COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Drawing the early lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic
Date: 2021-06-15
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: European cooperation, coronavirus disease, crisis management, disease prevention, economic recession, economic recovery, emergency aid, epidemic, public health, vaccine

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 15.6.2021  COM(2021) 380 final  COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS     Drawing the early lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic  
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 

The world continues to grapple with an unprecedented public health crisis, which has taken an 
unspeakable  toll  on  human  life,  put  societies  under  enormous  strain  and  sparked  one  of  the 
most acute global economic challenge in modern history. As vaccination rates continue to go 
up  and  infection  rates  go  down  in  Europe,  the  EU  has  put  in  place  a  set  of  measures  and 
coordination  to  confront  the  pandemic  and  ensure  that  the  impact  on  our  societies  and 
economies  is  alleviated.  At  the  same  time,  the  risks  of  COVID-19  are  still  high  and  daily 
global infection levels are more than twice what they were this time last year. 

This reflects the fact that, despite the progress, the pandemic is not yet over. But it also shows 
the  need  and  the  urgency  to  continue  learning  the  lessons  of  this  crisis  in  order  to  better 
address  the  new  and  emerging  threats  of  this  pandemic,  while  also  preparing  for  new  and 
different  health  crises  in  the  future.  This  Communication  therefore  focuses  on  some  of  the 
early lessons in the field of health that Europe needs to act upon now. It is by design – and by 
necessity – an interim report and provides a basis on which more lessons will be drawn in the 
longer term.  

Any  exercise  of  this  nature  must  start  with  a  critical  look  at  what  has  been  done,  what  has 
worked well and what has not. It needs to acknowledge that without the skill and selflessness 
of so many front line workers, the situation would undoubtedly have been even more difficult. 
It should also acknowledge the uneven impact of the crisis, with vulnerable groups amongst 
the hardest hit. This honest assessment is essential if real lessons are to be drawn at policy and 
political level. It can help identify where weaknesses and fragilities have been exposed, where 
preparedness  and  response  systems  and  cultures  have  to  be  strengthened  and  where 
emergency solutions can be built on or made permanent.  

The underlying truth is that just like almost every region and country across the world, neither 
the EU nor the Member States were ready for this pandemic. Preparedness and planning were 
exposed as being under-funded and under-developed and much of the EU response had to be 
ad  hoc  and  temporary.  Coordination  and  cooperation  between  Member  States  was  often 
initially  difficult  and  took  time  to  get  established  and  start  functioning.  This  cost  valuable 
time in the early stages of the pandemic and shows that the right structures were not in place.  

At the same time, the EU’s response to the evolving pandemic has included a wide range of 
unprecedented  initiatives  that  were  designed  and  delivered  in  record  time.  This,  above  all, 
saved  lives,  livelihoods  and  brought  help  to  health  services.  It  also  demonstrated  the  added 
value  and  need  to  work  together  as  Europeans  when  it  comes  to  pandemics  or  other  cross-
border  threats,  whether  through  emergency  response,  vaccines,  procurement,  the  production 
of essential goods, or leadership and effective support for global efforts.  

The EU’s action to mitigate the risk of major economic recession was swift, effective, and 
well-coordinated  from  the  start.  It  relied  on  a  combination  of  triggering  existing  crisis 
response mechanisms and the mobilisation of huge resources. This response drew heavily on 
the lessons  learned since the financial crisis  that  started in  2008.  Learning from  experience, 
the EU – Member States  and EU institutions  – took  swift and resolute action to  protect  the 
economy  when  crisis  struck  in  2020.  The  monetary  policy  decisions  and  forward  guidance 
from the European Central Bank, which have preserved favourable conditions for all sectors 
of the economy, and actions by supervisory authorities, have also been indispensable. 

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HOW TO LEARN LESSONS: WHAT THE ECONOMIC RESPONSE TEACHES US 
ABOUT CRISIS PREPAREDNESS 

The  EU  took  decisive  action  to  tackle  the  economic  fallout  of  the  pandemic.  This  drew 
heavily on the experience and arrangements built to address previous challenges and crises 
in  the  economic  and  financial  area.  However,  it  was  clear  from  the  outset  that  we  were 
faced with a once-in-a-century challenge.  

A trusted three-step approach:  

-  First, the EU took  emergency steps to mobilise EU resources, including €82 billion 
from the EU budget (including the Coronavirus Virus Response Investment Initiatives 
(CRII  and  CRII+),  and  deployed  the  General  Escape  Clause  of  the  Stability  and 
Growth  Pact  and  the  temporary  framework  for  state  aid  to  allow  Member  States  to 
step  in  at  scale:  in  2020,  national  measures  amounted  to  €3  trillion  in  fiscal  and 
liquidity  support.  This  was  backed  up  with  action  by  the  European  Central  Bank  to 
support financial stability.  

-  Second,  a  repair  phase  used  solidarity  through  the  mobilisation  of  EU  instruments 
amounting  to  €540  billion  to  cushion  the  economic  impact  of  the  crisis,  including 
through temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks (SURE).  

-  Finally,  we  are  now  in  the  recovery  phase,  with  NextGenerationEU  bringing  €750 
billion,  notably  in  support  through  the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  (RRF)  and 
REACT-EU to support investment and reform over the next six years. 

