Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 : ex-post evaluation.
Date: 2021-06-22
Institutions: Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services
Subjects: European legal status, European party, financial control, fraud against the EU, party financing, political parties, regulation (EU)

Statute and funding 
of European 
political parties 
under Regulation 
1141/2014 

Ex-post evaluation 

STUDY 

EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

Author: Irmgard Anglmayer 
Ex-Post Evaluation Unit 
PE 662.646 – June 2021 

EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statute and funding of 
European political 
parties under 
Regulation 1141/2014 

Ex-post evaluation 

On 28 January 2021, the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) requested authorisation to draw up a 
report on the application of Regulation 1141/2014 on the statute and funding of European political parties 
and foundations in accordance with the  evaluation clause set out in  Article 38  of the  regulation (co-
rapporteurs: Rainer Wieland (EPP,  Germany) and Charles Goerens, (Renew, Luxembourg)). The present 
study is aimed at supporting the scrutiny work of the AFCO committee. 

European political parties are transnational political alliances made up of 
national parties from the same political family. Since July 2004, they have 
been  able to  receive funding from the EU  general budget. The current 
Regulation 1141/2014, applicable since 2017, tightened the requirements 
for parties' recognition, funding and spending. Yet, some parties (and their 
affiliated foundations) found loopholes in the legal framework. Targeted 
amendments to the regulation adopted in 2018 and 2019 sought, inter alia, 
to prevent misuse of public funds, enhance the role of European parties in 
the European public space, and safeguard the integrity of the European 
elections by sanctioning breaches of the rules on the protection of personal 
data. This study examines the operation of the legal framework, ahead of 
the legislative revision announced by the European Commission in its 2021 
work  programme,  and  in  support  of  the  evaluation  report  currently 
undertaken by the AFCO committee. 

EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AUTHOR 

Irmgard Anglmayer, Ex-post Evaluation Unit, EPRS 

This paper has been drawn up by the Ex-post Evaluation Unit of the Directorate for Impact Assessment and 
European Added Value, within the Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services (EPRS) of the 
Secretariat of the European Parliament. 

To contact the authors, please email: EPRS-ExPostEvaluation@ep.europa.eu 

LINGUISTIC VERSIONS 

Original: EN 

Manuscript completed in June 2021.  

DISCLAIMER AND COPYRIGHT 

This  document is prepared for, and  addressed to,  the Members and staff of the European Parliament as 
background material to assist them in their parliamentary work. The content of the document is the sole 
responsibility of its author(s) and any opinions expressed herein should not be taken to represent an official 
position of the Parliament. 

Reproduction  and  translation  for  non-commercial  purposes  are  authorised,  provided  the  source  is 
acknowledged and the European Parliament is given prior notice and sent a copy. 

Brussels © European Union, 2021. 

PE 662.646 
ISBN: 978-92-846-8248-5 
DOI: 10.2861/353664 
CAT: QA-09-21-226-EN-N 

eprs@ep.europa.eu  
http://www.eprs.ep.parl.union.eu (intranet) 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank (internet) 
http://epthinktank.eu (blog) 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 

Executive summary 

European political parties are transnational political alliances made up of  national and regional 
parties sharing the same ideological affinity.  In  this  respect, they are each  a  'party of  parties'. 
Together with their affiliated think-tanks, the European political foundations, they seek to bridge 
the  gap  between EU  politics,  national parties and EU  citizens and  to  contribute to creating a 
European public space. Both entities have legal European personality and are registered under EU 
law. At present, 10 European political parties and 10 European political foundations are registered.  

Since 2004, European parties have been entitled to funding from the EU general budget1 to finance 
their activities, albeit under strict conditions. Their statute and funding are currently governed by 
Regulation 1141/2014, which has applied since 2017. In accordance with the evaluation clause in 
Article 38  of  this  regulation, the European Parliament has to  report on the  application  of  the 
regulation and on  the activities  funded by  31 December 2021.  To  this  end,  Parliament's AFCO 
committee is currently undertaking an own-initiative report under the co-rapporteurship of Vice-
President  Rainer Wieland  (EPP,  Germany)  and  AFCO  Vice-Chair  Charles Goerens  (Renew, 
Luxembourg). To inform the report, the committee requested that EPRS prepare a study to examine 
the legal framework and its application to date. Parliament's report constitutes a major step in the 
revision process, preparations for which have already started in the European Commission. Pursuant 
to Article 38  of the regulation, the Commission is set to draw up its own implementation report 
within six months of Parliament's resolution, paying particular attention to the implications for small 
European political parties. The report is expected to be accompanied by a new legislative proposal, 
as announced in the 2021  Commission work programme and the inception impact assessment 
issued in March 2021. The aim is to have the new rules in place well ahead of the 2024 European 
elections, so that they would apply in the 2024 financial year.  

The  first  chapter  of  this study provides a brief historical outline of  the  evolution of the legal 
framework since the emergence of the first European political parties in the 1970s, in the run-up to 
the  1979  first  direct  elections  to  the  European  Parliament.  It  outlines  the  scope  and  main 
characteristics of Regulation 2004/2003, the first European party regulation, which laid down the 
rules and conditions for formal recognition of transnational party alliances as European political 
parties and their access to public funding from the EU general budget. A 2007 amendment of that 
regulation extended the funding regime to European political foundations. Even if certain principles 
and  conditions  set  out  in  the  original  2004  Party  Regulation  remained  valid,  today's 
Regulation 1141/2014 constituted a fundamental overhaul of the legal  framework, establishing, 
among other innovations, a new EU oversight body, the Authority for European Political Parties and 
European Political Foundations.  

The second  chapter  depicts the main characteristics of the current legal  framework regulating 
European political parties and foundations. Special consideration is given  to the  requirements 
parties and foundations need to fulfil in order to qualify for registration, and to the rules in place on 
funding and spending. In  this respect, it  outlines the eligibility  criteria for EU  funding, the co-
financing requirement and the restrictions regarding contributions and donations, as well as the 
limitations applying to spending. Subsequently, the rationale and changes of the two  targeted 
amendments  to Regulation 1141/2014 are  discussed: that of  2018,  closing certain loopholes to 
prevent abuse of  EU  funds and  adjusting the funding rules; and that of 2019,  which  aimed at 
safeguarding the integrity of the European elections by sanctioning infringements of rules on the 
protection of personal data. Chapter 2 closes with the state of play of the ongoing revision process. 

1  

Their affiliated foundations  gained access to EU funding in 2007, when they were established by EU law. 

I 

 
                                                             
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

The third and main chapter analyses the application of the legal framework to date. It starts with a 
discussion of the effect  of the tightened registration requirements on the number of recognised 
European  political  parties  and  foundations,  and  outlines  the  complex  values  compliance 
mechanism  enshrined  in  the  regulation,  which  has  never,  up  until  now,  been  triggered. 
Subsequently, it looks into various aspects of funding, and examines questions of co-financing and 
issues related to own resources, such as donations, contributions and membership.  

Most recently, the ruling of the General Court of the European Union in  case T-107/19, ACRE v 
Parliament)  has clarified that national member parties of European political parties can only come 
from within the EU. This raises questions, since practically all European political parties maintain 
close  ties  with  like-minded  partners outside the  EU,  whether  in  the  context  of  enlargement, 
European neighbourhood policy, or the European Economic Area. Following Brexit, UK parties now 
count as non-EU parties. Traditionally, non-EU members enjoyed membership status (depending on 
the statute of individual European political parties either as full or associated member) and paid 
membership fees. According to the General Court's judgment, however, contributions from non-EU 
partners are  to  be  considered as  donations, and  are  therefore prohibited  under  the  current 
regulation (Article 20(5)d).  

Furthermore, based on European Court of Justice (ECJ) case law, the study examines irregularities 
encountered with parties' and foundations' spending. While some cases expose fraudulent intent, 
others show how difficult it can be to determine whether or not activities European parties have 
undertaken jointly with national partners are eligible for EU funding under the current rules. 

Finally, this paper sheds some light on the role of European political parties in European Parliament 
elections, where recent experiences with the Spitzenkandidaten process have shown the potential 
for European political parties as facilitators in the electoral process. Moreover, the strict boundaries 
under EU law between European parties campaigning in European elections and their funding of 
national parties or candidates – the former permitted, the latter prohibited – leads to tensions, as 
the lines between the two are thin. Finally, the analysis looks into issues related to better visibility of 
European political parties in European elections, foreign interference in elections and the state of 
play regarding campaigning in referendums concerning European matters. 

From a methodological point of view, this study is based on desk research. It analyses relevant 
legislation, examines the publicly available EU documents on the topic – reports, opinions and case 
law – and reviews research by academics and think-tanks, as well as press articles. The focus of the 
study is placed on the legal framework and its application. The scope of the study does not include 
the examination of financial reports of European parties and foundations and therefore does not 
provide insights into the activities that have been funded under Regulation 1141/2014. 

II 

 
 
 
 
 
Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 

Table of contents  

1. Background ________________________________________________________________ 1 

1.1. Introductory remarks on European political parties  _______________________________ 1 

1.2. The emergence of the regulatory framework  ____________________________________ 1 

2. The current legal framework __________________________________________________ 6 

2.1. Regulation 1141/2014  ______________________________________________________ 6 

2.1.1. Authority for European Political Parties and Foundations _____________________________ 6 

2.1.2. Registration requirements ___________________________________________________ 7 

2.1.3. Governance of European political parties and foundations____________________________ 8 

2.1.4. Current funding rules_______________________________________________________ 9 

2.1.5. Rules on spending ________________________________________________________ 13 

2.1.6. Financial control and sanctions  ______________________________________________ 14 

2.2. Amendments to Regulation 1141/2014 ________________________________________ 15 

2.2.1. The 2018 amendment _____________________________________________________ 16 

2.2.2. The 2019 amendment _____________________________________________________ 18 

2.3. Other legal acts ___________________________________________________________ 20 

2.3.1. Financial Regulation  ______________________________________________________ 20 

2.3.2. Delegated, implementing and other measures ___________________________________ 21 

2.4. Applicable legal framework per financial year ___________________________________ 21 

2.5. Preparing for the next revision: The state of play  ________________________________ 22 

2.5.1. The review clause  ________________________________________________________ 22 

2.5.2. European Commission preparatory work  _______________________________________ 22 

3. Application of Regulation 1141/2014__________________________________________25 

3.1. Compliance with the registration criteria  ______________________________________ 25 

3.1.1. The quantitative effect of adjusting the registration requirements _____________________ 25 

III 

 
 
 
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

3.1.2. The compliance mechanism regarding EU values  _________________________________ 28 

3.2. Funding of European parties and foundations  __________________________________ 29 

3.2.1. EU funding levels over time _________________________________________________ 29 

3.2.2. Maximum funding amounts for 2021 __________________________________________ 30 

3.2.3. Level of co-financing ______________________________________________________ 34 

3.2.4. Donations, contributions and membership-related questions  ________________________ 36 

3.2.5. Loans _________________________________________________________________ 39 

3.3. Spending irregularities _____________________________________________________ 40 

3.3.1. Verification of spending: An outline of the funding procedure ________________________ 40 

3.3.2. 2019 OLAF report  ________________________________________________________ 42 

3.3.3. Case-law _______________________________________________________________ 43 

3.4. Financial reporting and transparency requirements ______________________________ 46 

3.5. Role of European political parties in European Parliament elections _________________ 48 

3.5.1. Spitzenkandidaten process __________________________________________________ 49 

3.5.2. Transnational lists ________________________________________________________ 50 

3.5.3. Challenges in campaigning  _________________________________________________ 50 

Annex 1 – List of registered European political parties _____________________________59 

Annex 2 – List of registered European political foundations_________________________60 

Annex 3 – Applications for EU funding per year ___________________________________61 

European political parties (2007-2021) ____________________________________________ 61 

European political foundations (2008-2021)  _______________________________________ 62 

Annex 4 – EU funding granted to European political parties, 2004-2021  ______________63 

Annex 5 – EU funding granted to European political foundations, 2008-2021 __________64 

IV 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 

Table of figures 

Figure 1 – The evolution of the regulatory framework on European political parties __________ 5 

Figure 2 – Current legal framework  _______________________________________________ 20 

Figure 3 – Level of EU funding for European parties and foundations  ____________________ 30 

Figure 4 – Percentage of European Parliament funding per European party (2021)__________ 32 

Figure 5 – Increase in EU funding for European parties and foundations (since 2018) ________ 35 

Figure 6 – The funding procedure, step by step______________________________________ 42 

Table of tables 

Table 1 – Registration conditions for European parties and foundations ___________________ 8 

Table 2 – Current funding thresholds under Regulation 1141/2014 ______________________ 11 

Table 3 – Summary table of permitted and prohibited donations and contributions  ________ 13 

Table 4 – Applicable legal framework per financial year 2017-2021 ______________________ 22 

Table 5 – Currently registered European parties and foundations  _______________________ 27 

Table 6 – Maximum EU funding awarded to European parties and foundations in 2021 ______ 31 

Table 7 – Co-funding requirements over time _______________________________________ 34 

Table 8 – Number of individual members per European political party (as per May 2020)_____ 37 

V 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

List of acronyms 

ACRE 

ADDE 

AFCO 

ALDE 

CONT 

Alliance of Conservatives and Reformists in Europe 

Alliance for Direct Democracy in Europe 

Committee on Constitutional Affairs 

Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Party 

Committee on Budgetary Control 

DG FINS 

Directorate-General for Finance (European Parliament) 

ECA 

ECJ 

EDPS 

EESC 

EFA 

EPPO 

FR 

IDDE 

INGE 

OJ 

OLAF 

European Court of Auditors 

European Court of Justice 

European Data Protection Supervisor 

European Economic and Social Committee 

European Free Alliance 

European Public Prosecutor's Office 

Financial Regulation 

Institute for Direct Democracy 

Special  Committee  on  Foreign  Interference 
in the European Union, including Disinformation 

in  all  Democratic  Processes 

Official Journal of the European Union 

European Anti-Fraud Office 

OSCE/ODIHR  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Office for  

Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 

Treaty on European Union 

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 

United Kingdom 

UK Independence Party 

TEU 

TFEU 

UK 

UKIP 

VI 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 

1. Background 

1.1. Introductory remarks on European political parties 

The European Union's primary law, and in particular Article 10(4) TEU and Article 12(2) of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, recognises the contribution of European political parties 'to forming 
European political awareness and to expressing the will of citizens of the Union'. In this respect, 
European political parties have their legitimate place in the European democratic system as actors 
that bridge the gap between EU politics on the one hand, and national parties and citizens on the 
other. Together with their affiliated foundations, European parties seek to foster a European political 
debate and build a European public sphere. In turn, national parties use these transnational party 
alliances for gaining influence at the EU level 'beyond the sum of their parts'.2 

European  political  parties  differ  in  many  ways  from  their  national  counterparts. 3  Their 
conceptualisation is as umbrella associations of national and regional parties with similar ideological 
affinities, although in practice, the ideological heterogeneity of national parties gathered under the 
umbrella of  a  European party can be  significant. One of  the most striking differences between 
national  and  European  parties  is  party  membership.  While  traditional  parties  aim  at  mass 
membership of citizens, European parties are primarily made up of national and regional parties. On 
that account, they are 'parties of  parties' 4 and have  little  direct contact with  the electorate. In 
practice, the main function of European political parties lies in networking between like-minded 
national parties, coordinating the positions of member parties at the EU level – above all prior to 
European  Council  meetings  –  influencing  the  EU  political  agenda,  and  adding  a  European 
dimension to national party politics.  

Since 2004, European political parties have a party statute and have been granted access to direct 
funding from the EU budget. This funding system is tied to strict conditions and control mechanisms 
and has, since its inception, been subject to much debate. Over the years, it has undergone several 
adjustments to prevent the misuse of public funds and to enhance the role of European parties in 
the European public space. With regard to the latter, European political parties do not yet live up to 
their full potential, even if they have shown their potential as successful facilitators in the run-up to 
the last two European elections.  

1.2. The emergence of the regulatory framework 

European political parties evolved gradually since the mid-1970s, ahead of the first direct elections 
of the European Parliament, as transnational party alliances. 5 They were first recognised in the Treaty 
of Maastricht as 'political parties at the European level'. A dedicated Treaty article declared them an 

2  

3  

4  

5  

S. Lightfoot,  'The consolidation of Europarties?  The "party regulation" and  the development of political parties in the 
European  Union', Representation,  Vol. 42(4), 2006, p. 305. 

For a comparison  between the traditional functions  of national political parties with those at the European level, see 
the chapter 'What are European political parties and what  do they do?',  S. van  Hecke [et al.], Reconnecting European 
political parties with European  Union citizens, International IDEA discussion  paper 6, 2018, pp. 18-20. 

Van Hecke, [et al.], p. 13. 

The first European  parties were the Socialist, Christian Democratic and  Liberal party federations, which  were formed 
between 1974 and  1976 (outside  the European  Parliament), followed by  the Greens in 1984. For  a historic account  
see: S.  Hix and Ch.  Lord,  Political parties in the European Union, Macmillan  Press, 1997, in particular chapter 7: Parties 
beyond the Parliament, pp. 167-197. 

1 

 
 
 
                                                             
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

important factor for European integration. 6 However, this provision remained silent on statutory, 
financial and operational aspects. 

A  1996  report by the  European Parliament reasoned that European political parties should be 
financed from the Union budget, as this would give them 'a financial incentive to strengthen their 
roots in society and seek greater financial autonomy'.7 To that end, the report advocated amending 
the Treaty provision so that it would allow for specific EU legislation to be passed. In particular, it 
called for: 

  a framework regulation on the legal status of European political parties, to clarify their status, 

rights, obligations and procedures; 

  and a regulation on their financing from the EU budget.  

While the Treaty of Amsterdam brought no specific changes regarding the provisions on European 
political parties, a special report of the European Court of Auditors8 in 2000, reignited the debate on 
their funding. Due to the lack of dedicated finances, at the time, European parties relied heavily on 
the political  groups in  the European Parliament. It  was common practice that groups not only 
channelled parts of their appropriations into their associated European parties, but that they also 
provided them with staff and office accommodation. The audit report denounced such practices as 
illegal and, moreover, commented on the blurred boundaries between groups and parties in their 
use of Parliament's technical facilities (such as conference rooms and interpretation).  

The European Commission responded promptly with a first legislative proposal on the statute and 
financing of  European political parties. 9 The proposed regulation – requiring unanimity in the 
Council and conceived as a temporary act until the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice 10 – was, 
however, never enacted, as no agreement was reached in the Council. The main stumbling blocks 
included compliance with democratic values, funding requirements in terms of representational 
thresholds – i.e.  in  how  many Member States the  member parties must be  represented – and 
provisions regarding donations. 11 

Eventually, the Treaty of Nice paved the way for a legal framework on European political parties. It 
provided for the adoption – this time under the co-decision procedure – of legislation 'governing 
political parties at European level and in particular the rules regarding their funding'. The amended 
Treaty  provision  intended  to  give  European  parties  'operational  autonomy  vis-à-vis  the 
parliamentary groups'.12 An attached declaration precluded that European parties would use EU 
funding for financing 'either directly or indirectly, political parties at national level'. 13 

6  

7  

8  

Treaty of  Maastricht, Article 138a: Political parties at European level are important  as a factor for integration within the 
Union. They contribute to forming a European awareness and to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union. 

European  Parliament  resolution  T4-0661/1996  on  the  constitutional  status  of  the  European  political  parties, 
10.12.1996 ('Tsatsos  report'). 

European  Court  of  Auditors,  Special  report No  13/2000 on  the expenditure of  the  European  Parliament's  political 
groups.  OJ C 181, 28.06.2000. 

9   COM(2000) 898, subsequently  amended by COM(2001) 343. 
10   A sunset clause embedded in the draft text sought  to ensure that the regulation would expire after two years. 
11   Press release of the General Affairs Council meeting, 29 and 30 October 2001. 
12   European  Parliament resolution T7-0143/2011 on the application of regulation 2004/2003, 6.4.2011, point D. 
13   Declaration 11 on Article 191 of the Treaty establishing the European  Community.  OJ C 80, 10.03.2001, p 79. 

2 

 
 
 
                                                             
Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 

the 

threshold, 

A new European Commission proposal followed suit,14 and despite controversial discussions in both 
the Parliament and the Council, centred mainly along the values compliance mechanism and the 
co-
representational 
legislators agreed  on  a  compromise text. 
This first regulation governing  European 
political parties, Regulation 2004/2003,15 
became applicable  straight after the 2004 
elections to the European Parliament. It laid 
down the conditions for formal recognition 
of  European  political  parties  and,  most 
importantly,  established  a 
regulatory 
framework for their financing. In particular, 
the  regulation  made  European  parties 
eligible  for  direct  funding  from  the  EU 
budget.  At  the  same  time,  it  introduced 
restrictions on party income and spending. 

Article 224 TFEU 
The European  Parliament and  the Council, acting in 
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, by 
means of regulations, shall lay down the regulations 
governing political parties at  European level referred 
to in Article 10(4) of the Treaty on European Union and 
in particular the rules regarding their funding. 

Article 10(4) TEU  
Political  parties  at  European 
forming  European  political  awareness  and 
expressing the will of citizens of the Union.  

level  contribute  to 
to 

Within  the  European Parliament, support for the regulation, and in  particular for  the  funding 
framework, had mainly come from larger, pro-European political groups. Smaller Eurosceptic groups 
had predominantly spoken out against the proposals, but were outvoted. 16 Subsequently, some of 
their Members challenged the legality  of  the regulation before the European Court of Justice, 
arguing it would discriminate against smaller and minority political groups. Nevertheless, the Court 
dismissed these claims on procedural grounds, holding that the applicant Members of the European 
Parliament were acting in their own name (rather than on behalf of their respective political parties) 
and were therefore not directly and individually concerned. 17 

Since 2004, the EU has had a system in place that funds the lion's share of European political parties' 
expenditure directly from the EU  budget. These parties need to raise only a  minor part of their 
annual budget from private sources. The percentage of this 'minor part' was repeatedly adjusted 
over the years, as will be shown in Chapter 3.2.3. 

A 2007  amendment18 to Regulation 2004/2003 extended the party funding scheme to European 
political foundations. These are political think tanks at EU level, legally independent, but formally 
affiliated  to  European political  parties. The  rationale for  their  set-up was  to  complement and 
underpin the objectives of the corresponding European political parties, and to fuel the European 
public  debate.  The  regulation attributes  a wide  array of  tasks to  those foundations,  such as 
programmatic work, research activities, training for their members, political education and outreach 
with the public (e.g. conferences and events), and not least the function of a network for national 
foundations and experts from the same ideological family. In general, the focus of these foundations 

14   COM(2003) 77. 

15   Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003 on the regulations governing political parties at European level and the rules regarding 

their funding. OJ L 297, 15.11.2003, pp. 1–4. 

