US 
and Japan agreed in a common statement in January 2020 to strengthen the existing rules on 

130 White Paper on levelling the playing field as regards foreign subsidies, COM(2020) 253 final, 17.6.2020. 
131 
cwt2019/files/commissioner_mission_letters/mission-letter-margrethe-vestager_2019_en.pdf. 

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/sites/comm-

Mission 

letter 

See 

the 

29 

 
 
                                                           
industrial  subsidies132.  In  2020,  the  Commission  continued  its  active  engagement  in 
competition-related  international  fora  such  as  the  OECD  Competition  Committee,  the 
International  Competition  Network (ICN), the World  Bank, and United  Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 

In 2020, the Withdrawal Agreement between the European Union and the United Kingdom133 
was applicable, including the provisions for State aid and competition cases. The Commission 
issued  guidance  concerning  the  application  of  the  Withdrawal  Agreement  in  competition 
matters134.  In  December  2020,  the  negotiations  on  the  EU-UK  Trade  and  Cooperation 
Agreement  (TCA)135  were  finalised.  The  agreement  provisionally  applies  from  1  January 
2021. It includes comprehensive competition and subsidies chapters ensuring that competition 
between the EU and the UK is not distorted after the UK has left the EU.  

In  December  2020,  the  EU  and  China  concluded  in  principle  the  negotiations  for  a 
Comprehensive  Agreement  on  Investment  (CAI)136.  China  committed  to  a  greater  level  of 
market access for EU investors, including some new important market openings. China also 
made  commitments  to  ensure  fair  treatment  for  EU  companies,  so  they  can  compete  on  a 
better  level  playing  field  in  China,  including  in  terms  of  disciplines  for  state  owned 
enterprises, transparency of subsidies and rules against the forced transfer of technologies. 

When  negotiating  Free  Trade  Agreements  (FTAs),  the  Commission  endeavours  to  include 
comprehensive chapters on competition policy and State aid control. In 2020, the Commission 
continued  FTA  negotiations  with  Australia,  Azerbaijan,  Chile,  Indonesia,  New  Zealand  and 
Uzbekistan. 

In  2020,  the  Commission  continued  its  technical  cooperation  on  competition  policy  and 
enforcement with  the EU’s main trading partners. The Commission  also continued assisting 
EU  candidate  countries  and  potential  candidates  to  fulfil  the  necessary  requirements  in  the 
competition field for a future accession to the EU.  

7.4. Upholding a regular and constructive inter-institutional dialogue  

The  European  Parliament,  the  Council  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  the 
Committee  of  the  Regions,  with  their  specific  roles  vis-à-vis  European  citizens  and 
stakeholders,  are  key  partners  in  the  dialogue  on  competition  policy.  Despite  the  pandemic, 
through  modern  means  of 
this  dialogue  successfully  continued 
communication. 

throughout  2020 

132  Joint  Statement  of  the  Trilateral  Meeting  of  the  Trade  Ministers  of  Japan,  the  United  States  and  the  European 
Union, 14.1.2020. See: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/january/tradoc_158567.pdf  
133  Agreement  on  the  withdrawal  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Northern  Ireland  from  the  European 
Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, OJ L 29, 31.1.2020, p. 7.  
134 Notice to Stakeholders – Withdrawal of the United Kingdom and EU rules in the field of competition, Commission 
Notice of 2.12.2020. See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/brexit_files/info_site/eu-competition-law_en_0.pdf. 
135 Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of 
the One Part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the Other Part, OJ L 444, 31.12.2020, 
p. 14-1462. See: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2020.444.01.0014.01.ENG. 
136 EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment – Agreement in Principle, 30.12.2020 See:  
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/december/tradoc_159242.pdf. 

30 

 
                                                           
In  September  2020,  in  response  to  the  Parliament’s  resolution  of  18  June  2020  on  the 
Commission’s  Report  on  Competition  Policy  2018 
(rapporteur  Ms.  Yon-Courtin 
(Renew/FR)),  the  Commission  highlighted,  among  other  things,  the  adoption  of  the  White 
Paper  on  foreign  subsidies,  reflections  to  increase  the  use  of  the  merger  referral  system  to 
capture  transactions  currently  not  falling  within  the  EU’s  jurisdiction,  and  the  need  for  a 
comprehensive policy response for digital platforms through continued vigorous enforcement 
of  the  competition  rules,  including  the  possible  ex  ante  regulation  of  digital  platforms.  In 
2020, Executive Vice-President Vestager made several appearances in the other institutions, 
including the Parliament, the Council and the Economic and Social Committee. 

31