Three main characteristics of the policy response: 

-  Speed:  the  Commission  took  all  decisions  in  record  time,  while  maintaining  proper 
democratic scrutiny. The CRII entered into force just one month after being proposed. 
The  new  €100  billion  European  instrument  for  temporary  Support  to  mitigate 
Unemployment Risks in  an Emergency  (SURE) was also  adopted within a month of 
being proposed and became operational in summer 2020. The political agreement by 
the European Council on NextGenerationEU was achieved less than two months after 
the  Commission  proposal,  and  the  Own  Resources  Decision  was  fully  ratified  only 
five months after the start of the corresponding MFF. As a comparison, the last three 
Own Resources Decisions entered into force after more than two years after the start 
of the corresponding MFF;   

-  Ambition: the EU economic response united different viewpoints. NextGenerationEU 
was set up as a temporary and extraordinary measure to address an extraordinary crisis 
that affected all. This shows that the EU has the capacity to rise to the challenge. 

-  Coherence: the EU economic response delivered supportive and mutually-reinforcing 
fiscal and monetary policies. Importantly, it also struck a balance between short-term 
response  and  longer  term  imperatives.  The  Commission  pre-crisis  agenda-setting 
priorities  were  built  in  to  recovery  and  the  design  of  NextGenerationEU,  notably 
drawing on the European Green Deal, the digital transition and the social element of 
the recovery. 

Three lessons learnt for future health response:  

-  The decisive role of EU coordination:  Coordinated national  fiscal  policy responses 
and the strong role for the EU budget and the Recovery and Resilience Plans will help 
offset  the  asymmetric  impact  of  the  crisis  and  allow  the  EU  to  grow  together.  This 
common EU action on the economy mirrored the essential role of common EU action 

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in areas such as vaccines, but could draw on the experiences and arrangements built to 
address previous challenges in the economic and financial area and did not need to be 
improvised.  

-  Resilience  of  the  EU  policy  coordination  system:  strengthening  the  resilience  of 
national  economies,  the  Single  Market  and  the  EU’s  industrial  ecosystems  is  a  key 
element of the policy response. The response to previous economic and financial crisis 
allowed the EU to be much more ready to respond to the economic fallout, with tools 
in  place such as the  General  Escape Clause or the Banking Union. EU health policy 
did not have such tools already in place to be triggered at moments of crisis.  

-  EU role on the global stage: the weight of the EU economy and the Euro have been 
key to increase EU resilience to shocks, including the economic crisis triggered by the 
pandemic.  The  strong  interdependence  between  EU  economies  and  the  rest  of  the 
world  has  also  been  underlined  once  again,  with  global  supply  chains  recognised  as 
never  before.  Global  cooperation  in  health  needs  to  use  the  same  combination  of 
multilateral  commitment  and  the  EU’s  global  weight  to  leverage  the  best  health 
response in a crisis through a continued Team Europe approach. 

We  must  now  learn  from  this  example,  turning  emergency  action  into  structural  change 
for a coordinated response to future health crises of this nature. We must take what we have 
learned  over  the  past  eighteen  months  and  turn  it  into  a  more  systematic  approach,  a 
coordinated  system  that  allows  for  earlier  anticipation  and  detection  of  risk,  better 
contingency planning, and swifter and more effective joint response.  

This  Communication  therefore  focuses  on  health  preparedness  and  response.  It  starts  by 
providing  an  overview  of  the  story  so  far,  before  drawing  ten  early  lessons  from  the  health 
crisis  where  the  EU  needs  to  act.  It  will  feed  the  Leaders’  discussion  at  the  June  European 
Council, be presented to the European Parliament and will be followed up by the Commission 
in the second half of 2021 with concrete deliverables. 

2.  LEARNING BY DOING – THE STORY SO FAR 

By the time the World  Health Organization declared a  global pandemic  on 11 March 2020, 
the virus had taken hold  in  Europe. This  was exacerbated by the lack  – or suppression  – of 
information being shared by the Chinese authorities at the outset of the outbreak. Lacking a 
robust  EU  system  to  declare  an  emergency  situation  and  trigger  the  coordination  required, 
governments were already trying to catch up with the reality, and it proved difficult to bring 
together a consistent and effective early response.  

There was a clear shortfall in pandemic preparedness and planning, with few tools already 
in place to respond swiftly and effectively as soon as the pandemic broke out. This was true at 
global, European, national and local level but was perhaps more acutely felt in Europe, where 
we had not been tested by the epidemics or outbreaks seen in other parts of the world in recent 
decades.  Attempts  to  contain  the  spread  of  the  virus  by  using  internal  border  closures  and 
checks  were  uncoordinated  and  had  a  limited  or  counterproductive  effect,  weakening  vital 
supply chains, while temporary export bans on essential supplies only led to more shortages. 
In addition, on a global level, trade flows of critical products and materials were hampered by 
export restrictions and the prioritisation of domestic production by countries outside the EU. 

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In the initial phase, it immediately became clear that healthcare systems were stretched to the 
limit and the first wave revealed the limitations in Member State health systems in terms of 
healthcare  personnel,  the  lack  of  sufficient  hospital  beds,  medical  equipment,  supplies,  and 
medicines,  leaving  healthcare  workers  overwhelmed  and  the  whole  system  under  immense 
stress1.  Attempts  to  mitigate  these  gaps  through  increased  solidarity  in  intensive  care  or 
medical supplies showed the need and the value of coordination between Member States, for 
instance  by  deploying  teams  and  resources  to  help  areas  under  greatest  pressure.  However, 
these efforts were often hampered by a lack of reliable or comparable data.  

