COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Report on Competition Policy 2020
Date: 2021-07-07
Institutions: Directorate-General for Competition, European Commission
Subjects: EU competition policy, State aid, anti-trust legislation, competitiveness, control of State aid, control of restrictive practices, coronavirus disease, epidemic, merger control, restriction on competition, single market

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 7.7.2021  SWD(2021) 177 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Report on Competition Policy 2020 {COM(2021) 373 final}  
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 3 

I.  LEGISLATION AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS ........................................................ 4 

1.  State aid control .................................................................................................................. 4 

1.1 
Temporary  State  aid  Framework  to  mitigate  the  effects  of  the  COVID-19 
pandemic   ............................................................................................................................... 4 

1.2 

1.3 

1.4 

1.5 

1.6 

Preparing for the exit from the crisis – Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) 8 

Outcome of the State Aid Fitness Check .............................................................. 9 

Aid for horizontal objectives............................................................................... 10 

Monitoring, recovery and cooperation with national courts ............................... 16 

Significant judgments by the European Union Courts in the State aid area ....... 18 

Audit by the European Court of Auditors (ECA) on the Commission’s control of 
1.7 
State aid to financial institutions .......................................................................................... 19 

2.  Antitrust and cartels .......................................................................................................... 20 

2.1 

2.2 

2.3 

2.4 

Review of antitrust rules and guidance ............................................................... 22 

Important judgments by the European Union Courts ......................................... 27 

The fight against cartels remains a top priority................................................... 30 

Cooperation within the European Competition Network and with national courts 
 ............................................................................................................................. 32 

2.5 

Audit by the European Court of Auditors on antitrust ........................................ 35 

3.  Merger control .................................................................................................................. 35 

3.1 

Recent enforcement trends .................................................................................. 36 

3.2 
control 

The  evaluation  of  selected  procedural  and  jurisdictional  aspects  of  EU  merger 
 ............................................................................................................................. 37 

3.3 

3.4 

3.5 

Market definition notice ...................................................................................... 38 

Significant judgments by EU courts in merger control ...................................... 38 

Audit by the European Court of Auditors on merger control ............................. 38 

4.  Developing the international dimension of EU competition policy ................................. 39 

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Control  of  foreign  subsidies  –  a  new  policy  initiative  to  strengthen  the 
4.1 
Commission toolbox ............................................................................................................. 39 

4.2 

Multilateral relations ........................................................................................... 40 

5.  External Communication .................................................................................................. 43 

6.  The Single Market Programme ......................................................................................... 44 

II. SECTORAL OVERVIEW .................................................................................................. 45 

1.  ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT ............................................................................................... 45 

2. 

INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AND MEDIA .............................. 52 

3.  FINANCIAL SERVICES ....................................................................................................... 59 

4.  TAXATION AND STATE AID ............................................................................................... 66 

5.  BASIC INDUSTRIES AND MANUFACTURING ....................................................................... 69 

6.  AGRI-FOOD INDUSTRY ...................................................................................................... 73 

7.  PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH SERVICES SECTORS ..................................................... 78 

8.  TRANSPORT, TOURISM, AND POSTAL SERVICES ............................................................... 81 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 

The Report on Competition  Policy 2020 and this Staff Working Document  provide  the first 
account of the competition policy developments under the Commission led by President von 
der Leyen1. Covering the developments in EU competition policy in 2020, it also is the 50th 
year the Commission submits such a report.  

When  the  EU  now  faces  one  of  its  biggest  crises,  a  robust  competition  policy  in  the  EU  is 
more  important  than  ever.  EU  competition  policy  and  enforcement  preserves  the  EU  single 
market, benefits consumers, businesses and society alike. It also projects competition values 
in the efforts to launch a pathway to recovery from the current health and economic crisis to 
achieve  a  greener,  more  digital  and  more  resilient  EU  economy,  in  line  with  the 
Commission’s broader agenda. 

Throughout 2020, EU competition policy contributed to the Commission’s efforts to respond 
to and overcome the health and economic crisis due to COVID-19. The Commission adjusted 
the State aid framework and swiftly adopted a number of State aid decisions in various sectors 
to help Member States alleviate the economic effects of the pandemic, while limiting negative 
effects on the internal market.  In antitrust, the Commission provided to companies guidance 
and an ad hoc comfort letter, setting out the main criteria when assessing cooperation projects 
in essential products and services during the pandemic. In addition, the Commission closely 
cooperated  and  coordinated  COVID-19  related  competition  issues  in  the  European 
Competition  Network  (ECN).  Finally,  in  the  area  of  merger  control,  the  Commission  took 
measures to ensure business continuity for companies notifying transactions, while ensuring 
compliance with legal obligations, and continued to safeguard the implementation of the EU 
merger rules. 

In  addition,  the  Commission  took  major  steps  in  2020  to  launch  important  new  policy 
initiatives to  ensure that the competition  rules remain fit for purpose fully  able to  deal  with 
challenges, such as structural problems in digital markets and foreign subsidies, which could 
distort competition in EU markets. The Commission also engaged with stakeholders to reflect 
how competition rules could better support the green transition and started a process to assess 
whether there is a need for measures to ensure EU competition law does not stand in the way 
of  collective  bargaining  for  self-employed  in  need  of  protection.  The  Commission  further 
continued to advance on its significant policy review agenda encompassing a large number of 
its key block exemption regulations, guidelines and notices.  

EU competition policy enforcement in 2020 targeted a wide range of economic sectors in the 
EU. It was above all the demonstrated flexibility of the State aid instrument that came to the 
forefront to support the efforts of the EU and the Member States to alleviate the consequences 
of the pandemic.  

The  present  Staff  Working  Document  is  composed  of  two  parts.  The  first  part  presents  the 
main  legislative  and  policy  developments  in  2020  across  the  three  competition  instruments: 
State  aid,  antitrust  (including  cartels)  and  mergers.  In  the  second  part,  specific  enforcement 
actions are detailed in a sectoral overview. 

1  Political  Guidelines  for  the  next  European  Commission  –  A Union  that  strives  for  more  – My  agenda  for  Europe, 
2019-2024  by  candidate 
the  European  Commission  Ursula  von  der  Leyen.  See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/political-guidelines-next-commission_en_0.pdf. 

for  President  of 

3 

 
                                                 
I. 

LEGISLATION AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 

1. 

STATE AID CONTROL 

State aid control is an integral part of EU competition  policy and a necessary safeguard to preserve effective 
competition and free trade in the single market. 
The Treaty establishes the principle that State aid which distorts or threatens to distort competition is prohibited 
in so far as it affects trade between Member States (Article 107(1) TFEU). However, State aid, which contributes 
to well-defined objectives of common interest without unduly distorting competition between undertakings and 
trade  between  Member  States,  may  be  considered  compatible  with  the  internal  market  (under  Article  107(3) 
TFEU).  
The objectives of the Commission’s control of State aid are to ensure that aid is growth-enhancing, efficient and 
effective,  and  better  targeted  in  times  of  budgetary  constraints,  that  aid  does  not  restrict  competition  but 
addresses market failures for the benefit of society as a whole. In addition to this, the Commission acts to prevent 
and recover State aid which is incompatible with the internal market. 

The  Commission  enforces  State  aid  rules  to  make  sure  that  the  support  Member  State 
governments grant to companies does not give them an unfair advantage in the Single Market. 
In  2020,  State  aid  policy  played  an  important  role  in  the  crisis  response  to  stabilise  the 
economy.  The  Temporary  Framework  adopted  at  the  beginning  of  the  crisis,  and  amended 
several times, set out the conditions the Commission would apply to declare aid compatible. 
Well-targeted public support helped counter the damage inflicted on healthy undertakings and 
to preserve the continuity of economic activity. To prepare the exit from the crisis towards a 
sustainable  and  resilient  recovery  of  the  EU  economy  with  focus  on  green  and  digital 
transition, DG Competition together with other Commission services assisted Member States 
preparing their Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRPs). 

However, year 2020 was not limited to crisis response and recovery. The extensive review of 
the  State  aid  rules  and  enforcement  work  continued  across  sectors.  A  new  policy  initiative 
was started to consider the impact of subsidies granted by non-EU governments to companies 
in  the  EU,  as  these  fall  outside  EU  State  aid  control.  To  launch  a  debate  on  new  tools  to 
address this regulatory gap, the Commission adopted a White Paper on foreign subsidies2 in 
June 2020. An extensive consultation of stakeholders was carried out in 2020.  

1.1 Temporary State aid Framework to mitigate the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic 

The  COVID-19  outbreak  has  had  significant  negative  repercussions  on  the  economy  of 
Member States. The various containment measures adopted by Member States, such as social 
distancing  measures, 
lockdowns  have  affected 
undertakings  and  their  employees  in  all  sectors.  Well-targeted  public  support  has  been 
necessary  to  ensure  that  sufficient  liquidity  remains  available  in  the  markets,  to  counter  the 
damage inflicted on healthy undertakings and to preserve the continuity of economic activity 
during and after the COVID-19 outbreak. 

travel  restrictions,  quarantines  and 

On 13 March 2020, the Commission set out in its Communication on a coordinated economic 

2 White Paper on levelling the playing field as regards foreign subsidies, COM(2020) 253 final, 17.6.2020. 

4 

 
 
 
                                                 
response to the COVID-19 outbreak3 the various options available to Member States outside 
the scope of EU State aid control and which they may put in place without the involvement of 
the  Commission.  These  include  measures  applicable  to  all  undertakings  regarding  wage 
subsidies,  suspension  of  payments  of  corporate  and  value  added  taxes  or  social  welfare 
contributions, or financial support directly to consumers for cancelled services or tickets not 
reimbursed by the concerned operators.  

The  in-built  flexibility  of  the  EU  State  aid  rules  enable  Member  States  to  take  swift  and 
effective  action  to  support  citizens  and  undertakings,  in  particular  SMEs,  facing  economic 
difficulties  due  to  the  COVID-19  outbreak.  At  the  same  time,  they  ensure  that  State  aid  is 
effective in reaching those companies in need and that harmful subsidy races are avoided. 

Member  States  may  design  support  measures  in  line  with  de  minimis  Regulations4  or  the 
Block  Exemption  Regulations5  without the  involvement  of  the  Commission.  In  addition,  on 
the basis of Article 107(3)(c) TFEU and as further specified in the Rescue and Restructuring 
State aid Guidelines6, Member States can notify to the Commission aid schemes to meet acute 
liquidity  needs  and  support  undertakings  facing  financial  difficulties,  also  due  to  or 
aggravated by the COVID-19 outbreak. 

Furthermore,  on  the  basis  of  Article  107(2)(b)  TFEU  Member  States  can  also  compensate 
undertakings that have been particularly hit by the outbreak (e.g. in the sectors of transport, 
tourism,  culture,  hospitality  and  retail)  and/or  organisers  of  cancelled  events  for  damages 
suffered due to and directly caused by the outbreak. Member States can notify such damage 
compensation measures and the Commission will assess them directly under Article 107(2)(b) 
TFEU7. 

1.1.1.  The Temporary Framework: adoption, expansion and prolongation 

3 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European 
Central Bank, the European Investment Bank and the Eurogroup: Coordinated economic response to the COVID-19 
Outbreak, COM(2020) 112 final. 
4 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the 
Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  to  de  minimis  aid,  OJ  L  352,  24.12.2013,  p.  1;  Commission 
Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning  of  the  European  Union  to  de  minimis  aid  in  the  agriculture  sector,  OJ  L  352,  24.12.2013,  p.  9; 
Commission Regulation (EU) No 717/2014 of 27 June 2014 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty 
on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  to  de  minimis  aid  in  the  fishery  and  aquaculture  sector,  OJ  L  190, 
28.6.2014, p. 45 and Commission Regulation (EU) No 360/2012 of 25 April 2012 on the application of Articles 107 
and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid granted to undertakings providing 
services of general economic interest, OJ L 114, 26.4.2012, p. 8. 
5 Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories  of aid compatible with the 
internal  market  in  application  of  Articles  107  and  108  of  the  Treaty,  OJ  L  187  of  26.6.2014,  p.  1;  Commission 
Regulation  (EC)  No  702/2014  of  25  June  2014  declaring  certain  categories  of  aid  in  the  agricultural  and  forestry 
sectors and in rural areas compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union, OJ L 193, 1.7.2014, p. 1 and Commission Regulation (EU) No 1388/2014 of 
16  December  2014  declaring  certain  categories  of  aid  to  undertakings  active  in  the  production,  processing  and 
marketing of fishery and aquaculture products compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 
108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ L 369, 24.12.2014, p. 37. 
6  Communication  from  the  Commission:  Guidelines  on  State  aid  for  rescuing  and  restructuring  non-financial 
undertakings in difficulty, OJ C 249, 31.7.2014, p. 1. 
7  Nevertheless,  aid  on  the  basis  of  Article  107(2)(b)  TFEU  must  compensate  for  damage  directly  caused  by  the 
COVID-19  outbreak,  such  as  damage  directly  caused  by  quarantine  measures  precluding  the  beneficiary  from 
operating its economic activity. Other kind of aid addressing more generally the economic downturn from the COVID-
19  outbreak  is  to  be  assessed  under  the  different  compatibility  basis  of  Article  107(3)(b)  TFEU,  and  therefore  in 
principle on the basis of this Temporary Framework. 

5 

 
                                                 
To  complement  the  above-mentioned  possibilities,  on  19  March  2020,  the  Commission 
adopted a Temporary Framework to enable Member States to use the full flexibility foreseen 
under  State  aid  rules  to  support  the  economy8.  The  Temporary  Framework  was  initially 
established  with  an  expiry  date  of  31  December  2020.  It  provides  for  a  number  of  aid 
measures that the Commission considers compatible under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, such as 
limited amount of aid, selective tax advantages and State guarantees for loans. The aim of the 
Temporary  Framework is  to  allow Member States to  tackle the difficulties undertakings are 
currently encountering whilst maintaining the integrity of the EU internal market and ensuring 
a level playing field.  

The  Commission  set  out  in  the  Temporary  Framework  the  compatibility  conditions  it  will 
apply  in  principle  to  the  aid  granted  by  Member  States  under  Article  107(3)(b)  TFEU. 
Pursuant to that article the Commission may declare compatible with the internal market aid 
‘to  remedy  a  serious  disturbance  in  the  economy  of  a  Member  State’.  Member  States  must 
therefore  show  that  the  measures  notified  to  the  Commission  under  the  Temporary 
Framework  are  necessary,  appropriate  and  proportionate  to  remedy  a  serious  disturbance  in 
the economy of the Member State concerned and that all the conditions of that framework are 
fully respected.  

The  Temporary  Framework  includes  certain  requirements  related  to  the  green  and  digital 
transformation.  Indeed,  large  undertakings  that  received  recapitalisation  aid  must  report  on 
how  the  aid  received  supports  their  activities  in  line  with  EU  objectives  and  national 
obligations  linked  to  the  green  and  digital  transformation,  including  the  EU  objective  of 
climate neutrality by 2050. 

The Commission has amended the Temporary Framework several times to adapt the State aid 
framework to the various needs of the EU economy that arise in the context of the COVID-19 
outbreak. In particular: 

  On 3 April 2020, the Commission amended the Temporary Framework to enable Member 
States  to  accelerate  research,  testing  and  production  of  COVID-19  relevant  products9.  to 
protect jobs and to further support the economy, among other things, through tax payments 
deferrals and wage subsidies for employees10. 

  On  8  May  2020,  the  Commission  adopted  a  second  amendment  of  the  Temporary 
Framework  introducing  further  exemptions  for  recapitalisation  and  subordinated  debt 
measures  to  further  support  the  economy  in  the  context  of  the  COVID-19  outbreak 
applicable until the end of June 202111. 

8 Communication from the Commission: Temporary framework for State aid measures to support the economy in the 
current COVID-19 outbreak, OJ C 91I, 20.3.2020, p. 1, as amended by Commission Communications C(2020) 2215, 
OJ C 112I, 4.4.2020, p. 1; C(2020) 3156, OJ C 164, 13.5.2020, p. 3; C(2020) 4509, OJ C 218, 2.7.2020, p. 3; C(2020) 
7127, OJ C 340I, 13.10.2020, p. 1 and C(2021) 564, OJ C 34, 1.2.2021, p. 6. 
9  The  Temporary  Framework  lays  down  the  conditions  under  which  the  Commission  will  consider  such  measures 
compatible  with  the  internal  market  under  Article  107(3)(c)  TFEU.  The  Commission  took  due  consideration  of  the 
positive effects of such measures on tackling the health emergency crisis provoked by the COVID-19 outbreak when 
balancing them against the potential negative effects of such measures on the internal market. 
10 Communication from the Commission: Amendment to the Temporary Framework for State aid measures to support 
the economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak C(2020) 2215, OJ C 112I, 4.4.2020, p. 1. 
11 Communication from the Commission: Amendment to the Temporary Framework for State aid measures to support 
the economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak C(2020) 3156, OJ C 164, 13.5.2020, p. 3. 

6 

 
                                                 
  On  29  June  2020,  the  Commission  adopted  a  third  amendment  of  the  Temporary 
Framework enabling Member States to further support micro, small and start-up companies 
and incentivise private investments12. 

  On 13 October 2020, the Commission prolonged the Temporary Framework for six months 
until  30 June  2021  (until  30  September  2021  for  recapitalisations)  and  introduced  a  new 
measure enabling Member States to support companies facing a decline in turnover of at 
least 30% compared to 2019 due to the outbreak13. The new measure contributes to part of 
the  beneficiaries’  fixed  costs  that  are  not  covered  by  their  revenues,  up  to  a  maximum 
amount of EUR 3 million per undertaking. 

  On  28  January  2021,  the  Commission  prolonged  all  measures  set  out  in  the  Temporary 
Framework,  including  recapitalisation  measures,  until  31  December  2021,  and  expanded 
the  scope  of  the  Temporary  Framework  by  increasing  the  ceilings  set  out  in  it  and  by 
allowing the conversion of certain repayable instruments into direct grants until the end of 
202114. 

The Commission has put in place all necessary procedural facilities to enable a swift approval 
process. Where necessary, decisions are taken within days of receiving a complete State aid 
notification  from  Member  States,  and  the  Commission  assists  Member  States  with  any 
queries. 

1.1.2.  Measures authorised in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak 

In 2020, the Commission took 408 decisions approving 497 national measures notified by 27 
Member  States  and  the  United  Kingdom.  On  this  basis,  the  amount  of  around  EUR  3.08 
trillion of total State aid approved so far can be estimated. There are a number of important 
caveats: for some measures under the Temporary Framework, it is not necessary to indicate 
an amount. Therefore, the amounts included are best estimates based on amounts approved in 
State aid decisions and other available statistics, e.g. mentioned in public communication by 
national authorities, and in official information communicated by the national authorities. 

All State aid approved was necessary and proportionate to support businesses and remedy the 
serious disturbance to the European economy due to the Coronavirus outbreak. At the same 
time,  there  were  major  differences  in  the  amounts  approved  across  Member  States,  which 
appears linked to the fiscal space they have as well as the respective size of their economies.  

More  specifically,  around  51.5%  of  State  aid  approved  was  notified  by  Germany.  Italy 
notified  measures  that  represent  around  14.7%  of  the  entire  amount  of  State  aid  approved, 
while the aid notified by France represented 13.9% of this amount. The aid notified by Spain 
represented 4.8% of the entire amount of State aid approved, while the aid notified by Poland 
and  Belgium  corresponded  to  around  2%  and  1.8%  respectively.  Aid  notified  by  other 

12  Communication  from  the  Commission:  Third  amendment  to  the  Temporary  Framework  for  State  aid  measures  to 
support the economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak C(2020) 4509, OJ C 218, 2.7.2020, p. 3. 
13  Communication  from  the  Commission:  4th  Amendment  to  the  Temporary  Framework  for  State  aid  measures  to 
support the economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak and amendment to the Annex to the Communication from the 
Commission to the Member States on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union to short-term export-credit insurance C(2020) 7127, OJ C 340 I, 13.10.2020, p. 1. 
14  Communication  from  the  Commission:  Fifth  Amendment  to  the  Temporary  Framework  for  State  aid  measures  to 
support the economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak and amendment to the Annex to the Communication from the 
Commission to the Member States on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union to short-term export-credit insurance C(2021) 564, OJ C 34, 1.2.2021, p. 6-15. 

7 

 
                                                 
Member States is estimated to be between 0.01% and 1.5% of the total estimated amount of 
EUR 3.08 trillion. 

Based on the replies of all 27 Member States to two consecutive surveys carried out  by the 
European Commission,  in  the period between mid-March  and end of December 2020, EUR 
2.96 trillion in aid approved by then, around 544 billion euros was actually spent. In absolute 
terms, according to the preliminary data sent by Member States, France has granted more than 
a fourth of the total aid  paid out (EUR 155.36 billion), followed by Italy with 19.8% of the 
total  aid paid  out  (EUR 107.9 billion), Germany  with  19.1% of the total aid  paid  out  (EUR 
104.25  billion)  and  Spain  at  16.7%  (EUR  90.8  billion).  In  relative  terms,  according  to  the 
preliminary data sent by Member States, Spain is the country that has disbursed the  most as 
compared to its own GDP (7.3%), followed by France (6.4%), Italy (6.0%), Greece (4.39%), 
Malta (3.9%), Hungary (3.7%), Portugal (3.6%), Poland (3.6%) and Cyprus (3.5%). At EU 27 
level, the Coronavirus related State aid spending corresponds to around 3.9% of EU GDP. A 
number  of  these  aid  measures  have  been  co-financed  by  cohesion  policy,  notably  thanks  to 
the  two  emergency  response  packages  proposed  by  the  Commission,  and  approved  by  the 
European  Parliament  and  the  European  Council  in  2020:  the  Coronavirus  Response 
Investment  Initiative  (CRII)  and  the  Coronavirus  Response  Investment  Initiative  Plus 
(CRII+). 

Beyond aid notified under the Temporary Framework, State aid considered less distortive, for 
example aid based on the de minimis regulations15 or certain block exemption regulations16, 
can be adopted without prior approval of the Commission. In 2020, these included measures 
such as wage subsidies, payment suspensions of corporate taxes and VAT and social welfare 
contributions. Moreover, the Commission approved under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU measures 
adopted by Member States for undertakings particularly hit by the outbreak (for example in 
transport, tourism, culture, hospitality and retail sectors) to compensate for damages incurred 
because of the crisis (See further the Annex 2)17.  

1.2 Preparing for the exit from the crisis – Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)  

The Commission supports the implementation  of the first  pillar of the Next  Generation EU, 
the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)18 to facilitate a sustainable and resilient recovery 
of  the  EU  economy  with  focus  on  green  and  digital  transition.  With  funds  of  EUR  672.5 

15 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the 
Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  to  de  minimis  aid,  OJ  L  352,  24.12.2013,  p.  1;  Commission 
Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid in the agriculture sector, OJ L 352, 24.12.2013 p. 9; Commission 
Regulation  (EU)  No  717/2014  of  27  June  2014  on  the  application  of  Articles  107  and  108  of  the  Treaty  on  the 
Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid in the fishery and aquaculture sector, OJ L 190, 28.6.2014, p. 45 
and  Commission  Regulation  (EU)  No  360/2012 of 25  April  2012 on  the  application of  Articles  107  and  108  of  the 
Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  to  de  minimis  aid  granted  to  undertakings  providing  services  of 
general economic interest, OJ L 114, 26.4.2012, p. 8.  
16 Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the 
internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty (Text with EEA relevance). OJ L 187, 26.6.2014, 
p. 1. Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/1084 of 14 June 2017 amending Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 as regards aid 
for port and airport infrastructure, notification thresholds for aid for culture and heritage conservation and for aid for 
sport  and  multifunctional  recreational  infrastructures,  and  regional  operating  aid  schemes  for  outermost  regions  and 
amending Regulation (EU) No 702/2014 as regards the calculation of eligible costs, OJ L 156, 20.6.2017, p. 1.  
17 Annex 2 provides a complete overview of State aid adopted under the Treaty. 
18 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Recovery and 
Resilience  Facility,  COM(2020)  408  final,  28.5.2020.  In  December  2020  a  political  agreement  was  reached  in  the 
Council and the European Parliament approved the RRF Regulation in February 2021. 

8 

 
                                                 
the  RRF  accounts  for 

the  EUR  750  billion 
billion, 
NextGenerationEU recovery package19. The RRF will support public investments and reforms 
in the Member States, helping them to address the economic and social impact of the COVID-
19 pandemic as well as to facilitate the green and digital transitions. 

largest  part  by  far  of 

the 

To  receive  grants  and  low-interest  loans  under  the  RRF,  Member  States  must  submit 
Recovery  and  Resilience  Plans  (RRPs)  to  be  assessed  by  the  Commission  before 
disbursement  of  any  funds.  In  2020,  the  Commission  assisted  Member  States  in  the 
preparation  of  their  RRPs  in  compliance  with  competition  rules  and  in  particular  with  the 
State aid rules. To this end, the Commission published a set of guiding templates in December 
2020 and updated them in January 2021.  

1.3 Outcome of the State Aid Fitness Check 

In 2020, the Commission concluded the “fitness check” of the State aid rules20 adopted as part 
of the State Aid Modernisation (‘SAM’), together with the Railway Guidelines and the Short-
term  export  credit  Communication  (‘STEC’),  which  were  not  part  of  the  State  Aid 
Modernisation.  The  Commission  looked  into  whether  the  rules  are  fit  for  purpose,  also  in 
view of the European Green Deal, Industrial Strategy and Digital Strategy. The Fitness check, 
the  results  of  which  were  published  on  30  October  202021,  suggests  that,  overall,  the  SAM 
architecture and State aid rules which were reformed under the SAM initiative, are broadly fit 
for purpose. There is no need to reform the State aid framework of SAM as such.  

However,  the  individual  sets  of  rules  need  revision  and/or  update,  including  clarifications, 
further  streamlining  and  simplification,  as  well  as  adjustments  to  reflect  recent  legislative 
developments,  current  priorities,  as  well  as  market  and  technology  developments.  The  rules 
also  need  to  be  aligned  with  future  challenges  and  the  Commission  priorities.  This  is 
particularly important as State aid can, and should, contribute to the Green Deal as well as the 
Digital and Industrial Strategies.  

19 Other instruments to be used are for example the Just Transition Fund, the Digital Europe Programme, rescEU and 
the new health programme EU4Health. 
20 The Fitness check covered the following rules, which were adopted as part of the State Aid Modernisation: General 
Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) (Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain 
categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty, OJ L 187, 
26.6.2014, p. 1-78); De minimis Regulation (Commission Regulation (EU) No 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the 
application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid, OJ L 
352, 24.12.2013, p. 1-8); Guidelines on regional State aid (Guidelines on regional State aid for 2014-2020, OJ C 209, 
23.7.2013,  p.  1-45);  Framework  for  State  aid  for  research  and  development  and  innovation  (RDI)  (Communication 
from the Commission: Framework for State aid for research and development and innovation, OJ C 198, 27.6.2014, p. 
1-29);  Communication  on  important  projects  of  common  European  interest  (IPCEI)  (Communication  from  the 
Commission:  Criteria  for  the  analysis  of  the  compatibility  with  the  internal  market  of  State  aid  to  promote  the 
execution of important projects of common European interest, OJ C 188, 20.6.2014, p. 4-12); Guidelines on State aid 
to promote risk finance investments (Communication from the Commission: Guidelines on State aid to promote risk 
finance  investments,  OJ  C  19,  22.1.2014,  p.  4-34);  Guidelines  on  State  aid  to  airports  and  airlines  (Communication 
from the Commission: Guidelines on State aid to airports and airlines, OJ C 99, 4.4.2014, p. 3-34); Guidelines on State 
aid  for  environmental  protection  and  energy  (Communication  from  the  Commission:  Guidelines  on  State  aid  for 
environmental protection and energy 2014-2020, OJ C 200, 28.6.2014, p. 1-55); Guidelines on State aid for rescuing 
and restructuring non-financial undertakings in difficulty (Communication from the Commission: Guidelines on State 
aid for rescuing and restructuring non-financial undertakings in difficulty, OJ C 249, 31.7.2014, p. 1-28). In addition, it 
also covered the Railways Guidelines from 2008 and the Short term export credit Communication from 2012. Those 
rules  were  not  revised  as  part  of  the  State  Aid  Modernisation,  but  an  evaluation  was  relevant  in  the  light  of 
developments in EU law and the Commission’s case practice.  
21https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/2044-Fitness-check-of-2012-State-aid-
modernisation-package-railways-guidelines-and-short-term-export-credit-insurance.  

9 

 
                                                 
The short-term export-credit insurance Communication (STEC) was adopted in 2013 with the 
purpose of ensuring that State aid does not distort competition in the internal market among 
private and public or publicly-supported export-credit insurers as well as among exporters in 
different  Member States.  In the fitness  check, STEC rules were found  as  fit for purpose.  In 
2020, STEC was prolonged until the end of 2021 and revised to provide for more flexibility in 
response  to  the  COVID-19  outbreak.  Under  the  revised  rules,  all  commercial  and  political 
risks  associated  with  exports  to  the  countries  listed  in  the  Annex  to  the  Communication 
(including  all  Member  States)  are  considered  as  temporarily  non-marketable  until  31 
December 2021, in line with the duration of the Temporary Framework. 

1.4 Aid for horizontal objectives  

Aid for horizontal objectives in the common interest generally accounts for the overwhelming 
majority of all aid. As illustrated by the graphs below, much of horizontal aid falls under the 
General  Block  Exemption  Regulation  (GBER)22.  Already  now,  the  GBER  allows  Member 
States  to  implement  a  wide  range  of  public  support  measures  in  areas  such  as  research  and 
development, environmental protection or support to SMEs.  

22 Aid for horizontal objectives in the common interest have accounted for the overwhelming majority of all aid, while 
much of the horizontal aid fell under the GBER. Leaving aside the largest five State aid schemes, the share of (G)BER 
in State aid spending (71.8% and EUR 51.8 billion) is greater than the level of spending for notified cases (28.8% and 
EUR  20.3  billion)  in  2019.  Moreover,  by  now  Member  States  are  implementing  large  GBER  schemes  for  a  wide 
variety of objectives. 

10 

 
 
 
                                                 
GBER  State  aid  expenditure  by  objective  in  the  EU,  excluding  aid  for  agriculture,  fisheries 
and railways 

To  ensure  that  national  and  EU  funds  can  be  combined  seamlessly  under  the  proposed 
Multiannual  Financial  Framework  for  2021-2027  without  undermining  competition  in  the 
internal market, the objective is to improve the interplay between EU funding rules and State 
aid rules and streamline State aid control of national funds, including EU shared management 
funds, combined with funds from EU programmes managed centrally by the Commission. In 
2020,  the  Commission  continued  to  assess  evaluations  of  the  impact  of  large  national  aid 
schemes involving horizontal objectives. 

1.4.1.  Evaluation of aid schemes 

The State Aid Modernisation (SAM) introduced the requirement to evaluate aid schemes. The 
aim is to gather the necessary evidence to better identify the impact, positive and negative, of 
the  aid  and  to  provide  input  for  future  policy-making  by  the  Member  States  and  the 
Commission. Since 1 July 2014, evaluation is required for large GBER schemes in certain aid 
categories23 as well as for a selection of notified schemes under the new generation of State 
aid guidelines24.  

By the end of 2020, the Commission had approved Member States’ evaluation plans covering 
54  State  aid  schemes.  Thirteen  additional  schemes  are  currently  under  analysis,  covering  a 
total  of  14  Member  States25  and  the  United  Kingdom.  Most  of  these  decisions  concerned 
either  large  regional  aid  projects  or  Research,  Development  and  Innovation  (RDI)  aid 
schemes  under  GBER  or  notified  energy  and  broadband  schemes.  In  total,  these  schemes 

23 Schemes with an average annual State aid budget above EUR 150 million in the fields of regional aid, aid for SMEs 
and  access  to  finance,  aid  for  research  and  development  and  innovation,  energy  and  environmental  aid  and  aid  for 
broadband infrastructures. 
24 Evaluation can apply to notified aid schemes with large budgets, containing novel characteristics or when significant 
market, technology or regulatory changes are foreseen. 
25  Austria,  Czechia,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Italy,  Lithuania,  Poland,  Portugal,  Spain, 
and Sweden. 

11 

 
 
                                                 
account for over EUR 57 billion in annual State aid budget. By the end of 2019, the Member 
States had delivered to the Commission 21 interim and 24 final evaluation reports. They were 
assessed by the Commission services and considered to be of average to good quality26.  

In 2020, the Commission also completed a fact-finding study to assess the implementation of 
the evaluation requirement as foreseen by the GBER and relevant guidelines. The results of 
the study indicate that State aid evaluation works already quite well and does not need drastic 
changes  in  the  future.  The  study  offers  suggestions  for  the  development  of  strategies  to 
support  the  development  of  evaluation  capacity  among  Member  States,  for  broadening  the 
possible  methodological  approaches  maintaining  high  quality  standards,  and  for  fostering  a 
wider use of the evaluation results. 

The Commission continued to accompany the implementation of the evaluation requirement 
by  publishing  policy  briefs27  and  by  organising  dedicated  workshops  with  Member  States' 
representatives  and  evaluation  experts.  The  current  priority  of  the  Commission  is  to 
comprehensively  assess  evaluation  reports,  both  intermediate  and  final  ones,  in  order  to:  (i) 
give  appropriate  feedback  to  Member  States,  (ii)  make  sure  that  results  are  used  for  better 
policy-making, and (iii) provide evidence to assist Member States when reflecting on future 
legal developments. 

1.4.2.  Aid for research, development and innovation (RDI) 

RDI  spending  in  the  EU  has  traditionally  been  lagging  behind  major  global  competitors, 
mainly due to lower levels of private investment. To achieve the greatest possible impact with 
the  available  budgets,  RDI  aid  measures  should  not  replace  or  crowd  out  private  financing. 
On the contrary, efforts should be directed at encouraging more private investments. RDI aid 
can  help  where  market  forces  alone  do  not  deliver  necessary  investments  in  promising  but 
high-risk innovative projects. Therefore, the State aid rules for RDI help ensuring that public 
funding  goes  to  projects  that  otherwise  would  not  be  realised  due  to  market  failures.  In 
particular,  this  includes  projects  that  go  far  beyond  the  state  of  the  art,  and  which  bring 
innovative  products  or  services  (including  digitalisation)  to  the  market  and  ultimately  to 
consumers. The RDI State aid rules provide for flexible and simple criteria for assessing the 
compatibility  of  State  aid  and  thereby  facilitate  the  implementation  of  support  for  RDI 
projects by Member States. 

In  2020,  the  Commission  continued  to  ensure  that  aid  schemes  and  individual  measures 
notified or pre-notified under the RDI State aid rules were well targeted to projects enabling 
ground-breaking  research  and  innovation  activities.  Its  State  aid  control  activities  covered  a 
variety of sectors including the aeronautic, as well as research and technology infrastructures, 
innovation  clusters,  high  power  computing,  with  a  focus  on  support  for  the  development  of 
new clean technologies supporting Europe’s green transition. 

In a significant number of cases the Commission cooperated with Member States with a view 
to  enabling them to  adjust envisaged RDI measures and bring them in  line with  the GBER. 

26  All  the  submitted  evaluation  reports  are  reviewed  by  the  JRC  within  the  framework  of  the  Administrative 
Arrangement  established  between  DG  Competition  and  the  JRC  on  the:  “Support  to  the  quality  assessment  of 
evaluation  reports  in  the  area  of  State  Aid,  2018-2020”.  From  2021  onwards,  the  JRC  will  continue  to  support  DG 
Competition under the new Administrative Arrangement for the “Support to the quality assessment of evaluation plans 
and reports in the area of State Aid, 2021-2023 (EVALSA II)”. 
27  Competition  Policy  Briefs  7/2014:  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpb/2014/007_en.pdf;  and  3/2016: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpb/2016/2016_003_en.pdf. 

12 

 
                                                 
This  way,  aid  measures  could  be  granted  swiftly  without  having  to  be  notified  to  the 
Commission, thereby speeding up public support for RDI. It is noteworthy that following the 
State Aid Modernisation in 2014, total RDI State aid expenditure under the GBER as well as 
the RDI Framework rose from  EUR 8.9 billion in  2014 to  EUR 11.27 billion in 2018, with 
EUR 9.94 billion disbursed in 2018 under the GBER alone. 

Following  the  second  public  consultation,  in  2020,  the  Commission  continued  work  on  its 
proposals  for  RDI-related  amendments  to  the  GBER  to  facilitate  and  simplify  the  way  in 
which  centrally  managed  funding  from  Horizon  Europe  can  be  combined  or,  in  cases  of 
projects  having  received  a  Seal  of  Excellence,  in  particular  by  SMEs,  be  substituted  by 
national funding. The proposed amendments aim to align certain aspects of State aid rules on 
the  one  hand  and  Horizon  Europe  rules  on  the  other.  This  will  allow  preventing  potential 
discrepancies  causing  delays  or  difficulties  in  the  roll-out  of  RDI  funding  under  the  next 
Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF).  

Finally, following the Fitness check of the State aid rules for RDI (the results of which were 
published  in  October  2020  in  a  Commission  Staff  Working  Document28  which  included  an 
independent evidence-based evaluation on the implementation of the 2014 State aid rules for 
RDI29,  as  well  as  of  their  effects  on  RDI  investments  and  competition),  in  2020,  the 
Commission continued work on revising the State aid for RDI. The objective is to ensure that 
the revised State aid rules in the area of RDI are fit for purpose taking into account the market 
evolution, in particular the technological development, as well as the specific objectives of the 
twin transition to a green and digital economy, and the EU research and innovation policy.  

1.4.3.  Aid  enabling  Member  States  jointly  to  support  important  projects  of 

common European interest  

The  Commission  assesses  proposed  State  aid  for  the  execution  of  important  projects  of 
common  European  interest  (IPCEI)  based  on  the  compatibility  criteria  set  in  a  dedicated 
Communication30  adopted  in  2014.  In  order  to  be  deemed  compatible  under  these  rules, 
eligible projects must address a market failure or other important systemic failures and 

significantly contribute to strategic EU objectives; 

(i) 
(ii)  involve several Member States;  
(iii)  involve private financing by the beneficiaries;  
(iv)  generate positive spill over effects across the EU that limit distortions to competition. 

Depending on the type of project supported, additional specific conditions apply:  

a)  RDI activities must be of a major innovative nature or constitute an important added value 

in terms of research and innovation and must go beyond the state-of-the-art; 

b)  First industrial deployment activities31 must allow for the development of a new product 
or  service  with  high  research  and  innovation  content  or  the  deployment  of  a 
fundamentally innovative production process, excluding incremental development; 

https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/2044-Fitness-check-of-2012-State-aid-

28 
modernisation-package-railways-guidelines-and-short-term-export-credit-insurance. 
29  Retrospective  evaluation  of  State  aid  rules  for  RDI  and  the  provisions  applicable  to  RDI  State  aid  of  the  GBER 
applicable in 2014-2020, https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/modernisation/fitness_check_en.html. 
30 Communication from the Commission: Criteria for the analysis of the compatibility with the internal market of State 
aid to promote the execution of important projects of common European interest, OJ C-188, 20.6.2014. 
31 First industrial deployment refers to the upscaling of pilot facilities, including the testing phase, but excludes mass 
production and commercial activities. 

13 

 
                                                 
c)  Projects  in  the  areas  of  energy,  transport  or  the  environment  must  either  be  of  great 
importance  for  the  environmental,  energy,  including  security  of  energy  supply,  or 
transport strategy of the Union or contribute significantly to the internal market. 

In  line  with  the  Commission’s  battery  alliance  initiative32,  throughout  2020  intensive 
discussions  took  place  between  several  Member  States  and  the  Commission  for  a  second 
IPCEI on the battery value chain, following the first IPCEI which was approved in December 
201933.  In  December  2020,  twelve  Member  States  jointly  notified  the  second  IPCEI  on 
batteries for e-mobility and energy storage. This is consistent with the Commission’s policies 
to shift from the use of environmentally harmful fossil fuels to  alternative fuel technologies 
and the twin transition of the EU economy under the Green Deal and the Digital Strategy. The 
Commission approved the second IPCEI on batteries on 26 January 202134. 

In  addition,  in  line  with  the  recommendations  of  the  strategic  forum  for  IPCEI,  discussions 
with  Member  States  and  industry  for  possible  new  IPCEIs  in  the  areas  of  hydrogen 
technologies  and  systems,  low  carbon  industry  and  microelectronics  intensified  in  2020. 
Concrete projects in these areas are expected to emerge in the course of 2021. 

In 2020, the Commission finalised the evaluation of the IPCEI Communication in the context 
of the fitness check of the State aid modernisation package. The results showed that the IPCEI 
rules  are  broadly  fit  for  purpose  but  that  some  targeted  modifications  may  be  warranted 
notably in light of the practical experience gained from IPCEI cases (on microelectronics and 
batteries)  and  to  ensure  that  the  IPCEI  rules  fully  support  the  Commission  priorities,  in 
particular the European Green Deal and the Digital Strategy. The Commission prolonged the 
rules until the end of 2021 and plans a revision of the IPCEI Communication in 2021.  

1.4.4.  Regional aid  

Regional  aid  is  an  important  instrument  in  the  EU  toolbox to  promote  economic  and  social 
cohesion. The regional aid framework 2014-2020 was due to expire at the end of 2020. The 
Commission extended, however, the regional aid provisions in the GBER for three years and 
the  Regional  Aid  Guidelines  (RAG)  by  one  year  until  the  end  of  202135.  Related  to  that 
extension, the Commission also adopted a one  year prolongation of its regional aid map for 
each Member State.  

In  2020,  the  Commission  finalised  the  evaluation36  of  the  regional  aid  framework  in  the 
context  of  the  State  aid  fitness  check.  The  results  showed  that  the  rules  worked  well  in 
principle but  required some adjustments, notably in  light  of the new Commission  priorities. 
Based  on  this,  the  Commission  published  in  July  2020  a  draft  text  of  the  new  RAG  for 
stakeholder comments. The new RAG are expected to be adopted in the first half of 2021 and 
will apply from 2022. 

In  2020,  the  Commission  also  adopted  several  regional  aid  decisions,  authorising  regional 

32 Strategic Action Plan on Batteries, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the  European  Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions:  Europe on  the  Move,  17.5.2018, 
COM(2018) 293 final Annex 2. 
33 Available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_6705. 
34 Available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_226. 
35 OJ C 224, 8.7.2020, p. 2, available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/what_is_new/prolongation_sa_guidelines_en.pdf. 
36  Available  at  https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/2044-Fitness-check-of-2012-
State-aid-modernisation-package-railways-guidelines-and-short-term-export-credit-insurance. 

14 

 
                                                 
investment  aid  for  the  large  investment  project  of  Toray37  for  a  new  battery  separator  film 
plant  in  Hungary  and  also  approving  the  amendment  of  an  evaluation  plan  of  a  large  block 
exempted  French  scheme38.  The  Commission  further  initiated  a  formal  investigation 
procedure  in  relation  to  the  large  investment  project  of  the  chemical  company  LG  Chem 
Group39,  expanding  its  battery  cell  production  of  electric  vehicles  in  Poland.  Finally,  the 
Commission decided that the Madeira Free Zone scheme40 had not been implemented in line 
with earlier Commission decisions and Portugal will have to recover aid from companies that 
did not create real economic activity and jobs in Madeira. 

In 2020, the Commission continued advising Member States’ authorities on how to interpret 
and implement the regional aid provisions of the GBER, thus helping them to make a success 
of  the  reforms  introduced  under  the  2014  State  aid  modernisation  to  the  benefit  of  both 
consumers and businesses.  

1.4.5.  Aid to risk finance  

The  Risk  Finance  Guidelines,  which  were  adopted  in  2014  as  part  of  the  State  Aid 
Modernisation  package,  set  out  the  conditions  under  which  aid  to  promote  risk  finance 
investments may be considered compatible with the internal market. They are due to expire in 
2021,  following  a  prolongation  adopted  by  the  Commission  on  2  July  202041.  Their  recent 
evaluation  in  the  framework  of  the  comprehensive  State  aid  fitness  check  in  2019-2020 
showed  that  the  rules  are  broadly  fit  for  purpose  but  that  they  could  be  updated  to  reflect 
regulatory, technological and market developments. On 17 December 2020, the Commission 
announced the revision of the Risk Finance Guidelines to render the rules more effective and 
efficient42.  

1.4.6.  Infrastructure support measures 

The Commission approved several support measures for infrastructure projects. On 20 March 
2020, the Commission concluded43 that the public financing model of the Fehmarn Belt coast-
to-coast infrastructure between Denmark and Germany is in line with EU State aid rules. The 
Commission  also  approved  two  measures  to  encourage  the  shift  from  road  to  rail:  on  17 
February 2020 the Commission approved44 an aid scheme, as well as individual aid measures, 
to encourage the shift of freight transport in the Land of Saxony-Anhalt in Germany and on 
31 March 2020, the Commission approved45 State aid to Treeden Group for the construction 
of a transhipment terminal in Poland. Finally, on 7 August 2020 the Commission approved46 a 

37 Case SA.54226 Regional investment aid to Toray Industries – Hungary. 
38 Case SA.55006 France – Amendment of the approved 2015 evaluation plan for the DOM investment scheme “aide 
fiscal à l’investissement outre-mer (investissements productifs)”. 
39 Case SA.53903 Regional investment aid to LG CHEM 2 – LIP. 
40 Case SA.21259 Madeira Free Trade Zone – Tax scheme – ex officio investigation. 
41 OJ C 224, 8.7.2020, p. 2 (available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/what_is_new/prolongation_sa_guidelines_en.pdf). 
42 The roadmap for the initiative ‘State aid – rules on risk finance for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)’ was 
published  on  17  December  2020 
at  https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-
say/initiatives/12783-State-aid-rules-on-risk-finance-for-SMEs).  
43 Case SA.39078 Financing of the Fehmarn Belt Fixed Link project. 
44 Cases SA.54102 and SA.56001 Scheme to support rail infrastructure related to freight transport in Saxony-Anhalt. 
45  Case  SA.52716  Construction  of  TREEDEN  GROUP  transhipment  terminal  at  the  PKP  LHS  Station  in  Wola 
Baranowska. 
46 Case SA.56832 Sixth amendment to the concession agreement relating to the Istrian Y Motorway (sub-phase 2B2-1: 
section “Vranja interchange to the Ucka tunnel/Kvarner portal”). 

(available 

15 

 
                                                 
Croatian plan to prolong the Istrian Y motorway concession agreement between Croatia and 
the company Bina-Istra. 

1.5 Monitoring, recovery and cooperation with national courts  

1.5.1.  Increased  monitoring  of  existing  State  aid  to  ensure  competition  on  fair 

and equal terms 

Over the years, the architecture of State aid control has evolved. Today, a substantial part of 
aid  is  granted  under  block-exempted  schemes  which  are  not  examined  by  the  Commission 
before entering into force. Pursuant to the most recent figures available47, approximately 95% 
of the new State aid measures adopted in 2018 are covered by GBER and, among all the State 
aid measures active in the same year, 86% are GBER measures. These figures show that it is 
essential  for  the  Commission  to  verify  that  Member  States  apply  State  aid  rules  for  the 
schemes  correctly  and  that  they  only  grant  aid  when  all  required  conditions  are  met. 
Therefore,  monitoring  is  the  counterweight  to  the  State  aid  architecture  based  on  ‘self-
assessment’ by Member States resulting from the exemption from the notification obligation 
(e.g. GBER) or the approval by the Commission of State aid schemes.  

