JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL on EU-Russia relations - Push back, constrain and engage
Date: 2021-06-16
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: EU relations, Russia, Russo-Ukrainian issue, cooperation policy, economic relations, foreign policy, human rights, international law, political situation

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY Brussels, 16.6.2021  JOIN(2021) 20 final     JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL  on EU-Russia relations - Push back, constrain and engage      
 
 
1.  Introduction 

The  European  Council  on  24-25  May  2021  held  a  first  strategic  debate  on  Russia  and 
condemned  the  illegal,  provocative  and  disruptive  Russian  activities  against  the  EU,  its 
Member States and beyond. It reaffirmed the EU’s unity and solidarity in the face of such acts 
as well as its support to Eastern partners. The European Council reaffirmed its commitment to 
the five principles governing EU policy vis-à-vis Russia1 and set out that the EU will continue 
coordination  with  like-minded  partners.  It  invited  the  High  Representative  and  the 
Commission to present a report with policy options on EU-Russia relations, in line with the 
five principles, with a view to its meeting in June 2021.2 The following Joint Communication 
responds to this invitation. 

2.  Political context 

Russia is the EU’s largest neighbour, and remains a force to be reckoned with in Europe and 
globally. This is largely based on its size and geographic reach, its readiness to project power 
internationally,  and  its  political,  diplomatic  and  strong  military  capacity.  As  a  geopolitical 
player Russia aspires to retain its global standing in a power politics based, multipolar world, 
often  in  close  liaison  with  other  players  such  as  China,  rather  than  contributing  and  acting 
within  a  stronger,  rules-based  multilateral  system.  It  tries  to  enforce  its  own  geopolitical 
sphere  of  influence  based  mostly  on  a  zero-sum  logic.  In  doing  so,  the  government  often 
challenges and undermines international law, as well as the OSCE and Council of Europe key 
principles,  to  which  it  has  committed  and  which  structure  security  and  cooperation  on  the 
European  continent,  including  each  country’s  right  to  freely  determine  its  own  foreign, 
security and domestic policy choices.  

The Russian leadership uses a variety of instruments to influence, interfere in, weaken or even 
seek to destabilise the EU and its Member States, as well as the Western Balkans and Eastern 
Partnership  countries.  As  part  of  these  efforts,  it  continues  to  invest  heavily  in  its  ability  to 
control and influence the information space inside and outside its borders. Funding of state-
controlled media is growing quickly, in particular for outlets, such as RT, which are directed 
exclusively  towards  external  audiences.  Russia  continues  to  orchestrate  increasingly 
sophisticated  cyber  and  information  manipulation  operations  as  well  as  chemical  and  other 
attacks, including against the Organisation for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), 
the  German  Bundestag,  the  Skripals  in  Salisbury,  as  well  as  the  explosion  in  the  Czech 
Republic.  It  undertakes  direct  military  and  hybrid  actions  in  the  unresolved  conflicts  that  it 
feeds in  Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, as  well  as in  the EU’s southern  neighbourhood, in 
Syria  and  Libya  in  particular,  and  beyond.  It  seeks  to  retain  control  over  the  authoritarian 
regime in Belarus. 
Managing the relationship with Russia thus represents a key strategic challenge for the EU3. 
EU-Russia  relations  have  increasingly  deteriorated  since  2014,  following  Russia’s  illegal 
annexation of the Crimean peninsula, as well as its destabilisation of eastern Ukraine.4 This 

1   Implementation of the Minsk agreements as the key condition for any substantial change in the EU's stance 
towards  Russia;  Strengthened  relations  with  the  EU's  eastern  partners  and  other  neighbours,  including  in 
Central Asia; Strengthening the resilience of the EU (for example, energy security, hybrid threats, or strategic 
communication); The possibility of selective engagement with Russia on issues of interest to the EU; Need to 
engage in people-to-people contacts and support Russian civil society. 

2   https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/49791/2425-05-21-euco-conclusions-en.pdf 
3   https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf 
4   The European Council reacted swiftly in 2014 to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine by e.g. suspending bilateral 
talks  on  the  New  Agreement  and  visa  matters,  introducing  visa  bans  and  asset  freezes,  cancelling  the  EU-
Russia  Summits,  preparing    broader  economic  and  trade  sanctions  as  well  as  suspending  new  financing 

1 

 
                                                           
includes,  more  recently,  Russia’s  military  build-up  along  the  Ukrainian  border,  on  the 
Crimean peninsula and in the Black Sea, which was taken back only partly, and the prolonged 
closure  of  areas  of  the  Black  Sea.  Furthermore,  the  implication  of  Russian  intelligence 
services in disruptive actions within EU Member States has led to further negative dynamics. 
This includes the expulsion of diplomats, travel bans and the publication by Russia of the so-
called  list  of  “unfriendly  states”  and  ensuing  restrictions  to  diplomatic  representation. 
Moreover, the Russian government frequently attempts to advance its bilateral relations with 
Member States at the expense of EU-Russia relations. 

The evolution of Russia's internal policy, characterised by growing political repression by the 
government  to  preserve  the  current  political  and  economic  order,  has  also  increasingly 
affected EU-Russia relations. With forthcoming State Duma elections in September 2021, the 
situation of civil society, human rights defenders and independent media in Russia has further 
deteriorated, also curtailing their ability to cooperate with the EU. Changes in the constitution 
and  repressive  laws  on  so-called  “foreign  agents”,  “undesirable  organisations”  and 
“extremism”  are  reinforcing  a  systematic  crackdown  on  human  rights  and  fundamental 
freedoms,  despite  them  being  enshrined  in  the  Russian  constitution  and  the  country’s 
international  obligations. Moreover, authorities run disinformation  campaigns, creating false 
narratives  about  alleged  ‘foreign  interference’  in  Russian  domestic  affairs,  seeking  to  deter 
real  opposition  and  discredit  civil  society.  The  politically  motivated  sentencing  of  Alexei 
Navalny,  following  a  murder  attempt  by  a  chemical  nerve  agent,  the  effective  ban  of  the 
activities of his  political network as  “extremist”, as well as the  continuous intimidation and 
suppression of independent media and journalists are only some of recent examples. 