As  the  crisis  continued  to  unfold,  the  EU  proved  itself  capable  of  responding  effectively 
across  the  board.  It  increasingly  shifted  from  unilateral  actions  towards  convergence  of 
decisions  and  developed  a  wide  range  of  policy  responses,  adjusting  and  updating  to  the 
different  phases  of  the  pandemic.  This  is  exemplified  by  the  common  approach  to  vaccines 
but is also true of new initiatives across a range of other policies. The Green Lanes initiative2 
maintained  the  integrity  of  supply  chains,  ensuring  supplies  of  food  and  medicines  in  the 
Single  Market,  and  the  common  approach  to  assessing  infection  rates  in  different  regions 
helped  bring  more  consistency  to  imposing  testing  and  quarantine.  Tax  and  Customs 
initiatives were swiftly taken to help the supply of vital medical and protective equipment and 
Guidelines supported the safe movement of frontier and seasonal workers across borders. EU 
rules  on  cohesion  policy  were  amended  with  an  unprecedented  speed,  allowing  Member 
States to rapidly redirect EU funds to finance emergency needs in the healthcare sector. 

More  recently,  the  Commission  proposal  for  an  EU  Digital  COVID  Certificate  was  agreed 
and implemented in record time, paving the way for the lifting of free movement restrictions, 
and the resumption of tourism and travel. This initiative also showed the value of improving 
cross-border interoperability of information systems and data flows.  

A key area of response to assess is the approach taken to developing, procuring and producing 
vaccines. Learning from the initial disjointed response to the crisis, the Commission presented 
in June 2020 a common EU Vaccines Strategy3. This enabled the support and speeding up of 
development  and  manufacturing  at  scale.  Negotiations  with  vaccine  producers  have 
sometimes been challenging, but the approach has ensured access to COVID-19 vaccines for 
all Member States on the scale allowing the rollout we see today, as well as exports to more 
than one hundred countries worldwide. All 27 Member States agreed to join forces and give 
the  Commission  the  mandate  to  carry  out  tasks  that  were  traditionally  considered  to  be 
national decisions.  

This was an essential step to overcoming the pandemic together and had it not been in place, 
Member  States  would  have  been  competing  with  each  other  for  fewer  doses  from  fewer 
producers. We would have seen significant variations in speed of vaccination and would have 
faced a higher risk of inequity, variants and travel disruption. Instead, as it stands, over half of 
European  adults  have  received  one  dose  while  over  a  quarter  are  fully  vaccinated.  Whilst 
more remains to be done, this is a historic common achievement in record time and enables 
the gradual, sustained and safe reopening of social and economic life and the support to our 
international partners4.  

1   https://ec.europa.eu/health/sites/default/files/state/docs/2020_healthatglance_rep_en.pdf 
2   COM/2020/1897 final, 23 March 2020 
3   COM/2020/245 final, 17 June 2020 
4   COM/2021/129 final, 17 March 2021 

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At the same time, this success does not mask the difficulties that were encountered, notably 
scaling up manufacturing and production capacity, and dependencies on global supply chains. 
This  was  partly  down  to  the  lack  of  a  permanent  integrated  approach  to  research, 
development,  market  authorisation,  production  and  supply.  While  this  has  since  been 
addressed in the context of COVID-19 vaccines, a longer term solution is needed for future 
health events or crises.  

3. THE TEN LESSONS OF COVID-19 FOR PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY 

Learning lessons from any crisis starts with an honest reflection of the past and the present in 
order  to  improve  for  the  future.  In  this  spirit,  each  of  the  ten  lessons  drawn  in  this  report 
focuses  on  what  needed  to  be  improved  and  what  can  be  done  better  in  the  future.  The  ten 
lessons  are  not  exhaustive  or  mutually  exclusive  –  they  simply  provide  a  first  snapshot  of 
what we already know can be done to secure a more effective health response.   

Lesson  One:  Faster  detection  and  response  depends  on  stronger  global  surveillance  and 
more comparable and complete data  

As  with  every  outbreak  of  a  new  infectious  disease,  early  detection  is  essential  for 
successfully  containing  the  spread  of  a  disease  and  its  impact  on  people,  economies  and 
societies both locally and globally. Surveillance systems across Europe and the world enable 
faster  detection  and  earlier  notification  to  others,  as  well  as  a  much  more  informed 
management  of  a  pandemic  under  way.  They  also  allow  experts  from  across  the  world  to 
carry out research and risk analyses on new viruses and on their potential impact or threat.  

COVID-19  highlighted  the  essential  role  of  these  surveillance  systems,  which  successfully 
picked up reports of concerning clusters of pneumonia cases as early as 31 December 2019. 
Once the genomic sequence was released in mid-January, this enabled the development work 
on tests, treatments and even vaccines to begin in earnest.  

However, the pandemic also showed the limitations of the current surveillance systems. They 
revealed that they are only as effective as the data that feeds them. In the initial weeks after 
the  first  case,  a  lack  of  comparable  and  complete  data  meant  that  much  of  the  threat 
assessments and scientific research could not be carried out to the fullest extent. Critical time 
was lost in detecting the true scale, speed and severity of the epidemic, leading to delays in 
key decisions across Europe and elsewhere. As a result, global coordination took too long to 
be  put  in  place.  As  the  International  Panel  for  Pandemic  Preparedness  and  Response 
concluded, the current international alert system “does not operate with sufficient speed when 
faced with a fast-moving respiratory pathogen.” 