The Commission introduced monitoring in 2006 as a regular, ex post, sample-based control of 
existing aid schemes, which comprises a monitoring sample of approximately 50 schemes per 
year.  The  goals  of  monitoring  are  (i)  to  identify  and  seek  correcting  of  irregularities  by 
Member  States  concerned,  (ii)  to  expand  the  awareness  of  State  aid  rules  among  national 
granting  authorities,  (iii)  to  contribute  to  improving  State  aid  rules,  (iv)  to  detect  errors  in 
reporting and (v) to act as a deterrence.  

In the context of the COVID-19 crisis, all Member States have focussed their administrative 
resources  on  fighting  the  pandemic.  For  this  reason,  unlike  in  previous  years  in  which  the 
monitoring cycle was run on a yearly basis, the 2020 monitoring cycle covers two years, 2020 
and  2021.  It  monitors  19  Member  States,  all  main  types  of  aid  both  approved  and  block 
exempted,  the  Member  States’  transparency  obligations48,  and  puts  an  emphasis  on  the 
criterion “undertakings in difficulty”.  

The Commission follows up on irregularities and uses the means at its disposal to address the 
competition  distortions  that  these  irregularities  have  caused.  In  some  cases,  Member  States 
offer to voluntarily redress the problems detected, for example to amend national legislation 
or  to  recover  excess  aid  granted.  In  other  cases,  the  Commission  may  need  to  take  formal 
action.  

1.5.2.  Restoring competition by recovering of State aid granted in breach of the 

rules 

To  ensure  the  integrity  of  the  internal  market,  Member  States  must  take  all  necessary 
measures to recover unlawful and incompatible aid. The purpose of recovery is to restore the 
situation that existed on the internal market prior to the granting of the aid; this is necessary to 
ensure that competition in the internal market can take place on fair and equal terms. In 2020, 
the  Commission  made  further  progress  to  ensure  that  recovery  decisions  are  enforced 
effectively and immediately. 

47 See the State Aid Scoreboard 2019,  
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/index_en.html. 
48 Transparency Award Module, see: https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/competition/transparency/public?lang=en.    

16 

 
                                                 
By  31  December  2020,  the  sum  of  unlawful  and  incompatible  aid  recovered  from 
beneficiaries  amounted  to  EUR  28.4  billion49.  At  the  same  point  in  time,  the  outstanding 
amount pending recovery was EUR 6.7 billion. 

In  2020,  the  Commission  adopted  six  new  recovery  decisions  and  an  amount  of  EUR  126 
million  was  recovered  by  the  Member  States.  As  of  the  end  of  December,  the  Commission 
had 52 pending recovery cases50. 

Recovery decisions adopted in 2020 

Amount recovered in 2020 (EUR million)  

Pending recovery cases on 31 December 2020  

6  

126  

52 

As guardian of the Treaties, the Commission may use all legal means at its disposal to ensure 
that  Member  States  implement  their  recovery  obligations,  including  launching  infringement 
procedures. In 2020, the Commission launched one action under Article 108(2) TFEU51 and 
an additional action under Article 260(2) TFEU52 (both instances concerning Greece). 

1.5.3.  Cooperation  with  national  courts  to  ensure  the  effectiveness  of  State  aid 

rules  

The Commission continued its cooperation with national courts and tribunals under Article 29 
of the Procedural Regulation53. This includes direct case-related assistance to national courts 
when  they  apply  EU  State  aid  law.  The  courts  and  tribunals  can  ask  the  Commission  to 
provide  case  related  information,  or  to  provide  an  opinion  on  the  application  of  State  aid 
rules. The Commission may also submit amicus curiae observations at its own initiative. 

While the Commission received no requests for information in 2020, it received two requests 
for opinion from Belgian courts. The first request by Ondernemingsrechtbank Gent concerned 
the interpretation of a 2001 Commission decision proposing appropriate measures on the sale 
of industrial lands at a preferential rate. The second by Hof Van Beroep te Gent concerned an 
alleged State aid in the context of the sale of agricultural land.  

In  2020  the  Commission  intervened  in  recognition  and  enforcement  proceedings  before  the 
U.S.  District  Court  of  the  District  of  Columbia  in  two  cases54.  To  make  its  views  publicly 
known,  the  Commission  publishes  its  opinions  and  amicus  curiae  observations,  as  well  as 
observations to others, e.g. arbitration courts, on its website55. 

Following  the  publication  of  the  study  on  the  state  of  play  of  the  enforcement  of  State  aid 

49 The reference period is 1 January 1999 to 31 December 2020. In addition, the amount of EUR 4.5 billion could not 
be recovered from concluded insolvency proceedings because of the lack of mass from the liquidation of assets which 
did not allow satisfying the State aid claims. 
50 This includes 11 pending recovery cases concerning the agricultural and fisheries sectors. 
51 Consolidated version of the TFEU, OJ C 115, 9.5.2008, p. 47. 
52 Respectively, Case C-11/20 Commission v. Greece, action brought on 10 January 2020; Case C-51/20 Commission 
v. Greece, action brought on 29 January 2020. 
53 Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 
TFEU, OJ L 248 of 24.9.2015, p. 9. 
54  The  Commission  submitted  written  submissions  on  the  enforcement  of  investment  arbitration  awards  obtained 
against  Italy  on  the  basis  of  the  Energy  Charter  Treaty  and  oral  observations  on  the  enforcement  of  an  investment 
arbitration award obtained against Romania based on an intra-EU bilateral investment treaty. 
55 See: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/overview_en.html.  

17 

 
                                                 
rules by national courts on 30 July 201956 and based on the assessment of its main findings on 
the enforcement of State aid rules at national level, the Commission is currently revising the 
Communication on the Enforcement of State aid rules by national courts57. 

In 2020 the Commission continued its advocacy efforts; it was actively involved in evaluating 
the  training  programmes  for  national  judges  and  in  assessing  their  needs  and  also  provided 
training during workshops and conferences. 

1.6 Significant judgments by the European Union Courts in the State aid area  

The European Courts in 2020 brought clarifications on  

- 

the  notion  of  aid,  including  on  the  (non)  economic  nature  of  certain  activities58,  on 
State resources59, on selective advantage and the market economy operator principle60;  

-  Services of General Economic Interest (SGEI)61, and on the compatibility assessment 

under Article107(3)(c) TFEU62; as well as  

-  procedural matters and recovery63.  

In  a  judgment  of  11  June  202064,  Commission  and  Slovak  Republic  v  Dôvera,  the  Court  of 
Justice  brought  clarifications  on  the  non-economic  nature  of  compulsory  health  insurance 
systems. It considered that the existence of a certain degree of competition in the provision of 
healthcare services was not such as to call into question the social and solidarity-based nature 
of  a  compulsory  health  insurance  system.  The  system  was  characterised  by  compulsory 
membership, an absence of direct link between the amount of the social security contributions 
and  the  benefits  provided,  the  presence  of  a  risk  equalisation  mechanism  between  insurers, 
and  a  State  supervision.  In  this  context,  the  presence  of  competition  is  secondary  and  not 
capable of changing the non-economic nature of the scheme. 

In  the  judgment  Larko  v  Commission  of  26  March  2020,  the  Court  of  Justice  clarified  the 
burden  of  proof  in  relation  to  the  market  economy  operator  principle  (MEOP).  The  Court 
recalled that it is for the Member State to prove that the MEOP is applicable, by establishing 
unequivocally  and  on  the  basis  of  objective  and  verifiable  evidence  that  the  measure 
implemented falls to be ascribed to the State acting as a private operator. However, once it is 

56 See: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0219428enn.pdf. 
57 Commission Notice on the enforcement of State aid law by national courts, OJ C 85, 9.4.2009, p. 1. 
58 Case C-262/18 P Commission v Dôvera zdravotná poistʼovňa, judgment of the Court of Justice of 11.6.2020. 
59 For example Case C-556/19 – Eco TLC, judgment of the Court of Justice of 21.10.2020. 
60  For  example  Case  T-515/13  RENV  Spain  v  Commission,  judgment  of  the  General  Court  of  23.9.2020;  Case  C-
212/19 Compagnie des pêches de Saint-Malo, judgment of the Court of Justice of 17.9.2020; Case C-244/18 P Larko v 
Commission, judgment of the Court of Justice of 26.3.2020; Case  T-778/16 Ireland v Commission, judgment of the 
General  Court  of 15.7.2020;  Case  T-892/16  Apple  Sales  International  and  Apple  Operations Europe  v  Commission, 
judgment of 15.7.2020.  
61  For  example,  Case  C-817/18  P  Vereniging  tot  Behoud  van  Natuurmonumenten  in  Nederland  and  Others  v 
Vereniging  Gelijkberechtiging  Grondbezitters,  judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  3.9.2020;  Case  T-316/18  První 
novinová společnost v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 15.10.2020. 
62 For example Case C-594/18 P Austria v Commission, judgment of the Court of Justice of 22.9.2020. 
63 For example on suspension injunctions and opening decisions, Case C-456/18 P Hungary v Commission, judgment 
of the Court of Justice of 4.6.2020; on recovery, limitation periods and national law, Case  C-627/18 Nelson Antunes 
da  Cunha,  judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  30.4.2020;  on  complaints  and  form  of  decision,  Case  T-745/17 
Kerkosand  v  Commission,  judgment  of  the  General  Court  of  9.9.2020;  on  preliminary  rulings  and  validity  of 
decisions, Case C-212/19 Compagnie des pêches de Saint-Malo, judgment of the Court of Justice of 17.9.2020. 
64 Case C-262/18 P Commission v Dôvera zdravotná poistʼovňa, judgment of the Court of Justice of 11.6.2020. 

18 

 
                                                 
established that the MEOP is applicable, it is for the Commission to prove the advantage, and 
to not only rely on a negative assumption of the existence of an advantage in the absence of 
other positive evidence. 

In the judgment of 22 September 2020, Austria v Commission65 (Hinkley Point C), the Court 
of  Justice  clarified  certain  aspects  of  the  compatibility  assessment  under  article  107(3)(c) 
TFEU.  Under  that  Treaty  provision  the  Commission  must  verify  that  two  conditions  are 
fulfilled to declare an aid compatible: the aid must facilitate the development of an economic 
activity, and the aid shall not adversely affect the trading conditions to an extent contrary  to 
the  common  interest.  When  assessing  the  first  condition  the  Commission  identifies  the 
economic activity that the aid aims at developing, but is not required to identify the relevant 
product market. When assessing the second condition, the Commission balances the positive 
and the negative effects of the aid; but when assessing the latter, it is only required to identify 
the  negative  effects  of  the  aid  on  competition  on  the  relevant  product  market  and  intra-EU 
trade.  When  adopting  State  aid  guidelines,  the  Commission  can  also  not  unduly  restrict  the 
scope  of  Article  107(3)(c)  TFEU  by  adding  conditions  which  are  not  present  in  that  Treaty 
provision. 

In C-212/19 Compagnie des pêches de Saint Malo66, the Court of Justice declared a State aid 
decision invalid in the context of a reference for a preliminary ruling. The  Court considered 
the questions admissible despite the fact that they were more than just interpretation questions 
and  related  to  the  validity  of  the  decision.  On  substance,  the  Court  clarified  that  in  case  of 
relief  from  social  security  contributions  owed  to  the  State  by  the  employee  but  paid  to  the 
State by the employer (i.e. the undertaking), direct aid to the employer is excluded if there is 
an obligation on the undertaking to pass on that advantage to the employee. In such a case, the 
undertaking acts as a mere intermediary. 

In the judgment Kerkosand vs Commission of 9 September 202067 the General Court clarified 
that a Commission decision confirming that an aid measure fulfils the conditions of the GBER 
and  is  hence  exempt  from  the  notification  requirement,  is  a  no  objection  decision  in  the 
meaning of article 4(3) of Regulation 2015/1589. 

1.7 Audit  by  the  European  Court  of  Auditors  (ECA)  on  the  Commission’s  control  of 

State aid to financial institutions 

In  October  2020,  the  European  Court  of  Auditors  (ECA)  published  the  conclusions  and 
recommendations related to its audit of the Commission’s control of State aid to EU financial 
institutions68.  The  audit  focused  on  the  application  of  financial-sector  State  aid  rules  since 
August 2013 (when the Commission started to apply the 2013 Banking Communication) until 
the end of 2018.  

In  its  Special  Report,  ECA  acknowledged  that,  overall,  the  EU  has  developed  appropriate 
means  and  powers  for  the  efficient  control  of  State  aid  to  banks  and  that  the  rules  for  the 
control of State aid to the financial sector were well drafted and clear. It also concluded that 
the Commission  allocated the necessary resources and expertise to  State aid  enforcement in 
this  sector  and  established  a  robust  ethical  framework.  On  the  other  hand,  ECA  was  of  the 
view that, in some areas, State aid enforcement in the financial sector could be improved. To 

65 Case C-594/18 P Austria v Commission, judgment of the Court of Justice of 22.9.2020. 
66 Case C-212/19 Compagnie des pêches de Saint-Malo, judgment of the Court of Justice of 17.9.2020. 
67 Case T-745/17 Kerkosand v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 9.9.2020. 
68 See https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/DocItem.aspx?did=54624. 

19 

 
                                                 
that end, ECA recommended the Commission to conduct an evaluation of the existing rules 
after  the  current  COVID-19  crisis  and  by  2023  at  the  latest,  to  work  on  document 
management and to encourage Member States to better respect best practices, and to improve 
performance management indicators. 

The Commission strives to improve its enforcement action in the area of State aid, as it does 
in  all  other  areas.  Therefore,  the  Commission  agreed  to  put  forward  a  series  of  actions  to 
follow up on ECA’s recommendations. For instance, the Commission will continue to work 
on  the  improvement  of  its  internal  processes  and  document  management  system  to  further 
increase  efficiency.  This  process  has  already  started.  The  Commission  will  also  encourage 
Member  States  to  respect  the  existing  best  practices  on,  for  example,  the  length  of  pre-
notification  contacts.  In  addition,  the  Commission  will  revisit  the  existing  performance 
indicators in its management reports to increase accuracy of the monitoring of its enforcement 
action in the relevant area. 

Finally, in the context of the ECA Special Report, the Commission also committed to carry 
out an evaluation of current financial-sector State aid rules. At the same time, the Commission 
has  announced  a  review  of  the  EU  bank  crisis  management  framework,  i.e.  the  Bank 
Recovery  and  Resolution  Directive  and  the  Deposit  Guarantee  Scheme  Directive.  As  a 
follow-up to the Eurogroup statement of 30 November 202069, the Commission continues its 
process towards reviewing its State aid framework for banks in the context of the  review of 
the  bank  crisis  management  framework  (the  Bank  Recovery  Resolution  Directive  and  the 
Deposit  Guarantee  Scheme  Directive),  using  a  holistic  approach  to  ensure  consistency  in 
particular  in  relation  to  adequate  burden  sharing  of  shareholders  and  creditors  to  protect 
taxpayers, and the preservation of financial stability. 

2. 

ANTITRUST AND CARTELS 

Articles 101, 102 and 106 TFEU 
According  to  Article  101  TFEU,  anti-competitive  agreements  are  prohibited  as  incompatible  with  the  internal 
market.  Article  101  TFEU  prohibits  agreements  with  an  anti-competitive  object  or  effects  where  companies 
coordinate  their  behaviour  instead  of  competing  independently.  However,  even  if  a  horizontal  or  a  vertical 
agreement could be viewed as restrictive it might be allowed under Article 101(3) TFEU if it ultimately fosters 
competition (for example by promoting technical progress or by improving distribution).  
Article 102 TFEU prohibits abuse of a dominant position. It is not in itself illegal for an undertaking to  be in a 
dominant position or to acquire such a position. Dominant undertakings, as any other undertaking in the market, 
are entitled to compete on the merits. However, Article 102 TFEU prohibits the abusive behaviour by dominant 
undertakings  that,  for  example,  directly  or  indirectly  impose  unfair  purchase-  or  selling  prices  or  other  unfair 
trading conditions.  
Finally, Article 106 TFEU prevents Member States from enacting or maintaining in force measures contrary to 
the  Treaty  rules  regarding  public  undertakings  and  undertakings  to  which  Member  States  grant  special  or 
exclusive rights. 

Preserving  market  discipline  to  secure  the  functioning  of  the  Single  Market  is  essential 
especially  in  times  of  crisis.  Effective  enforcement  of  the  EU  competition  rules  is  of  vital 
importance to the digital transformation of the EU economy and a resilient recovery after the 
pandemic;  antitrust  enforcement  can  contribute  in  tearing  down  remaining  barriers  to  the 

69  See:  https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/11/30/statement-of-the-eurogroup-in-inclusive-
format-on-the-esm-reform-and-the-early-introduction-of-the-backstop-to-the-single-resolution-fund/. 

20 

 
 
                                                 
Single Market and eliminating restrictions in the development of clean technologies and the 
free  flow  of  resources  necessary  for  the  circular  economy  and  the  Green  Deal’s  objectives. 
The  present  Staff  Working  Document  highlights  the  recent  antitrust  and  cartel  decisions, 
while  the  graphs  below  give  an  overview  of  antitrust  enforcement  activity  in  the  past  ten 
years, including also decisions rejecting complaints70.  

Alongside  enforcement,  reforms  are  also  crucial  to  ensure  competition  policy  is  fully 
effective: the Commission advanced on its review agenda encompassing a large number of its 
key block exemption regulations, guidelines and notices as well as moved forward the work 
on a number of ongoing initiatives to ensure fair competition in the single market.  

Antitrust and cartel decisions 2011-2020 

70  Cases  AT.39999  Concurrence/Samsung,  AT.40584  MAN  Italia,  AT.40629  Services  postaux,  AT.40572  Dutch 
Bricks,  AT.40626  Strutture  Trasporto  Alto  Adige  S.p.A.  and Trenitalia  S.p.A.,  AT.40594  Kids  Furniture,  AT.40562 
Polish biodiesel supplies, AT.40665 Toyota and AT.40609 Polish fuel app. 

21 

 
 
 
                                                 
2.1 Review of antitrust rules and guidance 

Due  to  the  COVID-19  outbreak,  the  Commission  and  the  national  competition  authorities 
took  action and provided guidance  on antitrust  rules and cooperation between companies in 
the context of the pandemic. In 2020, the Commission also advanced on its review of antitrust 
rules and  guidance  to  ensure that they  are  fit  for a changing market  environment,  including 
the  accelerating  digitalisation  of  the  economy  as  well  as  a  new  initiative.  The  review  also 
follows from the input provided by the three independent Special Advisers in their report of 
April 2019 on digitisation and competition law71.  

2.1.1.  COVID-19 related guidance 

On 8 April 2020, the Commission adopted a “Temporary Framework for assessing antitrust 
issues related to business cooperation in response to situations of urgency stemming from the 
current  COVID-19  outbreak”72.  The  document  lays  down  the  main  criteria  that  the 
Commission will use when assessing cooperation projects aimed at addressing a shortage of 
supply  of  essential  products  and  services  during  the  COVID-19  outbreak.  The  Temporary 
Framework  is  not  sector  specific,  but  refers  to  and  builds  on  experience  gained  by  the 
Commission in discussions with stakeholders in the health sector.  

The  Temporary  Framework  also  introduced  a  new  and  temporary  tool  –  so  called  ad  hoc 
‘comfort letters’ – that allows the Commission to exceptionally give not only swift guidance 
but also adequate certainty and comfort to individual initiatives. The Commission decided to 

71 “Competition Policy in the Digital Era”, 2019: See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0419345enn.pdf.  
72  Communication  from  the  Commission:  Temporary  Framework  for  assessing  antitrust  issues  related  to  business 
cooperation in response to situations of urgency stemming from the current COVID-19 outbreak, OJ C 116I, 8.4.2020, 
p. 7. 

22 

 
 
 
                                                 
add  this  new  instrument,  as  an  exception  to  the  self-assessment  rule,  and  in  addition  to  the 
existing  routes  for  providing  guidance  in  specific  situations73,  since  these  existing  routes 
cannot address situations of extreme urgency due to their procedural requirements. This does 
not  mean  that  the  Commission  has  re-introduced  a  notification  system  or  abandoned  its 
discretion to decide how and when to give guidance. Self-assessment remains the rule, but the 
Commission is ready to engage and discuss and will ensure that its extensive general guidance 
reflects today’s needs and business realities74. The Commission will decide on a case-by-case 
basis what the appropriate form of response to individual requests will be, based on e.g. the 
public interest, complexity, urgency and the risks that the companies will be exposed to. By 
maintaining  its  discretion  to  decide  when  and  how  to  give  guidance,  the  Commission  can 
prioritise the investigations that require its action. 

On the same day it adopted the Temporary Framework, the Commission issued the first – and 
so  far,  the  only75  –  comfort  letter,  addressed  to  the  European  association  of  generic 
pharmaceutical  manufacturers  “Medicines  for  Europe”76.  The  letter  concerns  a  specific 
cooperation among pharmaceutical producers, targeting the risk of shortage of critical hospital 
medicines  for  the  treatment  of  Coronavirus  patients.  The  cooperation  consists  in  modelling 
demand,  identifying  production  capacity  and  existing  stocks,  adapting  or  reallocating 
production and stocks based on projected and actual demand and, potentially, addressing the 
distribution  of  COVID-19  medicines.  The  Commission  concluded  that  this  temporary 
cooperation  did  not  raise  competition  concerns  under  Article  101  TFEU,  provided  that  a 
number of conditions stipulated in the letter are satisfied.  

2.1.2.  Digital Markets Act 

As a centerpiece of the European Digital Strategy77, presented by the Commission in February 
2020, the Commission put forward two Digital Acts aimed at creating a safer digital space for 
all users where their fundamental rights are protected, as well as a level playing field to allow 
innovative digital businesses to grow within the Single Market and compete globally.  

In  addition  to  a  Digital  Services  Act  (DSA)78,  the  Commission  adopted,  on  15  December 
2020,  a  proposal  for  a  Regulation  for  a  Digital  Markets  Act  (DMA)79.  Both  Commission 
proposals are subject to the ordinary legislative procedure and will be discussed in Parliament 
and Council during 2021.  

73  See  Article  10  of  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1/2003  (Finding  of  inapplicability)  and  Commission  Notice  on 
informal guidance relating to novel questions concerning Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty that arise in individual 
cases (guidance letters) (Text with EEA relevance), OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, p. 78-80.  
74  To  facilitate  contact  with  the  Commission  on  COVID-19  related  antitrust  issues,  the  Commission  launched  an 
“Antitrust  rules  and  Coronavirus”  webpage  providing  information  and  contact  details  for  requests  for  guidance  on 
specific cooperation projects, available at https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/coronavirus.html. COMP-COVID-
ANTITRUST@ec.europa.eu. 
75 State of play at the end of 2020. 
76 https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/medicines_for_europe_comfort_letter.pdf.  
77  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  establishing  the  Just  Transition  Fund, 
14.1.2020, COM(2020) 22 final 2020/0006 (COD).  
78  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  a  Single  Market  For  Digital  Services 
(Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC COM(2020) 825 final, 15.12.2020. 
79  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  contestable  and  fair  markets  in  the 
digital sector (Digital Markets Act) COM(2020) 842 final, 15.12.2020. 

23 

 
                                                 
The  proposal  for  a  Digital  Markets  Act  builds  on  the  horizontal  Platform  to  Business 
Regulation80, on the findings of the EU Observatory on the Online Platform Economy81 and 
on the Commission’s extensive experience in dealing with digital and online markets through 
competition  law  enforcement.  The  proposal  seeks  to  address  more  effectively  the  problems 
arising in digital markets, such as the gatekeeper power of large digital platforms. These are 
large companies that have a significant impact on the internal market, serve as an important 
gateway  for  business  users  to  reach  their  customers  and  which  enjoy,  or  will  foreseeably 
enjoy, an entrenched and durable position. 

The  Commission’s  proposal  establishes  three  objective  cumulative  criteria  to  identify  the 
“gatekeepers”  that  will  fall  under  the  scope  of  the  Regulation.  Each  of  those  qualitative 
criteria is accompanied by a series of quantitative criteria. If all of the quantitative thresholds 
are  met,  the  company  concerned  is  presumed  to  be  a  gatekeeper,  unless  it  submits 
substantiated arguments to demonstrate the contrary. The criteria are the following: 

1.  A  size  that  impacts  the  internal  market:  represented  by  an  annual  turnover  in  the 
European Economic Area (EEA)  equal  to or  above EUR 6.5 billion in  the last three 
financial  years,  or  where  the  company’s  average  market  capitalisation  or  equivalent 
fair market value amounted to at least EUR 65 billion in the last financial year, and it 
provides a core platform service in at least three Member States; 

2.  The control of an important gateway for business users towards final consumers: met 
when  the  company  operates  a  core  platform  service  with  more  than  45  million 
monthly active end users established or located in the EU and more than 10 000 yearly 
active business users established in the EU in the last financial year; 

3.  An (expected) entrenched and durable position: this is presumed to be the case if the 

company met the other two criteria in each of the last three financial years. 

If not all these thresholds are met, the Commission may designate a company as a gatekeeper 
on  the  basis  of  a  qualitative  assessment  following  a  market  investigation.  This  mechanism 
would  also  allow  the  Commission  to  designate  as  a  gatekeeper  a  company  which  can  be 
foreseen to enjoy such a position in the near future. 

The proposed Regulation sets out  harmonised rules addressing practices by gatekeepers that 
limit  the  contestability  of  core  platform  services  or  are  unfair  vis-à-vis  their  business  users. 
Designated  gatekeepers  have  to  ensure  compliance  with  the  obligations  of  the  proposed 
Regulation  within  six  months  after  one  or  more  of  the  core  platform  services  they  provide 
have been identified as fulfilling the thresholds of the proposed Regulation. 

To ensure the effectiveness  of the rules, the proposed Regulation  foresees the possibility  of 
sanctions  for  non-compliance  with  the  obligations,  including  fines  of  up  to  10%  of  the 
company’s worldwide turnover.  In case of systematic non-compliance, the Commission  can 
impose additional behavioural or structural remedies to the extent that they are necessary  to 
ensure compliance and proportionate to the infringement.  

80 Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on promoting fairness 
and transparency for business users of online intermediation services, OJ L 186, 11.7.2019, p. 57-79.  
81 EU Observatory on the Online Platform Economy, see:  
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/eu-observatory-online-platform-economy.  

24 

 
                                                 
Finally,  to  keep  the  rules  future-proof,  the  proposal  for  a  Digital  Markets  Act  provides  the 
Commission with the possibility to carry out market investigations to examine whether new 
services in the digital sector should be added to the list of core platform services. Moreover, 
the same tool would allow the Commission to detect new practices by gatekeepers that are not 
effectively addressed by the proposed Regulation. 

2.1.3.  Guidance on vertical agreements 

The  Commission  finalised  the  evaluation  of  the  Vertical  Block  Exemption  Regulation 
(VBER)82,  and  the  accompanying  Guidelines  on  Vertical  Restraints  (Vertical  Guidelines)83. 
The  findings  of  this  evaluation  phase  are  set  out  in  the  Staff  Working  Document  that  the 
Commission  published  in  September  202084.  A  key  finding  was  that  the  VBER  and  the 
Vertical  Guidelines  are  useful  tools,  which  significantly  facilitate  the  self-assessment  of 
vertical  agreements, but  that there is  room for improvement. On this basis,  the Commission 
launched  an impact  assessment  to  have revised  rules in  place when the currently applicable 
rules of the VBER expire in May 2022. In October 2020, the Commission asked stakeholders 
for feedback setting out the scope of the impact assessment and proposed policy options85. In 
December  2020,  the  Commission  launched  a  public  consultation  on  the  basis  of  an  online 
questionnaire  to  collect  more  specific  input  from  stakeholders  to  inform  the  drafting  of  the 
revised rules. 

The Commission also continued its review of the Motor Vehicle Block Exemption Regulation 
(MVBER)86, which will expire in May 2023 and mandated an evaluation report by May 2021. 
In  this  context,  the  Commission  appointed  consultants  to  carry  out  a  fact-finding  study  that 
was  delivered  in  November  2020.  Most  importantly,  an  online  public  consultation  with 
stakeholders  was  launched  on  12  October  2020,  and  ran  until  25  January  2021.  The 
information gathered through different processes will feed into the Commission’s evaluation 
report,  which  will  in  turn  form  the  basis  for  drawing  up  and  assessing  the  options  for  the 
future regime and deciding among them. 

The  COVID-19  pandemic  proved  a  challenging  environment  for  the  manufacturing  sectors, 
which  were  faced  with  both  plant  shutdowns  and  falls  in  demand.  In  this  context,  the 
Commission  has  been  open  to  engage  with  stakeholders  on  the  potential  application  of  the 
antitrust rules to co-operative schemes intended to facilitate recovery in the aftermath of the 
COVID-19  crisis.  For  example,  in  the  automotive  sector,  the  Commission  had  fruitful 
exchanges  with  representatives  of  companies  who  approached  it  for  feedback  on  particular 
frameworks  for  cooperation.  The  Commission  provided  informal  clarifications  as  to  what 
kinds of cooperation were likely to be unproblematic, and identified the necessary safeguards 
for the cooperation to bring benefits without the risk of anticompetitive effects. 

82 Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on 
the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  to  categories  of  vertical  agreements  and  concerted  practices,  OJ  L  102, 
23.4.2010, p. 1. 
83 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (Text with EEA relevance), OJ C 130, 19.5.2010, p. 1-46. 
84  Commission  Staff  Working  Document:  Evaluation  of  the  Vertical  Block  Exemption  Regulation,  8.9.2020, 
SWD(2020) 172 final. 
85  See:  https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12636-Revision-of-the-Vertical-Block-
Exemption-Regulation.  
86  Commission  Regulation  461/2010  on  the  application  of  Article  101(3)  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the 
European  Union  to  categories of  vertical  agreements  and  concerted  practices  in  the  motor  vehicle  sector,  OJ  L  129, 
28.5.2010, p. 52.  

25 

 
                                                 
2.1.4.  Guidance on horizontal agreements 

In  2020,  the  Commission  progressed  with  the  evaluation  of  the  rules  exempting  certain 
horizontal agreements87  from  the EU’s  general  competition  rules. The EU competition  rules 
on  horizontal  agreements  include  two  Block  Exemption  Regulations  for  horizontal  co-
operation  agreements  that  exempt,  respectively,  certain  research  &  development  and 
specialisation  agreements  from  Article  101  TFEU.  The  accompanying  guidelines  on 
horizontal  cooperation  agreements  (Horizontal  Guidelines)  provide  further  guidance  to  help 
companies  in  their  efforts  to  engage  in  competition  law  compliant  cooperation  agreements, 
giving  also  detailed  recommendations  on  topics  such  as  the  competitive  assessment  of 
information exchanges, joint purchasing, joint commercialisation and standardisation.  

The Commission launched the evaluation in 2019, in view of the expiry of the two Horizontal 
Block  Exemption  Regulations  (HBERs)  on  31  December  2022.  While  the  Horizontal 
Guidelines do not have an expiry date, they are evaluated together with the HBERs. In 2020, 
the  Commission  received  the  results  of  the  public  stakeholder  consultation88  and  the 
consultation  of  the  national  competition  authorities89.  The  Commission  also  launched  an 
evaluation support study on the rules on horizontal agreements. The findings of the evaluation 
process will be set out in a Staff Working Document. 

2.1.5.  Sustainability and competition 

The European Green Deal aims to transform the EU into a fair and prosperous society, with a 
modern,  resource-efficient  and  competitive  economy.  Executive  Vice-President  Vestager 
stated that all of Europe’s policies – including competition policy – will have their role to play 
in the pursuit of these objectives90.  

On  13  October  2020,  DG  Competition  published  a  call  for  contributions  on  a  number  of 
issues  about  how  competition  rules  –  State  aid,  antitrust  and  merger  control  –  can  work 
together  with  sustainability  policies91.  The  purpose  of  the  call  was  to  gather  the  views  and 
industry, 
proposals 
environmental groups and consumer organisations. The input from the public will be used to 
inform the on-going revisions of Commission block exemption regulations and guidelines in 
both the antitrust and State aid fields.  

including  competition  experts,  academia, 

stakeholders, 

from 

2.1.6.  Collective bargaining of self-employed 

Digital  platforms  have  changed  the  way  people  work.  They  provide  access  to  work,  and 
flexibility;  but  they  can  also  leave  some  workers  vulnerable.  And  those  providing  services 
through platforms do not always fit into traditional employment categories. That means that 
for  these  –  as  for  a  great  many  others  in  a  changing  EU  economy  –  it  is  not  always  clear 

87 Commission Regulation No 1217/2010 of 14 December 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on 
the functioning of the European Union to categories of research and development agreements, OJ L 335, 18.12.2010, 
p. 36; Commission Regulation No 1218/2010 of 14 December 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty 
to categories of specialisation agreements, OJ L 335, 18.12.2010, p. 43. 
88  https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/11886-Evaluation-of-EU-competition-rules-
on-horizontal-agreements/public-consultation.  
89  Summary  of  the  contributions  of  National  Competition  Authorities  to  the  evaluation  of  the  R&D  and  the 
Specialisation Block Exemption Regulations and the Commission Guidelines on Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, 
available at: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2019_hbers/NCA_summary.pdf.  
90 Competition and Sustainability, speech of 24 October 2019, GCLC Conference on Sustainability and Competition 
Policy, Brussels. 
91 https://ec.europa.eu/competition/information/green_deal/index_en.html.  

26 

 
                                                 
whether EU competition rules allow them to come to agreements to jointly negotiate on their 
working conditions.  

In June 2020, the Commission therefore launched a process to assess whether there is a need 
for  measures  at  EU  level  to  ensure  that  EU  competition  law  does  not  stand  in  the  way  of 
collective  bargaining  for  self-employed  in  need  of  protection.  Following  the  initial 
information  gathering  process  as  part  of  the  consultation  on  the  Digital  Services  Act  and 
discussions with social partners and businesses, the Commission published on 6 January 2021 
an inception impact assessment describing the problem and outlining four policy options  for 
future action. 

2.2 Important judgments by the European Union Courts 

2.2.1.  Review of decisions finding an infringement 

In  2020,  the  European  Courts  issued  fewer  judgments  than  usual  concerning  the 
Commission’s cartel enforcement. The judgments issued largely confirmed the Commission’s 
cartel enforcement practice. In particular, the European Courts confirmed to a large extent the 
Commission’s investigatory techniques during inspections of suspected infringements of EU 
competition,  focusing  in  particular  on  the  power  to  make  copies  of  documents  and  the 
possibility  to  continue  inspections  in  Brussels.  At  the  same  time,  the  European  Courts 
highlighted the importance of having a certain level of evidence on file justifying the need for 
an inspection.  

Other  judgments  focussed  on  companies’  procedural  rights  during  the  Commission’s  cartel 
investigations, largely confirming the Commission’s general handling of such investigations 
while  drawing  attention  to  the  importance  of  setting  out  all  allegations  in  the  Statement  of 
Objections prior to issuing an infringement decision. 

In  relation  to  the  question  of  liability  for  cartel  conduct,  the  European  Courts  confirmed 
longstanding  case  law  and  Commission  practice  in  relation  to  the  concepts  of  ‘parental 
liability’ and ‘economic continuity’, and, in doing so, safeguarded the efficient enforcement of 
EU competition law.  

2.2.2.  Investigative powers 

In  two  judgments  concerning  the  Power  Cables  cartel,  the  Court  of  Justice  confirmed  the 
Commission’s  conduct  during  inspections  carried  out  under  Article  20  of  Regulation 
1/200392.  According  to  the  Court  of  Justice,  the  Commission  had  a  “certain  discretion 
regarding its specific examination procedures”93.  

As part of that discretion, it was within the Commission’s right to make copies of electronic 
documents  as  an  intermediate  step  in  the  investigation  of  the  data94.  The  Court  of  Justice 
rejected the argument that the powers conferred upon the Commission have to be interpreted 
narrowly,  as  long  as  it  was  ensured  that  the  rights  of  the  defence  of  the  investigated 
undertakings were protected95. Making copies of certain documents enabled the investigated 

92 Case C-606/18 P Nexans v Commission, judgment of the Court of Justice of 16.7.2020; Case C-601/18 P Prysmian 
v Commission, judgment of the Court of Justice of 24.9.2020. 
93 Nexans, para. 61. 
94 Nexans, para. 63. 
95 Nexans, para. 64; Prysmian, para. 58. 

27 

 
                                                 
undertaking  to  continue  to  use  the  original  data,  thus  reducing  the  interference  in  that 
undertaking’s operation caused by the Commission’s inspections96. 

In the same judgments, the Court of Justice also confirmed the Commission’s practice of so-
called  ‘continued  inspections’  at  its  premises  in  Brussels.  The  Court  confirmed  that 
Article 20(2)(b)  of  Regulation  No 1/2003  does  not  provide  that  the  inspection  must  in  all 
circumstances be carried out exclusively at the company’s premises97. According to the Court 
of Justice, there can be legitimate reasons for continuing an inspection in Brussels “also in the 
interest of the undertakings concerned”, as, for example, the processing of “large volumes of 
data could have the effect of significantly extending the duration of the inspectors’ presence 
at  the  undertaking’s  premises,  which  would  be  liable  to  hamper  the  effectiveness  of  the 
inspection and to needlessly increase the interference in that undertaking’s operations”98.  

In  the  Alliance  Casino  &  Intermarché  investigations99  the  General  Court  issued  three 
judgments  concerning  inspection  decisions  adopted  by  the  Commission  in  2017  concerning 
inspections in the French retail sector. In its judgments the General Court largely confirmed 
the  Commission’s  powers  in  the  early  stages  of  an  investigation.  The  General  Court 
confirmed  the  clear  distinction  between  “indicia”,  relevant  for  the  early  stages  of  a 
Commission  investigation  leading  to  inspections,  and  “evidence”  relevant  for  subsequent 
stages  in  order  to  demonstrate  an  infringement  of  competition  rules.  The  General  Court 
further  recalled  that,  to  order  an  inspection,  the  Commission  must  be  in  possession  of 
sufficiently strong indicia.  

The  General  Court  held  that  in  the  early  stages  of  the  investigation,  in  order  to  serve  as 
indicia, informal minutes of meetings and  conference calls did  not  have to  comply with  the 
formal  requirements  of  Article  19  of  Regulation  1/2003100.  It  also  found  the  minutes  of  the 
meetings  and  conference  with  manufacturers  drafted  by  Commission  officials  as  being 
credible.  Furthermore,  the  General  Court  recalled  that  the  information  provided  by 
manufacturers become indicia from the moment it is communicated to the Commission, and 
not  when  it  materialised  in  the  form  of  minutes.  As  regards  the  content  of  the  indicia,  the 
General Court, upheld one leg of the inspection decisions relating to exchanges of information 
on discounts obtained on the procurement markets of certain everyday consumer products and 
on  prices  on  the  market  for  the  sale  of  services  to  brand  manufacturers  of  those  products. 
However,  the  General  Court  annulled  the  second  leg  of  the  inspection  decisions  relating  to 
exchanges of information concerning future commercial strategies of the undertakings under 
suspicion, concluding that the indicia in possession of the Commission were not sufficiently 
strong.  

The  General  Court  also  examined  if  the  dates  chosen  for  the  inspections  caused 
“disproportionate  and  intolerable  damage”  to  the  undertakings’  business  and  found  that  this 
was not the case. It also considered that the dates chosen by the Commission were justified by 
the objective to  have the maximum  number of key  staff present.  Finally, the General Court 

96 Nexans, para. 66; Prysmian, para. 60. 
97 Nexans, para. 78. 
98 Nexans, para. 81. Confirmed in Prysmian, para. 66. 
99  Cases  T-249/17  Casino,  Guichard-Perrachon  and  Achats  Marchandises  Casino  SAS  (AMC)  v  Commission,  T-
254/17  Intermarché  Casino  Achats  v  Commission  and  T-255/17  Les  Mousquetaires  and  ITM  Entreprises  v 
Commission,  judgment  of  the  General  Court  of  5.10.2020;  for  background  concerning  the  cases  see  below  section 
Agri-food industry.  
100  And  Article  3  of  Regulation  773/2004  relating  to  the  conduct  of  proceedings  by  the  Commission  pursuant  to 
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. 

28 

 
                                                 
also held that inspected undertakings were entitled to raise arguments related to the protection 
of  their  staff’s  privacy  and  noted  that  the  undertakings  had  not  identified  those  documents 
where copies could have led to a violation of staff privacy. 

2.2.3.  Procedural rights in Commission investigations 

In a judgment concerning the Retail Food Packaging cartel101, the Court of Justice confirmed 
the General Court’s and the Commission’s handling of its cartel investigation (in particular in 
relation to the decision of both the Commission and the General Court not to hear or cross-
examine a witness relied upon by the appellants). 

Nevertheless,  the  Court  of  Justice  highlighted  in  a  judgment  concerning  the  Power  Cables 
cartel the importance of setting out all allegations clearly in the Statement of Objections, thus 
allowing the undertakings investigated to submit their observations102. 

the  conduct  of 

issues  concerning 

Concerning  the  Commission’s  pending  investigation  in  Metal  Packaging103,  the  European 
the  Commission’s 
Courts  dealt  with  procedural 
investigation. In one court order, the Court of Justice confirmed the General Court’s finding 
that  a  decision  to  formally  initiate  proceedings  according  to  Article  2(1)  of  Regulation 
773/2004  did  not  negatively  affect  a  company’s  position  and  therefore  did  not  constitute  a 
challengeable act104.  In a second court order, the president of the  General  Court rejected an 
application  for  interim  measures  against  a  Commission  request  for  information  pursuant  to 
Article  18(3)  of  Regulation  1/2003,  as  the  applicants  could  not  show  any  urgency  resulting 
from  providing  replies  while  having  to  wait  for  a  decision  in  the  main  proceedings,  i.e. 
concerning  the  applicants’  action  for  annulment  against  the  Commission’s  Article  18(3) 
decision105. 

2.2.4.  Use of evidence 

While generally confirming the Commission’s practice of assessing and relying on evidence, 
the Court of Justice nevertheless highlighted in  one judgment concerning the  Power Cables 
cartel that – in order to be held liable for the conduct of another participant in the context of a 
single and continuous infringement – the undertaking in question had to have been aware of it 
or  reasonably  able  to  foresee  it.  Without  proving  such  awareness,  the  Commission  was  not 
entitled to hold the undertaking liable – even if the insufficient proof of awareness concerned 
“non-essential”  parts  of  the  cartel  (in  this  case  a  refusal  to  supply  accessories  and  technical 
assistance to competitors not participating in the cartel)106. 

2.2.5.  Liability for cartel conduct 

In  two  judgments  concerning  the  Power  Cables  cartel,  the  Court  of  Justice  confirmed  the 
Commission’s  interpretation  of  the  concept  of  attributing  liability  for  cartel  conduct  to 
undertakings107. 

101 Case C-702/19 P Silver Plastics and Johannes Reifenhäuser v Commission, judgment of the Court of 22.10.2020. 
102 Case C-607/18 P NKT v Commission, judgment of the Court of 14.5.2020 paras. 47-60. 
103 Case AT.40522. 
104 Case C-418/19 P Silgan Closures v Commission. 
105 Case T-808/19 R Silgan International Holdings v Commission. 
106 Case C-607/18 P NKT v Commission, judgment of the Court of 14.5.2020, paras. 164-171. 
107  Case  C-601/18  P  Prysmian  v  Commission;  Case  C-611/18  P  Pirelli  v  Commission,  judgment  of  the  Court  of 
28.10.2020. 

29 

 
                                                 
Concerning the concept  of ‘economic continuity’, the Court of Justice  confirmed that where 
two  entities  constitute  one  economic  entity,  the  fact  that  the  entity  that  committed  the 
infringement still exists does not per se preclude imposing a penalty on the entity to which its 
economic activities were transferred. This is to avoid restructurings being used to escape the 
liability for competition law infringements108.  

Concerning  the  concept  of  ‘parental  liability’,  the  Court  of  Justice  held  that  the  General 
Court, in  its  original judgment, had been right  to hold  that the Commission did  not  have to 
consider each and every piece of evidence advanced by a company to reject the application of 
the presumption of parental liability to a former subsidiary in cases where the company held 
all or almost all of the shares in the subsidiary at that time109. 

2.2.6.  Calculation of fines 

In  the  Smart  Card  Chips  case110,  the  General  Court  ruled  on  the  proportionality  of  a  fine 
imposed  on  Infineon111.  Both  the  General  Court  and  the  Court  of  Justice  had  already 
confirmed the existence and duration of the cartel, but the Court of Justice nevertheless sent 
the  case  back  to  the  General  Court  because  the  latter  had  not  reviewed  all  anti-competitive 
contacts.  Such  review  was  necessary  to  assess  whether  Infineon’s  fine  was  commensurate 
with the number and intensity of anticompetitive contacts. 

In its second review, the General Court concluded that the Commission had not succeeded in 
proving to the requisite legal standard the existence of one contact (out of eleven) and that this 
reduced number of anticompetitive contacts warranted an increase of the reduction of the fine 
for mitigating circumstances from 20% to 25%, reducing the fine from EUR 82.8 million to 
EUR 76.8 million. 

In the Retail Food Packaging cases112, the Court of Justice concurred with the Commission 
in  relying  on  the  company’s  group  turnover  in  the  last  full  business  year  for  purposes  of 
calculating the 10% turnover cap according to Article 23(2) of Regulation 1/2003. 

In  its  GEA  judgment113  in  the  Heat  Stabilisers  case,  the  Court  of  Justice  confirmed  the 
Commission’s  practice  when  attributing  joint  and  several  liability  for  fines  between  several 
entities which were part of the same undertaking at the time of the infringement. The Court of 
Justice clarified that in such scenarios the Commission’s practice complies with the principle 
of  equal  treatment.  The  Court  of  Justice  upheld  the  Commission’s  appeal,  annulled  the 
judgment of the General Court and referred the matter back to the General Court to decide on 
the remaining pleas. 

2.3 The fight against cartels remains a top priority 

Cartels are the most serious form of competition infringements and cause significant harm to 
both consumers and the economy as a whole. They can lead to inflated prices, limit consumer 
choices  and  restrict  innovation.  The  Commission’s  enforcement  against  hard  core  cartels 

108 Prysmian, paras. 83-93. 
109 Pirelli, paras. 33-53. 
110 Case T-758/14 RENV Infineon Technologies AG v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 8.7.2020. 
111 Case AT.39574, Commission Decision C(2014) 6250 of 3 September 2014. 
112  Case  C-702/19  P  Silver  Plastics  and  Johannes  Reifenhäuser  v  Commission,  judgment  of  the  General  Court  of 
11.7.2019. 
113 Case C-823/18 P Commission v GEA, judgment of the Court of 25.11.2020. 

30 

 
                                                 
prevents companies from profiting from such illegal arrangements and ensures a level playing 
field for business.  