At  the  same  time,  Russia  suffers  from  serious  and  growing  structural  weaknesses.  Real 
disposable incomes in Russia have dropped by 10% since 2013. The country is on a declining 
demographic  and  socio-economic  trajectory,  exacerbated  by  its  business  model  focused  on 
fossil fuels, an unbalanced budgetary path and the current impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.  

Despite  these  fundamental  differences,  the  EU  and  Russia  have  a  fundamental  common 
responsibility  for  peace  and  security  on  the  European  continent.  We  face  common  global 
challenges and are interlinked in some specific economic fields.5 We are also both bound by 
the same obligations in international organisations like the Council of Europe and the OSCE, 
which we must live up to.  

EU-Russia economic relations 

  Russia is the EU's fifth largest trade partner, representing 4.8% of the EU’s total trade 

in goods with the world in 2020.    

  Vice versa, the EU is by far Russia's biggest trade partner, accounting for 37.3% of the 

country’s total trade in goods. 

  The EU is also by far the largest investor in Russia. In 2019, the EU’s foreign direct 
investment (FDI) stock amounted to EUR 311.4 billion (75% of total FDI in Russia) 
  Russia’s FDI stock in the EU was estimated at EUR 136 billion (only 1% of total FDI) 

It  is  evident  that,  provided  the  political  conditions  allow  for  it,  the  potential  for  EU-Russia 
cooperation  is  very  considerable.  The  EU  has  made  a  conditional  offer  of  cooperation. 
However,  the  Russian  government  is  actively  pursuing  objectives  that  go  in  the  opposite 

operations  in  Russia  by  the  European  Investment  Bank  and  coordinating  with  the  European  Bank  for 
Reconstruction and Development to adopt a similar position. 

5   As regards cooperation  with the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), constructive steps  from Russia  towards 
more  openness  in  our  trade  relations,  including  abiding  by  its  WTO  commitments  and  respecting  those  of 
other EEU members, are necessary before building a relationship between the EU and EEU beyond technical 
contacts. Any decision on engaging in formal relations is also conditional on a better political context. 

2 

 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
direction:  creating  an  area  of  dependence  in  its  neighbourhood,  undermining  a  politically 
united  Europe,  pushing  back  our  vision  of  a  multilateral,  rules-based  order,  and  creating 
situations in international affairs to limit the role of the EU and its partners. 

3.  Implementation of the Minsk agreements  

The  EU  has  remained  unwavering  in  its  support  of  the  Normandy  format,  the  Trilateral 
Contact  Group  and  the  OSCE,  including  the  efforts  of  the  OSCE  Special  Monitoring 
Mission  (SMM).6  While  President  Zelenskyy’s  election  provided  a  renewed  impetus  in  the 
negotiations,  the  December  2019  Normandy  Summit  conclusions  remain  to  be  fully 
implemented. More worryingly, the Russian government increasingly tries to present itself as 
a mediator and not as a party to the conflict and demands direct contact between Kyiv and the 
so-called  “republics”,  which  runs  contrary  to  the  Minsk  Protocol.  It  also  scaled  up  in  April 
2021 its military presence at the eastern border of Ukraine and on the Crimean peninsula. The 
OSCE  SMM’s  access  to  eastern  Ukraine  remains  routinely  obstructed  by  the  so-called 
“republics”, and ceasefire violations are at pre-July 2020 ceasefire level. This trend will likely 
persist, with Russia lacking a constructive approach.  

The EU continues to support existing formats and instruments. It will also keep emphasising 
its readiness to play a leading role in the reconstruction of the conflict-affected regions once 
the  conditions  are  met,  including  by  incentivising  the  full  implementation  of  the  Minsk 
agreements.  Meanwhile,  the  EU  remains  steadfast  in  its  endeavours  to  alleviate  the 
humanitarian consequences of the conflict. 

Indeed,  the  EU  is  one  of  the  largest  humanitarian  donors  to  the  crisis  in  eastern  Ukraine. 
Since  its  beginning,  the  EU  has  provided  over  EUR  190  million  in  emergency  assistance, 
including  EUR  25.4  million  in  2021,  and  over  EUR  1  billion,  with  the  Member  States,  in 
humanitarian  and  early  recovery  aid.  The  EU  support  benefits  vulnerable  people  and  those 
most  in  need  on  both  sides  of  the  line  of  contact7.  The  EU  is  also  providing,  through  the 
International  Federation  of  the  Red  Cross  and  Red  Crescent,  humanitarian  assistance  to 
Ukrainian refugees in Russia. The total assistance for them since 2017 amounts to over EUR 
1  million  and  covers  access  to  healthcare  services,  vouchers  for  food,  non-food  items  and 
livelihood support.  

The EU has imposed three sets of restrictive measures on Russia as a reaction to its illegal 
annexation  of  the  Crimean  peninsula  and  ongoing  destabilisation  of  eastern  Ukraine.8  They 
aim at preventing further escalation or negative developments in Ukraine, and strongly signal 
the  EU’s  support  to  Ukraine  and  its  territorial  integrity,  sovereignty  and  independence.  The 
clear  linkage  of  these  sanctions  to  the  full  implementation  of  the  Minsk  agreements  is 
designed as an incentive for the Russian government to contribute to a solution to the conflict, 

6   The EU and its Member States contribute two thirds of the budget and monitors of OSCE SMM, as well as 
EU  Satellite  Centre  imagery  and  analysis.  The  EU  will  continue  to  support  local  dialogue  initiatives, 
including  the  OSCE  led  Trilateral  Contact  Group,  and  mine  clearing  operations.  Work  to  counter 
disinformation in southern and eastern Ukraine has also been stepped up. 

7   EU-funded  humanitarian  projects  include  multi-purpose  cash  assistance;  provision  of  basic  needs;  shelter; 
water; protection activities; health assistance including psychosocial support; education in emergencies; mine 
risk education; and the distribution of essential winterisation items. 