This is why a new global surveillance system needs to be put into place, with the necessary 
tools and open environment to share data at the earliest possible stage. This should focus on 
greater coverage of surveillance networks in parts of the world where there are gaps, as well 
as facilitate faster exchange of comparable data.  

At European level, a new European pandemic information gathering system, building on 
the  existing  Early  Warning  and  Response  System  and  an  upgrade  of  the  European 
Surveillance  System5,  should  be  set  up  to  manage  and  exchange  data  in  real  time  and 

5 https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/european-surveillance-system-tessy 

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integrated into the new global system. This should focus on Member States providing timely 
information, ranging from early signals of potential threats – whether pandemics, bioterrorism 
or anything in between  – to concrete data on cases, exposures, risk factors, health outcomes 
and  healthcare  capacity.  As  part  of  this,  connecting  public  health  authorities  would  allow 
coordinated management of stockpiles and hospital beds, and rapid workforce redeployments. 
It  would  allow  up-to-date  screening  of  the  situation  to  be  shared,  drawing  on  innovative 
sources  of  data  like  the  wastewater  monitoring  now  being  put  in  place6.  It  will  also  allow 
swifter and more effective contact tracing, as well as enable patient records and data to follow 
patients  across  borders.  This  should also  be integrated into the broader initiative to  create  a 
European  Health  Data  Space.  Seamlessly  linking  clinical  and  public  health  data,  such  as 
through  the  secure  sharing  of  electronic  health  records,  allows  a  real-time  snapshot  of  the 
epidemiological situation and response capacity.  

Drawing the lesson: 

-  The EU should lead efforts to design and implement a new, robust global surveillance 

system based on comparable and complete data.  

-  New and improved European pandemic information gathering system to be 

launched in 2021 

Lesson Two: Clear and coordinated scientific advice facilitates policy decisions and public 
communication  

While  policy  making  and  public  messaging  during  the  COVID-19  pandemic  continue  to  be 
informed  by  the  latest  scientific  advice,  the  early  months  of  the  crisis  exposed  the  uneven 
level  of research and advice in  different  Member States, as well as the different  approaches 
taken  to  providing  and  using  that  advice.  This  meant  that  evidence  was  patchy,  sometimes 
contradictory  and  often  confusing  as  a  result  of  different  messaging  in  different  Member 
States.  

The  need  to  share  knowledge  and  expertise  and  align  messaging  and  advice  prompted  the 
European  Commission 
to  set  up  an  advisory  panel  on  COVID-19  composed  of 
epidemiologists and virologists from different Member States. This panel continues to inform 
EU  guidelines  on  science-based  and  coordinated  risk  management  measures.  Other  new 
groups, such as the EU Scientific Advice platform on COVID-19, have provided a forum for 
peer exchange and coordination among scientific advisors to national governments, and have 
complemented work of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). 

The  success  of  these  groups  does  not  hide  the  need  for  more  coordination  at  EU  level  on 
scientific advice and for consistent, coherent and factual communication. There is a need to 
bridge  the  gap  between  science  and  policy-making,  and  for  an  authoritative  EU  scientific 
voice to communicate directly to the public, as was successfully done in countries in Europe 
and across the world.  

To  address  this,  a  new  European  Chief  Epidemiologist  would  help  bring  together  leading 
epidemiologists  in  Member  States  to  formulate  evidence-based  policy  recommendations  to 
the Commission and act as a point of communication with the public in times of crisis. 

6   This follows the Commission’s Recommendation on systemic surveillance of wastewater, COM(2021)1925, 

17 March 2021. 

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Drawing the lesson: 

-  The EU should appoint a European Chief Epidemiologist and set up a corresponding 

governance structure, by the end of 2021.  

Lesson Three: Preparedness needs constant investment, scrutiny and review 

If there is an overarching lesson for Europe to heed, it is that preparedness and planning was 
not  as  robust,  financed  or  as  comprehensive  as  it  needed  to  be.  While  there  were  many 
preparedness plans, the systems and infrastructure to update these and put them into motion 
did not always match the requirements needed. As in many other parts of the world, a historic 
and systemic underfunding in preparedness significantly hampered the first response efforts in 
many parts of Europe.  As this crisis  has shown, the cost  of non-action far strips the cost  of 
effective  and  systematic  investment  in  preparedness  and  planning,  including  strategic 
foresight.  

A new, systemic approach to preparedness is needed to learn the lesson from this pandemic. 
This starts with stepping up investment, for instance with an earmarked preparedness budgets 
to support initiatives such as stockpiles at national and EU level. Regular reviews and audits 
should  be  undertaken  to  ensure  that  the  latest  threats,  trends  and  risks  are  addressed  and 
capacities are in place should preparedness plans need to be put in motion.  

To  support  this,  the  Commission  will  prepare  an  annual  State  of  Preparedness  Report  to 
reflect  the  overall  changing  risk  landscape  in  Europe  and  the  state  of  preparedness.  It  will 
cover pandemics  and other health emergencies,  along  with  other scenarios that  the EU may 
realistically  have to  face in  the near future. These include  chemical,  biological,  radiological 
and  nuclear  attacks  or  accidents,  large  seismic  shocks,  environmental  or  technological 
disasters, or a widespread blackout. In preparing the report, the Commission will draw on all 
relevant expertise and authorities in these fields.  

Drawing the lesson:  

-  The European Commission to prepare an annual State of Preparedness Report to be 

presented to the European Council and European Parliament. 