The fight against cartels therefore remained a top priority also during 2020, but the COVID-
19  crisis  had  an  impact  on  the  Commission’s  enforcement  activities.  Recognising  the 
exceptional  difficulties  that  companies  faced,  notably  in  the  early  phases  of  the  lock-down, 
the  Commission  adjusted  its  priorities  and  reconsidered  certain  envisaged  steps  that  would 
have triggered the need for immediate business reactions (such as requests for information or 
the  notification  of  Statement  of  Objections),  if  and  when  warranted.  It  also  temporally 
refrained  from  carrying  out  inspections  that  would  have  required  a  longer  presence  in  the 
company  premises.  The  Commission  nevertheless  stressed  the  need  to  ensure  a  vigorous 
cartel enforcement also during an economic crisis, when there might be an increased incentive 
to collude. The eLeniency114 tool, launched in 2019, enabled companies to submit statements 
with  the  same  high  level  of  protection  as  the  oral  procedure  (that  would  have  required  a 
presence  in  the  Commission’s  premises)115.  The  tool  was  frequently  used  for  documents 
submitted  in  the  context  of  the  leniency,  the  cartel  settlement  or  the  antitrust  cooperation 
procedures.  

Despite  the  particular  circumstances,  the  Commission  nevertheless  adopted  three  cartel 
decisions  concerning  six  separate  cartels  in  sectors  which  directly  affected  European 
consumers  and  European  business;  namely  car  parts,  the  chemical  sector  and  retail  food 
packaging. The decisions  resulted in  total  fines  of approximately EUR 288 million.  Two of 
the decisions were adopted under the cartel settlement procedure, which again proved to be a 
successful and efficient tool to resolve cartel cases. The third decision was a re-adoption.  

In  July  2020,  the  Commission  adopted  its  second  decision  in  recent  times  concerning  a 
purchasing  cartel.  It  found  that  four  major  purchasers  of  ethylene  had  colluded  to  buy 
ethylene for the lowest possible price on the ethylene merchant market in Germany, France, 
the Netherlands and Belgium. The Commission fined Celanese (based in US), Orbia (based in 
Mexico)  and  Clariant  (based  in  Switzerland)116  totalling  EUR  260  million.  A  fourth 
participant to the collusion, Westlake (based in US) was not fined as it received full immunity 
under the leniency procedure for revealing the cartel and cooperating with the Commission. 
All companies acknowledged their involvement in the cartel and agreed to settle the case. The 
decision demonstrates that the Commission does not tolerate any form of cartels and that the 
EU antitrust rules do not only prohibit cartels related to coordination of selling prices, but also 
cartels related to coordination of purchasing prices117.  

In  September  2020,  the  Commission  fined  Brose  and  Kiekert118,  two  German  suppliers  of 
closure systems, for their respective participation in two separate cartels. Brose took part in a 
cartel coordinating the prices of door modules and window regulators supplied to Daimler and 
was fined EUR 3.2 million. Kiekert participated in a cartel coordinating the prices of latches 

114 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/leniency/eleniency.html.  
115  In  February  2020,  the  Commisson  decided  not  to  offer  the  possibility  to  submit  statements  through  the  oral 
procedure. 
116 Case AT.40410 Ethylene, Commission Decision of 14 July 2020, available at:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40410. 
117 See also the first Commission Decision on a purchasing cartel adopted under the 2006 Fines Guidelines in the case 
AT.40018 Car Battery Recycling, available at  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40018.  
118 Case AT.40299 Closure systems, Commission Decision of 29 September 2020, available at:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40299. 

31 

 
                                                 
and strikers supplied to BMW and Daimler and was fined EUR 15 million. A third participant 
to the collusion, Magna, based in Canada and Austria, escaped fines after having received full 
immunity under the EU leniency procedure. All companies acknowledged their involvement 
in  the  cartels  and  agreed  to  settle  the  case.  This  cartel  decision  is  part  of  a  series  of  major 
investigations  into  collusions  in  the  automotive  parts  sector.  The  Commission  has  already 
fined suppliers of automotive bearings, wire harnesses in cars, flexible foam used (inter alia) 
in  car seats,  parking heaters in  cars and trucks,  alternators and starters, air conditioning and 
engine  cooling  systems,  lighting  systems,  occupant  safety  systems,  and  spark  plugs  and 
braking systems119. The 2020 decision brings the total amount of Commission fines for cartels 
in this sector to EUR 2.2 billion.  

On 17 December, 2020  the Commission  re-adopted a decision imposing  total  fines of EUR 
9.4  million  on  the  CCPL  Group  for  its  participation  in  three  separate  retail  food  packaging 
cartels. The General Court had in its judgement of 11 July 2019 annulled the fines imposed on 
CCPL in the original 2015 decision after having found that the Commission had insufficiently 
reasoned its inability to pay assessment120. In line with its consistent practice, the Commission 
decided to re-adopt a fine that had been annulled for purely procedural reasons. 

Case name 

Adoption date 

Fine imposed 
EUR 

Ethylene purchases 

14/07/2020 

260 443 000 

Undertakings 
concerned 
4 

Prohibition 
Procedure 
Settlement 

Closure Systems 

29/09/2020 

18 196 000 

Retail food packaging 

17/12/2020 

9 441 000 

3 

1 

Settlement 

Prohibition 

2.4 Cooperation within the European Competition Network and with national courts 

2.4.1.  Cooperation  with  national  competition  authorities  within  the  European 

Competition Network  

Since 2004, the Commission and the national competition authorities in all EU Member States 
cooperate through the European Competition Network (ECN)121. The objective of the ECN is 
to build an effective legal framework to enforce European competition law against companies 
who engage in cross-border business practices which restrict competition.  

In 2020, the Commission continued to ensure the coherent application of Articles 101 and 102 
through  the  ECN.  Two  of  the  key  supporting  cooperation  mechanisms  in  Regulation 
1/2003122  are  the  obligation  on  national  competition  authorities  to  inform  the  Commission 
about a new investigation at the stage of the first formal investigative measure and to consult 
the  Commission  on  envisaged  decisions.  In  2020,  139  new  investigations  were  launched 

119  Cases  AT.39748  Automotive  Wire  Harnesses  (2013),  AT.39922  Automotive  bearings  (2014),  AT.39801 
Polyurethane  Foam (2014), AT.40055 Parking Heaters (2015), AT.40028 Alternators and Starters (2016), AT.39960 
Thermal Systems (2017), AT.40013 Lighting Systems (2017), AT.39881 Occupant Safety Systems (2017), AT.40113 
Spark plugs (2018) and AT.40481 Occupant Safety Systems II (2019).  
120 Case T-522/15 CCPL v Commission, judgment of the Court of 11.7.2019. 
121 Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, p. 43-53 
and OJ C 374, 13.10.2016, p. 10. 
122 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1-25. 

32 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
within  the  network,  97  envisaged  decisions  were  submitted,  compared  to  138  new 
investigations,  and  95  envisaged  decisions  in  2019.  These  figures  include  Commission 
investigations and decisions, respectively.   

On top of these cooperation mechanisms set out in Regulation 1/2003, other ECN cooperation 
work  streams  equally  ensure  a  coherent  enforcement  of  the  EU  competition  rules.  The 
network meets regularly to discuss cases at early stages, policy issues, as well as matters of 
strategic  importance.  In  2020,  24  meetings  across  horizontal  working  groups  and  sector-
specific  sub-groups  were  organised,  where  competition  authorities’  officials  exchanged 
views. 

2.4.2.  Transposition of the ECN+ Directive  

The  ECN+  Directive123  empowering  Member  States’  competition  authorities  to  be  more 
effective  enforcers  of  EU  competition  rules  in  the  field  of  antitrust  entered  into  force  on 
4 February  2019.  The  ECN+  Directive  will  ensure  that  when  applying  the  same  legal 
provisions  –  the  EU  antitrust  rules  –  national  competition  authorities  have  the  effective 
enforcement tools and the resources necessary to detect and sanction companies that infringe 
Articles  101  and  102  TFEU.  It  will  also  ensure  that  they  can  take  their  decisions  in  full 
independence, based on the facts and the law. The new rules contribute to the objective of a 
genuine single market, promoting the overall goal of competitive markets, jobs and growth. In 
2020,  the  Commission  has  continued  to  monitor  the  transposition  process  and  assisted  the 
Member States in their efforts in incorporating the Directive into national law by 4 February 
2021. 

Empowering NCAs to become more effective enforcers 

Once transposed by Member States into national law, NCAs will: 

 

 

 

 

 

 

benefit from minimum guarantees of independence when applying EU competition rules; 

have the basic guarantee of the human and financial resources they need to perform their tasks; 

have  an  effective  investigative  and  decision-making  toolbox,  including  to  gather  digital 
evidence stored on mobile devices; 

be able to impose deterrent fines, for example companies will no longer be able to escape fines 
by restructuring; 

have  effective  leniency  programmes  in  place  which  encourage  companies  to  report  cartels 
throughout the EU; 

provide each other with mutual assistance so that, for example companies with assets in other 
Member States cannot escape from paying fines. 

The  importance  of  companies’  fundamental  rights  is  underlined:  appropriate  safeguards  will  be  in 
place  for  the  exercise  of  NCAs’  powers,  in  accordance  with  the  EU  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights 
and general principles of EU law. 

2.4.3.  Cooperation with national courts 

Effective  overall  enforcement  of  antitrust  rules  in  the  EU,  for  the  benefit  of  both  EU 
households  and  businesses,  requires  interplay  between  public  and  private  enforcement.  In 
addition  to  its  cooperation  with  NCAs  in  the  context  of  the  ECN,  the  Commission  also 
continued  its  cooperation  with  national  courts  under  Article  15  of  Regulation  1/2003.  The 

123  Directive  (EU)  2019/1  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  11  December  2018  to  empower  the 
competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the 
internal market, OJ L 11, 14.1.2019, p. 3-33. 

33 

 
 
                                                 
Commission  helps  national  courts  to  enforce  the  EU  competition  rules  in  an  effective  and 
coherent manner by providing case-related information or an opinion on matters of substance 
or by intervening as amicus curiae in proceedings pending before the national courts. 

Following  approval  from  the  concerned  courts,  the  Commission  publishes  its  opinions  and 
amicus curiae observations on its website. 

2.4.4.  Private enforcement 

Directive 2014/104/EU on antitrust damages actions (Damages Directive)124
 aims at ensuring 
that anyone harmed by infringements of the EU competition rules can effectively avail itself 
of the right to compensation before national courts. To assist national courts in how to protect 
confidential  information  disclosed  in  private  enforcement  proceedings,  the  Commission 
adopted in 2020 a Communication on the protection of confidential information by national 
courts in proceedings for the private enforcement of EU competition law125.  

The  Communication  seeks  to  provide  practical  guidance  to  national  courts  in  selecting 
effective  protective  measures,  considering  among  others  the  specific  circumstances  of  the 
case,  the  type  of  information  requested,  the  extent  of  the  disclosure,  the  parties  and 
relationships  concerned  as  well  as  any  administrative  burdens  and  cost  implications.  It 
presents  a  number  of  measures  (e.g.  redactions,  confidentiality  rings,  use  of  experts,  closed 
hearings)  national  courts  may,  depending  on  their  procedural  framework,  order  to  protect 
confidential information in the context of disclosure requests throughout and after the closing 
of  the  proceedings,  and  it  describes  how  and  when  such  measures  could  be  effective.  The 
Communication is non-binding and does not alter existing rules under EU law or the laws of 
the Member States. Its goal is, however, to be a source of inspiration, in particular for national 
courts that deal with damages actions for infringements of EU competition law. 

The  Commission  submitted  in  December  2020  a  report  about  the  implementation  of  the 
Damages Directive to the European Parliament and the Council126. The report takes stock of 
the  implementation  of  some  of  the  core  rules  of  the  Directive,  such  as  the  right  to  full 
compensation, disclosure of evidence, evidentiary value of infringement decisions, limitation 
periods, passing on of overcharges and  estimation  of harm. The  report also notes that since 
the  adoption  of  the  Damages  Directive  in  2014,  the  number  of  damages  actions  before 
national  courts  has  significantly  increased  and  damages  actions  have  become  much  more 
widespread in the EU. Therefore, while the effectiveness of the measures will depend on their 
actual implementation by the national courts, the rights of victims of antitrust infringements 
have  been  already  strengthened.  Based  on  the  findings  of  the  report,  the  Commission  has 
drawn  positive  conclusions  as  regards  the  consistent  implementation  of  the  rules.  The 
Commission  intends  to  continue  to  monitor  the  developments  in  the  Member  States  with  a 
view to evaluating the Directive, once sufficient experience from the application of its rules is 
available. 

124  Directive  2014/104/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  26  November  2014  on  certain  rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member 
States and of the European Union, OJ L 349, 5.12.2014, p. 1-19.  
125  Communication from  the  Commission:  Communication on the  protection  of  confidential  information by  national 
courts in proceedings for the private enforcement of EU competition law, C(2020) 4829, OJ C 242, 22.7.2020, p. 1-17. 
126  Commission  Staff  Working  Document  on  the  implementation  of  Directive  2014/104/EU  of  the  European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law 
for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union SWD(2020) 338 
final, 14.12.2020. Available at  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/report_on_damages_directive_implementation_en.pdf. 

34 

 
                                                 
2.5 Audit by the European Court of Auditors on antitrust  

In November 2020, the European Court of Auditors (ECA) published a Special Report on EU 
merger  control  and  antitrust  proceedings  in  the  period  2010-2017127.  In  the  report,  ECA 
concluded that the European Commission, the enforcer of EU competition rules, has generally 
made  good  use  of  its  powers  in  antitrust  proceedings  and  merger  control,  and  addressed 
competition  concerns  with  its  decisions.  ECA  also  found  that  overall  the  NCAs  and  the 
Commission cooperated well in the European Competition Network.  

However, ECA points to the increasing complexity of the context in which competition rules 
are enforced, especially  due to the challenges relating to digital markets,  and sees a need to 
scale up market oversight. The ECA acknowledges the efforts made by the Commission since 
2017 to accelerate its antitrust proceedings, and takes note of the constantly high success rate 
of  the  Commission  defending  its  competition  decisions  in  EU  Courts.  The  ECA  report 
confirms the relevance of the Commission’s ongoing review of competition rules and of the 
tools at its disposal to ensure that they are fit for the changing market environment, including 
the accelerating digitalisation of the economy. As also detailed in this report, the Commission 
has  a  significant  policy  agenda  in  antitrust  for  the  next  years,  including  the  review  of  its 
horizontal  and  vertical  rules  and  guidance  and  of  the  market  definition  notice,  as  well  as 
efforts  to  introduce  new  policy  tools  in  digital  markets,  in  line  with  the  Commission  Work 
Programme.  

In the report, ECA calls for the Commission to perform a study of the deterrent effect of its 
fines  and  update  its  fine-setting  methodology  as  appropriate.  The  Commission  envisages  to 
conduct an external study on whether the fines imposed under its current fining methodology 
achieve that aim. Finally, ECA recommends that the Commission regularly carries out ex-post 
evaluations of its enforcement. The Commission accepts this recommendation subject to the 
availability of sufficient resources. 

3. 

MERGER CONTROL 

EU merger control  
The purpose of EU merger control is to ensure that market structures remain competitive while enabling smooth 
restructuring of the industry. This applies not only to EU-based companies, but also to any company active on 
the EU markets. Industry restructuring is an important way of fostering efficient allocation of production assets. 
However, there are also situations where industry consolidation can give rise to harmful effects on competition, 
taking  into  account  the  merging  companies’  degree  of  market  power  and  other  market  features.  EU  merger 
control ensures that changes in the market structure which lead to harmful effects on competition do not occur.  

EU merger control ensures that all firms active in EU markets can compete on fair and equal 
terms.  Proposed transactions  which may distort  competition  are subject  to  close scrutiny by 
the Commission. If necessary to protect competition, the Commission can give merging firms 
the  possibility  to  dispel  competition  concerns  by  offering  commitments.  If  sufficient 
commitments cannot be found or agreed upon, the Commission may prohibit the transaction. 
In its assessments, the Commission takes into account efficiencies possibly brought about by 
mergers.  Efficiencies  may  have  positive  effects  on  costs  and  innovation,  for  example, 

127 Special Report 24/2020 The Commission’s EU merger control and antitrust proceedings: a need to scale up market 
oversight, of 19 November 2020, available at  
https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR20_24/SR_Competition_policy_EN.pdf. 

35 

 
 
                                                 
provided  that  they  are  verifiable,  merger-specific  and  likely  to  be  passed  on  to  consumers. 
Despite  the  impact  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  the  Commission’s  enforcement  activity  in 
2020 remained very similar to the previous year. 

3.1 Recent enforcement trends  

In  2020,  361  mergers  were  notified  to  the  Commission.  While  the  number  of  merger 
notifications  initially  slowed  down  at  the  outbreak  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic  crisis,  the 
overall number of merger notifications received in 2020 has remained relatively stable when 
compared with recent years. After years of continuous and significant increase in the number 
of notifications received in the period 2013-2018 (including an all-time record in 2018 with 
the  highest  number  of  notifications  ever  received),  the  number  of  notifications  have 
experienced  a  slight  decline  in  the  last  two  years  but  still  remain  high.  While  in  the  period 
2010-2014,  the  Commission  received  on  average  289  notifications  per  year,  in  the  period 
2015-2019  the  yearly  average  increased  to  373.  Moreover,  there  were  30  reasoned  pre-
notification  submissions  by  notifying  parties,  requesting  referral  of  a  case  from  the 
Commission to a national competition authority or vice versa. 

Like in the previous years, most mergers notified in 2020 did not raise competition concerns 
and  could  be  processed  speedily.  The  simplified  procedure  was  used  in  76%  of  all  notified 
transactions  in  2020,  showing  the  continuous  positive  impact  of  the  simplification  package 
adopted  by  the  Commission  in  December  2013.  The  proportion  of  simplified  cases  in  the 
period 2004-2013 was substantially lower, at 59%.  

to  carefully  assess 

Nevertheless, 2020 involved intensive work by the Commission both due to the large number 
of  notified  transactions  and  the  complexity  of  a  significant  number  of  cases.  An  increasing 
number of notified transactions concerned already concentrated industries. This required the 
impact  on  competition,  employing 
Commission 
sophisticated  quantitative  techniques  and  comprehensive  qualitative  investigations.  In  2020, 
the  Commission  opened  in-depth  investigations  (second  phase)  in  eight  cases.  These  cases 
concerned  diverse  sectors  such  as  manufacture  and  retail  sale  of  lenses  and  eyewear, 
hydraulic  components,  automotive,  digital  healthcare  and  wearable  devices,  and  financial 
markets. 

their  potential 

The  Commission  increasingly  has  to  assess  mergers  involving  digital  issues,  both  in  the 
digital and traditional industries, and their number is likely to continue growing. In 2020, the 
Commission cleared Google’s acquisition of Fitbit subject to commitments aimed at ensuring 
that  the  market  for  wearables  and  the  nascent  health  digital  space  remain  open  and 
competitive.  

Despite  the  impact  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  the  Commission’s  enforcement  activity  in 
2020  remained  very  similar  to  the  previous  year.  The  Commission  adopted  352  merger 
decisions in 2020128 and intervened in 18 cases, a slightly lower number than previous years 
but that remains in the 5-7% range (out of total decisions adopted) of previous years. In 2020, 
13  mergers  were  cleared  subject  to  commitments  in  first  phase,  three  were  cleared  with 
remedies after a second phase129 and one was cleared unconditionally in second phase. Two 

128 For the purposes of this report, decisions based on Articles 6(1)(a), 6(1)b, 6(1)b in combination with 6(2), 8(1), 8(2) 
and 8(3) of the Merger Regulation are considered as final decisions. 
129 Case M.9014 PKN ORLEN/GRUPA LOTOS, Case M.9730 FCA/PSA, Case M.9660 Google/Fitbit. 

36 

 
                                                 
cases  were  abandoned  during  the  in-depth  investigation130.  Finally,  the  Commission  did  not 
prohibit any transaction in 2020.  

Merger decisions 2011-2020: 

Most remedies accepted  by the Commission  in  2020 consisted of divestitures of tangible or 
intangible assets. This confirms the Commission’s general preference for structural remedies 
in  merger  cases  as  best  suited  to  address  in  a  durable  manner  competition  concerns  arising 
from  a  concentration.  In  2020  some  complex  transactions  were  successfully  resolved  in 
Phase I  subject  to  comprehensive  remedy  packages  offered  by  the  Notifying  Parties  in  due 
time,  such  as  in  the  Alstom/Bombardier  case.  The  Commission  accepted  non-divestiture 
remedies  in  a  few  cases,  where  they  were  considered  to  solve  effectively  the  underlying 
competition concerns in light of the specificities of the sector and the case at hand.   

Finally, in 2020, two procedural infringement cases continued to be under investigation. One 
against  Merck  GmbH  concerning  their  alleged  provision  of  incorrect  and/or  misleading 
information  during the  Commission’s merger review, and one against Telefonica  for breach 
of the commitments given in relation to its acquisition of E-Plus in 2014. 

3.2 The  evaluation  of  selected  procedural  and  jurisdictional  aspects  of  EU  merger 

control 

In 2020, the Commission has entered the final stages of its evaluation of selected procedural 
and jurisdictional aspects of EU merger control131. A Staff Working Document summarising 
the main findings of the evaluation was published on 26 March 2021132. Following the results 
of  the  evaluation,  the  Commission  adopted  a  communication  providing  guidance  on  the 

130 Case M.9547 Johnson & Johnson/Tachosil, Case M.9097 Boeing/Embraer.   
131 The evaluation focussed on four topics, (i) possible further simplification of EU merger control, (ii) the functioning 
of  the  jurisdictional  thresholds,  (iii)  the  functioning  of  the  referral  system,  and  (iv)  specific  technical  aspects  of  the 
procedural and investigative framework for the assessment of mergers.  
132  Commission  Staff  Working  Document:  Evaluation  procedural  and  jurisdictional  aspects  of  EU  merger  control, 
SWD(2021) 66 final, 26.3.2021. See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_1384 

37 

 
 
                                                 
application  of  the  referral  mechanism  between  Member  States  set  out  in  Article  22  of  the 
Merger  Regulation,  and  launched  an  impact  assessment  on  exploring  policy  options  for 
further targeting and simplification of merger procedures133.  

3.3 Market definition notice  

On 26 June 2020, as part of an evaluation, the Commission launched a public consultation to 
seek  views  from  stakeholders  whether  the  Notice  on  market  definition  (Market  Definition 
Notice) is still fit for purpose, in particular in light of recent market developments, including 
digitalisation.  The  summary  of  the  stakeholder  views  was  published  on  18  December 
2020134.The evaluation work is ongoing. 

3.4 Significant judgments by EU courts in merger control  

In its judgment of 4 March 2020135 the Court of Justice dismissed Marine  Harvest’s appeal 
against the General Court’s judgment whereby it upheld the Commission decision imposing a 
EUR  20  million  fine  to  Marine  Harvest  for  gun  jumping.  The  Commission  decision  was 
therefore validated by the Court of Justice.  

In  its  judgment  of  28  May  2020136  the  General  Court  annulled  the  Commission  Decision 
adopted in 2016 which prohibited Hutchison’s acquisition of O2 UK and provided guidance 
on the assessment of whether a transaction gives rise to a significant impediment of effective 
competition  when  such  a  transaction  does  not  result  in  the  creation  or  strengthening  of  a 
dominant position. The Commission appealed the General Court judgment on 7 August 2020.  

In its judgment of 5 October 2020137 the General  Court upheld  the Commission  decision to 
prohibit  the  joint  acquisition  of  Cemex  Croatia  by  HeidelbergCement  and  SchwenkZement 
through their joint venture Duna Brava. The Court validated the Commission’s jurisdictional 
and substantive assessment of the transaction.  

In its judgment of 16 December 2020, in case T-430/18 American Airlines v Commission, the 
General  Court  upheld  a  2018  Commission  decision  adopted  in  the  context  of  the 
implementation  of  remedies  made  binding  in  2013  to  clear  the  merger  between  American 
Airlines and US Airways. The General Court validated the Commission’s interpretation of the 
threshold an airline has to fulfil to obtain grandfathering rights over remedy slots used on a 
given route on which competition problems have been identified.  

3.5 Audit by the European Court of Auditors on merger control  

As  per  section  2.5,  the  European  Court  of  Auditors  (ECA)  published  in  November  2020  a 
Special  Report  on  EU  merger  control  and  antitrust  proceedings  in  the  period  2010-2017138. 
On merger control, ECA found that the Commission completed its merger reviews within the 

133 Communication from the Commission: Commission Guidance on the application of the referral mechanism set out 
in Article 22 of the Merger Regulation to certain categories of cases, C(2021) 1959 final, 26.3.2021. 
134 Summary of the stakeholder consultation: Evaluation of the Market Definition Notice of 18.12.2020, available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12325-Evaluation-of-the-Commission-Notice-
on-market-definition-in-EU-competition-law/public-consultation. 
135 Case C-10/18 P Mowi (formerly Marine Harvest) v Commission. 
136 Case T-399/16 CK Telecoms UK Investments v Commission. 
137 Case T-380/17 HeidelbergCement and Schwenk Zement v Commission. 
138 Special Report 24/2020 The Commission’s EU merger control and antitrust proceedings: a need to scale up market 
oversight, of 19 November 2020, available at  
https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR20_24/SR_Competition_policy_EN.pdf.  

38 

 
                                                 
legal  deadlines.  However,  the  Commission  has  to  cope  with  an  increasing  number  of 
concentrations of companies and more and more data to be analysed. ECA concluded that the 
Commission successfully applied a simplified merger procedure but still can act upon further 
streamlining  measures.  In  addition,  ECA  studied  the  turnover-based  thresholds  used  for 
deciding whether a transaction would affect competition in the internal market, as well as the 
option of charging merger fees.   

The Commission accepts to look into possible ways to optimise merger procedures and case 
management.  ECA’s  recommendation  of  regular  ex-post  evaluations  concerns  also  merger 
control,  for example, when assessing whether assumptions  about  market developments  after 
intervention  in  a  merger  operation  were  correct.  While  the  Commission  accepts  the 
recommendation  it  notes  that  the  implementation  of  the  recommendation  is  subject  to  the 
availability of sufficient resources. 

4. 

DEVELOPING THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF EU COMPETITION POLICY 

As  world  markets  continue  to  integrate  and  more  companies  rely  on  global  value  chains, 
competition agencies need to increase their collaboration and agree on common standards and 
procedures  more  than  ever  before.  Effectively  enforcing  competition  rules  depends  to  a 
growing extent on co-operation with other enforcement authorities and having effective tools 
to ensure a fair business environment in the EU. 

4.1 Control  of foreign subsidies  – a new policy initiative to strengthen the Commission 

toolbox 

Europe’s  economy  is  open  and  closely  interlinked  with  the  rest  of  the  world.  Therefore, 
ensuring  a  fair  business  environment  in  the  Single  Market  is  key  for  companies  in  the  EU. 
Subsidies  given  by  Member  States  have  always  been  subject  to  strict  EU  State  aid  rules. 
Subsidies granted by non-EU governments to companies active in the EU, however, seem to 
have  an  increasingly  negative  impact  on  the  internal  market,  but  fall  outside  EU  State  aid 
control.  

To  launch  a  debate  on  new  tools  to  address  this  regulatory  gap,  the  Commission  adopted  a 
White Paper on foreign subsidies on 17 June 2020139. An extensive consultation was carried 
out  in  2020140,  to  which  the  Commission  received  150  contributions  from  various 
stakeholders.  The  Commission  also  received  22  submissions  on  the  Inception  Impact 
Assessment141,  published  on  6  October  2020,  and  carried  out  targeted  consultations  of 
stakeholders on the available policy options and their impacts.  

The  White  Paper  put  forward  several  complementary  options  to  address  the  existing 
regulatory gap: 

Module 1 proposed the establishment of a general market scrutiny instrument to capture all 
possible  market  situations  in  which  foreign  subsidies  may  cause  distortions  in  the  Single 

139 White Paper on levelling the playing field as regards foreign subsidies, COM(2020) 253 final, 17.6.2020, available 
at https://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/overview/foreign_subsidies_white_paper.pdf. 
140 See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12621-Trade-investment-addressing-
distortions-caused-by-foreign-subsidies./public-consultation. 
141 See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12621-Addressing-distortions-caused-
by-foreign-subsidies/feedback?p_id=8607947. 

39 

 
 
                                                 
Market.  Under  this  Module,  the  competent  supervisory  authority,  could  act  upon  any 
indication or information that a company active in the EU benefits from a foreign subsidy. If 
the existence of a foreign subsidy and its distortive impact is established, and not outweighed 
by  its  positive  impact,  the  authority  would  impose  remedial  measures,  such  as  redressive 
payments and structural or behavioural remedies.  

Module 2 aimed to specifically address distortions caused by foreign subsidies facilitating the 
acquisition of an EU target. Under Module 2, companies benefitting from financial support of 
a  non-EU  government  would  need  to  notify  their  acquisitions  of  EU  companies,  above  a 
given  threshold,  to  the  Commission.  Should  the  Commission  find  that  the  acquisition  is 
facilitated by a distortive foreign subsidy, it could accept commitments or impose redressive 
measures or prohibit the acquisition.  

Module  3  addressed  the  distortive  effect  of  foreign  subsidies  on  EU  public  procurement 
procedures. Under this Module, the White Paper proposes a mechanism where bidders would 
have  to  notify  financial  contributions  received  from  non-EU  countries.  The  competent 
authorities  would  then  assess  whether  there  is  a  foreign  subsidy  and  whether  it  distorts  the 
awarding  of  the  public  procurement.  In  such  a  case,  the  bidder  could  be  excluded  from  the 
procurement procedure. 

Finally, the White Paper set out ways to address the issue of foreign subsidies in the case of 
applications for EU financial support.  

As  announced  in  the  Commission  Work  Programme  2021142,  a  legislative  proposal  on 
addressing distortions caused by foreign subsidies will be presented in 2021. 

4.2 Multilateral relations 

In  2020,  the  Commission  continued  its  endeavours  to  improve  international  rules  for 
subsidies.  Reforming  the  subsidy  rules  is  one  of  the  EU’s  main  priorities  for  the 
modernisation of WTO trade rules. To this effect, the EU, US and Japan agreed in a common 
statement  in  January  2020143  to  strengthen  the  existing  rules  on  industrial  subsidies. 
Moreover,  in  2020  the  Commission  was  engaged  in  several  sectoral  initiatives  addressing 
subsidies  in  the  international  context,  for  example  the  G20  Global  Forum  on  steel  excess 
capacity.  Finally,  the  Commission  also  continued  the  work  with  EU  Member  States  in  the 
International Subsidy Policy Group, exchanging views and coordinating initiatives concerning 
international subsidy policies at multilateral and bilateral level.  

In 2020, the Commission continued its active engagement in competition-related international 
fora  such  as  the  OECD  Competition  Committee,  the  International  Competition  Network 
(ICN),  the  World  Bank,  and  United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development 
(UNCTAD). 

At the OECD Competition Committee meeting in June 2020, the Commission contributed to 
the  discussions  on  conglomerate  effects  of  mergers144,  start-ups,  killer  acquisitions  and 
merger control thresholds145, consumer data rights and impact on competition146, and on line 

142 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, The European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Commission Work Programme 2021 – A Union of vitality in a 
world of fragility, COM(2020) 690 final.   
143 See: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/january/tradoc_158567.pdf. 
144 See: https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/conglomerate-effects-of-mergers.htm.  
145 See: https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/start-ups-killer-acquisitions-and-merger-control.htm.  

40 

 
                                                 
of business restrictions147. In December 2020, the Commission contributed to the Competition 
Committee’s  deliberations  on  the  role  of  competition  policy  in  promoting  economic 
recovery148, economic analysis in merger investigations and the role of economists in merger 
teams  and  qualitative  evidence  review149.  Furthermore,  the  Executive  Vice  President 
Margrethe Vestager delivered a keynote speech in the opening session “Competition Policy: 
Time for a reset” of the OECD Global Forum on Competition150.  

In the ICN, following the 2020 Virtual Annual Conference, which took place in September, 
the  Commission  continued  its  three-year  co-chair  role  of  the  Unilateral  Conduct  Working 
Group,  which  it  currently  shares  with  the  South  African  and  Japanese  Competition 
Authorities.  The  Commission  continued  the  multi-annual  project  on  the  “assessment  of 
dominance  and  market  power  in  digital”,  where  it  published  the  survey  report  on 
dominance/significant market power151 in July 2020. DG Competition contributed to various 
work products of the Cartel Working Group, in particular the “Guidance on Enhancing Cross-
border Leniency Cooperation” and the “Big Data Project”. The Commission is also an active 
member  in  the  other  ICN  Working  Groups;  the  Merger  Working  Group,  the  Advocacy 
Working Group, and the Agency Effectiveness Working Group.  

In  UNCTAD,  the  Commission  contributed  to  the  eighth  Conference  on  Competition  and 
Consumer Protection in October 2020152. The conference included discussions on competitive 
neutrality,  combating  cross-border  cartels  and  consumer  protection  and  competition  in  the 
digital economy.  

4.2.1.  Relations with the United Kingdom 

In  2020,  the  Commission  continued  to  prepare  for  the  withdrawal  of  the  United  Kingdom 
from  the  European  Union,  including  the  competition  and  State  aid  related  aspects  of  that 
withdrawal.  The  Withdrawal  Agreement  between  the  European  Union  and  the  United 
Kingdom, which entered into force on 1 February 2020153, set out the continued application of 
the  EU  acquis  during  the  transition  period,  until  end  2020.  It  included,  amongst  others, 
provisions for State aid and competition cases which were ongoing at the end of the transition 
period.  The  Commission  issued  guidance  explaining  the  application  of  the  Withdrawal 
Agreement in competition matters154.  

In  December  2020,  the  negotiations  on  the  EU-UK  Trade  and  Cooperation  Agreement 
(TCA)155  were  finalised.  The  agreement  provisionally  applies  from  1  January  2021.  It 
includes  comprehensive  competition  and  subsidies  chapters  ensuring  that  competition 
between the EU and the United Kingdom is not distorted after the United Kingdom leaves the 
EU.  

146 See: https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/consumer-data-rights-and-competition.htm. 
147 See: https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/line-of-business-restrictions-as-a-solution-to-competition-concerns.htm. 
148 See: https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/role-of-competition-policy-in-promoting-economic-recovery.htm. 
149 See: https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/economic-analysis-in-merger-investigations.htm.  
150 See: https://www.oecd.org/competition/globalforum/competition-policy-time-for-a-reset.htm. 
151  See:https://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/UCWG-Report-on-dominance-
in-digital-markets.pdf. 
152 See: https://unctad.org/meeting/eighth-united-nations-conference-competition-and-consumer-protection. 
153 See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/relations-united-kingdom/eu-uk-withdrawal-agreement_en. 
154 See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/brexit_files/info_site/eu-competition-law_en_0.pdf. 
155 Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of 
the One Part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the Other Part, OJ L 444, 31.12.2020, 
p. 14-1462. 

41 

 
                                                                                                                                                         
4.2.2.  Other bilateral relations 

At  bilateral  level,  the  EU  and  China  concluded  in  principle  the  negotiations  for  a 
Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) on 30 December 2020156. China committed 
to  a  greater  level  of  market  access  for  EU  investors,  including  some  new  important  market 
openings.  The  Agreement  improves  the  transparency  of  subsidies,  essentially  by  extending 
the current WTO transparency disciplines for industrial goods to also cover services sectors. 
In  addition,  it  also  establishes  a  two-stage  consultation  mechanism  between  the  parties 
allowing to collect the necessary information to assess the effects of specific subsidies on the 
investment interests of a party. China also made commitments to ensure fair treatment for EU 
companies, so they can compete on a better level playing field in China, including in terms of 
disciplines for state owned enterprises, transparency of subsidies and rules against the forced 
transfer of technologies. 

The  Commission  aims  at  including  provisions  on  competition  and  State  aid  control  when 
negotiating  Free  Trade  Agreements  (FTAs).  In  2020,  the  Commission  continued  FTA 
negotiations with Australia, Azerbaijan, Chile, Indonesia, New Zealand and Uzbekistan.  

As regards the draft Second Generation Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Canada, 
the Commission is in regular contact with the Canadian Competition Bureau to find a solution 
on  data  protection  in  Canada  lining  up  to  the  standards  established  by  the  Opinion  of  the 
Court of Justice on the  2014 EU Canada Passenger Name Record  Agreement157. Moreover, 
the  Commission  continued  the  negotiations  with  Japan  on  a  Second  Generation  Agreement 
with a view to updating the existing cooperation agreement from 2003158. 

Another  key  area  of  the  Commission’s  activities  is  technical  cooperation  on  competition 
policy  and  enforcement  with  the  European  Union’s  main  trading  partners.  To  frame  this 
cooperation, the Commission has signed a number of Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs). 
The  Commission  has  signed  MoUs  with  the  BRICS159  countries  and  Mexico,  and  it  has 
engaged  in  technical  cooperation  with  these  countries  to  varying  degrees.  In  2020,  the 
Commission  also  continued  its  technical  cooperation  activities  with  the  Japanese,  Korean, 
Indian, Chinese and ASEAN160 competition authorities161.  

In  negotiations  with  candidate  countries  and  potential  candidates,  the  Commission’s  main 
policy objective – in addition to advocating a competition culture – is to help these countries 
to create legislative frameworks with well-functioning operationally independent competition 
authorities that build up a solid enforcement record. To meet the conditions for EU accession 
in the competition policy field, these requirements must be fulfilled. In 2020, the Commission 
continued  to  monitor  candidate  countries’  and  potential  candidates’  compliance  with  their 
commitments  under the  Stabilisation and Association  agreements.  In 2020,  the Commission 
also  continued  monitoring  the  implementation  of  the  competition  acquis  in  neighbouring 
countries, with which the EU has concluded deep and comprehensive free trade agreements. 

156 EU – China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), available at: 
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2237.  
157 See: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?pro=AVIS&num=C-1/15. Currently, Canada is preparing an overhaul of its 
domestic privacy act. 
158 See: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:22003A0722(01). 
159 BRICS is an acronym commonly used to denote the countries Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. 
160 Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 
161 See: https://competitioncooperation.eu/. 

42 

 
                                                 
The Commission has also been actively engaging with several African national and regional 
authorities  to  develop  cooperation  in  the  competition  field.  In  2020,  the  Commission 
continued  negotiations  for  the  future  Agreement  for  ACP  countries  (the  Cotonou 
Agreement)162  and  the  related  Economic  Partnership  Agreements  (EPAs).  The  Commission 
reached a political deal on the former on 3 December 2020163. 

5. 

EXTERNAL COMMUNICATION 

The Directorate-General for Competition’s external communication is focussed on the use of 
mass  media  to  reach  a  variety  of  audiences,  including  businesses,  lawyers,  researchers, 
academics,  students  and  the  general  public.  This  is  achieved  principally  via  the  Executive 
Vice  President’s  press  conferences,  press  releases  and  speeches,  as  well  as  social  media.  In 
addition,  the  Directorate-General  issues  newsletters  and  other  publications  aimed  at 
stakeholders  and  the  general  public,  as  well  as  participation  by  staff  in  stakeholder 
conferences. 

The Directorate-General for Competition produced 952 press releases related to competition 
cases during 2020. Of these, 286 were longer, multilingual, press releases while a further 666 
were  shorter  and  monolingual  (“midday  express”).  Some  of  the  cases  and  policy  initiatives 
generated  broad  media  coverage,  such  as  the  antitrust  decision  to  accept  commitments  by 
Broadcom,  the  decision  to  fine  pharmaceutical  companies  Teva  and  Cephalon  EUR  60.5 
million  for  delaying  entry  of  cheaper  generic  medicine,  the  approval  of  the  acquisition  of 
Fitbit by Google, the proposal for a State aid Temporary Framework to support the economy 
in  the  context  of  the  Coronavirus  outbreak,  its  four  successive  amendments  and  the  many 
support  measures  that  were  approved  under  its  provisions  and  the  proposals  for  a  Digital 
Markets Act and a Digital Services Act. All of these cases and policy projects were covered 
by TV, radio, print and internet media around the globe. 

Throughout  2020,  Executive  Vice-President  Vestager  delivered  around  35  speeches  to  a 
variety of audiences. The Director-General delivered 25 speeches at a variety of international 
events. 

On social media, the Directorate General for Competition was active on Twitter during 2020. 
Throughout  the  year,  around  1 056  tweets  from  the  Directorate-General’s  account  achieved 
more  than  4.3  million  impressions  (i.e.  the  number  of  times  a  tweet  appears  in  someone’s 
feed).  The  tweet  posted  in  March  regarding  the  revision  of  the  State  aid  rules  due  to  the 
Coronavirus outbreak achieved the most impressions (36 500). Other popular tweets included 
those  on  the  proposals  for  the  Digital  Services  Act  and  the  Digital  Markets  Act  posted  in 
December (32 500 impressions); the opening of the investigation into Apple’s App Store rules 
posted  in  June  (32 200  impressions)  and  the  opening  of  the  in-depth  investigation  into  the 
proposed acquisition of FitBit by Google posted in June (22 500 impressions). The number of 
followers on the COMP Twitter account rose by 2 870 over 2020 to a total of 18 616.  

The  number  of  subscribers  to  the  Directorate  General’s  revamped  electronic  newsletter  was 
13 168  subscribers  in  2020,  while  its  publications  in  the  EU  Bookshop  were  viewed, 
downloaded or ordered as paper copies 6 000 times. 

162 See: https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/acp-eu-partnership_en. 
163 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2291. 

43 

 
                                                 
6. 

THE SINGLE MARKET PROGRAMME 

Adapting  to  an  increasingly  digital  and  globalised  environment  is  a  major  challenge  for  the 
enforcement  of  EU  competition  policy.  New  sophisticated  IT  tools  and  algorithms  used  by 
economic  operators  combined  with  an  exponential  increase  in  electronic  communications, 
quantity  of  data  and  the  number  of  documents  on  case  files  make  many  competition 
investigations increasingly complex.  

The  Multiannual  Financial  Framework  2021-2027  includes  for  the  first  time  a  Competition 
Programme,  which  is  within  the  Single  Market  Programme.  Negotiations  on  the  Single 
Market  Programme  with  the  co-legislators,  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council,  were 
launched in  October 2019 and were  concluded in  December 2020 by a provisional  political 
agreement  on  the  text.  The  adoption  of  the  Single  Market  Programme  by  the  co-legislators 
followed  on  28  April  2021164.  With  EUR  4.2  billion  over  the  period  of  2021-2027,  the 
Programme provides an  integrated package to  support and strengthen the governance of the 
Single Market, including for financial services. The Single Market Programme will ensure a 
budget  of  around  EUR  140  million  for  the  seven-year  period  dedicated  to  the  Competition 
Programme.  That  will  enable  the  Commission  to  directly  support  competition  policy 
development  and  to  ensure  efficient,  effective  and  relevant  competition  enforcement.  The 
Single Market Programme Regulation will apply retroactively from 1 January 2021. 

The  Competition  Programme  will  enable  the  Commission  to  modernise  EU  competition 
policy enforcement by investing in state-of-the-art IT tools (including AI), to better deter and 
detect  any  wrongdoings.  Moreover,  the  Competition  Programme  will  allow  investing  in 
knowledge  and  expertise,  strengthening  the  cooperation  between  the  Commission  and  the 
Member  States’  competition  authorities  in  all  areas  of  EU  competition  law,  ensuring  strong 
global presence, and raising stakeholder awareness of EU competition policy. 

164  Regulation  (EU)  2021/690  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  28  April  2021  establishing  a 
programme for the internal market, competitiveness of enterprises, including small and medium-sized enterprises, the 
area of plants, animals, food and feed, and European statistics (Single Market Programme) and repealing Regulations 
(EU) No 99/2013, (EU) No 1287/2013, (EU) No 254/2014 and (EU) No 652/2014, OJ L 153, 3.5.2021, p. 1-47. 

44 

 
 
 
                                                 
II. SECTORAL OVERVIEW 

1. 

ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT 

1.1 Overview of key challenges in the sector 

Competition  policy  contributes  to  the  EU’s  environmental  objectives  and  climate  targets, 
including  the  decarbonisation  of  the  economy,  and  the  shift  in  the  transport  sector  from 
polluting  fossil  fuels  to  alternative  fuels  in  accordance  with  the  Commission’s  mobility 
policy. To this end, the Commission authorises State aid measures promoting the deployment 
of  renewables,  improving  energy  efficiency,  stimulating  demand  for  low  emission  vehicles 
for  public  and  private  transport,  thereby  contributing  to  the  reduction  of  CO2  emissions.  In 
addition,  the Commission authorises intermediate measures reducing nitrogen oxides (NOx) 
emissions  by  allowing  support  for  the  retrofitting  of  polluting  vehicles  used  in  public 
transport. Competition policy also ensures that consumers have  access to sustainable energy 
at the lowest possible price, and supports innovation. 

After the adoption in December 2019 of the “European Green Deal” Communication, which 
outlined a number of policy initiatives to reach net-zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in 
the EU by 2050 and to tackle other environment-related challenges165, in March 2020166 the 
Commission put forward a proposal for a European Climate Law167 in order to ensure that its 
climate neutrality goals are met and developed a wide range of legislative proposals aimed at 
making  possible  the  achievement  of  the  intermediate  target  of  55%  reduction  of  GHG 
emissions  by  2030,  then  endorsed  by  the  European  Council  in  December  2020.  The 
Commission has also adopted a number of strategies aiming at supporting the green transition 
in  the  energy  sector,  such  as  the  Energy  System  Integration  Strategy168,  the  Hydrogen 
Strategy169 or the Offshore Renewable Strategy170. It has also pursued its policy in the field of 
battery development by creating the European Battery Alliance in December171.  

The Commission  is  currently reviewing the 2014 Guidelines on State aid  for environmental 
protection  and  energy  (EEAG),  whose  validity  has  been  extended  until  the  end  of  2021  to 
allow finalising the revision. On 12 November 2020, a public consultation was launched on 
the Inception impact assessment and on the design of the future EEAG that will apply from  
1 January 2022 and the related GBER articles172. The revision of the EEAG and the relevant 
GBER  provisions  aim  at  delivering  a  fit-for-purpose,  modern,  simplified,  easy  to  apply  and 
future-proof enabling framework for public authorities to help reaching the EU environmental 
and  energy  objectives  in  a  cost  effective  manner  while  minimising  potential  distortions  of 
competition and trade within the Union. The revision is based on the findings of the Fitness 
Check  of  the  State  aid  modernisation  package,  which  showed  that  the  EEAG  and 
corresponding  GBER  rules  have  generally  delivered  on  their  objectives,  but  also  identified 
certain  aspects  where  the  rules  should  be  further  simplified  and  modernised  in  a  way  that 

165  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  European  Council,  the  Council,  the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The European Green Deal, COM(2019) 
640 final. See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/communication-european-green-deal_en. 
166 See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/communication-european-green-deal_en. 
167 See: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1588581905912&uri=CELEX:52020PC0080.  
168 See: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/topics/energy-system-integration/eu-strategy-energy-system-integration_en.  
169 See: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/topics/energy-system-integration/hydrogen_en.  
170 See: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/topics/renewable-energy/eu-strategy-offshore-renewable-energy_en.  
171 See: https://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/policy/european-battery-alliance_en. 
172  See:  https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12616-Revision-of-the-Energy-and-
Environmental-Aid-Guidelines-EEAG-.  