8   Measures  concerning  the  destabilisation  of  eastern  Ukraine:  targeted  individual  listings  of  persons  and 
entities,  and  targeted  economic  measures  directed  at  promoting  a  change  in  Russia's  actions  in  Ukraine, 
leading to a peaceful settlement and a political solution of the Ukraine crisis. Measures concerning the illegal 
annexation  of  the  Crimean  peninsula:  targeted  economic,  trade  and  financial  restrictions  directed  at 
promoting a change in Russian policy on the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula. Council Decision 
2014/512/CFSP  of  31.7.2014  and  Council  Regulation  (EU)  No  833/2014  of  31.7.2014,  Council  Decision 
2014/145/CFSP of 17.3.2014 and Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17.3.2014, and Council Decision 
2014/386/CFSP of 23.6.2014 and Council Regulation (EU) No 692/2014 of 23.6.2014. 

3 

 
                                                           
while the perspective of the EU agreeing additional sanctions is meant as a deterrent against it 
worsening  the  situation  further  through  its  aggressive  behaviour.  The  continued  unanimous 
rollover of sanctions demonstrates EU unity and credibility. The EU measures have increased 
Russia’s cost of further aggression and constrained the further use of military capabilities and 
expansion  in  Ukraine.  Russia  will  be  held  responsible  for  any  deterioration  in  the  so-called 
“republics”9. It also remains crucial to maintain the existing coordination and unity, including 
on sanctions, with like-minded partners such as the G7.  

To ensure respect for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and the full 
application of EU rules on Schengen visas in Russia and Ukraine, the EU has also provided 
guidance  on  the  non-recognition  of  certain  categories  of  ordinary  Russian  international 
passports  issued  to  residents  of  the  Crimean  peninsula  and  on  the  handling  of  visa 
applications  from  residents  of  non-government  controlled  areas  of  Ukraine’s  Donetsk  and 
Luhansk regions.  

4.  Strengthened relations with the EU's eastern partners and other neighbours 

The  EU  continues  to  offer  closer  relations  to  its  Eastern  partners  for  prosperity,  good 
neighbourliness,  and  reforms.  A  well-functioning  Eastern  Partnership  is  a  tool  to  enhance 
European stability, security and prosperity. In March 2020, the High Representative and the 
Commission  proposed  the  long-term  policy  objectives  of  the  Eastern  Partnership10  in  the 
areas of economy, governance, environment and climate, digital, and society, with a particular 
emphasis on resilience. The 6th Eastern Partnership Summit in December 2021 will endorse a 
renewed agenda beyond 2020.  

The  EU  firmly  rejects  the  Russian  pursuit  of  a  privileged  sphere  of  influence.  The  Eastern 
partners have a full, sovereign right to shape the breadth and depth of their relations with the 
EU  and  other  international  players  freely.  Still,  the  Russian  government  continues  its 
confrontational policy, employing soft and hard policy tools to exert pressure. Therefore, the 
EU’s  policy  remains  to  strengthen  the  Eastern  partners’  resilience  via  bilateral  agreements 
(including  Association  Agreements/Deep  and  Comprehensive  Free  Trade  Areas)  and 
important  financial  support,  with  a  particular  recent  focus  on  necessary  reforms  in  the 
economy,  governance  and  the  rule  of  law,  green  and  digital  transformations,  and  inclusive 
societies. In the last seven years, almost EUR 5 billion in grant assistance was delivered, with 
a special emphasis on the resilience against hybrid and cyber threats and disinformation, and 
international law enforcement cooperation. Moreover, the EU provided in 2020 almost EUR 1 
billion to help the countries address the COVID-19 consequences. The EU has also provided 
significant macro-financial assistance to three Eastern partners.  

The  EU  also  continued  to  counter  the  Russian  government’s  attempts  to  portray  itself  as  a 
mediator and not a party to the territorial conflicts affecting Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. It 
pursued its non-recognition policy regarding the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula 
and  the  Russian-supported  “independence”  of  the  Georgian  breakaway  regions  of  Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia.  

9   Russian efforts to seek de-listings of individuals (such as parliamentarians and some government members) 
show  that  EU  sanctions  have  a  practical  impact  and  affect  Russia’s  calculations.  Apart  from  the  Ukraine 
crisis, Russian individuals and entities are listed under the EU sanctions regimes on Libya (for violating the 
UN  arms  embargo),  on  cyber  attacks  (ransomware,  cyberattacks  against  the  OPCW  and  the  German 
Bundestag) and on the use and proliferation of chemical weapons (Skripal and Navalny poisonings) as well 
as under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (Navalny imprisonment, and torture and repression 
against LGBTIQ persons and political opponents in Chechnya). 

10  JOIN(2020) 7 final of 18.3.2020. 

4 

 
                                                           
The  EU  renewed  its  Central  Asia  strategy  in  June  2019  to  step  up  its  engagement  and  to 
contribute to the development of the region with a focus on resilience, prosperity and regional 
cooperation. The EU has maintained an ad hoc dialogue with Russia on Central Asia. Yet the 
Russian  government’s  attitude  towards  EU  engagement  in  the  region  remains  negative, 
including on the conclusion of Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreements.  

5.  Strengthening the resilience of the EU  

Over  the  last  years,  the  EU  has  made  significant  progress  in  strengthening  its  resilience 
against  challenges  emanating  or  being  instrumentalised  from  abroad.  Managing  and 
accelerating  the  twin  green  and  digital  transitions  enhances  EU  resilience,  by  making  us 
gradually less dependent on foreign supplies and the geopolitics of energy, and by making the 
advanced hard- and software of our economies more robust to foreign influence. The Trade 
Policy  Review11  and  the  Update  to  the  2020  Industrial  Strategy12  also  set  out  concrete 
actions  to  enhance  the  Union’s  open  strategic  autonomy  and  to  address  strategic 
dependencies. Generally, the Union is  equipping  itself with  more  autonomous tools such as 
the FDI screening mechanism13, the 5G toolbox or the new instrument on foreign subsidies14. 