Lesson Four: Emergency tools need to be ready, faster and easier to activate  

A striking feature of the pandemic was the increasing use of different emergency tools needed 
in  response  to  the  crisis.  These  include  the  use  of  the  Emergency  Support  Instrument,  the 
Advance  Purchase  Agreements  used  to  purchase  vaccines,  or  the  use  of  the  Union  Civil 
Protection  Mechanism  for  emergency  response  and  repatriations.  While  these  instruments 
were  successfully  deployed,  the  pandemic  highlighted  the  importance  to  have  fast, 
functioning and flexible temporary and exceptional measures ready to be activated, to allow 
the EU to react as quickly as it is needed.  

With  speed  being  of  the  essence,  the  pandemic  showed  the  need  for  a  more  systematic 
approach to these instruments. This requires a clear and decisive political decision on when to 
trigger  crisis  response,  as  well  as  a  toolbox  to  be  deployed  for  such  situations.  This  could 
include  the  automatic  activation  of  the  Emergency  Support  Instrument  to  allow  surge 
funding,  or  other  mechanisms  to  allow  swift  support  for  the  research,  development, 

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manufacturing  and  procurement  of  essential  countermeasures.  It  could  also  ensure  a  more 
coordinated approach to information-sharing and decision-making on public health measures.  

The  toolbox  should  include  targeted  measures  covering  specific  sectors.  A  proposal  will  be 
made  in  2022  for  a  Single  Market  Emergency  Instrument  (SMEI)  to  provide  a  swift  and 
flexible  response  to  the  impact  of  any  given  crisis  on  the  Single  Market.  It  would  include 
triggering  the  possibility  under  public  procurement  legislation  to  fast-track  negotiations  in 
cases of extreme urgency, as well as allowing for procurement on behalf of Member States for 
goods  beyond  the  current  limitation  to  medical  counter-measures.  In  line  with  the  Strategy 
towards  a  fully  functioning  and  resilient  Schengen  Area7,  the  Commission  will  propose 
initiatives  to  put  in  place  a  stable  framework  for  EU  coordination  of  internal  and  external 
border control measures, as well as a contingency plan for transport and mobility to build on 
the experience of the successful Green Lanes framework so that measures can be put in place 
if required for the exceptional circumstance of temporary internal border measures blocking 
traffic. 

Drawing the lesson: 

-  Establish a framework for the activation of an EU Pandemic State of Emergency and 

a toolbox for crisis situations 

Lesson Five: Coordinated measures should become a reflex for Europe 

Many  of  the  initial  responses  to  the  COVID-19  pandemic  were  characterised  by  unilateral 
decisions and a lack of coordination. This led to widely varying and unilateral approaches to 
the  health  interventions  between  Member  States.  Restrictions  designed  to  contain  the  virus 
were also changed very frequently, and there was considerable variety in testing policies and 
methodologies. The result was to undermine public trust and compliance with the measures in 
place, and to reduce their effectiveness. 

Although the focus of Member States was on unilateral measures during the early days of the 
COVID-19 outbreak in Europe, there was a  gradual move towards greater solidarity and 
cooperation as the limits of purely national approaches became clear.  

However, it is  clear that the coordination was too slow and too  ineffective, in  part down to 
information  and  expertise  being  scattered  across  various  inter-institutional  working  groups. 
There is a clear need to further strengthen inter-institutional cooperation, streamline decision-
making and better combine the necessary expertise with sufficient authority to ensure timely 
and  informed  decisions  during  a  crisis.  Designating  the  main  group  or  entity  in  each 
institution to be activated during a crisis and establishing efficient working methods between 
them  could  help  ensure  strong  inter-institutional  coordination.  This  needs  to  be  backed  up 
with clear political support from the Heads of State and Government in the European Council. 

As  a  first  step  to  improve  the  coordination  of  public  health  measures  across  the  EU,  the 
European Commission  made a set  of  proposals on  building a European Health Union in 
November 20208. These proposals  will revamp  the legal  framework for dealing with  cross-
border health threats, and strengthen the crisis response mandates for the European Centre for 
Disease  Prevention  and  Control  (ECDC)  and  the  European  Medicines  Agency  (EMA).Data 

7   COM(2021) 277 final, 2 June 2021 
8   COM/2020/727 final, COM/2020/726 final, COM/2020/725 final, 11 November 2020 

8 

 
                                                           
reporting  and  surveillance  would  be  strengthened.  There  will  be  regular  reporting  on  and 
auditing of EU and national preparedness plans. ECDC’s capacities to support Member States 
in  preparedness  and  response  will  be  enhanced,  and  EMA  will  have  a  stronger  role  in 
monitoring and mitigating shortages. 

Drawing the lessons: 

-  Strengthen coordination and working methods between each institution’s main 

contact group or entity to be activated during a crisis. The European Health Union 
legislative package should be adopted swiftly - before the end of the year 

Lesson Six: Reinforced public-private partnerships and stronger supply chains are needed 
for critical equipment and medicines 

The pandemic has highlighted the need to increase resilience of supply chains important for 
the security of many critical supplies. In the area of health, it created a surge in demand for 
key  products  such  as  medicines,  ventilators,  and  masks.  Global  supply  chains  came  under 
huge  pressure.  Competition  for  products  led  to  shortfalls  and  inequalities,  while  creating  a 
major  obstacle  to  planning  an  effective  response  as  the  virus  took  hold.  As  a  result,  in  the 
early months  of the pandemic, Europe suffered from  shortages of tests  and testing material, 
trained personnel and, in some cases, supplies of laboratory equipment. In addition, the global 
ramp-up  of  vaccine  production  resulted  in  bottlenecks  of  key  production  materials  and 
ingredients.  This  revealed  a  number  of  over  dependencies,  as  well  as  the  fragility  of  global 
production processes, especially in medical goods and pharmaceuticals9.   