45 

 
                                                 
minimises  distortions  of  trade  and  competition  in  the  Single  Market  and  in  line  with  the 
objectives of the Green Deal.  

In October 2020, the Commission launched a call for contributions on how competition policy 
can  further  support  the  objectives  of  the  Green  Deal.  This  call  encompasses  all  the 
instruments  of  competition  policy.  The  contributions  received  supported  the  “The  Green 
Competition Conference”, which took place on 4 February 2021173.  

1.2 Effective competition in the green economy 

In 2020, competition enforcement continued to contribute to the EU environmental objectives 
through the application of the State aid, antitrust and merger rules.  

1.2.1. E-mobility  

The large-scale deployment  of  charging stations  under a competitive market  is  important  to 
ensure  the  take-up  of  electric  vehicles  and  encourage  the  shift  away  from  fossil  fuels.  In 
addition,  support  for  the  acquisition  of  low  emission  vehicles  should  be  limited  to  what  is 
needed  to  incentivise  the  purchase  of  those  vehicles  instead  of  more  polluting  conventional 
vehicles. 

In  2020,  the  Commission  approved  14  schemes  for  the  deployment  of  electric  charging 
stations and other alternative fuel infrastructures as well as for the acquisition of low emission 
vehicles  (in  particular  electric  buses  for  public  transport).  Moreover,  the  Commission 
approved  support  schemes  to  retrofit  diesel  vehicles  used  in  municipalities  where  harmful 
NOx emission limits were exceeded. These measures are in line with the EU environmental 
goals, as well as with the European Strategy for low-emission mobility, and the policy for the 
shift  to  zero-emission  vehicles  in  cities  and  for  creating  a  functioning  market  for  such 
vehicles. 

1.2.2. Reduction of emissions  

On 14 December 2020, the Commission approved a EUR 30 billion Dutch scheme providing 
aid  in  the  form  of  premia  paid  based  on  CO2  emission  avoided  to  industrial  installations 
reducing CO2 emissions through the production of renewable energy, the  recovery of  waste 
heat, replacing ‘dirty’ with low carbon electricity, for the production of renewable hydrogen 
or  the  production  of  heat174  or  by  the  capturing  and  storing  of  CO2
175.  The  selection  of 
beneficiaries and the level of support will be set through competitive bidding processes. The 
premium  will  be  paid  per  ton  of  CO2  emission  avoided,  based  on  the  consumption  or 
production of cleaner energy compared to energy production/consumption from fossil fuels or 
measured based on captured CO2.  

173 See :  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/information/green_deal/index_en.html  and  https://webcast.ec.europa.eu/competition-
green-deal-conference. 
174  Those  are  so-called  electricification  projects.  To  ensure  that  the  support  effectively  leads  to  carbon  emission 
reductions, electrification projects will obtain support only for a limited number of running hours each year based on 
the  number  of  hours  in  which  the  electricity  supply  in  the  Netherlands  is  expected  to  be  met  completely  from  low 
carbon sources.  
175 Case SA.53525 press release available under https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2410.  

46 

 
                                                 
In  July  2020,  the  Commission  approved  a  scheme  to  support  electricity  production  from 
renewable  sources  in  Ireland,  the  Renewable  Electricity  Support  Scheme  (RESS)176.  The 
RESS, will help Ireland reach its national target to transition away from fossil fuels and reach 
a share of 70% of renewables in its electricity mix by 2030. The scheme contains provisions 
for the treatment of energy communities and local communities where wind farms are to be 
installed, in line with State aid rules. The Commission found that the aid is necessary, has an 
incentive effect and is proportionate and limited to the minimum necessary, as the amount of 
aid will be set through competitive auctions. 

1.2.3. MFF-related GBER amendment (energy efficiency in certain buildings and low 
emission mobility infrastructure)  

In  order  to  further  simplify  and  synergise  support  from  national  and  EU  funds,  in  2019  the 
Commission  initiated  a  targeted  review  of  the  GBER  also  covering  financial  products 
supported  by  the  InvestEU  Fund  under  the  new  Multiannual  Financial  Framework.  To  this 
end, the Commission proposed compatibility conditions for facilitating the combination under 
the  same  project  of  investments  in  energy  efficiency  measures  with  investments  improving 
the energy performance of mainly residential buildings and those used for social, educational 
or  public  administration  activities.  Following  the  second  public  consultation  on  those  new 
provisions177 and to ensure consistent treatment, in 2020 the Commission proposed additional 
new  GBER  provisions  for  investment  aid  (outside  of  InvestEU)  to  publicly  accessible 
charging or refuelling infrastructure for zero- and low emission road vehicles from charging 
or refuelling stations supplying renewable electricity or hydrogen.  

1.2.4. State aid guiding templates  

The  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  supports  the  green  transition.  Each  Recovery  and 
Resilience  Plan  (RRP)  will  have  to  include  a  minimum  of  37%  of  expenditure  related  to 
climate. In 2020, the Commission published guiding templates to assist Member States in the 
design  of  their  national  Recovery  and  Resilience  Plans  in  line  with  EU  State  aid  rules, 
including  for  a  series  of  support  measures  for  environmental  protection  in  line  with  the 
“European flagships” of the Commission’s Annual Sustainable Growth Strategy 2021. These 
guiding  templates  include  templates  on  Energy  and  hydrogen  infrastructure178,  Energy  from 
renewable  sources179, 
renewable  sourced  hydrogen  production,  District 
heating/cooling generation and distribution infrastructure180, Energy efficiency in buildings181, 
Electric charging stations and hydrogen stations for road vehicles182, as well as Acquisition of 
zero and low-emission road vehicles183. 

including 

176 Case SA.54683 Irish RES electricity support, Commission Decision of 20.7.2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_54683. 
177 See second public consultation: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2020_gber/index_en.html.  
178 https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/what_is_new/template_RFF_energy_and_hydrogen_infrastructure.pdf. 
179 https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/what_is_new/template_RFF_renewable_power_generation.pdf.  
180 https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/what_is_new/template_RFF_district_heating.pdf.  
181 https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/what_is_new/template_RFF_energy_efficiency_in_buildings.pdf.  
182 https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/what_is_new/template_RFF_electric_and_hydrogen_charging_stations.pdf.  
183 https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/what_is_new/template_RFF_premiums_acquisition_low_emission_vehicles.pdf.  

47 

 
                                                 
1.2.5. Renewables and cogeneration 

In 2020, the Commission adopted seventeen decisions concerning renewables and combined 
heat  and  power  support  schemes184,  which  concerned  a  number  of  different  renewable 
technologies  (such  as  for  example  geothermal,  photovoltaic,  onshore  and  offshore  wind, 
biomass) including some new features, such as the support of local communities and the use 
of decarbonisation technologies (such as hydrogen). An increasing number of Member States 
grant  support  for  the  production  of  renewable  energy  through  competitive  tenders  and  by 
integrating renewables installations in  the electricity market.  This  has resulted in  lower cost 
for consumers in the electricity system as a whole185.  

Antitrust  enforcement  also  contributes  to  the  objective  of  a  low-carbon  economy  and  the 
Green Deal. After sending a Statement of Objections in 2018, the Commission continued in 
2020  its  investigation  of  ethanol  producers  suspected  of  having  colluded  to  manipulate 
ethanol  benchmarks  published  by  the  price  reporting  agency  Platts186.  If  confirmed,  such 
practices  harm  competition  and  undermine  EU  Green  Deal  and  energy  objectives  by 
increasing prices for renewable energy, in this case biofuels used for transport.  

The Commission has been discussing with the Greek authorities remedies in the long-running 
Greek  lignite  antitrust  case,  relating  to  Greece  having  granted  state-owned  PPC  privileged 
access  rights  to  lignite.  In  December  2019,  Greece  adopted  a  new  National  Energy  and 
Climate Plan according to which all existing lignite-fired units would be decommissioned by 
2023.  In  this  context,  the  Greek  authorities  submitted  a  remedies  package  in  October  2020, 
which the Commission has consulted with the market. The common objective is to finalise the 
design of the remedies in order to close the case. 

1.2.6. Coal exit  

Phasing out coal-fired power plants also contributes in a crucial way to the transformation to a 
climate-neutral  economy,  in  line  with  the  European  Green  Deal  objectives.  In  2020,  the 
Commission  approved  Germany’s  plans  to  provide  incentives  for  the  early  closure  of  hard 
coal-fired  power  plants  and  to  compensate  the  businesses  that  leave  the  market  early  via 
competitive  tenders  in  line  with  EU  State  aid  rules187.  The  Commission  also  approved  as 
proportionate  the  compensation  granted  by  the  Netherlands  for  the  early  closure  of  the 
Hemweg coal power plant188.  

1.2.7. ETS Guidelines revision  

On 21 September 2020, the Commission adopted revised EU Emission Trading System State 
aid  Guidelines  in  the  context  of  the  system  for  greenhouse  gas  emission  allowance  trading 

184  Cases  SA.55891,  SA.56125,  SA.56908,  SA.54683,  SA.57657,  SA.58556,  SA.55695,  SA.59020,  SA.59024, 
SA.57507, SA.59028, SA.59842, SA.59125, SA.59126, SA.55453, SA.57476 and SA.59015. 
185 Resulting from bidding processes, weighted average price of wind capacity  fell by 62% between 2015 and 2019, 
while the weighted average price of solar capacity fell by 51% between 2014 and 2019. Based on the sample covered 
by the study Retrospective evaluation rules for environmental support study on State aid protection and energy of 5 
June 2020, see: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/d3289dd8-a930-11ea-bb7a-01aa75ed71a1. 
186 Case AT.40054 Ethanol Benchmarks. See : 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40054. 
187 Case SA.58181 Tender mechanism for the phase-out of hard coal in Germany. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_2208.  
188 Case SA.54537 Prohibition of coal for the production of electricity in the Netherlands. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_863.  

48 

 
                                                 
post-2021 (the “ETS Guidelines”). They entered into force on 1 January 2021 with the start of 
the new ETS trading period, and replace the previous Guidelines adopted in 2012. 

The  ETS  Guidelines  aim  at  reducing  the  risk  of  “carbon  leakage”,  where  companies  move 
production  to  countries  outside  the  EU  with  less  ambitious  climate  policies,  leading  to  less 
economic  activity  in  the  EU  and  no  reduction  in  greenhouse  gas  emissions  globally.  In 
particular, they enable Member States to compensate companies in at-risk sectors for part of 
the  higher  electricity  prices  resulting  from  the  carbon  price  signals  created  by  the  EU  ETS 
(so-called  “indirect  emission  costs”).  At  the  same  time,  overcompensation  of  companies 
would  risk  running  counter  to  the  price  signals  created  by  the  EU  ETS  to  promote  a  cost-
effective decarbonisation of the economy and create undue distortions of competition in the 
Single Market. 

Against this background, the revised ETS Guidelines: 

 

target aid only at sectors at risk of carbon leakage due to high indirect emission costs and 
their  strong  exposure  to  international  trade.  Based  on  an  objective  methodology,  10 
sectors and 20 sub-sectors are eligible (compared to 13 sectors and 7 sub-sectors under 
the previous Guidelines); 

  set  a  stable  compensation  rate  of  75%  in  the  new  period  (reduced  from  85%  at  the 
beginning  of  the  previous  ETS  trading  period),  and  exclude  compensation  for  non-
efficient technologies, to maintain the companies’ incentives for energy efficiency; and 
  make  compensation  conditional  upon  additional  decarbonisation  efforts  by  the 
companies  concerned,  such  as  complying  with  the  recommendations  of  their  energy 
efficiency audit. 

The Guidelines also take into account the specificities of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs),  in  line  with  the  SME  Strategy  for  a  sustainable  and  digital  Europe,  by  exempting 
them from the new conditionality requirement in order to limit their administrative burden. 

1.3 Secure Energy Supply 

Capacity mechanisms are measures taken by Member States to ensure that electricity supply 
can match demand in the medium and long term. They are designed to support investment to 
fill  expected  capacity  gaps  and  ensure  security  of  supply.  Typically,  on  top  of  income 
obtained  by  selling  electricity  on  the  market,  capacity  mechanisms  offer  capacity  providers 
additional  rewards  in  return  for  maintaining  existing  capacity  or  investing  in  new  capacity 
needed to guarantee security of electricity supply.  Before introducing a measure for security 
of  supply,  Member  States  should  prove  its  necessity  and  proportionality  in  line  with  EU 
sectoral legislation and the minimisation of distortions of competition. 

However,  capacity  mechanisms  cannot  substitute  electricity  market  reforms  at  national  and 
EU  levels.  The  2019  electricity  market  regulation189  requires  Member  States  planning  to 
introduce  capacity  mechanisms  to  present  a  market  reform  plan  to  address  regulatory  and 
other  failures  that  undermine  investment  incentives  in  the  electricity  sector.  The  regulation 
in  capacity 
will  also  prevent  high-emission  generation  capacity  from  participating 
mechanisms. 

In  2020,  the  Commission  has  continued  its  enforcement  activity  with  respect  to  measures 

189 Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal  market for 
electricity, OJ L 158, 14.6.2019, p. 54. 

49 

 
                                                 
aimed  at  security  of  supply,  including  capacity  mechanisms,  on  the  wake  of  the  evidence 
brought  about  by  the  2016  sector  enquiry190.  The  Commission  has  engaged  actively  with 
several Member States with a view to guiding them towards a procompetitive design of these 
measures.  The  entry  into  force  of  the  Clean  Energy  for  all  Europeans  Package  has  also 
contributed  to  the  review  of  the  existing  schemes  to  ensure  compliance  with  the  State  aid 
rules as well as energy regulatory aspects and a better energy market design. In Greece, the 
Commission  has  considered  appropriate  to  allow  for  the  temporary  prolongation  of  the 
Transitory  Flexibility  Remuneration  Mechanism  (TFRM)  and  interruptibility  schemes 
conditional upon a market reform plan and a number of competition commitments191. 

In  2020,  the  Commission  also  approved  the  state  guarantees  for  securing  loans  for 
Lithuania192  and  Cyprus193  targeting  infrastructure  projects  for  securing  gas  supplies.  The 
Lithuanian  measure  will  serve  to  finance  the  purchase  of  the  Floating  Storage  and 
Regasification Unit of their LNG terminal. In Cyprus, the measure approved will support the 
construction of a liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) terminal at Vasilikos Bay, in Cyprus. 

In a landmark judgment of 22 September 2020194, the Court of Justice maintained the validity 
of  the  Commission  decision  authorising  the  UK  to  support  the  construction  of  new  nuclear 
capacity  (Hinkley  Point  C  reactor).  The  Court  confirmed  that  Member  States  may  chose 
nuclear  energy  for  securing  their  electricity  supplies  if  this  choice  does  not  distort  trading 
conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest. 

1.4 Effective competition in energy markets  

The  objective  of  competition  law  enforcement  in  the  energy  sector  is  to  strengthen  and 
integrate  the  principles  outlined  in  sector-specific  regulation  to  create  a  well-functioning 
unified market, where energy can be exchanged freely and securely across the EU, and where 
all related services are provided competitively.  

In 2020, the Commission has worked on a series of cases to ensure the integrity of the single 
energy  market.  With  its  2020  decision  in  the  Romanian  Gas  Interconnectors  case  the 
Commission  made  commitments  offered  by  Transgaz  legally  binding  under  EU  antitrust 
rules195.  The  Commission  was  concerned  that  Transgaz,  the  sole  gas  transmission  network 
operator in Romania, may have sought to create or maintain barriers to the cross-border flow 
of natural gas from Romania to other Member States, in particular Hungary and Bulgaria. The 
final commitments offered by Transgaz and adopted by the Commission enable the free flow 
of  gas  from  Romania  and  support  the  further  integration  of  South  Eastern  Europe  into  the 
European  internal  energy  market.  These  commitments  ensure  that  market  participants  have 
access to additional capacities for gas exports from Romania, that Transgaz’s tariffs proposal 
do not discriminate between domestic and export tariffs, and that Transgaz does not use other 

190 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_16_4021.  
191 Case SA.56102 Second prolongation of the Transitory Flexibility Remuneration Mechanism (TFRM)  
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/mex_20_1771.  
192 Case SA.57032 Support to the LNG terminal of Klaipėda in Lithuania  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/news/state-aid-commission-approves-additional-state-guarantee-klaipeda-lng-terminal-
lithuania-2020-nov-20_en.  
193 Case SA.55388 State aid to Cyprus LNG Terminal. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/news/state-aid-commission-approves-state-guarantee-financing-lng-terminal-cyprus-2020-
dec-08_en.  
194 Case C‑ 594/18 P Austria vs Commission, judgment of the Court of 22.9.2020.  
195 Case AT.40335 Romanian gas interconnectors, Commission Decision of 6 March 2020.  
See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_407.  

50 

 
                                                 
means  to  refrain  exports,  in  particular  by  delaying  infrastructures  completion.  These 
commitments will remain in force until 31 December 2026. 

Moreover, in the LNG markets case, the Commission opened a formal investigation in June 
2018 to assess whether the long-term agreements of Qatar Petroleum, the largest supplier of 
LNG to the EU, contain direct or indirect territorial restrictions196. Whilst LNG cargos can in 
theory  move  freely  on  a  worldwide  basis,  the  Commission  continues  to  investigate  whether 
some  clauses  of  the  contracts,  such  as  those  restricting  cargo  diversions,  may  limit  the  free 
flow of LNG within the EEA, thereby segmenting the internal market.  

Competition  enforcement  in  2020  also  focused  on  ensuring  that  all  market  players  can 
compete  on  fair  and  equal  terms  and  that  alternative  suppliers  are  not  subject  to  abusive 
conduct  by  incumbent  operators.  State-owned  energy  provider  Bulgarian  Energy  Holding 
(BEH),  active  in  the  gas  supply  market  and  controlling  the  Bulgarian  gas  transmission 
network,  was  fined  in  2018  for  blocking  competitors’  access  to  key  gas  infrastructure  in 
Bulgaria197. The aim of the Commission’s intervention was to enable competitors to enter the 
Bulgarian gas supply market and compete with BEH, bringing gas prices down and ensuring 
the  integration  of  the  Bulgarian  gas  market  with  neighbouring  markets.  On  1  March  2019, 
BEH  appealed  against  the  Commission  decision198.  In  2020,  the  Commission  has  continued 
defending this case before the ECJ. 

Furthermore,  the  Commission  has  continued  monitoring  the  implementation  of  the 
commitments  made  legally  binding  on  Gazprom  by  decision  in  2018199.  The  commitments 
addressed the competition concerns identified by the Commission and have enabled the free 
flow  of  gas  at  competitive  prices  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe.  Gazprom  offered  to  the 
relevant customers the possibility to amend their gas contracts in line with the commitments. 
The  reaction  of  the  customers  who  accepted  to  modify  their  contracts  confirmed  that  the 
commitments  are  economically viable  and attractive for the market.  The new clauses in  the 
gas supply contracts have been working well and have had a substantial impact on gas prices 
in Central and Eastern European Member States. This is highlighted by the application of the 
price revision clause in Bulgaria, which has led in March 2020 to a new price formula and a 
reduction of more than 40% in the gas price for the Bulgarian wholesaler, Bulgargaz200. 

In  electricity  markets,  following  up  from  the  DE/DK  Interconnector  case201  whose 
commitments  on  capacity  availability  and  interconnection  extension  it  monitors,  the 
Commission continues tracking potential discriminatory behaviours or restrictions to the free 
flow of electricity amongst Member States.  

The  energy  sector  has  also  seen  intense  mergers  and  acquisition  activity  in  2020.  The  most 
prominent  case  has  been  the  proposed  acquisition  of  Grupa  Lotos  by  PKN  Orlen  under  the 

196 Case AT.40416 LNG supply to Europe, Commission Decision of 21 June 2018. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40416.  
197 Case AT.39849, BEH Gas. For further information see IP/18/6846, Commission Decision of 17 December 2018. 
See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/fr/IP_18_6846.  
198 Case AT.39849 BEH gas. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39849.  
199 Case AT.39816 Upstream gas supplies in Central and Eastern Europe, Commission Decision of 24 May 2018. See: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39816. 
200 
NATURAL-GAS-FOR-BULGARIA-DECREASES-BY-OVER-40. 
201 Case AT.40461 DE/DK Interconnector. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40461.  

https://www.gov.bg/en/Press-center/News/PRIME-MINISTER-BOYKO-BORISSOV-THE-PRICE-OF-

See: 

51 

 
                                                 
EU Merger Regulation. PKN Orlen and Grupa Lotos are two large Polish integrated oil and 
gas  companies202.  The  Commission  reviewed  the  merger,  which  could  potentially  have 
lessened  competition  in  the  supply  of  fuels  and  related  markets  in  Poland  and  Czechia.  To 
obtain  the  Commission’s  approval,  PKN  Orlen  offered  a  large  and  complex  package  of 
remedies that combine, among other things, refining capacity, greater access to infrastructure 
to facilitate import and fuel retail stations. These commitments will preserve competition and 
ensure a genuine choice and fair fuel prices for households as well as businesses. 

2. 

INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AND MEDIA  

2.1 Overview of key challenges in the sector 

Markets in the information, communication, technologies and media sectors (ICT) continue to 
be  characterised  by  digitisation  and  a  rapid  pace  of  technological  change,  which  constantly 
brings to market new devices and new intangible advances, such as services, applications, and 
ecosystems. Business models and sources of revenue tend to change faster in digital markets 
than  elsewhere.  Furthermore,  since  a  few  years,  the  media  sector  has  been  characterised  by 
technological  convergence:  various  types  of  devices  and  networks  can  be  used  to  deliver 
content  to  viewers  (films,  music  and  editorial  contents  offered  by  different  platforms  are 
through  fixed  or  mobile 
available  on  TV  screens, 
telecommunications  networks).  Technological  innovation  has  also  created  cross-border 
opportunities and poses challenges to established business practices. 

laptops  running 

tablets  and 

Network  effects  are  frequently  observed  in  ICT  markets,  meaning  that  they  may  be 
particularly prone to  lock-in  and entrenched positions of market  dominance. Market  players 
frequently have a dual role, by operating a platform or marketplace for third parties and at the 
same  time  offering  their  own  products  or  services  on  that  platform  or  marketplace  in 
competition with those third parties. In ICT markets, access to and control over various types 
of  data  will  often  be  decisive  for  commercial  success.  At  the  same  time,  anti-competitive 
practices may cause the small and innovative competitors to exit early from the market. 

With  a  view  to  contributing  to  the  Digital  Transition,  effective  antitrust  scrutiny  of  the 
behaviour  of  market  players,  including  platforms,  as  well  as  timely  intervention  need  to  be 
ensured  in  ICT  markets.  To  make  and  keep  markets  open  and  competitive  in  line  with  the 
goals  of  the  digital  agenda,  enforcement  must  focus  on  safeguarding  interoperability  and 
competition between different technological platforms, and improving standard setting.  

Finally,  State  aid  policy  and  enforcement  are  important  enablers  of  the  Digital  Transition, 
which requires a combination of technological developments, industrial strength, world-class 
infrastructure and an appropriate regulatory framework. 

2.2 Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges  

2.2.1. Data and platforms 

In  view  of  these  characteristics  and  challenges,  the  Commission’s  antitrust  enforcement 
activities in ICT markets pay particular attention to platforms and the access and use of data.  

202 Case M.9014 PKN Orlen/Grupa Lotos, Commission Decision of 14 July 2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_9014. 

52 

 
                                                 
In  the  Amazon  Data  case203,  the  Commission  issued  a  Statement  of  Objections  against 
Amazon as regards Amazon’s systemic reliance on non-public business data of independent 
sellers who sell on its marketplace, to the benefit of Amazon’s own retail business, in direct 
competition with those third party sellers. The Commission’s preliminary findings show that 
very  large  quantities  of  non-public  seller  data  flow  directly  into  the  automated  systems  of 
Amazon’s  retail  business  and  are  available  to  its  employees.  Amazon’s  ability  to  aggregate 
these granular data and use them in its automated decision-taking mechanisms to calibrate its 
retail offers and strategic business decisions, is preliminarily found to be capable of harming 
competition on the merits in online retail and marginalising third party sellers, in particular in 
best-selling product categories.  

The Commission is examining how Google and Facebook gather and use data, and the impact 
of  such  practices  on  competition.  In  addition,  the  Commission  is  examining  the  potential 
tying of Facebook Marketplace to Facebook’s social network.  

In July 2020, the Commission  launched a sector  inquiry into the  Internet  of Things (“IoT”) 
sector,  based  on  Article  17  of  Regulation  1/2003204.  The  IoT  sector  inquiry  has  as  its  main 
goal to gain a more comprehensive understanding of competition issues, market dynamics and 
business challenges in the consumer IoT sector. Despite the early stage of development of this 
sector,  there  are  indications  of  practices  that  could  affect  competition  in  this  area,  such  as 
restrictions of data use,  given the accumulation  of big data by platforms and “gatekeepers”. 
The  sector  inquiry  will  allow  the  Commission  to  examine  indications  of  conducts  in  this 
sector  that  could  lead  to  restrictions  or  distortions  of  competition,  and  allow  for  early 
intervention  if  necessary.  A  preliminary  report  will  be  published  in  the  first  half  of  2021, 
followed by a public consultation. The final report will be issued in 2022.  

The Google / Fitbit merger 
On  17  December  2020,  after  an  in-depth  investigation  the  Commission  cleared  the  acquisition  of  Fitbit  by 
Google205. The approval is conditional on full compliance with a commitments package offered by Google. The 
Commission’s investigation focused on the data collected via Fitbit’s wearable devices and the interoperability 
of  wearable  devices  with  Google’s  Android  operating  system  for  smartphones.  By  acquiring  Fitbit,  Google 
would acquire (i) the database maintained by Fitbit about its users’ health and fitness; and (ii) the technology to 
develop a database similar to that of Fitbit. By increasing the already vast amount of data that Google could use 
for the personalisation of ads, it would be more difficult for rivals to match Google’s services in the markets for 
online search advertising, online display advertising and the entire “ad tech” ecosystem. The transaction would 
therefore  raise  barriers  to  entry  and  expansion  for  Google’s  competitors  for  these  services  to  the  detriment  of 
advertisers, who would ultimately face higher prices and have less choice. In addition, a number of players in the 
market  for  digital  healthcare  currently  access  health  and  fitness  data  provided  by  Fitbit  through  a  Web 
Application Programming Interface (‘Web API’), in order to provide services to Fitbit users and obtain their data 
in return. The Commission found that Google might restrict competitors’ access to the Fitbit Web API and that 
such  a  strategy  would  come  especially  at  the  detriment  of  start-ups  in  the  nascent  European  digital  healthcare 
space.  Finally,  the  Commission  was  concerned  that  Google  could  put  competing  manufacturers  of  wrist-worn 
wearable devices at a disadvantage by degrading their interoperability with Android smartphones.  
To address the Commission’s competition concerns, Google committed that it will not use for Google Ads the 
health  and  wellness  data  collected  from  wrist-worn  wearable  devices  and  other  Fitbit  devices  of  users  in  the 
EEA,  including  search  advertising,  display  advertising  and  advertising  intermediation  products.  Google  will 
maintain  a  technical  separation  of  the  relevant  Fitbit’s  user  data,  which  will  be  stored  in  a  “data  silo”  that  is 

203 Case AT.40462 Amazon Marketplace. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40462.   
204 Sector inquiry IoT, Commission Decision of 16 July 2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/IoT_decision_initiating_inquiry_en.pdf. 
205 Case M.9660 Google/Fitbit, Commission Decision of 17 December 2020. See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_9660. 

53 

 
                                                 
separate  from  any  other  Google  data  that  is  used  for  advertising.  Google  will  also  ensure  that  European 
Economic Area (‘EEA’) users will have an effective choice to grant or deny the use of health and wellness data 
stored in their Google Account or Fitbit Account by other Google services. Furthermore, Google will maintain 
access to users’ health and fitness data to software applications through the Fitbit Web API, without charging for 
access  and  subject  to  user  consent.  Finally,  Google  will  continue  to  license  for  free  to  Android  original 
equipment  manufacturers  (OEMs)  those  public  APIs  covering  all  current  core  functionalities  that  wrist-worn 
devices need to interoperate with an Android smartphone. To ensure that this  commitment is future-proof, any 
improvements of those functionalities and relevant updates are also covered. 

The  Commission  equally  continues  its  enforcement  actions  ensuring  that  platforms,  which 
hold  a  “gatekeeper”  role,  do  not  engage  in  practices,  which  could  lead  to  a  distortion  of 
competition.  In  June  2020,  the  Commission  initiated  three  formal  antitrust  proceedings 
against Apple concerning Apple’s rules on the distribution of apps that compete with Apple’s 
own  apps  and  services  on  Apple’s  App  Store  in  the  European  Economic  Area  (EEA)206. 
These investigations concern in particular (i) the mandatory use of Apple’s own proprietary 
in-app purchase system through which Apple charges app developers a 30% commission on 
in-app payments, and (ii) restrictions on the ability of developers to inform iPhone and iPad 
users of alternative cheaper purchasing possibilities outside of apps. The conduct in question 
may also dis-intermediate developers of competing apps from important customer data, while 
Apple  may  obtain  valuable  data  about  the  activities  and  offers  of  its  competitors.  The 
Commission investigates whether those practices distort competition between Apple and other 
app developers and harm consumers.  On 30 April 2021, the Commission sent a Statement of 
Objections to Apple on the Apple App Store rules for music streaming apps207.  

As  part  of  the  line  of  cases  looking  into  potential  “self-preferencing”  and  discriminatory 
practices of digital “dual role” platforms, the Commission, on 10 November 2020, initiated a 
second  formal  antitrust  investigation  into  Amazon’s  business  practices208.  Amazon  might 
artificially favour, on its marketplace, its own retail offers and the offers of third-party sellers 
that  use  Amazon’s  logistics  and  delivery  services  (the  so-called  “fulfilment  by  Amazon”  or 
“FBA”  sellers).  In  particular,  the  Commission  will  investigate  whether  the  criteria  that 
Amazon sets to select the winner of the “Buy Box” and to enable sellers to offer products to 
Prime  users,  under  Amazon’s  Prime  loyalty  programme,  lead  to  preferential  treatment  of 
Amazon’s retail business or of FBA sellers. Winning the “Buy Box” and effectively reaching 
Prime users are crucial for sellers to generate sales on the platform.  

2.2.2. Cross-border access to content 

On 9 December 2020, the Court of Justice set aside the General Court’s earlier, confirmatory 
judgment,  and  annulled  the  Commission’s  decision  of  26  July  2016,  which  made  binding 
commitments  offered  by  Paramount  studios  in  the  pay-TV  investigation209.  The  pay-TV 
investigation  related  to  certain  clauses  in  licensing  contracts  for  pay-TV  between  six  major 

206 Case AT.40437 Apple App Store Practices – music streaming, Commission Decision of 16 June 2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/40437/40437_657_3.pdf;  Case  AT.40652  Apple  App  Store 
Practices – e-books/audiobooks, Commission Decision of 16 June 2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/40652/40652_142_3.pdf;  Case  AT.40716  Apple  App  Store 
Practices, Commission Decision of 16 June 2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/40716/40716_13_3.pdf.  
207 Case AT.40437 Apple App Store Practices – music  streaming. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_2061.  
208 Case AT.40703 Amazon – Buy Box, Commission Decision of 10 November 2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/40703/40703_67_4.pdf.  
209  Case  C-132/19  P  Groupe  Canal+  v  Commission,  judgment  of  the  Court  of  9.12.2020;  Case  T-873/16  Groupe 
Canal+ v Commission, judgment of the Court of 12.12.2018.   

54 

 
                                                 
film  studios  and  Sky  UK.  Such  clauses  restricted  Sky  UK’s  ability  to  accept  unsolicited 
requests  from  consumers  located  outside  the  UK  and  Ireland,  eliminating  cross-border 
competition  and  rendering  more  difficult  cross  border  access  to  audio-visual  content.  The 
Court  of  Justice’s  judgment  confirmed  the  Commission’s  interpretation  of  Article  101(1) 
TFEU  and  indicated  that  the  geo-blocking  clauses  at  issue  created  absolute  territorial 
protection and thus had as their object the restriction of competition. The Court of Justice’s 
judgment  also  confirmed  that  the  Murphy-judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice210  on  sports 
content applies to copyright protected audio-visual content, such as films. This reinforces the 
Commission’s  interpretation  that  cross-border  access  to  such  services  cannot  be  prevented 
contractually. 

2.2.3. Technology Markets 

The  Commission’s  actions  in  technology  markets  aim  at  keeping  markets  competitive  and 
maximising incentives to innovate. In this context, the Commission has continued monitoring 
compliance  with  its  decisions  in  the  Google  Search  (Shopping)211  and  Google  Android212 
cases, as well as market developments regarding other Google verticals, notably Local213 and 
Jobs214.  

The  Commission  is  engaged  in  a  number  of  other  preliminary  investigations  in  the  field  of 
information technology and consumer electronics, including into Nokia’s licensing practices 
in relation to Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) in the automotive sector. 

The Broadcom Case 
In  October  2020,  the  Commission  closed  proceedings  with  respect  to  potential  exclusionary  conduct  by 
Broadcom in the field of components for TV set-top boxes and modems215. Broadcom’s final commitments offer 
was made legally binding under EU antitrust rules by Commission decision of 7 October 2020. Pursuant to the 
commitments,  Broadcom  will,  in  particular,  suspend  all  existing  exclusivity  or  quasi-exclusivity  arrangements 
and/or  leveraging  provisions  concerning  systems-on-a-chip  for  TV  set-top  boxes  and  Internet  modems  and 
refrain from entering into new agreements comprising such terms, for a period of seven years.  
In the Broadcom case, with interim measures aimed at preventing irreparable damage to competition already in 
place,  commitments  discussions  could  take  place  in  an  efficient  manner  and  without  the  risk  of  the  market 
deteriorating in the meantime, leading to a timely and comprehensive solution, thus promoting fair competition 
to the benefit of consumers. 

The Commission approved on 11 August 2020 the acquisition of joint control of Archipels, a 
newly  created  company  based  in  France,  by  the  Caisse  des  Dépôts  et  Consignation, 
comprising La Poste, (CDC), based in France, the Électricité de France group (EDF), based in 
France,  and  the  ENGIE  group  (ENGIE),  based  in  France216.  Archipels  will  be  active  in  the 
sector  of  authenticity  certification  and  the  management,  by  block  chain,  of  documents  and 
information related to individuals.  

210 Case C-403/08 Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and Others and Case C-429/08 
Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd, judgment of the Court of 4.10.2011.  
211 Case AT.39740 Google Search (Shopping). See: https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1784_en.htm.   
212 Case AT.40099 Google Android. See: https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4581_en.htm.   
213 Case AT.40585 Google Local. 
214 Case AT.40592 Google Jobs. 
215 Case AT.40608 Broadcom, Commission Decision of 7 October 2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40608.  
216 Case M.9619 CDC/EDF/ENGIE/La Poste, Commission Decision of 11 August 2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_9619. 

55 

 
                                                 
2.2.4. Telecommunication sector 

European consumers must be able to benefit from increased choice in the telecommunication 
sector  thanks  to  low  prices,  high  quality  and  innovative  services.  Today,  incumbents  must, 
pursuant  to  regulatory  obligations,  provide  wholesale  services  and  network  access  to 
alternative operators. The fast and efficient roll-out of 5G, ensuring the European industry’s 
competitiveness  in  an  increasingly  digital  society,  is  a  key  priority  for  the  Commission. 
Network sharing agreements can be a source of efficiencies – such agreements can facilitate 
the  roll-out  of  advanced  technological  solutions  by  reducing  the  costs.  These  type  of 
agreements are also a means for operators to quickly and efficiently deploy 5G networks. The 
better  the  parties  can  strike  the  optimal  balance  between  competition  and  cooperation,  the 
more the networks will benefit consumers both in terms of quality and prices. However, not 
all network sharing arrangements are beneficial and potential anti-competitive effects have to 
be carefully assessed in order to avoid harm to competition and consumers. 

On  19  February  2020,  the  Commission  approved  unconditionally  the  acquisition  of  joint 
control  over  Prosegur  Alarmas  by  Telefónica  and  Prosegur,  all  three  companies  active  in 
Spain217. 

In 2020 the Commission continued its investigation into a mobile network-sharing agreement 
between  the  two  largest  operators  in  Czechia,  O2/CETIN  and  T-Mobile  following  the 
issuance  of  a  Statement  of  Objections  (SO)  on  7  August  2019218.  The  Commission’s 
preliminary  view  in  the  SO  was  that  the  network-sharing  arrangement  was  anti-competitive 
because it was  likely to  remove the incentives of the two mobile operators to  improve their 
networks and services.  

On 6 March 2020, the Commission issued a common merger/antitrust press communication in 
which  it  announced  the  clearance  of  the  joint  venture,  INWIT,  subject  to  commitments,  as 
well as its prima facie finding on the antitrust aspects of the case219. In 2019 Telecom Italia 
(TIM)  and  Vodafone  Italia  decided  to  consolidate  parts  of  their  mobile  infrastructure  by 
merging  all their tower  assets into a commonly  held  joint  venture,  INWIT, by  entering into 
agreements to share their passive network (towers, masts, etc.) in the whole of Italy as well as 
their  2G,  4G  and  5G  active  networks  (the  signal  processing  equipment)  in  selected 
municipalities.  While  the  creation  of  the  joint  venture  was  reviewed  under  the  EU  Merger 
Regulation,  the  Commission  investigated  in  parallel  the  agreements  on  passive  and  active 
network sharing under Article 101 on a preliminary basis. In this context the Commission also 
reviewed the geographical extent of the active sharing, namely the parties’ initial decision to 
exclude from  the  active  sharing  all municipalities above 100.000 inhabitants,  in  light  of the 
assumption that densely populated areas are also  considered as the most profitable areas for 
investment  and  roll-out  on  an  individual  basis.  The  Commission’s  dialogue  with  TIM  and 
Vodafone led the parties to scale down their active sharing further, excluding municipalities 
above 100.000 inhabitants as well as most of their densely populated suburbs, corresponding 
to  over  30%  of  the  Italian  population  and  more  than  33%  of  data  traffic.  In  this  area,  the 
parties  will  continue  to  compete  on  network  quality  while  retaining  the  benefits  of  network 

217 Case M.9559 Telefónica/Prosegur/Prosegur Alarmas España, Commission Decision of 19 February 2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_9559.  
218 Case AT.40305 Network sharing – Czechia. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40305.   
219 Case M.9674 Vodafone Italia/TIM/INWIT JV, Commission Decision of 6 March 2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_414.  

56 

 
                                                 
sharing in the remaining cities and towns as well as rural areas. The Commission concluded 
that  this  adjustment  seemed  appropriate  to  alleviate  possible  concerns  stemming  from  the 
network  sharing  agreement,  taking  into  account  that  the  Italian  telecommunication  markets 
are less concentrated than in other Member States, and that concerns in relation to the network 
roll-out of recent entrants were addressed by the commitments in the merger decision, prima 
facie.  

On  27  November  2020,  the  Commission  approved,  subject  to  conditions,  the  acquisition  of 
Covage  by  SFR  FTTH,  a  company  jointly  controlled  by  Altice,  Allianz  and  Omers220. 
Altice/SFR  FTTH  and  Covage  are  leading  fibre  networks  operators  in  France.  The 
Commission  had  concerns  that  (i)  on  the  wholesale  fiber-to-the-office  (“FTTO”)  access 
networks market the competitive constraint exercised by Covage would be eliminated by the 
creation of a large market  leader both  nationally and in  multiple local  markets; and (ii) that 
the  merged  entity  would  have  the  ability  and  incentive  to  shut  out  retail  competitors  from 
competitive  access  to  Covage’s  fibre  capacity  at  wholesale  level,  as  Covage  would  become 
vertically  integrated  into  SFR’s  retail  activities.  To  address  these  concerns,  SFR  FTTH 
offered to divest to a suitable buyer of 25 subsidiaries and of assets corresponding to the bulk 
of Covage’s local fibre loop (FTTO) business. In addition, SFR FTTH offered a transitional 
service agreement, including access to all assets and services required to operate the divested 
business  competitively  for  a  duration  enabling  the  divested  business  to  become  fully 
independent from SFR FTTH.  

2.2.5. Media 

The Commission authorized on 30 April 2020 the creation of a joint venture based in Sweden 
by Nordic Entertainment Group AB (NENT) of Sweden and Telenor ASA of Norway221. The 
joint venture will be mainly active in the provision of TV distribution services in Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden. 

On  30  June  2020,  the  Commission  approved  the  acquisition  of  sole  control  of  Banijay  and 
Endemol Shine, companies based in France and the Netherlands respectively, by Lov Group, 
based in France222. The Commission concluded that the proposed acquisition would not raise 
any competition concerns given the presence of a sufficient number of alternative players with 
portfolios of similar content in the countries concerned.  

On  12  August  2020,  the  Commission  approved  the  creation  by  Liberty  Global  and  DPG 
Media  of  a  joint  venture  that  will  operate  a  Subscription  Video  on  Demand  (SVOD) 
business223. The Commission’s investigation found that the proposed transaction is unlikely to 
hinder  effective  competition.  In  particular  (i)  the  joint  venture,  Liberty  Global  and  DPG 
Media will each exercise their content  acquisition activities separately, (ii) the joint  venture 
will not include linear channels and ancillary services linked to the linear broadcasting of such 
channels, and (iii) a number of strong alternative SVOD players will remain in the market.  

220 Case M.9728 Altice/Omers/Allianz/Covage, Commission Decision of 27 November 2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_9728.     
221 Case M.9604 NENT/Telenor/JV, Commission Decision of 30 April 2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_9604.  
222 Case M.9676 Lov Group/Banijay/ESG, Commission Decision of 30 June 2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_9676. 
223 Case M.9802 Liberty Global/DPG Media/JV, Commission Decision of 12 August 2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_9802. 

57 

 
                                                 
On  6  October  2020,  the  Commission  unconditionally  cleared  the  acquisition  of  Central 
European  Media  Enterprises  (CME)  by  PPF  Group  NV  (PPF)224.  PPF  and  CME  are  both 
active in the acquisition of sports broadcasting rights in Czechia and Slovakia and in the sale 
of advertising space in Czechia. In parallel, the two companies are active at different levels of 
the  TV  value  chain.  CME  is  mainly  active  as  a  wholesale  supplier  of  TV  channels  in  a 
number  of  Member  States,  while  PPF  offers  retail  audio-visual  and  telecommunications 
services in Bulgaria, Czechia and Slovakia. The Commission found that the transaction would 
not affect the companies’ position in these markets. 

In January 2020, the Commission concluded the final probe in relation to the sale of licensed 
merchandise.  The  Commission  fined  several  companies  belonging  to  Comcast  Corporation, 
rules225. 
including  NBCUniversal,  EUR  14.3  million 
NBCUniversal  included  clauses  in  licensing  agreements  for  film  merchandise  prohibiting 
licensees  from  selling  online,  selling  outside  specific  territories  or  to  specific  customers. 
These clauses partitioned the Single Market to the detriment of consumers.  

for  breaching  EU  antitrust 

2.2.6. Facilitating the Digital Transition 

The  Commission,  Member  States  and  the  private  sector  are  cooperating  to  facilitate  the 
Digital  Transition,  which  will  also  be  an  important  enabler  for  the  Green  Transition.  In 
addition  to  regulation,  effective  State  aid  control  will  be  key  for  a  well-functioning  Digital 
Single Market. It will help to ensure a fair business climate, favour innovation, and significant 
business  opportunities  for  the  private  sector,  expected  to  finance  the  majority  of  digital 
investments.  20%  of  the  funds  in  the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Framework  (“RRF”)  are 
dedicated to the digital component. A large part of this will be aimed at digital infrastructure, 
which is a key digitalization driver. The RRF being subject to State aid rules, State aid control 
will ensure that such funds are used to remedy market failures, ensure that private investment 
is  not  crowded  out  and  distortion  of  competition  is  limited  to  a  minimum.  Furthermore,  in 
2020,  the  Commission  launched  an  evaluation  of  the  State  aid  guidelines  for  broadband 
deployment, with  a view to  verifying  whether these are still relevant  and fit  for purpose.  In 
parallel, in 2020, a number of broadband and mobile infrastructure cases were adopted, which 
align the Commission’s approach with technological developments226.  

224 Case M.9669 PPF Group/Central European Media Enterprises, Commission Decision of 6 October 2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_9669. 
225 Case AT.40433 Film merchandise, Commission Decision of 30.1.2020. See:   
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/40433/40433_734_3.pdf. 
226 Commission Decision in cases SA.52732 National VHC scheme in grey NGA areas – Germany,  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_52732; SA.56599 Modification of the 
Superfast Broadband (SFBB) Project – Greece,  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result&policy_area_id=3; 
Broadband voucher scheme for students – Greece,  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_57357, 
vouchers for certain categories of families – Italy;  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_57495;  SA.55742  Aid 
the 
replacement  of  the  frequency-dependent  equipment  for  broadcasting  in  the  context  of  migration  from  the  700  MHz 
band  –  Czechia,  https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_55742;  SA.55578 
Mobile infrastructure roll-out in Hesse – Germany,  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_55578; SA.58261 Broadband Austria 
2020  Prolongation  –  Austria,  https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_58261; 
SA.58074 – Mobilfunk Bayern Modification – Germany,  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_58074;  SA.54684  –  High-capacity 
mobile infrastructure roll-out in Brandenburg – Germany,  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_54684.  

Broadband 

SA.57495 

SA.57357 

for 

58 

 
                                                 
3. 

FINANCIAL SERVICES 

3.1 Overview of key challenges in the sector 

EU competition policy with its three enforcement instruments – antitrust, merger and State aid 
control  – plays  an important role in  ensuring that competition  takes place on fair and equal 
terms  throughout  the  financial  sector  and  that  disruptive  technologies  are  developed  and 
applied for the benefit of consumers and businesses alike. Innovative technology should never 
be used to erect barriers in emerging markets.  

Financial services is a sector undergoing rapid and profound change. New players in financial 
services  like  Apple  Pay  have  already  entered  payments  markets  and  providers  of  FinTech 
services227 continue to gain ground in many areas. Nevertheless, established players like card 
schemes in payments, banks for deposits and credit services, as well as traditional insurers are 
still  indispensable.  Whether  involving  new  players  or  established  ones,  the  Commission  – 
through  its  merger  enforcement  instrument  –  closely  scrutinises  consolidations  between 
competitors  and  vertical  integrations  in  the  financial  services  sectors,  notably  when  such 
mergers may create or strengthen data-based market power. 

In 2020, the COVID-19 crisis has had an impact on the different sectors of financial services. 
For  example,  in  payments,  the  pandemic  has  led  to  an  increase  in  contactless  and  digital 
payments  in  shops  with  digital  wallets,  payment  apps  and  contactless  cards.  While  in-store 
card  transactions  decreased  in  general  during  the  COVID-19  lockdown  measures,  the 
percentage  of  contactless  payments  among  all  in-store  card  payments  increased.  This  was 
accelerated  by  consumer  preferences  for  contactless  payments  without  interaction  with  a 
terminal/keypad.  Similar  considerations  apply  to  mobile  payments  with  digital  wallets  and 
apps, which are becoming increasingly popular as a payment method.  