16   The legislative resolution was adopted with 345 votes in favour,  102 against and  34 abstentions. 

17   Case T-13/04, Bonde and Others  v Parliament and Council, dismissed by the Court on 11 July 2005; Case T-17/04, Front 
national and Others  v Parliament and Council, dismissed  on 11 July  2005; appeal  case  C-338/05 P  was  dismissed  on 
13 July 2006; Case T-40/04, Bonino and Others v Parliament and Council, dismissed on 11 July 2005. For a discussion  of 
the three cited cases see: J. Morijn, 'Formation and  funding  of European  Parliament political Groups,  political parties 
and political foundations  v. EU-level political rights (case note T-118/17, IDDE v European Parliament)', A. Pahlandsingh 
and  R.  Grimbergen (eds.),  The Charter  and the  Court  of Justice of the  European Union: Notable Cases from  2016–2018, 
Wolf Legal Publishers, 2019, pp. 266-267. 

18   Regulation 1524/2007. 

3 

 
 
 
                                                             
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

is rather geared towards longer-term and strategic thinking, while the corresponding European 
parties (and even more so, the political groups in the European Parliament) are more involved in 
day-to-day politics. 19 As a further major novelty of the amendment, European political parties were 
allowed to use some of  their finances for campaigning  in the  context  of  European  elections, 
albeit under strict conditions.  

The 2004 regulation constituted a milestone in the development of European political parties, as it 
secured their financing, and hence their existence. Notwithstanding, two successive reports by the 
European Parliament examining the operation of the European party regulation identified major 
shortcomings in the legal framework.20 A major issue of concern in this respect was the lack of legal 
personality and uniform legal status of European political parties. Moreover, a reformed funding 
procedure should draw a distinction between the recognition of political parties on the one hand 
and their funding on the other. This prompted a revision process that led, following two years of 
difficult  negotiations,  to the  adoption of  Regulation 1141/2014, 21  which  repealed  the  original 
Regulation 2004/2003. 

The 2014 regulation introduced a number of significant changes:  

It provided for a registration procedure and a common register of European political parties and 
their affiliated foundations. 
It laid down governance rules for the parties and foundations. 
It  introduced a  European  legal status  (European legal  personality) for  registered  European 
political parties and foundations, 22 the acquisition of which was made a precondition for parties' 
eligibility  for  EU  funding. At  the  same  time, the regulation  provided  for  the  parties'  legal 
recognition and capacity in all Member States. 
It provided for stricter control mechanisms, including sanctions for misconduct. 

  And last but not least, it established the Authority for European political parties and European 
political foundations as  an oversight body. This  EU body is in  charge of registering (and de-
registering) parties and foundations; monitoring and controlling their compliance with the rules 
in place; and, if necessary, imposing sanctions. 

Applicable since January 2017, Regulation 1141/2014 has since governed the statute and funding 
of European political parties and foundations. Targeted amendments23 were passed in 2018 and 
2019, to enhance transparency, democratic legitimacy and enforcement. The next chapter discusses 
the current regulation and its amendments in greater detail. 

19   W.  Gagatek  and  S.  Van  Hecke, 'The  development of  European  political foundations  and  their role in strengthening 
Europarties',  Acta politica, Vol.  49(1), 2014, p.  9. Apart from  this article, and  compared  to European  political parties, 
European  foundations  appear still widely under-researched. 

20   European  Parliament,  reports  on  the  application  of  regulation  2004/2003: A6-0042/2006, rapporteur  Jo  Leinen 

(Germany,  S&D);  A7-0062/2011, rapporteur Marietta Giannakou (Greece, EPP). 

21   Regulation 1141/2014 on the statute and  funding  of  European  political parties and  European  political foundations. 

OJ L 317, 4.11.2014, pp. 1–27. 

22   Previously, they have been legal entities only under the national law of the Member State where they have their seat. 

23   Regulation 2018/673 amending regulation No 1141/2014 on the statute and funding of European political parties and 
European  political  foundations;  and  Regulation  2019/493  amending  Regulation  No  1141/2014  as  regards  a 
verification procedure related to infringements of rules on the protection of personal data  in the context of elections 
to the European  Parliament. 

4 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 

Figure 1 – The evolution of the regulatory framework on European political parties 

pre-1979

• Emergence of the first transnational alliances of political parties at 
community level before the first direct elections to the European 
Parliament

1993

1996

2000

2003

2004

2007

2017

2018

2019

2021

Source: EPRS. 

• Treaty of Maastricht – constitutional recognition of European parties 
through insertion of a specific treaty provision on 'political parties at 
European level'

• Tsatsos report (EP own-initiative report) – called for amending Treaty 
provision on European political parties, to create a legal basis for 
regulating their financial and legal status

• European Court of Auditors special report no. 13/2000 – criticised 
the practice of Parliament's political groups to finance European 
political parties from their group appropriations

• Treaty of Nice – amendment of the party article established a specific 
legal basis for regulating parties' statute and funding

• Regulation 2004/2003 - established a regulatory framework for the 
statute and funding of European political parties

• Amendment to Regulation 2004/2003 – established European 
political foundations

• Regulation 1141/2014 governing European political parties and 
foundations; became applicable in January 2017

• First amendment to Regulation 1141/2014 – modified, inter alia, the 
funding rules and the representation requirements

• Second amendment to Regulation 1141/2014 – focus on data 
protection

• Evaluation of the regulation by the European Parliament by end-
2021 (Article 38 of the regulation)
• Revision of the existing regulation announced in the 2021 
Commission work programme (Q3 2021)

5 

 
 
 
 
 
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

2. The current legal framework 

The first part of this chapter is rather technical, as it presents the main elements of the current legal 
framework, in particular the role of the Authority, the registration requirements, the rules regarding 
funding and spending, and the provisions regarding financial control and sanctions. A discussion of 
the application of these and other provisions follows in Chapter 3. 

Subsequently, this chapter examines the two amendments to the regulation passed in 2018 and 
2019. Furthermore, it outlines the legal acts that constitute, together with Regulation 1141/2014, 
the legal framework for European political parties and foundations, before closing with the state of 
play of the revision of the regulation, currently under preparation. 

2.1. Regulation 1141/2014 

The current rules and principles governing the statute and funding of European political parties and 
their affiliated foundations are laid down in EU Regulation 1141/2014, as amended. The regulation 
was  adopted under the  ordinary legislative procedure, in  accordance with  Article 224 TFEU.  It 
entered into force on 24 November 2014 and became applicable on 1 January 2017. 24 It has been 
amended twice, through EU Regulations 2018/673 and 2019/493 (see Chapter 2.2. for a detailed 
discussion of the modifications). The provisions regarding the funding of parties and foundations 
entered into effect from the 2018 financial year. 

Under the current European party regulation, a political alliance and its affiliated foundation can, 
under specific conditions, apply for formal registration as a European political party or foundation. 
Registration is an important procedural step, since only formally registered parties and foundations 
enjoy European legal personality (once the decision to register them is published in  the Official 
Journal of the EU) and are thus eligible  for funding from the general budget of the EU. In  turn, 
registered parties and foundations must adhere to a set of rules, in particular regarding their income 
(from public and private sources), spending, transparency, and adherence to the EU's fundamental 
values. 

The rationale for the European party regulation was to create a party structure at the EU level, seen 
as a necessary step to fill the gap between EU politics on the one hand, and national parties and 
citizens on the other, and thus contribute to the creation of a European public sphere. 

While  the  specific  provision in  the  Treaty of  Maastricht saw  European political  parties as  'an 
important factor for European integration', this seemingly pro-European notion was later replaced. 
Today's regulatory framework for European parties instead  stresses 'the need to  ensure party 
pluralism' (Articles 6 and 11), key in any democratic system. In this respect, access to EU funding is 
not conditional on  parties' support for European integration, and Eurosceptic parties are thus 
equally as eligible for funding as pro-European parties, as long as they comply with all requirements, 
including adherence to the EU's fundamental values.  

2.1.1. Authority for European Political Parties and Foundations 
One of the major innovations of the new regulation was the establishment of the Authority for 
European Political Parties  and European Political Foundations ('Authority'). Although physically 
located on European Parliament's premises, the Authority is an independent EU body that enjoys its 

24   Article 6, which  establishes the Authority for European  Political Parties and  European  Political Foundations,  already 

applied as of 1 September 2016. 

6 

 
 
 
                                                             
Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 

own legal personality. It was formally set up in September 2016, but effectively began its operations 
on 1 January 2017, the date of application of Regulation 1141/2014. The Authority is headed by a 
director, appointed for a five-year non-renewable term by a selection committee composed of the 
Secretaries-General of  the  European Parliament,  the  Council  and  the  European Commission, 
following an open call for candidates. 25 Under the former Regulation 2004/2003, European political 
parties and foundations had been under the responsibility of the European Parliament, which was 
in charge of funding and verifying their compliance with the rules and conditions. Under the current 
regulation, only the management of grants from the EU budget has remained with the Parliament, 
whereas most of the other functions were transferred to the Authority. 

The Authority is entrusted with registering, controlling and, in case of non-compliance, sanctioning 
European political parties and foundations. It has the power to decide on the registration – including 
denial  of  registration and de-registration – of  parties and  foundations in accordance with  the 
conditions set out in the regulation. Furthermore, it monitors registered parties and foundations' 
continued compliance with the rules, since this is a pre-condition for maintaining their status and 
access to  EU  funding. Moreover, its mandate includes verification of  parties' and foundations' 
respect of the fundamental values upon which the EU is founded, as laid down in Article 2 TEU. It 
is important to note that the Authority has also wide-reaching sanctioning powers: it can remove a 
party or foundation from the register by way of sanction or impose financial sanctions on them in 
case of non-compliance with their obligations under the regulation (Article 27). 

However,  while  the  Authority  has  wide  powers  with  regard  to  the  scrutiny  of  the  formal 
requirements set out in Regulation 1141/2014, its powers are more limited with regard to verifying 
whether a registered party or foundation is in breach of the EU's fundamental values. In such a case, 
the Authority cannot decide alone on de-registration of the party concerned, instead, a complex 
procedure comes into play  with  built-in  safeguards that also involves the Parliament and  the 
Council, both of which are granted a right of veto. This values compliance mechanism is explained 
in detail in Chapter 3.1.1. 

In general, any decision taken by the Authority is subject to judicial review by the European Court 
of Justice (mainly through actions for annulment pursuant to Article 263 TFEU). 

2.1.2. Registration requirements 
European political parties 
Article 3 of Regulation 1141/2014 defines the conditions a political alliance, made up of like-minded 
national and  regional  parties, must fulfil  to  obtain registration as  a  European political  party. 
Registration is the precondition for access to EU funding and subject to the following requirements: 

  The party alliance must have its seat in an EU Member State. 

It must not pursue profit goals. 

  The alliance or its members must have participated in European elections (or intend to do so in 

future). 
Its member parties must be represented in at least one quarter of EU Member States by elected 
members of a parliament (at the European, national or regional level). Alternatively, its member 
parties must have obtained, in minimum one quarter of Member States, at least 3 % of the votes 
cast in the last European elections. 

  Member parties cannot be members of different European political parties. 26 

25   The Authority's founding  director is Michael Adam.  He was  appointed  by decision 2016/1432 of 19 August  2016, for 

the period 1 September 2016 to 31 August 2021. 

26   This requirement was added through amendment  2018/673. 

7 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

  The programme and activities of the political alliance must respect the founding principles set 
out in Article 2 TEU (i.e. respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law 
and respect for human rights). 

One of the most controversial points during the negotiations – alongside the values compliance 
mechanism – was the representational threshold. In political practice, the threshold of minimum 
one  quarter of Member States is  considered a  challenging requirement. 27 In this context,  it  is 
worthwhile noting that earlier proposals had suggested an even higher threshold of one third of 
Member States, 28 which was eventually considered too high.  

European political foundations 
For European foundations, registration conditions are similar to those of parties, as far as their seat, 
their non-profit status, the representational threshold and compliance with European values are 
concerned. In  addition, a  foundation seeking recognition must be affiliated  with  a  registered 
latter's  objectives.  Under  Article 3(3)  of 
European  political  party  and  complement  the 
Regulation 1141/2014, a European party can have no more than one formally affiliated European 
foundation. 

Table 1 – Registration conditions for European parties and foundations 

European political parties 

European political foundations 

Seat in an EU Member State 

Representation in at least one quarter of EU Member States 

Respect for fundamental values set out in Article 2 TEU 
Non-profit goals 

Member parties must not be members of another 
European political party 

Formal affiliation with a registered European 
political party 

Member parties must have participated in 
European elections (or intend to do so) 

Objectives of the foundation need to complement 
those of the associated party 

2.1.3. Governance of European political parties and foundations 
Articles 4 and 5 of Regulation 1141/2014 regulate the governance of European political parties and 
foundations, respectively. The relevant provisions set out that the statutes of European parties and 
foundations must comply with the applicable law of the Member State in which they have their seat. 
Moreover, they stipulate that the statutes of a European party must include: 

some minimum provisions regarding its name, logo, seat and political programme;  
the name of  the affiliated political  foundation and  a  description of  the formal relationship 
between the party and the foundation; 

  and  some minimum rules regarding the  internal party  organisation  (e.g. the modalities  for 
admission, resignation and exclusion of its members; the list of its component members; rights 
and  duties  associated  with  all  types  of  membership;  the  powers,  responsibilities  and 
composition of its governing bodies).  

27   Van Hecke [et al.], p. 25. 
28  

In particular the European Parliament's Tsatsos  report (1996) and the Commission's  2003 proposal (COM(2003) 77). 

8 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 

Article  4(3)  establishes  that  the  Member  State  of  the  party's  seat  may  impose  additional 
requirements for the party statutes, provided those additional requirements are not inconsistent 
with the regulation. 

Overall, the provisions on governance are not very prescriptive and leave European political parties 
much leeway to organise themselves and to elect their main bodies. 

2.1.4. Current funding rules 
Eligibility criteria  
Article 17  of  the regulation sets out the principles and conditions for parties' and foundations' 
eligibility for EU funding. Accordingly, a European political party may apply for funding from the EU 
budget on the condition that: 

it is formally registered with the Authority as a European political party; and 
it is represented in the European Parliament by at least one Member of the European Parliament, 
who must not sponsor any other European political party. 

In  comparison, a  European political foundation is  eligible  for EU  funding provided it  has itself 
obtained registration with the Authority, in addition to the party with which it is formally affiliated. 

Criteria for the allocation of funds from the EU general budget 
Since  2004,  the allocation of  funds from 
the EU budget makes up the largest part 
of  European parties' income  (and  since 
2008 also of foundations). Both entities are 
required  to  raise  part  of  their  annual 
income in own resources, which they gain 
mostly 
from  membership  fees  and 
donations. For both types of income – EU 
funding and own resources – strict rules 
apply, in particular concerning spending, 
transparency  and  accountability,  and 
control. 

EU party funding:  The budgetary procedure 
The total amounts available for funding European political 
parties  and  foundations  for  a  given  financial  year  are 
determined in the annual budgetary procedure.  

In  a  first  step,  the  Secretary-General of  the  European 
Parliament includes estimates in Parliament's draft budget, 
requiring  approval  by  Parliament's  Bureau.  The  draft 
is  examined  and  adopted  by  the  Budget 
budget 
Committee and subsequently endorsed by the plenary.  

European political parties 
The regulation caps EU public funding at 
party's 
maximum 
reimbursable annual expenditure. Or, put 
differently, the party needs to  secure at 
least 10 % from other sources.  

90 % 

the 

of 

The total amount of funding from the EU 
budget – €46 million for the 2021 financial 
year 29 –  is  distributed among all  parties 
eligible  for  funding,  pursuant  to  the 
distribution key specified in Article 19 of 
the regulation:  

In a second step, Parliament's administrative expenditure 
feeds  into  the  draft  budget  of  the  European  Union 
(Section I), which is prepared by the European Commission 
and  subsequently  negotiated  by  Parliament  and  the 
Council.  

The  final  appropriations  available  for  the  funding  of 
European political  parties  and  foundations figure in  the 
section on the European Parliament of the general budget 
of the European Union (budget item 4 0 2 for parties and 
4 0 3 for foundations). In the 2021 budget, €46 million are 
earmarked for European political parties and €23 million for 
foundations.  These  appropriations  are  implemented in 
accordance with Regulation 1141/2014, the EU's Financial 
Regulation and the implementing decision by Parliament's 
Bureau. 

29   See  Budget  online  at  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/budget/www/index-en.htm,  Section  1  -  Parliament,  expenditure, 

item 4 0 2. 

9 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

  10 % of the total amount is distributed in equal shares among the eligible European political 

parties (so that each party receives the same lump sum as basic funding); 

  while the remaining 90 % are proportionally distributed, according to their representation in the 
European Parliament, that is the number of Members of the European Parliament signed up per 
European political party. 

This two-tier system ensures that all registered European political parties represented by at least 
one Member of the European Parliament have access to some basic EU funding, regardless of the 
party's size. However, as the lion's share of the funds is disbursed in proportion to the number of 
seats in the European Parliament, the amount of EU funding is higher for those European parties 
that are represented by a greater number of Members. 

In practice, the amount a European party can effectively obtain in public funding varies from one 
year to another, as it is dependent on a number of factors: 

  The  total  amount  available for party  funding  for  a  given  financial year,  i.e. the  amount 
earmarked in the European Parliament's general budget under budget line 4 0 2. This amount 
may change from one year to the next. 

  The distribution key: higher basic funding (lump sum) makes a proportionally bigger difference 
to smaller parties than to larger ones; adjustments in this respect are discussed in Chapter 3.2.2. 
  The number of Members of the European Parliament affiliated to a European political party: 
as  national  parties  and  individual  Members may  decide to  modify  their  membership in  a 
European political party during a parliamentary term, changes in the numbers of Members linked 
to that party may occur; therefore, parties are required to submit their updated list of Members 
of the European Parliament to the Authority once per year. 

  The number of European political parties qualifying for funding; this number fluctuates when 
new parties meeting the registration conditions emerge, or existing ones are removed from the 
register. De-registration can be due to the following reasons: parties may dissolve; they may no 
longer fulfil the registration conditions; or they may have been the subject of sanctions for non-
compliance with the rules. 

  The funding amount the party has applied for, which may remain below the 90 % threshold.  
  And finally, whether or  not the party  succeeds in gathering the required threshold of  own 

resources; otherwise, the EU funding is downsized until it corresponds to 90 %. 

While all these factors impact on the amount of pre-financing a party can obtain, the final funding 
amount  is  only  determined retrospectively, resulting from the  ex-post  control  of  the  party's 
expenditure carried out by an external auditor and Parliament's financial services. 

European political foundations 

For foundations, EU public funding is limited  to a maximum 95 %  of  annual expenditure, since 
compared to parties, it  is  harder for them to  acquire sufficient own resources. In other words, 
foundations need to collect  only 5 %  of their budget from private resources. Irrespective of the 
difference in co-financing thresholds, at 10:90, the distribution key remains the same for parties and 
foundations. 

10 

 
 
 
Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 

Table 2 – Current funding  thresholds under Regulation 1141/2014 

European parties 

European foundations 

90 % 

10 % 

Funding from the 
EU budget 

Private funding 

95 % 

5 % 

Funding from the 
EU budget 

Private funding  

10 % in equal shares 

90 % in proportion to the share of Members of the European Parliament 

Co-financing threshold 

Distribution key 

Source: EPRS. 

Restrictions applying to donations and contributions 

Definition of donation 
Any  payment, in whatever form,  originating 
from  third  parties (i.e. non-members of the 
European  party  or  foundation). This  includes 
payments 
in  cash,  offerings  in  kind,  the 
provision of below market value of any goods, 
services (including loans) or works and/or any 
transaction  which  constitutes  an 
other 
economic  advantage  for  the  party  or  the 
foundation. 

Source: Regulation 1141/2014, Article 2.  

Definition of contribution  
Any  payment,  in  whatever  form,  originating 
from  a  member  of  the  European  party  or 
foundation. This includes payments in cash, e.g. 
membership  fees,  contributions  in  kind,  the 
provision  of  below market value  of  any  good, 
services (including loans) or  works, and/or  any 
other transaction which constitutes an economic 
advantage for the party or the foundation.  

Source: Regulation 1141/2014, Article 2.  

As  illustrated above,  co-financing  is  mandatory for  European parties  and  foundations under 
Regulation 1141/2014. Therefore, parties and foundations need to generate a certain percentage of 
their income by way of contributions and donations. Regulation 1141/2014 defines any payments 
from party members as contributions, and any payments from third parties as donations. This own-
resources requirement aims at ensuring that parties and foundations engage in fundraising and 
strive at building up ties with their members and citizens. The regulation sets no upper ceiling in 
terms of how much a European political party can raise in own resources. However, a cap applies to 
payments from member parties: their total amount may not exceed  40 % of  the party's annual 
income. The 40 % ceiling also applies to foundations.  

For reasons of transparency and accountability, and with a view to avoiding corruption, a number 
of restrictions apply to the collection of contributions and donations. The relevant rules are spelled 
out in Article 20 of the regulation. 

Permitted donations and contributions under Regulation 1141/2014 

First and foremost, parties may accept donations  from legal  and  natural persons. A ceiling  of 
€18 000 per year and donor applies for both individual and corporate donors. Out of  principle, 
donations are subject to stringent transparency requirements. In this respect, European political 
parties and foundations must disclose the identity of all donors, together with the amount of their 
donations. In practice, they do so once annually, when submitting their annual financial statements. 
In line with the proportionality principle, looser transparency requirements apply to donations from 
natural persons below €3 000 (annual total). If single donations exceed a value of €12 000, they must 
be immediately reported in writing to the Authority. Donations do not necessarily need to be cash 

11 

 
 
 
 
 
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

payments, but may include other forms, such as offerings in kind. For in-kind donations, the party 
or foundation needs to determine the value and include it in the party accounts. 

Contributions from members of the European political party are generally permitted, regardless 
of whether the members are natural or legal persons. In practice, membership contributions from 
individual citizens play a minor role; parties generate the main part of own resources from their 
national member parties. Even if  no  ceiling  applies  for  contributions from individual member 
parties, as already underlined, they are subject to a collective upper ceiling: their total value must 
not exceed 40 %  of the European party's annual budget. For contributions from individual party 
members (i.e. natural persons), an annual cap of €18 000 applies (in analogy to donations). The sole 
exception applies to party members who are elected parliamentarians (at the European, national or 
regional level): they are allowed to surpass the cited threshold.  

Transparency requirements apply to all kind donations and contributions, including membership 
fees. Transparency rules are even tighter for donations received in pre-election periods: within six 
months prior to European elections, parties and foundations are required to report donations 
received to the Authority on a weekly basis. Such requirement is common in other democracies and 
aims at ensuring the fairness of the elections. 

The regulation includes specific rules for European political foundations. A foundation may accept 
contributions from its members, and also from its parent European political party. However, two 
limitations apply: first, as for parties, the total value of these contributions must not exceed 40 % of 
the foundation's annual budget; and second, these contributions must not derive from funds the 
political party in question has received from the general EU budget. 