The  EU  used  a  series  of  measures  to  address  these  vulnerabilities,  from  joint 
procurements10  of  personal  protective  equipment  to  stockpiles  of  ventilators  and  masks.  A 
‘Clearing  house’  for  medical  equipment  helped  match  supplies  to  national  demand  and  a 
monitoring  system  was  launched  to  anticipate  drug  shortages11.  A  Task  Force  on  industrial 
scale-up was established to resolve supply chain bottlenecks and foster industrial partnerships. 
A temporary  export authorisation mechanism provided transparency on vaccine trade flows, 
while keeping supply chains open and retaining Europe’s role as the world leader in vaccine 
exports. 

Such ad hoc measures increased access for Europeans to essential supplies and made the most 
of  the  EU’s  possibility  to  work  at  scale.  However,  they  also  revealed  the  huge  knowledge 
gap at the start of pandemic in terms of manufacturing capacities and potential Member 
State  demand,  as  well  as  the  depth  of  reliance  on  global  supply  chains.  This  points  to  the 
need  to  be  able  to  monitor  and  shape  market  priorities  and  capacities  for  essential  health 
supplies at every stage, from research and development to production and supply.  

To support this, a new Health Emergency Preparedness  and Response Authority  (HERA) is 
essential to ensure better EU preparedness and response in terms of medical countermeasures 
to serious cross border health threats. This would boost market intelligence and foresight. It 
would  also  strengthen  development,  production  and  distribution  capacities  in  the  EU  – 
integrated  with  national  efforts  and  the  private  sector  –  supported  by  flexible  financing  and 

9   https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/653626/EXPO_STU(2021)653626_EN.pdf 
10   Joint  procurements  included  orders  for  gloves  and  coveralls,  eye  and  respiratory  protection,  ventilators, 

laboratory equipment, medicines used in intensive care units, etc.  

11   https://ec.europa.eu/health/sites/default/files/state/docs/2020_healthatglance_rep_en.pdf 

9 

 
                                                           
procurement tools. By pooling existing capacities to increase scalability in the EU, it would 
ultimately  enable  Member  States  to  access  vaccines  and  therapeutics  earlier  and  at  greater 
scale.  HERA’s  work  would  also  have  a  strong  international  dimension,  working  with  other 
partners and regions. 

At the heart of this  approach, and learning from  the crisis  response, is  the need to  combine 
public  and  private  efforts  to  incentivise  breakthrough  research  and  innovation  in  the  health 
and pharmaceutical sector, making it more resilient. This can, for instance, be done through 
an  Important  Project  of  Common  European  Interest  (IPCEI)12  focused  on  developing  new 
generations  of  pharmaceutical  products  or  breakthrough  manufacturing  technologies.  The 
Commission stands ready to support Member State and industry plans for a possible IPCEI in 
pharmaceuticals and coordinate where necessary.  

The  crisis  also  showed  the  need  to  improve  our  knowledge  of  manufacturing  capabilities 
that  could  be  available  in  a  public  health  crisis.  To  address  this,  the  Commission  will 
develop an interactive mapping platform to support the analysis of the supply chains and any 
possible bottlenecks. A pilot will be launched this year under the EU4Health Programme. The 
EU should use this information to address supply chain vulnerabilities and dependencies, and 
to  boost  manufacturing  capacity  for  key  ingredients  and  materials  for  the  production  of 
vaccines and therapeutics to address the health crises. A call for expression of interest for the 
EU  FAB  facility  will  be  launched,  aiming  to  ensure  that  the  EU  has  enough  “ever-warm” 
capacity to  produce 500–700m  doses vaccine doses  per  year, with  half of these doses to  be 
ready in the first six months of a pandemic.  

Drawing the lesson: 

-  A Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA) should be 

- 

operational by early 2022. 
 Set up a Health Important Project of Common European Interest as soon as 
possible to enable breakthrough innovation in the health and pharmaceutical sector, 
making it more resilient.  

Lesson Seven: A pan-European approach is essential to make clinical research faster, 
broader and more effective 

As the pandemic continues, it is  of vital  importance that Member States do everything they 
can  to  expedite  rapid  approval  of  clinical  trials  of  vaccines  and  therapeutics.  A  fragmented 
and divided approach to clinical trials across Europe since the beginning of the pandemic has 
hampered  efforts  to  track  and  analyse  variants.  This  was  exacerbated  with  the  lack  of 
sequencing and testing capacity in most Member States at various stages of the pandemic.  

With  the  risk  of  variants  posing  the  most  serious  challenge  to  reaching  the  end  of  the 
pandemic in Europe, the need for larger and more coordinated clinical trials has become all 
the more acute in the short to medium term. To boost these capacities and support open data 
sharing  and  cohorts  studies,  the  Commission  supported  a  new  EU-wide  vaccine  and 
therapeutics  trial  network  called  VACCELERATE,  using  Horizon  2020  funding.  The 
permanent  establishment  of  a  large  scale,  flexible,  well-resourced  platform  for  multi-centre 
trials  would  help  establish  a  structured  approach  to  EU  clinical  trials  for  future  crises.  This 

12   See COM 2014/C 188/02, 20 June 2014 

10 

 
                                                           
strengthened support and simplification of clinical trials could, for instance, be an important 
tool in the fight against cancer or other diseases.  