Moreover,  the  loss  of  revenues  and  turnover  that  resulted  from  the  lockdown  measures 
responding  to  the  COVID-19  crisis,  translated  into  measures  and  certain  pressure  on  the 
banking  sector  to  provide  for  credit  payment  windows  to  business  clients.  These  and  other 
related measures required temporary agreed guidelines that were coordinated by supervisory 
authorities and assessed for compliance with competition law.  

Despite the COVID-19 crisis, index tracking funds and investment vehicles continued to grow 
in  significance  within  the  EU  capital  markets  and  the  significance  of  the  index  producing 
industry as well as the market for market data on which index users rely, became increasingly 
apparent.  This  was  emphasised  in  particular  by  policy  initiatives  and  commercial  strategies 
aiming  to  encourage  a  stronger  shift  towards  sustainable  investment  patterns  through  the 
greater use of rigorous environmental, social and corporate governance indices. The relative 
growth  of  index  tracking  investment  vehicles  also  further  stimulated  the  debate  relating  to 
how  common  ownership  of  competing  portfolio  companies  might  impact  on  competition 
levels within the academic and legal communities. 

The insurance sector faced the prospect of potential pressure from mounting insurance claims 
related to the COVID-19 crisis. Cooperation amongst insurance service providers in the EU 
occurred  in  relation  to  the  granting  of  rebates  on  insurance  premiums  in  the  context  of  the 
pandemic.  Such  cooperation  necessitated  both  a  need  to  stand  ready  to  provide  guidance  in 

227 Fintech refers to the integration of technology into offerings by financial services companies to improve their use 
and delivery to consumers. Fintech primarily works by unbundling offerings by such firms and creating new markets 
for them. 

59 

 
                                                 
the event of uncertainty of the compatibility with EU competition law of specific cooperation 
initiatives  with  an  EU  dimension  and,  at  the  same  time,  a  need  for  vigilance  to  detect 
situations where companies seek to take advantage of the COVID-19 crisis to breach antitrust 
law.  

Beyond  the  traditional  financial  services  mentioned  above  and  the  COVID-19  crisis, 
disruptive  changes  in  terms  of  new  products,  services  or  competitors  have  continued  to 
emerge. Although some of the entries of digital  enterprises in the financial services markets 
may  have  positive  effects  for  competition  in  the  internal  market,  important  risks  may  also 
arise.  To  this  end,  the  Commission  has  started  investigations  into  possible  anti-competitive 
conduct  related  to  restrictions  on  companies  offering  new  forms  of  payment  solutions.  Key 
concerns  relate  to  the  application  and  interpretation  of  card  scheme  rules  regarding  the 
products offered by these companies. 

The development of cryptocurrencies and the announcement by Facebook and others of plans 
to  develop  a  new  private  digital  currency  (Diem,  previously  Libra)  raises  a  number  of 
regulatory  challenges,  including  possible  competition  issues.  DG  Competition  therefore 
continues to closely monitor developments in this area, and works in cooperation with other 
services of the Commission to make sure that new technologies will be used for the benefit of 
all citizens and businesses and without jeopardising financial stability.  

While  new  entrants  challenged  established  players,  the  banking  sector  in  the  EU  stabilised 
further  in  2020:  capital  buffers  increased,  funding  conditions  remained  benign,  and  asset 
quality  further  improved.  These  developments  were  mainly  thanks  to  the  supportive 
macroeconomic  environment  present  until  the  start  of  the  COVID-19  crisis,  but  also  the 
positive impact of the EU’s enhanced regulatory framework for the financial services sector 
put in place in the context of Banking Union. At the same time, in the Member States which 
were  hit  the  hardest  during  the  financial  crisis,  some  banks  still  had  to  cope  with  lingering 
legacy issues such as high stocks of non-performing loans. In addition, banks across the EU 
handled  a  variety  of  structural  challenges  such  as  overcapacity,  continued  low  profitability 
due to the persistent low-interest-rate environment, the integration of digital technologies into 
business models, new sources of competition such as FinTech players (as mentioned above) 
and more demanding sector-specific legislation.  

The improved resilience of the sector as a whole enabled EU banks to immediately play a role 
supportive of the real economy when the COVID-19 crisis started. From the outset, financial 
intermediaries  were  key  in  passing  on  public  support  to  households  and  firms  in  need  of 
liquidity,  as  enabled  by  the  Commission’s  Temporary  Framework  for  State  aid  measures  to 
support  the  economy.  As  such,  EU  banks  were  vital  for  keeping  borrowers  in  temporary 
distress  afloat  and  preventing  the  emergence  of  new  non-performing  loans  and  harmful 
second-round effects such as foreclosures and a sharp increase in unemployment. 

During  2020,  the  effect  of  the  COVID-19  crisis  on  the  banking  sector  itself  has  remained 
limited, while the outlook is still subject to high uncertainty. In addition, EU banks indirectly 
benefitted from the public support to non-financial borrowers and were granted flexibility by 
regulators and supervisors. At the same time, supervisors asked them to refrain from paying 
dividends to preserve capital. The impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the EU banking sector 
might  materialise  over  time,  and  will  be  dependent  on  the  further  development  of  the 
pandemic and the smoothness of the economic exit strategy.  

60 

 
3.2 Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges  

3.2.1. Contribution of EU competition policy to innovation and fairness in payments 

In 2020, the Commission continued its assessment of the application of the Interchange Fee 
Regulation  (IFR)228.  A  study  which  collected  and  analysed  comprehensive  market 
information from all Member States to that effect was published on 11 March 2020229.  

On  29  June  2020,  the  Commission  published  a  Report  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Council  on  the  application  of  the  IFR230,  processing  input  from  the  study,  as  well  as  from 
stakeholders and national authorities. The Report concludes that the IFR has achieved its main 
objectives.  In  particular,  decreased  interchange  fees  for  consumer  cards  led  to  reduced 
merchant  charges, improved services  and lower  prices  for  consumers.  An increase in cross-
border card transactions, improved transparency and a limited increase in the use of acquirers 
located  in  other  Member  States  reduced  fragmentation  of  the  internal  market.  The  Report 
concluded  that  some  areas  require  continuous  robust  enforcement,  monitoring  and  data 
gathering, for example to continue the complex assessment of the implementation of fee caps 
and their possible circumvention. In other areas, recent implementation prevented conclusions 
on impact. The Report did not conclude, therefore, on the need for legal revision. As part of 
the continued consultation and evaluation process, the Commission collected additional views 
from stakeholders and national competent authorities during a public hearing on the IFR on 7 
December 2020.  

The  European  Payments  Initiative  (EPI)  is  an  initiative  by  Euro-zone  banks  aimed  at 
competing with international card schemes and Big Tech companies, with a focus on creating 
an integrated pan-European card scheme and instant payment solution based on the innovative 
SEPA  Instant  Credit  Transfer  Scheme.  This  is  in  line  with  policy  objectives  set  out  in 
Commission  Communications  on  a  Retail  Payments  Strategy  for  the  EU231,  and  Towards  a 
Stronger  International  Role  of  the  Euro232.  Starting  in  October  2019,  the  Commission 
provided  antitrust  guidance  (on  issues  such  as  governance,  standardisation,  cooperation  and 
exchange of information) and guidance on the application of the IFR. 

3.2.2. Antitrust and cartel investigations in the financial services sector 

On 16 June 2020, the Commission opened a formal antitrust investigation to assess whether 
Apple’s  conduct  in  connection  with  Apple  Pay  breaches  EU  competition  rules233.  The 
investigation  concerns  Apple’s  terms,  conditions  and  other  measures  for  integrating  Apple 
Pay in merchant apps and websites on iPhones and iPads, Apple’s limitation of access to the 
Near  Field  Communication  (NFC)  functionality  (“tap  and  go”)  on  iPhones  for  payments  in 
stores,  and  alleged  refusals  of  access  to  Apple  Pay.  Apple  Pay  is  a  digital  mobile  wallet 
operating  on  Apple  (iOS)  devices.  Based  on  the  Commission’s  preliminary  fact-finding, 
Apple appears to have engaged in practices that may distort competition among providers of 

228 Regulation (EU) 2015/751 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on interchange fees for 
card-based payment transactions, OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p. 1-15. 
229 Study on the application of Interchange Fee Regulation (2020), by Ernst&Young and Copenhagen Economics. See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_442.  
230 Report on the application of Regulation (EU) 2015/751 on interchange fees for card-based payment transactions of 
29 June 2020, SWD(2020), 118 final.  
231 Commission Communication on a Retail Payments Strategy for the EU, 24.9.2020, COM(2020) 592 final.  
232 Commission Communication: Towards a stronger international role of the Euro, 5.12.2018, COM(2018) 796/4. 
233 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1075.  

61 

 
                                                 
digital  mobile  wallets  and  reduce  choice  and  innovation.  The  Commission  is  currently 
carrying out its in-depth investigation as a matter of priority to determine whether there has 
been a breach of EU competition rules by Apple. 

the  ongoing 
the  Commission  continued  monitoring  and  scrutinising 
During  2020, 
preparations for the introduction of the Diem stablecoin (formerly Libra) by the Swiss based 
Diem Association and the related plans of Facebook’s subsidiary “Novi” to introduce mobile 
wallets  for Diem  related payments and money transfers. The launch of  Diem  in  the EU has 
been  delayed  because  of  regulatory  concerns  regarding  the  risks  for  financial  security  and 
stability. To address these concerns, the Commission adopted in September 2020 a proposal 
for  a  Regulation  on  Markets  in  Crypto-Assets  (MiCa)234,  which  seeks  to  regulate  and 
supervise  crypto-assets,  like  Diem.  The  objective  of  the  monitoring  is  timely  antitrust 
assessment of the impact for the payment sector and consumer welfare. 

As regards competition in capital markets, the Commission continued to monitor this sector, 
in particular focussing on the markets  for market data, covering identifiers, asset price data, 
consolidated  feeds  and  indices  where  there  continue  to  be  informal  complaints  against 
incumbent  suppliers.  These  informal  complaints  allege  that  incumbents  would  be  applying 
abusive  licensing  terms/prices,  as  opposed  to  fair,  reasonable  and  non-discriminatory 
(“FRAND”)  prices.  In  relation  to  asset  management,  in  September  2020  the  Commission 
published  a  Report  on  Common  Shareholding  in  Europe235.  The  Report  proposed  a  new 
means to measure the phenomenon and found that such shareholdings were widespread and 
increasing  across  the  European  economy.  It  also  applied  econometric  analysis  for  one  pilot 
sector  that  showed  a  positive  correlation  between  common  shareholdings  and  economic 
performance. However, this analysis did not show causality. The Commission shall continue 
to monitor the phenomenon in 2021. 

In the field of motor insurance, the Commission continued in 2020 its investigation into the 
conditions  of  access  to  the  Insurance  Link  data  pooling  system  administered  by  the 
association of undertakings Insurance Ireland236. The investigation aims to assess whether the 
conditions  imposed  on  companies  wishing  to  participate  in  and  access  the  Insurance  Link 
database, may have had the effect of placing these companies at a competitive disadvantage 
on the Irish motor insurance market in comparison to companies already having access to the 
database.  In  2020,  the  Commission  also  continued  its  monitoring  of  competition  in  the 
insurance sector. 

3.2.3. Merger investigations in the financial sector 

The  Commission  continued  to  ensure  that  concentrations  in  the  financial  services  sector  do 
not  lead  to  consumers  paying  higher  prices  or  being  offered  less  choice.  In  the  area  of 
payment systems, the Commission investigated two mergers which were approved subject to 
conditions remedying concerns identified in the market investigation. 

On  17  August  2020,  the  Commission  approved  the  acquisition  of  Nets’  account-to-account 

234  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  on  Markets  in  Crypto-assets  amending  Directive  (EU)  2019/1937,  24.9.2020, 
COM(2020) 593 final. 
235  The  Report  was  undertaken  by  the  Finance  &  Economy  Unit  of  the  Commission’s  Joint  Research  Centre  at  the 
request of the Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition. See:  
https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC121476/jrc121476_jrc_commonshareholding_final.pdf. 
236 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_2509.   

62 

 
                                                 
payment  business  by  Mastercard237,  subject  to  the  transfer  of  a  global  license  for  Nets’ 
“Realtime  24/7”  technology  for  account-to-account  core  infrastructure  services,  and  of  the 
relevant  personnel  and  other  assets.  Account-to-account  core  infrastructure  is  the  backbone 
that  allows  the  smooth  processing  of  payments  between  bank  accounts,  including  instant 
payments.  The  Commission  found  that  the  transaction  as  originally  notified  would  have 
harmed competition and lead to higher prices and less choice for the provision of account-to-
account core infrastructure services. The Commission concluded that, as both companies have 
strong  positions  and  are  close  competitors,  the  transaction  would  have  led  to  the  anti-
competitive strengthening of the leading player, Mastercard.  

On  30  September  2020,  the  Commission  authorized  the  acquisition  of  Ingenico  by 
Wordline238,  subject  to  the  parties’  commitment  to  divest  certain  businesses  active  in 
provision  of  point-of-sale  (i.e.  card  readers)  merchant  acquiring  and  terminal  provision  and 
management in Belgium, Luxembourg, and Austria. The Commission was concerned that the 
transaction  would  create  or  strengthen  a  dominant  position  in  these  markets  and  so  would 
harm competition and lead to higher prices and less choice.  

As  regards  the  financial  and  insurance  sectors,  the  Commission  opened  two  in-depth 
investigations under the EU Merger Regulation.  

Following an in-depth investigation opened on 22 June 2020, the Commission conditionally 
approved  on  13  January  2021  the  proposed  acquisition  of  the  Refinitiv  Business  by  the 
London  Stock  Exchange  Group239.  The  Commission  found  that  the  transaction  as  initially 
proposed would significantly impede effective competition in the markets for the provision of 
trading  services  for  European  government  bonds,  as  well  as  for  the  trading  and  clearing 
services  for  over-the-counter  interest  rate  derivatives.  The  Commission  also  found  that 
following  the  transaction,  competitors  in  consolidated  real-time  data  feeds  and  desktop 
services could be foreclosed from accessing LSEG’s input data, and that competitors in index 
licensing  could  be  foreclosed  from  accessing  Refinitiv’s  input  data.  To  address  the 
Commission’s concerns, LSEG committed to divest the Borsa Italiana group and to maintain 
open access to  relevant  input  data  and for over-the-counter interest  rate  derivatives  clearing 
services,  for a duration  of 10  years.  LSEG’s commitments will ensure that the markets  will 
remain open and competitive and the acquisition will not lead to higher prices or less choice 
and innovation for these products. 

On  21  December  2020,  the  Commission  also  opened  an  in-depth  investigation  into  the 
proposed acquisition of Willis Towers Watson by Aon240. The Commission is concerned that 
the  transaction  could  significantly  reduce  competition  in  the  markets  for  commercial  risk 
brokerage services, re-insurance brokerage and provision of retirement and health & welfare 
services to commercial customers. 

3.2.4. State aid investigations in the financial sector 

In 2020, there were no new individual cases of State aid to financial institutions. This reflects 

237 Case M.9744 Mastercard/Nets. Commission Decision of 17 August 2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_9744. 
238 Case M.9776 Worldline/Ingenico. Commission Decision of 30 September 2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_9776. 
239 Case M.9564 LSEG/Refinitiv Business. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_9564. 
240 Case M.9829 AON/Willis Towers Watson. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_9829.  

63 

 
                                                 
largely the fact that the EU banking sector had largely overcome the previous financial crisis 
before the COVID-19 crisis hit – with no immediate effects for the banking sector in 2020. At 
the  same  time,  Member  States  have  been  increasing  intervention  in  the  banking  sector  in 
market conform terms, i.e. under conditions which would warrant the intervention of a private 
investor rather than relying in direct public support.  

Nevertheless, in 2020 the Commission did still authorise the prolongation of already existing 
schemes  under  which  Member  States  can  provide  aid  to  foster  the  restructuring  or  orderly 
market  exit  of  entities  in  distress,  should  there  be  a  need.  For  Poland,  the  Commission 
approved an extension of a scheme (in place since December 2016) under which the Polish 
authorities can grant aid to cooperative and small commercial banks that have been placed in 
resolution241.  It  also  approved  a  further  prolongation  of  the  Polish  credit  union  liquidation 
scheme  (in  place  since  February  2014)242.  For  Ireland,  the  Commission  authorised  the 
prolongation of the credit union restructuring scheme243 (in place since October 2014) and of 
the orderly winding-up scheme for credit unions (in place since December 2011)244. In all the 
above-mentioned schemes, terms were included to ensure that any aid granted is limited to the 
minimum necessary and that any competition distortions are mitigated.  

In  spite  of  an  overall  positive  development  over  the  last  years  of  the  financial  sector,  high 
levels  of  non-performing  loans  (NPL)  are  a  legacy  problem  especially  in  some  Member 
States. In 2020, the Hellenic Asset Protection Scheme (“Hercules”), approved as free of State 
aid, was available for Greek banks  to  address the NPL issue. This scheme is an example of 
how  Member  States  can  help  banks  clean  up  their  balance  sheets  without  granting  aid  or 
distorting  competition.  Such  State  guarantees  apply  only  to  senior  tranches  under  certain 
conditions which are remunerated on market terms. 

In 2020, the Italian guarantee scheme for the securitisation of non-performing loans (Fondo di 
Garanzia sulla Cartolarizzazione delle Sofferenze – “GACS”) continued to apply. By assisting 
banks to securitise and move non-performing loans off their balance sheets, the scheme is an 
important  component  of  Italy’s  strategy  to  tackle  banks’  asset-quality  problems.  Between 
February 2016 and February 2021, the scheme has been accessed 27 times, removing around 
EUR 74 billion of non-performing loans from the Italian banking system. 

For Italy, the Commission approved a new orderly wind-down scheme for small Italian banks 
that  have  been  put  into  compulsory  administrative  liquidation245.  Given  the  exceptional 
circumstances  linked  to  the  COVID-19  crisis  and  the  safeguards  against  undue  competition 
distortions included in the scheme, the Commission accepted that banks with a balance sheet 
up to EUR 5 billion (instead of the EUR 3 billion threshold mentioned in the 2013 Banking 
Communication) could benefit from the new liquidation scheme. The Commission made clear 
that it would also temporarily accept that a higher threshold for similar schemes is applied by 
other Member States in the context of the COVID-19 crisis, as long as similar safeguards to 

241 Cases SA.56141 Fourth prolongation of the resolution scheme for cooperative banks and small commercial banks, 
OJ  C  260,  7.8.2020,  p.  4;  SA.58389  Fifth  prolongation  of  the  resolution  scheme  for  cooperative  banks  and  small 
commercial banks, OJ C 430, 11.12.2020, p. 7.  
242 Case SA.56635 Tenth prolongation of the Credit Unions Orderly Liquidation Scheme, OJ C 277, 21.8.2020, p. 3. 
243 Cases SA.57053 11th prolongation of the Credit Union restructuring and stabilisation scheme, OJ C 220, 3.7.2020, 
p. 8; SA.58819 12th prolongation of Credit Union restructuring and stabilisation scheme (not yet published in the OJ, 
but available at https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases1/202050/288445_2219131_68_2.pdf).  
244 Case SA.57378 16th prolongation of the Credit Union Resolution Scheme 2020-2021, OJ C 336, 9.10.2020, p. 7. 
245 Case SA.57516 COVID-19 – Italian orderly liquidation scheme for small banks (not  yet published in the OJ and 
public version of decision not yet available).  

64 

 
                                                 
those implemented by Italy can be demonstrated.  

The  Commission  also  approved  a  few  liquidity  support  schemes.  This  was  the  case  for 
Greece,  where  the  Commission  allowed  the  prolongation  of  a  bank  guarantee  scheme  (in 
place  since  November  2008)  to  address  remaining  challenges  related  to  banks’  liquidity 
situation246. In relation to Italy, the Commission gave its green light to a new liquidity support 
scheme for viable Italian banks with temporary liquidity issues247. 

To complement  commercial financing provided  by lending  institutions or investment  funds, 
Member States can provide aid to young SMEs and start-ups that typically suffer from limited 
access to finance to grow and develop their full potential due to well-defined market failures, 
most notably the problem of asymmetric information available to investors. These measures 
can  either  be  directly  implemented  by  Member  States  if  they  fall  under  the  General  Block 
Exemption Regulation (GBER)248, or structured as notifiable schemes under the Risk Finance 
Guidelines249.  

In  2020,  the  Commission  approved  modifications  of  existing  risk  finance  schemes  in 
France250  and  Germany251,  with  budgets  of  EUR  160  million  (2020-2025)  and  EUR  88 
million  (2021-2022),  respectively.  The  Commission  further  found  that  a  EUR  12.5  million 
Czech scheme252 to foster the financing of SMEs through capital markets (the so-called “IPO 
Fund”) does not involve State aid within the meaning of EU rules because the IPO Fund will 
participate in the public offerings launched by the SMEs at the same time and under the same 
terms as private investors. 

Member States continued to promote the creation or expansion of development banks. These 
financial  institutions  implement  State  aid  schemes  on  behalf  of  the  Member  States  and,  in 
2020,  have  notably  played  a  key  role  in  addressing  the  economic  consequences  of  the 
COVID-19  crisis.  From  a  State  aid  perspective,  publicly  funded  development  banks  can  be 
active within a well-defined remit that addresses market failures and if they do not engage in 
activities crowding out commercial financial institutions. In 2020, the Commission approved 
funding  (including  the  start-up  capital  of  up  to  EUR  800  million)  for  the  creation  of  a  new 
development finance institution in the Netherlands: Invest International253. It also authorised 
funding  (including  capital  of  approx.  EUR  1.7  billion)  for  the  setup  of  a  new  development 
bank  in  Scotland:  the  Scottish  National  Investment  Bank254.  Finally,  the  Commission 
approved Portuguese plans to set up a new national development bank (Banco Português de 
Fomento),  resulting  from  the  merger  between  the  existing  Instituição  Financeira  de 

246 Cases SA.55767 Prolongation of the Greek State Guarantee Scheme for banks 1.12.2019-31.05.2020 (Art. 2 of Law 
3723/2008),  OJ  C  74,  6.3.2020,  p.  4;  SA.57262  Prolongation  of  the  Greek  State  Guarantee  Scheme  for  banks 
01.06.2020-30.11.2020 (Art. 2 of Law 3723/2008), OJ C 277, 21.8.2020, p. 5.  
247 Case SA.57515 COVID-19 –  Italian bank liquidity support scheme (not  yet published in the OJ, but available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases1/202051/287680_2223630_98_2.pdf).  
248 OJ L 187, 26.6.2014, p. 1 (available at  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:02014R0651-20170710). 
249 OJ C 19, 22.1.2014, p. 4 (available at  
https://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52014XC0122%2804%29). 
250 Case SA.55869 Dispositif IR-PME pour les investissements dans les FCPI et FIP, OJ C 269, 14.8.2020, p. 1. 
251  Case  SA.59267  INVEST  –  Direct  grants  for  risk  capital  Investments  –  Prolongation  and  Amendment  of  the 
INVEST Guidelines (not yet published in the OJ and public version of decision not yet available).  
252 Case SA.57590 IPO Fund (not yet published in the OJ, but available at  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases1/202049/286455_2217342_172_2.pdf).  
253 Case SA.55465 Invest International, OJ C 326, 2.10.2020, p. 3.  
254 Case SA.54780 Scottish National Investment Bank (not yet published in the OJ, but available at  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases1/202049/288562_2216747_58_2.pdf). 

65 

 
                                                 
Desenvolvimento and PME Investimentos255. 

4. 

TAXATION AND STATE AID  

4.1 Overview of key challenges on tax evasion and avoidance and fiscal aid 

The  Commission’s  enforcement  activities  in  this  area  tackle  tax  base  erosion  and  profit 
shifting  to  better  align  the  right  to  tax  with  economic  activity.  State  aid  investigations  into 
Member States’ tax ruling practices are one of the tools the Commission has at its disposal to 
ensure  that  companies  pay  the  taxes  they  owe  in  the  Member  States  where  they  generate 
economic value.  

Tax evasion and avoidance can be the result of aggressive tax planning strategies, in so far as 
they  shift  profits  to  low  or  no-tax  locations  where  there  is  little  or  no  economic  activity, 
resulting  in  little  or  no  overall  corporate  tax  being  paid.  Aggressive  tax  planning  can  be 
pursued  by  using  preferential  tax  schemes,  or  by  requesting  individual  tax  rulings.  They  all 
have in common that they result in a loss of tax revenue in the Member State where economic 
value is generated (but not taxed), and in the EU as a whole because the tax eventually paid is 
less than it would have been if the profits had not been shifted.  

The  side  effects  of  aggressive  tax  planning  for  the  EU  are  particularly  negative.  First,  it 
results  in  undue  tax  reliefs  that  distort  competition  by  leading  to  advantages  for  certain 
companies  or  groups  of  companies.  Second,  it  involves  an  issue  of  social  fairness  as  the 
revenues  foregone  from  untaxed  multinationals  need  to  be  compensated,  which  normally 
shifts the burden to the less mobile income of SMEs and labour. Third, from the perspective 
of  the  delocalisation  of  activities,  aggressive  tax  planning  can  present  a  threat  to  the 
sustainable growth of the internal market.  

Although,  in  the  absence  of  harmonisation,  direct  taxation  is  a  competence  of  the  Member 
States,  national  tax  measures  have  to  comply  with  internal  market  rules  and  be  in  line  with 
EU competition rules. The recent judgments of the General Court have confirmed that Article 
107  TFEU  allows  the  Commission  to  determine  whether  a  tax  measure  confers  on 
undertakings  an  economic  advantage  which  places  the  beneficiaries  in  a  more  favourable 
position than other taxpayers. In particular, the General Court considered that the Commission 
can assess under State aid rules whether the transfer pricing method validated by a tax ruling 
leads to an outcome which is established in conformity with the arm’s length principle256. 

4.2 The Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 

4.2.1. State aid investigations and decisions concerning aggressive tax planning 

In 2020, the Commission continued its investigation into Member States’ tax rulings practice 
and  changes  in  tax  legislation.  To  recall,  the  Commission  started  gathering  in  2014 
information  on  Member  States’  tax  rulings  practices  for  the  years  2010-2013.  This  enquiry 
was aimed at clarifying allegations that tax rulings may constitute State aid and to allow the 

255 Case SA.55719 Banco Português de Fomento, OJ C 294, 4.9.2020, p. 4. 
256 Joined Cases T-755/15 and T-759/15 Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and Fiat Chrysler Finance Europe v European 
Commission, judgment of the General Court of 24.9.2019, paras.  159 and 160; Joined Cases T-760/15 and T-636/16, 
Kingdom of the Netherlands and Others v European Commission, judgment of the General  Court of 24.9.2019, para. 
107; Joined Cases T-131/16 and T-263/16 Belgium and Magnetrol International v European Commission, judgment of 
the  General  Court  of  14.2.2019,  para.  67;  Joined  cases  T-778/16  and  T-892/16,  Ireland  and  Others  v  European 
Commission, judgment of the General Court of 15.7.2020, paras 224 and 225. 

66 

 
                                                 
Commission  to  take  an  informed  view  of  the  practices  of  all  Member  States.  Overall  the 
Commission looked into more than a thousand rulings.  

However, Member States have moved on since 2013 both in terms of tax legislation and of 
ruling  practice.  In  order  to  take  an  informed  view  of  this  evolution,  at  the  end  of  2019,  the 
Commission  requested  all  Member  States  to  provide  an  update  of  their  legislative  and 
administrative practices and a list of tax rulings for the  years 2014 to 2018. This process of 
information gathering continued in 2020 and the Commission is reviewing the information. 

4.2.2. Important cases 

The  Commission  continued  the  investigation  of  its  pending  cases  on  alleged  aid  granted  by 
the  Netherlands  to  Inter  IKEA,  to  Starbucks  and  to  Nike;  on  alleged  aid  granted  by 
Luxembourg  to  Huhtamäki;  and  on  alleged  aid  granted  by  Belgium  to  39  individual  aid 
beneficiaries of the Belgian excess profit scheme. 

Also  in  2020,  the  Commission  defended  a  number  of  its  decisions  before  the  Court.  On  15 
July  2020,  the  General  Court  annulled257  the  Commission  decision  on  State  aid  granted  by 
Ireland to Apple on the basis that the Commission had not shown the existence of a selective 
advantage  in  favour  of  Apple  to  the  requisite  legal  standard.  However,  it  upheld  the 
Commission decision on the applicability of important legal principles. 

Ireland – General Court judgment on Apple 
On 15 July 2020, the General Court annulled the Commission decision of 30 August 2016 in case SA.38373. In 
that decision, the Commission had declared that Ireland had granted illegal and incompatible State aid to Apple 
Sales International (ASI) and Apple Operations Europe (AOE) based on two findings of advantage (primary and 
subsidiary line of reasoning) and several findings of selectivity. The Court ruled that the Commission failed to 
demonstrate to the requisite legal standard that the tax rulings from 1991 and 2007 provided ASI and AOE with 
a selective advantage for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU. 
Under the primary finding of advantage, the Commission had argued in the decision that the Apple IP licenses, 
which  had been transferred to ASI  and  AOE  via a buy-in and cost  sharing agreement (CSA)  with  Apple Inc., 
should  have  been  allocated  to  the  Irish  branches  of  ASI  and  AOE  for  tax  purposes,  since  only  those  Irish 
branches had the capacity to generate any income from those licenses. According to the Court, the Commission 
had  not  demonstrated  that  the  income  attributed  to  the  Irish  branches  represented  the  value  of  the  activities 
actually  carried  out  by  the  Irish  branches.  It  held  that  attributing  essential  assets  and  functions  to  the  Irish 
branches solely on the basis that the companies had no staff outside the branches was inconsistent with Irish law 
and the authorized OECD Approach. The lack of employees and physical presence outside the Irish branch does 
not, in itself, preclude a conclusion that the company, and not the branch, controls that property. 
Equally,  the  Court  rejected  the  Commission  argument  that  the  head  offices  of  ASI  and  AOE,  through  their 
boards  of  directors,  did  not  have  the  ability  to  perform  the  essential  functions  of  the  companies.  The  Court 
accepted that Apple Inc. conducted the central strategic management in Cupertino, and that this should be taken 
into  account  for  profit  attribution  purposes,  particularly  in  relation  to  the  Apple  IP  underlying  the  group’s 
products.  In  doing  so,  the  General  Court  ignored  the  Commission’s  arguments  that  these  activities  were 
undertaken by a separate entity, and were already remunerated under a CSA between Apple Inc. and ASI/AOE. 
As regards the subsidiary finding of advantage,  which was based on accepting Ireland and Apple’s hypothesis 
that the Apple IP licenses should be attributed to the head offices of ASI and AOE, the Court considered that the 
method used by the  Commission to attribute profits to the  Irish branches  was incorrect.  While acknowledging 
the  defective  and  inconsistent  nature  of  the  tax  rulings,  the  General  Court  considered  that  the  methodological 
errors identified by the Commission were not sufficient to demonstrate the existence of an advantage. 

The  Commission  decided  to  appeal  the  judgment  to  the  European  Court  of  Justice.  The 
General Court judgment raises important legal issues that are of relevance to the Commission 

257  General  Court  judgment  in  Cases  T-778/16,  Ireland  v  Commission  and  T-892/16,  Apple  Sales  International  and 
Apple Operations Europe v Commission of 15 July 2020. 

67 

 
                                                 
in  its  application  of  State  aid  rules  to  tax  planning  cases.  The  Commission  is  bringing  this 
matter before the European Court of Justice to bring clarity on these legal issues. 

At the same time, whilst the Commission decision on Apple was annulled, this does not bring 
into question the long standing principle dating  back to  very early case law of the Court of 
Justice that tax sovereignty must be exercised in light of Treaty principles and EU State aid 
laws.  The  Court’s  judgment  on  Apple,  in  line  with  its  previous  judgments  on  the  Belgian 
Excess  Profit scheme, Fiat,  and Starbucks, confirmed that Member States must set  their tax 
laws  in  respect  of  EU  law,  including  State  aid  rules.  The  Court  also  confirmed  the 
Commission’s approach to assess whether transactions between group companies give rise to 
an advantage under EU State aid rules based on the so-called ‘arm’s length principle’.  

4.2.3. Investigations into discriminatory tax schemes and measures sheltering national 
companies from competition in the internal market  

With  regard  to  the  investigation  into  fiscal  aid  to  ports,  the  Commission  took  negative 
decisions adopted in January 2016 (Dutch public undertakings258) and July 2017 (Belgian259 
and French260 ports). These decisions were upheld by the General Court261.  

In January 2019, the Commission proposed appropriate measures to Italy262 and Spain263. The 
two Member States were invited to abolish the corporate tax exemptions  for port authorities 
from  1  January  2020.  Spain  accepted  the  appropriate  measures.  As  a  consequence,  in 
November 2019, the Commission closed the investigation related to the Spanish ports264. Italy 
did  not  accept  the  appropriate  measures.  Therefore,  the  Commission  adopted  a  negative 
decision  in  December  2020265,  ordering  Italy  to  remove  the  unjustified  corporate  tax 
exemptions  for  port  authorities,  because  these  exemptions  provide  them  with  a  selective 
advantage,  in  breach  of  EU  State  aid  rules.  Public  remit  activities  carried  out  by  port 
authorities are not subject to State aid control. As a consequence, the request to abolish the tax 
exemptions  only  concerns  income  from  economic  activities.  If  port  authorities  generate 
profits from economic activities, these need to be taxed under the normal national tax laws to 
avoid distortions of competition. 

258  Case  SA.25398  Corporate  tax  exemption  of  Dutch public  enterprises,  Commission  Decision  of 21  January  2016. 
See: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_25338.  
259 Case SA.38393 Ports taxation in Belgium, Commission Decision of 27 July 2017. See:  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_38393.  
260 Case SA.38398 Ports taxation in France, Commission Decision of 27 July 2017. See:  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_38398.  
261  Case  T-160/16  Groningen  Seaports  NV  and  Others  v  European  Commission,  judgment  of  the  General  Court  of 
31.5.2018. Case T-673/17 Port autonome du Centre and de l’Ouest and Others v Commission, judgment of the General 
Court of 20.9.2019. Case T-674/17 Le Port de Bruxelles and Région de Bruxelles-Capitale v Commission, judgment of 
the General Court of 20.9.2019. Case T-696/17 Havenbedrijf Antwerpen and Maatschappij van de Brugse Zeehaven v 
Commission,  judgment  of  the  General  Court  of  20.9.2019.  Case  T-747/17  UPF  v  Commission,  judgment  of  the 
General Court of 30.4.2019. Case T-754/ Chambre de commerce and d’industrie métropolitaine Bretagne-Ouest (port 
de Brest) v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 30 April 2019. 
262 Case SA.38399 Ports taxation in Italy, Commission Decision of 8 January 2019. See:  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_38399.  
263 Case SA.38397 Ports taxation in Spain, Commission Decision of 8 January 2019 and 7 March 2019. See:  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_38397.  
264 Case SA.38397 Ports taxation in Spain, Commission Decision of 15 November 2019  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases1/201951/273981_2118576_340_2.pdf.  
265 Case SA.38399 Ports taxation in Italy, Commission Decision of 4 December 2020. The public version of this  
decision is not yet available. 

68 

 
                                                 
The  Commission’s  action  is  consistent  with  the  objective  to  ensure  that  all  companies  pay 
their  fair  share  of  taxes  and  that  no  sector  or  company  unduly  receives  a  more  favourable 
corporate  tax  treatment  than  its  competitors.  Ports  are  essential  to  the  EU  economy  and  the 
Commission does not prevent  Member States from  providing aid  to  their ports, for instance 
when  this  is  necessary  to  develop  port  infrastructure.  However,  corporate  tax  exemptions 
provide a bigger advantage to  those beneficiaries who  are most profitable. They  are neither 
transparent, nor limited or targeted at financing activities or investments which are necessary 
and justified by objectives of common interest. 

5. 

BASIC INDUSTRIES AND MANUFACTURING 

5.1 Overview of key challenges in the sector 

Manufacturing makes up more than 20% of the EU’s economy, serving as a driver of growth 
and  innovation,  and  employing  around  35  million  people:  more  than  20%  of  the  EU 
workforce. The two million companies active in the sector face substantial challenges, in the 
form  of  trade  tensions,  the  introduction  of  advanced  technologies  and  the  need  to  radically 
adapt their practices to make them climate friendly. All of this must now be seen against the 
backdrop of the pandemic, which has brought  factory shutdowns and substantial  changes in 
both  working  practices  and  the  patterns  of  demand.  The  proposed  Recovery  and  Resilience 
Facility along with the “European Green Deal” and a New Industrial Strategy for Europe, aim 
to  address  these  challenges  by  supporting  the  competitiveness  of  the  EU  businesses  and 
boosting investment during the pandemic recovery and the transition to a digitalised and clean 
economy. Enforcing the antitrust and merger rules in the manufacturing and basic industries 
sectors  contributes  to  this  transformation,  in  particular  by  ensuring  that  innovation  is  not 
hampered and that firms can compete on fair and equal terms. Meanwhile, the application of 
the  State  aid  rules  ensures  that  purely  national  interests  do  not  distort  competition,  and  that 
public  funding  is  directed  towards  research,  training  and  energy  efficiency.  Improving  EU 
firms’  long-term  competitiveness  in  the  Single  Market  also  makes  these  firms  fitter  to 
compete in the global market place.  

5.2 Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 

5.2.1. Antitrust investigations in basic industries and manufacturing 

Manufacturing and consumer goods industries continue to represent a significant share of the 
Commission’s  enforcement  practice.  In  2020,  the  Commission  continued  its  lines  of  action 
(including  individual  casework,  market  surveillance  and  advocacy)  in  these  sectors.  It  also 
engaged  with  stakeholders  on  the  potential  application  of  the  antitrust  rules  to  co-operative 
schemes  intended  to  facilitate  the  response  to  the  COVID  crisis.  At  the  same  time,  it 
continued to monitor the aftermarkets in manufacturing industries, to ensure that competition 
is not reduced to the overall detriment of consumers.  

5.2.2. Merger investigations in basic industries and manufacturing 

In 2020, the Commission continued its thorough review of mergers and acquisitions involving 
the basic industries and  consumer  goods sector,  to  ensure the  availability of  diversified  and 
affordable products across the EU, and to protect innovation. 

69 

 
In  the  specialty  chemicals  industry,  the  Commission  authorised  on  15  January  2020  the 
acquisition  of  Omnova  by  Synthomer266,  subject  to  the  divestment  of  Synthomer’s  global 
vinyl pyridine latex business. The Commission found that the acquisition would have likely 
led  to  higher  prices,  reduced  choice  in  products  and  lower  quality  of  services  provided  to 
customers  because  the  market  for  the  supply  of  vinyl  pyridine  latex  in  the  EEA  is  highly 
concentrated, with Synthomer and Omnova being the only two players with EEA production 
capacity, and characterised by high barriers to trade across regions. 

In the pigment industry, the Commission authorised on 7 December 2020 the acquisition of 
BASF Colors  & Effects  by  DIC Corporation267, subject  to  the divestment of DIC’s pigment 
manufacturing  facility  located  in  Bushy  Park  (South  Carolina,  US).  The Commission  found 
that following the transaction as originally notified, customers seeking pigments for the most 
complex applications would have had insufficient alternatives for the supply of some colour 
indices within perylene and quinacridones pigments. 

On 30 August  2019,  aircraft manufacturers,  Boeing  and Embraer268, notified their proposed 
creation of two joint ventures: (i) a joint venture solely controlled by Boeing that would take 
over Embraer’s global commercial aircraft business; and (ii) a joint venture jointly controlled 
by  the  two  companies  that  would  be  in  charge  of  the  marketing  of  the  Embraer  KC-390 
military aircraft. The Commission opened an in-depth investigation into the joint ventures on 
the  4  October  2019  due  to  concerns  that  the  transaction  could  remove  Embraer  as  the  third 
largest  global  competitor  in  an  already  highly  concentrated  commercial  aircraft  industry.  In 
particular,  the  Commission  had  concerns  about  the  impact  of  the  transaction  in  the  small 
single-aisle commercial aircraft segment (100-150 seats) where Boeing and Embraer appeared 
to  engage  in  head-to-head  competition  on  price  and  other  parameters  in  important  aircraft 
purchasing campaigns, as well as the elimination of Embraer’s potential  position as a small 
but  important  competitive  force  in  the  overall  single-aisle  market.  The  transaction  was 
ultimately abandoned by Boeing and Embraer, and the notification was withdrawn on 8 May 
2020. 

On 27 February 2020, the Commission approved Assa Abloy’s acquisition of Agta Record269 
without  opening  an  in-depth  investigation,  subject  to  the  following  conditions:  (i)  the 
divestment of Agta Record’s automatic pedestrian door business in the Netherlands, Austria, 
Hungary  and  Slovenia  and  of  Assa  Abloy’s  automatic  pedestrian  business  in  the  United 
Kingdom  and  France;  (ii)  the  divestment  of  Agta  Record’s  industrial  high-speed  door 
business  located  in  France;  and  (iii)  Assa  Abloy’s  commitment  to  supply  spare  parts  and 
related technical information and servicing tools on fair and reasonable terms for a period of 
at  least  ten  years  in  a  range  of  EEA  countries.  The  Commission  had  concerns  that  the 
proposed transaction would have significantly reduced competition in the supply of different 
types of automatic pedestrian doors in various Member States and in the supply of industrial 
high-speed  doors  in  France  mainly.  These  concerns  also  extended  to  the  provision  of  after-
sales  services,  including  maintenance,  repair  and  overhaul  of  the  products  in  question,  and 
access  to  spare  parts.  Without  the  conditions,  the  proposed  acquisition  could  have  led  to 

266 Case M.9502 Synthomer/Omnova. Commission Decision of 15 January 2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_9502. 
267 Case M.9677 DIC/BASF Colors & Effects. Commission Decision of 7 December 2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_9677. 
268 Case M.9097 Boeing/Embraer. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_9097. 
269 Case M.9408 Assa Abloy/Agta Record. Commission Decision of 27 February 2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases1/20212/m9408_2435_3.pdf. 

70 

 
                                                 
increased  prices  for  intermediary  and  final  customers  of  these  products  in  the  relevant 
countries. 

On 23 December 2019, EssilorLuxottica notified its planned acquisition of GrandVision270 to 
the  Commission.  EssilorLuxottica  is  the  largest  global  eyewear  company,  active  in 
sunglasses, lenses and frames. It owns or operates several well-known brands in the eyewear 
universe such as Ray-Ban, Oakley and Chanel. It is also present with optical retail chains in 
various  countries,  including  Italy.  GrandVision  is  a  globally  active  eyewear  retailer,  which 
operates  some  of  the  largest  optical  chains  throughout  Europe,  such  as  GrandOptical  and 
Pearle.  The  acquisition  follows  the  recent  (2018)  merger  between  Essilor  and  Luxottica, 
which  the  Commission  cleared  unconditionally  after  an  in-depth  investigation.  The 
Commission  opened  an  in-depth  review  of  EssilorLuxottica’s  planned  acquisition  of 
GrandVision on 6 Feburary 2020 and, by the end of 2020, the case was still ongoing. 

In 2020, the most significant case in the automotive sector was the proposed merger of Peugeot 
SA  and  Fiat  Chrysler  Automobiles,  which  creates  the  fourth  largest  automotive  group  in  the 
world271.  Following  a  Phase  2  investigation,  the  Commission  was  concerned  that  the  merger 
could  have  harmed  competition  in  the  manufacture  and  supply  of  small  light  commercial 
vehicles in Belgium, Czechia, France, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal and Slovakia. 
Those  concerns  were  solved  by  remedies  aimed  at  facilitating  entry  and  expansion  of 
competitors. They consisted of (i) an extension of the cooperation agreement already in force 
between PSA and Toyota for small light commercial vehicles under which PSA produces the 
vehicles for sale by Toyota under the Toyota brand mainly in the European Union, by way of 
increasing the available capacity for Toyota and reducing the prices for the vehicles and spare 
parts/accessories; and (ii) an amendment of the “repair and maintenance” agreements in force 
between  PSA,  FCA  and  their  repairers,  to  facilitate  competitors’  access  to  PSA  and  FCA’s 
repair and maintenance networks for light commercial vehicles.  

The Commission continued its in-depth investigation opened on 17 December 2019 into the 
proposed  acquisition  of  Daewoo  Shipbuilding  &  Marine  Engineering  (DSME)  by  Hyundai 
Heavy  Industries  Holdings  (HHIH),  both  active  in  the  manufacturing  of  cargo  vessels  and 
based in South Korea. The Commission initially investigated the impact of the transaction on 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) carriers, LPG carriers, large containerships and oil tankers. In the 
course of its in-depth market investigation, the Commission focused its efforts on the global 
market for large LNG carriers (LLNGCs) characterized by high concentration and barriers to 
entry  such  as  track  record,  know-how  and  technology.  However,  the  investigation  was 
suspended on 14 July 2020, as HHIH did not comply with the deadline set for the submission 
of  information  requested  by  the  Commission  by  means  of  a  decision  issued  pursuant  to 
Article  11(3)  EUMR.  The  procedure  remained  suspended  until  the  end  of  2020,  absent  the 
submission by HHIH of the requested information.  

In 2020, the Commission continued its in-depth investigation into the proposed acquisition of 
Chantiers de l’Atlantique by Fincantieri, as opened on 30 October 2019, and its likely effects 
on  competition  in  the  global  market  for  the  construction  of  large  cruise  ships.  The 
investigation  was  suspended  on  13  March  2020,  as  Fincantieri  did  not  comply  with  the 
deadline set  for the submission of information  requested by the Commission  by means of a 

270 Case M.9569 EssilorLuxottica/Grandvision. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_9569. 
271 Case M.9730 FCA/PSA, Commission Decision of 21 December 2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_9730.  

71 

 
                                                 
decision issued pursuant to Article 11(3) EUMR. The procedure remained suspended until the 
end  of  2020,  absent  the  submission  by  Fincantieri  of  the  requested  information.  Over  the 
suspension  period,  the  Commission  monitored  market  developments  and  the  impact  of  the 
COVID-19 pandemic, with the assistance of market participants. 

5.2.3.  State  aid  investigations  in  basic  industries  and  State  aid  for  the  rescue  and 
restructuring of companies in difficulties 

State aid  rules play a key  role in  maintaining a level  playing field  in  the EU manufacturing 
sector,  in  particular  by  ensuring  that  ineffective  companies  are  not  kept  artificially  alive 
through continued public funding.  

In  February  2020,  the  Commission  found  that  for  several  years  the  Romanian  rail  freight 
operator CFR Marfa had received around EUR 570 million of incompatible State aid through 
the non-collection of public debt and a debt write-off. This gave the state-owned company an 
unfair advantage over its many competitors in the liberalised rail freight  transport market in 
Romania, which CFR Marfa now has to pay back to the Romanian State272.  