The  EU  is  continuing  to  strengthen  its  resilience  and  energy  security  by  diversifying  its 
international sources and supplies and through the creation of a single EU energy market, in 
particular  regarding  gas.  This  has  been  achieved  through  better  ‘hardware’  (e.g.  new 
infrastructure  including  interconnectors,  reverse  flow  pipelines,  more  storage  facilities  and 
Liquefied Natural Gas terminals) as well as clearer legislative ‘software’, providing inter alia 
for open, non-discriminatory retail markets, the unbundling of generation and supply from the 
operation  of  networks,  regulatory  independence  and  cooperation,  and  the  full  application  of 
EU  competition  rules.  EU-Russia  energy  relations  are  marked  by  a  substantial  degree  of 
interdependence:  Russia  is  currently  the  EU’s  first  energy  provider  and  the  EU  is  by  far 
Russia’s  first  energy  export  destination.  Additional  energy-related  challenges  include  the 
cybersecurity  of  EU  energy  installations  and  the  acquisition  by  Russian  state-controlled 
players  of  strategic  assets  in  the  Union  and  close  neighbours.  However,  also  by  moving 
decisively toward decarbonisation, our energy independence will further grow and reliance on 
Russian  supplies  overall  decrease.  Russia  will  see  its  exports  of  energy  products  to  the  EU 
shrink  significantly  within  the  next  10-20  years,  which  will  inevitably  have  a  domestic 
impact.  

EU-Russia energy relations 

  Russia currently accounts for 26% of EU oil imports and 40% of EU gas imports. 
  However, Russia is clearly dependent on the deep, stable and lucrative energy markets 
of the EU: nearly two thirds of Russia’s oil exports, two thirds of its gas exports and 
roughly half of its coal exports go to the EU, whereas only 27% of its oil exports and 
only 2% of its gas exports go to China.  

  Energy exports are also  critical for Russia’s business model, representing 60% of  its 

total exports, 40% of its budget revenue and 25% of its GDP. 

Enhancing the EU´s capabilities to tackle hybrid threats has been an essential aspect of the 
EU’s security agenda in the last five years. Triggered by the illegal annexation of the Crimean 
peninsula  and  subsequent  disinformation  campaign  against  the  EU,  the  2016  Joint 

11  COM(2021) 66 final of 18.2.2021. 
12  COM(2021) 550 final of 5.5.2021. 
13  Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of 19.3.2019. 
14  COM(2021) 223 final of 5.5.2021. 

5 

 
                                                           
Framework15  is  building  a  broad  EU  policy  framework.  It  was  further  developed  in  201816 
after  the  Salisbury  chemical  agent  attack,  including  a  new,  dedicated  EU  sanctions  regime 
related to  the use of chemical  weapons17, and in  the ongoing roll-out  of the Security Union 
Strategy18.  

The  EU’s  counter-hybrid  toolbox  is  building  societal  resilience  against  shocks  of  different 
hybrid  attacks  in  fields  such  as  protecting  critical  infrastructure,  cybersecurity,  countering 
disinformation, election integrity and foreign direct investment screening.  

Russian  players  have  become  more  assertive  in  cyberspace,  conducting  and/or  allowing 
malicious cyber activities that advance its political objectives, threaten Western open societies 
and  economies,  and  harm  human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms.  However,  the  EU  is 
strengthening its ability to prevent, deter and respond to cyberattacks. The EU also adopted, 
for  the  first  time,  sanctions  in  response  to  cyberattacks  in  July  202019.  This  targets,  among 
others,  Russian  hackers  involved  in  Cloud  Hopper,  WannaCry  and  NotPetya  cyberattacks. 
The  2020  EU  Cybersecurity  Strategy20  further  strengthens  the  EU’s  collective  resilience  in 
this  field  and  the  dedicated  EU  toolbox21  provides  a  set  of  robust  and  comprehensive 
measures  with a view to ensuring an adequate level of cybersecurity of 5G networks across 
the EU. Cyber defence is one of the areas in which the EU and NATO are strengthening their 
cooperation. The Strategic Compass to be adopted in  2022 will provide a framework which 
will  help  focus  Member  States’  efforts  in  security  and  defence.  Through  Permanent 
Structured Cooperation and the European Defence Fund the EU is supporting Member States 
in the development of their defence capabilities ensuring coherence with NATO efforts. 

Russia continues to deploy information manipulation and interference activities, using a range 
of different tactics, techniques and procedures. These disinformation campaigns are carried 
out  in  an intentional  and coordinated manner, with  the objective to  mislead, sow distrust or 
undermine democratic processes and institutions. This has become even more obvious during 
the  COVID-19  pandemic,  where  Russia  has  supported  disinformation  action  aimed  at 
undermining the EU’s response.22 

The  EU  has  put  in  place  a  series  of  structures  and  measures  to  tackle  foreign  information 
manipulation  and  interference.  It  continues  to  strengthen  its  situational  awareness,  to  build 
resilience  and  to  become  more  effective  in  disrupting  these  activities.  With  its  strategic 
communications  capability,  and  in  particular  the  East  Stratcom  Task  Force,  the  EU  detects, 
analyses and exposes Russian disinformation. It continues to build capacity and pro-actively 
engages  with  audiences  inside  the  EU,  the  Western  Balkans  and  the  neighbourhood.  The 
Rapid  Alert System  connects  EU institutions with Member States and like-minded partners, 
such as the G7 and NATO, to enable joint responses. With the Code of Practice, the EU has 
also  established  a  clear  framework  for  online  platforms  to  deal  with  this  challenge.  The 

15  JOIN(2016) 18 final of 6.4.2016. 
16  JOIN(2018) 16 final of 13.6.2018. 
17  Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1544 of 15.10.2018 and Council Regulation (EU) 2018/1542 of 15.10.2018. 
18  https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2328 
19  Council  Decision  (CFSP)  2019/797  of  17.5.2019  and  Council  Regulation  (EU)  2019/796  of  17.5.2019, 

Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1127 of 30.7.2020.  

20  JOIN(2020) 18 final of 16.12.2020. 
21  https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/cybersecurity-5g-networks-eu-toolbox-risk-mitigating-

measures 

22   These  activities  are  documented 

in  a 

series  of  Special  Reports 

issued  by 

the  EEAS: 

https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-special-report-update-short-assessment-of-narratives-and-disinformation-around-
the-covid-19-pandemic-update-december-2020-april-2021/?highlight=covid 

6 

 
                                                           
implementation  of  the  European  Democracy  Action  Plan23  will  further  enhance  these 
instruments. 