Prohibited donations  and contributions under Regulation 1141/2014 
Article 20 not only sets out what constitutes a permissible donation/contribution (and under what 
conditions), but it also regulates what types of donations and contributions are prohibited. Most 
importantly, as a general rule, anonymous donations and contributions are forbidden. Furthermore, 
donations must not originate from the budget of  political  groups in  the  European Parliament. 
Donations from any public authority and government-related entities from an EU Member State or 
a third country are also proscribed.  

Finally, donations from foreign donors are banned. This concerns all donors from third countries, i.e. 
public authorities and government-related entities; private entities; and individuals based in a third 
country. The only  exception  to  this ban  are  individual citizens  who  have  the  right to  vote in 
European Parliament elections (i.e.  EU  citizens living  abroad). Recent case  law  established that 
contributions from foreign members are to be considered as donations and are thus forbidden 
under the current legal framework.30 

Under Article 20(6) of Regulation 1141/2014, European parties and foundations need to return any 
forbidden donations  to the donor. If  a  repayment is not viable  (e.g.  in  case  of  an anonymous 
donation), the  donation must be  reported to  the  Authority and the  European Parliament. In 
accordance with the EU's Financial Regulation, Parliament is entitled to recover the amount. This 
amount is then fed into the general budget of the EU. 

30   Case  T-107/19 Alliance of Conservatives  and Reformists  in Europe  (ACRE)  v  Parliament, see  judgment  of  the General 

Court issued on 25 November 2020, para. 150-175; this ruling is discussed  in Chapter 3.2.4. 

12 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 

Table 3 – Summary table of permitted and prohibited donations and contributions 

Donations and contributions 

Comments 

Donations up to €18 000  
per donor and per year 

Donors may be natural and legal 
persons 

Disclosure of donors' identity for 
donations above €3 000 

Immediate notification for donations 
above €12 000 

Weekly reporting in pre-election periods 

Contributions from members of the 
European party or foundation 

Contributions from natural and legal 
persons 

  national and regional 
parties/national 
foundations and 
associations 

individual members (i.e. 
natural persons) 

  elected members (of the 
European, a national or a 
regional parliament) 

Total value must not exceed 40 % of the 
annual income of the European 
party/foundation 

Cap of €18 000 applies, but no 
obligation to disclose identity 

Exempted from cap 

In-kind donations and contributions 

Value to be determined 

Anonymous donations 

Foreign donations and contributions 

Unless from a natural person residing in 
a third country who has the right to vote 
in European Parliament elections 

Contributions and donations from  
the 

  political  groups 

in 
European Parliament 
  any public authority 

Permitted 
donations and 
contributions 

Prohibited 
donations and 
contributions 

Source: EPRS 

2.1.5. Rules on spending 
Article 22 of the regulation sets out certain limitations on how European parties and foundations 
can spend their money.  

European parties 
First and foremost, European parties must not support  – directly or indirectly – national political 
parties or candidates in national elections. This prohibition on financing national political parties 

13 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

was already laid down in a declaration annexed to the Treaty of Nice, 31 to preclude that EU funds 
could be used to influence national elections or the competition between national parties. 32 

European parties are allowed to finance campaigns in the context of elections to the European 
Parliament, 'in which European parties or their members participate' (Article 21 of the regulation). 
The green light for European parties to engage in European Parliament election campaigns was 
given in 2007, with a view to further enhancing and promoting the European character of European 
Parliament  elections,  as  suggested  by  a  recital  of  the  amending  regulation.  Transparency 
requirements  apply:  European parties are  required  to  flag  any  kind  of  expenditure  linked  to 
campaigns for European elections in  their annual accounts. The regulation emphasises that, in 
accordance with the provisions in the 1976 Electoral Act, 'the funding and possible limitation of 
election expenses for all political parties, candidates and third parties is governed in each Member 
State by national provisions' (Article 21(1)). 

European foundations 
Interestingly, the provision regarding the funding of European Parliament election campaigns does 
not extend to European foundations. While Regulation 1141/2014 sets out in general that European 
foundations must not fund – directly or indirectly – 'elections, political parties, candidates or other 
foundations',  Recital 28  is  explicit  about  the  funding  ban  pertaining  to  European  elections 
('European or national political parties or candidates'). 

With regard to foundations, the regulation prohibits the use of their funds for any other purpose 
than:  

  analysing and contributing to the European public debate; 
  organising and supporting seminars, training, conferences and studies; 
  developing cooperation to promote democracy, including with entities in third countries; 
  and serving as a framework for national political foundations and academics. 

Referendum campaigns 
Furthermore, the regulation strictly bans the financing of referendum campaigns through European 
parties and foundations (Article 22(3) of the regulation). The rationale behind this prohibition is that 
referendums are conducted at the national level, even if they may focus on issues pertaining to EU 
integration or EU politics. 

2.1.6. Financial control and sanctions 
Financial control 
Article 23  of the regulation governs accounts, reporting requirements and auditing obligations. 
Accordingly, European parties and foundations need to submit the following documents to the 
Authority: 

their  annual  financial  statements  and  accompanying  notes,  covering  their  revenue  and 
expenditure, assets and liabilities, in accordance with the law applicable in the Member State in 
which they have their seat, as well as annual financial statements on the basis of international 
accounting standards (pursuant to Article 2 of Regulation 1606/2002); 

  an external audit report on their annual financial statements, carried out by  an independent 

body or expert, the latter selected, mandated and paid by the European Parliament; and 

31   Declaration 11 on Article 191 of the Treaty establishing the European  Community.  OJ C 80, 10.03.2001, p 79. 
32   W.  Wolfs  and J.  Smulders,  'Party finance at the level of the European  Union:  party  finance reform to vitalize the EU's 
proto-party system?',  J. Mendilow and E. Phélippeau (eds), Handbook of political party funding, Elgar Publishing, 2018, 
p. 193. 

14 

 
 
 
 
                                                             
Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 

the list of donors and contributors and their corresponding donations or contributions. 

While the documents are to be submitted to the Authority, Parliament's Authorising Officer and the 
competent national contact point of the Member State where the party or foundation has its seat 
also receive a  copy of the aforementioned documents. In fact, control of  European parties and 
foundations' compliance with their obligations under the regulation is exercised, in cooperation, by 
the Authority, the European Parliament and the competent Member States (Article 24). 

The European Parliament exercises control of funding received from the EU budget and the related 
spending in accordance with the EU's Financial Regulation. In this respect, the Party Regulation 
states that, in carrying out such controls, Parliament should 'take the necessary measures in the 
fields of the prevention of and the fight against fraud affecting the financial interests of the Union' 
and entitles Parliament to recover unspent funds and amounts unduly paid (Article 24(2)). 

As further instances of control, the regulation mentions the European Court of Auditors (ECA) and 
the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). The former may verify the legality of expenditure and the 
proper implementation of the provisions of the EU funding agreements with European parties and 
foundations within its general mandate to examine the accounts of all revenue and expenditure of 
all  bodies (Article 287 TFEU).  In  comparison, OLAF is involved in  suspected cases of  fraud and 
corruption, to carry out investigations in connection with public funding of European parties and 
foundations under Regulation 1141/2014. Ultimately, OLAF findings may result in the Authorising 
Officer of  the European Parliament taking a  recovery decision. Finally, Recital 30a  recalls that it 
would  be  up to  the European Public  Prosecutor's Office (EPPO)  to  investigate alleged criminal 
offences by European parties and foundations that affect the EU's financial interests. 

Sanctions 
Article 27 governing the sanctions regime is actually the longest and most detailed article of the 
entire regulation. Under the regulation, the Authority is entitled to impose sanctions on European 
parties  and  foundations in  case  of  irregularities. Two  categories of  sanctions are  envisaged 
(Article 27): 

removal from the register, if  European parties  and  foundations no  longer comply with the 
registration conditions and  requirements, or if a  judgment has  found them guilty  of  illegal 
activities detrimental to the financial interests of the Union; and 
financial sanctions (i.e. fines); in this  context, distinction is made in the  regulation between 
quantifiable and non-quantifiable infringements. 

To date, the Authority has never made use of its sanctions powers. However, the deterrent effect of 
the sanctions should not be under-estimated. For instance, in the event of irregular sums received 
or not reported, the fine can amount to 300 % of the irregular sums (if they exceed €200 000) or up 
to 50 % of a European party's annual budget when a judgment finds it to have engaged in illegal 
activities detrimental to the financial interests of the EU. 

Further sanction powers for the misuse of funds are held by the Authorising Officer of the European 
Parliament, as set out in the Party Regulation and in the Financial Regulation. The Authorising Officer 
is empowered to exclude a European party or foundation from future EU funding for up to five years 
(or even up to 10 years, if the infringement is repeated).  

2.2. Amendments to Regulation 1141/2014 

Regulation 1141/2014 was amended twice, in 2018  and 2019,  through Regulation 2018/673 and 
Regulation 2019/493.  

15 

 
 
 
 
 
 
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

2.2.1. The 2018 amendment 
Even before Regulation 1141/2014 had become applicable on 1 January 2017, some actors within 
the European Parliament – notably the larger political groups – considered revising that regulation 
'a matter of urgency', to mitigate major shortcomings and loopholes. Their concerns were spurred 
by  a  number of  cases of  inappropriate use of funding, which  Parliament's administration had 
discovered while verifying parties' accounts and which had also come to light in the press. 33 The 
emergence of atypically composed right-wing parties, made up of just a few national parties and 
otherwise  individual  members (see  Chapter 3.1.)  was  a  phenomenon perceived  as  worrying. 
Moreover, in a few  cases, Parliament had not been able to recover the funding for non-eligible 
expenditure from parties and foundations because they had gone bankrupt in the  meantime. 
Overall, Parliament considered there was an urgent need to amend the legal framework to better 
protect the EU's financial interests. Although the cited malpractices related to the application of the 
initial Regulation 2004/2003, without amendment, the new Regulation 1141/2014 would not have 
prevented similar cases.  

In a first step, in April 2016, the presidents of the three largest political groups in Parliament asked 
the European Commission in writing to revise the regulation. 34 Subsequent plenary debates,35 one 
of which was prompted by an oral question to the Commission,36 addressed a number of issues in 
the application of  the regulation. A case in point was the sponsoring of new  'pseudo-parties',37 
which  were  made  up  of  one  or two  national political  parties and  otherwise mainly individual 
members. To gain access to EU funding, various European parties relied on the sponsorship of 
members of one and the same national party, or, in  extreme cases, even of  one and the same 
individual member ('multi-membership'). This malpractice was denounced – also by the Council –as 
an attempt to circumvent the initial objective of the regulation. 

Another key issue in  the debate was the  level  of  co-financing, as  it  appeared that parties and 
foundations encountered major difficulties in meeting the required level of own-resources (15 % of 
their annual budget at the  time). This  made parties and foundations prone to using 'dubious' 
financial practices in order to reach the threshold.38 Such dubious practices included, for instance, 
the abundant listing of in-kind contributions in the accounts, which are generally difficult to audit, 
and lucrative contracts in exchange for donations,39 also described as 'circular financial flows'. 40 

In  a  resolution  passed  on  15 June 2017,  Parliament  recalled  that  party  funding  should  be 
'transparent and not open to abuse' and encouraged the European Commission to propose a 
revision that would tackle the  observed shortcomings, 'especially in  respect of  the level  of  co-

33   e.g. Euractiv, Danish far-right MEP ordered to return €400,000, 10.5.2016; Euractiv, EU anti-fraud body to probe Danish 
party,  17.10.2016; The Guardian,  EU set to ask  Ukip group  to repay almost  £150,000 in 'misspent  funds',  17.11.2016; 
NRC Handelsblad,  Anti-EU  partijen zijn goed  in misbruiken  EU  subsidies,  17.11.2016; Wall Street Journal,  European 
Parliament Asks  UKIP To Pay Back  Money Used For Brexit Campaigning,  21.11.2016. 

34   This letter is mentioned in the plenary debate of 15 March 2017 and in Oral question O-000007/2017. 

35   On 15 March 2017 and on 14 June 2017. 
36   Oral question O-000007/2017, Danuta Hübner on behalf of the AFCO Committee, 31 January  2017. 
37   Council press release, Funding  of European  political parties: revised rules get Council approval,  7 March 2018. 
38   COM(2017) 481, p. 7. 
39   EU Observer, Anti-EU parties face funding cuts,  15.9.2017. 
40   R. Kergueno, Fraud  and boats:  funding  European  political parties, Transparency  International, 2017. 

16 

 
 
 
                                                             
Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 

financing (own resources), and of  the possibility of multi-party membership of Members of the 
European Parliament'.41 

The  proposal  presented by  the  European Commission in  September 2017 42  sought to  'close 
loopholes and improve transparency, to ensure the appropriate allocation and expenditure of 
limited resources from the EU budget'. 43 When then-Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker 
announced the proposal in his State of the Union speech, as part of the democracy package ahead 
of the 2019  European Parliament elections, he stated bluntly that the aim of the reform was to 
prevent abuse ('We should not be filling the coffers of anti-European extremists'). 44 The proposal did 
not,  however,  aim  at  restricting party pluralism:  it  was  intended  to  'in  no  way  dictate  what 
programmes EU parties should follow',45 as Vice-President Frans Timmermans emphasised. 

Due to the urgency imposed by the 2019 European elections, the co-legislators agreed on the text 
of the amendment in record time, after consulting the advisory committees and the European Court 
of Auditors.46 Regulation 2018/673 was adopted on 3 May 2018, and entered into force the day after. 
The Bulgarian Council Presidency was satisfied that the amendment 'put an end to abuses', ensured 
more fairness in  funding  and  increased transparency ahead of  the  2019  European Parliament 
elections. 47 

The amendment tackled a number of specific issues: 

First and foremost, it reformed the funding rules. In particular,  

it modified the co-funding thresholds, raising the share of EU funding to 90 % for political parties, 
and to 95 % for foundations. (Formerly, the applicable threshold had been 85 % for both entities.) 
The lowered level of own resources should make it easier for parties and foundations to meet 
the  co-funding threshold  without  'using  questionable practices', as  the  European Court  of 
Auditors  noted. 48  However, some observers found  that  lowering the  threshold  alone  was 
insufficient to tackle the underlying transparency issues.49 
It re-adjusted the distribution key of the EU envelope in a way that better reflected the election 
results. Under the new rules, 10 % of the total appropriations  are distributed in equal shares 
among the political parties and foundations, and 90 % in proportion to their share of elected 
Members of the European Parliament (previously, the distribution key was set at 15 % and 85 %). 
This reform better aligned EU funding to parties' representation in the European Parliament. It 
hit smaller parties (and their foundations) hard, whereas the financial impact on larger parties 
was negligible. 50 

41   European  Parliament  resolution  T8-0274/2017  on  the  funding  of  political  parties  and  political  foundations  at 

European  level, 15.6.2017. 

42   COM(2017) 481. 
43   Explanatory  memorandum,  p. 4. 
44  

J.-C.  Juncker, State of the Union Address  2017. 

45   Wall Street Journal, EU Executive Body Proposes Stricter Party Finance Rules, 15.9.2017. 
46   EESC,  Opinion  on  the Statute  and  funding  of  European  political parties and  foundations,  7.12.2017; ECA,  Opinion 

No 5/2017, OJ C 18, 18.1.2018, pp. 1–4. 

47   Statement by  Monika  Panayotova,  Deputy  Minister for  the Bulgarian  Presidency of  the Council,  quoted  in Council  

press release Funding of European  political parties: revised rules get Council approval,  7.3.2018. 

48   European  Court of Auditors, Opinion 5/2017 concerning the Commission  proposal COM(2017) 48, para. 11. 
49   Kergueno, 2017. 
50   See simulation table in COM(2017) 481, p. 6. 

17 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

Moreover, the amendment tightened the representation  requirements  for  European political 
parties (i.e.  the  requirement to be  represented in at  least  one  quarter of  Member States), by 
introducing two fundamental changes: 

It declared the forming of a European political party a prerogative of national (or regional) 
parties;  as a  consequence, individual members were no longer taken into  account  for the 
representation threshold. 
It  abolished  multi-party  membership. National parties were thus  no  longer  allowed to  be 
members of more than one European political party. 

Furthermore, under the  heading sanctions, the  rules  for  de-registration of  political  parties or 
foundations (i.e.  removal  from  the  register) were  stiffened.  To  safeguard the  EU's  financial 
interests, in the event of infringement or fraud, recovery of misspent funds was made possible from 
natural  persons,  representing  a  party  or  foundation  and  responsible  for  the  infringement 
(Article 27a:  responsibility of  natural persons). Furthermore,  publishing the logos and  political 
programmes of the European political parties on the websites of their member parties was made 
compulsory. This measure aimed at greater visibility of the affiliations between national parties and 
their parent European parties. 

And, as a final point, the evaluation clause embedded in the regulation was amended, moving the 
deadline for Parliament's evaluation report from mid-2018 to 31 December 2021, and postponing 
the subsequent European Commission review accordingly. 

Notwithstanding, a number of other issues in the application of the regulation which had been 
flagged during the various parliamentary debates at both, committee and plenary level, remained 
unaddressed in the 2018 amendment. These concerned in particular:  

the financing of referendum campaigns; 
loans and donations; 
limiting contributions in kind, which are difficult to verify; 

  and the question whether parties should be allowed to build financial reserves. 

Views were divided on the amendment. While some hailed it a success, others were more critical. 
For instance, Euractiv claimed that the warnings of the Court of Auditors' had fallen 'on deaf ears'; 
the amendment would 'simply lower the bar for EU grants', without tackling 'dodgy donations and 
loans'. 51 Transparency International found the former distribution key of 15 % was fairer, as it had 
ensured a higher basic income for smaller parties and foundations. It argued that lowering this 
threshold should not be used as a means to reduce funding for 'staunchly anti-democratic' parties. 
Instead, it  suggested tightening the registration  requirements or serious assessment of parties' 
compliance with the EU's fundamental values. 52 

2.2.2. The 2019 amendment 
In  September 2018,  in  the  wake  of  the  Facebook/Cambridge Analytica data scandal, 53  where 
personal data were harvested at large scale to generate personalised advertisements, the European 
Commission  proposed  a  further  targeted  amendment  to  Regulation 1141/2014,  aiming  at 
protecting the  integrity of  the  European elections.  It  introduced a  sanction  mechanism  for 
infringement of data protection rules and fraudulent use of personal data by European political 

51   Euractiv, New EU party finance rules short circuit accountability, 19.4.2018. 
52   Kergueno, 2017. 
53   European Commission,  Report on the 2019 elections to the European Parliament, COM(2020) 252, p. 1. For an analysi s 
of the scandal,  see e.g. M. Hu, 'Cambridge  Analytica's black box',  Big Data & Society, July-December  2020, pp. 1-6. 

18 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 

parties and foundations. 54 The positions of the Parliament and the Council were close on this file, 
ensuring that the amending Regulation 2019/493 could be swiftly adopted in March 2019, ahead of 
the  European Parliament elections, and  after  having  consulted the  European Data Protection 
Supervisor (EDPS) and the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC). 55 

The  mechanism  provides  for  dissuasive  financial  sanctions  on  European  political  parties  or 
foundations that deliberately influence (or attempt to influence) the outcome of European elections 
by  taking advantage of a  breach of  personal data rules. From a procedural point of view,  the 
amendment established  a  verification  procedure for  determining whether  a  breach  of  data 
protection rules has taken place. To be noted, the scope of the protection extends solely to personal 
data.  Following notification of a violation by a national supervision authority, the verification is 
carried out by the Authority for European political parties and foundations, under involvement of 
the  committee of  independent eminent persons. In  the  event  of  a  proven  infringement, the 
Authority may impose a fine on the party, which can amount to 5 % of the concerned party's annual 
budget. Moreover, a party found guilty risks a ban on applying for EU funding for an entire year.  

The 2019 amendment also strengthened the Authority by reinforcing its staffing situation. This was 
welcomed, as the wide portfolio of responsibilities had put the Authority's human resources under 
strain during its first years of activity. 

54   COM(2018) 636. 
55   EDPS,  Summary  of the Opinion of the European Data  Protection Supervisor on the Commission  Package on free and 
fair European elections, OJ C 47, 6.2.2019, pp. 8-11; EESC,  Opinion SOC/613-EESC-2018  on the Protection of personal  
data in the context of EP elections, 12.12.2018. 

19 

 
 
 
                                                             
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

2.3. Other legal acts 

While  Regulation 1141/2014, as amended, is the principal  legislative act in  the legal  framework 
regulating European parties and foundations, a set of other acts complement the framework (see 
schematic overview below).  These  encompass the EU's Financial  Regulation and a  number of 
delegated and implementing measures, which are briefly outlined below. 

Figure 2 – Current legal framework 

European Party Regulation

• Regulation 1141/2014 
(repealing Regulation 2004/2003)

Amendments to the
Party Regulation

• Regulation 2018/673 
• Regulation 2019/493

EU Financial Regulation

• Regulation 2018/1046

- Title XI (contributions to European  political parties) and 
- Title VIII (grants)

Delegated/implementing acts 
and other measures

• Commission  delegated Regulation 2015/2401
• Commission  implementing Regulation 2015/2246
• Decision of the Authority of 24 July 2020 
• Decision of the European Parliament's Bureau of 1 July 2019
• Parliament's Rules of Procedure (Rules 25(11) and  235)

Source: EPRS. 

2.3.1. Financial Regulation 
The EU's Financial Regulation 56 sets out the rules applicable to funding from the EU  budget for 
European political parties and foundations. These rules are specified in Title XI  ('contributions to 
European political  parties') and in  Title VIII  ('grants'), respectively. They lay  down some general 
principles and govern the financial aspects of the award procedure, the use of the funding, reporting 
obligations, control powers by Parliament, the Court of Auditors and OLAF, as well as administrative 
and financial penalties.  

The  new  financial  rules under Regulation 2018/1046 have applied  to  the  funding of  European 
parties and foundations only since the 2020 financial year. Until the 2019 financial year, the previous 
Financial Regulation 966/2012 applied, as amended through Regulation 1142/2014. 57 

56   Regulation 2018/1046 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, OJ L 193, 30.07.2018. 
57   Regulation 1142/2014 amending Regulation 966/2012 as regards the financing of European political parties. OJ L 317, 

4.11.2014, pp. 28-34. Implicitly repealed by the current Financial Regulation 2018/1046. 

20 

 
 
 
                                                             
 
 
Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 

2.3.2. Delegated, implementing and other measures 
In accordance with the provisions set out in Regulation 1141/2014, the following delegated and 
implementing measures complement the legal framework: 

Commission Delegated  Regulation  2015/240158 specifies the content and functioning of  the 
register of European political parties and foundations, managed by the Authority. It entered into 
force on 8 January 2016. 

Commission Implementing  Regulation  2015/224659 lays down the details of  the registration 
number system that applies to the register of European political parties and foundations and defines 
the content and format of information extracted from the register for third parties. It entered into 
force on 23 December 2015. 

The Decision of the Authority of 24 July 2020 60 concerns public access to documents. It defines 
the conditions, limits and procedures under which the Authority grants public access to certain 
documents it holds. 