The Commission also found that the restructuring plan of the Romanian uranium processing 
company  CNU  was  not  addressing  the  problems  that  had  created  the  company’s  financial 
difficulties  and  was  thus  incompatible  with  EU  law.  In  particular,  the  plan  contained  no 
measures  capable of making the company  viable on its own merits  in  the long-term  and no 
private investors had agreed to participate in the restructuring alongside the State273.  

In  February  2020,  the  Commission  approved  Romanian  plans  to  grant  a  EUR  251  million 
temporary  rescue  loan  to  the  state-owned  electricity  producer  Complexul Energetic  Oltenia, 
which  was  experiencing  financial  difficulties.  CE  Oltenia  has  3.2  gigawatt  of  capacity  and 
generates  close  to  25%  of  electricity  in  Romania.  The  Commission  considered  in  particular 
that  the  loan  was  limited  to  meeting  the  company’s  well  identified  liquidity  needs. 
Furthermore,  Romania  committed  to  ensure  that,  after  six  months,  the  loan  would  either  be 
fully repaid, or CE Oltenia would undertake a comprehensive restructuring in order to return 
to  viability  in  the  long  term,  or  be  liquidated.  The  Commission  also  found  that  the  aid 
contributed to an objective of common interest. In this respect, the loan has mitigated the risk 
of an insolvency process which would have led to the potential loss of 13 000 jobs in a region 
with already relatively high unemployment. In line with its Commitments, Romania notified a 
restructuring plan for Oltenia to the Commission, which is currently being assessed in an in-
depth investigation. 

The  Commission  also  assessed  a  Croatian  rescue  aid  in  the  form  of  a  State  guarantee  on  a 
loan of around EUR 40 million in favour of Đuro Đaković, a manufacturer of freight wagons 
for  special  purposes  with  a  diversified  industrial  portfolio  including  defence,  transport, 
industry and energy274. The company is located in the Eastern part of Continental Croatia, in 
an area with high unemployment, and has a staff of 794 people. The State guarantee will help 
Đuro Đaković obtain the funds necessary to cover its liquidity needs for the next six months. 
The  Commission  found  that  the  State  guarantee  was  necessary  to  allow  Đuro  Đaković  to 
continue  production,  deliver  on  contracts  already  entered  into  and  avoid  layoffs  in  a 
structurally  disadvantaged  area.  Moreover,  the  company’s  liquidity  needs  over  the  six  next 
months  are  based  on  reasonable  assumptions.  Finally,  Croatia  committed  to  provide  a 

272 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_313. 
273 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_314. 
274 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_836. 

72 

 
                                                 
restructuring plan for Đuro Đaković within six months following the first disbursement of the 
guaranteed funds. 

Moreover, the State aid rules helped to level the playing field during the COVID-19 outbreak 
by  ensuring  that  Member  States’  support  measures  towards  the  economy  all  followed  the 
same  set  of  common  rules.  The  Commission  approved  many  national  schemes  covering  all 
sectors, including the manufacturing sector and basic industries, such as the German umbrella 
scheme  for  recapitalisation  measures275,  the  Spanish  recapitalisation  fund276,  or  the  Polish 
recapitalisation  scheme277,  to  mention  just  a  few.  The  Commission  also  assessed  numerous 
individual measures, as for example the EUR 5 billion loan guarantee in favour of the French 
automotive  group  Renault278  or  the  EUR  71  million  loan  guarantee  in  favour  of  the  French 
automotive supplier Novares279. 

6. 

AGRI-FOOD INDUSTRY  

6.1 Overview of key challenges in the sector 

Food  supply  chains  are  resilient  sources  of  stable  supply  of  a  variety  of  products  to 
consumers,  including  in  very  challenging  conditions  such  as  those  that  prevailed  in  2020. 
Operators  in  food  supply  chains  face  in  normal  times  a  number  of  challenges:  (i)  increased 
competition from supply inside as well as outside Europe, (ii) higher and changing demands 
from end consumers in terms of qualitative aspects such as health, animal welfare, variety and 
improved traceability, and (iii) higher investment needs to mitigate the fact that the EU food 
value  chain  is  a  contributor  to  air,  soil  and  water  pollution,  an  important  source  of  GHG 
emissions  and  has  a  significant  impact  on  biodiversity,  (iv)  uncertainty  regarding 
productivity,  as  community  wide  strategies  may  affect  the  possibilities  to  use  inputs  and 
agricultural land in most productive ways280. 

The  structural  characteristics  of  the  European  agricultural  sector  make  it  more  difficult  to 
cope  with  the  aforementioned  challenges.  First,  agricultural  producers  are  the  least 
concentrated  level  of  the  food  supply  chain  in  the  EU,  producing  relatively  homogenous 
outputs. They are mostly small or grouped into small cooperatives and other types of producer 
organisations.  In  contrast,  their  input  suppliers  and  customers  (processors,  wholesalers  and 
retailers)  are  often  much  larger  and  more  concentrated,  giving  them,  together  with  credible 
outside  options,  more  bargaining  power  in  their  negotiations  with  farmers281.  Second, 
unforeseeable  events,  such  as  adverse  weather  conditions  and  diseases,  can  significantly 
reduce crop yields, resulting in volatility of output and prices.  

275 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2256.  
276 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1426. 
277 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_1041. 
278 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_779. 
279 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/mex_20_953. 
280  See  e.g.  Krzysztofowicz,  M.,  Rudkin,  J.,  Winthagen,  V.  and  Bock,  A.,  Farmers  of  the  future,  EUR  30464  EN, 
Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. 
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/publication/eur-scientific-and-technical-research-reports/farmers-future.   
281  There  are  approximately  11  million  farms  in  the  European  Union  which  produce  agricultural  products  for 
processing by about 300 000 enterprises in the food and drink industry. The food processors sell their products through 
some 2.8 million enterprises within the food distribution and food service industry, delivering food to the EU’s 500 
million  consumers.  See:  https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/food-farming-fisheries/farming/documents/factsheet-
food-supply-chain_march2017_en.pdf. 

73 

 
                                                 
A  continued  integration  into  larger  producer  organisations,  where  these  organisations 
aggregate  supply  in  terms  of  both  volumes  and  variety  of  products,  can  help  the  European 
farmers to cope with these challenges. Such integration can provide more stability and risk-
management,  scale  to  reach  more  customers,  flexibility,  more  value  and  more  bargaining 
power. This may further strengthen the role of the farmers in the food supply chain. 

The  COVID-19  pandemic  has  represented  very  challenging  conditions  in  2020  for  food 
supply chains and highlighted the importance of a robust and resilient food supply chain that 
functions in all circumstances to facilitate access to a sufficient supply of affordable food for 
consumers. The increasing incidence of climate related disturbances continues to pose a threat 
to the stability of the food supply chain and reinforces the need to maintain its sustainability 
and resilience. While the EU’s food supply chain has demonstrated an overall resilience in the 
ongoing  crisis,  some  specific  sectors,  products,  and  groups  of  workers  have  had  to  sustain 
higher  levels  of  pressure.  This  was  caused  by  sudden  change  of  demand  patterns  (with  the 
closure from one day to another of horeca and food services and a complete switch of demand 
towards  a  variety  of  retail  channels),  staff  shortages  due  to  confinement  measures,  lack  of 
access to cross-border or seasonal workers, restrictions on workplace conditions, or COVID-
19 outbreaks (in particular in some processing plants), for example. Challenges in storage of 
production  in  e.g.  aquaculture  reinforced  this  pressure.  Consequently,  the  efficiency  of  the 
supply chains has also been hampered. 

6.1.1. The Farm to Fork strategy as a response to the challenges 

As part of its Green Deal, the Commission adopted the Farm to Fork strategy on 20 May 2020 
with the purpose of transforming the EU food system into a sustainable one.  

In practice, the strategy has three central aims: 1) to ensure that the EU food value chain has a 
neutral or positive impact on the environment which entails preserving earth’s resources and 
mitigating the effects of climate change; 2) to guarantee that the EU population has access to 
sufficient amounts of sustainable food; 3) to ensure that the economic returns for actors in the 
value  chain  increase  whilst  the  affordability  of  the  most  sustainable  food  products  is 
preserved. Some of the most noteworthy ambitions are to address the Green Deal targets and 
those  stemming  from  the  Farm  to  Fork  Strategy  and  the  Biodiversity  Strategy  for  2030 
including  among  others  the  reductions  in  a)  overall  use  and  risk  of  pesticides  by  50%  by 
2030,  b)  in  nutrient  loss  by  50%  by  2030,  and  c)  in  the  sales  of  antimicrobials  for  farmed 
animals and aquaculture by 50% by 2030. Further goals include reaching the level of 25% of 
EU  agricultural  land  being  organic  in  2030,  full  access  to  fast  broadband  in  rural  areas  by 
2025, improving animal welfare standards, etc. 

In order to achieve a sustainable food system it is expected that, alongside regulatory changes 
imposed on the value chain actors, the latter would also contribute by engaging into voluntary 
cooperation  agreements  having  as  their  aim  the  achievement  of  sustainability.  In  order  to 
assist  them  and  to  address  any  concerns  of  competition  law  issues  raised  in  the  context  of 
cooperation,  the  Commission  will  clarify  the  scope  of  competition  rules  applicable  to 
collective initiatives  

6.1.2.  Opportunities  and  challenges  posed  by  increased  retail  concentration  in  the 
internal market  

Until  recently,  chains  of  retailers  have  multiplied  joint-procurement  alliances  aimed  at 
improving  their  purchasing  processes,  but  also  to  reinforce  their  bargaining  power  vis-à-vis 
their suppliers that include large manufacturers with strong market positions in many product 

74 

 
categories. Such alliances may benefit the final consumers provided that retailers pass on to 
them the lower prices and costs that they obtain through alliances. A prerequisite for such a 
passing on is  that  retailers maintain effective downstream  competition,  and do not  use their 
purchasing  alliances  as  fora  to  collude  on  other  aspects  of  their  activities  beyond  joint 
procurement.  

6.1.3. Challenges for the optimal functioning of the EU internal market 

The  first  challenge  to  a  proper  functioning  of  the  EU  internal  market  is  the  existence  of 
protectionist agreements in certain national markets. Operators in some national markets (e.g. 
retailers  alone  or  together  with  other  levels  of  the  chain)  sometimes  agree  on  giving 
preference to domestic products even though this preference is not based on objective criteria 
(quality, specific traits, etc.) of the products. This preference is sometimes promoted through 
the  labelling  of  origin  of  domestic  products.  Such  discrimination  based  on  nationality  has 
implications  for  the  fundamental  principle  of  the  EU  to  give  a  fair  chance  to  all  producers 
inside  the  EU  independently  of  their  origin.  The  Commission,  together  with  National 
Competition Authorities, has monitored food markets and initiated investigations 

Secondly,  international  food  manufacturers,  present  for  several  years  with  equal  or  similar 
brands in different Member States reportedly try to compartmentalise the Internal Market by 
preventing  or  hindering  retailers  from  importing  products  from  lower-priced  markets  into 
higher-priced  markets.  In  November  2020,  the  Commission  published  a  study  on  territorial 
supply  constraints  (TSCs)  in  the  EU  retail  sector282.  TSCs  are  constraints  set  by  private 
operators which may limit retailers’ possibilities to purchase products from whom and from 
where  they  want.  The  study  found  that  TSCs  exist  in  the  form  of  various  practices  for  a 
number of products and in a number of markets, ultimately fragmenting the Single Market283. 
Refusals  to  supply,  quantitative  restrictions,  destination  obligations  and  differentiation  of 
products  in  terms  of  packaging  and  labelling  requirements  are  the  most  prevalent  barriers 
faced by retailers and wholesalers when attempting to source cross border. Different taxation 
regimes, cost differences in inputs and production and different pricing of logistics contribute 
also to the fragmentation of the internal market.  

A third challenge appears to be the growth of common shareholding284, i.e. common owners. 
Common shareholding affects operators in the European food supply chains. The JRC report 
by  Rosati  et  al  (2020)285  studies  the  effects  of  common  shareholding  in  the  industry  of 
manufacturing  of  non-alcoholic  beverages  in  Europe286.  The  results  show  that  large  funds 
steadily hold significant blocks of shares in 20 to 25% of the market players. The study finds 
that  the  acquisition  of  part  of  Barclays’  portfolio  under  the  BlackRock-Barclays  Global 
Investors  merger  of  2009  emerges  clearly  from  the  picture.  Based  on  the  econometric 
analysis,  the  results  suggest  a  positive  association  between  common  shareholding  and  the 
market  power  of  ﬁrms  in  the  industry  for  manufacturing  of  non-alcoholic  beverages. 
However, these ﬁndings should be treated with caution, as it cannot fully be ruled out that the 
merged entities did not speciﬁcally target companies that would have performed well after the 

282 See: https://ec.europa.eu/growth/content/study-territorial-supply-constraints-eu-retail-sector_en. 
283 See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/growth/content/half-eu-fast-moving-consumer-goods-sellers-experience-supply-constraints-based-
their_en. 
284 Common shareholding is the simultaneous ownership of shares in many firms active in the same sector.  
285 Rosati, N., Bomprezzi, P., Ferraresi, M., Frigo, A. and Nardo, M., Common Shareholding in Europe, EUR 30312 
EN, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2020. 
286 See: https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/publication/common-shareholding-europe. 

75 

 
                                                 
financial crisis 2007-2008. However, the results of the study suggests that the institutions did 
not substantially alter their portfolio in anticipation of the economic and financial turmoil. 

6.2 EU competition policy’s contribution to the functioning of the Single Market 

6.2.1. Making farmers more competitive in the Single Market 

The  Common  Market  Organisation  (CMO)  Regulation287  lays  out  competition  rules  for  the 
production and trade of agricultural products, including specific rules concerning agreements 
and  organisations  of  producers288.  In  2020  the  Commission  issued  its  first  opinion  on  the 
compatibility  of  agreements  of  farmers  (or  associations  thereof)  potentially  restricting 
competition  with 
to 
the  objectives  of 
Article 209(2) of the CMO Regulation. 

the  Common  Agricultural  Policy,  pursuant 

The  Spanish  association  Cooperativas  agro-alimentarias  (CAA),  requested  an  opinion  on  a 
plan  of  its  members  to  regulate  the  supply  of  olive  oil  to  the  market  through  temporary 
storage  of  olive  oil.  Due  to  the  characteristics  of  olive  trees  and  due  to  natural  conditions, 
olive  oil  production  varies  significantly  between  years.  When  olive  oil  supply  exceeds  a 
certain  threshold,  taking  into  account  domestic  consumption  and  exports,  the  CAA  and  its 
member cooperatives that wish to do so plan to store on a temporary basis a part of the excess 
volume of olive oil.  

Based on the information available, the Commission was of the opinion that the agreements 
of  the  CAA  and  the  cooperatives  participating  in  the  mechanism  are  compatible  with  the 
objectives set out in Article 39 of the Treaty289. However, according to the third subparagraph 
of Article 209(1) of the CMO Regulation, the agreements, decisions and concerted practices 
must not entail an obligation to charge an identical price and must not exclude competition. 

6.2.2. The application of the EU State aid rules in the agricultural and fishery sector 

State  aid  to  promote  the  economic  development  of  the  agricultural  and  forestry  sectors  is 
embedded  in  the  broader  Common  Agricultural  Policy  (CAP)  and  in  particular  the  rural 
development policy. Similarly, State aid to promote the economic development of the fishery 
and  aquaculture  sectors  is  closely  linked  to  the  Common  Fishery  Policy  (CFP)  and  in 
particular to  EU support granted under the European Fisheries and Maritime Fund (EMFF). 
The  economic  effects  of  State  aid  do  not  change  depending  on  whether  it  is  (even  partly) 
financed by the Union, or whether it is financed by a Member State alone. Consequently, the 
use of State aid can be justified only if it is in line with the CAP and the CFP and meets the 
underlying  objectives  of  those  policies  in  terms  of  ensuring  viable  food  production  and 
promoting  an  efficient  and  sustainable  use  of  resources  in  order  to  achieve  intelligent  and 
sustainable growth, including economic, social and employment benefits.  

The Commission has set up specific frameworks of rules for State aid in agriculture, forestry, 
fishery  and  aquaculture.  Most  of  those  rules  are  long-standing  and  have  proven  their 
relevance over the years. However, State aid rules are limited in time and the current State aid 

287  Regulation  on  (EU)  No  1308/2013  of  17  December  2013  establishing  a  common  organisation  of  the  markets  in 
agricultural products and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and 
(EC) No 1234/2007. 
288 See the 2018 Competition report on agriculture for more details about these rules:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/agriculture/report_on_competition_rules_application.pdf. 
289 Commission Decision of 28 October 2020 on the request for an opinion pursuant to Article 209 of Regulation (EU) 
No 1308/2013 by the Cooperativas agro-alimentarias – Spanish olive oil sector, C(2020) 7322 final. 

76 

 
                                                 
rules,  which  were  set  to  expire  at  the  end  of  2020,  are  therefore  under  review.  The  review 
comprises the Agricultural Block Exemption Regulation (ABER)290, the State aid Guidelines 
for  agriculture,  forestry  and  rural  areas291,  the  Fisheries  Block  Exemption  Regulation 
(FIBER)292, the Regulation on de minimis aid in the fishery and aquaculture sector293 and the 
State  aid  Guidelines  for  fishery  and  aquaculture294.  In  the  meanwhile,  the  Commission  has 
decided to extend the application of those rules until the end of 2022, in order to ensure their 
alignment  with  the  future  CAP  and  EMFF  regulations,  for  which  the  legislative  procedures 
are still pending. 

In 2020, the Commission continued to assess notifications by the Member States and adopted 
189  decisions  and  continued  to  advise  Member  States’  authorities  on  how  to  interpret  and 
implement  the  applicable  State  aid  rules.  The  Commission  also  continued  to  check  all  new 
block  exempted  measures  designed  by  Member  States  under  the  Agricultural  Block 
Exemption Regulation (ABER) prior to their entry into force and advised Member States in 
case  of  any  doubts  or  problems,  thereby  enabling  them  to  implement  the  corresponding  aid 
schemes quickly. 

6.2.3. Mitigating the effects of the pandemic context  

In 2020, the prolonged closure of bars, restaurants and other catering venues, as well as the 
cancellation  of  most  events,  has  triggered  supply  disruption  in  a  number  of  agricultural 
markets. This has prompted the Commission to authorise on a temporary basis agreements on 
the collective management of quantities, pursuant to Article 222 of the CMO Regulation.  

In  accordance  with  Article  222  of  the  CMO  Regulation,  the  Commission  has  granted 
derogations  from  Article  101  TFEU  through  four  Implementing  Regulations  covering  the 
whole EU territory and authorising the conclusion of agreements of a maximum duration of 
six months for the raw milk, flowers and plants, potatoes for processing, and wine and wine 
products295.  

290 Commission Regulation (EU) No 702/2014 of 25 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid in the agricultural 
and forestry sectors and in rural areas compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ L 193, 1.7.2014, p. 1. 
291 Commission Communication: European Union guidelines for State aid in the agricultural and forestry sectors and in 
rural areas 2014-2020, OJ C 204, 1.7.2014, p. 1. 
292  Commission  Regulation  (EU)  No  1388/2014  of  16  December  2014  declaring  certain  categories  of  aid  to 
undertakings active in the production, processing and marketing of fishery and aquaculture products compatible with 
the  internal  market  in  application  of  Articles  107  and 108  of the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union, 
OJ L 369, 24.12.2014, p. 37.  
293  Commission  Regulation  (EU)  No  717/2014  of  27  June  2014  on  the  application  of  Articles  107  and  108  of  the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid in the fishery and aquaculture sector, OJ L 190, 
28.6.2014, p. 45. 
294  Commission  Communication:  Guidelines  for  the  examination  of  State  aid  to  the  fishery  and  aquaculture  sector, 
OJ C 217, 2.7.2015, p. 1. 
295 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/593 of 30 April 2020 authorising agreements and decisions on 
market stabilisation measures in the potatoes sector, OJ L 140, 4.5.2020, p. 13; Commission Implementing Regulation 
(EU)  2020/594  of  30  April  2020  authorising  agreements  and  decisions  on  market  stabilisation  measures  in  the  live 
trees and other plants, bulbs, roots and the like, cut flowers and ornamental foliage sector, OJ L 140, 4.5.2020, p. 17; 
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/599 of 30 April 2020 authorising agreements and decisions on the 
planning  of production  in  the milk  and  milk  products  sector,  OJ  L  140,  4.5.2020, p. 37;  Commission  Implementing 
Regulation (EU) 2020/975 of 6 July 2020 authorising agreements and decisions on market stabilisation measures in the 
wine sector, OJ L 215, p. 13. 

77 

 
                                                 
6.2.4. Investigation into possible restrictions of parallel trade 

In 2020 the Commission has continued its ex-officio investigations into possible restrictions 
of parallel  trade of food products.  One investigation initiated in 2019 concerns a number of 
potentially restrictive practices on the markets for chocolate, biscuits and coffee products.  

6.2.5. Buying alliances and competition in retail trade in the single market 

In 2020 the Commission has continued the proceedings, opened in November 2019, against 
two  large  retailers,  Casino  and  Les  Mousquetaires/Intermarché,  regarding  a  potential 
collusion  built  around  their  purchasing  alliance,  and  consisting  of  a  coordination  on  shop 
development and on prices towards final consumers. In doing this, the Commission addresses 
an  EU-wide  systemic  risk  of  collusion  through  alliances  both  at  national  and  international 
level. The risk of excessive transparency has been made more acute since retailers have often 
changed  partners  in  these  alliances,  and  specialised  managers  have  been  moving  between 
retailers  and  alliances  as  a  result,  thus  providing  more  opportunities  for  retailers  to  collude. 
The Alliance Casino & Intermarché case is subject of court proceedings at the General Court. 
On 5 October 2020 the General Court ruled on the legality of the 2017 inspection decisions of 
the  Commission296.  Details  about  the  judgments  are  presented  in  section  2.2.2  above  on 
Important judgments by the European Union Courts.  

6.2.6. Broadband in rural areas 

The Commission is committed to avoid the complexity linked to the use of different State aid 
frameworks  for  connectivity.  The  GBER  provisions  have  been  simplified  by  replacing  the 
broadband  section  in  the  regional  GBER  section  and  concentrating  assessment  of  all 
broadband aid under the specific broadband provisions, that are to be significantly expanded, 
inter alia, to allow to deploy 5G in areas with no 4G coverage and to deploy 4G in areas with 
no 3G coverage.  

7. 

PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH SERVICES SECTORS  

7.1 Overview  

Competition  law  enforcement  in  the  pharmaceutical  and  healthcare  sectors  in  2020 
contributed  to  consumers’  access  to  effective,  innovative  and  affordable  medicines  as 
emphasised in the objectives of the Commission’s new Pharmaceutical Strategy for Europe297. 
This  addresses issues with  the affordability and  accessibility of medicines which have, over 
the past years, become an increased concern in the pharmaceutical sector.  

The  Commission  and  the  competition  authorities  in  the  Member  States  monitor  the 
pharmaceutical  and  health  services  sectors  to  identify  potential  competition  issues.  This 
enforcement  action,  which  complements  the  regulatory  frameworks  in  these  sectors,  fosters 
both  dynamic  competition,  which  leads  to  more  innovative  medicines,  and  effective  price 
competition, which contributes to more affordable and accessible medicines and treatments.  

296  Cases  T-249/17  Casino,  Guichard-Perrachon  and  Achats  Marchandises  Casino  SAS  (AMC)  v  Commission;  T-
254/17  Intermarché  Casino  Achats  v  Commission  and  T-255/17  Les  Mousquetaires  and  ITM  Entreprises  v 
Commission (under appeal). 
297 See: https://ec.europa.eu/health/sites/health/files/human-use/docs/pharmastrategy_com2020-761_en.pdf. 

78 

 
                                                 
7.2 Contribution of EU competition policy  

7.2.1. Antitrust enforcement in the pharmaceutical sector 

In 2020, the Commission investigated firms suspected of preventing or reducing consumers’ 
access to effective, innovative and affordable medicines.  

The Cephalon case298 
On  26  November  2020,  the  Commission  issued  a  decision  fining  the  pharmaceutical  companies  Teva  and 
Cephalon a total of EUR 60.5 million. These companies agreed to delay for several years the market entry of a 
less expensive generic version of Cephalon’s drug for sleep disorders, modafinil, after Cephalon’s main patents 
had  expired.  The  agreement  amounted  to  a  violation  of  Article  101  TFEU  by  object  and  by  effect.  It  caused 
substantial harm to EU patients and healthcare systems by keeping prices artificially high for modafinil.  
The  Commission’s  decision  concerned  a  patent  settlement  agreement  whereby  Cephalon  induced  Teva  not  to 
enter the market with a generic version of modafinil, in exchange for a package of commercial transactions that 
were beneficial to Teva and some cash payments. Teva held its own patents relating to modafinil's production 
process, was ready to enter the modafinil market with its own generic version and it had even started selling its 
generic product in one Member State. Nonetheless, Teva agreed with Cephalon to withdraw from the market and 
not to challenge Cephalon’s patents. The Commission’s investigation found that for several years, this “pay-for-
delay” agreement eliminated Teva as a competitor and allowed Cephalon to continue charging supra-competitive 
prices, even if its main modafinil patent had long expired. 
While  generally  patent  settlements  can  be  legitimate,  the  Commission  showed  that  the  settlement  agreement 
between Teva and Cephalon was not. Teva committed to stay out of the modafinil markets, not because it was 
convinced of the strength of Cephalon’s patents, but because of the substantial value it received from Cephalon. 
Without the “pay-for-delay” settlement agreement, Teva could have entered the market earlier and could have, in 
turn, pushed down prices for modafinil. 

The Aspen case299 
In June 2020, the Commission adopted a Preliminary Assessment pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 in 
its  first  excessive  pricing  investigation  in  the  pharmaceutical  sector.  The  Preliminary  Assessment  set  out  the 
Commission’s  concerns  about  the  pricing  practices  by  Aspen  Pharmacare,  a  South  African  pharmaceutical 
company,  regarding  six  of  its  cancer  medicines  mainly  used  in  the  treatment  of  leukaemia  and  other 
haematological cancers in several EU Member States (excluding Italy) and EEA countries. 
The  Commission’s  assessment  follows  the  framework  of  analysis  set  out  by  the  Court  of  Justice  in  its  United 
Brands  judgment300.  Aspen’s  accounting  data  on  revenues  and  costs  revealed  that,  after  the  price  increases, 
Aspen consistently earned very high profits from the sales of these cancer medicines in Europe, when compared 
to the profit levels of similar companies in the industry. In certain cases, high profit margins can be explained by, 
for example, the need to reward significant innovation and commercial risk-taking. However, the Commission’s 
assessment did not reveal any justifications for Aspen’s very high profit levels.  
In July 2020, the Commission published Aspen’s commitments proposal in the Official Journal to seek feedback 
during a market test consultation. Aspen’s proposed commitments would drastically reduce prices for Aspen’s 
cancer  medicines  and  include  a  supply  commitment.  The  responses  to  the  market  test  were  overwhelmingly 
supportive of the Commission’s enforcement action, and provided certain suggestions for improvements of some 
technical or practical aspects of the commitments. 
On 10 February 2021, the Commission accepted and declared binding final commitments from Aspen to remove 
the  concerns  of  excessive  pricing:  (a)  Aspen  will  reduce  its  prices  across  Europe  for  all  six  cancer  medicines 
under investigation by, on average, approximately 73%; (b) these new prices will be the maximum that Aspen 
can charge for the coming ten years. They will start taking effect already as of October 2019 when Aspen first 
approached  the  Commission  with  a  commitment  proposal;  and  (c)  Aspen  guarantees  the  supply  of  these 
medicines for the next five years, and, for an additional five-year period, will either continue to supply or make 
its marketing authorisation available to other suppliers.  

298 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2220. 
299 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_524. 
300 Case C-27/76 United Brands v Commission, judgment of the Court of Justice of 14.2.1978. 

79 

 
 
                                                 
These commitments deliver to patients and national health systems concrete and tangible benefits at a moment 
when  there  are  widespread  concerns  about  companies  withdrawing  from  supplying  some  Member  States  (a 
concern also highlighted in the Commission’s Pharmaceutical Strategy for Europe)301.  

The Commission will continue investigating potentially abusive unilateral conduct, including 
potentially anticompetitive practices delaying the entry of  rival  products,  such as  generic or 
biosimilar versions of medicines. 

7.2.2. Merger review in the pharmaceutical sector 

In  2020,  the  Commission  continued  its  thorough  review  of  pharmaceutical  mergers  and 
acquisitions,  to  ensure  the  availability  of  diversified  and  affordable  medicines  and  medical 
devices to patients and medical practitioners across the EU, and to protect innovation. 

On  10  January  2020,  the  Commission  approved  the  acquisition  of  Allergan  by  AbbVie302, 
subject to the divestment of a product under development by Allergan to treat inflammatory 
bowel  disease  (IL-23  inhibitor).  The  Commission  was  concerned  that  following  the 
concentration  AbbVie  would  not  continue  to  develop  this  promising  pipeline  product  of 
Allergan, for which only two other competing pipeline products, in addition to AbbVie’s and 
Allergan’s  IL-23  inhibitors,  are  currently  being  developed.  Without  this  divestment,  the 
transaction would have led to a loss of innovation in inflammatory bowel disease treatments.  

On 22 April 2020, the Commission approved the merger between Mylan and Pfizer’s Upjohn 
division303, subject  to the divestment  of Mylan’s business  for certain  genericized medicines. 
While  finding  no  competition  concerns  for  the  majority  of  the  products  supplied  by  both 
companies,  the  Commission  found  that  the  merger  raised  competition  concerns  for  36 
molecule-country pairs where the position of the two companies was strong and only a limited 
number of significant competitors would have remained on the market in the absence of the 
proposed remedies.  

On  28  May  2020,  the  Commission  waived  the  commitments  made  by  Takeda  to  obtain 
clearance  of  its  acquisition  of  Shire  (which  was  conditionally  authorised  on  20  November 
2018)304. The Commission found that permanent, significant and unforeseeable developments 
took  place  during  the  divestiture  process,  which  affected  the  evolution  of  the  competitive 
landscape in inflammatory bowel diseases treatments and which have negatively impacted the 
development  of  Shire’s  pipeline  drug  so  that  the  divestment  of  SHP  647  was  no  longer 
necessary to render Takeda’s acquisition of Shire compatible with the internal market. 

The  Commission  also  continued  its  thorough  review  of  animal  health  mergers  and 
acquisitions  to  protect  innovative  and  competitively  priced  pharmaceutical  products  for 
animals. On 8 June 2020, the Commission approved the acquisition of Bayer’s animal health 
division  by  Elanco305,  subject  to  the  divestment  of  otitis  products  and  endoparasiticides  for 
pets  and  anticoccidials  for  ruminants  in  the  EEA,  the  UK  and  globally.  The  Commission 

301 See points 2.2 and 4.1 here: https://ec.europa.eu/health/sites/health/files/human-use/docs/pharmastrategy_com2020-
761_en.pdf. 
302 Case M.9461 AbbVie/Allergan. Commission Decision of 10 January 2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_9461.   
303 Case M.9517 Mylan/Upjohn. Commission Decision of 22 April 2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_9517. 
304 Case M.8955 Takeda/Shire. Commission Decision of 28 May 2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_8955 . 
305 Case M.9554 Elanco Animal Health/Bayer Animal Health Division. Commission Decision of 8 June 2020. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_9554.  

80 

 
                                                 
found  that,  as  originally  notified,  this  transaction,  which  created  the  second  largest  animal 
health  company,  would  have  raised  competition  concerns  in  the  provision  of  otitis  products 
and parasiticides in a number of EEA countries where both companies have strong positions 
and/or face a limited number of competitors. 

7.2.3. State aid actions in the health services sector 

The Commission made progress on the evaluation of the State aid rules for health and social 
Services of General Economic Interest (SGEI) and the SGEI de minimis Regulation that was 
launched in 2019306. In order to also appropriately evaluate the SGEI de minimis Regulation 
and to avoid a gap after its expiry, it was prolonged for another three years until 31 December 
2023307.  By  carrying  out  the  evaluation,  the  Commission  aims  to  get  a  better  and  more 
detailed  understanding  of  the  potential  issues  that  Member  States  may  have  had  in 
implementing the rules.  

Together  with  the  prolongation  of  the  SGEI  de  minimis  Regulation,  and  in  light  of  the 
COVID-19  pandemic,  a  temporary  derogation  for  undertakings  in  difficulty  to  benefit  from 
SGEI de minimis aid was introduced.  

8. 

TRANSPORT, TOURISM, AND POSTAL SERVICES 

8.1 Overview  

The transport and postal services sectors account for approximately 5% of the EU economy, 
and  their  performance  can  have  many  beneficial  effects  for  other  sectors  of  the  European 
economy. Transport is the key to both an integrated internal market and to an open economy 
integrated into the world economy. Tourism accounts for 3.9% of the EU economy. 

The transport sector was hit hard by the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly the air transport 
sector. Numerous airlines were on the brink of bankruptcy due to the restrictions on passenger 
movements, which caused a dramatic drop in revenues and required public support. 

8.2 Contribution of EU competition policy 

8.2.1. Merger review in the aviation sector 

On 3 April 2020 the Commission adopted a clearance decision with commitments in the in-
flight catering sector. Gategroup had proposed to acquire the European business of Lufthansa 
Service  Group  (“LSG”)308.  The  Commission  concluded  that  the  notified  transaction  would 
have  led  to  a  quasi-monopoly  or  left  at  most  only  one  remaining  viable  competitor  in  the 
markets  for  in-flight  catering  services  at  airports  in  Belgium  (Brussels),  Germany  (Berlin-
Tegel, Cologne, Dusseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Hannover, Munich), France (Paris Charles 
de Gaulle), and Italy (Rome Fiumicino). To address the Commission’s concerns, Gategroup 
committed  to  divest  the  overlap  businesses  in  order  to  facilitate  the  entry  or  expansion  of 
competing  in-flight  caterers  at  those  airports.  The  commitments  were  subject  to  an  up-front 
buyer clause. 

306 See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/initiatives/ares-2019-3777435_en.  
307 Commission Regulation (EU) 2020/1474 of 13 October 2020 amending Regulation (EU) No 360/2012 as regards 
the  prolongation  of  its  period  of  application  and  a  time-bound  derogation  for  undertakings  in  difficulty  to  take  into 
account the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, OJ L 337 of 14.1.2020, p. 1-2, available at:  
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/1474/oj.  
308 Case M.9546 Gategroup/LSG European Business, Commission Decision of 3 April 2020. 

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On  25  May  2020,  the  Commission  opened  an  in-depth  investigation  into  the  acquisition  of 
Transat  (the  parent  company  of  Air  Transat)  by  Air  Canada309.  Air  Canada  and  Transat  are 
respectively  the  first  and  second  largest  providers  of  scheduled  passenger  air  transport 
services  between  the  European  Economic  Area  (EEA)  and  Canada.  The  Commission  is 
concerned that the proposed transaction may reduce competition in the passenger air transport 
services  on  33  origin  and  destination  (O&D)  citypairs  between  the  EEA  and  Canada.  The 
Commission’s  preliminary  market  investigation  revealed  that  Air  Canada  and  Transat  have 
been historically competing head-to-head for the passenger air transport services between the 
EEA  and  Canada.  Other  airlines,  in  particular  the  EEA  national  carriers,  were  found  to  be 
more  distant  competitors,  only  competing  on  a  very  small  subset  of  routes  out  of  their 
respective home hubs. As the proposed transaction was notified to the Commission at a point 
in time where the aviation sector is impacted by the  Coronavirus outbreak, the Commission 
has  been  also  investigating  the  impact  that  the  Coronavirus  crisis  would  have  on  Air 
Canada’s, Transat’s and their competitors’ operations and hence the competitive landscape in 
the mid- and long-term.  The parties subsequently decided to  terminate the proposed merger 
agreement on 2 April 2021310. 

On  16  December  2020,  the  European  Court  delivered  a  judgment311  in  a  case  brought  by 
American Airlines against the Commission. American Airlines had applied for the annulment 
of the Commission’s decision of 2018 granting  grandfathering rights  on the ground that the 
slot  remedy  taker,  Delta  Airlines,  had  not  made  appropriate  use  of  the  slots  during  the 
preceding utilisation period. The European Court sided with the Commission’s interpretation 
and dismissed the application. 

8.2.2. Antitrust enforcement in the aviation sector 

In 2020, the Commission continued with its ex officio investigation based on concerns about 
the  imposition  of  content  Most  Favoured  Nation  clauses  (“MFN  clauses”)  by  Global 
Distribution  Systems  (GDSs)312.  The  investigation  focuses  on  MFN  clauses  governing  the 
content that airlines distribute through travel agents.  

8.2.3. State aid to the aviation sector 

The aviation sector has been among the worst affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. To assist 
Member States in  their effort  to  support the aviation  sector in  this context, the Commission 
issued  in  April  2020  a  document313  guiding  Member  States  on  how  to  best  channel  public 
funding  to  safeguard  air  connections.  Moreover,  the  Commission  helped  several  Member 
States design public service compensations that complied with the so-called Altmark criteria 
and could therefore be exempted from notification to the Commission. 

In  2020,  the  Commission  adopted  42  decisions  allowing  State  aid  to  airlines,  airports  and 
ground handling companies to address their liquidity and capital needs caused by the COVID-

309 Case M.9489 Air Canada/Transat, see:  
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_934.  
310 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_21_1562. 
311 Case T-430/18 American Airlines v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 16.12.2020. 
312 GDSs are two-sided platforms that act as a technical intermediary between, on one side, travel service providers, 
such  as  airlines,  rail  operators  and  hotel  companies  and,  on  the  other  side,  travel  agents  and  travel  management 
companies. The Commission initiated proceedings in November 2018 in this case. See:  
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_6538.  
313 Overview of the State aid rules and public service obligations rules applicable to the air transport sector during the 
COVID-19 outbreak.  

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19  pandemic.  The  aid  measures  were  generally  approved  under  the  Temporary  Framework, 
Article  107(2)(b)  TFEU  which  allows  Member  States  to  compensate  undertakings  for  the 
damage directly caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, or under the Rescue and Restructuring 
rules. A few notable examples are presented below. 

On  15  and  24  April  2020,  the  Commission  approved  State  guarantees  by  Denmark314  and 
Sweden315, each of up to EUR 137 million of revolving credit facilities in favour of SAS. The 
measures  are  intended  to  compensate  the  airline  for  the  damage  caused  by  the  COVID-19 
pandemic.  On  17  August  2020,  the  Commission  also  approved  plans  by  Denmark  and 
Sweden to contribute up to approximately EUR 1 billion to the recapitalisation of SAS.  

On  4  May  2020,  the  Commission  approved  EUR  7  billion  aid  by  France  to  Air  France, 
consisting of a State guarantee on loans and a shareholder loan, to provide urgent liquidity to 
the company in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic316.  

On  18  May  2020,  the  Commission  approved  a  State  guarantee  by  Finland  of  a  EUR 
600 million loan to Finnair to mitigate the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on 
the company317. On 9 June 2020, the Commission approved Finland’s plan to contribute EUR 
286  million  to  the  recapitalisation  of  Finnair  through  the  subscription  of  new  shares  by  the 
State in the rights issue launched by Finnair on 10 June 2020318. 

On 25 June 2020, the Commission approved a plan by Germany to contribute EUR 6 billion 
to  the  recapitalisation  of  Deutsche  Lufthansa  AG,  the  parent  company  of  Lufthansa  Group. 
The Commission found the measure to be compatible with the Temporary Framework, as it 
aims  to  restore  the  balance  sheet  position  and  liquidity  of  the  company  in  the  exceptional 
situation  caused  by  the  pandemic,  while  including  the  necessary  safeguards  to  limit 
distortions of competition. The commitments undertaken by Deutsche Lufthansa AG, i.e. the 
company will make available certain slots and assets at its congested hub airports of Frankfurt 
and  Munich,  and  will  preserve  effective  competition  in  markets,  where  it  holds  significant 
market  power319.  Deutsche  Lufthansa  AG  committed  to  publishing  information  on  how  the 
use  of  the  received  aid  supports  the  company’s  activities  in  line  with  EU  and  national 
obligations linked to the green and digital transformation320. 

On 13 July 2020, the Commission approved EUR 3.4 billion aid by the Netherlands to KLM 
consisting of a State loan guarantee and a subordinated State loan to provide urgent liquidity 
to the company in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Netherlands imposed certain 

314  Case  SA.56795  Compensation  for  the  damage  caused  by  the  COVID-19  outbreak  to  Scandinavian  Airlines, 
Commission Decision of 15 April 2020, see :  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_56795.  
315  Case  SA.57061  Compensation  for  the  damage  caused  by  the  COVID-19  outbreak  to  Scandinavian  Airlines, 
Commission Decision of 24 April 2020, see : 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_57061. 
316 Case SA.57082 COVID-19 – Encadrement temporaire 107(3)(b) – Garantie et prêt d’actionnaire au bénéfice d’Air 
France, Commission Decision of 4 May 2020, see : 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_57082. 
317 Case SA.56809 COVID-19 – State loan guarantee for Finnair, Commission Decision of 18 May 2020, see : 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_56809.  
318 Case SA.57410 COVID – recapitalisation of Finnair, Commission Decision of 9 June 2020, see : 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_57410.  
319 Case SA.57153 COVID-19 – Aid to Lufthansa, Commission Decision of 25 June 2020, see : 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_57153.  
320 There are similar reporting requirements in all recapitalisation measures, i.e. SAS and Finnair. 

83 

 
                                                 
conditions  on  the  aid  measures  with  respect  to  profit  allocation,  working  conditions  and 
sustainability321. 

In  September  and  December  2020,  the  Commission  approved  Italian  plans  to  grant 
compensation  to  Alitalia  for  the  damage  suffered  from  containment  measures  and  travel 
restrictions  linked  to  the  COVID-19  outbreak.  Since  the  start  of  the  Coronavirus  outbreak, 
Alitalia has suffered a significant reduction of its services, resulting in high operating losses. 
On  4  September,  the  Commission  approved  a  direct  grant  of  EUR  199.45  million, 
corresponding to the estimated direct damage suffered by Alitalia in the period from 1 March 
2020  to  15  June  2020322.  Subsequently,  Italy  notified  to  the  Commission  an  additional  aid 
measure  in  the  form  of  a  EUR  73.02  million  direct  grant  to  compensate  Alitalia  for  further 
damage  suffered  on  19  specific  routes  from  16  June  2020  to  31  October  2020  due  to 
emergency measures imposed to limit the spread of the virus. The Commission approved the 
second measure on 29 December 2020323. For both measures, the Commission has thoroughly 
verified  that  compensation  is  only  granted  for  damages  directly  linked  to  the  Coronavirus 
outbreak  and  that  the  compensation  does  not  exceed  what  is  necessary  to  make  good  that 
damage. The Commission’s investigations into loans granted by Italy to Alitalia in the process 
of the airline’s restructuring are currently ongoing324.  

In  June  2020,  the  Commission  approved  a  EUR  1.2  billion  rescue  loan  in  favour  of  the 
Portuguese  airline  TAP  Air  Portugal,  which  had  been  in  financial  difficulties  since  2019, 
before the COVID-19 outbreak325. The measure notified by Portugal  aimed to provide TAP 
with sufficient resources to address its immediate liquidity needs, with a view to preparing a 
plan  for  the  long-term  viability  of  the  company.  The  Commission  found  that  the  measure 
would  help  avoiding  disruptions  for  passengers  in  particular  in  view  of  the  easing  of  travel 
restrictions and the upcoming touristic season. At the same time, the strict conditions attached 
to  the  loan  in  terms  of  remuneration  and  use  of  the  funds  and  its  duration  limited  to  six 
months would reduce the distortion of competition potentially triggered by the State support 
to a minimum. 

Also in June 2020, Portugal notified to the Commission public financing in favour of SATA, 
an  air  transport  company  ultimately  controlled  by  the  Portuguese  Autonomous  Region  of 
Azores326. SATA provides air transport passenger and cargo services within Azores, and from 
and  to  several  national  and  international  destinations.  With  respect  to  certain  routes,  it  has 
been  entrusted  with  a  public  service  obligation  to  ensure  connectivity  of  the  islands  and 
operation  of  small  airports.  The  Commission  approved  a  public  guarantee  of  up  to 
approximately EUR 133 million on a temporary loan strictly related to urgent liquidity needs 
linked  to  the  provision  by  SATA  of  essential  services  including  routes  subject  to  public 
service obligations and services of general economic interest at local airports. Separately, the 
Commission  has  opened  an  in-depth  investigation  to  assess  whether  certain  public  support 
measures in favour of SATA were in line with the 2014 Guidelines on State aid for rescue and 

321 Case SA.57116 COVID-19 – State loan guarantee and State loan for KLM, Commission Decision of 13 July 2020, 
see: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_57116.  
322 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/mex_20_1567. 
323 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_2540. 
324 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_3501 and 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_349. 
325 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_1029. 
326 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_1489. 

84 

 
                                                 
restructuring327.  

Moreover, the Commission assessed in favour of Corsair328 two French support measures: a 
restructuring aid  measure totalling EUR 106.7 million  and a measure in  the form  of a EUR 
30.2 million tax credit  compensating damage suffered because of the Coronavirus outbreak. 
The financial difficulties of Corsair, a private French airline, had been severely aggravated by 
the travel restrictions imposed by France and several destination countries to limit the spread 
of the Coronavirus.  

As  regards  airports,  the  Commission  approved  for  instance  on  11  August  2020  a  German 
scheme  which  allows  firstly,  for  damage  compensation  under  Article  107(2)(b)  TFEU  and 
secondly, for liquidity support in the form of grants, guarantees on loans, subsidised interest 
rates and deferrals of certain taxes and charges under the Temporary Framework329.  

On  11  August  2020  the  Commission  approved  a  German  aid  scheme  to  support  airports 
affected  by  the  Covid-19  outbreak.  The  scheme,  which  is  open  to  all  operators  of  German 
airports,  was  approved  partially  based  on  Article  107(2)(b)  TFEU  and  partially  under  the 
Temporary  Framework.  Under  the  scheme,  the  German  authorities  may  (i)  compensate 
airports  for  revenue  losses  directly  caused  by  the  coronavirus  outbreak  during  the  period  4 
March - 30 June 2020, in the form  of direct  grants,  and (ii) provide liquidity support in  the 
form of grants, guarantees on loans, subsidised interest rates and deferrals of certain taxes and 
charges to airports facing liquidity shortages330. 

On 23 November 2020 the Commission approved a EUR 4.4 million Romanian aid scheme to 
compensate  regional  airport  operators  for  the  damage  suffered  due  to  the  Coronavirus 
outbreak.  Under  the  scheme,  operators  of  Romanian  airports  with  annual  traffic  turnovers 
between  200 000  to  3  million  passengers  are  compensated  with  direct  grants  for  net  losses 
incurred between 16 March and 30 June 2020331. 

As regards ground handling operators, the Commission approved on 8 July 2020 a EUR 25 
million  Belgian  aid  to  support  Aviapartner,  a  ground  handling  service  provider  at  Brussels 
National  Airport  (Zaventem).  The  aid  measure  was  provided  in  the  form  of  a  convertible 
loan332. 