6.  Possible selective engagement with Russia on issues of interest to the EU 

As  per  the  five  guiding  principles  agreed  in  March  2016,  the  EU  is  open  to  selective 
engagement  with  Russia  on  issues  of  interest  to  the  EU.  The  EU  has  such  interests  on 
elements  of  our  green  agenda  (climate,  environment,  energy)  as  well  as  on  some  foreign 
policy  issues.  Ongoing  selective  engagement  on  issues  such  as  trade,  economic  and  digital 
matters,  home  affairs  and  public  health  have  brought  some  limited  concrete  results,  whilst 
there exist major irritants, notably in the fields of trade and transport.  

Shortly after Russia joined the Paris Agreement and given the EU’s ambitious climate goals24, 
the EU has gradually resumed senior officials’ discussions on climate with Russia, including 
through the EU-funded conference in December 2020 in Moscow, in the run-up to the COP-
26 in Glasgow. Russia has been working on a long-term strategy and has slightly updated its 
nationally  determined  contribution,  though  it  still  leaves  considerable  space  for  growing 
emissions. Russia has also taken some legislative steps to update its climate policies25, but its 
recent  efforts  could  generate  false  expectations.26  The  Russian  authorities  have  increasingly 
requested technical discussions with the EU on the possible impact of the EU’s climate policy 
on  the  Russian  economy.  The  EU  has  offered  thematic  discussions,  including  on  carbon 
pricing, climate change adaptation, and possibly the carbon border adjustment mechanism. 

Russia  shares  more  than  2,000  kilometres  of  border  with  the  EU  and  faces  a  number  of 
environmental  challenges  that  have  an  impact  on  the  EU  and  its  Member  States.  Deeper 
cooperation  could  include  issues  such  as  waste  management,  reducing  cross-border  and  air 
pollution, the circular economy, sustainable forest management, and fighting forest fires. This 
would  also  have  a  positive  impact  on  climate  change,  the  effects  of  which  already  tangibly 
affect Russia, such as melting permafrost. In the short term, the upcoming Conference of the 
Parties  of  the  Convention  on  Biological  Diversity  provides  an  opportunity  for  prior 
engagement.  

While  the  EU-Russia  energy  dialogue  remains  suspended,  there  are  a  number  of  pressing 
issues.  The  correct  implementation  of  the  agreement  on  Ukraine  gas  transit  needs  to  be 
monitored. The synchronisation of the Baltic States to the European grid and electricity trade 
should be completed while ensuring continued safe operation of the Russian and Belarusian 
grid.  

On digital issues, working level exchanges with Russia have lacked concrete results. Pursuing 
EU interests, notably coordination on the use of the 700 MHz frequency band27 and market 
access for EU companies in Russia, remains important. Other topics, including research and 
innovation,  big  data,  data  protection,  copyright,  internet  governance  and  autonomous 
vehicles,  were  discussed  without  any  substantial  follow-up.  The  EU  should  also  actively 

23  COM(2020) 790 final of 3.12.2020. 
24  COM(2019) 640 final of 11.12.2019. 
25  Such as the recent draft bill on monitoring greenhouse gas emissions at corporate level and a special law to 

turn Sakhalin into a pilot territory for carbon-neutrality. 

26  In the context of the recent legislative developments on climate policies, the Russian authorities have put a 
lot of emphasis on creating the conditions for forest-based offsetting projects to grow, thus benefitting from 
the  possible  opportunities  of  international  voluntary  carbon  markets,  but  the  EU  is  not  planning  on  using 
international credits for EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) compliance after 2020. 

27  The failure of Russia to manage the switchover of the 700Mhz band prevents EU Member States bordering 

Russia from fulfilling their own legal obligations to do so. 

7 

 
                                                           
address Russia’s import substitution policy in public procurement of software and hardware to 
avoid significant risks and difficulties to the EU’s digital industry. 

As regards foreign policy issues, there are persisting tensions in the EU’s neighbourhood, and 
growing competition in other regions where Russia is strategically seeking to assert its role, 
such  as  the  Western  Balkans  and  the  Southern  Mediterranean,  as  well  as  the  African 
continent.  Nevertheless,  there  are  areas  where  the  Russian  government  has  been  playing  a 
constructive  role,  such  as  on  the  preservation  of  the  Joint  Comprehensive  Plan  of  Action 
(JCPoA) with Iran and ensuring its full and effective implementation. The same holds for the 
ongoing diplomatic efforts  in  Vienna to  facilitate a possible return by the US  to  the JCPoA 
and a full resumption by Iran of its nuclear commitments. In the context of Libya, the key EU 
priorities  are  to  ensure  the  Russian  government’s  positive  attitude  to  the  ongoing  political 
process  and  for  a  swift  withdrawal  of  its  mercenaries.  Russia’s  view  on  the  Middle  East 
Peace Process has remained in principle close to that of the EU.  

On Syria, the EU’s and Russia’s positions differ sharply. The Russian government supports 
the current  Assad regime, including  the recent  “Presidential  elections” on 26 May  2021.  Its 
military  intervention  in  Syria  may  have  been  instrumental  in  securing  the  survival  of  the 
regime,  but  has  further  undermined  the  stability  and  viability  of  the  Syrian  state  and 
contributed to a regional humanitarian crisis. For the EU the only way forward is a genuine 
political solution based on the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 2254 in 
full,  which  would  also  open  a  path  to  a  possible  voluntary,  safe  and  dignified  return  of 
refugees.  In  any  case,  the  EU  will  keep  engaging  with  Russia  on  the  need  to  sustain 
humanitarian access  to  Syrians in  need,  as well as on upholding  International  Humanitarian 
Law in Syria. 

The EU continues to engage with Russia within the Northern Dimension and the Black Sea 
region. Cooperation under the Transport and Logistics Partnership of the Northern Dimension 
focuses  on  possible  sharing  of  views  and  best  practices  on  decarbonisation  of  transport. 
Discussions are also ongoing on Russia’s participation in the Black Sea Basin and Northern 
Periphery and Arctic  Interreg programmes in  2021-2027, in  which it has  expressed interest. 
The  Russian  leadership  continues  to  block  the  EU’s  application  for  observer  status  in  the 
Arctic  Council,  which  it  now  chairs,  although  this  has  not  prevented  the  EU  from 
contributing  to  its  work.  Russia  also  blocks  the establishment  of  Marine  Protected  Areas  in 
the Southern Ocean. 