The Decision of the European Parliament's Bureau of 1 July 2019 61 lays down the procedures for 
implementing Regulation 1141/2014 on the side of the Parliament, in particular in respect of the 
funding practicalities. It encompasses all steps, from the call for application up to ex-post control 
mechanisms. Templates of funding agreements for European parties and foundations, respectively 
are annexed. The Bureau decision has repeatedly been adjusted, as it needs to be constantly aligned 
with the Party Regulation on the one hand and the EU's Financial Regulation on the other, both of 
which have undergone several modifications (see Table 4). 

Finally, Parliament's Rules of Procedure  include a dedicated section detailing the European 
Parliament's powers and responsibilities with regard to European political parties and 
foundations.62 

2.4. Applicable legal framework per financial year 

Although Regulation 1141/2014 has applied since 1 January 2017, it began to apply to the funding 
procedure only from the 2018 financial year onwards, since the 2017 calls for applications had been 
published under the previous regulation. The various revisions encountered in recent years, both of 
the Party Regulation and the EU's Financial Regulation, led to a certain complexity in the legal 
framework, as it underwent modification in almost every financial year. Each of the changes also 
entailed an update of the implementing decision by the European Parliament's Bureau. The table 
below provides an overview of the applicable legal framework per year, since the 2017 financial year. 

58   Commission  delegated regulation 2015/2401 of 2 October 2015 on  the content and  functioning  of the Register of 

European  political parties and foundations,  OJ L 333, 19.12.2015, pp. 50–53. 

59   Commission  implementing  regulation 2015/2246 of  3  December  2015 on  detailed provisions  for  the  registration 
number  system  applicable  to  the  register of  European  political  parties  and  European  political foundations  and 
information provided by standard  extracts from the register, OJ L 318, 4.12.2015, pp. 28–33. 

60   OJ C 258, 6.8.2020. 
61   OJ C 249, 25.7.2019. 
62   Title XII, Rule 235 (edition January  2021). 

21 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

Table 4 – Applicable legal framework per financial year 2017-2021 

Financial year 

Party Regulation 

Financial Regulation 

EP Bureau Decision 

2021 

2020 

2019 

2018 

2017 

Regulation 1141/2014, 
amended by 
Regulation 2019/493 

Regulation 1141/2014, 
amended by 
Regulation 2018/673 

Regulation 1141/2014 

Regulation 2004/2003 

Source: EPRS, based on EurLex. 

Regulation 2018/1046 

Decision of 1 July 2019 

Regulation 966/2012 
(as amended by 
Regulation1142/2014) 

Decision of 28 May 2018 

Decision of 12 June 2017 

Decision of 29 March 2004 

2.5. Preparing for the next revision: The state of play 

2.5.1. The review clause 
In  accordance  with  Article 38  of  Regulation 1141/2014  (as  amended  in  2018),  the  European 
Parliament is required to submit a report on the application of the regulation and on the activities 
funded by the end of 2021,  and every five  years thereafter, after consulting the Authority. This 
consultation took place on 15 June 2021. In addition, the Director of the Authority, Michael Adam, 
presented the  body's 2019  annual  report on  27 January 2021  in  a  meeting  of  the  European 
Parliament Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO). 

From a Better Regulation perspective, the aforementioned review clause is particularly interesting, 
because it assigns the evaluation duty to the European Parliament in the first place, although it is 
later for the European Commission to propose amendments to the regulation if required. Against 
this backdrop, the AFCO committee requested authorisation to draw up an own-initiative report on 
28 January 2021. 63  The  Budgetary Control  Committee (CONT)  decided  to  submit  an  opinion. 
According  to  the  provisional  time  schedule,  the  vote  in  plenary  is  currently  envisaged  for 
October 2021. Preparations for Parliament's evaluation have to date included two expert hearings: 

'How to make political party and campaign financing more transparent: what rules do we need 
in  the  EU?',  organised  by  Parliament's  Special  Committee on  Foreign  Interference in  all 
Democratic Processes (INGE) in association with AFCO, on 23 February 2021; and 
'The  statute  and  funding of  European  political  parties  and  foundations',  held by  AFCO on 
25 May 2021. 

Article 38 also requires the Commission to draft its own report on the application of the regulation 
within  six  months  following  Parliament's  evaluation  report,  paying  special  attention  to  the 
regulation's implications for the position of small European political parties and European political 
foundations. If  appropriate, that report may be  accompanied by a new  proposal to amend the 
regulation. 

2.5.2. European Commission preparatory work 
The European Commission has, in several instances, stressed its intention to propose a revision of 
Regulation 1141/2014 and, at the time of writing, it has already taken the first steps in the process 
of preparing the revision. When President Ursula von der Leyen revealed the political guidelines for 

63   Procedure reference 2021/2018(INI). 

22 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 

the current Commission term in summer 2019, she announced a dedicated legislative proposal 
would constitute part of a European democracy action plan seeking to ensure clearer rules on the 
financing of European political parties. 64 In the democracy action plan, presented in December 2020, 
the Commission indeed committed to come forward with a new legislative proposal in the course 
of 2021, which should aim at: 

  addressing the financing of European political parties from outside the EU; 

revising audit requirements; 
strengthening the links between European financing and national campaigns; and 
facilitating transparency and auditing. 65 

The  Commission's work programme for 2021  reconfirms those plans, although the envisaged 
schedule of the new legislative proposal – autumn 2021 – appears too ambitious in respect of the 
provisions set out in Article 38 of the current regulation. In a statement before the AFCO committee, 
the Commission reassured the committee that it would not present the new legislative proposal 
before Parliament has voted on its own-initiative report.66 

Most recently, it emerged that the Commission will underpin the new proposal with an ex-post 
evaluation of the existing act and an ex-ante impact assessment of the amending proposal, in a 
combined process. From a Better Regulation perspective, such an abridged process (in Commission 
jargon: a 'back-to-back' initiative) is typically chosen when 'political urgencies or timing constraints' 
do not allow for a standard process.67 In a first step, the Commission consulted the public on the 
initiative, to  collect  input from  citizens and  stakeholders. The consultation was open between 
17 March and 14 April 2021. 

The combined evaluation roadmap/inception impact assessment  of March 2021 68 outlines the 
Commission's intentions for the revision. The evaluation is set to examine the operation of the 
current regulation since 2017. In particular, it will look at the regulation's: 

  effectiveness with regard to: 

  donations, in particular aspects of transparency and 'whether the provisions create a level 
playing field among European political parties and foundations and ensure appropriate 
financial resources for them'; 

  gender representation; 
  transparency and visibility aspects with regard to the affiliations between national and 
European parties to ensure that voters can make informed choices at the ballot box for 
the European elections; 

  the role of the Authority with regard to imposing sanctions for breaches of the rules; 

  efficiency in terms of enforceability; 

relevance in the sense that 'the evaluation will examine whether the provisions appropriately 
address the increased risk of indirect funding by foreign interests channelled through national 
means or private donations and prevent foreign interference in European elections'; 
coherence with the current European electoral law, and with the (planned) legislative proposal 
on transparency of sponsored political content, in the context of the European democracy action 

64   Ursula von der Leyen, A Union that strives for more. My agenda  for Europe.  Political guidelines for the next European 
Commission  2019-2024, July  2019. See  in particular Chapter  6: A  new  push  for  European  democracy,  subheading 
'Protecting our democracy'. 

65   European  Commission,  Communication  on the European  democracy action plan,  COM(2020) 790, pp. 5-6. 
66   AFCO meeting of 17 March 2021, first exchange of view on the report in question. 
67   European  Commission,  Better Regulation Toolbox,  tool #7. 
68   European  Commission,  Combined  evaluation roadmap  and  inception impact assessment,  22.03.2021. 

23 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

plan.  Coherence with the Electoral Act  is  particularly  relevant for  Parliament, as the  AFCO 
committee is currently drawing up a report aiming at electoral reform.69 

Pending the outcome of  the impact assessment and stakeholder consultation, the revision will 
either be narrow in  scope and focus on tightening the funding provisions of the  regulation to 
increase transparency with regard to indirect funding from third countries and to reduce the risk of 
foreign interference. Alternatively, it will take a broader approach, to 'further enhance the European 
dimension' of the European Parliament elections and to address 'loopholes not yet covered by the 
two previous amendments'. Under the latter option, the new proposal would seek to enhance the 
rules regarding transparency, sanctions and enforcement.  

In  any case, the new  regulation would ideally be in  place in  early 2023,  well  ahead of the 2024 
European elections, so that they would be applicable already to the 2024 financial year. 

69   European  Parliament,  Report  on  the  reform  of  the  electoral law  of  the  European  Union,  procedure  reference 
2020/2220(INL), Rapporteur: Domènec Ruiz Devesa  (S&D,  Spain).  The draft report was  presented at the beginning of 
June 2021. 

24 

 
 
 
                                                             
Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 

3. Application of Regulation 1141/2014 

3.1. Compliance with the registration criteria 

3.1.1. The quantitative effect of adjusting the registration requirements 
Increase of European parties under Regulation 2004/2003 
The main purpose of the 2004 legal framework was to introduce a system of public party funding in 
order to  enhance  European democracy. Creating a setting favourable to  the  development of 
European political parties was believed could support European integration and help overcome the 
EU's democratic deficit, which had marked the public discourse since the 1980s. 70 In that respect, 
European parties were meant to contribute to creating a European public space through political 
debate. Public  funding should give them financial autonomy, notably from the political  groups 
within the European Parliament. 

Following the adoption of the first Party Regulation in 2004, a  number of transnational political 
alliances sought recognition as European political parties in order to gain access to EU funding.71 
They  came  from  across  the  political  spectrum:  mainstream  and  radical;  pro-European  and 
Eurosceptic. In quantitative terms, a peak was reached in 2015-2016, when as many as 16 European 
political parties and 15 European political foundations applied for EU funding.  

Nevertheless, from 2011  onwards, the party system was characterised by 'a  certain degree  of 
volatility'. 72 A  new  phenomenon was observed, namely European parties composed of  a  few 
Eurosceptic national parties and otherwise individual politicians. Several parties formed and then 
dissolved; national parties changed their affiliation from one year to the next; individual national 
parliamentarians or Members of the European Parliament were members of a different European 
party to their national party or, in some cases, of more than one European political party. 73 In fact, 
this 'proliferation of small right-wing parties in ever changing permutations'74 used legal grey zones 
to  qualify  for  EU  funding.  Academics  observed that  some  of  the  proponents behind  these 
Eurosceptic European parties were precisely those groups and Members who had formerly spoken 
out against party funding in European Parliament debates, which suggests that their motivation for 
forming European parties was driven less by ideology than by pragmatic reasons. 75 

Decreasing numbers under Regulations 1141/2014 and 2018/673 
The trend and practices depicted above gave rise to concern and eventually prompted an overhaul 
of the original Party Regulation 2004/2003. When Regulation 1141/2014 became applicable in 2017, 
one immediate effect  of  the tightened registration requirements was a noticeable decrease in 
European parties and  foundations, because some of  them no  longer fulfilled  the  registration 
conditions set out in Regulation 1141/2014. Consequently, the number of European political parties 
dropped from 16 to 12, and that of foundations from 15 to 11.  

70   e.g. European  Parliament, Tsatsos  report (1996); Wolfs and  Smulders, pp.  185-187. 
71   The first European parties that formed in the aftermath of regulation 2004/2003 were the European Left, the European 

Democratic Party, and  the Alliance of a Europe of Nations. 

Idem. 

72   Wolfs and  Smulders, pp.  196-197. 
73  
74   R. Corbett, F.  Jacobs  and D. Neville, The European Parliament, John Harper, 9th edition 2016, p. 148. 
75   Wolfs  and  Smulders  argue  that  Eurosceptics  created  European  political  parties  'to  attract  funding  to  form  a 

counterweight for the traditional pro-European  parties', p. 197. 

25 

 
 
 
                                                             
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

Nonetheless, certain malpractice continued until amending Regulation 2018/673 established that 
forming a European political party was the prerogative of parties. This put an end to the practice of 
individual parliamentarians sponsoring the registration of a  European party in the absence of a 
national party. Moreover, as explained above in Chapter 2.2.1., the amendment banned multi-party 
membership (i.e. the artificial creation of several European political parties with similar or identical 
tendencies by one and the same national party). 76 

Following  the  entry into  force  of  the  2018  amendment, all  political  parties and  foundations, 
including those that had already obtained recognition for funding purposes under the former rules, 
had to provide proof that they would also satisfy the new registration conditions. The Authority 
decided on the status of the applicants once it had verified all documents submitted. Pursuant to 
Article 40a of the regulation, a party's failure to meet the conditions would lead to its removal from 
the register. As a consequence, the party would lose its European legal personality and, as a result, 
its eligibility for EU funding. 

Exactly that scenario happened to two European political parties and one foundation: the Alliance 
of European National Movements;77 and the 'Alliance for Peace  and Freedom', together with its 
foundation 'Europa Terra Nostra'. 78 In addition, the Authority rejected the re-registration request for 
another foundation, 'Identity and Traditions of Europe', for formal reasons, because at the time of 
the application the associated party (the 'Alliance of European National Movements') had already 
been removed from the register.79 

In  sum,  the  stringent registration  requirements  of the  2018  revision brought the  number  of 
recognised European political parties and foundations down to 10 of each. No further changes have 
occurred since, therefore, at present, the same 20 parties and foundations remain registered. In the 
course of 2020, the Authority rejected two newly filed registration requests, as the applicants failed 
to meet the minimum registration criteria.80 

The  table  below  lists  all  currently  registered European  political  parties,  together  with  their 
foundations. 

76   Regulation 2018/673, Recital 4. 
77   Decision of 29 August 2018. 
78  Decision  of  3  September  2018  and  13 September 2018,  respectively.  See  also  press  release  of  the  Authority, 

27.09.2018. 

79   For more detail, see G. Grasso  and  R. Perrone, 'European  political parties and  the respect for the values on which the 
European  Union is founded between the European legislation and  the national laws',  European public law, Vol. 25(4), 
2019, p. 673. 

80   Decision of the Authority of 2 September 2020 not to register European Alliance for Freedom and  Democracy  ASBL; 

Decision of the Authority of 26 November 2020 not to register Alliance for Peace and Freedom ASBL. 

26 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 

Table 5 – Currently registered European parties and foundations 

Name of European party 

Acronym 

Affiliated foundation 

Acronym 

European People's Party  EPP 

Wilfried Martens Centre for 
European Studies 

WMCES 

Party of European Socialists  PES 

Foundation for European 
Progressive Studies 

Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe Party 

ALDE 

European Liberal Forum 

Identity and Democracy Party 

ID 

Identity and Democracy 
Foundation 

EFPS 

ELF 

ID 

European Green Party  EGP 

Green European Foundation 

GEF 

European Conservatives and 
Reformists Party 

ECR 

New Direction – The 
Foundation for European 
Reform 

Party of the European Left  EL 

Transform Europe 

European Democratic Party  EDP 

Institute of European 
Democrats 

IED 

European Free Alliance  EFA 

Coppieters Foundation 

European Christian Political 
Movement 

ECPM 

Source: Authority. 

Sallux 
(formerly: European Christian 
Political Foundation) 

Notwithstanding these changes, and as already mentioned, verification of parties' compliance with 
the  registration conditions is  a  permanent and continuous task carried  out  by  the  Authority 
throughout the year. Enhanced checks are undertaken around the time of Member States' national 
elections, and following European political parties' annual submission of an updated list indicating 
their member parties.  

It has been observed that the current legal framework, which is tailored to 'parties of parties', does 
not allow for recognition of transnational political movements with individual mass membership. 
Moreover, the criterion of geographical representation (seven Member States clause) was deemed 
to  be  high  for  new  applicants. 81  However,  it  should  be  noted  that  in  order  to  satisfy  the 
representational  threshold, members do  not  necessarily  have  to  be  elected  to  the  national 
parliament,  as  the  regional 
into  account.  Under  Article 2(1)  of 
is  also  taken 
Regulation 1141/2014, a political party is defined as an association of citizens that pursues political 
objectives and 'which is either recognised by, or established in accordance with, the legal order of 
at least one Member State'. In  this context, it  is worthwhile noting that the legal  conditions for 
forming a party and the thresholds for representation of parties in parliament vary significantly from 
one Member State to the other. 

level 

81   e.g.  Volt  Europa,  Contribution  to  the  European  Commission's  public  consultation  on  the  roadmap  for  revising 

Regulation 1141/2014, 14.4.2021. 

27 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

3.1.2. The compliance mechanism regarding EU values 
As shown above, in the past, the Authority has used its vested power to deny registration or remove 
parties and foundations from the register in case they fail to meet the requirements. However, this 
is true only for the formal requirements spelled out in Article 3 of Regulation 1141/2014. Another 
specific requirement deserves close attention, namely parties' adherence to the EU's fundamental 
values. In this area, the Authority's powers are much more restricted.  

European political parties and foundations must observe, in particular in  their programme and 
activities, 'the values on which the Union is founded, as expressed in Article 2 TEU, namely respect 
for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law  and respect for human rights, 
including the rights of persons belonging to minorities'. In other words, parties and foundations are 
only entitled to EU funding if (and as long as) they comply with Article 2. For an initial compliance 
check, the Authority merely formally verifies whether the party or foundation has duly completed 
the corresponding self-declaration. 

Should a registered party or foundation be suspected of a manifest and serious breach of the EU's 
fundamental values, the regulation envisages a  verification procedure encompassing multiple 
stages. The procedure is designed so that a preliminary administrative decision by the Authority 
undergoes political scrutiny by the Council and the Parliament. 

The Authority itself is not mandated to initiate a verification procedure. Instead, it needs to turn to 
the European Commission, Parliament and the Council. Once the procedure is lodged, the Authority 
needs to consult the  independent committee of eminent persons, in a  first step. This advisory 
committee was  established for  precisely  that purpose under Article 11  of  the  regulation. The 
committee's opinion 'shall give full consideration to the fundamental right of freedom of association 
and to the need to ensure pluralism of political parties in Europe'. On the basis of the committee's 
(non-binding) opinion, the Authority decides whether the party or foundation in question should 
be removed from the register. However, the Authority's decision constitutes merely the end of the 
administrative procedure; a political procedure is yet to follow. 

Both the European Parliament and the Council have the power to veto any Authority decision to 
deregister a party or foundation on the grounds of non-compliance with the EU's fundamental 
values, by raising objections in accordance with their internal decision-making rules. In the case of 
the Parliament, these internal procedures are laid down in Rule 235(4) of the Rules of Procedure. A 
deregistration decision by the Authority is only upheld if neither Parliament nor the Council raise 
objections. The current procedure is designed so that a  party's de-registration on grounds of a 
breach  of  values  ultimately becomes a  political  decision  (rather than  an  administrative one). 
intricate',  suggesting  that 
Academic  research  deems  this  procedure  'too  complex  and 
Regulation 1141/2014 failed to give the Authority 'a real power over the ultimate outcome of the 
procedure'. 82 

The request to launch the verification procedure must come from the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Commission or the Member State where the party/foundation has its seat.83 
For instance, the European Parliament may request to lodge the procedure under its own initiative, 
or following a reasoned request from a group of at least 50 citizens, provided the President of the 
European  Parliament  deems  the  request  admissible. 84 Up  until  now,  the  values  compliance 

82   Grasso  and Perrone, pp. 679 and  687. 
83   On the question of non-compliance  with Member States' requirements, see Grasso and  Perrone, pp. 681-686. 
84   European  Parliament, Rules of Procedure, rule 235(2) and (3). 

28 

 
 
 
                                                             
Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 

procedure, which has been in  place  since 2017,  has  never  been  triggered, 85  despite concerns 
regarding backsliding developments in some Member States regarding values and the rule of law.  

Although the regulation includes a firm commitment to party pluralism and freedom of association, 
the  values  compliance  mechanism stirred a  controversial  debate  as  to  whether it  could  be 
perceived  as  primarily targeting right-wing populist parties. 86 Concerns along these lines  had 
already been voiced during the negotiations on Regulation 2004/2003. In light of these discussions, 
academic John Morijn (University of Groningen) argues that the verification procedure has inherent 
limitations in  its design, as it  targets illiberal  European political parties as  a whole,  rather than 
individual illiberal parties that are component members of a European party.87  

The  European Commission's 2019  communication on the rule  of  law  indicated  that European 
political  parties have begun to reflect on  'whether parties which challenge the rule  of law  and 
common EU values should be excluded' from European parties.88 In this respect, the communication 
calls on European political parties to ensure that their national members pay due regard to the 
respect of the rule of law. 89  

3.2. Funding of European parties and foundations 

Public funding is considerably the most important source of income for European political parties 
and foundations, but as explained, a certain percentage must also be raised from private sources. 
This chapter discusses how EU funding has evolved since 2004; the effect of the distribution key (i.e. 
the formula on which the distribution of the EU funds is based); and issues related to parties' and 
foundations' efforts to secure a sufficient level of own resources. 

3.2.1. EU funding levels over time 
European political parties have been entitled to annual funding from the EU budget since 2004, and 
their  associated foundations since 2007.  Technically,  the  funding  is  part of  the  administrative 
expenditure of the European Parliament (budget items 4 0 2 and 4 0 3). 

As  Figure 3  illustrates, the  total  amount of  EU  funding for  European parties has  significantly 
increased over time, from an initial €6.5 million in 2004, to €46 million in 2021. The funding reached 
a peak in  the 2019  election year, when an envelope of €50 million was earmarked for European 
parties. 90 The following year saw the first ever decrease, whereas for 2021, the trend again reversed. 

85   A different, simpler procedure to verify a European  party's compliance with EU values existed under the former Party 
Regulation 2004/2003, entrusting the examination to the European  Parliament. This  procedure was launched  for the 
first time in 2013, against two (formerly recognised) European parties (European  Alliance of National Movements and 
the European  Alliance for Freedom).  The procedure was  closed because  the competent committee (AFCO)  found  it 
had  not enough  evidence to come to an assessment.  See minutes of the Conference of Presidents, 10 October 2013. 
Another  investigation  against  the  far-right  party  Alliance  for  Peace  and  Freedom  was  carried  out  in  2016,  see 
European  Parliament  press  release,  12  May  2016.  The  representatives  of  the  party  were  heard  by  AFCO  in 
February 2017, however, in this case, the Committee of Independent Eminent Persons never submitted their opinion, 
as its mandate  under the previous Regulation 2004/2003 had expired. Cases  described in Grasso  and Perrone, p. 681. 
86   For an in-depth discussion  of the values compliance mechanism  see J. Morijn, 'Responding  to 'populist' politics at EU 
level: Regulation 1141/2014 and beyond',  International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 17(2), 2019, pp. 617–640. 

87   Morijn, Responding  to 'populist'  politics, pp.  634-635. 
88   COM(2019) 343, Strengthening the rule of law within the Union: A blueprint for action, p. 2. 
89  
90   The effective outturn was eventually slightly lower, namely € 47.5 million. 

Idem., p. 12. 