Beyond  clinical  trials,  the  EU  must  continue  to  draw  on  its  powerful  research  base.  Under 
Horizon 2020, the Infectious Diseases Finance Facility was instrumental in providing finance 
to  very  risky,  but  promising  projects  by  companies  developing  vaccines,  treatments  and 
diagnostic  technologies  for  COVID-19.  Its  budget  of  €400  million  included  support  to  the 
vaccine  candidates  of  BioNTech  and CureVac.  However, the structure of the EU’s research 
instruments  meant  that such support  was not  linked to  future procurement by the EU or the 
Member States. In the future, a more joined up and flexible approach under the new HERA 
will help ensure that critical research investments are better linked to procurement. 

Drawing the lesson: 

-  Establish a large scale EU platform for multi-centre clinical trials  

Lesson Eight: Capacity to cope in a pandemic depends on continuous and increased 
investment in health systems 

The pandemic exposed structural weakness in health systems. While different Member States 
faced  different  challenges,  there  were  a  number  of  common  challenges.  These  included  the 
lack  of  surge  capacity,  the  speed  at  which  health  systems  became  fully  operational  and  the 
significant  spillover  impact  it  had  on  tackling  other  diseases  or  providing  other  health 
services.  The  fact  that  health  systems  were  able  to  help  so  many  people  was  down  to  the 
dedication,  sacrifice  and  leadership  of  so  many  health  workers  across  the  EU.  While  this  is 
testament to the professionals involved, it does not hide the fact that health systems in Europe 
need to become more resilient and that healthcare services and public health prevention and 
preparedness efforts need to be better integrated.  

This starts with ensuring that investment in the capacity and effectiveness of health systems, 
including  investment  in  better  working  conditions  and  attractiveness  of  the  health  and  care 
professions,  is  stepped  up.  EU4Health,  the  cohesion  policy  funds,  and  the  Recovery  and 
Resilience Facility all provide key funding opportunities to boost investment in public health 
functions  and  capacities.  The  Commission  welcomes  that  Member  States  have  proposed  a 
wide  range  of  health  reforms  and  investments  in  their  Recovery  and  Resilience  Plans  to 
strengthen  resilience,  quality,  accessibility  and  efficiency.  This  includes  a  focus  on 
investments  contributing  to  the  digital  transition,  in  infrastructure,  skills  and  shifting 
healthcare delivery to telemedicine. To support this, the European Semester process can also 
support  regular  assessment  of  national  health  system  resilience,  and  EU  cohesion  funds  can 
support structural changes and capacity improvements.  

Drawing the lesson: 

- 

 Member States to be supported to strengthen the overall resilience of health care 
systems as part of their recovery and resilience investments. 

Lesson Nine: Pandemic preparedness and response is a global priority for Europe 

The evolution of the pandemic has made clear that only a global response can provide a long-
term  answer  to  the  virus.  Even  as  Europe  reaches  its  vaccination  goals,  and  some  Member 
States start to inoculate children, other parts of the world do not have access to the vaccines 

11 

 
they need. This increases the risk of the pandemic spreading further and of new, potentially 
vaccine-resistant variants developing and circulating in Europe. This is a matter of solidarity 
and  of  self-interest.  These  lessons  apply  to  any  global  pandemic  and  requires  mobilising 
policy, financial and diplomatic instruments.  

From  the  beginning,  the  EU  and  its  Member  States  worked  together.  This  included  joint 
efforts  to  repatriate  EU  citizens  stranded  overseas.  It  also  meant  coordinated  efforts  via  the 
‘Team Europe’ approach to lead international solidarity, and mobilise financial instruments in 
a  flexible  way.  This  approach  enabled  the  EU  to  be  at  the  forefront  of  the  international 
efforts to curb the pandemic.  

The  EU  worked  to  establish  and  support  the  tools  to  share  vaccines  with  lower  and  middle 
income  countries,  the  ACT-Accelerator  and  COVAX.  Team  Europe  remains  one  of  the 
biggest  supporters  of  COVAX,  having  committed  close  to  €3  billion,  including  €1.3  billion 
from  the  EU  budget  in  funding  and  the  EU  has  pledged  to  donate  100  million  doses  of 
vaccines  before  the  end  of  the  year.  It  has  also  offered  humanitarian  assistance  and  helped 
bring medical supplies to people in hard-to-reach areas. 

The EU has also led the way in keeping supply chains and trade open, with around half of the 
vaccine doses produced in the EU being exported. However, other parts of the world chose a 
more narrow and closed approach, with the blocking of exports from a number of countries 
leading  to  serious  delays  in  the  production  of  vaccines  at  the  global  level.  The  EU  should 
respond  be  ready  to  respond  quicker  to  such  actions  but  will  always  remain  determined  to 
cooperate internationally. In this spirit, the EU is advocating multilateral action in the World 
Trade  Organization  to  maintain  open  supply  chains  and  reduce  barriers  to  trade,  as  well  as 
taking a holistic approach to  the problem of equitable vaccine distribution, including on the 
intellectual  property.  Our  neighbourhood  also  requires  particular  attention.  Cross-border 
activity  has  been  particularly  hit  by  uneven  access  to  vaccines  and  medical  equipment. 
Partners  in  our  immediate  neighbourhood  should  be  brought  into  EU  efforts  to  increase 
preparedness and responsiveness, including the future HERA, while also continuing to receive 
support in capacity building, monitoring, training and structural adaptations of infrastructures.  