The  EU  has  maintained  technical  contacts  with  Russia  on  trade  that  are  usually  limited  to 
exchanges,  with  few  results,  on  the  numerous  irritants28.  Most  of  them  emanate  from  the 
Russian  government’s  policy  of  import  substitution,  which  is  increasingly  justified  on 
purported  security  grounds  related  to  sanctions.  This  comes  in  addition  to  already  existing 
government-induced significant distortions in the Russian economy. As a result29, the overall 
business  and  investment  climate  in  the  country  is  further  deteriorating.  In  a  relatively  more 
positive  context,  the  EU  and  Russia  have  engaged  on  WTO  reform,  including  on  the 
restoration of dispute settlement.  

28  Discrimination in procurement by state-owned enterprises,  intellectual property rights and other challenges 
affecting  healthcare  goods  and  to  goods  and  services,  unreasonable  technical  requirements  for  alcoholic 
products and cement, export bans of raw materials, a drastic increase of a “recycling fee” for vehicles, etc. 
These  can  have  an  impact  also  on  customs  clearance  of  goods.  Over  the  last  five  years  (2015-2020)  some 
trade  irritants  with  Russia  (regulation  on  medical  devices,  measure  on  toys)  were  solved  in  the  WTO’s 
Technical Barriers in Trade Committee. 

29  Russian  import  substitution  policy  and  limited  contacts  has  led  to  a  gradual  loss  of  EU  positions  in  the 
Russian market: whereas in 2013 the EU was the origin of 43% of Russian imports and China of 17%, the 
numbers for 2020 are 34% and 24%. EU investors in Russia, notably in areas particularly linked to national 
security such as ICT, are under continuous pressure. 

8 

 
                                                           
The  Russian  government  has  banned  the  import  of  approximately  half  of  agricultural 
products  from  EU  Member  States  to  allow  the  increase  of  domestic  production  and  put 
pressure on the remaining agri-food trade, in particular wine, spirits and pet food, via various 
sanitary and phyto-sanitary restrictions. Notably EU Geographical Indications continue to be 
misused.  However,  the  EU  agri-food  sector  has  been  remarkably  resilient.  With  some 
sectorial  and  regional  differences,  it  has  generally  been  able  to  find  alternative  markets  so 
that,  since  the  imposition  of  the  embargo,  the  value  of  global  EU  exports  has  increased 
considerably.30 

Some expert dialogues on home affairs are continuing at varying intervals. The last meetings 
of  the  EU-Russia  Migration  Dialogue  and  the  Joint  Visa  Facilitation  and  Readmission 
Committees  took  place  in  2018-2019.  Although  the  Russian  government  considers 
cooperation  in  these  areas  important,  it  does  not  meet  fully  its  obligations.31  It  also  often 
opposes the EU on counterterrorism and cybercrime in international fora. The last high-level 
EU-Russia  counterterrorism  talks  took  place  in  October  2019.  A  Russia-sponsored  UN 
Resolution has started a challenging process possibly threatening the position of the Budapest 
Convention  on  Cybercrime.  The  expert  dialogue  on  drugs  exchanges  relevant  information 
annually. 

There are no regular technical EU-Russia exchanges on public health, although there is good 
regional  level  cooperation  within  the  Northern  Dimension  Partnership  in  Public  Health  and 
Social Well-Being. The European Medicines Agency started in March 2021 a rolling review 
of the Russian COVID-19 vaccine Sputnik V, assessing its compliance with the EU standards.  

A  variety  of  other  contacts  is  ongoing,  on  sectors  ranging  from  customs  cooperation  via 
industrial and competition issues to transport. These contacts remain at a technical level.  

7.  People-to-people contacts and support to Russian civil society 

Russia remains an important partner in terms of people-to-people mobility. It is the country 
where  most  Schengen  visas  are  issued  worldwide:  between  3.1  million  and  3.8  million  in 
2016-2018,  4.1  million  in  2019  (accounting  for  27%  of  total  Schengen  visas  issued 
worldwide), and 635,000 in 2020 (26%). Furthermore, around four out of five Schengen visas 
issued in Russia since 2016 are for multiple entries. 

Research and innovation has been an important area of cooperation, particularly through the 
participation of Russian entities in the EU programmes32. For example, under Horizon 2020, 
their participation in the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions involved 36 different organisations 
and  approximately  520  Russian  researchers.  Cooperation  is  based  on  the  principle  of  co-
funding, with Russia supporting its own scientists in joint projects or making a commensurate 
financial  and  material  contribution.  EU  interests  include  accessing  Russia’s  leading  large-
scale research facilities, engaging Russian scientific expertise for research on topics related to 
EU policy priorities and global challenges, facilitating the adoption of European solutions in 
Russia,  and  maintaining  bridges  with  Russia’s  academic  community.  Both  sides  have 
completed  the  internal  procedures  to  renew  the  EU-Russia  Science  and  Technology 
Cooperation Agreement for a new five-year period, but the renewal remains blocked due to an 
issue  related  to  its  territorial  scope.  Whilst  the  renewal  would  ensure  a  stable  long-term 

30  Despite  these  serious  issues,  the  Russian  market  remains  the  sixth  export  destination  for  EU  agri-food 

products, which have gradually increased since 2017 (to decline in 2020).  

31  The main issues of concern for the EU remain the  lack of visa reciprocity (e.g. low share of multiple-entry 
visas issued to EU citizens), the need to restart (previously satisfactory) cooperation on readmission after the 
pandemic and the necessity to hold both Joint Committees on a regular basis. 

32  Framework  Programmes  for  Research  &  Innovation  (Horizon  2020  (2014-2020),  Horizon  Europe  (2021-

2027)). 

9 

 
                                                           
framework  for  cooperation,  the  Joint  S&T  Cooperation  Committee  meetings  are  held 
annually. 