29 

 
 
 
                                                             
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

Similarly, the budget allocation for European foundations encountered a steady upwards trend, 
from  €5 million  in  2008,  to  €23 million  in  2021.  On  average, the  appropriations reserved for 
foundations amount to half of those for parties. 

Figure 3 – Level of EU funding  for European parties and foundations   

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

appropriations parties (mio €)

appropriations foundations (mio €)

Source: EPRS, based on Eurlex. 

3.2.2. Maximum funding amounts for 2021  
The annual budget amount is distributed to eligible parties in two steps: 10 % of the total sum is 
distributed in equal shares, while the remaining 90 %  is divided in  proportion to the number of 
Members of the European Parliament affiliated to a party.  

For the budget allocation for 2021 – totalling €46 million –  the 10 parties eligible for EU funding 
receive each a lump sum of 1 %, i.e. €460 000. The lion's share of 90 % – amounting to maximum 
€41.4 million in 2021 – is distributed to the parties according to their representation in the European 
Parliament. As of September 2020, the reference date for funding attribution, 607 Members of the 
European  Parliament  were  members  of  a  European  political  party. 91  Membership  varies 
substantially, ranging from 174 Members of the European Parliament currently representing the 
largest European political party, the European People's Party (EPP), to 4 Members supporting the 
smallest party, the European Christian Political Movement (ECPM).  

In  the current system, the determination of the maximum contribution awarded to a European 
political party depends on a number of factors: 

the total funding amount set out in the EU's general budget; 
the number of registered parties applying for funding; 
the Members of the European  Parliament affiliated to  European political  parties (individual 
Members per party  and  the  collective total); the current minimum  threshold is  set  at  one 
Member; 
the distribution key; 

  and the funding amount for which the party has applied.  

91   607 of  705 Members of  the  European  Parliament  (post-Brexit  number  of  seats).  This  list, provided  by  Parliament's 
Directorate-General  for  Finance  (DG FINS),  served  as  the  basis  for  the  calculation  of  the  2021  contributions  to 
European  parties and grants  to European  foundations.   

30 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
 
Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 

Following consideration of these factors, the maximum contribution to be awarded to European 
political  parties for the 2021  financial year amounts to €43.4 million (instead of the €46 million 
earmarked). As for European political  foundations, the maximum grants awarded to them are 
calculated in analogy. Table 6 lists the maximum funding per party. 

Table 6 – Maximum EU funding  awarded to European parties and foundations  in 2021 

European party 

Maximum 
contribution 
awarded 
(€ million) 

Number of 
Members of 
the 
European 
Parliament 
affiliated 

European foundation 

Maximum  
grant  
awarded  
(€ million) 

European People's Party (EPP) 

12.3 

174 

Wilfried Martens Centre 
for European Studies 

Party of European Socialists 
(PES) 

Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe Party 
(ALDE) 

Identity and Democracy Party 
(ID) 

8.1 

5.3 

4.6 

European Green Party (EGP) 

4.3 

European Conservatives and 
Reformists Party (ECR) 

4.1 

139 

Foundation for European 
Progressive Studies 

71 

61 

57 

54 

European Liberal Forum 
(ELF) 

Identity and Democracy 
Foundation 

Green Europe 
Foundation 

New Direction – 
Foundation for European 
Reform 

6.2 

5 

2.7 

2.3 

2.2 

2.1 

Party of the European Left (EL) 

1.8 

29 

Transform Europe 

1.2 

European Free Alliance (EFA) 

1.1 

European Democratic Party 
(EDP) 

European Christian Political 
Movement (ECPM) 

0.9 

0.7 

9 

9 

4 

total 

43.4 

607 

Source: European Parliament, DG FINS.  

Coppieters Foundation 

0.5 

Institute of European 
Democrats 

Sallux 

0.5 

0.4 

23 

31 

 
 
 
 
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

Although the lump sum (i.e. the 10 % disbursed in equal shares) ensures that smaller parties which 
are represented in Parliament with only a few Members have a certain minimum income to run their 
operations, the current distribution key of the split-envelope system is said to favour bigger parties. 
Under the current rules, the two biggest parties receive nearly half of the total budget allocations.92 
(See Figure 4 for 2021 budget year.) 93 

Figure 4 – Percentage of European Parliament funding  per European party (2021) 

Source: EPRS, based on data from the European Parliament, DG FINS. 

Distribution key under discussion 
Prior to the 2018 amendment of Regulation 1141/2014, EU funding was disbursed according to a 
distribution key of 15:85. This key had been more advantageous for smaller parties. The current key 
of 10:90,  introduced in 2018,  was  a compromise achieved during the negotiations; initially, the 
Commission had proposed a key of 5:95, arguing it would lead to a better reflection of electoral 
representation in Parliament. 94 

Views are divided on the design of the distribution key. Under the current system, the 90 % share is 
allocated according to the electoral representation of European parties in the European Parliament, 
hence the level of the fixed share is a major budget factor for smaller parties that are represented by 
only a  few  Members. Ultimately, it is  a  matter of political  choice  whether EU  party funding  is 
disbursed in proportion to the election results, as the Commission proposal maintained, or whether 
it should rather promote creating 'a level playing field between parties', as a recent ideas paper 

92   For  a  historical  overview  of  the allocation  of  funds  per  European  political  party  and  foundation  since  2004, see 
European  Parliament, Funding  from  the European  Parliament to  European  political parties per party  and  per  year, 
DG FINS,  2021. 

93   This graph is based on the calculated maximum funding ('appropriations').  The final funding disbursed ('outturn') may 
be slightly lower. Full transparency on the funding amounts  for individual European  political parties and foundations 
is ensured via the European  Parliament's annual  report. See here the report for 2021 for parties and  foundations. 

94   COM(2017) 481, explanatory memorandum,  p. 5. 

32 

 
 
 
                                                             
 
Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 

argues. 95 This paper proposed increasing the lump sum to as much as 20 or 25 %, in order to alleviate 
the  financial  situation of  smaller  and  newer  parties.  In  much  the  same  vein,  the  Coppieters 
Foundation, which is the political foundation of the European Free Alliance – a European party made 
up of various regionalist, separatist and ethnic minority parties across Europe – suggested to raise 
the key to 10-15 % for foundations, to promote party pluralism and ensure that 'all political ideas 
have  an  opportunity to operate and  develop',  which  would  be  particularly important for the 
representation of  structural minorities in  Europe. 96 Another study  suggested granting newly 
established parties a higher lump sum in the beginning, for a limited period of time. 97 

Eligibility criteria: Representation in Parliament 
Under the current rules, a European political party is eligible for EU funding on condition that it is 
represented by at least one  Member holding a  seat  in  the  European Parliament. This funding 
criterion has been contested ever since, including within Parliament, as is apparent from various 
committee and plenary debates. Some political groups in Parliament find the threshold too low and 
push for an increase to, for instance, three Members, arguing 'one-man parties' would not express 
the political will of EU citizens. Conversely, other groups reject any change, maintaining this could 
eliminate smaller parties; the registration requirements would anyway already ensure the party's 
support through citizens in at least seven EU Member States. 

The 2011 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Office for Democratic Institutions 
and  Human  Rights  (OSCE/ODIHR)  Guidelines  on  political  party  regulation 98  state  that  high 
thresholds for public funding 'may be detrimental to political pluralism and small political parties', 
arguing that having 'a lower  threshold for public funding than the  electoral threshold for the 
allocation of a mandate in parliament' would boost political pluralism. In a similar vein, the European 
Commission appears reluctant to changing the current system, raising concerns that this might 
'unduly  limit  the  pluralistic  nature  of  European  politics'. 99  In  addition,  former  European 
Commissioner Julian King  emphasised  the  principles  of  proportionality and  equal  treatment, 
arguing 'the rules on party funding should not tilt the balance in favour of incumbents, compared 
with new political movements'.100 

The EESC would favour an entirely different system, arguing that the current representation criterion 
of  one  Member  of  the  European  Parliament  would  not  be  'appropriate  given  that  voting 
procedures – and thus the conditions for success – vary widely between Member States'. 101 Instead, 
it suggested, as an alternative threshold, the requirement that a European political party should 
have  obtained at least  one  million  votes across at  least seven  countries at the  last  European 
elections,  thereby  taking  inspiration  from  the  threshold  established  for  European  Citizens' 
Initiatives. 102  

95   Louis  Drounau,  A smarter funding  system  for European  parties, Österreichische Gesellschaft für Europapolitik,  ÖGfE 

Policy Brief 01/202, p. 7. 

96   Coppieters Foundation,  Contribution to the European Commission's  public consultation on the roadmap  for revising 

regulation 1141/2014, 22.3.2021. 

97   Van Hacke [et al.],  p. 45. 
98   OSCE  Office for Democratic Institutions and  Human Rights (ODIHR), Guidelines on Political Party Regulation, adopted 

by the Venice Commission  on 15-16 October 2010, para. 185. 

99   COM(2017) 481, p. 5. 
100   Then-Commissioner  Julian King in the plenary debate of 15 March 2017. 
101   EESC,  Opinion SC/036 on the funding of European  political parties, 13 February 2013, points 4.1 and  4.2. 
102   See Regulation 2019/788 of 17 April 2019 on the European citizens' initiative. 

33 

 
 
 
                                                             
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

In  current practice, however, even the least represented European political party eligible  for EU 
funding – the European Christian Political Movement – is represented by four Members.  

3.2.3. Level of co-financing 
Public  funding is by far the most important source of income for European political parties and 
foundations. However, to qualify for funding from the EU  budget, parties and foundations must 
generate some of their income from private sources. The rationale behind the requirement to secure 
own resources is twofold: first, raising private funds avoids exclusive reliance on public funding; and 
second, it brings European parties closer to their member parties and citizens. 

Under the current legal framework, the required level of own resources – also referred to as co-
financing threshold – is set at 10 % for European parties and 5 % for foundations. This threshold has 
been  adjusted twice in  the past. While  the  first Party Regulation 2004/2003 stipulated that EU 
funding should not exceed 75 % of a party's annual budget, thus obliging parties to collect 25 % on 
their own, the 2007 amendment lowered the co-funding threshold to 15 %. However, practically all 
parties and foundations have encountered difficulties to reach the threshold in the past, as the 
European  Parliament's  Director-General  for  Finances  stated  in  2017, 103  with  three  political 
foundations going into liquidation.104 Against this background, the 2018 amendment brought the 
threshold down to 10 % for parties and 5 % for foundations. Nonetheless, it appears that parties 
continue to struggle to acquire the necessary level of own resources, especially smaller ones with 
few member parties. 

Table 7 – Co-funding requirements over time 

Legal basis 

Maximum EU funding 

Required own resources 

parties 

foundations 

parties 

foundations 

Regulation 2004/2003 

75 % 

n/a 

25 % 

n/a 

2007 amendment and  
Regulation 1141/2014 

2018 amendment 

Source: EPRS based  on Eurlex data. 

85 % 

15 % 

90 % 

95 % 

10 % 

5 % 

Typically, larger parties with many members would have a steady income from membership fees. 
However, any increase in  public  funding obliges parties and foundations to collect more own 
resources proportionally. Therefore, keeping pace with the rise in EU funds over the last years has 
proved challenging even for larger parties. Since the 2018  financial year, the total amount of EU 
funding has risen from €32.5 million in 2018, to €46 million in 2021 (i.e. 41 %) for European parties. 
The 2019 election year saw an all-time high level  of funding at €50 million. For foundations, the 
increase was slightly more moderate at 19 % (from €19.3 million in 2018, to €23 million). 

103   Didier Klethi, the European Parliament's Director-General for Finances,  in an AFCO meeting, 12.7.2017. 
104   EU Observer, New EU party finance rules short circuit accountability, 19 April 2018. 

34 

 
 
 
                                                             
Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 

Figure 5 – Increase in EU funding  for European parties and foundations  (since 2018) 

60

40

20

0

2018

2019

2020

2021

parties (mio €)

foundations  (mio €)

Source: EPRS, based on Eurlex. 

In practice, the co-funding threshold can put parties under strain: if they fail to collect sufficient own 
resources, they automatically receive less public funding, as the amount of EU funding is lowered 
until it corresponds to 90 % of the total expenditure (95 % for foundations). 105 Against this backdrop, 
parties  have  previously sought creative  solutions, leading  to  'questionable practices',  as  the 
European Court of Auditors observed, such as loans at advantageous conditions to finance parties' 
operational activities  or  contributions in  kind,  the  value  of  which  was  difficult  to  assess.106 
Parliament's financial services also confirmed abuses and challenges linked to contributions in 
kind. 107 Other dubious practices uncovered were linked to conflicts of interest and retrospectively 
paid commissions. 

From a  case brought before the  ECJ (T-118/17,  IDDE  v  Parliament)  it emerged that a  European 
foundation circumvented the rules on  co-financing  through a  system that awarded contracts 
against donations, in order to meet the own-resources threshold. This case is discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter 3.2.8. 

Regarding the amount a European party can raise in own resources, the ceilings for contributions 
and donations differ. While for donations an individual cap applies (€18 000 per year and per donor), 
the ceiling applicable to the entirety of contributions from members is set at 40 % of the European 
party's annual budget (Article 20(7)). 108  

Also with regard to parties' own resources; that the EU system, contrary to some national systems, 
does not incentivise parties to raise own resources, has been criticised. 109 For instance, Germany and 
the Netherlands operate reward systems, where every euro a party raises from private sources is 
topped up by a pre-defined amount from the public purse.  

105   Wolfs and  Smulders, p.  198. 

106   ECA,  Opinion 5/2017, para. 11 and  12. 
107   D. Klethi, the European  Parliament's Director-General for Finances,  in an AFCO meeting, 12.7.2017. 
108   The 40 % ceiling applies in analogy  also to foundations. 
109   Drounau,  p.  9. The author provides the example of Germany,  where parties obtain a bonus  (i.e. a lump sum of €0.45) 

for every euro raised. 

35 

 
 
 
 
                                                             
 
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

3.2.4. Donations, contributions and membership-related questions 
Donations and contributions 
Focusing on parties' own resources, the regulation governs contributions and donations only. Other 
sources of income also exist, but they are not covered as a separate category in the current legal 
framework.  These  include,  for  instance,  participation  fees  for  events  and  training,  project 
contributions, the sale of books and other publications, consulting operations, legacies, or similar. 
Quantitatively, and compared to contributions and donations, these sources appear to play a minor 
role in parties' accounts.  

According to the definition provided in Article 2(7) and (8), contributions are to be understood as 
payments from  members, whereas  donations originate  from  non-members. This  delineation 
appears unambiguous in theory, however, certain grey zones emerge in the practical application, 
especially with regard to payments from third countries.  

Judging from European parties' financial statements for the 2019 financial year, the predominant 
category of own resources are contributions received from national member parties.110 This matches 
with the conceptualisation of European political parties as 'parties of parties'. In comparison, only 
few  parties generate noteworthy income from individual membership fees. 111 While  individual 
membership (of natural persons) has been admissible since 2007 112 – and most European parties 
have indeed extended membership to individuals in  their statutes, albeit under greatly varying 
terms and conditions113 – it has never become a mass phenomenon. The Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe Party (ALDE) appears to be the only European political party that is actively 
promoting individual membership, in an endeavour to develop 'from a network of liberal parties 
into a fully-fledged European political party'.114 The table below illustrates how marginal individual 
membership is for most European parties, according to parties' self-reported data, compiled by the 
Authority. 

110   This is true for all but one of the 10 currently registered parties: the European Christian Political Movement acquires a 

higher amount  in donations  than in membership contributions.  

111   For this chapter,  two types of documents  were examined, both  for 2019, which is the latest available  financial  year: 
1) the financial  statements of all European  parties and  foundations;  and  2) the list of contributions and  donations,  as 
compiled by the Authority. The former are available on a dedicated European  Parliament webpage,  and the latter on 
the Authority's website. However, 2019 may not be entirely representative, as it was an election year. 

112   Article 6(3) of Regulation 1524/2007 amending Regulation 2004/2003. A list of the number of individual members per 

European  political party is provided on Parliament's website, in accordance with Article 32(2). 

113   I. Hertner, 'United in diversity? Europarties and  their individual members' rights', Journal of European integration, Vol. 

41(4), pp.  497-498. 

114   Hertner, p. 492. 

36 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 

Table 8 – Number of individual members per European political party (as per May 2020) 

European political party 

Number of individual members 

Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Party (ALDE) 

Party of the European Left (EL) 

European Conservatives and Reformists Party (ECR) 

European Green Party (EGP) 

European Christian Political Movement (ECPM) 

European People's Party (EPP) 

European Democratic Party (EDP) 

European Free Alliance (EFA) 

Identity and Democracy Party (ID) 

Party of European Socialists (PES) 

1 340 

410 

55 

55 

35 

16 

3 

3 

3 

0 

Source: European Parliament. 

Under Article 20(9)  of  Regulation 1141/2014, contributions by individual members of  parties or 
foundations are  allowed,  up  to  an  annual  total  of  €18 000  per  member,  but  –  contrary to 
contributions  from  legal persons and donations from individuals –  disclosure of  the member's 
identity is not required. This has been flagged in a recent European Parliament committee hearing 
as a loophole in the current regulation that could be  used by intermediaries to circumvent the 
transparency requirements applicable to donations by funnelling donations into a European party 
under the guise of individual contributions. 115 In this context, it was also stated that it is difficult to 
assess whether all contributors pay on their own behalf. 

Compared to contributions, the level of  donations was generally low in the 2019  financial year, 
which is somewhat surprising for an election year. Larger parties with high numbers of fee-paying 
member parties appear especially able to secure sufficient funds through members' contributions 
and depend less (or not at all) on donations to match the threshold for EU grants. Only the accounts 
of  two  European parties showed a significant income  from donations: the European Christian 
Political Movement (ECPM) and the European Conservatives and Reformists Party (ECR). Conversely, 
three parties declared not to have received any donations in 2019, and the accounts of three further 
parties listed donations of a low total value (under €3 000). Turning to foundations, contributions by 
member associations constituted the largest part of the foundations' own resources, although for 
most foundations (including also some larger ones), donations also appeared to be an important 
source of income. Three foundations declared not to have received any donations. 

As  a  general  observation,  the  published  financial  statements  and  accounts  of  parties  and 
foundations lack granularity with regard to contributions and donations, and the use of these two 
income  categories seems blurred in  some  cases (e.g.  payments by members are  listed  under 
donations instead of contributions). In addition, for quite a number of parties and foundations, the 
amounts listed in the 2019 financial statements under 'revenues' differed from the amounts figuring 
in the detailed list of contributions and donations that the Authority compiles (which is based on 

115   Issue raised by Michael Adam,  Director of the Authority, in a hearing of the European  Parliament's Special Committee 

on Foreign Interference (INGE), 23.2.2021. 

37 

 
 
 
                                                             
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

notifications by parties and foundations). This is likely linked to the way financial data are reported 
(i.e. the criteria for and the time of booking revenues). 

Categories of membership 
The  fuzzy  delineation  between  contributions and  donations might  be  related  to  an  unclear 
definition of membership in parties' statutes. Article 4(2) of the Party Regulation concedes that 
parties may have different types of membership, as long as they define them in their statutes, and 
provided the statutes comply with the applicable law of the Member State in which they have their 
seat (Article 4(1)), which is Belgium, for the majority of these parties and foundations. 116 Moreover, 
in accordance with the principle of the primacy of EU law, membership categories must also comply 
with the party regulation.  

Trying to understand the multitude of membership categories is a daunting task, as terminology 
and  definition  varies  considerably across parties. Terms  used  include:  ordinary members, full 
members,  associated  members,  affiliate  members,  observer  members,  candidate  members, 
supporting members, individual members, member associations etc., and the exact  meaning of 
these membership categories may alter from one party to another. For instance, some European 
parties limit full membership to national party members from within the EU, while others also allow 
parties from third countries to acquire full membership. The different membership categories have 
implications for the membership fees that European political parties receive from their members, as 
the party statutes tend to attach different fee obligations to the different membership types.  

Third-country party membership: ECJ ruling of November 2020 
While the regulation strictly forbids donations originating from third countries, it is silent on the 
legality  of  the  contributions parties and  foundations receive  from  their  members in  non-EU 
countries. Given the traditional – and legitimate – interest of parties and foundations to maintain 
close ties with like-minded partner organisations in other European countries (in particular in the 
Western Balkans, the European Neighbourhood and the European Economic Area), 117 and even 
beyond Europe, their statutes generally allow for membership from outside the EU. Until the entry 
into force of Regulation 1141/2014, it  was common practice for non-EU members to contribute 
membership fees to the revenues of European political parties. 

Most recently, the European  Court  of Justice judgment  issued on 25 November 2020 in Case 
T-107/19,  ACRE  v  Parliament 118  has  contributed  to  clarifying  the  question  as  to  how  far 
contributions from  members outside  the  EU  are  admissible.  In  a  nutshell,  this  ECJ  ruling  is 
remarkable, as it interprets the Party Regulation in a restrictive manner, so that contributions from 
third country members are to be considered as donations. In the case in point, the European political 
party the  Alliance  of  Conservatives and  Reformists in  Europe  (ACRE)  challenged  Parliament's 
decision regarding the party's expenditure and accounts for the 2017  financial year. The Court 
explored, inter alia, whether a payment of a substantial amount that ACRE had received from one of 

116   Only two European  parties and three foundations  have  their seat in Member States other than Belgium, namely: the 
Identity and Democracy Party, and its affiliated foundation  Association pour l'Identité et Démocratie Fondation (both 
based  in  France);  European  Christian  Political Movement,  and  its  affiliated  foundation  Sallux  (both  based  in  the 
Netherlands); and  the Green European Foundation  (Luxembourg). 

117   On  the  role  of  European  political  parties  as  foreign  policy  actors  see  Chryssogelos  A.,  'Europarties  in  the 
neighbourhood:  how  transnational  party  politics  bind  Eastern  Europe  and  the  Western  Balkans  to  the  EU', 
Comparative European Politics, Vol. 19(1), 2021, pp. 77-93. 

118   ECJ  Case  T-107/19  Alliance of Conservatives  and Reformists  in Europe  (ACRE)  v  Parliament,  judgment  of  the General 

Court issued on 25 November 2020, para. 150-175. 

38 

 
 
 
                                                             
Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 

its non-EU member parties –Armenia, in the case in question – was to be considered a contribution 
or a donation.  

Given that these proceedings referred to the 2017 financial year, the applicable legal framework was 
the  first  Party  Regulation 2004/2003. This  is  important to  note, since,  contrary to the  current 
Regulation 1141/2014, the former regulation did not in principle prohibit donations from abroad, 
but set a  general ceiling  for donations at €12 000. (Under the current regulation, donations are 
capped at €18 000 and prohibited if originating from outside the EU). The Court reasoned that the 
Armenian party 'was not a 'political party' within the meaning' of Regulation 2004/2003, since, 'in 
order to be classified as a 'political party', it would need to be 'recognised by, or established in 
accordance with, the legal order of at least one Member State'. The Court therefore concluded that 
the payment from the Armenian party 'did not constitute an eligible contribution', thereby following 
Parliament's argument to reclassify the contribution as a donation. It then ordered ACRE to repay 
the difference between the donation and the €12 000 permitted, to the Armenian party. 