At the same time, the pandemic showed the frailties of the international system and of global 
cooperation. The global health security system was not able to provide the data and the steer 
with the speed and authority needed for containment to have been a realistic strategy for most 
countries.  Travel  restrictions  were  not  shaped  by  a  pre-existing  common  framework.  This 
reflects the need to strengthen the global health security architecture and the EU is leading 
a  global  effort  to  strengthen  and  reform  the  WHO.  To  guide  current  and  future  action  for 
global health, together with the Italian G20 Presidency, the Commission convened the Global 
Health Summit, where many world leaders signed the Rome Declaration. 

To support these multilateral efforts, there is also a need to do more on a bilateral level with 
partners from the neighbourhood and beyond, including Africa, Asia and Latin America. New 
pandemic  preparedness  partnerships  will  help  improve  exchange  of  information  and  best 
practice,  ensure  common  approaches  to  preparedness  and  response  and  ensure  coordinated 
action  in  a  crisis.  This  will  include  continued  support  to  strengthen  health  systems,  for 
universal health coverage, as well as to boost local production of health products, for instance 
through the Team Europe initiative on manufacturing and access to vaccines, medicines and 
health technologies in Africa. 

Finally,  there  is  also  a  need  to  factor  in  geopolitical  competition  during  pandemics.  The 
response to the pandemic has also often been interpreted, or pitched, as a competition among 

12 

 
rivals or systems. Firm responsiveness has been portrayed by some international players as a 
proof  of  their  strength  and  credibility,  while  disinformation  has  been  used  to  discredit  or 
destabilise regions.  This highlights  the need for  more united messaging  and communication 
on the EU’s global response.  

Drawing the lesson: 

-  Continue to lead the global response to the pandemic as ‘Team Europe’, through 

COVAX, vaccine sharing, and export openness. 

-  Strengthen the global health security architecture, notably by leading on the 

strengthening of the WHO 

-  Develop pandemic preparedness partnerships with key partners 

Lesson Ten: A more coordinated and sophisticated approach to misinformation and 
disinformation should be developed 

Since  the  beginning  of  the  pandemic,  misinformation  and  disinformation  accentuated  an 
already acute communication challenge by spreading dangerous information, fuelling vaccine 
hesitancy  and  contributing  to  general  anxiety  and  polarisation  through  conspiracy  theories. 
This reflects a continued and prolonged questioning and distrust of science and experts.  

The speed with which misinformation and disinformation spread at the start of the pandemic 
shows  the  need  for  a  standby  capacity  able  to  trigger  targeted  action  to  combat  these  risks. 
This needs to engage all key actors including platforms, advertisers and the media, as well as 
taking full account of the need to protect fundamental rights such as freedom of expression. 
These  efforts  should  be  complemented  by  strengthening  and  coordinating  European  crisis 
communication.  

The  pandemic  has  also  illustrated  the  threat  coming  from  foreign  information  manipulation 
and interference campaigns, used to undermine trust in political processes and institutions.13 
These campaigns have also targeted countries in our neighbourhood. 

The Commission came forward in June 2020 with a set of immediate measures to address the 
situation  to  make  the  EU’s  action  more  effective  and  push  platforms  to  take  more 
responsibility14. A longer-term approach on addressing online disinformation and information 
manipulation was then put forward in the European Democracy Action Plan and the Digital 
Services Act15. This needs to be supported by strategic communication capacities to address 
misinformation and disinformation campaigns at local, national and European level, as well as 
in our neighbourhood. These actions need to be fully implemented and operationalised by the 
relevant  actors,  public  and  private  alike.  Full  coordination  between  the  EU  institutions  can 
also harness the EU’s potential to disseminate action against disinformation more effectively.  

Drawing the lesson: 

-  Expand further the tools for better coordination to detect and react to 

disinformation campaigns at EU level. 

13   https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-special-report-update-short-assessment-of-narratives-and-disinformation-around-

the-covid-19-pandemic-update-december-2020-april-2021/?highlight=special 

14   COM (2020) 790 final, 3 December 2020 
15   This has been further emphasised in the recent Guidance for strengthening the Code of Practice on 

Disinformation COM(2021) 262, 26 May 2021 

13 

 
                                                           
4.  CONCLUSION 

The EU response to the COVID-19 pandemic continues in earnest and has been characterised 
by  unprecedented  speed,  scope,  ambition  and  solidarity  –  both  within  the  EU  and  with  our 
international  partners.  Where  it  worked  best  was  where  we  showed  the  strength  of  working 
together for common solutions, whether on vaccines, recovery investments or protecting our 
Single Market. Where it was less effective was where there was a lack of coordination and a 
resort to unilateral measures, often due to new or ad-hoc structures and solutions having to be 
developed.  

Crises have often been catalysts for a stronger European Union in the areas where it is most 
needed.  The  Conference  on  the  Future  of  Europe  will  provide  an  opportunity  to  listen  and 
discuss  the  way  forward  with  citizens.  While  we  cannot  predict  every  detail  of  every  crisis 
that will come our way, we can put in place frameworks to make our response more effective 
and our structures more resilient. This paper responds to the European Council’s request for a 
lessons learnt report and is the next step in ensuring that we not only repair the damage of this 
crisis but prepare for a better future.  

14