As regards education, youth and culture, the EU supports the outreach to Russian society, 
the academic and research community, youth and culture stakeholders via EU programmes33. 
Russia  has  been  a  full  member  of  the  European  Higher  Education  Area  and  the  Bologna 
Process. Russia holds the first place among all international partner countries participating in 
Erasmus+  2014-2020  International  Credit  Mobility  with  over  23  000  Erasmus+  two-way 
academic exchanges of students and staff.  

In  the  area  of  culture,  Russia  can  participate  in  the  Cultural  Relations  Platform.  Erasmus+ 
2021-2027  foresees  continuing  established  cooperation  with  Russia  in  higher  education  and 
youth  and  new  funding  actions  in  vocational  education  and  training  and  virtual  exchanges. 
Under  Horizon  Europe  2021-2027,  the  intention  is  to  further  balance  the  researchers’  flows 
between  Russia  and  the  EU.  The  recently  adopted  amendments  to  the  Law  on  Education34 
could have implications for international cooperation in education and research.  

Russia currently participates in eight Interreg cooperation programmes which remain one of 
the  few  EU  instruments  investing  in  projects  in  Russia  via  central  authorities.  Russia  is  a 
committed contributor to the programmes.  

The EU is a leading supporter of Russian civil society and human rights organisations. EU 
action  for  Russians  covers  a  broad  range  of  areas,  including  support  for  universal  rights, 
media literacy, youth, women, gender equality, social inclusion, elderly, women and children, 
people  with  disabilities,  migrants,  people  belonging  to  minority  communities,  victims  of 
domestic  violence,  prisoners,  and  other  marginalised  and  vulnerable  groups.  The  EU  also 
funds  the  EU-Russia  Civil  Society  Forum.  EU  action  has  been  crucial  for  Russian  civil 
society  organisations  to  continue  their  activities  despite  a  very  repressive  and  further 
tightening  environment,  enhance  awareness,  and  allow  for  providing  factually  correct 
information about the EU and important topics. 

As set out above, the more restrictive legal framework35, suppression of independent voices 
and limitations on fundamental freedoms in Russia impose major constraints to the work of 
civil  society.  A  number  of  independent  journalists  and  human  rights  activists  have  left  the 
country.  The  EU  has  continued  to  support  people-to-people  contacts  and  civil  society 
unabatedly, as an investment for the future.36 

Finally,  the  EU  is  now  equipped  with  specific  instruments  against  those  violating  human 
rights.  The  adoption  and  first  listings  under  the  new  EU  Global  Human  Rights  Sanctions 

33  Erasmus+, Horizon’s Marie Skłodowska-Curie actions, and the European Solidarity Corps. 
34  According to the new law, any activity classified as ‘educational’ must be coordinated with the authorities. 
35  Such as the legislation on “foreign agents” organisations that is used e.g. to harass NGOs and activists with 
possible  criminal  liability  as  well  as  to  pre-screen  electoral  candidates  and  bar  NGOs  and  media  from 
participating in election campaigns. Under the law on “undesirable organisations”, for which amendments are 
being considered to toughen its scope, the authorities can shut down foreign or international organisations in 
Russia. The concept of a candidate “performing the function of a foreign agent” and “affiliated with a person 
performing the function of a foreign agent” was recently introduced in the electoral law and will most likely 
be  applied  in  a  selective  and  discriminatory  manner  targeting  non-systemic  opposition.  The  Russian 
authorities  often  abuse  legislative  provisions  to  ban  inconvenient  political  gatherings  and  new  provisions 
provide  for  labelling  of  single  pickets  as  a  mass  action  and  criminal  liability  for  blocking  roads  and 
sidewalks. Several legal acts, with often vague wording, restrict  media freedom and give the state agencies 
significant powers. 

36  The EU also updated in February 2021 its guidelines on supporting human rights defenders and civil society 

as well as enhancing people-to-people contacts. 

10 

 
                                                           
Regime  sent  a  clear  political  signal  about  our  willingness  to  act  against  those  undermining 
them, including in Russia.37 

8.  Conclusions and action points 

This report sets out the state of EU-Russia relations in all their complexity, clearly identifying 
challenges  and  opportunities.  Russia  remains  our  largest  neighbour  and  an  important  global 
actor. However, as this report shows, the deliberate policy choices and aggressive actions of 
the Russian government over the last years have created negative spiral.  

the  strategic  challenge  posed  by 

leadership,  our  collective 
To  meet 
implementation of the five principles has given the EU purpose and a principled approach to 
defending  our  interests  and  promoting  our  values.  The  EU  and  its  Member  States  shall 
continue to act with unity and consistency, defending their fundamental values, principles and 
interests. Bilateral engagement should not be pursued at the expense of common EU interests 
and goals. 

the  Russian 

History,  geography  and  people  bind  the  EU  and  Russia.  However,  a  renewed  partnership 
allowing us to realise the full potential of close cooperation seems a distant prospect. Against 
the backdrop of the challenging political context and in light of Russia’s strategic choices, the 
EU needs to prepare for a further downturn of its relations with Russia as the most realistic 
outlook for the time being. 

Our  ambition  should  be  to  explore  paths  that  could  help  change  the  current  dynamics 
gradually into a more predictable and stable relationship. 

To enable this, the EU will maintain open channels of communication with Russia. We expect 
the  Russian  leadership  to  demonstrate  a  more  constructive  engagement  and  political 
commitment and stop actions against the EU and its Member States, as well as against third 
countries.  This  is  indispensable  to  turn  the  current  unproductive  and  potentially  dangerous 
tide in this important relationship. 

The  EU  will  simultaneously  push  back,  constrain  and  engage  Russia,  based  on  a  strong 
common understanding of Russia’s aims, an approach of principled pragmatism and fully in 
line with the five principles.  

The EU will continue to push back against human rights violations and will speak up for 
democratic  values,  including  in  international  fora,  making  clear  that  these  are  matters  of 
direct  and  legitimate  concern  to  all  UN,  OSCE  and  Council  of  Europe  States  and  do  not 
belong exclusively to the internal affairs of a country. The Russian government needs to abide 
by its international obligations and commitments. 