In  addition  to  COVID-19  related  measures,  the  Commission  approved  operating  aid  to 
regional airports under the Aviation Guidelines to keep the airports running until they become 
profitable  again,  with  the  aim  of  ensuring  connectivity  of  citizens  and  facilitating  regional 
development  in  the  regions  concerned  The  Commission  approved  for  instance  EUR  18.2 
million  aid  for  Saarbrücken  airport  in  Germany333  and  EUR  6.37  million  to  secure  the 

327  Communication  from  the  Commission:  Guidelines  on  State  aid  for  rescuing  and  restructuring  non-financial 
undertakings in difficulty, OJ C 249, 31.7.2014, p. 1-28. 
328 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_2398. 
329 Case SA.57644 COVID-19 Airport Scheme, Commission Decision of 11 August 2020, see:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_57644. 
330 Case SA.57644 COVID-19: Airport Scheme, Commission Decision of 11 August 2020, see:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases1/202033/287537_2180954_47_2.pdf. 
331 Case SA.58676 COVID-19 Support for Romanian regional airports, Commission Decision of 23 November 2020, 
see: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_58676. 
332 Case SA.57637 COVID-19 – Recapitalisation of Aviapartner, Commission Decision of 7 July 2020, see:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases1/202051/287017_2221214_124_2.pdf. 
333 Case SA.55302 Operating aid to Saarbrücken airport (2019-2024), Commission Decision of 12 May 2020, see:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_55302.  

85 

 
                                                 
 
functioning of the Debrecen airport in Hungary334. 

8.2.4. Evaluation of the Aviation Guidelines / Relevant GBER provisions 

As a part of the State aid Fitness Check, the Commission carried out an ex post evaluation of 
the Aviation Guidelines335 and the relevant  rules under the GBER  as  regards aid  for airport 
infrastructure.  This  involved  a  targeted  consultation  and  an  external  study  on  the  rules  for 
operating  aid.  The  evaluation  focused  in  particular  on  the  rules  governing  operating  aid  for 
airports, as the transitional period introduced by the Aviation Guidelines is set to end in 2024, 
as well as on the passenger thresholds and aid intensities for operating and for investment aid.  

Furthermore, the Commission has evaluated the rules for aid to airlines, including the rules on 
start-up aid under the Aviation Guidelines. The evaluation  found that the transitional period 
allowing operating aid under the Aviation Guidelines appears to be insufficient to allow many 
regional airports to become cost-covering by 2024. Furthermore, according to the evaluation, 
there  seems  to  be  a  structural  need  for  operating  aid  for  airports  with  less  than  200 000 
passengers per  year, currently covered by the GBER. Another finding was that the Aviation 
Guidelines  do  not  specifically  address  measures  to  mitigate  airports’  impact  on  the 
environment and the climate.  

8.2.5. Court Judgments in aviation aid cases 

The  General  Court  delivered  three  important  judgments  concerning  State  aid  cases  in  the 
aviation  sector.  In  the  Sardinian  airports  case336  the  General  Court  dismissed  the  actions 
brought  by  the  airlines  easyJet,  Volotea  and  Germanwings  seeking  the  annulment  of  the 
Commission’s decision of 29 July 2016 which declared partly incompatible with the internal 
market  the  aid  granted  by  Italy  to  several  European  airlines,  including  the  three  at  issue, 
serving Sardinia. 

In its judgment in the Sea Handling SpA case337, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
dismissed the action brought by the City of Milan seeking the annulment of the judgment of 
the General Court of 13 December 2018 and the annulment of the Commission decision of 19 
December  2012,  which  found  that  State  aid  granted  between  2002  and  2010  by  SEA,  the 
State-owned operator of the Milan Malpensa and Milan Linate airports, to its subsidiary SEA 
Handling, ground handling operator at the airports, was incompatible with EU State aid rules. 
The Court confirmed the Commission’s finding that the capital injections were imputable to 
the Italian State and that no private investor would have continued investing in a loss-making 
activity for such a long period without any concrete prospect of a return on its investment. 

334 Case SA.57109 Operating aid to Debrecen International Airport Kft., Commission Decision of 14 September 2020, 
see: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_57109. 
335 Communication from the Commission: Guidelines on State aid to airports and airlines, OJ C 99, 4.4.2014, p. 3-34. 
336  Case  T-8/18  easyJet  v  Commission,  judgment  of  the  General  Court  of  13.5.2020;  Case  T-607/17  Volotea  v 
Commission, judgment of the General Court of 13.5.2020; Case T-716/17 Germanwings v Commission, judgment of 
the General Court of 13.5.2020. 
337 Case C-160/19 P Comune di Milano v Commission, judgment of the Court of 10.12.2020. 

86 

 
                                                 
8.2.6.  Antitrust  Consortia  Block  Exemption  Regulation  (CBER)  concerning  the 
container shipping sector  

In  2020,  the  Commission  finalised  its  evaluation  of  the  Consortia  Block  Exemption 
Regulation  (CBER)  concerning  the  container  shipping  sector338.  The  Commission  analysed 
responses  received  during  a  public  consultation  in  2018.  The  Commission  published  its 
findings  in  a  Staff  Working  Document  on  20  November  2019,  which  summarised  and 
presented  the  results  of  the  evaluation  process.  Based  on  the  review,  the  Commission 
extended  the  CBER  for  another  four  years,  i.e.  until  25  April  2024.  The  extension  of  the 
CBER was adopted on 24 March 2020 and published in the Official Journal of the European 
Union on 25 March 2020339. 

8.2.7. State aid enforcement in the maritime transport sector 

Numerous  maritime  routes  operated  so  far  on  a  commercial  basis  were  on  the  verge  of 
collapse  due  to  the  restrictions  on  passenger  movements,  which  caused  a  dramatic  drop  in 
revenues.  Public  intervention  was  urgently  needed  to  preserve  connectivity  with  remote 
territories and islands in many Member States and the Commission quickly responded to that 
challenge and accompanied Member States in their effort to support the maritime sector in the 
context of the outbreak.  

First, the Commission issued in April 2020 a specific guidance document340 aimed at guiding 
Member  States  on  how  to  best  channel  public  funding  to  safeguard  maritime  connections. 
Second, the Commission helped several Member States design public service compensations 
that  complied  with  the  so-called  Altmark  criteria  and  could  therefore  be  exempted  from 
notification  to  the  Commission.  Third,  the  Commission  approved  under  Article  107(2)(b) 
TFEU  a  number  of  schemes  (i.e.  Sweden,  Estonia,  Finland)  to  compensate  the  damages 
suffered by the maritime sector as a result of the COVID-19 outbreak.  

Moreover,  in  2020,  the  Commission  approved  a  number  of  State  aid  schemes  under  the 
Maritime State aid Guidelines341, which allow tax reliefs for shipping companies. The aim of 
the  Guidelines  is  to  maintain  the  EU  maritime  sector’s  competitiveness  in  relation  to  third 
countries and promote EU maritime employment. The Commission approved an extension of 
the  UK  Waterborne  Freight  Grant  scheme  promoting  the  development  of  coastal  and  short 
sea-shipping342;  an  extension  of  the  Croatian  tonnage  tax  scheme  to  commercial  yachts 
involved in international navigation343; the inclusion of certain service vessels in the Belgian 
seafarer  scheme  for  example,  research  vessels,  pipe  and  cable  laying  vessels,  as  well  as 
vessels  for  raising,  repairing  and  dismantling  windmills  and  other  off-shore  installations344; 

338 Commission Regulation (EC) No 906/2009 of 28 September 2009 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty 
to certain categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices between liner shipping companies (consortia), 
OJ L 256, 29.9.2009, p. 31. 
339 Commission Regulation (EU) 2020/436 of 24 March 2020 amending Regulation (EC) No 906/2009 as regards its 
period of application, OJ L 90, 25.3.2020, p. 1. 
340 Overview of the State aid rules  and Public Service rules applicable to the maritime sector during the COVID-19 
pandemic. 
341  Commission  communication  C(2004)43:  Community  guidelines  on  State  aid  to  maritime  transport,  OJ  C  13, 
17.1.2004, p. 3-12. 
342 Case SA.54911 Waterborne Freight Grant, Commission Decision of 21 January 2020, see:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases1/20207/282390_2131740_78_2.pdf. 
343 Case SA.55577 Extension to the tonnage tax scheme, Commission Decision of 3 April 2020, see:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_37912.  
344  Case  SA.56474  Extension  of  the  Belgian  seafarer  scheme  to  certain  vessels,  Commission  Decision  of  27  April 
2020, see: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_56475.  

87 

 
                                                 
the  Italian international  registry  scheme consisting in a  corporate tax reduction for shipping 
companies  as  well  as  other  tax  and  social  contributions’  reductions345;  the  German  seafarer 
scheme on the reduction of social security contributions, the inclusion of research vessels in a 
Danish  seafarer  scheme346;  and  the  introduction  of  a  new  seafarer  scheme  in  Estonia 
consisting in a partial reduction of labour-related costs for passenger shipping companies347.  

Lastly, the Commission opened the formal investigation procedure regarding the three public 
service  contracts  granted  by  France  to  Corsica  Linea  for  the  provision  of  maritime  services 
between Marseille and the ports of Ajaccio, Bastia and L’Île Rousse, as the Commission has 
doubts whether the contracts are in line with the so-called SGEI framework348. 

8.2.8. Judgment in the Spanish Tax Lease case 

By  its  judgment  of  25  July  2018,  the  Court  of  Justice,  hearing  an  appeal  brought  by  the 
Commission,  set  aside  the  judgment  in  Commission  v  Spain  and  Others349.  The  Court  of 
Justice held that the General Court, in its analysis of the selective nature of the Spanish ‘Tax 
Lease  System’  (‘the  STL  system’)  to  certain  finance  lease  agreements  allowing  shipping 
companies  to  benefit  from  a  20-30%  price  reduction  when  purchasing  ships  constructed  by 
Spanish  shipyards,  misapplied  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty  relating  to  State  aid  and  that, 
contrary to the findings of the General Court, the Commission’s decision was not vitiated by a 
failure to  state reasons for the  distortion of competition and effect  on trade. As the General 
Court had not ruled on all the pleas in law raised before it, the Court of Justice referred the 
case  back  to  the  General  Court.  By  its  renvoi  judgment  of  23  September  2020,  Spain  and 
Others v Commission, T-515/13 RENV and T-719/13 RENV350, the General Court dismissed 
the actions brought by the applicants. 

8.2.9. Antitrust enforcement in the rail sector 

On  30  October  2020,  the  Commission  has  adopted  a  Statement  of  Objections  in  case 
AT.40156  Czech  rail.  In  the  Commission’s  preliminary  view,  the  state-owned  Czech  rail 
incumbent České dráhy (ČD) has breached EU antitrust rules by charging prices below cost. 
If confirmed, ČD’s conduct would amount to  an infringement of Article 102 TFEU through 
predatory pricing. The Commission takes the preliminary view that between 2011 and 2019 
ČD engaged in predatory pricing on the Prague-Ostrava route. This conduct appears to have 
taken place at a time when RegioJet and Leo Express posed a growing threat to ČD, quickly 
expanding on the Prague-Ostrava route and beyond. 

On 18 November 2020, the General Court delivered its judgment in case T-814/17, Lietuvos 
geležinkeliai AB (Lithuanian Railways) v European Commission. The European Commission 
had  fined  Lithuanian  Railways  in  2017  an  amount  of  EUR  27 873 000  for  hindering 
competition on the rail freight market, in breach of EU antitrust rules, by removing a rail track 
connecting  Lithuania  and  Latvia.  The  removal  of  the  track  made  it  more  difficult  for  the 

345 Case SA.48260 Italian international registry scheme, Commission Decision of 11 June 2020, see:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_48260.  
346  Case  SA.55760  Tax  deduction  scheme  for  seafarers  to  include  research  vessels,  Commission  Decision  of  9  July 
2020, see: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_55760.  
347 Case SA.57541 Support for international passenger shipping, Commission Decision of 27 August 2020, see:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_57541.  
348  Communication  from  the  Commission:  European  Union  framework  for  State  aid  in  the  form  of  public  service 
compensation (2011), OJ C 8, 11.1.2012, p. 15-22. 
349 Case C-128/16 P Commission v Spain, judgment of the Court of Justice of 25.7.2018. 
350 Case T-515/13 RENV Spain v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 23.9.2020. 

88 

 
                                                 
Latvian  rail  freight  operator  to  enter  Lithuania  and  serve  a  customer  based  in  Lithuania. 
Lithuanian Railways failed to show any objective justification for the removal of the track. In 
2020, Lithuanian Railways rebuilt the track. The GC confirmed that the Commission correctly 
interpreted  the  concepts  of  abuse  of  a  dominant  position,  of  objective  justification  under 
Article 102 TFEU and also confirmed that the Commission correctly determined the duration 
of  an  infringement.  In  particular,  the  Court  noted  that  the  removal  of  the  track  cannot  be 
assessed  in  the  light  of  the  case-law  established  in  relation  to  refusal  to  provide  access  to 
essential facilities, which sets a higher threshold for finding that a practice is abusive than that 
applied  in  the  contested  decision.  In  fact,  the  conduct  assessed  in  the  decision  must  be 
analysed  as  an  act  capable  of  hindering  market  entry  by  making  access  to  the  market  more 
difficult  and  thus  leading  to  an  anticompetitive  foreclosure  effect.  However,  the  Court 
reduced  the  fine  to  EUR  20 068 650  on  the  basis  of  its  unlimited  jurisdiction.  Lithuania 
Railways lodged an appeal against the judgment of the General Court in Case C-42/21 P. 

8.2.10. Rail and intermodal State aid enforcement  

As in other transport modes hit by the COVID-19 pandemic, public intervention was urgently 
needed to preserve connectivity and the Commission quickly responded to that challenge.  

First, the Commission issued in April 2020 a guidance document on the possibilities available 
to  provide  support  to  railway  undertakings  in  the  pandemic.  Second,  the  Commission 
supported  Member  States  in  amending  existing  public  service  contracts  to  address  the 
exceptional circumstances in line with the applicable rules. Third, the Commission approved 
under  Article  107(2)(b)  TFEU  three  schemes  under  which  public  service  operators  are 
compensated for the damages suffered as a result of the COVID-19 outbreak351. Furthermore, 
the  Commission  approved  a  scheme  for  the  reduction  of  track  access  charges  and  parking 
fees352 (similar schemes have been notified but not approved yet on 31 December 2020). 

Besides the handling of COVID-19 related cases, the Commission continued to enforce State 
aid  rules  applicable to  the rail sector. The Commission approved several  schemes353 for the 
coordination of transport (which is broad concept encompassing aid for infrastructure use, aid 
to reduce negative externalities or aid for interoperability measures) on the basis of the 2008 
State  aid  Guidelines  and  Article  93  TFEU.  Approved  schemes  include  for  instance  aid  to 
support  measures  for  noise  reduction,  aid  to  support  research  into  environmentally-friendly 
rail  transport  support  for  systems  ensuring  interoperability,  in  particular  to  enhance  the 
deployment  of  ERTMS  and  aid  for  single  wagon  transport.  All  these  measures  support  the 
modal shift from road to rail as the safer and more environmentally-friendly transport mode, 
which constitutes a priority to implement the European Green Deal.  

351 Cases SA.57675 (Germany) and SA.58738 (Netherlands). 
352 Case SA.57371 (Austria). 
353 Cases SA.57886 (Sweden) – Environmental compensation for rail freight transport; SA.55861 (Czechia) – ERTMS 
Prolongation;  SA.55912  (Italy)  –  Prolongation  of  the  aid  scheme  for  combined  transport  in  the  Province  of  Trento; 
SA.57271  (Germany)  –  Prolongation  of  the  Funding  Guidelines  for  noise  reduction  measures  on  freight  wagons; 
SA.56718  (Italy)  –  Incentives  for  rail  transport;  SA.58046  (Germany)  –  Support  for  rail  freight  transport  (single 
wagon); SA.55353 (Germany)  –  Programme  to  support  innovation  in  rail  freight  transport;  SA.57809  (Denmark)  – 
Prolongation  and  amendment  of  the  scheme  for  the  support  of  ERTMS  equipment;  SA.57556  (Belgium)  – 
Prolongation  du  régime  de  promotion  du  transport  combiné  ferroviaire  et  du  trafic  diffus  pour  2021;  SA.58023 
(Belgique) – Prolongation du régime d’aide en faveur des modes de transport alternatif à la route pour la période 2021-
2025; SA.57398 (France) – Augmentation du budget globale du Plan d’Aides à la Modernisation et à l’Innovation de 
la flotte fluviale pour la période 2018-2022 (PAMI). 

89 

 
                                                 
As  regards  policy  developments,  in  2020,  the  Commission  completed  the  evaluation  of  the 
State aid rules in the railway sector laid down in the Community guidelines on State aid for 
railway undertakings adopted in 2008 as part of the State aid Fitness check. The Commission 
services concluded that those rules are no longer fit for purpose and need to be reviewed, as 
set out in the Staff Working Document of 30 October 2020.  

Regarding  new  case-law  in  the  land  transport  sector,  the  Court  of  Justice  replied  on  19 
December  2019354  to  a  preliminary  ruling  concerning  the  public  company  Ferrovie  del  Sud 
Est e Servizi Automobilistici S.r.l. The judgment provides useful guidance on the notions of: 
(i)  beneficiary  of  potential  aid;  (ii)  transfer  of  state  resources;  and  (iii)  distortion  of 
competition.  

8.2.11. Confirmation of the Commission’s inspection decisions by the Court of Justice 

On  30  January  2020,  the  Court  of  Justice  (in  joined  cases  C-538/18P  and  C-539/18P355) 
dismissed the appeals brought by České dráhy (ČD) against the General Court’s judgments of 
20  June  2018  (cases  T-325/16356  and  T-621/16357).  The  General  Court  judgments  validated 
two Commission inspection decisions in ongoing cases investigating the alleged involvement 
of  České  dráhy  in,  respectively,  abuse  of  dominance  (AT.40156)  and  cartel  conducts 
(AT.40401). The judgment of the Court of Justice, upholding the respective judgments of the 
General Court358, confirmed the Commission’s prerogative to carry out successive inspections 
in  the  premises  of  the  same  undertaking  to  investigate  different  suspected  infringements, 
where  justified  by  the  needs  of  such  enquiries  pursuant  to  its  powers  under  Regulation  No. 
1/2003. 

8.2.12. State aid enforcement in the road sector 

The Commission adopted two decisions concerning Germany directly under Article 93 TFEU. 
Some of the potential beneficiaries of these two aid measures operate on tracks (local trains, 
trams etc.). On 28 August 2020, the Commission approved a scheme that aims at providing 
funding for the construction, extension, renewal and improvement of communication systems 
and  the  development  of  an  electronic  fare  system  in  North-Rhine  Westphalia359.  On  22 
December 2020, the Commission approved a scheme that aims at supporting the coordination 
of  local  public  transport  and  further  improving  the  modal  split  (i.e.  the  distribution  of 
trips/transport  over  different  transport  modes)  in  favour  of  local  public  transport  in 
Germany360. With a budget of EUR 300 million over a period of four years (2020-2023), the 
scheme  promotes  the  investment  and  innovation  capacity  of  local  public  transport  with  the 
view to achieve a sustainable mobility transition from private motorised transport to climate-
friendly local public transport.  

354 Judgment of 19 December 2019, Arriva Italia e a., C-385/18, EU:C:2019:1121. 
355 Joined Cases C-538/18 P and C-539/18 P České dráhy v Commission, judgment of 30.12.2020. 
356 Case T-325/16 České dráhy v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 20.6.2018. 
357 Case T-621/16 České dráhy v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 20.8.2018. 
358  The  General  Court  fully  confirmed  the  second  inspection decision,  while  it  partially  annulled  the first  inspection 
decision in as far as it went beyond the scope of the investigation in the alleged predation practices by ČD, covering 
routes  other  than  Prague-Ostrava.  In  practice,  that  had  no  negative  influence  on  the  Commission’s  action  (the 
Commission’s ongoing investigation relates exclusively to the Prague-Ostrava route). 
359  Case  SA.56519  Investment  in  Intermodal  Transport  Control  System  and  electronic  billing  system,  Commission 
Decision of 28 August 2020, see:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_56519.  
360 Case SA.57783 Support scheme for model projects that strengthen local public transport, Commission Decision of 
22 December 2020, see: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_57783.  

90 

 
                                                 
On  5  October  2020,  the  General  Court  ruled  on  two  almost  identical  complaints  on  public 
road  transport  in  Lower  Saxony361.  With  effect  from  1  January  2017,  the  Land  of  Lower 
Saxony  replaced  Section  45a  PBefG  (Personenbeförderungsgesetz)  with  Section  7a  NNVG 
(Niedersächsisches  Nahverkehrsgesetz).  The  Commission  decided  on  12  July  2018  that  the 
replacement does not amount to a transfer of resources to an undertaking and hence does not 
amount to State aid. On 5 October 2020 the General Court confirmed this approach. The case 
is now under appeal before the European Court of Justice (C-656/20 P and C-666/20 P). 

8.2.13. State aid enforcement in the postal services sector 

Electronic  substitution  of  traditional  letters  continues,  which  in  turn  results  in  a  decline  in 
letter  volumes.  Nevertheless,  postal  services  continue  to  have  a  significant  economic  and 
social value, not the least because they are also active on other markets, in particular parcel 
delivery. Efficient postal services are a key factor in allowing e-commerce to realise its full 
potential for growth and creating jobs. 

Through State aid control in the postal sector, the Commission pursues multiple related goals. 
State aid control ensures that where a postal service provider – typically a postal incumbent – 
is  entrusted  with  a  costly  public  service  obligation,  any  compensation  paid  to  the  provider 
does not distort competition between postal incumbents and new entrants. State aid should not 
shield  the  recipients  from  competitive  pressures  and  market  developments,  but  should 
incentivise efficiency, innovation and investment. 

On  7  February  2020,  after  a  lengthy  procedure  including  several  appeals  before  the  Union 
Courts, the Commission concluded that a pension measure implemented by Germany and that 
covered a major share of the pensions for Deutsche Post’s retired civil servants for the period 
from 1995 to 1999 does not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU 
on the basis that it does not confer an advantage to Deutsche Post362. 

On  12  May  2020,  the  Commission  concluded  that  capital  injections  for  PostNord  Logistics 
A/S, which is ultimately a subsidiary of the joint Danish and Swedish company PostNord AB, 
do  not  constitute  State  aid  on  the  basis  that  the  capital  injections  were  not  imputable  to 
Denmark and/or Sweden363. The Decision has been appealed (T-525/20, pending).  

On 14 May 2020, the Commission approved State aid granted by Spain for Correos’ universal 
postal service obligation. In this decision, the Commission concluded that the measure was in 
line with State aid rules by ensuring that the compensation granted by Spain to Correos would 
not  exceed  the  net  cost  of  the  public  service  mission,  meaning  there  will  not  be  any 
overcompensation.  In  its  decision,  the  Commission  also  addressed  the  concerns  raised  in  a 
complaint  lodged  in  March  2019  by  two  industry  organisations  who  alleged  that  Correos 
received  incompatible  State  aid  through  several  measures,  including  the  universal  service 
obligation364. 

On  23  June  2020,  the  Commission  opened  an  in-depth  investigation  to  assess  whether  the 

361  Cases  T-583/18  and  T-597/18  GVN  and  Hermann  Albers  v  Commission,  judgment  of  the  General  Court  of 
5.10.2020.  
362 Case SA.17653 Deutsche Post, Commission Decision of 7 February 2020, see:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_17653.  
363 Case SA.52489/SA.52658 Alleged State aid to PostNord Logistics, Commission Decision of 12 May 2020, see:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_52489.  
364 Case SA.50872 USO compensation for Correos, 2011-2020, Commission Decision of 14 May 2020, see:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_50872.  

91 

 
                                                 
compensation granted by Czechia to Czech Post to fulfil its public service mission is in line 
with EU State aid rules365. The concerns that led to the formal investigation relate to potential 
overcompensation  between  2018  and  2022  for  the  delivery  of  the  universal  postal  service. 
Moreover, two complaints were submitted in parallel.  

On  1  December  2020,  the  Commission  approved  Universal  service  obligation  (USO) 
compensation  for  Poste  Italiane  for  the  period  2020-2024366.  This  approval  followed  the 
presentation by Italy of relevant information to calculate the net avoided cost of the universal 
postal  service,  including  a  customer  survey  on  the  impact  of  the  discontinuation  of  Poste 
Italiane’s  postal  activities  (including  the  USO)  in  a  counterfactual  scenario  where  Poste 
Italiane would not receive the aid.  

The General  Court decided on two postal  cases in  2020. First  the General  Court upheld  the 
State  aid  decision  of  19  February  2018  concluding  that  the  USO  compensation  granted  to 
Czech  Post  over  the  period  2013-2017  was  compatible  aid  under  the  SGEI  Framework367. 
Second,  the  Court  of  Justice  upheld  the  General  Court  in  its  judgment  concerning  Polish 
Post368.  In  this  latter  case,  the  Court  confirmed  the  Commission’s  approach  regarding  the 
assessment  of  universal  service  compensations  under  the  SGEI  framework.  In  particular,  it 
confirmed the approach to be taken regarding compensation funds as well as the articulation 
between the Postal Directive and the SGEI Framework.  

8.2.14. Antitrust enforcement in the hotel sector 

On 21 February 2020 the Commission  fined the Spanish  hotel group Meliá EUR 6 678 000 
for  including  restrictive  clauses  in  its  agreements  with  tour  operators.  These  clauses 
discriminate  among  consumers  within  the  European  Economic  Area  (EEA)  based  on  their 
place of residence, in breach of EU antitrust rules.  

The  Commission  investigation  showed  that  Meliá  entered  into  contracts  with  tour  operators 
that  restricted  active  and  passive  sales  for  hotel  accommodation.  More  specifically,  Meliá’s 
standard terms and conditions for contracts with tour operators contained a clause according 
to which those contracts were valid only for reservations of consumers who were resident in 
specified countries. 

These agreements may have partitioned the European Single Market by restricting the ability 
of  the  tour  operators  to  sell  freely  the  hotel  accommodation  in  all  EEA  countries  and  to 
respond to direct requests from consumers who were residents outside the defined countries. 
As a result, consumers were not able to see the full hotel availability or book hotel rooms at 
the  best  prices  with  tour  operators  in  other  Member  States.  Meliá  cooperated  with  the 
Commission beyond its legal obligation to do so. Therefore, the Commission granted Meliá a 
30% fine reduction in return for this cooperation. 

Following the decision by European Competition Network (ECN) in 2017 to keep the hotel 
booking  sector  under  review  and  to  re-assess  the  state  of  competition,  on  9  July  2020,  the 
Commission published an open call for tender for a market study on the distribution of hotel 

365  Case  SA.55208/SA.55497/SA.55686  Czech  Post  compensation  for  the  period  2018-2022  /  Complaints  regarding 
alleged incompatible State aid to Czech Post, Commission Decision of 23 June 2020, see:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_55208.  
366 Case SA.55270 USO Compensation – Poste italiane S.p.A., Commission Decision of 1 December 2020, see:  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_55270.  
367 Case T-316/18 První novinová společnost v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 15.10.2020.  
368 Case C-431/19 P Inpost Paczkomaty v Commission, judgment of the Court of Justice of 17.12.2020.  

92 

 
                                                 
accommodation  in  the  EU.  The  study  will  be  conducted  in  2021  and  will  focus  on  Austria, 
Belgium, Cyprus, Poland, Spain and Sweden. The market study is intended to provide up-to-
date information on how hotels market and sell their rooms, including: (i) whether distribution 
arrangements differ between Member States; (ii) whether there have been changes relative to 
the findings of a monitoring exercise conducted by a group of EU competition authorities in 
2016;  and  (iii)  whether  national  laws  banning  booking  platform  parity  clauses  have  led  to 
changes in distribution arrangements. 

93 

 
ANNEX 1. 

State aid decisions adopted under the Temporary Framework in 2020369 
by country 

Member 
State 

1  Austria 
2  Austria 

Case 
number 
SA.56840  COVID-19 – Austrian liquidity assistance scheme 
SA.56981  COVID-19:  Austrian  scheme  for  guarantees  on  bridge 

Title 

Decision 
date 
08-04-2020 
17-04-2020 

loans 

3  Austria 

SA.57148  COVID-19:  Support  Measures  by  Carinthia,  Styria, 

19-05-2020 

Tyrol, Upper Austria and Vienna 

4  Austria 

SA.57340  COVID-19:  Individual  aid  to  Apeptico  –  Emergency 

03-07-2020 

Call for the research of COVID-19  

5  Austria 

SA.57345  COVID-19:  Individual  aid  to  Panoptes  –  Emergency 

03-07-2020 

Call for the research of COVID-19  

6  Austria 

SA.57928  AT-  COVID-19;  Compensation  scheme:  Directive  for 
fixed  cost  subsidies  for  economic  activities  of  Non-
Profit-Organisations 

06-08-2020 

7  Austria 

SA.58360  Richtlinien des NÖ Wirtschafts- und Tourismusfonds – 

10-09-2020 

Förderprogramm COVID-19 

8  Austria 

SA.58661  COVID-19:  Fixed  Cost  Compensation  according  to 

20-11-2020 

3.12 Temporary Framework  

9  Belgium 

SA.56807  COVID-19  -  Mesures  de  soutien  en  faveur  des 
aéroports  wallons  –  Moratoire  sur  les  redevances  de 
concession  

11-04-2020 

10  Belgium 

SA.57057  R&D  scheme  of  Brussels  Capital  Region  “R&D 

17-04-2020 

Projects – COVID-19” 

11  Belgium 

SA.57056  Aide dans le cadre de la crise sanitaire du COVID-19, 
en  vue  d’indemniser  les  entreprises  actives  dans  la 
production  primaire  de  produits  agricoles  et  dans 
l’aquaculture, dans le domaine de l’alimentation 

24-04-2020 

12  Belgium 
13  Belgium 

SA.57083  COVID-19 – Guarantee scheme – Walloon Region 
SA.57132  COVID-19 Flemish subordinated loan scheme for start-

30-04-2020 
05-05-2020 

ups, scale-ups, and SMEs 

14  Belgium 

SA.57173  Walloon  scheme  for  COVID-19  relevant  research  and 

12-05-2020 

15  Belgium 
16  Belgium 

development 
SA.57187  Credendo Bridge Guarantee 
SA.57605  Strategische  transformatiesteun  aan  ondernemingen  in 
het Vlaams Gewest die investeringen doen betreffende 
de  productie  van  COVID-19  relevante  producten  
(Strategic  transformation  aid  to  undertakings  in  the 
Flemish Region for investments in COVID-19) 

13-05-2020 
19-06-2020 

17  Belgium 
18  Belgium 
19  Belgium 

SA.57637  COVID-19 – Recapitalisation of Aviapartner 
SA.57797  COVID-19: Support to the social tourism sector  
SA.57869  Loan  guarantee  scheme  in  response  to  the  COVID-19 

07-07-2020 
09-07-2020 
14-07-2020 

crisis aimed at SMEs 

20  Belgium 

SA.58014  Aid scheme to support potato growers and ornamental 

27-07-2020 

21  Belgium 

22  Belgium 

plant growers affected by COVID-19 

SA.58081  Besluit van de Vlaamse Regering tot instellen van een 
terugbetaalbaar  voorschot  ter  ondersteuning  van  de 
opstart  van  de  evenementensector  (Decision  of  the 
Flemish Government regarding a repayable advance in 
support of the restart of the event sector.) 
SA.58165  Exonération  de  la  contribution  annuelle  obligatoire  en 

27-07-2020 

05-08-2020 

369 A number of these decisions have subsequently been amended. 

94 

 
 
                                                 
23  Belgium 
24  Belgium 

25  Belgium 
26  Belgium 
27  Belgium 
28  Belgium 

faveur de l’AFSCA et destinée à financer les contrôles 
des établissements, à charge des entreprises du secteur 
HORECA  et  du  commerce  de  détail  alimentaire 
ambulant. 

SA.57544  COVID-19: Aid to Brussels Airlines 
SA.58649  COVID-19  Aides  au  producteurs  de  pommes  de  terre 
de  conservation  détenteurs  en  propriété  d’un  stock  de 
pomme de terre en vente libre. 

SA.58299  COVID-19: Aid to the Flemish airports 
SA.58691  COVID-19 – aid to the Flemish coach sector 
SA.58763  Belgium – COVID-19: Aid to hotels and aparthotels 
SA.59297  Aid  for  the  payment  of  employer  social  security 
contributions  in  sectors  particularly  affected  by  the 
COVID-19 outbreak. 

21-08-2020 
23-09-2020 

28-09-2020 
06-10-2020 
09-10-2020 
19-11-2020 

29  Bulgaria 

SA.56933  COVID-19 – Bulgaria – Bulgarian Development Bank 

08-04-2020 

Guarantee scheme 

30  Bulgaria 

SA.56905  COVID-19  –  Employment  scheme  for  preserving  jobs 

14-04-2020 

31  Bulgaria 

32  Bulgaria 

33  Bulgaria 

in most affected sectors 

SA.57052  COVID-19  Bulgaria  financial 
under 3.1 Temporary Framework 

instrument  measure 

23-04-2020 

SA.57283  Call  for  Proposals  BG16RFOP002-2.073  “Supporting 
micro and small enterprises to overcome the economic 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic” 

13-05-2020 

SA.57795  COVID-19:  Supporting  medium 

to 
overcome  the  economic  impact  of  the  COVID-19 
pandemic 

enterprises 

26-06-2020 

34  Bulgaria 

SA.57759  Bulgaria  –  COVID-19  –  Short-Term  Employment 

14-07-2020 

Support in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic 

35  Bulgaria 
36  Bulgaria 

SA.58050  State aid for tour operators  
SA.58095  COVID-19:  concession  fee  deferral  Burgas  and  Varna 

24-07-2020 
14-08-2020 

airports 

37  Bulgaria 

38  Bulgaria 

39  Bulgaria 

SA.58328  “Aid  to  provide  liquidity  to  farmers  active  in  primary 
agricultural  production  to  overcome  the  effects  of  the 
negative economic impact of COVID-19” 
SA.59182  COVID-19:  Aid  to  micro,  small  and  medium-sized 

coach companies 

SA.59704  Support  for  small  enterprises  with  a  turnover  of  over 
BGN 500 000 to overcome the economic consequences 
of the COVID-19 pandemic 

27-08-2020 

30-11-2020 

16-12-2020 

40  Bulgaria 

SA.59990  COVID-19:  State  aid  scheme  for  tour  operators  and 

18-12-2020 

41  Croatia 

42  Croatia 

43  Croatia 
44  Croatia 
45  Croatia 

travel agents 

SA.56877  Portofolio  insurance  of  liquidity  loans  for  exporters 
the  Temporary  Framework  for  State  aid 
under 
measures  to  support  the  economy  in  the  current 
COVID-19 outbreak 

AND 

the  economy 

SA.56957  STATE  AID  SCHEME  CROATIAN  BANK  FOR 
DEVELOPMENT 
RECONSTRUCTION 
Temporary  Framework  for  State  aid  measures  to 
the  current  COVID-19 
support 
in 
outbreak  and 
the  Temporary 
Framework for State aid measures to support the econo 
SA.56998  State aid in fisheries supporting economy – COVID-19 
SA.57175  Guarantee schemes and subsidised loans scheme  
SA.57595  State  Aid  Programme  of  the  Ministry  of  Culture  to 
Support  the  Economy  in  the  Current  COVID-19 
Outbreak  

  Amendment 

to 

06-04-2020 

09-04-2020 

17-04-2020 
12-05-2020 
17-06-2020 

46  Croatia 

SA.57711  State  aid  Scheme  to  support  the  maritime,  transport, 
transport  infrastructure,  tourism  and  related  sectors 

30-06-2020 

95 

 
impacted by the COVID-19 outbreak 

47  Croatia 

SA.59815  State  Aid  Program  for  primary  agricultural  producers 
due  to  difficult  business  conditions  caused  by  the 
pandemic COVID-19 

11-12-2020 

48  Cyprus 

SA.57511  COVID-19  –  CY  –  Waiver  of  interests  and  penalties 

10-06-2020 

49  Cyprus 

for late payment of VAT 

SA.57587  Aid  scheme  in  support  of  the  primary  agricultural 
production sector to address the impact of the COVID-
19  outbreak,  on  the  basis  of  the  EU  Temporary  State 
Aid Framework 

16-06-2020 

50  Cyprus 

SA.57654  COVID-19:  Subsidy  Scheme  for  Micro  and  Small 

25-06-2020 

51  Cyprus 

52  Cyprus 
53  Cyprus 

54  Cyprus 

enterprises and Interest Rate Subsidy Scheme 
SA.57691  SA.57691(2020/N)  – Cyprus  – COVID-19 – Incentive 

scheme towards airlines 

SA.57762  Support Scheme for newspapers – CY – COVID-19 
SA.58923  Loan  provided 

to  Hermes  Airports  Limited  for 
addressing  financial  implications  of  the  effects  of 
COVID-19 

SA.60263  Support  scheme  for  organised  producer  groups  and/or 
producer organisations in the agricultural sector due to 
the  effects  of  the  restrictive  measures  implemented 
during the COVID-19 pandemic 

01-07-2020 

03-07-2020 
17-11-2020 

22-12-2020 

55  Czechia 

SA.56961  Scheme  for  investment  aid  for  the  production  of 

14-04-2020 

COVID-19 relevant products 

56  Czechia 

SA.57094  Czechia  –  COVID-19  –  Loan  guarantee  scheme  to 
support  the  economy  in  response  to  the  COVID-19 
crisis 

05-05-2020 

57  Czechia 
58  Czechia 

SA.57071  COVID-19 – Support to R&D projects 
SA.57195  Czechia – COVID-19 related loan guarantees managed 

08-05-2020 
15-05-2020 

by CMZRB 

59  Czechia 

SA.57464  COVID-19: Program to support entrepreneurs affected 

02-06-2020 

60  Czechia 
61  Czechia 
62  Czechia 

by the spread of the COVID-19 (rent payments) 

SA.57475  Opex 2020 - Loan Principal Reduction 
SA.57506  COVID-19: State aid measures in Moravia-Silesia 
SA.57149  COVID-19:  Social  security  contribution  relief  for  self 
employed  affected  by  COVID-19  Waiver  of  penalties 
related 
to  pension  and  state  employment  policy 
contributions payments 

03-06-2020 
26-06-2020 
06-07-2020 

63  Czechia 

SA.57848  Aid  to  mitigate  the  effects  of  SARS  COV-19  on 

06-07-2020 

64  Czechia 
65  Czechia 
66  Czechia 
67  Czechia 

68  Czechia 

agricultural and food production (AGRICOVID) 

SA.57102  COVID-19 – Wage subsidies in Czechia 
SA.58018  COVID-19: Support for Health Spa’s  
SA.58213  COVID-19: Aid to the cultural sector 
SA.58167  COVID-19  –  CZ  –  3.1  TF  –  Operational  Programme 

27-07-2020 
07-08-2020 
19-08-2020 
24-08-2020 

Employment 

SA.58398  Accommodation 
Accommodation) 

Facility 

Support 

(COVID-

27-08-2020 

69  Czechia 

SA.57358  COVID-19:  Public  health  insurance  reliefs  for  self-

09-09-2020 

employed  

70  Czechia 

SA.59336  Aid to mitigate the impact of SARS COV-19 outbreak 

11-11-2020 

on agrifood production (AGRICOVID) 

71  Czechia 
72  Czechia 

SA.58430  COVID-19 – City of Pilsen’s aid programme 
SA.59536  COVID-19: Continuation of the support programme for 

13-11-2020 
25-11-2020 

businesses in the cultural sector 

73  Czechia 

SA.58353  Landesprogramm 

zur 

Bekämpfung 

der 

22-12-2020 

Langzeitarbeitslosigkeit – Sozialer Arbeitsmarkt [SN] 

74  Czechia 

SA.59340  COVID-19  –  Aid  for  sport  entities  and  organisations-

22-12-2020 

CZ 

96 

 
75  Denmark 

SA.56708  Danish  guarantee  scheme  for  SMEs  affected  by 

21-03-2020 

COVID-19 

76  Denmark 

SA.56808  Liquidity  guarantee  scheme  under  the  Temporary 
Framework  for  State  aid  measures  to  support  the 
economy in the COVID-19 outbreak 

30-03-2020 

77  Denmark 

SA.56856  State  loan  for  the  Danish  Travel  Guarantee  Fund  as  a 

02-04-2020 

result of COVID-19 

78  Denmark 

SA.57027  COVID-19 – Credit facility and tax deferrals linked to 

30-04-2020 

VAT and payroll tax – Denmark 

79  Denmark 

SA.57164  Denmark  –  COVID-19  –  Loan  scheme  for  early  stage 

05-05-2020 

and companies in the venture segment 

80  Denmark 

SA.57919  COVID-19:  Limited  amounts  of  aid  scheme  for  self 

13-07-2020 

employed  

81  Denmark 

82  Denmark 

SA.57920  COVID-19:  Limited  amounts  of  aid  scheme  for  self-
employed  and  freelancers  related  to  large  events  and 
seasonal work 

SA.57931  Limited amounts of aid scheme for undertakings under 
restrictive  measures  (prohibition  lifted  from  8  June  or 
later)  

13-07-2020 

14-07-2020 

83  Denmark 
84  Denmark 

SA.57543  Denmark – COVID-19 recapitalisation of SAS 
SA.58157  Aid  to  Danish  airports  and  airlines  which  land  in  and 

17-08-2020 
03-09-2020 

85  Denmark 

depart from Denmark 
SA.58780  Targeted  compensation  scheme 

for 

fixed  costs 

08-10-2020 

(prohibition lifted from 1 September or later)  

86  Denmark 

SA.58515  Wage 

compensation 

scheme 

for 

undertakings 
to  COVID-19 

09-10-2020 

prohibited 
prohibition 

from  operating  due 

87  Denmark 

SA.59048  COVID-19:  Aid to cafés, restaurants, bars, nightclubs, 

29-10-2020 

venues & their suppliers 

88  Denmark 

SA.59091  COVID-19:  Targeted  compensation  scheme  for  fixed 

11-11-2020 

costs (sub-suppliers) 

89  Denmark 
90  Denmark 
91  Denmark 

SA.57678  COVID-19 – Dani recapitalisation scheme 
SA.59414  COVID-19: Danish local wage compensation scheme 
SA.59370  COVID-19  –  Temporary  Framework/3.1  measure  to 
support  airlines  holding  a  Danish  air  operator 
certificate 

20-11-2020 
26-11-2020 
27-11-2020 

92  Denmark 

SA.58681  Compensation scheme for production costs resulting in 

27-11-2020 

a loss due to cancellation of events related COVID-19 

93  Denmark 

SA.59764  Compensation  scheme  for  self-employed  affected  by 

08-12-2020 

COVID-19 related measures 

94  Denmark 

SA.59960  Scheme 

for  cancelled,  deferred  or  substantially 

11-12-2020 

modified large events due to COVID-19 

95  Denmark 

SA.60094  Danish compensation scheme for fixed costs (umbrella 

21-12-2020 

scheme under TF3.12)  

96  Denmark 

SA.60081  Danish compensation scheme for fixed costs (umbrella 

21-12-2020 

scheme under TF3.1)  

97  Estonia 

SA.56804  Loan  guarantee  scheme  of  Estonia  under 

the 
Temporary  Framework  for  State  aid  measures  to 
support 
the  current  COVID-19 
in 
outbreak 

the  economy 

30-03-2020 

98  Estonia 

SA.57014  COVID-19 Estonian aid schemes under Section 3.1 TF 

21-04-2020 

99  Estonia 

100  Estonia 

– direct grants and payment advantages 

SA.57028  COVID-19 Estonian aid schemes under Section 3.1 TF 
–  guarantees  on  loans,  loans  and  subsidised  interest 
rates for loans 

SA.57403  COVID-19:  Support  for  rent  payments  for  trade  and 
service  operators  negatively  affected  by  Coronavirus 
outbreak 

28-04-2020 

28-05-2020 

101  Estonia 

SA.57586  Estonia COVID-19 – Recapitalisation of Nordica 

11-08-2020 

97 

 
102  Estonia 

SA.59338  COVID-19: Aid to undertakings in tourism and directly 

25-11-2020 

103  Estonia 

104  Finland 

105  Finland 

106  Finland 

107  Finland 

108  Finland 
109  Finland 

related sectors 

SA.59278  COVID-19:  Support  for  (1)  industrial  research  and 
experimental  development  by  companies  affected  by 
the  COVID-19  crisis,  and  (2)  for  COVID-19  related 
R&D  

SA.57059  COVID-19: Loan guarantee and subsidised interest rate 
loan  scheme  for  undertakings  most  affected  by 
COVID-19 

SA.56995  COVID-19: Framework Scheme for State aid measures 
(section 3.1 of the Temporary Framework)  
SA.57221  Temporary aid in favour of undertakings in fishery and 
aquaculture sector affected by the COVID-19 outbreak  
SA.57231  COVID-19: Temporary aid in favour of undertakings in 
primary agriculture production affected by the COVID-
19 outbreak 

SA.56809  COVID-19: State loan guarantee for Finnair 
SA.57192  Loan guarantee  scheme for maritime enterprises under 
the  Temporary  Framework  for  State  aid  measures  to 
support 
the  current  COVID-19 
in 
outbreak 

the  economy 

03-12-2020 

20-04-2020 

24-04-2020 

06-05-2020 

06-05-2020 

18-05-2020 
28-05-2020 

110  Finland 
111  France 

SA.57410  COVID-19 – recapitalisation of Finnair 
SA.56709  France  –  COVID-19:  Plan  de  sécurisation  du 

09-06-2020 
21-03-2020 

financement des entreprises 

112  France 

SA.56823  COVID-19  –  French  Solidarity  Fund  –  Scheme  for 

30-03-2020 

enterprises in temporary difficulties due to COVID-19 

113  France 

SA.56985  Régime  cadre  temporaire  au  soutien  des  entreprises 

20-04-2020 

dans la crise du COVID-19 

114  France 

SA.56868  COVID-19:  Garanties  des  préfinancements  des 

24-04-2020 

entreprises françaises exportatrices 

115  France 

SA.57134  COVID-19:  Aide  sous  forme  de  garanties  de  prêts  au 

29-04-2020 

116  France 

117  France 
118  France 

profit du groupe Renault.  