ACRE further claimed that Parliament's decision would be  discriminatory in the light of  foreign 
contributions paid to a European political foundation likewise exceeding the threshold of €12 000. 
On this  point the Court also followed  Parliament's argumentation that 'the rules applicable  to 
donations or contributions to foundations are more permissive than those applicable to parties', 
and that 'consequently, the administration monitors political parties at European level to a greater 
extent in so far as the latter are at the forefront of the political activities'.  

The  Court's judgment in case  T-107/19  raises concerns, since  European political parties have a 
legitimate interest in maintaining strong relationships with their like-minded partners outside the 
EU. Therefore, when the European Parliament adopted its resolution on stocktaking following the 
European elections the day after the General Court's ruling in the case in question, it included a 
political  statement concerning membership contributions from third countries, recommending 
'that membership fees from parties from Council of Europe countries could be allowed with a view 
to fostering pan-European political bonds, provided that this takes place within  a framework of 
enhanced transparency'. 119 Given the tension between the ECJ ruling and the declared need for 
European parties to maintain close links with national parties from countries outside the EU – post-
Brexit, this includes national parties from the United Kingdom – the forthcoming revision of the 
party framework might add clarification on this point. In any case, the ECJ ruling did not question 
the need for European parties to have close links with parties outside the EU; it merely interpreted 
the question of the membership payments. 

3.2.5. Loans 
In  a  2017  AFCO  committee meeting,  the  European Parliament's Director-General for  Finance 
testified  that  annual audits  had  shown  that European political  parties  and  foundations  were 
increasingly taking out loans to reach the own-resources requirements. This could consequently 
entail a risk of bankruptcy for some parties and foundations. 120 Since the financial year 2018 - first 
year of application of Regulation 1141/2014 - parties and foundations receive pre-financing of 100 % 
(before: 80 %). In addition, the 2018 amendment of the regulation resulted in higher Union funding 
rates of eligible expenditure (in place from financial year 2019), namely 90 % for parties and 95 % for 
foundations (instead of 85 % for both parties and foundations). Both measures reduced financing 
needs from other sources; however, they could only mitigate, but not solve bankruptcy risks. 

119   European  Parliament resolution T9-0327/2020 on stocktaking of European  elections, 26.11.2020, point 29. 
120   D. Klethi, European  Parliament, Director-General for Finances,  in an AFCO meeting, 12.7.2017. 

39 

 
 
 
                                                             
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

Neither Regulation 1141/2014 nor its 2018 amendment regulate loans as a means for parties and 
foundations to finance their operations. Loans are only referred to in  Article 2(7)  and (8), in  the 
provisions defining what constitutes  a donation or contribution; loans below  market value  are 
explicitly referred to in the definition.  

The European Court of Auditors looked at loans from a very specific angle, emphasising risks related 
to loans in the context of party financing.121 It pointed out that a lack of specific provisions on loans, 
their sources and their terms and conditions in the EU legal framework governing the funding of 
European political parties might lead to parties circumventing rules on donations and contributions 
through receiving loans at particularly advantageous conditions. In a similar vein, the OECD pointed 
to the fact that certain types of loans might potentially be considered as 'hidden private funding'.122  

The 2011 OSCE/ODIHR Guidelines on political party regulation deem loans admissible as a means of 
party financing in principle, as long as transparency rules are observed and the loans are adequately 
reflected  in  the  financial  reports. However,  if  loans  are  granted at  particularly advantageous 
conditions, possibly written-off by the creditor, or if they are reimbursed by a third party, the loan 
should be considered a contribution (in-kind or financial). 123 

Press coverage and academic research has brought a number of cases of dubious loans regarding 
political parties at the level of Member States to light.124 Parliament addressed this issue in its recent 
resolution on foreign interferences, 125 stating that 'foreign actors have found ways to circumvent 
[restrictions in place] and have offered support to their allies by taking out loans with foreign banks.' 
The resolution made reference to a number of cases of foreign funding at the national level. A recent 
external study commissioned by the European Parliament concludes that 'loans with foreign banks 
is only one of many ways in which foreign funding has been channelled to support political parties, 
sidestepping the extant legal  regulations'.126 This topic was  also further explored in  an  expert 
intervention in a recent INGE/AFCO hearing.127  

3.3. Spending irregularities 

3.3.1. Verification of spending: An outline of the funding procedure 
Contributions and grants from  the  EU  budget are  awarded  to  European political  parties and 
foundations at the beginning of the financial year; with the beneficiaries receiving pre-financing. 
After the end of each financial year, the beneficiaries need to justify the use of the funding granted 
to them ex-post. The accounts of parties and foundations are audited by an independent external 
auditor. In addition, the European Parliament, in cooperation with the Authority, verifies whether 
funding has indeed been used to finance reimbursable expenditure as set out in the initial call for 

121   ECA,  Opinion 1/2013, para. 10; reiterated in Opinion 5/2017, para. 8. 

122   OECD,  Financing democracy:  Funding  of political parties and  election campaigns and the risk of policy capture, 2016, 

pp.  49-50. 

123   OSCE  Office for Democratic Institutions and  Human Rights (ODIHR), Guidelines on Political Party Regulation, adopted 

by the Venice Commission  on 15-16 October 2010, para. 171. 

124   For  a  recent  account,  see  E.  Bressanelli,  Investing  in  destabilisation:  How  foreign  money  is  used    to  undermine 
democracy in the EU, Policy Department, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, European Parliament, 2021. 
125   European  Parliament  resolution  T9-0031/2019  of  10  October  2019  on  foreign  electoral  interference  and 

disinformation in national and European  democratic processes,  Recital 7. 

126   Bressanelli, p. 15. 
127   European  Parliament, Hearing 'How to make political party and  campaign  financing  more transparent: what rules do 
we need in the EU?', organised by Parliament's Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes 
(INGE)  in association  with AFCO, on 23 February 2021. 

40 

 
 
 
                                                             
Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 

contributions (for foundations: call for proposals), and within the limits of Regulation 1141/2014 and 
the EU's Financial Regulation.  

As  to  what  qualifies  as  reimbursable  expenditure,  Article 17(5)  of  the  regulation  indicates 
administrative expenditure and expenditure linked to  technical  assistance, meetings, research, 
cross-border events,  studies,  information and  publications, as  well  as  expenditure  linked  to 
campaigns, within the limits of Article 21 (European Parliament election campaigns) and Article 22 
(prohibition of  funding). More  detailed guidance  is  provided in  the implementing decision  of 
Parliament's Bureau, and in particular in the annexed templates of funding agreements, which give 
a wide range of examples for reimbursable expenditure (for parties) and eligible cost (foundations) 
and also specify what is non-reimbursable. 

If Parliament rejects certain expenditure as ineligible, or if awarded funding remains unused, the 
party or  foundation has to  repay part  of  the  pre-financing. Recovery of  funds is  actually not 
uncommon. The  final  amount of  the  EU  funding  is  determined only  when  the  parties' and 
foundations' annual reports (including the financial statements) have been approved by Parliament 
(Bureau). The final  amount may –  and often does –  differ  from the  pre-financing amount. The 
Authority may perform subsequent checks within its area of responsibility. In particular, it verifies 
that expenditure is not in conflict with the provisions set out in Article 22 of the regulation, i.e. that 
it  is  not used  for (directly or  indirectly) funding of national parties and foundations, elections, 
referendum campaigns or candidates, and that the rules on donations and contributions (Article 20 
of the regulation) are complied with. Any subsequent findings by the Authority may, apart from 
sanctions imposed by the Authority, result in modified final funding decisions by Parliament. 

In addition, the European Court of Auditors (ECA) checks sample transactions in the framework of 
its  regular audit of  the annual accounts of  the EU.  In  this context, annual ECA reports already 
included  observations  regarding  non-compliance  with  the  expenditure  eligibility  rules,  e.g. 
shortcomings in procurement procedures, lack of contractual documents and supporting evidence 
for costs actually incurred. 128 Again, ECA findings may result in Parliament decisions to modify final 
funding amounts. 

128   European  Court of Auditors, 2019 Annual report on the implementation of the EU  budget for the 2019 financial year, 

2020, p. 226. 

41 

 
 
 
                                                             
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

Figure 6 – The funding  procedure, step by step 

• call for contributions (parties) and  call for proposals  (foundations)  published by  the 

European  Parliament

• funding  applications by parties and foundations

• European  Parliament decision on the funding  applications
• includes the provisional funding amount

• funding  agreement between the European Parliament and  European  political 

party/foundation

• payment in form of pre-financing 
• by default in one instalment, unless European  Parliament Bureau decides otherwise

• external audit report (Article 23)

• annual  reports by European parties and foundations
• to be submitted within six months  following the end of the financial year

• control of compliance (Articles 20-25 of the regulation)

• determination of final funding  amount,  based on annual  reports
• calculation against pre-financing  payment (negative balance to be repaid)

• later ex-post controls may  lead to retrospective adjustment of the final funding amounts

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Source: EPRS, based on EP Bureau Decision of 1 July 2019 and Regulation 1141/2014 

3.3.2. 2019 OLAF report 
The latest annual OLAF report129 and case-law of the European Court of Justice give an insight into 
issues encountered with doubtful or even unlawful spending practices by European parties and 
foundations.130 It should be noted however, given that 2018 was the first financial year where the 
accounts of parties and foundations were checked under Regulation 1141/2014 and involving the 
European Parliament and the Authority, all cases outlined here below refer to funding under the 
previous Regulation 2004/2003. 

In  the  case  of  a,  meanwhile  defunct,  European  party  and  its  affiliated  foundation,  OLAF's 
investigation unveiled that their members used funding from the European Parliament 'to obtain 
unlawful gains for themselves or for others'. Furthermore, OLAF found 'that the rules linked to the 

129   European  Commission,  The OLAF report 2019, 2020, p. 23. 
130   Given that regulation 1141/2014 became applicable only  in January  2017, most  cases  relate to the legal framework 

established under the preceding regulation, 2004/2003. 

42 

 
 
 
 
                                                             
Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 

awarding of  the  grants by  the  Parliament were  frequently disregarded, resulting in  unlawful, 
irregular and ineligible spending of the money'. At the time of OLAF's investigation, the party in 
question and its affiliated foundation were in liquidation, which made it difficult for Parliament to 
recover the amounts incorrectly spent. To strengthen Parliament's position in such cases, OLAF 
recommended that staff approving unlawful expenditure within the party or foundation should be 
held personally responsible for the damage they cause to the EU budget, so that Parliament could 
recover the money from them. 

The same report described another investigation OLAF conducted against a European party and 
foundation that were suspected to have used 'a substantial part of the grant awarded to it by the 
Parliament' to indirectly fund national political parties, which is explicitly prohibited. OLAF further 
revealed that that party also made payments to a  Belgian company in a  situation of conflict  of 
interest. In addition, the affiliated foundation was found to have used some of its expenditure in a 
way  OLAF considered to  be  indirect  financing  of  a  national political  party and  a  referendum 
campaign in a Member State. For the following year, the party and foundation in question failed to 
submit  their  final  expenditure  reports  to  Parliament.  Consequently,  Parliament  requested 
repayment of the total amount of prepaid financing, in order to recover the funds. According to 
OLAF, the total amount Parliament sought to recover for both financial years was over €1.9 million. 
At the time the OLAF report was published, the criminal investigation was still ongoing. 

3.3.3. Case-law 
Case  T‑829/16,  Mouvement  pour  une  Europe  des  nations  et  des  libertés  v 
Parliament131 
This  case  concerns indirect  funding  of  national parties.  In  2015,  the  European political  party 
Mouvement pour une Europe des nations et  des libertés (which  today is  known as  Identité et 
Démocratie Parti) conducted a campaign concerning immigration in the context of the Schengen 
Agreement in France  and  Belgium. The  French version of  the  campaign poster displayed the 
European party's logo, together with 'Front National', whereas the Dutch version of that poster 
showed the logo of the Vlaams Belang, together with the European party's logo. The European party 
claimed that the campaign was run on an EU scale, but failed to provide evidence for this. 

Parliament considered  the  campaign  expenditure ineligible  for  EU  funding, arguing  it  would 
constitute 'indirect funding  of  two  national political  parties'. The  European party in  question 
challenged this decision before the ECJ. The General Court ruled 'that indirect funding exists where 
a national political party derives a financial advantage, inter alia by avoiding expenditure which it 
would have had to incur, even where no funds are directly transferred'. The Court therefore declared 
the expenses related to the campaign as ineligible and dismissed the claim. The party's subsequent 
appeal against the ECJ ruling was rejected. 132 

Case T-118/17, IDDE v Parliament133 
In this case, press reports of November 2016 134 unveiled that the (by now defunct) Institute for Direct 
Democracy  (IDDE),  which  was  the  foundation  of  the  (equally  dissolved)  Alliance  for  Direct 

131   Case T‑829/16, Mouvement pour une Europe des nations and des libertés v Parliament, judgment of 27 November 2018. 
132   Case C‑60/19 P, Mouvement pour une Europe des nations and des libertés v Parliament, order of 25 September 2019. 
133   ECJ  Case  T-118/17, IDDE v  Parliament, judgment of 8 February  2018. See also press  article: Ukip group  fails in bid to 
restore  EU  funding  amid  fraud  inquiry:  Institute  for  Direct  Democracy  denied  funds  as  EU's  anti-fraud  office 
investigates 'irregularities', The Guardian, 19.2.2018. 

134   e.g. Apache,  Eurosceptische partijen versluisden EU-subsidies  naar  eigen land, 3.11. 2016; NRC Handelsblad,  Anti-EU 

partijen zijn goed in misbruiken EU subsidies,  17.11.2016. 

43 

 
 
 
                                                             
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

Democracy in Europe and politically linked to the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), had 
circumvented party finance rules. In  particular, it had an internal financing system in place  that 
awarded contracts against donations. Paid donations helped the foundation to reach the threshold 
of own resources to be eligible for EU funding (15 % at the time), while donors received contracts in 
turn  that exceeded  the  amounts  they  had donated.  Following a  re-examination of  the  2015 
accounts, Parliament suspended the full payment of the grant to IDDE and referred the case to OLAF 
for fraud investigation. 

At about the same time, Parliament decided on the award of grants to political foundations for the 
2017  financial  year.  IDDE  was  granted  financing,  but  in  light  of  the  aforementioned  fraud 
allegations, its payment was suspended pending investigation. The grant would only be paid if the 
alleged irregularities were not established. However, pre-financing would be limited to 33 % of the 
maximum amount (instead of the usual 100 % instalment), and its payment would be conditional 
upon the presentation of a first demand bank guarantee.  

IDDE did not contest Parliament's decision regarding the 2015 grant, but sought annulment of the 
decision regarding its 2017 funding. Moreover, it made an application for interim measures, which 
was dismissed by the Court on 4 July 2017  (T-118/17,  IDDE v  Parliament).  IDDE  argued that the 
decision would breach the principles of good administration and of the right to defence, as it was 
given too little time to respond to Parliament's decision, and moreover assuming bias, as none of 
the 14 Bureau members was a member of a 'Eurosceptic' party. Finally, IDDE contested decision to 
limit the pre-financing to 33 %  of the maximum grant amount and to require a bank guarantee, 
invoking infringement of the principles of equal treatment and of proportionality. In its judgment 
of 8 February 2018, the General Court dismissed all claims as unfounded. 

Case T-48/17 ADDE v Parliament135 
In January 2017, the Alliance for Direct Democracy in Europe (ADDE), the parent European political 
party of the aforementioned IDDE foundation, brought a separate claim before the ECJ  to seek 
annulment of funding decisions taken by the European Parliament. ADDE, which was dominated by 
UKIP, existed between 2014 and 2017.  It declared bankruptcy in April 2017 and dissolved shortly 
after.  

The party had been awarded EU funding for the 2015 financial year. In the ex-post verification of the 
accounts, the  external  auditor considered  parts of  the  expenditure  as  ineligible  for  funding. 
Following additional checks, Parliament declared that even a substantial part of the expenditure 
was ineligible, alleging that ADDE had used parts of the EU grant to fund national political parties 
and a referendum campaign related to Brexit. As a consequence, it asked the party to reimburse an 
amount equalling around one fifth of the final grant. When Parliament decided on the funding of 
political  parties for the  2017  financial  year shortly after, ADDE was  awarded funding, but pre-
financing was limited to one third of the maximum amount of the grant and made conditional to 
the provision of a first demand bank guarantee.  

ADDE requested annulment of the decision relating to its 2015 budget, and of the decision relating 
to its  2017  budget in  so  far as the  restrictions  on pre-financing and the  bank guarantee were 
concerned, which it deemed disproportionate and infringing the principle of equal treatment. The 
General Court rendered its judgment on 7 November 2019, annulling Parliament's 2015 decision, 
while upholding the 2017 decision. With regard to the 2015 decision, the Court pointed out that a 
member of the Bureau had prejudged the issue in  a press release prior to the Bureau decision. 

135   ECJ  Case T-48/17, ADDE v Parliament, judgment of 7 November  2019. This case also received press coverage, see e.g. 
The Guardian, EU  set to ask  Ukip  group  to repay  almost £150,000 in 'misspent  funds',  17.11.2016; Politico, European 
Parliament suspends  UKIP group's  funding over kickbacks  claim, 13.12.2016. 

44 

 
 
 
                                                             
Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 

Moreover, it largely followed ADDE's argument concerning the funding eligibility of a poll held in 
seven European countries that investigated residents' preference for staying in or leaving the EU.  

Conversely, it  rejected  ADDE's  complaint  regarding Parliament's  2017  decision,  arguing  the 
principles of equal treatment and proportionality were not infringed, since Parliament imposed 
similar conditions on six other funding recipients. The Court also noted that in view of the party's 
financial  situation, limiting the pre-financing to  33 %  of  the  total grant and to  require a  bank 
guarantee in order to safeguard Parliament's financial interests was justified. The guarantee would 
ensure potential recovery of the sums disbursed by the Parliament. 

It should be noted that a specific provision in the EU Financial Regulation – introduced at the time 
by Regulation 1142/2014 – allows pre-financing to be limited, setting out that the 'contributions 
shall be paid out in full through one single pre-financing payment, unless, in duly justified cases, the 
authorising officer responsible decides otherwise' (Article 226(4) FR). 

According to the ECJ  case-law database, the Court dismissed four other cases where European 
parties or foundations challenged Parliament's decision to impose a bank guarantee and to limit 
pre-financing to one third of the total grant: 

  Case T-13/17 Europa Terra Nostra v Parliament 
  Case T-16/17 APF v Parliament  
  Case T-54/17 CLF v Parliament 
  Case T-57/17 Pegasus v Parliament. 

Case T-107/19, ACRE v Parliament136 
Already cited in Chapter 3.2.4, with regard to contributions from non-EU party members, which the 
ECJ  qualified as a  donation, this complaint encompassed a number of other arguments, four of 
which related to alleged irregularities in party spending. The proceedings showcase how thin the 
line can be between legal spending and illegal indirect funding of a national party and how difficult 
the assessment can prove. 

The  European political  party, the  Alliance  of  Conservatives and  Reformists in  Europe  (ACRE), 
received a substantial amount in EU funding for the 2017 financial year, equivalent to nearly 80 % 
of the party's total estimated eligible expenditure. Following retrospective checks of the accounts 
by  Parliament's financial services, Parliament found that expenditure for four activities did  not 
qualify for public funding in accordance with Regulation 2004/2003 and ordered the recovery of the 
sums due (totalling roughly €500 000). The expenses related to a survey on the attitudes of minority 
groups in the UK; a UK-Pakistan trade partnership conference held in London; and two conferences 
entitled 'Conservatives International', one held in Miami, Florida, and the other in Kampala, Uganda. 

Regarding the survey, the Court upheld Parliament's argument. It found that the survey was of only 
limited  interest to  the  European political  party,  whilst  it  was  of  obvious use  to  the  national 
Conservative Party in the UK, therefore constituting indirect funding of a political party at national 
level.  

Concerning the second contested activity, the London conference on UK-Pakistan trade, the Court 
argued that while  it  was  entirely  organised and financed by  ACRE, it  solely benefited  the  UK 
Conservative Party and moreover lacked a European dimension. The Court therefore ruled in favour 
of Parliament, upholding the decision to qualify the expenditure as ineligible. 

136   ECJ,  Case  T-107/19, ACRE  v. Parliament, judgment  of 25 November  2020. This  case received also press  coverage, see 

e.g. 'Daniel Hannan's  MEP group told to repay € 535,000 in EU funds',  The Guardian, 13.12.2018. 

45 

 
 
 
                                                             
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

On the contested Miami and Kampala conferences, Parliament maintained that neither conference 
could be attributed to the European party. The documentary evidence provided by ACRE suggested 
'Conservatives International' as the sole organiser of the two conferences, while the ACRE logo was 
not prominently or not at all displayed on the photographic evidence submitted. With regard to the 
Miami conference, the Court found that Parliament's reclassification of the expenses as ineligible for 
funding 'was without error'. Conversely, with regard to the Kampala conference, the Court held that 
'the overall assessment of the evidence undoubtedly leads to the conclusion that the Kampala 
conference  was  organised by  the  applicant'.  Furthermore, it  established that  the  conference 
concerned the EU's external policy and was 'linked to a legitimate objective of the applicant as a 
political party at European level', thus rejecting Parliament's claim. 

In the meantime, the applicant had submitted an application to the Parliament for funding for 2019. 
Based on  a  risk  assessment of ACRE's financial  situation, Parliament considered a risk  of  non-
payment regarding the non-eligible posts. This assumption was based on the high amount of the 
repayment and the fact that it was neither envisaged as a provision, nor covered by the applicants' 
own resources. Therefore, ACRE's funding for the 2019 financial year was made conditional upon 
ACRE having paid back the ineligible 2017 expenditure and the contested Armenian membership 
fee.  Failing  that,  ACRE  would  only  receive  85 %  of  its  total  grant in  2019,  to  guarantee the 
reimbursement of the sums due for the 2017 financial year. This decision was challenged by ACRE. 
The Court annulled Parliament's decision, maintaining it had breached the party's right to defence.  

3.4. Financial reporting and transparency requirements 

Financial reporting obligations 
The regulation sets out that European parties and foundations need to submit their annual financial 
statements in accordance with the law applicable in the Member State in which they have their seat 
and, in addition, also on the basis of international accounting standards. This two-tiered reporting 
obligation was introduced into the regulation upon a suggestion from the ECA,137 to enhance the 
transparency and comparability of financial data. 