The EU will continue to raise Russia’s consistent breaches of international law in Ukraine, 
Georgia, and elsewhere prominently, including through initiatives with like-minded partners. 
This  includes  calling on  Russia to  assume its responsibility as a party to  the conflict  and to 
fully  implement  the  Minsk  agreements.  The  EU  will  more  actively  challenge  the  false 
narratives employed by Russia to justify its actions, on all levels. We will continue to counter 
(through our visa practices) Russia’s policy of “passportisation” in Ukraine.  

The EU will continue to respond to the Russian government’s malicious actions, including to 
hybrid  actions,  in  an  appropriate  manner.  This  could  include  scaling-up  and  expanding  its 
various existing sanctions regimes and/or taking additional restrictive measures if needed.  

37  Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999 of 7.12.2020 and Council Regulation (EU) 2020/1998 of 7.12.2020, and 

Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/372 of 2.3.2021. 

11 

 
                                                           
The EU will aim at limiting the resources the Russian government can draw on to carry out 
its disruptive foreign policy. We will also enforce EU legislation more effectively to counter, 
in a targeted manner, criminal activities originating from Russia (including ransom attacks), 
together with like-minded partners. We will step up our fight against corruption and money 
laundering, including through increased transparency on financial flows concerning Russia. 
The EU will step up its action against coercive practices by third countries, including Russia, 
by developing a new, autonomous tool permitting effective responses to dissuade and offset 
coercion.  

To  constrain  Russia’s  attempts  to  undermine  EU  interests,  the  Union  itself  must  become 
more robust and resilient.  

We  must  counter  threats  and  malign  actions  more  systematically  and  in  a  joined  up  way, 
whilst  ensuring  coordination  with  like-minded  partners  such  as  NATO  and  G7.  Member 
States should coordinate their responses to Russia’s actions even more pro-actively. 

We  should  further  develop  the  EU’s  cyber  security  and  defence  capacity,  as  well  as  its 
strategic communication capabilities. We will further step up our action to address and stop 
information  manipulation  and  disinformation,  including  by  strengthening  the  regulatory 
framework  for  social  media  platforms.  The  EU  is  considering  introducing  new  instruments 
allowing  to  impose  costs  on  perpetrators,  including  in  the  framework  of  the  European 
Democracy Action Plan.  

We should continue to strengthen our capabilities against  hybrid threats, including the EU 
Hybrid Fusion Cell, Helsinki European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, 
and  our  structured  cooperation  with  NATO,  and  take  dedicated  action  to  protect  better  the 
EU’s and Member States' democratic processes, institutions and electoral infrastructure. 

We  will  make  better  use  of  the  leverage  provided  by  our  energy  transition  and  will  fully 
implement  EU energy market  rules. We will support the energy security  of our neighbours, 
including the correct implementation of the agreement on Ukraine gas transit. Completing the 
synchronisation of the Baltic States to the European grid and electricity trade remains a high 
priority. 

We will step up support to our Eastern partners, working to realise the full potential of the 
Eastern Partnership. The upcoming Eastern Partnership Summit will be an important occasion 
to  forge  this  common  post-2020  agenda.  Successful  political  and  economic  reforms,  in 
particular in the areas of the rule of law, human rights, the fight against corruption and good 
governance,  will  reduce  the  vulnerabilities  of  our  partners  and  serve  as  a  key  antidote  to 
interference  and  destabilisation  attempts  by  Russia.  Our  agenda  could  include  investing  in 
security partnerships with our neighbours to further increase their resilience. 

To further its own interests, the EU should engage Russia on several key challenges.  

The  COVID-19  pandemic  has  shown  the  common  interest  for  constructive  engagement  on 
public  health,  e.g.  on  tackling  cross-border  health  threats,  better  preparedness,  work  on 
antimicrobial resistance, regulatory convergence and access to medical products.  

In light of our common interest to combat climate change and other environmental issues, 
the EU should engage in a closer dialogue with Russia, most immediately in the run-up to the 
COP-26  in  Glasgow  and  the  COP-15  on  Biodiversity  in  Kunming.  It  should  also  pursue 
thematic  discussions  in  these  fields,  including  on  carbon  pricing,  renewables,  methane 
emissions,  climate  change  adaptation  and  the  EU’s  future  carbon  border  adjustment 
mechanism. This is all the more important for Russia given the fast-changing geopolitics of 
energy and its own delayed low-carbon transition. 

12 

 
There should be more technical engagement with the Russian government on the vast number 
of  economic  irritants,  e.g.  on  import  substitution,  trade  barriers  and  subsidy  controls, 
leveraging the EU’s competitive advantages. Depending on the issue and strictly in line with 
the sovereign choices of other countries concerned, this would also include targeted, technical 
work with the Eurasian Economic Union, within the latter’s remit.  

The EU will further people-to-people contacts. This could include more visa facilitation (e.g. 
visa fee waivers) for the youth, work-and-travel programmes, academic cooperation, science 
and education, and student exchanges.  

As  regards  regional  and  cross-border  cooperation,  we  should  continue  to  pursue 
programmes  with  Russia,  cooperation  under  the  Northern  Dimension  and  practical 
cooperation in regional inter-governmental formats, e.g. the Council of the Baltic Sea States, 
the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, the Black Sea region as well as in the Arctic. 

The  EU  will  enhance  its  support  to  Russian  civil  society  and  human  rights  defenders, 
applying  more  flexible  and  creative  approaches.  We  will  step  up  support  to  independent 
Russian language media outlets to strengthen a plurality of views. We will also fine-tune our 
aid programmes as needed to ensure their effectiveness and avoid the repression of partners. 

The  EU  will  work  on  conflict  prevention  and  bilateral  de-confliction  and  confidence-
building  mechanisms.  We  will  cooperate  on  regional  (such  as  JCPoA,  Middle  East,  Libya, 
Afghanistan)  and  global  issues  (such  as  counter-terrorism  and  nuclear  proliferation),  based 
on the full respect of international law as the core of a rules-based international order. The EU 
will continue to engage with Russia in multilateral organisations. 

On  the  basis  of  overall  developments  and  guidance  from  the  European  Council,  the 
Commission  and  the  High  Representative/Vice-President  will  operationalise  the  agenda  set 
out above. 

13