SA.57082  COVID-19 – Cadre temporaire 107(3)(b) – Garantie et 
prêt d’actionnaire au bénéfice d’Air France 

SA.57405  COVID-19 – Groupe Novares 
SA.57367  Aid for COVID-19 relevant R&D projects, investment 
into  relevant  testing  and  upscaling  infrastructures,  and 
investment 
relevant  production 
capacities. 

into  COVID-19 

04-05-2020 

26-05-2020 
05-06-2020 

119  France 
120  France 

SA.57754  COVID-19: Dispositif d’activité partielle ad hoc 
SA.57695  COVID-19:  Régime  d'aides  sous  la  forme  de  prêts 

29-06-2020 
30-06-2020 

121  Germany 
122  Germany 
123  Germany 

publics subordonnés 
SA.56714  Germany – COVID-19 measures 
SA.56787  COVID-19: Bundesregelung Bürgschaften 2020 
SA.56790  Federal  Framework  “Small  amounts  of  aid  2020”  – 

22-03-2020 
24-03-2020 
24-03-2020 

COVID-19 

124  Germany 

SA.56863  Germany  –  COVID-19  –  Federal  framework  for 

02-04-2020 

subsidised loans 2020 

125  Germany 

SA.57100  Germany  – COVID-19 – Federal Framework  “Aid  for 
in 
testing 
COVID-19  related  R&D, 
infrastructures 
facilities” 
(“Bundesregelung  Forschungs-,  Entwicklungs-  und 
Investitionsbeihilfen”) 

investments 

production 

and 

28-04-2020 

126  Germany 
127  Germany 

SA.57153  COVID-19 – Aid to Lufthansa 
SA.56814  COVID-19  measures of the Wirtschaftsstabilisierungs-

25-06-2020 
08-07-2020 

fonds 

128  Germany 
129  Germany 

SA.57644  COVID-19: Airport Scheme 
SA.57447  COVID-19 measures of the BayernFonds 

11-08-2020 
20-08-2020 

98 

 
130  Germany 
131  Germany 

SA.59289  Fixkostenhilfe 2020 – DE 
SA.58504  COVID-19: 

Bundesregelung 

Rekapitalisierungsmaßnahmen 
Fremdkapital 2020 

und 

für 
nachrangiges 

132  Greece 

133  Greece 

SA.56857  First  loss  business  loans  portfolio  guarantees  for  new 
the  current  COVID-19 
loans 

in 

working  capital 
outbreak 

SA.56815  Greek  COVID-19  measure  –  Repayable  Advance 
Scheme (RAS) for enterprises affected by the COVID-
19 outbreak 

20-11-2020 
01-12-2020 

03-04-2020 

07-04-2020 

134  Greece 

SA.56839  Greek  COVID  measure:  support 

to  SMEs 

loan 

08-04-2020 

135  Greece 

136  Greece 
137  Greece 

obligations 

SA.57194  State Aid Grants in the Floriculture Primary Production 
Section  under  the  COVID-19  Temporary  Framework 
(Commission C(2020) 1863/19.3.20) 

SA.57165  COVID-19 – Wage subsidies to self-employed 
SA.58029  Support to primary sector farmers, producers and open 
air  markets’  sellers  on  the  basis  of  the  COVID-19 
Temporary Framework. 

05-05-2020 

11-05-2020 
23-07-2020 

138  Greece 

SA.58048  Support  of  the  sheep  and  goat  farming  primary  sector 

23-07-2020 

on the basis of the COVID-19 Temporary Framework. 

139  Greece 

SA.58069  Support of the primary sector/ asparagus production on 

23-07-2020 

140  Greece 

141  Greece 

142  Greece 

the basis of the COVID-19 Temporary Framework. 

SA.58367  COVID-19  -  WORKING  CAPITAL  FOR  VERY 
SMALL  AND  SMALL  ENTERPRISES  IN  THE 
REGION OF CENTRAL MACEDONIA 
SA.58368  COVID-19:  Working  Capital  and  Investment  Loan 
Scheme by the Greek Infrastructure Fund 
SA.58867  Wage  subsidies  to  self-employed  affected  by  the 

28-08-2020 

19-10-2020 

22-10-2020 

COVID-19 outbreak 

143  Greece 

SA.59033  COVID-19  –  Aid  for  cultural  activities 

in 

the 

28-10-2020 

Municipality of Athens 

144  Hungary 

SA.56926  Aid  measures 

for 

increasing  competitiveness  of 

08-04-2020 

145  Hungary 

undertakings in relation with the COVID-19 outbreak 

SA.56994  Scheme financed from Structural Funds for enterprises 
in  temporary  financial  difficulties  due  to  the  COVID-
19   

17-04-2020 

146  Hungary 

SA.57007  COVID-19  Scheme  to  provide  aid  in  form  of  wage 

17-04-2020 

147  Hungary 

148  Hungary 

149  Hungary 
150  Hungary 

subsidies for employees in research and development 

SA.57121  COVID-19: Exceptional Liquidity Guarantee Programs 
by Garantiqa Zrt and the Hungarian Development Bank 
SA.57064  COVID-19:  Grants,  guarantee  and  subsidised  interest 

measures 

SA.57198  Crisis Rural Guarantee Programme by AVHGA 
SA.57329  Temporary  aid  scheme  for 

the  agri-food  sector, 
aquaculture  and  forestry  affected  by  the  Coronavirus 
outbreak 

28-04-2020 

29-04-2020 

07-05-2020 
19-05-2020 

151  Hungary 
152  Hungary 

SA.57269  COVID-19 – CAPITAL FUNDS 
SA.57285  COVID-19:  Grant  Scheme  related  to  the  Széchenyi 

20-05-2020 
20-05-2020 

Card Programme  

153  Hungary 

SA.57468  COVID-19  umbrella  scheme  of  direct  grants  provided 
from  the  appropriations  managed  at  the  level  of 
ministries’ budgetary chapters 

09-06-2020 

154  Hungary 

SA.57767  COVID-19:  Scheme 

to  provide  payroll 

related 

07-07-2020 

155  Hungary 

SA.58202  COVID-19 

exemptions in the aviation industry 
related 

research,  development 

and 

10-08-2020 

156  Hungary 

SA.58420  COVID-19: Recapitalisation Fund Scheme managed by 

20-11-2020 

production support scheme 

HIVENTURES Zrt 

99 

 
157  Hungary 

158 
159 
160 

Ireland 
Ireland 
Ireland 

161 
162 

Ireland 
Ireland 

163 
164 
165 
166 
167 

Ireland 
Ireland 
Ireland 
Ireland 
Ireland 

168 
169 

Italy 
Italy 

SA.59477  State aid SA.59477 (2020/N) – Hungary – COVID-19: 
Scheme  for  the  protection  of  the  economy  during  the 
second state of emergency 

SA.56845  Repayable Advances Scheme – COVID-19 
SA.57036  COVID-19: Sustaining Enterprise Scheme 
SA.57453  Scheme  to  facilitate  COVID-19  relevant  research  and 
development,  to  support  construction  and  upgrade  of 
testing  and  upscaling  facilities  of  COVID-19  relevant 
products and to support investments into the production 
of COVID-19 relevant products 
SA.57509  COVID-19 – Irish Restart Grant  
SA.58214 

Ireland  –  COVID  19  Adaptation  Fund  for  the  Re-
Opening of Tourism and Hospitality businesses 

SA.57465  COVID-19: Credit Guarantee Scheme 
SA.58387  Beef Finishers Payment  
SA.58562  COVID-19 – Live performance support scheme 
SA.58955  COVID-19: Irish Coach Tourism Scheme 
SA.59719  COVID-19  Ireland-Based  Inbound  Tourism  Agents 

Business Continuity Scheme  
SA.56786  Production of medical equipment and masks 
SA.56690  State guarantee to support debt moratorium by banks to 

170 

Italy 

SA.56966 

SME borrowers 
Italy  – COVID-19:  Loan  guarantee  schemes  under the 
Fondo di garanzia per le PMI 

171 

Italy 

172 

Italy 

173 

Italy 

174 

Italy 

175 

Italy 

176 
177 

Italy 
Italy 

178 
179 

Italy 
Italy 

SA.56963  Guarantee scheme under the Temporary Framework for 
State  aid  measures  to  support  the  economy  in  the 
current COVID-19 outbreak 
SA.57068  Loan  guarantees  and  grants  under 

ISMEA 
Guarantee  Fund 
the  Temporary 
Framework  for  State  aid  measures  to  support  the 
economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak 
SA.57005  Granting  of  the  State  aid  under  the  COVID-19  anti-
crisis  program  provided  for  by  art.  12  of  the  regional 
law  n. 5/2020 in compliance  with the  TF for State aid 
measures  to  support  the  economy  in  the  current 
COVID-19 outbreak 

according 

the 

to 

SA.57185  Loans provided by ISMEA in favour of undertakings of 
the  agricultural  and  fishery  sector  affected  by  the 
COVID-19 outbreak 

in 

SA.57349  Plan  for 

the 
the  socio-economic  emergency 
Campania  region  –  Aid  measures  in  favour  of  the 
undertakings  of  the  agricultural  sector,  of  the  fishery 
and  aquaculture  sector,  of  the  buffalo  livestock  sector 
and of the floriculture sector 
SA.57021  RegimeQuadro – COVID-19 
SA.57439  COVID-19  –  Interests  on  the  anticipation  of  the 
amounts  payable  to  farmers  in  the  framework  of  the 
CAP support schemes 

SA.57252  Modifications to COVID-19 Regime Quadro 
SA.57429  COVID-19  –  Tax  exemptions  and  tax  credits  adopted 
as  a  consequence  of  the  economic  crisis  caused  by 
COVID-19 

10-12-2020 

30-03-2020 
21-04-2020 
03-06-2020 

03-06-2020 
14-08-2020 

14-08-2020 
24-08-2020 
18-11-2020 
19-11-2020 
18-12-2020 

22-03-2020 
25-03-2020 

13-04-2020 

13-04-2020 

21-04-2020 

21-04-2020 

04-05-2020 

19-05-2020 

21-05-2020 
28-05-2020 

24-06-2020 
26-06-2020 

180 

Italy 

SA.57752  COVID-19 – Italy, Grants to small businesses and self-

08-07-2020 

employed 

181 

Italy 

SA.57947  Support  measures  for  undertakings  carrying  out 
activities  in  the  agricultural,  forestry,  fishery  and 
aquaculture sectors and the activities related thereto, in 
relation with the COVID-19 outbreak crisis  

15-07-2020 

100 

 
182 

Italy 

SA.57891  DIRECT  GRANTS  TO  ITALIAN  COMPANIES 
ENGAGING  IN  INTERNATIONAL  ACTIVITIES 
AND OPERATIONS 

31-07-2020 

183 

Italy 

SA.57289  COVID-19:  Capital-strengthening  measures 

for 

31-07-2020 

184 

Italy 

medium-sized companies 

SA.58208  COVID-19  –  Aid  in  the  form  of  guarantees  on  loans 
and  subsidised  interest  rates  managed  by  the  “Istituto 
per il Credito Sportivo” as provided by Article 14, Para 
1 and 2 of Law Decree of 8 April 2020, no. 23. 

19-08-2020 

185 

Italy 

SA.58300  COVID-19  –  Fiscal  measures  for  the  municipality  of 

21-08-2020 

Campione d’Italia 

186 
187 

Italy 
Italy 

SA.57612  Patrimonio Rilancio project 
SA.58727  COVID-19:  Supporting  measures  for  companies  for 

17-09-2020 
30-09-2020 

reducing the contagions risk in the workplace. 

188 

Italy 

SA.58802  COVID-19  –  Decontribuzione  SUD  –  Agevolazione 

06-10-2020 

contributiva per l’occupazione in aree svantaggiate 

189 

Italy 

SA.58418  COVID-19 – Tax treatment of revaluation of assets by 

14-10-2020 

190 

Italy 

191 

Italy 

192 
193 
194 

Italy 
Italy 
Italy 

195 

Italy 

196 

Italy 

agricultural cooperatives 

SA.59255  COVID-19:  Exemption  of  social  security  contribution 
payment  for companies not applying for  wage  support 
measures 

SA.59295  COVID-19:  exemption  of  social  security  contribution 
payment for companies in the tourism and thermal bath 
sector engaging with fixed-term contract 
SA.58801  COVID-19 – Aid to small publishers – IT 
SA.58847  COVID-19 – Aid  to music publishers – IT 
SA.59590  COVID-19: Contribution for economic and commercial 

activities in historic centers 

SA.59509  Support  measures  for  undertakings  carrying  out 
activities  in  the  agricultural,  forestry,  fishery  and 
aquaculture sectors and the activities related thereto, in 
relation with the COVID-19 outbreak crisis  
SA.59755  COVID-19: Aid to tour operators and travel agencies – 

Italy 

10-11-2020 

16-11-2020 

17-11-2020 
17-11-2020 
03-12-2020 

07-12-2020 

04-12-2020 

197 

Italy 

SA.59992  COVID-19: Support measure for the congress and fair 

17-12-2020 

industry 

198  Latvia 

SA.56722  COVID-19: Loan guarantee scheme and subsidied loan 

23-03-2020 

scheme 

199  Latvia 

SA.56932  Procedure 

for  administration  and  monitoring  of 
emergency  support  measures 
the  sector  of 
agriculture  and  food  due  to  a  negative  impact  of 
COVID-19 virus spread 

in 

16-04-2020 

200  Latvia 

SA.57287  State  aid  for  short-term  loans  in  agriculture  to  relieve 

12-05-2020 

201  Latvia 
202  Latvia 
203  Latvia 

204  Latvia 
205  Latvia 

the negative impact of the COVID-19 outbreak 

SA.57423  COVID-19: Grants for the benefit of tourism operators  
SA.56943  COVID-19: Recapitalization of Air Baltic – Latvia 
SA.57655  Guarantees  for  large  and  medium-sized  undertakings 

affected by the COVID-19 outbreak 
SA.57409  LATVIA – COVID-19 – Recapitalisation Fund 
SA.57740  COVID-19:  Reduction  of  the  lease  payments  for 

29-05-2020 
03-07-2020 
06-07-2020 

06-07-2020 
09-07-2020 

lessees of publicly-owned property 

206  Latvia 

SA.58072  COVID-19 – Aid to performers of economic activities 

27-07-2020 

in the tourism sector  

207  Latvia 

SA.58117  COVID-19:  Aid  for  forestry  cooperatives  affected  by 

31-07-2020 

208  Latvia 

the Coronavirus outbreak 

SA.58104  Limited  amounts  of  aid  (direct  grant  scheme)  to 
support the employer's mandatory State social security 
contributions 
for  undertakings  whose  exporting 
activities are affected by COVID-19 outbreak  

03-08-2020 

101 

 
209  Latvia 

SA.59592  Grants  to  companies  affected  by  the  COVID-19  crisis 

17-12-2020 

to ensure the flow of working capital 

210  Lithuania 

SA.56927  State  aid  measures  to  support  the  economy  in  the 

08-04-2020 

current COVID-19 outbreak – LT 

211  Lithuania 

SA.56980  Loans to the companies most affected by COVID-19 – 

09-04-2020 

212  Lithuania 

213  Lithuania 

214  Lithuania 
215  Lithuania 
216  Lithuania 

217  Lithuania 

218  Lithuania 

219  Lithuania 
220  Lithuania 

221  Lithuania 
222  Lithuania 

Lithuanua 

SA.57066  SA.57066  (2020/N)  –  Lithuania  –  COVID-19:  Direct 
grants to cover interest on loans of SMEs active in road 
freight transport 

SA.57135  The  Measure  “Partial  Rent  Compensation  for  the 
Enterprises Most Affected by COVID-19” 
SA.57342  Program to fund new culture products and (or) services 
SA.57008  COVID-19 – Aid Fund for Business 
SA.57529 

interest  and  guarantee 
Individual  guarantees  and 
premium compensation during the COVID-19 outbreak 
SA.57665  COVID-19:  Lithuanian  guarantees  and  loans  for  tour 
service 

operators,  accommodation  and  catering 
providers 

SA.57823  Temporary  State  Aid  to  economic  entities  active  in 
economic 

agriculture 
difficulties during the outbreak of COVID-19 

aquaculture 

facing 

and 

SA.58476  COVID-19 compensation for tour operators 
SA.59345  Temporary  State  Aid  to  Fur  Animal  Keepers  facing 
the  outbreak  of 

economic  difficulties  caused  by 
COVID-19 

SA.58885  COVID-19 – Deferral of social security contributions  
SA.58645  Measure  No.  01.2.1-LVPA-T-858  “COVID-19  R&D” 
of  Priority  1  “Promotion  of  Research,  Experimental 
development  and  Innovation”  of 
the  Operational 
Programme  for  EU  Structural  Funds  Investments  for 
03.3.1-LVPA-T-859 
2014-2020.  Measure  No. 
“COVID-19 produc 

223  Lithuania 
224  Lithuania 
225  Luxembourg  SA.56742  Scheme 

SA.60308  Lithuania – COVID-19 – Subsidies for enterprises   
SA.60379  COVID-19: Direct COVID-19 loans 

for  enterprises 

in 

temporary 

financial 

difficulties due to COVID-19 

226  Luxembourg  SA.56805  Loan  guarantee  scheme  of  Luxembourg  under  the 
Temporary  Framework  for  State  aid  measures  to 
the  current  COVID-19 
in 
support 
outbreak 

the  economy 

24-04-2020 

30-04-2020 

20-05-2020 
26-05-2020 
16-06-2020 

25-06-2020 

14-07-2020 

11-09-2020 
13-11-2020 

18-11-2020 
06-10-2020 

22-12-2020 
23-12-2020 
24-03-2020 

27-03-2020 

227  Luxembourg  SA.56954  COVID19 – LU – Scheme for R&D aid and investment 

08-04-2020 

aid for the production of COVID-19 relevant products 

228  Luxembourg  SA.57305  COVID-19:  Luxembourg  Investment  aid  for  certain 

20-05-2020 

sectors 

229  Luxembourg  SA.57304  Luxembourgish 

fund 
affected by the COVID-19 outbreak 

solidarity 

for  undertakings 

29-05-2020 

230  Luxembourg  SA.57338  COVID-19 Luxembourg – Aid for commercial shops 
231  Luxembourg  SA.57530  COVID-19  –  Aid  scheme  for  audio-visual  production 

29-05-2020 
18-06-2020 

companies 

232  Luxembourg  SA.59322  COVID-19 – Aid scheme for uncovered costs under the 
Temporary  Framework  for  State  aid  measures  to 
the  current  COVID-19 
in 
support 
outbreak  

the  economy 

233  Luxembourg  SA.59428  COVID-19: nouvelle aide de relance 
234  Luxembourg  SA.59726  COVID-19 – Support of the meat sector 
235  Luxembourg  SA.59945  COVID-19: Support of wine sector 
236  Luxembourg  SA.59944  COVID-19: Support of the seed sector 
237  Malta 

SA.56843  COVID-19: Loan guarantee scheme  

24-11-2020 

24-11-2020 
09-12-2020 
15-12-2020 
15-12-2020 
02-04-2020 

102 

 
238  Malta 
239  Malta 
240  Malta 

SA.57075  COVID-19 R&D Fund 
SA.57076  COVID-19 Wage Supplement Scheme 
SA.57204 

Investment  Aid  for  the  Production  of  COVID-19 
Relevant Products 

22-04-2020 
24-04-2020 
12-05-2020 

241  Malta 

SA.57163  MDB  COVID-19  Interest  Rate  Subsidy  Scheme 

13-05-2020 

(CIRSS) 

242  Malta 

SA.57574  Bond  subscription  facility  By  the  Malta  Development 

03-07-2020 

Bank 

243  Malta 

SA.58006  Support  to  entrepreneurs  affected  by  the  spread  of 
COVID-19  (rent  and  electricity  payments  of  business 
premises). 

15-07-2020 

244  Malta 

SA.57984  COVID-19  Grant  Scheme  for  Bluefin  Tuna  (BFT) 

20-07-2020 

Fishers 

245  Malta 

SA.57961  MDB  COVID-19  Small  Loan  Guarantee  Scheme 

29-07-2020 

246  Malta 
247  Netherlands 

248  Netherlands 
249  Netherlands 
250  Netherlands 

251  Netherlands 

(CSLG) 

SA.58306  Temporary State aid to Land Farmers – COVID-19 
SA.56915  Direct  grant  scheme  for  e-Health  services  at  home 
the  Temporary  Framework  for  State  aid 
under 
measures  to  support  the  economy  in  the  current 
COVID-19 outbreak 

SA.56914  COVID-19: GO-C Guarantee Scheme 
SA.57107  Subsidised interest rates scheme 
SA.57397  Dutch  temporary  guarantee  scheme  for  small  bank 
loans for medium sized and small enterprises due to the 
COVID-19 outbreak 

SA.57712  Dutch  direct  grant  scheme  to  support  fixed  costs  of 
small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  affected  by  the 
COVID-19 outbreak 

08-09-2020 
03-04-2020 

22-04-2020 
24-04-2020 
27-05-2020 

26-06-2020 

252  Netherlands 
253  Netherlands 

SA.57850  COVID-19: Subsidised interest rates for loans 
SA.57116  COVID-19:  State  loan  guarantee  and  State  loan  for 

08-07-2020 
13-07-2020 

KLM  

254  Netherlands 
255  Netherlands 
256  Netherlands 
257  Poland 

SA.57897  COVID-19: E-Health at home 2.0 
SA.57985  COVID-19 – State loans for Travel Guarantee Funds 
SA.59021  COVID-19 Planned aid in favour of InnoGenerics 
SA.56876  Polish  anti-crisis  measures  –  COVID-19  –  guarantee 

15-07-2020 
28-07-2020 
11-11-2020 
03-04-2020 

scheme 

258  Poland 

SA.56896  COVID-19 – Anti-crisis measures in the form of loans 

08-04-2020 

and guarantees financed from EU funds 

259  Poland 

SA.56979  Polish  anti-crisis  measures  –  COVID-19  virus  interest 

10-04-2020 

260  Poland 

261  Poland 

262  Poland 

rates subsidies 

SA.57065  COVID-19:  anti-crisis  measures  in  the  form  of  loans 
and  guarantees  financed  from  the  re-use  of  resources 
returned from 2007-2013 financial instruments  

SA.56922  Polish  anti-crisis  measures  –  COVID-19  virus  –  wage 
subsidies, tax and social contributions reliefs and other 
measures. 

SA.57015  State  aid  in  the  form  of  grants  or  repayable  assistance 
under  operational  programmes  for  2014-2020 
to 
support  the  Polish  economy  in  connection  with  the 
occurrence of the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak. 

22-04-2020 

23-04-2020 

24-04-2020 

263  Poland 

SA.56996  COVID-19  –  Repayable  advance  scheme  for  micro, 

27-04-2020 

small and medium-sized enterprises 

264  Poland 

SA.57191  The Polish anti-crisis measures – COVID-19 – state aid 
the  simplified  repayable  from  from  financial 

in 
engineering instruments. 

11-05-2020 

265  Poland 

SA.57306  COVID-19:  Financial  shield  for  large  enterprises: 

25-05-2020 

Liquidity loans 

266  Poland 

SA.57055  The  Polish  anti-crisis  measures  –  COVID-19  –  equity 

11-06-2020 

103 

 
267  Poland 

SA.57568  Polish anti-crisis measures – COVID-19 – interest rates 

12-06-2020 

subsidies (for farmers) 

instruments 

268  Poland 

269  Poland 
270  Poland 

271  Poland 

SA.57519  Poland: R&D aid for COVID-19 relevant research and 
development,  investment  aid  for  the  construction  and 
upgrade 
upscaling 
infrastructures, and investment aid for investments into 
production facilities for the production of C 

relevant 

testing 

and 

of 

SA.57452  Guarantees on factoring 
SA.57726  State aid in the form of reduction of the annual fee for 
perpetual usufruct and relief in rent, lease and usufruct 
fees  to  support  entrepreneurs  affected  by  the  COVID-
19 pandemic outbreak 

SA.58105  COVID-19: Aid scheme for agricultural producers who 
are  at  risk  of  liquidity  loss  as  a  result  of  agricultural 
market restrictions due to COVID-19 

18-06-2020 

23-07-2020 
28-07-2020 

31-07-2020 

272  Poland 

SA.58102  COVID-19  support 

to 

tour  operators  and  other 

21-09-2020 

273  Poland 

274  Poland 
275  Poland 

276  Poland 

277  Poland 
278  Poland 

279  Portugal 
280  Portugal 
281  Portugal 

282  Portugal 

undertakings active in tourism and culture 
SA.58185  COVID-19:  Polish  anti-crisis  measures  –  State  aid 

granted by the State Forests 

SA.57172  COVID-19 anti-crisis measure – Tax deferrals 
ormamental 
SA.59382  Aid 

producers 

for 

plants 
of 
(chrysanthemums) threatened by a loss of liquidity due 
to restrictions on the agricultural market caused by the 
COVID-19 epidemic. 

SA.60060  Aid  for  pig  producers  who  are  threatened    with  a 
financial  liquidity  loss  due  to  restrictions  on  the 
agricultural market caused by the COVID-19 outbreak. 

SA.59158  COVID-19 – Aid to LOT Polish Airlines 
SA.59763  COVID-19 – The Financial Shield for SME 2.0 (aid in 
the form of limited amounts of subsidy for micro- and 
aid  in  form  of  support  for  uncovered  fixed  cost  for 
small and medium-sized enterprises) 

SA.56755  Guarantee schemes related to COVID-19 
SA.56873  Direct grant and loan guarantee scheme 
SA.56886  COVID-19.  Credit  line  with  subsidised  interest  rates 
addressed  to  undertakings  active  in  the  fishery  and 
aquaculture sector. 

SA.57035  COVID-19  Support 

-
infrastructures  and  production  of  COVID-19  related 
products 

to  R&D  projects, 

testing 

29-10-2020 

13-11-2020 
13-11-2020 

16-12-2020 

22-12-2020 
23-12-2020 

22-03-2020 
04-04-2020 
08-04-2020 

17-04-2020 

283  Portugal 

SA.57049  COVID-19  –  TF  measure  to  preserve  employment  on 

20-05-2020 

the Azores Islands I 

284  Portugal 

SA.57050  COVID-19  –  TF  measure  to  preserve  employment  on 

20-05-2020 

the Azores Islands II 

285  Portugal 

SA.57494  COVID-19 – Direct grant and loan guarantee scheme – 

22-06-2020 

286  Portugal 

Autonomous Region of Madeira 

SA.58423  Credit line  for anticipating the support provided for in 
the POSEI Program to producers and companies in the 
agricultural  and  agri-food  sectors  in  the  Autonomous 
Region of Madeira COVID-19 

31-08-2020 

287  Portugal 

SA.58658  COVID-19  –  Temporary  Framework  measure 

to 

20-10-2020 

support employment on the Azores 

288  Portugal 

SA.59450  PT Direct Grants Micro and Small Companies COVID-

27-11-2020 

19 

289  Romania 
290  Romania 

SA.56895  Romania – COVID-19: Support scheme for SMEs  
SA.57408  COVID-19:  Framework  scheme  for  State  aid  in  the 

10-04-2020 
01-07-2020 

form of subsidised loans and guarantees on loans 

104 

 
291  Romania 

SA.57817  Romania  –  COVID-19  –  Oradea  airport  support 

27-07-2020 

292  Romania 

293  Romania 

294  Romania 

295  Romania 

scheme to airlines 

SA.58166  Support for SMEs and certain related large enterprises 
to  overcome  the  economic  crisis  caused  by  the 
COVID-19 pandemic 

SA.58450  Supporting the activity of breeders in the pig  sector in 
the  context  of  the  economic  crisis  caused  by  the 
COVID-19 pandemic 

SA.58452  Supporting the activity of breeders in the poultry sector 
in  the  context  of  the  economic  crisis  caused  by  the 
COVID-19 pandemic 

SA.58453  Supporting the activity of breeders in the bovine sector 
in  the  context  of  the  economic  crisis  caused  by  the 
COVID-19 pandemic 

27-08-2020 

02-09-2020 

02-09-2020 

09-09-2020 

296  Romania 

SA.59156  COVID-19 – Incentive scheme for airlines operating at 

20-11-2020 

Sibiu airport 

297  Romania 

SA.59520  Supporting the activity of producers in the wine sector 
in  the  context  of  the  economic  crisis  generated  by  the 
COVID-19 pandemic 

20-11-2020 

298  Romania 
299  Slovakia 

SA.58462  COVID-19 – Guarantees on factoring 
SA.56986  COVID-19  TF  aid  to  preserve  employment  and  self-

23-11-2020 
21-04-2020 

300  Slovakia 
301  Slovakia 

employment during the health crisis 
SA.57599  COVID-19: Rent rebate for tenants 
SA.57483  COVID-19  Government  Resources  Higher  Level 
Liquidity  Needs  Support  State  Aid  Scheme  –  
Eximbanka 

16-06-2020 
18-06-2020 

302  Slovakia 

SA.57484  COVID-19  Government  Resources  Basic  Level 

18-06-2020 

Liquidity Needs Support State Aid Scheme – SIH 

303  Slovakia 

SA.57485  COVID-19 ESIF Basic Level Liquidity Needs Support 

18-06-2020 

304  Slovakia 

305  Slovakia 

306  Slovakia 
307  Slovakia 
308  Slovenia 

309  Slovenia 
310  Slovenia 

State Aid Scheme – SIH 

SA.57829  COVID-19 – Slovakia: State aid scheme for temporary 
aid  to  support  COVID-19  research,  development  and 
testing 

SA.58054  COVID-19: ESFI Liquidity Support State Aid Scheme 
for  Innovative  Companies  with  Limited  Access  to 
Credit Facilities 

SA.59996  COVID 19: costs subsidies under 3.1 of the TF 
SA.59240  COVID-19 – Aid to airport operators 
SA.56999 

Intervention  measures  to  mitigate  the  effects  of  the 
SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19) infectious disease epidemic 
on the economy 

SA.57143  COVID-19 Liquidity guarantee scheme and rent relief 
SA.57558  COVID-19 – Additional intervention measures scheme 
(Short-time  work  scheme,  wage  subsidies  for  June, 
cableways, agriculture land) 

13-07-2020 

10-08-2020 

21-12-2020 
22-12-2020 
24-04-2020 

30-04-2020 
26-06-2020 

311  Slovenia 

SA.57724  COVID-19 Framework scheme for state aid in the form 

08-07-2020 

of soft loans 

312  Slovenia 

SA.57782  COVID-19  –  Support  for  SMEs  and  for  COVID-19 

14-08-2020 

313  Slovenia 

314  Slovenia 

related RDI and investment projects 

SA.58887  Exceptional  temporary  support  to  farmers  and  SMEs 
affected  by  the  COVID-19  crisis  (Article  39(b)  of  the 
Rural  Development  Programme  of  the  Republic  of 
Slovenia for the period 2014-2020) 

SA.59149  COVID-19  –  Support  for  self-employed  in  form  of 
monthly basic income and partial compensation for the 
lost income due to quarantine.  

15-10-2020 

29-10-2020 

315  Slovenia 

SA.59124  COVID-19  –  Re-establishment  of  air  connectivity  of 

16-11-2020 

Slovenia 

316  Slovenia 

SA.59717  COVID-19 – Aid in the form of partial reimbursement 

21-12-2020 

105 

 
317  Slovenia 

SA.60270  COVID-19:  Financial  assistance  for  the  duration  of 

23-12-2020 

of the uncovered fixed costs 

318  Spain 

319  Spain 

320  Spain 

incapacity for work due to COVID-19 

SA.56803  COVID-19 - Guarantee scheme to companies and self-
employed  to  support  the  economy  in  the  current 
COVID-19 outbreak 

SA.56851  ECON  –  Umbrella  Scheme  –  National  Temporary 
Framework  for  State  aid  in  the  form  of  direct  grants, 
repayable  advances,  tax  advantages,  guarantees  on 
loans and subsidised interest  rates for loans to support 
the economy in the current COVID outbreak. 
SA.57019  COVID-19  –  Spain  –  Temporary  Framework  support 
measures  for  COVID  RDI  and  testing  infrastructure, 
wages,  tax/social  contribution  deferral  and  COVID 
related production  

24-03-2020 

02-04-2020 

24-04-2020 

321  Spain 
322  Sweden 

SA.57659  ES – COVID-19 – Recapitalisation fund 
SA.56860  COVID-19:  Government  guarantee  programme  for 

31-07-2020 
02-04-2020 

companies 

323  Sweden 

SA.56812  Loan guarantee scheme to airlines under the temporary 
framework  for  state  aid  measures  to  support  the 
economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak 

11-04-2020 

324  Sweden 
325  Sweden 
326  Sweden 

SA.56972  COVID-19 – Rent rebate for tenants  
SA.58342  Sweden – COVID-19 recapitalisation of SAS 
SA.58822  Compensation  scheme  for  undertakings  faced  with 

14-04-2020 
17-08-2020 
15-10-2020 

turnover losses due to COVID-19 in June-July 2020 

327  United 

SA.56792  UK COVID-19 measure CBILS Guarantee 

25-03-2020 

Kingdom 

328  United 

SA.56794  Coronavirus  Business 

Interruption  Loan  Scheme 

25-03-2020 

Kingdom 

(CBILS) Grant – COVID-19 

329  United 

SA.56841  COVID-19 Temporary Framework for UK authorities 

06-04-2020 

Kingdom 

330  United 

Kingdom 

SA.57152  COVID-19 – UK – Self-Employed (including members 
of partnerships) Income Support Scheme 

11-05-2020 

331  United 

SA.57617  COVID-19  Temporary  Framework 

for  Gibraltar 

06-07-2020 

Kingdom 

Authorities  

332  United 

SA.58205  Scottish Enterprise Subordinated Loan Scheme   

24-08-2020 

Kingdom 

106 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX 2. 

State aid decisions adopted directly under the Treaty 
by country 

Member 
State 

1  Austria 

2  Austria 
3  Austria 

4  Belgium 

5  Belgium 

Case 
number 
SA.57291  COVID-19; Compensation Scheme: Directive for fixed 

Title 

Decision 
date 
23-05-2020 

cost subsidies. 

SA.57539  COVID-19 – Aid to Austrian Airlines  
SA.57371  COVID-19  –  Amendments  to  the  existing  aid  scheme 
for the provision of rail freight services in certain forms 
of production and temporary support for rail freight and 
passenger transport 

SA.56919  The  title  of  the  aid  measure  is  “the  COVID-19-
guarantee” as specified in Section 4 and Articles 22/4/1 
and 22/4/2 of the COVID-19 Guarantee Act. 
SA.56819  COVID-19 – Loan guarantee scheme in response to the 

06-07-2020 
25-11-2020 

09-04-2020 

11-04-2020 

COVID-19 crisis 

6  Belgium 

SA.57188  COVID-19:  Reinsurance  of  short-term  credit  and 

15-05-2020 

surety risks 

7  Croatia 
8  Cyprus 

SA.55373  COVID-19 Damage compensation to Croatia Airlines 
SA.58340  Support  scheme  for  the  pig  sector  (piglets)  due  to  the 
effects of the restrictive  measures implemented during 
the COVID-19 pandemic 

30-11-2020 
25-08-2020 

9  Czechia 

SA.57614  CZ  –  Compensation  scheme  for  non-profit  sport 

22-07-2020 

organisations related to COVID-19 

10  Czechia 

11  Czechia 

SA.58198  COVID-19:  Aid  scheme  to  support  facilities  with  in-
patient  spa  medical  rehabilitative  care  in  the  Karlovy 
Vary region  
SA.59118  COVID-19:  Call  2  for 

to  support 
entrepreneurs affected by the spread of the COVID-19 
(rental payments) 

the  Program 

21-10-2020 

03-11-2020 

12  Denmark 

13  Denmark 

SA.56685  State  aid  notification  on  compensation  scheme 
cancellation of events related to COVID-19 
SA.56791  Temporary  compensation  scheme  for  self-employed 

12-03-2020 

25-03-2020 

financially affected by the COVID-19 

14  Denmark 

SA.56774  Compensation  scheme  to  companies  exposed  to  large 

08-04-2020 

turnover decline related to COVID-19  

15  Denmark 

SA.56795  Compensation  for  the  damage  caused  by  the  COVID-

15-04-2020 

19 outbreak to Scandinavian Airlines 

16  Denmark 

SA.57112  COVID-19  –  Portfolio  guarantee  on  trade  credit 

15-05-2020 

insurance 

17  Denmark 

SA.57106  COVID-19 compensation scheme for the Danish media 

27-05-2020 

sector 

18  Denmark 

SA.57352  COVID-19  compensation  scheme  to  travel  operators 

29-05-2020 

19  Denmark 

20  Denmark 

21  Denmark 

SA.57930  Temporary 

for losses incurred by cancellations 
targeted 

for 
companies  affected  by  COVID-19  prohibitions  (bans 
and cancelled events) 

compensation 

scheme 

SA.57932  COVID-19 :Temporary targeted compensation  scheme 
for  undertakings  affected  by  closure  of  borders  and 
travel restrictions 

SA.59747  COVID-19: Damage compensation to operators of rail 
passenger  services  that  concluded  net-cost  public 
service contracts 

13-07-2020 

22-07-2020 

21-12-2020 

22  Estonia 

SA.57643  COVID-19:  Aid  to  companies  active  in  international 

09-07-2020 

maritime passenger transport 

107 

 
 
23  Estonia 

SA.58678  COVID-19:  Exceptional  temporary  support  due  to  the 

06-10-2020 

24  Estonia 

COVID-19 outbreak for the food processing sector  

SA.58783  COVID-19  –  Estonia:  aid 

to  support  businesses 
operating in the old town or city centre of Tallinn and 
modifications to SA.57014 (2020/N) 

21-10-2020 

25  Finland 

SA.57284  COVID-19: Finnish damage  compensation  scheme for 

28-05-2020 

restaurants 

26  France 

SA.56765  COVID-19  Moratoire  sur  le  paiement  de  taxes  et 
redevances  aéronautiques  en  faveur  des  entreprises  de 
transport  public  aérien  sous  licences  d’exploitation 
délivrées par la France  

31-03-2020 

27  France 

SA.56903  COVID-19:  State  guarantee  for  the  reinsurance  cover 

12-04-2020 

of domestic trade credit insurance risks 

28  France 
29  France 

SA.57219  COVID-19: Garanties des cautions 
SA.57607  COVID 19: Garantie de l’État en soutien à l’assurance-

11-05-2020 
16-07-2020 

crédit  

30  France 

SA.58125  Corsair – Compensation for the damage caused by the 

11-12-2020 

COVID-19 outbreak 

31  Germany 

SA.56941  COVID-19:  First-loss  portfolio  guarantee  on  trade 

13-04-2020 

credit insurance 

32  Germany 

SA.56867  COVID-19 – Support for Condor 

27-04-2020 

33  Germany 

SA.57741  COVID-19: Aid in the form of guarantees on vouchers 

31-07-2020 

issued for package tours 

34  Germany 

SA.57675  COVID-19  –  scheme  for  regional  and  local  public 

07-08-2020 

passenger transport 

35  Germany 

SA.58464  COVID-19  –  Bavarian  Assistance  Programme 

to 
safeguard  the  Social  Infrastructure  of  Youth  Hostels, 
School  Country  Homes,  Youth  Education  Centres  and 
Family Holiday Centres   

29-09-2020 

36  Germany 

SA.59228  COVID-19  –  federal    compensation  scheme  for  child 

26-11-2020 

37  Greece 

38  Greece 

and youth education/work 

SA.58616  COVID-19:  WORKING  CAPITAL  FOR  MICRO 
IN  12  GREEK 

AND  SMALL  ENTERPRISES 
REGIONS  

SA.58929  Support  of  the  primary  sector  in  the  production  of 
“Kalamon”  table  olives,  early  watermelon  of  low 
coverage  and  spring  potatoes,  and,  in  Crete,  green 
house crops of tomatoes, cucumbers and eggplants 

28-09-2020 

19-10-2020 

39  Greece 

SA.58555  COVID-19  temporary  primary  residence  protection 

12-11-2020 

scheme 

40  Greece 
41  Hungary 

SA.59462  COVID-19 : Damage compensation to Aegean Airlines 
SA.57375  COVID-19  Compensation  scheme  related  to  future 

23-12-2020 
23-06-2020 

42 

Italy 

43 
44 

Italy 
Italy 

Italy 
45 
46  Lithuania 

47  Lithuania 

48  Lithuania 

SA.57937 

investment 
Italy  –  COVID-19  –  State  guarantee  for  portfolio  of 
trade credit insurances 
SA.58114  Alitalia damage COVID-19 – new 
SA.59029  COVID-19 – Compensation scheme for carriers having 

an Italian operating licence 

SA.59188  Alitalia COVID-19 Damage Compensation II 
SA.57514  Temporary  State  Aid  to  bovine  animal  producers  and 
milk  producers  facing  economic  difficulties  caused  by 
the outbreak of COVID-19 

SA.57508  Aid  to  undertakings  engaged  in  the  processing  of 
agricultural  products  in  the  poultry  and  eggs  sectors 
and which have incurred losses due to the epidemic of 
COVID-19. 

SA.58856  Temporary  State  Aid  to  poultry  farmers  and  poultry 
processing  undertakings  facing  economic  difficulties 

13-08-2020 

04-09-2020 
22-12-2020 

29-12-2020 
05-06-2020 

29-07-2020 

16-10-2020 

108 

 
49  Lithuania 

SA.58540  COVID-19:  Trade  credit  insurance  portfolio  guarantee 

22-12-2020 

caused by the outbreak of COVID-19 

scheme 

50  Luxembourg  SA.57708  COVID-19 Reinsurance of short term credit and surety 

01-07-2020 

risks 

51  Netherlands 

SA.57217  NL LNV AGRI Compensation scheme agricultural and 

08-05-2020 

horticultural undertakings COVID-19 

52  Netherlands 

SA.57095  Netherlands – COVID-19: Portfolio guarantee on trade 

25-05-2020 

credit insurance 

53  Netherlands 

SA.57554  Compensation  Scheme  Special  Transport  for  Special 

29-06-2020 

Groups due to the COVID-19 outbreak 

54  Netherlands 

SA.58738  COVID-19  –  Support  for  regional  and  long-distance 

03-11-2020 

public passenger transport 

55  Poland 

SA.57054  The  Polish  anti-crisis  measures  –  COVID-19  –  write 

29-05-2020 

56  Poland 
57  Portugal 
58  Portugal 
59  Romania 
60  Romania 
61  Romania 
62  Romania 

63  Romania 
64  Slovenia 

off of loans 

SA.58212  COVID-19 – Aid scheme for Polish airports 
SA.57369  COVID-19 – Aid to TAP 
SA.58101  Rescue aid to SATA Group 
SA.57178  Romania – COVID-19 – Aid to Timișoara Airport 
SA.57026  COVID-19 – Aid to Blue Air 
SA.56810  COVID-19 – Aid to TAROM 
SA.58531  Romania  –  COVID-19  –  State  aid  scheme  for 

commercial trade credit risk guarantee 
SA.58676  COVID-19 support for Romanian regional airports 
SA.57459  Compensation  scheme  for  damage  caused  by  the 

28-09-2020 
10-06-2020 
18-08-2020 
05-08-2020 
20-08-2020 
02-10-2020 
15-10-2020 

23-11-2020 
29-06-2020 

COVID-19 outbreak 

65  Slovenia 

SA.59014  COVID-19: Reduction of the minimum concession fee 

30-10-2020 

caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences 

66  Spain 

SA.59045  COVID-19:  Guarantee  scheme  for  undertakings  with 

20-11-2020 

composition agreements 

67  Spain 
68  Sweden 

SA.58458  COVID-19: Trade credit reinsurance scheme 
SA.57051  COVID-19  –  aid  for  cancelled  or  postponed  cultural 

04-12-2020 
22-04-2020 

events in Sweden 

69  Sweden 

SA.57061  Sweden – Compensation for the damage caused by the 

24-04-2020 

COVID-19 outbreak to Scandinavian Airlines 

70  Sweden 

SA.57372  Sweden  Compensation  scheme  for  undertakings  faced 

11-06-2020 

with turnover losses due to COVID-19 

71  Sweden 

SA.57710  Compensation  for  damages  suffered  by  passenger 

06-07-2020 

72  United 

Kingdom 

73  United 

Kingdom 

ferries due to COVID-19  

SA.57451  United  Kingdom  –  Trade  credit  insurance  support 

28-07-2020 

scheme 

SA.58477  COVID-19:  Free  distribution  of  PPE  to  health  and 
social care services, community pharmacies and public 
sector organisations 

17-09-2020 

74  United 

SA.58206  Film & TV Production Restart Scheme – UK 

02-10-2020 

Kingdom 

75  United 

Kingdom 

76  United 

Kingdom 

SA.58466  COVID-19 – 107.2.b – Tax relief Scottish airports 

02-12-2020 

SA.60013  Reimbursement  for  losses  incurred  due  to  COVID-19 

18-12-2020 

outbreak in the Scottish Poultry Sector 

109 

 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 3. 

Banking State aid cases: Decisions adopted by the Commission in 2020 
by country 

Member 
State 

Case number / Title 

1 

Denmark 

SA.34445(2012/C) 

2 

Greece 

SA.57262(2020/N) 

3 

Greece 

SA.53105(2019/FC) 

4 

France 

SA.56071(2019/N) 

5 

France 

SA.55869(2019/N) 

Type of 
Decision 

Date of 
Adoption 

Positive 
decision 

25.02.2020 

No objection 

16.06.2020 

No objection 

15.1.2020 

No objection 

7.5.2020 

No objection 

26.6.2020 

No objection 

30.10.2020 

The transfer of 
property-related 
assets from FIH to 
the FSC 

Prolongation of the 
Greek State 
Guarantee Scheme 
for banks 01.06.2020-
30.11.2020 (Art. 2 of 
Law 3723/2008) 

Alleged aid to 
Eurobank through 
sale of Piraeus Bank 
Bulgaria 

Renouvellement de 
l’autorisation de 
l’extension des 
activités de SFIL-
CAFFIL au 
financement des 
crédits à l’exportation 

Dispositif « IR-PME 
» de réduction 
d’impôt sur le revenu 
(IR) pour la 
souscription au 
capital de PME – 
Souscription de parts 
de fonds communs de 
placement dans 
l’innovation (FCPI) 
et de fonds 
d’investissement de 
proximité (FIP)- et 
ESUS 

12th prolongation of 
Credit Union 
restructuring and 
stabilisation scheme 

Ireland 

SA.58819(2020/N) 

6 

7 

Ireland 

SA.57378(2020/N)  16th prolongation of 

No objection 

12.6.2020 

110 

 
 
8 

Ireland 

SA.57053(2020/N) 

9 

Italy 

SA.57515(2020/N) 

10 

Italy 

SA.57516(2020/N) 

11 

Poland 

SA.56141(2020/N) 

12 

Poland 

SA.58389(2020/N) 

13 

Poland 

SA.56635(2020/N) 

14 

Portugal 

SA.55719(2020/N) 

the Credit Union 
Resolution Scheme 
2020-2021 

11th prolongation of 
the Credit Union 
restructuring and 
stabilisation scheme 

COVID-19 – Italian 
bank liquidity support 
scheme 

COVID-19 – Italian 
orderly liquidation 
scheme for small 
banks 

Fourth prolongation 
of the resolution 
scheme for 
cooperative banks 
and small commercial 
banks 

Fifth prolongation of 
the resolution scheme 
for cooperative banks 
and small commercial 
banks 

Tenth prolongation of 
the Credit Unions 
Orderly Liquidation 
Scheme 

Banco Português de 
Fomento 

No objection 

08.05.2020 

No objection 

10.11.2020 

No objection 

20.11.2020 

No objection 

29.4.2020 

No objection 

29.10.2020 

No objection 

8.6.2020 

No objection 

4.8.2020 

15 

16 

The 
Netherlands 

United 
Kingdom 

SA.55465(2020/N) 

Invest International 

No objection 

29.5.2020 

SA.54780(2020/N) 

Scottish National 
Investment Bank 

No objection 

5.11.2020 

111