However, smaller  European parties and foundations have voiced  their  concerns, arguing that 
reporting in the form of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) comes at a cost. In this 
respect, for instance, the European Free Alliance and its associated Coppieters Foundation argued 
that 'IFRS is  extremely burdensome both administratively and financially, whilst providing little 
added value' to European political parties or the European Parliament. 138 

Transparency requirements 
The regulation sets out vast and detailed transparency requirements for a number of actors, notably 
European parties and foundations; the Authority; and the European Parliament. Article 32 stipulates 
that information regarding the scope of the regulation should be made accessible on a dedicated 
website. In accordance with this provision, the Authority publishes the following information and 
documents on its website: 139 

the names and statutes of registered European political parties and foundations; 

137   ECA,  Opinion 1/2013, para. 18. 
138   EFA,  Contribution  to  the  European  Commission's  public  consultation  on  the  roadmap  for  revising  regulation 
1141/2014, 13.4.2021; Coppieters Foundation, Contribution to the European Commission's  public consultation on the 
roadmap  for revising Regulation 1141/2014, 22.3.2021. 

139   http://www.appf.europa.eu. 

46 

 
 
 
 
                                                             
 
Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 

the Authority's decisions to register and not to register European parties and foundations, and 
to remove them from the register; this information must also be published in the Official Journal 
of the EU; 
the annual financial statements and external audit reports of European parties and foundations, 
and,  for  foundations, the final  reports  on  the implementation of the work programmes or 
actions; 

  data regarding donors and corresponding donations; 
  data regarding contributions from member parties and organisations, including their identity; 

the details of and reasons for final decisions taken by the Authority regarding sanctions and any 
opinions adopted by the Committee of Independent Eminent Persons [none to date];  

  and an updated list of Members of the European Parliament who are members of a European 

political party. 

In addition, the website of the Authority links to information that is made available by the European 
Parliament under the regulation, in particular: 

  an annual report with a table of the amounts paid to each European political party and European 

political foundation, from the EU budget (as contributions or grants), per financial year;  

  a description of the technical support provided to European political parties;  
  an updated list of legal persons who are members of a European political party; 
  and a table indicating the total number of individual members of each European party. 

The  Authority and European Parliament comply with all  the above transparency requirements. 
However, concerning financial information, notably data on contributions and donations received 
by parties and foundations, the Authority itself acknowledged that their submissions vary in depth 
and format. The Authority stated that it would encourage parties to use templates, to ensure a 
'comparable level of granularity of information across all accounts'.140 In a similar vein, researchers 
and investigative journalists bemoan that the data on contributions and donations are not easily 
accessible (portable document format (pdf) only, poor legibility of scanned financial statements), 
and could be more granular and comprehensible. 141 Non-governmental organisation Transparency 
International criticised retrospective publication of information regarding donations, with relatively 
long  reporting delays, and  pointed to  the  common practice  in  many  countries of  publishing 
donations in real-time. 142 Since the 2018 financial year, reporting on donations and contributions 
falls under the responsibility of the Authority, which publishes aggregated lists retrospectively per 
financial year on its website, following notification by the parties and foundations, and following 
verification. Only donations exceeding a value of €12 000 are published as they are notified. This 
appears to be in  line  with the transparency requirements set out in Article 32(1) e) and f) of the 
regulation. 

The  Authority itself is  required to report annually on its activities to the European Parliament, 
Council and the European Commission, in accordance with Article 6(10) of the regulation. It has, to 
date, delivered three such reports, but chose to declare its first two reports (2017 and 2018)  as 
confidential; they were presented to Parliament solely in in camera committee meetings and never 
published. The European Parliament, however, insisted that the annual reports be made public, 

140   Authority, 2019 annual report, p. 13. 
141   A. Katsaitis, 'Following the money: Exploring business  financial contributions to the European Union's political parties', 
Journal of  Common Market  Studies,  Vol.  58(5),  2020, p.  1349; L.  Drounau,  Visualising  donations  and  contributions, 
European  Democracy Consulting,  blogpost,  2021; journalist platform Follow the money. 

142   Kergueno,  2017.  To  be  noted,  this  criticism  related  to  the  reporting  of  donations  under  the  previous 

Regulation 2004/2003. 

47 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

arguing public  reporting would  constitute an  element  of  accountability.143  Subsequently, the 
Authority changed its practice with the 2019 report; it was presented to the AFCO committee on 
28 January 2021 and the Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) on 16 November 2020, in public 
meetings and also made accessible on the Authority's website. This shift in openness was remarked 
upon positively in Parliament's 2021 discharge resolution. 144 

3.5. Role  of  European  political  parties  in  European  Parliament 
elections 

Although participation of a  European party in  elections to  the  European Parliament is  a  pre-
condition for its registration with the Authority, the effective role European parties play in European 
elections remains limited in practice, at least as long as these 'represent the sum of 28 [now 27] 
elections'. 145 In pre-Lisbon Treaty times, European parties remained largely in the background as 
'service  providers  for  national  parties', 146  and  focused  mainly  on  coordinating  the  electoral 
campaigns of their member parties. In addition, they adopted common manifestos (i.e. common 
electoral programmes) ahead of  European elections. The manifestos are, however, considered 
insufficiently known and to have inherent limitations, as they tend to represent the 'lowest common 
denominator' 147 of national party programmes, a reason why national parties might not use them 
for their campaign work. Thus, the manifestos' direct impact on the political debate has remained 
limited, although it was argued that they indirectly force national parties 'to transpose the main 
common positions to the national level'. 148  

Furthermore, candidate selection for European elections remains widely in the hands of national 
parties, as the  question of who  is  entitled  to put  candidates forward in European elections is 
regulated  by  national  Member  State  law.  In  this  respect,  two  initiatives  are  attempting  to 
Europeanise  the  election  process  and  to  involve  citizens  more  directly:  the  idea  to  create 
transnational electoral lists, and the lead candidate process (Spitzenkandidaten process). In the 2014 
and 2019  elections, European political parties became more directly involved through the lead 
candidate system, significantly enhancing their traditional roles by campaigning actively in  the 
Member States. 149 

The  European  Parliament  has  several  times  underlined  that  truly  'Europeanised'  European 
Parliament elections would require a more uniform electoral law. To this end, Parliament has long 
worked towards electoral reform and proposed changes to the 1976 Electoral Act. Its latest formal 
proposal was approved by the Council, albeit in a compromise version that did not take account of 

143   European  Parliament resolution of 13 May 2020 on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget 

of the European  Union for the financial year 2018, Section I – European Parliament, points 201-203. 

144   European Parliament resolution of 29 April 2021 on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget 

of the European  Union for the financial year 2019, Section I – European Parliament, point 200. 

145   Van Hacke [et al.],  p. 25. 

146   J. Kovář, Z. Sychra   and P. Kratochvíl, 'Alignment of national parties and European  party federations', S. Blockmans  and 
S. Russack  (eds.),  Deliberative democracy in the  EU: Countering populism with participation and debate,  CEPS,  Rowman 
& Littlefield International, 2020, p.123. 

147   D.  Hanley,  'Outside  their comfort  zone?  National  parties,  European  Parliament  groups  and  transnational  parties', 

Magone J. M. (ed.), Routledge handbook of European politics, Routledge 2015, p. 596. 

148   J. Kovář, Z. Sychra   and  P. Kratochvíl, p.122. 
149   How European  political parties' carried out their campaigning  activities 'on the road' is depicted in S. Fotopoulos  and 
L.  Morganti, 'The  influence of the Spitzenkandidat  process  on the role of the European  political parties',  L'Europe en 
Formation, 2020/1, n° 390, pp.  17-34. 

48 

 
 
 
                                                             
Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 

all of Parliament's initial reform requests. Council Decision 2018/994 is not yet in force, as ratification 
is still pending in some Member States. 150 

3.5.1. Spitzenkandidaten process 
The non-binding lead candidate principle, introduced by the European Parliament in an attempt to 
'Europeanise' the 2014 elections, meant a paradigm shift, as it attributed a central role to European 
political parties in electoral candidate selection. In particular, it encouraged European parties to 
nominate a lead candidate who would run for the President of the European Commission. 151 This 
would give European citizens a say over who would head the European Commission in future and, 
at the same time, increase the visibility of the electoral debate through the personalisation of the 
campaign. 152  

Although  the  process  was  not  uncontroversial,  five  European  parties  appointed  their 
Spitzenkandidaten  in the run-up to the 2014 elections, and eventually the lead candidate from the 
strongest party, Jean-Claude Juncker, was elected Commission President. In comparison, in 2019, as 
many as seven of  the ten  registered European parties abided by  the lead  candidate principle, 
although that time it was eventually not decisive in the appointment of the European Commission 
President, due to the European Council's stiff resistance. The latter argued the nomination of the 
Commission President is an 'autonomous competence of the European Council, while taking into 
account the European elections'. 153 In addition, several Heads of State or Government (e.g. French 
President Emmanuel Macron and the Luxembourgish Prime Minister Xavier Bettel) have publicly 
questioned the lead candidate system. 

Conversely,  the  European  Commission  endorsed  the  system  in  a  2018  recommendation,154 
considering it a means to reinforce the EU's democratic legitimacy, to strengthen the Commission's 
own  accountability, and to mobilise voters. The Commission therefore suggested the system's 
continued use and improvement. In particular, it advocated the selection of the lead candidates 'in 
an open, inclusive and transparent way, e.g. through "primary" elections'. 

A European Parliament initiative 155 to codify the lead candidate process, following its successful first 
application in  2014,  was  rebuffed by the  Council.  The ensuing Council  decision –  adopted on 
13 July 2018, in response to Parliament's proposal to amend the European Electoral Act and, at the 

150   For an outline of the debate on electoral reform, see S. Kotanidis,  European Union electoral law: current situation and 
historical  background  European  Parliament,  EPRS,  European  Parliament,  2019;  and  Legislative  Train  Schedule  on 
reform of the electoral law of the EU,  EPRS,  European  Parliament [continuously  updated].  For an  in-depth study  on 
the outlook see: L. Cicchi, Europeanising  the elections of the European Parliament: Outlook on the implementation of 
Council Decision 2018/994 and harmonisation of national rules on European  elections, Policy Department for Citizens’ 
Rights and Constitutional Affairs, European  Parliament, 2021. 

151   For an outline and background  see L. Tilindyte, Election of the President of the European Commission:  Understanding 

the Spitzenkandidaten process,  EPRS,  European Parliament, 2019. 

152   M.  Nogaj  and  E.-M.  Poptcheva,  The  reform  of  the  Electoral  Law  of  the  European  Union,  European  Added  Value 

Assessment,  EPRS,  European  Parliament, 2015, p. 22. 

153   Tilindyte, p.  7. 

154   Commission  Recommendation  2018/234 of  14  February  2018  on  enhancing  the  European  nature  and  efficient 

conduct of the 2019 elections to the European Parliament. 

155  To  this aim,  Parliament proposed  amendments  to the European  Electoral Act on  the basis  of  Article 223 TFEU.  This 
report was  underpinned  by  the aforementioned European  Added  Value  Assessment  by  Nogaj  and  Poptcheva  (on 
codification  see p.  22).  European  Parliament resolution T8-0395/2015 of  11 November  2015 on  the  reform of  the 
electoral law of the European Union,  Annex: proposal  for a Council decision, Article 3f. 

49 

 
 
 
                                                             
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

time of writing, not yet in force – did not consider the lead candidate process at all. 156 The future of 
the system therefore remains uncertain. However, a new electoral reform proposal currently being 
undertaken by  the  AFCO committee includes a  reference to  the  lead  candidate  process. 157 In 
addition, Parliament sets its sights on the Conference on the Future of Europe to stimulate a reform 
of the Spitzenkandidaten  system, 158 in the wider context of debating a reform of European electoral 
law.  Parliament insists 'that all  European voters should be  allowed  to  vote for  their preferred 
candidate for the President of the Commission', arguing that lead candidates stand 'for a unified 
European electoral programme'.159 

3.5.2. Transnational lists 
Since the 1990s, the European Parliament has repeatedly presented proposals to establish a pan-
European constituency. 160 Here, European citizens would be entitled to two votes for two different 
constituencies: they would continue to select their candidates from national list, and in addition be 
able to vote for a pre-defined number of Members of the European Parliament from transnational 
lists. This system of Europe-wide candidates would favour a truly European campaign that places 
the  focus  on  European (rather than national) themes. At the  same time,  it  would  strengthen 
European political parties, as they would play a central role in the selection of candidates for the 
transnational lists and in campaigning.  

Despite a number of attempts from within Parliament to put such transnational lists in place, the 
idea has so far remained theoretical and is not uncontested within Parliament itself. One of the more 
recent initiatives to stimulate a debate on a pan-European constituency was included in Parliament's 
2015  proposal to amend the European Electoral Act, but was not subsequently taken up by the 
Council. Some politicians (e.g. Emmanuel Macron) had suggested using the opportunity arising 
through Brexit to fill the liberated UK seats with candidates from pan-European lists, but this idea 
was not pursued.  

New  efforts aiming  at  codifying transnational lists are  currently undertaken by means of  the 
aforementioned legislative own-initiative report on the revision of the EU's Electoral Act, which is 
currently being discussed by the AFCO committee.161 This draft report includes detailed provisions 
on a 'Union-wide constituency'. 

3.5.3. Challenges in campaigning 
Since 2007,  the European Party Regulation allows European political parties – but not European 
political foundations – to finance campaigning in European elections, to enhance the elections' 
European character. Article 21 of  the regulation sets out that 'the funding of European political 
parties from the general budget of the European Union or from any other source may be used to 
finance campaigns conducted by the European political parties in the context of elections to the 

156   Council Decision 2018/994 of 13 July 2018 amending the 1976 Act. As of yet, the Council decision has  not yet entered 
into force, as several Member States have  not completed the ratification process.  Therefore, this amending  act will – 
full ratification provided – be applied for the first time only  in the 2024 elections. 

157   OEIL procedure reference 2020/2220(INL). Draft report dated 3.6.2021. 

158   European  Parliament resolution T9-0327/2020, recital U. 
159   Idem., point 18. 
160   For  a  comprehensive  discussion  of  transnational  lists  see  M.  Diaz  Crego,  Transnational  electoral lists:  Ways  to 

Europeanise elections to the European  Parliament, EPRS,  European  Parliament, 2021. 

161   OEIL procedure reference 2020/2220(INL). 

50 

 
 
 
                                                             
Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 

European Parliament in which they or their members participate'. In practice however, European 
parties face a number of challenges pertaining to election campaigns. 

Divergent national law 
A major challenge is that European parties cannot fully participate in European election campaigns 
because the conditions for campaigning are uneven across the Member States. A report on the 2019 
elections underlines that Member States' rules on  the  funding of  election  expenses  and their 
limitations vary significantly. 162 According to this report, the spending limitations applicable  to 
European elections differ greatly from one country to another, and moreover, ten Member States 
even forbid the financing of national campaigns in European Parliament elections by European 
parties. The European Parliament raised this issue in its resolution on the stocktaking following the 
2019 elections, calling for a further alignment of national and EU legislation to level the playing field 
across the EU for the European elections (point 27). 

Delineation between campaigning and financing national parties 
As highlighted by the Authority in several instances,163 the regulation includes a certain dichotomy 
or tension: on the  one hand, European parties are granted the right to campaign in  European 
elections (Article 21), and on the other hand, they are not allowed to (directly or indirectly) fund 
national political parties or candidates (Article 22). The interplay of these two provisions limits the 
scope of action for European parties and creates legal uncertainty. It implies that European and 
national parties have to maintain entirely separate campaign spending, which is difficult in practice, 
e.g. in case of jointly organised campaign events and activities. However, campaigning related to 
European elections in a Member State typically requires support and cooperation from national 
counterparts. Therefore, the campaign activities at the two levels cannot be easily separated, and, 
consequently, such activities are  risk  being  qualified  as  indirect  financial  support for national 
parties. 164 Even if it can be difficult to determine indirect financial support, it is true that co-organised 
campaigns have in the past involved the misuse of EU party funding, 165 as becomes apparent from 
the relevant case-law (see Chapter 3.3.3.)  

With  the  objective  of  giving  some  practical  guidelines,  the  Authority has, together with  the 
European Parliament's financial services (DG FINS), developed a set of five operational principles to 
determine what factors make a campaign a European campaign: 166 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

Scope: campaigns should have a European dimension, i.e. they should take place in several 
Member States; 
European content: European parties should focus on European topics, i.e. topics that affect 
citizens across the EU; 
Ownership:  European  parties  should  have  ownership  of  their  campaigns  and  take 
responsibility for them; 
Authorship: the campaign should be clearly attributable to a European party, for instance 
through logos and banners; 
Law: European parties' campaigns must comply with the applicable national law. 

162   Election-Watch.EU,  Elections to the European  Parliament, 23-26 May 2019, Election assessment  mission,  final report, 

2019, p. 20. 

163   e.g. AFCO meeting 23.2.2021. 
164   Van Hacke [et al.],  p. 28. 
165   Van Hacke [et al.],  p. 28. 
166  Authority for European  Political Parties and European Political Foundations,  Annual activity report 2019, pp. 14-15. 

51 

 
 
 
                                                             
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

For the  sake of  legal  certainty, and  in  addition to the principles,  the Authority suggested also 
addressing this issue in the next revision of Regulation 1141/2014. 167 Parliament shares this view: to 
remedy the 'limited  possibility for campaign financing and  shared activities with  their national 
member parties', it called for amending the regulation to allow European parties and foundations 
'to fully participate in the European political space, to campaign, to be able to use campaign funds 
and stand in European elections'.168 Most recently, in April 2021, Parliament reiterated its call in the 
context of the budget discharge procedure, acknowledging 'the practical difficulties created by the 
nature of the regulation' and emphasising the need for revision and enhanced proportionality and 
flexibility. 169 Support comes from academia, where recommendations include that the financing 
rules on joint activities between European and national parties 'could be softened during European 
campaigns' and suggest the introduction of separate campaign grants to European parties from the 
EU budget for European elections.170  

Visibility 
European political  parties  are  not  widely  known  by  European  citizens,  as  recently  collected 
Eurobarometer data confirmed: over 90 % of survey respondents thought there is scope for better 
explanation of the role of European political parties in the EU, while 77 % supported highlighting 
the links between the national and European political parties, for example by displaying both names 
on ballot papers and in targeted political content.171  

This  lack of  visibility  in  European elections is  to some extent due  to the  relationship between 
European and national parties. The latter traditionally do not  emphasise their European party 
affiliation in events or campaign material, nor do they make much use of the common manifesto 
endorsed at the level  of  the European party. 172 The 2018  amendment to Regulation 1141/2014 
aimed at enhancing the visibility of European political parties in the Member States, by requiring 
national parties to display the political programme and logo of the European political party on their 
websites 'in a  clearly visible and user-friendly manner' (Article 18(2a)). However, recent research 
found that national parties are not fully in compliance with that display requirement. 173  

In general, logos on party websites are just one possible course of action for boosting the visibility 
of European parties. The European Commission recommendation mentioned above, adopted in 
February 2018, aimed at stimulating change with a more comprehensive set of measures. It called 
on national parties to make their affiliation with European parties more visible in their campaigning 
activities; to communicate clearly their European political party affiliation, and which lead candidate 
they support; and called on Member States to display the logos of European parties on the ballots.  

Regarding this latter point, empirical research comparing the electoral ballots of the 2014 and 2019 
elections showed that the 'Europeanisation' of ballots remained EU-wide at an extremely low level: 
only around 4 % of national political parties – from ten EU Member States – displayed textual or 

167   Idem. 

168   European  Parliament resolution on the stocktaking of European  elections, 2020, point 29. 
169   European Parliament resolution of 29 April 2021 on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget 

of the European  Union for the financial year 2019, Section I – European Parliament, point 199. 

170   Van Hacke [et al.],  p. 45. 
171   European  Commission,  Report on  the  public  consultation  for  the European  Democracy  Action Plan  (EDAP),  2020, 

pp.  11-12. 

172   Van Hacke [et al.],  p. 33. 
173   European  Democracy  Consulting,  The  Logos  project,  report,  April  2021.  This  report  found  that  nine  of  the  ten 
European  parties have national  member parties that do not display  their logo on their webpages;  moreover, where 
logos are displayed,  they are not clearly visible. 

52 

 
 
 
                                                             
Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 

visual references to European political parties on the ballots, and the percentage remained largely 
unchanged from one election to the next. 174 This figure would suggest that the 2018 Commission 
recommendation was unable to trigger change. However, from a Commission report, it appears that 
current national legislation in a number of Member States does not allow the logos of European 
political parties to be displayed. 175  

In  its  2015  legislative  own-initiative  report on  reforming the  EU  electoral  law,  the  European 
Parliament proposed to make the display of European political parties' names and logos on ballot 
papers compulsory, along with the names and logos of national parties. In a similar vein, Parliament 
suggested Member States could  make the  affiliation and manifestos of European parties more 
visible  in  electoral campaign materials. 176 However, Parliament's request was watered down in 
Council Decision 2018/994, which made logos merely optional ('Member States may allow for the 
display, on ballot papers, of the name or logo of the European political party to which the national 
political  party  or  individual  candidate  is  affiliated').  Parliament  returned  to  the  issue  in 
November 2020, reiterating its request to make logos on ballot sheets compulsory.177 

An interesting proposal in this respect was put forward by a think-tank, suggesting – instead of 
making logo display a mandatory requirement – introduction of a system of incentives for the use 
of  European parties' logos and manifestos instead, e.g. by granting national parties access to 
dedicated EU funds for European election campaigns. 178 

3.5.4. Foreign interference in European elections 

Electoral interference can take a variety of forms, such as dark money, disinformation campaigns, 
cyber-attacks, misuse of personal data, and unlawful micro-targeting, to name just a few. 179 Similarly, 
motivation for interference can be manifold and include the intention to distort election results (e.g. 
by  manipulating  voter  choices  or  discouraging  turnout),  undermine  public  confidence  in 
democracy or  obtain  financial  gain. 180  Aware  of  the  systemic  global  threat  foreign  electoral 
interference poses to democracy, in the run-up to the 2019  elections, the EU developed a set of 
measures to tackle foreign interference in election processes and disinformation. 

The European Commission's report on the 2019 European Parliament elections noted multifaceted 
manipulative efforts ahead of the  elections, such as  isolated cyber-attacks and data protection 
issues, but concluded that 'a covert, coordinated large-scale effort to interfere in the elections has 
not been identified'. 181 

This is also the conclusion the European Parliament reached in its resolution on the 2019 elections, 
which found that foreign interference in the EU electoral process in any of its forms – disinformation, 
cyber-attacks or  financing  of  political  parties  –  did  not  affect  the  2019  European  elections. 
Nonetheless, Parliament recalled that electoral interference at the Member State level may affect 

174   Cicchi,  pp.  19-24.  The  display  of  logos  on  electoral  ballot  papers  is  also  explored  in  K.  Auel  and  G.  Tiemann, 
Europeanising  European  public  spheres,  Policy  Department,  Directorate-General  for  Internal  Policies,  European 
Parliament, 2020, pp.  74-80. 

175    European  Commission,  Report  on  the  2019  elections  to  the  European  Parliament,  COM(2020)  252,  p. 13  and 

SWD(2020) 113, p.  26. 

176   European  Parliament resolution T8-0395/2015, Annex, Article 3e. 
177   European  Parliament resolution on the stocktaking of European  elections, 2020, point 28. 
178   J. Kovář, Z. Sychra   and  P. Kratochvíl, p.120. 
179   European  Commission,  Report on the 2019 elections to the European Parliament, COM(2020) 252, p. 18. 
180   Idem., p. 18. 
181   Idem., p. 26. 

53 

 
 
 
                                                             
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

the EU as a whole and therefore stressed that 'threats can neither be addressed solely by national 
authorities working in isolation nor by  pure self-regulation of the  private sector but require a 
coordinated multi-level, multi-stakeholder approach'. 182 

While  the 2019  amendment to Regulation 1141/2014 regulated the misuse of  personal data to 
influence  electoral  outcomes, protection against other  forms  of  electoral  interference  is  not 
specifically taken into account in the current European Party Regulation. 

Foreign  interference  in  European Parliament  elections  is  also  one  of  the  topics  the  Special 
Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including 
Disinformation (INGE) is currently examining. 183 

3.6. Referendum campaigns 

While  Regulation 1141/2014 allows for  the funding of  campaigning in  the  run-up to  European 
elections, it prohibits the financing of referendums and national election campaigns (Article 22(3)). 
Non-compliance with this rule gives rise to sanctions. 

The  ban  on  funding  referendums was  already included  in  the  European Commission's 2012 
legislative proposal on the regulation.184 Parliament took a different view, voting an amendment to 
allow European political parties to finance 'campaigns conducted in the context of referenda in one 
or  several  Member  States which  directly  concern  matters relating to  the  European Union'.185 
However, this amendment was not retained in the adopted regulation, due to lack of support in the 
Council. 

Notwithstanding, voices in Parliament have continued to advocate amending the to allow European 
parties to campaign in referendums 'that concern European matters', such as international trade 
agreements or the UK's 2016  referendum on EU membership, 186 arguing that would 'help form 
European political awareness'.187 Engaging in EU-related referendums would increase the visibility 
of  European political  parties. However, giving parties a  role in  these referendums would likely 
require changes in national legislation. 188 

182   European  Parliament  resolution  T9-0031/2019  of  10  October  2019  on  foreign  electoral  interference  and 

disinformation in national and European  democratic processes,  point 13. 
183   OEIL procedure 2020/2268(INI), rapporteur Sandra Kalniete (EPP, Latvia). 
184   COM(2012) 499. 
185  European  Parliament, Report A7-0140/2013 (rapporteur: Maritetta Giannakou (EPP,  Greece), amendment 9. 
186   European  Parliament resolution on the stocktaking of European  elections, 2020, point 27. 
187   European  Parliament, plenary debate 15 March 2017. 
188   J. Kovář, Z. Sychra  and P. Kratochvíl, p.121. 

54 

 
 
 
                                                             
Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 

4. Conclusions 

European political parties have come a long way since they first emerged at the EU level, ahead of 
the 1979  direct elections to the European Parliament. Today, they are firmly anchored in the EU 
Treaties and in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. As actors linking EU politics with national 
parties and EU citizens, European political parties fulfil an important function in the European public 
space. However, due to their characteristic feature of being 'parties of parties' (rather than parties of 
individual members), they have little direct contact with the electorate and suffer from a lack of 
visibility among the general public. In that respect, European political parties do not yet live up to 
their full potential, even if they have begun to engage as facilitators in the run-up to the last two 
European elections.  

The statute and funding of European political parties and their affiliated foundations are currently 
governed by Regulation 1141/2014, which has been applicable since January 2017 and amended 
twice since. Under this regulation, both entities enjoy European legal personality, and their formal 
registration is a pre-condition for accessing funding from the EU general budget. At present, a total 
of  ten  European political  parties and  ten  foundations are registered, from across the political 
spectrum. Their number has been stable  since  the 2018  amendment to Regulation 1141/2014 
became applicable, which tightened the registration requirements and put an end to abusive party 
formation practices. While academic research has examined different aspects of European political 
parties, their associated foundations have remained under-researched to date. 

One of the main innovations of the Party Regulation was the establishment of a dedicated oversight 
body, the Authority for European Political Parties and Foundations. It is responsible for registering, 
controlling and, in  case of non-compliance, issuing sanctions on, European political parties and 
foundations. Since its inception, the Authority has acted effectively with regard to the registration 
process, which was its main activity in 2017. From the 2018 financial year, it has also reviewed the 
accounts of parties and foundations, with particular consideration of parties' compliance with the 
rules on contributions and donations, as well as spending. It has not yet imposed any sanctions. 
Likewise, the politically delicate and somewhat complex verification mechanism as to whether a 
registered party or foundation is in breach of the EU's fundamental values has never been triggered. 

Levels of  funding from the  EU  budget have  substantially increased over time and  amount to 
€46 million for parties and €23 million for foundations for the 2021 financial year. This means an 
increase  of  41 %  for  parties  and  19 %  for  foundations, since  2018.  However,  as  parties  and 
foundations are obliged to generate a certain percentage of their income from own resources – this 
threshold is currently set at 10 % for parties and 5 % for foundations – keeping pace with the steady 
rise in EU funds has proved challenging for even larger parties with a broad membership structure. 
This  has led  to  parties increasingly taking out loans, which  are not  regulated in  the  EU  legal 
framework in terms of origin, terms and conditions, as the European Court of Auditors has noted. 

To acquire the required level of own resources, parties and foundations rely mainly on membership 
contributions and to a lesser extent on donations. Both are subject to strict rules and transparency 
requirements. In  the  past, practically  all  parties and  foundations used to  raise  a  part  of  their 
contributions from like-minded member parties and associations in third countries, with whom they 
traditionally maintain close ties in the context of EU enlargement or other EU strategic partnerships 
(e.g. Eastern Partnership and European Economic Area). However, the recent ECJ  ruling in Case 
T-107/19 ACRE v Parliament  raises questions, in so far as the Court clarified that contributions paid 
by third-country actors should be equated with foreign donations (which are prohibited under the 
current  regulation). This  ruling  requires  further  reflections  in  the  context  of  the  revision  of 
Regulation 1141/2014. However,  it  should be  noted  that the  ECJ  ruling  did  not  question the 

55 

 
 
 
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

cooperation between European political parties and their non-EU partners as such, it merely set out 
that these partners cannot be considered members in light of the regulation's definition of a political 
party and therefore they cannot pay membership contributions. Since the UK left the EU, third-
country status also applies to UK parties. An important element in this discussion appears to be the 
definition of membership types in the various party statutes. At present, parties use a variety of 
terms and  concepts,  such  as  full  members, associated members, affiliate  members, observer 
members and candidate members, which adds a certain degree of complexity. 

Under  Regulation 1141/2014,  contributions by  individual  members  (i.e.  natural  persons) are 
allowed, up to an annual total of €18 000  per person, but – contrary to contributions from legal 
persons and donations from individuals – they are not subject to any transparency requirements. 
This  has  been  flagged  in  a  recent European Parliament hearing as  a  loophole in  the  current 
regulation, which could be used by intermediaries to circumvent the rules on donation. 

Apart from donations and contributions, other sources of income also exist – e.g. participation fees 
for events, project contributions, book sales, consulting activities – but they are not covered as a 
separate category by the current legal framework.  

Turning to spending, ECJ case law gives an insight into the issues encountered with the dubious or 
even unlawful  spending practices of  European parties and foundations. It also showcases how 
difficult it can be to draw a line between legal spending and indirect funding of a national party. 
However,  it  is  important to  note  that  the  existing  body  of  case  law  refers  to  the  previous 
Regulation 2004/2003; under current Regulation 1141/2017, no case has yet been brought before 
the Court. Regarding cases of suspected fraud and/or corruption, several cases have been passed 
on to OLAF for formal investigation. 

As yet, the role and visibility of European political parties in European elections has remained fairly 
limited. Regulation 1141/2014 requires national parties to make their affiliation with a European 
political party visible on their websites. Moreover, Council Decision 2018/994 (reforming the 1976 
Electoral Act) mentions the display of the name or logo of the European political party on the ballot 
paper, without making it compulsory. Any substantial attempt to truly 'Europeanise' the elections 
would  necessitate  a  further  reform  of  the  1976  Electoral  Act.  Innovative  initiatives,  such  as 
transnational lists, would not only enhance the European dimension of European Parliament elections, 
but also attribute a central and more visible role to European political parties. A new attempt to codify 
a pan-European constituency and the lead candidate process is included in the AFCO committee's 
ongoing legislative own-initiative report pertaining to the revision of the EU Electoral Act.  

The views  of  the Council and  European Parliament also diverge on the question of  funding of 
referendums.  Parliament advocates allowing  this,  although under  narrow  terms  ('campaigns 
conducted in  the context of  referenda in one or several Member States which directly concern 
matters relating to the European Union').  

Finally, with regard to financial reporting, Regulation 1141/2014 establishes a two-tier reporting 
system,  encompassing  national  and  international  standards.  Smaller  European  parties  and 
foundations especially  question  the  mandatory use  of  the  International  Financial  Reporting 
Standards (IFRS), finding them burdensome, costly and not appropriate for party reporting. 

The forthcoming revision of Party Regulation 1141/2014 presents an opportunity to address any 
shortcomings, non-clarity or other issues within the scope of application of Regulation 1141/2014. The 
revision process is informed by the European Parliament's evaluation report, currently being drawn 
up in accordance with Article 38 of the regulation and by the European Commission's stakeholder 
consultation, and evaluation and impact assessment. The aim is to have the new regulation in place in 
early 2023, well ahead of the 2024 European elections and to apply in the 2024 financial year. 

56 

 
 
 
 
Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 

REFERENCES 

Auel K. and Tiemann G., Europeanising  European public spheres, Policy Department, Directorate-General 
for Internal Policies, European Parliament, 2020. 
Bardi  L. [et al.], How to create a transnational  party  system, Policy Department, Directorate-General  for 
Internal Policies, European Parliament, 2010. 

Bressanelli  E. [et al.], Institutions  and  foreign interferences, Policy Department,  Directorate-General  for 
Internal Policies, European Parliament, 2020. 
Bressanelli  E., Investing  in destabilisation:  How foreign money is used to undermine  democracy in the 
EU, Policy Department, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, European  Parliament, 2021. 
Chryssogelos A., 'Europarties in the neighbourhood:  how transnational  party politics bind Eastern Europe  
and the Western Balkans to the EU', Comparative European Politics, Vol. 19(1), 2021, pp. 77-93. 

Corbett R., Jacobs F. and Neville D., The European Parliament, John Harper, 9th edition 2016. 
Cicchi L., Europeanising  the  elections of the European  Parliament:  Outlook  on the implementation  of 
Council  Decision  2018/994  and  harmonisation  of  national  rules  on  European  elections,  Policy 
Department, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, European  Parliament, 2021. 
Diaz Crego M., Transnational  electoral lists: Ways to Europeanise  elections to the European  Parliament,  
EPRS, European  Parliament, 2021. 
Drounau  L.,  A  smarter  funding  system  for  European  parties,  Österreichische  Gesellschaft  für 
Europapolitik,   ÖGfE Policy Brief 01/2021. 

Fotopoulos  S. and Morganti  L., 'The influence of the Spitzenkandidat  process on the role of the European 
political parties',  L'Europe en Formation, 2020/1, n° 390, pp. 17-34. 
Gagatek  W.  and  van  Hecke S.,  'The  development  of European  political  foundations  and  their  role  in 
strengthening  Europarties',  Acta  politica, 49/1, 2014, pp. 86-104. 
Grasso G. and Perrone R., 'European political parties and the respect for the values on which the European 
Union  is founded  between the European  legislation  and  the national  laws', European public law, 25(4), 
2019, pp. 665-668. 
Hanley D., 'Outside their comfort zone? National parties, European  Parliament groups  and transnational 
parties', Magone J. M. (ed.), Routledge handbook of European politics, Rutledge 2015, pp. 590-607. 

Hertner  I., 'United  in  diversity?  Europarties  and  their  individual  members'  rights',  Journal of European 
Integration, Vol. 41(4), 2018, pp. 487-505. 
Hix S. and Lord Ch., Political parties in the European Union, Macmillan  1997. 

Hu M., 'Cambridge  Analytica's  black box', Big Data & Society, July–December 2020, pp. 1-6. 
Katsaitis  A., 'Following  the money: Exploring  business  financial  contributions  to the European  Union's 
political parties',  Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 58(5), 2020, pp. 1342-1351. 

Kergueno R., Fraud and boats: funding European  political parties, Transparency  International,  2017. 
Kotanidis  S.,  European  Union  electoral  law:  current  situation  and  historical  background  European 
Parliament, EPRS, European  Parliament, 2019. 
Kovář  J., Sychra  Z. and  Kratochvíl  P., 'Alignment  of national  parties  and  European  party  federations',  
Blockmans  S.  and  Russack  S.  (eds.),  Deliberative  democracy  in  the  EU:  Countering  populism  with 
participation and debate, CEPS, Rowman & Littlefield International,  2020, pp.133-130. 
Lightfoot  S., 'The consolidation  of Europarties?  The 'party  regulation'  and  the development of political 
parties in the European  Union', Representation, Vol. 42(4), 2006, pp. 303-314. 

Morijn  J., 'Formation  and funding of European  Parliament political  Groups,  political parties  and political 
foundations  v. EU-level political  rights  (case note T-118/17, IDDE  v European Parliament)', Pahlandsingh 
A. and Grimbergen R (eds.), The Charter and the Court of Justice of the European Union: Notable Cases from 
2016–2018,  Wolf Legal Publishers, 2019, pp. 257-272. 

57 

 
 
 
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

Morijn  J., 'Responding  to 'populist'  politics  at EU level: Regulation 1141/2014 and beyond', International 
Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 17(2), 2019, pp. 617–640. 
Nogaj M. and Poptcheva E.-M., The reform of the Electoral Law of the  European Union, European Added 
Value Assessment, EPRS, European Parliament, 2015. 

Priestley J., European  Political Parties: the missing link, Policy Paper 41, Notre Europe, Paris, 2010. 
Tilindyte L, Election of the President of the European Commission: Understanding  the Spitzenkandidate n 
process, EPRS, European Parliament, 2019. 

Van Hecke S. [et al.], Reconnecting European political parties with European Union citizens, International 
IDEA discussion  paper 6/2018. 
Wolfs W. and Smulders J., 'Party finance at the level of the European Union: party finance reform to vitalize 
the EU's  proto-party  system?', Mendilow J. and Phélippeau  E. (eds.), Handbook of political party funding, 
Edward Elgar, 2018, pp. 182-202. 

58 

 
 
 
 
Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 

Annex 1 – List of registered European political parties 

Since entry into force of Regulation 1141/2014; as of 31 May 2021. 

Name of the party 

Acronym 

Date of decision by 
the Authority 

Comment 

Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe Party 

European People's Party 

Party of European Socialists 

EPP 

PES 

European Democratic Party 

PDE-EDP 

European Green Party 

European Free Alliance 

EFA 

Party of the European Left 

European Conservatives and 
Reformists Party  

European Christian Political 
Movement 

ALDE 

4 May 2017 

23 May 2017 

14 June 2017 

18 July 2017 

20 July 2017 

27 July 2017 

7 August 2017 

ECR 

24 August 2017 

ECPM 

31 August 2017 

Identité et Démocratie Parti 

ID 

14 September 2017 

Formerly: Alliance of 
Conservatives and 
Reformists in Europe 

Formerly: Mouvement 
pour une Europe des 
nations et des libertés 

Source: EurLex and Authority. 

Two further parties had been registered by the Authority under Regulation 1141/2014, but following 
the entry into force of amendment 2018/673 they were removed from the register. 

Name of the party 

Acronym 

Date of decision by 
the Authority 

Comment 

Alliance of European National 
Movements 

12 January 2018 

Alliance for Peace and Freedom 

AFP 

9 February 2018 

Removed from register on 
29 August 2018 

Removed from register on 
3 September 2018;  
new application rejected 
on 26 November 2020 189 

189   Decision  of the Authority of  26 November  2020 not  to register Alliance for  Peace and  Freedom.  The  rejection was 

substantiated  by the fact that the alliance did not meet the minimum representation requirements. 

59 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

Annex 2 – List of registered European political foundations 

Since entry into force of Regulation 1141/2014 on 1 January 2017; state of play: 31 May 2021. 

Name of the foundation 

Acronym 

Wilfried Martens Centre for 
European Studies 

Founding 
year 

Date of 
registration 
decision 

2008 

12 July 2017 

European Liberal Forum 

ELF 

2007 

25 July 2017 

Institute of European Democrats 

IED 

2007 

10 August 2017 

Foundation for European 
Progressive Studies 

EFPS 

2008 

31 August 2017 

Green European Foundation 

GEF 

2008 

31 August 2017 

Affiliated party 

European People's 
Party 

Alliance of Liberals 
and Democrats for 
Europe Party 

European 
Democratic Party 

Party of European 
Socialists 

European Green 
Party 

Sallux 
(formerly:  European Christian Political 
Foundation) 

Coppieters Foundation 
(formerly:  Centre Maurits Coppieters) 

2008 

2007 

New Direction — The Foundation 
for European Reform 

ID 

2010 

Transform Europe 

2007 

20 September 
2017 

European Christian 
Political Movement 

20 September 
2017 

European Free 
Alliance 

20 September 
2017 

European 
Conservatives and 
Reformists Party 

27 September 
2017 

Party of the 
European Left 

Association pour l'Identité et 
Démocratie Fondation 
(formerly:  Fondation pour une Europe 
des Nations et des Libertés) 

2011 

29 September 
2017 

Mouvement pour 
une Europe des 
nations et des 
libertés 

Source: EurLex, Authority and Hanley (for founding year). 

A  further foundation had  been  registered by  the  Authority under Regulation 1141/2014,  but 
following the entry into force of amendment 2018/673 it was removed from the register. 

Name of the foundation 

Founding year 

Date of decision by 
the Authority* 

Affiliated party / 
comment 

Europa Terra Nostra  not indicated 

24 April 2018 

Source: EurLex and Authority. 

Alliance for Peace and 
Freedom; removed from 
register on 13 September 
2018 

60 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 

Annex 3 – Applications for EU funding per year 

European political parties (2007-2021) 

Legal 
basis 

l

n
o
i
t
a
u
g
e
R

4
1
0
2
/
1
4
1
1

3
0
0
2
/
4
0
0
2
n
o
i
t
a
u
g
e
R

l

year 

2021 

2020 

2019 

2018 

2017 

2016 

2015 

2014 

2013 

2012 

2011 

2010 

2009 

2008 

2007 

Number of 
applications 

Number of 
rejections 

Explanation provided 

10 

10 

10 

12 

16 

16 

16 

13 

14 

13 

12 

10 

10 

10 

10 

2 

Reason for rejection not stated 

One proposal judged null and void 

One proposal was refused since it did not 
fulfil the eligibility criteria 

One proposal was refused since it did not 
fulfil the eligibility criteria 

One proposal was refused since it did not 
fulfil the eligibility criteria 

The award decision on one proposal was 
suspended a few days after approval.  

1 

1 

1 

1 

Source: European Parliament, Brief annual reports, 2021. 

61 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

European political foundations (2008-2021) 

Legal 
basis 

l

n
o
i
t
a
u
g
e
R

4
1
0
2
/
1
4
1
1

3
0
0
2
/
4
0
0
2
n
o
i
t
a
u
g
e
R

l

year 

2021 

2020 

2019 

2018 

2017 

2016 

2015 

2014 

2013 

2012 

2011 

2010 

2009 

2008 

Number of 
applications 

Number of 
rejections 

Explanation provided 

10 

10 

10 

11 

15 

16 

16 

13 

14 

12 

13 

9 

10 

10 

1 

1 

1 

1 

2 

1 

Reason for rejection not stated 

One proposal was rejected since the 
application of the affiliated party was 
judged null and void. 

One proposal was refused since it did not 
fulfil the eligibility criteria 

One proposal was refused since it did not 
fulfil the eligibility criteria 

Two proposals were refused since they 
did not fulfil the eligibility criteria 

The decision on one proposal was 
suspended on the grounds that not all 
the eligibility criteria were fulfilled. 

Source: European Parliament, Brief annual reports, 2021 

62 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statute and funding of European political parties under Regulation 1141/2014 

Annex 4 – EU funding granted to European political parties, 
2004-2021 

year 

2004 

2005 

2006 

2007 

2008 

2009 

2010 

2011 

2012 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

2019 

2020 

2021 

Source: EurLex. 

Amount granted: appropriations 
(rounded, in € million) 

Final amount granted: outturn 
(rounded, in € million) 

6.5 

8.4 

8.6 

10.4 

10.6 

10.9 

14.1 

17.4 

18.9 

21.8 

27.8 

28.3 

31.4 

31.9 

32.4 

50 

42 

46 

4.7 

8.3 

9.2 

10.2 

10.3 

10.5 

14 

17.3 

18.9 

21.6 

27.7 

27.9 

30.6 

30.9 

32.2 

47.5 

63 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

Annex  5  –  EU  funding  granted  to  European  political 
foundations, 2008-2021 

Amount granted: appropriations 
(rounded, in € million) 

Final amount granted: outturn 
(rounded, in € million) 

5 

7 

9.1 

11.4 

12.2 

12.4 

13.4 

16.7 

18.7 

19 

19.3 

19.7 

21 

23 

4.3 

6.4 

8.8 

11.1 

12 

12.4 

13.4 

16.1 

18.4 

18.9 

19.1 

19.7 

year 

2008 

2009 

2010 

2011 

2012 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

2019 

2020 

2021 

Source: EurLex. 

64 

 
 
 
 
 
Q
A
-
0
9
-
2
1
-
2
2
6
-
E
N
N

-

European  political  parties  are  transnational  political 
alliances  made up of national parties from the same 
political family. Since July 2004, they have been able to 
receive  funding  from  the  EU  general  budget.  The 
current  Regulation  1141/2014, applicable since 2017, 
tightened  the  requirements  for parties' recognition, 
funding  and  spending.  Yet,  some  parties  (and  their 
affiliated  foundations)  found  loopholes  in  the  legal 
framework. Targeted amendments to the regulation 
adopted in 2018 and 2019 sought, inter alia, to prevent 
misuse of public funds, enhance the role of European 
parties  in  the European public space, and safeguard 
the integrity of the European elections by sanctioning 
breaches  of  the  rules  on  the  protection of personal 
data.  This study examines the operation of the legal 
framework,  ahead  of 
revision 
announced by the European Commission in its 2021 
work  programme,  and  in  support  of  the evaluation 
report currently undertaken by the AFCO committee. 

legislative 

the 

This is a publication of the Ex-Post Evaluation Unit 
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

This document is prepared for, and addressed to, the Members and staff of the European 
Parliament as background material to assist them in their parliamentary work. The content of the 
document is the sole responsibility of its author(s) and any opinions expressed herein should not 
be taken to represent an official position of the Parliament. 

ISBN: 978-92-846-8248-5 
DOI: 10.2861/353664 
CAT: QA-09-21-226-EN-N